William B. Baker


With an introduction by
the Honorable George Deukmejian

Interviews Conducted by
Germaine LaBerge
in 1997 - 1999

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Since 1954 the Regional Oral History Office has been interviewing leading participants in or well-placed witnesses to major events in the development of northern California, the West, and the nation. Oral history is a method of collecting historical information through tape-recorded interviews between a narrator with firsthand knowledge of historically significant events and a well-informed interviewer, with the goal of preserving substantive additions to the historical record. The tape recording is transcribed, lightly edited for continuity and clarity, and reviewed by the interviewee. The corrected manuscript is indexed, bound with photographs and illustrative materials, and placed in The Bancroft Library at the University of California, Berkeley, and in other research collections for scholarly use. Because it is primary material, oral history is not intended to present the final, verified, or complete narrative of events. It is a spoken account, offered by the interviewee in response to questioning, and as such it is reflective, partisan, deeply involved, and irreplaceable.

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INTRODUCTION -- by George Deukmejian

From the beginning, William Baker was a builder and the University of California was his monument.

He came to the system when there were 80,000 students. Tuition was $35 a semester, and they didn’t serve fat-free chocolate cherry cake in the dorms. When Bill retired, enrollment had risen to 167,000 students, tuition to $4,000 a semester, and the UC system had plans to open its tenth campus at Merced.

In this day and age of meteoric rises and spectacular collapses, it is rare that one person stays with one enterprise for all of his or her professional life. People work and move on, often without a lasting measure of what they have meant to a place and of what that place has meant to them.

Not so with Bill Baker. To Bill, the University of California was a lifelong passion to which he gave his loyalty and his talent.

Bill helped open access to quality education to literally thousands of students. In many cases, that education changed people’s lives, opened opportunities that their parents never had, and opened horizons that they had never before seen.

For thirty-four years, Bill worked for the University of California. In a sense, he inherited the family store. Bill’s father worked for the University of California for forty years. His mother, sister, and numerous relatives went to Cal. His friends went to Cal. Later, his three children went to Berkeley. As for Bill, in 1954 he entered Cal and, essentially, never left.

In 1958, William Baker graduated with a civil engineering degree from the University of California at Berkeley. His first job out of college was that of a builder. He served as an engineer, helping to restore the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge. In 1964, Bill continued to build, serving as a temporary, associate engineer in the Office of the President at University Hall in Berkeley.

It didn’t take long before his extraordinary talents were recognized, and he was requested to address some capital budget issues that arose in Sacramento.

Ten years after taking this temporary position, Bill was named director of the capital budget; four years later he was appointed as assistant vice president of budget and planning for the University’s state operating and capital budgets.

When I first met Bill, in December of 1982, he was about to undertake his new duties as vice president of the University of California system, with responsibilities for governmental and university relations, representing the University before the state legislature, the U.S. Congress, the
news media, the alumni and the general public. It was also the beginning of the tenure of President David Gardner.

While the Board of Regents and the University are autonomous under the state constitution, the Governor and the state legislature must enact the annual budget for the University. Both David Gardner and Bill Baker informed me of the urgent needs for the University.

In my view, the future of our great state would heavily depend upon the existence of a well-educated workforce. Our economy was beginning to depend significantly upon rapid developments in technology and the medical care profession. As a nation-state, competing with other American states and with major foreign nations throughout the world, it was imperative that we be able to attract and retain the finest faculty possible. They would help to ensure that our graduates were the best educated and create much needed jobs by encouraging strong companies to locate in proximity to our campuses. To do otherwise would have been a disservice to the hopes and aspirations of our students and the high quality of life sought by Californians.

David Gardner used excellent judgment in virtually all of his actions, especially when he selected Bill Baker to lead the University’s building effort with the state legislature and our administration. Bill’s careful attention to details, his warm, low-key personality and his unique professionalism served the University very successfully. He was highly admired and respected, and he performed his duties with dignity and distinction.

His achievements and reputation are so noteworthy that, since his retirement from the University, he has been very busy consulting and advising numerous institutions of higher education throughout the United States.

It was a genuine pleasure for me to work with Bill and it is befitting that his exceptional oral history be included in the library of distinguished builders of the great University of California.

November 20, 2002
George Deukmejian
William B. Baker served as Vice President-Budget and University Relations for the University of California from 1983-1992, and then Vice President of University and External Relations from 1993-1997. In that capacity he was interviewed by the Regional Oral History Office in 1997 as part of the project on the UC Office of the President and Its Constituencies, 1983-1995. It became clear that those two interviews only scratched the surface of Mr. Baker’s forty-plus years as a participant and observer in the expansion of the nine campus university system—coming on board as President Clark Kerr was building three new campuses (Irvine, Santa Cruz and San Diego) and implementing the Master Plan of Higher Education in 1960. Therefore, President Richard Atkinson asked us to expand on that short oral history to cover Mr. Baker’s full career. The oral history which follows adds greatly to our documentation of the history of the university, particularly the intricacies of the budget process and the complexities of the university’s relations with the governor’s office and the legislature in Sacramento.

William Baker came from a long line of UC Berkeley graduates and employees. “I thought it was a state law that I had to go to Cal.” Indeed he did, graduating with a degree in civil engineering in 1958, and joining the systemwide staff as an associate engineer in 1959. He stayed, adding responsibilities and titles, until his retirement in 1997.

As a student, William Baker delivered mail to President Robert G. Sproul. As a young employee, he observed and worked for Presidents Clark Kerr, Harry Wellman, and Charles Hitch, as an engineer and then as a “budget guy.” Under President David Saxon, he became assistant vice president for budget and planning. Baker continued to direct the complex budget process for the University of California system under Presidents Gardner, Peltason and Atkinson.

In this memoir, Bill Baker outlines the evolution of that process and the presidents’ involvement in securing more funds from the state legislature for the university. Together with now-Vice President Lawrence Hershman, he “opened up” the budget process, doing his “missionary work” on the campuses, spending time with chancellors, vice chancellors, and campus budget officials on down. A true people person, he emphasizes the importance of cultivating working relationships with state officials. “The only coin in the realm in Sacramento is credibility.” And he maintained friendships with alumni and the community at large. He correctly describes himself as “everybody’s best friend.”

Baker also discusses the decision-making process in the Office of the President, relations among the vice presidents and the chancellors, and interface with the individual campuses. He addresses the need for hard decisions when the economy went sour in the 1990s, decisions such as increasing student fees, VERIPs for faculty and staff, postponing the establishment of a tenth campus. “I’m always straight as a string. I am Mr. Straight. I have a reputation for telling it like it is, which hasn’t always been easy in our history.”
Three interviews (1998-1999) were recorded in The Bancroft Library’s conference room. We held the fourth and final interview (1999) at the Bakers’ gracious Calistoga home, with breathtaking views of the surrounding wine country. The resulting eight tapes were transcribed at the Regional Oral History Office, lightly edited, and sent to Mr. Baker for approval. He took care looking over the transcript, checking facts in his collected correspondence and other papers, and decided to seal certain portions until 2025. The final version was corrected and indexed at ROHO, and bound with the two interviews recorded in 1997.

Many thanks to former Governor George Deukmejian for writing the fine introduction to his friend and colleague’s oral history. We appreciate funding from the Office of the President under President Richard Atkinson. The history of the University of California is richer with this addition from an Old Blue who devoted his working years to the institution he so loves.

The Regional Oral History Office was established in 1954 to augment through tape-recorded memoirs the Library’s materials on the history of California and the West. Copies of all interviews are available for research use in The Bancroft Library and in the UCLA Department of Special Collections. The office is under the direction of Richard Cándida Smith, and the administrative direction of Charles B. Faulhaber, The James D. Hart Director of The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Germaine LaBerge
Editor/Interviewer

August 2003
Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library
University of California, Berkeley
I FAMILY BACKGROUND, CHILDHOOD, AND EDUCATION

[Interview 1: June 26, 1998] ##1 [The Bancroft Library]

Elementary School and Childhood in Berkeley

LaBerge: As this starts, I want to say for researchers reading this interview, to please read this in conjunction with Mr. Baker's two other interviews in the Gardner era series, because this is an embellishment of those.2

In those two other interviews we already went through your birth and a little bit about your growing up, but there are several things we didn't cover, more about grade school and high school and who your influences were. I read someplace else one of your father's best friends was an influence.

Baker: Yes. Just to pick up on that one so we don't forget it. Well, let me back up and start with grade school. I went to grade school where my sisters had gone before me.

LaBerge: Do you have two sisters or one?

Baker: Yes. Two.

LaBerge: Okay. I only have the name of one, Jane.

Baker: Oh, the other one is Nanette. She lives in Windsor which is up near Santa Rosa. She's six years older than I am and Jane is ten years older than I. I always remember when I turned forty I was complaining to my father about it and he says, "Knock it off. How'd you like to have a daughter who's fifty?" And I never complained again. [laughs]

1.## This symbol indicates that a tape or tape segment has begun or ended. A guide to the tapes follows this transcript.
2.See other interview incorporated herein at page 99.
So grade school was Cragmont Elementary, Berkeley, California, which was just about three or four blocks from home. Head straight down Marin Avenue for three blocks. Easy to walk to school. In fact, my son went to the same school through fourth grade and my middle one, my oldest daughter, went through the second grade, the same school.

In any event, so grammar school was--you know, you just go through grammar school.

LaBerge: Right. Tell me things that you did as a child.

Baker: Well, I was always interested in sports. Probably an influence of my father who was a great Cal Bear fan for many, many years and played sports himself. And I always played sports. It was a great neighborhood. Interesting in those days. It was on Bonnie Lane, which I think you know is between Marin and Hilldale. Those days, well, we played ball and games of one kind and another. Like, kick the can and all that in the street. There weren't any cars parked in the street. Now, every street in Berkeley is loaded with cars on both sides. So it's a real difference.

LaBerge: Did you like school?

Baker: Oh, yes. I remember my second grade teacher who allowed me to shift-- Well, I'm left-handed, and she allowed me to shift the paper and write normally for a left-handed person. As you can see, there are left-handers who go like this [demonstrating with paper] and the reason they go like that is the teacher wouldn't let them turn the paper around. So that was a good experience.

Fourth grade was memorable because I had an accident. I broke my back. I was nine years old. Fell out of a tree and crushed four vertebrae in my back. I was out of school for half a year. Had a home teacher. And that was more frightening for my parents than me because they would not know if I'd be able to walk again until three months, after three months of being literally strapped to a plywood board. That's how they did it back then.

In any event that was sort of a memorable time. I collected comic books and listened to every radio program that existed of the day. That would have been 1944.

Sixth grade was interesting particularly because we had a sixth grade graduation ceremony and each student was asked to announce their plans for the future, what do you want to be when you grow up? And even then I wanted to be a mechanical engineer, I said then at that time. Later turned to civil engineering.

Back then I used to build roads and the sort of things you do as a little kid playing in your backyard. I'd construct things. And my brother and I--I had a brother who was three years younger than me who passed away a couple of years ago--he and I built this shack really, two-story shack, out of the lumber from wooden fruit cartons, if you remember those.

LaBerge: Yes.
Baker: I have a photograph of it. In fact, my office staff did a memory book for me on my retirement, and, not to my knowledge, they contacted my sisters for old photographs. And both of them sent in that same picture just by chance.

LaBerge: What was your brother's name?

Baker: Robert Baker. He was three years younger.

So, sports was always something I did. I played on every conceivable team that you have through grade school and junior high school. And by the way, this is the same grammar school as [UC President Emeritus] David Gardner and his siblings attended. And junior high school was--now called King, then called Garfield--further down the street. Took the bus. Took the bus to school most of the time, the number seven bus that went down Euclid and all the way out.

LaBerge: To Hopkins?

Baker: Hopkins and Rose. The school is between Hopkins and Rose a block west of what is now called Martin Luther King; it used to be called Grove Street.

**Family and Early Influences**

LaBerge: Any memorable teachers in junior high?

Baker: Not significantly. I mean, none of them had great influence on me. I had a bent for math. So I did well in math which was good since engineering was my goal. Again, a lot of sports. Ran unsuccessfully for office a few times in junior high school.

LaBerge: What about World War II? What do you remember about that?

Baker: Well, a lot. Yes. I remember the blackouts were all lights out and all curtains drawn. My father was a block warden. He was of an age that would be past draft age. He was a block warden, and he had to go out with his helmet and his light and patrol the streets. I remember collecting scrap metal. We used to collect it--early recycling. Remember food stamps? My mother was on good terms with the butcher so she always got a little break at the butcher shop, the butcher shop at Shattuck and Vine. I remember that. Butter, gas rationing--all those things I remember really well.

Played as a kid, played soldier a lot. That's sort of what little kids do. Played construction worker, played soldier, that kind of thing.

Played basketball, baseball, and track in junior high school. What else in junior high school? I had a paper route, *Oakland Tribune.*
LaBerge: How about books? What were your favorite books?

Baker: You know, I never read a lot. I can't say I had any favorite books. I was not one to read a lot.

LaBerge: You were good at math. [laughs]

Baker: Yes. I used to listen to the radio. I used to follow sports. I used to listen to the baseball games and keep score. Then it was the Pacific Coast League, the San Francisco Seals and the Oakland Oaks and those teams. That was before major league baseball came. It didn't come here until 1958.

LaBerge: How about family gatherings? Was your extended family in the area?

Baker: My grandmother [Maude Trefts] lived in Berkeley. My father was from Missouri and I never knew my grandfather [Jack Baker] on his side. My grandmother [Lee Baker] I saw only a few times. She stayed in Missouri. My maternal grandfather [Ralph Trefts] died when I was about two years old. I never knew him. My maternal grandmother I knew quite well. Lived in an apartment at Oxford and Virginia. I used to go there and spend the night often. She was up probably every Sunday, I suppose, if I remember right. And the usual holidays, birthdays and Thanksgiving and Mother's Day and Christmas and all those sorts of occasions.

I had aunts and uncles and cousins that lived in Napa. We used to go there fairly often. So that was probably it for the extended family.

It was a good neighborhood and we were pretty close to each other in those Berkeley homes, you know. And the gentleman I mentioned as one of my great influences was—in addition to my father who had a great influence on me—was a man named Jim MacDonnell, who was the vice president of an insurance company. They had no children until very late in life. He was my father's age roughly, and he had a daughter when I was about fifteen years old. So he must have been, well, he was fifty probably, and his wife, probably was forty, forty-five. It was pretty old for child-bearing in those days.

But he told me a lesson I'll never forget. Two special memories about him. One is the lesson that the most important attribute you can have in life is to get along with people. Be nice to people. And if you have that as a built-in habit, he says, good things will happen. And I actually consciously worked on that. I call it "friendship maintenance." I'm one of these guys that makes the call— you know the AT&T television ad where these two old guys call in on the phone?

LaBerge: Yes.

Baker: I cry every time I see those. [laughs]

LaBerge: That's you. [laughs]
Baker: I'm one of those guys. [Laughter] Yes, I'm one of those guys.

