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INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT SCALAPINO

Interview 1: May 22, 2000

[Tape 1]

Scalapino: My secret was having a loving grandmother. She was in a wheelchair and
she taught me to read at the age of four and a half, so I started early.

Rubens: Why don’t we just start there? I had asked you if you were a speed reader.
We might as well do some of your family history. You were born in
Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1919. How did that come to be?

Scalapino: My father was a small town superintendent of schools in northeast Kansas,
and Leavenworth was the nearest hospital to the town of Severance, where
we actually lived. Leavenworth was the home of my mother’s father and
mother so she went home to have the baby.

Rubens: So it was her mother who taught you to read?

Scalapino: Yes. It was her mother. Her mother had severe rheumatoid arthritis, and
she was confined to a wheelchair when I was a small infant, and so I used
to climb up on the foot of her stair and she would read to me, and then I
got so I started reading to her. By the time I went to school--I started
school actually when I was five, reading came naturally to me.

Rubens: How would you describe your grandmother’s social background or class?

Scalapino: My grandparents on both sides of my family were enormously different.
My grandmother came originally from Virginia; they migrated to Missouri
and were in a little town near Hannibal, Missouri during the Civil War.
She never forgave the Yankee soldiers for stealing her pony when she was
thirteen. She, therefore, would not celebrate Lincoln’s birthday. My
grandfather on my mother’s side was from Michigan; he was a Northerner
and did diversified jobs. Actually, when I was born, he was Deputy
Warden of the Federal Penitentiary in Leavenworth.

My father’s people were totally different. My father’s father was born in
Italy and came to the United States with his parents as a boy of seven, in
the 1850s. But instead of doing like good Italians were supposed to do and
settle in New York or the East Coast, they went to Kansas. My grandfather
farmed, because he had a younger brother who had already gotten there
and was driving a stagecoach, so he invited my grandfather. When my
grandfather grew up, he lost some of his Italian attributes. He got angry at
the Catholic Church because they wouldn’t let him marry a Lutheran
German girl, so he brought up his children to be Methodists. The Methodist Church was the pillar of a small Kansas town. You wanted to have a picnic, you wanted to do anything, you went to the Methodist Church. My grandmother on my father’s side, as I noted, was of German background, but she was born in Kansas, near Everest, which was my grandparents’ home when I was alive.

I think one of the interesting things that reveal the extraordinary changes of the last century in terms of mobility: my grandmother who lived to be eighty-five, never left the county of the state in which she was born. Never left the county. My father never left the United States, and yet today our children and grandchildren travel all over the world. That’s just one example of the changes that have taken place in the not so distant past.

Rubens: So your father left the Catholic Church and became Methodist?

Scalapino: Left all of it. My father didn’t speak any Italian. He trained at one point with the Methodist ministry, and so those attributes were lost. Even our name was changed, because they wrote it down wrong at Ellis Island. The original name was Scanavina. They wrote it down Scalapino, so we kept it.

Rubens: Do you know anything about Scanavina?

Scalapino: Once when I was in Italy, I went to their town of Laguerno, which is near Milan, and looked in the telephone book. I called somebody named Scanavina, but they only spoke Italian and I only spoke English, so we didn’t get very far.

Rubens: It is such an American story. So your father’s parents names? Do you know them?

Scalapino: Well, my father’s father, of course, was named Antonio Scalapino. My grandmother was originally named Katherine Kampf, and her people had originally come from Bavaria.

Rubens: Do you know if there was any particular objection from both families for this intermarriage?

Scalapino: No, because they were already mixtures. My mother was born in Pratt, Kansas, out in western Kansas, because her father, for a time, had land out there and was a farmer.

Rubens: Tell me your parent’s names so we have this.
Scalapino: My mother’s name before marriage was Buelah Stephenson, and it was spelled with a “ph.” Actually, from my understanding, our great-great-great-great-grandfather was George Stephenson, who invented the locomotive, in Scotland. I inherited none of his mechanical ability.

Rubens: But you are telling me that this generation goes back several generations in Kansas?

Scalapino: Yes.

Rubens: And where were you in the birth order? How many?

Scalapino: I was the oldest. There were just two children in our family, myself and my brother. My brother William was five years younger than I.

Rubens: I think we should just do credit to your grandma who taught you to read. Her name?

Scalapino: Her name was Elizabeth.

Rubens: I was struck when you said that your mom went home to have you. When you first mentioned where you were born, Leavenworth, all I could think of was the prison, and you’d mentioned there was a hospital so you would go from Severance to Leavenworth.

Scalapino: We lived in a number of small Kansas towns. Havensville, Axtell, and briefly in Everest.

Rubens: This question is quite reductionist, but generally, how would you describe the intellectual, or cultural life of your family. Obviously your grandmother read, and this was important.

Scalapino: Kansas in those days was a fairly isolated area, rural Kansas, and we thought it was the center of the world. Of course there was news available. A newspaper from a nearby town could be obtained. A little later the radio became popular, but knowledge about the external world was very limited, and also there was not much interest. My grandfather for example, on my father’s side, said, “We want everybody to be Americans, the Old World has had it, it’s finished.” So he just had a library composed of the life of Theodore Roosevelt, and various other books dealing with this country. He was head of the board of education in this small town of Everest. Members of my family on both sides were quite literate, but their interests did not extend to the international environment.
Rubens: When you were born, World War I is just over. And starting in 1920, ‘21 farmers experienced a severe economic depression because of the over-expansion during the war. Did this affect your family in any way?

Scalapino: First let me say, my father was drafted into the army in the course of World War I, but he was not sent overseas, stayed in the United States. As for conditions in our area, they were relatively good, and there was no great want or poverty on the part of my family. My grandfather had owned 360 acres of land, corn mainly, and livestock, so that when I grew up as a small boy, we didn’t have any sense of deprivation. By no means were we wealthy, but there was no feeling of where’s the next meal coming from, or we’ve lost everything. None of that. Wouldn’t be middle-class today, in terms of income.

Rubens: But a superintendent of schools, that’s a professional.

Scalapino: Absolutely. We had no economic problems and as a matter of fact, when we lived in Axtell—which is the first town I can remember because by that time I was four—my parents had a helper, a rural girl came in to do some of the cleaning. She was paid five dollars a week.

Rubens: Not bad.

Scalapino: For that time, no.

Rubens: Did your household farm a bit, or was it just--

Scalapino: No, it was just education. My mother had been a school teacher before her marriage, so they both were in education. My father graduated from the University of Kansas, and my mother from a state teacher’s college.

Rubens: Not that many women went to college then. How about your grandmother?

Scalapino: No, just high school.

Rubens: So you experienced in a way an iconic pastoral American life.

Scalapino: Well, [laughing] it was a very quiet peaceful life. And there was no crime in the community. It was a fairly homogenous community—all white. We did move later to Missouri, before we came to California, and there you saw all of the effects of the Civil War—the racial cleavage and the segregated schools, in the small town of Nelson, Missouri. But that was later, that was 1926-27.
Rubens: You went to high school there?

Scalapino: No, we moved to Santa Barbara California. My father took a teaching job in the high school at Santa Barbara. His younger brother had gone out earlier, and had told him about this opening. Santa Barbara of course was an entirely different experience. I had the sixth grade in Santa Barbara and then junior high school, high school and college. Santa Barbara was much more cosmopolitan--in touch with the United States and the world. It was very different than Kansas.

Rubens: Did your father teach at the high school you went to?

Scalapino: Yes, Santa Barbara High. There was only one high school in the city.

Rubens: That must have been quite a dramatic move.

Scalapino: Yes, it was a greater cultural shock to go from Kansas to Santa Barbara than today moving from here to Beijing. The conditions were very, very different.

Now we happened to move in the summer of 1929, just on the eve of the Depression. But of course the Depression didn’t hit us, because his high school teaching salary was the same. Wasn’t lowered, wasn’t changed. We lived in an apartment in Santa Barbara, but again thinking back on that era, my father’s top salary, during his life--he passed away at the early age of fifty three in 1945--his top salary was $3,000 a year. And my parents did not feel they could buy a home, so we rented, always. After my father’s death, my mother took up a profession, electrolysis. She took that profession up and she did earn a sufficient amount of money to buy a home, in Santa Barbara. I was already out of college.

Rubens: To not own a home, I was a little surprised when you said that because they had come from generations of farm owners. And the California setting--

Scalapino: It was very different, culturally as well as geographically. Well, I adjusted, but not easily. One of my problems was that I was two years younger than most people in my class, because I had started school at five, and I had skipped the third grade. I found it somewhat difficult to adjust socially. I was small, and I wasn’t terribly athletically inclined. Moreover, I was rather introverted.

Rubens: Anything else that might have been significant in shaping your youth? The church was a mainstay but not fanatical?
Scalapino: Not at all.

Rubens: And local politics?

Scalapino: No, we had very limited interest, either in Kansas or in Santa Barbara.

Rubens: Club life?

Scalapino: No, of course in college I joined a fraternity.

Rubens: Well, how did you get to college?

Scalapino: Well I graduated from Santa Barbara High School in 1936, as a matter of fact, I just got an invitation to attend our sixty-fifth reunion, class of 1936. And it never occurred to me at the time to go out of Santa Barbara to college because we had no money. So Santa Barbara Teachers College, as it was then known—this was long before it was part of the university—was available. It was a small school. At my time there were only about 1,300 students there. I went there and I found it very enjoyable. I acquired several very good teachers, majored in history and joined a fraternity. In my senior year, I ran for student body president, and I shall always remember my opponent’s slogan which was, “Too dumb to be dishonest.” He almost won, but I won by a few votes, so I was student body president that last year, of a four-year college. I graduated in 1940.

I applied to three graduate schools, Harvard, Chicago and Princeton. I got admitted to all three, but with no scholarship, so the president of the [Santa Barbara Teacher’s] college said, “Well, we need a history instructor. You teach for a year; you’re living at home, save your money, and then you can go to graduate school.” So at the age of twenty, I began teaching in college. I couldn’t go out with the women faculty members, because the youngest was thirty-five, and I did become very attracted to a young girl in my class. This of course is quite immoral, but we were very straight-forward. I persuaded her at the end of the semester to get out of the class.

Rubens: The immorality was that you weren’t to date your student?

Scalapino: Right. She remembers that the way we met was after class, she had a second class in the same room, and I thought she was staying to see me, so I went up and offered her a stick of gum. That’s the way we met. This August we were celebrating our sixty-first wedding anniversary.

