"The Reminiscences of Howard R. Tolley"

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The Reminiscences of

HOWARD R. TOLLEY
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CHILDHOOD AND EDUCATION

I was born in Indiana on September 30, 1889 on a farm in Howard County. My father farmed eighty acres which he rented and also taught public school.

When I was five or six years old, the house burned down. As we were in a gas belt, a gas well was drilled on our farm, forty rods from the house. I can remember the derrick with the men working around and finally striking gas. A pipeline was connected up to the house, so we had gas in the stove instead of wood. That was the reason the house burned down!

The church which our family went to was across the road from our farm on the opposite corner from the gas well. It was a Methodist Protestant church and had a circuit preacher occasionally. On Sundays when he wasn't there my grandfather, my mother's father, would take his place and be leader of the class.

My grandfather was a Hoosier and was in the Civil War. He was with General William Tecumseh Sherman on his march to the sea, to Atlanta. When he became sick and was left behind, a Georgia family nursed him back to health. By that time the war was over and he came back to his home in Indiana, where he married my grandmother and then started West to make his fortune. He went to Bloomington, Illinois, in a covered wagon and stayed for two years. Droughts and grasshoppers came. My mother, the first of the family, was born there, and they gave up and came
back home to Indiana in a covered wagon. They homesteaded an eighty-acre farm in Indiana where they lived when we used to go to Grandpa's for Sunday dinner after church.

My grandfather told me a little about the Civil War. He was a draftee. He talked about riding in boxcars and being left behind. My mother was his first child, and he named her Mollie because the name of the woman in whose home he was left as an invalid soldier was Mollie, down in Georgia. I don't think he was in a great deal of stirred-up fighting and was most likely in Sherman's army only in the latter days.

He may have homesteaded their farm, or may have bought the homestead and the rights from somebody else who had homesteaded it. He told of clearing the land of timber and draining it, and of my mother and her brother being large enough to help in the clearing, digging ditches and laying wooden logs and semi-logs in underground drains in place of the tile that they used later. They raised corn, oats, wheat, cows and pigs.

The Sunday dinner was quite an event. I looked forward to going to Grandpa's which we didn't to a good many places. Grandpa and Grandma liked their grandchildren and treated us fine. They always had something good to eat and always had something interesting to tell us. My grandmother's mother lived with them at the time. My mother's branch of the family was Pennsylvania Dutch. Grindle was the name. They had migrated to central Ohio and finally came on to Indiana back in the 1850's and Indiana was absolute frontier. My great-grandmother told about Ohio and the trip from Ohio to Indiana in a covered wagon.
Those were things we children liked to hear about.

They were very religious people, and were strict with their children. I never heard my grandfather swear. He didn’t smoke, and he didn’t drink. That fact was rather typical of the community in which we lived and the atmosphere in which I was brought up.

My brother Adrian was born four or five years after I was. There was another broker between us who died of scarlet fever when I was about ten years old. One sister was born two years before me and one sister eight or ten years after me. My two sisters stayed out in Indiana as adults. My father died in 1929. My mother and my older sister continued to live in Marion, the county seat, where they moved between 1905 and 1910 when he was still active and had become general agent for a life insurance company.

I was five years old when I started to school and I went to the country school two miles away where my father was the school teacher. Many early recollections are of walking to school with her, carrying our lunch in the same dinner bucket, worrying about how we were going to be late, and she trying to have her younger brother hurry and he not wanting to hurry.

Country school teachers in those days were janitors as well as teachers, and my father had to get up very early to build a fire in the school house to get it warm for the kids to come. Some time later my sister and I started out to walk. One day along came a neighbor in a horse and buggy and asked us to ride with him. I refused to ride. My sister got in alone
and left me to walk along by myself. After a while, when I
was within half a mile of the school house, here came a couple
of boys hurrying toward me. Where had I been? I was getting
along all right but my sister had shown up in time for school
to begin and the little boy wasn't there. So my father sent two
of the big boys down the road to find out what the trouble was.

When school was out I used to play and also worked.
Father and Mother felt that children should do something useful.
Chores included gathering up the eggs and driving the pigs out,
but there was also time to fool around in the house getting into
the sugar bowl and sugar bucket.

In this period my youngest brother was still a baby.
When we got father long, he and I had a lot to do with each
other. There was a period when we lived in Converse, Indiana.
We were going to school there. My father still had the twenty
acre farm out south which was rented to someone living on a
larger farm. But there were quite a few things to do out on
that farm, and my younger brother and I spent quite a bit of
time there. He would hitch up the horse and buggy and drive
three miles south to the farm for the day or the half-day to
pick fruit, fix fences and do other odd jobs.

I was about seven years old when the brother between
us died. We had the scalet fever. My older sister was very
ill. My younger brother became very critically ill, and my
father drove to town to get the doctor. The doctor brought
another doctor and they had what they called a conference. But
he died the next day. Because we all had scarlet fever, we
couldn't go to the funeral. I don't think there was a church funeral because there was a general epidemic of scarlet fever around. People wouldn't come, and Father and Mother wouldn't let them in the house if they did. That was the biggest tragedy that ever hit the family.

When the house had burned down the year before, everybody escaped, and the loss to the family was not too great. It was a rented house. When the fire broke out in the gas stove in the kitchen, my mother came running into the other part of the house where I was with my father.

"Elmer, the house is on fire!"

She herded all of us youngsters out and over toward the barn. Then she ran back and began to ring the dinner bell. Pretty soon here came the neighbors. A good part of the furniture and things in the house were rescued. After that fire we moved over to Grandpa's, two miles away. We stayed quite a little while, until my father bought this twenty acre place only two miles farther on the way.

When we moved into the house on the twenty acre farm, neighbors, friends, relatives all came up, everyone of them bringing something - a piece of furniture, a quilt, curtains for the windows.

Even as an adult, I have liked to talk to my mother about these days in Indiana. The neighborly spirit was general throughout that part of the country in the period after the Civil War before 1900 when it was still semi-frontier and the old frontier customs and habits still persisted.
The railroads had come. The Clover Leaf Railroad went from Toledo to St. Louis. Later it was called the Nickel Plate. It went across country about a half to three-quarters of a mile south of our house. Sometimes you could see a brakeman walking up on top and going along to set the hand brakes for the stop at the next town. The railroad went way yonder to places where my father and mother and grandfather had never been. That made a real impression.

On a trip in the 1950's I flew to California. Later I wrote my mother telling her I left Los Angeles at 8:45 in the morning and was home in Alexandria, Virginia at 10 o'clock that evening. That struck a chord in her memory and in a return letter she replied in effect, "Yes, quite different from the covered wagon days when I was a girl and Grandma and Grandpa Grindle brought me from Bloomington, Illinois, to Howard County, Indiana." It took a month to make that trip, and her father nearly always was able to find a house which her mother and she used to live in and spend the night. Her father would spend the night in the barn or in the wagon with his horses.

After we moved to the twenty acre farm we went to another school just two miles away. The school houses were single-room school houses, two miles apart. The school district was two miles square or four square miles, and we moved across the school district line and went to another school. I went to school there with my sister and brother. To graduation from common school, as it was called - the first eight grades, we had to take a written examination. Then there was a commencement
which the whole township attended. Everyone had on a new suit of clothes. A picture was taken in the Concord Picture Gallery there in Converse, Indiana, of me in my new suit of clothes with my books and it remained one of the prized old pictures around my parent's home.

Everybody had to recite a piece. My piece was a poem about the Civil War. I forget who wrote that poem. "On the Banks of the Rappahannock" was the name of it, and it had to do with the Civil War on the banks of the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, the Confederates on one side and the Union soldiers on the other, talking back and forth across the river to each other.

I didn't have my father as a teacher all the way through. My aunt was one of my teachers - my mother's sister. I only had two years with my father as my own teacher (I think that's right) and my aunt one year or two years. Other teachers were young men and women who lived in the neighborhood.

I went to high school at Converse, a little town with something like 1000 people. At that time going to high school was not as common as today, and we country youngsters had to go to town to high school. The high school, had a total of thirty or forty students from the little town and surrounding country.

The curriculum was a standard one. It included Latin, and also studied German for a year. Other courses included geometry, trigonometry, civil government, history, both ancient and medieval.
My graduation class had five people. I was fifteen years old and wore my first long pants suit to commencement.

During those years, I was beginning to learn to work outside of school. I used to get a job with a farmer to pick up potatoes at potato harvesting time or to help get in corn at corn harvesting time or to carry water to the threshing crew at threshing time. We didn't think it was hard work then, and we liked the excitement. The pay was fifty cents a day.

I used to get awfully tired from the labor that was involved. Now it seems terribly slow how much time it took to plow a field with a two horse team and a twelve inch walking plow, but tractors and all the later farm machinery had not been invented.

The first automobile I ever saw was very exciting. I was plowing with this two horse walking plow and was twelve or thirteen years old. This strange contraption went along the road very much faster than any vehicle I had ever seen, and I thought it was a runaway gypsy wagon. There used to be gypsies who came through the country, and they all traveled in covered wagons. I thought the horses had run away with a gypsy wagon, but when it passed out of sight I could see there were no horses there. My father almost fell out of the loft of the barn to get a better look at it.

This was the first automobile that had ever been built by Elwood Haynes of Kokomo, Indiana. The Hayes Automobile Company in later years was a leader in the making of the automobile industry. Hayes-Apperson automobiles were famous
in the early days.

The road by our home was a one-way gravel road. There were no paved roads in those days. Speaking of automobiles, I remember how the horses used to get scared of automobiles. After there got to be a few more automobiles, my mother was afraid to drive the horse and buggy along the road because an automobile might come along and make the horses run away with her.

In high school I liked mathematics better than any other subject. We used to have ciphering matches in school. On a Friday afternoon the students and others would come together in one of the school rooms for a ciphering match. Two by two we'd get up to the blackboard, and the teacher would read off two numbers to be multiplied together. Then we would compete to see who would get the right answer first. Or he might read off a string of numbers to be added. The one who didn't get the right answer first was ciphered down, and then somebody else would come up. I was the winner in a good many local ciphering matches.

Marion Normal College, is a private institution at Marion, Indiana in the county adjoining Converse and fifteen miles away from where I lived at that time. I was following in both my father's and mother's footsteps in preparing to be a school teacher. Both my father and mother had attended Marion Normal College. My mother was a school teacher before she was married, and my father was a school teacher, and they met each other when they were teaching school in the same township
there where I was born.

My ambition, aided and abetted by both my father and my mother, was to go to college at a university - more than a normal college. Maybe you would teach school for two or three years and save enough money to go for a whole year. My parents sent me to Marion Normal College for one year, because I had no money at all, but after that, when I went to the university, they paid half and I paid half. With the other children around and the family income as it was, it would have been a tough squeeze for the folks to give me enough money to go four years to the university.

At Marion Normal College, I took the scientific course and some teacher training on the side. I hoped at the time this was a transitional period. The biggest mark that it left on me was that I found my wife there. I lived in a rooming house and boarded at a boarding club.

I met my wife in 1906 and knew pretty much that she was the girl. The following year I taught school in a little country school house back of Converse. Her parents then had moved to Marion, which is fifteen miles away. I went to Marion every weekend and in between if I could. By the time that year was over, I definitely knew that was the girl.

I taught high school for six years, but during that time I was also attending the University of Indiana. It didn't make my college life different from the standard. Indiana University had perhaps 1000 students, and there were 100 or 200 of them who were doing what I was doing - something on the
side and coming to the university for one term this year and one term the next year and maybe a whole year at the end. I never felt really part of the university group until the last year. I'd saved some money, and my father had helped me out.

I majored in mathematics at the university and became a teacher of mathematics in high school after graduating. Earlier I had given serious consideration to taking up medicine, having an urge to help people rather than just being a mathematician. But it would have cost too much and taken too long to become a doctor.

I forget the language and the English and English composition but had a real liking for the sciences - physics, chemistry, and botany. But history, philosophy, and ethics, which I didn't have very much of, were the things that were exciting other than mathematics.

I've wondered whether my years in college were the years of great awakening that they so often are. I've seen my own boys wake up. I can't remember any great time like this. Maybe I did more waking up teaching country school before ever going down to the university. To teach school after normal college, you had to take an examination to get a teacher's license. After passing the examination, there was the question of whether I was old enough to teach school. Although I was only seventeen years old, I obtained a position at Haifley School, three miles west of Converse in Jackson Township, Miami County.

It was a little red school house with one room and
eleven pupils, first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth grades. I lived at home and walked or drove or rode a bicycle out to school every morning and back home every evening.

In some ways it was a lonesome year. Maybe that's why it was an awakening year. There were no close friends or pals left around Converse. Walking back and forth to the school, I wondered about what makes the world go around and how the universe is built, wondering what the people in the houses along the road were doing and what their aspirations were, and wondering how these children were going to grow up and what they would be like when they grew up.

That year I got interested in church and joined the old Methodist Episcopal Church in Marion which I had attended as a child. They had protracted meetings, which is another word for revival. I stood up, confessed my sins, said that I believed in God, and joined the church. Maybe it was in that year that I woke up as much as I ever did at any one time.

Whatever led me to my life in Agriculture was still subconscious through those years. Not until I had come to the Department of Agriculture, and begun to observe and wonder about agricultural problems and the human side of agriculture that I came to have a conscious interest in the welfare of rural people that I've carried ever since. Yet, I'm sure this interest comes in part from the felling of poverty when I was growing up. My father and mother would never admit that they were poor, and they weren't according to the standards of those days among the people they lived with.
Being a mathematician became sterile after a while. One of the people that I admired was William Jennings Bryan. He came to Kokomo to make a campaign speech. My father and mother drove fifteen miles to hear him, and I was the one member of the family that they took along. My father held me on his shoulder so I could see him. He was a hero of mine for many years, but that was boyhood. There was nothing reasoned about that.

In high school days I don't remember having any great heroes. I admired the president of the normal college, C. W. Boucher. Maybe there's a little thread there. His son, who was my age and was in the Marion Normal College at the time I was, later was chancellor of the University of Nebraska.

At Converse I liked the preacher in the church, the banker and the owner of the store.

William Lowe Bryan was president of Indiana University for a long period, and I admired him. At the university I also liked my math professors partly because they could manipulate equations more rapidly than I could.

In high school I had played on the football team. At Marion Normal College they didn't have any organized sports, but I played basketball and some baseball.

At the university, I never did get into sports, but did play the clarinet in the university band. The interest in the clarinet goes back to the girl who became my wife. Her family is a musical family - apparently something inherited. I don't know whether geneticists would agree with this or not. She played the violin and sang, her sister played the piano,
and her brother played clarinet.

Before becoming acquainted with her family I had taken music lessons at home on the organ. Part of the education in those days was to take music lessons. We didn't have a piano - we had a pump organ. My principal interest in the organ music was its relation to mathematics and physics. I never could carry a tune and never did know when I was out of tune.

At the university, I joined the band and played second clarinet. The first time I ever went to Chicago was when Indiana University went to Chicago to play football with Chicago University.

My earliest political recollection is that of being a Democrat which had been the tradition in my family. My father never was active in politics, but around 1900 he became a Republican. My own political philosophy was not settled in college days. Albert J. Beveridge was United States Senator from Indiana. At the university at some function, he impressed me. He was a Republican.

My father admired Senator James E. Watson at this time. But I did not. He was also a Republican.

Looking back, I believe it was progressivism (a cliche) versus stand-patism between Beveridge and Watson. Beveridge was forward looking, and warming up to the common people. That was what appealed to me. Jim Watson was a status quo boy.

The admiration I experienced at Converse for the banker and the storekeeper raised. It was really envy rather than admiration. All this passed out of my life when I came to
Washington and got married.

Another man I admired was James Whitcomb Riley, the Hoosier poet. He was living then and was at the height of his career with new poems being published. I admired those poems, and I loved to hear people stand up and say those poems. I knew a good many of them at one time – knew them myself and could repeat them. They were about country life in Indiana – something I knew – and made me feel that the country life in Indiana was good – better than I thought it was. While not washing to escape from the environment physically, I never had any ambition to be a farmer. My ambition to be something else in the city may have come from the attitude of my father and mother and my brother. They thought that being a school teacher, a banker, a lawyer, a merchant, a life insurance agent, which my father became in this period, was better than being a farmer. A lot of the local rural people around there had that feeling about life at that time and about their children. Perhaps this was a manifestation of the movement away from the farm that is still occurring.

Never in those days or any time since did I have the feeling noticed in other parts of the world where rural and village people want to get an education so they can absolutely turn their backs on the rural scene. There was never any conscious revulsion against farm and rural living even in that period when I was just subconsciously moving away from it.

After graduating in 1910 with a BA in mathematics, I went and got myself a job as a school teacher in Michigan City,
Indiana, teaching mathematics. I joined a teachers' agency, which is really an employment agency for teachers, went directly to Michigan City, Indiana, and taught algebra, geometry, and trigonometry in high school for a year and a half.

Teaching youngsters, most of whom weren't very much interested in mathematics, became a chore. Yet I liked the youngsters and enjoyed feeling that I influenced them to do the right things. I was faculty adviser on athletics and various social things.

Because of debts after finishing at the university, I couldn't get married. So that was put off a year and a half. At the end of the first year of eaching high school, there was soul-searching about what to do the rest of my life. Continuing to be a math teacher in high school wasn't going to be satisfying at all.

The financial side of it was secondary. One a boyhood ambition had been to earn $100 a month, and the Michigan City high school job paid $95 a month. My first Washington job paid $100 a month and fulfilled a boyhood ambition.

After my first year, during vacation I went back home to Marion and came down with something like typhoid fever. While not sick in bed, I was just no good all summer long, but was over it in time to teach school again. By the time the summer was over, high school teaching business wouldn't do. I had to do something else.

Here's the way I got started to Washington. My younger brother and I were close whenever together. He had gone
Marion Normal College and taken a business course to be a bookkeeper or an accountant. He'd taken the civil service examination and obtained a job in Washington, D. C., in the Post Office Department as clerk at perhaps $900 a year. About that time I found there was a civil service examination for a computer in the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey. This was the fall of 1911, when I was back at Michigan City. The examination was given at the Post Office in Valparaiso, Indiana. It was just an examination in mathematics. A month or six weeks later, a letter arrived from the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey asking if I would be interested in a job at $1200 a year. In the meantime my brother had come to Washington, and decided I was interested.

The earliest date I could get out of my high school contract was the beginning of the Christmas vacation. I went down to Marion and saw my lady, and she agreed to get married the following day. Then I got on the train to come to Washington on the first day of January, 1912.

Looking back, I remember more about my feelings after I had been here a few days than about before coming to Washington. I felt, "Maybe I can get to have some influence on things that happen around Washington if I stay around here." Too, there was excitement about going far away.

At times before coming to Washington, I had speculated going west. Going west was still in the atmosphere, even though frontier wasn't there any more.
I found that my job in Washington with the Coast and Geodetic Survey consisted of sitting in an office up here on Capitol Hill, where the House of Representatives office building is, mostly running a computing machine, computing such things as the latitude and longitude of particular triangulation stations in different parts of the United States and computing the altitude of different hilltops and mountaintops - taking the observations and readings of different geodetic surveyors throughout the United States and computing them, or adjusting them, as we called it, to get the geographic positions of a great number of points in the United States. They'd run all the way from bench marks on the mountaintops to church spires and tall buildings in the cities. This was for Coast and Geodetic Survey maps and other publications that just have geographic positions of a lot of things in. The coast part of the job is surveying the coast of the United States, and a lot of it was work preparatory to making precise maps of coastlines, and there was some depth of the ocean in it and so on. But computing was a good name for it.

I went home, and my wife and I were married in a
little town back in Indiana on May 3, 1912. We came out
here immediately, and honeymooned in Washington, D.C. I
remember we got on the train the night we were married
and were in Washington the next day. We honeymooned around
Washington by sightseeing and such things for a week or
so, and then I went back to computing. We first lived at
610 I Street NE. Financially, we figured that we would
pay not more than $30 a month rent and not more than
$1000 for household furniture. We went in debt for
practically all the household furniture. A good part of
it was bought out in Indiana from my wife's uncle, who
was a very small, small town furniture dealer, and was
shipped out here. 610 I Street NE, Washington, D.C., is
a very plebian part of Washington.

We didn't live there very long, though. We moved
to an apartment house at 131 A Street NE up on Capitol
Hill that has since been demolished. The Supreme Court
Building now stands there. We lived there for eight or
nine years. That was just one block from where I worked,
and I used to go home to lunch. That's one reason we
moved up there. A. L. Baldwin, the senior computer of
the Coast and Geodetic Survey, who had some influence on
my life at that time, lived next door to this apartment
house. I only had a half an hour for lunch and I had to sign in and sign out. Living there, I could get home, eat my lunch, and get back in half an hour.

My first son, Edwin Grant, was born April 27, 1915. He was born at Sibley Hospital.

Baldwin was my boss during that three year period. He took a lot of interest in this youngsters from the sticks of Indiana. When I married and came back here, he and Mrs. Baldwin took a lot of interest in us. They helped us along with advice and helped us get acquainted with people and so on. He was sort of a restless soul, and it was in that period that I got pretty restless. I was more restless in that three year period, I think, than I ever had been before. I don't know whether I can say since or not. My wife says I get more restless as I grow older.

I hadn't been there very long until I began to feel that this wasn't the place for me either. On the surface, as I look back I felt, "What is there to this? I come over to the office every morning at nine o'clock and I work on computing these things, adding, multiplying, running these computing machines, deciphering what's in the books of these surveyors that they've turned over to
us, and finally coming out with a map or a big publication of some kind or another. That isn't making the world better or influencing anything. I just go back and forth and draw this $50 twice a month. In effect it's all spent before I draw it, and I have a pretty hard time keeping good clothes on my back and my wife has a harder time keeping good clothes on her back than I do on mine."

The finance end had something to do with it. I didn't know how I was ever going to get good finances. I never had the urge that so many people do and that some of my own sons do now to get out and make money—that is, to go into business and be an entrepreneur. I never had that urge. There just wasn't anything much to this job. I could see the older fellows there who had been there ten years or twenty years had just settled down to come back and forth, sign the book, and wait for pay day. I had to have something better than that.

I remember two things I looked forward to and prospected on in that three year period that didn't eventuate. One of them was going to Manila to compute for the Coast and Geodetic Survey in their office in Manila, P.I., where they were busily engaged in making coast and geodetic maps of the Philippine Islands. I
remember that didn't work out, and I forget just why now. That's the job I wanted to get.

Then along comes the Alaskan railway, which was going to be built. I thought I could get a job in Alaska. They were going to survey the right of way and do all these things. That didn't work out. Neither one of these got very imminent. Probably in both cases they didn't want a desk mathematician - they wanted a surveyor.

Then I remember looking around at the Washington public schools. Here comes the school teaching business again. I remember going and seeing the superintendent of schools - I forget his name now - to see about getting a job. This was part time incoming producing. They were having night schools, and I thought I could get a job teaching school three nights a week or five nights a week for an hour to supplement my income. That didn't work out either. I think I turned my back on that one - I don't remember.

The first year I was there I got married and learned Washington and so on. That was just a honeymoon year, but after that I began to get restless and wanted to do something else. I don't remember I had much idea what. I still wasn't thinking about agriculture. I
still remember feeling that just being a computer in the Coast and Geodetic Survey was completely futile as far as the world was concerned - it wasn't helping the world any. I seemed subconsciously to be wanting to do something maybe just for my own aggrandizement - I don't know - but subconsciously wanted to do something to make the world a better place to live in. That was pretty much subconscious in those days. Then after a while the baby was coming, and that's a financial responsibility. Living on $100 a month wasn't easy even in those days.

Another point, after we got set up in housekeeping, my brother, who was here before we came, came to live with us. For both of us that was financial, you see. He paid us something for board and room, but he didn't pay us as much as if he'd lived someplace else.

I guess maybe financial pressure or rather the desire for a better financial position - just a little better - that was pushing me along in those days. A. L. Baldwin, who, as I say, was my boss and my friend, was about the only man I ever talked to much about this. He was a very understanding and very sympathetic man, because he had a family of five children who were all in their most
expensive stage. The oldest was in high school and the youngest was maybe in kindergarten. I found him agreeing with me that; yes, maybe this wasn't the place for me and that maybe I ought to get something else. At that time I thought about mortgaging my future and going back to college and maybe studying medicine or maybe getting a doctor's degree in mathematics and being a college professor.

But one day A. L. Baldwin came to me and said that the night before he had been down here in Washington someplace to a meeting of the Washington Philosophical Society, and a man named W. J. Spillman of the Department of Agriculture had asked him if he knew anybody with a mathematical background and mathematical ability who might be willing to come over to the Department of Agriculture and work with him on some mathematical problems that were related to genetics – Mendelianism – and on some that were related to the capacity of farm silos – those two primarily.

I thought that might be worthwhile for me to look at, so Baldwin calls up his friend Spillman and makes a date for me. I go to see him, he offers me a job, and I take it. W. J. Spillman, I guess, had as much influence
on my life as anybody. H. C. Taylor later had influence on my life, and John D. Black of Harvard. That was really the turning point.

I said I was just a computer at the Coast and Geodetic Survey, but there were some real mathematical problems involved in what we called adjustment of observations. A surveyor in attempting to find the exact latitude and longitude of a mountaintop or any other point makes a considerable number of observations of that particular point and doesn't just shoot it once. We'll shoot it ten times or twelve times or maybe fifteen times. The latitude and longitude resulting from one shot is not exactly the latitude and longitude resulting from another shot. There are errors of observation.

Part of our job as computers and really the only part that required any knowledge of real mathematics was this adjusting the observations. The question is: What is the most probable position of this point in the light of these fifteen or ten or twenty observations that don't quite match. The theory had already been developed before I came to the Coast and Geodetic Survey — the theory of least squares. That theory of least squares that can be found in any book on mathematics or statistics, says that
the most probable true position is the position which makes the sum of the squares of the errors a minimum. It all grows out of the mathematical theory of probability. I knew all that.

One thing that I really enjoyed and that gave me some mental satisfaction out of my years in the Coast and Geodetic Survey was working with some of the people around there on adjusting observations and on developing both more precise and less laborious methods of computation. It was my knowledge of least squares and the adjustment of observations that W. J. Spillman was interested in and that was my start in the field of statistics, to which I devoted a lot of time in my early days in the Department of Agriculture.

I got $1500 a year at the Department of Agriculture.
As I remember it, it was the fifteenth of April, 1915, when I checked into the Office of Farm Management, of which W. J. Spillman was the chief. The Office of Farm Management had just been created a year or so before. There had been some work in farm management carried on under Spillman's direction in the old Bureau of Plant Industry. Spillman had been a plant scientist. I believe he called himself an agrostologist, a term that's not current any more. He had been on the faculty of Washington State College before he came to the Department, and while there he had become interested in breeding better varieties of wheat adapted to the soil and climate of eastern Washington and Oregon. In his breeding experiments he'd been crossing varieties and doing all of the things that the plant breeders now do, and he was almost the co-discoverer of Gregor Mendel's laws of inheritance. In that work he'd gotten involved in mathematics. He was quite a mathematician himself, but he'd come to the conclusion that he needed somebody to help him. That's the real reason I went to work for the Office of Farm Management.
He had a lot of mathematical problems, on many of which I was not able to help him very much, in connection with his plant breeding experiments and others which had to do with the work of the Office of Farm Management. I remember the first job he wanted me to do was to figure out a formula for determining the capacity of silos. The silo was sort of a new invention at that time, and ensilage was coming into common use for feeding beef cattle and dairy cows. In their investigations they needed to know how many tons of silage a circular silo of a certain height and diameter would hold. It was much more than just finding the cubic content, because silage tended to pack and weigh more per cubic foot down at the bottom than it did up at the top of the silo. I worked quite a lot for him on that.

At that time in Spillman's life this mathematical work was sort of an avocation with him. The new science of farm management, which was the forerunner of what is now known as agricultural economics, was just coming into being, and Spillman was one of the makers of that science.

Two other people who were helping develop this science of farm management and agricultural economics
were H. C. Taylor of the University of Wisconsin, who was Spillman's successor in the Department of Agriculture, and Professor George F. Warren of Cornell University. They were the triumvirate in the early days. They were very good friends, and at the same time there were lots of disagreements on the theoretical and professional side. I had never heard of any of them until I went to work for Spillman, but I was acquainted with them for many years thereafter. Spillman was here in the Department of Agriculture, Taylor was at Wisconsin, and Warren was at Cornell, and each one of them was carrying on research in this general field. Spillman, in the Office of Farm Management in the Department of Agriculture, was cooperating both with Wisconsin and Cornell on particular problems.

Each of them had his own ideas as to how things were to be done or what was worthwhile studying. So they and all the rest of us would have lots of discussions and arguments about this new science of farm management - agricultural economics - what the United States Department of Agriculture and the land grant colleges might do to help farmers decide what combinations of enterprises to have on their farms and how to manage each enterprise,
and in general what farmers could do in the way of organizing their farm businesses to increase their incomes.

This was the first time in the history of the Department of Agriculture that farmers' incomes, the income of farm people, had been a subject of study and investigation. In 1914, the nationwide system of agricultural extension work had been established through the passage of the Smith-Lever Act, and that gave a big impetus to farm management work and farm management investigations. Spillman, of course, had been close to the development of this extension work, was always interested in it, and had quite a lot to do with getting farm management and agricultural economics to be part of the agricultural extension work of the Department and the colleges.

Those who didn't like these three men thought they were radicals in the work they were doing - not in the political sense - and those of us who were in their army thought they were the leaders of the new army. In those days I wasn't too close to administrative politics except at the very low level, but there was a very general feeling that in Department of Agriculture circles Spillman was discriminated against. Others in the Department didn't want to listen to him. The climax finally came,
jumping ahead a little, after the war came on and prices began to go up and the question of what should be the right price of wheat and other agricultural commodities got hot. Spillman and the then Secretary of Agriculture, David F. Houston — I forget the details — came to a complete disagreement.

I didn’t begin to feel this discrimination against Spillman until along toward the wartime period — two or three years after I’d joined up. I can’t say that I was conscious of the Department forming into pro- and anti-cliques at the time I entered the Department, or a little time afterward, although later it became almost open warfare. I know many of Spillman’s old colleagues in the Bureau of Plant Industry, — the agricultural technologists — arrayed themselves against him. I had the feeling after I had been there a year or two that people in the Bureau of Plant Industry, especially his old colleagues, were attempting to say that this farm management, economics of agriculture, and so on wasn’t scientific, wasn’t worth-while, and was something that didn’t have very much place in the Department of Agriculture.

There are two little things that I recall of my first meeting with Spillman. The first time I called on
him to apply for this job he couldn’t talk above a whisper. There was something the matter with his voice. And he chewed tobacco like everything. He had a cuspidor beside his desk which he was using all the time that he was talking to me in a whisper about mathematics, what he was interested in, and so on.

He was to me one of the most inspiring men that I ever met. He had wide interests. We would have inspiring talk about agriculture, farming, the well being of farmers, and how the government agencies, the Department of Agriculture, and the land grant colleges could help to make farming a better way of living and help farmers to get better incomes.

Then he had a lot of inventions that we used to talk a lot about, too. I mentioned his interest in mathematics. I remember a little later he made a perpetual calendar — I forget just what date that was. He gave me one, and it’s on my desk now. If you can figure it out, it’s very easy to do. It has just seven sheets of paper with twelve months on each sheet. Change the sheets at the end of the year, and you’ve got a perpetual calendar. It’s been there on my desk for I don’t know how long. Of course, you’ve got to change it twice in a leap year, but
he had that all worked out, too.

Another time he got interested in a law of
gravitation - a restatement of the laws of gravitation.
I remember I was in on that quite a little bit, but I
never followed that through. I got lost, and I got the
idea that "Prof," as we called him, was chasing something
that wasn't going to be productive there.

He was an intense believer or disbeliever, and he
could become quite tense in arguing and rationalizing
and so on about almost anything he was interested in. We
used to tend to say that Prof wasn't a good administrator -
some of the folks would say that - which I have come to
the conclusion later in my life that that's just another
way of saying that he would become interested in some-
thing and work hard on it. Many of the people in his
organization would go ahead with the work they were on
without a great deal of attention from the boss for long
periods of time. That would get rationalized into the
workers' minds that Prof was not a good administrator.
He had some people around him that turned out to be good
people.

When I had been in the Office of Farm Management
a few months, I was assigned to help analyze data on the
cost of producing baby beef. Baby beef was a new enterprise at that time. Spillman had sent some people out into the corn belt, where farmers were fattening these yearling calves to be baby beaves to get information on how much feed was required, the different kinds, how much labor and so on - the cost of producing baby beef. They had records from several hundred baby beef producers there in great detail, and the problem was how to summarize and analyze the information which they had.

So for a period I sat there along with other young men and women in the office, multiplying and dividing, and adding and subtracting, coming out with the cost of producing baby beef on each one of these farms as three cents a pound, four cents a pound, or six cents a pound or whatever. Right there I began to have a lot of questions in my mind as to, on one side, the validity of the data that had been collected from these farms, but more importantly, on the other side, how it could be put together and analyzed to bring out something that would be meaningful and helpful to other farmers. I found that in the Office of Farm Management or really in the entire Department of Agriculture very few people other than Prof Spillman himself had any comprehension of statistical
theory and method and its application to all the data they were collecting so avidly.

I didn't know anything about statistics as such either but the mathematical theory of probability and the theory of least squares, I found by prospecting around, had been developed, mainly in England, into a theory and method of correlation - the relationship between variables. Over a period of several months there I talked repeatedly to Prof, and I got out all the books on statistics and the theory of probability that I could find in the library. After some months between us we came up with what was then to the Department of Agriculture an entirely new method of measuring the correlation between variables. The first article that was ever published under my name was under some title such as, "The Application of the Theory of Multiple Correlation to the Fattening of Baby Beef." There again Prof Spillman was very enthusiastic about it, but a good many of the other people in the Department of Agriculture thought it was a bunch of foolishness, you see. It was another example of Prof Spillman's wide interest.

Not very long after that I got interested in weather data and its influence on agricultural production. There
was being started then under the name Agricultural Geography an effort to get together information—it became pretty much mapped information—on rainfall, on frost dates, and on cumulated temperatures, and other climatic factors that affect crop production.

I remember two people who were working on Agricultural Geography. One of them was O. E. Baker, who was there in the Department of Agriculture for a long time and then finally went to the University of Maryland as a professor of geography. He died just a few years ago. Another was E. A. Goldenweiser, who later became head of the research department of the Federal Reserve Board and is now up at the School of Advanced Studies at Princeton.

There were a number of other people there, and I remember specifically working with that group on one thing, the length of growing season. Here we got into statistics and probabilities and so on. We computed the length of time between the last killing frost in the spring and the first killing frost in the autumn in any one year, and then the probabilities of particular lengths of the growing season in any one year to provide a basis of forecasting.

At that time I knew that someone out in Des Moines,
Iowa, was working on similar studies, but I didn't know young Henry A. Wallace until his father became Secretary of Agriculture and he came to Washington. I never knew his father personally and I never knew Uncle Henry. Uncle Henry Wallace was one of the famous old men. I never knew Tama Jim Wilson. He was before my time.

I really didn't play any part in the agricultural legislation that was promoted until after the end of World War I. I began to get into it some then. I more or less stayed with my own work.

Along some time later - I don't remember just when - I got into the use of farm machinery. That would have been about the time the war was breaking out. I moved into that as a statistician and mathematician to help analyze data and so forth. I worked with a very energetic young man by the name of A. P. Yerkes, who finished out his career with the International Harvester Company. He left the Department some time in World War I days.

Here was Prof Spillman's vision again - a new source of farm power - the farm tractor was coming. But back before that Prof Spillman was interested in the kinds of tillage, seeding machinery, and harvesting machinery
that would save labor on the farm and still wouldn’t cost more than it was worth. He found out how many acres per day one man with a single-bottom plow could plow or how many acres per day could be seeded with an eight foot drill, and so on down the whole list of farm operations. Then the tractors began to come. They still weren’t practical, but he in his vision saw that here was something that might have a place in American agriculture, and he inaugurated studies of farm tractors.

I was in that for a good many years, first, as I say, as sort of clerk or statistician, but as time went on I found myself out in the corn belt and the wheat belt, where tractors were coming into use, getting information from farmers about how much it cost to use tractors. I found myself out in the country, visiting farmers, sent out there by the Department. I was sometimes alone, sometimes as a member of a party, and sometimes as a leader of a party. That continued until after the war.

During the war years, as I remember, work having to do directly with the impact of the war on American agriculture didn’t hit me very much. I wasn’t involved in a great deal of it. I was not drafted, and I did not serve in the armed forces. I remember very serious
thinking and talking about whether I should enlist. I was married and we had this youngster, so I decided to wait to be drafted. I was never drafted.

It was during the war period, as I look back, that I got my eyes opened really on the problems of American agriculture, the need for a better life on American farms, more stable incomes, and so on. The war, of course, increased the demand for farm products, hence the price, and hence the net incomes of farmers. I think it was back about that time that we all began to worry about surpluses which might occur later when the war was over and the shipment of wheat and other farm products across the ocean stopped, and about what was going to happen to prices and hence the incomes of farmers. I know Prof Spillman was worrying about that during the war, and that was one of the things that others in the Department of Agriculture didn't agree with him on, including the then Secretary of Agriculture.

The change in agriculture that I noticed most during those years was the better living on the farms. Of course, farms were beginning to get larger, and that's still carrying on; roads had come; automobiles were coming;
schools were better, and the little old one room red schoolhouse that I knew was disappearing out through the corn belt and the wheat belt in favor of the consolidated township school; more farm boys and girls were going to college; the agricultural colleges were beginning to have bigger enrollments and more of a place; and land values were rising; and there during the war period you know what a spurt they had.

I know, as I said, that Prof Spillman was worrying about the coming fall in farm prices, and we used to talk about it a lot. Here comes Warren and Taylor again. Warren, I remember, during the war period was getting together all of the information that was available on agricultural prices - the prices of agricultural products and the prices of other products. In about 1919, after Prof Spillman had resigned, Warren came along with a big set of charts and conclusions about the relation of farm prices to other prices, which was to my knowledge the origin of this parity concept that still is so much on the scene and in the thinking.

What was then the Bureau of Crop Estimates in the Department of Agriculture had been collecting some information on prices for a long while, and what is now
the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Department of Labor had been collecting information on prices. Warren and people working with him separated those into farm and non-farm prices. I think they finally used wholesale prices of farm products and wholesale prices of other commodities as a basis. But they separated the two and charted them from away back yonder in Civil War time or whenever they could get the first data and showed that in times of prosperity farm prices went up high, but in times of depression farm prices fell first and farthest.

Then Warren wanted to make some index numbers. That's another thing that I was interested in in those days, but I didn't have anything to do with this. He looked for a base period for his index numbers of farm prices and other prices, and he and the group that was working with him in the Department of Agriculture and elsewhere decided that 1910-14 was the right period to have for the base of the index numbers - 1910-14 equals 100. Farm prices, as I say, rose higher than others during the war, but after the war this ratio between farm prices and other prices got to be less than 100. Thus, 1910-14 got to be the base period for parity prices.

From the theoretical index number standpoint, the
base period should be a period of relative stability not too far in the past, and 1910-14 had been a relatively stable period with not too many ups and downs in any part of the economy at that time, and it was only five years in the past then. There was no particular debate at that time about whether these should be the base years. 1910-14 is ancient now, and all the debate now is that the base period should be brought up to date. I don't remember that there was any of the political questioning and bickering that's gotten into the question of the base period for parity prices in recent years.

The dealings of Agriculture with other departments of the government was all quite remote to me. I knew there were arguments, and Prof Spillman and others in the Department were then getting to be the "farmers' friends," so-called, who saw that agriculture was not discriminated against, as we said. I didn't take part in the discussions about sugar which Herbert Hoover was connected with or about wheat - I didn't have any particular part in that.

I did play a little part there in the latter part of the war period in agricultural machinery. Machinery was getting short. There wasn't enough agricultural
machinery to go around - there wasn't enough being manufactured there at the end of the war to go around - and there were fears of shortages. I played a little part in setting up some statistics and so on.

I was interested in farm tenancy in my own investigations. It was one of the things we were all interested in and one of the things that Prof. Spillman had put into the program of his Office of Farm Management. We used to always find out when we went to visit a farm for any purpose whether the operator owned the farm or whether he rented it and so on. We were always interested in finding out about the wages of farm labor and making some comparisons of farm wages with other wages. That's one of the things that H. C. Taylor had been quite interested in in his professorship and his work at Wisconsin, and that really blossomed out in the Department of Agriculture, as I remember it, after H. C. Taylor became head of the Office of Farm Management and chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

I think that concern with the farmer as a social entity goes clear back yonder before the establishment of the agricultural extension service. You know the story of the Smith-Lever Act and the county agents. It
is agricultural extension work in agriculture and home economics. Those who talked about home economics in those days were thinking about, in a nebulous sense, of course, the farmer and the farm family as a social entity. When they were talking about how to make farm living better, they were thinking about the farm family rather than strictly about the farmer as an entrepreneur, as the economist and the farm management people did. Spillman and the people around him there were all conscious of that, but in Spillman's time it never did get focused up in the economic and social investigations and activities of the Department of Agriculture the way it did after Taylor came in.

Spillman resigned in the fall of 1918 - I don't remember exactly why. It was a big row with the Secretary of Agriculture, David F. Houston. I don't know how much of that was ever written down. I just wasn't close to it. I remember that relationships weren't good there for a long period between Spillman and Houston. Over on our side of the street it was often said that Houston didn't know anything about agriculture and wasn't interested in agriculture. He'd come from New York, and Wall Street was then a good devil, as it is now. That was just gossip
around the halls, but there was a lot of that feeling.

Then there was a big to-do about fixing the price of wheat - I believe this is right - which I didn't have much to do with and which I don't remember. Hoover might have been there in the background. As I remember it, Prof Spillman stood up and fought for a higher price of wheat for farmers, and Houston and company - or whoever it was that had the authority - was willing to fix it at something like two dollars and twenty cents a bushel. I didn't have much to do with this because of my position. I was always wanting to know what was going on, but I was off in another building. I was still in the pro-Spillman gang, but I just wasn't working on this particular thing.

Spillman resigned in the fall, and it wasn't until about four or five months later that Taylor was named to fill his place. George I. Christie was in there in the interim. At that time he was at Purdue University as Dean of the Agricultural College there. David F. Houston, who was Secretary of Agriculture, shortly after Spillman's resignation got a committee of which Christie was the head, to come to Washington to the Department of Agriculture to take a careful look-see at the Office of Farm Management and economics work in general and
recommend what ought to be done about it. This affected my job, and I was very keenly interested, to say the least.

I remember Christie being there for a very considerable length of time and various people with him. I remember H. C. Taylor was one of the people who were in Washington for part of that time - I don't remember in just what capacity. Christie and the people around him would come to see us and talk to us about what we were doing, and they would have conferences and seminars, and some of us would be there and we'd talk about the whole thing. After two or three months and before H. C. Taylor took office on April 1, 1919, they made a report to the Secretary, and it was published - I don't remember the title of it - which was an outline of their ideas of what ought to be done in the Department of Agriculture about farm management, agricultural economics, and so on.

Spillman was pretty much in the background on this - Spillman was out and somebody was going to be his successor. What these people were doing was sort of getting the outline of the field, the guidelines, and so forth for Spillman's successor. They just had very little to do with Spillman at the time. Spillman just dropped out of
the scene for awhile. He was associate editor of the *Farm Journal* from 1913-21.

Spillman was replaced by one of his closest friends, H. C. Taylor, which means that he won the fight against Houston. There isn't any question about that. The land grant colleges always have been a potent force in agrarian politics, and they were then. Spillman had lots of friends and followers in the land grant colleges - two of them I mentioned and there were lots of others.

M. L. Wilson was not yet directly connected with the Department of Agriculture. In that period I hadn't met M. L. yet. He then was at Montana. My relations with M. L. began in the H. C. Taylor days.

When H. C. Taylor came in the whole office was reorganized. I don't remember the reorganization. H. C. brought in quite a different viewpoint and method of approach. H. C. was the one of that triumvirate who started out his life as an agricultural economist. He studied economics, and had been to Germany and studied economics with the Germans. The German school was famous then. Back at Wisconsin he studied as a disciple of Richard T. Ely, and John R. Commons was there. I knew Commons. He contributed a whole lot to economics and
the economics of agriculture as well as the economics of labor.

R. C. had, I think, just as much missionary spirit, as much push, and as much desire to help agriculture and make farm life better and so forth, as anybody. He manifested it in quite a different way. On the surface in those days he appeared to be more of the academic, scientific type, not so much of the crusading type as either Spillman or Warren.

When Taylor began to reorganize the Office of Farm Management, his greatest desire seemed to be to have it made over into agricultural economics as distinguished from farm management, which had quite a lot of meaning to those who called themselves economists in those days and differing from those who called themselves agriculturists. There was some emotional content in that meaning.

As I said, Taylor had started his academic life as an economist, and economics was then much more than now an undeveloped field of study. The economics of agriculture - the application of economic principles to agricultural problems - was Taylor's approach to farm management and agricultural economics, whereas Spillman, coming out of plant breeding, pasture improvement, and
so on and like me never having had a course in economics in his life, came at the economic problems in what to people of Taylor's type was a very unorthodox, helter-skelter, hit or miss way. Taylor wanted to get things organized so that they followed the pattern of his thinking as an economist.

One of the first things he did, and one of the very significant things he did, was to establish a division of land economics. He got one of his old students, L. C. Gray, to come and be head of the Division of Land Economics. Another thing, he established a division that is still over there called the Division of Farm Population and Rural Life. That was really sociology.

During the war Spillman and all the rest of us had done a lot of work, so-called, on cost of production - the cost of producing baby beef, the cost of producing wheat, and the cost of producing sugar and all of that. Taylor knew, as I came to know from him and others around him, that theoretically this cost of production concept that we had then was very faulty, and he wanted to get it on a "sound" basis.

He saw the need for organized and regularly flowing statistics on many things in a way that Prof Spillman
just couldn’t be bothered about. I think Taylor at that time had more of an interest in crop estimates, as it was called then, than Spillman ever had. He had an interest in agricultural history, and he wanted to look at things historically. There was in his vocabulary at that time, I remember, the historical method in economics research. We used to talk about the historical method, and then after a little we’d get to arguing about how much one can reason by analogy - Is it going to happen again just because it happened ten years ago or fifteen years ago? That was another concept that Taylor brought out into the open.

He was an intellectually alive man - quite a different type of intellect from Spillman. It wasn’t statistical. Taylor wasn’t as much of a statistician as Spillman - in fact, he wasn’t a statistician at all. He wanted to see the finished result of a statistician’s work, but wouldn’t work with the statistician. I was going to say he had more of a judicial approach, but that isn’t quite right. In all the time I was associated with Taylor there was not the personal warmth there that there was with Prof Spillman.

Another side of Taylor was epitomized by his nickname.
In his young days he was red-headed, and he was called "Red" Taylor. You know, a red-head is supposed to have a quick temper and all of those things. That's one of Taylor's characteristics. I remember one time when he'd been around for quite a while I was talking to him one day. I guess I was probably crying on his shoulder or telling him about something I didn't like, and he reminded me of how he oftentimes got terribly out of patience and how when people would leave his office he'd get up and go over to the wall and kick the baseboard rather hard when nobody was around to see him.

H. C. had somewhat of a flair for organization or administration - a reasonably high order of it. He didn't want to do it himself. He always got himself an assistant chief to do the things for him that needed to be done. Prof Spillman would admit it needed to be done, and maybe it would be done some day, but he didn't have time to put himself to it right now.

I remember H. C. brought in G. W. Forster, who had been one of his graduate students to be his assistant chief in Farm Management. I guess before that he brought Asher Hobson in to be his assistant chief. Hobson is now (1952) at the University of Wisconsin, and Forster is
at North Carolina State College. They are professors of agricultural economics.

N. C. early inaugurated staff meetings and at stated times division leaders' meetings and so on to report on what had been done the last week and the week before and what was going to be done this week. In these meetings he would tell all the people what he thought they ought to know about the Secretary of Agriculture, other Cabinet members, Congress, or the world at large. I remember the staff always used to be there on time. They liked it pretty well.

We had a reasonable amount of direction. I always felt, "Let's go ahead and think and do on my own," to a considerable extent. I just wasn't sitting waiting for orders from the boss. On the other hand, I just wasn't running free to do anything that came to mind or that I damned please.

Another thing that N. C. had was a willingness to work with other people and other agencies in the Department of Agriculture in a way that Prof didn't have. Prof always got out of patience with them, and they didn't like each other. N. C. was always in the early days of his time there willing and desirous to work with other
agencies. In the case of myself, working with agricultural machinery and farm tractors, H. C. came through with the thought that there's lots of engineering involved in studies of farm machinery and tractors, and there's a little old Division of Agricultural Engineering in the Bureau of Public Roads which was then in the Department of Agriculture. H. C. thought the people in the Office of Farm Management should be working with the people in the Division of Agricultural Engineering. Then too farm tractors were taking the place of horses on the farms, and horses are animals, and there is a Bureau of Animal Industry in the Department of Agriculture. So - said H. C. - this line of research really ought to have three way cooperation in it - farm management and agricultural economics, agricultural engineering, and animal husbandry.

We all had a strong sense of our group, Agriculture, versus other departmental groups, but, as I remember, this was not very apparent in H. C.'s actions back in these early days.

After H. C. had been here a couple of years, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics was established. I don't remember whether some of the incidents I have just
mentioned happened before or after the establishment of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. First he came in to be head of the little Office of Farm Management, then a year or so later what had been the Bureau of Crop Estimates was combined with that, and then a short time after that what had been the Bureau of Markets was combined with these other two and it was all renamed the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

Henry C. Taylor was there as the head of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. The thing that happened that really influenced the Department of Agriculture and my own work more than anything else as a result of the 1920 election was the appointment of Henry C. Wallace as Secretary of Agriculture. There was accompanying the election and following the election, a "back to normalcy" slogan that meant get away from the war as fast as possible and get the aftermath of the war finished off.

Henry C. Wallace was in my opinion a very broad-gauged and understanding man — especially understanding and sympathetic with what we call farm problems and the desire of farm people to have a better living.

I don't know that his appointment was so obvious,
Politically, the Secretary of Agriculture would come from the farm belt and be a Republican. The history of the Wallace family gave Henry C. Wallace a standing both in the political scene and in the farm scene that made him acceptable as Secretary of Agriculture to a large segment of the farm group as well as to the political group. I just don't remember other people who were considered for the job at the time now.

During the period of the election and immediately thereafter, there was lots of uncertainty and lots of talk and wondering about what was going to happen, but from the standpoint of the part of the Department of Agriculture that I knew at the time the appointment of Henry C. Wallace as Secretary of Agriculture allayed all fears.

Henry C. Wallace and Henry C. Taylor had known each other before Henry C. Wallace became secretary, and they worked very closely together all the time that Henry C. Wallace was here. I expect that Henry C. Taylor still counts Henry C. Wallace as one of the best friends he ever had and one of the best men he ever knew.

I don't remember that there were any marked changes under the new Secretary as compared with the former Secretary.
Edwin T. Meredith in his short stay here, as far as I can remember, was very well liked and very well respected by the general run of the people in the Department. He was sort of in the nature of an interim appointee when there wasn’t much change in direction, when no long time programs were being challenged, or when no new ones were being considered in the way they were after Henry C. Wallace came in. Farm distress, falling farm prices, and so forth didn’t take place immediately thereafter, and it was still a couple of years before the spread between prices farmers received and prices farmers paid became very apparent, and it was still some little time before farmers anyplace began to be in difficulty in paying their interest, their taxes, their debts, and so on.

I always characterized Henry C. Wallace (somebody else can do it much better than I) as a progressive Republican - maybe the Teddy Roosevelt kind. That was the general feeling among us in the department, as I remember. Then I was getting real interested in the welfare of farmers and what ought to be done about it. We sort of had the feeling that here was an understanding champion of the farmers’ cause. We didn’t use those words
in talking about it.

I can remember that about the time Henry C. Wallace became Secretary of Agriculture tariffs and tariff revision were being considered in Congress. All of the thought was that of course tariffs should be higher and should be protective to protect manufactures and industries of all kinds in the United States from foreign competition, the competition of cheap labor and so on and that there should be tariffs on agricultural products to protect farmers. I can't remember just the tariff rates that were put into effect, but beginning then and continuing on until 1932 or '33, there was a general feeling for the need for protective tariffs for farmers. It went so far that it meant not only tariffs on farm commodities that were imported into this country but tariffs on commodities that were exported. There seemed to get to be sort of a religion about it that tariffs were a good thing. It didn't make any difference if this country is an exporter of wheat - Have a tariff on the wheat. Maybe some day the Canadians would want to ship some wheat down here, and we can't have that. We must have a tariff on it. And so it went for a good many commodities.

In the department we all had lots of arguments,
and those of us who by that time had some economics in our heads, thanks to H. C. Taylor and John D. Black and others, would often discuss and talk about the extent to which more and better tariffs could be of help to American farmers and American agriculture, but the general position, as I remember it, wasn't a question of tariffs or no tariffs. I can't remember in those days that we ever talked about the international balance of payments of the United States, and I can't remember our saying to each other, "If the United States is going to export wheat or manufactured products or anything, it must import a like amount of something else." I can't remember that that idea was ever in any of the thinking or talking. Our thought was, "Yes, tariffs, but what would be the right tariff, how much, what tariffs would be effective and how effective would they be?"

The tariff law that set up the United States Tariff Commission - I believe that's the law - also had in it the proviso that the tariff on commodities imported into the United States should represent the difference between the cost of production of the commodity in another country and the cost of production in the United States. Of course, agricultural commodities were one of the principal
items of contention, and when the tariff commission organized itself to find out the difference between the cost of producing wheat, cotton, sugar, butter and so on in the United States and in the country which was shipping or hoped to ship those commodities to the United States, we in the Department of Agriculture had quite a bit to do with that organisation. Several people from the Department went over to the tariff commission to help conduct such studies. I didn't do any of this myself. I participated in many discussions and studies about how to make the studies, but I never participated in any of the studies myself.

H. C. Taylor and the people around him that I mentioned were already in the Department when Henry C. Wallace came.

Sometime a little later than the coming of Henry C. Wallace and when he was still Secretary of Agriculture, E. D. Ball was assistant secretary. I don't remember the exact date of this, but I'll say it was '23 or '24—maybe it was '22. H. C. Wallace, E. D. Ball, H. C. Taylor and a group of other people came to the conclusion that the employees of the Department of Agriculture needed the opportunity to go to school some more and learn some
more on the subjects on which they were working, and they proceeded to organize as a non-governmental institution the Graduate School of the Department of Agriculture, which is still in existence. One of the things that they decided should be taught in the school was the theory and method of statistics, and I was greatly surprised and gratified when they came and asked me if I would teach such a course. Of course, I said I would. Then we organized and got going, and this course in statistics turned out to be about the most popular course in the first year of the graduate school's existence. I remember someplace between forty and fifty people turned up to take it.

After we got going and I began to get acquainted with them, I found that the smartest and best fellow in the class was a young Jewish boy sitting back there in the middle, and when I looked him up, I found his name was Mordecai J. B. Ezekiel who was a clerk in the Census Bureau. He had just graduated, I think, from the University of Maryland. That was my first acquaintance with Zeke.

By the time I had finished that year with that group, as I say, I found that Zeke was really the outstanding
mentality in the bunch. By that time I was in charge of the Division of Farm Management, and I had an opportunity to do some recruiting. I decided I would like to hire young Zeke as a junior economist and statistician. His name was on the civil service register, and it was close to the top — that is, he was available for appointment. But, I had a little difficulty in getting clearance, as we call it now. It didn't go any further than H. C. Taylor's office and his assistant. They weren't sure that they ought to take Zeke on because he graduated from Maryland just in technical agriculture, he'd never had any farm experience — his people had lived in Richmond, Virginia and were city people — and he was Jewish. This last wasn't spoken very loudly. Anyway, after argument, Zeke with his very sharp mind became a member of the division, and very quickly he began to make his presence known and his influence felt.

He was there in that division for several years. After a while, when the Federal Farm Board was established, Zeke went to work for the Federal Farm Board in just what capacity I don't remember. He stayed there until the New Deal days when H. A. Wallace came in, and then he came back to the Department of Agriculture.
I didn't know Charles Brand so well. I first knew Charley rand as head of the Office of Markets, which later became part of the new Bureau of Agricultural Economics. I believe it was once called the Office of Markets and Rural Organization. In it was the beginning of sociology in the Department of Agriculture. But, main interest was in marketing and in the farmers' share of the consumers' dollar, although the expression hadn't taken that form then. One of the big things they did, as I remember from my acquaintance and contacts with Charley Brand in those days, was to establish the Market News Service. He and the people with him were responsible for establishing this market news network, which is still in existence in more or less the same form it was established then, whereby representatives of the Department of Agriculture as market news specialists are around at the various livestock markets in the country and report every morning how many cattle and how many hogs are there to be marketed and report what the prices are. The same thing was done for dairy products, fruits and vegetables, and grain, and so on. In those days they established a leased wire system whereby all these reports were telegraphed to all the different markets in
the country, and of course, when the radio came, they came to be put on the radio, and so on. It was just a reporting of the news - not an analysis of the news. This is just statistics, although the Outlook Reports sort of grew out of this.

They were interested in warehousing in those days, too. There was a warehouse law - I can't remember the name of it now - requiring the warehouses for grain storage, cotton storage, and so on to be licensed.

I believe it was during Charley Brand's time that the law providing for the supervision and regulation of the commodity exchanges was passed - the Chicago Grain Exchange, the New York Cotton Exchange, the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, and all the rest of them.

I don't know Charley Brand's personal history at all, and I don't know the circumstances under which he left the Department of Agriculture. I forget what happened to Charley Brand when this was all made into the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and Henry C. Taylor became chief of it. Brand was assistant chief, associate chief or something of the kind for a while, but not very long after that he went with the National Fertilizer Association, where he finished out his career.

I can't remember just when I got acquainted with
O. C. Stine, but he was a graduate student in economics at the University of Wisconsin under H. C. Taylor. I believe that he came to Washington before H. C. Taylor did and joined the old Office of Farm Management under Spillman, but I can't remember exactly. When H. C. came, Stine became head of what was named then the Division of Statistical and Historical Research. H. C. Taylor in talking about research used to talk about the historical method and he used to talk about the statistical method. They were two different things in his mind. Stine had a flair for history and was somewhat of an historian. He was somewhat of the theoretical statistician, but he didn't keep up with the brilliant youngsters like the Eberhards - there were others around during that period.

The historical part of that division became less important as time went on. It was in Stine's division where all this analysis of prices and the factors that affect farm prices was made - what are the factors that determine the price of wheat and so on. Then they would forecast the price of cotton for a year ahead or the price of wheat for a year ahead or the price of eggs for three months ahead, or whatever.
In addition, they analyzed agricultural or farm income — back in the early 1920s the farmers' share of the national income. Stine and his people were pioneers in that whole national income study and research effort. In those days there were no data on national income, on farm income, and so on, but Stine was one of the pioneers. The National Bureau of Economic Research up in New York, a private organization, had a lot to do with it. Now the total national income with all its components is computed or estimated by the United States government and published regularly, and the total agricultural income and the components of it are computed in the Department of Agriculture — under Stine's direction as long as he was there. This farmers' share of the national income has become a political slogan, you see. On the price side, Ezekiel worked on price statistics with Stine for a certain period back there in the 1920s.

That is a broad outline of Stine's professional career. He was the organizer of that Division of Statistical and Historical Research in the early 1920s, and he stayed there as head of it until 1946, I believe, when he became assistant chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.
I had a lot of personal contact with M. L. Wilson. I can't remember the first time I met M. L., but when I did, he was at Montana College of Agriculture doing research and extension work in agricultural economics. He had been at Wisconsin, and had become a disciple of Henry C. Taylor and others at Wisconsin. He was taking graduate work, I think, there.

In the early 1920s when the farm problem began to emerge and the farmers' share of the national income was not what we agricultural fundamentalists thought it should be, M. L. Wilson began to appear on the scene in Washington in various capacities as sort of an advisor. In 1924 and '25, he took leave from Montana and came to Washington to be head of the division of Farm Management. He was my boss during that period. That's the time I really got acquainted with him.

As I remember it, George Warren wasn't around the Department in an important capacity. I remember seeing him, and I remember he took part in various conferences but I never was conscious that George Warren personally was having a great amount of influence on the policy and programs of the Department of Agriculture during this period. Just at the close of the war he was working
for the Department in some capacity. He was tied up
with the Department when he made this big analysis of
prices of farm products contrasted to the prices of non-
farm products - mostly wholesale prices going back as far
as he could get any data. He produced this publication,
a Department bulletin - I forget the name of it - that
had all the prices set down in it. It had price charts
of all kinds in which he showed that in the history of
farm prices in the United States they were quite unstable
and in times of prosperity tend to go up fast and in
times of depression tend to go down more than most other
prices. That was a real contribution to thinking and a
real basis for policy making for quite a while. That was
really Warren's contribution. Aside from that, he took
part in various discussions and conferences that had to
do with the course of farm prices.

I didn't become aware of George Peek and Hugh S.
Johnson until McMurry-Haugen days, which really originated
with this big farm conference of 1922.

Chester C. Davis was out in Montana and was rather
closely associated with M. L. Wilson - that is, he knew
M. L. Chester had been the publisher of a farm paper
out there, and then he became state commissioner of
agriculture and labor. Then he became associated with George Peek – I learned this afterwards – in a business capacity. He and I first met each other along in this period of 1921, '22, and '23, when the farm problem came to the fore and Peek showed up as one of the leaders.

Young Henry Wallace – H. A. – came along and spent a lot of time in Washington while his father was Secretary of Agriculture. He was interested in statistics, statistical method, the theory of probability, the method of least squares, and so on, and he and I really got acquainted in those days by way of this statistics route. As I remember, he spent a lot of time down there, but also spent a lot of time in Iowa; At that time he was writing or editorializing for Wallace's Farmer on the farm problem and what might be done about it.

O. E. Baker was in the Department of Agriculture when I joined it in 1915. He'd come down from Wisconsin. He was a Wisconsinite. He had worked on the Atlas of American Agriculture as a geographer. He had a little unit there under Spillman. He stayed on through in that when H. C. Taylor came. He still had his interest, of course, in agricultural geography, but by that time he had become quite a well known man throughout the United
States and outside the United States, too, for what he
had produced and what he had said about the geography of
agriculture on one side, and what he had said about
population problems on the other side. He was one of
the pioneers in this consideration of the relation between
population growth, economic growth, and so on.

He never was very happy with his situation in the
Department of Agriculture in the Bureau of Agricultural
Economics. He was in the Division of Land Economics for
quite a while, and I remember he wanted to get out of
that. I was in a position where I could help him a
little there. He wasn't happy in the position he was in
with his boss. He went over into the Division of Farm
Population and Rural Wealth there, Carl Taylor was the
chief. He was there for a number of years. Sometime
in the early 1940s, he resigned and went to Maryland to
be on the faculty and stayed there until he died in 1948
or '49.

H. C. Wallace came into the picture, and he found
the Bureau of Agricultural Economics over here and his
old friend, H. C. Taylor, in charge of it. H. C. Wallace
was greatly interested in economic and social problems
of farmers and economic and social betterment. He came
from a family of agricultural crusaders, you see. As I remember it, he and H. C. Taylor saw things alike very much, and I always had the impression that H. C. Wallace depended upon H. C. Taylor for expert advice on a lot of things, and I know that H. C. Taylor had the highest admiration for H. C. Wallace. Those of us in the lower echelons - the younger fellows in those days - the ones that I was associated with, the ones I remember, and the ones I've mentioned here, all followed along or we had the same ideas or convictions and we were always trying the best we could in our respective fields of study, analysis, and collection of statistics to provide Henry C. Wallace, H. C. Taylor and the other people around them in the Department of Agriculture with facts and figures and the results of studies and research that they could use in making what came to be called later agricultural policy, and attempting to influence legislation, and so on. Never in any consciousness that I have was there any separation between the two men. It seems to me that they were one on policy.

The University of Wisconsin had their departments of economics, sociology, and history, and so on. On the agricultural economics front Taylor was their outstanding
man. There was also Dr. Richard T. Ely, H. C. was a protege of Ely. Benjamin H. Hibbard, who is still out there (1952), was another member of the group. John R. Commons probably had as much influence on things as any one of those people, and there were others. We used to feel that the University of Wisconsin was the outstanding center of learning and thought on - we didn't call it agricultural reform in those days - economic and social problems of agriculture. They had organized and were conducting a very good series of courses, both graduate and undergraduate, in this field.

One of the reasons we felt the University of Wisconsin was advanced was because the men there were concerned with the economic approach to agriculture as well as the technological approach. The University of Wisconsin has an agricultural college, and they have their experiment station and people who are interested only in working on technological phases of agriculture. I don't know just why, but I felt many times that one of the reasons for Wisconsin standing out is that Ely and his group were first economists and social scientists and agricultural technologists second. Spillman was first an agricultural scientist and second an economist-sociologist,
and so was Warren. These men approached the same point, having started from different places. Of course, there was then and still is jealousy and inter-university scraps and talks between Wisconsin and Cornell. The department of agricultural economics at Wisconsin and the department of agricultural economics at Cornell still don't like each other, but that's a very minor thing.

As a matter of fact, I think a good many people in a good many parts of the Department of Agriculture were really not very much concerned about what we've been calling the farm problem. There was the Bureau of Plant Industry and the Bureau of Animal Industry—the technical groups—Soils, and so on, all of which were going ahead with technological research and studies. They wouldn't be so interested in the farm problem.

Then there was the Office of Extension, of which M. L. is now the head and has been for a long time. It really blossomed out like everything during the war. It was devoted, as I remember it, then mostly to helping increase production because of the high demand for agricultural commodities during the war. In the period after the war, extension work in agricultural economics, came into the picture quite a bit. C. B. Smith was the
director of the Office at the time and the moving spirit in those early days. I'm not sure, but I think that the Extension Service of the Department of Agriculture had only a secondary interest in the farm problem and the welfare of farmers as distinguished from technological phases of agriculture. But I can't say that I was ever conscious of any conflict between the extension people and others in the Department of Agriculture.

After a while, around 1922 and thereafter, there was a conflict outside the Department because of this new accent on the economic and sociological approach to the farm problem. That was the conflict with Hoover and the Department of Commerce.

I remember that the Farm Bureau and the Grange in those days were interested in tariff legislation, and usually, if not always, pled for higher tariffs on farm products and protection for the American farmer. I can't remember when the farm organizations as such, the Farm Bureau and the Grange, first took the position. The Grange came out with the export debenture plan in the early twenties as a variation of the McNary-Haugen plan.

I wasn't conscious of any special social groups or cliques in the Department. I can't remember any rifts or
splits in the Department, so there weren't any that I was in or was conscious of. The Department was operating pretty much as a unit behind Wallace, and the economic end was operating behind Wallace by way of Taylor. On the economic and social front, Taylor was the outstanding man in the Department below the rank of Secretary. In my opinion he was the outstanding man in the Department below the rank of Secretary, but people who think about technical agriculture, agricultural education, and agricultural extension might rank C. B. Smith, the grand old man and director of extension, right up beside H. C. Taylor, for example.

Not long after H. C. Taylor came to Washington, the interest in farm machinery and the introduction of tractors was increasing. There were economic phases of it, engineering phases of it, and so on, and it was arranged that there should be a sort of an inter-bureau approach to research on this subject. What was still the Office of Farm Management was interested in it, and the Division of Agricultural Engineering, which was a division of the Bureau of Public Roads, also had a great interest in it — possibly a primary interest. As a result of the working together of these three agencies I found myself
transferring to the Division of Agricultural Engineering in the Bureau of Public Roads sometime, I think, in 1919. I had the title of "Agricultural Engineer."

There for a period of two or three years I devoted almost exclusive attention to this subject of mechanical power - the place of tractors on American farms. It was just after the close of World War I, and agriculture was still quite prosperous. The larger farmers were very much interested in the tractors such as were available in those days. The Department of Agriculture cooperating to a certain extent with the Land Grant Colleges undertook investigations - how much it cost to operate tractors or what particular farm operations could best be done with tractors and what could still best be done with horses, etc. Pretty soon the relationship between the number of horses a farmer had to keep after he bought a tractor and the cost of operating his farm got to be a real question. The manufacturers of farm machinery and tractors especially hoped that these investigations of the Department of Agriculture would show that the primitive sort of tractors they had in those days would be profitable almost any place on almost any kind of a farm. We found them arguing with us that we weren't being fair in our research to the
tractors and that they were more economical and more adaptable than we said they were. We found ourselves involved on the other side with the lovers of horses, who were saying that we were parties to banishing the horse from the American scene.

There were some real arguments. I remember a group of representatives of manufacturers of farm machinery coming to Washington and insisting that we just hadn't done a fair job. I remember sitting down with them for a period of two or three days—a group of us who were working on this—and taking before them our original information that we'd collected farm by farm from tractor owners in various places, showing them what we'd collected, what the tractor owners had said, and what we'd done with this raw data after we got it. They really thought we were not being fair.

On the horse side, a man (whose name I can't think of) in Chicago, and his group, the Horse Breeders' Association, were interested in making money, of course, from raising horses, and they wanted the price of horses to be high. Mules were in it, too. There was lots of correspondence back and forth, visits to Washington, discussions, and so on.
That was about my first exposure to what we came to call pressure groups. I don’t remember that we used that term in those days at all, but there they were. It was true then, as it’s true ever since and doubtless will continue to be true, that anything the government or any public agency does will be looked at very carefully by various interest groups in the country to see how it affects their fortunes and their well-being, and if they think it helps them along they are going to be very much interested in helping that line of work and if they think it’s on the other side they’re going to do something to cut it down or stop it.

During that period of two or three years the use of the tractor expanded in the corn belt and the wheat belt, but it didn’t get into the South much because in the South agricultural “progress” — pardon the word — was lagging at that time.

After two or three years of that — I can’t remember the date — maybe in 1922 — I got one of the surprises of my life when H. C. Taylor wanted to see me one day, and I went over to his office. He asked me if I would be head of the new Division of Farm Management that was being created (or that maybe had been created a little while
before) in this new Bureau of Agricultural Economics, I remember that I felt when I went over to the Agricultural Engineering Division that I'd probably never get back into the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, because I wasn't an economist from Wisconsin, etc., etc. Then until 1928, I was there as head of the Division of Farm Management.

I remember I thought at the time that was quite a step up for me. Being head of the Division of Farm Management put me in a position where I had something to say about programs and policies of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and I could make some contribution to broader policies of the Department. Of course, at first I was very much a junior member of the firm.