Something else about him I remember was, on Pearl Harbor Day--I was out in front of our house--

LaBerge: You weren't too old. You were two or three?

Baker: I was six. Pearl Harbor was 1941.

I was out in front of my house and Mr. MacDonnell was across the street, out washing his car. He had a brand new Pontiac. He always had a new car, always with a radio in it. Pretty impressive. And he hollered at me, "Bill, Bill, get your father. Something big is happening." He had heard on his car radio as he washed his car, the news about Pearl Harbor. Little things stick in your memory like that.

Summertime at the Family Cabin in Strawberry

Baker: An important piece of my life happened right about the time I would have been graduating from junior high in 1950. And that was the year my father began to build our little cabin up in the mountains. I spent that summer, the next two summers, ages fifteen and sixteen, up at--I don't know if you know Highway 50, Placerville--

LaBerge: Yes.

Baker: --Echo Summit? Well, in between Placerville and Echo Summit is a little place called Strawberry Lodge and that's where we were, within about a mile of the road on Forest Service property. We built that. My dad and I, a couple of cabin neighbors, and a carpenter we hired for about three weeks. And we spent all summer building that cabin. My dad would come up on Friday and leave on Monday. Worked from sunup to sundown.

LaBerge: And were you there the whole summer?

Baker: Yes. We had a tent we camped in. My mother was up there most of the time, but I stayed there by myself some of the time. Digging the septic tank. I remember that. One of the cabin neighbors was a former World War II munitions expert and he'd come down with a stick of dynamite and blow it up and I'd dig for a while and I'd go get him when I couldn't dig anymore. He'd come down with another stick of dynamite.

So I was fifteen and sixteen. Those two years I spent pretty much all summer up working on our cabin. Then Strawberry Lodge in those days was a big resort with a tennis court, swimming pool, and a full-time lifeguard. And the summer I was seventeen--would have been 1952--I was the lifeguard at Strawberry Lodge.
LaBerge: I see. [Chuckles]

Baker: A hundred and twenty-five pounds of speed and romance. [Laughter]

In fact, I wrote a chapter of a book—should remember to bring that to you—about my summer at Strawberry Lodge. The guy who owns it now [Rich Mitchell] has become a good friend of mine. He's writing a book and he asked me to write a chapter about that piece of it. That was a great summer.

And the next summer, which would have been after I graduated from high school—I was the class of 1953—I worked as a lifeguard again, but this time at the Davis campus. The Davis campus in those days converted its gymnasium, swimming pool, athletic facilities; it became the City of Davis Community Center. And because one of the cabin neighbors who was my father's good friend was the business manager of the Davis campus—he'd have been a vice chancellor today—he got me this job as the lifeguard at the pool.

LaBerge: What was his name?

Baker: Cecil Norris. Marvelous man. One of the finest men I ever knew. He and my dad were real close friends. He was the munitions expert who helped me with the septic tank at our cabin.

LaBerge: So, it sounds like your biggest influences were some of your dad's friends, really.

Baker: Yes, that's right. And my brother-in-law, who I mentioned before, in the Gardner era interview.

High School Remembrances: Public Speaking, Sports, Trips

LaBerge: You were the bat boy for the Cal team.

Baker: Yes, right. My brother-in-law’s great, a marvelous, marvelous person.

There was a teacher in—this is kind of interesting—a teacher in high school. I took a public speaking class which counted as one of the English requirements. I took that class and I remember still, doing well in that class and learning that public speaking wasn't just stand-up talking; there's an art to it. His name was Thomas Kowalski. You must find in this work that people are amazed at the things they dredge out of their memories. I don't know where that came from. [laughs]

1. See Appendix.
Another memorable piece of my high school life was that I discovered, at the end of the eleventh grade, I was not eligible for the university because my GPA wasn't good enough. In those days you had to have a minimum of 3.0. There was no SAT for UC admissions then. And I was not eligible. I thought, I have got to get serious. And that last year, I got eleven out of twelve A's and just made it. 3.00, smooth.

LaBerge: Nobody ever talked to you about it? Your father didn't sit you down and say, "Okay, time to--"

Baker: No. Isn't that interesting?

LaBerge: Yes.

Baker: Now, isn't that interesting? No, nobody did that. And they were very interested in my schoolwork. I had a wonderful home environment for being a student. But nobody did. And geez, I was on my kids like a glove.

LaBerge: Me, too. I knew every test. [Laughs]


LaBerge: But maybe because in this day and age it's harder. It's more competitive.

Baker: Oh, yes, it is indeed. I filled out a three-by-five card and I was in. Engineering, no less, which nowadays is as tough as getting into medical school. I wasn't doing well because I just wasn't working very hard.

Played sports in high school. Basketball and track were my two sports. The older I got the slower I ran. Girls began to influence my life.

LaBerge: Well, I can tell that with the comment about the lifeguard.

Baker: Yes. Gosh, that was great. A license of some sort.

LaBerge: What about other family outings? Or did you spend all the summers at Strawberry before that?

Baker: No, no. We would always take vacations. Prior to the cabin, we would often rent a cabin up at Lake Tahoe. One of the great trips was in 1948. My father used to travel for the university, and he'd go to Boston and New York and Chicago, probably once a year. So he decided to package up a string of those kinds of meetings and probably a conference or so, and took my mother and my brother and I, by car, cross country for five weeks. We had to be taken out of school for five weeks and we went--great trip.

We went up through Salt Lake City and on to Detroit. Went to an automobile assembly plant. I remember that. Went to Cooperstown, New York, the Baseball Hall of Fame. Remember that. Went to New York City. I don't think we went to Washington, D.C.
New York City I remember, and Boston. Went to a New York Yankees-Cleveland Indians baseball game in Yankee Stadium. And then came back sort of mid-South through Tennessee and Kentucky on our way to Missouri where we stopped to visit my dad’s family. My father had a sister, who along with her husband continued to farm until they finally retired in Missouri in the same little town where he was born.

Tiny town in Missouri called Bois D'Arc. I don't know what that means. It's near Springfield.

Tiny little town. It had a little general store there and I remember going in that store with my uncle and the motto of that store was, "If we don't have it, you don't need it." [Laughs] We don't have it, you don't need it.

I had an uncle, who was my mother's brother, who was an influence on me. He's discussed in our other interviews.

LaBerge: Is he the one who went to Cal?

Baker: Yes, class of 1918. And he was a man who always had a good time. I kind of learned from him it's okay to have a really good time, carry on a bit. A bit crazy. He was as crazy as a loon.

LaBerge: Tell me his name again.

Baker: His name was Sam Trefts. Also my mother's maiden name. Unusual name. We once had a family reunion about the mid-seventies. Some of her second cousins organized this and over a hundred people came. One fellow, one of her second cousins, was an airline pilot and every time he'd go to a different city he'd go to the phone book and try to find Trefts. And one fellow came all the way from Pennsylvania for this reunion. We had it down in Santa Maria. We had it in a public park with a picnic table the size of this table [taps table] and they laid out this butcher paper and constructed a family tree and everybody was working on that, I remember. This guy turned out to be not in the same family!

LaBerge: I see. But his name was Trefts. [Laughs]

Baker: Which very well could have been a modification of another name over history, you know. A lot of people whose names today aren't what they started out with. But anyhow, I remember that.

Yes, Sam Trefts. Gosh, he was some piece of work. He taught me it's okay to be a little crazy, in a wonderful way!
Eagle Scouts

LaBerge: Would you go on outings with him, or--

Baker: No, just to each others' houses. I went backpacking with my father once. I don't know why we didn't do it more. Just the two of us. I was probably about ten or so. I was very active in the Boy Scouts. I was an Eagle Scout. Get that down.

LaBerge: I will. [Laughs]

Baker: Recently I was at Blake House before I retired, and there I was with [UC President Richard] Dick Atkinson and [Provost and Senior Vice President C. Judson] Jud King, who's a vice president, and a guy named Bill Gurtner–Medical Clinical Services Vice President.

Bill, Dick and Jud, those are three. There were five of us and we were all Eagle Scouts. And I remember saying, "Well, I'm not surprised." But, for example--do you know Jud King?

LaBerge: No, I don't.

Baker: Well, if you knew him you would not be surprised to discover he was an Eagle Scout. He still is an Eagle Scout. You would be surprised to find out that I was, though. I remember we discovered that.

So I did a lot of backpacking as a kid. Boy Scout troop. I think David Gardner and I were in the same Boy Scout troop. He thinks we were and I can't remember for sure, but it's likely.

Diversity in the City of Berkeley

Baker: You know, it's interesting, growing up in Berkeley, I never had any notion of various religions and how people as adults look upon people from those religions. The discrimination that the Jewish people have undergone, for example. Mormons have their special set of rules and take care of themselves. And Catholics with their not eating meat, eating fish on Friday. We used to call them mackerel snappers. But it never meant a thing to me. And as a matter of fact, I didn't even know about Jewish discrimination until I discovered while I was a freshman at Berkeley they had Jewish fraternities and sororities. I was absolutely dumbstruck by that, which says something about the quality of growing up in Berkeley because you take diversity on the natural. Don't even give it a second thought. And the same with people of color.
Berkeley High School, of course, had a very diverse student body and I was on many sports teams with all kinds of folks. I mean, you knew obviously, because when a person's black or white it's obvious, but you didn't dwell on it. Didn't even think about it much. And in Berkeley in those days, UC Berkeley was very white. Boy, I look back at those days and there were very few people of color, including Asians. You look at it today and it's hard to imagine how it was back then. Knowing my own feelings about the topic, I can't imagine it. That's just how life seemed to be.

LaBerge: What kind of religious background did you have, if any?

Baker: Oh, not much. Not much. We really didn't practice religion in the formal sense. We were not a church-going family. Nominally we would occasionally go to the Congregational Church here in Berkeley.

Sigma Nu Fraternity at UC Berkeley, 1953-1958

LaBerge: Well, since you opened up the subject, what about the Cal campus? We (in the Gardner era interviews) talked about your jobs on campus and doing civil engineering and everything else. What about, for instance, the social life and the diversity? Were you in a fraternity?

Baker: Yes, I was in a fraternity.

LaBerge: Which one?

Baker: Sigma Nu. It worked for me because it gave me a home. It gave me a social order, if you will. And I always needed that. I was always a bit of a follower, socially. I wasn't a social leader. A follower to a fault, really as I look back on it, I was timid. People that know me now don't believe that, but it's true. I was timid. Not shy, necessarily, but timid. I didn't want to be the first doing anything. I didn't mind being the second because you still got a little credit for being a leader if you were second, you know, from those who didn't know about the first one. [Laughs] And that went to the social activities with the opposite sex. I would have a terrible time asking a girl to the sophomore prom or whatever those things were, mostly because I was afraid she'd say no. Just in dead fear of it. I had to crank myself up something unbelievable to call up a girl and ask her to go to a school dance. [Laughs] I got over it.

I was a follower in terms of what you wore and what you did. And it wasn't until college I began to grow, I think, in terms of my social ability.

LaBerge: Did you live at the fraternity house, or did you live at home?
Baker: I lived at home for the first semester and lived in the fraternity house for the next six semesters. And then the last three semesters--should be ten altogether--last three semesters I lived in an apartment with friends.

There are four of my fraternity brothers all in the same class--so there are five of us--and to this day we're still very, very close. In fact, Fourth of July, a couple come up to spend the weekend with us. Next week another one's coming up to see us on their way up north. And the five of us get together with our wives most every year for some kind of an outing, and have for fifteen-odd-years. We do all sorts of different things. Sometimes up to somebody's cabin. We rented a house in Bodega Bay one time. Went to Catalina Island one year. Went to somebody else's cabin another time. Just different events--went to Montana once. Somebody gets an idea and plans it and away we go for about three or five days and have a great time.

Still see each other in the fall. One lives in Long Beach, one in San Marino, one in Salinas, and one in Palm Desert. They all still come to Cal football games, so in the fall we see them several times.

So my fraternity experience was a good experience. It gave me a built-in social life, without which, knowing me, I'd have struggled. I would not have had a social life. I'm generally against them today, much of what fraternities represent. Most of its activity, the drinking, hazing, all that stuff is awful. And I can't support fraternities anymore for those reasons.

##

LaBerge: Okay. You were talking about the fraternities.

Baker: At the time it really worked for me because it was a built-in social life and there's always somebody whose girlfriend has a girl to fix you up with.

LaBerge: Fix you up. You don't have to call. [Laughs]

Baker: Interesting. I needed that. I had a hard time with that aspect for some reason.

My athletic career ended because, you know, as you go on you have to be really good. [Laughs]

LaBerge: That's right. The pool's bigger.

Baker: And I played intramural sports. Played a lot of intramural sports. Had a good time doing that.

LaBerge: Any other activities on campus like ASUC, or--

Baker: No. No, I was always working and I had engineering to contend with. I didn't have time for anything else. Really didn't.
Used to ski a lot. I was an avid skier. Most weekends a bunch of us would go off just for the day or for the weekend.

**College Jobs: Construction, Engineering Lab, Postal Delivery**

Baker: Summer then, I started working in construction. In the summer of 1954--would have been after my first year of college--a friend of mine from kindergarten all the way through high school--his father was a contractor, pretty big road contractor, and he was a low bidder on a project. It's a piece of freeway that goes between Hayward and Castro Valley and I got a job on that project. Started out as a laborer and then ended up being a surveyor. And I worked for that contractor--the two summers with that project and then the next two summers on a piece of Nimitz freeway from around Warm Springs--you know where that is--below Warm Springs, Decoto, Union City, down that stretch. And so I worked on that project.

And then my last year--would have been summer of ’57 because by that time I had developed a little expertise in this surveying deal. There’s a person, me, who works with the motor grader on the fine grading. You run ahead and give him signals about how much to cut or fill. And I was pretty good at that. So I worked six days a week, six ten-hour days a week. And in those days you got double time for overtime. I was making a thousand bucks a month in 1957. That was pretty good.

But you know, Germaine, no matter how much I made in the summer, I ran out of money in April every year. Just like a clock. April. Right about April first I ran out of money. That was the darnedest thing. So I'd usually get a loan from my father to carry me through the last month or six weeks of school and that's where my first summer check went, to pay him back. [Laughter]

But you know, my income in that time--when I started out it was $2.10 an hour or something like that. So for eight hours--sixteen bucks. That's only eighty dollars a week. I was making three hundred bucks a month and three years later, a thousand bucks a month and I'd still run out of money in April. [Laughs]

LaBerge: That's really something. [Laughs]

Baker: I had a lot of different jobs--I don't know if I told you this before, but I worked in the engineering department--in the lab--making concrete samples and making concrete test beams and that sort of thing. I was a low-level research assistant for some faculty member. And I delivered flowers.

LaBerge: Oh. I knew you delivered mail but I didn't know you delivered flowers.

