Since 1954 the Regional Oral History Office has been interviewing leading participants in or well-placed witnesses to major events in the development of Northern California, the West, and the nation. Oral History is a method of collecting historical information through tape-recorded interviews between a narrator with firsthand knowledge of historically significant events and a well-informed interviewer, with the goal of preserving substantive additions to the historical record. The tape recording is transcribed, lightly edited for continuity and clarity, and reviewed by the interviewee. The corrected manuscript is bound with photographs and illustrative materials and placed in The Bancroft Library at the University of California, Berkeley, and in other research collections for scholarly use. Because it is primary material, oral history is not intended to present the final, verified, or complete narrative of events. It is a spoken account, offered by the interviewee in response to questioning, and as such it is reflective, partisan, deeply involved, and irreplaceable.

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Table of Contents—Doug Scott

Interview history xiii

Interview 1, November 19, 1990

Tape 1 1


Tape 2 20

Testifying on the Shenandoah National Park Wilderness Proposal—Continuing activism in graduate school—First lobbying effort on San Rafael Wilderness—The crucial summer of 1968, working on wilderness issues in Washington, researching the history of the Wilderness Act, and representing the Mackinac group of the Sierra Club—Observing the political process in Congress, the power of Wayne Aspinall—The valuable experience of being involved in both the grassroots and the national component of a campaign—The contribution of Wilderness Act implementation in the making of the environmental movement at the grass-roots and national levels—Return to graduate school in fall 1968, inheriting the job of conservation chair for the Mackinac Chapter—Background to the Sleeping Bear Dunes campaign.

Interview 2, November 21, 1990

Tape 3 36

Catching Potomac Fever in summer ‘68, and setting sights on a career as an environmental advocate—Reigniting interest in a Sleeping Bear Dunes national park, building up relationships with congressmen and staff—Learning from history: finding a model in Howard Zahniser’s work with Congress on the Wilderness Act—Efforts to maintain the Wilderness Society’s tax-deductible status—Stirring the pot for Sleeping Bear Dunes with a letter-writing campaign—Securing the support of Governor George Romney—Presenting Sleeping Bear
Dunes to the Sierra Club board, witnessing the Brower controversy firsthand, September 1968—The evolving position of local congressman Vander Jagt.

Tape 4


Tape 5

Comparing Sierra Club and Wilderness Society, continued—Financing parklands acquisitions under the Nixon and Johnson Administrations—Supportive people in the Nixon administration.

Interview 3, November 26, 1990

Tape 6

Lobbying the Bureau of the Budget and the White House on Sleeping Bear Dunes—The origins in fall 1969 of the Ann Arbor teach-in on the environment, an expansive vision, antiwar movement organizational tools, becoming the prototype for Earth Day—A broad spectrum on the steering committee, Dow Chemical funding—Give Earth a Chance slogan—The five-day teach-in, March 1970, Gordon Lightfoot, cast of Hair, Arthur Godfrey, others—Spreading the message: role of the national Sierra Club and interest from the press—The radical element in the teach-in movement, and Scott’s commitment to working within the system—Going national, on the steering committee for Senator Gaylord’s national teach-in organization.

Tape 7

On the youth panel for the 1969 UNESCO Conference on the environment—May 1970 to Washington for the Wilderness Society—Reflections on the impact and aftermath of Earth Day, a quantum jump in scale and a broadening of scope in the environmental movement—Joining the battle against the SST as Wilderness Society representative, 1970-1971: putting grassroots pressure on Senator Griffin—The significance of the successful SST campaign, first victory against “the industrial might”—Focus on implementing the Wilderness Act in Congress—The Park Service’s wilderness threshold theory and other obstacles to
park wilderness proposals—Orchestrating congressional and White House pressure on Park Service director George Hartzog.

Tape 8

Assessment of Hartzog as Park Service director—Pushing the Forest Service to protect de facto wilderness—Recommending Chuck Clusen, friend and fellow activist from Ann Arbor days, for the Sierra Club staff—Accepting the appointment as Northwest Representative for the Sierra Club, 1973.

Interview 4, November 29, 1990

Tape 9

John McComb, friend and professional colleague—Staff restiveness and creation of the conservation department in the Sierra Club, 1979, as a vehicle for more disciplined campaigns—Becoming director of federal affairs as part of a quadrumvirate command structure over the conservation department—1983 reorganization, becoming associate conservation director under John McComb—Staff changes under Doug Wheeler as executive director, 1985-1986—Sierra Club’s loss of senior staff members to the Wilderness Society—Mike McCloskey’s singular contributions, a stabilizing force in the Sierra Club—Implementing the framework for a unified wilderness system, through the details of early wilderness bills, fighting insistence on “purity” in wilderness areas—Zahniser’s careful wording of the Wilderness Act, the meaning of “untrammeled.”

Tape 10

The significance of the battle over eastern wilderness--The importance of precedents: early attention to details of Great Swamp Wilderness, Lassen National Park wilderness, and others—The Forest Service’s first Roadless Area Review and Evaluation, and legal and administrative challenges based on NEPA, 1971-1972—Wilderness Society trainings for grassroots citizen-activists—Wilderness workshops, working around the Sierra Club’s bureaucracy and inwardness—The Washington staff of the Wilderness Society in early 1970s, Stewart Brandborg’s later dismissal as the society’s executive director—Deciding to leave the Wilderness Society for the West and the Sierra Club—The eastern wilderness issue.

Tape 11

Wild areas or wilderness designation for “previously disturbed” eastern wilderness, a split in the conservation movement—How Washington works: influencing the Nixon administration, the administration and eastern wilderness bills.
Interview 5, November 30, 1990

Tape 12

Hiring process for the Sierra Club Northwest representative—Staff and volunteer roles in the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society—Perspective as a candidate for the Sierra Club board in 1971—Putting down roots in Seattle, engaging in the fight against dams in Hells Canyon—Strong collaboration with other groups, the how-to of grassroots organizing.

Tape 13

Challenging the RARE I wilderness inventory and appealing their roadless area designations—Characterizing the Forest Service: “a cross between the Jesuits and the Marine Corps”—Fighting the details, and challenging the principle of purity in wilderness designations—Getting the Forest Service to go beyond unit plans and consider the whole wilderness—Brokering a deal with the local Chamber of Commerce, leading to the Gospel-Hump Wilderness in Idaho and a timber sale benefiting the local community—Thinking big: Orchestrating the Endangered American Wilderness Act, preserving 1.3 million acres, 1976-1978—Challenging Donald Hodel’s Bonneville Power Administration—Influencing the selection of Rupert Cutler as assistant secretary of agriculture—Good timing: friends in Congress and the Carter administration—Cutler and the beginning of RARE II and end to the purity argument in wilderness—Organizing for RARE II.

Tape 14

Summing up: the achievement of RARE II, “in the right position at that magical time.”

Interview 6, December 3, 1990

Tape 15

Effect of RARE II on the Sierra Club and the environmental movement: a greatly increased appetite for wilderness areas—The importance of involving the grassroots, developing a social consensus, sometimes accepting the necessity for compromise—Evolution of a decentralized wilderness movement—Thoughts on the timber industry, the Forest Service, and wilderness impacts on local communities—Starting the campaign for RARE II—Dave Foreman, and thoughts on the tactical value of radicalism—Growing concerns about RARE II and growing timber industry and dependent community pressure on the process—Reacting to the Forest Service’s RARE II results.
Implications of the State of California lawsuit against RARE II, found in violation of NEPA—Working with Congressmen Phil Burton and John Seiberling on a California wilderness bill, developing sufficiency language as a model for additional twenty-two state wilderness bills, 1984—Release-language fights in the wilderness bills, central role of Tim Mahoney—Mid-seventies, a time of sorting out his personal life—The beginnings of the battle for Alaskan wilderness: resolving Alaskan native lands claims—Early interest in conservation of Alaskan lands—Lobbying for the national interest lands, an illustration of how Congress worked in the pre-Watergate era, Wayne Aspinall’s power—The reason for opposition to the national interest lands from Alaskan natives and the civil rights community—Newly arrived Congressman Ron Dellums’ successful challenge to the House power structure.

Interview 7, December 5, 1990

Recalling the early evolution of the de facto wilderness issue: drafting an early omnibus bill for John Saylor in 1970, setting the groundwork for future directions—Making the connection to the National Environmental Protection Act, reflections on the origins and significance of NEPA—Returning to the Alaska story: John Dingell’s about-face on the environment—Getting a provision for wilderness in Section 17 (d)(2) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 1971—Strategizing for implementing the selection of national interest lands: the importance of support in the Carter administration; including Southeast Alaska.

Bringing Bureau of Land Management lands under Wilderness Act study requirements, 1976, and defeating a later challenge by James Watt—The Alaska Coalition and the campaign for Alaskan wilderness: the importance of public hearings, Congressman Young’s missteps; Chuck Clusen, coalition leader—Scott’s move to Washington, 1978, as lobbying coordinator: developing a innovative, comprehensive campaign strategy, working with a former union grass-roots organizer, establishing authority within the coalition—Developing an unprecedented, elaborate, disciplined lobbying organization with phone banks, selectric typewriters, beepers, and first-class mail: “Information is power, and we wanted to control that”—The role of Laurance Rockefeller, Jr.—Floor fight in the House, May 1978, Lloyd Meeds’ opposition.

Interview 8, November 28, 1993

Reorganizing the Sierra Club conservation staff for the campaigns of the 1980s: West Virginia meeting, impact of Chuck Clusen’s departure to the Wilderness Society—Appointment as Sierra Club’s director of federal affairs—Expanding the field offices to mobilize the club for national campaigns—Setting priorities among the expanding club issues—Entering the 1984/5 farm bill campaign, applying the Alaska campaign technology to a new issue—Responding to the industry counterattack on clean air and water efforts and a new climate in Washington DC, developing a grass-roots/staff synergy on pollution efforts.

The emergency Superfund campaign, in response to Dingell assault: mobilizing and educating the grass roots—Lobbying for reauthorization and strengthening of the Clean Air Act, 1985-1990, using a new tactic against the powerful opposition of John Dingell—The petition drive against Secretary of Interior James Watt, 1981, stimulates growth in club membership and validates power of grass-roots mobilization—Problems in club governance and management in the 1980s: inability to bring the Legal Defense Fund in line with club political strategies; failure to utilize Sierra magazine or another communication tool in the service of club campaigns; problems in developing an effective international program.

The path from a concentration on public lands issues to pollution, population, urban issues—Shortcomings of applying the club’s public land political technology to new issues—Reconsidering the command-and-control regulation of pollution: dangers of alienating public sympathy, growth of government bureaucracies—Thoughts on the club’s governing structure and mythologies: shortcomings and complexities of the volunteer leadership bureaucracy—Choice of Douglas Wheeler as executive director by outside search and his short and unhappy tenure, 1985-1986: the role of senior staff in the opposition to Wheeler
and the abysmal response by the board of directors, ultimately a failure of the club to breed its own leadership.

Evaluating insider and outsider candidates for executive director—Michael Fischer as executive director, a good fit with the club—Deciding to leave the Sierra Club: lingering unease with the Wheeler affair, needing a different lifestyle, and unhappiness with the “radical” environmental movement embodied in the ancient forests issue and ill-advised legal action—A small-d democrat, deeply critical of anarchistic principles and actions.
xii
Doug Scott interviewed for the Sierra Club Oral History Series in 1990, as he was leaving a seventeen-year career with the Sierra Club. He joined the club staff in 1973, first as Pacific Northwest representative, oft borrowed from the Northwest to coordinate Washington DC lobbying campaigns, and then in the national office in San Francisco, initially as director of federal affairs and finally as associate executive director for conservation and communications. Previously, he had been a lobbyist for the Wilderness Society in Washington DC and an active volunteer for the Mackinac Chapter of the Sierra Club.

Doug’s engagement with wilderness preservation began early, as a student at the University of Michigan, where he helped organize the five-day teach-in in March 1970 which was the prototype for the first national Earth Day. For his master’s thesis in forestry, he researched the history of the Wilderness Act of 1964, and forever after considered Howard Zahnizer, the father of the act who died shortly before its passage, as his mentor. The oral history tells how he caught “Potomac fever” in 1968 while lobbying for the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore and set his sights on a career as an environmental advocate. His account of the Sleeping Bear Dunes campaign in 1968-70 shows the genesis of many of the hallmarks of his later environmental campaigns.

In the following decade, working first for the Wilderness Society and then for the Sierra Club, and always with a clear vision of the intent of the Wilderness Act, he jostled with the Forest Service over the implications of its RARE I and II programs and honed his skills in campaigns for wilderness locally and nationally. His oral history details the strategy and organization behind the enactment of the Eastern Wilderness Areas Act of 1975 and the Endangered American Wilderness Act of 1978, among many others. As lobbying coordinator for the Alaska Coalition, 1978-1980, he and his colleagues developed and carried out an innovative, comprehensive campaign strategy, drawing on insider knowledge of Congress, longstanding close relationships with key Congressional leaders, and an unprecedented mobilizing of targeted grass-roots support. Jimmy Carter signed the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act shortly after the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan.

Moving to San Francisco in his position as director of federal affairs for the Sierra Club, Scott applied this sophisticated campaign technology to the broader environmental issues that the club was increasingly engaging: his oral history recounts the club’s role in the 1984/5 farm bill campaign, clean air and water efforts, and the Superfund campaign. His account gives a lively and detailed picture of environmental lobbying in an era of can-do congressmen and positive public sympathies, guided by Doug’s strategies and his energetic orchestration of grass-roots citizen movements—all without the benefit of fax machines, email, Facebook, and Twitter. In his final interview, recorded in 1993, he points toward a new era for environmental campaigning, as he reflects on the growing power of industry lobbies in Washington, the changing nature of Congress, and shortcomings of applying the club’s public land political technology to newer issues.
Doug Scott served under three executive directors of the Sierra Club and worked with legions of volunteer leaders. His is a valuable vantage point from which to reflect on the internal dynamics of this unique, highly political, and often contentious organization, and he does so perceptively in the last interview session. His final remarks center on his dismay at the rhetoric and programs of radical environmentalists embodied in the leaders of the ancient forests issue. As he left the club, he faced criticism from these fronts for his commitment to democratic compromise on divisive issues, a strongly held belief honed in his decades of campaigning for wilderness. In 1997, Doug was awarded the John Muir Award, the Sierra Club’s highest honor.

The oral history interviews began in November and December 1990, as he was packing up his house in Berkeley for a life-changing move to the San Juan Islands. While we were planning and recording seven interview sessions, he was going through his extensive files to ready them for placement in the Bancroft Library. His memory prompted by the paper record, he related events with freshness and detail. Interviews were cut short by Doug’s move. Three years later, former club president Kent Gill visited Scott at his Northwest home and recorded over three additional interview hours to complete the oral history.

Having moved on to new professional challenges—he is now the manager of the Campaign for America’s Wilderness at the Pew Environment Group, a division of the Pew Charitable Trusts, and the author of a history of the wilderness movement1—Doug did not undertake a review of the lengthy transcript of his oral history. After many years, the Regional Oral History Office has completed a careful audit-edit to insure the accuracy of the transcription, making selected light edits for clarity. We are pleased to make this oral history accessible to researchers, as part of our extensive collection of interviews on natural resources, land use, and the environmental movement: http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/ROHO/collections/subjectarea/index.html. The Doug Scott papers relating to the Sierra Club, 1965-1989, are available in the Bancroft Library. Additional Scott papers are housed at the University of Washington.

The Regional Oral History Office was established in 1954. ROHO conducts, teaches, analyzes, and archives oral and video history in a broad variety of subject areas critical to the history of California and the United States. The office is under the direction of Neil Henry and the administrative direction of Elaine Tennant, director of the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Ann Lage
Interviewer
Director, Sierra Club Oral History Project

Berkeley, California
September 2012

Interview with Doug Scott

Interviewer: Ann Lage

Transcriber: Elizabeth Kim

[Interview 1: November 19, 1990]

[Begin Tape 1, Side A]

Lage: Today is November 19, 1990, and this is the first interview with Doug Scott. Doug, we want to get an idea of your roots, your beginnings, and sort of try to figure out how your later concerns and interests came about. So without immense detail, let's talk a little bit about family, where you were raised, and especially with attention to things that may have affected your later course.

Scott: I was born in Vancouver, Washington, but that was only because the doctor practiced there. My family lived across the river in Portland, Oregon, but there was time. So I'm a native of Washington State, but I grew up in Portland, Oregon, or actually on the outskirts of Portland, what at the time were the outskirts, relatively near where the airport is today, in a neighborhood called Parkrose. I went to grade school, junior high, and high school there.

Lage: Did you go to public schools?

Scott: Public schools. I was always in the college track courses and all that sort of stuff, but was something of a rejector of the social norms of the high school years. I was active in agitating to get out of having to go to what were then mandatory pep rallies before the various teams left for the various games.

Lage: Let's set the time. We don't have a date.

Scott: I was in high school in the late fifties and early sixties, graduated in June of 1962.

Lage: You were born around '45?

Scott: Born in '44. My family was a pretty conventional suburban family. My mother was a graduate of the University of Washington in music and librarianship and was a children's librarian and went back to work when I was about five. So I learned a degree of independence early on to leave school and take a bus, I think, starting at seven or eight years old, and go to meet her at the old Carnegie Library where she worked. I have in my veins some genetic love for old, musty stacks in old Carnegie libraries.

We were not wealthy people. My parents were civic-minded only to the extent that they voted. They were conscientious voters, but they were not otherwise politically
active. I have a suspicion that while my father was a fairly rock-ribbed Republican, that my mother probably cancelled him out on some things, but I couldn't swear to it.

Lage: You didn't have great discussions at the dinner table about politics?

Scott: We didn't have great discussions about that at the dinner table. There was a lot of competition at the dinner table. I had two older brothers who were very busy.

My father did not graduate from college, and after a brief interlude of thinking that he might be an Episcopal minister, he studied accounting and was an accountant and business manager of one kind or another, first for the Great Northern Railroad. Incidentally, in that era, he grew up in Saint Paul, Minnesota, and took the train out every summer and was the chief reservationist for the then-railroad-operated Many Glacier Hotel in Glacier National Park. So long before he met my mother and I came on the scene, he was something of an outdoorsman.

We spent our family vacations typically car camping in the old-fashioned Forest Service campgrounds in the Oregon Cascades, for the most part. Or—

Lage: Now, was that something a lot of families did in Oregon? It wasn't unusual?

Scott: This was not unusual at all. You would kind of throw the things in the back of the car and go out. We had old-fashioned, big, heavy canvas tents. If we were going on a longer trip, we would camp along the way, and that was just standard. We also spent a lot of time at a place on the Oregon coast. The Portland Library Association, the staff of the library, had been left a fabulous old-fashioned beach house right on the Oregon coast. We spent a lot of our vacations there because it was inexpensive. So I was always outdoors and so forth.

Lage: Any scouting or anything like that?

Scott: I was a dropout from scouting. I think I had a fairly healthy dose of disregard for authority. I know I was forever taking on authority in my junior high school and my high school. I learned early on that you could beat the hall monitors if you simply had a piece of paper the same color and roughly the same size as an authorized hall pass. If you walked with your head held up and looked like you were going somewhere very important, possibly to discuss something with the principal, the hall monitors would generally get out of your way.

In high school I had lots of fights with authority. I remember at Parkrose High School you preregistered for the courses you wanted for the following year, late the year before. In the end of my junior year I indicated the courses I wanted, and then came back in the fall. To my considerable surprise, I started my senior year to discover that I wasn't in the right college track math and I wasn't in the right this and that and the other thing.
I went to complain about it, and the principal or the vice-principal told me that it was because the class schedule didn't match my preferences. A perfectly reasonable excuse except I got a hold of a copy of the class schedule, and to do what I wanted to do was perfectly simple. So I went up to the principal to explain this and to say I was told it was because the class schedule was incompatible, and I could prove that that wasn't the case, so would they please change it? He threw me out of his office unceremoniously, saying that they couldn't make any changes because if they made one for me they would have to make them for everyone else.

It may be a key to me that I had learned to type quite early, I think when I was eight or nine, and put out neighborhood newspapers and that sort of thing. So I went home and wrote a blistering two-page letter to the school board or the school superintendent or someone like that, with a carbon copy to the principal. I didn't send the original; I just walked in the next morning and left the carbon on the principal's desk. Later that morning I was paged out of whatever class I was in and was given the correct program.

My older brothers had set the course for me by the time I got to any particular class. The teachers would say, "Scott, not as in Richard or Robert," and I'd say, "Yes."

Lage: So your brothers also had this streak?

Scott: I think we were all independent people who didn't believe that you should just keep your head down and march in a particular lock step.

Lage: Was that something your parents had passed on?

Scott: Well, I suppose so. I think my mother's influence was very strong in me and that we were independent people who made up our minds about how things ought to be organized, and pressed for them.

Lage: Did you do any group organizing? When this pep rally thing came up, did you—

Scott: I had a little coterie of buddies. All of us were sort of, I think “late-bloomers” would be a modern expression for it, who weren't part of the accepted socially active leadership set in the high school and who tended to be, I think, more intellectual oriented (or at least that's the way we posed) and who thought things like pep rallies were greatly to be put down. Humor, which is something that I have found serviceable throughout my conservation work, was something that was very strong in my family. I grew up on the Gilbert and Sullivan operettas, which certainly have a strong streak of poking fun at authority, and listening to "The Bob and Ray Radio Show" was a standard week-night obligation in my family.

When I had to go the pep rallies I'd sit in the back doing Bob and Ray impressions, to the entertainment of my coterie of friends. But basically I got through high school with a sense that I had not gotten, and was not able to get there, the kind of education I really wanted. My high school did not offer Latin, and I was in an intellectual phase where I wanted to learn Latin. They made me take French, which I didn't want to learn.
and did very badly in. But I was not politically active, at least in any recognizable sense.

One highlight of my high school years was the morning after the Nixon-Kennedy election in which Kennedy won the presidency and in which I had been widely predicting that Nixon would win—I don't know why—and my sophomoric view was that Nixon was the better person. In the first class that morning, which was gymnastics in P.E. class, I flipped over some piece of equipment and landed on my elbow and broke it, and so spent the rest of the day in the hospital and didn't have to face my chums who would upbraid me for my lack of political insight.

So I left high school with a very strong sense that I wanted to have much more intellectual rigor, much more challenge than I had found there. But I need to backtrack just briefly because starting from the time that I was in eighth grade, maybe even in seventh grade, the minister at my church—. I suppose I had better get the evangelical part of this in here.

My grandfather, my mother's father, was an Episcopal minister. I knew him clear into my high school years. He was retired and quite elderly, but this had led to my being raised by the daughter of an Episcopal minister and a father who at least for a while had thought he might become an Episcopal minister. My father worked for a while for the hospital in Portland that was administered by the Episcopal Church. I guess we saw the bureaucracy of the church from the inside, and we fought authority there, too.

Lage: Oh, really?

Scott: My father had some falling-out, the precise details of which were never told to me, but it was very grave and very serious. I suspect it may have had something to do with catching the bishop with his hand in the till. My father left his position with the church and the hospital. From then on, in our church-going years, if we happened to be at a parish, we went around a lot. My mother was a peripatetic this way. We would go to a lot of different churches, different denominations. Late in her life she said that she'd finally decided she was a nonpracticing agnostic Unitarian.

She took us to Jewish temples, she took us to Greek Orthodox services, but whenever we were in Episcopal churches, if it happened that the bishop, this particular fellow, was visiting that particular day, we would leave by a side door. Whatever it was, it was very deep. But I think all of that must have had something to do with "Challenge authority. Don't take what authority says for granted."

Lage: But was religion itself something important in the family?

Scott: Increasingly less so. We stopped attending church in probably my high school years. I probably stuck with it longer than my parents because I was an altar boy.

The fellow who was the Episcopal minister at the church where I was an altar boy in my junior high school years took another fellow and myself on a camping and hiking
trip one summer. I must have been in the seventh or eighth grade, I guess. We went to Mount Adams in Washington State, one of the peaks along the Columbia River. We climbed Mount Adams, which is 14,000 feet tall, and neither the other fellow nor I had any knowledge about climbing mountains. This was mostly just a long slog up a snowy hillside for hours and hours. I remember my parents being somewhat aghast that we had actually done this when we returned. But that started—and I guess based on the camping and so forth and the family outdoors activities—that started an interest of mine in mountain climbing.

I went to a meeting of the Mazamas, which is the mountain climbing group in Portland. The Mazamas were founded about—it's interesting—were founded about the same time as the Sierra Club in the Bay Area in the late 1800s, about the same time as the Mountaineers in Seattle, but always were a climbing group and didn't develop other activities. They had a conservation committee, I vaguely remember. I didn't have anything to do with it. I think they were never particularly forceful in their conservation advocacy. But at least at that time they were having a very big program to teach basic mountaineering skills.

I think it must have been when I was in the eighth grade, possibly the ninth grade—certainly when I was still in junior high school—I took their basic mountaineering course, which amounted to going one night a week for four or six weeks to lectures about various things, and then weekend training programs, outings: compass use, map reading, basic rock-climbing, basic snow, how to use an ice axe, how to tie the knots that climbers use, and so forth. I just very much liked that, and I was relatively young, but I sort of carpooled with people and fell in with people that I liked and got very active in this to the point that by the time I was in maybe my freshman year or my sophomore year, I was teaching in the Mazamas program. Ultimately I taught in their advanced school, things like rappelling and so forth.

I'd started to go in the summers on Mazama-organized climbs of the various Cascade peaks in Oregon and Washington: Mount Saint Helens, Mount Hood, Mount Jefferson, Mount Washington, Three-Fingered Jack, the Three Sisters, and so forth. I think the highlight of that was 1960, the summer of 1960, I did an enormous amount of climbing. That would have been the summer after my sophomore year. And in 1961 I did a lot of climbing. Except in '61 something else happened to me that was, I think, formative.

I had been interested in being an exchange student and going overseas. I forget how you went about being an exchange student, but I was runner-up but not selected. The woman that was selected went to New Zealand, and I've always felt how my life would have been changed if I'd done that. Partly in compensation for that, I suppose, my parents—between my newspaper route money and with my parents, I think, providing some, I went on a month-long student tour to the East Coast. There was a little outfit headquarter in Lake Oswego, Oregon. I think their name was American Heritage Tours. It was a nonprofit student educational organization.
We bundled up and went on a train, a group of probably thirty kids from all over Oregon, Washington, and northern California. The train first went to Washington DC, and we spent about a week there, and then we went south to Williamsburg and Yorktown and so forth. Then we went north to New York City and all of that. But we spent a considerable amount of time in Washington, and while we were there, I remember, we had a meeting with Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, who came from our part of the country. I remember being very impressed, being received in his chambers with this group.

We had a meeting with Senator Maurine Neuberger, who was then the junior senator from Oregon. We had our picture taken on the Capitol steps with her and with Senator Henry Jackson of Washington State. We met the local long-time congresswoman, the congresswoman from my district, quite a power in the Congress, Edith Green, who was a name I just knew from the newspaper. But in some faint way my mother had known her, and I remember having some little conversation.

But this was my introduction to Washington DC. I loved the buildings, I loved the sense of history on the East Coast. Because if you grew up and spent your entire time on the West Coast, suddenly when you went East there were a couple hundred more years of history than you knew of. This was especially clear to me because in 1959 Oregon had its centennial as a state, and just the year after that, here I was on the East Coast looking at places that were four hundred years, or three hundred years old, anyway, and had a big effect on me.

That was in the summer after my junior year in high school. My senior year in high school I continued with the climbing things and thinking about colleges, and ultimately selected Willamette University. I looked at Stanford, and I looked at—interestingly, having gone to Washington—I looked closely at George Washington University and was quite strongly thinking about it. Interestingly enough, it's the university my wife went to some years later.

But I selected Willamette University in Salem, Oregon, which is about fifty miles from Portland. Small, and my high school had been small; I liked the idea of a small place. I was not a very socially outgoing person, and a small place just felt more comfortable. It also was a Methodist-based, fairly rigorous intellectual place with a faculty that I thought was impressive.

So I went off, following another summer of working for the library in the summer, I went off to Salem, Oregon, to Willamette, in the fall of 1962. I remember being particularly taken by an older man who was my English professor, Dr. Trueblood, who was a Thoreau scholar and a Robert Frost scholar. He and I hit it off. I felt I was in a very yeasty period of feeling, "Ah, at last my intellectual needs are going to be met here." They didn't have introductory Latin. I never did get to take Latin because my high school didn't have Latin, and Willamette figured any self-respecting student had already had some Latin from somewhere else. I took German from a native German, and I did terribly at it. He was so nice about it.
I read. I was a voracious reader when I was a kid. My mother would bring home from the library—. I never had to pay library fines because my mother was in the business, so she would bring home books that she was reviewing to see whether the library should buy them, but also she would just bring home things she thought were of interest to me. I spent an enormous amount of my youth in libraries; I just read voraciously. I think I learned what command and facility I have with the English language in terms of writing and speaking from being a reader. I certainly didn't learn it by knowing the rules of grammar, which was demonstrated when I took German, because I couldn't learn all the complications of German grammar because I didn't know what a past participle was. So I had to go ask this native German what the parts of English were before I—. It was a losing—

Lage: Was this something they hadn't taught at your high school, or one of those things that didn't interest you?

Scott: It didn't interest me. Rightly or wrongly, I didn't need it for the most part, though I have a couple of sloppy things that I learned along the way. My command of the language was acquired by using it rather than by learning rules.

Lage: Right. That's true. Good English speakers often don't learn the rules until they take a foreign language.

Scott: Sure. It didn't work well.

Lage: It didn't work in college.

Scott: But I also got deeply involved in philosophy. I think my freshman year I took an "introduction to philosophy" course. And an English history course from a wonderful, wonderful Englishman. I was just having the time of my life intellectually.

Again, I had fallen in with a small crowd of friends who were sort of on the fringes. There were fraternities there, but we were none of us in fraternities. At an early mixer I met some nice young woman from Denver, and we spent time together. But very much on the fringes of social things. Not active in the school plays or the newspaper or any of the kind of things that people might do.

An event of very big impact on me happened in December. Late December, just before Christmas in 1962. My mother had driven me down to the campus of Willamette to leave me there, and I had, of course, been home for Thanksgiving. I'd been making plans, of course, to go home for the Christmas holidays. In a funny way I had a premonition about this when somebody came to get me for the telephone one evening. My mother had been killed in an automobile accident.

Lage: On her way back?

Scott: Just on her way to visit my grandmother. In that same accident, my brother, my next older brother, Robert, who had been driving, was very, very seriously hurt. My mother
was killed outright. My eldest brother was calling me to tell me this. (He was at that
time in medical school.) He said there was no way to sugarcoat this, that our mother
was dead and that our brother was very likely not going to make it. His stomach had
been exploded, amongst other very severe internal injuries.

I returned for a devastating period in my life. I'd been very close to my mother, and I
think in some deeply psychological way had not quite unplugged from the apron
strings. I wasn't quite finished in some kind of way.

I went back to school, ultimately.

Lage: Did you stay out for a while?

Scott: Well, I didn't go back for the rest of the holidays. Some arrangement was made to take
finals or something some other way, and the semester ended. So I went back in
January. But from then on in my life I was much more cut-loose than I would have
been. It's no fault of my family's; we were not a particularly close family. My brothers
were both considerably—well, not considerably—the next one was three years older,
and the oldest one was six years older than I was. They were busy pursuing their own
lives in different ways. My middle brother who'd been so badly injured did survive,
but just by the skin of his teeth.

So here I was, at age eighteen, suffering a really serious blow, the seriousness of
which, in terms of its impact on me, I did not fully appreciate for a long time. Life got
back to somewhat normal, but I was thrown much more on my own resources from
that point on.

Lage: Did your dad step in at all?

Scott: To a certain degree, but he was hurting and searching in his own way. I'm not sure that
theirs was a particularly happy marriage, and I was too young to grasp that one way or
the other. But in any event, we did have a wonderful—.

Fighting authority all the way, my father and I went to arrange the minimal funeral.
My mother was the sort of person who wanted no pretense. We had a memorial
service, but we had to go and deal with the undertaker. It was this slimy undertaker,
who was unctuous in the extreme. My father and I got the only laugh we got for about
six weeks out of putting this guy down. He was trying to sell us some giant bronze
casket for a million dollars. I remember my father saying, "Do you have a sheet?"
[laughs]

Lage: That's the only way you can survive this sort of thing.

Scott: My mother would have been terribly pleased.

The effect this had on me, to jump ahead, is that the social introvert in me was kind of
frozen at that stage, and I threw myself into other things. And of course I visited home
and visited my father. After a reasonable period of time, my father was definitely not
the kind of man who was going to live by himself, and he got interested in seeing if he
could meet eligible women of roughly his age bracket. He brought home some just
weird people. And here he's got these three more or less grown sons who have to pass
approval.

Lage: Poor guy.

Scott: He was very clever about it. Willamette University had a parents' sort of auxiliary
thing that met in Portland to hear speakers and so forth. He would go early and hang
around at the registration desk watching for single women who'd come in and sign up.
[laughter] Widow ladies. He met several people that way.

But my brothers and I, in various subtle—my father might not have thought they were
subtle—ways, kept saying, "Dad, what about Miriam?" There was a woman I had
known literally all my life, who was my mother's boss. She was the head children's
library for the whole Wallowa County Library System. One of my earliest memories
was being taken in to see Mrs. Hearn in the sort of austere giant Carnegie Library, the
downtown headquarters. She'd always been a family friend, and she'd been widowed
about a year earlier, and she had been someone who had come to our house the night
my mother died and had been right there with our family. We kept saying, "Dad, well,
Miriam." [laughs]

Finally the old man wised up. They had a wonderful courtship and married. They
went to San Francisco for their honeymoon, and my brothers and I gave them tickets to
hear Leontyne Price singing "Aida" at the San Francisco Opera. Which they did. A
charming story. They were so excited by this that they spent most of the rest of the
night walking around the city holding hands. [laughter] Because they were on such a
high.

Lage: That's very nice.

Scott: So things worked out well for him.

That summer after my freshman year in college, I landed a job. I wanted to do
something interesting, and I applied to various of the concessions in the national parks.
I landed a job as a dishwasher at Mount Rainier National Park, working at a little place
in the lowest elevation of the park, a little place called Longmire, which was the park
headquarters. Before the summer was out I had learned to be a short-order cook and I
pumped gas and so forth. I only had one day off a week, but every day off I had and
mornings before I went on, or afternoons, I was out hiking. There were some
wonderful hiking trails. It irked me greatly that I never climbed Mount Rainier, and I
never have. It's a two-day climb, and they'd never give me two days off, so I couldn't
arrange to join a climb of the mountain. This also thrust me into more direct contact
than I'd ever had with the National Park Service, because the rangers were always
coming in to [the restaurant]. When I was in a national park I began reading a little bit about the lore and the history of the national parks, and I really liked it.

I went back to Willamette that fall. I had declared my major to be history, a joint major in history and philosophy. Took some of the God-awfullest things. I took some incredible course on mathematical logic. There was one guy who was brilliant, so the professor would put some incredibly long theorem, something to be proved, on the board, and before he had it up there, this guy would have done it in his head; he'd say, "The answer is" whatever it was. And I was still copying the problem down.

Scott: I was increasingly unhappy at Willamette. I was unhappy socially, and I also, whatever intellectual drive I'd had, the idea that this was all going to lead to being a professor didn't catch with me. I wasn't sure what was going on.

Lage: Why leading to be a professor?

Scott: Where else was I going to go with a history and philosophy degree? The chairman of the philosophy department and the chairman of the history department were very friendly to me, very encouraging. I certainly could have continued in that vein, but I was having social sort of adjustment—I was having a sophomore slump or whatever it is they call it. And I decided that working for forty-seven cents an hour, which was what my wage worked out to be at the concession washing dishes and so forth, had nothing to recommend it when there were summer jobs in the National Park Service.

I got the information about how you applied for a Park Service job. I wrote to every national park you could think of and was roundly rejected by all of them. But late in the spring—clearly not a first-round choice—I was called and asked if I would like to be a park guide at Carlsbad Caverns National Park in New Mexico. This was a uniform position, and I remember the great excitement the day my uniform arrived and I paraded around in it.

Lage: You were young for that.

Scott: I was young. To be a summer ranger they generally wanted people that were twenty-one for law enforcement reasons. I'm not sure if it was actually mandatory, but they sort of had that rule. This job, though a uniform job, was not called a park ranger, although everybody called you a ranger when they saw you, with the flat hat and all of that. But it was to lead the tours through the cave.

So I'd never flown in my life before; I jumped on an airplane and flew to Carlsbad, New Mexico.

[End Tape 1, Side A]

[Begin Tape 1, Side B]

Lage: Okay.
Scott: So here I was at Carlsbad Caverns National Park. Perhaps the most important thing about the experience was that being in a uniform allowed me to be more outgoing. It was a kind of a crutch.

Lage: Putting on a role.

Scott: It allowed me to put on a role. People approached me; I didn't have to approach them to ask questions or to start up a conversation. "Oh, ranger," you know, "where can I park my car?" or whatever. There was good camaraderie with the other guides and with the park naturalist. And I just fell in love with this work. The work of naturalists in the national park is called a fancy name: park interpretation. I just loved it, and I started reading in the park library about the history of the parks and about the philosophy of the parks and so forth.

I decided I was going to be independent, so I got this wretched little apartment in downtown Carlsbad, which was thirty miles away, and had to take this government bus every day to and from work.

Lage: Did other people live on the site?

Scott: A lot of people lived there, but some people lived on the site. I made a very big mistake in doing that, because I had nothing to do in town and knew nobody there, and wasn't the sort of person who was going to go out and make acquaintances. I was just there for the summer.

So I went to the park every day. Just suited up in my uniform and went to the park and volunteered. Which had some of the older rangers growling at me that soon they'd be expecting this from everybody. But since I was there on volunteer days, I could do what I wanted, so I started leading nature walks in the desert that they were not otherwise offering. Or if they had a particularly big tour I would join, so they'd have more guides than was typical.

Interpretation in a cave is a particularly challenging thing. Some of the old, somewhat dull fellows said, "Now I have to go down in the hole." This just became this thing that they had to do, to slog through. After all, caves do not change at all. So once you've done it three hundred times, then you're doing it the 301st time and it's all the same story. Which I took to be a great challenge of how to make it fresh for the people I was talking to. I just had a ball.

Lage: How did they train you on the interpretation? Did they give you—

Scott: We were given quite a large dose of training, and then we were put with other guides for a while. They don't do it this way anymore, but this was in an era when they walked people through every hour or so on scheduled trips. There would be a ranger in the lead setting the pace, and a ranger in the rear, and maybe one or two other rangers going back and forth through the line answering questions. And then you'd stop at these enormous seating areas where walks had been arranged for people to sit
down. One of the talks that was given—usually these were seven- to ten-minute talks—was about the geology of the cave and various other things. There were like three of these rest stops. The big tour was a three-mile walk and then you came out on an elevator. There were shorter versions as well.

I just fell in love with this, and I particularly fell under the influence of a very nice fellow who was the chief ranger at the park by the name of Bill Birdsall, who was a bachelor native of New Mexico. Big, big man who was just very hale and hearty and outgoing, and a career park guide and enthusiastic about it. He just thought that it was the cat's pajamas that I was interested in this.

I got to thinking about how I didn't really have much to go back to. My sense of continuity with my work at Willamette was not very great. So I didn't go back that fall. I stayed in Carlsbad. Seasonal employees, at least then, were on a, I think it was a six-hundred-hour maximum arrangement. They worked their tails off to try and get from Washington permission to extend me because they needed help. I would have stayed regardless of what happened to me.

It was clear into October, the middle of October, when they finally figured out that they couldn't keep me, though they would welcome me back the next summer. So I flew home, and my brother, who was pals with the admissions people at Portland State University, got me in late. I started my classes about two weeks or three weeks late and had to choose what I was going to take on the way in from the airport. I took "The Art of the Film," a graduate seminar in Greek history—here was the intellectual poseur coming out again. "The Art of the Film," a graduate seminar in Greek history, some survey of Greek drama, a graduate seminar about the utopian novel; this made no sense.

Lage: It wasn't leading you anywhere.

Scott: This was leading nowhere. And I lived with my brother and his family. I had a little wretched Corvair, and I kept my hiking boots and my ice axe in the back. I got less and less enthusiastic about this set of courses, so I made up this rule: I would drive down in the morning, and if in circling the block twice I couldn't find a place to park, I would drive off to Mount Hood and go hiking instead. [laughter]

So I dropped out. I just stopped going. I never took the exams, and I was flunked out of Portland State University at the start of my junior year.

Lage: This was about '63, then?

Scott: I've done this wrong. Excuse me. Back up, back up. So I had my first year at Willamette.

Lage: And that was '62?
Scott: That was '62-63. That academic year was my first year. The summer of '63 was my year at Mount Rainier. '63-64 was my second year at Willamette, first summer at Carlsbad. I left Willamette and went to Portland State and flunked out.

So I drove up to Seattle. I'd been talking with this chief ranger, and I said, "What do you need to do to go into the National Park Service?" He said, "The best thing to do is to get a degree in forestry or forest recreation. There's just a few places in the country that have a really good program, and the very best is at the University of Michigan, the School of Natural Resources."

So I'd gotten their information, and I didn't have any of the prerequisites for a natural sciences kind of a degree. So having flunked out of Portland State, I went to the University of Washington, which welcomed me with open arms and didn't seem the least offended by my flunking out, and admitted me for January, for two quarters—they were on the quarter system—knowing I wasn't going to stay there. I took chemistry, biology, zoology, all the obvious things that you would take for—. I don't think I took anything that I took by choice. It was all the things that I could get more cheaply. Out-of-state tuition at Michigan was just outrageous. It was a good deal cheaper to go to the University of Washington.

I lived in the dorm there and was just there for two quarters, and then I went back that summer, summer of '65, for a second summer at Carlsbad. That year I wised up and lived at the park and just was in my element. I was out hiking around in the desert and leading nature walks and giving talks about the bats that fly out of the cave in the early evening and so forth, just having a ball, and was admitted to the University of Michigan.

So I left Carlsbad in August of '65 and flew to Detroit, which I knew nothing about, and rented a car and drove into Ann Arbor and drove up in front of the School of Natural Resources and went in and said, "Does anybody know where Dr. Sharpe's office is?" Because he was the head of this recreation program. I found myself an apartment and arrived at the University of Michigan.

Lage: Now, you hadn't actually graduated from college yet.

Scott: I'd never graduated from anything. I was coming in as essentially a junior, a half a year late, but I'd gotten these various prerequisites. So I started taking things like dendrology, tree identification, and silvaculture and forest soils and civil engineering—surveying—and all these sorts of things at the University of Michigan. I liked it perfectly well and did very well.

Lage: So the science turned out to be okay for you?

Scott: The science was all right. A lot of it was memorization, and I've forgotten it all to this day. But I also hit it off very well with Grant Sharpe, Professor Sharpe, who was the head of this program.
Lage: This was forest recreation?

Scott: This was forest recreation. He taught courses in forest recreation: design, how to design campgrounds and picnic grounds, and what makes a good privy, and what doesn't and all that sort of thing. Conservation policy. And there were other courses there in policy sorts of things. Sharpe was an old-time Park Service advocate, so I was really in my element. And I was a Park Service defender; I mean, the Park Service could do no wrong.

The summer after that, summer of ’66, I spent going to a mandatory summer field camp which the University of Michigan had in the upper peninsula of Michigan, which is very different than metropolitan-urban-agricultural downstate Michigan. Heavily forested, beautiful country, beautiful rivers, and it's on a peninsula, essentially, stuck between the upper part of Lake Michigan and Lake Superior. It was this big camp with all the [facilities for] taking special outdoor programs that are best done in the summer camp. It was very intensive. I think it was probably two and a half months, or two months, anyway.

But at one point during this program, the people who were in regular forestry, sort of the saw-log forestry people, all went on a weeklong field trip. They loaded up in trucks and off they went. They went on a field trip to look at sawmills and things all over the upper Midwest. That left a few of us—I think maybe three students—and Professor Sharpe with a week with nothing better to do. So Sharpe said, "I know what we'll do." I think this is what he standardly did. "We will go and do kind of a field visit to Isle Royale National Park in Lake Superior," which is a magnificent place.

By this time, I was feeling very sorry for myself. Here's this fellow who'd spent every weekend in 1962 hanging from one or another of the Cascade Mountain peaks, and here I was in flat, uninteresting Michigan. I was so sorry for myself. There was no wildness around and I wasn't going camping or doing anything interesting like that. So here we were on this marvelous island national park that was just wilderness. Psychologically, you took a boat over and you were surrounded by water, and that added to the sense of isolation. There were wolves and there were moose, and there was just this fabulous, beautiful, forested, rocky seascape sort of place that I just loved. I just thought Isle Royale was wonderful.

Lage: It was part of a park?

Scott: A national park had been established in the twenties. Something like that.

Lage: But was there much interpretive—

Scott: Yes. We didn't hang around—. The Park Service took us around in boats to places we wouldn't have gotten because we didn't have our own boat, because we were a class. I think we probably met the superintendent maybe or something of that kind. We were sort of studying where there are campgrounds and having a good time, too; did a lot of fishing. Another chap and I took a hike for a day and a night, and camped, and went
around a part of the trail system, and met Professor Sharpe and the rest of the group at another point on the island. This place just captured my imagination and I really liked it. I was deeply into the lore of the national parks at that stage.

So I went back in the fall of ’66 to finish by that time, so I’d had all of the calendar year of ’65-66. Yes, it was ’65 and ’66, and the summer of ’66. I graduated in December of ’66 with a Bachelor of Science in Forestry degree. I had immediately pending, seeing that I was coming up to graduation, I had applied for admission there at the University of Michigan to the graduate school of forestry to continue my studies for the simple reason that I was trying to avoid the draft.

The war in Vietnam was a very big deal at that stage, and the draft was a central part of any young person's life. In oral histories from that era you are going to find stories of either people who did go, or people who went to Canada, or people who were conscientious objectors, as were several of the people that I worked with at the Sierra Club later, who had gotten into the Sierra Club by doing conscientious objector service.

Lage: Would you have gone to graduate school, do you think, had it not been for the draft?

Scott: Probably, but who knows in what way. I essentially didn't have any choice. Sometime in the fall of ’66, I had been called up for a physical and my draft status had been changed to 1A. I passed the physical, so they were just waiting to get me. So the papers went to my draft board in Portland, Oregon, from the graduate school at the University of Michigan saying that I had been admitted. They passed in the mail apparently. I was drafted in December of ’66. Merry Christmas. I was sitting at home opening the mail. So I decided since I was home in Portland anyway, I went down to the draft board the next day to see what kind of arguing I could do with them. They said, "Oh, Mr. Scott, didn't you get our notice of cancellation?" I remember saying "No, but I'll get it! Bye!" [laughter] That's the last they ever heard of me. I took right out of there.

So I stayed in graduate school for—. I was aiming to get to be twenty-six years old, which was when you were no longer draftable. I was only in the lottery—they introduced a lottery afterwards—only [in my] last year. Had I been drafted, I'm virtually certain I would not have gone. I might have gone to Canada. I don't know what I would have done, but I would not have gone to the military. It was in part out of real opposition to the war in Vietnam, but it was also something more fundamental. There is in me a deep streak of resistance to authority. I knew the military could break that, and I didn't want it broken.

Lage: You would have ended up in the brig a lot of the time.

Scott: I didn't want them to do to me, just to me as an ego, as a person, as an individual, what I knew they had more experience in doing to me than I had experience in resisting. I wouldn't have any part of it.
Lage: Had you been involved in any war protests?

Scott: Later, when they really steamed up. It wasn't something that I was terribly involved in.

Lage: In the School of Natural Resources, was the feeling against the war as strong as in the rest of the university?

Scott: No. The University of Michigan, particularly the more central academic disciplines—. The School of Natural Resources was right in the center of the campus, but it was kind of a little world apart. The University of Michigan was where the anti-war teaching started. It was a hotbed of the SDS and the Weathermen and all that sort of thing. It was a very active anti-war place, and I certainly agreed with all that. I didn't particularly take any active part in it one way or another.

So I proceeded, having gotten my bachelor's degree in December of '66, I simply proceeded in graduate school. I didn't have any particular theory of what I was doing other than evading the draft, but I was sort of going to study recreation policy or conservation or something. I started teaching, being a graduate assistant and a teaching fellow on the introductory to conservation course that was one of the things that—. This is a forty thousand-student university. Among their [course] requirement—students in the university had to get a diversity of exposure. One of the things you could do was take this introduction to conservation. So we had hordes of people from outside the school—freshmen that came to take the introduction to conservation course, and I was a teaching assistant to that, and so forth.

Lage: Excuse me, I don't want to interrupt your train of thought, but was the conservation thrust in the school a very strong one, or was it more towards forest management?

Scott: There were two things going on. The forestry department was made up of really only two kinds of people: people who were lost in their research, and people who were very conservative about forestry matters. And then off on the side there were those of us who were doing recreation, and we were greatly looked down upon by some of the faculty as not being quite rigorous and serious enough. There was also simultaneously a graduate program in conservation, which had a very sharp crowd of people in it. Amongst its faculty, the dean or the head of that program had been Dr. Stanley Cain, who under Stewart Udall had been assistant secretary of the Interior. There were people that were politically involved in policy and so forth. I studied things like the Wilderness Act and the national parks and all that sort of stuff, but I hadn't really gotten focused on those things.

Some time in the fall of '66, I saw on the bulletin board one day—and this is how I got where I went—I saw on the bulletin board one day an announcement that pursuant to the requirement of the Wilderness Act, the National Park Service had completed a proposal for what parts of Isle Royale National Park were to be designated as wilderness, and that this proposal was publicly available and that a public hearing was scheduled, and that people could appear at that hearing to comment or could write for the hearing record to comment, and that ultimately this would go to Congress. And I
knew there was a Wilderness Act, I suppose; I knew there was a Sierra Club and so forth; but I didn't know much about it. But I had been to Isle Royale and had this very intense reaction to this place.

So I wrote off probably just a postcard to the Park Service and said, "Please send me your packet of information." I got this packet of information. Knowing nothing, I was appalled because great chunks of this island were excluded from designation as wilderness. A proposal by the Park Service for designation of wilderness for no good reason except that there were some policies that the Park Service had about you had to leave big swathes around any campground or any boat dock. Huge: acres and acres and acres. Well, that could be just some place that they could build additional things.

There were in the backcountry of Isle Royale three-sided shelters—old Adirondack shelters—and they had thirty-two-acre big Swiss cheese holes around those, and a vast part of the shoreline that the public saw the most, where the boats went, was excluded. I was outraged. The hearing was being held on January 31 of 1967 in Houghton, Michigan, which is one of the coldest, snowiest places on earth, on January 31. No hearing was being held in lower Michigan accessible to the population.

Lage: Is Houghton near Isle Royale?

Scott: The Keweenaw Peninsula is a little thing that sticks up off the upper peninsula into Lake Superior, and it's battered on both sides by the cold snowstorms off Lake Superior. January 31. Well, I couldn't. There was no way. It's farther from Ann Arbor, Michigan, to Houghton, Michigan, than it is from Ann Arbor, Michigan, to Atlanta. So there was no way I was going to this thing.

So I was in my sort of an office I had taken over, probably on a Saturday. I must have had some term paper due or something, and one of my professors, a fellow named Ross Tocher, came in and saw that I was working with unusual intensity on something, and it couldn't be my schoolwork. [laughter] He asked me what it was, and I said I was writing a probably fifteen- or twenty-page, maybe more than that, detailed letter to the hearing record about the Isle Royale Wilderness proposal. He said, "That's interesting," because the Wilderness Society and the UAW [United Auto Workers] and the Detroit News and some other people had gone together, having protested that there was no hearing in the lower part of Michigan, had gone together to charter an airplane and were going to fly a group of Michigan conservation leaders from the lower part of the state to this hearing to testify.

Lage: The UAW was in on this?

Scott: The UAW. He said he was going, but he couldn't go, and how about if he arranged for me to go in his place? I do not know to this day—I've never had a chance to ask him—whether he really couldn't go or whether this was some inspiration on his part. But the upshot was that on a very snowy morning at six-thirty in the morning I found myself at Detroit city airport—not the big metropolitan airport but this little place right downtown—in a blizzard getting into a DC-3 with the tail sitting on the ground. We
had to walk uphill with this ragtag group of people which included a woman from the Michigan parks. An elderly woman named Genevieve Gillette, who was the sort of doyenne of Michigan state park politics. She'd been on the park board forever and she lived in Ann Arbor. She was a wonderful old lady.

Lage: Did you know her?

Scott: Yes. I didn't know her before this. I didn't know anybody. A gentleman named Ted Penkowski [?], Sr., who was on the conservation staff of the UAW, and one of his colleagues. And a couple of people from the Michigan group of the Sierra Club, who I didn't know from Adam. And some other people, I suppose. Ten or eleven of us. But most memorably was the assistant executive director of the Wilderness Society from Washington, who had put this all together, had gotten all these people to pull off the money to charter this airplane, whose name was Rupert Cutler. He was assistant executive director of the Wilderness Society.

On this plane ride and at the hearing—I remember I came into the room—the hearing started at nine in the morning. They knew we were coming. The Park Service used retired superintendents to do these hearings, and the hearing officer was a man named John Preston, who was the retired superintendent of Yosemite. So he'd gotten there somehow or other in this snowstorm. They'd started the hearing at nine o'clock, and by 9:20 they were done with the few people in Houghton, Michigan, that wanted to talk about this rather obscure topic. So they just adjourned and were sitting there waiting for this plane.

We had to touch down in Petoskey, Michigan, which is another very cold place, get more fuel. We were going through blizzards. It was a hair-raising experience. We landed and were whisked in. I had to sit on the luggage in the back of one of those old-fashioned, long station wagons that they used for airport limousines. I was one of the first people to get my coat off and come into the hearing room. There was some park ranger sitting there at a little table, and you filled out a little card saying you wanted to testify. I didn't even notice; I filled out the little card. Everybody else was still getting off their coats. He'd gotten up and went marching up to Mr. Preston and gave him the card. "Mr. Scott." [laughter]

So I was up there with my papers, quivering—

Lage: Your twenty pages?

Scott: —and gave my little statement, and I remember John Preston said something. He said, "That was a very impressive statement. We're very glad to have your views, and it will be made a part of the official hearing record. But," he said, "I want to particularly say how nice it is to see younger people taking an—." Some nice thing.

So I sat there watching all of this and chatting with this fellow, Cutler. By the end of this flight back, I had just become very chummy with Cutler. He called me Boy Wonder and I forget what I called him. We had an exchange of correspondence. I
joined the Wilderness Society and got on their list of people that they kept apprised of what was going on in all of this stuff. I was just hooked. We have an organizing thing that we say that if you can get a person to a public hearing and get them to stand up and testify—. You can get a lot of people there, but then they won't. If you can do that, you've got them hooked. Well, I was hooked. I joined the Wilderness Society.

The Wilderness Act had passed in September of 1964, and it required that every roadless part of every national park and every roadless part of every national wildlife refuge and certain national forest areas had to be reviewed within ten years on a very rigorous schedule, had to have an agency proposal, had to have a public hearing in the state, and then ultimately proposals went to the president and from the president to the Congress. It had a very straightforward little process. And then to designate these areas it took an act of Congress for each one.

The agencies had dawdled a little bit getting going, and they were supposed to have a third of these done within the first three years and another third within—. So there were wilderness hearings going on every week somewhere in the country on these, you know, some obscure little wildlife refuge somewhere or some unit of the national park system. Not just the big, famous ones. Not just Yosemite, but also Craters of the Moon National Monument in Idaho. Not just huge wildlife refuges that were well known, but the Farallon Islands off San Francisco were a wildlife refuge and they had to be studied, and a hearing was held, I suppose in San Francisco.

The Wilderness Society, its business was making this process work and getting the strongest possible proposals and stirring up people to testify and so forth. So they would put out a little bulletin about each of these hearings. Well, I got on the list and got all of these. I was looking at my files, and in 1967 I wrote—I must not have done any schoolwork—I wrote fifteen- or twenty-page diatribes about Petrified Forest National Park in Arizona. I'd never been there. Lava Beds National Monument. I'd never been there. Receiving all this literature from the Wilderness Society. I must have been one of their—

Lage: They would send you enough information?

Scott: They would send me all this information. I would write to the agencies and get their stuff and pore over the maps and all this. Cutler and the people at the Wilderness Society must have wondered what they'd tapped into. But I had these huge, long essays that I would send off to these people.

Lage: But you'd send a copy to the Wilderness Society?

Scott: And then I'd send a copy to them. I had a good time doing all that.

Late that spring of '67 the question was, what was I going to do that summer? One day, one of the professors, whose courses I'd never taken, named Bill Stapp—I don't know why I never fell under his thrall particularly, but he was a leader in creating a much more activist, conservation activists' program at the university a little later on,
more after my time. He stopped me in the hall one day, and he said a friend of his had called and said that the National Audubon Society had a position for the summer in their Nature Center Planning Division, headquartered in Manhattan, and was I interested?

So I found myself spending the summer of 1967 working for the National Audubon Society based in Manhattan. That was the summer of the city riots, and the office was on 92nd Avenue near the park, right on the edge of Harlem. There were windows broken and places burned within a couple of blocks of where I was. I was very poor; I lived at the YMCA in midtown Manhattan and didn't have any money, so I wasn't enjoying—

Lage: Did they pay much of anything?

Scott: Oh, they paid me, but not much. And I was putting myself through school for the most part, so I was on fellowships and things. I wasn't going to Broadway shows in the evenings. What I did was go to the Dellacorte Theater. Joseph Papp's public theater has a theater in Central Park, an open-air theater where they do free Shakespeare. You just have to stand in line and get a ticket. I would go to the same play after night after night after night. One night I'd just watched the lighting, another night I'd just watch the theater. But during that summer I was also sitting there writing letters to the wilderness studies.

The very nice people that ran this little division of the Audubon Society, which was terminated a few years later, was financed by Laurance Rockefeller, and its job was to consult with communities or schools on the designing of nature centers. There was a certain cookie-cutter quality to the way they did it. But we would draft these great, thick plans, so I was doing draftsmanship and I was—but mostly bound in this little office.

[End Tape 1, Side B]

[Begin Tape 2, Side A]

Scott: In June of 1967, while I was working for the Audubon Society in New York, the Park Service scheduled their hearing for the wilderness proposal for Shenandoah National Park—as usual, a place I'd never been. The hearing was to be held in Luray, Virginia.

Lage: Was this again an out-of-the-way place? They seem to do this pretty regularly.

Scott: Pretty much. It was near the park. At that point I was working on a special project. This division of the Audubon Society was publishing a book, a soft-cover, large-format book about interpretation, about nature interpretation for school teachers and nature center people and so forth. They had some chapters on specialized kinds of interpretation, and they wanted a chapter on cave interpretation. Well, hell. So I wrote this chapter for them on cave interpretation, and I sent it to them. I know a lot about national park cave interpretation; I did it for two years.
But I don't know a lot about private caves, and we ought to have something about that in here too. And they said that made sense, and I said the most famous private caves that are really very well run and all that are the Luray Caverns in Luray, Virginia. "So you should send me down to Luray, Virginia, to meet—." And I corresponded with and got an invitation, and they would show me around and they would meet me and all this at the Luray Caverns. I scheduled it for the same week in June as this wilderness hearing.

Then I went marching in to the then-head of the Audubon Society, Charles Callison. Charlie Callison, a great fellow. I said, "Mr. Callison, as I'm going to be in Luray anyway, would it be all right if I testified on behalf of the National Audubon Society at this hearing, because you're probably not going to have anybody else there?" He said fine, and we went over it. He said it was fine. He was an old wilderness advocate.

So I went to Luray, Virginia and I did my thing with the cave people, and then there I was for the hearing. I think by comparison with the hearing at Isle Royale, which is the only other one I'd ever been at, this room was packed. In fact there was a bus in the parking lot. I thought, "How extraordinary." At this hearing I gave my little statement. My friend Rupe Cutler was there. We had been corresponding on the phone a lot back and forth in the intervening months since I'd met him. But he introduced me to his boss, the executive director of the Wilderness Society, Stewart Brandborg. I said, "Gee, I'm going to be driving back to Washington in my rental car. Before I continue my trip, I'd like to stop by your office as a loyal member." They were all making a thing, "Well, this is Doug Scott who's writing all these incredibly long letters."

Lage: They were probably so glad to get a look at you.

Scott: So I went back the next morning to Washington and marched into the offices of the Wilderness Society, which were near the White House in a very creaky old place. You took this old-fashioned elevator with a grillework that opened and you just walked right out in this office. I nearly dropped my tongue because everyone in the office had been at the hearing. All these people that had been testifying for this wilderness, they had closed the office and taken this chartered bus, and taken everyone. The staff wasn't twenty people, but [they had taken] the secretaries, the mailroom people, as a training thing to say, "We want you all to see what these hearings are like," and they all testified. In fact, one of the great stories is Brandborg, who was just a born organizer, got the bus driver to testify. [laughter]

So I was quite bowled over by this. We had a little further discussion. At that point I was trying to think, now that I was in graduate school, I ought to be doing some research. So I had cooked up this completely ridiculous theory that I was going to do my research on whether what happened at these public hearings made any impact on the agency's subsequent decisions. I was going to take some case studies and I was going to read the entire hearing record from those case studies and then play that back into what happened with the agency proposals. I spent some months fussing with this and learned a lot more about the Wilderness Act and the wilderness program.
Lage: Did you learn more about the agencies also?

Scott: A little bit, but it ended up being essentially an impractical experience.

So my summer at the Audubon Society came to an end. I remember going in to see Charlie Callison to say goodbye. He said something polite like, "If you ever want a job, let me know, because we thought you were a great guy." I said, "Well, I want to try Washington. I want to see what this is all about." He said, "Government?" I said, "Yes." He said, "Let me give you a piece of advice, Doug. I've tried both. I find working on government a good deal more fun than working in government." [laughter] I've always remembered that.

I went back to Ann Arbor for the fall of '67 and continued taking political science courses and all this sort of thing and working on my wilderness stuff on the side.

Lage: It sounds like they left you pretty loose in the graduate program.

Scott: I was a graduate student in the forestry department, but taking all my coursework in the political science department and other places. Virtually all of it. So I was mostly not around.

Lage: And you didn't seem to have an idea of where it was going.

Scott: I sort of fooled around with one thing or another, but I kept busy. I think I must have been on the student council or something, and I was pals with my professors. They wouldn't give me an office, so I found this extremely narrow, long thing in which I could get a desk at the far end, which was the room where they kept the pine cone collection. And for three years that was my office, just down the row from the department head's office. But it wasn't an official office so they couldn't figure out how to get me out of it. Didn't have a phone; I kept lobbying for a phone, but I'll come to that part of the story later.

So here I was continuing to hide from the draft and writing these long-winded statements for the hearing record. Now I was in touch with the Wilderness Society, and they would call me every now and then. When some important votes came up in Congress, they would ask, "Could you help out with this?" in one way or another.

At one point they called and it was going to be the first crucial showdown about the wilderness system. It was over the first of the Forest Service proposals to reach the Congress, for a place near Santa Barbara called the San Rafael Wilderness. The issue worked itself down to literally a few thousand acres' difference between the Forest Service's proposal, which had been greatly revised—the old permit area had been greatly enlarged, and after the public hearing they enlarged it some more.
But various people, local Sierra Club people out there and some of the Wilderness Society people, kind of—I'm not sure how deliberate it was, but they ended up making it a test case. This was the very first wilderness proposal to come before the Congress, and was the Congress simply going to be a rubber stamp to whatever the agency said, or was it going to expand agency proposals?

There was great interest in getting the precedent established that the Congress wasn't just a rubber stamp. Already acres had been greatly increased from the individual area, which had its opponents greatly alarmed; was that going to be the pattern? And the answer is yes, that became a pattern. So a fight was fomented over the San Rafael Wilderness, and it basically went that the Senate passed a bill that was the Forest Service's acreage. The House passed a bill that was the Forest Service acreage plus 2,200 additional acres in an area the Forest Service said they needed to be able to make firebreaks there. We said, "No, no, this is terribly important. It's got ancient Indian petroglyphs and other Indian artifacts," and yak, yak, yak, yak, yak.

So this huge fight boiled down into the House and the Senate disagreeing, and the conference committee [accepted the Senate plan]. So then a vote was held in March of '68. So I'm going ahead here a little bit. In March of '68 a vote was held in the House about whether to reject the conference report, reject the deal because they'd given up this 2,200 acres. In an all-out effort the Wilderness Society just threw itself into this, and the Sierra Club.

Lage: Did they come clean with the congressmen that the reason they were most concerned about it was establishing this precedent?

Scott: There was talk about that, but there was also talk about why this particular area was meritorious. Two thousand acres, I mean, you're right, this is really not much. So a formal motion to recommit, which is seldom done—. The Senate has passed the bill, the House has passed the bill, the conferees have worked out a compromise, which typically Congress reacts to rally around that kind of a compromise, so rejecting a conference report and sending it back and saying, "Do it over again," is [rare]. And it was even rarer in those days, because in those days the power of seniority hadn't yet been broken, hadn't been through Watergate, hadn't been through all the breaking of the monopoly of the committee chairmen. The conservationists lost this vote. It ended up with something like 155 to 230 or something. But we thought we'd done very well.

In the midst of getting ready for all this, a fellow called me from the Sierra Club or the Wilderness Society—I forget which—and said, "Your congressman, Congressman Marv Esch"—a Republican representing Ann Arbor, Michigan—"is one of the guys we're not sure about. We've heard he's going to be in his district office. Would you go see him?" Here I am, this guy that's been writing all these letters, I'd never met a congressman. But I'd been following this battle, and I had all the maps and all this. I had these huge maps and stuff. I don't know when I studied. I'm not sure I ever did.

So I made an appointment and marched down to the office of this congressman in downtown Ann Arbor, and marched in not having the faintest idea what I was doing.
He greeted me affably and ushered me into this office. I was sort of, "Oh, a congressman. Oh, God, I wonder what they are." He heard my little pitch and he said, "Tell me more about it." Pretty soon we were down on his floor with this map unrolled, crawling around and saying, "Here's this area E that's this much-disputed area." We chatted about it back and forth, and he said, "Well, you know, I'll tell you what, Doug," or Mr. Scott or whatever he called me. He said, "You've made a very persuasive case, and I'm going to support you." He added, "If you wanted to give me a few paragraphs of draft, I'd even be happy to say something about it during the floor debate."

Well, I walked out of there about four feet off the ground. I mean, this was my first lobbying, and this went—. Now, in retrospect, here's a Republican congressman from Ann Arbor, Michigan to whom this vote means zip. He's a very nice guy and he was very nice to me, and we were friends later, but this wasn't some big deal. He wasn't angering anyone that mattered to him by agreeing with me, but he sure as hell made me feel good. And I did draft him some little remarks. I've never gone back to look up, or I've long since forgotten, but I suppose he did give a little speech. Well, I was just hooked on this guy. And I reported back to the people that were masterminding all this in Washington and so forth. But I still—. This was just Lone Ranger Doug Scott doing this stuff out of his office at the graduate school.

So we're now into 1968, and the question was, what was I going to do that summer? By that time I'd given up on this research project and I said to [my advisor], I said, "This thing is—this is crazy." But when I'd gone in June of '67 to meet Stewart Brandborg in his office at the Wilderness Society, he had said to me, "Yes, but we really need and what we don't have is someone to really write the history of the Wilderness Act." So I said, "I'm going to do that." I wrote or called Cutler and said, "I'm going to do the history of the Wilderness Act, because I'm really getting interested in this political stuff, and this would be an interesting project. But if I'm going to do that, I've got to have access to the files of the Wilderness Society, so why don't you hire me for the summer? I've got a full-time fellowship so I don't particularly need the money. So he said, "Sounds good to me."

So I got myself this job working for Cutler at the Wilderness Society in the summer of 1968, and appeared in Washington in probably April. The University of Michigan was on a funny trimester system so you got out real early but you went back in the middle of August. It was a kind of a strange academic calendar. Off I went to Washington DC to work for the Wilderness Society.

Somehow, and I don't remember how, the local Sierra Club heard I was going —. Now, I had met some of them in January of '67 when I'd gone to the Isle Royale hearing. Maybe I knew some of them some other way which I have no memory of it. But somehow it got around that I was going to Washington. In any event, we got together, and they said, "Listen, we've got some stuff that we're interested in that we could use help on, somebody snooping around in Washington. When you go down there why don't you—here, join the Sierra Club and all that—but why don't you kind of be our agent and look around?"
So in May of 1968, I arrived in Washington DC. I had these elaborate notes which I prepared about what I needed to know about the issue. The issue that they [the local Sierra Club chapter] came to me on and said, "Our big priority is to get some action on the long-stalled legislation for the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore," a national park proposal on the west coast of Lake Michigan, that had been greatly stalled, and I'll talk a little bit about the background of it in a little bit.

At that time the Mackinac Chapter hadn't quite been organized. Let me see if I can tell you this. The timing on this was that the board of directors had—. Well, the by-laws for the Mackinac Chapter, which was at that point a group of the Great Lakes Chapter, which was at one point nine states in the Great Lakes area, the Michigan people had petitioned to become a chapter, and the by-laws were approved by the Sierra Club Council in December of '67. So in '68 the chapter was a brand-new thing. In late '67 it had 425 members. By May of '68 it had six hundred members. The headquarters and the locus of energy was the Ann Arbor area.

I remember being taken over to the home of Virginia Prentice, who was the chapter chairman, and meeting with a group of people who were going to brief me about the Sleeping Bear Dunes and about what this was all about. These weren't people that I knew. Virginia then wrote—and this letter is in May of '68—to Lloyd Tupling, who was the head of the Washington office of the Sierra Club, saying, "Dear Mr. Tupling, Douglas Scott of our chapter will be in Washington this summer as an employee of the Wilderness Society, and we don't want to trip over you, but we've asked him to kind of be our chapter representative. He'll be reporting to us all the time, so we'll keep an eye on him."

I wrote in early May—so I guess I didn't actually go down there until mid-May, for some reason—I wrote to Senator [Philip] Hart, who was the lead sponsor of the Sleeping Bear Dunes legislation. I'd thanked him for something and commented about something or other, and he'd written back to me in early May of '68 saying here was some information about Sleeping Bear Dunes and he was real hopeful that it could be worked out somehow or other. I wrote him back and said, "This summer I will be living in Washington DC, and I want to do all I can to spur support for the Sleeping Bear. I'll be representing the interests of the Mackinac Chapter. I'll be arriving in Washington next week. When I've gotten settled, I'd like to meet with you to talk about what's going on."

And I wrote—this is typical; I must have had nothing, no finals or anything—I wrote on that same day to Congressman James O'Hara, who was the lead House sponsor—he's the Detroit area congressman who's the lead House sponsor. A virtually identical letter to Congressman John Dingell, who was a Michigan congressman who was interested in conservation things. "As soon as I get settled, I'll look you up." And I wrote to Tupling saying, "I want to do this, and I'll meet you."

So I went down to Washington and started meeting these people and doing my job at the Wilderness Society, which was—my first assignment was to take the lower reaches of Rupert Cutler's in-box, which were several years old, and cope with them,
answering correspondence, drafting correspondence and so forth. But if you were
headed for the kind of career I was headed for, if your interests were the kind of
interests that I was developing sort of inadvertently, the summer of 1968 was an
incredible period of time. During that summer the Congress acted on the National
Trail System Act, the Wild and Scenic Rivers System Act, the first Redwoods National
Park Act, the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, the North Cascades National
Park—a huge, complicated bill—and any number of little wilderness proposals of one
sort or another.

The Wilderness Society had a tiny staff, and the people who went to Capitol Hill were
an even smaller portion of that group. At the Sierra Club there were two full-time staff
people spread across all the issues that the Sierra Club was interested in, which went
way beyond the Wilderness Society which was a more specialized kind of an
organization. So it very quickly became all hands on deck. We were sitting phoning
every congressional office to try and get people to the House floor to vote on the Land
and Water Conservation Fund. My first lobbying was to go and lobby on the
Redwoods National Park. There was a little crew of us and somebody gave us a
briefing.

Lage: This was from the Wilderness Society?

Scott: The Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club, working very closely together. So there
was the Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth [not founded until
1969—ed.]. These groups were always doing the same stuff together.

Lage: So they were informally planning together?

Scott: Planning together and plotting together. They would figure out a position and then
somebody would type up fact sheets, and then they'd recruit people to go and slog
around the halls carrying this literature around and talking to people. So I started
wandering around the halls of Congress and tagging along with these people who were
serious lobbyists.

The Redwoods Park bill was a very tough piece of legislation. They just had a terrible
time getting it through. The guy that was the chief lobbyist for it was Mike
McCloskey, who flew back and forth from California week to week to do this. At one
point there was some high-level meeting that involved Stewart Brandborg from the
Wilderness Society and Mike McCloskey from the Sierra Club and Congressman
Jeffrey Cohelan.

Lage: He was from this district [District 7 in Northern California].

Scott: Yes. He was the prime sponsor of the most aggressive bill. And probably several
other people. This was in some House restaurant in the Capitol building. I was sent up
to take some piece of paper to Brandborg. He'd missed something or there was some
urgent message or something, so I came—a little wet behind the ears, Doug Scott came wandering in and handed this—. And then sort of hung around. And Mike clammed up. Mike McCloskey didn't know who I was from Adam, and I wasn't somebody who was trusted to be listening to this high-level plotting. I remember very clearly feeling—

Lage: You were aware of this.

Scott: Yes, and I was ushered out feeling sort of "Hmmmm." [laughter] "Drat."

Lage: As you watched the lobbying for the Redwood National Park, how prominent was Mike's role in it?

Scott: There was always a kind of funny—tension is too strong a word, but a funny—. One version of it is that the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society had sort of divvied up the turf. Wilderness, the wilderness bill, the implementation of the wilderness bill, the studies, and the legislation on individual areas was a very big business then. The Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club had long cooperated; they'd worked together on building up the momentum for the Wilderness Act, they'd collaborated on all sorts of issues over the years. But the Wilderness Society conceived of itself somewhat as the senior partner. It was Washington-based; the Sierra Club wasn't, and so forth. There was a certain—I don't want to make more of this than there was, but there was a certain kind of undertone of, "They kind of fly in here and do their thing and then off they go again, and we're there to pick up the pieces." There was a little tension of that kind.

The reality is that the groups kind of divvied stuff up. The redwoods was the Sierra Club's issue. The Wilderness Society covered it in their magazines, was available to run around and help and so forth, but the leadership momentum was being driven by Mike McCloskey and Ed Wayburn at the Sierra Club. And there was so much. The Wilderness Society was clearly in the driver's seat on most of the wilderness issues, though if they were in California or a couple of other places where the Sierra Club was really strong, then the Sierra Club kind of took the lead on them. But it was mostly a collaborative deal.

There weren't enough people. This is all pre-Earth Day; there just weren't very many people, and there wasn't the luxury for having great battles with each other except over very important things. Plus all these people were friends. The Wilderness Society in particular had an organizational philosophy which it had had from its inception in 1935, which had been very much the credo of its longtime executive director, Howard Zahniser, of cooperation, of collaboration. I was trying to say, "Here's our program. If we can get other people to adopt it, who cares where the credit goes?"

And coalition building—so that a hearing would come up for a wilderness area and they would send out one of these alerts, and they'd try and get all the other groups, so they might have the Mackinac Chapter of the Sierra Club and all the other groups included, and thereby it was this joint proposal. The Sierra Club just inherently has
always been a little less evangelical about that kind of cooperation, so there was an undercurrent, "Well, gee, Mike's left town. I wonder if we have to go and pick up the pieces."

But the greater problem was not fussing between the organizations. It was that the political process in the Congress in that era was very difficult for us. The Senate was stronger on environmental things; people like Scoop Jackson and Frank Church and others were leaders there.

The House, on all these public lands things, was dominated and had been since the early fifties by a fellow named Wayne Aspinall. A congressman from western Colorado who was a tiny, bantam-sized, extremely feisty old man. Very genial. Not genial; very proper. Always very nice to me, and I was just a wet-behind-the-ears whippersnapper. But tough as—. This was the era when House chairmen had absolutely authority. If they wanted to say, "That bill is not coming out of here," that was the end of it. If you were a young congressman on their committee, you didn't speak unless spoken to. It was just unbelievably different than the way it is today.

This committee held its markup sessions on the legislation at the full committee level in open sessions, but it was mostly cut and dried. The markups in subcommittee, where much of the work was done, were held behind closed doors. If you were a lobbyist, you stood out in the hall wondering what was going on. Very different from today, I mean, just unheard of today.

So the process, Aspinall's power was such that he finally agreed to produce the first redwoods bill in the summer of '68. It was a dreadful bill. It was tiny compared to the—. Aspinall said, "Take it or leave it." It came out under a provision that allowed for no amendment on the floor. If we'd been able to get a vote on the floor, we would have overruled it. He knew that, so he said, "There will be no bill unless it's the way I have dictated that it will be." So I'm not quite clear what we were lobbying about in this early lobbying experience of mine because there wasn't anything that you could do about it. But that's the way it worked out.

So I had this fabulous summer of being in on the edges and around the edges. I was there in the House gallery the night that the House of Representatives defeated the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. I've just said all these things about the autocratic power of Wayne Aspinall. There was nothing worse to a committee chairman than having his bill defeated, and he was just beside himself. I remember walking out of the House gallery with Rupe Cutler thinking, "How did this happen?" We scurried around and fixed it, and a somewhat weakened version of the bill was later passed in a different procedure.

Lage: Mike recalled your writing speeches for the various congressmen.

Scott: He told me that episode, and I can't—. I later became notorious for this. I have a facility to write quickly and to write at length, as people will tell you—too much length sometimes—and type very fast. The capacity to produce the kind of things that are
speeches, typically which aren't ever spoken. It's not as though the congressman got up and said it, but they put it in the Congressional Record, and there it is. Until recently, certainly at that time, there was no distinction in the text of the Congressional Record as to whether it was said or not. So there was a sort of cottage industry.

It was part of my training and experience with the Wilderness Society that the record was very important and that keeping your issues in front of people, keeping up your points in front of people by regular insertions of stuff in the [Congressional Record]. We read the Congressional Record every day. A summary of it was typed and prepared for us by a secretary at the office every morning: what had happened in Congress the previous day, who said what, which bills were introduced and so forth. So talking points and speeches were just something that I became familiar with doing and became something of a fetish of mine later on.

I came out of the summer of '68, which was in fact a brief summer—. I spent the daytimes doing this stuff and the evenings in the bowels of the Wilderness Society's archives xeroxing everything I could find about the history of the Wilderness Act and particularly all the papers of Howard Zahniser, who had died in May of 1964 just before the final enactment of the Wilderness Act. So this started me on a course of being involved in what was going on in Washington in conservation, particularly public land, wilderness conservation things, of having now a very close working relationship with the staff at the Wilderness Society, and becoming acquainted with key people at the Audubon Society and Friends of the Earth and the Sierra Club. And I was acting as the Washington eyes and ears of the local chapter of the Sierra Club.

[End Tape 2, Side A]

[Begin Tape 2, Side B]

Scott: I was sending back reports and on the phone to the Sierra Club chapter leadership in Michigan about what I was finding out about things. All through June and July and August I was particularly getting acquainted with people in the Michigan delegation to find out what was going on in Sleeping Bear Dunes. So here at the end of June I was writing to Dan Carson, who was a faculty member at the University of Michigan, who was the Mackinac Chapter conservation chairman and a very active fellow who was forever doing mailings and a very active guy. I was writing to Dan, sending reports every week or so, and on the phone, and giving him little updates. On June 28 I was reporting to him, "I've made initial staff contacts in Hart's and O'Hara's offices, and both are eager and ready to help. I hope to talk to the senator and to Mr. O'Hara personally too before very long," yak, yak, yak.

I was getting acquainted. Formative to my whole theory about politics and how I later shaped campaigns at the Sierra Club was the fact that the experience I had with the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore was whole. I came to have a position where I knew basically everything that was going on in that campaign and could see how different parts of it fit together. I actually got to the point where I was doing both sides of it in many ways, as I'll relate here. I had the luxury, which is very hard if—. If
you're just a Washington lobbyist you see the Washington end of something. Before this was over I was working on stirring up the grass-roots stuff, getting the governor's position to be a good one and other parts of the state government, and working with the media, stirring up other environmentalists in Michigan to do things, and rushing back and forth to Washington and doing the lobbying there, and writing speeches for people, and fussing around.

Lage: You were seeing the grass roots immediately.

Scott: I was seeing it all, and I was doing it largely as an agent for a premier grass-roots organization, the Sierra Club, and being inculcated with the Sierra Club's concept of grass-roots politics. And working for the Wilderness Society, which at that time,

unlike today, was under the tutelage of Zahniser's old style, Stewart Brandborg's very forceful personal style, and Rupert Cutler—I was getting an incredible education in the philosophy of citizen action. Stewart Brandborg—who I later came to have differences with, but that's another story—Brandborg gave me my first job when I ultimately left school. I think he recognized that I brought a lot of energy and commitment to this. But he passed on an enormous amount of experience to me, as did Rupe Cutler and others of my colleagues there. Brandborg was very different than Howard Zahniser, I'm sure, but he was Howard Zahniser's right-hand guide through much of the fight for the Wilderness Act.

When the Wilderness Act was being passed in the Congress—and it took eight years—once it was drafted and introduced in June of 1956, it was eight years and a little more until it was enacted. In most of that time it was hung up. Ultimately, it was hung up over Wayne Aspinall's—here he is again—insistence, along with some key senators, that if additional areas were to be designated as wilderness, each one had to be designated by an act of Congress.

The bill as Zahniser had drafted it and as Hubert Humphrey and the others—. The leaders for the bill were insisting that there be a kind of automatic provision that the agencies would conduct these studies, they would figure out what the boundary ought to be, there'd be some public hearings and stuff, and then the president would send that agency proposal to Congress and it would automatically become wilderness with that boundary unless Congress vetoed it. This now has been found to be unconstitutional, but Congress could pass within some period of time, either one house or both houses, and they kept fighting over the details of this. But this was Zahniser's theory. It became wilderness automatically.

Their problem was that they didn't think in that era that the Congress was necessarily where they [wilderness advocates] were going to do the best. Because you have to really put yourself back to that time. We're talking the mid-fifties and the sixties, with this massive dominance of the key committees that would handle this legislation by western entrenched politicians that they couldn't do anything about, like Wayne Aspinall, and that the agencies were pretty helpful. After all, these people's experience was this wasn't all that big a grass-roots movement. The top people in these
organizations hung around with the top people at the Forest Service and the Park Service. They could go lobby the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture. They would, in kind of this small circle in Washington, concoct a deal, and then the problem was how to get Congress to do it. So they weren't trying to solve a problem in the Congress, they were trying to make that as slick as possible.

So Zahniser drafted it, and the big fight came down to this business of what came to be called affirmative action. Did Congress have to act on a new bill affirmatively to add each area? Zahniser went to his grave, and another people, thinking, "Oh, Lord, we lost that one, and this means that these people will block all our efforts to add wilderness areas to the system," they were wrong. They were dead wrong. But that's what the leaders of the Wilderness Society, the leaders of the Sierra Club thought. This shows you that maybe it's just that people can react to what they end up with and adjust with, but it was Brandborg who foresaw this, and I think it was in about 1966.

Within a couple of years after the passage of the Wilderness Act, Brandy—his name was Stewart Brandborg, but he was commonly known as Brandy—Brandy came up with this theory that this was the best thing that ever happened. I'm not going to find it right now, despite my best efforts, but there's a wonderful quote from Brandborg in which he says, "We thought we had lost this provision." It's Brandy's annual report to his board of directors for 1968, and he says, "The education and leadership training of the public has been greatly aided by the wilderness law, particularly those provisions which were inserted by the opponents of the measure, requiring that Congress must act affirmatively on each addition to the National Wilderness Preservation System. We saw this as a blocking effort at the time, but it's turned out to be a great liberating force in the conservation movement. By closing off the channel of accomplishing wilderness designation substantially on an executive level, where heads of organizations would consult and advise on behalf of their members in Washington, the wilderness law as it was passed has opened the way for a far more effective conservation movement in which people in local areas must be involved in a series of drives for preservation of the wilderness areas they know best." It was a long-winded way—and I'm not quoting him exactly there—but a long-winded way of saying that the conservation movement, to meet the challenge of these hundreds of wilderness bills that would have to be passed, had to be decentralized.

Well, this fell upon exactly the era in which the Sierra Club was bursting out of California and organizing chapters everywhere, and there were these wilderness studies everywhere, not just in the West. In Michigan we had four or five of them. Not just Isle Royale, but various little wildlife refuges and so forth, all over the country. New Jersey, Maine, every place. There were these studies going on. And Sierra Club chapters. This gave them something to work with, and people really did get organized around these things, and Wilderness Society people or Sierra Club people would fly in and organize people. I did some of that myself.

Lage: How did the Wilderness Society reach out? They don't have local chapters, do they?
Scott: But their byword was cooperation, so they would find whoever they could find, as in my experience when Cutler had come for this hearing in Michigan, he'd reached out for the UAW, he'd reached—

Lage: He had reached out to other environmental groups?

Scott: They had lists and contacts, and they reached out to the local Sierra Club and the Michigan Parks Association and the Michigan Audubon Society, all the various groups, to get them together. And they had huge lists of these people all over the country. So the process of the Wilderness Act provided this incredible hands-on opportunity for grass-roots people and people like me to really roll up their sleeves and get involved in the whole political process.

It is my very strong belief that that decentralization and the involving in the actual work of the Congress—not just writing letters, but the far more detailed involvement by volunteer people in every state—was the making of the modern environmental movement. Not just the wilderness. I don't think you could have done the kinds of things we'd done on clean air and so forth if you hadn't had an experience in which it became commonly appreciated that people flew to Washington to testify at hearings or to lobby for a week, took part of their vacation to do that. People had responsibility for organizing themselves so they could get hold of their local congressmen and lobby them. They'd done that on their local wilderness bill. So it was, "Now we want you to do it on the SST [supersonic transport]." "Okay, no big deal. We understand what that's like."

It's not as though none of this was happening before, but it was a quantum change in the environmental movement. I lucked into wandering in for the very time when this was all falling together. So I learned—like mother's milk—I learned the importance of grass roots to the lobbying process. But I learned it on both sides. I was out in Michigan, mostly through the Sierra Club, doing my thing, and in Washington being a lobbyist. And I did that for three years.

Lage: Yes, that went on over three years?

Scott: This went on for three years in which I was getting sort of my undergraduate education and my graduate education in the art of the politics, thanks to my draft board. I was getting both sides of this.

Lage: This all comes together so well.

Scott: Well, it seems like it. It seems like it does.

In August of '68 I went back to Ann Arbor just incredibly charged up. I now knew with great certainty what I wanted to do with my life. I now knew what I wanted to do by way of my graduate research. Those two questions were now solved for me. I didn't want to do any more coursework, and pretty soon I figured out a unique way to get out of that. I encountered Dan Carson, who was the chair of the conservation
committee of the brand-new Mackinac Chapter, on the street outside my school one day. He said, "This is kind of sudden, but I've just taken a new position at the University of Pennsylvania," or Pennsylvania State, one of the two, "and we're leaving today. Here is a membership form." He joined me up in the Sierra Club, and he said, "Oh, incidentally, you're conservation chairman." [laughter]

So in August of 1968, I became conservation chairman of the Mackinac Chapter of the Sierra Club. I didn't keep that position very long. I'd been their agent in Washington and been on the phone with these people. So I started spending a great deal of time being a leader of the—and with the other leaders—of the Mackinac Chapter of the Sierra Club.

The people who taught me an enormous amount about that side of this business were, first and foremost, Virginia Prentice. Virginia was the longtime Sierra Club person—outings leader and so forth—who became chair of the Mackinac Chapter when it was formed. She took a role in the national organization and was at various times on various of the national committees back then.

Lage: She might have been a board member then.

Scott: She ran for the board. She was chair of the nominating committee one year—we'll come to that, because she nominated me—but she ran for the board unsuccessfully, and I'm not going to be able to tell you just when that was. But like '69 or '70, I believe.

Another couple who were deeply involved in the Mackinac Chapter were Richard and Doris Cellarius. Dick Cellarius was a professor in botany, I believe. Microbiology, but I think he was housed in the botany department at the university. He and Doris became friends of mine and colleagues on this executive committee. I don't think I was ever on the chapter executive committee. I think I was just conservation chairman. I don't think I was ever elected to the executive committee.

Virginia and I became great pals, and a close friend of hers, a woman who was a botanist, a great expert in botany, Cindy Thomson, Cindy and Virginia and I particularly became real pals on the Sleeping Bear Dunes business.

I'd been snooping around Washington about the Sleeping Bear Dunes during 1968 and made the acquaintance of people in the key congressional offices. Somebody had told me that there was a Park Service regional office offshoot, which the Park Service had set up in East Lansing, Michigan, to help it lobby for all this, and that there was a good guy there, and I called him. A man named Al Edmonds. He helped me find local contacts. He told me that the editor and publisher of the newspaper in Benzie County in Frankfort, Michigan, was sympathetic and had been running editorials. So we started putting this thing all together.

I need to backtrack for just a moment, and then we're going to have to stop. The Sleeping Bear Dunes legislation had resulted from a study that the Park Service had
done in the late fifties of shoreline recreational needs and opportunities on the seacoasts and the Great Lake coasts of the United States. They had identified a bunch of places. This had led in the sixties to a number of places; Cape Cod National Seashore was the first, Point Reyes was, I think, the second. The establishment of shoreline areas were identified as something very important, and a bunch of these were established as national park system units. This was a great change. It started both at Cape Cod and at Point Reyes because the land had to be purchased. The land was private, not federal. Most national parks, that is not the situation.

Lage: Cape Cod was the first purchase?

Scott: Yes, in '62. Right. So they had to figure out what do you do with existing homeowners? Do you condemn property? There were just all these complications about how do you do this.

Well, they'd identified a number of places on the Great Lakes as well. Pictured Rocks on the upper peninsula of Michigan on Lake Superior, Apostle Islands on Lake Superior in Wisconsin, and Sleeping Bear Dunes, and [Indiana] Dunes. In 1961 Senator Phil Hart had sponsored legislation, and the legislation had made some progress. The brand-new little Sierra Club chapter in Michigan had paid some attention to this. I found in my files a presentation booklet typed up that the then-conservation chairman—this was in 1967—of the Michigan section of the Great Lakes chapter, Donald Kucera (as far as I know, I never met him) had prepared for the local congressman in Ann Arbor, Congressman Esch, about the Sleeping Bear Dunes and how long they'd been worked on. The bills had been introduced since 1961. The bill had passed the House—had passed the Senate twice in '63 or '64 and in '65 or '66. It had come out of the House Interior Committee in '66 and then just died in the House Rules Committee for reasons that weren't quite clear. So it had gotten almost all the way through the Congress in 1966 and then just poof! had died.

So in '67 the local chapter had adopted this and said, "We're going to work on this thing. We've been fussing around with it one way or another, but it wasn't a huge priority." Mike McCloskey wrote a letter in September of 1967, apparently out of nowhere, to "Dear Miss Prentice," to Virginia, "Acting Chairman, Mackinac Chapter"—the chapter was just being formally organized at this time—saying, "Dear Miss Prentice, one of our informants in Washington DC recently advised us that the legislation to establish a Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore may have a better chance of moving in the next session of Congress if conservationists could work to develop a more sympathetic attitude on the part of representative Guy Vander Jagt, who I understand represents the district where the dunes are located. We are told blah, blah, blah, blah." Mike, passing on as conservation director some tidbits to the chapter.

Lage: There was some coordination.

Scott: So there was some work going on and some coordination, but this was no—. And the board had endorsed the concept in 1962, but not that big a deal.
I got back to Ann Arbor in the fall of 1968, got made conservation chairman of the chapter, had all these contacts in Washington, both in the environmental movement and on Capitol Hill. Virginia and Cindy said, "Hey, it's time for you to see this place." So off we went one September afternoon to Sleeping Bear Dunes on a camping trip. This was the start of a great tradition of Virginia and Cindy and I drinking whiskey sours. It was very cold at that campground; the only way you kept warm was mixing up whiskey sours and drinking it.

We also met a little cadre of very courageous local people who were fighting for this thing. We had some names, we had—because I'd talked to this Park Service guy. We knew a couple of names up there, and we just went up and looked up people, and we found three or four local people who said, "Yes," whisper, whisper.

Lage: How close to a city area was it?

Scott: This was near Traverse City, Michigan. It's way up on the—. [opens map] Here's Lake Michigan. Sleeping Bear Dunes is right here. It's on the so-called little fingers of Michigan, on Lake Michigan probably a hundred miles—

Lage: It's not near an urban area like Point Reyes and Cape Cod?

Scott: No, no, this is not. It's close. A figure we used then was it's within a day's drive of twenty-five million people, but it in fact was a very rural area, which was being rapidly developed for second homes. The area is made up of a series of headlands with big dunes on them, two islands offshore, and a whole bunch of little lakes. And the lakes were just being reamed by second-home development and golf courses and all that sort of stuff.

So in the fall of '68, Virginia and I in particular—and we really became a team—set to work to make a campaign out of this thing. Our clear recognition—certainly mine, as a sort of budding professional—was this campaign had just lost steam, that it wasn't that the sponsors had flagged in their interest, but there was something missing, and it was enthusiasm and coalition and support and groundswell to kind of push it along. A lot of compromises had been made. The developed private land was not going to ever be condemned, and the boundaries had been chopped back, and some argument historically about whether it had been so compromised that it wasn't worth it or not. But we had all this, now, this information from inside tips from the Park Service, and I had made the acquaintance with the key political players, so we were really ready to roll. And I think we'd better stop.

Lage: And that's where we're going to stop for today, because you have to pick up your daughters. Okay.

[End Tape 2, Side B]
Interview 2: November 21, 1990

Begin Tape 3, Side A

Lage: Today is November 21, 1990, and we're doing the second interview with Doug Scott. I remember that you led up dramatically—

Scott: —to 1968. [laughter]

Lage: And said now Sleeping Bear was ready to roll. And that's where we cut off. We'll roll on with Sleeping Bear.

Scott: Perhaps the place to start is to reiterate that by the spring of '68 and probably even earlier, I was firmly set on a career vision for myself. I'd tasted through my work with the Wilderness Society, through my summer job with the Audubon Society and through vicariously being involved in a number of things that were going on in Washington relative to wilderness legislation, I'd vicariously tasted what that field was like, and liked it. So from that point on I was increasingly consciously setting myself a goal of going to work in the environmental movement as an advocate.

Lage: Was it the political work in Congress that drew you, or the being in the wilderness?

Scott: At that stage I was less acquainted with the Congress. That came a little later, but I think it was a combination of I was already well grounded in the historical lore about the national park movement and was greatly taken with that, and I just became infectiously involved in the advocacy role.

In the summer of '68 when I went to Washington, hooked up with the Mackinac Chapter and was their agent in Washington and started working on these things, I got a real case of Potomac fever. It is a real disease, it is highly contagious and communicable, and I got a good dose of it. So my academic career, though I didn't know it at the time, was on the wane, and the timing was largely controlled by my draft board and by the calendar and when my twenty-sixth birthday would arrive.

So in that summer, I called Rupe Cutler at the Wilderness Society and talked my way into a minimally paid summer job there. I'm not clear in my own memory how the contact was made with the Sierra Club chapter, but I remember very clearly going to Virginia Prentice's house, where a group of people assembled, and the purpose was to brief me about the Sleeping Bear Dunes and also to get acquainted. A slide show was put on to show me what the area was like, and maps, and we pored over all of that. My role in Washington was basically to go around and find out what was going on and how this thing could be pushed along. Dan Carson, who was then the conservation chairman of the chapter, had been—

Lage: I think we've talked about this period. You just want to reiterate?
Scott: Yes. I'm just trying to catch up. Dan had been working on this and had the advice of a woman who I had met in 1967 on the plane trip to the Isle Royale Wilderness hearing, Genevieve Gillette, who was an elderly woman who lived in Ann Arbor who was very politically active, had been all her life, had been some kind of presidential appointee of something or other that I've forgotten now. I have correspondence of Dan's before I got into the picture in February of 1968 in which he is saying to Rupe Cutler at the Wilderness Society that Genevieve has suggested that the big problem is to get the local congressmen, a new freshman congressman named Guy Vander Jagt, to reverse his opposition to the bill, and also saying that according to Genevieve, Chairman Aspinall of the House Interior Committee would not consider a bill unless it had the united support of all the congressmen from the state. At that point this bill had nothing like the united support of all the congressmen from the state. So I'm sure that at my earliest briefing with the chapter leaders—Dan and Virginia and Cindy Thompson and others—that the question of rallying the Michigan congressional delegation and the figuring out how to bring Congressman Vander Jagt around were prominent on our minds.

Another element of the strategic mix was that while we had the excellent advocacy of Senator Hart, newly elected a year or so earlier, Senator Robert Griffin, the junior senator from Michigan, a Republican, had been the local congressman from the district that was later represented by Guy Vander Jagt. Senator Griffin had been an adamant opponent of the bill when he was the local congressman. So I'm trying to figure out how, now that he had to respond to a statewide constituency, how to either bring him around or simply use the power of Senator Hart to overwhelm him. These were all part of the strategic mix.

Lage: It seems like a tall order to ask for the entire congressional delegation. How many congressmen did they have?

Scott: Eighteen or nineteen. Before we were done, we got them all.

Lage: That's good.

Scott: This legislation had a long and difficult history already. A particular element in that history was that in addition to the fierce local opposition of property owners in the Glen Lake area and other parts of the shoreline, there was a congresswoman from Illinois, from the Chicago area, named Charlotte Reid, who had property up there and who was adamantly opposed to this bill. So there was someone in addition to the local congressmen, and she was a fairly senior person who—I don't want to besmirch her memory. It was alleged to me by people who might be in a position to know that she had used all of her charms in securing opposition to this bill, and the death of the bill in 1966 after it had passed the Senate and been approved by the House Interior Committee, and it simply died in the House Rules Committee, was attributed to the behind-the-scenes work of Charlotte Reid. So it wasn't just that there was inertia, that the bill simply didn't have anything pressing it along. There was active opposition that had to be dealt with.
Lage: And was based in the local property owners.

Scott: It was based in the local property owners who, as is often true of vacation property, which is for the most part second homes, they came from all over the place and were relatively wealthy people who had contacts and were influential. So that various members of the Michigan delegation and other people in the Congress had motive to be opposed to this bill. So we had to figure out where all that lay and how it worked.

So in May of 1968 I went down to Washington and started this summer job with the Wilderness Society. I believe I've already described that I was mostly there to push paper and to spend the nights xeroxing out of their historical files, but whenever I got a chance I scurried up to Capitol Hill to snoop around about not only Sleeping Bear, but I was also representing the chapter's interest in several other pieces of legislation, but none nowhere near as high priority as Sleeping Bear. I have notes from May 24 of 1968 which suggest that that's about when I first walked in Senator Hart's office and Congressman O'Hara's office to follow up the letters I'd written saying I was coming and to find out who the people were. That's when I met two people who were crucial to this whole history and crucial to my education.

Senator Hart's senior legislative assistant was a wonderful woman named Muriel Ferris. Muriel was a former head, I believe, of the League of Women Voters of the United States, a longtime, very quiet, calm lady, relatively older. I think she probably was in her fifties or pushing her sixties at this stage. Senator Hart was a remarkable person. He was self-effacing, which is very unusual in a politician. He had a human quality to him that was just quite remarkable, and his staff reflected that. They weren't hard-bitten, political sort of toughs. They were very gentle, sweet people, and Muriel was just the ideal person to learn from. I sat at her knee for several years and we became very fast friends.

In Congressman O'Hara's office—Congressman O'Hara represented a Detroit district. He had been in the House for several terms at this stage but moved on to, as a more senior member, join the Interior Committee, perhaps specifically at Senator Hart's request, to help move this legislation that had been boxed all these years. I'm not just sure about that, but there would be no natural reason for a congressman from urban Detroit to want to go on a committee that mostly dealt with western grazing lands and forest stuff. But the one piece of work that Michigan had to be done there was the Sleeping Bear Dunes.

In his office, his chief aide who was working on this was a fellow named Bill Shands. Bill and Muriel were collaborators, and Bill and Muriel and I really became, I think it's fair to say, in the period from later in '68 as they got to know me and as this relationship blossomed, we became a team for the rest of the period of passing this act, and late in the game, that team was joined by Congressman Vander Jagt's staff, who also became good friends and a part of all this. But that's later in the story.

So I was getting my feet on the ground in Washington figuring out the details. Meanwhile, back in Ann Arbor, Dan Carson and company had cooked up a—had been
planning for a long time a special flyer about Sleeping Bear that would describe the need and the history of the proposal and the background, and have some pictures and a map, and that would end then in urging the members of the Sierra Club and other groups to which it was distributed to write to their individual congressmen across Michigan. This very handsome little four-page brochure was put into the monthly newsletter—or quarterly, I guess—newsletter of the Mackinac Chapter called *The Mackinac* but is pronounced "Mackinaw."

Lage: Is there a reason for that?

Scott: It's an old historic Indian name for Michigan. The straits of Mackinac and the Mackinac straits and so forth.

So by June I was sending back from my home address in Washington, my apartment, on Sierra Club Mackinac Chapter letterhead, a status report to the chapter executive committee about not just Sleeping Bear but other things that were going on just at that time. But as early as June 7, 1968, I was reporting to them that "passage of the bill this year is simply out of the question. Our efforts, however, to build local support and support in our delegation should not mention this. We may be able to get stronger commitments for action early in the 91st Congress in 1969."

So we had our feet on the ground right away and realized that what we had to do was essentially reignite a fire under this legislation, solve these political problems, and build a consensus for it, in order to move it along. While Carson and Virginia Prentice and others had been working on it for a while, I was certainly brand new to it, and I think we all needed to kind of circle the wagons and figure out what the lay of the land was. So my function really in the summer of '68 was to skulk around in Washington and figure out what was going on.

Lage: Were there other supporting groups besides the Sierra Club?

Scott: Historically there had been a bunch of groups that were supportive of this. The Sierra Club had always been a supporter of it but had only recently grown up to be a big enough group in Michigan to really have a cadre of leaders that could actually do work. The Michigan United Conservation Clubs, which was the sportsmen organization there, the affiliate of the National Wildlife Federation, known as MUCC, was an advocate of the bill and had been not terribly active but Senator Hart was close to them and could urge them on. The Michigan Parks Association, a small organization that Genevieve Gillette ran; the Wilderness Society; and other groups had been moving it along but it had not had the kind of full-time, single-minded zealous attention that came together, I think, particularly with Virginia and Cindy and myself in 1968.

