S. Bevier Show

NATIONAL FORESTS IN CALIFORNIA

An Interview Conducted by
Amelia Roberts Fry

Berkeley
1965
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PREFACE

Stuart Bevier Show is one of the West's outstanding figures in the forestry movement. A Palo Alto boy who received his BS from Stanford and his MS in forestry from Yale, he entered his profession in the vigorous Pinchot era, 1910. After his rookie days as "technical assistant" on the Shasta National Forest, he applied his tremendous drive to forestry research. Then came twenty of the most formative years in California conservation, years in which Show, as Regional Forester in charge of nearly a third of the state's total land mass, made his greatest contribution in the development of fire protection, organization of services and personnel, land management, timber production and sales, recreation, and research. The fast-moving changes brought by the New Deal occurred in this period, as did some of the major controversies involving the Forest Service. In all these changes and challenges Mr. Show was a concerned and active participant.
To sense the amplitude of his daily schedule, one must view also his extra-curricular activities: an impressive list of publications, which includes a nine-chapter treatise on the history of California rural land use and management, written with William S. Brown and containing an 18-page bibliography (published in mimeographed form by the Forest Service); his unsung leadership in getting the Civilian Conservation Corps established in the Forest Service; his willingness to enter often into local community problems and wider government issues; and his pioneering in assisting in the establishment of the Forestry Branch of the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization, efforts which culminated in his becoming its Chief of the Forestry and Forest Products Division.

This transcript of interviews which were tape recorded with Mr. Show by the Regional Cultural History Project is a part of a series on the history of forestry; others in the series include Leon F. Kneipp, Christopher Granger, Samuel T. Dana, Lloyd-Swift, John H. Sieker, Henry Clepper, Fred Hornaday, and Edward I. Kotok. It was during the interviews with Mr. Kotok that Dean Henry Vaux of the University of California School of Forestry suggested that we also tape
record some sessions with S. Bevier Show, Mr. Kotok's brother-in-law.

Shortly after Dean Vaux's recommendation, Mr. and Mrs. Kotok drove with this interviewer to Palo Alto in order to make introductions and to sit in on the first session. Starting at first to use the interviews mainly as a supplement to his previous efforts to write down his memoirs, Mr. Show progressively included more and more completely fresh material such as the section on the Kings Canyon controversy and that on recreation and wilderness areas. The account of his United Nations contributions and perhaps other stories remain untold because of sudden complications which brought on his death the ninth of November 1963. Later the story of his FAO experience was recounted on tape by Edward Kotok in a sort of proxy interview which can be read in the Kotok transcript.

At each session Mr. Show was always primed and ready to go, welcoming the interviewer warmly and turning on (or unable to turn off) his wry wit for tape after tape. He did his homework; indeed, in most cases he had done it years before because of his natural interest in leaving a coherent and accurate record. Evidence of the unlimited vigor which had characterized his career could be seen in his reluctance to
end an interview when it was obvious to the interviewer that he was becoming fatigued.

His unpublished manuscripts have been made available to both Bancroft Library and the Forestry Library of the University of California either by Mr. Show himself, or, posthumously, by his daughter, Mrs. Barbara S. Volarvich. They include the eight-chapter work on the development of fire control in California, a lengthy history of the development of organization and personnel in Region Five (California), the Show-Brown History of California Rural Land Use and Management, and a personal account of the adventures, trials, and controversies of a young ranger named Show—a story begun after Mr. Show's retirement and at the behest of Chief of the Forest Service McArdle in 1955; it covers Show's early professional life to 1932.

The transcript appears here in unedited form, having been checked for errors by the Kotoks; the names were checked by Mr. Show in the interviewer's notes before the transcriptions were typed. The Project is indebted to the Regional Office of Region Five of the United States Forest Service for the photographs used for the Civilian Conservation Corps chapter.
The Regional Cultural History Project was established to tape record autobiographical interviews with persons who have been prominent in the recent history of Northern California. The Project is under the direction of Mrs. Willa Baum and under the administrative supervision of Assistant Librarian Julian Michel, and it is advised in its work by the Bancroft Library Subcommittee of the Library Committee of the University.

Amelia Roberts Fry
Interviewer, RCHP

22 December 1964

Regional Cultural History Project
Room 485, The General Library
University of California
Berkeley 4, California
INTRODUCTION

My Brother Bevier
by
Ruth Show Kotok*

There is always some element of mystery in digging into a personality in search of the motivations that formulate the adult character. Insofar as is possible at this late date, we can take a brief look at the childhood of Bevier Show as regards any hints that childhood influences played a profoundly important part in his personality and career.

Primarily, there is no question but that his father had a deep and lasting and in many ways a surprising influence on his adult life. Take the whole question of his feeling and love for nature. This is truly an intangible, but nevertheless a definite force. The earliest memories of the younger members of the family would, if assembled, show the effects of the personal efforts of his father to teach him not only a love for all living things but a deep personal interest in them as personal belongings.

*Mrs. Kotok is the wife of Edward I. Kotok and is Bevier Show's younger sister, six years his junior.
The effect of this influence was to stimulate the formation of nature "collections" from the very early years of his life. One of the first manifestations of this desire to own and keep was the construction of a large case of very shallow drawers (made of fine-grained redwood) for the storage of butterflies. This was not merely a collection--each and every specimen was correctly classified and labeled, dated and assigned its area of capture.

From butterflies his interest and collection went on to bird eggs, nests, and as he grew old enough to handle it, gunning for bird skins. This latter interest came gradually to be the basic one and was augmented by his securing a license for the collection of native birds. The curing and classification into accurate descriptions with the necessary problem of storage came to occupy one of the large sections of the family attic, locked carefully against intruders because of the use of arsenic in the treatment of the skins. However, nothing untoward ever happened in this regard and the collection grew through the years until he was forced to sell it when his own family expenses grew to a hazardous peak. (I am under the impression that it was sold then to the Academy of Sciences in San Francisco.)
Ruth, Bevier and Esther Show
1894
Another activity that brought Bevier close to his father was hunting—not merely for killing but for food. During the difficult time when Stanford University was all but destroyed by years of litigation and the loyal members of the faculty had to rely on credit with the little merchants of the then very small Palo Alto, Bevier and his dad became the food-suppliers for many meals by means of their mutual prowess with the shotgun.

It might be of interest to note here that the south bay area then was a part of the natural fly-way for duck and geese. Food was plentiful in the shallows of the "slough," as the marsh areas were called. Early in his residence at Stanford, Bevier's father organized the Palo Alto Gun Club, which maintained a primitive shelter on the edge of the bay designed to offer warmth and comfort before the dawn shooting hours began. At a very early age Bevier participated in these hunts, bringing home with the other members of the party as many duck as he could carry. There was no legal "limit" in those days, so the Show family ate duck and geese until they could, as they said, quack. The rest of his life, Bevier didn't relish duck meat. But this collaboration in the field with his father as joint providers was a deep and everlasting motivation for much
of his later extra-curricular activity. He did not eat much duck, but to the end he loved the companionship, the exhibition of skill and even the exposure to ruggedness of weather that are the normal aspects of hunting. Other than duck and geese, his hunts early began upland hunting; but he never relished deer meat and, so far as one can tell, only killed four-footed animals when food became necessary.

Besides hunting for food rather than merely for killing, Bevier at a very early age was initiated into the joys and skills of fishing. His father had spent much of his childhood in the Wisconsin rural country, and he and his brother Arthur had early been initiated into the pleasure of lake and stream. With Bevier, his father's tutelage took the form of genuine fishing skill. Before he could even handle a reel he was taught dry-fly casting. He progressed into the finer aspects of stream and lake fishing but never extended his skills as a boy into the realm of salt-water fishing.

At a rather early age he and other members of the family shared a rough summer camp in the redwood region just outside the rim of what is now Big Basin State Park, where a group of Stanford professors had established a series of water-side camps along the Pescadero Creek, well named for its finny
Professor Show with his children at their first Palo Alto home, 1896. Left to right: Javier, father, Ruth, and Esther
College Graduation, 1908

Bevier, his brother Joe, and his father, taken in 1904.
treasures. Here, also with no legal limit imposed, Bevier and his father whipped the lovely stream, bringing home the fighting trout of that then virgin area. Later, they packed together into the Lake Tahoe region and Fallen Leaf Lake, which was really rugged going in those days. But his lessons in packing, his handling of recalcitrant mules and horses, stood him in good stead in later years. In fact, during Bevier's professional career both while in Sisson and at the Feather River headquarters, his father often vacationed along with the field units that covered the high Sierra as far south as the Tuolumne country.

So the picture fills out, of a lad learning the sportsmanship of that era, the love and respect for living things, and above all, man's responsibility towards all the many elements of nature. With this, all through the formative years, into manhood and the assumption of adult responsibilities, this early closeness between father and son continued.

There was nothing of note other than these sketchily narrated aspects of his young years to guide one in estimating how and why he became a forester. Not until he entered Stanford and found his niche awaiting him in the Department of Systematic Botany under Professor Abrams. This was the
closest he could come to getting the botanical background
he wanted in order to become a forester. To his later
sorrow, he did not add to this curriculum any adequate
study of zoology. His knowledge of these aspects of nature
he picked up more or less informally. However, his interest
in birds and insects as well as a continuing study of butter­
flies added to the riches of the mind and remained a life­
long hobby.

To go back somewhat to the really formative years,
there obviously must have been other interests than the
outdoors. As a boy he shared in the neighborhood games of
informal baseball, races on the ever-present "bikes," etc.
There is no record of his very early introduction into the
universal hobby of stamp collecting. This interest remained
with him to the very end, a stimulating activity that brought
him much pleasure and enjoyment. Besides this hobby, he
early began playing chess with his father and later in compe­
tition as a University student with other college teams. His
liking for the game stayed with him long years, but didn’t get
as much attention after he became a householder and parent.
None of the rest of either his brothers and sisters or his
own children followed this bent. Added to these numerous
evidences of a lively and developing mind was the effort and time he devoted to the piano. Later, of course, most of this hobby had to be abandoned, but during many a professional meeting after he had arrived at man's full estate, he led the men in their ribald and good-natured spoofing by his playing the piano.

So far as knowledge of his professional growth and development go, this aspect of his life has been fully covered by others. I want to add what is a very personal phase of observation about his relationship with Ed. I. Kotok.

From childhood Bevier had been more than an average tease, and while I suppose there was the usual parental effort at restraint of these practices, I had been a ready and constant target. The elder sister in the family was completely immune to his ways, so consequently I suppose I got a great deal more than my share. It was often, I hate to admit, quite cruel, both physically and emotionally. Ridicule and other subtle weapons were frequent. It was daily expressed in our enforced piano practice in duets that I came to fear and hate bitterly. But there was no enforcement of fair play or allowance of permissiveness when it came to little sister. Eventually, years after I grew up and married, we were able to amiably
resume this musical cooperation and it did give a pleasant hobby to us both.

This brief reminder is cogent because much of his early relationship when first he started out on the Shasta Forest with E.I.K. had a recall of those early habits of very barbed teasing. There were, I suppose, reasons on both sides, but it took a number of years and a myriad of mutual experiences for this give-and-take to act as a binding rather than as a wedge between them. Then, and up to the last part of his life, the recall and memory of shared hazards and joint exploits gave them both (and their families) much amusement. There was a very close bind as a result, a mutual understanding that was possibly unique, for I don't recall any other two foresters who were quite that close and mutually tolerant and helpful.

There is one additional aspect of the overlapping and interweaving of the two careers—E.I.K. and S.B.S.: When the Experiment Station at Berkeley was established, there was a general feeling and understanding that S.B.S. would be chosen as director. After all, he had been for several years working in research and it was a natural advancement. Also S.B.S. had the mental equipment and temperament for the job. However, at about the same time, the position of
regional forester in the Region Five became vacant. In one of those switches that happens once in a lifetime, perhaps, S.E.S. was offered the Region Five job and E.I.K. that of the new directorship. All the reasons back of these choices I cannot give, but they no doubt are to be found among the data about their joint and separate careers.

At any rate, these two men saw in each other riches of mutual interest, no matter how separate their work might be, that grew and deepened with the years. The best years of both their lives were enriched and nourished by shared backgrounds that not many men are given to receive.

November 1964

Walnut Creek, California
Dear Mrs. Try,

Please let us express our appreciation for your work with our father, S. B. Show. He was vitally interested in our project, and your visits were looked forward to very eagerly. No doubt they kept him going longer than he would otherwise have done.

Sincerely,

The Show Family
(herb Show Clarke)
(Barbara Valentine)

Forester
Stuart B. Show Dies

Stuart B. Show, who devoted his life to work with the U.S. Forestry Service and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, died Saturday night in Palo Alto Hospital. He was 77. A 1909 graduate of Stanford University, Mr. Show was the son of Arley B. Show, who joined the Stanford faculty as a history professor when the university was founded.

After graduation, Mr. Show attended Yale University where he earned his master's degree in forestry, and in 1910 joined the U.S. Forestry Service.

At his retirement in 1946, he had for 20 years been district forester in California. Afterward, he worked for three years as chief of the Forestry Branch for the United Nations.

He was a Fellow of the Society of American Foresters, a member of the California Academy of Science, of the Cosmos Club in Washington, D.C., and of the Sierra Club, and had written several scientific and technical journals on forestry.

SURVIVORS

Mr. Show is survived by three daughters, Mrs. Peter S. Volavich of Los Altos, Mrs. Charles Clark of Pasadena and Elizabeth S. Beals of Santa Clara; and three sisters, Mrs. Edward Koto of Walnut Creek, Esther Hopkins of Santa Cruz and Mary Show of San Jose. There are seven grandchildren.

Funeral services will be conducted at 3 p.m. tomorrow (Tuesday) in the chapel of Roller and Hapgood, 830 Middlefield Road, Palo Alto. Burial will be at Alta Mesa Memorial Park, Palo Alto.

The family asks that memorial donations be directed to the Stuart B. Show Memorial Scholarship Fund, School of Forestry, the University of California.
602 Casita Way
Los Altos, Calif.
Feb. 18, 1964

Dear Mrs. Fry:

I have wanted to write you ever since last passed along in November, but everything had been so rushed up I just haven't been able to get to it. If you have talked with Mr. Klotz (and I'm sure you have) you'll be able to understand.

Well, the family will always be grateful that you were able to spend so much of what Dad did in the pioneering of forestry in California. You must have a very special talent to have been able to do all this we still make Dad enjoy it.

Mr. Klotz had told me that these maps would be available if we wanted them. I wish certainly do, but don't know how much the cost would be. If you
Could find time to send me this information. I'd send you a check to cover.

Again, a very special "thanks" for your fine work.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

(Mrs. P. J.)
Endowment Fund Set For Forestry School

A new endowment fund in the University of California School of Forestry has been established in the memory of the late Stuart Bevier Show, long-time regional forester for the U.S. Forest Service in San Francisco.

The Memorial Fund was set up by the Show family and friends in recognition of Mr. Show's lifelong leadership in the devotion to conservation of California's forest resources, said Dean Henry J. Vaux of the University's School of Forestry here.

Dean Vaux said it is hoped to build the memorial fund by additional contributions to the point where income from it will make possible grant awards to outstanding forestry students.

From a beginning in 1906 as a day laborer on the Shasta National Forest, Stuart Bevier Show went on to a bachelor of science degree from Stanford and a master's degree in Forestry at Yale. He became a technical forest assistant on the Shasta forest in 1910 and devoted his next 36 years to service in the California region of the Forest Service. He was named regional forester at San Francisco in 1926.

The widely known forest researcher and conservationist left the service in 1946 to become deputy director and chief silviculturist in the forestry and forest products branch of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.

His close relationship with the University's School of Forestry during his years as regional forester led to establishment of the memorial fund. After his retirement he lived in Palo Alto but made much use of the University's Forestry Library in Berkeley in connection with his writing.

Originators of the Show Scholarship fund provided that income from it is to be used for "awards to students in the School of Forestry who display the potentials and talents for the kind of conservation leadership which Mr. Show's career exemplified."

The Dean will select winners of the awards on recommendations from the School of Forestry faculty.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERVIEW I</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 11, 1963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Emergency Relief Work</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry is Prepared for CCC in California</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Civilian Conservation Corps Gets Organized</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of Camps and Work Programs</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Government Agencies Get CCC</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics Looms Up</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Buying of Machinery</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC Gets Underway</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Suppression Program</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help of Expedite</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERVIEW II</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 19, 1963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATION OF THE CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Control</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponderosa Way Solves the Problem of Useful Winter Work</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Detection Plan</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC and the 1933 Fire Season</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive Public Dependency on CCC</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results of CCC</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pack Trip with Generals Marshall and Arnold</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTERVIEW III
August 1, 1963

RECREATION USE OF NATIONAL FORESTS 139
Special Use Summer Home 145
Tourist Use and Wilderness Areas 150
Recreational Inventory, 1936 168

INTERVIEW IV
August 16, 1963

BACKGROUND AND EVENTS OF KINGS CANYON CONTROVERSY 175
Period of Cooperation Between National Parks and National Forests 175
High Sierra Forests -- for People or Sheep? 180
Pressure for More National Park Areas 185
The Kings Canyon Battle 195
Basic Issues in the Fight 208

PARTIAL INDEX 212
INTERVIEW I

July 11, 1963

THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS
Shasta National Forest, Castella ECW Camp P-7 (November 1933). CCCs building Mt. Bradley Lookout Station.
INTERVIEW I
July 11, 1963
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS
California Emergency Relief Work

Fry: According to my notes, your correct title after 1926 was "Regional Forester" in charge of the California national forests. Is that right?

Show: It was technically "District Forester" at the time those events took place. It was changed to "Regional Forester" when the CCC began, so I suggest you just record me as Regional Forester. I had had at the time of CCC seven years in that assignment, so I was not exactly a green kid anymore.

Fry: I understand the state of California had a kind of emergency conservation corps before CCC, and you were in on that from the very beginning?

Show: Oh, yes.

To me, this begins with the Great Depression. The vast number of working men who just didn't have jobs anymore. There was no public program of any kind to take care of them. They were not an object of public concern. They had no jobs, and they had to survive. So during the years from 1928, antedating the official depression, we
began to get a wave of incendiary fires, obviously set for jobs, in areas where we had not had such things. In the Lassen forest, for example. The same gangs of homeless, jobless men would show up at those fires, and it was clear they were being set. That of course got worse and worse during ensuing years, and by the end of 1932, particularly in the big cities where these seasonal working men went to winter, actually beginning in 1931, their situation was desperate. They were sleeping in doorways, pilfering fruit and vegetable stands, walking the streets. Their best hope was to get thrown in jail, actually. In San Francisco, some minister with executive ability and a warm heart organized a free chow line, which fed once a day. One of the places was across from the Ferry Building. I could look out from my office and see these men parading in the rain or otherwise for a bowl of stew. This minister got discarded meats, discarded vegetables. It wasn't fancy and it wasn't tasty, but they got to fill their bellies at least once a day, and if they
Show: wanted to go through the line twice, that was all right.

If a man was hungry enough to do that, he needed the food.

Well, that still wasn't enough, and in late '31 a
guy called Rex Black organized and pushed through the
California state emergency program for employment. He
was then a member of the state Board of Forestry, and in
his private employment was executive secretary of the
California Forest Protective Association, which had for
its object to protect the lumber industry from undesirable
legislation. But he was a pusher, and he got it done.
This was under Governor Rolph.

[Reading]

"In the fall of 1931, those in charge of relief
work in California recognized that the problem of the
itinerant, of which large numbers had, in normal times,
floated into the country in the winter with their savings,
was changed from that of dealing with men who could largely
pay their way, to that of supplying the necessities of life
to a very greatly increased number of destitute men. This
threw an unwarranted burden on the local charity agencies."
Since there were no federal funds at that time for relief, the state was the next agency to which an appeal could be made. It was a serious social problem, demanding action.

"It was proposed that work camps be set up in forest and brush covered areas to house the single, transient unemployed, and that fire prevention and fire control projects be undertaken," -- that's the origin of the conservation work, "thus using the labor on productive work and the men would be housed and fed and kept from wandering about.

"Governor Rolph was keenly interested in the idea. He appointed committees of local, state and federal officials; S.R. Black, Secretary of the California Forest Protective Association, got things moving. The state made $110,000 available; the Forest Service spent $14,000 plus contributed time of its men and use of its equipment. The California Protective Association spent $3,300 in cash contributions.

"The first camp was set up in the snow in the South
Show: Fork of the Merced River in the Stanislaus Forest in December, 1931, and manned by a crew picked up from the bread lines of San Francisco. By February there were 28 camps in operation, scattered from the Coast redwood region to the Mexican border. They were closed in April, 1932, after having cared for 2,650 men and accomplishing satisfactory work on fire lines, trails, hazard reduction and road building."

Fry: Why were they closed?

Show: They ran out of money.

"This camp program was, in fact, a model for the New Deal program, and began work on what later became 'Ponderosa Way' fireline." Now, this is the end of insert one.

Forestry is Prepared for the CCC in California

What I have mentioned is the degree of real preparedness that the California region had built up over the years, so that when we expanded operations, I should say a hundred times, for CCC, we were prepared, by not having to flounder around and say, "Oh, my God, we've got to find this out --"

Kotok: Each forest was required to set up a plan long before
Kotok: there was any provision for work. Show required his supervisors, way in advance of any other regional forester, to have advance plans of work if and when an expanded program occurred. In these plans Show required them to consider the physical tasks that had to be done in order to secure better fire protection, in the first place, and second, approaches to recreational areas and better timber exploitation, and even improvements on ranges to utilize them better.

Show: This insert deals with the basic preparedness that existed in this region when CCC broke.

"No one knew at the time that this calamity" -- that was the great fire at Matilija in September, 1932 -- "signaled the end of the foregoing 28-year period during which the region was poverty-ridden in preparedness and able to write blank checks at will in suppression. Mr. Roosevelt's election to the presidency was impending, and his ideas about conservation work as a means of breaking the depression had been announced. Had top Forest Service leadership not been politically myopic and naive, the vast effort of the Copeland Report might have been diverted to

*A National Plan for American Forestry, 73rd Congress, 1 Session, Senate Documents No. 12, Serials 9740, 9741.
Show: the planning of a really solid work program.

"The California Region and Station had put in the foundation and part of the framework for such planning. Hour control requirements for major types in the north were worked out, and attack strength needs were being tested." That is, how many men do you send to a fire? "The risk areas had been mapped." That's where fires start. "Techniques for planning detection and transportation systems were worked out." Cooperatively, between the region and the station. "Really effective working relations between Region and Station were routine. The basic tool for fast and cheap production of fire roads -- the trail builder --" a big ten-ton tractor with a fully adjustable blade in front so that the machine can go on the steepest slopes and build its own road ahead of itself -- "had been perfected. Specs for most types of improvements were established. There was relatively little guessing as to what the task of fire control preparedness was and how to do it.
Show: "The top management team dealing with fire control was strong, well-balanced, aggressive and imaginative. The corps of Supervisors, Rangers and Staff contained many men of seasoned managerial skill, capable of expanding mere size of operations surefootedly and effectively."

Not all of them were. [Laughter]

"Since 1925 the Region had restored the traditional hiring policy, stupidly abandoned for a decade, and brought in junior technicians, subjected them to diverse work experiences and pressures, and exposed them to formal in-service training. The Station had worked and appraised a large number of junior technicians on its projects. The cream of a large crop of these young men was ready and indeed crowding for a place in the sun as managers of big planning projects, staff officers dealing with operation management, assistant supervisors, supervisors.

