Michael McCloskey

SIERRA CLUB EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR:
THE EVOLVING CLUB AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT,
1961-1981

With an Introduction by
Joe Fontaine

An Interview Conducted by
Susan R. Schrepfer
1981

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and the Sierra Club
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In fall 1969 and spring 1970 a self-appointed committee of Sierra Clubbers met several times to consider two vexing and related problems. The rapid membership growth of the club and its involvement in environmental issues on a national scale left neither time nor resources to document the club's internal and external history. Club records were stored in a number of locations and were inaccessible for research. Further, we were failing to take advantage of the relatively new technique of oral history by which the reminiscences of club leaders and members of long standing could be preserved.

The ad hoc committee's recommendation that a standing History Committee be established was approved by the Sierra Club Board of Directors in May 1970. That September the board designated The Bancroft Library of the University of California at Berkeley as the official depository of the club's archives. The large collection of records, photographs and other memorabilia known as the "Sierra Club Papers" is thus permanently protected, and the Bancroft is preparing a catalog of these holdings which will be invaluable to students of the conservation movement.

The History Committee then focused its energies on how to develop a significant oral history program. A six page questionnaire was mailed to members who had joined the club prior to 1931. More than half responded, enabling the committee to identify numerous older members as likely prospects for oral interviews. (Some had hiked with John Muir!) Other interviewees were selected from the ranks of club leadership over the past six decades.

Those committee members who volunteered as interviewers were trained in this discipline by Willa Baum, head of the Bancroft's Regional Oral History Office and a nationally recognized authority in this field. Further interviews have been completed in cooperation with university oral history classes at California State University, Fullerton; Columbia University, New York; and the University of California, Berkeley. Extensive interviews with major club leaders are most often conducted on a professional basis through the Regional Oral History Office.

Copies of the Sierra Club oral interviews are placed at The Bancroft Library, at UCLA, and at the club's Colby Library, and may be purchased for the actual cost of photocopying, binding, and shipping by club regional offices, chapters, and groups, as well as by other libraries and institutions.

Our heartfelt gratitude for their help in making the Sierra Club Oral History Project a success goes to each interviewee and interviewer; to everyone who has written an introduction to an oral history; to the Sierra Club Board of Directors for its recognition of the long-term importance of this effort; to the Trustees of the Sierra Club Foundation for generously providing
the necessary funding; to club and foundation staff, especially Michael McCloskey, Denny Wilcher, Colburn Wilbur, and Nicholas Clinch; to Willa Baum and Susan Schrepfer of the Regional Oral History Office; and last but far from least, to the members of the History Committee, and particularly to Ann Lage, who has coordinated the oral history effort since September 1974.

You are cordially invited to read and enjoy any or all of the oral histories in the Sierra Club series. By so doing you will learn much of the club's history which is available nowhere else, and of the fascinating careers and accomplishments of many outstanding club leaders and members.

Marshall H. Kuhn
Chairman, History Committee
1970 - 1978

San Francisco
May 1, 1977
(revised May 1979, A.L.)

PREFACE——1980s

Inspired by the vision of its founder and first chairman, Marshall Kuhn, the Sierra Club History Committee continued to expand its oral history program following his death in 1978. With the assistance of a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, awarded in July 1980, the Sierra Club has contracted with the Regional Oral History Office of The Bancroft Library to conduct twelve to sixteen major interviews of Sierra Club activists and other environmental leaders of the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, the volunteer interview program has been assisted with funds for training interviewers and transcribing and editing volunteer-conducted interviews, also focusing on the past two decades.

With these efforts, the committee intends to document the programs, strategies, and ideals of the national Sierra Club, as well as the club grassroots, in all its variety—-from education to litigation to legislative lobbying, from energy policy to urban issues to wilderness preservation, from California to the Carolinas to New York.

Together with the written archives in The Bancroft Library, the oral history program of the 1980s will provide a valuable record of the Sierra Club during a period of vastly broadening environmental goals, radically changing strategies of environmental action, and major growth in size and influence on American politics and society.

Special thanks for the project's later phase are due to Susan Schrepfer, codirector of the Sierra Club Documentation Project; Ray Lage, cochair of the History Committee; the Sierra Club Board and staff; members of the project advisory board and the History Committee; and most importantly, the interviewees and interviewers for their unfailing cooperation.

Ann Lage
Cochair, History Committee
Codirector, Sierra Club Documentation Project

Oakland, California
April, 1981
SIERRA CLUB ORAL HISTORY PROJECT
June 1983

Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library

David R. Brower, Environmental Activist, Publicist, and Prophet, 1980
Norman B. Livermore, Jr., Man in the Middle: High Sierra Packer, Timberman, Conservationist, California Resources Secretary, 1983
William E. Siri, Reflections on The Sierra Club, the Environment, and Mountaineering, 1950s-1970s, 1979

SIERRA CLUB LEADERS, 1950s-1970s:
Alexander Hildebrand, Sierra Club Leader and Critic: Perspective on Club Growth, Scope, and Tactics, 1950s-1970s, 1982
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Raymond J. Sherwin, Conservationist, Judge, and Sierra Club President, 1960s-1970s, 1982
Theodore A. Snyder, Jr., Southeast Conservation Leader and Sierra Club President, 1960s-1970s, 1982
Wallace Stegner, The Artist as Environmental Advocate, 1983

In Process: Ansel Adams, Phillip S. Berry, Claire Dedrick, Brock Evans, Stewart Udall, Edgar Wayburn

Sierra Club History Committee

Elizabeth Marston Bade, Recollections of William F. Bade and the Early Sierra Club, 1976
Philip S. Bernays, Founding the Southern California Chapter, 1975
Harold C. Bradley, Furthering the Sierra Club Tradition, 1975
Cicely M. Christy, Contributions to the Sierra Club and the San Francisco Bay Chapter, 1938-1970s, 1982
Nathan C. Clark, Sierra Club Leader, Outdoorsman, and Engineer, 1977
Harold E. Crowe, Sierra Club Physician, Baron, and President, 1975
Glen Dawson, Pioneer Rock Climber and Ski Mountaineer, 1975
Nora Evans, Sixty Years with the Sierra Club, 1976
Francis Farquhar, Sierra Club Mountaineer and Editor, 1974
Marjory Bridge Farquhar, Pioneer Woman Rock Climber and Sierra Club Director, 1977
Wanda B. Goody, A Hiker's View of the Early Sierra Club, 1982
C. Nelson Hackett, Lasting Impressions of the Early Sierra Club, 1975
Joel Hildebrand, Sierra Club Leader and Ski Mountaineer, 1974
Ethel Rose Taylor Horsfall, On the Trail with the Sierra Club, 1920s-1960s, 1982
Helen LeConte, Reminiscences of LeConte Family Outings, the Sierra Club, and Ansel Adams, 1977
Grant McConnell, Conservation and Politics in the North Cascades, 1983
John and Ruth Mendenhall, Forty Years of Sierra Club Mountaineering Leadership, 1938-1978, 1979
Harriet T. Parsons, A Half-Century of Sierra Club Involvement, 1981
Ruth E. Prager, Remembering the High Trips, 1976
Bestor Robinson, Thoughts on Conservation and the Sierra Club, 1974
Gordon Robinson, Forestry Consultant to the Sierra Club, 1979
James E. Rother, The Sierra Club in the Early 1900s, 1974
Tom Turner, A Perspective on David Brower and the Sierra Club, 1968-1969, 1982
Anne Van Tyne, Sierra Club Stalwart: Conservationist, Hiker, Chapter and Council Leader, 1981

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California State University, Fullerton--Southern Sierrans Project

Thomas Ammeus, New Directions for the Angeles Chapter, 1977
Robert Bear, Desert Conservation and Exploration with the Sierra Club, 1946-1978, 1980
Irene Charnock, Portrait of a Sierra Club Volunteer, 1977
J. Gordon Chelew, Reflections of an Angeles Chapter Member, 1921-1975, 1976
Arthur B. Johnson, Climbing and Conservation in the Sierra Club's Southern California Chapter, 1930-1960s, 1980
Olivia R. Johnson, High Trip Reminiscences, 1904-1945, 1977
E. Stanley Jones, Sierra Club Officer and Angeles Chapter Leader, 1931-1975, 1976
Marion Jones, Reminiscences of the Southern California Sierra Club, 1927-1975, 1976
Dorothy Leavitt Pepper, High Trip High Jinks, 1976
Roscoe and Wilma Poland, Desert Conservation: Voices from the Sierra Club's San Diego Chapter, 1980
Richard Searle, Grassroots Sierra Club Leader, 1976
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Jordan Hall, Trial and Error: the Early Years, 1980
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Marlene Sarnat, Laying the Foundations for ICO, 1980
George Zuni, From the Inner City Out, 1980

SIERRA CLUB OUTREACH TO WOMEN:
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LABOR AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA, 1960s-1970s:
David Jenkins, Environmental Controversies and the Labor Movement in the Bay Area, 1981
Amy Meyer, Preserving Bay Area Parklands, 1981
Anthony L. Ramos, A Labor Leader Concerned with the Environment, 1981
Dwight C. Steele, Environmentalist and Labor Ally, 1981
Michael McCloskey has served as executive director of the Sierra Club during a time when the club has faced serious crises both from within and from outside the organization. Due in large part to Mike's dedication to the principles of the Sierra Club, his depth of understanding of what the Sierra Club stands for, and his advice to the club's Board of Directors, the Sierra Club has emerged from these crises stronger than ever.

When Mike first became executive director, we had just gone through the most divisive period the club ever experienced. His charismatic predecessor had been fired by the board, and the volunteer leadership was divided among the former executive director's supporters and detractors. Many club leaders seemed to take more pleasure in fighting one another than they did the opponents of conservation. Through statesmanship and a willingness to work with all factions of the club's leadership, Mike helped the club through an ugly period in its history. Gradually the bitter feelings subsided, and the various factions began to pull together again. Without someone of Mike's character and determination much of the club's vital leadership might have left, leaving a weak, ineffective organization.

Mike also inherited a chaotic financial mess. The board had to hold several emergency meetings to resolve one financial crisis after another. A lesser person than Mike would have thrown up his hands and left the club to find more stable employment. But dedicated as he is to what the Sierra Club stands for, Mike persevered.

By hard work and persistence he gradually acquired a staff that reformed the club's budget-making process and helped achieve financial stability. Then in 1982–83, in spite of the fact that the nation went through the most severe recession since the Depression of the 1930s, the club's financial status improved dramatically. Much of the credit for that success belongs to Mike McCloskey.

During the 1970s, with Mike as executive director, the club became increasingly successful in achieving its conservation goals. Mike was the architect for much of the club's strategy in the various arenas in which we worked. He has an uncanny knack for anticipating the course of events and planning how we should deal with them. Before we charged off into battle Mike always analyzed the situation, charted our course, and made sure we avoided the pitfalls.

Of course Mike could not take the lead on every issue. There were far too many. Over the years he has hired an outstanding staff to work with our volunteers and to assist them. This is true in every department of the
Sierra Club. They are highly capable and dedicated people. It is a tribute to Mike McCloskey that he has found such an outstanding staff who are willing to stay with the club for the minimal salaries we can offer.

Mike has been an inspiration to all of us, volunteers and staff alike, during the adversities of the Reagan administration. He anticipated the nature of the challenge before us and was one of the primary strategists dealing with those in the Reagan administration who wanted to return to the days of rape and ruin of our natural resources. Our success in meeting the threat is a measure of Mike's leadership. Sierra Club membership nearly doubled during the first two years of the Reagan administration. The club successfully entered the arena of electoral politics. And the attempts of the enemies of environmental protection to roll back the environmental clock have been thwarted at nearly every turn. The Sierra Club is indisputably stronger and more effective than at any point in its history. Without Mike McCloskey's help such a strong position would certainly not be possible.

A word needs to be said about the personal help and the encouragement Mike gives to the passing parade of Sierra Club presidents. The job of president of the Sierra Club is overwhelming. It would be unbearable if the president had to worry about the daily operation of the club. I can speak from personal experience that knowing Mike is there making sure the machinery is functioning is a load off one's shoulders. That coupled with Mike's advice and personal support make the burden of the club's presidency manageable. Mike's assistance provides the continuity and depth of experience that a club president needs to function. All of us who have served in that office owe him a special debt of gratitude.

It would indeed be difficult to imagine the Sierra Club being what it is today without the contributions of Mike McCloskey.

Joe Fontaine
Past President
Sierra Club 1980-1982

9 June 1983
Tehachapi, California
INTERVIEW HISTORY

I began these interviews with Michael McCloskey, executive director of the Sierra Club, on February 13, 1981, in New York City, as he paused briefly between meetings on club business. We completed the series that August, with four long and intense sessions in the club's San Francisco office. McCloskey was far too busy to prepare systematically for these interviews, but his excellent memory and analytical skills allowed him to recall events of the past twenty-one years with accurate and significant detail. Because of his well organized thinking and presentation, the transcripts required only minimal editing. Oral histories are generally recorded with individuals toward the end of their careers, which is clearly not the case here. The high quality of McCloskey's recollections, however, is a strong argument for mid-career memoirs.

The transcripts that follow offer insights into many aspects of the environmental movement since the 1950s. In the 1950s, McCloskey was one of the first organizers of grass roots environmental activism in the Pacific Northwest. From the mid and late 1960s, when he was the club's conservation director and principal lobbyist for the redwoods campaign, McCloskey recalled in rich detail the club's first full-scale legislative campaigns, thereby contributing to our understanding of the club's development as a nationally prominent lobby in the 1970s. He is unique in that his involvement with federal wilderness policies spans from the passage of the Wilderness Act to the reclassification battles that ensued. He discusses the club's development of procedures to meet these battles and differences over strategies among the environmentalists themselves. As somewhat of a bystander in the controversies that developed around David Brower in the 1960s, McCloskey offers some interesting insights into club politics during those years.

The interviews that follow are perhaps most valuable for the history of the 1970s. That decade brought an explosion of environmental issues and support. From these years McCloskey discusses in detail the progress of legal advocacy, energy policies, wilderness issues, political activism, the redwoods, and the Alaskan campaign—to name only some of the more significant issues. McCloskey's interview is also key to understanding the club's management policies during the 1970s, from publishing to decision-making and hiring practices. Close identification with the Sierra Club and his life-long dedication to the environment are abundantly evident in the interviews that follow.

Susan R. Schrepfer
Interviewer

5 June 1983
New Brunswick, New Jersey
Scouting and Outdoor Experiences

Schrepfer: I think we should probably start fairly early in your life. I think it's often most interesting to talk about your philosophy of conservation and your early activities, particularly since you have often written legal things and less often written about what you thought and felt. Oral history is particularly important for peoples' opinions and peoples' philosophies. Can you think perhaps of what might have been some of the earliest influences on you in developing an interest in conservation, maybe books and family or an experience?

McCloskey: Yes, I know quite clearly when my consciousness of the environment began. I really became profoundly influenced by nature and the outdoors as a boy participating in the Boy Scouts in Oregon. I grew up in Eugene, Oregon. I joined scouting right on my twelfth birthday, the moment I was eligible to be a Boy Scout rather than a Cub Scout, and immediately became quite interested in hiking and backpacking and camping and was absolutely enthralled with what I saw of the rain forests in Oregon at that time along the Mackenzie River where we used to have a Boy Scout camp. I became totally wrapped up in scouting activity through the years. I stuck with it many years. I became an Eagle Scout with lots of merit badges and a silver palm, which is the highest level of all in scouting. It was a consuming commitment for a long time. I went through all of the ranks of scouting and eventually became, when I was in law school, an advisor to an Explorer Scout post, which is equivalent to a scoutmaster. I went to Boy Scout camp many summers in a row.

This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 255.
McCloskey: After scouting introduced me to mountain climbing, I then learned that there was an organization in my hometown devoted just to mountain climbing and mountaineering called the Obsidians. So, at the age of fourteen, a buddy of mine and I decided that we should join the Obsidians. We had all sorts of fantasies that they wouldn't let boys of our age in, but we finally screwed up our courage and applied, and after a while we were admitted.

So I began, at the age of fourteen, to also participate in the activities of the Obsidians and go on hikes with them. That introduced me to the existence of conservation. I was doing all of this, I think, from about 1946 through 1952 when I graduated from high school and went away to college at Harvard in the East. During those years, I continued to subscribe to their newsletter and learned of the emergence of conservation disputes, such as that over the Three Sisters Wilderness Area which began to unfold soon after the [Dwight D.] Eisenhower administration brought in a new chief of the Forest Service and a new secretary of Agriculture. That whole dispute emerged while I was away, and I followed it in detail.

Schrepfer: Are you talking about [Richard] McArdle?

McCloskey: McArdle. Lyle Watts was fired, and McArdle came in to succeed him [July 1952]. Ezra Taft Benson was the secretary of Agriculture. The secretary of Agriculture and the Forest Service under the Eisenhower administration decided to review all of the primitive areas beginning with the Three Sisters in Oregon, which was literally in my backyard. That's where I first hiked and climbed.

Harvard University and a Return to the Northwest

McCloskey: I began to be caught up in the whole set of problems that emerged in the '53, '54, '55 period that I was away at college. I became also active in the Young Democrats in college and became aware that there were sharp disputes between the Democrats and Republicans in the West over forest policy, over how much forest-land should be taken out of wilderness areas. There were disputes over mining policy--the Al Serena case in Oregon. At that time I was interested in the disputes over public power versus private power and dam policy and problems of oil drilling in national wildlife refuges.

I might add also I became acquainted with a candidate for the U.S. Senate in Oregon who ran in '54 and got elected senator, Richard M. Neuberger, who had written articles around the country. I corresponded with him and had him speak to the Young Democrats at Harvard. I became drawn into this whole controversy over public policy as it was emerging then.
McCloskey: Carrying on with this progression in my thinking, I graduated from Harvard in June of 1956. I was going into the army in late fall. I had been in ROTC, but it wasn't until after the election, so I volunteered my time to work in the re-election fight of then Senator Wayne Morse in Oregon and was a field organizer for him among college students. That also immersed me further and got me back into the state and the politics of conservation.

I might add that I went in the army at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, where there had been a controversy over intruding upon the Wichita Mountain Wildlife Refuge, which is next to Fort Sill, as an extension of a firing range. That kept my interests moving along [laughs], even though I couldn't do anything about that.

But at any rate, when I ended my tour of the army in 1958, I returned to Oregon to enter law school at the University of Oregon--

Schrepfer: Let me ask two questions: One, what did you major in at Harvard, and was there anything in your education maybe that was an influence? Number two, what was your reason for returning to the Northwest; was it partly involved with your interest in conservation, or was it something else entirely different?

McCloskey: At that time, my notion of where my career would go was that I would return to Oregon, earn a law degree, and go into politics. I had in mind that conservation was and would continue to be a leading issue in Oregon, so I saw a marriage of two interests I have always had which are in politics and conservation. What I did not suspect would be that the interest in conservation would so come to overshadow the interest in politics.

At Harvard my major was in American government, which was their phrase for what was otherwise called political science. It had a little different emphasis there. I did look for courses that had to do with natural resource policy. There were very few at the time. I took Arthur Maas's course that dealt with public policy and natural resources, but that was about all that was offered in the government department at that time. I remember how little of that course seemed to ring true to me. My education was very frustrating to me in terms of my emerging interests.

I returned to Oregon to go to law school because I thought, with four years at Harvard and two years in the army, I had been away from the state long enough, and I wanted to get back. When I did, one of the great frustrations in law school to me was that there was nothing at that time even hinting at environmental law or public interest law. All of the courses were mundane business law courses that bored me completely. So, I reimmersed myself in the local political scene. I became active again in the
McCloskey: Young Democrats in organizing a unit in the college and eventually becoming executive secretary of the state Young Democrats. I also became active in the local political scene, and at the same time I became active once again in the Obsidians and after a while became the chairman of their conservation committee.

Through that period, a transition began to take place where the conservation activities that I pursued began to compete with the political activities. I didn't really see what was going on [chuckles] until after it occurred, but one was quickly overtaking the other.

It was in the end of my junior year in 1959 that I went to the first Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs convention as the delegate from the Obsidians, since I was their conservation chairman, and this began to expose me to the whole wider field of conservation. I learned about the Sierra Club at that meeting and met their delegates. Dave Brower was there representing the club, and I served on the resolutions committee with him and was very impressed and totally turned on to the larger scene which I saw for the first time.

Then the following year, serving again on the resolutions committee with him, he told me about a controversy over the Minam River Valley in eastern Oregon. It was a well-forested corridor leading into the Eagle Gap Wilderness. It was unprotected at that time. Justice William O. Douglas knew it well and had appealed to Dave to have the club do something, so Dave asked me if I would like to do a couple of weeks of summer work for the club. He actually paid me. Phil Hyde was sent up to take the photographs, and I was asked to write up the text of a mailer.

So we explored the Minam River Valley and turned out a mailer, a protest, against the roads and logging that were planned for the area. That was the beginning of my first official work for the Sierra Club. By the end of the following year as I was graduating, I discovered that various groups in the Pacific Northwest felt that the problems that were gathering were so overwhelming that they needed a staff person to pull together the fragmented efforts to resist Forest Service logging up and down the Cascades from the Canadian border to the California border.

Grant McConnell, who has been a longtime activist in the North Cascades, had written in 1959 or '60 an outline of what was needed. It proposed a partnership between northwest conservation groups and the Sierra Club and the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs to organize an office. As I recall, it called for two people. So people in the Sierra Club, in the North Cascades Conservation Council, and the Federation of Western
McCloskey: Outdoor Clubs started talking to me in my senior year about whether I would be interested in doing this. Very little money had been raised.

I was so uninterested by then in the standard practice of law that I decided that this would be an interesting thing to do instead. I had in my mind that I would only do it for a year or two and then get back to my game plan, which was to practice law and to run for public office.

I did run for public office in 1962 in Oregon for the state house of representatives. I got nominated as a Democrat in Lane County, which is where Eugene is, but I was not elected. However, I came in only about two thousand votes shy of getting elected, and I suppose if I had run another time or two, I might have gotten off on another track. In fact, after I started as a Pacific Northwest representative of the club and the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs and some other groups, I was paid very little. Four hundred dollars a month was what the initial salary was, out of which expenses came. I was offered a job in 1962, I think, as a reading clerk in the Oregon State House of Representatives, and I almost quit the club's job unless I got a little more money, but Dave said, "Yes, we will pay you some more." So I didn't take the new job, and that was my last touch with the political scene.

Schrepfer: What was your reaction to Brower at this point as a person? What attracted you to him?

McCloskey: I suppose the same thing that attracted many other people, which was his fighting spirit in resisting a situation that seemed to us all at the time to be outrageous. I shouldn't say "all" because that raises an interesting question, but let me back up in my own reaction. When I went away to Harvard in 1952, there had not been a great deal of logging in the national forests in the Northwest, particularly in the Central Oregon Cascades where I came from. There had not been many dams built, so rivers were largely free flowing, and the forest cover was largely unbroken. But six years later when I came back in 1958, the situation was undergoing massive changes. New dams were being thrown up on the rivers. The south fork of the Mackenzie River had a big dam across it. Dams had been proposed on the north fork of the Mackenzie while I was away in college. The Obsidians led the fight to defeat one of them. Senator Neuberger helped.

I got back immediately in the fall of '58. Three alternative dams were proposed. The first thing I did was to try to rally the Obsidians to oppose those dams. But then they said, "We just don't have the resources to keep fighting this indefinitely."
McCloskey: I remember making an impassioned plea to them to rise to the occasion. We organized a protest committee and wrote letters to the newspaper. But that didn't succeed, but I could just see that the roads were being pushed everywhere in the national forests. The forests were being mowed down unceremoniously. It was all during the Eisenhower administration which was a very prodevelopment period, perhaps not unlike what we now face under the [Ronald] Reagan administration.

But I was absolutely outraged at the change taking place. I felt, and so did many other people in the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs and the Sierra Club, that there had been no really fair, orderly process for deciding these things, particularly the forest policy. Somewhat covertly the Forest Service had just decided to commit most all of the merchantable timber to timber companies, and there had been no fair, visible process by which this commitment was made explicit and public hearings could be held.

So we shared a sense of outrage that something was being put over on the public, and Brower was one of the first to take the lead in a high profile way to give expression to this outrage that a lot of us felt. We were somewhat pariahs in our communities at that time in that it was the conventional wisdom that we were overreacting, and the pattern was just emerging.

We had terrible fights with the Mazamas from Portland in the Federation of the Western Outdoor Clubs, who were dominated by people who were sympathetic to the Forest Service. For a while every federation convention would be a power struggle between the different elements of the federation. The Obsidians and the Mountaineers were in the vanguard of protest over this. The Mazamas defended the Forest Service and the Wyeast Club did, and a number of clubs were in between and didn't know what to make of it all. For four or five years this was a struggle that would surge back and forth in the conventions.

After I went to work, I was retained not only by the Sierra Club, but by the federation itself and the North Cascades Conservation Council, the Olympic Park Associates, the Oregon Cascades Conservation Council, and Friends of the Three Sisters Wilderness. But I remember going to many Mazamas meetings where there was a struggle over control of their conservation committee, and it was evenly split. Each meeting we would have to try to get a majority of our forces there, or their policies would go wrong. The Trails Club of Portland was pretty good, but the Mazamas was not. There was even some internal struggle within the Mountaineers, but the dominant group in Seattle was favorable to our side.

But it was an interesting, yeasty period and attitudes were changing rather quickly.
Influences of the Kennedy Years

Schrepfer: During this period of time, the national mood underwent a fairly significant change. At least we moved from [the] Eisenhower into the Kennedy period. Did you feel that when Kennedy came in it made a difference to your activities?

McCloskey: I might say I looked somewhat wistfully at the fact that a number of people I had known in the Young Democrats, who were just a few years older than I was, were off to Washington in new posts of the Kennedy administration. I was a little bit green to be thinking of going off, but it was a period where we were very hopeful for all sorts of reversals. In many respects, we were disappointed by the lack of perception of the Kennedy administration about these problems. The officials who came in under Orville Freeman in the Agriculture Department and some of those under [Stewart L.] Udall in the Interior Department were more open than their predecessors to looking into these changes and considering what it was all about, but they had no intuitive feeling for what we were talking about. At best, they had experiences in the Midwest and, in some cases, Minnesota and the Midwest, that they could relate to and see that conservationists were potential political allies who should be heard out, but I think they thought we were a bunch of malcontents out on the West Coast, and they just couldn't understand what all of the yelling was about.

They did set in motion a number of commissions and committees to study problems that we were raising. George Selke, a longtime associate of Orville Freeman, who was then secretary of Agriculture, was sent out to look at a number of the problems of the national forests. For the North Cascades, a special study committee was set up, and we had lots of opportunity for input to those, but at the same time, in 1962, Orville Freeman got hornswoggled by the timber industry into making a number of commitments that over the course of time were designed to step up the allowable cut in the national forests. It intensified the pressure on potential wilderness. I think he simply did not really understand the nature of the conflicts. I think basically he was very much committed toward intensive resource management.

When Kennedy made a tour, I think about 1962, of the West to give a series of planned speeches on conservation and natural resource policy, I think most of us felt initially great hope that this would be the final clarion call to reversing direction. It fell flat. It was an effort to reinvoke the natural resource policies of FDR in the thirties, which were make-work projects. We felt we were on the threshold of a wholly new period, and it proved to be, with what Udall later called a third wave in conservation, which was environmentally oriented and qualitatively oriented rather than quantitatively.
McCloskey: But the people, I think, in the Kennedy administration in that first four-year period, were basically out of the mentality of the thirties and simply weren't striking any very responsive chords.

Schrepfer: Do you have a feeling that it was an eastern administration and that conservation in this case was a western movement?

McCloskey: We, at that time, had very much that view. As a matter of fact, I think it is literally true that the protest in the post-World War II period in the midfifties about excessive commercialization, excessive development in violation of nature sanctuaries, was the genesis of what came to be the environmental movement by the seventies. I don't think it was Silent Spring.* Silent Spring, which, it is popular to say, is where it all began, came on the scene about 1961. Now, that had its importance in the Midwest and East and may have been the beginning of a new rise in general consciousness. The book had great relevance about questions of DDT at that time, but I think the Three Sisters Wilderness in the Far West and the Dinosaur Dam fight in the Rocky Mountain areas [1954-1956] were the beginning of the whole post-World War II upsurge.

II MULTIPLE USE, THE WILDERNESS ACT, AND NORTHWESTERN CONSERVATION CAMPAIGNS

An Assessment of the Multiple Use Concept

Schrepfer: Let's discuss the Forest Service in more detail. Chronologically, it might make sense to begin with the multiple-use issue, if that's all right with you. You wrote quite a bit about it in 1960. You referred to what you thought was an inherent confusion in the act, that it recognized the 1897 Organic Act, which designated two primary uses, but yet was clearly designed to be a multiple-use act. Do you think that twenty years later that your assessment still holds, that the act had a weakness that has cost a great deal in terms of the preservationists?

McCloskey: I'm not sure that the act itself was the source of our problems. I think it was more just symptomatic of the emerging conflict between commercial pressures trying to squeeze every last bit of merchantable resource out of public lands, and those of us who felt there was a need for a different kind of balance that found a place for commercial use, but [did] not [give it] the dominant role in the management of public lands. I felt that commercial use should have a modest and limited role and that noncommercial resources should have a very significant role and that the process of blending the two should be a very sensitive process.

I might add that one of my theses in that law review article on the Multiple Use Act* was that one could interpret that act as providing a place for resource protection as a major authorized use. I might add that one of the things I later

*For this and subsequent references, see the bibliography of Mike McCloskey's publications in the appendix.
McCloskey: found amusing was that a decade or more after I wrote that article, the Intermountain Forest Service Experiment Station at Ogden [Utah] generated a major research paper, which turned out to be a rebuttal of that article that I had written. [laughs] The fact that they could have labored a decade to produce a rebuttal just utterly amazed me.

Schrepfer: How much weight would you have the Forest Service give to wilderness and recreation as opposed to commercial use? Is there any way you can measure that?

McCloskey: Of course, it will vary with each forest and according to local situations, but the club has argued in recent years that the allowable cut is too high and ought to be reduced. It has been in the vicinity of ten to twelve billion-board feet for many years. We had suggested that that level was beyond what could be sustained indefinitely and perhaps ought to be on the order of nine billion-board feet per year.

The Forest Service says that the potential yield which they would like to get to is seventeen billion-board feet. So in an aggregate sense, that outlines the divergences of viewpoint.

Schrepfer: Do you think that multiple use is in theory a sound management policy?

McCloskey: I have never felt that there was a great deal of either intellectual or managerial content to the notion of multiple use. It is a truism to say that there will be a multiplicity of uses over a large aggregate quantity of land. But when you get beyond the truisms, one can wonder whether there is any real guidance. It provides a catch phrase which was a political football in the early sixties. What it meant to those opposed to wilderness was some sort of intellectual rationale for opposing wilderness and justifying the onslaught of commercialism.

One of the things I had in mind as a secondary purpose in writing that article was to explore just what kind of content "multiple use" had. By now, twenty years later, few use it as some kind of magic phrase that settles debates, but then that is what it was invoked as. I might add that one of the political curiosities of the political debate, however, is that even today the phrase is invoked for BLM [Bureau of Land Management] lands that are heavily devoted to grazing as a predominant use. In that context, some of the people on our side still like to wave the flag of multiple use as a slogan which arguably would bring us toward a better balance between commercial and noncommercial uses. But when the balance in the national forests was already struck heavily toward commercial uses, particularly timbering,
and we were trying to get wilderness and noncommercial uses considered in the picture, then multiple use appeared to be the rationale for maintaining the status quo, and we were quite critical of that use of the term.

I don't think these questions of how the balance is defined can be solved by waving any phrase around, and that's all it ever was.

Would you agree that the phrase was developed by the Forest Service as a part of their antiwilderness campaign or their concern about the proposals for a wilderness act?

Yes, I think they certainly had that in mind. But provisions were put in the Multiple Use Act to make it clear that wilderness was consistent with multiple use.

Did you have any part in putting that--

I didn't. That happened while I was still in law school, but the conservation movement did.

The Forest Service always claimed that the conservationists pulled wool over their eyes and stuck that provision in at the last minute on the floor of Congress.

Let's go on to the Wilderness Act. I think that we can continue, in essence, in saying that the causes that you list in your discussions or in your writings on the Wilderness Act, with the growing demand for statutory protection of wilderness, are primarily theoretical. I'm just wondering how much did the actual disillusionment with the Forest Service's activities and a feeling of, let's say, betrayal or perhaps even as strong as dishonesty in their treatment of wilderness and what their personnel said about wilderness policy—how did this contribute to the need for a Wilderness Act, particularly in the Northwest?

In the Northwest context, what we quickly learned through the fifties was that there was no way to get any sensitive balance between areas that still looked like forest and had environmental quality except through wilderness. Unless you had a wilderness line drawn, it was just standard logging terrain. For years, with the term "multiple use," the Forest Service would keep arguing that it was otherwise, but one merely had to go out on the land
McCloskey: and look. You saw a mile-after-mile of trail disappear into a jungle of logging debris. You couldn't find the trail take-off points anymore. The forest just became an industrial tree farm.

In theory, there might have been all sorts of ways to do selective logging and small-unit selection logging. In fact, it is ironic that in the southern Oregon Cascades, after twenty-five years of insistence upon clearcutting, the Forest Service is now admitting that they have such poor reproduction that they are abandoning clearcutting and going to shelter wood and various forms of selective cutting.

But be that as it may, we learned—because we were on the ground; we were hiking; we were covering it out there—that the only forest that survived was that that was within a wilderness boundary or a national park boundary and all the other talk was simply propaganda. The Forest Service took this very hard. They took it as a criticism of their management practice and their custodianship and as an assault upon their integrity, and we took it as just plain misrepresentation to assert that anything else could be the truth because we could see it with our eyes. Nothing was surviving that wasn't protected in a wilderness that still looked like a forest.

Now, they would argue that it was going to reproduce itself; indeed, many areas outside of the southern Oregon areas have reproduced themselves. But the result is an industrial tree farm; it is not a national forest serving a multiplicity of public uses.

Schreper: So you didn't feel that outdoor recreation was compatible with Forest Service forest practices?

McCloskey: That's right, in terms of the quality of a forest experience. It's very clear in the overall record of history that the Forest Service itself was being pushed unmercifully by the timber industry, the Industrial Forestry Association, and others in the Pacific Northwest. When John McGuire was chief [of the Forest Service], he admitted to me in a moment of candor that Orville Freeman's 1962 order was the turning point in the last twenty years. His so-called Four Point Policy is what led the Forest Service into the death grip of the timber industry's efforts to overcut the national forest to compensate for what is basically a continuation of cut-and-get-out policies on private industrial lands in the Douglas fir region of the Far West.

Schreper: You portrayed the Forest Service as somewhat of a, perhaps, hapless victim. Do you think that most of the on-site or the field workers in the Forest Service in the Pacific Northwest in the late fifties and the early sixties were genuinely interested in wilderness or high quality outdoor recreation?
McCloskey: Not really. There was a changing of the guard that gradually occurred in the early and midfifties. Foresters who came in the 1920s out of the Gifford Pinchot tradition of the custodial period--Lyle Watt epitomized that when he was chief through the forties--were retiring. Most of them were not graduates of forestry schools.

The people who replaced them had an overwhelming commitment to manipulation and management and had this stubborn streak of self-confidence that they could manipulate the forest to produce any set of outputs you wanted and were brimful of confidence and eager to get on with it. They saw us as some sort of throwbacks who were standing in their way. They were anxious to displace their old guard. Some twenty years later a new generation of foresters is coming out of some forestry schools that is much more modest in their intentions and more imbued with the need to do a good job of protecting the environment. That middle generation was just plain terrible on the whole. They really lacked much sensitivity to environmental values, although there are exceptions.

Schrepfer: Do you think that was probably an internal change in the service or did forestry schools play a role; did politics play a role?

McCloskey: It was a convergence of forces, I think, but certainly most of the forestry schools by then were very commercially oriented and oriented toward serving industrial clients. Oregon State University, the University of Washington, and the University of Idaho are prime examples in the Far West that are turning out students of that sort. The University of California has not been all that much better, despite the intellectual pretentions of some of their faculty. Their clientele attitude toward the industry has just been a bit more sophisticated. The University of Montana in Missoula has been one of the exceptions through that period to some extent.

Schrepfer: I gather the Three Sisters [Wilderness] was the area that was particularly crucial in the development of your conservation thinking. Perhaps we might talk about that. When the Forest Service designated the Three Sisters, first as a primitive area and then as a wilderness area, was it the way the Forest Service drew the line, in part, that was disturbing to you? In other words, did you feel that the Forest Service at that time, in their primitive areas, restricted them to rock and high altitudes where there was nothing?
McCloskey: Yes, the reclassification of the Three Sisters Wilderness was where the term "wilderness on the rocks" first got coined, and then it reemerged in the fight over the Glacier Peak Limited Area. In the case of the Three Sisters, there was a large block of land on the west side of it, in the old Cascades, the non-volcanic portion of it, that was heavily timbered. This was the so-called 53,000 acre area later called inaccurately the French Pete Area. It included the Olallie Ridge and a number of ridges. By 1956, it had been deleted from the reclassified Three Sisters Wilderness Area and that became a cause celebre of the movement. Its deletion was heavily protested at the time with hearings.

When I came on the scene, the deed had been done, but by 1961 when I was at work, we were devising holding strategies for trying to buy time to keep it from being logged. We had just emerged from the strategy of asking for a series of natural areas around small key points within the 53,000 acre unit that had undeniable natural values.

We also tried to get streamside corridors, with sort of the strategy that if we could hold on to a number of strong points, so to speak, we could use them as a focal point for slowing down the onslaught—to buy time. We made only a little bit of headway with that; in that I think a couple of natural areas were designated and further study was to be given to a number of our proposals. But logging finally did get under way, and some of the wilderness was lost. But by the mid-sixties with a new generation of people involved, we began to gain momentum with the whole French Pete campaign and gained some time in the mid-seventies. We finally succeeded and a good share of that 53,000 acres was finally put back into the wilderness.

Schrepfer: Did you work with Brock Evans?

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McCloskey: During my time as the northwest representative, I worked primarily with Karl and Ruth Onthank in Eugene who were the principal leaders. He, in fact, was my mentor during that time. He had been a dean of students at the University of Oregon and was a towering figure in northwest conservation work through many years, certainly from about the 1920s on until his death in the late sixties. He provided a real continuity between the first wave in American conservation and the beginning of the third. He brought me along in the Obsidians, introduced me to the Federation of the Western Outdoor Clubs and the Sierra Club and knew virtually everybody and had tremendous self-confidence in dealing with problems.
McCloskey: In some ways, Onthank is a bit like Dr. Edgar Wayburn has been in the Sierra Club in the San Francisco area at a little later time. He had been the person who had been marshalling the protests from the beginning of the Three Sisters contest.

After his death, Richard Noyes, a Sierra Club activist, took over the leadership for many years in the battles and others followed him. I really was not involved to any significant degree after 1965 when I went to San Francisco. Brock Evans came on the scene after I left.

Oregon Cascades National Park

McCloskey: Out of the protest over the Three Sisters Wilderness Area in about 1960, there was a decision that we needed to develop a way to keep from being nibbled to death. The idea of the Oregon Cascades National Park was developed by a fellow by the name of David Simons, whom I never met. He was from the neighboring town of Springfield. He was active locally while I was still in the army, and he died soon after I got back [from meningitis contracted in] the army. We should have been good friends, but our careers crossed in the night. He wrote this magnificent proposal for an Oregon Cascades National Park in a very moving pamphlet of the time, and that embraced a large area of the central Oregon Cascades, basically from about the Diamond Peak Area on the south to Mount Jefferson on the north and included the Three Sisters Area. It was a grand vision.

When I came aboard as the field representative [for the Sierra Club and other groups], I faced the question of what to do about it. Simons was sort of a precursor for my work. As a volunteer, he threw himself with tremendous energy into their campaigns. He also had been active in the North Cascades and had drawn up some ideas for a North Cascades National Park also. He had been in touch with Dave Brower in the San Francisco office. So that was sort of a legacy that I came upon. However, we decided that we could not successfully push simultaneously both for a North Cascades National Park and an Oregon Cascades National Park and that the North Cascades, in the aggregate, had a higher value.

Schrepfer: Was there a special year and meeting when this decision was made?

McCloskey: I can't remember any meeting that was held, but Dave Brower and I did discuss this as a strategic decision. We also had the Oregon Dunes National Seashore proposal pending, which was
McCloskey: supposed to have been a Park Service unit. We gave priority to first, the North Cascades National Park, then to the Oregon Dunes, and then to the Oregon Cascades.

I then developed the notion of mounting a holding action on the Oregon Cascades Park—that instead of advancing the park proposal frontally, we would take parts of it and try to build campaigns around saving those components so that in the aggregate, if they succeeded, we would keep the area somewhat intact.

The Waldo Lake controversy, toward the southern end of it, was one component of it. The Mount Jefferson Wilderness Area proposal at the northern end was another component. The 53,000 acres on the west side was another component in the middle. There were some other minor ones, but those were sort of the three salients in the plan, and I worked actively on all of them. The Waldo Lake controversy was something that I got very involved with while still in law school as a volunteer with Karl Onthank.

We organized a committee to save the Waldo Lake Area. It was the largest nearly wilderness lake in the Oregon Cascades at that time. It was a beautiful large lake, and the surroundings remind you of Alaska. It has high alpine vegetation around it. It had only one tiny little primitive road into the northeast corner of it at that time. The Forest Service had plans to log at the edge of it and to put a high speed road at the southern end of it. We lobbied against that road and to create wilderness areas around a good share of it.

Eventually, we lost on the road, but we got some wilderness protection around parts of the lake. It attracted a great deal of attention at the time in that part of Oregon. Protests over that, along with some of the ones in the North Cascades, led to the creation of the high mountain landscape management policy, a policy of the Forest Service in the Northwest. This was a policy that restricted the amount of logging taking place in the high elevation zone. They had shown little sense or restraint in talking about the problem or planning about it in the past.

Let's go back to the Oregon Cascades story, on Mount Jefferson. This had been a primitive area. It was a long thin area running along the crest, with Mount Jefferson as the center piece of it and also a couple of other mountains, the Three Finger Jack particularly. It didn't have much breadth running east to west. I drew up a proposal as the field rep, along with local groups, to give it a greater breadth on the west and to some extent on the south. The Chemeketans of Salem were another group that was involved at the time.
McCloskey: That issue engendered a fair amount of controversy. Eventually, the plan that was adopted by Congress did include some additional areas that the Forest Service had not originally proposed and that we had advanced, particularly along Pamelia Creek on the west side.

But over the course of time, the whole notion of an Oregon Cascades National Park did get lost in the shuffle as the controversy was directed toward these component parts. Eventually, the component parts strategy bore a certain amount of fruit. We improved the protection for and breadth of the Mount Jefferson Wilderness Area. We obtained the landscape management policy that impeded, to some extent, the high elevation logging that was planned in the area. We got a greater acreage of roadless area around Waldo Lake and eventually, when the Three Sisters Wilderness controversy came to an end (including the French Pete campaign), the whole boundary for the Three Sisters Wilderness Area was substantially expanded and closely corresponded, particularly on the east and west, to our original Oregon Cascades National Park boundary. So we got, I suppose, half to two-thirds of a loaf after about fifteen to eighteen years of struggle!

Schrepfer: How about some of the Forest Service men that you dealt with on the Oregon Cascades. In the Washington office, was Ed Cliff at all sympathetic? I have some vague recollection that Orville Freeman might have been somewhat sympathetic. Did you have that reaction at the time?

McCloskey: We met with Cliff on occasion, but I never felt there was any sympathy there. Orville Freeman was somewhat remote in all of this, but he was willing to, as I said earlier, to set up various study committees and send out George Selke to look at problems. He came out and met with us on a number of occasions. He was a retired political science professor from a university in Minnesota, who had helped Freeman as governor. He exuded a considerable amount of human warmth and was willing to have questions reconsidered. But in the end, not all that much change came out of his missions. I think he viewed his efforts principally as a way of trying to pour oil on troubled waters and just calm down all of the protesters out there. I don't think he ever really understood why we were upset.

Schrepfer: How about J. Herbert Stone (regional forester of Region Six in the early 1960s)?

McCloskey: We viewed Stone as the hardest of the hard-liners who was pushing the opposite point of view with total zeal. Recently somebody told me he had just died, and they made a comment along the same line that he was a totally unreconstructed devotee of logging.
Glacier Peak and the North Cascades National Park

Schrepfer: Should we go on to some of the other reclassification fights?

McCloskey: Yes, the Glacier Peak controversy had a history similar to the Three Sisters Wilderness. It arose in the mid-fifties shortly after the Three Sisters Wilderness fight. It, however, was one of a number of so-called "limited areas" in the Pacific Northwest. It didn't even have primitive area status. It had been set up, I believe, in 1946 simply by order of the regional forester. They were areas identified as having outstanding natural values and that they should be on the agenda for further study as to their disposition. Of course, Glacier Peak was this tremendously impressive, snow-clad volcano in the North Cascades in Washington state with major forested river valleys running down from it. It had gotten attention from Bob Marshall and others in the 1930s.

From the mid-fifties on, conservationists in Seattle and Washington state had been trying hard to get protection for it. The Forest Service had come up with a series of proposals for very circumscribed boundaries that basically ran along the ridge tops and excised the valleys, particularly along the Suiattle. This had the same effect in enraging conservationists and hikers around Seattle and rallying them. There were a series of incidents over the years about this, beginning in the late fifties, and the area north of that in the North Cascades. In fact, over the course of time, the Glacier Peak Wilderness has had the boundaries repeatedly redrawn on it, and Congress has dealt with it a number of times, gradually filling in the river valleys, putting them back into the wilderness and developing better and better boundaries.

When the North Cascades National Park was finally created, the Forest Service lost a huge chunk of terrain to the Park Service [in 1968]. They then extended all sorts of interim protection to areas around the Glacier Peak Wilderness, with scenic areas and other kinds of designations to restrict logging and improve the total scope of protection.

So ultimately that campaign brought us a lot of success. I was involved in a limited degree when I came on as the northwest conservation representative in trying to develop strategies for the next step. But when we drew boundaries for the North Cascades National Park, we initially put the Glacier Peak Wilderness in our proposals and drew very expansive boundaries, though when Congress finally dealt with the matter it chose to put the part north of the Glacier Peak Wilderness in a park and to keep the wilderness under the Forest Service.
McCloskey: On the North Cascades National Park, I might say that when I arrived on the scene, people in the movement were still arguing about whether to give up on the Forest Service and efforts to try to get them to do better in terms of the boundaries or to opt for a national park. The controversy was intense.

Schrepfer: McCall was one of the leaders of the advocates of the Forest Service and the administration, wasn't he?

McCloskey: That's right. In the '59-'60 period—that was before I went to work as northwest rep, but I had been to some of the meetings as a volunteer—there were intense internal debates. There was some feeling that a national park was going to have roads in it and lodges, and it would be overdeveloped, and, in theory, a Forest Service wilderness was a purer and better designation. The problem was that we didn't have a wilderness act at the time, and the Forest Service had administrative discretion, or the secretary of Agriculture did, to shrink the boundaries at will. Here we were not even dealing with the wilderness or primitive area; we were dealing with a couple of limited areas. There was a North Cascades primitive area along the Canadian boundary, but that was limited in scope, and there was a magnificent intervening area between that and the Glacier Peak Limited Area to the south, and the limited area had no real status. J. Herbert Stone, who was hostile as the regional forester, could have done away with it at a moment's notice.

Schrepfer: Did you have any qualms then, and did you feel right from the beginning that it should be a national park?

McCloskey: Basically, that decision had been made by the time I got there, but I was so fed up with the Forest Service that I was quite prepared to go for a national park, although it was a calculated decision. We all realized that once it got to be a national park, we would have to protect it from the Park Service. I think all of us had our eyes open. We had no illusions that the Park Service would be easy to deal with nor could be relied upon. But the one thing we knew was that the Park Service isn't in the business of selling timber to timber companies; it isn't in the business of developing mines; it isn't in the business of building dams, and we had problems with all three.

Schrepfer: Was this '61 that we are talking about?

McCloskey: I think it was in 1959 and '60 that the decision was made, as I recall it.

Schrepfer: Can you recall anything that helped form this attitude you had toward the Park Service?
McCloskey: One of the antecedents of this was the Sierra Club's experience in California with the Kings Canyon National Park and also in Washington state with Olympic National Park. Both of those had been precursor battles where conservationists had become fed up with the Forest Service. They had embraced parks and had come away whole; we hadn't lost everything to roads. Those who had been through those battles reminded us that history doesn't always turn out poorly, particularly when the legislative history and the political history of the fight makes it clear that the Park Service has the land only because the conservationists put in the effort to get it transferred and were basically seeking a wilderness-type park.

Those arguments were persuasive. Those were two hands-on experiences. The people who had been involved in those were still around and telling us and showing us it was true. I might add, simultaneously I was having a bad experience with the Park Service in the Oregon Dunes National Seashore proposal that emerged about 1959, both as a volunteer and a little later as a staff person who was advancing that proposal. I met with the Park Service in San Francisco on a number of occasions, and even before the seashore was authorized they were drawing up development plans that involved too many roads and inappropriate development, and I found that a very bittersweet experience.

Eventually, it was not made a national seashore under the Park Service but under the Forest Service, and our movement finally acquiesced in that because the Forest Service showed greater restraint in their road and development proposals and, to this day, they do not have a road as far down the beach as the Park Service had then proposed.

Schreiper: How about Mission 66? Did you have a reaction to that?

McCloskey: The movement was upset. During my time, Mission 66 was not having much of an impact on the parks that then existed in the Northwest. I think it was having a greater impact elsewhere. I guess the worst thing about the Mission 66 in the Northwest was at Mount Rainier National Park where there was a proposal to build a new lodge on the west side. Eventually, there was a compromise. They built a conical-shaped structure, but it was just a visitor's center with no overnight lodging in it, with the idea that the old lodge there would eventually come down, but it's still there! But Mission 66, at least in the Northwest, didn't on the whole appear to be all that pernicious.

I might add, back on the North Cascades National Park, as I came on the scene on the Sierra Club staff, people had just made this decision to go for a park, but I found that they didn't have
McCloskey: a strategy; they didn't have a plan. I said, "Look, we can't sell an idea until it becomes concrete, until we have something specific to promote."

So I was the first one to develop a specific proposal with a boundary line to it. I went around to pick the brains of all the people that knew different sections of it. Our proposal was for a very large park. I forget the exact acreage. It was well over a million acres. No one person knew the whole area that well, so I found out who was the most expert on the different components of it, picked their brains about a boundary, and did shuttle diplomacy between the conservation groups involved until we came to agreement on a boundary line. We developed a Prospectus for a North Cascades National Park, I called it, which was over a hundred page document. It was a case for why a park was desirable.

That was the first specific proposal for a North Cascades National Park and led to the eventual establishment of the park.

Schrepfer: The prospectus was written in 1961?

McCloskey: I think it was '62 when we had it ready. That, in turn, was used as the key document to persuade the Kennedy administration to study the idea. They set up a five-person study commission, and it worked over the next couple of years to develop a proposal. Eventually, they did develop an administration proposal for a much smaller national park.

Schrepfer: Did you testify at the '65 commission hearing on the proposal?

McCloskey: Yes, I testified at a couple of hearings up there at that time, and I organized our turnout at them; we turned out a very large number of people.

Schrepfer: Generally, your testimony was fairly positive toward the study team's proposals. Did that reflect what you really felt, or was it politically expedient?

McCloskey: As a matter of fact, internally, in discussions Dave Brower and I had particularly, I was not as inclined to go along with the highly restrictive proposal that came out of that federal study. Dave Brower reminded me of Dick Neuberger saying, "Let's catch a train that's going somewhere rather than be sitting idle at the station with our dreams." I thought at the time that that was a very uncharacteristic statement for him to make because he is generally viewed as the person who goes for the big objective and holds tough to the end. As a matter of fact, that's an interesting contrast between me and Dave. He was perceived as not
McCloskey: having a pragmatic streak, and I am perceived as perhaps being primarily pragmatic. But there have been a number of times through the years when the reality was somewhat reversed. He had more of a pragmatic streak than a lot of people gave him credit for, and I think I have had more of an idealistic streak than many people give me credit for. But our images are somewhat different.

Schrepfer: Isn't this partly manner?

McCloskey: Yes, I was somewhat disappointed at the time that we were giving up so easily on the grand plan. I suppose there was some pride of authorship on my part since I had spent so many hours pulling it together. I thought we ought to have been a bit more critical of it, but the feeling had been that all along that it was a device to get some land, a substantial chunk of land, away from the Forest Service, to put the fear of the Lord into them so that they would behave better. That had been the historic wisdom we had learned from the Olympic fight and the Kings Canyon fight, that the Forest Service only shaped up when the ultimate sanction was directed toward them, which was the loss of jurisdiction over land and that all sorts of better results would ensue once they learned that we had the political power to take land away from them.

But the Forest Service would listen to nothing else and nothing else worked, and I think that this strategy once again was proven there. Once the park came into existence, albeit it was limited in size, all sorts of scenic areas began to emerge around the edge of it. The allowable cuts started going down in the Snoqualmie National Forest and other nearby places, and a whole new sensitivity emerged.

Schrepfer: I did want to ask you a question about a 1961 hearing in the subcommittee of the House Agricultural Committee. You wrote an article in the Sierra Club Bulletin in which you said that the Forest Service was deliberately manipulating the committee. Do you have any recollection of that?

McCloskey: [laughs] I'm afraid I don't! Have you anything else to refresh my memory?

Schrepfer: I wondered, by what you had said, if you meant that the Forest Service excluded the park advocates, if you had some problem getting access to the committee?

McCloskey: Was that a hearing in Portland?

Schrepfer: Yes.
McCloskey: I simply don't recall the details, other than now that you mention it, I do recall that we came away with a very bittersweet feeling about the whole occasion.

Schreper: Did you sometimes have problems with that in the hearings where the Forest Service would manipulate the congressmen's time and attention?

McCloskey: Yes, but I simply can't recall the details.

Senator Henry Jackson and the North Cascades Struggle

Schreper: As long as we are on the North Cascades, what about the roles of the individuals during this period? Do you remember, for example--what we're talking about is from '61 to '65--some of the senators and congressmen who were helpful to you?

McCloskey: Ultimately, on the North Cascades National Park, Senator Jackson was the pivotal person. By 1968 our field representative was Brock Evans. There had been two successors to me by then. However, I was in Senator Jackson's office during the '67 through '68 period working on the Redwood National Park. In fact, I even had a desk in his office that I used a great deal of the time! Sterling Munro was the force who was really deciding what was going to happen with the North Cascades National Park, and I talked to Munro on a number of occasions about that. The final decision to go with the park and the final decisions about which boundaries were basically Jackson's.

When I began in the Northwest, the congressmen from the districts on the east and west side of the North Cascades were both Republicans who were extremely unsympathetic. So we realized that even if we could bring Jackson around, we could never progress in the House until we had different congressmen. So in '62, I took a leave of absence from the Sierra Club staff and went to work in the west side congressional district on the north of Seattle, to change the congressman. He was a Republican by the name of Jack Westland who was a great golf player and a great enemy of conservation. I went to work for a fellow by the name of Lloyd Meeds who won the election with our help, and he agreed that he would support the national park and support wilderness areas. It was then a very heavily logging-oriented district, though it later became a heavily Boeing-oriented district!
McCloskey: The congressman soon thereafter changed on the east side, too. He had been a staff person for Jackson by the name of Tom Foley. Both Foley and Meeds became proteges of Jackson, and when Jackson decided to go with the park, they both came along easily, although later Meeds, in the final stages of his career in Congress, became very troublesome on the Alaska bill and other things.

Schrepfer: The redwoods?

McCloskey: I'm not sure about that. At any rate, Meeds later became a great problem to us, but he was essential to getting the North Cascades park through.

Schrepfer: What about [Kennedy administration secretary of the Interior Stewart L.] Udall's role?

McCloskey: I don't recall much about his role in the '68 legislation for the North Cascades National Park; I do on redwoods when we come to that.

Schrepfer: So he didn't help you, to speak of?

McCloskey: Not that I know of, but again, I did not do any lobbying on the North Cascades National Park after '65. Brock Evans and some others took that over as they succeeded me.

Schrepfer: I want to just ask you one last question on the North Cascades and then maybe you will want to add something later. In retrospect, what do you think was the major reason it took so long to get a North Cascades National Park? After all, there wasn't a whole lot of timber involved, not compared, for example, to the redwoods. There wasn't a great deal of money involved in terms of a federal purchase as there was with the redwoods, and yet the battle was every bit as long.

McCloskey: It was eight years from beginning to end, and it didn't have a history stretching back much earlier than 1960. I think that is relatively short for a major campaign, many of which go back for decades and decades. Now that I look back upon it, I think it was Jackson's reservations over it that took the time. He was a congressman during Olympic Park fights, representing that district in the thirties. I think he came out of that feeling very nervous and cautious because it was a big timber fight, and he was a congressman from a timber district. He was a park supporter eventually in the Olympic National Park battle, but I think he is by nature a cautious politician, and he wants to be sure of absolutely minimizing the political risks. When he put together the final proposal, his staff man was gerrymandering around one problem after another and put in one safeguard after another, and I think it's just his manner to be extremely cautious.
McCloskey: He was the political power, and has been, in the state. All of Kennedy administration people deferred to him, and nobody was going to do anything that Scoop didn't want. The long and the short of the lobbying was to convince Scoop that that was the thing to do.

Schrepfer: Did you approach him when you were still in the Pacific Northwest about the proposal, or his office?

McCloskey: I had dealings with his office, but I can't remember much about how far we got. We did get him to join Senator Wayne Morse in '62 in requesting the landscape management policy, which was an effort to slow down logging in the higher elevation areas, which included the North Cascades. But during my time in the Northwest, that is from '61 to '65, most of the time was taken up on this federal study and the hearings surrounding it. It really didn't get to the point of a legislative proposal. Jackson would just merely reply that he wasn't going to develop a position until he saw what came out of the study, and the study led to the wheel-spinning that went on.

Alpine Lakes: A New Approach to Boundary Drawing

Schrepfer: Do you have any reaction to the North Cross State Highway?

McCloskey: To this day I haven't driven it, so I don't know what it looks like yet!

Schrepfer: Certainly in California such highways have caused a great deal of controversy.

McCloskey: At the time, my recollection is that there was, as I recall, a fair amount of controversy within the North Cascades Conservation Council and others about it. We opposed it, as I recall, but I think that there was a feeling that we couldn't do anything and that it should not be the centerpiece of our program, that the logging was the critical thing, and if we appeared to be trying to keep people from having any access to the area, then we would compound our political problems. So, it was resisted, but it wasn't given a very high profile as an issue.

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Schrepfer: We have been talking about Glacier Peak, and we have not finished it, as I recall, if you want to continue with that.

McCloskey: Not so much on Glacier Peak, but south of Glacier Peak is the Alpine Lakes Area. It was also a limited area, and it was between Snoqualmie and Stevens Pass, an area of marvelous
McCloskey: Alp-like crests, with spurs running out east and west sprinkled with Alpine lakes and deep river valleys. I ran into the same thing on it that I did with the North Cascades National Park, which was that many local conservationists were concerned about its future. The existing limited area boundaries were certainly inadequate. The Forest Service was committed to studying its future, but conservationists had not decided what they wanted.

So I said, "The beginning point is to have a proposal that people can get behind." Once again I picked people's brains who knew different parts of it and drew up a boundary proposal, with a write-up attached to it, and got endorsements from the leading groups. At that time, I think there were four of them—the Mountaineers, the Mazamas, the Sierra Club, and the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs. It proposed a unified wilderness area. At that time, the Forest Service was proposing to break up the limited area into a couple of different chunks. The limited area also did not embrace very much of the checkerboarded area which was intermingled with land grants and private land on the east side.