The outcome was that we created a new boomlet of interest and we made it our job to goose the other groups who might not have done things on their own initiative. They might not have been paying attention or it might not have occurred to them. So fairly quickly we got ourselves into business either directly or indirectly of trying to get the
other organizations to do things, writing articles for their newsletters, ghost-writing mailings for them, suggesting things they could do, urging them to call or write.

There wasn't any statewide coalition of conservation groups that got together regularly, at least of which the Sierra Club was a part. So we had to kind of create a network and we had to figure out what the lay of the land was. At some point there in the summer of 1968, on the suggestion of, probably of Muriel, I started making contact with people that she knew. Of course, Senator Hart's office was the repository of who had been supporting this all along, and Muriel knew all of this stuff because she'd been working on it since 1961.

There was in East Lansing a sub-office of the regional office of the National Park Service. Now, they typically create little offices and put them someplace like that so that they have somebody on the ground to kind of keep an eye on and to move along their proposals for new parks. The man that was in that office, Al Edmonds, was a soon-to-retire career Park Service man who was very helpful, very astute politically, and had spent a lot of time up in the Sleeping Bear area snooping around, finding pockets of support, and assessing the opposition. From him, in a phone call that I had with him in May of 1968, I was able to pick up—and I think Dan Carson was the one who put me on to Edmonds—lists of people that would help us. John Peterson, the editor and publisher of the Benzie County Patriot in one of the two counties, the newspaper in one of the two counties involved. Larry Olson, the chairman of a local citizens' committee for Sleeping Bear Dunes, and some other people that Al Edmonds put me on to. I started calling those people and corresponding with those people and urging Virginia to be in touch with them to get us linked up to people that were pushing this thing.

Simultaneously, I was starting to develop my skill, which later became seriously developed, of doing drafting and writing of things for the members of Congress. I have a letter in August of '68, by the time I returned to Ann Arbor, because the university's academic year began in mid-August, writing back to Bill Shands in O'Hara's office and saying, "Here's a proposed speech that the congressman might want to put in the Congressional Record." So clearly, in the summer of '68 I was doing a lot of that sort of thing.

I think I should say a bit about what else was going on the summer of '68. We talked about it a little bit. A long list of very prominent public land preservation measures were enacted in the summer of 1968 as that Congress, the 90th Congress, was coming to a close. This was an extraordinarily productive Congress of redwoods and North Cascades and so forth, and I was able to participate in those things in a sort of a journeyman apprentice kind of a way, doing phoning to the Hill, running around, dropping pieces of paper for people on the Hill and so forth, but increasingly realizing that at the meeting of Stewart Brandborg and Rupe Cutler, that one of the functions that a lobbyist could do was to be sort of adjunct staff. If someone in the congressman's office had nothing better to do with their time and had the single-minded attention to be thinking first and foremost about Sleeping Bear Dunes or whatever it was, they might have thought to do these things themselves. But part of
the lobbyist function became to say, "Gee, Bill Shands or Muriel or whoever may not
get around to drafting a speech for the congressman to put in the record."

Lage: So if you have a sympathetic congressman—

Scott: If you have a sympathetic relationship with a congressman, then they begin to rely
upon you. And as you build up a confidence that you're not going to spend your time
going out saying, "I just wrote that speech for Senator Hart," to the world, they begin
to rely on you and your initiative for good ideas because you're trying to accomplish
the same thing. It soon emerged that I was the draftsman for virtually everything that
emerged in the Congressional Record and elsewhere. Often they would change them
or tone them down or whatever, but my files are full of draft speeches and so forth.

Lage: Was this an unusual thing, or does this happen with other lobbyists?

Scott: Oh, it happens a lot. I was learning that I could do this partly just by doing it, partly
by, I'm sure, the day-to-day just oral advice of Rupe Cutler and Stewart Brandborg,
and partly because what I was doing right then in the evenings was copying a reading
and immersing myself in the legislative history of the Wilderness Act and the work of
Howard Zahniser.

Howard Zahniser was, I believe, the most important and influential conservation figure
of the twentieth century in America. To those who believe that Dave Brower was that
person, I'll explain why I say what I say in a moment. Zahniser was a charter member
of the Wilderness Society, a very bookish fellow. He was an editor at the forerunner of
one of the agencies of the Department of Agriculture. In 1946 when the then single
staff person of the Wilderness Society died after a long illness, Howard Zahniser was
ultimately approached, first just to edit the magazine and keep the quarterly magazine
going out to the small membership of the Wilderness Society, but ultimately he was
asked to come over and take on this position, and he did.

Almost from that period, the mid-forties, he began to conceive of the possibility of a
legislative policy to protect wilderness. Prior to his time, the wilderness movement
had been—prior to World War II, the wilderness work had been dominated by the
agencies, the Forest Service——. Robert Marshall, one of the founders of the Wilderness
Society and the most important figure in wilderness history during the 1930s, did his
work by inside influence because he was there in the Forest Service. He was personal
friends or certainly on personal terms with Secretary of the Interior Ickes and worked
in a hotbed, I'm sure, of policymaking to get the Forest Service to toughen up its
wilderness protection policies. Bob Marshall died prematurely at the age of thirty-nine
in 1939.

The whole wilderness business was on the back burner, of course, during the early
forties, during the war. Along came Zahniser on the scene, soon after the end of World
War II, and by that time the then-leaders, the thinkers of the Wilderness movement,
were saying, "Just leaving it to these agencies isn't working. First of all, it's not
working because there's nothing additional being designated, being protected. And
secondly, even the stuff that supposedly was protected by the policies of Bob Marshall is being reconsidered by the Forest Service, the boundaries changed, and big chunks of timber or whatever else they want to get their paws onto being left out."

A policy that simply relies on the goodwill and the future goodwill of unknown administrative people in the bowels of an agency dominated by political appointees isn't good enough. Zahniser was committed to the notion that we were to preserve wilderness. If we were doing this, we were doing it for perpetuity. That's one of his favorite words. He had a wonderful epigram. He said, "We have the boldness to take the wilderness that has come to us from the eternity of the past and project it into the eternity of the future." This mechanism wasn't working, so he started in the forties, I'm sure, talking with lots of other leaders at the time: George Marshall, who was a president of the Sierra Club later in that era and Bob Marshall's younger brother, who was also—.

There was at that time a lot of interlinkage at the board level between the Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club. Richard Leonard, a longtime Sierra Club leader and president, was on the trustees of the governing council, they called it, of the Wilderness Society. George Marshall was a longtime member of the governing council of the Wilderness Society who went on to become president of the Sierra Club for a while. So there was a lot of interlinkage. In their conversations, I'm sure they were all just working themselves towards the proposition that more definitive protection was necessary.

By 1947 Zahniser had it pretty well figured out what needed to be done, but he was an extraordinarily shrewd, political, P.R. man, and he saw that there was no chance of getting such a thing, of passing a law in Congress until a much stronger coalition of organizations was put together. So he quietly went about building the enthusiasm for this. He used the biennial Wilderness Conferences that the Sierra Club started holding in 1949 in Berkeley as forums where he gave speeches promoting the idea of legislative protection for wilderness. All of this was very carefully thought out, and he was a very careful keeper of records.

So there I was in the middle of the evenings, and sometimes would go quite late at night, delving in dusty old files in the little wire cage down in the basement of the building where the Wilderness Society's office was in downtown Washington DC, in these old musty records, and just getting a sense of this man and the way he thought. What I quickly discovered, because he'd kept, with little annotations on them, all his drafts of things, was that as he was building this proposition, he was the moving force in all sorts of things that to the outside world looked like they were independent actions.

In 1947 the Library of Congress legislative reference service conducted a study of whether there was a need for a stronger national policy for wilderness protection. That was done because Howard Zahniser caused a congressman who he cultivated to request that study for the Library of Congress. It gets more internecine. The director of the legislative research division of the Library of Congress at that time was a man
named Ernest Griffith, who was a member of the governing council of the Wilderness Society, so this was obviously all hooked up.

So in '47 and '48 or '49, someplace in there, in this very thorough study, was a long memorandum of input from David Brower and Charlotte Mauk of the Sierra Club and from many other organizations and from the agencies, a kind of a survey of opinion. Zahniser prepared a wonderful, long, long, forty- or fifty-page treatise on all the aspects of wilderness philosophy and policy and what might be needed. This whole study gingerly led to the conclusion that many people were saying, "There ought to be a wilderness law." By 1951 Zahniser was ready to say, "There ought to be a law and here's what it ought to be like," and at the second of the Sierra Club Wilderness Conferences his speech was "A Vision of the Wilderness Act," and he said it ought to have eight features. That set of eight features reads like a table of contents for the law we have today. He had it all thought out but had not written the law.

So I was following all of this and seeing how he was doing this stuff.

Lage: This behind-the-scenes manipulation.

Scott: This behind-the-scenes stuff. I think he would reject the word "manipulation." "Encouragement" of things to happen.

I'm going to jump ahead because all of this is in the written record. For various reasons, largely the fight over Echo Park Dam, which is where Brower and the Sierra Club linked up with Zahniser, they became the odd couple. Very different sorts of people, but here was Dave from the West Coast headquarters of the Sierra Club, and Zahnie the inside guy in Washington, leading along with some other people an incredible battle all through the early fifties, to stop dams that would invade an obscure area in an obscure national monument in Utah, because it was against the principle that you shouldn't build dams in national parks.

From the outset, Zahniser saw that the defensive fight to stop the dams at Echo Park could be turned into the rallying point that would draw the entire nationwide conservation movement, which wasn't very big at that stage, together, and that could become the stepping-stone to the positive campaign for a wilderness bill. So he said, "We'll put the idea of the wilderness bill aside while we win this fight," which they did. It took them five years.

Lage: In the records do you see him conveying this to others? To David Brower and others?

Scott: Yes. And I'm sure Brower in his own way bought that program completely, but Zahniser was very clear about it.

Lage: It wasn't just something in his own mind.

Scott: No, it was something that he conceived and then got other people involved in, and knew how to take advantage of. Really did pull together this working coalition.
I believe the fight over Echo Park Dam was the single most influential conservation fight of our time. Out of that battle came the first conservation book, which Brower was very involved with—Wallace Stegner was the editor, and Alfred Knopf published it at his own expense. Bernard De Voto, who'd grown up in Utah, just nearly every month in his columns in I believe it was Harper's—either Harper's or Atlantic that he wrote a monthly column for, and often in articles in the Saturday Evening Post—was rallying public opinion against these dams and to protect national parks. The first full-page ad used in a conservation campaign was run in the Denver Post at a key moment in the campaign.

And this was come-from-behind. The entire western political structure, or the Rocky Mountain political structure, was for these dams. The Eisenhower administration was for these dams. They were up against—. It was a billion-dollar project, and we're talking about a billion dollars in 1950. And the environmentalists won.

They won by sticking to their principle and by being extremely adroit. The bill would pass the Senate one year, and they'd manage to tie it up in the House. It would pass the House another time and they'd tie it up [in the Senate]. There were a lot of internecine and other elements that entered into it, and it's been well written up in the literature. But Zahniser, I could see and I was learning how he used these techniques of building support and rallying organizations. The next day, I would be at work on the redwoods, or writing correspondence for Cutler, or whatever. So I was just immersed in these things.

Lage: You were kind of living out the past in the current times, 1968.

Scott: I was trying to learn, and what a way to learn. What a way to be as close as you—. I not only was learning from the records of Howard Zahniser, but there was Stewart Brandborg, who had worked at his side, and Michael Nadel, the editor of Living Wilderness magazine, two people who were sort of acolytes. Very different in their own way. So this was all being reinforced because the Wilderness Society was using these same techniques, and there I was helping with mailings and gathering people in a cooperative effort to put together coalitions.

[End Tape 3, Side A]

[Begin Tape 3, Side B]

Scott: When the Wilderness Bill was introduced in 1956, Zahniser had drafted the bill and I had a complete set of eighteen sequential drafts with all his little annotations, changes suggested by David Brower, changes suggested by So-and-so. And then I discovered that he had used a remarkable sort of literary technique. He had drafted the introductory speech for Senator Hubert Humphrey, who was the Senate sponsor, and for Congressman John Saylor, who was the House sponsor. He had drafted other speeches for other people. He would then go to them, working with their office. He and Mike Nadel often did the detail work, would go to their offices and arrange to have those speeches reprinted in a small-format booklet by the Government Printing Office
at absurdly cheap prices and sent under frank with a covering letter from, say, Senator Humphrey, to mailing lists. Tens of thousands people would get these. And then the covering letter would say, "We'd be glad to have your comments about this," and back would come this flood of comments. Nadel, then, would take all these comments and take the interesting parts of them, and a new speech, "What the American People Think about the Wilderness."

Well, this whole technique of using the Congressional Record and the importance of the words, and then using them to disseminate and to educate people, was a technique that Zahniser had perfected to a fine art. I just looked at that and said, "That makes great sense to me. Why don't we keep doing this?"

Lage: Did you get a sense of what his models were, as you studied his records, or was his model experience?

Scott: I think his model was experience. Again, Congress, even certainly at that stage, had even smaller staffs than they have now, or they had when I was there in the sixties. If somebody walked in and they were trying to help you pass the bill that you were— it wasn't as though Hubert Humphrey dreamed up the Wilderness Act and got Howard Zahniser to help. Au contraire; it was just exactly the other way around. But once Humphrey and Saylor and these other leaders that had large roles in this came to view Zahniser as almost an adjunct to their own staff in accomplishing what they wanted to accomplish, they were getting the gratification that a politician gets from passing legislation, and that was being aided in a very big way by the work that was being done by Zahniser. And I modeled myself on this. I said, "Ah, ha. So that's how you do this."

I'm sure I was getting a daily dose of how you do this as well from the Wilderness Society, which, because of all those wilderness studies that were going on, and all of this stuff going through the Congress, I was a daily participant in 1968 in a little factory effort of mailings: "Dear Wilderness Society members," and other lists if they could get them, "There's going to be a wilderness hearing in your area. Please drop everything, and here's the background, yak, yak, yak. Please go or please write a letter." "Dear Wilderness Society member, Congress is considering legislation to do thus and so. Please write your congressman."

The Wilderness Society was a 501(c)(3) charity, which at that era there was a completely indistinct level of admonition in the tax code. Groups that enjoyed the capacity of giving deductions for the contributions of their donors could not engage in a substantial amount of influencing legislation. There was no definition of what "substantial" meant. And of course, the Sierra Club ran into this, with the full-page ads in 1966 against the Grand Canyon.

Lage: That helped define it.

Scott: That helped define the Sierra Club's political—. So here was the Wilderness Society and the National Parks Association and other organizations seeing what had happened
to the Sierra Club and some saying, "We're not going to do any legislation," and really drawing in their horns. Other saying, "We're not going to go the way the Sierra Club did of losing our tax status, but we're going to find ways and means of pushing this fairly far up."

The Wilderness Society's way that I was tutored in was, first off, every year or so we would go to our friends on Capitol Hill, like Senator Hart and Congressman O'Hara, and get them to write us a letter saying, "Dear Mr. Brandborg." We would draft the letter. "Dear Mr. Brandborg, Because the Wilderness Society has such important knowledge in the area of public lands and national parks and wilderness areas, and these matters will be before the Congress on and off through the coming period, I hereby request that you provide me and my colleagues with information." [laughs] We'd just stick those in the file hoping that would help. We wouldn't send out mailings that said, "Dear Wilderness Society member, Congress is going to be voting on the Redwoods National Park in two weeks. Would you please write a letter to your congressman?" We'd write a letter that would say, "The Redwoods National Park is a very important issue. Here's the background. Here's a whole bunch of emotive stuff about the issue. Here's what the votes are going to be about." And then at the end it would say, "Conservationists are writing their congressmen."

Lage: Very cleverly written.

Scott: Probably more apparent than real, but an effort to cast this as a news story, but with a clear message. "Conservationists are writing" would be underlined. [laughs] And the address would be conveniently printed right there. But these were efforts to get around—

Lage: Did the IRS ever—

Scott: Yes, while I was there in 1968 or '69, or maybe it was in the early seventies, sometime during my period with the Wilderness Society we were audited by the IRS. There was an agent in our office on and off for months, and he cleared us. Said we were fine. Now, we didn't keep a lot of stuff in our files. I kept my Sleeping Bear Dunes files at home.

Lage: I think of the Sierra Club as having this far-flung operation, like the outings and things that are truly not legislative.

Scott: But the Wilderness Society at that stage had an outings program, which was all done through commercial outfitters. And it published a magazine and so forth, and it did other things.

Lage: It just seems like the balance of legislation, interest in legislation, was at least as great in the Wilderness Society as in the Sierra Club.

Scott: Yes, it was, and that was the game one played in that era. Now, later legislation was passed which we all worked on which gave a firmer definition of what percentage of
effort could be legislative, and defined grass-roots lobbying and all that sort of stuff. But in this era this was all very wishy-washy and iffy. Also, there was a great deal of inventing of, I don't want to say front groups, but of coalitions and letterheads, and the things that couldn't be done under one rubric could be done under another. Zahniser and Ed Wayburn at the Sierra Club both had—and Brower—had been involved in earlier years when the Supreme Court had tightened up by some decisions in the forties or early fifties, some decisions on lobbying. Things were set up. There was one headquartered in San Francisco, I think in Dick Leonard’s law office, called Trustees for Conservation.

Lage: It was supposed to be the lobbying arm.

Scott: It was the lobbying arm. The equivalent in the East, which was headquartered at Howard Zahniser's home in Gaithersburg, Maryland, was Council of Conservationists, which was made up of Zahniser, Brower, and a couple of other heads of organizations. So mailings were done in their names. They found ways around these problems.

So the summer of 1968 was a period of my intense involvement around the edges. I wasn't a central person in anything but the Sleeping Bear Dunes, which was my only project, of just learning an enormous amount about how these things were done, and reveling in it. It called on speedy writing talents, which I had. It called on collaboration with interesting people and running up to Capitol Hill to find out what was going on, on various topics. I just really liked it. And I was gathering all this information about Zahniser.

In this fall of ’68 and the winter of ’69 I did my main work on my thesis, and it ended up what I was working on was a master's thesis on the origins and drafting of the Wilderness Act. So it covered from the earliest period in the thirties when people started talking about the idea that maybe stronger legislative protection was necessary for wilderness, through to the Echo Park fight, and then Howard Zahniser's drafting of the Wilderness Bill in collaboration with Brower and George Marshall and many other people in the spring of 1956 and the introduction of the bill in June of ’56. And then theoretically I was someday going to do a PhD dissertation on the detailed legislative history of the eight years it then took, from 1956 to 1964, to enact that law.

I was back now in my little rabbit warren office in the School of Natural Resources in Michigan and just reveling in these files, just going through all this stuff and seeing how the pieces fit together and saying, "Wait a minute. The writing style in this sounds suspiciously like Zahniser. Oh, here's his draft." And simultaneously, I was doing more and more of that same kind of thing myself. In my files I don't know whether this particular speech was ever used, but in August of ’68 back in Ann Arbor I was writing to Bill Shands with a suggested draft for the marks to appear in the Congressional Record. We were putting out little fact sheets. The Sierra Club chapter had set up something called the Sleeping Bear Task Force which Virginia Prentice was the chair of, which was an effort to not have the name be so Sierra Clubby that other groups wouldn't kind of join in with us. We were putting out fact sheets about the details of the legislation and who needed to be written to and so forth.
I had spent a good deal of time that summer, as I say, making the acquaintance of people in various of the Michigan congressional offices. In September of 1968—. Before I do that, in July of 1968, at the end of July, the National Parks and Recreation Subcommittee of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee held a hearing. They hadn't held hearings for several years about Sleeping Bear Dunes, and they conducted a hearing at which I testified, and I believe Virginia came in, and some of the—

Lage: What was the date on that?

Scott: July 29, 1968.

So there is a printed hearing record of that hearing. I'm sure what we did in conjunction with that was have various people come to Washington and go around and talk to members of Congress and all of that. Also, in August just before I left, I had concocted a draft speech for O'Hara which took his testimony at the hearing and put some introductory paragraphs on it. It was printed in the Congressional Record. A member of the Congress could get a very cheap reprint which was just done with a blue-line ditto. They had some mechanism for making a photographic stencil, so there was a simple blue-line or maybe mimeograph kind of reprint that was very cheap and you could get them for next to nothing.

So we got, I think in the end, about three thousand copies of this August 2nd speech by Congressman O'Hara, which I'm sure I wrote, in collaboration with Bill Shands, I should say. We prepared, in the name of the Sleeping Bear Dunes Task Force, a cover memo which is dated August 15: "Dear Conservationists, Now there's renewed hope for action. We had this hearing. Here's who needs to be written to. Enclosed is a Congressional Record reprint. The voice of concerned citizen conservationists must be heard." This was signed by me, and this was sent, if my notes are right, to all the Wilderness Society's members in Michigan, all the key leaders, the activist people on the Wilderness Society's lists in surrounding states, and a thousand copies were sent to the Michigan United Conservation Clubs for it to distribute. A hundred were sent to Genevieve Gillette for her to distribute to her lists, and seven hundred to the Mackinac Chapter for distribution to their membership. So something like three thousand of these got distributed to start stirring up letters to Congress. So we were starting to get seriously into the mailing business.

Lage: Did you have a way of registering how much response you were getting?

Scott: One was always very interested in that, and one way you could do that was actually to ask, when you were lobbying, when you went around to offices, to say, "Are you hearing anything about this?" They'd say, "Yes, we're getting a lot of mail about it." In a really friendly office you could probably get to look at the mail, but that wasn't—. If your question was, "How much mail is Guy Vander Jagt getting? from his district," going to O'Hara's office and looking at how much mail O'Hara's getting, generally this was more of a wholesale effort.
If you send enough of these sorts of things out, enough people will write that it will have more impact than if you didn't do it. It's just one of the things that you did. You can get endlessly sophisticated about how personal these communications are and so forth, and what return address they have and all that sort of thing. This was a fairly sophomoric effort, but it showed that we were starting now to use the Sierra Club's flyer and these reprints from the Congressional Record to stir the pot for this legislation.

Similarly, we were trying to see what are the problems politically. Where is there some political support that would help particularly influence Congressman Vander Jagt, a Republican, that needed to be goosed up?

For example—and this is probably a pretty good example of the fact that I was able to work sort of both sides of the street—in my files I have a letter that Senator Hart wrote to then-Governor of Michigan George Romney in August of 1968 thanking him for the telegram that he had sent for the House hearing. But Romney's telegram, apparently from reading this, had had a couple of caveats. It wasn't just an all-out endorsement of the bill, and Hart sort of says, "At the risk of having you think me ungrateful for nitpicking a general fine message, I hope I might urge you to help us unite behind a single piece of legislation without qualification."

Five days later, here's Doug Scott, chapter conservation chairman now, because Dan Carson had left the state, writing on Sierra Club Mackinac Chapter letterhead to Governor Romney and saying, "We've got to have your support on this." A long letter: "I urge you, governor, to personally convey to the committee and to our delegation your concern for immediate action this year." Now, again—

Lage: Even though you didn't feel—

Scott: That's right. September 10, back comes the letter to me from Governor Romney saying, "Thank you for your thoughtful letter. We've reevaluated our position on this legislation and have taken the following action. The Upper Great Lakes Regional Commission," which is the governors from all those states, "has fully endorsed the bill. I have sent personal telegrams. I have reassured Senator Hart of my strong support." Terrific. A good piece of work.

Well, this stuff was terribly reinforcing. September 20, back goes my thank-you letter, and in my September 20 thank-you letter I acknowledged that I had spent a few days back in Washington, and "Here's what I learned from—. Apparently, however, the bill has died for another year, so we're turning our full attention to enacting this thing. How can we be of further assistance to you, Governor Romney?" So we're trying to keep all of that going.

In September of 1968, I went to Washington, I think, three days, and I suspect my main purpose was further research. I'm not quite sure what the instigation was, but I made some further calls on members of Congress about the Sleeping Bear Dunes. But the most important of those calls was to Congressman Vander Jagt, who I believe, to
the best of my recollection, I had not actually sat down and talked to previously. He had put out position papers so we knew kind of what he was saying, which was roughly, "This shouldn't be federal. There's an important need to protect the natural values here, but it shouldn't be federal. We have the best state park system in the world. We could take the two little state parks that are in this area and expand them. The only problem is that Michigan doesn't have the money to do that, so why don't we have the federal government give Michigan the money to do that?" So he had legislation that he introduced to get the federal government to give Michigan money to do this.

Well, there was no way the federal government was going to. That was unheard of, wasn't going to happen. On September 13, 1968, I have my notes from visiting with him and that he said something to the effect that "No one, with the possible exception of Senator Hart, has done more for this bill than I have. It didn't pass this year; don't hang too much of this on me. I don't know where the bolt of lightning came on Monday that killed this bill," whatever that was.

Lage: He said this while—

Scott: I got these in my notes as quotes. We had a long conversation. In correspondence about it, I referred someplace to this meeting. In some note that I made for myself to someone else I referred to this meeting as "not very constructive." But we also fairly quickly sized up that Vander Jagt wasn't a reactionary, adamant opponent. He was a young freshman congressman with real serious political skills. He was an old evangelical minister and television newsman, and his subsequent career has demonstrated he had been a very effective member of Congress. He wasn't going to get trampled by this. If this thing was going to go—. So his position papers, even as early as '67, had said, "But if my approach doesn't work, I am prepared to work with Senator Hart to try and find something that will work, as long as we take care of not condemning the property of my constituents." So he was clearly somebody we could work with.

In August of '68 we had decided that one of the things we could do to drum up further excitement about this was to get the Sierra Club Board of Directors to pass a new resolution about how important Sleeping Bear Dunes was. So Virginia—Dan Carson wrote to Mike McCloskey about that, and I wrote to Mike about it, having met him during the summer. Mike wrote back. At that point I was sending Mike various stuff, various things to keep him apprised of what the chapter was doing. Virginia wrote a letter. For the board meeting, which was September 14 and 15, 1968, Sleeping Bear was put on the board's agenda. A request came out from Mike McCloskey's office that the chapter have someone there who could speak about and explain the details. Virginia was going to that meeting because she was the chapter delegate to the council, and for some reason we decided I should go too. So she and repaired to the Detroit metropolitan airport.

Lage: Would the chapter put up the money for this? Do you remember this kind of detail?
Scott: I don't remember where the money came from. Yes, presumably; it wasn't mine. Presumably it was chapter money. The council mechanism would have paid for one ticket, presumably, but I believe it was Virginia who felt it essential that I go. I have a sense that people like Virginia thought, "Boy, we've got this young, hot-shot guy and we ought to keep encouraging him."

Lage: They'd be crazy if they didn't.

Scott: I think that must have been part of it. Virginia and I went out to Detroit, the metropolitan airport. She had had a long and—someday I would really like to know—distinguished career in remote sensing, which was—. She had top-security clearance; she clearly had worked for the CIA. She was working at something called the Willow Run Laboratory outside of Ann Arbor in this field at that time. So she had traveled a great deal. So she was a member of what was then called The 100,000 Mile Club, now called the Red Carpet Club. Now anybody can get in, but at that point you had to have been a very substantial traveler and you can go to this little club. I remember sitting; I think we were drinking beer or something, and we determined that our flight to Reno, for some reason we were upgraded to first class, and we flew out to Reno and we were picked up by Jack Schanhaar, who was one of the staff people—I think he was controller or something like that on the staff of the Sierra Club at that time—and driven up, and this meeting was held at Clair Tappaan Lodge.

Lage: And that was an exciting meeting.

Scott: This was, for a neophyte Sierra Club member, this was an amazing meeting. The meeting was held out in the meadow in front of the lodge. The board sat at a table that was sort of V-shaped, and the audience sat in the meadow kind of up the ski slope. Mike McCloskey was there; he was conservation director. Dave Brower was executive director. And there was an elaborate conservation agenda. But as they still do to this day, the board would sort of work on the conservation agenda for a while and then they would repair to fight about something else. The something else they were fighting about was Dave. Increasingly hostile.

At one of the breaks, I walked up to Dave Brower, who I'd never met, and said, "Excuse me, Mr. Brower, my name is Doug Scott and I'm a graduate student, and I'm working on the history of the Wilderness Act as my project." The first words Dave Brower ever said to me were, "Howard Zahniser taught me all I know,"—about the legislative process, was the implication. I was greatly taken by that because by this time I was completely in the thrall of this mentor, Howard Zahniser, who I felt very close to but had never known, of course. But Dave then had to turn away because it was at that point, and I may be overdramatizing this in my memory, but my memory is at that point the meeting was called back to order and Ansel Adams said, "I move that the executive director be discharged." Which was the first of the motions to discharge Dave.

So here was this enormous pulling and hauling going on at this meeting. But every now and then they'd sort of tire of that or they'd need to infight amongst themselves, so
they'd go back to the conservation agenda. My very clear recollection is that Mike McCloskey was there and businesslike and managing the conservation agenda whenever that was on. But when all this fracas would start, he'd just dematerialize. He was hiding behind a tree or under a rock or something.

Lage: That's how he survived.

Scott: That's how he survived. Our Sleeping Bear Dunes thing came up and Mike introduced the topic, and then I gave that up and gave a little pitch, and they passed a resolution. The other memory I have of—

Lage: Was there controversy over your discussion?

Scott: Oh, not seriously. Somebody probably asked two questions, but it wasn't—I'm talking about controversial. There may have been advice offered or something of that kind, but clearly the energy at this meeting was not in Sleeping Bear Dunes or anything like that.

My one other memory of that meeting is that as the two days wore on—. And of course I was—I hadn't been West for a while, and I certainly hadn't been where there were big trees, so I was just out hugging the trees and glorying in being in the Sierra, which I had no experience with. But the infighting of the board was just tremendous. The delegate from the Potomac Chapter at one point just lost all—just sitting out in this mob of people just lost all patience and jumped up and shouted in a very loud voice, "I can't stand this!"—expletive deleted—and went storming off up the ski slope.

Lage: I would think for the chapters who hadn't been involved in this internal fracas—

Scott: By that time the two sides had been organized, and there was a lot of stuff going [out to chapters] on what was called then the xerox circuit.

Lage: Was Virginia Prentice in on that? Did she get in on the taking sides?

Scott: I don't remember whether she took sides particularly or not. I don't remember that question. It was the '69 ballot, so April of '69 where the deed was done.² So this was all the preliminary jousting. That delegate that got up and said, "I can't stand this anymore" was—. Now his name's gone right out of my head. Anyway, he became the first executive director of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund.

Lage: Oh, Jim Moorman.

² With his dismissal imminent, David Brower tendered his resignation as executive director at the May 3-4, 1969, Sierra Club Board of Directors meeting, after his faction was defeated in the April election of board members.
Scott: Jim Moorman, who was at that time running a thing called the Center for Law [and Social Policy] in Washington and who happened to be the delegate of the chapter. I've always had this memory of how funny it was that Jim got so perturbed about all this.

Virginia and I came back to Michigan and put out a press release: "September 17, 1968, Sierra Club 65,000-Member Organization Endorses Sleeping Bear Dunes." The thing that's interesting about this press release is that we were still publicly laying the problems at the door of Vander Jagt in this press release, which I have no idea of whether it got any play or at all, but I'm sure we sent it to Vander Jagt. I was quoted as saying, "We can only hope we will have Congressman Vander Jagt's support next year, yak, yak, yak."

So that whole fall was sort of getting support from the chapter and all of that. I sent that with a copy of that release, I sent to Muriel Ferris in my letter saying, "We got a good, strong endorsement from the Sierra Club board. I'm mulling over preliminary thoughts of a possible speech and we'll send you a draft one of these days. It would be handy to have something of this kind especially written to make a useful reprint for wide distribution." So I was getting right into that, the Zahniser-Brandborg business of working on the speeches.

By this time, Muriel and Bill Shands and I were in essentially a steady stream of correspondence back and forth—too bad they didn't have faxes then—and telephoning back and forth. My files are full of letters. "Dear Doug," from Muriel. "I'm sure Senator Hart would be happy to make a Senate speech if you have one handy!" And then I said, "Here we put out this release, but we don't have a very good press list." I mean, here's this little hand-to-mouth chapter in Michigan; we didn't know what we were doing. "If your office has a good press release, please send it." So she says, "Here's how to get a good press release for Michigan." So we were collaborating back and forth.

I have a remarkable document that Muriel got a hold of someplace and sent me in October of '68. This is key to the reversal of Congressman Vander Jagt, which is key to our success. She had gotten hold of the notice of a special meeting of the U.S. 31 Corridor Association. The U.S. 31 Corridor Association was a group of businesspeople that wanted a new federal highway to be built following up the shoreline of Lake Michigan rather than along a route further inland, to bring business in to them. What better way to cause there to be a reason to build a bigger highway than to have a national park at the end of it? So we quickly figured out these people can be helpful.

Virginia and I went to this convention, which was held as a part of the convention of the West Michigan Tourist Association. So Muriel had put me on to this, and we went to this thing. Congressman Vander Jagt spoke there, and we spoke to him, and this was, I think, one of my first trips in the fall. It was only September of '68 that Virginia and Cindy and I finally went up to Sleeping Bear. It may have been on this trip that we met Congressman Vander Jagt and talked to him some more.
By early October the *Ann Arbor News* was running a Washington story from their Washington news bureau: "Vander Jagt Eases Stand on Sleeping Bear Park."

[End Tape 3, Side B]

[Begin Tape 4, Side A]

**Scott:** Vander Jagt was starting to move, for a variety of reasons. He'd never been firmly opposed, but he had said some things that left the door open. We were starting, getting Governor Romney, getting the Michigan Conservation Commission, which was a political body that oversaw the work of the State Conservation Department. More organizing and letter-writing, all those things. I'm sure there were other reasons we knew nothing about, but he was starting to move.

But the Congress was over. It was the '68 election—Nixon, Johnson, end of Johnson's time—and everybody was starting to look ahead to 1969. To close out that year, I finally did deliver the speech for Senator Hart. The tape won't show this, but here's my letter of October 7 to Muriel with the draft of the speech for Senator Hart all about the good conservation achievements of the 90th Congress, but there was one big disappointment—and my letter suggests the title. Here is the Congressional Record for three days later: "Sleeping Bear Dunes, One Disappointment of a Great Conservation Congress," by Senator Hart. I'm sure we reprinted that and spewed it around. I have in my files—from Al Edmonds to Muriel Ferris, who then sent it to me—minutes of a later meeting of that U.S. 31 Corridor Association. Congressman Vander Jagt begins speaking to them and saying that "the newspapers have reported that he caused the defeat of the Sleeping Bear Dunes lakeshore bill but that's not true."

**Lage:** Was he annoyed with you?

**Scott:** Oh, I don't think so. I think that this was all viewed as fair game. Later we started being real pals.

So we were now focused on getting the legislation introduced in the next year. I was writing introductory speeches for both Congressman O'Hara and Senator Hart, and we conceived from the outset that these speeches would go into one of these little reprinted booklets for very wide distribution sometime. We'd planned to do that with speeches from late '68 but it kept getting put off. Muriel and I and Bill Shands were exchanging my drafts with their changes on them of what a cover letter to go out with such a reprint would look like.

But this kept slopping over into early '69, trying to get the bills introduced. I was getting a typical phone message taken by the much-annoyed secretary of the chairman of the Forestry Department: "Doug Scott, 3:35 p.m., February 6, 1969, call Operator 32, Washington. Mr. William Shands calling." To return these calls at their expense, of course.

**Lage:** And they were annoyed?
Scott: The secretary was. You know, who was I? [laughs] I mean, they never saw me doing any studying. I was preempting the department chair's secretary. They wouldn't give me a phone because the office I was in wasn't a real office [laughs], so it just sort of went from bad to worse.

In January of '69, that previous November Congressman Vander Jagt had been elected, and Virginia wrote him a very sweet letter, congratulated him on his reelection, saying, "We really want to enact the Sleeping Bear Dunes bill." He sent back in January a very nice letter saying, "I, too, look forward to the enactment of Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore legislation. I invite your support for two specific amendments to previously introduced legislation." Yak, yak, yak, yak, yak.

He had two things that were on his mind that he sort of said, "If you can fix these...." He put out, in the fall of '68, a new fact sheet, a new position paper saying that he would prefer to do his bill to give the money to the states, but if that wasn't possible, he had these two amendments. One had to do with further protecting property owners from condemnation.

Lage: Property owners within the—

Scott: —within the national lakeshore. The bill as it finally emerged has a very complicated provision. Some properties would be protected, others would be subject to being condemned. How that all worked was complicated, but that was a big point of sensitivity to him.

The other point of sensitivity to him was the argument that with the taking of this land by the federal government, the tax base would be eroded in the schools, and Benzie and Leelanau counties would be adversely impacted. He, when he was in the state legislature a few years earlier, had been behind the passage of a bill which prohibited the state from paying, from augmenting those taxes, so he had to go get—. His bill had to be repealed, because ultimately one of the things that made this all go was we got the state to say that they would augment the school budget in these two counties.

So the press was starting to say that the Dunes park may start a new fight. Clearly we had succeeded in stimulating the notion that there was now a revival of political reality behind this legislation. The press was reporting that Vander Jagt was coming around and that things were starting to get a little better.

In February of '69, at another one of these West Michigan Tourist Association meetings, we met with a bunch of the local people. By this time Virginia and I and others had started meeting and corresponding with, and being on the phone with, a little knot of local supporters: this fellow who was the publisher of a local newspaper, a guy that ran a bar in one of the little towns, a woman who lived along the highway just where the Platte River crossed the highway and had a little kind of a tourist business there. We were regularly corresponding back and forth with them about what we could do to help, and they were sending us little notes, copies of their letters to
congressmen and so forth. And they had this little committee in the area. This is all carried in my correspondence.

At this point I was running back and forth to Washington DC. From correspondence of the time, I can see that in the latter half of February I must have spent a week or so in Washington for some reason and was working on this a lot. Oh, here it is. "I'm here in Washington for a week primarily working on my graduate research, but with a liberal amount of time planned for the Bear as well. I hope to talk to Congressman Ruppe and to Vander Jagt and perhaps to someone in Senator Griffin's office." We were feeding ideas for what these local people could do, and encouraging them.

Lage: This local support was seen as an important feature?

Scott: Crucial, crucial. Because this was what was going to get Vander Jagt really fully around the corner.

Somewhere in that period of time, Virginia and I finally came to grasp, with the help of friendly Republican people in the state government of one sort or another, particularly a man named Carl Johnson who was on the Conservation Commission, that Benzie and Leelanau counties, where the Sleeping Bear Dunes were located, lay in the north end of Congressman Vander Jagt's district, was a very small population, and that where he had to really worry about for his electoral base was the southern part of the district. So we started working on the newspapers and building contacts and trying to find politically powerful people in that area. Through a variety of contacts, we found a variety of people who were fundraisers for Congressman Vander Jagt, Republican Party stalwarts of one kind or another, so that we were starting to have correspondence with and to be urging along people of that kind.

Lage: Was there a general pro-environment or pro-park feeling such as was in California at that time? Kind of a building force for issues like this?

Scott: I don't think there was ever any question of the statewide sentiment in Michigan, and we saw this in polls. Polling wasn't the kind of science it is now, but there were ones done by politicians and things. There was never any doubt of the statewide support and the statewide enthusiasm for this, but the political problem we had to solve was the local congressman, because as long as he as a Republican was resisting this bill by these two Democrats, Hart and O'Hara, other Republicans weren't going to support him, and now there was a Republican in the White House. We were not going to meet Aspinall's test that we had a united Michigan delegation, and that was the test we had to get over.

But in March of '69, the tensions between O'Hara and his staff and Vander Jagt and his staff got pretty hot and heavy. "Accusations Traded on Dunes Bill," this is from the Ann Arbor News of March 11, 1969. Vander Jagt then took this little pose that now that a Republican administration was there, he was going to take his idea of the federal government funding the state and go to talk to Secretary Hickel about it. I had a call from Bill Shands in late March of 1969 that I have a note about, that Vander Jagt had
issued a press statement. He had now had his conversation with Hickel. He'd taken a long time to get an appointment, but he discussed his proposal with Secretary Hickel and Assistant Secretary Train, and he had to agree with them that his idea was too far ahead of its time. So he was now ready to work with Senator Hart and Congressman O'Hara.

A poll had been done. Congressmen in that era, and maybe they still do it, did their own sort of phony little constituent polls. They'd send out questions and then they'd announce the Congressional Record. He'd done a poll of some sort. This was probably a legit poll, done by Booth newspapers, which included the *Ann Arbor News*. Shands had gotten this information from their Washington record that in his district the poll was 62 to 38 in favor of the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore. So clearly, things were starting to move. By late March the *Ann Arbor News* Washington bureau was reporting, "Sleeping Bear Park Compromise Near." The *Lansing State Journal* on March 28: "Vander Jagt Supports State Dunes Proposal."

Now, in this period—and my memory is not good on exactly how this all happened—I started becoming well acquainted with Congressman Vander Jagt and regularly hanging out in his office, and getting to know in particular two people on his staff: one, a kind of a junior and temporary guy, was a fellow named Jon Hawley, Jonathan Hawley, who had done a dissertation, I believe, at some school in Oklahoma or Missouri, I'm not just sure. All I have is an abstract, and it doesn't say where. "The Politics of National Park System Expansion, a Comparative Study of the Authorization of the Ozark National Scenic Riverways in Missouri and the Proposed Authorization of the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore in Michigan." For some reason that I've now forgotten, this guy with this kind of background knowledge and sympathy ended up at least on some kind of temporary assignment on Congressman Vander Jagt's staff, and we hit it off.

The congressman's senior legislative guy was a man named Bud Nagelvoort. Brief interlude: Western Michigan is heavily Dutch and Dutch-reformed church, and Vander Jagt and Nagelvoort, these are Dutch names out of that ethnic background. Bud Nagelvoort and I became very good pals. Years later his son worked for us in San Francisco, in the Sierra Club office, but Bud was doing the staff work on this for Congressman Vander Jagt, and I started being on friendly terms with them, and it now became a matter of increasing sense of our collaboration to figure out how to make this thing go.

We were doing our mailers and so forth. I have in my hand a sample: the long-planned, big mailing of a congressional reprint. It took the speeches which I had drafted for Senator Hart in February of '69 introducing the bill in the Senate again, and Congressman O'Hara's speech of the same date, and reproduced those in a neat little eight-page, handsomely produced Congressional Record reprint with little headlines put in to make it easier to read: "Will Sleeping Bear Dunes Be Saved?" "Introduction of Bill to Establish in Michigan a Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore." "Speech of Philip A. Hart." Not printed at government expense, but very inexpensive. And with a cover letter from Senator Hart and Congressman O'Hara, which I had prepared.
This was mailed to over 30,000 Sierra Club members, Wilderness Society members, and several other organizations. I beat the bushes something awful trying to talk other organizations into giving us their mailing lists, or agreeing to give the senator their mailing lists.

Lage: So it was sent out from the senator's office?

Scott: Sent out under frank. Under franked mail from the senator's office. The letter said, "Dear friend, For eight years we've worked for this. The bill was passed by the Senate twice. It was approved by the Interior Committee. Last year we had high hopes for the bill but it didn't make significant progress. Now with the growing support of conservationists throughout Michigan and the entire country, we are going to make an all-out effort for passage this year. As you know, enactment of a proposal such as this is achieved only with the knowledgeable support of the public. We believe you will find the proposed reprint contains useful background information." And then down at the bottom, "P.S. We'd be pleased to answer any questions or send this material to others who may have an interest in conservation."

So we got lots of replies back to the senator's office and to Congressman O'Hara's office. People saying, "In our little hiking club we have a hundred members. Would you send me a hundred copies of your brochure?" and so forth. This went out in April of 1969.

Oh, here's another just funny little episode. All of these things are just sort of illustrating a kind of—figuring out how to work all the avenues. The School of Natural Resources at the University of Michigan invited Stewart Udall, the former secretary of the Interior, to come and give some lectures to an evening honors convocation. Here's a letter from the dean, February 13, 1969, to Stewart Udall that says, "Douglas Scott, president of the student council"—I'd forgotten that—"will be in Washington next week. If you are in, he will try to arrange a few minutes to discuss the subject matter for the above three occasions."

Subsequently, I wrote to Muriel and said, "Stewart Udall is going to be in Ann Arbor for these speeches. It seems like a good opportunity to get some press if he can be approached to include specific reference to Sleeping Bear Dunes. Can you folks reach Mr. Udall with a suggestion that he plug the Bear?" So thereby comes a carbon copy to me of a letter to Stewart Udall from Phil, "Dear Stu, Enclosed is largely self-explanatory. It's from Doug Scott, an official of the Mackinac Chapter, yak, yak, yak. We're making an all-out effort. Please do what you can." Here's a handwritten note from Stewart Udall back to Phil. "Dear Phil, Sure will indeed strike some blows for Hart and the Bear at Ann Arbor." So just every occasion that we could trip over to work on these sorts of things.

Simultaneously, we were beating the drums with the local people, and encouraging them, and providing some funds to this local committee from our chapter to help them put out material. They started putting up billboards along the highway saying, "Call this number. Support Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore." This wasn't a sudden
conversion by Vander Jagt. All through March and April this kind of went slowly. I have a letter that I wrote to Larry Olson, who was the ringleader of the local Save the Sleeping Bear Dunes Committee up in Beulah, Michigan, in the heart of the area, saying, "What we need for Vander Jagt is a truth squad." So we were still working to move him along.

That was all happening in—. That was sort of in transition in March, April, and May. We were working simultaneously, Virginia and I and others, to promote broader recognition with the big mailing. I ghosted an article for Senator Hart that appeared in American Forests magazine, and we had O'Hara put it in the Congressional Record with some laudatory remarks. Virginia—we arranged that the Sierra Club Bulletin for June 1969 had Sleeping Bear Dunes on the cover and then a long article with a map and everything: "Sleeping Bear Dunes, a National Lakeshore for Michigan," by Virginia Prentice, a four-page article in the June issue with all the details, and then at the very end of the article, a stop press: "On June 17, 1969, Representative Vander Jagt introduced a bill similar to Senator Hart's calling for $17 million for land acquisition. This is the first time such a bill has been sponsored by the areas represented and is expected to unite the Michigan delegation."

Lage: So you had the representatives behind you.

Scott: We were off and running. Here's a Detroit News guest article in the "Outdoors" column in the Detroit News by Congressman O'Hara. It's quite possible that I wrote this, but Shands may have done it, saying, "Time is running out. Fate of Sleeping Bear Park now depends on fast action." This is June 8, 1969. June was a momentous month for this campaign.

I slightly got ahead of myself. What I need to explain is that in the summer of '68 I worked for the Wilderness Society. In the summer of '69, I'm not quite sure how it emerged, but I ended up working part of the week as a summer employee at the Wilderness Society, and the other part of the week as a paid employee of Senator Hart. I'm not sure how that emerged, whether the Wilderness Society didn't have the funds to take me on full time, or whether I really wanted to work for Senator Hart but he couldn't—. Somehow I put this together. So now I was really in the thick of it. I was one day up on Capitol Hill—I think it was two days a week with Senator Hart—working for Muriel and working on all this correspondence.

Lage: Just on Sleeping Bear?

Scott: Essentially just on Sleeping Bear. One other project, but pretty much essentially Sleeping Bear. And the other days of the week at the Wilderness Society. I can remember clearly that there would be days when I wanted something from the Park Service and I'd call up from the Wilderness Society and they'd give me the run-around. The next day, "This is Senator Hart's office. I want [laughs] such-and-such." "Yes, sir. We'll have it right up there."
Invaluable to my professional development was, as close as I was to Muriel and Bill and later to Bud Nagelvoort and to the inside workings of the Congress, which I was falling in love with—. The Congress as an institution is something that I feel very patriotic and strong about, because it was something I found I could work with and was very rewarding. But invaluable to my professional development was some time spent on the inside of a congressional office. Being on the receiving end. Somebody would come to lobby us about some conservation thing, and Muriel would be busy, and I would be called up to the front office to listen to their pitch. It doesn't matter how many times you've walked in an office door to lobby some staff person about something. To be in the other seat was just invaluable. And plus going in and being sworn in and raising my right hand and having a little card that said I was an employee of the United States. I never did get on the Senate floor, which irked me.

But I have my memo. So here I was, working in Senator Hart's office, and I have my memo prepared as a background briefing for Senator Hart on June 12, 1969, for his 9:30 a.m. meeting with Congressman Vander Jagt. "Congressman Vander Jagt has asked for this meeting with you. The purpose is to discuss the manner in which the new Sleeping Bear Dunes bill will be introduced. It needs to be introduced the same day as the meeting." Then I had background—the legislative situation and all the events that were beginning to come to really put pressure on Vander Jagt. "In view of the local Save the Bear Day, Monday, June 16—," this memo is June 12—"and under Secretary of the Interior Russell Train's visit to Sleeping Bear Dunes and speech in Grand Rapids, Michigan, on June 19, Representative Vander Jagt is under strong pressure to introduce some legislation immediately. Sixty-two percent of his constituents who responded to his recent poll favored the national lakeshore. It is desirable from his perspective to have Senator Hart and/or Representative O'Hara as a co-sponsor to avoid allegations of another roadblock. He said he would be agreeable to the new bill as: 1) an O'Hara bill; 2) an O'Hara-Vander Jagt bill; or 3) a Vander Jagt-O'Hara bill."

Then I allude to the fact that "since last October there has been no direct communications between Representative Vander Jagt and Representative O'Hara or their staffs. Representative O'Hara is extremely reluctant to do anything which appears to credit Vander Jagt with any contribution to the settlement. On Tuesday of this week he refused Sid [Wolner?] and Jerry [Cable?]”—these are the two senior political staffers of Senator Hart's—"request to join in co-sponsoring this revised bill." There was clearly bad blood. This memo goes on and on, and it's in the file, to brief Senator Hart for this meeting. This was a highly momentous period of time.

On June 16, 1969, under the leadership of Larry Olson and John Daugherty and some other people in the local area, and with money from the Sierra Club, and I expect we got some from the UAW as well, the local citizens committee at Sleeping Bear Dunes rented a car ferry. These are huge ferries that ply across Lake Michigan from Frankfort, Michigan, which is just at the south boundary of Sleeping Bear Dunes, to some harbor on the Wisconsin side. We rented one of these things, the City of Green Bay, for a day, and put on this thing called Save the Bear Day.
It says in the press clipping that I have from the Frankfort *Benzie County Patriot*, John Peterson's paper, on June 19, "233 People on Save the Bear Cruise." "Last Monday, 233 passengers, including Senator Philip Hart, a representative of Governor Milliken's office"—the new Republican governor who was on our side—"a number of officials from the Department of the Interior and the National Park Service boarded the Ann Arbor car ferry City of Green Bay for a six-hour Save the Bear Day cruise along the shoreline north of Frankfort. Also on board was Mr. Richard Wright of Birmingham, Michigan, a vice-president of the Ann Arbor Railroad Company. The passenger list included people from Benzie and Leelanau counties, site of the proposed national park. During the excursion, which took the sightseers along the shore, giving them an excellent view under sunny skies in the Sleeping Bear Dunes from Lake Michigan, Senator Hart spoke to them, reaffirming his belief." I believe I spoke as well; I can't remember.

The cruise was arranged by residents of Benzie and Leelanau counties, headed by Larry Olson and John Daugherty, co-chairmen. The Mackinac Chapter of the Sierra Club was on hand to help promote the adoption of the legislation. *Look* magazine sent a crew to do a story on the subject. The Sierra Club had a number of displays. This was a huge ferry, and we saw this place we'd been working on, including these islands, from the outside. None of us had ever seen it before. We were standing with Philip Hart with a good deal of abetting from the Sierra Club—in particular, Dick Cellarius. I don't remember whether Doris was there, but Dick Cellarius was there, and the then-new president of the Sierra Club, because now it's June of 1969, the Brower fracas has come and gone, and the new president of the Sierra Club, Phil Berry, was on hand, had come out specially for this.

Lage: That was something new, wasn't it?

Scott: We were just trying to make as big a deal as we could, so we had Senator Hart, we had all these people. We took Senator Hart up on a dune buggy ride. There was a commercial dune buggy thing that had this track out across the dunes. These dunes are perched up on top of big glacial moraines so that you just look down to the lake, from these big, high hills. We went out on this dune buggy, and the wind was cold, a bitter wind, for *Look* magazine to take a picture. They did a feature two weeks later, color photographs of earth savers, and they had Edward Abbey and Stewart Udall and Laurance Rockefeller, Sr. and Phil Hart sitting in Sleeping Bear Dunes. Because we were all standing there freezing. He had to have his coat off. The poor guy was just frozen to death. But that was all part of this thing. So that was June 16, is the Save the Bear Day and the car ferry ride.

On June 17 Congressman Vander Jagt introduced his bill. On June 19, and he of course had known this was coming, Undersecretary of the Interior Russell Train did a flying tour of Sleeping Bear and then gave a speech in Gerald Ford's congressional district—Gerald Ford was then the minority leader of the House of Representatives—about the Sleeping Bear Dunes, and amongst other things said, "This is the kind of project we ought to do. This is a good thing." On June 21 Governor Milliken made a big speech. So all this stuff was now coming together.
I have a press release from June 19 from Senator Hart, leader of an eight-year fight to establish Sleeping Bear Dunes, that they welcomed a Republican version of the park bill. Hart said the national lakeshore bill submitted by Congressman Vander Jagt was "a constructive and helpful step that gives the concept 'bipartisan unity' for the first time." So we were really on a roll now. And now we characterize these bills as being very similar. The Vander Jagt bill did things about the state tax payments and did things about the condemnation of property that were different from the Hart bill, but the boundaries were the same, the general outline of the thing was pretty substantially the same. In that era—of course, I was still working for Senator Hart—I have in my file various copies of the correspondence that I wrote for him to people who opposed him or people who were supporting the bill with my initials on the blind carbon, a letter cleared by Muriel Ferris. Typed by me. I was doing a lot of that kind of stuff.

In August, now that we had basically equivalent bills, and we'd been getting more and more of the House members to co-sponsor these bills, we prepared—I drafted in August a letter from Senator Hart to Congressman Aspinall saying, "We've now got bipartisan unity on the fundamental features of the bill. These are signs of terrific progress. I hope it will prove possible to consider this legislation. So we will move it."

[End Tape 4, Side A]

[Begin Tape 4, Side B]

Scott: Meanwhile, in August of 1969, the Wilderness Society put out a release to its members in the lake states pointing out that the House Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation will visit Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota during the August congressional recess to study pending lakeshore national park proposals. August 14 and 15, field inspection of proposed Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore, no hearing. They went on to look at the wilderness at Isle Royale and the Apostle Islands and the Voyageurs National Park in Minnesota. This was all a standard Wilderness Society alert.

In summary, "conservationists are commending the House subcommittee. [laughs] Through oral testimony at the field hearing, through letters and statements submitted for the hearing records, and through correspondence with their own congressmen, conservationists are urging immediate action for the two national lakeshores." And then here's the whole list. And this was prepared—I daresay I wrote this. It's under Rupert Cutler's signature. So the House subcommittee was starting now to work.

In late August I did a memo for Senator Hart and his staff telling them how things were coming along and saying that Congressman O'Hara was now urging Aspinall to proceed and to proceed to hearings. The purpose of my memo was to urge Senator Hart to call Congressman O'Hara to inquire how things were going and to urge him along.

"As of August, nine Michigan House members of the nineteen had co-sponsored either O'Hara or Vander Jagt bills. Others are expected soon. Mr. Vander Jagt has gone as
far as he's going and has given his blessing to Mr. Ruppe to take the leadership for the Vander Jagt bill."

So we were pushing—I was writing in my Sierra Club capacity, I guess, urging the Michigan United Conservation Clubs to get on with coverage in their newsletter and so forth. We had fact sheets of all that we were handing around on Capitol Hill that I prepared, which were the fact sheet on the background and current status of the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore proposal: what is it, where is it, why, who supports the proposal, what legislation is now pending, the detachments of the various things showing people—.

Here's the January 1969 *American Forests* magazine article by Senator Hart, which I wrote. The resolution of the Michigan Natural Resources Commission. Excerpts from the speech in Grand Rapids in June by Undersecretary Train in which he said, "The various proposals to create the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore are a timely and pertinent example of what can and should be done. The idea of a national lakeshore has had bipartisan support." Yak, yak, yak. "I support and will promote—I'm personally enthusiastic about this—Governor Milliken's speech to the annual convention of the Michigan United Conservation Club. Time has come, for the good of all the people of Michigan, to take decisive action on the Sleeping Bear proposal."

So we were passing all those things around on Capitol Hill to stir folks—I've got the stuff in my files—still urging on the local people, Larry Olson and so forth, about things that they might do to lobby other people in other groups to get on with it. In this particular one in August of '69 I'm urging them to write to the National Parks Association, trying to goose them into doing something helpful.

Lage: Was the question of cost ever raised?

Scott: Yes, the question of cost was a big, decisive factor in '69 and '70 because there was a budget crunch. One of the arguments was, there's no point in passing this bill because there will be no money to do the land acquisition. But we passed in 1968 an augmentation of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, which brought the revenues from offshore oil drilling, particularly in Louisiana, into that pot automatically, into that trust fund, essentially. That opened the way for—. Until that passed, Chairman Aspinall was saying, "We're not going to pass any more national park bills because we've got so many that we've already passed where we haven't completed the acquisition and we don't have enough money, so we're not going to pass any more until we ease up the funding."

That had sort of been eased up in '68. I think the number, as I recollect, at least from the Vander Jagt bill that we were talking about then, for the land that would actually be acquired at Sleeping Bear, was $17 million, as was utterly typical. It happened at Cape Cod, it happened in a big way at Point Reyes. You passed a bill with a particular authorization, and a few years later you went back and had to greatly raise the offer.

Lage: So the same thing happened here?
Scott: The same thing happened here in a big way.

Vander Jagt was—. We were still working to get more and more members of the House. What we didn't have at this point was the complete support of the Nixon administration. That is, their formal report to the committee saying, "The President's view is such and so." We spent a lot of time in the fall of '69 trying to get that to happen while we were getting ready for action in the House committee. Because again the Senate wasn't even going to take this up until there was real sign of movement in the House. So we were now really focused on getting more co-sponsors.

Lage: Was that standard, that the Senate would refuse to take it up until the House—?

Scott: Well, they'd just done it a couple of times, and in some ways it would be demeaning for Hart to go and say, "Would you please do this again?" It put more pressure on the House, in a way, to say, "The Senate's done it twice; come on, get with it." Also, it didn't turn out this way, but if we had the House go first, if the bill got weakened—. The House was where we had all this trouble. If the bill got weakened we could strengthen it in the Senate and take it to the conference. I'm sure that figured in this.

I was corresponding back and forth by this time with a key guy in Allegan, Michigan—Charlie Yeates, who was the administrator of a health center there, who was a key Republican leader for Vander Jagt and had copies of the letter he wrote in that fall to Vander Jagt. This is to Vander Jagt: "Enactment of this bill would greatly enhance your reelection in 1970. There's a definite movement in Leelanau County to arrange for opposition to you in next year's primary, and I personally am not too concerned at this being a successful venture if Sleeping Bear park becomes a reality without further delay. If the park is not either voted in or if it is turned down, then I would think that a great number of supporters of the park would join in opposition to you in next year's primary. This is the way I read the Ninth District at the present moment. I don't know if your own grapevine is getting the same feedback as mine, but I am concerned regarding the possibility of you being defeated next year, and I think a lot hangs on action on Sleeping Bear. I guess this is just one of the plain facts of life in politics." Which is wonderful.

Lage: Was this an effort to persuade him, or was it a real analysis of the situation?

Scott: I'm sure it's Charlie's real analysis of the situation. I had been writing him about the progress we'd been making earlier in the year. I think somebody would have to really paw through the files to see just how this was all going. This guy was a real power behind Vander Jagt, so that letter doubtlessly had some real impact.

Sixty-nine was a definitive year in which things really started to move. In 1970 we got—and we're getting close to the end of the story here now—we got into a big effort to try and force through the total co-sponsorship. We still weren't getting a markup. We now had the field inspection, but we'd not had a hearing in the House committee. So in the fall of '69 we were putting more heat on Vander Jagt to keep him moving,
and we were getting organized in individual congressional districts around Michigan to stir up a lot of people.

Lage: Did you say you hadn't had a mark-up of the bill?

Scott: No, we had not had a mark-up of the bill.

Lage: So was that Aspinall holding it back?

Scott: Yes, just in getting it—. For whatever reasons, we simply weren't getting it scheduled. This continued all through the fall of ’69 and into early ’70. May 8 of ’70, I sent a memo to Virginia Prentice; to Olga Madar, a key lady who was international vice-president of the UAW; to Dougherty; to Olson; to others of these key contacts in the state government and so forth, saying, "Hearings are now being scheduled for June 8 and 9 in Washington and a two-day, fairly extensive hearing, because according to the staff, they feel they are reopening a subject they've not looked into closely since 1966. We need to have a relatively small number of proponent witnesses, and we need to do everything we can to minimize any potential hangups and avoid anything that might hold up action. If we can all agree on a common stance, especially on the differences between the Hart-O'Hara and the Vander Jagt-Ruppe bill, we're endeavoring to work that out here and I'll keep you informed. Hopefully, this common agreement will also be in harmony with the administration. Enclosed is my memorandum about the differences between the two bills. It's my feeling that we can all agree on Vander Jagt's revision of Section 1." So this is detailed about how we would work this all out and which parts of the bill we ought to work on and so forth.

That same day, the *Ann Arbor News*, whose outdoor editor was a close friend of ours, Doug Fulton, had an article: "Sleeping Bear Awakes Again." "The off-again, on-again issue of Sleeping Bear Dunes on the shore of Lake Michigan is apparently on again. Conservationists around the state," yak, yak, yak, yak. So things were getting rolling.

We did, from the Wilderness Society in June of 1970, we did a mailing that was directly sponsored by the Save the Sleeping Bear Dunes Committee, that local group, the Michigan United Conservation Clubs, Michigan Audubon Society, the Wilderness Society, Mackinac Chapter of the Sierra Club, West Michigan Environmental Action Council. [looking through papers] Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore hearings. Here's the details on the proposals. "The bill has wide support." Here's a map. "How conservationists can help." "Conservationists in Michigan are urging that the following steps be taken." [laughs] There's that careful wording again.

The hearings were held in June. Now, to race ahead here a little bit, in May of 1970, at the end of the school year in Ann Arbor, I left the university and moved to Washington and took up my full-time job at the Wilderness Society. So from mid-May of ’70 on I was full-time lobbyist on the staff of the Wilderness Society. My title was "educational liaison specialist." That was the cover for "lobbyist."

Lage: That was the education aspect of lobbying.
Scott: I had a business card that said "Educational Liaison." I used to joke with people: "Yes, I'm an educational liaison specialist. I work on 435 remedial students [laughter] in the House of Representatives."

I testified at the hearing in June of 1970 for the Wilderness Society. We had a number of witnesses. I remember very clearly Virginia and others were there. The other side had the opponents. Charlotte Reid, this congresswoman from Illinois, came and testified, and she had clearly helped in identifying this sort of carefully picked cross-section of opposition witnesses. And there was a sort of a society lady from someplace, and the former football hero from the University of Michigan twenty years earlier, and a Catholic priest from Detroit, and so on and so forth.

My favorite memory of that hearing is that this Catholic priest attacked the committee. His statement was something to the effect that the Congress of the United States would "steal"—his word was "steal"—our land. He had this little retreat that he would fly to—he was also a pilot, and he would fly up to sort of have little retreats. In the midst of his testimony, after he'd used the word "steal," Congressman John Saylor of Pennsylvania, who was the senior Republican and one of the great conservationists, a very tough guy, John Saylor came marching in and sat down and was just flipping through the testimony, and you could see when he got to that phrase that the red color just rose. And then he just sat there and he waited for this priest to finish. When it came his turn to question, he said, "Father O'Malley"—whatever the guy's name was—"that you, of all people, a man of the cloth, would accuse the elected representatives of the people of the United States of stealing!" The guy just had to walk out under the door. I mean, he just made complete mincemeat of him, and we had a good laugh about that.

We had our witnesses, whoever they were, and the hearing record would show. I know Virginia was there. Our group. And we typically would bring people in and we would go around lobbying before the hearing and after the hearing, so they'd be there for several days. The out-of-town people were staying at a hotel next door to the House office building when the hearing was held, called the Congressional Hotel. A few years later it was converted into a House office building, but at that time it was a hotel.

We left for breakfast on the morning of either June—it must have been June 8. I was paged at breakfast, which greatly impressed my out-of-town friends, and it was Congressman Vander Jagt calling me to say that he knew that throughout all of this the Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club, and I had especially been advocating that because there was a lot of undeveloped land, particularly on these two islands that are part of the lakeshore, that there ought to be what had then become a standard provision in new national park legislation, a provision that said that the Wilderness Act study requirement would apply to this new park, and whatever was roadless there should be studied for wilderness designation. Because the Wilderness Act of '64 only applied to parks existing.

Lage: So each new one needed this provision.
Scott: So each new one. Another fellow and I had invented the language that would do this in '68 when we passed the North Cascades Park; that had it first. So we, as a standard deal, put this in. A lot of park legislation was passing at this time: Apostle Island, Voyageurs, Sleeping Bear. Congressman Vander Jagt called me that morning to say that he thought I'd been a very constructive source. He wanted me to know that as a favor to me, he was going to advocate in his testimony that morning the wilderness amendment. I remember saying, "Wow, listen to this! Isn't this great?"

So we had our hearing in early June and we went around and made the rounds, and the opposition was—. At this point now we had the whole Michigan delegation more or less, and we still had these two bills, the Vander Jagt-Ruppe bill and the Ruppe-Vander Jagt and O'Hara-Hart version, and it hadn't been confirmed, but we were getting there.

At about that time I had a little note that I wrote which—I think this was for a flyer. "The national lakeshore on which we worked so long is nearing reality. Following good hearings in June, at which Virginia Prentice represented the club, the legislation has made rapid progress. On August 5 the Interior Insular Affairs Committee approved an excellent new bill which harmonizes completely the two versions, Congressman O'Hara's and Congressman Vander Jagt's. The new bill is excellent in every detail and includes an amendment requiring study of potential wilderness areas within the lakeshore under provisions of the Wilderness Act. The new bill was reintroduced by seventeen of Michigan's nineteen congressmen. Thus, this new bill has come out of committee in excellent shape. On August 11 it was granted a rule by the Rules Committee, a key step in reaching the House floor for a final vote. It was in the Rules Committee that the proposal died in 1966. Rules Committee approval came over the determined opposition of Representative Charlotte Reid, a Republican of Illinois, who owns a cottage well inside the boundary but has nevertheless appointed herself the leading congressional roadblock to this lakeshore. Mr. O'Hara, Representative Vander Jagt, and the committee leadership worked extremely hard to achieve the rule over Mrs. Reid's opposition."

Lage: Were those cabin—. Were they second homes, or cabins?

Scott: Second homes.

Lage: Were they protected in any way?

Scott: They were protected, but she was still opposed. There was an irreducible core of bitter opposition, of which she was a leader. In an August 4 memo—I don't know who this was sent to—I'd summarized the action, "The subcommittee had acted on July 28 and had harmonized all this stuff, adopting some slight changes that Vander Jagt wanted in the boundary, updating the money figures. This new bill was introduced in the House. Despite urgings from conservationists and colleagues, two of the congressmen refused to join in co-sponsoring to make it 0-19, and it's this new bill that will be acted on." Future prospects and timing. This was some kind of an alert that got mailed out.
I recollect in particular a dramatic moment of sitting one morning, the morning of this Rules Committee action in late July, and Congressman Morris Udall, who is a very close friend of ours at the Wilderness Society, personally called Stewart Brandborg and said, "I just heard that Charlotte Reid's got a majority of the Rules Committee to get us in this bill." Brandborg just cleared his desk and started calling, and we all just went crazy just calling our friends and putting heat on and getting Senator Hart to call, and all the things you do. We had the votes, and defeated her.

The bill came to the House floor in September. I'm not sure I could tell you the precise date. Yes, I can. September 22, and the bill was considered and passed by the House. I remember very clearly, Congressman Vander Jagt was now a sophomore. This was the first piece of legislation of his that had ever reached the floor—which is a big deal for a congressman, and he was a masterful orator. He closed his office, and the entire staff came and sat in the gallery, and I was with them and with other friends to watch this debate. It passed on a voice vote. I think there were some committee amendments but there was no big contested amendment. The accolades that Vander Jagt received, I mean, he'd really turned around and become a hero in all of this.

The Senate acted very quickly. It came out of the Senate committee on October 2, and I believe it came out by unanimous vote. I believe the Senate bill probably was identical to the House-passed bill. They reported the House bill under the House number, and I believed it was identical. The bill went to the White House and was signed into law on October 21, 1970. There was not, as far as I know, any signing ceremony or anything of that kind. We ground out all the thank-you letters and so forth. By that time there were a hundred other issues that people were embroiled in.

But I guess the thing I want to say about this whole experience in terms of its influence on me in the future was that I held a relatively rare experience by being both in Michigan and in Washington, and both on Capitol Hill in an office part of the time, and in a lobbying organization, of seeing the whole process, kind of seeing it from all of its sides. It is so easy, and it became frustrating to me later in my lobbying career when I lived in Washington, that what I saw was just a phase. A proposal came and became a bill, and you aren't quite sure of all the background and whether that was the best thing or whether something else that you were not a part of had been done a month earlier. It might have been a better bill, and then you lobbied on it, and then it passed or whatever happened, and then you never knew what happened to it again.

In the early seventies I worked on scores of wilderness bills. We were just passing them right and left, the complex ones. I didn't ever see the areas for the most part. I was just a functionary doing this political Capitol Hill thing in a phase of a process that I knew had antecedents and implications in the future, but all I knew was this, and then I'd go on to the next one, which would have been even more frustrating if I hadn't had the insight and the experience to hone my own perception of how things worked, hadn't had this project that was sort of a God-given opportunity to sort of try one's wings. It wasn't as though I was following around somebody else and just being their acolyte. This was sort of Mother Bird kicked me out of the nest and said, "Here's this thing. Let's see what we can do with it."
Now, this is my oral history, and I'm talking about this all in the first person, and "I wrote this" and "I did that." This was an enormously collaborative effort. My dearest and most wonderful colleague in all this was Virginia Prentice and her sidekick and friend Cindy Thompson. I already told you the stories about our trips up there and the symbolic—symbolic? Hell, it was good—thermos of whiskey sours that we drank. Cindy's dog, Mandy, this wonderful setter sort of a dog that would chase around chasing the squirrels. These wonderful local people who in the early stages put their life on the line—I mean, there was bitter local opposition—and created this committee. Later, one of them, a fellow who came in towards the latter stages—he was president or some functionary of a dredging company named Erich Luedtke—he ended up being a member of the executive committee of the Mackinac Chapter after I had left Michigan.

This was the making, in many ways, not only of Doug Scott as a much more experienced lobbyist, but of the Mackinac Chapter as a relatively sophisticated operation looked to and respected by other environmental groups in state government. The chapter grew very rapidly in this period. There were a great many people involved. I believe it's fair to say my role was central in the period from '68 to '70 in reviving and making this all happen. It was in part because there was no limit to the amount of time I would give. I wasn't spending any time doing virtually anything else. This was monkish devotion and a terrific learning experience.

Lage: And a heady experience, I would think.

Scott: A very heady experience. Extremely heady experience. You know, sort of coming out of nowhere with no particular political background and mingling with as great a man—when I say great, I mean a legendary, top-quality, incredible human being—as Phil Hart. To get in the rough-and-tumble of how to—you know, here was this fight going on between Congressman O'Hara and Congressman Vander Jagt, and they wouldn't speak to each other. Interecine battles, and how do you get—? You just get Governor Romney, and then he's out, and then his successor, how do you get them? Just all of those things. It was extraordinarily heady. We had a terrific time doing it. I, for the life of me, don't remember how I ever got any schoolwork done. I must have been taking some classes. Maybe not.

Lage: Maybe not. You were writing your thesis.

Scott: And again, the capacity to see the process from all sides.

It was my introduction to the Sierra Club, which I loved—. I relished this. The local—there were some funny people. Dick Cellarius and I laugh about it to this day because we have followed each other around in our further Sierra Club involvement, but the funny people that were on the executive committee and those funny things that we would get ourselves into.

Lage: In the chapter?
Scott: In the chapter. And the Brower fight and all of that, which might have been a real turn-on, might have been terribly absorbing and destructive, but I didn't get interested in the Sierra Club as a social organization. I didn't get interested in it as an internal apparatchik. I got interested in it as a vehicle for doing this political work for this particular area at a time when it was very easy and lots of people got distracted off into all the internal brouhaha. I think that was terribly important in my learning to sort of keep my eye on the ball.

I was also picking up cues and advice and models and a lot of positive feedback about my work from Sierra Club people: people in Michigan, Mike McCloskey, Ed Wayburn, and others. But I was able to trade off the kind of Sierra Club perspective of how you did things against my intense involvement with the Wilderness Society. And they had different styles. I was molded out of some funny combination of the two.

Lage: Shall we save that for next time, or can you put that together, because I know it's important.

Scott: I guess I would summarize it this way, that the Sierra Club was—. Well, the Wilderness Society was a Washington-based, staff-run organization which also had the essential function of being the real keepers of the flame of the fundamental truths of wilderness. The executive council, the council, and I got to go to these meetings. I sat at the feet of Sigurd Olson. I was wet behind the ears. There wasn't anybody else within thirty years of my age at some of these meetings. Or twenty years, anyway. And there I was with Sigurd Olson; Ernest Griffith, this man that Zahnie had worked with in the forties on the Wilderness Bill; George Marshall, Bob's brother; James Marshall, Bob's other brother, one of the founders of NRDC. Just this incredible group of people, plus my staff colleagues: Brandborg, Mike Nadel, and others.

That, plus my research, plus my dabbling, made me feel an incredible, conscious, purposeful sense of continuity, with a history that I hadn't been part of but that I had, thanks to my draft board [laughs], immersed myself in, and a style which emerged. Then there was the Sierra Club, which had the grass-roots side. The grass-roots side of the Wilderness Society was intense, but it was mostly in writing. It was mostly mailers and things of that kind. Very important, and I became a great advocate of it. The Sierra Club wasn't doing much in the way of that kind of mailing of outreach of information on a mass basis.

[End Tape 4, Side B]

[Begin Tape 5, Side A]

Scott: What I was learning from the Sierra Club was sort of a whole different grass-roots perspective. Organization, keeping a little chapter going, how to put stuff in the newsletter. During all of '69, in every issue of the Mackinac newsletter, there were anonymous updates by the Sleeping Bear Dunes Task Force on Sleeping Bear, usually in the front page. I wrote them all, but in sending them to the editor, there was my little note: "Don't put my name in here," because I was working for Senator Hart at the
time and he had some sense of allegations of conflict. But learning how that whole organizational mechanism worked, and being able to go out to the Sleeping Bear Dunes and to talk to those local people and to figure out what their problems were and how to help generate the publicity and figure out the political organizing angle.

I don't think, looking back where I went subsequently, that I could have had a better initiation, better combination of things, that equipped me to be what somebody in some analysis called a "transitional figure." I think it was NRDC's magazine at one point was doing something about the history of the environmental movement, and I was characterized as a "transitional figure." I think that's fair. I was there long before Earth Day, long before—. There were a couple of other people my age running around in Washington sort of doing this stuff, but there weren't the hordes that there are now. So I was able to be—

So I was able to be a principal in things that today it would be very hard for a junior person coming in to have anything like that sense of being totally involved. I fell in love with the work. I absolutely had a love affair with the Congress. This institution that somebody like me, with no political background. I remember one time when I was a park ranger I had on my uniform a nametag that said "W. Scott." I remember a frequent question was, "How did you get this job?" People would ask you on the tours. I remember somebody saying, "Oh, Scott. You must be related to Senator Hugh Scott, that's how you got this job."

No political background. I mean, none of this, but simply by cause of temperament or something else, and by a love of the cause, I wanted to do, and with writing and so forth, was able to do. I felt a huge loyalty—based on the study of Zahniser and on my work there—all through the early seventies I felt a huge loyalty to the Wilderness Society. That was my home. It was the place that had some qualities to it of—. It was in Washington, and much as I worked with Lloyd Tupling and others in the growing Washington office of the Sierra Club, my spiritual center place was the Wilderness Society. And if you'd said to me early in that period that I would end up being on the staff of the Sierra Club, I would have been very surprised, and probably disagreed fairly vehemently.

Lage: Even though you worked so closely with the Mackinac Chapter.

Scott: Just because I had a sense that the Wilderness Society had its hand on a more focused approach to how you did things. We talked earlier about a certain sense that the Sierra Club people kind of dropped into Washington and did their thing.

That Wilderness Society—and we'll talk about it in detail—that I worked for part time and around the edges and flying in and out from Michigan, '68 to '73, that Wilderness Society does not exist. It has not existed since about 1975. The organization went through—.

And funny, here was the Sierra Club that had this huge, internal fracas that was on the front pages, and blood in the sand, and all of that. But, largely owing, I felt, to two
people: one, the character of Mike McCloskey, who was the continuity figure; and to Dave's very constructive way of saying, "I'm going to honor the Sierra Club even though—." I mean, he could have been much more bitter than he was. To look back and say that the Sierra Club's been a stable organization for as long as I've known it and that the Wilderness Society that exists today in 1990 is four generations removed from and totally different from the organization I worked for, it is no longer the keeper of the flame. It has forgotten its institutional history or has twisted what it knows of its institutional history to its own purposes. It is not a bastion of grass roots, cooperative, self-effacing—. Which was one of Zahniser's characteristics.

He gave a speech one time about—there's some quote about—if somebody's fighting, you draw the circle to make it bigger, to get them in. I mean, this was just his sense. And Brandborg had some of that. That Wilderness Society is a nostalgic thing to me because it no longer exists, and some of the functions that it performed, like the keeping-of-the-flame function, aren't being performed at all any more, which I think is very sad.

Lage: We'll talk about that more.

Scott: What we haven't covered is the teaching, the Earth Day stuff, and the early Wilderness Society.

Lage: Let me ask you a quick question.

Scott: We've sure done Sleeping Bear Dunes. [laughs]

Lage: We got that pretty good.

I'm doing a little project on Point Reyes, on this same time period, the effort to get increased appropriations, which was going on just parallel to Sleeping Bear Dunes and ended in the early seventies.

Scott: Yes. That was a huge jump, too. It had to go from some very small number. Was it $62 million or something like that?

Lage: Oh, yes, it was a huge jump. But it was all tied into whether Nixon would release the Land and Water Conservation Fund. He had basically frozen it and said, "Yes, we have this fund but I'm not going to release funds." And it seemed to be Point Reyes that broke open the Land and Water Conservation Fund, partly through John Saylor. Did you get in on any of that?

Scott: I was aware of it all, but there was in the late sixties and early seventies far more work to be done than either the Wilderness Society or the Sierra Club could do, and those were the only games in town on this stuff. You'd sometimes get the Wildlife Federation interested in some of these things. Audubon was represented by one person who was sort of available sometimes to help, but the public lands stuff was being done by the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society, and there was a highly informal
divvying up. There were just things and places and California was just substantially the Sierra Club's deal. So the Point Reyes thing was handled, as far as I know, by the Sierra Club—

Lage: Sierra Club and ad hoc.

Scott: And ad hoc people, and what was that congressman's name?

Lage: Bizz Johnson—

Scott: Well, yes, but who was the congressman that was killed in the plane crash?

Lage: Clem Miller.

Scott: Clem Miller, yes. And then Mrs. Miller. Now, I knew some of those people, and I knew that was going on.

Lage: I'm thinking about this breaking open of the Land and Water Conservation Fund by the Point Reyes campaign, which seems to have been necessary, perhaps, for Sleeping Bear six months later.

Scott: The Johnson administration, Johnson was as close to the New Deal as you could be, and there was, "Why not spend?" We were spending ourselves into deep trouble on Vietnam already, but they were spending for the War on Poverty, and they were spending for parks, and they supported all this stuff and had this incredible team of people—Stewart Udall and so forth—who were working on these things, and they were a Democratic administration with a Democratic Congress wanting to do all these things. So they just did them, and they did them fairly well.

Aspinall, a Democrat, was the one real sticker. He had single-handedly blocked the Wilderness Act for three or four years in the early sixties. The last phone call John Kennedy before he left Washington to go to Dallas was a phone call to Aspinall where they did the deal on the Wilderness Act, on Aspinall's terms, I might add. He was a cagey old guy.

So Johnson was carrying on that legacy, and the floodgates were substantially open. The Land and Water Conservation Fund had been established in '64, and also a thing called the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation to administer it and to administer a big demonstration project, federal thing. This is an agency that no longer exists. In its latter days it was turned into the Heritage Conservation Agency or something, and James Watt ran it.

Lage: No wonder it no longer exists.

Scott: Before Reagan. So here was a whole bureaucracy moving these things positive to them. The regional office of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation in the Midwest was in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The regional director, a politically astute guy, came and spoke
in my classes, and I got to know him. He was a source of advice. Though not somebody I was terribly close to, there was a guy named Roman Koenings, maybe. So there was this whole huge bureaucracy to promote all this stuff.

So Nixon comes along, and he's still got this expensive war, getting more expensive, and I'm sure that there were deficit worries and all that at the time. Aspinall had played this game of saying, "Since we don't have enough money in the Land and Water Conservation Fund and we have a larger backlog of authorized but unappropriated acquisitions—Cape Cod, Point Reyes, places where the land values—." The federal government had said, "We're going to make this a national park and we're going to buy it." Well, zingo.

Lage: That was $17 million originally, too, like Point Reyes.

Scott: Right. What that said was, if you can get this property to appreciate, you've got a willing buyer. So the properties just went sky-high. One of the things we knew about Sleeping Bear was we had to get a good number in there, and we had to get the appropriations and we had to get going, because it included time tables. If you didn't buy the property within a particular time—this was part of what Vander Jagt put in it—then you lost the power of condemnation in certain zones within the park.

And you're right, my recollection is that Cape Cod had broken the barrier of "We will acquire lands for the national parks." Back in the old days, in the Franklin Roosevelt administration, Shenandoah and Great Smokies were purchased by the states and gifted to the federal government to make national parks. Those were largely private lands too. There were school children all over the country sending their pennies and their milk money to raise the money to buy the Great Smokies, because the federal government would not spend a nickel on private land. Well, Cape Cod broke that, so then now you had this huge need, so then they invented the Land and Water Conservation Fund.

Then they augmented it in '68 with this bill which I worked on when it passed the House in the early part of that summer of '68, which tapped into the offshore oil revenues. Because Aspinall said, "We're not passing any more parks, because we haven't got this money, because we've got this backlog." And Point Reyes was one of—. My recollection is that the differential between the original Point Reyes Act authorization, which in my memory, very faint, is that it was like $7 million or something.

Lage: I think it was $17 to $57.

Scott: Yes. It was something. Just some enormously dramatic leap, and everybody just about choked. Well, the other thing that was going on at this time was we were passing the first redwoods bill, which was acquisition from big industrial concerns.

Lage: And in the same county.
Scott: Right. The same congressional district. Do you know how much we've paid for Redwood National Park? It had a second bill in the seventies.

Lage: I don't know the final figure. I'm sure it's giant.

Scott: One billion. One billion dollars. Every now and then I say, "Oh, this is Mike McCloskey and Ed Wayburn, the fathers of the $1 billion national park." Well worth it, I'm sure.

So you knew if you were in this lakeshore-seashore private land acquisition business, you were going to have huge opposition. Typically, the Park Service made the opposition worse because they would come in with a hard line. They did this in Michigan. I heard the story directly from Senator Hart, who was there.

There was some kind of big public briefing after the study that the federal government did in the early sixties up there, in Leelanau County. Connie Wirth, then the director of the Park Service, was asked by some little old lady who was a retired schoolteacher and the darling of the community, "What's going to happen to my house?" He says, "We're going to condemn it." It was some kind of just—. And they threw things at Hart. People shook his car. They got in his car and were shaking it. I mean, there was just violent opposition, which everyone up there remembered: "They're going to take what's-her-name's—." "They're going to condemn our property." It took years to overcome that much stronger opposition. Someplace here I've got a letter in which Hart just says, "I think Connie Wirth made it significantly worse."

So you could have opposition. It was going to be expensive, and once you got it authorized, the land values were really going to take off. So how did that work? Did you—? And you had to get this money, and there was a war on. It was a rough, rough time. What do presidents have to do with this stuff? At some terribly esoteric level, in a one-minute conversation—"Oh, yes, go ahead, Stu, do that"—the policy gets established that we're going to go out and create national parks. If it hadn't been Lyndon Johnson's administration that sort of set all this up—.

Now, I want to say it's not widely appreciated that the Nixon administration, possibly having a little to do with Richard Nixon himself, was very good on public land and park and wilderness issues. They were very productive, they were supportive, excellent people in the bowels of the administration. Undersecretary Train—and Hickel, after the big brouhaha of the Sierra Club, had moved in. Hickel was reasonably constructive on most things. He was replaced by a congressman who'd been on the House Interior Committee that came from Maryland, so he wasn't a captive of all the western issues, and who'd been a former head of the Republican Party, Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior. His assistant secretary for national parks and wildlife refuges was Nathaniel Reed, a great friend of the environment. There were people in the White House. [John] Ehrlichman himself was pretty positive on this stuff. He was kind of an outdoorsy guy who came from Seattle. He had a deputy named John Whitaker who was terrific, as a wet-behind-the-ears, twenty-six-year-old, way-out-of-his-depth fellow.
I was in and out of the White House during the Nixon administration many times. I was in and out of the Interior Department all the time. I was in and out of the White House many times, talking to people like John Whitaker, getting things changed. I remember the wilderness proposal for Point Reyes, which came along in the late sixties or early seventies. We, the Wilderness Society, had the agencies wired for sound, and there were people who were on the governing council of the Wilderness Society, there were senior staff people on the Park Service. The head of the Wilderness Program for the Fish and Wildlife Service was hired in 1970, became my boss at the Wilderness Society, a man named Harry Crandall. And these were all—. There was just this pattern of relationships.

Lage: I didn't realize that about the Nixon administration. I knew that when Carter came in there would be people—.

Scott: No, this was—. In some ways it was stronger during the Nixon years. These were really good career people, and Nixon, unlike Reagan, didn't zap out the career people. We would learn that the Park Service proposal, we would know what it was. They'd had their proposal, they'd had their public hearing, and here was what they were going to recommend. We'd go to Reed and say, "This is terrible." He'd call in George Hartzog, the director of the Park Service: "This is terrible. Redo it." And he'd do it.

Hartzog would fight bitterly over it. Just for two years he stopped doing any wilderness studies. He just lost complete interest in the thing, and we had a huge fight about that. But then if it ultimately came up from the secretary of Interior that it wasn't good enough, we would go to the White House. We'd go to Whitaker, or in one case, to Ehrlichman himself, and back it would go. Telling their people they're unhappy about this.

Lage: You have to get to your next appointment. But this is something we want to talk about in greater depth.

Scott: Yes, this is where we go next.

[End Tape 5, Side A]

[Tape 5, Side B not recorded]
Today is November 26, 1990, and this is the third interview with Doug Scott. We're going to start with a little follow-up on last week. When you talked about Sleeping Bear, you didn't mention actual lobbying of the White House, which I noted occurred from an article you gave to me. They say here that in the summer of '69 you went directly to the White House.

Scott: Yes. Particularly Virginia Prentice and I, and working with Muriel Ferris and Bill Shands. Once we'd kind of gotten the lay of the land in the Congress, we were confronted by a sort of a high hurdle race. As is true in many legislative situations—and this one was sort of classic—you've got to get over every hurdle, and as soon as you get over one you just discover a long line of them that you've still got to get over, and if you knock any one of them down, you're out.

We started reinvigorating the efforts on Capitol Hill and putting a lot of energy into the speeches and the cosponsorships and all that sort of thing, but we quickly came to grips with the fact that Chairman Aspinall, either formally or informally, was saying that there were three or four things that had to be done.

One, which we talked about, was getting all the Michigan congressional delegations united in supporting the legislation. Another was the question of the administration. Whereas, of course, Senator Hart had had the extreme help of the Johnson administration and Secretary Udall, with the Nixon administration the budget situation was such that there wasn't a lot of money. There was backlog that we talked about for appropriations of funds for parks that were already authorized. The Bureau of the Budget got in a very public statement that they simply weren't going to be requesting in the budget all the funding, even for the existing parks, and therefore they weren't going to be recommending new ones.

Lage: They weren't going to use the Land and Water Conservation Fund?

Scott: And they weren't going to use the Land and Water Conservation Fund. They were not going to fully fund what was authorized. One of the little hurdles that Chairman Aspinall clearly was going to fall back on was that he wanted more funding for the parks, too, so he was saying, "No more parks. No more new parks until the White House cleans up its act." And that was carried on as a much larger fight, which I was involved in around the edges, but the whole environmental movement was worked up about that. I was just looking at an entire October 1969 newsletter, twelve pages long, from the Conservation Foundation, not a particularly radical organization, all about the administration's "no new parks" policy: "Budget Knife Hits Land and Water Conservation Fund."

But the other little technical thing that Aspinall would want was a report from the administration on its views, in detail, on the Sleeping Bear Dunes legislation. There
had been a report back in '66, I guess, the last time the bill had passed the Congress, but the bills were sent over with a formal request from the House committee for the administration's views and simply nothing happened, partly because of this budget mess and partly for other reasons we didn't understand.

So sometime, I suspect it was in the summer of 1969, Virginia Prentice came to Washington, and she and I and I believe someone from the Sierra Club staff or the Wilderness Society staff—I believe it was not just the two of us, but it may have been—made an appointment and went to see the Bureau of the Budget people in the old executive office building, which is part of the White House compound, to say, "Hey, come on. We want to talk to you about Sleeping Bear Dunes and get this moving." And of course we were urging and colluding with Muriel and Bill Shands so that the pressure was coming from the Hill, from people saying, "Let's move on this."

But the Bureau of the Budget, particularly in that era, was a power of its own. It just sort of survived. It didn't matter what party was in the White House; they just did their thing. I remember my overwhelming impression in this very ornate room. I fell in love with the old executive office building. It's a gorgeous old gingerbread affair. The room that we met with these folks in was rather gray in decor. These people, I joked later that if you turned your head away and looked back, the grayness of these bureaucrats with the Bureau of the Budget sort of faded into the wall.

The Bureau of the Budget handled all of the—it's now called the Office of Management and Budget—handled all of the legislative clearance; not just the money, but the legislative clearance, so we worked on the White House Bureau of the Budget to try and blast a report out.

Lage: Do you remember the results of that meeting?

Scott: Ultimately, I think we cleared up some ideas in their mind. A huge issue in the Sleeping Bear Dunes was the question of how much property would be acquired, what would it cost, what were the protections for private property owners to be—

Lage: So they were concerned with those issues, not just how much it would cost?

Scott: A big concern to people in the kind of position that the Bureau of Budget was in was, "Well, gee, what kind of precedents are we setting? If we do it here, will people all say, 'Look at the way we did it there?'" So I think our role was mostly to say, "What kind of problems have you got? How can we help you overcome the problems you have?" The whole conservation movement at that point, and the senators and congressmen from many states that were all part of this backup, powerful people and Republicans as well as Democrats, were putting increasing heat on the administration to come across on parks. Secretary of the Interior Hickel was giving speeches about how important parks were and so forth.
Lage: And urban parks, like Sleeping Bear Dunes.

Scott: And we stressed that Sleeping Bear Dunes was within a day's drive of 25 million people. So it was a constant effort in 1969 to press these things forward. I don't remember a particular visit to the White House. We may well have, though in Washington DC parlance, "White House" means the whole compound, not just the—

Lage: This article might not be completely accurate, but they imply that when you were rebuffed by the Interior Department and Bureau of the Budget, you went directly to the White House and played on its eagerness to get on the right side of young people and the ecology issue. So that's just something that probably has faded out of your memory.

Scott: Well, now, wait a minute. Now that is coming back. That is coming back now. Let me work on this for a minute. Yes. Sometime in 1969—this was a larger meeting—we had a meeting that involved Chuck Colson, who was the famous Nixon aide that said he'd walk over his grandmother, of later Watergate fame. In his office he was rather rude to us. A number of, it might have been six or eight, people had a meeting with him at which we were bellyaching about the park's problem and other problems with the administration.

I remember making the case that the upsurge of student enthusiasm, the burgeoning campus teach-in movement—so this was either late fall of '69 or maybe even into early '70—was such that there was going to be this new political reality of youth and that they had to deal with that. Now, of course, this was in the Nixon administration where the thing they were having to deal with the young people was the war. So here we were saying, "Here's something else you have to worry about that young people are going to get concerned with." I remember playing on that case to say, "Here's another constituency that you have to worry about." The specifics of our work with the White House elude me at this point, but I do remember the meeting with Colson where we made that case, and I think the meeting involved a number of other, younger leaders of one sort or another, but my memory is hazy.

Lage: Okay. Well, that's good. So let's leave Sleeping Bear Dunes again, and we were going to talk about the teach-in in March '70 and Earth Day. Where did you want to start with that?

Scott: I'm going to talk first I think mostly about the environmental teach-in in Ann Arbor, the University of Michigan. The summer of '69, I've now clarified. I worked in Washington that summer three days a week for Senator Hart and two days a week for the Wilderness Society, and I have some contemporary correspondence I was looking at in which I gloat over the fact that this kind of allowed me to play both ends against the middle sometimes, particularly in my dealings with the Interior Department.

I returned to Ann Arbor in August of that year and was continuing my pattern of working with the Sierra Club Chapter on the Sleeping Bear Dunes, being in regular touch with people in Washington, and keeping involved in whatever the current
wilderness issues that were moving along in the Congress were. But I was also still a student and a teaching assistant and hanging around the School of Natural Resources. I very clearly remember one day which probably was in late September of 1969, several people bumping into each other in the hall and saying, "Hey, a group of us thought we ought to get together and talk about an idea that's come up for a teach-in on the environment." In that era, a teach-in was a well-understood phenomenon. The University of Michigan, I think, is where they started—some special events at which the faculty and the students would talk in sort of an extracurricular way, particularly the teach-ins against the war. So the concept of the teach-in was a well-understood one.

Later we determined that the idea of doing such a thing at the University of Michigan occurred to a Japanese student in the Department of Japanese Studies or something of that effect. At least I had a clipping from the Detroit Free Press of January 4, 1970, in which one of my colleagues in the original organization was quoted as saying, "The idea didn't even originate in the School of Natural Resources. Somebody in the School of Japanese Studies suggested the possibility to a graduate student who was in botany, who got together with a friend." In any event, I was drawn into this little circle of people. We had a brown-bag lunch and got all excited about all the possibilities.

So we called a larger meeting, and that meeting was held on October 9, 1969, in one of the classrooms in the School of Natural Resources. Some thirty people from the School of Natural Resources, the Engineering School, the natural sciences departments, met to discuss this whole thing, the faculty and students from the outset. Typed up in the dittoed notes of that meeting which were circulated, first a general status report, one of the first things we did was decide there had to be some leadership. A fellow from the botany department named David Allen and myself were designated as an executive committee.

Then this started snowballing immediately. The following day there was a meeting of the objectives committee. My status report that covers that meeting is very funny. It talks about from the beginning of the discussion, two blocks of opinion were evident. Generally, one group felt strongly that pitching the teach-in event to radicals in radical terms and by radical methods was undesirable; that this might well, they pointed out, alienate many people from environmental issues. The other group of opinion emphasized that to be anything more than a typical educational venture, which was unlikely to really change anybody's level of commitment or action, would require aiming the teach-in at influential people, particularly on campus, and generating a pervasive sense of outrage over environmental screw-ups.

Then it talks about there was a long, seldom-quiet discussion, and I do remember this. Finally, we were getting absolutely nowhere, so everyone in the room was asked two questions, and we all agreed not to interrupt, thirty people, to go around and answer two questions: who should the audience be, and what is the desired outcome? Once we did that, we kind of all saw that our earlier disagreement was sort of semantic. It says in my notes, "The radicals admitted that they did not mean anti-social, violent, or hopelessly irrational upheaval and shouting about environmental issues. Rather, it was
their intent that the nature of the subject matter and its presentation during the teach-in would generate a sense of constructive outrage amongst the participants. Similarly, the anti-radicals admitted that they did not intend the teach-in to be merely a PTA-style presentation, but rather—"

Lage: Are these your notes here?

Scott: This is a dittoed, first-action report that we sent around to people.

So we finally decided that the audience would be the general university community and citizen influentials, and the general citizens secondarily, and that the desirable outcome is to generate an increased awareness of the crisis in the environment and opportunities for constructive action, and to motivate people from all walks of life towards a commitment to action. So you can see that we were having really good debates about sort of general philosophy from the outset.

Lage: Did you see it as a chance to create a constituency that would help in Washington?

Scott: Oh, sure. One of the key things about the teach-in in Ann Arbor, and I think I was particularly influential in this just because of where I was coming from, was that our image of what we were going to do was very broad. It was always conceived from day one to be students, faculty, and the community, and with outreach far beyond that. It was always intended to be political, it was always intended to be linked up with ongoing issues in the state legislature, the city government of Ann Arbor, the county, things that were going on there, and things that were going on in Congress. We passed resolutions about Sleeping Bear Dunes, and guess whose influence that was? [laughs] Our newsletters always had little stuff about what were currently issues in the national debate.

From the outset, this thing just got away from us. We never in our wildest imagination conceived at the outset how big it was going to be. We were just dumbfounded. I remember very clearly after the thing was over, and being in the press room just exhausted. I don't think I'd slept for five days, quite literally. A fellow from Science magazine, Luther Carter, a reporter from Science magazine who covered the teach-ins, came wandering in. He'd been kind of pals with us. He'd hung around for a week or so. I remember him saying to a couple of us—we were pasty white, exhausted people, just unbelievably exhausted, and still on a huge adrenilin high—he said, "You know, you guys are never going to organize anything this big again in your lives." [laughter] I remember just being dumbfounded by that because, I was, you know, twenty-five years old.

Lage: Now, why did it get so carried away?

Scott: We were in the forefront of something very big that went on in the country, and it wasn't that Doug Scott or Gaylord Nelson came up with some grand plan and pulled it over. There was something going on in the drinking water or in the air, in the whole country, that mushroomed in the fall of ’69 into the Earth Day movement. We were on
the very forefront of that. So we went into this with a common attitude—it's always been an attitude of mine and it was one that was shared by the people who got involved in this—which was "We are going to set no artificial limits on our ambitions for this thing."

What surprised us was that it kept growing beyond our wildest ambitions, but we never said, "Well, it's only going to have a budget of $5,000," or "It's only going to be a two-day thing," or "We won't be interested in reaching the press outside of Detroit." We always were expansive about it. We always had it in mind that the organization we created to bring off this thing, which was a student, faculty, and community organization, would be a continuing thing. The teach-in was just the first project of what was going to be a permanent organization.

Lage: And what was that organization?
Scott: It was called ENACT. Environmental Action for Survival, Incorporated. The short version of that is ENACT, and it became very widely known as ENACT, but that was short for Environmental Action.

Well, getting back to the continuity, we had another general meeting, one of these sort of brown-bag lunchtime meetings on October 16, 1969, and at that one, in addition to many of the people who were at the first meeting on October 9, there were another twenty people that showed up, students and faculty, to continue this. At this meeting we had some more discussion about who it was we were trying to reach, and again, I have detailed notes that went on about sort of the philosophy of the thing. We were then aiming for an event in late February or early March of 1970.

The idea crystallized from this Japanese student somehow or other, and we got going, and I remember very clearly, and I think it was on the date of this October 16, 1969, meeting that someone came in—me or someone who read *Time* magazine came in. The old *Time* magazine had a little column, just little squibs of things, and there was a little note there that Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin, a U.S. senator, was running around promoting the idea that in the spring of 1970 there should be teachins on the environment on the campuses all across America. We were somewhat annoyed, or felt sort of like our idea had been swiped, that here was somebody promoting this same idea. On the other hand, we weren't all that annoyed. It seemed like a very good thing. Nelson's call was October 15. I have some note here, so this was all coming together at the same time.

Well, as it happened, just a circumstance, Art Hansen was I think a zoology student—. No, he was a fisheries, a Canadian fisheries student, I believe, who became our treasurer. He was from Fish and Wildlife; he was a graduate student. He had gotten himself invited to a student conference held in Washington DC, October 23 to 26 of 1969, sponsored by an outfit called the Institute for the Study of Health and Society. This was later using, I think, federal money from HEW or someplace to put on educational things for students. They were holding a series of these that fall, and the first one was about environment. Art Hansen applied and went to this thing, which
was held at Aerlie House, a prestigious conference center outside Washington DC. Art made a lot of contacts with other students and with prominent people that spoke at this conference, including Senator Nelson, and walked into Senator Nelson's office while he was there in the Washington area, and said, "Hey, we're doing this."

We were, in the person of Art Hansen, the first people to come in off the street into Senator Nelson's office and say to a very beleaguered staff man named John Heritage, who was a former Christian Science Monitor reporter who was one of Nelson's aides, "Hey, we're really doing this." So we established a liaison with Senator Nelson back to the point when his advocacy of this was just speechmaking and when his office was getting inundated by people sending in cards and saying, "Hey, we heard you were talking about this. Send us information." They hadn't anything prepared. So we, from the outset, the University of Michigan crowd, was linked up with the national operation.

We went on through, in late October or maybe very early November, we decided that the next thing to do was to hold what was known on the University of Michigan campus as a mass meeting in order to see who would come. We made a huge, big banner and stretched it out across the center of the campus, diagonal, and said that at seven o'clock one evening there was going to be this mass meeting about a teach-in on the environment held in the undergraduate library.

Lage: Just the phrase "mass meeting" comes right out of the antiwar—

Scott: That's right. This was the standard thing you did if you wanted to get something going on this campus. Three hundred and fifty people came. There weren't enough chairs; there were people standing around the edges. I mean, we were there for hours. People were just incredibly—. And there were people from the community, there were people from all over the university, and this is a huge university.

Lage: Now, what kind of people came? Did you get people who came out of the black power movement or out of the antiwar movement?