Rubens: What is her name?
Scalapino: Dee. Her legal name which she doesn’t like is Ida Mae, but we all know her as Dee. Her last name was Jessen.

Rubens: So you meet her having just graduated college, preparing to go to which graduate school?

Scalapino: What happened was this: We were married during the summer, and our honeymoon was driving, a 1932 Ford Coupe to Cambridge, Massachusetts to enter Harvard. I had decided to go to Harvard, so I began as a graduate student there in September of 1941. Fortunately for me, a number of people that had been given grants were not able to come to Harvard because they were drafted, so I was given a non-teaching tutorship that fall after I got to Harvard, which helped us out financially. We lived in a one-room home that was owned by some local people. Paid five dollars a week. We tried to budget twenty-five dollars a month for total expenses. We went over that a bit, but we were pretty abstemious.

Rubens: Did she have to work?

Scalapino: She got a job. But after that first semester, she entered the New England Conservatory of Music. She was a singer, a classical singer. She has studied with Lottie Lehman in Santa Barbara. That was one reason she came to Santa Barbara.

Rubens: Why was Lehman in Santa Barbara?

Scalapino: She retired there.

In the fall of ‘41 a tutee of mine came to me and said, “I’m going to study Japanese.” I said, “What in the world do you want to do that for? It will do you no good; it’s an esoteric language.” “Oh no,” he said, “The navy runs a secret school, and if you do well, get an A or a B in Japanese, you can get into that school.” Came Pearl Harbor a few months later, and I remembered this. I didn’t follow up immediately, because I had an exemption being married, but then in the fall of ‘42 I went to see the old white Russian who taught Japanese at Harvard. I said, “Is it true that if I get an A or a B in your course, I can get into this program?” “Oh, yes.” He said, “You write to a Captain Heinmarsh in Washington and tell him you want to be considered at the end of the semester.” So I enrolled in Elisoff’s course and wrote the letter. Elisoff was an old white Russian, who had fled the Bolshevik revolution and ended up in Japan.

A week after I wrote, I got a form letter which simply said, “Please report to Washington,” and I thought there’s been a mistake because I haven’t finished this course. But I went down, and Heinmarsh, who was somewhat
officious said, “You’ll sign these forms,” and I said, “Well, I haven’t finished this program.” He said, “How long have you been in it?” I said, “One week.” He said, “Well, how have you done?” And I said, “I’ve done all right.” “Sign up.” I then said, “Also, without my glasses, I only have 2/20 vision; is that a problem?” “Scalapino,” he said, “We’re desperate for language officers, if you are interested, you sign these forms.” Years later people would say, “It must have been very difficult to get into that program.” Well, not for me it wasn’t!

Then I was off to Boulder. The Navy had originally had its Japanese language program here, at Berkeley. But when the American Japanese were evacuated, since ninety percent of our instructors were Japanese, they had to go into the interior, so they went to the University of Colorado. I studied Japanese for fifteen months. We had four hours of class a day.

Rubens: Your wife obviously moved with you?

Scalapino: She moved a couple of months later. She graduated from the University of Colorado, because she took her last year there. The Japanese program was a very rigorous course. We had an examination every Saturday morning. We had to attend a Japanese movie every Monday night. We did nothing but language training. Nothing else, no history, culture.

Rubens: How many in your class?

Scalapino: The classes were extremely small, but there were many of them. There were five in a class, but there were perhaps 150, maybe 200 students when I was there. I think they said they trained some 600 altogether, but I’m not sure of that figure. So then when I finished, after a brief period in New York, undergoing the Intelligence Indoctrination, I was sent out to Pearl Harbor. I did code breaking, and then some translation of documents and diaries.

Rubens: What year would you say this is?

Scalapino: Well, I was there starting in ‘43, early ‘44. Yes, early ‘44. Then I was on the Okinawa campaign toward the end of the war—that was in March of ‘45—to the end of June.

Rubens: You mean literally?

Scalapino: Yes, I was there from the beginning. It was very bad. We used to search caves for documents after battle—some narrow escapes.

Rubens: Were you inducted, I can’t think of the word?
Scalapino: Yes I was a lieutenant JG in the navy. During the school period I was made an ensign, which is the lowest rank. Then I was promoted, after finishing, to lieutenant JG. Then after the Okinawa campaign, I was sent to the Philippines to train for the invasion of Kyushu. In the fall of ‘45, the war ended, however, and we were sent up to Osaka. Our little unit was in charge of monitoring the media, newspapers, radio, cable, everything in the Kansai area, to see what was being said. And then I came home, I got out of the service and came home in January 1946, then went back to Harvard. However, not right away, I taught a semester at Santa Barbara [Teacher’s] College again, and then went back to Harvard in the fall of ‘46.

Rubens: Backing up just for a minute, why did you want to go to graduate school, and what did you think you were going to do after you went to graduate school?

Scalapino: Well, my objective initially was to specialize in international relations with an emphasis upon U.S. foreign policy in Europe. I had no interest in Asia.

Rubens: Why even this? Why international--?

Scalapino: Because one of my instructors at Santa Barbara College, Dr. Harry Girvetz, was very influential in shaping my interests. He taught in that field. My interest in Asia only came with the war.

[tape interruption]

Rubens: Was there someone you particularly wanted to study with at Harvard?

Scalapino: No, I just knew it was a school of reasonably good reputation.

Rubens: I wonder how many people went from Santa Barbara College to Harvard?

Scalapino: Not many, I’m sure.

Rubens: And your family--just very quickly--was it always known you would go to college, if not necessarily graduate school?

Scalapino: Yes, I think they expected me to go to college, and to be a teacher. That was our background.

Rubens: Did they support this idea of graduate school?
Scalapino: Oh yes, very strongly. They didn’t have any money to give, but they were supportive.

Rubens: In the context of taking that language course, it seems to me that it was happenstance that you—something about it appealed to you?

Scalapino: I was not anxious to go into the military, I was perfectly willing certainly, after Pearl Harbor, and language training was not my first choice. I found language difficult. But this was an opportunity which I couldn’t turn down.

Rubens: Why was it secret?

Scalapino: I’m not certain it was altogether secret, but they didn’t advertise. They just conducted interviews selectively. I think they didn’t want to give it a great deal of publicity. Perhaps partially, because the navy would not admit American Japanese. It was very ethnically exclusive. Japanese were admitted to the army. The well-known separate unit of Japanese was segregated and brought to Europe. But there were no Japanese in the navy.

Rubens: How did you understand this?

Scalapino: We noticed, but never discussed it. When I was on the Okinawa campaign, my assistant was an American Japanese in the army. Not an officer, he was an enlisted man. As a matter of fact, he saved my life because one day we went into a cave to look for documents, and here was an Okinawa civilian, with his small son, but he was holding a grenade. All my Japanese left me and the only thing I could think of to say was konichiwa, which is “good day.” But my Japanese associate became very fluent, and said, “Please set the grenade down, we are not here to hurt you.” So finally the man did, and we all backed out of the cave, but that was a close call.

Rubens: I can imagine. Did you ever have contact with any of those classmates again?

Scalapino: Oh yes, with a few of them. As a matter of fact, we had a reunion last year organized by Frank Gibney, down at Pomona; he has an institute down there. There were about forty-odd people that showed up. None of them were in my class, but some of them I had known there. It was the only conference I ever attended where the average age was seventy-nine to eighty.

Rubens: So Harvard it is, again. You had intended to go back, but now was there a change in what you were going to study?
Scalapino: Definitely. I wrote my Ph.D. thesis on the failure of democracy in pre-war Japan. And I started studying Chinese. I took intensive Chinese for three years, and served as the assistant to a visiting professor from Peking University in 1947-48. We became very well acquainted.

Rubens: Who was that?

Scalapino: His name was Chien Tuan-sheng. He was a very well-known professor who had gotten his Ph.D. at Harvard in the 1920s. He was an older man. He persuaded me to apply for a grant to study Sun Yat-sen under his supervision in Peking. And I got the grant. I was scheduled to go in the summer of ‘49, but Americans could not go to China at that time, so I was not able to go. My first trip to China was in 1972. But I continued with my studies of Chinese and I was active as an assistant to Professor John Fairbank in organizing the Center for Chinese Studies. I got my Ph.D. in 1948, and I taught for one year at Harvard before coming to Berkeley.

Rubens: What did you teach?

Scalapino: I taught a course on East Asian politics.

Rubens: To come in ‘47, Chien Tuan-sheng, what must he have been? What was he working on?

Scalapino: He was a long time specialist on Chinese politics. He was not a Communist, but he was very critical of Chiang Kai-shek, and the Kuomintang. He was a “third force man,” as it was put. And when he went back to Beijing at the end of ‘48, the Communists decided that they could use him, since he had not been close to the Nationalists, and they appointed him supervisor of a training program for cadres. He did quite well initially. He kept writing me saying, “Come, everything’s fine.” I kept writing him saying, “I can’t come.”

Well, our correspondence ended with the outbreak of the Korean War, because you couldn’t have correspondence then. But I heard about him from time to time. He’d be on a conference or tour somewhere. Then in ‘55, ‘56, we heard he had gotten into trouble in the so-called Anti-Rightist Campaign, I first saw him again in our 1972 trip. He was at a dinner that was given by the vice-foreign minister of China, Jia Quan Hua. Jia had invited many older Chinese professors who had gotten their advanced degrees in the United States. Here was Chien in the reception line, but it was clear he didn’t want to talk to us alone. He kept pulling us over--my wife was with me--into a group. At the end of the dinner, I came up to him and said, “I do hope I can see you while I’m here.” No response. So then I knew he hadn’t been cleared, and as a matter of fact, he was not
rehabilitated until 1979. I always asked about him when I went to China but I was told it wasn’t convenient to see him. In 1979 we began our acquaintanceship again. He was very bitter. He said, “I lost twenty-three years of my life.”

Rubens: Was he broken also?

Scalapino: Well, his health was all right. But he said, “I wasn’t allowed to write; I wasn’t allowed to see my friends.” And he was very anti-Mao. Now, ‘79 was the year after which Deng Xiaoping had came back to power, and the reforms had commenced. From that point on, Chien got back into the swing, and as a matter of fact, he joined the Communist Party. John Fairbank wrote him and said, “Why did you do that?” Chien said to me, “He doesn’t understand Communist China. I did it for my children and my grandchildren.” Actually Chien became head of the foreign relations committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, which was nominally a multi-party organization. He lived up until his nineties, so he ended his life in reasonably good repute with the regime.