Later, larger proposals were drawn up that embraced more of that, and my successor, Brock Evans, developed what turned out to be an excellent strategy, developing a wilderness core proposal and a buffer around it.

But at any rate, my proposal, while somewhat smaller and focused primarily on areas of consolidated federal ownership, did get the ball rolling and provided a focal point for a long fight or struggle which ensued and finally came to a successful conclusion in the late seventies. But I drew up the first proposal for an Alpine Lakes Wilderness that had backing and recognition. My techniques for drawing up these proposals were, I think, perhaps also the first time that anybody in our movement had a coherent approach toward how you drew boundaries. Before then, I found the movement had no way to get a proposal together.

What I did, first of all, was a series of interviews with people who had expertise, and I found out from each who would be the next one who might be useful. Once I collected these ideas, I then would obtain all the different types of maps I could lay my hands on and develop a base map. Then I would circumnavigate the periphery by car on back roads to drive to every roadhead. I would make notes on what I saw from the roadhead, and look at questions as to whether you could close off part of the road. I usually hiked to a promontory from the roadhead and would get a picture of the lay of the land. After driving all the roadheads
McCloskey: all around the periphery, I then sometimes would charter a light plane and fly over the area and get a sense of how the core looked that I couldn't see from the easy vantage points around the edge.

Then I would plan one or more backpack trips into the core areas or traverses through it; I certainly could not sample them all, but I'd sample enough, so I felt I got a sense of the quality of the area. I would also go around to different federal agencies that had plans for the area. I would go to the Corps of Engineers and see if there were any proposals for dams. I would go to the Bureau of Mines and look for mineral information and to state mining agencies. I went to court houses to look for mining claims. I went through the records of filings there. I would go to the highway agencies to see what road development plans they had and build a whole picture of all of these development proposals and to try assess them to see how far advanced they were, how substantial they were in terms of conflicts we'd have to resolve.

Naturally, I went through Forest Service files and tried to develop--and I think I was the first to do this, with one exception that I will mention in a moment--accurate information on how much timber was involved. I would get the Forest Service timber maps and got their little overlays to figure out how much acreage and volume was involved, and I learned how to use their tables. I built a fairly complete picture of all the resource conflicts, so that we knew what we were facing, and if the industry would make some outrageous claim about all of the timber, then we would say, "Oh, it's not that much at all; it's of a marginal quality," and so forth.

The first comprehensive proposal of this sort that I did was for the Mount Jefferson Wilderness, which I think was in early '62. I even tried to convert the information into economic data. In that proposal, I tried to do a little benefit-cost comparison of the values foregone of an economic nature versus the values to be gained of a noncommercial nature. I did proposals like that then on the North Cascades (that was a very elaborate one) and on the Alpine Lakes. I drew up a proposal on an area called the Sky Lakes Wilderness, which is in Oregon south of Crater Lake National Park and along the crest. That became a prototype for what I tried to teach my successors to do later. The idea was that we didn't want to be politically surprised by not knowing what arguments the opposition could make, and we would want to be able to answer them in advance and reassure decision makers that we knew what the problems were, and that we had answers for them.

Schrepfer: You did this in the Sky Lakes area also?
McCloskey: Yes. I might also add that we did it for the Idaho Primitive Area, but that was toward the end of my term in the Northwest and that was turned over to my successor. I was also involved in some field studies on the reclassification of the Sawtooth Wilderness Area in central Idaho. I did some field work on that, flying around and looking at some timber on the west side. I did a little bit in Montana on the Cabinet Mountains wilderness proposal and a couple of others.

In my time in the Northwest, I began with the base of Oregon, knowing it fairly well. I then became familiar with Washington state, and when I got that under my belt, I moved into Idaho and then eventually into Montana. I felt I had only scratched the surface on Montana, but I might add that as I got around, I made contacts, and pulled people together. I recruited new clubs for the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs. I brought in a club in Missoula, Montana (the Rocky Mountaineers) into the Federation. I even moved into Utah and brought the Utah Alpine Club in there and helped bring in a couple of more clubs from Washington state. I even went off to British Columbia occasionally and tried to bring in some clubs up there.

At that time, the pockets of conservation were very small and separated from each other. The Sierra Club had only one chapter for the entire Pacific Northwest, and it was more like the regional conservation committee of later years. I did more work with non-Sierra Club groups than I did with Sierra Club groups. I was very much involved in tying together all of these scattered units that felt isolated and who felt very much that we were on the outside and that the whole system was working against the direction that we wanted to go, that we faced a great deal of public hostility and got very little sympathy from the media. They had definite feelings of being outcasts in those days, and that is quite a contrast to the situation in which we operate today.

Schrepfer: Between '61 and '65 you were employed by both the Sierra Club and the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs.

McCloskey: It was a joint arrangement; I was on contract through '64, and I was finally put on salary then. The arrangement then was changed so that the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs then would reimburse the club for its share. All along, the money was paid through the Sierra Club, and the federation initially was to pay half. They were supposed to raise half the money from non-Sierra Clubs, and they would send money to San Francisco and reimburse the club for part of my salary. But I always felt that I was retained by the whole collection of groups and was answerable to them all.
Schrepfer: Did it ever happen that the club and the federation took different positions on something?

McCloskey: They didn't in fact, but with the Mazamas being the problem that I mentioned, it was always a potentiality that that faction could become dominant. But we had a very close sense of partnership in those days. People felt so isolated, that I always got a warm welcome when I came in. Other than the Mazamas, you had a sense that we were colleagues out on the front lines pulling together. There was a marvelous sense of camaraderie that came out of that period, unlike any I have ever had in the club since.

Campaigning for the Wilderness Act

McCloskey: There is one other thing that happened during that period that comes to mind. Occasionally, I was asked to go outside of the region to do work for the club. I did that on the Wilderness Act on hearings in '62 and '63. I went into Colorado to do some organizing work in Congressman [Wayne] Aspinall's district. He was then the chairman of the House Interior Committee. His district was on the west slope of Colorado, and I and a field representative for the National Wildlife Federation divided up his district. I took the southern half of it. We flew into Denver, and I asked the Colorado Mountain Club (there was no Sierra Club there then) if they had any contacts on the west slope, and they said, no, they didn't know anybody over there. So, we went into Grand Junction. The National Wildlife Federation field representative drove off to the north in a rental car, and I started south. I didn't have any notion of how to get started.

We were supposed to get telegrams sent to Aspinall from constituents asking him to support the Wilderness Act. So I went into a local sporting goods store and started kibitzing with the manager about whether there was anybody concerned about conservation questions. I didn't get too far, but I stumbled on a list of guides and packers that he had for that area with addresses, names, and phone numbers. So, I took that and drove south into every little town where there was one, and I would call him up, or I would go out and see them in their corral or wherever they were and talk to them. The majority of them supported wilderness because they made their living from taking people into the wilderness area; they were quite supportive. So I'd collect six bits from them, and they would dictate some messages to me, and I would go back into town to the telegraph office and send off their messages.
McCloskey: I just rode on from town to town doing this. Aspinall later complained bitterly about outside agitators being sent into his district and stirring up his constituents. But it didn't all go smoothly. I remember at the pass north of Durango one night when I went to see a packer who did work for the Wilderness Society, and I thought he would be sympathetic. It turned out that there were two brothers that did it, and I got the wrong one, and he threw me off his ranch in a threatening manner. I then went, to calm myself down, to a local bar, a kind of resort. Feeling sorry for myself, I started chatting with the bartender and asked whether there were any more packers around there. He said, "Well, we do some ourselves." So I started talking to him, and he got friendlier and friendlier, and I finally revealed what I was up to. It turned out he was a complete supporter. He gave me a long list of people in Durango that I could contact. I went down there, and it was just a pure streak of good luck. Everybody I talked to was supportive. I felt that I could organize that town right then into some conservation club!

But the tail end of that little story had a bittersweet note to it. I went out to a place called the Vallecitos Reservoir east of there, and there were packers all around there. They went into what is now called the Weimenuche Wilderness. Everything was going well, and I had this old patriarchal guy taking me around and introducing me to one person after another. He said, "Well, we are just about through, but here is a dance hall. Let's go in there. There is a fellow and his wife who do some packing occasionally. Maybe they will help." We went in there, and there was this woman and this man standing beside her. I made my pitch and thought he was her husband. It turned out he wasn't at all. He was some local rancher who started scowling, and he looked at me in a ferocious way and said, "There was a shooting here this last week, and there is just about to be another one." He was looking at me! The old patriarch grabbed me and said, "Let's get out of here!" So we did. So I escaped with my life. I don't know how serious he was, but he looked pretty mean! So this was the high point. I really got a lot of wires into Aspinall and, while he never supported the Wilderness Act, eventually he let it out of his committee, and it passed in 1964.

Later I went around to a whole series of hearings in Denver, and McCall, Idaho, and Olympia, Washington. I remember all of them; I was helping to organize the turnout on our side for these hearings that were preparatory to the final push in '64.

Schrepfer: So that was your primary activity in supporting the act in the Northwest?
McCloskey: Yes, I was primarily an organizer to get people to come to the hearings. I remember in McCall, Idaho, Stewart Brandborg of the Wilderness Society staff and I made the rounds. We would go to sporting goods stores with the same technique, looking for names of people that might be sympathetic, to get them to come to the hearing. McCall, Idaho, was a small resort town. The hearings should have been in Boise where we would have had more potential supporters. It was deliberately put into McCall to be close to the logging country where you would expect the maximum turnout from the loggers and the miners. They did turn out, but we spent a number of days beating the bushes around there, and we got a fair number of our people.

Schrepfer: Did you know Howard Zahniser personally?

McCloskey: Yes. In particular I remember Zahniser somewhere in Montana at one of the last hearings. He was then ailing. I remember him telling me at a bar one night—he was having a drink—that he had a bad heart. He said his doctor told him he should actually have a drink now and then to calm him down. But Zahnie should not have been out there at that final round of hearings. He was really ill, perhaps even dying, but was still dragging himself around. He was in good spirits because he could see the end of the road was in sight for the Wilderness Act. It was finally moving, and there was a sense it was going to happen, and indeed it did, but it was also the end of the road for him.

Schrepfer: Did you get any sense of his personality?

McCloskey: Yes, indeed. I suppose the thing I remember most was his gentle manner and his cheerful way.

Schrepfer: At that time, you didn't anticipate any of the problems that you later had with the Wilderness Act? You supported the legislation as it was proposed, or did you have qualms?

McCloskey: The thing we fought against, until we had to accept it, was the burden of affirmative action by Congress to add each area. We thought that that would be a terrible gauntlet that we would have to run for each unit and that we would be at it forever. Indeed, it does seem almost forever. Here we are sixteen years later still pushing along, and it will probably be another fifteen, twenty, or thirty years before we get all of the units through, although there has been steady progress on the Forest Service units. It has been the Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service units that have lagged.

A strategic decision was made that, for the most part, the units of the Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service were not in any great danger and the priorities should be given to the
McCloskey: Forest Service units. There was later quite a controversy internally over whether we should then give priority to the primitive areas of the national forests or whether we should give more priority to the so-called defacto areas, later called "roadless areas," that had no protected status. For quite a while in the late sixties, I felt that it was psychologically important to increase the volume of reclassifications and that it would be dispiriting to the movement to have too long a backlog of units. It would be disspiriting if it looked like we weren't getting anywhere, that we were just chipping away at the problem. If we had sixty to a hundred million acres that we were after, to be only creeping up from twelve to thirteen to fourteen to fifteen to sixteen million acres as we have done, it would get people down.

Later this strategy changed and one reason that I became less concerned about that was that, after the explosion of the environmental movement in the late sixties, the idea of what our agenda was changed a great deal and shifted away from wilderness. In the process, I think fewer people were concentrating on the size of that backlog. Now, of course, with the Alaska legislation, although I think we probably made a strategic mistake in neglecting the wildlife refuges because without those wilderness overlays, we are now facing tremendous pressures for oil drilling.

Schrepfer: So this strategic decision was first made when? And, as I remember you saying, it was made because the idea was not to push more through, but to keep a slow and steady pace.

McCloskey: Well, the idea was to concentrate on the Forest Service, but also Stewart Brandborg at the Wilderness Society decided that it was strategically important to set the right tone, which in his view was that the first few had to be done well, which meant with optimal boundaries. The first one was the San Rafael wilderness in southern California back of Santa Barbara.

Schrepfer: That occasioned quite a fight.

McCloskey: Yes, it was a bitter fight, and we fussed a great deal over areas of limited consequence. I differed with that strategy but deferred to the Wilderness Society. I was for a higher volume process. I thought we ought to begin with some easier ones. I thought that the bitter fight over the San Rafael wilderness left such a bad taste in the mouth that now many members of Congress, particularly on the House Interior Committee, had no appetite for jumping into it a lot more, and indeed the process moved very slowly for quite a while. We paid a price for the lack of volume in that as the members of Congress turned over in that committee, fewer and fewer had any residual memory of the commitments that had been made to
McCloskey: move the process along and not be obstructionistic. Then the emphasis shifted to other things, and we now have to reeducate the committee constantly to remember what definitions of wilderness are and what the Wilderness Act is all about.

Later, in the mid-seventies, a decision was made as a matter of strategy, that we should pursue emphasizing the most vulnerable of the defacto wilderness areas and do it in sort of reverse order, that those who had the greatest likelihood of eventually being put in the system should be done last, and those that had the least likelihood of being put in should be done first because otherwise they would get lost in the process. I think that has become a fairly plausible strategy, although it is probably going to undergo further changes.

Schrepfer: I gather that at one point in the early seventies, you seriously considered the abandonment, or trying to get the abandonment, of piecemeal decisions.

McCloskey: Yes, again because I had favored a higher volume strategy. All along I had favored packaging proposals together, either in state wilderness bills or in larger omnibus bills. The Wilderness Society since the Wilderness Act fight of '64 had clearly been the leader, and the club had only been a major partner; out of respect for Zahniser, we tended to defer to them. In retrospect, I don't think Stewart Brandborg's judgment was nearly as good as Howard Zahniser's, and I believe that strategic errors were made in the way the situation was basically handled in the period from 1964 through about 1974.

Thereafter, Brandborg, from about '71 to '72 on, became less focussed on wilderness, and the Wilderness Society underwent its own troubles, and the Sierra Club began to move into a position of leadership on the wilderness issue. Douglas Scott of our staff, who had come from the Wilderness Society, began to emerge as our principal strategist.

Schrepfer: Do you by any chance know who coined the phrase "de facto wilderness"?

McCloskey: No, I don't.

Schrepfer: It goes back a long way.

McCloskey: Yes, it does. It was principally a term of the late fifties and sixties and fell into disuse in the seventies.
III THE STRUGGLE FOR A REDWOOD NATIONAL PARK, 1968

The Citizens' Committee for Redwood National Park

Schrepfer: I guess from December '64 through February '65, you were coordinator of staff. I ran across a letter that Brower wrote which appointed you coordinator of staff and volunteers. Before, technically you were assistant to [Edgar] Wayburn. During that very first three months you were in northern California, one of the things you did was to try to organize the Citizens' Committee for Redwood National Park. I wondered if you had any recollections from that period of how people received you—anything that might not be written down. I also wondered if you might not want to reflect on the question of, in the long run, whether the Citizens' Committee made much of a difference in the battle. I notice that the club did not organize such a group in the seventies. Do you have any feelings in retrospect about that type of approach as a conservation technique?

McCloskey: I came down to San Francisco at the beginning of 1965, but even before I did, from November on, I was shuttling down to the redwoods region to start to familiarize myself with it. It was clear that I was going to be involved in a major way in the fight for a redwood national park. Actually, I pointed out at the time that Portland, Oregon, where I then was, was closer to the site of the park than was San Francisco, an anomaly.

Schrepfer: You didn't want to move?

McCloskey: I don't remember. I certainly knew I was coming to San Francisco. The approach I took in trying to organize the Citizens' Committee for a Redwoods National Park was an outgrowth of the type of field organizing I had been doing in the Pacific Northwest. That seemed to be just a natural thing to do. I remember reflecting on the fact that while I felt confident about how to do that kind of local work, I really didn't, at that moment, understand the larger
McCloskey: political situation. I didn't know what the political situation was in California nor what was going on in Washington on this, and I made a mental note that that was the growing I would have to do, but I felt confident that I knew how to handle the local situation. As it turned out, probably the local situation all through those battles [laughs] was the toughest part of the whole matter.

I think that probably the Citizens' Committee was fairly important in that in the end, the congressman for the district, Don Clausen, didn't stand in the way of the legislation, neither the first time nor the second time. I think he could have taken a much harder line and that he could have made it much more difficult to get park legislation. The question is why he didn't. It may have been a reflection of his personality. It may also have been a reflection of the fact that the southern part of his district always had some conservationists in it. He may have been worried about reelection. His predecessor had been a Democrat from the southern end of the district who had a great reputation as a conservationist, Clem Miller. In having first lost to Miller and then later having succeeded him when Miller was killed in a plane accident, I think he probably had it imprinted on his mind that he couldn't be totally oblivious to conservation and that he had a district with two different faces to it, though he came from the northern part of it.

The Citizens' Committee also, I think, became important in that it was a recruiting device for some local activists like Dave Van de Mark who was critical particularly in the first round as the volunteer who put in a tremendous amount of time and energy and developed an on-the-ground credibility in terms of knowing what was happening out there with the logging, where the biggest trees were. He knew every back road and the trees almost by sight!

Although the idea I had when I first went in was that the group as a whole and the network of activists would be more important than they turned out to be, it principally became Dave Van de Mark and Lucille Vinyard as the core group. But nonetheless we always had, I think, a credible turnout at hearings, both the first and second time. Locally we were outnumbered, but not by incredible margins. Later there became a credible environmental movement in the locality. At times, in the early seventies, the majority of the board of supervisors in Humboldt county was even environmentally oriented. So I think the effort planted some seeds which later grew in terms of the conservation and environmental community there, though it has always been embattled.

Schrepfer: So you didn't feel the need to repeat this action in the seventies; you already--
McCloskey: By then, yes, there was an infrastructure that was existing there. We had a Sierra Club group that existed there by then. There was a North Coast Environmental Center. There was a lot of activity going on, but there was nothing the first time around. It was like a situation I had originally encountered in the Northwest. With the Wilderness Act, you just went in and started from scratch. We got the names of people like Dave Van de Mark and Lucille Vinyard from the Park Service's chief field scout, Paul Fritz, who went in with the team of Park Service people in '63 that located the valley where the greatest remaining stand of unprotected virgin redwoods were.

Lobbying in Washington: Some Key Individuals

Schrepfer: When you first went to Washington, I guess that was in March of '65, how did you initially make your contacts? I gather Senator Metcalf helped you a tremendous amount. Did you know already to go to him, and I'm also thinking you organized quite an impressive display of legislative support in the multiple introduction of bills for Redwood Creek. Who helped you organize those, or were you working completely alone?

McCloskey: I'll try to remember the details. Congressman Jeffrey Cohelan was actually my congressman in the East Bay where I lived in the San Francisco Bay region. I went to my own congressman and found out that he was sympathetic, and he became our initial champion, and I had easy access to his office. I don't remember whether I discovered Senator Lee Metcalf's [of Montana] interest through Cohelan or through other friends around town, but Senator Metcalf had a long reputation, which was already then developed, as a leading conservationist. So we probably just scouted around and found him. I don't remember exactly how I got there, but Vic Reinemer on his staff was very interested and helpful, and we got him to introduce our bill, too.

The battle heated up very quickly after I came to San Francisco and, incidentally, I outlined the sequence of basic actions in that whole fight in an article I did for the American West. I would have to refresh my memory on exactly what events took place and in which order, but I remember one of the things we did a little pioneering on was to get television coverage for the day we introduced the bill. We used an outfit called Gordon News Films, and actually that has not been done too much in the intervening years. But we got film footage of the redwoods and had film clips made up in advance that we took around to the television studios with the visuals and film footage and a voice
McCloskey: track of the same length—twenty or thirty seconds—talking about the introduction of the bill to create the park. We had a press release. We put all of these packages all together.

What made it more newsworthy was that the administration had been dragging its feet on the matter and the secretary of the Interior Udall seemed to be bogged down with indecision. LBJ had been lobbied by Laurance Rockefeller, Senior, at that time. We felt that we were basically having to do the work of the administration. We were advancing the proposal that their Park Service people had developed that had gotten bogged down in internal fights in the Department of the Interior. So we thought we better be as professional and as organized as possible.

Schrepfer: Two things: One, you do say in your writings on the redwoods what you are saying now, essentially, that the administration should have carried the ball and didn't, so you turned to Congress and took it upon yourself. I have two questions about that. One, why did you say it is a task with which the executive branch is more congenial and, number two, does the type of organization that the club has generally give it more influence with Congress than the executive branch?

McCloskey: It varies from time to time as to where we get our most congenial welcome. Through the seventies, the part of it dominated by the Nixon and Ford administrations, we had far more access to Congress and could achieve far more there than we could in the executive branch. During the Democratic administrations, it varied. Through Carter's period, we could get far more out of the executive branch than the Congress. Through the Kennedy and LBJ years, it was very mixed. There were points of access in the administration, but there were a lot of problems. I think on the whole that we felt in that period we had lots of friends in the Senate. The House was more difficult, particularly with Congressman Aspinall who seemed to be the great barrier on the House Interior Committee to getting things through. We generally got very good votes out of the Senate; we generally had trouble in the House.

Secretary Udall was a person who provided a lot of inspirational leadership to the movement and, through the writings of Hal Gilliam and others, gave voice to grand visions and eloquent language. After Kennedy's death he apparently felt insecure about his hold on [the Department of the] Interior and disappointed us many times by failing to lead on specifics. The redwoods was an example, and there were others, too, notably Grand Canyon. We felt that Udall was constantly caught in an inconsistent position between urging us on to greater heights in a rhetorical way, but in the clinch, buckling and sitting on his hands. In fact, at one point I think he was quoted on the redwoods as saying he had washed his hands of the whole matter.
Schrepfer: Dr. Wayburn called Udall, I think as a result of the redwoods primarily, the bitterest disappointment of his conservation career. I wonder what your reaction to that is, primarily with the idea that as a political figure, how much opportunity do we have to hold the line, so to speak? Could he have opposed Johnson once Johnson had made up his mind, or are you saying that he should have had more influence on Johnson?

McCloskey: I don't know the inside truth in terms of those relationships. I do know that Laurance Rockefeller had quite an impact on Johnson, and I suspect that Johnson's insecurity about his Texas background made him feel that he needed the kind of respectability that Rockefeller brought to him as being part of the eastern establishment or connected with it. I suspect there is some deeper psychological explanation along those lines.

I don't think it was important to Johnson politically in the larger sense to have gone with Laurance Rockefeller, who embraced a smaller, low-keyed proposal, versus going where Udall might have wanted on the redwood park proposal. I think and believe that if Udall had exerted himself strongly and said, "Look, it's good politics, it will be good for the administration; it makes sense in terms of backing up your people down the line; it's part of the wave of the future"—if he had faith in what he himself was preaching, I think he could have won LBJ over. If any cabinet secretary had weighed in strongly and said those things, I can't imagine Johnson resisting.

McCloskey: There was a great mythology attached to Laurance Rockefeller's "invincibility" in those days. He had, from the period of the mid-fifties to the early seventies, always had a major commission going or a major project and had sections of the White House staff involved in natural beauty and one thing or another, and he made himself indispensable to LBJ, as he had to other presidents. He was investing money in different conservation groups, and there was an aura of authority about him. I'll never forget, perhaps it was symptomatic though of what the change to come was, that in the final stages of the redwood park battle, I was in Senator Jackson's office, and Jackson, once again, as in the North Cascades, played a pivotal role in the redwoods. I had, first, developed a very close relationship with Senator [Thomas] Kuchel. He was the ranking minority member. He and Jackson decided to put the redwood park proposal together as a partnership and move first on the Senate side.

As I said, they actually gave me a desk in their office, and I would work out of there. I remember, in fact, walking to work one day and Laurance Rockefeller was cooling his heels in the
McCloskey: outer antechamber to get in to see Jackson, and his face just fell when he saw me just walk through the door, and I was obviously an insider in that relationship, and the park was finally drawn up more on our basis than on his basis. The power relationship had changed there.

Subsequently, we have come to have a very close relationship with his son who has related a new generation of Rockefellers to a different strain of the conservation movement.

Schrepfer: You made a very intriguing statement in your article, "Why Worry About the Redwoods:" in the Saturday Review. You said that it was hard to tell who was responsible for slowing down the solution of the redwood problem in 1967. You said the companies, the financial institutions behind them, and the foundations attached to them, or was it certain members of Congress were behind the slowdown? What were you alluding to in terms of the foundations and the banks?

McCloskey: At that time we were doing some interesting probing into the ownership patterns of some of the companies involved in the controversy—Georgia Pacific and Arcata, particularly Arcata. Some of the Weyerhaeusers were involved in it, and we were looking in turn at some of the family relationships, and there appeared to be a very interesting web of people behind Arcata who might have influenced Laurance Rockefeller. I must say that I think in retrospect the more plausible explanation is simply the long relationship Newton Drury had with the Rockefellers, and that probably had more to do with explaining why there was the fight. I think the fight very much was a contest of wills, in some ways, between Newton Drury and Edgar Wayburn, and the administration was caught in between, between two figures in the conservation movement in California.

The Redwood Creek Controversy

Schrepfer: Do you want to talk about the Save-the-Redwoods League and the club at this point?

McCloskey: All right.

Schrepfer: Do you think it might have been a personal issue between Dr. Wayburn and Newton Drury?

McCloskey: I certainly think it had an edge of that sort to it. From the club's point of view, what we were doing was picking up the staff work from the National Park Service field team, and we felt that
McCloskey: we had a larger vision of what the "state-of-art" offered at that time. I suspect that Newton Drury regarded Ed Wayburn as a newcomer who didn't have the background he did, and Wayburn certainly didn't have (stretching back to the twenties) what Newton had. Newton had decided in the forties that the time for a national park politically had passed, and it really wasn't a politically viable concept anymore, and he made—at least, this is our understanding of it—a political judgment then that these efforts were bound to fail, and that the time for really a good park had passed, and that Mill Creek represented the largest remaining thing on the league's agenda, and if the national park proposals were indeed moving along, this was a fine time to have it move along the major remaining part of the league's program.

Schrepfer: I notice that you say in some of your writings that the league had lost hope in the idea of a national park and displayed what you called an "initial apathy." You didn't know that the league was, in fact, interested in a national park in '61? As far as you were concerned, the league reacted to the club's advances?

McCloskey: I think it's all more complicated than that, and you probably know more about the league's side of it. I gather that the league had played a part in the National Geographic Society's expeditions out there that discovered the tall trees and had been involved in all of that work.

Schrepfer: But it was your understanding that the league was not interested at the time?

McCloskey: Yes, it was our feeling that they did not really, when push comes to shove, have any real confidence that the national park idea was going to pass.

Schrepfer: Perhaps you thought that because Newton kept saying that Mill Creek was feasible. Did you get the idea because you thought that was a concession to the lumber companies?

McCloskey: No, I don't think we thought they were reacting to that. I guess on the question of feasibility, it was our sense by then that our movement was emerging from being a bunch of outcasts into gathering strength. We had come out of the Wilderness Act fight feeling that now we had reached a wholly new level of support that was gathering momentum, and the club was feeling stronger, and we had kind of sensed a rising tide, and indeed we were accurate. If you draw kind of a graph, the curve was moving up very quickly, and it was that sense that we were on some new rising tide that led us to feel that we could put this over even if it were more substantial in size and cost. I guess it was our sense that Newton, who was the much older man and who had worked on this since the twenties,
McCloskey: had been rebuffed so long that he had developed a strategy that working at the state level on smaller units was the only way progress could be made and that he felt that trying to do it in too big a chunk was doomed to failure.

Indeed, both strategies have their place. I guess it was our feeling that these were new times, and a new strategy had a chance now, and it was our sense that he didn't believe that.

Schrepfer: In the late sixties, you and Dr. Wayburn and Dave Brower had at least two meetings with Drury and John Dewitt and Richard Leonard. Do you recall anything that went on at those meetings?

McCloskey: Not specifically, except that most of the meetings we had were unproductive because the lack of personal chemistry was so evident that they really couldn't get anywhere. In fact, at the last meeting I remember with Drury--just a year or so before his death--he was now bitter over the second round, a successful one, for expanding the national park. He was saying, "You have so alienated the lumber companies now that no one will sell us an acre of land anymore for a redwood park." His reaction, after having just added another nine thousand acres of virgin redwoods to the national park system, was that we had killed the chances to add what, by then, were miniscule remaining portions elsewhere. His whole philosophy was that we had done something terrible.

Schrepfer: Did the Brower and Leonard conflict enter into this at all? I know that part of the bad chemistry was a result of that.

McCloskey: I think those were additional complicating factors in that Ed Wayburn and Dick Leonard were to some extent, while of the same generation, competitors as moral leaders among our volunteers. I might add that on the club side we soon developed a division of labor where it came to be understood that Dave Brower was going to concentrate on leading the Grand Canyon national park fight and would leave the redwoods to Ed Wayburn and to me. Dick Leonard didn't quite find a place in all of that and drifted off into identifying with the league where he came to be their president.

Schrepfer: You mentioned in your article, "Last Battle of the Redwoods," that eventually the Wilderness Society and the Izaak Walton League began to waver in their support of a Redwood Creek park. What evidence did you have of that?

McCloskey: I remember that the Izaak Walton League, one of their local units, I think in Santa Rosa, had developed a proposal that was not very supportive. I remember I went off to their national convention
McCloskey: in Boston to help lobby them. We had to overcome the recommendation of their closest local unit, and I remember working with Joe Penfold and Tom Dustin of Indiana, who were very supportive. We finally brought them around through their national convention, but we had to overcome their California contingent.

With respect to the Wilderness Society, I can't recall exactly what was happening there. I do remember that at times it seemed like no national group could be relied upon as a firm ally! Things were constantly in a state of coming unglued and having to be reassessed.

Schrepfer: Do you think that part of the conflict, in addition to this personal one between the league and the club, was ideological or philosophical involving the question of what a park should be like and how lumber companies should be dealt with?

McCloskey: I think there probably was a strain of that. I had heard Newton say many times that the park system ought to represent the crown jewels--the real gems--and that we were adding too many subcaliber units to the system and how much he opposed the urban national recreation area concept. Ed Wayburn helped pioneer one, the Golden Gate National Recreation Area. There were deep philosophical differences over what the park system should consist of, and I think also, to your question about the lumber companies, I suspect that Newton and Ed had differences over whether issues ought to be addressed in terms of head-on confrontation rather than quiet diplomacy.

Schrepfer: How did you perceive the difference between Mill Creek and Redwood Creek?

McCloskey: To us, Redwood Creek represented the largest remaining tract of relatively undisturbed redwood acreage, which included the Tall Tree Grove and some other very large trees, though perhaps not as concentrated a group of specimen trees as places in the large, then existing state parks. Mill Creek just didn't really have any more specimen grove type trees, and it had also smaller acreage of virgin redwoods. But it was a more compact unit, and it fit within or complemented or filled out an existing state park to present a total unit which seemed to be more compact. But Redwood Creek seemed to us to offer the greater total opportunity for doing something substantial.

Schrepfer: What does size mean? Why would size be important?
McCloskey: I suppose there are a couple of things involved. One was the overall notion, which I think both the league and the club shared, that too small a percentage of the total original acreage had been saved in parks. We used to say it was something like two or three percent.

The second notion involved the effort to try to get something like a wilderness experience in the redwoods where you could walk for mile after mile just in redwoods and sense the depth of the area, a real kind of redwood wilderness experience, though we weren't talking in technical terms of wilderness. But I do remember walking on Redwood Creek, where after about the fourth or fifth mile, the whole wilderness type experience begins to grow on you. You don't have the sense that you are dealing with a little thin fringe along the road or something where it's going to run out on you after a quarter of a mile. Anyway, that was, I think, a difference. Also, in the philosophy, we were seeking something evocative of the wilderness experience in the redwoods, where I think Newton's notion was more oriented to specimen groves, campgrounds, and roads.

Schrepfer: How damaging do you think the division between the league and the club was to the battle?

McCloskey: It was quite damaging. It became a three-way contest, really. It was bad enough with the lumber companies opposing either site, but the competition between us confused the conservation movement; it paralyzed the Johnson administration, and it made the politicians dubious about having anything to do with it. Fortunately, the second round had an entirely different tone to it. The club and the league were working compatibly together then. In fact, we had an improving relationship as John DeWitt began to be more paramount in the affairs of the league, and Dick Leonard was their president. And even while Newton was still there and active, I think we all came out of the first round with the feeling of "Never again; we've got to work together somehow."

Schrepfer: To some extent, I wondered if the split between the conservationists couldn't have played upon a split within the lumber companies. Did the club cooperate with Miller-Rellim at all?

McCloskey: We did to a limited degree in the final stages. We had meetings with their lobbyist, and he made it clear that they were not going to be opposing the southern unit, and he did some lobbying to make that quite clear—that not all lumber companies were opposing that, and I think that was mildly helpful. I don't remember exactly when that occurred, but I am sure it was quite late in the process.
Schrepfer: Do you think that there was any possibility that the Humboldt County companies were willing to abandon Miller and that that hope might have played a role in Johnson's calculations or in Rockefeller's?

McCloskey: Yes, I imagine the reverse happened, too, that it began to be every man or company for him or herself in the process, though the real turning point came when Senator Kuchel decided the controversy had gone on long enough and somebody had to take responsibility for bringing order out of chaos. As a senator from California, he was senior minority member on the Senate Interior Committee. Also, the ongoing logging was creating such pressures that the controversy couldn't be allowed to sit much longer, or there would be nothing left for anybody to decide, and the public visibility and outcry by then was so great that I think Kuchel took the pragmatic approach of looking for something for both sides. I think it tilted more our way than not.

Framing the Redwood Park Act

Schrepfer: I have one question to ask you, and that is, if you would specify your role in the framing of the Redwoods Act, and if you know who else participated in it. We could start perhaps with the open letter to the president in '65.

McCloskey: I think it's interesting that that ad was the first of a series of full-page newspaper ads that we did in '65 and '66 which ultimately led to a loss of our IRS tax deductibility. But the first ad was not run on Grand Canyon; it was on the redwoods. Dave Brower developed the notion about doing ads and how important they were. He wrote a good deal of the first ad without using an ad agency, but there was one early one where we decided to do a split run where he wrote one version of it, and the ad agency wrote another. They had coupons attached, and we wanted to see which one would do better. It turned out the ad agency one did a little better, so Brower finally agreed that we should work with an agency.

He was certainly the impetus behind doing them. I fell into the role of being the lead person working with the agency on the series on redwoods. There was also a series on the Grand Canyon. I was not involved much in those. But I was the person who went to the ad agency and gave them the basic materials and was involved in all of the brainstorming sessions where they were coming up with ideas. Brower was in and out of the process. He was usually involved in the brainstorming sessions over the
McCloskey: headlines, which are the hardest parts of all to do. Actually, many of the headlines were thought up by Howard Gossage. Jerry Mander was the lead copywriter for most of them, but Howard Gossage, Brower, I, and Wayburn and Mander usually were a team that went over the headline production.

Schrepfer: Did you say Wayburn?

McCloskey: Yes, he was often there. The text on the redwoods ads always had to be cleared with Wayburn, and I kind of got into a shuttle diplomacy between the agency and Brower and Wayburn trying to shape them and get everybody in agreement upon their content. It was very much of a collaborative enterprise. Wayburn became a convert to the importance of doing them, but I think he had rather mixed feelings at times about the whole process.

Schrepfer: How about you?

McCloskey: I was very enthusiastic about them as a way to try to obtain leverage to move through the obstacles that we saw in our way. They were different, the redwoods and the Grand Canyon. In the Grand Canyon case, we were trying to overcome Aspinall's and Udall's adamance. With the redwoods, we were trying to get the administration off of dead center, and they wouldn't come out saying what they were for or against, and Congress wouldn't act until the administration would say something; at least, that was the feeling. But they worked beautifully in both instances because we had a clear target. One person had to decide and come down one way or the other, and we had time pressures, particularly in the redwoods, in that the trees were being lost.

Schrepfer: I think one major question is the role that the Bureau of the Budget played. A lot was said about the Bureau of the Budget putting a ceiling on spending. Some of the things I've seen seem to indicate that the Bureau of the Budget in fact was much more willing to go further and put more money into the park. I was wondering if it was possible that the Bureau of the Budget's position was sometimes used as an excuse for others in the government?

McCloskey: It may have been. I think that that was primarily what Udall was saying when the Interior Department finally came down—that was that the Bureau of the Budget told the Department of the Interior that sixty million was all the federal government could spend, and that's why they came out for Mill Creek. Of course, what we did then in the Senate with Metcalf was to say that if we can only afford a sixty million dollar park, then we'll show you how to have a better park with sixty million than what you've come up with so far.

[tape interruption]
Schrepfer:  I want to make sure that I understood your response correctly. The only evidence you had of the Bureau of the Budget's role in being pivotal in terms of the administration's policy was what Udall said?

McCloskey:  I would have to refresh my memory from documents to be sure about the answer to your question. I do remember that there was a complicated negotiation with the state of California involving the Reagan administration over an exchange of state parks and other areas. As I recall, that turned on the questions of money and was attributed to, in part, the Bureau of the Budget, but I don't have clear recollections on that point.

Schrepfer:  In one of your articles on the redwoods, you discussed Reagan's role. You said that you thought he had finally agreed in the end, that his opposition lessened. Why do you think that? Did you have any idea at the time of what your perception of it was, and how crucial that was in easing the passage of the bill?

McCloskey:  I think Senator Kuchel was concerned about his upcoming race where he finally was defeated by Max Rafferty in the Republican primary. I think he was concerned with the impact of the Reagan administration on his political future, and thus, I think, the Reagan administration's willingness to go along was important. I think they, in fact, did point out that they didn't stand as an obstacle, and there was a turnaround in the stance they took in the final hearings.

Ike [Norman B.] Livermore undoubtedly had an impact on that as secretary of the Resources Agency, though he had been the architect at various times of all sorts of complicating positions. But I think the interesting thing was that the Republican actors--Livermore, Reagan, and Clausen--avoided getting pinned down into an adamant position. They were always flexible and in motion, and I think that was very important in the outcome. It allowed Kuchel to feel that he could move it along by stages, and they weren't locked into hard-line opposition.

Schrepfer:  Why do you think they were flexible?

McCloskey:  The upsurge of public opinion was so strong, and the tide was so evidently moving in that direction that I don't think they wanted to be painted in the corner of being hard-line opponents. It was like a lot of things that happened during the Reagan gubernatorial administration. Their initial position was one of opposition or skepticism, but pragmatically they got moved along by the process.
Schrepfer: To go back to Washington, what about Ed Craft's role? Was he easier to deal with than Udall had been or more difficult? I would presume that one of the reasons that he came to the fore was that he was perhaps less sympathetic to environmentalists than Udall had been.

McCloskey: I think that's right. He was close to the Rockefeller interests, and he became the broker who was supposed to pull together the interests of Rockefeller and Udall and the environmentalists. He, in fact, was in and out of a number of controversies then. When BOR [Bureau of Outdoor Recreation] was established, that was one of his roles—to find a "practical way out of these endless controversies." Generally, he would come up with things that were much less than half a loaf as far as we were concerned, but the virtue of it was that he usually would get the administration off of dead center. Ed Craft's recommendation would usually open the door politically to go after more, so I don't regard his role in the final analysis as being unhelpful, although certainly his sympathies tended to be weighted in the other direction.

Schrepfer: What about Martin Litton's role? I know it would have been in the very early period. I am wondering about a couple of things. How pivotal he was in the selection of Redwood Creek? Do you have any idea what role the club, particularly he and others, played in that very early period? Also, what kind of attitude did you have toward this type of, I would say, militancy—maybe you don't see him as a militant—and particularly in dealing with the league. Did you ever hear him say anything intensely hostile to the league, to Newton or about Newton?

McCloskey: I think I first remember Martin's work in dealing with the proposed freeway on the north side of Jed Smith State Park—taking pictures, walking the freeway route with fire in his eyes about the whole business. Yes, Martin became intensely involved at an early stage in championing the Redwood Creek proposal and taking photographs. Martin's style, though, was to suddenly appear out of nowhere with intense interest in a subject; he would devote a great deal of time for a short period to taking photographs, flying people around, and making speeches, and then suddenly disappear for months on end. So he didn't have any real consistency in the contribution he was making. It was more a matter of flavoring; it would be like pepper thrown into the pot from time to time, an extra measure of it.

In the Sierra Club, the commitment to Redwood Creek grew primarily out of Ed Wayburn's relationship with Paul Fritz, the Park Service staff person. I was quite prepared to go along with it and satisfied myself that it was reasonable and the thing to do,
McCloskey: but it was Ed Wayburn's conviction and stubborn determination that always kept us on that track. I think Martin helped reinforce that at times with our board of directors and at other places. I do seem to have a vague recollection that Martin said things that showed a real annoyance with the league, but I don't remember anything specific.

Schrepfer: Let's go back to the end of the fight. Do you think that by 1968, at least by the spring of 1968, that the lumber companies, and particularly the Humboldt ones, had lessened their opposition?

McCloskey: I don't remember any evidence of that, but Georgia Pacific seemed to be absolutely hostile to the end, and that manifested itself in what we regarded as spite cutting immediately outside the boundaries within months after its establishment. I think that was probably true of Arcata, too. I think Simpson Timber Company was peripherally involved and was more of a minor actor all along.

Probably somewhere toward the end, they must have realized that something was going to happen, and it was just a matter of minimizing the damage from their point of view. Both Georgia Pacific and Arcata took it personally and very strongly. I'll never forget a few days after the park bill was signed, a couple of us went up to look at the park, and we walked through part of one of the virgin areas added, and Gene Hofstead of Arcata was parked in a jeep on the other side, and he said, "You are trespassing," and was acting like he was going to have us arrested. We said, "As of last Wednesday" -- or whenever the bill was signed -- "we are on the property of the United States of America." He said, "Don't step across that line, or you're not!" We said, "We're not."

Schrepfer: I'm not surprised that the local lumber people would have been the most intensely hostile generally. I was wondering if Arcata was so prepared to take the money and deal with it.

McCloskey: Some time around then the management changed, and they got the idea they were getting into the communications business. I don't recall whether it was shortly before or after the Redwood Park Act passed.

Schrepfer: It was before.

McCloskey: Yes. That would suggest that they must have developed the idea that their future lay in a different direction. Toward the end they had a new president by the name of Dielendorf who was testifying, and I now recall that he led them in this direction.
Schrepfer: He, as you say, did more for your cause than anybody else! I don't understand Aspinall's maneuvers at the end. Did you have any perception at the time of why he reported out of committee such a bad bill, and then what was your reaction to it? In other words, did you finally agree to let the bill go through, feeling that it would be a better bill when it came out of conference or did you do it just because you felt you had no other choice?

McCloskey: We were outraged by the committee bill. I felt particularly victimized because I collected enough proxies for both [Morris] Udall and John Saylor so that we could have overturned Aspinall. We had the votes. It shocked me because I had accurately counted the votes, and I had personally written up the proxies, got them signed and delivered them. Saylor ended up not voting all of the proxies that I had given him, and Udall actually voted a couple of them the other way. So we got a bad bill and one that was just the tail along the creek.

Schrepfer: That was in committee?

McCloskey: In committee; they didn't vote the majority that we had. They told me after the fact that they thought that would be tantamount to a revolution against Aspinall's chairmanship, and that was before the seniority rule had been broken, and that they weren't ready to make a revolution against their chairman. I remember Udall walking me down the corridor afterward and putting his arm around me and telling me, "Don't feel so bad about it. It will get fixed somehow, and that's the way things are." But I just felt absolutely betrayed and outraged by what had happened. Nobody else knew that because they just saw what happened publicly. They didn't know where the proxies were and how they had been pledged. I never brought this out before, but it didn't need to have happened that way, and we paid the price for a long while after with the destructive logging.

The reason why the committee didn't vote the majority that we had undoubtedly was that Aspinall prided himself on never having lost a bill on the floor. He felt that he could sense the mood of the House and bring out a product that would stand the test of floor debate. It was his political judgment that he stood the smallest risks with a small bill. I don't think that was right. I think we could have mustered a vote for improving amendments, but it was brought up under suspension of the rules so that it was not amendable and thus it was a take it or leave it type of vote. For a while we threatened to object so it couldn't be passed under a suspension of the rules, but I was persuaded that Aspinall would give sufficient ground in conference that a lot of the damage could be repaired.
McCloskey: As you recall, Aspinall's bill was basically for just a corridor along Redwood Creek. One of the anomalies was that Congressman William Pitts Ryan from New York City did get one amendment passed in committee to expand the new park configuration that was called the kite on the tail. He thought he was adding some acreage in the right place downstream which would have been more like the final bill that came out of Congress. But he didn't know the geography well enough, and I think he misread a note of mine, and he moved the wrong part, and it ended up an expansion going uphill, way upstream. It was a ridiculous result, but at any rate they came out with a park which looked like a string with a kite on the end of it. That was what the proposed House park looked like.

But Aspinall didn't want more of that to happen, and the committee was getting to be on the verge of being rebellious and out of control. He just barely kept the matter under control, and at that point he cut off further action and didn't allow any more amendments in committee. But his hold on the whole process was fairly tenuous, and we were promised that the actual result to come out of conference would not be all that bad.

As it turned out, the Senate got about three-quarters of its bill enacted in conference, and the House acceded fairly readily to the Senate. So we had a bad time in the House, but the fact that the whole matter was on the verge of coming apart in committee induced Aspinall to be more reasonable when he got to conference. However, he then blamed the Senate for having overwhelmed him. I think he must have had some commitments to the lumber companies to protect their interests on the House side.

Schrepfer: So you are saying you think he wanted it to get through?

McCloskey: In the final analysis, yes. When he found the pressures were overwhelming, he didn't want it to be the cause of his downfall as chairman and felt that the time had come to dispose of the issue by moving something through—that he would satisfy the lumber companies by keeping it as small as possible and avoid having the matter coming back to haunt him in future congresses by acceding to the Senate so that they could get the issue behind them rather than being deadlocked.
Schrepfer: Now, in your article on "The Last Battle of the Redwoods" you said that the final act was a victory. Did you feel that? When it was done, did you feel that you had really won something significant that you felt positive about?

McCloskey: I did. I felt that we had brought protection to 11,000 acres of virgin redwood that otherwise would have been logged and destroyed as virgin redwood. We all recognized two things: one, that this was not the park we would have preferred had we had the raw material available to us that they did in the 1920s. We also recognized that it was only part of what we set out to get and that it was vulnerable and that our work wasn't finished. So we knew that there would be the second battle of the redwoods. The Park Service, locally at least, was a little unsympathetic to continuing the battle. We had a battle thereafter to get them to not prematurely throw the game away for the future, and once again, without much administration support for quite a while, we had to start building the case about the threat to park values and the adverse impact of logging outside.

Gradually, that campaign built up, and the sympathy and attention of Nat Reed, who was then assistant secretary of the Interior under the [Richard] Nixon administration, was enlisted, and we began to finally get good, helpful reports out of the Interior Department. We realized we couldn't go back to Congress immediately, that we had to allow a sufficient interval so that Congress felt that it was not constantly having its nose rubbed in redwood matters that were so controversial that it didn't have a lot of appetite for them. But it was a race, again, with the lumber companies and how much we would lose in the intervening period. It was a terribly difficult moral dilemma to resolve—delay and the threats of loss aided the political process, but on the other hand, the more that the politics became enhanced, the less there was yet to save.

Schrepfer: I gather that the idea of the legislative taking of the land in the '68 bill was the lumber company's? Dave Brower said it was your idea. Do you recall the origins of it and your reactions to it?

McCloskey: I certainly remember developing and elaborating the idea at an early stage in the campaign, but I believe it had been used elsewhere on a modest basis.

Schrepfer: You supported it?
McCloskey: Oh yes, I thought we had to have a declaration of taking, or we'd lose more trees to delay; it might run many years through litigation about adequate compensation and so forth.

Schrepfer: Aspinall put it into the bill?

McCloskey: I frankly can't recall on which side it emerged. I thought it was the Senate side, but I'm not sure of that.

Schrepfer: Again in "The Last Battle of the Redwoods" you called the redwood campaign a harbinger of the more sophisticated campaigns ahead and said it introduced a new generation, which I presume were the new conservationists and legislative advocates. I was wondering if you had any reflections on these legislative precedents, now that you have had a much longer period to reflect upon it.

McCloskey: It certainly was the Sierra Club's most important introduction in the post-World War II period to the full legislative process, the process in Congress of moving a bill along affirmatively. We had to overcome all of the obstacles along the way. We had been through some battles of a negative sort on dams--Dinosaur, and Grand Canyon--but you only have to succeed at one step of the some twenty steps when you have the negative side. On the affirmative side, you have to succeed at every step, or you lose the whole matter.

With respect to the difficulties of alliances within the movement and relations with the administration, there was hardly a technique or a step that was not addressed. I think the Sierra Club came to be, throughout the seventies and is, the most sophisticated lobbying organization in the environmental movement. I think, in part, it was the orientation that I brought to the job--that I wanted us to be able to call ourselves American's most effective environmental lobby. That was where my interests have lain.

The movement itself began to be much more sophisticated and has become so throughout the seventies. I suppose the Alaska campaign is the epitome now of sophistication. Mo [Morris] Udall in that campaign said it was the most sophisticated lobbying operation he had ever witnessed. I think the environmental movement now in many ways is the most effective of the public interest movements. So I see some seeds of that in the whole redwood campaign. In some ways the Wilderness Act fight was a very sophisticated campaign, but I think the tools or the lessons out of that really didn't get transferred very well.
McCloskey: In a way, Howard Zahniser, who was the genius behind it, died without passing on what he learned out of it to very many people, except to Stewart Brandborg, and I think his skills and strengths were not in the area of legislative strategy. So the transference was far less. The trouble is, in '68 with the passage of the Redwood Park Act, and the North Cascades and Wild Rivers and National Trails acts, we at the moment thought this was some high point in conservation history and wondered whether much would happen thereafter. Hardly did we realize that the very next year in '69, we were then on the threshold of another tremendous take-off in terms of the overall quantity of activity, enthusiasm, and support with Earth Day coming.

So it turned out to be not a high point, but merely a staging ground for what was to come, and it quickly got so much more sophisticated and involved and intricate that the redwoods campaign, I suppose, has now shrunk into a more modest place in history.

But it was also a simpler point in that conservation in the sixties was much more focussed, and one could keep track of it; in the seventies, it was just an eruption of activity on every front. Things that in an earlier time, if they had happened individually, would have had, I think, a degree of attention and memory attached to them, just became part of the passing parade— at least for me. I don't know how much this is a matter of my own role versus the movement, but if any one of the many things that happened in the seventies had happened in the earlier period, I think, it would have gotten a lot more attention.
IV WILDERNESS POLICY, 1965-1969

[Interview 2: August 17, 1981]#

Differences Between the Club and the Wilderness Society

Schrepfer: We are going to begin by talking about the question of wilderness policy between 1965 and 1969, not having to be too worried about the dates as restrictive. Let's talk about the compliance of agencies with the Wilderness Act, particularly the Wilderness Act of 1964. We might discuss both its specific issues, as well as the more general, philosophical questions dealing with the agencies. We might logically begin with the U.S. Forest Service and the San Rafael Wilderness Area reclassification controversy and perhaps discuss your differences with Stewart Brandborg over strategies.

McCloskey: Stewart Brandborg was then the executive director of the Wilderness Society. The club looked to the Wilderness Society then on wilderness matters as sort of the senior partner in devising strategies. I was then the conservation director of the Sierra Club, but Stewart certainly then had more experience than I did. He had just taken over a year or so before from Howard Zahniser, who had died and who had been the great strategist for the Wilderness Society. So I think young Brandy's credentials as a strategist were somewhat unproven. He was more of a field operator. He and I had worked in the field, as I think I mentioned before, in the final stages of the Wilderness Act's passage in arranging field hearings and so forth. Stewart thought that it was important in the first legislative test under the Wilderness Act to establish some great precedents. Many people thought that the 1966 San Rafael classification—that was a primitive area back of Santa Barbara—was a relatively simple one and ought to go smoothly.
McCloskey: But we engendered great arguments in Congress over very small amounts of acreage, particularly over some high prairie areas along a road called Potrero's. The question was over whether these meadows beside the road should be in the wilderness or outside the wilderness on these ridge tops. There were some other very esoteric issues. I had my doubts about the ferocity with which our movement pursued those questions, particularly as the first wilderness reclassification before Congress under the Wilderness Act. The longer the battle went on, the more doubt I had. I later wrote this up in an article, but my point was that I think we left a very bad taste for a while in the mouths of many members of Congress, particularly on the House Interior Committee. As you may recall, when the Wilderness Act was passed, one of the compromises was that we had to have affirmative action by Congress on each and every wilderness reclassification.

From that time on, when a compromise was struck, I was awed by the immensity of the numbers, the total number of units that had to receive affirmative congressional action. It was just a mind-boggling legislative agenda, and later, as we know, in the seventies with RARE I [Roadless Area Review and Evaluation I] and RARE II, we faced literally thousands of units waiting in line to get through Congress.

I saw no way to ever accomplish that objective if each and every wilderness proposal was to be a battle royal akin to the Redwood National Park fight and others that would go on for years, with hundreds and thousands of dollars being invested in the struggles. I feared Congress simply was going to lay down on the job and give up in disgust if it saw a never ending succession of thousands of such battles ahead of it.

So I thought that a better strategy would have been to pick up the pace and take some easy proposals first and get Congress sort of acculturated to the whole notion that this really isn't so bad and that it is a manageable task to pass all of these acts, and we could get on to some of the harder and tougher ones later on. Brandy gradually came around to that point of view, but claimed that it was only the intransigence of the other side that made San Rafael such a bitterly fought contest.

We had arguments, too, about when we should come around to having omnibus bills and over packaging a number of wilderness proposals together. I think he agreed in theory that that would make sense at the right time, but it was quite a few years later, as I recall it, before we began to get some real omnibus bills, and for quite a while we were slugging it out one by one.
McCloskey: Moreover, we had a tremendous number of hearings that came up in 1966 to 1967. I remember I had grease-penciled charts that I would post at the time. Sometimes we would have two and three hearings a month. We would have to arrange witnesses. Actually, that was the simplest part of it. The hardest part was to figure out what our position was going to be once we knew what the agency's position was going to be and to put out fliers. It was a frantic time. I remember particularly that 1966 and '67 were absolute bedlam in that regard.

Schrepfer: You did consider trying to change the wilderness bill. Would you have had any allies in that?

McCloskey: I don't think we seriously considered surfacing that idea. We had put so many years into the battle for the Wilderness Act, and it was so precariously achieved at the end that we concluded that we didn't want to disturb the basic corpus of that legislation. That just had to be accepted as the best deal we could make. I think we thought that in fifteen or twenty years, it might be ripe to reopen some questions once we have achieved a great deal under it.

Schrepfer: Do you think that the San Rafael fight and the perception that the wilderness reclassifications were going to be so difficult explains why Congress was so slow to act?

McCloskey: I think that it does. For a good many years after the San Rafael battle, particularly in the House of Representatives, there was little disposition to act on the matters. Then I must say that in the early to mid-seventies, another strategic difference of opinion developed, this time within the Sierra Club. To a certain extent [it was] between me and Doug Scott, who was hired in '73 from the Wilderness Society, though later I pretty much acceded to his sense of strategy, but the difference was this. I had felt, growing out of the Wilderness Act battle, that the important thing was to get some momentum, to get a lot of areas moving smoothly through the pipeline and that this would give heart to Congress that it was a doable task and that it would give heart to conservationists and wilderness advocates locally that they would not have to wait forever in line. It wouldn't be the year 2050 before their local roadless area got before Congress.

My feeling was that we had to have a volume operation, and I also felt that, because people had been working on the primitive areas for the longest time, that it was generally important to get them out of the way and then move to the so-called defacto wilderness proposals, or roadless areas as they were later known. That might have been viewed as, perhaps, too straightforward an approach.
McCloskey: Doug Scott had quite a different idea, which has now become the ruling theory. His idea was that the primitive areas were protected basically by a combination of the Saylor Amendment, that kept them under status quo until Congress acted, plus the ruling that we got in the Parker case.* That was a case that Tony Ruckel won in the early seventies that held that the Forest Service had to protect the areas that were roadless and adjacent to a primitive area until there had been a decent chance for Congress to act. Doug's view was that when you put these two doctrines or provisions together, you had substantial protection for primitive areas and roadless areas adjacent to them. He felt once we got into the RARE I process, and then RARE II, that the most endangered areas were the areas that were roadless but not recommended for wilderness by the Forest Service and that we should work in order of the most endangered areas first and deal with the least endangered areas last.

I have come around, as has the club, to the point of view that that makes sense, but it is also true that that shift in perspective occurred in a period when a great many more wilderness supporters have materialized, and we've come to terms psychologically, I suppose, with the huge list of areas that we will have to work on, and we have begun to talk and work in terms of state wilderness bills and omnibus bills which are very similar to what I was talking about thirteen and fourteen years ago.

It amazes me how long it has taken to come around to that point of view, but I would also observe that basically the Wilderness Society became less active on the whole wilderness reclassification process after about 1971 or '72, and shortly thereafter, Doug Scott joined the Sierra Club, and we became much more active. I'd say that basically in the period from about 1965 through '72, I was our leading theorist on wilderness policy and from '73 on Doug Scott has been. I had written a long, fairly definitive article on the Wilderness Act, and later he had done an unpublished master's thesis on the Wilderness Act, and in a way we were natural rivals, but as my career developed, I finally deferred to him and became more interested in other matters.

*Parker et al vs. United States of America and Clifford Hardin, a case to prevent logging in East Meadow Creek Valley in White River National Forest, Colorado.
Sierra Club Wilderness Reconnaissance Studies

Schrepfer: You mentioned the problem of establishing the Sierra Club policy on a particular area. I want to ask you first how successful your recreation and reconnaissance trips were in this, and after their demise, how do you now establish a policy on a specific recreation area; what is the machinery within the club that you use?

McCloskey: I became conservation director about 1966. I discovered that we didn't have a good mechanism for scouting out the various primitive areas to study the boundaries and make recommendations on new boundaries. This was before the Sierra Club developed local chapters and groups around the West and the country, although we had some very diffuse chapters in places like the Pacific Northwest. Of course, in the Northwest (at least in Oregon and Washington) I, as field representative, and later my successors, did a great deal of work on boundaries. But in northern California we didn't have anybody, surprisingly enough, working on that subject, nor in the northern Rockies did we have anybody working on that subject. We didn't have chapters there at that time. In fact, there wasn't much going on in Colorado either, other than some limited work that the Colorado Mountain Club was doing. I think there was some limited work that the Southern Arizona Hiking Club was doing. John McComb, at that time, was associated with them as a volunteer.

But the detailed field study business was not in good shape, so the club developed a series of trips we called exploration and reconnaissance trips. These were trips put together by a special committee that recruited volunteers in the summertime to go off to Wyoming, for instance, to look at areas like the then Stratified Primitive Area, now the Washakie Wilderness, to study the boundaries and draw up a report. They produced some very handsome, elaborate reports at the time. Some of them were a hundred pages or more in length with elaborate maps and evaluations of resources.

I might add that in the mid to late sixties I had drawn up a series of guidelines on how to do wilderness reconnaissance studies. These played a certain part in the exploration and reconnaissance studies. A person by the name of Larry Douglas headed up a number of them. There were ones on the Siskiyous in northern California; one in the Idaho Primitive Area; I remember one particularly on the Stratified. There were some others also; one on the Bear Tooth area in Montana, especially. I believe there were some trips of that nature into the Sawtooths of central Idaho.
McCloskey: Those studies basically were superceded in the early seventies by work done by our local chapters and groups as they became organized; thus we gradually developed a finer-grained structure of organizations throughout the West in the country.

Schrepfer: Who went on these early trips, what kind of people? How many of them were generally on a trip?