"Technicians skilled in project layout and construction of all sorts of improvements had been developed. There was a large, generally competent and dependable body of the short-term employees -- guards, lookouts, construction and maintenance foremen."
Kotok: Many of the graduates of the forestry school found themselves without jobs. The first opportunity for direct extra money that the station or the region received, we recruited these forestry graduates who were without jobs and gave them these temporary jobs. We trained them specifically in such research jobs in which they could apply their skills later as administrators.

Show: Part of the story is the initial testing of these young men on Wieslander's cover typemap, and their transferring to planning jobs.

"By no means all of the non-technical and technical men in the supervisor, assistant supervisor, staff, ranger, technician and guard ranks were capable of expanding the scope, range and level of their performance. But there existed great assets of knowledge and of people prepared to apply it. The problem was by no means solved, but the never-ending series of challenge and response had laid the basis for a major leap ahead in fire control.

"The great defect was the partial financing of the known things that needed to be done." Amen.
Fry: Then you didn't have the problem of finding adequate supervision for these tasks.

Show: Well, we did have that problem, but we had an awful lot of knowhow about it all. We had a corps of men that we knew about that we could throw into this thing when it blew up in our faces.

The Civilian Conservation Corps Gets Organized

Here I want to read again. "The CCC Act of March 31, 1933, was the first positive step" -- this was the beginning of the CCC story as such. What I've given heretofore is background."-- dreamed up by President F.D. Roosevelt as a measure to combat depression, prime the pump, and replace hopelessness by hope. It was to be a real and notable achievement of the swift-paced 'first hundred days' of his term.

"It fell like a bomb on the higher leadership of the Forest Service -- even more so on the leadership of other interested bureaus. The Regional Foresters were hastily summoned to Washington to determine what was to be done about it all, though some -- Kelly, Kircher and I -- had just finished long stints on the Copeland Report. The
Show: Regional Foresters didn't have worked-out programs -- but their ideas were expansive." [Laughing] Here was the gravy train.

Fry: In other words, this was just what you'd been wanting.

Kotok: Dreaming about and hoping for. [Laughter]

Show: "The President appointed the late Robert E. Fechner, a labor leader from Boston, as boss of the project, a sop to organized labor which was unhappy about the $30 a month wage rate." That was the wage rate of the so-called enrollees. "'Uncle Bob' was a lovable, cooperative and amiable elderly gentleman, quite unhampered by any knowledge of conservation, but disposed to accept the Regional Foresters as the fountain heads of wisdom, which the Regional Foresters didn't discourage.

"To recapture the sense of desperate urgency of the day it is necessary only to recall the belief 'in the highest quarters'" -- that meant the President, because he said so -- "that rioting in the cities was imminent. Perhaps that is why the President decided to put the Army in charge of camps, and perhaps that shrewd mind saw also
Show: that such a course would leave organized labor less to
object to, since, at that time, the wage of soldiers
and non-coms bore no relation to 'going' wage rates.
The President had his own ideas - some were changed

"The President granted an audience to the Regional
Forester group, emphasized the need for speed, said firmly
this was a six-months' project only, bade all do their
stuff." Of the nine regional foresters, six went in
there overawed and tongue-tied by the audience with the
President of the United States, and they just stood.
Three of us, Evan Kelly of the Northern Rockies, Earl
Tinker of the lake states, and Bevier Show of the Cali-
ifornia region, weren't overawed and tongue-tied. "Some
of the Regional Foresters got questions and ideas in
edgewise." The President said, [reading] "Yes, all the
legally authorized activities of the work agencies could
be done." We were thinking in terms of the Forest Service,
don't make any mistake. "Yes, we might need to acquire
more land as National Forests so there would be more room
for more camps."
Kotok: Among the regional foresters each had his qualities. Show and Tinker — these are my comments — were land acquirers. Tinker had started in a new region and he wanted to acquire more land for national forests in the lake states, and Show had that disease of expanding the national forests for a long time. They had already laid the groundwork to the President that in order to carry on CCC work, they would need a lot more land. Tinker's position was probably more pertinent than that of Show.

Show: "No," the President said firmly, "the Army would run the camps, though Kelly and I brashly urged that Forest Service experience with big fire camps and depression work camps fully qualified it to run the works." We just wanted to have full control. [Laughing]

After the meeting was dismissed, by the President lighting a new cigarette, Evan Kelly and I went out and got hold of little Louis McHendrick Howe, the President's secretary. He was a funny little monkey-like gnome of a man, with
Show: perennially bad health, and we piled into him and made our pitch, why it was important that the Forest Service should run the show. And he listened to us, very friendly, very sympathetic, and said, "Well, I agree with you, men. I don't think the boss will, but I'll try it on him." So he tried it on him and got the word, and later that afternoon he phoned over and said, "Well, I'm sorry, I tried my best but no go. The Army runs the camps." So that was that.

Fry: What was the reason for wanting the Army to do it?

Show: Well, as I've explained, he said "riots in the cities," and that would be the Army's turkey, of course. And he wanted to give a sort of a sop to labor. Anything run by the Army didn't have its wage rates set on the basis of going wages.

Kotok: The Army too was without jobs. There were a lot of reserve officers that he called in; otherwise they would have had no jobs at all. Not foreseeing a war in the future, he was anxious to see as many of the reserve officers --

Show: He was going to lose his reserve officers.
Show: The President said enrollees could come mostly from the big cities. That was where the problem was most acute. And they would be selected by the Labor Department. He said work would be done by hand; enrollees would be unskilled, and the available work would absorb more labor that way. Foremanship would come from the corps. Some kid from the West Virginia coal fields.

We regional foresters looked at each other. It was clear that "some ameliorating changes in the general specs had to be wangled." Very clear. I say it without immodesty, I hope, that only two of us, Kelly and I, were willing to take on the general problems of this project and work on it. The others were concentrating on what they were going to get and how they were going to use it, and they had no part in it at all.

"Kelly and I worked out, with Frank Persons of the Labor Department, the prescription for 'local experienced men'" -- Persons was a very capable, extremely friendly man, and we worked one night till about midnight on this --
Show: "the l.e.m.'s -- on the basis that they depended on the Forest Service for employment and would be able to teach the enrollees useful handicrafts and keep them from injuring themselves." These were the men who normally would have been hired by the Forest Service, as fire guards and workers on construction projects and all that sort of thing. Our seasonal employees. We got them in on the basis that they depended on the Forest Service for employment and that they would be able to teach the enrollees. Frank Persons and Kelly and I took turns dictating and finally we got a document of justification, and "Persons put it across." So we got the l.e.m.'s.

Then we couldn't accept the fact that the leaders, the foremen, were going to come from the enrollees. It simply would have meant chaos and confusion in the work. "Kelly worked out the classification structure for camp overhead" that would satisfy us and would make the project go. That was called, very neatly I thought, "facilitating personnel." Well, then we went over and saw Uncle Bob,
Show: who "put it across on the basis of getting more and better work, and having a 'rank deals with rank' setup in camps." That's one of the precepts of military camps.

Fry: You mean between the Army and the Forest Service?

Show: Yes.

Then there remained the problem of getting machinery. Here we had this magnificent trail builder and a whole battery of high-powered machinery that would replace the work of fifty men. We had to get that authorized. So we invited Uncle Bob to a nice luncheon at the Cosmos Club. My colleagues had said, "Bevier, you go ahead and put it up to him." So I scratched my head and I put it up on the grounds that "increased and efficient production of roads would be a factor in enrollee morale," that is, they'd see things being done, "and they would be trained for civilian employment." Most of these kids had no training whatever. They had lived in a world closed to them as far as work went.

Fry: As I understand it, training them for civilian employment
Fry: when the economic situation bettered, was not a part of the picture up to this point.

Show: That's correct. We developed the idea and I made the initial song and dance, and Evan Kelly pitched in. And we breathed a sigh of relief when Uncle Bob -- who by the way was a machinists' union labor leader and therefore sympathetic -- accepted it, and he put it across to the President.

Kotok: This labor leader that Show has described to you, who I personally got to meet and to love, practically, had a way of getting to the President that is very difficult to explain. He was not very vocal, but he was dedicated to carrying out the desires of the President, and he had an entrée there that none of us ever suspected.

Show: I got to know him pretty well, Ed, and I asked him. "Why," he said, "I just go over to see the President and I say, 'Mr. President, I've studied this matter very carefully and we need to authorize the Forestry'" -- that's what he called us, the Forestry -- "'to do it this way. They know
their job, they know how to go at it, and this will help your program very much." The President was very well aware of public appeal. And that's how he did it, with sincerity and simplicity.

**Distribution of Camps and Work Programs**

You must remember that this originally was a forestry program. The President imagined himself as a great forester, and there were various claimant agencies of which the first and mostest was the Forest Service. There was the Biological Survey, the Bureau of Fisheries, the National Park Service, and others, all excessively timid, but there had to be some work. The President said there would be 500,000 young men -- and good God. The camps were going to be 218 men per camp -- an Army company. Who was going to get the camps? I took on the job of working out a scientific method for distributing the camps.

**Kotok:** It wasn't completely objective; I don't think the Forest Service suffered by it.

**Show:** The Forest Service did not suffer by it, because I worked out the answer backwards, you see. [Laughter]
Show: I took unassailable things, like the areas of public lands involved, the estimated program of the bureau involved, and the Forest Service had scores and scores of millions of dollars of urgent work to be done.

Fry: It's not clear how you got on the committee to do this work, Mr. Show.

Show: Well, during this time the regional foresters would be scrambling and scratching around, and once or twice a day we'd get together very informally, and someone would say, "What about this?" Then they'd say, "Bevier, you take this job," or "Evan, you take that job. See what you can make of it." It wasn't a highly formal setup. In other words, the regional foresters who were not taking an active part in what I call these general welfare things, which affected the whole project, were informed about them and had a voice in saying, "We've got to get this work out."

Kotok: You remember, Mrs. Fry, that I related that one of the important things in the Forest Service is the field units, who sometimes fight against what I call the "college of cardinals," the men immediately under the Chief. They
Kotok: had a lot of power and they were encouraged to be active participants in program building and analysis. So historically when the regional foresters met collectively in Washington they were given and assumed a lot of power in order directly to work with the Chief and not through the channels of the assistant chiefs. That power is very important and probably distinguishes the Forest Service from other bureaus. The more daring regional foresters would take leadership in propounding their proposals and would defend them in open court, when the regional foresters met with the Chief and the assistant chiefs.

Show: During this whole time, nobody in the Washington office, including the Chief, had anything whatever to do with all this development. As a matter of courtesy we'd tell poor Bob Stewart what we were working on and how it would help the project and he'd say, "Yes, yes, that's fine." And Roy Headley, who should have been chief of operations, went around wringing his hands saying, "Oh,
Show: we can't do that. It's unsound financial policy."

Kotok: He was a penny pincher.

Show: Then, of course, the problem of division of camps within the Forest Service arose, and that was worked out among the regions by the regional foresters, "chiefly on the basis of their imagination, aggressiveness and capacity to think in terms of the 'camp month' -- 218 men 25 days -- as the unit of labor. The California Region initially had an allocation of 165 camps."

That was primarily my job, but I didn't go to these men and say, "Well, how many camps do you think you want?"

I said, "I've studied the figures available, the estimated cost to complete your systems and the areas involved, and it seems to me about 35 camps, which will give you at least two per national forest, 400 young men with good leadership." The two weakest sisters, they had about 18-20 forests each, national forests, so I said I thought about 35 camps would do it. "You can pick that up and make the thing go." They'd wriggle around a little bit.

*Other regional foresters.
Show: and say, "Oh, yes, that'd be fine." So down they went for 35 or 40 camps, and I ended up with 165. That's what was left.

Kotok: I think Region 5 and Region 1, which was Kelly, had probably gone farther in working out work loads than any of the other regions, so they had criteria by which they could work out the magnitude of manpower needed. Show also understood that the experiment stations were expanding then and wanted to expand further in developing experimental forests. Show had made provision that out of the regions should come a sufficient number of camps allocated to do the work on the experimental forests within each region. So out of that formula California got experimental forests -- the San Dimas, the Stanislaus, Kings River, Blacks Mountain, and the San Joaquin Range. Some of the other regions had no plans for their experiment stations and they had to wait 'way later to get any help.

Fry: Can you make any comparisons with the plans of Oregon
Fry: and Washington?

Show: Well, they were deficient in their level of planning. They got a lot of camps, I don't know how many, because there was a huge lot of work obviously, but the regional forester wasn't aggressive. He didn't have any ideas at all. C.J. Buck. I think he got a hundred or so. It sounds like a magnificent sum, but we had several hundred camps.

"Late on a Friday afternoon word came over from the White House that, since the Regional Foresters had had several days to prepare plans and programs, the President wanted on his desk Monday morning (a) a map showing exactly where each camp would be located; (b) a detailed work program for each camp for six months." We had two whole days. The regional foresters immediately got together. Most of them were saying, "What'll we do? We can't do that. There's not enough time." Well, with Franklin D. Roosevelt, he wasn't very sympathetic about being stalled, and we knew that. Anyway, we got together and the gang said, "Well, Evan and Bevler, you've got to
Show: figure out how we're going to get this job done."

[Reading] "So the leaders within the Regional Forester corps" -- I modestly refer to myself as one -- "decided to use the General Land Office state maps -- scale about twelve miles to one inch -- and to show camps by a circle scaling about six miles in diameter."

[Laughing] You see, I had about 165 camps, and I distributed them tastefully over the map. [Laughter] I had conferred by telegraph and telephone with Bob and Jay -- Bob Deering, my chief of operations, and Jay Price, my fire control man and a supremely good man -- saying, "I propose to distribute the 165 camps as follows: Los Angeles 17, San Bernardino 16, Modoc 4, and so on. Give me your ideas about the distribution between forests." I had to have that before I could start my beautiful map. Oh, it was beautiful. It just showed camps practically -- it was a lovely thing.

Anyway, they came back and they said, "No, we think there ought to be five on the Modoc, 15 on the San Bernardino--" So they made small changes. I resume reading.
The result was a beautiful and well-distributed pattern -- the locations broad enough to give the local officers room to work later on. Of course, Regional Foresters hit the long distance to confer with their Chiefs of Operation. For California, Price, Deering and I agreed on the number of camps for each forest, and I distributed them tastefully on the map. "I'm not a very good draftsman, but I really got a beautiful-looking thing."

At the same time we had to devise a "camp work sheet form," which would list in detail each project, how many man-months it would take, and so on. Well, if you figure, this was late Friday afternoon, and the girls had to have it for typing sometime--I had 165 camps. If you put a half-hour on each camp that'd be 80 hours, and there weren't 80 hours. I could put in maybe ten minutes on a camp -- 1,650 minutes. Anyway, we did it, and listed in detail all the projects and how much labor it would take. "As to California, selection and naming of projects and estimating labor requirements had to be done mostly by me."
Evan Kelly, for example, was phoning interminably to Stockdale to wrangle about how many man-days — oh, God; he got nowhere that way. "Naturally and inevitably, protection got the great bulk of projects, since vastly more study of protection improvement needs had been done than for timber, range, recreation or wildlife." And as I said, we thought there was liberal provision for station work. "This imbalance was later a subject of debate and criticism, founded on abstract ideas of forestry 'needs' rather than on a realistic understanding of readiness."

As I said earlier, we considered that we were ready on fire control. We were not ready on the other activities, and the chiefs of divisions were as bewildered as anybody in the whole show. Jesse Nelson, Woodbury —

"Project labor estimates were definite and firm and highly approximate. The main thing was to balance the books on each camp sheet." I got my 165 done and turned them in to copy. The others wangled through, except one guy. "Stenos beat typewriters till far into Sunday night, and a massive load of impressive documents went to the
Show: Executive desk on schedule. The President approved by
journal," that is, he gets a long list of the camps and all that, and he signs his name once and that means he's approved the whole business, "and word came back that he was pleased with the breadth and completeness of the plans. It is true that Forest Supervisors later had difficulty in recognizing projects on their own forests," [laughing] because I had to work fast; I had to put in in less than ten minutes a six-months' period per camp, and you don't dawdle around and have long arguments with yourself, "in harmonizing labor estimates, in understand­ing why pet local projects had been omitted -- and in other such small matters. But by then 'adjustments' in the original programs and estimates were the accepted thing."

One of my colleagues, Frank Pooler, of the south-western region, about the time I was finishing up my 165 camps he came around and he had made no project of his 35. He was just bewildered and confused. He says, "Bevier, can you help me?" I says, "Sure, Frank." "Well," he says -- he did have sort of a distribution of his camps, by forests.
Show: I didn't know his country, so I said, "Well, what about this country?" He said, "We've got a new yellow pine insect, and we ought to do something about that." So we put in a figure for that. Then I said, "Well, Frank, what roads do you need?" "Well, we've got to have one from here to there." "Is it a pretty big job?" "Oh, yes, it's a pretty big job." So I'd put it in, and in two or three hours of brotherly work like that I helped Frank get his camp projects finished up, and he was so relieved and happy about it all. He had never thought in terms of big projects. We had had to think out here of big operations, to do something big about fire control. I mention that not as bragging but as something of the background of how this job was done.

Fry: Then you could make adjustments in men and camp projects after it got started, right?

Show: Yes.

Fry: And the allocation of men to your camps in California was adequate?
Show: Oh, yes.

Other Government Agencies Get CCC

Now we come to the way the state forestry departments got in on it. "Fairly early in all this hectic scramble, the late William Howard, who had served as State Forester while F.D.R. was Governor of New York, sold the idea" to the President "that the states, through their forestry organizations, should benefit from the program, and a new horde of claimants showed up." Believe me. "From California came George Cecil to protect successfully the interests of Los Angeles County." I undertook the job of protecting the poor weak sister Pratt, who was state forester. It would have been no use to confer with him. "Regional Foresters either negotiated with their opposite members, or told them how many camps they could have." In the East, the state forestry departments are more important than the Forest Service. In the West, the regional foresters did the telling. "Thus 34 camps were authorized for the California State Division of Forestry. Pechnner and the President approved the resulting recommendations." So that was that.
I want to add a footnote here. We had considered the allocation of camps for the Biological Survey -- this was before the Fish and Game Commission. They were due such things as porcupine eradication, poisoning the rodents on the range. So we got word to them that any plans they might make would be sympathetically considered. I got a rather frenzied call from no less than the chief of the Biological Survey, who said he had to see me at once. I was doing about four different things, but I said all right. He came over, sort of with his hat in his hand, and he said, "Now, we have some very important projects that we think ought to be done." I said, "Oh, what are they and why are they," and all that. "Well," he says, "You take the Modoc forest, for instance. We ought to have ten men" -- ten men [laughing] -- "and they give us a 218-man camp to work on porcupine eradication." They chew the tops off young pines. I said, "Well, yes." So then he said, "On the eastern part of the Lassen forest is a terrible problem -- rodents destroying some of the good ranges. It's going to take at least twenty men and, oh, I don't know, maybe $2,000 for poison."
Show: I just sat back and looked at him. I said,

"Now, in the other national forest regions is this about the way your more urgent projects run, Mr. Director?"

He said, "Yes, that's about the way it is."

"Well," I said, "I tell you, I'll see to it that each regional forester undertakes to provide your needs."

And this director said, "Of course, we have some very skilled men, and we'll take care of getting them enrolled in some way or another in the camps so they can work out of one of the Forest Service camps, and you can go ahead about your job."

And I thought, Well, good God, here's a supposedly major federal bureau and that's the level of their thinking about this business.

Kotch: How did the Park Service get in?

Show: They paddled their own canoe pretty much. They came in from the start.

Fry: In what position were you to decide on a national level?

Show: Well, I was given the job of working out that beautiful formula for the distribution of camps between the work.
Show: agencies -- each bureau was a work agency. I had the
gall, or something of the sort, to get it accepted. The
Park Service got a fair cut, of course.

طول: The Soil Conservation Service didn't come in at that
time, or the others?

Show: No, they came in later.

Another project got so it had to be handled, and
that was the financing of the non-labor needs. The pay-
roll for the enrollees and the military was allocated to
the Army. We had gotten the basic specs down pretty
well. We had machinery, we had overhead set up, we had
the local experienced men who would normally be employed.
The general specs were reasonably workable, but they left
unanswered "two vital questions: (1) how much money
would be available for overhead, material, tools and
equipment; and (2) working relations with the Army.

"The first question was assigned to E.W. Loveridge
and me. Loveridge was an imaginative and daring Operation
Assistant in the Washington Office." We went about getting
Show: a very impersonal and scientific formula. I remember we worked that out one Sunday and came up "with an impressively documented proposal for $7,500 per camp month" -- that would be allocated to the work agency, you see, for these supplemental expenses -- "which, after some muttering, was approved by high authority."

Kotck: We spoke of Headley, who was then assistant chief of operations. Loveridge, who worked under him, had considerable difficulty in winning over Headley to accept that kind of expenditure. It was very fortunate that Loveridge appeared on the scene at that time, because working with Headley would have been almost impossible without him.

Show: It was found "that this was not an unduly restrictive sum" because my chief of operation Bob Deering saved half a million dollars per month on the California National Forest camps -- that is, he saved two-thirds of this per camp month. And that was after "liberal provision was made for camp needs. The savings financed material for the big housing, warehousing and telephone
Show: construction programs." When Bob came to me and said, "What'll I do with this money?" I said, "Keep it! Never give away a penny or I'll personally choke you." So in two or three months we had a lot of money stacked up to our credit.

Working relations with Army were solved -- mostly in the field.

"Reaching understandings with the Army was a far more complex matter. In Washington there was worked out with the Chief Finance Officer of the Army a reasonable compromise on forms and procedures to be used in vouchering and auditing -- since Army acted as paymaster." Our chief finance officer, I've forgotten his name, had got into a head-on collision with the chief finance officer of the Army, who was a clerk with an eagle on his shoulder. They just couldn't agree on anything. Our man demanded full control and the Army man demanded full control. So Loveridge and I again took on the job of seeing if we could do anything about it. We met with the head of that whole section of Army work,
Shaw: General Coleman, who was a big, impressive, friendly sort of a guy. I didn't demand anything, I simply said, "We believe that we can do this and this part of the job satisfactorily, and we'd like to feel that we have some part in this whole thing." He said, "I think so too."

And he turned to his little clerk with an eagle on his shoulder and said, "Now, you work that out with the Forest Service. I think that's reasonable." And we got enough to save face. That's what it largely was about, saving face, you know.

Fry: So this made a difference?

Shaw: Oh, yes, it made a difference. It gave us a part, and made the clerks feel good.

Fry: I'd like to ask you a question on the initial stages of this. I understand that particularly in the Northwest some of the foresters felt that it would have been better if all this had been put under the Clarke-McNary Act [1924], that they perhaps could have gotten more technically trained labor and so forth. Did you run up against this?
Show: No. Not at all. I think it's a false idea, myself.

The states came in, you see, and we had to be guide, counselor, and mother to them.

In Washington we'd never see the chief of staff. He'd send word, and word came that the Army had decided "to put the Commanding Generals of the nine Corps Areas in command [of the program], and asked for an experienced Forest Officer as liaison" -- the Army is very strong on liaison on such things -- "at each headquarters to represent all the work agencies. Assistant Regional Forester Morse of Region Four" -- the intermountain region -- "was selected for the Ninth Corps and did a magnificent job" of representing the work agencies with the Army. And it was a hectic job, too.