I remember conferring often at great length with H. C. Taylor and others about the kinds of research which should be undertaken in this field of farm management. Some of the old relations between the University of Wisconsin and Cornell emerged here. Cornell, under Professor Warren had developed a method of studying farm management problems, which came to be called the farm management survey method whereby members of the staff at Cornell would go
to a farm and obtain a financial record from memory from that farmer of his operations the preceding year. They would do that for some hundreds of farmers, then compare these records, one with the other, manipulate them in various elementary statistical ways, and arrive at some conclusions as to what particular crops were most profitable, how large a dairy herd was most profitable on a farm of a certain size, and all the other so-called farm-management factors.

Wisconsin, on the other hand, had developed what they called a farm record method, which involved inducing a farmer to keep an accurate record for at least a year of all of his activities; to record every day how many hours he spent on this job and that job, how many hours he worked his horses or his tractor if he had one, how many pounds or tons of hay he fed to his dairy herd, how many bushels of corn he fed to his hogs; and along with that to record all his cash expenditures during the year and all the income from various sources. At the end of the year they would come out with what we called the complete financial farm management record.

It just so happened that neither method quite hit the spot. Many kinds of data could be obtained from
these detailed records which Wisconsin sponsored that couldn't be obtained by a farm management survey. The so-called errors of observation that were inherent in putting down from memory what had happened on the farm during the preceding year were not in this daily record - errors of observation didn't amount to anything there. But when one came to generalize and to consider the results from the standpoint of statistical sampling, we found that, of course, the farmers who were willing to keep records for the university were not at all a representative sample of the farmers of Wisconsin or any other part of the country.

After lots of thought, lots of talk, and lots of discussion, we came to the conclusion the problems of farm management could not be explored by either method exclusively, but there still persists to this day among some of the agricultural economists and farm management workers of the country the old squabble as to which is the better way of approach.

We began to get on to a broader basis. I got acquainted with John D. Black for the first time. He contributed a lot to the development of what we then called farm management and what in academic circles now is called production economics. John D. Black had been
a student of economics at the University of Wisconsin, and at that time was on the faculty of the University of Minnesota. Shortly thereafter he moved to Harvard, where he has been since. H. C. Taylor got John D. Black to come to Washington and spend the better part of a summer with us in the Division of Farm Management, holding conferences and seminars and discussing the problems that we wanted to do research on and the best ways of doing them. More than anything else he helped me get some organized ideas into my head about this emerging science of economics. I think I learned more about economics as such from John D. Black in that period than any other time in my life.

Among the other men in these discussions was Ezekiel. Two other men that became leaders there that I haven’t mentioned were J. B. Nutson and J. W. Tapp. Another was Foster F. Elliot. I’m not sure whether Cris V. Wells had arrived on the scene and participated in those discussions or not.

At the same time, this statistical analysis – theory and method of statistics – was emerging. We got some economic theory, we got some statistical method, and we
sort of put them together in the study of problems of production economics in agriculture, and out of that stemmed the research program of the Division of Farm Management.

Another thing happened in that period — closer cooperation with the agricultural colleges. Congress passed a law sometime in 1925 or thereabouts — the Purnell Act it was called — which appropriated money to be used cooperatively with the land grant colleges in studying the economic problems of agriculture. Up until that time the federal appropriations of so-called grants-in-aid to agricultural colleges had been almost completely on the natural science or technological science side, and here for the first time Congress appropriated money to the colleges specifically to support economic and social studies of agriculture.

The Agricultural Outlook Reports came into being. The first Agricultural Outlook Report was issued in 1922. It was a product of thinking of N. C. Wallace and N. C. Taylor especially. They were concerned with the economic and social problems of farmers and what could the government and the agricultural colleges and so forth do that
would help the farmers of the country along to better economic and social positions, to obtain better incomes, and so on. Of course, uncertainty regarding the course of prices was one of the big problems at that time. The prices of farm commodities had begun to weaken and decline. So they came to the decision that the Department of Agriculture should embark upon what came to be called and still is an Outlook Program.

The Department of Agriculture had information about crop and livestock production, about stocks of different commodities, and past and present farm prices, and we, the Department of Agriculture people, would put all that together once a year and attempt to make some judgment as to what supplies of various commodities would be in the year ahead, what the demand for them would be, and finally whether prices were likely to go up or down. The object of this was not to forecast prices — we argued lots about that — but to give farmers information that would enable them to adjust their operations in the light of market conditions so as to increase their incomes.

In connection with this agricultural outlook work, we inaugurated the so-called Intentions to Plant Report,
which is still current. As of the first of March every year or thereabouts, the Division of Crop Estimates would obtain from farmers an expression of how much of each crop - how much corn, how much cotton, how much wheat, and how much of everything else - they intended to plant for the year ahead. This would be the basis of determining the prospective supply if these intentions were carried out. Then we attempted to appraise these intentions in the light of the general demand situation and see whether or not farmers would profit by departing from their intentions and adjusting their plantings and their livestock production upward or downward. About that time, too, the so-called pig surveys were inaugurated whereby a sampling of farmers’ intentions to raise pigs in the year ahead was obtained.

All of that was done not in the Division of Farm Management, but over in the Division of Crop Estimates, but we all worked together, and it was our job in the Division of Farm Management, concerned with the economics of production, to do what we could to make this appraisal of whether or not it would pay farmers to change their intentions.

Another significant development that in my opinion
grew out of this was the interest in foreign agriculture. I have mentioned tariffs and how the United States had gone quite nationalistic in getting "back to normalcy" after the war. None of us seemed to realize that the United States had changed from a debtor to a creditor position on account of World War I, that the problems of international trade of the United States in the future were going to be very different from what they had been in the old development days of the country when the United States was a debtor nation. The prevailing opinion was that the right kind of tariffs would cure the ills of the export crops, such as wheat, cotton, and tobacco. However, it was recognized that competition, both in the United States and in foreign countries, between the products of United States farms and the products of farms in foreign countries affected farm prices. That seemed to lead to the conclusion that the Department of Agriculture of the United States should have information about production of different crops and kinds of livestock in those countries of the world which were or might be competitors of the United States, so that it could be analyzed, summarized, and passed on to farmers to help them make better decisions as to what crops and livestock to grow
and how much of each.

That led to the establishment of a system of agricultural attaches in principal countries. Many of those attaches were at first agricultural statisticians who came out of the crop and livestock estimates line and went to the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France, and other countries. Their principal job was to find out over there what the production of different crops and livestock was or was going to be in the period immediately ahead, what prices were, and what the demand looked like and relay all that back to the United States to the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, where it was put in with all the other information we had as a guide to the production plans and the production policies of the people of the country.

The International Institute of Agriculture was founded in 1914 or 1919 — I swear I can't remember. Of course, that was an earlier manifestation of this same general feeling of the need for knowledge about production of and trade in agricultural commodities all around the world.

When H. C. Wallace brought W. J. Spillman back into
the Department of Agriculture in March of 1931, H. C. Taylor was here and Spillman came in to what was then, I guess, the Office of Farm Management which soon became part of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. He was there for a good many years with the title of "Consultant," I believe. All of us used to go and talk to Prof about problems of our day to day work, about the well being of farmers, the state of the world and what might be done. I remember for some years thereafter, after I got back in the Office of Farm Management, Prof Spillman's office was adjoining mine, and I would ask his advice and suggestions on a great many things. A number of Prof's old disciples of the old days were still in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, several of them in the division of Farm Management that I was heading. Prof would help them understand me and help me understand them and help us work along together.

Along in '23 or '24 Prof's fertile mind began to work on the emerging problem of the disparity of farm prices. He thought and talked and developed statistics, and wrote his book, Balancing the Farm Output. I don't remember the exact date of that. During that period he was thinking, talking, and writing about this disparity
and about what might be done about it and come up with this manuscript that later became a book. In that book, as I remember it, were quite a lot of facts and suggestions that were closely related to what became the Domestic Allotment Plan and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.

I forget exactly how long Prof Spillman stayed there in the Department of Agriculture, but he left. He became ill. I believe it was in 1931, when I was in California, he died, after an operation for gall bladder or something of the kind. He was someplace in his sixties.

He had a very active mind always. He gathered young men around him, and he was rather venerated in those latter years by people who then weren't so young, but who had known him for many years and who had been his disciples since they were young men. I remember his door was always open to anybody who wanted to come see him. He would talk about anything you wanted to, and he would also talk about things that were on his mind. He was intense. When he was writing he would march up and down his office dictating at a great pace, driving his stenographers wild. He would do many, many pages a day.
I used to envy him that - something I never could do.

I can't remember how the fight with Hoover as Secretary of Commerce originated, but as I observed it and remember it, it was a fight between H. C. Wallace and Herbert Hoover. It was sort of an agrarianism scrap. H. C. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, scion of the old Wallace family, the friend of the farmer, was endeavoring to steer the United States government into actions and activities that would be of benefit to farm people. H. C. was very much interested in research, extension, and all the activities of his Department, but he wanted more done "in the name of agriculture" as we said in those days. As I remember the viewpoint of the Department of Commerce and Hoover, it was more nearly the laissez faire attitude; that the government doesn't need to do and shouldn't do anything especially for farmers or any other particular class. Various things that H. C. Wallace started, wanted to start or advocated were opposed by Hoover.

Some of the lines of work that H. C. Wallace really started were taken over by Hoover. I think I mentioned the Foreign Agricultural Service, these agricultural attaches that were sent to various countries of the world
as part of the diplomatic staff to assess the agricultural situation in those countries and to get information about the supply of and the demand for agricultural products in those foreign countries. "Foreign Competition" became a slogan.

The supervision of these foreign attaches caused quite a battle between Wallace and Hoover. Most of these things get to have jurisdictional phases and sometimes "jurisdictionitis" rules everything. This came to be pretty much of a jurisdictional battle. I think at that time the Department of Commerce had commercial attaches already. Hoover and his Department of Commerce thought an agricultural attaché was just a different kind of a commercial attaché and that they should all be in the Department of Commerce. I don't remember and I don't believe I ever did know much about the in-fighting that went on there, but the outcome was that these agricultural attaches were attached to the Department of Agriculture, which means that Wallace won that fight. Of course, at a considerably later date they were made part of the Department of State. That was ten years or so later, as I remember it.

I don't want to do H. C. Wallace an injustice, but
he was another red-head. He was red-headed and somewhat quick on the trigger, as we say. He was rather intense in his feelings about what he wanted and what he thought was right and wrong. He was what we called in those days and later an agricultural fundamentalist.

The agricultural fundamentalist believes that the welfare of the nation depends upon the welfare of agriculture. If agriculture is prosperous it generates action, wealth, and income for the rest of the economy, and the whole nation will be prosperous; if agriculture isn't prosperous and the purchasing power of the farmers goes down, then farmers can't buy the products of industry and industrial activity goes down, workers are laid off, and we get into a depression. You can write a whole book on it. Their feeling was that agriculture is the fundamental industry in the economy of the country. Some statistics were drawn up one time - I guess H. C. Wallace didn't have this done - which showed that in boom or depression the whole national income is seven times the agricultural income in this country. From this the conclusion was drawn that if agricultural income is kept high, then just automatically national income will be seven times higher; and that if agricultural income goes
down, national income will still be just seven times the agricultural income.

That's related, you see, to the old Populist movement and to the earlier days when most of the people of the country were engaged in farming and we were primarily a rural country and a rural economy. This doctrine of agricultural fundamentalism was just sort of an outgrowth, a hangover, of that time. Agricultural fundamentalism has pervaded a lot of the thinking and a lot of the action all the time from the H. C. Wallace days clear down to the present time. I think that the earlier Wallaces, Uncle Henry and others, probably had that same general philosophy about agriculture and farming, and H. C. had gathered it from the family. It was very, very intense.

I just didn't know him well enough to be able to say whether he could see the other side in any dispute that might arise. He would get red-headed in these arguments and take a position, and there it would be. Now, whether it was a quick temper, jurisdictionitis, or fundamental philosophy, I don't know. I never saw his temper directed at me personally, but I saw it in remarks that he would make at staff conferences and sessions, and
in remarks and decisions that I heard about second hand. I don’t remember ever having seen him get mad and bawl somebody out publicly or anything like that. I wouldn’t characterize him as being vindictive, as you suggest, but when he did take a position, he had that position and that was it. He was rather considerate in his treatment of people, especially his subordinates in the Department of Agriculture.

In those days he had red hair that had turned grayish. His voice was a bit like H.A.’s. H. A. inherited some of his voice. As I remember it, there was nothing of the apparent bashfulness about H. C. that is often apparent about his son, H. A. He always spoke both in his office when I heard him and publicly in what appeared to be a very, very convincing manner. He spoke as though he were quite sure of what he was saying and of the group to which he was speaking. I think that’s one of the characteristics I remember most about him—he was just quite sure that he was right in whatever he said. I don’t remember anything unique or distinctive about his mannerisms. I never was around his private office enough to know what his mannerisms were when he was alone or with one or two people.
I had the feeling that his philosophies about agriculture and about American life in general came pretty much from his own father, but I may be wrong about that.

Back in those days H. A. spent quite a lot of time here in Washington. As I said, that's when I got acquainted with H. A. - when his father was Secretary of Agriculture. Only seeing them come in together and go out together and seeing them ride together in the car, I always had a feeling there was quite a close relationship between them - that they understood each other. In those days, H. A.'s philosophy of what was right and wrong and what ought to be done was right along with his father's. I just wasn't close enough to have any definite feeling about their personal relationship. As I say, I always felt they understood each other and liked each other, and so on.

It must have been during those years when his father was Secretary that I first met H. A. - I can't remember exactly when it was. I may have seen H. A. someplace before that in Washington or elsewhere, but I don't remember. In those days when H. A. was here, one of the things he did was work with his father. He probably was writing articles for *Wallace's Farmer*. You know, he
followed his father as editor of *Wallace's Farmer*. When I got acquainted with him I found that he had the same interest that I did in statistics and statistical method. He and I did more talking and conferring on that point than anything else. As a matter of fact, I don't remember now having had any very significant conversations with H. A. in those days on anything except statistics and statistical method.

Back there in the early twenties I remember I was struck with H. A.'s appearance of bashfulness. He was quiet and retiring. When he would approach you, he'd have an attitude of feeling like he was intruding. Often his eyes would drop when he spoke to you. I think that he was no more bashful then than he is now. He still has that outward appearance sometimes. I was impressed with the great keenness of his mind and the analytical ability that he had then. The statistics that I talk about was just one manifestation of it. He at that time was primarily interested in the application of statistics to technical agriculture and to analyzing results of experiment station work - the differences in yields on different plots on an experiment station.

At about that time, shortly before or after, H. A.
was coming through with his experiments on hybrid corn. They were really carried on, I think, at the Iowa State Experiment Station, but H. A. was very much interested in them, analyzing the results and so on. The interest he had at that time in the science of agriculture, typified by the hybrid corn, but covering all phases of agriculture, continued during the time he was Secretary of Agriculture and continues even to the present.

Partisan politics was part of the picture, too, at that time. H. C. was a Republican; H. A. was Republican in those days. I'm not sure, but I think that H. A., after his father died and he was back in Iowa, was a supporter of Alfred E. Smith in 1928. I'm rather sure of that. He left the old Republican party primarily, I guess, because of what their attitude was and had been toward agriculture and McNary-Haugenism and so on.

Another personal characteristic of H. A. became more pronounced as time went on. I came to call it mysticism. I have a feeling now as I look back that that was there in H. A.'s mental makeup and has been all his life. It wasn't apparent to me back there in those days of the early 1920s as it was when I got reacquainted with him in about 1930 or '31 and from then on. I call
it mysticism, but maybe another way to describe it is that he often had the feeling that what he, Henry Wallace, might do or what I, Howard Tolley, might do or what both of us or a group of us together might do wasn't going to have very much influence on the course of events - that somehow or other there was something else that determined things. Related to that is a religious streak that was in H. A. at that time. I forget just how, but he was active in the Episcopal Church. It seems to me that he wanted to preach or that he did go occasionally and occupy the pulpit of the church on Sunday and give the people his message. This was out in Iowa.

I don't have any idea where he got this mysticism. So far as I know H. C. didn't have it. H. C. wasn't that kind of man at all. Maybe his grandfather had it - I never knew him. I never knew his mother or whether he could have gotten some of it from her. Along in 1936 or maybe a little later, I know he got the feeling that somehow or other he someday would be President of the United States. That was just in the stars - that was going to happen.

In the early days, H. A. was very much interested
in scientific agriculture. While his father was Senator he was working closely with him, and I know that he was giving attention to the agricultural situation, the cause of the farmer, the McNary-Haugen bills, and so on.

The passage of the Emergency Tariff Act in 1921 brings to my mind the whole tariff movement. Of course, it was partisan to a considerable extent, but not entirely so. The Republicans of old were high tariff people, and the Democrats favored the tariff for revenue only. I didn't have a realization in those days of a world economic situation as it was impinging upon the United States and upon United States agriculture, and I don't think many people did. But, we, the United States, emerged from World War I as a creditor nation; countries owed us money; Great Britain and countries of Europe needed and wanted agricultural commodities from the United States; and they needed and wanted manufactured commodities from the United States; but the balance of payments and balance of trade situation changed so that they didn't have the money to pay for them and the United States wasn't importing enough to balance exports. That was, I came to realize later, one of the underlying causes of the drop in the prices of wheat, cotton, and other
agricultural export commodities which showed up in this disparity between the prices for farm commodities and the prices for manufactured commodities. Nobody was saying that then. I can't remember ever having heard anybody saying that. I know it wasn't in my thoughts. I don't remember H. C. Taylor talking about it or H. C. Wallace or H. A. Wallace talking about it or writing about it. Maybe they did, and I've forgotten or maybe I missed it at the time. I first remember hearing this argument in 1930, when it became popular. Some of it was in the economics textbooks, and the economists talked some about it, but we agricultural economists didn't talk about it.

The tariff had sort of gotten to be a religion. Here was this disparity between agricultural prices and other prices, and agricultural prices were low. It got to be sort of a religion to put a tariff on and that would put the prices up. I remember a tariff of forty cents a bushel on wheat. We were exporting wheat and wanting to export more wheat, but we got a tariff on wheat. What good would a tariff on wheat do when we exported wheat? Well, Canada might want to ship some wheat to the United States some day, and we'd make them pay the tariff, and
that would help that much.

This reminds me of the national master of the
Grange in those days, Louis J. Taber. This was some time
later - maybe in the middle of the twenties, I remember
talking to him about tariffs. He had been supporting
higher and better tariffs for all agricultural commodities.
I remember his remarking something to the effect that
he didn't understand all this tariff, how it worked, and
so on, but everybody was wanting tariffs on their
commodities, and so he was going to do all that he could
to get more and better tariffs on agricultural commodities
no difference whether they were export commodities or
import commodities or what. I think that pretty well
sizes up the general feeling in those days.

The economic situation and the world trade situation
all changed, and the people in the United States and the
leaders in the United States just didn't realize it, or
if they did realize it, they didn't accept the change.
It was this tariff philosophy and the lower prices for
agricultural commodities that led right off into McNary-
Haugenism, the equalisation fee, and so on. One began
to hear the doctrines advocated that people in foreign
countries couldn't be expected to pay as much for commodities
from the United States as people in the United States would pay, so we needed a two price system. Everybody was careful not to use that terrible term, you see, but then many came to believe that farmers' incomes would be increased if agricultural commodities were sold abroad at a lower price than the price at which they were sold in the United States. The equalisation fee was invented to bring that about and to make that possible. Tariffs got bigger and better until the Smoot-Hawley in 1930. At the bottom of a world depression the United States Congress put on bigger and better tariffs in an effort to cure worldwide depression.

The Department of Agriculture just had only one line of work in the old days that had any bearing on economics. That was Crop Estimates, which later became Crop and Livestock Estimates. It is the oldest part of the Department of Agriculture. Then we got this little Office of Farm Management on the side, but broader economics never got into it until the Bureau of Agricultural Economics was established. Even to this day there's lots of question and lots of resistance to the Department of Agriculture taking any very active part in analyzing economic problems and pointing out the implications of
different lines of action, government or private. There is opposition from some Congressmen and opposition from some farm organizations. They say, "The job of the bureaucrats is to give us the facts and figures, we'll decide what they mean, we'll make the agricultural policies." There's a real fight about this right now between the Secretary of Agriculture and the Farm Bureau. Some of the Congressmen and Senators are in it.

In the twenties, there was a lot of attention to the social side of the Grange, but the National Grange and the state granges did discuss economic problems of agriculture and did begin to take positions on some of them in that period. The Grange put forward the "Export Debenture Plan" as an alternative to the "Equalization Fee."

When they began to take a position, they would send a man to Washington to speak to a Congressman on behalf of some position. Like the Farm Bureau, the Farmers' Union, and the other non-agricultural organizations, they had their national organization, and the National Grange had a national meeting once a year. They had a resolutions committee, and the resolutions committee would get up resolutions, which would be put before the
national conference - delegates from all the states who voted on them. That would be the position of the Grange, and that's what they would take to Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture. Of course, they said, "We are speaking for the Grange." That's about what they do now, and that's about what the Farm Bureau, the Farmers' Union and all the rest of them do.

When the Smith-Lever agricultural extension act was passed in 1914, establishing the nationwide county agent and home economics system, there was some kind of proviso that in each county there should be a local organization, a group of farmers, which would help defray the expenses of this county agent. It was sort of a cooperative between the federal government, the state government, and the farmers with whom and for whom the county agent and home demonstration agent were working. So in each county where a county agent was established, a county farm bureau was organized. That was just a group of farmers who wanted to work with the county agent and who were willing to put up a dollar a year or five dollars a year or something of the kind to help pay office rent and other expenses of a county agent office. The county agent system spread over the country quite rapidly, and these local county farm bureaus were organized
wherever the county agent system came in. By the end of World War I, 1918 or 1920, there were — I don't know — I guess 2000 counties in the United States that had local farm bureaus. Then the leaders in these local farm bureaus got the idea that if all the county farm bureaus would federate into a state federation of farm bureaus, and then all the states federate into a national federation, there would be an organization which could speak for the farmers and carry the flag for them. That's exactly what happened.

I don't know who were the leaders in federating these farm bureaus. I just wasn't close to it. The National Farm Bureau Federation came into being sometime near 1920. I don't remember whether it was just before or just after. I forget who was the first president of it. I never knew any of them personally until Edward A. O'Neal, III, in the 1930s. He had just become president.

The Grange is an older organization. Any farm person and his family who wanted to joined the Grange. It was more or less like joining a lodge or a secret society - the Masons, the Odd Fellows, or something. When the farm bureaus came into existence, many Grangers joined these local county farm bureaus, maintaining
relationships with both of them. I don't think that the farm bureaus took people away from the Grange. I don't remember having seen anything on that. The Grangers who were interested in the farm bureaus became both Grangers and farm bureau members. There are lots of people today who belong to both the Grange and the farm bureaus.

The National Farmers' Union was in existence back there in 1919 and the 1920s. It was just a minority group. I don't know too much about them. They were always known as radicals with radical ideas. They were the left wing farm organization in the 1930s and on up to the present time. Their membership, then as now, I think, was primarily small farmers, low income farmers. In the latter 1920s and in the 1930s, the Farmers' Union leadership and membership was presumably and actually, I think, more friendly to the labor movement, labor unions, and the labor people than either one of the other farm organizations. Maybe what I'm trying to say is that there wasn't as much of this agricultural fundamentalism in the Farmers' Union in the early days back in the 1920s as there was in the Farm Bureau and the Grange.

Not completely and exclusively, but to a considerable extent, one type of farmer would join the Farm Bureau and
the Grange and another type would join the Farmers' Union. I would say that the small farmers would join the Union, and the larger and more prosperous would join the Farm Bureau and the Grange, although both the Federation and the Grange would deny that. There was no distinction between who could join the Grange and the Federation, and so far as I know there was never any distinction between who could join the Farmers' Union and the Farm Bureau.

The Farmers' Union wasn't in the part of Indiana that I knew and where my people were. The Grange was there and had been for a long time. It was eminently respectable. Of course, when the county agent system came along, the Farm Bureau followed it. But the Farmers' Union wasn't there at all.

Back in the twenties there was not too much difference between what the lobbyists for the National Farm Bureau Federation wanted and what those for the Grange wanted. Sometimes I remember differences, but not too much. Their fundamental philosophy was the same. Take the McNary-Haugen bills for example. As I remember it, both the Farm Bureau and the Grange supported the objectives of getting higher prices for what was consumed at home than what could be gotten if everything were left
free and open on the world market, tariffs not with-
standing. But the orange, I remember, did come up with
a proposed modification of the McKinley-Haugen bill, the
export debenture plan. That was 1926. That was presumably
just another way to accomplish the same thing - to keep
the price in the United States higher than the price that
could be obtained on the world market. I don't remember
the position that the Farmers' Union took on this.

The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 was another
move to help farmers. The people who buy what farmers
produce and the people who loan farmers money are, of
course, in the minds of the agricultural fundamentalists
the enemies of the farmer, and just naturally they try
to get from the farmer all that they can. Here are these
packers that buy the livestock, and prices never are what
they should be and never have been and need some regulation.
Then Congress passes a law to regulate them. I just don't
remember any of the personalities in it or any of the
particular struggles that went on.

The packers and stockyard people had their own
organization. It's now the National Meat Institute. It
might have been called the same thing then. It was the
trade organization of the packers. I just wasn't close
enough to it to know if such an organization existed then. The cooperative marketing movement and the farmers' Cooperative Livestock Marketing Associations were becoming vocal during the twenties. They wanted protection against these devils, you see.

The Federal Highway Act of 1921 meant farm to market roads. The farmers had settled the country, had gone out on the frontier and carved out their farms. Their roads were poor. They were mud roads that were impassable part of the time. The automobile had come into being, and the farmers were beginning to get automobiles. Farming had become more and more commercial over a long period, and farmers sold more of what they produced and bought more of what they consumed. So farmers needed better roads - farm to market roads. The "friends of the farmers" who were interested in farm to market roads could make common cause with automobile manufacturers, the American Automobile Association, and so on in the cause of better roads everywhere.

George Peek was a "friend of the farmer." You can see how people like Peek would be agricultural fundamentalists in the sense that I said H. C. Wallace was because Peek's livelihood and his company depended upon the farmers.
When the farmers didn't have any money they couldn't buy any plows.

I recall the National Agricultural Conference of 1922 vaguely. To me the conference did not have the importance that it has assumed in the books. I think the purpose of the conference was to focus up and get support for the general idea that agriculture was falling behind the rest of the economy, that farm prices were lower than they should be compared to other prices, and that the government ought to do something about it. That was Henry C. Wallace's philosophy.

I don't remember whether I knew Henry C. Wallace was going to call such a conference. I remember the announcement that the conference was going to be held, and I remember that the conference was held. I don't remember that I had anything to do with the preparations for the conference. I attended one or two of those sessions just as a looker-oner, and that's all. I didn't meet Peck at this time. I just don't remember meeting any of the people there. I believe I was not in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics at that time. I think that was the place and the time that I was over the Bureau
of Public Roads in the Division of Agricultural Engineering, heading up that unit studying farm power and machinery. I never officially had anything to do with roads, or the legislation or the appropriation for roads.

There was quite a play in the newspapers and lots of talk around Washington about the National Agricultural Conference. Not too long after we began to hear about legislation and bills that were introduced within the next year or two by Senator Charles L. McNary and Congressman Gilbert N. Haugen. I think this conference was just an incident along the way that helped McNary-Haugenism along. It was in the air, in a great many people's minds, and in a great many Congressmen's minds.

Gray Silver had a high position in the American Farm Bureau Federation, as I remember it. I'm not sure whether he was president of it or not. Later he became associated with the good roads movement in the United States, and for years he had an office here in Washington, pushing along the good roads movement and more appropriations for highways and so on. I knew him back there in the twenties. I didn't know him well.

I never had a great deal to do with Hugh Johnson, except in the thirties during that short period when he
was head of the National Recovery Administration. I can't remember when I first met George Peek - when he came to Washington - but it was in the latter part of the 1920s when I first met Chester Davis. Long before he came into the Department, Chester Davis was associated with George Peek in McMary-Haugenia, and Chester spent time down in Washington in the latter 1920s working on - I guess you can say lobbying for - the McMary-Haugen Bill.

I had nothing to do with the informal conference on equality for agriculture held by H. C. Wallace and H. C. Taylor with various big businessmen or "friends of the farmer." I just remember there was such a conference.

The Capper-Volstead Act was passed in 1922. Cooperative marketing became to be considered the way by which the farmers could get their fair share of the consumers' dollar and not be subject to the deviltry of the packers, the grain dealers, the cotton merchants, and so on. I can't remember that I had anything to do with the Capper-Volstead Act, the preparation of it or the defense of it. I can remember in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics shortly thereafter, the Division of Cooperative Marketing was established. Chris L.
Christiansen was in charge of it. My guess is that would not have been until '23 or '24. It was while H. C. Taylor was still there. The essence of their job was to help develop cooperative marketing associations, to help these associations get good business methods into their operations, and similar things.

The Division of Cooperative Marketing was sort of a bone of contention for a considerable period of time. I don't remember that there was any outright fighting within the Department of Agriculture or within the Bureau of Agricultural Economics about the establishment of this division. H. C. Taylor, and I guess H. C. Wallace, just decided it should be done, they got an appropriation for it in the annual appropriation bill, and the division was established. But a lot of the old line people in the various divisions of the bureau that had to do with marketing, the market news service, grades and standards, and so on, of course, weren't sympathetic to cooperative marketing and didn't think much of this group. After the Division of Cooperative Marketing was organized there was lots of argument and disagreement within the bureau about how cooperative marketing associations could best operate, what their functions were, and so on. The Capper-
Volstead Act resulted, I think, in quite an upsurge in the cooperative movement in the country.

I don't remember as far as the Department of Commerce and other parts of the government are concerned any overt instances, but of course the people there who were following the laissez faire philosophy felt that the government was getting into lines of activity that really weren't "legitimate" lines of government activity; that cooperatives might be all right if they could compete without any assistance with private operations; but that assistance from the government would be giving cooperatives an unfair advantage. The agricultural fundamentalists felt the farmers needed help to improve their economic well being and this was just one way of helping them. Of course, in the latter part of the twenties, after the McNary-Haugen bills were vetoed and the Federal Farm Board was established, cooperative marketing became very respectable, and the Division of Cooperative Marketing of BAE came to be looked on as one of the places that the farmers could get help and it had quite a following among the cooperative organizations of the country.

The Federal Farm Board was created in '28 or '29.
After the McNary-Haugen bills were vetoed and that fell by the wayside and this disparity between farm prices and other prices continued to grow and the parity idea had taken root, the administration - then Hoover - had to have something, and they came up with this Federal Farm Board, which was in a very real sense a forerunner of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. The Federal Farm Board was established by an act of Congress. There were seven members on it. Alexander Legge, head of the International Harvester Company, was chairman. Charles C. Teague, whom I later came to know very well, who was head of the California Fruit Growers' Exchange, a big citrus coop, was vice-chairman of it. They had an appropriation of $500,000,000 to use to stabilize the prices of farm commodities. They were to work primarily through cooperative marketing associations. They had authority - and this is the laugh - to establish stabilization corporations to buy and sell agricultural commodities on the market - to buy when the prices were going down and to sell when the prices were going up. The worldwide depression engulfed them along with a lot of other things. That act was repealed in 1933. A lot of the same ideas came over into the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
Concerning Warren Harding's death, I only remember the occasion of his death out yonder on the West Coast and Calvin Coolidge coming in. I don't remember any immediate repercussions on the Department of Agriculture or on the agricultural movement. Everybody wondered what kind of a man this Coolidge was. You know the stories about how he never talked and nobody knew what he stood for.

I had no part in drawing up the first McNary-Haugen Bill, but only in discussions, I remember, with H. C. Taylor. There was a young fellow, Nils Olsen, who later became chief of the bureau, who appeared on the scene about that time. He was pretty much the center for drawing up the statements and assembling material for use in testimony, speeches, and so on. I worked along with him, supplying information, and so on.

I'm not sure whether I met Chester Davis when he came to Washington in October, 1924, but he was here quite often. That was, as I said earlier, no doubt in connection with the McNary-Haugen Bill. He was closely associated with George Peek after that. That was after N. C. Wallace left the Cabinet. Chester was in Montana as state commissioner of agriculture. He had been editor
of the *Montana Farmer* before he became commissioner of agriculture.

On October 25, 1924, H. C. Wallace died. It was a great shock. I can't remember that it had a great effect on me. I think I would remember if it had. I will always remember FDR's death and how terrible I felt about it, but I can't remember any feeling comparable to that when H. C. Wallace passed on. Of course, I felt the loss of somebody I knew and admired and the loss of a leader, and I wondered what would happen.

As I mentioned before, Henry C. Taylor came to be head of the Office of Farm Management, and I was an employee in that office not too long thereafter — maybe a year or so thereafter — in connection with this cooperative research on farm tractors, horses, and so on. Then I transferred over to the Division of Agricultural Engineering in the Bureau of Public Roads, where I was for, I think, two or three years, devoting all my time and that of two or three people who were working with me to trying to find out the cost of using tractors, the adaptability of tractors to different kinds of farm work, the effect of the use of tractors on the number of horses in the country, and related things. Not long after the
Bureau of Agricultural Economics was established, T. C. Taylor asked me, much to my surprise, if I would be head of the Division of Farm Management, which he was carrying over from the old Office of Farm Management in the Prof. Spillman days. I was in that position, I guess, for three or four years.

There was also a Division of Farm Costs, I believe it was called, which was occupied primarily with trying to determine the cost of production of different agricultural products in different parts of the country. Into that division T. C. had brought with him a couple of men from Wisconsin who had been working on it with him there and a man from Minnesota. There was C. A. Juve from Wisconsin, who later went to the Cost of Production Division of the U.S. Tariff Commission, and R. H. Wilcox, who was from Minnesota. He later went to the agricultural college of the University of Illinois, where I think he still is.

The work of these two divisions was very closely related, and after a while T. C. came to the conclusion that they should be combined into one division. He sent for A. L. Wilson, who up to that time had been at the college of agriculture at the University of Montana, and
M. L. became head of this combined division for a period of something like six months to a year while he was on leave from Montana. He was my boss in that period. Then I became intimately acquainted with M. L.

K. L. in my opinion was at that time and still is one of the best in considering what we then called economic problems of agriculture, which now we call the economic, social, and political problems of agriculture. M. L. even then was very much of a scholar. He was interested in many things other than the details of operating and managing a farm. All in all, it was a very stimulating experience to me to be associated with him during that period. He was interested in religion, and he was interested in philosophy, as he still is. He talked about often and considered often the subject that we now call anthropology, but we didn't have that name for it in those days. He had near the front of his mind all the time not only the problem of what could be done by farmers and by the government to increase the incomes of farmers, but also the wants and desires of farmers and farm families — not necessarily always on the material side. M. L. had this broad gauged view of life in general, and farm life in the different parts of the United States
in particular, and he introduced that into the thinking of the Department of Agriculture more than it ever had been before.

He was a stimulator of us in the Department of Agriculture, and he spent quite a lot of his time during that period in working with the agricultural colleges and visiting the agricultural colleges of the country. Many of the agricultural colleges were just organizing their work in agricultural economics and farm management. Much of it was in cooperation one way or another with the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. During the time that M. L. was formally associated with us there he spent, I remember, a great part of his time out of the office, out in the field and in the agricultural colleges. I think that must have been about 1924.

During that period he and Spillman had lots of contact with each other. They already knew each other. M. L. had been a homesteader in Montana. After he joined the Montana Agricultural College as an economist and as an extension worker, he'd become acquainted with Spillman and knew him and admired him.

Henry C. Taylor thought very highly of M. L. Wilson.
and looked on him as the top-bracket agricultural economist in the whole country. As I remember, both officially and unofficially, there were very close relations between them. I'm quite sure that if there had been any personality clash at all I would have been conscious of it.

M. L. didn't want to stay in Washington at that time. He could have stayed right there if he had chosen to do so, but after this period of six months or so he went back to Montana. I think he felt that he, M. L., would be happier out in his mountains. I remember he and I used to talk about the mountains. Both of us grew up in the plains. M. L. felt that he could really do more to influence events in Montana and among the farmers of Montana than he could down here.

Tractors, horses, mechanical farming, and so on were in the air; the pioneering, homestead days in Montana had just passed; and the family farm was scarcely established there. M. L. was responsible for organizing what was called the Fairway Farms. They got a grant of money from some philanthropic group to either acquire land in efficient family farm sizes or to enable a renter to rent an efficient family size farm. They also made loans to the owner or renter so he could equip his farm with the right kind of tools, machinery, and so on. Tractors
were one of the items. Another was big teams - a ten horse or a fifteen horse team had as much power as a tractor in those days. Through this Fairway Farms the operators of the Fairway Farms were helped and encouraged to use large units of horsepower as well as tractors and mechanical power. I don't remember who financed it, and I don't remember how long it lasted.

There was quite a little relationship between that and what later came to be called supervised credit and the tenant purchase program of the Farm Security Administration. The Farm Security Administration was focused primarily in the South, the Middle-West, and irrigated areas of the Far West. But the philosophy underlying M. L.'s Fairway Farms was quite similar to that underlying the Bankhead-Jones Tenant Purchase Program of the 1930's, the assistance program to low income farmers that was carried out through the Farm Security Administration, as distinct from the loaning program of the Farm Credit Administration. I'm not sure that in M. L.'s mind there was any particularly close carry-over from Fairway Farms to the Farm Security Administration, but the same basic idea was there - to supply a farmer with the credit he needed, to help him get hold of the right sized farm and
the right kind of capital goods, to keep accounts of his
inputs and outputs, (another expression which became common
in those days) and to help the farmer each year appraise
what he had been able to do the year before, what the
weaknesses of it were, how to reorganize his farming
business, and how to change it so as to make more money
next year.

I think H. C. Taylor was one of the members of the
board of directors or board of trustees of the Fairway
Farms corporation. I think M. L. was the director or
manager of it.

M. L. had taken a position on McNary-Haugenism
even before he came in to Washington for this little
stay. At the time I first knew him, he had this feeling
that I described; that the well being of farm people was
decreasing relative to the well being of other segments
of the population; and that agricultural prices and
agricultural incomes were decreasing relative to the
prices of other things and incomes of other classes of
people; and that this was a field which the government
should step into and somehow or other help to correct the
disparities. I don't know when M. L. first began to take
an active part in the discussions and planning of the
McNary-Haugen movement, but he was one of the people in it. At the time he was down here it was a rather important extracurricular activity beside his job of running this division. Of course, from then on he was very much interested in it and was pushing in any way and every way he could to help the movement along.

As far as I know there was never any close relationship between Henry C. Wallace and M. L. Wilson. I don't remember that I ever saw H. C. and M. L. together or heard a comparison of their views, but I think they would have been pretty close together.

M. L., just like the rest of us, was a member of the Peck faction. I don't like to say he was a follower of George Peck, but I'd say subscribed to George Peck's philosophy. I remember one of the many things we concerned ourselves with in those days was how to apply the equalization fee, the heart of the Peck-Johnson, McNary-Haugen program, to products such as hogs, butter, and fruits and vegetables. It was all worked out in relation to commodities that were on the export market, and here are commodities that are not necessarily on the export market. I remember M. L. in such discussions, answering questions, and so on.
Mils Olsen, whom I mentioned, came into the Bureau of Agricultural Economics about the time I did. His formal position was head of a new division of agricultural credit - or agricultural finance maybe it was called. We didn't have the term "brain truster" in those days, but Nils was the brain truster for the McNary-Haugen program. M. L. had a lot to do with Olsen in those days, as I did, on such things as I am mentioning and many other things as well.

I feel quite sure that there was a lot of talk, give and take, and discussion between Prof Spillman and M. L. Wilson during that period when M. L. was formally inside the Department of Agriculture, and that that continued thereafter. I've been trying to think myself where this name "domestic allotment" originated. It was not in Spillman's book. It was just a commonly used phrase. I can't remember if I heard it spoken first or whether I saw it in print first. It was common before the thirties.

As I said, M. L. had a very cosmopolitan viewpoint and a wide range of interests, not all of them focused on farming and the well being of farm people directly, but he was a very stimulating person as he is today. He went
back to Montana after his few months here. From then on I was very closely associated with him. I corresponded with him and I'd see him when he'd come to Washington and I'd see him at various places around the country.

When he left, I became head of the Division of Farm Management and remained there, I guess, until some time in 1928, when I went over to be assistant chief in charge of research in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. M. L. had gone back to Montana, and I was in his place while H. C. Taylor was still chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

H. C. Wallace died, and then Howard M. Gore became acting secretary for a period of a few months. He had been assistant secretary. From the standpoint of the overall leadership and direction of the Department, as I remember it, everything was at a standstill. H. C. Taylor, I remember, was having a difficult time with Gore. Gore didn't have the leadership ability at all, as I remember it, that Wallace did.

I remember one specific instance with Gore. He was from West Virginia, and there was a man in the division - Bruce McKinley I think his name was - who was just one of the run of the mine professional workers in the
division. One day I was informed by the administrative officer of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics that Mr. Gore thought that Mr. McKinley should have a promotion and an increase in salary. I remember that made me feel not good and I said, "I couldn't recommend that without recommending promotions for a lot of other people in the division that are just as deserving and a lot more so." I was stubborn, and that was all there was to that as far as I was concerned. I don't know whether McKinley ever got his promotion or not, but I never signed the papers. That maybe was typical of a lot of things that were going on during Gore's short period there.

There was a great letdown. We'd lost our leader, Henry C. Wallace, a real leader. That was a shock for everybody, and then here was Gore, Acting Secretary of Agriculture during this period with no particular leadership and no force. He was interested in and was thinking about small things, you see - personal favors, I don't remember whether he was considered for the appointment to the Secretaryship or not.

The general feeling was that Herbert Hoover, who was Secretary of Commerce, picked the Secretary of
Agriculture to succeed Wallace. William E. Jardine, was president of the Kansas State Agricultural College, and presidents of agricultural colleges are high up in the hierarchy. He was a rather broad gauged man, as agricultural college presidents and deans and directors of experiment stations went in those days. Presumably he was quite well qualified for the Secretaryship.

Jardine exerted leadership of a kind, but it was entirely different from H. C. Wallace's. It was oriented in a different direction. Wallace, as I said, was a forceful sort of a man. He'd take a position and stand for it. He knew what he thought should be done in respect to agriculture, both by the Department of Agriculture and outside. Jardine, as far as the Department of Agriculture and the economics of agriculture were concerned, didn't take forthright positions. I shouldn't say he would wait until he knew which way the wind was blowing and then fall in with it, but there wasn't the forthrightness with him that there was with H. C. Wallace.

I always suspected that there was a close relation between Jardine and Hoover, but I don't know. Many of us suspected that, you see.
In the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the period of March to August, 1925, when it was felt that H. C. Taylor would leave, there was a great feeling of uncertainty, of course. Also, a great many of us felt an increasing loyalty to H. C. Taylor and an increasing dislike of Gore and Jardine. Along with that went a sharpening up of almost a feud that had started between Commerce and Agriculture in the R. G. Wallace days.

There was uncertainty as to the future of the work program of the bureau and various parts of it and constant wondering what would happen next in regard to Taylor-Jardine relationships. We were always thinking about Herbert Hoover in the background.

I never did know what was the overt act or particular circumstance that caused H. C. Taylor to be fired. H. C. had just had another one of his unsatisfactory and stormy sessions with the Secretary, and he came back to the office and said he was through and was leaving. That was in August 15, 1925.

I can't say that H. C. Taylor's departure created a cleavage in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. I can't remember any reorganization inside the Bureau of Agricultural Economics or any people leaving along with
H. C. Wilf Olsen, who by that time had become assistant chief of the bureau, one of two, and Lloyd Tenny, who was the other, both remained on the job. I can't remember any breakup or reorganization.

As far as Jardine is concerned, I think it is probably true that Hoover was trying to build up allegiances to himself in the government with men of power, and of course, there was also his relationship with Coolidge, when Coolidge came in, but I can't remember anybody of consequence in the Department of Agriculture who became a Hooverite or who became pro-Hoover as a result.

Partisan politics and all that never had anything to do with it at all. I mentioned the farm bloc. The southern members of the farm bloc were Democrats, of course. The farm problem and the friend of the farmer showed itself in the legislative halls. I remember we used to watch the votes on the McNary-Haugen bills and the Capper-Volstead Act and all the other farm bills, and they weren't primarily partisan.

In the period 1925, '26, '27, '28 and '29, the heat was off some because farm prices had improved a little, but the farm bloc still remained in being, and the interest
groups and pressure groups were still pushing for something to be done, and before the crash came the Federal Farm Board came into existence through legislation.

I want to say a little bit more about the outlook work of the Department of Agriculture. I think I mentioned that in about 1921 or '22, H. C. Taylor and H. C. Wallace originated this idea that the United States Department of Agriculture should give to farmers economic information about what prices of the products they were going to grow in the year ahead were likely to be. Behind that were questions such as: What will the supply of and the demand for agricultural commodities produced in the United States likely be in the year ahead? What will that mean to prices? What adjustments in farming would be profitable? That word "adjustment" carried on from those days until now. It came into being in that period.

The hypothesis was: If a farmer knew in January or February of 1925 that in the fall of 1925 the demand for wheat would be less than it had been the year before and presumably the price would be lower, then he would look around for some other commodity to produce in place of part of the wheat that he had been producing. An
easier one: If a farmer in the corn belt knew in the spring of 1925 that in the fall of 1925 the number of hogs coming to market would be less than it had been the year before, and presumably the price higher, then he would increase the number of pigs farrowed on his place in the spring of 1925 and maybe raise more corn to feed to these pigs so that they would get to the market at a time when prices were good. That was the hypothesis on which this outlook service was based when it was originated.

Another part of it was "Intentions to Plant. As a real part of this outlook effort, which carries on to the present day, the Division of Crop Estimates, which is now known as the Division of Agricultural Estimates, obtained from farmers statements of how many acres of wheat, corn, cotton, and other commodities they intended to plant in the year ahead. That is reported on March 15 every year since then. I saw the announcement of this year's results in the paper this morning (20 March 1952) on how many acres of all of these crops farmers intend to plant. I was associated with this.

The Crop and Livestock Estimating Service of the Department of Agriculture had then and still has a great network of crop reporters throughout the country. Most
of them are farmers who are voluntary, unpaid, crop reporters. At stated intervals each crop reporter out yonder gets a questionnaire of some kind or other from his state office. The monthly crop reports of the Department of Agriculture in those days were based almost exclusively on the replies to those questionnaires. One month a farmer would be asked, "How many acres of corn have you planted this year? How did that compare with the number of acres you planted last year? Another month he’ll be asked, "What yield per acre do you expect from your corn this year? How does that compare with the yield you got last year?" Down at the end of the season he’ll be asked, "How many acres did you harvest and how many bushels did you harvest?" That question is the basis of the December crop report which is the report on production. These others come along during the season starting in June - "How many acres of corn have you planted?" - and along in July or August - "What yield per acre do you expect this year?" The crops are growing by that time. And so it goes for all different crops.

Outlook reports and intentions-to-plant reports were a logical outgrowth of the work of the Department of Agriculture. They came with the rise of economics in
the Department of Agriculture. The Department of Agriculture was established to supply farmers with information about good seeds, good cultural practices, what crops were adapted to what parts of the United States and so forth - to supply what we call technological information. Then the farmer, getting that information, would apply it and get better harvests of both crops and livestock and increase his income. That was what the Department of Agriculture was from the time it was organized and that was what the agricultural colleges were, too, from the time they were organized up until this period after 1900. In the days of Spillman, Warnen, Taylor and company economics and farm management began to emerge. And in the early 1920s the Department of Agriculture and the land grant colleges began supplying farmers with economic information as well as technical information. It was just a logical addition.

The emergence of economics and statistics as something somewhat organized occurred at this time. Up until that time there had been no organized thought or work on the application of economics to agricultural problems. With statistics, the Crop Estimates had been in existence for a long, long time, but all that they had done was
get out these monthly reports and publish them in the paper. The traders in agricultural commodities were the principal users of them and the principal beneficiaries.

Here is Outlook, what the demand is going to be and so forth. Here is the Intentions-to-Plant Report. Presumably if farmers had the Outlook Reports and the Intentions-to-Plant Reports they would have a sound basis for making individual adjustments, farm by farm, around the country that would keep supply and demand of all the products in better balance than it had been and enhance farm incomes. That was our religion for a good many years - for Taylor, for Spillman, although this didn't emerge as a big activity until after Spillman's days. This started in 1922.

The farmers read the reports, and the agricultural colleges and the extension services of the agricultural colleges picked them up. As I said, the agricultural colleges in this period were organizing or expanding their little departments of farm management and economics. Practically all of them made Outlook work one of their big projects, especially on the extension side. There got to be a whole network of so-called extension economists around the country. As a matter of fact, one of W. L.
Wilson's titles in Montana was extension economist. They worked out from the agricultural colleges through the county agents with individual farmers wherever they could reach them, and they would carry the Outlook story. Meetings would be held, county by county around this state, that state, and many states. The professors from the colleges and a lot of us from the Department would go out to these meetings and present the Outlook to the farmers - whoever would come.

A farmer, looking at the Outlook Report and seeing that a certain product was going to be overproduced in the coming year, might decide to plant another product, but he couldn't know how many other farmers might also decide to plant something else. That finally caught up with us. In a way the Outlook service was a forerunner, as I said, of agricultural adjustment, of farm planning, of production goals - important activities of the Department and colleges today, you see. The Outlook service still carries on as a background.

The conservative Republicans tended to look on farming as an industry impersonally rather than as a large group of people or families. This Outlook service was accepted pretty well - I should say accepted whole
heartedly. Coolidge accepted it, and I don't remember that Hoover opposed it until later. The Department of Commerce was setting itself up to supply information to businessmen on the supply of and the demand for what they manufactured or what they were selling. They had regional offices by the end of the 1920s all around the country which were really set up - I shouldn't say it - as sort of adjuncts of the chambers of commerce to bring to businessmen all the information that would help them make their decisions with respect to their buying, their selling, and their trade, and so on. There was a real analogy between that and this agricultural Outlook service. The system of agricultural attaches around the world was really part of this Outlook business, too, you see. I think it has been one of the most important aids to agriculture, and it's still here.

Sometime along in 1931 when Hoover was President and after I went to California, the Outlook Report came out with statements of declining purchasing power, deepening depression, and so on. Hoover didn't like it at all. Arthur M. Hyde was Secretary. I remember the Outlook Report, published every year, was toned down and made to be almost meaningless, you see, because the President
was objecting to anybody saying that better times weren't just around the corner. I happen to remember that because that was one of the few years there when I wasn't directly concerned with it.

The Outlook service during that relatively stable period, 1925, '26, '27 and '28, came to be looked upon as a very fine activity and gained lots of support, but when the depression struck in 1929, it wasn't long until those of us who had been so much interested in and had been working so hard to get more and better economic information for the farmers began to come to the conclusion that even all the economic information in the world and the dissemination of it couldn't stem a world wide depression and that something more was needed both on the farm front and on the other sectors of the economic front.

Of course, back in the McNary-Haugen days it was recognized by some that something more needed to be done. I should say that everybody, even the people that contended that just giving farmers information was the only proper government function with respect to farming, came to the conclusion that the government would have to do something more than just give information to farmers and businessmen to stem a worldwide depression. But that
didn’t mean that economic information with respect to agriculture and economic information for farmers was to be cut down or stopped, because this depression was the result of forces which no one foresaw. So on one side there was a realization of the need for more and better economic information and a feeling that that was the direction that government effort should take, and on the other side was the feeling: Yes, economic information, but action programs as well.

Between 1925 and ’29 there was not much pressure for action because farm prices were almost at parity, plus the fact that those in power — Coolidge, Hoover, and others — really and honestly felt, I think, that it wasn’t the place of government in our economy to step in and take direct action such as collecting money through taxes or otherwise and making direct payments to farmers and others. As I say, Coolidge didn’t take such action on anything.

Except for Cabinet members and sub-Cabinet members, in the group that I knew there wasn’t much change and turnover. People weren’t quitting the government and other people coming in except, as I say, at the Cabinet and sub-Cabinet level. They just sort of settled down.
Many of the people in the Department of Agriculture came
during the Woodrow Wilson administration and stayed right
on through. Of course, there weren't many of us so-
called economists in the Wilson days—only the bunch
around Prof Spillman. The Crop Estimates is an old
service that antedated Wilson's administration. It had
been growing some. The old Crop Estimates crowd, as we
called it, stayed on through the Wilson times.

Here is something else that may be of historical
significance. One of the things that H. C. Taylor did
was to revivify and rejuvenate Crop Estimates, which had
been the Bureau of Statistics. Leon M. Estabrook was
chief of the Bureau of Crop Estimates. I remember a number
of the state statisticians who were elderly, satisfied
with what they were doing, and weren't endeavoring to do
a better job and get better statistics. Estabrook himself
was a rather forward looking man. His chief statistician
was Nat G. Murray, who had been here many years.

Along in the early 1920s the program of what was
then the Division of Crop Estimates of the Bureau of
Agricultural Economics, was examined in great detail by
a group of people brought in from outside. I remember
George Warren was one of them. Outside the Department
there had been quite a lot of development in statistical method - ways of measuring the reliability of statistics and better ways of sampling the farms of the country to get more reliable estimates of what the whole thing was. So it was all looked over and reorganized. Quite a lot of new blood came into the statistics of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the early twenties.

When Crop Estimates was made part of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Estabrook was "promoted" from chief of Crop Estimates to associate chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Not too long thereafter he was assigned to the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome to promote and be in charge of the first world census of agriculture, which was to be taken in 1930. For several years before 1930 he was in Rome and traveling around the world visiting different countries to interest them in taking a census of agriculture in that year of 1930. In 1932 he came back here when that job was finished and he retired to a country place up in Frederick County, Maryland.

There was during the M. C. Wallace and H. C. Taylor days, as I think I've said before, a considerable
clash between those of us on the economic side and those on the natural and biological side. We, of course, insisted that what they were doing wasn't enough and that they were often recommending things that were uneconomic or unprofitable. Additional production of milk from a dairy herd might cost more than the additional production is worth, you see. I was most interested in Outlook work and the improvement of statistics at that time.

Quite a group of intelligent, forward looking, younger men who had a real desire to serve their country came into the Bureau of Agricultural Economics during this period. In our case, this meant helping improve agriculture and the conditions of farming. There was general acceptance of the idea of "agricultural fundamentalism;" that is, if agriculture were prosperous and healthy the rest of the economy would be, too. I shouldn't say that we were exclusively agricultural fundamentalists, but we thought first and foremost about agriculture.

The dodos over in the Department of Commerce were taking care of the rest of the economy, you see, but there were some jurisdictional scraps. I was talking about
Outlook. If we were to appraise the demand for agricultural commodities, we knew that we had to consider the income and the purchasing power of the entire economy, but that was the job of the Department of Commerce rather than Agriculture. So they didn't like it when we came out with a statement that overall demand or overall national income would decline or would be larger in the year ahead than it had been in the past. They felt that was their job. They'd quarrel with us about the accuracy of what we did. They weren't coming out with anything like that, but they didn't like for us to. That's what I call "jurisdictionitis." Quite a lot of this group hostility and even individual hostility in the government in those days, as I look back on it, was based on jurisdictionitis, and today it's probably worse than it ever was.

I remember somebody once said to me that the scope of the job of a particular person who works in the government - I suppose it goes for people who work for a salary in an organization anywhere - is of real interest to him and that he gets a sense of ownership about that. I heard somebody say once that jurisdictionitis among bureaucrats takes the place of the desire to own property.

There are many people - I don't like to say people
who have secondary positions - whose jobs are primarily
bread and butter jobs - "I've got a good job and I'm never
going to get much farther in this life." They turn to
extracurricular activities as an outlet for their
desires and emotions. The Department of Agriculture had
and still has an orchestra. If, as you suggest, a man who
has been the government can't remember anything about the
history of a particular year, but remembers only the
parties that took place, my first reaction would be that
that man hasn't been very close to history; hasn't been,
as I might say, in the stream of events, and hasn't had
any part in shaping history.

Back in the twenties the most aggressive bureau
was the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. The Capper-
Volstead Act, the Packers and Stockyards Act, the Grain
Standards Act, and the Cotton Standards Act were all
administered by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. It
was the aggressive, growing point. I'd say second most
aggressive - and maybe other people, M. L. for example,
would say the most aggressive - was the Extension Service.
That had begun developing before economics came into the
picture. In the period right after the war the Agricultural
Extension Service spread all over the country.
We used to talk about the old line. We often referred to some part of the Department as "Old Line Bureaus." For example, the Bureau of Plant Industry and the Bureau of Animal Industry. It isn't fair to say that the people in those bureaus weren't interested in scientific agriculture or that they weren't really trying in their way to make discoveries and to produce better varieties of crops and through their experiments determine better ways of feeding and producing livestock. That was their objective - those and similar things. It isn't fair to say that they weren't really interested in them, but it was a line of work that had been started way back yonder, and they were just carrying on, I guess I should say, in a passive way during that period.

There is still some hangover from that. My oldest son, Grant Tolley, came to Washington in 1942 to work for the Office of Price Administration. One day in connection with his price control activities he went over to the Bureau of Animal Industry of the Department of Agriculture to get some information about serums and antibiotics for controlling animal diseases. I remember seeing him that evening and the way he jumped onto Dad about finding an office over Dad's Department that didn't know a war was on,
price control was needed or anything of the kind. Grant felt that they were just sitting there over among their test tubes, talking, and enjoying themselves as apparently they had been since the beginning of the Department of Agriculture.

They weren't all like that at all. P. V. ("Vince") Cardon, who took over ten years or more ago as director of agricultural research is an entirely different kind of man. A great deal has been done during and since World War II to spread out, rejuvenate, and increase the influence of agricultural research.

Another occurrence of the 1920s in the field of farm management, agricultural economics and research and extension was the development of Farm Budgeting. Before H. C. Taylor's days some of the colleges had introduced farm accounting, whereby an individual farmer would be induced to keep an accurate record every day throughout the year of his income, expenditures, the amount of feed he fed to his livestock, and so on - a farm record of past history. The idea was that an accumulation and the study of those records would enable one to make some generalizations about the best way to organize a farm in
a particular place and the most efficient way to operate
it. But when we began looking ahead instead of looking
back, we had to take into consideration the fact that
prices, and so on next year were likely to be different
from what they were last year.

John D. Black, I think, invented "Farm Budgeting."
It became a research tool. For a typical farm in an
area, one takes the typical inputs of labor, feed,
machinery, and so forth, and derives therefrom a typical
set of outputs - bushels of crops, pounds of meat and
other livestock products, and so on - valued at the prices
that are expected to prevail a year hence, if it is a
budget for a year hence, or five years hence, if it is a
budget for five years hence. Then the expected income
of this typical farm is computed. Then one makes
alternative budgets for this typical farm - say, increase
the size of the swine herd and decrease the size of the
dairy herd, to see whether it would be more profitable in
the year and the years ahead to keep the same size of
swine herd and same size of dairy herd or to decrease his
swine herd and increase his dairy herd or vice versa;
and so on for many alternatives. In fact, we'd make budgets
for each of several alternatives and arrive at conclusions
as to what would be the most economic or profitable adjustments for farmers in different situations.

Farm Budgeting first came to be an accepted method of research and then an accepted method of extension work. The extension economist of the college in a state would meet with a group of farmers and help these farmers prepare budgets for their particular farms for the year or the years ahead to determine what would be the most profitable combination of enterprises and methods of operation. These Farm Budgets later were labelled Farm Plans. In the 1930s making individual farm plans was one of the things that various agencies helped farmers to do in the name of agricultural adjustment. A number of people in the Department of Agriculture and in the agricultural colleges, who helped in one way or another with the development of the agricultural adjustment program of 1933 had this Farm Budgeting and Farm Planning background and method of thinking.

J. E. Hutson, who has an office right here in Washington somewhere - I had dinner at his house a couple of weeks ago - did a lot to develop this farm budgeting idea. As a matter of fact, he wrote his doctor's thesis at Columbia University on the subject,
Another man who was here was J. W. ("Jess") Tapp. He came into the Department way back in my farm tractor days, in the early 1920s when we were studying horses and tractors in the wheat belt. I was sort of chief of party, and I recruited some helpers, some of whom I'd never seen. One of them was a man named Tapp, who was at the University of Wisconsin. When I got off the bus someplace one night down in Kansas, this nice young boy met me to take me to the hotel. That was my first acquaintance with Jess Tapp. That might have been back in 1921, '22 or '23. He was a native of Kentucky and had graduated from the Kentucky Agricultural College, as Jack Hutson had. Jess then was doing graduate work at the University of Wisconsin. This was his summer job. He was in the division of Farm Management and other places in the bureau during most of the twenties. He went to Harvard, I remember, for a year or two, and in the latter part of the twenties, as a result of what he had done at Harvard, he took a position with an investment firm in Wall Street. He was there during the time I was in California and came back to the Department in '33, when I did. During the five years from 1933 to the end of 1938, when he left to go to California, we were quite
close together. Jack Hutson and I were quite close during that same period.

Foster P. ("Buck") Elliott joined the Department along in that same period. Incidentally, Hutson, Tapp, and Elliott were graduates of the University of Kentucky and all knew each other as undergraduates down there.

Oris V. Wells joined the Department about the same time that these three fellows did — maybe a year or two later, but before 1925. Oris was in the New Mexico Agricultural College. He was said to be the brightest young man that had ever been to the New Mexico Agricultural College. Some of our people, M. L. Wilson and Mordecai Ezekiel, found this bright young boy down at the New Mexico Agricultural College. They were down there working with the people at the New Mexico Agricultural College on the economics of range cattle production. As I remember it, they wanted a student helper, a computer, to fix up their statistics and so on, and they got Oris Wells. Zeke, who has as quick a mind as anybody, found that Oris could keep up with him, Zeke.

Buck Elliott was with me during the period of the 1930s in the Program Planning Division of the Triple-A. Buck and Oris were both there, and then they came back
to BAE when I did in 1938.

I just wasn't involved in politics. I can't say I deliberately stayed out of politics, but I just wasn't involved in politics.

The Division of Cooperative Marketing was established and Chris Christensen came to be head of it while H. C. Taylor was chief. The Division of Cooperative Marketing was a research and educational institution to get information and supply it to cooperatives, to give expert advice and assistance to cooperative organizations about their business methods, their marketing outlets at home and abroad, and so on. It got to be quite influential, as government activities had influence in those days, in the latter part of the 1920 decade. When the Farm Board was established to sponsor and help cooperatives, there was a big question as to whether the Division of Cooperative Marketing should remain in the Department of Agriculture or whether it should be transferred to the Farm Board. I believe the whole thing was transferred to the Farm Board. I'm sure Chris Christensen who had been chief of the division, went over to the Farm Board, and after a year or so there he resigned to go to the University of Wisconsin to be Dean of Agriculture.
When the Farm Credit Administration got going big in the 1930s, a section was established whose function it is to make loans to cooperatives. When that was established, some of the same people had been active in the old Division of Cooperative Marketing and some who had been in the Farm Board and so on came into the Farm Credit Administration in this cooperative marketing section. There is a cooperative division in the Farm Credit Administration today, and a series of Banks for Cooperatives. There is a provision for making government loans to cooperative marketing associations, that doesn't apply to other kinds of marketing institutions.

The Division of Cooperative Marketing in those three or four years was really a part of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and the Department of Agriculture.

There was a group of people in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the latter 1920s who had come through the old Office of Markets, which was one of the three integral parts of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Many of them had their roots in private marketing institutions, organization, or companies of one kind or another. They were market news men, and men who were making and developing standard grades for cotton, wheat,
and similar things. A bunch of those people thought that cooperative marketing wasn't too good. One of them was a very good friend of mine, Clarence Kitchen, who had come up through that line in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. He was assistant chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics at the same time I was. There were two assistant chiefs— one in charge of research and one in charge of marketing and regulatory work. "Kitch" was that assistant chief, and I was assistant chief in charge of research. Kitch is one of the people who never accepted the worthiness of the cooperative movement. His sympathies were always with the private marketers. As a matter of fact, he left the Department of Agriculture about the same time I did, and he is now, I think, employed by a trade association of private marketers here in Washington.

This feeling wasn't very extensive. Co-ops were farmers, too, especially the smaller co-ops. Helping co-ops spread outside the Department of Agriculture, through the land grant college system, and through the extension system was the general feeling. One of the things that I did in California was work with co-ops and help organize co-ops.
I knew about the veto of the McNary-Haugen bills in 1927 and '28 and had my first information about the veto message in both cases when I read it in the newspaper. I wondered then and I wonder to this day who wrote those veto messages for Coolidge. Cal Coolidge himself didn't write them. Some of my friends in the Department of Commerce might have written them - Hoover or some of his people. I might be right or wrong. Or it might have been that Bill Jardine or one of his very close associates wrote them. It's a possibility.

The Capper-Ketcham Act adds funds to extension work. Another act in that 1920 period, the Purnell Act - Congressman Fred S. Purnell - authorized the appropriation of money for economic research in grants-in-aid style to the agricultural colleges. It must have been along in the middle of the 1920s. It was another example of the rise of interest in high circles in the economic problems of farmers. The Purnell Act was an extension of the old original Hatch and Adams Acts authorizing appropriations of money for economic research. It wasn't exclusively for economic research, and I remember there was quite a bit of scraping around inside the Department of Agriculture and inside the Land Grant College Association
to get a slice of this Furnell money, which we all thought was to be for economics, for what we then called old line work which had been supported by grants-in-aid for half a century. I remember then we attributed that to a very considerable extent to the lack of vision of the deans and directors of the agricultural colleges most of whom had been trained in the natural and biological sciences.

The Tobacco Statistics Act of January, 1929, provided for the collection and publication of statistics on tobacco and set standards and classifications for tobacco. Similar acts for milk, cotton, corn, and so forth had been passed during the twenties. I didn't have anything directly to do with either the passage of any of those acts or with the administration of them. This demonstrated the movement and desire on the part of government people, on the part of marketing people, and on the part of some of the farmers' organisations, for more and better statistics, especially statistics of marketing. This is commonly characterised as market news or the Market News Service.

Also, grades and standards for marketing were being developed all during this period. Some of them were
legalized and made mandatory for international trading, as I believe cotton standards and grain standards were. Most of them were permissive and remain permissive to this day.

The number of types of tobacco marketed in this country is very large. There are scores of them. If all different types of tobacco were lumped together showing only how many pounds of tobacco are produced in the country, are marketed in the country, or are exported, it would not be very meaningful to anybody who's really and directly interested in the production and marketing of tobacco. So probably the marketers, the producers, the Department of Agriculture people, and the Congressmen from the tobacco districts came to the conclusion that more and better statistics were needed in order that farmers and marketers would have better information on which to base their decisions.

Arthur M. Hyde became Secretary of Agriculture in 1929, and I left the department six or seven months thereafter. As far as I remember, in my part of the Department his coming didn't result in any particular change in activities or emphasis. I didn't know him as well as I knew some of his predecessors. He was from
Missouri. He had been an automobile dealer and had been governor of Missouri. It seemed to me that his knowledge of agriculture was considerably less than that of his predecessor Jardine and much less than that of Wallace. His interest in agriculture, in the farmers' movement, and the welfare of farmers, was a secondary thing in his life, as was also his interest in agricultural research and agricultural education. In other words, being Secretary of Agriculture was sort of a secondary occupation for him.

Jardine was a knowledgeable man about agriculture and agricultural problems, technical and economic. He knew quite a lot about it, you see. Hyde, I always thought, just didn't know much about farming and agriculture and wasn't particularly interested in it and wasn't interested in doing anything about it. I never knew what he was interested in. I remember hearing stories about how a group used to gather in his office in the afternoon when business wasn't too hot and drink tea and play cards. That had some effect on the Department.

I remember another thing that had quite an effect on some of us—salaries of Department workers. Shortly before Hyde became Secretary the classification act for
the whole government service was passed. All the positions
were classified and the requirements and the salaries to
apply to the positions were written down. It resulted
in an increase in salaries for a lot of people in the
Department of Agriculture and throughout the government.
But Secretary Hyde is reported to have said at that time
that as far as he was concerned $4000 was enough salary
for anybody in the Department of Agriculture. That had
been his salary when he was governor of Missouri, and that
was enough for anybody.

I left shortly after he came, and I don't remember
a great deal about him.

My old friend Nils Olsen, who died some years ago,
remained as chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics
through that period. Somewhere in the period between
1929 and 1933 and the coming of Roosevelt, Nils Olsen,
who, as I said, had been the brain truster of Henry C.
Wallace became, shall I say, a disciple of Arthur H.
Hyde, and the poor old Bureau of Agricultural Economics
just sort of sat still all through that period.

I remember one incident. I was in Washington the
night of the election, and the morning after FDR was
elected I went to call on my old friend Nils in his office.
I was feeling just as good as I ever felt in my life.
All the things we had stood for and worked for were going
to come to pass, but Nils didn't like it at all.

Henry A. Wallace came to be Secretary and never
got in step with Nils, and within six months Nils resigned
and went to work for the Equitable Life Insurance Company.
Whatever happened to Nils happened during the Hyde administra-
tion. I think it was a personal thing with Nils — probably
what happens to so many of us — a desire for security,
falling in line with whatever the boss says, does or
wants is the thing to do. Some of it might have had its
roots in partisan politics. We were all Republicans back
in the twenties. Nils was still a Republican on the
morning of the fifth of March, 1933.

The Bureau of Agricultural Economics had enough
momentum to carry on. I never heard Nils' name being
mentioned as one of the cardplayers. The fellow who
told me the story about the cardplaying is dead now —
Clyde W. Warburton, who was director of extension in
those days and M. L.'s predecessor in his present position
(1952).

Statistics and Crop Estimates, if nothing new is
being developed, had to carry on. Nothing new came into
the Bureau of Agricultural Economics during the Hyde days. I wasn't a member of the Department at that time, and I don't remember any bureau or any particular line of activity that particularly progressed during that period.

H. A. Wallace was editor of Wallace's Farmer during that period. The one thing I remember is that H. A. supported Al Smith. I voted for Hoover in '28, if I voted. I lived in Washington, but if I sent in an absentee ballot to Indiana it would have been for Hoover.

Nils Olsen was concerned with my going to the Giannini Foundation only in an indirect way. Nils was chief and I was assistant chief. The job I remember devoting the most time to was trying to get some organization into the widespread and farflung research work of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Different fields and different projects had never been organized and catalogued, and I remember spending a lot of time getting a catalogue of projects - what the objectives were, what results were being obtained, how much money was being spent on each, and so on - in all of these different divisions, every one of which was doing some research. I remember getting the feeling by the time I'd been a year in that particular position that, "After all, let's remember the calendar - this was 1929 or early 1930 -
and nothing's going to happen here in this situation. I'm not going to be able to do anything except sit around and keep the files on research activities in the Department of Agriculture." I got itchy feet again, so I was receptive to something that came along.