Baker: I delivered mail for the campus. I also delivered mail for the U.S. Postal Service at Christmastime for about two or three years.
I also delivered flowers--some guy I knew, knew someone who knew someone, you know. And there were two or three of us who worked on Valentine's Day, Mother's Day, Easter, Thanksgiving, Christmas. This guy had a floral delivery service--his business was delivering flowers for florists. He needed extra hands, so you'd go early in the morning, fill your car up with these pots and addresses and all day be delivering those flowers. And gosh, it was hard to find some of those streets. All through Berkeley, Oakland, Albany, and Richmond. You made fifty cents a delivery so you could make a hundred bucks in a day which was pretty darn good in those times.

So I did that for two or three years--on those holidays. Delivered mail for the Postal Service, delivered mail for UC. Oh, I had another job for one year, every Thursday night. There used to be a movie theater here on Bancroft, right across from Eshelman Hall, called Campus Theater. My job every Thursday night for $1.10 an hour--that was the minimum wage in those days--was to climb up on the ladder and change the marquee. [Laughs] And my friends would come by and heave stuff at me. I remember that. Up on that ladder. I did pretty well until the movie *Anastasia* came out. I remember that was a hard one.

LaBerge: To spell, you mean?

Baker: Yes. When you're right on top of it and the letters are as big as your face, you know. [Laughs]

**Memorable Professors**

LaBerge: Any memorable professors or classes that you took?

Baker: Well, Fred Stripp. Did you ever know Fred Stripp?

LaBerge: Oh, I did. I interviewed him.¹

Baker: Fred Stripp I had for speech. He was a very close family friend and in fact, he was really the family pastor.

LaBerge: Oh, was he?

Baker: When we had a wedding--both of my sisters and two of my cousins got married in our home--Fred Stripp, pastor. Funerals, Fred Stripp. My father's funeral, Fred Stripp. He was a close friend of the family.

Do you remember the terrible murder of a little girl named Stephanie Bryan, murdered by a man named Burton Abbott?

LaBerge: No.

Baker: It was 1954 or five. There was a ten-year-old girl who was abducted and ultimately discovered to have been murdered. The guy sat in front of me in Fred Stripp's class.

LaBerge: You're kidding.

Baker: Isn't that interesting? That's a side bar.

Well, I had other memorable professors. One was a professor of engineering named Clyne Garland. I wasn't doing very well--he was a friend of my father's and a neighbor--he put it to me, "You ought to think about another major." I said, "I'm not going to do that." And he helped me by tutoring me and counseling me and coaching me and encouraging me because I certainly hit a point there where I was on the edge of the ledge. A lot of people dropped out of engineering. Hard. Geez, is it hard. I don't know how I ever made it.

On the negative side there was a faculty member--you might even know, what was his name? Eberhart was his name. He was a tough guy and he used to make you get up in front of the class and work out a problem when you hadn't a clue how to work it out. Deadly embarrassing. I vowed never to be like that.

Oh, a lot of engineering professors. Carl Monismith was terrific. Jerry Raphael was terrific. Alex Scordelis was wonderful.

This is interesting. There was a visiting professor named Jim Spencer who taught a class in highway engineering. This would have been about my senior year and he wasn't much older than me. He was a young Ph.D., he might have been maximum five years older, probably twenty-six or twenty-eight years old. Memorable because I never knew anybody who taught in such a way that you could really understand. He made it so real. And he and his young wife had the whole class to his house for a barbecue. Nobody did that. Ever.

Network as CSU Consultant

Baker: Well, forty years later--this is no joke--last fall, forty years later--Barry Munitz who was the chancellor at CSU [California State University] and who I worked for as a consultant--he's gone now and I'm now working with the new chancellor of the CSU system [Charles Reed]. But I used to meet with Barry Munitz once a month to see if I was doing what he wanted, have him give me new assignments, and he said, "First
item, Jim Spencer. Ring a bell?" Well, it did because I remembered that guy because
of what I just told you.

Jim Spencer is now a retired faculty member at Cornell, runs a foundation. He's head
of a foundation. The Atlantic Philanthropic Foundation, anonymous money. Nobody
knows where the money comes from. And Barry Munitz is out seeing this guy in New
York hustling money for the CSU Monterey Bay campus and my name came up in
their conversation. Jim Spencer had tracked my career--Lord knows why. He says,
"Do you ever see Bill Baker from the University of California?" "See him? Why he's
working for me." The grant that the Atlantic Philanthropic folks were going to give to
the CSU Monterey Bay campus wasn't quite sealed yet. It's a unique campus.

LaBerge: We've been down there to check it out.

Baker: Well, it's unique. Different. And I went to Cornell in Ithaca, New York. As an
assignment from Barry Munitz to go see Spencer and seal the deal and I did. And we
had a great visit. That was amazing! This guy remembered me. I mean, see, it's
logical I could remember him. He was a faculty member--

LaBerge: He was the professor.

Baker: --did something special, I was just his student. But how he remembered me is beyond
me today. Went out and had lunch with him and his wife at his home and spent the
day. And he called me two weeks later--I wrote him a note thanking him--he called
me and said, "We're about to make this grant and I’ve got one question." I said,
"What's the question?" He said, "Do you think we should do it?" I said, "Yes." And
he says, "Done."

LaBerge: Wonderful.

Baker: Isn't that an amazing story?

LaBerge: Yes, it is. Yes, yes.

Baker: That really is an amazing story.

Ithaca's hard to get to. I was in New York on other business. I had a board meeting
there and so I flew over and back and it was a day's journey. It's tough to get there.
Pretty place. Amazing how isolated it is.

LaBerge: You know who is there now--and you probably did know this--is [UC Davis

Baker: Ted Hullar. I tried to go see him. In fact, Jim Spencer called Ted Hullar that day and
we were going to have a surprise visit because I knew Ted quite well. Another Eagle
Scout. You wouldn't be surprised about that.

LaBerge: No, no. I'm not surprised at that. [Laughter]
Baker: But we couldn't see him. I did drop Ted a note that said sorry I missed him, but I didn't hear back.

More on Background

Baker: In my era you go to school because you're supposed to. That's what you do. I mean, you're programmed. You don't even think about the options that kids do these days and the plethora of activities they're engaged in. Cub Scouts, Boy Scouts, and school sports teams, that's it. That's what we did. And I wasn't any different from anybody else. That's what we all did. And if you didn't do sports, why, you know some were more studious or they had hobbies. I remember one kid was a model railroad builder.

All these things are going on now with the parents' involvement. Although my parents were always very supportive. They'd come to my sporting events, not all of them, but come to most of them. Now parents are so engaged in kids' lives. I don't know if that's good or bad.

So mostly I did just what everybody did and what you're supposed to do. You go to school and you get done with sixth grade, you go to junior high, get done with that, you go to high school, get done, you go to college. I've said that, as a joke, I thought it was a state law you had to go to UC Berkeley. [Laughs] Not far from the truth.

But then graduate school. I didn't--

LaBerge: You didn't consider that.

Baker: No. My father encouraged me to, but in the fifties you were so anxious to get out and make a buck, make a living. That's what you did. Relatively few people went to graduate school.

Military Service

LaBerge: And how about the service? Did you have to--

Baker: Yes. It's a whole other avenue here, Germaine. In those days, the Cold War was going on. The draft was still on. And you had some choices: you get drafted, go in the army for a couple years; you could enlist in the service of your choice; you could go to--if you were a college graduate of the right type--you could go to Officers’ Candidate School; or you could go into either the air force or the army for six months active duty coupled with five and a half years of reserve duty, total six years.
LaBerge: I have a brother-in-law who did that.

Baker: Or you could get an exemption. What kind of exemption? Well, a critical job, graduate school. That's about it as far as I can remember.

Everybody's choosing different options; ROTC was another option. A lot of people did that. A lot of my friends were in ROTC because that was a way--a better life in terms of serving your military time. I didn't fit so well in ROTC.

LaBerge: So you tried it.

Baker: We had to. Two years were compulsory then. I mean, they yell at you and they make you march around. I didn't care for it. I was not made for the military life. I got a "D" in ROTC. Can you imagine that? People can't imagine. How could you do that?

I can remember this wonderful faculty member at USC [University of Southern California], a man named Leo Buscaglia. He just died. That's why it's on my mind. He was a psychologist and his specialty was love and caring and the emotions associated with that and he gave a course at USC called Love 1A. His joke was, can you imagine getting a "C" in Love 1A? [Laughs] Much less flunking it.

So I could see going on for the second two years to become an officer was not for me. But many did it.

So I graduated and because I was working on this Bay Bridge project which we talked about [Gardner era interview], believe it or not, that project was then considered by the [United States] Department of Defense as being critical to the national defense because it was a main artery to a main city. And working on that project gave me an exemption which was nonsense, of course, but nonetheless I had it. I didn't apply for it. It just happened on the natural.

I didn't trust that exemption. And so I decided that I would serve my time and I planned to go to Naval Officers’ Candidate School. And I was accepted. I had a hard time with the physical because I had had asthma when I was a kid and they made a big deal out of it. I had to go get special examinations and doctors’ letters and all this sort of thing to pass, but I was accepted. In those days, it was very difficult to get into one of those six month programs because you had to be a member of an active reserve unit and they only had so many slots. And until somebody decided to drop out, there were no slots.

This would have been 1958. It would have been spring of '58 so I was still a student and my dad was still on the Berkeley campus. A guy who worked with him was a reserve general officer. His name was Dick Nedderson, who I never really knew. Well, I couldn't get in one of these reserve units. I thought, well, I'll go into the Navy OCS. So I was guaranteed to be in the seabees as a civil engineer and that sounded like an exciting thing to do. I was all for it.
The very night before I was to go down to be sworn in, my father came home and said, "Well, Mr. Nederson tells me that there's a spot opened up in his reserve unit." This is "who you know, not what you know." And I had to make a decision that night obviously, because I was to go get sworn in the next day. Agonizing decision. Decided to go into the army for six months mainly because it was only six months and the other was a three-year commitment and I was going to be working and I thought it's going to--

LaBerge: Interrupt your life?

Baker: Disrupt my career, says I. So that was the basis upon which I made that decision. And only I could make it. My father says, there are pluses and minuses. He helped me analyze it, but he didn't give me a clue which way I should go. So I turned down the navy (in retrospect, I wish I had accepted, but that's hindsight) went in the army--six months. Awful experience. I mean, they yell at you. You know, they never call you Bill. They call you "Baker!" Constantly yell at you. I didn't care for that. They make you run a lot.

LaBerge: Where were you stationed?

Baker: Fort Ord. Monterey Bay. I'm back. I've been down there a lot. I was down this week. Down there Tuesday as a matter of fact.

In the army, you go through the first eight weeks as basic training where you do your basic soldiering. The second eight weeks is your specialty class. I became a clerk/typist. I did figure out which was the easiest. I was smart enough to figure that out. Well, a couple things happened in the army in my six months. They made us run down to get a haircut every week. I mean they'd make us line up outside our barracks at about six o'clock at night, run down and get a haircut, and run back. Two hundred guys get a haircut all at once. I thought, there's money to be made here. So I bought a pair of electric hair clippers, and opened a barber shop. So while they're all running down getting a haircut, I'd give haircuts. Fifty cents apiece. I made more money than my army pay cutting hair. I had to hire guys to be lookouts and I had to put a cold compress on the clippers. They got too hot. They'd burn guys' necks. [Laughter]

And then I finished with that first eight weeks and I went to clerks' school. And next to the clerks' school was the cooks' school and in the cooks' school was a real civilian barber. That's what he did when he wasn't being in the army. He opened up with competition. And he started to shave sideburns. I couldn't do that so I cut my prices. I ran him out of business at two bits [twenty-five cents] a pop, but I wasn't making enough money to make it worthwhile so I finally gave it up.

Meantime when I was in the army at Fort Ord, in my first eight weeks everybody had a duty around the barracks. My duty was to clean the captain's office each night which took about a minute and a half, but I made it take an hour. I'd read stuff in there. I discovered he was a Korean War vet who'd gotten the Congressional Medal of Honor and they made him a captain. He was dumber than a post, but they made him a
captain because he was a hero. So he never read these army regulations and there was a whole bookcase full of the army regulations, twenty volumes.

I started looking. I found in there if you had a critical skill, you could get out early. Well, I was going to go back to working on the bridge. I worked there for six months, went in the army six months, came back, my job was still there for me. So I got them to write a letter for me, the bridge folks, that I was badly needed back at work and I had a critical skill, and I got an early release. But it took so long to process the paperwork that I got out three days early and in the process lost all my veteran's benefits, because I later learned in order to qualify for veteran's benefits you had to have at least six months active duty. Well, what'd I lose out on? A VA loan, veteran's hospital, that's about it. I mean, there really weren't many benefits, but I was too smart for my own good. I outsmarted myself. So that's my army career.

LaBerge: So then did you have to go on the reserve thing once a month or whatever?

Baker: No, because of this exemption.

LaBerge: So your exemption really wasn't phony.

Baker: It really did work. And it really saved me from ever having to go to summer camp. I got out of summer camp because the first time I was going to be going on active duty within six months. Second time, I'd been on active duty within six months. Third time, I had this critical skill. I got transferred to another kind of reserve unit. And the officer that signed that paper knew what I was up to--he knew. And he says, "You don't like this, do you? I know why you're doing it." He was just a civilian who was continuing reserve duty. A lot of people continue in active reserve and they get a little money for it and they have to go to a meeting once a week and summer camp or something like that. He knew what I was doing, but he couldn't do anything about it, so I got out. I never went to summer camp. That's the end of my military career.

[Laughs]

LaBerge: That's pretty good. Pretty good.
II EARLY CAREER AT UC SYSTEMWIDE, 1964-1978

Construction Program: Expansion of Infrastructure

LaBerge: Well, we did talk about your first jobs and working on the bridge [Gardner era interview]. Let's start with your first job for [University of California] systemwide in 1964. You told me how you got it and you weren't sure if you wanted to work where your father worked. What were you doing? I know Frank Crouch was your boss.

Baker: That's right. I knew for sure I had to get out of Caltrans. That was not my future. The bridge project was done and I had no idea what was going to be next. I just didn't see a clear path. And this was perfect because I lived in Berkeley. I rented a little house next to Live Oak Park owned by the city of Berkeley and I didn't have to move. At the time--I think I told you--my son was two and a half and a daughter about to be born January second. I went to work for the university February third. And so it just seemed to be a convenient thing to do at that time. The university was generally a good place and so I took it.

They were just beginning to build the three new campuses at Irvine, Santa Cruz, and San Diego. It was a huge construction program and there were lots of problems that surfaced to University Hall from the campuses. For example, problems with contractors. In those days, construction contracts were signed centrally, so I would review the construction contract before Frank Crouch would sign them. That's one thing I did. The new campuses had a big building program and lots of infrastructure. They didn't have roads or wires or pipes, so a big component of the building program was infrastructure. An unusually large component because of the nature of new building. Other campuses like Davis were expanding dramatically and Riverside and UCLA and even Berkeley. So we had a huge growth.