"Before the Regional Foresters departed, they drew up a long list of questions about Army-Work Agency relations which would have to be answered. Since Ninth Corps [at the Presidio in San Francisco] covered most of the West, I was delegated by my fellows to deal with the
Commanding General on behalf of the western Regional Foresters." Immediately when I got home a date was made and I and some of my staff appeared and the commanding general appeared with his staff.

"The late General Malin Craig proved to be a very able officer of the broadest calibre, concerned to make the project fully successful, and willing to meet the needs of the work agencies as fully as possible." He was later chief of staff, which was some measure of his ability and competence, and held very high reputation within the Army. "With him it was easy to reach agreements, which were promptly and effectively made the law for his six District Commanders in California, each of whom had responsibility for camps of all so-called 'work agencies' in his area."

We met, and I had this list of questions. And I said, "General, one thing that concerns me is that of spike camps -- that is, camps away from the main base camp. You people probably don't even like the idea, but
Show: they're necessary in our farflung operations so that
we can make the camps fully effective in carrying out
our work program." Which we'd worked out so carefully.

[Laughter]

And General Craig would say, "Well, yes, I think
you people should reach an agreement with my camp commanders
and district commanders." He said, "I'm going to set up
districts in the state, each in charge of a senior
officer" -- majors and colonels in the regular Army, most
of them -- "and they'll deal with a group of your camps
within a certain prescribed territory. I want you to
put in a liaison officer at each of the headquarters so
that he can handle things for you in the work agencies."
I said, "Fine, we'll do it." And he said, "Then either
the district commander or the camp commander will study
the needs for spike camps, and if you don't like it you
can appeal to me." I said, "Fine and dandy." So that
was that.

Then there was the question of the status of our
overhead in camps. Were they, for instance, going to eat
Show: with the hired hands or were they going to have a table and service of their own so that they'd be equivalent to the military? Of course, they couldn't do anything different, so that was that.

I went down the line with my 28 questions.

Kotok: Discipline was very important.

Fry: Who did discipline the corps?

Kotok: We left it to the Army. We didn't want any of that. We disciplined our own men and they disciplined the enrollees.

Show: Anyway, I went down the line and the general would say, "Yes." One or two he'd say, "I don't think I can do that." Then we'd go on. And at the end -- maybe a couple of hours for all this, and I of course had made notes -- I said, "Well, now, I have a suggestion, General. I'll go back and I'll dictate to you a memorandum saying we've discussed these things and have reached the following joint conclusions. I'll send it up to you by messenger and if you'll send a simple covered letter saying,
Show: Yes, this represents our joint agreement. Or if I've misunderstood you can specify those things." He says, "Fine."

Well, I galloped back down and dictated this thing, and by the end of the afternoon we sent it out by special messenger, and the general sent back a short covering letter: "This corresponds with my understanding of our agreement, and it will be accepted as Army policy and the appropriate officers informed."

Then of course part of my job was to send that to each regional forester for guidance in his own negotiations, and I did that.

As I left General Craig held me back for a minute, and he says, "Show, you know, the way we're going to be building up camp commanders and camp superintendents that we don't know anything about, there's bound to be some troubles in individual camps where they fight each other instead of working together. Now, if you find one of my men is not fitting in, you pick up the phone and call me. If I find one of your men is messing things up,
I'll pick up the phone and call you." I said, "Okay, sir. That doesn't need to go into the agreement."

"No, I didn't mean it to." And when we had trouble, one or the other of us did call the other guy, and it worked.

I want to resume reading here.

"The key questions were:

"1. Authority to establish spike camps -- since the planned work programs could not be carried out from the 218-man base camps. Agreed to, provided what the Army regarded as adequate supervision and discipline could be maintained. Some District and Camp Commanders proved resistant and timid, but, on the whole, the work agencies got a reasonable set of spikes.

"2. Facilities required for base and spike camp establishment. Army disliked the narrow, crooked dirt roads which were just routine to the Forest Service, wanted to be close enough to civilization to get the enrollees into town once a week, feared getting stormed in, was excessively concerned over purity and adequacy of water
Lassen National Forest, Green Baye
ECW Camp F-47 (September 1933).
Major W.J. Tuck, Redding District
Commander, on tour of inspection:
left to right, Major Tuck, Captain
George S. Bandy, Commanding Officer,
and S. Prewit, M.C.
Show: supplies, liked a liberal area of usable ground for a camp in the military style, and insisted on telephone connections. All these preconceptions made difficulties, but most Supervisors successfully negotiated most of their choices for locations." I left that wholly up to the supervisors. I said, "If you want that, get cut and work for it."

"3. The proportion of camp strength available for work agency projects. Initially, the Forest Service naively expected no difficulty on this, failing to recognize that, in peacetime Army posts, they used fussy and meticulous standards of appearance and neatness, and fine-spun division of labor as "made work" to keep troops occupied. The problem came insistently to the fore as camps were established and the camp construction period came to a close. Camp forestry personnel and Supervisors gnashed their teeth or stormed to see husky enrollees picking up cigarette butts, whitewashing lines of stones along camp roads, etc., to the detriment of field work. Camp commanders were, in fact, doing the things that would
show: draw praise from their bosses -- the District Commanders -- on their flying inspections, which initially covered the camps only. It took much effort before agreement was reached with the Commanding General that no more than 21 to 24 enrollees could be used for Army work in camp, depending on actual camp strength." You see, they said, "We're not concerned about your work. You've got to keep these camps in tip-top condition."

In four of the six Army district areas, the supervisors began to report with anguish the fact that they weren't getting a fair cut of the camp strength for the work projects, so by sort of unanimous consent -- this came later, but it's part of the story -- that was put up to me. I'd like to tell how I went at it, and how the guys were cracked.

In the San Diego Army camp area, the commander was a fine, handsome colonel, named Fitzgerald, and George Cecil, who was my representative down there, made a date to meet him. Well, I appeared in field work clothes. It was the Forest Service uniform, but I had high boots and I
Show: didn't have a choker collar or a coat. It was in the summer and it was hot as hell. So I went to the camp and I said, "Let me see Form 16," which was the camp work sheet. I added it up, and I said, "Well, we're only getting about 125 men. That isn't enough for our projects, and do you mean to tell me it's taking you nearly a hundred men to run this camp?" He was sort of stubborn and resisted a little bit. I said, "Well, colonel, why don't we go out and see some of these jobs of ours?" He'd never been out of camp. "So that you'll know and see for yourself why we desperately need more men."

Well, it was a hot day, and we were building a road. That's a messy kind of a project. So off we went. He was in full military regalia, decorations and choker collar and all, beautifully shined shoes, and a coat. On this kind of construction job you're tearing up rocks and pulling road rippers through to tear up the soil so it can be graded out of the way. That's a dirty job. You can't get through clean. The sweat began to stand out on his brow. I took the lead and we began plodding along. Here was a place, and I said, "Why isn't that getting done?"
The foreman spoke right up and says, "We haven't got enough
Show: men.

So I rubbed his nose in a couple of those jobs, picking the ones that would be most impressive. Well, so we got back to camp, and he says, "I see your point. Things'll be different from now on."

Then, at Redding there was a mean surly fellow.

Kotok: That Irishman.

Show: He didn't come to cooperate with anybody. His whole attitude was wrong. He'd been told by his commanding general that we had to do everything to make this project go but he just figured that he knew better than the general. Well, that Army headquarters covered the camps on six forests. It was the biggest single bottleneck, from our viewpoint. Well, I got the screams and I went up to see this guy. It was impossible to deal with him, he wouldn't deal, so finally I just got dirty and mean, and I said, "You've received instructions from the commanding general about making this project work. You're making it not work. You will not discuss it on a regional basis with me, and I'm charge of all the work here in California. I've only one recourse left and I'm going to take it imme-
Show:  Immediately. I'm going to appeal directly to General Craig
to have a change made up here. We can't tolerate this.
Good-bye."

Well, I did. And about the day after tomorrow
there was a new district commander. That was the most
important appeal I made to General Craig. He sent up
one of his inspecting officers, found the facts as I'd
reported them were correct, and took action.

Fry:  This was after you'd arrived at an agreement with the Army?

Show:  Yes.

The third event I want to tell is about Major
H.H. "Hap" Arnold, who was commanding officer at March
Field in Southern California. Major Arnold was a very
decisive, aggressive Irishman, and we were having troubles
there. Even Joe Elliott, the most adroit of my supervisors,
couldn't get the men on the job that he thought were
needed, so again I got appealed to and I went down.

We started out. I had a routine; when we'd come into
camp I'd say, "Let me see Form 18." Then I'd scowl and
huff and puff and tut-tut and say, "Why, we're only getting so many men out of full strength. Are your camps at strength, Major?" He'd ask the camp commander. And "Yes, we're at strength." "Well," I said, "that isn't good enough." And we'd look around camp and see what all these dozens of husky young men were doing -- picking up cigarette butts and raking the grounds and keeping everything nice and neat. But that wasn't helping us. I would try to shame Major Arnold by saying, "You mean you can't run this little old camp without using 85 men?" It put him on the defensive.

Well, after about two of those, and Joe Elliott was along pushing me from the rear saying, "Tie into him, boss. Tie into him." So about the third camp we came to, Major Arnold hopped out of the car and went over to the camp commander and says, "Let me see Form 18." [Laughter] The week before Major Arnold had inspected the camp and had commended the commander very highly for the fine appearance of the camp. And Arnold says, "Don't you know" --
Shoving the table -- "don't you know we've got to release more men to the Forest Service? They aren't getting enough to do their jobs. Now, you've got to cut your camp strength for camp work way down, and I want to come back in about a week and see if you've done it." He just turned right against this guy. He was perfectly cold-blooded about repudiating his own men, you understand. He didn't even take him to the corner to tell him, he bawled him out right in public.

That's enough stories. We got what we wanted--camp teams of 21 to 24 men. And that was satisfactory from our standpoint.

There were still the basic problems of getting the work programs established in California.

Politics looms up

"From the start there were pressures from members of Congress for camps in 'my' district or state and later, when the schedule of facilitating personnel was approved, for hiring of worthy and unemployed constituents. C.M."
Show: Granger, and later Fred Morrell, "both members of the office staff, "were assigned in Washington to deal with these aspects, and did a good job. But when a political liaison officer was appointed in the Secretary's Office, it was clear that difficulties were on the horizon, and the Regional Foresters went home forewarned. Overhead would be chosen without benefit of Civil Service."

Pry: This was a liaison officer in Wallace's office?

Show: Yes.

The way we beat that out here was just to move faster than the politicos and get a camp overhead selected before they really got organized.

Another main item, after we got the authorization for machinery in the camps, was to decide how much and what kind and how it would be purchased and distributed.

Central buying of machinery -- a well done job

"Once use of heavy machinery was approved, a general formula of two trailbuilders or tractor-grader units, seven 1-1/2 ton stakeside trucks, and five pickups per camp was agreed on. High pressure machinery peddlers

*Secretary of Agriculture
Show: swarmed to Washington since central purchase was to be made, and Jack Haile, a dynamic, red-headed Texan, did a splendid job of preparing specs, getting and analyzing bids, awarding contracts, and setting up shipping and delivery schedules. Industry was barely breathing, and the surge of new cash business was a real shot in the arm."

We set up in California the following delivery centers, since all this stuff was going to come by rail: Redding, for Northern California; Sacramento; Fresno; and Los Angeles. To each of those a schedule of shipments was arranged. Well, pretty soon the stuff began to come by the trainload. You can imagine. Two trail-builders per camp, fifty camps in Northern California. The railroad company was trying to find a place to put all that machinery, and frantically notified us that the stuff was there and to come and get it, right now.

The supervisors would scramble around and send men and get them out of the way. At Redding, an amusing aspect came up. Of course we always would have a man to check
Show: that we got the number of things that we called for.

Well, we ended up with the stakesides distributed and Trinity Forest came and said, "Hey, we didn't get all our stakesides." Well. Millard Barnham, the supervisor, was terribly hurt about it. What happened, of course, was some other Forest had come in and probably had an extra driver and said, "Well, let's take an extra stakeside. We can use it." So they just picked it up and went away with it, and we never did find the blooming thing. Bob Deering, with his respect for order and exactness, was worried all the time. I didn't personally give a d— oop. These little slipups are bound to occur.

Anyway, the stuff came and it was rolled out to the camps and everything.

CCC Gets Underway

"Back home at the end of April, several tasks had to be done day before yesterday, and Supervisors and Regional Office staff assembled to get at them. First, everyone had to grasp the concept of the great opportunity, with -- at the moment -- almost no restrictive rules."
Show: One of the things that Evan and I had done in Washington was to fight against detailed rules. We'd simply say, "We're competent to handle that. We'll take care of it." And we got away with it. "Second, to understand the then unfamiliar job of working with the military." I told the supervisors that that was up to them. The two had to work together. "Third, to agree on unstinted use of available Forest Service assets of knowledge, men and equipment, to get the camp program going." It has to be understood that the routine of Army operation was as follows: that a camp location would be selected, then there would be sent an advance cadre of about 25 men with officers to make the initial buildings and develop the water supplies -- in other words, to get the camp ready for occupancy by the full strength. I instructed my supervisors to put everything the Forest Service had into helping the military, whether it was legal or illegal, authorized or unauthorized, to get the thing going. And they were terrific on that. "Fourth, to revise the rough work program estimates for each camp," you'll remember how I made those estimates, "and to settle on the number and kinds of
facilitating personnel required for it. Fifth, to
agree on a plan for recruiting the thousand or so facili-
tators as determined." With 105 camps, and six or eight
facilitators per camp, you can see it ran into numbers.
"Sixth, to agree on methods for mass training of train-
builder operators -- of whom there were no more than a
dozen" -- trained -- "and several hundred would be needed.
And the same for truck trail locators." That's a specialized
skill, locating cheap roads in the mountain country that can
be built quickly. There were only about three that we con-
sidered fully trained for that job. "Seventh, to assign
the job of designing, drawing specs, obtaining bids, award-
ing contracts, setting delivery schedules for the hundreds
of buildings for protection and administration that would
be programmed." Our rate of progress had been maybe three
ranger stations a year, two or three guard stations -- about
on that scale.

"A high-pressure week disposed of these tasks
initially. Some Supervisors, such as Jones, Rogers, Bene-
dict, Elliott and Mendenhall, expanded their thinking readily --
some did not. Nearly all Supervisors learned to work well with the military, and all helped the military in vital ways to get going.

"Revision of camp work programs brought in a fair number of range, recreation and water development projects, though prime emphasis remained on protection and administration works." The way that was handled, a review board of myself, Bob Deering, Jay Price, and Chester Jordan, who was a road man. Each supervisor usually brought in one of his local men and had his own proposals to make in regard to work projects for each of his assigned camps. We went over it and I tried to get them to put in range projects and recreation development projects -- campgrounds and so forth -- with not too much success. We worked three shifts a day, morning, afternoon and night, and so I got rid of three supervisors a day, sent them home and told them to get going, with an approved program.

"Natural tendency of Supervisors was to think of their local guards and foremen as logical heirs to the
higher facilitating assignments" -- particularly the camp superintendent job which is a top Forest Service job in the camps, "but as a general pattern that just wasn't good enough." So I had to regretfully tell the supervisors that that wouldn't be how it was. 

At the time, there were in California about 5,000 unemployed registered Civil Engineers -- that is, men with formal training plus five years or more practical experience. Many had run construction projects involving crews far larger than the 218-man camps of CCC. It was agreed that Pitchlynn," an extraordinarily able man who was my personnel officer, Paul P. Pitchlynn, "would work with the late F.H. Fowler and with" the late "Walter Huber, both high in the American Society of Civil Engineers and both former Regional Engineers, to winnow out the best men from among the hordes of often desperate applicants."

They were desperate. Good men, but the world was closed to them. "Then, too, there were unemployed logging bosses, and some good men came from that source. Recent forestry graduates were unemployed and, from the many selected as
"So rapidly and surely did the overhead hiring program move that nearly all the budgeted jobs were filled before the politicians got really pressing. Inevitably, some of the men hired turned out to be duds, but the general level of honesty, ability and savvy was high.

"A training school for truck trail locators was excellently planned and run by Charles Young, an experienced Forest Service locator."

Fry: Where did you have the school?

Show: It was on the Sierra forest. "Training of trailbuilder operators was supervised by Ed Huestis, the dean of them all." He had the simple little job of expanding from ten or twelve trained men to several hundred, and he did it.

"During its preceding poverty-stricken days when only an occasional residence, warehouse or office could be financed, local design of each individual structure had been accepted, and various officers had come to fancy themselves as architects. Clearly, with hundreds of structures to do in the remaining portion of the President's
Show: six-months' period, past practice wouldn't work."

Over a month was gone. "So it was agreed to have

functional types -- ranger station, guard station,

office, large and small warehouse, etc. -- each

standardized, shipped ready cut. The late L.A. Barrett

was assigned the vast job. Two young architects,

Blanchard and Mayer," selected by Barrett, "worked

nightly day and night on design and specs," one of them

was a design man, the other was a specification man, "bid

proposals were broadcast up and down the Coast to a

stagnant lumber industry, the complex task of awarding

bids taking freight costs into account," and

that was important on the old land grant Southern Paci-

cic, which as part of the grant agreed to carry govern-

ment freight free, "was completed, the Navy Inspection

Service was brought in to inspect at point of shipment"

to avoid shipping of substandard material or wrong bills

of goods or something, which if they had gotten out to

the job would be impossible to unscramble, "and, in due
course, the trains began to disgorge the ready-cuts at selected delivery points. This huge task was not in Barrett's formal portfolio as Chief of Lands, but he did a magnificent job of it."

Kotok: What would you guess were the number of units?

Show: Structures, you mean? Oh, a thousand or more. It was a good-sized village. Barrett darned near worked himself to death.

Here I want to interject another lost shipment.

We used the same shipping centers for deliveries as we had for the machinery, and again at Redding we had trouble. There were no roofs for a couple of structures; the shingles had been received, and they'd vanished. We never found them, of course.

The other thing was to show the character of the California lumber industry. These bid proposals went to all the major producers of lumber. One of them was the Fruit Growers Supply Company at Hilt, California, which is within the Klamath National Forest. At the same time
bid proposals went to the big Douglas fir manufacturers of Puget Sound and that area. Well, when the bids came in the Puget Sound had bid delivered prices lower than the lumber company in Hilt. They picked up their lumber and shipped it by boat to San Francisco, put it on the largely free freight Southern Pacific, and had it to the delivery points in the Klamath forest. And the Hilt lumber company did not get the bid. Same thing happened with the other major companies --

Kotok: Diamond Match was the other one.

Show: And Red River. In other words, they weren't aggressive.

Kotok: And yet they needed business in the worst way.

Show: That was a sorry sidelight on the quality of the lumber industry in the California pine region.

Kotok: The redwood industry was much more aggressive.

Fry: I wondered if this was because the pine industry was so small in California at that time?

Show: It wasn't so small. It was just not aggressive. Dead on their feet.

Fire Suppression Program

Now, I want to tie the CCC in with the fire suppression program. During this supervisors' meeting, some unre-
Top: San Bernardino National Forest, City Creek ECU Camp, F-157 (September 1933) Fire Suppression crew in action.
Middle: Sanbernadino N.F. Elivanda ECU Camp, F-142 (August 1933) Fire Suppression squad answering fire siren.
Now: solved questions of the relation of the CCC program to the regular program came to the fore. "Many base camps would be at or near normal first attack locations," guard stations and ranger stations. "At many of these, crew rather than single guard was needed but could not be financed under regular appropriations. In most places organized follow-up was needed as well. The camps of conditioned and organized crews of young men under their own leaders would clearly be superior to pickup labor on major suppression jobs.

"So the general plan was that, in each camp, a group of enrollees would be selected, trained and organized as a first attack and follow up crew, led by a selected guard, ready to roll at once in a siren-equipped truck gleaming with shiny brass and bright red paint in the best fire department tradition. Assignments to the fire crew became sought for marks of prestige. Whole camps were to be organized and trained by rangers for duty on big fires." Now, the training and selecting of these
Show: first attack crews was made by the rangers. They were a pretty select bunch of husky young men. For instance, after the siren blew, which meant a fire call, these boys would be scattered around camp doing various kinds of jobs -- taking care of our storage equipment, conditioning tools, lots of different things. When the whistle blew you'd see kids pulling on shirts, pulling up pants, galloping frantically to the fire truck which was sitting out in the middle of the grounds. As it went out of camp somebody would be there with a written message saying, "Take such-and-such a road, the fire's at so-and-so." And away they'd go. The maximum allowance for getaway time which was acceptable was one minute. I mean, we wanted action, and the rangers trained them to do it.

The scramble to set up and operate camps was helped by expediters

"It was inevitable that, in so vast, far flung and hastily assembled a venture, all would not go as swimmingly as the basic specs assumed. Supervisors shortly had cases of advance construction cadres disembarking at wrong sta-
tions; not met by Army trucks at the right station; arriving without their tool kits; arriving properly equipped but the lumber and nails undelivered; lacking the most rudimentary construction skills; saddled with standardized camp layouts which, lamentably, failed to fit selected camp sites, etc., etc. District Commanders were still under the shadow of the then massive rule books of peacetime military ritual. Supervisors weren't all too clear" — Ed, I'm going to get you in here yet as an expediter — "how far they could go in doing things supposed to be done by the Army." The rule was that they shoot the works and not worry about the legality.

"So Kotok loaned himself from the Experiment Station and Price was released from the Regional Office scramble" — Bob Deering and I had to continue to handle that — "and the two, as what would now be called 'expediers,' divided the State, hitting District Headquarters, Supervisors' offices and camps, breaking bottlenecks — and rules, getting action, phoning in to Deering or me when
Show: new wrinkles popped up." I'd get a call and it'd be Ed from the Inyo, "Say, we've got this problem over here," and he'd describe it. I'd say, "You can do that. Good-bye." A few hours later he'd pick up the phone in Los Angeles. They were moving. They reassured and fortified the supervisors, pitching in and getting the show on the road. They were invaluable. "They helped vastly in the early stages of camp establishment. So did Cecil in the South and the late retired Supervisor W.G. Durbin in the North later on when expediting was needed to get work projects going, get enrollees pulled off needless camp work, and the like.

"Thus the work program got underway, unevenly to be sure, but with growing power and momentum. Here and there were packaged buildings lying around for which sites had not yet been purchased due to title complications; some road projects were proceeding across private land without legal rights of way -- a source of later embarrassment; some pet local projects of dubious priority slipped in."
But, on the whole, there was great advance toward the avowed dominant goal of adequate and planned protection facilities. Deering was the overworked key man in handling the expediting at the Regional Office end." That was a vast job; he took work home every night. I always recognized when Bob was on the edge of a blowup because his voice would get very edgy and tense, so I'd say, "Bob, you get the hell out, go out and look things over," and I'd give him some peaceful forest. He loved to go to the Inyo because it was peaceful, or the El Dorado. Bob would say, "Well, who's going to handle all this?" I'd say, "I'll handle it." He'd have a sort of hopeless look, but he'd go. I'd just send him out; I didn't argue with him. In a few days he'd come back refreshed and we'd get back to normal operations. But one of us, he or I, had to be in the office every moment. [Reading] "By June 30, 1933," two months after the first movement began, "all of the 127 National Forest and 22 State Division camps which were finally approved for the first work period were fully occu-
Show: pied and more or less ready to go to work. This was truly a notable achievement," considering the men came from all over the place. We got an awful lot of Rowery, Loop boys; Negroes from various locations; from the coal field area.