A. F. Giannini had given the University of California an endowment of a million dollars to help them expand their economic services to agriculture in California. It wasn't stated in just exactly those terms, but that was what it was. C. B. Hutchison had just become dean of the agricultural college of the University of California, and this Giannini Foundation was really a glorified department of agricultural economics in the college of agriculture. All of the college of agriculture is up at Davis, California except the economics. There was more at Berkeley, California, in those days. The experiment station is at Davis and the undergraduate college is up at Davis, but some research on animals and plants, genetics, and so on in those days was down at Berkeley. The grant had been made, the Foundation formally established, C. B. Hutchison had become dean, and he was looking for somebody to be director of the Giannini Foundation.

This came to me by way of my friend John D. Black.
I think what happened was that Hutchison came to Black to try to get him to take the job. Black said he didn't want it. Out of their discussion my name emerged, and Black came to talk to me about it. It sounded interesting. I had never been to California in my life. There were two states that I hadn't been in at that time. One of them was Florida and the other was California. So there was a little adventure in it. There was the salary, too. I remember there was $1000 increase in salary, and I always had been hard up, so that had a little appeal.

It was something of an escape from where I was, but on the positive side somebody had offered me a job as a top flight professor in a top flight university. C. B. Hutchison had assumed the title of director of the Foundation. When he became dean, of course, the Foundation wasn't organized. I went out there as assistant director, but I hadn't been there very long until C. B. came around one day and said I was to take it all over. M. L. Wilson had nothing to do with this so far as I know. He might have.

I went to Nils Olsen and said goodbye. I wrote my resignation. I left behind Zeke, Buck Elliott, and Oris Wells - Jess had gone to New York just a little while
before that - all my friends, the statisticians in Crop and Livestock Estimates, economic statisticians and price analysts in Stine's division. I cut loose from the Department. I resigned and I straightened out my leave and retirement fund. Pulling out of a Department of Agriculture job is more trouble than pulling out of a university job. I've done it three times. I was finished as far as the Department of Agriculture was concerned. I took with me a record of having started in as a clerk at $1500 a year and going out as assistant chief of the bureau, you see. I was kind of proud to carry that out with me, too.

I expected to stay in California for good. I remember long talks with a lot of people - John Black more than anybody else - about university life and being a professor and the difference between that and what I had been doing. I remember talking to Mr. L. about it when I was in the process of making up my mind. It didn't take me too long to make up my mind. I didn't go out there to look it over first.
From the time I arrived at the University of California in August, 1930, until the school year opened in August (sic), I was working with Dean Hutchison, who for the first year I was there had the title of director of the Giannini Foundation. I was assistant director. I was working with him and others on the faculty both in the college of agriculture and in the economics department of the university to lay out a research and teaching program which was to be kicked off next fall.

We hired some new professors, associate professors and assistant professors. We established a series of what we called research associates, which were really fellowships for graduate students who would come for a year or more, take graduate work, and use half their time presumably doing research work - really helping the members of the faculty. Quite a large group of graduate students came there in the following years, and some of them have made their names since then in one place or another.

At the same time I was getting acquainted with California. Before I'd been in Washington, and all the states had been far away, and of course, California was
the farthest away. Contact with farmers and farm organizations had been Washington contacts and secondary contacts, but when I got to California I began to find that I had firsthand contacts and firsthand acquaintance and firsthand knowledge of what farm groups were thinking about and working on and what cooperative marketing organizations - there were many of them there - were thinking about and what their problems were. It was just at the time when the depression was striking. It began to make itself felt in California just about the time I arrived there and got deeper and deeper through 1930, '31, '32 and '33. Even in those first few months when I was out at the university and before I really got settled down, I found that farmer groups, such as the Farm Bureau Federation, were concerned with the deepening depression and falling farm prices.

I got a firsthand acquaintance with the California Farm Bureau Federation there. As I remember, they were primarily interested at that time in marketing problems. My impression of the other farm bureaus and the National Farm Bureau Federation is that they weren't concerned primarily with what we out there called marketing problems. Maybe that was just a manifestation of the depression and
the drop in prices of farm products and an effort on the part of the Farm Bureau Federation to do something to help farm prices. They thought that if marketing methods could just be improved then the margin between what the consumer paid and what the farmer received could be decreased and farm prices would rise again.

This attitude didn't reflect domination of the Bureau by cooperatives out there. They worked along with the farm bureau, as I remember it. I don't remember any scraps between them. As I look back, I think it was just a reflection of the spirit of California agriculture. The market for California products at that time was primarily in the East. The population of California and the West Coast wasn't nearly as big then as it is now, although it was growing then as it has. But their fruits, vegetables, and eggs and most of the things that were produced out there had their markets primarily in the East, and the prices that California farmers got were determined by prices in the East. They were far away, and the costs of marketing were high, and the demand was uncertain even in good times. The thoughts of the California farmers and their organizations tended to focus on the marketing problem.
Then, too, there were exports. Dried fruits were on the export market at that time. From a half to a third of the prunes and a half to a third of the raisins were sold export to Europe, Canada, and so on. They were interested and concerned about the prospects for markets abroad for what they exported. Then some products were up against foreign competition. Most of the lemons, another big crop of California, went to the East, where they set lemons from Italy. The lemon growers were interested in lessening the competition. English walnuts were another. Almonds, figs, dates, and so on were others. So there was a group interested in international trade - mainly tariffs and how tariffs could be increased or what could be done to give the California producers better markets within the United States for what was grown in California. That was one group. Another group, typified by the dried fruit people who were on the export market, was on the other side, thinking that the market should be free and trying to reduce the impediments to international trade. That went for both cooperatives, marketing associations, and the producers' groups, primarily the Farm Bureau. That is the only general farmers' organization of any great strength in California.
The Grange had little importance. The Farmers' Union was scarcely heard about in California in those days.

The dust bowl immigration began in about 1934. The "Okies" and "Arkies" began to come to California before that time as the depression deepened and before the drought of the Great Plains struck. People started to come to California as just a continuance or revival of the old westward migration of so many years ago. There were hard times in the Middle West, the mountain states and so on, and people came on West to look for a better place. But that reached its height in 1934 and 1936.

There was a migratory labor problem that I quickly became conscious of - mostly Mexicans and Filipinos and some other Orientals. There was a considerable number of migratory Japanese. Most of the Japanese got themselves settled, but there were still Japs that went up and down and followed the harvests. But, as I say, they were mostly Mexicans and Filipinos.

I quickly became conscious of the situation of organized labor. Most of California was not unionized at that time. As I remember, there was a very little unionization in Los Angeles and southern California, except among the skilled trades. There was more in northern
California and San Francisco than in southern California. The so-called fruit processing, fruit packing and canning industry was one of the large industries there, and during this period of the thirties as the depression deepened moves toward unionizing some of these groups or particular plants would get underway and even moves to unionize migratory labor kept coming up in this period of two or three years. Much of the unskilled labor that was employed in these fruit packing and processing plants was migratory labor.

I became very conscious of the antagonism of both the processors of agricultural commodities and the producers, those who owned land, toward any move on the part of labor to unionize. Along in this period of three years almost any move to organize or unionize this labor was labeled as communistic. I've heard farmers and fruit merchants, fruit canners, and fruit packers say, "Down at Merced and over at Fresno there's a bunch of Reds trying to organize our labor in the packing plants and on our farms, and we've got to get those Reds out of there." There I saw the remains of the old vigilant spirit of the gold rush days. You could just see it and feel it then on the hills of San Francisco. This was
almost as rabid among the farmers as it was among the manufacturers and handlers.

As the depression deepened and demand for California products in the markets of the eastern United States declined and continued to decline, there came among the cooperative marketing people, the chamber of commerce people, the Farm Bureau people, the manufacturers and processors of farm commodities - among all of those - a move to regulate the amount that was sent to market, to keep some of it at home and not send it to market at all. That wasn't exactly new. I remember the California Fruit Growers' Association, a big co-op that handles all kinds of citrus fruit had had prior to that time a marketing scheme of their own whereby they kept some of their lemons in years of high production and generally low demand and never sent them to market - they let them rot. They were hauled out and dumped in the desert or an arroyo someplace.

The fruit industry was far away from the market. A great part of all their fruit produced in California came by rail as far east as Chicago, Kansas City, and on to New York City and the cities of the East. Much of the fresh fruit would have to come under refrigeration.
It was quite an expensive rail haul. On top of that the cash outlay for production and marketing was quite high. Many of the farms— or ranches as they were called in California— were a large size and required lots of hand labor, especially for harvesting. So the out-of-pocket cost of harvesting, packing, and shipping all of this fruit represented a good part of the total cost of it. This is very different from the situation in the East, say, on a dairy farm, a family farm, where most of the work is done by the family or on a corn-hog farm in the corn belt or a wheat farm in the wheat belt or a cotton farm in the cotton belt, where typically most of the work is done by the farmer and his family and the cost of moving to market is low. That's one of the rather unique things I found in California.

As the depression deepened and the demand declined, the supply of fruit and other perishables kept up, of course. When harvest time came they'd all be harvested and shipped to the East. Along in 1931 and 1932, especially, a lot of this fruit, when it got to the eastern market and was sold, would not bring enough money to pay even the cost of hauling it from the valleys of California to Chicago or New York, and the man who'd
shipped it there for sale found that the money he got for it wasn't enough to pay his freight bill. That was called red ink. Grapes, pears, oranges, lemons, and so forth returned red ink in lots of cases.

I like grapes, especially the big, red Tokay grapes. Lodi, California, over in the Sacramento Valley is the center of the grape section. I remember being over there and going with a farmer out to look at his grape vineyard. It was just sundown, and the sun was shining through the ripe grapes, hanging on the trellis there - one of the most beautiful sights I ever saw. I made some remark about how beautiful it was and so on, and the farmer literally began to cuss. He said he never was going to touch any of those damned grapes; they were going to hang there and rot; and if I wanted any of them to take home with me, I could have them; and that he had shipped several carloads East already, and every one of them returned red ink. They were going to stay right there and rot, and so far as I know they did. There was really no financing involved in allowing the fruit to rot.

These farmers didn't make up their losses. They began to get into financial difficulties pretty rapidly.
The California Fruit Growers' Association, the name on the refrigerator cars, is a big citrus fruit cooperative out there. At that time 80 to 85% of the fruit, lemons especially, was grown by members of the association. All of this fruit was pooled when it was brought into the packing house - it was all put in one pool. Then the managers of the association with their big offices in Los Angeles would size up the market in the East or wherever it was and decide that in the coming week they would ship just so many cars of lemons. The supply in all the packing houses would probably be considerably greater than the amount which would be shipped, so supplies would pile up in the packing houses. Lemons would keep for a little time - a few weeks, a month or six weeks - in the packing houses before they were shipped, but if demand stayed low and the managers of the co-op held to their curtailed shipping schedules, supplies would pile up in the packing houses, and then the lemons would rot. Then they'd have to be hauled out and dumped someplace.

The farmers got paid for their lemons at the end of the marketing season. They would get an advance payment, but the final settlement was at the end of the
marketing season when the association as a whole had receipts of some many hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars from sales and it had received so many boxes of lemons at the packing house door, many of which didn't go East. These total receipts were pro-rated back to the producer on the basis of the number of boxes that he delivered. So this pooling and holding back was pro-rated among all the producers in the co-op.

Another thing that I found out was that Intentions-to-Plant Reports for fruit couldn't be effective. It takes five years after a lemon, orange, pear, or peach tree has been planted before it starts bearing. It takes three years for a grape vine to start bearing after it's planted. Here these farmers had planted their groves and vineyards many years before, and they had a large investment there. An alternative to going on and doing the best they could with their fruit was to pull up their trees and vines and grow something else. Many did just that in the thirties. A lot took part in discussions and even research on whether or not it would be good business for the producers of prunes, for example, in the Santa Clara Valley to pull out their prune orchards and start growing annual crops - beans, strawberries, or
something else. Quite a lot of farmers did pull up their trees. Usually it would be the older and less productive orchards and vineyards that would be destroyed and something else put in. There was quite a lot of it.

As far as the Outlook Reports were concerned, there I found that the private marketing agencies and the cooperative marketing agencies and the larger farmers, many of whom marketed their own products, were the ones who were paying attention to market information, Outlook Reports, and coming to us and asking questions on what we thought things would be like on ahead. It is another manifestation of the fact that Outlook Reports and Intentions-to-Plant Reports — just information, all there was in the world and the best analyzed — wasn't enough to enable farmers of California or any other part of the country to stem the depression and overcome the great effects of it. It was out there during this period that I became myself firmly convinced that while research and education for farmers with respect to agriculture is desirable and necessary for agricultural prosperity, it isn't enough and wasn't enough in those days when we had a worldwide depression. It didn't make any difference what the farmers did, they couldn't cure it.
I had graduate courses and seminars at the University of California. My own particular pet in the teaching line was a graduate course, a seminar on research methods in agricultural economics. The Giannini Foundation was dedicated to research primarily and to teaching only secondarily, but there was a considerable group of graduate students. As I say, my own pet was research methods in agricultural economics, which was, as I remember it, a mixture of statistical theory and method, endeavoring to quantify economic theory, to make quantitative conclusions arrived at by economic theory applied to the problems of California agriculture. We had other courses. I remember agricultural policy, a seminar of graduate students. A whole group of us took part in that. There we'd consider what the U.S. government might and "should" do in respect to agriculture and what the state government of California could and "should" do and what individual producers could and "should" do. We'd talk about the place of cooperative marketing associations. We'd consider problems of expanding California agricultural production and contracting California agricultural production and so on. In addition to that, we had a whole string of courses in agricultural economics such
as courses in marketing, paying particular attention to marketing right there in the State of California. There were courses in production economics, too. That's just another word for what back in Washington we called farm management. Out there we called it production economics.

We had quite a worthwhile group of graduate students. In the year 1931-32 and again in the year 1932-33, there were probably twenty to thirty graduate students in agricultural economics, which was one of the largest groups in any university or college in the United States, and we were all quite proud of that.

F. V. Cardon was one of our students there. We learned to call him "Vince" then. He was, I believe, director of the agricultural experiment station at Utah State College, and he had a year's leave. I don't know whether it was a sabbatical or not. Anyway, he came over for an academic year. That was when I first really became acquainted with Vince Cardon. I'd known him before that, but not well. I don't remember when I did first know him, but I remember that I knew him when he came and corresponded with him before he came.

Another one who comes to mind is J. Kenneth Galbraith,
who is now (1952) up at Harvard. He was just a youngster. He had just graduated from Guelph College in Ontario, Canada, and came down as a first year graduate student.

Allan Manchester was another one of the same class as Vince Cardon. He had been professor of agricultural economics at Connecticut State College. He came out on a year's leave. Later he was associated with me in Washington and is now (1952) semi-retired at the University of Maine.

Another man I remember is William E. Morgan. He came up there as a first year graduate student from Texas A & M. He's now president of the Colorado State Agricultural College. I still call him Bill.

Another was R. H. Allen. We called him "Tillie." He's still called that. He now is in Paris as head of the food and agricultural division of the Mutual Security Agency in Europe.

Agricultural economics was still an emerging science, and one of the things that I was consciously trying to do was develop something there at both graduate and undergraduate levels that would help all of these boys and girls that come to agricultural colleges to understand more about the economic and social forces that influence
the prosperity and well being of farm people. I don't think I realized this so much at the time as I have since, but I was really trying to help these people prepare themselves for careers in public service - in service to agriculture. That public service might be on the campus; it might be in a big building in Washington; it might be as a county agent; it might be in the state department of agriculture over at the state capital at Sacramento; or it might be as a manager or worker in a cooperative marketing association or in the Farm Bureau Federation. Most of the students, especially the graduate students, were really attempting to prepare themselves for careers in fields like that.

Another thing, agricultural colleges are part of universities. The Agricultural College of California is a college of the University of California, but there, as at most other universities where the agricultural college is attached to it, the agricultural college is sort of looked down upon by many other parts of the university. The agricultural college including the Giannini Foundation was often referred to as the "cow college" over on the other edge of the campus. I think one of the things I was
trying to do was make the "cow college" more respectable as far as the rest of the university community is concerned.

During the three years I was there before I left to come back here to Washington on leave my interest in teaching and helping these graduate students especially get some ideas of how to carry on and do worthwhile research kept up. I remember spending a lot of time in individual discussion and consultation with graduate students and with younger members of the faculty - and even some older members of the faculty - on how to do useful and productive research in agricultural economics. I don't think I realized that motivation at the time as much as I did later. I remember some time later when a book entitled Knowledge for What? appeared, that title appealed to me like everything, and I realized that that was one of the things I'd been talking about in a left-handed way around the campus at Berkeley all the time that I was out there.

I don't know that my thoughts on what should be done for agriculture were changing. I would say maybe they were taking form - crystallizing. One of the things was what I just mentioned - research and education. Marshaling the facts and dissemination of the facts and
so on was not enough in times of depression. In the policy field that led to: What is the role of government? What more than research and education can the government, federal, state, and local, do? What can farmers themselves do by collective action? Collective action was a good term in those days.

What I would advocate was a long time taking shape, and I don't know that it ever did take shape fully in my mind. I remember that marketing of perishable products was one of the subjects to which I gave a lot of attention. I remember considering the great wastefulness of keeping some of them at home, throwing the lemons and the oranges in the ditch, and letting the grapes stay on the vine, and thinking about the people who didn't have enough to eat in various parts of the country at that time, but finally coming to the conclusion that under the circumstances with laws and customs and so forth as they were that that was the best thing to do - that was all right.

Along in maybe 1932 the State of California legislature passed a law that was called the California State Pro-rate Act, I think, which legalized pro-rating for a whole industry - not just for the members of this
cooperative, but for everybody, cooperative member or not cooperative member. This is market restriction. Assume that all the producers of lemons in the state would have a referendum to decide whether or not they wanted in the coming season to have marketing control - control of the quantity of lemons that would go to market week by week during the season. If a certain percentage - I've forgotten whether it was 60%, 75% or 85% - of the producers who voted in this referendum voted for market control, then a control group or agency, really an arm of the state government, would decide week by week and month by month how many ears of this fruit that was under control should go to market. That would probably leave quite a lot of them at home. Then everybody had to share in this pro-rating, whether or not he was a member of a cooperative. That's one of the things that came over into the national agricultural adjustment effort later, and is still there.

I approved of this plan at the time, and in fact, I came to Washington later and helped it into operation as part of the national effort, because there was nothing else to do. The other parts of the economic system were all out of gear, and the farmers would all go broke unless
they did something. This seemed to be the best thing to do.

Agricultural credit was another very tough problem out there. Lots of these farms or ranches in California were highly commercialized, as I've said, with high investments in trees, groves, livestock, machinery, and so on. As prices went down and the quantities marketed decreased, the incomes of the ranchers and farmers went down. They weren't able to pay their interest; they weren't able to pay their mortgage when it was due. I was convinced that in this period of depression the government should do something to keep the producers from losing their farms wholesale and losing all of their savings along with them. I wasn't as closely associated with that as with some other things. The federal agricultural credit operations - the Federal Farm Loan Board, I believe it was called at that time, now the Agricultural Credit Administration - was in operation to some extent. One of the regional offices was right there in Berkeley. I remember working with those people and talking to them, trying to help them figure out what they might do and what recommendations they might make to Washington, and so on.
I think I changed during that period from being a conservative to becoming a liberal, as liberals were defined in those days. That really came, I think, into focus in my mind in the Presidential campaign time of 1932. Here was the incumbent administration of Herbert Hoover. I was a Californian then, and he was a fellow Californian. The people around him didn't say in those days that they were endeavoring to preserve the status quo, but they were all saying to themselves at least that prosperity was just around the corner and that somehow or other this worldwide depression was going to cure itself. I came to the conclusion that that was not true at all. Then the opposition, the Democrats, came up with what was then a liberal platform. Franklin D. Roosevelt appeared on the scene, and his statements and the statements of the people around him indicated that he and they, of the Democratic party, would if they came into power step in to this situation and do all they could to alleviate it and keep the farmers of the country from losing their farms and get them some better incomes and at the same time help labor get some better incomes. I found myself quickly swinging into line there. I remember there was no doubt in my mind for a good many months before the election as to the way I was going to vote on
It wasn't true with all of my colleagues on the campus. Some of them still thought everything was going to be all right in a little while; California was still out on the frontier; California had its ups and downs; all these cyclical variations that occurred in economic affairs were accentuated in California because it was far away from the markets and out on the end of the transportation line. I remember some of them who were really very much surprised on the morning after election day to find that Herbert Hoover hadn't been reelected. They were just insulated there behind the campus wall.

I remember another thing that indicated part of that feeling of fellow faculty members, not necessarily in the economics or agricultural economics department. As the depression deepened and incomes fell and prices fell, appropriations for the university fell and the income from endowments decreased, and something had to be done about the cost of running the university. One way was to cut professor's salaries. I can remember that I took the side, "That's all right. I'll take a cut. How much is it going to be?" But many of the professors, maybe a majority of the members of the faculty, just couldn't see that at all. They were there behind the
campus walls, and they apparently didn't realize at all what was happening.

Quite a number of us came together for about a week in August, 1931 at the University of Chicago. It was entirely unofficial. Nobody was inhibited as to what he would say. We were trying to exchange ideas and argue out questions and problems pertaining to American agriculture in this depression. M. L. Wilson, as usual, was one of the prime movers in arranging this conference. Professor Duffy of the University of Chicago was sort of host.

I remember my own part in it. What I was interested in in those days and what I presented and argued there was what later, I guess, came to be called an agricultural production program for the United States. There was a feeling of the need to assess the demand for particular commodities at home and abroad, a need to assess the production possibilities of them in different parts of the United States, and endeavor to come up with answers as to how many acres and bushels of wheat would be most profitable for the farmers of the United States to produce all together, how many acres and bales of cotton, how much milk, how much pork, and so on. The idea of surpluses was
uppermost in the minds of a whole lot of people at the time and continued for years thereafter. There was also the argument about what was a surplus and how much is that commodity or this commodity in surplus if at all. I was very much interested in all of these questions. It was sort of an effort to combat the thinking that was becoming, I thought, too general at the time that the farmers of the United States would be better off and the United States would be better off if the farmers just produced less and less of everything. This of course was patently illogical and untrue, but there seemed to be quite a lot of people who just subscribed to that idea unthinkingly.

During that week we talked about almost everything on the agricultural front and the relation of agriculture and the well being of farm people to the other sectors of the economy. We talked about land especially and the use of agricultural land. With this surplus philosophy arising, of course, came the question of how much of the land of the United States would it be most profitable for farmers of the United States to devote to agricultural production. Prices having gone down, some land that would have yielded a profit in wheat or cotton or corn or grain sorghums or
something else a decade before now wouldn't yield enough
to provide the farmer and his family a satisfactory kind
of living.

We began to talk about "submarginal" land. This
involved the old economic concept of the margin. M. L.
Wilson was one of the chief explainers of that idea. That
kept on and kept on. I can't say that this is the first
time this concept of marginal land had been dealt with.
It had been in the vocabulary of at least a limited
number of us back in the days when I was still in BAE and
also in that of some of the land economists that stemmed
out of the University of Wisconsin. One of these was
L. C. Grey, who had come from Wisconsin with R. G. Taylor
in the first part of the 1920s to establish a Division
of Land Economics. He was head of that division until
he became director of the submarginal land program of
the Triple-A in 1935 or '35. They had a concept of
submarginal land and of land classification in the economic
sense as distinguished from the classification of soils
in the natural science sense. I don't remember that
L. C. Grey was at this conference. I think not.

Another man who was at this conference was a John
R. Commons; also his disciple, Bushrod W. Allin, who still
is over in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. We were interested in the relation of agriculture to the rest of the economy and the effect of failing demand, depression and deflation on agricultural prices and agricultural incomes. Another distinguished economist there was Jacob ("Jake") Viner, who then was at the University of Chicago and now is at Princeton. He held forth on what would be done to cure the depression generally and what effect and influence that would have upon agriculture.

I'll always remember John R. Commons coming forth with the proposition that if the country really wanted to cure this depression and get it over with the thing to do was to turn the Bureau of Printing and Engraving loose to printing a lot of dollar bills, five dollar, ten dollar and twenty dollar bills; hire some airplanes, take the bills up in the airplanes, cut the bills loose and let them float down. The people would pick them up and spend them. It didn't make any difference who got hold of them; whether they were deserving persons or not. They'd pick them up and spend them and get the money into circulation; and the price level would go back up and the depression would be cured. John R. didn't say it quite as simply as that, but that was the burden of it. It made all of us stop and
think that agriculture isn't the whole of the economy and that a lot of things other than agricultural production determine the well being of the people of the United States, including the farmers.

Rexford G. Tugwell was there. That was my first meeting with Rex. He was a very bright-eyed, energetic, enthusiastic "reformer," (to use the word in a good sense). I remember I talked to him mostly about Franklin D. Roosevelt. Rex was at Columbia University at the time, and he was a member of FDR's Brain Trust. I remember talking to Rex at great length about what kind of a man FDR was and what his philosophy was. It had quite a bit to do with my becoming a disciple of Franklin D. Roosevelt. I forget what particular part Rex had in this conference other than being one of the seminar, raising questions. I'd guess there were forty or fifty people at the conference.

I forgot Henry A. Wallace. Henry Wallace was there just as one of the group, talking about what could be done about agriculture and farmers' incomes. I remember his presentation of agricultural adjustment. I'm not sure whether we used that term at the time, but I remember Henry talking about shifting agricultural production from this crop to that crop, shifting from
export crops to other crops which would all be consumed in the United States. Of course, that was part of the general discussion of international trade. By that time, 1931, foreign demand for agricultural commodities in the United States had dropped off terribly. Exports of wheat had gone down; exports of lard, which came from Henry Wallace's home state and other states, had dropped way off on account of the lack of purchasing power in the United Kingdom and other countries of Europe.

Most of us who attended this conference knew each other quite well by that time. We didn't see each other very often. It was an entirely unofficial gathering, as I said. The big significance to me at the time, and since, was that it was an opportunity for some of us who were thinking, worrying, and working on the farm problem to get together and pool our ideas, see where we all were, and maybe change our minds.

The Domestic Allotment Plan was common knowledge as far as I was concerned. It had come to mean really in baldest terms a two price system - one price for agricultural products consumed domestically, the domestic allotment, and another price, presumably a lower price, for exports. The idea was in the McNary-Haugen bills.
George Peek had had it. I don't know when it first got into the literature. Maybe it goes back to H. C. Wallace days.

Domestic allotment and acreage restriction were considered two separate but related things. Acreage restriction, reduction in production, was in the minds of a lot of us in those days, but domestic allotment was also. How many acres or bushels of wheat would be the national domestic allotment in the year 1931 or '32 would depend upon the purchasing power of the people in the United States for wheat. It might be lower this year than it was last year, and we hope it will be higher next year. The production for domestic consumption, or domestic allotment, varies from year to year. So maybe there should be some acreage restriction. At that time, as I said, foreign demand for most of our exports, crops and livestock, had fallen way down. As I look back, a lot of us had the feeling that the United States would have to withdraw from production for export for some commodities. We used to talk about wheat, corn, lard, hogs, and even cattle.

Restriction of acreage in our minds, you see, was just an outgrowth of our thinking, our efforts to invent
some way of keeping production in line with demand at prices which would enable farmers to live. Later when it all broke out in the form of the Agricultural Adjustment Act and related laws, in the popular mind it seemed to be just restriction of production - the less you produce the higher the price will be and the better that will be for all farm producers regardless of how much the total volume of production and the total number of producers in decreased. But, we weren't accepting any theory or philosophy of that kind at this Chicago meeting.

The Hoover administration, it seemed to us then and still seems to me now, really was not trying to do very much of anything. They were trying to do as little as possible on the agricultural front. By that time the Federal Farm Board, had been in existence for a couple of years. They were going to solve the farm problem by promoting cooperative agricultural marketing associations and by buying and selling agricultural commodities on the open market and in the futures market. All this adjusting production, the land problem, the relation of agricultural income and the well being of farmers to the total economic situation weren't thought about very much in the Hoover administration.
There was more thinking about these things in the Department of Agriculture, I'm sure, than came out at that time. I remember an incident. I'm not sure whether this was in 1930 or '31. The Annual Outlook Report of the Department of Agriculture was censored in one of those years by President Hoover himself or someone at the White House. I was in California, and I heard about it only, secondarily. The fellows who were honestly sizing up the situation felt that the depression was deepening, supply of wheat was high, and that there was no prospect for better prices for most agricultural products in the year ahead than there had been in the year past. That and all statements like that were censored, and the Outlook Report that year just didn't say anything. I remember talking to O. C. Stine about it at some meeting at Chicago.

I didn't know Eugene Meyer well, and I wasn't close to things that he sponsored or that he did. He was, of course, an adviser to the Hoover administration. He was generally reputed to be very influential in the Hoover administration. I never did come to know him well enough to know just what his philosophy about all these things was or just what his prescription for a cure would be, but
he was reputed to have been quite influential in the establishment of the Federal Farm Board of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

Not only was not very much done for or to the farmer during the Hoover administration but not very much for or to any other group of people or sector of the economy. Prosperity was just around the corner, and if you'd just sit still and wait a little while, everything would be all right. I never changed my mind about the attitude of the Hoover administration toward the whole general economic situation. Prosperity's just around the corner. This depression is just a little incident, and everything's going to be all right soon.
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION

I started in at the University of California in the academic year of '30-'31, and taught in '31-'32 and '32-'33 until nearly the end of the academic year. I came to Washington to join the new Agricultural Adjustment Administration in May or early June '33.

I had been in Washington in August of '32, when the bonus marchers were on the street. I had come to a meeting of the Federal Farm Board, called by J. S. Davis of Stanford University, their chief economist. I can't remember the date of that conference. It was a bunch of economists - some of the same. I remember M. L. was there; I remember John Black was there; and there were several from the land grant colleges, trying to help Joe Davis - Ezekiel was still in the Federal Farm Board, and others - chart some course as to what the Federal Farm Board could do.

I didn't contribute very much to that conference. I was out of patience with all of it. But one of the things that was talked about a lot was: What more could these stabilization corporations do? They had tried to buy and store; they had tried to trade on the futures market;
but prices just went down. They used up about all their money - maybe all of it. $500,000,000, I remember, that was the amount of money that was appropriated for the use of the Federal Farm Board when it was established. Maybe I'm doing an injustice to some of my colleagues there, but, as I said, I couldn't get head up about that one. I called it a no-decision bout and still call it that.

As I said, the bonus marchers were on the street. This was before they went to Anacostia Flats. They were here in the city, many "camping out" over where the Department of Agriculture South Building now stands.

The Hoover administration did spend money for public buildings to provide employment. Of course, the first and biggest and the best one built was the Department of Commerce down here on Fourteenth Street. Then they built the whole row of buildings on Constitution Avenue from Fourteenth Street on down to the Archives Building. The new Department of Agriculture building called South Building was to be built. Most of the old buildings had been razed, and that area was just a pile of rubble. I remember walking back there with somebody - I don't remember who now - and there were a lot of the bonus marchers camped in that rubble. I remember looking at them, talking
to them, and spending an hour or two back there, looking around and sizing up the situation. Here they were. They had nothing to do - no way to make an honest living. Here was a group of people coming to Washington, asking the government for help. They couldn't handle things themselves, they were completely frustrated and didn't know what to do. They'd come to ask the government to help them.

Yes, the newspapers said they were Reds. That's like the Reds in California. Every laboring man in California who was out of a job, couldn't find a job, and wanted to do something about it was likely to be labeled as a Red. Every organizer of union labor in California was labeled a Red. Even at that early date some of the students and faculty at the Berkeley campus who were vociferous were likely to be looked on as Reds. People were afraid - the people in Washington more so when the bonus marchers were around although they were perfectly peaceful. The bonus marchers were going up to Congress, trying to find their Congressman, and asking their Congressman to do something about it. But the people in Washington were afraid.

I was in California most of the time between the
election and Roosevelt's inauguration. I probably was in the East at an Economic Association meeting or some other meeting. I may have been back here at Washington, although there wasn't anything doing in the Department of Agriculture at that time - everybody was sitting. I don't have any remembrance of having participated in anything significant outside of California during that period.

I knew that Henry Wallace would likely be FDR's Secretary of Agriculture and that Rex Tugwell probably would be Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. So I can't say that I was surprised. I don't remember that I thought anybody else might be named. Of course, there was George Peek himself, and there was M. L., who had been active all this time, but as I try to remember events and my feelings at that time, as I say, those two men, Wallace and Tugwell, were in my mind. By correspondence, visits, or newspaper reports I knew what was happening in the Department of Agriculture, after FDR's inauguration what men were brought in, many of whom I knew. I followed the Agricultural Adjustment Act from the time the bill was introduced in Congress until it became a law. I knew the kind of organization that was being set up in the
Department. As I think back, I knew pretty well what was going on here. Just how I got the information, I don't remember.

Jerome Frank, my feeling is, came into the Department by way of Rex Tugwell, but I don't know how Peek came into the Department.

I wasn't in Washington when the Triple-A was passed and signed in May. When I came to Washington the Triple-A had been going a month or six weeks or something. George Peek was here and several people around him; Chester Davis was here; and M. L. Wilson was here. Chester Davis came in with George Peek. I don't know the relation between Henry Wallace and Chester Davis back in the days before May, 1933. I know that they knew each other fairly well. I know that M. L. Wilson and Chester had been together on a lot of things in Montana and elsewhere and that H. A. would have listened very carefully to any suggestion or recommendation about people that M. L. made in those days.

Chester had been associated with George Peek back in McNary-Haugen days, and after that George Peek and maybe somebody with him had started to organize a new company to use corn stalks and waste products to make paper
and other useful things. Chester had been associated with George Peek in that effort just before 1933. I don’t remember the dates. My impression - I wasn’t here at the time, so it’s all secondhand - is that when George Peek came to be administrator of the Triple-A, he wanted Chester Davis, and Chester became, I think they called it, head of his production division of the Triple-A. He must have come on just about the same day that George Peek did - probably all part of the same deal. Assuming that George Peek was going to be administrator of the Triple-A, then he would want people of his own choosing working for him, and Chester would have been one of them.

I was quite happy at the University of California. My family was happy. My wife was happy. Our boys were growing up. The oldest had become a freshman in the university. The two younger ones were happy. We were going to buy a lot and build a house up on Euclid Avenue or Spruce Street on the north side of the campus. Mrs. Tolley even went so far as to get some architect’s plans for a house.

The people in California, in spite of the depression, were the friendly people that they are now. The university in spite of the depression was, to me at least, a stimulating
place. At that time I had many off-campus contacts with farmers' groups. I worked closely with the California Farm Bureau in those days, the state chamber of commerce, the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, the Commonwealth Club, and the Cooperative Marketing associations.

I knew Herbert Eugene Bolton. Not being an historian myself, he and I never talked history very much, but I knew him. Henry Grady, who was then professor of economics, and I had quite a little to do with each other. I knew Ira B. Cross. I guess Henry Grady and I had quite a bit to talk about and quite a bit in common because we both wanted to help make the world better rather than just stay behind the campus walls and talk about what was wrong. I got the impression Ira B. Cross was quite content to stay on the campus and lecture to a thousand kids every morning over in South Hall. I knew Robert Kerner quite well. He's a nice fellow. Carl Plehn was elderly and past his prime. I liked him and did quite a bit of discussing of things with him. At that time he was what I would call an economic historian - history of economic thought and all of that. I have lost track of R. M. Knight, who was in economic history. We
had exams for master's degrees as well as doctor's degrees, and professors from the economics department were on the committees. M. M. was on quite a few of them. He was in economic history, but to him it wasn't just old, dead history.

One day in May or June, 1933 I got a telephone call from Washington from either Henry Wallace, Chester Davis or M. L. Wilson. I'm not sure which one of them it was from, but he asked if I wouldn't come into Washington for a little while to help them get organized and decide what to do about fruits, vegetables, and other special crops that were so important in California and in which I'd been interested but which had not had any great amount of attention or debate during the time that the Agricultural Adjustment Act was being written and enacted. The original Agricultural Adjustment Act was concerned primarily with "basic commodities" - wheat, corn, hogs, cotton, tobacco. But there were many, many other products of American agriculture, the producers of which were in the same difficulty as the producers of the so-called basic commodities.

There was a provision in the Agricultural Adjustment Act for marketing agreements and licenses, which had been
mainly sponsored, as I remember it, by the dairy cooperative associations of milk producers in the milk sheds, mainly collective bargaining associations. The producers just bargained with the distributors for the price of their milk. This provision of the law in general gave government sanction to a bargain that might be made between the producers and distributors of milk as to the prices which the distributors would pay to the producers. If a bargain were arrived at among a good majority of the distributors and producers, then the United States government under this act could make this bargain binding on the distributors and producers who weren't party to the agreement. A "license" would make it binding on all. I don't remember the exact provisions of the act on that, but it seems to me that it provided that if two-thirds of the producers and two-thirds of the distributors or processors - I think this is the time the word processor got into the English language - agreed as to prices, methods of handling, and so on, then the Secretary of Agriculture was empowered to issue a license or order making that agreement binding on all producers and on all processors or distributors.

This part of the Agricultural Adjustment Act was
applicable to fruit and other perishables as well as milk. Before I came Henry Wallace, George Peck and company were being asked for help by producers of perishable commodities, fruits, vegetables, and so on. That was the reason for this telephone call asking me if I wouldn't come and help get started on this.

I came to Washington just to talk things over. I left the family at home and didn't make any arrangements whatever for leave from the university. It became apparent when I arrived that if I'd stay it would be fine. All these people that I'd known and many I hadn't known were here. I felt that we really had a chance to put into operation all these things we'd been hoping for. If we really meant it, we'd stay and really try to do it. So I agreed to stay for the summer.

As I remember the organization, Chester Davis was my immediate superior. Henry Wallace was Secretary of Agriculture; George Peck was administrator of the Triple-A. Of course, George Peck never did accept Henry Wallace as his boss, but that was the administrative line. Chester Davis was one of George Peck's first lieutenants. N. L. was in charge of the wheat section. There was a bunch of commodity sections under Chester Davis. There
was a wheat section with M. L. Wilson in charge, a cotton section with C. A. ("Cully") Cobb in charge, and a tobacco section with Jack Hutson in charge, and others. South Building was being built. I was going around to see if I could find a room that I could use for my office when I saw a familiar figure through a door, and I went in, and there was J. E. Hutson, whom I've mentioned.

Jack had been in Europe in what is now the foreign agricultural service as a tobacco specialist. It happened that he was back here in the United States at that time. He was the one man who knew a lot about tobacco, so he was asked if he wouldn't come in like I and try to organize Triple-A activities for tobacco producers. There he was.

I don't believe O. E. Reed ever was in the Triple-A. AAA had a dairy section under J. H. Mason. I think he had been head of the producers cooperative association for the Philadelphia milkshed. A young fellow named Ed Gaumnitz, whom I had known, was one of his assistants.

There was a corn-hog section under A. C. Black. He had been professor of agricultural economics at Ames, Iowa. He was a disciple of John D. Black — no relation — we called him Al. He played quite a peculiar role in
later days. Al Black had been a student of John D. Black at Minnesota before John went to Harvard. He knew H. A., and H. A. had been responsible for Al coming in to head the corn-hog section.

A young fellow named Claude Wickard was Al Black's first assistant. I remember Claude Wickard stopping me in the hall one day and introducing himself to me and reminding me that I had been one of his high school teachers in Delphi, Indiana, in 1910. Before I graduated from Indiana University, there was a tail-end-of-a-school-year vacancy at Delphi. Some teacher had dropped out, and I was broke. I remember I put off my graduation from spring until the end of the summer session, went up there for the spring, and made $200. Claude had been a senior out there in my math and physics classes.

I believe that was the general organization of the Triple-A. There were two principal lieutenants to Peek; Charles J. Brand was one and Chester Davis was the other. I never had much to do with Charley Brand in those days. He didn't stay very long after I came in.

Then there was a young fellow named Wayne Taylor, who worked as a sort of special assistant to George Peek. There was another young fellow sitting beside Wayne
Taylor whose name was Adlai Stevenson. Wayne Taylor has been around Washington most of the time since then in many different places. Right now he's over here in the Mutual Security Agency and has been, I think, ever since ECA was organized. He at one time was in the Export-Import Bank. He's been in many places around Washington. Adlai Stevenson was here maybe a year. He left the AAA when Peek did or shortly thereafter.

Then there was Victor A. Christgau. Maybe he was in the wheat section when it started - I forget. He stayed around for quite a while.

I had lots of contact with Jerome Frank.

I began to set up a Special Crops Section. I would be here only for a few months. One of the first men I got to help me was Porter Taylor, whom I'd known. He's a son of W. A. Taylor, who'd been chief of the Bureau of Plant Industry for many years during the time when H. C. Taylor was head of Agricultural Economics.

Then I called up Jesse W. Tapp, who'd been with me in the old Farm Management days who then was in New York with an investment banking firm - I can't remember the name of it. He came down for a day or two to talk to us, went back up to New York and checked out, and came
down here. He started there and was with the Triple-A until after I left it in 1938, when he went to California to be vice president of the Bank of America.

There were two other important parts of the Triple-A - the Consumers’ Counsel and the Legal Division. The Legal Division of Triple-A wasn’t part of the Solicitor’s Office of the Department of Agriculture. You see, what we were getting here was a parallel organization to the old Department of Agriculture. This was sure to cause difficulty some day. Jerome Frank was head of the Legal Division of AAA. I’d never known him and never heard of him until we met up here. He had some mighty bright young men with him. One who worked with me in the early days was Abe Fortas. I think he had just graduated from Yale Law School. He did much of the legal work on marketing agreements for fruits and vegetables. I had quite a lot to do with him. Another was Telford Taylor. He is the General Taylor who was in the Nuremberg Trials as prosecutor or something of the kind. But the two most noted ones were Alger Hiss and Lee Pressman. They were all there with Jerome. He recruited them.

I don’t know whose idea was the Consumers’ Counsel, but it was a good idea. I don’t know who generated that.
I don't know whether it was Henry Wallace, Jerome Frank, or Rex Tugwell — probably Rex. Colonel Frederick C. Howe was head of it. Gardner Jackson was in the Consumers' Council. Another man who was in the Consumers' Council was Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., who's now a professor out at my old stand at UC. He was an Assistant Secretary of Commerce until a year ago or so. Another one who was in there for quite a while although not at the beginning was Calvin Hoover of Duke University. I don't remember too much about F. M. Shea. He was a lawyer.

C. B. ("Beanie") Baldwin was in Henry Wallace's office. When I got here Henry Wallace's administrative officer was one Paul Appleby. Out in the next room sat a young fellow named "Beanie" Baldwin. Paul and Beanie both originated down in Virginia. I'm not sure just how Beanie happened to get here — whether by way of Paul because they knew each other down around Radford, Virginia. I'm not sure about it. They were the two people who in those days "took care of" the Secretary. They received all the callers, all the mail, and all telegrams, arranged the Secretary's appointments, and so on. I always had the impression that in those days and
for a good while thereafter H. A. paid a lot of attention
to suggestions that either one or both of those fellows
made to him.

Rex Tugwell, assistant secretary, was in the
adjoining office. I don't remember that Rex had any
Paula or Beanies right around him in those days. He was
close to Jerome and these young lawyers and to Fred Howe
and members of the Consumers' Council and quite close
to Henry Wallace. I don't think in those days Henry
took many major decisions until he had had a discussion
with Rex about them.

It soon became somewhat apparent to those of us
not in the top echelon but one or two steps down that
three groupings were emerging: one the George Peek
group, one the Henry Wallace group, and one the Rex
Tugwell group. Henry never asserted his authority to
bat the other two down and say, "This is the way it's
going to be." I never saw him do that, although every-
body knew that he was the ranking member of the hierarchy.
It soon became apparent that these three men often
didn't agree on particular policies or even on particular
programs.

I always told them I was a maverick, belonging to
no specific group, but when the showdown came - it was a long while before any showdown came as far as I was concerned - I left a lot of people, who had been my good friends and still are and lined up behind Chester Davis, who was really George Peek's disciple.

Chester and George Peek had had a long period of association before they came to the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. I think, but I'm not absolutely sure, that back in the days of the depression Chester went completely broke, and George Peek bailed him out, gave him a job, and put him on his feet. That's oversimplified. With Chester's mental makeup as it is, that made Chester loyal to George Peek to this day. He speaks highly of George Peek and reminisces about him. He was doing that a month ago (March, 1952) when I saw him. He reminded me of things George Peek used to say and do. George Peek was a man who wanted to do things. He was much more than an implement manufacturer and president of Deere and Company.

George didn't see all the facets of this great problem. Chester could see many more of them than George Peek did. Chester's reaction to a proposal or suggestion often would be, "Yes, that's right. Something
else needs to be done. This won't have the whole effect that we expect it to have, but this is what the vocal group in Congress, in the farm organizations, and in the pressure groups want now. We better go along with that, and the next year we'll correct it." I guess maybe what I'm trying to say is that Chester and George Peek operated in much the same way, although their philosophies were somewhat different.

Another lawyer, Frederic P. Lee, was there as special legal assistant to George Peek. He had been employed by the Congress as "legislative counsel," I guess, and he and people working with him were the ones who drafted the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the National Recovery Act, and other acts of the early days of the Roosevelt administration. He and Wayne Taylor and Adlai Stevenson, I always felt, looked upon themselves as the personal helpers and protectors of George Peek. They weren't in the line of administration like Chester Davis was. They were all buddies with Chester Davis, and I think still are.

Ezekiel had stayed, as I remember it, with the Federal Farm Board until Henry Wallace came in. Then Zeke came over to the Department of Agriculture to be
special adviser to the Secretary of Agriculture. Louis H. Bean, who was in the Department of Agriculture in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Stine's division, joined up with Zeke. The two of them were housed in the Secretary's office across the street from South Building.

There are some people like myself whom I can't quite catalogue. I can't quite catalogue M. L. In the Wallace group I'd put first and foremost Paul Appleby and Beanie Baldwin, who of course, always thought in those days that everything Henry Wallace did was fine. They defended his actions, positive and negative, at all times. Al Black was a Wallace man from start to finish. I think you could put M. L. in the Wallace group, and I belonged to that group if I belonged to any. I think that's all the people I'm inclined to label as being in the Wallace group.

In the Tugwell group were the Jerome Frank group and the Consumers' Counsel, Fred Howe, Alger Hiss, who was in the legal group, Shea, Gardner Jackson - pretty much the whole bunch on Rex Tugwell's side.

I can't catalogue Victor Christgau. I can't remember him being involved in anything that would enable me to catalogue his actions. Calvin Hoover was pretty
much neutral. As I remember, he didn't show up on the scene until later. The same thing goes for Blaisdell. A lot of other men could be mentioned who weren't of such importance or who were not concerned.

These men were standing behind Wallace, Peck, or Tugwell because of personality and idealistic reasons both. In those days my impression was that it was pretty largely personal - personal liking, personal relationships before they got together over in the Department of Agriculture. Idealistic accord or ideological differences didn't seem to be important in those days - in the first few months. It wasn't long until the producer-versus-consumer complex began to show up. I think we could say that George Peck and the people immediately around him and Chester Davis and the people immediately around him were primarily, to use a hard word, producer-minded, while the people over on the Rex Tugwell side were primarily consumer-minded, and Henry Wallace was on both sides. The group that followed Wallace was primarily doing so because of personal loyalty.

We would argue in those days about what was in the public interest. H. A. was probably responsible for that
more than anybody else. What's the public interest? Where does the public interest lie? What's best for all the people — that's the public interest, you see. He'd raise the question, as I would in those days, in answer to another question. What's in the public interest? One could really argue that agricultural fundamentalism is the public interest.

I really can't remember how Wallace and Peck came to be diametrically opposed to each other on policy questions. Wallace and Tugwell weren't opposed to each other in those days, and I can't remember that they ever were until a year ago (1951). I think it is pretty much my feeling that this was a personality struggle, accentuated by differences in viewpoint, you see. It was the consumer-minded against producer-minded, and so on. Let's call Wallace public-minded. He was interested in the National Recovery Administration, fiscal and money policy, international trade, and all those things. Rex Tugwell, too, was interested, you see. We had a lot to do even then in 1933 with Harry Hopkins and the Federal Emergency Relief Administration and the Works Progress Administration.

During the summer and early fall of 1933 I was
very busy organizing this special crops section and getting some marketing agreements and orders for California Clingstone peaches, grapes, pears, citrus fruit, and so on. This was somewhat out of the mainstream of the basic commodity — wheat, cotton, corn, hogs, tobacco — principal interest of the Triple-A in its earliest days. I got the impression quite early that George Peek himself was primarily interested in benefit payments and processing taxes applied only to these so-called basic commodities. The interest in this marketing agreements and orders centered around Henry Wallace and Rex Tugwell. Chester Davis wasn’t antagonistic to it, it was part of his job to keep it going. I remember never having been turned down or having a recommendation that I made vetoed by George Peek during those days, but as I look back I remember that for him it was something off on the side. Primarily he was interested in processing taxes, benefit payments, contracts with farmers, to reduce production, rather than marketing agreements and orders — producers on one side and distributors and processors on the other side bargaining and making agreements with the government as the umpire.

I had the feeling that Peek didn’t like the Consumers’
Counsel idea. You see, the Consumers' Counsel was here in the public interest, and the Consumers' Counsel was to make recommendations to the administration and the Secretary with respect to every proposal for adjusting production of a basic commodity or for a marketing agreement for a non-basic commodity or for whatever. I got the impression that George Peek thought that didn't have much of a place in the picture. Chester Davis tolerated Consumers' Counsel. George Peek sort of felt, I think, that this was new stuff which could be tolerated. Chester Davis followed Peek. Davis had a broader concept but Davis would always fall in behind Peek.

I got the feeling then in the early days that George Peek had wanted, as many people did, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration to be an independent agency like the Federal Farm Board had been. There was an analogy, you see. But it was set up as part of the Department of Agriculture. I have the feeling that that was one of the difficulties—maybe the basis of the real difficulty between Peek and Wallace. Peek had always been a leader and a go-it-alone sort of fellow.

There was a conflict of farmers versus the braintrusters. Those are bad words, but maybe I'll be able
to use them here. I was talking about the group of people who were producer-minded. Some were farmers; some owned and operated farms and some didn't; but they were producer-minded. And they were the people who insisted that they thought and spoke for the farmers. They didn't want to be bothered with Consumers' Counsel, consideration of the public interest, and so on. Soon processing taxes were being collected, contracts made with the farmers calling for reduction in production, and payments began to go to farmers for not growing crops. Then the producer-minded group tended to take the position: We don't want to be bothered about what happens to consumers; we can't be bothered about the public interest; we can't concern ourselves about foreign markets; and whether or not the people of the United States have enough to eat and an adequate diet is somebody else's concern and not ours. Then the Agricultural Adjustment Administration began to proliferate immediately into state and local organizations, state and county committees of farmers. We thought we were making democracy work, getting the programs out of the hands of bureaucrats into the hands of the farmers. And these farmers' committees were naturally producer-minded. This feeling is still held by many people in the Department of
Agriculture. Peck would belong to this group if he were here today.

Then there are the brain trusters on the other side - call it the Tugwell group or anybody who came out of a university. In that sense I was a brain truster, you see. Any professor was a brain truster. If you'd been a farmer or a manager of a co-op or something like that, you weren't a brain truster. They looked on brain trusters as men who figured up big ideas. They figured out big, new plans and pointed out the weaknesses of going programs, thought up new kinds of organization and new kinds of programs, thought about the relation of our program to all the other New Deal programs, thought up ways to work with other agencies such as the NRA, PWA, WPA, and what became the Soil Conservation Service, and the Civilian Conservation Corps - all the programs that were going.

M. A. would see all these various problems and their interrelationships in a way that most of us wouldn't. He would always go ahead with a program knowing its shortcomings. He'd recognize the shortcomings of a program, but go ahead with it. In those days I felt he worked on the theory - here was some relationship between
him and Chester Davis - that, "Yes, this isn't the best thing. This isn't the right thing. This isn't pointed exactly in the right direction. This violates the public interest a little here and there. Maybe it violates the farmers' interest a little here and there. But we'll go ahead with it because it's better than nothing and in the present state of the art of administration and in the present state of thinking of the people, this is all that can be done."

When I first came to the Department of Agriculture and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration my job was to develop the Triple-A program in its application to perishable commodities other than dairy products - primarily fruits and vegetables. Of course, that was a consequence of my experience and activities in California in the immediately preceding period where I'd worked with producers, marketers, and processors of fresh fruits, canned fruits, dried fruits, and vegetables, fresh, canned, and dried.

The big emphasis in the beginning of the Triple-A program was on the so-called basic commodities, but here were the perishable commodities, fruits and vegetables, the producers of which were in dire straits, individually
and collectively. Individually and through their cooperative marketing associations they were looking to the government now to help them get back on their feet. The handlers and processors, canners, and dried fruit merchants in private enterprise, as distinguished from cooperatives, also were looking to the government for help. My job was to develop programs pretty much commodity by commodity through the "marketing agreements and order" route that would regularize, as we said then, the flow of these commodities to market, prevent surpluses from appearing in the market, and in general enhance returns to producers.

California was first in my thinking in those days, but soon here came Florida with all of its fruits and vegetables of the same kind, and southern Texas, producers of citrus fruits and vegetables - as a matter of fact clear across the whole Gulf Coast. We had apples, for example, grown all over the country. Almost immediately we were involved in endeavoring to work out commodity by commodity and area by area marketing agreements and order programs for many commodities.

The first one I was directly involved in was California peaches for canning. I think the name of the marketing agreement and order was "Clingstone peaches
grown for canning in California north of the Tehachapi." It involved getting an agreement with the producers' cooperative associations, with cooperative canning associations such as there were, and the private canners, the California Packing Corporation, and the dozen or so others. Their representatives came to Washington. We had long sessions. They'd send their representatives, and they'd send their lawyers. We would develop ideas that might be put into a marketing agreement and order as to the quantity of peaches to be canned, as to the allocation of that quantity among the different canners, as to the different prices at which they would be sold, as to the returns which were to come to the producers and the processors. Finally we got something worked out which the producers and the canners would be willing to sign. Both had to sign it in order for it to be a valid marketing agreement.

As I remember it, the law said that those responsible for two-thirds of the volume of production in canning must sign voluntarily. After they had signed voluntarily and after the Secretary of Agriculture had signed with them, then the Secretary of Agriculture was empowered to issue an order making the terms of this agreement
binding upon all producers and all processors. We finally got that up to place just after peach harvest began in California in 1933.

Then immediately there were a lot of questions among the non-signers as to whether they should obey the order. I remember a very hurried airplane trip - the first time I flew across the continent - in July of 1933. One of the young lawyers that was working on it with me was Abe Fortas, who later went into the Department of the Interior and was, I believe, Under Secretary of Interior and now a member of the famous Arnold, Porter & Fortas law firm here in town. Abe Fortas was Owen Lattimore's counsel at the recent performance on Capitol Hill. In 1933 he was just a young, beginning lawyer. He and I went to California and had hearings for several days among the dissidents to this order. But as a result of it, they all agreed that they would conform and go along. We cut our eyes teeth on that marketing agreement and order.

The objections of the non-signers were the standard ones. A small canner, for example, would feel that he could do better for himself by being an outsider rather than being inside subject to control. If a big segment of the industry, producers and canners, carried the weight
of pro-rating their produce and maybe not marketing all their peaches then a single canner, doing as he pleased, canning all that he could, facing a better market, would find his individual year's business more profitable. But we argued that all must share in the costs as well as in the benefits. Our arguments and explanations, plus the possibility or threat of legal action, convinced all that they should comply voluntarily with the government order.

I don't think I've changed my mind much since then about what were the purposes of the Triple-A, and I don't think I changed my mind much during that hectic period of initial operations. The primary purpose of all of it was to make it possible, through government activity, for the farmers of the United States, individually and collectively, to adjust or change their production of different commodities and their marketing and distribution of different commodities in such a way as to enhance their incomes up to the parity level. At that time, this seemed to be something entirely beyond reach. As time went on over a period of a year or two years, to get ahead just a little bit, this idea of adjusting and changing agricultural production, marketing, and so on to make it
gear in with the generally changing and evolving economic situation in general was rather lost sight of. It began to be lost sight of in 1933 and the push was all for just somehow or other through benefit payment or through price fixing by way of marketing agreements and orders to just get more money to farmers without agriculture, individually and collectively, to help along the rest of the economy or get geared in to a developing economy.

Differences in opinion as to purpose and programs of the Triple-A began to be apparent, as I said, early in the life of the Triple-A. Those who pretended or thought that they were the farmers and the spokesmen for the farmers - as distinguished from the brain truster, the professor, or the doctor, or as distinguished from those who like Henry Wallace placed the public interest first and foremost - seemed to feel that the objective was simply to get more money into the farmers' pockets, and anything that interfered with that should not be tolerated, and that anybody who raised a question about the desirability or wisdom of their proposals, was just a little bit traitorous to the farmers' cause. Stepping on ahead, in 1934, '35 and '36 the Triple-A came to be looked upon by a considerable segment of people both inside and
outside the government, including some on Capitol Hill, as simply a mechanism for grinding out checks to farmers.

In extreme cases advisory groups coming in as well as those inside the Triple-A talked exclusively about reduction in production. I've used the term adjustment - changes, but many thought exclusively about reduction in production, believing that the job of the Triple-A was to reduce agricultural production. In 1933 in the effort to do something now, quickly, came plowing under cotton, killing little pigs, keeping the oranges and lemons at home and throwing them into an arroyo in southern California, and many other things of the same kind. These things came to be looked upon by many as the ultimate long range objective in the Triple-A. I think these differences in viewpoint - I don't like to say lack of understanding, but it really was that - led to the frictions that began to develop in 1934 and '35.

I mentioned Cully Cobb. He was from Georgia and had been editor and publisher of a southern farm paper - I swear I can't think of the name of it. He was director of the cotton division. Cully was immensely interested in helping the farmers, especially the poorer farmers of the South, toward a better living, but his answer to
it was reduction in production of cotton. There was much the same feeling among some of my erstwhile friends in California. To them the remedy was: Let the peaches and the oranges rot, pull up the prune trees, and so on, and get the government to pay us for doing it - the government pay us for plowing under the cotton, the government pay us for pulling up our trees and so on.

I can't right now bring to my mind many individuals in the Corn Belt. One of them who was prominent and influential but not inside the Triple-A was Earl Smith, then head of the Illinois Agricultural Association, which is the Illinois State Farm Bureau. I remember he helped develop the pig program. There were too many pigs and too many hogs. The only thing to do was to kill the little pigs before they grew up. When 1934 came along the acreage of corn was going to be too large, and the farmers were paid for leaving part of their corn land vacant. There was nothing on it at all - it was just vacant. A farmer would have a forty acre field which according to his rotation would have gone into corn in the spring of 1935. He would make a contract with the Triple-A that would say only thirty or thirty-two acres would go into corn. The rest of the field would lie
idle, not even cultivated, to grow up in weeds. Those were called "Henry Wallace's weed patches" in 1934 and 1935. Henry Wallace's weed patches were all over the Corn Belt.

In the beginning, all of us in the Triple-A advocated reduction of production. That was emergency action. Some of us hoped to do something different, and better, next year. There's where the split began. The split really became serious in '34.

Marketing agreements for fluid milk were at least as important, I believe, in the activities of the Triple-A and still are as marketing agreements for fruits and vegetables and other perishable products. The marketing agreements grew out of the cooperative marketing movement. I think I can make it a little more explicit by using the milk markets. The producers in most of the milksheds around the cities had had milk producers' cooperatives, which were simply cooperative bargaining associations for many years. The milk producers' cooperative of the Washington milkshed was a bargaining association. They would bargain with the distributors of fluid milk for the price which the distributors would pay to the members of the marketing association, and the
distributors would do everything from going to the farms to pick up the milk on through to delivering it on our doorsteps in pint and quart bottles. Not all farmers, of course, belonged to the marketing associations, but the majority did. The first marketing agreement of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was a milk marketing agreement, I think, for the Philadelphia milkshed. Marketing agreement number two was this Clingstone peach agreement that I talked about.

At that time the producers, the handlers, and the distributors of fluid milk were glad to get together to do something to bolster up the prices and bolster up what the distributors and processors could get, too. There would be an agreement on the part of the two that only a certain amount of milk would be delivered. So much of that milk would be "class one" milk. That comes on our doorsteps in bottles. So much of that milk would be "class two" milk, that which is used to make cream. The remainder which couldn't be used either as fluid milk or as cream, was surplus milk, "class three," which was manufactured into butter or cheese. This would command a lower price. Then at the end of the month the total amount received for all milk that came in under the marketing agreement would be pooled - the word pooled
is still used. And then that total would be pro-rated among all the producers according to the number of quarts, gallons, or hundredweights of milk that were delivered in the course of the month, not according to the use to which the milk from a particular farm was put. The same general principle went into all the marketing agreements. In many the total supply of the commodity that went to market was cut down.

The farmers and the cooperative marketing associations, in fact all of us, reasoned this way: Supply and demand determine the price, and if the supply is curtailed, the price will be higher. They couldn't do anything about demand, but they could do something about supply, so they cut down the supply to increase the price. They didn't get as far as thinking about the public interest, and they didn't get as far as thinking about the total incomes to farmers, you see. So the thinking both on the marketing agreement front and on the reduction-in-production front was pretty much the same.

Some of the reasons why these two differences of approach could exist side by side without being reconcilable can be found in the history of the decade or decades before 1933. This cooperative marketing effort had been
centered and still is to a pretty large extent in perishables. The producers of the so-called basic commodities, storable commodities, had some cooperation but not a great deal. But underneath all of it was what I call "agrarian fundamentalism" of some earlier time just manifesting itself in a somewhat different way. The producers and handlers of these different commodities which go to market in different ways and are handled in different ways come up with different remedies. One of them wants a marketing agreement remedy and the other one the adjustment and reduction in production and the benefit payment remedy. The reduction in production remedy still continues in the minds of a lot of people. Some now call it the "surplus-psychology."

It wasn't long until many questions were being raised. Here is this extra milk that isn't going to market in the regular way, and here are a lot of children who need the milk. Can't the government do something about that? Here are Henry Wallace's weed patches, very good land on very good farms being wasted. Can't that be put to some productive use? Here there is the killing of little pigs which is really sinful. Certainly something could be done about that, and the
pigs could be fed to grow up and the pork and the products used to feed hungry people.

That sort of thing was in the minds of a lot of people from the start, one of the principal ones being Harry Hopkins, who, as you know, came in with the Roosevelt administration. The Surplus Commodities Corporation came along in 1934 out of this line of thinking. I've always felt that Harry Hopkins was the man who was primarily responsible for that working through and working with Henry Wallace and Rex Tugwell. In the Triple-A this was fine for the Consumers' Counsel group. Their job in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was to help get the programs developed in the interests of consumers so that consumers wouldn't be penalized too much. We used to say, "The consumers are all of us." Everybody who eats food is a consumer. Much of the thought of the Consumers' Counsel had to do with these low income people, people at that time who were unemployed and people on relief.

I think the Consumers' Counsel group were the ones who first became vocal that something broader and different was needed. They felt that to just cut down production while people are hungry was wrong. They felt
that alone wasn't in the public interest and wasn't good government activity. Sure, they would agree that maybe there were too many peaches to go through the market and keep all of the producers in business, and too many hogs to go through the market and keep all the hog producers in business. In an emergency something had to be done - everybody went along with that. But proposals to take the next step and cut down some more so that farmers' prices would be up a little higher brought on the schism. As I remember, the Consumers' Counsel group and the people around the Consumers' Counsel first became vocal on it. The Surplus Commodities Corporation came out of that.

I think that FDR and the people around him were sympathetic to this approach. Mrs. Roosevelt began to get into the picture early on this problem. Henry Wallace and Rex Tugwell went along with it wholeheartedly. Many of the rest of us did, but a lot of the group of agricultural fundamentalists didn't. They looked on the processor and the consumer as the natural enemies of the farmers, you see. Any programs or any moves to benefit consumers were in an emotional sort of way considered as detrimental to the welfare of farmers.
It was the group that spoke for the farmers that felt that way. I have talked about Paek and Cully Cobb. There were some segments of the Farm Bureau, particular state federations or particular spokesmen, who felt that way. The marketing agreement and order program was backed by the National Farm Bureau Federation. The California Farm Bureau Federation was one of the principal protagonists of marketing agreements. In many of the states were milk marketing agreements were put into effect, the State Farm Bureaus sponsored and supported them.

I can't remember that the Grange took over any particular position with respect to marketing agreements. My memory's poor, but as I think back, it seems to me that some of the Grange spokesmen very early in the game sort of revolted against this reduction in production. I remember an incident that happened in 1936 after the Agricultural Adjustment Act had been declared invalid and the so-called Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act was coming into effect. I remember how pleased the Grange seemed to be about that. My old friend, Lou Taber, from Ohio, who then was president — and a small group came in to see me one day and told me
how pleased they were that the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was getting on a positive rather than a negative basis.

The Farmers' Union then wasn't particularly vocal or influential. The Farmers' Union grain marketing cooperatives in the Northwest were headed by William Thatcher, who was their spokesman in Washington in 1933. I don't remember any expression of Thatcher or any of the Farmers' Union spokesmen at that time about this scarcity complex and the reduction in production complex. I do remember that Thatcher and the people around him wanted to get the parity formula revised so that the parity index would include all of the farmers' costs instead of, as it did in the early days, just the cost of the commodities that farmers buy. Thatcher and the group around him worked up a revision of the parity formula to include farm taxes. Most spokesmen for farm groups believed that the all the necessities of life list should be included in the commodities index. Of course, all of the farm groups went along with this idea of enlarging the parity index, and that's continued until the present time. They felt that the cost of farm labor should be included in the parity index. At that time it
was included, but that was discussed, discussed, and discussed. One or two years ago when the parity index was revised farm labor was included.

Henry Wallace was a very understanding man, and he had a realization all the time that this reduction in production was simply emergency action, and he realized the validity of the criticisms about Henry Wallace's weed patches and killing the little pigs. These were the only things that the United States government or he, Henry Wallace, was able to do the first year, but he wanted to do something more and better all the time.

The Ever-Normal Granary originated in 1934. It was, in the main, an invention of Henry Wallace. Maybe his reasons were something like this: Farmers like to get their returns out of the market place in the price they get for their commodity. Getting part of their incomes from the market place and part from a government check somehow or other didn't fit in to the thinking and the mores of the farm people. So Henry Wallace came forward with the idea of making loans to farmers on their storable crops at harvest time so that they wouldn't have to sell them on a glutted market - everybody
has to sell at harvest time, you see—and so that there would be orderly marketing throughout the year. Then in 1934 a nationwide drought came along and again in 1936 production was very low. All the crops were used up—there was no carry over. H. A. reasoned that we should have an Ever-Normal Granary, a carry over for emergencies, drought or something else. The way to get it was to enable farmers to store their commodities in their own names and get a loan from the government of so many cents per bushel on their corn, so many cents per bushel on their wheat, and so many cents per pound on their cotton, and so on. The crops would be kept in storage until the price got up to the place where the farmers were ready to take them out of storage, pay off the loans, sell them, and pocket the differences. This loan program started, I believe, with corn. It was very popular among farmers and continues so to this day, with many modifications and ramifications. The principal business of the Commodity Credit Corporation now is making loans to farmers on stored commodities. I think in about 1934 it was first dubbed the Ever-Normal Granary. Still our old friends talk about Henry Wallace's Ever-Normal Granary.
At first the funds were obtained from Jesse Jones's outfit, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Henry Wallace, Chester Davis, and others bargained with RFC for a commitment to make loans to farmers on their stored commodities, and the loan rates were determined by the Secretary of Agriculture by pronouncement. After a year or so the Commodity Credit Corporation was formed. I don't remember whether the Commodity Credit Corporation was separate from the Department of Agriculture or not. It didn't come into existence until 1935 or 1936. I think there were at least two years when the funds or these loans came from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and then legislation was passed setting up the Commodity Credit Corporation.

Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 reduction of production was brought about through contracts with farmers. A farmer would sign a contract with the Secretary of Agriculture to produce only so many acres of corn, to produce only so many pigs, or whatever. If he lived up to his contract, then after his compliance was checked at harvest time or at the end of the livestock marketing year he got a payment of so many cents a bushel on his corn or his wheat that he did raise. That was his
benefit payment, and the funds for the benefit payment came out of this processing tax that was levied on all that did come to market. The Supreme Court declared this unconstitutional early in 1936. As I remember it, the adjustment of production, processing tax, and benefit payments were hung on to the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court said that adjustment in production was a local matter and not interstate commerce.

Early came the question of farmer participation and farmer control of these adjustment programs versus government or bureaucratic control. I have said that two-thirds of the processors and representatives of two-thirds of the producers had to subscribe to a marketing agreement before it could be made universal. There were some who thought we shouldn't bother about voluntary agreements and that the government should just issue the order. I remember arguments in which the words totalitarianism and authoritarian were used. Most of us didn't accept this proposal at all. But many scattered individuals and minority groups would say: "We're right. The majority is wrong. Get Uncle Sam to issue an order and compel them to go our way."
Then, too, some of the business groups felt that the government should just issue orders and not bother about agreements and voluntary contracts. A very striking phenomenon was the way the business groups, the free enterprisers, the *laissez faire* boys came to Washington for help. They wanted to be helped; they wanted their fortunes saved along with the fortunes of the farmers. I can't remember anybody who would say in an open meeting, "Mr. Secretary why don't you just order this?" But there'd be lots of talking around that, "You pay too much attention to what these farmers out here think," or "You won't make these farmers get in line and do what they should. That reflects on us."

Down at the bottom of the hill on California Street in San Francisco is the California Packing Corporation; up a ways is Rosenberg's, and Libby, McNeill and Libby, and all the rest of them. There was a lot of feeling among those people whom I knew quite well in those days. "Come on in and order it, and let's get this over with. That's the right thing to do. We'll never get out of the woods wandering around with these people who don't understand."

Maybe there were people inside the Department and
inside the Triple-A who felt this way. George Peek was a man who liked to order things done. General Hugh Johnson of the NRA liked to issue orders, too. His shades were around the Department of Agriculture in those days.

The farmer committee system which exists to this day came into being in '33 and '34. We have a cotton adjustment program. Every farmer in every cotton producing county in the United States is importuned to sign one of these contracts to grow only so much cotton. How's that going to come about? Will a great army go out from Washington with these contracts in their pockets and interview every cotton grower in the country? Or, alternatively, will the Secretary of Agriculture issue an order that everybody will grow only a certain percentage of the acreage of cotton they grew the year before? That was out. Then, how to get the contracts signed and into effect - a huge, giant bureaucracy or get the farmers to do it themselves? I expect M. L. had more to do with the idea of getting the farmers to do it themselves than anybody else. I know he and I were in step on it all the time with Chester Davis and Henry Wallace.

M. L. Wilson felt that the farmer committee system was the democratic way. It was democracy versus bureau-
cracy if not versus totalitarianism. Soon there was organized in each county an association, as we called it - if it were in a cotton county - of the cotton producers in that county. Each township elected a committeeman, and the township committeemen all together made up the county committee. That county committee became the agent, on one side, of the farmers there and, on the other side, of the Secretary of Agriculture in administering the program in that county. They got the farmers to sign contracts and at the end of the year they checked compliance, as we call it, which meant going out and measuring the fields, field by field, to see if the acreage in cotton, if it were cotton, was no greater than the acreage that they had contracted to grow.