Rubens: Would you see him?

Scalapino: Oh, yes. I saw him fairly often after that.

Rubens: I understand your lack of access to China, but how did the shift come to Japan? Was there someone who encouraged you to make it a field?

Scalapino: I wrote and lectured on Japan initially because of my training during the war, and because I was there at the end of the war. On my thesis committee, since the government department at Harvard didn’t have any specialists on East Asia, I put Edwin O. Reishauer. Reishauer was a very prominent scholar of Japan, and I think he was the son of missionaries. At any rate, he had spent time in Japan. During the war he had taken leave and served in the government. Much later, after I left Harvard, he was made ambassador to Japan, so he was a link for me. But my fundamental reason for doing work in the Japan field initially was that had been my training.

Rubens: How does the offer come, to go to Berkeley?

Scalapino: Well, in a very curious way. I liked Harvard, but I was not very fond of New England. The weather, the deep ethnic, economic class differentials. We lived, for example, until the last year, in a small apartment over an unheated basement, and cooked on a coal stove. This was a Harvard tenement house. They intended to tear it down and rebuild, but in the
immediate post-war period they couldn’t. So I wanted to come back to California, as did my wife.

I had gotten a Harvard professor, who was a good friend of mine, to write to UCLA, Berkeley and Stanford, asking if they were in the market for someone in the Asian politics field. UCLA said they’d just hired someone. Stanford also did not have an opening. But Peter Odegard who was then the chair of the department here, said, “Yes, I’d be interested. Ask the young man to come to New York on such and such a day. I’m going to be there for a meeting, we’ll have dinner together.” So I went down, had dinner with Peter. He didn’t ask me any questions; he seemed to want to talk about himself all the time. So I thought, I guess he isn’t interested. And at the end of the evening he said, “Well would you like to come to Berkeley?” And I said, “Yes.” He said, “Well, you’re hired.” In those days there didn’t seem to be any committee or oversight. I think Peter had been brought to Berkeley to rehabililate the political science department which had had some problems, and so he had a good deal of authority. Though I’m sure privately, there was a committee set up later.

Rubens: So you were offered in probably in the spring of ‘49, then?

Scalapino: Yes, and we came here in the summer. We drove across country and we had three small children at that point.

Rubens: So in ‘32 you drove across country in a Ford coupe. When you come back, what do you drive?

Scalapino: We had a slightly later car. [laughs] I don’t remember what it was now.

Rubens: When had the three children been born?

Scalapino: Our eldest daughter was born in Boston at the hospital. It was a year and a month after we were married, so she was born in October 9, 1942.

Rubens: Her name?

Scalapino: Diane. Our second child, also a girl, Leslie, was born in Santa Barbara while I was overseas. My wife came back and lived with my mother in June of ‘45. And then our third daughter, Lynne, was born when we were back in Cambridge, after the war. She was born in May, 1949. Three daughters.

Rubens: So you had just had a third child that summer when you’re coming out.

Scalapino: Yes.
Interview 2: May 24, 2000

[Tape 2]

Rubens: How did you make contact with Odegard?

Scalapino: The man who introduced me to Berkeley, Professor John Gauss at Harvard, knew Peter Odegard.

Rubens: What did he teach?

Scalapino: He was in the American politics field.

Rubens: Did you come to think of yourself as a Californian?

Scalapino: Yes, I no longer connected myself with Kansas, and certainly not with Massachusetts. I thought of myself as a Californian.

Rubens: I’m just wondering how you would describe yourself as a person at Harvard, newly married--

Scalapino: Well, I was never apprehensive about my abilities; I thought I could compete intellectually. I am not a hail fellow, well met. I am not an extrovert. I have to force myself to be outgoing and gregarious, and interact with people I don’t know. Those traits don’t come naturally to me, although I’ve cultivated them. But I enjoyed Harvard very much, never had any problems academically.

The only problem I had there was that I contracted polio in 1947. We had been protecting our two small children, keeping them out of swimming pools and so forth, because there was an epidemic at the time. And I came down with polio, and I was three months in a children’s hospital in Boston, and then three or four months at home in bed. Fortunately I was not left with any permanent damage.

Rubens: And the family was there?

Scalapino: None of them got polio; everyone survived.

Rubens: You could have been killed in the Okinawa campaign. You could have been also with that grenade, then you come home and--. Was there any concern when you went to Okinawa of radiation?

Scalapino: No, not at that time. We were just concerned about Japanese bullets. [laughs]
Rubens: I bet. Berkeley, 1949. This is probably irrelevant too, but hadn’t Henry May come to Berkeley in ’47 in the department of history?

Scalapino: No, I didn’t know him. No, I didn’t know anyone at Berkeley, and I was starting as a young assistant professor. This was in the fall of ’49.

Rubens: The fifties had to have been a formative, extraordinary decade?

Scalapino: When I came here, there was a controversy over the Loyalty Oath. As a matter of fact, I had signed my contract in Cambridge; I didn’t give a second thought to the Loyalty Oath. I’d signed all sorts of oaths at various times. When I came out here, I was so amazed. I found that there was this big fracas, controversy over signing the Loyalty Oath. Opponents of the oath insisted that this was a demand upon university personnel that was not made to others. Some professors left Berkeley at that time, because of it. So that was my introduction.

Rubens: Did that trouble you; were you caught up in this?

Scalapino: No, I didn’t become involved in this. I was more amazed than involved. I found the political science department very compatible. I was very happy with my colleagues.

Rubens: Who were your main friends or supporters there in ‘49 or ‘50?

Scalapino: In ‘49, I became well acquainted with Odegard, with Charles Aiken, who was one of the more senior people. And one of the people who came at the same time with me, although he was older, was Leslie Lipson, who taught in the comparative politics field. We had a Chinese American professor, Professor Mah, who was teaching in my field, in East Asian government and politics.

Rubens: How long had he been there, roughly?

Scalapino: He had been here a while. I’m not sure, a decade maybe. Another person who was here at the time, and who I came to know, was T.A. Bisson. Now Bisson, of course is a very controversial figure. He was not a Ph.D.; he was not a professor. Odegard had brought him here initially, I think, with the idea of him staying just a year, as a lecturer. But he kept him on, and I got to know Art, as we called him. He had a background that was left of center, shall we say. He had been associated with the journal, Amerasia, which had been edited by a Communist, Phil Jaffey. He had been in the Japan occupation, and I got to know Art very well. We used to have lots of arguments. For example, he wanted to redistribute all land in Japan, and give it equally to the peasants. But I became convinced that Art was not a
Communist. He was a Christian Socialist. He was a do-gooder, and on ideological grounds, he would not have been considered orthodox, by the Communists, as Phil Jaffey told me later. So I got into a bit of trouble, because a year later, I was asked to write a letter about Bisson to the government, and I said that he was not a Communist. I think this caused some problems for me temporarily, because there was then some suspicion about my political antecedents and background by some of the conservatives.

Rubens: Because you were defending him?

Scalapino: Right. One of my students told me that when he was interviewed for a job in Washington, they asked him, “Well, how much has Scalapino influenced you?” So this gave me a kind of signal. But as I say, this was quite temporary, and in subsequent times it wasn’t a factor.

Then I went to Japan for an academic year, in 1952-53. That was my first extended academic trip. I went to Japan first, alone, in 1950, again after the war. Then I was setting up a UC Extension program for our overseas personnel and dependents.

Rubens: When you say, “our”--

Scalapino: U.S. And my post was Fifth Air Force headquarters at Nagoya. The real reason I went was to revise my doctoral dissertation for publication, but this was a way to get paid. [laughs] On June 25th, I had 102 students. On June 26th, 1950, I had two students. The Korean War had broken out and suddenly, all of the personnel were put into service. But I stayed on for a brief time, and then came home. But my most extensive trip for further research came in 1952-53. My book had already been published at that point--my first book.

Rubens: This is Democracy and the Party Movement (1953).

Scalapino: Right. But I was doing some research on the Japanese Communist movement. My family and I spent nine months in Tokyo. Everybody, our whole family, went.

Rubens: Let’s take a break for a few minutes to have some water.

[tape interruption]

Scalapino: Frankly, I was not too happy with this idea of concentrating on the Free Speech Movement [for this interview]. I was somewhat appalled by reading that this money was given to honor Mario Savio and the Free
Speech Movement. I don’t think that we should sell out for money. Many of us don’t want to honor Mario Savio. I think that there should be a kind of general oral history, rather than concentration on this one episode.

Rubens: Well it has been my goal, as well as by design, to make the links between the post-war era and then the Vietnam Era. You know about Vietnam, but few are paying attention to it in 1964. Now FSM certainly looms large in a longer arc of social protest, and of course is a big part of UCB’s history. So if you will, let’s start by telling me about Clark Kerr.

Scalapino: Well, I had known Clark very well, of course. I had known him long before the Free Speech era. When I came he was at the Institute of Industrial Relations, and a very close friend of his, was a very close friend of mine, Lloyd Fischer. Lloyd had been at Harvard just for a year, and had come back to Berkeley and was with the Institute. But he was also a member of the political science department. I got to know Lloyd very, very well, and through him, Clark.

Rubens: What was Fisher’s field?

Scalapino: His field was industrial relations.

Rubens: Roughly, how big was your department in 1949? It was just beginning to expand I believe?

Scalapino: I don’t know how big it was. But yes, because three or four young people were hired two years after I came.

Rubens: What was Bisson’s field? You had said he wasn’t an academic.

Scalapino: He had worked as a journalist for a time, and he had been associated as I said, with *Amerasia*. He had been a writer for them. He had also been associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations, which was a focal point of the investigations in the early fifties. At the end of the war, he had been associated with the U.S. occupation of Japan, playing some minor role. I didn’t know him then.

Rubens: You had been telling me is that you had gone to Japan, and in ‘52 to ‘53 you had taken your family. Did you have an appointment or release from Berkeley?

Scalapino: No, I had a sabbatical, and I had a grant from one of the foundations to do my work.

Rubens: Now your second book was *Reflections on American Relations*?
Scalapino: [Looking at a list of Scalapino’s publications] Yes, but that was done before I went out. This one, with Masumi, was done later.

Rubens: It seems at some point there was a gap in the publications.

Scalapino: Yes, there was. I did a lot of articles in that period, but I didn’t do another book until later.

Rubens: I’m wondering if there is a story in that. I can’t possibly read all your work; and I wonder how you produced so much!