The capital budget people, beginning with Bob Walen, who was the head of the capital budget. He and Ian Turner, Pat Henry, a fellow named Dan Mackey, along with another named John Noyes, used to play the bells in the Campanile--they were all on his staff. They were all budget analyst type folks. They were looking to be sure that the number of square feet was consistent with state standards and that the building was
consistent with the academic plan and all that sort of thing. And then they needed to set priorities because the campuses always had a thirst for more money than God had. You could never have enough. So you had to make some decisions about what got funded and what didn't get funded. They would measure the building program proposed by the campuses against academic plans, against the growth plan, the curriculum, making sure that Riverside wasn't trying to do some esoteric program that Berkeley already did. You know, the sort of things that analysts look at.

But all these infrastructure projects came along and they didn't know anything about it. Why do you need to expand the steam plant? Why can't the road be two lanes instead of four? Why can't the pipe be eight inches instead of twelve?

**Trips to Sacramento**

Baker: What was happening was, the legislature had a staff person who was an engineer in the office that they call the Legislative Analyst. And the Department of Finance had a staff person who was reviewing the proposals, he was also an engineer, and they were asking questions that these [UC] guys couldn't answer. And we were getting some buildings with no pipes and wires. That's kind of an exaggeration, but there was a problem. [Vice President, Business] Elmo Morgan said, “Well, let's have Bill go up and talk to these guys and say we've got a problem here. We've got to straighten this out. We can't be not getting the projects we need to make things work.”

So I went up to Sacramento--this would have been in my first few months, I suppose. It must have been the first few months. It wasn't hard. I understood the questions--even if I didn't understand the question, I had learned early on how to pretend you understand because I always had this fear of being embarrassed, an old dummy. So I learned early in my life to pretend I knew what was going on in any situation really out of fear of embarrassment. They liked me because I was nodding at a good question. I write it down, I go back to the campuses, try to figure it out, get the answer, come back, give them the answer and began to take on a piece of the capital budget. I was also reviewing construction contracts, I was working with our attorneys a lot on problems they had with the construction contracts to try to develop--

**Working on Contracts with the General Counsel's Office**

LaBerge: And this is the General Counsel's office?

Baker: Yes, yes. Particularly, George Marchand. You might know that name.

LaBerge: That name sounds familiar.
Baker: I worked with him a lot. Don Reidhaar was the general counsel back in those days. So I worked with them a lot because they would try to make our contracts bulletproof.

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LaBerge: Okay, so you were negotiating these contracts.

Baker: We're working between the campus architects and engineers' offices and our attorneys trying to get a contract to the point where the lawyers would approve it so that we could sign it, because Mr. Crouch couldn't sign it until it was approved by the lawyers. So that big piece, along with the infrastructure projects kept me pretty busy in the beginning.

LaBerge: Had you been trained to do that? To read the contracts and everything as an engineer or--

Baker: Well, not trained, but I had on-the-job training. Because on the bridge project you really had to work at interpreting contracts, what the document said, particularly because it was a remodeling project, if you will, and things are rarely as they are expected to be in remodeling. If you've ever remodeled your house, you open up that wall, my gosh, I didn't know there were wires in that wall. And so as a remodeling project, there was lots of field decisions that had to be made. So you really had an experience in reading contract language, contract plans, and interpreting them and implementing them. It was a very good experience. So I had that experience.

I think, if I remember, that's when I started making campus visits. I went to campuses a lot because that's where the work was.

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**Campus Visits Bring Credibility in Sacramento**

LaBerge: Tell me about some of them, if you remember. I know that you went to Riverside for your first trip.

Baker: My very first one. My first week I was there.

LaBerge: Who did you go talk to?

Baker: I went to talk to the people in the architects and engineers offices. At Berkeley, it would have been people like George Kimball, Florence Baldwin, and Louis DeMonte, who was the campus architect. Those are some Berkeley names that come to mind.

I can remember the names of the people at each campus who I worked with. I would make a call, say who I was. The first time I said, "Mr. Crouch has asked me to come up and take a look and talk about these projects," so I'd go up and we'd talk about them. Made some terrific friends. Just wonderful people.
Never really had anybody that I couldn't get along with and get the job done. A lot of engineers are absolutely stick-in-the-muds, but we all wanted to get the job done and there's always pressure because the students were coming or the buildings were coming. Always pressure.

I ended up sort of changing the way we did those projects in terms of planning and getting the money. I decided that rather than send something up and have the state folks tear it apart and come back with half a loaf, let's tighten up our loaf so when we go up there we got a project that I know I can defend. And I know it will answer the questions they're going to have.

I had to push on the campuses quite a bit because they always wanted more than I thought they needed. That's just nature. But I got the money they needed so they had trust in me because even though they didn't like that we had a pared down project, at least I got it. So I then got heavily into that part of the building program.

I started going to the campuses early then and worked with them so that by the time the document, the project proposal, hit my desk, I had already written half of it. I got way up in the front end of a project--and I knew the projects, really in and out--so when I went to Sacramento, they couldn't stump me because I'd really work hard at knowing those projects.

LaBerge: So how did you learn? Just by reading or--

Baker: Learned it from other people. Not afraid to ask questions. I wasn't afraid to ask, "I haven't really dealt with a steam plant before. Tell me how it works and tell me why you need it--how do you decide how big it is?" Because there's a big steam turbine that's run by gas and it's the heat that circulates through the buildings, right? There's a central heating plant here in Berkeley down by Edwards Field, by the baseball diamond.

"How do you know how big it should be?" Well, they would teach me how. You have this many square feet. I say, "Well, you seem to have a little extra in here." "Well, we ought to have that just in case." "Just in case what?" I would say. So that's how I'd approach it and we'd get it pared down so that I didn't have to go up and have that very question asked of me in Sacramento because I learned it was going to come so I'd get it done first.

I think that turned out to be a good thing to do because it generally worked and I developed a reputation of being a straight shooter. I didn't come to Sacramento asking for something I couldn't justify. I didn't really do it for that reason. I did it because I just thought that's the best way to do it. But it turned out that I developed a long-standing reputation for being honest and they could trust me. That helped a lot. That really turned out to be an important piece of good luck since I happened to do that for different reasons. It turned out that it gave me credibility in Sacramento. The only coin of the realm in Sacramento is credibility.
The Free Speech Movement, 1964, and Its Effect on Building Projects

LaBerge: And you didn't know you were going to be doing that the rest of your life, going up to Sacramento. That might have been just short term.

Baker: That’s right. I like construction and I liked administration of construction and I thought, you know, there ought to be a vice president for construction. That's what I should be. [Laughs] I really did think that just like everybody thinks there ought to be a vice president for oral history, right? I did that for quite a while, spent a lot of time on the campuses and--

LaBerge: While you were doing it--just let me ask you about some other things that were happening. Things like the Free Speech Movement and Vietnam. How did that affect what you were doing?

Baker: Not very much. Well, that's not quite correct. It affected me in the following way: one, of course, I was there. I mean, I was here while it was going on.

LaBerge: So you could witness it.

Baker: It was going on. It was in the air, literally. The National Guard surrounded University Hall one or two times. I guess there was going to be a march on University Hall or something. I had friends on the Berkeley campus that would come down to our offices to use it as an outpost. So I was around it, but never directly involved in it except--because I didn't work with the regents in those days at all--except testifying before the legislature. Here I am trying to get a steam plant or some mundane thing and I get blasted for what's going on on the campuses. So we did have, those of us who were working Sacramento for the budget, did get beat up a bit, fair amount from that. Those were hard days.

LaBerge: Yes. How would you handle it? I mean, it wasn't your responsibility and you were just, as you said, trying to get a steam plant.

Baker: The way you handle it is just don't take their bait. Say, “Well, it's pretty bad. I agree, Senator. But the answer to your question about the steam plant was--” I deflected. They just wanted to rant and rave in front of the audience because there were always public hearings, there was always a full audience. So they wanted to rant and rave. I just never took the bait. Passive resistance. It's a great tool.

Learned that from George Marchand, the lawyer. Passive resistance.

We really didn't get hurt by the legislature in financial terms--they didn't penalize us. They talked about it a lot. A lot of talk about it, but in fact, I don't recall that we got penalized for it. Beat up a bit, yes, but not actually penalized. They didn't cut our budget because of this problem.
Governor Reagan Fires UC President Clark Kerr

LaBerge: What about the governor or Department of Finance?

Baker: Well, Ronald Reagan became governor in 1966 so I enjoyed two years of [Governor Edmund G., Sr.] Pat Brown, who was wonderfully generous to the university. Reagan came in with a campaign as governor to “clean up the university.” And of course he fired [UC President] Clark Kerr, at the very first regents’ meeting. And cut us. The budget folks called it the Ronald Reagan haircut--take 10 percent off the top. [Laughter] And he did. He cut our budget by 10 percent, which was a lot, as a punitive measure.

LaBerge: What was the feeling, just in University Hall when Clark Kerr was fired? Do you remember what was happening or what people were saying or reactions?

Baker: Shock. It was shock. President getting fired? Shock. Remembering that preceding President Kerr was twenty-eight years of one guy, Robert Gordon Sproul. So the culture of the institution was not used to changing presidents. And to have one get fired? I mean, was just absolute shock. Disbelief.

Well, the regents did something very smart. They made Harry Wellman acting president. Harry Wellman, the most beloved university administrator probably ever. Just the grandest guy.

Harry Wellman took over as president, the perfect calming influence for a system in a variety of shocks because of the whole campus unrest and disruption. People were beleaguered and beaten down and worn out and then Kerr was fired. People tend not to recognize a large institution for its inertia. You know, if all the top administrators went down in an airplane, it would just keep on going.

LaBerge: Because people keep coming to work and doing the job.

Baker: Just keep on going. People overlook that and get "the world is coming to an end" and "the sky is falling" thoughts and feelings. Harry was perfect because he calmed the water. Calmed everybody down.

Campus Scope Visits

Baker: But in those days of the sixties, the work for me was out on the campuses. That's where I did it. And we were having for the most part, a great time. We were building. Everyone was building like crazy. For someone in the building business, that's a fun time.
LaBerge: Did you have relationships with those chancellors?

Baker: I began to, yes. There is an annual tribal ritual called the "scope visit" wherein the state staff comes and spends a day on the campus with the campus staff and the Office of the President staff. Probably two to five state people and two to five OP people, so five to ten visitors and the campus staff. And the chancellor always participated in that day.

The word "scope" was often thought to be an acronym for State Capital Outlay Program Evaluation, but that acronym was made up in a bar by me and an architect on our staff. It stood for “let's go out and check the scope of these proposed projects.” It was not an acronym, but people thought it was. A guy named Cochrane Brown, who was an architect on Vice President Morgan's staff, he and I always took these trips together because he was trying to figure out the cost of the buildings and I was doing the same thing on the infrastructure. We made that up. And people thought that was an acronym, but it really wasn't. [laughs] And they still have these tribal rituals where these guys come down and the chancellor dances and these twelve-year-old state analysts ask nasty questions.

Well, the chancellors liked me because I knew more about the engineering projects than sometimes their own staff did because I always spent a lot of work on that. And I got the money. I answered the questions. And I got along with these state guys, too. So I got to know them in that context and of course, much more when I became director of the capital budget. Then I worked with them a lot.

One of my favorite chancellors was Vernon Cheadle at Santa Barbara because he invited me into his kitchen when I was about twenty-nine years old. I thought, man, that's some kind of guy. A great big, giant chancellor. It's like the President of the United States inviting you to his house, into his kitchen. "Come on, Bill." Put his arm around me. I thought that was great. I'll never forget that.

There's another story about Emil Mrak who was at Davis. You might have heard this story. If you have I won't repeat it.

LaBerge: I haven't heard anything from you about him.

Baker: Emil Mrak was a grand, grand person. Just one of the grandest. His architect, his campus architect, was a guy named Cliff Jay. Mr. Jay lived in Davis and he played golf with the chief protagonist in the Department of Finance, Russ Thompson. He was the one who reviewed our capital budget. They used to play golf together because they were friends. And they used to have these mock bets. "Okay, this putt is for your chemistry building. You know, if you miss it, you don't get it. Whoever gets the best on this hole gets to have a new road," or something like that. They'd just have fun.

Well, Chancellor Mrak heard about this. So he wrote Mr. Jay a formal letter. Campus architect, Clifford Jay. "Dear Mr. Jay, Either learn how to play golf orquit gambling with the building program. Signed, Chancellor." [Laughter] That was great.
Yes, the chancellors were all pretty good folks. I knew every one of them, one degree or another. Mostly through the building program. Almost exclusively through the building program in the beginning. Then later on when I was vice president, I worked with them all the time because of the regents’ meetings and the Council of Chancellors and all kinds of politics and whatnot. I got to know them. I got the privilege of working with them early on.

Did I tell you my Chuck Young story? Chancellor at UCLA for so long?

Well, back in those days, it's just hard to believe that they did this, but they would have not only the scope visit of the state staff, but in addition two or three vice presidents and their staff would go spend a whole day on each campus, just about the building program. Just to learn about it and have the campus dog and pony shows and so forth. I got to go on those trips because infrastructure was an important piece of the capital budget. Not too many staff got to go. That was a real special break for me because you learn a lot by being around those kinds of people and you get to know them as well.

So on my very first visit to UCLA they have the meetings in the chancellor's conference room, it's called, and it's even bigger than this room and this table [Stone Seminar Room in The Bancroft Library]. And of course, it's fine polished wood that you would imagine they'd have at UCLA. This is probably in '66 or '67, something like that. Franklin Murphy was the chancellor. Chuck Young was the vice chancellor for administration. He was only two years older than I.

I had four shocks all in that day. The first shock was--and being vice chancellor is a big job when you're a staffer. It's a really big job. I couldn't believe that the vice chancellor was my age. I was dumbfounded. I mean, just overwhelmed. How could that be? Shock number one. Shock number two, he was an extremely mouthy guy. I mean, I couldn't believe the things he was saying. Insulting people and cajoling people and mouthing off all the time. That was a shock. Shock number two. Shock number three, Franklin Murphy in the course of the meeting stood up to his full five-foot-three and said, "For Christ's sake, Chuck, will you sit down and shut up?" Shock number four, he did. I never forgot that. That was my introduction to Chuck Young.

LaBerge: And Chuck Young is about, what? Six feet plus tall?

Baker: Yes. I was up against the wall where the staff sits, not at the table. I mean, that was just amazing. [laughing] It was really something.

LaBerge: Dean McHenry?

Baker: Dean McHenry at Santa Cruz, Dan Aldrich at Irvine.

LaBerge: San Diego.

Baker: San Diego was a guy named--he's a historian.
LaBerge: John Galbraith?

Baker: Yes, John Galbraith. And Riverside, Ivan Hinderaker. Although actually, in the very beginning there was a guy that preceded him, but I never really knew him. Santa Barbara was Vernon Cheadle, and Santa Cruz, Dean McHenry. The Berkeley chancellor back there was Ed Strong and then Roger Heyns. I knew Roger quite well. Wonderful, wonderful man.