Scott: We got all sorts of people. They were people who were attracted by the interest in environment. We very quickly had to get a much more thorough organization underway, and we did so with David Allen and myself as co-chairmen, and a publicity committee and a finance committee and an interdepartmental coordination committee which had about fifty people—every department in the university was represented—and a community outreach committee.

Lage: Were you a prime organizer?

Scott: I was a prime—. Dave Allen and I were the people who were sort of pulling this together, but then there was a steering committee made up of the chairs of each of these different committees. We started having newsletters and weekly meetings of the steering committee, and again, there was a program committee. We began putting together all the pieces of this operation. So that by the end of November and
December of '69, we had a very large thing underway and had established a pretty thorough organization, and were clearly out ahead of any other campus in the country in terms of the scale on which we were planning, and the date.

The reason for the date, and it's very crucial to how successful this thing was, the University of Michigan was then on a trimester system, so it was done with finals and dismissed for the year by April 22. So April 22 having been set by Nelson and his friends for the environmental teach-in for whatever reason nationally, we couldn't do it then, so we had to go earlier. So that also emboldened us. We thought, "We're going to be the prototype." So we ultimately, after a great fishing around, settled on March 11 through 14 of 1970 and there we are, a five-day program with all kinds of activities planned. We had a little office in the basement of the School of Natural Resources, and pretty soon we had a second one. One was sort of our working office and one was where people could come in and chit-chat.

We went fairly early to the university administration and said we'd like their support and assistance. The president of the university, Robin Fleming, came across with $5,000, which was packaged in the form of two fellowships, so Dave and I both dropped out of school but were considered continuing students to keep my draft board happy and had a stipend from the university to be full-time organizers of this thing. And then we started raising money elsewhere. I remember Art Hansen did a preliminary budget that was $60,000 or $70,000, and we all nearly choked to death. The first big money we raised other than from the university was $5,000 from Dow Chemical, which couldn't get a recruiter—with napalm and all that stuff—couldn't get a recruiter anywhere near the campus.

Lage: Did that go—

Scott: We put on pressure. We said, "There's $5,000 we got from Dow Chemical to work on environmental awareness, and that's $5,000 they aren't going to do whatever stuff they were going to do with it."

Lage: Did you get flak about that, though? Those were days when people were very—

Scott: We knew that we might get flak, so we were just very open about it. We said, "Money is green," and they didn't try and put the muscle on us at all. The president of Dow Chemical came and spoke at the high school during the teach-in at one of our events that was on at one high school. That was the only event for which we had an elaborate—. We had police security and an elaborate getaway plan and how to get him in and how to get him out and all that. It was the first time anybody connected with Dow Chemical had been anywhere near Ann Arbor, Michigan, in years.

Lage: Did it go over well?

Scott: It went over fine. Part of this was that the group was sufficiently broad from the very outset, and as these sort of funny discussions about radical versus not radical implied, we in some way had the wit to be so broad in our conception of what we were doing
that most everybody felt they had a place at the table. Before we got done we had this enormous, unwieldy steering committee. There were three or four active SDS Weathermen types and a fellow from the other end of the spectrum who was a very conservative Young Republican type. His name was John Turner. John is today the administrator of the Fish and Wildlife Service in Washington after a long career in the state legislature in Wyoming. Very successful.

Lage: Now, how did all these people sit at the table together?

Scott: We had a big group.

Lage: Were there efforts to compromise, or was there a lot of wild arguing that went on?

Scott: The steering committee was in fact mostly only ratifying the work of a whole series of specialized committees, and people had a piece of the action. There was a committee called the Action Committee, which was sort of about demonstrations and stuff. They said, "We want to do a bunch of things. We want to take a car and beat it to a pulp with sledgehammers." "Fine. Go right ahead." Our attitude was, collectively, this was an opportunity for people to express these issues and to pose solutions of every kind. The consumers, the people that come, can pick and choose, and that breadth was the secret to keeping the whole thing going.

We very early fastened upon a logo, and we stole it from the War Resisters' League. Some piece of their literature came across our desk that said, "Give peace a chance," so we swiped from that our motto, which was "Give Earth a chance." We had a button with a little picture of the earth surrounded by, in big letters, "Give Earth a chance." On the rim of the button, if you'd look at it sideways, it said "Copyright ENACT" and our address. We ultimately sold hundreds of thousands of those buttons. We were ordering 20,000 at a time, selling them not only on our campus to raise money for this thing but getting batch orders from all over hell and gone. The button ultimately ran in Newsweek magazine. This was just one of the thousand little ways that we were raising money.

I stressed that we were collaborating with the university administration. Early on we fell in with and got the support of excellent people at the publicity department, the university's administrative P.R. operation. So there was a University of Michigan, not an ENACT press release, but a University of Michigan press release, sometimes every other day. All during this buildup, some interesting thing: "Here's the latest things that are going to happen in the high school." "Here's the latest—." And these were sent all over Michigan and beyond, and got a lot of good attention. We had a newsletter that came out every week, we had reading lists, we had all that sort of thing. The program began to fall together.

Lage: I'm going to stop it right here because—

[End Tape 6, Side A]
The program for the teach-in fell together ultimately. We knew we were going to have a huge kick-off. We were going to start with this demonstration and dismembering this automobile for the trial and death of the automobile as an outdoor thing. And then that evening we were going to have our big kick-off event. At first we talked about having it in a place called Hill Auditorium, which was in the center of the campus in sort of a, probably a 4,000 or 5,000-person standard auditorium with a big stage. I remember the sort of fateful day that we decided that this was going to be bigger than that and we moved to the brand-new Chrysler Arena, which is a basketball stadium which held 17,000 people. We sort of thought to ourselves, "Now what have we gotten ourselves into?"

But ultimately we put together a program that attracted a great deal of attention, of interest there. There was something going on all the time. There was a whole symposium that the law school students organized. It was a part of our teach-in but they did all the work on it, on using the law to protect the environment. This was very early—this was actually on March 10—this was very early in the evolution of environmental law. But it was Victor Yannacone, one of the founders of the Environmental Defense Fund and a very flamboyant environmental attorney; Don Harris, one of the founders of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund; and David Dominick, the head of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, a precursor of the EPA.

And then on Wednesday, March 11, we had "The Car Trial and Execution?" it says in the program [laughing], but the car was guilty. And this is the University of Michigan, which is founded and funded by Ford and GM and all those big auto companies. For the evening kick-off rally, we had a neat little ticket printed up and we sold those all over. We were out flogging those tickets that day. Fifty cents. The president of the university was the master of ceremonies; the welcoming remarks by the governor of Michigan; the keynote address by Arthur Godfrey, who drove in in an electric car; a keynote address by Barry Commoner, who had just been on the cover of *Time* magazine.

Lage: Was it difficult to get these people? How did you make those contacts?

Scott: Let me just finish the lineup. Then, and this is why everybody came, I think, then Gordon Lightfoot put on a concert, and the cast of *Hair* from the Chicago company of *Hair*, and I gave a closing statement, which I can't remember. What I do remember in this event, we turned people away from the 17,000-seat basketball arena. There was a huge press contingent and huge floodlights and this big stage set up. We'd spent all day mediating between Gordon Lightfoot, who wanted the sound system rigged one way, and the cast of *Hair*. So he would get it all rigged up and then he would leave, and the cast of *Hair* would come in and change it around.

I came out, and I'd never been on a huge stage with spotlights. You can't see anything. There's these huge lights on you, and the whole place is dark. I was coming out to
announce that the fire marshal had closed the doors and that people couldn't sit in the aisles, and that people needed to calm down because we were going to start. And then my only part of that kick-off was to say, "And now, ladies and gentlemen, from Chicago, the cast of Hair," and out came the cast of Hair singing the "This is the dawning of the age of Aquarius" song.

Lage: It's a wonderful combination of that—

Scott: It sends shivers down my spine. The lead singer—"This is the dawning"—the lead singer's mike didn't work. I died a thousand deaths. But we shoved them all back behind the curtain and somebody said, "It's working now, it's working now." So we just did it again. The place was just hopping.

You asked how we got these people. We'd started clear back in late October, writing to people, calling people, discussing it in our program committee, which was chaired by a fellow named Bill [Pinter?], who later came to Washington and ran a number of environmental groups in Washington. Notably, he was one of the first leaders of the American Rivers Conservation Council. As the scale of this event became clearer, getting the politicians was easier. I didn't mention Gaylord Nelson, who was also present this evening. I think our first effort had been to get Ed Muskie, who was then lining up to be the next Democratic presidential candidate and who was one of the great leaders, particularly in clean air and clean water, in the Congress. Arthur Godfrey had been very active in environmental stuff.

Lage: Did you write to them directly or did you have the president of the university write to them?

Scott: No, no. We went whatever way made sense to get the particular people. I know I ended up talking on the phone with Arthur Godfrey's people. How we found out who they were, I think probably we went through Friends of the Earth because he was connected with Friends of the Earth. He was the honorary chairman of the Coalition Against the SST [Supersonic Transport], which was getting organized at about that time. Barry Commoner, we just called his office at Washington University in St. Louis. Gordon Lightfoot, I suppose we went through his agent. The cast of Hair, my college roommate, who I want to talk about a little further here, later, Chuck Clusen, came from the Chicago suburbs and was down visiting, probably at Thanksgiving or something like that, or Christmas, and was going to see Hair anyway, and he said, "I think I'll see if I can get backstage and see if they would come." He went backstage and they said they would.

Lage: They did? Just like that?

Scott: They came up. They slept on these people's floor; they didn't charge us a nickel. They closed the show in Chicago, came up, and had a wonderful time.

Lage: Did Gordon Lightfoot charge, or was this gratis also?
Scott: Yes. I forget what. He was something of a—. He was a difficult person to deal with. He was very demanding.

There were high school assemblies. Eddie Albert and Arthur Godfrey conducted assemblies at the high schools the next morning. The Michigan Natural Resources Commission, the official body that governs the Department of Conservation in Michigan, held its meeting there. We made a big deal out of this. We had a commission meeting, we had a state legislative committee meeting, and we had a congressional hearing, all as a part of the teach-in. And all sorts of other individual events were going on around the campus and around the community.

There was a symposium on the future of the Great Lakes sponsored by the Sea Grant program of the University of Michigan. There was a whole program about the bridge between ideals and action, a workshop that included Marvin Durning, a prominent Seattle attorney; and Roger Hansen, director of the Rocky Mountain Center on the Environment; and Murray Bookchin, a prominent socialist anarchist sort of fellow; and just a whole lot of others. Donald Jensen, who's now, I think, the head dog of Ford Motor Company but was then one of the upper-level leaders.

There was a symposium on pesticides with Dr. Charles Wurster, who was at that point in time the leading activist on this with the Environmental Defense Fund; and a bunch of people from the School of Public Health. There was an environmental town meeting on the evening of March 12 at the high school, with addresses by Eddie Albert; by a black fellow, C. C. Johnson, the head of Consumer Protection for HEW; and the director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources; and then a panel responding to them made of the local congressmen, the mayor of Ann Arbor, the local state senator, the local state representative, and the principal of the high school.

Lage: It sounds like everybody got in the act.

Scott: On Friday of March 13 there was a congressional hearing about student attitudes toward environmental issues that went on all morning.

Then the afternoon of that Friday there was a huge eco-rally with a local rock band, and the keynote address was given by U.S. Senator Hart, and the closing speech that afternoon was given by Ed Muskie, who couldn't come for the opening event but arranged to come for another event. In the evening there was a big panel, also in the community, in the high school, on the root causes of the environmental crisis with Dr. Lamont Cole, an ecologist from Cornell University; Walter Reuther, president of the UAW; Ted Doan, the president of the Dow Chemical Company; Murray Bookchin, the fellow I mentioned earlier; Dr. Rene Dubos—

Lage: Talking of big names.
Big, big names. By the time this all got rolling, they wanted to be there. We had people calling us. It wasn't just us calling people. Saturday, March 14, there was a Huron River Walk, and Dave Brower was one of the leaders of the walk along the local river. There was a pollution auto control tune-up going on at the auto lab. The auto industry financed this huge lab where they were doing car tune-ups. In the afternoon there was a keynote speech on citizen and political action by Ralph Nader. And in the evening a big discussion on man's future struggle for survival with Dr. Kenneth Boulding, an eminent economist from the University of Colorado; Charles Luce, the chairman of the board of Consolidated Edison from New York City; Dave Brower; Congressman John Dingell; closing remarks by Mayor Richard Hatcher, the black mayor of Gary, Indiana. A very elaborate program, and I'm leaving out—. Then every school, every department, was having little events. We'd simply made it possible for all of this to happen.

At the same time as this was being built up—and again, I think it had something to do with the fact that I came into this with a sense of contact with the environmental community, which would get the Sierra Club in here—I was corresponding back and forth with Mike McCloskey and had sent him a letter in early November. He said he'd be delighted to participate, and it was marked down on his schedule. I was writing him back on December 1 saying we changed the dates, and the Mackinac Chapter's got a bunch of things it's doing on the side, and here are two or three things that we'd like to have you do, and oh, incidentally, why don't we run something about this in the Sierra Club Bulletin, in the new National News Report; and how to write bulk orders for Sierra Club posters, because we'd sell those.

I said to Mike in a letter, December 1, 1969, "The potential of this youth movement is really unlimited but there is a real need, I believe, for leadership and guidance towards the most effective forms of expression and political action. Here, it seems to me, is a major opportunity for the Sierra Club to get involved, particularly by encouraging individual members in the chapters to get involved with a teach-in movement in their area or to stimulate the formation of such groups."

Lage: Now, did that happen?

Scott: Yes. Mike set up a woman named Connie Flateboe. I think I'm not pronouncing her name correctly. They set up a campus representative. There was another fellow named Ron Eber. I got a letter which, bless their hearts, they didn't date. It's called, "Dear folks," and it's saying, "We're going to circulate news of campus conservation activity in a regular special bulletin as an insert in the new National News Report. Here's how you subscribe to it, and here's a list of our chapters around the country for you to get in contact with." So I wrote in January of 1970 to tell Connie all about our teach-in. She was going to come. I said, "Bring lots of Sierra Club stuff. There's some work that we could do with the teach-in and Sleeping Bear and all that kind of stuff."

And by that time we were also in the business of trying to stimulate teach-ins at other campuses. We had a real outreach program. But keeping up with the contact with
Mike, December 30, 1969, I was writing back to Mike further specifying how we thought he could best do this. He was giving me a report in his December 30 letter about, "We're doing a number of things to give an added boost to the teach-in movement. We're bringing out a paperback book with Pocketbooks, Inc., in early April. We're asking college newspapers throughout the country to run a newspaper ad welcoming the teach-in."

So there's a whole list of things that he was suggesting, and I'm back in correspondence saying all this is wonderful. "In my view, the booming youth movement is of historic dimension in its potential impacts on the conservation movement and has huge potential contacts, offers perhaps the single greatest opportunity ever for a quantum jump in active constituency of the movement; and secondly, the activism and concerns of youth can energize the whole movement anew." I'm sending to Mike on January 10: "Finally, I hope you will wear the first of our buttons. One thousand sold in less than a week. You'll note that the slogan which I'm promoting for the national effort is adapted from the peace chant: ‘All we are saying, give Earth a chance.’"

We produced an elaborate fund-raising prospectus for the teach-in sometime in probably about January or so, which was seventeen pages of rhetoric about what the teach-in was going to do and how it related to the national effort and the speakers' bureaus and all the plans that we had, which we used. We ultimately raised just shy of $80,000 to fund this thing.

Another sense of the dimension of it was that we had the press calling us. There were something in the range of sixty presses that covered the teach-in. A lot of Michigan press, of course, but CBS from New York; the Chicago Tribune; Science magazine; Landscape Architecture magazine; "The Huntley-Brinkley Report;" the Chicago Daily News; the Philadelphia Inquirer; the Los Angeles Times; NBC News from Cleveland; the paper from Bloomington, Indiana; Business Week; Columbus, Ohio, television station; ABC News from Chicago; Newsweek; Planned Parenthood. The New York Times—Gladwin Hill, the environmental reporter based in Los Angeles for the New York Times came out, spent the whole week. NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation had a crew of six people that covered the whole thing.

Lage: Did that Japanese student stay active?
Scott: I don't know that I ever met him.
Lage: He just had the idea but he didn't get involved in it.
Scott: I didn't have any connection with it so I just don't know. The Chicago Sun-Times; the University of Massachusetts newspaper from Amherst, Massachusetts. So just an elaborate turnout of media. I remember being interviewed with a huge crowd of students behind me. One of the old ABC national correspondents said, "Well, that's all very well, Mr. Scott, but isn't this just a passing fad with the students?" I gave some rip-snorter answer, and there was this huge cheer behind me. [laughter]
We also had a crew from Westinghouse Television who got a hold of us, and they came and they produced a three-hour documentary, which was run on the Group W network and which I only think I ever saw once. I'd love to lay my hands on it. I have a set of the working scripts, but they filmed all over the place and produced this elaborate deal about the teach-in in March.

So right in the midst of our teach-in, Joseph Kraft called one day and said, "I want to come," and he came and snooped around and wrote his column for the *Washington Post* and his syndicate: "Environmental teach-in stirs pros-cons on Michigan campus. Dateline Ann Arbor, Michigan." It was all about how radical this was or whether it wasn't.

Lage: He put a lot of emphasis on the kind of increasing radicalization of it as it went along. Was that a correct characterization?

Scott: No, I don't think so. I think that was the most interesting thing to newsy people who wanted to see it that way. The thing was very broad. It had radical aspects to it.

Lage: Did it have any part in radicalizing your outlook at all? I know the issues came up about blaming the system and attacking the structure of society, the corporations.

Scott: I think its biggest influence on me was that I became much more educated. I'd been very much a public land person and really still am and always have been, first and foremost, wilderness and parks and so forth. But I got much more educated in and much more aware of the huge support and concern about environmental quality issues and population issues, neither of which were things that I was particularly devoted to. I think that was probably its biggest impact on me. I was twenty-five years old, and I had now by this time spent three years in Washington and in the national environmental movement and working in the Senate and all that sort of stuff, so I think my commitment to work within the system was pretty strongly fixed.

I also had, in speeches that I gave at the time, a common theme. My sense was that radicalism was fine. If you had sort of a radical commitment, I was prepared to be tolerant about it, but I thought you hadn't really earned the right to be radical and say the system sucks and it doesn't work and it won't save the earth unless you tried it. I'd tried it, and I had found it highly responsive. Now, I was trying it on relatively simple-minded things, but I had found that I, as one person, depending on how much energy I wanted to put into it, how hard I wanted to study and learn and get better at how I wanted to build my skills, that I could make the U.S. Congress do what I wanted it to on side issues. So I wasn't about to give up on that.

Furthermore, I have a very strong commitment, and I think always had the theory that a society that turns to anarchy isn't a society that's going to stop pollution. The whole tragedy-of-the-commons thing, if everybody's just looking out for themselves, it doesn't matter how radical they are if they're polluting the creek. So I don't think it had that effect on me.
Lage: I wondered if it was you who influenced the movement to use this energy for political action, for working within the system.

Scott: I think I had a very strong effect on that. Now, with what was going on in the world in 1969, the Sierra Club was very prominent in the news because of its internal troubles, but Dave Brower was becoming even more of a national figure. Friends of the Earth was getting started; there was the fight against the SST going on; the Sierra Club was in the process of breaking out and forming chapters all over the country and had a lot of this same energy that was going into that. There wasn't a huge sense, "Well, this system doesn't work." There was just a huge sense that it hadn't focused itself on this issue, so we sort of had the sense that what we were doing was saying, "Hey, the earth's in trouble. Come on, now, let's get with it." I'm sure many people, having said, "Hey, the earth's in trouble," didn't notice anybody responding and probably either got turned off or got radicalized by that.

Lage: But they hadn't had this experience of making the system work that you had had.

Scott: That's right. And I think that's what I brought to this. Also, this was not just a student group. It wasn't just a bunch of people sort of in some ivory tower or hothouse dreaming up ideas that were completely extraneous to the real world. We had the good effect of faculty, we had practicing attorneys from downtown, and housewives, and city officials, and community people. And it was conceived of that way all along. Everybody was wildly enthusiastic about it. There was always a community outreach group, there was always a guy that was working in the schools, there was always a lady that was working in the churches, there was a little crowd that wanted to set up an ecology center. I'm one of the incorporators of the Ann Arbor Ecology Center. They wanted to have an ecology center. Swell, let's have an ecology center. So we did all of those things.

We also, again, because we were the prototype and because we were going early, we were starting to get an enormous amount of correspondence. I spent a lot of my time responding to correspondence. We finally got a secretary to type all these letters, responding to people's correspondence.

Lage: Getting ready for Earth Day?

Scott: Yes. "We understand you're doing a teach-in. We'd like to do one too." It wasn't until December that the national operation, which I'll talk about here in a minute, got itself organized and had an address and could really be responsive to this stuff, and we were getting a lot of requests. I was increasingly getting invited places and started going around in the speech-giving circuit, which is where my old ranger practice came in handy.

Lage: I was going to ask you, you'd written all these speeches, but had you given many?
Scott: No, but I'd given all these talks as a ranger and clearly had untutored—never took a speech class in my life, thank God—clearly was given a gift for being able to speak in public to people and not have stage fright and not get discombobulated and to be able to project myself. I'd learned to project my voice speaking in a cave. It's a very good place to learn to project your voice. So I started being on the speaker's circuit quite a bit.

In February we held a workshop in Ann Arbor and invited—. I mean, people came from all over hell and gone but it was mostly from schools and universities. Excuse me. In Michigan we sponsored a workshop about environmental teach-ins, and fifty campuses were represented. A little steering committee was set up from people from Antioch College in Ohio; from Ferris State College in Big Rapids, Michigan; from the University of Houghton, Michigan [Michigan Technological University]; and so forth. Two hundred participants listened to speakers, attended workshops, and talked over ideas of how to best approach organizing an environmental action program.

"A great exchange of ideas," said the conference coordinator, who was one of our committees, was intended to do this. "Douglas Scott, co-chairman, developed the main address. He urged delegates to go beyond the talk stages and develop real action projects that will give earth a chance. 'Our generation,' Scott continued, 'has no choice but to live with the problem of pollution and overpopulation, but we do face the choice of letting these unprecedented threats overwhelm us or initiating the hard changes that can change our species and the earth. This means changes in how we do business, in our sense of priorities, and in our individual lifestyles.'" This is a press release from the University of Michigan P.R. department. But people came to that meeting from, amongst other places, the University of New Hampshire and from all around.

To turn slightly to the question of the national teach-in, Art Hansen had gone to this meeting in October in Washington and had gone to talk to John Heritage in Senator Nelson's office. That established our contact. Somehow between then and November 20, and I do not know how, I simply have no memory other than—. I bet you I was in Washington on some Wilderness Society business because I got to know John Heritage and started chatting with him on the phone. On November 20 there was the organizational meeting of the Environmental Teach-In, Inc., which was the Senator Nelson group.

Prior to that time, a woman named Barbara Reid, who was a member of the staff of the Conservation Foundation, and I were corresponding. I don't know how this got started. I think maybe I knew her slightly in Washington when I'd been there in the summers, but I have a letter from her of November 4, 1969: "Dear Doug, How great it was to hear that the University of Michigan is again coming out with the first teach-in on the environment," yak, yak, yak, yak, yak. "I had lunch today with John Heritage at Senator Nelson's office, and [Harold] Bud Jordahl, who is from the University of Wisconsin, and they are all set to go on incorporating a group to start the national organization." Yak, yak, yak, yak, yak.
Lage: Let's put a note in here so people will know, where are these papers [that you are looking at today] going?

Scott: These papers are going to the University of Michigan Bentley Historical Library. All the things connected with my involvement in Earth Day. I think that's the best place for them to go.

Lage: That's good to know. Whoever wants them can find them there.

Scott: Right. But in any event, so this November 20 organizational meeting was held, and I was elected one of the members of the steering committee, it was called, the board of directors of this organization. Just how it happened to be me and not one of our other people, I don't know, but there you are.

It turns out that when Art Hansen had gone to Washington in October, he had gotten a copy of the first draft of a prospectus for a national teach-in on our worsening environment prepared by Fred Dutton, who was a prominent Democratic party kind of organizer type, and presumably prepared at Senator Nelson's request or in some fashion. This is an elaborate document about how such a thing might be organized, but it hadn't gotten very far.

By December 1, Environmental Teach-In, Inc., had been properly established. Common Cause had loaned it office space, and it had gotten organized. Barbara Reid from the Conservation Foundation had come over there. The head of the Conservation Foundation was one of the guys on the steering committee and had loaned some money and loaned some staff to kind of get the thing going.

On December 1, the organization put out a letter. I remember I was in Washington for some reason helping to stamp the envelopes. I mean, this was a hand-done operation. Put out an open letter to the college students of America: "Plans are now well underway for a nationwide teach-in next spring, on Wednesday, April 22, on the grave crisis facing our earth," yak, yak, yak, yak, yak, "signed by," and they had a black student from the Federal City College in Washington; a student from Rockefeller University in New York City; Senator Nelson; Sidney Howe, the president of the Conservation Foundation; Pete McCloskey, the congressman from California, a Republican; and myself, as a student from the University of Michigan; we were the committee for this call to the students of America to do this thing. There was also a letter to university presidents saying, "You ought to help."

In both documents, it said, "As one example of how one university group has proceeded with its planning, we enclose a copy of a memorandum prepared by students at the University of Michigan regarding the teach-in they now have well under way for next spring." It was held out as a prototype, and I had prepared a little two-page memorandum about all the things we were going to do. This was sent out around the country as an example.
Partly because of that, partly because I was on this committee, I started getting asked around for things. This institute that sponsored the student seminar that Art Hansen had gone to in October had one about population in November, which I went to—November 20 through 23 of 1969. Eddie Albert was there and Dave Brower was there and Paul Ehrlich was there and a bunch of other such people.

Lage: I'd forgotten Eddie Albert was so involved.

Scott: Oh, very much so. I made contact with some of those people and asked them, could they help us and could they get involved? With only about a week's notice, I had gotten a call while I was in Washington saying, "Could you at the last minute—"

[End Tape 6, Side B]

[Begin Tape 7, Side A]

Lage: Okay, why don't you repeat about UNESCO Day?

Scott: Kind of at the last minute, the Thirteenth National Conference of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO was having its annual deal in San Francisco November 23-25, 1969, on the theme "Man and His Environment: A View Towards Survival." This was held at the Saint Francis Hotel and had this elaborate planning committee chaired by Huey Johnson and Steven Spurr, who was the former dean of my school at the University of Michigan. I think it was through him that they decided they wanted to have a youth panel, so they wanted me to come to their youth panel.

Well, here was this snazzy conference, "Activism of Youth." The chairman was Nick Robinson who was a member of the United States National Commission for UNESCO and a relatively young fellow who was, of course, an important Sierra Club leader. They had a young professional, they had Stephanie Mills talking about "Ecology of Commitment." Stephanie was from the Sierra Club, has published over the years. "A Young Philosophy Statement" by Dan Rosenberg, who was a somewhat radical young man on the Sierra Club staff. "The Young Generalist and Political Action" taught by Penfield Jensen, graduate student at San Francisco State College. And "Environmental Teach-Ins: A Plan for Action" by Douglas Scott, Ph.D. candidate in forestry, it says here, at the University of Michigan.

Lage: Little did they know. [laughs]

Scott: But I'd met a bunch of people at that event. One of the youth leaders there was Cynthia Wayburn. One of the people I met was Bob Cahn, who was the prize-winning staff correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor. He wrote a series from this conference for the Monitor. On December 4, 1969, his last article was called, "Leaders, Officials, Appear to Welcome Revolt; Youth Takes Over at National Environmental Conference." And it goes on and on about what went on here.
Ed Wayburn and I have reminisced about this any number of times—that the evening before the final day, about forty young men and women gathered in a room to work out a platform, the Youth Platform. For several hours they argued over the proposal. A few adults, including Ed and Peggy Wayburn, sat in the background observing. A nonstudent radical, Barry Weisberg, tried to move the group toward stronger action. The young men and women listened to Mr. Weisberg but did not follow. They did agree, however, to add to their speaker's panel a representative of the more radical action, Mike Perlman of the University of California at Berkeley.

"After working all night"—that's true—"on their proposals, they appeared on the scene with four petitions to President Nixon and a nineteen-point policy statement." This writer, this guy, Barry Weisberg, was a crafty organizer. Nobody could figure out where he came from, and he was really trying to turn this crowd of people. Ed credits me with having fought back against this and having at some point punctured his balloon in some sort of way. Literally, it was an all-night deal.

Lage: Did he stay on the environmental scene? Do you know?
Scott: No, don't know a thing about it.
Lage: You don't know where he came from?
Scott: I think he was a local agitator type in the Bay Area.
Lage: He probably came from UC Berkeley.
Scott: Probably. I've heard they're famous for that. [laughter]

In February of 1970, through some contact, Lord knows how, I ended up participating in a program at the Hotchkiss School, a private prep school in Connecticut. In February we had this big conference at the University of Michigan. In April there was a congressional hearing in Washington about youth attitudes on the environment at which I was one of the witnesses. On April 18, just leading up to Earth Day, Eastern Michigan University in Ypsilanti, Michigan, which I can't spell—anyway, it's in Ypsilanti, Michigan—held a big, fancy program through their student group, which was called SAVE. I was one of the participants and I think the master of ceremonies for the kick-off. "Environmental Imperatives of the 1970s," and the participants were Stewart Udall, former secretary of the interior; Odetta, the folk singer; and Doug Scott, a member of Gaylord Nelson's National Teach-In Committee. And there were about ten people in the audience because the black students had closed the campus. There were a lot of black campus revolts that spring, and they'd closed this campus down but good, so Stewart Udall and Odetta and I had a good time. [laughs] There wasn't anybody else there.

We had had, in our teach-in in Ann Arbor, we had had some charges that we were not adequately sensitive to black issues. We wrote letters to the student newspaper saying yes, we weren't anywhere near as good as we should be and saying we wanted to
broaden the program and invite people in, and we endorsed—there was a Black Power Day and a closing down the campus thing in the spring of ’70 sometime. We endorsed that and tried to handle some of those things.

Lage: Did you get many black students or community people to come on to your operation?

Scott: Not in a big way. For whatever reason.

Lage: That's been a problem in general in the environmental movement.

Scott: Yes. On Earth Day itself, April 22, 1970, I ended up speaking in New Hampshire. A crew of people that came to our February workshop in Ann Arbor and then came to our teach-in invited me to the University of New Hampshire, so I was a speaker at the organization that used our button and modeled itself in many ways after our operation. I was a speaker there with a couple of senators and so forth.

By that time I had long since agreed that I was going to go to work for the Wilderness Society, so in May, the teach-in having finished in Ann Arbor, in May of 1970 I moved to Washington DC. I was close enough to my twenty-sixth birthday, which was coming up in July that I felt they couldn't get me, and moved and started my work down there.

Lage: I just wondered about your studies. Did you have any qualms about not completing them?

Scott: No. I was spending most of my psychological energy in being in the teach-in and in the environmental movement.

Lage: You'd been on leave.

Scott: And I'd been on leave from classes, and I had completed a rough draft of my Master's thesis on the origins and the drafting of the Wilderness Act and had learned what I was going to learn out of that. I got some fellow student's wife, who I had hired to retype the damn thing, but I only got a couple of chapters of it done, and I just got swept up in the teach-in thing. I didn't need a Master's degree, and I had the prospect to go and get a job and do what I really wanted to do, and didn't see how a Master's degree was going to help me. And I'd learned what I wanted to learn from the research, so I had no qualms about leaving.

ENACT continued for a long time. The Ecology Center is still there. They just had a twentieth reunion last year. That has become a fixed institution in the recycling and all the things that ecology centers do in Ann Arbor. I don't believe the ENACT organization lasted more than a year or so after the teach-in, but it lasted for a while.

But a big part of the energy moved to a statewide confederation of student environmental groups, which one of the fellows who came to our February workshop, who was at Albion College, named Walt Pomeroy started. Walt Pomeroy today is a
regional executive with the National Audubon Society. Walt—Lord knows where he got the money—Walt decided that he was going to take on the building up of a continuing political organization that would unite all the former teach-in groups.

So in October of 1970, Walt had been offered someplace for the summer. ENACT was still going strong and there were groups at a number of other places. Walt was the driving force in forming the Michigan Student Environmental Confederation. They organized a big conference which I went to. "Finances are nonexistent at the moment," says Walt in a letter to me. "I'm working voluntarily in footing much of the cost on my own. It's a gamble on my part, but one I need to take, and start a newsletter and all this." And I became the Washington representative of the Michigan Student Environmental Confederation.

Here's a press release from October 23, Michigan Student Environmental Confederation. "Student interest in ecology continues with a new twist. Michigan college and high school students are striving to channel their environmental activities into one centralized, unified organization, the Michigan Student Environmental Confederation. Headquarters are in the state capital." There was going to be a lobbying operation.

Here's Walt quoted in his press release: "The students are still concerned about our environment. All they lack right now is a focus such as Earth Day provided last spring. We hope to supply that focus into established contact with all the existing student organizations." And it's off and running. And that organization lasted, I think, for a couple of years. I was involved with it as its Washington representative and in some other ways that we'll come to.

But I've pretty well finished with Earth Day and the teach-ins. There were actual meetings of the national steering committee a couple of times. Paul Ehrlich joined the committee, and we had two or three meetings, but it became a staff-driven operation. Somehow somebody tripped over Denis Hayes, who was a, I think, pre-med or medical student or law student or something like that. He'd been at Stanford and I think he was starting at Harvard, law, maybe. Denis came to work and organized the thing. They put out a regular little newsletter, and then those of us who had incorporated the organization right after Earth Day 1970 signed over the organization to its staff. We disbanded the other one, got ourselves out of any legal liability for the other one, and handed over the organization in a new form which became Environmental Action, which is still going strong today.

Lage: So that was the origin of Environmental Action?

Scott: Yes, so I am one of the founders of Environmental Action. Interestingly enough, I was looking in some of the newsletters from the Environmental Teach-In, Inc., which was the thing I was on the steering committee of. One of the staff members, although I don't think I knew him other than in passing because it became a very staff-driven organization and I had my fish to fry that I was busy with, was a young men named Kent Conrad, who is now the junior senator from North Dakota.
Lage: So all these people ended up somewhere.

Scott: Lots of people ended up in lots of places.

Lage: Do you see Earth Day as a turning point in the environmental movement? Do you think that it has that significance?

Scott: Absolutely. I value the fact that I was involved in the organized environmental movement—Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society in particular—prior to Earth Day, because much of the commentary that I have seen over the years about Earth Day sort of implies that everything started then. The reality is that there were a bunch of people that had been working for years, there were a bunch of techniques, there were a bunch of forms of advocacy that were well practiced that people were pursuing. They were well organized, they were small.

Earth Day had, I think, two effects. One, it was a quantum jump in the scale of everything. Memberships in the Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club, everything else, just mushroomed. Now, maybe they were going to anyway, but the whole special issue of *Time* magazine with Barry Commoner on it, on and on and on. All the publicity from our teach-in, which was in every newspaper in the country and on the evening news for four days running, all that kind of stuff had the effect of greatly increasing the membership and activism and so forth over what it would have been otherwise. It would have still grown, it would have still gotten bigger, but here was a kind of a— Sort of like the Watt business a decade later. The Sierra Club would have gotten bigger, slowly but surely; Watt, I'm sure his help speeded it up. So that was one of the effects.

The other effect was that it accelerated what was happening in the Sierra Club most notably, anyway, which was a broadening of what the environmental movement was perceived to be about. Now, from the forties there had been the Izaak Walton League concentrating on clean water. It was a fishing group, so they were worried about clean water. Well, the Sierra Club didn't adopt the first resolution which was drafted by the Izaak Walton League about water pollution until sometime in the sixties, and air pollution. Then the agenda broadened greatly.

Well, now, there are several other reasons for that. Earth Day was certainly one of them, and all the attendant publicity.

Lage: But that impulse had been there, as you pointed out. Population had been a concern.

Scott: The impulse had been there. Population had been a big concern. The Sierra Club had published *The Population Bomb*, you know, and all of that, in Brower's time. But these had been kind of isolated things.

The other phenomenon was that the environmental movement, which had been perceived as a public lands thing, mostly focused on saving things like redwoods and Grand Canyons, particularly as the Sierra Club brought it out, started looking around at
local issues in its own area. Some people in Michigan and New Jersey and New York and Georgia started looking not only to redwoods as what they were fighting about as environmentalists, but hey, what's going on here in our own back yards? And that had the automatic effect of saying—. Because the things that were going on in Georgia and New Jersey were pollution things and population pressures and things of that kind, so there was a big broadening in that fashion. And you know, cause and effect. I don't know. Nixon created the EPA, the centralized EPA. NEPA was enacted. A whole series of things all happened in that same period of time. Sorting it all out is a good job for a historian. I was enough of a participant in some of those things to have a very skewed perspective [laughter] on it all.

A big thing that started in the mid-sixties—and I think was sort of the next thing a lot of my energy went into—served as a transition out of the teach-in, was the fight against the SST, the federal subsidy for the production by Boeing of a civilian supersonic jet transport. By the time of our teach-in that was a big issue. There was a book called *The SST and Sonic Boom Handbook* that had been published by a little outfit called something [Citizens League] against the Sonic Boom, based in Boston. But then Friends of the Earth, which got organized following the Brower flare-up in 1969, picked up on the SST as a major deal. Some very talented people got together and put together, with behind-the-scenes funding from a wealthy fellow, the Coalition against the SST, and it turned out that three or four people who were by that time becoming professional colleagues and buddies of mine were the ringleaders of this, most notably George Alderson.

A funny story: George grew up in Portland, Oregon, went to Reed College. He's probably about a year older than I am. George's mother worked in the Portland library system, as did my mother; they worked together. George's father was a member of the faculty at Reed College and was a great, huge man with a wonderful bass voice, and he sang all the big bass leads in the Gilbert and Sullivan operettas that were put on at Reed College. Both of my brothers at various times were in the chorus. And then for a brief time, sometime in the sixties, that Gilbert and Sullivan group became a professional repertory company and were doing Gilbert and Sullivan in repertory for the whole summer in Portland, to huge success. So I knew who George Alderson was because he was this guy that played "The Policeman's Lot is not a Happy One," and "The Mikado" and all those parts.

I don't think I ever met George until I met him at the xerox machine in the Wilderness Society's office in '68 or '69. He had gone to Utah to study range management. He came from a very musical family; he played the viola. His way of dealing with the draft was that he ended up in the Air Force Symphony, based in Washington, and he was not only in the Air Force Symphony, he was in something called the Strolling Strings, which was a group of Air Force Symphony violists and violinists who played light cocktail music at White House receptions and dinners. And George had to play several meetings a week, one thing or another, had to go to a couple of rehearsals every now and then, but he basically had his working day free, so he went to work for the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society as an unpaid volunteer. [laughs] He was one
of the few other people of my generation that I fell in with in '68. A very talented guy.3

Later, he was very active in the Sierra Club. He was chairman of the Atlantic Chapter when it covered most of the East Coast. He was very close to Brower. He was one of the five candidates on Dave's slate in the fateful election of 1969. By that time I guess he had finished his service and was perhaps working for the Sierra Club; I'm not quite sure. But anyway, he became the head of the Washington office of Friends of the Earth, and in that capacity was deeply involved in the SST. Gary Soucie, who'd been the Northeast representative of the Sierra Club based in New York, the Atlantic representative—he covered again the whole East Coast—Gary had become chairman of Friends of the Earth. They both left the club's employ with Dave.

Gary was the chairman of the Coalition against the SST. Arthur Godfrey was the honorary chairman. George was the first coordinator but he was doing that and doing a lot of Friends of the Earth stuff as well. So they ended up hiring a woman named Joyce Teitz to be the coordinator. Lloyd Tupling for the head of the Sierra Club's office in Washington was involved in it, and I got my folks at the Wilderness Society sometime in 1970 to say that "Yes, I can spend a significant portion of my time working on the SST."

Lage: Was that a new issue for the Wilderness Society, or had they—
Scott: It wasn't that one that they were going to be in in a big way because they didn't—. Brandborg was a fairly broad-minded fellow, and the organization didn't want to lose its sense of specialty but it wanted to contribute to things. The SST was a threat to wilderness because if they built the damn things in sufficient number, despite great pledges that they wouldn't fly them at supersonic speeds producing sonic booms across land masses, we could all see that sooner or later that would fall by the wayside. *Living Wilderness* magazine had articles about what's the effect on Indian ruins at Mesa Verde that were cracking and falling over because of sonic booms from military flights, et cetera. There was a lot of sonic boom versus the solitude of the wilderness stuff.

So anyway, even though one of the council members of the Wilderness Society at that stage was a gentleman deeply involved in Olympic National Park matters from Seattle but who was very loyal to Boeing—that caused a small stink.

Lage: What was his name?
Scott: I'm not going to be able to tell you.

George Alderson in particular was, I think, the genius of this. The way this coalition worked was a little band of people had got together, and we would figure out from

3 George Alderson’s oral history in the Sierra Club series can be found at http://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/roho/ucb/text/sc_nationwide3.pdf
what meager evidence we had of earlier votes who were the likely people to try and figure out how to turn around, where could we stir up grass-roots development and so forth. We brought lots of people in from around the country to lobby and to get them all enthusiastic for the grass-roots work that needed to be done, and began having votes. We were getting closer and closer.

But in that era, the House of Representatives took most of its "for" votes when it was in what's known as the Committee of the Whole, a parliamentary device that they use. Took them by a thing called teller vote in which tellers, a couple of people to count, were put at the head of each of the two aisles up through the House chamber, and the people that were voting yes on a particular proposition would walk up one aisle and the tellers would count them by tapping them on the shoulders. The people that were no would walk up the other aisle by the tellers there, and then the tellers would report and that was the vote, and it was anonymous.

The SST was routinely being challenged in the House by Congressman Sidney Yates of Illinois, who was the leader, a senior member of the House Appropriations Committee. It was an appropriation bill, so this came up every year, at least once and often twice, every time an appropriation bill for the Department of Transportation came along. So we were going to get votes.

So at one point George and Louise Dunlap, who was another one of the Friends of the Earth staff, and Joe Browder, another one of the Friends of the Earth staff, and I, and a bunch of other people ended up—people who knew members of Congress by sight—ended up divvying up as many of the House as we could and sitting in the gallery and watching the teller vote. We had the initials of each of the persons we were responsible for written on the tips of our fingers, and we were trying to keep a memory of who voted which way, and we published a role call vote.

Lage: You couldn't make notes?

Scott: No, you can't make notes in the House gallery. We published what we asserted was how people had voted. Well, there was just hell to pay about this. This was one small episode in the big reform movement that the Young Turks were beginning to make in the House anyway, so in 1970 the House came up with something called the recorded teller vote, in which before you walked up either aisle you got either a red or a green piece of paper and you signed your name on it. Then you were counted. You handed in the little piece of paper, and the next day in the Congressional Record it listed who voted which way. This was all leading up to the electronic voting that they have now, which is much more sophisticated. But it's recorded that they were hiding behind these anonymous votes. You'd go up and talk to someone who'd say, "Yes, I'm against this, I'm against this," but then you'd see them going up the wrong aisle on the teller vote.

Lage: Was this just when they got together as a Committee of the Whole, or was it on everything?

Scott: This was in the Committee of the Whole, which is where they do most of their work.
So through '69 and '70, by these devices, we were getting closer and closer. I was working the Michigan delegation. I was the Washington representative for ENACT, which had this big name in Michigan. I became the Washington representative for the Michigan student environmental confederation and I was harassing the members of the Michigan delegation mercilessly. Walt back home was stirring up grass-roots stuff, and the Sierra Club Mackinac Chapter was working very closely with Walt. And this was going on all over the country, but my particular area that I was concentrating on, one of the particular areas, was Michigan.

The episode that I want to talk about, because it needs to be in the historical record someplace—I think it had considerable to do with winning this battle—involving Senator Robert Griffin, who was the junior senator, a Republican, somebody I had had some dealings with because he had been trouble on Sleeping Bear Dunes. He'd been the local congressman before Vander Jagt and before he got to the Senate, and he had not been favorable. So he had some faint idea who I was.

In the summer of 1970, the votes were coming hot and heavy now on the SST and we were getting closer. Kind of everybody realized this was becoming more controversial. The Wall Street Journal was against it, prominent people were against it. There was real political oomph. Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, who is an indefatigable person, was leading the fight in the Senate.

Well, Senator Griffin had risen to become the assistant minority leader. He was this Republican whip of the Senate. He was one of Nixon's leadership team in the Senate, and Nixon was all for the SST. The summer of 1970, as happens every summer, there were a bunch of Michigan students of one sort or another, Ann Arbor and others, who were in Washington doing one thing or another—internships and so forth. A bunch of them were there in some institute thing sponsored by this institute that had sponsored these things that Art Hansen and I had gone to in October or November of '69.

One of these fellows was somebody from ENACT, or at least had been around the edges of ENACT, a guy named Earl Bradley. Somehow Earl presented me with a copy of a June 26, 1970, letter that Griffin had sent him, in which he'd written to Griffin saying, "You ought to vote against the SST; you've been voting for it." This was Griffin's new form letter, robotyped form letter. Virginia Prentice got another one about a week later. But the first one I got was from Earl Bradley, the student: "As you know, the SST developed by Britain and France is already airborne and they have a significant number of orders. The Soviet Union is going to build one. If the United States hopes to maintain a competitive position in the important field of aviation, we must stay abreast of technological developments. If we lag behind, our inaction will not be translated into red ink in terms of international balance of payments but there will be a loss of many jobs," yak, yak, yak, yak, yak. "You may be sure that I shall give this subject my careful study and consideration when it comes before the Senate." But the big, huge impression of this page-and-a-half letter was that he was going to be voting for the SST.
Well, this letter was laced with things that were not true. This letter was highly amenable to being attacked. So we sat down and got ahold of all the Michigan people in Washington that we could find—one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen Michigan students, counting me, who were from Flint and mostly Ann Arbor. We wrote a letter on the ENACT letterhead with me as Washington representative for ENACT dated July 14, 1970, that said, "Dear Senator Griffin, your June 26 response to my letter"—Earl Bradley was one of the first signers of this thing—"is appreciated. However, I and those who join me in this letter are not satisfied by the arguments you set forth in favor of the SST program. Though you do not say so directly, it appears that you lean towards voting for the FY1971 supersonic transport subsidy. This would be a serious error, particularly because the things that you said are the reasons are not right. They're factually wrong, . . . Frankly, Senator, as young people with a particular active concern for environmental sanity and the quality of life, we are dismayed that you do not seem to regard the SST as a peril on these grounds. You do not mention these concerns at all. This matter concerns us deeply and we look forward to an early opportunity to come and talk to you about it."

Then we issued a press release. [laughter] A two-page press release: "Contact Douglas Scott, Washington representative," on the ENACT letterhead, and gave it to all the Michigan press. So that the minute he got our letter he was getting calls from the Michigan press who were friends of mine, saying, "Are you going to meet with these young people, Senator?" [laughter]

Lage: So this is an aftermath of Earth Day?

Scott: This is an aftermath of Earth Day and grass-roots skills that I'd been working on for a while. We [had kind of saved?] urging Griffin and being very concerned about the arguments in his letters, but he doesn't actually say he's going to vote for it. For this reason they "are eager to present their views to Griffin and discuss the issue with him in detail." So of course the press was calling and saying, "You're going to meet with these young students?"

Well, these folks, most of them were living in dormitories, the co-signers of this letter, out at a little college on Foxhall Road in northwest Washington DC. I prepared a detailed analysis of the answer to every argument in Griffin's letter and the ones that he hadn't raised. George Alderson and I went out and spent a whole afternoon sitting on the lawn—this has become quite famous in some circles, anyway—sitting on the lawn at this college with these fourteen students, briefing them about this. We divided them up. I remember there was some attractive young woman who got the assignment of the balanced payments and we gave her endless fact sheets that the coalition in Georgia had put together. We had every main economist in the country saying, "This is just complete junk." And this woman knew the balance-of-payments argument cold.

[End Tape 7, Side A]

[Begin Tape 7, Side B]
Scott: He had no choice. He gave us an hour and a half; I think, as I recollect, in his private little hideaway right off the Senate floor in the capitol building, because he was the whip. He said at the outset—he was very gracious—he said at the outset that he wasn't there to debate with us, and he wasn't there to tell us what he was going to do. We had alleged that he needed some more information, and he was there to discuss with us the merits.

So we just went through them. We'd say something. I was sort of the ringleader, and he knew I was the ringleader. We were sort of going back and forth about things and at some point he would say, "I understand all of that, but the balance of payments really concerns me." On turned the nice young woman who'd been studying up on the balance of payments and just gave him a lecture about the balance of payments, the answer to which is although the plane cost a zillion dollars and you'd sell a bunch of them to the French and to Luxembourg using the Swiss, so that you would get a bunch of their hard money that would help our balance of payment, the only place they were going to fly was back and forth across the Atlantic. This was before the Arab boycott. The price of fuel in the damn thing half the time in the other country would wipe out the balance-of-payments advantage in about a year and a half, just would totally destroy it. An airtight argument. We had this letter signed by all these eminent economists and all. He now knew—

Lage: How did he react? Did you see something on his face?

Scott: Very graciously. No, we didn’t.

Lage: But he didn't look overwhelmed?

Scott: This meeting must have been in late July or early August, I'm not sure. He was very gracious. But he went away from that, and this was a conscious strategy. He went away from that knowing that he had listened to fourteen young people in a publicly exposed way tell him facts that ran counter to how he was basing his position.

On August 23, 1970, in a speech to the Jaycees at the annual convention in Flint, Michigan, the Michigan Jaycees, Senator Robert P. Griffin announced that he will oppose the administration's $290 million request for the supersonic transport. This was front-page news in the Washington newspapers. This was Nixon's guy saying, "I'm going to vote." So there's one vote, but it was Nixon's Republican leader saying to other Republicans, "It's okay to cross Nixon on this." It's widely felt that this probably brought us four or five votes. And we won by four or five votes [laughing].” And his office had called and said, "I'm going to do this," so we sent off a wire from all these students to him saying, "Your decision is the slickest thing since sliced bread."

Months later, because the SST worked its way, particularly through the Senate, through the filibusters clear into New Year's, 1970—. Proxmire was filibustering it. He was demanding, "I want a clear up-or-down vote." The clear votes came in 1971, but by that time Walt Pomeroy was coming down from the Michigan Student Environmental Confederation back and forth, and got correspondence back and forth
between Walt and Griffin, so he became a real advocate and somebody that we used.
And then, of course, we used him on all the Republican Michigan congressmen, the
House members, that Senator Griffin has done a turn around. "Gerald Ford, how come
Senator Griffin has turned around and understands? How come you don't?"

Lage: Did Gerald Ford ever come around?

Scott: I don't think so. We worked on him. We worked and worked on him, but I don't think
so. I worked a little bit on Senator Buckley of New York; I worked a little bit with
student groups in Iowa, working on senators there. And the SST fight was put together
by a sequence of these kind of sort of various of us just concentrating on individual
people. It came down to the crucial votes, and we phoned a bunch of people or they'd
driven all night or however they had gotten there from around the country, from the
states with the key senators and rallied on the steps of the Senate for a last kind of
checking of signals.

I remember George couldn't be there all the time because he was playing the viola in
the orchestra for the Bernstein Mass, which premiered at the Kennedy Center. They
were recording the mass, and he had to go to recording sessions for which he was
getting paid handsomely [laughs], so he would be there and kind of get us all
organized, and he'd leap in a cab and go out.

We were all standing on the Senate steps one day, and it was within a couple hours of
the crucial vote. We were getting our last-minute assignments when we were fanning
out across the Hill to bring our senators to the floor and harass them, nip at their heels
or whatever. Senator Joe [Joseph] Tydings, then senator of Maryland, suddenly came
out the Senate chamber door above us, came down the steps, and jumped in a cab, and
we dispatched some secretary from the Sierra Club who said, "Follow that cab!"
[laughter] This is a classic scene: "Follow that cab!" He was just going to lunch.
[laughs] We thought he was taking a walk on us. [laughs] I don't know what she was
supposed to do, but . . .

And I remember Gary Soucie and I and Lloyd Tupling sitting in the Senate gallery
when the Senate defeated the SST, and they did so. We weren't sure. We knew it was
going to be fairly close, and we won by four or five votes, which was a huge
accomplishment. I remember Gary was just kind of comatose. I remember shaking
him and saying, "Gary, we won!" [laughter] And coming up out of this, and the
galleries have these swinging doors, and coming up out of these swinging doors, and
we were all just making a beeline for the old Sierra Club office where we were going
to have—. We got very drunk. It was like having a big party. Lloyd Tupling, who
was an old-time top Senate staffer and knew the Senate cold, he came out with just
tears pouring. I think we were all just blubbering, but tears were just rolling down
Tup's face and he was saying, "We beat Maggie. No one beats Maggie." [laughs] We
beat the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, all-powerful Warren
Magnuson of Washington State, who'd been the chief advocate of this thing. "We beat
Maggie. No one beats Maggie." [laughs]
Lage: That's fantastic.

Scott: So we all went running over to the Sierra Club office and had a huge party, and Proxmire came by in his jogging outfit because he jogged back and forth from work. We had beat the thing in the House the previous week and this was one of a series of votes, but this was sort of it now. We hung around and we hung around. Finally we went over to Lloyd Tupling's house in the middle of the night. Nobody wanted to let go, this had been such a big deal.

But the SST was important because it was kind of a first-time confrontation of the environmental movement with sort of the industrial might. It was sort of, this is more technology, bigger is better, more technology is good and of course the taxpayer should subsidize. It had a huge shot-in-the-arm effect. Sierra Club was central to it, Friends of the Earth was central to it, and the Wilderness Society, in its own way, was central to it.

Lage: Was Proxmire's main interest his economy-in-government interest, or did he show a commitment to environmental concerns?

Scott: Oh, he was a good, dependable environmental vote. He was not on the key committees that dealt with environmental matters as Senator Nelson was, so Nelson was sort of the darling environmental ringleader of that era, one of them in the Senate. Proxmire was known as sort of a good government, no dumb spending deal. He was a very fit guy; I mean, he stood there all night filibustering. He wasn't reading the Bible or something; he was going on and on about the SST. Just unstoppable. A very impressive performance on his part.

I cannot re-create in my mind the sequence, and somebody's doubtlessly done some study or got this history down, but the sequence of parliamentary steps, so the timing of all of this is a little unclear to me, but my contribution and a place in which I played around to get some other grass-roots techniques and the use of the press and so forth was the mode of Senator Griffin.

Lage: Do you recall the date of this final vote, or the approximate date? We can check that.

Scott: It was in '71. I'm not absolutely sure when the pivotal, crucial vote that I'm talking about was, but I believe it was '71. We then had to go defend it a couple of times. They kept trying to revive the thing in supplemental appropriation bills and things, so it wasn't just there was one definitive thing and that was all.

I remember in the spring of '72, a friend of mine and I went to England, to Great Britain, for a month. The day I left, Gerald Ford—we must never have gotten him because Gerald Ford made an effort to revive the SST in the House. I remember George Alderson calling and saying, "Doug, emergency meeting." I said, "George, I'm getting on an airplane at six o'clock tonight. [laughter] I'm going to London." “You can't.” I felt guilty. Oh, God, I felt guilty, and got over to England. We only spent a couple of days in London, where you could get U.S. papers. There was nothing in
them. We were driving around rural England on no particular schedule, and I would
go and try and find any kind of paper [laughs], any little detail. Never did find out a
darn thing about it. And was gone for a month and came back, and people said, "Oh,
yes, you've been away." It was a real learning experience that you're not half as crucial
as you sometimes think you are. [laughter] "Oh, yes. You used to work here, didn't
you?" That worked out pretty well.

The main thing that I was doing in 1970 with the Wilderness Society, however, was
fitting into and becoming a part of the then-growing staff team that was working on
both the wilderness proposals that were coming up for the field hearings under the
Wilderness Act study process, and then those that were moving into the congressional
arena in one way or another. I was involved fitfully in the ones in the field. The
Wilderness Society had a field office in Denver which handled the ones in the West,
but there were so many of these things coming that every now and then I got involved
a little bit.

For example, in 1970, in December of 1970, there were hearings held in two tiny little
towns in very far rural northwestern North Dakota concerning the wilderness proposal

Lage: I've never heard of it.

Scott: The Park Service put out its elaborate proposal and it needed fixing up, so we prepared
a typical Wilderness Society four-page alert that went to all of the members in that part
of the world, but it was jointly sponsored with the Sierra Club and the Izaak Walton
League and the Badlands Environmental Association and so forth. I went out and
spent a week in advance of that hearing stirring up the grass roots, organizing, driving
all around little towns in North Dakota stirring people up to come to the hearings. I
didn't get to do very much of that. I did that one, I did the wilderness proposal for
Carlsbad Caverns and Guadalupe Mountain National Parks, which were done
simultaneously in probably late '72 because I'd worked there and knew all those issues.
But I didn't get out very much. It was the sense that I wasn't involved in the grass-
roots side of things except from the limited perspective of Washington that led to my
starting to think maybe I needed to wonder if there was some other place to do that. It
ultimately led to my leaving the Wilderness Society.

Lage: So you were interested in getting into the grass-roots field area?

Scott: Yes. As I think we talked about last time, the Washington perspective on legislation is
a very narrow one. It's partial. You see the part of the process that happened in
Washington and you kibitz maybe a little bit with the grass roots. But you weren't
there to help shape the precursors and to build the political support, so you're not quite
sure how much there is. You weren't there to help draw the boundary lines. You sort
of take what came to you from that part of the process and deal with it while it's active
in the administration and on Capitol Hill, and then you go on to your next one.
Whatever happens afterwards, you don't know much about either. In some sort of
incoherent way, I found that frustrating.
The big thing that we were dealing with in the late sixties and early seventies in wilderness policy was the wilderness threshold. The Wilderness Act had passed in September of 1964. Its primary function was to take virtually all the discretion about wilderness boundaries away from the administrative agencies and put it in the hands of the Congress. The administrative agencies didn't care for this, and so by one device or another—except the Fish and Wildlife Service, partly because it was staffed with people who were sympathetic and because it saw that it was actually getting something [with the wilderness designation]. Wildlife refuges had rather tenuous legal protection, some of them. Here was a chance to get one more layer of statutory protection for large parts of the wildlife refuges. Well, they thought that was a pretty good deal.

The Park Service hated it. George Hartzog, the director of the Park Service, was simply unsympathetic with the point of the wilderness program because—I don't want to attribute bad motives to him, but administrators don't like to give up discretion. The function of the Wilderness Act in a national park was not, in our view—something I came to feel very strongly about—was not to protect Mount Rainier, the top and the sides of Mount Rainier. Nobody's going to build anything there anyway, so they weren't threatened. It's not like a national forest where you have timber sales and all that. The point was to protect the stuff right at the edge of the roads, and just outside the campgrounds, and just outside the edge of the parking lot, the threshold in which development was going to occur.

Well, Hartzog and his crew came up with this elaborate theory which I'd first run into at the Isle Royale proposal, that there were all sorts of policy reasons that sort of rose to the status of high theology with them, that you couldn't have wilderness right down to the edge of a road, you couldn't have wilderness right down to the edge of development, you couldn't have wilderness right down to the boundary of the park. You had to have what they called the wilderness threshold. This was a zone a quarter of a mile, a half a mile, an eighth of a mile wide, back from the edge of the road, back from the outskirts of the campground, back from the boundary of the park. The theory was this wilderness threshold protected the wilderness within, but the wilderness threshold wasn't in the wilderness.

Lage: So they could do as they wished eventually with that.

Scott: Sure, and where is development the greatest threat? Right along the roadways. The ones around the edge of the park boundary were really, really ludicrous, but they just—. Every wilderness proposal that came from the Park Service had this stuff in it. We yelled at them about this and we organized people at hearings to yell at them about this.

The first two park units that passed the Congress, we had other fish to fry. We were fighting about getting additional lands in one way or another, so the threshold between the park boundary and the wilderness boundary, they got, in Craters of the Moon National Monument in Idaho and in Petrified Forest National Park in Arizona. Some day I'm going to go and pass a law that gets those back in and I'm going to name it—. There's going to be this long, skinny wilderness all the way around the edges of this
park, and I'm going to name it the George Hartzog Memorial [laughter] Wilderness Threshold Wilderness.

But then we came to the Lava Beds National Monument wilderness proposal and the Lassen National Park, and these both came up at about the same time. George Alderson was working very closely on those, so this is probably '68 or '69. I was writing letters for those hearing records back when I was in Ann Arbor and all of that. We had excellent support. We had Senator Cranston and then-Senator Tunney probably by that stage, good people to help us. Phil Burton and so forth. So we beat them on the boundary exclusion, but the Park Service refused to—. What we were ending up with was each one was being handled sort of in a separate way and there was no consistent policy. The policy didn't get changed. So we had huge fights in 1970 to try and get this stopped.

And then they came along with this other theory. At Isle Royale there were little Adirondack shelters—three-sided screened shelters back in the middle of the wilderness. At Glacier National Park there are a couple of chalets out in the middle of the park. In Yosemite there's the—

Lage: —the high Sierra camps.

Scott: The high Sierra camps. There are snow gauges in the high Sierra and in the Rockies. There are hydrological gauges. Well, the Park Service got so theological about this stuff that they decided that those things had to be excluded too, so they came up with thirty-two-acre round wilderness enclaves so that around each one of these adirondack shelters at Isle Royale, out in the middle of the wilderness, was this Swiss cheese thing, a whole bunch of them. In Sequoia and Kings Canyon, all of these Swiss cheese things. Just absolutely nutty.

Well, the wilderness threshold was an eighth of a mile. If you take a circle and do an eighth of a mile radius, it comes out to thirty-two acres, so this was, one of their theologians told me, this was a circular threshold zone. [laughter] We could say, "What if you decide after we pass this, and you decide in all your good wisdom that that shelter is in the wrong place and you move it? Do you have to get an act of Congress for this little Swiss cheese to follow you as you carry it down the trail? It just got ludicrous.

Well, fortunately, during the Nixon administration there was a very talented team of people in the upper echelons of the Interior Department overseeing the Park Service. Hartzog was a very political man and ran a very political Park Service, and was very good in many ways. A good advocate in many ways, but he just dug in his heels about these things. He also got infatuated with the notion that there needed to be one-way motor nature trails where you would drive fifteen miles an hour up some little one-way road and observe nature. Have you ever tried to drive fifteen miles an hour? It's very dangerous.
So the word went out to the planners that every park was going to have one of these things. So at Lava Beds National Monument there was this old road and they turned it [into a motor nature trail]. So a whole huge chunk of the national monument was excluded from wilderness in their proposal so that there could be this stupid one-way motor nature trail.

Lage: And a wilderness threshold on either side?

Scott: Exclude the whole thing. We had no interest in having more roads in national parks, so we typically opposed those. And we fought these battles where we'd go to assistant secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks Nathaniel Reed and his deputies, in particular a very fine fellow named Curtis [Buff] Bohlen. He was the nephew of the Bohlen that was the ambassador of the Soviet Union for years, and he is now the most senior environmental guy in the Bush administration in the State Department, a very fine man. And another one of the aides was a gentleman who I knew and dealt with and liked named Douglas Wheeler.

Lage: He comes up again too.

Scott: He comes up again. We would go in, people from the Wilderness Society—I was often very forward in these discussions—and say, "Nat, can't you get George to stop?" "Buff, can't you do it?" Then it got more sophisticated. We'd say, "Listen, we've arranged for some congressmen to ask you at a hearing about this." We kept dancing around trying to get this thing solved. We were in the newsletters that the Wilderness Society sent out. The Wilderness Society in particular because they were the key person, the flame of sort of the Holy Grail of the Wilderness Act, how it was supposed to work. We were just adamant. Zahniser had not wanted this; that's all there was to it. It wasn't worth further discussion. A bunch of these park things just languished. The first thing that happened was Hartzog just stopped having any more wilderness proposals for two years. He simply stopped.

Lage: But he was required by law.

Scott: He was required by law to have them, and for two years he just stopped, didn't do any. So one, he was technically violating the law, and two, there was this huge backlog. And our goal of getting these areas in the wilderness system wasn't getting done.

So I remember, we went up to the House Interior Committee, and we wanted to raise hell. This was a little later—or earlier. It was either before or after Reed. There was an assistant secretary named Leslie Glasgow, who was from Louisiana. He was going to be testifying about something or other at the House National Parks Recreation Subcommittee. So we decided that we'd jump it, so we called up our pal John Saylor and said, "Why don't you take this guy to task?" Well, Saylor had to be somewhere else that morning, so we called up Congressman Mo Udall and he said, "Sure. Bring me some little statement and a line of questions."
So I prepared some "Mr. Secretary, when are you going to stop beating your wife?" [laughter] line of questions and trudged them up to Udall. Well, the morning of that hearing, Udall called and said—or his staff guy, I forget which—called and said, "I've got to be someplace else. I can't do this. But I've asked Patsy Mink, a senior Democrat from Hawaii, a senior member of the subcommittee, and she said she'd do it, so you go over there and brief her." So we went rushing over to Patsy Mink's office, and we were really briefing her and her staff, and then something came up and she couldn't do it.

But Stewart Brandborg and I were running around and doing it. We were beside ourselves. We'd put a little effort into this, and we had no one to do this. We were standing around outside the House Interior Committee Hearing Room and the hearing was about to start, and we were sort of thinking, "Hmmm. This was a good idea. It's just the fates have been against us." And up comes, walking in, then-Congressman James McClure of Idaho, the first district of Idaho, a very conservative Republican but a very smart, nice guy. I always have liked him. He went on to the Senate, just retired from the Senate this year. And we had had dealings with him, and Brandborg and known him over the years.

He said, "What are you guys moping around out here about?" We said, "Do you realize," Brandborg started, "Do you realize, Jim, that the president of the United States is technically in violation of the law because of" dadadadadada. Well, this didn't make any big difference having to do with the timber industry or the mining industry or dams or anything. It didn't make any difference to McClure and it sort of offended his sense that the law said you're supposed to do that.

So he says, "Well, here, give me that," and he takes it, a senior Republican member, and he goes marching in, and here was this poor assistant secretary not knowing what's going to hit him. The senior Republican on the committee just lambasted him: "Mr. Secretary, do you realize you are placing the president of the United States in . . . . You personally are going to the stocks and we'll dunk you." [laughs] He was so toothsome about this that Congressman Wayne Aspinall, chairman of the committee, kept saying, "My colleague, my colleague, this is a senior official in the administration. You can't talk to them like that." [laughs]

Lage: You couldn't have had a better person to pose the questions.

Scott: Couldn't have been better. So he went back and raised hell about this. We were also going to Ehrlichman and Ehrlichman's deputy, John Whitaker, in the White House, and complaining. Finally, I actually have a copy someplace that I purloined somehow. Maybe Whitaker gave it to me, a blind copy of a very brief memo on White House letterhead that said, "Dear Mr. Secretary, the National Park Service is not complying with the Wilderness Act. Please fix this." Signed—

Lage: This was to Hickel?

Scott: This was to Hickel. [laughs]
Signed, Nixon?

It wasn't signed Nixon. It was probably signed either by Ehrlichman or—. Probably Ehrlichman or Whitaker. "The president is not amused. [laughs] Thou shalt do better." Heady sense to a relatively young person to think that you're scoping around causing this kind of stuff to happen.

The upshot of all this was that—. Glasgow must have been in the late sixties. He must have the first assistant secretary. Must have been, because in May of 1972 we had a bunch of these park proposals that had been lying around: Sequoia-Kings Canyon, in which the great citizen advocate of that was Joe Fontaine of the Sierra Club; the North Cascades, long-time old Sierra Clubber Pat Goldsworthy was the head of the North Cascades Conservation Council, was working on that; Olympic Park, Polly Dyer, former board member and ringleader of the Olympic Park; Isle Royale; and a bunch of others—Shenandoah Park, I think—had all been hanging fire. We cooked up a hearing in the Senate Public Lands Subcommittee on a whole series of these park wilderness proposals. All these activists from around the country came in for the experience.

I believe it was literally the night before, I'm not quite sure, that it occurred to me that this would be a good chance to really get after all this stuff. We had been over yelling at Reed and Bohlen that now that at last we'd arranged this hearing, to try and move these things, that this would be a great chance for them to solve all these problems by saying we're not going to have these enclaves, we're not going to be the threshold zone, yak, yak, yak.

We had another one, unbelievable. Hartzog said you can't have any wilderness lands from which if you're standing in them you can see man-made effects outside. So Lava Beds National Monument, which is a very sloping, big lava flow, kind of slopes down in there. Greatly off in the distance you can see agriculture. The Park Service declared the vast majority of the land in this national monument wasn't suitable for wilderness because from within it you could see in the distance the rectilinear landforms of modern agriculture.

We knew that's not what Zahniser meant. We knew that the careful words in the definition, I knew from my study that he had chosen the words in the definition and the act very precisely. There was even some contemporary writing of his that said, "When I say wilderness, it's an area that retains its primeval character and influence. Influence does not mean from outside. It means the character of the acre you're talking about."

So we were trying to get Bohlen and Church and Reed, who was going to testify. I think that day, or the day before, I sat down and wrote a twelve-page, double-spaced, opening remarks for Senator Church, who had been the floor manager for the Wilderness Act when it first passed the Senate in 1961 and again when it passed the Senate in 1963 and was the chairman of this subcommittee, and with whom I was buddies. I called Bohlen, and that morning, I think, of the hearing, and I said, "Now, Buff, I don't know if he's going to do it, but it's just a chance that your boss is going to get a real lecture from Senator Church and it's going to be roughly like thus and so, and
if it happens, I hope Nat will—. He's always said he disagrees with these park [wilderness proposals]; here's his chance."

Lage: So you did take the precaution—I'm just looking at the copies here—you took the precaution of the courtesy to let Reed know.

Scott: We wanted them to answer the right way. We didn't want them to suddenly think that they were blindsided, because they were our friends, and they were agreeing with us. These political appointees don't tell the agencies what to do every ten minutes, and it's hard to reverse the inertia. So I typed up on my little typewriter at the Wilderness Society—. You'll notice that the heading is in one type, and the body the statement of Senator Church: "As we begin this hearing, I want to take a few minutes to reflect on the wilderness proposals that we're considering and whether they in broad terms meet the statutory objectives that I set in the Wilderness Act."

This is largely his handwriting changing a few things, but he sat up there and gave this statement. He just said, "Now, Mr. Secretary—." So he gave this whole statement, and then when they'd come to the individual proposals, Reed would be up there and say, "We now have—"

Lage: This is a long statement.

Scott: Oh, yes. It's full of the legislative history of the Wilderness Act that he cited.

Lage: Taken right from your dissertation. Twelve pages.

Scott: Taken right from my dissertation. "Now I see we've got these enclaves. Now I see you've got them but you don't need them, because under the act we intended," yak, yak, yak.

Lage: We're about to run out here, so we'll stop.

[End Tape 7, Side B]

[Begin Tape 8, Side A]

Scott: The National Park Service had brought in, of course, to back up Reed not only their legislative guys but they had the superintendents of each of these parks. So Reed was testifying, and he'd be accompanied while he was testifying about Yosemite, he was accompanied by the Yosemite guy, or Sequoia. Church gave this big statement, and then they started in on a Sequoia National Park proposal. He'd say, "Well, now I see you've got six of these Swiss cheese things." [laughs] This is what Church called them. "These Swiss cheese guys in the back country. What are those for?" "Those are for snow pillows for measuring winter snowpack." "Per my earlier discussion you don't need those, isn't that right?" "Yes, Mr. Chairman, we don't need those. We'll remove them."
Lage: So they agreed right away?

Scott: Reed. This was the occasion that Reed, the policy boss, said, "That's right, Mr. Chairman, based on what you said before."

Well, the legislative guy, who was a guy named Mike Griswold who later went to work for the Forest Service, who was the—

Lage: The legislative guy for—?

Scott: The Park Service, who was one of the chief theologians of all these hare-brained ideas, was just in the back of the room having kittens, he was so angry. He came storming up to me at one point. He says, "Did you hear what that man—" and he pointed at [Church, or Reed?]—"did you hear what he said? That's not right." I said, "Go tell him," [laughs] which of course he couldn't do. So this May 5, 1972 hearing was, I think, my high point in unstringing the Park Service on their wilderness policy.

Lage: How much longer did Hartzog last? He was replaced by Nixon. I can't remember the date.

Scott: Yes, he was replaced by Ron Walker.

Lage: I think it was around this time, or maybe even before.

Scott: Yes, and I think Reed had left by then too. Maybe that's when Glasgow came in. I just don't remember which one of them was in which order. I do remember Ron Walker, who was the advance man for Nixon, became the head of the Park Service.

Lage: That was an incredible choice.

Scott: And I was at the swearing-in, which was held in the secretary's headquarters, and Ehrlichman came over in the secretary's ceremonial room in the Interior Building. I don't remember why I happened to be there. Hartzog went on to be a lobbyist for the redwood companies in the second redwood fight, but a very interesting man, very political, one of the better directors of the Park Service.

Lage: Even with all this? He'd say—

Scott: This is minor stuff. I mean, it was important to us because we wanted the wilderness system to end up being right, and in some ultimate way it was important, but Hartzog was an advocate for the parks. He could drive you crazy. He was a very willful man and he didn't do just what we wanted him to do all the time, but he was a strong advocate for the parks.

Lage: Are you saying that in retrospect after Walker—
Scott: Oh, yes. I mean, what's happened in the Park Service subsequently was just shocking. I mean, we've gone away—Hartzog was a career man. He'd kind of been a political-superintendent-type all of his career. He hadn't ridden a horse out in some national park somewhere. But we haven't had quite that degree of really serious career man despite a couple of efforts. I mean, we've had some real—. We had Walker, Rittenour, the current guy.

Lage: Dickinson was a career man.

Scott: Dickinson was a career man but very weak. You go both ways. You get somebody that's a career person, and that's always more well received by the agency. Sometimes to bring somebody in from the outside to shake things up is a useful thing. We've never had an outsider in the Forest Service and desperately need to shake up the Forest Service. But these details of the little Swiss cheese enclaves and stuff, these are not big—

Lage: It's important to get that in. Your overall assessment of Hartzog.

Scott: It was the business of the Wilderness Society to worry about that level of detail. Now, the Sierra Club agreed with us about it, but again, the Wilderness Society had this function of being the principal spokesman of the kind of meaning and consistent standards of the wilderness system, and that's what this episode represented. We were in and out of Nat Reed's and Buff Bohlen's offices all the time. We were working to make sure the Park Service wasn't, even when they were doing their field studies, they weren't studying whole areas that we believed they should have under the mandate of the act. I carried on elaborate correspondence and a set of visits with Bohlen about that.

I've got a memo here, just a sample, August 21, 1972, from me to Bohlen, deputy assistant secretary of the interior, on the treatment of private inholdings and existing private rights in national park and refuge proposals. If some guy had the grazing rights over part of a national park because they were there from when the park was established, Hartzog would say, "That doesn't qualify until the grazing's removed." Aw, come on. There's got to be a better way to—

Lage: Did you go to Hartzog also on these things first?

Scott: Not much. He was a strong-willed man, and I've been in and out of his office a little bit. And Stewart Brandborg was a strong-willed man, and they did not like each other. They were kind of both big, kind of gruff, kind of "Hail fellow, well met," pat-you-on-the-back sort of guys, so they greeted each other affably enough. But Hartzog was not the kind of guy to have us coming in telling him how to run his Park Service, so we went to his boss, who was much nicer. So there was a lot of that kind of work going on.

Similarly, but less need with the Fish and Wildlife Service, and a great deal of work going on with the Forest Service. The Forest Service was even more willful an
agency. They just didn't like the Wilderness Act. They immediately noticed the pattern which started with San Rafael, the very first of the areas after the Wilderness Act to go all the way through the Congress. Even though we did not win our little fight about the last 2,200 acres, the proposal had more than doubled from the size of the old San Rafael Primitive Area by the time it became a wilderness area, and that started being the routine pattern. In 1969 Desolation Wilderness and just a whole series of the Forest Wilderness started being enacted. The Forest Service didn't particularly care for what was going on there.

So there was a lot of working with them, or working around them, or going and meeting them in the Congress, to win votes to expand over their proposals. But increasingly, the bigger picture became not the areas that the Wilderness Act required to be studied on the national forest because there were only—I forget the number of them, but there were only 9 million acres in total of them. They were the primitive areas.

Lage: They were required to be studied by the act.

Scott: They were required. At the time the act passed in '64, there were on the national forest some areas called wilderness areas which were established under a 1939 Forest Service regulation by the secretary of agriculture. The committee kind of looked at all those, and those all became wilderness areas under the new wilderness system. I said 9 million acres; that's not right. There were 9 million acres of land. They were all little areas called wild areas. All those became a wilderness area. Those were the only instant areas in 1964.

All the parks had to be studied, all the refuges had to be studied, and the Forest Service mandate was to study those other areas which it had which were officially established as primitive areas. Those had been established in the twenties and thirties under a 1929 regulation which used the term "primitive area." The '39 Wilderness Act designation had contemplated that each of those old primitive areas would be studied and expanded and boundaries updated and elevated to this wilderness category but a lot of them hadn't been done, so the only areas the Forest Service had to study were those little primitive areas. There were a lot of important areas, but there were just only so many of them.

Our attitude—and Brower was a part of this in his time, and all the rest of us began to quickly see that yes, there was the routine of implementing the requirement of the Wilderness Act to get all these primitive areas dealt with, but there was all the other stuff on the national forests that had wilderness qualities which wasn't required to be studied by anything, and it was also all the BLM land, which wasn't required by the Wilderness Act to be studied at all.

Lage: Was that something in your studies of the Wilderness Act? Did you find there was a reason why that wasn't included?
Scott: Yes. The overwhelming reason was that from the perspective of 1956 or 1960 or the key times when the Wilderness Act fight was focused, it was not particularly perceived as a reform measure. They weren't out to—. They were selling it as basically simply giving the effect of statutory law to what was already the situation. So Zahniser had an elaborate argument for the Wilderness Act. It didn't stop logging anywhere where logging was now allowed; it didn't stop grazing; it didn't do any of these bad things. Getting that passed was hard enough, so there was no implication in the Wilderness Act itself. The only thing it said was that if there is—. Well, it said two things.

First off, it said any additional unit added to the wilderness system will have to be added by an additional act of Congress, and of course Congress can make wilderness wherever they want to. So the implication was there. It also said that for each of those old primitive areas—this was done as a floor amendment by Congressman Saylor in 1964—for each of those old primitive areas, if there was any land around them that was also qualified, that was contiguous, it ought to be considered too, and that led to a court decision in 1972, the Parker Decision, which mandated that anything that was contiguous to a primitive area had to be protected and left alone until Congress had made up its mind one way or the other about it. So suddenly the primitive areas which had had known boundaries got much larger. [laughs]

But the big concern was stuff that wasn't contiguous to primitive areas, the so-called de facto wilderness and what to do about that. The first thing that happened was that by largely grass-roots initiative—although people, particularly the Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club helped foster this in a few places—people around the country noticed that there was this Wilderness Act. They were trying to save some little area in a national forest; it didn't happen to be a primitive area or near one. They saw that Congress was passing wilderness bills so they went to their congressman and said, "We want to save this place. Why don't you do that?"

The first one was a place in Montana called the Lincoln backcountry, which is now the Scapegoat Wilderness. In the Montana congressional delegation, Lee Metcalf was one of the fathers of the Wilderness Act and a terrific guy. The local hardware store owner in Lincoln, Montana, got him to introduce legislation and got it past the Senate over the years, and this is all well reported in the existing historical literature, that the Scapegoat Wilderness was finally established.

A little crowd of people, a kind of nature group in—and maybe the Sierra Club was there too—called the Alabama Conservancy got behind an area called the Sipsey Wilderness in the Bankhead National Forest in Alabama very early, the late sixties, and it started moving. Rupe Cutler went up to West Virginia and helped organize a thing called the West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, and they focused on three areas on the Monongahela National Forest in West Virginia—the Dolly Sods, Cranberry, and Otter Creek areas—and got legislation introduced about those. We would push that legislation along and that actually started passing.

But there wasn't any big picture. In 1971 sometime—it had to be '71—I was one of the moving forces in the development of a series of omnibus bills. We'd been working on
these proposals. First off, we had a bunch of wilderness proposals which had gone to the Congress. The president is required to pass these study proposals on to the Congress with his recommendations, and they got in the habit of doing them one at a time or in funny little bundles. So there's all sorts of separate proposals. In September of '71 we dreamed up for Congressman Saylor an omnibus bill that took all of the ones that hadn't been enacted and put them in one lump, got to give them sort of a—

Lage: —critical mass.

Scott: Critical mass, exactly. Prior to that, and I don't have the date here, he had already introduced a bill which was an omnibus bill, a de facto proposal, so it had the Lincoln Scapegoat in it because that hadn't passed yet. It had the Sipsey in it; it had the three West Virginia areas; it had French Pete Creek in Oregon, which was a huge, longstanding controversy; it had the Siskiyou in California; and had Golden Trout, I think, in California. These were all areas that had been kind of hung up and hadn't been acted upon. The Siskiyou and Granite Chief.

And I remember, this was one of the first times that I worked with Brock Evans, who was the Sierra Club's Northwest representative from about 1967 on, I guess; '67 or '68. I had known Brock and corresponded with him in that first flush of my trying to write about every possible environmental issue. I know I corresponded with Brock about French Pete in 1967, and I'm sure I met him along the way at one thing or another once I started hanging around in Washington. But he was out in Seattle.

I recall—he and I laugh about this whenever we get together—that I was on a real deadline to prepare this bill which I drafted for Congressman Saylor, and we decided kind of roughly what the criteria were and which areas we were going to put in them. One of them was an area that Justice Douglas had long been advocating in the Cascades of Washington State near his home in Yakima, called the Cougar Lakes. I didn't have a good current map, and the way a wilderness bill is organized, it says, "The following areas, name the following thing, roughly the following acreage, as shown on X map, is hereby designated as wilderness," so you needed a set of maps. Now, you didn't need them immediately, but I was trying to be neat and I had the maps of all these other things.

I called Brock, and Brock dictated the boundary of the Cougar Lakes Wilderness for the Saylor bill to me over the telephone. I had a map of the forest and he had one with the boundary, and he'd say, "Now, do you see that little thing?" I'd say, "Do you mean the one over in section—?" "No, no, no, not that one." [laughing] It took us about two hours, but we got this boundary all organized.

Lage: You needed a fax machine.

Scott: We needed a fax machine or express mail, which didn't exist then. So we had this omnibus de facto bill. Well, that plus the fact that we were all realizing that this wilderness that was in trouble was the de facto wilderness, not the stuff that was subject to the Parker Decision and the mandated Wilderness Act because it was on ice
anyway, but the stuff under national forests that was in trouble was everything else, so we used the Saylor de facto bill, which wasn't going to go anywhere, but this kind of raised the—

Lage: Oh, you didn't have great hopes for that?

Scott: No, no. But it was to establish the concept and give it more stature and get everybody around the country yelling about how come you weren't enacting these areas? The Forest Service had long had in its manual, and how it got there I don't know, and it's not entirely clear from Dennis Roth's history, had long had a kind of sentence in its manual that said that regional foresters could recommend additional areas that they thought were most suitable for wilderness, other than the ones that were required to study.

Well, sometime in 1971. All right, here we are. On August 11 of 1971, the chief of the Forest Service, I believe seeing that our movement was starting to cook up all these wilderness proposals and just take them straight to Congress, leaving the Forest Service out, the Forest Service didn't do any studies of these areas; they just went straight to Congress. So August 11 of '71 the chief put out a directive saying, "We're now going to study these roadless areas," and setting a June 30, 1972 deadline for those to come in. There was a whole process outlined for how to do this, which we probably ought to talk about next time.

Lage: I think so, because it’s a long story.

Scott: But there is one thing; do you have a minute right now?

Lage: Yes.

Scott: I need to go back and catch up about some people for just a minute.

Lage: Is this Wilderness Society?

Scott: This is clear back to Michigan. In 1967, fall of '67, I was now a graduate student, and I was a teaching assistant in an Introduction to Conservation course, which was a thing that undergraduates from outside the School of Natural Resources could take for their dispersion requirements or whatever they're called. So Dr. Leonard—I forget his first name—good old Doc Leonard was the teacher of this class and it had the usual lecture format, and then there were sections that met and I was one of, I think, two teaching assistants. My section became kind of an update on what was going on in Washington. Here I was, this was '67, I was infatuated with the weekly events of the San Rafael Wilderness fight and all this, so I was giving all these updates about all this stuff. I don't know what was going on in the real course.

My star pupil, was a young guy from—. I don't know what department he was in. A young undergraduate named Chuck Clusen, who didn't stick out at first, but that class went on into spring of ’68, and at some point I announced that we'd been following all
this legislation, and I made it known that I was going to Washington that summer and would be working for the Wilderness Society. After class this guy came up to me and he said, "You're going to Washington? Now, isn't that interesting? I've got a summer job with the National Park Service as a ranger in Washington this summer. Have you got plans for where you're going to live?" He said, "Well, maybe we could—. I'm going to be down there before you are."

So the long and the short of it is that Chuck and I ended up being roommates in Washington that summer, along with another friend of ours named Jim Jordan, who was another Michigan graduate. When we came back to Ann Arbor the following year, we were roommates in Ann Arbor, at least through the fall of '68 and '69. Then I went back to Washington to work again. For the rest of my time in Michigan, Chuck and I were roommates, and he transferred into the School of Natural Resources, or maybe he went into graduate school there, I forget which, and he became a teaching assistant in this class.

In the spring of '70, the teach-in was going on and all of that, but Chuck was a teaching assistant in Dr. Leonard's class that year. I had been to the population student thing at Aerlie House sponsored by the Institute for the Study of Health and Society, and the people from that institute had liked me, and at one point they called me up one day and they said, "We've got a job. We're at our headquarters here in Atlanta; we've got a job. We want somebody to do X, Y, and Z, and you'd be just the guy." I said, "I can't. My career is already organized in front of me, but I know somebody who'd be very good." He said, "Who is that?" I said, "My roommate, Chuck Clusen. So Chuck left the next morning, flew down and had an interview with them, came back, packed up his stuff, and was gone. [laughs] Dropped out and went to Atlanta and went to work for this organization, leaving me to grade all his papers. [laughs]

I then moved to Washington in 1970, and Chuck—. The institute decided that it wasn't where the action was, so it moved itself to Washington. That's who was holding the summer program where the students were at the college campus where we did the SST business, so Chuck, as the staff member, was one of the Michigan "students." His girlfriend, or maybe by that time they were married, was another one of them. So now he was housed in Washington, but he hated this organization. It was sort of a phony grant-getting program putting on kind of—. He was thoroughly unhappy.

As I was leaving Michigan, or in the process of leaving Michigan but was still involved in the Mackinac Chapter, we and all the chapters in the Great Lakes had gotten together and had organized the Midwest Regional Conservation Committee, RCC. I was at the first organizing meeting for that.

Lage: This was for the Sierra Club?

Scott: For the Sierra Club. I was at the first organizing meeting for that, which was probably 1969, maybe '68, in Chicago. We started right away agitating. It was something that Virginia and Dick Cellarius and I felt very strongly about, and the other chapters mostly agreed, and some of them felt strongly about it. We started agitating that we
wanted a Midwest representative. We had had a visit, probably in '69, from Jeff
Ingram, who was then the Southwest representative of the club. No, that would have
been '68. He gave us a talk about the status of the redwoods and all that, and we had a
slide show that he put on about the Grand Canyon or whatever. But that was the
closest we ever saw of a staff person. We said, "We want one of those. There's more
to be done in this region and we want a Midwest representative." And we agitated and
agitated and agitated, and finally, pulling and hauling, the Sierra Club created the
Midwest office and the position of Midwest representative.

Mike McCloskey's then assistant—Mike always had this kind of junior entry-level
position of an assistant—his assistant was Jonathan Ela. Jonathan, who was the son of
a college professor in Madison, Wisconsin, Jonathan was a conscientious objector. The
Vietnam War figures very strongly in all of this. Jonathan was a Vietnam
conscientious objector, had gotten CO status, and he walked into the Sierra Club sight
unseen one day and said, "I've got a CO and I need to work for an organization that's
appropriate for a CO, and you're one of them. Would you take me on?" Mike said,
"Yes." So Jonathan Ela, off the street, became Mike's—. There may be more to it than
that.

Lage: Were these positions paid? These CO positions?

Scott: Yes. Not very many. Not very well. Yes. So Jonathan became Mike's kind of
sidekick assistant. There was no conservation department or anything like it at the
time. There were two or three people putting out the NNR [National News Report]
starting in 1969 and doing little odd stuff, but there was Mike, being conservation
director as well as executive director once Brower was gone, and his assistant—

Lage: The club was in pretty bad financial straits at that time.

Scott: Yes, terrible straits. So here was Jonathan doing this job, and he'd finished up
whatever his CO time was. When the Midwest position was created, Jonathan became
the Midwest representative.

Lage: Did you get to consult or your group get to consult—

Scott: I was gone by then. His office was not physically up and running, I don't think, until
about 1970, or it might have been in '71. It had to be '71. It was '71. It was 1971,
because Jonathan took that position, leaving Mike without anybody. Now, I knew all
this was going on; I was now a full-time employed person, and my friend Chuck was
coming around my office every now and then. I remember he was in my office the
first time a U.S. senator ever called me. Bob Packwood called me from the Senate
about something, and God, I put on the airs: "Oh, yes, Senator," as though this
happened every day. [laughter]

So I think Chuck was unhappy. He and his wife had just moved into this fourth-story
townhouse apartment thing, and he had one of these couches with a fold-out bed in it.
Those things are heavy as sin. The frames of those are made out of lead or something.
And this little, treacherous townhouse stairway. Chuck and I and several other of his friends had sweated blood moving this damn sofa hide-a-bed thing up to his apartment. Three weeks later I called Mike and I said, "Mike, Jonathan's gone. You must need a new assistant. Have I got the guy for you!" And Mike says, "Oh. Sounds good to me."

So Chuck Clusen became Mike's assistant and moved out of that damn apartment with his sofa bed to San Francisco, and joined the Sierra Club staff. So here was my old college roommate and buddy, Chuck, who was the one who went to the cast of *Hair* and got them for the environmental teach-in. Here was Chuck working for Mike McCloskey now. To jump ahead, it was he who called me in late '72 or early '73, whenever it was that Lloyd Tupling retired and Brock was made the head of the Washington office and got ready to leave Seattle, so they were looking for somebody to be the Northwest representative, and it was Chuck who called and said, "Gee, Doug, what do you think about that?"

I said, "No, over my dead body. I wouldn't work for the goddamn miserable Sierra Club," because we were having the fight about the eastern wilderness stuff, which we'll talk about in detail. I just said, "Wild horses couldn't drag me to go to work for them." Chuck privately agreed with me on the wilderness thing but he was in a very awkward position, which we'll go into.

Some months later, in '73, the eastern wilderness matter had moved forward. The Wilderness Society's position had prevailed, and the wounds had been tenderly covered over. The person that the club ultimately hired to be Northwest representative, a guy named Rick Applegate, who was married to a member of the state senate in Montana, had taken this job, a nice guy, apparently under the theory that he would move the office to Montana, which was then part of the Northwest region, because his wife was not going to live in Seattle. He discovered that there were three full-time people on the staff in Seattle and that they didn't want to move to Montana. In ten days he realized he'd done the wrong thing, and he resigned.

So here, after going through some enormous research process that took six months, here was the Sierra Club, was now bereft of a Northwest representative again and somewhat desperate. I had paid attention to this, and I let it be known by Chuck that I was not going to apply but that were an offer made to me, I would condescend [laughter] to consider it.

There was a retiring party for Tup. They cleared out all the chairs in what was then called the Senate Interior Committee's hearing room, which Senator Jackson was the chairman of, to have a big retirement party for Tup and kind of a welcome to Brock, but mostly it was a retirement for Tup. Mike McCloskey was there and I remember when he saw me he came rushing across the room and said, "Doug! What is this? I hear you're looking—." He ushered me over to the side, and we sat in a little chair. That was in May of 1973, and that started the process of my move. I then moved to the Northwest office of the Sierra Club effective August of '73.
Some short time after that, Chuck, having been Mike's assistant long enough and having done a brilliant job in particular on the coast initiative—. He was the ringleader of the campaign for the coast initiative. His wife was very unhappy. They lived in the fogbelt out on the avenues of San Francisco and had a little baby and were unhappy there. An additional position opened in the Washington office as a public land lobbyist, so Chuck moved back to Washington DC.

Lage: I hope he got rid of his hide-a-bed.

Scott: [laughs] Yes. And became a member of the lobbying staff working for Brock in the Washington office. Brock was expanding the Washington office very quickly.

[End Tape 8, Side A]

[Tape 8, Side B not recorded]
Interview #4: November 29, 1990

Transcriber: Chris DeRosa

[Begin Tape 9, Side A]

Lage: Today is November 29, 1990, and we're continuing the interview with Doug Scott. We were going to take right up where we were kind of abruptly stopped last time.

Scott: We stopped last time with basically a long review of my relationship with Chuck Clusen, who is a very important figure in the work of the Sierra Club and later the Wilderness Society and the Alaska Campaign. I want to similarly recap the origins and nature of my relationship with John McComb. In some ways parallel to my background, John in the mid-sixties was a volunteer conservation activist with the Sierra Club’s chapter, the Grand Canyon Chapter, in Arizona and with the Southern Arizona Hiking Club, a local organization based in Tucson where he lived. He became the Sierra Club's southwest representative when Jeff Ingram, who had had that position, left the club staff. I'm not just sure of that date but it was probably about 1970. John and I first became acquainted, I believe it was probably the summer of 1969, when I was working at the Wilderness Society's office and when John came in to work on some Arizona legislation. It might have been 1970. He was still a volunteer. I believe he was chair of the chapter at that time. It may well have been the congressional hearings on the Forest Service proposals involving two primitive areas in Arizona: Sycamore Canyon and Pine Mountain.

The wilderness bills for those became law in the spring of 1972. So just in the normal course of events—I haven't looked this up but it may well have been 1970—I remember meeting John in the old Wilderness Society's office on 15th Street. He was a very engaging and dedicated person, a bit older than I am, but we became friends and professional colleagues. He fairly shortly after this joined the full-time staff of the Sierra Club, and I joined the full-time staff of the Wilderness Society. While my work didn't involve, in those first years with the Wilderness Society, an enormous amount of field work—I didn't go out visiting all that much—I did go to Arizona during that period and saw John there. We had encounters in that period in wilderness work in Washington DC. In 1973, when I joined the Sierra Club staff, John and I became colleagues as field representatives, which was then a fairly small crew of people. There was Jonathan Ela in the Midwest, and myself in the Northwest, and John in the Southwest, and Mary Ann Erikson in Southern California, and a few other people scattered around.

Lage: What happened to Northern California?

Scott: Northern California I think did not have an office at that stage. At least if it did, I don't remember, so I think Mary Ann covered all of California. And all of the field offices, the San Francisco headquarters and the Washington office of the club in that era, in the
early seventies, were connected by teletype machines. Western Union TWIX machines. We called it the TWIX.

Lage: T-W-I-X?

Scott: T-W-I-X. John and I used to laugh that the environmental movement was always one major technological step behind the industrial lobbyists with whom we contended. But we were all able to communicate with these things. So in addition to talking on the phone, there was an exchange of messages back and forth.

Lage: Did these get saved? Were there copies?

Scott: They certainly weren't saved in any automatic way but they would be recognizable because the TWIXs used a kind of crummy, yellowish, draft kind of quality, rough kind of paper. They were maddening things, unlike a teletypewriter or a fax machine. If you wanted to send something that you already had you had to retype it into the TWIX machine. But they were kind of fun because you would be sitting in some lonely little office without very many other people around. John's office was in an old converted motel on the strip in Tucson. The machine would suddenly ring with this loud ring. Everybody would jump. It sounded like an A.P. alert coming across the wire. It would start clattering away. They kind of shook. In the case of John's upstairs former motel place office, the whole office shook.

So from 1973 on, at staff meetings and joint operations of one kind or another, John and I became very close friends and collaborators. Our relationship was a very strong personal one, as well as just a professional one. As it turned out, years later John moved to the lobbying staff of the Sierra Club in Washington probably in about 1976 or maybe 1977. So he was in Washington when I arrived to spend my time on special detail on Alaska. We had already collaborated on a number of other things that we'll talk about here. But from that time on John and I were very close. Usually when I was in Washington, if I wasn't living there I would very often stay at his apartment. We collaborated on sort of dreams of what we could do with this Sierra Club if we could only get it properly organized. Chuck Clusen was another part of this crowd.

Lage: Were John and Chuck also single at the time?

Scott: Chuck was not. Chuck was married at that time but then was divorced a little while later. John was divorced before he left Tucson. He had been married earlier. So there was, at least for large parts of this time, a certain bachelor quality to all of this. We went hiking when I would be in town over a weekend. We would go up to Shenandoah National Park and go hiking and so forth. In the fall of 1979 the conservation staff of the Sierra Club got together, even though there wasn't a conservation department—the field staff, the key people from the San Francisco headquarters, I guess everybody from the conservation part of the San Francisco headquarters, Mike McCloskey and the Washington staff, Brock and others—and had a big retreat in West Virginia. During that retreat a great frustration bubbled up from the staff that we weren't operating in a unified way, that because Mike was serving as
both conservation director—which he had been before Brower had left ten years earlier, and he had retained the title and had never given it up—. But he was also executive director and so, particularly in things like budgets, suddenly he would stop being the advocate for the interests of the conservation department because he was now the judge.

Also he was being pulled in very many directions. The demands of the board of directors, the demands of the many other things that the club was doing that he was required to pay attention to, there wasn't any unified vision of the conservation work. In Brower's era there had been a unified vision of the whole thing because it all happened essentially in Brower's head. You had a big campaign about the Grand Canyon and you produced books. Well, who oversaw the books? Dave Brower. You lobbied and issued press releases. Who did the lobbying and oversaw the press releases? Dave Brower. But as the place got bigger, and particularly with the increasing number of field offices and the expansion of the Washington office, the stresses that were placed on doing the quality of work we wanted to do by not having any elaborate and well-disciplined coordination was becoming very apparent to us.

And, as I think we've already discussed, the Alaska campaign, which was going on at that time (which was a highly disciplined campaign, in which all of the Sierra Club people were involved intensely, not just me), had shown what a disciplined campaign could be like. So at this meeting in the fall of 1979 there was a great restiveness and Mike agreed. I don't want to say that this was a revolt. There was some quality of, "Hey, this is an unsatisfactory situation and it is not being dealt with." We want to deal with it. Mike authorized or agreed, or whatever the right word is, to a task force of staff members which I believe involved Brant Calkin and Jonathan Ela and Carl Pope, probably some others—did not involve me—and this task force worked with Mike and came up with a report on how they thought things ought to be. Mike fooled around with it and in very late 1979 Mike issued a directive about the new nature of the conservation work at the club. He still did not agree to give up the title "Conservation Director" though he didn't use it, but he didn't want anyone else to use it.

So that's when the cohesive conservation department of the Sierra Club was born. In 1973, when I joined the staff as the Northwest field representative, I reported directly to Mike McCloskey the executive director. The head of the Washington office reported directly to Mike McCloskey as executive director. The people in San Francisco reported directly to Mike. As we got more staff, particularly more field offices, there were just too many people reporting to Mike.

At some time in the mid-1970s, to deal with that field office problem, Mike created the position of what came to be called associate conservation director, or assistant conservation director, one of the two, which was first held by the original Southern California representative Larry [E.] Moss for a fairly brief period of time. I recollect very clearly that those of us in the field offices were outraged that we were now going to be one bureaucratic layer removed from Mike. There was among this group—Jonathan Ela, John McComb and myself—a real camaraderie which did not include
Larry Moss particularly, for a variety of reasons. He was skilled and a good guy, but it did not include him for a number of reasons. So not only were we being cut off from direct access to Mike but there was somebody in there who wasn't sort of part of the group. In good bureaucratic tradition, I think we're all concerned that the incredible freedom we had had: we ran what we did in our regions, there were no performance evaluations, there were no annual goals, we sort of said, "we need more money," and the budget would appear. It was a pretty loose, little, pretty informal kind of an operation.

Lage: Did you really have that much budgetary freedom?

Scott: I don't remember having any fights about the budget. I hardly ever came to San Francisco. We would have meetings a couple times of year or once a year. But we would say, "We need more money." But we weren't getting calls from someone in San Francisco every ten minutes saying, do this, do that. My recollection is, and I'm sure I'm gilding it over, that on those fairly rare occasions when I heard from Mike it was with compliments about the work that he had perceived that I was doing. How he perceived what I was doing—there is a story to that—was always a little bit of a mystery. Sort of, "Gee, do you need anything?" I'd say, "Yes, more money." And he would send more money. It was very informal.

Lage: [laughter] So you didn't even report formally, when you said how he knew what you were doing.

Scott: Mike, of course, was the original field representative of the Sierra Club so he had some theory about how these things were done. Then Brock had established a practice, when he was Northwest representative, of quarterly reports. These were long, four or five page long, sort of lists, people I have seen, things I had done. These were sent quarterly, not just to Mike but to the leaders all over hell and gone. Then there was a period when Brock had already moved to Washington and before I took the job in the Northwest, several months, and there was a fellow temporarily there named Roger Mellem, who was something of a disciple of Brock's and who sort of took Brock's report to the next level of purity. These things kind of became a joke. I remember Larry Williams joking one time that he had seen Roger Mellem in an airport. They passed in the concourse some place. That showed up on Roger's report. [laughter]

They weren't terribly substantive but they were lists. I didn't want to do it. I didn't want to keep those kinds of records, and I just never filed one of these things, and McComb didn't file them very much, and Ela was sort of—. We were all sort of resisting authority, and Mike would complain every now and then. "Where are these quarterly reports?" At some staff meeting in the late seventies, not the one in 1979 so it was probably 1977 or so, we got through the whole staff meeting without Mike remembering to raise this question. Just at the end as we were all sort of saying goodbye and sort of in our final session, Denny Wilcher, who was then one of the fund raisers for the club, cleared his throat and said, "Say, Mike, it would sure help me to know what the field staff were doing, if we ever had any of those quarterly—." We were all just going to strangle him. [laughter]
Because every now and then, Mike would get angry and sort of say, "Now, by God, I want these quarterly reports." Which was out of character for Mike.