McCloskey: Oh, there usually would be six to eight or nine people. They were often people who were handpicked for their backgrounds. One might be a geologist; one might be a botanist; one might have skills in surveying or something of that sort. I remember Orrin Bonney led the one into the Washakie area of Wyoming because he had climbed most of the peaks in the area.

Schrepfer: Were they generally young?

McCloskey: No, they were of all ages. The reports were not of uniform quality and value, but the Washakie one, for instance, was the basis for our position in Congress and that was a fairly important wilderness reclassification that got a great deal of attention in its time. As a matter of fact, one of the regrettable things about the passage of that pattern was that the Sierra Club's central office, thereafter, lost all sense of the quality of the work that went into the boundary definition process. We came to rely, and had to, on all of our local chapters and groups.

In fact, in 1971 one of the reforms the board of directors made at that time that I recommended was that basically all policy-making authority over site-specific matters was delegated from the national board of directors to the local chapters, with federal legislation delegated to RCCs. So our lobbying staff thereafter just took it as holy writ that if the chapter said this should be the boundary, then that was the boundary you would lobby for. A lobbyist or field representative might have some sense of how well thought out the boundary was, but I and the headquarters managers and the board of directors didn't have a good sense thereafter of whether our homework had been thoroughly done.

We reached a high point in the thoroughness of homework through these E & R trips. I got a bit of a glimpse into the problems thereafter in the Siskiyous and in the case of the Trinity Alps Primitive Area in northern California. On and off from the late sixties, we had wilderness coordinators working for us in northern California. One of them, David Van de Mark, had been very active as a volunteer in the Redwood National Park battle of the late sixties, and Van de Mark was indefatigable in his field reconnaissance work on both of those areas. However,
the problem was that every fall he would come in with a new set of boundary recommendations, and I felt this caused real credibility problems.

The Forest Service would legitimately say they never knew what we wanted. We always had a new line. Admittedly, these were huge areas and Van de Mark would study part of it one summer and get a better grip on the boundary, and the next summer he would get a better grip on another part of it. But his recommendations were not embodied in any thick report.

These E & R reports would have a chapter on mineral values to forewarn us better to meet the arguments that an area had too much copper in it or something else. They would have a chapter on timber and a chapter on recreation and a chapter on the wildlife and maps showing all of the mineral deposits.

I pioneered, I think, some of these techniques in the early sixties in my studies on the Cascades National Park where I went around from one county court house to the next painstakingly looking up all of the mineral claim records and looked in the reports that the state departments of mines and geology had for all of the known mineral deposits and would plot them. We would get the timber type maps and plot them and calculate volumes and allowable cuts. We'd look for all of the proposed dam sites and all of the proposed sites for repeater towers and transmitter towers and proposals for roads and transportation developments. We would get a huge amount of information altogether, but only by doing this in a systematic way could we determine what the dimensions of the arguments might later be and how to meet them and, indeed, in some cases it might be reasonable to omit a portion of an area from our boundary if we thought there might be a legitimate social claim—that some other values might be greater.

So I was proud of the quality of the work that we did during that period, but it was clear by the early seventies that the total number of wilderness proposals alone, to say nothing of all the other hundreds of environmental disputes, were overwhelming the ability of any central office to work on studies and publish them and study them page by page. When we were dealing with dozens of disputes we could handle them; when we were dealing with hundreds, it became impossible, and now we are dealing with literally thousands.

Did the chapters want to do this?

I don't think they were ever directly asked! But, I think, that the reform of '71, which delegated all site-specific policy making to chapters, was welcomed.
Schrepfer: By the Sierra Club Council, in particular?

McCloskey: Of course, we chartered more chapters after '71 than before '71. Of course, the new ones that came on then just accepted it as the way things were done. There was an aspect of it that has never worked too well, and that is the regional conservation committees [RCCs] were expanded throughout the country at that time. They were supposed to deal with and make policy on site-specific matters of a federal nature where legislation was required. Some of them never understood that well and have, in some cases, allowed the chapters to do that. Our feeling at the time was that where federal legislation was going to be required, some higher level of oversight should be required, and the chapter might be too provincial. Somebody ought to be looking at their homework, looking at questions of consistency of approach.

Chapters vary in their quality and strength, and the thought was that the RCCs would be a group of peers from neighboring chapters in three or four states, and that they would be close enough to the situation to make good judgments but would be a step or two removed from pride of authorship. I can't say that that has worked as well as we hoped, but it was the only practical solution that I could think of.

Schrepfer: So the central offices generally made these national decisions rather than the conservation committee, is that what you are saying?

McCloskey: I meant to indicate that following the reforms of '71, all decisions on site-specific areas, such as the boundaries of the wilderness area or the boundaries of a proposed national park or whether we ought to oppose a given dam, all were made below the national level, some by the regional conservation committees and some by the chapters.

Schrepfer: So even though the regional conservation committees have not functioned, you are saying, as well as they might have, they have in fact made the decisions.

McCloskey: Either they or the chapters did. They were supposed to make those decisions where federal legislation was required, but they sometimes let the chapters do it. But the national has not been involved in making those decisions. Since then the national has been involved just in making policy of broad national implications or endorsing or defining generic legislation that we would like to pursue.
Precedent-Setting Controversies

Schrepfer:  I think we have talked about Trinity Alps, but we still have Golden Trout we might discuss and also your bill to extend Sequoia National Park. I think your strategy was to try to force the Forest Service into a strong wilderness policy.

McCloskey: The Golden Trout wilderness proposal on the Kern plateau had been a perennial problem for a very long time. Conservationists had wanted a unified wilderness area across the Kern Plateau down to the Dome Lands, from the southern boundary of the Sequoia National Park. Innumerable studies had taken place and the boundary lines had been drawn again and again. Logging was proceeding, and more roads were being constructed. The Forest Service administratively had set aside the Dome Lands wilderness in the early sixties and made its intention clear that there would not be a unified wilderness down the length of the Kern Plateau. Instead, it would propose one at the northern end, and it already had established one at the southern end.

In the late sixties, Martin Litton, who was then on our board of directors, rallied us again to develop a new strategy. By then there were so many roads that it seemed like it was no longer possible to have a connected wilderness, but we decided that we needed to redefine our goals in terms of the largest potential wilderness at the northern end of the Kern Plateau.

Working with Martin, the board of directors decided to endorse expansion of Sequoia National Park southward to embrace the Golden Trout areas, as it later became known. I don't think the board had any realistic expectations that such a measure would ever pass, but we had learned through decades that the one thing that got the Forest Service's attention was the fear of losing land to its rival agency, and it had, of course, been conditioned by the fact it had lost lots of land in the southern Sierra; this was an ever present danger. They had lost it through the many expansions of Sequoia [National Park] and the Kings Canyon [National Park] and later came to lose them in the Kings area in the Cedar Grove area.

I found out at that time from a person working in the regional office—actually, Millard Barnum, their wilderness specialist—that there were more Sequoia trees and groves outside Sequoia National Park on the Kern Plateau than there were inside Sequoia National Park. I got out the maps and studied this. I drafted the bill to expand Sequoia National Park into the Golden Trout area and wrote a speech that Phillip Burton, who introduced the bill, delivered playing this theme.
McCloskey: It, in fact, was a very legitimate proposal on the merits, to put almost all of these Sequoia groves in Sequoia National Park. Of course, while the Forest Service doesn't log sequoia trees themselves, they do log other species in and around them; so the areas don't have a well-protected look.

This bill didn't get anywhere, but I think it was instrumental, as well as the changing mood, in getting the Forest Service to propose a somewhat larger wildernesses in the Golden Trout area than it had been thinking of and to gradually take a firmer stand on off-road vehicles. Of course, it wasn't until later in the late seventies that we finally won success with the bill to establish the Golden Trout Wilderness.

One other area in California that I dealt with in the late sixties and early seventies that had important precedential value was the Desolation Valley primitive area reclassification. That area is west of Lake Tahoe and, of course, is probably the most heavily used wilderness area anywhere. The issue there centered on the question of how many so-called nonconforming uses could be allowed in a wilderness. There were a number of small stream flow control structures on lakes in the wilderness, like Aloha and others, that had been raised by PG&E by rock outlet dams that are five-feet high in places. Indeed, at the northern end of it, there is a dam that is actually twenty-feet high, a rock-faced dam. Most of these dams raised the size of existing lakes and were not drawn down very much so that the average hiker thinks that they are natural until you stand on the outlet structure.

We argued that these areas ought to be and indeed then were, put in the wilderness on reclassification. The Forest Service argued against having at least the larger structures in. This triggered, or at least was the focal point at one time, of a very critical argument over purity in a number of senses.

We took the position that the Wilderness Act was basically a zoning act that specified that once areas are zoned for wilderness, agencies cannot do certain things within them. They cannot build structures there, and they can't operate motor vehicles there and have commercial activities in them and so forth. But the Wilderness Act set a different test about the qualifications for admission to the system. It looked to the general appearances of the area taken as a whole, whether it looked like it was predominately affected by the forces of nature. We thought that that allowed for flaws and imperfections here and there and clearly saw that when we got into questions, as they later arose, in the East of the wilderness in the national forest, we might actually be talking of areas that had been logged once and that were now second growth, but to the average eye and recreationist, it would look like they were predominantly affected by the forces of nature.
McCloskey: So we fought that battle out, I think, for the first time in a frontal way in Congress on the Desolation Valley area. Of course, there had been an old road put to bed in the San Rafael reclassification, which was the first congressional one, and there were some precedents in old wildernesses set aside by the Forest Service. But these were the first two where it was argued out four-square before Congress. Desolation set the precedent. Our argument was basically accepted by Congress, that the act was a zoning device and that it was appearance taken as a whole that was critical.

Schrepfer: Were there areas that you eliminated from consideration specifically because they had certain roads or dams or something, or are you willing to take almost anything, regardless of what kind of intrusions there are?

McCloskey: We had some critical arguments in the Mission Mountain Wilderness reclassification in Montana in that regard. This was a long, thin mountain range wilderness proposal. On the east side, there had been timber logged in a mile or more from the boundary; this was recent logging--clearcutting--and we advocated putting that into the wilderness. That again was a rather critical test. Does a clearcut look like a wilderness? At that time, we philosophically came to grips with the fact that you could not push that argument endlessly. At some point, it no longer looked predominantly like wilderness; it looked predominantly like a developed area. But the argument was very hard to deal with when the nonconforming development is at the periphery or edge because I think, taking the area as whole, as long as it was at the edge and it was limited in nature and was something like two or three percent of the total acreage, you clearly could see that the main body of it had integrity as wild land, and that you were dealing with a boundary problem.

We also had a number of other boundary problems at that time that came under the rubric of the purity problem with the agencies. With all the agencies, one dealt with the buffer issue. If, as the Forest Service intended and made clear, it was going to log right up to the wilderness boundary, with immense clearcuts, and run large roads right up to their edges, we felt that the boundaries of national forest wilderness ought to be large enough to provide some buffer at the edge. You certainly were not going to get a wilderness experience there immediately, but if you had a valuable wilderness core, there ought to be some buffering next to the core. I think we might have accepted the theory of buffers outside the boundaries, if they had been willing to provide them, but it was very clear they were not going to provide them. So this got us into the arguments about size. They were arguing that we were trying to put areas that were not sufficiently meritorious within the boundaries.
Schrepfer: Are the Forest Service buffers the same things as the argument with the National Park Service over thresholds?

McCloskey: With the National Park Service, the argument had had some similarity, but was also different in some ways. Basically, with the national parks we were dealing already with areas in some ways more like wilderness proposals because the national forests are huge areas, and the wildernesses are relatively small areas within them. On a comparable basis, many of the national parks were like wilderness areas. In our mind, the threshold argument would have been valid if you had been trying to protect the edges of the national parks themselves. But when we got within them, then George Hartzog, director of the Park Service, and his people in the late sixties wanted to pull the boundaries for wilderness within the national park back away from roads and developments at a considerable distance and provide something called a "threshold."

The problem with that threshold was that, within the national parks, we were trying to achieve something quite different from the national forest wilderness. With the national forests, we were particularly trying to keep logging and massive development from encroaching too far, and in the national parks we were principally dealing with the problem of roads and how far they would be extended. We feared that if the thresholds existed that they would allow creep and expansion of the road net because the thresholds would not be legislated, only the wilderness would be legislated, and Congress would just say you couldn't put a road within the wilderness zone within the park. But Congress had not spoken on the rest of it, and the threshold might at one time be defined in such a way that a road couldn't be put in it, but the next superintendent could change his mind, and there you were with a road right up to the wilderness again.

We took the position that in most of the parks, the road nets were as large as they should be and that we were using wilderness again as a zoning device to fix the relationship between wild land and the pattern of development and that wilderness designation is really kind of a charter to define that balance. Of course, the agency wanted the maximum amount of freedom of action and discretion and didn't want to be under the Wilderness Act in the first place, and during the first five or six years they struggled bitterly to, first of all, not have to do wilderness studies, and they hoped nobody would notice for a while that they weren't doing them. They were way behind until well into the seventies. It wasn't, I think, until the mid-seventies when Nat Reed was assistant secretary of the Interior that he finally turned them around on their whole foot dragging operation and their purity arguments.
McCloskey: There were also arguments with the Forest Service, and later the Bureau of Land Management, over the sights and sounds of civilization. The argument went like this: if from within the proposed wilderness you could see a development outside such as a reflecting tin roof on a ranch house, that wasn't wilderness; or if you could hear a logging truck going down a road, that wasn't wilderness. We made the argument on sounds particularly, that it was a circular argument. If you then pulled in the boundaries, so you couldn't hear the chain saw, and if they then could extend the road to bring the chain saw up to the boundary, it would be an infinitely shrinking boundary and you would have nothing.

The sights of civilization business is a matter of topography and terrain. Many mountain ranges of the West are long, thin ranges. When you get up high, you can see tremendous distances, and you are bound to see reflecting roofs or logging roads. Again, if they have logging roads circling up to the edges and you get up high, you are going to see them. Well, that argument finally collapsed, but it had tremendous vitality. The Forest Service also at one time, when it was somewhat spiteful after the Wilderness Act was passed, was trying to make the wilderness areas purer than pure and went around tearing down Adirondack huts before they were scheduled to be phased out, because they were too old or decrepit, and in some places they pulled out bridges that crossed major streams, in effect saying, "If you fellows want it rugged, we'll show you what rugged is!"

Park and Forest Services: Resistance to Wilderness Act

Schrepfer: Why do you think the Forest Service has been so unwilling to go along with the Wilderness Act? I think that Grant McConnell once suggested that its decentralized nature has made it too subject to local economic pressure groups. Do you think that's possible? What kind of explanation do you have for the Forest Service's position?

McCloskey: The Forest Service and the Park Service used the purity strategy in the late sixties simply as a device to minimize the amount of land that would qualify to be wilderness. The tighter the admissions standards, in terms of any of the marks of past development, the least amount of land would qualify to get in. It was a clever pose of being philosophically sympathetic to the idea of wilderness and at the same time it would absolutely minimize the disruption of their other hallowed programs, such as timber cutting in the national forest.
McCloskey: To answer the rest of your question, each agency has a special type of development activity that is close to its heart. With the Forest Service, it's timbering. With the BLM, it's grazing. With the Park Service, it's recreational development. These agencies are also fairly good on other types of development. The Forest Service, for instance, is much better on grazing than the BLM is. The Forest Service is pretty good on dealing with mining developments and water projects. The Corps of Engineers is terrible on water projects. A tradition gets started of what kind of discipline is the dominant one in an agency and that really controls its outlook.

I also think that is very true with the Forest Service. Ever since the national forests were established and they were attacked for being socialistic and were worried about having Congress overturn the original forest proclamations, Gifford Pinchot directed them to get along with local folks, and they have struck their own bargains in terms of political viability. Certainly, making timber available for sale was the way to make it very clear that these lands were going to be economically productive.

The Park Service, at the same time, never developed the same tradition of local accommodation; while in some ways that is good, by the same token, they were never very skillful politically in making friends and influencing people. That made our job harder at times.

Schrepfer: Why harder?

McCloskey: We often would not find members of Congress who had any sense of sympathetic relationships with the National Park Service. For far too long they attracted people who had a tendency to be almost antisocial. They just wanted to go out and commune with the wide open spaces.

Schrepfer: Do you mean it made it more difficult to get national parks established, not in reclassification issues.

McCloskey: Yes, right.

How Much Wilderness Is Enough

Schrepfer: All right, let me ask the question that I suppose many of your opponents ask. Exactly how much wilderness do you want, and aren't you always upping your standards as to what you consider an adequate wilderness system for the United States?
One thing I have learned through the years is that one should be very wary of setting any upper limit on what you want. For one thing, each generation has a right to define for itself what it thinks is needed for the public interest. For another thing, we are always learning more and more about the nature of resources and the trade-offs, demands, and the alternatives.

Then on top of those considerations, the context for viewing what is reasonable is changing constantly. During the late fifties and early sixties in the campaign for the Wilderness Act, we talked in terms of never wanting more than 2 percent of the acreage of the county in wilderness; that was sort of the ultimate outer limit. We then had only something like one-half of 1 percent or less as wilderness.

I did some calculations in the early seventies for presentations I made to wilderness conferences, both in 1973 (Boulder) and 1974 (Seattle). In '74 we pointed out that if all of the acreage we were after for wilderness or parks or refuges in Alaska were added to the amount of acreage we have now identified in the lower forty-eight states through RARE I and now RARE II (that was later), and you added the amount of acreage we were then talking about on the BLM lands (some twenty million acres or more), plus new parks and other such systems, we were talking about an amount of land that was more like 10 percent of the gross acreage of the country. Now, I think that that amount of acreage looks fairly reasonable and is more in line with what is a customary observation—that about 90 percent of the land is going to be developed, or has been, and about 10 percent has special environmental values and ought to be protected.

We had observed even back at the time of the Wilderness Act that Japan had about 10 percent of its land in protective reservations, and that was a country that was fairly small. I was kind of surprised to see, when I added it all up, that we were getting close to 10 percent as the ultimate feasible limit in the United States, too.

Of course, the question is also asked, "Are you people insatiable, always wanting more and more?" I have often replied that this turns the whole question upside down. It is, I think, really the developers who are insatiable. It is the timber industry that always wants more timber, that never has enough for its mills; and the mining industry that always has to open a new mine; the oil industry that always has to have a new field. You should ask them when are they going to be through, when are they going to stop wanting more. Well, there is no end to what they want, and they are the people that have 90 percent of the country
McCloskey: under one sort of development or another, and it's we with the 2 to 10 percent who should not be put on the defensive by trying to justify it as reflecting insatiability.

Schrepfer: Suppose that you could have all that you wanted? Is 10 percent a politically reasonable amount, or is it the amount that you would want if you could have all you wanted?

McCloskey: That is sort of an iffy question of the kind that Franklin Roosevelt advised against trying to answer, but let me ease into a related theme. In the 1970s, we talked less about wilderness and parks as a land classification and started talking in terms of classifications that would protect environmentally sensitive areas, or areas of critical environmental importance. You will recall that for quite a while we championed a federal land use bill (1972-1975) that would have provided grants-in-aid to states to zone lands, both those that were important for future development, industrialization and other heavy development, and lands of critical environmental importance.

Ironically, a lot of that legislation never got passed. When the FLPLMA, or the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, for the Bureau of Land Management was passed, it was passed with a provision in it for the BLM to designate areas of critical environmental importance. That was under the anticipation—and I actually drafted some of that language that got in the bill—that private land would then be covered by that zoning concept. States such as Oregon got into comprehensive statewide land planning with that concept. To answer your question, we ultimately would like to see all of the states do as Oregon has done—have comprehensive land-use planning whereby areas that are fragile or have particularly interesting or unusual associations of environmental resources, would be given special zoning protection of some sort.

I actually developed a precursor of that idea in an article I did for the Denver Law Journal in the late sixties. In that article I advocated taking all of the results of inventories of resources and overlapping them on maps to identify areas or landscapes of special importance. At that time there was a lot of interest in natural beauty and outdoor recreation, and the U.S. was inventorying areas for innumerable purposes. We were inventorying areas with outdoor recreation values under the ORRRC system, a classification system for recreational lands, with classes one through six for lands with recreational values. We were also talking about prime farmland. We were talking about the view sheds and landscapes of particular interest and wild rivers. It occurred to me that it would make sense to overlay all of these critical resource values that were coming out of the
McCloskey: inventories, and where they begin to overlay in any particular density, to recognize that these were special landscapes that ought to be given particular protection in public law.

Actually, that idea underlays in considerable measure the notion of areas of critical environmental importance. It comes out of studies that a professor, Phillip Lewis, had done in Wisconsin, though he had it done on a more confined basis, and what I did was to pick up his ideas of overlaying landscape evaluations with all of the results of these inventories on public lands and to project the idea onto all land.

**Land-Use Legislation and Related Control Issues**

McCloskey: With the collapse of the land-use legislation, nothing really came of the idea of areas of critical environmental importance. Ironically, the Sierra Club abandoned it, or stopped advocating it, by the latter part of the seventies because we began to see that it might do more harm than good. It might serve as a basis for energy industries to push pipelines and power plants and other such things across the country.

Schreper: Weren't the petroleum companies and some of the other ones lobbying right along side of you for that legislation, in favor of it?

McCloskey: Well, I don't know that they were when we abandoned it, or that they were ever active in lobbying for it. But from about 1965 to about 1975, there was considerable interest in national power plant siting legislation. From the late sixties on, energy companies were constantly pushing pipelines in Alaska or gaslines or superports or other large facilities. They were complaining of the obstacles posed by all of the state and local licensing that they would have to go through. They used to claim that there were thirty-six steps or licenses they had to get, that it was a quagmire, and there was no way to get through it. It was very clear that they were on a threshold of coalescing behind some kind of preemptive national legislation.

Ironically, by the mid-seventies, too, environmentalists had been successful enough at state and local levels that we had pockets of strength here and there; if they had to get a couple dozen licenses, the chances were that somewhere along the line, we had some friends who didn't want that pipeline going through their backyard!
McCloskey: So the politics changed entirely. Environmentalists, who had largely favored strong federal roles in contrast to state and local roles, suddenly became less sure of a strong federal role; and industry, which had always championed states rights, then suddenly became more interested in national preemption and overrides. At the same time, the Liberty Lobby was still championing local and states rights in a vehement way as if it were still back in the nineteenth century. We finally just walked away from the land use legislation.

I might add that on power plant siting legislation, for years we and the Edison Electric Institute both lobbied against it; it was a both-ends-against-the-middle operation. That then finally withered away as an idea, too. They didn't want a federal role in licensing coal-fired power plants, which had always been just licensed at the state level, and we feared that if such legislation were passed, at least in its more outrageous forms, that it would be used to force power plants down the throats of unwilling local people in all of the wrong places.

Schrepfer: Couldn't a system of statewide or a system of state land planning turn into a mechanism that could be used by economic interests just as well as by environmental interests?

McCloskey: Indeed it could, though with fifty states, the actual patterns were likely to be highly varied. But that was one of the trade-offs; the theory was that they could be empowered to designate both areas of critical economic importance and critical environmental importance. There was to be no effort to control the balance between them. They could be all one or all the other, and it was a gamble that you would take with that system.

Also, even in environmental ranks, by the end of the seventies, there was quite a bit of disillusionment with planning and a lack of confidence in it.

Schrepfer: How about with the federal government?

McCloskey: I wouldn't say it was so much disillusionment as fear of control passing into the wrong hands, as with oil companies where you could get plants and facilities and pipelines that we didn't want. Throughout the seventies it was clear that while we had a generally favorable public attitude toward environmentalism during most of that time, the executive branch of the federal government was not inherently sympathetic.

Schrepfer: This was somewhat of a significant transition then. In other words, up to this period most of the thrust of the environmental and conservation movements really was toward raising the level of decision making and after the late seventies, the feeling is in the other direction.
McCloskey: Well, at least it has been something that we have agonized over increasingly. There is still a lot of force to the old doctrine, which was that it was easier to lobby one legislative body, namely Congress, than it was fifty legislative bodies and that at the federal level, the mix of interests is much more dilute than it is at the state level, where the local timber industry may be absolutely insuperable. By the time you get to the national level, they are a smaller frog in a bigger pond, and the informational resources at the federal level are better.

The information networks work very well at the national level and the professional and technical resources at the federal level have become absolutely excellent. They don't exist in many states. There is nothing like all of the professional technical newsletters you can get at the federal level; with them you can tap into almost any degree of information you want in any field and be as well armed as the other side. You just aren't going to get that at the state level. Of course, one can also have a large national constituency which can be mobilized and have more friendly newspapers. And generally, although this is not as true as it once was, the level of rationality in the debate and the professional technical resources of the agencies are greater at the federal level.

So those are all of the traditional reasons. Yet, we also see at the end of the seventies that at the federal level that if the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] is captured by a hostile administration, it suddenly slows down everything, whereas some states are still good on the environment and would be going right ahead. So I realize that there are problems with putting all of your eggs in one basket, too, although actually in the pollution control field, we don't have them all in one basket.

Schrepfer: What about [your] calculations in relation to national versus local power that deal with your constituency—do you know where your greatest strengths are geographically, and does that help you make any sort of decision?

McCloskey: Of course, we know where our membership is, and we know where our support in Congress has been. Our membership has been concentrated very heavily in the Far West and in the Northeast and in the Lake States. In the mid and late seventies, we filled in a fairly elaborate club structure throughout the South and the Great Plains. It was commensurate in the Great Plains with its population level. The club continues to have about a third of its membership in California, which is quite disproportionate for a national organization, though we have a very respectable apparatus now throughout the whole country.
McCloskey: The votes in Congress have come very heavily from the same places where our strength is greatest, from the West Coast and California particularly, the Lake States, and the Northeast. That is like a lot of liberal causes. That is where you basically build your first 150 votes in the House of Representatives, and then you have to pick up another sixty or so from somewhere else, and that's where having members in the South and the Great Plains and the Rocky Mountains is important. Those votes are hard to pick up. Of course, with the general shift to the Sun Belt, we face the fact that, like a lot of other liberal causes, our base was eroding in the Lake States and in the Northeast.

Now, the one thing that is different and is unlike a lot of other liberal causes, is that our support in Congress not only comes from the inner cities, it also comes from congressmen in Republican suburbs. We have many, many suburbs where we do quite well, and we have the support of friendly congressmen.

In fact, throughout the seventies, even though the general mood was becoming more conservative in election after election, the one kind of issue at the state level that would often get passed would be bond issues for pollution control and for parks and open space. Those election results almost invariably would show those measures doing very well in the suburbs. So, we were not locked into only inner city votes, we were still doing well with suburban voters. Where that fails is when you get into a presidential campaign. Our issues get melted in with so many other things that they get lost in the final calculus.

Schrepfer: Like recently?

McCloskey: Yes.

Schrepfer: Most of the club's members and most of your congressional vote then is urban, either urban or metropolitan—urban and suburban. Does that make your power greater at the federal level than it would be at the local level when many of the local issues are in rural or less populated areas?

McCloskey: Clearly, we have suffered from a new version of the old urban-rural split. In fact, I think in many rural areas, we've taken on the onus of all the traditions of a hundred years of hostility toward urban areas. Since the Supreme Court's decisions on reapportionment a decade or so ago, I think basically urban America has forgotten about rural America. It has stopped complaining about it; it's just out of its mind entirely. But the one place where urban people keep remembering rural America is with respect to the environment. Urban Sierra Club types go out to some rural area and look out at the forests and say they ought not to be logged,
McCloskey: or they ought to be in a national park, or that that dam they want ought not to be built, or that the mine they lust after is going to pollute the local stream. So we are at a point of friction constantly between urban and rural interests, and the rural interests have transfer en masse to us all of their decades of resentment over people from the cities coming out and telling them what to do.

Consequently, we certainly don't do well with legislators from rural areas. Although with reapportionment, it depends on how people are skillful in gerrymandering. At least statistically we ought to do better now in the state legislatures. One of the problems of state legislature is that so many of them have traditions against undertaking major programs—traditions of inactivism that are deeply ingrained. Many of them still have sessions that are only every other year, and they are short sessions. There is almost a transition in many state legislatures that only trivial matters, other than basic questions of taxes, are legislated upon. Legislators are typically amateurs. A local merchant comes to the state capitol and will, as a matter of pride, try to get some bill passed. To enhance his chances, he will pick on something that is very trivial, and they all scratch each others' backs and carry each others' bills through.

Congress's assumption is that 99 percent of the bills are dead the moment they are introduced, and the art of lobbying is to bring them to life. In most state legislatures, the theory is that a bill has to be killed; that's the terminology. It's like a conveyor belt. But the only basis on which that works is the assumption that basically what is dealt with is trivial. We are usually talking about fundamental things that change traditional directions in major ways. Because of those traditions the climate for us has never been very good in state legislatures. In fact, throughout the seventies, while there had been lobbying activities on the part of environmental groups—let's say substantial activities in more than half of the states—we stopped generally doing very well in state legislatures by about 1974 or '75 and thereafter were very much on the defensive, whereas in Congress, throughout the seventies, we have continued to progress legislatively.

From 1972 on, our adversaries said that, "Your movement is going to have a backlash against it; you are no longer going to progress." Indeed, after about '71 or '72, industry got well organized and counterattacked, but there was never any real evidence of a backlash. We passed far more legislation after '72 at the federal level than in all the prior years.
McCloskey: That was not true at the state levels. At the state levels, we basically stalled out by about '74. In California it was in 1975 where we probably had the most sophisticated environmental lobby in the entire country. We had been basically defending our gains since 1975.

Schrepfer: So in short you really have no clear idea or direction on this question of centralization versus decentralization in land planning. It is not clear whether you are stronger at the federal or at the state level or which is the best way to go.

McCloskey: I think that's true. It's a pragmatic matter which changes from year to year as to where our strength lies. But, back to the question of planning, many of us lost faith in the notion that anybody has enough wisdom in a fast-changing world to paint with a very broad and comprehensive brush to describe how things ought to be. Where planners have had their greatest impact—that is, in urban areas—I think many people were profoundly disillusioned with anything that planners laid their hands to.

I personally identify with Jane Jacobs. I don't like giantism, and I don't like large institutional complexes or things that look all controlled and regimented. Even though it's a fine design, I would look at it and say, "Psychologically, I don't like that." I don't know how you get a finer grain to things, but of course in the general area of land planning, we are now sensitized to the fact that so much planning is self-fulfilling prophecy—that if facilities are set aside and opportunities provided, they will be utilized.

Particularly in the whole area of growth control arguments, we have come to kind of a negative framework for planning—if you don't provide it, it won't happen. The disentangling of all of these conflicting strains of thought, I think, is still going on. Probably one could say conceptually there is nothing wrong with planning. It's a question of how it's done and what vision is brought to it and on what scale it's done, but it's proven to be such a difficult thing to master in any way that exerts any real appeal to any of us that I think many of us just walked away from it and said, "We don't see anybody who knows how to do it well or in a way that appeals to us, and we have no confidence in any center into which so much power would be reposed, and let's just forget about it." Guerilla warfare, as it's posed, may yield better results than putting this much power in the hands of any philosopher-king that can be found.

Schrepfer: Some of it seems to be a sort of loss of control of one's life, too, that much of the planning implies this kind of loss.
McCloskey: I think so. This invokes even a larger theme, which is the tension that exists between two contradictory strains in the environmental movement, or in society as a whole, coming out of the thinking of the late sixties and early seventies. There is a considerable emphasis on decentralization and simplicity in life, making things less complicated, bringing control into the hands of smaller groups of people on a more local basis, giving people more control over their lives and destinies.

At the same time, as I said earlier, it was clear that, on balance, environmentalists at least as a community could more control their destinies through an instrument of the federal government than through, say, state government. There are certainly certain local communities where environmentalists have had great impact, although I think it's a minority out of the total number of communities in the country.

Also, there are increasing technical developments that tend to bind peoples of the globe together and bind the economies of the planet together and cause problems that are of worldwide nature, whether it be the ozone layer or problems with carbon monoxide. They all call for global instruments of control and management. We can talk about wanting to go back to some idyllic community in Oregon or wherever, but we realize we don't have instruments of control to deal with the present challenges of a global nature and don't know how to deal with acid rain that crosses the boundary between the U.S. and Canada, let alone with CO₂ problem on a worldwide basis.

So until you can turn off technology and developments that are producing problems on a larger scale, it's not responsible to walk away from them and act as if your opposition wasn't playing on a bigger court. If they are expanding the size of the court, we have to also. There has been a real tension in the movement over these two tendencies. I think the club has opted in favor of dealing with the real problems on the scale on which they exist, and will not wander off into the idyll of living just in your local community, though we urge people to be active there, too. But we realize that emotionally, we are caught going both directions at the same time, that there is no easy answer.
V THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT IN THE SIXTIES

Reasons for Upsurge of Interest in the Environment

Schrepfer: This might be a time to talk for a moment about the environmental movement in the sixties, the roots or the nature or the causes of the sort of upsurge in the environmental movement that took place. You suggested that the upsurge took place in 1969, although the middle half of '64 is when the club's membership and its growth rate jumped up to about 30 percent per year. What do you think the causes of this upsurge were?

McCloskey: I think it was a process that fed upon itself, but basically in the period following World War II one can see its roots. In the early fifties, people who came back from the war and reestablished their lives, began then to take an interest in public affairs and conservation and planted the seeds of activism. I saw that particularly in things that I was involved with in Oregon in the mid-fifties—the Three Sisters Wilderness—and other such issues which emerged elsewhere, as with Dinosaur National Monument and its protection.

We went through the phase of trying to protect areas we thought were saved from new threats as the economy gathered steam into the sixties. Then we went on the offensive for the Wilderness Act and later for redwoods, trying to get new protective reservations through the late fifties and early sixties, and at least on the public lands and in the West, this renaissance was carried under the rubric of outdoor recreation and its needs.

Then by the mid-sixties we moved with Lady Bird Johnson to thinking in terms of natural beauty, which is a way to elevate the debate conceptually a bit over the mundane needs of recreation. That quickly metamorphosed into the notion of environmental quality, which is a broader level of conceptualization. Around 1965 and '66 natural beauty was very much on people's minds, when Mrs. Johnson was talking about billboards and junk yards.
McCloskey: When we spoke in 1967 and 1968 of environmental quality we were trying to embrace broader indices of concern. In 1969, we got into ecology, and the environmental movement took off. But at least for the Sierra Club, and I think for the movement as a whole, from about '62 on through '68 membership was growing very rapidly. The curve was moving up from a flatter curve to a steeper curve of membership growth, and in general levels of activity—the numbers of issues that were garnering publicity, the number of people who were involved.

I view the transition in '69 to environmentalism, which of course then took off from notions of ecology, as a very logical progression. However, the real upsurge began about the middle of the summer of '69. I remember when Nixon came into office in January with Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel, and the Santa Barbara oil spill took place. Of course, we led a great campaign then to keep Hickel from being nominated and to challenge him in Congress. In fact, we thought in 1968, with the passage of the Redwood National Park Act and the North Cascades National Park, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, and the National Trails Act, that this was sort of the culmination of our strength and so much of what we wanted.

We were shocked when Hickel came in. It looked like things were going to slip backwards. I remember through the spring and the summer thinking that we were fighting a rearguard action. I remember Stewart Brandborg saying something about how we've got to pull ourselves in closely around the campfire. We felt very defensive and threatened, not realizing that we were on a threshold of an explosion into a period of our greatest growth and influence.

I remember, though, that the publicity we were getting by the summer and fall of 1969 in the Everglades campaign, told me that something unusual was happening. Here was a campaign that didn't have a long build-up like the Redwoods. It hadn't been built up for four or five years, and it was already getting that kind of publicity after about two or three months. It was over the jet port in the Everglades and some water problems. Suddenly things were being publicized on a wholly new basis.

Then, of course, the Earth Day celebrations were organized. I remember going to one in Ann Arbor [Michigan], I think in February or late January, with three or four thousand students in a field house, chanting and screaming. I had never seen anything like that. It was almost frightening in a way. Suddenly, one of the things that I found most disturbing was that a lot of the traditional spokesmen for the conservation movement was regarded as old hat and out of step with the times. People emerged at the student level, literally from nowhere, who were inventing new standards for what was right and what should be done and whole new theories overnight.
McCloskey: For instance, I remember hostesses who were suddenly saying, "I can't serve paper napkins anymore. I've got to have cloth napkins." Someone had written that paper napkins were terribly wrong, and colored toilet paper was regarded as a sin. But all sorts of people from different backgrounds coalesced in the environmental movement. People who were interested in public health suddenly emerged and very strongly.

Schrepfer: At this point, however, the growth of the membership of the Sierra Club declined in the early seventies from its high point, didn't it?

McCloskey: The highest growth period was from '69 through '70, and then in '71 it suddenly subsided, and this marked a new phase. I think what happened is that about a decade of social activism from '61 at the beginning of the civil rights movement to about 1971, basically came to an end then in terms of, among other things, the intensity of interest of the press—the amount of coverage they are willing to give in a basically sympathetic and sustained way. I think it kind of coincided with the winding down of the Vietnamese War and Richard Nixon's second reelection, and that period of mass optimism about the ability to make social change sort of collapsed, and the popular mood became one of disillusionment and withdrawal.

Schrepfer: But you were still influential?

McCloskey: What happened, as I analyze it, was while we paid a price in terms of our membership recruitment, which leveled off, still, as a result of the tremendous surge out of the Earth Day period, public opinion had been lifted way up to a new plateau of support. Public opinion surveys throughout the seventies have shown, to oversimplify it a bit, that about two-thirds of the public was quite supportive of strong environmental measures. About one-third were either skeptical or think "things have gone far enough." Prior to that period, we didn't have anywhere near that level of support.

Now, what has waned through the seventies is the degree of belief that environmental problems are the most pressing problems in society. Quite appropriately, the public recognizes that billions have been invested in environmental improvement programs and that massive bureaucracies have been brought into existence and that considerable progress has indeed been made. So they no longer list air pollution or water pollution as among the top five problems of the country such as crime or inflation or something else.
McCloskey: But if they are asked questions about how strongly they believe in the importance of, say, cleaning up pollution, you still get very high measures of support, even when it requires additional taxes or means higher costs on goods.

Environmental, Civil Rights, and Antiwar Movements#

Schrepfer: Do you think that there was any kind of affinity between the upsurge in the conservation movement in the sixties and the civil rights movement and the Vietnam movement, either an affinity among these protest movements, an actual affinity or a philosophical affinity?

McCloskey: I don't think there was an actual affinity or a connection. I think we all benefitted from a period of greater social activism or a general receptivity in the popular mind for social change, though certainly I think that began to collapse with Nixon's election in '68. I think it had enough momentum, though, for the environmental movement to get launched in the latter part of that period. In that whole period of social activism, the environmental movement, the women's rights movement, the Indian or native rights movement and gay rights, all got launched rather late in the process, with civil rights and poverty and antiwar protests, Selective Service rights, and so forth all coming on much earlier in the main part of that period.

There were occasionally meetings between these interests, but the ones which I had anything to do with were generally very unsatisfactory, particularly with some of the civil rights groups. Too often there was an expectation that each could manipulate the other, and each one ought to abandon their own interests and get aboard in helping to advance the other's cause, which obviously was perceived by them as having greater merit and priority. I concluded from some of these encounters that broad coalitions between these movements are inherently very, very difficult. Each one had legitimate limits to how far it can go because its own raison d'etre is rooted in a different interest.

There are some natural overlaps of some of these issues, but unfortunately they tend to be at the margin or periphery of each group's interest, where your vital interests are not going to go into advancing things that are at the margin, and because they are marginal. Even if you agree in principle that you are going to work together on them, you have great problems in terms of who is going to put in the time and energy to advance them. So they are productive of all sorts of misunderstandings.

Schrepfer: Didn't Vietnam cause the club to have to consider the question of involvement in political issues?
McCloskey: We had very little to do with the Vietnam issue. In fact, I think in retrospect it is somewhat surprising that there were not more pressures to do something. It was only rather late in the game that we finally agreed to do an article on the problems of defoliation and Agent Orange in the jungles of Vietnam. It was a good article, but we did get a bit of internal criticism over it.

Schrepfer: Within the staff or from the membership?

McCloskey: From the membership--angry letters. However, the pressures to do something of that sort were not very great. By and large, the issue stormed on by us.

Schrepfer: What was your own position on the war?

McCloskey: I personally felt it was a colossal error from the very beginning. In the early sixties, when I was still in the army reserve, I taught some courses on counterinsurgency warfare, and from what I learned in that process, on top of what I had already had known, I felt very strongly that it was doomed to failure from the inception. Basically, I think it was [John F.] Kennedy, and more so [Lyndon B.] Johnson, who feared that Nixon would charge them with having given away Indochina, just the way Republicans in the mid-fifties charged Truman with giving away China, and they felt politically that the Democrats simply could not afford to have that argument laid against them, and despite the advice of many military experts that a land war on the mainland of Asia was unwinnable, felt that they had no political alternative. It was from almost every conceivable vantage point, a blunder of the first magnitude.

However, as executive director of the Sierra Club, I felt that we had our hands full with our own issues, which were mushrooming on every side. It was more than we could do to advance our own agenda, and I didn't see any point in getting involved with the agendas of other movements, that had in some cases more resources than we did.

Schrepfer: How about any sort of philosophical affinity between the movements?

McCloskey: The one crossover that I see deals with the questions of direct action, demonstrations, marches, lying down before the bulldozers and so forth. The Sierra Club historically has done very little of that. I don't think it ever felt very comfortable with that kind of direct action. Maybe we didn't have a Quaker background, but I do remember a few instances where we flirted with it. I remember up in the first Redwood National Park battle, early in the process, we had some marchers along the highway, and I remember
McCloskey: instructing them to get local permits, and arrangements were made in advance with attorneys in case they were hassled along the highway, marching in some kind of a protest over logging.

I remember once when we were in the Mills Tower Building after the oil spill in San Francisco Bay, we decided to picket Standard Oil across the street. I remember looking out the window and instructing the pickets, "Now, that's where you go," from our windows to their windows, just across the street!

Schrepfer: What year was the redwood protest march?

McCloskey: I don't remember that exactly, but I think it must have been around 1965. We made a few limited efforts to launch protests at shareholders meetings of oil companies, and sent people to three or four meetings—I think Standard Oil and Atlantic Richfield and one other. I suppose that around the country our local chapters must have had some similar experiences with experiments here and there.

However, by then, I think the club's political pragmatism, at least in the post World War II period, was well established. Our business was not to just bear witness. Our business was to secure the political change that would protect the environment. Once you embark upon that process of analysis, you go in an entirely different direction in most instances than you do with direct action because for the most part, direct action is a confession of either failure with respect to being able to work through the political process or a reflection of the fact that the political process somehow is closed to you, or you are locked out of it.

By and large, we did not find that we were locked out of the political process. We found many ways to influence Congress, to influence administrations. We did not conceive of ourselves as people who were unable to make that process work on our behalf. Now, there were two cases since the civil rights movement where it has made sense. One was the antiwar movement. The political process was not working for it. The nation was locked into position, and both parties were committed to the war. So the only way you could go was to protest.

The other issue is the nuclear issue. Up until at least the Carter administration, both parties again and the whole establishment in Washington were locked in a position that was promonuclear, and anybody who raised a question about it was regarded as some kind of a "nut" or a heretic.
McCloskey: At least up until the last three or four years, the only route to go on this issue was one of either being a gadfly through the political system or one of direct protest. I think that is one reason that the antinuclear movement by and large has become a movement which has specialized in direct action via protests, marches, and on-site demonstrations.

It has also really become a movement somewhat different than the environmental movement. It has attracted a great deal many more young people, and I think a fair amount of crossover from the anti-Vietnam protest, with people who wanted to continue with protests after the war was over and moved into it. We see all of these antinuclear alliances around the country now—Clamshell, Mussel, and Sunfish.

Schrepfer: Aren't some of these antinuclear demonstrations rather symbolic? In other words, they are protesting nuclear power, but it's also a symbolic protest.

McCloskey: It probably is symbolic of a great many more things. Some think it is a subtle protest against nuclear weaponry at the same time. One comparison that I see very clearly comes from trips to Europe and analyses of the environmental movement there. In most of Western Europe, the lobbying of legislators is not even possible or doesn't work very well because of party control. So environmentalists are reduced to a few techniques. One of these is mass publicity, usually via demonstrations. In Western Germany the antinuclear movement has a much closer link with the environmental movement because the environmental movement, even if it is not all that comfortable inherently with mass demonstrations because of its middle class nature, finds that the tools available in the United States simply aren't available there.

The other option is to become involved in party politics and to ally yourself with a political party or to found a political party, such as the Greens in France and Germany. You need to get around the problem of party control in lobbying, and if you have your own party, you can control it. As in some of the states in Western Germany, environmentalists have successfully infiltrated and are moving in on the Social Democrats.

Mass publicity is a technique we have used in the United States, but it's been allied with using legitimate channels of political change more than it has with protest.
The Johnson Administration and the Environmental Movement

Schrepfer: Let me ask you two questions about the Johnson administration. One is in reference to the wilderness policies that we talked about before. In 1968 Johnson signed twenty-some or twenty-six wilderness reclassification additions to the wilderness system. Did you feel at the time that this, in fact, represented a significant involvement for Johnson, or how active was the administration in helping you? Particularly, I suppose, you might come to some conclusion about [Stewart] Udall's role.

McCloskey: My recollection was that the Johnson administration was so preoccupied with the war and its own troubles that it really did not pay attention much to wilderness legislation. Most of its term [1964-1968] was spent in processing proposals through the hearing stage by the bureaucracies. Just at the end as he went out of office, I think he did send on a number of the proposals to Congress for wilderness that had emerged at that point. Very little had come out of the Park Service, as I recall, or the Fish and Wildlife Service. So Udall was not involved to any extent except inferentially. One can say that he did very little to push his agencies, the Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service, into good faith compliance with the Wilderness Act. They didn't, in fact, initiate many studies. By going limp and ignoring it, they were hoping that no one would ever push them hard to comply with the act.

Later, ironically under Nixon and his secretaries of Interior, that was finally turned around.

Schrepfer: What about Orville Freeman in Agriculture? Did he help you?

McCloskey: Orville Freeman, on the whole, was not much help during his tenure of eight years as secretary of Agriculture. He considered himself a conservationist, but he came out of the midwestern tradition of soil conservation and utilitarian thinking. The Muir tradition was something he really didn't understand much. The Gifford Pinchot tradition he did, but it didn't have much relevance at that time. He had an aide named George Selke who came from Minnesota with him who I dealt with a great deal in the earlier part of the sixties on the North Cascades National Park and on some other issues. Selke had been Freeman's natural resource commissioner in Minnesota and knew something of the Boundary Waters canoe area, and that was his introduction to wilderness.

Ed Cliff, as chief of the Forest Service during all of that period, was not all that favorably disposed, and the argument then, as now, was over the balance between commitment to timber
versus wilderness. The timber industry was making steady progress throughout the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in getting larger and larger commitments to an increasing allowable cut. In fact, later John McGuire, who was chief of the Forest Service in the late seventies, told me that Orville Freeman in 1962 got taken by the timber industry in committing himself to a four point program, all of which led inevitably to increases in the allowable cut which McGuire claimed put the Forest Service in a very difficult position forever after.

What about Ed Crafts and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation? Did he play any role?

On wilderness?

Yes.

I can't remember him playing a role on wilderness, but he, of course, played a very active role on the redwood national park issue and on Mineral King and some other park issues at the time. Generally, his role was to provide a more technically respectable case for the administration's positions, which were politically defined.

You say that the Johnson administration was very preoccupied. Do you think then that Vietnam hurt you a lot more than it helped the conservation cause? I presume that's what you mean by preoccupied.

Well, the truth of the matter is that no president has ever taken an interest in wilderness policy on a sustained basis. Kennedy didn't, and Johnson didn't. Nixon didn't; Ford didn't; Carter didn't.

Didn't Johnson pay more attention to conservation issues in the earlier period of his administration, but maybe not to wilderness?

I think that even under Carter, who was by far the most sympathetic president, and a president willing to immerse himself in detail, we never got much beyond lightweights on the White House staff who dealt with the wilderness issue in a most disappointing way. Over those twenty years the issue rarely ever engaged the attention of any of the secretaries of Agriculture. It was an issue that usually bounced around between the chief and the assistant secretary and, at best, underlings in the White House and people in the Interior Department with ambitions to control the issue, and of course the key congressmen in the committees on the hill. It was a pretty good example of the iron triangle of control on political issues.
Schrepfer: At the very end of Johnson's administration as Nixon was being inaugurated, the issue of the national monument's proclamation got national headlines and evidently Udall had put forward a large program that Johnson ultimately did not accept or did not sign into existence. I think that the question that is logical on this issue is to ask how much of a role you had in helping Udall draw up this program. Was it really your program?

McCloskey: No, but we had our program. Starting late in the fall of '68, we went to work putting together a set of proposals, and Dave Brower talked to Stewart Udall some time earlier in the year, and Dave asked me to pull together specific proposals. We put forth a proposal for a Mount Shasta National Monument and for a Great Basin National Monument similar to the park proposals out in eastern Nevada. We had some proposals in Utah, too, but those were basically Udall's and the Park Service's proposals for enlarging Arches National Monument as it then was, and a number of other Utah units. I can't remember now all of the units we had on our list, but I think we had seven or eight proposals. We took it in more as a shopping list, hoping that we might interest them in some of them if certainly not all.

As it turned out, Udall's list ran very heavily into both units in Utah and wildlife refuge proposals in Alaska. We were not really involved in wildlife refuge proposals. We were just involved in national monument proposals. None of ours got through the process at that time. We went to see Sam Hughes, then in the Bureau of the Budget, and had a very cordial meeting in the White House with him, and I believe Sharon Francis was there at the time and some other White House aides. I was somewhat encouraged to think that we would do better than we did. As it was, I think basically Udall was responding to staff work that had been done both by the Park Service in Utah and the Fish and Wildlife Service in Alaska.

Of course, the final outcome was that on inauguration day at nine in the morning, Udall announced a larger list of proposals that the president was signing, and I think at five minutes to twelve, Johnson signed a proclamation for far fewer monuments and refuges than Udall had announced that morning. I think somebody else has written up the whole episode of what happened that morning, and I wasn't there, but that was the first time, though, we learned somewhat how it was done. This was suggested by the successful experience that the Wildlife Management Institute had had in the late fifties involving Fred Seaton, who was secretary of the Interior, who set aside the Arctic Wildlife Range as Eisenhower went out of office. Of course, we also harkened back to Teddy Roosevelt's days. Since Johnson, with every outgoing president we have made an effort of one sort or another to get national monuments set aside.
McCloskey: Not with Nixon since he went out a bit precipitously, but we certainly did with Gerald Ford, who finished out Nixon's term. Ansel Adams lobbied him, and we had the help of Nat Reed, who was then assistant secretary of the Interior. We found out that the Park Service had worked up a list and secured the interest of somebody in the White House, and apparently some rather solid proposals worked their way substantially through the White House. But Ford never was willing in the final analysis to do anything.

We did the same thing with Carter when he went out. In fact, some of our proposals have been up again and again—the Mount Shasta National Monument proposal particularly. We've had a proposal for a national monument in the Palm Canyons in back of Palm Springs [California]. With Carter we tried to get Mount St. Helena's area set aside, which we thought was one that was clearly achievable. We lobbied very late into the game with Carter. It was clear when we failed that the same thing that happened with Udall happened again, and that was that the president was unwilling to sign it if the agencies had not really done their homework in working up a proposal which seemed to be solid. The fear always is that Congress will erupt in outrage afterwards and that unless the homework is very solid and thorough, it won't stand up.

You can't really get started in working with agencies and secretaries before the election because then they don't want to admit that they are not going to be in office, and if they are continued in office, they won't do it. It is only with the supposition that they are defeated that you can proceed, and they don't take the question seriously until after the election, and then there isn't enough time to do the homework. So it is a very difficult process.
The Organization of the Conservation Department

Schrepfer: Shall we talk about the internal club affairs again in the sixties? How much were you responsible for organizing the conservation department within the club?

McCloskey: I was entirely responsible. I began in 1965 as assistant to the president of the club, who was then Will Siri. After a year in that position, I recognized that it was not really appropriate to have a staff person for the club president who in some ways was assisting the president to compete with the executive director of the club. It was an unhealthy situation that grew out of the friction between Dave Brower and the board of directors and the president of the club during his tenure as executive director. After less than a year I quickly perceived that I didn't want to get drawn into staffing up one side of the fight. What was clear was that Dave was increasingly investing his time in publishing books, particularly developing the Exhibit Format series.

Both the problems, or the demands I should say, of producing and financing them were such that he didn't personally have the time to do much hands-on work on conservation anymore, and he didn't have any immediate staff to do that work. We didn't even have anything called a conservation department. So I proposed to Brower and the president and the board that we recognize that the staff's specific job is to organize our conservation campaigns and that the notion that the executive director could do that in between flights to London on publishing ventures and borrowing and begging a little time here and there from the staff of the Sierra Club Bulletin and elsewhere just wasn't going to work, and it wasn't really going to work to have me become Brower's rival through the office of the club president. I just didn't want to play any part in that rivalry. So we all agreed that the case was right, and we went ahead and organized that department.
Schrepfer: Brower supported you then?

McCloskey: Yes, he did. My office was next to his; it was right there with a connecting door, and I thought we worked quite well together. The field representatives were put under me, and he started hiring a number of them. I had a good relationship with the northwest representative, which was the territory from which I came. As we added the representative in the Southwest, the relationship was more tenuous. Jeff Ingram, who was the first southwest rep, was hired by Dave, and I think that clearly his allegiance was primarily to Dave, as was the first eastern rep, Gary Soucie.

But I tried to coordinate activities with them, and while I'm not sure they truly recognized me as their boss, we accomplished a fair amount in terms of coordination.

Schrepfer: So you weren't second in command in the office. You had your own territory, and he had his territory.

McCloskey: That's right, and increasingly we developed a sort of a relationship of mutual respect and self-restraint. I would try to clear big things with Brower and give him informational memos, and he would drop in and give me ideas from time to time. Certain things like the newspaper ads were clearly his promotion, and I would help him accomplish what he wanted on those, but increasingly, when it came to lobbying and strategy, he deferred to me, except we had a division of labor that recognized that the Grand Canyon was his issue, and the redwoods and North Cascades were things on which I was going to be primarily working. Of course, on the redwoods, Ed Wayburn had the leadership role on it, and I was in the supporting staff role.

The Brower Affair: An Insider's Observations##

Schrepfer: You are one of the few insiders in the club during the Brower affair and one of the even fewer who took no side. It is hard to know where to begin a discussion of the affair, so I'll ask you to establish some priorities. Do you think Brower was dismissed as executive director primarily for financial-administrative reasons or primarily for ideological conservation reasons?

McCloskey: I think he left for both reasons and other reasons, too. I think most important of all was the fact that he was best suited for an organization that was primarily built around his personality
McCloskey: and gave him lots of freedom of action to pursue his own intuitions. I don't know whether the Sierra Club was ever intended to be such an organization, but certainly it better suited his style when it was smaller. As it grew in size throughout the 1960s, and it grew in the size of its staff and in its complexity, it was less and less able to accommodate Brower's particular style.

By the end, he had simply become weary of fighting with the board of directors over his stylistic difference, which is a rather fundamental question, too. The board of directors' position was that this was a democratic organization, that policies were set by the board, that as a membership organization it required a lot of interaction between differing viewpoints out of which would be distilled an agreement upon what to do. Brower's whole impetus was to follow his own intuitions. If he believed something, he wanted to pursue it immediately, and he had no tolerance for the give-and-take of extended negotiations with the board. If he had been able to do that, and apparently he was to some extent in the fifties and early sixties, but by the end of the sixties he had simply lost his appetite for the whole process.

It was clear to me at the end from discussions with him that he wanted to provoke a showdown; he wanted to have it out once and for all as to who was running the organization. Was he running it, or were the others running it. In effect, he was saying, "If you want to pay me as executive director, let me run it and stay out of my way. At any point, you can make a determination of whether you want to get rid of me, but it's got to be either one way or the other. Either I run it, or you run it. There is no in-between ground."

That is one reason he ran for the board of directors. He knew it was an inflammatory action, but it was a way to force a showdown. All the fussing over finance, I think, was merely a reflection over this basic disagreement over who was running the show. Clearly, he is a person who is willing to take very high risks with finance and always hoped for the best, and I think finances were a very legitimate issue. I think the board of directors had lots of reasons to be concerned.

Indeed, if you look at the charts I have in my office over the last twenty years of years in the red and years in the black, most of my years are years in the black, and most of Brower's years are years in the red. We were going broke under Dave! But it was a mixed picture. Some years there were surpluses, too. I think one should not oversimplify some of those issues.
McCloskey: I have this belief, that on a lot of the big initiatives, somebody had to act with some boldness to get them done. If they had been left to the directors at that time, many of the good things never would have been done simply because, I think, too many of the directors at the time were people who were too mired in the past.

However, to take an example, on the ads, I think running many of the ads was exactly the right thing to do, but Dave's attitude was that if one ad was good, two ads were better and a third was even better, and he became almost intoxicated with them. He also had a syndrome that every December he felt almost a compulsion to publish an ad. I think it had something to do with the mood of the Christmas season or his depression or an antidote to it. But there were strange compulsions.

Dave was a person who does need, I think, some restraints on his genius, but psychologically he doesn't bear the restraints very well. So there were basic incompatibilities. On the question of philosophy, I think that it wasn't whether he was too liberal, so to speak, for the club. I think that is a very distorted issue. It is quite true, I think, that Dave was battling some old-guard directors through a great deal of the sixties, particularly the early part of the sixties, and I very much sympathized with his side then. But I think one thing Dave failed to recognize is that by the end of the sixties, when his showdown came, most of those old-guard directors were gone. The people he was then battling with were not really philosophically incompatible and out-of-step with what he wanted to do. Indeed, I think it was very clear once he left the club, we didn't revert to being "companions of the trail" as his supporters charged. We continued very much on the course that we had been pursuing before and, indeed, took on even more and broadened our horizons more.

One of the interesting things, I think, after Dave left and Friends of the Earth was founded, is that a lot of club people thought Dave would fail in his new effort, and he succeeded. I think Dave and a lot of his supporters assumed the club would collapse and we would fail without his guiding hand, and we didn't either. In fact, we are now nine times larger than Friends of the Earth is, but it is a good organization, and we are philosophically very close. I think the fact that his successor organization is philosophically close to the club is pretty much the answer to the question of whether it was a philosophical problem.

Where there is a difference between Friends of the Earth and the Sierra Club, I think this reflects something of a difference in temperament and style. Dave and Friends of the
McCloskey: Earth believe in bearing witnesses; they believe in the principal of standing for something, regardless of what anybody else thinks. I think the dominant club feeling then and since has been that our business is to get things done, to make change, and standing up and saying something that is going to alienate all of your friends and not advance your cause one whit is not what we should be doing. There are times when it is important to stand up for what you believe in, regardless, but bearing witness as a principal mode of action or the hallmark of the organization is something that, I think, is more characteristic of Friends of the Earth than of the club.

Schrepfer: Could the financial issue have been ideological?

McCloskey: After a while, I think the sheer rivalry or competition for control found expression in almost every issue that came before the board or the executive committee. Finances were the most convenient thing to fight over, but it was basically just an issue over who was going to call the shots and who was going to weigh the risks and make the judgments about how to measure the trade-offs.

Diablo Canyon: A Major Club Issue

Schrepfer: One of the biggest issues of the sixties was, of course, the Diablo Canyon-Nipomo Dunes fight. I know your role was minimal really in it, but nonetheless, you were obviously active in the club. What was your reaction first to the question of choosing Diablo Canyon for the site of the nuclear plant. Were you in favor of the siting at the time, and what was your reaction to Brower and his supporters' actions over Diablo?