Those committeemen were paid from the start. In the early days they were paid somehow or other out of the proceeds of the processing tax. There was a provision for administrative costs. Certain amounts were taken out of the proceeds of the processing tax to pay them three, four or five dollars a day or whatever it was.

By the end of 1934 here was this system of committees in practically every rural county where the basic commodities were grown.
A county might grow cotton, tobacco and corn. There would be a cotton committee, a corn committee, and a tobacco committee. In the Middle West there would be a corn committee, a wheat committee, and maybe a hog committee in many counties. Those commodity committees lasted until 1936 when the Agricultural Adjustment Act was declared unconstitutional and the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act was passed. Then that was changed so that there was one committee per county, one contract per farm instead of maybe two or three or four. The idea of one-contract-per farm started long before 1936. I expect even in 1934 many of us were talking about the possibility of doing that and saying, "That's the way things ought to be."

In 1933 we didn't think about the hog reduction program in terms of killing little pigs. I think this was maybe important. These little pigs were going to be sent to market, and they were sent to market. They were to be sold to the packers for whatever the packers would pay for them, and the packers were to do whatever they could with them. The program was launched all through the Corn-Hog Belt. Train loads of little pigs began to come to market, but nobody would buy them.
Nobody wanted them. I remember as I was coming into the South Building one morning somebody—maybe Claude Wickard—was bemoaning the terrible news that they were driving little pigs into the Mississippi River at St. Paul and just letting them drown. That was the beginning of killing little pigs. It was all figured out as a marketing program, but there was no market, you see. I don’t remember the details of how it went after that, but since there was no market it soon turned into a program of slaughtering the little pigs and the farmers getting paid for it.

This program was considered long before August of ’33. I can’t remember exactly because I was off in another part of the Triple-A. We called it hog restriction; we didn’t call it killing little pigs. It really didn’t get named that until the campaign of the program at its height. I remember it was quite shocking to everybody.

Al Black was head of the corn-hog section. Claude Wickard was his assistant. A little later Al became the chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and Claude Wickard became head of the corn-hog section in late ’33 or ’34.
I remember one day when this was at its height. I kidded Al saying that killing little pigs would go down in the history books as one of the terrible things that Al Black and Henry Wallace had done in 1933. Al is one of these solemn, semi-sullen fellows with apparently not much sense of humor, and my joke fell flat.

To jump ahead a year or two to an entirely personal incident, in the fall of '34 or maybe '35 I was out home. I'd stopped at Marion, Indiana, to see my mother and had taken a drive in her automobile down to the cemetery where my father's grave is and around the countryside where I grew up. Sometime in the course of our drive I was observing the countryside, and here were the hogs in the pastures with the corn cribs full of corn and the corn being thrown out to the hogs. I just made a random remark, "There's a lot of hogs again, aren't there? And they look real good."

My mother said quickly, "Howard, you're not going to start killing little pigs again, are you?"

I think that represents the feeling of a great many of the common, ordinary people. They felt it was just sinful. To kill a sow with pig was worse than killing pigs after they were farrowed.
I don't remember anything significant about Charles Brand's departure from the Triple-A on September 30, 1933. I believe he went directly from there to the National Fertilizer Association. He had been presumably Peck's assistant on this marketing and distribution side, and I had quite a bit to do with him, and if there was any crisis or even any serious ill feeling, I was not conscious of it. I think Charley just got a better job. He wasn't particularly happy in the AAA. I wouldn't know why he wasn't - I guess because he wasn't number one man or something of the kind. He was that type of man. He and Peck had different approaches to the problems they were working on, you see. He had been one of Peck's associates with Chester Davis, Adlai Stevenson, and three or four others around in the early days. I never knew whether Charles Brand was there at George Peck's invitation or at Henry Wallace's invitation. Charles Brand's career went back to the days of H. C. Wallace. I think Charles Brand died within the last year or so.

J. B. Hutson was head of the tobacco section from the start. In tobacco there were moves from the start for a tobacco marketing agreement as well as acreage adjustment of tobacco. That was one commodity where both
attacks were pushed. I don't remember a great deal about the tobacco marketing agreements, but that involved working with the tobacco purchasing and manufacturing companies, the big four or five of them. I remember many meetings, discussions, and arguments. I don't remember any political arguments that were unique to tobacco. The buyers of tobacco for the making of cigarettes, cigars, and chewing tobacco, of course, were the devils of many tobacco growers, and there was lots of talk about them acting monopolistically and about the larger buyers and manufacturers getting together to keep the price of cigarettes and cigars fixed, and all of that. But that wasn't unique to tobacco processors.

The Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, established in October, 1933, was one of the first of the government corporations established—a public corporation. I remember discussions and arguments about it. Here was the government taking over an invention of the free enterprisers. But it proved to have a great many advantages, and they still exist. I remember discussions that M. L., Chester Davis and I had, just talking.

We talked in each other's offices, at lunch, and riding back and forth to work. We'd drive each other home
once in a while and pick each other up going to work. In 1933 I lived out on Macomb Street. In the fall of 1933 out on Meadow Lane in Chevy Chase, the Wilsons and the Toleys lived next door to each other, and the Chester Davis's lived up on the corner of Meadow Lane and Connecticut Avenue. We lived there until I went back to California to stay in the fall of '35. I believe that M. L. had moved away a little bit before that. For a couple of years there we drove to work together, and quite a lot of medicine was made, going back and forth. I remember when things were hot that I'd go over to M. L.'s after supper or he'd come over, and Chester would come walking down the street or both of us would just go up and see if Chester was home, and sit out and talk for awhile. 'If somebody had something on his mind when he woke up in the morning, he'd call me or I'd call them and say, "Ride down with me this morning and I'll bring you home."'

I first got acquainted with Theodore G. Bilbo when he came to work in the Department of Agriculture in the fall of 1933. I hadn't known him before. He appealed to me then as much more quiet, subdued, and reasonable than he was in later years. It might just have been because
he was a "lame duck" at that time. He didn't have much of a job there. As I remember it, he was sort of running a clipping service. His job was to see what was said in the papers about Triple-A, the New Deal, and so on. That's about all there was to it. I don't know, but he may have been working hard trying to influence George Peek or Secretary Wallace. But if he was, I wasn't conscious of it. I doubt that he was.

I can't remember when I first learned that there might be a change in the administration of the Triple-A. For some weeks it had been apparent that there was great strain between Henry Wallace and George Peek. I saw reticence on the part of each one of them to talk informally about the attitude of the other concerning pending questions. A decision was reached when the administrator and the Secretary of Agriculture both signed a paper. There was a reticence to get together on that. George Peek would sign a paper. It would go on to Henry Wallace, and if Henry wanted to sign it, all right, and if he didn't, he didn't. There was a lack of rapport between them. I never did know and don't know to this day what was the reason for that, other than that George Peek felt from the start that the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration should have been separate from the Department of Agriculture. As I said before, they had quite different philosophies about what should be done and how it should be done, and there was a feeling on George Peek's part that Henry was too much of a dreamer and Henry was listening too much to Rex Tugwell and Harry Hopkins and not thinking about agriculture as much as he should.

The relationship between Peek and Roosevelt I never knew and don't know now. Chester Davis would know something about it.

Wallace and Davis worked on the same side back in the McNary-Haugen days and knew and respected each other. Chester, as I remember it, in those strained days was rather the bridge between those two men. I feel quite sure - I doubt whether I could document this - that George Peek brought Chester Davis in and put him in what was, in effect, the number two spot in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Chester was head of the Production Division. I'm sure that Henry Wallace and M. L. Wilson would have welcomed Chester's appointment very much. I don't know that Chester knew Rex Tugwell before he met him in the Department of Agriculture. If
he did know him, he didn't know him well. He hadn't known Jerome Frank. He hadn't known the Consumer Counsel people unless it had just been incidental. He'd never been associated with them.

There wasn't any feeling about Chester that he had won any battle when he replaced George Peek as administrator. As a matter of fact, I remember talking with Chester at the time. He wasn't sure whether he should stay around since George Peek was going out — he just wasn’t sure. Maybe he should go, too, you see. He seriously thought about it and talked about it. I said, "Stay and help us make the thing go." W. L. said the same thing. "Chester, you're the only man that can make this go." He was really the bridge, as I say, between George Peek and Henry Wallace. Chester felt he could work for and with Henry Wallace and still not have turned his back on his old friend and boss, George Peek.

Chester Davis's way of handling things would be different. George Peek was a man who would say yes or say no and give orders in a few words, and so on. Chester was more meditative, more deliberative. He would talk more freely to everybody. He had the friendly approach
and still has it. I saw him yesterday (9 April 1952) and he still has it. That was one of the big differences when Chester took over. Everybody felt the spirit of friendliness. "Sure, Chester will be glad to see you. Go up and see him. He's always glad to see us." You never felt when you were going in to ask a favor that you had to bow to him from the other side of his desk.

There was one characteristic of Chester's general philosophy which I think was quite different from George Peek's - of this last I can't be sure. Chester felt then that the job of the administrator was primarily to carry out the desires of those whom we were trying to help, primarily, the farmers. That is, no part of Chester's make-up called for standing up and issuing edicts and going totalitarian at all. He was strong - for what we called information - getting information, the whole story, out to the farmers and farm groups and using the extension service to do it as well as this farmer committee system. We didn't call it education in those days. The general theory was that if the people understand what the situation is then they will make the proper decisions - the essence of democracy, as we know it. That, I think, was one of the strong bonds
in those days between Henry Wallace and Chester Davis. You see, George Peek and his old friend Hugh Johnson didn't have that approach to administering government programs.

One of Chester's remarks comes to mind. I guess I was arguing with him, "Let's go faster." I remember his making the remark, "One mustn't get too far out in front of his army. He'll get shot in the back." It was quite pithy and also quite illuminating. As time went on, through 1934, '35 and early '36, that's just about exactly what happened. He probably made that remark in '34.

The change from Peek to Davis caused a real stir in the Department. I remember the night I heard that. I met either Paul Appleby or Seanie Baldwin in the hall over in what we called the Secretary's office building, the main building. His eyes were shining, and he said, "Howard, George Peek just resigned! He's just left Henry's office. He's resigned." I think I probably said something like, "I didn't know it was going to happen today." But I did know it was going to happen some day.

I think Peek resigned rather than being fired. I
don't know, but I feel sure that Peek said he wasn't going to stay here any longer in this situation. He would put on his hat and walk. Then quickly somebody said, "Now, don't walk out on us. Come over here and help us see if we can't do something about this international trade."

The Tugwell, Consumer Counsel, Jerome Frank group didn't see eye to eye with Peek at all. Chester Davis didn't see eye to eye with the Consumer Counsel group, either. But he was more tolerant. It was a matter of approach - "We'll talk about it." Peek was always doctrinaire and intolerant. Chester was very tolerant. Of course, Chester finally did come to the place where he had enough, too, and he quit. Chester's tolerance was, "There's probably some sense in what you're saying. I'll try to find it, and maybe we can get together."

The little group of Peek's personal assistants left before or at the time of Peek's leaving. This group included Fred Lee, who was Peek's private lawyer, Wayne Taylor, and Adlai Stevenson, who were his - according to our expression over there - side door boys. I remember those three rather distinctly. I forget just
how they all left, but they were still good friends of
Chester Davis.

I had come into the Department just for the summer. I got this special crop section fixed so that I could leave it. Jess Tapp came to be head of it, and there were a few other people around him. My period of three months or whatever it was, was up, and I was going back to California. One day in that fall of 1933, before Peck's leaving, Chester said, "Yes, that's done, all right, but a lot of work's got to be done to get these programs moving and get it organized like it ought to be. You please stay here a little longer and just work as a sort of special assistant with me." There was no Planning Division then.

I forget what my title was. I remember having a one-man office down the hall there from Chester Davis's office. In that period that I was worrying about this revision of parity, and I was worrying about combining local commodity committees into one county committee. I was also concerned, being sort of an economist, an economic analyst, with how things were going, how supplies were turning out that year, and what was happening to prices. In that time, too, I began those talks and discussions about what turned out to be the Surplus Relief
Corporation. For June, July and August I was with the special crops section, and for September, October, November to mid-December I was in this job.

Concerning the Program Planning Division, the word "planning" had come into good repute. We all talked about planning the program, and planning ahead, and a comprehensive approach, and so on. Rex Tugwell was a planner in those days. Paul Appleby would be in those discussions. Some of my old friends and colleagues from the Bureau of Agricultural Economics were in on a good deal of it. Chester was wholeheartedly in support of it. M. L. Wilson was thinking and talking about it very much.

Paul Appleby wasn’t part of our group. I don’t remember his title. He was Secretary Wallace’s private secretary, and he had that position all the time that H. A. was Secretary of Agriculture. In those days he was welcomed into our group, and as far as I was concerned all the way through. We used to talk to Paul, and he would often be in our discussions in lieu of the Secretary. I don’t remember in those days ever having had many serious differences of opinion with Paul about the direction in which things should go and the particular
way things should be done. He was often very helpful in getting things through and done - getting the Secretary to sign a paper or taking a message for the Secretary.

Very shortly after Chester became administrator - within a very few days, I think - he asked me if I wouldn't stay on and not go back to California and be head of the Program Planning Division for the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. This gave me pretty much of a free hand to make up a program of activities, spread out into thinking and planning beyond the reduction in production and these specific marketing agreements and the little surplus relief that had started.

The land program came in then. I think I mentioned submarginal land. It was tied up a little bit with reduction in production and Henry Wallace's weed patches. Our hypothesis was: Yes, maybe there is too much land in farms in this country for now, but the land that should be taken out of cultivation is the poor land, not the good land. This term submarginal land had become a commonly used term around the Department of Agriculture before the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was organized. One of the things to be done was to work out a submarginal land program.
I think that Chester Davis, M. L., Rex and myself were responsible for the idea of this planning division. All of us thought and talked in the same general terms of additional activities beyond the narrow program we then had that needed to be thought about and planned for and put into action. H. A. himself was in one way the biggest planner of us all, or say, the greatest dreamer of us all.

I will comment on an article, "Organization for Policy Planning in the U.S. Department of Agriculture," by Edward C. Banfield in the Journal of Farm Economics, February, 1952, pages fourteen to thirty-four. In the first six months or so of operations of the Triple-A it had become apparent that many things were involved in agricultural adjustment in addition to reduction in acreage, reduction of export crops, marketing agreements, and licenses. Also the Triple-A was coming to be recognized as an effort and an agency that would extend over a long period of time and the job wouldn't be finished and it wouldn't go out of business within a few months.

When Chester Davis became administrator he asked me to organize and direct a new Program Planning Division. Our job was to set up this division, get some people
around us who knew agriculture, the economics of agriculture as well as agricultural technology, to study and discuss emerging problems, to evaluate as best we could the current programs, and make recommendations to the administrator and the Secretary of Agriculture for additions to or changes in the programs that had been developed up to that time.

I find in this article a description of the division. It says, "The division included six sections," which I remember very well. First was land policy; second, production planning; third, imports and exports; fourth, agricultural and industrial relations; fifth, replacement crops; sixth, rehabilitation.

We talked about the land problem - submarginal land, government-owned land. There had been talk and even some preliminary efforts to develop programs that would take poor land - submarginal land - out of agricultural production rather than taking good land out of agricultural production. That was the base from which we started in our land policy section. Not more than a year later we launched what came to be called a submarginal land program, whereby the United States government purchased submarginal land in specified areas
from private owners. The tract might be in the hills of southern Indiana with poor land and poor farms; it might be in the western Great Plains where the drought had struck and it appeared doubtful that the climate was good enough to justify continued wheat production or whatever; it might have been down in the Appalachian Mountains, where people had lived for a long time but where farming was still in a very rudimentary stage, farmers' incomes had always been poor, and would continue so.

A very considerable group - we didn't call them appraisers at the time but really they were - of soils experts, agricultural economists, and agronomists would go to a poor farm area and make an appraisal of its agricultural possibilities and of its alternative possibilities. Maybe it would be more productive in forest over a period of time; maybe it would be more productive as a grazing preserve; maybe it could be a state park or a national park. I forget how many such areas were picked out all over the United States. Government agents would go and purchase the land from the farmer at a price. I don't know how many areas were finally purchased and turned into national forests or
state forests or grazing preserves or state parks. That kept on and finally became part of the Resettlement Administration, which was formed a year or so later.

Production planning was really the day to day, month to month program of adjustment. We tried to get the idea of adjustment as distinguished from reduction back into the picture and into the thinking of everybody concerned, including the farm people. Our job was to try to figure out a year in advance or two years in advance how many bales and acres of cotton, how many bushels of wheat and of corn and of other crops, how many head of hogs and how many head of beef cattle, how much dairy products should be produced - what should be the total national production in the year ahead of each one of these commodities. After having come to some judgment on that and discussing it with other people in the administration and discussing it with all these committees which had come into existence, we finally arrived at figures which we didn't at that time call the national production goals for 1934 or 1935 or 1936 but which were in effect the goals toward which agricultural adjustment efforts were to be directed and for which payments would be made.
Then we had to determine how much change from present acreages was needed. For most of the basic crops further reduction was needed. Then, where should the reduction be made to serve the best interests of the farmers concerned and the best interests of the nation. If there was to be another 15% reduction in cotton acreage in the year ahead, should it be 15% on every cotton producing farm in the country or should it be 20%, we'll say, on the poor farms in Georgia and South Carolina and only 5% on the more productive farms in Texas and maybe no reduction on the highly productive irrigated lands of New Mexico, Arizona and California? We faced all these problems and argued them out one way or another.

When I say we, I mean, first of all, we in this Program Planning Division, and then the administrative people in the Triple-A, Henry Wallace, Chester Davis, Cully Cobb, Claude Wickard, George E. Farrell, who was head of the wheat section, and so on - the operating people in the Triple-A - plus the representatives of these county and state Triple-A committees which had come into existence at that time, plus representatives of farm organizations, the Farm Bureau, the Grange, the Farmers' Union, and often the cooperatives. Part of our
effort was always directed toward what later came to be called citizen participation in this agricultural adjustment effort. We were always talking about democracy and being democratic in our administration, trying to remember that we braintrusters and bureaucrats often wouldn’t arrive at the right answer to nationwide problems and that with our philosophy of government the best answer would be arrived at after a full and free discussion.

In our Program Planning, Foster F. Elliott was head of the production planning section, and he had in his head and still has the best picture of types of farming in the United States, where they are and where they should best be. Oris V. Wells, who is now chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, was Elliott’s assistant. He was the man who always reduced all these things to figures for us — statistical data. Both Elliott and Wells had been in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and when the Program Planning Division was organized, I induced them to come over there. They’d both been with me in my old days in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

For our land policy section, L. C. Gray, a disciple
of H. C. Taylor, was the leader. He also had been in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics from the time H. C. Taylor arrived. He was head until then of the Division of Land Economics. Alternative uses of land had been a subject of study and debate by him and his people and a good many people in the agricultural colleges for a good many years. The term submarginal land, I think, had originated, or at least had come into use, through the work of that division and the so-called land economists who were stationed in the agricultural colleges.

Vince Cardon joined the land policy section a little later in the game and became one of the regional directors of this submarginal land program. He and Gray, whom I remember as outstanding, realized full well that the acquisition of submarginal land was not by any means the total answer to the general agricultural adjustment problem of the United States, but they felt that with the economic outlook as it was then, agriculture had become overextended. In many places in the United States it had been pushed out into areas where the farmers wouldn't be able to make a good living even if demand increased and prices improved, and that some land being used for farming would give a greater social return
if used for forestry, for grazing, for recreation, for parks.

Henry Wallace saw all these things very well. Rex Tugwell and the people around him were greatly interested in this land program. They were greatly interested in the last little section we had, rehabilitation. That was really human rehabilitation. Families who'd owned land that was bought by the government now needed something else to do. With many of the crops being reduced and the number of livestock being reduced, the demand for labor on the farm was less. Now there was no work for many who had been hired farm workers.

In the South there had arisen by the time this division was established the problem of the sharecropper and the tenant farmer. Let me digress on that a little because it becomes very important. In the sections of the Cotton Belt where farms were large, remnants of the old plantation system really, most of the cotton was raised by sharecroppers. The sharecropper is a tenant who has only his own labor to supply. The landlord supplies the land, the seed, the machinery, the livestock and the power. The sharecropper is given a verbal contract
for ten acres or fifteen acres of cotton, and on a
large farm there would be ten, twenty, forty, fifty
sharecroppers. He works under the direct supervision
of the owner or manager of the entire plantation and at
the end of the season receives a share of the cotton crop
to pay for his work for the year. Hence the name share-
cropper. With cotton acreage being reduced very
significantly the owners said they didn't need so many
sharecroppers, and there was a lot of logic to that.
So the sharecroppers had to look elsewhere for something
to do for a livelihood.

There was a group in the Department of Agriculture -
some in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and
some elsewhere - who came to the conclusion that cotton
producers should not reduce the number of sharecroppers,
but that since the government makes a contract with
this man to reduce his cotton acreage and pays him for
it, the owner should keep the same number of sharecroppers
and in his contract with the sharecroppers should pay
each one of them a part of this benefit payment that
he, the owner, got from the government for reducing his
cotton acreage. It finally focused up into pretty much
of a split between, I believe, what was called the urban
liberals, who believed that the number of sharecroppers should not be reduced and that they should receive part of the benefit payment, and the so-called agrarians, who agreed with the viewpoint of the landowner and manager that, after all, this was a contract between the landowner and the government and under this contract the owner was free to operate as he thought would be in his, the owner's, best interest. This often meant laying off sharecroppers or in some cases even going from sharecropping to a hired labor basis of farming where the man who had been a sharecropper became a day laborer and received cash wages, which in those days were quite low, for the particular number of days that he worked on the cotton crop. It was a step down in the social status of the sharecropper. I got caught in the middle of this.

Oscar G. Johnston was head of the Delta & Pine Land Company, at that time, I think, the biggest private landowner and cotton producer in the Mississippi delta. He had come to Washington to be manager of a cotton pool which was selling government-owned cotton, buying cotton, making loans on cotton, and so on. He was very strong in this agrarian feeling.

Cully Cobb, who was head of the cotton adjustment
section, having what they called in those days a good social point of view on many things, still had this narrow agrarian point of view with respect to sharecroppers and the sharing of benefits with tenants and laborers. As a matter of fact, most of the southerners I remember who worked in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration had the agrarian point of view.

Within the Agricultural Adjustment Administration the Consumers' Counsel early took the other point of view - before it became acute at the end of 1934 when we were looking forward to what the 1934 program should be. This problem had arisen in 1933 before the Program Planning Division had been created, but it hadn't become acute.

As I remember, I tried to avoid taking a position. I was trying to work something out that would be reasonably satisfactory to both sides - to all concerned. The job of the Program Planning Division was to come up with suggestions, we said, rather than to come up with answers. I remember, for instance, very hot personal arguments with people like Oscar Johnston and Cully Cobb. By the same token I remember arguments of the same kind in which I was taking a position different from that of
fellows like Jerome Frank, Lee Pressman, probably Gardner Jackson. I said, "Philosophically you fellows may be right, but we can't make this whole world over overnight, and we've got to move along here as best we can as fast as we can. We're never going to reach the millenium."

We had a section on replacement crops. Cotton must be reduced; what goes in its place? Not just weed patches. Corn must be reduced; what would go in its place? What crops can replace those that are being reduced? It was to be reduction of these crops which we said were in oversupply. Then when we got down to thinking about corn, we had the corn-hog division and the corn-hog committees, and when we were thinking about cotton, we had the cotton division and the cotton committees - even tobacco and the rest of them. The contracts with farmers were first to reduce their acreage of these so-called basic crops, and another part of the contract after the first year was to replace their reduced acreage of cotton with something else. Maybe it would be only a cover crop to enrich the soil. In the agricultural adjustment contract for 1934 or '35 soy beans was introduced as a replacement crop for corn.
Soy beans had been grown very little on a commercial scale in the United States up until that time, and now (1952) they're one of the main crops of the Corn Belt and the northern Cotton Belt. The United States is even exporting soy beans and soy bean oil.

Of course, we had no answer to those who said that many people were hungry and starving while we were reducing food production. We would be inclined to say, "That isn't our job. That's your job. That's Harry Hopkins's job. That's somebody else's job, not ours."

I think there was rather a feeling of relief in the Department when the pork from slaughtered pigs was turned over to Harry Hopkins. But there was objection when the friends of the consumers would suggest, "Don't reduce the number of hogs by a little pig program or any other. Go ahead and grow them and feed them, and maybe the government will buy them and give them to the poor people." There would be real objection to that among the agrarian fundamentalists. This idea of reduction, and reduction only, came to be the accepted, almost single, idea of agricultural adjustment.

A lot of people seemed to come to the conclusion that somehow or another the marketing situation and the
marketing mechanism for agricultural commodities needed to be fixed up so that the prices and the market price would be satisfactory. Part of the agrarian attitude included a little reluctance in 1934 - I remember more of it in '35 and so on - to accept these government checks for having reduced production, adjusted production or whatever. That was not according to traditions, not the democratic way; that was the government taking over, and so on. On the other hand, if the government just passed the right laws or we in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and other places would just make these middlemen do the right thing, then prices would be all right. That's another divergence. Most of what I've said can be channeled into those two forces of urban liberals and agrarians.

Mordecai Ezekiel and Louis Bean, who was his assistant, were economic advisers to Henry Wallace. But they had their position in the Program Planning Division. Zeke, I believe, was deputy director of the Program Planning Division. Louis Bean was head of what we called the agricultural-industrial relations section. Both of them, at that time, were preoccupied with the relationship between the demand for and the price of
agricultural commodities and the incomes of consumers, and national income, income of labor, the dividends of corporations - but mostly incomes of laboring men and self-employed people; these groups and their families make up the great bulk of the consumers. Zeke and Louis Bean realized - we all did in the Program Planning Division and in the Triple-A - that the income of farmers and the agricultural income of the country was bound up quite intimately with the incomes of other classes of people, with the portion of the national income that came from manufacturing and so on. I don't remember that either Zeke or Louis Bean took any position with regard to this agrarian-urban-liberal split. I don't remember that any of the people that I've mentioned in the Program Planning Division finally lined up one way or another on it.

Aside from the people in the Consumers' Counsel, Jerome Frank and the group around him belonged to this urban liberal group - for instance, Harry Hopkins and the people around him. The Public Works Administration was another agency. I suspect that if our old friend Harold Iokes had stood up and been counted he would have been there, too.
The classification wouldn't be complete. There were differences, in all shades, of opinion and conviction concerning what should be done administratively and when it should be done—maybe something that couldn't be done, that wouldn't be feasible this year, might be done next year. Another part of this difference between agrarianism, as we're calling it, and urban-liberalism showed up in the planning and administering of international trade. This had been a high tariff country, and the agrarians in the early 1930s seemed concerned that more and better tariffs were fundamental in curing the terrible decline in international trade—in exports of cotton, wheat, tobacco, and other export commodities—that accompanied the worldwide depression. Many people felt that there should be an embargo on the shipment of almost every agricultural commodity into the United States. That didn't include sugar, because the United States only grows a small portion of the sugar that it consumes. It included corn and all feed grains, it included wheat, it included cotton, it included tobacco and so on, even though long staple cotton that's needed to make automobile tires and real good cloth wasn't grown in this country and hadn't been, and even though many
types of tobacco that are demanded and needed in cigarettes didn't grow in this country. There was a feeling that it should now be all barred and embargoed.

We had this import-export section in the Triple-A, giving attention to such things and considering what should be our policy. They and many others began to think and talk about export subsidies. It wasn't long until export subsidies began to be used. The urban liberals, I think, teamed up completely without reservation with Cordell Hull and his Reciprocal Trade Agreements program that began to emerge about that time. This was fundamentally a move toward free trade and a reduction in trade barriers. Again, the urban liberals were for breaking down trade barriers, and the agrarians were for building them up in spite of the fact that the farmers hadn't ever benefited from the tariff—except the sugar farmers and maybe a few others.

I don't remember the particular time, but in this period there was a proposition from the apple growers of the country that high tariffs be imposed on bananas—maybe import quotas too imposed. They contended that a man who ate a banana wouldn't eat an apple—hence bananas competed with apples.

So it went through 1934. Chester Davis had become
administrator. As I look back and think about him during this period, I see him as primarily a compromiser. I don't mean that in a bad way at all. Here were all the different groups of interests, not only within his own administration, within the Department of Agriculture and in other government agencies but also in Congress on the Hill and among the farm groups and other groups. Chester was always trying to find a solution that would be workable and that would move at least some distance in what he thought was the right direction. As for myself, I can't remember that any real differences existed between us or that my opinion or my advice to him on programs was in conflict with the direction in which he felt things should move, or the direction in which he thought the administration should turn. The question always was, "Is it practical now? How fast can we go? Can we do it now or had we better wait until next year?" Not in 1934, but in 1935 I began to get out of patience with the slowness with which things were going.

Along some time in 1934 some of us began to talk about one-contract-per-farm. This was adjustment versus reduction. Instead of a farmer having a contract to
adjust his wheat acreage and another to adjust his corn acreage, if those were the two crops that he had on his farm, he'd have one contract for adjustments on his entire farm. It began to come up early, and in the Program Planning Division we worked up some definite ideas and definite propositions on it.

The Agricultural Extension Service comes to mind. It, of course, had been established a good many years — nearly twenty years — before agricultural adjustment came along. It had a pretty good sized network of county agents all over the country. They early came to have a place in the program. They worked with these county committees. Sometimes the county agent would be secretary of the county committee. The administrator of the Extension Service said, and correctly so, that the Extension Service was an educational agency, not an action agency, but the Extension Service all the way out from Washington to the state colleges and down to the counties and communities carried the educational phases of agricultural adjustment. The county agent would tell the farmers in his county what the program was and what it would be for the coming year, and what the contracts would provide for. Of course, they would tell all the farmers that they should sign the contract and participate
in the program. Clyde W. Warburton was Director of Extension at that time, and he and his immediate helpers around him were in the councils of the Triple-A, the Secretary's office, and so on, on the educational phases of the program.

The attitudes of state directors of extension in the state colleges, varied from state to state and person to person, of course, but in general the state college people, we soon came to feel, would take what I've been describing here as the agrarian point of view on adjustment problems rather than what I've been calling the urban liberal point of view. In 1934, it began to be apparent that many of the agricultural college people were out of sympathy with some of the things the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the Secretary of Agriculture were doing.

I remember either in 1934 or 1935 Henry Wallace making a speech to the annual meeting of the Land Grant College Association where he rather took the college people to task for two things, as I remember, One was what he characterized and I would have characterized as a narrow agrarian point of view. Second and more particularly he took them to task for not paying attention
to the problems of the small farmer and for not being concerned about the hired laborer and the sharecropper.

Henry Wallace is a hard man to catalogue. At times he had quite a lot of the urban liberal point of view, and yet he was basically an agricultural fundamentalist. There are many sides to him; I might say a side where reason prevailed and I might say a side where mysticism prevailed and I might say another side where fate prevailed. Fate or God or something has decreed thus and so for Henry Wallace, and that's the way it would be - there was no reason for it; that was just the way it was. He came to feel that God or fate had decreed that he was going to be President of the United States. He hadn't gotten to that place yet in 1934, but it was part of his mental make-up. I'm trying to make a difference between the reasoning side of Henry Wallace and the mystic side and what I might call the fatalistic side.

When Henry Wallace was a reasoning man, when you'd take a walk through Rock Creek with him, when you'd have lunch with him in his office, or when you'd go to his office after the rush of the day was over and you weren't too tired, he would understand and see all
these things we were talking about. He's an excellent agricultural technologist. He knows what makes crops grow, what makes livestock grow, where they grow, and so on. When he was a reasoning man he would see all the things. The mystic and fatalistic were related but different. Often he would say, "No, not that. No, it's no use to think about that. I don't think we can do that." It's hard to catalogue the things he would turn his back on at different times. He might say, "Yes, logically and from a reasonable standpoint, this is the right way to go and the proper thing to do, but it can't be done."

Henry really took two sides on international trade at once. He was supporting Cordell Hull and his reciprocal trade program for all he was worth on one side, and at the same time he said, "Yes, we mustn't have too much competition from outside. Import quotas or maybe high tariffs wouldn't be too bad."

Anybody who holds on to an administrative position around Washington or anywhere else has to be expedient, but Henry wasn't expedient, in the sense that Chester Davis was and is. Things would come up on agricultural adjustment, land policy, on international trade that needed to be taken to the White House to FDR.
Sometimes H. A. would then be fine. He would go over by himself or we would go over together, and he and Chester often went together. Sometimes he would want to take things up in a full way in a Cabinet meeting or at a meeting of the Emergency Council - the Cabinet plus all the agencies. He would delineate a problem and a question and get a consensus on it. Other times he wouldn't want to do that at all. He wouldn't want to consider what seemed to me and some of the rest of us just as important a problem, and he'd dismiss it by saying, "Howard, I don't think anything you or I can do on this particular front at this time will influence the course of history or even the economic situation in the United States just now. Let's forget it."

In the Program Planning Division in the calendar year 1934, land policy came forward and we began getting a submarginal-land-purchase program ready for administration. International trade problems and policies were pushed forward and discussed and presented to people inside the administration, to college people and farm groups. There was a growing realization that agricultural adjustment of a lasting kind couldn't just
be a flat reduction of a given percentage of crop acreage in every county in the United States, and that it must vary from county to county and place to place — regional differences as we used to call it.

A point that I haven't stressed so far is that of farmer participation and farmer discussion, a moving away from bureaucratic edict toward farmer participation or citizen determination of what the program should be in a particular place — giving the citizen a voice. That came about working with the Extension Service, the land grant colleges, and this group of farmer committees. We did all we could to get together information and statements of problems and situations that would form the basis of intelligent discussion.

The Program Planning Division did quite a bit to ventilate and focus up the problem of who should receive the benefits of agricultural adjustment.

Agricultural-industrial relations, which Zeke and Louis Bean were interested in primarily, became part of the thinking of the group in the Department of Agriculture — or the Agricultural Adjustment Administration at least. Statements were made, reports put out, and discussions held on the relationship between
agriculture and industry.

How much of all this was really translated into administration or how much administrative action was changed as a result of the activities of the Program Planning Division I couldn't tell then and I can't assess now. Administrative decisions, the important ones at least, were made on the basis of a great many considerations, and we of the Program Planning Division always tried to keep what we considered the economic and social - although we didn't say "social" in those days - considerations uppermost. Maybe we didn't say "social" because we were a little bit afraid of the word. It was primarily because when our little group of myself, Buck Elliott, Zeke, and so on, talked among ourselves and said economic, we meant economic and social.

I did then, and although I haven't talked to Rex Tugwell for years, I would probably find myself in accord with many of Rex's ideas and much of his philosophy of the way this United States should develop for the benefit of the citizens thereof. I thought then that Rex was more of a fascist, meaning by that one who would prefer to have things done by decree or order rather than by what we came to call the democratic process
then, than I was. I don't agree with Raymond Clapper at all on calling Chester Davis an agricultural fascist. You could say that Chester like Henry Wallace and myself, to a certain extent, leaned toward this fundamental agrarianism we're talking about, where Rex didn't. But Chester was primarily a compromiser, to use that word again. Rex was not at all a compromiser. Rex wanted things to be done his way somehow or another. He would quickly get out of patience with long discussions and the ventilation of differences and points of view. There was none of the moderator, the thing it takes to moderate different points of view, in Rex's makeup. There was a great deal of it in Chester's makeup.

Chester had become identified with the agrarians, and his dislike for Rex and Rex's group, Jerome Frank, those young lawyers, and the Consumers' Counsel, was apparent both inside and outside the Department. Rex, at least, made public statements. I don't remember particular ones, but he made statements publicly criticizing some of the programs of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

As you mention, Raymond Clapper stated in the Washington Post that I was a rival to Rex Tugwell. Maybe
we were rivals in planning. That's about all I can think of there. Of course, I was head of the planning division. I was the planner for the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, which meant pretty much for the Department of Agriculture. Rex was and still is a planner. I can remember having been referred to with Rex as a planner. Pretty soon this term planning began to take on an anti-democratic connotation — planning was not democratic in the minds of a number of people.

I remember a discussion with Rex. I was trying to get Rex to write something under the title, "Planning in a Democracy." We were talking about this give-and-take in citizen participation, and so on. Rex was being very much misunderstood along during that period, you see. I remember several times talking to Rex and telling Rex, "You ought to write a good article and make some speeches on planning in a democracy. All of this thinking, planning, blueprinting, chart making, and so forth that we're all doing around here will be accepted if we talk about planning in a democracy and show that it's simply to give the people some facts as a basis for making laws." But Rex never got around to that.

By December and January of 1934-35 the relationship
between Paul Appleby and Chester Davis had become pretty grim, I think. That's one of the things I never understood very well and don't to this day. I know Chester still carries his dislike of Paul Appleby. They came out of pretty much the same background.

Paul was Henry Wallace's front man, you see. His office was just outside Henry Wallace's front door. All callers went past Paul's desk. Paul made most of the appointments. All the mail that Henry Wallace received and letters and documents he signed went over Paul's desk. Henry depended in those days on Paul for suggestions, and he'd listen to and likely accept without much question a suggestion that Paul would make. Chester was in his office across the street, running the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, as big as and as important as all the rest of the Department of Agriculture put together. In a way Paul Appleby sat between Henry Wallace and Chester Davis. And Henry Wallace, of course, was the boss, the number one man. Chester Davis was number two. That had been fought out between Henry Wallace and George Peek.

Consciously or subconsciously, deliberate or not, Paul, I'm sure, did things, said things, and influenced
Henry Wallace to take positions which were not the positions and actions that Chester would have suggested or did suggest. When this split between the agrarians and the urban liberals became imminent, Paul's sympathies apparently, and I think really, were with Rex Tugwell, Jerome Frank and company. Paul was always seeing that Henry Wallace, his boss, was recognized as number one man, and Chester Davis was the number two.

I was still living near Chester Davis and M. L. Wilson during that period. I don't remember any definite statements that Chester made about Paul then. I can't recall definite and specific things and actions by Paul that annoyed Chester or actions by Chester that annoyed Paul. I know that Paul Appleby would talk to various people in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration without going through Chester Davis. I remember, in my own case, that Paul and I talked about lots of things. He'd come over to my office or we'd talk to each other at lunch or I'd go over to his office. I remember in that period I got quite conscious of the feeling between Paul and Chester, and I was rather careful to report to Chester that I'd talked to Paul about thus and so. I'm sure that wasn't the case with a good many people in the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, especially the people in the Consumers' Counsel and in the legal counsel's office.

No, it wasn't good administrative procedure. One could classify it simply as informal exchange of ideas - informality as distinguished from careful paper procedure and observance of protocol. There was some of that in it. In the early days of the Triple-A, in 1933 especially, what we later came to call the administrative line hadn't been established. You talked to people as you pleased and to whomever you pleased and you wrote your letters, requests, and memoranda first to this fellow and then to that fellow. This has some advantages unless it raises the ire of the administrator or the one who is really in authority because he feels he is being bypassed or not consulted. There was something of that in Paul's method in those days.

There was a little of the Machiavelli in Paul's makeup, but not as much as a good many people tended to believe. The very fact that Henry Wallace is the kind of man he is would encourage a man like Paul to act as he did. Henry Wallace knew that Paul talked to many people, and he must have become conscious that Paul and
Chester didn’t like each other, but that wouldn’t concern him. It wouldn’t concern him today. He knew those two people weren’t getting along well - he must have known it. There was nothing Machiavellian in Henry’s own disregard for administrative lines - it’s just Henry Wallace, you see - but it would encourage a man like Paul to go ahead and do it. I doubt if Chester even ran to Henry Wallace and told him what Paul Appleby was doing. Chester isn’t that kind of a fellow.

Paul may have taken more overt action than I was conscious of then or can remember now to, as we would say, put Chester in his place vis-a-vis the Secretary of Agriculture. There wasn’t any reason for putting him in his place. Chester Davis isn’t that kind of a fellow at all. But - I experienced it later myself - he would get a lot of attention from outside people and outside groups, and farm people would come in to see Chester and the people around Chester. Maybe they just wouldn’t bother to go over and see Henry Wallace, you see. Paul Appleby and others would know about these sessions and they’d wonder what the hell these fellows were talking about over there. Maybe Chester would tell Henry some time in passing and maybe he wouldn’t. Henry would never worry about it at all.
I would account for Paul Appleby's behavior by his position vis-a-vis Henry Wallace, plus the fact that Paul, like all the rest of us, wanted to change the world, and he wanted to change it in what he considered to be the right way. He was a reformer, along with all the rest of us, you see. I would put him in the urban liberal camp when the showdown finally came, although he, like myself, was just caught in the middle. He never took a position. He stood with Henry Wallace like I stood with Chester Davis.

I can't say that Paul was disliked in the Department. I shouldn't say this, but I will: Paul isn't a likeable man in the way that Henry Wallace is and in the way that Chester Davis is or the way that M. L. Wilson is.

I don't remember the conference on the tariff program with Wallace, C. C. Stine, Leslie A. Wheeler, and L. R. Edminster on January 22, 1935. I remember the Commercial Policy Committee of the State Department, but I don't remember the ten page memorandum we had prepared to send them. Memoranda were going fast and furious in those days. The Commercial Policy Committee was an interdepartmental committee that was formulating
what became Cordell Hull's reciprocal trade program. Henry Wallace, as I said, was in close on that. I would sit in on the meetings sometimes. Edminster was head of the Triple-A export-import section. He later became a member of the Tariff Commission.

I don't remember the conference on January 21, 1935 with Wallace, Davis, Tugwell, Wilson and myself in which we discussed a revised Triple-A organization for 1936, setting up a series of regional directors. It grew out of this idea of regionalization of adjustment—a conviction that you can't have a uniform program all across the country. It had grown out of our thinking—my own thinking and that of the people around me—during the whole history of the Triple-A. But by that time Chester had his back up about a lot of things, and it was impossible for him to moderate all the differences of opinion and all the differences of views. When one can't moderate a change that will be acceptable or that he thinks will be acceptable, the decision is likely to be no change for now "but maybe we can do it later."

The "books and records" clause grew primarily out of the marketing agreement and license provisions and
operations of the Triple-A. In one way of looking at it these were essentially price fixing agreements and orders. Under the provisions of a milk marketing agreement the producer would receive a fixed price for his grade one milk; the wholesaler would sell it to the retailer at a fixed price; and the retailer would sell it to the consumer at a fixed price. Those would be specified in the agreement. On the distributor's or processor's side, what should the spread be between the price the producer received and the price the consumer pays? That had been one of the devils of the agrarians for a long time. One of H. C. Wallace's, H. A.'s father, phobias was: What happens in the dark? Why do the meat packers pay so little for our hogs and cattle and charge so much for the pork and the beef? In H.C. Taylor's first days in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics Stine started collecting and publishing statistics on the proportion of the consumer's dollar which the farmer received, and it is still done regularly over there. The Agricultural Adjustment Act contained a provision, which I don't remember exactly, stating that this spread should be a "reasonable" one. That was the legal basis for the "books and records" clause in the
marketing agreements and licenses which gave the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to examine the books and records of the processors and distributors who were parties to an agreement or under license.

It was quite a job to gain access to the records of all the processors and getting them to make periodic reports to the Secretary of Agriculture on their earnings. I can remember being in on lots of sessions with the accountants and others who were examining the books and records, helping decide the particular items to study and the particular ways to analyze them.

So as 1934 progressed here came another schism. The urban liberals wanted to squeeze the last cent out of the processors and distributors, assuming that they're all devils. But the businessmen, the processors and distributors, made as good a case as they could that they were being persecuted and their business being ruined, and so on. Some of the same goes on around Washington now.

I'm sure Chester Davis was for the examination of the books and records. He must have been - it couldn't have been done without his support. He would have been for a much more reasonable, as he would call it, system
of examination than were Fred Rowe and his cohorts in
the Consumers' Counsel and Jerome Frank and his lawyers,
who were getting ready to take legal action or considering
the need for legal action, and who insisted that they
needed careful and complete analysis. This was tied up
to some extent with NRA and the codes. There were some
of the same provisions there. Incidentally, the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration administered some
NRA codes along with its marketing agreements and licenses.

I don't remember having lunch with Davis and
Wallace on January 25, but it sounds reasonable that
Wallace and I were trying to talk Davis into the
regional approach.

I don't remember the Brookings Institution dinner
on January 28, but it reminds me of a rather significant
line of study that I haven't mentioned. When the
Triple-A was organized in 1933, the Brookings Institution
inaugurated a concurrent appraisal of the activities of
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. E. G. Nourse
was leader of the triumvirate of himself, Joseph S.
Davis and John D. Black. H. I. Richards and Harold B.
Rowe were two of their helpers. A third member of it
was Dennis A. Fitzgerald. He now (1952) is one of the
high ranking members of the Mutual Security Administra-
tion over here. They came right into the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration and attended our meetings,
read our dockets and our documents, talked to us about
why we were doing some things and not doing others and
so on, wrote reports that finally came back to us, and
finally published a number of books on the operations
of the Triple-A. They didn't wind that up until after I
came back here in 1936. This incident that you speak
about must have been a time when Nourse and company
invited us to dinner to talk and ask about things that
were being done or were not being done and why, and to
give us the results of their study and thinking.

I'm not conscious of Victor Christgau having
made a statement on January 30 that the Triple-A was
dividing into cliques for and against Chester Davis.
Just why he should have made it at that time, I don't
know. It was very apparent weeks and months before that
that friction was growing between - as I characterize it -
Chester and Rex Tugwell-Jerome Frank.

I don't remember when Congressman W. J. Driver
of Arkansas and J. F. Tomkins brought eight members of
the Arkansas Farm Bureau to Washington to complain about
Section 7 of the Cotton Contract on February 1, 1935. I don't remember the way the provisions of the contract were worded, but the intent of them was that the landowner should not unduly reduce the number of tenants and that he should share his benefit payments with his tenants. Of course, many of the large cotton growers and plantation owners didn't like that. This would have been concerning the contract for 1934, on which payments were being made about that time, rather than the contract for 1935, which was under discussion at that time. I don't remember the writing of the Cotton Contract for 1934. That would have been done probably in January or February of 1934 so that it would get out and the producers would sign it before planting time. It would have been drafted by the lawyers, I don't know who would have written Section 7. Of course, it might have been written by some unknown junior. Jerome Frank would have been very careful to know what was in it and how it was written and what it meant, and he would have his own interpretation of it. Alger Hiss was in that part of Jerome Frank's show, too. I would imagine he had something to do with it. Lee Pressman was primarily concerned with marketing agreements, orders, and codes, as I remember it.
It's news to me now that on February 2 Chester Davis told Wallace that Jerome Frank and Paul Appleby were trying to build a record against me and J. W. Tapp, although maybe I knew it at the time. Jesse Tapp at that time was in charge of the division that had to do with marketing agreements and orders. Jess was generally known as one of Tolley's disciples. He'd known Tolley back in the old BAE days, and the first thing Tolley did when he came to Washington in 1933 was to get Jess Tapp to come to be his assistant for a little while and his successor after a period of a couple months. Jess Tapp and Tolley were bracketed in a lot of people's minds.

Along in that time, the latter part of January and in February, the friction was getting worse. Chester Davis was getting angry. He was talking about what these fellows were doing to him, how they weren't paying attention, how they were saying things, interpreting things that weren't in line with his decisions, and how they were talking to Henry Wallace and making observations, suggestions, and recommendations that were at variance with Chester's thoughts and ideas. I don't remember the dates of any of these, but I remember one morning going
to Chester's office, which was located practically next door to mine. I forget whether it was on my own volition or whether he called me. He just said, "Howard, I can't get along with these fellows any more. Here are a bunch of them that have got to go." Jerome Frank's name led the list, and it included all the rest of them that were in the purge. He was terribly worked up. This very rarely happens to that man. When he gets worked up and fed up, something is going to happen.

Everybody was working hard, and everybody was getting tired, irritable, and irascible. There was a lot of dissatisfaction - we've talked about some of it among various groups about what was being done. They'd say they weren't being treated right and so on. When they'd come in to Chester they'd quote or presume to quote what somebody else had said to them, and when they'd go to see somebody else they'd quote what Chester had said, and that would come back in scuttlebutt fashion. There was lots of feeling on everybody's part. I know I felt and I'm sure Chester felt that, "God, somehow or other we ought to be doing a much better job than we are." A tendency to blame the other fellow, which is human nature, went for all of these people, you see.
You'd get into an argument about something and blow your top, and then you were mad at the other fellow and he was mad at you. It just got that way around the Department of Agriculture.

"Building a record against" would mean writing a memorandum to somebody that such and such a thing has happened or that such and such a man has directed that this be done or that this not be done. I think that's all it meant. Probably by that time it had become apparent to everybody, as it had become apparent to me after a few sleepless nights some time before this, that I was going to stand by Chester this time. One had to take a position. The chips were down because everybody was mad at everybody else. The fundamental differences in philosophy as well as fundamental differences in how to proceed in the new venture — sure, it was a government venture — and inability to reach an honest agreement on the fundamental problems of policy and administration just grew and grew. It's one of the fundamental things of human life. You get mad at your kids; you get mad at your wife.

I knew I had to take a position because too many things were happening and feeling was too high. When it
got to the place where Chester Davis was going to be kicked around, was I going to help kick him?

Either Chester was going to get rid of these s.o.b.s or he was going to quit. I'm not sure that he said that, but that was his feeling.

I think that M. L.'s position was very much the same as my position on this. M. L. was back at that time as assistant secretary, I think. He'd been over to Subsistence Homesteads in the Department of the Interior for a while and came back to be Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. I think M. L.'s position and feeling on the whole thing was very much the same as mine.

I don't remember having faced the question, since I had taken the position of standing with Chester Davis, of either resigning or being forced to resign. All during that period here I was simply on leave from the university doing a special job here and sooner or later I was going back to the University of California. The phase of all this that bothered some people, you see, to be fired and be out of a job or to resign and be out of a job, a difficult thing to face, I never had to face in those days. The fear of being out of a job would explain some of the feeling here. The depression was still
on, and jobs weren't easy to come by. Most of us, including myself, had the best job we had ever had.

Chester had been in financial straits before he came in with George Peek in 1933. The repercussions of that never were apparent in any of his actions, public or private, that I knew about. He never seemed to be fearful that that might occur to him again, but I had the feeling in those days that Chester had some sense of insecurity, which, as I say, I didn't have. It didn't bother me a bit.

I suspect that I might have said very easily that I would resign and that others might resign with me. I remember an incident. Jess Tapp and Harry R. Wellman of the University of California, now director of the Ciannini Foundation out there, who was here on leave assignment like myself working with Jess Tapp, showed up at home one evening. They had come out to talk about it. "This crisis is coming here. What are we going to do?" I remember the three of us talking about it. I didn't know what was going to happen, but I wouldn't stay around in any intolerable position. I would just go back to California. I can remember Harry saying his leave was up, and I can remember Jess saying, "I can go
back to Wall Street or I can do something else." There was such talk.

I didn't know which position Henry Wallace would take. I don't think anybody did. I remember talking to Chester, and Chester talking to me. He didn't know whether Henry would take this or not, you see, but this was his ultimatum.

I don't remember whether anything happened on Sunday, February 3, 1935. I guess I saw either Chester or M. L. or both of them on that day. I saw M. L. in the backyard of his home no doubt, but I don't remember.

It was on Wednesday, February 6, that Seth Thomas took over Jerome Frank's job as head of the AAA Legal Counsel. That had been worked out before. I think he was also solicitor for the Department. Let me put it this way. I'm sure that Chester figured that if Jerome and his bright young men did get out of there he would get Seth Thomas, and I feel confident that when he talked to Henry Wallace and Henry agreed that Chester might ask for the resignations of these people, at the same time they would agree that Seth Thomas would take over, which was maybe in the period of that weekend.

Monday and Tuesday were hectic days. Everybody was
coming in to talk. I was seeing people and talking. At that time we were in two camps, and the people in the other camp wouldn't talk to me at all and I wouldn't talk to them. Some time along in there I learned, I suppose direct from Chester, that here was his list, and Henry had agreed, and he, Chester, was seeing these men one by one and telling them the verdict.

Apparently it came as quite a shock to Jerome, Rex, and company. I believe Rex was out of town. I have a remembrance of the boys going to Rex's office and using Rex's telephone, probably to call Rex down in Florida. I have the impression that Jerome, Gardner, Lee Pressman, and so on were feeling that if Rex had been here it might have been different. They wanted to talk to Rex, tell him, and get his advice on what to do.

What I really remember is the press conference. It was the biggest press conference, I think, that Henry Wallace ever had while he was Secretary of Agriculture. It was in his office, as his press conferences always were. Chester Davis always sat up at the side of his desk. Sometimes I'd sit on the other side or around near. Zeke was always there to answer questions about statistics. There was always a group
of us that sat around Henry Wallace's desk. This time Chester was there, and I was there. Chester was seated right next to Henry, on his right. I believe I was sitting next to Chester. Paul Appleby, no doubt, was standing in the back of the room. The press boys always came in through Paul's room - you see, the anteroom where Paul sat - and Paul would come in and sit at the back of the room or over on the side.

Then the door opened and the reporters came in. There were more, I think, than at any other press conference Henry Wallace ever had. I remember there were not enough seats, and many of them were standing. In some quarters there was violent questioning. "What is the reason for this?" I remember Robert S. Allen, who was with Drew Pearson at one time, standing up in the middle of the floor there, and he kept on asking questions and making statements trying to get out of Henry Wallace and Chester Davis what was really behind all this. They couldn't get anything more than, "This is just for the good of the cause."

We had talked it over beforehand in a general way. There was no definite rehearsal, but we had established
the position we were going to take, you see. "We aren't
going to fight these men. We aren't going to say
they're bad men. We're going to be gentlemanly and
polite about it as far as we can. We've got to have a
press conference and state our position, which will be
in the paper in the morning."

Henry Wallace was concerned and tense — more so
than Chester at that press conference, I have the feeling.
Chester had won his battle, his victory. After all,
Henry was the one who was being asked the questions and
who had to answer. Chester could relax. I don't like to
compare Henry to myself, but I suspect and always did
that he felt that here was a crisis — was he going to
stand with Chester or wasn't he? In his thinking he
didn't go into all the causes of the crisis, but here it
was. Did he want to part company with Chester as he
did with George Peck or would he prefer to part company
with Jerome Frank and his boys? He decided he'd prefer
to part company with Jerome Frank and his boys and have
the newspaper men of Washington and others think that
maybe he deserted Rex Tugwell too.

If Rex had been present, he would have been
violently opposed to the action taken. I have no doubt
that he would have said, "Let Chester go." It's a hypothetical question whether if Tugwell had been there things would have been different. They might have been because it was very much touch and go. Suppose Rex had been there and suppose Chester had come to talk to Henry, and Henry had said: "Let's get Rex in here." Chester might have marched out then. Or suppose that Rex had been there and had decided he wanted to talk to FDR about it. I'm sure it wouldn't have been in Henry's mind to wait until Rex was down in Florida, and I doubt very much whether it was in Chester's mind. He wouldn't deliberately wait. He would wake up in the morning and come to the conclusion that, by golly, things have got to be changed, and he would remember suddenly that Rex was out of town. That would be a relief, but I can't believe that Chester would sit back and wait until Rex was far away before he would precipitate a crisis.

Let me put in a footnote. Either the next day after that or two days after that Alger Hiss comes in to see me. He said, "I wanted to stop in here first to tell you I'm on my way to Mr. Davis's office to give him my resignation. I think he did all wrong in this.
I've worked closely with him, and I've admired and respected him. But now I just don't think I can work here and keep my self respect any longer. I hope there'll be no hard feelings" - or words to that effect.

I told Alger how much I had enjoyed working with him and all that. He went down to Chester's office and apparently had about the same kind of conversation, left his resignation on Chester's desk. That was that. That's an item that isn't in the books.

Chester had omitted Alger's name deliberately from the purge list. He didn't want to fire Alger, like he wanted to fire the others.

Another little footnote concerns Lee Pressman. Lee Pressman, as I mentioned before, was giving primary attention from the legal standpoint to marketing agreements, codes, licenses, and so forth. I'd started in with the Triple-A in that work in 1933 and was still quite conscious of how things were going. Last summer (1951) it just happened that Chester and I were reminiscing about the purge at Chester's home in Pasadena, California. Chester reminded me that during that period I rather pleaded with him not to fire Lee Pressman because Lee Pressman was the one man on the legal side who knew and
understood all the intricacies of these marketing agreements, licenses, and codes. I told Chester he was probably right, but I had no remembrance of it.

I remember F. M. Shea, but not too well - not as well as I remember these others. I don't remember if anybody stood up for him.

Gardner Jackson was in the Consumers' Counsel. In all these problems and disagreements that we've mentioned he had almost invariably lined up with Jerome and the lawyers, and others who held the urban liberal point of view. Gardner had taken quite a part, as I remember it, in the examination of the books and records of the processors and the disagreements about it. He'd been especially interested in the plight of the sharecropper and the laborer in the South. He was just "included in." He was just personally anathema to Davis.

I don't remember February 7, 1935, when Rex returned. I don't remember anything about what he did or what happened at the time of his return.

The crisis was very largely emotional. This fundamental difference in viewpoint on what the policy and program of the Department of Agriculture and the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration should be began to show up early. You couldn't completely classify any two of us as being identical in our ideas on the way things ought to be. There is, of course, this general classification that we have called fundamental agrarians and urban liberals. The principal cause of the crisis, I think, was the sharp disagreement between the boss - Chester Davis - and Jerome Frank, Lee Pressman, Gardner Jackson, and some others. The administrator, Chester, felt, "I've decided and I've said so. These fellows are working for me, and they should fall in line and do what I've decided should be done, and there shouldn't be any sharp practices or misinterpreting what my position is or in writing some contract that doesn't reflect my position or in making some statement that doesn't reflect my position." Wittingly or unwittingly, these boys did such, and I think that was what precipitated the crisis. Once the chips are down, there are two camps. Each of us had chosen his side. So there we were.

There was so much emotion that women got all mixed up in it. Our wives took sides along with us. Social relationships were strained and severed. My wife still
hates some of those people. Mrs. Davis does. But they
don't hate exactly the same people.

I've been asked recently whether Communism or
anti-Communism was involved in this in any way, especially
since Alger Hiss's trial and conviction. As I remember
it, that wasn't a point at issue. That never was
considered. It wasn't a question of being a Communist
in the sense of overthrowing the government of the
United States or anything of the kind. There were these
differences I've mentioned - opinions and attitudes on
policy and programs and some wanting to be more
authoritarian and some of us wanting to be more democratic.
But to my knowledge and belief there never was any
consideration of Communists and anti-Communists in this.
There were at that time and for a good many years there-
after a good many people in the Department of Agriculture
as elsewhere who thought that the Soviet program and
policy was a very good thing for Russia and the people
of Russia, who wanted to know more about it, and who
felt very friendly toward the Soviet government and the
Soviet people. That, of course, would have been more
among the so-called urban liberals than the fundamental
agrians just because it's the sort of thing the urban
liberals think about and consider. But I can't remember ever any suggestions that some policy or some program out of USSR might be transferred with greater or less change to the United States. I can't remember that line of thought ever coming up or being expressed anyway by anybody. Or I can't remember the adverse of it - anybody saying, "We shouldn't do that because that's the way they do it in the USSR." I apply that to all the men that were fired.

The transfer of the Forest Service to the Department of the Interior is one of the old battles in government. How much and what part of forest and grazing and public land, conservation, and wild life, should be in the Department of the Interior, and what part of it should be in the Department of Agriculture? When the United States Forest Service was established in the days of Gifford Pinchot I don't know why it was allocated to the Department of Agriculture. A great many people thought it should not have been, and that feeling is still smoldering. It was talked about and argued in the halls of the Department of Agriculture and no doubt in the halls of the Department of the Interior again before Harold Ickes came out and made
his speech on January 21, 1935. Why he made the speech at that time, I don't know. I never did know just what motivated him, but it of course met with opposition from the disciples of Gifford Pinchot, which included not only "Sil" (Ferdinand Silcox), who at that time was head of the Forest Service, but almost all the people who were in the Forest Service, and the people in the Department of Agriculture and in the land grant colleges who were interested in forestry.

I remember conferences and discussions in the Department of Agriculture on what the Secretary of Agriculture’s position should be. Silcox was a rather quick-spoken man. He would speak loudly and vehemently. I remember one time talking to him in private, just the two of us, when he was wondering if the best thing to keep this from happening was for him, Silcox, to go out on his own with a great big blast against the proposal and then submit his resignation. That’s the kind of man he was. I remember I said to him, "Well, any of us can go and jump off the dock at any time. We make a little splash, but it doesn’t last long."

I didn’t know Silcox until he came in to be head of the Forest Service. Rex Tugwell had a lot to do with
his coming. Silcox had been located in New York someplace in the labor movement, and stepped out of that to come to Washington. He died nearly ten years ago. I remember attending his funeral in Alexandria and sitting in the front seat at the Chestley Funeral Home in Alexandria. He died of a heart attack. He lived right around the corner from where we live in Alexandria now. He died more than ten years ago, because we still lived in Washington then.

This Forest Service transfer proposal stirred up much discussion, argument, and battle about what activities and functions belong in the Department of Agriculture and what don't. The Taylor Grazing Act was passed in this immediate period, I think before this time. It provided for the supervision by the United States government of the public grazing land, as distinguished from the National Forest, and the national parks. This was all grazing land which had no forests on it and which hadn't been turned into parks. It was simply public, and any cattleman or any sheepman could graze his stock on it. Often the cattleman or the sheepman who owned the water holes and the sources of water was the only man who could really use the surrounding
range. The result was that it was often over-grazed and much of it was being ruined, in the minds of the conservationists of the West and all over the country.

Congress passed this Taylor Grazing Act, putting this public grazing land under public management. Any one who wanted to use the public land that was put into a Taylor Grazing district had to get a permit from the United States government to turn his sheep or his cattle or livestock on it, just like he had to get a permit from the Forest Service since the National Forests were established. Many said that was agricultural use — it was cattle and sheep and grass — and administration of the Act ought to be in the Department of Agriculture.

The Soil Erosion Service is even more to the point. The Soil Erosion Service is now called Soil Conservation Service. When FDR became President he established the Civilian Conservation Corps, and the boys and men in the Civilian Conservation Corps came onto the government payroll, off the relief rolls, in fact, and were assigned to do useful things.

One of the projects that came up early was to retard soil erosion. Erosion in many parts of the South had become very bad and lots of land had been eroded to
the point where it was no longer tillable. Out West, in the Rocky Mountains, and on out toward the coast, trees had been cut down and the land left bare, and the rains would come and wash the soil away. The mountains sometimes would slide down into the valleys and spoil part of a productive valley with gravel and debris. Soil erosion had gotten into the public consciousness to a considerable extent.

The Soil Erosion Service was first organized in the Department of the Interior, under Hugh R. Bennett. Hugh Bennett had been the leader in the Department of Agriculture in studying how to prevent soil erosion. What he had done had been, primarily, to set up some experiments on a hillside in North Carolina. They would block off small areas of land - maybe a hundred square feet, maybe an acre, maybe two acres - and measure the amount of soil that was taken off from there by the rains in a year. They set up some little terraces to see how much a terrace of a certain height or terraces a certain distance apart would retard soil erosion. I think there were experiments at the agricultural experiment stations - a good many of them. Hugh Bennett was the moving spirit behind it, and Hugh Bennett and
others were preaching the problems and the evils of soil erosion.

Then comes what I have mentioned, the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Works Progress Administration, relief and so on. One of the things to be done, it was decided somewhere—in the White House probably—was to get some of the Civilian Conservation Corps to building terraces, planting trees, filling gullies, and terracing around the gullies so that they wouldn't get any deeper, in various parts of the country where erosion had taken away the topsoil entirely or taken away the topsoil so as to make the land less productive. The Soil Erosion Service was established, in the Department of the Interior, and Hugh Bennett was picked up out of the Department of Agriculture and taken over there to become head of it. He took along with him some people who were working with him and all his evangelistic zeal and knowledge that he had gained out of his years of experimentation and study.

Well, right away in the Department of Agriculture we were again saying that that was agriculture. It had started in the Department of Agriculture and should stay in the Department of Agriculture. Even the U.S. Extension
Service, of which Clyde Warburton was then the head, and the state extension directors took an interest. I can remember sitting in meetings with some of them when I was in Triple-A, talking about soil erosion, the Soil Erosion Service, and how if that were just in the Department of Agriculture and could be geared in with all of the other things that were going on in agriculture, and if the extension services of the states could have that into their program, much more could be done at much less cost. The desire and the feeling that it was part of agriculture was all rationalized into the feeling that it could be done much better and much more cheaply if it had just remained in the Department of Agriculture.

I can't remember just when the Soil Erosion Service was established over there in the Department of the Interior, but it took hold and grew rapidly. As part of the inter-departmental war that was going on, the Department of Agriculture — Henry A. Wallace himself — took the offensive. I probably didn't know at the time too much about the details of what went on, but as I remember it, Henry Wallace went to the President with a proposal that the Soil Erosion Service be transferred
to the Department of Agriculture. He probably went with a paper - a draft of an order - already fixed up, and if Franklin D. Roosevelt would just sign his name then the deed would be done. And I think that's exactly what FDR did. That Mr. Ickes might think of this was part of the battle. Ickes was out of town when this happened. Whether that was intentional or simply coincidental, I don't know, but it was done just like that.

Then Ickes and his friends began to be heard from. I remember conversations in Wallace's office and around his office, and scenes there. He'd be talking to people from the Department of Agriculture and people from outside the Department of Agriculture would come to talk to him. Lots of memoranda and letters were written about the transfer. Paul Appleby had a file case in his office into which all these letters and memoranda were placed under lock. I remember thinking at the time how "jurisdictionitis" and bureaucracy would go to very high places. Henry Wallace, as Secretary of Agriculture had to resolve many jurisdictional squabbles within the Department of Agriculture. He would kid us about being jurisdictional and urge everybody to work together, and so on. But Henry Wallace himself
really got excited about this inter-departmental squabble. He really had on his fighting clothes.

On April 27, 1935 the Soil Conservation Service was established. The Soil Erosion Service was transferred to the Department of Agriculture, and maybe as part of the same movement, shortly thereafter it was reorganized and renamed, and called the Soil Conservation Service. M. L. Wilson had come back to the Department of Agriculture at that time. I don't remember that he was up in the front ranks in this battle, but I'm sure that he probably knew more about what was going on between Henry Wallace and Harold Ickes and others than most of the rest of us knew. I'm sure he would have thought, as I and all the rest of us in the Department of Agriculture thought, that this was right; that soil conservation, building the soil and so on, should be one of the big items, in any comprehensive agricultural improvement program in the United States; that it should be part and parcel of land policy, agricultural adjustment, and so on.

On April 30, 1935, the Resettlement Administration was established. In the Program Planning Division the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was the land policy
section which had developed a sub-marginal land program. The government was beginning to acquire sub-marginal land from private owners, preparatory to putting it into grazing preserves or public parks or, what we called, its best use. And there was the rehabilitation section of the Program Planning Division, where we had been doing something, but not too much, about people who had been employed in agriculture - as laborers and tenants, and maybe as small farmers - who with agricultural adjustment going apace, had no place in agriculture any more. And here were small, rundown, worn-out, eroded farms - not sub-marginal in the sense that we were using the word then - which could be and needed to be rehabilitated and made productive and self-supporting again.

Well, those activities were simply transferred to the Resettlement Administration when it was established. Of course, in addition, Harry Hopkins and his relief operations were in the rural field to a certain extent. A very considerable number of rural people had gone to the cities as workers in factories and so on, who were out of jobs in 1931, 1932, 1933. Even though there
had been some revival of industry by 1935, there were still many millions of unemployed, many of whom were going back to the country, going back to the land. They were trying to get just a place to exist and subsist. The Subsistence Homesteads, which was started over in the Department of the Interior, was a move in that direction. All that was brought into the Resettlement Administration.

Rex Tugwell, who was made head of it, still continued to be Under Secretary of Agriculture. I forget just what arrangement they had there for a little while. A good many of the things that the Program Planning Division of the Triple-A had interested itself in — things that we thought should be done and needed to be done — went so far beyond and so far afield from what most people thought of as an agricultural adjustment that either the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was going to have to be changed quite a lot — the emphasis changed and so on — or a brand new agency would have to be established. And there were, in addition to the Program Planning Division, people with Harry Hopkins and around Harry Hopkins, people in the Interior where W. L. Wilson had been in Subsistence Homesteads —
whole group of people. It was not only those of us in the Program Planning Division, but related spirits elsewhere and there was a whole group of what I'd call related activities - some of which were in the Triple-A Program Planning Division, and some of which were not, or which had sprung up and proliferated then with the administrative organization and situation as it was then.

Nothing much was being done about them, and nothing was going to get really done about them until something was done about this administrative set-up. Out of all of it came the Resettlement Administration, with Rex Tugwell as head of it. The Resettlement Administration carried on the ideas and the philosophy of the old Consumers' Counsel. It became a rallying point for the urban liberals, although it was not exclusively that by any means. M. L. Wilson was very much interested in the Resettlement Administration and in getting it going. I was myself. I remember that some few days before this date, Rex Tugwell asked me to have lunch with him one day, and would I be his assistant in this Resettlement Administration. I don't know how long I thought about it - not more than a day or so, if that long - and I told him no, I wanted to remain in
Agricultural Adjustment. It's been so long, I forget why I refused. It was probably due to a feeling that it was going to be another wild scramble, poorly organized, difficult to administer and difficult to get anything done in. It was probably a feeling that I'd be getting into a situation where there'd be more frustrations than accomplishments, as far as I personally was concerned. I expect I probably thought that I'd rather be trying to help Chester Davis even in a limited field.

I was very much interested in the program of the Resettlement Administration and all of the things that they were going to do. Several of the people who had been in the Program Planning Division went with the Resettlement Administration. I can remember keeping in close touch with them and talking to Rex and the people around him about the problems of organization, programming, and so on. My rememberance is that I was really doing all I could to help it along, help it get going, and help it become a functioning organization.

Regarding the Program Planning Division, as far as my own freedom of action was concerned, it was quite good. I never felt very much inhibited. Chester Davis was my immediate superior and Henry Wallace was beyond
him. As I remember, they always took the position that "Yes, Howard, if you and your people think that you should be working in a particular field and trying to develop a prospective program in it even though we aren't going to do anything about it right now, that's fine, go ahead." And I never remember being bothered in those days by anybody about funds, about how many people were getting on the payroll, and about how we were spending money. There were never any inhibitions there. Up until this time, and even some months thereafter, we in the Program Planning Division felt - and this went not only for me, but for others in the division, I'm sure - that we were really playing a vital role in this agricultural program, which at that time was very largely within the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

In other words, we were to help plan and program, and were to take a leading part in developing the adjustment or reduction program for particular commodities, and develop our own position with respect to international trade and what government action ought to be taken with respect to tariffs and so on. And it was very likely to be accepted right up the line. This land program that I mentioned and whatever we decided,
whatever we said, whatever we recommended, usually really came to the point of being carried out. So there, until the time of the purge, I felt that the agricultural program in all its phases was really developing, really becoming a program that I thought was good, and that I was really having a prominent place in it.