Mrs. Katok: I remember that bunch from Kansas City up in the Inyo. Most of them were fourteen or fifteen. Their parents had vouched for them because they couldn't support them.

Mrs. Katok: We found that the authorities would ship us delinquents in many cases.

Mrs. Katok: I was there with Sandy -- I can't think of his name, but he was a famous West Point football player, an awful good-hearted man. He said, "You know, not a one of my 218 boys has ever seen a toothbrush." We were down on a range camp, and they had all these kids practicing up and down on short roads, learning how to drive. They were insane to learn how to drive a car.

Show: These kids by and large were simply dispacessed.

Mrs. Katok: I was up at Quincy when the camp was settled there, and
Mrs. Kotok: we almost had a riot one night. Ed sashayed out and got the captain, and we talked a little bit on the porch over a drink. I said, "What the heck is the matter with these boys?" "They're scared of the coyotes." Every night they came and howled around the garbage pit, and these kids were hysterical.

Kotok: Major Arnold made a comment to me later when he was a five-star general. He said, "I never appreciated what good soldiers those CCC boys were being prepared to become."

Show: These enrollees were a dispossessed lot -- underfed, undernourished, knowing nothing. The key to making men of them came largely from my "l.e.m.s" -- my local experienced men. They'd take a bunch of kids and be a combination of a boss and a mother to them. The camp cooks under the Army didn't turn out what I considered to be tasty meals, but they were abundant, and as the saying was the kids "began to get wrinkles out of their bellies." They had something to do, and somebody to teach them how to do
Show: it. Well, it made men of them. We eventually set up an education program in the camps to teach them to read and write.

Try: Who were the teachers?

Katok: The Department of Education took care of that.

Show: The kids were given a certain number of hours per week for educational activities, and they wanted it.
INTERVIEW II

July 19, 1963

OPERATION

OF THE CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS
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OPERATION OF THE CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS

Training

Show: We've gotten the complicated preliminaries out of the way, and we're getting the boys in camp and the overhead, and particularly that special class, the local experienced men. They were the men whom we normally would have hired for fire guard and construction foreman jobs and so on, but for whom we did not have regular jobs. The first, and huge, undertaking in getting the camps going and producing useful work was to train these boys. The bulk of them came from the cities; they knew nothing about the use of hand tools -- particularly the ax, which can be damaging to the person using it if he's wholly ignorant; they didn't know how to work. So the l.e.m.s were the key men. We had several in each camp, and they taught the boys how to work, how to use tools safely, how to take care of themselves. Without that corps of men we couldn't have gotten the boys so they could produce good results.

Of course, we did have some of our regular fire guards, but the l.e.m.s were the key body of men in turning a mob of ignorant kids into organized, reasonably
show: competent workers. It was solved with quite surprising rapidity, because these men knew their stuff, and a very wholesome relationship developed between the kids and the l.e.m.s. The kids looked up to them because they were skilled, and the l.e.m.s. themselves took more than a purely formal interest in the boys.

The question of discipline in the camps was of course handled by the Army, which on the whole did a very good job in the kinds of discipline and training they gave the boys. There were a few impasses, primarily where the Army camp commander, or in some cases our own camp superintendent, simply took the wrong attitude and the boys got sullen and resentful. But they weren't terribly serious, or numerous. In a couple of cases where our men were suspect I asked Kotok, who is very skilled in getting people to talk to him, to investigate, and action was always taken and was always effective. There were no major disciplinary problems. [Laughing] The kids were afraid to run away because it's a horrifying experience to
Show: be picked up and set down from the Bowery to the lower Klamath River, miles from nowhere.

Fry: What proportion of l.e.m.s did you have?

Show: I think there were five or six per camp, to a total theoretical number of 218 per camp. But as I explained to you we had difficulty getting as many as we wanted out on the job, which was where the l.e.m.s took over. We had enough l.e.m.s by and large in each camp to do their job of basic training.

Fry: If you had any tough boys, did you tend to put them under the Army and do kitchen work?

Show: Well, the Army handled most of those problems. They put them to work they didn't like. We had the problem in quite a few camps of boys who thought they were pretty smart and could beat the game, so they'd report for sick call. Military people in camp, particularly the camp doctors, can be somewhat adroit. After they'd told a boy, for instance, "Oh, you're eating too much. You'll have to eat very lightly now for a week," it was remarkable how rapidly he recovered and reported for work. [Laughter]
An important factor in the camps was the camp chaplains, who more or less circulated around from camp to camp. There were some mismatches -- for instance, a Hebrew would be sent to a camp where the boys were Catholic. But those things were adjusted, and the influence of the doctor and of the visiting minister -- I use that in the larger sense -- was quite a factor.

We appraised the boys on the basis of judgment after they got going, and our best figure was that they were 65 to 70% as effective as workers -- as the men we would normally have hired, selected working men. And that's a pretty good percentage. They were eighteen to twenty-two, theoretically, but the enrolling officers didn't ask for birth certificates, so there were some younger boys and some older ones who slipped in.

I would like to go on to some special problems of training the overhead. We got the great majority of these men from the American Society of Civil Engineers. They were good men, competent men, but they were not used to working, and there were two special jobs that had to be.
Show: done right away. The first of those was training the truck trail locators -- those were the surveyors who laid out our little dirt roads. In every camp that was the big major undertaking. We had in our regular employ three skilled locators at that time, and we needed a couple of hundred. We took the senior locator, a man named Charles Young, and he organized a training camp to train trainers [laughing]; he couldn't train 200 men at once, but he organized and did an extremely good job. The problem was that in selecting, through the American Society of Civil Engineers and my man Pitchlynn, these trail locators, we had acquired men who were accustomed to laying out mainline railroads, highways, and such major jobs as that. Some of them had a very difficult job of stepping their professional activities down to our simple dirt roads.

Fry: These were roads to be built by the CCC boys?

Show: Yes, with the help of the big machinery.

The second problem was with the big machinery itself, the trail builder and pertinent equipment. We had hardly more than a handful of really trained operators to run
Cotal Canyon State CSA Camp
P-225 (September 1933). CCC
truck trail and firebreak
work in Angeles National Forest.
Klamath National Forest.
Hilt ECW Camp F-23 (October 1933). #55 Trailbuilder on Cinnabar Road Project.
those big monsters. There again, we got our senior
operator, a young man named Ed Huestis, to organize
a training school for trainers, and they went back to
camp and began the job of training enrollees. There were
no trail builder operators outside the Forest Service.
I don't remember that we had any major accidents, which
speaks well for the quality of the training. Of course
the selection of enrollees as operators was a definite
mark of prestige in the camps. They were much sought
after by the hot-shot fire crews.

As we got a body of young men trained to do the
work we were able to step up our use of the machines in
quite a few cases to three shifts a day -- three eight-
hour shifts. It took about an hour to service a machine
after a shift, and we simply told the Army they had to
provide proper meals at the time our men wanted them, so
there was no problem there. We kept the machines rolling,
and that greatly increased the speed with which we were
able to get roads going. We had literally hundreds of pro-
Show: There was another special category of men we got, the carpenter foremen. We were buying a fair-sized town of new buildings to go up here and there. I don't suppose some of those boys had ever hammered a nail, but these foremen took hold. They were not the technical supervisors, they were the foremen, whose primary job was to train these boys to do adequate work in putting up buildings.

Fry: I suppose they also assisted in supervision of the actual construction too?

Show: Oh, sure. They were participating supervisors; they worked as much as the crews. Many of the buildings didn't have a big crew on them, as you have now on modern buildings. And they were our employees -- I mean the Forest Service.

Fry: But paid for by CCC?

Show: Yes. So that's how they made a headless mob of kids able to be reasonably effective -- two-thirds of full efficiency is a pretty high figure, as I said. If you'd seen these kids, why, you would have realized that.
Pry: What kind of supplementary schooling was there for the boys in the camps?

Show: Initially there was no supplementary training in reading and writing, although the level of schooling was extremely low. So during the first work period of six months, the organized educators sold the idea that it would be good to give rudimentary schooling to the boys in camps. That meant a little time off from work. A lot of it was just rudimentary reading and writing, and some indoctrination on U.S. history. That went on, tending to get more extensive. The educators had a good many unemployed of their own, for one thing, and this was a chance to assign them to camps and get them on somebody's payroll. The costs were reabsorbed by the project, not by the Forest Service. It was about an hour a day for the kids, in the evening.

Pry: I did want to ask you about the complaint that there was too much political indoctrination going on in the camps.

Show: To my knowledge there never was anything of that sort done. The military certainly didn't do it and I don't think they sanctioned it. There was never any formal ruling.
Fry: Do you think the CCC lasted long enough?

Show: Yes. It was thought of as a depression-buster, and happily Roosevelt tied in the idea of useful conservation work.

Fire Control

I'd like to go on to the really major projects.

Fry: As I understand it your really major projects had to do with fire control.

Show: Yes. Our thinking on it was that this was the great opportunity to strengthen ourselves immeasurably in our ability to get on top of the fire problem. To do so required the kind of major works, what we called fire control improvements, to speed up and strengthen the attack in handling of fires.

Initially of course we had a great many desirable fire control road projects, ever since the trailbuilder was invented. The rangers and supervisors had blocked out jobs they thought were desirable, so there were lots of places to start work.

[Reading]
Show: "The depression failed to beat a retreat, and Government decided to continue the CCC project and also to broaden the attack." It was clear by that time that the project was an effective implement. "The National Industrial Recovery Act of Blue Eagle and Ironpants Johnson fame provided not only for industry codes but for useful public works to be run by the work agencies" directly, without the Army. In other words, we got money. "Price, Deering and I whipped up proposals, better balanced as to timber, range and recreation than the CCC program, and got most of the asking." And we weren't modest.

Fry: Was this early in the days of MIRA? I was wondering if you got there first.

Show: Well, we weren't last. We had pretty extensive proposals and we got most of what we asked for. "The Civil Works program -- widely damned as boondogling and leaf raking -- came into being for a brief and inglorious span of life. The Region got a cut of it, too. 'Ponderosa Way' solves the problem of useful winter work

"All this rush of riches meant some heavy head}

*General Hugh Johnson, head of MIRA.
scratching to plan an effective program for the winter 1933-34. In the South, work could continue on most of the National Forest and all of the State and County areas. But in the North winter work was impracticable on most of the timber area, but feasible in the lower brush and woodland area.

"Here seemed the great opportunity to undertake a major project which had been thought of and talked about, but which could not be financed -- a continuous cleared fireline between timber and brush the length of the Sierras." And that is quite a stretch of country. We had had experience with the efficacy of that kind of insulated fire line. "A.E. Wieslander of the Experiment Station, who had worked for seven years on the monumental vegetative type map project, and C.E. Dunston, a capable timber management assistant" in my office, "were assigned the large job of defining the approximate location of the project on a consistent basis, obtaining but not governed by views of local officers. In various areas, the early day drawing of forest boundaries had left important areas
Show: of timber outside the National Forests, and these were
now under State protection.

"So it was necessary to agree with the State
Forester," who was M.B. Pratt, "on zones of responsibility,
and to so pool the total work resources that the whole vast
task could be done. The general agreement was readily
obtained, and the complex planning of operations begun.
This involved transfer of northern National Forest camps
to new locations, some to State territory and under State
supervision. For the second CCC work period," which was
from October 1933 through March 1934, "National Forest
camps dropped from 127 to 94; State camps rose from 22
to 32, chiefly on account of the project which was
promptly christened 'Ponderosa Way.'"

Fry: Why was it named that?

Show: Well, somebody thought it up and everybody said, "That's
just the right thing to call it." It was that informal.

Fry: Did you and Merritt Pratt share supervision?

Show: Well, he had his own set of camps and we had ours, for
which we were separately responsible.
"Decision on general location was all right as a basis for dividing work strength and picking camp locations, but left in the air selection of exact location and standard of line mile by mile. For these operational jobs, San Bernardino Supervisor J.E. Elliott was detached."

Fry: So that you were dividing the Sierra on a north and south basis by camps.

Show: Yes. Elliott was "a man of vast energy, a fine analytical mind and incomparable experience in behavior and suppression of foothill fires; he did an outstanding job."

Retired Supervisor W.G. Durbin "was the hard-working and surefooted expeditor.

"Based on experience with the San Bernardino Front Line Break," which was between extra hazardous and merely hazardous mountain lands, "it was decided to build a continuous truck trail on or near the line." That is, to get rapid access and movability along the line. The lines themselves will not stop a smashing, hard-running fire."
Show: "Since this [Ponderosa Way] crossed many deep and rough canyons, a major job of location was involved and many bridges had to be located, designed and put in." Now, here's July, and it's going to have to start in October.

Fry: Were you using your American Society of Civil Engineers people?

Show: By that time we'd pretty well settled down on our foremanship job. "Liberal allotments made possible the 36 NIRA camps," that nice jackpot of fluid money we got, "mostly assigned to bridge projects." The regular CCC was by then pretty skilled in road building as such, but here we had steel bridges. One of my engineers, John Lawrence, was key man on the bridge program, and he simply ran himself to death. He not only decided on location but he was the primary man in design. He worked his head off, and he got the job done. By the time the second period began, the advance work of engineering was on the way or out of the way. The output during that winter was really extraordinary. We got great chunks of it done and ready to operate next season. We got some very good bridge crews. We didn't have any bridges collapse on us. [Laughter]
As I remember, the next job was to get a network of roads in.

Now, just be patient.

**Fire Detection Plan**

It was obvious that to get the most from the CCC systematic plans had to be worked out. CCC was after all designed to accomplish project work of permanent or enduring value, not just leaf-raking and that sort of thing. From the start in July 1933, when we knew we were going to keep on going, "regional management was hard-pressed to get analytical and comprehensive planned programs for each of the main classes of protection improvements, to the end that piecemeal attention to a project at a time might be ended." A good deal of our situation was that we had projects but we didn't have a road system, a telephone system, well tied together, "and the true and great potential of emergency programs capitalized on. The forces were available to build lookouts, telephones, roads and structures. The basic work of research and exploration had been done, but not the plans."
Show: The first major job after Ponderosa Way was the detection plan.

Fry: You really did complete the entire Ponderosa Way project?

Show: Pretty near. "The detection plan, grounded on Gowen's pioneer research and on training of a capable corps of young and enthusiastic planners, was already well along, and was readily completed and put into the action program. A Board of Review with the old standbys Price, Deering, Kotok and myself, dug into the proposals of planners and Supervisor before each forest plan was approved and became actionable, setting a pattern thereafter followed on other plans. This orderly process insured reasonable uniformity between forests and efficiency of choice for each. Some of the old standby lookouts were abandoned," often with tears. There was sentimental attachment.

"Number of lookouts went from about 100 to about 200, and a really good system to cover then known risk areas was built and manned."

The next project was an honest-to-goodness telephone system.
Now: "The telephone system was a notable case of an organism which had just 'grewed.' Trunk lines followed roads and trails which had been built to serve the needs of pioneer communities rather than those of forest protection. A multitude of branch lines had been tied to trunks as service was extended to 'cooperators' -- stock camps, hill farms, country stores, mines and the like -- and to guard and lookout stations.

"Many trunks thereby became seriously overloaded, and dependable service suffered." And you can't afford to have it suffer when there's a fire call to be made. "Trunks were more often than not tied into ranger rather than forest headquarters, though central dispatching was more and more in use. Newer power lines fouled up the tree lines of the Forest Service and a skilled craftsman, the late Frederick E. Hailey, had worked for years to unfoul such situations." I mean interference, you know. "Forest Service lines had been tied to farmer lines and service was tricky and uncertain. Forest Service lines had connections with Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company
and other commercial telephone systems, and priority calls on fire didn't always obtain priority."

Fry: Because there were so many parties on the line?

Show: Yes. If PT&T was involved you'd say, "This is a fire call," and they wouldn't always throw competing calls off the line and give us priority, so there was delay. It was very unsatisfactory. "The fact that this archaic jumble worked as well as it did was due to the skill, persistence and hard work of local officers, who put an unconscionable amount of time on maintenance and repairs, to the detriment of more productive work. Effective inter-forest ties were few." So that Supervisor A couldn't call Supervisor B direct and say, "Hey, I've got trouble over here. Can you send me some men?"

Fry: What did they do, then?

Show: They'd have to go around through commercial telephone lines, from North Fork to Fresno and then back to Porterville.

"A major operation was clearly indicated. It was
undertaken in 1934 under direction of A.A. Browne and Fred Funke," Browne was from the experiment station and Funke was one of my men, "who decibelled and planned their way under the urging of the management, who saw the ending of lush 'per camp month' and NIRA allotments. In fact, to beat deadlines, very large orders for materials were placed after plans were done and reviewed for two National Forests which were made to serve as an 11 1/2 sample of the whole." It worked out pretty well.

Fry: What do you mean, it was made to serve as an 11 1/2 sample of the whole?

Show: Well, we were through with two out of the 18 forests, and we simply said, "We'll use that as a sample to determine the total amount of material that will be required." It was a pretty good guess. "The string had been pulled, but fortunately the Regional Forester didn't know about that until orders and shipments were too far advanced to recall." There were some rather sharp exchanges of telegrams between me and the bosses in Washington, but I got
Show: what I wanted. I think it was about a million dollars' worth of material.

Fry: But you were covered, since you hadn't known about it.

Show: Well, I didn't go to jail. [Laughter] The initial instructions just got mislaid in my office. "So a modernized and efficient telephone system got into the works program, with relocated lines, limited loads, and metallic circuit poles lines replacing ground circuit lines where interference problems existed.

Finally the transportation plan

"The transportation planning done earlier by Huestis was proving its worth but, as explained, had not been based on good type maps and on standard hour control for each major type." Those bodies of fact were really essential to planning an integrated road system that would cover just what we wanted to cover at a minimum cost. Hour control standards "had now been set, and the Station's type-mapping project, strongly supported and subsidized by the Region, was producing a flow of new and accurate essential fact." We acted in our own self interest; it
Show: helped the station and it helped us. "On forests roads to lookouts were pretty common. Always pet local projects, since they simplified the chore of servicing, they nonetheless were often low in true local priority.

"The Region undertook the needed revised transportation planning job in 1934. F.P. Cronemiller, Modoc Supervisor, was detached and put in charge. He fell heir to a very unusual and able group of recent forestry graduates, many of whom had been screened and trained in the highly-disciplined type mapping, detection and communication projects. Some, such as James, Stathem, Fischer, etc., were to go on and up.

"The project developed elan, imagination and discipline. As plans for National Forest after National Forest were completed and reviewed, the basis for doing the still vast job of protection roads and for correctly locating first attack forces was put, for the first time, on a sound basis." Those plans are to a large extent still the guiding rule after nearly thirty years.
"In the South the plans provided a strategic net for manning the many fire breaks and ridges." There again, like Ponderosa Way, these fire breaks don't automatically stop fires. You have to get men there, and get them there before the fire does.

"The protection improvement plans as a group were designed to displace intuitional individual opinion and judgment by factual analysis and to substitute articulated systems for mere aggregations of similar things. This they did to the degree allowed by the basic knowledge of the time."

So that was the procedure by which we got ready for these big steps in the vital project of fire control. These planning jobs had great benefit to the young men who took part in them. First of all, they were compelled to see a job as a whole. They had to see to it that the planned coverage, particularly roads, was in the right place to meet the known occurrence of fires and our control requirements. They got that kind of training under great
pressure, because we worked them hard. We were in a hurry to get these things done. We found some extremely able young men. I see some of them occasionally. There was George James, who is presently regional forester in Milwaukee; Hamilton Knickerbocker Pyles, called Ham, of course, who has been regional forester in Atlanta, Georgia, and is now an assistant chief of the Forest Service—that means he sits next to the all-highest; William Fischer, who is presently in charge of the vastly important recreational planning and development programs here in California, and is recognized as a leader in the whole United States in those activities.

Pry: Is he in the Department of Conservation here?

Show: No, he's in the California Division of Forestry. Paul Stathem, who is presently in charge of the Shasta-Trinity National Forest, one of the largest and most complex jobs of national forest administration in the United States. I see all of these men occasionally, and they always go back to their experiences on the planning project, on which
Show: all of them worked. They say in effect that they learned more that has been of continuing benefit to them from those experiences than from any other experience before or since.

Fry: I'm assuming that their jobs were also under CCC.

Show: That's right.

I'd like to take time now to talk about our fire record.

CCC and the 1933 fire season

"Meanwhile the 1933 fire season ran its course. Total burned area was 92,000 acres -- the Los Padres again dominating with 49,000," out of 18 forests, "and thus again proving the price of inaccessibility. The San Bernardino with 10,000 acres, Mendocino with 9,000, and Shasta with 6,000 were the other big ones. But the most damaging fire was Pickens Canyon of a mere 5,000 acres on the Angeles. Followed by the abnormally heavy rains of late December, floods from the burn funnelled through the little foothill town of La Crescenta, killing about thirty people, destroying buildings, burying highways,
Show: and piling up dollar damages. All proof that the foresters' perennial belief in the benign values of brush cover were true.

"During the 1933 fire season, the fire bosses and dispatchers took wide advantage of their pleasant ability to call out whole camps, and this certainly made many stops and saves since camps rolled faster than equivalent strength of pickups or industry crews, and were better organized and led.

"Organized camp fire crews" -- these 15-men crews with their beautiful trucks -- "were generally, and rightly, called for first attack and immediate followup. This practice certainly contributed to the fact that regional total of C fires (over ten acres) was 121 -- the then lowest of record by far. Thus, for the first time, the general practice of crew rather than single guard attack -- recognized by the region as needed in the fast spread types" could be put into wide, almost universal use.

"The good, in 1933 and following years, was not
"unmixed with" loose and wasteful practices which tended to become habits. It was comforting and reassuring to throw a 15-man crew of tough youngsters at a fire and to follow up with another crew. But even old-timers often forgot that, in given areas, crews of three to five men could on experience catch small fires. The growing mass of junior technicals, who never knew anything but massive first attack, inevitably tended to accept it as minimum requirement.

"Ganging up on fires escaping early attack had been a desirable and growing practice, particularly since the overnight control doctrine became the guiding star of fire bosses. Inspection of going fires and annual Boards of Review commonly showed that the wastefulness of this practice arose from two sources: (1) poor quality and poorly shod labor -- usually pickups from the cities; and (2) insufficient or ineffectively used leaders on fires to handle efficiently the available labor. Under CCC the first problem was generally solved, but the second remained,
though on a diminished scale. Foremen of the organized
CCC work crews went with their crews on fire call and,
even though many were inexperienced in suppression, they
learned by experience. The practice of importing experi­
enced regular forest officers on big fires continued.
The weakness was that receiving fire bosses seldom had a
real plan to use such skills to best purpose, and assign­
ments both above and below real abilities were far from
uncommon."

That then is one of the undesirable aftermaths.
I'm going to break now and I'll go on to the other undesir­
able aftermath later. All right?

Yes.

Here's the heading: CCC dwindled, but with other measures
was a big factor in fast improving the fire record.

"CCC clearly meant a great step ahead in catching
fires small and in putting out running fires faster and at
smaller size than formerly. The first work period (fire
season 1935), the 127 National Forest and 22 State camps,
totalling 149, gave a really potent net to use the corps on
suppression as above described. Thereafter, the project
dwindled away," and here is the table, "fire season strength being:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National Forest Camps</th>
<th>State Camps</th>
<th>Total Camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"As an initial average of eight camps per National Forest dropped to three or four plus, then to two plus, and finally to one, GCC became less and less a major factor in first attack and reinforcement, though retaining a major role in ganging up on going fires. Since regular appropriations, both to Forest Service and State, failed to advance greatly during this decade, the net effect was a progressive reduction in first attack strength.