McCloskey: As conservation director, I did look into what was at stake from the beginning at Diablo Canyon. The club had spent a number of years campaigning to save what we then called the Nipomo Dunes. We were trying to save them most immediately from a power plant, and all of our attention at that time was focused on how to get that power plant out of those dunes. There had been a number of negotiations trying to persuade PG&E to move the power plant somewhere else, and our local leaders of the save-the-dunes movement thought she had a place that was fine. That was Kathy Jackson. Will Siri, as the club president, went down to check that out with her and negotiated the understanding with PG&E to move the site to Diablo Canyon.

Schrepfer: He negotiated the agreement before the meeting in which the board of directors voted?
McCloskey: That is correct. I was not involved in that negotiation. I never felt comfortable with the way that that was done behind closed doors. In fact, I cannot think of any other instance in the twenty years I have been employed by the club where there was a unilateral negotiation of such a conclusive nature. The fact that there was no collective judgment employed on the club's side bothered me considerably.

I also went down and looked at Diablo Canyon and slept under its oak trees and certainly saw that a fine area was at stake. Clearly, this was one of the most difficult trade-offs that has ever been attempted in the name of the club, of one fine area for another fine area. I concluded, though, that one should not second-guess one's leader when a commitment in good faith has been made. Whether he was well advised in making it is another matter. It was an internal problem that, for better or worse, the club president had made the commitment. I know it's always easy to do Monday morning quarterbacking, and in lobbying and in matters of this sort, there are times when decisions have to be made on the firing line. You need a leader, and if your mode of operation is to shoot down your leaders and question their judgment and never be able to make up your mind when you face a deadline, you might as well withdraw from the field of public affairs. You have decided that you are not a credible player; you have decided you are the "cranky debating society." So I felt that once we had gotten to that point that we were honor bound to support Siri and that it was inappropriate to keep pursuing the matter as Brower did, though I must say that I never had any real appetite for the decision that had been made.

Schreiper: Do you, in general, like the idea of choosing alternate sites, and in the same vein, what about communicating with opposition leaders? How effective is it? How much do you believe in it?

McCloskey: I have come to the view that we should not choose alternate sites. We are not a public utilities commission; we are not utility planners; we don't know the best place in which all of the factors that are relevant to planning can by synthesized. Moreover, particularly in this day and age when we are so decentralized, we can't control our local groups, let alone other groups and what they are going to say.

I think the best thing for us to do, even though it sounds negative, is to indicate unacceptable sites and to say nothing about other sites, and let the utilities or developers then, by a process of trial and error, try to find a site that does not in fact engender much public opposition. I don't think we ought to be endorsing a site and be saying that a project is a good idea. Clearly, there is an element of pragmatism here. If we or other
McCloskey: Environmentalists vent equal opposition to every site that is proposed, and let us assume we are dealing with a case where there is a reasonable argument for a development—in many cases there are not—but where there is a reasonable case, if we show equal opposition to every site, we have given them no useful clues at all, and we can then expect even the worst possible site to be developed.

So we have to choose a method that shows more opposition to certain sites and, by implication, they may find less opposition to other sites. I think that's the way to do it, and this is the lesson we have learned. There are times and places in which we have to negotiate with the opposition, but choosing the sites in the first instance is not a good place to do it. There was a reasonable case in the sixties to try it, but I think we have learned through three or four bitter experiences in our history that it is fraught with no end of immense hazards, and it is just not something that we should do.

Schrepfer: If you were to describe yourself politically, what words would you choose among the traditional ones available: liberal, conservative, radical?

McCloskey: I am a fairly liberal person. I guess I throw people off of the track somewhat by being somewhat conservative socially and in my manner, but politically I am fairly much a conventional liberal, in some ways an unreconstructed New Dealer, one of the last of the New Dealers, I suppose you could say!

On some of the social issues which now are a matter of public policy, I am probably somewhat more conservative, and on spending issues I am probably more a moderate liberal, but by and large I favor an activist government and a fairly heavy role for the federal government and am fairly skeptical of giving business much leeway, though I believe basically in a healthy private sector and that most goods and services can be probably more efficiently delivered through the private sector. While the private sector does well if you have a relatively free market—in delivering goods and services of quality—by itself it has no motive to behave well in terms of social interests and so-called externalities, certainly not in terms of the environment. They can't afford it in terms of their competition. They have to have firm rules set down for them.

Schrepfer: When you say social issues, to what do you refer?

McCloskey: I suppose, for instance, on matters of crime my views have moderated quite a bit. I tend basically to be a civil libertarian, but nonetheless feel the crime problem is a real problem. It's
McCloskey: not a made-up problem. I have been mugged in Washington after club affairs. A robber tried to knock me out with a pistol; I've seen crime problems firsthand. I don't presume to know what the answers are, but I am no longer of a mind to think that the complete answer is merely full protection of civil liberties. I don't think that alone takes care of the crime problem. I'm not sure that civil libertarians would argue that either, but while at one time I was simply concerned with civil liberties, I now believe there is a real problem also which needs attention in some energetic fashion.

Schrepfer: To get back to Nipomo Dunes, Brower considered it quite pivotal in the movement toward his dismissal or departure from the club. I want to know if you agree about how important it was. Brower also has said that he felt that PG&E had a role in his dismissal and connects this with the Diablo issue. Would you agree in these assessments?

McCloskey: I think Dave wanted to characterize his showdown in as flattering terms as possible. He could not have characterized it successfully if he said he merely wanted all power. So he had to cast it in terms which as much as possible were connected with issues. Of course, for his opponents to prevail, they had to cast it as much as possible in terms of the fact that he was fiscally irresponsible and insubordinate, and I viewed it more just as a straight-out power struggle where, in the end, Dave had no chance of surviving because of the nature of a membership organization. Any organization with a self-respecting board of directors can't acquiesce to a dictatorship, much less in the Sierra Club. But on a case by case basis, if I were calling balls and strikes as the arguments rambled on, in some instances I was cheering for Dave and in others I would say the directors were right. But after a while I began to view the whole thing as just a power struggle; that's what it was.

Schrepfer: In which no one was right, or ultimately the board was right?

McCloskey: I think ultimately the board was right in that Dave came out of a history where, for quite a few years, there were so many old guard directors that he developed a style that reflected his belief that if you waited until you got permission from them or you could persuade them, it would just take too long. After a while he developed a damn-the-torpedoes attitude. Now, frequently what happens to those who have been around a long time is that our view of reality is an amalgam of things over many, many years, and we get behind the times. You aren't sensing what the directors are like today. You are seeing them as an amalgam of directors over twenty years or fifteen years or ten years, and I think that was his problem with the directors. He was seeing
McCloskey: them as a kind of synthesis of what had been there for a long
time, and I think was misreading what some of them were saying.
Ed Wayburn wasn't saying that ads were a bad idea; Ed was
saying, "Dave, you just can't run off and put one in the paper
anytime the mood strikes your fancy. You can't just have free
rein to say anything you want. It's got to be cleared with me."

Now, it is true that Ed Wayburn would have liked to run
everything in his style, too, which is back to the power struggle
business. But the reality is—and I've dealt with it now for
thirteen years as executive director—while every powerful person
would like to leave his or her mark on things as much as possible,
the proper procedure is one of give and take. We are best as an
amalgam of different contributions. In the end, the executive
director has more of a burden than anybody else to try to make
it all come out in a form that is coherent and will look sensible
to the outside world, and you can't let committees construct
their camels so that the club looks ridiculous.

So in my time I have had problems of a somewhat different
nature, but I think the basic problem was that Dave was just
temperamentally unsuited after a while for the give-and-take
of getting along in an organization that had an increasing number
of personalities who were demanding a right to play their role
in the whole scheme of things. He has had the same difficulties
over at Friends of the Earth, and he has had two or three power
struggles there.

An Assessment of Brower and Club Politics

Schrepfer: Wallace Stegner accused Brower of being bitten by the worm of
power, and, in essence, though you are not as antagonistic, I
think, as Stegner was when he wrote that article, you are, I
gather, agreeing with this assessment.

McCloskey: I guess I am agreeing to a degree, but I think in Dave's mind, it
was not seen as a power struggle. It was always a matter of
getting on with the business of getting the decisions behind you
and not being bogged down forever in these niggling disputes, and
I think his lack of temperament for dealing with people on a
basis of mutual respect and give-and-take made him instantly
suspicious that [other] people did want to shoot him down, whereas
in reality I think they wanted to play a part in making a
contribution to a decision. There were certainly times earlier
in his career where he was very much part of a give-and-take
process, but I just know from talking to him that he just no longer
had the resilience, the ability temperamentally, to deal with that.
McCloskey: He had this compulsion that there was a huge amount of work to be done and an opportunity to be seized and that every day's delay for another argument or a wait for a memorandum to be circulated was another opportunity lost.

Schrepfer: Do you think that he felt that he had a chance to win?

McCloskey: I think he felt that the odds were against him, but I think, yes, he thought he had a chance.

Schrepfer: So you don't think the PG&E and the Forest Service were out to get him and worked through part of the club.

McCloskey: I had no firsthand knowledge of any of that. I don't think it's implausible that PG&E, particularly, had conversations with some of the anti-Brower people, but I think it unlikely that they found any practical way to materially affect the outcome.

Schrepfer: What do you think about having people active in the club who are also active in development industries? In other words, how much do you believe it's possible for a person to have one foot in each camp? I'm thinking of someone like Alex Hildebrand [club director, 1948–57 and 1963–66, and a former executive of Standard Oil]. Is it possible for these people to exist any longer in the club, and if so, do you approve of the idea?

McCloskey: I don't approve of it. Of course, one of the standard observations about people in the club is that almost everybody is employed somewhere, and with the club's nearly universal reach of interests today, at one time or another almost everybody's livelihood, at least if it's in manufacturing and basic resources, can be affected. When we joined the boycott of Shell Oil products, the chairman of our Texas chapter [Rio Grande Chapter] resigned and the group chair in Martinez also resigned, both of whom were employed by Shell Oil. We've got a professor of forestry who is great on writing books for us on one subject, but when it comes to the timber industry, it's something else again, and so it goes.

I take it as an inevitable fact of life that most of our members and leaders who are employed in given industries will have a better attitude on issues affecting things other than their own industry, and they will be caught with all sorts of conflicts of interest over positions and stresses over what to believe. This touches another constant of our work and that is that in most industries, a near monopoly of accurate information exists within that industry. Most of the experts on petroleum geology are going to work for the oil industry. We always are reduced to looking for a few mavericks in a given area of specialization, an outcast at a university, or somebody who didn't fit in very well, for our information.
McCloskey: Most of the people in an industry, even if extremely intelligent and well don't realize the extent to which they've been brainwashed by that industry by reading their trade publications for years and years. Sure, there are a lot of nice people in the industry who are their colleagues who told them these things, but after a while they lose all proportion about what is fact and what is propaganda, and they don't know how much they have been brainwashed.

We, in turn, often will play the game of probing around, trying to find the truth ourselves, not knowing what is fact and what is fancy. It's an extremely difficult process disentangling the two, but I certainly believe that at the level of our governing boards we should not be burdened by people who have these problems.

Schrepfer: I think you may have already answered this but not directly; was Brower a successful administrator? Was he efficient; was he effective first in the things that he worked primarily on--publications--and secondly in conservation?

McCloskey: [pause] Both Brower and a great many people in the environmental movement have had difficulty coming to grips with the fact that public interest groups need to be administered and managed. They have, I think, suffered from a notion, which I also find lots of lawyers suffer from, that the best way to manage is to just turn something over to somebody and get out of their way and let them sink or swim. I myself suffered from that for a number of years.

McCloskey: Management involves setting goals for people, monitoring their progress in achieving them, and finding out whether they have problems, helping them set strategy, following up and so forth, and at the same time, not conceiving of your own work as being primarily that of a hands-on performer. Brower was primarily a hands-on performer. He was a great hands-on performer in designing and laying out books and choosing photographs. That is what he felt most secure and comfortable in doing and spent most of his time doing.

He spent a great deal of time traveling. He was very good as a hands-on performer in public speaking to sympathetic student audiences. In some ways he was very good as an organizer, a catalyst of new groups, but those were all hands-on tasks that he undertook and did them well. He did not really understand much about managing a group of managers and pulling them together as a team and assessing their performance, and I might add that there are very few people in public interest groups that do understand this and do it very well.
McCloskey: So if that didn't come to him naturally, it also did not come naturally to many others, and I can't say it came to me naturally. But I fancy that I have learned to do it.

Schrepfer: To what extent do you think Brower was responsible for the club's financial problems, or were there deeper roots behind them? Was he personally responsible?

McCloskey: Clearly more and more money was being spent on the book publishing program. This was the period from '66 through '69 when the Exhibit Format book line was being promoted most heavily and was a very expensive program. It drew great critical acclaim, but I think financially it was a drain. It's very clear to me now in overseeing the managing of the club's program that books alone lose money. We have the calendar line, which Dave started, which we have now built up into the largest continuing line of commercially sold calendars in the country, and perhaps the world. It generates surpluses which offset the deficits in the book program. In one sense, Dave can't be blamed for running deficits in the book program because, I think, any book program alone would run deficits. He could not draw in the value of the calendar line, having not yet been built up to provide a cushion of surpluses.

But by the same token, he actively expanded the book line, and what it really came down to is that every additional book you do means a greater deficit. When we published the first big book or two, they may have helped prompt membership growth. I think it's very plausible that in the period from '63 through '66 that the books brought us more national attention and visibility and prompted membership growth. So for a while I think when the program was modest, it probably was a stimulus to our financial growth and membership growth. But when he began to expand it even more, its positive effect in stimulating membership, I think, was probably more than offset by its negative effect in terms of financial losses on the books themselves, which I think is not owing to anything wrong about the books. It is simply that we didn't have the financial base for an expanding book program.

Schrepfer: How about the advertisements, the newspaper advertisements?

McCloskey: I think they were a brilliant breakthrough at that time, and Dave conceived of them, though I must add a footnote that was kind of funny. With the first one, he tested whether his copy was as good as the advertising agency's copy, and they had a controlled response through coupons. He had to concede in the end that the agency's copy had drawn a slightly better response than his did.
McCloskey: Of course, I worked on most of those ads, too, on the details of them, with the agencies. But I think the only problem was that there was no holding Dave back in terms of the number of them, even when they reached diminishing returns in their effectiveness. The final one, the "Earth National Park" one [January, 1969], really didn't relate to any particular campaign or purpose. He was following an inspiration he had that seemed to be out of context to most people.

Schrepfer: Did you think that the club should go into international conservation?

McCloskey: Oh yes, indeed, and the club did following his departure and, of course, Dave did a great job with Friends of the Earth in organizing counterpart groups in dozens of countries.

Schrepfer: Did the club go into international conservation in the early seventies?

McCloskey: Yes, we opened our international office in 1971.

Schrepfer: Did you participate in the April 1969 campaign in any way?

McCloskey: No, I didn't.

Schrepfer: Could you describe something of what was going on inside among the club staff during that period? Were most people on the staff pro-Brower?

McCloskey: I think they were. Those on the publishing staff and in the Sierra Club Bulletin certainly were. When we got into services and membership, a lot of them, I think, really didn't know what to make of it all. I do remember a day after the election results came in, one staff member being appalled when I told him I wasn't leaving. He said, "The rest of us are resigning in protest, to leave with Dave."

Schrepfer: Most of the staff did leave or was asked to leave.

McCloskey: About half of the staff left. The conservation department staff didn't leave for the most part, nor did the membership. But eventually the whole Bulletin staff left. The book staff left almost entirely. I would say that the secretariat for the board and executive director's office obviously left. General services—Bob Golden, who was the one-person manager, left. When I was asked to take over as chief of staff, I faced having about half of the staff gone, trying to keep things going.
Schrepfer: Okay, before we get to that period, just a couple of more questions. There were two issues that came up over that during the late sixties, and one was whether there should be any campaigning in the club at all for the board of directors, and then in '68 whether the staff should campaign? Do you have any reaction to this issue of whether it was morally correct to ban campaigning.

McCloskey: I think it's quite appropriate for candidates to campaign for the board of directors and for groups to coalesce behind slates if they want to. I think it is probably a sign of trouble in our body politic if we develop a really entrenched factionalism. It is probably an indication that we aren't doing something very well.

I must say, on the other hand, it's very hard under the current system for there to be much reality to the democratic theory in the way our elections are conducted. Without enduring factions, the voters have very little way to know what their votes mean. Many candidates are cynical enough to claim adherence to positions usually in an inverse relationship to their real positions. The candidates who are weakest on wilderness will proclaim the greatest fealty to it. The candidates who sometimes are the most reckless spenders will bear down most on being tight with the penny. So the voter has a very tough time knowing what to believe. At one time there were efforts to provide the voting records of the incumbents, which I think is an excellent idea, although that was regarded as quite divisive. But I still believe it ought to be done, although the problem is in characterizing the meaning of the vote without rehashing entirely the argument at the time in an election which may be years later.

It's a problem most nonprofit institutions face. In voting for university alumni governors or the directors of a hospital or a coop, how do you figure out really who are the people that would espouse the point of view that you have? I don't know the answer to it. Conceivably factions, if they were permanently organized, could develop followings and tell people who is on the slate that would go further in this direction or further in that direction.

I might add the reforms of 1971 put a two-term limit on directors, and you have to have a year off of the board before you can return. Before that reform was made, we had a problem with some directors being on the board just too long and not making room for new blood. We also had some national directors in the sixties, who were well-known people with perhaps broad experience and viewpoints, but who had little background on the club. They had a very hard time in adjusting to the kind of detailed considerations that are usually before the board of directors. They wanted to debate policy in the broadest terms and go home.
McCloskey: So that experiment did not work well, but I think we have probably gone to the other extreme now. We have people turning over too rapidly on the board of directors. It takes five years to really learn the ropes, and by the end of the sixth year, you're off. All of them come now from local chapters and experiences there, which is valuable, but I think we also need the leaven or the contrast of people with national perspectives and reputations, and I think we now have to look for some way of getting some balance back in.

Also, too many of the directors, I believe, now represent very parochial interests. They are interested in only one issue, and that all they want to be is a lobbyist to get funding for that issue or that committee, and they aren't interested in the rest of the story. If you just have a collection of parochial lobbyists on the board of directors, you really don't have any institutional strength and breadth of viewpoint.

Schrepfer: One of the issues in the Brower affair, which you must have been particularly sensitive to, was the conflict between volunteers and staff. How big a role do you think this played in the Brower affair, but also how much of it was a San Francisco-versus-the-rest-of-the-club syndrome, particularly out of state people? Did that play any role?

McCloskey: Certainly, in the two factions that existed in the Brower affair, there was a strong nucleus of longtime members in the Bay Area that led the anti-Brower faction. Certainly, it can be said that Brower's faction included a number of prominent club members in the East. But by the same token, I think that Brower had some local supporters, and by the same token, the anti-Brower group had support in a number of other chapters all over the country, and obviously, they had the support of enough voting members because they won by a heavy margin.

Schrepfer: So you would agree with the volunteer versus the staff, but not any--

McCloskey: Can you put that question again, the one about the staff?

Schrepfer: To what extent was there a conflict between the staff and the volunteer leadership of the club, primarily the Sierra Club Council, that played a role in Brower's departure?

McCloskey: I am not inclined to put much weight on the role of the council in the whole matter. The conflict between Dave and the directors and the officers was so apparent that I am not sure it added much spice or dimension to the problem to see where the council was in it all. As to the staff, to the extent that Brower
McCloskey: symbolized the staff as the chief staff person, it could well have been viewed as a staff-volunteer conflict. But I think most people close to it regarded it really as a conflict between Dave as a personality and the board and the president, as the board's chief spokesman. I was staff. In fact, I must say the directors and Dave and a lot of people went out of their way not to draw me in. I think there was almost a conscious feeling that somebody had to be left untainted to carry on.

I remember people said to me afterwards that "we didn't approach you about that" or "We didn't come to you" or "We didn't want to bother you." By the same token, the Brower people did it, too. I was sort of put in a protective position where they consciously left me out of it, and I was glad to be left out.

Schrepfer: In other words, you weren't a victim of antagonism from either side then.

McCloskey: That's right. Now, of course, I was deliberately trying to stay out of it, but people could have made it very difficult for me, and they did not. I tried neither to aid and abet Brower's critics, nor to aid and abet Brower's defenders. I just stepped back and let them go at it.

The Brower Legacy

Schrepfer: How much of a role did the Brower affair play in the politics of defining your role after his departure?

McCloskey: It had quite a role, and basically from 1969 through 1975, I was under a cloud of sorts. The cloud arose out of the imagery that the volunteers had recaptured control of their organization, and as outgrowths of that, the number of meetings of the board of directors increased from three to five; the executive committee of the board of directors was emasculated, and all power after about 1971 was put in the board of directors. It was all kind of an outgrowth of the philosophy that we don't want a small group of people, much less the executive director, making decisions; we were going to make them collectively on a broad basis.

As an outgrowth of this, too, the various committees developed close and proprietary relationships--some of them had long had it—with department heads. It was not really until the mid-seventies that the attitude cooled to the extent that I could really be a manager, and I gradually, in the process, learned to be one.
McCloskey: But it wasn't until the late seventies that the board finally got so tired of the old way that we did our budgets that they decided to ask me to really do my job. Before, the tradition of budgeting—the control of the disposition of financial power—had been an open political game where every contending interest in the club made its plea for the maximum amount of spending authority, promising the minimum amount of income and jealously protecting its territory while asking for the moon. The job of the staff was simply to collate all of these contending claims in a document, and then the budget committee and the board would have their battles royal over the spoils, which was just sheer chaos. As the club got bigger and bigger, it got worse and worse.

Finally, after the debacle of '78 when people became almost permanent enemies as a result of the debate and then realized that they really didn't want to be, they turned to me and said, "We're paying you to be executive director. Bring in a balanced budget, and provide for the following programs, and then we'll decide whether we like it or we don't, and we can change it if we want."

But this would have been unthinkable in 1969 or '70. This would have been regarded as a power grab ala Browerism, and there are many other instances of this, for instance, on salaries. Until the mid-seventies the board members wanted to control the salaries down to fairly low levels of employees. Basically, they now want me to implement a professional salary program, and they set my salary, and I set the rest under the professional program which is reviewed by a personnel committee. Things then got immensely more professional.

But for the first five or six years, there was a paranoia about power and that was confused with management responsibility, and it was very difficult for me to manage because the board as a committee of the whole was looking into countless matters of detail.

Schrepfer: Did it effect in any way your conservation stand?

McCloskey: I had established a tradition from '66 on as director of conservation about how conservation was handled, and they had come to respect me and have confidence in my recommendations. I developed a very elaborate trail of paperwork in making proposals to the board of directors with the policy history and the pros and cons of proposals. So I think that was the smoothest part of all in the transition.
Schrepfer: Did it affect any of your hiring policies in having gone through the Brower affair? Did it have an affect on the kind of people you tried to hire when you were executive director?

McCloskey: I don't think it immediately affected the kind of people I hired. The abrupt loss of half of the staff was the biggest single problem I faced. I had to do a lot of quick hiring, and while I think those people who came in under difficult circumstances certainly made their contributions, I'll also say that as we've had successive turnovers, I think the quality of the staff has steadily improved. When suddenly you have no staff at all for the magazine, you've got to do some quick hiring, and it may not be the most deliberate search process imaginable.

Schrepfer: Do you have any sort of general policy of the kind of people that you think should work for the club?

McCloskey: Yes, I learned through experience that in conservation it's best to have people who work their way up professionally in the movement from a fairly early age, either for the Sierra Club or some other similarly minded organization. We have generally not had successes with people who are very advanced in their careers in other fields and who then had switched over to the professional lobbyists.

Schrepfer: Why do you think that is?

McCloskey: I think a number of reasons explain it. One is that people have been too long in other careers. They bring habits of other careers along with them that are not necessarily appropriate for this business. Lobbying for a public interest group, the Sierra Club in particular, is a very specialized task, and what we've now learned is that it takes a long apprenticeship to master it. There may be superficial things about some other profession that may seem similar to what we're doing, but the full magnitude of public interest lobbying is not readily apparent.

Also, the commitment on the merits to our positions is something that cannot be forecast well in terms of somebody's prior performance in another discipline, nor from interviews, and there are grave dangers of getting somebody who thinks they agree with you, but once they get into the thick of it, they may find just too many cases where they have doubts about the validity of our position, and that's just fatal on the part of a lobbyist. Where they grow up in the movement, they either grow into accepting the positions, or they basically absorb their ideas from the movement or the organization.
McCloskey: Somewhat in contrast to this, in other professional and technical fields, I have learned that our best course is to hire the best professional you can find for an accountant. Don't get a club person who is also an accountant. That can pose lots of trouble. Just get the best accountant you can find or the best fund raiser you can find or the best editor you can find. When you move into editing, you need people who are editors with experience in the field of environmental issues or natural history or something that is related because there is a technical background of information that is highly pertinent there. They have to have editorial judgment, but they don't have to have worked their way up in the movement or have been active as Sierra Club members. It is usually better if they have not had very much to do with the Sierra Club.

The people in the nonconservation ends of it, if they have had too much of a club background, want to meddle in internal club affairs; they've got too many prejudgments on lots of things that they really don't have to be concerned with. It's hard to focus on containing their energies. They have learned the bad habits of being a club volunteer who wants to pursue whatever interests him or her.

But in conservation, it is the other way around. The more you've got the club background, the better, and particularly the staff-volunteer relationship is very sensitive. We have far more membership participation and leadership participation than any other effective environmental group. It's a unique style of give-and-take and a mutual respect that is hard to pull off, and it takes a long time to learn. If you have learned your habits elsewhere—that you don't have to clear things with a lot of volunteers—it's very hard to get people trained to do that.

By the same token, we demand real, professional work. If you have primarily been a volunteer interested in just doing things when it suits you and things that interest you, then that's the wrong attitude, too. It's real professional work. You've got to do things that meet deadlines whether you like them or not and to meet all of the kind of standards and be a respectable, professional person.

Schrepfer: How about the emotional or mental traits of the people that you hire?

McCloskey: Well, there has been quite a contrast, I think, between the kinds of people I have hired, particularly in the last half dozen years, with people during the Brower years and, in fact, the number of carry-overs that we had. I would put it this way, that on the whole, the people I have been hiring are more calm, focussed, and professional, and I think probably are better rounded individuals.
Schrepfer: In the same vein, perhaps, you wrote an article for the Pacific Historical Review in which you showed the shifting in the environmental movement from what you said was the charismatic leaders to the more managerial leaders. Is that the way you see your role?

McCloskey: I see my role as facilitating, among other things, a great many leaders to find prominent roles in the club, whether they be staff or volunteers. But I have not viewed myself as the key quarterback throwing all of the long balls and if I'm injured, we're out of business. The charismatic types are the people who provide most of the energy for the organization and have a lot of people who, I think, are rather dependent on the charismatic figure for their self worth and for their energy and for their ideas. I think organizations are in deep trouble if that's the case. I want there to be dozens, hopefully hundreds, of people who find their own sources of energy and their own sources of motivation and ideas, who were out there being their own quarterbacks, and they don't need me to inspire them onward. In fact, in hiring in the conservation department I have tried to hire a number of high energy people who have personalities somewhat in contrast to my own. In some ways, I am the kind of person that tries to hold it all together and to soothe people who are upset about what other people are doing.

I moved in my own career through a number of stages as executive director, in fact. I moved much more in the last half dozen years into the role of being an active manager and less of a hands-on performer. In my early years as executive director, I did a lot of hands-on lobbying before we got a Washington office really set up. Then when we got that set up, I stepped somewhat into the background from that. For a while, I thought my intellectual role in contributing ideas was more important, but now we have a lot of other people generating ideas and program. Then I moved into a period of management in hiring good people. That was one of the principal things I did. Recently, I have concentrated on reforming the budget process. I hired some good people to do that. I'm looking forward to doing more in fund raising in the future and more in long-term public relations work. As long as my job keeps changing, and with the board I seem to keep redefining it through the years, it remains stimulating.
Schrepfer: Let's talk about internal Sierra Club affairs between 1969 and roughly 1981. We have discussed some of the legacy of Brower and how it affected your years as executive director. We can go on, I think, and discuss financial problems during your period. I think the most notable thing that happened early, when you were executive director, was the big financial dip in 1971 which accompanied the dip in membership in 1971. Can you talk somewhat about the causes of this financial crisis and draw some conclusions about why the membership declined so precipitously since your point earlier was that the club's effective power in Washington didn't decline during that same period?

McCloskey: Actually, the club's membership did not decline; growth leveled off. What happened in '71 was that suddenly our membership stopped growing. It stalled out at around 130,000. Our budgeting assumptions for almost a decade had been that we would grow each year. I remember in the 1971 period we were debating on whether we should count on 8 percent growth or 10 percent growth. It had been as high as 33 percent net growth around 1969. So we had lived on growth, and we had always expected to earn more money the next year than the prior year.

We had been more conservative in 1971 in our budgeting, but we had still counted on some 8 percent growth. That growth simply failed to materialize, and our spending overshot our income by a great deal. We ran a huge deficit that year and that wiped out our net worth. We went into a negative net worth that year. That experience, which was a searing one, caused us all to realize that we needed to have a new basis for our budgeting, and thereafter our budgeting processes steadily improved, and we were much more conservative. We didn't count on growth for a good many years thereafter.
McCloskey: It also triggered a feeling on my part that we could no longer count on accidental forces to stimulate growth in membership. Up until that time, we had never engaged in direct mail promotion of membership. We had no promotional system at all except simply printing up extra membership applications and a little brochure about the club called Why the Sierra Club? It has gone through many evolutions and printings and titles through the years, but it is an evolution of a pamphlet that we have had for well over fifteen years. That was sent out far and wide to club leaders.

But after '71, we gradually began to develop the rudiments of a promotional system for membership. We began to put coupons in our magazine to solicit membership. We began to develop advertisements in the Sierra Club Bulletin to solicit membership. We experimented with advertisements in other magazines, small ones. We printed up larger quantities of Why the Sierra Club?, but it was not until 1975 that we actually began to use direct mail to any extent to solicit members. We did so at that time on a very cautious basis.

The membership committee for a good many years had actually opposed overt efforts to promote membership. There were furious internal arguments over whether we even wanted to grow. Some were invoking arguments that I am sure had been expressed in the twenties about whether the club should emphasize quality or quantity. I thought a lot of the arguments were fairly spurious. I drew up a membership development plan and set of objectives in 1975 which called for reaching a goal of 250,000 members by 1980. The board of directors finally accepted it, and the membership committee with some misgivings did.

Thereafter, we hired staff who had promotional abilities and who knew direct mail. Learning that process was a slow business. It wasn't really until about 1978 that we began to get in the mail in a big way. Even then we were far more cautious and conservative in that regard than other organizations, such as the National Audubon Society. Back in the early sixties, we were virtually the same size as the National Audubon Society. We both had some thirty thousand members. By the end of the 1970s, they had almost four hundred thousand members, and we had less than two hundred thousand. They mailed consistently throughout the 1970s, and they mailed generally more than twice as much as we did, and it enabled them to get way out ahead of us.

Our membership finally broke out of the doldrums in the mid-seventies, and we finally began to move beyond the one hundred and thirty thousand range. We vacillated between one hundred and thirty-three thousand and one hundred and thirty-eight thousand for
McCloskey: three or four years. Later we got caught in the doldrums in the one hundred and eighty thousand category. We vacillated between being about one hundred and seventy-eight and one hundred and eighty-three thousand for three or four years. But we finally broke out of that, too, as we expanded our direct mail operation.

In the late seventies and the early eighties, we finally got our preferred postal status back. In 1970, after the IRS had revoked our tax deductibility, which was in 1966, we had appealed that and had exhausted the administrative appeals in 1968. We decided not to go into court and to challenge that because we had actually become so legislatively active that we thought it was too confining to try to live within the constraints of the status as a 501-C3 [a tax deductible] organization.

Schrepfer: Did the loss affect you financially?

McCloskey: I don't think it really did because in 1969 we activated the Sierra Club Foundation, and they became a conduit for tax deductible contributions. We can get into that more when we discuss the foundation at some length, but in 1970 the Postal Service looked at what the IRS had done and concluded that we should be denied our reduced rate, our special third-class bulk permit rate. This is a rate that almost all other organizations enjoy. We challenged that first through administrative challenges, hearings we had with the Postal Service in Washington. We finally went to court, first in a district court in San Francisco. We lost there; we appealed to the ninth circuit. We lost again. We finally decided not to appeal to the Supreme Court, but this held us back in direct mail because we had to get better than a 1 percent response in the mail in contrast to .6 percent that those organizations who enjoyed that reduced postal rate could realize and still make money.

So this held us back. Finally, in about 1977 or '78, the federal law was amended dealing with these postal rates, and the amendments made it possible for organizations that are so-called "civic leagues" under the IRS regulations, as we were, to get the preferred postal rate. So we reapplied at that time. We got turned down again, allegedly because our case had already been decided by a court of law. The issue was whether we could claim to be an educational organization. The Postal Service claimed that we were a conservation organization, not an educational organization. We claimed education was the means, conservation was the message.

But we finally found a major law firm in Washington, D.C., to represent us, Arnold and Porter, and they very skillfully persuaded the Postal Service to reconsider. We worked out a
McCloskey: settlement that we were regarded as a philanthropic organization. We had never applied as such before, and it was another basis for an application. The court, the ninth circuit in our court case, had never addressed that question, or it never had it before them, so there was nothing on the record regarding it that had been decided. So that was the settlement. Once we got that settlement, it made a great difference to the success of our direct mail campaign to promote membership. We stepped up the mailings from a million and a half to over three million, and they are expanding beyond that today.

This led to a great spurt in our membership in the late seventies and early eighties, and we then broke the two hundred thousand barrier. Throughout the seventies our finances went through a number of stages. Our net worth after '71, the next year, got back into the black. For a number of years it was in the $300,000 plus range, and then it started growing gradually and was up in the $600,000 to $700,000 net range for a number of years. But when our membership took off in the late seventies and early eighties, it finally exceeded the one million dollar range, and quickly in 1981, when we ran our campaign against Interior Secretary Watt, our net worth broke the two million dollar mark, jumping by almost a million dollars in one year alone.

We have ambitions to have the club's net worth be about half of its total budget, which would be on the order, at the time we are transcribing this, of some five million.

Schrepfer: Do you think that the dip in the membership in '71 might have had something to do with the departure of Brower or the whole Brower fight?

McCloskey: I don't think so (and there was no dip—only an end to growth) because it reflected what was happening to almost all other public interest groups. The membership leveled off for almost all of them except Audubon, that got into the mail in a very big way for the first time then. I think that if we had gotten into the mail at the same time, we would have sustained our membership growth. But everybody who was relying just on word of mouth as we had been found, their membership suddenly leveling off. Brower's new group, Friends of the Earth, in its first year, solicited twenty to thirty thousand members but thereafter they were stalled almost permanently at that number and never really progressed beyond it.

Schrepfer: Do you think his ads helped as a device for raising membership at all?
McCloskey: No, what happened in 1971, I think, was basically that it was the end of a decade of social activism that had led to a tremendous degree of visibility for environmental organizations in the press. Everytime there was a story about an organization in the press, this kept interest at a high pitch. It would stimulate letters which would come in applying for membership, but once that press bubble burst, as it did by May of 1970, the aura of that press buildup wore off in the next year.

I remember it came to an absolute end in May of 1970 because I had spoken at an Earth Day celebration at the University of Minnesota on Earth Day, April 20, 1970. I had a crowd of three thousand hearing me, and I was the principal speaker. One month later I was speaking to a group in an auditorium of similar size at Tulane in New Orleans. By then the Cambodian invasion had occurred and the students had decided that they would go off to work on the Vietnamese War. The press had decided that Earth Day was over, and only a couple of hundred people turned out. To me that symbolized that it was suddenly over. The press had stopped being interested. It had given us this huge buildup that had lasted about a year, and it was simply over. I have never seen so abrupt a cutoff in my life.

Schrepfer: The students were still to some extent interested in it after '71, but maybe so many students didn't join the Sierra Club?

McCloskey: I think what the public opinion surveys revealed in the aftermath of all of that was that that press buildup had elevated public commitment to a very high level throughout the seventies, but the public's sense that the environment was the number one issue or that they wanted to read about it day after day had changed or began to change rather drastically after 1970. What became clear over the next few years were that dozens of, if not hundreds, of laws were passed and agencies brought into existence. The issue didn't disappear from the news pages entirely, and I think interest continued to be fairly solid, but the carnival-like atmosphere of promotion is what ended.

Schrepfer: Did you draw any criticism when the club went into the red?

McCloskey: I probably should have gotten more than I think I did get. The budget process at that time and for quite a few years thereafter, though, was very much a process dominated by the board of directors and the volunteers. The staff provided assistance in pulling together the numbers and the documents and packaging them, so to speak, but the board of directors made all of the decisions in great, excruciating detail—a detail that wouldn't be possible nowadays. They adopted the figure of 8 percent growth. I must say I had suggested a 10 percent growth number, which was a
McCloskey: larger number, but since they had had the debate and committed themselves to 8 percent as a reasonable number, none of us could really point fingers at anybody. It was a collective decision, and it was certainly reasonable in terms of the past decade. We just went through a radical phase change.

Schrepfer: Was there any problem with the computerization of the membership rolls that contributed to this fiscal crisis?

McCloskey: I don't have a clear recollection of exactly which years our various computer crises occurred, but we had been through quite a few problems over about a dozen or more years every time we changed computer companies. We have had some excruciating problems, generally of a different nature. Somewhere in the early seventies, there was a decision to terminate one computer company whose services weren't very good. But they sued us for breach of contract, and we countersued them for failure to perform under the terms of the contract; that is, failure to deliver the services that they were obligated to. We had mutual claims against each other, as I recall, in order of excess of $400,000. It was finally settled with us, I think, owing some $100,000 because their claims exceeded ours. That was a body blow at a time when our financial reserves were very low.

We subsequently got into a computer service contract, a contract with a service bureau [DCA] that lasted throughout most of the seventies and that was probably the best service that we ever had, though by the end of the seventies we had outgrown them, and actually by about 1976 we began to outgrow them. Then we attempted to buy our own computers and develop an in-house computer system. That proved to be another very trying experience as some had predicted. It took us more than twice as long, and cost more than twice as much as we had anticipated, to finally get an adequate system, though it is working well today and represents the state of the art both in terms of the hardware and the software. We probably, in the early eighties, have the most sophisticated computer program for a complex membership association as any around.

Conflicts Between the Staff and the Volunteers

Schrepfer: Phil [Phillip] Berry was Sierra Club president from '69 to '70, and he made a bid to be a full-time president. Was this a threat to your position?
McCloskey: I thought that it was improper. The year before in the Brower affair, a great deal had been made of the issue that it was improper for a staff person, particularly the chief staff person, to try to mix roles and become one of his own directors, to occupy a spot reserved for volunteers. It struck me that it was just as illogical for one of the members of the board of directors, much less the president, to want to become a staff member, to be paid on a full-time basis. It struck me that some principles of separation of roles between volunteers and staff had been forged in the Brower affair, and that they worked both ways, and that they ought to be observed.

The Sierra Club Council almost unanimously felt the same. At a climactic meeting in May of 1971, when the issue was before the board of directors, representatives from chapter after chapter stood up and said that's the way they felt. The roll call of chapters was just overwhelming; they were saying that we had our own variation of the principles of the separation of church and state, so to speak, and we had a long internal battle over that question and that it wasn't time to have another one.

Schrepfer: As I understand it, during this period the board of directors was generally fairly inclined toward the idea of a minimal staff; that is, they were still to some extent affected by the Brower affair, and yet didn't a number of directors support Phil Berry's bid? Isn't this a rather contradictory position?

McCloskey: I cannot remember what the balance of the board was on that question, but clearly the majority decided it did not want to pursue Berry's proposal that he be shifted into being a paid, full-time president. It also raised a very direct challenge to the question of whether there ought to be rotation or turnover in the office of the president. It raised the fundamental question of access by others to the top position of the club because once a person is on the payroll, even though they say it is only for two years or for a limited period, they may come to rely upon it as their source of livelihood, and it may be a reflection or have implications that they weren't performing adequately if they weren't continued in the position.

This really goes to the whole question of the confusion of roles: who is really a volunteer and who is not. I think the more that the implications were examined in terms of what it meant in terms of opportunities for other members of the board of directors to aspire to higher office, in terms of what it meant in terms of turnover of board positions, of access to the board from the leaders out in the chapters, the more it became clear that this was a threat to the volunteer structure and the opportunities for advancement within it. There was almost universally no enthusiasm for it at the chapter level or within the council.
Schrepfer: Do you think the council defeated it?

McCloskey: I think the council was the pivotal factor.

Schrepfer: This leads to a more general question I think a lot of people wonder about. How much power does the council actually have in the club?

McCloskey: The council has gone through some curious stages of evolution over the last fifteen years. There has always been some rivalry between the council and the board of directors. They are alternate centers of power. In fact, by the end of the seventies one could say that there were three or four different national centers of power in the volunteer structure competing for leadership with the board of directors. The council was the one of longest standing, but the caucus of chairs from the regional conservation committees evolved into another, and finally, those who chaired all of the conservation issue committees and task forces were getting together in caucuses and seeing themselves almost in the same light.

So by the end of the seventies, we had three or four competing centers for power and influence. However, the council had been in existence from the 1950s and had evolved the furthest. In the 1960s, they were not, I think, taken all that seriously by the board of directors. The board got in the habit of rather uniformly rejecting proposals from the council, which infuriated the council. They were treated almost with contempt at times by the board of directors. In the early seventies, I think, the council became quite discouraged at times, but by the mid-seventies the council had matured a great deal, and the board of directors was increasingly inclined to listen to its proposals with an open mind and to adopt them.

In fact, by the end of the seventies it was evident that more and more of the members of the board of directors were coming from the council. They had been council officers. Even at the beginning of the seventies, you could see Kent Gill coming along; he chaired the council meeting in 1970 when Phil Berry's proposal was before the board. By the mid-seventies, he was club president, and the same could be said for a number of other officers of the club. By the end of the seventies, the board was almost inclined to turn over work to the council without wanting to even pass on it, particularly work relating to the governance of chapters and how they were structured and the guidelines for them and so forth. The board of directors had lost interest in that area and had developed real confidence in the council. So the council's progress was slow and agonizing and full of frictions, but I think it has come a very long way.
Schrepfer: Following Phil Berry was the presidency of Larry Moss.

McCloskey: No, Ray Sherwin.

Schrepfer: Okay, sorry. Now, in this connection, while Ray Sherwin was president [1971-1973] there was a bid, I guess, partly his bid, to extend the authority of the committee structure. How does this fit in with this conflict you were talking about with the council?

McCloskey: Ray Sherwin as club president championed the proposal that the conservation issues committee have authority to implement policy within their sphere. The committees had been established in the late sixties and early seventies to make recommendations to the board of directors on various subjects. For instance, an energy committee was established to recommend on energy policy and similar committees were established on a great many other subjects, particularly after 1971 when the responsibility over site-specific measures was delegated to the chapters and to the RCCs. The board of directors needed a mechanism to develop drafts of broad policy, and the mechanism chosen was the issue committee.

The conservation staff particularly, as well as the majority of the board of directors, resisted the idea of turning over implementation authority to the issue committees. Their feeling was that these committees principally represented people who were expert on matters of policy often from an academic point of view, but they felt that that kind of expertise was not the same as expertise on lobbying or on publicity or on all of the techniques needed to change public policy—that you needed quite a different set of skills, and that those skills weren't present on these committees as they had been constituted.

Ray Sherwin may have seen this as a way of advancing the sphere of volunteers. He may also have been piqued at some of the conservation staff because of the Berry affair and saw it as a way to circumscribe the freedom of action of the staff.

Schrepfer: He was a supporter of Berry?

McCloskey: Oh, yes.

Schrepfer: So Ray Sherwin did support Berry, and I guess that Sherwin also had some antistaff feelings from what you are saying and from what I have heard otherwise. Didn't he have a representative in the office, a personal representative?
McCloskey: Yes, he actually had hired an assistant to the president. He was not the only president who had done this. In fact, I had been an early assistant to the president, to Will Siri. The first one was Dave Pesonen, who later went on to be head of the state Department of Forestry in California. But for a number of years the assistants to the presidents had not been people who had been very high on the pay scale. Sherwin hired somebody quite high on the pay scale. He also had his own board secretary doing the minutes, and all of this was quite divorced from my operation.

The person Sherwin hired as his assistant was Jack Townsley. As a matter of fact, Jack and I got along fairly well, but the stature of that position was fraught with the potential for great rivalry and conflict. Jack and I both realized that was not good for the organization, and we bent over backward to avoid it. I must say I got along much better with Jack than I did with President Sherwin!

Schrepfer: He hired this person to represent his interests here?

McCloskey: That's right. This was an outgrowth of the 1960s when the club president considered himself a rival to the executive director and lacked any confidence in the ability of the staff under the executive director to provide him or her with the assistance which they might need. The assumption apparently was that if they were going to get assistance, they had to hire their own. Fortunately, as the seventies progressed, that whole set of assumptions withered away, and I think club presidents became quite accustomed to looking to the regular staff for all of the assistance they needed, and I think they got it.

Schrepfer: I think that the East Bay block is something that we sort of skipped over, and it might be something that we should discuss. In the first place, the East Bay block did support Phil Berry, isn't that correct?

McCloskey: Yes.

Schrepfer: Now, the East Bay block—just in case it isn't written down and made clear somewhere—many of these people were from the East San Francisco Bay Area and they had defeated Brower and served on the board of directors.

McCloskey: Yes.

Schrepfer: They were generally determined to keep control on the board of directors, but did you have a sense of their conservation stand, their ideological stand?
McCloskey: I think to a certain extent Phil Berry, and perhaps the others, felt that they had to go the extra mile to demonstrate that they were not more conservative than Brower, that Brower's charges that they represented an old guard with attitudes in the past was not true. I think Phil particularly saw himself as a rival or alternate to Brower. He led the revolution as a young Turk, and I think perhaps he almost felt that his own vindication or ability to play out the role of showing that he was as good as Brower required him to be the top paid officer of the club.

Schrepfer: Do you think he would have liked to have become executive director?

McCloskey: Well, he assured me that I could continue to be the executive director, but it was clear that I no longer would have been the chief paid staff person. There was somebody over me. So it would have radically changed my position, and it would have been a demotion.

Schrepfer: Now, he must have been dragging some weight along with him because August Frugé and Leonard and some of the other people were part of the East Bay block, too, weren't they?

McCloskey: I think in the final analysis at that meeting, Dick Leonard and Maynard Munger and some other directors who had been very active in the anti-Brower campaign disassociated themselves from the proposal to make Phil Berry a paid president. In the end I think they only had those four—namely, Berry, Frugé, Sherwin, and Siri committed still to the idea.

Schrepfer: There must have been ideological tensions within the East Bay block because certainly Leonard was quite different from someone like Berry.

McCloskey: Yes, Dr. Edgar Wayburn led the campaign against the very idea. Ed Wayburn had been president when the Brower affair occurred and considered himself a principal architect of the final shape of the outcome, although he tried to prevent it from coming to absolute breach. But I think he felt at that time a sense of rivalry with Phil Berry and, in fact, Dr. Wayburn urged me very much to resist the Berry proposal. At one time I was somewhat disheartened about my ability to resist, but Dr. Wayburn was very insistent in saying that that was the true meaning of the Brower affair; it was that you not confuse the roles here. That would have been a distortion of the significance of the whole matter.

Schrepfer: Did you play an active role in this controversy?
McCloskey: Yes, I did. I was sort of whipsawed for a while by the two sides each trying to get me to concur in their proposal, Berry's East Bay block on the one hand, Dr. Wayburn and his associates on the other hand. Some of the junior staff, I think, were drawn into talking to council members and other board members a great deal. The thing got onto almost as widely an organized basis as the Brower affair in terms of the number of meetings that were held and the people that were talking night and day on the phones. I think there has never been since anything like that council meeting where every one of the chapters had their representative stand up and read a resolution of opposition from their executive committee.

Schrepfer: What about the position of the staff during this besides yourself?

McCloskey: I think Jonathan Ela was probably more active than anybody I know in talking to people about this. He worked very closely with Claire Dedrick at that time, who was on the board of directors and later became vice-president of the club and Resources administrator of California for the second Governor Brown [Edmund G. Brown, Jr.].

Schrepfer: All of this is a good indication that, in part, the shadow of the Brower affair still extended itself to the early seventies. How about after, say, '75? How about the late seventies? Did you still feel the affect of both the Brower and then the Phil Berry questions?

McCloskey: Only in the sense that I had not realized how much of an impact those affairs had had in terms of creating long-standing suspicions about anybody who occupied the position of executive director. For instance, some of the older directors like August Frugé, I think, as long as he was on the board of directors, always saw me as just a Brower with a different face on, and some of the other old-timers thought that anybody who was executive director was power mad and had to have his wings clipped. That was just what was by definition healthy for the organization.

By the mid to late seventies, presidents and officers and directors were saying, "Look, we've got to get on with life. McCloskey is not Brower. A healthy organization requires a well run staff with somebody clearly in charge of the staff. You have to have confidence in your executive director. You are hiring him to do things, and you've got to let him get on with doing those things and not stay mired forever in paranoid suspicions that the staff by definition has to be up to no good."

For a long while, the board used to go over every staff salary over $12,000 to decide whether to approve it or if it wanted to change the numbers. Phil Berry, when he was on the board,
McCloskey: used to think that this was the most important thing that could be done in establishing who was in charge, but Denny Shaffer and Ted Snyder during their terms as treasurer and Ted as president [1978-1980] said, "This is all backwards. If we want the staff to be responsible, they've got to be responsible to the executive director. He hires them, and he fires them, and he should set their salaries." Hiring field representatives and others had to be approved by the board as a whole in interviews through the mid-seventies. By the end of the seventies, the board said, "We hired you, and you hire the rest of the staff."

Schrepfer: What was the date on which they gave you the authority to hire staff within the club office here.

McCloskey: It was an evolutionary process, but as the seventies grew to an end it was clear that basically I had hiring authority for all positions. In the late seventies, I still had to clear the highest level positions; in the mid-seventies, the more senior positions, so it underwent an evolution.

A thing related to this was the conflict between the inner five and the outer ten on the board of directors. Beginning in 1970, the new board that came in after the Brower election decided that it didn't trust its executive committee of five members, and executive committee meetings almost ceased. The number of director's meetings were expanded gradually from three to five, and more and more business was conducted by the board as a whole, and greater detail was handled by the board for a while. This was all a kind of reflection of the intensity of feeling that the volunteers had recaptured control of their organization and were determined to run it in a great level of detail.

The board as a whole didn't break out of these habits until nearly the end of the seventies and as the eighties began were still struggling in many ways with that legacy.

Conservation Activism: Staff and Volunteer Roles

Schrepfer: Let me just ask you a sort of general question that I think is related to all of these things. In spite of the Brower affair and the Berry affair, which seemed to be and which were in fact decisions in favor of a high degree of volunteerism in the club, would you agree that the most significant thing that has happened internally in the club through the sixties and the seventies consistently has been the growth of the staff and its increasing power within the club?
McCloskey: Certainly, the growth of the staff has been a significant factor, though there have been lots of other significant developments in the club. Certainly the growth of the total size of the membership from some fourteen thousand when I began to some two hundred and twenty-five thousand or more today is significant. But the growth in the number of local units of groups has been absolutely phenomenal; it has doubled in the decade of the seventies. Growth throughout the whole country and into Canada has been extremely significant.

But back to your point, there are some interesting indices over the period that I have been executive director. For instance, the membership has grown from 70,000 to an excess of two hundred and twenty-five thousand, so that's more than a threefold increase. The net worth of the club has grown from, let's say, an average of $300,000 early in my term to more than $2,000,000. So that's a sevenfold increase. The staff has only grown from a little less than a hundred to about a hundred and fifty in that period, a 50 percent increase. So the staff has not grown nearly as fast as either the membership or the net worth or the number of local units. It has definitely been restrained, and I have aimed at keeping the staff size under control.

Schrepfer: Is this one hundred and fifty the number of people full or part-time? How is that adjusted?

McCloskey: That is comprised both of the full-time and the part-time ones; there are generally thirty part-time people.

Schrepfer: Has that number been fairly consistent, or would there be more full-time people now?

McCloskey: I think that the ratio of part and full-time has been relatively constant through that period. There have been some temporaries too, but I don't think there are any significant trends there.

Schrepfer: Do you have any idea what percentage of the membership is actually active in the club?

McCloskey: Yes, we figure that generally about 10 percent of the membership is very active. This would be generally about twenty thousand people who go to a great many meetings and do quite a few overt things in the course of the year. Our lists show that three to four thousand occupied positions, elected or appointed, of responsibility somewhere in the structure. Some of our surveys, through sampling surveys, show that about two-thirds of our members do at least one overt thing in the course of the year. They either write a letter, respond to an appeal, contribute money or go to a meeting; they do something besides just renewing their dues,
McCloskey: which is a fairly high percentage in its own right. But clearly the majority of the members are followers rather than active leaders, though that's true of almost every volunteer society in the country.

Schrepfer: Do you have any sense that this percentage of activism has been constant through at least the sixties and seventies?

McCloskey: I think it probably has. I would doubt very much that the ratios have changed. I think probably just the base has changed. One thing, though, that is clear is that—again we have some public opinion surveys that serve as the basis of this—in the mid-sixties, three-quarters of the members joined for outings and one-quarter for conservation. By the early seventies, the ratios were reversed. Three-quarters were joining for conservation and less than one-quarter for outings.

So I think from that time on probably these ratios have been fairly constant, but I might just use this as the opportunity to state that one of the interesting things that happened through the seventies is that we became the largest outing organization in the country without ever having intended to do so or even having realized it. We have outing programs in most of our local units around the North American continent. There are probably over three hundred communities where a number of times a month outings are being launched into the local woods or hills or down their rivers, and we estimate that we collectively take out over a hundred thousand people each year into the out-of-doors, on an outing of some duration.

Schrepfer: How many people?

McCloskey: Over a hundred thousand participants. In some places, I found, particularly in the South and states like Alabama and Louisiana, we are known particularly as an outing organization, with canoe trips going all the time. In fact, in some communities a majority of the participants are not even members. It's advertised in the local newspaper that there is a Sierra Club outing this week, and people just show up. A minority of the participants in these programs are members. It is a real problem to get them to sign up and pay their money!

Schrepfer: I remember it was so surprising to find out that you didn't have to be a member to go on a trip.

McCloskey: You do on the so-called national outings but not on the local outings.

Schrepfer: That's interesting. I don't even know why that is that way.
McCloskey: We regard this as a device to solicit new members. Locally the theory was that if the people enjoyed themselves, they liked the friends they developed, then they would sign up after a while. But there are some freeloaders!

Schrepfer: It sounds like [John] Muir's idea originally. If you like the mountains, you will defend them. All right, to get back to this question of whether the role of the volunteers has increased or decreased, you effectively made the point that volunteers still do most of the conservation work evidently. This is what I gather you are saying.

McCloskey: They do virtually all of the work at the local level in a given community. Where we have field staff, the staff occasionally will provide advice on how to tackle an argument, let's say, over the siting of a local power plant or a garbage dump. But they direct most of their work at issues of transcending regional importance and not of a local nature. So local work is done almost entirely by volunteers. Work at the state level is done by a combination of volunteers and staff.

In a limited number of states we have hired staff to do lobbying, particularly in the states of California, Texas, Ohio, Minnesota, Florida, New York, and a few other states. In some states, as in Indiana, we go in on a lobbyist with the Audubon Society, and we do that in a few other states, too.

But in the majority of the states, the lobbying is done by volunteers. They go up to the state capitol a couple of times a week to testify and do some lobbying, and in a few instances people are so situated that they either live in the state capitol city or they can stay there for a month or two. But it is a mixed picture at the state level. At the regional level, volunteers are extremely active, and we have a field staff over about two-thirds of the country who play a key role, too.

When you come to Washington, D.C., it is predominantly a staff operation, though letters to members of Congress from constituent members are a key part of the equation. People—members and leaders—can work best on issues from their home cities and thus are well situated to handle local problems. It is not always easy to get to a state capitol, but it is not so far away, but Washington is far away from most people in most states. You have to be on the scene almost every day to be effective in lobbying. So almost by definition, the Washington lobbying operation becomes a staff dominated one, though there are volunteers in the neighboring states of Virginia and Maryland who have done really good work.
McCloskey: We do bring in volunteers to serve as expert witnesses to testify before congressional committees, particularly on state wilderness proposals and things that are site-specific. Sometimes we bring in volunteers to testify on generic legislation, but this requires more continuity, and it has happened less often as the seventies progressed. Volunteers are also brought in from time to time to help with mass lobbying operations, door-to-door canvasses, particularly in the House of Representatives.

There are a great many volunteers who come in and out of Washington every week, some of them announced and some of them unannounced. We often have a dozen to two dozen volunteers who show up in the office every week. We generally encourage them to go to see their own member of Congress and senators, and we assist in the meetings and arm them with background materials when they don't have it. Those are kinds of courtesy calls. In fact, the office is somewhat overwhelmed by the number of people coming in there who in some ways regard the Washington office as our headquarters in the East. It is not really set up to do that and that has proven to be a problem in the late seventies and early eighties, though we are trying to find ways to find a focal point for those who just drop in unannounced.

Schrepfer: You have described who does the work in the club. This isn't necessarily the same as where the power lies.

McCloskey: True.

Schrepfer: In fact, the answer to that lies in the relationship between the board of directors and, I would think, the staff here in San Francisco, particularly yourself. How has that balance of power changed? Do you feel now in 1981 that, in fact, the staff is even perhaps stronger than it was in 1968 or '69? I know we talked about the two-term limit slightly, but has this perhaps decreased the power that the board of directors has?

McCloskey: A number of things have happened during that period. Certainly, the two-term limit has made it difficult for board members to have as long a time on the board of directors in order to move up the learning curve and to master the organization's intricacies, and the organization has become far more intricate as a result of growth in tripling its membership size over a decade.

I might also add that one of the inherent problems of the club is that it has so many bright and able people in it that they often have a tendency to think up complicated solutions to problems that are really not easily administered. As a result, we rarely find a simple way to handle anything because somebody will always see another distinction that can be drawn, whether it is an important one or not. So we have become an incredibly complex organization.
McCloskey: Some have asserted we have the most complex bureaucracy of any environmental organization. I think the staff increasingly has become restive over the unnecessary complications being introduced into our system.

For instance, we have a formula for distributing dues that involves square roots and area calculations and other things that defy ordinary understanding, and we have all sorts of financial mechanisms that are tied into algorithms that feed back on each other and again make simple calculations and comparisons difficult.

The organization has become extremely complex, and it even takes longer as a result to learn the systems. Because the senior staff has had long tenure, it has an advantage in learning the system and the intricacies, and newer people just don't have the time or exposure to learn it. Inherently, I suppose that strengthens the relative position of the staff vis-à-vis the volunteers on the board of directors. Moreover, as I have mentioned earlier, somewhat to my regret, more and more of the volunteers who came on to the board have seen their roles as lobbyists for pet issues. So they have not even really tried to master the whole system. Increasingly the majority of them are only trying to learn one part of the system or to pursue a part they already knew. So at the same time there are not as many actors trying to learn the whole system and pay attention to it, which is regrettable.

However, the relationship between, I think, me in particular and presidents has really undergone an evolution in the late seventies. It is no longer one based upon the supposition that there is inherent opposition, nor is it one mired in either overt or latent suspicion. It has, by and large, been one of mutual confidence in working together and of teamwork. Increasingly, directors such as Denny Shaffer and others have fostered techniques of consensus even among board members. Instead of voting a matter up or down and having minorities who lose, we try to work things out so that everybody is agreeable, and this includes staff, too. It is a different spirit.

In fact, by the end of the seventies it was now clear that we ought to develop mechanisms that overtly recognize collaboration between staff and volunteers as a norm. Campaign steering committees were set up in the conservation department under the aegis of the board that include staff members as well as volunteers. Although they have a majority of volunteers and a volunteer chair, by design the purpose of these is to structure in collaboration rather than competition and to remove the lingering implications of second-class citizenship or a master-servant relationship and all of those things that have some legacies of the ill-feelings of the sixties.
Schrepfer: Brower once accused the board of directors of treating the staff like bodies rather than people. Have you ever had that feeling?