As to why the Resettlement Administration was set up outside the Department of Agriculture or outside the Department of the Interior, too, and was completely separate, I just characterize that as one of Franklin Roosevelt's actions. There were a considerable number of so-called "independent agencies" in those days, and when some new activity was to be undertaken, an independent agency might be established. Maybe it was because the people in the so-called "old-line" agencies weren't in sympathy with or weren't enthusiastic about the new activity. The Resettlement Administration was bringing together emerging and some on-going activities from different places in the government - from Harry Hopkins, WPA, PWA and from the Interior Subsistence Homesteads - so maybe the White House thought it was better to establish an independent agency than to put
all this in the Department of Agriculture. It might be done better if done by an independent agency, and probably would cause less friction and scuffling among the departments and already established agencies in government.

I don't remember that those of us in the Department of Agriculture were seriously concerned because the Resettlement Administration was made an independent agency. Maybe some of the old-liners were; I don't remember that I was or people around me. I don't think that making it a separate agency had a great deal to do with the purge. Rex had already come to be known as an individualist, a dissenter on a lot of things, and a recognized leader of the urban liberals.

But there's another point that I made a little while ago. While the so-called urban liberals did gravitate to or rally into the Resettlement Administration, there were some, and a good many, that we'd probably classify as fundamental agrarians, who stepped right in there too. There were those in the land program and the tenant program, L. C. Gray and the group that was working with him. I remember Carl C. Taylor showed up in the Resettlement Administration in its
very early days, and he's a liberal but he's far from
being among the Rex Tugwell-Jerome Frank group. Taylor's
an agrarian liberal. And Will Alexander, who became
Rex's assistant and later head of the Farm Security
Administration - I'd call him a liberal agrarian,
rather than an urban liberal.

The Bankhead-Jones Act of June 29, 1935, just
increased the amount of federal funds that went to the
agricultural colleges for research and for extension.
I can't remember that I had any active part in that.
That would have been carried primarily by the then-
Extension Service and the Office of Experiment Stations
and research bureaus of the Department of Agriculture.
There were other Bankhead Acts which I have mentioned.
There was a Bankhead Cotton Control Act, which provided
for cotton quotas, production quotas. That would have
been in 1934. I had quite a bit to do with preparing
for that and discussing it. I had to appear occasionally
before Congressional committees.

I don't remember so much about that particular
period - 1933 and 1934 - as I do about the later period.
Congressional hearings tended to be perfunctory and
rather cut-and-dried. But there were lots of informal
talks in the offices of Congressmen and Senators. And Congressmen and Senators would come down for informal talks with the Secretary of Agriculture or the administrator or myself. We'd sit and talk about problems and programs. I remember Marvin Jones and Senator John Bankhead. Senator Almer Thomas of Oklahoma was chairman of the Senate Agricultural Committee. I remember being on a first name basis with practically all the Congressmen and the Senators on the agricultural committees of the two houses. The hearings were to get facts and recommendations into the record, while the informal conversations were to "educate" the Congressmen and clarify their ideas and help them get ammunition for what they wanted to do and statements they wanted to make.

Generally in the period before 1936, the feeling between Congressmen and the USDA I think was about as I've described it in respect to myself — generally, a pretty cordial feeling towards Henry Wallace and Chester Davis. And the whole group of us except Rex — who became identified as, what shall I say, an outstanding liberal — developed a good relationship with these Congressmen. As I remember, they didn't talk to Rex a
great deal, and they didn't go to him to talk over common problems as they did with most of the rest of us. And that feeling held pretty well, right up on through 1935, and on to 1936.

I left as assistant administrator of Triple-A, on September 16, 1935 to return to the Giannini Foundation. Why did I decide to go back to the university? It wasn't a hasty decision at all. The Resettlement Administration had been formed, Soil Conservation Service had been established, the Agricultural Adjustment program for 1935 was under way, and there was a tendency to settle down, most of the yeast had disappeared, and there wasn't much ferment.

I mentioned Seth Thomas and the lawyers that he had around him. They were lawyers serving their clients. If you asked a lawyer to do a certain thing, write a certain thing, draw up a certain document, he was likely to be very careful to see just what you had in mind, raise no question and draw the document. Whereas it had been quite different — Jerome Frank and his boys were advocates. Before the days of the purge, this group of lawyers and the Consumers' Counsel people — many of whom were now with Rex, but on their own, as far
as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was concerned - had always been raising questions about the worthiness or the effectiveness of programs that were being considered. They would urge changes - to them, improvements - in on-going programs. Discussion and argument and dissatisfaction with what we were doing was in the air. But after this series of events, there was a tendency to be satisfied, a tendency for more and more of the people down the line and out in the country in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration to become satisfied with the programs as they were, to think that the agricultural adjustment program should be primarily, if not exclusively a program of writing benefit checks to farmers and of making crop loans, non-recourse loans which were in effect purchases of agricultural commodities if the price in the market place wasn't up to the loan value.

Primarily, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was coming in that period to just settle down into an agency to increase the incomes of farmers. I remember along sometimes in the middle of the summer, when I said to Henry Wallace and Chester Davis, "It seems to me the way in which things are going in the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the planning has been done for years ahead, and it's going to be years before the administration ever catches up to the planning and programming."

They agreed: "Yes, that's right, that's the way in which we should go."

I remember along about the same time saying that I was going to take a week off, I wasn't going to work, nobody could expect a thing out of me, but I was going to be hanging around the Department of Agriculture all the time. I said, "If you see me around here, don't ask me what I'm doing, because I'll say I'm on a vacation."

I spent that week just wandering around the halls, stopping in to talk to anybody and everybody I wanted to, to help me size up the situation and the way in which the whole thing was going, and to help me decide what I was going to do. The roots of my dissatisfaction were a lack of feeling of accomplishment and the feeling that there was getting to be lack of a willingness to consider a change or reconsider an already established line of action by the agrarians that I talked about. By that time, in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, this whole series of farmer
committees that I talked about had been established. This was as I thought it should be. Local farmers’ committees, county farmers’ committees, and state farmers’ committees were having a large part to play not only in administering the program when it was going but in deciding or at least recommending what changes should be made.

That group seemed more and more to be satisfied with what was going on and to act as though the primary if not the sole purpose of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was to write checks and buy agricultural commodities in order just to get more money into the farmers’ pockets. This attitude prevails to this day - 1952. As to being dissatisfied with men and not with institutions and programs, and who these men were that I was dissatisfied with, about the most blunt thing I can say is: Henry Wallace and Chester Davis. They were getting to be, in my opinion, too well satisfied with what they had done so far. I did talk to them about it. Chester Davis kept saying, "Howard, we mustn’t get too far out in front of our army, or we’ll get shot in the back."
Maybe Henry Wallace was just getting a little bit weary and tired of the day-to-day and hour-to-hour grind of getting things done and pushing things along. There was a desire to philosophize. When you'd go to his office to talk about immediate things, he would try to look far ahead and far afield and not pin his mind to immediately important and, I might say, practical day to day problems of running a big operation. I remember at this time and at later times - 1936 and thereafter - Henry would say to me: "Well, Howard, I don't think what you and I are doing here or what we might do next week is going to have much influence on events in this country or the course of history - maybe it isn't worthwhile to try to bring this to pass now."

Out of all of this I just got the feeling that my job in the Triple-A was done. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration was set and becoming ossified, developing into an "old-line" agency. I had the feeling, "I can't contribute very much more to it unless I'm willing to just settle down and gather statistics and write justifications for existing programs - almost like I used to do for the Coast and Geodetic Survey."

At that time I had been away for two years from
the University of California and I either had to go back home or resign. As I said, "The school bell is ringing."
When I left, Chester Davis and I parted company the best of friends. I still have a mental picture of coming down from our offices with him, crossing the street to the service station where my automobile was being all serviced up for the five thousand mile trip back to California by way of Florida. I was going back with my family to stay in California; we'd never been to Florida and we had decided to take an extra week to go via Florida. Chester and I stood and talked quite a while, finally said, "We'll be seeing each other soon," and shook hands cordially. He turned and waved his hand as he went through the office door, and I stepped on the gas and started home quick to pick up the family, and move on out. I don't know why I remember this scene in such detail — I wonder. I expect I was proud of the fact that I left in that way.

I can remember thinking and maybe talking to somebody about when I was deciding to go or had decided to go, about how I would make the break. One thing I could do — I could write a great big rabid letter of resignation and turn that over to Chester Davis and the newspapers, and get my picture in the papers. But as
I had told Sil (Silcox) one day, "Go and jump off the docks and make a big splash today, but it'll all be forgotten tomorrow." And that would have, of course, meant the end to any influence I might have had on the future course of events there. So I expect my remembrance of parting with Chester was due to that pride. I remember I got the family and headed south. I drove out across the Potomac River Bridge and started down the Mount Vernon Highway. I looked back at the buildings of the Department of Agriculture, and I remember thinking, "Maybe I'll go back there some day." But I told everybody I was going to California to stay.

After the purge, in the middle of 1935, many of the urban liberals had gravitated to the Resettlement Administration, but there were many agrarians there too. The so-called "Henry Wallace group" was now complacent. Why did it get that way? Well, maybe people were just getting tired after the depression, the political campaign, the election of Roosevelt, the coming of the New Deal, the establishment of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and all the other agencies. In 1933, when the New Deal came, a great army of new people came into the government - diverse people, whom I've talked about. There was new blood, new ideas, new thoughts. There was the desire and the willingness
on the part of the government to do things that it never would face before. There was a willingness of Congress to legislate expeditiously - far reaching legislation.
That was in 1933.

By 1935 things were rolling. In a way, most of the people who had pushed and argued a point of view and endeavored to get a particular program rolling had either succeeded and had got something going, or hadn't succeeded and left to try something else. I don't remember whether the word "ossification" was in my vocabulary then or not - but it has been for a good many years now. Any organization, any agency - public or private - tends to ossify, get hardening of the arteries, settle down, not want to do anything new, want to follow the old routines, and so on. I'd seen it happen, up to that time, with respect to parts of the Department of Agriculture. I'd been to the University of California and I'd stepped right into the situation out there, in 1930 - professors and administrators and so on who were very happy with what they were doing and didn't want to be bothered. They rather resented being urged and stirred up, and they had to be coaxed and helped and led and so on. That's the sort of thing that it seemed to me then, as I remember back,
was happening with surprising rapidity in the Department of Agriculture, in the Agricultural Adjustment administration.

The program was established; the committees and the organizations were set up; and the people had found their places in the organization. The farmers seemed to be happy to get their benefit checks and to have government loans on their commodities. The farmers and processors seemed to be happy about the marketing agreements and orders, and there weren't any more devils to fight. If I had suggested major changes to Chester Davis, what would he have said? He probably would have said, "We'd better not try that this year. Maybe that's something we can take up next year. We'd better have a series of sessions with our state committees to talk about these things."

I don't believe there was fear in the Department. I don't remember that people in general were afraid of their jobs, afraid to speak out, or afraid to see a Congressman or a Senator. I don't remember that at all. I don't remember that the general line of employees in the Department of Agriculture were afraid of their bosses in the sense that they were at a later date - some of them
are now. Of course, they weren't afraid of a change of administration and the whole program being thrown out. It was mostly a question of "How fast will we go? How much more will we try to do? Haven't we done a pretty good job? Now let's carry on with what we're doing."

I have mentioned the Brookings Institution's appraisal of the Triple-A activity. I remember they were at that time bringing in a lot of these questions. They kept bringing up such questions as, "How much adjustment and change in American agriculture are you bringing about with all your far-flung activities and all of your millions of dollars? How much are you really influencing events? Is the most economical cotton program simply a fiat per cent reduction of the cotton acreage from an historic base. Is your program to withhold from the market the most beneficial kind of a program?"

And by that time, there was resentment in some quarters, among our, shall I call them our farmer friends, who were becoming more important in the administration, when anybody raised such questions. And Chester Davis through all of it was a moderator. Maybe I do him an injustice when I say he was a moderator, rather than a militant leader. If everybody around him agreed and
recommended a line of action, then he would very likely say, "Let's go." If someone were going, he would say, "Probably a good thing, probably ought to be done, but the time isn't ripe. Let's wait."

About this time there began to be quite a lot of feeling about the relief rolls and people on relief - a feeling that people were just staying on relief because it was there and because they could; that they weren't trying to get out and be self-supporting; that using surplus agricultural commodities, as Harry Hopkins started to do, for food for people on relief wasn't quite right.

Just an incident or two on the way back to California: I said that we - our two younger boys were with us and the older boy stayed in Washington - went back to California by way of Florida and we took our sweet time. I had agreed to be in Berkeley, back on my university job, on a certain Monday morning in October, which I think was the first Monday morning in October. But I remember distinctly sitting on the rim of the Grand Canyon on the Sunday evening before that Monday morning, watching the sun go down in the west, and I didn't care if I didn't get to Berkeley for a good while. That
probably indicates that at heart I wasn't really too anxious to get back to simply being a university professor.

Well, we got back and into the old routine - meeting classes, conducting seminars, talking to the graduate students about their prospective Ph.D. exams, courses, awards, and so on. But along with that, there were many people from off-campus - businessmen, farmers, farm bureau people - coming to see me. They talked to me about the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, about what was going on in Washington, about things that should be done and all that. I can remember that with such people I became a defender of what was being done, and, some might say, an apologist for what was not being done.

I remember one day I was in the Blue Bird Cafeteria in Berkeley. I was with Alec Johnson, who at that time was secretary of the California Farm Bureau Federation. As I was going down the cafeteria line with him, somebody patted me on the back - and it was Rex Tugwell. We just sat down together and had a good visit about how was everybody, and what was everybody doing, and were all the families well, and what new things had happened in Washington, and so on. It was just nice and friendly.
I was glad to see Rex and find out what was happening in Washington since I had gone or since I had heard - I remember feeling very good about it. I probably said, "Well, you were a professor once yourself and probably will be again." I do remember a feeling of being outside the stream, a sort of feeling of loneliness and the silence was terrific with respect to some things.

On January 6, 1936, the State Agricultural Extension Workers' meeting was held at the University in Berkeley. Once a year the county agents and home demonstration agents all got together for the annual roundup. I was to address the meeting on the morning of January 7 to describe the national agricultural program and what it was doing, and how good it was, and how it was helping California farmers and California businessmen, and so on. On January 6, I was sitting in the audience, when I was presented with a handwritten note stating that the Supreme Court had declared the Triple-A unconstitutional, by a vote of 6 to 3.

I had known, of course, that the Hoosac Mills case was before the Supreme Court, but the news of the decision was a very great surprise. The speech I had worked on, of course, went out the window. The next
next morning at nine o'clock when I appeared before these people, I had a copy of the San Francisco Chronicle in my hand. It had the court's decision in it - the majority and the dissenting opinions. I held forth an hour, reading the opinion and commenting on it, and winding up with the observation that in spite of what the Supreme Court had done, I felt that government aid to agriculture would continue somehow and that new legislation would take the place of the Agricultural Adjustment Act that had just now been overthrown.

The case involved the interstate commerce aspect of the AAA. All the changes in acreage and production under the AAA were being made, according to the law, to "regulate interstate commerce" and the processing taxes were used to pay farmers for making the changes. The court nailed its decision on the processing tax. The Hoosac Mills was a cotton mill in New England, and that company went to court about the processing tax. They had to pay the processing tax, the proceeds of which were used for benefit payments. The processing tax had been levied under the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution, and their case, as I remember, was that it wasn't used for regulating interstate commerce, but for
regulating acreage and production - local matters out on the farms.

There had been talk in 1935 that funds for agricultural adjustment should come out of the general treasury fund rather than from a specific source such as a processing tax. That, of course, was quickly picked up after the Hoosac Mills decision. March 2, 1936 marked the passage of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. The processing tax was cut out. Money used for it was to be appropriated from the general funds of the treasury.

I'm almost sure that the week following the Supreme Court decision, I came back to Washington. I have no record of that, but I came back to Washington and talked to Henry Wallace, Chester Davis, M. L. Wilson and all the rest about what might be done. I was asked by one of them to come back. I think I wouldn't have come back on my own.

My remembrance - and the remembrance of other people involved here will be better than mine - is that the Hoosac Mills decision brought widespread consterna-
tion among those who were administering the Triple-A and among those who were benefiting from it. The result
was a revival of the spirit of "Now, we've got to do something. Now what will we do? Now we've really got to face a situation here - we can't just go on and hope for the best." As far as I can remember, there was no such thing as the draft of a new law or no agreement as to what the provisions of a new law might be. That was all done after the Hoosac Hill decision.

Of course, there was this feeling in Congress, as I remember, that I had stated out in Berkeley, "This movement is going to go on, if not under this particular law and in this particular way, then in some other way." Soil conservation, soil building, land policy, agricultural rehabilitation had been in the thinking, or at least, in the vocabulary of many people for some time. As to who stressed it more than others, it was the urban liberals first, Henry Wallace second, and I'd say agrarians third. Maybe Chester Davis was an exception there. I'd classify him as an agrarian, but an exception. "Conservation" appealed deeply to Chester Davis's system of values.

There was something good about replacement crops, soil conserving crops, in Chester's mind and in the minds of the urban liberals and Henry Wallace. Russell
Lord is another man who felt the same way. So there was a very considerable group, and it's not surprising that conservation emerged as the center of this new effort. Of course, marketing agreements and orders and licenses weren't directly affected by the Supreme Court decision.

I can't remember who called me back, but it certainly would have been Chester Davis. "What are we going to do about all this?" - maybe I said that to him or maybe he said it first, but there it was. Of course, the talk was spreading all around - it wasn't just Chester and me, it was everybody.

And then conservation began to emerge. Hugh Bennett was not playing an important role in the new planning. The Soil Conservation Service had been established over in the Department and was going, and continued to go. It was never merged, even to this day, with the administration of this Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. Processing taxes were gone, so why shouldn't funds come out of the general funds of the treasury? We thought they should, if paying farmers for conserving their soil is in the public interest. Another clause in the Constitution is "... and the public
welfare." The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act was hung on the "public welfare" clause of the Constitution. It is very easy to rationalize the position: Conserving the land of the United States enhances the public welfare.

I remember newspapermen coming in to see me. They'd drop in to see Chester, and come in and say, "Could I see you a bit?" and "What's the situation?" and talk. I remember Russ Wiggins, now managing editor of the Washington Post, who then was Washington correspondent for the St. Paul Pioneer Post Dispatch. I remember Jack Wilson of the Cowles Papers, and Felix Belair correspondent from the New York Times. I remember those three; they were very good friends, on a first name basis. They had been there for a couple of years. I remember them talking to me about conservation.

I can't remember where the move towards conservation first came from, but what I'm saying is that it became quite general - even the newspapermen were talking about it. I don't know if I thought of it myself on my way to Washington. I probably did, but I'm sure I didn't have that as the solution in my mind. As to what else Chester Davis said when I came back, we talked
about how I was enjoying myself and how I liked being a college professor again, and "How are you getting along, Chester, and is everybody treating you alright?" He said that internally there was nothing terrible. I expect we talked about how Henry had been becoming more of a dreamer and it was still hard to get administrative decisions and administrative action and get the papers past Paul Appleby inside to Henry Wallace, and so on. But that was quite secondary. Here again was this old feeling or urgency, that something must be done, and we'd all together think and talk and work and get a new law.

Quite a lot of fire came back to Henry Wallace then too. I remember an incident: I was sitting in Henry Wallace's office when he and I decided the name of this new law should be the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. We decided to keep that expression: Domestic Allotment. We had a copy of the bill. It may not even have been introduced by that time. It may have been just a draft that was being worked on jointly by the draftsmen for the Congressmen and by us in the Department of Agriculture. Wallace was sitting at his desk, with the draft of the bill on the desk, and
the desk board pulled out. I must have carried it in to go over it with him. Probably I asked to see him to go over this bill. That wouldn't have been a hush-hush conversation with him. Chester Davis and company would have known about it — I would have gone at their suggestion, with their blessing. Maybe it just happened that I was free at that hour, and Chester Davis was talking to Congressmen and M. L. Wilson was someplace else, so "Howard, you take this to Henry and see if it's all right with him."

I wasn't a member of the USDA, but I was back at the old grind and that didn't make any difference. We talked over various parts of the bill, and one of us said, "Well, what will we call it?" It was probably at the last paragraph of that bill — it's a standard thing: "This act shall be known as..." Probably there were blanks on the line on the piece of paper, and we decided, "Let's fill it in." I suspect that we had in mind the pulling power of this conservation idea — pulling power for public support. Conservation was something good, that doesn't call for killing little pigs, plowing up cotton and so on. That means building up the soil and keeping it productive and so on. I suspect there was some of that in our thinking.
Domestic allotment - that was good and had no connotation of bad or evil. There probably wasn't any question about soil conservation being in it all all. There was probably a question about, "Do we put domestic allotment on too?" I remember that. So we put "...and Domestic Allotment Act."

At about this time, or maybe this came later after this new act was passed, there was a question about whether the name of the administrative unit should be changed - Agricultural Adjustment Administration. And that wasn't changed at that time; it wasn't changed until some years later.

I don't remember any urge to get back into harness in Washington. I stayed for a week or ten days - two weeks at the most - then I told everybody goodbye again, "So long, see you soon," got on the train and went back out to California.

I'll add a comment: Chester Davis at this time (January 1936) seemed to me to be feeling good and quite happy - very content about the whole affair.

When I was back in California, I can't remember that I had any idea of coming back to Washington to stay. I don't remember particular correspondence between myself
and Chester or anybody in Washington. I was, of course, vitally interested in how things were going, and had followed in the newspapers and on the radio the course of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act through Congress; the newspaper comments on it, and so on. That brings us up through February and up to some morning in March 1936. It must have been after the passage of the act. On that morning, at nine o'clock, I picked up my books at my desk and marched down the hall to meet my nine o'clock class. Just as I had my notes spread out and was ready to go, the door opened and a boy said, "There's a long-distance telephone call from Washington."

And I said, "Tell them I'll take it at ten o'clock," and started my lecture. The door opened again—"It's Henry Wallace, he won't wait."

I excused myself to the class and took the telephone call.

"Howard I want you to come back to Washington." This was Wallace himself on the phone. I suspect M. L. was sitting at his elbow, but I never knew, and maybe Chester was too. But, "Won't you come back to Washington?"

He had just arranged for Chester to go to Europe
for a couple of months. I don't remember what he said about that, but he inferred that Chester probably wouldn't be back as administrator. He said, "We'd like for you to come back as soon as you can and be acting administrator of the Triple-A during his absence."

I don't remember what I said in return or the length of the conversation, but the conclusion of it was, "All right, I'll be there as soon as I can get loose and get there." I made my decision right there on the phone. Then I had the job of seeing Dean Claude B. Hutchinson who was my immediate superior about another leave, getting him to say that he would recommend it to the President and the board of regents, and going home and telling my wife. We still lived in a rented house, but we were in the process of negotiating for a lot up on top of the hill and we had architects going on the plans for the house that we would build up there.

Well, within forty-eight hours I was on the train headed for Washington. On March 12, the Washington Post said that I was to return that day, so the telephone call must have been on March 9 or 10. The newspaper said I was to direct the new soil conservation program and would serve for two months while Davis was in Europe.
studying economic conditions. I was to be acting administrator. That's the way it was given out to the newspapers. Chester still had the title of administrator and carried that title to Europe with him. I didn't move my family to Washington. My going didn't interfere with anything - the plans for the house up on the hill. Just sat still. I was still going to be a professor, and nothing was changed, except that I realized that this was about the last time that I was going to get another extended leave of absence from my professorship. Probably a half a dozen times in that period I'd already asked to have a leave extended, and so on. Then I'd come home to stay and been there October to March!
people around the Secretary's office had something to do with it, like they have with the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the Soil Conservation Service and so forth, and if the finance office of the Department of Agriculture and the personnel office of the Department of Agriculture were taking care of finance and personnel for the Resettlement Administration, everything would be better." This may or may not have been true. I just had the feeling that Rex was glad to have another job and that FDR and Henry Wallace and others were glad to find this other job for Rex, which would take him out of the local limelight.

Tugwell was taking quite a beating throughout this period. He had become the New Dealer at whom many people threw brickbats. During that period, Rex Tugwell and Harry Hopkins were close together and had the same ideas about the reforms needed to help the common people, both on farms and in the cities. But Rex came to be tagged as a violent reformer much earlier than Harry Hopkins did. As I remember it, Harry Hopkins was not damned by many people then. Of course, Harry was somewhat more discreet in his statements and pronouncements than Rex was, which explains a part of it at least. Then Rex,
on the agricultural front, was in contact with and exposed to the agrarians around the country many of whom, as far back as 1934, had come to the conclusion that Rex Tugwell was not one of their kind, and that they liked some of the other people in the Department of Agriculture better.

I remember discussions and correspondence with Senator Arthur A. Vandenberg about the operations and administration of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. I think it had mostly to do with the way payments were being distributed, shall I say, and the way large operators were getting large payments as a result of compliance and participation in the program, and small farmers were getting small payments. That of course was being questioned, with some political implications in the questioning. That was my first experience with Senator Vandenberg and I never had a great deal of contact with him, except at that time. I know that while we had some pointed exchanges, both written and verbal, I soon came to respect the Senator and admire his ability as a thinker and a questioner and a presenter. I can't remember how much of the correspondence there was — three or four letters, or maybe a little more.

Sam Bledsoe was in the information division of
the Triple-A, and he had been the carrier of letters back and forth and had had some discussion with the Senator's secretary. I remember Sam coming in one day and saying that he guessed the Senator was ready to quit - the Senator was just too busy. He only had one person to help him and I had a thousand. I don't remember that it made me angry at all. Of course, in those days it was always disturbing when members of Congress openly and forthrightly challenged us on any front. That was early in 1937 and we had the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act that we'd been trying our best to administer and operate. We had all come to realize the weaknesses in the law itself, and we knew there were plenty of weaknesses in our administration. We were sensitive to criticism, especially Congressional and Senatorial criticism.

On June 3, 1937 the Agricultural Marketing Act was passed. When the original Agricultural Adjustment Act was declared unconstitutional in 1936, the agricultural marketing phase of that act was not involved. The Supreme Court decision covered only processing taxes and the regulation of production. But the NRA (National Recovery Administration) had been declared unconstitutional
and the marketing agreement and order phases of the original Agricultural Adjustment Act had been in question since that time. So, as I remember, in the latter part of the calendar year 1936, with the help of and possibly at the urging of groups interested in marketing - the cooperative milk marketing associations, fruit marketing associations, and, I think, the Farm Bureau and other general organizations as well - the marketing phases of the original act were reexamined and rewritten.

As I remember, there were no major changes. It was rewritten in line with the Supreme Court decision and tied to the interstate commerce clause in the Constitution. It contained no provisions concerning adjustments in production or processing taxes. Parity prices must have been in it. In all of the acts, parity was the goal and since the beginning of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration parity prices had been computed and used as a sort of a guide for all programs, both production adjustment programs and marketing programs. There might have been in this act - I don't remember - a precise definition of parity prices and how they were to be computed for the purpose of the act. The main purpose of all AAA activity was to attain parity for farmers.
Production and marketing programs for agricultural commodities were to be planned and carried out with government help in such a way that the price the farmer received would be the parity price, as defined in the law and as computed according to a set formula. I don't remember that at this time there was any special change in the definition of parity prices.

The lawyers in the Department of Agriculture drafted the bill. I remember, as I said, sessions and meetings with representatives of cooperatives and general farm organizations to talk about it, to talk about the provisions, and probably to examine drafts which had been prepared in the Department before they were sent to Congress. The farm organizations and the cooperatives would have agreed then, as I think they would today, that there should be clauses in these laws calling for the protection of the consumers. I remember no arguments or discussions, or differences of opinion, with the urban liberal group, which was very much in evidence that year in the Department of Agriculture. Tugwell had gone, and many had left in 1935. What was left were gravitating to the Farm Security Administration - Beanie Baldwin was there. I don't know whether I would call him
a leader at that time. I don’t know if there was a leader among them at that time.

Dr. Will Alexander was Tugwell’s successor there in what became the Farm Security Administration. He didn’t assume the battle of urban liberalism. I don’t know what happened. Urban liberalism versus fundamental agrarianism — by this time Wallace was in the middle in all his activities — just wasn’t in evidence in those days. I don’t remember any long debates or difficulties in getting the Agricultural Marketing Act through Congress, such as there was about other pieces of legislation.

The Bankhead Jones Farm Tenant Act, passed on July 22, 1937, was a very important piece of legislation with which I had very little to do. The Resettlement Administration and later the Farm Security Administration had been operated as a sort of an adjunct to Harry Hopkins’ relief activities, and I think were supplied with funds from appropriations to that agency of government, rather than through any specific funds appropriated directly to them. But the need for assistance to small farmers, the need for new kinds of credit facilities and new kinds of technical advice and assistance
to tenant farmers and low-income farmers in general had come to be recognized. There was lots of thinking and talking about tenancy and the increase in tenancy, about tenants and sharecroppers being pushed off the farms by the advance of technology and by reduction in acreage of cotton and wheat and other crops. All that was the general background out of which first the Resettlement Administration and then the Farm Security Administration came. And this, the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, so called, sponsored on the Senate side by Senator John Bankhead and on the House side by Representative Marvin Jones, was really the underlying basic legislation for the Farm Security Administration and related activities in the Department of Agriculture.

I probably had as much contact with Senator Bankhead over those years as with any other single Senator. He was to me in those days one of the more understanding and more sympathetic Senators. His questions, remarks, statements always seemed to me to be pretty good. He was primarily an agrarian but at this point he came out and sponsored far-reaching legislation designed to help low-income people. That to me indicated his realization that the low-income people in the South, in Alabama, who in
the years before had been disenfranchised for one reason or another, whose political voice had not been heard, were rising and that their voices would be heard. Here was something to help them. He was always very much interested in the Farm Security Administration and in its program. They had a very broad program in the State of Alabama, because they were welcome there.

On the other hand, in his Bankhead Cotton Act of 1934 - which as I remember was the first provision for quotas for production - he really had sponsored compulsory control of cotton acreage on individual farms. In 1937, the year in which the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act became a law, in the first efforts to revise and amend the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act into a more effective piece of legislation, Senator Bankhead, as I remember, was one of those who wanted to make agricultural adjustment an adjustment of acreage mandatory, rather than voluntary with payments, as it was. I never knew him outside of Congressional halls and the Department of Agriculture and so on, but he was a very personable man, a very easy man to meet and talk to and express yourself freely to. He had some of the characteristics of a Southern gentleman, without being
at all a gentlemanly Southerner. He was nice and kind and gentlemanly and considerate.

I probably knew Marvin Jones better than Senator Bankhead, especially during the time when he was chairman of the agricultural committee. I've just characterized Senator Bankhead as a person easy to meet and talk to and quite understanding. Marvin Jones was still easier to talk to and come to an understanding with. As chairman of the agricultural committee, he operated in a completely "democratic" fashion. He would discuss questions with the committee before they came to a vote. He would discuss and encourage the members of his committee to discuss with each other and I know that he tried to get unanimous agreement as nearly as possible on all important things that came before his committee. Of course, that sometimes led to compromises, which may not have been too good. But he deliberately operated in that way and the members of his committee always all respected him and I think they all felt - whether they were Republican or Democrat - that Marvin Jones, their chairman, wouldn't try to put anything over on them, either as a committee or as individual members of it.

I would say that he ran the committee with a good,
firm hand, although that doesn't quite seem to square
with the statement just made about the way he operated.
He always knew what was going on in his committee. He
decided on what would be taken up and what wouldn't be
taken up. He often, as I remember, let proposed
legislation or matters before the committee stay before
the committee for a considerable time, instead of
hurrying them through and pushing them out. But he would
do that deliberately and, of course, he couldn't have
done it if his committee had out-voted him. He was
the real chairman of the committee and not just somebody
who occupied the chair and called the committee to order.

The original Agricultural Adjustment Act was the
first piece of legislation that had ever come through
the agricultural committee while Marvin Jones was
chairman of it which had been challenged in the courts
and declared unconstitutional. I remember Marvin
mentioned that repeatedly and apparently he had taken
great care about any proposed legislation that came up
later. I think he had been proud of his reputation
in this respect up until the Hoosac Mills case. But more
importantly, he was statesman enough, I'm sure, to
realize that for Congress to pass legislation which would probably be thrown out by the courts was a waste of time and not a very intelligent way to proceed. I think he was motivated more by the latter than by any disappointment or fear that he would be overruled by the courts.

One of the pieces of legislation he was responsible for was the so-called Section 32 of the 1935 amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act. This automatically appropriated thirty per cent of the customs receipts of the United States for finding new markets for agricultural products. It was adopted in a peculiar fashion. It wasn’t in the bill as it originated and came to the floor. It was in a conference report or in an amendment offered on the floor about which there was not much discussion. It became law at that time and still is. Total customs receipts were maybe a hundred million dollars a year. Anyway, there were many million dollars each year, and still are, automatically appropriated for finding new markets and new uses for agricultural commodities. That’s thirty per cent of the customs receipts that goes back to fundamental agrarianism. Back yonder before the 1930s agricultural exports, cotton, wheat, tobacco and so forth, had been large compared to
what they were in the 1930s.

On the other side, prices of commodities that farmers buy remained higher on this parity comparison basis in the 1930s than the prices of agricultural commodities. The agrarians always insisted that one of the reasons was that so many of the commodities farmers buy both for production and living were protected by the tariff, and that, one way of looking at it, the farmers and especially producers of export crops were helping to pay the tariff and helping to keep these prices up, and that some of this income from tariffs in some way or another belonged to the farmers. I forget how the thirty per cent was arrived at. At that time, perhaps thirty per cent of the national income was agricultural income. But somehow or another, this thirty per cent figure was found and a logical and rational case was made, and, the law was passed.

In most laws a law authorizing something is passed and then an appropriation follows. A law authorizing an appropriation for soil conservation is passed and then the appropriations committee, when an appropriations bill comes up, appropriates money for it. This was telescoped in this section thirty-two. I think Marvin Jones was pretty much personally and solely responsible for that
law going through Congress. He didn't have any difficulty with it - it just sort of went through pro forma.

1937 was a good crop year, as contrasted to 1936, a drought year and low crops. We had a big wheat crop and a big cotton crop in 1937. I remember we just sat by and watched the cotton crop grow in the fall of 1937. Acreage wasn't too large, but it was a very good growing year. The crop reports forecast a crop to be a million to two million bales higher than in 1936, and we knew we were going to be sunk with too much cotton when the crop was in. The same thing was true with wheat. Funds from this law were used for a straightforward export subsidy program for both wheat and cotton of the 1937 crop. Funds from that law were used for buying commodities to be used for relief - butter, meat or any kind of farm produce. Milk was bought sometimes. These commodities were turned over to relief authorities.

In 1937, we were really trying to strengthen and perfect legislation and administration. First on the administrative side: By 1937 we had been through the first year of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. We were all trying to make the administration of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act more
"democratic." I remember we had lots of talks and discussions among ourselves in Washington and with the state colleges and state and county committeemen when we'd get together with them about this being a farmers' program, for the benefit of farmers. We discussed the fact that conditions varied from region to region and from state to state and from county to county throughout the country, and that one single set of rules promulgated from Washington simply wouldn't fit all the diverse conditions throughout the United States.

We thought that if this was going to be worthwhile, continuing activity, which we hoped it would be, that there would have to be more and more - I think we came to call it by that time - farmer participation and citizen participation, as distinguished from bureaucratic control and direction. Of course, this was just the time when Hitlerism in Germany was rising and Mussolini was coming to power in Italy, and authoritarianism was in the air - at least on the other side of the Atlantic. Many of the critics, not only of the Agricultural Adjustment program but of the New Deal in general, were crying "totalitarianism," "authoritarianism," and "FDR politics." But I was concerned and M. L. Wilson was
concerned, and I'm sure Henry Wallace was primarily concerned, with what we called "citizen participation" and "democracy" in the administration and operation of governmental programs for agriculture.

So we had these committees — agricultural conservation committees — county by county, and we were taking pains to see that those committees were really and truly elected. We began to take pains to see that their ideas and suggestions as to the content of the program and the method of operation of it were received and listened to. I remember we got a few people outside of the administrative line of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration to travel around the country and talk to farmers and committeemen and townspeople about how it was all going, what they thought about the program, how did it need to be changed, and so on. They made reports directly to the Secretary of Agriculture, I believe. Those people would come to Washington and they would talk to us in Washington. And we found at that time the beginning of bureaucracy among the state and local administrators.

These state and local administrators thought they knew how things should be done and what should be done.
Many of them didn't seem to be paying very much attention to the problems of the individual farmers. Many of them got the idea that, even here in 1936 and 1937, about the only purpose of this Agricultural Adjustment Administration still was to write checks and make payments to farmers. Well, we organized discussion groups. M. L. Wilson had a great deal to do with that. We started to organize farmers' discussion groups to talk about all the things that needed to be done. And we got this exploration of farmers' attitudes and opinions about programs more or less formalized so that regular reports would come in from different parts of the country.

By the way, I'll put in a big long footnote here: The old Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 had in it a provision that in 1938, at the end of two years, it would become a state grant-in-aid program, more or less comparable as far as administration and financing were concerned to the Smith-Lever Act that established the Extension Service, and to the Morrill Act and others that established the state colleges. What I'm trying to say is that after two years, in effect, the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act would be administered by a series of state administrations.
The United States government would in effect make a contract with the state government and a grant to the state government, and the state government would take the lead in the administration on the farms.

That never went into effect because the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 superseded it. It was in the tradition of the old Department of Agriculture relationships to state institutions, and I approved of it. But it was just no use trying to get it into the second Triple-A. The opposition was too strong. It also became apparent that a good many of the states wouldn't pass the needed enabling legislation. That's the end of my footnote.

The Soil Conservation Service was growing and becoming more influential. A model soil conservation district law was drafted in the Department about this time. A soil conservation district, according to this model law, would be a little watershed or a county or some other civil subdivision. If landowners in this area to become a district voted by referendum that they wanted a district, then they would have a district and it would become a legal entity and that district could and would have relations with the state government or the
federal government, along the line of the old federal-
states relations grants-in-aid and so on. It was an
effort to decentralize and at the same time give the
farmers a ruling voice in whatever was done. This model
law had in it the provision for land use regulation,
which said in effect that whenever two-thirds of the
landowners in a district voted among themselves that
land should be used in a certain way or should not be
used in a certain way, then it would be binding on all
landowners in the district.

In the dust storm area in the Great Plains a
piece of land which had been plowed and planted repeatedly
to wheat in a dry year would blow and cause dust storms.
The dust might settle on the grassland on the next farm
and ruin the grass, and so on. If two-thirds of the
landowners in an area like that should vote by a two-
thirds majority that row crops should not be grown in
that area, or that all land should be terraced, or some-
thing of the kind, then it would be binding on all of
them. Well, the model law was drawn up in the Department
of Agriculture and worked out in great detail. President
Roosevelt sent it out, I remember, in a special letter
to every governor in the country, suggesting that this
was something that should be adopted by the state legislatures. The legislatures began to legislate on it shortly thereafter, and now in 1952 most of the farmland in the United States is in soil conservation districts.

It is primarily through the soil conservation districts that the Soil Conservation Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture works with farmers. A member of the soil conservation district will ask the board of supervisors for his district for a conservation diagnosis and prescription for his farm. The board of supervisors then will ask the state college or the United States Department of Agriculture for the services of an expert to do this. It's just the pattern of the Extension Service. Well, that was another effort to decentralize and to get to the grass roots. I would say I was one of the leaders in the effort to decentralize. Among the others were M. L. Wilson and Henry Wallace, of course, and of course, the people in the state agricultural colleges, who were all very loudly for it. The local farm leaders, as distinguished from the presidents of the national farm organizations, very much wanted decentralization.

Rex Tugwell was great on regionalization. Dr. Will
Alexander had set up his Farm Security Administration in nine or twelve or thirteen regions. Rex had done that with the Resettlement Administration first. Of course, regionalization is one of the necessary steps of decentralization, but there’s the question of how much further to go? I wanted to go very much further. The Farm Security Administration generally in those days wanted to go much further. There was not much forthright outspoken opposition to the theory and philosophy of decentralization.

Maybe I'm coming to another division here like our old liberal-urban versus agrarian. I think it finally came to the place where there was a rather marked division between those who felt, as I've been saying, that in the long-time program for the benefit of agriculture in all of its phases - not only agricultural adjustment but farm security and credit and education and so on - the best program would be developed if the people whom the program was designed to help had a voice in it from start to finish. They should have a voice in deciding on what should be the content of these programs and in deciding how they should be administered and how they should be applied to their particular locality and even
their particular farms.

Such a program should be run with the administrator, the bureaucrat, having the over-all look and national point of view, and having the knowledge and information about the national and international situation, and so on, as it applies to localities and particular farms.

On the administrative side, the administrator, the bureaucrat should have the job of carrying these things out as they've been worked out in agreement with local people, in the way that the local people want them carried out, insofar as it can be done within the realm of existing legislation, and so on. What I'm trying to say is to explain that conception of "democracy," grass roots participation, and the phrase Henry Wallace coined, "economic democracy." We used to make comparisons with the labor unions and the labor movement.

That's one side. The other side is: Many still felt - as a good many did a few years earlier - that to pass a law, issue a decree, cutting cotton acreage, or fixing prices, or something else that could arise - that passing laws and making decrees and ordering things done was primarily the way for the government to help agriculture. Such people were very likely to be entirely
out of patience with this slow process that involved citizen participation, which we called the "democratic" process.

As to the attitudes of urban liberals and agrarian fundamentalists, you had different groupings that would go across both lines. Sometimes, you'd find your agrarian fundamentalists all for citizen participation. Other agrarian fundamentalists you would find - and this got sharper as time went on - would be of the opinion that the farmers were downtrodden and the farmers needed government help and all of that, and the way for them to get it was for the government to order it and the government to get it done, without any bother about farmer participation. Among the urban liberals, so called, you'd find those with authoritarian leanings wanting to pass a law and issue an order. At the same time, you'd find others who thought that the way for the laboring man, the farm tenants or the farm laborers to improve their lot in life was for them to get together in the democratic way and work with each other and with their government agencies to develop laws and programs.

I don't know whether there was any larger proportion of those with - I don't like to use the word
"authoritarian" because it's come to be a very hard word — authoritarian leanings among the so-called agrarians than among the urban liberals.

On the side of decentralization,¹ I'd put M. L. Wilson, number one. H. A. Wallace always said that that's the way things should be. I can think of a group that got to be more and more on the side of centralization and exercising of authority. It was a group of which many of the members had been original backers of the Agricultural Adjustment Act and what preceded it in the 1920s and 1930s. They had come into the Triple-A in the early days as the local administrators and chairmen of state committees. In the national board of directors of the American Farm Bureau Federation, there was a feeling that, "We know how this thing should be done. So let's just get this law passed and then you fellows administer the law by issuing orders," and so on.

I don't remember that the American Farm Bureau Federation as a national organization ever took a position on this. There were individuals on their national board of directors who had been state presidents or held similar positions, who felt that decentralization and decentralized

¹ By "decentralization" I mean the "democratization of farm programs. The use of "decentralization" here is not to be confused with later attempts at decentralization of departmental administration.
determinations of the programs was not in the interest of helping agriculture. The question "why" is something that's bothered me all these years. Of course, the hard, mean thing to say would be that they were people who didn't have an understanding of the way this United States came into being and the way it grew and what its government is supposed to be, "-- of the people, by the people, for the people --" and so on. Then, too, a man with a lust for power who gets into a position where he can issue an order by which three million farmers do a certain thing, or else they don't get a check, or else they pay a fine, sometimes finds it's rather easy to forget "democracy."

There got to be quite a bit of that inside the Department of Agriculture. I remember Cully Cobb, whom I've mentioned several times. In 1937, in the South, there had been this feeling about issuing orders among a lot of people who were vocal and close to the administration. The Bankhead Cotton Control Act back there was the first one. It came out of the South. There were also the tobacco growers. Jack (Hutson) always went along, issuing orders. Well, it got to the place where Cully Cobb just couldn't stand it any more.
He resigned and went back to Atlanta and started a publishing house. He resigned over this general issue - things just weren't going the way he felt they should. That must have been about in the middle of 1937. I can't remember dates but I can remember this: I can remember going to a party at Jack Hutson's house one night. It was a goodbye party to Gully Cobb. I remember coming home that night after the party and seeing my two boys off for California before the break of dawn. The older one was going back into the university there that fall. So I'd say it must have been August.

I'll leave that phase of it now. It comes up again very strongly in connection with myself when I left the Triple-A. By the beginning of 1937, as I've said, it had become apparent that the law under which we were working as well as the administrative setup which we had might well be changed and strengthened. By the middle of 1937, it had become apparent that the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act as written at that time was not an effective instrument for adjustment of acreage and production. Payment under the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act for improved practices - such as fixing up pastures and building terraces
and plowing on the contour - was all fine, but had nothing directly to do with the volume of production of commercial crops. Payments for increasing soil building crops and payments for decreasing soil depleting crops had some influence on acreage, but not as much influence on production.

Farmers with smaller acreages of corn, with better cultivation and more fertilizer produced as many bushels as before. As a matter of fact, I remember myself coming to the conclusion, after a lot of study and some pretty careful documentation, that up to the end of 1937, throughout the agricultural adjustment period, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration had had very little influence on the volume of production of wheat and corn. It had been most effective in reducing the production of tobacco and had had quite a little influence in reducing the production of cotton, although cotton yields per acre were increasing through this period quite rapidly. Acreage was coming down and yield was going up and there was not so much influence on production. That, plus the general results of the one year of operation led the people in the Department of Agriculture and Congressmen and Senators to the conclusion that something
more, better, and stronger than the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act was needed.

On one side were those people who wanted to do it by orders, and have production quotas and marketing quotas for everything all the time. During this period and to a certain extent as a result of the drought which kept production way down in 1934 and 1936, there came to the forefront what was called the Ever-Normal Granary idea. I'd call that Henry Wallace's idea. One of the objectives was to stabilize the supply of storable agricultural commodities from year to year. It couldn't be done for non-storables. The idea was to store and carry over from years of high production large quantities of wheat, corn, oats, cotton, tobacco, and so forth into the years when production would be smaller on account of drought or for some other reason.

The droughts of 1934, with a short corn crop and the short wheat crop and the drought of 1936, with a short wheat crop again, had accentuated the instability from year to year. The object would be to get stability by means of storing in years of plenty for use in years of scarcity. The government would make loans to farmers on their wheat or their corn or on their cotton if they
would keep it themselves and not sell it. Then a year hence, or two years hence, or three years hence, or six months hence, when they wanted to sell their wheat or corn or cotton that was under loan, then they would sell it and pay off the loan. They'd never sell it unless the price were higher than the so-called loan value. That's the fundamental of the Ever-Normal Granary idea, as originally propounded, as I've said, by Henry Wallace himself. The government had made loans on cotton, wheat, and corn before 1937, but this new and expanded agricultural adjustment legislation, we argued and propounded, should make more definite provisions for Ever-Normal Granary storage and carry-over to stabilize supplies from year to year.

We thought that the legislation should be definite as to the quantities to be stored, and as to loan values that would be available to farmers and so on. There was some difficulty in getting this Ever-Normal Granary through. It finally became one of the primary things in this Agricultural Adjustment Act of February 16, 1938. Bills were introduced in Congress early in 1937 by individual Congressmen and Senators. I remember that some were sponsored by outside groups. Hearings were held
on them, but they never got reported out and there never was agreement in Congress in the 1937 session. Congress adjourned sometime in the summer or fall of 1937. During this recess of Congress, in the time that Congress was in adjournment, there was a series of meetings all over the country. As a matter of fact, the Congressional agricultural committees had so-called hearings in different parts of the country, where farmers, farmer organizations, Department of Agriculture people and so on would appear and testify as to what they thought should be in agricultural legislation, how they thought it should be administered, and so on.

Some of the people in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration here in Washington serviced these committees as they travelled around. I don't remember or maybe I didn't know whether that idea of having these committees travel around came out of Congress, or whether that came from the executive branch of the government - from FDR or Henry Wallace. But I remember during that period we were all very busy and very much concerned as to how the hearings were going around the country. We were getting out information to the Triple-A people and to others in different parts of the country.
as to what had been done and what hadn't been done, what had been accomplished and what hadn't been accomplished, for presentation to these committees.

Partisan politics came in, too. The Ever-Normal Granary and the loans to farmers were tagged as price fixing, which they were to a certain extent, and as vote buying, and so on. Finally, after all these hearings, there was general agreement, I think, among the Congressional committees and most of us in the Department of Agriculture, on a proposal that loan rates should depend upon the size of the stocks — on the supply. If the supply of wheat was quite large at harvest time — crop plus carry-over from the previous year — loan rates should be low, because here was a big supply to move and lots of bushels for a low price would mean as much total income as fewer bushels at a higher price. More would be taken if the price was low and the stocks would tend to be stabilized. Now, if the next year the supply or the crop was short or the carry-over had been used up, and the total supply was low, then the loan value should be higher than the year before.

A schedule was worked out. If the supply of wheat was a hundred and thirty per cent of normal — a hundred
and thirty per cent is just an illustrative figure, and normal was the normal crop plus the normal carry-over—that would be a big supply and the loan should be seventy per cent of the parity price—I'm not sure if it was exactly seventy. Down at the other end of the scale, if the supply was down to ninety per cent of normal, the loan should be say ninety per cent or ninety-five per cent of parity. That particular schedule was worked and worked and worked on. Jack Nutson had a great deal to do with it. I remember that Senator James F. Pope, who was one of the sponsors of this 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act, was down in our office one day on a holiday—a Saturday afternoon or something. He went over it all with us and agreed to it. Then he took off his coat and went to the typewriter and sat down and wrote a draft of this part of the bill. That would have been around November or December of 1937.

Well, that sliding scale of loan values got in the bill and became law. Today, it has been modified, but that question is still one of the leading questions in agrarian politics: What should loan values be? Some say they should always be at parity, because parity is parity and anything below parity is wrong. I remember
there was that same argument at the time. I remember Senator "Cotton Ed" Smith was a fundamentalist and parity was his cry. Either then or sometime not very long after, an exception was made for cotton. Cotton loans could be at ninety-five per cent of parity; I think ninety per cent of parity was the top for anything else, but cotton loans could be at ninety-five per cent of parity. FDR himself had a personal interest in cotton and that had something to do with it.

My own opinion is that the agrarian Democrats in Congress were primarily Southerners. Cotton was and is a great export crop of the United States. Back there in those days before the depression something like half our cotton had been exported. But the export market had declined and there was a real big problem of adjustment of agriculture in the South. The Southern agrarian Democrats remembered well the war between the states and the days of the Reconstruction, but now the South must be treated as an equal with the North. The politicians made hay with that particular line. Tobacco got as much favorable treatment as cotton, but of course tobacco is a smaller crop with fewer people involved. Tobacco is also a Southern crop.
Well, finally in February 1938 this new Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed. I forgot to mention crop insurance. Here we'd had these droughts in 1934 and 1936 and a great many farmers didn't have any crops to harvest, so crop insurance was talked about and argued about and finally included in this act. I think a bill was introduced earlier, maybe in 1936 or 1937. This was to be another stabilizer for agriculture and agricultural income, especially. Farmers could take out crop insurance and pay their premiums in kind—for crop insurance on wheat, they'd pay so many of bushels of wheat per acre per year. The government would take the wheat and store it, as part of the Ever-Normal Granary. In years of poor crops, when farmers were entitled to insurance for crop failure or a partial crop failure, the insurance would be paid in bushels of wheat. So crop insurance would stabilize supplies as well as stabilize farmers' incomes.

There had been efforts at private crop insurance in the country which had failed due to lack of actuarial base—not knowing what the risk was. The risk was greater than they thought, but possibly failure was due partly to lack of correct appraisals of losses by the
people working for the insurance companies. In 1938 it was recognized that private initiative and free enterprise couldn't or wouldn't undertake large-scale crop insurance. So after the droughts, in this general effort to stabilize supplies and stabilize farm incomes, and with the recognition that crop insurance was too big a job for private enterprise, it was rather generally accepted that crop insurance should be one of the additional things in our new legislation. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration had this nationwide network of committeemen and employees who were inspecting acreage and yield and so on of the farms of the country anyway, so they could administer this program and decide what the premiums should be. They could assess losses, if any, at the end of the year in an adequate fashion. The operating cost wouldn't be too great because it could just be tied on to an already going program, and the competence was there to do an adequate and honest job of assessing premiums.

About the only opposition to crop insurance I remember is just the general cry of, "Here the government is just going another step to take over." Concerning who pushed the program most strongly, it was Henry Wallace
again. I don’t remember anybody in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration who wasn’t all for crop insurance – they were all for it. I remember that Al Black, who then was chief of BAE (Bureau of Agricultural Economics) took a part in helping to prepare information and figures on variations in production, possible premium levels, and so on.

About the Ever-Normal Granary idea, I said that was Henry Wallace’s idea. It was Henry Wallace’s idea in 1934, just coming into bloom in 1937 and 1938. As for crop insurance, Wallace was spokesman number one after it began to move and be accepted. I remember Louis Bean, to whom H. A. paid a lot of attention in those days, was very enthusiastic about the Ever-Normal Granary as a way to level off the ups and downs of supply and income. There was the story about Joseph and the Pharaoh and the seven lean years in Egypt that became current about that time. Louis Bean was responsible for getting that line. Of course, it met considerable derision from the people who didn’t like us.

Now back to Henry Wallace during the period of 1937. I feel sure that Wallace was at this time thinking about the Presidency. After the election of 1936 and in
1937 and on into 1938, all things having to do directly with the agricultural program were, of course, taken to Henry Wallace. His advice and suggestions were sought. I remember two distinct ways in which he would react. First of all, I can't remember new ideas coming out of Henry Wallace's mind about the agricultural program, as they had back in 1933 and 1934. The first general reaction was that sometimes he wouldn't be interested at all. I would go, or a group of us, insiders and outsiders, would go to talk to him and to get his advice or his authorization to go ahead. I've seen him go entirely to sleep - close his eyes and nod his head - with me and other people in the Department of Agriculture and people from the outside - a dozen people, sitting around there talking to him. He would completely go to sleep. Everybody would be embarrassed and somebody would upset an ashtray or something to wake him up. That was one reaction.

Very often, if and when he did evince real interest in what was up and what we were talking about and possible lines of action, his questions would be about the political implications, about the farmer's reaction and other people's reactions.
I remember one time he made a remark that most of
the newspapers of the country would be opposed to
whatever it was we were talking about. I said, "Well,
eighty-five per cent of the newspapers of the country
have been opposed to us for the last two years anyway,
and it's going to continue to be that way." That's all
I remember, but I got a feeling after I said it that it
had some effect. I remember, too, in that period on
the political side looking for - we were all guilty of
this, of course, in debate - a "devil." Farmers from
time immemorial had sold their produce to merchants
and the merchant has sold it to somebody else. The
buyers of farm products have always been a good devil
for the agrarians - I mean the middle-man. "What
happens in the dark?" was one of Henry C. Wallace's
lines.

Well, in this time when what became the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 was under consideration and debate,
I remember H. A. - and the rest of us followed him - would
always make a point that government had to protect the
farmers. Private enterprise, the middle-man, had
always bought low and sold high, and taken advantage of
farmers when the supplies were high, and the farmer never
got as good prices as he should when supplies were low. I remember him, it seemed to me, going out of his way to find the "devils" and play them up in connection with all of these things. He did this through 1937, 1938 and 1939.

Concerning Nicholas K. Roerich, it began to be noised around the halls of the Department of Agriculture that Henry Wallace was having some long correspondence with some mystic of Asia who came to be called the "yogiman." Practically all of this is hearsay as far as I'm concerned - I had very little firsthand contact with it. Presumably H. A. would spend a great deal of time writing a mystical letter to this man in Asia, and then he would get back his reply. The rumors were that they were carrying on a voluminous and continuous correspondence. It had little or nothing directly to do with his problems of the Department of Agriculture or the United States government. It was all in the far blue yonder. People around Henry Wallace - I remember Jim (James) LeCron being one of them - presumably tried to do something about it, tried to get Henry to forget it, all to no avail.

My friend Knowles Ryerson, who had been in the Department of Agriculture as a plant explorer, and then
had been at the University of California and is back out there now, was in the Department of Agriculture. He was involved in some early stages of correspondence as a sort of a go-between message carrier, or something of the kind - I don't know what. I remember his coming to my office one afternoon or evening to just tell me goodbye. He had resigned and was going back to California. He said that he'd been involved and mixed up in this "yogi-man" business and that it was all going to break out one of these times. He'd just had a discussion and an argument with Henry Wallace and he couldn't take it any longer and was going home. And then later, it all broke out in the papers. I don't know who, if anybody, other than Henry Wallace, ever saw that correspondence.

I don't know how it was revealed. I don't think H. A. himself revealed it. I think probably it got noise about, maybe from the other end, from Asia, or someplace. I just don't remember how it became public and how the story broke out. I think Jim LeCron was a loyal friend, a friend who had Wallace's best interest at heart. I always felt that he came into the Department to really help Wallace out. He was not a career man; he
didn't want to be a career man. When he got enough of it, he just quit one day and moved to California, and he's still there in Berkeley.

I've been talking about 1937 and 1938. There came to be more and more of a problem to keep the good old spirit among the general run of people in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration - both those in Washington and those out of Washington. Whenever new legislation was being considered and hearings were being held and votes were going to be taken, there would be, it seemed to me, a sort of a rise in enthusiasm, a rise in interest. But the feeling that had been apparent before 1936 and was apparent in 1935 - self-satisfaction, a tendency towards ossification - seemed to be coming back and staying there through 1937 and 1938. There was more ossification. More and more of the people were feeling satisfied with what they had and with what they were doing, and there was less effort to pioneer and make things better. More people were following unquestioningly the line taken by interest groups, farm organizations, cooperative groups, and so on.

After the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was
passed and began to go into effect there was a resurgence of the feeling of, "Now this is the farmer's program and we farmers are going to run it, and we don't need the help of these brain-trusters and college professors," and so on, and so on. That was a feeling that I wanted to give them - that it was their program, and that was one of the reasons for my strong emphasis on decentralization. More and more of these people who had been local committeemen were becoming state committeemen. People who had been state committeemen were becoming regional directors, and so on. R. M. "Spike" Evans is an example. He had been closely associated with the Triple-A in Iowa and came in to be another one of Henry Wallace's immediate assistants, along with Jim LeCron, and others.

Unfortunately, these same farm people who were in the administrative, policy-making line seemed again to simply be interested in receiving government checks and getting largesse from the government, and not in agricultural adjustment, better conditions for tenants and farm laborers, and so on. There was a resurgence of the attitudes that became prominent there in 1935. Maybe it was a general feeling that, "Now at last we have this law that we needed - the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938. We've got the political setup that will keep it going so that we who are in it will get what's coming to us. That would be the best thing. We don't care for any more innovations and we don't want any more of this high powered planning. We'll continue this way."

Then many of that group began to look to Henry Wallace as the next President who would carry all this on. And Henry Wallace, as I've said, began to look at this group as the people who would enable him to be President. While he was writing to the "yogi-man" and looking for "devils" and so on, he at the same time was cultivating this group of agrarian fundamentalists.

I don't remember the influence of the urban liberals concerning the Triple-A Act of 1938. I would say there was no longer a cohesive group of them in the Department of Agriculture. In the Farm Security Administration at that time there was what I would call a liberal "agrarian" group. Some of those we called urban liberals in the early days had shifted their emphasis and their thinking and their actions to the Farm Security Administration program, but their actions at least were modified by the liberal agrarians, who were in the ascendancy in the Farm Security Administration. I'd classify Dr. Will
(Alexander) as a liberal agrarian. I'd classify R. B. "Pete" Hudgens and most of the people in the Farm Security Administration as that. They were of agrarian background and agrarian point of view, rather than of urban background and urban point of view. That went both for the part of the staff that was here in Washington and for the staff that was in the field - in the regional offices and state offices and so on.

As to whether the interest of the urban liberals shifted to anything else, there were the school lunch programs and the stamp plan - more and better food for people who couldn't afford to buy. Then, too, the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation which had been in action ever since the early days of the Harry Hopkins group was in 1937 and 1938 both an exporter by the subsidy route, as I mentioned, and a buyer of foods in large supply, to be turned over to relief agencies or to be sold at reduced prices to low income families. That was a good mixture of agrarian fundamentalism and liberalism.

But back to the Farm Security Administration: There was lots of interest and effort in the early days there to establish cooperative farms - cooperatively owned and operated farms. For years we had had cooperative
marketing associations, where the commercial farmers would get together into an association of their own and market their own products and buy their own supplies cooperatively. But that was all. Their farms were individually owned and individually operated. This effort on the part of the Farm Security Administration was for cooperative farms, cooperatively owned and cooperatively operated; that is, cooperative production as distinguished from cooperative marketing. It started in the Rex Tugwell days and was carried on by Dr. Will and Beanie Baldwin. I think those cooperative farms have all been liquidated now. I remember being on a farm in southern Indiana where the land had been purchased by the Farm Security Administration or Resettlement Administration. Houses for the cooperative farmers had been built, and there were barns and silos very well built and well constructed, good farm machinery, and so on. The farm was being operated as a cooperative, with people who lived on the farm working under the direction of a man whom they had selected to be supervisor and tell each one of them what to do. At the end of the season, these farmers shared the proceeds of the farm. It had been financed very largely by the Farm Security
Administration, and they got advice and assistance from Farm Security advisers - supervisors, they were called.

I suspect that in those days Wallace was as close to the Farm Security Administration as he was to the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. As far as I know, the Farm Security Administration people were no more active and interested in politics than were the Agricultural Adjustment Administration people. As a group, all in all, I expect they did less - I'm thinking of the people outside of Washington who would have been interested in partisan politics on the state or local level. I think the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was taking a more active part and doing more in partisan politics than any other part of the Department of Agriculture. I guess I should say that in 1937 and 1938 I didn't realize what was happening. I had no comprehension of the influence that political thinking had on the actions of individuals and groups who were presumably administering a government program on a non-partisan basis.

Of course, the Farm Security Administration was generally looked upon as the liberal program, the liberal
wing, of the Department of Agriculture at the time. It was shot at by the opposition more quickly than anything else. The Farm Security people may have found occasion to defend themselves, may have felt the need of defending themselves just as much as the Triple-A people or the Farm Credit Administration people did. But so far as I know, the Farm Security Administration in 1937 and 1938 and 1939 did not take on the character of a political machine at all.

1937 had been, as I said, a good crop year. Agricultural production had been pretty good and supplies were rather plentiful. At the end of 1937 and through 1938, we were looking for more markets for export commodities. We had as our unofficial goal a hundred million bushels of wheat to be exported, and it had to go under subsidy in order to be exported. J. E. Tapp and his assistant F. R. Wilcox had the job of selling all this wheat in the export market to exporters. At the time it was done, I remember that the export subsidy had to be as much as thirty cents a bushel - which was considerably higher than we had figured would be necessary when we started the program. That took place at the end of 1937 and through the first part of 1938.
The cotton crop in 1937 had turned out to be very surprisingly large, on account of the high yield per acre, and we had the same problem there. There were government purchases of perishable commodities - fruit. We had a butter purchasing program too. The Dairy Products Marketing Association was the name of the outfit through which we worked. It really was an adjunct of the Land O' Lakes cooperative marketing association. We were buying butter on the market to support the price, keeping the butter, and selling it back in the market if it could be done without unduly depressing the price. But as I remember, most of the butter, as was the case with most of the fruit and so on, went to charity and to the school lunch program, and so on.

Getting into 1938, I had the feeling, and I think that people with whom I was working closely had the feeling, that our program through 1936 and 1937 had not been very effective. But now we had the new act which made it possible for more to be done. Al Stedman, Jack Hutson, Jess Tapp, and I decided that the annual report of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration for 1937 should be an accurate and careful stock-taking of just
how much had been accomplished since the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act had been passed. What were the strengths and shortcomings and where could the policies and programs be improved for the welfare of agriculture and in the public interest? We hired Harold Rowe, who had been a member of the old Brookings Institution team that appraised the early Triple-A, to come in and help prepare that report.

I remember "Buck" Elliott, Oris Wells, and others in the then still-existent Program Planning Division of the Triple-A and several people in the BAE worked and studied and appraised the production changes and the causes thereof, and the increases in yield per acre, and changes in prices, and changes in agricultural income. Even the attitudes of farmers towards the program, they tried to appraise. Well, that finally eventuated as a report of the administration of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration for 1937 which would have been concluded along the middle of 1938 or early 1939. I was quite proud of it and all of us who had worked on it were quite proud of ourselves, because we thought we'd been honest.

Of course, that was my report to the Secretary of
Agriculture. It probably went from my desk to his with a formal note of transmittal. He knew what we'd been doing and the way we'd been proceeding. After he'd had it for some time, I talked to him about it, and found that he just didn't like it. He thought it would be meat for the opposition. He mentioned some of the Congressmen and Senators who would say that we hadn't done as well as we could - we might have done better. In the report we pointed out that acreage of some of the crops hadn't changed as much as they might have, or they should have. We pointed out that benefits of agricultural adjustment hadn't gone very much to the low-income farmers. This must have been sometime during the spring or summer of 1938. I remember after talking to him I said, "Well, that's my report to you, Mr. Secretary. There it is, it's on your desk - it's up to you whether it's published or not."

He sent it on to publication. I think it is the one report of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration that is still studied by students of the early days. That the others were not quite so honest may be an implication.

There got to be as the year wore on, a feeling
among more people that after all getting the checks and getting them to farmers was a big thing and making conservation payments and making loans to farmers and giving the checks to them, rather than agricultural adjustment and fundamental improvement, was enough. Henry A. Wallace knew how that group felt.

I remember another incident along about the same time - I would say in the summer of 1936. He and I were talking about agricultural adjustment and the democratic process and getting balanced farming and all of that. He was feeling, "Can't go too fast on that." He thought people maybe weren't ready for it and after all, farm incomes were low and payments help out, and so on. During that conversation I remember saying to the Secretary that I wanted to have something more than several trainloads of canceled checks to show for my stewardship of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Well, he agreed, and we had a nice talk about what more we could do. But I think that one incident which I happen to remember maybe exemplifies his attitude at that time towards the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and also exemplifies the feeling of a growing number, apparently,
of the agrarians in the Department and in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration - slowing down, being satisfied.

As to whether they had a reason, I can't rationalize that very well. One thing to say would be that many who had risen, shall I say, to administrative positions in the Department and in the Triple-A in Washington, the regions, states, and counties, and so on - were essentially conservative. That is, they didn't want to change the status quo too much, except that farmers never did get enough for their products.

During the summer of 1938, I was working hard on administration on all these administrative committees and program committees. Jess Tapp was still there, Jack (Hutson) was still there, Sted (Stedman) was still there, "Buck" Elliott was still there. There had been no big administrative changes, so there were no particular administrative upsets during that period. We were all busy, morning to night, as I say, on administration and trying to make this thing democratic. We were trying to make up our minds: What do we do under this law and how do we operate? I don't remember any significant travel at this point. I must have travelled plenty but I don't remember anything of great significance. There were
always regional meetings, state meetings, meetings at the colleges, and so on.
On October 16, 1938 I became head of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. That is in a way a long and involved story. I never did know all of the events that led up to that move or all the reasons why Henry Wallace decided to make it. A few days before October 16 - a very few days before - a telephone call came to my office from Miss Mary Huss saying that Secretary Wallace would like to see me, and could I come over? Yes, I'd go over to see the Secretary, as I had many times before. I went into his office and he said to me, in what I look back on as a sort of an embarrassed fashion, that he had decided to make some changes in the organization and administration of the Department of Agriculture. He said that he had another position for me, which he hoped I would like and be willing to accept, or words to that effect.

I expressed surprise and asked him what and why. After a very brief statement, he asked for M. L., who then was Under Secretary, to come in. M. L. came in and E. A. wanted M. L. to tell Tolley the bad news, which he did. The gist of it was that several far-reaching moves
were to be made in the organization of the Department of Agriculture, and a good many parts of it were to be reorganized. The reasoning was based to a considerable extent on the need for integration and unification of all the diverse programs of the Department, and the diverse agencies that were operating them - the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Soil Conservation Service, the Extension Service, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Office of Land Use Coordination, and so on.

So after all of that had all been thought about and talked about, Henry Wallace had decided on this reorganization whereby the Bureau of Agricultural Economics would become a central planning agency for the entire Department of Agriculture. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration would be in effect split into two parts, one of them to administer the production phases of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which remained as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. He established a new Marketing and Regulatory Administration - I believe that was the name of it - which Al Black, who had been up to that time chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, would head.
the position of being head of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and of its new and expanded activities?

As I remember, I asked for some time to think it over. I asked for some reasons why, which I did not get. I had a hard time for the next few days. I felt shocked that this would happen to me and that Henry Wallace as Secretary of Agriculture, in effect, without saying a word to me had reorganized the Department of Agriculture. I was shocked at the way he had decided that I should leave the job that I was in and go to another job if I wanted it, and if not - I could do something else. I never quite looked at it as a step down - I always called it a pushing aside. Outwardly or, shall I say, publicly at the time, it was looked on that way. What was said inside the Department and what was said outside the Department in newspapers and so on inferred, if it didn't state directly, that here the Department of Agriculture was being fixed and reorganized so that it would have a unified and integrated program on all fronts. This man Tolley was moving over into a new place to really plan the programs, and so on. The "planner of plans" was a phrase used.

The question of why, as I say, never was explained
to me. "Spike" (R. E.) Evans replaced me in Triple-A. He's now a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank. I was not told that, I remember, at the time. I remember wondering and asking. I replaced Al Black - A. C. Black - who'd moved over to become head of this short-lived Marketing and Regulatory Administration. At the same time, the old Program Planning Division of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was made part of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. The marketing agreement and order phases of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration were made part of this Marketing and Regulatory Administration. The Market News Service and other marketing activities of the old Bureau of Agricultural Economics were made part of this new Marketing and Regulatory Administration.

One of the new things that was established was the so-called Program Board. The Program Board of the Department of Agriculture was composed of the heads of all the bureaus and agencies, with the Secretary of Agriculture or his designated representative as chairman of it, and with the Bureau of Agricultural Economics being in effect the "secretariat" of this Program Board. I don't remember now any other changes of great significance. "Spike" Evans became the head of the Triple-A. He had
been in the Secretary's outer office, as we called it. He had been one of the three or four people who worked there with Paul Appleby. Appleby was assistant to the Secretary and I suspect that was Evans's title too. Beanie Baldwin had been in that same group and Milo Perkins was in it when he first came into the Department.