"To some degree such arithmetic losses were offset. Management analysis and action resulted in better placing of first attack forces in relation to risk areas and in
Show: reducing size of first attack crews to more nearly match the job. These processes faced the inertia of established practice and habit of thought, and were by no means universal. The vastly growing mileage of truck trails built by CCC and the other programs increased the risk area accessible to fast motorized attack, and thus multiplied the coverage within time limits of a good many attack centers. Increasing supplies of light tankers, used in first attack, increased the strength and effectiveness of attack."

"The period 1933-41, during which CCC was a dwindling but potent factor in suppression, varied in difficulty from season to season as shown by selected figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Burned</th>
<th>M.C. Fires</th>
<th>C Fires</th>
<th>Forest-year units</th>
<th>No. N.F.s Holding to Allowable</th>
<th>No. N.F.s Over 20M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1122</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>8276</td>
<td>1293</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total
1924-32 2072  8290  2685  37  33
Average 235  992  298  4.1  3.7
Show: "So long as individual forests could go to pot with over 20,000 acres burned in a single season (about ten times allowable), it cannot be said that the period was easy.

"These major failures were far less frequent than during the years from 1924-32. So were the individual fires notable for size and destructiveness. But enduring marks on the landscape were left by the second Nelson Point fire on the Plumas in 1934; by the Red Cap fire on the Klamath and the Bear Wallow fire on the Trinity in 1938; by the Deer Creek fire on the Shasta and the San Joaquin fire on the Sierra in 1939; by the Log Springs fire on the Mendocino and the Keenbrook fire on the San Bernardino in 1940.

"A solid achievement within the period was a slow, irregular but steady reduction in man-caused fires from an average of 1,020 in the first two years to 830 in the last two, reflecting persistent and directed effort, but showing as well the lag in effectiveness of measures designed to meet massive problems."
Show:

"Comparison of the period as a whole with the preceding nine-year period shows the accumulated effect of the many measures and skills devised and applied during the time, beginning in 1920, with the powerful aid of CCC. Area burned was down by nearly two-thirds to an average of about twice allowable. Number of C fires was down by over half. Half the records for individual forest and year were at or below allowable, doubling the earlier rate, and the number of hopelessly bad forest and season records was down two-thirds.

"None of this justified complacency -- the continuing inspection and Boards of Review showed too many cases of faulty first attack, follow up and big fire suppression. But the region had handled creditably the difficult 1934 fire season, following a deficient winter, which held potentiality for disaster. It had handled skillfully the all-time record of 1625 lightning fires in 1939, including a record concentration in the North, with moderate losses and with none of the disorganization
and disintegration which had characterized earlier and far smaller concentrations. The Klamath, with a dose of 165 fires, had done a notable job....

"There was reason to believe, as the period went along, that a continuation, improvement and necessary expansion of the many-sided program of the Region could win to eventual consistent success -- that if the means were available the job could be done." And CCC was the core, the center, and major element in all this various-sided advance.

Excessive Public Dependency on CCC

Now, I've already spoken of the habit of extravagance as an undesirable aftermath, and I want to go on to the other one: the belief that all this unexampled wealth was going to solve all of our problems. That was held by people from the President down, and had one effect that the regular appropriations, which we'd count on from year to year for continuity, couldn't be built up. We desperately needed to add ranger districts. As we were then operating, many of them were far too large, and we couldn't add more. It would have been ridiculous if we'd said that in addition to all this wealth which was gra-
Show: ciously given us we have to build up the regular appropriations.

Another aspect of this apparent wealth was a sort of slackening off in the strength of our public support. Apparently nobody understood, as we keenly did, that wealth was in the form of labor and things to support that labor. Going ahead requires two things: continuity, so that you don't have wild ups and downs, and more than mere men. That's dictated by the rather complex national forest job. Some of the manifestations of the slackening off of public support were as follows.

In Southern California one of our long-established, loyal, and hard-working centers of political support had been the Tri-county Reforestation Association, and the leader of it was Francis Cuttle of Riverside, an ardent believer in our work and in the Forest Service. The association had come front and center several times when we had to have strong political support. Well, it was disbanded because Mr. Cuttle felt, and I couldn't change his mind, that his work was done. That was a major tragedy.
It had been a central source of most loyal and aggressive support.

In Southern California also there was an organization called the Angeles Protective Association, and its primary purpose was to provide tough, skilled fire-fighting leaders on the line, who went fully equipped and prepared to step in, and it greatly supplemented and improved the corps of our employees whom we could throw on those tough California forests. It didn't disband, but it drifted back into being a sort of a social club. Its central purpose was gone, and that was tragedy too, because we missed them.

Fry: You mean they felt you didn't need to use them anymore?

Show: Well, they felt that their job was done pretty much, and they couldn't keep the strength and ardor up.

There were some individual very strong men among the key citizen leaders in Southern California. Herbert Gilman in San Dimas, who had been an unswerving supporter, rather shifted his interest to state forestry rather than
show: federal forestry. Another man who shifted his interest was perhaps the most potent of all our citizen leaders — Dr. George Clemens of the agricultural department of the very powerful Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. He shifted his interest to what was always to me the rather myopic, vastly expensive downstream flood control program of the Army, so that they built great sluiceways to carry the water to the sea and ignored the role of the national forests in protecting watershed. I argued and urged plaintively, vehemently, with these men, as with the organizations, and they just generally sloughed away. The general attitude was, "You guys are getting all you need. You don't need us anymore." There were fewer such cases in the north than in the south, but the south was our traditional source of the most powerful political support.

We made efforts, I did myself, to get men of the younger generation who would measurably replace these leaders that we had had, and various things had happened. Men had a more complex range of interests in public affairs.
They weren't prepared to center and compromise on one project as these men had. Part of the reason for the slacking off was that the older generation was getting older and they didn't have the energy and the drive to continue at the same pace. But primarily it was because they had the fallacious belief that the vast assets—largely in manpower, as I've explained, rather than in accessible financial ability—seemed to them to solve all the Forest Service's programs up to our wildest dreams. And that was, I assure you, a major loss. It's never been wholly offset, although I as well as others—

**Fry:** What about Englebright and some of the leading congressmen?

**Show:** Englebright to his death remained a loyal and intelligent supporter.

**Fry:** Did you lose other supporters in Congress?

**Show:** We didn't lose them. They were harder to talk to [laughing], because they had this central fallacious belief.

Two efforts were made to offset this drift. We recognized it very early, and one thing that I did
show: personally was to write letters to about 2,000 "key men" -- the makers and leaders of public opinion in all the cities and towns affected by our operations. I told them what was going on, why we needed their understanding and support, and so on, and although I didn't solicit a reply, nearly fifty percent did reply. Now, that's an extraordinary response from a letter solicitation. They were intelligent; many of them had been out to see the camps and works going on, and they said how much they approved of it, what a fine thing it was for the forests and all, for the boys. It perhaps slowed down the drift somewhat, but it didn't solve it.

Early in 1934, Charles Dunwoody, the director of the conservation department of the state Chamber of Commerce, who was a very alert chap, came to me and said he felt this process was going on and we should try to do something about it. He and I agreed that we would organize a barnstorming tour of the different work agencies to meet in as many cities as possible, with audiences
Now: brought together by the Chamber, to explain what was going on, why continued public understanding and support were necessary, and to try to offset the drift.

Fry: A tour by the heads of the work agencies?

Now: Yes. I represented the Forest Service administration; Kotok was there from the experiment station; Drury for state parks, Newton B. Drury; and Merritt Pratt for state forestry. We did the grand tour of about thirty meetings from Eureka to El Centro, and from Santa Rosa to Reno.

We had a pretty good show; we had some very good audiences, we got some good responses. At least people had been told about it honestly and clearly, and we all felt it had had some beneficial effect in maintaining a live and active interest in conservation of all these work agencies.

Fry: You didn't just say, then, "This is what CCC has done."

Now: Partly that, but we told them the problems that remained. And it was useful.

I'll go on now to a broad critique of CCC, with some historical perspective.
Results of CCC

One of the big areas of benefit was a great increase in the technical work and research of the experiment station. Our liberal support of their research programs, which would affect our work, was done because we regarded it of mutual benefit. That included the cover type program under Wieslander, which we vastly speeded up and improved, of writing our technical handbooks by order. The best of those was a handbook of the rehabilitation of mountain meadows. Many of them had gullied out. That was done by Charles Krebel, the watershed man of the station, and an excellent job it was. Another one was by Nick Mirov, of the experiment station, which dealt with the methods of germination and growing the many native wild species which would be useful in various phases of the operations, controlling erosion and so on. That area was one in which long-term beneficial results came from the CCC project. We were able to subsidize them, literally, and they took advantage of it. It was altogether a happy system of cooperation.

For our own part, we were able to undertake various
Above: Los Padres National Forest. CCC Mono Silt Dam construction (ECW)

projects that we've thought of before somewhat but hadn't been able to touch. One of those was the problem of the trout. What could be done to improve streams to make them more suitable for the different species of trout?

Fry: You mean natural streams, or the streams that had been changed?

Show: Natural streams. Fortunately I had a young man in my organization, Fred Johnson, who had studied and pondered over that. The brook trout likes still waters, and the simplest forms of obstructions and -- not real dams, but just obstructions, would create pools which were a preferred habitat and therefore increase the yield of trout. Another one was the effectiveness of planting the millions and millions of small fingerlings that were turned out by the state hatcheries. It was done with Squaw Creek on the Shasta particularly, by first of all turning loose marked fingerlings. They clip the fins in various ways. There was only one entrance to the creek, and we kept a detailed creel
Show: census. Every fisherman who went in was checked as he went out, as to his catch and the number of hours he'd worked at it, and whether any of his fish were the marked fish. It was found unmistakably that the planting of vast numbers of fingerlings was providing only a minor small part of the sport fishing. Most was coming from the native spawners, which of course fortified our determination to improve the streams. In some cases migrations were blocked by barriers, and we could get rid of them.

In another area we worked out methods for artificial spawning beds, the requirements of which are well known, so that the native fish could spawn effectively. We got started on quite a varied assortment of technical things of that sort. Another one was to sail into the fight on the prevailing practice of the big dam builders to take the whole stream. PG&E was one. God bless 'em, I guess. So we sailed into that fight -- I did particularly, and we crowded the Fish and Game authorities to find out what minimum stream flow would be required to maintain fish life. The big dam builders would come up and say,
Show: "You don't realize, my good man, the value of a cubic foot per second of water." You couldn't beat them on arithmetic. We did some guessing as to the minimum stream flows to maintain desirable fish life, and we fought it through. That was done by our ability to get special people through the CCC. We didn't have any regular appropriation for them, you understand.

Fry: I don't see how you could do these studies for Fish and Game?

Show: Well, they were extremely stick-in-the-mud, both the state and the federal agencies. They said they'd have to have years of research and so on. So we said fifty cubic feet a second or a hundred cubic feet a second, and we stood by it, and they couldn't prove we were wrong.

Fry: Did you have to go before the power commission?

Show: No. We conducted our arguments directly with the company. But those were beneficial results, in the larger sense. In the game field, we made some very careful studies of the relation between coyotes and deer population, for example. We began studies of the condition, environment,
Show: causes of losses of the native California valley quail, which was done both by the station and by ourselves. We were able to subsidize the station in building its work centers, of which it has quite an array, and we did that because we expected, and got, benefits to our own people, in learning the results of up-to-date and very practical research in timber management and range management. That I consider one of the larger beneficial results of the project — the very great strengthening of research which would be of value to us in the actual job of administration and management of the national forests.

Fry: I'd like to ask you more on problems with PG&E, because the Project has a series on California water problems.

Show: Well, the habit of the big dam builders, of whom PG&E was the biggest, was that when they went in to develop a stream, the stream was theirs. There had been nobody to say them nay. That had the effect of destroying the value of some pretty major streams in California -- in San Joaquin and parts of the Feather River -- for recreation,
Show: which was becoming more and more of a problem even thirty years ago. Where are all these people going to go? We got them on the defensive, and in some cases they modified their plans so that there would be water to keep the desirable fish alive. It finally helped to push the state Fish and Game Commission and the federal Bureau of Fisheries, the Biological Survey, into taking an active part in the big fight between the public interest and private interest. The fight pretty much had to be made on the grounds of the larger public welfare. You couldn't argue arithmetically with them, because there is no way of giving dollar value to public recreation. I know, because I tried. The minimum appraisal of it has to be what the people will spend to enjoy it, and that in and of itself is rather difficult to ...

Try: Was this carried out between you and the heads of the power companies or was it between the engineers on the local jobs and the Forest Service people?

Show: It was carried on variously. I got into it myself as it seemed necessary. PG&E was reluctantly forced into some kind of action by public opinion. Once the issue was opened up, and we did that, why, the latent recognition
Show: of the problem was forthcoming. I had some fun out of it actually. To put the mighty on the defensive, I am afraid is a source of joy to me. [Laughter] And they were extremely sensitive then, as they are now, to public relations. I suppose the money-conscious management liked no part of it; they were compelled to take a fresh look at their complete freedom of action. But they did do some responding.

Fry: How did you get this before the public as a problem?

Show: Oh, we made speeches around to representative groups and things like that, and talked to our key men. I over-emphasize my own part, because a great many officers here in the region were taking part, mostly by rather informal activities. We are so thoroughly organized in this state that it would get to organizations which served as clubs and would pass resolutions.

Fry: So local foresters in their contacts on the local level had influence.

Show: Oh, yes. They felt very strongly about it.
Show: I've come to the point now where I'd like to talk about what I felt, and feel, about what were some of the larger results of the whole thing. Somewhere along the line we had sent out a letter to our key men, asking them to tell us what they thought. Well, the response was overwhelming. It was after the project had been going for some time, and they said in effect, "This is far and away the best conceived, best run program of all that the President has tried to combat depression and do useful work."

Try: Which key men do you mean?

Show: The men in the towns and villages who made public opinion. Well, we made up a little report and sent it through channels and it got to the White House, and the President sent word back he was pleased and that he thought so himself. That is by the way, but the larger result still, aside from the amount of work done, is that we salvaged a part of a lost generation that was headed toward what we would now call, what is it, teenage delinquency. These boys had no
work experience, didn't know how to work, their families couldn't take care of them. If they had not been taught useful skills, useful discipline, certainly there would have been a generation of petty criminals, and not all of them petty, because, to be a little vulgar perhaps, "an empty belly has no conscience."

I have always thought that that salvaged quite a lot of young men -- 500,000 per work period, so probably several million, boys who went through the CCC project in one way or another. Many of them learned useful skills that were marketable; they could get jobs and be self-respecting and self-supporting -- not great jobs, but some important men went through CCC as kids. In this state there was one aspect of that which interested me a great deal. The logging industry was just in the process of changing from high-power machine logging, donkey logging, which is very destructive, by the way, to tractor logging. They pull the logs by tractor. It's beneficial to the forest and beneficial to costs. Well, when that process got under way, they suddenly found that there was no big
Lassen National Forest, Big Springs ECW Camp F-48 (Aug. 1933). Assistant Regional Forester T.D. Woodbury from Regional Office giving woods crew a talk.
body of men who knew how to run tractors. Well, we
had trained hundreds of them in the camps to run tractors,
when there was a change of one kind of road construction
to a type requiring to use of tractors and trailbuilders.
Some of these youngsters who had been green kids a few
months before began to get jobs, because they were the
only pool of trained men.

Try: Do you know whether some of them went into construction
work?

Show: Oh, yes -- artisans, carpenters, plumbers. Some of them
had been taught the skills of blasting, and there was a
demand for them as the depression receded. Some got jobs
as mechanics, because they had pretty good mechanical
training in the camps, on maintenance of machines. So
the net effect was to salvage a good part of a lost genera-
tion to whom the world was closed. I like to think of
that as a part of the whole thing. We were interested in
getting our projects done, of course, but we had a genuine
interest in the kids. The mere fact that some of them
learned to read and write meant that they had one of the
requirement of effective citizenship.

So the CCC could be summed up as the most effective and successful of Roosevelt's projects to break the depression; it was the major step in saving a lost generation of kids.

Did many of those mustered out stay in California?

Some of them did, where they got jobs. Many of them of course went back to their point of origin, where they'd been enrolled, but it was a more wholesome and healthy and decent society after that. After they served their first work period in camp, they were given the opportunity, and urged, to look for outside jobs. There never was complete turnover but there was a great deal.

Could they leave CCC at any time to take an outside job?

They would be released. The policy was very liberal. After all, that was the purpose of it.

There was no military training in camp; that was out. Many of the camp commanders would have liked to do so, but we were very alert to that. Fairly early, about
the end of the first work period, my public relations officer, Wallace Hutchinson, came to me with the idea that we should have a diploma, signed by me, to give enrollees as they left the project. So we fixed one up. You must remember that most of these kids didn't have a grade school diploma. They had nothing. So we worked up a very impressive diploma saying that "I certify that so-and-so has completed successfully a work period in the CCC project and has done useful work to protect and improve his country's resources," and so on, "and been an accredited member of the corps. Signed, S.B. Show, Regional Forester." Well, those were handed out, and the kids loved them. I know here at home, afterwards every once in a while my wife would answer the door, and some boy would ask, "Is Mr. Show here? I'd like to see him." And she'd act a little surprised and he'd say, "Oh, I know Mr. Show," and pull out his diploma. "See what he gave me?" Well, it was so touching. Don't you think so? I suspect a lot of those diplomas are still the only diplomas,
Show: and I think the boys treasured them.

It was in itself a trivial thing, but I'm not sure in the larger sense that it was.

Well, I think I have to the best of my knowledge covered the subject.

Try: Yes, you have, except for one minor thing. Last time someone mentioned the Army reaction to CCC boys in World War II.

Show: Of course, General H.H. Arnold was outspoken in his approval of it -- from the military standpoint. He held the view later, when the war was impending, that the boys who had been through CCC were far and away better disciplined, easier to train in the military mode, than the general run of boys who were drafted or volunteered. On the trip with General Arnold and General Marshall in 1944 in the high Sierras, General Marshall, who had been a district commander in CCC and who formed a very high opinion of it, spoke to me with conviction of the enormous abilities of the Forest Service to organize these things, and he also
said that the experience in the military training camps was that these boys were far and away better material, from the Army standpoint, because of the training they'd had in the camps. Those were pleasant things to hear.

Pack Trip with Generals Marshall and Arnold

I wondered if you wanted to tell the story of being in the Sierras with General Marshall and General Arnold.

It was shortly after D-Day. I'll have to tell it informally; I've never written it out.

We had known and valued Hap Arnold beginning with the air patrol days of 1919 and continuing intermittently ever since. He had been a district commander under the Army at March Field during the early days of CCC. He was major at that time. About 1941, I think, before the war, we had organized a trip for him in the high Sierras. We had taken him along as a guest on a trip organized for another purpose, and he had a wonderful time, fishing and all. Then in 1944, not very long after D-Day, the phone rang and I picked it up, and Arnold, whose voice is unmistakable, said, "Hey, do you know who this is?"
I said, "I think I do." So he was identified.

He said, "Say, no names, but there's a very eminent gentleman in the Army -- more eminent than I am in the Air Force -- who would like to go away for a trip in the high Sierras."

I said, "When, how long, and how many in your party?"

"Well," he said, "About August so-and-so, for about ten days, and there'll be about," and he counted, "about four in our party, one of whom will be a radio technician, because we must keep in constant touch with the communications center."

I said, "Well, all right." And I got hold of two men or three, in the office. He'd said, "Phone this number," with a certain code for recognition, "when you work it out." And he said, "For God's sake, keep it completely secret except for men you have to get into it."

So I got two or three men who knew the high Sierras best, and we blocked out the rough shape of about a ten-day pack trip which would give them a nice trip, not a hard day's ride. We got the supervisor of the Inyo Forest,
Roy Booth, and went over it in detail with him -- what would be needed in the way of hired help, because we weren't going to do our own cooking and that sort of thing, or our own packing.

Then, since there was going to have to be radio communication (Arnold said they would set up their communications center in Owens Valley), I undertook to send our radio expert, together with one from the military, to make a dry run of our route -- to do the preliminaries of getting the aerials up and checking out at the campsites.

So the supervisor began to tie down pack and saddle stock. I took one of my hired assistants, Cronemiller, along as a combination of cook -- he was extremely good as a camp cook -- and as a general overseer of the packing, animal problem. We got going; we made an arrangement, and I met them with my big car over in Bishop.

Fry: And that was the first you knew that the man he was bringing was Marshall?

Show: Well, it was easy to figure out, although it was never actually said. I'd have reason to call the number Arnold
showed me, and I'd get questions about what kind of trout flies to use, and practical details like that. [Laughing] So General Arnold was going to have fun, to get as far as he could away.

Another member of the Army group was a special technician. They had this marvelous scramble machine for sending messages, and they'd change the code every day. You'd put in the message and it'd grind it out a bunch of x's and z's and y's, so this technician was along as an aide to General Arnold. Marshall came alone.

I picked them up fairly early one morning in Bishop. They'd waited rather late in Washington to fly out, in General Marshall's private plane. We took them up to the starting-off point and as usual there was all sorts of trouble and confusion about getting organized and packed. It was a center up at Mammoth, where lots of parties went for one-day rides and that sort of thing, and there were a lot of people around. We tried to keep things as unobtrusive as possible while we got organized. I remember one woman finally came up to General Arnold and she said,
"You're General Arnold." With that handsome Irish face, there was no denying it. So I got hold of her and I said, "Look, it is extremely important that nothing be said about this. Please, may I depend on your cooperation not to tell this to anyone?" We did the same thing with the newspaper fraternity -- it was not a true secret, but we said; "You can't say anything or hint anything."

Well, finally we got started, and the first day's ride was a little hard, particularly on General Arnold. I'd taken along J.E. Elliott, because he was an awfully good man in the mountains and because he and Arnold were very old and very close friends. The first day's ride took us to a place called Purple Lake; we came into camp along in the middle of the afternoon. The first thing Arnold did was get off his horse and say, "C'mon, Joe, let's catch 'em." And he went dashing off to catch fish.

General Marshall got off his horse and the first thing he did was look for a place to put down his bed for the night. He found it, carried his bed over, spread it out, "Now I'm ready." Then he took off his boots, his socks,
found one of those cold mountain rills, and carefully
bathed his feet, fished into his coat pocket, put on
a clean pair of socks, and he said, "You know, there's
a rule in the Army to always do this. I think I'm the
only man in the Army who does." And he did that all
the way, even at lunchtime, keeping his feet in shape.
He said, "I'm a soldier."

Then he hunted up a fairly soft spot and said,
"Got any whiskey?" I said, "Oh, yes." We'd assessed
ourselves for a pretty liberal supply of good whiskey,
and for good sherry, because somebody had the idea that
General Arnold had been told not to drink whiskey, but
sherry. So Marshall says, "I think I'd like a little
drink." I got him a tin cup and a good drink of whiskey
and mountain water. He relaxed a little bit and talked.
He was a pretty dour-looking man in his photographs, if
you'll remember, but he was extremely good company. He
liked to talk. Of course, he was with us because Arnold
had said, "These guys are all right, I know them."
So we had a little drink and I said, "What do you want to do?" He said, "I think I'll just lie here and relax." I said, "I think I'll go down to the lake and see if I can catch any fish." I went down and fished for a while.