McCloskey: Certainly not in recent years. I must say that I think those who immediately succeeded Brower on the board, who came onto the board and to power immediately after the Brower affair, were people who more reflected that idea than officers in recent years.

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Schrepfer: I wanted to ask you about the volunteer task forces, and how these people were selected; do they get any kind of compensation or financial help?

McCloskey: As the club has grown larger and larger, the club presidents have been burdened more and more in trying to manage a proliferating number of committees and task forces. The list of these units has just grown like topsy. In theory, task forces were supposed to be of limited duration. They had a task to do and were supposed to go out of existence at the end of it. However, a number of them really were not anxious to go out of existence and wanted to evolve into being committees. There was never any clear theory through the seventies as to whether task forces were simply devices to solve temporary problems or whether they were units that were supposed to implement, in some cases, conservation policy. This has led to no end of confusion.

Efforts were made at the beginning of the eighties to sort this out in a more rational way and to define what task forces and committees were supposed to do. It didn't entirely succeed, but the roles of committees were made somewhat clearer with the notion that the implementation of issues that were priorities of the national club would be handled by campaign steering committees. The rest of the issues that were not priorities would be handled by committees, who would be given implementation authority. Task forces by implication, then, were units to solve temporary problems and should go out of existence at the end of their work when the problem was solved.

Club presidents in the first instance appoint the members of all of these various units, though since 1973 it has been clear that the executive committee is supposed to ratify the appointments of members and the appointment of the chair. So it really becomes a collaborative process between the club president and the executive committee, although the president has the burden of getting the list of names together and being the moving force in the process.
McCloskey: Often the club president will ask me or staff for ideas in various areas for appointments, and we will talk around and come up with names. Sometimes the club president will ask some other officer or board member to get together a list of names for him. That helps, too.

Since 1973, another rule has been that members of committees are all supposed to be assigned terms, and they are supposed to draw straws for terms, and there is a two-term limit, and the minutes are supposed to be kept and so forth. But club presidents found it harder and harder to come up with the names for these committees and task forces. They are just getting too far removed from the grass-roots level, and you can't just always put on either council delegates or chapter chairs. Because council delegates come to board meetings, there is some association with them, although their meetings often are held at the same time. So that impedes the ability to get personally well-acquainted.

Club presidents do travel around a bit to chapters, and they will usually get to know some of the chapter chairs, but they only meet a very limited number of them, say, during an average two-year term. They know literally the whole organization at the top and know literally nothing of the leadership echelon at the group level because there is no formal way in which they are ever brought together except to the extent that club presidents travel around to local cities and meet group chairs.

I do a certain amount of that too, but we are always just scratching the surface there. There are over three hundred local communities that we would need to travel to. It takes a long time to get around to a great many of them.

So this is a real quiet crisis of the club, how it stays in touch with its leadership echelon once you get below the very highest rungs on the ladder. I might add another quiet crisis that is not entirely unrelated is that, as the seventies ended, the board of directors had processed resolutions on most matters of broad policy. They spent almost a decade developing broad policies on energy, on water, on forestry, on wilderness, and agriculture. The list goes on and on. This had occupied a good share of its attention at meetings, but most of the logical areas to be covered are now represented in resolutions, and there are a few gaps to be filled. The board to a certain extent in the eighties has started to get into revisions of earlier policies, but a question looms very large ahead as to what is going to be the standard material on conservation that will occupy the board of directors' attention in the 1980s.
McCluskey: The staff does the staff work on priorities in conservation. They are adopted for a decade. And then for every two-year session of Congress, the staff works up a set of proposals for what the specific priorities ought to be, and they are reviewed in the middle of that two-year period for adequacy. The staff work involves soliciting input and reactions from chapters and groups around the country and the RCCs too. It has become a very elaborate and ritualized process.

We are now also extending our efforts into long-range strategic planning. As the eighties begin, the board has had some staff proposals before it which also have come out of our volunteer committee on goals and objectives, but it's not really developed a very great appetite yet for spending this time on strategic planning.

Geographic Tensions within the Volunteer Sector

Schreperi: I would like to talk about the role of the volunteer in the club. Since the club has become national, have you suffered from geographical tensions, particularly East versus West or any other configurations?

McCluskey: Yes, the club is one of the few voluntary societies in the United States to start on the West Coast and grow towards the East Coast. Most start on the East Coast and grow West. Most voluntary societies experience tensions over the fact that the eastern outlook pervades, but in the Sierra Club it is the reverse. Our eastern members are restive over the western attitude that prevails. I came from the West—the Pacific Northwest particularly—and Brock Evans, who was our associate executive director and with us for a long period of time, was one of my successors in the Pacific Northwest. Douglas Scott, who is our director of federal affairs also comes out of that region. A number of us come from Oregon, in fact, and there is a feeling in some quarters that it is not a California attitude that is a bit too thick; it may be a northwest attitude that is a bit too thick.

Schreperi: Has this affected your policies on something like air and water?

McCluskey: Our leadership, particularly in the northeastern states such as New York and New Jersey in particular, have been restive over the fact that traditional conservational issues like wilderness and national parks seem to always end up at the top of the list when our priorities are adopted. If there is a battle over timber, even if it had not been high on the priority list, the charge is made that the staff manages to have national forest timber policy suddenly and easily get escalated to the top of the priority list.
McCloskey: Some of the representatives of the club in the East have felt that questions of water pollution ought to be a very high priority and have pressed very hard for that. Indeed, when the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was up for renewal and extension in 1977, we finally did make it a fairly high priority, and staff resources and money were assigned to it, and we led the coalition effort in that year. We failed to do that when it came up for renewal in 1981, and we didn't do that in 1972 either. This has led to some bad feeling.

It has been my conscious intent to balance the issues on our national priority list so that about half of them involve traditional conservation issues, which have more of a westward tilt, with the newer environmental issues relating to pollution, energy, international matters, and so forth.

I think that a balancing act has occurred, but discreet constituencies within the club have often been bitterly disappointed that their particular issue didn't get enough attention. Since about 1972, we have generally given air pollution a great deal of attention. Our theory was that we couldn't do well on every pollution issue, and the president of the club, who was then in the East, Laurence I. Moss, led us into the air pollution issue in a big way. I felt that we had our hands full mastering one pollution issue at the national level. We later took on toxics. We were the leader both in 1976 when the Toxic Substance Control Act was passed, and later we were one of the two leaders when the superfund was adopted in 1980.

But even the air pollution issue, which arguably is as of much significance in the East as in the West, took on a western aspect when we came to specialize in the so-called PSD question. This is the question that involves preventing significant deterioration (PSD) of air quality where it is already very good. As a matter of fact, there are places in the East that do have very clear air, particularly as it is technically defined to be the absence of any one of the five or six regulated pollutants. There may be places where they have low oxides of nitrogen, for instance.

But nonetheless, the doctrine is popularly associated with the wide open spaces of the inter-mountain West where most of the arguments have centered, for instance, over western Colorado with oil shale development. A club lawsuit pioneered that doctrine, and it was embodied in the Clean Air Act when it was extended in 1977, and the club has regarded it as its special mission to protect the doctrine ever since. So, as that balancing act worked out, perhaps the East didn't get as much attention as it deserved.
McCloskey: We were a leader on actions on energy by Congress over the 1970s in adopting energy laws of broad application. These certainly had a great deal to offer the East, but perhaps they were not pointed enough so that our eastern constituency felt particularly benefited. We had had ambitions earlier in the seventies to become the leader in the campaign to control strip mining for coal, and our field representative in New York was transferred to Washington to specialize in that issue. As things turned out, however, the Environmental Policy Center [EPC] became organized about the same time—that is, in 1972—and adopted that issue as its reason for existence. Whereas we assigned two-thirds of the time of one person, who then was Peter Borrelli, they were quickly able to hire people and assign four or five people to the issue, which completely outgunned us.

Of course, the important thing was that the campaign succeeded and certainly the East benefited, but our constituency took this as further evidence that we didn't do very much for them.

Schrepfer: Is there any tension between the East and the West over mining? For example, the question of strip mining versus deep mining, strip mining being more western, deep mining being more eastern; that is, if you try to make strip mining too difficult, then you hurt the East by limiting, maybe, the amount of coal and by forcing more reliance on deep mining and harming the environment of the East. Has this been an issue?

McCloskey: No, actually this worked out fairly well. The strategy that we and EPC both developed was to be particularly tough on western strip mining. This had twofold advantages. One, it limited the amount of strip mining that would take place in the West, and it limited the opening of new mines. It simultaneously had the tendency to improve the competitiveness of eastern deep mines, which were a better alternative. I think the preferred alternative of environmentalists was coal mining in the East.

We helped champion in the Clean Air Act's requirement to install the best available control technology. This was bitterly resisted by the utilities and the western coal interests. It prevailed and had the effect of meaning that you could burn high sulfur eastern coal and comply with the Clean Air Act. The utility, say, in Ohio could burn its local coal and comply and couldn't get any advantage out of importing coal from Wyoming. Combined with the PSD doctrine that impeded the development of mine mouth coal-fired power plants in the West, this tended to mean that the market for western coal was sort of under a double bind. They had less of a local market locally, and they had less of a market in the East or Midwest.
Schrepfer: You mentioned the field office; has it contributed to the eastern-western tension there?

McCloskey: The club's field office system began in the West, first in the Pacific Northwest and then we opened a southwest office. Then, as a third office, we did open an office in New York City in the East. That office had a special history that I will come back to in a moment. We went from the Southwest to southern California with an office, and then we went to Alaska and then to the Midwest and later to the northern Great Plains, and somewhat later through a complicated series of steps, got a field representative in northern California.

In about 1971 when we had our financial crisis, this whole process of filling out field offices slowed way down. There had been an expectation that we would complete it throughout the country in a very few years. Ones were added after '71 in the northern Great Plains and in northern California, but essentially the impetus to fill out the system ran out of steam after the financial crisis.

In addition, some of our leaders in the East had ambiguous feelings about whether they wanted field offices. The leaders in the Appalachian states particularly, and the Carolinas and Virginia, for a long while we felt that they did not want a field representative. They had the attitude that they could do the job themselves. "Just give us the money," they said.

There was intermittent interest in the Deep South, in Florida and Georgia, for instance, and in the Gulf states in having field services for a very brief moment in the early seventies. We actually had an office in Florida, though it didn't work out very well. There was interest in Texas and in the southern Plains area in having a field representative, and they petitioned for them a number of times in the early seventies, but the money had run out at that point.

New England was always very ambivalent about what they wanted. The club had a somewhat difficult time coming to be accepted in New England and had competition for a while with the Appalachian Mountain Club, though at a later time our offices came to be in their building. But New England couldn't make up its mind.

There was also a problem about the theory of what field offices were there for. In the West, the classic notion that I began with in the northwest states was that we would help organize volunteers, particularly in the cities where they clustered, but in the hinterlands where we had few members, the field representative would actually go out and do hands-on work,
McCloskey: both lobbying and doing research and publicity work. We tried to develop volunteers who would gradually come along and take that over, and then you could back away from it. But you had this pattern of a hinterland where the natural resource problems were, and then you had the big cities where the members were.

This pattern had ironically a lot of parallels when you got to New England. It was the one place in the East where you could see something somewhat similar. The people were in Boston and you could go up into the White Mountains of New Hampshire and work on problems there or up into northern Maine. But the ambivalence of our constituency meant that we couldn't get started. When we went into the Midwest, we could see some of the same picture. Our people lived in Minneapolis, Milwaukee and Chicago, for instance, and you could have the field representative go up into the North Woods and the Boundary Waters Canoe area and elsewhere and work on problems way up there. However, it quickly became clear that the volunteers were very much involved already with problems in the Boundary Waters Canoe area. The staff could be of some assistance, but it wasn't a distant hinterland.

In the Midwest, we then came to look for some crosscutting issues of a regional nature that would pull our constituency together in the states. We hit upon the Great Lakes as such an issue and their welfare, and even more so, the plight of the Upper Mississippi River, which is technically a national wildlife refuge but threatened by the expansion of a series of locks and dams and the flooding out of wildlife habitat.

As it turned out, those two focal points in these theories worked out very well in the Midwest, and we made a lot of progress in fights over the Upper Mississippi River, particularly on the so-called Lock and Dam 26 fight on the Mississippi River. It worked out less well on the Great Lakes since the issue was much more diffused.

One of the general problems we faced, though, going into the East was that the topography and settlements were much finer grained then they are in the West. In the West, people and resources are separated at greater distances, and the natural resources are much larger and tend to be much wilder. In the East, they get divided into smaller and smaller quantities which are more finely intermeshed, and it was very unclear from the outset as to whether the classic modes of operation in the field offices in the West would work in the East.

We have never entirely settled that question, though I think there were gradually emerging perceptions that these transcending regional issues could be found. For instance, in the Gulf states
McCloskey: there might be barrier islands along the coast, and there are wild rivers and the Tennessee Tombigbee Project. I think now most club leaders feel that the work is there to be done, and increasingly there is demand now for such offices once again, and there is reason to think that as the eighties begin, we may be on the march to complete this field office system.

Schreper: Since the Sierra Club has evolved this distinctive structure of having very strong local chapters, it appears to look much more like the Audubon Society has looked for a long time with one big exception; that is, [with] the Audubon Society, the national can do one thing and the local another. With the club there is always one policy, isn't that correct?

McCloskey: The way it works is this. Chapters are delegated authority to make policy in the name of the club on matters that can be decided by state or local government. The RCCs are delegated authority to make policy in the club's name on site-specific matters in their regions that could be decided by Congress and to coordinate the policy-making work of chapters on matters that cross state boundaries. The chapters and group policies have to be consistent with national policies that are now cast in very broad terms. There is a question which has always existed about what happens if there is no broad national policy that applies. Is the chapter then barred from doing anything or can it kind of operate in the spirit of Teddy Roosevelt—if not prohibited, it's free to go ahead! I favor the latter theory.

Schreper: But there is always one club policy on each issue, whoever formulates it, whether it is the national, local or what have you?

McCloskey: What do you mean by one policy?

Schreper: In other words, one answer, one position on a specific issue.

McCloskey: Well, we would hope so, though there are some opportunities for discrepancies. The board of directors often adopts revised policy on the same subject many times over the years. One could read through the policy guides and find certain things that were emphasized at one time that may not be completely consistent with things said at a later time. From time to time, committees and staff working in given areas try to reconcile these things in new clean drafts. In fact, the staff has produced popular policy guides that are complete rewrites of many board policies to try to get some synthesis which is both readable and logical for the public. But there are certain liberties taken in doing that. In theory, local chapters might take stands that sound contradictory, though they would be both drawing conclusions from national policy and applying it locally.
McCloskey: For instance, one of our groups up in Burlington, Vermont, is opposed to a wood-fired electrical generating plant because it would cause, they fear, too much smoke pollution in their valley, whereas it is quite conceivable that some local group somewhere else might think that is very preferable to a coal-fired power plant or a nuclear plant.

Schrepfer: Do you notice any geographical differences in the degree of militancy? Do you find the South less militant than, say, California chapters?

McCloskey: A curious thing has, I think, happened through the sixties and seventies and that is that there are delayed reactions to popular moods in the country. California was very militant environmentally in the late sixties and early seventies. The South became very militant and aggressive in the mid to late seventies, and that's when we filled in our structure in the South. Our people in the Pacific Northwest probably fell in shortly behind California in terms of catching on to the environmental movement. I don't notice any really distinctive differences between regions.

Chapters, however, develop habits and attitudes that seem to last for a very long time. There will be a chapter that may be very lethargic, or it may be very suspicious of the national office or hostile to it, and that may carry on from one leader to the next. It's an attitude that is just sort of passed on and absorbed. Another may have exactly the opposite attitudes, and that gets passed on.

On the other hand, there is waxing and waning in terms of vitality. One large chapter may be vigorous for a while and then wane. Let me give you an example. The Bay Chapter was much better organized and better led in the 1960s than in the 1970s. In contrast, the Angeles Chapter was not very well organized or led in the 1960s, but became a standout chapter, the model, in the 1970s. There is no real explaining why these turnovers take place. I have never figured it out. Sometimes continuity is very marked over a long time and sometimes things just turn over and change markedly.
VIII THE SIERRA CLUB FOUNDATION AND THE LEGAL DEFENSE FUND

Conflict Between the Club and the Foundation

Schrepfer: One of the reasons, as you made clear earlier, that the IRS ruling didn't hurt the Sierra Club was because of the founding of the Sierra Club Foundation, yet there has been quite a bit of conflict between the foundation and the club. I think people might like to have some idea of how you perceive the relationship between the two organizations and to what extent the club controls the foundation and to what extent it should. After all, in theory it is a separate foundation. Is it somewhat of a dodge of the IRS ruling to control it too much?

McCloskey: The relationships between the club and the Sierra Club Foundation have been troubled virtually from the beginning, though the foundation actually was formed in the early 1960s. At that time, there was a notion that we should have three institutions proceeding in a somewhat parallel way. There was the club, the foundation, and Trustees for Conservation. The thought was that the trustees would play a very out front role in overt lobbying, that the club would take some risks in doing lobbying, but it would not set out to lose its tax deductible status, but that if we did, the foundation had been formed and was there to be used, should the worst happen.

Of course, the worst did happen in 1966. The trustees withered away, though we hired Bill [William, Jr.] Zimmerman to be the head of our Washington office back in 1962 actually. He represented the trustees supposedly, which was controlled really in fact by the club. Many people have forgotten that Trustees for Conservation was a front organization that the club ran for a long time. It actually pretty much went out of business by the early seventies, though it wasn't until virtually [the] end of the seventies that we and the Wilderness Society worked out a settlement of its final assets.
McCloskey: But back to the foundation, the foundation was activated in 1969 following the club's final loss of deductibility with the IRS in '68. When the foundation was activated, it was thought that the club and the foundation could stay close together by the device of having the trustees of the foundation be comprised of former presidents of the Sierra Club, and they were. But what no one anticipated at the time was that many of those former presidents of the Sierra Club represented quite a different generation than the directors of the club in the 1970s. Basically, the trustees of the foundation at that time came to represent an earlier generation. There was often twenty to thirty years in age difference between the people on the two boards. It was certainly at least one generation's difference.

Some of those former presidents of the club who were now trustees, had long chafed under the regime of Dave Brower, and when they went to the foundation's board, they came to hold attitudes toward the club which were forged during the period of the Brower conflict and projected a certain suspicion toward the club as a result. Some of them also had a hard time, I think, seeing that I was not Dave Brower.

The generation gap between the directors and officers and the lingering feeling over the Brower affair resulted in some estrangement from the outset. Moreover, the former presidents of the club running the foundation almost reflected a superior attitude that they had been around a long time, and they knew what was best for the club. This was resented by the younger club leadership. The new trustees carried over many of the same habits that they had had when they were in the club. Meetings were conducted in a similar fashion.

Schrepfer: What do you mean a similar fashion? In a similar fashion to what had been carried on in the club both by the board and directors and--

McCloskey: Yes, in some ways through the seventies, the club became much more businesslike in its affairs, but the trustees inquired into matters in great detail. Some of the trustees in the early seventies wanted, in effect, to make conservation policy for the club via grants that they made. They would inquire into the merits of whether something we were doing, for instance a book manuscript, was really the kind of book we ought to be publishing and were not. They were not limiting their inquiry to the question of "Is this a suitable project for the recipient of charitable funds; does it pass the test of being nonlegislative; does the club indeed want to do it; has it been duly authorized?" We thought those were the proper inquiries and once they had been
McCloskey: made and satisfied, that the trustees ought not to go on and act as if they were still directors of the club and inquire in detail into the management and merits of the way the club was doing its business.

This led to lots of frictions. In effect we had a former board of directors arguing with a current board of directors. Gradually, the issues between the club and the foundation came to be settled. The foundation finally adopted a set term and a limited number of years that one could be on the board of the foundation, and some of the people of longest tenure finally left, and newer blood came in. We finally worked out something called a "block grant" arrangement under which the club would ask for a total sum of money for the year. The club would explain and justify the programs that would qualify for the grants, and the foundation would agree on what those grants were in their entirety. Then, in the course of the year as this money was raised, they would just dole the money out, having already assured themselves that we passed the test of nonlegislativenss and so forth.

We used to have to sing for our supper at each meeting. The staff would stand up, and we would have our begging cup out, and we would do a ritual song and dance to justify the program, even though it was the same program as before. We had presented it dozens of times. For instance, the book program would consistently qualify for grants and the story was virtually the same meeting after meeting, but we used to have to go up and go through a charade of justifying it. In the end, the foundation gave the money to us, and everybody knew they were going to give it to us, but it was a tedious process that really provoked a lot of ill will.

But that problem was finally solved. The problem that became paramount as the seventies drew to an end had a couple of thrusts to it, but centered on the question of effectiveness. Was the foundation effective in raising funds for the club? I might add, at an earlier time we settled the issue of whether the foundation ought to be giving any substantial amount of its money to institutions other than the club. It was finally agreed that 90 to 95 percent of the monies ought to be given to the club because the money was really raised in the name of the club. People giving assumed that the foundation and the club were merely expressions of the same institution. Of course, legally it had been incorporated as an entirely separate and independent organization.

One of the reforms made along the way to try to keep the two groups closer together was to put the club president automatically on the board of trustees. A number of club
McCloskey: presidents came to be very controversial with the foundation because they represented the club's point of view, which was not accepted by the foundation's trustees.

But at the end of the seventies, the issue of effectiveness dealt with the question of whether they were raising enough money and whether they were spending too much in the process. There were arguments again and again over whether the New York office was effective and whether the Los Angeles office of the foundation was effective. The New York office had three different people serving there, and I think by common consent that the third person in that position—namely, Alice Pinsley—was quite effective and did a good job. But it took her a number of years to build up the office into a productive one. Her two predecessors, however, basically failed to raise any significant amount of money.

But the question was whether, over the course of virtually a decade, too much money was spent in relationship to what was raised. The Los Angeles office didn't have as long a history, but some of the same questions were asked. There were repeated arguments over how much pump priming or spending has to be done, how long you invest money before you see the returns and what the returns ought to be. There were arguments over cost-effectiveness. Generally, the club maintained that the cost of raising money should only be about 20 percent of the total. The foundation at various times got well above one-third in terms of the cost of raising money.

There were efforts to pull the whole picture together of how much money collectively between the club, the foundation, and the legal defense fund, we were raising and to measure that against how much collectively it cost us. Our bookkeeping systems didn't mesh; the systems of management and analysis didn't mesh; the legal defense fund wouldn't play ball, or weren't even trying to really mesh any of its systems to any considerable extent.

When the club and the foundation at even a staff level disagreed on some process or procedure, there was no way to resolve it for a number of years. It was just a standoff. This led to inefficiency, and it led, I think, to lessened productivity. The club and the foundation in the late seventies finally consummated an agreement for something called a funding center. It was supposed to have been a joint venture whereby we pooled our staff under the management of a jointly constituted committee drawn from both boards to pursue fund raising and management in a collaborative way. As part of the peacekeeping involved, the foundation was given a leadership role at the volunteer level on the management committee, and the club's chief staff person in fund raising was supposed to have been the number-two person in the funding center.
McCloskey: The funding center never really worked in a collaborative sense except on a very narrow basis. Our number-two person, who was Denny Wilcher, was never really made the associate director. Nick Clinch, who was executive director of the foundation, basically ran the show. There were constant frictions between the management committee and the staff operation. There was a little merger of operations when it came to keeping records and input of records into our computer and with respect of acknowledging donations.

We also had long had frictions between Denny Wilcher, who worked for the club, and the various executive directors of the foundation over approaching major donors. Early in the game, both institutions were doing it, and we didn't want to have a donor find one of us going into her door one day and the other the next day. We finally came to terms in terms of dividing up lists. The foundation accused the club's staff of high grading lists and grabbing off all of the prime donors, and we accused the foundation, in turn, of being very unproductive and not raising much money. There were accusations that the foundation wasted money and spent far too much money on whatever they did, that their quarters were always more lavish, that their expenditures for trustee luncheons were lavish, that they paid for all sorts of things that the club didn't do.

There were counter charges, too, that the club was manipulating figures and being unduly hostile and provocative. The funding center eventually evolved into simply a division of labor whereby the foundation handled going after major givers, the over five hundred dollar donors, for instance. The foundation handled bequests and deferred giving and approaches to foundations and corporations, where the club, in contrast, was put eventually in charge of all direct mail operations and government grants and memorial gifts and some other things.

When Nick Clinch finally resigned as executive director of the foundation, after five years of service, the time seemed right to take another look at the whole set of relationships, and in 1981, the two boards of directors spent six months negotiating a new agreement. The agreement this time was that the club staff would basically provide the fund raising services and most of the management services for fund raising. It would do it as an agent of the foundation and on its behalf.

Also at that time, there was an historic agreement that the club could reclaim the name Sierra Club from the Sierra Club Foundation whenever it wanted to, though it technically has to go through something called the Sierra Club Fund. At one point in the mid-seventies, when the club felt the foundation was becoming
very unresponsive and threatening to change its name and threatening to give lots of grants to other organizations, the club chartered its own C-3 organization.

From the late sixties on to the mid-seventies, lawyers on the foundation board would assert that the club had to work through the foundation, that there was no way the club could have its own controlled C-3 organization. The assertion was that we had to stay so much at arm's length as a legal matter. The club sought its own legal counsel, including top counsel in Washington, D.C., and it was told that just simply was not true.

At one time, the challenge was thrown down that the club could not do that, and the club answered back, "Just watch us." So the club went off and founded something called the Sierra Club Fund which was an internal C-3 captive entity which the club solely controlled. In due course the IRS did recognize it, and a little money was worked through it. This sent shock waves through the foundation that their bluff had been called, that the club had an alternative. It could abandon the foundation and route deductible monies, if raised, through its own fund.

After that point, the foundation became much more tractable because it realized that the club had an alternative. Ultimately, the club didn't need the foundation. It had a C-3 fund controlled by its own executive committee which would do exactly what it wanted to do and all of the arguments for six or seven years about legalities were proven, I believe, to be completely spurious. They were merely policy arguments that were posing as legal arguments.

Finally, when the 1981 agreement was worked out for the return of the name, it was worked out in terms of the Sierra Club Fund being the body which could ask for the name back. The remaining problem, should there ever be a fatal parting of the ways, is that while the club can get the name back and prevent the foundation from ever soliciting funds in its name, the club has no way of guaranteeing that it can get the assets back. Millions of dollars could have been raised in the name of the club, and those assets could just walk away and be used for some other organization's benefit someday, which we think would not keep faith with the donors.

I argued that point very strongly in 1980 and '81 and was gravely disappointed that it was not successfully addressed. The foundation trustees, however, had changed a great deal in recent years. They are much more interested in fund raising nowadays than in arguing over the disbursement of monies. A lot of them didn't have the background of twelve years of friction and felt that if the club pressed anymore it was virtually insulting them.
McCloskey: As a consequence, the 1981 agreement represented the art of the possible. It was a revolution in relationships. It massively restructured relationships. It doesn't completely tidy up all I wish to have tidied up, but I think that the work of guaranteeing that the assets are never lost to the club's benefit is the work probably of a successor at some later time.

The Establishment of the Legal Defense Fund

Schrepfer: Whose idea was the founding of the legal defense fund?

McCloskey: It's hard to know. When Phil Berry was president, he and I were both interested in fostering environmental law. He, of course, is a practicing attorney, and I was trained as a lawyer, though I got into club work and never practiced. I have written probably a dozen or more law review articles in the environmental field through the years, which is more than most people have written who have law degrees. I was very interested in this field and tried to get together some people who could organize a legal defense fund. I had a young lawyer in New York City working on the proposal in 1969.

The beginnings of the club's efforts in environmental law were a few years earlier. It was, I think, I more than anyone else who was responsible for bringing the Mineral King lawsuit [1969], which was our first substantial piece of litigation, at least that the club undertook by itself. We had been involved in the Storm King litigation in New York state [1960s], but as merely one of a number of parties, an ad hoc group which included some of our own leaders there. We helped pioneer that early piece of environmental litigation.

We had also been interested in the early to mid-sixties in some litigation over Rainbow Bridge National Monument, Utah, but that was brought and lost by the National Parks Association, so Mineral King was our first big suit. I looked around for some way to pursue the issue legally once it became clear that the Forest Service was not going to give us any recourse whatsoever. I went to Bob Jasperson, who then ran the Conservation Law Society of America out of Dick Leonard’s office, for advice and assistance. He agreed to help and enlisted an associate by the name of Greg Archbald. They launched the case, and a little later we turned it over to another attorney as it grew to be too big.
Shortly thereafter, we got into a number of other pieces of litigation. Two lawyers who were associates, or friends rather, of Phil Berry agreed to help. One was Donald Harris and the other was Fred [R. Frederic] Fisher. Both were at the Lillick firm [Lillick, McHose, Wheat, Adams, and Charles], Phil had gotten to know Don particularly in the California division of Trout Unlimited. They were both active in it, but they were both also members of the Sierra Club. So Don Harris and Fred Fisher began to undertake cases largely on a pro bono basis for us. I remember a number of them were in southeast Alaska dealing with Admiralty Island and other places.

In 1969 and '70, things just mushroomed. Pretty soon we had thirty or forty cases going, and we had volunteer attorneys around the country. It was impossible for them to keep on going that way. They weren't practicing any ordinary law. They were just running all of our lawsuits around the country. So, Harris and Fisher, I think primarily in response to Phil Berry's leadership when he was club president, actually organized the Sierra Club's legal defense fund. They incorporated it, and they hired Jim [James W.] Moorman as its first executive director. Moorman and Harris together, I think, landed a grant from the Ford Foundation in New York for the legal defense fund. The person I had in New York a year and a half before had also made some contacts or overtures at the Ford Foundation.

But my first effort was really in advance of the blossoming of the case load, and it was only when the case load really began to develop that the details of what kind of an organization we needed became clear. When the legal defense fund was founded, however, unlike the Sierra Club Foundation, there was an explicit agreement that the club could reclaim the name of the Sierra Club at any time on demand. That was a distinct improvement.

However, like the foundation, the legal defense fund is a separate, independent nonprofit corporation. The club has no direct control over their board of directors. Usually, one member of our board of directors has been a member of their board of directors, but not always. The principal control we have, I suppose, is that most of the cases are brought in our name, so we can say yes or no as to whether we want to have a case brought, and about a third of the total funding is provided by the club, though under IRS regulations we cannot give money directly to the legal defense fund. We have to raise it on their behalf.

So you decide on a suit? Your board of directors votes and then the board of directors of the legal defense fund votes to pick that suit up?
McCloskey: Yes, actually, it is done at a somewhat lesser level. Our executive committee or board makes those decisions, and they have a litigation authorization committee that is a smaller group of their trustees that does it. We also have an emergency body composed of three people: the club president, the legal vice-president, who has been Phil Berry ever since the beginning, and me as executive director. In between meetings of the executive committee, we can authorize litigation on an emergency basis.

Schrepfer: Why was the decision made to make the legal defense fund a separate organization? Why not part of the club?

McCloskey: I have changed my mind about this matter completely over the course of a decade, but in 1970 our affairs were growing so rapidly that I worried, and others did too, about trying to force more business through the bottleneck of our decision making processes, through myself, through our board of directors, and so forth. It seemed the essence of wisdom at that time to spin off separate bodies to handle these new ventures, to have a separate foundation raising money, and a separate legal arm conducting litigation.

We even organized and chartered at one time something called the Sierra Club Land Trust. Ed Wayburn was a principal in that, but people quickly lost enthusiasm for trying to compete with the Nature Conservancy, and that was put out of existence. We nominally had from the Brower days something called the Sierra Club of United Kingdom Limited in existence—which technically is still alive—comprised of a three-person board of trustees and a bank account in England. That was never put to death.

Just recently we organized a new entity called Earthcare Network, Inc. to conduct some of our international affairs and to handle grants and the work under them on a worldwide basis. We have the Sierra Club Fund as a captive fund, but its money is to be segregated and separately managed, and similarly we have a political arm called the Sierra Club Committee on Political Education [SCCOPE] that has a quasi-independent status.

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McCloskey: Both SCCOPE and the Sierra Club Fund represent examples of a different pattern that we could have pursued. In both cases, we have new ventures that have to be carefully managed by law, but they are organized within the Sierra Club's corporate structure and under our control. In the case of the foundation, the legal defense fund, and the short-lived Sierra Club Land Trust, they were organized outside. I think that was a terrible error in retrospect. Providing an alternative process for making
McCloskey: decisions does not require you to go outside of your corporate structure. Once you lose control, it's not just a matter of competition for power. The problem is that you can have deadlocks that cannot be officially resolved.

Differences of opinion don't bother me. They occur all the time. On our staff we have them, legitimate ones, all the time; differences in perspective. Within the Sierra Club's corporate structure, we have them. We have a mechanism, though, to break deadlocks. Somebody ultimately can make a decision, and questions don't linger on, festering forever. With these separate corporations they can, and the resolution invariably becomes a question bigger than the merits involved. It becomes a question of the sovereignty of the organization; it becomes a question of pride of possession, and egos get involved, and the merits get lost while the questions of sovereignty come to the fore. So I regret very much having been a party to the suggestions in the early seventies for these separate organizations.
The Publications Program

Schrepfer: I think we might go on to conservation techniques, but we want to start with publishing. I think that we discussed somewhat briefly the question of cost, but you might want to elaborate some on the question of how much books cost and the extent to which the resources of the club should be put into books as opposed to volunteer activities. That was one of the fights, after all, during the Brower affair. The Exhibit Format books were very expensive, and to a certain extent the club has shifted away from these very expensive books and put some of the money into things like the regional club offices and things that are more oriented toward the volunteers. What is your opinion on this distribution of power?

McCloskey: During the Brower years, the club began to be viewed as much as a publishing company as anything else. Certainly, in the ensuing years the club has not been thought of as primarily a publishing company and has not had an executive director who is preoccupied with publishing. But at the same time, the club's publishing operation is much larger today than it was under Brower in the 1960s. We publish fifteen to twenty titles a year now, but certainly there has been a series of shifts in the emphasis in the program through the years. As the sixties ended, we were seeing the costs of these large pictorial books, the Exhibit Format series, skyrocket. Brower got into it at exactly the right time. In fact, he really developed and demonstrated the commercial viability of large color pictorial books.

There were soon a lot of other publishers jumping in in the early seventies, and suddenly we had lots of competition, and as we had lots of competition, the costs of presswork and printing were going out of sight. So I came in and hired some new people to run the program. We made a conscious decision to shift emphasis. We decided to move our mastery of color presswork into
McCloskey: the calendars and to deemphasize the color work in books per se. The books were getting to be so expensive that we had to gamble on just one press run and print a lot of overstock and carry it through the years. Normally a more conservative approach is to have a first printing of conservative size, and if that sells out, then you go into a second printing and a third printing. You could do that for smaller books and black-and-white books. But it's very expensive to go back on press for a big color pictorial book.

So for a while we were reprinting some of the best selling exhibit format books like *In Wildness is the Preservation of the World* by Eliot Porter, and *Not Man Apart: Photographs of the Big Sur Coast*, and one on the High Sierra [Gentle Wilderness]. But we decided that it would be far better to put our emphasis in the calendars for pictorial work. Brower had started them in the mid-sixties and had sold them through Ballantine Books for a while. When I took over, we switched them to Scribner's [Charles Scribner's Sons]; Ballantine had gone on to other ventures by then.

We negotiated an agreement a few years later for Scribner's basically to put up the capital for the calendars, and that we would design them and deliver the camera-ready materials, but they were Scribner's investments. This reduced our capital requirements and also enabled us to continue to be associated with fine color work. The color calendars tended to be printed overseas in Italy and Japan. With Scribner's we built the calendar series up into the largest line of nature calendars in the country. By the end of the seventies, they were the best, continuous-selling line of calendars which were sold commercially in the country. Every Christmas season they usually come in in second, fourth, or fifth places as the best-selling calendars. We never came in first place, the first place calendars were always topical calendars that weren't around very long. They were Star Wars, or something of Tolkien, or something of that sort, but ours come back and were sold year after year and became tremendously profitable.

Another change that we made in the early seventies was to try to find some stable source of publishing income as part of a line of books that we could count on to be cost effective along with calendars. It turned out to be the tote books, which were a series of guide books. It was hoped that the calendars and the tote books together would generate a profit which would pay for books on topical issues of conservation importance. We developed one topical line called the battle books. They were done on such issues as energy, toxic substances, and others. As it turned out, the battle books didn't really do all that well, though they were interesting for a while.
McCloskey: John Mitchell was editor at that time. When Brower left, there was a consultant who agreed to stay on for a while by the name of Ted Willentz. He got us through the first year. He was in New York. John Mitchell had been editor of the magazine for the Open Space Action Institute in New York. Before then, he had been a science reporter for *Newsweek*. I had gotten to know him in the redwood park fight when he covered it for *Newsweek*. I went on to deal with him on a number of other issues.

I worked with Paul Brooks, who then chaired the publications committee, to recruit a new editor and, since we very much had in mind this shift toward more topical, hard-hitting books, we thought that somebody who had been in journalism might be very good. So Mitch was hired, and he stayed with us from 1970 through 1974. He did yeoman work in 1970 in getting out the club's Earth Day book. We got that out through Bantam Press in a matter of about three months. It sold about four hundred thousand copies and was one of the better sellers during the Earth Day period—*The Ecology Handbook* it was called.

However, Mitch was not a professional publisher. He had to learn the hard way about how the book business was run. He was an excellent writer and had a real sense for good writing, but he didn't know the economics of the business very well. We decided about 1974 that we wanted to move the publishing operation out to San Francisco to try to get it under better financial control. We thought that we were not publishing books whose costs were adequately controlled nor were the printing commitments well thought through.

Mitch did not care to relocate to San Francisco. So we closed the New York office and started from scratch again out here. I hired Jon Beckmann to be the next editor. He had been with a small publisher in Massachusetts, Barre, that published a lot of books in the field of natural history. Before then, he had been with Prentice-Hall, Inc., and he had an excellent background for publishing in our field and was a thorough professional. He hired a professional staff out here, and the program began to expand, and it begun to improve in its financial performance. He developed a line of natural history guides which are being filled in in various regions around the country. He pushed the tote series hard. He developed other new series too.

In more recent years he has been testing the outer limits of the definition of environmental concern. A book on galaxies [*Galaxies* by Timothy Ferris], which was our most expensive book at $75, illustrates the largest possible definition of concern on our part about the natural world. That, incidentally, was the kind of book that would have been immensely controversial in the
McCloskey: Brower days. No one on the board of directors was really told about it in advance. It was an extremely expensive project, and it turned out extremely well. It not only got good critical acclaim, but we sold out the entire printing.

However, he had a good publications committee. It has been composed in Beckmann's time of about half publishing professionals—vice-presidents of different publishing companies—and about half leading club volunteers, including some members of the board of directors. It has become a very stable, responsible committee whose judgment is respected a great deal, and it exercises a very active oversight of the program. There is very good rapport between the staff and the committee which parallels, I think, rapport elsewhere in the national operation.

The program, however, has not always generated the profits or surpluses that are projected in the budget. It is clear that over the last six or seven years it generally generates some $200,000 in surpluses. At times, we have hoped for double that amount, and that rarely materializes. We have improved the basis of analysis for the program, and what is now clear is that the calendar program generates $500,000 to $600,000 of net surplus, and the book program basically costs $200,000 to $300,000. So the net surplus, when you subtract one from the other, is on the order of $200,000 to $300,000. I feel that the $200,000 to $300,000 cost of the program is a reasonable amount to be paid to do our educational work. Legally, we are obliged to produce a charitable work product. We are chartered to do educational work, among others. Our postal status has hinged in the past on showing that we are doing real educational work, and this is the work product that we have.

Schrepfer: And much of this money comes from the foundation?

McCloskey: Well, not the money that I am talking about. On top of that, there can be subsidies from the foundation that we can use to pay for the net loss on the books as opposed to the calendars, but that's primarily a technical-legal mechanism to find a use to which the foundation's monies can be put, so as to assure the IRS that it is not going for lobbying.

Schrepfer: Do you think these books could ever be made to support themselves?

McCloskey: It may be possible, but I think one could not easily plan on making it happen; at least, I would not want to do that. We have chosen to publish serious books. In fact, I think in contrast to the 1960s, we now publish books that are true books and not albums or guides, which were mainly what we did in the 1960s. These are books that predominantly have texts. They are serious books such as Wendell Berry's book on agriculture [The Unsettling of America: Culture and Agriculture, 1977]. We have serious books
McCloskey: on the history of environmental thinking; we now have books of poetry. They are respectable books that represent serious thoughts of scholars and authors who have grappled with their subject a long time. They are books which will endure. They are not simply passing thrusts such as the battle books were, or albums such as some of the format books were.

But these books, while they may get critical acclaim, for the most part will never be money-makers. Most publishers, in fact, on their trade books operate under the guideline that out of the planned publishing efforts they expect only to break even. Any profit comes from the sale of subsidiary rights—rights to special reprintings or serial rights or paperback rights or movie rights or things of that sort. We do get those, but you can't plan on those happening. They may or may not occur. We probably could publish some more popular books so that the sales margins would be better. We try to find some of those to offset the losses which are more likely on the serious books. But I would never like to see us not do the serious books.

Publicity Versus Legal Action

Schrepfer: In the late 1970s, the club has moved to develop a new set of strategies in conservation battles, relying less on publicity such as ads and more on lobbying and legal advocacy. I want to know if you agree with that summary and secondly, if you don't feel it's possible that you might lose touch with the public and lose some of the sympathy the publicity has brought to the club.

McCloskey: Our lobbying operation really represents the expression of this pragmatic commitment that we exist to make the world better in fact and not just to stand for something which is important. More important than your stance is to have the air actually cleaner and the wild places surviving. That need poses the pragmatic problem of how you do it. We, for over a dozen years, have been operating clearly on the premise that the most powerful lever toward that end is reached through governmental action. Clearly one-third of the country is in public ownership, and clearly common resources such as the air and many of our waters are only susceptible to improvement through governmental action.

This has led us into the theory of lobbying which, simply stated is that you have to first determine precisely what you want to achieve; second, you have to figure out who has the authority to make the decision to give you what you want; and third, you
McCloskey: have to figure out what is the best way to influence that party. That party often is Congress, though it may be some agency in the executive branch or an independent commission or a state unit.

I think the Sierra Club has mastered the theory of lobbying, particularly with respect to Congress, better than any other organization in the environmental field. In fact, Congressman Morris Udall said at the end of the Alaska campaign that he had not seen any campaign organized as well and as thoroughly, certainly nothing of similar scope and professionalism since the civil rights days.

The club has become known preeminently as the environmental lobby. We tackle more issues; we are there on more occasions and before more committees than any other organization is. There are a couple of organizations that are larger, but they are less active than we are legislatively. There are many other organizations going after one issue or another, but nobody is going after as many issues with as much vigor on Capitol Hill.

We have really focussed on the theory of lobbying. It involves usually seeking out your champions in Congress to begin with. You have to have friends there who are sympathetic, who are willing to undertake to move your measures along. We do drafts very frequently of bills. I have written quite a few bills myself or drafts that have been delivered there. Our other lobbyists have learned how to do that. We have learned how to write introductory speeches.

Doug Scott is one of the most phenomenally good writers of congressional rhetoric I have ever encountered! I remember back in 1968, when he was still in college on a break helping me in the redwoods campaign, seeing him sit in the House galleries writing speeches on his lap while listening to other speeches, and we would take them down through runners who would deliver them onto the floor to keep up our side of the debate. He wrote them almost letter-perfect, so congressmen just delivered them the way he had handwritten them. So we have learned all of those behind-the-scenes techniques.

A lobbyist, however, has limitations on what he or she can do. You can find your friends, and you can look for the latest intelligence on where things stand. You can try to urge your friends to do more and to try to persuade the uncommitted to move off the fence, but really only pressures from their constituents are going to bring them around. So lobbying involves very much reaching out to those who live in the districts of the congressmen or senators and trying to persuade them to write letters and telegrams or to call in. We have become much more sophisticated in the course of the decade in how to do that. When I was
McCloskey: conservation director in the late sixties, we made many mass mailings to our entire membership. When it was sixty thousand, that was one thing, but when it was two hundred and twenty-five thousand, that is another thing. You can't afford to mail to that many very often. The postal rates had gone way up.

We've compensated for this through the years by becoming much more targeted in our mailings. Now in the course of committee work we will identify who are the swing votes, who are not committed yet, and we don't worry about those who are our enemies because we can't influence them. But then we will mail just to our members by zip codes in the congressional districts of swing members. This cuts down on the cost of mass mailings.

In the last two or three years we have gotten very sophisticated in how all of this is done. We have computers in our Washington office. We keep in a computer bank there the daily intelligence of who is committed one way or another, who is leaning, how strongly they are leaning, the source code on the intelligence, and at any one moment if we want a list of swing votes that have to be influenced, we get it right out of the computer. We have ways to trigger telegrams through tapes that are put into Western Union magnetically. Through pressing a button, our computer is connected with theirs, and we can trigger wires with the message to two or three thousand people all at once in targeted districts.

We have overnight printing capacity to lay out, design, and print lobbying packets. The night crew that will come on to do this has done it on the Alaska campaign; it is being done on the clean air fight—beautifully laid out and printed things. This night crew will bring it in at 6:00 a.m., and the next crew will come in at 8:00 and pick it up and distribute it that morning.

We have learned and pioneered a lot of these techniques. Unfortunately, our opposition is using them now, too, and the business is becoming very much more professional, competitive, and expensive. Moreover, our competition is now beating us at the game of mass mailings. Whereas we have survived by targeting our mailings more and more to control expense, they not only have that capacity, but they are expanding their mailings on a large basis. The challenge ahead, I think, is to get more personal contact between our constituency and their legislators. Since we can't match them with money on expanding quantity, we have to substitute quality increasingly.

Schreper: All of this directs your energies toward the exploitation of existing potentials and your membership within Congress. It's not the same kind of publicity. I'm thinking of what Brower said
Schrepfer: in his oral history,* that the Sierra Club existed primarily to persuade the public—I am paraphrasing how he said it—that it was to exploit the democratic system. I gather that you have moved away from this. Why have you dropped something like the ads?

McCloskey: The ads stopped working by the early seventies. We continued running ads and experimenting with them in different forms for three or four years after Brower left. In '72 we ran some full-page ads around the country on the Alaska campaign. We ran some quarter-page ads [in 1974] on the Clean Air Act and its problems. We experimented with running them in smaller cities in different sizes. We ran some with coupons and some without.

What basically happened was that after 1971 when this ten-year period of activism collapsed, people were not responding to ads and coupons anymore on a mass basis. If you could target it at your own membership or pool membership lists with other organizations, you then had a constituency whose interest was manifest and was responsive. But if you just put something out to the general public, it fell pretty flat then.

Plus, I think, ads had simply lost their novelty. They were great when we started because people had not seen them in years, but after five or six years, the novelty affect wore off. When we first ran them, the press treated them as news. They would run news stories, "Sierra Club Runs Ad." Well, after you have done five in one year and you are doing three or four the next year, it becomes a "ho hum" operation. The press didn't treat it as news anymore.

For a while in the early seventies the Washington Post used to be having, toward the end of a congressional session, ads every week or two by one organization or another, and I concluded that the bubble had burst, that they had to be given a rest for a while and that if they were given a rest for five or ten years, they might seem like a novelty again and could be successfully revived. I feel that time may be coming again now in the early eighties. In fact, my theory is that we have a period of social activism every ten or fifteen years and some time between 1981 and 1986, I think we are due for a revival and a period of social activism if there is not any distorting factor like a long war or something.

*See interview with David R. Brower, Environmental Activist, Publicist, and Prophet, Regional Oral History Office, the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1978.
McCloskey: So I think it is good to start experimenting with them again, and I think you will probably see us doing that.

Schrepfer: Are you deemphasizing publicity?

McCloskey: Not at all. In fact, we are now intending to emphasize it even more. With the Reagan administration, we have a loss of friends in office. We have to compensate for that through a variety of techniques, one of which is building our grass roots and another is being more successful in publicity. In fact, with the anti-Watt campaign [to force the resignation of Interior Secretary Watt], we have gotten more publicity than we have in years. But again, that shows that this is not so much a thing you can control internally. When you have the external forces in the right configuration, when you have the right villain and they are doing things that outrage the public, then it is easy to get publicity.

When the circumstances aren't auspicious, it is difficult, to say the least. During the Carter years, conditions were not auspicious. People thought we had friends in positions of power and were getting our way substantially, and people were complacent and the press was just not much interested. We would issue releases, make statements and speeches, but they just weren't picking it up. Now they are.

Schrepfer: Do legal suits have any policy bearing on publicity?

McCloskey: The filing of a lawsuit is usually an opportunity to secure some publicity. It is regarded as a hard news hook by the press. Something real has happened, and you can invariably get some publicity, though canons of ethics for lawyers somewhat restrict your opportunities to tell as much of the story as you might otherwise do. But they are good, hard news hooks. In fact, one of the developments over the whole 1970s has been the disappearance of hard news hooks. The press has somewhat worn out on covering issues that seem to be repetitious—essentially the same story that is heard hundreds of times, and it has lost interest in hearing merely the expression of pure point of view. Until, as I said, the Reagan administration with Watts' outrageous behavior came along, the whole movement was having real trouble getting its story covered much.

Now things have just completely turned around. We have a whole wall full of anti-Watt cartoons, some of which we have probably stimulated, but the press was raring to go on it!

Schrepfer: If you had picked a secretary of Interior to help your cause, Watt might have been a good choice!
McCloskey: Internally, the club has never thrived more than during 1981 when he was in office. Of course, in the area of public policy, conservation has never been in greater jeopardy.

Talking to the Opponent: Benefits and Dangers

Schrepfer: In the early 1970s—I don't have the exact date, you and Ray Sherwin gave talks before the American Mining Congress and you also talked to other principal opponents of the environmentalists. I am not interested so much in the specific speech but in knowing how much you think this kind of thing is successful.

McCloskey: Talking to your opponents?

Schrepfer: Yes. How much of it have you done? Have you kind of moved away from it?

McCloskey: I spent a fair amount of time during the 1970s talking to high level representatives of our adversaries. I think there are some things that are worthwhile about doing that, but the advantages are somewhat limited. It is a good way of gathering intelligence about what they are up to. You invariably stumble, for instance, on newsletters in their fields, sources of information that you didn't know about. Service on boards and commissions with them has brought a lot of technical information to my attention.

For instance, I had a president of a major oil company in confidence say to me, "We will be out of business as an oil company by 1995. We are going to be out of oil." Well, this is the kind of thing that you don't read about in the press, but it helps with strategic calculations on our part, to sense what we are dealing with.

It is also a way of letting them know what they are dealing with with us. Many of them harbor the most extreme illusions. They think we are a bunch of nuts who are against all oil drilling, are against ever cutting a tree, and they think we are light-weights, and as a result they are subject to gross miscalculation. They may plan a power plant or something thinking that we are a bunch of hippies, and they can just cast us aside and get it through. Well, we bogg them down for a half dozen to a dozen years, and they never knew that they had creditable opponents that they were dealing with. Face-to-face dealings with the presidents of corporations, and vice-presidents, changes those relationships. They suddenly realize that we are not lightweights; we are heavy-weights, and that we've got respectable arguments, and we've got technical data to back them up, and we've got our own batteries of lawyers and technical experts and lobbyists.
McCloskey: Many of them think we have a staff of five or six people and a budget of maybe fifty to a hundred thousand. When they are told we have a budget of thirteen million dollars and a staff of a hundred and fifty, they are absolutely appalled. They had no notion that that was the case.

So I think there are some values of that sort. Also, when I say adversaries, not all of our adversaries are adversaries in every sense. At one time or another, we probably cross swords with about every major developmental industry in the country, but on the majority of issues we are dealing with, they are not necessarily fatally opposed. It is only in the one that involves their particular industry at a given time and place. Some of them are thoughtful people who are not opposed to the Clean Air Act in general. They may be opposed to the specific auto emission limit or some specific feature dealing with their industry, but I think there is an educational value of acculturating leaders of American industry to the notion that, by and large, environmental programs are worthwhile and soundly conceived. While they may have differences over details or particular provisions, they shouldn't conceive of themselves as enemies or adversaries of a program or the movement as a whole.

I felt particularly strongly through the middle part of the 1970s that our society was burdened with too much hostility and misunderstanding, and we were part of that, and that it was both good public relations and promoted the general welfare to try to lower the level of hostility and misunderstanding and that the part that I could play, and our organization could play, would be in terms of a better dialogue on our issues. I had no illusions that we were going to convert anybody to oppose their self-interest. Some people think that is what it is all about when you are engaged in dialogues, and it is really not.

There is another subtle purpose involved, and that is to be conceived of as part of the "establishment," if you will, of the country. There are competing establishments of sorts, but I am referring to "establishment" in the broad sense, which is composed of those who are the people who exert real power over time in society in shaping what in fact is done--people whose names and whose organizations appear again and again in connection with thoughtful public affairs, who turn up on boards and commissions, who turn up on boards of advisors, who are invited to speak at serious and thoughtful conferences. I wanted the club to be positioned as part of that group, and not as a group of gadflies who were dealing with illusions or spinning idle thoughts or providing entertainment for people who are basically living in their own private worlds. I felt that participating in public affairs in this fashion was a long-term investment toward that end.
McCloskey: The fact that I have been appointed again and again to various public commissions and to boards, as have some of our other top officers suggests, I think, that that strategy has been successful to a degree. The club, in fact, in Washington, D.C., is viewed very much in that fashion, as a heavyweight organization that can make a big impact and that we are responsible, thoughtful advocates for our position. It is only, I think, in rural areas among people who are the least familiar with public affairs, and among the least educated, that we are regarded still as shrieking hippies who are ridiculous.

Schrepfer: Do you think it really helps your cause, then, to be liked and respected by your opponents in Congress and in industry?

McCloskey: I am not sure being "liked" is very important. I think being "respected," in a sense, is important. Every industry or group promoting a development, when it begins, has to look at what is the environment for success in its proposal, who are likely to object to it, how much weight do they carry, do they have the resources to succeed, and so forth.

More and more of the major industries are now realizing, when they do that kind of analysis, that it is going to have to contend with the Sierra Club. It has had some experience with it. It knows that it can bring a credible lawsuit and tie it up for years. It knows that any public relations fight they get into is not going to be an easy one. They can't just walk away with the prize easily.

Schrepfer: So then they are going to come to the club because they respect your--

McCloskey: They may not come to the club. In fact, I think it is better, on the whole, if they merely draw their own conclusions not to go ahead with a project that is likely to draw our fire.

Schrepfer: You intimidate them beforehand?

McCloskey: I wouldn't put it that way, but more that they correctly gauge the problems they will encounter and find a project which better meets the test of the public interest.

Schrepfer: In the late 1950s on to the late sixties, of course, there was a tremendous battle over strategies within the club. There were people like Mr. Bestor Robinson who argued very strongly that you should work with these industries and be reasonable, and he used to criticize Brower for expressing hostility toward them, impugning their motives, impugning the actions of public officials. How do you define yourself within that dichotomy between someone like [Bestor] Robinson and [Dave] Brower?
McCloskey: I think they are both wrong in a way. I think Robinson was naive and woolly headed in his notion that you could just sit down with them and negotiate in advance and that honey rather than vinegar would get you your way. I think Brower was wrong to the extent that his dislike for what they were proposing should in any way justify ad hominem arguments toward the people involved.

I think that in the subsequent period, the club has demonstrated that it can and does stand up and object to poor developments wherever they are opposed. We file lawsuits and stay at it five, ten, fifteen years or however long it takes. We don't call people names. We don't imply that somebody is evil. They are doing their job and often don't share our values or beliefs or haven't had our exposure, or they may not have freedom of action, or they may just be completely wrong headed. But it doesn't help, I think, for any of these differences to become personal, ad hominem matters.

By the same token, no company is going to back away from what it perceives to be its self-interest or financial interest. It is there to serve its shareholders in terms of what it thinks will enrich them. So what you have to demonstrate is that they are either not going to get their way if they go ahead with their first proposal or that they are going to pay a very heavy price if they do and that, as a result, it is not good economic sense to push ahead, that they are going to encounter tremendous delays of very adverse publicity, community hostility and opposition. But you rarely can just sit down and negotiate to that effect. In fact, I have very little confidence in advance negotiations. You have to have repeatedly demonstrated your clout in advance to get their attention and then, I think, by far the better technique is not to try to negotiate anything but that they just draw valid lessons from the past and avoid adopting a poor proposal in the first place.

Schrepfer: In a sense, the judicial solutions—that is the movement toward litigation—and to some extent, I suppose, lobbying then, have kind of revolutionized relations between citizens' groups and developers.

McCloskey: It has because the lawsuit for the first time has given us some real clout, particularly through opportunities for delay, but in many cases—in fact, the majority of cases—we have won our suits. It's put us on the same level, a level of parity. We have equal time in court under the same rules. The judge is used to dealing everyday with people who disagree, and we are in his eyes no different than anybody else coming in and disagreeing. It is just another lawsuit, another argument, and subject to all of the long,
McCloskey: excruciating process to get to a final decision. It cuts the high and mighty down to size very quickly, and it is kind of a humbling experience for them.

I might add that as much as I think corporations dislike litigation, government agencies dislike it even more. It completely pulls away the veil of pretense that they are the governors and we are the governed. Suddenly, they are standing in court beneath the judge in the same way we are, with equal time. In fact, most of our lawsuits have been against government agencies, though in many of them the action we are questioning has the effect of promoting the opportunity for some commercial development.

Schrepfer: Maybe not now, but we should talk about the need for the development of the legal strategy. Are you ever worried that by associating with the enemy, you might be swayed?

McCloskey: There is a danger there and, in fact, I have come to feel that one has to ration the amount of time you spend with the other side because you can be subtly influenced in terms of accepting their premise. What they like to do is harp on the fact—which is good psychology—that they've got a problem, and they want you to help solve their problem, which is how to get the plant constructed that they want. They keep saying, "What can we do to get this problem solved and to get the plant constructed?" As if that is the given and everything else follows from it. Well, in some cases a plant just simply shouldn't be constructed. It's not needed, or it is completely in the wrong location. So you have to be wary of not getting pulled into that mind-set.

By the same token, we should not be afraid of learning things. Our first impression of what a problem is all about may not be accurate. In fact, because we often are outsiders scratching around to learn what it's all about and so much of the technical expertise is on the other side, we have to realize that we can go through many iterations of scratching around to get a firm and accurate grip on what the problem is. I think we have to be intellectually prepared to back away from a first impression or second or maybe a tenth one, until by successive approximations we probe around and finally feel we have got a firm grip on its dimensions.

I think it would be terrible if we were afraid to expose ourselves to other points of view. I have taken the attitude that we ought to be willing to meet with anybody at anytime at anyplace on any subject. We ought to be able to defend our point of view on any occasion and be willing to talk to any serious
McCloskey: person about their problems or proposals. We may disagree completely, or in part, but to be afraid to sit down is, I think, a terrible confession of fear and weakness, and I simply won't make that confession. I will go anyplace, anytime and talk to anybody.

Schreper: Suppose a corporate utility asked you to serve on the board of directors. Would you accept?

McCloskey: No. In fact, it is a somewhat different point, but I had gotten overextended in the course of the seventies in the number of non-profit boards on which I sat and a couple of years ago decided to reduce the number of them. However, that simply involves a commitment of time. In the corporate case, I think there would be a conflict of interest. I couldn't honestly commit myself to foster the interests of some developmental group.

Schreper: Do you think the Sierra Club should hold stock in developmental companies?

McCloskey: This has been a controversial and difficult issue for the club in the seventies. In 1973, we divested ourselves of our stock holdings and gradually divested ourselves of corporate bonds, and our investments now are entirely in government securities. This was partly done as a way to get a better return on investments. Once the stock market moved into the long-term doldrums, the board of directors at that time took the position that it could conceive of getting into the stock market again if we could develop some appropriate guidelines for ethical investments in environmentally responsible firms.