Regarding Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-War Japan. Had you looked at the Communist much in that?

Scalapino: Oh, I interviewed all of the leading Communists in Japan at that time. First in ’50, then in ’52-’53, then I was back in Japan for a sabbatical in ’58-’59.

Rubens: What was the role of the Communist Party in Japan? ’37 is this big divide.

Scalapino: Well, they were underground. They were illegal, and some of them went abroad. A few were in Yenan with the Chinese Communists. Then there were others who went to other places, but they didn’t become a legal party until 1945 at the end of the war. When the Korean War broke out, many of them went into exile, and most of those went to China. But I interviewed a great many of these people.

Rubens: How would you talk about the interweaving or the influences of what starts to happen in the United States, in terms of the virulence of anti-Communism, and then your observations about literally what’s happening in the world?

Scalapino: Let me put it this way: Anyone who was studying Asia in the 1950s was aware of the ascendancy of democracy in some areas and the ascendancy of Communism in other areas, and the potential conflict between these forces. The conflict broke out openly when the North Koreans attacked the South and then when we became engaged in the war with China. When the Chinese crossed the Yellow River into Korea, we and the Chinese came into conflict. This was very close to the vital center of Asian politics in this period. In the late fifties, I developed an interest in the Korean Communist Movement, and did a two volume work with one of my students, Chong-Sik Lee, on Communism in Korea. Now, my interests went far beyond Communism. I did a number of things on U.S. policy, on the general scene in Pacific Asia, and many of these were articles. In this
period, as I say, you could not go to China if you were not an especially invited personally.

[tape interruption]

Scalapino: Coming home from Japan, in the winter of '59, we went to Saigon. And in Saigon I met a number of Vietnamese who had left the North as refugees. Some of them became friends; several later came to the United States as students. So I had some conversance with Vietnam just as we were beginning to become more seriously involved, and that led, of course, to the many events in my life and in my experiences here at Berkeley, in the mid-sixties and thereafter.

Rubens: Throughout the fifties, as you are on the one hand broadening and also deepening your research into party-formation, movements, elites versus--

Scalapino: International relations of the area. I never wanted to be a one-country specialist. I wanted to deal with the region as a whole.

Rubens: You said you were distant from the Loyalty Oath to-do here, but now things get more intense. The McCarthy hearings, John Service is kicked out of the state department. There is so much political attack on communism; the culture is obsesses with it.

Scalapino: It was an enormously complex period. The media gave its primary attention, through much of the fifties, to the Cold War. And the Cold War was essentially the struggle, as it were, between the Soviet Union and the United States. Now, this also related to a Soviet-Chinese alliance of that period, which began to break down at the end of the 1950s. ’58, ’59 in particular. And to the Communist insurrections in Southeast Asia—in Thailand, in Burma, as well as in Vietnam, and incidentally the Chinese were giving assistance to the guerrillas in these countries whereas we, the United States, were trying to give support to the fragile governments that had been set up after World War II. And we were also participants in international conclaves trying to resolve some of these problems, for example the Geneva Conference in 1954, that tried to work out a solution to Vietnam by having elections, which subsequently Hanoi refused to accept, would not even accept UN representatives in the North. So all of these things were developing.

At that time however, in the United States, I would say, most of the political activists were more concentrated on the issue of black rights and the South. There was rising opposition to the Korean War when it became clear that it was going to be protracted and with no easy victory. I think Americans in recent decades have found wars popular only when they are
quickly over, with minimal casualties, and people are brought home. The Gulf War was the most popular war. Before Vietnam, Korea became increasingly unpopular, and as a matter of fact, Eisenhower may have scored his presidential victory partly because he said, “I will end the Korean War. Now I may end it one way or another, but I will see that it comes to a close.” However in general, foreign policy was not a highly divisive issue in the 1950s in this country. And I think most of the young activists who launched the Free Speech Movements were products of the human rights, or civil rights issues, relating to the blacks and to the South. Many of them had participated in these. They were therefore “movement people.” I put that in quotes, who were very anxious to continue movements, and they found a cause here, but they had a background of seeking and being involved in causes.

Rubens: It seems to me also--certainly for the New Left, or the “movement people” you’re talking about, 1962 is a big turning point because with the foundation of SDS and in the Port Huron statement, one of their points is that they are not going to be red-baited. They are not going to take a position on the Communist Party; that is not our generation for which we have to be accountable. So they did not grow up with the specter of Communism that their parents had. So in a certain sense, they were freed, perhaps naively, but indeed free of that suspicion.

Scalapino: And I think also, by the sixties, the McCarthy era was over. There was no great effort on the part of the Right to dig out, identify, attack American Communists.

Rubens: I’m wondering if, as you are doing more and more research--and really at the center of things by ‘54, ‘55--is the State Department calling on you for advise, for expertise about the status of--?

Scalapino: I interacted on occasion with various people in the government, sometimes, people in our embassy in different countries in Asia, sometimes with people in Washington. But it was not until 1965 that the State Department set up two advisory committees. One was an advisory committee on China only. The other was an advisory committee on East Asia in general. I sat on both of those committees from 1965 until they came to an end at the conclusion of the Carter administration.

Rubens: Why so late? There is trouble in ‘54, ‘55, ‘56. I don’t know if there was ever the possibility that China could have been destabilized then, but surely the U.S. didn’t want to see Mao get anymore entrenched, just as things were warming up with the Soviet Union.
Scalapino: Our attitude--the U.S. attitude--towards China after the Korean War, was that while we had a commitment to our alliances, namely with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and certain other South East Asian countries, and also, by this time, we were following a new policy towards Taiwan. Prior to the Korean War, the United States had made it clear that the Chinese Civil War was over and the Communists had won, and we were out. Every indication was that if the Communists attacked Taiwan, they could have it if they won. But the Korean War changed that. And therefore we had become an ally of sorts of the Republic of China, as it was then known, and that continued. But in those days, the government did not pay special attention to academics.

Rubens: Were there arguments between you and your students about the position that the U.S. should take on Taiwan, on the Korean War, on the insurgencies that were taking place.

Scalapino: Not particularly. Student interest in the fifties was not focused much on foreign policy. Now there were some opponents of the Korean War, but the critical facts of that war were very well known and not debated. Nobody challenged the fact that the North had invaded the South. No one challenged the fact that China had come across the Yalu River. Now, you could argue that the United States should not have gone across the 38th parallel into North Korea. And some did argue that, but not so much as a moral or ethical question, because after all, the North had attacked the South, so why not allow the South to reunify Korea? But as a strategic question, was it wise to take UN forces, primarily American, up to the Yalu River, and would this not be likely to create a problem with respect to China?

Rubens: Did you take a position on that?

Scalapino: I did not take a position on that. My general view was that the North had to be defeated. Period. I did not take a position on this question of crossing the 38th parallel. My involvement came later, with the Vietnam War. As I said, I had first gone to Vietnam in 1959, and established contacts with people whom I respected. Of course, in the early sixties, our involvement in Vietnam was still limited. However, the great change really came with the Kennedy administration, when we sent some marines into the region--many of them were military soldiers. And we undertook a commitment to South Vietnam and then, in my opinion, very mistakenly, the United States connived in the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Now there is no question that Diem was a difficult man with whom to deal. There is no question also that he made mistakes in his relations with the Buddhists and so forth, but the United States had no substitute for
Diem when we helped with his overthrow. Therefore South Vietnam was thrown into political turmoil for two or three crucial years. I think the Kennedy administration must bear responsibility for that. However, my view was that the broad American commitment to South Vietnam was legitimate. The South Vietnamese political figures were nationalists, as much nationalists as the Communists, but they wanted a more pluralistic system.

Rubens: Had you already become suspicious of Ho Chi Minh?

Scalapino: Yes, primarily because it seemed to me his actions in the North were those of a typical Communist leader, that is, suppressing all opposition parties, carrying out drastic land policies that dispossessed a great many, and not all of them big landlords, and reducing the capacity of individuals to express themselves or to play any role in questioning the government. Furthermore, it seemed to me, Ho was aiding directly or indirectly the Communist movement in the whole Southeast Asian region along with the Chinese, so this wasn’t just a question of Vietnam. It related to events in Cambodia and Laos, where training was going on.

Rubens: That’s what you said earlier. You had never been interested in just one country.

Scalapino: So, by the mid-sixties, I was supporting our commitments to Vietnam. I became highly visible as a result of an accident of sorts. McGeorge Bundy called me in 1965, in the fall, and said, “I’m going to participate in a discussion/debate with professor George Kahin of Cornell University. We are each allowed three supporters to talk after we talk, giving sustenance to our respective positions, and would you be one of these.” So I said, “All right.”

Rubens: Had you known him before?

Scalapino: Slightly, not well. So he chose myself, Zbigniew Brezinski, and a young professor named Wesley Fishel, who was teaching at the time at Michigan State.

Rubens: Was he an Asian scholar?

Scalapino: Yes. Kahin chose Hans Morgenthau, Mary Wright, who was at Stanford at the time, and William A. Williams, who was a Marxist professor at Michigan.

Well, we got to Washington. There was a huge audience in the big auditorium, several thousand people, and it was nationally broadcast.
Forty-five minutes before it was to start, an emissary from the White House came over and said, “The president has sent Bundy to the Dominican Republic, and so he cannot participate.” The organizers of the program were distraught, needless to say. So they turned to us and said, “Well, one of you three has got to do this.” Fishel hadn’t arrived yet. So I said to Zbig, “Well, let’s break a match stick and the person who gets the longest part will have to do it.” Guess who got the longest part? I did. [laughing] And so here I was on national television, radio and so forth, as if I was Bundy’s representative. As I say, I was supportive of our policy, although I saw us making various mistakes, and I argued very strongly that we should begin the Vietnamization process. That is the training of Vietnamese to take the primary responsibilities at the earliest point.

Rubens: Had that word been in the discourse before?

Scalapino: Not then. At any rate, subsequently I went periodically to Vietnam in the late sixties, to see the situation. Never staying long, a week or something like that.

[Tape 3]

Rubens: The purpose of our meeting was to discuss that fateful year ‘64-’65, and why you were put in the position of running the convocation at the Greek Theater. But your history is so rich and informative, I can’t move on without asking you about your point that academics were not really people who were turned to for advice and information particularly during the late fifties and the early sixties. Do I have that correct?