Lage: It sounds as if within yourselves, you had a tension between wanting more organization and delighting in that freedom that you had.

Scott: Absolutely. The breakdown in this system—. Here, we started talking about McComb and now we're talking about how the Sierra Club was organized in the seventies.

Lage: We were going to get to this anyway.

Scott: The breakdown in this system came whenever an issue became big enough that it wasn't just some one lobbyist or some one regional representative who could sort of cope with it. Because no one had the authority, except Mike theoretically, to pull everybody together and to say, "Field reps, drop what you're doing and come to Washington to work on this or stir up the troops on this." It was a much more laissez-faire kind of an operation. For much of this period, I think that it was not only comfortable for those of us who were the incumbents but in fact a good thing because a lot of the work that we were devoting ourselves to, the RARE I [Roadless Area Review and Evaluation], the intense field work on big controversial wilderness proposals, were probably not things that would particularly lend themselves to some central authority saying, "All right, Doug, now, here are the next six things we need to do on the Hells Canyon campaign." I was doing that. John was masterminding the campaigns in the Southwest. Jonathan was masterminded the stuff in the Midwest.

There were some issues that rose to sort of campaign level, particularly the Clean Air Act amendments of 1977. I remember with very great clarity that John and I, and I suspect several other people, but I remember John and I in particular, were recruited to go to Washington.

Lage: Would that be by Brock or by Mike?

Scott: By Brock, by Carl Pope, I'm not quite sure who, but somewhere the word came down, "You shall go to Washington to work on the coal conversion provisions of the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments." No one briefed us. No one had been keeping us informed about this stuff. I wasn't involved in the Clean Air Act at all. Didn't know a thing about it. Kind of came in and the guy who was the lobbyist, whose name I conveniently forget, sort of said, "Here's a copy of the committee report." I arrived at the immediate conclusion that I was not about to stake my contacts and my political reputation on going around and talking to the senators and congressmen and their staffs that I knew about something I hadn't been properly briefed about. It wasn't well done.

By contrast to that, the Alaska campaign where groups, particularly the Sierra Club, had consciously decided to concentrate their resources in a big way and to impose through the Alaska Coalition, outside of the individual organizational structure, a heavily disciplined campaign, which I was a part of. We all liked that. At this meeting
in 1979, we all sort of said that we want to do more like that, even at the price of giving up some of this freedom.

So that was what led to the announcement by Mike in December of 1979 that he was reorganizing the conservation department. He of course had discussed this with the board of directors and so forth. His memo in which he does this, which I don't have a copy of at hand, is an extremely important historical document in the Sierra Club. This memo resulted from the work of this task force. So it wasn't that Mike sat in the quiet of his office and dreamed this all up, but it reflected Mike's very systematic thinking and detailed experience and knowledge plus the input of this task force and other voices.

He said, "I'm now creating a conservation department which will have characteristics that we have not had and that will answer the needs of the eighties." The needs of the eighties he identified were that we needed the capacity to field more disciplined campaigns that were orchestrated. And someone needs to be empowered to cause that orchestration to happen, to pull together the disparate working team from the disparate resources of the club. "There needs to be greater unity of command over this orchestrated system." And he said quite clearly, "The work of the conservation department shall largely be the carrying out of these orchestrated campaigns and its work shall be judged largely on the success of carrying out these orchestrated campaigns."

Then in a kind of classic Mike McCloskey way, he brokered together not a unified command structure, not a triumvirate, but a quadrumvirate. Brock, who had been the head of the Washington office, was repositioned and based in Washington, entitled the associate executive director, a brand new title in the club. He was out of the line. He did not have a line authority over the Washington staff, or he was not part of the line management anymore. He was kind of a subsidiary to Mike, with the theory that his principal role was sort of coalition building and outreach to constituencies that needed to be brought into these more orchestrated campaigns. I think it fair to say that there was a certain amount of being kicked upstairs that was going on here.

Lage: Was there a sense that he didn't have the managerial skills?

Scott: Yes. Brock played a crucial role in the seventies in building the Washington office of the Sierra Club, which had been a pretty laissez-faire operation. Brock was very aggressive about that and pressed for more resources and added lobbyists. But he is the sort of person who lends a sort of charismatic leadership. The pulling together of and bringing together of the team of people to do the job is somewhat less his skill. And he accepted this arrangement so presumably there was some degree of self-analysis in that.

True enough, and I wish we had all done more to help make him successful in this role because the thing that Mike hit upon of the need, and others of course contributed to this idea—for serious outreach to labor, certain corporations and other interest groups and so forth—was in fact a very important need. But to a certain degree, because
Brock was a little apart from the line of authority, though he had great skills and lots of contacts that he developed with such other groups, it didn't get integrated as much. That is still a crying need. We still haven't figured out how to do that as well as it ought to have been done. Brock chose to leave a few years later, it must have been about 1982, maybe 1981, to go to a senior position to the Audubon Society, which was somewhat similarly defined.

But for the first instance after this 1979 reorganization, Brock was one of the four people who were charged—though he was explicitly not in the line. John McComb, who by that time had moved to the staff in Washington, was made the director of the Washington office with line authority over all the functions, all the lobbyists and all the functions in Washington. Paul Swatek, who had been—. I need to back up here and say that Larry Moss had had this original position that was the associate conservation director. He didn't stay in that position for very long. Then he left and Mike needed to choose a new person, and Paul at that time was a member of the board of directors and treasurer of the club and had applied for this position.

Lage: That's not supposed to happen, as I remember.

Scott: It was, I believe, made clear to Mike that he should choose this member of the board of directors.

Lage: I thought there was a specific rule, maybe not a rule but an informal rule, that board of directors member shouldn't be hired.

Scott: Well, there wasn't.

Lage: Although Brant Calkin was also.

Scott: That's right. I don't think there has even been a rule that board members can't be hired to be on the staff. However, it's more than just a policy, I think it is a by-law that no staff member may run for the board for two years after leaving the staff. My own view is that that is unwise in both directions. Board members, if they want to make a career out of doing this stuff, should go. Because then people are caught in funny positions of, "Well, wait a second. Which path of communication loyalty is this person living in?" Brock later served on the board of the Sierra Club and I think successfully so. And Paul was certainly successful in helping to bring a degree of financial management to the conservation functions of the club.

At this point, Paul already was in the position that had been previously held by Larry Moss, of being the staff supervisor of the field staff and of the San Francisco conservation staff, which included people like Gene Coan and Carl Pope and so forth. Paul continued in the position, which continued to be titled assistant conservation director, though there was no conservation director and there hadn't been one since 1969. He was in particular to have these functions that involved the management of the field staff and the day-to-day management of the San Francisco staff and the kind
of financial and personnel functions. I was brought into this leadership in a position that was titled director of federal affairs, based in San Francisco.

Lage: Had that been something suggested by the task force?

Scott: I'm not clear in my memory. There is a written report of the task force. I think it was a clear suggestion of the task force that I ought to be brought into the leadership. I was willing to do that. I think in part this was because I had been very much a ringleader of the orchestrated campaign work in the Alaska campaign. I remember explicitly Jonathan Ela saying, "This is odd because he has been my colleague, but I would like to work for this guy because he has talents in this particular way." Which is a very generous thing for Jonathan to say. So I think it was kind of a foregone conclusion that I was going to have some role in this. Mike left it that this four-person crew of people were going to manage this operation collegially as a committee. We were called the management committee. I was not happy about that but there was a little out. It said that any time that either the press of business or the fact that the committee can't agree, if something has to be settled, the first among equals is Doug Scott as director of federal affairs.

So I came to San Francisco with my pal McComb, with whom I was extremely simpatico, operating on the ground work in Washington, with me in a position to pull together the field staff and the Washington lobby.

Lage: Did you have line authority over something?

Scott: I had theoretical line authority over the whole works.

Lage: Because, if they couldn't agree. But aside from that—?

Scott: Well, it wasn't that a flag went up. Really I think whether I had line authority, I was the leader. There was in the early eighties a certain degree of tension even with a good friend like McComb. We would get at each other's throats at various times. Paul was a somewhat methodical person and often the speed at which we were doing things, there were some frustrations there. Brock really was more removed from this than the design might have implied. So by 1983 it was fairly obvious that this really wasn't working as well as it ought to. There were some tensions. Mike, for reasons that he would be better in position to enunciate, decided that now he would finally relinquish the title of conservation director and that we had to have one person in line authority over this whole work. John and I agreed between each other that it better be one of us. It was understood between John and Mike and myself in private discussions that went on at Mike's house at Piedmont at least one whole day, that in this new design, the functions that Paul had had were going to have to be done in a different way and by somebody different. That's when Paul left the club.

Mike chose John McComb. We both applied for the position of conservation director. Mike chose John McComb for that position.
Lage: Does that put strains on friendship?

Scott: No.

Lage: Both applying? Did you both sort of agree to apply?

Scott: No. We were doing this cheek to jowl. I was living in Mill Valley at that time. I remember John and I took a long walk along the flats down by Richardson Bay and talked this all through. In the back of anybody's mind is sort of, "Gee, I would rather have the most prestigious job." We were extremely simpatico. We would get at each other's throats every now and then. But we were extremely simpatico and worked well together. We knew each other so well, and we were very different in our strengths. We knew to defer to each other's capabilities. So the fact that he became conservation director, that meant he did my job evaluation and yak, yak, yak. It didn't change all that much.

Lage: Did you stay as director?

Scott: I became deputy conservation director, or associate conservation director.

Lage: So there was no more a director of federal affairs? Or did someone else get that?

Scott: No. The federal affairs title was relinquished. So Paul left at that point. It was shortly after that that we recruited Bruce Hamilton, who was our Northern Plains representative in Latimer, Wyoming, to come to San Francisco to manage the field staff. David Gardiner, who had worked with Carl on Clean Air in San Francisco and then moved to Washington and was a lobbyist in Washington—when John became conservation director, David became staff director of the Washington office. Of course, Carl Pope in that era was the political director running the SCCOPE political activity. That really defined that. And Gene Coan, who served in various capacities. That defined the new leadership group which lasted until Doug Wheeler became executive director. We'll talk more about him of course.

I had known Doug back in the days when he was a deputy to Nat Reed in the Interior Department in the early seventies.

Lage: Hold one second. Okay.

[End Tape 9, Side A]

[Begin Tape 9, Side B]

Scott: I was one of the three department heads who were selected by the other department heads to be part of the interview team when we were looking for a new executive director after Mike's status changed. So when it became fairly clear that Doug Wheeler was the pick of the group that we had to look at, I remember having dinner with him in his home in Washington before he was formally selected and saying, "It
strikes me that this is all headed in your direction." I remember saying very clearly to Doug, "There is a thing that you are going to notice right away that is going to seem very odd and that is that the conservation director, John McComb, who is the senior report to the executive director, is based in Washington DC., 2500 miles away.

Lage: He didn't move to San Francisco? I see.

Scott: —and therefore is kind of at a distance from the other department heads and the collaboration that goes on there, but spends a lot of time worrying about things like budget and personnel and so forth, and managerial things, and that the deputy conservation director, who is really still functioning as leading the legislative campaigns, is 2500 miles out in San Francisco. It might easily look to you as if we were in the wrong places. But here's the deal. I won't live in Washington DC; John won't live in San Francisco; and it works. So my advice to you is, don't meddle with it."

Well, for a whole variety of reasons, Doug Wheeler did not take to John McComb, even faintly, and I'm sure that's in part because John McComb didn't take to Doug Wheeler either.

Lage: Was he on the recruiting team also?

Scott: No, John was not. Fairly soon after he got into the job, Doug made a clear statement to John that he wanted the conservation director to be at his elbow in San Francisco and that John had the choice of either moving to San Francisco or being demoted, in which case he would choose someone else to be conservation director who would live in San Francisco, presumably me.

Well, though John and I had been trading hats and trading, sort of, relative places in the pecking order several times, this, particularly because of why it was done and the way it was done, was a very hard blow to John. We didn't issue any press releases. We didn't make any [announcements, such as], "Today, Doug Scott became conservation director." But in point of fact, John after considerable agony decided he did not want to move. His social life and his sense of being with the group in the Washington office that were very important to him he did not want to leave. So he was in effect demoted.

Shortly after that, the blowup over Wheeler began. John was in the eye of that storm in many ways and felt very ill-used by some of the board of directors. Chuck Clusen, remember him?

Lage: Yes.

Scott: Chuck Clusen, who had left the Sierra Club staff in 1979—this is very funny. In the fall of 1979, the Wilderness Society had gone through two sort of revolutions and been completely changed. They hired a new executive director, Bill Turnage, William Turnage, a somewhat arrogant and difficult person but not to be gainsaid in terms of
his talent for promotion and fundraising and building. He built a new Wilderness Society. It wasn't anything like the old one, but there you are. He came sniffing around. He had lunch with me one day, and he had lunch with Chuck. He was clearly sniffing around to see what was around. He, in the fall of 1979, lured Chuck away. Chuck had previously attempted to be lured away to the Wilderness Society by Stewart Brandborg, who left there in the mid-seventies. In response to that effort, Mike McCloskey, who was close to Chuck and whom Chuck had worked for at the start of his career with the Sierra Club, said, "Well, I'm not going to lose you," and made him an offer to make him deputy director of the Washington office and increased his salary and so forth. Chuck had a young family and lots of obligations and so money was an important part of all of this.

My recollection, which could easily have been somewhat encrusted over these years, is that this idea of a deputy was not popular with Brock. This was essentially imposed on Brock. Brock wasn't given to that kind of organizational stuff. So no announcement was ever made to the other people in the Washington office, that Chuck was the deputy director, which sort of annoyed Chuck. But some many months later—wonderful story—Chuck was sitting in his office one day signing expense vouchers for some of the other people and one of them, Linda Billings, came marching into office about something else, saw what he was doing and threw a fit.

Lage: [laughter] She didn't know he had this authority?

Scott: This was the first time that she discovered that he had this job. Well, Chuck was not entirely happy in the organizational structure in the Washington office and wanted more money and so forth and was able to be lured away. So he left—.

Lage: In the middle of the Alaska campaign—.

Scott: —a senior position, and he was already chairman of the Alaska Coalition, and he continued that. Chuck was a very well-liked and beloved figure on the Washington staff in the Sierra Club and a part of this little clique, as it was sometimes negatively referred to by various people, that included John McComb and myself. It was at the staff meeting in the fall of 1979 in West Virginia where the rumbling started to say, "We want to reorganize and have a more orchestrated operation" that Bill Turnage came, just for a brief collegial visit with our staff and came with Chuck Clusen, whom he had just hired away. It was Chuck's goodbye.

Lage: And now you knew?

Scott: Yes, we knew it by then. But looking back on it, it is perfectly clear that if Chuck had not left the Sierra Club staff at that particular time, he would have been part of this leadership group maybe in lieu of me, maybe in lieu of McComb, unclear, but the fact that he was gone had an influence on who then fell into these various spots. He might easily have been in the position I was in. He might easily have been in the position McComb was in because he was cut out for it and his career ambition was to move up. He had great skills, has great skills in that area.
So now back to the early eighties when Doug Wheeler was mistreating McComb, and that's the right word for it, in ways that were psychologically very hard on John—

Lage: It did seem fairly rational, what he asked. To have—

Scott: Rational, except that he was messing with something that was working, and the two people involved wouldn't do it, wouldn't do what he was trying to do, and abuse his authority to do it. I don't gainsay it. It didn't make him popular, particularly with John. Chuck at that point was continuing in the senior conservation position at the Wilderness Society, conservation director at the Wilderness Society, and he was of course still living in Washington, as did John and very close to John and watching all of this with a certain amount of interest. So he hired John away when John was demoted.

In the midst of all the serious agonies that we went into later with Wheeler, John was just beside himself. Many people were dressing up their résumés and figuring that they would either have to quit in outrage at any given moment or that we were all going to be fired at any given moment. John just couldn't take it. Didn't want to take it, not couldn't, didn't want to take it anymore. So he succumbed to Chuck's blandishments and went off to be director of field services for the Wilderness Society, who had by that time gotten a new executive director, George Frampton, who didn't take to either Clusen or McComb, and who three months later fired them both unceremoniously.

Lage: Oh my goodness! This is quite a tale. At the same time, the club was going through all that.

Scott: Well, sort of. We had calmed down again [Wheeler left as executive director], and Mike was back in the temporary position of acting executive director. Again, George Frampton is the executive director at the Wilderness Society, and I suppose if his governing council wants to let him have this authority, he has this authority. It was done in an extraordinarily cruel and rotten way. Chuck was told one morning to clean out his desk and get out of there, and John was on grand jury duty at that point and came back late in the afternoon to see if there were any phone messages for him. Nobody would look him in the eye.

But anyway, I tell all this story, first the long story about Clusen and then the story about McComb, to show the pattern of interweaving of a little crew of us who were sort of plucked out of the organization and moved along and moved up, mostly under Mike McCloskey's influence.

Lage: How was Mike to work for?

Scott: Oh, Mike was a joy to work for. First off, let's talk about it from the perspective of the mid-seventies. I was less of a Mike McCloskey disciple than were, in particular, Jonathan Ela, but also pretty strongly McComb. Much as I had learned my craft at the knee of Rupe Cutler and Stewart Brandborg and Harry Crandall and others, John and
particularly Jonathan, and Chuck Clusen had learned their craft at the knee of Mike McCloskey. But Mike was a figure who actually went back—unlike anyone once Brandborg was gone from the Wilderness Society—he was the one person in the conservation movement who went back to the original fight over the Wilderness Act. He had been involved in the very latter stages of that in the early sixties and had this wealth of knowledge and had a particular, kind of quasi-academic way of conceptualizing what our work was.

It was very attractive to have somebody draw general principles out of what was just a daily rush of events, and it more than compensated for the fact that Mike was somewhat stodgy. Not stodgy in his political commitment. He was as tough as anybody else could ever be. But very thoughtful, very analytical. It was excellent to work for Mike. His great strength as a person managing me and moving me up was that he was unfailingly complimentary. He would pick out and say—. I remember a staff meeting we had at Lloyd Tupling's weekend home on the Eastern Shore of Maryland. I had been probably in the Northwest office for only six months or a year. The big legislative issue I was working on was the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area and stopping the dams and so forth. We had been doing classic grass-roots mailings to congressional districts all around the country, not just in the Northwest, to Sierra Club people in the key congressional districts where votes on the committee—where this was going to be a very dicey matter.

I was designing the mailings and writing them and laying them out, all of that stuff which I had learned to do in my sleep at the Wilderness Society. The club had kind of gotten out of that or was orienting its efforts in other ways, in part because the Washington office wasn't doing that, all the membership records were in San Francisco, and it wasn't quite clear what the San Francisco staff was doing—.

Lage: Because it wasn't coordinated.

Scott: Things like the NNR had been invented, but there wasn't a systematic machine for this grass-roots mailing. Mike, being very complementary, would say, "I've been watching that and it's worked. You won those votes. They were very tough, close votes. That's kind of reminding us of a skill that Doug does so well." Just very complementary. That and the incredible freedom that we had then was a very favorable way to help me develop.

Lage: He didn't seem threatened by these young men on the way up.

Scott: No. When the history of the Sierra Club is written, Mike McCloskey is, I think, going to be the most important figure in the first hundred years of the Sierra Club. More important than John Muir, who was in many ways a figurehead. Dare I say that. More important than Dave Brower, who was—for all he did to build the reputation of the Sierra Club, he was also spending an awful lot of time building the reputation of Dave Brower. I don't believe Dave is in the normal sense of the word an egomaniac, but he built a system that depended upon him. He didn't build other people. You don't find in the penumbra around Dave Brower a bunch of people who said, "Boy, I really got
started out in life..." and who were started on careers. When Dave left, his acolytes went with him. Most of those people aren't around. They weren't organization sorts of people.

It wasn't Dave's skill. That's why he got crosswise with the volunteers and the Sierra Club wanted to be of a different quality than he wanted to be. Well, quietly in the background all that time, chosen by Dave Brower (and give him credit for that) was Mike McCloskey, who had in his uniquely calm way taken the Sierra Club: one, out of this period of incredible internal chaos. What happened to the Sierra Club in 1968 and 1969 would sink a normal organization. I've talked about the fact that the Wilderness Society from the time I worked for it, the one that exists today in 1990, is four times removed. It is four generations and the generations didn't speak to each other. There is no institutional continuity in terms of sense of mission, in terms of institutional memory. It has just been remade, whereas the Sierra Club, for all of its volatility, is incredibly stable.

Who's been the gravitational force at the center of that stability? Not the board of directors, which turns over all the time and is frothing about its various things. The force of stability at the center of the Sierra Club since the mid-sixties until the current day has been Mike McCloskey. He has changed. He has allowed an enormous amount of change to happen around him. He's not been threatened by bright, aggressive people who wanted to direct that change in other ways. He has been nurturing and encouraging in a funny way towards those people. While I did not grow up as an acolyte of and sort of in the style of Mike McCloskey—I came from that old Wilderness Society style—I had boundless respect for the man and fully understand why Chuck, John, and Jonathan, colleagues of mine who very strongly have that sense of Mike McCloskey, felt that way. It was just an accident that I didn't grow up closer to Mike. My encounters with him until I moved to San Francisco were episodic. There was not a continuity of relationship with him, even though I had known him since 1968, but he was unfailingly complimentary of and encouraging of the way I was doing things.

I think McComb was operating in that same way, I think Clusen and we were all simpatico and learning our skills and developing them together. Mike allowed that to become the dominant paradigm of the conservation work of the Sierra Club, which was an incredible piece of leadership on his part. The Sierra Club could have gone in a lot of other directions and did not. I think that was all to the good.

It was not the four-part committee that was supposed to run the conservation department. It was not one of Mike's skills to be decisive and say, "Now we are just going to change it and here's the new way it's going to be." Maybe that's not so bad and particularly in an organization—

Lage: Like the Sierra Club.

Scott: And in an organization where he freely understood what the limits on his freedom were. He had to keep the board with him, a large and complex volunteer assemblage
that wasn't just a matter of how you would—. Running the Wilderness Society, any one of the four of them [chuckles], a much simpler matter. A non-involved board, basically, and it's a staff-dominated organization. The artistry with which Mike has served to be the catalyst and center of gravity for the Sierra Club—.

Lage: And just to survive as long as he has survived is—.

Scott: To survive, being revered for his service to the club, is extraordinary. Though my decision to move from the Wilderness Society to the Sierra Club in 1973 was very painful—I agonized for all I was worth about that—I have never regretted it, and I have never regretted being in a position where Mike has been someone that I could counsel with and turn to all those years. I've watched a lot of other talented people fall by the wayside because the organization in which they worked didn't have that kind of quality. You have never seen that kind of development of people at Friends of the Earth. You've never seen that kind of development of people at the Wilderness Society in the last decade and a half. I think, remarkably enough, in this incredibly political organization, the Sierra Club has had a quality of stability. I may say that because for seventeen years I have been a central part of that as well. [laughs]

From my vantage point, that's very much the way it feels to me, to the point that when someone came along, Doug Wheeler, who didn't understand those qualities, just plain didn't understand them as it turned out, and who thought that he could be in a position to change not only the explicit organizational mechanism of the Sierra Club but the sort of unwritten stuff by simply [saying], "I'm the boss." That does not wash at the Sierra Club.

Lage: Even though we didn't plan to, should we go into that [the Wheeler years as executive director] now? Or would you rather think a little bit about it and we'll come back to it?

Scott: I'll think a little more about that. I think the transition here probably is to now go briefly back into the late sixties and early seventies when I was at the Wilderness Society just to say this much. Out of my research, I think the role I had to play in the seventies in wilderness, and it wasn't a unique role, was that I came along in a very fortuitous way. The fact that I had spent this draft board-encouraged period of time immersing myself in the fine details of the Wilderness Act and its legislative history and the intent of its framers, notably Howard Zahniser, and had fallen under the influence in particular of Stewart Brandborg and Rupe Cutler, meant that I came into a central role in Washington in the wilderness movement.

The wilderness movement consisted of the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society, and any number of local and grass-roots groups. But nationally those were the two groups that viewed it as their thing that they were working on. Others would sometimes come to the party, but it was our central business. By the late sixties and early seventies, the challenge that was facing the wilderness program was that we passed the law in 1964 and the three agencies that were involved had spent a considerable amount of time and energy beginning to implement the law through the
field studies. The [U.S.] Congress had horsed around with passing a few of the bills but there was this enormous workload to be done.

The agencies were inventing all sorts of policies which weren't necessarily congruent with the original Wilderness Act as we understood it. We viewed our mission very explicitly, and it was a mission for which I was ideally suited and felt very comfortable with: our mission of saying, "Well, no, wait a minute." What happens in each of these seemingly episodic little wilderness bills that passes, and each of these little policy statements of the agencies and the departments, is laying the groundwork for what will then become really routine. Once we've been in this for twenty years, it's all going to be pretty well cut and dried, but if we get purity policies and some hare-brained national park theory of how you do things, we're not going to end up with one unified wilderness system, all of the areas of which conform to one singular vision of the Wilderness Act, which is what Zahniser and Brower and others had always envisioned. What we're going to get is something that isn't unified and that you can't defend effectively because it is cut up into the Park Service's version of the Wilderness Act and the Fish and Wildlife Service's version of the Wilderness Act and the Forest Service's version of the Wilderness Act. The public and the Congress are not going to have a clear core of belief around which to organize themselves. So we were explicitly fighting all kinds of little fights that appeared to many other people to be esoteric, unimportant, "Oh come on. You're getting the acreage you want. Why are you fighting over whether you can have a privy in this wilderness?" On and on. That sort of thing.

That dominated the work I was doing in those early years with the Wilderness Society and in collaboration, almost always, with Sierra Club. I brought to that my knowledge of the Wilderness Act and a devotion to the precedents. "Now wait a minute. In the Great Swamp Wilderness bill that we passed in 1968, we handled private land in the following way, so wait a minute, Forest Service. Just because that's Fish and Wildlife Service area in New Jersey, now over here in the wilderness proposal for some area in Washington State, you're saying you're going to do it completely differently. No. That doesn't wash."

There wasn't any place in the government where consistency was being demanded. And it wasn't fair to expect the Congress to do it. People like Frank Church and John Saylor and other congressional leaders on this subject had other fish to fry. So it was the specialist groups, and in particular the Wilderness Society, that were going to get this basic structure down. In the case of the Wilderness Society, Brandborg and I, in particular through my sort of disembodied apprenticeship with Howard Zahniser, just felt very strongly about these fundamental principles. These were things we talked about with the governing council of the Wilderness Society all the time. Here I was, wet behind the ears and sitting at the feet of Sigurd Olson and George Marshall, James Marshall, people who were legendary theorists—Mardy Murie—of the wilderness movement. There was a real devotion to this work.

The things that we fought about, and I have a little catalogue of them here, the Park Service and sometimes the Forest Service were devoted to the theory that lands that were subject to the sights and sounds of exterior things might not be qualified for
wilderness. They weren't consistent about this but these were—. The Park Service had this thing that we've already talked about of the buffer zone or threshold zone along roads, around campgrounds and along the boundaries. They had these Swiss cheese enclaves, non-wilderness enclaves. There was no consistency between the agencies over how you treated private land or private rights, like grazing rights. There was no consistency about how you treated established uses such as the established use of motor boats or the established landing of aircraft in areas.

There was a deliberate purity policy in the Forest Service—deliberately thought out. It's covered in excellent detail in Dennis Roth's history. A man named Richard Costly and another fellow named Bill Worf were certainly involved, and the then chief in the late sixties, Ed Cliff, in having a policy that while it appeared noble—"We do not want to dilute the quality of the wilderness system by allowing things in that don't conform with the most pure definition."—that had the simultaneous benefit of being both noble and minimizing the acreage. [laughter] We always thought that it was less noble and more motivated by diminishing the acreage in the wilderness area.

In particular, the Forest Service raised (the other agencies less to a theological level) to a very fine Jesuitical (if that's the right word) level the fact that they insisted that there was no distinction between the definition of wilderness which is found in Section 2(c) of the Wilderness Act and the management requirements for wilderness which are found in Section 4 of the act. So they would read in the management section something or other and they would say, "Ah, that means you can't make this wilderness."

And we said, "Wait a minute. There is a clear distinction." In Section 4 there is a provision that says that there can't be management facilities within wilderness areas roughly speaking, other than those that are necessary to meet the minimum requirements for the purposes of the Wilderness Act. Now we read that to say, if you've got to have a privy, not for the comfort of the visitor but to protect water quality, then you can have a privy. That's what those words mean. No privies in wilderness areas. So they would see, "We've got to have a privy here so we'll leave out six hundred square miles of wilderness."

Lage: How did that conflict with the former section, the definition section?

Scott: Oh, the definition section? The definition runs roughly like, “wilderness is an area of federal land which generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable.” Now I have emphasized three big modifiers. Those were put there very deliberately. Zahniser slaved over that definition. At one point it says that these are lands that are untrammeled by man and the imprint of man's work is substantially unnoticeable. Untrammeled is a somewhat archaic word. Doesn't say "Untrampled." Here, Forest

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Service people would say, "Untrampled." We would say, "That's not what it says." Untrammeled is derived from a Latin word meaning net, as in fishing, and it means unrestrained. So the forces of nature can proceed untrammeled. They may have been trampled in the past, logged over or whatever, but from now on, they are going to be unrestrained.

I have found in my research explicit correspondence. Somebody wrote in 1959 when Zahnie was redrafting the act for introduction, "Hey, this word "untrammeled" is just dreadful. Please get rid of it." He wrote back a two-page letter very precisely explaining that he did not mean undisturbed, he did not mean untrampled, he meant untrammeled, and he accepted that word knowing that it was archaic and difficult, only after rejecting all these others because they had meanings that would be very deleterious in the long future when this act was being implemented.

Lage: So does that stand—?

Scott: Some piece of information like that was definitive to Brandborg—.

Lage: Does that [Zahniser’s correspondence] stand for interpreting the law, or does what Congress perceived when they passed it stand? Did Congress know what untrammeled meant?

Scott: It was close enough. [laughter] For purposes of an interest group, this wasn't a subject of debate. This is what the law meant because we were the lineal successors of the guy who wrote it.

[End Tape 9, Side B]

[Begin Tape 10, Side A]

Scott: We had to go to John Saylor and Frank Church in the Congress and kind of remind them that they felt strongly about this, and then they felt strongly about it. But we viewed it as our role to see that the Congress remembered and that the agencies remembered, by force if necessary, the seemingly fine details. I keep saying they are seemingly fine details. They had very important implications, and I'm going to jump ahead for just a minute to the eastern wilderness fight because here is where this all came home to roost. In quick summary, because we will go over it a little more later, the eastern wilderness fight was about the question of whether the Forest Service's assertion that since virtually no land in the eastern national forests was undisturbed, a word which does not appear in the Wilderness Act in any place, it couldn't qualify as wilderness under the Wilderness Act. So they would concoct a second system called wild areas which would be a statutory system so that they could designate areas in the East.

Now, in this statutory system as they drafted it up, with the help of the Sierra Club [laughter], they would allow timber cutting, not for timber cutting reasons but for wildlife habitat improvement. Of course, being on eastern national forest which is
acquired land, it wasn't part of the public domain, the jurisdiction is in the agriculture committees, no friends of ours particularaly back then. We had spent years cultivating and working in the very difficult House and Senate Interior Committees. But at least we knew all the bodies, and we had constituency buildup in all of their districts and all of that to influence them, and had heroes there that were well-schooled. Here were the agricultural committees that were just a bastion of people who were in there because they were worrying about sugar subsidies and the price of pork bellies and were highly influenced by the Forest Service and not very much influenced by us at all.

Lage: But only the forest lands that had been acquired from private lands?

Scott: Acquired from private ownership were in the jurisdiction of the agriculture committee. So the effect of having these two systems was to bifurcate the wilderness movement, was to take us into an enemy camp in the House and Senate agriculture committees, and was to justify at least in the East the purity theory of the Forest Service. The effect of that would be that you could designate a bunch of nice little areas in the East, and we would have a nice fight about what the management provisions were and that might be fine, which was what the Sierra Club thought. The effect of that was to say that in the West the purity theory is right. The effect of that was to say that anything that was disturbed in the West didn't qualify under the Wilderness Act. The effect of that was to say that the boundary would have to be way up the mountainside, because if you wanted to get the boundary down the mountainside, you were almost invariably into trees, and if you got very far into trees, there was some old logging road.

For a fact, in the sixties and in the early seventies, when all of this was brewing, the Forest Service in some places, particularly in Oregon—Brock was a master in documenting this stuff and catching these patterns—they would come to essentially a virgin valley, miles long, and they would run a road clear to the head of that valley and put a clear cut so that they could disqualify the valley because they knew that sooner or later we were going to come up and say, "Hey, all this is wonderful, roadless, old-growth forest, and we want a wilderness. This happened particularly around the Mount Jefferson primitive area.

Lage: Was the Forest Service as astute as you are implying in getting it transferred to the agriculture committee?

Scott: Yes. The people in Division of Recreation and Lands of the Forest Service, who were the Washington lobbyists about this stuff, notably a man named Bill Worf and later a man named Mike Griswold and a number of other people, and the key people in the chiefs' echelon. There are a bunch of chiefs in the Forest Service. There are deputy chiefs and associate chiefs. People who were in that upper echelon and in the forefront of their lobbying were very aggressive about these views. In Dennis Roth's history, very commendably he's got a lot of the internal memos and stuff which we didn't have access to at that time that showed just how deliberate this all was. Richard Costly, who had been the guy who had started all this purity stuff, was very deliberate about it and made no bones about it. It was published and known.
We didn't want to have this fight about the eastern wilderness. It only came up in the 1972-73 period. We were choosing to solve this problem by passing wilderness bills for particular, little individual areas and fixing up each problem as we went. That way we could choose our turf. Great Swamp National Wildlife Refuge in New Jersey was the third wilderness area established after the Wilderness Act. In the Great Swamp—this is a 3700-acre area near Morristown, New Jersey, twenty-five miles from Times Square—there was a little wildlife refuge. The reason there was a little wildlife was because the wealthy people in that wealthy part of New Jersey bought it and gave it to the government to be a wildlife refuge and the reason they did that was because the Port Authority of New York was thinking of putting a jetport there and they didn't want the jetport there. So then they heard about the Wilderness Act and they thought, "Well, that will be even one step better protection."

The Wilderness Act required that the Fish and Wildlife Service review all roadless areas of 5,000 acres or greater and all roadless islands regardless of size within wildlife refuges. So that required the study of Great Swamp. You're going to say, "Wait a second. You said it was only 3,700 acres." The guy who was the solicitor of the Interior Department under Stewart Udall when Wilderness Act regulations were written (this was 1965-66) was a man by the name of Frank Berry, who was later on the governing council of the Wilderness Society. Frank got away with a particularly astute piece of work in which he defined in the official legal regulations "island" to be either a body of land surrounded by water or a piece of land surrounded by land that was sufficiently different, i.e. a mesa, or ecologically different, a sort of ecological island. So we said, "Here is this little wildlife area surrounded by suburban New Jersey. It requires to be studied. It was studied and these people in New Jersey were terribly motivated to get it to be a national wildlife refuge.

Well, some of the land still hadn't been purchased. There was a paved, two-lane county road cutting right through the middle of it. There were houses along that road, typical suburban tract houses. I was sitting in the room in the summer of 1968, that first summer I was in Washington, at the hearing on this in the House committee when Congressman Aspinall threw a small fit about this and said, "There is a road going right through the middle of this." He said, "We can't have paved roads in wilderness areas, and these houses and stuff. What are we going to do about that?" The county commission in a body got up—they were there; they didn't want this jetport—and said, "We'll close it."

So they closed this road, tore up the asphalt, took it out, put it to bed, got rid of the houses, bought the property, all after the area had been designated wilderness.

Lage: Oh. It had already been designated when Aspinall—?

Scott: This law was passed and enacted in September of 1968, so years later when the Forest Service and the Park Service and others were taking the position that on private land, when they chose to for other reasons usually, a grazing right someplace would not allow an area to be designated as wilderness, we got upset. "Wait a minute. The Congress has already resolved that. Here is what they did in Great Swamp. In their
committee report they explained it thus and so, or in a speech on the House Floor."
Well, in nine chances out of ten, we had written that paragraph of that committee
report, or helped the congressman's staff write it and drafted it. So we were
deliberately laying out a body of precedent, choosing our fights.

I mentioned, I think, before that the Park Service had this ridiculous buffer strip around
the outside of the parks, and they got away with it the first time in Petrified Forest
National Park, in Arizona, and Craters of the Moon National Monument in Idaho. We
chose not to contest it because we didn't have the will to win, or we had other bigger
fish to fry, or something. So we waited and we came to the Lava Beds National
Monument a year or so later and Lassen National Park Wilderness, which had one of
these buffers around it. Well, right next to Lassen, coterminous to the boundary of
Lassen National Park on the eastern side, is the Lassen Wilderness Area on the
national forest. It is already in the wilderness system. It was brought in by the
Wilderness Act. We said, "Hey, wait a minute. The result of this stupid policy of the
buffer strip is that you are going to have the Forest Service wilderness, it's already
there, and the park wilderness within the park, with this eighth of a mile no-man's zone
down the middle of it. Everybody fell on the floor laughing and said, "That's stupid,"
and fixed it. Then we never had those buffer zones again.

So we were deliberately sneaking around and picking these things up as we went. One
of the prices that we paid for that was that we were all focused in the late sixties and
very early seventies, extremely focused, on that job, on getting the primitive reviews
underway and fighting these fights with the Forest Service and Park Service and so
forth. We were paying somewhat less attention, in the early going, to the de facto
wilderness. As early as during the passage of the Wilderness Act, Brower had started
giving speeches in which I think the first references I ever saw to the phrase de facto
wilderness—wilderness in fact though it is not designated as such by any agency. It
came to more thoroughly mean, after the Wilderness Act was passed, particularly
national forest lands that were roadless and of wilderness quality and could be
designated as wilderness but which were under no study mandate and had no interim
protection. They were going to get chopped down or eroded unless we did something
about it.

Well, just this morning as I was looking through my notes for all of this, I discovered
an interesting thing. In 1969, the Wilderness Society began, with a little grant of
money that they got from somebody or other, what became a series. I later had
considerable to do with running these. But the first one was held in June of 1969 and it
was then called the regional conservation leader seminar. This was a week-long
training program for volunteer conservation leaders carefully recruited from the key
places where we needed them from around the country. For a whole week they went
through a kind of a tutorial about how Congress works, about how the agencies work,
met with prominent people that they might need to know and then went out and did
practice lobbying, with Wilderness Society staff people helping. The first of these was
held in June of 1969. I was working for the Wilderness Society then part time. I
arranged with Senator Hart's office where I was working for the other half of the time
for that particular week to spend the whole week at the Wilderness Society. I was a
student and helped around the edges Rupe Cutler and Brandborg, who were running this thing. I have my elaborate notes and the typed notes that the participants prepared for that whole session.

This was a very thoroughly planned out proposition. This group met with Stewart Udall, the then former secretary of the Interior; they met with George Hartzog, the director of the Park Service; they met with Ed Cliff, the chief of the Forest Service; they met with all sorts of Capitol Hill people—John Saylor and so forth—in a carefully organized program. As part of the organization of this, someone, Cutler and Brandborg I suppose, or maybe I had something to do with it but I don't remember that, had prepared for each of the speakers a little sheet, and we as participants all had these, what the subject of the talk was, where it was, and some topic suggestions of what it was hoped they would cover for the speakers. In that sheet, for Ed Cliff, the chief of the Forest Service, he was asked to speak on the subject, "Have Citizen Conservation Groups Failed in their Work for Wilderness in the National Forests?" Among the topic suggestions, it says, "Can the Forest Service meet the need to inventory and give interim protection to undesignated (de facto) wilderness lands on the national forest until it can be determined whether or not these should be placed in the national wilderness preservation system? Examples: Laramie Peak Area; areas adjacent to the Gore Range, Eagle Nest primitive area; Lincoln-Scapegoat area."

So here we are. People had been talking about this problem even earlier, but here we were in June, 1969. The explicit question asked, "What are we going to do about this?" In my notes I have it that Ed Cliff, since he was asked to talk about that, Brandborg again raised the question at this meeting and the chief said, "We have in mind areas we plan to consider for wilderness which we can't now formally announce. The Forest Service can't classify and hold areas in a de facto wilderness status because Congress has directed that only it can establish such reservations. We want to play it loose." My total notes on that discussion. In that era, as we've already talked about, conservation leaders from around the country—Alabama, West Virginia, Wyoming, Montana—were promoting, were just going straight through the congressional delegations and saying, "Here's an area the Forest Service is mistreating. They won't study it and we want it to be wilderness. Will you pass a law?"

The Forest Service to get out ahead of that problem, and for their own good motives—and their own motives were good, at least some of them—understood that wilderness was a resource in its own right and that not everything had been identified in the 1930s as a primitive area that ought to be designated. Even though the Wilderness Act didn't command a study, they ought to pay attention to this.

So since the late sixties, contemporaneous with this conversation with Ed Cliff, there had been a directive in the Forest Service manual that regional foresters should sort of think about this and that at some future date they should report if they had any such places in to the chief. Every few years a little memo would come out from the head office saying, "I'll do something about this."
As this pressure from Capitol Hill and from the conservationists about de facto wilderness began to build, they decided to get out ahead of that. Somewhere in that, and Dennis Roth's history is pretty thorough on this point, emerged the directive for RARE I (RARE stands for Roadless Area Review and Evaluation). Those directives came out in 1971, directing that the old provision in the manual be followed and with specific criteria.

We were not apprised of this. I remember that it must have been about November of 1970 when we finally figured out that they were doing this. We went rushing over to get briefed on it by the Forest Service and sort of caught up with it all. What they were doing was that they were doing a process in which they were using specific criteria which we didn't agree with. They were inventorying all the potential roadless areas on the national forests. Then there was going to be a second phase in which they would select some of those that would become wilderness study areas and would go through the Wilderness Act's formal study process leading to a proposal to Congress. By implication they would select some others that were going to be available for being logged or whatever, being developed. So this was a sort of a giant slicing of the pie.

Well, they inventoried 1,446 roadless areas. There were two or three in the East, including one in Puerto Rico. This included Alaska, 56 million acres. Then after a great, elaborate process, the secretary of agriculture, Earl Butz, held a big conference, which I was at, at the agriculture building in Washington to announce the list of new study areas. That was the technical phrase: new wilderness study areas, of which there were I believe 256 amounting to about twelve million acres. So out of 56 million acres they selected twelve.

We very quickly stumbled to the obvious fact that the 256 that they had selected for study were now on ice. While we might not agree with them, and often did not believe that they had gotten the boundary right so that the entire area was properly protected—there might be some areas that needed to be added—but basically that stuff was safe for a while.

But they wanted us to spend all our time studying the ones they selected with them, and going to hearings and all that, about those. We said, "Baloney. Those ones are relatively safe. We are going to worry about all the ones you selected not to study for wilderness. And the ones you didn't even inventory. We're going to spend our time on that stuff."

Lage: This was all while you were in the Wilderness Society?

Scott: Well, in the Sierra Club also, we were intimately involved together in all of this. There weren't very many of us, so it was Sierra Club volunteers, conservation leaders around the country, and Wilderness Society and Sierra Club staff. We were all trying to contend with this. So this was a very massive deal. We had troubles with how they were doing this almost from the outset. We had great troubles with the speed with which they were doing the inventory process because they were missing things. Then they were holding little public meetings. They were having them all over the country.
in a very brief period of time, and organizations like ours just didn't have a prayer of coping with that. We rattled sabers at them and said that this was unfair and that if this was the way they were going to proceed, we were going to clearly get into big and complicated difficulties about it all before we were done.

On January 11, 1972, as all of this was going on, I drafted a fifteen-page closely reasoned, typical Doug Scott, "Dear Ed Cliff, you ought not to do it this way. Slow down, etc." Which fortunately got boiled down into a four-page letter from Jim Moorman, the executive director of the then fairly new Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. So this reflects the collaboration. Jim was representing at that point the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society and the NRDC [Natural Resources Defense Council], who were complaining to the Forest Service about the way they were doing this process. In my files in the Bancroft Library will be found my draft of this letter. I was not intimately involved in the legal considerations of this because kind of contemporaneous with all this, I was distracted by Alaska and then by my move to the Sierra Club staff and then all the on-going wilderness legislation that was being handled in Congress. But I did play a role in drafting this thing.

The Sierra Club chose to file a lawsuit. It's well to remember that at the very end of 1969, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act—NEPA—which I'm here to tell you that if anyone had understood the implications of it, including its sponsors, it never would have passed.

Lage: Yes, that's what I understand.

Scott: It could not pass today with the much larger environmental movement.

Lage: It had tremendous implications.

Scott: Yes. Incredible implications. The Forest Service in particular didn't grasp the implications. Today in 1990, we're seeing on controversial timber sales individual environmental impact statements, not just analyses, being produced for individual timber sales. We're certainly seeing them produced for every land-use plan on every national forest. In 1970, 1971-2, the Forest Service had no part of it.

One of the things they liked about RARE I was the theory that they could do a little NEPA statement of two or three pages on the nationwide inventory, and that would comply with NEPA.

Lage: For the entire inventory?

Scott: For the whole works. Now they weren't alone in this. The Interior Department's first draft environmental impact statement on the Alaska pipeline was eighteen pages long. Before they got done, it was eighteen volumes long. [laughs] And this was a time when it was sort of a field day for Jim Moorman and people like him who were filing lots of NEPA lawsuits to flesh out what that law meant, suing the Corps of Engineers...
and all these others. Well, the Forest Service wasn't in the main line of attention in all this until this RARE I came along.

So the Sierra Club ultimately filed a lawsuit about all this. The Wilderness Society did not choose to be involved. As far as I know, I was not involved in that decision. It had to do with Frank Berry, the former Interior Department solicitor who was then on the governing council [of the Wilderness Society], his opinion that this lawsuit had no merit and would not prevail—lawyer's have opinions. In fact it did prevail. Sometime in mid-1972 Judge Conti in [the Northern] District Court in San Francisco sort of ruled for the Sierra Club in that lawsuit. As described to me years later by Moorman, the guy was basically paranoid, and neither the Forest Service attorneys nor the Sierra Club's attorneys could quite figure out what he had ruled. But they mutually agreed that going back to ask him was so random a process that they would live with what they had.

The Forest Service came out in November, then, of 1972 with a directive—I've got it here some place. A chief's directive dated November 28, 1972, that said, "In view of the Sierra Club v. Butz injunction we have determined to prepare NEPA statements on a basis which will satisfy the court's order. Therefore we are going to do this in a more thorough way. That set in motion a scramble by the Forest Service to figure out what action to write—since they couldn't get away with just one NEPA statement—the NEPA statement on. They didn't want to write one NEPA statement on each of 1446 inventoried areas because we said that the environmental implication is not your decision to study the 236 that you are going to study for wilderness. The environmental implication is the ones you are going to develop. The heck with those. They'll take care of themselves. We want the environmental NEPA complied with on the ones that you are now making in effect an irrevocable decision to commit to development. And they are not ever going to be wilderness again. That is an irrevocable environmental application that you've got to write a NEPA statement [about]. That's the federal action."

Well, they didn't want to write one on every one of those 1200 areas. So at that point they had a kind of a half-baked multiple-use planning process for the national forest that was done somewhat differently in different regions. There wasn't a big central planning bureaucracy, and it was long before the National Forest Management Act was passed, which had much more elaborate planning procedures in it. But they were doing something that was generally called around the country “unit plans.” In some forests, the unit on which they were planning, there were only three or four in a whole big national forest. In some forests there were dozens and dozens of these complicated little units. Basically the effect of this November, 1972, directive from the chief was to say, "Use those. In your unit planning, do the NEPA compliance and analyze the environmental considerations of not choosing wilderness for that area."

This led to a new industry. One, of the Forest Service writing NEPA statements on unit plans, and two, of them doing just a terrible job of figuring out how to accomplish it. When I moved, and I moved to the Northwest office of the Sierra Club at about the time that all of that was getting under way, we discovered endless problems.
Somebody would say, "There is a little roadless area that we care about and the Forest Service is about to offer a bunch of timber sales there." We would say, "Well, let's see if we can figure out some way to appeal that in the administrative appeal process." They would say, "Have they done a NEPA statement?" "Well, they did one on the Podunk Falls planning unit, but only a portion of this roadless area is in that planning area." So that you might end up with one roadless area which was never evaluated in an environmental impact statement as such. One little pie-shaped segment of it was evaluated in one unit plan EIS and months later another little pie-shaped chunk of it was evaluated in some other thing, but they never looked at the whole works. That was one kind of problem.

Another kind of problem was the situation where one planning unit involved several roadless areas and they just looked at the alternative of saving all of them or of chopping them all down. But they didn't say, "This particular one, here's its merits, verses this particular one." We had a field day in appeals about those sorts of things. In those days there were three levels of appeal, and you would get clear to the chief's office in Washington before a Forest Service lawyer ever looked at the appeal. By that time they had made so many mistakes and stuff.

In 1973-74-75, we were doing a land-office business in those kinds of appeals.

Lage: These were all administrative appeals.

Scott: Administrative appeals, with always the threat that we would litigate over them, but generally we won the appeal sooner or later. We'll come back to this later, but what had happened essentially was that RARE I had not been thought through well and not implemented well. The kinds of things we were saying in the letter that Moorman sent and elsewhere, of slowing down and doing it right, weren't adhered to. Then as a result of this lawsuit, they had to impose a NEPA compliance on a thing that already wasn't very well thought through. In the process it got bungled so badly that in it were the seeds of discontent that led to RARE II, which we'll come back to later.

I want to come back a little bit to one final thought about this period with the Wilderness Society in the seventies. That training seminar that I was a part of in 1969 was the first part of what became an enormous devotion of the Wilderness Society, particularly under the influence of Stewart Brandborg, that training of citizen-activists, in which he was absolutely right, was crucial. We started doing these several times a year. When I joined the staff fulltime, it became one of my principal preoccupations, to organize those things. I have the program for one that we did in March of 1973, again a week long, and it featured detailed briefings on how the Wilderness Act works. By that time we had volunteer leaders we had identified, and who had been through the thing before, coming to help put it on with us. People met with a guy at the Office of Management and Budget and with the key people in the Fish and Wildlife Service and with the director and key people in the Park Service and with the Bureau of Land Management. They had a meeting with Nat Reed, the assistant secretary of the Interior. They had meetings with key people at the Forest Service.
Lage: How large a group would there be that met?

Scott: These were typically fifteen, twenty maybe. And again recruited from—. It included Sierra Club leaders or whomever. Key leaders from all over the place that we had tripped over and identified and cultivated. We would select them from places where we either had wilderness proposals coming along that we needed to work on administratively and in the Congress, so we needed to prepare grass-roots leaders, or because they were key political places. We had a congressman from there who was important. In this particular program, I gave the role of the grass-roots leader in the governmental process. Who knows what that was about.

Lage: So you didn't have a chapter structure like the club—.

Scott: No.

Lage: —but still had this network.

Scott: No. Au contraire, we had a devotion to trying to create coalitions at the grass-roots level that involved the Sierra Club and many other groups. We weren't trying to be competitive. It was an old pattern that went clear back to Zahniser of a very strong sense that the role of the Wilderness Society—.

[End Tape 10, Side A]

[Begin Tape 10, Side B]

Lage: Okay.

Scott: This became a highly elaborate process. In this program, on the Wednesday morning, they met right after breakfast with Congressman Udall for a talk on how to work with your congressman and then for an hour with a key staff member. He happened to be a staff member of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee of the Senate but a very good friend of ours who had just incredible insights into the legislative strategy. We had lunch with Congressman [Teno] Roncalio, who was then the chairman of the public lands subcommittee. Then the last several days of the week were spent doing what we euphemistically called visitations, which was going into little teams and practicing lobbying and then coming back and reporting on how we had done. Dinner with the Washington representatives of other conservation groups: George Alderson from Friends of the Earth, Brock Evans from the Sierra Club, Cynthia Wilson from the National Audubon Society. It was a very elaborate week-long program.

Simultaneously, we were beginning a series of wilderness workshops held in the field which again were a principal responsibility of mine. I found some old correspondence in which it was talking about—. We did one of these in February of 1971 in Phoenix. We did one in Davis, California, particularly involving the Sierra Club, in April of 1971. In Northern Michigan I did one. They were done in Tennessee and a number of other places. I found an old memo in which I was outlining the plans for these for the
first half of 1971. This was a memo from me to Stewart Brandborg and a number of my other colleagues at the Wilderness Society. I found a part that is of interest for my and the Wilderness Society's attitude then. We were going to do one of these in Northern California, April 24-25 in Davis, tentatively co-sponsored by the California Academy of Sciences and a Davis student group called "Active Conservation Tactics in Cooperation with the Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club." The general theme of this workshop was "What do we do next after we've finished field studies and boundary work and how do we do it? One hundred participants by invitation only, a special effort is being directed at reaching key leaders on a regionwide basis and going outside of the trenchant and somewhat debilitating Sierra Club structure." [Laughter]

Lage: What did you mean by that?

Scott: I go on. "We need to do two things in this workshop. One is to bring together regional leaders and the other is to establish a pattern of bringing together coalitions for wilderness, a pattern now severely limited due to Sierra Club dominance and inwardness, characteristics more noticeable in the club's chapter leaders than regional wilderness workers."

What I meant by that was, Sierra Club volunteer leaders, many of them, not all of them, have a particular quality of being fiercely invested in the organization of the Sierra Club, as well as the issues. That leads to a certain kind of organizational ego on some people's part. What we were trying to do was to break that down and to say, "Here is Joe Dokes from the local Sierra Club, and here is Betty Sue from the local Audubon, and here are three or four other independent people we've tripped over. Let's all get together and pool our efforts. More often than one would desire, the Sierra Club people would all say, "Well, we would have to have an executive committee meeting." All this Sierra Club bureaucracy would come out.

The Wilderness Society's particular value was that they didn't have all that bureaucracy. You could say, "We're not going to talk to anybody's executive committees. Here's the work. We need to get on with it, and let's get rolling." That inwardness in particular parts of the country, a certain possessiveness about the issues, was a real problem, in part because the Sierra Club in our perception was not devoting intensity of assistance to a lot of these issues. They weren't being pushed along with it. The Wilderness Society's full-time job was this stuff, so there was a certain difference. But this was usually done with a good deal of collaboration with our friends in the Sierra Club. In this case one of the Sierra Club ringleaders in Davis was a fellow named Jim Eaton, who still runs the California Wilderness Coalition based in Davis. This was done in connivance with Jim and with a certain effort to take some of the less cooperative-minded Sierra Club people and kind of broaden their horizons, but also to bring in and mix in other people.

Lage: Did it seem to work?

Scott: Yes. Now, here was the Wilderness Society's problem. It could drop out of the sky and help put on a thing like this, or fly somebody to Washington for a training seminar,
but it wasn't there with the same continuity that a Sierra Club chapter was. So some little coalition that we might put together might fall apart the next week or a year later, whereas the Sierra Club had this enormous staying power because of the grass-roots structure. Never any interest, never any discussion at the Wilderness Society about, "Should we have our own chapter structure?" It sort of was the sense that if there hadn't been a Sierra Club, you'd have to invent it, but why have two of those things [laughter] with all that bureaucracy.

Out of one side of your mouth, you can say, "Ugggh, boy, all that bureaucracy." Out of the other side of your mouth, "That's the reason for that stability." But there were some downsides that we were identifying that we needed to work with. So I was involved fairly intensively in these field training things and in the Washington training things. And on occasion, in grass-roots organizing. Jim Eaton and I, and Francis Walcott who was at that point the head of the Sierra Club's Wilderness Committee and a full-time volunteer, a very interesting character.

For example, he spent a week one time going all up Northern California. We were worried about the wilderness proposals for Lassen and Lava Beds, which were then in the Congress. We were worried about the upcoming wilderness review for the Trinity Alps. We were worried about getting coverage in Northern California. We went to Red Bluff and Redding and Yreka and Weed and Weaverville and all those places stirring up people. At that point, we were just using raw membership lists. There weren't very many Sierra Club members in those places and even fewer Wilderness Society members. So we would come into a town cold and sort of—.

Lage: No advance calls?

Scott: There wasn't any chapter structure. Maybe we would call somebody and say we're coming, but in some cases we weren't even sure who they were. They were just names.

My particular funny story from all this, which had some considerable payoff, was that Jim had had to leave at this point, and it was just Francis and myself. We were in Yreka, or Weed, one of the two. We had the name of somebody and it was J. Smith. So we looked it up in the phone book. There was "J. Smith," no address, so we called him up. A woman answered and said, "Sure," if we wanted to come over after dinner, come right over. This was not the same person. This was just like going randomly. Furthermore, this woman's husband was a county deputy sheriff, who was really hostile. I had quite long hair at the time, and Francis was an aging hippie of a somewhat bizarre appearance. We were not—.

Lage: Oh, I can imagine.

Scott: This man was not pleased with us. In restraining him from killing us outright and trying to be polite to us though kind of wondering why we were there, she said, "You know, I used to work for a lawyer in Dunsmuir. I have heard of some guy in Mount
Shasta who might be interested in what you are talking about. So on nothing more than this utter stranger's recommendation, we looked up this lawyer in Dunsmuir named Chris Stromsness, and I've forgotten the name of the school teacher friend of his in Yreka. These two guys were just wonderful. Francis took off, and I went on about my business laughing about this wonderful anecdote. I ended up then going to Weaverville and looking up some people in Weaverville. I remember that then Hughes Airwest had a strike on, and I had to rent this car and somehow get to Eureka, which was the only place I could get an airplane from.

I remember stopping along a wide place in the road where there was a phone booth there in the middle of the Siskiyous and calling back to Chris Stromsness and saying, "How would you like to go to Washington next week? We're having a training problem." By God, there he was. We were doing a lot of that kind of recruiting.

Lage: It's almost ministerial.

Scott: Ministerial, evangelical.

Lage: Yes.

Scott: Chris and his buddies decided that the Sierra Club was a little too volatile in that part of the world in terms of its reputation, so they created the Mount Shasta Audubon Society, which is going strong to this day. There is a little crowd of people there whom I have been back to see several times and they have been a mainstay of wilderness work in that part of the world.

Stewart Brandorg and the Wilderness Society had a great devotion to this notion of training people. In fact later in the period leading up ultimately to his removal as executive director of the Wilderness Society, Brandy became so devoted to this that it took on a quasi-religious quality and became somewhat removed from what the purpose was. Touchy-feely was the way some of my colleagues and I referred to it, with some training consultants who were pretty strange and just got fairly disembodied.

Nonetheless, working at the Wilderness Society in that era was an enormously heady experience. Rupert Cutler had left in a disagreement with Brandborg in 1969, 1970. So when I joined the staff fulltime at about the same time, Brandy recruited a fellow named Harry Crandall, who had been running the wilderness study process for the national wildlife refuges for the Fish and Wildlife Service, to come to work as the director of wilderness reviews. So Harry was in a sense my boss. We are life-long best friends and alter egos in many ways. Harry, who is exactly twenty years older than me, is somewhat of a substitute father figure in my life and a very close family friend of my wife's and mine.

We had an older guy from Knoxville, Tennessee, named Ernie Dickerman, who had been present at the founding meeting, although he wasn't a member ever of the governing council of the Wilderness Society, in 1935. Ernie was the grand old fighter
for the Great Smokies. He had been at various times on the payroll of the Wilderness Society as a field agent in various informal ways. He finally was dragged into Washington. He was the director of field services for the East. The society had a regional office in Denver headed by a man named Cliff Merritt. Cliff was the director of field service for the West, so we had established this fairly elaborate bureaucracy.

Then there were a few little ill-paid people who were recruited and paid to be agents around the country. Jim Eaton for a while was one of those and a number of other people. Amongst others, I helped to recruit some of those folks. This organizational group worked to identify the schedule of upcoming issues, Congress and field reviews and to move those along in preparation of mailings and organizing of who was going to be at the hearing to represent the Wilderness Society, who was going to go out and do the grass-roots organizing to get people there, were we coordinated with the Sierra Club and all those sorts of things.

Meanwhile, *Living Wilderness* magazine, as it was then known, the editor of that was a man named Michael Nadel who had been also with Zahniser and Brandborg way back. A wonderful, somewhat elfin, little New York fellow who was just devoted, just devoted to these issues. A very remarkable man. But he reached retirement and wanted to slow down. So he stepped back into an emeritus role; he came to the office all the time. Brandborg recruited a man named Richard Olsen—Dick Olsen—who had been chief of staff for Congressman Morris Udall, who came to our staff as editor of our magazine. Howard Zahniser's son became his assistant (Edward Zahniser). There was just this very collegial group of people and issues were just hitting us right and left.

For what appeared to me to be golden moments, this was just the wonderful place to be. Nonetheless, the opportunity to become the Northwest representative of the Sierra Club came along and ultimately I made that choice. It was a very hard decision, a very hard decision. I left not all that long afterwards. There were these growing tensions with Brandborg over an episode, the details of which I have long since forgotten. Brandborg summarily cashiered Richard Olsen, whereupon Harry Crandall, my very close—. And I happened to be in Washington when all this happened. Somebody called me and said, "Doug, Harry needs you." Harry quit in protest right then and there so the whole place sort of fell apart around his ears.

Dick Olsen landed on the speech-writing staff of soon to be speaker, then majority leader of the House, Jim Wright of Texas. Harry landed as chief of staff for the subcommittee that handled all the wilderness stuff of the House of Representatives and later was in a crucial position as the chief of staff for the subcommittee that wrote the Alaska lands bill. But this ended my contact and friendly relations with Brandborg, though I've seen him years later.

Lage: What happened to Brandborg?

Scott: He was then after a period of further internal brouhaha of one sort or another, he was ousted by the governing council.
Lage: It seems almost like a change of personality from what you just said earlier.

Scott: I've stressed that a lot of this wilderness work was sort of picky detail and carefully lining up precedents. It became pretty routine. I think Brandy who was a somewhat messianic character, who was very much his father's son. His father had been an old Forest Service supervisor in the Bitterroot Mountains of Montana and was a very dominating personality and an early advocate of progressive education in Montana in the twenties and thirties and so forth. Our perception was that Brandy drifted farther and farther away from what the program was in this sort of touchy-feelyesque sort of a thing that he was into. We came into conflict, various of us, with that when the demands of that program—. You would say, "Well, wait a second. There are sixty-two hearings, and they are marking up the wilderness bill." He would say, "Well, no, we've all got to go and do..." It just got out of hand.

Brandy had a circle of people: this outside consultant from Denver and a woman who was sort of a business manager but was very close to Brandborg and who was kind of playing into all of this. It kind of ended up being two camps. I'm not sure what might have transpired differently had I stayed. But in retrospect I was just as glad I didn't.

All that time, we were continuing the processing of these wilderness bills. We were continuing to be deeply involved, though often the Sierra Club was more deeply involved, in a series of the national park bills to establish new parks that came along in that era. In 1968, the redwood park bill was passed and the North Cascades National Park bill was passed. For that North Cascades park bill, we realized that now that we were going to have the new North Cascades National Park, the Wilderness Act study requirement doesn't apply to it because it only applied to the parks that were in existence in September, 1964, when the act passed. So we invented— I remember sitting down at my typewriter, which is no big deal—a little provision to stick in new national park bills to require the wilderness study be done as the Wilderness Act required. That first was stuck in the North Cascades bill in the fall of 1968. Then the next place we put it was Sleeping Bear Dunes. Then we put it in the Gulf Islands National Seashore and the Voyagers National Park and Canyonlands National Park. So it became a routine thing to stick that study amendment into park bills.

We were lobbying the park establishment as well. The Wilderness Society was involved in those things. But very often, particularly in the western ones, the Sierra Club was the lead operation. Certainly in Redwoods and North Cascades it was true. Simultaneously, the Wilderness Society was the lead plaintiff in the lawsuit challenging the legality of the Alaska pipeline. While Sierra Club was not a party to that lawsuit, it is well to remember that that lawsuit was won. The Supreme Court found that the Alaska pipeline was illegal. It was illegal under the provisions of the mineral leasing act of 1921 which said that the right of way that could be granted by the secretary of the Interior could only be so wide. The secretary of the Interior granted a wider right of way. After all this protracted court suit, the Supreme Court said, "No, you can't do that."
So they went right back to Congress and very quickly got Congress to pass an amendment to the mineral leasing act saying, "Oh, yes you can," in the process, exempting the pipeline from further challenge under NEPA.

Lage: So there is a lawsuit that didn't really pan out, but it delayed the pipeline.

Scott: Collectively, the environmental movement was getting its first taste of something it took three or four times of being beaten over the head to finally figure out. A few years later a brilliant lawsuit was one declaring clearcutting to be illegal. Based on the case in the Monongahela, but it had nationwide implication. The lawyers I'm sure all had a brilliant victory party but our opponents went right to Capitol Hill and got that unstrung. After a while, we finally caught on that when you are thinking about winning lawsuits, you ought to have a political strategy for hanging onto your victories in hand as well.

Simultaneously in the early seventies, in 1970 and 1971, the Wilderness Society was extremely central in the Alaska issue, having to do with the settlement of the native land claims in Alaska and the first conception and requirement for study of the national interest lands, the potential parks and wilderness and wildlife refuges in Alaska. I was very much involved in that. I ended up being the lobbying coordinator for the House of Representatives for the massive effort (massive for its time) that we put on on that issue. I was lobbying coordinator in both the House and the Senate in 1973, in our ill-fated efforts to keep the Congress from overriding our victory on the Alaska pipeline.

In fact, I made my decision to leave the Wilderness Society and join the Sierra Club staff in Seattle in May of 1973 but had a deal with Mike McCloskey that I would not actually leave until we had completed the house fight, which I was very much involved in coordinating, on that Alaska pipeline legislation, which we completed on August 1, and I got on a plane that night to Seattle. [chuckles]

Lage: When we started on Alaska—.

Scott: All of this stuff, plus the de facto wilderness and the SST, were all transpiring simultaneously. I think an aerial photo of me at that era would show this sort of whirling dervish who was extremely monkish at that time. I was there every day of the week to all hours of the night and just in my element, drafting speeches and drafting bills and plotting and scheming on the telephone with people all over the country and working on these training things, and just loved it. The agony that I had about leaving the Wilderness Society was partly fed out of my own, "Gee, I just really like this," and partly fed out of the sense of my friends, people like Chuck Clusen and other people, saying, "You're a Capitol Hill guy. You're not going to like being at a distance from this."

Lage: But you did want to get out West.

Scott: You see, I had now been in the Michigan, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, for the better part of six years and in Washington DC for another three, with only the briefest and
occasional western trips. I wanted to get back out West. So here came the only decently paying (it didn't pay very much but the only decently paying) and relatively senior kind of a position that I could earn money at in my old native region of the Pacific Northwest. Though I did not apply for the job the first time and said, "Hell, no," because we were having this huge fight with the Sierra Club at that time over the eastern wilderness, when it came around again, in the final analysis, it was just too much to give up. I hated leaving Harry Crandall, but he encouraged me to go. I'm sure there were tensions in the relationship with Brandborg and in the goings-on at the Wilderness Society. There were all sorts of this suggesting to me.

On the other hand I had a very strong sense—and I don't want to say this in a way that says I was making a preference because I chose to join the staff of the Sierra Club—of my understanding of the mission of the Wilderness Society and of its crucial importance in the movement. I did not have that same sense of loyalty to the Sierra Club I came to have, of course. So it made it very hard to go.

But the Wilderness Society work was not giving me a sense—I've stressed several times that being in Washington you only see a chunk of a process that you didn't have very much to do, if anything, with how it got there. Yet suddenly it's a bill in Congress. Then it went off to be implemented and you sort of had done your thing in the middle without knowing where it came from or what was going to happen to it afterwards.

Lage: Or what the areas were that you were preserving.

Scott: Or what the areas were. So I was somewhat frustrated by all of that. Maybe we should turn this off. [Tape interruption]

Lage: Okay. We're going to go to some further discussion on the wild areas controversy.

Scott: I'm going to be fairly impressionistic about this and the simple reason is that much as I was immersed in the eastern wild areas issue in the early seventies, my papers from that area are all at the University of Washington, including all my papers, which are extensive, about the eastern wilderness battle, so I have not had them to refresh my memory.

Lage: So they went to the University of Washington even though you generated them in Washington DC?

Scott: I always kept my own files on things. The Wilderness Society in the early seventies underwent an IRS audit, which, amongst other things, was looking to see how substantial our legislative activities were. So there was always a kind of a suggestion that the more of the files that stayed at home and the fewer that were at the office, the better. Plus I had a real sense of history so I may have left copies, and I know I did because in Dennis Roth's history some stuff of mine is quoted that is in the Denver Conservation Library, which is where the Wilderness Society's papers are. But I had my own files as well, particularly if the thing was working.
But when I left the Wilderness Society in August of 1973, the eastern wilderness issue—the part about the Sierra Club disagreement—had been resolved. The passage of the legislation was in mid-course. I continued to be actively involved in it from Seattle, actively consulted and participated, and flew to Washington a couple of times and dealt with it. So I wanted all those files with me. So that's the reason there are at the University of Washington Library my papers on eastern wilderness. Well, the inventory of my papers up there takes two pages to list what's there. It's apparently twenty boxes, or twenty folders worth.

The eastern wilderness issue kind of snuck up on us. The implementation of the Wilderness Act required the study of the parks and refuges. Of course there are lots of wildlife refuges in the East, and the Fish and Wildlife Service, because "island" had been defined in this creative way, was studying a lot of areas in the East. Proposals for those were working their way through the Interior Department, being blessed by the president and being sent to Congress, and Congress was starting to work on them, with the Wilderness Society and local Sierra Club or whoever all encouraging this.

Ditto national parks. I was at the Shenandoah National Park wilderness hearing. Well, that came to Congress after a while to be enacted. Shenandoah National Park was all cutover once, yet here we were with a presidential proposal to designate a bunch of it as wilderness. Monomoy Island, Great Swamp, dozens of fish and wildlife islands, Moose Horn Wildlife Refuge in Maine—a great number of places that had had the heavy imprint of man at one time or another but were being designated under the Wilderness Act.

There were also three existing Forest Service wilderness areas in the East. The way it had worked back in 1939, the Forest Service had adopted regulations governing the establishment of wilderness areas. If an area they were going to designate was larger than 100,000 acres, it took the signature of the secretary of agriculture. If it was between 5,000 acres—which for who knows what reason became sort of the guiding principle of what was the littlest—and 100,000 acres, it was not called a wilderness area. It was under a parallel regulation; it was called a wild area. The chief of the Forest Service had the authority to designate those. So a number of wild areas had been established, including in the East.

Now, once the wilderness bill was clearly going to be enacted, Congressman Aspinall, chairman of the committee—it was a very big point to him that the Congress was going to dominate this question of what was wilderness and what wasn't. So he extracted an explicit deal from the administration in probably about 1960 or 1961, which was, "If under your existing administrative authority to designate areas as wilderness areas or wild areas you're going to designate anything, it is then automatically going to become a wilderness area under this new law when we get around to passing this thing. So before you designate it, I want you to come up and tell me about it." So they would troop up there and say in some plodding, bureaucratic way that the Forest Service had decided to create some particular area and that they weren't going to wait around for the Congress to pass the Wilderness Act, which took eight years.
Some big areas were designated this way. For example, the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness in northern Idaho and far western Montana in 1962 by act of the secretary of agriculture, in 1962 or 1963. So in conformance with this Aspinall requirement, some people went up from the Forest Service to brief Chairman Aspinall and he must have presumably said, "Oh, all right." In saying, "Oh, all right," his function in his mind, I gather, was to say, "This is consistent with what we're [going to do]."

[End Tape 10, Side B]

[Begin Tape 11, Side A]

Scott: In 1963, the Forest Service established a little wild area in North Carolina called Shining Rock Wild Area, by action of the chief of the Forest Service, one Ed Cliff. In conformance with the Aspinall requirement they trotted out and Mr. Aspinall got briefed about this and by implication said, "This is consistent with what we're going to do. So when the Wilderness Act passed in 1964, the Shining Rock Wild Area was added to the wilderness system as a wilderness area. Ditto for a place in New Hampshire called the Great Gulf Wilderness. There is one more name which I've forgotten. Three little areas on national parks in the East.

When the Forest Service designated in 1963 the Shining Rock Wilderness in North Carolina, in their press release announcing they had done this, they acknowledged that in a particular place, the most logical place to put the boundary met including an active clear cut, a thing in the process of being logged, in the salubriously named location of Ugly Creek. And that they had done this knowingly, but they were going to clean up this clear cut, and in due course it would restore itself.

Lage: Wonderful admission.

Scott: Well, I found that in the file one day in the midst of all this battle. You could hear me all over the Wilderness Society office as I went roaring down the hall saying, "Look at this, Ernie!" I remember with great relish walking up to the chief or somebody at some hearing and saying, "Look what I have." And they're saying, "Oh no."

So that was the track we were on. We were designating wildlife refuge wilderness in the East that had been previously disturbed. We were designating national park wilderness in the East which was being previously disturbed. The administration was endorsing those, and there were these existing Forest Service areas.

For reasons of its own that had to do with this purity policy and other reasons, the Forest Service got itself going on the theory that this was all not a good idea. It started in the regional offices in Milwaukee and in Atlanta. They started talking about this, that maybe there ought to be some other system. They had a proposal for the heritage land areas. Always the idea was that this was going to be legislated. Of course they were getting the pressure from the folks in West Virginia, from the folks in Alabama going straight to Congress to designate these de facto areas. So part of this was reaction to that.
So they were harassing the chief's office to say, "We want something else." In September of 1971, September 24th, the Sierra Club conducted, with the Wilderness Society, its biannual wilderness conference in Washington DC, at the Washington Hilton Hotel. The then associate chief of the Forest Service, a very fine man named John Maguire, whom I worked with a lot—he became chief in 1972—gave a speech at this conference. In that speech he said flatly, "Inasmuch as no lands in the East qualify for wilderness under the Wilderness Act, we are going to be working on this other idea."

I remember Ernie Dickerman, my colleague in the Wilderness Society staff, coming running up to me and saying, "Did you hear what that man said?!" We did not know at that time and in the ensuing period that Ted Snyder, who was a leading wilderness advocate in the Sierra Club structure—and I'm not sure how this overlapped with his presidency, but he was at various times president of the Sierra Club and chairman of the club's national wilderness committee—that Ted, who was a devoted wilderness activist and was working in particular to save an area in North Carolina, the name of which I've forgotten (he had a particular area that he was particularly devoted to and was working real hard on, which I can't remember)—.

Lage: We can put that in later.

Scott: Ted, working with Jonathan Ela, the Midwest representative, and Peter Borrelli, who was then the staff representative in New York for the far eastern area, through processes that they'll have to report because I don't know, they were meeting with the Forest Service and they were collaborating with the Forest Service on drafting—. There in fact are minutes, which are in the club's archives and it's in Dennis Roth's history, minutes which Ted Snyder kept of a very detailed meeting, a philosophical meeting, that they had with the chief and others in the Forest Service to which the Wilderness Society was not privy and/or invited, about whether the Wilderness Act could apply to these areas and if it didn't, what would you do with it?

This led, I think with particular activism from both Jonathan and Peter, to the active collaboration between the Sierra Club and the Forest Service in drafting a wild areas system bill.

Lage: So the Club was really in on it.

Scott: The Club was in on it.

Lage: Or taken in on it, is what you're saying.

Scott: Was in on it. This was not Senator Aiken's idea or Senator Humphrey's idea. The Wilderness Society was busy with a lot of other things and, as was our practice, was busy working on the Sipsey Wilderness in Alabama and the three areas in West Virginia that were in process. We were going to just chip away at this problem by just encouraging the Congress to go about designating such areas in the East, and the Forest Service didn't like it. In RARE I, they had inventoried some areas in the East
but not very many. In RARE I, they had not yet adopted this doctrinaire, "There is none that qualifies." That was a somewhat separate proposition. I think probably the fact that they were fussing with RARE I—they issued this instruction to all regional foresters to do this—probably had something to do with impelling it.

So the long and the short of it is that Senator Aiken of Vermont, the chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee introduced a bill called the wild areas bill, which purported to be in essence parallel to the Wilderness Act for areas in the East where the land had been previously disturbed and which, in various ways that were pretty damn explicit, embodied the purity policy and had these implications for the wilderness system in the West.

All of that was anathema to the Wilderness Society. It wasn't something that we had a discussion about or a debate about. We knew. Howard Zahniser and Harvey Broome, a long-time president of the council of the Wilderness Society, and George Marshall and other leaders who were most intimately involved in drafting the Wilderness Act were all easterners. They had actively collaborated in the establishment of the Shining Rock Wilderness and so forth. This was contrary to their intent. We believed ourselves to be the lineal descendants of the founders of the wilderness system and we were not going to take the back seat to the Sierra Club or to the Forest Service in saying what or what not was allowed under the Wilderness Act.

Secondly, if you had the Congress involved in this blessing of the purity doctrine, it meant incredible implications for wilderness boundary locations in the West. We were having no party to that.

Thirdly, the wild areas bill had all these phony management arrangements. Its premise was that wilderness areas in the West weren't really recreational areas. True, wilderness areas are for their own sake. You can recreate in them, but that is a side benefit. But in the East, these were going to be more specifically for recreation and hunting, particularly squirrel hunting and things like that that are big in the East. So you would do a certain amount of timber harvest, not for timber harvest's sake but to promote wildlife openings and that kind of stuff and to promote recreation. Those weren't allowed in the Wilderness Act, but they would be allowed in this thing. That was anathema to us.

Finally, this legislation was written for, and could not have been written to avoid, jurisdiction to the agriculture committee. It was written with sole jurisdiction to the agriculture committee.

Lage: By the chairman of the agriculture committee.

Scott: And the Sierra Club. [chuckles] And the Forest Service. And if the Sierra Club people didn't know what they were doing, I can tell you the Forest Service people sure as hell did.

Lage: So how did you respond?
Scott: Here was this bill introduced, and we said, "This is a terrible idea," and put out our literature far and wide, saying it was a terrible idea. We were not fully aware of the degree of Sierra Club involvement in all of this. We attacked the living daylights out of it but didn't view it as a huge threat. It certainly wasn't going anywhere in a hurry. One obvious reason it wasn't going—.

Oh, one other terrible implication of this was that if you had a wild area system in the East and a wilderness area system in the West that were distinct, you were going to bifurcate the wilderness movement. One of the crucial qualities of the wilderness movement is that people all over the East understand the Wilderness Act and participate in helping save the areas in the West where the local politics is a lot more difficult. If you bifurcated them, you were going to greatly weaken this unity of the political impact of the wilderness movement. We would just have no part of it. One of the reasons we didn't pay all that much attention to it—I mean, we lambasted it, we testified against it and all those things, but we were very busy with a lot of other things, not the least of them being RARE I and its aftermath.

But also we knew that there was no great chance that this thing was going to go very far because it tread on the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Interior Committees which had sole jurisdiction over the Wilderness Act. So it was, you will well imagine, with considerable surprise that I learned—shows you how closely I was keeping tabs—from a timber industry lobbyist at some reception that I found myself at where he was also present, who fell into conversation with me and said, "What do you think of the Senate today passing the Eastern Wild Areas Act?" We had literally, for some reason, missed the fact that the agriculture committee had reported this bill. I'm sure we were running around doing stuff, but I am not sure what it was.

And in September of 1972, the Senate passed this thing. I swallowed my soup or whatever I was eating and snuck out and called my friend Ernie Dickerman, who was the chief eastern guy for the Wilderness Society, and said, "Ernie!" We started having serious meetings. I sat down at my typewriter, and we pulled together the inventory of the areas we thought would be politically palatable. I drafted an Eastern Wilderness Areas Act the next morning, and the next afternoon set off to Capitol Hill to find my friend Frank Church and to say, "Hey, Frank. This will have all these bad effects." He wasn't around his office and I went looking for him. I think he was actually out of town, and I was sort of in a bad mood about all this because time was clearly of the essence.

I went in to a guy named Jerry Verkler, who was a friend or a person we dealt with. He often spoke to these training sessions we had, and I knew him well. He was the chief of staff for Senator Jackson of what's now called the Senate Energy Committee but was then called the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee. He said, "What are you moping around about?" or "What are you up to?" I told him, and he said, "Well, I think Frank is out of town or some place, but Scoop would be interested in this."

[Chuckles] The chairman of the committee! Better yet. I had cultivated the acquaintance of a new senator from New York, Senator James Buckley, William
Buckley's brother, who is a very devoted bird-watcher and naturalist in his own right, and I had been in to see him about the SST and faintly knew members of his staff and had had one or two contacts with him. He was a member of this seven-tier committee, a Republican. I thought, "Oh good. Church and Buckley." Well, we'll just substitute Jackson. And the bill was introduced I think that day or the next.

Lage: And it was more or less a competitive bill with this wild areas bill that had been passed?

Scott: Yes. It was a bill that was based on the Wilderness Act, didn't set up any new system and designated a whole bunch of eastern areas.

Lage: What did the Wild Areas Act do? The one that they had just passed?

Scott: It created a whole new system.

Lage: Did it also designate areas?

Scott: It designated areas and set up studies. It was essentially a completely competitive alternative designation. So within days, Senator Jackson and Senator Buckley introduced the Jackson-Buckley Eastern Wilderness Areas Act, with Jackson's staff's connivance. I was never personal friends with Jackson. I had several meetings over my career with Henry Jackson, but he was a somewhat austere character. Ed Wayburn was very close to him, and Brock knew him and worked with him. I just never had dealt with him. I dealt with his staff a lot, but I just never had occasion to spend any particular time or get to know him as I knew some of these other people. Certainly as I knew Church.

We said, "We've got to have it quick. We're going to get a House bill equivalent to this." By that time Aspinall had been defeated for reelection, and we had an old guy from Florida named James Haley. He was, for one term of Congress, the chairman of the House Interior Committee. He was very slow and really didn't do anything. So we decided we would go get our friend John Saylor, who would of course be outraged about this, who was the ranking Republican, and James Haley. Jackson or his staff called ahead and said, "I'm sending these boys from the Wilderness Society over there. Listen, Jim. This affects our jurisdiction." What we had going here was the competitive—.

One, Jackson did not like the chairman of the agriculture committee. I said that Aiken was the chairman. That's not right. Aiken was a Republican. The chairman of the agriculture committee was Herman Talmadge of Georgia, and Jackson and he did not speak. So that increased the incentive and interest. These guys might have been wild enthusiasts for the eastern wilderness. I'm not sure. [chuckles] But they were awfully big enthusiasts for their jurisdiction.

So Ernie Dickerman and I went and had an amazingly funny interview with Chairman Haley of the Interior Committee, in which he was busy explaining to us how he had
been an environmentalist all his life. Dickerman is this very funny character who was just playing this right back. "Oh, it must please you so much to see the young people following your leadership." [laughter] I was just trying to maintain my composure.

So very quickly, Haley and Saylor introduced this bill as well. In this process, and I can't do dates here at all, but in this process we are talking something between 1972 and 1973—.

Lage: I have you writing the bill in July of 1972.

Scott: It was earlier than that. I'm not sure about the dates, but they are easily found from the historical record. But in the process of all this, the disagreement between the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society became heated. There were difficult exchanges. All during this period I was maintaining conversations with my friend Chuck Clusen and slipping him copies of things and keeping him informed of what we were doing. But Mike McCloskey (he was not a central player in this) was quite properly defending the view that his staff was taking and whatever view Snyder was taking; he was an important volunteer leader at the time.

I remember in particular that we had one sort of show-down session, which was held at Stewart Brandborg's home on Tricky Foot Road, or Tricky Run Road, something like that, in suburban Maryland, with I think Jonathan Ela and Peter Borrelli and Mike, and with Harry Crandall and Stewart Brandborg and me, which was very heated and very difficult. It was about the fundamental questions and we were not in a compromising mood. We were not in an, "Oh, you're right," mood. We were in a mood of saying, "We know what the intentions of the founders of the wilderness system were and the needs of system continuity and consistency." Basically, our position was (I am not sure if we actually said it, quite) that the Sierra Club people were engaged in an exercise of, what's the word, expediency to get some acres. The price they were paying was the future of the wilderness system. We were having none of it. Organizational jealousies that always existed, stylistic differences—Mike McCloskey and Stewart Brandborg couldn't have been more different. They were born on different—.

Lage: But Mike seems so tuned in to the political implications of things. I would think he would pick up on it right away.

Scott: I think he and certainly Jonathan Ela, who backed away from this after a while (at least that was my perception. Jonathan and I at that era were not so close), I think they were conflicted. I think they saw that there was considerable merit in our side of the argument. There was some merit in the expediency side. "You're going to get licked between the Forest Service and the agriculture heavies, and it's already passed the Senate." You could make arguments that said, "Well, maybe you're right, you Wilderness Society people, in some sort of esoteric way, but the real world is..." I had been on both sides of those kinds of arguments. This isn't good guys versus bad guys. But it was very heated. Some fault lines in the distinction between the two organizations were at play there.
This was not just between the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society. The Forest Service is a premier lobbying organization, and they don't make any bones about it. They had gone out, as usual, and cultivated an organization called the American Forestry Association, which has always toadied their view of things. They had also gotten a hold of—through whatever mechanism, I don't know; maybe also he had been writing about this subject in some way—then, a quite elderly fellow, Joe Penfold, who was the long-time conservation leader of the Izaak Walton League, based in Denver. Joe, who was something of a patriarch and had been involved in the Wilderness Act and was one of the prestigious long-time leaders, was very strong on this and wrote widely circulated articles and so forth. So this was a serious split in the conservation movement, not just Sierra Club and Wilderness Society. On our side were the Friends of the Earth, George Alderson, who was another person devoted to the Wilderness Act and very active at that time and headed the Friends of the Earth office in Washington; Dave Brower, who was absolutely with us on this, and a number of other groups, the Environmental Policy Center and some other places.

There ensued a campaign to win the hearts and minds of the conservation movement. We, the Wilderness Society, had something going for it. There were people always in the Sierra Club, which is a very democratic organization in arriving at its policy positions, who did not agree with the position that the Sierra Club was pursuing.

Lage: Was Snyder in on those conferences that you had?

Scott: I think the showdown one, I don't believe he was there. My memory is not entirely clear, but I don't believe so. I think it was staff to staff. George Alderson and I, in particular, were sort of captains of this campaign. George did a lot of writing of articles that really laid out the case. There are several definitive pieces about this that were part of our campaign literature, which we encouraged so there wasn't just the Wilderness Society. And George was highly respected, as the former chair of the Atlantic Chapter, highly respected in Sierra Club circles.

I remember he and I and probably somebody else and Dave had dinner one night, plotting and scheming about how to do this, at a little, funky Italian restaurant in Washington called the AV Ristorante, which had only opera on its jukebox. We made sure that literature that the Wilderness Society was sending out about that reached key Sierra Club people. But a lot of them were members of the Wilderness Society so it did automatically, but we made sure that the whole board of directors was getting our stuff that said our side of all this. We were also making sure that things like Scoop Jackson's speeches—. Now, I've never asked him but here was Ed Wayburn, who was very tight with Scoop Jackson and other leaders of the Senate Interior Committee, and always powerful in the Sierra Club. I had no idea whether he played any role in this or not, but if he saw his pal Scoop and Udall and Saylor and all these people going our way, that had to create difficulties within the Sierra Club, because we were writing speeches for Church and Buckley and all of this building our case. We very much felt we had our backs to the wall.
Meanwhile the Senate committee and the House committee started to work on this legislation, and they ultimately produced bills. We also conducted, and my belief was that it was in December of 1972, that the Wilderness Society by invitation only, off the record, behind the scenes, held a regional volunteer conference of eastern wilderness leaders in a motel (Holiday Inn) near the airport in Knoxville, Tennessee. Ernie Dickerman and I organized this thing. We hand-picked the people to go and not surprisingly, quite a number of them were Sierra Club leaders from the region, but it did not include Ted Snyder. It did not include people whose minds were closed. It included people we needed to convince on the merits. The program at this thing was an hours-long session in which we went through every part of the argument, every part of the implications: the political, the historic and all of that. We also invited, and they came at the committee's expense, two senior staff people from the Senate Interior Committee: a man named Porter Ward—or no, I'm not sure—anyway, a man named Russ Brown and I guess, maybe Porter Ward, yes, who was Church's staff guy clear back to the Wilderness Act. These guys would just nod their heads very helpfully, or say, "That's absolutely right," and, "Scoop feels very strongly about this point or that point." Which had an enormous persuasive effect on this audience.

This audience was calculatedly [assembled], and I make no bones about it here; we were out to unstring the Sierra Club because they were very powerful and had very high visibility. As long as there was dissension in the conservation ranks we were never going to get this thing resolved. So there were people there whom we were out to convince in order to have the second order of consequence of their being convinced.

It was a very successful event. People went away with a whole body of knowledge reinforced by these Jackson staffers that our view of this matter was correct. I do not remember the mechanism by which the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society ultimately resolved this. I know that we dispatched George Alderson. George Alderson went, and I think this was Brower's suggestion, and set up a hospitality suite at the annual convention of the Izaak Walton League and worked over—there was a guy who was very close to Brower and Alderson and myself in the Indiana division of the Izaak Walton League, a staff guy named Tom Duston. The Indiana division broke with Penfold and went our way. Then the whole convention passed a thing endorsing this then, our bill, and we began to move the Izaak Walton League away from Penfold, and the Sierra Club came around, I don't remember the mechanism, so that by some time early in 1973, the internal squabble had been put to rest.

By that point we were faced with an extremely unsatisfactory situation. Now the sleeping dogs in the Senate agriculture committee had been awakened. They were real interested. There was no putting the genie back into the bottle. They ended up passing their bill, and it was now a new Congress. They passed their Eastern Wild Areas Act through the Senate in February of 1973. After a good deal more screwing around, we passed the Interior Committee version which I had originally drafted, with many changes of course, in December of 1973. The House was doing whatever it was doing at the same time.
By May of 1974, and by this point I'm gone (I'm in Seattle but I'm paying attention to all of this), the Senate agriculture committee and the Senate Interior Committee had gotten together and produced a merged bill. The price we paid for this is that the agriculture committees of the House and the Senate got jurisdiction over any national forest wilderness in the East, which is highly undesirable but there it is. Once that genie—.

Lage: So that looked at it along with the Interior Committees. And they can pass holes in it.

Scott: They can change it. It has not typically been a problem because there was nobody there who was particularly interested.

Lage: Except they are more under the influence of the Forest Service.

Scott: The potential is always there for trouble-making. Generally speaking, you are not going to pass a wilderness bill at some point unless you pretty well brought around the local congressional delegation anyway, and if they're locked in on it. There is not somebody sitting around that the Senate agriculture committee spending their time trying to think how to do dirt on the eastern wilderness. These aren't the kinds of areas that they were sitting around—. If somebody were putting energy into it, it would be a very dangerous situation and much to be regretted. It didn't need to happen.

But all of this had the effect of annoying me greatly about the Sierra Club just sort of in general. Certainly, probably making me not particularly popular over there either, because I was very much in the center of it. So that when Lloyd Tupling retired as Washington representative of the Sierra Club and Brock was made Washington representative, the question was what to do about Brock's position. A big hiring process was going through and I was contacted—I don't know by whom but most likely by Chuck Clusen—to see whether I was interested. I said something between no and hell no, and why. They proceeded through a hiring process in which they ultimately hired a chap to be the Northwest representative who didn't stay. Then they were really up a creek because by this time Brock was long gone. They had an interim guy there. By that time, the spring of 1973, the internal fracas had been resolved, and I let it be known via my friend Chuck that I wouldn't have applied for that job, but that if they wanted to invite me—.

Lage: You would go.

Scott: If they wanted to approach me, I was approachable. That set up the process by which I ultimately moved to the Sierra Club staff.

Lage: Let me ask you one question here on that. The Roth book said that you, Dickerman, and Crandall persuaded Nixon to support the concept of eastern wilderness.

Scott: Yes. I read that to refresh my memory. Let me talk about the Nixon Administration a little.
Lage: Okay. Hold on.

[End Tape 11, Side A]

[Begin Tape 11, Side B]

Scott: Because I had a legalistic turn of mind, amongst other things it was important—. And by this time I was spending a major part of my career in the early seventies at the Wilderness Society drafting things, drafting bills. I enjoyed doing it and studied up about it. Much goes to the person who puts the words on paper. Much power is inherent in that and I learned that principle fairly quickly. When I drafted the Eastern Wilderness Areas Act for Senator Jackson and company, I drafted it with that title: The Eastern Wilderness Areas Act of 19—whatever it was. That was important because we didn't want it to be called the Eastern Wilderness Act, even if we won the sort of fundamental point. This was just another law that happened to designate some areas as wilderness in the East under "The Wilderness Act." So there was a semantic importance about the title.

I don't know who did it, but it passed the Senate with my title and it passed the House with my title, but there is no Section I. I am looking at Public Law 93622, January 3, 1975, which is the act designating these areas, which is this bill. It starts off "Section II." There is no Section I. Section I was my short title that said, "This action shall be known as the Eastern Wilderness Areas Act." So on my little list of things I'm going to do some day is to sneak a little rider on something to put the title back in that law. This point is not a big one.

I want to say something generally about the Nixon Administration. In that part of my career, I was exposed to the day-to-day working with the administrative agencies and with the White House because that is what the logic of the Wilderness Act process required. Our job as we conceived was to take a wilderness proposal that an agency produced, and simultaneously—and the Sierra Club in particular had a big wilderness study committee, staff people and stuff, and at least in certain parts of the country were producing citizen proposals, and the Wilderness Society was producing citizen alternatives to the wilderness areas studies being done by the agencies. The agencies would then decide, the workers in the bureaucracy would decide, "We're going to designate this land or we're not. Here's the map."

We didn't say, "Oh well, that's the end of that. Now we'll see you in Congress." We would say, "Well, that's what you think. We're going to go the chief or the director, to see if we can get them to change that." If we couldn't get it changed there, we would go to the assistant secretary in the cabinet level. If we couldn't get it changed there we would go to the secretary. If we couldn't get it changed there we would go to the White House, or this new institution which gave us an arm in at the White House, which was the Council on Environmental Quality, where we, generally speaking, had friends both as councilors and on the staff.
I grew up in my involvement in that era spending an enormous amount of time in and out of the administrative agencies, Forest Service, Park Service, Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife and the Interior Department hierarchy in particular. And the White House. This wasn't an everyday affair, but we didn't think of ourselves as congressional lobbyists who sometimes went and dealt with the administration. We were in and out of there all the time. This would strike people on the staff of the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society today as very odd because one of the effects of the Reagan years was that there was a long sort of dark ages where there wasn't any point in going to talk to people in the agencies. There were a lot of people who have got years of professional lobbying experience under the belt who spent very little time [with the administration]. With the agencies, you spent all your time trying to muscle them via the Congress and courts, but—.

In this era, though I don't have any belief that Richard Nixon had any particular strong feelings one way or the other about environmental matters, he was not, as Reagan was, devoted to the proposition that these were bad ideas. He was busy trying to be a foreign policy guy and run the war in Vietnam and all that sort of stuff. If he could get a few extra brownie points by having people say nice things about his environmental initiatives, well, what the hell. Ehrlichman, who was his White House aid for domestic policy, who came from Seattle and had a kind of an outdoorsy background and I believe had done some modest amount of work to help—Brock would know this story. I believe in Brock's time in the Northwest, he had gotten Ehrlichman to do some volunteer work with this or that or something or other. There is some story there that I don't know.

Lage: He was a lands attorney.

Scott: Yes, he was kind of a lands attorney. He had a deputy named John Whitaker, about whose background I don't remember anything, who was an extremely nice and approachable man, who I had frequent dealings with at the White House as these things came up. I remember explicitly going in—. This is not me individually. This is often with Harry Crandall, who of course came from the Interior Department bureaucracy and had the place wired for sound. He had friends all over there he could talk to. But any number of times going in at the White House level and getting things changed. We spent a lot of time with Nat Reed.

I came to spend more after I left the Wilderness Society and went to Seattle and was doing all these appeals and things. But even while I was there in Washington, I came to spend more and more time with people in the upper echelons of the Forest Service. Most notably, I was never chums with Ed Cliff, who was a somewhat austere and reserved sort of a character, but John Maguire, who was associate chief at that time and later chief, was a very approachable and constructive man who knew that his job was trying to solve problems. For the most part, we had a good relationship.
All of this was in the Nixon Administration, so that it would be a normal part of our work. I don't remember the specifics, but if we were trying to get eastern wilderness embraced by the administration, both publicly and as a matter of internal policy, in our line of thinking rather than in the wild areas approach, it would have been a normal part of what we did to go and sell that message in the White House.

We also, in the eastern wilderness battle, were playing the Interior Department off against the Forest Service, because here was the Interior Department recommending Shenandoah National Park and all these wildlife refuges under one Wilderness Act. So you can't have one agency saying, "It doesn't qualify," and another agency saying, "Here's our proposal for Shenandoah National Park." It just didn't make any sense. There was no love lost at all, historically, forever, between the Interior Department and the Agriculture Department. I don't remember specifics but I know we had people in the Park Service goading the Forest Service or helping us on the Hill in all this. I'm sure that helped in the White House.

In that era—and again, people wouldn't remember this, particularly Johnson but Nixon continued this—there were frequent messages to Congress about environmental things, written messages. We would know those things were in the works because the bureaucracy helps write little paragraphs that filter up through the White House chain of command and then some speechwriter turns it into the message to Congress about one thing or another. I know, because I read it in Dennis Roth's history so it must be true, that it would be a normal part of what we did to see if we could get a sentence or two snuck in there, probably through CEQ [Council on Environmental Quality] or through Nat Reed or John Whitaker or whomever, taking our view of the issue. Then we would run around saying, "President Nixon says." Then also, if you had gotten him to say in some speech somewhere or in some message to Congress—. Whether Richard Nixon ever looked at these words is entirely unclear to me but he let it happen. So give him credit for that.

We would try to get him to say one sentence about something. That's just how Washington works. Then we would turn around and say, "Now we are waiting for the Administration's official pronouncement about our bill verses this bill. Oh. Incidentally, the boss has already said..." This was a powerful kind of an argument that our friends would use and we would egg them into using in the internal debates with the Bureau of the Budget, or what became the Office of Management and Budget. So it all kind of fit together.

It's not a theory of political science, but there's a well-understood analytical picture of how government in this country works, which says that it is not the three separate branches of government and the public voting and all that. What it is, is intense little whirlpools or little iron triangles of usually the members, and particularly the staff, of a specialized subcommittee in the Congress; and the agency staff people who deal with that same field; and the interest groups who deal with that same field, who are all kind of working together and putting words in presidents' mouths. This is certainly true.

Lage: That's the way you saw it.
Scott: Of course, the one little triangle of people in these three places, the interest group, the administration agencies and the Congress, worked on one side of the agency and there was another little triangle, the timber industry and so forth, on the other side. But an advocate for a position in an interest group in that kind of a situation is in a position to sort of go around and pull strings and push buttons to wherever he can get it all to add up. So we would be simultaneously trying to get the administration to do X, Y, and Z and to say such and such or stick such and such in a presidential speech or write such and such a letter. We would be playing the agencies off against each other. We would be getting people on Capitol Hill to ask rude questions at hearings or to send hearings saying, "I want to know all about this or that or the other thing."

I think what it amounts to, in the eastern wilderness fight, is that while the Forest Service was intensely interested in this (so that they were running around doing what they could do) there is in fact a sort of limit. In the final analysis they can't be quite as cheeky as we could be. While they recruited and had the effective assistance of Joe Penfold, Joe Penfold was a nice guy but he was an old guy and he wasn't running around doing this stuff. He was sending forth his opinions from Mount Olympus. The Sierra Club, while it was active in the early going, got dissuaded from pursuing this. So after a while, there wasn't anybody running around with the same intensity helping Senator Aiken and Senator Talmadge and company. Aiken felt pretty strongly about it, but even he got tired of it after a while. So there was much more intensity of activity on our side.

We got into it late. We didn't see it coming as we ought to have. We were going to handle it as a piecemeal deal of just sort of snipping away at the edges. But once we were mobilized, we were throwing the full resources of the organization at the issue. Of course, then, once the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society and the Izaak Walton League and others made peace, then we were all in the same boat. We were all trying to get the same thing to happen. Then it was a foregone conclusion. The unfortunate side effect was that we ended up with this legacy of giving the agriculture committee at least a potential voice in these decisions, which is unfortunate.

So let's stop there.

[End Tape 11, Side B]
Interview 5: November 30, 1990

[Begin Tape 12, Side A]

Lage: Today is November 30, 1990, and we're starting on our twelfth tape of an interview with Doug Scott. We are going to start today talking about the Pacific Northwest Regional Office. You had a tale about how you were hired. I know you told last time about Mike talking to you.

Scott: Right.

Lage: How did it go from there?

Scott: At some point in the summer of 1973, or the spring, I flew to Seattle. It must have been the spring, maybe late April. That's about when I made the decision and accepted the offer and all of that.

Lage: So was that a hire actually?

Scott: Well, that was the decision to hire. I accepted and all of that, but it was in a highly informal way, and these things were all very informal then. It was contingent on an interview with volunteer leaders in the Northwest. There has always been a sense, now that it's much more organized, that the volunteer leadership of the club in a particular place ought to be involved in the hiring of the regional staff person, even though that staff person doesn't work for the local chapters or the local regional RCC [Regional Conservation Committee]. That person works for the line of authority in the staff.

So I flew to Seattle and was met by Polly Dyer and taken to dinner with Polly Dyer and Pat Goldsworthy. That was my interview. Actually, I think we went straight from the airport and met Pat and had dinner, and that was my volunteer interview.

Lage: Just the two of them.

Scott: Yes. And the thing that I'm laughing about about that is that I, by that time, was very well acquainted with and had worked closely with, episodically, both of them. Polly is the long-time doyenne now of Olympic National Park matters, but basically all conservation public land issues in Washington State. She's had a piece of that action since at least the fifties. She was involved with Zahnie [Howard Zahniser] in a very important way in one of the key drafting decisions on the Wilderness Act. I referred to that earlier, the word "untrammeled."

Lage: Was she involved with that?