I have worked on the question of such guidelines for many years, and the farther I get into it, the less confident I become that one can develop guidelines that would serve us well. I am increasingly skeptical of investments in the stock market, not because I think it is inherently evil or that there is an inherent conflict, but simply because I have found how difficult it is to really know what you are dealing with.

A great example I sometimes cite, though it is somewhat in the past now, arose in the early seventies. We were negotiating with a pharmaceutical company in New York to put on a series of five-minute radio programs. We were in an advanced stage of negotiations, and it then occurred to me, "Gee, we haven't checked out their manufacturing plant to see whether it is a water polluter or an air polluter." It was in upstate New York on the Hudson River. We checked it out, and lo and behold, it was under indictment for water pollution. But we went to the extent of getting them to negotiate with the state to get on a
McCloskey: compliance schedule. So we cleaned up that problem, and then I thought, "Now, where do they buy their supplies from?" I suddenly envisioned us sending detectives to dozens of places around in the country, and I said, "How many steps in the chain do you check out? Where does this all end?" Then you can think, also, what happens if you have a really big corporation with divisions and dozens of plants? How do you tell that they are "clean"?

In the case at hand, I decided that that first step was as far as it was reasonable to go. The day before we signed an agreement with them, whereby they would be the sponsor on the air of our program, they were indicted by the Food and Drug Administration for producing a carcinogenic substance. It was Phisohex, and we thought we were involved with a nice, clean cleansing agent that turned out to give babies cancer! We were saved by the bell, and that really spooked me. Thereafter, I just didn't want to have any more to do with such relationships.

Wilderness Protection and the Larger Environmental Movement

Schreper: Do you think that the wilderness protection movement has been helped or harmed by its merger into this larger environmental movement?

McCloskey: One can argue that both ways. I wrote an article in the early seventies suggesting that the wilderness movement got lost in the shuffle of the larger environmental movement. Certainly, the newer groups in the East like NRDC [Natural Resources Defense Council] and EDF [Environmental Defense Fund] weren't doing very much about wilderness. They were talking about pollution and toxics and energy. The Sierra Club began to talk about those a great deal more. We devoted tremendous efforts to energy issues through the 1970s.

Simultaneously, in the early seventies, the Wilderness Society fell upon hard times with executive directors who turned over every year or two, and their staff was subject to great turnover. Ironically, the club, as a result, picked up more and more of the burden in Washington on wilderness legislation and did the pioneering work on RARE I and RARE II and brought the big lawsuits on RARE I, and followed through on the environmental impact statements and so forth, and developed the strategies and got the Endangered American Wilderness Act through.

But during all of that time, wilderness was definitely downplayed in the total output of words and publicity coming from the club, though we did kind of conceive of our program as a
McCloskey: balancing act, with wilderness and parks on one hand and energy and pollution on the other hand, and we tried to keep some rough parity between them. In the process, we also became the leading group on forestry legislation, fighting the battles of the Timber Supply Act in 1970, with replays in '73 and '76 and later.

I think the Alaska campaign in the late seventies put nature protection back into a preeminent position in the picture and, in fact, the energy and pollution issues began to diminish. But I think the wilderness and nature protection themes definitely did suffer from less attention in the early seventies.
Schrepfer: Let's talk about conservation topics between 1969 and the present. To some extent the 1970s have come to be regarded as a non-reforming period, a period in which causes like the environmental movement were in the decline. Do you think this is a fair assessment of what happened to the Sierra Club after 1971?

McCloskey: It really isn't. There is an irony here in that the visibility in the press for the environmental movement declined to a degree; also, the sense of the stirring discovery of issues, which was very much evident in the period between 1969 and '70, faded. But as a matter of fact, we were instrumental in persuading Congress to pass more environmental legislation in the 1970s than the federal government had enacted in all of the prior years of its history. A huge number of bills were enacted, and the club was in the forefront in leading the effort on more of these than any other group. Certainly, almost all of the groups found a niche and did useful work, but the club was virtually everywhere and deferred to again and again, both in the field of nature protection and in the fields of pollution and energy and on the other emerging issues.

Schrepfer: People sometimes accuse the environmentalists of never being satisfied. Do you think there is somewhat of an end to what you can get, or want to get, from the federal government in the way of environmental legislation?

McCloskey: I think the end is certainly easier to see in the area of energy legislation and pollution legislation than it is in the field of nature protection. In the latter field, clearly we see a long list of specific wilderness proposals that will occupy the Congress
McCloskey: for the next two decades or more, well into the next century. There are literally thousands of them out there, and as time goes on, new local constituencies develop that are militant in pressing their case for an area near their homes; it's their favorite back country area.

There are still some pieces of generic legislation that I think the environmental movement will want to pursue. For instance, we still have not reformed the Mining Act of 1872. One can contemplate the need for an act which is the counterpart of the Surface Mine Control Act for coal to control strip mining for minerals other than coal, such as copper or molybdenum.

I served on a National Academy of Science study dealing with that problem. There are measures which we would still pursue in the international field. But in the energy field in the seventies, Congress legislated four times in developing broad packages of legislation. I think it has covered most of that field now. In the field of pollution, the basic Clean Air Act of 1970 represented virtually all we were seeking. Since then, while Congress has had to deal with its extension a number of times, we were basically fighting a defensive campaign. We wanted to keep it as strong and as good as it initially was. There were some similarities in the clean water campaign, too.

For instance, now in the area of toxic substances and hazardous wastes, we have a body of comprehensive legislation which is not being implemented well. It's being neglected; it's not funded adequately; it's not making much progress. But it is not the fault of the legislation. I think inevitably there is a shift toward implementation as a focus, and our total agenda of reform legislation, I think, is shrinking. There still are things out there for us to pursue. Certainly, we and others will think of new proposals in the future too. I don't think we'll ever be done with federal legislation.

But I think the seventies did represent a singular phase in American history. At no other time was so much legislation and so many programs brought into existence to protect the environment in such a short period. It was a kaleidoscopic period that just dazzled one's mind. You couldn't keep up with the pace of legislation. Every year you had some new huge reform battle, and one had to practically clear your mind of the debris of the last battle to make room for the next one, and I frankly can't remember the detail after a while. There were just too many things going on too quickly, but we have written lists that show that there are sixty or seventy measures in that period where the club was a leader in passing the legislation. Certainly,
McCloskey: Other groups were the leaders too on other pieces of legislation. For instance, we were not the leaders in the Clean Water Act's enactment in 1972, but we were the leaders in drawing a coalition together in 1977 for its extension.

Let's look at some of the most important measures enacted during that period—and this is in no particular order—let's begin with the field of national parks. The extension of the Redwood National Park was again a climactic battle in the seventies. The establishment of the Hell's Canyon National Recreation Area [on Snake River, Idaho and Oregon border] was a culmination in that decade of almost twenty years of battling over dams in the Hell's Canyon. The addition of the Mineral King enclave to Sequoia National Park was the culmination of work begun by John Muir in 1909. The establishment of fifty million acres of national parks, and as many again of national wildlife refuges in Alaska, was some of the most historic work ever accomplished, and we were in the forefront of the battle for Alaska.

The establishment of a system of wilderness in the East was a major accomplishment. Back on the question of national parks, we also led the way in securing enactment of a bill to close loopholes which allowed mining claims to be filed in six units of the national park system.

On the subject of wilderness, we were prime movers in getting the RARE I wilderness survey done and brought the critical lawsuit that required environmental impact statements before undeveloped areas could be exploited.

We were instrumental in getting legislation passed in 1975 that protected wildlife ranges from being transferred out of the federal control of the Fish and Wildlife Service. We were the key player in blocking the Timber Supply Act at the beginning of the seventies, which would have led to quick liquidation of old growth in the national forests, and we were the key party on the environmental side in 1976 when the National Forest Management Act was passed. We were the key player in the reform of the public land laws in 1976 with the enactment of an organic act for the Bureau of Land Management.

We pioneered the whole notion of protecting air which was already clean from significant degradations, and we did this through a lawsuit which we brought in 1973; we later got that doctrine embedded in the Clean Air Act when it was amended in 1977. We did the key lobbying on the Toxic Substance Control Act to get it enacted in 1976.
Schrepfer: We could put the list in the appendix.*

McCloskey: Why don't we do that? I'll conclude this quickly.

Schrepfer: I wonder if in some of these, when you're going along, you might remember the name of the person who was the most important in the club?

McCloskey: I certainly can in some of them. For instance, on the Toxic Substance Control Act, Linda Billings was our lobbyist at the time and was the leader on that--

Schrepfer: She was a volunteer leader?

McCloskey: Well, there was none at that time. That was primarily a staff action. On the other hand, the PSD doctrine in the clean air area was pioneered by a volunteer, Larry Moss, who was then club president. The BLM Act fight was primarily staff run. Chuck Clausen on our staff did the principal work on that. On the National Forest Management Act, Brock Evans was the leader on that as he was back in 1970 in fighting the Timber Supply Act, though I participated in that also. On the wildlife range transfer matter, Chuck Clusen was our staff leader.

Schrepfer: Most of these people that you are naming are staff leaders. Even Larry Moss was a staff member, wasn't he?

McCloskey: No, there were two Larry Mosses.

Schrepfer: So who is this?

McCloskey: This was the volunteer, not the staff member. This is Laurence I. Moss. The other was Larry E. Moss.

Schrepfer: Yes, we want to be careful. But most of these people are staff people. Have most of your major battles been led by staff?

McCloskey: At the national level they have been. Volunteers in the seventies, for the most part, were not in a position to play key roles. I think Ed Wayburn on Alaska matters and redwoods matters was an exception, and Larry Moss was involved with the PSD doctrine in the Clean Air Act and also on the first national energy bills which were passed. There were four pieces of national energy legislation of broad scope that were passed in the seventies, and on the first two, which were in 1974 and '75, Larry Moss was very active. He

*See Appendix A, p. 256.
McCloskey: no longer was club president, but as a former club president, he was in Washington and testified repeatedly. He did a lot of lobbying.

We played critical roles in those and particularly in the 1978 act, which grew out of President Carter's program. Back in the early seventies in the SST battle, we were a principal actor, along with Friends of the Earth, and Laurence I. Moss was a leader on that, too. For a while, the coalition was run out of our office.

Of course, the Alaska legislation, which culminated in 1980, was another huge battle, the biggest probably we ever undertook. In that battle, Ed Wayburn played a critical role, but there were a huge number of staff people who did also. Douglas Scott was certainly a prime mover in the final two years of that battle and managed our floor campaigns in Congress.

Earlier, when Chuck Clusen had been on our staff, he played critical roles too and chaired the coalition. I did some work on it that I can describe later, too. I might add, the battle to defeat President Carter's proposal for an Energy Mobilization Board in 1979 and '80 was a huge battle, too, which we almost lost time and time again, but, in the final analysis, we killed it. It would have allowed the president to suspend the Clean Air Act and other environmental laws to fast track big energy projects.

In the second battle for the Redwood National Park besides Dr. Wayburn, Linda Billings and John Amodio were our two key staff people. John was out here, but traveled to Washington a great deal. On the Hell's Canyon legislation, Brock Evans was the prime mover, a staff person. On Mineral King, it was a combination of many people over the course of time. I was the only staff person associated with it throughout the entire battle, but our lobbyists in Washington changed over the years on it.

On the National Park Mining Act, Mary Ann Eriksen out of our Los Angeles office, did the critical work. On the Eastern Wilderness bill, I remember volunteers played key roles, including Ted Snyder, who was later club president, and Allen E. Smith out of New England, who later became club controller. On the RARE I matter I suppose I played as much of a role as any on that in both suggesting ideas which provided the genesis of it and later in pressing for the lawsuit.

I think that pretty well covers most of the campaigns I mentioned.
Mineral King: Establishing the Idea of "Nature's Rights"

Schrepfer: Let's discuss some specific issues. Let's start with Mineral King. I think that one of the crucial early questions deals with the legal aspect. That is perhaps Mineral King's biggest legacy, the legal precedents. Whose idea was it to try to establish the idea that the club had the right to defend nature, and what was the origin of the idea of "nature's rights"? Where did this come from?

McCloskey: That was the idea advanced in Justice Douglas's dissent in the Supreme Court case [Sierra Club v. Morton, 1972]. The majority holding liberalized the rule of standing, but it did not really embrace the idea of the trees having standing or, as others have put it, that rocks had rights. Justice Douglas got his idea from Christopher Stone, who had written the Southern California Law Review article, and got it to Douglas at the last moment.*

Schrepfer: What I was referring to primarily is the idea that the club would go into the courts in claiming to represent nature and the rights of nature. This is what the club put forward before Douglas said anything.

McCloskey: I don't know that we made a clear representation on that point. We maintained that we had the right to challenge the legal validity of the actions the Forest Service was undertaking without showing that we were recreational users of the area. We could have made that demonstration very easily. However, our partners in the suit were cabin owners in the area, and our lawyers were afraid that if we made a showing that we were recreational users, we would then have to show that they had property interests in the area and that the reference to their property interests would make the suit look like it was selfishly inspired just to protect the uses which we both made of the area against adverse development, and in the public relations sense that could hurt us.

Schrepfer: So you had no choice about the way you framed it?

McCloskey: Our lawyers, at least, thought that it was inadvisable to make those recitations. We did debate that in advance. It was no inadvertence by which we forgot to do it. Later, some lawyers criticized us severely for failing to make an easy showing. We

McCloskey: had economic and tangible interests at stake. In its holding the Supreme Court did broaden the rule on standing, and said that the tangible interest didn't have to be an economic interest. It just had to be a tangible interest that was adversely affected, such as recreation; they allowed us to amend our suit, which we did.

Schreper: Did you consider the possibility of claiming, as you did in later suits, that your people used the area for wilderness recreation?

McCloskey: Yes, that is what I was trying to indicate, that we considered making that recital--

Schreper: I mean not the cabin owners, but just hiking there.

McCloskey: Yes, we could have done that for us, but legally, if we did it for us, we would have to do it also for the cabin owners who were coplaintiffs because the lawyers represented both of us and with joint clients you would have to make parallel recitations.

Schreper: Yes, you would have to say that both used the area--

McCloskey: As a matter of correct procedure, if the lawyers put in a paragraph to justify the standing of the club on the grounds that we were users in fact of the area, for the other plaintiff, they would have had to make a parallel recital that they had an economic interest in the area. But if we did that, we thought then that would have had an adverse public relations implication.

Schreper: You couldn't have claimed that both just had an uneconomic interest?

McCloskey: At least that is what we thought at the time.

Schreper: So really the decision on the case, which was extremely precedent setting, was really made inadvertently. In other words, you thought you didn't have a choice.

McCloskey: Oh, that's right. We certainly did not foresee that the case would become a landmark Supreme Court case on the question of standing. Actually, we did hope that the matter would be bogged down in the courts for a long time, which might indeed have involved the Supreme Court, though it is always a long shot that you will get to the Supreme Court. We did hope that the litigation would produce a delay to give us time to gear up political action. At the time we filed the suit, we were on the ropes. The Forest Service was about ready to issue permits and start construction. The stakes had actually been driven in the ground for the road up to Mineral King. The popular expectation was the developers were going to begin ground breaking very soon.
McCloskey: We began literally from ground zero in the sense of public support. Our board of directors was split when the decision was made in 1965 to oppose development. The governor had committed himself to the developers; the legislators had committed themselves; the newspapers had committed themselves. We were literally alone in the world, with no support other than a bare majority of our board. It is a classic case, in the sense of scrambling from the lowest depths of being alone, to eventually turning everything around in over a fifteen year period. By the end, the legislature had backed out on support for the road. The Highway Commission had removed its support. The governor supported us at that time. The majority of the congressional delegation supported us; the administration had turned around; the Congress had turned around; public opinion had turned around. We had articles approving it all over the country. But it took a long time to do that. It was step by step, the first step being turning around the legislature and the state Highway Commission. But the lawsuit was absolutely critical in gaining us four or five years of time to build up our campaign.

Schrepfer: This desire to gain time didn't play a role in your decision not to claim a vested interest?

McCloskey: No, we didn't think of that possibility at the time.

Schrepfer: Let me just rephrase it because I think this is an important point. The club did not set out to establish the precedent that you had the right to defend nature? Your bid to do so was, in a sense, the only alternative you felt you had?

McCloskey: Correct, though I would say this: we clearly knew on questions of standing that we were asserting a position that was not recognized yet in the courts; namely, that an intellectual interest in the fate of a wild area should suffice alone as the basis for standing. I think that still should be the position of the courts, and in fact it has come close in recent years to being what is accepted, though for the record you still must make a recital about injuries in fact. But the issue of standing now has virtually collapsed as a practical matter any more.

Schrepfer: So the courts in essence handed back to you an alternative that you had not really anticipated.

McCloskey: Yes, they nominally held against us, but then said, in effect, that we could continue the case if we wanted to amend our complaint to plead that we had a recreational interest and, of
McCloskey: course, we could, and we immediately did so. Shortly thereafter, NEPA [National Environmental Policy Act] passed, and then we amended the complaint to allege that the Forest Service hadn’t done an EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] and that produced another four or five years of delay!

Schrepfer: Did you continue to use the coplaintiff of the cabin owners?

McCloskey: Yes, I think they were in to the end.

Schrepfer: So how did you deal with this—

McCloskey: Well, we just pled they had an economic interest, but at that point the issue had already become so famous that we were no longer in danger of the allegation that this was just a narrow economic interest we were promoting.

Schrepfer: Was there dissent on the board when you did this, when you proposed this suit?

McCloskey: The suit? No, I don't think there was any substantial opposition to the suit. I think there was some uneasiness about the plunge into the unknown of major litigation and what it was going to cost. In fact, it played a role in stimulating the later development of the legal defense fund.

We retained outside counsel. The Lillick firm with [Don] Harris and [Fred] Fisher, who had been donating time, made it very clear that they did not have the time to undertake a major piece of litigation. So once Bob Jasperson and Greg Archbald, who had launched it, said they couldn't handle it, and they wanted more help, we went to the Lillick firm's people, and they said that they couldn't handle it, but they would find us a firm.

They found us Lee Selna at another firm in San Francisco. He undertook the case, but it cost us well over fifty thousand dollars through the Supreme Court level. After the Supreme Court, we gave the case to the club's own counsel because by then we had the legal defense fund. But when we saw that it could cost us fifty thousand dollars (which is the equivalent, I suppose, of double that amount today with inflation) we realized that we could hire our own lawyers for the price we were paying outside counsel. We thought, "If we are going to start spending money on this order of magnitude, let's invest it in our own lawyers and get our own defense fund," which we did.

Schrepfer: When you entered the lower courts with the case, did you think that you had a chance to win?
McCloskey: Oh, yes, we did. In fact, we won at the trial court level, and then we lost at the ninth circuit, and then that was appealed.

Schrepfer: Did you think you would win when you got to the Supreme Court? Were you surprised by the decision?

McCloskey: We were hopeful at the time that we would prevail. Interestingly enough, Justice Douglas had resigned as a director of the club back in the mid-sixties because he anticipated the development of environmental law, and he did not want to be disqualified if the Sierra Club ever had a case before the Supreme Court. This was the first case of ours finally that did get there and, of course, he jumped at the opportunity and wrote that famous dissent, and, like a lot of other dissents, it is the opinion that is remembered now.

In fact, I might add as a postscript, the club has now used the Douglas dissent successfully as the basis for filings in later cases. The Pahila case in Kauai [Hawaii] was filed by the bird itself--through the Sierra Club as its "friend." Similarly, in Death Valley [California] when we had a case, it was filed by Death Valley through its "friend," the Sierra Club; this was using the doctrine that Justice Douglas expounded in that case. In those cases these devices were never challenged; they have been accepted. So in a way, the Douglas dissent has now prevailed.

Schrepfer: If you hadn't liberalized the legal doctrine of standing, what could you have done with environmental litigation? How important is this?

McCloskey: I think it was quite important in that the development of environmental litigation would have been severely hobbled if the plaintiffs would have always been required to show an economic interest at stake. Basically, the litigation would have been limited to contests between economic interests and, of course, environmentalists for the most part don't have economic interests. We have noneconomic interests. Those noneconomic interests usually have a tangible expression, and that is all you have to show under this Mineral King decision.

Schrepfer: What are the philosophical origins of the idea that "nature has rights"? Was this something that came naturally to you, or did you read a book and say, "This is a new idea."

McCloskey: I'm not sure. The club didn't conceptualize it in those terms or in that phrase. That all came out of Christopher Stone and his research which has now become famous. As I indicated, what
McCloskey: we conceived was that an intellectual interest in a problem should suffice as a basis for standing. I suppose our sense there was, or the sense I had, was that the public interest movement, as it was developing, was a counterweight to developmental interests in society, and it was simply unfair to give one side of the contest access to the courts and deny it to the other side.

We have never had economic interests to assert, and it was very much my feeling that the intellectual interest in wilderness, or the vicarious interests in the enjoyment of wilderness, was as important as the practical enjoyment of it, that it was fine for people to think about and read about wilderness in Alaska. It didn't matter whether they ever got there and stepped inside it and became users in fact. They were users by thinking about it and enjoying it and reading about it. Similarly, people were reading about Mineral King in the East in Harper's Magazine. They too owned it, and they had as much right to have it protected, and it seemed to me just wrong to have to go in to assert that you had a tangible connection to it. I believed that this intellectual interest in nature ought to suffice for the public interest movement to have access to the courts.

Schrepfer: Did you formulate it this way before or after you went to the courts?

McCloskey: I am not sure that we ever formulated that in so many words. That was the thinking that I had in advance. I will say that in a law review article I wrote in 1961, I did forecast the development of environmental law, particularly in the field of forestry. In that connection particularly, it was evident that we didn't and couldn't ever have an economic interest. We weren't buying and selling lumber! We were hikers.

Schrepfer: Clearly the club uses now the notion that nature has rights, legally and politically.

McCloskey: Yes.

Schrepfer: So what you are saying is that the notion came from Christopher Stone and that you as a person first read it there.

McCloskey: Well, yes. What was unique about Stone was the formulation that connected the idea of nature having rights to the legal doctrine of standing. He put the two together for the first time. As I have just been relating, before the case was filed I had the sense that on the grounds of standing, an intellectual interest should suffice. I had not connected that up with the rights of nature. Quite separately I had a sense of the rights of nature, and I think other people did in the environmental movement. We
McCloskey: clearly didn't think we were going to all of this trouble just on behalf of ourselves or the Sierra Club. We had the sense that we were the agents of the natural world in pursuing its welfare. But we had not connected up these two things in exactly the way Stone did.

Schrepfer: So you came quite naturally to the idea that "nature had rights," intellectually?

McCloskey: Oh, I think so. This was similar to the idea that knowledge is valuable for its own sake. I believed that things in nature had a right to exist independent of whether people were using it or had established property rights or any relationship to it. I think it is deeply embedded in the whole conservation ethic and the writings of [Aldo] Leopold and others that creatures other than human ones have their own reasons for existence, and we aren't the lord and master of nature.

Schrepfer: Do you remember when you read Leopold first?

McCloskey: Oh, it must have been early in my career. I can't put a year on it.

The Development of Club Policy on Mineral King

Schrepfer: Let's go back to Mineral King. If Disney [Enterprises, Inc.] had advanced a more reasonable plan, not that mammoth onslaught against Mineral King, do you think that the club would still have opposed it? How would you have felt about it?

McCloskey: I think it would have. The sequence here is, I think, illuminating. In January and February of 1965, the Forest Service had made it clear that it was soliciting bids on the development of Mineral King. Meetings were held at Will Siri's house—he was then club president—with John Harper, a leader from our Kern-Kaweah Chapter. Harper had been following the Forest Service's proposals, and we had lots of debates in the spring of '65 about what level and kind of development might be contemplated by the Forest Service and any permittee. We talked about mitigation and whether it would be acceptable to have lift towers on crests, or whether they could be put below crests, and what kind of development would be acceptable. Our mind was very much on the question of mitigation and the level of development that we could accept.

However, that was before the Forest Service put out their official announcement. It came out, as I recall, a few months later and called for a $3,000,000 development. Well, all of us
McCloskey: who were discussing it at that time, thought that a $3,000,000 development was simply too large, and when the board met in May of '65, we fought it out and the majority of the board concluded that we would oppose a development that large. We had no idea that a few months later the actual bids would be for a mammoth development estimated to cost $30,000,000, and by later standards of inflation that figure would have run into the hundreds of millions.

To sum up, at an earlier point there was a willingness to consider mitigation and the question of the level of development, but as a practical matter, the actual thinking on the Forest Service's side was so much larger, by many orders of magnitude, that there was no hope of negotiation over questions of size.

Schrepfer: Did the decision to block the Mineral King development in your mind represent somewhat of a change, in Sierra Club policy, I mean a significant change, or was it a case that simply the project had changed so much that the Sierra Club position had to change?

McCloskey: It was a combination of two things. Certainly, the club in 1946 and '47 had been on record as having said that it thought that Mineral King was a suitable site for the development of a ski area. My reading of the history of that period was that the Sierra Club board had in mind a fairly modest development, something much less than the $3,000,000 development that the Forest Service invited in '65. If it had been a proposal of that huge order of magnitude back in 1947, I think it would not have been clear as to what the board would have done or how the votes would have gone.

However, I think John Harper's work in the Kern-Kaweah Chapter was a definite impetus toward coming to grips with the historic anomaly that left this enclave out of Sequoia National Park. It was a thumb from the south over a pass into a watershed that drained out, in fact, through the park to the west. In terms of adequate or sensible park boundaries, that enclave simply didn't make any sense. It was just an historical accident from the debates of the 1920s.

Harper was pushing us to really consider whether that was defensible any longer and whether the club ought to pick up the historic work once again of completing Muir's boundaries and getting rid of that thumb. Harper was not of a settled mind as to the practicality of trying to buck a new thrust for development, but clearly his preferences were to try to get us to put the area in the park.
McCloskey: That was the debate through the spring, of whether it was practical to buck development or whether we really should just go for what was historically right and forget about, shall we say, our lapse of good judgment in 1946 and '47, which of course came out of seeking an alternative for a proposal for a ski development in the San Gorgonio mountains [in southern California]. However, as I said, once the magnitude of the development that was actually being promoted emerged, the internal questions revolved themselves quickly.

Schrepfer: Did you ever have any qualms about whether Mineral King was a national park of wilderness quality because of the cabins and mining and the other things that had been done there by the way of development?

McCloskey: I didn't have any qualms. We were principally talking about adding it to the park, and were not really dealing so much with questions of wilderness. Of course, parks have developments in them; those fragile little cabins looked puny compared to what is in Yosemite Valley [Yosemite National Park], for instance. Moreover, during the period of the debate, the number of cabins steadily declined. They burned down; they were torn down; avalanches destroyed them. What little development was there practically disappeared by the time the area was added to the park.

Schrepfer: Did you ever have any qualms about whether Mineral King was a good ski resort site, aside from the question that you wanted to protect it? The avalanche question has been something the Sierra Club has considered for years.

McCloskey: That was a point that we made through the debate, that it really had a lot of problems as a ski development site. It has an awfully lot of advance skiing terrain. It was burdened with very severe avalanche problems, particularly in the main valley. People were killed there doing research work for the ski development in a number of winters. I thought that was a very serious argument.

Schrepfer: Did you have any trouble with the southern members of the club and the leaders in southern California who tended to favor the development?

McCloskey: No, as a matter of fact, a good share of the volunteer leadership for the battle emerged in the Los Angeles area through the years. Where we did have troubles was that this fight engendered tremendous and long-lasting hostility with the Far West Ski Association. As a matter of fact, once they lost the Mineral King campaign, they became far better organized in dealing with legislation than ever before, having lost San Gorgonio at an
McCloskey: earlier time, which they took as a mortal blow. To lose Mineral King on top of that, they felt was absolutely intolerable, and they will probably never forget these losses.

They, in fact, were not a very credible or effective opposition in the long battle, nor were the Disney interests themselves. I might add, too, that the club did not put heavy resources into the Mineral King battle the way it did in the redwoods and Alaska. This was handled usually on a somewhat casual basis by me and lobbyists burdened with other things. We used time very much to gradually build up our forces rather than try to build them up very quickly.

The Sierra Club and Redwood Park Enlargement

Schrepfer: How about going on to the redwoods? In the Redwood Park Enlargement Act [1978], I think, one question that first presents itself is exactly what were your calculations in the early seventies? You must have debated the question of when to move.

McCloskey: Yes.

Schrepfer: How did you finally decide when to move?

McCloskey: We knew after 1968 that Congress had no appetite for reopening the question in the near future. They were terribly tired of it. People like Senator Jackson in the Senate didn't want to hear about it anymore for a good many years. There had been a feeling that huge sums had been spent on it and that, in the redwoods, California had gotten its due. As a matter of fact, we had other measures to move in California in the ensuing years—the Golden Gate National Recreation Area; we had to come back to Point Reyes National Seashore inholdings, and the Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation Area, and the Channel Islands National Park proposals were pending in southern California. There was a feeling generally in southern California that northern California got all of the attention and that as soon as we'd finish one thing up here, we would have another thing that always took priority over theirs.

In fact, I felt guilty at times about our failure to devote sufficient staff resources to both the Channel Islands and the Santa Monica Mountains and Death Valley, though finally, as Mary Ann Eriksen [Sierra Club's southern California representative]
McCloskey: came aboard and matured in the job, she became very effective in moving all three of those along in Congress. It was a critical factor. We finally got more mature leadership there.

But back to redwoods, we realized that we had to play a waiting game for a while and that we could not successfully pursue the argument that simply more virgin redwoods had to be saved. So we focussed on the question of how to protect the federal investment in the redwoods that were already in the park along Redwood Creek and build up the whole issue of the threat to the "worm," or rather the corridor along Redwood Creek, from up-slope logging, and prodded the Park Service into having studies by the U.S. Geological Survey, and brought lawsuits alleging breach of trust by the secretary of the Interior and so forth. We used these efforts as the vehicle for getting attention drawn back to the park issue again.

Schrepfer: Would any forest practices in Redwood Creek have been satisfactory to the club?

McCloskey: Well, in fact, we were trying to get the rest of the area added to the park. We were seeking to have what survived of our original [Jeffrey] Cohelan bill added, and I think we did not envision that the pace of destruction would be so fast and be so devastating, but in a way we had ammunition whichever way things went. If the trees were still standing, we had virgin redwoods to save. If they went down, the geology of the area was so unstable that we had pictures of huge rock slides and devastation to the redwoods in the corridor. It was, I think, a good strategy which worked. The tragedy of it was that we ended up saving so little when it was all over and that so much damage had been done in that it took so long.

Schrepfer: Did the new California Forest Practices Act significantly improve forestry and forest practices in Redwood Creek?

McCloskey: I think it did. Well, I would put it the other way around in terms of its historic significance. The second battle of the redwoods, I think, was a very significant factor in improving state forest practices. By highlighting in one vivid area the problems and inadequacies of the prior state forest practice laws, it gave us a ton of ammunition which we could carry to the legislature and that friendly legislators used. So there were two or three upgradings of this California State Forest Practices Act as a result of this battle, and the unstable soils of the north coast became the centerpiece for the arguments.

I think those acts, as they were improved steadily, certainly provided more protection for the redwoods, but by then so much damage had been done that the whole area was a mess.
Schrepfer: I think that one--

McCloskey: I might add that it was Bob Curry, who was our scientific director at the time and a geologist, and I who conceived of the idea of the park protection zone in the bill and that, of course, became law. I conceived of the idea of drawing a distinction between the areas that were still more or less virgin and uncut and the areas that had been simply devastated. Curry recognized the distinction and conceived of the idea of putting two different zones within the bill, and I believed that this eventually created a precedent. For the first time, the Park Service administered an area that did not have park qualities in any sense of the word, but was designed to protect prime areas in the park and had to be actively managed in a highly manipulative sense.

Schrepfer: Was the [Jerry] Brown administration helpful to you? I guess we should really divide the question into the issue of forest practices and the issue of actually getting the park. I know that the club was very optimistic in the beginning when Claire Dedrick was appointed. Brown appointed her as Resource secretary. Was her performance on the redwood issue satisfactory?

McCloskey: In the end, the Brown administration provided useful assistance and support in Congress for the enactment of the bill expanding the redwood park. However, Claire Dedrick's performance as the resources agency secretary or chief was, on the whole, a disappointment to me. She left here as vice-president of the club and went to Sacramento to assume leadership of the largest agency in any state dealing with natural resources. We hoped that this would be an exciting period for natural resources in California. However, I think she felt on the defensive. She was attacked bitterly by the timber industry and moved consciously to a middle position. In fact, to my amazement, she renounced a number of her prior views with the Sierra Club and stated that she really had almost been brainwashed by us and didn't realize that they were poorly supported views. I regarded this as the kind of thing that no honorable person would do in leaving a position with an organization like the Sierra Club.

She did not support us very strongly on the issues that immediately emerged over the State Forest Practices Act. These issues dealt immediately with questions of environmental impact reports. These were confused and difficult times full of vacillation and backing and hauling on her part. We did far better under her successor, Huey Johnson, when he became Resources administrator. There was a much greater degree of self-confidence in espousing an environmental position and much more consistency in approach.
Schrepfer: So it is possible, you feel, for someone to work closely with the Sierra Club, please the Sierra Club, and be a public official?

McCloskey: I think it is possible, but there are all sorts of patterns in how one performs after leaving an environmental group. In the Carter administration, we saw a great deal of this. On the whole I think one can say that appointees from the environmental movement perform no better and no worse than appointees from almost any other walk of life. Some of our closest friends who took public office were some of our greatest disappointments. A minority of them, I think, performed well and creditably. Some of them turned on us entirely. Some remained steadfast and some moved into a very vacillating kind of performance.

For instance, in the Carter administration Dick Frank, one of our former lawyers, became head of NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration]. We helped him get the job, but he was really very bad on whale policy and a great disappointment. Jim Moorman, who had left the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, performed quite creditably in the Justice Department as an assistant attorney general, but he didn't have as many hard questions before him on environmental issues. A number of people from the environmental movement who went into the Interior Department were distinct disappointments.

Schrepfer: Why do you think this happened?

McCloskey: Many of them felt under pressure to bend over backwards to show that they were broad-gauged people who were not captives of their former walks of life, and I think the less secure they were, the more they felt they had to bend over backwards. But it really made them look ridiculous, having invested years in environmental professions, to suddenly claim that they had been hoodwinked, or they hadn't thought clearly before. It made them sound like people who may not have been thinking clearly then either.

Legal Precedents Pioneered in Redwoods Litigation

Schrepfer: Again I think that the redwoods, like Mineral King, established somewhat of a legal precedent. I am referring here to the public trust theory, the idea of saying that an agency is accountable, not just negligent but accountable for taking specific actions. Whose idea was this?

McCloskey: The public trust doctrine was advocated in a number of law review articles in the early seventies. I forget exactly who championed it the most. I think Joe Sax may have done it to a
McCloskey: degree. But it was one of the more popular theories for the development of environmental law. I believe we pioneered it in applying it to the duties of the secretary of the Interior, particularly with respect to the national park system. We did this in a number of cases, but the redwood case was the most notable of them. While it was never fully recognized or accepted by various secretaries of the Interior, that case put considerable pressure on the Interior Department to look like it was responsible and responsive and acting rationally and being thorough. It was part of a related legal development which was forcing agencies to demonstrate that they had a rational, thorough, and professional basis for their actions. To put it another way, if you had an inadequate record, you were vulnerable in court to a charge of being arbitrary and capricious.

Those two doctrines, the trust doctrine and that the need of an adequate record both emerged in our redwoods case. The case probably led to the most elaborate responses to those doctrines because the Geological Survey invested a large amount of time and money on behalf of the secretary of the Interior in examining what was happening to the redwood trees with all of the erosion and land movement. It was probably some of the most elaborate fact-finding done in any environmental case or forced by an environmental case.

Schrepfer: Did the case accomplish what you wanted? What was your goal in doing it? Did you think that you could actually get the Interior to move if you wanted, by which I mean you didn't anticipate what was going to happen?

McCloskey: The primary aim of the case was to escalate the visibility of the issue of the threat to the existing trees in the park, to develop a record and to generate publicity about the problem, and to force the secretary of Interior to acknowledge it in some way and to acknowledge that he had a duty to do something about it. We didn't feel that the secretary himself was likely to develop the ideal plan that we wanted, but we felt that the acknowledgement of the problem would be sufficient to allow us to get back into action with Congress; it was. After a certain point, we didn't need the secretary of the Interior, or we didn't even care what President Ford said. We had our case made to Congress, which then had to take notice of the problem.

When Congress had concluded its work back in 1968, the conference committee and principal conferees like Senator Jackson had told us that this was not necessarily the end of the line. This was the most we could do for now. We could come back later, but we couldn't come back right away. So this was,
McCloskey: in a sense, with both Senator Jackson and Congressman Udall, both of whom participated in the original conference, an elaborate rationale to get them to look at the problem again.

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Schrepfer: Did the case go in the direction that you wanted it to go?

McCloskey: Yes, it did its work very well for us.

Schrepfer: Did you contact [Congressman] Leo J. Ryan to get the hearings arranged, or did he contact you? What was the behind-the-scenes dynamics?

McCloskey: I contacted Ryan in Washington about oversight hearings through his Governmental Operations Subcommittee and suggested to him that he ask for a Government Accounting Office investigation of the way the implementation of the original park act had been handled. We gave him data on costs of the park and the slow pace of settling the financial questions. He had let us know that he was interested in keeping in contact with us and getting ideas about good issues that might be pursued, but we gave him the redwood issue.

Schrepfer: How did he tell you this? Did he call you up?

McCloskey: I have forgotten. I think it was through one of our lobbyists who had run into him somewhere who said that he would like to talk more about working together and what issues his subcommittee ought to pursue. It may have been that one of his staff people called me, too.

Schrepfer: Was it his idea or the club's idea to merge the redwoods in with the larger question of clearcutting in the United States, particularly on national forests, public land?

McCloskey: Did we do that?

Schrepfer: His oversight hearing did include both. To get back to the question of the suit, why don't you explain why the club chooses to sue government agencies 90 percent of the time rather than sue the industries directly?

McCloskey: There are many reasons for that. One of them, of course, is that a great many of our issues are directed toward the public lands, lands that the government owns, so you would have to sue the government if you were pursuing a quarrel over those in the courts. I suppose another reason is that the legal handles which are most available to us are in the field of public law. Public law deals with legal questions that concern governmental
McCloskey: operations. We lobby to get public laws enacted by Congress to protect the environment. The next step then is to lobby administrators to get them enforced and properly implemented, and if we fail there, then the final step is to go into court where we can make our case and to allege that the administrators are acting outside of the scope of the law in some fashion.

So litigation in the public law arena is all part of a three-step process for follow-through. The second step obviously also includes appropriations. It is really, in the largest sense, the completion of the lobbying process. When you complete that process you are then suing a government agency or a wayward government official, not a private entity.

In the field of private law, which deals with contractual questions, tort questions, class action questions and so forth, there have simply not been as many good handles for the development of environmental law. It has just not progressed as far. We can't do much about contract law if we are not a party in the contract in the first place. Tort law usually involves after the fact rather than preventive litigation. Instead of suing to complain about choking pollution from a plant, we would far rather sue in the first place to prevent the plant from being constructed without air pollution controls. To do that, the easiest handle is to allege that the air pollution agency, the control agency, hasn't met the proper requirements under the statute. In both events you would be ultimately affecting private interests, but the one route has just been so much more promising than the other.

Sources of Support for Environmental Victories of the Seventies

Schrepfer: I think Mineral King and the Redwood National Park are very good examples of the enormous success you had in the early seventies in environmental things, and you also made this clear when you were giving many of the other successes of these years. What were the combination of factors in the early seventies that made this possible? Why did things go so well, especially in view of the lack of public attention?

McCloskey: We certainly had this new firm foundation of public support, even if the attention was diminishing in the press. We had the 60 to 70 percent level of support that the polls and surveys showed. We had the wholly new development of environmental law—access to the courts. It was a very exciting time in terms of developing new theories, and our spirits were charged up. I remember earlier
McCloskey: lawyers would tend to tell us, "That is too much of a long shot." We would say, "If we have got a 5 percent chance, let's go for it." I remember a number of cases of that sort.

The courts were anxious to make law in the field of the environment. There were judges who were reading, and they were stimulated by the prospect. They were eager to get environmental cases. We won three-fourths of our cases at the beginning—agencies hadn't complied with NEPA [National Environmental Protection Act], for instance—and they were cream puff cases that you could win quickly and easily because the other side hadn't prepared an EIS or the agency was asleep. Later, our success ratios went down to probably sixty-forty.

Moreover, the members of Congress were remarkably sympathetic as a whole. The administrations were not. With regard to the Nixon administration, I think its initial disposition, before Earth Day, for its first six months was to give us the back of its hand. But they saw a tidal wave of support coming, and they decided to drift with it. They put some good people in here and there—Nat Reed in the Interior Department as assistant secretary, some fine people in CEQ [Council on Environmental Quality], some pretty good people in EPA.

So we had our supporters in the executive branch, too. Regardless of how bad the administration was as a whole, the environment was something you had to pay a lot of attention to. We had strong, capable friends in Congress like Senator [Edmund S.] Muskie in the Senate. Senator Jackson was quite good at the beginning of the decade. He became less sympathetic as it wore on, but never wholly unsympathetic. At the beginning of the decade, people like Congressman [John] Dingell [Democrat, Michigan] were very sympathetic, though their sympathy waned as the decade progressed. Morris Udall ascended to the chairmanship of the House Interior Committee and became very friendly.

There were a lot of experienced, sympathetic people in high places who were almost competing with each other to leave their marks on legislation. I told about Leo Ryan looking for things he could do. People who had been chairman of that subcommittee before had made names for themselves. There were lots of members of Congress who were eager to get ideas from us about what they could champion, about bills they could move.

Schrepfer: Who were your strongest congressional supporters?

Schrepfer: Magnuson?

McCloskey: —Of Washington state. Senator [Philip A.] Hart, in the early seventies, from Michigan, was very, very helpful. He later retired. In the House in the early seventies, Congressman [John] Saylor, who was a Republican, was very helpful. Congressman [Henry S.] Reuss from Wisconsin chaired the [House] Government Operations Subcommittee for a while. He was very helpful, as was Congressman [Richard L.] Ottinger from New York state and Congressman [Paul] Rogers in the air pollution field. The Public Works Committee was very helpful.

Later, Congressman Morris Udall emerged into a strong position of leadership, as did Congressman John Seiberling from Ohio. I mentioned Congressman Dingell. Congressman Phillip Burton from San Francisco in the latter part of the seventies chaired the Subcommittee on National Parks in the House and did heroic work in moving wilderness bills and park bills, particularly moving a lot of California legislation along.

Schrepfer: How much support was there from the Republicans? Just a few mavericks with exceptions like Saylor?

McCloskey: No, partly this was because they were the minority party through the seventies. They didn't capture the Senate until 1981, so they weren't chairing committees or subcommittees and had less power. There were some of the eastern liberal congressmen and senators in the Republican party who were sympathetic. Starting in 1981, we had to go to people like Senator [Robert T.] Stafford from Vermont who suddenly chaired the environmental committee in the Senate and dealt with clean air legislation. He had a good voting record and was very sympathetic, but he was not a prime mover or principal in the seventies, but when he became chairman suddenly he was.

Congressman Pete McCloskey from California was more sympathetic and helpful as a Republican in the early seventies than in the late seventies. He became less sympathetic and interested with the passage of time.

Schrepfer: You got some support from the Nixon people. How much help did you get from the agencies under President Ford?

McCloskey: Strangely enough, the situation deteriorated under Ford. Ford was viewed as more moderate than Nixon, but he focussed particularly on energy, and his energy advisors like Frank Zarb and others had very strong fixed notions that air pollution laws and other environmental laws were in conflict with the energy policy they wanted. Ford vetoed the Strip Mine Control Act twice, for
McCloskey: instance, and real hostility in the environmental movement toward Ford grew much more pronounced than it had been with Nixon. I don't think people liked Nixon as a person, but he had not really ever gone to war with the environmentalists.

We did have our battles during that period. There was the supercut order for increasing cutting on the national forests that we challenged and so forth. There were people under Nixon in the Bureau of the Budget or OMB [Office of Management and Budget], as it later was called, who were very hostile. But Nixon was very pragmatic, and his White House was flexible on environmental policies. As soon as he saw much momentum behind an environmental proposal, he kind of got out of the way and let it roll on by.

Schrepfer: One of the precedents that the Redwood National Park Enlargement Act also established was, of course, title II.* I am wondering how you see this fitting into a pattern of the politics of the club. Is the club, by sanctioning title II, moving in the direction increasingly of a liberal coalition, moving toward the left? Is it part of a political pattern?

McCloskey: It probably is. There are applications of our work that assume both a liberal cast and others that can assume a conservative cast. To the extent that the club had generally called for more governmental regulation and is usually in conflict with business and industry, it certainly looks liberal and looks to liberals in Congress for support. To the extent that it is highly critical of government expenditures and ill-considered developments for water projects and waterway projects and things such as the breeder reactor and others, it sounds more conservative and looks to conservatives to a certain extent for help in cutting such government expenditures.

But there is no doubt that the environmental movement has found a greater sympathy and support consistently among congressional liberals than among congressional conservatives. There are those in both camps who support the environmental movement as well as oppose it, but on a statistical basis there are far more friendly liberals, and our voting bloc invariably starts with inner city liberals in Congress. It doesn't start with rural conservatives,

*Title II of the Redwood National Park Enlargement Act (H.R. 3813, 1978) provided that lumber company employees would receive compensation, retraining, and relocation payments if they lost their jobs or had earnings reduced as a result of Redwood National Park expansion.
McCloskey:  though there are conservative votes that we invariably get, and we always have to pick up some. But generally, even on a party basis, the results show that something on the average of about 55 percent of the Democrats in Congress vote right on environmental issues and about 45 percent of the Republicans do. Now, of course, there are liberals and conservatives in both parties, but the Democrats tend to be a bit more liberal.

I think that kind of fairly describes where we are. Neither party is perfect by a wide margin, but on a marginal basis we get better help, I think, from left of center.

Schrepfer:  Many Sierra Club members are, in fact, Republicans. Did you get any political backlash from title II within the club?

McCloskey:  Oh, no, not from within the club. There are surveys that show that about two-thirds of our members are Democrats and liberals (though the two things are not synonymous), and about one-third are Republicans and conservatives. Public opinion surveys, oddly enough, show that liberals and conservatives alike are committed to strong environmental protection by a very similar percentage, something like 64 percent of the liberals and something like 62 percent of the conservatives. So it is interesting that performance by elected representatives does not match up very well with the attitudes of the people themselves toward the importance of environmental protection as that is related to their political persuasion.

Schrepfer:  The club has never really managed to exploit the affinity that environmentalism can have with the conservatives?

McCloskey:  We were certainly trying in 1981 in the battles over the budget to point out the inconsistency of conservatives who will vote on the one hand in Congress to cut federal expenditures and on the other hand to keep spending going for wasteful water projects. There is a considerable body of those we consider to be rank hypocrites in that regard! If they were consistent one way or the other, you could say that they were honestly committed to their convictions, and when their convictions and environmental interests coincided they were going the same way, but this doesn't always happen.

I think that to be honest, the club's quarrels over government regulation outweigh in practical impact its interests in cutting down wasteful expenditures. On governmental expenditures, our positions vary. If the question is one of supporting EPA's sewage treatment plant construction program, we are big spenders trying to get billions spent. If there are water projects at issue, we are trying to get billions cut. But we can go both ways
McCloskey: on spending, whereas we rarely go both ways on government regulation. We are almost invariably for more government regulation. I think that fact means that we find a more consistent home left of center than we do right of center, though we are not philosophically wedded to either side of the aisle.

Protection for National Forest Roadless Areas

Schrepfer: How active were you in the formulation--the agitation--for the executive order to establish the roadless areas in the national forests?

McCloskey: That line of development had an interesting history to it. In 1969, the Forest Service first had a provision in its manual that suggested that it would be a good idea if regional foresters started looking at roadless areas and seeing how many of them it might want to suggest for a wilderness someday. In early '71, that idea was put forth more forcefully by the chief of the Forest Service--that such surveys were supposed to really be done in a systematic way. It was promulgated in February. In March of that year when I was in Washington with Stewart Brandborg of the Wilderness Society, we had an appointment over at the Council of Environmental Quality. We were trying to figure out what we should say on this question of this new wilderness survey order that had gone out.

I developed the idea that we ought to ask for a moratorium on logging in the areas subject to the study. It occurred to me that we had just won the Parker case, which was this case I mentioned earlier, the United States v. Parker. It was this case that Tony Ruckel, our lawyer in Denver, had brought to require that roadless acreage in the national forest adjacent to a primitive area be exempt from logging until a wilderness reclassification study of the primitive area is complete and forwarded to Congress. The Saylor Amendment had provided that there should be no development until Congress disposed of primitive area status. In effect, the case extended the coverage of the Saylor amendment to the roadless area adjoining the primitive area, too.

It struck me that if we were getting a moratorium on logging on roadless areas adjacent to primitive areas, why didn't the same logic extend to roadless areas that weren't adjacent to primitive areas? After all, the Forest Service itself was now saying that we not only should complete the surveys of the reclassifications of the primitive areas but, at the same time,
McCloskey: we should look around and see what other roadless areas we have too, and to see whether we want to recommend any of them for wilderness status. It was illogical not to log one while you were studying it but to go ahead and log the other.

So I came up with the idea that we ought to ask for an executive order for a moratorium during the pendency of the study, and Stewart Brandborg thought that was a great idea, and he was kind enough later to mention to quite a few people that I was the author of that idea. We made some progress over at CEQ, and an executive order was actually drafted, which was sent to the White House. It was almost signed in June, but the timber industry found out about it, and there was a battle royal behind the scenes in the White House, and it was bogged down by the end of the summer.

The survey went ahead and became RARE I. We argued that it was done in a slipshod way and they missed a good many areas. That winter, a spokesman for the Forest Service said, "They are going to go ahead and log these areas now." I made a statement to a newspaper in Denver that I thought that that was unconscionable, and I said, "We'll sue them if they go ahead and do that." They proceeded to try and go ahead. We sued and that was our famous RARE I lawsuit, the settlement of which required an environmental impact statement on each roadless area before it could be dismissed from consideration as wilderness and be logged. That provided leverage for the first time to the environmental movement on the whole question of what became of the wilderness roadless inventory.

Later on, we got a second study under the Carter administration, the so-called RARE II study, that improved the quality of the inventory considerably.

Schrepfer: So your role was quite important.

McCloskey: It was, but it is something that I have never written up, nor has it been written up anywhere else.

Environmental Organizations: Stylistic and Ideological Differences

Schrepfer: Certainly something you had much less involvement with was Proposition 9 [Clean Environment Act (Pollution Initiative), on the June, 1972, California ballot], but I did want to ask about it. The Sierra Club eventually took no stand on Proposition 9, as I recall, and the board was split over the issue. It was a pretty
Schrepfer: classic split. [Martin] Litton was for it, and [Richard] Leonard was against it. What did you think of Proposition 9, and did you think that the Sierra Club should have taken a position on it?

McCloskey: This, of course, was an initiative measure in California that was designed to be an environmental cure-all. It was promoted, as I recall, by the People's Lobby that had an eccentric person directing it. They didn't consult much with other organizations, much less the Sierra Club. It was going to do everything from closing down nuclear power plants to refining the use of pesticides, and God knows what else. It was full of a lot of loose rhetoric. I felt that it was so poorly drafted and so likely to be defeated that it would only redound to our detriment to have anything to do with it. We really had not been involved nor invited to collaborate in developing it. As a matter of fact, I think most of our key people thought that it was a bad idea to try to put all of our eggs in one symbolic basket and to amass all our enemies against us—to give every major industry in California a reason to pool its money to give the environmentalists a slap in the face.

It was practically worthless. Many parts of it weren't self-executing; they weren't clear. It would have been productive of endless court challenges, and so I was glad that we stayed out of it. They made other efforts again in the future, but nothing that the People's Lobby ever tried at the statewide level succeeded.

Schrepfer: Did you ever talk to any of the people from the People's Lobby?

McCloskey: Yes, I talked to Ed Koupal. He is now deceased.

Schrepfer: Did he by any chance regard the Sierra Club as too conservative?

McCloskey: He complained to Ralph Nader about us, and Ralph Nader denounced us as a tool of big business at the time, which was one of the more ludicrous things that had ever been said. I have never really forgiven Ralph Nader for letting himself be duped into saying that, though he has since written books for us—or his associates have—and we have cooperated on lots of projects.

Schrepfer: Is there much tension within the environmental movement today, this ideological tension between supposedly the more liberal and the less liberal? It certainly was something that plagued the club internally for many years. Does it still exist either inside the club or within the movement?
McCloskey: It doesn't exist within the club to any appreciable extent. Most of the directors who were active in those schisms of the sixties are no longer around. As a matter of fact, there were a couple of directors, such as Martin Litton and Fred Eissler, who really identified more with the style of the Friends of the Earth [FOE], which was one of taking a stand as almost the ultimate act, regardless of whether it influenced the public or was an aid or hindrance to achieving your objective in public policy. We haven't had many more people like that, nor have we had any people like Bestor Robinson and others who really, in an earlier period, seemed to be primarily protecting business interests. I think, fortunately, those schisms just seem to have left the board, though to a degree I think Director Berry had echoes of, you might say, the FOE style.

The movement as a whole has become quite cohesive at the national level. Most organizations have moved toward a kind of a common style, a common set of assumptions, and almost an agreed upon agenda. What has become evident is a schism between the modern environmental groups, of which there are a couple of dozen on the one hand, and some of the old-line groups concerned with the wise management of resources, such as the American Forestry Association and the Wildlife Management Institute and the Soil Conservation Society. Groups of that sort have really become left in an entirely different sphere.

But the National Wildlife Federation used to identify with the old guard groups, but by the end of the seventies had come firmly into the environmental camp, due largely, I think, to the leadership of its national staff. Tom Kimball, as their executive director, began the seventies over in the old wise management camp, making speeches criticizing environmentalists, and ended up leading his group into the environmental camp at the end of the seventies, with plaudits at his retirement from almost all of the environmental leaders. It was a remarkable transition.

Schrepfer: What you are describing then is more sort of a polarity rather than a spectrum--two camps.

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Schrepfer: In one camp, then, there were groups like the AFA [American Forestry Association] and then in the other camp there was a pretty homogeneous body of environmentally-oriented organizations.

McCloskey: That's right. There certainly are minor differences in style and emphasis among the groups, but our basic assumptions about public policy and how to get things done with respect to public policy seem to be fairly uniform.
Schrepfer: This would include groups like the Audubon Society and Friends of the Earth?

McCloskey: Oh, yes.

Schrepfer: Do you see them as fairly much in agreement?

McCloskey: Oh, yes, about the basic assumptions. As I say, there are stylistic differences.

Schrepfer: By "stylistic" what do you mean?

McCloskey: I think some groups are more apt to make statements that are much more controversial or strident than others. Some may feel that it's important to put more emphasis on the executive branch, others on the judiciary, others on Congress, things of this sort. Others may be organizations that principally respond to the initiatives of one leader. Right now the Wilderness Society is very much that way. The Izaak Walton League, on the other hand, very much gets its initiatives from the bottom up. They are two polar extremes. But yet the national leadership of the Izaak Walton League and the Wilderness Society don't disagree over fundamentals.

Schrepfer: I seem to remember something lately about an editorial in a local New Jersey newspaper to the effect that if the National Wildlife Federation is mad at Watt, then something really must be wrong.

McCloskey: There certainly should be. Two-thirds of their members voted for Reagan, and yet 90 percent of the people who responded to their survey, which was very large, were up in arms over Watt.

Schrepfer: So it appears that there has been a high degree of intellectual maturity in the movement, that there was a lot of controversy within the movement, but it has leveled out.

McCloskey: Yes, the homogeneity of attitudes within at least the leadership echelons, and I suspect actually in many cases it goes down to the grass roots, too, is one of the more interesting phenomenons of the 1970s.

Schrepfer: Do you see the transition to more homogeneous attitudes as part of the shift that you described in one of your articles, the shift from the charismatic movement into the more managerial movement?

McCloskey: I think they tend to be related in that the movement now has a large body of ideas and literature and doesn't have to look to a few people for its sources of ideas or inspiration; like every individual is his own pastor, a kind of Quakerish thing in a way,
and the leaders have become more facilitators in getting information to people and getting the arrangements made so that things can be carried forward. There is no pope of the movement who gives forth the blessings from on high. That's just not well accepted.

Moreover, at the very end of the seventies and at the beginning of the eighties, the individual leaders of the environmental groups began to actually meet regularly every quarter to pull together in a way they had never done during the seventies. The working lobbyists had gotten together quite regularly to form coalitions in Washington on issue after issue. That was just a regular way of life. There would be anywhere from a half-dozen to a dozen groups, relating in this way and often these coalitions got substantial funding and hired staff.

But the chief executive officers themselves didn't sit down to systematically develop strategy. Some of them continued working through the old Natural Resources Council of America, which became increasingly moribund, as did the Citizens Committee on Natural Resources, which really became a captive of the old-line wise management groups, principally the Wildlife Management Institute.

The movement had not developed any institutions for cohesion at the top until virtually the end of the decade. Then suddenly two groups came into existence, which may or may not survive. One of them is the Group of Ten, composed of the ten largest organizations. There are no officers for that. It just meets with rotating leadership. Then there is a larger group, the Environmental Leadership Conference, staffed up by a group called the Environmental Task Force, which considers questions of broad interest to the whole movement, as does the Group of Ten.

But regardless of which of those survive, I am fairly confident that there will now be continuing institutions to get the leadership together.

Is this part of the professionalization of the movement?

McCloskey: I think it is, and they bend over backwards not to indulge prima donnas!

The Sierra Club and the Alaska Campaign

How involved were you on the Alaska campaign? I think that is kind of unclear.
McCloskey: My involvement was somewhat limited. It was greater in the early stages in helping to get the campaign airborne and moving. I did some field work in Alaska, flying on a float plane, for instance, on the Alaska Peninsula to the middle of the Aniakchak Crater to look at that proposed national monument. I went to the Lake Clark area and did quite a bit of looking around to prepare myself for roles in Washington. Later on, I gave the lead testimony at the kickoff hearing in the Senate for the Alaska bills. I was the initial environmental witness there.

Somewhat before then, I had actually drafted the first Alaskan bill, though in very rudimentary form, but I took input from Jack Hession, the Sierra Club field representative, and put it into bill form. That was circulated and eventually went through many, many revisions and got introduced in Congress. But I did pull the first draft together, and I helped chair a considerable portion of the first coalition meeting which haggled out the contents of our bill.

Thereafter, the whole impetus behind the campaign gathered so much momentum that many other actors were brought onto the scene, and I just kept more of an eye on the whole development.

Schrepfer: How important was Dr. Edgar Wayburn in the Alaska campaign, and how would you describe his role?

McCloskey: He was the only person I know of who was associated with the campaign from beginning to end. He came to a board of directors meeting about 1967 or '68, after he had just come back from his first visit to Alaska, and insisted that we devote major resources to conserving Alaska. It was made a priority of sorts as an indulgence to him and out of respect for his position more than out of any knowledge. Some people thought, "Gee, do we make a priority out of it just because Ed Wayburn is enthusiastic about it?" But it didn't take us long to learn that never had there been more substance behind any campaign than that one.

In the early stages in the battle over the pipeline, he played very critical hands-on roles, flying up to Alaska and meeting with the undersecretary of the Interior. Throughout the entire campaign, he was the embodiment of the push in the club to keep the campaign moving in high gear. He was the prodder who was always on the phone to our lobbyist, always making appeals to our board of directors to provide more money, always appealing to our editor to put more articles in the magazine, to put out more newsletters, to run ads. He was, in many ways, insatiable. He was never satisfied that we were doing enough or spending enough.
McCloskey: He was also the person, I think, who had the best overview. He followed the detail, and he followed the grand strategy. He would go back to Washington a number of times each year. He had the contacts with Senator Jackson. He would always go in to see him. Hardly anybody else could get to see him or get through to him the way Ed Wayburn could. He would also see Phil Burton. He would see key people on both sides.