Cronemiller was rustling around camp, getting his fire going and the food ready for supper. We ate pretty well; he's an excellent informal camp cook. Then we went on with the trip.

There were no notable incidents until the third or fourth day out. In the evening, if any messages had come in the generals would receive them, usually General Marshall, and if a reply was called for they'd write it out and this guy would put it in the scramble machine and send it on its way. Well, one morning -- no, one night, a message came from Washington that a very important document needing consideration by General Marshall personally would be sent in, flown in by an Air Force plane from the message center. We got all ready to go. The plane was
Show: to fly over and drop a sack; General Marshall had one key
and there was another key in Washington. It was a heavy
leather reinforced sack. So we got the horses ready, some
of them packed, and pretty soon we heard the plane coming
over the Sierras. We were at that time west of the summit.
We were camped out in the open; the pilot couldn't over­
look us. We had a signaling pistol, which made a cloud of
pink smoke. This young ass ran out and fired it off, and
the horses all snorted and reared back on their tie ropes,
and some of them broke away and went bucking off.

While we were having horse troubles, the pilot -- who
turned out to be a woman -- came over and took the sack in
one hand (she was in a small plane, of course) preparatory
to dropping it. The only trouble was that the wind whipped
it out of her hand and it fell, oh, several hundred yards
uphill, in thick timber. And that was that. I remember
Joe's remark to General Arnold: "That Air Force of yours,
General, is a mighty fine institution, as long as it stays
on the ground." [Laughter] Arnold flushed and got mad,
but -- Well, we sent out everybody to hunt for this sack.
The pistol, set off by this ... person [laughter], had set afire the edge of this timber. It was rocky country and there wasn't much dirt or anything to shovel on the fire and get it out, so I saddened my young radio technician's life and said, "You get a shovel and get up there and get that stuff." Well, he found a little pocket of sand and he'd shovel it up a few feet at a time, sweating and laboring, to where he could get it onto the fire. It was only a few feet, but I couldn't see the regional forester going away and leaving a fire.

We had one really good packer; he was an Indian from over in the valley, and he found this sack and came bearing it in. Everybody else, not including me, had been scrambling around looking more or less aimlessly, and this fellow found it. General Marshall got out his key, opened it up, went over and sat down by the fire -- we still had a fire, it was a little chilly -- and everybody of course pulled off. The envelope said, "For General Marshall's eyes only." There was a beautiful vellum map, for his eyes only, showing the up-to-the-minute situation in Europe. The two big things that were happening were, first, Patton's
breakthrough, which had the effect that he was outrunning his field supplies. They were frenetically following with pipelines, but he was going too fast, so he was running out of means -- you know there was a high degree of mechanization in his advance.

Yes; he was bringing the Sixth Army up from southeastern France.

Well, so they were in the middle of that. And General Hodges was approaching Rome, wasn't it? from the south, smashing up from Naples. As General Marshall said, "Hodges is a smasher, a destroyer." I mean, he was wrecking the country as he came.

Well, pretty soon Marshall said, "Come on over, Arnold, and look at this." And he did and they talked a little bit about the message to go out. Then Arnold said, "Maybe these guys would like to see this." "Why," Marshall said, "Certainly." So we all went over and peered at it. It was a beautifully done thing. It showed the disposition of our forces, the disposition of the opposing forces, all
Show: sorts of pertinent military information, and the envelope no doubt contained up-to-the-minute critiques from the big generals. What the questions were you could infer but you couldn't know.

So Marshall said, "Burn it up," and into the fire it went and was reduced to ash. Same way with the messages. We sent the message out, got the horses under control, and we were on our way.

I always had Cronemiller ride ahead because he knows what is safe, and this Inyo supervisor had picked some pretty rough trail. If it was Cronemiller's judgment we should get off and walk, we got off and walked, with Arnold protesting plaintively. He was a pretty big heavy fellow at that time.

Well, from the last camp was the worst of the trails. It was over rock rubble, every horse and mule had its hocks skinned and bleeding, Cronemiller said it was unsafe to ride so we got off and walked and hoped that our animals wouldn't break their legs. None of them did. We eventually
I got through and I said some words to the supervisor who had selected that route.

When we had first met, General Marshall had said, "I will leave at nine o'clock on such-and-such a date. My plane will be there. I have to meet with the President and make a report." We got them out on time, but at the last camp all of us started fishing seriously. I took care of the fish, cleaning them immediately, stringing them up and drying them overnight and rolling them in the bedroll the next day. They never refrigerated but they chilled, and you can carry them for several days, perfectly sweet. So I had a good bunch of fish, I guess a couple of hundred trout -- mostly golden, beautiful little fellows. So we took them out. My car met us at the bridge head, we arrived on schedule. Meanwhile, Roy Booth had asked General Marshall if it would be permissible to have a meeting of his people in Bishop for a dinner, and Marshall said, "Yes, I think that'd be nice." So we radioed that word out.

We got into Bishop. After a pack trip a bath sounds
awful good, so we got our rooms, signed the register—with the generals' proper names and military titles, and the lady who owned the place said, "Hey, I'm going to keep this sheet." I said, "What do you want first, a bath or a drink?" Arnold went for the drink first; General Marshall thought he'd clean up. He did, and he came out in his full military uniform with all the decorations, five stars. He was a pretty impressive looking gentleman, I'll tell you. Arnold said, "Where's that whiskey?" So we all had a drink.

We went into the meeting place. This was a big moment of prestige for Roy, of course. We had a very good dinner. Then General Marshall looked at his watch, and he just stood up and took command. He said, "We've had a very fine time with your Forest Service people; we're refreshed." Arnold had said when we were coming out, "Why don't we just turn around, George, and do it again." General Marshall just stood up and took command, that's all. He called on each of us of the Forest Service to say a few words, and you had a feeling of sureness that it
was going to be a few words.

Then Marshall said, "Well, now I have to go."

Of course everybody wanted to crowd around and chatter to the great man, shake hands with him, and two or three of us got in front of him and ran interference and got him off to his private plane.

Back along the way Marshall had said to me, "Show, I'd like to take you back on my plane and have you as my guest a few days. I'll be pretty busy but we can take care of you." I said, "Well, General, I appreciate it, I'd love to go, but we're getting fire troubles built up in the south, and my job is to stay here. But two supervisors could be released." He said, "Yes, I'd be glad to take them both."

So they sent out frantic radio messages. Joe Elliott had to come from Susanville for his good clothes and some money. Marshall shook hands with us and thanked us, and Joe Elliott and Roy Booth were looking for a band or something of the sort, but there was no band so they climbed in and away they went.
Show: General Arnold climbed into his plane and went somewhere else.

The thing I remember is the freedom with which General Marshall talked to me. The things he shouldn't have said he said because he had faith that the Forest Service were honorable. After that of course the story was, so to speak, released. The newspapers couldn't get hold of the generals but they interviewed those of us who'd been on the trip.

And I felt a great feeling of relief; having ten stars under my care I found was quite a responsibility. I fished and all that, but mostly I was trying to see that everything was run safely.

Iry: People I have talked to have said they were impressed with Marshall's intellect and his remarkable memory.

Show: Oh, yes. First of all, he's a man of extreme ability. He has the best grasp of the war, I think, of anybody -- including Winnie. Second, he was a completely dedicated man. Some things came out when he was talking to me; he said, "You know, nobody has an original idea after three
p.m." He'd get up and ride every morning and then have breakfast. He said, "I do my best work early. By three o'clock I've lost something, and I just quit work." He told a story about D-Day. He said he knew it was going to take place, he'd done all he could to give Eisenhower what Eisenhower said he needed, so he went home and went to bed and took a nice rest. The next day of course the newspapermen were after him, turning out stories that General Marshall had kept in close personal touch with the situation throughout the night. And Marshall said, "Why, I was really irritated. I couldn't do anything, it was in others' hands. In the morning I got the early reports and knew how it looked. Meanwhile I couldn't do anything, so why pester me so?" That's the level of self-discipline he worked on; extremely high.

Fry: Did you get any of his ideas on man's humanity to man?

Show: No. His talk, and there was quite a bit of it on that trip, was wholly Army-Forest Service relations, on military matters.

I mentioned that fire trouble was building up in
Southern California. We got in touch with my supervisor and zone coordinator, and he stepped in to take in an overall look -- we had fires in different forests, and we weren’t getting help from the military training camps as we had been doing before. We had to depend on them during the war primarily for fire-fighting labor. So I talked to Bill Mendenhall on the telephone and learned from him what the problem was. Well, General Marshall was close, and he said, "Is there trouble that I can help on?" I said, "Yes, indeed, you’re the only man in the world who can help, I guess." And I told him what it was, we weren’t getting the release of men from training camps. He thought a moment and then wrote a little message; it said, "Give every help, what they need, to the Forest Service on their fire problem." Signed, "Marshall, Chief of Staff." Well.

I headed down with Cronemiller the next morning to see the trouble, after this banquet. Mendenhall says, "That happened? I’ve been begging them for their soldiers -- " 
Show: So I told him what happened. And I think that's a fitting way to end this, because our support from the generals, which was vital, was an aftermath of CCC. Both of them knew us from CCC.
INTERVIEW III

August 1, 1963

RECREATION USE OF NATIONAL FORESTS
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RECREATION USE OF NATIONAL FORESTS

Try: Are you going to separate recreation and wilderness?

Show: It's all part of a continuous story. Wilderness areas are a part and a major step in the development of forest recreation.

Try: My idea is that in national parks the wilderness areas have nothing to do with recreation -- nothing to do with active recreation, camping.

Show: That's right. We'll talk today about the development and background of forest recreation in the California mountains. Of course long before the forest reserves, now national forests, were created, beginning in 1892, forest recreation had been a rather common thing in the California mountains. The early forms of that were the family camping party, where a family took a team and wagon and went to some spot in the mountains and stayed for quite a while. You didn't move around. Those were quite common in areas where there was good fishing and attractive country, and where life could be convenient
as camp life goes. Another form was the development of resort cities. The first mountain resorts occurred fairly early in California history. There was one in the Mount Shasta, upper Sacramento canyon, which gradually developed, and those who were able to afford resorts used them. Another developed in Yosemite Park. Shasta was accessible by railroad, Yosemite by horse stage. They developed in Southern California too, because those people pushed out into the mountains very early. And there was one in the Geysers area up on the north coast which developed very early.

The Sierra Club was organized in 1892, and it took as its particular problem the high Sierra, rather narrowly defined, and they developed their rather elaborate party which went into the high Sierra every summer.

So those were, broadly speaking, the early forms of recreational use in the mountains. Of course, the totality of use was trifling compared to the present day. Use of course was largely on public land, which was unre-
Authorization Act authorized the President to set aside selected areas as forest reserves, to provide timber supplies and to preserve favorable conditions of water flow. Immediately after the act such areas were set aside by President Harrison. But the act didn't provide for any administration at all; the lands were reserved but there was no attention to them. That didn't come till 1898 when the beginnings of a system of administration were set up by congressional law. Thereafter there was a very thin network of forest rangers who were appointed largely politically by the General Land Office, to whom the President had turned over the administration of the reserved land.

With that we begin to find attention to recreation, primarily because tourists and campers caused fires. The General Land Office Forest Reserve Manual of the late nineties -- the rule book for the officers -- treats forest recreation in this fashion: it says, "Officers must always be polite." They must never lose their tempers or use
abusive language in dealing with people. If, for instance, a ranger finds a camper has built a fire against a dry log, he must reason with him and show him why he shouldn't do that, not haul him before a justice of the peace. Nowadays he would appear and a justice of the peace would speak to him. Campers are instructed not to build too large fires, to clear the ground before and put the fire out -- all this very politely.

Along with this there was some attempt to control use involving fire in certain forms or which were likely to cause fires. That began very early in Southern California under a superintendent named Thomas. For instance, shotguns and black powder shells were prohibited in hunting in the reserves. Blasting was prohibited because the fuses could cause fires. And the rangers were required to tack up cloth signs on selected trees which were a full quotation of the laws that existed regarding use of the reserves. Well, they were probably the poorest signs ever invented because you'd have to put your reading specs on to read them, and the chipmunks chewed them up. But it
was indication of an attempt to educate users of the reserves, and as such I think it had some significance.

The next thing was that the forest reserves were transferred from the General Land Office in the Department of the Interior to the infant Forest Service, on February 1, 1905, and Gifford Pinchot became the first chief of the Forest Service. The forests were renamed "national forests" instead of forest reserves; Pinchot very much disliked the word "reserve" because it wasn't popular. In the original plan of organization, Pinchot ignored forest recreation. The only goal was to prevent fires, which is a negative goal, you might say. Why he did that in the larger concept of the conservation movement is far from clear. There were a few national parks, which were to preserve the great national wonders, and they had been set aside through public insistence on protection from private exploitation -- the same basic morality and aim as for the national forests. Their administration had been turned over to the Army because it alone among government agencies had integrity. But
that could hardly have seemed a sound and permanent solution. Pinchot reportedly could have had the national parks at the start, and it seems clear that his preoccupation with wood, water, and forage for use precluded the idea of taking over the national parks. His preoccupation with the usable natural resources left parks on the fringe of his thinking, and thus left the situation which in Graves' regime led to the creation of the National Park Service, in 1914. There had been no separate agency before.

This led to Stephen Mather's aggressive, skilful, and sometimes unscrupulous drives for more and bigger parks, forcing long, continuing, defensive, and sometimes losing battles. I think most significant in the creation of the National Park Service is the fact that it was the first major step in the fragmentation of conservation. There were various legally equal bureaus and services, each with its own often conflicting aims, laws, and policies. It was a superficially innocuous beginning of the single-
Show: purpose reservation, which the parks are and the national forests are not, and it formed a direct challenge to the national forests' basic policy of multiple use.

Why Pinchot ignored forest recreation and parks is difficult to understand because he had a deep appreciation of the great natural wonders; he went to Grand Canyon, the big trees, Yosemite, and believed they should be in public ownership. But he didn't see parks as part of the national forest job.

Special Use Summer Home

In spite of the official Forest Service attitude -- the early field attitude of the rangers was largely that the tourists were a nuisance because they caused fires. But it wasn't long before they began to rub noses, because the early rangers got around, they knew people, they knew their area. It was particularly in the areas of concentrated use -- light as compared with today -- that the rangers simply could not ignore recreation.

People came and began to demand, and expect, certain forms
of attention. So beginning about 1911 or '12 there were pressures first of all for the creation of what we now call the "special use summer home" -- where an individual rents a surveyed-out piece, usually a quarter or a fifth of an acre, on which he can build a mountain cabin as a summer home. That began in Southern California, and appeared on the American River and the El Dorado forest very early. These were in areas which the users selected; there was no recreation plan. Somebody would come to the forest supervisor and say, "I'd like a permit for a cabin here." And because the Forest Service was getting the vast sum of $15 a year for the rental, they were welcomed with open arms. There were some of the weirdest cabins ever built on some of those special use lots; there was no control of architecture. It was up to the permittee to provide his own water and sanitation and all.

Q. What guarantee did he have that the land would remain his?

A. It was his unless the land was required for some higher
new purpose. For instance, if a river canyon with permits in it is developed as a reservoir by the building of a dam, the permit may be cancelled -- but with recompense by the new water permittee.

That I think represents a change in attitudes in the Forest Service from essentially negative to positive, doing something creative for the benefit of people. In California particularly the summer home permittee does fulfill a socially useful purpose. Summer in a hot valley is hard on the women and children. A very common pattern was for women and children to move to a summer home and papa would go back to work in the valley and come up weekends as he could. And it avoided the dirt and dust and hard work of camping. And with a rental income of $45 or maybe $60 an acre, forest officers greeted the users with joy.

Fry: Was the money kept within the national forest?
Show: It went into general receipts, into the U.S. Treasury.
Fry: Did you have much experience with summer homes in Shasta?
We had a few. My connection with them was mostly to survey them out and make nice neat plats of them. That started when I was pretty much of a junior.

There was a tendency for neighbors to select spots in the same locality. There were groups of the Cal faculty up at Fallen Leaf Lake established very early. There was a Stanford group. And there were groups from various valley cities which developed as roads were built into the mountains, beginning with the early bond issue of 1908, and as the automobiles built could negotiate these roads -- the flivver especially. These centers attracted the various kinds of resort business; stores, in some places boat rentals, and along with that went selection of areas for campers, naturally near the businesses. So we began to get very early a scrambled-up mess mixing different forms of use in the same area. There was interference, and it didn't work. Along with roads and cars, the recreational use of the mountains began relatively to boom. The messes were to
persist and they were quite troublesome. Some rangers in the heavier-concentration areas in effect became mayors of communities [laughter], because all the troubles were draped around their necks. There were quarrels and tensions, and the ranger would have to cajole people to make more attractive cabins and keep the place cleaned up and all that sort of thing.

Fry: It sounds like you might have an anecdote about this.

Shep: For instance, the water supply was limited, and an association would be formed led by the ranger of the summer home permittees to provide a clean and safe water supply. The campers would say, "Well, we don't know whether we'll be here next year. We don't see why we should put any money into a pipeline." Some of the permittees were perfectly willing to be parasites, and they'd say, "We live pretty close to the spring. We don't have any particular problem." So the ranger would get them together and try to appeal to their better natures. That happened up in the Shasta, I know. Progress was made, but it was slow
and rather painful. But mixing the different uses together on the same area was not feasible, not satisfactory.

So recreation was proceeding apace in the field, although the official policy had nothing to do with it.

Well, there was still no real policy. This hit us particularly in California because there were more people using the mountains here. Nevertheless, the individual summer home was a step of positive nature and did fill a very useful social purpose.

Tourist Use and Wilderness Areas

In the teens there were various other positive efforts in recreation. There was education in the form of talks and lectures. A man by the name of Hodge wrote the first camper handbook, telling campers what to do, how to do it, and why, when they camped in the mountains. He was working for the Forest Service in San Francisco.

There was more personal contact; the rangers would visit around and try to lead the users, many of whom were pretty amateurish at the start, into better ways. And there were talks, as I have said.
S. Bevier Show
Tagging trees, September 1919
Another thing which came about was saying good-bye to those miserable cloth signs which nobody ever read, and the development of a really pretty good system of metal and enamel signs, directional signs to warn people what was good manners in the mountains and what was not. One would say, "Be sure your cigarette is out," and another one, "Such-and-such Meadows on the trail seven miles." They were an effort to prevent fires and to educate people on not starting fires, and to help them in getting around without getting lost. It was a positive attitude.

Then there were the six rules for preventing fires in the mountains worked out by the supervisor, and they were widely distributed, put in correspondence and all that sort of thing. There were other steps taken to help tourists; one was introducing new species of game into areas. Some of the planting of big game animals was done in the Shasta while I was there -- the introduction of elk in the southeastern part of the forest. They
show: didn't persist. And there was introduction of new
game birds into areas where the native quail were get-
ting thin. The Forest Service worked very closely with
the Fish and Game people from the beginning. A great
deal of the work of the rangers was in law enforcement.
Some of them were very aggressive, and some were quite
successful in making cases.

A rather notable event was the Huir Trail, which
started, I believe, when Ed Kotok as supervisor of the
El Dorado forest wangled a small appropriation out of
the state legislature for it. The trail started north
of the high Sierra proper but was visualized as eventually
being a continuous trail down the length of the Sierras.
It had a good deal of sex appeal. The Forest Service
had very little money, but it put some into the building
of the trail as a continuous project. Of course it's
become enormously popular and heavily used now.

The first prepared campgrounds were on the Angeles
forest in 1915. In those days the camping was in the
canyons which were excessively dangerous and from which recreational fires started and spread. They were very simple campgrounds indeed, largely consisting of clearing the ground, developing springs so that the fire could be contained, perhaps putting in a garbage pit. But that all had to be done by the rangers and guards because there was no money for it. It was simply what we called "contributed time," which was a nice way to say it.

There was an assistant regional forester named Barrett who in his inspection trips made a special point to try to teach the rangers the things that might be done and how to do it -- how to do a better job. So there was considerable attention to positive steps in recreation.

Try: Was this on his own?

Show: Well, it gradually got formalized a little bit.

In addition there was more recognition of recreational use in the high Sierras. They began to build pasture fences so that the stock wouldn't wander away, and the sheep were kicked out of the high Sierras, be-
cause tourists and sheep or cattle never have mixed.
The people were coming in, so quite a few grazing
permits were cancelled, to the anguish of the permittees.
And a few hiking and riding trails were sort of boot-
legged in by supervisors. A rather neat job was done
by Kotok on the El Dorado, which I think was the begin-
ning of road-signing historic spots. I happened to be
up there for a day when he got some doddering old timer
and we went up the Lincoln Highway, and the old man
would say, "Now, here's where the 17-mile house was."
And he'd tell what he knew about it. And quite a series
of signs were put up in the forest while Ed was there.
It was an attempt to help the tourists.

You can sum up this period by saying that the
Forest Service field forces changed quite rapidly in
various ways, from an essentially negative attitude to
forest recreation to a more positive one. It was still
done without any plan or control; it certainly was far
from being as much as would have been desirable.
During the same period that the Park Service was created, Steve Mather, the first director, began his long-continuing push for bigger and better national parks to be made by transfer of national forest lands, and the Forest Service began its long defensive campaign. That story will peak up in the Kings Canyon story when we get to it.

Well, with all of this, the number of camper fires per annum continued to increase, and for other reasons the number of incendiary fires did. In 1918 there was organized the Arson Squad, a group of selected rangers with some talents for law enforcement under the conditions of law enforcement in the mountains, and who were assigned to forests to make legal cases against violators. They made a great many. I mention that only because of the fact that users did cause fires persistently until much later.

And there were some prevention measures which were tightened up. We gradually got, for instance, county ordinances requiring owners of cabins to keep debris raked up and burned so that fires couldn't spread, requir-
ing them to put ashes into metal containers, and so on.

The fact that the official Forest Service attitude was still negative is signified by the passage of the first federal appropriation dealing with recreation, and that was called the Sanitation and Fire Prevention Measure -- to attempt to deal with fire prevention. This was the first, in 1923, and it was a rather small appropriation -- we out here could have eaten it all up and not have had indigestion, but of course we didn't get it all.

Well, the totality of use continued to grow a great deal in the twenties, with roads and cars and more leisure time. 1924 was an extremely severe fire season, and it developed in the Board of Fire Review that the local users, rather than outside users, caused relatively a vastly greater number of fires. In other words, the efforts to educate the tourists, the outsiders, had borne fruit, and the number of camper-caused fires are now really a minor cause.

In Southern California recreational use was con-
centrated in the canyons, which were very hazardous places. Beginning in the mid-twenties, after 1926 when I became regional forester, I fought through the first forest highway on top of the San Bernardino mountains, which would get people out of the canyons up on top and into nice country. It was bitterly resisted in the other agencies in the forest highway program, but we fought it through and later we got others to pull people from the bottom to the top.

Ely: What was the basis of their opposition?

Snow: Well, they always wanted the forest highway money to go on roads of interest to them. They would be in the national forests, all right, but not serving our purpose.

We developed the device of getting some of our summer home permittees in the most dangerous spots a life estate permit — that is, they couldn't transfer. We handled it with a fairly light touch. What happened in many families was that the old folks began to get old, the children didn't have any real interest in the place often, and the life estate permit helped us in wiggling
out of various places, eventually discontinuing the permit.