Scalapino: I would say that was basically true. Some of us were offered positions in the Kennedy administration. I, for example, was offered to be the head of the Peace Corps in Asia. [laughs]

Rubens: You did not tell me that—my jaw is dropping!

Scalapino: Yes, I was asked to be the head of the Peace Corps in Asia. I went back to Washington for a day or so at Sergeant Shriver’s request, he was Kennedy’s brother-in-law and he was running that program. My escort was a young man named Bill Moyers, who later became quite well known. I decided against it primarily, not because of the job—it sounded very interesting—but because I wanted to continue with my research and writing. But it is, I think, correct to say that in the Kennedy administration, there was not too much communication between Asian scholars and the administration.

Rubens: How did they know about you?
Scalapino: I really don’t know.

Rubens: Your books?

Scalapino: That may have been a factor. There was increasing interaction with the Johnson administration. As I think I’ve mentioned, during that period, two advisory committees were set up for the state department, one on China only, and the other on all of East Asia, except for China. I was on both of those advisory committees. Those committees, incidentally, continued on through, until the end of the Carter administration, so that some of us had contact during that entire period.

Rubens: Now how would that have come about? By ‘64, you are much better known.

Scalapino: Bill Bundy, who was Johnson’s assistant Secretary of State for Asia, and McGeorge, Bundy’s brother, knew me, and we interacted during that period.

Rubens: How did he know you?

Scalapino: I don’t recall. By that time, of course, I was writing articles on contemporary Asia, and these were being published in various journals, so I suspect they first ran into to some of my articles, because we had no school connections. I was out here, and they had been graduates of eastern schools.

Rubens: A couple of questions to fire at you regarding the academic community. John Fairbank was the big name in China at Harvard.

Scalapino: Yes, John had been a China specialist and he--I cannot recall for certain whether he was born in China or not, but that was his field. He had written several very well-known books on the history of China.

Rubens: I don’t recall that you mentioned him as someone you’d studied with?

Scalapino: No, I didn’t study with him. What happened to bring me close to John, was that he was in the course of organizing the Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard after the war, and he wanted a young political scientist. I was recommended and I talked with him, and accepted this, so I became involved during my final graduate years at Harvard, in the organization of the China center. That’s the way I became well acquainted with him. My other contact in the Asia field, as I have mentioned, was with Edwin O. Reischauer. He was a Japan specialist, and he sat on my thesis committee.
Rubens: I just want to know, if at Harvard, there was anyone else you wanted to mention?

Scalapino: Reischauer and Fairbank were the two principal people. As I say, here at Berkeley, there were certain people in other departments, for example, Woodbridge Bingham was a professor of Asian history, and I got to know him. There were several others—I can’t think of them now. My closest contacts naturally were inside the political science department.

Rubens: My understanding is that at one point, Fairbank was looked at as too left-leaning. He had the misfortune of being tagged by McCarthy, who did go after him, so he shut up for a while.

Scalapino: He was tagged as a left person. John was involved, not only rather deeply in Chinese politics by virtue of having been with the US government during the war, but he was quite critical of the nationalists and of Chiang Kai-shek. Furthermore, he had associations with the Institute of Pacific Relations, which was tagged as a leftist organization and he did come under attack in the period when the McCarthy probes were going on. Much of this was, in my opinion, totally fallacious. On the other hand, there was an element of naïveté in John. He was certainly not an ideologue, but he had a kind of sentiment for the Left, that was born out of his adverse experiences with the Right, with the nationalists.

Rubens: When you say this, are you speaking primarily about the Left in China, not the Left in the United States?

Scalapino: I’m primarily speaking about the Left in China, yes. But this brought him into association with some leftists in the U.S.

Rubens: Did the virulent anti-Communism here in any way mirror what you were starting to see in terms of your own judgment about the fear of Communism in the Far East? Specifically, did you have some sense that Communism universally was a problem?

Scalapino: Let me define my political position and evolution. As a young college student at Santa Barbara, I was a committed Democrat. Now that represented a certain change. I had actually marched in the Landon-for-president campaign in Topeka, Kansas. But that was in the Kansas era. My parents--and this undoubtedly influenced me--moved from being Republicans to voting for Roosevelt. And so our family moved over to what might be called the center, and that continued to be my position.

Through the World War II period, I was of course not deeply involved in politics, and when I went back to Harvard and graduate school, I was
fairly undecided about various political matters. I didn’t take a highly active role of any sort and I considered myself a kind of wait-and-see person although I had great suspicions about Communism. I think I may have told you that when I was student body president at Santa Barbara, I was invited to come to what was called a California Youth Legislature in 1940. It was held in Los Angeles and the student body president of Berkeley called me, and said, “If you represent 1,000 people or more, you can be a Senator, if less than 1,000, a member of the House of Representatives.” Thus, I went as a Senator. When I got to the conference, there were three of us--

[tape interruption]

Scalapino: As I was saying, there were three of us from Santa Barbara, and two of them were Communists! They didn’t represent anything, but you could set up a bogus organization and say, “I represent X,” and be in the House of Representatives. They weren’t from school. They were outside school. Then the first thing that happened, somebody moved that we amalgamate the Senate and the House of Representatives making them one body. That gave the Communists control, because every place had these bogus organizations. I became more and more unhappy and finally a young woman beside me got up and moved that we condemn Finland for attacking the Soviet Union. I said, “This is it.” So I got up and I said, “This organization is controlled by the Communist Party of the U.S. Those who are not supportive of this, I think we should walk out.” I walked out, and about 150 people joined me. But quite a few of them were Trotskyites. [laughs] So my experience therefore with the Communists had made me very suspicious and when it came to China, although I had no in-depth knowledge when I went back to Harvard after the war, I had a number of concerns.

As I think I mentioned, I became very close to Professor Chien Tuan-sheng, and Chien, while he was anti-Chiang Kai-shek and anti-nationalist, he had his doubts about the Communists, the Chinese Communists, because he thought they were too close to Russia, and might be controlled by the Soviet Union. So I kept this openness about the political situation in China. I did join the Institute of Pacific Relations, because that was one of the few organizations that had publications on Asia and was playing an active role. I was still a graduate student, and I didn’t take any active part in the institute. As I said earlier, when I came to Berkeley in 1949, I interacted with T.A. Bisson. And I didn’t agree with Bisson, he was too much a leftist from my standpoint, but on the other hand, I defended him strongly, arguing that he was not a Communist. So my background, I would say, up to the Free Speech Movement, was that of a centrist.
Rubens: Before the FSM, around ‘61 or ‘62, I read that you and Franz Sherman were asked to offer positions on the Sino-Soviet split. You said that you thought it was going to be a serious thing. Sherman denied that there was a split and that the two remained allies. Also that someone criticized you. There was someone raising the question, “Who was this Scalapino?” Maybe raised by the Senate Internal Securities Commission? I’m not sure, but do you have any memory of this?

Scalapino: I don’t have any memory of this specific episode. I did of course know Franz Sherman very well. We did appear on public platforms together, so this is probably true.

Rubens: How would this have happened?

Scalapino: Well, it was probably publicized, and it may have taken place here on campus but got newspaper publicity because outsiders, including journalists, could have easily come to the meeting.

Rubens: In your mind do you know of ever being investigated at all?

Scalapino: No. Not in any public way, or any sense that I knew. I think I told you that after I defended Art Bisson, I was informed by a student that he had been asked whether I had influenced him, when he was applying for a government job in Washington. But I was never publicly probed either here or in Washington.

Rubens: Meaning by any state committee or anything?

Scalapino: No, not to my knowledge. Now it may well have been that they had a record on me, you know, they do that for a lot of people. But no, I was never publicly or knowingly investigated.

Rubens: By what time did you have questions about the Communists in China?

Scalapino: I never identified myself as a supporter of the Communists. I had had these experiences in my own personal background, as I have indicated, and I considered myself a liberal Democrat. That certainly does not mean that I was supportive of the Kuomintang. I felt they had made innumerable mistakes and I had been influenced here by people like Professor Chien, when I was at Harvard. My early contacts with the Communists of China came only indirectly at international conferences—not here, because we would not allow them—but I attended conferences, some in Asia, some in Europe, where there were Chinese Communist representatives. We communicated, we talked, but I was not particularly supportive.
What I did come to believe, was that we should broaden our dialogue and that is why, quite a bit later, in 1966, I helped to organize the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. I was contacted by a Quaker named Cecil Thomas, who was here in Berkeley, and Cecil had gotten me involved in a number of things. I liked Cecil very much because he had no ulterior motives. He was a do-gooder, and he wanted to save humanity. We didn’t have much in common in the sense of research and that kind of thing. This wasn’t his bit.

Rubens: He was not an academic?

Scalapino: No, no. He ran a service program here. And Cecil, one day, came to me and said that he thought we should put the McCarthy period behind us, we should open up a dialogue with the Chinese. I said, initially, “Cecil I’m not going to get involved. You’ve involved me with too many things, I’m too busy.” “No, no,” he said, “this is very important.” So I said, “Well, I’ll call a couple of friends in the East. I’ll call Douk Barnett and Lucian Pye and see what they think of this.” I called them, and they said, “Well, it’s probably a good idea.” So we met in New York. A well-to-do Quaker named Robert Gilmore and his wife had a foundation. They put up some money, and we organized the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, and I was the first chairman.

Rubens: There was not a prior organization for this?

Scalapino: No, I think we were the first. And then in 1971, I was no longer chair at that time, but the State Department asked us to host the Chinese ping-pong players when they came. This was the opening of serious contacts. So the Chinese government felt they should invite our board of directors to come to China, and we went in December and early January. December of 1972, just a few months after Nixon’s trip. That was my first trip to China.

We were there a month. And a fascinating time it was. We started in Canton, Guangzhou, as it’s called in Chinese, because you could only come in by train then, from Hong-Kong. Then after spending a few days there we went up to Beijing, and that was when I saw Chien Tuan-sheng for the first time since he left Harvard. And then we went on up to Manchuria to An Shang, which is the headquarters of the iron and steel industry, and everywhere we went we collected large numbers of Chinese just looking at us, not friendly, but not unfriendly, as if we came from Mars.

Rubens: Was this only men, or did wives go too?
Scalapino: Three wives: mine, and two others. In Anshan incidentally, a rather amusing incident occurred. One of my hobbies, was to take down prices of products and compare them with wages to see what the real standard of living was. I had gone into this department store rather early in the morning. No one was in it. But suddenly, people began to pour in it to look at me. So after about 100 had come in, I rushed out, up the hill and I lost everybody except one young man. I finally stopped and said, in my rudimentary Chinese, “Do you know who I am?” He looked at me and he said, “Albanian?” Because the Albanians were their only friends, in that period. This was a rather typical incident in China 1972. The Cultural Revolution was just going down, much was drab and dreary, it was a kind of startling revelation. The National Committee, incidentally, then began to foster Track Two type conferences and interactions.