In San Francisco they had Bill Fleming, at one time, a dentist. I guess I got to know Frank Sooy as well as I knew any of the San Francisco chancellors.

**Vice President Elmo Morgan and His Staff**

LaBerge: Did they have, what, campus planning committees? And would you meet with them or who would meet with them?

Baker: No. We had, on Vice President Morgan's staff, people who were called planners. Campus planners. Al [Albert] Wagner, Naftaly Knox and Ira Fink. They were all planners. Vice President Morgan always had one staff person who was an ex-officio member of each campus planning committee and those guys all served in that role. Cochrane Brown, I think, did some of that, too. Bob Evans, of course, was the University Architect in those days. He oversaw all that. Hadn't seen him in a while and he came down to my retirement party. It was wonderful to see him. He looks like a million bucks.

LaBerge: What was your impression of people like Elmo Morgan and Bob Evans and the people you were working for? Or did you not have much contact?

Baker: Oh, yes, yes.

LaBerge: You did.

Baker: Elmo, of course, was my great hero. I mean, boy, he was what I wanted to be when I grew up. He just was such an impressive guy and he had a style that I emulated. He always talked about doing missionary work which meant he would go talk to folks and lay the groundwork and get things set before you call for a decision. He taught me to never call for the vote until you've done your missionary work. So I learned that from him about schmoozing, which is really what it is. You spend time with people so that they get to know you and trust you and like you and then the rest comes easy. They're not fighting you emotionally. They like you and they want to join hands, and go to work, get things done. I really adopted that philosophy.

I learned as much from Elmo, I think, as anybody. He was so well liked and so highly respected, highly regarded. I copied his style in terms of working with the campus people and it worked for me. Because one of the issues about being responsible for
the budget is that you're saying "no" all the time. You're always saying "no." You say "no" for a living. And to say "no" and have them still like you was sort of a trick. I think I learned that from Elmo.

Frank Crouch was more of a very straight ahead guy. Schmoozing wasn't his game.

Bob Evans was the consummate architect. He was always looking at things through the architect's eye. I remember something he used to tell me about landscaping because landscaping money was part of the infrastructure packages I worked on, and the state was usually cutting out landscaping as a frill. "Bring back some petunias, will ya?" Well, I always tried to get some petunias for Bob. He remembered that because he said that to me when I saw him at my retirement reception. He remembered that.

LaBerge: That was probably particularly important at Santa Cruz and Irvine where there was nothing, right?

Baker: Yes. Any campus where you build a new building, you have to have landscaping that goes around it. And the state always wanted to cut that out. They viewed it as a frill. So you had to fight like the devil to get those petunias, really fight hard.

LaBerge: Did you have any contact with Thomas Church?

Baker: Yes, a little because he was the design architect on some landscaping projects and a consulting landscape architect sort of overseeing a number of our developments. I can't remember which ones, but Tommy Church was well known. I had little to do with him directly, but more at the periphery, dealing with his ideas and trying to get money for his ideas rather than him personally.

Justification for Roads, Pipes, and Wires

LaBerge: How did you adapt to being the person who was trying to get the money? I mean, because you certainly didn't think you were going to be doing that.

Baker: No, I surely didn't. Well, it was all quite evolutionary because I started as a construction engineer. That's what I was trained to do, that's what I did, I'd been four summers in construction, I worked on the bridge project for six years, that's what I did. And that's what I thought I came to the university to do.

Well, the first step might be that they didn't want to give us money for this road because they say we don't need it. Well, I know a little bit about how to analytically determine whether or not you need a road. You’ve got traffic counts and patterns; there's a science to it. And so I could do that--that was an easy transition because I knew something about the topic. Getting the money was incidental. The topic was, as
I looked at it, was the road or the pipes or the wires. It wasn't the money, it was the road. And you sort of don't look at it as always trying to get the money.

I looked at it as if I was trying to answer a question. They asked a question or made a statement. "You don't need this road." I said, "Well, yes, we do need this road. Let me show you why." Because I'd been to the campus to find out why. Well, how do we justify it? So we'd talk about it or the campuses got these studies and this consulting guy and we had this much traffic and project this many students, this many cars. There's a science to it.

So I would come back and say, "Here's why we need that road." And I'd get it because I had the right answer that somebody else got for me, but I had it. I was the spokesperson for the campus people who had the answers. I wasn't looking at it as getting the money. I was looking at it as an engineering problem, really. But of course, it was getting the money. But I didn't look at it that way.

**Planning Under Vice President Joe McGuire, 1970**

Baker: In 1970 was the first major reorganization I experienced. They brought in a new vice president for planning, a guy named Joe McGuire who--retired now--came from the University of Illinois. I believe he had been the dean for the school of business in Illinois, something like that. Came here to be vice president of planning. Later became the dean of the school of business at Irvine.

LaBerge: And was this when Elmo was retiring?

Baker: Yes. Elmo had left. He had actually left to go to Washington to be assistant secretary of the interior and that's about when this was. I think he actually left before this.

LaBerge: He took a leave and then came back.

Baker: Took a leave maybe in '69 or something like that, I kind of forget, but I know that Bob Evans was “acting” at the time. He was acting as head of the office during Elmo's leave.

Hitch would have been president and McCorkle was the vice president, like the executive vice president, the top vice president. And they decided to put the operating budget and capital budgets under a vice president for planning. And so Evans and Loren Furtado each reported to Joe McGuire. Elmo's office, then headed by Bob Evans, didn't do just the capital budget, they did maintenance and things like easements and utilities and engineering, architecture, and construction contracts. That all got reorganized under Joe McGuire.
Importance of the Correct Office Location

Baker: That was an interesting break for me because when that happened, they physically separated the office, Elmo's old office run by Evans. On the second floor where Vice President McGuire was, they made space for about five people. Evans and Bob Walen and Frank Crouch who were lead guys and Dick [Richard] Grenfell, who was the number two architect under Evans, and there was one more office. Those people were the principals. They each reported to Bob Evans.

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LaBerge: There is one more office left.

Baker: This is important because I believe it had to do with my career. In the following way: Who's going to get that other office?

LaBerge: And they're all big guys. [laughter]

Baker: Yes, and they're all important people. I reported to Frank Crouch. And I thought to myself, "The second floor is where you've got to be, because that's how you get to know the vice president, that's how you're in on the action, that's where the hallway conversations take place. Otherwise you're just stuck up there on the sixth floor, a bunch of staff people with nobody to ever see or hear from us."

Just on instinct, I thought, "That's where I've got to be." I went to my pal, Bob Walen, who I worked with a lot and got him to be my champion because of my close working relationship with him and the building program. Now, others could have made this argument just as easily as I could but they didn’t. He made the case for me, and nobody else really stepped up. Others wanted to do it, but somehow my argument prevailed, and I got to be in that last available second-floor office. And that was important, because that's how I got to know the budget people.

Joe McGuire, the new vice president, liked me; I liked him. He's a good guy, easy style. So we had a good relationship. I began to do more and more with the capital budget because I began to have some influence over some of the decisions that Bob Walen made, worked closely with him. He and I were really close.

Reorganization Under Vice President McCorkle, 1974

Baker: McGuire, after four years of trying to coordinate planning, got the boot, because McCorkle wouldn't let him do his job. McCorkle was the guy who ran the budget, in terms of making the decisions about who got what money for what. McGuire was frustrated, and I gather that he and Chet didn't see eye to eye--and I don't know this--
but he was out. Nobody gets fired. He was "returned to the laboratory." That's what we do with academics. They never get fired; they return to the laboratory. [laughter]

And Chet had a big reorganization at that time.

LaBerge: This was 1970?

Baker: No, this was '74. A major reorganization where he decided to put the capital and operating budgets together under [Loren] Furtado. And all the construction, architecture, and engineering—all that was going to go under the vice president for business.

**Director of the Capital Budget**

Baker: He separated the capital budget out and asked me to be the director of the capital budget. There was no search; there was no job description published. He just called me in one day and said, "This is what I'd like you to do."

Well, I turned it down because—I might have told you this already in an earlier interview. I told him, "I've got to think about it," and I came back the next day and I turned it down, because I had the idea that I could never become vice president through the budget.

LaBerge: You did tell me this.

Baker: Because I wasn't a budget person; I was a construction guy. What if my friends found out? So I'd never make it. My only shot is to become a vice chancellor on campus and maybe become a vice president through that route. So I turned it down.

That evening—I told you the story about running into Joe McGuire who had come back for something. He was gone, but he came back for a meeting or something, and I told him. He said, "Well, you ought to think that over. Sometimes to advance yourself you have to change your spots." And that chance meeting in the University Hall parking structure changed the course of my life.

I went back the next day and told McCorkle, "I've reconsidered. I'll take it." "Good," he said, "Good!" Only one day had passed, so he hadn't had time to do anything. I told him, I explained to him why I had turned him down. He didn't disagree with that. He said, "Well, that's probably logical. I don't disagree with that." So Joe McGuire changed my mind. That was, then, the beginning of the most fun time I guess I ever had in my university career.

LaBerge: And was it considered a promotion?

Baker: Yes. Definitely a promotion.
Setting the Stage for the 1970s.

LaBerge: Today is March 12, 1999. We're in the study room in the Doe Library. As I said last time, we ended in 1974, when you decided to take a new job. Charles Hitch was president. Tell me who your immediate supervisor was.

Baker: At the time, it was Frank Crouch, whom I'm sure you knew. He was the university engineer, and I was the associate university engineer. I may be repetitive here, but back up the tape a bit and get back into the chronology.

LaBerge: Okay.

Baker: I had gone to the Harvard Institute--

LaBerge: We didn't talk about that, so tell me about that, how that came about.

Baker: That was a very important part of what happened. So you go back, let's say, to 1970. I had been there six years, and I had been promoted from associate engineer to senior engineer to principal engineer to assistant university engineer, and then a little bit later, associate university engineer. All that happened before 1974.

I was at that time, say in 1970, more or less, I was thirty-five years old, sort of ramping up my career and wondering what the future might hold for me in terms of advancement. Having by that time no longer viewed the university as a temporary job and having enjoyed it enormously and having had some real career growth and success--I was doing quite well, but looking for the next rung on the ladder, if you will.

I began to think that probably my best shot (I thought I would have no chance ever becoming a vice president, Elmo Morgan notwithstanding. I didn't see that happening again. He had been brought in because they were building these three brand-new campuses, this huge program) was to go to a campus.

So I thought on a campus probably was the best shot. Somewhere along the line, in the early seventies, I was a candidate for associate vice chancellor for business, under [Robert] Bob Kerley.

LaBerge: On the Berkeley campus?

Baker: On the Berkeley campus. I didn't get that. [Theodore] Ted Chenoweth got that. He beat me out of it because he was a computer type, and that's what they needed, an early computer type. I can't really recall, but I was always looking around and always keeping my eye on the next opportunities.
By that time, 1970, McGuire had become vice president for planning. There was a reorganization so that the building program: construction, architects, engineers, planning, capital budget, and all that was transferred to the vice president for planning, Joe McGuire. Bob Evans was an assistant vice president. Elmo had left by then. And then Loren Furtado, who was assistant vice president for the operating budget, and then another assistant vice president who did analytical studies, that sort of thing, so it was “planning.”

**Harvard University, Institute for Educational Management, 1972**

**Nomination**

Baker: In 1970, unbeknownst to me, there had started at Harvard University a summer Institute for Educational Management, attended by about a hundred people each year who were usually presidents, vice presidents, deans of the universities across the country. It was part of the Harvard Business School and designed to parallel some of the summer advanced management programs Harvard Business School put on.

Chet McCorkle, who was then vice president of the university, under Charles Hitch, was instrumental in forming that. He was on the initial group of educators who put the I.E.M. program together. So he had a keen interest in it. He decided that three UC people would go each year, two from the campuses and one from the president's office. So each chancellor and each vice president was asked to nominate a candidate, and Vice President McCorkle decided which three went.

This proves my theory of given a choice of luck and skill, take luck any time. [Laughter] Because Vice President McGuire had forgotten to send his nomination, and at the last minute, Doras Briggs, whom you know was his assistant, she had been Elmo's executive assistant. She moved over to be McGuire's executive assistant.

LaBerge: [laughs]

Baker: Every vice president had his own executive assistant, Afton Crooks, Dorothy Everett. Dorothy and Gloria Copeland--that whole crowd. They were a club of sorts. Anyhow, I always made a point to be Doras Briggs's brand-new best friend. She was very close to the vice president. And in a mad scurry to rapidly get his nomination in past the deadline, she had put my name in. This is 1972. Magically, McCorkle picked me.

LaBerge: Do you know who else was nominated?

Baker: No. What I know is that I was pretty low in the ranking for that program. When I got there, at Harvard, I was clearly among the lower-ranking folks, although I had worked
in a big system, so it was comparable. Actually I probably had a much more complex job than the president of a small college, given the nature of dealing with nine campuses and the legislature.

Anyhow, it was a six-week program.

LaBerge: And did you want to go?

Baker: Oh, yeah! Great! Harvard! Harvard had a magic ring. It does today. So I did. I went. My family went with me. You're advised not to do that by the Harvard folks, but I thought this was too good an opportunity to get to live someplace else. I had to scurry around to rent my house and find a place to live.

Again, a great stroke of luck: One friend of mine was interviewing candidates. He worked for a Big Eight accounting firm. He was interviewing candidates, and a recent MBA--or about to be an MBA grad, was going to be looking for a summer sublet for his married student apartment in Cambridge, right on campus. Within the same week, another friend of mine--he's a lawyer--had just hired a young lawyer who was looking for a place to live for three months. So I was able just by great good luck to rent my house and find a place.

I did all this in a couple of months. Time was short.

**People and Program**

LaBerge: Who went from the campuses?

Baker: At Irvine, it was a man named George Roberts, who served in some kind of “faculty on leave to the chancellor” kind of position. You know how they do that?

LaBerge: Yes.

Baker: Faculty member on leave, working as a special assistant to the chancellor. The guy from Davis in the School of Agriculture, whose name escapes me.

LaBerge: You might think of it later.

Baker: Yes. But anyhow, those were the ones who went. Subsequently, over the years, I've sent about five or six of my staff, one at a time--Steve Arditti, Trudi Heinecke, Sandy Smith, Paul Sweet, Barbara Perry--five come to mind.

Anyhow, so I get there. It's a very intense program. My family was ensconced across the Charles River in this two-bedroom married student apartment, and I was in a dormitory at the Harvard Business School. If you did it right, the schedule was rigorous. Some people were slackers. But basically you started at seven in the morning, have breakfast. At eight in the morning, you met with a small group to
discuss what you'd read the night before. And then they had classes until about four o'clock in the afternoon. They were case-study kind of classes, where there's class participation.