The development of powerful machines for road building, which had begun around 1920, was resulting in the pushing of roads -- usually very poor roads -- into areas without roads in the mountains. There began to be some concern that unless that process was controlled, together with the building of formal structures, we were going to end up with the California mountains lacking many areas that people valued because they didn't have roads and structures in them. Leopold was one of the early spokesmen that we ought to do something about it. We had found that we could not block an owner from building what he called a road to his own land -- we tried that down in Santa Barbara. The only recourse was to load the road-building permit, which we did have, with stipulations, but basic fairness prevented us from going too far that way. That was another reason why we needed to get hold of the whole question of road building in
the new areas of the California mountains.

Finally, in the winter of 1927-28, there came a letter from the chief of the Forest Service, Greeley, to prepare proposals for a system of wilderness areas, as they were originally called, through which roads, buildings, and formal recreational developments would be barred. Pasture fences would be all right. The idea was that unless roads were halted they would work into every corner of the mountains and destroy a kind of country, a kind of forest recreation, which had been a cherished part of the American way.

In his book Donald Swain holds that the Forest Service, around 1927 under Greeley, was fearful that national parks might win guardianship of these areas that were valuable primarily for their natural beauty, and it was to reduce Forest Service vulnerability on this point that the Forest Service acted. How do you feel about that?

Well, I think that certainly was an expected result of the wilderness area program, that it would take off pressures for the creation of additional national parks from national forest lands. But the program was primarily positive in purpose.

The formula in Greeley's letter spoke firmly against including large areas of presently or imminently commercially-exploitable timber. It was vague on including speculatively commercial stands of the inferior species, as they were then called -- they're not any more, the true firs. It accepted grazing under full control as consistent with the areas to be designated, and it bespoke the widest possible distribution of areas.

My chief of lands, Assistant Regional Forester Lou Barrett, came limping down to my office to talk to me about it. Today the story of how the job was worked out in California is either unknown, ignored, or distorted by raucous proponents of bigger and better wilder-
ness areas, so I think it worthwhile to tell it.

Others in the field and in my office had roles in the final result, but essentially it was the offspring of Lou Barrett and myself. First of all, we accepted the idea without reservation, and second, we began to study the formula. Nothing was said about the level of fire hazard. We were by then committed to building fire control roads into areas of medium and high hazard. Nothing was said about inclusion of private land, although as I've said we had recently tried and failed to block road access to private areas. We feared the exchange program under the General Exchange Act, as dominated by E.A. Sherman of the Washington office, would look coldly on the kind of private lands found in the country we'd be studying. As to the stands of "inferior species," we would simply have to roll our own. As to scenic or recreational quality, we would have to be broadminded and flexible if we got much into Southern California, and certainly that big mountain-using community
show: deserved attention. As to minimum size, the formula was silent, and we would have to accept relatively small areas if we did much in Southern California. Nothing was said about consultation with private people, but we felt Sierra Club leaders, with their deep and proper interest, should be consulted and could be helpful.

So Barrett and I made up a modified formula. Keep out of areas where fire roads look to be essential; accept no more than a relatively small amount of private land; accept scattered and patchy stands of inferior species; work for the best quality and largest size possible but get areas on each national forest. With the help of others in the shop we made out a first list of suggested areas to consider, and Lou started to deal with supervisors. Their initial response varied from enthusiasm to a sort of foot-dragging passive resistance, and shortly Lou and I agreed that where we had doubts about the sufficiency of supervisors' proposals I would
Show: ride out to the areas and form an independent judgment. Lou couldn't ride because of his lameness.

The job might have been considered below the dignity of a regional forester but I didn't feel that way about it. It seemed creative, and it was setting a new Forest Service policy and program which was of the greatest concern to many, many people. In 1928 and during the next several years I made about a half a dozen pack trips to look over what became the high Sierra wilderness area, and the two big ones in Northern California, Marble Mountains and the Trinity Alps. From time to time Lou arranged meetings with the Sierra Club leaders -- Will Colby, Duncan McDuffie, Walter Huber, Francis Farquhar, Walter Starr. They at least knew what we were doing and why. Of course they were enthusiastic about the general idea. I always got a rather low and sinful joy out of the fact that the Forest Service originated this creative program, though then and later the Park Service spoke well of itself, as the one and only true protector
Barrett handled the vast job of preparing maps and reports, and by January 1929 our first fourteen areas, totalling about one and a half million acres, went in and in due course were approved. I got into the drawing of boundaries as well as the examination of lands, and some of these boundary drawings were a meat-ax job, done in full expectation that future revisions would be needed. The best maps were grossly inaccurate and sketchy, and we just did the best we could. Mostly I think we did a pretty good job, considering the low level of data on the high country.

You know, then as now people would fight, bleed and die for wilderness areas although they never go to that kind of country and never expect to go. They just like to know that they're around.

At about the same time, 1928, the State Park Bond Issue was passed, which was a memorable step in the
development of the state parks -- in fact, the key step. There were a few parks here and there, but there was no state park system. Well, a state park board was immediately appointed by the governor, and it was the best possible choice, I think -- Will Colby, one of the old Bull Moosers of the Sierra Club, was chairman. They got Frederick Law Olmsted, the eminent outdoor man, to study and report on possible desirable areas for state parks. His report was filed in 1929; it included several areas, Mt. San Jacinto of Southern California is the notable example, which Mr. Olmsted thought were desirable as state parks.

Try: Was this a national forest area?

Show: It was national forest land. Well, Barrett and I had qualms, because we thought the state Park Board was about the same ethically and tactically as the National Park Service, in demanding transfer of national forest lands to other status without any quid pro quo, just because they wanted them. We, being simple souls, asked Mr. Colby
and former professor C.B. Wing of Stanford to come over to see us and talk about it. I had known Professor Wing since I was a faculty kid at the start of Stanford, and he was a high-class, honorable man. I told them that if they wished to go on the cooperative basis of exchanging a quid pro quo value for value, then we could surely work out transfer of national forest lands to state park status. If they tried to conduct raids, as the National Park Service had done, we'd fight them.

They said, "We want to do this on a fair basis," and the state park people forever after did act that way. We worked out San Jacinto with them to our joint satisfaction, and others, and I have always felt that that was an admirable case of how public agencies should act toward each other.

Q: I believe Newton Drury was their land officer.

A: Yes. He primarily dealt with negotiations for purchase and that sort of thing; I don't think at that time that he had much control in policy and selection of areas.
The Forest Service had participated a few years earlier, at the request of the governor's office before the passage of the bond issue, in a study of areas suitable for state parks in the redwood country, and that was made through our loan of R.F. Hammatt to make the study. It was a good one and many of the recommendations were carried out.

Then we get into the days of CCC, and the only thing to say is that we were able for the first time to do something positive and in a big way about the system of public campgrounds, because we had the men and the money to do the work. We'd learned how to make a very satisfactory layout for a camping area with tables and benches, running water, adequate sanitation, and blocked-off parking areas for cars. We fastened a big chunk of log to the ground, and made a parking area along any road. We learned not to overdo the clearing of it, which added to the attractiveness. In other words, we were kind of professional on that system of campgrounds. The selection wasn't the best, because that was left pri-
Show: marily to local option -- the supervisor or ranger decided where to put them. But altogether they made a tremendous boost in the facilities provided by the Forest Service for the benefit of recreational users. Recreational Inventory, 1936

Well, then things went along till 1936, when I got started on the Recreational Inventory. Up to this point, each area had been pretty much treated by itself, either because it was preferred by users or because the Forest Service had stimulated the selection and development. We just didn't have any arithmetical idea of what we had to deal with suitable for different forms of recreation. There was no guide anywhere as to how to conduct such things; this was the first thing of the sort that had ever been attempted.

I got two pretty good leaders and they got a bunch of junior technicians, and we went to it. I have to emphasize that there were many, many questions that were unresolved. For instance, how and to what degree do you segre-
Show: gate mixed camping-summer homes resort areas so that they don't get in each other's hair all the time?

How in calculating canyon capacity do you decide how many camping units per acre to allow? What degree of slope and roughness is acceptable or unacceptable?

In other words, to give your junior inventory boys definite targets to shoot at you have to have answers to those questions.

Well, they were set by the informed judgment of men who had dealt with the recreation business. There was no other way to do it. Only they could say what kind of access road would be needed, say, for major new areas, and so on. This inventory did give for all the national forests of California a rating of areas suitable for use, or unsuitable, the kinds of access roads required, and so on. It was a good job and had a great deal of influence in shaping the rather slow actual program, because by that time the wealth of CCC and the other programs had run out and we just didn't have the money.
Show: I also want to emphasize that this was the first such program done anywhere. The one that has been worked on by the state and by the Forest Service since then, almost contemporaneously, has gone a long way, but one of my very good friends, Bill Fischer, who is in charge of the national forest studies, told me repeatedly -- and he worked on the Recreational Inventory as a junior technician. -- that that has been the model and guide and still is a basically sound approach to the problem.

I've already spoken of the first recreational road from the bottom to the top in the San Bernardino mountains, designed to get the people up into areas of attractiveness and out of the southern canyons where fires were starting. In 1935 we made quite a comprehensive study of the problem of spreading still further the use in Southern California, because that vast population, used to roaming around, simply did not have in Southern California the area to absorb the use. We started
on a project which involved a long continued conflict with the state highway people and the Bureau of Public Roads people, to build side highways to the many attractive areas along Highway 395 east of the Sierras. Covering a few hundred miles doesn't bother the Angelenos. The difficulty we always had was they said that the only criterion of the need for such a highway is an overload of traffic. Well, where there was a poor little dirt road you couldn't show an overload of traffic, so we simply had to fight that one through. Gradually we were able to get several of these side highways built in my time, to June Lake, Gull Lake, Mammoth, one at a time, but accomplishing the purpose of getting mountain recreational outlets to the hundreds of thousands of users in Southern California. It was a good program. My colleagues on the programming board always dragged their feet and scowled, but I got stubborn and slowly I got the things that we had to have.

Pry: Was it state highways you were working with?

Show: The forest highway is an appropriation item designed to
show: build highways of benefit to the national forests, and it also includes federal aid highways and state highways in the national forests, which are the major two routes. My colleagues always wanted to see a great deal of the forest highway money go onto those; I wanted it to go on the roads of primary concern to the national forests.

That is pretty nearly the end of the recreational story in my time. I'd like to take a minute to sum up by saying that from the beginning there are two major things that need to be re-emphasized. One is the overall change from the negative to the positive attitude, from no program to a quite well organized program. And the other one is very important: the change in the handling of recreation from an amateur to a professional status; recreational planning and development can now claim to be of professional quality, which they were not in the early days when every ranger scratched his head and did the best he could with a local problem.

say: I did want to ask you one more thing. How did you manage
Fry: to keep your boundaries secure around the wilderness areas when there was so much pressure to change them?

Show: The formality of it was a public hearing. For example, there is an area in the San Gorgonio, and the proponents in that case were the big stores that sold winter sports equipment. They said, "Oh, if we can only get a little corridor up here so people can go in by car to ski, it will be so much better for our business." Well, I got that out and nailed to the cross pretty clearly in public hearing, and I advised the recommendation. So did a good many people other than the business people who appeared at the hearing. That was quite a lively meeting. Not violent but lively. [Laughter] You have to check back and say, "Did we do the right thing the first time on this? Did we draw the boundaries sufficiently well so that there's no valid claim to push them in for timber or anything else." On the timber problem we were pretty successful in avoiding that kind of pressure, against which the Forest Service hasn't been able to stand up
Show: very successfully.

Fry: Do you feel this was because the national forests included too much commercially valuable timber?

Show: It wasn't commercial at the moment but it was going to become so. It was foreseeable but it wasn't foreseen. I think the system in California has withstood the test of thirty-odd years very well, and with the growing population and pressures that's an accomplishment that is cause for satisfaction, to me at least.
Redwood Inspection Trip
(Purchase Units and Logging),
July 1937. Left to right, back row:
Emmanuel Fritz, Garver Show, Edward
E. Carter, Earl J. Tinker. Front row:
John C. Saets, Robert L. Person, Ed
I. Kotok.
INTERVIEW IV

August 16, 1963

BACKGROUND AND EVENTS

OF THE KINGS CANYON CONTROVERSY
INTERVIEW IV
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BACKGROUND AND EVENTS OF KINGS CANYON CONTROVERSY

Period of Cooperation Between National Parks and National Forests

Show: Today I want to talk about National Forest Service and National Park Service relations, and their highly variable approach on use and treatment of the wild mountain lands, leading up to the Kings Canyon fight and the creation of the Kings Canyon National Park.

That I believe is the only way to see that even a major event is not something by itself, but that it falls in an historic process. It may seem it'll take a long time to get anywhere, but that is my habit of approach. It's pretty much an unwritten story, except for the bare bones, in regard to the dedication of the wild public lands.

The first major point to keep in mind at all times in considering relations is the fact that by law there are built-in conflicts between the United States Department of the Interior, through its National Park Service, and the United States Department of Agriculture, through its National Forest Service. By law the national
Show: forests are and always have been dedicated to what we call "multiple use," which is a term that I think I coined about thirty years ago -- that is, the productive use for all purposes of all the resources of these wild lands. And, by law again, the National Park Service parks are dedicated to a single use, in the larger sense recreation and public enjoyment, but excluding consideration of the other uses inherent in public lands. So there is that conflict and all consideration of the relations between the two services must always keep that in mind. It seems to me basic to the whole history of relations. And it is a highly variable, up-and-down working out, because each service has consistently upheld its own purposes as set by the Congress.

The early national parks were set aside before the establishment of the National Park Service in 1916. Yosemite -- which first was ceded to the state of California by the United States, and the state of California I guess decided it didn't want it; and Yellowstone; Hot Springs in Georgia. Those were the principal ones.
The major point in the early history of relations was that the Forest Service took the initiative in recommending withdrawal for national park purposes of several areas here in California, before the National Park Service was set up. One was a tiny little area, the Devil's Postpile, in the upper South Fork of the San Joaquin River. Walter Huber, who was a very eminent engineer, at that time, 1912, was chief engineer of the Forest Service in California, and he was also one of the handful of leaders of the Sierra Club, and the Sierra Club thought it would be a good thing to set the Devil's Postpile aside as a rather unique little spot with some very interesting basaltic columns stuck in the middle of a sea of granite. So Huber came to the regional forester, Court duBois, and said, "Why don't you approve a rather informal request that this be set aside as a national monument?" A national monument is largely a matter of size, and this was a small area, but with a guardian strip around, it was adequate and so it was done.
Snow: I think of that, along with later acts I'll describe to you, as evidence of the initial attitude of the Forest Service — one of helpfulness, wishing to see areas of outstanding interest set aside under a separate administration so they might be given the kind of attention they merited.

With the creation of the National Park Service, that attitude continued. After the 1914 eruptions of Mount Lassen, for example, the Forest Service took the initiative in recommending that a suitable area containing and surrounding Lassen peak be set aside as a national park to take suitable care of the unique live volcano in the United States proper. That was done about 1918.

Fry: Why did the Forest Service not want to keep it as part of its wilderness area?

Snow: Well, we believed that that was the suitable jurisdiction and handling of those public lands — most of which were in the national forests, by the way.

There was certainly nothing unfriendly or uncooperative about the attitude of the Forest Service to the
Show: Park Service.

Fry: From 1910 to 1915 you were a forest assistant, is that right?

Show: Yes. I was here in California. I was not involved with the initiative, though I was familiar with it because I had a very great interest in this live volcano. I hadn't pondered very deeply on the matter, but I know that there was general approval within the Forest Service toward taking the action which it did take.

Fry: Was this when you were in Shasta?

Show: The transfers were after I had become a researcher working out of San Francisco, but as a forest assistant I was at Shasta, yes.

Fry: By the way, did you see the eruptions?

Show: We were in Sisson, close enough to see the clouds billowing up over the mountains at the southeast.

The attitude of trying to be helpful, of trying to see, let's say, the true place of the national parks in the scheme of handling the public lands, continued. In setting up the boundaries of the new Lassen park, specific
Show: proposals had been made by the Forest Service dealing with the details of boundaries, and those were accepted by the Park Service and all concerned and became the boundaries of the new park.

The next area set aside -- by transfer of public lands and their jurisdiction from the Forest Service to the Park Service -- was the Lava Beds National Monument on the Kedoc National Forest, in 1925. That was an extremely interesting area because of the multitude of ice caves underground, and the Forest Service had done a good deal of exploring them and in some cases built ladders so people could go down and cool off. That was taken on the initiative of the Forest Service, too. So I think it's fair to say that this represented a continuing interest, friendliness, and cooperativeness on the part of the Forest Service.

High Sierra Forests -- for People or Sheep?

The beginning of aggressiveness on the part of the National Park Service for transfer of considerable areas of national forest land to national park status had begun even in the late teens. As the Park Service
I got organized and began to look around, it cast covetous eyes on particularly the high Sierra, where there of course are some very fine areas of public lands all under the Forest Service with very considerable inspiration value. You can't say the whole high Sierra is outstanding in the sense that Yosemite is, but it is a very fine piece of country. Its use at the time was primarily for grazing, and the Park Service and the Sierra Club -- which gradually shifted its interest to the parks and away from the forests -- didn't like grazing. There began to be attacks on the administration of the Forest Service of those high areas.

The director of the Park Service, Mr. Mather, was an extremely aggressive, strong man, who clearly believed in his service and his assignment, and he was very skilful and effective in obtaining public support. That has to be said.

The first thing, partly a reaction to the pressures for national parks in the high Sierras, was done by Graves
about 1918 or '19, and that was kicking the sheep out of the upper Kern River drainage and out of the upper Kings River drainage. Sheep are an interference with mass parties, such as the annual trek of the Sierra Club, which in those days moved with a vast lot of animals and people. Where sheep had been in ahead and eaten off the feed there was little or no feed left for the saddle and pack stock. Sheep messed up favorite camping spots and so on, because they had continued to use the area without any particular thought of camping use.

Fry: What about damage to watershed land?

Show: Oh, there perhaps was some -- damage to the range itself, and some to the watershed values. But the grazing permittees of the Forest Service were long established in the business. But Graves took that action first of all because it was becoming clear that the conflict of people and sheep was irreconcilable, and second, presumptively at least, as a defensive move against creation of additional national parks. Public support was being
built up quite skilfully by Mr. Mather. His appeal pretty generally was the great economic advantages to the towns of the San Joaquin Valley by having a national park. The national parks had built up and were building up a trade mark value, and certainly they drew additional people and business. So there was a period -- let me back up first. The chief point of the attack on national forest administration was grazing, and particularly sheep grazing.

Then during a period of years, the attitude and tactics of the Park Service, and of its friends, was changing to one more and more of aggressiveness, seeking transfer of additional areas to national park status. In 1925, the area of the upper Kern River canyon was transferred to park status by the Barbour act, and that was done with the approval of the Forest Service. The reasons for that approval by Greeley, head of the Forest Service, were I think primarily because he felt that an area in the high Sierra, south of Yosemite, would be a proper and desirable addition to the national park.

The Barbour bill extending Sequoia National Park to the Kerns and Keweah sections and Mt. Whitney was signed by President Coolidge July 2, 1926.
system, which was growing and expanding in other areas in California. The unwritten part of the history of that was it was understood and agreed between Greeley and Mather that if the Forest Service got out of the way, the Park Service would drop additional pressures for additional major transfers of areas to park status. Of course, history records that the attitude of Mather was about like that of Russia today— a deal is a deal, but. This was a deal so long as it was of advantage to Mr. Mather. I believe that has to be said, because it became evident very quickly.

Fry: It was mentioned during the debate * on the floor of Congress at that time that the reason the Forest Service was behind this was because the President had sent down an order.

Show: Well, I do not know that to be the case. I've never read or heard or been told by the people who were inside it at the time that it was so. In terms of participation this is about where I came in. I became

Regional Forester immediately thereafter, early in 1926.

*This is an erroneous reference to the debate on the Gearhart bill for Kings Canyon in February, 1939, not the 1924 Barbour bill which Mr. Show is discussing.
Well, the pressures for additional areas, including Kings Canyon, continued not only unabated but enhanced, and early in 1926 Greeley, who was a very canny and wise man, took the lead in having a special coordinating committee formed, consisting of himself and Mather, the president of the University of California, William W. Campbell, as a leading interested citizen, and the president of the Santa Fe Railroad, I think his name was Stone. There was perhaps one other citizen.

In 1926 there were pressures not only for Kings Canyon but for another area adjoining Yosemite. There's no particular name to it. So that summer the committee came out to examine this area on a field trip and to decide whether to recommend it for national park status or to continue it as national forest. I remember the occasion particularly because I was supposed to go along on the trip, but we had had fire troubles continuously and it was necessary for me to withdraw at the last moment and stick to my homework. I took Greeley up to Wawonah, where
the party took to horseback, and we put in an evening
together on planning a public meeting after the commit­
tee returned so that the views of interested people
might be heard.

When the party returned, we had agreed on people
to invite to appear; the meeting was held in San Francisco,
day-long. And many people did appear, people with strong
and vigorous views on the subject. Some of the people
who spoke against it were indeed outspoken. The chief
of them was my old friend and former colleague, Ernest
G. Dudley, who had been in the Forest Service and was a
rancher near Exeter. He made his views preeminently clear.
Mr. Mather didn't like opposition, and his face and neck
got red. Colonel Greeley mostly I think had a good time,
asking such witnesses questions that would clarify their
views. [Laughter] At any rate, the decision of the
coordinating committee was withheld for some months, and
[Yosemite] eventually the proposed extension of the park was adversed
by the committee and that was the last of it.
Meanwhile, Supervisor W.A. Benedict of the Sierra Forest was not inactive in getting opposition to the apparently unlimited expansion of the park areas. The chief source of opposition was the Kings River Irrigation Districts Association, which had been formed after many long and tortured studies to cover the areas which were of interest to the irrigation districts, which used Kings Canyon water. The president of the association was Ike Boone, the watermaster was Charles Kaupke, who later became president; their chief engineer, whose name I have forgotten, was particularly firm and unyielding in opposition to expansion of the park around the Kings River, because a great many rather elaborate engineering studies had been made showing that the most productive control and use of the water would come not by a single dam but by adding one or more dams upstream, which would involve the several mountain valleys on the south and middle Kings River. He was a very effective fighter, and so the really active conflict about the disposi-
Show:  The development of Kings Canyon began about that time, in the middle and late twenties. You may say the war was on.

Pry:  Were you aware of the Los Angeles city interest in this controversy?

Show:  Oh, yes. Among the several agencies which had studied the development on the Kings was Los Angeles city, which of course was reaching out very far for water in large quantities.

At the same time, in the mid-twenties, the demand for expansion of national parks took a new turn. The Park Service, through Mr. Mather, came up with demands that the Forest Service use its legal powers of exchange to buy private lands desired by the Park Service and then cede them to the Park Service. In other words, use Forest Service resources to buy national parks. The area around which that centered was the South Grove of the Calaveras Big Trees, which were a very fine body of big trees. That demand first came to me as regional forester and I adversed it, then it went to Greeley and he adversed it. The Park Service had no money to buy
Show: private lands for parks. So far as I know they had never seriously sought such appropriations, though they might have done so.

Again it's necessary to say that in seeking support for his projects Mr. Mather was pretty unscrupulous in his representations and tactics.

Fry: There is a theory that Mather's unscrupulous rivalry was a reaction to the Pinchot forces, which were still very strong at this time. Do you think there is anything to this?

Show: I don't believe that is the case at all, no.