Scott: He was staying at her house on the occasion of one of the Federation of Western Outdoor Club’s northwest wilderness conferences. He reports this later, which is in the files in the correspondence in 1956 when he was actually putting words on paper, and he had been struggling with the definition. He was staying at Polly's house and he
and Polly were down on her living room floor, poring over maps of the Olympic coastal strip. She was exuding Polly Dyer's unique form of enthusiasm for how wonderful this country was, and she said, "Oh Zahnie, it's so untrammeled!"
[Laughter] That's when he figured that it was all right; it was a word in sufficiently common usage.

Lage: He had thought of the word before, but—.

Scott: I guess. One of us would have to look at that correspondence precisely. Years later, I had the occasion—on the tenth anniversary of the Wilderness Act, there was a conference honoring that that Polly put together. I made a speech about Howard Zahniser, something of a memorial about Howard Zahniser, and in the midst of that speech I told that anecdote, which I had never told to Polly. She was so pleased that Zahnie had recorded in his later correspondence this particular origin of the word.

So Polly and I had known each other through work in Washington. She was present in May of 1972, as was Pat Goldsworthy. The same was true of Pat, who was the grand old man of the North Cascades Park battle, the Pasayten Wilderness, and the Glacier Peak Wilderness, and other things in that area. Each of them had been in Washington in May of 1972 in conjunction with hearings on the wilderness proposals at which Senator Church made the definitive statement about what the Wilderness Act did and did not mean, which I had prepared.

So in that capacity and others while I was at the Wilderness Society, I already knew these people perfectly well, so we had a jolly good dinner. They were both by that stage former members of the board of the sixties of the Sierra Club. Often Sierra Club meetings were held at one or the other of their homes, though I don't think either of them from that point on were actually elected volunteer leaders of the Sierra Club. But they were my volunteer committee, so that was a shoo-in. I went to the office, which was a kind of crummy little place upstairs with linoleum floors above commercial establishments on the main business strip adjacent to the University of Washington campus, University Way. I was in that box office for a long time.

I met with the staff. There were four staff people of one sort or another who had been working there for Brock and with Brock, to whom I was coming in as the new Northwest representative and the new boss. I had not met any of them. So this was an occasion to get to know them and to let them feel that they had at least an opportunity to meet the guy before he had been really formally pronounced upon. They had gone through quite a bit of stress at this point. First of all, Brock left. Then after great pulling and hauling, this other chap had been hired and he had chosen to leave after ten days. So they were thrown back in the street again. In between, this fellow who was something of a disciple of Brock's from Oregon named Roger Mellem had been acting Northwest representative, and he was younger than all the other people in the office. They were somewhat frosted about this whole business.

Lage: I hope you were old enough for them.
Scott: I was old enough for them. I think it's fair to say that I arrived in Seattle unknown to lots of people in the Sierra Club in the Northwest. Certainly to the staff in the office. But on the other hand, we had very established credentials in the public land lobbying business. I wasn't somebody who had been hired out of some other line of work, as is often the case.

Lage: And you had worked on the Hill.

Scott: And I had some knowledge of the issues in the areas, specifically because I had worked on legislative aspects of them in Washington. I had a pretty good established acquaintance with Brock and so forth, so I wasn't a completely unknown quantity. The people in the office then were two women who had been secretaries for Brock; Brock was a prodigious producer of dictation.

Lage: And very fast.

Scott: And he would dictate on these wretched old dictating machines. He would just dictate a mile a minute. He had these two women who were writing out his dictation and then he would take additional tapes around the corner to a public stenographer as well. The equipment in the office was execrable. [laughter] The typewriters were just loathsome. But it was quickly established that I could type faster than either of these women: Linda Haberfield and Donna Klemka. Additionally in the office was a young, kind of jack-of-all-trades researcher in the Forest Service staff named David Pavelchek, who was working on RARE I and follow-up things in timber sales and so forth. Then there was a fellow who had been hired temporarily, who was a volunteer leader who had been put on the payroll as the club was doing around the country to augment staff specifically because of the huge workload of RARE I. His name was Richard Fiddler. That was my first acquaintance with Dick. He's a close personal friend today and went on to become a long-time member of the board of directors.

I also came into the region, although they weren't part of the interview, with roots that went clear back to 1968, with Richard and Doris Cellarius. Richard had been on the botany faculty at the University of Michigan when I was there and had subsequently moved to the Evergreen State University in Olympia, Washington. So when I came into the region it was like old home week with Richard and Doris, with whom I had been very close friends in Ann Arbor.

So I was a known entity at least to that extent. Plus, the Wilderness Society had field agents. They were little paid agents working out in that part of the country. That established a fairly strong liaison in the region. I think this all must have been in late April of 1973, because I'm sure it was the May, 1973, board meeting that I then flew on to, I think all in one trip, to San Francisco for the circus meeting. Given that it was a circus meeting, I was interviewed at the time the pattern—.

Lage: Maybe you should say what a circus meeting is. [127]
Scott: A circus meeting is the board and the Sierra Club council delegates from each of the chapters and various committees. It's the largest coming together of the apparatchiks of the Sierra Club from across the country. In 1990 it was hundreds and hundreds of people, but even in 1973 it was hundreds of people. And we were meeting at the Unitarian Church on Van Ness Avenue and in the Cathedral Hill Hotel catty-corner from the Unitarian Church on Van Ness Avenue in San Francisco. The pattern, I gather, at the time was that when major staff hiring decisions were made, Mike had an interview with them with the executive committee of the board of directors.

But since the whole board was present, the whole board had a little interview with me. It's very funny. I can't remember whether Richard Cellarius was on the board then or not, but Ed Wayburn certainly was. I'm not quite sure who it was that asked the question. It might have been Sandy Tepfer, if he was on the board at that time. Someone asked me how I was going to cope. I had worked for a staff-dominated organization, the Wilderness Society. Now I was proposing to come to work for a volunteer dominated organization. How did I propose to deal with that very difficult transition?

I already had this job in all practical details. So I was somewhat cheeky. I said that I thought the distinction was more apparent than real, but at the Wilderness Society we accomplished what we accomplished by getting lots of volunteer people, whatever organization they were affiliated with, and invested in them to pursue our program. We worked cooperatively with lots and lots of people. I thought that was pretty much the same drill and that I had been intensively involved at the Wilderness Society in volunteer training work. How was that different from working for the Sierra Club.

Lage: Did they buy that?

Scott: Oh sure. One of the things about people in the Sierra Club is that they perceived the Sierra Club as unique. In many ways it is, but it is a great potential weakness of the organization that the excuse that the Sierra Club is uniquely volunteer controlled and uniquely this and uniquely that is sometimes an excuse for covering up things that ought to be improved. You can say, "Well, there ought to be better communication between X and Y in the Sierra Club." They would say, "Oh, you don't understand. We're unique. That wouldn't apply to us." You just shake your head.

There is a type of Sierra Club—always has been, at least to this day—one type of Sierra Club leader who has got the huge ego investment in the institution, almost to the exclusion of the issues. One of the things that I always liked to do, sort of sitting around and joshing with people, is to pose the challenge, "Well, let's see. We're fighting dam development and then to save the Redwoods or stop the Energy Mobilization Board or to pass the Clean Air..." Whatever it is, from big dramatic issues people get really worked about it, is that issue sufficiently important to you, Ann, that it would be worth destroying the Sierra Club to win the issue? The Sierra Club after all is just an institution. We could prepare another one the day after. But it required risking the whole place. The whole place would come down around our ears,
but we would save the Arctic Wildlife Refuge. Would that be worth it? My answer is, you betcha. I would make that deal in a moment's notice. I would sell the company.

Lage: In effect, that's one of the things that Brower was criticized for.

Scott: Sure, but there is a class of Sierra Club leader who would just erupt at that very thought, that the crucial thing was the organization, not the mission. I always liked to goad people into that kind of thing, sort of testing them.

Lage: There seems to be another kind of emphasis, different emphasis, in the way the volunteers perceive this working relationship. You described the Wilderness Society as you work with volunteers, you train volunteers, you kind of use volunteers to carry out the policy of the Wilderness Society. I always believed that the Sierra Club saw itself the other way around. The volunteer leaders do it the other way, but they hire you to carry out their policies.

Scott: It's set up the other way, but that's why I said the distinction was more apparent than real. These are just two different ways of looking at the same thing. The Sierra Club doesn't tell its staff, if it's smart, it typically has not said, "You're sort of here to—. Don't have any ideas of your own. Take no initiative. Don't press us to do things that we don't tell you we want to be pressed to do. Just follow around and sweep up after us and open the doors and keep the lights on." That isn't what the staff is about. The staff is to extend the impact of a volunteer organization in ways that volunteers, however good-hearted, however skilled, cannot do because they have to do other things in their lives and cannot jump on a plane and fly to Washington to lobby for three years continuously or whatever.

Also staff exists to provide a level of continuity in the outside world. To save wilderness or to stop SSTs or whatever it is, we deal with politicians. We build relationships and trust. Some of that is kind of generic and is based on the incredible reputation of Sierra Club for accuracy of its information, for the integrity of its representations with politicians and so forth, for its clout.

Some of it is based on personal reputation. Frank Church dealt with me on a basis of very close trust because that relationship was created first off by the very generous act of a man who had had twenty years of prior relationship, Stewart Brandborg, saying, "Frank, this young man is somebody you can trust." He passed me on and tapped on my shoulder. I then had a long working relationship with Frank Church. It wasn't a close relationship, but it was a close working political relationship.

Trust. If something was said in confidence, I wouldn't betray it. I wasn't around selling different goods to other people. I wasn't using my connection with him. I was helping him accomplish goals that both he and I wanted to accomplish and that he had the power to accomplish, and so I was helping him. That meant drafting things, lots of different things to do. That was not because I was Doug Scott from the Wilderness Society or Doug Scott from the Sierra Club. Or that Betty Sue Smith was the current chairman of the Idaho Sierra Club chapter.
Brock Evans exemplified this. All around the region when I arrived there, there were forest supervisors and political people and reporters and leaders of other environmental groups whose day-to-day contact with the Sierra Club wasn't with the volunteer leadership. It was with the staff person whom they held in high regard. Most Sierra Club leaders value their staff in that way, recognize that that is an additive function; it extends the impact of the organization beyond what a pure voluntary relation could accomplish. I think normally you get somebody who says, “Hey, wait a second. You're getting—” As a staff person you have to be sensitive about that. The distinction from the Wilderness Society style of that era is more apparent than real, in part because that is all equally true of how you had to behave if you were a Wilderness Society staff, working with Polly Dyer and Pat Goldsworthy. You didn't come in and say, "Here Polly and Pat, here's what you have to do now and get back to me when you've got it done." You collaborate. You say, "Here's my view of this problem. What's your view?" You goad the discussion along. It made no difference. I didn't find I was behaving particularly differently at the Sierra Club staff.

Lage: You didn't meet many problems?

Scott: I met a degree of day-to-day organizational involvement which I thought, working with an organization where there was a cadre of leaders in every town and in every state, that was different in style. But the fundamental psychological way that you went about presenting yourself and doing the work was no big difference. I was cheeky enough by 1973 and confident enough with my own skills and my own stature as a person working in this profession. I wasn't going on bended knee to the Sierra Club. This was in part why I said that I would be happy to entertain some offers if we want to talk about that, but I am not going to apply for that position because I have a perfectly good job now. If you want to come and recruit me from my perfectly good job that I have now that I'm quite happy with, there are some things you could have to offer me, mainly the idea that I could get back to the West, that would be attractive to me. But I'm not a supplicant.

Now, if you told me that I was going to end up working for the Sierra Club for seventeen and a half years I would have thought that was quite remarkable. We need to back up here one brief way. My good pal from Michigan, Virginia Prentice, ran for the board of directors at various times, at least once and maybe more, and was active as a council delegate at various times and was active in the outings program at the national level at various times. One year, it must have been whoever was president in 1970 appointed her to be chair of the nominating committee. To my complete surprise, she nominated me. I don't know who else was on the nominating committee, but in 1971 I was a nominee for the board of directors of the Sierra Club as a member of the staff of the Wilderness Society.

I thought this was probably a terrible idea. But in that period, when I was travelling to California for some training things that we did in the spring of 1971—. No, this must have been the fall before. I believe it was the April, 1971, ballot that I was on. I did not win. I was second runner-up. Bill Futrell was first runner-up and somebody then stepped down from the board, and Bill was appointed to fill that vacancy. This is the
way I remember it. I hope it's accurate. But I've often laughed about what might have
happened had I been elected to the board of directors.

Lage: That would have been really—.

Scott: My instinct was it was a bad idea. I should have followed that instinct. But I
remember thinking that my observation was that the way in which the board of
directors was functioning at that time, as an occasional observer of them, would make
it valuable to have somebody there to say, "Hey, do we have to make all the
decisions?" I came to some meeting while I was thinking about whether this was a
good idea, whether I would really go forward as a nominee. As I walked into the
room, they were debating a conservation policy decision on a one-hundred-acre swamp
in Ohio, about which none of them knew anything. But they were wasting five or ten
minutes of their time. At that time the club had not yet decentralized as it has
subsequently. Things rose to the board that were wildly unnecessary to go to the board
and wildly beyond their competence. Not because they were more important, but
because they were less important. Why can't the board of directors of the Sierra Club
be deciding about a one-hundred-acre swamp about which they knew nothing, except
what somebody prepared some memo for?

But anyway, I did stand for that election and fortunately was not elected, but it's a little
known secret about my background. I was working in the summer of 1973 helping to
coordinate the lobbying drive to try to block or to slow down the legislation to override
the Supreme Court's decision on the right of way of the [Alaska] pipeline to be illegal.
What we were really trying to do was to force a new NEPA review and planning
process in which the all-land Canadian alternative would be given adequate
consideration. Oil companies had decided that they wanted to build a pipeline to
Valdez with a tanker leg out from Valdez, and that was what the Interior Department
granted them. We believed that there was never an adequate evaluation of an all-land
alternative which would avoid the tanker route. In retrospect we were right. But there
was no hearing of it.

In the Senate that issue was decided on a tie vote. Spiro Agnew, who was vice-
president, broke the tie. He broke the tie in favor of the proposition that NEPA would
be overridden and that the pipeline decision would be declared final and not subject to
further court review. Then we went over to the House. It was August 1, 1973, that the
House passed this legislation, and I was no longer needed. So that's when I hopped on
the airplane and made my move to Seattle.

At that time, in the spring of 1973, in conjunction with a wilderness training program,
hence lobbying, in Washington, I had spent more time with a young woman who was
the wilderness staff person in the San Francisco headquarters of the Sierra Club, for the
wilderness work of the Sierra Club. It is sort of hard to describe this now. At that
point there was a national issue committee called the Wilderness Committee. It was,
amongst other things, conducting wilderness studies, fielding outings that would go to
conduct underground wilderness studies of major areas that were under review under
the Wilderness Act or by this time RARE I.
Francis Walcott, I think, at that stage was the chairman of that committee. If not, he was certainly involved in it. Shelley McIntyre had been around for a year or two. I corresponded and we would exchange working information. She spent some time in Washington in the spring of 1973. We became fond friends, had a romance develop. So when I moved to Seattle in August of 1973, not very long after that, and I want to guess it was still the fall of 1972, Shelley left her job at the Sierra Club and moved to Seattle to join me. It may have been September because she was going to start school. She was going back to school so that may have been what it was. In 1974 we bought a house together in Seattle, and she continued to have some role, although it is faint in my memory now, as sort of a volunteer, of helping with the Wilderness Committee work because I know we traveled around to various Wilderness Committee meetings, retreat sort of meetings.

A few years later the club came to the conclusion that the wilderness business was now so decentralized and there were so many different things going on at the state level where the chapters were the source of the action, that having what had become this huge committee—there were twenty or thirty people on this—that met a couple of times a year and pontificated about things of such level of generality, wasn't particularly helpful. With some considerable encouragement from me and John McComb and others, some courageous president ultimately decided not to reappoint the thing. There is no such wilderness committee now. That function, such as it is, has been decentralized in the chapters, or the RCCs, or absorbed into the Public Lands Committee.

So in the fall of 1973 and on into 1974, my monkish existence had come to an end, and I had put down roots in Seattle and bought a house, two cats and the whole business. But when I arrived in the position of the Northwest representative, I arrived with several things in my mind. The first thing was, I was not Brock Evans. Brock was a beloved figure, rightly so, in the Northwest. Thought of in Olympian terms. I was not interested in competing on those grounds or attempting to fill those shoes. I also thought that I was bringing to the Northwest a degree of intimate knowledge with the legislative process and the unfolding politics of wilderness in Washington that was quite different from Brock and that I was just going to be Doug Scott.

I also arrived with a little portfolio of issues. I mean, they didn't arrive with me. They were the issues which were in mid-stream in the Northwestern states that required immediate attention. The most immediate of those was the Hells Canyon fight, which had been brewing for a couple of years: questions of building dams and if so, where, and if so, who got to build them, on the middle range of the Snake River on the Oregon-Washington-Idaho border, relatively near Lewiston, upstream on the Snake River from Lewiston, Idaho. It was a huge, defining political issue in Northwest politics in the fifties. A whole generation of politicians of that era had fought their way to Congress on platforms of whether they were for or against public power or private power. This was a very big deal all across the region.

The issue was not whether to dam the middle range of the Snake River. The question was whether public utilities would dam it or private utilities. Democrats were for
public power and Republicans were for private power. One of the young Turk leaders of the public power [contingent]—build the biggest possible dam but build it with a public agency with public benefit in mind—was Congressman Al Ullman of the district in the Northeast corner of Oregon. His campaign manager, I think, but anyway a principal ringleader of his was Lloyd Tupling. Actually, I think Tup was the guy who was in charge of a local association called the High Hells Canyon Association, which was the proponent group for the public power.

Lage: Oh. That's right. I remember that.

Scott: Tup later went to Washington with Richard Neuberger when Richard Neuberger became the Senator from Oregon. After Dick Neuberger died—Dick Neuberger was a leading advocate of the Wilderness Act—his wife Maureen Neuberger took the Senate seat, and Tup stayed on to be her top staff person. It was when she retired from the Senate that Tup became the Washington representative of the Sierra Club, the first full-time person in that role. It is interesting because in all of the later work, while Tup was still on the scene while some of this was unfolding, he later worked on Hells Canyon where the issue was now, "Let's not build any dam at all." Tup would always get a perplexed look on his face. It took him back to his youth when he had a very different position. In the Hells Canyon issue, Justice Douglas had been a great proponent of not building any dam at all.

[End Tape 12, Side A]

[Begin Tape 12, Side B]

Scott: Brock [Evans] and some other folks had done some work, which is well documented in several histories that have been written about this, of pursuing a regulatory legal battle in front of the Federal Power Commission (FPC) over the question—. It's the so-called High Mountain Sheep case, High Mountain Sheep being the name of one of the proposed dams. After great pulling and hauling, the effect of this had been to block immediate proceedings for a dam in the canyon.

Slowly but surely, opinion had been changing in the Northwest. A young freshman senator came to Washington—having defeated, to everybody's surprise, possibly even his, Wayne Morse—Senator Packwood, who introduced legislation to preclude dams on the middle range of the Snake. Slowly but surely the process of turning people around began, as the politics in the region changed. Tom McCall was opposed to the dam. Governor Dan Evans in Washington State ultimately was opposed to the dams, and Governor Anderson of Idaho became opposed to the dams. Frank Church came around.

In ways that I cannot do from my memory, we were in the midst of this transition.

Lage: So when you were hired—.
Scott: —I had been working on this to a certain degree, particularly with Senator Church's staff and my Wilderness Society staff, and Brock had been working on it more from the angle of the Northwest, from Seattle. That became the first major preoccupation of my term as Northwest representative. There are elaborate files about this in the archives in Seattle. The citizen's crew that had been working on this, and some of whom I already knew well because they had come to Washington for Wilderness Society training events and for hearings where I had helped squire them around: Russ Brown, Jerry Jayne, and Pete Henault were three of these people whose names were particularly prominent. And Brock had worked with them over the years.

They were all based at the Atomic Energy Facility at Idaho Falls, Idaho, though Pete Henault, who was the leader of the Hells Canyon Preservation Alliance, or whatever the name of the citizen's group was, later moved to Seattle and worked for Seattle City Light. That move was about contemporaneous with my arrival in Seattle. I spent time with and was friendly with Pete and his wife socially.

My role was an inside lobbying role. We had some vicious knock-down drag-out rounds and fights. The power companies were not giving up on the Hells Canyon dam. They fought it bitterly and to the end. Our leading advocate—because he was the choice of people available who were fairly senior on the House Interior Committee where the crucial fight came in probably 1974—was Congressman Lloyd Meeds, a Democrat representing the north of Seattle-Everett-Bellingham area in Washington State, a very nice guy whom I became very close to, and a lot of his staff members that were involved. We had the fight of our lives on this in the House Interior Committee.

Lage: You met stronger opposition on this than on wilderness issues?

Scott: Oh yes. The typical wilderness thing is just in one little place and doesn't affect anybody, except someone in the timber company, so the national timber lobby has somebody who comes out and causes a little trouble. This was a life or death issue to very powerful interests in the Northwest, including both public power agencies and private power agencies. On the question of no dam at all, they felt very strongly.

There was a consortium of the companies—. If there was going to be a license, they had it. They fought tenaciously. There were incredible episodes in this. I brought to this the technologies that I had used in the Wilderness Society: the mailers and so forth. From Seattle, either because I didn't know whether the San Francisco operation was capable of doing it, or geared to doing it. For whatever reason, probably because I wanted to keep a good deal of the control right handy, we did mailings all over the country to key congressional districts from the Seattle office.

I functioned, I guess, as the chief lobbyist in the ladder going on Hells Canyon. I cannot call that back from memory without going through my papers, but a pretty good political history of that fight was written by a man named William Ashworth who also was, at the time, the editor of the Oregon Chapter newsletter for the Sierra Club. It is published commercially in a book called *Hells Canyon* by Hawthorne Press or...
Hawthorne Books. It has a good set of my more current recollections about that
campaign.

That campaign brought me again into close cooperation with a long-time friend of
mine, Larry Williams. Larry was the executive director of the Oregon Environmental
Council and had been since the late sixties. I had started running into him when I was
in the Northwest, because I would go back to Portland, I think every year or so, to see
my family. I made Larry's acquaintance at the OEC, and we had worked on, or at least
had been acquainted on, an early wilderness fight that I participated in as early as
1968: the Mount Jefferson Wilderness in Oregon. Larry had been involved in our
considerable efforts to get Senator Hatfield to vote the right way on the SSTs. So my
arrival in the Northwest was a chance to work more closely with Larry Williams, who
was already a person that I knew to be a top quality professional environmental
advocate with this really neat organization that he had, which has since fallen on hard
times but was in its real heyday under Larry's leadership.

Lage: Was that one of the organizations that Brock fostered?

Scott: I shouldn't say, "Yes," so quickly. There was a series of statewide organizations which
appeared in the Northwest at various times, and Brock certainly played some role in
the founding of them. I have heard it said (I wasn't there) that Brock was very much
involved in the formation of the Washington Environmental Council [WEC]. By my
observation, by the time I got there OEC was always the stronger group. It had a
several-person professional staff. It was getting federal grants to do programs. It was
politically active on not just the state level but the federal level. It lobbied in Salem
aggressively, had a very fancy newsletter. It was head and shoulders ahead of the
WEC in those various ways. That was attributable largely to Larry. And Larry and
Brock had worked very closely together and known each other for years and years and
years. And Brock certainly was instrumental in working during his era there with
these groups.

The other person who was a very close friend of Larry's, and who I think I had not
known before I got to Seattle, or only had known, sort of, around the edges was Dale
Jones, who was the long-time Washington representative of Friends of the Earth, based
in Seattle and in fact based just a few blocks from my office in Seattle. Dale is a very
unique character with a very intensive media background, just a whiz at the media.
During the SST fight—there he was in Seattle—just very quietly and calmly he would
get the signal from George Alderson or someone in Washington that they had heard
that some national press guide with the Wall Street Journal, the Christian Science
Monitor, NBC or somebody, was flying to Seattle to get Boeing's side of the story, and
Dale would go to meet him at the airport. "Hi, I'm Dale Jones from the Sierra Club.
Can I drop you at Boeing." Boeing never had the wit to have their agents do this.

Dale is a very self-effacing character and shies away from the limelight considerably,
but he was a very crucial player in a lot of things. Friends of the Earth never had a
large budget. Dale had to raise his own budget so he didn't run back and forth to
Washington as I did.
Lage: It sounds as if there is a lot of interplay and cooperation between the various groups.

Scott: Absolutely, yes. Elaborate cooperation between the groups. The Wilderness Society had an agent—I had been responsible for finding him and recruiting him—in Oregon who covered Oregon and Washington, but he lived at that point in Eugene, Oregon, and later moved to Portland, named Joe Walicki. Joe came from Philadelphia. He and his wife had just left Philadelphia to say that they wanted to go West and help save the earth and had lived in San Francisco and volunteered in the FOE [Friends of the Earth] office in the late 1960s. She had gotten a job either at the public library in Eugene or at the university library in Eugene, so they moved to Eugene.

Joe was a world-class grass-roots organizer. He would get in his old beat-up VW bus and go around to the most god-forsaken places where you wouldn't think there was anybody who would be on our side, stir up people and get them organized, and organize little local groups. He was the classic organizer. Joe and I were on an organizing trip even before I moved out to the Northwest. When I was with the Wilderness Society, he and I and another Wilderness Society guy from the Denver office all met in Oregon and spent a week traveling around organizing in southern and eastern Oregon. For most of that week, this other fellow from Denver was with him.

I remember we went to Coos Bay, Oregon, which is part of the deepest, darkest timber beast country. There was some kind of big public forum about clearcutting. Brock was the speaker, and I remember Brock huddling with us. We were his only friends in the audience, sort of huddling about and genuflecting before he went up to expose himself to the anger of this crowd. That was a debate format, the kind of thing that Brock was just extremely gifted at doing.

But the fellow from the Denver staff had to go back to Denver or something ultimately, so Joe and I were in Bend, Oregon, organizing a meeting there, showing slides, passing out literature, signing people up, collecting lists and the things you do. We were driving very late at night in Joe's bus from Bend to Klamath Falls where they were going to do the same thing again the next day. It was part of a big circuit around southern Oregon. We were riding along and just telling each other war stories and anecdotes of people who knew him. He was saying, "I don't think I really know how you got into this." I was going over my long-winded story about Michigan and Sleeping Bear Dunes working for Phil Hart.

Lage: You mean I'm not the first person you've told about this? [laughter]

Scott: I've practiced. He said, "Oh, Phil Hart. Well, I remember I was the conservation chairman of the Batona Hiking Club in Philly. I got this letter from Senator Hart with a little booklet enclosed about Sleeping Bear Dunes, and it said in the P.S. that if we wanted more information, to get in touch with him. I wrote him and said that I needed one hundred copies or three hundred copies because everybody—. I got one of the best letters from a member of Congress right back." I let him long-pause and I said, "I
wrote that letter, Joe." This was in the summer of 1969, and I remembered it perfectly well and had a copy in my files on Sleeping Bear Dunes. [laughter]

So these connections just keep going.

Lage: I think this whole image of you traveling around Oregon, stirring people up, what was the model for that?

Scott: I don't think we knew it. It was a Stewart Brandborg model. Where I knew it from was from my work at the Wilderness Society. You had a wilderness hearing someplace, whether it was a congressional hearing or an agency hearing, and it was going to be damn important to turn out anybody you could, and it was clear that they would shut the mill and all the loggers would come to the thing. You went out a few weeks early to beat the brush and make people talk, to try to whoop them up and say, "Can you take off work? Can you get there at all?" It wasn't something we invented. Joe had a natural gift for it.

Lage: I think Brock did it also.

Scott: Brock did it. It was what you did.

Lage: Was it unique to the environmentalists?

Scott: No. Union organizers do it. Civil rights organizers did it. You did it because that's what the work demanded. It was how you sustained the political impact of your movement. It was the typical progressive thing that you do. They have been doing it for years. I went out in whatever year I said it was to North Dakota and spent a week. It was one of my first episodes of really doing it. I had gone to Sleeping Bear Dunes and done some of that with Virginia Prentice. But you just use your native wits, and you've got some list of people who maybe once belonged to the Sierra Club or the Wilderness Society, or you look up the local Rod and Gun Club and hope for the best.

Lage: It must take quite a bit just to come in cold like that.

Scott: It's very difficult, very impacting, very stressful work. People who are gifted at it, and Joe Walicki is the single most talented grass-roots organizer I ever laid hands on, because it is not just a matter of—.

Lage: What was his gift?

Scott: Thorough organization. He was in touch with the people before he got there, he was friendly and outgoing with them and built bonds with them when he was there and he was right back in touch with them with a little note and a phone call and a little additional literature and a post card. Once you were drawn into his maw, suddenly you were the Douglas County Oregon Wilderness Coalition or something, and boom off of that. Joe was the living image of an approach that was endemic to the Wilderness Society's theory of how this stuff was to be done. Of course, any place in the
Northwest this was being done with the recognition that there was a Sierra Club there too, so Joe was also very active as a volunteer in the Oregon Chapter of the Sierra Club and still is, even though he has long since left the Wilderness Society.

Jim Eaton in California still runs the California Wilderness Coalition. He was another person like Joe who was recruited about the same time, in the very late 1960s or early seventies, and went on these kinds of excursions. I was just dropping in out of Washington DC, out of the sky, and later when I came to the Northwest, I did some of that work collaboratively with Larry Williams. It wasn't that there was a Wilderness Society guy trying to organize the Wilderness Society, and a Friends of the Earth guy trying to organize the Friends of the Earth, and a Sierra Club guy trying to organize the Sierra Club, and an Oregon Environmental Council guy trying to protect his turf from all those people. We were all friends, it was all incredibly collaborative, we had good knowledge of each other's personal strengths and also organizational strength.

I had a big budget. I had a much larger budget than any of those people. I also was a denizen of Capitol Hill, so it was usually my role to jump on the airplane and rush off to Washington. I was deferred to fairly much on the nuts and bolts of the legislative strategy of moving the pieces around and all that sort of stuff. I was instantly deferential to and called upon Larry Williams and Dale Jones, who were far better at the media. We didn't have big articles; it was just going to be a Friends of the Earth press release. That didn't matter. Dale was very generous in introducing me to the Seattle press people that he was long-time drinking buddies with. They were going to call him first, not me, typically. Later they would figure out that I was the one who had just been to Washington. But it was all very friendly and collegial.

If it was in Oregon, we tried to help build up the Oregon Environmental Council. The Sierra Club was a member of the Oregon Environmental Council and wanted it to succeed. There was so much to be done and the demands of this work were so great that there were lots of disincentives for getting lost in petty rivalry. We just didn't do it. The aftermath of RARE I, the existence of all these roadless areas that had not been selected for further study by the Forest Service and the unit planning that was being done was a huge demand in which particularly the Sierra Club was intimately involved. Dale and Friends of the Earth tended to work more on Fish and Wildlife Service issues: dredging permits, coastal wetland things, oil on Puget Sound issues.

There was a certain divvying up. In fact the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society were right in the middle of both the legislative fights for wilderness that had reached that stage in Hells Canyon and the grass-roots fight over the RARE I areas, the wilderness areas. Hells Canyon was very much a collaboration of this indigenous group, the Hells Canyon Preservation Council (HCPC), the Oregon Environmental Council, the Friends of the Earth, and the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society. We worked hand-in-glove through all of that.

The RARE I aftermath had a thousand little parts to it. There were all these unit plans being done. This fellow that I mentioned, David Pavelchek, in the Northwest office staff, was an absolutely invaluable resource. Dave is one of the brightest people I have
ever met and he had a photographic memory or something close to a classic photographic memory. He simply wallowed in the details of the timber sale plans and the land-use planning process for thirty-five or more national forests across Oregon, Washington, Idaho and Montana. We tended to work particularly hard on Idaho and Montana because the conservation groups there were much fewer and farther between. Whereas there were other professionals working—Joe Walicki in particular—working in Oregon. Larry Williams was working these issues in Oregon. Committees in the Sierra Club were a much bigger deal, long established in Oregon, ditto Washington.

So our missionary work was Idaho and Montana. At that time Montana was part of the Northwest office territory. Later it became shades of gray, and it is today part of the Northern Plains office. But during my era the day that we were divvying it up with the Northern Plains office, I joked that I had the parts that were vertical and had trees on them and my colleague at that time, Laney Hicks, the Northern Plains representative, had the parts that were flat and had coal under them. That's the way it actually worked out. She was working coal issues and the people—Bruce Hamilton—who came after her were working coal issues. I was pretty well doing the wilderness and forestry stuff with Dave from Seattle and with the nascent Northern Rockies chapter, which was very, very thinly spread.

The big virtue we had going for us in Idaho was first that there was this knot of just incredible people in Idaho Falls. There was a one-man band of spectacular proportions named Ralph Maughan, who was a college professor at the little college in Pocatello, Idaho. Then up at the other side of the state in Moscow, Idaho, in connection with the University of Idaho, there was one of the social science librarians at the university library named Dennis Baird.

When I discovered that Dennis Baird was in Moscow, Idaho, I realized that I had made a smart move. Dennis Baird was somebody whom I had met first on a Wilderness Society organizing trip to stir up trouble on the Shawnee National Forest in southern Illinois in 1970 probably, or 1971. I made a swing through that part of the world and stopped to stir up what trouble could be stirred up with the local Sierra Club. I was a Wilderness Society agent, but I was in touch. Dennis Baird was the ringleader. He was at the library up at Carbondale. Dennis and I had camped out in a place called Lusk Creek. I'm happy to say this in November 1990, because within the last month President Bush has signed a law that made that and a few other areas on that forest wilderness area. That's how long it took.

Nineteen years ago I was there with Dennis Baird. He left and moved to Idaho which I didn't know and I moved to the Northwest. I remember very clearly discovering that Dennis Baird was there and just thinking, "Oh boy." This guy—all volunteer. An incredible Forest Service fighter. Dave Pavelchek and I were working with people like that, trying to keep up with all these timber sales.

We didn't put a pattern on this work. There were some things that were to be pursued legislatively, like Hells Canyon, and we were pursuing them. There were big, big Forest Service hearing procedures in October, 1973, just soon after we got there. We
had the public hearings held in Seattle and on the other side of the mountains, Wenatchee I guess, on the Forest Service's wilderness proposal for the Alpine Lakes, which was a very big deal, hundreds of thousands of acres.

So we were organizing for those hearings and with Joe Walicki and the Wilderness Society group. But then, a quieter but terribly important part of this was that we were watching and observing what Region 1—. I may have these region numbers wrong, but anyway, the region based in Missoula, Montana, which had Montana and the part of Idaho north of the Salmon River, whatever the other region—Region 4, I guess—which was based in Ogden, Utah, which had the southern part of Idaho, and Region 6, which was Oregon and Washington. We watched how individual forests in these three different regions were bungling the question of the protection and study of the roadless areas that were not selected for wilderness study in RARE I.

Lage: When you say bungling, just on the part of you or just bungling in general?

Scott: From theirs, afterward. Nobody designed RARE I very thoughtfully. It then fell apart when Jim Moorman and the Sierra Club attorneys won the lawsuit that said you can't do it that way. Nobody understood what the command of NEPA was going to mean. They had this sort of ragtag planning deal, with unit plans, that wasn't very uniform around from one part of the world to the other. But now all that was at least potentially subject to not only congressional oversight, but the Wilderness Act moved the decision to the Congress, but also to legal review because of NEPA. Before NEPA it was hard to sue the Forest Service over things. They had a very broad grant of discretion under their basic stature. But you could get them for not doing an adequate environmental impact statement.

You couldn't just go sue them. You had to file administrative appeals first. Brock in his day, which was largely pre-NEPA and pre-the elaboration of NEPA law, had been doing a lot of these appeals on whatever grounds you would then file these things. You dredged up whatever grounds. You requested stays and hoped for the best. Brock was filing a lot of appeals right down to the level of individual timber sales which threatened various places. No wonder he had to dictate so much. There was a lot of that going on. He was just like a whirling dervish.

But I think he would not resent my saying that there were more sophisticated appeals that involved something that might actually ever get to court. There the question was had the Sierra Club ever asserted its rights way back when. We would dig around in the files. Dave Pavelchek was wonderful at this. He would disappear in a cloud of dust into these massive files of boxes and find some letter that Brock had dictated.

Brock had made some field trip to the Nez Perce National Forest years ago and looked at some place. He had this little staff of ill-paid people of whom Dave was one. His office in Seattle received every individual timber sale announcement from every national forest in these four states, which is a lot. Somebody would open these damn things, look at them, plot them on a huge map and then Brock would come by with his
dictaphone and say, "Wait a minute! That's in a bad—." And fire off a letter, and there would be a copy.

Well, bless him for doing it because on more than one occasion, we were able to say, "Back in 1967, we said, 'By God you should save this place and you haven't done it.'"

Lage: Was Brock in all these places? Was he a person who knew things on the ground?

Scott: Brock spent an enormous amount of time out on the land.

Lage: Did you go to as much?

Scott: No. I didn't choose to. I became acquainted with Brock slightly. I told you this story of dictating the Coos Lake boundary map over the telephone from Seattle and all of that. But I didn't become acquainted with Brock in the way I became acquainted with John McComb. Brock was not in and out of Washington very much. For whatever reason the collaboration pattern with the Wilderness Society—Brock was not in that order very much. Brock was a famous, well-known and influential person in our movement. I'm not gainsaying any of that. I lost track of your question.

Lage: It was, did you get on the ground as much as Brock, even though he was a real field man?

Scott: It was Brock's style to do it that way. He was there for a long time. Pre-Rare I the pressures were not quite the same, so he had more time to get out and do that. He very strongly believed that he was going to have to be a personal advocate for these places and he better know them. Here I came from the experience I had worked on—. I still have never been anywhere near the San Rafael wilderness, but I worked on it. And the Desolation—. On and on and on. I had worked on all sorts of wilderness areas.

I knew that my kind of advocacy as a lobbyist in Congress over the media didn't look like my having been there. I didn't lie and say, "Here's what it is and I've been there. I didn't make any bones about it. I'm an advocate for this. This is information I will vouch for because I have checked about it, but it's not that I was out there around the campfire." So it was the demands of the political work, first Hells Canyon and Alpine Lakes and Oregon Wilderness and on and on and on, and my natural proclivities. I was trying to change the politics, which in my view didn't have very much to do with on-the-ground knowledge which other people had.

[End Tape 12, Side B]

[Begin Tape 13, Side A]

Scott: So in 1973 in the fall and into 1974, I was learning how to use the appeals process of the Forest Service, and Pavelchek and I in particular were really bearing down on the many problems with the unit planning consideration of roadless areas. There were a variety of kinds of problems that we had identified at one point or another. The Forest
Service had done this inventory. They had gone out and figured out where these roadless areas were and kind of drawn them on maps. They missed places, they missed whole places that were 5,000 acres big and were roadless. We would say they were; they said they weren't.

Also the boundaries were very often, in our view, wrong. So we started harassing the Forest Service about, "Well, what are you going to do about it? If when you get out to the unit plan, you have this area that is inventoried and your boundary is wrong, and you missed a whole chunk, we think you have an obligation under NEPA to look at that roadless area." There were no manual instructions. So finally some instructions were issued about how to do that, and in October of 1974 I was corresponding with the regional forest saying, "On August 28th, the chief issued this directive," which I think had gotten the chief to do by calling this problem to his attention and stirring it up through some method or another. I don't remember the particular details. "Now you have to, by his order, go back as you are doing this and perfect the inventory before you then discuss whether those roadless areas should be chopped down or not. How are you going to do it? What are you telling your forests? How are they going to do it? Here are examples of how it's been well done on some places that we have reviewed." Pavelchek had found, in some unit plan that had wandered in from Montana, a good example.

So that was an example of the kind of stirring up that we were doing. I was functioning—partly because of my background with the Wilderness Society, partly because the Northwest is a particular place of intensity on these kinds of issues with the Forest Service—as the generic wilderness policy guy on the staff of the Sierra Club for more than just the Northwest. Now there isn't some organizational manual that says that. This was all very informal. While he was active on the Forest Service wilderness, John McComb was much more oriented towards a very different kind of national forest—less trees—and was very much more oriented toward the Grand Canyon issues, and water issues, and coal power plants, Kaiparowits, and stuff.

I was sending copies of this kind of stuff around the rest of the country to the Wilderness Committee to other field offices of the club and so forth. We were conscientiously trying to find places where the Forest Service was doing something wrong, through appeals or through direct requests to the chief or his staff or through intervention from the Congress that we organized, to get that changed and get some new directive issued. And then not waiting for the Forest Service to get that directive around, we would then go around and say, "Hey, look at this. Now you've got to do this."

Lage: How was your relationship with the Forest Service regional officers?

Scott: Pretty good. Nothing like appealing things and tying them up in paperwork to try and get their attention. The regional forester during much of my time in the Northwest in Oregon and Washington was a fellow by the name of Ted Schlapfer, who was very pleasant to deal with. After he was ousted, which he was, from the Forest Service, he
and I worked together often in some training programs that he was doing independently for Forest Service people as a consultant later.

Lage: Why was he ousted?

Scott: It had to do with the pricing of timber sales and his efforts to—I never did know all the ins and outs of it, but he got crosswise with a powerful senator and had to go. The Forest Service has a way of dressing those things up. But I've had less day-to-day contact with the regional foresters in Montana and Idaho.

Lage: Do you have some kind of description of them, or why they are the way they are?

Scott: My favorite definition of the Forest Service is that it is a cross between the Jesuits and the Marine Corps. It then had, and it does not have today, a very high esprit d'corps. Like a herd of musk oxen when its young are threatened, they all got their butts together and formed a defensive circle. They're very in-bred. The Forest Service has been the subject of some classic studies in political science. The Forest Ranger, by somebody or other, is one of the great books about how a far-flung field organization can be managed in a way in which the ranger on the ground, or the forest supervisor, feels that they have a certain amount of discretion, but in fact their decisions are being largely controlled from the center.

Lage: Did you see that?

Scott: Oh, I studied that in school. Oh yes, sure. So they had this enormous old manual of how to do things, and this constant flow of directives up and down and bureaucrats, and bureaucrats at the regional office.

Lage: You used that by presenting it—.

Scott: Well, it's the old appeal mechanism. If the forest supervisor did something you didn't like, made a decision, "We have now done a unit plan, and we're going to chop down that roadless area," and you would say, "No." You would go remonstrate with the guy and he would say, "No." You would say, "I would say your decision finally got—." You would file an appeal and would send it to him. He would answer. They have good lawyers in the forest supervisor's office. He would answer and say, "You're wrong and here's why you're wrong." I wrote one that was probably forty pages long. Jim Moorman looked at it and said, "It was a pretty good sophomore law school effort." [laughter] It was my first one.

Then he would write some long-winded answer. Then the whole thing would go to the regional forestry. Well, nine chances out of ten, in his long-winded answer, he had made three further mistakes. Then you would write some thing to the regional forester, the regional forester would decide to uphold, typically, the forest supervisor, so you would appeal his decision. You would write him a big long thing telling him why he was wrong. He would write a big long thing telling you why you were wrong, probably make three or four more mistakes there. If there was a lawyer in the regional
office, they often weren't very good. Then you would appeal that whole thing to the chief. That's when a lawyer first got a look at it. If you didn't write to the chief, did you appeal to the secretary of agriculture? I've had four or five of them that I took all the way up to the secretary of agriculture.

Lage: This must have driven them wild.

Scott: They changed their field regulation because Pavelchek and I became—. Other people were doing this around the country. I think nowhere with quite the same intensity that we were doing it.

Lage: And they still treated you cordially?

Scott: Oh yes, sure. We were also drawing out of the decisions and issues that we distilled in trying to argue about a particular case, things that were fundamentally wrong that we then started trying to build a political fire about to stir up and get this whole thing changed. At that time, I was, as I say, functioning as something of the wilderness guru or policy person on the Sierra Club staff. In 1974, there was an oversight hearing called in the Senate Interior Committee on the Wilderness Act. I appeared for the club as the club's witness at that hearing and covered a lot of these—the purity issue, and the sights and sounds issue. Again, just constantly hammering away at these things that need to be fixed. Whether you could have privies in a wilderness area, private in-holdings, and so forth.

But also we were adroit. We were saying, "Here are all these problems you should fix up about how the agencies are misconstruing, even after the [Frank] Church business, the Wilderness Act, in particular the Forest Service. But," I said in that testimony, "we really wish you would settle that stuff and tell them to shape up and fly right, because we have got to get this out of the way so that other issues that are more important can be dealt with, namely this problem of what's being done with these areas that were inventoried in RARE I and that aren't being properly considered." I said, "We must not forget, in concentrating on the existing backlog and these newly mandated wilderness studies from RARE I, the most seriously endangered wilderness of all: those areas of roadless country which no agency has agreed to study and which lie vulnerable to adverse development."

I cited examples of the things that were arising out of these appeals.

Lage: These are areas that had not been studied in RARE I, are you saying?

Scott: They had not been selected for the full-blown wilderness study.

Lage: Not been selected. They might have been recommended.

Scott: So they weren't getting—. If they were getting any consideration, they were getting it through this unit planning process. We were engaged in a continuous sort of back and forth with the Forest Service. "You agreed to do NEPA studies and consider the
wilderness alternative. We're looking through unit plans. They aren't doing them adequately. What are you going to do about it?" In the appeal process, you've got oral hearing opportunities. So we would request oral hearings. We would go back and we would be meeting with the associate chief or the chief.

In that era, whenever I was in Washington, I was in and out of the chief's office all the time, and saying, very friendly, "Hey, you guys have got a problem. They aren't doing it right out there. We have got a problem. Places we think ought to be wilderness or at least ought to get a fair shake of being considered are getting trashed because your guys aren't giving them a fair shake and you haven't given them adequately clear and specific instruction. This isn't all right. Wilderness is being lost, and so we're filing all these appeals which are tying you up and making you very cranky. You aren't getting what you want. We aren't getting what we want. Come on. Let's figure a way out of this."

Simultaneously, we were raising hell in the Congress on all of these kinds of issues and using the Congressional reviews, whatever chance we got—oversight hearings, any chance we got—to sensitize the Congress as additional pressure on the Forest Service. This went on all through 1974 and 1975 and 1976. In particular, when I arrived in the Northwest, the supervisor of the Willamette National Forest, was a fellow named Zane Gray Smith, Jr. Zane was one of the best, if not the best, Forest Service employee I ever dealt with. An absolute straight-shooter. A top-quality mind. Loyal to the agency and its ideals, but practical. Wanting to solve problems. He was transferred in probably about 1975 to Washington and became a director, I guess. Let me just see if I've got a title here for him. The director of the division of recreation. So he was staff in the chief's very large office for one whole division. It has a division of timber, a division of water. He was in the division of recreation, and all wilderness things came to roost with him.

Of course, he and I were friends. He was the supervisor of the Willamette National Forest, which is where French Pete is located, and we had been fighting a cause celebre about French Pete since the fifties. Brock had been very centrally involved. Mike McCloskey had been involved. We had been fighting that battle forever. Zane had, after a very difficult supervisor who polarized opinion about the area, calmed the waters. We were starting to win the French Pete battle. Senator Packwood, when he was elected, was on our side on French Pete. Then a local realtor, who had been one of the people in the front ranks of the torchlight parade to the supervisor's office ("Save French Pete") in the late sixties or early seventies—his name is James (Jim) Weaver, a very close friend of mine—he just said, "We are not going to chop down French Pete. That's the end of that." So we were skulking around trying to figure out how to pass this legislation.

Lage: A successful election may have done that.

Scott: Absolutely. In the Northwest there aren't all that many congressional districts and they don't turn over very much. Jim Weaver was one of the most liberal members of Congress—he has a pretty safe district in Eugene, with the huge liberal community
there—even though he also had Grant's Pass and Medford and Douglas County, Roseburg, Coos Bay, which is the heart of the timber country, he had enough liberal Democratic support, plus worker support, that he was pretty safe. He could be very radical on wilderness matters, and he was.

Well, Zane had come out of that background, and he and I had a very constructive relationship. I would send him letters. "Dear Zane, I've been mulling over some issues about how these unit plans are supposed to be." This is clear in May of 1975. "How do you think this is working? What is adequate wilderness consideration? You haven't set any standards. You said, 'We are going to do a NEPA statement that will adequately consider the wilderness alternative.' What is that? We don't think you are doing it. What's it going to look like? How exactly is a large roadless area covered by three or four or more planning units ever considered as a whole?"

We had tripped over this example in Idaho, called the "Rainy Day Planning Unit." There was a huge timber sale that local people wanted—Dennis Baird in particular—us to appeal. So we appealed it. Dave Pavelchek and I were over there, skulking around, visiting with people. There was a long-time wilderness fighter in Lewiston, Idaho, named Mort Brigham. Mort designed sawmills for a living, highly efficient, highly wood-saving sawmills with very thin saw blades, which is a way of saving an enormous amount of wood that doesn't end up as sawdust. He had his work space down in the basement—he was a very old-fashioned man in a very old-fashioned house—where his wife hung all the wet laundry in the winter. We were down, sort of feeling our way through her laundry, and at his desk. We were saying, "Well, now, we've got this appeal going on this planning unit. Show me a map, Mort (because he knew this country like the back of his hand). Show us where this roadless area is."

He said, "Of course, it's a lot bigger than that." I said, "What? Well, show me on a big map." He proceeded to outline this enormous roadless area, the better part of a half a million acres of contiguous land that went clear down to the Salmon River and hopped over the Salmon River and was contiguous to the Idaho Primitive Area. So arguably to any judge, under the Parker decision, the whole damn thing should have been on ice. But worse than that, they were starting to complete a little rainy-day planning unit which was one tiny part of it, and decided they were going to chop down this enormous timber sale right in the middle of this planning unit without ever having looked at the whole wilderness.

I would say, "If you are supposed to consider the whole wilderness, but only part of it is in that particular unit plan, and you finish that unit plan and chop down a timber sale and you haven't even started the unit plan next door, where did that whole wilderness ever get considered?" Well, they didn't have any answer to that. The converse was equally true. What happens when there is one planning unit with three roadless areas in it and you look at the option of all wilderness (all three) or no wilderness, but not wilderness for A and B, but not C, or A and C but not B; they didn't do that.

So you would file these appeals over those kinds of questions. We didn't know those were the issues. Those issues took us into the mid-seventies. This letter became
something Pavelchek distilled after a lot of sort of, "Hey, that's not right. This is strange." And then you would go see the chief about it and they would see, "Oh, yeah. We hadn't thought about that." We were just having real difficulties with those kind of situations.

We were also winning these appeals. We would win them when they got clear to the secretary of agriculture, where there were serious lawyers. There was a young lawyer in the secretary's office, or chief's office actually, named James Snow, whom I became very friendly with. We would talk back and forth on the phone. He was representing the other side. "Let's not talk about this specific one. How are we going to get out of this?" Yes, we were starting to tie up massive amounts of timber, but in the process we weren't getting what we wanted. We were polarizing a lot of local opinion and terrorizing people with their jobs. We were stocking stuff, but that was only a first, an inadequate step of ever getting towards creating a local politics that would say, "Well, part of that area is going to be protected." That caused just very serious problems.

The case I want to talk about is the Rainy Day Planning Unit, because we stopped a single timber sale there which was partly in the roadless area and partly not in the roadless area. It was a huge sale. They only sold about one or two of those kinds of sales a year to keep the sawmill in Grangeville, Idaho, going, and we shut it down. Our belief was that we wanted a stay until they had properly studied the whole 400,000 acres, or whatever it was, of roadless area.

This was just devastation to the town of Grangeville and to the sawmill. That meant it was devastation to my friend Frank Church politically. It wasn't helping the image of wilderness. We were not out to be naysayers. So Dennis Baird, Dave Pavelchek, the fellow from the Wilderness Society in that part of the world and I, and Mort Brigham were all kind of in the center of this sort of nightmare of public reaction to the success of our appeal at the Rainy Day Planning Unit.

Senator Church stepped in and I, of course, was talking privately and quietly to his staff. But to the city fathers of Grangeville—who went to him and said, "We're in deep trouble. Help us."—he said, "Well, there is a legal problem here, but if you could work out with the environmentalists some kind of mutually agreeable solution, I could then legislate it, and we would overcome this problem." That's probably the fastest way. For the Forest Service to go back and actually do that plan in a way that the Sierra Club would say it was adequate and wouldn't just file another appeal over it and a lawsuit and on and on and on, you're talking years. So this little town was in deep trouble.

So Church, or his guys got a hold of me and said, "Would you guys be willing to talk with Church?" Church was the broker to get us together. Ultimately a little team of four people was put together representing the environmentalists: myself, Mort Brigham, Dennis Baird, and Dan Maciewski [?], who was the field guy for the Wilderness Society. A team of four people was put together by the Chamber of Commerce of Grangeville, Idaho. The Forest Service was there and Church was there and we all had this first sort of get-together. Church said, "I'm not going to be in the
world. I have other stuff to do, but I've now met with each side. I believe there is goodwill here. You guys do what you can. The Forest Service is here at our request to help you."

So we got in this room with these people—.

Lage: So you were dealing with the Chamber of Commerce, not with the Forest Service.

Scott: The Chamber of Commerce, right. The first thing we did was we kind of exchanged ideas for a little while. We decided that it wasn't going to be helpful to have the Forest Service there. So we threw them out of the room. For a period of four or five months, or whatever it was, meeting every several weeks, I would fly over there or drive over there and we would all get together. We sat down and bargained. No mediator in the room, no nothing. Four Chamber of Commerce people who had no love for us who didn't know what it was like to live in a little town in rural Idaho.

We became very friendly. We became very respectful of each other. In the midst of this, Dennis got married and went off to a honeymoon in France. We had one meeting without him. "Have you heard from Dennis? What a nice guy." We ultimately came to a deal. The deal was, "We don't need to be bound by any of the Forest Service's procedures. There is this roadless area here. There is a bunch of timber that you guys would like to have for your mill. We want very substantial chunks of this roadless area for wilderness, a wilderness study or something. Here's what we want." Or maybe that's too extreme. Great brokering back and forth.

We had to give. We gave a bunch of stuff, but we came up with a wilderness called the Gospel-Hump Wilderness. It let that timber sale, or most of it go, and we took it to Senator Church, he looked it over.

Lage: Did the Forest Service get in on it at any point to look at it?

Scott: They were able to testify about it. They were able to think about it. And in 1978, the Congress passed, and the President signed, the law which is—and we'll have to talk about it here—a bigger law that this ended up being in. But there is today a Gospel-Hump Wilderness. It didn't have anything to do with any study by the Forest Service. It emerged out of this process.

In the process, that and many other examples like that, not just in the Northwest but elsewhere, the aftermath of RARE I was proving to be utterly unsatisfactory. We were still having problems, notably from the Forest Service, with these interpretation problems. After the Senator Church speech in May of 1972, Assistant Secretary Reed and his staff had straightened out the Park Service pretty much. Also park wilderness was not a priority anymore. After RARE I hit it, you worked on Park Service when you had a chance to, but there was this much bigger threat of the roadless areas. Even though all those roadless areas were there (we knew about a lot of them), the inventory by the Forest Service increased the appetite of the environmentalists. I don't think the
Forest Service ever took that into consideration. And with RARE II it only got worse, from their point of view.

They didn't have this capacity to inventory the entire national forest system in the country, and figure out what was on this forest, and then decide whether we want it or not. They gave us all these nice maps. It was really quite helpful. Once they gave us all these nice maps, local people looked at them and said, "Hey, that sounds good. We'll have that, thank you very much."

The Forest Service was continuing to be a real problem still with many of these purity issues. In the unit plans we were seeing these problems in wilderness areas that were working their way to Congress at that point. In the fall of 1976, we had gained enough information about what was going on and things had slowed down in Congress enough, but things had changed so dramatically from the Aspinall era. Friends of ours were now at the subcommittee chairman level in legal power over these issues. People like Jim Weaver and Frank Church and Mo Udall were now way up the seniority and were in a position to be a real help to it.

In the fall or summer of 1976, I sat down with Chuck Clusen on the trip to Washington and we took a look at all this. He was then a Washington lobbyist on these matters for the club. We concluded that we needed a new initiative in the Congress. We needed to take the initiative to try and straighten all this out. We needed a vehicle to—. The national wilderness movement was now so decentralized; it hadn't had any big fight to get itself organized around to see that they were all in it together. We were being piece-mealed by these purity issues and these unit planning processes. We needed to re-excite this whole staff, bring it all back together, and give it an embodiment in something that you had a big campaign about. It would educate environmentalists, unify them, educate the Congress, put the heat on the agencies, and maybe save some wilderness in the process.

That was the genesis of the Endangered American Wilderness Act. I am working at a considerable disadvantage here because all those files are at the University of Washington archives, and I have very detailed files.

Lage: This was 1976.

Scott: This was 1976 that the idea came for that. I wrote a series of strategy memos on how this might work and so forth which are all in the files. I think of this whole thing, the documentary record is very strong. My recollections these many years later may gild over this in some respects. Let me say this prospectively about the history of the Endangered American Wilderness Act. It was the single most successful start-to-finish thing I ever did. With the close collaboration of my pals Clusen and McComb, who were principal aide-de-camps. Not aide-de-camps; that's unfair. They were principal collaborators in that. I was probably the most active.

But it drew on what I had been doing all this time. Drafting bills, drafting speeches, all that. We conceived this law; we wrote this law; we wrote to fulfill not only its obvious
purpose of designating a bunch of wilderness areas but to fulfill a whole little clever agenda of stringing up the Forest Service over a series of bad things that they hadn't changed. We selected every wilderness area that went into the bill. We selected the sponsors of the bill.

Lage: How many areas were there?

Scott: It ended up eighteen, I think, but at various times in the history of the thing, it was differing numbers. We wrote the introductory speeches for the sponsors. We chose the timing of the hearing in the House and Senate. We chose the witnesses in the House and the Senate. Not just our witnesses but the opposition witnesses.

Lage: How did you do that?

Scott: We controlled the floor time. We wrote most of the floor speeches. We had enormous amounts to do with writing a committee report. And the three of us were there when Jimmy Carter signed the law. This was as close to a classic case of orchestrating a legislative campaign from start to finish as I ever had anything to do with. It was enormously satisfying because it accomplished the perfectly good purpose of designating several million acres of wilderness, many of which had long been controversial. But more importantly, it was the fulcrum around which we resolved an enormous number of these troubles with the Forest Service. And it was the origin of RARE II.

Lage: The origin of that.

Scott: Though that wasn't part of our plan. We had wanted to show how corrupt—. Not corrupt, how unsatisfactory the outcome of RARE I was. Well, we did such a good job that we were kind of surprised by what turned up. I know the first strategic memo about this, which I believe I probably drafted, but it was a memo from Chuck and myself. It said, "We think that there is an opportunity to do the following things."

Lage: A memo to whom?

Scott: Probably Mike McCloskey and other wilderness leaders in the club. And, from day one, in the first memo, to the people who then were in charge at the Wilderness Society. But this period in the summer of 1976 and 1977 was in the midst of one of the worst eras of debacle in the internal collapse of the Wilderness Society. The guy who had long been their Denver field office guy, Cliff Merritt, was in Washington and was trying to run it. He had a number of young relatively inexperienced people who were sort of with great esprit trying to keep it all together and keep it going—one of whom was David Foreman [who later founded Earth First].

Lage: Hold up a minute.

[End Tape 13, Side A]
Scott: This was an era when the Wilderness Society was at such a low ebb that the Sierra Club was in total ascendancy providing the intellectual and political leadership of the environmental movement. But we involved the Wilderness Society in this process throughout. They participated as best they could, but they were basically deferring to our scheme.

Lage: To get this endorsed by the club, did you have to do something or was just the memo sufficient and then you would go ahead with it?

Scott: Let me explain the idea. We set out in the original strategic memo the goals of unifying and pulling together the environmental movement and charging it up around a single wilderness fight, instead of all these individual ones, of nationwide scope. We identified the purpose of educating the Congress to the inadequacies of the unit planning treatment of de facto non-selective roadless areas from RARE I and various other of these problems. And resolving a number of these pure old lingering problems of interpretation of the Wilderness Act, and said that to accomplish that—and this was the genius, if I may use the word, of this was to say—to accomplish that, we will create an omnibus bill which involves wilderness proposals for Forest Service lands in many states but which are cleverly selected to be politically feasible.

This wasn't a combination of all the most hare-brained and unfeasible [proposals]. Most of these proposals were almost to the point where it was obvious that they were politically ripe, but it wasn't quite obvious. So we very carefully looked all across the country state by state and consulted with the Wilderness Society and Sierra Club people, chapter people, field staff, whatever, in all those places, to sort these out. We had a little list of criteria. These were the criteria that things had to meet. They were political criteria. Everybody was to send in their nominations to the Seattle office where Pavelchek and I were sort of the secretariat of this operation.

Meanwhile, we were conceiving the whole campaign plan. We invented an organization which would give this a coalition quality, so it wasn't just the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society, called Citizens for America's Endangered Wilderness.

Lage: Just the choice of title has some significance.

Scott: Zahniser had taught me, without knowing it, that words were very important. [chuckles] And there is a wonderful book about the early history of the park system, I think it's Donald Swain's book, where he makes a point that Robert Sterling Yard, who was brought in by Steven Mather to help build public support for the parks as a concept, conceived of the term national park system. Every time they talked, they talked system, so that a threat to any one unit of the system would be perceived not just as a threat to Yosemite, but as a threat to the integrity of the system. Then you could rally people.
Zahniser fell right in with that, and that's why it's the National Wilderness Preservation System. He was very clear, and Echo Park taught this to him if he didn't already know it himself. We fought the fight over Echo Park, about a fairly obscure unit, as a fight about the principle of invasion of any national park. That's what was going to protect the most threatened unit of the wilderness system someday when we are all done with this classification business, and somebody wants to build a dam or chop down a tree or something. The thing that was going to protect it was, “No, that's an assault on the integrity of the whole system.” Then you could rally the whole country.

That's one of the reasons we had the big fight about the eastern wilderness. We weren't going to rally the East if they all thought, "Oh, this doesn't have anything to do with our Wild Areas System." That's why that was a non-starter. Swain, if that's whose book it is, referred to it as the rhetorical strategy. Well, my rhetorical strategy was this phrase endangered wilderness. The act was the Endangered American Wilderness Act.

Now, the truth was that these weren't, by any stretch of the imagination, the most endangered areas. A couple of times we had to forcefully deal with some of our colleagues who kept trying to get the really endangered stuff. "No, you missed the point." So we had Citizens for America's Endangered Wilderness, whose Washington address was 330 Pennsylvania Avenue, Southeast, Washington DC. Oddly enough, that's the Sierra Club's office. Its coordinators were Chuck Clusen in Washington; Bill Cunningham, who was one of the young staffers at the Wilderness Society at that point; and Doug Scott in Seattle. Its list of advisors—and they were told in the letter that invited them that we were never going to meet, but we'll welcome to your advice—were Tom Bell, the publisher of High Country News; Dave Brower; Brant Calkin, the president of the Sierra Club; Charles Callison, the head guy at the National Audubon Society; Jack Calvin of the Sitka Conservation Society, one of the great leaders of the Southeast Alaska wilderness; George Davis, then the executive director of the Wilderness Society; Ernie Day, out of the Wildlife Federation; Tom Deans of the Appalachian Mountain Club; Michael Frome; Pat Goldsworthy of the North Cascades Conservation Council; Celia Hunter, president of the Wilderness Society; Holly Jones, president of the Oregon Wilderness Coalition; George Marshall, past president of both the Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club; Mike McCloskey; Mardy Murie; Roderick Nash, author of Wilderness in the American Mind; Sigurd Olson; David Saylor, the nephew of John Saylor, who had died subsequent; Ted Snyder; Edgar Wayburn; Jim Whittaker, the general manager of REI and the first American to climb Mount Everest; Edward Zahniser, Zahnie's son. Some of those were chosen for pure nostalgic reasons by me. This was the board of advisors down on the letterhead.

So we drafted this bill. This was in mid-1976. Cast your mind back. In mid-1976, the Democrats were having one hell of a big primary to see who got to be the president of the United States. The surprise winner was Jimmy Carter. But in the early going the two leading candidates were Frank Church and Mo Udall. Now, I was bosom buddies with Frank Church, a trusted conservation pal of his. John McComb was even closer personally to Mo Udall. So when the time came, we divvied it up, and the Endangered American Wilderness Act was introduced simultaneously in the House and Senate by
Senator Frank Church and by Congressman Morris Udall and became part of each of their platforms. Not surprisingly, Jimmy Carter thought it was a hell of a good idea.

So when he finally had the nomination, it was in the Democratic platform. It was a Carter-made deal. The legislation was introduced. Frank Church—I guess he was still subcommittee chairman. No, he had gone off to be chairman of the foreign relations committee. Floyd Haskell of Colorado, I guess, was the chairman of the subcommittee in the Senate by that time, but he was in on this. The chairman of the subcommittee in the House was Congressman Teno Roncalio of Wyoming, who was a very close friend of ours. One of his staffers was Harry Crandall, who had left the Wilderness Society unhappily and ended up on Capitol Hill as the head of staff for the subcommittee that handles wilderness areas.

We introduced the bill, we had the introductory speeches, we made a cottage industry of sending copies of that far and wide all over the country, and we were doing news releases. We were doing all that sort of stuff. We were getting co-sponsors. We had a big co-sponsor drive and got all sorts of people to co-sponsor the legislation, particularly the people from the individual states.

In the design, Jim Weaver was an original co-sponsor of the Endangered American Wilderness Act. French Pete was in his district; French Pete was in the Endangered American Wilderness Act, one of the legendary controversial roadless areas. But it now had been mostly worked out, and he agreed to putting it in. What wasn't in the Endangered American Wilderness Act was the Gospel-Hump Wilderness proposal which we had negotiated in Idaho, on the Nez Perce National Forest. It wasn't in because at the very last minute—. It was in the drafts that I gave to Senator Church and I remember that he himself called me and said, "Doug, I'm going to sponsor this bill, but I've got a problem with having Gospel-Hump in there. That hasn't gotten worked out." I said, "This is the fast way to resolve the problem we've got in Grangeville." He said, "Well, I'm just not comfortable." I said, "Well, okay Frank, but if, while this bill is moving, we work something out on the Gospel-Hump, would you leave the door open to this coming back in?" He said, "Oh sure." And it did.

Lage: Oh, it did go in.

Scott: And it did. So some areas fell out after the bill was introduced, and certain boundaries got changed. But this was all pretty cleverly orchestrated. Of course, Mo didn't get to be president, but boy did he get national [publicity]. He was already a beloved leader in the House but he got very big national visibility. In the election that year, he was reelected to the House. I guess Congressman Haley, who was the chairman of the House Interior Committee, retired. I don't believe he was defeated. I believe he retired, but I'm not absolutely sure. It came down to a question of whether Mo Udall or a congressman from California named Harold "Bizz" Johnson would become chairman of the House Interior Committee. They were almost at equal seniority, but Bizz had a little more seniority. But Bizz also had seniority on the House Public Works Committee.
There was great standing around while this was trying to be decided. A party was organized because everybody was pretty sure on Udall's staff, and Chuck Clusen was standing with Mo Udall when Bizz Johnson called and said, "Congratulations, Mr. Chairman, I'm going to take the public works committee." This is Chuck's story. Mo turned and put his arm around Chuck and said, "Let's pass that Endangered American Wilderness Act." Because he was now the boss after all these years. And Church, of course, was a revered leader in the Senate.

This was not a cakewalk. We still had to work and struggle and all of that. But the other thing that happened was, of course, Jimmy Carter got elected. He was committed in his platform. The young staff that went into the domestic arm of the White House knew that this was something that he was for. It got mentioned in presidential messages to the Congress and so forth that we wanted to move along the Endangered American Wilderness Act.

I am going to take a digression here. I had mentioned that in the Northwest office there were these two secretaries for Brock. It was rapidly established that I typed faster than they did and that I preferred to type my own stuff, at least drafts because I think on a typewriter. So we fooled around finding things that they wanted to work on. Linda got very interested in the Bureau of Land Management and grazing and Bureau of Land Management wilderness and so forth. She spent a lot of time working on those things and managing the office finances and some other stuff.

The woman named Donna Klemka took an interest—I don't think I put her on to it; I'm pretty sure I didn't. I'm not quite sure how the interest arose, though Larry Williams at the Oregon Environmental Council and some other people had been sniffing around in regional energy policy in the Northwest, which is dominated by the Bonneville Power Administration, which is a unique federal agency that handles the wholesale distribution of electric power generated at public dams on the Columbia River system. Slowly but surely, she had gotten terribly interested in that.

And a young geography graduate from the University of Washington had started hanging around our office, gotten interested in that and was working as a volunteer helping her. His name was Jim Blumquist. He became the next Northwest representative after me. I don't remember ever hiring him. He was just sort of there, a fixture. So after a while we started paying him.

So we were working in a very toothsome fight. NRDC was doing the legal work. The Oregon Environmental Council and Dale Jones and all these people were involved in it. At one point, we were having a ferocious show-down meeting with the administrator of the Bonneville Power Administration, Donald P. Hodel [Secretary of Energy and the Interior in the Reagan administration]. [Laughter] I'm having fun weaving these webs. Don Hodel was at Harvard with Mike McCloskey. They had rooms across the hall from each other. Mike was the head of the Young Democrats, and Don Hodel was the head of the Young Republicans.
So here was Don Hodel running the Bonneville Power Administration. We were suing them and issuing press releases. We were just lambasting them. This was another huge issue in the Northwest, because we figured out finally that the future of the energy arrangement in the Northwest was as crucial to the future of the environmental. Here you had this centralized agency. If you could force it to do environmental impact studies of the alternative scenarios for the future of the region: least cost energy planning versus moving to big nuclear plants and stuff. You could really have fundamental impact on the region. They were having a fundamental impact, and we didn't like the way they were doing it.

Hodel did not take this lightly. He and the power structure of the utility industry, which after those years of fighting the Bonneville Dam, they all got in bed together. Public power and private power were indistinguishable.

A brief digression. One of the public power lobbying group leaders based in Vancouver, Washington, from the Washington Public Power Company, retired and moved to San Juan Islands and was chairman of the board of the San Juan Island Community Theatre and called me last summer and lured me away from the Sierra Club. He knew me from back then.

Lage: [laughter] You kept in touch with him?

Scott: No. In fact I had forgotten him. He said, "You don't remember me, do you?" at one point this summer.

We were having a show-down meeting, I don't remember the particular details, at the Bonneville Power Administration headquarters in Washington, in Oregon. A whole big crowd of us were there. I was kind of the chief. Don Hodel in this huge room with a bunch of his staff and all these environmentalists, and we were just going at it, hammer and tong, tooth and nail. And had a hell of a good time. This had to be in the late winter, early spring of 1977, because it was just when Carter had come in. Now we had our friend in charge of the administration.

Bonneville was a part of the Department of the Interior at that point. We had our friends in there. We were feeling our oats. We had this wonderful, ferocious meeting, and we repaired across the freeway to an old, long-established eating and drinking joint, a place called Sullivan's Gulch, which was sort of on a British theme. But out front they had one of these red British phone booths. We were sitting in there drinking and talking with Larry Williams and saying, "We need to find somebody really good to be the assistant secretary of agriculture in charge of the Forest Service. We have never had our own guy on top of the Forest Service. If we got somebody really good in there, we could really change a bunch of this and make the Forest Service start behaving."

I think I had already been plotting on this idea, but in any event I launched my idea, which was Rupert Cutler.
Lage: Another old friend.

Scott: A very old friend who had liked the Wilderness Society, gone to Michigan State University and specialized in extension work, got his PhD (is now Dr. Cutler), and he worked for this extension operation in Michigan. Now the assistant secretary of agriculture, who is in charge of the Forest Service, is also in charge of the extension service. So this guy was ideal.

So I marched out to this British telephone booth, called Cutler up at Michigan State University or at his home or some place and got a hold of him and said, "Rupert, has it ever occurred to you that you are ideally suited to be assistant secretary of agriculture?" He said, "Oh, I like that idea." [laughter] So we got a little movement going for Rupert. He did most of the work himself. He was very assiduous about how he went about it. He called one day. I knew it was imminent. I knew he was in Washington, he was cultivating Bob Bergland, the Democratic congressman who had been named by Carter to be secretary of agriculture. Rupert called and said, "Well, I'm calling you from Bob Bergland's party at his house office after we just walked back from his confirmation hearings in the Senate. We walked. He had his arm around me as we came walking back, and I think it is in the bag." [laughter] So Rupert became assistant secretary of agriculture. Here we had our Endangered American Wilderness Act and all these policy things we wanted to resolve. We just thought our ship had come in.

So it comes to May of 1977, and the first thing that happened is that we had a hearing on a separate bill: the Oregon Wilderness Act, which was dealing with a bunch of areas in Oregon and which was coming on. Rupert—it was his first testimony on a wilderness bill and we didn't lobby him about what he was going to say. We figured that this guy grew up in the family. He got up there and read the Forest Service's prepared statement.

Lage: You're kidding.

Scott: I've never been so outraged in my life. I was in Montana and I got a hold of this information from Larry Williams on the telephone. First I was scandalized that he would do it, and secondly I was scandalized because it was widely known that I had come up with the idea of Rupert being the assistant secretary. If this guy was going to flame out on me, it was going to be on my book. I was whipped. I was staying that night at the home of a friend, one of the great leaders of wilderness in Montana, Doris Milner, in Hamilton, Montana, birthplace or childhood home of Stewart Brandborg. I wrote and dictated a four-page mailgram to Western Union. It took an hour to dictate it to Western Union, to Rupert, just whipping him, just slicing him to shreds. Weeks later I was in Washington, and I had dinner with Rupert and his wife. His wife just laid into me. She said, "He couldn't sleep that night. It was just awful." He told me the story that he walked in the next day after agonizing about this, called in the chief and said, "We're going to change things around here. I'm not going to just give the testimony anymore the way you guys draft it."
Lage: What do you think was on his mind?

Scott: I don't know. The bureaucracy moves. The bureaucracy is used to capturing people who probably have a thousand other things on their minds and meetings to go to. And Rupert had not been in the center of the wilderness movement and all these little details. But we weren't about to let it go by.

Lage: But after this, did you work on others?

Scott: So it came to be May 6 of 1977, and we had our hearings in the House. I think we had had an earlier one. Yes, on the Endangered American Wilderness Act. But we had another one because we hadn't had the administration's views. First of all, when I say that we orchestrated hearings, we figured out who our witnesses should be for each of the areas and all of that. Then we figured out the order for them and working with our friends on the committee and said, "Now, the timber industry is going to want to react to this, these California areas, and of the people who might come from the timber industry in California, there is a particular guy whose weaknesses we knew all about. We think you ought to invite him." So the telegram arrives: "You are invited to be a witness at this hearing." It was arranged, choreographed, so that we could pretty well guess what he was going to say. Then we had our strongest person next to rebut that. [Makes a machine gun sound.] Right down through the day. We would weed through that hearing, like a work of art, happily, just like a work of art.

They then had on May 6 this hearing to hear the administration's views. We had been intimately involved in the White House level, and we would burden everybody with getting it all lined up, so there was no surprise. I sent out a memo a few days later to the key wilderness leaders of the country on the Citizens for America's Endangered Wilderness letterhead, saying “new wilderness policy for national forests.” "On May 6th, the assistant secretary of agriculture, Rupert Cutler, presented the Carter Administration's position at House hearings on the Endangered American Wilderness Act. Basically, the Administration endorsed our bill! Because of last minute clearance problems, Dr. Cutler was not able to give the full endorsement he intended. He was able to endorse at least study classification for all the areas but..." yak, yak, yak about the detail. "A full copy of Dr. Cutler's written statement is enclosed, along with a copy of our flier on the bill." So here was the detail of what he had to say.

"During questioning by Subcommittee Chairman Roncalio and Representative Jim Weaver, Dr. Cutler reversed much of the long-standing Forest Service purity policy on wilderness suitability. A summary of this important dialogue will be available soon and will be sent out. Finally, and most importantly, Dr. Cutler announced a major shift in the Forest Service approach to wilderness consideration for de facto wilderness, acknowledging the rising tide of citizen complaints about the inadequacies of RARE" (They didn't call it RARE I) "Roadless Area Review and Evaluation, and the serious problems with the unit planning approach. Dr. Cutler proposed an entire new look at the wilderness values of national forest roadless areas. A program taking one year or less is envisaged but details remained to be settled. The tentative approach Dr. Cutler suggested is shown in a one-page outline attached to his testimony."
"This is an enormous opportunity. This new look will include all roadless areas, those inventoried in winter and those missed at that time. It will include reconsideration for the wilderness areas already subject to completed unit planning. It will also include a list of areas the administration will recommend for immediate wilderness designation. The details are not settled yet but we are at work on them now. Here are the challenges we face for the moment." Yak, yak, yak.

"Drop everything, write Carter and tell him what a great guy he is."

Rupert had given his testimony. I was the only other witness. Rupert was going to talk, and then I was going to talk for Citizens for America’s Endangered Wilderness. Rupert gave his testimony. He says in his testimony, "As I have become more fully involved in the affairs of the department, I felt a need to reflect on the pact and see more clearly the events of today and tomorrow." It's a long philosophical thing. Then he says, "We're going to take a complete new look at wilderness. Then he ends up saying, "I'm going to take this new look. It will take seven to nine months," which was wildly optimistic.

At his testimony, he had a little one-page document which said, "For Official Use Only, Roadless Area Issue." This was waved around, but nothing had been talked to us about this. Some other people and myself—I suspect it was Tim Mahoney, who by that time was a young staff member who had come from the Denver office of the Wilderness Society and was still based in their Denver office, and myself, probably John McComb and maybe Chuck—had gone steaming down to the department of the Forest Service the next morning, after this hearing and said, "What is this?" We had gone to the associate chief, Rex Resler, and I had written in my handwriting on top, May 6, 1977, I got from Rex Resler not a photocopy but, as it happened, the original (which is my file someplace) of the one-page outline that became RARE II. I don't think he realized it, but I have the original. It says, "Evaluate all roadless areas in eleven western states, take four months to do that; evaluate alternatives (that will take one month); public involvement; draft the EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] on the alternative, implementation, instant wilderness, wilderness study, other areas released, other views."

Lage: It was very optimistic at the time.

Scott: It was wildly optimistic. In my testimony on the 6th, I welcomed it. I said, "It sounds good to us on first glance. We'll have to know a lot more about the detail." Thus I was postured from the outset, partly because of my friend Cutler—and this was very much his personal project that he and Resler had dreamed up. They brought in my old pal, Zane Smith, the director of recreation, who was given the full-time assignment to run this thing. Tim Mahoney, Clusen, and I worked very closely with them for the many months that RARE II went on to try and make it work. Being absolutely sincere: there was nothing in it for us to have another big study that blew up and that didn't do things right.
Now, the scale of this was getting so big that it was going to be one big massive EIS, and if we had to sue and stop it, there was potential that the relief that we would end up with was an injunction that would shut down the national forest system. Shut down every roadless area in every national forest, which was a political non-starter. That was like winning in the Monongahela case and then waking up the next morning and discovering the Congress had just stolen all your goodies.

We wanted RARE II to work. We invented the name "RARE II." The Sierra Club had by now long since had a bi-weekly bulletin called the National News Report. We used that, plus supplementary mailings to put out a joint Sierra Club, Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth, Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs [bulletin] to activists of how to cope with this thing. Because here was something, this huge Forest Service thing, people didn't know about it in the first instance, and they were going to hear about it from the Forest Service so then local guys were going to get it all wrong. We had to provide definitive information to this enormous challenge to the grass-roots people of what to do.

These things ran as inserts in the NNR. It's the smallest type face, I think, I ever used. A very fine type. The first issue is July, 1977, RARE II: a Citizen Handbook for the National Forest. It was hole-punched and ready to go and we wanted people to keep those. You've got yours right there.

Lage: Mine wasn't hole-punched though.

Scott: At least my intention was that they be hole-punched.

[End Tape 13, Side B]

[Begin Tape 14, Side A]

Scott: [I'm not going to talk] in detail about RARE II, the process, because it is well-documented, and I can't remember it in great detail. In the midst of all of this, as this developed, I got pulled away into the Alaska thing and became less and less directly involved in the fine details of how RARE II all played out. But I came back at a crucial point and was the main player in the devising of the lease language which is something we'll come to. Perhaps the thing to say, at the end of this interview, is to put this in a little historic context. In 1971 to 1973, the Forest Service conducted what came to be referred to as RARE I. They inventoried 1,446 roadless areas that totalled 56 million acres. In the years after that, and until RARE II came along, we believed something between ten and fifteen million acres of those 56 million acres were lost by one means or another.

When the inventory for RARE II was done, even despite that loss, the total amount of acreage was increased to 62 million acres. That is a measure of what the purity fight, which so many people thought was esoteric, and what winning the eastern wilderness fight, which so many people thought was irrelevant, was all about. Because what Cutler did in the testimony, what the Carter Administration did, was reverse all that
purity stuff. He issued the directive and all of that stopped. So the inventory they did in RARE II, unlike the inventory in RARE I, was done with the non-pure criteria. Even though the base of potential roadless land was smaller, they found 20 million more acres and the minute they found it, by and large local environmentalists got a look at those maps and said, "Hey, it looks good to us."

So today, the effect of RARE I and RARE II, with the crucial importance of the long, tedious battle to win these seemingly picky details about the purity doctrine, and the Forest Service’s criteria, and the effect of the inventory increasing the appetite of grass-roots environmentalists, because it is not in some office in San Francisco or Washington that we make these decisions, was that the wilderness system when it's done will contain 20 or 30 or 40 million more acres of national forest land than it would have otherwise because our movement left to its own devices could never have gotten there and could never have rallied the political support.

If RARE II had not happened when it did, and if the flow of wilderness bills had not gotten going as a result of RARE II—the Endangered American Wilderness Act, and then RARE II—then the big flood of post-RARE II wilderness bills, which reached its high tide in 1984—. None of that would have happened under Ronald Reagan. So we hit the magic—pure luck—of the right moment with administration support and great, sympathetic friends in power in Congress and on their staff. We were in the right position at that magical time. The result is that we will have 20 or 30 million more acres of national forest wilderness than would have been conceivable under any other scenario. That's what that is about.

Lage: An exciting task.

Scott: Isn't that classic.

[End Tape 14, Side A]
Interview 6: December 3, 1990

[Begin Tape 15, Side A]

Lage: Today is December 3, 1990, and we are onto our sixth interview. In thinking about our last session, I wanted to ask you about a remark in Mike McCloskey's interview, where he looks at the Endangered American Wilderness Act as representing a real switch in club strategy or club areas to go after. Do you recall any particular discussion about the pros and cons of making that switch? Or how did it occur?

Scott: Well, the mandate of the Wilderness Act and the continuing struggles to study the primitive areas, and the continuing struggles with the Forest Service over purity interpretations and management issues and other things that got in the way of smoothly moving the primitive areas through were a continuing preoccupation. Those were very bound up in the struggle over eastern wilderness and in the dispute between the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society and Friends of the Earth over eastern wilderness in 1973.

But nonetheless, by that time a number of the primitive areas had been processed through the Congress. There weren't all that many of them anyway. They were large, and the boundary issues were complicated. But there weren't all that many. As a result of these citizen-initiated de facto wilderness bills in Alabama, West Virginia, Montana, Wyoming, other places—more and more of those were emerging—there was, I think, a simple, logical transition going on of people moving on to the de facto area and sooner or later, it dawned on, I think, everybody sooner or later, and I'm not saying that Mike or I were necessarily in the forefront of all of this, that the logic of what we were out to accomplish meant that we should spend our time and energy on the areas that were the most in danger of being chopped down or eroded or otherwise being taken off the plate.

So when RARE I burst upon us, our attention focused on the areas that were not selected for further study. That became more and more the focus. Now, by this time I was in the Northwest so while I was continuing to function as the Sierra Club's principal wilderness policy person and was looked to, I think, that way in most quarters—.

Lage: But this was also informal.

Scott: It was all informal. In some sense maybe I inherited that mantle within the Club from Mike McCloskey, given where I had come from and the fact that he was now distracted by a thousand other obligations, and here I was with this very strong background in the subject. Most of my attention was focussed on the situation in the Northwest and in the Northwest we didn't have that many primitive areas. We had the Alpine Lakes area, which was called a limited area. This was just unique to that region. It had been set up some time in the forties, I guess. The Forest Service had ultimately made a commitment that they would treat it like a primitive area, so the
study for it was commenced and the administrative hearings were held in Seattle and in
Wenatchee in the fall of 1973, shortly after my arrival.

That's one of the things that I worked on organizing for those hearings, working with
local Sierra Club people, Wilderness Society staff in the region and from Denver, and
most notably with a group that Brock had been instrumental in organizing: the Alpine
Lakes Protection Society (ALPS). I had known some of its leaders, particularly a
fellow named Bill Asplin, from Wenatchee area, who had been back to Washington for
one of our training things when I was with the Wilderness Society, and I quickly got to
know the chief ALPS ringleaders in the Seattle area. We went through that
administrative hearing on the Alpine Lakes, but then, that sort of died down and went
back in to the bowels. ALPS and our specialists were worrying about it, but it wasn't
as though that were going to Congress and going to become a principal preoccupation
right away.

There weren't any active primitive area reviews going in Idaho. Excuse me, yes there
were. The Idaho primitive area, the biggest of them all, similarly went through the
administrative hearings sometime I think in the fall of 1973 or maybe it was 1974. We
went through the round of stirring people up for those hearings and working out our
citizen proposals, which had mostly been worked out before I arrived. My only role
was to say, "Yes, go for the largest acreage," which was 2.3 million acres in one
wilderness area. The citizen groups in Idaho coalesced around that proposal.

There weren't any active primitive area reviews still proceeding in Montana, so it was
logical that we were worrying mostly about the RARE I non-selected areas that were in
the most immediate jeopardy. I have the agenda for a meeting of the Sierra Club’s
national wilderness committee. It was held in Seattle in October of 1974. Just to give
an idea of what we were doing at that point: we were talking about, What lands are we
working on?" The new study areas that the chief selected for study, inventoried areas
not selected by the chief, uninventoried wilderness areas—the really most endangered.
They were really in trouble. Then of course, there were Bureau of Land Management
lands, which weren't under the mandate of wilderness study at all at that stage.

We talked about what volunteers around the country—club people on this
committee—were doing about all this, responding to EIS's on these areas and unit
plans and coordination. One topic was methods of achieving permanent protection of
western roadless areas. There was a discussion on "Forest Service Interpretation of
Wilderness: the Purity Argument Resumes." So there must have been some little flare-
up in the purity argument at that time.

This agenda was put together by Ted Snyder, who was then the chairman of the club's
wilderness committee. In that same era, I was preoccupied with negotiating and
raising sample issues with the Forest Service bureaucracy, ultimately the chief, and
getting new directives that said, "Now you've got to go back and find the areas that
should have been inventoried but weren't," and then circulating those around to the
wilderness leadership around the rest of the country.
It was not a clean decision. It wasn't, "Oh, we've been preoccupied with the primitive areas. What a mistake. We should have been worrying about these de facto areas that are the most threatened." It wasn't as though there was some one school of people that said, "Oh, we shouldn't worry about those defacto areas." It was just a logical transition. Most of the work had been done in many parts of the country on the primitive area reviews, and people were making the logical choice to focus on the stuff that was in trouble. Looking back at it, in hindsight and compressing history as one does, there was an important transition there. But I don't remember summit meetings—.

Lage: You don't remember the wilderness committee discussing the pros and cons?

Scott: No. Our organizations did not foment either RARE I or RARE II. RARE I was a complete surprise. RARE I, and I've told the story about being there as close to its birth as anybody but Cutler and Resler, was under way before we found out about it, in the fall of 1971, maybe 1972, whenever it was. I remember scurrying over to the Forest Service to find out what it was about and then memos flying out to tell Wilderness Society people what was going on with it.

Lage: Those dictated the logic of going for the—.

Scott: Forest Service did RARE I, and then Cutler and the Forest Service did RARE II, for their own good internal reasons as a response, first off—give them credit—to a recognition that there were some wilderness resources that needed to be reviewed; secondly because we were snapping at their heels, we and our lawyers, with increased effect, saying, "It's a major federal action to chop down a wilderness. Wilderness is declared by the Wilderness Act to be a resource of national value. NEPA has these commands that nobody quite realized what they were when we started. You've got to comply with NEPA. The Forest Service was making a hash, and so were a lot of other agencies, of trying to figure out how to write EIS's that were legally adequate for individual decisions on roadless areas, which was what we were demanding, without having to write an EIS on every timber sale.

It was driving them crazy. They couldn't imagine. What if we had to take every separate roadless area and essentially do a Wilderness Act study for it. They just threw up their hands at that. So they would experiment with doing one national EIS or unit planning EIS, whatever, and then we would come snapping right on their heels saying, "No, you didn't do it right. Nice try, guys, but this didn't work."

Meanwhile, what I think was only imprecisely perceived at the time, and we all gathered—. I've seen in Dennis Roth's book, there is a nice quote from Clif Merritt of the Wilderness Society's Denver office on this subject. I think we were all coming to this. The act of conducting the inventory of the roadless areas, first in RARE I and then in RARE II, that the Forest Service undertook, not because we demanded it or we went and got Congress to do it, greatly increased the appetite of the grass-roots environmental movement. At no point was there some big strategy room, command central in Washington or in San Francisco or any where else, where all the maps of all
the national forest roadless areas of all the country and the great thinkers like me or Mike McCloskey or Tim Mahoney or whoever pawing over them and arriving at great decisions. This was way too massive.

So the logic that Stewart Brandborg had developed, of saying, "When the Wilderness Act passes, this study process," (the demands of which were by comparison relatively modest) had developed a decentralization and a training of grass-roots people and relying on their sense of what the priorities were. Now this happened in spades. We had been (we: Brock, Joe Walicki, Jim Eaton, similar people in other states) out organizing grass-roots wilderness groups all over heck and gone, and those groups in Sierra Club chapters typically would take the law-court service inventory and say, "Humm, gee, I didn't know all those areas were there. Hey, Betty Sue, why don't we take a camping trip and go and see what that is like." This greatly enlarged the political appetite of the movement.

I will tell you something this did to my attitude. There were a lot of people who had very hard-line attitudes. Of course, there emerged later under Dave Foreman of Earth First, a sort of "We want it all" attitude—. I believe a political movement needs to behave in ways that it not only tops its opponents (who cares what they think), but that the people who ultimately make the decisions need to perceive that there is an aura of reasonableness, rationality.

The simple fact was that our appetite was greatly increasing. If Howard Zahniser came back from the dead and we told him we were after this many zillions of acres of wilderness, he would have been dumbfounded. No one had ambitions for wilderness on that scale. There's a famous story involving Mike McCloskey. At some point, and this record is in the archives somewhere (this letter), at some point, for some reason Mike felt it necessary to write a letter to the regional forester in California relative to the Siskiyous up near the Oregon border, saying that the Sierra Club felt very strongly that x acres was how much needed to be preserved in the Siskiyous. Well, many of us sooner or later, including Mike came to the realization that writing to the Forest Service what the ultimate acreage of the thing ought to be was a bad idea. What's in the wilderness in the Siskiyous today is much larger than Mike's letter, which in my recollection is about a 1974 letter.

The Forest Service trotted Mike's letter back and quoted it back at us repeatedly, back in whenever it was, maybe it was 1969. Some time or other, Mike had written this letter saying, "On behalf of the Sierra Club it should be this big." They said, "Now you are asking for this huge thing." Well, I was brought up in a Wilderness Society school which said that we defer on these kinds of issues not to the staff but to indigenous volunteer people who at least presumably know the area the best. If they want to say we're going for this or that, great. Generally speaking, we are not going to stand in their way assuming that the land truthfully qualified for wilderness. By the same token, they will be partners, those local people, in the inevitable compromises. All over this country, there are people who have had lots of experience and feel very good about helping get some acres into the wilderness system and having laws passed to do that, knowing they participated in the compromise.
Given that our appetite had expanded so greatly as a result of this inventory process, I take with only moderate good grace the latter-day "No compromise" attitude, which I think is antithetical to democratic values, basically, democrat with a little "d," and I might as well state that philosophy right now. Wilderness is preserved, one might think, looking at the Wilderness Act process by getting Congress to pass, the House and the Senate, to pass a law and you ultimately get an enrolled bill, passed by both houses, that says the same thing, and they print it on vellum and they deliver it to the White House, the President signs it and then they take it over and stash it in the National Archives. That's where it stays for the good of all. It has stamped on it "Public Law 97"—whatever it is and the act of whatever date it was. Chuck and John and I stood watching Jimmy Carter sign the Endangered American Wilderness Act. It was a great moment.

Wilderness is not saved by pieces of vellum in the National Archives. Wilderness is saved by a social consensus to respect that piece of vellum, and it will only last as long as that social consensus exists. Just by simply getting a law passed and then saying, "There, that did it," we've got to maintain, for the good and all in perpetuity, the social acceptance that that decision was a good one, or those laws will get changed. You don't impose by clever lobbying or by some momentary power play unyielding, uncompromising solutions on the local people. Well, you can't pass them.

And we have never passed a statewide wilderness bill in Idaho. We've been working at it for twenty years now. RARE I, RARE II have come and gone. Idaho is a very difficult place—it just got a good deal better in the 1990 election and our prospects are looking up there—in part because the social consensus in Idaho has not been able to gather itself around a piece of legislation. When it does, it will be a compromise piece of legislation and the Earth Firsters will all throw up their hands and say, "These guys have coddled with the enemy." I think that is part of making it a sufficiently acceptable decision. The price is some trees get cut, some roads get built, in the places that people don't want.

What kind of a world is it where the Sierra Club is assigned the power to decide where wilderness boundaries should be, figure them out, put them anywhere it wants without the people of Grangeville, Idaho, having a say about it, because it affects them too. I have long been accused in some quarters of being in the consensus end of the conservation movement and in the politically practical end. I do not view that as an assault. I accept that proudly. I understand that it is in fact compromise that makes our system work. The challenge to a person like me, and to people I work with, is to artfully choose our time, choose the legislative terrain, choose the nature of debate, and conduct ourselves in such a way that the compromises that emerge are the most favorable in our direction that we could have arranged them to be. But still they will be compromises.

Lage: Did you have trouble with your local groups? I can see, with each local group invested in their own particular wilderness, it leads to a situation where they are willing less to compromise than a person who sees a whole series of local wildernesses coming out.
Scott: I don't remember dreadful episodes. We faced some very painful choices. We faced some very painful choices at Hells Canyon, like at the last minute the size of the wilderness that was designated. The size of the national recreation area was reduced and the size of the wilderness was reduced. There was unhappiness with that. I'm sure there has been latter-day criticism. We made the arrangements we could make at the time with the political moxie that we had available and did the best we could. We are flawed creatures like everyone else.

The trick always is to be sure that the local people to whom one is responsible, and in my view that was not just the Sierra Club—that is, my employers—but the constructive groups that have worked with us, are in on those decisions and learn through the process.

Lage: You try to get them part of the process.

Scott: Have them well-enough informed. I never said, "Oh, no. You shouldn't come to Washington. I will take care of that end. I was very often the agent for these things. I was very often the last guy in the room. That was true on Hells Canyon; it was true in the Alpine Lakes. It was true on any number of these things from that era. I was best known to the politicians, particularly with things like committee staffs and people of that kind. A level of trust had developed and so forth. But very often, I would have somebody with me. "Hey, this is going to be the crucial week. Can we take off work and you can fly back with me and we'll make the rounds." Very often, we were on the phone at all hours of the night, back to some little cabal of the leaders, back in Seattle or wherever it was, saying, "This is how it's shaping up. What do you think? We can always pull the plug on this. Or should we do this?"

My attitude has always been, with some exception—. In Idaho we have steadfastly said, "We will make no deals," because the nature of the deals that have been offered have been so dreadful both in terms of minimal wilderness acreage, and only the most obvious stuff (the rocks and ice is the way we usually talk about it). And all sorts of writers and stuff have messed around with fundamental questions of wilderness management. We've said no western water rights and exceptions for mines. We've said no. There is no compromise coming out of this situation.

On the other hand, I have always been of the view that if you can make a good start, if in fastening an Oregon onto this wilderness bill, as we did in 1974-1975—. Actually, I guess that ultimately was swept into the Endangered American Wilderness Act. That is that much wilderness that you've got obtained, and then there's all the energy that has gone into getting that, and by the time you're ready to pass it, it's kind of safe already. Now that energy can go back and work on the next chunk.

Of course, our opponents were famous for accusing us of this: "Is this the end? I don't know; we'll see." That was the dynamic tension typically in these cases. Have we gotten enough? Are our supporters tiring? Do we need to let this rest for a while and go on to something else? Or should we not have this bill this year and regroup and stir up more support because we think we'll do better next year?
And things come along. Administrations change. One minute you're dealing with Gerald Ford. The next minute you're dealing with Jimmy Carter. One minute you're dealing with Jimmy Carter. The next minute you're dealing with Ronald Reagan. Those imponderables. John Saylor—I woke up one morning, opened my *Seattle Times*, my *Seattle P.I.* and there was a little squib that an obscure Pennsylvania congressman had died that morning during surgery in Houston. In due course, other champions will arise but if you have a whole plot that you put off settling this year because John Saylor is going to lead the fight next year—.

It was six weeks before he died, I was meeting with some Montana leaders, and with Lee Metcalf, a long-time wonderful wilderness champion senator from Montana, who had always been in a variety of seeming ill-health. We were finishing some arrangements about a Montana wilderness thing and talking about some leadership he was going to provide as the champion in the Senate for the Alaska lands bill. Well, he died six weeks later, and we never had a champion of his stature for the Alaska lands bill. It would have been very different.

So you weigh those imponderables in the future against what is going to happen today, and you bring the local people into those considerations. That is the great truth that Brandborg tripped over by good instinct, and by I think probably Zahniser's lingering influence, that the wilderness movement decentralized as a result of the Wilderness Act, and that was escalated by RARE I and RARE II, and we were no longer the executive level of a few top leaders, volunteer or staff, getting in some room of the chief of the Forest Service or some senator, and doing some giant deal.

This makes it a much less coherent movement. It means there are all these extremes now, from Earth First! people to very conservative groups, but that's just part of the territory. All those shades of opinion don't need to be reflected in decisions. I didn't ever view myself as responsible for the wild extreme, but I was sure as heck responsible to the Sierra Club chapter and the other groups that were working with it.

Lage: You mentioned recognizing the concerns of the locals, not just the local conservationists but the chamber of commerce of Grangeville. What about the timber industry? Did you ever feel any real understanding of their point of view? How did you deal with and live with the timber industry?

Scott: Well, I have a pretty strong prejudice about the timber industry. I think they have been extremely ill-used by their lobbyists. There is one big national organizer, the National Forest Products Association, which I think has been largely ineffecntual in all this stuff. I have often wondered, and wondered aloud to my colleagues, "Gee, now we've been in this wilderness business ten years. Now, we've been in this post-Wilderness Act business twenty years. Now, we've been twenty-five years. Do you suppose they ever called a giant meeting in a private off-the-record enclosed room, only trusted people, "Now here's the strategy we have been following to fight these wretched environmentalists for the last x years. How is it's going?" [laughter]
Because in general—and I don't know, if I were in their shoes, I'm not sure I would have thought of anything better. The real issue comes down to, with the timber industry, a question of timber supply verses the land base. They arrogated to themselves, I think that's the word, unconsciously I think, a view in the thirties and the forties and the fifties that any national forest land that didn't have a line around it already, was theirs. That they should build their mills and make their plans and make their investments, and the dependent communities fell right in with this, on the assumption that they could have it all.

Now, there is a school of historical thought that says that in the Northwest, there were two distinct periods. There was the period when the big private owners were cutting their land and they didn't want timber from the federal lands coming in to swamp the market and lower the price. So those companies, Weyerhaeuser in particular, were actively discouraging timber harvest on the national forest. Then they cut over their inventory, and yes, Weyerhaeuser says that they're the tree-growing company, and I always said, "Weyerhaeuser, they're the little tree-growing company." They have one helluva lot of little trees, but what they want to do to get by this narrow period when they have taken all the inventory of old standing timber off their land, now they want the federal land, and they gauged it that they would get it all. Well, baloney. They don't get it all.

Now, in fairness to them, nobody told them there was going to be this wilderness movement that was going to come riding out of the sunrise and be the cause of all this trouble. And it certainly was my experience with Grangeville. It was the most direct contact I had, not with the polished lawyers and advocates of the timber industry, but with just real down-home folk. You can have great sympathy for a dependent community that got caught in the middle of this stuff. We had our usual ration of sort of glib and truthful, but we weren't responsible for them, assertions. "Oh, your future is in tourism, not timber." That is a very nice thing to say to people, but they were working that morning in that sawmill, and nobody had yet offered them a job leading tours for this transition. [Phone call interruption]

One could have sympathy for these local communities. But on the other hand, I mean, if you were going to have too much sympathy and say, "Well, gee, we don't want to cause any transition. We don't want to cause any disruption that discombobulates people," the price of that is the wilderness all gets chopped down.

Lage: And then they would lose their job after the wilderness is chopped down.

Scott: And then they would lose their job, sure. I think the Forest Service, which has always been devoted to dependent communities, did not do in this era the job it could have done. After all, this was an era of Johnson and social intervention and so forth. There could have been an approach to the coming economic transitions in the West, and in rural America, that there wasn't. I think that's a shame because I think a lot of people have faced hardships they otherwise might not have had to.
On the other hand, people shouldn't go around drawing conclusions that, just because there is a tree over there on Uncle Sam's land that they get to chop it down. The people in New Jersey who don't want that chopped down have as much stake in it. These battles get railed around all the time.

We are going to have a viable timber industry in this country. It's going to work off a much smaller land base, what with all the ancient forest movement and the wilderness and all the national parks and so forth, the total acreage for all the public land from which timber is going to be raised is going to ultimately be much smaller than one might have guessed in the fifties. The timber culture is going to be increasingly more on the German style of serious cultivation and the maximized growth and so forth, which is very deep in the history of the forestry—I am sounding like a professional forester, but that is what my degree is. That is a very deep tradition, heavily influenced by Germany, the historic background of the forestry profession.

That is something that has been very hard for our nation to grasp—look at Canada, much worse there—given that we had all these trees just standing around. We didn't pay anything to grow them. It was as if you came to the bank, the vault was standing right open and they were saying, "Take whatever you want." The piper has to be paid some day because we'll end up only with little trees and a lot of scrub brush and so forth.

Episodically, this problem has become very much the focus of the politics. Little fixes have been sometimes used.