Rubens: What does that mean, “Track Two?”

Scalapino: It means non-official. Track One is official; it’s NGO. So contact was made on a widening scale, with people both in government and out of government. I made frequent trips to China after that, and my first series of lectures at Peking University was in 1981 when I delivered lectures for four weeks on the foreign policy of the United States in Asia.

Rubens: Were those published?

Scalapino: No. In ’81, matters were still very tight. I inaugurated a question and discussion period, and at first the students were very reluctant, but they gradually softened.

Rubens: Someone is translating?

Scalapino: Yes, I had a translator. One day I had lectured on the U.S. in Korea and I told them how the Korean War started, the North invaded the South. This student got up and said, “Well, Professor Scalapino, our government says that the American imperialists and the South Korean puppets invaded the North. You said the North invaded the South. Who’s right?” I cited my sources, and ended with Khrushchev’s memoirs, I said, “You know, he was no particular friend of ours, but he made it clear.” After the lecture and questions were over, I was still sitting up on the podium at my desk, when this boy came up, and he leaned over my shoulder and said, “I thought the North started the war.” [laughs] But this was so typical of that period. He could not say this in public.

Rubens: What did the Sino-Soviet split mean to you? What I began to understand was that the only country that the Soviet Union was giving money to was Indonesia, but I am asking you to just take a quick position on that.
Scalapino: In the 1950s, the Soviet Union was the dominant force in the Comintern, the international communist organization. They gave support to many Communist states and parties. They were a critical element in the world Communist movement. China’s activities in the fifties were primarily confined to East Asia. China was giving support to guerilla movements in such countries as Thailand, Burma, as it was then called, and Indochina, and North Korea. And there was no question that some of these states were under siege by the Communist movement. They had their own weaknesses, and of course, the Communists exploited this.

The Soviet-Chinese split came at the end of the fifties, and more intensely in the early and mid-sixties. It began really over a kind of contest for control. The Chinese Communists increasingly felt that the Soviets were trying to dominate the world Communist movement--trying to usurp all authority, and also discarding some of the Chinese positions as not ideologically sound. There were also controversies over specific countries and who should be the dominant influence in the Communist movements of those countries. Most Asian Communist parties tilted towards China from the late fifties on, and that, of course, annoyed Moscow a great deal. The climax came in 1969, when there was an open clash between Chinese and Russians on the Ussuri River. And it was after that clash, that Mao set ideology aside and began to indicate an interest in some kind of understanding with the United States, because he saw the Soviets as a real menace from that point on.

Rubens: Of course, the Soviets had already begun that, too, with the U.S.?

Scalapino: The Soviets has talked to the United States but we were not really close to the Russians.

Rubens: I read a book on Kennedy after seeing the movie Thirteen Days, and it said that Kennedy was much more concerned with what was going on in Indonesia, I think it was, and Sukarno, than any of us ever knew. And your point was that the media primarily covered Europe and Africa, it didn’t cover Asia.

Scalapino: Let me say this about the Indonesian situation. In the sixties, Sukarno came under increasing internal pressure, and he aligned himself with the Indonesian Communist Party. That Party had tilted towards China, along with other Communist parties of Asia. Incidentally, I interviewed the top leadership of the Indonesian Communist Party in--I think it was 1964--and I interviewed a great many other leaders in Indonesia at that time. There was a deepening concern in the United States and in some other regions about the drift of Indonesia towards an alignment with the Communists, both internally and possibly internationally.
Rubens: Are you making a distinction between China and the USSR at that point?

Scalapino: This was a tilt towards China. You also had in this period what was known as a confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, initiated by Jakarta and Sukarno. There was a great deal of concern about instability in Southeast Asia. You had a fairly strong Communist movement in the Philippines, in this period, and in several of the other Southeast Asian states. This made the question of Vietnam and of Indochina, including Laos and Cambodia, as well as Vietnam, all the more important because the general scene of this period was one of seeming Communist rise and the instability of the non-Communist states.

Rubens: It’s exactly in this period that the Civil Rights Movement is dominating the news and the attention of liberal students in the US.

So in the fall of ‘64, the students come back, loaded for bear in a certain way. They are not going to brook this to-do over who owns this property along Bancroft, and if they have the right to hand out literature. Whether it’s university property or city property, the students claim they have citizenship rights, constitutional rights, to advocate free speech.

I wanted to ask you if you had a certain awareness of this with fellow faculty in this initial period, before the car incident.

Scalapino: The answer is no. I had no involvement at all, until considerably later. I was, at the time, chair of the political science department.

Rubens: How long had you been the chair?

Scalapino: I think I became the chair in 1962. In the initial phases of this movement, I was not involved at all. Of course, like everyone else, I looked on the car episode with astonishment.

Rubens: Did you personally see it? Do you remember seeing it?

Scalapino: Yes, yes, you couldn’t avoid it. What struck me as so amazing was that the police allowed the car to be occupied and stay there, because it seemed to me incredible that you could occupy a police car without some retaliation. However my first involvement came later. It came primarily as a result of two people urging me to become involved. One was Professor Paul Seabury, who was in our department, the other was a friend of his and of mine, Seymour Martin Lipset. They had become involved in a group that was trying to explore some ways of handling the situation, and they urged me to attend some meetings of this group, which I did do.
Rubens: Beyond the Political Science department?

Scalapino: Oh, yes. These were from diverse departments. Out of this came the emergence of a group of departmental chairs, and for some reason I was elected to be the chair of the chairs.

[Tape 4]

Scalapino: I was urged to set up a group that could negotiate with the so-called Steering Committee of the Free Speech Movement.

Rubens: Are you being modest when you say for some reason? You had been a chair for a couple of years; you had published extensively and had been turned to by the Department of State.

Did you want to do it?

Scalapino: Not particularly. I didn’t campaign. [laughs] By that time, I had formed some impressions about this movement. First, my feeling was that the people involved at the top, were primarily “movement people.” They were people who had already been involved in other movements. Some of them had come from the East Coast very recently, and they had been involved in the Civil Rights Movement and they relished this kind of activity. It gave them a sense of doing something, of being important, of getting publicity, of fighting for righteousness. My second impression was that the issue was not free speech in its orthodox sense. We had total free speech on campus in terms of arguing and discussing issues, et cetera. It was this question of advocacy and, more importantly, of collecting money for political causes. And certainly the change that was made in the Sather Gate division: you can collect money outside Sather Gate, because that is not University, but inside, we are non-partisan. This triggered, in my view, the movement.

What I didn’t know at the time, and didn’t know until much later, was the growing estrangement, the growing conflict between President Clark Kerr, and Chancellor Ed Strong, together with Strong’s close associate Alex Sheriffs. I knew nothing about this.

Rubens: Did you know Strong, particularly?

Scalapino: I did not know him well.

Rubens: And no one called, early on, a meeting with department chairs?
Scalapino: No. We operated quite separately and we were not contacted by the administration.

Rubens: Did that strike you as strange, in a certain sense?

Scalapino: A little, yes. But we continued and I did of course a series of negotiations with their Steering Committee, and I had a small committee of my own.

I got acquainted with the top leadership. It was my impression, incidentally, that in private, some of the critical decisions, or at least expressions, were made by two slightly older students: [Jack] Weinberg and [Steve] Weissman, and that Mario Savio, while influential, was essentially a front man. He was the mobilizer, the public orator, the individual who attracted through charisma. In the private negotiatory sessions, however, he by no means dominated the scene.

It also seemed to me increasingly clear that the issue went beyond this question of advocacy and collecting money for causes. In a fundamental sense, it came down to the question of the governance of the university. Both in the sessions with the Steering Committee and in sessions we had in our department with students, the issue of participation in governance was made very clear. And we had long discussions, in the department particularly, with the students saying they should be on all committees, including the personnel committee.

Rubens: That early?

Scalapino: Yes. And our response was: We are a professional institution; if you get a Ph.D. and are appointed to the department you have the same vote as anyone else. But as a student, you are not yet qualified to make decisions about who should be hired and dismissed, though there should be some input from you on teaching quality, on whether a given person is, in your opinion, an effective teacher. We, however, never could reach an agreement on this broadest issue, in my view.

Now when we finally came up—we, my committee—came up with a proposal which we regarded as a fair compromise, we took it to Clark Kerr, because Kerr seemed to be, at that point, the key figure. And I no longer recall the details of this proposal, frankly. But we thought it was fair, and Clark accepted it and said that he thought we should present it to a special meeting of the Board of Regents. Such a meeting was called. It was held, actually at the San Francisco airport, because some regents had very limited time, and they wanted to fly up and have the meeting and then fly back. Among the people that were there was Governor Pat Brown. And initially we sat in one room, they sat in another, Clark served as an
intermediary. They of course had copies of our proposal. Then he called us into the Board of Regents’ room. We answered questions—I did—and defended the proposal. Governor Brown left early, saying he had to pick up his wife at the hairdresser. I shall never forget that. I think it was a political move. He did not want to take a position right away. In general the regents approved.

It was this proposal that we intended to present to the faculty at a large meeting. But Paul Seabury and some others felt that we should have a preliminary public meeting, and present the idea and have Clark speak. This was the antecedent of the December Greek Theater meeting. It was after the sit-in. I don’t know exact dates.

Of course a large group of students and others, faculty, too, assembled at the Greek Theater. Now both Clark and I had insisted that there be no police present at the Greek Theater because we didn’t want an incident. So both Clark and I assumed that there were no police at the meeting.

Just before the meeting took place, Savio, accompanied by a young professor from sociology, whose name I don’t recall, came to see me backstage to ask if he could make an announcement about their meeting in Sproul Plaza. I said, “Well, your meeting has been well-publicized, and this is a meeting organized by my committee and by the president, so I don’t see any reason for this.” The meeting got underway.

Rubens: So no particular argument from Savio that you remember?

Scalapino: No, no. As the meeting got underway, I noticed that Savio was sitting beside Bettina Aptheker down in the second or third row, down very close to the front.