Of course, he was not able to play the kind of hands-on role lobbyists in Washington were because he was out here, and when the campaign in the last two or three years mushroomed to include a huge number of people, his role became less obvious to all of the new people involved in working for the coalition. There were nearly a dozen staff people at the end either assigned to or employed in working for it. It was the largest operation ever put together by the environmental movement.

But Ed Wayburn was there from the beginning to the end and was more responsible than any other person for the club's performance. I think it's true to say that the club contributed more over the years to the success of that battle than any other organization did.

Schrepfer: One of the issues that has plagued the environmentalists in recent years in connection with the Arctic is subsistence hunting. I wonder if you might describe your feelings on the question of something like the bowhead whale. Should the Eskimos and other Arctic people be allowed to continue to hunt and under what circumstances?

McCloskey: In a draft I did of the first Alaskan bill, the provisions on subsistence hunting were some of the more difficult to think through. I might add that I believe that some of the provisions of the final bill parallel closely the thinking I developed with Ed Wayburn and Jack Hession in that very first draft. Basically, we decided that there was a legitimate case for subsistence hunting even in national parks and that we would fatally impede progress toward getting those parks if we tried to bar subsistence hunting. So we decided that it should be accommodated, but that it should be carefully controlled. We tried to draw the provision in a way that it was not a wide open sesame for abuse by white hunters and others, though it had to be drawn in a way that was not racially discriminatory. That was particularly a point that Senator Jackson felt strongly on. You couldn't have a racial test for who gets to shoot a moose in a park or not.

So we drew it rather closely to be limited to those who had a history of relying on the land for their subsistence. The basic pattern that we hammered out here survived, albeit the language changed.
McCloskey: On the bowhead whale we face one of the most agonizing trade-offs that is imaginable. Clearly, the Eskimos have a history of relying on the bowhead as a source of protein. But I think it is just as true to say that the scientific community is united in saying that of all of the whales in all of the oceans of the world, none is more endangered and in a more precarious state than the bowhead. The scientific committee at the IWC [International Whaling Commission] has consistently recommended a zero quota on it. The U.S., somewhat to the scandal of the conservation community, has continued to oppose that zero quota and champion whaling for Alaska's natives.

My wife, who runs the Whale Center in Oakland, has spent a great of time on this issue, and her Whale Center has advocated substituting gray whale protein for the bowhead. The gray whale is available within range of some Eskimos in Alaska. Some compromises have been struck in recent years on that issue, and it appears to have settled down a great deal as an issue.

It is symbolic, however, of a general problem throughout the world of the conflicts between cultures in transition that have subsistence patterns from the past and what is happening to the resource and what is happening also to the means of capture and killing. For instance, if you give them modern technology--motorboats, and high-powered rifles--and their population doubles based upon eating modern foods from the lower forty-eight states, the relationship between the native population and the resource changes. The exploitive pressures grow immensely and the resource is shrinking. Even if their patterns are a cultural matter, things are on a fatal collision course. The resource is going to expire; there is too much firepower being put behind the native cultural tradition.

Schrepfer: Isn't it unrealistic to think that the culture of these people can be protected?

McCloskey: That is one of the tragedies throughout native Alaska. The populations have doubled or more in recent years. They are quickly being turned from a subsistence economy to a cash economy. The populations are doubling and increasingly based upon the inputs of groceries from the lower forty-eight states. A dependency is being developed that is very heavy, and yet there isn't the economic base short of a dole to support that dependency. It's very tragic, and I think there is no way of pretending that the old patterns and cultures are enduring when the basic factors have, I think, irrevocably tilted toward modernization.
Schrepfer: It must be politically very difficult for a group like the Sierra Club to suggest anything like that.

McCloskey: It has been. We developed a workable relationship with the natives on the Alaska legislation. The relationship of the whale conservation community to the Eskimos on the bowhead, however, was extremely strained. People were shrieking insults at meetings and accusing each other of racism, and it became as emotional and difficult an issue as I have ever heard of.
XI THE SIERRA CLUB AND FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCIES

The Organization of Agencies Affecting the Environment

Schrepfer: In 1972 you wrote an article for the Duquesne Law Review in which you recommended the establishment of what you called a new super department that was to be a department of environmental affairs built around the EPA but including much more—everything from the land planning agency to power plants, energy, and environmental control of industries. Weren't you afraid to put all your eggs in one basket? Ten years later, almost, do you still agree with this?

McCloskey: I think a case could be made for putting more in EPA, but I don't think I would any longer favor putting everything that had any relationship to the environment in one agency. I must say that historically I have tended to favor transferring the Forest Service to the Interior Department, not that the Interior Department is all that good or reliable but that the Agriculture Department has very little to offer as a place for the Forest Service. No secretary of Agriculture in recent memory has evinced much interest in the Forest Service and what became of it. Some of the assistant secretaries of Agriculture have shown more interest than others, but they have not had the clout to have any support at the White House.

So the result is the Forest Service rattles around pretty much on its own, making its own accommodations, and it might as well be an independent agency. I think that it could probably do better in collaborating with other like-minded agencies in a larger department. However, the Interior Department has certainly had a checkered career.

This was an issue before the board of directors during the Carter administration. Secretary [Cecil D.] Andrus, when he was Interior secretary, was very anxious to get the Forest Service.
McCloskey: We debated it long and hard. At that time, Andrus had a background as governor of Idaho which suggested that he was somewhat sympathetic to the timber industry's concerns. He had actually been a logger and a lumberman himself. He was very good on most issues, but he made statements about increasing the allowable cut that really concerned us.

Also at that time we had an assistant secretary of Agriculture, Rupert Cutler, who had been with the Wilderness Society and later went on to the Audubon Society, whom we had helped put into that position. So we finally concluded that, at that time, transfer of the Forest Service didn't look all that attractive, and the case was always highly debatable, though the club had nominally been in a position of advocating a transfer at various times.

EPA, when it was established, was taken largely out of the Interior Department, and to a lesser extent, HEW [Department of Health, Education and Welfare]. The rationale at the time was that those other departments had so many other missions that the pollution control function was likely to get lost in those other departments. At any rate, those other departments always had an excuse if they didn't do very well on pollution in that they were preoccupied with other missions. The idea behind EPA was that by putting it by itself it had no excuse about being preoccupied with something else. They had only one mission, which was pollution control.

I think the same rationale could exist for a somewhat larger, more complex agency, if the rational would be environmental protection. However, over a decade EPA has not been an easy agency to administer. At times it has choked on the size of its agenda. Some new measures, like the Toxic Substance Control Act, are hardly implemented after four or five years, and clearly under the Reagan administration EPA has been put into very unsympathetic hands. But by the same token, most other agencies have too, so even dispersion is not likely to solve the problem of finding a sympathetic chief for an agency. I think it's true to say, however, that interest in broad institutional reform and reorganization has pretty much collapsed as a result of the Carter administration's experience. They reorganized the Energy Department. They had lots of other ideas beyond that, but they bogged down very quickly, and it came to naught.

Under the Nixon administration, there had been a tremendous reorganization effort under the Ash Commission. It bogged down rather completely, too. There have been many, many efforts at creating a department of natural resources or environmental protection, and they failed, and I don't see much likelihood of success in the future.
Schrepfer: Isn't there any benefit to the system of checks and balances? The Forest Service has certainly been prodded into doing better things with its land by the fear of losing land to the National Park Service, and to some extent Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers' function as a check on each other, don't they?

McCloskey: I think the checks and balances are real and valuable. The argument can be made, though, that they can exist within a department as well as outside. For instance, if the Bureau of Land Management is deathly afraid of losing land to the National Park Service in the Mojave Desert, it is very much on its mettle, just as the Park Service is likely to behave better than it otherwise would. Well, they are both in the Interior Department.

Schrepfer: Isn't there some problem with the agency that loses the ear of the secretary, therefore, being in essence shut up entirely since we don't have a system of--

McCloskey: That is true, that if they are both in the same department, one agency can be muffled more easily than if it is in another department. Another thing that has changed somewhat over the decade is that the land management agencies in general have moved, I think, to a more centrist position. They see themselves as, and in fact I think have been, much more balancers between competing interests. At the beginning of the decade, I at least had the feeling that the Forest Service, for instance, was much more timber-oriented than it is at the end of the seventies and is still more timber-oriented than I wish it were, but there is a younger generation of foresters coming on who have quite a different attitude than some of the older ones.

With the advent of the Reagan administration, regional foresters and others have told me how much they needed the Sierra Club, and they were calling us over for lunch and were really scared at the beginning of that administration over what was going to happen. They have an interest in maintaining tolerable relations with us because they see us as counterbalancing forces on the other side.

A great irony to this is that people like Bestor Robinson at the beginning of the sixties accused us of cutting off our relations with the Forest Service because of our fights. If anything, we fought harder and on many more fronts in the intervening twenty years. We've ended it up, I think, with closer relations with the Forest Service than at any time since the 1950s.
Schrepfer: Could you perhaps describe what you said had happened at the beginning of the Reagan administration more specifically? Did the Forest Service contact your Washington lobbyists? Is this what you are saying?

McCloskey: Well, they called our lobbyists and some of them called me. For instance, we got two awards from the Forest Service, if you can believe it, at the end of 1980, one for the club in general, one for our outing programs. We went to award ceremonies, and the awards were signed by the chief of the Forest Service, and club representatives asked what they were. They said, "Just for general admiration for the good work the club was doing." But it was clear to me that these were ways to symbolically reach out to send a message that they value the role we play and see themselves as needing us even more as a counterbalancing factor now that their ability to maintain a centrist position is very much dependent on our ability to counterbalance the other forces. Moderates of the Forest Service find their whole career advancement dependent on it.

Club Role in Selecting Federal Agency Chiefs

McCloskey: I might add that we played critical roles in the selection of the last chief of the Forest Service under the Carter administration.

Schrepfer: Can you describe that?

McCloskey: Yes, there were two competitors for it, Max Peterson, who had been the chief lobbyist for the Forest Service on the hill, whom we knew well. We regarded him as an honest, straightforward person, though not somebody who accepted our viewpoints on everything, but who nonetheless was somebody who believed in balance in the Forest Service. The other was a former regional forester in California, Douglas Leitz, who, ironically, we had not gotten along with well during his tenure out here. I felt he was much too oriented toward the timber industry. Indeed, in the battle behind the scenes in the Carter administration, the timber industry lined up behind him, and we lined up behind Peterson. Peterson was anxious to get our support, and we worked out understandings about who we would talk to, to line up support.

Schrepfer: You?

McCloskey: I and Brock Evans. We made those calls, and we were successful. Peterson became the chief of the Forest Service, and we have made lists at various times of people coming up in the Forest Service
McCloskey: whom we think would be good chiefs in the future. I might add that in the final months of the Carter administration before the election, our endorsement, or my personal endorsement which the board allowed me to give of Carter, was somewhat contingent on my success in negotiating understandings with the administration about the appointment of a future Interior secretary. Andrus had made it clear that he was going to leave at the end of four years regardless of the outcome of the election.

I negotiated an understanding with Stuart Eizenstat that if Carter was reelected, the name of the new secretary would be passed by me first and that if I felt that he was somebody who was not acceptable that I could have a meeting with the president to discuss the question. This was an understanding that went way beyond anything that any other environmental leader had. This happened because I held out my endorsement when twenty-two environmental leaders met in September [1980]. They later went to the White House and endorsed Carter. I was among them, but during a prior meeting, I had held back my endorsement. I and Marian Edey of the League of Conservation Voters wanted additional assurances about appointments and relationships where we had had some problems.

We had some problems with the administration's positions, so we were not willing to--or I was not willing at any rate, and I think Marian wasn't either--to extend that endorsement. We both wanted to go to the White House and negotiate some more. I was the prime mover in that regard. So we dealt with both Stuart Eizenstat and Ann Wexler, who were both counselors to the president and came to successful understandings, the most important of which related to the secretary of the Interior. We tried to negotiate some backing away of the administration from the Energy Mobilization bill. I thought I proposed some useful understanding on it. As it turned out, their chief lobbyist didn't pursue them, but we ended up killing the bill anyway.

I should mention another point back about the chiefs of the Forest Service. To illustrate that we have come a long way from the days when Bestor Robinson used to argue that no one would talk to us, we get in to see the chief of the Forest Service repeatedly. We play a role in who gets appointed to be chief. We are developing relations with regional foresters whom we hope will be chiefs someday when we get the right administration. We are looking after people whose careers we hope will progress nicely.

Similarly, for the director of the National Park Service, we at various times have played key roles in the appointments. I think we forced out directors of the Park Service at various
times. The White House, or at least the Carter administration, would check with us on suggestions. At one time, I was under active consideration to be director of the National Parks Service.

Schrepfer: Would you have taken it?

McCloskey: Yes, I would have taken it. I was recommended under Carter by the assistant secretary of the Interior, and I was actually on a short list. But Secretary Andrus had been, I think, angered by something Brock Evans had done with respect to Andrus's appointment, and was unforgiving, though his emissaries hinted around about whether I would be interested in being director of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation [BOR], later the Heritage Recreation and Conservation Service. I said, no, I didn't think that I would be interested in that. Ironically, later Interior Secretary Watt had come out of a stint as BOR director!

Schrepfer: You mentioned that you had an understanding with the Carter administration that you would have a role in choosing Andrus's successor?

McCloskey: Yes.

Schrepfer: This is an active role in selecting or a veto role, and how and by whom was this understanding conveyed to you? Was it in writing?

McCloskey: By Stuart Eizenstat, and it was oral. The understanding was that if I was not satisfied with the person they were broaching to leaders of the environmental movement, I then could let them know, and I could have a meeting with the president to discuss it. Now, that was not a veto per se, but it was an appeal in effect. We had a trial run on that, interestingly enough.

Schrepfer: What was the approximate date and circumstances of that?

McCloskey: This was in mid to late September 1980. At about the same time or perhaps a month or two before, Rupert Cutler had resigned as assistant secretary of Agriculture, the position which oversees the Forest Service. They were trying to fill that position. They had a candidate. I had made the same point, that that position, and the Interior secretary, were the two most critical to us, and the price of endorsement was to have some special relationship to the White House with respect to those appointments, not that we should have a final veto. I think no group should have a final veto, but we should have more of a chance to plead our case than being treated like all the others.
McCloskey: So they had a candidate to replace Cutler, and I went over to the secretary of Agriculture's office and sat down and interviewed him. He spent three hours with me and Brock Evans, and he tried to convince me that he was true blue, that he had the right attitudes. He came out of Tennessee, and we checked with leaders in the club in Tennessee and other people in the South who knew him. He was the brother of Landon Butler, who was in the White House. We finally concluded that he looked pretty good, so we called the White House to Ann Wexler and said that he was all right. "We'll clear him!"

So they played with me just the way they said they would on that one, and I expected they would have on the Interior secretaryship too had Carter been reelected.

Collapse of the Carter Reorganization Proposal

Schrepfer: Have I got the impression correctly that the Sierra Club was one of the agents responsible for the collapse of the reorganization proposal during the Carter administration. Is that correct?

McCloskey: Yes, I think it is. I described that at some length a little while ago. But there were few organizations that wanted to get involved with it. Some of the old-line groups like the American Forestry Association were all for keeping the Forest Service in Agriculture. A lot of the newer environmental groups didn't know much about it and weren't that concerned with Forest Service matters. The Sierra Club's position was absolutely pivotal; others were watching which way we went. We met with Andrus a number of times and tried to get him committed to good enough positions on the allowable cut and timber policy. There were some very bad proposals then pending in connection with implementation of the National Forest Management Act that had come out of a study committee.

But he would not commit himself to good enough positions. We went through negotiating with intermediaries and finally with him personally, and he resented having to look like he was accountable to us. But finally we said, "If you want our help, you are going to have to give us some help, and if you can't bring yourself to do that, we can't bring ourselves to endorse it." We didn't, and they never got any substantial support in the environmental community. There was little interest on the hill, and short of some push from the environmental community, it obviously didn't have a constituency, and it was dropped.
Schrepfer: Did any of the other environmental groups contact you and ask you about your opinion?

McCloskey: I think a number of them were obviously looking to us for clues about what to do. They would have gone with us, I think, if we had made up our minds.

Schrepfer: You just didn't trust him enough?

McCloskey: No, we didn't. In fact, that's how Brock Evans got into trouble with him in the first place. When Brock had been in the Northwest as a field representative, Andrus had been governor [of Idaho], and there had been frictions. Andrus, by and large, was a conservation-minded governor, but he had a soft spot in his heart for timber operations, and he saw both sides of that issue. Also, he and his associates always resented being lobbied by the conservation community. They had it in their minds that they were the originators of ideas and possessors of the litmus paper to run tests on what was good conservation and what wasn't. They had a strange vulnerability to being lobbied in the sense that when they were lobbied they got into a very negative mood unlike a lot of other department heads and agency heads. So we had somewhat prickly relations with Andrus.

When Brock held back, in some early meetings as the Carter administration was coming in, from joining announcements of other environmental leaders that they thought Andrus was a suitable candidate for secretary of the Interior, Andrus was deeply offended by the club, and particularly at Brock, in holding back and never forgave him, and some of that rubbed off on me. It came back to the fore when we got into this reorganization matter. He just didn't want to be lobbied or to negotiate on the matter.

Schrepfer: Do you think that, going back to something we were talking about before, the Environmental Protection Agency should have been created independent or as part of another department? What was your feeling at the time in 1970?

McCloskey: Oh, I believe very much that it needed to be independent and spun-off. I had watched what had happened in the Interior Department under Udall, and before then it had been associated with health related agencies. It was better under Udall and in Interior, but it simply didn't have the leadership, the single-minded leadership, that was necessary. So I was very happy to see EPA created.

Of course, it was born at the same time that NEPA was passed, and it was part of our general enthusiasm for new institutions at the time. I might add that on NEPA I was the lead environmental
McCloskey: witness at the first hearing on it in the Senate and gave very comprehensive testimony. Later, the chief counsel for the Interior committee said it was the best testimony he had ever heard on an environmental measure. Bill Van Ness said that.

Very few people in the environmental movement were there at the birth of NEPA, which has now spawned such a huge literature, and not too many people remember what was said and done when it was created.

Schrepfer: In view of the idea of what you wanted for NEPA in the beginning, are you satisfied with it?

McCloskey: Yes, they both succeeded in some respects and failed in some respects. They succeeded in providing an institutional handle for getting agencies, or forcing agencies, to look more at the environmental impacts of what they are proposing. It certainly provided us with access to lots of useful information which was marshalled in one place. It provided hooks for lawsuits that have forced agencies to go back and reconsider.

It has had its disappointments, too. I think it has done far less than we had hoped to redirect the thinking of agencies. Certainly, to a degree it has sensitized agencies and probably caused lots of projects that we never see to die aborning. Yet an argument can be made that the general environmental pressures of the times would cause them to die aborning anyway, and arguments can be made that quite a few agencies merely use the EIS process as a way to build defenses in depth for what they want to do and that they have just learned to spit out the paper by the volumes, and spend the taxpayers' money, and that they are not changing their thinking; they are just erecting their defenses.

The CEQ, the Council on Environmental Quality, did reform the EIS processes late in the Carter administration, particularly the amount of paper work in EIS's and went on to require agencies to set forth more realistic alternatives. I had some hope that those reforms would make the process more manageable, but in general, I believe that too much attention has been given, particularly in the scholarly community, to NEPA as a subject and that too little attention has been given to other environmental programs and statutes.
Legislation on the Management of the National Forests

Schrepfer: How much of a role did you play in the House agitation for the National Forest Management Act? We didn't discuss that or the Timber Supply Act.

McCloskey: Since the days when I began with the club in the Pacific Northwest as a field representative, I have followed the field of forestry, and my successors in the Northwest have done likewise, Brock Evans particularly. He and I, I think, formed a good team in heightening the club's interest in forestry legislation through the late sixties and throughout all of the seventies. In 1969 and '70, we faced the Timber Supply Act. I felt that this would have been the end to the old growth supply in the national forest, and any that might have gotten into wilderness in the near future, because it was a scheme to provide a large earmarked fund to rationalize the quick cutting off of the old growth.

Brock was still a field representative at that time, and I asked him to go back to Washington to rally the troops. I went back with him, and I put him in charge of building a campaign, and I helped with it too. I was in on many of the key meetings in congressional offices, but we whipped the campaign together in four or five days. That was the fastest takeoff of any campaign I've ever seen in terms of what we pulled off. We killed it on the floor of the House of Representatives and really surprised the opposition.

The timber industry made many efforts in the ensuing years to revive the idea, in '72 and '73 particularly. [Senator Mark] Hatfield had a bill for a while, and he tried to push it and got nowhere. What did get somewhere was the RPA [Resources Planning Act] in 1974 and the National Forest Management Act in 1976. These efforts came more out of the wise-use school than either the environmental school or the timber industry school. A forester who worked for the Library of Congress by the name of Wolf was probably more the author of both than anybody else. He worked particularly strongly with the House and Senate chairs of the Agriculture Committee on those.

The RPA was really a planning process requiring inventories of resources every ten years and comprehensive management plans and goals every five years. We didn't put much effort into that, but we toned it down a bit, so it didn't do us any harm. But the counterpart came in 1976. We developed a conscious strategy which provoked a crisis which forced Congress to come back and deal with questions on our terms. We devised a lawsuit with the Izaak Walton League in West Virginia—the so-called Monongahela case, which challenged clearcutting.
McCloskey: In this case, it was not so much Brock, but Jim Moorman of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and I and lawyers from the Natural Resources Defense Council. We had some planning sessions in the club office. We were looking in the field of forestry for a series of lawsuits that would bring different issues to the fore, hoping that, somewhat in the way we did with the second redwoods battle, that issues would get hot enough, and constituencies would get up in arms enough, that Congress would finally conclude that it had to do something about them. We picked a case in Montana in the Bitterroot [National Forest] dealing with timber mining. We picked a case in Wyoming dealing with similar issues. We picked cases in northern California dealing with erodable lands; cases dealing with clearcutting, particularly in the East, where we thought the circumstances would be most favorable and the constituencies greatest. There we challenged the legitimacy of cutting trees without marking them individually.

We won the case at the lower levels, and it sent shock waves throughout the forest industries. It raised questions about moratoria on timber cutting and closing down clearcutting. We were not really so much opposed to clearcutting per se as we felt that a series of studies had shown--and these were Forest Service studies--had shown a whole series of things wrong with the management of the national forests. Some studies had shown that land of poor site quality in the Rocky Mountains was being logged commercially. Studies were showing that there wasn't as much commercial timber in the national forests as they had assumed.

The Sierra Club experts on forestry felt that there was an accumulating list of studies and evidence showing that there were fundamental things wrong with the management of the national forests and that the movement had to amend the basic Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act to get more specific directions dealing with a series of subjects such as the size of clearcutting, cutting on steep slopes, questions of retaining non-commercial species of timber and other plants, protection of stream side zones and so forth. These questions were hard to get before Congress until there was some sort of a crisis.

The Monongahela case was the one that provoked the crisis, though conceivably some of the other half dozen cases we started around the country might have done it. But that one did do it, and it turned out that it not only succeeded, but it brought us the help of Senator [Jennings] Randolph from West Virginia, who was the senior senator from the state and a power in the Senate. He chaired the Environment and Public Works Committee. He became our champion in the Senate battle for a revised National Forest Management Act.
McCloskey: This battle turned out to be one of the most costly ones in a short time that we ever undertook. We spent a couple of hundred thousand dollars on lobbying. Brock Evans and Tom Barlow from NRDC [National Resources Defense Council], who actually went on our staff at that time, carried the battle in Congress. Congressman James Weaver helped, especially in the House of Representatives.

As it turned out, the Forest Service adopted a position somewhere in between the industry and us. The timber industry vehemently resisted efforts to be more specific and get more environmental protections in the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act. As it turned out, the compromise which we got was quite acceptable to us. There were a few things we did not like. In particular, we did not like a provision on departures from allowable cuts for limited periods. After it was all over, the Sierra Club put together a watchdog group to pursue the writing of the regulations under it. There was also a "wise man" committee, it was called, of scientists appointed to advise on that process.

Julie McDonald of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund was the principal lawyer who monitored this process, and we planned further lawsuits if necessary on the departures question. The Forest Service hasn't precipitated that lawsuit yet.

Schrepfer: I gather that you believe that clearcutting can be a reasonable forest harvesting system if it is done in the right places in the right way.

McCloskey: Yes.

Schrepfer: Do you think that multiple use is in fact a good forest management system?

McCloskey: I think the term is such a loose one that it is not of much practical significance. It is a truism to say that lands of such huge collective acreage, namely 186 million acres, are going to be and should be used for many purposes. Once having said that, the phrase casts little more enlightenment on the question of how and in what combination. That's a judgment call, and there is no magic in the phrase or in any professional methodology to lead the way toward determining who gets what and how much and where.

Schrepfer: I gather that you think the allowable cut has generally been used as a ruse. You've said a number of times that the allowable cut has been manipulated. Do you think it is a concept that could, if the Forest Service were well-meaning, be used effectively?
McCloskey: I have no quarrel with the concept of allowable cut. In fact, I think there has got to be one. The problem has been how high should it go? Since the late fifties, the timber industry and particularly so in the West, has schemed by every means imaginable to increase it. As it has cut out the old growth on its private lands, it has had to look to the national forests for remaining timber. The Forest Service has tried to keep the allowable cut at a given level over the course of time to provide trees for other uses—recreation, water, wildlife, and so forth. The timber industry has been ingenious in suggesting one methodology after another for jacking it up, and this has been the stuff of the battles over the past twenty years.

A lot of the arguments are cast in the most esoteric terms, but it all comes down to how fast they can force the Forest Service to cut it out. Obviously, someday most of it will be gone, but the rate at which it is cut has lots of critical impacts on the environment, not the least of which is that if it is cut quickly, you have impressed on the land a boom and bust pattern virtually forever. All of that timber will be close in age classes and is going to grow up at about the same time and eventually there will be pressure to cut it all off again in a short time because it is all of a similar age. Even distribution of age classes is very important to ration out the total amount of disturbance in any watershed and in any habitat area.
Evolution of the *Sierra Club Bulletin* and the Film Program

Schreper: Let's talk about some policy questions and developments relating to the evolution of the club's editorial and publishing policies. I think that you might want to describe the growing sophistication of the *Sierra Club Bulletin*. One question I might ask is how important is it that the *Sierra Club Bulletin* be pretty, and how much have you done in that direction?

McCloskey: We have had a lot of debates about that question. The evolution of the *Bulletin* has been such that there has been a clear tradition in that regard. Out of the fifties and early sixties, there was an annual issue for a while, and that was issued a couple of times during the sixties and was a large, rather elaborate publication. It was pretty. It had a lot of color photographs in it. But by the late sixties that was abandoned as overly expensive, and there was no longer an annual.

In the early sixties, the magazine assumed an 8½ X 11 size and format. It had color covers at times, but basically it was a black-and-white publication. It was only in 1970 when I hired James Ramsey as the editor that it became a color publication, and we had color capability throughout the magazine. There were always some signatures that we did in black-and-white.

However, in the early seventies, with the emphasis on ecology and "small is beautiful," some felt that the magazine ought to reflect that quality. When Bill Bronson became editor, in response to that feeling, and I suppose as an economy move, we put in a central section in the magazine that was newsprint, and we played down the amount of color in the magazine. That was a compromise. We had some white paper and some newsprint.
McCloskey: By the mid-seventies, a newer editor (Frances Gendlin) felt that this combination wasn't working very well. At the same time, we decided that we had to do something to improve the economics of the magazine, and we instituted a policy of accepting advertising. There had been a brief period in the sixties when advertising had been accepted, but little advertising in fact materialized. At one time, we dropped it out as being economically insignificant and just adding clutter to the design. So we put it back in, and, of course, it has been pushed since the mid-seventies in a big way and has been very successful. It is passing the half million mark in gross receipts.

Schrepfer: Couldn't advertising be potentially dangerous? Do you screen the people who advertise?

McCloskey: Yes, we do screen the advertisements that are offered. In fact, the board of directors had a number of vigorous debates on this subject in the mid-seventies. Strict guidelines were set at that time, and in fact the staff has been more conservative ever since in interpreting them. We do not accept advertisements from firms which are likely to be spreading propaganda to counter the club's basic positions or to argue with our basic values. We won't even take an oil company ad that is institutional in nature. We don't take auto company ads nor mining company ads nor timber company ads.

The Audubon Society has had some controversy over ads they accepted from Potlach Forest Industries. We generally avoid ads from extractive industries and from major manufacturing industries, though we get a great many from firms promoting outdoor equipment, and just recently we finally began to get advertisements from optical companies for cameras and binoculars and so forth.

The advertising program has enabled us to expand the size and quality of the magazine steadily in the late seventies. We have more than tripled the size of the average issue. We also went from publishing it ten or eleven times a year to publishing it bimonthly or six times a year. This enabled us to increase the size of the magazine. Advertisers, in fact, wanted a larger, more substantial magazine for it to be attractive to them.

Schrepfer: Do development interests try to advertise in the Bulletin?

McCloskey: Most of them now know our guidelines, though we had pressures from oil companies when we first started out. Gulf Oil particularly wanted very much to advertise. For a while, we worked through
McCloskey: advertising agents in the East and West but found them less effective than having our own staff do it. We gradually built up a staff of two or three people who spend full-time getting advertisements. As I said, it's enabled us to build up the magazine.

We have gradually gone back to more color work and are steadily improving the design. We have been able to offer more money to authors. When I took over as executive director, we used a lot of amateur authors, many of whom were club volunteers. While they had their heart in the matter, their professional skills usually weren't great enough. Some people said at that time that few people read the magazine and, we don't hear that complaint much any more.

Schrepfer: Do you solicit most articles?

McCloskey: It is a combination. We have worked with some authors now for quite some time. We suggest articles to them. In turn, we are deluged now with submissions. Well-know authors send their material into us. The market in some ways has also shrunk. Some of the new magazines that were formed, like Backpacker and Mariah and others have not been doing as well. We now are larger than Backpacker, and Mariah has gone out of business. So there are just as many writers, but there are fewer vehicles. This has made it possible for us to get better and better material and also to get more and more advertising. The receipts of a good share of the advertising are plowed back into improving the quality of the magazine. In 1981, we are embarking on a major redesign of the magazine to upgrade its aesthetics.

Schrepfer: Do you think that helps conservation?

McCloskey: I think it helps us to hold and retain members. We have the feeling that the magazine is the principal link between the main office of the club and most of our members. It is a visible and tangible reminder of the linkage, and I believe the more that linkage comes in a package which suggests the club's values and is one that is treasured, the more it reinforces strong feelings of commitment on the part of members. We had not emphasized aesthetics in the magazine in the seventies, but I believe one doesn't have to sacrifice the quality of the message to be attractive and cherished also. Members are more apt to save magazines if they think they are really beautiful and make a deep impact upon them.

As I said earlier, for a while we were thinking the calendars were the principal embodiment of graphic excellence on the part of the club, but the calendars don't come every other month in
McCloskey: the same way, and they don't have quite as much of a fresh impact as the magazine does, and I think we can do more with the magazine, too.

I might add that we went through another distinction as the seventies began, and that was that we decided that we could not keep up with the avalanche of current news on environmental developments in the magazine. That's when we founded the National News Report as a specialized vehicle that would come out in most weeks, about the end of the week, to keep our leadership cadre informed about these developments, written partly in Washington and partly in San Francisco and packaged and mailed at the end of each week in San Francisco. We try to tell our activists that if they want to keep up on the views, they need it in addition to the Bulletin, and they should write in and subscribe; about little less than four thousand of our leaders who are elected to various positions get it free, and others can get it by subscription. It is also circulated widely to members of the press.

Incidentally, it is not our only newsletter. Through the seventies we have evolved a stable of other newsletters, too. We have one published by our international program from time to time. Another is published from time to time on energy matters and another on population matters; another is published by our wildlife committee on wildlife. During the Alaska campaign, we had one on Alaska; we also had one for children. At one time, we had one on off-road vehicles, too, though we no longer have that. But this is very much our style. When a demand exists for more material on a given subject; we spin off a new newsletter.

Schrepfer: Who do you send them to?

McCloskey: They are sent to a specialized list of subscribers, those people who pay a couple of dollars to get it.

Schrepfer: Dave Brower once said that the Sierra Club should publish what he called "good propaganda." Do you agree with that editorial policy? Should the club make an effort to deliver unbiased information on a topic, or should it be specifically designed to sway people to be somewhat emotional and adament?

McCloskey: What is generally published in the magazine certainly reflects a strong point of view. Some of the articles are very much written in the tone of advocacy. Others assume that the point of view is understood. We have not attempted to give equal space or treatment to our opponents' point of view. I believe we should
McCloskey: not. They have their own vehicles for that. *Oil Daily* doesn't attempt to give the Sierra Club's point of view in similar length to the oil industry's. Nobody in the world of house organs attempts to do that.

However, from the standpoint of good journalism and persuasive writing, the reader should be educated enough so that he or she understands something about the nature of the opposition we are facing, the kind of arguments that they trade in. Our readers tell us that if we shield them too much from being forearmed about that, that they feel uncomfortable. So we do try to strike a balance there.

One major change perhaps from the Brower years to my years does involve a change in tone in the magazine. It perhaps is somewhat less oratorical in tone and perhaps more analytical in tone. As much as anything, I suppose, that reflects a difference in temperament and style between Dave and me. That is not to everybody's taste, but it has come to be a taste that I think, by and large, suits our membership, which is one of the best educated memberships of any volunteer society in this country. Forty percent of our members have graduate degrees, and many of them have doctor's degrees of one sort or another. Our presentations have to be intellectually respectable, I think, to appeal to our constituency. Passionate soap box statements simply are not going to go down well with most of our members and readers.

Schrepfer: How much do you control editorial policy?

McCloskey: I read virtually all articles in advance that are proposed for publication in the magazine. When I began, I used to mark them up quite a bit with comments and suggestions for additions and deletions. I now almost never do that in any detail. Our current editor, Frances Gendlin, has been with us eight years. She and I have developed an implicit working understanding about the kind of articles we are looking for. I tend to almost grade the articles, saying "very good" or "excellent, let's get more articles like this," or "this is all right, but I am not very enthusiastic." I'll occasionally flag some error or some ambiguity in an article. Others do the copy editing. The only thing that I really never see are the illustrations, the captions, and the headlines, which are done late in the process, and occasionally something slips by there.

I use "grading" primarily as a way to communicate in a practical way about the tone, approach, and nature of the articles. I have often said I was willing to stop doing that if I were getting in their hair, but they have urged me to continue if I can find the time because it's a very practical way to communicate
McCloskey: about the material for the magazine. Short of practical examples of a manuscript, it is very hard to know what words mean when you say you are seeking articles which are "accurate but hard-hitting." What does that mean? If you have an article in hand and say, "Now, this is exactly what I mean," then you have communicated clearly.

Schrepfer: The club used to rely with a fair amount of success on films circulated on college campuses. They were often very moving films showing areas that were going to be destroyed, something like the film on the redwoods. Do you still find films a successful means of communication?

McCloskey: The film program continued through the seventies much as it had been in the sixties. But it has fallen upon hard times recently. What happened basically was that two things caused the film program to be left in the past. One was that the film program was best adapted to dealing with site-specific issues, which of course were our hallmark in the sixties.

At the national level in the seventies, we began to deal more and more with generic legislation or broad, omnibus bills. There wasn't one single redwood forest that you were depicting; you were depicting a package of two-dozen wilderness bills in many different states or you were dealing with toxic substances across the country. It was no longer easy to go out and get some footage on one place. This made it much more expensive to construct the films.

Moreover, they began out of a process of taking footage that talented amateurs had collected and brought to us in a somewhat unfinished form. Our long-time film director, Larry [Laurence] Dawson, has made his career out of making movies backwards; that is, taking this kind of raw footage without a script and then writing a script and doctoring it into something respectable, which is not the proper way to make a film. You should write the script first, and then shoot to it. At any rate, we often had the footage donated to us and that made it rather inexpensive to fashion something from it.

By the mid-seventies, it was clear that this was not working so well because we weren't getting donated footage any more on as many issues, and there were a huge number of issues. We didn't feel we could afford to make films on hundreds of site-specific areas, and yet we weren't getting the footage on the generic matters. We found also that the costs were escalating rapidly. We used to be able to finish a film for about $15,000. When we tried to do films on Alaska, for instance, in the mid-seventies, it cost well over $60,000, and today to do a half-hour
McCloskey: film of a broad nature would cost well in excess of $100,000. We came to the point where we could only do a film if some angel donated the money, and the amounts of money grew greater and greater.

At the same time, the costs of distribution were going up. The economics were simply working against continuing to be in the medium of films. We curtailed the distribution gradually as the costs went up, and, as we had fewer and fewer new films to release, the sales started going down.

I must say, though, that we continued for quite a while to draw good critical acclaim. Our films have won awards and continue to do so. We won an Academy Award for the redwood film in the sixties that I helped produce, and we won a number of Golden Cine awards. I think we produced very creditable products. It's just that the need and the market started changing drastically and, the costs went out of sight.

As the eighties begin, we are looking at the possibility of developing video cassettes. Video technology is much less expensive. The costs may be more akin to the kind we used to look at. It's still a little early to expect most viewers to see these through Beta-Max equipment through their own home television sets, but that equipment is spreading very rapidly through the market, and in a few years it may be that that's where our principal market will be.

At any rate, the film program seems to be winding down and we're hoping we'll find some new way to deal with audio visual media.

Involvement in International Affairs

Schreiper: One of the issues of the late sixties in the club was whether the club should be involved with international affairs, and I gather then when you became executive director you supported this idea. Don't you think it is possible that the club is spreading itself too thin by getting involved with international questions?

McCloskey: That has been a recurrent argument within the club through the 1970s. It is, I think, true to say that the number of people within an organization that feel comfortable with the details of an issue shrinks as the scale and scope of it spreads. Almost everybody can relate to neighborhood issues and issues in their community, but when you get to state legislation it seems a
McCloskey: little bit remote. When you get to federal legislation, most people really don't have a good feel for what is involved, and when you escalate to the global level, to the international level, most people have a very hard time visualizing how an issue is pursued and what its practical meaning is.

That invariably means that the constituency for pursuing issues shrinks as the scale expands, and there is a fairly small constituency for our involvement in international issues. But by the same token, it is clear that the physical nature of many of the issues is indeed global. We face problems of the buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and its potential effect on worldwide climate. We face problems of ozone and its buildup of fluorocarbons. We face problems of nuclear proliferation and worldwide population explosions. There are problems of the worldwide commons, of the seas and of the upper atmosphere. Somebody has to pay attention to them.

What we have discovered, amazingly enough, is that the Sierra Club has become very well accepted as an expert on such problems now on the international scale. Experts at the United Nations and in the United Nations Environmental Program [UNEP] and various specialized agencies from the FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization] to the World Health Organization [WHO] and others recognize who the Sierra Club is and accept its advice and assistance very readily. In fact, we have gotten grants for our international program consistently from the UN Environmental Program and from UNESCO in Paris and are very much regarded as a creditable source of expertise. We are far more readily accepted as a noncontroversial organization on the worldwide scene than we are on the local scene.

Schreper: I wonder why that is.

McCloskey: It may have something to do with the old adage about the prophet being without honor in his own community or country!

Schreper: Do you really think that the UN offers hope for environmental control on an international basis?

McCloskey: I would not want to make a case for the contemporary effectiveness of the United Nations. However, there is no doubt that there are problems that can only be reached through international channels, and there is no doubt that there are some treaties and enforcement mechanisms attached to treaties which are more effective than others. The somewhat conventional problems of whaling and the International Whaling Commission have been a very good learning ground in the 1970s for American environmentalists on a worldwide basis.
McCloskey: I might add that there have been tensions, particularly in the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, between environmentalists from North America and from Europe as to matters of strategy. The Europeans have, by and large, been telling us consistently that the style of lobbying and the aggressive action characteristic of Americans simply wouldn't work on the international scene and that their style of patient diplomacy was the only way to go. We found with the International Whaling Commission that this simply isn't true, and it has been an important learning ground. There we found that you are dealing with conventional politics and needing a majority of votes from three-fourths of the nations participating. The club has pioneered reaching out to like-minded groups in other countries, getting them to lobby their governments to send the right delegates and to vote right in the IWC.

We have lobbied with others to get more countries that are nonwhaling countries to join the IWC, and it has been a very conventional kind of political lobbying and vote counting operation, and we have gradually made progress in the IWC. It's a slow process. One thing you learn at the international level is that everything moves much more slowly than it does at the domestic level. Your time horizons for accomplishing anything has to be much, much longer. You have to bring a great deal of patience to the matter.

But the IWC in a very concrete context shows that, by steadily battling away year after year, you can chip away at the problem. We now have a steady reduction in the allowable catch, and there is a moratorium on sperm whaling and a number of other kinds of whaling, always less than we would like but steady progress in the direction we want.

We have learned that this approach has worked in connection with the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species [CITES]. Conventional lobbying works there. We have learned that you have to get your government delegation instructed before it leaves home and gets to an international conference. You have to get the right people sent with the right instructions in the first place.

On the international scene the Sierra Club chose deliberately in the early seventies not to organize counterpart organizations in other countries. This is in contrast to Friends of the Earth that decided to organize Friends of the Earth organizations in some two-dozen other countries. We instead chose to try to develop friendly relations with indigenous organizations and that has worked reasonably well.
Schrepfer: You keep saying "we." I presume you mean here just the Sierra Club as a whole.

McCloskey: Yes, though I might mention who some of the personalities are who led our actions in the international sphere. Nicholas Robinson was the father of our international program. He is now on our board of directors. He is a lawyer and law professor from New York City. He conceived of the program and got it started in the early seventies and found the first staff director of the program, Patricia Scharlin, whose earlier married name was Patricia Rambach. Pat has been with us since 1971 when it began and has built it up. Gary Taylor joined the program a couple of years ago, and essentially they have been partners in carrying out its work, and other lesser staff people have come and gone too. A very powerful and effective international committee has emerged too. Robinson chaired it for quite a few years, and Ted Trzyna from Claremont College [Claremont, California] was the chair, and now it's Sandy Tepfer from the University of Oregon who is the chair.

The club has been represented by its international program at most of the major international conferences of the decade, beginning with the Stockholm Conference in 1972 and later at the Population Conference in Bucharest and other conferences on water in Argentina, on human settlements in Vancouver, on energy in Nairobi, and they continue.

We have worked particularly hard through the decade at the many negotiating sessions to develop a treaty for the law of the sea. We had a very effective delegation particularly in the early sessions in Caracas. A volunteer by the name of Anita Yurchychin, who used to represent us in London, has been on the U.S. delegation to the Law on the Sea Conference negotiations and has played a very effective role. She probably has been the prime mover in getting measures for environmental protection in those drafts. She has worked very closely with Elliot Richardson, who chaired the American delegation for quite a while.

Pat Scharlin has also spent a lot of time working on the revision of the Antarctica treaties, working with the treaty powers to develop the treaty on living resources. She served on an advisory committee to the U.S. government on that matter.

Another matter that occupied a great deal of our attention dealt with the subject of tropical forests. Throughout the seventies, Lawrence Hamilton, a professor of ecology at Cornell [University] and now at the East-West Center in Hawaii, did work for us under a grant from UNEP. He went to Venezuela
McCloskey: and worked with the Venezuelan government on a research project and developed a series of guidelines for improved management of tropical forests, both in Venezuela and in similarly situated countries.

To sum up, the areas of greatest impact by the club's international program in the seventies dealt with the Law of the Seas Treaty, Antarctica, and tropical forests. I might add that Pat Scharlin developed a list of, or a series of, volunteer representatives for the club on international matters in a number of foreign capitals where there were UN agencies dealing with environmental subjects. We have had such volunteer representatives in Rome, in Vienna, in Geneva, Nairobi, Paris, Brussels, and London at various times. I visited with some of them on my trips abroad, and they are a different breed of volunteer who becomes very professional and dedicated in their work.

I might add that when the club chose not to develop its own units in other countries, we did authorize the establishment of something nonetheless in the way of club organization by the establishment of something called country committees.

These committees could undertake social activities on behalf of the club and could conduct outings in another country, but they were not permitted to work on matters of public policy. There has been discussion intermittently of establishing such committees in England and Japan. Nothing has really come of it. I might add, though, in 1972 on a visit to England, I went to two large meetings of club members in England, one at the University of London, another in the Midlands at Buxton. There were two hundred members and interested people who turned out at the Sierra Club Conference in Buxton at which I spoke just following Stockholm, and it was really interesting to see club banners in England so far from the Sierra.

I might add though, during this same decade the club did take hold in Canada. We have developed an elaborate structure in Canada. We have chapters in both eastern and western Canada and in fact have actually been incorporated in three or four provinces in Canada as a separate organization. We worked out an agreement in the early 1970s to the effect that our units in Canada would be autonomous from the California corporation (later modified to limit autonomy somewhat). They could make their own policies. We trusted that they would be cast in the same spirit, but we would make no attempt to control what they did.

Schrepfer: Why weren't you going to do this in Europe?
McCloskey: I felt, as a matter of fact, we should. This was a policy disagreement that I had with Nicholas Robinson. I felt rather strongly that if we had members—as we did at the time—in England who wanted to organize as a Sierra Club, that we should let them and that we should not throw barriers up in the way of members in good standing who wanted to have a local unit. I lost on that issue.

Schrepfer: Were they afraid of problems?

McCloskey: I think they were afraid of distance in terms of management and quality control. The ostensible reason was that we should not compete with indigenous environmental organizations because we would engender more ill will than we would gain in terms of effectiveness. My answer to that was to let our local people be the judge of that. They are the residents of the country; we aren't. Clearly Friends of the Earth has spread from San Francisco throughout two dozen countries without causing a furor. Our name is admittedly a bit more strange and exotic, but I remember when it seemed strange and exotic in the Pacific Northwest and then in New England and later in Toronto. We have become a trade name for environmentalism and a success in international circles now. But at any rate, the decision was made, and it went the other way, and it has become quite well accepted now.

**Military-Related Environmental Concerns**

Schrepfer: Do you think the Sierra Club should go into military matters that have environmental implications?

McCloskey: In 1981, this is a matter of great controversy within the club at the national level. It's unclear at this time what the dimensions of the debate really are. The club has had some history of involvement in issues of a military nature where there was a conflict between a specific military proposal and the environment. Clearly at the present time we are opposing the deployment of the MX missile system in Nevada and Utah because we believe that it is a massive project that is going to have a devastating effect on the ecology of a very large area, a larger area than has ever been impacted by any single project in our history.

But the club's position is not against missiles per se or the MX per se. It is against deployment in that area. I am told that in World War II some of our members opposed the maneuvers of General Patton in the Mojave Desert because of the damage it
McCloskey: did at the time. I remember in the 1950s, environmentalists opposed expansion of the Fort Sill artillery range into the Wichita Mountain Wildlife Refuge—I was actually an artillery officer at Fort Sill at the time, and I went climbing in the refuge—they were concerned about that proposal, which was defeated.

Of course, we have opposed the Army Corps of Engineer and their civil works many times, but that is a different matter. I believe that it is certainly within our tradition to do that. There is no problem with that. A greater problem arises in terms of opposing military ventures in time of war. We got into that issue at the tail end of the Vietnamese War with respect to defoliation and the use of Agent Orange. The club's board of directors never addressed that issue, but when we ran a magazine article on it, it provoked some controversy.

However, through our international program, we did issue a book on atomic, bacteriological, and chemical warfare and the various hazards of that. As a matter of fact, the board of directors did adopt a very loosely worded resolution calling for an end to so-called "ABC" warfare.

The real issue now before us is the broad issue of nuclear arms control and/or disarmament. I believe that it would be quite proper for the club to back efforts to induce the American government to be more vigorous in pursuing negotiated agreements with other major powers to reduce nuclear arms levels. As long as it's done in a negotiated and graduated way, I think that's a highly responsible course of action. Certainly everyone deplores the prospect of nuclear havoc.

Whether we are going to face an issue between those who advocate unilateral disarmament and those who don't is unclear at this moment. I think it would be very divisive to join that issue within the context of the club's program. I have been concerned through my years about those who basically have other ideological baggage or causes who would like to come along and, in effect, hijack the club's programs and energies and march us off to fight their battles. I don't believe we ought to let Trotskyites march off with us or right-wingers march off with us or pacifists march off with us or militarists march off with us. I've always believed that we have our own distinctive ideology born of our own set of values and interests and that we have to protect ourselves against raids from any ideological quarter. I have some concern that in this particular case there are pressures from that direction, although perhaps well-intended.

Schrepfer: Within the club?
McCloskey: Within the club, but it's not clear at this writing just what we are facing in that regard. I also have been concerned through the seventies about a related phenomenon and that is that as the club's board of directors has dealt with more of the obvious questions of environmental policy, the ones that are left that we have not dealt with are the fairly peripheral questions. We have had questions such as what our policy ought to be on immigration. Mexican immigration particularly does contribute to population growth, and there is a legitimate environmental angle. There are also civil liberty aspects to it and questions of humanitarianism attached to it.

As the board of directors deals with such issues and its resolutions are treated as novelties and widely reported, it leads to a false impression on the part of a lot of our members about where our energies are really going. They write in and say, "Gee, you seem to be preoccupied with questions of abortion and immigration and the nuclear arms race and labor organizing. Whatever happened to environmentalism?"

There is a problem about the appearances of distortion in the emphasis in our program by us being drawn into dealing with more and more of these peripheral subjects. I am not necessarily saying that I don't think they have valid environmental angles to them, but we have not, at least to my satisfaction, found a way of addressing them without distorting the picture of our priorities. This does bother me because it becomes divisive and impedes our ability to attract and retain members.

Endorsing Political Candidates: A Recent Policy Shift

Schrepfer: The Sierra Club has recently taken the fairly unprecedented action of participating in political campaigns and trying to encourage environmentally sound candidates. I gather that this idea of endorsing candidates that was first considered in '76-'77 was not acted upon. How much of a controversy has the idea generated and why at this time, after all of these years of not doing something like that, why did the club take that action?

McCloskey: A number of things have happened to change our sense of what we ought to be doing. As long as we were a 501 C-3 organization, there was no legal way we could engage in influencing the electoral process. Once we became a C-4 organization, our situation was changed, but the federal law on this subject was only fully clarified in the mid-seventies as a federal election commission came into existence. So it only really became clear
McCloskey: in the late seventies that we could organize a political action committee and raise and spend money in influencing election campaigns. Once it became legally clear that this could happen, we faced the fact that many business corporations rushed into the field to establish a great number of political action committees, and they began to enjoy considerable success, and their candidates began to win in increasing numbers, first in 1978 and then in a devastating way to our interests in 1980.

This all began to change the rules of the game. The Sierra Club had long been concerned about the implications of doing this. I had had debates with others about such questions—about what if we were to get into electoral politics, about how divisive will this be within the club. If we endorse Democrats, will all of the Republicans leave; if we endorse Republicans, will all of the Democrats leave; if we endorse some of each, will everybody be mad at us; what will happen when you go before a congressman to testify or ask him a favor if you had opposed him in the past election; do you burn your bridges behind you?

We agonized about these questions for a long time, but the march of events in the late seventies, I think, consigned them to the wreckage of the past.

Schrepfer: What was your opinion?

McCloskey: I was genuinely concerned about those problems. I was interested in whether they could be overcome, so we did a test. The board of directors decided to do a test, but let me back up. Somewhere around 1976, the club did decide to organize a political action committee. It was called the Sierra Club Committee on Political Education or SCCOPE. It was organized soon after the law allowed us to do that, and we were one of the first of the environmental organizations to have a political action committee. In the first couple of years we hoped we could raise $3,000 to $5,000 to support its activity. Carl Pope on our staff, who also serves in another capacity as the executive director of the California League of Conservation Voters, was assigned the staff function of running SCCOPE. A volunteer committee was established to provide guidelines. A number of the directors were on it.

The board of directors approved guidelines which allowed SCCOPE to aid and abet candidates for public office, but not to endorse them. Legally we could, but for a couple of years we thought we should hold back and experiment with providing behind-the-scenes aid. We called this Class II activity. We called Class I activity providing neutral information about election procedures and political effectiveness, things that we could provide in the magazine and so forth. Class II activity was really
McCloskey: aiding and abetting candidates, providing volunteer labor, letting them use our mailing list and things of this sort, but not an official endorsement and not giving them money per se.

We were worried at that stage about its political divisiveness within our membership. As we faced the fact that we had lost significant headway in Congress in 1978, SCCOPE felt that we ought to be experimenting on a wider basis in the 1980 election. So two things were done by the board of directors. One was to authorize an experiment in California to allow our chapters there to selectively endorse candidates for the state legislature. There were a number of safeguards provided. Among them was the need that two-thirds of the members of the chapter executive committee concur in the recommendation, that all club units affected by the district of the candidate concur in the recommendation, and we would only endorse those candidates that had really good environmental records or platforms in contrast to their opponent, and those who had a chance.

The California experiment succeed very well. There was no real dissent nor objection in the ranks. We had no angry letters. Usually, these executive committees were composed of both Democrats and Republicans and often a couple of executive committees were covered by the district and had to concur. So if they disagreed, no endorsement was made. So there had to be a high degree of agreement that the case for endorsement was clear. Those involved were largely Democrats, but I believe there were some Republicans too. SCCOPE in California felt that it was influential in the outcome in two or three races. Incidentally, there were some other states that were champing at the bit in 1980 to be liberated to do that, particularly our chapter in Texas.

The board of directors also grappled that summer with the question of what we should do in the presidential race. I knew that leaders of other organizations were thinking of what they were going to do. In a retreat in Wyoming the board decided to allow me to personally endorse a candidate and the club president, too. We would do this in an individual capacity, which was the fiction that other organizations were using too who were C-3s who couldn't endorse. The club could have officially endorsed, but the thought was that this would still be something of a halfway position to test the waters as to how controversial it was.

The board in executive session also did discuss this again in September; they discussed the question of letting me endorse Carter as opposed to Reagan, so it wasn't in reality just a matter of cutting me loose. It was very clear what they were debating, and I was just a fiction that they were using, though certainly my predilections leaned in the same direction.
McCloskey: There was no substantial debate about the question of whether we ought to endorse Reagan. No one advocated that very strongly. A couple of people felt that Carter was not good enough and felt that we ought to endorse John Anderson, or that they were all so bad that we ought to stay out! But at any rate, Joe Fontaine, who was club president, and I did endorse Carter. I did it as part of a big press conference in the East--on the White House lawn, as a matter of fact.

Following that, the results in the 1980 election were so devastating to club interests that the board was under very strong pressure to go further in the next few years. Plans were laid in 1981 to start raising money for SCCOPE to allow us to be active in the 1982 elections, and the board in its summer retreat in 1981 authorized a doubling in the size of the fund raising effort for SCCOPE, with clear anticipation that we would make widespread endorsements of congressional candidates in 1982.

It certainly seems at this point that electoral activity is going to be a major new thrust of the club in the 1980s. I hope that it won't be divisive. The experiments have not suggested that it will if it's done thoughtfully. It is also clear that our lobbying is going to be futile if we don't have enough friends in Congress to vote our way and to champion our projects. For the first time in twenty years, it was clear as a result of the 1980 elections that our ranks were thinned to the point in Congress that we did not have the needed votes. Even with the most skillful mobilization in the Senate, we simply don't have enough friends there any more. Our leadership resource in the Senate is drastically reduced, and in the House our margins are paper-thin.

So this all adds up to the fact that influencing public policy turns in the first instance on having enough friendly people in office, and your skills as a lobbyist and your skills as a litigator or a publicist are all for naught if your enemies outnumber your friends.

Schrepfer: You don't think that you can use traditional publicity to work up public sentiment to try to influence even hostile legislators?

McCloskey: We'll certainly be trying in 1981 and '82, particularly on the Clean Air Act. The problem is that you are always dealing with a certain number of friends and a certain number of enemies, and you are working on the swing votes. But when there is a basic tide running against you in an election, the number of people thereafter who can be swung your way are reduced. Even some of
McCloskey: those will still be people who are sometimes skeptical about your programs. But if you just start out with a balance cast in the wrong way, you can win over some swing votes, but you just have too many people in the camp of the opposition to start with and too few people in your camp.
The Contributions and Internal Dynamics of National Energy Commissions

Schrepefer: During the past decade you have probably served on more energy commissions than anyone else in the country. There were six commissions you were on. Before we discuss them specifically, I wonder if you have any kind of conclusions about the role of such commissions, particularly on energy policy, and what part they play in the democratic system and how effective they are.

McCloskey: I have come to conclude that their importance is subtle and long-lived. Few of them make much of a splash that seems to last very long. They deliver their report; they get a bit of publicity for a week or two, and then to all appearances they gather dust on the shelf. I learned something about this history, however, recently on President Carter's Commission for an Agenda for the 1980s. We heard a review of the work of such commissions, beginning back with the time of one on a national agenda that President Eisenhower had. The odd thing was that as the 1980s approached, the books that were put out for popular consumption about those recommendations were still in print and in use as aids in college courses across the country. What we learned is that there is a very long life span for the ideas they generate.

The government doesn't respond quickly and say, "Hurrah, we like it; it's going to be put into effect." They often draw together material that is scattered and difficult to find in any other place in a way that is very useful. So they can be sort of like a slow twelve-hour pill that all the time gradually releases a little into the blood system—in this case the intellectual system of the country, though sometimes things move faster.
McCloskey: I was on the Ford Foundation's Energy Policy Project in 1973 and '74. When Carter came into office at the end of '76, he brought David Freeman with him who had been the executive director of that project. Freeman put together his energy policy, and Freeman just borrowed page after page out of our Ford Foundation project report. It became the blueprint for President Carter's energy policy. I have never seen a report more influential than that one was. It was the blueprint for a complete turnaround toward conservation in our nation's energy policy.

So some of these reports are sort of fugitive literature, and others become very hot items. Another subtle effect of them, though, is that you enter into a kind of a high level network of people who feed ideas into the body politic. You tap into higher levels of information networks, and you become part of the network yourself. Each one of these commissions and boards I've served on has tied back into the prior one. Someone I served with on the prior one thought I contributed usefully and suggested my name for the next one. You get carried on that way from one to the next, and I found it a marvelous education.

It has been one of the most intellectually stimulating things I've done in recent years, though there were frustrations—frustrations over the sense that the government is not immediately picking up your work, and there are frustrations over the time deadlines, or the fact that you are shorthanded or outnumbered. On the National Petroleum Council's coordinating committees on strategic oil storage and tertiary oil recovery I was outnumbered fifteen to one, and felt I was arguing with everybody. But by the same token, the adrenalin gets running, and you are engaged in lively debates, and you are scrambling for ideas and information.

Schreper: I wonder if you could talk about the inner dynamics of the production of the reports, when you dissented and why and also to some extent your role. When you sit on these boards, do you do so as a private individual or as the Sierra Club's executive director?

McCloskey: Nominally, I am always doing it as a private individual. It's a little like Congress. You are there representing yourself, and you are to be intellectually independent and draw your own conclusions. Now, this is something of a legal fiction because the other representatives are there as presidents of unions or presidents of oil companies and mining companies, and you know darn well that they are pursuing their companies' interests, and you have to, too. You have to pursue your interests, and no one
McCloskey: can divorce themselves completely, though you have to vote and express opinions on lots of subjects which are not a matter of record in your organization. So you can't just look back for instructions.

Schrepfer: Have you ever had someone from the Sierra Club or the board's executive committee disagree with some position you took?

McCloskey: On the National Coal Policy Project [1975-76] where I was the cochairman of the mining subcommittee, the task force hammered out a long list of agreements. We had an equal number of environmentalists and industrialists (people from the coal industry) on that task force. I think we pioneered some new techniques of discovering areas of accommodation between would-be antagonists, and I could actually describe some of the pioneering techniques we developed should we want to do that.