Gosh, I was amazed that I could play with all those fancy Ph.D.'s as well as anybody else. I was quite surprised at my knowledge of higher education, having not been in that part of the enterprise. I was really quite surprised. I got an enormous amount out of it. It changed my life, because when I finished that program, I knew that I could go up in the university. My confidence level was built up enormously.

LaBerge: Can you give me an example of the kind of case studies?

Baker: Well, one of the case studies was very interesting. It had to do with the Santa Cruz campus.

LaBerge: Oh, really?

Baker: Which, of course, was a topic of national interest in the higher ed community. There were several cases about Santa Cruz and the issues of abandoning the traditional departmental organization and issues of faculty members' divided loyalty between the college on the one hand and his or her discipline, on the other hand. And those were very interesting. They had personnel studies and they had a budget study. It's been a long time, twenty-five years.

LaBerge: But this is good. You obviously remember.

Baker: If I put my mind to it, I could probably remember more. But it was wonderful for me. Governmental relations--this is interesting--was a segment of the class. The man who taught it was John F. Kennedy's Harvard classmate, a man named Dan Fenn, F-e-n-n, who served in the White House as the director of personnel, the guy who makes the appointments. In fact, later--for about ten years or so, they had an annual alumni one-week program at some university or another. I always went to those and got to know quite a few people who were not from my class but from other classes, but quite a network of people across the country. Dan Fenn became the custodian of all of JFK's audiotapes and memorabilia on behalf of the family and was the head of the JFK Library.

He took us one time into the archives in Lexington, Massachusetts. I, for a brief moment, against all warnings, sat in the rocking chair. But nobody had a camera. Only I know that I did that. It doesn’t matter whether you believe me or not.

Anyhow, my family at the time--I had five-year-old, an eight-year-old, and an eleven-year-old.

LaBerge: Oh, what a great experience.

Baker: The eleven-year-old was prime time. Five was not quite ready. But they had adventures every day. And every weekend--I was off from noon Saturday to Sunday evening--I had a lot of reading to do, but we could take off someplace. When we
came back after the program was over, we took a three-week trip across country. Went to all the usual places: Washington, D.C., New York City. I got a fifty-dollar parking ticket in New York City, which was a lot of money in 1972. Anyhow, the kids still remember that trip. They still talk about some of those remembrances.

In any event, I came back--

**Impact on His Life**

LaBerge: When you say that it changed your life--

Baker: It opened my eyes to a much less narrow focus. My focus had been construction engineering. In any event, it widened my horizons dramatically. At Harvard, I was interested, and I could talk about it, do it, participate, and I could debate and argue with classmates on issues, so it gave me a chance to grow, really grow a lot.

Of course, I came back ready to go off and be somebody else's vice president, right?--and was just ready to go. I mean, I was really on a cloud, ready to go.

LaBerge: Were you thinking, too, of expanding beyond being a construction engineer?

Baker: Oh, yes. Oh, absolutely. The focus I had was construction engineering. That's what I always thought I'd do, and that's what I did. It widened my vision dramatically. I immediately started applying for jobs all over the place.

LaBerge: Just in the university, or elsewhere?

Baker: All over. In higher education, anyplace in the country. Out of the blue, through Elmo Morgan, who had a good friend who was president of the University of Houston--I got a call from Elmo telling me they had a position of vice president for planning and construction. It was the University of Houston system. They were building new campuses, and it was right down my alley, he thought, and I applied.

Next thing I know, I have a letter from the president. I forget how it worked, but I remember he sent two first-class airplane tickets to have my wife and me go back there. That was a thrill in itself. I didn't know about that kind of world. We went back, and I was offered the job. I just couldn't convince my family to go. I would have had to make a unilateral decision, and it would have come about mightily unhappy. Anyhow, Houston, Texas, is not exactly the garden spot of the world. So I didn't take that job.
More on Reorganization at University Hall

Baker: I think that was in 1973. Right after that, Joe McGuire was asked “to return to the laboratory.” That's how we do it in higher education. Nobody gets axed. They "return to the laboratory and the classroom.” He and McCorkle had a hard time, I think, dividing the responsibilities. Chet decided--he was executive vice president, with Charlie's blessing, I suppose--he decided to reorganize. So McGuire was gone.

I think, as I look back and as I have done a number of consulting assignments at other universities on this very organizational topic, I think it was a wise decision to bring the capital planning in with the operating budget planning, because it's resource planning. When I see--and I've done this a dozen times at other institutions--when I see the capital budget with the architects and engineers and construction people, it becomes far too utilitarian--I mean, they have terrific steam pipes but not great libraries, if you get my point, I’ll use that analogy.

LaBerge: Yes.

Baker: It's much better to make those resource decisions jointly with academic planning and capital and operating planning all working together. I really think that's most efficient and maximizes the use of resources. I advocate that. That's basically what Chet was trying to do. I was an advocate of that.

So that took all the construction--architects and engineers folks--and put them under the vice president of business, who at the time was John Perkins, if I remember right. But it left the capital planning group reporting to Loren Furtado. Loren really grew. His position was elevated. Although he was still an assistant vice president, the scope of his work was enlarged quite a bit because he now had the operating budget, the capital budget, health sciences planning, budget planning, and institutional studies.

This new organization--Loren and Chet developed five positions of director. The director of general campus operating budget was Chuck Courey. He brought over from UC San Francisco to become the director of health sciences, capital and operating, Larry Hershman. First time I ever met him, 1974. He had made Milt Von Damm, who had been I think in the Sacramento office--made him kind of the Sacramento liaison between the budget and Sacramento.

Barry Clagett was the director of data analysis, numbers management, and a new position called director of capital planning and budget. Chet just asked me if I wanted to take that job. There wasn't any recruiting or search or anything! The old days.

This, you see, was a major jump. So here I was, ready to move on--upward and onward--by this time I thought, well, I'm going to be a vice president one day. That's what I had my eyes set on. But I'll never be the vice president of the budget. How could I do that? I've got to stay on the administrative side. So I was prepared to turn down that opportunity. I turned down the job that night. Then I saw Joe McGuire in the parking lot, and he said, "Sometimes you've got to change your spots." I slept on
it. Went back in the next morning and took it. That was a major turn in the road for me.

The Capital Budget Job

LaBerge: So this was a major change.

Baker: A major change.

LaBerge: Tell me what that was.

Baker: Well, each year the university has a capital budget—it’s the building program. The process starts with the campuses, at the campus level, deciding what kind of improvements they need to make to the campus. There will be agitation for renovation of the chemistry lab or expansion of the library or consolidation of administrative space that ends up getting spread all over the place. Then the maintenance folks would say, "We've got to replace that water system." So on the campus their needs surface. And the needs are always considerably more than any available funding: several times over.

So the campus has to do a priority setting scheme of some sort, determining do we need to replace the about-to-go-out-of-business electrical system, shutting down the whole campus? Or do we need to expand the library because if we don't do that, faculty won't come here to teach? These are complicated decisions, having to weigh priorities at the top level of the campus.

What gets to the president's office—and the budget is a centralized effort—acquiring the money is centralized. What comes to the president's office, even after having been reduced considerably on the campus level, is still far more than we might dare even ask for, much less get from the state.

And there's a companion part called the non-state capital budget—residence halls, parking structures, student unions, gift-funded projects—they're simply a matter of can the campus afford to pay for them. So if you have a residence hall here [at Berkeley], the business and finance people do an analysis. Is the demand there? Can they charge the rents to pay off the bonds? Same with parking. The gift money—if somebody gives you ten million bucks, you can build about anything you want. It's kind of roughly coordinated by the systemwide office because all these things have to be approved by the regents ultimately, in a fairly rubber-stamp process, but it is a process.

But the state budget is where the action is. So the campuses—there are certain deadlines, and these are backed up from July 1—I can tell you exactly what you have to be doing every March 12th for the rest of your life, something having to do with this year's budget and next year's budget, and maybe the one before that.
LaBerge: But at this point, what was the percentage of the state budget, of the total? How much money were you getting from the state for the capital program?

Baker: My recollection is that in the long haul, lean years, growth years, not-growth years—it always works out to be roughly half the construction budget is non-state, half state, with some variations, of course. But over the long haul, that’s kind of how it always works out.

And I know that's true because when we did all the early planning work for the tenth campus, that's the number I had to have because I was asked repeatedly, "What's it going to cost? Where does the money come from?" So I had some people do some work on that, and they came out fifty-fifty. The number when we started was about three or four hundred million bucks of state money to get the first 5000 students—which always got published in the papers as that's what it would cost to build a whole campus. And that was only the state-funded part of the first 5000 students. I had the hardest time convincing the media of that seemingly simple fact.

Anyhow, so the job of director of capital planning involved working with the campuses to shape their program. I always wanted to be asking the state for money for a campus project that I had a chance to get. I would work hard on the campuses to convince them not to push forward for a project for which we had no chance at all because of some political issue. For example, an administration building and the state says, "Put them in tents." The students and the faculty we provide for. So I would always push hard to make the campus proposals as credible as possible. I would work with the language they wrote so as not to later sabotage me when I was testifying before a committee. I spent a lot of time on the campuses.

And out come their proposals, and then you've got to set priorities. You've got requests totaling $200 million, and you're only going to ask for $100 million, you've got to decide which hundred you ask for. You've got to rank them, one to twenty-seven, whatever the number is. So that's what that job entailed.

Staff and Office Placement

Baker: I inherited the people who had been doing that. Bob Walen, whom you knew, retired at that time. Pat Henry was his guy and joined me. And a woman named Theresa Coombs and JoAnn Catton and her husband, John Catton. I had a husband and wife duo. And then Irv Wallace. Those were my initial staff. And I got to hire a secretary for the first time, and that was great. I hired a woman named Jeanne Ruhl, who was just a dynamite lady.

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Baker: Jeanne Ruhl was with me from ’74 to about ’78. She went off to live in Placerville with her new boyfriend. She's still a great friend. I hear from her every once in a while.
LaBerge: Where was your office in University Hall?

Baker: I was on the second floor and, of course, without that visibility, of Joe McGuire and Chet McCorkle and being down on that floor and getting to know Loren Furtado and all those people, this might not have happened. Furtado had a whole floor, just fit all his people. He had eighty people or something like that, a big number.

Loren was moved to the southeast corner of the second floor, a big vice president's office. McGuire had been there before that.

LaBerge: This is great. We don't have this written down anyplace.

Baker: It's very intriguing. The second floor had four corner offices. McGuire had the big vice president's office--big, beautiful office. He had had hardwood floors put in and beautiful wood bookshelves on one whole big wall. It was a nice office. Oriental carpet. He was in the southeast corner.

Bob Evans had been the AVP for planning and construction, including the building program and was a big rival of Furtado—he was in the northeast corner. He had a smaller office, but it was all paneled, and with an old rolltop desk he had in there.

Furtado was in the northwest corner. The other corner was the analytic studies guy, George Weathersby.

Furtado really wanted me to be in Bob Evans' office because it was symbolic that his guy took that office. That wasn't available right away, so he stuck me in his old office and Furtado moved to the big vice president's office. It was really important for him--more important for him than for me. I like fancy offices, too, but that was symbolic for him that I be in that office. So shortly I was in that office on the northeast corner. I liked it. I basically cornered University and Oxford. Could see the campus, see the hills.

That's where my team was. We had offices in that corner of the building. I remember what I decided at the very beginning. This would have been probably in July of '74. I had to get on the campuses and spend a lot of time because they had been ignored—I can't find the right word, but not enough attention had been paid to them. After all, that's where the work is. That's always been my philosophy, that on the campus is where the work is; they certainly hadn't been given the attention they deserved.

So I hit the campus trail. From July to October, I made thirty-seven campus visits.
Philosophy: “No Phone Calls from Chancellors”

LaBerge: Wow.

Baker: I remember that number because McCorkle had a retreat after the first four months of this new administration and asked each of us to report what we'd been doing. So I remember reporting on thirty-seven campus visits. But also I remember seeing McCorkle at a football game in October, after doing this for about three months. He said, "I don't know what you've been doing, but keep doing it because the chancellors love it."

LaBerge: That's great!

Baker: That was as close as I got to a pat on the back. But that was encouraging. So I really spent time on the campuses. I began to establish new ways of communicating. That's where the big factor was. It was communication. They didn't know what was going on. I'd gather a crowd of campus folks and share with them what was going on in the mysterious Office of the President, and then we'd go to work and try to shape their building programs so that I had a chance--because another part of my job was going to Sacramento. Working with the legislative analyst, the Department of Finance, negotiating with the governor's office, appearing before the committees to support our budget, that was the job. So the capital budget was building it with the campuses and going to get the money. That's really what that job was.

LaBerge: On the campuses, who would you mainly meet?

Baker: The chancellor and the people who were the building and program planners on the campus. It would be people usually in the budget and planning office, and also the office of the architects and engineers. So I worked a lot with the A and E people because they handled a lot of the work going into pricing out and planning the building program. They worked with the faculty committees and got the numbers together and the sizes of buildings and the scope of the modifications and so forth. So I worked with those people. But often the chancellors because I wanted them to know what was going on, what I was doing.

What I learned and I guess something you just naturally learn is that if you're working the campuses--if you're the president's office person working the campuses and you force them into some decisions that the chancellor doesn't like, the chancellor gets to the president or to your vice president to kick your tail, so I learned that the chancellor has got to be on board. I never wanted any phone calls from the chancellors.

That's sort of one of my fundamental rules of managing people: no phone calls from chancellors. Whatever you do on a campus, first of all, you spend as much time as you can helping the campuses, and whatever you do, don't agitate the chancellor because the last thing you'll want is have a chancellor call the president or the vice president because then we're in trouble. And if I'm in trouble, you're in trouble. In fact, if I'm in trouble, you're in worse trouble. I preach that as a operative procedure.
It worked because I made sure that the right people were in on the deal, whatever the deal was.

And the same philosophy holds true in Sacramento. You don't want to get big people mad at you, so you want to be sure you find ways that they know what they need to know. Another mistake a lot of people make is trying to give the big people too much detail. Big people--and I say people with large jobs--have so much to do, they can't possibly deal with too much detail. That was often an issue for me, convincing my staff people not to give me too much detail, because I didn't need very much. I could make a speech from the tiniest bit. It just had to be right!

Sacramento Visits in the Jerry Brown Years, 1975-1982

LaBerge: That's right. Well, those years in Sacramento were when Jerry Brown was there.

Baker: Yes.

LaBerge: What was that like? His administration, and who was the Department of Finance person?

Baker: Mary Ann Graves was the director of finance person at the time. I had the great privilege of presiding over the leanest capital budgets we had in the history of our university.

LaBerge: That's right. And this is when you were first starting this job. So how did you do that?

Baker: Well, I just got the most I could. Everybody understood, I mean, it was the governor; it wasn't me. We survived. We got every nickel we could get, and I think I got more than I might have gotten if I hadn't fought harder for what little we got. The lowest year was about 1976 or '77. We got $7 million, the whole university capital budget, where in those days about $100 million would have been about the right number, something like that.