[End Tape 15, Side A]

[Begin Tape 15, Side B]

Scott: Sometimes negotiated arrangements, as with the Gospel-Hump Wilderness in Idaho—. Excuse me, I ought to explain Gospel-Hump. There are two peaks: Gospel Peak and Buffalo Hump. It got put together and is hyphenated: Gospel-Hump. It is one of the least mellifluous names of a wilderness area, but there you are. In Redwoods, where the political power and labor connections of Congressman Phil Burton were particularly what they were, and in a big large urban state like California, the displaced labor was paid off in training money and so forth.

Lage: It almost seems that the displaced companies, at least, made out well.

Scott: That's right. They were paid handsomely. For the land that their forebearers swiped from the public domain. It's fairly outrageous taken from the long view. If there hadn't been a war in Vietnam, if our country had been in a sustained period of war on poverty, social programs of the Johnsonian notion, this might have happened in a different way. But the simple answer is we are not going to pay off every displaced worker. That's just the reality. I believe the Forest Service, had it not been so cozy with the timber industry in viewing its role as serving the timber industry with the
laissez-faire, "Ah, that will trickle down for the benefit of these local communities." If it said, "We're going to be interested in what these local communities are doing—." 

Smart communities around the West—there is a little town north of Wenatchee (Lord, I forget its name) on the east side of the Alpine Lakes which made itself over into an Austrian village. It is a tourist mecca; it used to be a timber town. I presume some place on the outskirts of town behind an Austrian facade there is still a little sawmill. The little community of Leavenworth, Washington, made itself over. And Riggins, Idaho. I haven't been there for years, but Riggins was a place where you scraped the Sierra Club decal off of anything, and you snuck in only at night, and you didn't stop, and you sure didn't have a drink at the bar if you had hair the length that mine was in those days. Riggins is today a river-touring tourist town. It always had a riverboat, always had for the last twenty or thirty years, some of it a river-touring operation. But it also had a big sawmill. They don't have a sawmill anymore, I don't think. McCaw, Idaho. Grangeville.

This is a transition that is simply happening as the Rocky Mountain West depopulates, the rural West, and as this transitions happen—. A lot of other factors figure into this: overseas export of logs, etc. But one little part of this is the reduction in the land base based on trees going into wilderness and other such classifications. It's interesting. Today, in Idaho and in some parts of Montana where this is still a very lively political fight, it's kind of a throwback. It's sort of like, "Everybody else solved that in the late seventies or early eighties. What are you doing?" For whatever reason.

I was going to sort of transition here to work through RARE II fairly quickly.

Lage: Yes.

Scott: RARE II snuck up on us. We had an excellent plan for what we were doing with the Endangered American Wilderness Act and it worked swimmingly. I don't recall, and it may be in memos and things that I simply haven't had a chance to review, any particular grand vision of what was going to happen next after the Endangered American Wilderness Act. But that problem was solved for us by Cutler and Resler inventing RARE II, which as I said previously I welcomed, sort of as an official spokesman and leader, partly because this was my friend Rupe Cutler and partly because it seemed as good a next step as anything that I had thought of, because I hadn't thought of anything. I welcomed RARE II and worked very hard to maintain a sense of commitment to it until pretty late in the game, under the increasing recognition that many others in the movement that I was a part of had lost their patience with [inaudible].

John McComb and Chuck Clusen and Tim Mahoney and I became a little team of people working on RARE II. We faced an enormous logistic problem. This thing, at least as originally announced, was on an incredibly fast timetable. The Forest Service had this nationwide bureaucracy; they could issue all these orders, and this thing would just happen. We had no infrastructure, or we had the Sierra Club chapter network and field offices and some staff around the country, but this was a huge logistical impact.
So we quickly threw together—and it grew right on out of the work we had already been doing on the Endangered American Wilderness Act—we started putting out *RARE II: A Citizen's Handbook for the National Forest Roadless Area Review and Evaluation Program*. These were put out as inserts occasionally in issues of the *National News Report*.

Lage: Which went to what territory?

Scott: All Sierra Club chapter leaders nationwide, and others who subscribed to it, and a large media.

Lage: There is a leader list, as I recall, in the Sierra Club, isn't there?

Scott: There is.

Lage: Chapter leaders, committee chairs.

Scott: The *NNR* subscription list is less than all the whole leadership. Chapters could put a certain number of their leaders on; other people could subscribe. We sent this thing separately. Wilderness Society sent it to whatever list they had. We sent it to known ringleaders. The place that it got mass distribution quickly so we were at least sure that our vision of what people needed to be thinking and what they needed to know was in their hands was that it was automatically in every Sierra Club chapter, four or five people deep in the leadership, through the vehicle of the *NNR*.

This was put out explicitly on Volume 1, Number 1, in July, 1977. It said, "This bulletin is sponsored by national environment groups involved in wilderness preservation coordinated through Citizens for America's Endangered Wilderness,” the group that we concocted for the Endangered American Wilderness Act. It said that this is composed of the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth and the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs. This first issue was six closely printed pages in tiny type of background on RARE II: how is it supposed to work, what is the Forest Service's criteria? I know this is not a reading, but in the little boxed area, "What is a roadless area? The new Forest Service criteria.” This shows the effect of the Endangered Wilderness Act and Cutler.

"Since passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964, there has been prolonged controversy over the criteria used by the Forest Service to determine whether an area is qualified as 'suitable' for wilderness.” That's the word in the Wilderness Act. "Conservationists have insisted that the criteria are simply those spelled out in the legal..." yap, yap, yap. "Now, this new Administration has rejected the purity policy. Here is their new definition of what qualifies." So we were getting all of this material in the hands of people right away and then saying, "Yikes, there are going to be all these public workshops. All over hell and gone, thousands of them. Get ahold of your Forest Service." Then it said, "If you need any help, here are the national coordinators: John McComb at the Washington office of the Sierra Club, Roger Scholl at the Washington
office of the Wilderness Society, Tim Mahoney at the Denver office of the Wilderness Society, and Doug Scott at the Seattle office of the Sierra Club.

Lage: Tim Mahoney was with the Wilderness—?

Scott: He was with the Wilderness Society in Denver at that stage. It said, "Future issues of this bulletin will be prepared as necessary to keep you informed. They will be sent to state coordinators for local distribution, and copies of each new bulletin will be included in the *National News Report,*" and it told people how they could get that. We had, by the time this was put out in July of 1977, quickly thrown together a network of state coordinators. In Arizona, it was a fellow with the Arizona wilderness study committee and Dave Foreman, then the regional guy for the Wilderness Society.

Lage: Did you know him well at that point?

Scott: Oh yes. Well, he was somebody I knew as a worker.

Lage: Did he have the radical views we associate with Earth First! then, or was he trying out the political system at that point?

Scott: He had been through one of our Washington training events. I think he probably joined this ill-paid little network of local organizers that the Wilderness Society had while I was still on the Wilderness Society staff. I knew him, but not as well as John McComb, who was the Sierra Club guy in the same region. In one of the late seventies revolutions and internal difficulties at the Wilderness Society, Dave had gone into Washington and spent about a year. An outsider's impression was that a little group of very young and very relatively inexperienced people tried to keep the Wilderness Society going, as a commune almost. Dave was a ringleader in that. His latter-day version of it is that he was the Washington lobbyist. He found that so frustrating. He found that that system didn't work.

My answer to that—and said lovingly because I like Dave and I admire him, he's a very skilled person, though I disagree with him profoundly on some political tactics issues—my view of that was that Dave wasn't particularly suited to be a Washington lobbyist and wasn't very good at it and shouldn't draw the conclusion, which he does, that having tried it, that system doesn't work. There are those of us who were more sympathetic to that system and have done jolly well making it work, thank you very much, and it's sort of a legend that Dave has encouraged around himself. And I use the word "encouraged" advisedly, having been burned in the fires of the inadequacy of the political system when outside of it.

Dave has subsequently severed his relationship with Earth First! In part it's because at heart Dave doesn't believe that rhetoric.

Lage: Oh, he has severed his ties?
Scott: He has severed his relationship with Earth First! and his letter in which he announces that is a very interesting document historically, because he says that despite his efforts to keep it from happening and to encourage the organization in a different way, other newer leaders have arisen whose agenda isn't a conservation agenda. It's kind of a social change/anarchist agenda, and however much he might agree with that or not, he was in this and he led this organization because of a conservationist effort. You read Earth First! stuff from Dave's heyday, and it's full of all these radical things and very self-indulgent. These were people who liked to really get together and just drink up a storm. Very self-indulgent.

But at the core—and they would say awful things about the Forest Service, many of which were fully justified, and awful things about the political system, but then it would say down at the bottom, "Write your congressman." My view of it is that Dave is a truly conflicted person about what works politically, and not particularly insightful, no more insightful than I. I don't view myself as a great political thinker. I am a practitioner. Dave was thought of as this great caster of a new philosophy for how to save the earth. Well, baloney.

My assertion is that Earth First! ought to get complete credit, and ought to be able to castigate me and everybody like me, every time they get a one hundred percent victory. Every time the victory is eighty percent, or seventy percent, I'll take the credit. Because you don't get to say, "We want it all" and do all this agitation that they do, which I think has profound, adverse effects on the politics that I'm trying to create, and then say, "Oh, that compromise that people like Doug Scott cooked up, we'll take the credit for it. It wouldn't have happened if we hadn't been there." This is a very self-indulgent and egotistical view, "Well, we're out here on the far left, making you, the Sierra Club, appear more moderate." If I need that help, I can organize that kind of a group when I need it. I never have needed it.

That is a phony and extremely simplistic view of the political system, that if there is somebody asking for one hundred percent, then it makes getting eighty percent easier. That is not true.

Lage: I've heard it so many times, I've come to believe it.

Scott: If true, it is true episodically with particular kinds of politicians. I know a lot of people who, if you said, "I want it all," they would throw you out of their office and never let you in again. Whereas, if you walked in and said, "We're reasonable people. Look at our record. Here's my bona fides from what I did with the folks in Grangeville. Now we need to solve this little problem in your community." You may get more ultimate acreage and a better result, and you may get it a lot sooner than kind of a scorched-earth confrontation. Those are strategic and tactical decisions that ought to be made on a case-by-case basis. These aren't giant philosophical questions.

I will not brook compromise on the Arctic Wildlife Refuge. As far as I'm concerned, we'll sell the Sierra Club over that. If anything will bring me out of my retirement, that will, and I've told Michael Fischer this (in fact, he agrees with me), we will sell the
company over that one, partly because it is a fabulous place, and I've been fortunate to be there, and partly because I think it is the grand thing. I think it is the fundamental test of whether the philosophy of wilderness will survive for our time. I think it is our responsibility to say, "Not half a dam. This is the Echo Park." "Not a dam painted green so it will look nicer." No oil access in the Arctic Wildlife.

We may lose; it could easily happen. If we lose, the opening of the Arctic Wildlife Refuge, by the virtue of our fight, will be under more stringent regulation and on lesser area and with all kinds of sidebars on it, than if we hadn't fought the thing. But that is not the same thing as saying that in every case, the way to get the maximum is to ask for everything. Idaho: the Sierra Club and the Idaho Conservation League and some other groups up there have been castigated by a small cloud of radical-type people for not wanting every acre of the nine million (roughly) acres that remain in Idaho National Forest today. Our bill asks for about four or five. I don't have this precisely in my memory. We have made a bunch of compromises already. The local political structure won't even go one million so we're still a long ways away, but by having done that, we have a more plausible—. We can rally in more public support. We can convert more people to our view from that posture than from a "we want it all" posture.

I think it has ill-served the timber industry to oppose wilderness, which they usually do. One of my favorite episodes in the Endangered American Wilderness Act, including one little area in the desert mountains that ring Tucson—with John McComb's leadership we've totally encircled Tucson with wilderness, and now it is locked up. But there was a place called Pusch Ridge, Pusch Ridge Wilderness. This is in Mo Udall's district. He is the chairman of the committee. He is the sponsor of the bill. The timber industry sends some jerk in there to a hearing to oppose it. There isn't a tree. There isn't anything over about four feet tall in this. Anything woody.

Lage: They're just opposing it because it is wilderness.

Scott: Just because it's wilderness. I think I remembering this correctly. We'll have to go back and look in the transcript. Udall just lost his patience completely. "Now, wait a minute." This was some timber industry minion from some office in Denver, who had come to this hearing to bad-mouth this non-timbered area on some hare-brained scheme that he was arguing, about whether it was qualified. He was still fighting the purity thing. Just complete craziness.

Anyway, we set up this group of regional coordinators in the summer of 1977 to sort of organize ourselves. This list is a very interesting collection of who were then key ringleaders, who were then key staff people spaced around. I won't repeat the list. One of the things that is interesting about this list is that it has every Western state, of course. It also has the Midwest, the East, the South and the national grasslands. So here again is proof that RARE II was in fact nationwide, one single criteria. This was another part of the useful results of the eastern wilderness effort. You wouldn't have seen a list like this in RARE I because nobody was focused on it. Even we weren't all that focused on this.
So in November of 1977, here is the latest one of these bulletins. In March of 1978, what's happening now. I probably drafted—in fact I'm sure I drafted most of these. Well, they were edited by these other folks. The headline in the March, 1978, issue is "A Constructive Philosophy for RARE II." Well, that's classic Doug Scott. "RARE II is an ambitious program being pursued under a difficult but firm timetable. Its objectives are reasonable and limited but they are widely misunderstood," even by some Forest Service people, the implication is. So here I am, March of 1978, with my colleagues, still selling that this is a good deal.

Meanwhile, the experience of more and more people out working on the front lines is that it isn't a good deal. It is being done too quickly. It just wasn't working.

Lage: So you got feedback from the front.

Scott: You bet, frequently and in volume. I think these bulletins would be a very good thing for anyone researching this to go through because this was our only real method of communicating under these incredible pressures with the grass-roots professional people, as well as the volunteers in our movement. This one from March of 1978 has a whole section on the politics of RARE II. "What conservationists should be doing now." I think that shows an important part of this history. I also note that by March 1978, John McComb was listed still as the Washington coordinator for the Sierra Club, Roger Scholl the Washington coordinator for the Wilderness Society. Tim Mahoney was now in Washington so he had made his move some time in that period, and I was of course continuing to be listed as in Seattle. In May of 1978, here is Number 5 of this series: "What's happening now? Special message to wilderness leaders." Towards the bottom of this special message: "At this stage, wilderness advocates must again take a hard look at RARE II and ask whether its possible benefits outweigh the threat that high-level interference by industry will radically affect the programs outcome."

So here is a compendium of the kind of pressure that the timber industry was applying. The timber industry got ahold of Walter Mondale, and he put heat on Cutler. The president had a meeting with timber industry officials. We sent a petition from groups all over the country to President Carter saying, "This isn't going well." We were also working particularly closely with the Council on Environmental Quality and White House officials. [We were fearful] Cutler wasn't going to make the right decision. He had gotten himself backed into a deal where when the selection of areas came from all this decentralized Forest Service process, and then he would allot himself an hour and a quarter to figure out what to do. It wasn't going well.
Furthermore, we had been in with Zane any number of times, with our lawyers frequently, Julie McDonald in particular from the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and Trent Orr from the National Resources Defense Council, saying, "Zane, this isn't going right. This doesn't mean you're going too fast. The product is going to be an environmental impact statement." They were going to write one environmental impact statement. "That will not stand legal scrutiny."

Lage: One statement for all the roadless areas?

Scott: And unless you put an awful lot of detail in there, and unless it was done right, you were going to end up with something that was not going to survive legal challenge. Even if we didn't bring a legal challenge. From fairly early on it was obvious to us and explicitly stated, and in particular by me, that we didn't dare sue over RARE II. RARE II heavily polarized and particularized the West. Some part of the East too. In Boundary County, Idaho, right up in the panhandle, there was a rally at the fairgrounds, tens of thousands of people. There were torchlight parades, there were convoys—.

Lage: By whom?

Scott: Timber industry and dependent communities.

Lage: So they were now organizing their supporters.

Scott: They flooded these workshops. They flooded the Forest Service with mail.

Lage: They had picked up on your techniques.

Scott: They picked up on our techniques and were able to put a lot more energy to it. What was going on in our movement right then was that a lot of people, including me, were beginning to concentrate on Alaska and pulling away from this, necessarily. They did a lot of [mass mailings]. When we would be in with Zane saying, "Now, you aren't going to count printed postcard input the same as a thoughtful letter, are you?" "Oh, no.” Well, they ended up a hit. So the timber industry just printed a zillion post cards. We wouldn't stoop to that. We should have, probably.

Lage: I've gotten a lot of those [pre-printed postcards to send out] from the Sierra Club.

Scott: Well, those are fundraising. That's a different—. There are a lot of ideas about that. By the summer of 1978, I had had it with RARE II in terms of the way it was being done. I'm not just sure when it was, but there was some kind of big program about RARE II held in Missoula, Montana. Cutler was there. It was sponsored by the regional office or the University of Montana or some such thing. I gave a rip-snorter speech at that thing just tearing it apart in Cutler's presence. That was sort of the ripping of the sheet, not personally, with Rupert, saying, "This has failed. This will not meet the test. And our great concern is that someone is going to sue. When they do,
they are going to get an injunction that shuts this whole 62 million acres down pending meeting the NEPA mandate somehow.

And the political backlash of that is going to make the Monongahela look like a cakewalk (the Monongahela being the court case where clearcutting was declared illegal). In that case it didn't take the Congress very long despite our best efforts; basically clearcutting didn't stay illegal very long, and the timber industry dominated the politics of that solution, where we were going to have some firestorm of political reaction with which we could not cope politically.

The upshot of that is that—. I guess it must have been the fall, Number 6 of these bulletins was June, 1978, and it said, "The critical public comment period, June 15 to October 1, 1978. It is essential that we get public support..." yak, yak, yak. Then we're on to the December, 1978, Number 7 of these bulletins: "RARE II is just about over." And we got a little personal message from the four coordinators. It said, "RARE II is just about over. As we await the final Department of Agriculture recommendation, and as these are being evaluated by conservationists in January, local conservation leaders should be preparing for congressional action. Only a summary of the situation and ideas for action can be presented here. More detailed plans are being made at the local level. Thus we urge you to be in contact with other wilderness leaders in your area through statewide groups. Despite misleading and selective summaries being touted by industrial groups, conservation can take satisfaction in the results of the RARE II public comment, which showed the preponderant base of strong support for preservation of many additional wilderness areas."

Well, it was a great game of how do we count what the public results were. Meanwhile, the Congress—so here is again a very detailed history of what was going on at that time. We then put out a big mailer: "RARE II: Last Chance for our Wild Forest Lands." This was sent all over heck and gone to get the maximum number of letters in for the October 1st deadline. Then in January of 1979, the RARE II results were announced. The Forest Service selected fifteen million acres roughly as wilderness, but 5.6 of that were in Alaska and were already covered by the Alaska Lands legislation, so it was really only less than ten million acres that was now going to be recommended directly to Congress as wilderness. Thirty-six million acres went to non-wilderness and ten to eleven million went into a little escape hatch called "Further Planning."

So once again, the new logic said the thing to worry about is not the fifteen that are being selected for wilderness or the ten for further planning. The big stuff to worry about is the thirty-six. We said that, and the Forest Service was just furious with us, of course, and Cutler, and everybody because they thought, "At least you ought to agree that some of these areas shouldn't be wilderness." We said, "Well, that would be if your study had worked. Conservationists from all across the country are incensed by some of the secretary's RARE II recommendations, and with good reason. We're angered that some of the non-wilderness proposals are going to be heard in congressional offices," yak, yak, yak. We had a long-winded summary with editorials
from BusinessWeek, from the Portland Oregonian, shortening the wilderness in Oregon.

Lage: And this all went out to the same—?

Scott: We sent this out far and wide to wilderness leaders.

Lage: This really does presuppose a very literate leadership that you deal with.

Scott: We do. The leader types, and I'm famous for that—. I wanted to share information with people in a fairly intensive way. So these documents convey all of that history. Now, we had said, "You aren't doing this right. This is going to be legally insupportable. If there is a lawsuit, the results are going to be just dreadful." The White House decision was made in January, 1979, and a particularly useful insight—Cutler has recorded, I know, his version of what the White House decision was like, how he decided on these areas.

Lage: Where has he recorded it?

Scott: I'm not sure but I know he has done it. I think with the Forest Service. In the Dennis Roth history, I know he did an interview in depth for that. Another person whose story of this ought to be gotten is Larry Williams. Larry Williams of the Oregon Environmental Council. He got married in the late—.

[End Tape 15, Side B]

[Begin Tape 16, Side A]

Scott: They moved to Washington just at the start of the Carter Administration. Marion Edey, who was the major-domo in all ways of the League of Conservation Voters, on whose board of directors both Mike McCloskey and I had served from virtually the inception, had been nominated by Carter to be a member of CEQ [Council on Environmental Quality]. Ultimately, the Senate wouldn't confirm her. She had had too much involvement in too many political races and had annoyed various powerful people in the Senate. But while she was a nominee, she called me or Mike McCloskey or somebody to say that there was at least one staff opening that she could influence at the CEQ. I believe somebody said, I think probably it was me, "Hey, Larry Williams would be great and he's looking for work. He's just about to move to Washington."

So we organized, with Marion's connivance (who had known Larry for years), a masterful effort, if I may say, to get Larry this job, which was made slightly more difficult because he didn't meet the civil service requirements. He hadn't graduated from college. Some exceedingly creative résumé work was done and Larry was hired at CEQ. So during the Carter Administration, Larry was at CEQ in an important staff position dealing with all the public land stuff. He would be at the White House meetings with the Office of Management and Budget people, and Cutler, and all these people where these internal policy things were done.
This is not like being in hostile enemy territory. This is the White House and these are our friends, but there had been a lot of high-level timber industry manipulation within the Carter Administration. They had gotten to Mondale, and Mondale's staff was active in an unhelpful way, from our point of view. The president was distracted with a lot of other things, and we were distracted with the Alaska lands issue, so Larry was in a crucial role, and his history of this would be most interesting.

In July of 1979, not only was Carter in the White House but Jerry Brown was governor of California, and he had appointed Huey Johnson to be his secretary for resources. The Resources Agency, on its own hook, had said to the Forest Service, "Here are forty-five areas in California that we believe ought to be recommended as wilderness." And they weren't. Either all of them or many of them weren't. So in July of 1979, the State of California brought the lawsuit.

This is a lawsuit that we had kept any little rag-tag group that was outraged—. I personally had shouting matches with them. The attorneys at the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund were salivating. Any first-year law student could see that this was a winning lawsuit. I certainly knew, having spent the last three years with Tim and others going in and saying, "Don't mess up. You're messing up. This has got to be—."

Lage: Did Zane realize why you wouldn't want the lawsuit?

Scott: Yes. We were explicit with him. After a while, this thing just had a momentum of its own. The fates took over.

Lage: Did you go into see Huey Johnson?

Scott: So we had physically restrained, almost, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund from filing a lawsuit, because we knew they would win, which just annoyed them no end. Attorneys like to win and here was this spectacular winning lawsuit. The Sierra Club has powerful levers in the state government in California. We tried everything. Huey has got a mind of his own, and Huey sued the Forest Service. So quick as a wink, we got Trent Orr, a staff attorney then in San Francisco for the Natural Resources Defense Council to join the case, so that we would have somebody at the table at least. But it was not us. It wasn't the Sierra Club or the Wilderness Society.

We weren't trying to be two-faced. We did not like that lawsuit. We were madder than hell about that.

Lage: The Sierra Club didn't bring that Monongahela one either, I believe.

Scott: No. Izaak Walton League did. In January of 1980, Judge Lawrence Karlton in federal court in Sacramento did what we all expected. He found that RARE II was illegal under NEPA. He found at length, it was a legal opinion to bring tears to your eyes. It is one of the most masterful things I ever saw. This judge had figured it all out, had gone through it very carefully and had issued this spectacular opinion, except it had all the political adverse reactions that we had said.
Lage: With that decision, he enjoined the entire process.

Scott: There was an injunction. I don't remember the fine details of how the injunction worked, but the injunction was limited, I think, to the forty-five areas that California was specifically complaining about. The Forest Service appealed, but the legal decision stood. What this now proved was that we were right. You could win a lawsuit on this. What this said was that any little group, anywhere, that wanted to file such a lawsuit, but didn't have to ask me or Tim to do it, was going to get an injunction. Some little outfit could get an injunction and very large at that. Now, no one ever has. In all these years, no one else has filed. Because you could go to any federal court and get this decision replicated just like that. No one has. In places like Idaho, there is no real temptation.

The day could come, for reasons that I'll explain in a moment, when someone will and when I will agree that was a smart thing, because it will then be a tactic in very changed circumstances. The minute California won this lawsuit, the threat of this kind of potential injunction any place around the country was guaranteed, and this is why we had fought to block the lawsuit and why we wouldn't let the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund file the lawsuit. It was then politically unavoidable that any future wilderness bill, dealing with national forest wilderness in any state in the union was going to have to cope with the question of lifting that threat of a future injunction. There was going to have to be language that messed around with judicial review.

Lage: Because of congressional opinion.

Scott: That's right. Just because it was simply not possible to imagine that you could now go in in Wyoming, or some place like that, and pass a wilderness bill that simply designated a bunch of wilderness, as all wilderness bills before had, and leave the question of whether all the un-selected roadless areas had been legally dealt with by the Forest Service open for somebody then to come and follow with a lawsuit. Then the temptation was great. “We passed our wilderness. We still want to fight about some of the rest of it.” The temptation of local groups to then get an injunction was great. So nobody was going to pass any wilderness bills for these kinds of lands anymore that didn't cope with the threat of a future injunction. That's what we wanted to stop, because in all these years of designating wilderness, we have never designated areas where wilderness didn't have to be an option in the future.

I said earlier that part of our approach was we'll attack this wilderness today, and then we'll come back for more. Then we can build up the polities of it. Now, we were going to be backed into a situation where we were disclaiming, or Congress was disclaiming, wilderness as an option. And the way it went was this. There was going to be some kind of language which would say, "The Wilderness Act says that wilderness is a resource in its own right. NEPA says that you can't make a federal decision involving a major action without environmental impact studies. Judge Karlton, and any other judge would say, "The EIS that you did for the whole world on RARE II wasn't adequate. So to cut off that, we are declaring that wilderness has adequately been considered on these particular chunks of land. We are designating
some over here as wilderness but the price of that now is that we are designating the best as no longer needing to be thought about for wilderness."

Future Forest Service planning, and decisions in any court, no longer would consider whether the wilderness option had been adequately considered by the Forest Service. The demand for that was instant. The timber industry had been calling for this for a long time, but we had been staving it off. "They are getting areas designated for no cutting; we want areas designated for no wilderness."

Lage: Was it really designated for no wilderness or simply that no court could interfere?

Scott: This was what was being talked about. This provoked just an impossible situation. The Forest Service was now recommending this fifteen million acres, or ten million outside of Alaska, of wilderness around the West. People wanted to move on that, and congressmen wanted to move on that, and not only that, but wherever we could stir up the political support, we wanted to take some of the non-selected areas and add them to wilderness. So the movement for wilderness bills began, and it became a movement for statewide bills.

In July of 1980, the house passed a California wilderness bill, of which the lead actor was Phil Burton. Language in that bill provided that Congress had conducted its own review of the adequacy of the wilderness consideration for the lands affected in California and had decided that some of the them should be wilderness and that these other ones maybe should be considered for further planning, but these other ones had been adequately considered for wilderness for this round of land-use planning in the Forest Service. Therefore, for the next fifteen years roughly, until the land-use plans were reconsidered by the Forest Service, the option of wilderness didn't have to be considered by the Forest Service and no body could bring judicial action saying it hadn't been adequately considered. I negotiated that language.

We're talking now Phil Burton and John Seiberling, who were key subcommittee members. It was Phil Burton's bill. John Seiberling was the chair; he was a congressman and great hero from Ohio, who was the chairman of the subcommittee that handled these things in the House. The chief of the Forest Service, Max Peters, I guess it was Max, and his attorney, and me.

Lage: And no attorney for you?

Scott: Sometimes, Trent Orr as my attorney. In a closed room for three or four sessions. This was, "Y'all come." This wasn't, "If you would like to drop by." This was Phil Burton: "We are going to work out language and accomplish this. It's going to be put in a California wilderness bill, and I'm going to pass the California wilderness bill, and it's going to become the model for the whole rest of the country. We are going to start doing these bills on a statewide basis.

Then the back woods statewide bills just came along. It was sort of inevitable after RARE II. We had always avoided statewide bills unless it was in states where we kind
of had a good political handle because there was always the tendency— We would do one area at a time or a few at a time, or an Endangered American Wilderness Act. To say that these areas have already been designated wilderness was just an invitation for somebody to say, "Okay, the rest won't be." Now, we were going to statewide bills, which we had hated. That was one of the reasons we had fought the lawsuit. And we were going to put some sort of language of this kind in it.

Lage: So how did you feel about the California bill? Do you feel you negotiated well?

Scott: There was nothing for it. I would come back from these negotiating sessions—and this was when I was stationed in Washington and heavily preoccupied with the Alaska businesss, and I don't quite remember why I was the one doing this but I was—and I would get with people like John McComb and Tim Mahoney who, at about this time (1979-80) we swiped Tim. Sierra Club hired him away. John McComb hired him away from the Wilderness Society. We would go over this stuff. In my archives somewhere (I'm not just sure where, I haven't seen them lately) are endless graphs of what came to be called sufficiency language. The timber industry was demanding release language.

Lage: Was there any timber industry person in on these meetings?

Scott: Yes, a real dullard. [laughter] I couldn't tell you the guy's name. It's probably in my notes some place. They were demanding language that just looked draconian. "No wilderness will ever be considered for anything but the minimum we can get away with forever, barring an act of God." We were saying, "No, don't give me that." They called that release language. What finally emerged was an extraordinarily carefully sculpted piece of work, which we called sufficiency language, and which said RARE II has been this special thing—the big game that the land-use planning, which under the new National Forest Management Act has to occur every fifteen years—. RARE II, plus the fact that Congress has looked at these areas, satisfies the NEPA requirement for wilderness review for only this first cycle of land-use planning. When the current plans are reviewed in the nineties, or in the late nineties, and if the roadless area has survived, its wilderness values will have to be considered again.

The review is declared only because Congress has supplemented it. The Forest Service review as supplemented by Congress's own look allows us to declare that the wilderness option has been considered sufficiently for this round. That was the best we could do. I think I probably asserted my role in being involved in that simply because I felt so strongly that we should never have filed such lawsuits. Now that the fat was in the fire, we ought to get out of there with the least damaging arrangement. It was literally a no-option. Burton or his staff or somebody just said, "If you don't want to come, I'll write it myself."

Lage: What was Burton's view and how was he to work with?

Scott: He was a great man to work with. A strange man to work with. Very incendiary, moody, bursts of energy, not given to fine detail, but he loved, revered John Seiberling.
Two people of greater difference couldn't be imagined. John Seiberling was an extremely pedantic wonder man, given to, in the midst of a meeting, suddenly letting out with some long piece of childhood poetry that he had remembered, memorized in his childhood. A wonderful man.

Lage: Very gentlemanly in style?

Scott: Wonderfully gentlemanly. Burton was profane, drank like a fish, browbeat his staff, had huge temper tantrums, and didn't worry about fine details, but, boy, could he legislate. He was a power politician. We're talking serious. But he loved John Seiberling. This was sort of a funny dance. Burton wasn't sitting in on these negotiations for the hours that this took, three or four meetings, hours, over a period of weeks.

Lage: Was it his staff and Seiberling's staff?

Scott: Seiberling's staff. But he said, "We're going to have a California wilderness bill. Something like this is what's needed to get a California wilderness bill." That's the bottom of it.

Lage: So he knew that this was needed in Congress. To get it passed in Congress.

Scott: Absolutely. Everybody knew. The minute Judge Karlton signed that decision, everybody knew that the price—.

Lage: Did Huey Johnson get into any of this now, with all of this?

Scott: They played a role which—. I was not involved in the lobbying of the California wilderness bill. Russ Shea, our Sierra Club California representative at that time, and Tim Mahoney were intimately involved in it, and I had many other fish to fry with Alaska and with Northwest matters. So I was not intimately involved in the California bill. My own field at the time was one of—I had met Huey over the years—exasperation, that the subtleties of the politics of all of this and implications for states whose politics were very different from California—states like Wyoming and Idaho where there were no indigenous Phil Burtons—had not been taken into consideration by the State of California in its action. I was a realist so I didn't stand around crying in my beer for very long.

This was now the new political reality of no-cut national forest wilderness, and there was nothing to be done about it except get on with it. We were going to have these statewide bills which implied great tradeoff between acreage. "Well, I don't want more than a million acres," so you would get areas sliced in boundaries because somebody didn't think that you could go more than a million acres. It got into a kind of tradeoff game rather than specific boundaries and so forth.

Then again, we were adding wilderness in wholesale lumps. In 1984, the immediate aftermath of all of this—with Tim Mahoney doing an absolutely brilliant job of
coordinating the whole works, let alone lobbying—was that we passed twenty-two state wilderness bills for almost nine million acres. Almost as much as the original Wilderness Act had. The largest amount in one Congress, ever, in one year, 1984. But it was living within these new realities.

Then of course, the timber industry and the Forest Service in subsequent years had made four or five attempts, about which I am not a student, to unstring the sufficiency language and to go from (it's also known as) soft release to something that is very hard release, that is permanent and that operates in a very different way. Tim is a master of understanding all of that, and I am certainly not.

The California wilderness bill which set this thing passed the House in July of 1980. But then the timber industry got greedy, and they got a hold of Sam Hayakawa, the junior senator from California at that time. In March of 1981, he introduced for himself, Mr. McClure of Idaho, Mr. Helms of North Carolina, Mr. Heflin of Alabama and Mr. Symms of Idaho, a national hard-release bill called the RARE II Review Act of 1981. We just went nuts over this. We started issuing giant mailers both in California and out, the "Dangers of Release Language," and so forth. That history, while I was involved, now as the director of federal affairs in San Francisco, in kibitzing about all of this, this is Tim's era. Much of this is covered at least in summary form in Dennis Roth's book. An oral history with Tim Mahoney ought to be a very high priority, because if Mike McCloskey was the Sierra Club's wilderness guy in the sixties and early seventies, and if Doug Scott was the Sierra Club's chief wilderness guy along with John McComb and Chuck Clusen in the seventies and early eighties, at some point in there (1980-81), Tim took that role, and for the first time someone in our Washington office was really the guru of wilderness.

Tim did a brilliant job. And the subtleties, as compared to my day when these things were all fairly simple and straight-forward, all of these release-language fights and twenty-two separate wilderness bills and all that were intricate, and Tim did an absolutely masterful job. It shouldn't be part of my oral history. It should be part of his.

Lage: Is he still with the club?

Scott: No, Tim retired from the club last year and is doing some teaching. He is very much around the edges of all this stuff. We have had several little release battles, particularly in Montana. He lives in Washington and is right there.

Lage: Washington DC?

Scott: Washington DC, and he is right there participating in all of this. Nonetheless, the unhappiness of statewide bills—we took advantage of that. If that was going to be the new reality, we did some awfully good work with that. The upshot of all of this period of history is that as a result of the inventory process, and even with these changes in the fundamental ground rules, and even with release or sufficiency language, we have
added now far more de facto wilderness all the way through Congress and designated than anyone could imagine when RARE I started.

In most states, east and west, the issue is not a hotbed of controversy. In most states, a post-RARE II statewide bill has been enacted. Life is going on. The timber industry hasn't gone belly up. In Montana where we were long in the pattern of passing individual bills, or in little packages, there is another post RARE II bill. There has never been statewide sufficiency applied in Montana, and nothing has ever happened in Idaho since the passage of Gospel-Hump in the Endangered American Wilderness Act and the enactment of the River of No Return Wilderness, the old Idaho primitive area. So there is no statewide sufficiency language there.

I might add that there was a little side episode. We were in the process while all this release fight stuff was going on of passing the River of No Return Wilderness, which is a big story on its own but I'm not going to go into it here, in Idaho, working of course with Frank Church and his staff guy, Fred Hutchinson. Cecil Andrus, the former governor and now again governor of Idaho was secretary of the interior and was very deeply involved in this personally. The first effort to get release language in a bill was Senator McClure's effort to put explicit release language in the River of No Return wilderness bill in the Senate. We beat him on the Senate floor by saying, "No, no, we can handle this just by some language in the committee report," which was what we hoped to do. But that didn't last very long at all.

What I was doing in all of this period, and certainly by 1980-81, I was still following these wilderness things intently, but a whole generation of new field staff was doing the work. The leadership had shifted to Tim Mahoney in Washington. The thing that I was doing in the late seventies and in 1980 was the Alaska lands bill. We had done the Hells Canyon bill; it passed Congress ultimately in 1975. The Alpine Lakes passed the Congress, I believe, in 1976. I don't have my reference book. That's a whole story, though a good bit of that story is documented in a book called *Backyard Wilderness*, published by the Mountaineers, by David Knibb [1982].

Dave was one of the ringleaders of ALPS and documented it. I'm not sure I agree with every interpretation he's given to what happened, but my role and the flow of events such as Dave knew them in the Alpine Lakes is very thoroughly documented in that book. I don't believe he used my archival material at the University of Washington. I think he just relied on his own voluminous records. So some perspective on what I was doing as the chief lobbyist may have been lost in that rendition, but I've not had access to those papers. Hells Canyon is in a book I've already referenced here, and Alpine Lakes is in Dave's book, so I don't think we need to go through those in detail.

In 1975, I don't remember just what time of year, the relationship that I had entered into and the living together that I had entered into with Shelley McIntyre came to an end in an extremely unpleasant and difficult way, which led me right into therapy with a very nice woman. I would go to my office and at least once a week I would repair to her office and try to sort myself out. Looking back on it, there were two or three obvious things. She could have said, "Why don't you do this?" Her style was to—.
Lage: Get you to say it.

Scott: —get me to say it and it took forever. I think the only thing to be said is that since I couldn't enjoy life the way I might have liked to enjoy it, I was enjoying the pathos of my unhappiness to a considerable extent. At one point in the midst of all that, Larry Williams was still in Oregon with the Oregon Environmental Council, and he and I went on a vacation to Mexico. I remember that the timing of that was, I think, early 1975, because it was when Hells Canyon was signed. We were trying to find a newspaper in Mexico City at the airport that would tell us whether—. Because there was some question whether Gerald Ford would sign Hells Canyon or whether he would veto it. I also recollect that Larry and I and another friend a year later were in southern Oregon en route to Ashland to go to the Shakespeare Festival on a little vacation when I left the dinner table in, I think, Grant's Pass, Oregon, and called the White House to discover that Ford had signed the Alpine Lakes bill. So those were going in that period.

But I went through this period of unhappiness and more than a year of at least occasionally seeing this therapist and trying to sort out my life and for the first time in my life, entering the dating scene and being an abysmal failure. [laughter] Even when I was by any practicable measure successful, I didn't like it. My friends who were seeing the further decline of Doug Scott into unhappy bachelorhood, sort of holed up in this little house that I now lived in alone in Seattle—. I think the counselor brought herself to say to me at one point that the chances that the woman of my dreams would choose that little dead-end street, see that there was a house down the slope behind that hedge, come through the gate, knock on the door and say, "Hello," were fairly limited. [laughter]

Now, through all this period, having been involved in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act intimately in the enactment of what became Section 17(d)(2)—.

Lage: I think we better turn this tape over.

[End Tape 16, Side A]

[Begin Tape 16, Side B]

Scott: Intensively in 1971—and my papers about this will be in the Bancroft Library even though they were from my time at the Wilderness Society—the Wilderness Society, and the Sierra Club, and other groups, but with those two in the leadership, became terribly engrossed in the fact that Congress was in the act of passing legislation to resolve the aboriginal land claims of the Alaskan native and Indian peoples, a subject which the Congress had ignored for a long time. It had not resolved them at statehood and only discovered that they were interested in resolving out of an abundance of concern for the well-being of the native peoples.

When oil was discovered at Prudhoe Bay, the native claims seriously complicated land titles for the Alaska pipeline. Meanwhile, while the Wilderness Society and a couple
of other groups were suing over the Alaska pipeline and the lawsuit was carried clear to the Supreme Court, which we won, but under pressure from the oil companies and the State of Alaska and the natives and civil rights groups and so forth, and the Nixon Administration, legislation was moving through Congress to resolve the native claims and basically to do so by the natives disclaiming any further aboriginal claim of right to lands in Alaska in exchange for a grant of certain lands. It ended up being 44 million acres of land and a tax payment, which ended up being just shy of a billion dollars.

From what I know of it, were I an Alaska native leader, I would conclude today that that was an extremely poor deal for a variety of reasons. But it's a deal that they accepted. Not only that but Wayne Aspinall was the chairman of the House Interior Committee and not a known leader in civil rights issues. And Lloyd Meeds, a congressman from Washington State, was then the chairman of the Indian Affairs subcommittee. I believe he was then the chairman, anyway he was a leader in this cause for the Alaska native. A number of conservationists in Alaska and several farsighted conservationists in the lower '48 who were deeply experienced in Alaska grasped that this settlement could not be allowed to go by without some effort to assure that the national interest in potential national parks and wildlife refuges and wilderness and wild and scenic rivers were also at the party.

The reason was that the settlement of the Alaska lands claims would resolve the land freeze that Secretary of Interior Udall had placed on Alaska in 1969. He already saw that the pipeline was coming and all of this now sudden enthusiasm for the state's getting its selected land—the state selected Prudhoe Bay, that's why they get the revenues from Prudhoe Bay, not the federal government—under their statehood grants. Now the natives were going to get a bunch of land. But until that was all resolved, he froze any further—.

Lage: Did he freeze it with the thought of preserving wilderness lands?

Scott: I don't know what was in his mind. I'm sure the histories have been done about that.

Lage: Do you know who was behind the conservation impulse?

Scott: It is not the case that there were no conservationists in Alaska, and that someone from the lower 48 had to fly up there and come across this idea. There were terrific conservation leaders in Alaska: Dixie Baade, Jack Calvin, two in the Southeast; Mardy Murie, who had spent a lot of time in Alaska and had lived there in the twenties and before. There were numerous staff people of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park Service. There were after all parks and refuges in Alaska. There were in Anchorage a crowd of people: Dave Hickok, who was a Fish and Wildlife Service person and a woman who became his wife, Mark Ganapole, later Mark Ganapole Hickok. There were crowds of these people, and they were worrying about how to protect places in Alaska.
The Wilderness Society had had from its inception a special resonance with Alaska. Bob Marshall, the leading figure in the founding of the Wilderness Society, had spent some of his most formative time in Alaska and written a Pulitzer Prize winning (won a Pulitzer Prize, I think) account called *Arctic Village* of his year spent in a village in Alaska. So there were lots of connections to Alaska. Conservationists Dick Leonard and his wife Doris Leonard, and Doris' conservation group, the name of which—.

Lage: Conservation Associates.

Scott: Conservation Associates. William O. Douglas. All these people had worked in the Eisenhower Administration to get the Arctic Wildlife Range, as it was then called, established by presidential order. So it wasn't as though until the late 1960s nobody knew that Alaska was there. The impulse for the native claims then came from some of these people in Alaska. I have heard it attributed to Dave Hickok and know that to be true to this extent. In 1969 or 1970, Senator Jackson had a bill for a native claims resolution. It didn't pass that year. It had a paragraph in it that was very broad and loose but said, "In the process of all this, we ought to think about the potential for these kinds of lands." That is attributed, as far as I know accurately, to Dave Hickok.

Stewart Brandborg and Harry Crandall at the Wilderness Society, and in particular Harry, were a source of this impulse. These were people who were in Washington watching this flow of events in the Wilderness Society. The Sierra Club was not a party to the suit on the pipeline because they didn't think it could be won. They had been told by their counsel that it couldn't be won. Boy, were they wrong. I remember when that suit was filed, I was running a teach-in at the University of Michigan and I remember calling Mike McCloskey about something and saying, "Hey, has the Sierra Club..." He said, "Hey, get on board." Well, we decided we weren't going to do it.

So the Wilderness Society had a full-time staff guy, Jimmy Dean, in Washington worrying about Alaska, as well as Harry's worry about Alaska, and had an agent in Anchorage, as did the Sierra Club. For a while, they had the same agent, a man named Alan Weeden. If you look back, particularly in the *Living Wilderness* magazine in that era, these were things that were being discussed. As the ferment for the Native Claims bill in 1971 came to a crescendo, I was present when Harry Crandall said, "We've got to get on top of this. No conservationist is testifying." We prepared testimony and Stewart Brandborg was the only conservationist who testified and got raked over the coals by Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska for his trouble in asserting all this.

Simultaneously—and no great idea emerged in any one person's head in all of history as far as I can tell—Ed Wayburn had started going to Alaska, Ed and Peggy, in 1967, and they were coming up the learning curve about issues in Alaska. Based on Ed's incredible depth of experience in redwoods and other political things, and his closeness with Philip Burton, he was bringing the Sierra Club along so that the board made Alaska a priority at some point in that time. Resolutions were passed at several of the wilderness conferences. The wilderness conference, I think the one in 1969, was about Alaska (anyway, one of them was).
So here too was an instinct. All of this came together around the native claims fight, the ringleadership of which was carried on by the Wilderness Society and Lloyd Tupling, the Sierra Club's Washington representative, with frequent involvement of Ed Wayburn (who was still active in his medical career so he wasn't on the scene), and Jack Hession, who had been hired in 1969 I'm going to say, as the Sierra Club's Alaska representative and he is still there today. Jack, as he is well-known for doing, simply moved to Washington. Jack and I, and Ernie Dickerman, another staff member at the Wilderness Society, Harry Crandall, Brandborg often, Tup and a few other people organized an effort. My files are replete with the drafting and redrafting and redrafting—if anybody ever gets interested in this, some poor graduate will have to try and figure it out, but I didn't date everything—variations on the amendments.

Support for this concept was pretty good in the Senate. Senator Jackson and Senator Bible were the chief advocates, and Ed Wayburn and Lloyd Tupling were working particularly with them. The big problem was the House. We got Congressman John Saylor, the ranking Republican on the Interior Committee, and Congressman Mo Udall, then a fairly junior member but already a highly effective member of the committee, to collaborate in a land-planning amendment that failed in the full committee. Their collaboration was phony, and we often were playing a kind of middleman role to keep them together, which involved on my part a good deal of running back and forth from Ann Dunbar, who was the chief genius in addition to Mr. Saylor himself. Ann was his long-time alter ego and legislative assistant. And a variety of people on Udall's staff.

Lage: Were they different on the issues?

Scott: There was a stylistic, partisan, and generational difference between Mo and Saylor. Saylor was a crusty individual. It was a great pleasure to even know him. On my twenty-sixth birthday, which was very important between me and my draft board, it just by accident happened that the Wilderness Society staff was having a little appreciation dinner at the Cosmos Club on Massachusetts Avenue in Washington to honor John Saylor and Ann Dunbar and just tell them what great guys they were. It was just Brandborg and Crandall (I guess Crandall was there). It wasn't ten people, but a woman who worked with Brandy, whose name is [Virginia] Peeps Carney, had arranged with the Cosmos Club—it was a complete surprise to me—so that the door burst open and in came a big sheet cake which had something like, "The U.S. Army's loss is the wilderness' gain," decorated on it, in honor of my escaping the draft.

I don't know what Saylor thought of that. He was not anti-war or anything even faintly like it, but he was the advocate's advocate for wilderness. He was just indefatigable. Hells Canyon, just all these issues over the years, the wilderness bill and so forth, and to have known and worked as closely as I did with him for a period of years was—. Again, as with Church I wasn't intimate friends. We didn't hang around together socially. I was rather young and wet behind the ears. But I did a lot of leg work and a lot of writing for Mr. Saylor.

Lage: How did he react to the long hair? Not just then but in general?
Scott: It was fairly common then.

Lage: There was no problem with that?

Scott: It was fairly common. Mine was particularly unruly and unhelpful. I remember I went to a student conference in Iowa and then on to North Dakota on an organizing trip. My old friend Barbara Reed, who had been one of the ringleaders of the environmental teach-in nationally, was at this thing in Iowa. I had a severe haircut because I was going to very rural North Dakota to organize. She came unraveled about how I had compromised my principles by cutting my hair. I don't remember John Saylor particularly caring one way or the other.

We took a native amendment—. I believe I invented, continuing in the rhetorical tradition that Zahnie had schooled me in from the grave—. Originally we had a planning amendment. It was the Udall-Saylor Planning Amendment, but that didn't have any particular sex appeal. It was for parks and refuges and wild rivers and wilderness and so forth. The generic name that we extracted from all of that was the “national interest lands.” The state was going to get its incredibly generous selection of lands. The natives were now going to get their selection of lands. Industry was going to get its land. Everybody had been taken care of except the national interest in these kinds of units.

So we concocted the Udall-Saylor National Interests Lands Amendment for the floor. We put together around them the Alaska Coalition, which was invented by the Wilderness Society and which was one of these free-form things with no by-laws at that stage and no leadership. It was just the Alaska Coalition. I remember a very funny episode. There was an incredible old guy running the National Parks and Conservation Association in that area. He had been around forever and was named Anthony Wayne Smith, widely known as Mad Anthony, who was a very strange character. I remember Brandborg laughing uproariously one day that Smith had called him. Smith had a thing called the Environmental Coalition of America or some hoked up thing that never amounted to anything. He called up Brandborg and complained that we were using the word "coalition" and that was his word. [laughter]

We put together this coalition and mailings. I remember on one Sunday morning, we had lost a House vote but only by a margin of forty votes, so that if twenty members had changed it would have gone the other way. It was an incredible achievement. We ran this campaign out of a room in the Rayburn House Office Building that was loaned to us by John Dingell and Al Ullman, who jointly controlled this room. We had our own phones strung in and were operating our lobbying operation right from there. Ernie Dickerman and I were coordinating the lobbyists, which was a patchwork of George Alderman and Gary Soucie from Friends of the Earth, and Lloyd Tupling and others from the Sierra Club, and a mob of us from the Wilderness Society, and Jack Hession and whoever else we could scrounge up, and doing for those days a very intensive campaign.
We were against the Nixon Administration, Aspinall, and the entrenched leadership of the House and the House committee, the Interior Department, all the usual mining, gouging and scraping industries in Alaska, the State of Alaska and its delegation in the Congress, the national business establishment, chamber of commerce, etc., and the natives. And because of the natives, the national civil rights establishment, and I'm talking the most established, top civil rights spokesmen of that era. They were opposed, at least in part and maybe the most part, because Aspinall in his dictatorial way had said, "I will not let a native claims bill go the House floor unless I have it from you in blood that you will oppose any amendment that I oppose." The native leaders simply had to make that commitment to him and be bound by it or he simply would never allow the bill. In that era, this is pre-Watergate, this is old-fashioned Congress—. It is very hard for people today to imagine that that is how the Congress worked.

I talked earlier, on the SST, about the secret voting procedures on the House floor so you couldn't hold people to their votes. All that has changed. Mo Udall, incidentally, was one of the leaders of the House reform. Dick [?] and Mo Udall and others were leaders of the Young Turks who forced this change and then Watergate really accelerated it by causing such a large turnover in the House in 1974.

So the natives had made this unholy alliance. In that day, when you introduced a bill, you could only have twenty co-sponsors on a bill with the same number. If you wanted more, then you had to introduce a bill. We had finally, and my files are full of the drafts of this amendment (it was very complex), concocted our amendment. Mo introduced it in the House as a new bill with twenty co-sponsors. My list is there of how we carefully collected this proof of co-sponsors to get all shades of opinions, conservatives, Republicans, people from all the different regions to tap in, which is a way of saying, "This is a prominent thing. You ought to pay attention to this." Because then you get all these guys to sign joint letters to the rest of the House. Then somebody would go through and say, "Oh, another southerner is for this. That's a guy who thinks like I think, so this must be okay." This is sort of a standard procedure. We got just the right twenty.

One of the twenty was a young freshman congressman from Berkeley and Oakland, California, named Ron Dellums. Tall, courtly, already prominent in the news, a high image, a kind of young, with-it congressman.

Lage: He didn't mind the civil rights being against it?

Scott: Oh, he minded greatly. The morning of the vote, which I believe was October 20, 1971, literally the morning, debate had started the previous day on the House floor, Dellums or his guy, and for the life of me I have never been able to resurrect the name of the guy, somehow got our number in this. We received word to call his office from our secret hideaway in the Rayburn building. They called, and they said that Mr. Dellums is beside himself. He is under enormous pressure from the civil rights movement, and he is going to renounce his co-sponsorship of the Udall-Saylor amendment.
On that kind of time scale, you simply can't have anybody renouncing, getting up and giving a big speech and saying, "That's right. It is anti-civil rights." We were having enough trouble getting our liberal friends to stay with. Even with a liberal's liberal like Mo, a lot of people were under a lot of pressure. The civil rights movement wasn't just going to endorse this and go off on its own business. They were all over it.

Lage: This was all because of what Aspinall said?

Scott: Yes. There was not going to be a settlement of the native claims unless they passed this bill, and he would not accept this amendment. He could have said, "No bill." He absolutely had that control.

The chairman of the Rules Committee could simply say that he didn't like civil rights bills. Not so many years earlier, he would simply go back to Virginia and paint his barn, and there would be no bill because you couldn't get it through the Rules Committee because the chair wasn't around. They could put stuff in their bottom drawer and just leave it there.

Lage: Would people like Dellums come up with some ideological reasons or would they say, "I'm not for it because of what Aspinall said."

Scott: I'm sure that the letters, and one would have to go find them, there may be a few in my files, in which civil rights spokesman were saying why they were opposed to the Udall-Saylor Amendment, they must have manufactured some reasons. I know that people not known for their commitment to civil rights, like Wayne Aspinall, were making outrageous assertions that this was anti-civil rights. Just asserting that, and to prove that, saying, "Look at this list of prominent civil rights people who say so."

Well, Dellums had been leaned on. I don't know. I have a suspicion but I'm not going to say it, but some very prominent somebody had gotten to him personally and just told him—. Because he had already—. This was a subject of controversy, certainly in the circles that he ran in. So he said, "I want to talk to you people." So Lloyd Tupling and Jack Hession and I, and maybe somebody else there, went running, literally running—that afternoon they were going to be voting—to Dellums' office, which was painted in very bold colors. One wall would be bright orange and another wall bright blue. I haven't shaken his hand since. I haven't spoken to him since, and you know, he's my congressman. He votes better than we do so we don't spend a lot of our time with him.

He was pacing up and down. His wife was there. She said he had spent a sleepless night. He said that he had just come to the Congress, and he had come to fight the war in Vietnam and for justice and all these things. He knew he had taken on powerful people and that was what he had come to do, but this was just outrageous. He was so upset because something he thought was a good thing, our amendment, was being attacked by these people. He didn't want to be in support of something—. He gave a speech a day or so earlier in which he had said, "If I thought that this was anything but complete justice for the natives, that this amendment had some effect on their settlement..." He was pacing up and down.
We were feverish. He got to it before we pointed it out to him. He was saying, "Now, I don't understand why they say this isn't about civil rights. What's the structure?" We were going through how our amendment worked relative to the bill. What the bill did was say that, under statehood, the state has the right to select 103 million acres of land. They selected some. They had tens of millions of acres of rights left they get preferably. Then come the natives. They have 34 million acres they could select, but they come after the state, so they are second in line. Many of their selections, most of their selections are tied to native village locations. They can't just go anywhere. Under our deal, then come the national interest lands.

He said, “Well, wait a minute.” He got it even before we had to point it out to him. “The thing that is anti-civil rights is the bill. If you wanted to do justice to the natives, you would put them on top. Let them have Prudhoe Bay or places like that. They would go around Alaska and find the stuff that was of the most resource value. But the state gets to pick the place clean. There are no limits on what they can choose. The natives are tied to their land, and then comes the national interest. So the national interest isn’t threatening the natives. The natives are getting screwed by the state.” Of course, the state was wildly for this.

I said to him, “You know, we could amend that.” He said, “I like that. What would that look like?” I have in my files, written in orange magic marker (which was apparently all I had) on a copy of the bill, the amendment we would do to fix it so that the natives came first and weren’t tied to their land. The state came second. Their period for making their selections would be extended by however much longer it took.

He liked this. He said, “That sounds good to me. Let’s get this drafted up properly.” We went screaming over to the legislative counsel’s office. We got with a young member in the legislative counsel’s staff and put it in the proper form. Then we went roaring back to his office, and we went roaring over to the House floor. He went marching in, and we went up in the gallery. Tourists and people would sit in the gallery of the House of Representatives, whom I felt very sorry for because it’s like watching a ballet if you don’t know anything about it. It’s sort of people milling around and talking to each other and someone blabbing away. But if you know what’s happening, then it is wonderful to watch. Here comes this tall freshman congressman, walks up to this short, older powerful House titan, Wayne Aspinall, and Lloyd Meeds, and said, “Could I have a word with you?”

What he must have said is, “You all have been saying that my amendment, that I am a co-sponsor of with Mr. Udall, is anti-civil rights. I want to make this bill better for the natives. I am going to offer the following amendment.” My joke then and subsequently was that Mr. Meeds headed for the men’s room. He was droning on about something, and all hell broke loose. Here was this young freshman who was messing around with the power structure, and he was going to do it, and they knew he was going to do it. He said, “I’m a little tired of you bashing my amendment, casting it in this way, so here’s what I’m going to do.”
So he came back out. We were all gathered around a big long table in the Speaker’s Lobby, which is an ornate room. I think it’s called something else now. But we were around a long table. He was sitting, as I recollect, at the head of the table, and I was at one side. We were all gathered around and everybody hunched over me. “Now, Ron, here’s the . . . .” “But what if they say . . ?” Kind of getting up all our ducks in a row, because this was a gutsy thing. A freshman who hardly knew how to find the House floor. This was taking on the power structure back then. Big moxie.

Out of nowhere materialized a very powerful member of Congress, not personally acquainted with me at that time, who invited himself; he came uninvited. He sat where he was sort of looking at Dellums but was mostly looking right at me. (At least, this is my memory of it.) He said, “I really want to encourage you, bud.” Who told him? “I think you folks are asking this young member to do something which will be very damaging to his career here and to his future influence,” and just laid this incredible message on us. It was all as though Dellums wasn’t there. “You’re asking this young member, I think this is very unwise. I want to urge you to reconsider.” Because what was going to happen if Dellums got up and offered this amendment? The natives had flown in, not just their leadership. The galleries were loaded with Alaska natives. People were watching this and all that. The native people were going to see what their leaders had agreed to, which was second-class status in the land selection. The native leaders were going to have to stay with their oath to Aspinall of opposing an amendment that would put them in first place. This was just going to play havoc with the power arrangement that everybody thought they had gotten worked out.

Lage: Are you going to say the name of this member of Congress?
Scott: Yes. In due course, Mr. Burton got up and walked away. Lloyd Tupling, who had been around power on Capitol Hill so long, was sitting there, white as a sheet. I must have been trembling. Dellums said, “That doesn’t cut any shit with me.” [laughter] Those are the words I remember, or words to that effect. The power structure had come to speak to us in no uncertain terms, and it was a senior power guy from the California delegation.

Lage: But didn’t Phil Burton understand what was happening?
Scott: This wasn’t a discussion. This was a message, and then he left. So Dellums went marching back in and said, “I’m going to do it.” I suppose that’s what he said. They then said, “Well, all right. We will all get up and give little speeches saying how unfortunate it is that anyone might argue that the Udall amendment is anti-civil rights because of course it isn’t.” These other people had been arguing it. He said, “If you do that, I will not offer my amendment. There is no point in going down in flames here.” Which would get us what we were after, which was to defuse this issue and not have liberals . . .

So there ensued a little scene of Mr. Aspinall and Mr. Meeds giving little speeches. “Thanking my good friend, Mr. Dellums, for asking the question.” This is the way I
remember it. I have not refreshed my memory by looking at the Congressional Record. I hope that it’s all there.

This was a side episode. But, boy, it fused in my mind. It’s never been reported anywhere. It was just a wonderful moment of how power worked then, and how Young Turks were messing with that power. The House went on to defeat the bill, but by a very narrow margin, and given that we had the support of Senator Bible and Senator Jackson for something in the Senate, the House and Senate agreed on the amendment in conference, and it passed.

[End Tape 16, Side B]
Interview 7: December 5, 1990

[Begin Tape 17, Side A]

Lage: Today is December 5, 1990, and since our last meeting, you've discovered some new materials. So why don't we start by going back.

Scott: Yes. This has to do with the early evolution of the de facto wilderness issue, prior to RARE I. My recollection is, and it's going to be clear from the documentary record, that the Forest Service had proceeded to issue their documents about it internally and had had it underway and it was a thing that they were doing before we caught on to it, and that we all went running over. My guess is that was something like maybe November of, I think it must have been, 1971.

Be that as it may, earlier than that, and we've talked at length about the individual citizen initiatives of going around the Forest Service and going straight to Congress with de facto wilderness proposals in legislative form, notably the Lincoln Scapegoat in Montana, we had a number of those introduced in bill form. We had others which had been developed by citizen groups that had come to our attention but bills hadn't been introduced, either because of hostility of the particular congressional delegation or whatever. In the fall of 1970 and the spring of 1971, we undertook what—I have now refreshed my memory from the documents that I have—was a quite conscious decision to escalate the de facto wilderness issue on the national forests. We did this by drafting (I drafted) an omnibus de facto wilderness bill that was introduced by Congressman John Saylor.

I believe an early version was introduced late in the Congress in the fall of 1970.

Lage: This was with the Wilderness Society.

Scott: This was Wilderness Society, yes. I have a March 13, 1971, memorandum. That is a Saturday, and this is sort of typical—I was in my monk status then and was very often in the office all weekend—and on Saturday, March 13, 1971, there I was.

Lage: Does this say 1971? I know that—.

Scott: It does later. I got it from the context. I found a memo that I prepared for Stewart M. Brandborg, the executive director of the Wilderness Society on the subject, "Status: Saylor De Facto Measure." This was reporting to Brandborg on what obviously was an ongoing project of preparing this legislative package for Mr. Saylor. In this memo I say that the measure is scheduled for introduction on Monday or Tuesday, and that the only change to report to him is that we have just added the Siskiyou Wilderness proposal in California, which was 153,000 acres. We were talking about Mike
McCloskey earlier. My recollection is that 153 is already bigger than whatever Mike McCloskey’s letter saying how big it ought to be said.

Attached to this memo to Brandborg was my draft of a speech for Congressman Saylor, and I said about it in the memo, "The general intent is to be a bit more outspoken than previously on the issue of Forest Service insensitivity to the de facto problem. The point here is to build the relationship between the de facto issue and the broader issue of Forest Service troubles." Note too the mention of lack of compliance with NEPA when the Forest Service invades de facto areas. The point of that, and of getting John Dingell (I'm paraphrasing) to co-sponsor this bill is to set up—and I don't know from the documents available to me whether Mr. Dingell did end up co-sponsoring this bill, but he was the father of NEPA, the National Environmental Policy Act, in the House. And he was an original sponsor of the wilderness bill way back, and at that time a very close friend of the public lands movement. The point of getting Dingell to co-sponsor is to set up the foundation for the later issue of NEPA compliance. So we were plotting then and there that we were going to nail them on the NEPA appeal some other way.

Lage: So this just didn't happen.

Scott: This didn't just happen.

Lage: I know that it's a long way back, but do you recall when you first realized, or who first realized how important NEPA could be?

Scott: NEPA passed the Congress in 1969 and was signed by President Nixon on New Year's Day, I believe, of 1970, so it is always called the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970. It was passed in 1969. I had paid attention to it as a graduate student of policy. A professor, Dr. Lynton Caldwell, who I believe was from Indiana, had in some way that historians will find, become very influential with Senator Jackson. Caldwell's theory about how environmental statements could get federal agencies to pay attention to environmental alternatives became the concept of NEPA. Scoop [Senator Henry] Jackson, to his lasting credit, became the advocate of this. It would be interesting to know (I do not know) how conscious he and his staff were of the full implications. From what I remember of my readings of Caldwell, I think he was conscious of it.

I did attend several hearings about NEPA, which must have been the summer of 1969 when I was working in the Senate. I was vaguely aware and following what was going on with it. The Senate passed it. It came from Jackson's committee. I'm not quite sure how, but Jackson got the Senate committee jurisdiction as a sort of strange phenomenon. This was a new concept, and he established that it was his committee's business by preparing the legislation.

In the normal course of events, this bill would go over to the House, and the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee would have a fairly legitimate claim that it was the counterpart committee on the outside. Well, Wayne Aspinall had zilch interest in this. Zilch. He did nothing. Maybe he was more hostile than that.
So John Dingell, who was then prominent, but middle of the pact in seniority (he had not risen to the enormous prominence he has in the Congress today in 1990), was a very close friend of the environmental movement and with people like Brandborg and Lloyd Tupling and others whom I was working with. I had gotten to know him fairly well through my Michigan connections and was in and out of his office on one thing or another. Dingell was the chairman of a subcommittee of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. That was the Subcommittee on Fish and Wildlife. This was the Dingell-Johnson Act and so forth. Like his father before him, Dingell is a great hunter and fisherman, particularly hunter.

And he used this subcommittee assiduously to be a very powerful force in environmental issues. So he took the NEPA bill and restyled the title to be an Amendment to the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, and for other purposes. He didn't change any of the bill. He just changed the title. By the processes of bill reference, they don't look—. At least, they didn't in that era. The parliamentarian or whoever is assigning bills to committee doesn't read through the bill to figure out where it ought to go. They look at the title. It said, "Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act," you looked it up in some book, and it said that goes to the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. Off it went to the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, which assigned it to Dingell's subcommittee, which very promptly approved the bill and sent it back out. It just went past Aspinall completely. And to this day, the committee of jurisdiction over NEPA in the House is the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. For which there is no more logic than the story I just told you.

We knew that NEPA was important and quickly, early on, got some very talented attorneys: Jim Moorman, who later came to the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Tony Ruckel. Some of the early people in the founding of NRDC took ahold of NEPA and started to use it aggressively. Nobody was paying attention to the Forest Service very much with that, but in particular it was being paid attention to by the Corps of Engineers; dredging the Cross-Florida Barge Canal was a big issue at that time, the Tennessee Tombigbee Waterway, and all kinds of water projects. Much of early NEPA law had to be litigated. Really just the case law of federal judges interpreting, "What is a major federal action? What is the necessary scope of studying alternatives? Is no action an alternative that has to be considered, not doing anything at all?" All those things had to be litigated. Endless histories have been written of the evolution of legal—.

Lage: It was very good for the legal profession.

Scott: It was wonderful for the burgeoning environmental legal profession and wonderful for environmentalists. For the first time, it gave us a handle to get ahold of decisions which otherwise were delegated by statute and the rules of statutory interpretation to very broad agency discretion. The Forest Service has enormous discretion. Well, NEPA was the first thing that gave us a handle on this.

Lage: I think this shows how early you recognized—.
Scott: We recognized that there was some potential there. Now, in the circles that were hanging around and doing this—. And of course, the Wilderness Society was at that point on the cutting edge of NEPA law with this incredible lawsuit against the Alaska pipeline which, among other things was full of NEPA claims. Ultimately the Department of Interior wrote a NEPA statement that was so heavy—I'm not saying meritorious—so voluminous that the NEPA claim was not the one that ultimately won that lawsuit.

On the other hand there were no lawyers around our office, and so we weren't sitting around hatching some integrated strategy that had some brilliant insight about how we were going to unfold a brilliant legal strategy on the Forest Service. But this memo of March 13, 1971, surely indicates, and probably there is more in the record, that we were thinking creatively about lay environmental work. One of the things that I always prided myself on was paying attention to the details, and one step taken here could come back over there later. If, in a speech that was drafted here, Congressman Saylor said something useful, that would be quoted later over there someplace, and it was established in congressional intent and laying a legal groundwork.

We were also working on major questions then. There was a huge fight going on in the Congress about clearcutting. There were big controversies about clearcutting in the West, in Montana and in Wyoming in particular. The Wilderness Society was very forwardly involved in those. We were thinking about major Forest Service reform legislation. So I say in this memo, "Dingell's involvement also sets a foundation for his subsequent introduction of the forestry bill." Now, I'm not quite sure; one would have to go back and look to see exactly what that was about. "We finally note that Saylor's speech may be useful in promoting the de facto moratorium proposition in general, including possible presidential work on this subject."

If you read Dennis Roth's history, there is sort of this latent mystery about an opposed presidential executive order telling all the federal agencies, but most particularly the Forest Service, to leave alone all the de facto wilderness and to study it systematically. My recollection was that this was an idea wholly invented in the brain of Harry Crandall, my colleague at the Wilderness Society who was a long-time Fish and Wildlife Service bureaucrat and knew how the internal administration mechanism could be used.

We drafted (I had a hand in it, but Harry did the yeoman's work) a presidential executive order, and my recollection is that through the good offices of Russell Train, the chair of the Council on Environmental Quality which was set up by NEPA some time in about 1971, this draft executive order simply moved into the paperwork in the White House.

Lage: Did you expect to get it signed?
Scott: It came very close to being signed. What you see in Roth's history is that the agencies got all excited about, "Where did this come from?" They hadn't started it, and no one would let on. We just plopped it in the middle of the upper echelons of the executive branch.

Lage: Through Crandall?

Scott: Through Brandborg, who in particular had this relationship with Russell Train. My recollection is that's how it proceeded. I'm sure there was more to it that Harry will remember. This was sort of multi-faceted. We were putting the heat on the Forest Service about these de facto wilderness areas. Saylor's speech, which I drafted, and I have in the archives not only my draft (which I'm sure doesn't say what number of draft it was) but also then Stewart Brandborg's hand-written comments back on how to fuss with this draft. I believe this bill was introduced, and I believe this speech was put in the Congressional Record in pretty much the form that I prepared it. I don't have it here.

But the speech is very hard-nosed. If Saylor used it as written, and he probably would have because he was a very ferocious guy—. In fact, I always had this dream subcommittee for the chewing up of bureaucrats that I was going to invent. It was going to be John Dingell, John Saylor, and John Moss, the congressman from California, the three of whom were by my observation holy terrors on bureaucrats. Dingell would do things. He would have somebody up in front of him, some sort of general from the Corps of Engineers, and he would say, "I don't have that paper with me." Dingell would say, "We're sitting here. Get down to your office and get back here with it as quickly as you can and we'll be waiting." Just wonderful things.

So this speech is full of—and I was surprised when I was reading it over this morning—very toothsome attacks on the Forest Service and its alleged deliberate attack on de facto wilderness and resistance to de facto wilderness. The point of this bill was to bring together it turns out (in this version of the bill, anyway) ten citizen de facto wilderness proposals and put them in one bill, not because we ever thought we were going to pass it. But all of these are in the wilderness system today and in many cases with larger boundaries than were reflected in this 1971 draft. But our purpose wasn't to pass it. Our purpose was to use it to coalesce into a bigger focal point for the campaign, and a bigger pressure tactic on the Forest Service, the congressional interest in de facto wilderness. Prior to that, well, Senator Randolph had a bill for the areas in West Virginia and Senator Metcalf had a bill in for the Lincoln Scapegoat wilderness and somebody from Alabama had the Sipsey, but the Forest Service might view that as just sort of a piecemeal, and not get excited. This was to raise their excitement factor.

I will assert, pending being proven wrong by the historical record, that this was a major step that led the Forest Service to say, "We had better get ahead of the curve here and do our own inventory."

Lage: This was 1971. I hope researchers will be able to locate it in your Bancroft papers.
Scott: Brandborg's written notes are around the margin of the speech, and it would be good to get the final speech and see if it says this, but he was saying, "We need to add a paragraph calling for more citizen groups to draft more proposals so that Saylor's bill may be introduced to gain for them the next chance. So this is a tight specimen bill, a beginning for national de facto inventory." That's written right there in Brandborg's handwriting. I presume (he told me to do it) that I probably modified the speech.

The bill which I also drafted included the Lincoln Scapegoat Wilderness, which was perceived and ultimately then was enacted, as its own independent piece of legislation. It includes a two-unit Cougar Lakes Wilderness in Washington State. That is the one that Brock and I worked out the boundary by Brock dictating over the phone to me. What was done there is I think we added a new north unit, I forget whether it was south, but it was a two-unit wilderness broken up by a road and we added a second unit, and that's what we dictated. So that dates this in the spring of 1971, when I was in contact with Brock about that. It includes the Laramie Peak Wilderness in Wyoming, it includes an area then called the Upper Selway Wilderness in Idaho, which is in fact a place called the Magruder Corrido. The history of this huge controversy in the early sixties, prior to the passage of the Wilderness Act, over the Magruder Corridor is excruciatingly detailed in a large article that I co-authored in *The Living Wilderness* in probably 1969 or 1970. That was ultimately added to the wilderness system. And it includes the River of No Return Wilderness bill in Idaho, and the additions of the Minam River, which was a long-standing de facto problem, something that Justice Douglas was also very involved in Northeastern Oregon and ultimately was an addition to the Eagle Cap Wilderness.

Lage: What river was it?

Scott: Minam. A long-time big-name-recognition fight in the Northwest—the Save the Minam, a beautiful river valley that had been excluded from that previously established wilderness. The Indian Peaks Wilderness proposal in Colorado, the three West Virginia areas, the Cranberry Wilderness, the Otter Creek Wilderness and the Dolly Sods Wilderness, the Granite Chiefs Wilderness in California and the Jewel Basin Wilderness in Montana. Then, while this was in the process of being drafted, I added (I don't know why) the Siskiyous proposal at the tent in this bill.

I recalled someplace earlier in these interviews, it was later in this process that Ray Sherwin of the board of the Sierra Club queried Mike McCloskey about why an area that he was very much involved in, which is now, I think, the Ansel Adams Wilderness, but was for years called—it's where the highway was going to go across, the Minaret Summit Highway. There was a name for that wilderness proposal for years and I've forgotten it. Sherwin queried Mike about why that wasn't in, and there is a letter in the archives of Mike's explanation about why these were chosen. So obviously this was done in some degree of collaboration with the Sierra Club, though the records I have in front of me don't allude to it.

We got a bunch of co-sponsors. Saylor's office circulated the draft bill to all members whose districts were involved. The result was that a number of congressmen co-
sponsored the bill. I would say, "Surprise, surprise, Julia Butler Hanson—" who was a congresswoman from Washington State.

Lage: She was on appropriations, right?

Scott: She was a very powerful member of the Appropriations Committee. I then said, "Aspinall said no." The Indian Peaks area was in his district. Saylor was one of these guys who believed that wilderness and public land was [of national interest]—he was from Pennsylvania and here he was, the ranking Republican on this western-oriented committee. He had no use for the theory that you should defer to the local congressman. There is this sort of assumption in the Congress. So he was fighting dams in other people's districts, introducing wilderness bills in other people's districts, but he and Ann Dunbar went to the trouble of at least circulating this bill. My memo has a little report on how that process was going.

It's interesting. In Indian Peaks, then-Congressman Boxsmith [?] of California had introduced his own bill, but it was a study bill. It was Congress directing the Forest Service to do a primitive area style study of the area. My memo was on the debate, should we support that, or should we support the direct designation. I say in this memo, "I lean towards the option of leaving it in our bill, and then that gives us the widest number of options, for both us and for Saylor, without indicating our approval of the "let's study it some more" approach to de facto areas in general.

So we were trying to figure out how you were going to get the most acreage quickly. Because the Forest Service could always come in and say, we need another study. The tendency was to do these very expensive, time-consuming studies. Aspinall insisted, in the deal on the Wilderness Bill, there had to be a thorough U.S.G.S., Bureau of Mines mineral survey of each of the primitive areas, which took forever and cost ungodly amounts of money. So Aspinall was saying, "You've got to do a mineral survey. We can't do this once in Scapegoat." In fact, finally they ordered a special mineral survey to get around his objection.

We knew there were going to be not just dozens but scores, hundreds, of de facto wilderness proposals. If we had to wait around for the Bureau of Mines it would take forever. Meanwhile the chopping goes on. So ultimately the Forest Service, by inventing RARE I, sort of outran—. And also, about this time, we defeated Aspinall in his primary and got him out of the way. When he went, that western mining domination of the committee started to erode.

At the bottom of my memo, I say to Brandborg, "I've got to get this draft speech by Monday afternoon so I need your editorial suggestions by Monday morning. Note the speech is written with sub-headlines in preparation for the cheapest possible reprinting as a little booklet, should we decide to send it out to our activists, á la the old Zahnie approach." So here I am in that same old business.
All this pile of paper reminded me more than I could remember that there was more malice aforethought to our plots and planning than I had thought previously. This Saylor omnibus bill was an important step in that direction.

Lage: This is very useful that your doing your papers while we are doing this oral history.

Scott: The moving van is coming tomorrow.

Lage: Okay. Are we ready for Alaska now?

Scott: Did you have some note here that you want to go back to?

Lage: I just want to note where we finished last time, kind of abruptly because the tape ended. We finished with the fact that the amendment, including Section 17(d)(2) (I don't think we ever put that number after it), in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act was agreed to by the House and Senate in conference, and it passed. That's where we ended the day before yesterday. We'll never get through this story if we do a whole blow by blow—.

Scott: Oh, we're not going to. I have no paper on that. I'd have to make it up. [laughter]

Lage: Isn't Dingell now no longer so helpful on environmental issues? Did you have inside—?

Scott: Sure. Let's talk about that. At one point, John Dingell and I were—. These people were, and still are, thirty years older than me. So I wasn't a back-slapping buddy, hanging around the bars with them or anything like that, but I became a known operative in the small circle of people on Capitol Hill that dealt with these issues. Because of my Michigan connections, I was more than average acquainted with Dingell, who knew that I had worked hard on these things. In some vague way he and his staff knew I was somebody who was around and was friendly and helpful.

He had been helpful to our cause on any number of things. In 1970, he was one of the ringleaders in the fight which Brock was instrumental in and which John McComb and Mike McCloskey and other people were involved in—if I was involved it was very tangentially—to block the National Timber Supply Act, which was a cash-register scheme to say that all the money that you got from chopping down trees in the national forests could be put right back into chopping down trees on the national forest. It was kind of this perpetual motion machine for logging the forest. Some place I have a wonderful old photograph of the crew of people that lobbied on that. I don't think I spent much time on that for whatever reason. I think I was still in school. [The photo shows] a very young John McComb with more hair than he has now, and all these people gathered around John Dingell's desk, who was smiling and looking pleased with himself.

Dingell and Al Ullman, who was very senior and soon to be elevated to chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, a very powerful committee, had a room on the
fourth floor of the labor building, a sort of an annex to their offices which weren't nearby, which is this big room. It was where we would run our lobbying campaigns when we needed space. We ran several different campaigns out of there.

So Dingell was this very helpful person. He was very helpful with us on the SST, and I recall, just by way of anecdote, that after all our lobbying on the SST in the House, the vote was going to be very close the year that we actually won. We were standing, a bunch of us, trying to get into the galleries. There was a huge line that went clear out of the Capitol building. There was no way we were going to get in. The vote was coming, and we weren't going to see it. We had been slaving and working. I was standing with Linda Billings of the Sierra Club staff, Lloyd Tupling, head of the Sierra Club office, and I think Barbara Reed. There were four or five of us.

Gary Soucie of Friends of the Earth was there. Gary knew William Magruder who was Nixon's lobbyist, Nixon's chief SST guy. Magruder was ahead of us in the line, or his wife. Gary was joking with Magruder or his wife or whoever it was, and I was desperately trying to figure out how we were going to get into the gallery just to observe all this. Congressman O'Hara, my Sleeping Bear Dunes friend walked by and I said, "Gerald, is there some way you could get us in." He couldn't help us. A few minutes later John Dingell walked by and said, "Oh, hi, Doug, what are you guys doing?" "We're trying to get in." And he just enfolded us in his arm, and we went walking right upstairs and into the House Members’ Gallery where their families can go. John just enveloped the doorkeeper (John Dingell is a huge man), just gave him this big bear hug, and said, "My friend," which is really what he starts almost every sentence with, "My friend, these are my friends. Can they sit on the steps?" So we watched the SST vote, thanks to John Dingell, sitting on the steps of the House Gallery.

Dingell was sort of a rod and gun club kind of environmentalist. A "The more habitat we can save, the more ducks we can shoot" sort of a guy. With broad gauge. He fought the Corps of Engineers because that they were draining wetlands and stuff, and that was a bad thing. He did NEPA and all those good things.

[End Tape 17, Side A]

[Begin Tape 17, Side B]

Scott: John’s father had had the seat before him, and his son will have it after him. It's just the Dingell seat. John is a creature of the House. He had been a page. He is a power politician. He is a Phil Burton-style politician, though they were rivals. He was on that Merchant Marine Committee and had this Fish and Wildlife Subcommittee, so he had a bunch of staff, talented people, who were spending their time on environmental stuff so that we were in and out of their offices all the time, even if we didn't see him.

Then he was also on the Energy and Commerce Committee. He was in seniority there. At some point in the seventies, I'm not sure just when, fairly early seventies, he moved up in seniority. Enough of these other people left that he was able to take a
subcommittee chairmanship in the Energy and Commerce Committee. You can't have two subcommittee chairmanships so he had to give up his Fish and Wildlife Subcommittee chairmanship. Ultimately he even left the Merchant Marine Committee, I think, but not immediately. Ultimately he rose to be chairman of the Energy and Commerce Committee.

Well, that was naturally what he was going to do. The Energy and Commerce Committee has complete jurisdiction over telecommunications, over drugs and FDA and all of that, and clean air. John Dingell represents Detroit. Dearborn, Michigan, the home of Ford Motor, is in his district. So he became Mr. Clean Air issues, not Mr. Clean Air, and became very much a spokesman for Detroit.

At that point, the arm of our movement that dealt with those issues, which I was only sort of connected with—Carl Pope, who was running at the same time in Washington that I was, was sort of the—. If I was the prototypical young public lands advocate, Carl Pope was the prototypical young pollution and population guy. In the fights that the environmental movement had in 1970 and in 1977, those two reiterations of the Clean Air Act, Dingell became much more our nemesis.

Lage: Primarily it's because he represented Detroit?
Scott: Yes. He was blocking action on bills and weakening [the Clean Air Act].

Lage: What about on Alaska?
Scott: He ended up being on the wrong side on Alaska. My view of it is, and I could easily be wrong about this but I feel a certain guilt about this, the crowd that knew him and worked with him intimately, the people of his same age—Brandborg, Tupling and so forth—left the scene in the early seventies, or mid-seventies, and were replaced by people who didn't have that history with John. I think we left him alone too much. I think if we had stayed near him, I think if we had been buddies with him—

Lage: And part of it was that he changed to a different committee.
Scott: And part of it was because he worked [on air pollution issues]. The same thing happened with Hubert Humphrey, who was the original sponsor of the Wilderness Bill, but then he wasn't on any of the committees, and we always took him for granted and didn't hang around with him, and of course he went off to be vice-president. But later when he was back in the Senate, he became the sponsor of the timber industry's timber bill. I think that's at least as much our fault. Now, there are so many hours in the day and you spend your time with your friends to get the work done that seems to need to be done that day, but we stopped cultivating.

Lage: That's true but if one did have some feeling or ideological commitment, as you would expect, say Humphrey in particular, then to go over to the timber industry because you didn't curry favor seems a little odd.
Scott: Well, it's kind of a leading around with him. If you are a member of Congress and people come into your office with hot ideas that are sort of presented to you as progressive and in a line with your basic political philosophy, and if it's the timber industry that spends all their time visiting you, you're going to start thinking like them. That's just part of the game. There is this innate tension.

I think our movement has gotten very sloppy. We spend relatively little time cultivating new and rising stars because we think everybody—Mo Udall is in very poor health, but we're relying on him to be the leader in a number of things. One of these days he isn't going to be there. We better be bending some other people.

Lage: Because after all, you cultivated all these people when they were new and rising.

Scott: That's right. And at a time when we didn't have as many choices as we've got today. It was Mo Udall or Mo Udall. It was John Saylor or John Saylor. You couldn't say which should be our champion out of the sixty people we could think of. The Sierra Club particularly fought Dingell on a lot of things during the late seventies, clean air being the most obvious, during the late seventies and eighties, and we'll talk about him again when we talk about Superfund. This past May, 1990, I went to Washington for the House floor vote on the Clean Air Act. This is the first floor vote on the Clean Air Act since 1977. We've been working on it for years. As a senior executive, one, I wanted to be there sort of for morale with our troops who had been bleeding from all pores on this one for years. I also wanted to be there to use my title to open doors. So I spent three or four days just wandering around, which I hadn't done for years, just wandering around the House, door to door, talking to members, walking right in and seeing members of Congress and talking to them about the Clean Air Act.

But after the vote—it was late at night and things had been very difficult and deals were being done on the House floor and ultimately the big showdown vote was pending, which we weren't sure we would lose but we weren't sure we would win—ultimately after great hurried conferences in the corridors, a deal was done and the bill was passed and there wasn't any showdown vote. Our heroes, our various champions, came outside the House chamber and we all cheered them. We were all standing there cheering them. Across the way from us were the UAW lobbyists and some of the people who had been lobbying against it. John Dingell came out and they all cheered him. We clapped too. He came down their side of this little area outside of the House chamber shaking hands and chatting with them. Then he turned and came over to our side, and I just stuck out my arm and said, "John, Doug Scott from the Sierra Club." He stopped just momentarily and said, "I remember you." And then kept going. [laughter] Which made me feel really good.

Lage: As opposed to saying, in that previous era I remember you. From that long-ago past.

Scott: Right. We need to pick up the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, which was of extraordinary importance. The Wilderness Society, partly because it was a Washington DC-based organization and most of its staff was there, had a concentration of resources that the Sierra Club at that era in the early seventies simply didn't have.
The Sierra Club had a much broader agenda and was working on fifty million other things. So, while Ed Wayburn and Jack Hession from Anchorage might be spending full time worrying about Alaska, the Washington folks weren't. And there wasn't a continuity, except when Jack would fly into town and stay for months at a time, which he did.

So a lot of the sort of headquarters of the thinking about the Alaska issue was at the Wilderness Society headquarters and particularly in a little circle around Harry Crandall and Stewart Brandborg and myself. I had never been to Alaska. I was not a student of Alaska issues. I abhorred the pipeline, and participated in various things, read up about it, and was around the edges of the kind of work that was going on in the organization for the pipeline lawsuit. But it wasn't a major responsibility of mine.

I had become fairly immediately the all-purpose draftsman at the Wilderness Society. This was a very small staff to begin with. I was the guy who could sit down and once I grasped things could rattle off speeches and rattle off draft bills and all that sort of stuff. And I liked doing it. The whole organization just turned itself on its head to work on this Native Claims Amendment. This all happened in a very compressed period of time. There had been a theory that there should be some recognition of the potential of parks and stuff in Alaska in earlier iterations of the legislation, but it didn't have any steam behind it. Under Wayne Aspinall's leadership, there wasn't going to be any steam behind it. Though we put on a major effort in the subcommittee markup, we lost there in our effort to pass a planning amendment thing to say that before Alaska lands were divvied up completely, there ought to be some giant federal-state partnership land plan thing.

It is useful to remember that at that era, with the added support of the Nixon Administration, our movement was trying to pass national land use planning legislation and we got it as far as the House floor. This was one of the great non-starters but for some reason, we all talked ourselves into thinking that this could be done at that point. So a planning theme was a good one for this business. We ran into the adamant opposition of Aspinall and the Interior Department and the State of Alaska politicians and the natives. Then we lost in full committee, and then we had to put together a floor strategy. My archival material will be full of draft after draft that particularly Jack Hession and I worked on of what this amendment should look like for the final going, which was August, September, October, November of 1971. The act passed and was signed by the president in December of 1971 and was voted on the House floor on October 20 of 1971.

So in kind of the hothouse period of August, September and early October, we were trying to shape what would be the best amendment, what would have the most effect against this whole incredible array of opposition. Jack and I were just intensively involved in this, playing sort of handmaiden and middle man between Saylor and his staff and Udall and his staff, where relationships were quite prickly. I'm sure I knew at the time, but I don't remember just what that was all about, but Saylor was a much older fellow. Udall was very much a creature of the House, beloved even at that stage, and had his very strong sense of how to do things. Saylor was of course in the
minority party, in all other ways a very conservative Republican. The styles didn't match particularly. But you knew you had a winning combination when you could get Udall and Saylor. Any number of times, some big initiative of ours would either be the Saylor-Udall, or the Udall-Saylor, one or the other.

Lage: That's really interesting that they didn't get along, but—.

Scott: In some way they didn't get along. I don't know the ins and outs of it anymore. So Jack and I, and often Ernie Dickerman, Harry Crandall, Lloyd Tupling, Bob Waldrop from the Sierra Club staff, various other people, were running back and forth, brokering these ideas of what this amendment ought to be. Meanwhile, we had crews of people out in the House, going door to door trying to figure out, keeping lists of head counts and all that. We operated from this Dingell-Ullman room in the Rayburn building. I told the anecdote about Ron Dellums.

Lage: Yes.

Scott: Ultimately we lost on the Udall-Saylor Amendment. We lost by, I think, forty-two votes, which means that if twenty or twenty-one members had voted the other way, we would have won. That was, against the array of opposition, viewed as a very significant political statement. We already had a degree of support for something about this problem on the Senate side with Scoop Jackson and Allan Bible. So even though the House bill emerged with no such thing, because we were defeated on the House floor, once the Senate adopted a strong provision, going into conference it was clear that some provision was going to be in. Mo Udall and Saylor were both on that conference. Ultimately Section 17(d)(2) was worked out.

I can remember when we were brokering the amendment between Udall and Saylor, part of the issue was the nature of the amendment, which was true of the ultimate law as it passed. It was to say that the secretary of the interior was supposed to study the potential for parks and wilderness areas in Alaska and was to identify the lands with the highest values for that. And to put some number of those lands, some x million acres under some sort of interim protection until detailed studies could be done and Congress could decide on the fate of those lands. So the question was, what's that number. What's the ceiling? You had to have a ceiling, but what was it going to be?

I can remember days when we would come out of Saylor's office or Udall's—I don't want to cast doubt on either one of them—and one or the other saying, I think it was Saylor, “100 million acres,” to which we would say, "Good, good." Then we would go to Udall's office. "No, not enough. Fifty." I can remember days when it was cut in half. You would go home saying, "I lost 50 million acres. I feel just dreadful."

This was just a hothouse atmosphere. Jack had been down for months and months and months. We would often eat together, and often we were there until ten or eleven at night. One night we decided we needed to go to a movie and that we just needed to get away from this all—all this intense politicking and the bickering between these two offices and all this detail. We needed to just go out. I said, "A good costume drama.
Just something to get into some silliness." We went to see "The Lion in Winter," with Peter O'Toole and Katherine Hepburn, which is non-stop Katherine Hepburn as Queen-whatever-her-name-was and Peter O'Toole bickering about politics. We were just exhausted.

So a few nights later, we decided this time, "Let's go to a movie." We sent to see "The Night at the Opera" (the Marx Brothers). In the middle of "The Night at the Opera," Chico, as the agent for this tenor, and Groucho, as the impresario of the opera, are dickering over a contract. Groucho hauls out this contract that is about four yards long and starts reading, "And the party of the first part shall be known as the party of the first part." Chico looks very dubious and says, "No." Well, Peter was laughing just in the normal way. Jack and I were under the chairs we were laughing so hard, just making complete scenes. All this politics. It was a very hothouse period.

Section 17(d)(2) was enacted. It put in place a period of time, which was a year or eighteen months or two years or something, from December of 1971 to December of another year or two for the secretary to decide on eighty million acres—that was the number that was ultimately settled upon. The Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club worked very hard on public hearings that were held and various things to get Secretary Morton to maximize the selection of those lands. The effect of the native settlement was that any lands not selected for that interim protection were wide open to the state, or if they were in particular locations, were wide open—I think native selections had priority anyway—for the state to slap—.

Lage: So this did put the national interest ahead of the state?
Scott: Yes, it had the effect of segregating them out ahead of the state. I cannot remember the details.
Lage: We can check on that but I think that is true.
Scott: At that point the eastern wilderness bill was starting to be very active, and RARE I, and endless other things. I did not stay connected to the Alaska issue particularly, although I was in and out of it, sort of in an episodic way. In 1973, I moved to Seattle and in 1975, I was drawn into some early strategic discussions about, "Well, now the secretary has selected eighty million acres," and these intense field studies were going on in Alaska. They were spending a zillion dollars flying all over and studying all these wonderful places. A lot of our folk, Destry Jarvis from the National Parks and Conservation Association, Chuck Clusen from the Sierra Club, any number of other people from Washington would come through Seattle on their way to Alaska, going up and bumming around on these trips and being flown at government expense all over Alaska, and they would come and stay at my house or come visit or we would have drinks, or something. It never occurred to me to figure out some way to get on that gravy train.

But I was kibitzing around the edges about what the shape of this all might be. In 1976, we had a giant strategy meeting to which I was invited, but then Brock was
already going and they didn't have too many Sierra Club people. There was some reason I didn't go. Then the ultimate big strategy session was held for a couple of days in a dreadful little hotel room in Washington. I was there partly for that and on other business, probably Alpine Lakes, since it was November, 1976. There were some native people, there were endless numbers of Alaskans, Celia Hunter and a variety of other folks from Alaska. Harry Crandall was there. Ed Wayburn was there. Mike McCloskey was there. Chuck Clusen was there.

Lage: Was this seen as sort of the get together of all the different conservation groups?

Scott: This was getting our ducks in a row for what our strategic posture was going to be once the studies were complete. Once [Secretary Rogers] Morton selected the eighty million acres, the intensive studies were done, and I think then on the fifth anniversary of the native claims enactment, the secretary of the interior had to put his proposals before the Congress. Then the interim protection of these lands from other use ran out on the anniversary of the act, the eighth year, so that was 1978.

So the Congress was going to have to cope with these new things. The question was, how was the Congress going to do this? Here were going to be a bunch of proposals. There were huge fights within the administration. The Forest Service wanted to have a whole bunch of interior Alaska lands become national forest lands. It was a classic turf fight by the agency. The Fish and Wildlife Service wanted these things. The parks wanted those. So the bureaucracy and our folks were snapping around the heels of that process trying to influence those decisions, but whatever that led to, then the Congress was going to have to contend a little. But how was the Congress going to contend with this? We were used to one national park at a time, taking twenty years to get it, like Sleeping Bear Dunes, a few little wilderness bills. But here was going to be this gigantic thing.

So there would be a whole host of strategic questions. Should we piecemeal it out over time? Well, wait a minute. That wouldn't work very well because of the deadline. Should we go for a deadline extension? Should we have one bill, given the way committee jurisdictions are divvied up in the Congress? Should we have one bill that was just wildlife refuges? That would go to the Merchant Marine [and Fisheries] Committee in the House and to the environment committee [Committee on Environment and Public Works] in the Senate. Another bill that was just national forest issues? But wait a minute. We have been fighting having any national forest lands in this bill, because we didn't want any new national forests in interior Alaska. Then parks would go to someplace else.

So there were all these jurisdictional questions. It was a question of what resources we had. So we were sorting out all those things. I'm not sure. I think out of this meeting Mike McCloskey was tasked to lead the group that was going to draft our bill. I was intimately involved in that. In my archival material is a stash of comments in draft, scratchings back and forth. We ultimately had a bill, and it was introduced by Mo Udall and by Scoop Jackson, at our request. I think Wayburn played a big role in
Jackson's part of this. This was in 1976, or maybe it was 1977 according to these notes. That was the start.

We also needed to pull together our coalition. In the 1971 fight over the native claims, we had invented a thing called the Alaska Coalition. We had this thing flying around so we pumped that up again.

Lage: When you invent this thing, is this a thing with bylaws and legal standing?

Scott: I'm sure in that early going it didn't. I believe the Alaska Coalition today has bylaws and is incorporated and all of that. I was never involved in that end of it. I'm sure the 1971 one didn't have that degree of formality.

Lage: In the meeting you referred to, was one of the main purposes to form this coalition or was it to—?

Scott: I don't think so. My recollection is that the coalition was just sort of pulling together. Chuck's the one who's going to know all that story. I was not involved in the pulling together of the coalition. This was the legislative strategy session. It was the big picture. What's our timing going to be? What is the right venue and all that?

So our bills were introduced. The next thing that happened—this meeting was just after the election of November, 1976. Jimmy Carter had been elected so we had friends. This wonderful historic coincidence (it's more than that, I think) that we had a highly favorable president, who was deeply committed. He was committed by the environmental movement, through the League of Conservation Voters, who sent both the presidential candidates, Ford and Carter, lengthy questionnaires. Carter's came back written in his own handwriting. He would check yes or no and then put big elaborate things in there. He committed himself on Alaska and committed himself on the Endangered American Wilderness Act and so forth.

The first time I went in the White House after he was elected was to see a couple of people: Kathy Fletcher who had been an EDF [Environmental Defense Fund] attorney in Denver, and had been early involved with his campaign. She became one of the key domestic staff people for environmental matters. And Dan Beard. Kathy now lives in Seattle and is currently, the fall of 1990, a candidate for the board of directors of the Sierra Club. Dan Beard now works for Congressman George Miller. Here were these Young Turk people who were the environmental part of the domestic staff in the White House, working for Stu Eisenstadt. They had on their desks this document with the handwriting in it, saying, "Well, what's our policy going to be on that? Well, let's just look."

So we were working around the edges of the fact that we had the support of the administration. We were certainly in endless consultations with Mo Udall. Others, particularly Harry Crandall and John Seiberling himself, will have to tell the story, but the decision was made to take for Alaska—. We made the decision, by drafting one at
that November 1976 meeting, to have a big huge comprehensive bill that put it all in a huge package, and to mount this giant campaign around a huge package.

Lage: Was any of this decision made in conference with key leaders in Congress?

Scott: Sure, we were talking with them all the time. It was all brokered back and forth. We would think what our druthers were. Then we would go and see how much of that we could talk them into. Then we come back and think what our druthers were. Then we go and see how much of that we could them into. Then we would come back knowing that Mo had said, "Here was what he thought about it." Endless discussions of that kind, most of which I was not involved with. I was sort of a bit player at this point. I was there, I think in my hat as the Northwest representative of the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, just so there weren't so many Sierra Club people. Clearly, Chuck and others valued me for my legislative drafting and strategic sense. But those people weren't slouches at it either. It was not as though everybody said, "Well, we've got to find out what Doug Scott thinks."

I do remember that a major issue at that meeting—and I'm sure in various people's files there are voluminous notes from that meeting; I've not tripped over any of my own—was the question that Chuck and I were conniving about, which was the question that if it was already going to be a huge bill, for years we have had, including the Endangered American Wilderness Act, de facto wilderness proposals on the Tongass National Forest in Southeast Alaska, about which the Native Claims Amendment had nothing to do, absolutely nothing.

Lage: Because the bill didn't cover Southeast Alaska?

Scott: It didn't cover Southeast Alaska. Those were already federal lands that were going to stay in national forests. So we were only talking about the unreserved public domain type land. Our big plot was to say, "Well, if we are mounting all this effort, let's see if we can put the screws to the Forest Service in the Southeast at the same time. This was a controversial question. He can speak for himself, but it is my recollection that Ed Wayburn was opposed to doing this and that Chuck and I, over breakfasts and drinks the night before—and I probably was staying at his house on this visit—had plotted out that we needed to roll everybody on this one. The decision was made to put Southeast Alaska into this bill. Which was providential. Looking backward, it was a crucial strategic decision. No one could write a road map for how we ever would have gotten any wilderness on the Tongass Forest if we hadn’t done it in this bill.

It was all very funny, because it was clearly risky, because at any given moment the Alaska congressional delegations and others could clearly raise a big stink and say, "This is supposed to be legislation that fulfills the mandate of the 1971 Native Claims Act, which didn't talk about Southeast Alaska. This is unknown here."

Lage: Did they ever raise that issue? They fought it so desperately.
Scott: Partly, the Forest Service couldn't because the Carter Administration embraced this idea immediately. So you had Mo Udall and John Seiberling and all these people embracing this. It became part of their bills, it became part of the Carter proposals, and it just took on a life of its own. But it started around our little table, and it started as a little plot to save wilderness in the Tongass National Forest. We hadn't thought of any other bright idea of how we were ever going to save this stuff, so let's try this.

We all knew that the scale of fight that was going to be necessary to do Alaska was going to demand unprecedented reorganizing of ourselves. That was just sort of going without saying. The same thing was true in Congress, so that in the House they set up a special subcommittee called the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Alaska Lands. John Seiberling was made chairman of this subcommittee, the ideal person, devoted to Alaska. He had been an organizer of a Sierra Club group in Ohio before he ever came to the Congress. He had, and has, a brain for detail that is sometimes maddening, but he was a master of the detail.

[End Tape 17, Side B]

[Begin Tape 18, Side A]

Scott: And John Seiberling had a terrific staff devoted to this cause. The chief of staff on the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Alaska Lands was Harry Crandall, who had quit the Wilderness Society when Brandborg had fired another one of the people there. I think we talked about that.

Lage: Yes, we did.

Scott: So Harry went off and worked in various jobs on Capitol Hill. Harry had kids in school and family to feed and a mortgage to pay and all this, and he just was out on the street. But he got in on Capitol Hill and just was in a variety of places, but never was the more proper person in the right place than the team of Harry Crandall and John Seiberling. In the archives, if I can find them (he also has a set), I have possession of a complete set of every memo that flowed between Harry Crandall and John Seiberling and that whole staff, all through this whole thing.

Lage: You do have it but you haven't located it?

Scott: I haven't found it but I am going to have another little search this afternoon [at the club offices].

I wasn't around for how this all developed. But Chuck became the chairman of the Alaska Coalition at some point in this process. He was a member of the staff in the Sierra Club's Washington office and was detailed full-time to Alaska. I think that had something to do with John McComb coming in to take up the rest of the public lands agenda. John, and Chuck, and Harry Crandall over on the Hill made a huge mark on wilderness history on something that I can claim to have had nothing to do with, quite proudly, which was the Amendment to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act.
(FLPMA) in 1976, which brought BLM [Bureau of Land Management] lands under the study requirements of the Wilderness Act. They had been in Zahnie's early drafts at BLM but it was just a bigger bite than could be chewed in the fifties. It wasn't until 1976 that BLM lands again came under the legal mandate of the act.

The area called Section 703 or 706, or whatever it is, of FLPMA was masterfully designed. Unlike Forest Service de facto wilderness, the roadless areas that are selected here for study, and it's something like twenty million acres on BLM lands, are protected until Congress determines otherwise.