At any rate, when I came back to the board of directors, I think there was a lot of incredulity about what we had done. There was suspicion heavy in the air that I had frittered away my time and had been hobnobbing with coal executives and must have done something discreditable. The chair of our energy committee, or our former chair, who was on the board, Ellen Winchester, was innately suspicious. No one on the board would argue with me over any specifics, and when I would make a presentation they would kind of back away, but they just couldn't believe that anything acceptable could have been hammered out with coal industry executives.

I found out that the same thing happened when these vice-presidents of coal companies went back to their presidents and said, "We have come to agreement with the environmentalists on 134 propositions." Their presidents just couldn't believe that this was true and must have thought they frittered away their time in being taken in by environmentalists.

All of us who participated in it felt victimized by the unwillingness of our constituencies to take our work seriously and to point out where our errors lay. It's a real problem in terms of nonadversarial approaches toward policymaking. The constituencies are not psychologically prepared for acceptable accommodations. They are psychologically prepared for endless conflict.

Schrepfer: If you reached some sort of agreement, then did the club board of directors back you up or simply take no action on it?
McCloskey: I might add that my participation in that project was urged by the club's former president, Laurence I. Moss, who was the cochairman for the entire project, and he came to the board in advance and got their endorsement for my participation. He went back to the board and presented the results afterward, so there was a structure for anticipating the work, you might say. There was one disgruntled environmental executive who didn't like the results and got time before the board to make a fiery attack on our work, and I was much put out with that.

The board nominally backed me up as against her charges, but I really had no appetite for pursuing the whole matter, and I felt that I had really little encouragement to pursue it further. I got less interested in coal matters thereafter!

Schrepfer: How effective was the National Academy of Science's panel on geothermal energy [1972]? Was that a successful attempt to advance a viable source--

McCloskey: That was a small project. I later was on a much larger NAS [National Academy of Science] project dealing with surface mining for non-coal minerals, though the geothermal one was the introduction on my part to problems of the environmental impact of geothermal development, and for a number of years I was fairly active along with a couple of volunteers in trying to influence the Interior Department's policies. We made the point that while alternative energy resources such as geothermal have some considerable potential, they also have plenty of environmental problems associated with them, and in our enthusiasm to find an alternative to nuclear power, we have to have our eyes open about the real problems of alternatives. Geothermal has lots of problems, from site-specific problems to pollution problems.

One of the interesting footnotes to that experience—which incidentally, was chaired by Walter Hickel [Richard M. Nixon's former secretary of the Interior]—on geothermal energy was the cavalier way in which the National Academy of Science does its work. I lost much respect for their so-called scientific methods. We sat around a table and invented, out of whole cloth, notions about amounts of money needed for legitimate research. Somebody would say, "We need $30 million for this." "Well, if you need $30 million for your thing, I need $30 million for mine." We just played with numbers, and lo and behold, they all ended up eventually in an academy report laden with all of the prestige of the academy as if they had been the product of the most painstaking research. It was appalling.

Later, when I was on the COSMAR project [Committee on Surface Mining and Reclamation, National Research Council, 1979], which was the one on non-coal surface mining, I was appalled in a similar
McCloskey: I felt we ought to do real research in the literature on what was known about the environmental problems associated with non-coal surface mining and that we ought to have computers find the literature, and we ought to have scholars pouring through it, and we ought to collate the state of the arts information and then pour that into our deliberations. The academy director said, "When you are serving on an academy panel, it is assumed that you bring to the table all of the necessary knowledge." I said, "This is a big interdisciplinary project. There is nobody who has all of that knowledge at his or her fingertips." I almost withdrew from the project in disgust, but finally was given the assistance of a researcher in the Forest Service's Ogden Research Station by the name of Blair Richardson, who had some money from the Forest Service to work on mining problems.

I chaired the subcommittee on the environment on that project, and Blair did a marvelous job of doing a literature survey through the Lockheed system. We pulled together the only credible piece of research, I think, in that whole project. He looked at 22,000 pieces of literature and boiled down the most significant literature sources with a précis of the identified problems. We arranged that by all the different kinds of significant environmental problems by minerals and regions. I think we produced some very useful information, but it had a hard time finding its way into the main body of the report.

I might add that in none of these panels did I ever dissent. However, I threatened to dissent many times.

Schrepfer: In none of the six that we are talking about now?

McCloskey: Correct. My position varied through them. On the energy policy project I was very much a part of a majority. There were some other people, including the president of Mobil Oil who dissented on that panel. I got equal space for our side too.

On the COSMAR project, I was chairman of a subcommittee, and on the coal policy project I was also the chairman of a major task force; so our side did very well. On the two National Petroleum Council committees, I was outnumbered seriously. One of them was on the question of a strategic oil reserve, and the other was on the question of tertiary oil recovery. On the first one, actually there was no real, serious conflict between oil and environmental interests, though I favored a bigger reserve than the industry people did, and we compromised on that. On the second study, there was more of a conflict in that I was more optimistic about tertiary oil recovery than the oil industry was. The industry wanted more attention given to primary oil discoveries at this point, and to new oil concessions, and wanted to play down the potential of tertiary oil recovery.
McCloskey: Nonetheless, there were some environmental problems that were real, and I got adequate treatment of them in the report, though it took a battle royal to do so. I found those the least satisfactory experiences because I was so outnumbered, and the basic composition of the units was industry-oriented. I resolved not to serve on more of those projects, though club people continued to do so.

I was very frustrated by the work of the Commission on an Agenda for the 1980s because of the way they went about organizing the project. I and a number of other commissioners early on felt that we ought to try to find some fresh insights into a limited number of themes. Instead, the staff wanted to engage basically in a rehash of conventional issues by conventional categories and induced the chairman to pack the committee with twice as many people to break up an emerging consensus among the first twenty-five commissioners. I believe I was fairly outspoken and influential in the first group of twenty-five, but when an additional twenty-five were added, the group was too large to really have any cohesion anymore, and the chairman, along with the staff, pretty well took over the project.

I served, however, both on the regulatory panel and on the environmental panel, and I thought their reports came out very well on the whole. Our interests did quite well, though the debates were very vigorous.

Schrepfer: I notice that the environmental committee on energy really came to the conclusion that conservation was the answer.

McCloskey: That's right.

Schrepfer: I wondered when I read it if that wasn't a little Pollyanna. I wonder if the Sierra Club and environmentalists in general haven't placed too heavy an emphasis on the potential of conservation and don't need some more constructive alternatives?

McCloskey: I think it is true to say that you cannot attempt to deal with the whole subject of energy policy just by resorting to conservation, but one thing I have learned through almost a decade of dealing with the energy issue on various commissions and following energy legislation in Congress is that the subject is so volatile that one should be very wary of depreciating the potential for conservation. I remember at the time of the Ford Foundation study, we were looking to reduce energy growth to 20 percent sometime well into the 1980s. As it actually turned out, by the end of the seventies, the growth of energy consumption had already sunk below 2 percent. The problem we were grappling
McCloskey: with in 1973 was how to get it from something like 4.5 percent down to 2 percent, and that seemed like an overwhelming problem. Well, energy conservation and higher prices produced that result with a vengeance in short order.

Schrepfer: What energy initiatives did the commission and you have in mind specifically to accomplish this conservation? It really isn't spelled out in what I have read.

McCloskey: The Carter commission was not all that specific. It was not an in-depth study of the subject as the Ford one was, but most of us clearly had in mind letting the market reflect the real costs of producing energy. We all oppose subsidies for energy and felt that if, in addition, the costs of externalities were added on to a free market that the signals to consumers to conserve would be very strong and, indeed, that is exactly what's been happening. Of course, no one anticipated that OPEC would, over the course of such a few years, raise the price from $3 to more than $30. It is one of the great watermarks of history to see such a huge price rise.

Schrepfer: Do you think that it is the role of the environmentalists, the club and you personally, to consider the social costs of conservation? Obviously, one way to save is to have the price go up so that many people can't buy it. How much should the club worry about this problem?

McCloskey: The club has addressed the question of lifeline utility rates, and we address questions of a similar nature in actions by Congress and in some of these studies that I participated in. The club has generally taken the position that the price, in general, of energy should not be held down and distorted, but that if there are groups of poor people adversely impacted, the way to handle that is through direct subsidies to them to provide them with the money to pay for more expensive energy. You don't distort the general market, but you target the subsidies to those who have too little, rather than giving it to energy companies and others that already have too much.

Schrepfer: Then you do favor deregulation?

McCloskey: Yes, I do, and generally the club supported deregulation of oil prices. However, the club very much wanted it to be joined with a tax to recapture windfall profits. The club wanted virtually a 100 percent capture. When Congress finally acted in 1978, it went for capture of, I think, about two-thirds of the windfall profits on the deregulation of old oil. Now the Reagan administration is persuading Congress to do away with a good share of that capture. We felt that was a form of unjust enrichment that was an unwarranted gift as a consequence of letting the
McCloskey: market rise to adequately allocate energy uses and that that money should be recaptured for the general treasury. For instance, if it costs an oil company $2 to develop the old oil and it is now selling at $40, it had a windfall profit of $38 that it did nothing whatsoever to earn. OPEC jacked up the price and won a gift.

Schrepfer: I was wondering if you agreed with the Environmental Panel for the Agenda for the '80s in its lack of attention to what I would consider traditional land wilderness value questions. Very little attention was paid to that in relation to energy resources.

McCloskey: The environmental panel, in all honesty, was poorly organized. It didn't meet very often. It had a chair who was Professor Daniel Bell at Harvard who was having eye trouble and was sick most of the time. It didn't have a vice-chair, though I had been suggested for it. But I was regarded as too radical, I suppose. In the end, I worked hard at the last moment with a staff person to fill out the environmental part. The energy part had been written early and was accepted, and as it drew to a close I had been insisting, "We have got to have something in there about the rest of the issues." It was written rather hurriedly and certainly was far from adequate, but at any rate, it came out in a form that was somewhat more creditable than it would have been.

Once we won the victory on energy conservation in the early deliberations with some real skeptical words about nuclear power, we felt very good--I mean those of us who were on the environmental side on the panel. The main places where I spent my energy were on the regulatory panel where I had to fight off efforts to get rid of EPA. I might add that I did so successfully.

The Nuclear Power Issue##
[Interview 5: August 21, 1981]

Schrepfer: In 1974, the Sierra Club's board of directors passed a resolution calling for a moratorium on nuclear power. Would you have preferred to have the moratorium statement be stronger, or did you think that the club should take any position against nuclear power?

McCloskey: I favored taking a position at that time. The position, I think, was strong enough for the time. It was basically a stance of opposing the licensing of any more nuclear plants. It did not,
McCloskey: at that time, call for the closure of existing plants. The club, as a matter of fact, was a bit behind a number of other environmental groups in coming out against the further development of nuclear power.

Schrepfer: Why do you think that was? Do you mean something like Friends of the Earth?

McCloskey: Yes. The issue proved to be one of the more controversial within the club. The club had quite a few nuclear engineers and scientists in its ranks and among its leadership. As a matter of fact, in 1974, when this position was adopted, Laurence I. Moss was the club president. He was a nuclear engineer and opposed the position we took, which put the board and the staff in an exquisitely awkward position. Before then, for years, Will Siri had been on the board and had championed nuclear power. Nuclear power always had its champions on the board, and the arguments, which were highly technical, put the specialists on the board in a position of advantage in the arguments.

However, what finally turned the tide was that many of our chapters had passed resolutions urging this action. The Utah chapter had led the way and had secured resolutions from the majority of chapter executive committees around the country. The roll call was simply too overwhelming. It was a grass roots demand that the club take that position. The majority of the board just couldn't stand against that kind of grass roots demand.

Schrepfer: Was there any consideration about whether this was a politically wise thing for the club to do vis-à-vis the outside world?

McCloskey: This was at least implicit in our decision because the club never devoted any substantial resources to the antinuclear fight. We did gradually adopt the issue of nuclear waste disposal as an issue in which we would be somewhat active. Our rationale was that, by the time we adopted a position in 1974, there were five or six other organizations that had made the demise of nuclear power their principal issue. They were devoting heavy resources to it. This included not only Friends of the Earth, but the Union of Concerned Scientists, Businessmen in the Professional Interest, Critical Mass, and the Environmental Policy Center. This was a real consideration, but I also think we realized that the issue was still internally divisive, and there was little appetite for continuing to deal with that divisiveness.

To this day, I get more letters from members objecting to our policy on nuclear power than on any other issue. I just got a dozen-page letter from a Harvard professor taking vigorous exception to it. It's a quagmire of arguments still because
McCloskey: the professors who are disaffected want to argue in immense detail. If you respond to them, you will be dragged down to another level of detail, and it just drifts off into the most esoteric questions.

Schrepfer: What are your own personal feeling on nuclear power?

McCloskey: I have been strongly against it. I believe that it was unripe technology that was prematurely deployed. I believe it was pushed and deployed primarily as a reflection of a bad conscience over development of the atom bomb during World War II. I felt that the community of nuclear scientists had such a bad conscience that they were driven compulsively to find some redeeming use of nuclear power and to push it onto society.

It was subsidized and pushed with incredible determination. Indeed, I think that all of these angry letters, which we get to this day from nuclear scientists, reflect the same kind of compulsion. The people are obsessive about claiming incredible virtues for it and in suggesting incredible defects in any other approach to energy policy. I find them so obsessive that it is difficult to really approach the issue in a rational way.

Schrepfer: Does it become similarly symbolic to its opponents?

McCloskey: Yes, I think to its opponents it is part of the whole fabric of nuclear weaponry and raises the question of Armageddon. The issue has become a symbolic test of strength between those, on the one hand, who are committed to high technology as the savior of mankind and those, on the other hand, who think that mad and obsessive scientists are plunging us into unknown horrors. The issue has become so polarized, and so laden with symbolism that runs deep, that I find it very difficult to deal with it in the club's accustomed terms.

As a matter of fact, the whole environmental movement has really somewhat shied away from it and left it to a new movement of people who basically have picked it up as an issue to follow the Vietnamese war. These are the people in all of the alliances (Abalone, Mussel, Clamshell, Sunfish, etc.) around the country, and in a way they are people who thrive on symbolic tests of strength and who utilize direct political action and protest as their principal vehicle.

Schrepfer: You are kind of in between here. You don't approve of it, but you are really not going in that direction either.

McCloskey: Yes, I have little appetite for the club spending its energies on the issue because I think the ends are not tangible ends. They are broad, endless, ill-defined ends. I remain somewhat
McCloskey: suspicious of high technology, but I don't believe that we can walk away from it and damn it as a whole. I believe nuclear power is dying of its own economic weaknesses. There have been almost no new licenses or applications for licenses for quite a few years. The economics of nuclear power gets worse every year. Some have thought the battle was long since won, but the symbolic battle, because it is bigger than nuclear power itself, will continue for a long time.

Schrepfer: Do you think the Diablo Canyon plant should be opened? Has the club taken a position on this?

McCloskey: In following the Three-Mile Island accident, the club called for the gradual phaseout of existing nuclear plants. Once the board did that, it was clear that we had a basis for opposing Diablo regardless of its tangled history in club referenda. So the club's local regional conservation committees and chapters opposed going forward with Diablo.

Schrepfer: Has the central office taken a position then?

McCloskey: The central office has not been active on the issue. I might add that on the whole question of nuclear plant licensing, the national office in the mid-seventies changed its posture considerably. As a result of policies that the board adopted in the late sixties, we had begun opposing the licensing of specific plants even before we had the 1974 policy. We had opposed plants in protracted proceedings on the licensing of a number of nuclear plants around the Great Lakes, in Wisconsin and in Michigan and elsewhere. This was based upon a policy of no siting of plants along coastlines that Martin Litton got through the board in the late sixties.

Some of those proceedings were very costly, and we used lawyers who were highly independent. The legal defense fund came to have little appetite for dealing with such lawyers. By the mid-seventies, we decided that we could no longer afford to fight nuclear power on a site-by-site basis. It was incredibly expensive, and there were just too many cases. So the national office adopted the posture of opposing nuclear power through generic proceedings, i.e., broad, rule making questions before the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. We participated in the so-called GESMO proceeding which dealt with the recycling of plutonium and a number of other broad proceedings. We were sometimes represented by the Union of Concerned Scientists and sometimes by other public interest law firms.
McCloskey: So on the question of Diablo, when we finally got into a policy posture whereby we could oppose opening it in spite of our prior referenda on the question, it was quite within our normal framework to leave the question of how to conduct that campaign in the hands of our local chapters and groups. That's what we did everywhere after about 1975.

Schrepfer: As I understand it, the Sierra Club's energy committee has tended often to place a good deal of emphasis on conservation as the solution to the problem. Do you agree with this conclusion, and do you agree that conservation is the answer? I am wondering if there isn't some discussion as to whether the club should be more constructive?

McCloskey: This issue had emerged in various ways through the seventies. The club's energy committee was organized when Laurence Moss was club president. Sid Mogelwer was its first chairman, and later he was succeeded by Ellen Winchester. A lot of my early ideas on energy policy grew out of my service on the Ford Foundation's Energy Policy Project. It developed some scenarios for the future, the best of which called for very little growth in energy consumption and developed a plan for how that energy might be supplied in a fashion which did the least environmental damage. I felt that was a creditable way to proceed, but it did mean that some actual oil had to be pumped and some coal had to be mined and some water power had to be generated. You could reduce the total projected amount of consumption by conservation, but once you had reduced it, the remaining supply had to come from some physical process of generation.

Sid Mogelwer, when he was chair, agreed with this notion and actually was the first in our club to work up our own energy supply scenario. However, it was highly technical, and the committee had little appetite for grappling with its detail, much less the board of directors. I later developed a supply scenario for the state of California when the nuclear initiative was on the ballot in California in 1976.

Schrepfer: You developed it for the club?

McCloskey: Yes, for the club, and we used it as a campaign device to say that without nuclear power we can still meet our power needs. However, Ellen Winchester, who became chair of the committee, and other people on the committee had little appetite for ever talking about the question of supply. They wanted only to talk about questions of conservation. I certainly agree that conservation was by far the most significant of any steps we could take to control the energy problem, and it was the first thing you would do, but I felt that for the sake of credibility,
McCloskey: we had to also talk about where the supplies would come from, particularly since we were calling increasingly for the phaseout of nuclear power.

So the club gradually began to talk about solar power and geothermal. As we looked at geothermal, a substantial number of leaders in the West became quite concerned with its implications, particularly in mountainous regions and in northern California in the geysers area. There was a general feeling that in the Imperial Valley its environmental problems were minimal, and that's where we called for more of its development.

There were arguments about how fast solar development would occur, whether we were talking about it being a very significant factor before the year 2000 or not. But what began to be apparent, to me at least, was that we did not have in our scenarios a good transitional fuel to replace nuclear in the period between 1980 and 1995. I and some others felt that to be creditable we had to come to grips with the role of coal, dirty as it seemed.

Susan Steigerwalt was from San Diego and became the chair of the committee following Ellen Winchester. She agreed that we needed to come to grips with coal and, in fact, in California in the battle over the Sun Desert nuclear plant in the Imperial Valley, she and other club leaders actually advocated a coal-fired plant as preferable to a nuclear plant. We developed evidence to show that with the best available control technology, technology which was the highest state of the art, that the emissions would be hardly more than you would get from an oil-fired plant.

We also continued to advocate the use of natural gas in power plants in the Los Angeles basin to control pollution.

Schrepfer: By "we" you mean the--

McCloskey: --The club leaders in California did. Nonetheless, there was opposition nationally to ever saying anything constructive about coal. I served on the coal policy project because I thought that it would provide some credibility to the environmental movement in the argument over nuclear power—that there was a short-term supply of energy which could serve as an alternative. I felt that the argument turned to a considerable extent on a tradeoff between pushing environmental problems off to the distant future—for a quarter of a million years future generations would have to live with nuclear waste—versus the present beneficiaries of the use of power having to live with
McCloskey: the adverse environmental impacts. Burning coal certainly will produce some residual pollution, and our lungs will have to deal with it, but at least we're the people receiving the heat and light and benefitting from it. I felt there was some fairness in having to bear those burdens if we were enjoying the benefits.

As I said earlier, my service on the coal policy project did not draw any welcome from Winchester, particularly, and from people on the energy committee. They preferred to talk just about conservation and solar energy. As it turned out, another bridging fuel emerged by the end of the seventies and early eighties and that was natural gas. Its appeal environmentally was far greater than coal. The estimates of natural gas supplies have been both suppressed and underrated when its prices were fully decontrolled. This unleashed a lot of new exploratory activity separate and apart from oil development. It turned out that natural gas had been mainly discovered as an incident of oil drilling, and there had never been a considerable amount of exploration for it in its own right.

So this issue somewhat evaporated by the end of the decade, but was a source of tension behind the scenes in our energy planning for quite some time.

Schrepfer: Tension between you and the committee?

McCloskey: --Between me and the committee. I had essentially become so disgusted with the lack of any strategic sense on the committee that I washed my hands of involvement in the issue by the end of the decade. I do feel that I was vindicated in one sense, and that is that we lost in the battles in 1979 and 1980 in Congress over authorizing federal subsidies for the development of synthetic fuels. I felt we lost because we had no creditable alternative to suggest about where the energy was coming to fuel automobiles in the future. You can talk about conservation, but you can't pour conservation into your gas tank. You can't pour solar energy into your gas tank.

People were getting very panicky in a political sense. We had successfully fought off the development of oil shale and fuels from coal liquefaction. There were federal subsidies proposed for that purpose again and again through the 1970s in Congress. But we finally lost as the full inflationary impact of imported oil became apparent in the last Congress in the seventies because we could not stand up and point to any creditable alternative. I felt that vindicated my political judgment about the weakness of always avoiding the question of tangible sources of supply.
McCloskey: Moreover, the energy committee became increasingly—and the club's energy policies became—I thought, increasingly the captive of provincial outlooks. Each chapter or group didn't want any supply source developed in its locality and would say, "Do it over the state boundary in some other state." The states without geothermal potential would say, "Geothermal should be developed," and the places that had the geothermal would say, "No, that's not very good; develop wind power," and the people who had windmill sites would say, "That's going to mar our views." For instance, we got into conflicts in the Southwest between Utah and southern California.

Schrepfer: Do you mean you and the board?

McCloskey: No, the different units in the club did.

Schrepfer: I mean did you and the board get into conflict with this other part?

McCloskey: No, our chapter in Utah and our chapters in southern California took positions which weren't fully consistent. The club nationally earlier, and then later our southern California chapters, didn't want nuclear plants at all. They didn't want plants along the coastline; they didn't want them in the Mojave Desert, or the Imperial Valley for a while. So the power companies went to southern Utah to build coal-fired plants and, of course, our chapter in Utah and the club nationally didn't want power plants in southern Utah either, or very many of them.

So the power plants have bounced back and forth along the whole line between Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and St. George, Utah, and the power companies kept probing around to find somewhere on that line where they could get away with building a power plant. I thought it would have been more rational to sit down and plan out where we were and where we were not going to accept power plants.

But it became increasingly clear that anybody who touched that issue in the club was going to get burned, that people were fanatically devoted to pushing off the problem somewhere else. I became very discouraged with the lack of any national constituency within the club for strategic planning in dealing with energy. There was no really sensible way of getting an overview and trying to decide what you would and would not accept, where and when. We principally came to represent a collection of local interests.

The only thing I did learn out of this whole process is that the issues—the questions of supply and technology and what was possible—were so volatile and changed so quickly that one
McCloskey: was burdened with a great deal of risk if you firmly stated any proposition about what could or couldn't be done or what would or would not happen. The issue left a huge wreckage around of people who were wrong, and I admit I was wrong to some degree. I was wrong in the sense that I thought that we had to accept coal to a greater extent than we did. Natural gas emerged suddenly as a better alternative, but on this really everybody else was wrong about natural gas, too. Most energy experts constantly predicted it would virtually vanish by the early nineties, and now that seems extremely unlikely. At the beginning of the decade no one predicted that the price of foreign oil would go from $3 to more than $30.

So the issue was extremely volatile, but suffice it to say the club had great problems developing any comprehensive strategy to deal with the issue, though we struggled and in some ways, I think, we did it better than most did in dealing with it.

Club Role in the Development of National Energy Policy

Schrefper: Every recent president has certainly come up with some sort of energy message. How much of a role has the Sierra Club played in the development of these messages, particularly with Carter's administration?

McCloskey: From about 1971 on it was almost an annual event to hear a sitting president discover that there was an energy crisis and to call for the development of a national energy policy. President Nixon did it starting in 1971, and almost every year he discovered there was some new dimension to the problem. The club was active from the outset in responding to those presidential messages and in developing its own policies. At about that time, we held our first energy conference in Vermont--this was directed particularly at the problems of electrical power, and we developed more and more elaborate documents as the years went by. I made many speeches and wrote articles on the subject. I testified in Congress a number of times.

The club, in many ways, played a defensive role through the Nixon and Ford years particularly. In 1973 and 1974 during the Arab oil embargo, we faced Nixon's call for energy independence. The Nixon administration was seeking to end the importation of oil in a very short time and to replace it through the massive development of domestic coal, oil, and nuclear power. It also called for more energy conservation for the first time
McCloskey: and that set forth some motion in Congress that led to new broad energy acts in 1975 and 1976. The club was very active in lobbying for them. Laurence Moss, who had just come from being club president, provided a great deal of leadership during those days. He was assisted by Richard Lahn on our Washington staff.

McCloskey: At one time, in fact, during a mark up of one of those measures, the club actually had its own preferred bill printed up in the comparison of pending bills before the committee.

Schrepfer: When was this now?

McCloskey: In 1975. This is practically unprecedented, or it was at the time, though later this happened again on the National Forest Management Act. "The Sierra Club bill compared to the Ford administration bill" and so on. These are actually the words put at the headings of the columns in the committee. So we were a very credible force in terms of what was being considered. We were the only organization that was dealing with broad policy and was lobbying across the board. We did so in both of those years [1974 and 1975], and we did so again in 1978 when Carter's first comprehensive energy package was finally adopted, and we did so again in fighting largely defensive campaigns in 1979 and 1980 when the fourth set of measures were adopted. We used different lobbyists during that whole time. I had mentioned Dick Lahn. He was succeeded later by Gregory Thomas, who was succeeded later by Jonathan Gibson and assisted by Drew Diehl.

It was somewhat unfortunate that we had so much turnover among our energy lobbyists, but the work was extremely demanding, and they felt beleaguered, outnumbered, and stretched impossibly thin. After about two years, most of them would burn out and want to go on to other work. We suffered somewhat from the lack of continuity in these efforts, but I am proud of what we were able to accomplish.

Schrepfer: How do you envision the Sierra Club's ideal role in dealing with federal energy planning? Is the club's role to be a purist organization which exerts always the strongest pressure for the best environmental solution, or is the role to be somewhat more--I don't want to say constructive—but somewhat more flexible in working out accommodations?

McCloskey: The approach we have been adopting now for a dozen years or more is to stake out fairly tough but creditable positions at the beginning of the development of an issue and advocate those positions, but as the politicians hammer out their proposals we
McCloskey: shift our lobbying to trying to improve those proposals and keep them from being weakened within a margin that represents the art of the possible at that time.

I am a strong believer that one should not accept a definition of the art of the possible at the opening of the campaign. At the opening of the campaign, you have not marshalled your forces, you have not run the campaign, you have not put out your mass mailings, you have not stirred up press support. So one should stake out a very ambitious proposal at the beginning and see how much support you can develop for it. One would not expect, in most cases, to get all you are seeking, but you never know.

In the dynamics of campaign, what you realize is that at the beginning of the campaign, you and your allies control the development of the issue to a fairly full extent. For instance, when a bill is introduced for us, we draft it before it is sent off to a legislative counsel for final drafting. But it represents what we want, the ideal bill. We shop around until we find a congressman willing to adopt that bill pretty much. We write the speeches, and they say pretty much what we want. We issue the press releases. We control the issue at the beginning.

But as soon as the issue begins to move along and is picked up and worked on by committees and more congressmen join in it, you suffer a progressive lost of control over the issue. There is an irony involved here. The more you succeed, the less you succeed in maintaining control. But that's all right because the issue is moving from merely your idea to being a public idea, and many people buy into it.

Toward the end of the campaign when the measure is in conference committee, you suffer nearly total loss of control, and this is psychologically hard to deal with in that you wish that you were sitting in there haggling out the details. But the fact of the matter is at that point, you are pretty much out of the picture. So the question sometimes posed, I think, is a false one in the sense of suggesting that you are there to make the deals over a compromise. At least at the national level, for the most part you don't make any deals. The congressmen do what they want to do. You start the ball rolling often with a grand idea that you lay out.

In the middle of a campaign, you may have to develop ideas to move the campaign along to keep it from being stalled. As you recall, on the redwood campaign many years ago, I faced that in lobbying in the Senate where we were stalled and was told that we could only get any action if we limited the bill to what you could buy for $60 million. So we came up with a plan for what you
McCloskey: could best do with $60 million, and that got it moving again. But toward the end, at least in Congress, they don't really care so much whether you will accept the final bill. Sometimes state legislators, on the other hand, want to deal in terms of "will you buy this?", or "I won't go the next step unless you agree to support it." At the federal level, that rarely happens.

Schreupper: If a congressman has to compromise, are you willing then to help him come up with what you think is the best compromise if you feel there is no alternative? Is this what you are saying?

McCloskey: I might add that things are far different when you bear the burden of the affirmative side of an issue than the negative. If you are trying to get a measure enacted, you have to find creative ways of moving it along. You can't just sit back and say, "That's unacceptable. I won't buy in on it; I won't support it; I won't do anything about it," because you are slitting your own throat that way. The others may say, "Hurray! If your ideas die, that's exactly what we want."

Now, if you have the negative side of a proposition, you can oppose it again and again. We did that with the Energy Mobilization Board. We never were willing to compromise or accept the proposition. I just thought that it was inherently bad from the beginning to the end. I stood firmer on that than anybody else in the movement did, and even in our organization. But you have great luxuries when you are on the negative side of a proposition that you just don't have on the affirmative side.

The Carter Administration and the Environment

Schreupper: Would you agree that Carter's has been the most environmentally sound administration since World War II?

McCloskey: Yes, I would. When you take their record as a whole, it was an incredibly good one, though when you look into the details, it was not without its glaring faults and problems. Some departments were better than others; some agencies were better than others; some individuals were much better than others. I think the best environmentalist in the whole administration was the president himself. I think Carter really had a feeling--certainly a better feeling--for these issues than anybody else in the White House.
McCloskey: Gus Speth, the last chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, was simply superb. He was one of the bright stars of the administration. He was both extremely bright and knowledgeable and could work well with people and knew his way around the White House.

The Interior Department deserves very mixed marks, I think, under Carter. Andrus, on the whole, was quite good but was a mercurial, moody person given to prickly behavior in dealing with environmental constituencies. Not all of his people were that good, and some of the environmentalists in the department were real disappointments. NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] was a real disappointment. Rupe Cutler in Agriculture, who served as assistant secretary over the Forest Service, behaved creditably, by and large, but his performance had disappointing aspects to it.

Schrepfer: Why do you say that Carter had a good sense of the environment? Do you have any specifics? Did you meet Carter, by the way?

McCloskey: Yes, I met with him a number of times and chatted with him. Once I asked him for an interview for our magazine, and he said, "Well, maybe we should do it in a canoe sometime." This was after the "killer rabbit" episode, so he had his mind on canoes. He called me once about six months before the election soliciting the Sierra Club's support. At that time we were steaming over his energy mobilization proposal and disappointments over RARE II. I talked with him very frankly about those disappointments and the problems they were causing our constituency.

Carter recognized that those were problems, but hoped that on balance we would remember what he had done on Alaska when he had set aside all of the national monuments and wildlife refuges (56 million acres). That action, of course, was the most courageous and incredibly ambitious thing that any president had ever done. It provided the muscle to get the bill finally through Congress after the time for interim protection had expired. If he had not done that, I think we might well have never gotten a significant package of legislation on Alaskan parks and refuges out of Congress. So that alone towers above all of the other problems of the administration.

Schrepfer: So did you say that you would try then to help him? What was your answer?

McCloskey: I told him that we were mindful of the political realities and what the choices would likely be and that we had never made the plunge into making endorsements in the past, and I wasn't sure the board would do it, but we had been sympathetic to his
McCloskey: administration, and I imagined that that sympathy could be rekindled if they could correct some of the recent problems we had seen. He said he hoped we could work it out.

Schrepfer: Did you tell the board about this?

McCloskey: Oh, yes, I did.

Schrepfer: The board responded relatively positively then?

McCloskey: After the passage of a few months they did, particularly once it was clear that Ronald Reagan was the Republican nominee. All through this time of the spring and summer of 1980 we were, however, engaged in a bitter battle over the Energy Mobilization Board. That began in the summer of 1979, and Carter had made his malaise speech complaining that there was a lack of spirit and determination in the American people. Many people, of course, thought the malaise was really in the lack of spirited political support for Carter rather than in the American spirit in general. My appointment to Carter's presidential commission on An Agenda for the Eighties really grew out of the malaise speech, too.

But be that as it may, he had two proposals in the energy field stemming from that speech. One was at last to subsidize the development of synthetic fuels, which we opposed vigorously, and the other was the proposal for the Energy Mobilization Board. This board would have been given the power to expedite the licensing of energy developments of all sorts. This was called "fast tracking." It would have applied to nuclear power plants, to coal-fired power plants, to new oil fields, and synthetic fuel factories, and practically anything you could think of.

We did not object so much to the idea of requiring licensing agencies to complete their work within a reasonable time. We made that quite clear. What we objected to was a provision that quickly worked its way into the bill before Congress to allow the president to waive the application of environmental laws. We were particularly concerned about the potential of waiving the Clean Air Act, but also the Clean Water Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act; any number of acts could have been waived. We thought that this was outrageous. This was a backdoor way of undoing many of the environmental gains that we labored for so long throughout the seventies. We thought it was a panicky reaction to Carter's fall in the polls.

What we thought was so ironic was that that was not the nature of the problem at all that was creating the political pressure. The problem was the high cost of imported oil, and 90 percent of the oil was used for automobiles. The problem was one of an affordable source of fuel for automobiles, and power plants and electricity had little to do with this.
McCloskey: Electricity was a big issue in the late sixties and early seventies when energy use was growing very rapidly, but the number of applications for new power plants had dropped way down by 1979. In fact, utilities were in grave financial troubles and were cancelling new plant proposals right and left. It was a proposal somebody dredged up from a decade before, and we had beaten it before in Congress (as "one-stop licensing"), and we were just outraged. Carter in his desperation dragged this old chestnut out and cleaned it off and tried to use it to save his political hide.

We had to mobilize in the late summer and fall of 1979 and campaigned very quickly against this legislation. It moved first in the Senate and then in the House. The Senate actually did not agree to waivers while it did agree to fast tracking. The House under Congressman [John] Dingell passed a very bad bill that embraced waivers also. It went to conference in the winter of '79-'80. For a long time we kept the conference hung up and managed to keep the Senate conferees on our side in resisting waivers, but finally in the spring--

Schrepfer: By "we" you mean--

McCloskey: --The Sierra Club, our lobbyists, principally Jonathan Gibson who was working on it. Jonathan was on the phone to me repeatedly. Also working on it were lobbyists from Friends of the Earth and from NRDC. Those three organizations did the bulk of the work, and we did probably more than the others did. It looked hopeless again and again. I went to the White House and met with Bert Carp, who was a White House strategist on the matter. He was very close to Congressman Dingell in the House. We tried to talk him out of agreeing to waivers. Many times they indicated they really didn't want waivers, but, on the other hand, they were desperate to get a bill, and if it included waivers, they would accept it. I didn't feel they were entirely candid and straight with us in those negotiations. This carried over through the late summer of 1980 when we were negotiating with the White House with respect to whether we would support Carter, or rather I would support Carter.

We had succeeded in delaying it, however, through a very protracted conference--long enough that the matter was now pending on the eve of the election. We finally lost in conference, and it was taken to the floor of the House and the Senate. But on the floor of the House, the Republicans then saw this as something that Carter could use to claim that he had "solved the energy problem." They did not want to hand him a victory of that sort, and so we were able to mobilize both some liberal Democrats and many conservative Republicans to oppose the final conference measure. We had banners up saying, "EMB means even more bureaucracy."
McCloskey: For a variety of reasons we put together a winning coalition. It was turned down in the early fall and that spelled the end of the EMB. It had been a campaign of little more than a year, a campaign over a measure I thought was entirely needless. But a number of times in the conference, Bert Carp called and asked me, "Do we have to continue this battle? It doesn't seem that you can get any more." I said, "Look, I think it's a matter of principle. The thing is just totally wrong. There is no justification for it. There is no reason we should ever accept these waivers. It's a bad law; it's bad policy."

I even called some oil companies and got them to lobby against it because I thought it was unfair to allow one company that had--

Schrepfer: Who did you call?

McCloskey: I called Atlantic Richfield and then made some overtures to Gulf Oil, too. We had a curious combination. There were a number of industries who were opposing it because they saw it would have been a chaotic situation, with companies with political clout who would have been able to get their plant built without having to comply with the Clean Air Act, and another firm that didn't have political clout would have to comply. It would have been a lack of equal protection under the laws.

Fortunately, the whole thing finally collapsed, and we won that issue. I might add that in history, the negative battles of that sort are all too quickly forgotten because they don't result in any act which continues and that is implemented and that people remember. But I thought that this was one of our more important battles and a fitting climax to our work on energy through the seventies. We played a principal role in the enactment of four positive measures and a principal role in the defeat of one very bad measure. We played a positive role in helping to get the fuel economy requirements for automobiles passed and requiring greater insulation of houses, in requiring efficiency labeling on appliances, and finally requiring state utility commissions to promulgate energy conservation standards.

Schrepfer: When you spoke with Carter when he asked the club for support, did you ask him specifically for concessions or for cooperation on this Energy Mobilization Board?

McCloskey: Yes, I did.

Schrepfer: And/or on RARE or just the board?
McCloskey: RARE II at that time was virtually finished, and it was less clear what we wanted him to do then. I expressed our concerns about how that had been handled, but I asked specifically for things on the EMB. I asked him to instruct his people to work against any waiver of substantive laws on the EMB proposal and to tell the conferees he would veto it, that he would not sign it, if those provisions were in it. But he was never willing to commit to veto the bill under those circumstances.

Schrepfer: So he really didn't meet you on this at all?

McCloskey: He had made a statement to the press that he was against substantive waivers, and he reminded me, "I am on record as against them." But that's really not what I was seeking. He, and particularly Carp, were very ambivalent about the extent to which they would go to make sure that waivers were not in the bill.

Schrepfer: You have mentioned that you have played a decreasing role on energy issues within the club through the seventies and into the eighties. Would you perhaps tell us who a researcher should go to should they want to find out about the club's energy politics or energy policies through the seventies?

McCloskey: The club's principal actors were the chairs of its energy committee and the lobbyists who actually worked on this legislation. Laurence I. Moss was the club president who really brought us into that field. Sidney Mogelwer was the first chairman of the committee and then Susan Steigerwalt and following her, Ellen Winchester, and finally Ruth Caplan. Our lobbyists were Richard Lahn, Gregory Thomas, Jonathan Gibson, Andrew Diehl.

McCloskey Reflects on His Career

Schrepfer: I wanted to draw to a close, if you don't mind, by reflecting back on your environmental career. Could you say something about what you think have been the most important influences on the development of your environmental thinking and your environmental activities. I was thinking perhaps of a book, a person, an incident.

McCloskey: I suppose there were two individuals who influenced me more than any others. The first was Karl Onthank in Eugene, Oregon, when I began. I first met him in 1958 and knew him through the mid-sixties. He had been a dean of men at the University of Oregon going back to the 1920s. He had learned his conservation in the
McCloskey: Teddy Roosevelt period, and he was a respected, towering figure at the university. He had been a member of the State Water Resources Board. He had been the conservation chairman of a local outing club, the Obsidians, for years. He was a member of the Sierra Club.

I began my conservation work when I came back from the army to enroll in law school at the University of Oregon through the Obsidians, which I joined in 1946, coming out of my participation in scouting. I had done hiking and climbing in the Oregon Cascades with the Obsidians. I had subscribed to their newsletter through the fifties when I had been away in college at Harvard and then later in the army for two years, and had learned about the Three Sisters Wilderness battle through those newsletters. Onthank and his wife, Ruth, had been the spark plugs for a great deal of that battle. They had organized all sorts of front groups, the Friends of the Three Sisters Wilderness and others.

So when I came back from the army in 1958 and became active again in the Obsidians (I had kept my membership going), I immediately fell under Onthank's influence. He saw me as a source of energy and manpower and put me to work, and I became cochairman of the conservation committee within a few years and later succeeded him as chairman of the Obsidians' conservation committee. These were my volunteer years, mainly when I was in law school to boot!

I had gotten involved with him and the Obsidians in fighting some dams on the upper MacKenzie River. Some earlier proposals had been defeated while I was away, in public referendum, and I tried to rally opposition to their successors. I failed, but that was my first battle. Then he and I launched a public committee to save an area called Waldo Lake from logging. We wanted it in a wilderness area and that ran in the public eye for a good many years.

But Onthank showed me how things were done. He knew virtually everyone in Oregon and the Pacific Northwest. He knew the regional forester, and he and his wife knew everybody in the outdoor movement. He had been appointed by the governor to different boards and commissions. He knew the history of so many things. I learned the background from him. Everytime I had a question about how this or that happen, when it happened, Karl knew the answer, or Karl knew who to call.

So this relationship provided a great tutelage for me. It gave me a sense of history. He took me to my first convention of the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs in 1959. I was on the resolutions committee and met Dave Brower who was also on the
McCloskey: resolutions committee representing the club and that was my first exposure to the Sierra Club. I next served a couple of more years on that committee, and during the summer of 1960, Dave Brower hired me for a summer project to go to the Wallowa Mountains at Justice Douglas's behest to write up a flyer to save the Minam Valley there from logging. Phil Hyde and I worked on that.

At any rate, that was my introduction to the whole process. When I came to California, I found a person who was in many ways similar to Onthank in Ed Wayburn. He, for California, had the same kind of roots. He knew the history of the club, and he knew who was who, and he knew how things were done. He wasn't as old as Onthank was, but in many ways he was a similar kind of person. His outstanding quality was a kind of persistence and a long sense of vision.

I suppose the most important thing I learned from him was to set your sights high, to not underestimate what you could accomplish over the course of time. I had always been of a very pragmatic cast of mind, but I had not had a settled opinion about how successful one could be by setting one's sights high. I learned from Dr. Wayburn that it pays off, and one should not give much credence to the difficulties you face when you start out. It's merely the inevitable condition of beginning with a vision.

##

Schrepfer: Are there any books that have been particularly influential in your thinking?

McCloskey: I had already done a great deal of reading in the environmental field, or conservation field, by the time I became employed by the club. Some of the law review articles that I had written for the University of Oregon, both on the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act and the Wilderness Act, by the mid-sixties had exposed me to a lot of classical literature, though I have tried to keep up since.

I particularly was influenced by research findings that I did on the Multiple Use Act by the debates in Congress in the 1890s over the creation of forest reserves. It gave me a sense of history that the kind of conflicts that we were encountering now were the kinds of ones that had always been engendered. I read the furious debates in Congress in 1891 and 1892 over President Harrison's reservations, about how mad people in Colorado and Wyoming were over those reservations—the thundering denunciation from local communities and their representatives, and the need for people in the Midwest and East to defend conservation in the West.
McCloskey: I had learned what bitter legacies were left as a result of the Olympic National Park fight in the 1930s. I had learned in Oregon in my early years how bitterly the Oregon Dunes National Seashore proposal had been resisted, with advocates being denounced as Communists, and I had learned in my own home community of Eugene, Oregon, how much of a pariah one could become in trying to save virgin forests from the lumbermen in the lumber capital of the world. I had seen fistfights break out on the courthouse steps at wilderness hearings.

Schrepfer: When was this?

McCloskey: This was in the Waldo Lake dispute in 1961. There were people pulling microphones out of the wall and swinging. So it was no surprise to me later in the Redwood Park battles that people were livid and unforgiving. But my research and reading about those debates in the Congressional Record had given me a sense of perspective—it was never easy and that time would pass, and later things would be applauded as the most obvious measures to promote the public's interest and yet were bitterly resisted at the time, and that one had to be philosophical in accepting controversy and conflict as the price of conservation.

Schrepfer: Thank you very much for the interview.

McCloskey: Thank you for all of your help.
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APPENDIX A

SIERRA CLUB ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 1969-1980

A. NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM

1. Redwood National Park: the club was a leader both in the effort to establish it in 1968 and to expand it in 1978.

2. Pt. Reyes National Seashore: the club helped materially in the successful effort to obtain full funding for this seashore in 1971.

3. Golden Gate National Recreation Area: the club provided the key leadership both in the establishment (1972) and in the expansion of the area (1974).

4. Gateway East National Recreation Area: the club also provided the most visible leadership in the establishment of this area in New York in 1972.

5. Congaree National Monument: the club provided the core leadership for setting aside this area in South Carolina in 1976.

6. Grand Canyon National Park: the club was the moving force in a long campaign which succeeded in substantially expanding this park in 1974.

7. Big Thicket Preserve: the club's efforts in Washington were decisive in bringing this biological reserve in Texas into existence in 1974.

8. Hells Canyon National Recreation Area (Forest Service): the club was the main force in a long campaign to block further dams and to have the area along the Oregon-Idaho border established as a recreation area (1975).

9. Cayahoga National Recreation Area: the club was one of the principal groups aiding in the establishment of this urban recreation area in Ohio (1974).

10. Big South Fork Cumberland NRA: the club's chapter in Tennessee was a leading force in establishment of this area in 1974.

11. Gulf Islands National Seashore: the club was the principal force behind establishment of this area off the Mississippi coast.

12. Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore: the club's chapter in Michigan was the chief booster in the process of setting this area aside.
13. **Voyageurs National Park:** the club was the most prominent of the national groups pushing for the establishment of this park in Minnesota.

14. **Glen Canyon National Recreation Area:** the club was the force that succeeded in having much of the Escalante canyon added to this NRA in Utah.

15. **Chattahoochee National River:** the club was one of the strongest supporters of the successful effort to establish this area in Georgia (1978).

16. **Mineral King:** the club was the main force behind the successful effort to have this enclave transferred to Sequoia National Park (1978).

17. **Alaskan National Monuments:** the Sierra Club led the coalition which succeeded in persuading President Carter to set aside 56 million acres of national monuments in Alaska in late 1978; he also initiated the process of reserving new national wildlife refuges; campaign culminated in an act of Congress in 1980 reserving 110 million acres in national parks and refuges.

18. **General legislation:**

   a. **Land and Water Fund:** the club was a leading force in the successful effort to enlarge the funding available for buying parkland in this fund to $900 million by 1980.

   b. **Omnibus National Parks Act (1978):** the club was the main force behind the enactment of this legislation which added over two million acres to the National Park System and which affected over 100 units; as an example, the Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation Area near Los Angeles was authorized by this measure; the Pine Barrens in New Jersey were also protected, and the New River in Virginia.

   c. **National Park Mining Act (1976):** the club was the chief architect of this measure which closed loopholes which allowed mining claims to continue to be filed in six units of the National Park System.

B. **WILDERNESS**

1. **Additions to National Wilderness Preservation System (1973):**
   the club was a prime mover in having 1.5 million acres added to the wilderness system in 1973.
2. **Endangered American Wilderness Act (1978):** the club successfully designed this whole effort which resulted in adding 1.3 million acres to the wilderness system through establishing 13 new wilderness areas, including the Golden Trout area in California, and in expanding four existing units.

3. **Eastern Wilderness:** the club played an important role in breaking the barriers which had minimized wilderness reservations in eastern national forests; 16 new areas were reserved in 1974, and 17 were designated for study.

4. **RARE I:** the club inspired the first comprehensive study (1971-1973) of remaining roadless areas in the national forests; 56 million acres were identified, and 12 million set aside for further study; a suit filed by the club resulted in an agreement that no inventoried area would be developed until an environmental impact statement was prepared.

5. **RARE II:** because of imperfections in the first inventory, the club was the leading proponent of a second study (RARE II), the new study identified 67 million acres, with 15 million acres recommended for immediate wilderness designation.

6. **Individual areas:**
   a. **Alpine Lakes:** the club was the leading national proponent of setting aside this large area in Washington state (1976).
   
   b. **Boundary Waters Canoe Area:** the club played an important role in expanding this area in Minnesota by 42,000 acres and banning future logging in any part of it (1978).
   
   c. **Adirondack Preserve:** the club's chapter in New York was the leader in firming up protection for this 3.7 million acre state reserve (1973).
   
   d. **California Wilderness System:** the club spearheaded the effort which succeeded in establishing a state system for protecting wilderness within parks; 105,000 acres initially protected (1974).
   
   e. **Tongass Timber Sale:** the club led the way in forcing cancellation of the largest timber sale in history in the Tongass National Forest of Alaska so that wilderness could later receive a fair hearing there (1976).
C. WILDLIFE

1. **Arctic Wildlife Range**: the club led the campaign to protect the range against the intrusion of a gas line in 1977—successfully.

2. **PET 4 Disposition**: As Naval Petroleum Reserve #4 in Alaska was disbanded in 1975, the club was the most vigorous force in assuring that wildlife values were given appropriate attention in future development plans.

3. **Wildlife Range Transfers**: After countering piecemeal efforts to transfer western wildlife ranges from the Fish and Wildlife Service to the BLM, the club was among the leaders in securing legislation permanently blocking any transfers (1975).

4. **Marine Sanctuaries**: When the Ocean Dumping Act was enacted in 1972, the club was the moving force which led to inclusion of Title III, which authorized the establishment of marine sanctuaries to protect marine biota; in 1980 the club was instrumental in persuading President Carter to set aside four new marine sanctuaries.

D. PUBLIC LANDS

1. **National Timber Supply Act**: The club led the campaign to prevent enactment of this act which would have forced the quick liquidation of old growth in the national forests and the destruction of much prospective wilderness (1970).

2. **National Forest Super Sale**: The club was one of the groups that successfully opposed efforts to increase the allowable cuts in the national forests by one billion board feet in response to industry pressure, thus again threatening proposed wilderness areas (1974).

3. **Monongahela Case**: The Sierra Club was one of the prime movers behind a successful suit which reinterpreted basic statutes of the Forest Service to prevent the cutting of immature timber (1975).

4. **National Forest Management Act**: The club led the successful campaign to improve provisions of law governing clearcutting, assuring even-flow sustained yield and the maintenance of species diversity, and gaining better protection for marginal lands (1976).

5. **Model Forest Practices Act—California**: The club was the lead group in securing improvement of California's Forest Practice Act so that it is now the best in the nation (1974).

6. **Public Land Law Review Commission Bill**: The Sierra Club led a coalition which successfully opposed enactment of an industry oriented bill in Congress to revise the public land laws (1972).
7. **BLM Organic Act:** The club led the coalition which finally succeeded in having a somewhat balanced law passed to revise the public lands laws, abolishing most disposal laws, and extending strong protection to possible wilderness areas (1976).

8. **California programs:**
   
   a. **Bay Conservation and Development Commission:** The club was a central force in the enactment of legislation in California to control and restrict further filling of San Francisco Bay (1970).
   
   b. **Tahoe Regional Planning Agency:** The club was active in the effort which established a regional agency to try to plan and restrict development in the Tahoe basin, with a separate agency with stronger powers on the California side (1971).
   
   c. **California Coastal Conservation and Development Commission:** The club played a central role in the campaign to establish this commission to control coastal development, both in 1972 and 1976.
   
   d. **California Energy Commission/Nuclear Siting Act:** The club was an active force in the successful effort to establish an energy commission to coordinate energy planning and to restrict siting of additional nuclear plants until waste disposal and other problems were solved (1975-76).
   
   e. **Upper Newport Bay Development:** The club pursued the lawsuit which eventually caused the proposal by a developer to fill much of this estuary to be dropped (1973).

E. **POLLUTION**

1. **DDT and FIFRA:** The club was a leading litigant in the successful effort to substantially restrict the use of DDT, as well in the effort to amend and strengthen the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act in 1972.

2. **Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality:** The club launched the successful litigation which clearly enunciated the doctrine under the Clean Air Act of 1970 that air which was already clean could not be significantly degraded (1973); it also successfully pursued efforts in the 1977 amendments to that act to extend and strengthen that doctrine.

3. **Defense of the Clean Air Act:** The club led the successful effort to defend the health-related provisions of the Clean Air Act during energy crisis of 1973-74, particularly with respect to programs to convert oil-fired power plants to coal.
4. **Toxic Control Substances Act:** The club led the effort in Congress to secure enactment of this measure to control the manufacture of substances which are toxic (1976).

5. **Federal Water Pollution Control Act:** The club organized the coalition which helped defend the 1972 water pollution act against significant losses when it was amended in 1977, particularly with respect to the best available control technology requirement and toxic substances.

6. **Utah Power Plants:** The club's legal efforts succeeded both in preventing the Kaiparowits power plant and the Intermountain Power plant from being built in Utah at sites close to national parks where air pollution would violate the "no significant deterioration" rule (1976; 1978).

7. **Superfund:** The club was a lead group in persuading Congress to set up a special fund to finance cleanup of old hazardous waste dumps.

F. **ENERGY**

1. **Auto Fuel Economy:** The club played an important role in having legislation enacted requiring major improvements in the fuel economy of automobiles by 1985 (1975).

2. **Thermally Efficient Housing:** The club also played an active role in the enactment of legislation providing incentives for constructing more thermally efficient housing (1975).

3. **National Energy Act:** The club was the major supporter of the National Energy Act which, among other things, provides an increasing tax on autos which are not efficient in their use of fuel and which mandates reforms among state utility commissions to promote energy conservation (1978).

4. **OCS Legislation:** The club was one of the lead parties in pushing for new laws which now provide a more orderly and environmentally safe basis for federal programs to lease the outer continental shelf for oil exploration and development (1978).

5. **Northern Great Plains Coal Leasing:** The club brought a major lawsuit which eventually led to a change in federal policy with respect to agreeing to prepare environmental impact statements on a regional basis before resuming leasing of federal coal reserves (1976).

6. **Oil Tankers:** The club was active in efforts which secured better regulation of oil tanker traffic: Ports and Waterway Safety Act (1973) (avoiding accidents in harbors and oil cleanup); Deep Water Port regulation (1974) (federal licensing of superports for extremely large tankers); and improvements in standards for safe operation of tankers on the high seas (1978).
1. **SST**: The club was one of the leaders in the effort which caused Congress to reject proposals to subsidize construction of a fleet of SST's which were wasteful in fuel consumption and noisy (1970).

2. **Highway Trust Fund**: The club was one of the most active groups in pressing to have the highway trust fund rules changed so that funds from it could be used for mass transit (1973).

3. **Nuclear Exports**: The club was one of the litigants who secured an agreement that the federal government would prepare an environmental impact statement on proposals to export nuclear fuel to other nations (1974).

4. **NEPA Defense**: The club led successful efforts to block proposals to weaken or waive application of the National Environmental Policy Act to freeway projects and power plants.

5. **Contribution to UNEP**: The club led the effort in 1974 to persuade Congress to appropriate a substantial contribution—$40 million—to the UN Environmental Programme.

6. **Panama Canal Treaty**: The club was the principal participant in negotiations which succeeded in having explicit provisions inserted in the treaty with Panama on transfer of the canal to protect natural values (1978).

7. **Nuclear Waste Repository**: The club's chapter in Kansas was the leading group which worked to expose the shortcomings of the nuclear waste repository near Lyons, Kansas which the AEC once proposed (1973).

8. **Texas Water Plan**: The club's chapter in Texas was the leader on a number of occasions in rallying public opinion in that state to turn down bonds to finance a wasteful water diversion scheme which would have harmed watersheds in east Texas.

9. **EMB**: In 1980, the club played a pivotal role in persuading Congress to turn down President Carter's proposed "Energy Mobilization Board" which could have overridden environmental protection laws.
RESUME OF BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON
MICHAEL McCLOSKEY

BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION

Born on April 26, 1934 in Eugene, Oregon; active as youth in scouting (Eagle Scout with silver palm);
B.A., Harvard College, 1956 in American Government (magna cum laude),
Detur Award winner; service in U.S.A.R., Artillery, 1956-58, final
reserve rank of Captain; J.D., University of Oregon, 1961; nominated
candidate for Oregon House of Representatives, 1962.

Married in 1965 to Maxine E. (Mugg) Johnson; resides at 93 Florada Avenue, Piedmont, California 94610.

EMPLOYMENT

Represented Sierra Club and Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs in
Pacific Northwest from 1961 to 1965 (played leading role in
instigating landscape management policy in the national forests,
and in developing early stages of campaign for a North Cascades National Park);
1965-1966 served as Assistant to the President of the Sierra Club in San Francisco;
1966-1969 served as Conservation Director of the Sierra Club
(organized Conservation Department of the Club and was principal legislative advocate for the Redwood National Park established in 1968);
February 1969 to December 1969 served as Chief of Staff of the Club;
Appointed Executive Director of the Sierra Club in December 1969
(club size has increased over four times since then). As Executive Director, initiated idea of Executive Order to study and
protect unreserved roadless areas in the National Forests, which
in turn led to a decision eventually by the Forest Service to undertake such studies on more than 12 million acres of land.

PUBLICATIONS

Books

Contributor to:
-- The Patient Earth
-- Wilderness and the Quality of Life
-- No Deposit-No Return
-- Action for Wilderness
Resume of Biographical Data on Michael McCloskey, cont.

Forwards to:
--Ecotactics
--Wilderness: The Edge of Knowledge
--Clear-Cut: The Deforestation of America

Editor of:
--The Proceedings of the Fifth Biennial Conference on Northwest Wilderness
--Some Suggestions for Teaching About Wilderness and Wildland Parks

Articles


Book Reviews

Western American Literature*, Forest History, Not Man Apart, Summit, American West.

LISTINGS

Who's Who in America; Who's Who in the West; Who's Who in California; Who's Who in Ecology; Dictionary of International Biography; Personalities of the West and Midwest; Leaders in American Conservation.

AWARDS

California Conservation Council Award (for professional service), 1969
2000 Men of Distinction, 1970
John Muir Award (Sierra Club), 1979

* Multiple Contributions
Resume of Biographical Data on Michael McCloskey, cont.

PRESENT SERVICE

Board of Directors

- International Union for Conservation of Nature's Commission on Law, Policy and Administration, Vice-Chairman
- League of Conservation Voters
- Sol Feinstone Environmental Awards
- National Committee for Urban Recreation
- Energy Innovator Awards Program, American Public Power Association

Advisory Boards

- Environmental Assessment Council of Academy of Natural Sciences
- The Arbor Day Foundation
- Urban Environmental Conference
- Public Interest Economics Foundation
- Council on Economic Priorities
- Environmental Studies Institute
- Save the Tallgrass Prairie, Honorary Board
- American Institute for Public Service, Board of Nominators
- Natural Resources Council of America, Awards Committee
- Who's Who Among American High School Students

PAST SERVICE

- Presidential Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties
- Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project, Advisory Board
- National Petroleum Council, Coordinating Committee (studies on strategic oil reserves and enhanced oil and gas recovery)
- Mining Subcommittee of the National Coal Policy Project, Co-Chairman
- Committee on Surface Mining and Reclamation, National Research Council, Chairman, Environmental Subcommittee
- Western Forest Environment Discussion Group, Co-Chairman
- Resolve, Board of Directors
- National Academy of Science's Panel on Geothermal Energy 1972, Member
- Sun Day, Board of Directors
- Joint Center for Urban Environmental Studies, Board of Directors
- North Cascades Conservation Council
- Council on Population and Environment
- Center for California Public Affairs
- Columbia Journal of Environmental Law
- Environmental Planning Institute, University of Southern California Planning Board
- Friends of Bikecology, National Advisory Committee
CONFERENCES

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Sierra Club (life member)
International Council on Environmental Law
Explorer's Club
Harvard Club of San Francisco
American Society of Association Executives
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