[David] Saxon was president for most of that period. He became president in 1975, I believe. So most of that time, most of the Brown era--all, actually, from '75 to '83. Virtually all the Brown administration was David Saxon.

LaBerge: Would you talk mainly to the Department of Finance or to the legislators?

Baker: The way the process works--first takes about two years working with the campuses, then it gets up to the president, then it goes to the regents, then it goes to the Department of Finance. You have to spend a lot of your energy getting everything you can into the governor's budget, which is settled in December. Comes out in January. The negotiations take place in the fall: October, November and the first part of December. Those are the heavy negotiations, where you really are in Sacramento, pushing the Department of Finance as hard as you can.
The Legislative Analyst was also a player in those days in the early negotiations, more than they are now. The Leg Analyst theoretically was supposed to analyze the budget independently of the governor and the legislature, but what he or she analyzes isn't published till January. They get started before that because they can't do it otherwise. And they get engaged in negotiations, and they did a lot then. So I had the Leg Analyst person and the finance person, lived with those guys to the wee hours of the morning plenty of times, negotiating and answering their questions, defending the projects, pushing as hard as I could to get everything I could get into the governor's budget.

And then once you get past the individual who has budget responsibility for the Department of Finance, for the capital budgets for the university, you have to convince his boss, and his boss is a person who will be head of the higher ed budget for the whole state. And I used to win quite a few of those.

LaBerge: Who were those people?

Baker: Oh, a man named Chuck Gocke, and another named Dick Cutting. And Bob Harris, and another named Stan Stancil. Those are four that come to my mind. They were what were called “program budget managers.” The state budget as a whole is divided into programs: higher ed is a program, corrections is a program, Fish and Game is a program, Department of Highways, Justice, and so on. If you couldn't get it past him, you were probably not going to make it because the next level was when the president of the university and the vice president--it wasn't me then--go to see the director of the Department of Finance. I knew many of those people.

When I first started, it was Hale Champion. Later he went to Harvard. He was Reagan’s guy.

LaBerge: And Verne Orr--wasn't he--

Baker: Verne Orr, who became a friend, later secretary of the air force. I saw him in Washington in that capacity when I was working on the supercollider. Verne Orr and then Brown had that fellow who went to jail, Richard Silberman. And then Mary Ann Graves. And then Deukmejian had--I'm missing some, but Jess Huff and Russ Gould, Tom Hayes, and Craig Brown is the current director. Until [Governor] Gray Davis came in.

**Building Relationships**

LaBerge: So when would you get involved with the legislature?

Baker: We're now in about mid-December, when the last shot--or maybe early December the president and vice president meet with the director of finance for the last shot. The heavy lifting had been done by then. That was more ceremonial. Then the president and vice president go to the governor about mid-December for the last shot. That
rarely had anything to do with the capital budget. It was always faculty salaries, almost every year, and one or two other issues. You could never take more than two or three issues to the governor, maximum. We debated internally about which three we'd take. Couldn't be more than that.

We'd meet with the governor. What you had to do in the process—you had to have a champion at the table when you weren't there. When you were there, you talked to the governor. He made no decisions. He listened. Almost every governor I have ever met with, Brown, Deukmejian, Wilson, they never decide. So a day or two later, when they're deciding, you've got to have somebody at that table who's your champion.

I always tried to find such a person. Sometimes it would be the director of finance; sometimes it would be the governor's education advisor; sometimes it would be somebody else. But you always needed somebody there who would speak up on your behalf while the governor was trying to make a decision. If you didn't, you weren't going to make it because the governor was not going to remember what you said. And somebody has got to say, "Well, Governor, you'll recall the president was in to see us. He said this. I think it's a good idea." Or a bad idea. The more people you can have seconding the nomination the better.

LaBerge: That's right. Can you give me names of some of your champions?

Baker: Well, actually, Lowell Paige at one time, who became Deukmejian's education advisor. And Russ Gould when he was director of finance, and Tom Hayes when he was director were terrific friends of the court. And Peter Mehas was a wonderful friend of the university. He was Deukmejian's education advisor. Sat in on all those budget discussions. A wonderful friend. He was great. Peter would help me. Bill Hauck was key in Governor Wilson's administration. All those I mentioned were good people. All personal friends. What I knew was, I knew they'd do the best they could, and I couldn't ask for more than that. If they couldn't get it, then we weren't going to get it.

I believe that every president I worked for knew that I had that kind of relationship. They knew that I had given it the best shot you could possibly give.

LaBerge: That's right.

Baker: We didn't win all of them, but we won a lot. So it was the sort of thing that you consciously work out. To be good at this, you just can't be accidental. You've got to really work at it. And it takes a lot of effort to build those relationships, and trust, so that when you need them—it sometimes takes years—so when you need them, they'll take your call and make the effort.

LaBerge: It's a lot of work, and yet you make it look like it's just natural.

Baker: Most people, I would guess, think that's just the way I am, that I'm not thinking about doing it consciously. But I make a lot of phone calls. I go see a lot of people—just to build that relationship. I do all the things you do to build a relationship. It was quite
conscious on my part. I figured that's what my job was, to build the trust and build the confidence so that when I needed somebody to speak up at that meeting when we weren't there, the one that we didn't attend, where the decision was really made, I could do that. I think you're probably right, that people probably figure I just--

LaBerge: That's just your personality. Did you learn any of that at the Harvard Institute?

Baker: No.

LaBerge: Where did you pick this up?

Baker: My father. That was his style. I just observed this over my life. He was everybody's friend, and when he needed something, he could call up and get what he needed. I'd hear him talking about how he talked to this person and that person and the other person. It was a different era, but the same technique. That's where I learned that.

Governor's Budget, Legislative Analyst, Senate Subcommittee on Higher Education

LaBerge: Okay. We're in now--we've got the governor deciding on the budget, December/January.

Baker: Okay, so the governor decides at the end of December. Then the governor's budget is printed, and the Legislative Analyst prints a book that's usually one page thicker than the governor's budget.

LaBerge: What did you do with the Legislative Analyst?

Baker: I was their friend because they are going to print some nasty stuff about my building program, so I worked as hard as I could to minimize the damage. I couldn't win them all. The Legislative Analyst's job was like a traffic cop. They had to write up a certain amount of negative recommendations.

LaBerge: Alan Post.

Baker: Alan Post was the Leg Analyst. After him, Bill Hamm, and I think that Elizabeth Hill succeeded him. There's been only three in all those years. They, of course, had staff to handle the capital budget and the famous name is a man named Jerry Beavers.

LaBerge: Oh, yes. Was he a friend of Elmo, too?

Baker: Oh, sure. Jerry Beavers is everybody's arch enemy because he is so tough. He says no more than he says yes. The name of the game is to get him to say yes. So I spent hours with him. He loved to do our work in bars. We'd take our papers in there and I would stay in a corner at some bar and sip a beer for hours on end while we were doing our work, until they closed the bar sometimes. Hard work. But I minimized the damage. That was it: minimize the damage. I am one of the few people in the
university who I think would call Jerry Beavers a friend, and he is a friend. I have no
trouble indicating that publicly. He is a friend. He just had a different job and
approached it differently, and you had to understand that. Take the time and agony to
hear him out.

So then the analyst's recommendations--yes and no on every single project--basically
became the agenda for the legislative committees. In March, the committee structure
starts. The Senate Finance Committee had a subcommittee that heard higher
education. You'd appear before that committee, and they'd take every project and
every Leg Analyst recommendation would be taken to a vote.

So you testify and defend your case, and Jerry Beavers and the Department of Finance
would say their piece, and they'd vote. Well, of course, meantime--you didn't do that
without working hard behind the scenes. I would always go to see the senators and
assemblymembers, brief them on the issues so they understood the issues and what my
point of view was, always worked with the committee staff, get them on our side--
because a lot of times members turned to the committee staff and asked them what
they'd think. You don't just go up there for the first time and testify. You do a lot of
behind-the-scenes work.

And you worked hard in conjunction with our Sacramento office, building friendships,
so they trusted me. You worked hard so they would believe what you said. You had to
be credible. You had to work hard to develop a reputation to be credible. And we
spent a lot of time on that. I did, personally.

The assembly had the same situation. Ways and Means had a subcommittee. Bob
Campbell chaired that subcommittee for many years. Same deal. Leg Analyst. Okay,
Leg Analyst, let's see what you have to say, "University, Mr. Baker, go ahead." And
you make your case. "Mr. Chairman, as the analyst said--here's our position and here's
why." [raps table for emphasis] Bang, bang, bang. Lay it out. Got to be succinct; got
not to ramble. Their attention span is limited--a lot of things on their minds. Crisp and
hard-hitting. That's what it takes. And then they ask lots of questions, and you've got
to answer them.

**Bringing University “Witnesses” to Sacramento**

LaBerge: When do you bring other people in? Are you in there alone?

Baker: I bring other people in--for example, supposing that we're pushing hard for a new
library--

LaBerge: On?

Baker: A campus. Irvine wants to expand the library. "Why do you need so many books in
the first place?" says the senator. "Why not microfilm them?" Or "How often do you
use these books?" "Well, some books don't get used for fifteen years." "Well, why do
you even have them?" So I get a librarian to help me, or maybe a vice chancellor who is really good. Very few campus people were really good at testifying because this was another world.

LaBerge: That's right.

Baker: So you have to have people who can deal in that world. I would handpick them. Probably the best I ever had was [UC Berkeley Chancellor Ira M.] Mike Heyman. He was good. He was the best. First of all, he'd charm the socks off all of them. And then he has this style--he'd wave this twenty-five foot wingspread out there and that wonderful voice of his, and he'd laugh, and he'd admit when he had committed a crime. He was great. Nobody better in all my experience. He was great.

A man named [James L.] Jim McGaugh, a vice chancellor at Irvine, was another outstanding testifier--witnesses, we'd like to call them. A number of faculty members over the years were just terrific. One of the best ones, right here on the Berkeley campus--a man named [Alexander] Alex Glazer. He's a biologist. When we were trying to get all these life sciences facilities, Alex and I became really close friends. It turns out, by chance, that he's the next-door neighbor of one of my closest friends, in Orinda. Alex was great. And he's a brilliant scientist. You would never imagine he could function in that gaudy world of Sacramento, but he was among the best, and we did some great work together because he could explain this complicated science--why they had to do what they were doing in terms that people understood. He was just wonderful.

One of the mistakes that people make--I can't tell you how many times I've watched from the audience--it's a very inefficient time. You might spend three days to get an hour, waiting for your turn. I've seen some of these people who after they've answered the question keep going and undo the answer and undo their success. You've got to know when to shut up. A lot of people don't know that. It's just amazing. Not having to answer any questions at all is the best thing you can have. So I would bring--probably in the course of a year you might have five witnesses you need to call upon because you needed extra credibility about something that was academic in nature. If it wasn't academic in nature, I could probably handle it, but if it was having to do with why you need so many library books or why you need biology buildings and so forth, you need to have these people. Maybe five. Three to five. There weren't that many. And it was only when you were in trouble that you would have to have somebody. If you weren't in trouble, you wouldn't need them.

A yes vote is all you want. You don't care how you get it.

LaBerge: That's right.

Baker: Get the money. That's your job. So many people don't seem to understand that. In fact, faculty are among the worst because they love to talk about what they do, and they get--

LaBerge: Wound up.
Baker: Oh, my goodness.

LaBerge: When would you bring the president, or did you not?

Baker: No. The president always opens up--throws out the opening ball, if you will, by making a presentation to each house, the first day each house is holding hearings. So at the Assembly Ways and Means subcommittee--the president makes a presentation. For a couple of hours. He answers a lot of questions, an overview. After that you don't use the president unless some dastardly thing happens. But no, I can't recall an instance where the president came in to weigh in. I really can't. Except for those kind of unexpected issues that we were in trouble. It was pretty rare. So we go through all these hearings, and eventually each house sends a budget up, and it goes to a conference committee, and they wrestle over the differences. It goes back to the governor, and they negotiate. It's called the Big Five--the minority-majority leader in each house and the governor.

More on Sacramento and Friends There ##

LaBerge: We were talking about the Big Five.

Baker: We might get involved in some of those because the issue of student fees might be decided by that group, or a salary increase might be decided by that group. Generally it's one of those huge issues, no small ones, just the big issues. And then the budget gets signed by the governor. We report it to the regents, and you're off planning next year's budget.

LaBerge: Who were some of your friends in the legislature? Who would you call?

Baker: Friends? Well, let's see.

LaBerge: You must have had the same kind of champions.


LaBerge: Okay. How about Willie Brown?

Baker: Yes, Willie was the speaker for most of that time, and I would go see him later, as vice president. Didn't get involved with Willie Brown before I was vice president. I know Willie. Had dinner with him about six months ago. He was my mayor for a while when I lived in San Francisco. I voted for him for mayor. But I don't see him much now.
LaBerge: Now, a couple of people you mentioned--I'm just interested--are real critics of the university, too. So how did they become your friends?

Baker: Well, by trying to answer to the criticisms, being honest, acknowledging when they were right, trying to explain, convince them when they were wrong, listening to them, allowing them to vent on you, is a lot of what you do. Because a lot of times their criticism comes from constituents.

LaBerge: That's right.

Baker: And they're duty bound to kick us around.

LaBerge: In public, so that it's reported.

Baker: Another great friend is [Senator] Barry Keene. I think of him because he was in trouble on a bill and I showed up in his district as the vice president to take some heat. I did that as vice president. Did that quite often. I don't mind. See, all these things are part of the job. Some people take this stuff personally. They don't like to get beat up. You're not getting beat up. You're getting beat up because you've got that vice president title in front of your name. If you don't want to get beat up, get another title next to your name. Assistant to somebody. Don't be the somebody; be the somebody's assistant.

So heady years from '74 to '78. Had my own show, you might say. Furtado was a wonderful, wonderful boss. Supported me when I needed him and let me have my own head. That was a great, exciting time for me. High times.

LaBerge: Even though the budget was lean.

Baker: Yes, it was lean, but we were the first team. We were in the action. It was fun because of that, if you like that. If you liked to be behind the scenes and out of sight, that wasn't for you. We were very visible.

LaBerge: Now, thinking about things that happened during those years, one was the Bakke case. Did that affect anything--about that budget?

Baker: Not that I can remember.

**Effect of Proposition 13, 1978**

LaBerge: What about Proposition 13?

Baker: Awful.

LaBerge: Okay, tell me about it.
Baker: Well, Jerry Brown gets the blame for Prop. 13 because through his low-budget attitude--I'm trying to not use a pejorative term--he allowed a huge surplus to grow, $7 or $8 billion, as I recall, at a time when the budget might have been $30 billion. Seven or $8 billion. So the surplus he allowed to build up was something like 20 percent.