After all these years, looking back on it, of course it was Henry Wallace's decision again. Why did Henry Wallace make this decision? There, I'd say that Henry Wallace was expecting and hoping to be President one day not too far in the future. He felt the need - consciously or subconsciously - of an organization among farm people to back his candidacy when the time came. This great farmers' group, farm committeemen, state, county, and local, was the making of such an organization machine. It couldn't become such an organization unless something direct and deliberate were done about it. There were people who were sponsoring it and talking to Henry Wallace about it. I don't know who was doing this - maybe "Spike" Evans. I was never told. Maybe it was "Spike" Evans, maybe Paul Appleby, maybe any number of people in the Triple-A or directly connected with it - committeemen and so on. They were talking to
the Secretary in those days, as they always had. Any or all of them might very well have said or suggested that maybe somebody with political ambitions, political desires, and so on, should be head of this organization now, preparatory for two years hence, and Henry Wallace finally agreed.

I did learn, of course, that practically everybody of any importance in the Department of Agriculture knew that this was pending except myself and the people right around me. I hadn't known until two or three days before it happened. Incidentally, I remember I'd been out of town vacationing in Maine for a period of about two weeks in the latter part of September and the first of October. I had only been back for a little while when I was informed of this. I really felt torn up. A good part of it was that Henry Wallace, whom I'd known and worked with and admired and respected would do this to me - in effect kick me around. That's what it amounted to and everybody in the Department of Agriculture, and of course some outside, knew that that's what it amounted to.

I can't document my reasoning that this was an
attempt to use the Triple-A as a political instrument. I felt I knew Henry Wallace's feeling about the Presidency at the time. Many of the people around him talked to him about it. And not very long thereafter, the Triple-A group began to really take part in political discussions, political activities. I'm thinking about the people out in the country and the people in the Triple-A in Washington—Evans and the people who remained right around him, plus people in state offices and local offices. As for LeCron, Baldwin, Perkins, and Appleby, they were all for Wallace for President at that time. "That would be alright, that would be fine, that's the thing we should have." They were talking about it, but I don't know that they at this time were doing anything else.

As I started to say, not long thereafter, within about a year or so, so-called political activity on the part of the agricultural department employees, meaning the Agricultural Adjustment Administration very largely, came to be recognized and condemned. Senator Carl A. Hatch of New Mexico had an act of Congress passed prohibiting this. (He must have known Clinton Anderson, but then Senator Hatch became a judge, perhaps before
Anderson came to the House.) At this time, the feeling in Triple-A dropped back further toward just payments—conservation payments and parity payments, and supporting prices. The ideas of conservation, improving the soil, adjusting production to meet demand and so forth, went into the background again.

Concerning my feeling about Wallace for President, up to that time and some little time thereafter, I was strong for Wallace for President. I felt he had the knowledge, the vision, the understanding, and that his actions and activities would be in the main directed toward improving the lot of the common people—the common man, as he used to say. I felt that he would be, shall I say, a worthy successor to FDR and that he would carry on FDR’s philosophy and make additions thereto—that he would carry on what had been inaugurated and gotten under way in the Roosevelt administration. I remember him intimating to me one time, probably a few months or weeks before this, when I was endeavoring to talk to him about some changes or improvements in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, that it was not worthwhile to bother about such things very much just at the present time, that the path of the future (he didn’t
use those terms) was being made by the President. He
intimated that anything that he could do or that I could
do on the agricultural front just at that time would
have very little or no influence on history.

I took this as just another way of saying two
things: One was that he was thinking about something
else and didn't want to worry too much just now about
agriculture, and the other was that he was looking forward
to being Roosevelt's successor, and then was when he,
Henry Wallace, would make history.

Regarding the question of whether I would have
helped Henry Wallace politically through the Triple-A had
he asked me, it's very doubtful. I doubt if I would
have or could have. Ever since Triple-A started, since
I'd had anything to do with it, we tried to make it and
all of the other programs and activities designed to
help agriculture a-political, non-political. Maybe
because I'd grown up in government service, or maybe
for some other reason, I probably couldn't have accepted
an assignment or acceded to a request to, in effect,
become the leader of a political machine inside the
government, even for Henry Wallace.

I don't remember any serious disagreement between
Henry Wallace and myself concerning my administration of Triple-A. When I finally went back to Henry Wallace and told him alright, I'd move over to BAE, we talked some more, but I never did get anything definite from him as to why he was doing this. I remember quite distinctly making two remarks to Henry Wallace at that time. One of them was that if I had it to do over again, I'd do it just the same. The other was that I wore no man's collar. Then we talked about religion a while and I went on home. He probably said something about the great forces that move the world, and the super-human, and so on.

I never felt that the people in Wallace's office felt that I was antagonistic to his Presidential aims. I think they had something to do with my transfer and agreed with it. As to whether this affected morale in the Department, it did for a considerable number of people. There were many questions. I remember instances with particular people. First of all, Al Stedman was to remain in Triple-A as an assistant administrator, but the next day Al resigned and went back to his old job as Washington reporter for the St. Paul Dispatch, at just half the salary he'd been getting. Jess Tapp, who'd
been assistant administrator, was to have gone over into this new marketing and regulatory unit. F. R. Wilcox, who had been in charge of that division of the Triple-A, was also to have gone there. They took a look at this for a week or so, and then each one of them submitted his resignation.

I remember Jess Tapp coming in to see me in my new BAE office, after I had been there two or three days. He asked to dictate a note to my secretary. It was his resignation. He delivered it in person to H. A. Jess had been talking to Al Black and Secretary Wallace about the reorganization, the line to be followed and work to be done and so on. He just hadn't gotten any satisfaction, as I remember it, out of the talk with either one of them and felt that one or the other or both of them did not trust him and would not trust him to carry on programs as he had been trying to carry them on. So he decided not to stay.

Old incidents come back from the graveyard. Milton Eisenhower, who was mentioned much in this, was not quite one of the "Palace Guard." He was head of the Office of Land Use Coordination. This was a little group in the Secretary's office that had been established
some time before. In one of the sessions that I had with the Secretary I asked him questions of just how things were to be, what the organization and administration was to be. Well, the Secretary sent for Milt Eisenhower. I remember Milt coming into the Secretary's office carrying his briefcase. He opened the briefcase and put a pile of papers on the Secretary's desk. That pile of papers included organization charts, reorganization orders, etc. All the papers had been fixed up by Milt and Milt carried them around in his briefcase so nobody could see them. He waited for a call from the Secretary to deliver them. Milt, I think, was simply carrying out orders.

A day or so later, in the middle of the afternoon, on a day I was cleaning up my old Triple-A office to get out and get into the other one, Milt asked to come and see me. I was determined I would not let anybody know I was hurt about this, and I was very deliberately perusing an article in the Journal of Farm Economics when Milt came into my office. He wanted to tell me that he was sorry about all this and that he really hadn't been a party to it. I was putting on a brave front and talked about the article in the Journal of Farm Economics.
and called his attention to how clean my desk was. Suddenly Milt began to cry and to really sob. I got up and left the room and told Milt, "Now nobody will bother you. This door won't be opened until you open it and come out." I closed my door and told the girls to stay away; that was the end of that period.

One point comes to my mind: M. L. I remember that some few weeks before this took place, M. L. came over to see me one Sunday evening and talked about the Department of Agriculture, the Secretary of Agriculture and the world in general, as we always did. After this was all over, I came to the conclusion that M. L. had come to see me that evening to tell me what was in the wind, but that I either didn't understand what he was trying to tell me or he decided not to tell me the story after he got there. But in this hard time I had with myself during this period and for a considerable time after, M. L. was my best friend. He never did express himself very much as to how he felt about it. To me, he sort of said it might have been much worse, and after all over here in RAE was a real opportunity, let's see what we can do about it. I suspected at the time and
still do that N. L. had quite a little influence in shaping this reorganization and my place in it when it became apparent that it was going to be made.

My alternatives were either to go to BAE or resign and look for a new job like these other fellows did. I was living in Georgetown at the time. In those days, I'd been riding home with my chauffeur. The administrator of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration had a car in those days, and old Hamilton was the chauffeur's name. Of course, that car was used not just for my personal use, but all around. I remember Hamilton telling me that he'd known this was going to happen. It had been talked about in the car when other people were in it.

Now, as for the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Eric Englund was assistant chief of the bureau and had been with Al Black. "Buck" (F. F.) Elliott, who had been head of the Program Planning Division of the Triple-A came in with the division. He became in effect an assistant chief. They were the two at the time. Then, we began to get reorganized internally to take on the job of attempting to plan a unified and integrated program for all phases of the Department of Agriculture. The
program board began to function and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics began to work with the so-called action agencies on specific phases of programs and bring suggestions and recommendations to the program board for approval, disapproval, acceptance or non acceptance. When that began to take shape, which was two or three or four months after the reorganization, I got some other assistant chiefs.

One was Ray C. Smith, who is still in BAE as an assistant chief. He had been regional director of the Farm Security Administration in the region that included Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri, I believe. His function was, in the BAE, to pay particular attention to the programs of the Farm Security Administration and the Farm Credit Administration, insofar as they applied to low-income farmers, to the applications of agricultural adjustment programs and the Soil Conservation Service program, to small farms, such as were the clients of the Farm Security Administration. Then John R. Fleming, who had been in the Division of Information of the Secretary's office, I believe, came in as another assistant chief. His function was primarily that of seeing that the statements written for radio of all of
the parts of the Department, insofar as they applied to planning and administration of action programs, fitted together and made a unified coherent story.

Roy Kimmel, who had been in the Office of Land Use Coordination and stationed in the Great Plains, was appointed to pay particular attention to programs in that part of the country and to submarginal land programs, conservation programs in the Great Plains and grazing regions farther west, and related things.

Within a week or two after I became chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, at N. L.'s suggestion, we decided that he and I and a few other people from the Department should go to different places in the country to study and observe the operation of some of the programs with which I had not had firsthand acquaintance. These were primarily the Farm Security Administration program, the program of the Soil Conservation Service, the program of the Forest Service. Particularly, we examined the relations that existed between the so-called action agencies of the Department and the land grant colleges, especially the extension services of the land grant colleges.

I think that the main aim of Wallace and the men
who advised him was not to get a unified and integrated program, but to get somebody else in as head of the Triple-A. I never have been sure that "Spike" Evans had been tagged for this job until October 16th or thereabout. I really took this "unified program" idea and tried to turn it into something valid. That's exactly what I did for three years in the FAE. I actually tried to take the quotation marks out of it. As for the other people who went with us on this trip I spoke of, I don't remember specifically who they were. Black wasn't with us, nor Kimmel. I don't believe Kimmel had come into the bureau at that time. Smith was not in the bureau at that time, because it was on this trip that I got acquainted with Smith. Fleming and Elliott may have been on the trip. Of course, there were people from the Farm Security Administration, from the Soil Conservation Service, from the Forest Service, from the Extension Service, and Land Grant Colleges.

That trip was very helpful to me in a good many ways. It helped me cool off and get my bearings and see the country — it's always nice to see the country and talk to farm people. We developed ideas as to
procedure and methods of operation which would help to
unify and integrate the programs of the Department
and the land grant colleges too, insofar as they had a
bearing on these action programs. I don't remember how
long that trip lasted — several weeks. When we got
back to Washington, we proceeded to endeavor to get
going.

One of the first things we did was to establish
a Division of State and Local Planning, in the Bureau
of Agricultural Economics. State and Local Planning
was to be a nationwide effort supported by a nationwide
organization. There was to be in every agricultural
county in the United States a — I believe we called it —
Land Use Planning Committee. We were using the term
"land use" in those days in a very broad sense. Each
county was to have a Land Use Planning Committee
composed of farmers chosen by the farmers, plus the
representative of the county Triple-A committee, plus
a representative of the Farm Security Administration if
it was operating in the county, plus a representative
of the Soil Conservation Service if it was operating
in the county and similarly for the Farm Credit Administration,
and the county agricultural agent. The county agricultural agent was in effect to be the secretary and manager of the county Land Use Planning Committee.

This county Land Use Planning Committee was to be a citizens' group, in effect, which would make suggestions as to what in their opinion the agricultural program in that county should be, and what changes and modifications in present farm programs would be desirable. All those suggestions and recommendations were to be brought together first at the state level. There was to be a state Land Use Planning Committee as well. And then after that, they would be brought together at the national level in the United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Division of State and Local Planning.

So we established in Washington this division. We chose Bushrod W. Allin as head of the division. He still is in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and I believe his title is assistant chief. He's head of the so-called Outlook and Situation Board, which is an inter-bureau board or committee through which the stream of so-called outlook and situation statements from the Department go before their release to the public. That's
the place where they're studied and put together and really prepared. D. A. Fitzgerald, who's now in the Mutual Security Agency, was assistant head of that division. A young fellow, Harold Vogel, who had only recently come into the Department in the Office of Land Use Coordination, from the University of Idaho, was number three man in that division. Harold was with me in FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) all the time I was over there and is still with the North American regional office of FAO.

And, as I said, then there was a group of regional men and, when we got it worked out, a group of state men who were in fact joint employees of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and the respective state colleges. That, in general, was the organization which we established to carry out this mandate. The old established parts of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics were continued without a great deal of change.

As a related part of the effort, we decided that there should be a method of obtaining directly from a representative group of farm people their ideas about the state of agriculture, about the programs of the Department of Agriculture, and their reactions to the way
programs were being administered. It was to be something in the nature of a public opinion poll of farmers. We established a division. I believe it was called the Division of Farm Surveys. Rensis Lickert, trained in social psychology and I believe a native of Kansas, who had never been in the Department of Agriculture, came to be head of it. He got around him a small group of qualified people - psychologists, statisticians who knew agriculture and farm life. In cooperation with the land grant colleges, they started making surveys or polls and periodic reports to the Secretary of Agriculture and the administrators of the action agencies on the reactions of farm people to the program.

Another innovation. In this citizens' participation in planning, we felt there was need for free and frank and intelligent discussion by farm people of both local and national problems and programs. We decided that we should try to help organize local discussion groups to encourage these local county committees to resolve themselves into discussion groups at meetings, to discuss current problems. We hired Carl Tausche to direct this effort. I believe he was in the Program Planning Division of the Triple-A for awhile. Before
that he had been a professor of philosophy at the Harvard School of Business Administration. By the time all that was done 1938 had passed.

On the trip, I mentioned, we went to Indiana, southern Illinois, southeast Missouri, Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and probably some states in between. I remember those in particular. For a period after I returned from the trip, I remember I felt pretty good about program planning. After all, here was an opportunity to help make farm programs better and more in the public interest and more helpful to farm people, and to get more productive working relationships between the bureaucrats of the Department of Agriculture and the professors and extension workers in the agricultural colleges, and farm people themselves. That's something that we had thought about and talked about for years. For a period there I felt pretty good, as I said. For a year or so, we seemed to be making progress and having some influence on events.

I've expressed myself about the Agricultural Adjustment Administration as such. There still was a feeling of satisfaction that writing checks and making loans were the objects in view. Maybe I'm biased there -
I don't think so. "Spike" Evans never had any program of his own that I ever knew of, at any time.

In the Farm Security Administration — there was lots of zip at all levels during this period. What was left of the urban liberals were still there. They were less influential, but not smaller in number. The people in the regional, state, and local offices of the Farm Security Administration were a surprisingly alert group of, I'd call them, agrarians. They had come from the farm and talked and thought in terms of rural living, rural problems, rural people. Ray Smith may be a good example. He had been a county agent in Ohio. I remember being back to his old county with him sometime later. Then he'd become a so-called district agent in the extension service in Ohio, stationed at the state college with a number of counties under his general direction. He had at some time taken a year or two years off to go to Columbia University to study sociology, economics, and so forth. He had been picked up by the Farm Security Administration and made regional director.

I remember T. Roy Reid, who had been director of extension in Arkansas. He became regional director of the Farm Security Administration for Arkansas and adjoining
states. Later, he became and still is, director of personnel in the Department of Agriculture in Washington. And the local agents and supervisors, those who work directly with Farm Security Administration clients, as we called them then, were almost wholly, I think, rural people, farm people, ex-county agents, and so on. I must call them agrarian liberals as distinguished from urban liberals. So the spirit and attitude in the Farm Security Administration became one of what we might call agrarian liberalism as distinguished from urban liberalism of the Tugwell ilk.

It was in the first half of 1939 that the state and county planning committees, farm surveys, discussion groups, and so forth began to function. As I remember now, the whole year of 1939 was one during which we had the sense of urgency and the sense of mission. We had a feeling that we did the right things in the right way, this new effort would begin to produce results and influence programs. The program board of the Department of Agriculture had some meetings that were quite good and quite productive. The Secretary himself, Wallace, would come and preside and take an interested part for an hour or two hours or the length of the meeting. But when we
came to the end of 1939 and into 1940, it began to seem that not much was happening. Other agencies of the Department of Agriculture, especially the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, were not welcoming the new activities of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. It seemed as if not much cognizance was taken of their recommendations and findings. The Triple-A had their program, they knew what they wanted to do and they felt they didn't need our help. I'd say this was taking place at the end of 1939 or early in 1940.

As to personnel changes, on April 16, 1939 P. V. Cardon was made assistant chief of the Bureau of Plant Industry. That was just a normal elevation of a man and recognition of his ability, and there was a vacancy. The general feeling I have about the Department in 1939 is that it just flowed along without very much happening. What I said before about the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was with respect to that period of 1939. I account for this by the satisfaction of the people concerned that, "We have a going concern here. It's getting along reasonably well." There was also the preoccupation of the Secretary and those around him with political matters.
Perhaps there was a growing antagonism - bureaucratic to a large extent - between the Farm Security Administration and the Farm Credit Administration. That would have been about agricultural credits. The Bankhead Jones Farm Tenant Act was in operation. In addition, the Farm Security Administration was making rehabilitation loans to tenants still, to help to get them on their feet. All of these credit activities of the Farm Security Administration were activities which the Farm Credit Administration could not or would not undertake. So there would be arguments about the worthiness of the Farm Security Administration loans. Someone would say that they were loaning money to people who didn’t deserve it and who wouldn’t use the credit properly. There were counter-charges by the agrarian liberals that the Farm Credit Administration was interested only in large farmers and made no effort to help the low-income farmer. The same thread runs through all these battles.

There were antagonisms between the Farm Security Administration and the Extension Service. The Farm Security Administration would feel that the county agents weren’t interested in low-income farmers. The county agents would feel that the local agents and supervisors
of the Farm Credit Administration were doing part of their jobs — whether they'd been doing it before or not. Even the land grant colleges were in many places showing antagonisms against the Farm Security Administration on the one side, against the Soil Conservation Service on the other side, and against the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. The land grant colleges were feeling that they were the old established institutions and that all or many of these new activities should somehow or another be channeled through the colleges. Dr. Will Alexander was still head of the Farm Security Administration.

Regarding the situation in the Secretary's office, as I've said, there was more and more talk and consideration of political matters. One of the things that was talked about was whether or not FDR would be a candidate for President again. Those who were thinking about Henry Wallace, of course, were all hoping not, and hoping that FDR would in effect put the mantle on Henry Wallace at the proper time. I don't remember a great deal about specific acts and specific incidents involving Henry Wallace and the Presidency at that time. I wasn't a member of the inner circle at the time, and they would
not have been discussed at length with me. But the
general impression was that all actions and all public
statements and so on by the Secretary and those around
him were conditioned by political considerations during
that period.

On December 21, 1939 Grover Bennett Hill replaced
Harry L. Brown as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture.
Brown actually resigned on the 5th of December. He was
with the Farm Credit Administration not long after that,
in one of the Southern regional offices, where he
remained until a year or so ago (around 1951). Harry
L. Brown was a Southerner from Georgia, who looked,
talked and acted like a dirt farmer. He was very honest,
but not very quick on the uptake on any subject I ever
discussed with him. He was always a great admirer of
Henry Wallace and always endeavored to carry out the
orders of Henry Wallace, and when he was acting on his
own initiative, to act in the way that he thought would
be pleasing to Henry Wallace. He was generally a nice
fellow, pretty well liked. He'd been, I think, director
of agricultural extension in Georgia at the time he got
the assistant secretaryship.

The coming of Grover Hill was probably lauded and
applauded in some quarters. I think there were two considerations, as I remember, in the appointment of Grover Hill. He was from Texas. He, too, looked and acted and talked like a farmer. He had been in the Department, in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration in one capacity or another over a very considerable period of time. And he was a protege of Marvin Jones, from Marvin Jones's district in western Texas. He had been associated with Marvin for some years before he came into the Department of Agriculture, as I remember.

I don't remember details concerning the committee of which I was chairman in March, 1940 to gather ideas on an international economic post-war conference. Al Black and Les Wheeler were members, and we were to work with Leo Pasvolsky and Herbert Feis of the State Department.

On March 1, 1940 Claude Wickard replaced M. L. Wilson as Under Secretary of Agriculture. M. L. actually resigned on January 31, 1940. He resigned as Under Secretary of Agriculture and simultaneously was appointed as federal director of extension. In a way it was quite a step down, while this was brewing or maybe just after it happened, I remember hearing Mrs. Wilson say to Mrs.
Tolley, "I just don't understand what they're doing over there in the Department of Agriculture, do you?"

M. L. had been assistant secretary and Under Secretary for six years. Of course, politically, M. L. was looked upon as not exactly an asset to a political campaign. He cannot be characterized as a farmer or one who looks, acts, and thinks like the ordinary run of farm people, as much as he has worked for them and as much as he believes in them. There again, I don't know just why or how all of this happened. M. L. replaced Clyde E. Warburton, who died a year or two ago. Warburton was a career man in the Department of Agriculture. He'd been in the old Bureau of Plant Industry and was appointed Director of Extension by Henry C. Wallace. Warburton was made governor of the Farm Credit Administration at this time. That was neither a step down nor up - it was a step sideways to make room for M. L. Nobody ever told me that, it is just my impression of why the decision was made. It was a step up salary-wise for Warburton. He got maybe nine thousand to ten thousand a year as governor of Farm Credit.

M. L. through all these years had a great interest in agricultural extension work and agricultural extension
activities. He had been in the agricultural extension service at one time in the State of Montana. I can remember talks with M. L. when we had luncheon together or were taking a Sunday ride together or were riding around the country together about what he was going to do. He wouldn't spend the rest of his life being Under Secretary of Agriculture. And he was, indirectly at least, expressing interest in the agricultural extension work. Many of the deans and directors of the land grant colleges liked M. L. and admired him.

Maybe I should put it this way: M. L. liked being Henry Wallace's Under Secretary. He had an influence on a great many things, and enjoyed life most of the time he was in that position. But as 1939 and 1940 rolled on and the day approached when a change in administration, including the under secretaryship of agriculture, M. L. thought and kept thinking of what he would do thereafter. I don't know, but I've always assumed that the change was worked out between M. L. and Henry Wallace — that they worked it out themselves over a considerable period of time, several weeks or months.

The appointment of Claude Wickard to the under secretaryship put another farmer in a high place, another
disciple of Henry Wallace who was a real farmer. Claude was a farm owner and operator in Indiana. He had been a member of the state legislature there. He was a life-long Democrat, and had been in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration since it started. He was director of the north central division - Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and so on. He held one of the half-dozen top posts in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

Claude Wickard, a farmer, real dirt farmer, became Under Secretary of Agriculture.

On May 13, 1940 I met Spike Evans, Les Wheeler, Milo Perkins and some other people to work out a plan: for temporary use of gold to facilitate more active inter-change of our surplus agricultural commodities for strategic raw materials. That was just one of many sessions and discussions about the growing call for agricultural commodities overseas, especially in Europe, and the growing difficulties which the countries then at war had in making any kind of payments for them. This was before Lend Lease came into existence, I think. The United States had a great amount of gold piled up and there was talk and thought about the possibility of the United States loaning some of its gold to some of
these countries, the gold to be used to buy commodities from us - a sort of a dodge to keep international trade flowing and to keep the payment for it on a respectable basis. I don’t remember much about this particular session. As I say, it was just part of more or less continuous conferences and discussion about it.

I can’t remember any significant occurrences on the official front during the summer of 1940 which affected the Bureau of Agricultural Economics directly. We had the problem of working with the other agencies in the Department of Agriculture and getting something definitive developed and accepted. It was becoming more and more difficult. I know we in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and others in the Department and in the land grant colleges, were discussing and worrying about whether or not this new move that we had embarked on with so much energy a couple of years before was really going to come into fruition. Inter-agency and inter-bureau relationships were bothersome. Over all of it was the political campaign and all of the talk and push to have Henry Wallace be the Presidential nominee.

I don’t remember that I played any particular specific part in that movement, but I was acquainted with many of the things that were going on and with the
that were being made. The big question in everybody's mind was, of course, "What will FDR himself do?" And, as I remember, nobody knew until convention time. The convention was in Chicago in July. I remember an incident. Our oldest son, Grant Tolley, was being married in Chase City, Virginia to Miss Jean Currier. Mrs. Tolley and I and our two younger boys drove down to Chase City the evening before the wedding. Driving along U.S. #1 to Richmond, we listened on the radio, while Henry Wallace was being nominated for Vice President.

When I returned to Washington a few days later the Department was buzzing with: "Of course, Henry Wallace will now resign and won't be Secretary of Agriculture any longer. Who will be, and what will be the effect upon the work of the Department and its program of activities?" There was wonder and discussion about what would Henry Wallace's attitude be hereafter toward the Department of Agriculture and the welfare of farmers, and so on.

On August 13, 1940 he resigned and Claude Wickard became Secretary.
Claude Wickard had been Under Secretary of Agriculture. I can't remember the details, but I'm sure that Henry Wallace recommended to FDR that Claude Wickard be made Secretary of Agriculture, and that FDR accepted that without question and appointed him. I remember an incident. Claude told me, after the first Cabinet meeting to which he went after he became Secretary, that he felt that FDR didn't recognize him. He felt that FDR did not know who he was when he first laid eyes on him. When he came into the Cabinet room FDR didn't quite know who that was! I don't know that Claude had had any particular aspirations for this job, and I know that he'd never had any close relationship with FDR or the "Kitchen Cabinet." I felt at the time and still do that Henry Wallace's prime motivation was to have another farmer — a fundamental agrarian — there.

As to the personal relation between Wallace and Wickard, it was nice and friendly, but Wickard had never been one of Wallace's close associates or close advisers. I don't think the charge made by some that Mr. Wallace wanted someone as Secretary who would be susceptible to
Mr. Wallace's running the Department from the Vice Presidency was the primary motivation by any means. He could have found many others, who had been more closely associated with him, and would have unquestionably followed his suggestions. If that had been the motivation, I think, H. A. wouldn't have looked toward Claude Wickard, but toward a good many other people first.

On September 5, 1940 Paul Appleby became Under Secretary of Agriculture. He had been H. A.'s special assistant through all the years of H. A.'s tenure as Secretary, and had, I suspect, done at least as much as any other one man to forward the Wallace candidacy for the Presidency. After H. A. was nominated for the Vice Presidency, Appleby was doing all he could, and I expect as much as anybody else in the Department, to help in the Presidential campaign. Of course, he wasn't spending all his time at that, anymore than anybody else around the Department of Agriculture was. He knew the Department of Agriculture from all his years as special assistant to the Secretary, and I felt sure at the time and still do that when Claude Wickard became Secretary, he called on Appleby for help, advice, suggestions about many problems and situations within the Department.
Henry of course moved out and became Vice President and had an office on the Hill. I think that Paul endeavored to keep up his relationships with Wallace, to talk to him, exchange views and ideas, and so on. But before long Henry Wallace, dreaming still of being President some day and feeling, I suspected at the time, that maybe Paul Appleby couldn't help him any more along that road, decided that he should look for other helpers. Henry wasn't paying much attention to Paul any more, as he wasn't paying much attention to a great many people with whom he had been closely associated earlier. I saw Paul much more often during that time than I did H. A. Paul felt and said, and I agreed with him, that Henry Wallace's wagon was hitched to a star, and the star was the Presidential star. Paul felt that all of H. A.'s thoughts were in that direction and that he had not very much interest in any of the problems of the Department of Agriculture. Toward the end of Henry's tenure as Vice President he and Paul saw very little of each other. I feel sure that Henry Wallace nominated Paul Appleby to the job of Under Secretary and made it possible for him to get it. Paul stayed in that position for three or four years and moved from there to be assistant director
of the Budget Bureau, another position of equal rank. Paul probably desired that position. At least, he didn't have the feeling, so far as I know, of being kicked around at that particular time. I think in Agriculture, he didn't feel he was kicked around but felt that he was neglected and that his voice wasn't heard. Appleby was quite influential in the Department of Agriculture, during all the time he was Under Secretary, on the international front in international relations and in the movement that led up to the establishment of FAO, the Hot Springs Conference, and so on.

Claude Wickard, as Secretary, insofar as he sought advice, sought it more and more from his old friends in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration—especially Spike Evans and Harry Schooler, who was head of the north central division of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration for a good part of that time. Claude conferred alone with Schooler at great length on many things.

As to the difference it made to me—the coming of Wickard and the going of Wallace: Wallace of course in the last year or so he had been there, as I've said repeatedly, had not been particularly or vitally interested
in the Department of Agriculture, except as it impinged directly upon the political aspects of problems and the political feelings and aspirations of farm groups. He had always supported and worked with the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, both within the Department and outside. I had a feeling of security, shall I say, on a limited scale at least. Wallace had always attempted to get the facts and findings and recommendations of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics into the stream of thinking and action in all parts of the Department of Agriculture. I can say the same about Paul Appleby as I've just said about Wallace.

Claude Wickard was a good friend of mine and still is. But I have the impression that when Claude was Secretary he was afraid and uneasy about himself and his job. I can remember times when I have gone into his office and when I could almost see him flinch when the door opened and I came in. I felt that he was afraid I was going to ask him a hard question or make a suggestion that he wouldn't want to follow. That fear and uneasiness did have an influence on Claude Wickard's whole tenure there as Secretary of Agriculture. There was not much stepping out, stepping on ahead, no daring-do.
I guess I've said he wasn't a good Secretary. He was a good Secretary as far as being nice and considerate to people personally. As far as having the welfare of farm people at heart is concerned, he was ahead I think of even Henry Wallace in his most missionary-like days. Claude Wickard always did have that and still has it. That was one of his characteristics which I think influenced Henry Wallace to nominate Claude Wickard to be his successor. From those two standpoints, yes, Claude Wickard was a good Secretary, and sometimes, he would take fearless and forward-looking action.

We got the various bureaus and agencies in the Department of Agriculture together, and worked out some tentative production goals. The consumption of food products, especially, and the demand for them had been increasing, and the surpluses that had been piled up were disappearing. It was apparent that there'd be a need, as part of the war effort, for much more agricultural production to meet the demand at home and to feed the armed forces overseas and to furnish food supplies to our allies. And it seemed to a group of us that the agricultural programs should be reoriented toward getting enough of the right kind of production.
About this time C. B. Baldwin and I tried to convince Wickard that it was absolutely essential for the Department of Agriculture to go all out to get increased food production. But Wickard was afraid to do this because he feared the Farm Bureau. Claude could understand the situation, but here comes agrarian fundamentalism of 1941, 1942. Among the agrarian fundamentalists there was a fear of surpluses. And that came up of course not only in Claude's mind but in the minds of all my old friends over in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and in the minds of the farm leaders and the people in the Farm Bureau, of course. I think their answer to this proposal for increased production went something like this, "Yes, fine, that's right, we need that. But this war is going to be over one of these times, and then we'll have a big depression and farm prices will go down. We may have a repetition of the 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933." - and so on, with all the rest of the familiar argument.

All the argument finally crystallized on the legislative front in the so-called Steagall Amendment, which provided for supporting the prices of commodities - so-called basic commodities and a lot of other enumerated
ones - at not less than ninety per cent of parity, whenever increased production was called for by the Department of Agriculture. Something like five hundred million dollars was appropriated and set aside to be used to take care of surpluses which might develop as a result of this expanded production program.

As for Beanie Baldwin and his part in this, I believe at that time Beanie had become head of the Farm Security Administration. Not only Beanie but a great many people in the Farm Security Administration as well as people in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Extension Service and so on, felt the need for expanded agricultural production. Possibly, Beanie and I just planned to talk together to the Secretary to urge him to call on farmers for all-out production as their contribution to the war effort, and tell him that our feeling was shared by a great many people, both outside the Department of Agriculture as well as inside the Department of Agriculture. But on the other hand, there was and still is the fear of surpluses. As to Claude being afraid to go for an all-out program, it wasn't a unique feeling on his part.

The OPA (Office of Price Administration) was established
in April 1942. I simply took an indefinite leave from the Bureau of Agricultural Economics for my OPA assignment. In the fall of 1941, the war clouds were darkening. The big thing on the policy front in the Department of Agriculture was just what I've been talking about - whether or not to expand production and how to protect farmers' incomes and support prices, and how large should the goals of production be, and so on. The feeling of, shall I say, fear on the Secretary's part was apparent to a good many of us around him.

BAE and its agricultural planning was not being supported by the Secretary and by the Triple-A and by the Farm Bureau. The work of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in this planning business was still being carried on pro forma. But our findings and recommendations were not getting a great deal of consideration within the Department or having much influence on policies and programs. This was probably exemplified by the circumstances surrounding my going over to OPA.

I remember December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor day. It was Sunday, and I was at home in the afternoon, sitting in front of the fireplace with my wife, enjoying myself. Our son George was home. The telephone rang, and he
answered the telephone. He came back in a very short time with a very startled expression, saying, "The Japs have bombed Pearl Harbor." The three of us said to each other, "Well, that means war." Then I remember in the course of the afternoon thinking, "Well, in modern days, wars in which the United States is involved last for four years. Get ready for a four year pull."

I remember driving into Washington from Alexandria Monday morning, coming to the highway bridge out here that crosses the Potomac River, and finding it was guarded by soldiers. And coming on into town I saw that soldiers were beginning to appear in other places. Everybody was concerned, fearful of the bombing of Washington or something of the kind.

I can remember talks about if Washington should be attacked, if Washington should be bombed, what would we do, what would the people do. I can remember some saying, "Keep your gas tank full, so that if something should happen, you can get as far as possible." Of course from a personal standpoint, Mrs. Tolley and myself, the great concern was that we had three boys, all of military age. We thought about that of course, more than anything else.
The oldest one, Grant was rejected as 4F. He couldn't stand it - his other two brothers were in - and he joined UNRRA and went to Egypt for the duration. After Italy was liberated, he went back there with UNRRA. Our number two boy - he is another Howard - joined the Air Force. He was at the University of California as a student. He entered the university in 1939 and lived at the ATO House. Only a short time after Pearl Harbor we got a letter from him saying he'd decided that he wanted to join the Air Force Cadets. He was only nineteen years old and he'd have to have his parents' consent. So we marched down to the notary public's office and signed the papers and sent them back. He had quite a career in the European Theater, came out unharmed with the rank of Captain, the DFC and other medals. He went back to the university and graduated in 1946, I think.

Grant waited for the draft, but he was turned down, 4F. George, the youngest one, was still in high school. He waited for the draft and wasn't drafted until 1944. Anyway, he never went overseas. The group that he was with, his infantry regiment, went overseas just in time to get caught in the Battle of the Bulge, but he had been transferred from infantry to Engineer
Training School at Pennsylvania State College. It turned out that a group of them were being trained for atomic warfare, but the war was over before he got back in the line.

Back to the Department of Agriculture: Leon Henderson was head of this new Office of Price Administration, and Kenneth Galbraith, who is now a professor at Harvard, and who'd been a graduate student in agricultural economics at the University of California while I was there, came to be one of his assistants. They wanted somebody to head up their food and fiber division. So Leon called up Claude Wickard and said, "Look, Howard Tolley isn't doing much these days. How about letting him come over and help us for a while." Then Claude called me up at home at eight or nine o'clock in the evening. He told me Leon had called him and that Leon was going to call me, and then said that it would be alright - whatever we decided. Pretty soon the call came from Leon, and the next day I went over to see Leon. I simply arranged that I would go over to this new OPA for an indefinite period. I'd still be chief of BAE on paper, and OPA would reimburse the Department of Agriculture for my salary while I was over there.
I stayed three months. We did quite a little to get price controls moving during that period. I found myself back in association with a lot of people that I'd been closely associated with before. A series of commodities in which price controls were necessary or thought about at least were fruits and vegetables, and I found myself one day facing a group of my old friends from California, Florida, and Texas discussing the need for price controls on canned fruits and vegetables and dried fruits and fresh fruits and vegetables. Many of them were saying that, "Yes, we must have price controls. We mustn't have runaway inflation which we're likely to have. But no price controls for us, we don't need price controls." From down South in Florida, I remember Claude Pepper coming into my office saying, "We don't need price control on citrus fruits in Florida." I remember Harry Brown, assistant secretary of Agriculture at one time, who was then with the Farm Credit Administration in the South, coming to my office in the name of the cooperatives of the South, to convince me that price controls for fruits and vegetables weren't needed.

Another incident that I remember very distinctly
is Senator George D. Aiken of Vermont coming into my office to say that they didn't need price controls on Vermont maple syrup. I remember when the Senator came in - I knew him quite well of course - before we started our conversation, he said that he had to be at the Senate at twelve o'clock when it met, because some very important action was to be taken that day, and I think it was declaring war on Germany. Senator Aiken said, "My name comes first on the Senate roll; I'm going to be the first man to cast a vote for war with Germany."

Our job was to work out a system of price controls for agricultural commodities, all the way from the farm to the grocery store, which would be acceptable and enforceable and, at the same time, consistent with all the laws and regulations concerning agricultural parity, price supports, and so on. And, too, we had the problem of recruiting a staff in a time of great uncertainty.

We finally, as a first step in all OPA got up a regulation which we nicknamed "General Max." The name of it was General Maximum Price Regulation, and it covered everything. In effect, it was a freeze of prices at about where they were. That was a temporary order and after that every commodity or series of commodities was to be studied and ceiling prices worked out for each of them.
Then the question of rationing came up. There were long discussions and arguments throughout the government as to whether or not price controls could be effective without rationing. It was a simple economic concept that if prices were left alone and not controlled, they would rise to a place where supply and demand would be in balance. But if prices were controlled and held down, demand would be greater than supply and black markets and soon and so on would arise, and more importantly, without rationing, there would not be an equitable distribution among different classes of consumers. After many long arguments throughout the government, we decided that we must have rationing also. Then the whole problem of working out a scheme of rationing, commodity by commodity, clear across the food board and for all of the fibers and textiles and tobacco and so on faced us. But it was rushed through. Ration books were printed by the government printing office, rationing boards were set up all over the country, and so on, and rationing was put into effect. All of that was done in a period of two or three months from the time I joined OPA. Then OPA began to settle down for a long pull, to revise all their regulations, take care of
inequities here and there, and to get ready to enforce regulations, and so on.

I faced the decision: Do I stay here and fight out the war here or do I go back to the Department of Agriculture? And I decided to go back to the Department of Agriculture. I was quite happy over in OPA during that period. I don't know just why I decided not to stay. I remember having long talks about it with Leon. I was all for their program, and saw very much the need for price controls and rationing, but I guess I felt that this is just another temporary war agency and that they were going to have a terrible time. Leon took the position from the start, "Well, we're going to be the most unpopular people in the whole government."

Henderson had been in the Roosevelt New Deal administration in one capacity or another and in some of the emergency agencies that had been forerunners of OPA. He was a very understanding man. I'd call him a good economist who at the same time understands human nature and political forces quite well. There was nothing ivory tower about him at all. The man had the courage of his convictions. He used to kiddingly say, "My name
is Leon. That means lion. I'm not afraid." On the negative side, the one thing that I often disagreed with him on, was his uncompromising attitude. To make these things go in a democracy even in wartime, you have to give and take here and there, but he had an uncompromising attitude. He stayed on as administrator or OPA until he did become just about the most unpopular man in the USA. Ken Galbraith stayed with him. But one day FDR, I guess, told Leon that he would have to make a change, and so Leon wrote his resignation, saying that he was having trouble with his back.

I remarked about all these producers groups arguing that price control wasn't needed for their particular products. Also, we found ourselves in difficulty with the Quartermaster Corps of the army immediately. They felt that they shouldn't be subject to price controls. They felt that they had the job of supplying the armed forces, which were going to be very large, and they'd have to get all their supplies, food and clothing, and ammunition, tents, motor trucks, arms and everything just as quickly as possible. They felt that if they were subject to price controls there would be delays and they would have difficulties getting the manufacturers
of the United States to produce for them. We had quite a lot of arguments with the higher brass on that. This was one simplification of the military mind. The war was on and their job was to raise an army and train it, equip it and feed it. That was the job to be done, and everything else was subsidiary to it. In this particular instance and pretty much throughout the war, so far as I had anything to do with it, there was a unanimity among these military people on that point - the military is paramount and everything else is subsidiary.

I don't remember any particular contact with the White House at this time. I'd be there in general groups - OPA, OPM, Emergency War Council - but this was only cursory and only for a little while. Back in the earlier days, I had a lot of contacts with Harry Hopkins. During this period in the days when Harry Hopkins was living in the White House, I didn't have any more contact with him than with the other people in the White House. I wasn't seeing much of Henry Wallace during this period. I remember no significant contacts or conversations with him during that period. Frank McDougal, in 1942, was talking to him about a U.N. food committee. This was the background of the Hot Springs Conference.

On July 16, 1941 I was at a meeting with Frances
Perkins, Henry Wallace, Harold Smith, C. C. Stine, Thomas E. Blaisdell, Isador Lubin, A. F. Hendricks, Alvin Hanson, Richard, Ezekiel, E. A. Goldenweiser, and others, at the Federal Reserve Building, to consider the prospect of inflation. It was just another one of those meetings that exemplifies the concern of the administration over increasing pressures and mounting inflation. I can't remember that it was anything other than a talk-fest.

In 1941, it began to be apparent that our valiant effort to mobilize citizen participation, along with the participation of representatives of the Department of Agriculture, representatives of the land grant colleges, the cooperatives, extension service, and all the public servants in agriculture into one non-political group to help plan and administer agricultural programs made to fit all of the various conditions in the country and all of the varying types of farmers was not going to be accepted and was not going to work.

Sometime in that period, the Farm Bureau became vocal against land-use planning. I remember before they became vocal, one time I was talking to my friend Theodore Schultz, then professor of agricultural economics at Iowa
State College. He told me that he knew of the thinking and talking of the people in the Farm Bureau - that they probably would try to get Congress to kill the land-use planning effort by denying appropriations for it. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration never overtly took the same position, but aided and abetted all efforts to discredit the program. The stated reason of the Farm Bureau was that the farmers' organizations themselves should be the ones to decide policies and programs. But my opinion then, which has never changed, was that the leaders of the American Farm Bureau Federation feared that the state and county planning committees might someday become another national organization of farmers, which would displace the American Farm Bureau Federation as the leading spokesman for the farmers. As far as I was concerned, there was no reason for such fears.

All of us who had to do with this development from the time of the beginning of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration were striving to get some working partnership - non-political - between the citizens and the representatives of government. The planning program was carried on through the Farm Bureau as much
as through any farmers' organizations. In a county, where the Farm Bureau was organized, Farm Bureau members would be influential members in the county planning committee. But the Farm Bureau leaders had not forgotten the history of this organization and how it came into being as a result of government activity - the establishment of the Agricultural Extension Service. Their strength in 1942 and even in 1952 depended to a considerable extent on their continued tie-up with the agricultural colleges and the extension services.

Of course, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and its farmer committees all over the country, saw in the planning committees a competitive organization. During this period too, the agricultural adjustment committees - conservation committees we call them - in the states and counties, had engaged rather overtly in partisan political activities. That was one of the things which led, as I've said before, to the passage of the Hatch Act. It was one of the things that bothered Claude Wickard greatly during his incumbency. The old fundamental agrarianism may have been responsible for some of the opposition to our programs. In all agricultural program planning, we were trying to give
attention to levels of food consumption, trying to see that small farmers and low-income farmers and their problems received consideration. We were often paying particular attention to localities or communities where land was poor and farms were small and incomes low and so on. So there may have been some of that in the background - there no doubt was as far as some of the people in the Farm Bureau were concerned. We knew that the Farm Bureau was trying to kill the program and we made efforts to combat it at every opportunity, to no avail.

Well, it came to an end by a little clause in the appropriations bill in this year, which simply said about the appropriations for the Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics "— provided that none of these funds may be used for county land use planning."
The leader on the Senate side on the appropriations committee, the man who carried the ball against us, was Senator John Bankhead. I believe he was listening to the Alabama Farm Bureau Federation. Marvin Jones was out by then. On the House side, was Congressman from Georgia, Judge Malcom C. Tarver. Tarver was chairman of the sub-committee on appropriations for the Department
of Agriculture. Bankhead was a member of the Senate committee on appropriations for the Department of Agriculture. I remember quite well the way those two men carried the ball for the opposition.

The killing of that program was to me (of course, I was directly involved in it) a quite significant incident in the political development of the United States. This must have been in the spring of 1943. I don't think the war was a real factor. There was lots of interest in the program in many places throughout the country. Farmer participation was growing and the whole movement was beginning to make its influence felt. But I can't put my finger on particular significant programs and policies or changes in programs and policies that were the direct result of this planning effort.

I don't remember that the question of its being a needless expenditure in time of war was brought up. That would have been a very potent argument. The Grange was silent on it. The Farmers Union was very much for us. I think about that time was the beginning of my friendship with Jim Patton, the present head of the Farmers Union. I don't remember that Wallace took any
position at all. There was lack of interest and support within the administration and within the Department of Agriculture. Wickard acquiesced. It was therefore due to lack of support within the Department of Agriculture and within the administration and the antagonism of those two well organized groups - the Farm Bureau Federation and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

There is a point here that I'm not clear on. I've never been clear in my mind about the attitude of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration group after I left and went to the BAE. I've never been clear about their attitude toward this fellow named Tolley. That attitude might very well have been the cause of the antagonism of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration group toward land-use planning. That group might be made up of Spike Evans, Ed Dodd, Gully Cobb and his successor, and many, many others whom I could name. I later had an experience with Ed Dodd in FAO which convinced me that there was a real hangover with him from those days.

That brings us to the spring of 1943. My program was pretty well down the drain. Internally, within BAE there was the problem of cutting down. A hundred or so real carefully selected forward-looking men, most of them
young, on the make, had joined up in Washington and in
the states and in the regions in this effort of
comprehensive and cooperative planning and program
making. I had the job of terminating all of them quickly.
I managed to keep a few of them by sticking them in one
place or another. Bushrod Allin, who had been head of
State and Local Planning stayed on. Harold Vogel
stayed on, and I was associated with him for a long
time thereafter. Dennis A. Fitzgerald left. I still
meet people, many of whom I don't remember any more
who say I was at County Winniken, or in Texas, or in
Nebraska or Colorado or Virginia, in land-use planning.
There are many vestiges still in existence. Some of
the states are carrying on much the same thing under
another name, sometimes under the aegis of the Extension
Service and the county agents.

After I got through laying off these hundred fine
young people and reorganizing the Bureau some and it was
beginning to settle back into a fact-finding, semi-ivory-
tower research organization, I found myself pretty much
frustrated. In August 1942, I had become interested
in the U.N. Food Committee. On January 18, 1943, Senator
Harry S. Truman asked whom he might consult in the
Department of Agriculture concerning manpower, and I went to see him. I don't remember a great deal about what transpired or what I promised to do. He was looking for information and I agreed to get together information for him, and so on. The impression I had at the time— it was the first time I'd met the Senator and of course this was all in connection with his investigating committee—and have always remembered was that he was a nice and friendly man. He was quite approachable and easy to talk to. Manpower, of course, was scarce and they were investigating use of manpower on farms and in factories as well as in the armed forces. What were the manpower needs of agriculture? That was the question he was asked. I don't remember that there was any crisis involved.

On March 29, 1943, Claude Wickard was still Secretary of Agriculture when Chester Davis was appointed War Food Administrator. Of course, we had all these new agencies such as OPA, OPM. By that time, the food problem had become quite acute. There were scarcities of some foods in this country and more and more calls were coming from allies in Europe for help on the food front. So the War Food Administration was set up by the
President. I don't know the background of just how and why. Probably Harry Hopkins had something to do with it. The War Food Administrator was to be independent of the Department of Agriculture and in rank equal with the Secretary of Agriculture. But the office of War Food Administration was established in the Department of Agriculture and the War Food Administrator was to use the facilities and services of the Department of Agriculture. His job was to plan production, storage, distribution, and so forth for food.

Chester Davis came in from St. Louis to be head of it. He was president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. He was here only about three months, I believe. Jess Tapp came in to be his assistant. I didn't have a great deal to do with the official activities of the War Food Administration, either during that period or during Marvin Jones's incumbency. The War Food Administrator's dealings were primarily with the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Surplus Commodities Corporation, insofar as it was still in existence, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, with the armed forces, with the Combined Food Board, which tried to get together and allocate food to the different allied countries.
Officially in those days, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics was just a fact finding agency and provided the statistics, and when that was done, our job was done officially.

Well, when Chester came in I saw him of course, greeted him and talked to him, and exchanged ideas. He didn't know what this job was going to develop into. He was still president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and he thought that was where he was going to finish his career. He wouldn't think of leaving that for a government job in Washington. I believe that Roosevelt himself induced Chester Davis to become War Food Administrator.

After a couple of months, I found that Chester was very unhappy. He was using the phrase, "responsibility without authority." He and his group were supposed to handle this whole food problem - for civilian United States, armed forces, and the allies, insofar as the United States part of it was concerned. But production and marketing were all in the Department of Agriculture, over which he didn't have any authority. Price controls and rationing were in another agency, over which he had no authority. He had no authority over the food purchases
for the armed forces. On the international front he or his representatives was just simply a member of the Combined Food Board. He had no authority to give orders and no way to carry out his recommendations or decisions.

As to how he and Wickard got along, their offices were near each other in the same hall. They saw each other and exchanged the time of day and talked about the problems. I never knew of any open hostility, but there was just not a real teaming up and working together. It was very strange to put a man in with equal rank with the Secretary. I don't know whether that was Roosevelt's idea or Harry Hopkins's or Henry Wallace's or somebody else's, but Roosevelt did many things like that. Of course, it was done in recognition of the weakness of Claude Wickard.

In June Chester had had just all he could take. He wrote his letter of resignation to FDR on June 28, 1943 and got on the train, I guess, and went back to St. Louis. Maybe he carried his letter of resignation over and handed it to the President, but I don't know that he did.

When the War Food Administration was created, the legal status of the Extension Service was unchanged, but
its status in the Department was changed - it lost. That was just one of many things that happened. The War Food Administrator was coordinate with the Secretary of Agriculture. The cooperative Extension Service had by that time become a carrier of the message of food needs, food programs, and so on. But when the War Food Administrator came, he and his people became carriers of the message. I don't remember now exactly what happened with respect to the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and its associated agencies - Commodities Credit Corporation, etc. They were given the primary job of being the carrier of the message to the farm people - rather a pushing aside of the Extension Service.

I don't know whether Paul Appleby had anything to do with the establishment of the War Food Administration. He knew, as many others did, that the Department under Claude's leadership just wasn't meeting the food problems brought on by the war. And Paul had entree to the Budget Bureau and through it to Harry Hopkins and others at the White House.

Bill Jump would have known about the establishment of the War Food Administration before it was announced, but he wasn't an originator of things like this at all.
I never did know whether Chester was consulted about the organization at the time it was being decided upon, before he was asked to become War Food Administrator. In my opinion, he would not have come had he known how it was to be organized. He was unable to really get it swinging in the way that he thought he would be able to when he came. So he just wrote his letter and put on his hat and went home.

This organization was a two-headed monster and really the War Food Administrator, as Chester said, had the responsibility without the authority. People like Chester just couldn't stay in such a job and keep their self-respect. Marvin Jones was of different mental make-up. He would try longer and harder, and indirectly - not deviously, but in indirect ways - to get things done in a way that Chester wouldn't.

It was an attempt to remedy the situation without removing the Secretary. I think that was the heart of it - to by-pass Wickard. As to removing Wickard, FDR just didn't do that kind of thing. That was one of the first things Harry Truman did, very shortly after he became President.

In 1942 and 1943, as regards the urban liberals
and the agrarian liberals, there was still a group in
the Farm Security Administration and a few in other
places, but most of them had dropped out and gone
elsewhere. The war came along and we were in it. From
whatever motives, most people felt that they wanted an
active part in something. People weren't searching
for security and tenure in those days, especially this
group. Of people in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics,
I remember two whom I guess you can class as agrarian
liberals – Russell Smith and Jack Fleming. Jack Fleming
had been in the Department of Agriculture in the
information division way back before the New Deal. He'd
been a personal helper of Henry Wallace in the early
days and worked closely with Rex Tugwell. In 1938 he
came into the Bureau of Agricultural Economics as an
assistant chief – one of four or five – to help on
popularizing this planning idea and concept and getting
it understood. I think he had enjoyed himself and
felt that he was making a contribution, until the war
came along, and of course agricultural planning folded up.

Jack came in one day and said, "Look, I just can't
enjoy myself. It's no fun being around here any more.
We aren't able to do anything that I really enjoy, and
I'm going to look for another job where I can feel like I'm doing something worthwhile." And pretty soon he was over in the Office of War Information with Elmer Davis. Russell Smith, was head of the Division of Information of the BAE. He was the son of a small town newspaperman in Georgia. He, Russell, had been on the staff of the Washington Post and had come into the Department of Agriculture in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Well, at about the same time, Jack Fleming made his decision to leave, Russ approached me in an embarrassed sort of manner, to say much the same thing. There hadn't been any collusion between these two people. And pretty soon he was over in BSW (Board of Economic Warfare) with Henry Wallace and Milo Perkins. I think those are just two instances of what was happening in a good many places.

Liberals of this sort were likely to be found during the war in BSW, OPA quite a lot, and in the OWI (Office of War Information). I characterize Elmer Davis as a very good liberal, but in that job, my impression was that he tried to be just an impartial administrator. I remember Dr. Will (Alexander) and I talked some time along in this period. We agreed that the Farm Security
Administration program was going to be neglected and there wasn't going to be much interest in it. He didn't feel that as administrator he could make much more, if any, contribution to the lasting welfare of the low-income rural people of the South and other parts of the United States. Not long after that, I forget the date, he just resigned and returned to the Rosenwald Foundation.

Before that time, I think most of the liberals in the legal group had left. Bob Shields had become Solicitor and none of the old urban liberals that I can remember remained.

I went to BAE in October, 1938. At that time, Wickard was still head of the North Central Division of the Triple-A. He had been there all this time doing a very good job in what was probably the toughest division in the Triple-A. I always felt that he understood the farming and adjustment problems of the farmers of that region very well and that he had their confidence. His program proposals were always understandable, both to Washington and to the farmers out in the country. His efforts to carry out whatever programs were agreed on showed him to be very conscientious about the whole thing.
I have already spoken of land-use planning, but I would like to add this: land-use planning was laid out as one of the functions of this new BAE, while I was sitting over in AAA, unconscious of all of it. This newly organized BAE was to continue with economic fact-finding and economic research, and in addition, was to be the central planning agency for the Secretary's office and the Department to synthesize insofar as possible - or to make suggestions for synthesizing - the program of the Triple-A and the SCS, the Forest Service, the Farm Security Administration, and so on. Presumably, it was not an operating agency and one not willing to push one thing at the expense of another. It was to be a group that would take an overall look.

Well, when I was reassigned to BAE, the functions of this BAE had already been laid out by this group around the Secretary's office. They had said, "Here, Howard, we want you to come over here and run this." No doubt the Secretary had some ideas about it. Land-use planning was one of the functions which the group in the Secretary's office laid out.

I thought that Henry Wallace felt the need for something like this. M. L. Wilson, who was Under Secretary
at the time, had always been very much for some synthesizing and integrating, and for getting the feelings, ideas, and desires of farm people themselves considered in making agricultural programs. There was Milton Eisenhower, who had been Land-Use Coordinator - I would say that that office dated back to 1935, but I don't know whose idea that office was. I couldn't say whether Wallace had the first idea, or whether Rex Tugwell, M. L. Wilson, or Milton Eisenhower did.

To return to the functions of the reorganized BAE, I never did know what group the Secretary had finally depended upon there. Al Black was one, I know, in that period. He had been chief of BAE and later went over to another job. BAE, under his stewardship, had functions in some respects quite different from these functions that were given to it when I went in.

Because of the agencies with which land-use planning dealt, and because policy and formation of policy is a hard thing to get a hold of, it was difficult for land-use to put itself into an overall position. But in that year or two or three there, we tried to play a strategic role.
Actually land-use planning and county planning are synonymous terms. On land-use planning and county planning, we had — and when I say we, I mean the group I mentioned, those who moved closely around me in BAE — a firm conviction that these national programs for the betterment of agriculture had to be grounded upon the needs and desires of the farm people, their opinions and their attitude, and their willingness or their unwillingness to make changes and make adjustments. During the five years that had been rolled on since 1933, there had been more and more of a tendency to sit down in Washington and write the rules and regulations for every program. The Extension Service was an exception but its influence was not very great.

There were people in Triple-A — the ones I remember were primarily in Washington, but there were no doubt some in the field also, maybe more of the old field people — who felt that the Agricultural Adjustment Administration by itself, on its own, was going to develop, organize and administer the programs that would put agriculture in the place where it should be, that everything else was off on the side and more or less unimportant.
Fellows like Harry Sbooler felt this way, and Ed Dodd was also one of them – he had started out as a field man out in Oregon. Cully Cobb had left, but he would have had the same feeling. Wayne Darrow was another one of them – he was sort of in between Washington and the field. I don't believe I would put Reuben Brigham in this group. As I have said, I don't remember ever talking to Claude or getting any expression from Claude about it, but I imagine he felt the same way.

In my relationship with Wickard, I was conscious of the feeling of the carryover of the student-teacher relationship a good many times. I remember specific instances where I felt that Claude was still looking at me just a little bit like his old high school teacher with him as the student. We never reminded each other verbally of it, except on jovial occasions and when we first met. After we got going and worked together, there was no mention of it. But I always had the feeling that Claude would maybe not express himself fully to me because of that. I felt that if I really spoke out firmly, not with the intention of slapping a man down, but for the purpose of focusing attention on an issue, Claude wouldn't come back, like many other people.
I don't remember Claude too much as a student. It's been too long. As a matter of fact, our relationships at Delphi were only for one semester, when he was a senior in high school. I was a senior at the university. I went up to Delphi for the second semester - something had happened to the science teacher up there - and postponed my graduation from the university until the summer. I went back and finished my studies during the summer session.

I remember seeing Claude in my class. I don't remember that he was particularly athletic, or took part in athletics. He might have, but I don't remember. Earnestness is the thing that I remember about him - earnestness and seriousness. He was serious in class, and worked hard; it wasn't too easy for him. A good proportion of the high school students in Delphi consisted of boys and girls from the country. Having come from the country, I can say that the boys and girls from the country were different from the boys and girls who had gone to grammar school in town. It would be hard to explain how they were different. Most of them were more serious, on the surface at least, than the town kids. As a group, they weren't exactly the school leaders
in extra-curricular activities, and so on. I remember
Claude as sort of the personification of the high school
boy from the country—just a little bit retiring and
subdued when the town boys and girls were with him. He
was serious, wanting to do the right thing, wanting
to have his lessons. He was honest, serious, a hard-
working boy—that would be a pretty good characteriza-
tion of him—a good "B" student.

I guess it began to become apparent that I was
taking on a Farm Security tinge soon after I moved over
into BAE. But you could find people who would tell you
that I had that inclination in 1933. For example, when
I was just starting in the Planning Division of the
Triple-A, I was one of those who insisted that the
sharecroppers of the South should have a fair share of
the benefits that were coming out of the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration. Along in my BAE days, as I
look back now, I see that Triple-A, the Farm Bureau and
others began to be obstreperous and vociferous and did
not want any more to do with land-use planning, and
BAE as the central planning agency of the Department of
Agriculture. But the Farm Security people wanted it to
so continue to be, and they were our friends, almost the
only friends we had for awhile.

The question is raised as to who in the Secretary's office in 1939 would be considered Farm Security minded. At that time, M. L. Nelson moved out to the Extension Service. Paul Appleby was still there. Milo Perkins was over in Surplus Commodities. Beanie Baldwin was in Farm Security. Jim McCamy and Jim LeCron were in the Secretary's office. Spike Evans was over in Triple-A.

Paul Appleby, in his pseudo-judicious way, was a friend of Farm Security in the Secretary's office. He was also a friend of land-use planning, in principle, very much. As to his relations with Milton Eisenhower, I wouldn't say that there was a break there, but there was a lack of working together the way they had in the early days. Jim McCamy was, I'm sure, friendly toward the Farm Security effort, although that wasn't exactly his field of activity. The same thing was more or less true about Jim LeCron. Milo Perkins was very much a friend of Farm Security in those days, even when he moved over to Surplus Commodities. Of course, he changed entirely later.

To return to Wickard's appointment as Under Secretary of Agriculture in February, 1940, I don't remember that
I knew he was going to be appointed until he was - I guess I was surprised that Henry Wallace picked out Claude Wickard to be his Under Secretary. I finally rationalized it in my own mind, as I have stated earlier, that Henry had decided that he wanted a real farmer - a man who had a real farmer's way of thinking, farmer's instincts - to be his Under Secretary. In addition, Wickard was from the Middle West, which was then and still is a tough place politically. I felt the appointment was heavily tinged politically.

I didn't think of Wickard as a farm politician in the ordinary sense of the word, but as a farmer who had been to Washington, who had political thoughts, ideas and instincts of his own, and who understood the political currents among the farm people and the farm leaders of the Middle West, and who, in this position, would help Henry Wallace to enhance his prestige with that group.

I knew that Wickard had served in the Indiana State legislature, but I didn't know very much about what his political ties were in Indiana or with the national Democratic party. He and I always talked about politics in a general way. In the 1936 campaign, we were all doing
what we could. But Hickard didn’t talk about politics any more than a good many others did. For example, those of us who were in the Triple-A, or the Wayne Darrow group.

I didn’t know that his ties with Indiana were completely severed in 1934 or that he was driven out by McNutt, and forced to resign from the State senate. All I remember now is that I thought or was told that Claude voluntarily dropped out of the Indiana legislature because he was staying on in Washington. I knew that he had been a Democratic member of the state legislature. As for the definition of him as a politician, I would say that he was one in the sense of being politically oriented toward a party and understanding political trends, currents and so on, and tuning himself to them.

Claude had been a Democrat before he became a member of the Indiana State legislature, and so it didn’t involve a change from one party to another, as it did for Henry Wallace, who had been a Republican until shortly before the Roosevelt days. But I think Claude put the welfare of farmers and the farm program first, and the Democratic party second. If these were
1940 and he stood here now talking to me and saying, "Howard, I hate politics. I don't like any part of it. I don't want anything to do with it." I would feel that he would be speaking honestly, but I would think that he hadn't examined himself very much before he made that statement.

It had been called to my attention that in March, 1940 Wallace appointed the Rural Human Welfare Committee - I was on the committee. I don't remember the first meeting of the committee, although I have in my hand the notes of this particular meeting. [Notes of the Meeting of Rural Human Welfare Committee, April 11, 1940, Wickard Documents] The three questions that were set up in the meeting sound very familiar. They were: an opportunity through reforestation and so forth to give low-income farmers an opportunity to acquire some cash income; also, there was the question of whether the federal government should set aside reclamation land for dispossessed farm people, and whether it would be feasible to have a cooperative enterprise composed of small farm units. On May 21, there was a statement from the Rural Human Welfare Committee on what the Bureau could do to help farmers in the low income
group. There is another statement from the committee on June 13 in regard to what the Soil Conservation Service could do.

This would have been a focusing on a particular problem. While there were many problems in land-use planning and county planning and general overall planning, this was one of the particular problems therein. Low-income farmers were still very much the concern of the Department of Agriculture and of Henry Wallace himself. Times were going a little better; the farm income at this time in general was up from where it had been. The ordinary family farmer, as distinguished from the low-income farmer, had a better income and lived better. There was somewhat of a tendency to forget or push aside this real low-income group - people on small farms, tenants on small farms, owners or tenants on poor farms, and so on. This committee, as I remember it hazily, was an effort to get programs for these people back near the center of the picture. No doubt some people looked upon it as an effort to strengthen the Farm Security Administration at the expense of somebody else - not at the expense of land-use planning, but at the expense of the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration, Agricultural Extension Service, and perhaps the Soil Conservation Service as well, to a certain extent.

The question has been raised as to why Milton Eisenhower dynamited this Rural Human Welfare Committee, if that in essence is what he did do. This might have belonged properly under land-use planning, but there's no reason why it should have been dynamited because it belonged under land-use planning. All this land-use planning and central program making had to finally get down to specifics, not just a bunch of great generalities, if it was going to have any influence and if anything was ever going to come out of it. I don't really understand Eisenhower's antagonism toward the committee. At that time antagonism between the Soil Conservation Service and the Extension Service was becoming rampant. It might very well be that this was just a reflection of Milt's wanting to stay in with what he thought was a majority faction in and out of the Department of Agriculture.

But I can't remember this Rural Human Welfare Committee otherwise. I know that Wickard was appointed chairman of it by Wallace. Meetings were held over in
old committee room on the second floor of the Administration Building, with Claude in the chair and all of us around - I remember that much, but I just don't remember any specific instances.

I had some contact with Paul Appleby back in the days when Wickard was Under Secretary. My guess as to what Appleby thought of Wickard as Under Secretary is that Paul thought Claude was a man who needed a lot of help, guidance and suggestions in that job. Paul would have been making suggestions and trying to guide Claude in the direction that he, Paul, wanted Claude to go. That's rather characteristic of Paul. I think Paul felt that Claude was not the strongest man in the world, that he wouldn't necessarily see all sides of the question, wouldn't realize the results of decisions he might make and so on, although I have the feeling now that Claude didn't make many major decisions on programs or policies for the Department of Agriculture while he was Under Secretary of Agriculture. He was advisor and councillor to Henry Wallace, and that was about all.

Paul, Spike, and so on would come up to Henry with thoughts and ideas about policy and programs, or with
propositions which had been put to them, and they would all get to Henry's desk. Henry, I'm sure, saw Claude and they talked, as Henry and Claude would, about the decisions to be made by Henry.

There were a number of people who could have been chosen for the position of Under Secretary in February of 1940. Besides Spike Evans and myself, in the agricultural hierarchy at that time, Henry had the lists of all the chairmen of the state Triple-A committees, of all the directors of Extension, directors of experiment stations, and so on, not to mention the leaders in the Farm Bureau, Farmers' Union, and other places from which to choose. I'm sure there were other places and other people. I can't say whether Wickard was one of the top three or four or five people being considered for the job, but as I said earlier, I was just surprised. I myself can't remember ever thinking that I wanted that job. That fact that I would have had to succeed M. L. Wilson would have bothered me. I would have felt obligated to carry on and push for and try to do the things that M. L. had tried to do. I suspect that Wickard never gave that a thought. I believe that my feeling on that score is accounted for by my long, close association with M. L.
But Claude and M. L. weren't buddies, they hadn't been close together on the team, and I think the fact that Wickard was going to replace M. L. just never bothered Claude.

I think that I could have worked with Paul Appleby in the post of Under Secretary; I don't think Paul would have doublecrossed me. I don't think I would have gotten to the place where I couldn't have talked to Paul. Thinking back to my association with Paul during all that time, I can't remember any time in any of the positions I was in when I just couldn't work with Paul. We would have things that we wouldn't agree on, and we would understand that we didn't agree on them. If it was something for the Secretary to decide, it went to the Secretary. If it was something for Paul to decide, why, he decided. I might not agree, but he had his order to make that decision, and the same thing held true for me. That's the sort of atmosphere that prevailed in the Department as I remember it, and I don't think it would have been much different had I been in some other position.

After the election was over, Wickard was named to succeed Wallace. That was something of a surprise
again at first. I wouldn't know how to say whether anybody is capable of handling a job, especially a Cabinet position. I don't think Wickard was the strongest man that could have been found to take that position.

The choices to fill the post of Secretary were not so wide as they had been for the post of Under Secretary. There were some Congressmen and Senators mentioned—Marvin Jones, Clinton P. Anderson, who later moved out of the House of Representatives to become Secretary. Spike Evans was proposed, as was Jack Hutson. Chester Davis was also mentioned, but that was impossible. I suppose Wickard was also placed on the list of probables since he was Under Secretary and a faithful servant and all of that.

At the time of Wickard's appointment, I think the verdict was, "Well, we'll wait and see. Maybe he has more than we think he has." I'm thinking now about some of us around the Department, but I don't remember other people specifically. Paul Appleby would have been one of them—M. L. would have been another. The general feeling was, "Well, Claude's Secretary and he's a good fellow. We've got to help him all we can. Come on, let's go." But I don't believe I ever knew that there were any
inside deals in Paul Appleby's becoming Under Secretary and Wickard's becoming Secretary - I don't ever remember it being so.

After Wickard became Secretary, in general I think I had the feeling that Claude was not sure of himself, that he was somewhat afraid, and that he didn't act boldly, that he was subject to pressures, so that decisions were not forthright decisions by the Secretary of Agriculture in many cases. I remember Claude's decision to fire Edward Crockett, the old colored messenger, and my thinking that, "Well, that wasn't a statesmanlike action."

I would say that apparently, those who weren't on the inside thought the tendency for Wickard to appear weaker as time went on might have been just the accumulation of lack of decision and hesitancy and concern about Edward and who was to be head of PEA and so on. On the surface it appeared that there was a sort of progressive deterioration here. I think my own feeling is that it was just a piling up of lack of decisions, and so on.

I remember a feeling that I had about Claude's attitude toward me, which may have been toward me only, or may have been general. Many times when Claude was
Secretary and I had gone into his office, I had the feeling that Claude would sort of flinch when the door opened and I came in - you could see it in his eyes - "Well, here's somebody else with something unpleasant."

There was always the question in my mind as to whether the fact that I had been Claude's schoolteacher once had something to do with that. I remember that I used to think: "Don't go in there and act like Claude's old schoolteacher. He's the Secretary of Agriculture." I wouldn't characterize Claude as a coward at all, but I would ascribe this attitude of his to fear, or something akin to it.

I remember Jim Patton of the Farmers' Union talking to me about Claude and his attitude. I'm quite sure in my own mind that even at that time Jim Patton was being somewhat of a bully to Claude.

As I remember it, there was no very close relationship between Wickard and Wallace after Wickard became Secretary and Wallace became Vice President. I never had the feeling that Henry was telling Claude what to do at all. I had the feeling that Claude continued to have great admiration and respect for Henry while he was Vice President. I don't remember that I ever heard of
any disagreement between them.