Back then, Carter was in the White House, and our ship had come in and we were just the cat's pajamas. When James Watt got there [as Reagan’s secretary of interior], James Watt tried to make an end run around that provision. Maybe I'll tell that story then, but we called his bluff. He was going to say, "Oh, yes. The president can decide that portions of these BLM lands aren't going to be recommended for wilderness. Therefore we can start development." We said, "The hell you can." We beat him.

Lage: Did you have to go to court or you just beat him with blackmail?

Scott: Well, I will tell the story right now of what we did. Because FLPMA says absolutely, flatly, in words of one syllable, until Congress determines otherwise, these areas are to be protected so that the wilderness qualities are not harmed irreparably. Fairly early in his tenure Watt announced with great glee at a Western governor's conference that he had a legal opinion from the solicitor that said that he and the president could release these areas. Of course, the word “release” was by that time a part of the lexicon because of the RARE II decision. If you were James Watt, you were there trying to think of how to get the maximum amount of lands the Doug Scotts wanted to have studied for wilderness and protected released.

So he came up with this deal that he was going to fix it so that he and the president could release all these BLM lands. We said, "Oh, you've got a solicitor's opinion. Have you ever heard of the Freedom of Information Act?" So we go the solicitor's opinion, which was—I am not a lawyer but I am steeped in this little part of the law, and I quickly got my view of it confirmed by our legal aces—an atrocious opinion. Watt or somebody had told some jerk in the solicitor's office the desired outcome, and this guy had written this just dreadful piece of work at some length that purported to justify this conclusion. It was just terrible.

Well, the lawyers at SCLDF [Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund] just did handsprings. They wanted to wait and have Watt do this and then sue the living bejesus out of him, and they would rack up another big one. I said, "No, we can't screw around with that and besides which, here's an idea that ought to be fun." So we, with some grumbling from some of them, because the powers that be at the Legal Defense Fund like to win in court—that is what they view as their thing to do in life—and several of the lawyers over there, particularly Deborah Reames and Larry Silver, wrote a legal brief about why the solicitor's opinion was shockingly, outrageously wrong and printed it up with a blue cover just like a legal brief is printed up at the Supreme Court level, all very
fancy with footnotes and case citations. It was the brief we would have written in a court of law, except we sent it to Watt. We made a zillion copies and sent them all over, to wilderness activists everywhere, and held a big press conference.

We said, "Under the constitutional provision that citizens have a right to petition government for redress of grievances, Mr. Watt, we hereby petition you that you are dead wrong, you son-of-a-bitch. We want you to acknowledge that you are wrong and cease and desist what you're doing, or if you try it we'll sue you from now ‘til Christmas." We also sent a copy directly to the White House counsel, hand-delivered, and to CEQ and the EPA and all these other places. One of the things you can do with government is just put paper in all over the place and see what happens. Just stir the pot and see what happens.

There was never a formal response, but we never heard another thing about that solicitor.

Lage: Watt himself was a lawyer, wasn't he?
Scott: A terrible one. That bluff got called.

In any event, during the era that the Alaska Coalition was resuscitated and a little group of mostly new people, most of whom I only knew in passing because I was now living in Seattle and had my own fish to fry, got mobilized around the Alaska Coalition—these included Chuck as chairman; Cathy Smith (Cathy with a "C"), who was on the staff of Friends of the Earth, specialized in Alaska; Pam Rich, also on the staff of Friends of the Earth, specializing in Alaska; Steve Young at the National Audubon Society, Washington office, a young fellow; and a number of people at the Wilderness Society, most notably Peter Scholes [spells it] and his long-time girlfriend, now wife, Dee Frankfourth [spells it], and some other people.

Lage: They were all quite young?
Scott: Mostly quite young.
Lage: You were getting to be the older generation.
Scott: I was seriously older generation at this point. They were mostly not Washington creatures. Dee and Peter came from Alaska. Dee is a third generation, native-born Alaskan. He had been on the Wilderness Society staff up there. I guess that's how it worked.

Anyway, these and some other people became the nucleus of this operation in Washington. Denise Schlener [spells it], who was a young staff member. Now we're three generations of Wilderness Society after the one that I worked for. There was the whole crew of new young people. Randy Snodgrass from the Wilderness Society.

Lage: Did Friends of the Earth get in on it?
Scott: Pam Rich and Cathy Smith were Friends of the Earth. A number of other people: Destry Jarvis, who was a more experienced older fellow and kin in generation (not quite as much) to Chuck and myself. These people became the backbone of the Washington work that was being done.

In 1977, the principal focus of all of this became—. John Seiberling and/or Harry Crandall, or somebody, I don't know who, came up with the brilliant idea that in planning hearings, because now here was this bill that we concocted, which was for 115 million acres (scandalously big), and clearly there were going to have to be hearings. There were going to have to be hearings in Washington, which we had. I attended some of them. I don't think I ever testified in Washington. I can't think of why I would have, but I remember that I was in the room. There were clearly going to have to be hearings in Alaska, which were going to be no picnic. But before they did that, they planned a schedule of five day-long hearings around the lower 48. Atlanta, Denver, Chicago, San Francisco, and Seattle. San Francisco was ultimately cancelled for reasons that I forget.

These hearings were held during 1977, before they went to Alaska. Enormous efforts were put into place, which I was involved in in Seattle, but which this coalition was organizing from Washington. Organizers went out to stir people up. People carpooled from hundreds of miles away and just mobs of people came to these centers, to these hearings. Of course, we were working hand in glove with Seiberling, Crandall, and the staff about the whole business. But the effect was that literally hundreds of people came, and all these hearings were recorded and typed up and printed.

Lage: Did much opposition come?

Scott: Not much. Some, particularly in Seattle where there was a lot of economic interest tied to Alaska. But why would someone in Atlanta who didn't have much stake in it—. And there wasn't an organization in place yet with anything like the savvy that would have been needed to see what effect this was having. So there were constituents from probably one hundred congressional districts who went to these things.

Even better, the one who came to all of them was Don Young, the sole congressman, Republican, from Alaska (he is still in Congress—he came to Congress when Nick Begich, the Alaska congressman whom we worked with in a quite friendly way, though he opposed us on the Native Claims Amendment in 1971. In fact, Jack Hession and I shoved our way in with a great mob of Alaska natives to his victory party just to say good-fight-well-fought to him. Nick Begich was lost in a plane crash in Alaska with the House majority leader Hale Boggs, in probably the early seventies. Anyway, I think there were some other people also, but Don Young came. We widely joked, "Don Young we ought to pay. Don Young should get the John Muir Award." Don Young's style of opposition to us was filled with such blind rancor and such bumbling political theory.

So he went around to all these field hearings and would mostly bide his time and take little cattling hits at people when they came to testify. But he had an unerring skill to
choose the wrong the person for his occasional big attack. In Denver, he attacked a high school student, a girl who had driven all night with a carpool of people from Tucson—Mo Udall's district [laughter]—to come clear to Denver from Tucson to testify. Of course, Mo is sitting there, and Young just said something to the effect (it will be in the transcript) of, "If this testimony had been turned in to me, if I was teacher, you would get an ‘F.'" It just reduced the poor girl to a puddle of jelly. It just inflamed Udall, who rose in the defense of his constituent you can bet.

In Seattle, Don Young attacked Jim Whittaker, the first American to climb Mount Everest, the general manager at that time of REI, a front-page prominent name, one of the heroes in Seattle. Whittaker gave some testimony, my recollection is, fairly late in the day. Everybody was tired. Whittaker gave some nice testimony and was finished. Don Young said, "What do you make your packs and tents out of? They're made out of oil." He was making some hare-brained argument. "If they couldn't put a drill in Alaska wherever they wanted to drill, they couldn't dig up minerals, and they couldn't make tents and backpack frames," or something, I don't know. It was done in such a snarly and unpleasant way that at some point Whittaker just turned on his heels, turned away, and walked back to his seat.

Young had a goddamned conniption. "I'm not finished with you. I'm a member of the U.S. Congress. You come back." My recollection is, which I may be gilding, Whittaker turned, and Whittaker's a very tall man with great physical presence, just turned and gave Don Young a withering look, and in a voice just dripping with sarcasm said, "Mr. Young, I have been to the top of the world, and I have seen a very great distance. You have climbed not very far and can't see very far either," or something like that, and the place, which was staffed with our people, just went nuts. Of course, the headline in the paper the next day was, "Alaskan attacks Whittaker." Don Young continued to play this role throughout the battle.

Lage: He didn't learn.

Scott: Then the committee went to Alaska. They took Air Force II and spent almost a month in Alaska. They not only held hearings in the big cities, but they went with a stenographer and held little meetings in native villages out in the bush with two or three people. A wonderful exercise. A near majority, or maybe even a majority of the people who came forward in Alaska favored our bill. So we came back out of that whole process which I was only minimally involved in, in the fall of 1977, when that was all done, with—. Now the Carter Administration was in place, and we were kind of ready to go, and we had this huge hearing record that demonstrated so that Seiberling and the people could get up and say, "Wait a minute, Mr. Young. You say nobody in Alaska likes this or everybody in your state is opposed to it. I was there. Not true. Yak, Yak, Yak."

Plus they were getting incredibly detailed information in briefings and all this stuff about all the details of the areas and the complexities of native subsistence. It was a very complicated issue, which I never bothered to understand. My role, once I got into this, was never to be an expert about Alaska. I still have never been to Alaska.
In 1978, it was time to go, and we started mark up in the House committee, and it did not go particularly well. We had simultaneously heavy mark up because the House Merchant Marine Committee, because of its jurisdiction over Fish and Wildlife Refuges had jurisdiction as well, so two committees had to produce a bill. There were opponents (Don Young was on both committees) up the wazoo on both committees. It was going to be dicey.

So little committees of the lobbyists were specializing on these two committees and all this. My recollection is that not great thought had been put into how this all came together when you got to the House floor. Mo Udall is an enormously skilled legislative tactician. He was at the prime of his life then, and I suspect that there was a certain amount of "let Mo worry about that." I do not remember the reason, and I keep meaning to call up Chuck and ask him, but at some point—. And this was Chuck's show. I had done lots of famous things and been a prominent person, and not without my own ego, so it wasn't as though Chuck needed me breathing down his neck. He was the perfect person, with skills I never would have had to pull this coalition together, and patiently listen to everybody, and raise the money, and cultivate the donors, and keep all the groups together, which was a huge job which he did single-handedly and masterfully.

But the House floor situation was not coming together well. My impression is there was some kind of crisis. But at some point, Chuck called me in Seattle and said, "Doug, will you come help? In particular, what we need is someone with your skills to figure out the lobbying strategy and the political strategy for this big floor fight." Which was something I had now done. I had been involved in the biggest ones our movement had ever done: the SST, native claims, and three or four others by that time. It was something I was known for specializing in.

Now, at this point I had been going to see this therapist for months, much to her annoyance and much to my expense, and she was losing patience with me. I remember going to see her and saying, "Well, now one of my friends has called up and said he would like me to come to Washington, which would mean moving there for a while. But that would be running away from my problems, wouldn't it?" She said, "I don't think so. It would probably be good for you. Why don't you do that."

As it turned out, this led almost immediately to meeting the woman who is now my wife and solving in a permanent way, that problem in my life. There wasn't anything holding me to Seattle. I was footloose and fancy free. So we arranged a deal, with the volunteers in the Northwest agreeing. Basically, the Sierra Club had said we were going to do whatever was necessary, that we were going to tilt our resources in whatever way is necessary to win this fight.

So I went to Washington early in the year of 1978. There was snow on the ground in Washington. I remember that because I had drugged my cat (I had this wonderful little black cat) and carried her on the airplane. I stayed in Harry Crandall's basement and got up the next morning, and the cat was looking out of one of these half windows, so she was right ground level with this snow, which she wasn't used to, and a cardinal,
bright red, went by. I always joked, "Dad, they have red ones here." So I had moved to Washington.

Now, prior to that—I have a little historical document here of some considerable value—on the 14th of February, 1978, I don't know whether I had already made the arrangements to do this and I don't quite know why I was where I was, but I flew to Denver from Boise for some reason. I was going to Boise in pursuit of the Gospel-Hump negotiations or something like that. I don't know what it was. I had been asked, I think, by that time to think about what was needed for the floor vote.

So I sat on that airplane and drafted a four-page, handwritten memo to Chuck called, "Needs for House Floor Fight," saying that this was just shorthand but we would need to write out an elaborate plan. It had how we were going to get in every door repeatedly, how that was going to work, what the information system would be, how it was all going to be administered, what the phoning system would be like, how the mailings would be done to stir up grass roots, how the press would work, all in very simplified form, but here were my early thoughts about how to put this together. "Meetings with congressmen, what kind of personnel will we need, spare the lobbyists from any other function whatsoever during at least the final three weeks." That was in this original draft. "Coordinator must have no other work. The most experience possible. Judgment and direction must be sound and authoritative. Can't waste time with lots of consensus-building meetings."

Lage: Consensus building among the—?

Scott: Among themselves. I came into the coalition from day one, as reflected by this—there are a whole bunch of things that I'm reading back over this and am rather pleased to see that are in this document in February, 1978, that became absolutely essential elements of our floor plan that were quite innovative at the time.

I came into the coalition as a somewhat controversial figure. For one thing I wasn't part of the inner crowd that had been there from the start, and I immediately concluded that that in-crowd had an in-crowd attitude. Some of the younger people. "This is our thing." They weren't making it very comfortable for new people to sign up. That was a problem that was going to have to get dealt with. I also came in as somebody who had done this stuff in my sleep for now over a decade. I had passed bills—Sleeping Bear Dunes and things like that—where I was intimately involved in the details and I knew how the institution worked. I was a student and lover of the House of Representatives. This wasn't something I was learning how to do as I was going.

Lage: As many of the others were?

Scott: As many of the others were. I am not the sort of person who suffers fools lightly. I'm not saying that any of these people were fool, but this statement says that the coordinator can't waste time in a lot of consensus-building meetings. My view was that this was going to have to happen very quickly. We were on an enormously fast
timetable against very difficult political circumstances. They couldn't stand around being a consensus builder too much, which was Chuck's role anyway.

But if I was going to run this thing, I was going to have to be able to say, "You, do this." And not have somebody say, "Well, I want to call a meeting about that."

Lage: You meant in assigning tasks, or did you mean in making a compromise?

Scott: Assigning tasks and managing these people. This was not substance. This was simply in getting the people put together in doing the job. "I don't want to do the lobbying materials that way." "Well, nobody asked you. I'll do the lobbying."

As we fought through the scale of what we had to do, Chuck or somebody found a woman named Sandy Turner who was an old union grass-roots organizer. She wasn't there very long, but she came in to ringlead the thinking and plotting about the grass-roots outreach part of the coalition's work. The Denver to Boise memo I telecopied to the Washington office the afternoon of February 14, 1970, from Senator Church's Boise office. By March 14th, a month later, I was living in Washington and had prepared an elaborate memo with Sandy. I did most of the lobbying part, and she did most of the grass-roots part, but then we merged our ideas for presentation first to Chuck and then to the whole steering committee, which was these people from the various groups that were the authoritative body of the Alaska Coalition. This was our preliminary draft proposal for how to run the House floor campaign. That got reduced to a typescript with confidential written all over it and became the little plan for the floor campaign.

Lage: Did the coalition accept this idea of more central control, or less consensus-building, in the same direction?

Scott: Yes. Some of these were difficult meetings. There were people who were being asked both to cede some of what had been their previous degree of "isn't this fun? We'll get together every evening and have six-packs of beer around and all be in on every decision," which is the death of a lobbying coalition. I have watched it handled very poorly in other ones since. "I can't go out and walk door to door. I have to be at the meeting that's going to happen this afternoon about where the boundaries ought to be in the Illiamna area." "No you don't. Let someone else who has never even been there worry about that. You go lobby. That's what you're supposed to do."

My own view was it was Chuck's campaign, and Chuck and I were close enough and had a frank relationship so that he would set me straight if I was too far off from what he wanted, and I was there and I said the day I arrived, "I'm here. This is your campaign, Chuck, not mine. I'm here to do this the way you want it done or to go home again." We had a clear understanding along those lines.

So we had a big steering committee meeting with butcher paper on the wall and all of that and outlined all of this. People quibbled about it, but this basic plan was then the plan that was adopted. Its features I think I should summarize because I'm not going to
go through how the Alaska lands fight went. There is endless documentation about that. The basic plan of the lobbying was that we would have twenty core lobbyists, who would be coordinated by a lobbying coordinator, who would be me. The floor fight was to be organized around those twenty core lobbyists.

Lage: They were full time?

Scott: They were going to be full-time devoted to this campaign and to this effort, regardless of who paid their salary, because they all worked for different organizations. They were going to report to me and not go to their offices and not have other things to do. They were going to be full-time Alaska Coalition lobbyists. They each had a little business card that we printed up. It said "Alaska Coalition" on it, which became quite important for another reason. A big part of my plan was that we were going to have to get these twenty lobbyists plus a bunch of people to do the grass-roots work. All of a sudden there has got to be more people, and you folks are going to have let new people in. So we had a very strong discussion about that.

Lage: Were they willing to accept that they had been closing people out, or do you recall that?

Scott: I don't recall in detail. This plan says, "Effectiveness of the new people will depend upon their feeling that they are received as full partners in the effort and feeling entirely welcome to approach the old hands for rapid assimilation into the substance and strategy of the Alaska effort. Style has an enormous political impact. Our objective must be to make this lobbying campaign a professional tightly coordinated operation. Our materials, attitude, appearance and presentation must convey an essential, unspoken message that the national conservation movement is putting its top priority on this issue as the ‘land conservation votes of the century.'"

If I was going to do this, I was going to select the lobbyists, and the criteria were going to be my criteria. Egos were going to be bruised, and people who said, "Oh, I want to be part of that," were going to get told that they could talk on the telephone, but we were going to choose how we did this. The objective, and very importantly, was spelled out right here. You have to be absolutely clear about the objective. "Our objective is not to win. Our objective is to win BIG (in all capital letters) by the very largest possible margin of votes, both on amendments and on final passage. A strong vote is needed psychologically to rebolster our grass-roots campaign and it is vital in later steps in the process."

The big problem we all knew we were going to have was in the Senate. We had to come out of the House with incredible momentum. So they had a little a chapter on momentum. The image I invented was that the House floor fight should be thought of as a spring flood. When you get in a spring flood, you often don't know that is snowed last winter, then it got warm in the mountains, and by the time the flood gets to you, you didn't realize. But we have to be up there, snowing, doing all of that work uphill, so that by the time we get down we are just rolling down the hill.
This plan went through all the details of how this would operate. The core lobbyists, the twenty of them, would each have roughly twenty or twenty-one congressman that they were assigned to. Basically, we didn't work on Young, and we didn't work some members of the committee that we knew were absolutely hostile to us. But basically we worked every conceivable vote. Often you end up saying, "Well, these are all the people who are almost certainly going to be with us, and these are the people who are almost certainly going to be against us." Because you haven't got a lot of lobbyists, you just have to concentrate on the people in the middle and hope that the other people at the two extremes stay where you thought they were. We were going to work everybody and intensively work everybody. The core lobbyists were to be selected, and they would operate as agents of the Alaska Coalition. They would make a planned series of visits.

[End Tape 18, Side A]

[Begin Tape 18, Side B]

Scott: The first time we sent the lobbyists out, and this was in the plan from day one, it was just to get acquainted. They only had twenty congressman to work on, so their job was to become buddies, probably not with the congressman because these were mostly young people. In many cases, they became buddies with the congressman, but their job was to chat up the staff, to get to know them, to be in and out of there, to be relied up as the authoritative source about Alaska and about the issues and to be in and out of there so frequently that they just had that office wired for sound in terms of what their thinking was, and could not only report what their thinking in that office was about any particular question that we were concerned about, but could prescribe what next needed to be done to move that person. Did they need grass-roots attention? Did they need an editorial back home? Did they need one of our issue specialists to go and talk to them in great detail about something? The word prescription was a part of this.

The first time we sent them around was to just get acquainted. The only thing they needed to leave in that office was an impression of how big 375 million acres were. We had to plant the idea. We had to say in offices that paid no attention to this that Alaska is enormous because then we were going to come through the door and say, "Oh, incidentally, we want to lock up about 100 million of that."

We were going to have lobby materials. How do you visualize this for people? I tried getting a huge sheet map of Alaska and cutting out all the lands that we wanted to have preserved and then being able to hold it up and say, "Look how much is left: the biggest part." The pattern didn't work.

Scott: So we had this theoretical sequence of visits. These people were all operating as Alaska Coalition lobbyists. Then in a startling little innovation of which I am very proud, I invented a thing called—what did we call it? Switching? I don't know. We had some fancy name for it. Later on, we had a really neat name for it. At some point, if one of the lobbyists had done all the stuff they needed to do and had a little time, they would switch lists with somebody and instead of using their Alaska Coalition
business card, they would use their regular one. So they would go into somebody else's office with their Audubon card and the next time you switched, it would be a Wilderness Society Card, so that from the same twenty people, any one congressman kept getting visits, not only from the one person that they saw again and again and again, but then the Audubon Society and then the Wilderness Society, then Friends of the Earth and then the Sierra Club, all just by having people switch lists. Pairing, was what we called it.

Lage: Pairing?

Scott: They just paired the lobbyists off. They just switched lists with each other. That was all an idea. We had VIP lobbyists, the executives of the environmental groups, people like Wayburn and McCloskey and various prominent people who had been recruited to help us who we would send around. The core lobbyists would say, "In this office I think somebody from the [National] Wildlife Federation making a visit there would be useful." We could arrange all of that. We had issue specialists. Jack Hession was the head of the little core of issue specialists, and if somebody said, "I don't really understand this subsistence stuff," which is enormously complicated, we could send somebody in who could really explain it. Or, "I don't understand about the economics of oil," we could send somebody in who knew all that sort of stuff.

Lage: How did you train your twenty core—?

Scott: I'm going to tell you that.

Lage: You're coming to that. Okay.

Scott: We then had a whole plan for bringing in people from the grass roots. Volunteers would come in to augment our lobbying to be constituents right there. We had people that we had picked out all around the country, ultimately, that we had picked out. A little cadre of interns, really young people, whose job—. They were called droppers, and they were simply available to sweep up and do all the other things that needed to be done. But then, if you suddenly had some piece of literature that you needed to get out to the whole House in a hurry, each of them had a building. They would just go door to door to door dropping off our literature. So you weren't wasting the prime lobbyists' time with that operation.

My role as lobbying coordinator and my colleague who worked with me on that, Peter Scholes, about whom I'll say some more here in a moment, we had the job of dispatching people. So that became my role every morning, to give the motivational pep talk, or arrange for Mo to come or John Seiberling to come or for Elvis Starr from the Audubon Society to come and say something just to keep everybody revved up.

Then in the afternoons, we would have debriefing sessions, to sell people by the way I presented it. "Here's how to sell this message in these offices." Then we would discuss it. People would say, "I don't think that will work. I think that if we said it this way it would work better." So that we were doing role playing of "Here's how to get
this message across, because this is now the message." We wanted to be the source for these offices of what the parliamentary situation was so I got into endless complexities with people of explaining, because the parliamentary arrangements, once amendments started being proposed and so forth, was very complicated.

Lage: And the Congress needed to be told itself.

Scott: We wanted to be the source of their information about absolutely everything. We wanted them to think the way we thought. The best way to do that is to just shower them with so much information in such a friendly and dependable way that they would say, "Oh. So that's the way it's going to be." Information is power and we wanted to control that.

Matching this, Sandy had worked up a plan which I kibitzed on, for an elaborate boiler-room operation. There were a whole bunch of people who were hired at minimum wage to sit in the backroom of the Sierra Club or in the Friends of the Earth office calling grass-roots people all across the country with the latest pitch about, "Would you get after your congressman to do this, that, or the other thing." And there was an elaborate arrangement, all theorized in this document, for how these operations would communicate with each other. We had special reserve phone lines and so forth.

Lage: Was that new? That much rattling of the grass roots?

Scott: All this was new.

Lage: But they did build on what you had done before.

Scott: Yes, but what would happen in the SST days is that you would go up to the Hill and slog around all day and then you would go back and make the grass-roots calls yourself. Here we were dealing with an embarrassment of riches. We had the luxury to have people specialize in roles. We had the luxury to be able to not just leave them to their native wits, but to train them and to work with them as a group of people. We had the luxury to have people specialize, and we had the luxury to innovate.

Some of these people were very young, and this was all fairly new to them. Some of these people were old hands, particularly the Sierra Club people who were long-time field staff or whatever. The thing that they got excited about was the innovation. Everyone of these twenty lobbyists had a beeper. So it wasn't as in the old days where you would say, "Well, I just got this hot piece of information about Congressman Foghorn," and short of calling the congressman's office and saying, "Is the guy from the Sierra Club there?" you had waited until that afternoon. Or you said, "If anybody sees Ralph while he's out on Capitol Hill..." We could beep him right up and get him right to a phone and give him the latest piece of information.

Everybody beeped. There was a special signal. "You all meet somewhere; we have some late-breaking thing, quick, go to the designated spot." All this was being run from the Sierra Club's office on 330 Pennsylvania Avenue, Southeast, which is about
four long blocks from the nearest part of the House office building complex. That was too far away for when it really got intense, which the Boise memorandum had pointed out. I think by this time I had certain malice aforethought about where this was going to be, because it said in the memo, "We will need to have a location much closer to Capitol Hill." I was used to running House floor fights out of the Dingell room. Well, now Dingell was opposed to us, and no such room was readily available.

John McComb lived in a basement apartment that is literally one door from the Capitol complex. Out his front door and into the garage entrance of the underground parking garage on the House side of the Capitol complex is twenty yards, which was very handy when it rained. So we just simply moved John out. He moved in with a girlfriend or some place. I don't know where he went, but we moved him out and took over his house, strung the additional telephones.

Upstairs lived a woman who was just retired in this Congress named Virginia Smith, and her husband. Virginia Smith was a blue-haired elderly congresswoman from Nebraska of the Republican persuasion and never on our side about anything. We did not want her to start complaining that there were twenty people in her basement running this operation day and night. I just lived there. So the absolute firm ground rules once we moved over there were that no one of you were going to come walking down the walk and downstairs into the house. There was no going and standing outside smoking. There was no sitting out in the sun on a nice spring day. [laughter]

Lage: A clandestine operation.

Scott: I think Mrs. Smith never knew. Mo Udall would come to give a morning pep talk and Congressman Weaver or Congressman Seiberling. I don't think she ever knew. There were phones ringing, all this stuff going on, beepers being beeped and all this stuff.

So then the question was, who were going to be the core lobbyists? We prepared a list of who were the plausible people who were around who could be used. All this happened in a very compressed period of time between February and May 15, which was when we started floor debate in the House. Meanwhile, specialized crews of our folks were still working on getting the bills out of the committees, and following up the votes, and doing the lobbying of the committee members. But I have a list that is dated March 28, 1978—so now this general plan has been adopted and we were implementing it—of the potential core lobbyists, and there are all sorts of various people listed. Some of them are on this list. Some of them are crossed out. Usually the reason they are crossed out is that there was some other role that they were playing or that they couldn't get away or something. But we were making a selection. I knew most of these people—.

Lage: Were they already on the staffs of one of the environmental groups?

Scott: Yes. These were almost all staff people of one sort or another. A few volunteers. Many were field staff of the Wilderness Society or the Sierra Club. Those were the two largest cadres. I went through a process, and we interviewed people and talked
about it and winnowed down the list. I talked to somebody who will here go nameless because he is still on the staff. My remarks are, “Okay, but not enthusiastic.” Or here's somebody who could only be there for three weeks or so forth.

So from this we distilled a list of the core lobbyists. It ended up being twenty people as proposed. Just to give you a flavor of them: George Alderson, who was at that time still working for Friends of the Earth, I think; Brant Calkin who was with the Sierra Club; a woman (I forget what group she came from) named Sheila Cheston; Ernie Dickerman from the Wilderness Society; Jonathan Ela from the Sierra Club Midwest office; Mary Ann Eriksen from the Sierra Club Southern California office; Bruce Hamilton from the Sierra Club Northern Plains office; Linda Haberfield from, by that time, the Midwest office of the Sierra Club, I think (She had been one of the secretaries for Brock who had been in the office in Seattle); David Levine from the Anchorage office of the Sierra Club; Perry Moyle from the Colorado office of the Wilderness Society; Glenn Olson from the Sacramento office of the National Audubon Society; Connie Parrish from the San Francisco office of Friends of the Earth; Denise Schlener from the Washington office of the Wilderness Society; Muffy Scott from the Washington office of the Defenders of Wildlife; Stan Center from the Alaska office of Friends of the Earth. On and on.

All these people were rounded up and on April 24th, we had our orientation session for these lobbyists. Chuck in his memoir, or however he does this, will best tell this story, but one of the crucial clues to the success of the Alaska campaign came in the person of Larry Rockefeller, Laurance Rockefeller, Jr., son of Laurance Rockefeller. Larry is a devoted environmentalist and became deeply personally committed to Alaska. He brought resources to bear. I never knew, Chuck did, I suppose, whether they were his own personal resources or whether he was raising money within his family, but an enormous amount of money came that way. But also resources of specialized assistance. He organized himself, hired a staff to create a subsidiary group called Americans for Alaska, which used the Garden Clubs of America as its grass roots. They were a big part of it. It then recruited VIPs. I'm talking very prominent people: George Romney, former governor of Michigan and Republican presidential candidate; Elmo Zumwalt, retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Henry Cabot Lodge, the retired ambassador to Vietnam. People across every part of the spectrum politically. Very prominent people. The widow of Rogers C. B. Morton, the Secretary of the Interior. Morton had died at that point. There must have been sixty or seventy.

Lage: A lot of Republicans.

Scott: A lot of Republicans. Jim Buckley, the former senator from New York, brother of William Buckley. Just this whole crowd of people. We used their names for door-opening purposes any number of times. We used their names and faces in full-page ads. We did repeated full-page ads in the Washington Post time and time again. These things cost a fortune. Larry was the key to all of that.

Lage: So it wasn't just the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society putting up?
Scott: They also put up money but it was mostly money in the form of staff, or mailing to their own organizations. It wasn't sacks of money transferred to Chuck for the operation of the coalition. The Sierra Club housed the coalition and most of the coalition operation. Some were at the Friends of the Earth, but most were at the Sierra Club office. People like me were detailed to this for the duration, and we continued to be paid by the Sierra Club.

Lage: A lot of these twenty core lobbyists are Sierra Club, or a fair number.

Scott: A lot of this list of twenty are Sierra Club people. That was true of other people who were in other functions. These were just the lobbyists. There were a lot of other functions: press people, grass-roots people, issue specialists. Most of the issue specialists were Sierra Club people.

One of the things that Larry brought us was an organizational expert. The guy's not an organizational psychologist. It was just somebody that the Rockefellers or Larry or somebody used. One of his jobs was organizing the staff for new hotel properties and mobilizing them. Sort of a guru-type person whose name was—Dick Borden? That's not right. I may find it written down here. Ah, David Borden, there it is right there. He came via some Rockefeller subsidiary. On April 24, 1978, at a fancy room in the Cannon House Office Building arranged by Udall's staff, we had a very fancy, linens-on-the-table luncheon, followed by an afternoon orientation for the lobbyists. It says John McComb recorded this, so I bet you there is a tape of this some place. "Introduction of participants," which I ringled; "History of the coalition and the issue." Chuck Clusen about the Seiberling hearings, the formation of the coalition, the expected timetable, the big picture of our strategy. "Structure of the floor fight." How the grass-roots stuff was going to work—Sandy Turner talked about that. How the lobbying was going to work—I talked about that.

Ground rules—and this was where Borden was a particular counselor to me. He said, "You know, you weren't asked to come here to be a nice guy." I said, "Yes, and furthermore, I'm not." I had this attitude that campaign needed to be done in a disciplined and professional way, and that standards were going to be imposed. He said, "Well, the thing to do is just to lay that out." So he had a whole section called ground rules, which he was the MC for, dealing with pressure and anxiety. "Don't second-guess ideas. If you've got to complain, complain through Doug. Don't all sit around belly-aching to each other about it. Deal directly with people in your group. Make sure you share recognition. What to do when you're at the form bank. Difficulty of staying with the discipline that's involved."

Then we had a little slide show on what the issues were going to be and so forth. What our lobbying techniques were going to be. Getting trusted by each member of Congress or staff as a resource. Knowing what the member knows, knowing how the member stands, being the expert for us, because we are never going to go in those offices. In other words, coming back and telling us how we're to approach that person to get that vote.
So we spent a whole afternoon, it would appear, going through all this training and then we went out and starting doing this. We had a wonderful time. I think in the aftermath of this first floor fight, people appreciated why the discipline was necessary, appreciated that what was happening here was a mix of people with long-established skills and insights into how this worked who were simultaneously, starting with me, really getting off on the fact that we were learning new stuff. This all happened with an intensity. Chuck and I and Peter, or some subset of us, would meet two or three times a day with Mo Udall in intimate discussions of the strategies. We organized a group of House members that Mo called together that would meet, sometimes in the final going, a couple times a day, and would lobby other House members and exchange strategy. To be in a room where there was no congressional staff—there is Mo Udall and twenty powerful members of the House talking with each other about other congressmen—and be sitting there. Just an incredible thing. I never got that before. [laughter].

The proof of the pudding. We had so disciplined an effort, we had such excellent information about what was going on, we were so prepared to react to whatever hit us, that it built enormous confidence, which Chuck and others had been building all this time, in Udall and in Seiberling and in others who were working with them, and in the administration's agents, about what we were doing. We were where the action was. The proof of the pudding was that when the bill finally came out of the House committee at the nth hour, Lloyd Meeds, who had decided to become the chief opponent and was in his final term in the Congress and was our chief opponent in the committee, decided that he was going to have a substitute. We won in committee and had a very strong bill coming toward the House floor. We wanted to strengthen it further. But he came at us at the 11th hour with the Meeds substitute.

We got wind of this and went skidding over to Mo. Mo said, "Well, I'll call him and get a copy of it so that we can see what we're dealing with." He called up Meeds, and Meeds told Mo (I was sitting right there listening to one side of the conversation) that they had given their only copy to the Congressional Record people for printing in the record, because amendments had to be printed in full in the record. Which couldn't possibly have been true. If it was, it was a shocking piece of information about the clumsiness of Meeds operation. Of course, I was an old friend of Meeds, and he was our hero on Hells Canyon. I was an intimate friend of his and through his office in earlier days, and I still like him and greet him affably when I see him. And he was going to be serious trouble.

Lage: I don't want to interfere with the story, but what made him stop being an old friend and become the chief opponent?

Scott: Always a little bit of a mystery. He felt burned by the environmentalists, I guess, in the latter stages of the Alpine Lakes thing. He was also set up, I believe, by others in the Washington congressional delegation, notably Senator Jackson, to take the full brunt of the Alpine Lakes issue from the timber industry. Meeds came from a timber district. He didn't come from downtown silk-stocking Seattle. He came from Everett, Washington, Bellingham, Washington, timber country.
In whatever year it was (I think it was that year), he came within an inch of losing his seat, and he didn't know it. This had to be the fall of 1977. No, 1976. Yes, this was in the election of 1976. In Washington State, the primary is very late. It's in September. He barely won his primary and he didn't know it. He didn't see it coming. Then he got reelected, but by a very narrow margin and ultimately decided not to run the ensuing year, so he was in his final term of Congress. He believed that we had not worked hard enough for him and was quite put out at us, rightly or wrongly. We had a meeting with him at my house in Seattle. I can't tell you just when that was but it was after that election, so say the late fall of 1976 or early in 1977. He announced at that meeting, "What you're doing in the Alaska Lands bill prostitutes the Wilderness Act, and I'm not going to stand for it."

This was a made-up argument. We were allowing things. There are special provisions in the Alaska lands bill that allow various things to go on in wilderness areas in Alaska—.

Lage: Hunting?

Scott: Well, hunting is allowed in wilderness areas. It wasn't that issue; it was cabins and subsistence facilities and things. In my living room, he told this assembled group of his best friends in the wilderness movement in Seattle—Polly Dyer and people like that—he told us that he was going to lead the fight against us on the Alaska lands act. I got very intemperate with him, politely intemperate—after all, I was the host. I said, "Lloyd, I'm not going to stand for this in my living room. I have devoted my adult life to the Wilderness Act and I'm not going to have you telling me that we're prostituting the Act." I gave him a chewing out.

But lots of reasons.

Lage: He wasn't under reelection pressure because he wasn't going to run again.

Scott: No. But Western Washington is economically tied to Alaska. Who knows. I'm sure for good reasons and not sleazy ones Lloyd Meeds was the ringleader.

So he would come up with a substitute. "No, Mo, I don't have a copy."

Lage: Was this all in 1978?

Scott: This was set up in early May of 1978.

Lage: May of 1978.

Scott: So we went to the Congressional Record and got in the middle of the night the first copy of those pages that were printed. We were up all night. Jack Hession and the little crew and Ben Shane and some other people who were our expert people, and David Levine, just tore this thing and figured out what was wrong with it. The xerox machine would break. We were xeroxing. We had this fourteen page rebuttal of what
was wrong with the Meeds substitute. Our core lobbyists were walking in individual House members' offices at quarter to nine the next morning before any member of the House knew there was a Meed substitute. We had bad-mouthed it. We had said, "Here are fourteen, closely-reasoned single-spaced pages of detailed arguments about why this thing is a piece of trash," before they had ever heard there was such a thing. That was what we were capable of doing, and we were up all night. We were drunk and giddy, we were so tired, walking around the big table collating, because that was the fastest way to collate fourteen pages. I remember Jonathan Ela: we were singing Gilbert and Sullivan songs in the middle of the night in the old Sierra Club office.

But that was what we were capable of doing. We invented a bunch of rhetorical models, which has always been a thing that is important to me: "The Land and Wildlife Conservation Votes of the Century." We wanted to say, "You're going to hear from the National Rifle Association that this is gun control by land use. You're going to hear from the miners, and you're going to hear from the timber beast. You're going to hear from corporate America. They all care a little bit. We care big." That whole message was, "We'll never forgive you if you vote wrong. This one is so important to us. It's the most important environmental vote you'll ever cast, as far as we're concerned."

Some other environmental lobbyists at that time who were working on other issues were annoyed that we were sending that signal.

Lage: And then later, when you have to come back in a year or two and do it again with the next issue.

Scott: Do it again. That's right. We joked about that, that we would have the next Land and Wildlife Controversy vote of the century. Or the Land and Wildlife Conservation vote for the rest of the century.

Lage: The last great first chance.

Scott: We called it the last great first chance. We had all sorts of fancy letterheads. Here's one that's on goldenrod yellow paper with bright red "Alaska" and a big picture of a caribou. The Last Great First Chance. The picture of the caribou was the button. We had scads of these buttons. When it was in our interest to be seen all over Capitol Hill, suddenly everybody who walked by had these buttons on. One punch of the beeper or one instruction at the morning briefing, because we met every morning, sometimes every morning and then again at lunch. We would say, "We want to be stealthy today, and we don't want people to know that we're all over the Hill. No identification." I would give my little lecture, "You don't stand in an elevator like this [demonstrates] because the person next to you will see who you are and what you are doing." Stand like that with the paper.

Lage: When would be the times when you would want to be stealthy?
Scott: Just when you wanted to be all over the place doing something or other, listening at keyholes, and didn't want people to know who you were. One of the great tricks on Capitol Hill is just to keep your ears open in the cafeteria. You can hear all sorts of wonderful things. Years ago, Gary Soucie and I were having lunch in the Senate cafeteria during the SST fight in the Senate. We were inappropriately discussing enough so that someone listening could figure out who we were. We detected that two men in the next table were showing an undue amount of interest in our conversation. Gary kicked me under the table, or I kicked him, and we both were on to it, and I said in a conspiratorial whisper, "You know, this is going a lot better than I thought. It will really blow them away. Wild horses wouldn't have gotten me to believe that we were going to get Herman Talmadge!"

We didn't have Herman Talmadge, and we never did. But these guys spit their soup clear across the room, and in a few minutes got up and went rushing off. [laughter] In telling that, my sense was that I had come to the Alaska Coalition effort to bring that kind of experience and to say, "Everybody is going to learn a lot, including me, in this deal, but we are not going to learn by doing it wrong. We're going to learn by doing it right. So we're not going to have little trial and errors here. Don't talk in the elevators." Et cetera.

So we had these little updates. These things went around. The droppers would take these every morning. Here's one. Typically, I didn't put the date on it. This was before word processors, at least before we had them, so these things I would usually do in the middle of the night with an IBM Selectric Typewriter. I'm a big believer in italics so in the middle of the night I would be storming around the office screaming, "Who's got the italics ball [element]?

Lage: The computer was invented for you.

Scott: This one, just for example, says, "Yesterday, the House adopted the procedural rule for HR 39 by a vote of 354-42," so this has to be May 15th. "The Alaska Coalition expresses its appreciation to each member who supported the rule. The problem is that, using a fortuitous loophole in the rule—."

[End Tape 18, Side B]

[Begin Tape 19, Side A]

Scott: "—has assured the House that this can be avoided. This update presents the floor situation expected today. Parliamentary status: . . ." Then we just simply outlined. "Mr. Meeds is expected to present his Meeds substitute. To reemphasize the position we have stated to you and your staff in greater detail, the Alaska Coalition strongly opposes the Meeds substitute in whole or in any particular. Briefly it underlines . . . Now, support the new Udall substitute to focus House debate. Details. . ."

So we were delivering new pieces of paper every day to be the definitive source of information for our friends and for the people that we still had to get around the corner.
We were rating every congressman every day and updating these ratings. We kept all this information on six big wall charts. We had little red dots and little blue dots and scratchings.

Lage: Were these in the basement apartment?

Scott: These were in the basement apartment. Peter Scholes was an expert at getting all this information together because each lobbyist when he came back had a debriefing session with either Peter or myself or, after a while, we had a couple of other people helping us. They would say, "Here's what I found today from this particular congressman." We would say, "Well, wait a minute. When you say such and so, do you mean this or that?" So that it wasn't just their report, it was their report which we had argued with them about to make sure that we really had—. "Oh, so you're not quite sure he meant that. We'll go back tomorrow and find that out." Or they would say, "Okay, so that's the situation. You've just been there. What is your estimate of the best thing the grass rooters should be doing in this particular district, or what is needed?"

They were all using a thing we invented with carbonless paper. We invented the nefarious three part form (still used to this day by Sierra Club), which had a white copy, a pink copy and a yellow copy. The lobbyists would write out on that form the time and date of the visit to a particular office and what they found out and so forth. They kept a copy of that. Each of them had a file for each of their congressmen. Peter got a copy of that and after our comments were written on it during a debriefing session, that all ended up in the master data information. If it had some remark, "Need grass roots to do x, y, z, then a copy went by messenger to the grass roots people, and that was their source of the input of what they needed to do now.

Lage: Where are all these copies now? In the Washington office?

Scott: In great cartons in the Bancroft Library I hope.

Lage: Oh, good.

Scott: I'm going to call Peter, who lives in Seattle now, and find out what he has done with his records. Peter kept probably the clearest set of notes of this operation. He was a very organized young man, kept very thorough notes. I believe he still has them with him and if he does, I'm going to see to it that they come down here or the University of Washington or some place. Chuck, I'm sure, also has detailed notes. But Chuck often wasn't around this operation. He had lots of other fish to fry. In particular, he was the chief person. I got intimately involved, but he was the chief person dealing with the administration. So he was in and out seeing Cecil Andrus or Andrus' huge staff that was working on this. Later we were in and out of the White House every day when these votes were happening, particularly in the second year, in 1978.

Leading up to that House floor fight, which happened on May 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, those days of 1978, we did a little mailing. This was a typical thing, mother's milk to
me, mother's milk to the environmental movement. If you want to stir up grass-roots
people, you do a little mailing. The mailing is two-color, four pages, with a beautiful
picture. I remember when we discovered this picture, we just all leapt. Some old oil
drums and a beat-up car and a bunch of old mining equipment and a bull-dozer in the
foreground and Denali in the background—guaranteed to annoy any environmentalist.
On the mailing panel, it says, "Alaska Coalition, 620 C Street," which is the old full
Congress will vote in just days." And in little tiny print down at the bottom it says,
"This is a direct communication to you as a member of National Audubon Society,
Sierra Club, Wilderness Society, National Parks and Conservation Association,
National Wildlife Federation, Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth,
Defenders of Wildlife."

In the corner, under the postal permit, it says in red letters, "First Class Mail." This
was before John McComb and the rest of us fully grasped the rapidly emerging
technology of merged, purged mailing lists. Some people got quite a few copies of this
if they belonged to a lot of environmental groups. It's a story I love to tell. I wrote this
mailer, although it was picked over by a lot of other people. They had several big
fights. Sandy Turner left shortly afterwards. She and I disagreed violently about how a
mailer like this ought to be done. This little mailer was sent by all these groups to their
lists. We weren't doing any fancy selection by congressional district, the way we do it
now. We were just going to the membership lists.

Lage: All the membership. This is a tremendously expensive mailing.

Scott: I remember the day that Larry Rockefeller called and said, "How many of those are
you able to mail?" I said, "Well, given the amount of money that we've got, we're just
at 800,000." "Is that all the labels you've got?" "No, I've got a lot more labels." "Okay, make it a million." I called the printers who were out on the eastern shore of
Maryland someplace. I said, "Make that a million." They said, "Make that a cashier's
check." We sent a million pieces of first class mail. You can just guess what that cost.
It was a very large amount of money. This was dated April 26, 1978. It went first class
because we were really late. But it was updated so closely that it talked about,"We
expect these votes in mid-May. Let your representative know that voting for final
passage of HR 39 is not enough. This would be an empty gesture if weakened." So
we were signaling final passage. It isn't the vote that counts. We knew there was
going to be a Meeds something or other so we had already named Meeds. We told
people phone numbers to call, and how to send wires, and all that sort of thing.

As you can imagine, this unleashed one hell of a lot of mail and phone calls. We rolled
into the House. We devastated Meeds. We devastated a couple of amendments that
Young wanted. We were on an absolute roll. We were winning typically by nine to
one margins.

I need to say something about the House floor because for the last three weeks, or
month I guess, we were operating from John's apartment. But once we got to the floor,
we were on the floor for three or four days counting the rule. That was too far away.
Good soldier that he always was, Peter agreed to stay because we had the phone numbers and arrangements at John's apartment. So Peter spent all those days and all those nights on lonely duty at the coordinating center in John's apartment. I called up Mo. By this point Mo and I were talking on the phone often during the day. I called up Mo and said, "I got to be closer." He said, "Let me see what I can do, and I'll call you back." He had somebody call back in a few minutes and said, "Speaker's Dining Room." We operated for three days out of the private dining room in the suite of offices of the Speaker of the House, which is about twenty feet from the House chamber.

John McComb and I went over to scope this out. John, a particularly intimate friend of Mo Udall's, had been crucial in building up this level of trust, and here's this ornate high-ceiling fancy room. This is just when they are starting to televise the House, just internally, so the cameras were in place. In some parts of the complex, the wiring had been put in and the monitors put in and you could watch the proceedings on the House floor. But in the Speaker's Dining Room, there was this television set in a kind of a funny gun-metal kit. It looked as if it had been pulled out of a B-52. It sort of looked like air force issue television monitors. The wires were just strung down the ornate hallway to the House floor. But there was no sound. So we could watch what was going but you couldn't hear. I took one look at that, John and I looked at each other, he picked up the phone and said, "Could I speak to the House architect please? This is the Speaker's Office calling. We would like to have sound for the House floor proceedings in the dining room immediately please."

These guys must be like firemen, waiting to jump into their boots and go racing off, because in two seconds there were about twenty technicians. The Speaker's Office had called. The best thing they could figure out to do was to run in a speaker phone. We then called on that phone—a speaker phone in the Speaker's Dining Room—to Congressman Jim Weaver's office. He had sound in the Longworth Office Building. He agreed to leave his personal phone off the hook with the receiver up against the speaker on his television. But every now and then he wasn't around in his office, someone would come in dusting or something and hang it up [laughter], and we would have to call over and say, "Would you go in and reestablish it?"

So we were watching the television and listening on this speaker phone to the House proceedings and dispatching people and running around. It was quite remarkable. We had people stationed in key places all around, and when the bells would ring and the vote was on, we would have our people meeting congressman and walking to the floor. All this intensive stuff. And for three days, most of the time, it was people droning on in debate. It wasn't at votes. We had all the ringleaders in the environmental movement, most notably Mike McCloskey and Ed Wayburn. That goes without saying. Most notably the executive vice-president, chief staff person for the National Wildlife Federation, Tom Kimball, without whom there wouldn't be an Alaska Lands bill. We were under terrible fire from the National Rifle Association, who were vehemently opposed to this bill. Sending the Sierra Club in to answer the National Rifle Association didn't cut any ice with the kind of people who would be influenced by the National Rifle Association to begin with.
So we had Tom Kimball. He spent a week there at our command, with our young lobbyist who would be grabbing a congressman, because Tom didn't know all these guys, saying, "We would like you to meet Tom Kimball of the Wildlife Federation," and he would give them their pitch, or a beeper would ring and he would be dispatched to go running off to offices.

Lage: But didn't you have some differences at various points along the way with Tom Kimball?

Scott: No. Not on this. The Wildlife Federation doesn't join coalitions, just as a matter of policy. But he had an agent named Pat Goggin, a very pleasant person to work with, who was with us all the time and liked this mailing. It describes who the Alaska Coalition is and then there is a big list of groups, and down at the bottom it says, "The National Wildlife Federation, America's largest conservation group, joins in the Alaska Coalition in this urgent bulletin to conservation-minded citizens everywhere." That last 200,000 of the mailing when we upped it to a million was all Wildlife Federation names.

Lage: They have some commonality with the National Rifle Association?

Scott: Well, they are a hunting and fishing group.

Then with Mo's incredible sense of the House, he picked out Ike Skelton, a congressman from Missouri, who was a leading anti-gun-control person, and Ike Skelton became a sponsor of our bill and gave a big endorsement in his floor speech, and we copied that all around. We had all the mechanisms in place. If we detected, because we had ears out there, listening in every office, that something was hurting us, we were able to throw together a response and get it fielded very quickly.

Of course, by this time, half the members of the House were wearing our caribou button on their lapel as they were walking around the House floor. The House doorkeepers and the policemen, who can't take part in these sorts of things (Ha, Ha) took up the style—I don't know who suggested it to them—of wearing the button on the inside of their tie so they would flip their tie over.

Lage: It sounds like tremendous enthusiasm was built, not just within your group.

Scott: Oh, yes.

Lage: But my notes here say that when it did pass in May, it wasn't strong enough.

Scott: Oh, no. One of the things that was somewhat annoying—. You have to defer to the leaders. We weren't choreographing absolutely everything about this. We were winning every vote. We had people ready to offer amendments and tough amendments that were worth offering, which Mo and Seiberling, I think particularly Mo, decided that with the mood of the House, they had done as much as they were going to do and that they shouldn't mess around. So amendments were cut off. The big vote was the
Meeds substitute; we defeated it handily. We would have loved to have then offered a whole sequence of amendments that we had ready to strengthen the bill, and we were somewhat frustrated, down in the dumps, that we didn't get to do that.

But the big purpose, back in the plan, was to come out of the House on this huge political roll to head to the Senate, and we did have the effect of doing that. We had the all-time victory party back at the Sierra Club headquarters, which was a dumpy but big cavernous sort of a place. It was just stuffed with people: Agency people, Capitol Hill people. We of course were just circulating on the Hill, inviting people to come to the party. Mo would come. We had people stationed down the stairs, and they would see some member of Congress, and word would flash up, and so there would be a big cheer. We all waited around the House floor. When Mo came out, we all gave him a big cheer, and John Seiberling. We gave Don Young a big cheer. He came out with tears flowing down his face. We owned the House that day.

We emptied the liquor stores on Southeast Pennsylvania Avenue. There are quite a few of them. We had people with handcarts going back for more. Everybody was just absolutely drunk as a skunk. I know I had not slept for at least four days. We were just all working on whatever reserves that are stored in toenails only for occasional times in life.

We had this huge blowout victory party. Leslie England was one of the secretaries in the office then. She is now one of our lobbyists. Her desk was closest to the door. We got everybody up on the desks. When they came in and they would give some of the speech, everybody would cheer and drink some more. Mo came in, he got up and he said, I have never seen a better lobbying operation, and that is on basis of twenty years in the Congress. He meant it.

So the House floor fight solidified an already good arrangement with him and with Seiberling and sent us into the Senate in a good position. I'm not going to go through the blow by blow of what happened. In a word, we were working against the December, 1978, deadline because the interim protection of the land would lapse. We got jerked around in the Senate. A crummy bill was produced and ultimately killed by a filibuster by Senator Gravel. And an effort to negotiate a bill between the House and Senate went on in the dark of night. Somewhat in frustration. We had owned the House and we didn't own the process.

Lage: Did you carry on with the Senate?

Scott: Oh yes. I was there throughout.

Lage: Did you do this kind of operation in the Senate then?

Scott: Yes. We couldn't, of course, use John McComb's apartment so when we got active in the Senate we rented a nasty little apartment a block from the Senate office buildings in a building that wasn't supposed to have offices so we had to be really sneaky to sneak and out of there. But the problem was the Senate didn't act. They didn't act, and
they didn't act, and it went on and on and on. Then it all went into backroom negotiations, which we were as intimately involved in as you can be if you are not in the room, because we were of course intimately involved with Udall and Seiberling.

It was all downhill from that House fight, and we knew it was going to be. Keeping morale up was a big, big problem. Chuck and I in particular had to be sensitive to that. We had lots of parties, we had picnics, we had salmon flown in.

Lage: Did this same group stay on? They would go home and come back?

Scott: Oh yes. There were constant comings and goings. People went home for a while, but there was a standard little crew of people that were there around the clock. That year the Congress stayed in until the last dog was slain, and Senator Gravel killed this. A deal was done. Senator Gravel killed that deal. Then in the final going we were working with Ted Stevens of Alaska, who was no friend of ours, to extend the interim protection. The Native Claims Act protection was going to lapse, and we were going to extend that out a year, and Gravel killed that too. God, Stevens was just—. I was in the Speaker's office typing in the middle of the night, rushing back and forth between the House and the Senate, typing up this little extension amendment and rushing it back and people rushing it back over and all this.

Lage: And Stevens favored that?

Scott: Stevens favored it because here was Carter saying that if these lands are not protected and the interim protection lapses, I will use executive authority to see that the conservation objectives of my administration are not frustrated. He said it repeatedly, and people like Gravel didn't listen. So later that winter, on the eve of the deadline lapsing, I'm guessing the dates here, Carter did use the Antiquities Act to designate a whole bunch of national monuments and Andrus used powers that were vested in the secretary of the interior to establish a bunch of wildlife refuges. The monuments were politically significant. We would like it and only wished they were bigger, but it was a big bold thing.

There is a famous story in conservation history about Teddy Roosevelt. This was Teddy Roosevelt-style leadership on Carter's part. His commitment to this issue was extraordinary and wonderful. Once designated by the signature of the president on an Antiquities Act proclamation as a national monument, that president and no future president can undo it. It can only be undone by an act of Congress. So the effect was to put us not only in the driver's seat, but to now put us in a position where the Alaska delegation had to have a bill. They had just been trying to kill bills and play for time and screw around with things. Stevens was smart enough to realize this. So the one year extension was a better deal than perpetual protection.

There was a big argument that maybe what we should do is just pull up our tents and go away and say, "Those national monuments are just fine." What you couldn't get with these executive proclamations were the fine details worked out, managing the special management conditions and subsistence use. There were just a whole bunch of
problems with just saying, "We are going to live forever under the national monuments," but politically it gave us the whip hand. So we went into 1979 in a good position.

Well, good thing, because in 1979, as a result of changes in the committee make-up, we lost the Udall bill in the Udall committee by a single vote.

Lage: Oh boy. Did this have to do with the election?

Scott: Just the membership of the committee changed. This was a very polarizing issue and on a key vote we lost and the Huckaby Amendment substituted. So the bill still said HR 39, but from there on out it was all this wretched substitute.

Lage: And who was the one vote?

Scott: I don't remember. So in 1979 we had to go back to the House floor and do this all again except we were fighting with our backs to the wall, and we had to go and unplug the Huckaby thing. Then we were fighting. There was a Dingell substitute. I'm not going to be able to sort out in my memory all the fine details of what went on except to say that we recruited—. John Seiberling was a wonderful guy, but he was definitely the lieutenant-general to Udall. We needed Republican cover in a very major way, so we went and recruited the chairman of the Republican conference in the House, John Anderson of Illinois, who was very well-liked and very articulate, and later, of course, ran for President on an independent ticket. A wonderful guy to deal with. We went and recruited him.

So our comeback on the House floor was the Udall-Anderson substitute. We had another one of these big dust-ups and moved into the Speaker's Dining Room again. And did it all again.

Lage: Were you able to keep your core of people as fired up?

Scott: Oh sure. The House was always our strong point so we have a lot of fun in the House. This happened in May of 1979 and then, we really got into trouble because then the Senate played—. We got into a terrible waiting game keeping people going. There was committee stuff going on in the Senate and all that, but keeping everybody with it in morale was a major problem. Then our hero that year in the Senate was a fellow who had been a junior member of the Interior Committee in the House and then been elected to the Senate, Paul Tsongas, a wonderful guy, of Massachusetts, who was particular close to Cathy Smith and a couple of the other earliest workers. They had worked with him in the House so they were especially close to him. I was not particularly close to him. I was in a lot of meetings with him, but I don't think I ever figured in his wavelength particularly.

He entered into a time agreement. I was having dinner with Jim Moorman and his wife. Jim had become in the Carter Administration the assistant attorney general for Lands Division. They had invited me to dinner, had a nice house in Georgetown. I
was having a perfectly pleasant evening and the phone rang. Moorman said, "It's for you." I never got back to dinner that night. Paul Tsongas, for his own good reasons, was on the Senate floor mid-evening, entering into a time agreement with Ted Stevens. Senators can speak at length—it sets up the filibuster condition—but getting the scheduling of legislation to happen, getting anything to happen, you have to get a unanimous consent agreement. He entered into an agreement as to when we would vote on the Alaska lands bill that was very unfavorable to us.

Lage: Put it way off in the future?

Scott: Put it way off in the future. So I was trying to find people. At this point we had a kind of death watch. There was somebody always at the office. Barbara Blake, a Sierra Club employee in the Washington office, who was one of our core lobbyists and a great person and very close to Paul, was sent on the run. I said, "Get a cab, get a horse, get to the Senate and keep him from doing this." I was calling Roy Greenaway—[Senator Alan] Cranston as whip, Roy Greenaway his top dog. I think that maybe who called me. Somehow I got on to this, using the Moorman's phone (they were eating dinner), dispatching people all over town. But the deal was done.

So we didn't get to vote in the Senate until way into 1980. It didn't get to the floor. But then we did get to the floor in the Senate in that second go-around. We had a series of amendments. There was this wretched bill that Scoop Jackson had worked out with Stevens. We had a whole sequence of amendments to that bill. We had a bunch of the leaders of the Environment Committee, which had jurisdiction on wildlife refuges. We put together a wildlife refuge strengthening amendment. There was a park strengthening amendment and whatever else.

We got to the first vote, and I believe Gary Hart, who was on the Environment Committee, had the Hart and Nelson (or somebody like that) amendment, and we won. Scoop and Ted Stevens took one look at that and said, "Nothing in this for us." So they just stopped. Then they each took the bill down. The phrase in the Senate, "They took the bill off the floor." Just said, "The hell with this. If we are going to lose, we are not going to play it," and proceeded into the backrooms and into a negotiating process in the backrooms that we were not party to.

Enormously frustrating. We would dispatch people into the Capitol building to lurk around to see who was going in and out of the rooms. The Capitol building closes at 9 o'clock p.m. so then we would have people hiding. It was just very frustrating, just a period of enormous frustration.

Lage: Would these people in the back room include House people? Or mainly Senate?

Scott: Well, Barbara Blake would go in. She was something of an attractive young woman. She would go in and cozy up with the guards and start saying, “Can I sit here?”

Lage: What about the people in the room, though. Were they House and Senate?
Scott: House and Senate, yes. Some of the time. There was some negotiation with Ted Stevens. It got very complex. I can't repeat it all here from memory. At various points we didn't like what we gathered was going on. Our guys were more boy scouts than their guys. So our guys wouldn't tell us. Well, we knew perfectly well what our opponents—a guy named Tony Motley of CIMALS, Citizens for the Management of Alaska Lands. We knew very well that Tony knew what was going on in those rooms. Sometimes we would be outside pacing around together. We hardly ever spoke to each other.

But at various times, there were bills being done that we didn't like. Since we knew where it was, we would go get Jim Weaver, who was sort of an incendiary character, and say, "Jim, we need somebody to roll a bomb into that room." He would go in and throw a tirade and piss off Ted Stevens. They would shout at each other, disrupt the whole meeting. It was just enormously frustrating.

In the summer of 1978, it may have been after the House vote in 1978, I think that's when it was, I called up Mike McCloskey. He said, "Doug, brilliant job on the Alaska—." I said, "Well, now I'm going to Alaska and you're paying for it." So I finally decided that I was going to Alaska. Peter Scholes and I, and Jim Free, Carter's lobbyist—Carter had taken this into the White House and there was a fellow on his legislative staff named Jim Free who was a Southern Old Boy type. He and I got along famously. The three of us went up to Alaska and palled around up there for the better part of three weeks, I guess. At one point we went out to what is now the Wrangell-St. Elias National Park. There is a little community there called McCarthy. One of our expert lobbyists, Ben Shine [spells it] and his wife, lived in a tiny little cabin in McCarthy. We went to visit them.

Ben Shine is a name that I think we've heard before here. When Chuck Clusen got the job in Atlanta and left the University of Michigan very quickly, his place in the other room in my apartment was taken by Ben Shine, who was arriving to work on the League of Conservation Voter's Michigan efforts, so we were there visiting them. I think Jim Free wasn't with us at this part of it. The White House guy was only with us on part of the trip. Peter and I took a little backpacking trip. We went up from McCarthy to the old Kennecott Copper Mine along the Kennecott Glacier. Then we hiked way up onto the ridge behind there and camped for one night or maybe two, just drinking in these glorious mountains all around the glaciers, fabulous scenes.

It started raining and we thought the hell with this. We marched down this steep, steep hillside in the rain. We came into the old ruined town of Kennecott, where there is the old filled copper mine. A jeep drove up, though we walked up this road, and a bunch of people all huddled in parkas, covering their faces obscuring them, got out—.

[End Tape 19, Side A]

[Begin Tape 19, Side B]

Lage: Okay.
Scott: People got out of whatever the vehicle was that they were in and were looking around. They came our way. We were all bundled up in our rain gear and ponchos and stuff. They were all bundled up in their rain gear. As we passed, the guy closest to us stuck his hand and said, "Hi, Peter." It was Tony Motley, the chief lobbyists for the bad guys. [laughter] We didn't stand around chatting for very long, because we really didn't have anything in common. But we just thought this was one of the great encounters of all time. We spent the rest of the day laughing about that.

Lage: How did the trip strike you after all this work you did?

Scott: Oh, I loved it. We didn't get to see—. We drove from Anchorage to the Wrangells. I just thought it was the cat's pajamas. It was not Arctic Alaska. I didn't get to Arctic Alaska on this trip. We spent some time in the Wrangells, and then we spent the rest of the time in the Southeast. We spent a couple of days on Admiralty Island with the Forest Service and spent a day on a little floatplane touring Misty Fjords National Monument in the Southeast.

I'm sorry. This had to be the summer of 1979 because the monuments were already in place. Areas you would think that somebody who was from the Sierra Club would be the least-liked person, walking into Ketchikan, clearly somebody from the Jimmy Carter administration was less popular. We were travelling under deep cover. That was my first, and during all this period, my only visit to Alaska. That was the summer, probably August, recess of 1979.

In 1980, we had passed the Udall-Anderson substitute and were done fighting in the House. Ultimately this deal was done in the Senate. The Senate passed the bill that had been worked out. It was highly unsatisfactory, and they passed it just before the election recess. There was clearly going to be a lame-duck session that year. So what we had was the long passed Udall-Anderson version and this relatively crummy, in many respects, Senate-passed version.

For example, Senator Melcher of Montana had included a provision which came back to haunt us something awful, which we've just gotten fixed, which was a logging mandate and which guaranteed money for the accelerated logging of the Tongass National Forest. It was a dreadful provision. That year Mo Udall was having a more than usually difficult election challenge from a Republican candidate in Tucson. So a bunch of us went down to Tucson to volunteer in Mo's campaign, led by John McComb. I wasn't there for very long. I think maybe a week.

But before we all left Washington, we had cooked up this plan, and Mo had signed off on this plan, in which we introduced a new bill, which was by Mo Udall and Congressman Tom Evans, a leading Republican on the Merchant Marine Committee. The Udall-Evans bill was a part of an elaborate strategy which was enormously clever and which I had something to do with working out with Mo, but I can't remember it in detail here, why it was so clever. [laughter] But basically the plan was that we now
had the Senate-passed bill that the House would pass the Senate-passed bill and send it back to the Senate, but the House would also pass as a separate matter the Udall-Evans bill. That would have the effect of strengthening. This would have the effect of bouncing the ball back to the Senate in a strengthened fashion. But it wouldn't jeopardize the passage of the underlying bill. We were dealing with a very difficult parliamentary situation.

Lage: Were you anticipating the kind of election that you got?

Scott: No. Who had any choice? There was an election and you hope for the best, but it was certainly the forces of darkness against Jimmy Carter. So there we were in Tucson. Mo won nicely and had a big victory party at his headquarters in some motel in Tucson. It was an extremely unpleasant evening, because as we stood there, we were watching Frank Church being defeated in Idaho, we watched the Senate go Republican, and of course Reagan was winning. There went our Udall-Evans strategy. Standing there at one part in the middle of the evening, talking to Mo, he said, "Well, Doug." I said, "Well, Mo." But that's all she wrote.

I flew to San Francisco, I believe it was the day after the election or maybe two days after the election, and Jack Hession flew in from Alaska, and we went out to Ed and Peggy Wayburn's weekend house in Bolinas and sat on the deck and talked it over. On behalf of the Sierra Club, we arrived at the only possible conclusion, which was that we would have to take the Senate-passed bill. The options were no Alaska lands bill and see how the future played out, and live with the monuments with all the downsides of those. There were some better features about the Senate-passed bill.

Lage: Better than just having the monuments? But Reagan couldn't have undone the monuments.

Scott: That's right.

Lage: But Congress could have?

Scott: Congress did. The monuments were undone and revised, and in many cases the boundaries were perfected and other things that we wanted. So on balance, given the choices, we wanted to have the bill. So we then flew on to Washington. There were unpleasant meetings of the coalition, not unpleasant because we were unpleasant with each other but just because we were dealing with a gun to our head.

When the House reconvened, the lame-duck session passed the Senate-passed bill. December 2nd, the President signed it, and we had a big huge coalition party at the Shoreham Hotel the night before. The signing ceremony was a big East Room signing ceremony, and a lot of people had flown in from around the country. Polly Dyer was there from Seattle, and Martha Scott had returned from her ranch in Wyoming. We had this whole East Room crowded not only with us, but some of the bad guys too. I remember Rosalyn Carter sitting in the front row watching her husband as this little ceremony was going on as he was signing the bill, tears just pouring down her face. It
was very poignant. None of us wanted to leave. There was a little reception, coffee
and tea, served in the State Dining Room, the other end of the mansion.

Lage: You knew you weren't going to get that for a while.

Scott: We knew we weren't getting that for a while. The White House guards, the Marines or
whatever they are, the stewards, have this very deft way. When it's over they just ease
everybody out, but you never know you're being rushed. We lingered as long as we
could. It was very poignant. I remember Ed Wayburn and I walked all the way back
to the office that afternoon.

The next day, Martha Scott and I had lunch. Some time earlier, I remember how
grievously unhappy I was, once I had gotten to know her as a lobbyist in 1978. We
were very good friends. Somehow we invented this deal of having morning hugs when
we saw each other, just a friendly hug. She would swipe flowers out of people's yards
as she walked to the office in the morning and bring them in and put them on my desk.
I remember the one time, which must have been some time in 1979, she was really
unhappy, and I told her I would buy her a drink. We went across to this wretched little
restaurant across the street from the old Sierra Club office. She told me her marriage
was in trouble. I remembered how unhappy I was when I discovered that she was
married, and then I was particularly unhappy when I discovered who she was married
to (no point in going into it here, but I knew him. He was bigger than I. [laughter])

Lage: And he was a Scott. Or was it a maiden name?

Scott: Her maiden name is Scott. She announced to me that her marriage was in trouble, and
I was trying to counsel her as a friend, but boy, was I enthusiastic. But we sat together
at the signing ceremony in the East Room of the White House and she went back to
Wyoming.

Begin sealed section—Seal for 30 years.

This fellow was seriously unbalanced. He got it into his head that his wife and I were
having an affair, which we were not, though we were clearly very strongly attracted to
each other. In fact, Olga Crandall, Harry Crandall's wife, had seen us together at the
party at the Shoreham Hotel the night before the bill was signed. She was a woman of
everous insight. She went straight to Harry and said, "Harry, what is going on
between Doug and Martha," which we were greatly charmed by.

So Martha went back home. Her husband was seriously unbalanced, and he decided
that there was this affair going on and confronted her with it repeatedly in very
shocking ways. She talked him into going to see some kind of counselor, not with her,
but the guy should have been committed. She would find him in the middle of the
night with a gun. At one point, he extracted a deal from her that she would not
communicate with me. I was back in San Francisco, and she called and said that was
the deal. What can I say.
Before that actual deal was done, they would go into Laramie, and he would go to his session with the shrink, and she would go down the hall and call me. I would hold her hand by long distance through all this very difficult circumstance. She had forgotten to reverse the charges, and it suddenly dawned on her that this phone bill was going to come showing all these calls. She has this wonderful story about racing her husband to the mailbox, and calling the phone company to try and get the bill squashed. He ultimately sent me a registered letter threatening my life, which arrived at the Sierra Club one morning. I signed the registered letter receipt and then read the letter, got up and got on an airplane right then, because this guy would do it. He told her over the phone that he wasn't—.

Lage: You must have been very frightened for her.

Scott: You bet. He repeatedly threatened to kill himself. Finally, she started telling him he should. She finally lost her patience with him. But she was only staying with him to keep him from doing something stupid. But she was clearly endangering herself. He told her on the phone one night that, when he came to San Francisco to get me, he wasn't dumb enough to travel under his own name, to take a non-stop flight. It was a pretty serious problem. This guy had gone to high school with Jim Watt, which probably had an impact on him.

Ultimately she finally left him. At that point, I was in San Francisco as the director of federal affairs for the Sierra Club. I was living in a rooming house shared with several people, including Denise Schlener, who had been one of the lobbyists in the Alaska Coalition and had become a very good friend of mine and was a very close friend of Martha's. I came home one evening and Denise looked something like the cat that swallowed the canary. She said, "Doug, Martha called." I said, "Oh, that's nice." She said, "You can't call her back, but she'll call you." Her deal was that she would not be in touch with me for months, so I hadn't heard from her for months. It just annoyed Denise no end that I would show no emotion about this, which is why I didn't. Martha called the next day. She had escaped and was living with a friend of hers in Northfield, Minnesota. That was the 10th of March.

Anyway, two weeks later we were on a little, wonderful Caribbean beach on the Yucatán Peninsula at a very out-of-the-way little resort, and a month after that in May of 1981, Martha moved to San Francisco, and a year after that, because the son-of-a-bitch wouldn't participate in the divorce and so it took a year to get her divorce, five days after her divorce was final, we were married.

Lage: What did you do about the violent husband?

Scott: For a while, mutual friends of theirs were keeping an eye on him for us, and we had private knowledge of his whereabouts and what frame of mind he was in. I think he was all bluster. When I travelled to Washington, I never took the subway, I never took the bus, I took cabs wherever I went. I usually didn't walk on the streets by myself. If he was in town, we knew when he was in Washington and when he wasn't. When it came time to get her divorce, he had to be served, and he was aware that this was in the
works, so he had gone to considerable trouble to make himself to be unavailable to be served. We had a lawyer who didn't do a good job, so we fired that lawyer and got a new lawyer. The very day we hired that lawyer, he got ahold of some detective in Washington, and we knew where Tom was. He was flying to South America for some period of months and must have been chuckling up his sleeve that he was going to frustrate us. We were living together by this time so practically speaking it didn't matter, but the detective got him in line at the airplane. He came walking up.

But it took a year after that for the divorce to be final. We knew right away that we wanted to have children. It was important to get through all this so that we could have legitimate children, because this was a matter of some concern for Martha's family, who didn't care for him but were still fairly straight-laced people.

End sealed portion

Ultimately, she left him. . . it took a year to get her divorce, and five days after her divorce was final, we were married. . .

Once we were married, it was never a question of where we would honeymoon. We honeymooned in the Arctic, not the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, we honeymooned in Gates of the Arctic National Park in the Noatak National Preserve on a 330-mile float and paddle, in a two fold boat down the Noatak River, which was incredible. It was very late in the season so we saw no one else. It was just an incredible experience.

We had a daughter who was born in 1983. We were married in July of 1982. Our daughter Elizabeth was born in June of 1983 and had a very severe heart defect, and she only lived about a month and died in surgery, which of course was a devastating thing that we had to work through and deal with. At the time, that reminded me that in addition to everything else, the Alaska crowd and the Sierra Club crowd were just people who came to our rescue in a major way. We had support and help from people all over the country.

In due course, we had two more daughters and having named our first daughter a family name, we decided we wouldn't do that anymore, so in trying to ascertain how to name our children, we decided that their middle name, since we were both Scotts, that rather than using family names we would use for their middle names ancestral names. So we got the map of Scotland and chose names that were two little towns in the part of Scotland where the Scotts came from, in the border country of Scotland.

In both cases, we knew we were going to have a girl so we didn't have to fuss around with boy's names, and we got the map of Alaska. We looked for names that we liked on the map of Alaska, so our older daughter is Kiana [spells it], which is a little village on the Kobuk River, where the Squirrel River joins the Kobuk River. Once we chose this name off the map, the research capacities of the Sierra Club were put to use in
determining what this meant in the Aleut language. We wanted to make sure it didn't mean "where the dead fish rot." It means "where the two rivers meet." Which we are.

Lage: That's a nice concept.

Scott: Her middle name is Melrose, which is one of the Scottish border abbey towns. When our youngest daughter was born, we named her Kendall. We couldn't find another girl's name in all of Alaska that we liked, but our eyes strayed over to the part of Canada that is on the standard maps. In the Mackenzie River delta there is a little island called Kendall. So it is Kendall Selkirk, the other little Scottish town. This is all done with some deliberation. This means that during their youth, we have highly plausible excuses for a trip to Alaska and to the Arctic of Canada to visit Kiana and Kendall Island. And an excuse for a trip to Scotland.

Lage: And they're both good names.

Scott: That's right. So when people ask me what was gained out of the Alaska lands fight, I say, "Of course, 120 million acres of fabulous wilderness and all that, but the most important thing is the creation of the Scott family."

Lage: That's a very nice way to end this session.

Scott: Yes.

[End Tape 19, Side B]
Interview 8: November 28, 1993

Interviewer: Kent Gill

[Begin Tape 20, Side A]

Gill: This is Kent Gill interviewing Doug Scott on November 28, at Friday Harbor, Washington. And Doug, we decided to start today on the transition from some of the big wilderness outdoor campaigns to some of the more contemporary environmental issues and the application of strategies that were important in those earlier battles as they worked out in, say, the Farm Bill and the Superfund battle.

Scott: I think we should acknowledge that it's three years now since Ann Lage and I completed part one of these recollections, and in those three years I have been away from the Sierra Club more or less completely, except as a fond and devoted member. But I've also been away from any records. So my preparation three years later is based on essentially no capacity to refresh my memory of sequence or of timing of things. But on the other hand, there's three more years worth of perspective.

Ann and I had talked at considerable length about the Alaska lands campaign, which was extraordinary not only for the scale of the resources that were at stake and the scale of the achievement, flawed though it was, but was also an extraordinary historical event, in terms of reshaping the strategic approach of the Sierra Club, and other environmental groups, for fights and issues that came along subsequent to the Alaska lands fight. The Alaska lands bill was signed by President Carter after the election in 1980.

In December of 1980, in the East Room of the White House, I was there. I remember walking home, back to the Sierra Club office, from that event with Ed Wayburn, across the Mall in Washington. It was clear, I think, to many of us that in the process of mounting what was far and away the largest concerted grass-roots-oriented political campaign in recent history, we had gone back and adapted some techniques that much of the environmental movement, including the Sierra Club, had sort of forgotten how to do.

They were techniques that had been used in the fight over the recession of Yosemite Valley by John Muir, they were techniques that had been used in the epochal fight over dams in Dinosaur National Monument in the fifties by Dave Brower and Howard Zahniser and others. Mike McCloskey was of course a student of all of these techniques and had used them himself in lots of campaigns, but Mike had increasingly in these years been drawn into such preoccupation with the overall management of the club that continuing to function with the title of conservation director, which he still maintained and which he had been before Dave Brower's departure, was just increasingly difficult. And he acknowledged that he was farther and farther from the front lines of these things, and that partly for that reason and partly for reasons of the huge growth of the environmental movement, a lot of what was known about how to mount campaigns in an orchestrated and organized way that drew on the real grass-
roots strengths, and that did it with efficiency and coordination of all the various parts, had kind of gotten left by the wayside.

Many of the people involved in the Alaska campaign from other environmental group staffs, from the Sierra Club staff, and Sierra Club volunteers, had liked the feel of the Alaska campaign. It had been tightly organized, in one sense highly centralized; that is, there was an animating strategy that had been carefully thought out that was being reassessed literally moment by moment over a period of years. That strategy was clear so that the people who were playing a part at the state level, at the Sierra Club chapter level, in field offices, individual lobbyists, the media people, all saw how their work fit into this larger concerted strategy. And the Sierra Club had not been doing things on the national level in that way for a long time, and that's what I mean by some of the technology had gotten away from us, some of the ways of thinking how to organize in that way.

Now, partly, this was reflected in the fact that as Mike McCloskey was drawn more and more into being the executive director, there was no one individual person as the focal point for leadership of the conservation work of the club, by which I don't mean the chapter conservation work or the RCC conservation work or the regional work done by staff and field offices, but by which I mean the federal focus and essentially legislative campaigns of the Sierra Club.

The one place we sort of did that in our sleep, because it was so well developed, was in the public lands issues. The people who came out of the public land tradition in the club—that's how you did a wilderness fight. Your object was to pass legislation. Let's face it, in many cases, wilderness legislation was fairly simple. It's certainly fairly simple-minded, relative to these two-pound bills about command-and-control, clean-air technology, that were horribly complicated, that went through different committees, that involved different kinds of experts. And essentially, this campaign technology had never been applied to those things.

Well, because Mike was not able to provide full-time leadership of that kind, and because of a series of incremental decisions as the club grew and as its staff grew, we ended up with a situation in the seventies where the field offices, by the time I was hired in 1973 in the Northwest, reported directly to the executive director. Each one of them, directly through to the executive director, who clearly didn't have time. There weren't as many field offices then, of course, but clearly Mike didn't have time to be thinking, What should I be getting after the Northwest office to do for the next six months?

Gill: But there were department heads in San Francisco as well who were reporting directly.

Scott: There were. There was a conservation department in San Francisco that was doing various things. Carl Pope was there, Paul Swatek was there, Gene Coan and a number of other people, who were doing various things. They reported in some fashion directly to Mike. And with the departure, and in fact before the departure, of Lloyd Tupling, when Brock Evans became the head of the Washington office, he reported directly to
Mike. So if you looked at that on an organization chart, you'd say, "Well, Mike must be the man that is guiding and putting this all together and orchestrating it." And to give him credit, which he deserves—Mike is an extraordinary figure in all of this history, and an extraordinarily talented person, and he did awfully damn well at it, considering that he had budgets and board meetings and development functions and personnel crises and a personal life—

Gill: [laughs] Not to mention that.

Scott: But the reality was that the Sierra Club, many people in the Sierra Club, including Mike, saw in the Alaska battle a style of coordination and cohesion that the Sierra Club structure at that time was not capable of delivering. The Sierra Club staff structure.

Gill: Because the Alaska structure was essentially sort of outside those—

Scott: It was outside the Sierra Club, but it was heavily dominated by the Sierra Club. The Washington end of it was run from the Sierra Club's offices on Capitol Hill. Sierra Club people, Chuck Clusen was the chairman, and at that time a Sierra Club Washington lobbyist. John McComb and I and a number of other people were senior Sierra Club folks. Many of the twenty lobbyists who worked with me were Sierra Club field reps: Jonathan Ela, and a number of others. And all of those people, and people in San Francisco who, at a great distance from the battle, began to see how what they were being called upon to do—mobilizing grass roots and getting out communications and using Sierra magazine and the NNR [National News Report] and so forth—began to see a more coherent process, and they liked it.

We had a staff retreat, which I think was just the conservation staff, as I recollect, some place in West Virginia in what must have been the fall of '79, might have been early '80. But in any event, the die was essentially cast on the Alaska campaign by the time of that, and we had been through one or possibly two House floor fights by that time. A source of conversation at that retreat was the staff saying, "We liked the way that worked, and we ought to work that way." I remember in particular Jonathan Ela, the Midwest representative, making this point very forcefully, and Jonathan was someone who liked the freedom he had to operate his own operation in the Midwest out of Madison, Wisconsin, without a heck of a lot of day-to-day supervision by anybody anywhere else, had lots of regional issues of his own that he and his RCC and his chapters were fussing with. And to have Jonathan say, "I liked that style of campaigning, and to the degree we're working on national legislation, we ought to do it that way, at the price of having more direct supervision, in a structure that will allow us to campaign this way."

There was a certain degree of pushing Mike. Now, my recollection isn't clear enough, and I was a principal in all of this. There was a degree of pushing Mike to go farther and faster with making the organizational structure of the conservation staff make sense. Some of it was budgetary, because every year when the usual crisis of the Sierra Club's budget would come up, the development department would have its development director there advocating its needs, and the outings department would
have its staff person there advocating their needs, *Sierra* magazine and so forth. But
the conservation director disappeared. The one person who could speak with a unified
voice for the conservation interests of the club—field, Washington, grass roots—was
also the executive director. He had to be the judge. He couldn't be the advocate.

And so at this meeting in West Virginia, there was—I'm clear in this recollection—a
degree of pushing Mike to go farther and faster. There was also a little bit of crisis in
the air, because at that point, new leadership had come to the Wilderness Society in the
person of Bill Turnage some months prior to that, and Bill was a very take-charge
character. Bill had wooed away Chuck Clusen, who had been a lobbyist in the
Washington staff of the club, and who had gained the club enormous prestige by
serving while a Sierra Club employee as the head of this extraordinary Alaska effort. It
was widely perceived that Chuck's departure reflected either some combination of
unhappiness on Chuck's part with his future prospects at the Sierra Club, and sensing
that the kind of things he was capable of organizing as he demonstrated in the Alaska
campaign, he would not be in a position to do.

Some of that was a degree of dissatisfaction—which is, I hope, a neutral word; I intend
it to be a neutral word—with the way decision making was handled in the Washington
office, and some of that necessarily focused on Brock. Those weren't things that
Chuck, as a subordinate to Brock but as someone who had been Mike McCloskey's
personal assistant and had worked in San Francisco for years, and was highly regarded
by Mike—it was just inherently awkward that these were things that couldn't be put on
the table easily.

The result was that Chuck chose to accept an offer to become conservation director at
the Wilderness Society. He attended this West Virginia meeting with Bill Turnage in a
courtesy visit as his swan song. After he and Bill left, the fat was in the fire. There
was great unhappiness that we had allowed Chuck to get away, an attitude which I
must say—this doesn't have anything to do with Chuck—but the idea that people
wouldn't move around in the environmental movement and that we should hang up
sackcloth whenever somebody left to go do something else, was always one that
seemed to me to be inherently short-sighted. One, people are going to do that. We are,
after all, all mortal.

The greater question was, why did he choose to leave? I mean, you're going to have
turnover. Those of us who were close personal friends of Chuck's, and he and I had
been college roommates and buddies for years, and had kind of helped each other's
careers along the way, felt badly that he wouldn't be quite so tightly a part of the Sierra
Club family, but felt that in this unknown future of our closest cooperating public-
lands organization, the Wilderness Society, under this new person who god knows
what he was going to do, that having Chuck there would be a steady hand influencing
the tiller, and that that would be useful.

But the sense in the room in West Virginia amongst the conservation staff was, here's
one of our brightest stars, somebody who clearly would otherwise eventually,
somehow or other, have emerged in a leadership role in the conservation work in the
club, and certainly a potential future executive director, who had gone off. And in the Sierra Club, including in its staff, there is a funny, quirky psychology which says if you leave, the phrase is, you "left the club." Well, Chuck didn't leave the club. He didn't burn his membership card. But you leave the club, and there's a tinge of disloyalty that attaches to it. It's very subtle.

So there was this sort of sackcloth and ashes that this very highly respected colleague, a person to whom any one of us and most of us collectively would have deferred as a future leader in our efforts, had chosen to go somewhere else. Now, I know for a fact that if Chuck had stayed, the next set of events in the musical chairs that I am going to relate would have featured Chuck in the position in which it featured me, and that would have been fine with me. I don't recollect whether I counseled Chuck to stay or go when he was talking about going to the Wilderness Society. It is ironic that Chuck had been an applicant for the position of executive director at the Wilderness Society, the process which led to Turnage's selection.

Chuck was clearly career-oriented and clearly wanted to move into a position of more authority. He had exercised enormous authority, had been the environmental movement's representative at meetings with the president of the United States, and on and on and on. He was looking for new fields to conquer.

As a result of Mike's own recognition and desires to reorganize things, and as a result of the clear need to deal with some inadequacies of the existing structure of people in roles that weren't meshing very well, and the bizarre situation where there was no unified command short of the executive director, Mike implemented a reorganization. There is a memorandum somewhere, which Mike issued at the time, which is very clear about what he was trying to accomplish. I remember the memorandum well enough to know that he spent several paragraphs summarizing these considerations, and acknowledging these considerations that I've just been discussing, and then implemented a series of changes which were radical. It was radical in the sense that they shifted people's roles, including some people who didn't want their roles shifted in those ways. It didn't imply, it said that people were going to have to heel to a degree of supervision that in particular the field staff, myself included, had spent years eluding quite successfully, and successfully for the club as well. Lots of good work had been done, but it was a running joke, or a running commentary amongst the field staff, that one didn't want to go to San Francisco too often. Out of sight, out of mind.

Gill: You weren't looking for a lot of oversight at that time.

Scott: And it should be said that this reorganization was widely supported within the staff.

It had the following effects: it took me out of the Northwest office where I had essentially been an absentee for two years by that time, because I had been living in Washington DC, working essentially full time on the Alaska campaign, and moved me to the San Francisco headquarters. Mike was unwilling, partly because he was moving people up fast in some cases, and moving people around in ways that were already uncomfortable for some and possibly threatening for some, Mike was unwilling to
relinquish the title "conservation director." But he essentially retired it, and it stopped being carried, I think, right then and there. It was not being carried on the masthead of the magazine and other things that Mike had this dual personality.

But he invented the title "director of federal affairs" for me, a position in the San Francisco office, and as the senior official of the conservation department. So in effect, I reported directly to Mike, but it was not going to be comfortable, because this jumped me over Paul Swatek. Some years earlier, the field staff had come under Paul's supervision, and this involved bringing me up essentially equivalent to Paul. And it involved putting me in a similar relationship relative to the Washington office, and to Brock.

Brock and I have always had an odd relationship. I followed him as Northwest representative, but I was never an acolyte. Brock liked having acolytes around. I had my own experience. I was a seasoned Washington lobbyist when I stepped into the Northwest role, and Brock and I had a friendly relationship but never a close relationship. So Mike had to wrestle with how to deal with that.

John McComb had been brought in out of the Southwest office to replace Chuck as the principal public-lands lobbyist in Washington. So Paul Swatek and Brock and John McComb, as the associate director of the Washington office—which is a title Chuck had received earlier in an effort to keep Chuck from leaving—and I were identified as sort of a quartet who would jointly manage the conservation department, but in any matters where there were disagreements amongst us, I was the first amongst equals. And in particular, my role was to orchestrate campaigns.

Mike's memo says in words that are almost this tight, "The principal work of the conservation staff should be national campaigns, and the success of the conservation department should largely be judged on successful conservation campaigning." That was my bailiwick. It wasn't a perfect fix to the problems, but it was certainly a step in the right direction. I suspect in business schools and places where they look at organization charts, they would say that this was a step along the way, but it reflected an unwillingness to simply bite the bullet and make it absolutely clear. Mike's document, however, is a very clear statement of exactly why and exactly what was put into effect.

And basically, I started functioning in this role at some point during 1981, but I was still living in Washington DC, mostly, and still involved in the final stages of the Alaska lands campaign of 1980. I was still involved in the throes of the Alaska lands bill. So I moved to San Francisco in any real sense in January of 1981.

Gill: What was the thought about having that office located in San Francisco instead of Washington?

Scott: I think it had partly to do with that being the club's headquarters, partly to do with Mike not wanting to be so divorced from where the center of the action was, and wanting to have this person at hand, and I think it also reflected my unwillingness to
move to Washington. I had spent by that time a good period of my life living in and out of Washington DC, and I had no desire to relocate there. It's a place I grew increasingly to dislike, as a place to live. I got the kind of satisfaction that I wanted out of experiences with the Congress and the federal bureaucracy and the moving and shaking in Washington by visiting there very frequently, ten or twelve times a year in that era, but I didn't want to live there. I was at that time single, unhappy, and I was making a change in my life, but I didn't want to go back into what I saw as a place that would so absorb me that I would never deal with the rest of the things that I wanted to deal with.

The new situation began to work in 1981. It required of me not only to say, "Well, the next campaign, sort of like the Alaska campaign, will be whatever it is, the Clean Air Act or whatever, and therefore we'll now just turn to that," but there were still lots of other issues. There were still lots of questions of internal organization and other kinds of issues other than the federal legislative issues—the growth of scope and a whole series of things like that. I did not walk in to the San Francisco office and assume my new role and everybody stopped doing what they were doing and started doing something new. Carl Pope was there and was the centerpiece of the club's thinking and work on pollution, energy, and population issues. Gene Coan was there and was masterminding all kinds of publications and grass-roots communications. Paul was there and was supervising that whole operation, and taking a very strong hand in the increased communication of the headquarters with the field offices.

And also, and I think this is an important point to make, the field offices became almost immediately a high priority for the staff, for me individually, for John McComb, for Brock. Brock strongly supported this; the Washington office had been expanding. Once Brock got there, he brought in a lot of additional people, and we had a pretty good-sized Washington staff. What we didn't have when we were talking about doing Alaska-style campaigns within the Sierra Club, we didn't have anything like a complete network of field offices. We had an office that had been there for twenty years in the Pacific Northwest; we had a big office that attempted to cover nine states in the Midwest; we had varying kinds of arrangements in the Northeast, but really they were kind of a Manhattan office of the Sierra Club. We had John McComb in the Southwest. We had various kinds of arrangements in California, which often got gobbled up in the arcane chapter structure of California and California issues. And we had huge holes: nothing in the Southeast, nothing in Appalachia, nothing in the Plains.

And for the kinds of issues that we were turning our attention to, the club's field strength had in large measure been built where the public land issues were. But if you were trying to influence the Clean Air Act, or Superfund and other toxic subjects, or energy, you were dealing with a different set of committees whose members selected themselves to go on those committees in the Congress because of the kind of problems that they faced back home. So you were talking about people from Kentucky and Florida and Alabama and Texas, where we had no field link. And so we were trying to operate campaigns that would mobilize the Sierra Club nationwide, focused on targeted places, using two completely different mechanisms.
Where there was a field office, you could make one phone call saying, "Drop everything, this is important, here's why it is." You were talking to somebody who knew you, who you'd established a relationship with, you were talking to them as a supervisor, they were in on the frequent communications that happened daily with them. If you were trying to mobilize Texas, you had no such person to call. When you were trying to mobilize Texas and Arkansas and Oklahoma and key districts, you started looking through the leader list. "Do we have anybody—" or "Who's the council rep?" And it simply wasn't a workable system.

This was the animating energy behind the push from the staff to expand the field offices. Most of those regions, and most of the grass-roots club leaders, chapters and RCC leaders in those regions, had a desire to have this kind of staff presence as well. There were some exceptions to that; this was in some circles looked on with great suspicion as a staff expansion.

Gill:  Empire-building.

Scott: Yes, empire-building and all. And it may have been some of those things, who knows, but it surely was first and foremost the need for a simplified and responsive mechanism for quickly and efficiently mobilizing the word out to individual club leaders in key places in a system that would work.

The effect of the club's growing reliance on its RCCs [regional conservation committees] was to focus more regionally out around the country than state-by-state, just because you couldn't sit in San Francisco and say, "I wonder what's going on in Alabama today." You might be able to sit there and say, "Well, now, here are the key districts in the Southeast on this issue, and we'll get somebody to call the leaders list in Alabama's fourth congressional district and see if they can find somebody that can do something." But you're talking to strangers. It just didn't work very well.

There was also in that era a great concern about everybody wants everything. Every issue in the Sierra Club came trooping in and said to the board and to Mike and to staff—

[End Tape 20, Side A]

[Begin Tape 20, Side B]

Scott: They all wanted to have the focus of attention and the kind of energy and resources that people had seen put into the Alaska issue, and this required something that the club had not really thought through, and that was how to choose the priorities of national issues, how to decide which were going to get how much level of effort. Largely it had been preordained because the club was first and foremost a public lands organization, and so there were always lots of people working on wilderness. Ed Wayburn and others convinced—not a hard sell—convinced the club that Alaska was important, and those things just kind of happened naturally.
But if you were interested in the problems of pollution and land use in the farm belt and wanted the Sierra Club, with its vaunted impact that you'd read about and you'd observed, and you wanted that applied to the quadrennial farm bills, there was no way to invite yourself to the table, other than to kind of politic it through, but there wasn't—the board at that point didn't—this was clearly a festering problem that individual directors had favored things that they were interested in; individual directors were being chewed on by individual people that they were responsive to politically within the politics of the club.

So we started evolving a process and started sort of picking up on a simplified process which hadn't actually meant much but had existed for some years that Mike and others of us, and Brock, had worked on, which was to sort of make a list of all the things the club was interested in. The list didn't really say, "Well, how much juice are you going to get?" It just said, "You're on the list," and that made people—it was better to be on the list than not on the list.

So we had to figure out a way, we had to blunder and back into some mechanism that forced ourselves—meaning collectively with the board, the senior management of the club, the senior volunteer leadership—to figure out how to say, "We're going to work on these things," and of course far more importantly, to say in a way that would stick, "We're not going to work on these things, or at least not very much."

Now, the first part's easy. [laughs] In a thing like the Sierra Club, the second part is just bloody impossible. But if you end up with a list that's just a list, that doesn't actually mean anything, it doesn't say, "This is where you're going to put the moxie," then the whole system that the staff had been struggling to set up that would allow this focused energy could just look like, well, there's Doug and his friends choosing whatever their favorite issue is, and it would have taken us a long time to get to some of the things [laughs] if we'd done that. And there was always a suspicion that this was staff-dominated, and that some other group of people in some other room was making a decision, because obviously, some decision had been made. This is antithetical to the grass-roots democracy of the club.

At that time, we had had for some time a position on the board of vice president for conservation, and someplace right there in the early eighties, that position was taken by Michele Perrault. I can remember many meetings in the little office that I then had at the Bush Street office with Michele and Matthew, who was then in a stroller. Matthew would slowly take apart my office while Michele and I would contend with how to deal with this issue, and do it in a way that met the internal needs of the volunteer politics of the club and the managerial needs of the staff.

So over a period of a sequence of time, a process was worked out that involved enormous consulting with the chapter and group leaders, and receiving input from them, and collating all that input, and ultimately taking a recommendation from the vice president for conservation and the conservation committee or whatever it was then called, and the senior staff, to the board of directors and saying, "We want you to pass a list, and it's actually going to mean something."
Gill: Because we're going to attach personnel and dollars.

Scott: We're going to attach personnel and dollars; we're going to attach levels of effort to this. And in some things—Ed Wayburn was on the board, so Alaska was on the list, whether there was anything brewing in Alaska just then or not. And wilderness was always on the list, and forests, and sort of the staple clean air, or whichever of the toxic/clean air/clean water things was up. Energy was on the list.

But the farm bill got on the list, and it got on the list because a bunch of people who had organized the Nebraska chapter, people like Bob Warwick, and the new field person that had been put into the Great Plains, Rose McCullough, set out to campaign to get the farm bill onto the club's priority list. They sent a letter to every chapter and group in the country saying, "We'd like you to support our desire to get these farm issues, which touch the whole country but which are the environment that we live in, listed. We'd like you to support this." So there started to be politicking, grass-roots mobilizing, of people to get issues onto the list.

This also led to—people could say, "Well, we need to have the farm bill," and we'd say, "Well, that's all very well, but if we're going to do the farm bill, we've got to have a lobbyist to work on it, and if we don't have the farm belt, which is where all the key committee members in the Congress are from, if we don't have field staff in some degree of concentration in those key places, we can't deliver this promised result." So all of these processes were going on at the same time, but it resulted in growth of the field staff. It resulted in some special fund-raising efforts and other ways to try and add positions in Washington or move people around in Washington to get staff that would be able to concentrate on whatever these new issues were. I spent a lot of my time in that era when I was director of federal affairs trying to make all those pieces mesh together, so that if there was a farm bill, there was a strategy for that farm bill. If that was going to be one of our campaigns, that there was a strategy for that, and that that strategy actually had personnel somewhere, volunteer and staff.

Gill: Was there already a vehicle by this time? Had a bill been drafted someplace?

Scott: Oh, yes. The Sierra Club simply wasn't a player. Yes, every four years, the agricultural lobby had organized itself to pass farm bills which essentially were the passing out of the rules for the farm subsidies, the price supports and crop insurance and so forth, subjects on which most Sierra Club people, first and foremost me, were wildly ignorant. So the smart club leaders—Bob Warwick is one I remember in particular, and field staff committed to this, Rose McCullough—said, "Well, we're going to make it our job to get key people like Doug up to speed about this." And I recall that at some stage in our getting in—once the farm bill made it onto the list, we invited some experts to a retreat which was held at the Johnson Wax Frank Lloyd Wright house in Racine, Wisconsin, under the auspices of Johnson Wax Company, and spent three or four days in effect educating—having some other experts tell us how this worked, and then us sort of saying, "Ah, there's a chunk. I can see how the Sierra Club could help with that."
Well, I could see a piece of our campaign technology, and so we had two or three people from our Washington office, we had two or three field staff people, and got ourselves into that issue. Well, the result was that the Sierra Club entered—I think it was the '85 farm bill campaign, so it would have been '84—bringing to the table ideas and technology and the grass-roots capacity that the kinds of public interest groups that had been working on getting environmental concerns into these farm bills had not had in the past.

There's a list that I am looking at here of the kind of generic technology that our campaign approach brought to the table, and this will go right through it on the farm bill. We had to figure out what it was we were trying to accomplish. We didn't have any particular interest in crop insurance and price supports for winter wheat. We didn't know much about it, and we had no credibility with anybody about it, and it wasn't quite clear what the linkage was. But these experts were able to help us figure out, and a number of these experts had long since figured out for themselves and wondered why we couldn't grasp it for ourselves, that the need was to get land out of cultivation, land that was marginal for agricultural purposes and that was highly erosive. And that if you could in a targeted way get that kind of land out of the base, get it retired in what had the working title of the “conservation reserve,” that you could by targeting it to the most erosive soils, you could make huge improvements in air and water pollution impacts that resulted from the cultivation of that land. Because, in fact, the farm programs, the price supports and the crop insurance and other requirements in the farm program, required farmers to plow up this stuff. Beyond that, there was stuff that had never been plowed.

We instantly fell upon a provision which somebody had invented called the sodbuster provision, which said, "If you bust previously unplowed land"—and it wasn't necessarily virgin, never-plowed, but it long since had not been plowed—"if you sodbust, Mr. Farmer, you lose all the goodies that you otherwise get. You lose the crop insurance, you lose the price supports. You can do it, but if you do it, you don't get to come to the trough for all the goodies that you're used to getting from the farm program." So that was how this thing worked.

Gill: It used economics, in a way, to control them.

Scott: And we could instantly see, sort of coming from no knowledge of this, "Ah, there's a simple concept." As I said that, your eyes lit up, "Yeah, that makes sense." That's something you could write in one sentence or two, you could get people switched on and say that makes good sense. You could see Sierra Club kinds of people, grass-roots people, saying, "Hey, I understand that. I don't have to read a two-pound bill and understand the price-support program. I can understand that." And there were a number of other provisions in the farm bill.

So we decided to take those provisions and work with the coalition which already existed in a number of groups, American Farmland Trust, and a number of other groups that we were actively involved with, and to run a Sierra Club campaign around those. So we consciously planned to make a big deal out of the fact that this vaunted
national environmental group, the Sierra Club, was suddenly throwing itself into the farm bill politics, and we decided to make a splash at that by using a bunch of pieces of our kind of off-the-shelf technology. We commissioned one of the fellows who had helped us figure out all this, a very brilliant guy whose name totally escapes me at the moment, we commissioned a fellow to write us a book about—not a book, a Sierra Club-published-type book, but a looseleaf notebook that we would use to hand out to members of Congress. We had a particular format that we used for these that would explain these provisions and why the Sierra Club was supporting each of these. We called it the Farm Bill Book, and it had printed on the spine of the spiral binder, which we presented each member of Congress, had beautifully printed, "Sierra Club Farm Bill Book," with the idea that the aide in that congressman's office would have that right on his shelf. And when I say, "sodbuster," he would look it up and there would be a tab that would say "sodbuster," and he could get all the details about it.

And simultaneously, we'd be sending that book, minus the notebook part of it, we'd send all the guts of that to chapter conservation leaders, to people in key districts, to our field staff, and that would give us a focus. We had a big press conference to release this book at the National Press Club in Washington, and Joanne Hurley and I and our media staff organized the whole thing so we'd make a big splash. We had some congressmen there, and tried to make news out of the fact that the Sierra Club was getting into this. We did mailings to stir up letters and phone calls from grass-roots people to key congressmen, and these were all parts of the technology.