There was a period of a few years, then, when the relations between the two services in regard to the use of public lands kept changing from bad to worse. Whatever historical judgment may be, that certainly was the case. The growing difficulties between the two services were essentially on that point -- use of public lands. Working relations between the local officers where they adjoined were, on the whole, pretty good, and there was no great difficulty in keeping them on a fairly even keel.
Then in 1926 there came a demand for expansion of the Lassen Volcanic National Park, which as you recall had been set up on the initiative of the Forest Service. It involved a pretty general expansion of boundaries which were urged by the Park Service as "adding a frame" to Lassen. I had examinations made, and in 1927 a joint field trip was made by myself, the local supervisor, the superintendent of the Lassen park, and eventually by Mr. Mather, to examine the proposals on the ground. Well, I adhered some of them and approved some. The Park Service wanted a particularly choice area of land for its headquarters; we needed it for our own purposes. They wanted a considerable area of just plain commercial yellow pine timber which had no apparent relation to the primary interest of the park, and that I adhered too.

Eventually the high brass in Washington failed to sustain me, and the substantial areas desired by the Park Service were added to the park. So Mr. Mather was having some successes with his program of expansion.

In the late twenties the wilderness areas were
created, bespeaking to me attention along the right lines of the Forest Service toward the scenic areas in the national forests. It was also recognized that in those high areas, particularly in the high Sierra, the Forest Service was not giving proper administrative attention. We had no resident rangers there; the administration was done by cowmen and campers, travelers, and so on. So about 1927 I added resident ranger attention to part of those high Sierra pieces, to see that some attention was given to protecting them and keeping conflicts to a minimum.

That local relations were, on the whole, good is evidenced by the fact that up until 1928 the Forest Service had carried the fire control work on the national parks. The Park Service simply didn't think in terms of fire, and the Forest Service as a good neighbor moved in and took care of them. But in 1928 there was a bad mess on the Sequoia forest and park; a fire started in the park and shortly spread and got bad and got into the national forest, and the Forest Service in self-defense moved in
and took it over. The situation wasn't helped by the fact that the park superintendent of Sequoia, John White, issued a rather gay and chatty news release saying that the fire was a wonderful sight if you came to the right spot in the park. To Forest Service men, who were sweating to put out somebody else's mess, that certainly wasn't endearing. And it wasn't endearing to the irrigation people up the valley who were keenly aware of watershed protection problems up in that country. Some of them got pretty mad.

Well, the upshot of that was that Charles G. Dunwoody of the state Chamber of Commerce's department of conservation was very anxious to have a public hearing on the question, after the thing was all wrangled out. It was perfectly clear that that would have the effect of putting out the fire by throwing on another bottle of gasoline, so I agreed to a public hearing with only selected, invited representatives of the irrigation interests and the official representatives of the two services.
It was held late in 1928. My fire control man, Jay Price, and I went down and conducted the meeting. The meeting started in an atmosphere of frigid aloofness. The Park Service men marched in and sat on one side of the table, and the Forest Service men did the same on the other. There was going to be a possibly very damaging inter-service fight if the meeting got out of hand. We solved that by talking for half a day about the nature of the fire problem, the need for a professional organization to handle it both in the parks and forests, and primarily to try to give the park superintendent a chance to save face by initiating the recommendation that the Park Service had to have its own fire control organization. So eventually the representatives of the two services were talking to each other rather than at each other — you know, making speeches and all. It ended up with the superintendent making such a recommendation, the meeting approved it, and we shook hands and that near impasse was successfully gotten over.

Shortly, Mr. Mather sent a request to me through
channels to nominate an experienced and capable forest officer who might transfer to the Park Service to head up their fire control organization. I selected John Coffman, who was then supervisor of our Mendocino forest. He accepted the offer and immediately went to work and did a very fine job for many years, building up within the Park Service a fire control organization.

Another form of demands by the Park Service for use of national forest lands took the form of a demand for elimination of grazing on national forest ranges adjacent to Sequoia National Park. The park itself, because of the exclusion of hunting, had its deer herds built up far beyond the capacity of the range. My head grazing man and I and the supervisor went up and met with Mr. Mather and his people and rode around enough to see that the park area was severely overpopulated by deer. The idea was that by eliminating the domestic stock on the national forest lands surrounding the park, the range would be attractive to the deer and would ease the pressure.
Of course if we had done it, which we did not, it would not have been any solution because the deer would have continued to breed and add to the problem.

So that was the situation in the late twenties and early thirties. We had our own friends to support us, particularly on Kings Canyon, and there was no big event for several years.

**The Kings Canyon Battle**

Pry: Was there an event that marked the opening of the Kings Canyon battle?

Show: Well, to begin with, let me read a couple of paragraphs from my manuscript.

"It was inevitable that the turn of the wheel would produce the amoral national administration and the consciousless leader operating within it, to force this innate, built-in Agriculture-Interior conflict of aim, method and morality from the series of skirmishes and localized battles into the status of a general war"
Show: of survival. The New Deal's Mr. Secretary, Harold L. Ickes, as the chosen implement of fate, was fully and admirably equipped for his self-appointed tasks -- to expand, without bounds, the single-purpose parks and grazing districts at the expense of the national forest system, and to capture control of the latter through transfer to his tender care."

I shan't tell here of the fight against transfer, but it ran concurrently with our own private war -- Kings Canyon.

"If anyone doubts Ickes' overweening ambition, the sublimity of his valorous and ignorant self-confidence," although of course he built himself up as Honest Harold, the Great Conservator, "his ready and eager embrace of any method, however mean, venal or ruthless, calculated to further his ends, his intolerance of and contempt for opposition, his egocentric imposition of his will on subordinates, who accepted or else, let such a doubter read the record, including Ickes' posthumously published journals."

He started the full-scale war in early 1936. This larger war was the drive for transfer. There was no longer any opportunity for good humor or being too nice. The pressures of this grim fight -- and it was simply a slugging match -- shortly separated the men from the boys.
The first thing that was done was a direct order from the President that members of the Forest Service should not appear in public meetings to inform the public of the issues at stake. That was telling us to violate part of our job. My own view, and of course I was very deep in this fight from the beginning, was that the public had a right to know, we had a duty to inform them, and if we received a request with a responsible purpose from any organization to appear for that purpose, it was going to be done. In other words, several of us were insubordinate.

Well, in California our chief source of political support was the California Chamber of Commerce, acting through its executive director, Charles Dunwoody. The immediate effect of bringing this war out in the open was that some of our supporters who had rather sloughed away, as I told you in the CCC story, got back on the team in a hurry.

Try: This was particularly in the south of the state?

Show: In San Joaquin more, but also in Southern California, yes.
Show: By that time my supervisor in Porterville was
a man named Joe Elliott, who was aggressive, adroit,
and enormously successful in obtaining political support.
The general moral of both fights -- I feel this properly
belongs in the record -- was set by such things as the
tapping of official Forest Service telephones. This we
knew. It was set by snoopers following and checking on
forest officers' contacts with members of Congress. That
I know to be true. And from the orders for the Forest
Service to cease and desist from informing the public of
the issues involved, which were very great.

Then there were two very sharp notes scribbled out
by FDR and sent to the Secretary of Agriculture, Henry
Wallace, asking why "Wallace and Silcox, Chief of the
Forest Service, hadn't called off Show and Price as he'd
said he wanted done? For a long time I had copies of the
notes, which I got through my own channels, but I don't
have them any more. My own boss, Silcox, at that time
showed me the note he got and said, "You see how it is,
Bevier." I said, "Yes," and went ahead.

There were raids by the FBI on Dunwoody's files in
Washington -- he'd set up an office there and communicated
with the Chamber of Commerce in San Francisco by means of teletype. He wiggled out of that, and we all figured there'd be similar raids on the home files here in San Francisco, so I went through rather a wild period to get word on the phone where I was living -- not the official phone -- to tell the Chamber to purge themselves immedi-ately, clean their files of all essentially damaging material on the fight.

I want to explain how we tried to offset the enormous disadvantages in this fight. We ourselves, through my man Hutchinson, took all of the limited written material dealing with the fight out of the office, out of the official files, and he took them home and kept them there. Eventually they were destroyed. So the private written record of this period simply does not exist. You see, there was an agency under Ickes' control to search archives for historical documents, during the middle thirties, and they could come in and say, "We want to go through your files for historical material." We had a touchy lack of
Show: faith in their good faith. [Laughing] We had to protect ourselves and protect the Forest Service.

Mr. Ickes also threatened individual members of Congress with withholding public works grants. He had a large sum of money available to him for allocation to worthy public works, as selected by him, and of course a member of Congress, part of his life and breath is the ability to get for his district such things. But to our knowledge Mr. Ickes did do that on a rather large scale.

Fry: Wasn't it easy for Forest Service to retaliate there, because in most congressional districts there were grants under Forest Service funds available?

Show: In spite of the amoral character of this thing, I never felt that was proper tactics. It's not within the dignity of a major organization.

Fry: You worked entirely through trying to influence the public, then?

Show: Yes. At one stage, Jay Price and Al Hall of the experiment station were in Washington taking active part in this fight, and they got orders to get out of Washington --
Show: or Silcox got orders -- so they did.

Fry: From whom?

Show: Well, it originated from the White House. In other words, what Ickes later called "minor bureaucrats" -- that was me -- were getting attention, unfavorable to be sure, from the all-highest, which I suppose was a matter of distinction. So a forest officer was in the position of a man with his hands tied being slugged at will by his enemy. Nonetheless the fight went on.

There were threats aplenty, but there were no reprisals. The President could fire me, as an earlier President had fired Pinchot, but he did not. I think my view was that we had put our hand to the wheel and we were going to go through with it, and our personal fortunes were not the key issue. The public good as we saw it was.

Fry: This key issue was Kings Canyon? Not transfer of public lands.

Show: Yes.

There were various other men, who selected themselves out, who got actively into the fight out here, and
Show: did each in his own way some illegal political activity.

Fry: You mean Forest Service men?

Show: Yes.

Fry: Were national park men also trying to attract public attention?

Show: Yes. They were free agents.

One of the episodes that occurred during this period was that my old friend and colleague Ernest Dudley, a leader among the outside people in fighting the transfer, gave his time to this and was completely inflexible and unyielding. He had his home and ranch near Exeter, and on one occasion he came unexpectedly home at night and found a member of the National Park Service who had broken and entered snooping among his private papers. Well, that certainly was on direct orders from somebody considerably higher up. It shows the unscrupulously, the venality, I think, of the Park Service.

Fry: Specifically, were they trying to prove that you were
Fry: drumming up public opinion?

Show: I suppose so.

There were two members of Congress, one on each side, who were fixed and unyielding in their views. The supporter of the Forest Service on the Kings Canyon fight was Congressman Al Elliott of Porterville. The supporter of the Ickes position was Congressman Bud Gearhart of Fresno. They simply wouldn't give, either of them.

I want to list some of the things that were done on our side. About 1936 I had one of my engineers assemble and analyze all the material on the possible methods of use of Kings Canyon water, through reservoir-ing. As you know a very large amount of engineering investigation had been made. Water was the essential value involved. There was grazing, some timber use, and so on, but the central point was the future use of water on the national forests. On the national parks it could not be done. The Park Service offered Pine Flat as a
show: complete solution, which it never was and never could be. Part, at least, of the upstream valleys would have to be used as upstream storage to even out the flow of water for irrigation and power development, and in that country the use of power for agricultural purposes was very great indeed, then and it is now.

So I got this report assembled, and wrote the main summary and conclusions myself. It was given to several people -- I hope copies still exist in Washington or San Francisco; I know one exists in the Yale Forest School Library because I gave a copy to Dean Graves.

Another fight was actively on in the middle thirties -- Frederick Law Olmsted's professional study of the best use and development of Kings Canyon, particularly of the floor of the valley. We gave him all the help he asked for, he took all the time he needed, and came up with a very comprehensive report which had extremely interesting features. One feature was that there was obviously going to be intensive use of that
Show: area by the public; to reach places outside the floor of the valley a great number of animals were going to be required. Well, to have corrals and pack stations close to people is not aesthetic or desirable, so Olmsted found a sort of pocket around the corner where such facilities could be developed. This final report, which was really a splendid job, was made available to various people, agencies, and so on.

Fry: What do you mean, "various people and agencies?"

Show: Well, of course the official agencies and to various members of Congress. I believe copies of it also went to the Air Force Library.

Fry: Did this report find its way to national park offices when the changeover was made?

Show: I think so. We tried to conduct things on a basis of courtesy.

Also along the way, when the going was rough, I produced a news release summarizing the reasons why the Forest Service believed that for the future development
Show: of the water the area should be kept in its present status so that dams as needed might be built. I, perhaps injudiciously, began the statement with, "the Forest Service will fight ..." [Laughing] It made something of a splash at the time. At any rate, it was rather widely used in newspapers and so on.

But the Forest Service was trying to get its story understood and accepted by the people concerned, who were primarily -- whether they knew it or not -- the people of the San Joaquin Valley.

Fry: What about the role of the power companies?

Show: Well, Southern California Edison was concerned and on our side, and they used their quite considerable political power to support the Forest Service position.

I want to make it clear that throughout my superiors had approved the stand taken by the California region in opposing expansion. I was in the rather queer position of not being insubordinate to my own immediate superiors, Silcox and Wallace, but of being insubordinate
Show: to the expressed wishes of the President of the United States.

So we approached the ending of this fight, which continued after the defeat of the general reorganization bill of 1938. The ironic feature of it was that the fight was lost through the action of our friends. It's clear that Wallace and Silcox received direct orders from the President to withdraw their opposition to the bill. Their change was made on the pleasant fiction that there was "new information" on the subject. There was no new information. So our official supporters simply slid out from under us.

The other thing was that our friend, Congressman Al Elliott, made a highly injudicious personal attack on our chief legislative opponent, Congressman Bud Gearhart, on the floor of the House. Congress, as you know, is extremely sensitive about such things. There can be violent disagreements, but this was impuning Gearhart's honesty. Gearhart replied effectively and Elliott's
Show: considerable influence on the matter vanished —
because of that clubby feeling within the House. So
it's ironic, we were defeated by our friends. And that's
hard to take. There was no way out of it; we had to quit
fighting, and the bill passed and became law in, oh,
1940. The group of us here who had fit, bled, and
finally died, took a brutal licking. I called the
others into my office and said, "We've been licked the
hard way. Now let's pick ourselves up and go on about
our jobs."

They were men of character and courage. They had
put their own personal fortunes on the line. Ickes's
information service was so good that he knew who we all
were. But that was that, we were licked.

Basic Issues in the Fight

I would like to state what I think were some of
the larger issues involved in this. First and foremost
to me is the morality of the tactics of public agencies,
whether the end always justifies the means, whether there
Show: are limits of decency and dignity beyond which public officers cannot go by the nature of things. That was always important to me. Second, to what extent could ambition or determination ignore and override the public interest? The public interest was involved in this, clearly. And third and perhaps largest is a question that has never been faced yet in this country: What proportion of the land with resources of public value can and should be withdrawn from multiple use for a single use? People simply ignore and dodge around that question. It's difficult, but it will have to be answered. I think it's implicit in the drives of many groups, including the Sierra Club, for bigger wilderness reservations. I don't know the answer, but certainly there comes a point in the upward addition to such areas where a halt has to be called, to say, "This is what our country and our economy can afford." I think perhaps it's the largest question involved in this continuing conflict. I tried to debate it in public once with Newton Drury, who later
Show: became chief of the Park Service, and he simply wasn't prepared to debate it.

But I want to leave that as the final word on this continuing relationship, which began with friendship on the part of the Forest Service toward the infant National Park Service, and became more and more difficult with the increasing aggressiveness of the Park Service and the, I felt, unscrupulous raids on the national forests by it. It never was a question of retaining land for mere jurisdiction; it was a case of trying to search out and identify wherein the major public interest lay.

So that's the end of that story.

Fry: One question: Do you think that the current ORRRC* report has faced up to this problem?

Show: They've come closer than anybody else, I think. But there has to be sometime a resolution. Sooner or later

*Outdoor Recreational Resources Review Commission.
Show: this country, with its explosively growing population, its freedom to travel and use the outdoors, is going to have to face up to it and make a firm decision.
PARTIAL INDEX

American Society of Civil Engineers, 56, 72-3, 83
Angeles Protective Association, 103
Barnes Act [1926], 183
Barnham, Millard, 52
Barrett, Lou A., 58-9, 153, 160-64
Benedict, M.A., 54, 187
Black, S.R., 3-4
Board of Fire Review, 95, 100, 156
Boone, Ike, 187
Booth, Roy, 123, 132-4
Brown, A.A., 88
Buck, C.J., 24
California Forest Protective Association, 3-4
California lumber industry, 3-4, 58-60, 173-4
California state:
  Bureau of Public Roads, 171
  Division of Forestry, 3, 30, 92
  Emergency relief work, 1 ff
  Experiment station, 7-8, 23, 63, 79, 88-9, 108, 112, 200
  State parks: Calaveras Big Trees, 183; State Park Bond
    Issue of 1928, 164; parks, 167
  Water and power: irrigation, 187, 203-206; Kings River
    Irrigation Districts Association, 187; Pacific Gas and
    Electric Company, 110-13; Southern California Edison
    Company, 206
Campbell, William, 185
Cecil, George, 30, 44, 64
Chamber of Commerce:
  California state, 106-107, 192, 197, 199
  Los Angeles, 104
Civilian Conservation Corps:
  Education, 68, 76, 119-20
  Trainees, 76, 66-70, 116-18
Clarke-McNary Act [1924], 35
Clemens, Dr. George, 104
Coffman, John, 194
Colby, William, 163, 165
Coleman, General, 36
Copeland Report, 6, 10
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cosmos Club</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craig, Army General Malin</td>
<td>38-41, 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronemiller, F.P.</td>
<td>90, 123, 127, 131, 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuttle, Francis</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deering, Robert</td>
<td>25-6, 34-5, 52, 55, 63, 65, 78, 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drury, Newton B.</td>
<td>107, 166, 209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>du Bois, Court</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dudley, Ernest</td>
<td>186, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunston, C.E.</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunwoody, Charles</td>
<td>106, 192, 197-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durbin, W.B.</td>
<td>64, 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elliott, U.S. Congress</td>
<td>Al, 203, 207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elliott, Joe E.</td>
<td>47-8, 54, 82, 125, 128, 134, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Englebright, Harry Lane</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farquhar, Francis</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fechner, Robert E.</td>
<td>11, 16-18, 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fischer, William</td>
<td>90, 92, 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Reserve Act</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fowler, F.H.</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funks, Fred</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gearhart, U.S. Congress</td>
<td>Bud, 203, 207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Exchange Act</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilman, Herbert</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granger, C.M.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graves, H.S.</td>
<td>144, 181-2, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeley, William B.</td>
<td>159-60, 183-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haile, Jack</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hall, A1</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hammatt, R.F.</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrison, U.S. President Benjamin</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headley, Roy</td>
<td>21, 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard, William</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howe, Louis McMahon</td>
<td>13-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huber, Welter</td>
<td>56, 163, 177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huestis, Ed</td>
<td>57, 74, 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hutchinson, Wallace</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ickes, Secretary of Interior Harold L.</td>
<td>196, 199-200, 208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James, George</td>
<td>90, 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson, Fred</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, Supervisor</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan, Chester</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kaupke, Charles, 187
Kelly, Evan, 10, 12-13, 15-16, 18, 23, 27, 53
Kircher, Regional Forester, 10
Kotok, Ed, 53, 70, 85, 107, 152, 154
Krebel, Charles, 108
Labor, 102:
  Department of Labor, 15
    Organized, 11-12
Lawrence, John, 83
Loveridge, E.W., 53-35
Marshall, General George Catlett, 120-21, 123-37
Mather, Stephen, 144, 155, 181, 183-86, 188-90, 193
McDuffie, Duncan, 163
Mendenhall, Supervisor, 54, 137
McRell, Fred, 50
Muir Trail, 152
National Industrial Recovery Act, 78, 83, 88
Nelson, Jesse, 27
Olmsted, Frederick Law, 165, 204
Outdoor Recreational Resources Review Commission, 210
Persons, Frank, 15-16
Pinchot, Gifford, 143-5, 189, 201
Pitchlynn, Paul P., 56, 73
Ponderosa Way fireline, 5, 78-85, 91
Pooler, Frank, 28
Pratt, Merritt, 30, 31, 107
Price, Jay, 25-6, 55, 63, 78, 85, 193, 198, 200
Pyles, Hamilton Knickerbocker, 92
Rogers, Supervisor, 54
Rolph, James, 3-4
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 6, 10-13, 18-19, 24, 28, 30, 77,
  101, 115, 118, 134, 141, 197, 201, 207
Sanitation and Fire Prevention Measure [1923], 156
Sierra Club, 140, 162-3, 165, 177, 182
Silcox, Ferdinand A., 198, 201, 206
Statham, Paul, 90, 92
Stewart, Robert, 21
Stockdale, J.C., 27
Tinker, Earl, 12-13
Tri-county Reforestation Association, 102
United States:
Army, 11, 14, 17, 33, 35, 37-43, 70-71, 74, 120-21, 143
Biological Survey, 19, 31, 113
Fish and Game Commission, 19, 31, 110-11, 113, 152
General Land Office, 141, 143
National Forest Service, 4, 10, 12, 14, 16-22, 36, 43,
53, 74, 153, 146-7, 152, 154, 159, 163, 170, 178, 180,
182-4, 188, 191-2, 200, 210;
Fires: control, 27; depression-caused, 93-6, 98-101,
136, 156; Latilige, 8; pre-suppression, 73-4; prevention,
141-3, 151, 155-6; Sequoia, 191; suppression, 2, 60-2,
77-101, 103, 191-4;
National forests and parks: Blacks Mountain, 23;
Devils Postpile, 177; El Dorado National Forest, 146,
152, 154; Hot Springs, Ca., 176; Inyo National Forest,
66, 122, Mammoth, 124; Kings Canyon, 23, 155, 155,
201, 203; Klamath National Forest, 99, 101, Lassen, 32,
178, 190; Los Angeles National Forest, 25, 93, 152;
Los Padres National Forest, 93; Marble Mountains, 153;
Mendocino National Forest, 93, 99, 194; Modoc National
Forest, 25, 32, 180; Plumas National Forest, 66-7, 99;
San Bernardino National Forest, 25, 93, 99, 157; San
Dimas National Forest, 23; San Gorgonio National
Forest, 173; San Joquin Range, 23; Sequoia National
Park, 191, 194; Shasta National Forest, 97, 99, 109, 140,
147, 149, 151, 179; Sierra National Forest, 57, 99,
160-1; Stanislaus National Forest, 23; Trinity National
Forest, 99, 163; Yellowstone National Park, 176;
Yosemite National Park, 140, 145, 176, 186;
Range, 55, 180-5, 194;
Recreation, 55, 112, 159-74;
Regions: Region 1, 23, 27; Region 3, 28; Region 5,
22-3, 25-6, 34 ff; Region 6, 23-4, 36;
Roads, 89-91, 157-9, 161, 170-2;
Telephone system, 86-89.
National Park Service, 19, 32-3, 143-5, 155, 160, 163,
165, 175-178, 180-183, 188, 190, 193-94, 202-203, 210
Soil Conservation Service, 33
Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture Henry, 50, 198, 206
White, John, 192
Wieslander, A.B., 7, 79
Wildlife, 108-113, 151-2
Wing, C.B., 166
Woodbury, T.D., 27
Young, Charles, 57, 73
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