Rubens: Hans Mark told me that he had wanted the UC band to be there. He thought that would give a certain—

Scalapino: [laughing] I don’t know. Clark gave his talk, and said that he was accepting this compromise and hoped all would go well. There was quite a group of faculty sitting on the stage. And after the talk, we were just about to conclude--

Rubens: That was the main essence of the meeting, to justify the faculty proposal?

Scalapino: Yes. He made his presentation and that was it. But just as I was getting ready to close the meeting, here came Savio, out from the audience, up the stairs, and it was at that point that the police appeared, and took him so he couldn’t get up the stairs. Of course, pandemonium broke out at that point.
I decided to go backstage into a little sort of closet where this policeman was holding Savio. I said to the policeman, “You can let him go; I will take charge of him.” And I decided, given the atmosphere, that he would be allowed to make his announcement. So I let him back on stage and he made his announcement. Very simple. Then the thing was over.

But of course the presence of the police created a very negative mood, and made it virtually impossible for us to go forward. Consequently, a separate proposal by the so-called Committee of Two Hundred was put forward at the faculty meeting that was held December 8th. And I elected not to put our proposal before the assembled faculty because there had been such negative repercussions from this police episode. I think Clark was disappointed that we didn’t put it forward, but frankly, under the prevailing circumstances, I doubted whether it would carry. That was, in essence, the end.

You know, in retrospect, I think it’s somewhat ironic that perhaps the most significant accomplishment of FSM was the election of Ronald Reagan as governor, because he ran against Berkeley radicalism. So the Free Speech Movement helped Reagan go to the governorship and thence to the Presidency. It left, of course, a faculty that was torn, and an administration that was torn. Some departments were much worse than others. Sociology practically blew apart. In political science, we had divisions but there were no open fractures, no intense animosities.

Rubens: I find it incredulous that Strong or Kerr wouldn’t have called some meeting of chairs or issued some kind of call for solidarity or caution. To your knowledge, they did not?

Scalapino: I had some personal contact with Clark Kerr during that period. But there was no public meeting and Clark was not in a position to do this since it was a campus affair. It would almost have had to be called by Ed Strong, who did not do this.

Rubens: Why did you have occasion to talk to Kerr?

Scalapino: Well, I knew him very well, and obviously once this process got underway—that of the committee of chairs—and discussion of what the regents would accept, some conversations had to take place.

Rubens: It sounds to me like you initiated it.

Scalapino: I think that’s true, basically.
Rubens: How would you describe the posture that this chair group was taking, vis-a-vis the administration, the students, the regents?

Scalapino: Well, fundamentally, the chairs wanted peace, we wanted to end the turmoil. We wanted a kind of centrist position that would bring the bulk of students and the administration together. That’s what we were aiming at.

Rubens: Seemed to me a true compromise.

Scalapino: Right. Now we were not aware, at the time--I only became gradually aware--of the deep division between the campus administration and the presidency. Clark did not talk with me about that.

Rubens: And how had you come to know Kerr pretty well?

Scalapino: Oh, from earlier days, when he was head of the Institute of Industrial Relations. We had a close friend in common, Lloyd Fisher from the political science department.

Rubens: Now, in terms of your work there would be no real—

Scalapino: No, this all came from my being chair of the department.

Rubens: No, I meant your friendship with Kerr.

Scalapino: Oh, no, that was previous. That was early. As you know, Clark thought of himself as a liberal. As a person who espoused liberal causes--labor unions, civil rights, and later anti-war.

[tape interruption]

Scalapino: Yet I think there was always this problem of how deeply to intervene in campus affairs. The president of the university gives autonomy to campus administrators, so how deeply do you get involved? Clark got involved very deeply toward the end.

Rubens: So much so, that he first offers to resign and then is fired later. Anyway, it sure seems like Clark Kerr is being sniped at by some Cal administrators, mainly Strong and Sparrow and Sherriffs, because he is expanding the number of campuses--the jewel in the crown is being diminished, I don’t know if he ever let on about that.

Scalapino: I know nothing about that.
Rubens: But did you have some questions of the character of leadership, both of Strong and out of Kerr?

Scalapino: Certainly I had the feeling that Strong, while a very nice individual, a very caring person for the campus and for education, was not the right person to be chancellor. I had this impression because he was not sufficiently outgoing, sufficiently inclusive, in terms of the diverse groups of faculty, student, et cetera. And he was not really decisive when it came to making decisions and drafting policies.

Rubens: Had you seen this prior?

Scalapino: I had felt this, but it became increasingly apparent. I think Clark was adept at making decisions. The problem here was that this kind of event caused within him a great tension because on the one hand, it seemed to challenge his liberalism. Whereas on the other hand, he became increasingly negative towards the FSM leadership, feeling that they were not prepared to compromise, or to end the movement, that it was too beneficial to them as individuals to have the movement going.

Rubens: Do you recall at all where your meetings with the Steering Committee took place?

Scalapino: Different places. I think the first meeting was at Barrows [Hall], but not in the political science department. Later we met once, I know, in the political science department offices. We met different places.

Rubens: But your impression—there’s just no question that this is the predominant story, that Mario was not a puppet, but seemed to bow easily. He was a reluctant leader; it was a little unclear how he became the figurehead.

Scalapino: Mario had a great public presence. He was passionate. He was convincing on the platform. He was highly emotional, and therefore, he had these qualities, that we associate with charisma. And he had an influence. His subsequent life, I think, shows that he didn’t have certain other qualities that were very important to a successful career and a successful marriage. But in this time—after all, we’re talking only about a few months—he was very influential publicly.

Rubens: Yes, he rose to the moment. I mean, once in a while, the times do make someone.

Scalapino: But I think it’s equally important to point out that in private, there were other figures.
Rubens: Something that a lot of people say is that the administration made such stupendous blunders. I mean, for instance, driving a police car onto campus at noon, and why the students would have come back from Thanksgiving vacation and receive more expulsions—that was what revved it up and led to the December sit-in.

Scalapino: I think there is no doubt that the administration made many mistakes, and there is also no doubt that this series of events was just a marvelous occasion for the media, and they played this to the hilt. The media were a key factor in keeping the whole situation revved up.

Rubens: There was a lot of elaboration and feasting by the media. It was covered on TV, but of course news was, then only ten, fifteen minutes.

The other observation that is made is how phlegmatic Kerr was at that meeting, that his character was not one of dynamism at the Greek Theater, and that somehow a lot of students were expecting something more to be said to douse the climate of tension that had arisen.

Scalapino: I think at the meeting, Clark was being Clark. He is not a dynamic person, he is not a public orator, and his sense of being before an audience is you give them your facts. He did not play to the audience. That is quite true and that’s just his style.

Rubens: Yes. Now, there’s an unconfirmed story that Robert Price [chair of political science department, UC Berkeley as of 2001] told me. He says he has this vivid recollection of Herb McCloskey and Kerr, and, I think, Sheldon Wolin—and I haven’t talked to any of them—that they walk back to Barrows Hall after the Greek Theater incident and went to the room at the top that had an incredible view of Sproul Plaza and the bay beyond. And McCloskey that says to Kerr, “Clark, that’s your public. You’re going to have to learn how to deal with them.” Not that he meant to cave in, but-

Scalapino: Both Sheldon Wolin and Herb McClosky were key figures in the Committee for Two Hundred. I don’t know myself who drafted their proposal, whether they did the drafting or they had a committee, but they were important figures. And Sheldon incidentally came to see me just before the general faculty meeting of December 8th. He came to see me with—what is his name? He is the person who has since changed his mind totally.

Rubens: Oh, Searle?
Scalapino: Yes, John Searle. Sheldon and John Searle came to see me just before the faculty meeting and wanted me to support their proposal, and I said, “No,” I couldn’t do that.

Rubens: Do you remember why?

Scalapino: I felt it was tilted a bit too much. But I said that I had decided that I would not present our proposal, given the atmosphere. They asked me if I would call Clark Kerr and see if he would come to the meeting, and if the faculty approved the Committee for Two Hundred’s resolution, support it. I did call Clark and he said, “No,” he did not want to come.

Rubens: Why would Kerr come? On the presumption that the resolution would pass, would he then come to be presented with it?

Scalapino: I didn’t think this was a very good idea, personally. But I called him, and he said that he didn’t wish to come.

Rubens: Wolin and Searle must have been quite taken with your capacity to lead and influence and to be rational that they would come to you.

Scalapino: Well, I don’t know. Of course I’d known Sheldon, he was a member of my department. I didn’t know John Searle at the time, I had met him but that’s all. And, as you know, he was to change dramatically later. I don’t know whether he has given his memoirs or not.

Rubens: He was interviewed for the Berkeley in the Sixties film. It seems really a mistake not to interview him.

Scalapino: He was very much on the FSM side at the time.

Rubens: So this seemed a reasonable thing for these people to do?

Scalapino: Well, we were not enemies. We had a difference of opinion, but I think one of the good things about my department, not only in this period but later, during the so-called Vietnam Era, was that people could differ, even differ dramatically, and still not engage in vitriolic, personal attacks. So the department held together through all of this very difficult period.

Rubens: Right, so did you have a particular feeling or observation that there was a Communist presence in the movement?

Scalapino: Well, we knew there was a Communist presence, Bettina Aptheker was the daughter of an American Communist Party leader, leading intellectual. No doubt this movement was under the influence of the Left. But the Left
has many coteries, many compartments, and my own feeling was that by the mid-sixties, when this event took place, the Communist Party as such was not very strong. There were all sorts of doubts being expressed about the Soviet Union, and the Communist policies on human rights, et cetera. The so-called New Left was clearly in charge, but the New Left is a very difficult animal to define. It had many different component parts, so I don’t think Communism per se was the critical issue.

Rubens: I agree with you in that case, I think Bettina was relatively—mild isn’t the word--she was not a Weinberg or a Weissman, and they were not Party people. But there were many parts.

It’s something that has always been hard to explain to students, this cultural change that was taking place at the time, also about belonging to the movement. When I say cultural transformation, this is such a pristine time, relatively. The students take their shoes off when they get on the car, they are dressed pretty well, though the media is very happy to show Mario more scruffy than I think he often was. But there were usually students in ties, with short hair. There weren’t drugs; rock and roll wasn’t the fantastic thing that it became.

These were very hard working kids, in terms of the manifestos they are turning out. But the sense that they were non-affiliated--a few may have belonged to CORE; SDS will not become that big until later. People belonged to SNCC, but not that many. People were just part of the movement. This was the New Left, coming out of the Port Huron statement. They were not going to be red-baited; they were not going to be dictated to by Harrington. That older generation was not going to influence them, so it seems like there was a sentiment of seize-the-moment-and-run.