The relationship between Wickard and Appleby was rather a difficult one after Wickard became Secretary. I have the feeling that Claude tended to turn to people other than Paul, maybe to an increasing extent, for advice and counsel. He would turn to the old Triple-A group, and people like that. Paul didn't have too much influence on things. I can remember that Paul and I talked about the situation, and how Paul was looking around for something else.

There was one thing, I know, that Paul did. Claude wasn't particularly interested in the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, international affairs in general, or what the world was going to be like after the war. He was interested in what the farmers were going to be like, yes. Paul had a lot to do with FAO. It was through Paul's influence or Paul's suggestion that I got into the Hot Springs Conference, that I got on the interim commission of FAO, and so on. Paul and I understood each other perfectly about that. I wasn't as close to Paul in 1940 and 1941, however, as I was in 1943 or 1944. At that time, I think I would be thought of in the Department as being close to Paul, but I don't
think that would apply for the earlier period.

The question has been raised as to whether I felt that I had the Secretary's trust in 1940 and 1941, when he first came into office. Let me put my answer this way: As I remember, I didn't think that Claude was completely candid or that he trusted any of the old group around there except some of the boys who had worked with him way back yonder on the Triple-A business - Harry Schooler and Wayne Darrow and some of the others that I can't remember now. But on the other hand, I never felt that Claude distrusted me.

I don't remember too much about the relationship between Beanie Baldwin and Wickard in the early days of his administration. The bulwark of the Farm Security Administration, Beanie Baldwin, Pete Hudgens and company, used to have sessions with Jim Patton and his people. Jim Patton would talk to Claude and would make suggestions and recommendations and so on, but the personal relationship between Beanie and Claude I imagine were somewhat the same as those between Claude and me. If I had something to be reported or decided upon, I would go and see Claude. Claude did, at times, ask me to do something that was in the line of duty, and
the same thing was probably true of Beanie.

Wickard and Milton Eisenhower weren’t kindred spirits either, and I think the same was true of the Secretary’s relationship with Milo Perkins. In regard to the situation between Claude and Spike Evans, as far as general philosophy was concerned and general talks, I’m sure that Spike would have been in the old Triple-A group that Claude was turning to all the time with problems about the farm program and agrarian politics. I’m sure that Claude and Spike would have talked things over. They would not have been as close as the old crowd that had been with Claude in the north central division, however.

It may have been that Claude, in turning his back on the whole Wallace group, was turning to people that he could more or less treat as cronies to help him. There was probably a considerable amount of what I have called the “fear complex” before. As far as I was concerned, Wickard was just not sure of himself when I would be talking to him, or would make a remark or suggestion. He was just not sure of himself, and so he would turn to people in the nature of cronies or old buddies, or people that he had gone through battles with.
in the early days. I never thought it was a deliberate
turning away from the Henry Wallace group or from
Wallace himself. Maybe, away down underneath, it was
this thing that I have characterized before as fundamental
agrarianism. Claude was one of the fundamental agrarians —
when things really get tough, and you don't feel sure
of yourself, "deep laid instincts" come to govern you.
This fundamental agrarianism being very strong in
Claude's make-up, he turned to others for comfort, advice
and assistance — Sam Bledsoe, T. Roy Reid, Shields,
Hamilton, Fred Wallace, and Townsend. Fred Wallace was
an agrarian fundamentalist, but none of the rest of them
were; Sam might pretend to be one when he was talking to
Claude. Claude had gotten acquainted with T. Roy Reid
and Lyle Watts after he joined the Department of Agriculture.
They had treated him well, and he liked them. T. Roy Reid
didn't work out, but Lyle Watts did. T. Roy was never
anything like a crony to Wickard, and I don't remember
that Lyle was either, not in the sense that the old
Triple-A boys were. These people that Claude chose to
place around him were people who had met Claude and had
been nice to him and treated him with respect. I'm
afraid I can't give a more rational explanation of why
Claude chose these people.

To return to the documents, I have a letter from the Secretary sent to me (Fickard to Tolley, September 11, 1940, National Archives, Secretary's Files, Box 250) in which he asks me to consider a production program in view of the production, processing and distribution of food, saying that he felt that these eventualities might arise as a result of unsettled world conditions. He refers to the Agricultural Advisory Council and the setting up of a committee of Spike Evans, Carl Robbins, Claude Kitchan, Milo Perkins and Jim McCamy, asking Chester Davis to designate George Livingston of the National Defense Commission. Again, I don't have much remembrance of that.

The following document (McCamy to Jump, Tolley et al., October 1, 1940, National Archives, Secretary's Files, Box 250) discusses the relationship of Chester Davis's advisory commission to the Council for National Defense and the Department of Agriculture. The advisory commission was divided up into several parts; the agricultural part was headed by Chester Davis. Claude would have been very conscious of this. Here was something that ought to be done in the Department of Agriculture.
being set up elsewhere. He could have thought, "FDR doesn't trust me," or "Chester Davis is trying to get back into the picture at my expense. We've got to work this together. We've got all the information." You see, this group named here were the people who knew all about the present agricultural situation, and the prospective agricultural situation, production, and so on. I don't remember any particular meeting of the group or what we did. I imagine that we got up a bunch of tables and figures on the present production and present supplies and something about prospective supplies. By this time, food needs in England and Europe were coming up, and the question was what would we have to spare of what things and how much.

Some of this group around Claude - not so much this particular group right here that I mentioned, this committee - were the people who remember the terribly low prices of the '30s and the surpluses and so on. Even at that time, there were pretty good sized stocks of wheat, cotton, and maybe corn, and so there was a fear of surpluses which held back the advocates of increased production. I think Wickard had that fear of surpluses
very much. You just don't overcome that fear easily.

It wasn't the quantities of this stuff in the warehouses that he was worried about; it was the price. As I remember back, it was not until things got to the place where these surpluses physically began to move out that Congress got around to passing the Steagall Amendment. But in December of 1940, Wickard had called for an increase in hog production and at the same time had announced the price on hogs as sixteen dollars and a half a hundred. I think I remember that Claude felt this was a good and satisfactory price for hogs, and that there was no call for increased production as long as prices were below that point.

There is a document in regard to that statement by Secretary Wickard [Department of Agriculture Press Release, December 26, 1940, Wickard Documents]. He says that the reduction in supplies with the prospective pig crop of 1941 and the increased consumer income are expected to result in considerably higher prices in that year. At the same time of this press release, or shortly thereafter, there was the announcement about the fixed price, although it has been called to my attention that the fixed price announcement came in April of 1941. In
this press release, Wickard advances the theory that farmers will profit more if in the months ahead they increase the number of pigs raised and send more cattle to market. That would be Wickard’s way of calling for increased production — it was a mild, very mild sort of way, protecting the agrarian viewpoint in saying that the farmers would make more profit if they did that.

On November 28, McCamy sent a communication to Means [McCamy to Means, November 28, 1940, National Archives, Meetings, Box 125] saying that corn owned by the Commodity Credit Corporation can’t be released until the price goes up. The real factor was the feeling of the farmers that the defense program was helping labor and capital but not the farmers. Claude there, you see, was really tooting the horn for the farmers. True, as I remember it, the defense program was helping labor. Laborers were getting good jobs at higher wages. The defense was helping capital too, but crop prices at that time were still considerably below parity.

I see our old friend the hog cycle mentioned. The hog cycle is always hard on farmers. They always went too far in overproducing on the up side and underproducing on the down side.
The Wickard plan was a document that I was not acquainted with - I have never seen it before - but it brings a good many things to mind. One of the first things is this "fighting frequently, and fighting each other." Claude was very sensitive about disagreements or lack of agreements with people who came to him to pressure him into one action or another. He's made a note of that here, I see. But he said, as Claude would, that it was necessary for a member of the Cabinet to conform to the general policy of the President. Then he goes on in this document to speak of aid to the British, which meant, of course, more food - the British were pressing us for it.

I now have a feeling that Claude became sold on producing and distributing food for war needs really and completely along in the summer of 1941, with his production goals effort. At the time of the announcement of his plan in February of 1941, I think there was considerable reluctance and uncertainty as to whether or not this would be to the interest of farmers and as to the extent to which it would increase farm income - fundamental agrarianism was still there. That was always
near the front of Wickard's thinking. As to whether it would override what the President presented to him in the Cabinet meetings, I think Wickard would feel, "Here's the way the President feels; I must conform to that, because he's the boss, but I'm afraid the price of hogs will go down," or "I'm afraid farmer's incomes won't be as good this year as they were last year." Still, he would go on with the President's proposal.

I think the Triple-A was dragging its feet, if I may use the expression, in regard to this increased production angle, probably more than Claude personally was. They had been fighting surpluses there for a decade, and all their thinking and all their programs were oriented against surpluses. In the couple of years just before 1941, stocks had piled up and the Ever-Normal Granary was running over. I felt sure, all during this time, that the Triple-A people, both in Washington and in the field, were primarily worried and dragging their feet about general increases in production.

As I have said before, the December, 1940, hog announcement was nothing more than a routine thing - a thing like that might have been put out any time - as distinguished from the April 3, 1941 announcement, which
did represent an awareness on Wickard's part of the war that was coming up. It is probably a good way to put it to say that in those three months Wickard had gotten the word in regard to increased production. There was a press release about this announcement [Department of Agriculture Press Release, April 3, 1941, Wickard Documents] saying that the Department was announcing a program of increased supplies of some foods, made on that date. After the Department of Agriculture's and Wickard's statement here, there is the statement of Commissioners Henderson and Elliott supporting the announcement which indicates that probably it was more than just support, that there had been pressure from Chester Davis's advisory commission and Henderson. Then the release says that the new food program had been worked out after a consultation with their offices and that it had their approval as a price and supply stabilization measure, which is an easy way, I think, of stating what really happened.

I don't know that I would use the word, "unwillingly" to describe how Wickard took this position. He was not the leader in this at all; he would just go along. The British would be pushing Roosevelt and Roosevelt would
be saying, "Yes, we must do all we can to help the British." Then the Defense Advisory Committee, and Leon Henderson, whatever his association was, were also influential in bringing this about. Claude went along reluctantly in terms of what I have often called his fundamental agrarianism, rather than unwillingly. I don't remember specifics, but I believe that that Henderson's attitude was one eager to forge ahead all through this time, from the time he got into the act.

The war was on, the United States felt it, officially we were with Britain, and the British were over here asking for supplies and so on. I can't remember everything from the start, which would be 1940, but certainly by mid-1941, the British were asking for supplies, and they were very insistent about it. I just don't remember what they were asking for, but I don't think they would have taken the position of, "Send us tanks and guns, and if you force it on us, we'll take food in order to get the other," because they were great importers, and the Nazi submarines were running wild in those days.

To return to the Pickard plan of February 16, 1941, [he states there would be no great program of Henry Wallace].
There was no great change from the program which Henry Wallace left behind him, but it is another question when you consider what Henry Wallace would have done if he had been Secretary at this time. My guess is that if Henry Wallace had still been Secretary of Agriculture and had his heart in the job, he would have stepped out very much more rapidly than Claude did into what became the war food program. He wouldn't have waited and waited to be led and directed by Roosevelt or somebody; he would have been coming along with wheat for England and meat for England. He would have said, "Let's open our Ever-Normal Granary right now; let's send our food over there so that it can help them." There's a difference between the way Henry Wallace reacts - or the way he did in those days - to questions and problems that he is really involved in and interested in and the way that Claude reacts.

To go on through Wickard's plan, he has a note that the loan rate must be higher, but production must be kept in line - no increase. He was thinking there about corn, wheat, and so on. He also mentions cotton, saying that cotton acreage must be cut. Getting a higher loan rate would mean higher prices, if production
could be kept in line — there's fundamental agrarianism right there. The excess was to be turned over to the government for disposal outside the regular marketing channels. There is also mention of adjustments in agriculture in the South with incentive payments, Lend-Lease, export subsidies, and increased home consumption. In adjustments in the South he probably had in mind better incomes and better living for low-income farmers, tenant purchasers, and so on. That's outside the field of fundamental agrarianism. Helping low-income farmers to get a better share of government programs would have little or no effect upon the supply or price of corn and hogs, and so on. But Claude would say that it helped poor people nevertheless.

Claude believed in and was for the so-called tenant purchase program. He would feel that every farmer should have enough land, equipment, and so on, to be a respectable kind of a farmer and made a more or less decent income. That much he went along with. But I don't know and I can't remember how much further Claude would have gone in his thinking and in his philosophy. I have talked about his relationship with the Farmers' Union; the Farmers' Union was then, as it still is, the
national farm organization which paid most attention to
the problems of low-income farmers. I'm not sure whether
it would have been true that he was closer to the
Farmers' Union than he was to either of the two other
major organizations, the Farm Bureau and the Orange, at
this particular date or not, but it was later. The
influence of the Farmers' Union arose with Wickard after
his fight with Ed O'Neal of the Farm Bureau.

The question is raised whether Wickard did change
Henry Wallace's policy. I don't remember that there was
any major change in the Wallace policy. It might very
well have been that if Wallace had stayed on, he would
have given more attention to low-income farmers, a
Farm Security kind of program, than was given to them
under the Wickard regime. The problems of the low-income
farmers would have been closer to the front of Wallace's
mind than they were of Wickard's, but that doesn't
connote any major change in policy; the program still
went on.

I can't put my finger, however, on anything in
the Department during Wickard's Secretaryship which was
definitely a departure from or an addition to the Wallace-
Roosevelt policy, aside from the fact that the war was on
and food was getting scarce, but that would have happened if Wallace had continued on as Secretary.

If I were asked to distinguish between Wickard and Wallace insofar as their concept of administration was concerned, I would put it pretty much this way: Claude usually had to be pushed or urged to do something; Henry Wallace was just the opposite. Henry Wallace was always out ahead, thinking about some change, suggesting something new, or asking us, "How about this?" or "How about that?" and "Has the time come to change our direction?" Claude had to be urged and led. As to their methods of administration, Henry Wallace isn't a real administrator, you see. The people in the Secretary's office and others around him always had a lot to do with Henry Wallace and he with them. The people in his immediate office were advisers to him and would suggest things to him, and at the same time, they saw that his decisions were sent down the line and implemented.

Claude operated with the same pattern on the surface. He was supremely conscious of the Triple-A - an organization that he had helped build - and he would tend to look upon that as the real unit of organization in the Department of Agriculture, which reached out to
the grass roots. So did Henry Wallace. Triple-A had been made that way under Wallace's leadership.

I know it has been said that Paul Appleby administered the Department under Wallace. He did have real influence; he was there all the time. As I have said of the people in Wallace's immediate office, Appleby was there longer than anybody else. But Milo Perkins, Jim LeCron and others operated in the same way that Appleby did, both as a suggester and adviser to the Secretary, and then by putting his decisions and his orders into the works. Paul did more of that than these other fellows, I think. I don't think Paul did very many major things, at least, that Wallace didn't know about and that Wallace didn't approve of.

It's hard to say how Wickard's office differed from this. I have a feeling that the people in Wickard's immediate office were often trying to get Wickard to face the problem and make a decision suggested to him, but were not getting answers. They did know how to write memoranda and send them all around the Department, such as these I have here which were written to the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, to bring up some data and some ideas to be discussed, all in the hope of getting
a decision.

Wickard had the ability to make decisions, but it was hard for him mentally to make them. I don't know why; I never did know. I don't like to use the words "fear of the consequences." I would rather say it was uncertainty within himself — within his own mind. He couldn't see the future, and he didn't know "what would FDR think of this, what would Ed O'Neal say, what will my friends in the Triple-A say, what will Leon Henderson say?" All this contributed to the uncertainty that he had.

I never thought that Claude was dumb — to use a hard word — on any of his problems. He could see, as well as most of us, the probable economic consequences of different lines of action. As to what the paralyzing factor was then, in his inability to make decisions, I don't know whether I can state it any better than what I have already said. As I say, I don't like to use the word "fear," because Claude Wickard wasn't then what I would characterize at all as a "fraidy cat." Maybe this was too big a job for Claude; he may have felt that way himself all the way through. To jump way over a large span of time, I remember I felt Claude was really relieved
when he ceased being Secretary of Agriculture and became administrator of REA, I'm sure Claude felt that a great burden was lifted from his shoulder.

I would characterize the April 3, 1941 announcement calling for increased production as quite good. Of course, the emphasis in the statement is on pork production, dairy production, and poultry production, the kind of farming that Claude was interested in primarily. The general part of the country that he comes from is devoted to what is called grain and livestock farming. But, as I say, I think this announcement was pretty good. In making this announcement, I believe that Wickard, to a considerable extent, was following the demand that had been created. I have called attention to his statement in December of 1940 about the hog situation. He fixes it now so that farmers will get nine dollars a hundred weight for hogs, which was a good price for hogs in those days. Back there in December, he couldn't do that.

He speaks of the expansion of the Ever-Normal Granary program into a food program designed to give ample supplies for the United States, Great Britain and other nations resisting aggression. Well, that's all on the
courageous side. We had lend-lease, food was getting scarce, prices were tending to go up and so on, so that it wasn't unprompted.

This announcement was made in April. Going on through the spring, economic conditions were improving in the United States through the defense effort and so on, and the demand for food in the country was going up. Then there was also all the demand for food from overseas. The stocks of food that had been piled up in 1937, '38, '39, and '40 were being used up. It also takes a good while to increase livestock production. We all began to get over our fear of surpluses, because the surpluses were disappearing. When I say we, I also include Triple-A and all the fundamental agrarians.

Then, as the calendar turned and the season progressed, there was the question of, "What should be the farm program for next year?" The outlines of that, at least, always have to be developed before the time for planting winter wheat arrives, which means that it has to be done in July or August at the latest for the year ahead. As we began to approach that date, supplies of some things were beginning to run down, the outlook for that year's harvest was beginning to be apparent,
and it was evident that supplies were not going to be too plentiful. It is noted in some of the documents I have before me that the British were pushing for more livestock products of all kinds.

So finally, out of it came this memorandum from Wickard to me dated July 17, 1941 Wickard to Tolley, July 17, 1941, National Archives, Secretary's Files, Box 5357 pointing out that we needed stockpiles of protein foods such as canned meats and evaporated milk. He also says that farm supplies will be needed, as well as agricultural labor and farm machinery, and that the realization of these objectives would be enormously facilitated by the immediate development of production goals for 1942 for all major and critical agricultural commodities. I don't know where Wickard got the concept of production goals, probably from the BAE, possibly from myself and people right around me.

The words "production goals" were never used under Wallace in the sense in which they came to be used here - a definite national goal for each major commodity and then definite goals for states and for counties and for farms for all commodities. Back in the old Triple-A days, we had had a wheat program - then we wanted so many
millions of acres of wheat, but it was not "more than" and it involved just wheat; it didn't include everything else, and it had always been on the reduction side. This program was on the increase side; it was an example of Wickard's turning around the scarcity program and making it into an abundance program.

The job of developing these production goals was a hard one. Most of the agencies in the Department participated. Oris Wells was really the sparkplug. We had a bunch of inter-bureau committees, commodity committees, and so on, and Oris Wells was in effect secretary of each of the major committees. Of course, the statistics by and large were coming out of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and he would be the marshaller of the historical statistics as well as secretary of the committees which were to establish the goal for wheat, and the goal for corn and other feed grains, the goal for hogs, and the goal for dairy products. What I'm saying is that Oris Wells had more to do with setting up the committees and keeping them in line than anybody else did. I suppose the concept of production goals came from those of us in BAE more than from anybody else. You might say that my own clan had the original ideas.
After argument and discussion and endeavors to picture what the situation would be at harvest time a year hence, we came up with this set of national production goals. Our idea at the time was to get maximum needed production, although not on everything. We got these production goals just as nearly as we could to equal what we thought would be needed. Of course, there had to be some compromises with our friends who were still fearful of surpluses, but there weren't too many at that time, because lend-lease was going full blast, food was getting scarce, and prices were pretty good. I've always been quite proud of the way different groups and agencies in the Department laid aside their fears of surpluses. I don't remember that any of the compromises that we did have to make with any groups were very great. When we finally came to getting these production goals accepted by the Department, we went through the routine that the Secretary always did. He called together this program board of all of us, and these goals and the reasons behind them were laid on the table. That was the time when Claude Wickard sat at the head of the table continuously for three days. I had the feeling then that Claude really became enthusiastic about this.

His contribution to the goals program was asking
for increased production and no doubt passing word around the Department that this was something he wanted. And then, when it came to the program board meeting, with Claude at the head of the table, Claude thought these goals were all right. As I said, he was not dumb about these things. He would see a figure - the supply of a commodity for next year, a forecast of domestic consumption for the year ahead, a forecast of exports or a forecast of carryover - and he would comprehend all of those. He would say that he thought those were just about right, and so they became the goals. He was, in effect, here making big decisions. Of course, anybody could question him and say, "Mr. Secretary, wait a minute. How about this, and how about that?" That was the atmosphere of those meetings all the time.

Then, of course, as soon as the goals were adopted, the campaign began to get the information to the farm people, and to get the goals worked out state by state, county by county, farm by farm, and Wickard led that campaign.

A document I have here from Shields to McInley in December of 1941 indicates the sort of things that Bob Shields thought about and did - lines of authority, and
so on – but the particular point about the Farm Security Administration doesn't mean anything at all.

I had known Bob Shields as one of the lawyers in the solicitor's office of the Department for a good while; I don't remember when he first came in. He had been assigned primarily to the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. His main heart was in legal work, and he was primarily interested, as I remember it, around the Secretary's office, in lines of authority and formal relations – memoranda like this one.

To continue speaking of the men around Wickard, Bob Shields and I were always good friends. We liked each other, and I thought we always understood each other. He was a likeable fellow. I can't remember that he was particularly chummy with people or bothered by people. He was quite a forthright fellow, but I rather doubt that he was in the right position in the Secretary's office. Primarily, he was interested in legal affairs – documents and so on – and that was a solicitor's job. He came out of the solicitor's office into the Secretary's office and after a while, went back and became solicitor. He might have been more effective in the Secretary's office if he had been working for somebody who made up his mind
more quickly, who would have signed things without too much question.

He was a good solicitor although not outstanding. The relationship between him and Wickard was then the relationship of a lawyer and his client. The Secretary of Agriculture was his client then.

I was about to mention T. Roy Reid next. T. Roy Reid was Claude's choice for a position in his office - it has been called to my attention that he succeeded Jim McCamy, as he had been chosen by Wickard to be the number one boy in the office. T. Roy is not a Jim McCamy nor a Paul Appleby. He could work for Claude Wickard, but not for Henry Wallace. T. Roy was a very understanding man so far as the land grant colleges were concerned. He came from Arkansas where he had been in the University of Arkansas as director of Agricultural Extension, previous to his connection with PSA.

I always had the feeling that Claude had taken a liking to T. Roy Reid sometime earlier, but I don't know when. It may have been when Claude had been in the South on a trip or attending some meetings. Here were two things involved: the South, which Claude didn't know too well, and the Farm Security Administration, which he
also didn't know too well. Then there was the fact that T. Roy had been in a land grant college. Here was a man whom Claude liked, and when he became Secretary, Claude thought T. Roy Reid could be the man to help him through on all these matters.

He was not too effective in his job, but there again, maybe a good part of that was due to the fact that during this period it was hard for Claude to make up his mind. It was difficult for T. Roy Reid to know how his boss wanted him to act. I have a feeling that in the early days T. Roy was a good bridge between Claude Wickard and the Farm Security Administration. I don't know how long that lasted, but after a while, it wasn't there any more.

I swear I don't remember Sam Bledsoe in the position of being the number one man in the Secretary's office at all. I don't think I ever had a hassle with Sam. I've known him ever since he was an AP reporter in 1933, covering the Department of Agriculture. I see him going in and out of this office building, and we stop and pass the time of day and talk about old times and how things are over in the Department of Agriculture now, but I don't remember him in that position. I can
visualize Sam at the desk over there in the Secretary's office, but I still don't remember any instance of his superior authority - no doubt I had quite a bit to do with him, but I just don't remember.

I remember quite a bit about Carl Hamilton. He was a very nice young fellow and quite a capable one. He had been with Claude over in Triple-A and while he was Under Secretary. When Claude became Secretary, Carl came right along with him. He was effective in his role, which was a minor one. His role with Claude was semi-personal. He probably, from my point of view, came the nearest to being a private secretary to Claude of anybody in the Secretary's office. I had the feeling that Claude would pour out his heart to Carl Hamilton to get sympathy from him, but I wouldn't say that Carl had the broad knowledge and balance of judgment needed to help the Secretary on all of the problems that he had to face. I think I have said before that Carl was sort of enslaved to Claude for reasons that I never knew.

To deal with the reorganization of the Department, I have before me a memorandum from the Secretary [Secretary's Memorandum No. 960, December 13, 1941, National Archives, Secretary's Files, Box 537] involving that. I can't
remember having been in on the making of this particular reorganization, but I have an idea that this memorandum follows Claude's line of thinking pretty well. A good many things in the Department were not changed significantly by the memorandum. In effect, this announcement just set the BAE aside. The planning powers were still there. The one significant thing in that connection is that the program board was abolished. The program board had been the officially designated spearhead of the whole planning movement. The Secretary of Agriculture had been the head of the program board but, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, were responsible for bringing things to the program board. It was a somewhat disconcerting reorganization to me; it meant a reduction of my war planning work in the Department - as a matter of fact, a good deal of the work that I had been doing just wasn't done any more. The old production goals kept on in about the same way, year after year, but they were not effectively organized or pushed like they had been in 1941. I had never had a personal run-in with Wickard, but I felt hurt and disappointed at this reorganization; this was almost the end of my close relationship with him.
The people in the Triple-A thought this was just fine; the reorganization put them in the saddle, but I don’t know as I would call it a battle between BAE and Triple-A. Actually, I don’t think that this reorganization was necessary because of war or because of a need for the development of a vast, swiftly moving program. I don’t know just why Wickard did it. The reorganization put everything — operations and administration and program planning as well — very largely into the hands of the Triple-A and what was called the Defense Boards, later the War Boards. Spike Evans was elevated upwards as a consequence of this, and Fred Wallace, Wickard’s own man from Nebraska, was put in as head of Triple-A.

So far as I am concerned, there was no difficult relationship between Wickard and myself, other than the one which I have already mentioned. I never had a real clash with Wickard.

As for the reasons why Wickard reorganized the Department along these lines, there was this old Triple-A line and this land-use planning, which was almost a corpse by this time. I can’t remember when the killing shot was fired by Congress by cutting off all money for it, whether it was in the summer of 1941 or the summer of
1942. But by this time, the Agricultural Adjustment group, the old Triple-A group, made common cause with the American Farm Bureau to kill off this land-use planning, because it was beginning to take hold out in the country among the farm people. We had worked hard in 1939 and 1940 to get in every agricultural county in the country a planning committee made up of the local representative of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the local representative of the Farm Security Administration, the county agent, the representatives of farm organizations, the farmers, and so on, and we were working with these groups. We had regional representatives and state representatives, and we were working clear down to the county and community level on agricultural adjustment, on how much more corn could be produced in this county, how much less cotton, how much land in the poorer areas would go back into forests, and conservation practices and programs. We were making a very conscious effort to have one integrated agricultural program.

Milton Eisenhower had been one of the allies and leaders in this effort, and so had M. L. Wilson. When, in the summer of 1941, the Defense Boards were created and placed under Triple-A, there was a hassle to have them
placed under land-use planning, and the hassle was apparently spearheaded by Paul Appleby and Milton Eisenhower. I would have been on Milt’s and Paul’s side on that. I think that hassle foreshadowed some of the things that happened in the reorganization of December, 1941.

As I remember now, back there sometime in 1940 it began to be apparent to me that to make this planning effort go would be a terrible job, and I began to feel that, “We’ll get licked anyway.”

I didn’t know that Wickard’s relations with Appleby were bitter, nor did I know that anyone connected with Paul ipso facto would receive the same treatment. Until it has been pointed out to me right now, I also did not know that Wickard had refused to let Milton Eisenhower concentrate his energies as land-use coordinator.

In these days, I would go to Claude’s office on an official errand for something or other, and to staff meetings when he had them, but that was about all there was to my relationships with the Secretary. But BAE suffered a serious letdown from the reorganization; it was, until it was dismembered just a few months ago, the fact-finding reporting agency of the Department.
Immediately after this, I went over to OPA; it was just getting started. I got some telephone calls at home one evening. One of them was from Claude Wickard, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the other was from Leon Henderson; I forget which one came first. At any rate, Claude said to me that Leon Henderson had just been talking to him over the telephone, and he, Leon, wanted to know if he could borrow my services for a few months to help him get going on price controls for foods and fabrics. Claude thought that was a very important thing and said that if I wanted to do it, it was all right with him.

Leon and I had been on a first-name basis for a long time, and in his call he said in effect, "I've just been talking to Claude Wickard, and I told him I understood he wasn't using you very much over there in the Department of Agriculture. We have a whale of a big job coming up, and we want you to come over and help us on it. Claude said it would be all right. Will you come?"

"Well, I'll see you tomorrow, Leon. I'll have to sleep on it."

I went. I don't remember whether I ever talked to Claude about it or not. As far as I remember now, I
never did. But Leon had called him up and pressed him about it, you see, and Claude had turned around and called me up at home at nine or ten o'clock at night, because Leon had been on the telephone just before. He wouldn't say to Leon, "Let me talk to Howard about this in the morning;" he turned around and called me right on the telephone.

I don't remember any specific instance with regard to the relationship between Henderson and Wickard. There was a feeling on Henderson's part, as I remember, that Wickard was indecisive and conservative - although that isn't exactly the right word - and difficult to convince of the need for action of the kind that Leon wanted to take. He would talk to Wickard and go to see Wickard himself often - I remember that. Of course, the price control bill came up at the end of January, and here were these parity provisions in the price control bill. I was the one man over in CPA that knew and understood all of that. I remember I often had to do a lot of explaining to Leon and the people over there. "Here is the law, and any prices we set up must be in accordance with this law. We can't have a ceiling price for pork or wheat or cotton or any of these other things
below the parity provisions in the price control law — I forget what the provisions were. I don't think that Leon evaded the price control bill or deliberately went contrary to it. Leon wouldn't do anything like that. Wickard's idea of the spirit of the law was probably quite different from Leon's idea of the spirit of the law. But in those days, when I was with OPA, I'm quite sure that Leon Henderson never came up with a proposed order or proposition that violated that law, because I talked to him and I think I knew what that law was pretty well. He didn't get down to specific dollars and cents, you see; my old boys over in BAE supplied the dollars and cents.

Jack Hutson played a somewhat independent role in this. I have a feeling he didn't always check with Claude before going to a session with the OPA people. He would go ahead and name the Commodity Credit Corporation to do things. Hutson was always careful about lines of authority; however, he wouldn't go contrary to orders from a superior, but in the absence of orders, he would create his own.

At this time, I don't know if my relationship to
Wickard and the Department of Agriculture could have been worse, but as I remember back now, I was over in OPA for several months there and then came back and took a vacation. I got back over to BAE and had the feeling, "Well, here is old BAE, research and fact-finding, and that's all it's going to be from now on. It's not much use to try to do anything else with it; we'll keep it going."

I can't remember too much about Herbert Parisisus. He came back to the Secretary's office in the summer of 1942. I had known him the previous time he was in the Department. I don't know about his relations with Claude. I don't know who suggested to Claude that he hire him again. Parisisus was interested in the low-income farmers, consumers, and so on. He was, of course, interested in winning the war. Agrarianism of the kind I have talked about was present in his make-up.

On the surface, Parisisus was a relaxed kind of person, but this was not the case underneath. There you would find the damndest feeling about how things should be done, and what should happen. I don't remember too much of how I felt when he was appointed head of the food production administration by Wickard, because I
was in a rather detached mental position myself. The Hot Springs Conference was coming up at that time, I was very much interested in it, and found it a real relief to have a challenging job again. I don't remember too much, but I'm sure I would have felt, "Well, Parisisus has the right ideas about these things - food production and the way production ought to go."

He wanted to shift the administration of the production end of the Department from Triple-A type of administration to the FSA type. FSA would have had to been made over in order to do the job, but I generally would have agreed to the shift. The philosophy of FSA was more production, you see, and not scarcity. The philosophy of FSA, according to one of my old cliches, involves the whole farm approach versus the approach of commodity by commodity.

I don't remember anything about the firing of Parisisus except the fact that he was out. The bone of contention probably was that Wickard was not pushing for all-out production. I don't think Congress would have supported such a program of all-out production as the Farm Security people wanted at that time.

One thing in Parisisus's make-up might throw a
little light on this. Parisius started out to be a minister, in which church I forget. As I remember it, he was unfrocked. Now I say this as a hazy remembrance. Maybe he left his church deliberately, maybe he turned his back on the faith of this church and said, "I will have no more to do with it." This instance probably indicates the instability of Parisius and the tendency he had to change his mind. He did not impress me as being too unstable, but sometimes he would change his position radically.

The question is brought up as to why Wickard was relieved as war food administrator. My explanation of it would be that the powers-that-be decided that, bold and decisive action had to be taken, and this great machine, the Department of Agriculture, had to be driven, and Wickard just couldn’t do it. What was needed was to get out and become aggressive, FDR style or Leon Henderson style. Claude did a lot of things under urging from the White House and pushing from Leon Henderson and others, whereas what they were looking for was somebody who would take the lead. People were tired of pushing him. He had done the job reasonably well, I would say. The Department of Agriculture did quite a
lot. It could have done more, and it could have done it more quickly, however. I have the feeling that the White House and the administration group in general had gotten out of patience with Claude Wickard, and these things get to be personal or semi-personal. When we really went to war - after Pearl Harbor, they felt, "We've got to have more and swifter action on the agricultural front. We can set up a War Food Administrator here within the Department of Agriculture who will get this action for us," and they proceeded to do it.
On August 12, 1942 Henry Wallace and Frank H. McDougall decided that a good United Nations food committee would consist of Alvin Henson, Dr. Thomas Parran, who was then Surgeon General in the Public Health Service, Winfield Riefler, Dean Acheson, and myself. They decided that Adolph Berle wouldn't do. I knew that general talks were going on; I didn't know the details. McDougall had many talks with various people in Washington, not only in the Department of Agriculture but in other departments of government and with people outside the government. McDougall had come with a mission growing out of his experience with the League of Nations so-called Nutrition Committee. His mission was in effect to try to get the countries of the world which were going to be victorious in the war to work together to get more and better food for hungry people, including the people of the war-damaged countries. This working together would call for some kind of an international organization. McDougall had been in London for some years (he's an Australian) before he came here with that particular mission. He realized then, as many did and more do now, that the attitude and actions
of the people of the United States and the United States government would very likely determine what if anything would be done.

When he came, he found a rather surprising agreement among a lot of people in Washington on the importance of more and better food in making and preserving peace after the war. Some of us who had been so greatly concerned about agricultural surpluses in the United States in the pre-war period saw that here might be an opportunity to escape from burdensome surpluses and reduction of production and all that went with it, and turn our efforts and programs toward expanding food production and distribution of food to hungry people and low-income people throughout the world. It had appeal for Henry Wallace. Then the question of getting full U.S. support of course arose, and attention was turned toward the White House and FDR.

In a series of events with which I'm not familiar, McDougall met and talked with FDR. As a result of the discussions with McDougall and others, FDR decided that the United States should sponsor an international conference on food and agriculture. I would say this was decided somewhere along toward the end of the year (1942). The conference was called for May, 1943. There had been
before that, as I said, much discussion in government
and non-governmental circles around Washington about
world food problems and what they were likely to be after
the war, and how the United States, as the arsenal of
democracy, was a great storehouse or could be a great
storehouse of food, as well as the implements of war.
After it was decided that the conference would be held,
then all the problems of what countries would be invited,
how the conference would be organized and conducted, and
all the other problems connected with international
conferences in general had to be faced.

This was the first formal international conference,
I believe, that was held after the United States entered
the war. Many governmental committees were established —
in the State Department, the Agriculture Department, the
United States Public Health Service, the Labor Department,
the Children’s Bureau, and others. Food and health,
especially in underfed countries, were closely related
to children — the starving children of Europe and else-
where — in many people’s minds. “Food is a weapon” was
a sort of a slogan as we went into the preparation for
the conference and even in the conference itself. Well,
these committees were set up and an over-all committee
was established to prepare the agenda for the meeting and to decide what countries to invite, to decide who should be members of the United States delegation and the staff that would be needed for the conference, where it should be held, and so on.

In the Department of Agriculture preparation for the conference centered around Paul Appleby, who then was Under Secretary of Agriculture. The Secretary delegated it to him. The Department of Agriculture was involved more than any other Department, since it dealt with food. My first official assignment was as a member of the U.S. delegation to the Hot Springs Conference. The delegation had twenty or twenty-five people on it. Of course, since it was an international conference, the State Department was responsible for formally recommending the make-up of the delegation to the President for his approval.

As far as I was concerned, and as far as the people with whom I was closely associated were concerned, we had great hopes for this conference. I had hopes that it would really result in an international organization whereby governments could work together to increase food supplies where they were needed and to get better food
and nutrition to the hungry people of the world wherever they were. I had hopes that this would be a great forward step toward lasting peace. In some minds a secondary objective and probably a primary objective in the minds of others was an international organization that would emerge after the war was won — the successor to the League of Nations. I'm not sure whether the phrase United Nations had been coined then or not. But there was lots of thinking about it, and here was a first step toward an international organization for the preservation of peace.

I don't know why food was the stepping stone, except that maybe it was easier for representatives of different countries to get together and talk about food problems — common problems of food production, trade, and consumption — than it was for them to get together and talk about subordinating national sovereignty to the international welfare. This was on my mind before I went to the conference. We really expected big things out of the conference before we ever went to Hot Springs. As preparations for it went along, most of us felt more and more hopeful that great things would come out of it.

I don't remember anybody who was opposed to the
conference - it was a good thing. Not too many people of course were over-enthusiastic, but I can't remember any opposition to the idea of the conference itself and what it was seeking to accomplish. I don't now remember any partisan opposition to it in Congress. A little while later, after the conference, some partisan aspects arose.

On May 16, 1943 I boarded a special train bound for Hot Springs, Virginia. The entire United States delegation and the so-called secretariat of the conference were on the special train. I remember Paul Appleby, I remember Marvin Jones, who was chairman of the conference. I remember Dr. Thomas Parran, Surgeon General of the United Public Health Service. The war was on and in those days he wore a uniform. Incidentally, it was the prerogative of the United States as host country to supply the chairman. FDR chose Marvin Jones. Whether FDR did it at somebody's suggestion or not, I don't know, but FDR designated Marvin Jones for chairman. When the conference convened Marvin was nominated for chairman by another member of the U.S. delegation and elected unanimously.

On the way down we talked about the agenda of the
conference. Working papers had been prepared and mimeographed, and I remember talks about them on the way down. We were all very desirous that the conference move off expeditiously and smoothly. For most of us, it was our first experience in a high level international conference. We didn't know the delegations from other countries. We had their names, but we weren't acquainted with many of them. We didn't know what their attitudes would be. We were conscious of the language problem that we'd face and that speeches would have to be translated - given in English and translated into French or Spanish, or possibly in Russian and vice-versa.

One phase of the arrangements that was quite unfortunate was a military guard around the conference. We were all quartered in a big hotel of course and the conference rooms were in it. And here was the army, soldiers doing sentry duty around the hotel grounds and guarding the doors. Each one of us had a pass, had a card that credited us to the conference. We would go out and walk around the grounds any time we wanted to but when we came back into the hotel we had to show our passes to the guard. Even though it was in wartime, that was something that was quite extraordinary in the United States. The press became peeved about it. I never did
know exactly who was responsible for this, but FDR ordered it done, and he got the credit and the blame for it among the people who didn't like him.

Congress didn't like it at all and there were some unfortunate incidents. I remember one day a Republican Congressman - from Ohio, I think - who had some doubts about the conference, came down on the train to look it over and see what was what. But he couldn't even get inside the hotel because he didn't have a pass. He made quite a scene, and finally somebody got to Marvin Jones, after the Congressman insisted on seeing his ex-congressman friend. Marvin went to the door, and as chairman of the conference, induced the guard to let the Congressman come in without a pass.

I mentioned the press. The press wasn't allowed to attend the conference sessions - security, presumably. They were housed in a building outside the hotel, a dormitory, cottage, or something. The chairman of the conference and the chairmen of the delegations from the different countries would go over to that building for press conferences. The press boys didn't like that, of course. So on account of the military guard, the conference got quite a little unfortunate publicity and there came to be
a feeling in Congress, especially on the Republican side, that something was going on, something was being hatched up at Hot Springs which the Congress and the public weren't being told about, and it would have to be watched quite carefully. And that attitude hung on in some Congressmen's and Senators' minds for a long time afterwards, even when the Food and Agricultural Organization was being formed, two or three years later.

Well, the conference got going with all the pomp and circumstance - plenary sessions and flags flying, orchestras playing, and state dinners, and cocktail parties, and so on. But through it all the United States delegation and most of the other delegations showed a real earnest desire and eagerness to lay the foundations for an international organization regarding food and agriculture. The Russians were there with quite a sizable delegation - I don't remember how many. They were accepted by everybody, by all of us in the United States delegation, and by delegations from other countries, without any qualms. Members of the Russian delegation were given prominent places in the organization of the conference, as chairmen of committees, and rapporteurs, and so on. And they had quite a lot to contribute in the
way of knowledge about the food needs not only of their
country but of Europe at large and other parts of the
world, and how these needs might be met.

The Chinese were there with quite a large and
intelligent delegation. There were funny incidents. One
of the questions which we were facing was: What is the
population of different countries and the total popula-
tion of the world, and what's it going to be some years
hence? It was reported that the Chinese delegation had
a meeting to consider the population of China. They had
no reliable data, so the delegation solemnly voted
that for the purposes of this conference, the population
of China was four hundred and twenty-five million.

The Indian delegation was another one with intelligent
and knowledgeable people on it. I there got my first-
hand impression of the effect and influence that the
British occupation of India all these years had had upon
the educated class, the elite of that day, in India. I
found that they spoke English very fluently, they wrote
fluently, but the English they spoke was English English,
not American English, and one had to be careful lest he
misunderstand the meaning of that kind of English. I
found that some of the Indians were very fine parliamentarians,
too. One, Sir Gerga Bagpai, the Agent General for India here in Washington and head of the Indian delegation at the conference was an especially good parliamentarian. I remember one of the sessions where a Russian was chairman. Well, the parliamentary situation got out of hand, because the Russian chairman couldn't understand the English, French, and other languages that were spoken. The translation was poor and it got out of hand. Our Indian Agent General was the vice-chairman of this session, and the chairman called on the vice-chairman to take over. And the vice-chairman straightened out the mess to everybody's satisfaction and pleasure in five or ten minutes and gained the respect of the whole conference.

The French delegation was made up primarily of French in exile - France having been overrun by the Germans. One of the leading spirits was Andre Mayer, who continued to be the spiritual leader, at least, of the French delegations to the Interim Commission and to the FAO during all the period that I was connected with it, and as far as I know, still occupies that position. From the British delegation, I learned quite a lot about how the British work in international conferences.
never any apparent disagreement among members of the British delegation on any point that came before the conference. I remember a few times myself getting out of patience with the United States delegation because of the apparent willingness of some of the State Department people to accept without question any proposition that the British might make. Of course, the Russians likewise always had an agreed-upon position on every question which we accepted even then, I'd say, as a reflection of totalitarian, authoritarian government operation. I remember the Russian chairmen of committees or commissions, when questions were put to a vote, would say: "All in favor say aye" or "raise your hands." But they would often not follow this with: All opposed say "no."

Well, those are details and random observations. The conference, as I've said, was really a working conference, attempting to appraise the world food situation as of that time, and as it would be at the end of the war — and there seemed to be no question in anybody's mind as to who would win the war. Since the United States had become actively engaged, all the other nations seemed to feel that our side would win, without question. No one
knew exactly when, of course, but it would. The general supposition was that the food situation would be quite grim when the war closed, and that there would be need for rehabilitation of agriculture in war-torn countries, and that there would be greater need than ever before for more food in the thickly populated countries of Asia. As far as I can remember, each Latin American republic was represented at the conference - not always with a large delegation. They were interested in discussing both how to increase food production and food consumption in their own countries, and how to get more international trade, mainly exports of food from their countries to other countries.

There was talk and proposals about what might be called an "international stamp plan." I'm not sure it was given that title, but the idea was some international financial arrangement whereby some foods in over-plentiful supply in the export countries would be made available to consumers in deficit countries, at prices below the going price. There had been developed here in the United States before the war broke out the "stamp plans" for low-income people, which made it possible for them to
to obtain some foods at less than the going price. And there was talk and discussion about what could be done to lower trade barriers after the war. I don't remember any arguments or any challenge by other countries of the United States reciprocal trade agreements. Of course at that time all international trade was completely nationalized.

Too, there was much thought and discussion about the necessity of continuing after the close of the war, some kind of international food allocation agency to sponsor, if not guarantee, equitable distribution of scarce foodstuffs among all the countries of the world.

As to my major duties at Hot Springs they were to be the United States representative on commissions and committees. I don't remember how many there were or what the names of them were. I was named to be the United States member - as we say, sit in the United States chair, and be the United States spokesman for some of them. On some of them, I was designated to be alternate, and have someone else sit in the chair. Our beforehand instructions were very general - that the United States wanted this conference to consider and come to an agreement on a permanent international organization in this field, and so on, and so on. We had delegation meetings almost every
day. The questions and problems that were under
consideration in the various commissions and committees,
were put up to our entire delegation. We'd discuss them
and arrive at a U.S. position, or decide to leave it to
our representative on the committee or commission to
decide what to say and how to vote.

There was almost continuous communication back and
forth with Washington on important things. I don't
remember that I personally talked to many people back
here in Washington, except to people in my own office
about the affairs of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics
which they would call me about, or which I would call
them about. Communications with the State Department,
as in other international conferences, were by means of
a so-called "tie-line," which was just a long-distance
telephone line open twenty-four hours a day, from the
State Department to the conference hall. Questions of
policy — such as whether or not the United States delega-
tion should take an affirmative position with respect
to sales at lower than going prices internationally,
whether we should favor the international allocation of
scarce food supplies, and so on, would usually be cleared
with the State Department by telephone. Dean Acheson,
who was then Assistant Secretary of State, was the person with whom most questions were taken up here in Washington. Dean Acheson came to the conference maybe two or three times for two or three days each time.

That was my first experience with an international conference. Looking back, it seems to me that the State Department had less influence at this conference on the United States position than it had at most of the international conferences - FAO, U.N., and so forth - which have followed it. This was an exploratory conference. Binding commitments, important and long-term, were not made at this conference. The conference recommended to its member governments that they do thus and so, but no binding commitments were made. That might have been one of the reasons why the State Department was not so much in the central position. And too there was the matter of technical competence. After all, the people in the United States delegation who knew food problems, agricultural problems, nutrition problems, health problems in their relation to food and nutrition, were people in other departments. So-called international political problems had not come to the fore in the preparation for the conference very much, and did not come to the fore
too much during the conference. And that of course is the State Department's forte, and center of interest.

Good feeling continued among the participants on through the conference, which lasted a couple of weeks. First of all, all of our papers were presented and discussed, and all the papers that had been prepared by other delegations were presented and discussed. Resolutions were drafted and presented and debated and adopted by the various committees and commissions. Then all the resolutions were put together and presented to the full conference in plenary session and adopted unanimously as "The Final Act of the Hot Springs Conference on Food and Agriculture."

About the Russians, they were not obstructive at that time. I have the feeling that those who were at the conference, at least on the surface, were endeavoring to find ways of working with other countries of the world. That attitude continued as far as the food and agriculture were concerned during the interim period, up to the time of the Quebec Conference. One will never know how much their attitude was influenced by the knowledge on their part that the United States was the strongest nation of all, or that the Russians were receiving and wanted
to receive much more lend-lease.

The British in their way were quite cooperative. One could sense the feeling of the Britishers that Great Britain wasn't as great then as she had been in times past. One could sense a possibly unconscious tendency on the part of members of the delegation, when they presented their position, or talked in private, to overplay the British position. There was a tendency for them to feel that still after all, Britain was the number one, the greatest country in the world. I got the sense there of the cohesion among the countries of the Commonwealth - the British, the Canadians, the South Africans, the Indians (of course, India was still a colony), Australia, and New Zealand. There was a feeling of unity among them, but not always did they have the same position on the questions which the conference considered.

I forget whether Paul Appleby was nominally the leader of the delegation or not, but Paul was in effect number one United States man. Then, Paul was interested in helping with physical arrangements, helping select and nominating chairmen of the different committees and commissions, in getting us members of the delegation assigned to our particular tasks. He was helping Marvin
Jones, the chairman, in the conduct of the conference. I'd say Paul was the "general" of our group. He'd contribute his ideas and his thoughts as to what our position should be on different questions. We would all listen but not necessarily always agree, and he would not necessarily always insist. I can't remember that he ever acted in an "authoritarian" manner.

Marvin Jones was chairman and number one man in the conference. Marvin presided at all plenary sessions. There was a conference steering committee. The head of each delegation was a member of it and Marvin was its chairman. They'd have stated meetings, probably once every day, where each member of the steering committee could bring up for discussion any problems about the conduct of the conference or the positions that were being taken by the different delegations. These could be discussed there in an informal, off-the-record way, in which they couldn't be discussed in full plenary session, where a full record was being kept. Marvin was pretty much the conference spokesman to the press, which put him in a tough spot because of the very bad press relations. I don't remember any significant contributions toward the content of the conference or of the Final Act which could
be attributed to Marvin Jones himself. As a matter of fact, he had to be more or less a neutral chairman. He didn't try to be authoritarian in presiding over the conference. Of course, he would speak on various subjects and it was very difficult not to speak as an American.

P. V. Cardon was another member of the United States delegation. He had much the same position on the delegation as I had. He and I had quite a lot to do with each other as the conference wore on. I remember one talk that Vince Cardon and I had. There was a lot of discussion in the conference about agricultural research to increase food production throughout the world. Cardon at that time was in the agricultural research administration. Sitting out in the park between sessions one day, he said: "All over the world, even in the United States, much, much more is known by the researchers about how to increase agricultural production - better seed, fertilizer, insecticides, better bred livestock and better rations for them, and all the other things - than is being practised by the farmers. The pressing need is for more extension work, worldwide, rather than for more research." That was Vince Cardon's statement to me, not my statement to him.
Concerning other outstanding people at the Hot Springs Conference, M. L. Wilson was there, and Tom Parran, whom I've mentioned. Les Wheeler was there and played quite an important role. Les really knew more at that time about what we called foreign agriculture than most of the other members of the delegation, by virtue of his position and his work in the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations. On account of that, he played quite an important part in many of the discussions about the situation in other countries and the possibility of increasing trade between countries. Let me mention some other people who were on the secretariat - Foster Elliott, Conrad Taeuber and Harold Vogel. I remember those last two particularly because they later joined FAO at the same time that I did. Vogel is still with FAO. Taeuber is now assistant director of the Bureau of the Census, and Elliott is still in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

Outside the United States delegation, two people come to mind particularly. One is McDougall, of course, who was there as a member of the Australian delegation and was in evidence throughout the conference, and probably was quite influential in reconciling or compromising the
incipient differences of opinion and position—a role, which I learned at that time, McDougall played very well. The other was a member of the Canadian delegation, who is now the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lester B. (“Mike”) Pearson. He at that time was number two man in the embassy here. Lionel Robbins, the British economist, was a very brilliant member of the British delegation. An Englishman named Dr. Wallace R. Aykroyd was a member of the Indian delegation, had been for a good many years in India in the colonial government. He is a nutritionist, became head of the nutrition division of FAO, and still has that position.

Alexey D. Krutikov was the leader of the Russian delegation. A good many of the Russian delegation were in uniform; I believe he was not. I don’t know what his position in the Russian government was. A joke about Krutikov came from Buck Elliot: When Krutikov was serving as chairman of one of the commissions, somebody speaking in English raised a long, involved parliamentary question. The interpreter interpreted to Krutikov in Russian. Krutikov talked back to his interpreter in Russian at great length. The interpreter turned around to the group and said, "Mr. Krutikov says no."
The Final Act of the Hot springs Conference contains all the elements of the Constitution of FAO. It established an Interim Commission composed of the representatives of, I think, ten or twelve governments, and directed this Interim Commission to proceed with developing a proposed constitution, a program of work, budget, and so forth for a permanent international Food and Agriculture Organization. The Interim Commission was to function until a permanent organization was established. Paul Appleby was the United States member of the Interim Commission immediately after Hot Springs. I was chairman of the economic panel of the Interim Commission in those days immediately after the conference.

A considerable number of panels set up to explore possibilities of international cooperation in all the fields to be encompassed by FAO. The economic panel prepared reports on economic problems, on statistical problems, how more and better statistics were needed and how they might be attained, how international comparability might be improved. There was a panel on agricultural production and a panel on fisheries and a panel on forestry. The Interim Commission established itself in
an old mansion near in Washington near the Wardman Park Hotel, on McGill Terrace. It is now the home of Charles Malik, the minister from Lebanon. I was out to see him a few days ago - the first time I've been there since Interim Commission days.

Difficulties began to arise when definite, specific commitments had to be made by member countries. As far as the United States was concerned, such commitments could be made only with the consent of Congress, in most cases. If FAO were as good as we thought it would be when we left Hot Springs, it would be a much better outfit than it is today. When I left Hot Springs I felt we had set in motion forces which would result in the formation of an outstanding international agency - the forerunner of the United Nations Organization - which would include all of the allied countries, in which the United States would take a leading part, and which would help to start the world on the road toward a lasting peace. It was only a food and agriculture conference, but we said then, and I've said many times since, "Two-thirds of the people of the world are food producers. All the people of the world are food consumers." One of FDR's four freedoms was freedom from hunger.
I returned to Washington about the end of May, 1943. Physically, I went back to my desk at the United States Department of Agriculture. Mentally, I was somewhere else most of the time, namely with the Interim Commission of the Food and Agriculture Organization. Many of the things I did in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics were related to the work of the Interim Commission. I've wondered why my attention turned so much to this. I've never been able to explain it to my own complete satisfaction.

I'll just mention two things: One, escape from frustration concerning the job in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. In the Bureau of Agricultural Economics we had started out in 1939 to be the big central planning and program-making agency, and that just hadn't worked, as I've said. Congress didn't like it, they didn't appropriate any money for it and legislated that all these land-use planning organizations should be liquidated. The Department of Agriculture and farm organizations didn't like it. We were still nominally the central programming agency for the Secretary of Agriculture, but only nominally. We did some other things which we thought
help United States farmers prepare for the end of the war and peace.

We organized a project which eventuated in a series of little publications entitled "What Peace Can Mean to American Farmers." There we explored and projected the demand for the consumption of agricultural commodities in the United States, and the export demand for United States agricultural commodities after the war if population continued to grow, on the assumption of full employment, on the assumption of another depression, on the assumption of a half-way between situation.

I enjoyed working on that, and expounding our conclusions and results. At that time, many people in the Department of Agriculture and in farm circles of the United States were expecting another great depression as soon as the war was over, and we were in fact saying, "It doesn't need to be." We talked about the employment of sixty million people. It was about the time Henry Wallace was coming out with his book on that subject. So many people never had been employed in the United States up to that time. The sixty million figure has been exceeded since, but at that time it was looked on in a good many quarters as scatterbrained.
Along at about this time, in 1942, the book, The Farmer Citizen at War by Howard R. Tolley, which had my name on it, came out. In fact, the first draft of most of it was done by other people around the bureau. It was an attempt to set down for ourselves and the general public our philosophy, our feeling about agriculture and farm people and how they might fare better in the future than they had in the past. And, as I look back, that was another escape from frustration.

The work of the Interim Commission was similar to some parts of the New Deal farm program. What had heretofore been just the United States program during the New Deal now became worldwide - better living for farm people, more and better food for farm people and others, participation by farm people in deciding on programs. But there was one very important exception: In the New Deal days of the 1930s, we had been concerned primarily with surpluses and how to keep from having too much production. Now we were concerned with how to get enough production worldwide, how to get it distributed worldwide. That made sense at the Hot Springs Conference.

One other point that influenced me, I feel quite sure, was a longing for peace, world peace, and never any
more war. I wasn't alone in that in the Department of Agriculture, and in the Department of State even. All of us who were in this were trying to get on the way, trying to help on the way toward a lasting peace. There really wasn't to my mind any counterpart of FDR, any great guiding light. Sir John Orr came nearest to it, but he wasn't at the Hot Springs Conference - the British government had left him at home. Wallace was much interested in all of this, but more interested in something else - being President of the United States. To jump ahead in history a little bit, some time in 1944, or early 1945, it fell my lot to ask Henry Wallace in the name of the Interim Commission if he would consider being the first Director General of FAO.

By that time, Paul Appleby had left the Department of Agriculture, and I had become the United States member of the Interim Commission. A group of us on the Interim Commission was thinking and talking about who would be our leader. McDougall was on the Interim Commission, Andre Mayer was on the Interim Commission, Mike Pearson was on the Interim Commission, and so on, and we were wanting to get a candidate. This wasn't a formal Interim Commission meeting. This was an informal group, and we unanimously
agreed that we would like to have Henry Wallace as the first Director General of FAO. Our little informal group agreed if Henry Wallace were interested and could be induced to become the first head of FAO, it would be a great thing for FAO and for humanity. And it was apparent to me at the time that Henry Wallace's star was waning - it was after the convention and so on. We would back him and we would try to get our respective governments to back him, which meant four governments - quite important ones - including the United States, most important one of all.

So I went to see Wallace. This particular session wasn't anywhere near as tense as other sessions which I described, when I was working with Wallace on the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. This was very easy and informal. I remember the office force buzzing around. I knew most of them and they knew me. I sat in front of his desk, right across the desk from him. Pretty soon, I told him the object of my mission, why I had come, and, as I remember, fully and frankly the discussions that I and others had had about it in the Interim Commission and our desire to have him as our leader. I told him that if he were willing to be considered
as our leader, we would all do what we could to see that he was elected when the organization council was held. He didn't seem surprised. Henry Wallace never openly seemed surprised about anything much.

We talked about what a great thing FAO might be and what a great thing it should be, and all the worldwide problems. His reception of the suggestion, I would describe as, "That's something interesting. I might be interested in it." He didn't look tired, but there was a tenseness about him then that hadn't been there back in the days of the 1930s. But he didn't appear tense when we were talking. He wasn't going to sleep as we were talking; he was very much interested. His mind was definitely on my proposal. I went away with the impression that maybe there was a chance.

Several days later, when I returned, same office, same general situation. I came in and "Hello, Howard," and "It's a nice day." and "How's the corn growing in Iowa?" and all those things were said. I don't remember how we got up to the question which he knew I had come to ask, to get his answer, but it came. He'd thought about all this, and of course, it would be very interesting. He was nice. I don't remember if we talked about the
election. But Henry had just decided that no, he'd better stay in the national field. Those weren't his words, and I don't remember what they were, but interpretation of it afterwards to myself was, "No, Henry Wallace still thinks he's going to be President someday." If he went off to this international job, he would be leaving the national political arena. One can't understand another man's mind, but that was his feeling. I believe that from 1938 until 1949 Henry Wallace thought he was going to be President someday somehow.

In 1944 there were some personnel changes in the Department of Agriculture. On January 31, 1944 Paul Appleby resigned as Under Secretary of Agriculture and immediately thereafter became assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget. In 1944 Claude Wickard was still Secretary of Agriculture. Grover Bennett Hill replaced Appleby and Charles F. Brannan replaced Hill. Marvin Jones was War Food Administrator. Grover Hill was really Marvin Jones's assistant as War Food Administrator. I don't remember exactly what Grover's position was before this, but he was a long-time old friend of Marvin Jones. He had been in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration for some time in one capacity or another. When Marvin
came in, he stepped up besides him, and when this change took place, he became Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. I wasn't too close to day-to-day operations at the time, but I think that Grover carried on, under the title of Assistant Secretary of Agriculture in more or less the same way that he'd been with Marvin Jones up to that time.

Charlie Brannan was a lawyer, a native of Colorado. He had been employed in the Denver regional office of the Farm Security Administration. I didn't know him well until he became assistant secretary. He had been the lawyer, the legal counsel of Denver regional office of the Farm Security Administration. The job of the Farm Security Administration was primarily to help low-income farmers increase their scale of operation and increase their incomes and have better living. Of course in that region, centering in Denver, irrigation, more water, was one of the big problems. There's a long story, not too pertinent, about internal bickering in that office in which he, Charlie Brannan and a man named Elmer Starch, who was a long-time employee of the Department of Agriculture in one capacity or another, mainly in the economic development of the Great Plains, and another man named Cliff Wilson, who was of somewhat similar background as Elmer Starch, were involved. It was about internal
bureaucracy and administrative problems. Personalities were aroused.

All three of these men are very good friends of mine still, but I find that the old animosities from way back yonder still persist in their minds. Elmer Starch is now head of the agricultural mission for the Mutual Security Administration in Turkey. He has been for two years and is doing an excellent job. Cliff Wilson is head of the Technical Assistance Administration work in India, doing a good job. Well, that's a little bit aside. Now how did Charlie Brannan become Assistant Secretary?

The National Farmers' Union, of which James G. Patton is the president, thought that people who had the welfare of small farmers, as distinguished from large commercial farmers, primarily at heart were not represented in the councils of the Department of Agriculture in the way that they should be. Claude Wickard was a Farm Bureau member, and had been from way back. He was not a leading rabid militant member of the Farm Bureau, but that was his background. On the other hand, he did have a very keen appreciation of the need of the smaller type farmer for help of a kind that the larger commercial
farmers didn't need.

Jim Patton personally appealed to Claude Wickard, as Secretary, to get a high ranking official in his Department from this group of people who were devoted to the little farmer, as distinguished from the large commercial farmers. The story goes that when Paul Appleby was moving out and this vacancy in the assistant secretaryship was occurring, Claude told Jim Patton, "Alright, I've got a vacancy now. Who's your man?" Jim Patton scratched his head for a day or two or three and came up with Charlie Brannan, and Claude nominated him for assistant secretary. Charlie didn't know the workings of the Department of Agriculture and of the land grant colleges in the way that a great many of us in the Department of Agriculture, including Claude Wickard, Paul Appleby, Grover Hill, and so forth, did. But he came with an open mind, with a desire to learn, with the desire to help the small farmer and his family, and began to do very well. He remained assistant secretary there until he became secretary in 1948, when Clinton Anderson resigned to run for Senator. I think Charlie Brannan is a scholar and a gentleman and his heart's in the right place. Of course, none of us is perfect. Almost as soon
as he got here and got his feet on the ground, he tied right into partisan politics and the politics of the Truman administration. He has been quite active and his wife has been quite active in partisan politics in Washington. He was especially active in the 1948 campaign, and he has been ever since.

In 1944 I was still chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics but was devoting more and more time to what became the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization. Paul Appleby had been the United States member for the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture, which as I've said before, was established at the close of the Hot Springs Conference. I had been engaged in a lot of the thinking and talking and planning that had been going on ever since Hot Springs. I was a member of and a leader of small groups or panels trying to figure out what this new organization should do on the statistical front - the statistics of food and agriculture on a worldwide basis - and what it might do on the economic front to improve economic conditions of agriculture in the various countries of the world. We had committees, panels, discussion groups, memoranda, and prepared a lot of reports for member governments.
When Paul left the Department of Agriculture, I succeeded him as United States member of this Interim Commission. The year following that, in October 1945, was the international food and agriculture conference at Quebec, the Quebec Conference at which the Food and Agriculture Organisation constitution was ratified by a very considerable number of governments. There the organization was founded. During that year, my thoughts were more on the international scene than they were on what's going on in the South Building, or even in the whole Department of Agriculture. We drafted the constitution of FAO and circulated it to member governments and talked to representatives of prospective member governments here in the embassies. We payed attention and thought about who would be the leader, the Director General of it. I mentioned Henry Wallace.

I remember during the same period, some of us talked informally among ourselves, when Henry Wallace got out of the picture, about the possibility of Lester Pearson of Canada. At that time, he had become Canadian ambassador here and was chairman of this Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture. But he wasn't interested in becoming Director General of this little international
organization. I remember he told me one day that he thought that his future lay in continuing to serve his own country and his own government, and of course now he's their Minister of External Affairs.

Along in this period, we began to feel tension between the U.S.S.R. and some of the other governments. The U.S.S.R. had been well represented at the Hot Springs Conference. It was a member of the Interim Commission, and their representative was always present at the meetings of the commission. They had representatives on the committees and panels which were working out the program of the organization. In general, up until probably the middle of 1945 - well, up until after the war was over and after the armistice - I don't remember any particular friction. After that, the representatives of the U.S.S.R. often had difficulty in agreeing to suggestions or proposals that had been made by other member governments. It seemed that they had to wait more and more for instructions from home.

I remember one incident that didn't seem so significant then. There was an international organization of labor unions, The World Federation of Trade Unions, in existence at that time, and which the Soviet government
liked and which apparently was more or less Communist dominated even then. Then there was another international organization of trade unions, the International Federation of Free Trade Unions, to which our CIO, AFL, and so forth belonged. Here were two competing international non-governmental agencies and the question came up in the Interim Commission as to which one was to be recognized or specifically granted consultative status by the new Food and Agriculture Organization. Here was a complete disagreement. The United States took the position that this International Federation of Free Trade Unions should be the one to be recognized by FAO. The U.S.S.R. took the position that the World Federation of Trade Unions should be. Strangely enough, at that time, the United Kingdom representative supported the U.S.S.R. position.

Here was one of the few times in the whole history of this Interim Commission where things came to a division, as Mike Pearson said, where things couldn't be resolved by discussion and unanimous agreement. One day each one of us stood up and stated the position of his government, and the chairman then had to call for a vote. And of course the United States side won, as it always has. All voted for the United States position except the
U.S.S.R. and the U.K. That's taken on more importance in my mind since. I just didn't realize, of course, that there was going to be a complete split between what we now call the free world and the U.S.S.R. I just didn't realize that anything like that was going to happen, but here was a forerunner. When the meeting adjourned after the debate and vote, I walked around the table and offered my hand to my friend from the U.S.S.R. and to my friend from the U.K. We smiled at each other, and my friend from the U.S.S.R. invited me to have supper with him the next night at the Statler Hotel, which I did. All was good humor and, presumably, all forgiven.

Lavrenchenko is the name of my Russian friend who was representative of the U.S.S.R. He was then and is now (of course, I haven't seen him for a long time) a very intelligent, likeable person. He had come to this country as a member of the Russian Purchasing Commission that was buying materials from the United States and getting lend-lease from the United States. One of the first things he did was to learn to speak the English language. He studied very hard at it. He and I talked many times about the United States and the U.S.S.R. He was interested in learning and seeing how agriculture in
the United States was operated, how the farmers worked and what was a family farm and how the family farmer lived. He was very much interested in agricultural research, technological as well as economic research. He was very much interested in statistics, and how the United States produced its statistics of agriculture. That was one of my jobs in the United States government in BAE still.

I can remember him coming over to the Department of Agriculture, to the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and visiting with our crop estimates people to see how they did things. I remember he wanted to see agriculture in the United States. I wrote letters to friends in the land grant colleges and arranged for him to visit them. I arranged for him to go to TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority). And finally I arranged for him to go to California. He wanted to see the big corporation farms of California, as distinguished from the family farms in other parts of the country where he had been. There never was any question in my mind at that time about the propriety of my doing this. I was a member of the U.S. government, you see.

We talked freely and discussed openly any subjects. We didn't discuss Communism versus Democracy, but we
discussed the efficiency of agriculture in the United States as contrasted to the efficiency of agriculture in the U.S.S.R. under their collective system, and so on. What he was really looking for was: What makes these United States farms so efficient? We would agree that productivity of agriculture in the United States was and is greater than the productivity of the agriculture of the U.S.S.R. He was trying to find out why, and find out what it was that made the United States so productive, and get it transplanted over there, if he could. He would talk about research. Well, the farmers of the United States have all the results of all this research. He visited the experiment stations, and then we talked about extension work. And he went to see how extension work is done.

All the time he was looking for the secret of this great productivity of the United States farmers. We never did argue very much about, what'll I say, free enterprise, entrepreneurship versus authoritarianism, but it was always there in our thinking when we were talking about such things as this. And I remember he was very much impressed about the general level of living of the farmers of the United States. He'd been in their homes
and seen how they lived. He'd seen that nearly everyone had an automobile. The productivity and level of living of our farmers was far above that of the farmers in the U.S.S.R. He was really honestly trying to find out why.

As I said earlier, when it came to official actions in the Interim Commission for Food and Agriculture, frictions and difficulties began to appear. Finally, came the Quebec Conference, and the U.S.S.R. had one of the largest delegations there. My friend was there, and a group from the Soviet embassy, plus a group which came direct from Moscow by special plane to Quebec. I suppose the delegation had twenty or so people in it. As the conference convened, they were given their place at the conference table like all the rest of us. Incidentally, the alphabetical arrangement that always was followed was such that U.S.S.R. and U.S. sat side by side. Through this conference, I sat elbow to elbow with the U.S.S.R. delegation.

One of the first things that was done after the conference was formally opened was the signing of the constitution. Most of the countries there were ready to sign the constitution. It had been through the United States Congress and the United States was ready to
sign it. A few countries didn't sign and the U.S.S.R. was one of them. At this opening ceremony the first day, they weren't ready to sign. I got the word that they were waiting for further instructions from the U.S.S.R. - from Moscow. But they went ahead and took part in the proceedings of the conference. There were no hard and fast lines drawn at that time between those who had subscribed and those who hadn't. Presumably, they'd subscribe tomorrow or next week or sometime. They went ahead, taking part in the plenary sessions and committee meetings and sub-committee meetings and in the steering committee.

We had a steering committee which was in effect just the old Interim Commission carrying on through the conference. The U.S.S.R. was a member. They took their place and talked and argued about how the conference should be conducted and what the order of business should be and so on. But a good many days went past and still they hadn't signed, and the time came when something had to be done about it. One morning, Mike Pearson, who was chairman of the conference, chairman of the steering committee, and so on, came to me and said that if it was agreeable to me, the representative of the United States,
he would like for me to call on the leader of the U.S.S.R. delegation, who was one of those who had come direct from Moscow, and get him to tell me if they were going to sign the constitution, and if so, when, because it was getting embarrassing and the conference was going to close soon.

So I went to call on this man in his hotel room, I forget his name. He seemed to be quite sorry that all this delay had occurred. He just didn't have word from Moscow. But in our conversation he said that he would get his plane and fly to Ottawa (the capital of Canada) the next day to see the Soviet minister there, get in touch with Moscow, and get an answer. He went the next morning and was there overnight. He came back and told me that his government instructed him not to sign the constitution of FAO, for the reason that they would not be able to supply all of the information about the state of agriculture and statistics of the level of nutrition of their people and so on that each government was pledging itself to supply to other governments through FAO.