We brought in Sierra Club volunteer leaders to Washington for a week to lobby for what we called the Lobby Week on the Farm Bill, using the Farm Book. They attended the press conference, so we were sure to get a lot of applause. And this was a big deal for them; they'd never been to the National Press Club. They then spent a whole week, one, getting briefed, and all of this was being explained to them by experts. And then they were the people that walked that Farm Bill Book into and talked to members of Congress and their staffers from their state, leaving the impact, "Hey, it's the Sierra Club. Remember them? They're always after us about wilderness and stuff. They're in there, and they're talking about this farm bill."

We also tripped over another provision, and I think this was the Sierra Club's unique contribution to the '85 Farm Bill. The sodbuster idea was so neat that we tripped over somebody just in passing saying, "You know, the other thing they do is they fill wetlands." And somebody said, "Swampbuster." So because of the Sierra Club's involvement, we put into the '85 Farm Bill, we wrote, we invented, and said in exactly a parallel to the sodbuster provision, it said, "If you fill wetlands for agricultural purposes, you lose all the benefits of the... You can do it, but if you do it, you lose all the benefits of the bill."

Now, this is far more impactful than some command-control permitting process involving the Army Corps of Engineers office in New Orleans and all that stuff. Here was a thing that just right down at the county level, the county agent and the people that hand out the farm checks could say, "Sorry, you filled wetlands, you're out of business." I think that was in particular our unique contribution, but it exemplified
how this new mechanism, or much revised mechanism of the club's conservation work could be brought to bear at the behest of a strongly motivated group of club volunteers to put a new issue on the platter, and to bring to that new issue the unique qualities of a Sierra Club campaign in a way that would make a difference.

Now, that was the model. That was what we were consciously trying to do. That's what Mike's memo had said, "Campaigns will be the centerpiece; the success of the conservation department will be largely viewed on its successful campaigns." And that's what we are out to do. It meant coordinating the media functions of the club, which were being built up at this time. There was, until this time, no media person in the Washington office, which is where 97 percent of the stories about what's going on in Congress are written, after all. [laughs] They're not written in San Francisco, and they're not written in Seattle. They're written by known people in Washington, who the Sierra Club was essentially not cultivating.

Other environmental groups, notably Bill Turnage at the Wilderness Society, were getting very aggressive in the press. They didn't have, and Bill said this explicitly, said, "I don't have here at the Wilderness Society the grass-roots cadres all organized in chapters and groups and RCCs. I don't have that mechanism. But if our name is constantly in the newspapers, that has a similar political impact. So our way to gain the equivalent of grass-roots clout is to be the most visible in newspapers," so he built up a huge and very clever—.

The Sierra Club had been used to being the Kleenex of the environmental movement. Back in the sixties, everybody said, "Sierra Club," when they meant "environmentalist," and the Sierra Club did an enormous amount of resting on its laurels. Because largely, after Brower left, there wasn't the continued inventiveness in the same way. The linkage that Brower personally represented between a campaign film, like his film about the Wilderness Alps of the Stehekin, and the exhibit format book, and which pictures were in the calendar, and what was on the cover of *Sierra* magazine, and what was being said in the newspapers, all merging with the campaign to stop dams in Grand Canyon or whatever it was.

Those other parts of the club were busy publishing books, and they were busy publishing calendars, and they were busy publishing *Sierra* magazine, but it wasn't all focused. It didn't focus the same way it did when all of that was in the focus of Dave Brower. And a lot of it, you go back and a lot of this story is in a different time with lots more people and greater resources, trying to go back and recapture what two or three people did together in the era of Howard Zahniser, Mike McCloskey was a part of that, and Dave Brower, and to get all the parts to fit together in a way that happened then, because if all those things happened in the fifties, it was because Dave did every single one of them, or said to the only other person there, "Here's a book, go publish it," or "Go make a film," or whatever it was. So dragging all those pieces back together and making them serve the conservation agenda of the club was kind of a subtext to all of this, and then getting in these new issues.
Now, the farm bill is a good example where we joined a coalition which didn't have many environmentalists in it, environmentalists in the sense of old-line, well-established environmental groups that were working on something else and then brought their moxie to the fight. There were a bunch of people who were doing farm bill things who were environmentalists, but the Wildlife Federation wasn't there, and the Audubon Society and the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society and so forth.

You can't say the same thing for the pollution issues. The pollution issues each had very well-established people on the turf. NRDC for years, by dint of great talent, had been dominating the politics of the clean air in Washington. Their staff leaders were undoubted experts, attorneys and scientists who were undoubted experts on the complexities of the subject matter, respected as such by [Senator] Ed Muskie and [Congressman] Henry Waxman and their staffs, the ringleaders on the bill.

But increasingly, they couldn't pass legislation, because as the Clean Air and Clean Water and Superfund and other toxic laws started to bite industry, industry started to bite back. It had seemed simple in the first generation of all those acts, which actually was in the late fifties and in through the sixties, and then kind of got caught up in Earth Day and everybody said, "Oh, the Clean Air Act is a good idea." There were certain fights about them, but they got put in place. And then the counterattack happened.

When I first started going to Washington DC, in 1968, it was still a sleepy little Southern town. There was not a lot of money, there was no cultural life other than what went on at a couple of small theaters and the DAR Constitution Hall. Then all of a sudden, the Kennedys came and went, the big government era of Johnson came, the Kennedy Center was there. And in that same era, all of this reaction of industry to increasing command-and-control regulation coming out of Washington was to start opening Washington offices. Not just to rely on some lawyer there.

So all of a sudden, you go to Washington DC today, and K Street from one end to the other is lined with fabulous new glass palaces with very high-paid representatives of every industry that's affected by the Clean Air Act, every industry that's affected by the Clean Water Act. And so all of a sudden—it never was easy to pass clean air or clean water legislation—but all of a sudden it became a serious problem. The groups that had worked on it for the most part had worked on it in a way that involves inside-Washington politics. They sent their experts, their experts went and argued to Ed Muskie, Ed Muskie went and contended with whoever was fighting him, and they passed the Clean Air Act. It wasn't perfect, but it was the next step of the way. And there wasn't much in the way of grass-roots environmentalist impact. There wasn't much in the way of grass-roots industry impact.

Well, all that changed. Most of the groups that were specializing in those issues weren't grass-roots political groups. They were like NRDC, so get some more experts, get some more attorneys, think of some more clever lawsuits to file to sort of force an issue onto the agenda. And they relied very strongly on a couple of very powerful and well-placed legislators. As long as Ed Muskie was in the Senate, he believed
passionately he was personally expert; he'd been there at every stage of the birth of the Clean Air Act and of the regulatory work.

When Carter came in, all the guys at NRDC who had been the scientists and lawyers and experts on the Clean Air Act for the environmental movement went over and ran that part of the EPA. And they just kind of go back and forth, depending on whether there's Democrats in office or not. But Ed Muskie went off and became secretary of state, and all of a sudden other people started emerging, and opponents started emerging in a much stronger way, pushed on by industry. John Dingell was a great pal of the Sierra Club's and other environmental groups when he was the chairman of the Merchant Marine Committee Subcommittee on Fish and Wildlife and the father of NEPA—there would be no NEPA if John Dingell hadn't figured out how to get it through the House by an enormously clever legislative process.

John Dingell was a strong supporter of the Wilderness Act and a whole bunch of other things, and all through the seventies, or certainly into the seventies, John Dingell was a pal. I, as a wet-behind-the-ears Washington lobbyist, I knew him well. When we ran a campaign on Alaska the first time in the early seventies to effect the Native Claims Act and get the provision that became the (d)(2) provision into the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act, we used in the final going in the House a room in the Rayburn Building as our campaign headquarters. We were there day and night. People like Ernie Dickerman and myself from the Wilderness Society—I was then with the Wilderness Society—and a bunch of Sierra Club people, and that room was made available for our use by John Dingell. It was part of his turf.

All of this started changing, because the Clean Air Act started biting Detroit. John Dingell went off and ended up in the absolute position to say yes or no to clean air legislation as the chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce. You go find anybody who started as a Washington lobbyist for the environmental movement and paid attention to those kind of issues after the early seventies, and you won't find anybody who will say anything at all nice about John Dingell, or would ever say, "He was my friend, he did this for us and that for us, and cared passionately about these issues." Because his role in life changed.

Gill: Well, there was clearly a place for a grass-roots organization at this point. How did the Sierra Club decide to move in and become that grass-roots organization?

Scott: Well, the club had grown out to be a national organization with chapters in lots of places with dirty air, instead of just in rural Oregon or places like that, so when club people got together, they didn't just talk wilderness, they started talking clean air. And so there was a demand coming from more and more chapters with more and more council representatives and more and more internal politics. There was also Carl Pope. The club had the good luck to have acquired Carl Pope as a staff member, who was knowledgeable, extremely knowledgeable, about clean air, clean water, and toxics, and enormously political. The magic for the Sierra Club is when, in some combination—this doesn't have anything to do with staff and volunteers—but some combination of staff and volunteers combined expertise about the issue with expertise about the
politics of that issue, and a sense of cleverness about how to figure out how to beat the politics of that issue. When you get Sally Reid, who cares passionately about Podunk Falls potential wilderness area that the Forest Service is doing something malicious to, and combine her with a field rep and a Tim Mahoney in the Washington office, and if I dare say a Doug Scott, and get them around a table and start talking, you have decades of collective knowledge. Sally's expertise about the area, and Sally's motivation—most of those areas that we worked on, the staff people didn't see at the time and haven't ever seen since. But we knew how to do it.

What we got with Carl was all in one package that knowledge about clean air and clean water, and the politics of them, and how they work, and where the levers were, because he was expert on the issues, and enormously astute politically. So when people started coming in, and I don't know whether he was one of the early ones, but Jerry Tinianow, who was a club leader in Ohio—and all the wilderness that's going to be saved in Ohio, I think, has been saved—Jerry Tinianow could sit down and have a conversation with Carl Pope that was in every way, if you took an aerial photograph of it, it would look just like a conversation about wilderness between Sally Reid and Doug Scott, or a conversation about Alaska between Ed Wayburn, Jack Hession, and Chuck Clusen. It would look—you'd say, "That Sierra Club thing is happening there."

Well, it started happening on these pollution issues. And, in this process of saying, "Now we're going to campaign on it," we looked for the usual things. Where's our niche, how can we take something that takes a week to read if you've been to law school, and make it graspable? Where do we find what we want to change in it, and then, how do we simplify—I don't want to use the word simplify in the sense of talking down, but how do we crystalize that in a way that can energize grass-roots people, and that can be conveyed simply and say, "Oh, god, clean air, I don't want—." I was famous for never having the faintest idea, and I don't to this day, about all that stuff.

Increasingly, my own personal evolution is I'm increasingly skeptical that we were ever on the right track. I'm increasingly skeptical that the whole command-and-control technology approach of saying, "Government will say you can do this and you can't do that, and you've got to get permits for this and that," because I see living in a little place how strongly that kind of government process evokes instant reaction from the public. Whether they're even poked by it or not.

And that—wilderness, all through the fifties and sixties and seventies and eighties, when you were fighting to save wilderness, if you poked the average guy on the street, if he or she knew anything about it, they'd say, "That's good." If you poke them and say, "The price of your car is going to go up by six zillion dollars," no. Opinion polls kept saying, "People will pay for clean air."

[End Tape 20, Side B]

[Begin Tape 21, Side A]
Gill: Well, we're on, and if you'd like to go ahead and say a few more things about the clean air campaign.

Scott: Well, I'm going to talk about Superfund and clean air, because the pollution laws, unlike most of the public land laws, come up for reauthorization every few years, which at least theoretically is an opportunity for them to be done in, but it also is an opportunity for them to be strengthened. Superfund, which the club had worked on when it was established, came up for such a reauthorization, and I am thinking that it was '85. It was '85 or '86. In the midst of a fairly routine process—we were out to strengthen the bill; the industry lobbyists were out to weaken it in various key ways—in the midst of the process, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, chaired by Congressman Dingell, issued its report on the bill.

There was an unusual separate view in the report by Chairman Dingell which attacked by name one of our lobbyists, Blake Early, who was our lobbyist on the subject, and a colleague of his from the National Audubon Society, and accused them of misrepresentation and various other nefarious activities. I can't quote the accusations from memory, but it was a fairly hostile—not fairly hostile, but seriously hostile—and direct attack on the club and its agents.

At the same time, they had seriously gutted key enforceable provisions of the law in the bill that they had proposed. We deduced that the attack on the club was so unprecedented and so direct and specific that it couldn't go unanswered, and that the attack on the law also couldn't go unanswered. But this was not at that time one of the priority things on our agenda. We were working on a lot of other things.

Reflecting the capability that had been built to shift gears quickly and to respond or take advantage of opportunities as they arose, in consultation with Michele Perrault, who was, I believe, still then the vice president—she might have been president of the club, I'm not absolutely clear on the timing—we very quickly, i.e., in a couple of days, decided to drop everything and throw the book at them, and launched an emergency Superfund campaign, sent telegrams or the equivalent of telegrams to club leaders all over the country, launched back a very strong counter-offensive to get the bill improved and to defend the club's honor, I guess.

This required a bunch of changes in gears, and it required a faster changing of gears and a faster set of decisions than lots of people in the volunteer structure were used to. There wasn't time for much consultation. But it reflected the kind of needs of the modern world, where you can't wait until the next quarterly board meeting and consult with lots and lots of people, but you've got to do what you've got to do. And there was a certain amount of fluff in the air later about, well, how did that get all of that attention? But it was basically a situation that the club couldn't walk away from.

We characterized it as an emergency campaign; we created a new weekly newsletter to activists—by that time, we invented a system which was masterminded by Gene Coan and others, and fed by the field staff, of identifying coordinators for each campaign right down to the congressional district level, in districts that mattered to us. Another
part of this whole technology, which had been standard operating procedure for any kind of a floor vote in the Congress, was to start sorting from day one through information received from your lobbyists or from what congressmen and their staffs were saying to constituents, and from past voting behavior on similar issues—to start sorting out who was likely to be on your side, who was likely to be against you, and who was in the middle. We had an elaborate computerized system devised by John McComb, a certified computer expert and by this time the head of our Washington office, to keep track of all of these and to update them continuously.

So we identified grass-roots activists, through activist networks and through the chapters, but reaching straight to the congressional district level, without having to go through a whole bunch of levels of the club to foment action. This mechanism reached right past all the governing structure of the club to get to somebody out there where the rubber met the road in the congressional district, hopefully somebody who would use all the club organization out there to get after them. So we started a weekly newsletter that just keep people very closely informed of what was going on, which I wrote and which we—

Gill: This was specific to the Superfund?

Scott: Specific to Superfund. It was called the Super Activist, and I think before we were done, there were twenty-four issues of it. We would report latest developments and also quote back things that were being said by industry lobbyists, which is always sort of like throwing red meat to the lions. Very much a motivational tool to really keep people informed. The reality is that Sierra magazine, even the National News Report, were not vehicles for actually causing people to take action. They were sort of to keep people informed, or broadly educated about issues, but if you wanted to get something to happen quickly, you had to have another mechanism for doing that. And before we were done, several issues of the Super Activist were sent in the form of mass mailgrams that were all computer-generated to these lists, so it was all intensively computerized, which is something that we started in the Alaska campaign. The first computer in the Washington office arrived during the Alaska campaign.

The Sierra Club's role in throwing its weight back against this assault on the Superfund law was certainly a major factor in successfully warding off the worst of what the amendments were attempting and in achieving what our goals were. It also needs to be noted that we were playing with a very helpful and frequent reality of the Congress, which was that there was a whole other committee of equal stature to Mr. Dingell's committee, the Public Works Committee, that had equal jurisdiction and which was outraged for its own reasons by this assault. So our grass-roots moxie had champions who were well placed to argue with the leadership and to counter the kind of internal politicking and logrolling that Chairman Dingell was pursuing.

That very often is the case, that you're looking for allies in the Congress. Those allies will have their own motives and their own institutional reasons for doing what they're doing, but as an outside lobbying group, the identification of champions, the identification of allies that have their own clout, is extremely important. What we
brought to them—in a way that constantly reinforced and gained new respect for the club internally within the Congress as a powerful organization, that is, people who could make the grass roots tingle—was that we were their foot soldiers. We would fly cadres of people from key districts to Washington. For these kind of lobby weeks, we would not only go and talk to all the congressmen from those folks' states and lobby them, but we'd meet with our champions, in this case the ringleaders of this other committee, so that they'd actually see that it wasn't just Blake Early and Doug Scott, or Carl Pope and whoever, it was a substantial group of people who could say, "I was just in that congressman's office, and here's what he said. Now, if you go talk to him, Congressman Colleague, I think he'd be ready to cosponsor our bill," or do whatever it was we were trying to do. And all of that was just part of the technology.

We were consciously, in the Alaska campaign and subsequently, consciously viewing these campaigns as an opportunity to also educate grass-roots Sierra Club people in how these internecine processes in the Congress worked, so that they would go back able to be more sophisticated in their grass-roots organizing and impact, because they understood how the other end of the process worked. It came to the point that when the club ultimately bit the bullet and obtained itself a new permanent office space in Washington, at considerable extra expense, we got a building on Capitol Hill as close as possible to the Capitol, and with substantial space dedicated to grass-roots Sierra Club volunteer visitors who were coming there, needed phones, needed computers, needed all the comforts of a place to operate out of to be most effective in the Congress.

The Clean Air Act situation was similar with the Superfund in the sense that our nemesis was John Dingell. The situation there was that the advocates for the kind of legislation we wanted in the Senate were very strong people: Majority Leader George Mitchell, and others. Dingell was in a position to absolutely stop the legislation from moving forward until it was tailored to his satisfaction, and had been doing that for years. Now, the law supposedly stopped having effect and needed to be reauthorized; that date came and went. But the reality is that as long as Congress continued to appropriate money to enforce the law, even though the reauthorization had not occurred, the old law was still enforced. But there were basically no teeth in the old law to deal with acid rain. There were basically minimal teeth to deal with auto pollution. Requirements and deadlines needed to be tightened all the way through the law, and Chairman Dingell had just put himself in a position of wanting to stop this entirely.

Our problem was that you could start going into detail about acid rain, you could start going into detail about cars and Los Angeles, but quickly the way you were talking about the issue started being very parochial. It wasn't terribly motivating. The key vote you were after might be somebody from rural Nebraska, and up to a point, you can motivate people to action by saying, "You know, this is your Sierra Club calling on you. You're in a key position; please drop everything." But at some point, that wears thin.
So we ultimately put most of the focus of the grass-roots campaign for the Clean Air Act, and this we're now talking about from 1985, essentially after Superfund was over, until 1990, to get that law passed. Basically our problem was that the chairman of the committee in the House would not allow a bill to move forward. Our strength was not in his committee. He had stacked his committee over the years in such a way that we and our champion, Henry Waxman, a great leader for clean air, chairman of the subcommittee—there was huge antagonism between Waxman and Dingell—was simply not in a position to be able to run over Mr. Dingell, and there wasn't any other way to move a bill forward, or didn't appear to be any other way.

Looking at that, and not getting lost in the details of the legislation, because most of us were not in any way, shape, or form experts about the legislation, the political problem that presented itself was how to use the resource we had, which was strong support amongst many members of the House who came from New England and therefore wanted something done about acid rain, or came from Los Angeles and therefore wanted something done about auto pollution, to mobilize all of that support on the House floor in some way that put the heat on the House leadership and Mr. Dingell to say, "You've got to move a bill." We almost didn't care what came to the floor, if we could put enough heat on, we would be, one, forcing the bill out of the committee, and two, demonstrating that we had enough clout that when it came to the floor it had to meet certain standards or we would amend it before we would let it go forward.

Now, John Dingell is one of the most powerful titans in the House of Representatives, and one doesn't take him on lightly. One doesn't think that if you just organize along the lines I'm talking about, that this will move smoothly and easily and he won't have ways to contend. But he also had lots of enemies, so we could work with them.

The device that we settled upon, arising from our analysis of the problem, and often we had used—in the Alaska campaign and in many other campaigns—we had used the device of having a bill that we wanted passed, our version of the Alaska lands bill, or our version of the wilderness bill, whatever it was, and getting members of the House or the Senate to cosponsor our bill. You could put their constituents on the task by saying, "Your congressman hasn't yet cosponsored this bill; you ought to get after him." Now, congressmen are used to that kind of pressure, and they've got all kinds of devices for saying, "Well, of course, I don't serve on the committee that has jurisdiction on this legislation, and it would be unfair of me to prejudge their view on the matter, so I'm waiting for the report of the committee before I take a position." And those excuses are sufficiently acceptable that it's very hard for a constituent who gets that—you know, you finally figure out how to get access to your congressman, he's home in Topeka, and you get him and you say, "Now, Congressman, I really—" and he gives you some long song-and-dance like that. Well, short of having the Washington lobbyist there to give the sophisticated answers—it's not that grass-roots people aren't sophisticated, it's that you can't equip them with every nuance of the kind of arguments the congressmen can give in their sleep.

So the question was, how to beat that? How to say, "We know there's no vote coming; we know there's no report from the committee." So we finally figured out that the
simple thing to say is in any body, legislative body, anything that has committees, committees are not the responsible thing. The responsible thing is the whole. The committee is created by the whole to do some specialized work; its responsibility is to the whole. So we put that argument right back to the members of the House. We said, "Wait a second. The fact that there's no action on the Clean Air Act is not John Dingell's fault. It's your fault. We, your constituents, are going to ask you to do whatever you can do to actually press forward for action, because if Mr. Dingell isn't letting this bill out, he works for you, not the other way around. He's a committee of you." And one, that's kind of a common and everyday point, you can explain it to people, you don't have to mention anything about nitrous oxide or deadlines or acid rain or scientific arguments or legal doctrine. Pretty simple point.

We wanted not only to say, "We want you to move the clean air bill," we wanted to say, "We want you to move the clean air bill that does the following things." Well, we weren't going to draft our own bill, because clean air legislation is very technical, and you'd end up with something two inches thick and weighing a pound, and not easy to get your mind around. Again, wilderness bills are so simple. They reference a map, they have about three standard provisions, and you're done. You can send copies all over hell and gone to people, and they can look at it and say, "Yeah, that's—."

So we came up with the device which I am inordinately proud of, because I believe I invented it, members of Congress—and this is something that other groups and other kinds of people have done, perhaps never on this scale. We came up with the device of using the "Dear Colleague" letter. If you're a member of Congress and you want to communicate something to your other colleagues, particularly in the House, the "Dear Colleague" letter is a standard thing. It comes out in blue print, it is sent around automatically to all the other members of the Congress, and it starts out, "Dear Colleague, I wanted to tell you that I feel strongly about something, blah blah blah."

Gill: Is there an office that generates these letters?

Scott: They just do it, and it just goes automatically in the House mail system. It's a very standard thing that's done.

Well, we took a variation of the "Dear Colleague" letter, and often a "Dear Colleague" letter will say, "Dear Colleague, I feel very strongly that the marigold ought to be made the national flower, and if you agree with me, I wish you would cosponsor my bill to make it that," or "I wish you would jointly sign a letter with me to the president urging him to issue a—" whatever. And then staff members call to say, "Did you get this letter; would you agree to be a sponsor of the marigold bill?"

Well, we took a variation from this, and we invented something which I believe in its first variation was called the Vento-Lewis Resolution. It was actually a resolution introduced in the form of a bill with a bunch of "whereas" clauses about how important clean air was, and saying that, before the end of that session, Congress wishes to pass a bill. This is a resolution expressing the view of the House that it wished to pass a bill that does the following things. So it had specifics in it. It was only a couple pages
long. We went out and shot that idea to some champions, Congressman Bruce Vento, Democrat of Minnesota, often a champion of ours on various things, and Congressman Jerry Lewis, Republican of southern California, very conservative leader of the Republican party.

And the Vento-Lewis Resolution was circulated by them with a "Dear Colleague" letter saying, "We're introducing this resolution, we'd like you to cosponsor it." And even before it was in, we had copies of it in the hands of every one of these clean-air people out at the congressional district level, and they were starting to call and pester their congressmen, "Have you cosponsored the Vento-Lewis Resolution?" That process allowed us to say in the latest weekly issue of the Clean Air Activist, which went to all these ringleaders, "Here's the latest people that have joined as cosponsors." So there was a constantly growing number of people who cosponsored this thing. We'd done this with the Superfund fight, we'd done it with lots of them. In the clean air case, it was the most sophisticated.

Ultimately, and Carl Pope and I had a bet on whether we could do this, it took nearly the full period of a two-year Congress, but we got a majority of the House signed on to a resolution saying, "We want a Clean Air Act, and we want it to be the following kind of thing." And by that time, and at some point in one Congress or another, it changed from being the Vento-Lewis Resolution to being the Vento-Green, Congressman Bill Green of New York, Republican, and it was a letter rather than a resolution, so there were some variations over time of how it worked. But we ultimately had a majority of the Congress, not because we were clever, but because we had equipped grass-roots people with something that they could ask the congressman to do that they could get their minds around and that was hard to say no to. We had equipped them with the three or four answers to the most obvious ways that a congressman might try and sidestep it.

We were whipsawing these guys. They were getting it from the grass roots, "Have you cosigned the Vento-Green letter?" "Well, gee, I don't—it's my policy not to cosign such letters." Well, that piece of information would come back to our field office directly from the office, "We met with Congressman Black today, and he said, 'My policy is never to sign 'Dear Colleague' letters.'" That would be flashed by our computer network to the Washington office, and somebody there would look around and say, "Well, here, this is funny, he's cosponsored the National Marigold Day letter." So the next morning, that would be in that guy's hand. He could call that congressman and say, "You know, we met yesterday and you said, but you did—." And all of that started happening. But it worked. It was all terribly imperfect, but when it was really clicking, it happened with speed. A congressman who was at the receiving end of that might not like us—

Gill: But he'd notice.

Scott: But he noticed this guy. What we were doing, in effect, was empowering that grass-roots Sierra Club volunteer activist to be a sophisticated participant in influencing his congressman by giving him the vehicle that was hard to say no to, and then by
responding to whatever attempts to say no in a personalized way. Using that technology, ultimately, week after week after slogging week, we got a majority of the House. So we had a huge brouhaha, and flew people in from every chapter, and stood them on the Capitol steps, and invited all of these—the majority of the House that was in favor of action on the Clean Air Act—to stand on the Capitol steps with us and have their picture taken. And of course, whenever that happens, and the media—Joanne Hurley and other media folks did a great job of talking to the Washington-based people with reports to the back-home state newspapers, and say, "You want to come over, we're having this big deal on the Capitol steps," and boy, the minute the congressmen heard that their newspaper or their local television was going to be represented, then they'd be there to get this attention. That's always part of this process.

We went one step farther, which was just bordering on taking this too far. We gave them all a medal. It was the Sierra Club Vento-Green Medal for Clean Air Act Advocate for that year. If you signed that letter, you got one, and the medals were a big, two-and-a-half-inch diameter bronze medallion that said, "Sierra Club Clean Air Medal" or something, and hung on a red, white, and blue ribbon. Joanne Hurley cooked up, or one of the folks that worked with her, cooked up the guy that had been the only big pole vault champion in the Olympic Games for the U.S., Bob Seagram, in the sixties I guess. He flew in from Los Angeles, and he presented these to the members of Congress.

We had members wearing these things on the House floor. We had a line of congressmen having made appointments to get in our camera position with the Capitol in the background to get their picture taken shaking hands with some chapter official or whoever, president of the Sierra Club, whoever they wanted, in front of the local television camera for feed back home receiving their medals.

Mr. Dingell had lots of other reasons why he finally had to let a clean air bill come to the House floor, but that was one of them. Commitments were made that by a certain date in the following Congress—what in effect was a variation on Chinese water torture of saying, "We will build one brick at a time, we will not—we will get one Congressman after another until we get a majority, if that's what it takes, to isolate and cast light on the fact that this man is standing in the way of this legislation." That was the nature of the clean air battle.

Then real legislation ultimately came to the House floor, and there were huge fights about that. And there were real votes about real amendments. But we had a cadre of congressmen who had signed a letter that said, "And the clean air bill that I want to pass should do thus and so," and it had been artfully enough written that we could say, "This amendment does, Congressman, what you said you wanted to do," and we flew in a lot more people for that. There were many other forces that were coming to bear on Mr. Dingell, as there always are. But I believe that a correct history of the Clean Air Act would have to view this whole Vento-Lewis, Vento-Green mechanism which was substantially organized and run by the grass-roots operation of the Sierra Club as an important factor. Not the only important factor, maybe not the most important
factor, but a factor in forcing this thing along faster than Mr. Dingell was prepared to take it.

Gill: How did the strategy apply when the James Watt petition campaign occurred?

Scott: I remember that. [laughter] Usually, this system of campaign technology that we had was properly disciplined to operate, as is appropriate in the Sierra Club, with lots of volunteer involvement and volunteer consultation and volunteer approval. We did slip up once. I was considerably distracted in the spring of 1981 by the fact that not only did I have this new job and was newly living in San Francisco, and had lots of new work to do, but that the potential that had long existed for a romance with Martha Scott, who is now my wife, was coming to fruition. Martha called me in April of 1981 to say that she was away from and was no longer with and was separated from her estranged husband, and that she was staying with a friend on a farm in Minnesota. I said, "Well, now, that's handy. I'm going to be giving a speech at Tufts University in Boston shortly, and why don't on my way back I stop through O'Hare Airport, and why don't you stop through O'Hare Airport, and why don't we fly off to Cancun, Mexico?"

We did that. We did that on the 30th of March of 1981. The night before, having given my speech at Tufts and being thoroughly distracted by this ten-day trip that I was going to take with Martha, I checked in with the office in San Francisco, and they said that Carl Pope had been trying desperately to reach me. Carl got on the line and he said that he had had an idea that he thought was worth doing, but it certainly was something that ought to be run by me first, that he thought that the Sierra Club ought to organize a petition, a nationwide, public petition drive, urging the Congress and the President to get rid of James Watt as secretary of the interior.

Now, Watt was always his own worst enemy. So from day one, the purpose of—and getting rid of him, many people argued, would only result in somebody who didn't shoot his own foot off, and then we'd have to deal with somebody who actually was competent. But Watt was lending a credibility to anti-environmental rhetoric in some circles. He was giving aid and succor to the traditional enemies of ours—

[End Tape 21, Side A]

[Begin Tape 21, Side B]

Scot: It was worth getting rid of Watt if he could be gotten rid of. There were also, and from day one, it was understood that there were significant institutional advantages. Every environmental group in the country was using Watt in all their direct mail.

Gill: That's how they were fundraising.

Scott: That's how they were fundraising, and adding new members and all that. And there was an overtone of this from the first moment of Carl's idea, which was that the Sierra Club ought to do this itself, rather than form a coalition to do it, because it would have very substantial potential institutional advantages to the Sierra Club. So Carl was
checking with me, and I said, "Gee, it sounds like a good idea to me," and I thought no more about it and didn't again for ten days.

I returned to the San Francisco office in early April of 1981 to walk in on the press conference where Mike McCloskey and Dave Brower, on behalf of Friends of the Earth, and several other people were announcing our drive to get a million signatures to urge the Congress and the president to oust Watt. It did come to light shortly thereafter that no one had checked with the board of directors [laughter], and there was a brief bit of fluff in the air, but not for long, because seldom has an idea hit at a more opportune moment. There were well more than a million people who wanted to sign that petition; the biggest problem was to get it in their hands.

We suddenly found ourselves in the San Francisco office of the Sierra Club turned into a petition factory, and having to cope with a whole series of questions of just how you do this, and how it plays out, and how you process all of this, having launched the idea. The smartest thing we did was stopped the presses on Sierra magazine and printed the text and the blank of the petition in Sierra magazine, so instantly hundreds of thousands of Sierra Club people had access to this petition and could make more Xerox copies. It wasn't just dependent on copies that were printed in San Francisco and mailed to people, although we did lots of that as well.

Very quickly, we started getting sacks and sacks and sacks of envelopes of every size and description full of signed Watt petitions. Now, what hadn't been taken into consideration at the outset of this great idea was who would open these envelopes. Of course, they were of every different size and shape. Who would do what with the information on the petitions, how we would know when we had a million—because, of course, some people just signed the first blank and sent it in, and other people laboriously went around and got twenty signatures. People included little notes. Very quickly, we had quite an elaborate factory organized to simply cope with opening and counting and dealing with these positions.

Also, very quickly, the development department was brought into the circle and realized that what we had was a self-created address list of enormous value. In fact, there was a blank on the petition, "Send me more information about the Sierra Club." In some process, the fine details of which I don't remember, the names on the petitions were all ultimately computerized and became an extremely valuable list to the club. The club's membership would have grown anyway because the budgetary decision had been made that year, in view of a whole bunch of other circumstances, to invest more than usual in recruitment membership mail, and the whole threat of the Reagan-Watt period meant that renewals were higher, response to direct mail letters was higher. People in the development department of that era were always slightly miffed that the Watt petition got the credit for the huge growth of the club's membership, because the club's membership doubled in very short order there. They got their noses slightly out of joint, for good reason, because there were a lot of other things that had to do with this, but this certainly was one of them. It got the club ungodly amounts of publicity, just in every possible place. Our clipping service just went wild.
And it became fairly obvious fairly quickly, still in the spring and summer of that year, that before we were done, we were going to get a million signatures. This had been thought to be very audacious. Best we could tell, and we got a congressman to ask the Library of Congress to research it, best we could tell, nobody had ever gotten a million petition signatures about anything in this country theretofore.

So we had to contend with the question of how were we going to deal with this, to maximum institutional and political advantage, how we were going to deal with this at the other end. We concocted in a series of meetings that drew heavily on clever people like Carl Pope and John Hooper and people at the magazine and people at the development department, and Mike McCloskey, and various volunteer leaders, and we concocted a fairly elaborate plan. The elaborate plan basically involved having a representative or more from every chapter—from every state in the union, and by that point there were chapters in virtually every state—come to Washington on an appointed day. On their way they would hold an airport press conference, saying they were going, and we would freight them the petitions from their state. And what they were doing was carrying their petitions to join with all the others from every other state in a massive ceremony on the steps of the Capitol building to present the million petitions to somebody official. The notion was that they'd hold a press conference announcing they were going, then the local press stringers covering for their state in Washington would be there when they arrived. We would have this big ceremony, and then they would drag these petitions around and show them to every member of Congress. We had a list of things we wanted congressmen to do about this, to sign letters and sponsor bills and generally resist Watt-ism in all of its ugly caricatures.

My wonderful sidekick and one-time secretary and all-around wonderful person, Robin Senour, who is an extremely talented graphic artist, I said to Robin, I think over the telephone, "On the cover, make sure you say 'Confidential.'" The cover of this plan, which was all written down and sent to chapter leaders, highly confidential—in big block stencil-type letters in bright red across the front page of this eight- or ten-page document, it said, "Confidential," or "Secret Plan." One of the two.

The next time I saw the colored cover was in color on CBS Evening News. [laughter] Somehow, Watt or somebody in connection with Watt got a copy, and we never knew how it got out, because we knew exactly who we'd sent this to, but he wasn't dealing with a third-generation Xerox. The one I saw on television was an original, which is an interesting question. So Watt and company all made a big deal that this was all just a put-up media device, and some in the media, I know Tom Brokaw did a special piece about this being manipulation of the media, which of course it was, but that's what everybody does. In this day and age, the media make themselves available for this sort of manipulation.

But this only caused more attention. I remember getting a call in Washington from one of the network correspondents, whose name escapes me at this point, and he said, "Well, Mr. Scott, now I want to talk to you about this secret plan of yours," because the secret plan had my name on it. I thought, Oh, lord. He then proceeded to say,
which of course the conservatives who think that the press is a liberal bastion will view this as evidence, he said, "Well, now, you aren't just having these people come to Washington—they are going to go see their congressmen too, aren't they?" [laughs] And gave me some good advice.

We had a mob scene on the Capitol steps. Somebody had had the brilliant idea of getting a wheelbarrow, and we loaded—all these people from all these chapters passed these bushels of petitions over their heads, and they were all stacked in this wheelbarrow, which promptly collapsed on the steps of the Capitol. We presented them to the Speaker of the House, Tip O'Neill, who graciously made himself available for this purpose, and just had a heck of a good time, with enormous media attention. But the media attention that mattered the most was the media attention back home.

Now, Watt served a very valuable role for Reagan. He was a conservative lightning-rod that allowed the president to behave in different ways, but to sort of say, "Well, see this dog with the foaming mouth with distemper that I keep in the closet, see, that proves I'm a conservative." So for a variety of reasons, Reagan didn't want to get rid of Watt. Surely our petition drive, as well as all the things that other environmentalists and just people in general were doing, and the things that Watt brought on himself, brought him down ultimately.

The huge value of the petition drive, and this whole process of presentation, was again, early on in the creation of this more focused campaign mechanism within the Sierra Club, was to give it a very doable project. It wasn't make-work, it had real-world impact, but it was simplicity itself. People got a real sense—those Sierra Club leaders that came to Washington that week just had the time of their lives, and it took on a positive notion, that yes, this kind of technology, this bringing of volunteers by the hundreds to Washington every year—which no other environmental group was doing—so that in the average office, the lobbyist that they see from the Sierra Club is somebody who says, "Hi, you're from Nebraska, I'm from Nebraska," or if not Nebraska, "I'm from Iowa," right next door, and "I know all your—all my cousins live in Nebraska."

That whole technology was demonstrated on the delivery end of the Watt petition in a way that greatly buoyed the—not that there was a lot of convincing needed, but greatly buoyed the confidence of the Sierra Club structure of grass-roots group-chapter-RCC that this approach, which made sense viewed from the tunnel vision from a staff perspective, of how you mobilized a grass-roots organization, proved its worth in this early going with these groups.

There were a lot of things that we were doing, which if you had debated them in the Sierra Club in the late seventies and eighties generically, "Should we do thus-and-so, should we have an activist mechanism, that finds somebody who's devoted to that issue and reaches them directly—whether they're active in their local group or chapter or not—reaches directly to them without going through all the layers," which just isn't workable for most things. Well, if you'd have a generic discussion about that, then you would still be having that discussion, and we still would not have made a decision.
There are some things that are inherent in the complexity and the internal-governance enthusiasm that the Sierra Club has for meeting with itself that would take a thing like that and chew it until the end of time without ever being decisive about it.

Gill: You mentioned that the staff got ahead of the board early on in this particular campaign. How did the catching-up come about?

Scott: I think there were a bunch of quick phone calls when somebody realized that we had just announced this campaign. And over the years that I have watched it, the board of the Sierra Club is made up of a very diverse set of kinds of people. There have always been people who were drawn there out of a devotion to the internal governance of the club; there were people who were drawn there for credit and prestige, such as it is; there were people who were drawn there by political activism and who were very conversant with what we were talking about.

So with things that would be potentially controversial about some of these steps—the reorganizations that Mike was doing, this whole campaign technology, the priority-setting process—as often as there would be a board member who took it upon himself or herself to think that that was a bad idea and would want to raise a stink about it, there were usually two or three who naturally gravitated to saying, "Well, that makes utterly good sense, and why didn't we do that last year instead of waiting until now?" So usually these things were debated, and a neutral observer could say, "God, you know, all these people just like to fight with each other." But the world didn't stop. Those internal discussions were not such that we had to stand around and wait before we could issue the next *Super Activist*, or before we could get on with the Watt petition.

There weren't—and it doesn't have anything to do with me or personal credit for anybody—there weren't a lot of just god-awful screw-ups over the years in this process. Now, surely some choices were made which if they'd gone some other way, other things would have happened, different people would have risen or fallen in the structure of the club, volunteer and staff, and those kind of things leave their own marks, but I think that this period, if you step back and view it historically, this period from sort of the Earth Day seventies, as the club grew but outgrew its old means of doing conservation action, it didn't consciously notice that problem in any very coherent way, because a lot of the things it was working on were well-known processes, wilderness bills and all this sort of thing, and there were other groups that were also leading them. The Wilderness Society in the seventies was actively leading wilderness campaigns, and Sierra Club people were involved whether it was the Sierra Club or the Wilderness Society they heard from. So you didn't have to say, "Oh, look, our mechanism is now outgrown, it doesn't work."

But the membership grew so hugely, the internal bureaucracy of the volunteers grew so hugely, the internal bureaucracy of the staff grew so cumbersomely, that when it became necessary to address them—not to say the club is always catching up, but there was a reasonable degree of consensus usually that doing things this new way, or putting a new person in a position to draw it together, would be relatively successful.
Now, there were a bunch of things that only got dealt with later than they should have, and thus resulted in more broken china than desirable. I can think of two or three just off the top of my head. The relationship between the Sierra Club and the Legal Defense Fund went way off the track somewhere early on. It happened on my watch, notwithstanding a deep personal friendship between me and Bob Parker, who was always a senior part of their leadership during the time that I was a senior part of the leadership of the Sierra Club staff. A whole variety of reasons and personalities, for instance in goals. The relationship between the club and Legal Defense Fund deteriorated, and it deteriorated on a level that I'm not the least bit happy about, and in retrospect, I can't believe that I played a role in allowing it to happen, by inadvertence mostly.

And that is that the club stopped having strategic leadership on its legal program, as well as deferring to the legal expertise of the Legal Defense Fund lawyers. The club came over the years to defer or to advocate the broader political judgment about why the lawsuit was being filed, and the process of approval of lawsuits that went through the executive committee of the board wasn't really ever a process of really looking hard at it. It was a process of looking at whether it was a winning legal idea, but it was never—

Gill: But not whether the action should be brought?

Scott: Whether it should be brought, if it was won, would there be political fallout—that just all got deferred. And at the start of this period, the Legal Defense Fund lawsuit coordinator was a Sierra Club employee housed at the Legal Defense Fund. During this transition, this unintentional transition, that person stopped being an employee of the Sierra Club and started being an employee of the Legal Defense Fund, and Legal Defense Fund lawyers—they started having more and more field offices, and Legal Defense Fund lawyers were talking with lots of other people than the Sierra Club people, and representing lots of other people. Started having their own political ideas.

Well, that's fair, but the club lost the use, just as I am taking some credit for and talking about the conscious way in which we tried to bring the media use of the club and the grass roots and all these things, the field system and the electoral/political involvement, all of those to merge together in a focused way, somehow the Legal Defense Fund went off on its own track, which has led to a whole series of events and distance, and in some cases political repercussions for issues that I think is largely unfortunate and was never necessary. If I had it to do over, I would be a force for the Sierra Club having its own legal staff, not separated. There is in fact no good reason in this day and age, the Wildlife Federation doesn't have a separate organization doing its legal for it; NRDC doesn't have a separate organization.

And we ended up creating a monster—an unintentional monster, all made up of well-intentioned people, answering to two separate boards with two separate views. In my latter years, I would go to annual joint meetings of the two boards, and hell, it was like the Russians and the Americans at the worst of the Cold War. People who were suspicious of each other's motives, and who didn't know each other—it wasn't family
any more. And to the degree that this overworked idea that at the top levels, the club is still "a club," an important part of its arsenal had been taken away unintentionally, and I think that was altogether sad.

I think that, as a result of the distractions, if you go clear back to Dave Brower's period as executive director and then follow that out, that as a result of the increasing preoccupation of Mike McCloskey, the board, and others, with the operations of the Sierra Club, that Sierra magazine was allowed to become far too separate an entity, that it's all very well to talk about editorial freedom and the editorial control by editors and all of that, and you can get spirited arguments from the Sierra staff about it not being a house organ, but in fact, in a fairly low-dollar entry membership largely recruited by direct mail any more, not around the campfire (though that mythology continues), to take the principal investment you make in communicating, other than fund raising, in communicating your message to the constituency and have it as divorced as it once was, and I think some improvements have been made, but to have it—and at one point, it was headed the way, except not having a separate board, it was headed the way the Legal Defense problem developed, in almost being determined to be divorced from the role of the club.

Now, when I was a field rep and we were working to get the Alpine Lakes Wilderness Area established, and Dick Fiddler was a member, I think he was vice president of the board at that time, and Brock was up to his eyebrows in this issue in Washington, and Mike McCloskey—Brock and Mike and I used to chuckle about the association of former and present Northwest representatives—we had the cover of an on-the-press issue of Sierra magazine jerked on the day of publication and changed to be a picture of Alpine Lake, so we'd have a pretty picture of the Alpine Lakes to trot around in the House of Representatives.

You couldn't even think of that happening today. Over that period of time, and that was mid-seventies, the capacity to use Sierra magazine as a campaign tool—now, it has long lead times; it has to serve broader and more generalized, less intensely interested readers—so no one wants to turn it into a variation of the Super Activist, reporting every little detail, but if you go back and read the Sierra magazine from the thirties, and the same thing is true of the Living Wilderness magazine from the thirties, they recorded in detail about the conservation work and the ongoing legislative program and the activities of the organization, and no other mechanism for getting that same information in the hands of more than a few hundred internal club ringleaders, many of whom didn't become internal club ringleaders out of skill, capacity, or motivation to be conservation activists, but because they were outings leaders or because they did a great job at the local newsletter or they got to be council delegate or whatever.

So there ends up being this huge gap between the mass communication to 600,000 members, and the intensely activist communication to a relatively few hundred, or few thousands, and nothing in between. From the point of view of saying, "Is this a political instrument," and of course, the club is more than that, but to the degree that part of its function is a political function, then keeping members timely informed of the
continuity of issues is important. In the fifties, there was a fight over—I'll say the name wrong—but a redwood state park down on the peninsula, Butano State Park, and for two years you could follow the details of that fight in *Sierra* magazine. Not a chapter bulletin; in *Sierra* magazine.

Now, we tried a bunch of things, we being generally staff and volunteers that were concerned about this. The media program tried to have a feed that would go to chapter newsletters so—well, some chapter newsletters would use it and some wouldn't, so you couldn't sit there and say, "Well, it's time to send an expensive wire to mobilize people in this congressional district, we can be sure that we can allude to the details that they'll find on page six of something that they've still got around the house."

Now, in the old days, the latest chapter and verse of what was happening on Redwood Creek acre by acre was in the previous *Sierra* magazine, which was still on the coffee table, and if you'd gotten a wire, and I was a Sierra Club chapter leader, back in the era when you did get full-rate telegrams—Virginia Prentice, who was the chapter chairman, and I was the conservation chairman of the Mackinac chapter, and we got full-rate telegrams, both of us, saying, "Drop everything, forget your personal life, Wally Hickel has been nominated as secretary of the interior, drop everything." Which we did; we mobilized the whole chapter.

But if you're going to do that very frequently, you've got to have a second level of communication that gets people informed. The club has left a big chunk, and has used a lot of kind of crummy excuses—"Well, if people are that interested, they can take the *NNR*." Well, the *NNR* has never had more than a few thousand subscribers. It simply isn't an action vehicle. I think that's another big hole that in all of this scheming out of a system that would draw on all the strengths of the club, a big chunk of the communication system never got properly dealt with, and there was always talk about having *Sierra* magazine alternate with another bimonthly that would be a tabloid that would have continuity and so forth.

Gill: Never came about?

Scott: Never came about. And I think that I and others did a poor job of ever really making the case that there was a vision for how that would make the club stronger politically, so that other things became important.

Another one which got neglected for a long time, and just kind of festered around and caused sort of lots of unhappiness amongst various people, and nobody ever quite dealt with until after a while, was the international program. The club had had a modest little international operation which was housed in New York, and focused supposedly on causing something-or-other to happen at the United Nations. Most of the rest of us just ignored it, because we could never figure out that the world was any different because of what it did. Well-intentioned, good people, doubtlessly slaving away in a good cause, but it didn't connect to the rest of the club.
It was in this period of the eighties that that operation was buttoned up, and the international program, which was always a special interest of Mike McCloskey's, shifted to the Washington office and was staffed in the Washington office. It came to be viewed as a part of the legislative and campaign obligations of the Sierra Club, and it was brought to the table, and basically with a philosophy which had not previously been very well articulated of saying that the Sierra Club, as a small, outside group in one country of the world, can have relatively little impact on what goes on in Brazil, or what goes on in Africa, or what goes on in India. The U.S. government can have large impact, and the Sierra Club knows how to have impact on the U.S. government. That's what we're good at. So why don't we marry those—why don't we do what we know how to be good at, and apply it not to sending one of us to go and tell the Indian government what it ought to do, but to put the heat on the U.S. government. And whose corporations are screwing up the planet? Well, other than West Germany and Japanese, they're mostly American. Well, we can get a handle on them through our government, and thus suddenly there's a connection back.

You can visualize how to create an international program with roots in the grass-roots activism of the Sierra Club, where people are terribly motivated about international problems, and actually have an impact by leveraging through the power of the U.S. government. World Bank, and a whole series of issues emerged from that proposition. But for too many years, we just horsed around with it, sort of from a lack of—and I guess all of this is saying that the club grew so fast, it outgrew its management structure, and in some ways it outgrew its vision of how to do its work. It is, I think, a characteristic—

[End Tape 21, Side B]

[Begin Tape 22, Side A]

Gill: Doug, we talked a lot in the last tape or so about the club's activities on some of the nontraditional kinds of Sierra Club campaigns, the Superfund and the Clean Air business. Would you like to comment a little bit sort of generally on the club's approach to the pollution problem generally?

Scott: Yes, and perhaps with a personal angle. I came out of the public land and wilderness tradition of the club, and in fact, I worked originally at the Wilderness Society, and very much feel that both of my feet and at least one arm were rooted there. And as Northwest representative, I had little reason to get involved in the pollution issues. They didn't play particularly strongly up there; they weren't a high priority relative to the forest and wilderness issues, land management issues.

Energy is a little different. In the Northwest, energy—there is a sort of specialized set of problems bearing on the Bonneville Power Administration, which we got intensely involved in in the period just as I was starting the couple years that I was Northwest representative. And so my experience, I guess, and you could see a parallel with Mike McCloskey's personal experience, or John McComb's personal experience, that starting with roots in the public land issues for whatever reason changed responsibilities
required me, as did with those other people, to become involved with a broader array of environmental issues, which I was sympathetic with.

And that's parallel to the emergence of the club. A public land group renowned for its impact on public land issues grew to be a nationwide organization that attracted constituents who, while they had allegiance to those issues, when I was a club leader in Michigan in the late sixties, our chapter talked about the redwoods and dams in the Grand Canyon, and that's what you did at a Sierra Club meeting. Well, now if you went to a Michigan Mackinac Chapter meeting of the Sierra Club, you would be talking about some public land issues, but they'd probably be in Michigan, and you'd be talking about all kinds of pollution and population and urban and so forth.

That change didn't just happen overnight. Through this period, late sixties to the present, that change has been happening to the whole Sierra Club, and it happened to a bunch of us as individuals. Probably by a natural path, sort of the obvious thing to do, and maybe therefore inevitable, and possibly not deserving any particular accolades for brilliance, many of us took what we knew from areas that we knew about and tried to find common features about how to get political handles on these wider issues.

I am no expert about the pollution issues. And therefore, at the time that we were working on them, I never was working on them in the front lines. I would be a VIP at a meeting with a senator or a congressman or White House meeting or things of that kind. I've never been in the headquarters of the EPA, ever. I've been in the head chief's office of the Forest Service and the director of the Park Service's office a number of times, but we had front-line lobbyists whose job was to worry about those things. I was mostly above in the sense of the organization chart, and taking a broader role on those things.

And in fact, it was a source of some common joking, and not entirely joking, that I didn't know much about those issues. Because I was applying a political technology. I've come to have second thoughts about all that. I'm not sure, and maybe this is just the maturing of not just Doug Scott but of—or at least the evolution; maybe it's not getting more mature—of a lot of people in the environmental movement going through a series of reactions. I'm nowhere near as convinced as I allowed myself to be without being self-critical. The Sierra Club had adopted positions and policies about these things, and my job was to fulfill them, not to question them.

I have become far more skeptical of the overall utility and cost-effectiveness of command-and-control regulation. I don't think that's a turn to conservatism on my part; I don't view myself as a conservative in nearly any aspect. But I am convinced that programs like the Superfund and programs like the Clean Air Act are at best approximations of dealing with the real problems that they purport to address, that they are very expensive, that they result—and this sounds very conservative—they result in very large bureaucracies, which have a natural tendency to self-perpetuate, pursuing them. Demonstrably the air is cleaner, the water is cleaner. Demonstrably, we know a lot more about Superfund sites, even if we haven't cleaned up very many of them. But I think there's a whole series of questions about the costs, and not just the financial
costs, of approaching those problems in those ways that it would have been well to be skeptical about earlier on, and to be open to some alternative approaches.

Now, I'm not saying wholehandedly that we ought to just retire from that set of approaches and go to market approaches, but the command-and-control government regulatory approach to problems loses public sympathy. Our organization has for most of its years enjoyed an unearned—in many ways, and that will be taken as heresy in some circles—an unearned degree of public devotion. People say, "Ah, Sierra Club. Ah, wilderness. Ah, saving trees. I'm for that." There's just a natural tendency to identify with that. There is no such warmth for government regulation. There is no such warmth for the term "bureaucracy." There is no such warmth for taxes. There is no such warmth for job losses. So to the degree we are lending our support—if there are alternative ways to get the job done, to the degree we are staking ourselves on the side of things that have no natural public warmth and responsiveness attached to them, we may be doing a long-term disservice.

One, it may not be the best way to get the problems cleaned up. It may have side effects on our society in terms of costs and on people's lives that are unlooked for and unintentional on our part, but very damaging. I think environmentalists can well be faulted for not being as sensitive to side effects on other people's lives. It's part of the whole elitist charge against us. And I don't feel unhappy about the role I played and that the club played during my time as an employee there on these issues, but I think a lot of healthy skepticism has come up lately, and I'm paying more attention to it, even though I don't follow these things as I used to. Because in the long haul, a group like the Sierra Club can become overly dependent on the expectation of public acceptance, of public agreement—"Ah, the Sierra Club's for that, therefore that's good."

Now, that's a hugely valuable tool to have. That magnified our power to stop dams in the Grand Canyon; that magnified our power to save redwoods and wilderness and public lands and stop freeways in urban places. We were perceived to be with the little guy against the forces of the big guys. We ally ourselves with essentially something that doesn't have that public sympathy, and not only might we be approaching things in ways that aren't the best way to get the job done, but we may be doing long-term damage to the credibility of environmentalists in the Sierra Club as well. I don't think those questions were addressed consciously, certainly not by me, and maybe it wasn't my place to, but were not addressed consciously by the Sierra Club in anywhere near the way that I think, as I look back, I believe they should be.

Gill: Was the alternate of using market forces ever explored very thoroughly in the days that the policies were being drafted?

Scott: I don't think so. It's a funny thing. You can find very few people who sort of came to adulthood and became environmentalists from the mid-seventies on who have anything good to say about the Forest Service, anything at all. And that includes people who have good friends in the Forest Service. But a great many of us simply have lost all patience. My belief is the Forest Service has to be destroyed before there's any hope for the forests. I think there are so many bureaucratic tendencies in that agency that go
against, that are entrenched, that have decades and decades of commitment and that are
replicated in new employees.

I used to think, well, a new generation of the young people I was in forestry school
with—that's my degree—when those people get old enough to have their hands on the
reins things will change. But by the time they get there, if they've kept their nose clean
to get that high up in the organization, they've been selected for—. And if that's true of
the Forest Service, then it's probably true of the EPA, and it's probably true of large
public bureaucracies generally. You keep wondering, at some point, does the EPA
say, "Well, the air's clean, the water's clean, and we're all out of work." No. They're
going to continue issuing regulations.

I think that in the seventies and the sixties, when most of the club's policy was made—
the club hasn't sat around passing new conservation policy very much lately, in the last
couple of decades. The support for the Clean Air Act, and the Clean Water Act, and
the toxics laws, and so forth, largely plays out policies that were established at a time
when people in the Sierra Club on the whole said, "Forest Service is a good thing.
Now, there's a couple of bad apples, or they're getting bad political signals from
above." And so our whole attitude about that agency has changed. I think that that
reflects a growing skepticism about simply saying, "Because it's a government
program, and because we have clout in Congress, we can keep it headed in the right
direction."

I don't think there's going to be a time we ever get the real on-the-ground policies of
the Forest Service straightened out in a satisfactory way where you could generally
say, "There, now that's better." The momentum is all the wrong way, and I don't know
any reason to think that that wouldn't be equally true of the bureaucracy of the EPA, or
the bureaucracy of the Department of Energy. The Sierra Club helped establish the
national park system and the National Park Service. I think you could write a plausible
and probably quite accurate history of the national parks in the last fifty years as a
history of protecting the national parks from the National Park Service, as much as
protecting them from anything else.

And that ought to tell us something. I see in the little community where I live now a
natural tendency of people to be suspicious of government, and it seems like a more
healthy position to be in, in general. Much as I believe in most of the government
programs that there are, we are not winning sympathy by saying, "We're for more
government regulation." And I don't perceive that that's going to change. I think
people make generalizations from their own small sphere in which they live to the big
sphere and say, "Well, I had a rotten experience trying to get a permit to redo my
waterfront bulkhead, and therefore, I generalize from that that anybody that has to go
get a permit to have scrubbers on their stacks at the EPA. . ."

Now, my attitude about the pollution laws goes beyond that to say that maybe the
scrubbers weren't the right idea anyway, and maybe we're retrofitting industry in a way
that doesn't do the sort of Amory Lovins trick of saying, "Maybe we ought to reinvent
that industry, or maybe we ought not to be in that business at all, or we ought to rethink
in a more fundamental way than just slapping on all those extra costs." Because somebody pays them. I don't think environmentalists have been heard from in ways that draw public sympathy on those issues, and I think that's a mistake. I think that if all of that is true about bureaucracies, it's conceivable that lots of people might see the Sierra Club's bureaucracy the same way.

That was a segue.

Gill: Well, let's follow that up, then. One of the things that the Sierra Club prides itself in is being a volunteer organization, and you've worked, I guess, on both sides of the club. Why don't you comment a little bit on how you see the relationship between the volunteers and the staff?

Scott: Well, I'm going to take it in an even slightly broader context than that. I think that there are a lot of different Sierra Clubs, and that a person studying the history of the Sierra Club in this era, the evolution of the Sierra Club, could easily get off on the wrong course, depending on which Sierra Club one was talking about. There is the Sierra Club that meets in church basements in Omaha on Thursday nights, and that meets in the church parking lot to take off on the hikes on Sunday mornings. And what goes on in San Francisco and at the board meetings and amongst the staff is utterly irrelevant to that Sierra Club, and bless them.

There is the Sierra Club that is represented by Sierra magazine sitting on hundreds of thousands of coffee tables, of people who have never gone to a meeting or an outing, and wouldn't be caught dead going to a meeting or an outing. They couldn't care less what is going on in all those dimensions.

Then there is the Sierra Club of people who have worked their way up in the volunteer structure and taken an interest in the national affairs of the club, and through one means or another—as an increasingly senior outings leader or as someone experienced in publishing and therefore in some fashion recruited to the oversight committees on the publications or the Sierra magazine, Sierra books, or as a conservation activist, or as a council representative—have found their way to San Francisco. That's a largely self-selected group. It is not necessarily the Sierra Club's best and brightest. That is to say, when all the ringleaders of the local group get together and elect their officers, it's pretty clear that usually the group of people try and repose their leadership in the most confident and skilled person that they can figure out around the table. Same thing at the chapter level.

It's a very bizarre organization that views itself as a national organization but never gets the top elected leaders of its state units in the same room together. There is something very odd about that. Because I know in the chapter that I was a part of at the time that I was a part of it, in Michigan, that our council delegate was a pain in the neck. We gave him the council delegateship each year as a way to get rid of him and to keep him quiet. And as long as he got the free trips to San Francisco and got to make his little reports, he would largely leave us alone to do what we wanted to do. And either Virginia Prentice, who was then the chairman of the chapter, or I, went to
all those board meetings anyway. If we wanted to, we'd figure out some way to go. But this was a way to keep this unnamed person—.

Now, at that same era, this unnamed person showed up at the council meetings representing us and was the only voice there of the Mackinac Chapter of the Sierra Club. He might well have been in a room of—if there were fifty chapters—fifty similar people, who were the embodiment of the grass roots of the club. So before I talk about the bureaucracy of the staff, I want to talk about the bureaucracy of the volunteers, because I think there is a series of myths or shibboleths about the volunteer side of the club that as an employee and as a leader, I usually had to, and willingly did, adhere to. But it doesn't make them true; they're still myths and shibboleths. It is in my recollection an annoyance that so many of the leaders in those positions really believed it, really believed those myths and shibboleths, and that led to one part of the inevitable tension in a voluntary organization that arises when that voluntary organization hires staff.

The board of directors of the Sierra Club is an extremely ill-considered mechanism. It is elected directly by the members, including those coffee-table members, and those people whose interests are very limited and parochial, all having a potentially equal vote. Therefore, it's a crap shoot what fifteen people at any given moment may be directors of the club, and it is a crap shoot whether any of them have the faintest idea of how to operate in that role a $15 million, 700,000 member, international organization.

One of the myths or shibboleths is that they do, and that simply by virtue of being elected, they are imbued with that ability. So one of the myths is that by virtue of election by strangers, on the basis of a paragraph and a picture, and you've been there and I was a candidate once, so you know and I know the care that goes into the selection of each word, and the care that goes into—it is now known not to hold a fish in a picture, but when Peg Tileston did it, she thought it was fine. Nothing that gets a person there inherently equips them to exercise one-fifteenth of the governance of such an organization.

Too much of the way that governance is, or at least was exercised in my time, was by negative and suspicious assumption that someone else was up to something, so that the board functioned much of the time to control and limit what people could do rather than to empower and permit. It took itself all too seriously, and met too often, and ignored real problems while spending its time on silliness. It's not that there isn't a huge body of knowledge about how nonprofits need to be governed to grow and to use their resources effectively, and it's not clear that the club has set itself up institutionally so that its top governance by the board of directors is taking advantage of that kind of knowledge.

Now, I work for a board of directors today, a very small operation, but very sophisticated people. I observed the governing council of the Wilderness Society, I have been a part of boards of various small things, certainly nothing on the scale of the Sierra Club. It is not necessary that what I say be true; I think it is true. It's certainly
my opinion. It is not necessary and it's not inevitable, but it can only be fixed by the board itself. I fear that the implication of this is that the board, and therefore the top governance, self-select for a certain kind of people that is in fact not representative of the Sierra Club, though they are empowered to be the Sierra Club. And much is made of their representative capacity.

I think that it also has the effect of making others of these myths far more powerful than they ought to be, and the club has tripped over this five or six times, and it's usually been in the area of staff relationships. I am clear, anyone who ever works for a nonprofit organization in a salaried position had better be clear, that the volunteers hired them, not the other way around. And if you lose that perspective, down that road lies great peril. So if you were going to have a fault, I would choose the fault every time that said, "We'll take the weaknesses and the strange perversities that come in by the odd nature of how we govern ourselves with this volunteer leadership," over a staff-driven and a staff-dominated operation every time. That's where you get these cults of personality, and the club started down that path once in the fifties, and pulled itself back and said, "No, we're not going to remake ourselves into the image of one person." And wisely so.

And it's healthy that there is that tension. There could be a Sierra Club without any staff, but volunteers have chosen over the years to have quite a large staff. No staff member chose to add those positions. Volunteers did, every time. The board of directors has that responsibility, so if the Sierra Club has created too much staff, or in the wrong places, or doing the wrong things, or allowed too much license, there's only one place that that responsibility ultimately lies.

Now, the reality is that the successful staff leaders of the club, and there have only been two so far—there is another one in the saddle at the moment who from all I know is doing well—but two out of four of the club's executive directors have been successful in the sense of successful executives of nonprofit organizations. By that standard, Dave Brower was not successful. By that standard, Mike McCloskey set the model for being sufficiently self-effacing. Mike has enormous single-handed influence on a great many events in the history of his time in the club, including since he's left being executive director. But he did it in such a way, and he operated his role out of the knowledge of the subject that I'm talking about.

Doug Wheeler was not a success. I believe Michael Fischer was, and I think there's every reason to believe that Carl [Pope] will be. But where it's gotten into trouble is that people on one side or the other of the equation have started believing things that were mythological, in my opinion. You can always pull the staff up short by asserting the authority of the volunteer structure. But one needs to be very cautious about how they do that. In a huge organization as the Sierra Club is now, there's lots of layers. There's an endemic problem of directors meddling at every level of those operations, and of believing that that's the key to maintaining the special and unique qualities of volunteer control, which is just ridiculous.

Gill: That's where the mythology gets in the way.
Scott: It seems to me that you have to be utterly certain that you have an executive director who understands this stuff, understands it, came to the job understanding it, and then hold that person rigorously accountable. And then [you have to be certain] that the board's role is to set policies. It's not to inquire into every detail and second-guess every judgment. And you would never find 10 percent of the members who, fully informed on this process, would ever think that the way it often is done represents them at all.

And I might as well say it on the record, because I’ve said it enough to people of all stripes through the years, so it's probably widely remembered: you end up with something that I call the mandarin class. Sort of like ancient Chinese emperors, you had all these mandarins telling them they were always right, that the upward leadership of the club is too often made up of people whose feet aren't in fact in touch with the grass roots at all. They're in touch with the council, but then you have to ask yourself if that's where the action is. Or they come out of some other aspect of it, but they've left the club a long way behind, that other club out there.

Another part of the myth is that this is all just the campfire with a larger circle around it, that we all went to the Sierras for the High Trip in 1904, and now it's 1994, so let's all just make the circle bigger. Bull! A crucial decision was made some time in the fifties or early sixties to recruit members by direct mail. It was joked about when I joined the club that if I couldn't get two signatures of two sponsors, Dave Brower would sign the blank when it got to the headquarters. And obviously, they had never sent a membership back after some time in the fifties saying, "Sorry, you don't have the sponsors." But that mythology that that's the kind of Sierra Club we still have persisted in various quarters for a long, long time.

The reality is, most members of the Sierra Club joined because they got a direct mail request, and renewed because they got a direct mail request, and their relationship to the club is very different than people who gathered around the campfire. And yes, some small percentage of those people then went to a meeting and went on an outing and all that, but this is only one little part of the club.

Now, it would be complete anarchy if you said, "Well, therefore, the staff's role is to better understand this, and so it ought to serve that other membership and sort of thumb its nose at the ones that still think it's a campfire." That's not right either.

Gill: No, that's not going to work.

Scott: But a good degree of the tension that exists and that flares up from time to time between staff and volunteers at the Sierra Club is a variation on this reaction to mythology. And it very easily can become a sort of a tolerant attitude, "Oh, there you go again, but don't you know this a more complicated and sophisticated world?"

[End Tape 22, Side A]

[Begin Tape 22, Side B]
Gill: You just mentioned two recent executive directors, one that you judge to be successful and the other one less so. Could we go back and talk a bit about those two periods of time in the club's history, maybe starting with Doug Wheeler?

Scott: Well, I just want to say, I was alluding to their success, or lack thereof, principally on the dimension of their relationships to the volunteer leadership of the club. The history of the Sierra Club in the fifties and the early sixties revolves to a great deal around the great Dave Brower, and the club wouldn't be the same if he wasn't there. But as a leader of the staff of a volunteer organization, I think you'd have to judge him a failure. Certainly the board ultimately did, and in an enormously painful way.

Mike McCloskey was nearly ideally constituted, not only to be the executive director the day he suddenly stepped into those responsibilities, but to evolve as the times evolved and to help the club evolve, because that's one of the staff's jobs. There are whole forces for continuity and things like that as directors and other volunteer ranks change, where the continuity can be supplied, and that's one of the reasons you have a staff. At no point, to my knowledge, did the board of directors, any board of directors of the Sierra Club, ever take seriously their responsibility to be thinking ahead to the day when Mike McCloskey would either get hit by a truck, or have to be discharged à la Brower, or for whatever set of reasons, or choose to go away, which is what he ultimately did; choose to do something else.

So that when that matter occurred, and some fault can be laid at Mike's doorstep for that, because a chief executive has an obligation to help a board plan for his succession. And I want to say two things about that. One, the Sierra Club has done a lamentable job of preparing for the succession of its executive directors, and it's paid a very high price, because that's not something you can afford to make a mistake in doing. Secondly, the Sierra Club has done a lamentable job with investing in and training its own staff, for anything. A lamentable job. And those two things are intimately connected.

Mike McCloskey stepped aside, and a search process was begun, and I don't think the search process can be faulted in general. I think that the board took it seriously. The directors at the time were open to the modern idea that senior staff ought to have some representation, not in the choice, but in the review, which we did. I was one of those people. I think they engaged reasonably competent professional search help. I thought when that process was over that it had worked superbly, because it identified a person who had never occurred to me as someone who would be interested, but a person who I knew, so I naturally assumed that it had done a good job.

Doug Wheeler, when I learned that he was one of the I think eight or nine candidates who were presented out of a black box to the board, I was quite pleased because while I didn't know anything about any of the rest of them, everything I knew about Doug Wheeler was positive. I had known him first when he was a deputy assistant secretary in the Interior Department during the Nixon administration. I had been closer to his immediate boss, Nat Reed, and his senior colleague, another one of the deputy assistant secretaries, Buff Bohlen, but Doug was an inner part of that circle, that was a very
good circle, and I had every reason to think that Doug could be a successful—of the pool of candidates, that Doug would be a good choice.

I was involved in the interview process with him, with directors. I played a strong role, a conscious and deliberate strong role in being an advocate for him, once he was selected, to the staff, to virtually all of whom he was a stranger. He came across very effectively in the interview. Experienced, sophisticated people, Audrey Rust being one of them, were very taken with him. The board, when all the board met him, were very taken with him. It was not a controversial decision to hire him.

The nature of the process missed something about Doug, for whatever reason, and I can't psychoanalyze it, and I never became that close to him to know him well enough to do it. It turned out that Doug was a lamentably poor administrator of people. The problems that he came up against I think ultimately came down to two things: one, he didn't "get it" about the Sierra Club, and didn't adjust himself the way Mike McCloskey had—but of course, Mike McCloskey was raised in the club—didn't adjust himself to various of the truths and myths that he ought to have. And secondly, he was incapable of building trust and teamwork among the senior staff that reported to him.

An immensely likeable man, as far as I know an honest, very capable, smart, outgoing man, has all the ambassadorial functions. He obviously was adept on the cocktail circuit and the VIP circuit in Washington DC, knew his way around there, highly regarded there. Just didn't get the Sierra Club. And started to exercise his role fairly early on in ways that intended to change the club and intended to do it in ways that were not straightforwardly presented. He wanted to do things with the Sierra Club that a chief executive in some other kind of organization—including some of the other environmental groups with which Doug was more familiar—could do. Bill Turnage became the executive director of the Wilderness Society and changed it 100 percent. Met at lunch one day not very many months later with Mike McCloskey and me, and positively glowed with self-praise about the fact that of the forty-two employees, he'd hired forty-one of them, which, oh incidentally, meant that he'd gotten rid of all the others. Now, some of them doubtlessly deserved it, but this was hardly a definition of continuity in an organization.

And Doug was starting to try and do things of that kind. If there had been a staff revolt started by people who were jealous or antagonistic to Doug Wheeler personally, it would, one assumes, have represented itself in one or two very strong opponents to Doug's continuing, coming from probably fairly obvious quarters in the club with whom the executive director spent most of his time. We didn't think of what happened as a staff revolt. We thought of it as a plea to the board of directors to wake up and pay attention. Individually, not just Doug Scott or John McComb or Audrey Rust or Joanne Hurley, people in the daily flow of commerce with him, were having real problems. But so was the head of the outings staff, who didn't have very much daily dealing at all. So was Len Levitt, who was essentially the chief financial officer. Len was among the strongest voices in our private discussion the day that the senior staff just said, "We cannot take this anymore."
I don't think the senior staff accomplished its purpose very adroitly or wisely. It was an emotional thing more than anything else. There were enormous numbers of tears shed that day. Every one of us knew that we were putting our livelihood and our families in great jeopardy. But the verbalization of the desire to send a message to the president of the club that the senior staff was not prepared, without further intervention by the board, to respond to Doug as its leader, was verbalized by Len Levitt, not Doug Scott or John McComb, or any of the other likely suspects at that meeting. Amongst the strongest people was the woman who was then head of the outings department, and I'm sorry but her name just totally escapes me.

We all knew that we were precipitating a problem that the club leadership was inherently ill-equipped to deal with. I don't think if any of us had known how long and unpleasant the episode would become, I think we might have had second thoughts and individually just faded away. People started leaving; that was going on. Audrey Rust left, and a number of people just said, "Who needs this?"

Gill: There weren't any single precipitating incidents?

Scott: No.

Gill: Just an accumulation—

Scott: It was an accumulation, and I want to say importantly for this record that the board was incapable of handling this. It instantly, and to our great shock, including those of us who thought we understood the board and the individuals on it, it instantly chose sides. Some of the directors instantly decided that, without ever hearing from any of us, that Doug had to be defended at any cost, and several of them put themselves in a very antagonistic role to the senior staff. And that shocked many of us, because we thought we deserved a little more than that.

An emergency board meeting was called very promptly. It turned a finance committee into a full board meeting, and very quickly the finance committee meeting ceased and the board went into private session. We referred to it as the star chamber. We were hauled in one at a time, and treated abysmally. Abysmally. Shockingly badly, by a number of directors, and I think I won't on this occasion name names. I think it's adequately on the record elsewhere.

It then approved, and for my own part, I knew enough—I knew that Doug had a contract. I was not privy to his contract. Audrey Rust and I took private counsel almost immediately and were advised that meddling with a person's contract is an actionable thing, and I just made it known to the president of the club and to Doug that for the duration of this matter, I was not available to converse with him, because he was an attorney, I was not; he had a contract I didn't know anything about; I would not be capable of knowing when I placed myself in jeopardy; and I didn't think well enough of him to think that this couldn't—I felt his livelihood and his reputation were being placed on the line as well.
It dragged on way too long. It had a huge psychological toll I'm sure on Doug, I'm sure on the board members, I'm sure on the senior volunteers, and I'm sure on the rest of us. I know in my own case. I know that my psychological relationship to the campfire myth ended there, that I never had the same kind of unquestioning assumptions in my mind about my place at the Sierra Club after that. I remember having a long, heart-to-heart talk with Mike McCloskey about that.

Ultimately, the board could not cope with this problem, and it engaged outside help. It was given advice by that outside help after rather rapid review of the situation. I believe that advice was that Doug Wheeler needed to be discharged. It could not cope with that. I believe—I don't know that for a fact—I believe that to be the case. The woman was named Cathy something, and she was a law school professor and mediator from University of California at Davis.

Gill: What was her name?

Scott: Cathy—it will be on the records plenty; I'm sure she was well paid for the many months she spent with us.

So ultimately they adopted an extraordinary process of having this woman, and she recommended this process as a fallback if they would not accept her recommendation. She told us this. She had a meeting with the assembled senior staff, and she said, "I've arrived at some findings on a recommendation, and I'm going to make that recommendation, and I don't think the board will act on it. And therefore, I'm going to offer them a second alternative." She outlined what the second alternative was, and I argued with her in front of my colleagues very strongly, as did others, to say, "If you offer that second alternative, they'll take it." The first alternative, whatever it is, will be to make a decision; if they are offered the alternative not to make a decision, they'll take it.” [laughs] The board members were not speaking to each other. This was a very grim situation.

She nonetheless, despite my grand advice, offered them the second alternative, and either because it was in fact the wise thing to do or because I was right, they took it. And this involved having an interview of each senior staff person with Doug Wheeler, in her presence, on the basis of a written document to be prepared by that staff person, and in the format of the staff member's evaluation of Doug Wheeler's job, how he'd been doing. Several people refused to do it. Several people left.

And I can't remember anything quite so painful in my life, because Doug is an enormously genial and self-possessed fellow, and spending a couple of hours of going through with the initiative being on my side of the table, not his, to say, "And now, the next subject I want to cover is I think that you're not doing . . ."

Gill: What is your sense of why this process was undertaken, other than to save the board from making a decision?
Scott: Well, then all this was to be compiled, and presented to the board, and then this would give them more raw material from which to arrive at a decision. Their problem was that by the time this woman came forward with her first recommendation, which I'm absolutely certain, though I don't know it for a fact, but in my own mind at the time I was certain it was to discharge Doug, and that while there were doubtlessly problems in the senior staff, the balance of the equities, if you will, were that the problems were caused from Doug Wheeler's side of the equation.

The problem with the board was that there were those people who, whatever she found and recommended, were going to defend Doug to the death. There were some other people who probably equally regardless of what she found were going to say, "I'm with the senior staff," or "It's not a matter of choosing sides between those two sets of people, I want this guy out of here," for whatever reason. And then there were some people who couldn't make up their mind. This was a device to theoretically arm the people who couldn't make up their mind with more information.

All those documents were privileged, under rules set down by the board. I have a complete set of them, which I believe I have given to Ann Lage. I believe they are a crucial part of the history of the club, and that any researcher reviewing this part of the history of the club should give great attention to finding that woman and talking to her, and/or certainly obtaining all of those reports of those meetings, because Doug Wheeler and each of us signed these documents. So when we got all done, I had written out my assertions and my findings, and, acknowledging that we had discussed each one of them in her presence, and she making additional comments, these were signed. So lots of mythology is around about what went on in all this, and that it was a staff revolt. I think in those documents, one will find a great deal of fodder for the case that was being made that this man was inappropriately placed at the Sierra Club.

Gill: The upshot of this was that one party or the others had to leave.

Scott: That's right.

Gill: And so if the board had decided to keep Wheeler, all the rest of you folks would have had to go, because of the role you had played in this inquisition.

Scott: Well, yes. Now, it came to me in the midst of—this dragged on for months. And we were functioning—

Gill: And you were all functioning and working together at the same time.

Scott: We were functioning and doing our work, more or less. And Doug. A number of people were job-hunting, a number of people left. John McComb left, Audrey Rust left. Crucial people, neither of whom should have been lost to the club. It was asserted to me by someone in position perhaps to be acquainted with Doug's thinking that at that time, Doug had felt that he could salvage a working relationship with a couple of key people—interestingly enough, I believe I was one of them—and that he
would discharge the others in due course, and that he could essentially clean house and remake it according to his druthers.

Now, he was getting lots of advice. There were lots of people in and out of his office, and lots of observers. There were a lot of other things going on. My bottom line was that I had a family to look out for, and a reputation to look out for, and that he had a contract and I didn't, and that I didn't know what was in his contract, and he was a lawyer and I wasn't, and so I chose, and many of my colleagues did the same, because we—I shared the legal advice we obtained with the others—we simply went on about our business. The club—it was in the club's great interest that it continue to function.

During this whole episode, no one—and I have lots of close personal friends in the volunteer leadership of the club, the Joe Fontaines and the Bob Howards and the Sue Merrows and Dick Fiddler, lord knows—but no one played as important a role in keeping me on an even keel, and on keeping me believing—and not just me uniquely, but of being around and listening and bucking up and holding the hand of the people who were in this situation, than Denny Shaffer.

Denny and I over the years have crossed swords about lots of things, but he brought to his work as a director in the many different times he has served as director of the club a certain kind of down-home street smarts about what the world is like, and how to make it in the world, that was missing at some other parts of the table. And there are a lot of sort of people to whom the honorary part of being a director of the club in the years of their achievement, doing whatever it was they did, was the principal reason they were there. Denny was trying to see the Sierra Club managed.

Now, he went about it in ways that made him lots of enemies, and that made lots of people cross at him a lot of the time, including me. He made life miserable for whoever was the executive director at any given moment. In this episode, and partly because he was firmly on the side of discharging Doug Wheeler, so I make no bones about that, Denny played an invaluable role in my morale and my staying with it. I wasn't about to abandon the Sierra Club, I wasn't about to abandon Mike McCloskey, I had deep loyalties there. And I was just stubborn enough that I wasn't about to be driven away, while the game was still up. And I felt, as one of the political people and as the head of one of the larger staff departments, I felt a very strong anxiety and loyalty to other department heads who weren't perhaps as well equipped to cope, and who just didn't play in these kinds of games emotionally with anywhere near this kind of frequency. And a lot of damage was done, and I don't think that damage ultimately gets laid at Doug Wheeler's door. I think it ultimately gets laid at the door of the incapacity of the board of directors to come to a decision.

I had a director tell me the morning of the decisive meeting, and I had been told by intermediaries, because I also said the day this started, I said to Doug Wheeler, "I'm not going to seek out any member of the board of directors. If any of them wants to talk to me, I'm available. But I will not seek out—" again, I don't know what noose I am putting my head in, but if a board of directors member comes to me and wants to know anything, I'll converse with them. But their initiative and their choice of topic.
I was told that this particular director, who was Sandy Tepfer, had made it very clear early on to other people that he wanted to talk to me. He never did and he never did and he never did. The morning of the ultimately decisive meeting, he appeared in my office and said to me—he looked anguished, and everybody who had a role in this was anguished—and he said to me, "Doug, we can't afford to lose him." I understood him to mean, and his words I think were even clearer than what I just said, I understood him to mean, "We can't afford to buy out his contract," that it was a dollars and cents decision.

I was just shocked. I was just—. No one ever wanted it to be, "The whole senior staff will quit." It came to a head in a way that probably was ill-considered, more driven by emotion than anything else, but once the fat was in the fire, some choices had to be made. And the idea that it ever came down to a choice, and that one-fifteenth of the question was going to be decided by anybody who thought that it came down to a choice, of the dollars in a contract—. Now, I've always been an employee of somebody else. I'm now the senior staff person of a very small organization. I don't have a contract. I've never had a contract. And it will be a fine thing if we get in the Sierra Club or any other public interest group everybody having contracts to protect each other from each other. So that the staff went into this in a highly unequal role, with real grievances.

Now, maybe those grievances could have individually been raised in some other way, although no mechanism was in place for that. If you back away from all of this, I have seen Doug since and shaken his hand, and I don't bear him any ill will. I think he's an incompetent administrator, but—properly staffed and properly led—a good outside man. He wasn't what the Sierra Club needed. I think the real meaning of the Wheeler episode was that in the crap shoot of a completely unprepared transition of this chief executive, the club lost, at a huge price. They really did buy out a contract, and they really did lose the productivity of the organization for some ungodly amount of time, and the loyalty was deeply—a bunch of people left, people who the organization had no reason to lose, like Audrey and John McComb. And lost to its considerable—how many volunteers just took a look at all this and said, "Well, the hell with that," and took a powder, and said, "That wasn't what I came to this party for."

And the worst of it was, it wasn't clear to me that that lesson about continuity was ever figured out. That it is inevitably a crap shoot to do a search firm hire, be given a list of a few names, mostly utter strangers, with no history in the organization, and choose one of them. And that the only alternative to that is to breed your own, which we know worked with Mike McCloskey. I say this as somebody who wouldn't then or now be the executive director of the Sierra Club or anything that big for all the tea in China. It never was my career ambition, and I would have been, I hope, the first to say I would have been utterly ill-suited for that responsibility. In part because the Sierra Club never invested anything in getting me prepared.

Now, I was certainly a likely prospect from some point in my career, and John McComb was certainly a likely prospect from some point in his career, and there were probably some people in other parts, not just conservation, that were likely potential—
Carl, obviously—and that you could say, "Well, we're going to," as any competent organization would do, “we're going to send you to the Harvard Business School” or “Doug, you know, you're really good at this and this and this, but you don't know beans about that, and if you ever, just as an investment in you as a public interest employee of a nonprofit organization, you ought to know something about that, so instead of just hoping you'll pick it up—"

Gill: "We'll make it possible for you to go do it."

Scott: Or, "We'll do something. We'll send you for six months to the development department, have you work as Audrey's assistant." Whatever. So in the same sense that people come to the board utterly ill-prepared and just chosen by random, there's no one being bred up in the staff structure for the continuity value. The real reason that I think that's absolutely crucial is that it's just good dumb luck that the power has been split widely enough that we haven't had a situation when a staff change came that somebody in the senior volunteer structure, say a board member, said, "Oh, I'm ready." Because that's murder. That's just—you've just buy all sorts of trouble with that.

I believe that the Wheeler episode was unnecessary, and that it is likely to happen again. It is more likely than not to happen, every time a blind search outside is conducted.

[End Tape 22, Side B]

[Begin Tape 23, Side A]

Scott: About the selection of executive directors. When the most recent vacancy existed after Michael Fischer resigned, and the selection process was underway, and I was long away and not following—I don't get board minutes, I don't get packets from San Francisco at all. It's not a current interest of mine to follow the inner politics of the Sierra Club. But I was called by several directors who were members of the search committee, because I'd been Carl's supervisor in a variety of ways over the years. Carl and I joined the staff of the Sierra Club almost at the same moment. So some specific questions were being put to me.

One of those directors was a fairly new director, and I remember verbalizing something to her that I would like to have on this record. The nature of some of the questions that were being put to candidates to help decide whether to hire Carl, with nineteen years of history at the Sierra Club, or someone else from outside—and it was at that point I think just between Carl and one other candidate, placed a burden of proof on Carl.

Gill: On the insider.

Scott: On the insider, because we knew him, warts and all, and assumed the best about the paperwork and an hour or two of interviews with the outsider. That was implicit, not
explicit, and I just said, "This is what I observe, and I think it's bizarre." Now, maybe it ought not automatically and forever be that it's always got to be an insider, and there's always got to be a track, and so we'll spiff up the preparation of a little school of fish, and one of them will get to be the big fish someday. Maybe that ought not to be a given either, but to prejudice the selection of an insider because you know him—if the Wheeler episode stands for anything, it stands for the inherent risk to an organization with as many internal idiosyncracies, with as intense a loyalty to its own history and mythology and its special character. And it's possible to find an outsider with enough of that who "gets it," in the current idiom, to succeed, on those levels.

But the selection of Doug Wheeler, I think, stands for the proposition that it's very probable that however good an outsider looks on first acquaintance and second acquaintance and third acquaintance, the chances that they'll get all that stuff right, that they will get it, or ever get it, once they get there, are very remote. The very idea that people will say, "Well, I once had a set-to with Carl about this," or "I knew this about that," or "that person was inadequate ten years ago in something that mattered to me, and therefore that ought to all count against him," versus this utter stranger who made a good impression at an interview, I think that's really hard. But I think those are questions that the board of directors ought to, and Carl now, ought to take on in a generic way and have thought about and have decided about, and have in a little file folder someplace for the next time. Because I was just dumbstruck that the question was put to me in a way that revealed that to me.

Gill: The intervening director was one Michael Fischer, who I presume would be identified as an outsider.

Scott: Absolutely. Michael, it's not widely known, I don't think, that in the black box of the screening process by the search firm brought us when Doug Wheeler was selected, one of the nine was Michael Fischer. Michael had a very strong advocate in the board in the person of Michele Perrault, who knew him and was at least as delighted to discover that he was one of the candidates, I remember her saying so, as I was to know any of the candidates myself. Michael was not in the final cut that first time, for whatever reason.

In the aftermath of the Wheeler episode and after the interregnum when Mike McCloskey, good old Mike—people ought to take a long look at the series of characteristics that Mike McCloskey represents, because the fact that he was turned to again suggests that there's something in that pile of characteristics that ought to be watched for in the future. And a lot of people have observed that Michael Fischer and Mike McCloskey were kind of a lot alike, kind of looked like they spent, both of them, more time in the library than on the athletic field, and a whole series of things that one might say about the two of them.

Michael Fischer got it. I didn't know him in his role at the California Coastal Commission. I had no reason to ever have anything to do with the California Coastal Commission, I didn't know him there, I didn't know until late in the game that he lived in Mill Valley, which is where I lived, and that we were, though on opposite ridges, but
we were neighbors. Michael was, in the same way that Doug Wheeler was, an infectiously friendly, outgoing kind of a guy. But he got it about the Sierra Club. The loyalty that I felt and feel for Michael Fischer, and that I exerted myself to give him as my boss through the entire rest of my tenure at the club, arose from the fact that he got it. Michael just acted as though he'd been around the campfire for a long time with us. Now, in fact, he hadn't, but he had plowed other fields nearby, and he'd been an observer of the club.

Michael was not in a number of respects god's gift to administrative talent, but I would trade—up to some point—I would trade god's gift to administrative talent and staff leadership and some of those things for someone who, by their own makeup and background, understands viscerally, not intellectually, what the Sierra Club's about, what its cause is, and what the quality of its volunteerism is. Those things, Michael from the day he walked in, could speak about, could speak about with conviction, and could inspire loyalty.

Now, twice burned, I wasn't necessarily in a position to just be wildly enthusiastic about anybody new, especially somebody from outside, because we'd been around that track once. I found Michael an easy person to work for. I found that in matters where judgment was called for, he had, as Doug Wheeler did not, he had a natural tendency to call for diverse advice and to get people around him, and to make sure that the matter was talked out. He wasn't secretive. He was comradely, in the same way that I always felt with Mike McCloskey, that I could take my personal troubles or my uncertainties—that it wouldn't be held against me as a subordinate responsible to administer other people. My uncertainties about whether I was doing the right thing would not be taken as a weakness, but the fact that I brought them to him would at least allow him to do his role of helping me, which I valued greatly. I never heard anybody say that about Doug Wheeler. He was just very quickly of the view that if you admitted you were having problems with something, he wasn't there to help, he was there to note that down, sort of take a number.

The specific case I remember with Michael Fischer, because it was inordinately painful for me personally, was when I was responsible for hiring a new director for the political action committee, SCCOPE. We had made the decision to move that position to Washington DC. Carl had become conservation director, I guess. Anyway, Carl was my immediate deputy in whatever title. The center of gravity of the SCCOPE program was going to be moved to Washington. I had ultimately, as the Sierra Club always did, made a public announcement and got oodles of résumés, and Susan De La Rosa, the head of personnel, did her usual fine job of screening those and getting it down to a reasonable group of people. We conducted—I brought the director of the Washington office, David Gardiner, and Carl—and I think Bruce Hamilton—into all the interview process with me. It was my decision, but we conducted all of that jointly.

Among the four finalists were Rose McCullough, who was at one time our northern Great Plains representative and had gone on to other work outside the club, a close personal friend of mine at the time and my family, often guest at my house on
occasions like Thanksgiving and Christmas; Jonathan Ela, the former Midwest representative to the club who had been off sailing in the Caribbean for a couple of years with his wife, Trish, but who had been a close colleague from my earliest days at the Sierra Club, a person for whom I have boundless respect; and Bob Hattoy, the then-current southern California representative, head of the Los Angeles office, and a man whose personality is so prominent that he stands out in many ways.

Bob wanted this job. Jonathan Ela wanted this job. Rose McCullough wanted this job, and each of them in different ways conveyed to me an impression, or maybe I got the impression inaccurately, that out of long personal working relationships with them, I would be particularly aware of their unique talents to do the job.

Gill: Tough call.

Scott: Well, I hired an utter stranger named Reid Wilson, who was at the time maybe twenty-three years old, or some number like that, very young-appearing, enormously impressive. He was advocated by a number of people in the Washington office who had known him as I had not. I have seldom conducted a hiring interview with someone who just left me rocking back on my heels.

One could look at how this all transpired and say that I ultimately just made the decision that got me out of having to choose one of my friends and not choose the other two. I don't believe that that's what I did, but I remember, and the point of talking about this at all is that this was enormously difficult for me, because I had to make three phone calls—having made the decision to hire Reid, I had to make three phone calls to the people I hadn't chosen, and nobody else could do it. So there wasn't any way out of it.

Michael was an immense good friend and counselor to me in that process. To be able to rely on your own boss, and to reveal some of your own uncertainties like that, was very special. He and I have continued to keep in touch, and his response to me when I first showed interest in leaving the employment of the Sierra Club, and then didn't, and then did finally, was very supportive. He had the interest of the club always hovering around, but he never let me think that anything was higher on his radar screen in those conversations than what was in my interest, as best he could figure them out, or as best he could help me to see them. That's very valuable.

You add all that personal stuff to Michael's sense of what the Sierra Club is about, and his deep commitment to the issues, and his willingness to step in and make the calls and go to Washington and do the work that we asked him to do in his sort of titular role, which is an important part of what the Sierra Club executive director can do. I judge, from the time that I was there and from those qualities, I judge Michael's time at the Sierra Club to be a successful time. I think it was inherently a transition time, and maybe he even knew that going in, that this wasn't for a long haul, and that it wasn't fated to be the next fifteen-year Mike McCloskey exercise.
I think it speaks well of Michael that in the aftermath of my departure, his loyalty and his assistance to Carl, however that process played out—and I was not privy to how it played out—resulted in the fact that Carl was selected to follow him, and I think that that represents the start of what I hope is a new model. I hope Carl has got it. [laughter] Because I think it's too painful. Maybe you can't be lucky enough in an institution like this to have someone be executive director for fifteen years at a time, as Mike McCloskey was, without becoming a prima donna, without tripping over the egotistical problems that Dave Brower tripped over, and without getting in the way, which nobody ever accused Mike of doing. So maybe that's unreasonable to expect. But boy, you can't have it be a constant revolving door. It just won't do, and you just can't try out enough strangers until you happen to stumble over—.

Gill: Well, Doug, we're running out of time, but I'm sure the historic record wants to know about your decision to leave the Sierra Club and come to the San Juan Islands. Being here today, I get a little sense of why you might have made that decision, but why don't you share with us the thoughts that led to that decision.

Scott: I don't think I knew it at the time, but I was probably leaving the employment of the Sierra Club for about four years. Certainly the Wheeler episode changed my emotional relationship to the club as an employer in a way that was irreparable. I started having to think more about my own options, because mine is not a life that was planned out, and I didn't have that all schemed out ahead. Also, there is somebody else who is involved in the decisions in my life, and who I might say was at least as unnerved by the Wheeler episode as I was, and possibly in a position to be less charitable about the Sierra Club's responsibilities to me as a senior and long-time employee than I was, and that's my wife.

The reality is that to do the job that I had, and every time I got a more senior job, I didn't lose responsibility for those titular kind of roles. If you have ultimate responsibility for the field staff, if you have ultimate responsibility for the staff's interaction with the volunteer network of chapters and local groups and RCCs, if you have responsibility for a Washington office and a political presence, you have to go there. In 1990—unbeknownst to me until I toted it up in October when I was in the process of deciding to go—in 1990 I was on the Sierra Club's business and not my own on twenty-six weekends of the year. Now, that may have been just across the bay from where we lived in Berkeley to the Sierra Club office, but a weekend I spent doing that was not a weekend I spent with my wife and family. Or I was in an airplane on my—chapters meet on weekends, and I do not believe a senior executive in the conservation part of the Sierra Club can do their job if they don't go and hang around with chapters more than once a year. And usually that's in the form of being a banquet speaker, or at a retreat at some uncomfortable Boy Scout camps. I did a lot of that. It was the part of my traveling that I liked the best.

I went back and forth to Washington because that was part of the obligation; it was the part of my traveling I liked the least. Not because I didn't like the people in the Washington office, but because I had grown less and less fond of our nation's capital, and the kind of changes that have gone on there.
None of that was consistent with maintaining and succeeding with my family with two small children. I was hardly ever seeing my wife, I was hardly ever seeing my children. There's a theory in the Sierra Club that if you work more than the prescribed hours of the week, particularly because you're traveling or because you're at a weekend meeting, that you can take compensatory time.

Gill: That's another myth.

Scott: But no one—that's right—no one in the world thinks that you shouldn't have to be able to get hold of the associate executive director of the Sierra Club on Monday morning because he's been at a meeting all weekend, and not just including the meeting. You could choose not to go to them, but the social events, and the hanging around with the visiting firemen, and all of that, that was part of being a senior official of the Sierra Club the way I wanted to do it, and I could not do that and have my family life the same way. Martha and I had talked on more than one occasion about the—and Martha had lived on a remote ranch in Wyoming for part of her life, but I'd never lived in a small place—and the idea of getting up in the same bed every day for weeks at a time, of living in a small place with a more coherent life, of having time to be a volunteer in something else myself—because if you work for the Sierra Club, you don't have much opportunity to practice voluntary arts, which is too bad—in some other cause. People tend to think that you should be an outings leader, and you say, "I work there." That's the last thing that I want to do on the weekends!

So we had been talking about and thinking about what might we do, and I'd go through episodes, the Wheeler episode being the most obvious, of sort of thinking, Well, this is nearing its end. I was becoming also, and I think it wasn't a factor in my decision to leave just then, but it was a factor in my being ready to leave by the time I did, becoming much less enchanted with where I perceived the environmental movement to be headed, and with my inability to do anything about it.

And a particular focus of that was the ancient forest issue in the Northwest. I had and have a very strong unhappiness about the rise of the so-called radical environmental movement. I don't believe it's radical, I believe it's anarchistic. I believe that many of its leaders and many of its philosophers and most of its adherents, while they feel undoubted passion about whatever it is they're passionate about, behave without any very great responsibility to the rest of society. Conceivably, and I think the jury's still out on this, some of the tactics they use may result in more trees being saved than otherwise would be, including under tactics that I would advocate, strategies that I would advocate. And that is a risk. I don't say they would, I say it's conceivable.

But the price that is paid in tolerating and approving anarchism is unacceptable to me. I spent twenty-five years working very closely with the Congress of the United States. I treasure relationships I had with a number of flawed people, who were nonetheless great political leaders of our country. I revere the memory of Frank Church; I revere the privilege I had to work as closely as I did, and thanks greatly to the bridge that was built to me with him by John McComb, with Mo Udall. I left my direct work with the
Congress of the United States being a bigger patriot, though far more aware of its flaws.

And I have real anxiety about the logical result of empowering essentially anarchist principles, because the people who believe them believe passionately about them. I just think there's an irresponsibility there that is glossed over by the emotion, and I find it enormously unattractive. I find it enormously unattractive in the Ku Klux Klan, but I also find it enormously unattractive in Earth First!. I don't agree with the goals of the Ku Klux Klan; I agree with some of the goals of Earth First!, but I find the strategic posture equally abhorrent.

The way that's put in some popular mythology that has been fastened on to me, because I emerged as a lightning rod on this subject, and I think I played my hand poorly in many respects to allow that to happen and then not to be in a position where I felt I could do anything to defend myself, or to further my side of the argument, but the popular version of the argument I just presented, which has now made it into print in at least a couple of places with my name attached rather prominently, notably in a book called *Coyotes and Town Dogs*, about the history of the radical environmental movement by an admitted partisan author, whom I rightly or wrongly spoke to at great length and over a long period of time—but I've never been very shy about stating my opinions—is that I was the environmental movement's ranking advocate of conciliation and compromise. And that those are not just dirty words, those are fighting words. And that compromise in the fight to save the ancient forests is to not care about the ancient forests.

And the same is true—I find it abhorrent when people in the interest of a political cause use violence. But I'm supposed to be outraged that the French government sank the *Rainbow Warrior*, and applaud Sea Shepherd for blowing up a whaling ship in Iceland and killing a person, and I'm sorry, I can't do both of those. I just find it revolting, and I think the logical consequence of saying, "That's okay," if it's okay just because whales are good, and god bless whales. I'm for whales. I'm for ancient trees. Saved a fair number of them in my day, or played my role in it. But the logical consequence of following that philosophy out is to say, "Well, if it's all right for me to do that, because of the fervor I believe for my cause, then it's all right for anybody, the cause doesn't matter. Fervor is what matters."

Now, Earth First! people sitting here would disagree with that. They would say, "No, there's a rightness about this cause that's different. This is the earth that we're talking about, as opposed to something else." And I'd say, "Well, you believe that, and I believe that, but it doesn't make it right." And in the long picture, there's also people. And there are dislocations, as you well know from where you live and as I well know from where I live, the dislocations that the environmental movement in the name of clever tactics, largely lawsuits, has visited on innocent people, in ways that are far

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more destructive to those people's lives than what I know I felt when my livelihood was in jeopardy in the Wheeler episode at the Sierra Club.

Now, that's not to say, "Well, there's a lot of people in timber towns who, if we keep them in work, we have to chop down the forest, but keeping them in work is more important." But it sure as hell seems to me that a movement that wants in the long haul to earn and sustain public support cannot be perceived as being indifferent by the choice of its tactics. And boy, I'll tell you, lawsuits are a dime a dozen. Any idiot with a fifteen-dollar filing fee and a sheepskin can file a lawsuit. Lawsuits have consequences. I was not in favor of the master lawsuit strategy that sculled up attorneys from Seattle, implemented in the name of three or four of the most radical of the ancient forest groups, notably Oregon Natural Resources Council, in a way which didn't decisively do one thing or another, but threw—not one little place, not so that that family could move down the road—but threw in question and in jeopardy people's livelihoods way out of proportion to ultimate results. All those people aren't going to be put out of work, but every one of them thought so.

And it was in the interest of making that tactic work politically, these clever lawyers thought to themselves, that they made their injunction that broad. I take great comfort from the fact that, when I came to one big master strategy meeting in the Northwest and stated these views, and it's rehearsed inaccurately in some detail in this book Coyotes and Town Dogs, I just saw the handwriting on the wall and I said, "I'm out of this. The Sierra Club has front-line people who I believe are very competent working on this issue. I can't work on it all the time. I can't give it my full attention, I have other responsibilities, and I'm stirring up the waters in ways that aren't helpful, and I'm making myself mad in the process." So I just took a powder. I still disagree, I still think I was right. Now, we're talking about judgments here, not who's right will be able to decide in the final analysis.

That's very deep in me, and there is a democrat——

[End Tape 23, Side A]

[Begin Tape 23, Side B]

Scott: —a small-d democrat who believes because it was his own life experience that individuals in our democratic system can, by dint of their commitment and effort and energy and smarts, influence what happens. I've worked with zillions of Sierra Club volunteers to create opportunities for them to learn that same thing, and I believe in a kind of grass-roots politics that empowers people to make our democracy stronger, because as somebody said a long time ago, "It's a rotten system, but nobody else has invented as a good one yet."

I can't find on the front lines of the radical environmental movement any philosophical grounding for a democratic system. All I find is anarchy. And maybe I'm not hearing clearly, and maybe I'm filtering the information. But I don't see any formula there for how to make communities stronger, and people's lives better. I hear, "My Sea
Shepherd cause is worth blowing up and killing somebody, because that was a whale ship I blew up, that cause is right, and the French government's cause in blowing up the *Rainbow Warrior* is wrong." I think they're both wrong, and I don't think there's any logical consequence from those selections of the way the issues are handled that leads to the kind of political world that I believe in.

[End Tape 23, Side B]

[End of interview]