Scalapino: As I said earlier, I think these individuals represented diversity, and what brought them together--and now I’m talking about the core-- was the desire to be a part of a movement, to be a participant, to make things change. This was, in my opinion, what brought these individuals together.

Rubens: What led so many students to sit down around that car? It is such an iconographic central image of the movement. Why do you think so many students did so?

Scalapino: Well, after all, it’s fairly dramatic when you have a police car and somebody inside, and you have the setting that Sproul Plaza gives you. It’s not surprising that in varying degree, and I would underline that, students participated. Some just out of curiosity; some wanted to hear what was going on, some because they were en route to becoming supporters. I
don’t think the students were in any one group with regard to this matter. Later on, of course the student activists garnered support, but there still was a large proportion of the student body that was inactive.

Rubens: Absolutely. While 800 are arrested, that’s a lot, but it’s a campus of 27,000.

Scalapino: That’s right. I think it was easy to—as we see the media do today--focus on the extremities, upon the activists.

Rubens: You are right, though. The setting that Sproul Plaza creates—there is a politics of space. That arena held people and it was a convenient congregating place.

Now, I want to ask you about SLATE. SLATE was almost petering out. It had been a very important group two or three years before. Had you encountered them particularly?

Scalapino: No, I hadn’t. Before the fall of ‘64, we didn’t have, in my department at least, any great movements or altercations.

Rubens: Had you been aware at all of rumblings about the impersonal “multiversity?” Any challenges about that?

Scalapino: Sure. You read about these, you heard individuals talk about the problems of the university’s impersonalism, the lack of attention students got from professors.

Rubens: Did you have a position?

Scalapino: As chair of the department, I urged our own faculty to make sure they had ample time to see students on request and to interact with them. The real problem, I think, came in the freshman and sophomore courses where the classes were so large that it was the teaching assistants who had the primary contacts and not the professor. Moreover, it varied greatly. Some professors were very available, and others weren’t.

Rubens: The only critique I’ve heard of your department, was of Peter Odegard. He did not meet his TAs. One interviewee said, “I never met him.” But she said it was not typical of the department, or of any other department.

So Lipset, was in sociology right? And in their department--
Scalapino: Yes, oh sociology blew apart. Nat Glazer who left Berkeley--I think because of the crack-up--he too went through the same evolution as John Searle.

Rubens: That’s what I thought, he had been basically a supporter.

Scalapino: I can tell you one episode, in our first meeting with the Steering Committee; he was on my committee. I had put Nat Glazer on my committee. And before we opened the discussion, we were sitting there. The FSM people had come in, and I was about to open my mouth when Nat Glazer stood up and said, “Bob, I can’t go on with this, I’m with them,” pointing to the FSM, and walked out. [laughing] This was the beginning of my negotiations. Well of course, later, after he left Berkeley, Nat moved 180 degrees.

[Tape 5]Rubens: We don’t have much time left for the interview, and I’m not sure I asked you, when did you learn Chinese?

Scalapino: After the war, when I went back to Harvard in the fall of 1946, I began to take intensive Chinese, at the university.

Rubens: Why did you do that?

Scalapino: Because I wanted to be more than a one-country specialist. I had three years of intensive Chinese, until I left Harvard to come out here. But we could not go to China, so I lost the speaking ability. I can read Chinese, but not speak it.

Rubens: I meant to ask you--you said you interviewed practically every leader of the Communist Party of Japan that was around. Is there a short answer to why you were interested in them?

Scalapino: I was writing a book on Communism in Japan because in the months that I stayed in Japan at the end of the war--I went in September, and came out in January of ‘46--I was fascinated by the various political movements that were emerging in the opening days of the occupation. I went to see some of the demonstrations, some of the marches and so forth. I was also fascinated by the leader of the Communist Party at that time, Nosaka Sanzo, because he had spent time in Yenan during the war, Yenan being the headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party. So I just decided to make this a research project.

Rubens: You mentioned you were in Osaka after the end of the war.
I wanted to ask you if you developed then, or over the years, a particular position or understanding, and do you think it changed very much, of the relationship between the military, the State Department, or political administration and the CIA?

Scalapino: Obviously, you mean inside the American government?

Rubens: Yes, but that’s one period when you see it. But I’m wondering, by the time of the Free Speech Movement, is it different?

Scalapino: Well, I would put it this way: there have always been problems in the integration of American foreign policy given the nature of our politics. First of all, it is not at all unusual for there to be an element of tension and some contest of authority between the department of state and the defense department. We are seeing that today, and it has been very frequent in the past. We’ve also seen a tremendous difference depending on who is President. Is he a person who makes decisions, who is well informed on foreign policy matters, who has a commitment to foreign policy? Or is it a person who is oriented towards domestic politics, and who has had no particular experience in the foreign policy field? That makes a difference.

It is my opinion that the CIA has never been a key policy-making organization. It furnishes information to policy makers and depending on whether its information is accurate and complete; it of course has an influence in their decisions. But it is not a policy-making organization; it is an information collection organization.

Rubens: Yes, there was always a charge that people in the political science department--you, Lepovsky--did give information to the CIA that they turned to you for information. And I wondered if this is true and if you have something to say about CIA presence on the campus, or concern with the campus?

Scalapino: Many government officials came to me and to others asking for our views, asking for information on select countries and movements, and I always said to them privately what I said publicly, what I wrote. I didn’t have any secrets.

Rubens: Your position seemed to have really been consistent.

Scalapino: Yes, I had no secrets, I also talked to Russian embassy people, Chinese embassy people, Japanese embassy people because, as I say, I wasn’t confiding secrets; I was giving my point of view. I’d written an article, which was subsequently published, which expressed the same views. So it wasn’t a question of trying to give some people inside dope.
Rubens: You know, after this period, there is “exposure” of the role of the CIA in destabilizing regimes. Were you aware of a CIA presence here?

Scalapino: No. obviously CIA people came here and talked to people, they talked to me on occasion, but that doesn’t mean that they were governing the scene, by no means. As I said earlier, many of us interacted with the State Department. We had personal contacts with different individuals there, and they asked us our opinion or we gave it. But, they were free to keep it or toss it off.

Rubens: You don’t feel it was a subversive force on the campus?

Scalapino: Oh, not at all. One problem here is that you did have extremist groups. Our own home, for example, had bombs go of outside it.

Rubens: Your personal home?

Scalapino: Yes, one didn’t explode, and one did explode. Now they were in the street, so this was obviously intended to frighten us. This was in ‘68 or ‘69. It was said by the police that this was done by the Red Family Commune.

Rubens: Because you were a supporter of the war?

Scalapino: Yes. Also, my class was disrupted on one occasion by outsiders, not by people in the class, but people who marched in. And so we had a certain amount of tension during those years, primarily ‘68-’71 or ‘72.

But I must repeat that the students in my class, and my own fellow faculty members in political science, though they had different opinions in many cases, were always very supportive of my right to hold my opinion. They always indicated that they thought I was being sincere in stating my beliefs and the reasons for these. So I never felt greatly disturbed emotionally. As long as you have a kind of inner family support, you know, groups on the outside can do what they will, and they did.

Rubens: What a story.

Would you just tell me who Henry Rosovsky is?

Scalapino: He was in the economics department.

Rubens: And then at Harvard, he did the economic history of Japan.
Scalapino: Yes and he became vice-chancellor or held some administrative post. I knew him very well. He was in the Japan field and I don’t know exactly when he moved to Harvard.

Rubens: Okay, here it is: the very last question. You said the issue in the end, regarding the Free Speech Movement, was governance. What I have never read and I think needs to be explored, is Sheldon Wolin’s proposal on reconstitution of the university. Did the issue of governance underlie that?

Scalapino: I don’t remember that proposal.

Rubens: Fine. Did you have friends in the department who did not have the political position you did? Did you have friends that really argued with you?

Scalapino: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. And many of them—we would debate, discuss, but we always remained in communication.

Rubens: Okay. I’m honorable. [laughing] That was my last question.

Scalapino: I’ll just end with one anecdote that goes back to this question of governance and equal participation.

At the time of the FSM one of the students said, “Can I come to see you and just the two of us talk?” I said, “Sure.” So we made an appointment, and he came and we went over the same issues, but at the end, he won because he said—mind you I had never met this boy before—he said, “Well, I guess we’ll just have to agree to disagree, Bob.” Referring to me by my first name gave him equality.

Rubens: Do you think you were the first person to use the term “Vietnamization?”

Scalapino: I might have been. As I said, this was one of our mistakes, that we did not undertake such a program at an early point. I lectured toward the end of 1974 to the National War College in Dalat, Vietnam. This was a group of young Vietnamese military officers. During the question period, a man got up, a young fellow and he said, “Well, Professor Scalapino, maybe you can explain something to me. You Americans came into Vietnam so rapidly that we couldn’t easily adjust, and now you are going out so rapidly we can’t adjust. How do you explain that?” There you have the dilemma that they faced, having trusted us to stay with them, to defend them. They were suddenly confronted with our rapid evacuation.

Rubens: Do have an assessment of why that happened?
Scalapino: It was political. We lost the war in the United States, not in Vietnam. We lost the war here. Politically, it became increasingly untenable. Now, the Kissinger/Nixon plan was, of course, to get the North Vietnamese to agree to a compromise whereby the South could retain its autonomy, and in writing, the North Vietnamese came close to doing this. That’s why Kissinger and Tho got the Nobel Peace Prize. But in fact the North never intended to enforce that agreement, and of course they didn’t.

Rubens: Do you think the student movement had an effect?

Scalapino: It wasn’t just the student movement. It was a huge variety of people--I mean, Jane Fonda, et cetera.

Rubens: And Ellsberg?

Scalapino: Ellsberg--well, they told many stories, they weren’t all on one side. But you know, in broader, philosophic terms, as I have said, the only popular wars for the American people are those that are over quickly and decisively, with minimal casualties. Both Korea and Vietnam became progressively unpopular, because they were dragged out. There was no clear end in sight, and the casualties were mounting, so there were political costs.

Rubens: Someone just told me Ho Chi Minh said, “It took two million and I would have used twenty million.”

Scalapino: He made some such remark. Ho and the Communists in general were convinced that they could outlast us, and they did. They did. Of course, we ended up with a million refugees, a large number of whom live in this state today.

Rubens: So it was all these factors. There it is.

[End of Interview]