Of course, I took that word back to Pearson, the chairman. It caused quite a dither and shortly thereafter
it was announced to the conference. I forget whether the leader of the U.S.S.R. stood up and made the announcement or whether he put it in writing in a note to the chairman and the chairman read it to the conference. Anyway, there it was. The effect, of course, on the other countries that were members of the FAO and on the U.S.S.R. delegation itself was quite striking. Other members, the Europeans, the United States, India, the Far East—we were all there. It just raised a great big question in everybody's mind. Everybody knew that the U.S.S.R. could supply this information, and was as well equipped to supply it as most of the countries which were joining FAO. And some of the Russian delegation itself—my friend Lavrenchenko for example—as far as I could see then and still believe, were terribly disappointed and upset.

They couldn't come and talk to us, or to me, any longer as friend to friend, as equals, as before. I'd meet them in the halls and come to the committee meetings (there weren't many more after that) to sit by them. They wouldn't smile or speak first. They'd sit and wait for me or others to make the first move. Well, that's about that story. Some of these people who had been here
taking part in activities, looking toward the formation of this international organization were, I'm sure, quite disappointed that their governments didn't join with us. And this was the first time that the U.S.S.R. had withheld or withdrawn.

Hot Springs had been very amicable. Then something happened between 1943 and 1945 to change the situation. As far as agriculture is concerned, my interpretation of all of this is that these people who were over here working with the rest of us fully expected to go right along being members of the organization and work with the other countries of the world within the framework of FAO. But the powers that be back home decided differently. I believed at the time and still believe that this group that was in Quebec at the FAO conference went there expecting to sign the constitution and become members of FAO, but were finally told by headquarters not to do so.

As to the power of the Interim Commission at the conference, I should say theoretically that the Interim Commission had no power or authority at the Quebec Conference, except to call the conference and make the arrangements for it. The conference was called to order by the chairman of the Interim Commission and a chairman
and officers of the conference were elected, and the
general procedure of the conference - which had been
worked out by the Interim Commission - was accepted by
the conference. Then in effect the Interim Commission's
activities ceased. But we who had been members of the
Interim Commission worked together throughout the
conference.

As to the Russians, as I've said, they were
represented all the time. They were on the Interim
Commission from the time it was organized until the Quebec
Conference started and the Interim Commission went out
of existence. And seldom was the U.S.S.R. chair vacant
at the meetings of the Interim Commission. All during
the period from 1943 until the fall of 1945 there was no U.S.-
Russian antagonism. The trade union debate is the out-
standing incident I remember, and that wasn't anything
at all like all the scrapping that has gone on in the U.N.
about so many things. As to the deterioration of the
Russian-U.S. relations, I agree that we're not entirely
blameless.

McDougall, I think, was never considered seriously
for the position of Director General, except possibly in
his own mind, although he was the guiding light in the
whole movement. But the group just came to feel that organizing and operating a big worldwide organization of this kind was not the job for McDougall. He wasn’t that kind of a man. He was and still is, I guess (I haven’t seen him for a year) an excellent negotiator and arranger and so on, but not an administrator at all. If it hadn’t been for McDougall, there wouldn’t have been an FAO. But McDougall said, openly at least, that no, no, the Director-Generalship wasn’t the job for him. Of course, he hoped to be in FAO in some important position, but he didn’t want to be the leader of it.

Well, we got to Quebec without any consensus as to who should be the Director General. Nobody had a candidate. No country had a candidate. Some of the people in the United States delegation had known Sir John Orr. McDougall had known Sir John and worked with him. Some of the members of the U.K. delegation of course knew him and respected him. His name was mentioned often in the early days of the Quebec Conference. After a few days, maybe a week, the question came up in our steering committee: What do we do? We have to come forward with a nomination for Director General, and we want
came forward with a unanimous nominee. Sir John was suggested, I forget by whom. It was very likely Mike Pearson who was chairman. At that time, I was acting head of the U.S. delegation. Clinton Anderson was the head of it. He came to sign the constitution and so on, and then went away and didn’t come back until the closing days of the conference. So all during the conference, I, as number two man on the delegation, was sitting on the steering committee presiding at the daily meetings of the U.S. delegation, and so on.

After some discussion in the steering committee, I said that I would determine the attitude of the United States toward Sir John. Of course, what I did was to go back to my room and call up Secretary Anderson in Washington. He said he would do some checking on it and call me back within twenty-four hours. And pretty soon, he called me back. I remember he said that he had talked to the President and he had talked to Henry Wallace, and the United States supported John Orr. Henry Wallace was Secretary of Commerce. Maybe Anderson had brought it up in a Cabinet meeting where Henry Wallace had spoken and the President had agreed. It might have been that way. Anyway, he mentioned Henry Wallace and the
President.

Immediately, I took that to the steering committee. As always, the position of the United States is determining, unless there's some real opposition. So it was decided that as far as the steering committee was concerned, John Orr would be the candidate, and he should be nominated by the United States. And the next morning I got up at the plenary session and made a speech and nominated Sir John Orr. I knew him just a little. I did approve of the choice. He was there as a member of the U.K. delegation, sitting in a back seat. There were no other nominations. The deputy director generals were to be appointed by the Director General, but Sir John never did have a deputy D.G. He took McDougall to be his number two man with the title of counselor, I believe. But when Sir John came on the job and began to organize and get going, he decided he didn't want or need any deputy director general.

Regarding the Americans who did good service, in the Congressional part of the delegation, there was Clifford Hope. Two other members who didn't do so well were Senator Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma and Congressman John W. Flannagan Jr., who at that time was chairman of the agricultural committee of the House of Representatives.
Thomas was the chairman of the agricultural committee of the Senate. Senator Raymond E. Willis of Indiana was the fourth Congressional member of the delegation. But Clifford Hope was the outstanding Congressional member. Vince Cardon was outstanding and W. L. Wilson, of course, in his field. Anna Lord Strauss was also outstanding. There were representatives of the farm organizations. Jimmy Patton was there part of the time, but wasn't too active. Homer Brinkley, of Louisiana, on the cooperative marketing side, head of the Louisiana Rice Co-op, was another one that I remember doing very well and taking an active part.

The major achievements of the Quebec Conference were the adoption of the constitution, which had all been worked out beforehand, laying out the general fields of activities which FAO would undertake, and the election of the Director General.

At the end of the Quebec Conference I think I was as enthusiastic about FAO as an international effort in the food and agriculture field as I had been at the end of the Hot Springs Conference, two years before. Even the U.S.S.R. incident at that time didn't seem to be of such terribly great importance. I think I felt at the
time, and I know a lot of other people did, that it was just a matter of time, and "They'll sign up one of these times." I thought here was a food and agriculture organization, international. All the nations of any consequence except the U.S.S.R. were members. All these nations had worked together. They would support each other in common efforts to increase agricultural production and improve the well-being of farm people all over the world. They would increase the availability of food and help all consumers everywhere to have more and better food and better nutrition, and so on.

Then too, the International Labor Organization was still in existence, and WHO (World Health Organization) was coming. The over-all United Nations organization was beginning to take shape. We felt that through these organizations, the ravages of war would be overcome and a lasting peace would be established, and the world would be a better place to live in, and I was especially pleased with the fact that the United States this time was taking a lead in this international peace, as distinguished from the situation at the end of World War I when the United States refused to join the League of Nations.
I remember after the Quebec Conference, some of the people who had been delegates or members of the staff started reporting that Howard Tolley was the most popular man at the conference. My comeback was, "It wasn't Howard Tolley, it was the United States. I just happened to be active in the United States delegation." Most of the member governments never made a proposal of any kind without finding out beforehand how the United States would feel about it. Well, all those things put together made me feel that in this direction lay the hope of the world. All the countries of the world working through these organizations would bring peace and progress hereafter. And the feeling stayed with me for a good while.

At the Quebec Conference an Executive Committee was established. It later came to be called the Executive Council of FAO. On it were, I believe, representatives of eleven member governments. The conference composed of delegates from all member governments of FAO would meet only once a year or once every two years - that's the big parliamentary body. But the Executive Committee would meet more often, quarterly if possible or bi-monthly if need be. The United States was a member of that
Executive Committee.

It had been determined that the headquarters should be in Washington and Sir John Orr came on down to Washington, set up his office in the old headquarters of the Interim Commission, and began to recruit a staff and get things going.

As to events, in the Department in 1945, after Harry S. Truman became President, it became apparent that his confidence in Claude Wickard was not as great as it might be, for reasons I never did know. I always had the feeling that this element of uncertainty, if not fear, in Claude's make-up became apparent in his dealings with Harry Truman and people on the Hill, when FDR was no longer here to protect him. There was gossip around the Department of Agriculture and around Washington that Truman would be making some changes in his Cabinet and Claude Wickard would be one of those to go. I don't think it ever came to a personal clash.

I remember a few instances just a week or two before it happened. Carl Hamilton, who was Claude Wickard's assistant, occupied the same position in respect to Wickard that Paul Appleby did all those years as administrative assistant to Wallace. Carl came to me one day and
said, "I just want to tell you as one of Claude's old
friends that he, Claude, has heard that a new Secretary
is going to be appointed within a couple of weeks."

There was speculation as to who his successor
would be. Clinton Anderson's name was often mentioned.
There was mention of Marvin Jones and various Democratic
Congressmen and Senators. I don't remember anybody in
the Department being mentioned. Jack Hutson had become
Under Secretary. I never heard his name mentioned. I
never heard Charlie Brannan's name mentioned either.
Shortly after Carl Hamilton talked to me I saw Claude.
He told me that Truman had talked to him and that he
wasn't going to be Secretary of Agriculture any longer.
Truman had asked him what position he would like to have
and he had said that he would like to be head of REA.
Claude told me that as head of REA, he would have an
opportunity to do the sort of things he liked to do, and
that he'd be free from all of the problems and difficulties
that had beset him as Secretary of Agriculture. Rural
electrification would help low-income farmers more than
high-income farmers, because most high-income farmers
already had electricity and all of the things that go
with it. Claude said that he felt he had something to
contribute in the public service in the right spot, and that he would prefer being head of REA to going back to Indiana and becoming only a farmer again. He seemed to be completely resigned to the change and not unhappy about it.

In a few days, the change was made without any particular fanfare. On Claude's last day as Secretary, we had a little party for him and I invited him and Carl and Jack Hutson and some others from the Secretary of Agriculture's office to come over to the Bureau of Agricultural Economics to drink coffee and tea and eat cakes and talk about old times and what we were going to do with ourselves hereafter. It turned out to be a very pleasant occasion. I remember I did that as a result of a talk with Carl Hamilton as to how we could help Claude over the hump. We didn't want to subject him to just a silent fade-away into another position, and on the other hand, we didn't want to subject him to a great big formal goodbye party and have everybody in the Department come in and shake hands with him. Well, it worked out very nicely and Carl and Claude seemed to appreciate it very much. Next morning Claude became
head of REA and he's still there, apparently doing a very good job.

On July 3, 1945, I flew down to Venezuela to the Third Inter-American Conference on Agriculture of the Pan American Union, at Caracas, Venezuela. Most of us in the U.S. delegation went down there together. Jack Hutson, the Under Secretary, was leader of the delegation. Leslie A. Wheeler was number two man. I'm not sure he had that formal designation - he probably did. Anyway, he was number two man. Vince Cardon was there; I roomed with Vince Cardon at the Hotel Avila. M. L. Wilson and Hugh H. Bennett were there, and a number of people from the State Department.

The conference was devoted to problems of agriculture that were common to all of the American republics, members of the Pan American Union. I had a sort of special commission from the FAO Interim Commission to help the delegates from all the countries represented at the conference to know and understand what this about-to-be-created Food and Agricultural Organization stood for and how its work would gear in with the work of the Pan American Union. I was to explain what the FAO might be in a position to do to help these different
Latin American countries improve their agriculture. The Interim Commission sent a special delegate, a Dutch member of the Interim Commission, L. A. H. Peters, who had been the agricultural attaché of the Netherlands embassy here for years, and was the Dutch representative on the Interim Commission. He was sent by the Interim Commission to this conference as a representative of the Interim Commission. Of course, Peters and I had a lot to do with each other down there and worked closely together.

Well, the conference had the usual fanfare and official receptions. There were long speeches at plenary sessions. It was one of my first experiences in a conference conducted in a foreign tongue. Everything had to be translated. I remember I had to have what we call a "whispering interpreter" with me quite often. Someone would speak in Spanish and then an interpreter would stand up and repeat it all in English. But in smaller meetings, committee meetings, and so on, we tried to dispense with the formalities and get along with formal translation, and of course, Spanish was the language and I had no Spanish. So a man from the State Department became my "whispering interpreter." He'd just sit beside
me and whisper in my ear. Several members of the delegation had to do that.

Concerning the accomplishments of this conference, of course, all of the countries pledged to work together to increase agricultural production. There was quite a lot of talk about international trade and the need for more exports and imports. The Latin American countries were conscious of formal or informal barriers to their products in the United States, and there was quite a bit of talk about that. I don't remember any action. There was quite a bit of talk about the food and nutrition problem, as distinguished from the agricultural production side, which was gratifying to me and to Peters from FAO. It was an indication that the Latin American republics were taking an interest in what would be the whole field of activity of the FAO.

There were informal talks about working relationships that might be developed between the Pan American Union as a regional international organization and the FAO as a global international organization, if and when FAO should come into existence. Animal diseases and methods of control came in for a lot of discussion, also recommendations for better varieties of plants. Soil
Soil conservation and erosion control were given a lot of attention. It was probably the first time that this had received much attention in Pan American gatherings. Specific accomplishments were a group of resolutions and statements by delegations from every country that they intended to work with their neighbors for the betterment of agricultural producers, and so on.

I remember a weekend trip over the mountains to the interior, which was very enlightening to me. The whole conference group went. The government of Venezuela turned out a whole fleet of automobiles and they took us a hundred miles over the mountains into the interior valley. There I really saw the poverty of the people. I saw how so much of the land was owned by a few large landowners, but the people on the land lived in huts without doors or windows. There were no beds in them—they slept on the floor. There were no stoves in them—they made a fire on the floor or on a little mud shelf over which they cooked. They had no sanitary facilities. One could see that the drinking water was vile, and so on. That made a very real impression on me. I remember seeing cattle coming to market from the llanos down on the Orinoco River, being driven two or three hundred miles
up to Caracas before they were butchered. The cows were poor and lank and had no fat. That was the meat supply of the big cities in Venezuela.

A big building boom was on in Caracas. A lot of fine buildings were being built there on the hills below our hotel. It seems that those were being built to some extent from profits or income from oil which was being exploited over on the other side of the country, mainly by U.S. companies, and partly from profits or income of large land holders which came out of the hides of these poor people I've been talking about.

That trip to the interior of Venezuela gave me more urge to try to help do something in a worldwide way to get for the rural people of the world better incomes and better levels of living. I remember more about that phase of the trip than I do about the discussions and the resolutions of the conference itself.

On April 5, 1946 Norris E. Dodd replaced Hutson as Under Secretary (everybody called him Ed Dodd). Jack Hutson resigned, as I remember, to become Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations. Ed Dodd, was I believe, at that time director of what had become PHA - Production and Marketing Administration - the successor
of the old Agricultural Adjustment Administration. He had been a wheat farmer in eastern Oregon in the early days of the Triple-A, and he was one of the farm pushers, one of the agrarian pushers, of the agricultural adjustment movement. He became chairman of the state committee out there rather early in the game - maybe in 1933 or 1934. In 1936, when Spike Evans became the head of the Triple-A, he fired George Farrell, who had been director of the western division and brought Ed Dodd in to replace him. Back when the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was first organized, it was organized by commodity sections, and there was a wheat section. M. L. Wilson was the first head of the wheat section. When M. L. left that to go somewhere else, I guess as Director of Subsistence Homesteads, George Farrell became director of the wheat section.

Then in 1936, when the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was reorganized on a regional basis, George Farrell became head of the western division and remained in that position until Spike Evans became administrator of Triple-A in 1938. Several shifts occurred after Spike left the AAA - or PMA as it came to be called - and in one of them Dodd became the head of it.
He was well liked by the agrarian group. He was one of the leaders of the agrarian group, as we called them. In general, he was a nice fellow, well liked. He was competent in getting things done administratively, but not as a program maker in the sense of Jack Hutson, and not even in the sense that Claude Wickard was. His following (he still has it, incidentally) largely was the committeemen of the old agricultural adjustment hierarchy, now the FMA hierarchy. He was recognized by them as their leader and they thought they should have one of their men in a high position in the Department of Agriculture. Charlie Brannan had at this time been assistant secretary for a couple of years, but didn't become Secretary until 1948.

Along sometime after January 1, 1946 Sir John Orr really got into the harness at FAO. As I said, he came down here after Quebec for a while and then he went back home to Scotland to close up his affairs. When he came back, as a member of the Executive Committee of FAO, I had quite a lot to do with him. He was recruiting people for his staff. He was continually asking me about U.S.ers for this job or that job, and it wasn't very long until he asked me if I wouldn't be interested in coming with
him in some capacity. I think he knew the way I looked that I would be. We talked about various positions, including being deputy D.G. Finally along I suppose in April 1946, the organization was laid out with a division of economics and statistics and a division of agriculture, and a nutrition division, and a forestry division and a fisheries division. That was to be the lay-out.

One day Orr came to my office over in Agriculture and wanted to know if I wouldn't be interested in being Director of Economics and Statistics of the Food and Agriculture Organization. I told him I thought I would be and to let me think about it. And the next day or maybe the day after, I went out to 2000 Mass. Ave., which was his office, and made a deal with him.

One of the things that had to be done was that he or one of his people had to ask the Secretary of Agriculture if it would be alright for him to offer me the job. And the Secretary agreed without any questions, I think rather gladly. There's a little footnote to that. Sir John had been talking to Vince Carden, too, saying that Vince might be head of the agricultural division. But Vince really didn't want to move. In the course of all this, when Sir John was talking to the Secretary,
Sir John reported to me afterwards, the Secretary said, "Yes, so far as Tolley is concerned, that'll be alright." Tolley had done about all he could in the Department of Agriculture, but Cardon was in a very, very important position and the Secretary didn't see how he could spare Cardon. So, in May 15, 1946 I resigned from the Department of Agriculture for the third time. The next morning I reported to Sir John at the Food and Agriculture Organization.

As to my estimate of Clinton Anderson, he is quite an intelligent man with quite an active mind. When he was Secretary of Agriculture he made a whale of a lot of decisions without considering their consequences very much. His decisions about potatoes is a good example. The present day potato story goes back to that time. A real potato surplus appeared and the supply of potatoes that summer (it must have been in 1945) was so large that the prices went way down. Of course, the war was just over and everybody was fearful of a recession, and something had to be done about this potato surplus. The Maine potato growers and the Idaho potato growers and potato growers from every place descended on the Department of Agriculture to get something done about it. Well,
potatoes are perishable and you couldn't very well start making Commodity Credit Corporation loans on them to hold them until supplies went down and the price got higher. You couldn't expect to store them, to keep them until then.

But without considering the consequences very much at all, Clint Anderson announced his potato program. The Department bought potatoes and made CCC loans on them and stored them in the fields where they were grown. The potato farmer would dig a big trench three of four feet deep with his tractor, put the potatoes in it and then cover them up carefully. Millions of bushels of potatoes in Maine and the Red River Valley and in Idaho and so on were treated that way. Some people thought it was as bad as killing the little pigs, but presumably those days were over. They paid the farmers whatever the price was, I'd say a dollar a bushel, for every bushel of potatoes stored underground that way.

Well, after a little time, most of them were no longer fit for human consumption, and it was decided to sell them for livestock feed. Arrangements were made to color these surplus potatoes blue or some other color to distinguish them from commercial edible potatoes, and the government sold them at very low prices to any livestock
feeders who would buy them. Jack Hutson was Under Secretary. Jack and I talked about it. It reminded us of the early days of Triple-A. We talked about other ways in which it might have been handled. They might have been distributed to low-income families for food as we did under the old stamp plan. Many uses for these surplus potatoes could have been thought up and worked out, but this was just a hurry up job to bury them and get them out of the way.

As a result, in the following year potato prices remained high and production kept up, because the farmers could grow the potatoes and sell them to the government at a good price and bury them in the fields where they were grown, or something equally easy. It became scandalous in the public mind. Two or three years ago, Congress passed a law that the government couldn't support the price of potatoes any more. The price of potatoes went down and the farmers aren't planting so many and this last spring the country ran out of potatoes.

I don't remember any particular shift in policy from Wickard to Anderson. The story I've just told probably indicates what seemed to me to be the main shift in emphasis and action and activity. Claude Wickard was always afraid that some of his actions or orders wouldn't
have the desired result. He always hesitated to act, I guess, on broad problems. Just the opposite was true of Clint Anderson, who acted very quickly. In his early years, he had been suffering from tuberculosis and diabetes. He’d moved to New Mexico, on account of the tuberculosis or the diabetes or both, and became quite normally healthy. While he was Secretary, I had that feeling and all of us had that feeling that Clint Anderson — once a sick man — had recovered and was back in normal health. 

I have understood, although I don’t know, that he’s had some relapse since he went to the Senate, but I think he’s been on the job most of the time. Within the last few months, I saw him at the Cosmos Club one day, and he looked perfectly healthy. I told him so, and he told me I looked healthy too.

Anderson is a nice approachable man, well-read and well-informed on current events. He’s a good conversationalist. He conducted Department conferences and staff meetings in very much of a one, two, three, four, order. He doesn’t have long seminars in informal conferences, or even when you’re having a twosome talk with him. He makes up his mind, as I’ve said, quickly about things. He seemed to have a very wide acquaintance among people whom most of us
in the Department of Agriculture didn't know or had never heard of. People we didn't know or know about were seeing the Secretary and he was suggesting that they see people in the Department about many things. His acquaintances came to see him if they thought that maybe he could do something for them.

Regarding Henry Wallace, I saw him occasionally in his office, out of his office, socially. I don't remember too many specific occasions. He became Secretary of Commerce when Truman became Vice President. I can remember having been in his office on different occasions when he was Secretary of Commerce. One of the striking things was his father's portrait which hung in front of his desk in the Department of Agriculture and over his desk while he was Vice President. When I was in his office while he was Secretary of Commerce I saw the portrait hanging in the same place where the portrait of an earlier Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, had hung for many years, and Hoover's portrait was not on display.

H. A. while he was Secretary of Commerce, I had a feeling, was not too much interested in the Department of Commerce. The war was over, and he was interested again
in what was going to happen to the country and what could he do about it. Was a depression coming again? He had, as I remember, a very distinct feeling that we didn't need to have a depression after the war was over. During that period he got out his book, 60,000,000 Jobs. Louis Bean and Mordecai Ezekiel helped him quite a lot on that book. Just what they did and how much, I never did know, although I was supposed to know what each one of those boys was doing at that time. But 60,000,000 jobs was something we never had in this country. A good many people thought, "Here goes crackpot Henry Wallace again!" But 60,000,000 people had jobs in 1949.

I remember one picture which was very enlightening to me. It's a photograph of Harry Truman taking the oath of office over in the White House, surrounded by the Cabinet, on the day of FDR's death. It was published, of course, in all of the papers. Looking at Henry Wallace's face in that picture, I say to myself, "I can see hate in Henry Wallace's face as he's standing beside Harry Truman looking at him." I mentioned it to somebody, maybe Zeke, at the time, and the come-back was, "Well, H. A. missed by just a hair's breath. He might have become President," instead of Harry.
I had the general feeling, and I can remember talking to friends about it, that Henry Wallace and Harry Truman didn't have a high regard for each other. They couldn't work together too well, Harry Truman as President, Henry Wallace as Secretary of Commerce. I don't remember overt or open friction before the middle of 1946, when Wallace was summarily fired. He was interested in FAO. Sir John Orr saw him, I know, on numerous occasions and talked to him about world problems of food and agriculture. I know that Wallace made suggestions to Sir John about things to be done, including people that he might hire on his staff. One of Sir John's first big actions was to come up with this proposal for a World Food Board, which was to stabilize supplies and prices of primary foodstuffs through international action of buying and selling, and loaning. It was to be a sort of international, glorified Commodity Credit Corporation.

In May or June 1946 Sir John told me he had talked to Henry Wallace about it. Henry had read Sir John's writings on it, called up Sir John and told him he thought it was fine, and he hoped that Sir John would have better luck getting the world to accept this than Henry Wallace had had in getting the United States to accept
some of his suggestions. H. A. and McDougall keep up a friendly relationship still to this day. McDougall would see H. A. on matters of common interest. That's about the extent of my remembrance of H. A. and his activities concerning FAO during 1946.

Wallace spoke at Madison Square Garden on September 12, 1946, and Truman was supposed to have cleared that speech before it was made. Wallace was fired on September 16, and he protested about it. I was on an airplane going from Geneva, Switzerland to Rome, and Mrs. Tolley was with me. It was a Scandinavian airplane that had come down from Denmark or Sweden. We got on and got settled and I saw a Scandinavian newspaper in the pocket of the seat in front of me. I picked it up and opened it. It was in Swedish or Danish, and I couldn't read a word. Right in the middle of the first page was a picture of Henry Wallace and Harry Truman. I flagged the stewardess as she was going by, and said, "Will you please translate?"

"Truman fired Wallace."

And I unconsciously said, "Oh."

She looked at me and said, "Did you know him?"

And I said, "Yes."
When I got on down to Rome and saw friends in the embassy, I found out in a general way what had happened. When I got home, a month or so later, I talked to my friend John R. Fleming, who was in the Department of Agriculture with H. A. and in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics at one time. He was then and still is associate editor of U.S. News. He was editor of the world part of U.S. News. He and I always talked about old friends and acquaintances, including H. A. Wallace, when we were together. He in his mind was completely convinced, from information that had come to him through reporter channels and so on, that H. A. had taken his speech to Truman, that Truman had read it. Truman had looked at every page of it and had told H. A., "That's all right." That's another man's story, but I tended to believe it.

This is speculation, but H. A. might have done that, first out of sense of loyalty, but at the same time as a challenge to Truman, sort of daring him to "tell me no." And Truman might look it over and in his way of operating would say, "I guess that's alright." But then when it was delivered and caused this ruckus, aroused
Jimmie Byrnes and a lot of other people, Truman would take the action he did.

I don't remember when I first saw Henry Wallace after that. I remember speculating, even while I was in Europe, as to what H. A. would do, and thinking, maybe I should say hoping, that he might get back to Iowa and Des Moines and raise hybrid corn and hybrid chickens and write some books of the kind that he's capable of writing — not on his fight with Truman or anything like that. I was thinking that if he went back to Iowa, it would mean that he had given up the idea of being President someday. But he didn't do that. He went up to New York. And I remember saying to myself, "Well, H. A. still thinks he's going to be President someday."

Anderson resigned on May 10, 1948 and Bramman was appointed on June 2. On July 1, 1948, Ed Dodd took office as Director General of FAO. He'd been elected at a special plenary conference early in June, I think. These events are all tied together. Anderson announced that he was resigning to run for the Senate. That was very definitely Anderson's desire. There were two candidates for his successor. One of them was Charlie Bramman, the other Ed Dodd. One was assistant secretary of Agriculture
and the other Under Secretary of Agriculture. The story as I got it - I was mixed up in it a little, but I got it mostly from Jim Patton, of the National Farmers Union, and Russ Smith, who was working closely with him at the time - was that this group which Patton typifies and is one of the spokesmen for, began to back Charlie Brannan, their man, as successor to Anderson. They approached the President and so on. And the agrarian fundamentalists of the Department of Agriculture and their friends backed Dodd. Dodd and Brannan at that time, and maybe before, weren't working together well as a team as Under Secretary and assistant secretary. They disliked each other and this became intensified by their scrap over the Secretaryship.

Finally, someone told me that if Dodd could be elected Director General of FAO, then Brannan could be appointed Secretary of Agriculture, and everything would be taken care of. I understood that this had come out of the White House.

In FAO circles, the United States' desire and the United States' position was listened to very carefully by representatives of other governments. So some people in the United States who were close to FAO, including Jim
Patton and his group, began to say that since Sir John Orr's two year term was up and Sir John was refusing to consider remaining any longer, Ed Dodd should be his successor. And that became the official position of the United States government. People in the United States government talked to the Canadians and the British and people in the other embassies in Washington. I was becoming a little disenchanted with FAO by this time, but not nearly so much as I became a few months later.

In the USDA, this was the same old battle that had been going on all the way through the New Deal with overtones and undertones and modifications. Here was Truman politics. There was Charlie Brannan. From the time he had become assistant secretary, he had identified himself with political action, political movements, and had moved right up beside Harry Truman when Harry Truman became President. He had become one of the close advisers to Truman, and so on. As to Ed Dodd, most agrarian fundamentalists from the northern part of the United States are congenital Republicans. I'm not saying that Ed Dodd is a Republican, but he hadn't been in or close to the Truman group, the Democratic National Committee
and all of that. That's one undertone and/or overtone.

There was arising at that time this cleavage between
the National Farmers Union and the American Farm Bureau
Federation, which has become very marked since Charlie
Brannan became Secretary of Agriculture. Charlie Brannan,
as Secretary of Agriculture and Allan Kline, president of
the American Farm Bureau Federation, have become, I guess,
personal as well as political enemies in the past two
or three years. And Ed Dodd and a great many of the
agrarian fundamentalists of the country and within the
Department of Agriculture, are emotionally at least on
the opposite side to Charlie Brannan in that battle.

Now, how nationalistic was the National Farmers
Union because they were willing to shove off a man that
they did not want into this international organization,
implies that they didn't give a damn what happened to
it? Not very many people in the United States give a
damn about FAO or UN, or any of these international
organizations. Ninety-nine per cent of the people of the
United States put national well-being, national institutions
and so on first in their thinking. Well, the Farmers
Union is not the worst of them. There is, I'm sure, even
in Jim Patton's mind a greater regard for the United Nations
and international organizations than there is in the minds
of most of the people in the United States. But, when
the showdown came, they would rather have their man as
Secretary of Agriculture and somebody not so good as head
of FAO. As far as I was concerned at the time, Charlie
Brannan was the better man of the two to be Secretary of
Agriculture, and I've never had any reason to change my
mind since.

One day, one of our FAO people came into my office
in the FAO, and said he'd just been over to the Depart-
ment of Agriculture on some FAO business and had been
told that Ed Dodd was saying that after all he was going
to be Secretary of Agriculture and not Director General
of FAO. This, incidentally, was before Brannan's appoint-
ment had been announced. Well, within twenty-four hours
I had an opportunity to ask my friend Russ Smith, who
was an around-the-corner neighbor in Alexandria and
Jim Patton's National Farmers Union's legislative
representative here in Washington. I remember his saying
he was sure that Truman was going to send up Brannan's
nomination to the Senate, that Truman just hadn't got
it off his desk yet. Shortly after that, twenty-four
hours or so after that, I heard again from Russ that Ed
Dodd had been using his telephone to bring pressure to bear to get the President to appoint him Secretary of Agriculture. But Russ said that the President was going to send up Charlie Brannan's name the next day. Jack Hutson told me about a conversation he had with Ed Dodd during this period when Ed was still Under Secretary, verifying Ed's using his telephone as Under Secretary of Agriculture to call up people around the country to get them to urge the President to appoint him Secretary of Agriculture.

Let me explain the special FAO conference at which Dodd was elected. The conference of FAO is, strictly speaking, the conference of the member governments of FAO. Each member government appoints its delegate to this conference of FAO. Now, the regular conferences of FAO consider a great many things - all of the work of FAO, the food shortages of the world, the hungry people in the world and international treaties and activities that might remedy the situation. They consider the international action that might be taken to increase international trade, and a great many things. And the countries usually send to so-called regular conferences large, well-qualified delegations headed by high ranking
officers of the government. The Secretary of Agriculture is usually the delegate of the United States to the FAO conference, if important questions are to be considered.

Well, here this conference just had one item on the agenda - the election of the Director General. It had been agreed on the up and up that they should have a special conference to elect a new Director General. Then, since there was only one item on the agenda, it wasn't necessary for even the government of the United Kingdom to send over its Minister of Agriculture to do this one thing. Someone from the embassy here could be their delegate as he knew the position of the United Kingdom; and the same was true for other countries. So someone from the United States Department of Agriculture or the State Department would see somebody in an embassy, the ambassador, say, or somebody designated by him. They would talk about this up-coming conference, where a Director General is going to be elected, and "The United States has a candidate and we hope that your country will support our candidate." And then the ambassador or whoever from the embassy would cable home for instructions. The cable would come back, "Yes, this is all right with us," or "You're instructed to cast the
vote of the United Kingdom -" (or whatever country) "- for this candidate," and then they get together and cast the vote and that's it.

I knew about this whole deal at the time. Pretty much everybody in the FAO knew about it. It reflected this secondary, tertiary position in which international agencies were held by the United States government. As to the effect of the morale of FAO, here again everybody was hopeful, and I remember I was too. I can remember talking to my colleagues in FAO about Ed Dodd. I'd known him all this time. I was the one in FAO who really knew him. He was the only candidate nominated at the conference. There was no opposition. He was elected then for a year, and he's been re-elected twice since with no opposition. I guess that in the other countries of the world, as in the United States, there just has not been enough interest in FAO to propose and support and push through the election of an outstanding Director General.

However, when Sir John announced that he was leaving many people inside FAO still had great hopes. I remember one man, a Britisher, who was then head of the agricultural division and is now dead, coming to me one
day and talking long and hard about how can we get General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then president of Columbia University, to come and be Director General of FAO. He was looking for a world figure. So inside FAO, the aspirations and hopes which had been paramount in Interim Commission days and at the Quebec Conference were not dead. When Sir John said that he just wouldn't continue under any circumstances, some of us in FAO tried to rationalize the situation. We said to each other: FAO has passed through its formative stage. We have had our year of spiritual revival and grandiose planning, Now what we need is a good administrator and a good administrative mechanism to enable us all to go ahead and do the things that we have set ourselves up to do. Ed Dodd is a good administrator and will help us in this more than Sir John would have been able to, if he had stayed with us. The attitude was, "Let's decide that the next step in FAO is to get organized into a good strong going concern which Orr has already laid out for us." And that was accepted quite well by people inside FAO, who had known Ed Dodd, most of them only as a member of the United States delegation to the conference who made a speech
once in a while at the conference and was a nice host at a reception or dinner.

So Charles Brannan was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Ed Dodd came on to FAO. Just on the eve of Ed Dodd's coming over formally to be sworn in as Director General of FAO, a friend from the State Department who's in the division or section of international organizations over there and who'd been the State Department representative, shall I say, in FAO since it was started, urgently wanted to see me. So I said okay, and he came in. He'd just been talking to Ed Dodd and did I, Howard Tolley, know that Ed Dodd just didn't have any use for me, Howard Tolley, or Mordecai Ezekiel. I told my friend I thought he must have misunderstood, that I had known Dodd for quite a while and while we didn't agree on everything, I thought we would get along all right together in FAO. But I soon found that I was wrong. In my mind, that goes back to the old days of the agrarian fundamentalists versus Howard Tolley, K. L. Wilson, and so on, in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

Now let me review some of the outstanding activities and events in FAO, while Sir John was Director General. One of the first things he did - in May, 1946 - was to
call together representatives of the principal food importing and exporting countries, to see what could be done in the way of international collaboration to bring about an equitable distribution of food among the different countries.

At that time, the war was just over, and in Europe the production of food was quite low. There wasn't enough food to go around. The wartime allocations had been discontinued. At this conference, which I remember was attended by representatives of twenty or more countries, he put forward a proposal to continue international allocation of foods and other agricultural commodities that were in scarce supply. He put forth a proposition that FAO be authorized to do that. The European countries, the United Kingdom, France, and so forth, where food was still in scarce supply, wanted some kind of international collaboration continued. The United States wasn't so sure that it wanted anything of the kind continued. After two or three days' discussion, this group decided that the countries there represented would set up what they called an International Emergency Food Committee. But it would not be a part of Sir John's Food and Agriculture Organization. The
committee and its staff would not be members of FAO but it was to be financed out of FAO appropriations.

The objective was alright; what they wanted was alright. Setting it up as an adjunct of FAO, rather than as a part of FAO, opened my eyes some more to the attitude which member governments were taking toward at least one of their newly formed international organisations. They weren't willing to give to this organization which they'd just set up the authority to take action on allocation of food. Something needed to be done, but they would set up an independent committee with representatives on that committee from each one of the participating countries. And they would have a staff which would get together the information about the food situation and the staff would carry out whatever directions the committee itself would give to them.

It was my opinion at that time and still is that that was just an exemplification of the real underlying attitude of the nations of the world, the member nations, toward these international organizations and toward international collaboration. Sir John himself initiated this proposal. It wasn't too much apparent at this session when the International Emergency Food Committee
was set up, that the U.S., the U.K., France, and many other countries didn't want FAO to do anything of great consequence. They rationalized their action by saying that this wasn't exactly within the constitution of FAO and all member governments of FAO were not necessarily interested in this, and so on, and so on. But underlying this - at least in the case of the United States and the U.K. - was an unwillingness to turn over to an international organization anything whatever that impinges on national authority. The United States, the U.K. and the rest of them were not willing to tell their organization, as personified by Sir John and his staff, "You decide how this ought to be done and we'll do it."

I don't remember who was the U.S. representative at this session. It was somebody from the Department of State or the Department of Agriculture. On such things as this, the executive branch didn't often then take and now less often takes any position without having discussed it or checked it with members of Congress, or without a resolution or a law passed by the Congress. So, it's the executive and legislative branch, and of course behind them are the people, and I think that a good part of all this rests with the people of the United States -
the people of the United States as they make their influence felt.

The opposition to things that FAO and other international bodies might do comes sometimes first from Congress and sometimes first from the executive — sometimes one way, sometimes another. Underneath, unspoken and subconscious, in the mind of most of the people in whatever position here in the United States, is the feeling that the United States, our country, is paramount. You can call this nationalism, or isolationism — our country and the interests of our country are paramount, everything else must be made secondary to that. And it, as I've said, finally focuses up in the FAO and all these other international organizations in the question of national sovereignty. We, our country, and other countries as well, will not surrender any national sovereignty to these international organizations. The nation comes first.

As a footnote to this: I listened on the radio to General MacArthur's speech to Congress recently. He had just been called by the President from being commander of the United Nations forces in Korea. In all of what must have been a very carefully prepared speech
he never once mentioned the United Nations. I think his attitude is typical of the attitude of a lot of people in high places.

All the time during the formative stages and after there were close contacts between members of FAO, whether they were United States citizens or citizens of other countries, and the various parts of the administrative branch and executive branch of government. That continued all the time that FAO had its headquarters here in the United States. The same thing goes for the other agencies and the UN itself. But there was not very much direct information given to the people of the United States themselves, as distinguished from the government, because the United States government and all the other member governments of FAO and UN tend to say, "Well, now it's our job, the job of the United States government to tell the people of the United States about FAO and all these other things."

Direct appeals by FAO or by the UN would not be welcomed. There would have been a tendency for the U.S. government and other governments to chastise FAO and UN and so forth if any of them had gone out with a big appeal to the people directly. That began to be apparent right
then, and that's still the situation. In the minds of most of the people in the United States, official or unofficial, in whatever walk of life, the United States, our country, is most important.

Nationalism is paramount, and that goes for most of the rest of the countries of the world. With that unspoken, underlying, subconscious feeling on the part of most of the people, then here the administrative branch of the United States government and the legislative branch of the United States government simply take the position that they will decide, and tell the people of the United States what their international agencies' functions are and what their activities should be. And then they turn around the other way and tell the international organizations what they think their activities and functions should be. And of course, we don't want the international agencies to do anything at all that we don't consider to be in the interest of the United States.

There are certain groups, bureaus, and departments who have relatively little if anything at all to say about FAO - the Labor Department, hardly anything, a little; Interior, a little; Defense, nothing; Budget, insofar as
funds are involved (The Budget Bureau recommends to Congress); Agriculture and State, primarily. Of Agriculture and State which has more to do with FAO than the other is hard to say. Formally, the State Department presumably is the spokesman for the United States government with regard to all of these international agencies. That's the Department of external affairs of the United States government.

In the State Department, I dealt with Dean Acheson a great deal. In the days before Dean Acheson became Secretary of State, when he was assistant secretary, and so on, I sized up Dean Acheson as a thoroughgoing internationalist. I thought he was doing all that he could to help bring along the executive departments and the Congress. I had been with him at Congressional committee hearings on the constitution of FAO and appropriations and so on. I had a feeling that Dean Acheson was doing all that he could in those days. His attitude didn't change during these early days of FAO in the way that they've changed since. I don't have any calendar date as to when he changed, but it was since he became Secretary of State. With all of these political goings on about the weaknesses of the Department of State
and the way they form policy for the United States government, the weak foreign policy and so on, since he became Secretary of State, he had to go on the defensive. In my opinion, he wasn’t weak in those early days with regard to FAO and U.N. and foreign affairs in general.

In those days, also, I often saw and talked to Clair Wilcox, to the present assistant secretary for economic affairs, Willard Thorp, and some of his assistants - especially Ed Cale and LeRoy Stinebower. But later relations between FAO and the State Department were compartmentalized into a special office for the affairs of the United Nations and all the specialized agencies.

Another activity that Sir John Orr inaugurated was what he called a World Food Survey. All of the available information about the levels of food consumption and food production and trade, country by country throughout the world never had been brought together. In the formative days of FAO, even before I joined FAO, he with the help of his executive committee had gotten started on this World Food Survey. He enlisted help from many people in the United States government. I was responsible for Oris Welles’s spending two or three months bringing together
everything in the United States Department of Agriculture, in the Department of State, or any place else in the U.S. on production and consumption of food, country by country around the world.

Two or three people came over from the U.K. to work on it. That spring and summer, it was all brought together into a report which showed that in only a few countries of the world was the per capita consumption of food large enough in quantity and high enough in quality to meet the biological requirements of the people. That's the way it was at the close of the war and such historical information as we get, indicates that it has been that way for a long time. Orr brought that all together in a report and published it. Of course, that was discussed widely.

Along with the report came Sir John's proposal for a World Food Board, which would be an international United Nations organization, presumably part of FAO or an adjunct to FAO. It would have funds for buying, selling and storing food. It would buy and store food in the surplus producing countries that weren't moving into consumption and sell it to countries and people who were on the deficit side. It would establish buffer
stocks of food against drought and famine and war and calamities. He discussed that individually with lots of people in Washington and with his executive committee, composed of people from these eleven or twelve countries. He made that the principal item of business at the first annual conference of FAO at Copenhagen that fall.

Everybody agreed about the analysis of the world food situation - that there wasn't enough food in the world to go around. Out of that came the expression that people in the countries where two-thirds of the world's population is located have, on the average, less than enough food for health and vigor. That's all accepted. Everybody agreed that something ought to be done about it. What should be done about it? Here was Sir John's proposal. And it just so happened that there were lots of similarities internationally to the various phases of the agricultural program of the United States - the United States government buying and selling and storing and equalizing supplies from one season to another, and making a certain quantity of food available to low-income people at less than going prices. All of this was part of the United States agricultural program.
Ed Gale of the State Department took part in many discussions, but he was not a top policy maker. Most of the reaction to the World Food Board came by way of or out of the Department of Agriculture. The people I remember talking to about it over there and who had an opinion on it were Clinton Anderson, Charlie Brannan, Les Wheeler, Ed Dodd, and others. Clinton Anderson sized it up, "Sounds like a good idea, but could it be worked out?" He just threw it back to Sir John. Brannan did so too - he wasn't too close to it - and also Ed Dodd. I had just joined FAO and I arranged for Ed Dodd to come over and see Sir John, and I was present at the session. It was in the summer of 1946.

Sir John in his way explained his ideas and showed Ed Dodd his memorandum. Ed and I began to talk about how the World Food Board, on the international front, would resemble the United States program on the national front. All of that was fine and Ed Dodd just hoped that it would come into being. That was the talk with Sir John here in his office. At the Copenhagen Conference Ed Dodd, I believe, was the formal leader of the United States delegation. There he presumably was thoroughly happy to have a preparatory commission set up to simply explore the
matter further. As leader of the United States group in the preparatory commission, Ed Dodd made pious statements about the need for all of this and how something should be done to increase production, loosen up trade, and all of that. But when it came down to action, no action recommended.

I remember one other man, Will Clayton. He was Assistant Secretary of State in 1946. I remember Sir John telling me that he had talked to Will Clayton about the World Food Board and Will Clayton didn’t like it. Will Clayton in his business days was at heart a laissez faire businessman, and this would be too much government interference. As I recall now, his reaction was something like this: "If we can just have peace and get rid of tariffs and other trade barriers, the world food situation will improve greatly."

When this came up in the Copenhagen Conference, the first one, and was presented, discussed, and orated about they wound up by appointing a commission to study the matter further. That was called the Preparatory Commission on World Food Proposals. Representatives of fifteen or twenty countries were on it. It was directed to convene in Washington at the headquarters of FAO in October 1946.
within a short period of time after the Copenhagen Conference. They met here in Washington almost daily for at least a month. Then I think they recessed a while and came back and met some more. The result of all of it was that they just issued another report pointing out all the many things that needed to be done, including getting more and better information and statistics and including the need for increasing agricultural production and the need for removing the barriers to world trade. It included the need for doing something about the dollar scarcity which was emerging then and the balance of payments, and so on, and so on. It recommended that there be set up a committee in FAO to keep the situation under continuous review.

If the governments had been willing to agree to put the plan into operation and put up funds to make it go, there's no doubt that they would have been able to do so. Shortage of funds became then and still continues to be one of the rationalizations in a good many countries for not doing more internationally, whether it's appropriating more money to FAO to collect better statistics or doing something along the line of Sir John's World Food Board. They come up with, "We haven't got the money." And especially
they say, "We haven't got the dollars." and bring in the dollar shortage. But the amount of dollars that would have been required for this was quite small, compared to the amount of dollars that's available to these countries and which they use for other things. In other words, ways could have been found to overcome the dollar problem and the international exchange problem, if the countries had really wanted to set up the World Food Board.

The money problem was nothing compared to the money problem which faces the countries of Europe and the United States today in NATO and all that. In general, the under-developed countries, the really poor countries, wanted to go along. I remember talking to the Indian representatives and the representatives from some of the countries in Latin America. They wanted all this to come about, but they were not and are not the decisive voices in international councils. These are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and some of the other Western European countries, but primarily the United States and the United Kingdom, then and even now - their voice is decisive.

Another activity in which I was involved was the merger of FAO with the International Institute of Agriculture
at Rome. Some time about the second decade of the twenty-first century, I believe it was before World War II, the International Institute of Agriculture was established at Rome, as an international organization to obtain and disseminate statistics and other information about the state of agriculture in different countries of the world and to be, hopefully, an agency through which its members would work to improve the well-being of agricultural people. Food and nutrition were very secondary to it. The moving spirit was a Californian, David Lubin. I think he had a little private fortune which he thought should be devoted to something like this. He went to Europe, as I understood it, and tried to find a European government which would be sympathetic. The Italian government and the King of Italy were interested, and the International Institute of Agriculture was established there.

It lived through World War I. When the League of Nations was established after World War I, the International Institute of Agriculture decided that it would remain separate. It wouldn't become a part of the League of Nations. It stayed on down at Rome. It became primarily, to a very large extent, an agency for collecting and
disseminating agricultural statistics internationally. It stayed on through World War II, although during the war its activities were very greatly curtailed. Then the member governments of FAO, following the recommendations of the Interim Commission, decided that the International Institute of Agriculture should be merged with the Food and Agricultural Organization. A committee composed of representatives of member nations from the embassies and ministries in Rome was established to liquidate the International Institute and transfer its functions to FAO.

After the close of the Copenhagen Conference, it fell my duty to go to Rome to complete this liquidation and transfer. I looked over the group that was still there and arranged for a few, half a dozen or so, of the people who had been in the statistical end of the institute to come to Washington as members of the statistics staff of FAO. I left the remainder of the group and the financial problems and so forth with this committee of member governments. The rest of the personnel was pensioned in one way or another or, if they weren't Italians, were helped to get back home, where they could find some other employment. The building that had been the home of the
International Institute of Agriculture became the seat of the first regional office of FAO, the European regional office of FAO. FAO began to publish international yearbooks of statistics of agricultural production and statistics of international trade and statistics of forestry production. We published monthly bulletins of international food statistics, building on what had been done in that twenty year period there. The International Institute of Agriculture had done quite a little to get internationally comparable agricultural statistics in a considerable number of the countries of the world - not nearly all of them.

What to me then was and still is one of the most significant activities of the Institute, began in the days of H. C. Taylor in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics before 1930. It was called the 1930 World Census of Agriculture. It started, I think, at the suggestion and recommendation of the United States at the time when H. C. Taylor was chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. It may very well have originated with him. The Institute recommended to every country in the world that it take a census of agriculture in 1930, so that there'd be an internationally comparable worldwide
bench-mark for that period and for current statistics that followed.

I don't know how many countries took that census, but a considerable number did, although not nearly all of them. It became recognized that it was to be repeated every ten years - World Census of Agriculture. Presumably and hopefully, it would get better decade by decade. The World Census of Agriculture for 1940 became the leading project of the International Institute of Agriculture, but the war broke out and it fell through. Then when the International Institute of Agriculture was merged with FAO, a World Census of Agriculture for 1950 became one of our top priority projects. This is the kind of project that member governments said, "Oh, that's fine, there's nothing wrong with that. That's all good."

So that project was praised by all member countries and we were asked to help countries that weren't well staffed with statistical offices, to help them plan the census. We had many meetings of advisory committees and experts to draw up suggested schedules and methods of operation. We organized a series of regional training centers. I myself went to Mexico City and helped to inaugurate and start off a South American statistical
training center, where the World Census of Agriculture in 1950 was the principal item. The training center was to last three months. I stayed three or four weeks, in 1949. We had a center in Paris for Europe. We had one in Cairo for the Middle East. We had one in New Delhi for the Far East. I helped to get all of them organized and started.

The results of the 1950 World Census of Agriculture are now becoming available. I don't know how many countries finally got around to taking this census for 1950, but more than ever before. As I said, that sort of activity is all "good" as far as the member governments are concerned and, in the ultimate of course, much worthwhile. Sir John Orr during his tenure always told us, "Well, yes, that's all right. You fellows go ahead on that. That's all right, you just go ahead on it. I won't be here when that 1950 world census results become available. And anyway, the world can't wait until after that." So Sir John went on thinking about the world food board and similar things.

Two men who had more to do with the 1950 World Census than I did were Mr. Valentino Dore, an Italian who had been head of the statistics division of the International
Institute of Agriculture and came over here in 1946 and stayed here until he died in 1949, and Conrad Tasuber, who is now assistant director of the United States Census. Collecting and publishing statistics is the sort of activity that the U.S. and other governments want the international agencies to undertake. That's "good" and that's "fine." But when it comes to doing something about what the facts reveal, the member governments aren't likely to assign the job to the international agencies.

To just jump way ahead to one little incident: When FAO was getting ready to move to Rome, my old friend André Mayer, a Frenchman who had been a member of the Interim Commission, who was chairman of the executive committee of FAO until that, was converted into the council, who had always been a member of the French delegation to FAO, was in Washington at some committee meeting. Incidentally, he got tired of that committee meeting and withdrew from it. He wouldn't be back on this side any more before FAO moved and I wouldn't be in Rome, and he came in for a farewell visit. In the course of our conversation, we fell to reviewing what had happened to the International Institute of Agriculture and FAO.
And we found ourselves saying to each other, "Well, maybe someday a bright new worldwide organization with support from its member governments and lots of authority will show up in Rome," - (as FAO did in 1946) "to pick up the pieces of FAO and make it part of the next effort for world government and international collaboration. And Andre Mayer had worked just as hard for the International Institute as he had for FAO. This incident took place in 1950.

We began to recognize the toughness of the problem early in 1946, as I've said. I remember discussions at that time with Sir John and his son-in-law, David Lubbock, whom he had brought over here to be his special assistant. I mentioned earlier that some people came from Britain to help develop this World Food Survey. David Lubbock, who had been a student of Sir John Orr's and a research assistant at his institute in Scotland and who had married Sir John's daughter, was brought over by Sir John to help on this World Food Survey, and he stayed on. I think he and I left FAO on the same day. I remember talking with Sir John and David after the Copenhagen Conference. Sir John used an expression and so did David that, "We're swimming upstream against a strong current."
That was his figure of speech - "a strong current" - what I'd called nationalism or lack of willingness or desire on the part of member governments to have FAO do anything that would really influence events.

Of course, that's the reason Sir John left. He was elected for a two year term and before his two years were up he just wouldn't have any more of it. It really came to a head at the Geneva Conference in 1947. That was the second annual conference. It was held in Geneva in the old League of Nations headquarters, the Palace of Nations. During the conference Sir John let it be known that he simply would not be a candidate for re-election as Director General. It wasn't very long after that until he in effect withdrew, while he was still in his term of office. I size it up just as complete disillusionment - a feeling of complete frustration on his part. He's a very intense sort of man, with a real mission in the world. He just withdrew and went back to Scotland to his farm. For a period of three or four months before Ed Dodd came in Noble Clark, of the University of Wisconsin, was acting director general of FAO.
When Dodd came the situation that had led Sir John to propose his World Food Board was still in existence. The world food situation hadn't improved very much in the period between the end of the war in 1945 and 1948 and 1949. Europe had begun to get back on its feet. Production had increased there and production had increased some more in the United States and Canada. But it hadn't increased measurably in the Far East and the Middle East and so on. In that period, world population increased more rapidly than world food supply, and that's still the case. At the same time, there were threats of surpluses and fear of over-supply of wheat and cotton and other things in the United States and in other exporting countries.

So the council of FAO decided to establish an International Committee of Experts to convene in Washington at FAO headquarters to look over this whole situation and study it on an worldwide basis, and study the food and agriculture situation in relation to the general economic situation in the world, and come up with recommendations as to what FAO and its member governments should do about it. The committee of experts was composed
of eight or ten people. The chairman was Professor John Bell Condliffe, of the University of California, who's a native of Australia and who at one time between the wars was a member of the staff of the League of Nations. J. K. Galbraith of Harvard was a member. Colon Clark, the noted economist from Australia was a member. There was also an Englishman whose name I don't remember and a Mexican named Gustavo Polit, who was once on the staff of the World Bank, and at that time, was with the Economic Commission for Latin America.

This committee was convened in Washington. I remember Zeke and I sat with them all through their deliberations, which lasted a month to six weeks. They recognized the problem and they also tried to be realistic about what member governments would do and wouldn't do in working together internationally. They finally came up with a very restricted proposal for action along the lines of the large-scale action which Sir John had proposed for his World Food Board. They called it an International Commodity Clearing House. A corporation was to be set up to take food and other agricultural commodities that happened to be in over-supply in some countries and store them or distribute them to places and countries where they were needed. The proposal
contained provisions for trading commodities and for the International Commodity Clearing House to accept inconvertible currency in payment for commodities which it might have acquired and stored. The committee had worked out these provisions very carefully as a way around the problems both of the dollar shortage and inconvertible currencies.

They worked that all up into statements and recommendations and turned it over to Mr. Dodd. Mr. Dodd presented it to the next meeting of the FAO conference. The United States took the lead in turning it down. The United States government, the executive departments, had come to the conclusion and announced that this would accentuate the dollar shortage and would not help to solve the problems which were facing the world, and the United States could not subscribe to it. There was considerable debate in the conference. Here again, a good many countries wanted something like this. I remember the Canadian Minister of Agriculture standing up and arguing for it. Anyway, it was finally decided that no, not this, but that FAO should continue to study the problem and keep it constantly under review. I understand they have meetings occasionally to talk about how big the world wheat crop is going to be and how hungry
a lot of people in the world still are, and something ought to be done about it, and report that to the next meeting of the council or conference, and on they go.

Before I left FAO technical assistance to under-developed countries had become an activity of FAO and other United Nations agencies, as well as the United States government. President Truman in his inaugural address in 1949 announced what we've come to call Point 4. He said that some of the technical assistance activities should be carried on through the United Nations and its organizations. FAO and the other United Nations organizations, under the leadership of the U.N. itself, got together to see what could be done, the funds that might be needed, how they could use funds, and where they might come from. A few months later, a conference of members of the United Nations was convened to discuss and endeavor to come to some conclusions. The result of this conference was that a very considerable number of members of the U.N., of FAO, WHO, ILO and so forth, pledged money to the U.N. and its related agencies to enable them to expand what we've now come to call technical assistance, Point 4 activities, in under-developed countries.

Here again the United States is the leader. The
United States is the richest country in the world; the United States has the most money, and it's up to the United States to make the ante, make the first move. The United States pledged ten millions or twelve millions a year, a figure of that size, which it would appropriate to U.N. and the specialized agencies for technical assistance. And this was the largest amount pledged by any country. The total fund became something over twenty million dollars, I believe. Of course, it was all to come in the currency of the contributing countries and there would be many problems of converting currencies and all that. But here was say twenty million dollars or thereabouts, which was to become available to the United Nations and its specialized agencies, including FAO.

Then the decision had to be made as to how that total fund was to be divided up among U.N., FAO, ILO, WHO, and so on. The decision was that FAO would receive twenty-five per cent of the total amount. Well, that gave everybody in FAO a lift. The member governments decided that FAO should have a larger proportion of these funds for technical assistance than any other United Nations agency, including the United Nations itself. Food
and agriculture is still the greatest international problem, leaving aside security which isn't involved in this. Well, that gave us all a lift.

As to appointments to FAO or to any international organization, while I was there they were not cleared through the State Department or checked for loyalty and security. Then, the State Department had nothing whatever to do with appointments to the staff of FAO, whether they were U.S. nationals or nationals of some other country.

Regarding President Truman's saying that he believes that the United States is cooperating with the U.N. completely, I think he believes it. I think further as I have said before that the extent to which the United States is cooperating with the U.N. exemplifies the feeling and the attitudes of a great many people in the general public in the United States - cooperating, yes, but cooperating to a very small degree on worldwide problems. Just take this technical assistance that I've been talking about - the United States putting up for U.N. and all its specialized agencies a total of ten or twelve million dollars a year. Well, whether it's the ten million or fifteen million, it doesn't make much
difference when you compare it to what the United States is doing unilaterally on the economic development front. We are spending hundreds of millions of dollars each year there.

Regarding Dean Acheson's feelings concerning whether we are really cooperating with the U.N., I think that down underneath he is feeling just about as I do. Oh, yes, we're cooperating with the U.N. and its specialized agencies and you can make a good case for it, as Dean and the people around him do. We're putting more money into the U.N. than any other country. We're putting more money into technical assistance for U.N. to operate than any other country, and so on and so on. But Dean Acheson and the people around him over there, I'm sure, know full well that the U.N. and its specialized agencies are not any potent force at all in world affairs.

Since I left FAO, I found to my surprise that many people in the country at large whom I see and people here in Washington, in the U.S. government, have very little knowledge of what the U.N. and its associated agencies are doing or trying to do, other than the Security Council. Nowadays, newspaper reports come out
of U.N., and they have radio programs which I listen to carefully, but which I don't think very many people do listen to. As to what efforts are being made to influence the Congressmen, the Senators, the heads of departments, the President, I think not very much.

As far as the officials in the United Nations - Trygve Lie and his associates - as far as they are concerned, I think they feel it would be ineffective to try to influence the leaders in the United States. The time has passed for them to take the initiative in endeavoring to get the United States or any other country to give more authority to the U.N.

The U.S.S.R. political relationships, I think, were not influenced to any marked extent by any action or lack of action on the part of the U.N. or its related agencies. True, the U.N. Security Council is the debating ground and that's all to the good. But the U.S.S.R. has the veto power in the Security Council and is able to debate interminably in the General Assembly and so forth, where it doesn't have the veto power. That's been there from the first, so any action or inaction on the part of the United Nations or its agencies has not been an important factor in the course of the Cold War or the
relationships between U.S. and U.S.S.R.

While I'm speaking of the veto, I've often remarked as other people have that the United States government and the people of the United States would be unwilling to give up their veto power in the U.N. The United States probably had as much to do as the U.S.S.R. did with establishing this veto when the United Nations Charter was written. That's another example of nationalism, sovereignty, U.S. comes first, and we want our yes or no to be decisive. True, the United States hasn't been as vicious and ill-mannered and so forth as has the U.S.S.R. and, fortunately, the U.S. has been on the majority side of all this rather than on the minority side, but I think that's the situation.

But back to my relationship with Ed Dodd and the events that led me to say to him one day in June or July of 1950: "Well, I guess you can't count on me any longer. When FAO moves to Rome, I won't be going." Ed Dodd understood why I wanted to leave. I told him that the way things were shaping up I felt I couldn't make any more worthwhile contributions as Director of Economics and Statistics and that when FAO moved to Rome, I would be one among the many to resign. I said that if he had
something else for me in FAO where he thought I could make a contribution, I'd be glad to consider it. But he didn't have anything else.

On the surface, Dodd and I got along fine. We would today if we were together. We'd have a drink, smoke cigarettes, talk about the wheat crop, irrigation and water in the West. He'd talk about his trip around the world, and he'd tell me about all the pictures he's taken, and he'd want to know all about the Ford Foundation. We got along well in FAO, on the surface, but from the time he became Director General, he began cutting down budgetwise on activities that I was administering and promoting. I don't think he ever accepted any of my recommendations about lines of work or about members of the staff. He tried to get me to fire or push aside people I had hired and who were working for me, and whom he said he didn't like or he felt weren't any good. He couldn't fire me, but he could make things very unpleasant for me and hope I would resign.

Dodd was not at all consistent and forthright in his dealings with me and other members of the staff. I mentioned David Lubbock, Sir John's son-in-law, who had been Sir John's executive secretary or administrative officer.
When Sir John left, David decided to stay on, even though he was Sir John's son-in-law. Ed Dodd said to him, "Well, that's fine. Just stay where you are and continue to do what you were doing." (Which was being personal assistant to the Director General.) But David Lubbock sat there in an office adjoining the Director General's office for days and days, and not one thing came to him. One day the grapevine told me that Dodd wasn't going to make use of David Lubbock, that he was hoping David would get disgusted and resign. The next morning I went to Dodd's office to talk to him about the reduction in the activities and budget of the economics division which he was getting ready to make. He was asking me how many people I would have to fire and who. Nevertheless, in the course of that conversation, I said, "Dave Lubbock is a mighty good man. I've worked with him and he's got something that nobody else has here. He knows the biology of nutrition and he knows the economics of nutrition and he's a good statistician. I would just like to have him awfully well over in my division, unless you want him here."

"Oh, that'll be fine."

And within six hours, he was officially transferred
from that place over to my division.

Another example deals with my young friend Eric Wormald, an Englishman who had been in an administrative position around Sir John. He was just summarily fired. He had lots of backbone himself - Eric Wormald did. He carried his case to the 1949 conference and clear on through an appeals board. Why was he fired? He had been fired without cause, and he wanted to be reinstated. The Director General, through the appeals board, agreed that FAO should continue to pay Wormald his salary for, I think, a whole year from the time he was fired, but he just wouldn't or couldn't reinstate him; he just didn't have any place for him.

Another very disappointing trend became apparent after Dodd became D.G. Many members of the staff, some of them in high places turned out to be what some of us called "petty bureaucrats." They warmed up to the new D.G., became subservient to him just to get him to accept them. For most of them their FAO jobs were the best they had ever had, as far as salary was concerned. Their only motivation seemed to be to keep their jobs and get a raise once in a while. After Sir John left this appeared to be the primary motivation of many, both in high and low positions in FAO. Even my old friend,
McDougall, with all of his zeal, is hanging on today in FAO even though he has been shunted clear aside and isn't in position to make any significant contribution whatever. And he is going to stay there as long as he can.

Along with all of that, Dodd was playing politics - at which he is a master - for reappointment as Director General. In 1948 he was appointed for two years, because of his age. He was past seventy when he was first appointed, I think. His term would expire at the time of the 1950 conference, which was the last conference in Washington, before the move to Rome. So the conference reappointed Dodd for one year, which would have meant until the fall of 1951. There were no other candidates. The United States government had recommended him again, presumably on the grounds that he was the best man to supervise and direct the move to Rome, and that a year hence would be the right time to appoint an able, younger man to revivify FAO in its new home.

I was reliably informed that after that 1950 conference representatives of several other countries talked to Charlie Brannan about who was to be Ed Dodd's successor in 1951. The British came along with the
proposition that Vince Cardon should be the next Director General of FAO. That was talked about in Washington in various places. Somebody from the British embassy formally called on Secretary Brannan to talk about this proposal. Secretary Brannan is reported to have said, "Well, Vince is not sure he wants this job. He hasn't been well and he hasn't wanted to be under a heavy load. But if Cardon really wants this job, I'll be glad to see that the United States supports him."

It was then reported that when the question of the successor to Ed Dodd was taken to Harry Truman, his first question was, "What job have you got for Ed Dodd? If he leaves this job, what job have you got for him?" That came back to me from people in the State Department, before FAO moved to Rome. Ed Dodd had never done anything for Truman, but Ed Dodd had to stay happy so that he would never do anything against Truman and so he'd support Truman and the Truman regime. And I think that's the force that's behind Ed Dodd right now in being Director General of FAO.

An incident occurred in Rome in 1951 that Vince Cardon told me about. In Rome FAO had a committee to bring forward a slate of candidates for Ed Dodd's successor.
The council of FAO, as distinguished from the conference, met in Rome early in the summer of 1951, three months or so before the conference in October. Part of this council meeting or preparatory to it, was a meeting of the committee on the program of FAO, of which Vince Cardon was chairman. Vince's story is that when he got over there for the committee meeting, which was held several days before the council, the British and maybe the French, and a number of people approached him and told him that they were plugging for Vince to be the next Director General of FAO, and hoped that he'd be elected and that he'd accept if he were elected.

Then, when it came time for the council to meet, more United States people showed up, as delegates to the council. After they had been there a day or two, some of Vince's friends, English or French, came to him and were so sorry that, "-- your health is so bad. You don't look it, why didn't you tell us." It was all mystifying to him, but it turned out that before the United States delegate came to the council meeting, it had been decided that Ed Dodd would be the U.S. candidate for Director General. And the official line was that of course Vince would be fine but Vince's health was such that he just couldn't do it.
Of course, Dodd I'm sure wants to stay Director General of FAO as long as he lives and he had talked to his friends here in the United States about wanting to keep on. And he'll talk nice as he can to representatives of all member governments of FAO, about trying to do all that he can to have country X or country Y or country Z get lots of benefits from FAO. In other words, Ed Dodd wants to keep the job and is doing what he can to keep it. And the present administration here in Washington doesn't want Ed Dodd, who still has some influence here at home to become disgruntled and go over to the other side. So they're just keeping him as Director General of FAO.

I think that puts the attitude of the administration and a lot of the influential people in the United States, their attitude toward not only FAO but UN and all the other agencies, in just about as good perspective as is possible to do. They're going to keep FAO and UN and WHO and ILO. They're never going to abolish them. They'll continue making appropriations to them, which are infinitesimal compared to the appropriations for other things. They'll continue to say how good they are and what great things they have done. They will just in
in effect keep them up in the show window and say, "Look what fine things we've done," and then go on on a nationalistic basis. And I'm afraid that's going to continue for a good while.

As to the men who are responsible for keeping Ed Dodd, I think Truman and Charlie Brannan and the National Farmers Union are responsible. They don't turn their backs on internationalism. They just give it a very low priority in their thinking and action. Internal national affairs are so much more important in the minds of all these men. As to the farm organizations, the Farm Bureau, the Grange, the Farmers Union, I think I'd characterize them about like I characterized these other people. Now they are all members of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers. The International Federation of Agricultural Producers was formed right after the war, at about the time that FAO was formed. The national farmers organization of the United Kingdom, which is called the National Farmers Union of the United Kingdom, but which is not the type of organization our National Farmers Union is, was the leader in the formation of this International Federation. It has offices right here in Washington on Jackson Place. My old friend Andrew
Cairns has been the executive secretary of it since it was formed.

The four farm organizations in the United States all belong to it - the Grange, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Farmers Union and the National Cooperative Council. This international federation has passed resolutions urging FAO and the Economic and Social Council of U.N. and the member governments to take action to improve food distribution and the welfare of rural people everywhere. They have talked about all these good things that should be done, but nothing very much has happened. And I'm afraid that now the farm organizations of the United States, the Farm Bureau and the Grange especially, are taking what I've been calling here the nationalistic point of view to such an extent that even that International Federation of Agricultural Producers, a non-government organization, will not be able to have any forthright, positive platform of action on international problems. As a matter of fact, yesterday Andy Cairns just told me in passing, "I'm completely fed up with the IFAP. I can't stand it any longer. I'm quitting." He mentioned the Farm Bureau Federation and said he wanted to see me and have a big talk about it.
To wind up this story, I agreed with Ed Dodd that I would stay if he wanted me to until FAO actually moved to Rome. I asked him if he would designate somebody who was going to Rome to take over the remnants of the economics and statistics division that would be going to Rome. So he proceeded to appoint Ezekiel to be interim director. For about the last three months, I settled back with Dave Lubbock and a couple of other people to prepare a World Food Survey of 1951 - a companion piece to the first World Food Survey of 1946 - which would picture the situation as it was in 1951, and the changes from 1945 and the prospects for the future. We prepared a manuscript and sent it along. We got it done the day the boat left for Rome and sent it along to Rome with the people who were going. The group at Rome argued long and hard about our statistics and recommendations, revised them considerably and finally published it in 1952.

The 31st of March 1951 came and I told everybody goodbye, and the first day of April I went to work for the Ford Foundation.

I've enjoyed most of the things I've done. One of the outstanding things was my tour of duty at the University
of California, for which I'm glad. As I look back on that, I have the feeling that I accomplished something during the time there, both with respect to California agriculture and with respect to the College of Agriculture at the University of California as an institution, and with respect to some of the young men who came while I was there. I've been proud of what I was able to do to help them get started and of what they've done since.

All of my experiences in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration were stimulating. While I had lots of feelings of frustration, still, a feeling of accomplishment is still with me. I managed to get some ideas imbedded and ingrained into the thinking of people in high places, including the bureaucracy, that held over. I may be having some influence on events still. These ideas about farm planning, planning farm programs and citizen participation therein, go clear back to the old original BAE days, before I went to California, and had their culmination, so far as I was concerned, in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics there in 1938, 1939, 1940 and 1941. The activity itself ended with the act of Congress. I feel the philosophy of it which I had some part in developing is basic, and it's been accepted in a lot of
places, as I've said, and has stayed. The government is taking a part in the development of agriculture in the United States. It will continue to be involved in agricultural matters and agricultural problems. But the government does need to be attuned to what the citizens, what the farmers, consider to be their aims and aspirations and their needs. The government programs are to be worked out in cooperation with the people. That's democracy. It applies not only to agriculture but to other industries and walks of life. Well, I find I'm proud to have had a little something to do with that.

As for my international experiences, I had lots of frustration there, but I may have helped to get into some people's minds the idea that international action and international cooperation on the whole economic and social front as well as on the military and political front will be quite important in the future course of world events. But that's a long, long road and it will take much more realization of that in the minds of many more people in the United States and elsewhere before really effective international collaboration and international action on the economic and social front is taken.
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