At that time, in the 1970s, property values were skyrocketing. People's property tax was going up at a dramatic rate: 10, 15 percent a year. And so the taxpayers revolted because here was this surplus. The state therefore had plenty of dough. Why are we paying all these taxes? And Jerry Brown didn't do anything about it. He could have done things to rebate, to reduce the need to raise those taxes, and shift some of the surplus back to local government. That was within his and the legislature’s power to do. He didn't do a darn thing about it--surplus grew, taxpayer/property owners revolt--Prop. 13. Well, you knew that that surplus can go away one day. And down the road not very far, the University of California was going to be in trouble because the state would be in short supply of money.

And indeed, largely because of Prop. 13 and all the tax shifting and program burdens that were shifted, UC's share of the state budget in the seventies was in the 6.5, 7 percent range; it is now in the 4.5, 5 percent range. Well, that's a third. So we get now one-third less of a share of the state funding than we used to. And fees have gone up, and private giving has become more important and so forth and so on. It's all history. So yes, we got involved in Prop. 13.

I can remember that my son was in high school in that period of time. I can remember being active in the high school as a parent, making speeches to those people: You folks better think about Prop. 13. They were all in favor of Prop. 13. I made a number of speeches, to no avail, trying to convince those people what would happen to our schools. And indeed it did happen. Good Lord, look at it now. And Prop. 13, because it was a local tax, put our schools in terrible condition. It's a national embarrassment. How do you like being ranked next to Mississippi? I mean, this is California, right? So yes, we got involved with Prop. 13.

LaBerge: I'm trying to think of something. Larry Hershman talked about a little bit--he was doing the health sciences budget planning, and all of a sudden there wasn't any planning for health sciences, or there wasn't going to be new building.

Baker: Yes. We were then building some new medical schools, three of them: Davis, Irvine, and San Diego. And the campus planning for those programs, including facilities, was kind of out of control. They were just getting bigger and bigger. In each case, the legislature forced us to take over county hospitals. That's why Davis's medical school is half on the campus and half in Sacramento, and San Diego's is half on the campus and half downtown, and Irvine the same. We took over the existing county hospitals.
Selling Bond Issues, 1970 and 1972

Baker: Superimposed upon this elaborate and expensive planning, we were getting no building program. We had a bond issue fail in 1970. I was put on sort of detached duty for about six months. Did I tell you about this?

LaBerge: No.

Baker: Well, the bond issue had failed in 1970, and it came up again in 1972. This was going to fund the health sciences. We had to develop a war plan. We had to make that bond issue pass this time around. So Vice President McCorkle took me--this is how he got to know me on the capital budget, as a matter of fact. Took me and Milt Von Damm and Sarah Molla, who was a media, public relations person, a couple of guys who were professional writers--and he pulled them out. Paul Christopulos was involved with that. He was the systemwide development person.

Our job was to make the case all over the state. My particular job was to go to every campus and develop the story line that we could then sell. The writers would write it up, and then we'd sell it through media placements, through speeches the chancellors and vice presidents and president would make. My job was to go into the campus, get the story, like a reporter, and somebody would write it up. I'd bring back the story, like if we don't replace this building, we're going to get shut down by the government because the labs are unsafe. That was the kind of story I was looking for. And that's what I did for about six months. Milt Von Damm did it on the operating budget side; I did it on the capital budget side.

That was interesting. I got picked to do that before I had become director of capital planning. That's one way that McCorkle got wind of the way I did things.

LaBerge: Yes. And also you were doing some kind of university-relations before you knew--

Baker: Yes, before I knew--

LaBerge: That that's what you were going to be doing! [laughter]

Baker: That's right, that's right. I forgot about that.

LaBerge: In years since then, did you get involved in the bond issues?

Baker: Oh, yes, heavily involved, absolutely. That was a big part of my job. It was the governmental relations piece, it was the public relations piece, and it was the budget piece. Bond issues were--in fact, the bond issue in 1986 was the first of a series that continued on to this last election. We hadn't had a bond issue since those early seventies, so CSU and the community colleges and UC--all of us were in the bond issue--formed a PAC, a political action committee, legally, properly. I chaired the PAC, called Californians for Higher Education. Each segment had two representatives, and I was the chairman for the first four bond issues, '86, '88, '90 and
'92. In '94 I convinced CSU executive vice chancellor, Molly Broad, to take over that because I'd done enough of it. We were in it big time. I must have given hundreds of speeches on bond issues all over the place--to alumni clubs, Rotary clubs, campus people, media interviews, editorial boards.

**Athletics: Regents' Meetings**

LaBerge: What about Title IX? Did that affect anything?

Baker: No, you mean in terms of athletics?

LaBerge: Yes.

Baker: Not that I can recall. And one of the reasons for that is there's no state money.

LaBerge: For athletics?

Baker: For intercollegiate athletics. Maybe years ago there was. It's all self-supporting, all funded through admission tickets, private funds, and student fees. Even today, students vote on fees to support athletics. Irvine is having a referendum--I just read yesterday--having a referendum to raise their student fees in order to support athletic scholarships. Riverside is, too. They may not make it, but they have to get a majority of the vote, and at least 25 percent of the total student body has to vote. That's the rule, the regents' policy.

LaBerge: Talking about the regents, tell me a little bit more--we've talked already about the Sacramento part--about you going to the regents' meetings on the capital budget. Just in these years.

Baker: Yes, in those years--

LaBerge: Or didn't you go to the regents' meetings?

Baker: Not very often, rarely. I didn't start going regularly until I was assistant vice president. But in those years, after the 1972 earthquake, the regents got quite interested in seismic safety. Because of my construction and civil engineering background, I carried a substantial role in that. Of course, in '74 I became director of the capital budget, so I was deeply involved in the seismic safety issue. I would make a lot of presentations to regents about that.

I think I'd go to regents' meetings when the budget was discussed and respond to questions perhaps, but it was not a regular affair.

LaBerge: So the person who was going was the vice president, McCorkle?
Baker: McCorkle really did that part. Even Furtado didn't do it. He was there, but the heavy work for the regents was done by McCorkle, yes, for sure. I might be in the audience as a staff resource person. If something came up, I might get called on. I probably did a few times, but it wasn't any big role.

**Negotiations for the Clark Kerr Campus**

LaBerge: What about the Dwight-Derby campus or the Clark Kerr campus?

Baker: I was involved in that. Interesting. It was then called The School for the Blind and Deaf. Some chancellor--I think it was Mike Heyman, made a comment one time, "We ought to get that. Move the president's office there, and we won't have to change the name on the door."

LaBerge: [laughs]

Baker: There was great laughter about that, but that was sort of our inside joke. I was involved with that because it was a budget item and it was a facility, and I was engaged in negotiations with the Department of Finance. They wanted to sell it to us. I remember that.

LaBerge: So it was owned by the state.

Baker: Yes, right.

LaBerge: I remember there was a lot of controversy in the city of Berkeley about it, wasn't there?

Baker: Yes, and one of the mitigating elements of that was that the university did build some low-cost senior housing as part of that project. I remember that school because as a Berkeley High School student, we would compete against the School for the Blind and Deaf. So I was up there, on that campus, for some sporting events. That was always an interesting experience to compete against those kids.

I got involved in long, protracted negotiations, but then it finally went to the Berkeley campus. It was seriously considered as a relocation of the president's office. That was given serious consideration. I can't recall the details, but that's not what happened. It ended up on the Berkeley campus. And now it has become one of the most wonderful parts of the campus life--the students--it's the favorite housing among students. It's nice that it’s named after Clark, to remember him.

LaBerge: We've got a little bit more time. Maybe we'll just stay in this part of your job, and then next time we'd start with '79. Do you want to make any comments about David Saxon as president?
Baker: Yes, Saxon as president. I wasn't reporting directly to him in this period. I was reporting to Loren Furtado, who in turn reported to McCorkle. And of course, McCorkle and Saxon eventually had a falling out. We talked about that earlier. I guess during that period I didn't have much to do with the president. That was later. I spent about a third of my time on campuses, and a third of my time in Sacramento. I wasn't around much.

LaBerge: That's right.

Baker: I had a small staff, did my thing, worked a lot of hours. It was fun because we were doing a good job. We felt that and knew that, and it made it fun, to be proud of what you did.

**Shuffling the Deck of Staff**

LaBerge: What about the phenomenon of all the people, the staff who are just there always and stay, no matter who the president is and just keep the wheels turning, versus bringing in new people. How does that happen?

Baker: Good question.

LaBerge: You're an unusual vice president, who's been here a long time. Most of the others, it seems, have come in--

Baker: Yes. I'm trying to think how to answer that question. Well, in the first place, most people aren't affected at all, but they all think they're going to be affected and think they're all going to get fired. They're not. At the top level, there's a huge impact. There's always a reorganization and most always involving new people, new vice presidents, and reorganization.

But you don't have to get very far down to be non-disrupted. I would say at the vice president level, assistant vice president level; below that, it's not very disruptive. It really isn't. Even though people tend to worry a lot about it. I must say that my philosophy, which I've said many times, is that change means opportunity. You not only should not be afraid of change, you should welcome it and look for opportunities. They pop up every day, these changes being made--even if it's a simple thing like moving your office to get a window. Change happens, and change means opportunity.

But I think that to the extent that people believe there's a lot of turmoil, there really isn't much--except at those top two levels--obviously, the top level, the top two. Gardner--in fact, in more recent history, told Atkinson, "There hasn't been much change at the top. There have been reorganizations.” But most vice presidents have stayed. Conn Hopper is still there. He now holds the title of the longest-reigning vice president in the history of the university.
On the academic side, Bill Frazer chooses to go back to teaching, and Walter Massey came in, and Walter chose to go to Morehouse College to be president. And Judson King came in. And in past times it has been kind of like that. But administrative vice presidents--in the last almost twenty years we've had two, Wayne Kennedy and Ron Brady. In the year 2002, that will be twenty years, only two in my field. Bruce Darling and me, over a twenty-year period, of three or four presidents.

When David Saxon left, several vice presidents left. Archie Kleingartner, and Special Assistants Lowell Paige and David Wilson--a bunch of them left. McCorkle left just prior to that. And at other times, I can remember new presidents would bring in new vice presidents, more than has been the case in the last twenty years. When Gardner came in, he didn't bring anybody new, not one person.

LaBerge: That's right, because Ron Brady was already there.

Baker: He reorganized, but he didn't bring in anybody. Until Jim Kendrick retired--because he was sixty-five years old--David brought Ken Farrell in. So, really, it's been stable, pretty stable. Styles of presidents are quite different.

Saxon didn't like the external side of being president.

LaBerge: So who did that for him?

Baker: McCorkle. McCorkle entertained a lot. He had the house on Belrose in Berkeley, you know that house?

LaBerge: Oh, yes.

Baker: He entertained a lot. He had the press box at every football game, and had a big luncheon at his house before every football game. Went to basketball games. Had dinner parties and events. A member of the Bohemian Club. McCorkle was a real external guy. He was really in a powerful position. He was among the more powerful vice presidents that I can recall in university history, in my university history, at least, very powerful. I think that's what led to his departure. He was doing a lot of things, and I don't think Saxon was always clued in. That was just the impression we had.

Importance of Trust

LaBerge: What about the top administrative assistants? How important are they?

Baker: Very important, very important. They're important for a variety of reasons: they are the gatekeeper both for external people who want to come see a vice president and for internal people, and campus people. Vice presidents are by the nature of their job gone a lot, travel a lot, and the assistants need to be there, managing things. If mail
comes in, who does it go to? Systems for seeing to it that staff get the work back. The
quality of the product that comes to you.

Elmo Morgan wrote a classic piece back in 1964. I still have it. I should get a copy
for you. It has to do with correspondence. When you put something to the boss to
sign, say you put to your vice president a letter to the chancellor. Not only should the
letter be perfect, but every conceivable question should already have been asked and
answered, every single base should have been touched, so all the chief has to do is
sign it. And this letter is great. I adopted that philosophy.

LaBerge: So you really have to trust that person.

Baker: If you can't trust your staff, you can't do your job because the job is too broad. I had
110 people at my maximum. I had an office in Washington, big things going in
Sacramento and Washington every day. I had a budget. I had to negotiate the budget.
I had the media, all the alumni, the regents. I had a lot of these things going on. You
had to trust your staff. I've read Bob Woodward's book about the Clinton
administration, the first year of the Clinton administration.¹

And I just read excerpts of Stephanopolis—they talk about trust. For example, you
read that—he talked about [New York Mayor] Mario Cuomo and the president wanted
him to be a Supreme Court justice, and Stephanopolis was talking with Cuomo's son--
did you read that?

LaBerge: I didn't read that part.

Baker: Stephanopolis and the son [Andrew Cuomo] were negotiating this, and at first Cuomo
said no, he wouldn't do it--

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The call was to be made at six-thirty one evening. At six-fifteen Cuomo himself calls
Stephanopolis and says, "I'm not going to say yes." So here was Stephanopolis,
talking on issues of the highest nature on behalf of the President.

LaBerge: That is very big stuff.

Baker: And he represented the President, and he made this call and he'll say yes. And he has
to tell him he says no. "So what do I do next time?" he says. "I call somebody who
will say yes." Because the President can't get the reputation of having people say no,
you see. So it was very interesting on the topic of trust. I got thinking about it. I just
read this. I got thinking that David Gardner really trusted me. I can just think of all
kinds of times when he just trusted me. He said, "Okay, I'll do it. I'll sign it." And I
had to make hard decisions.

¹ The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House by Bob Woodward (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1994).
I remember one time--I won't use names because it wouldn't be useful, but one time one of the people on my staff was really causing trouble, and I had to discharge her or really find a way to get her out. I didn't fire her. I offered to transfer her to some other position, and she left. Her husband was one of David Gardner's personal friends. And her husband wrote David Gardner a letter, condemning my action. David Gardner called me in to talk about it. I told my side of the story and he took that letter and tore it in half. That was real trust. I'll never forget that. He was a great president. He really knew how to manage, to get things done.

So you've got to have a lot of trust. Trust inside and credibility outside, that's what you need. Trust on the inside and credibility outside. You just had to have that.

Yes, that's important. Worked hard on that. Again, I don't think that comes naturally. Maybe the ability to do it comes naturally, but to actually do it takes a conscious effort. I think that's misunderstood about people. It takes a conscious effort to earn the trust and develop the credibility.
III  SUPERCONDUCTING SUPERCOLLIDER

[Interview 3: July 15, 1999] ##

Regent Clair Burgener

LaBerge:  Today is July 15, 1999, and I'm interviewing William Baker in the Stone Seminar Room.  Well, today we were going to start with the story of the superconducting supercollider [SSC].  You were going to tell me something about Clair Burgener, whom you worked with on that.

Baker:  Yes.  When I appeared before the Board of Regents at my last meeting, I was offered a very nice and traditional resolution by the board and was invited to make comments, of which you actually have the text.¹ On that particular day, Regent Clair Burgener was also stepping down as a member of the Board of Regents, so we both had our resolutions and our swan songs.  In the course of my remarks, among other things I wanted to indicate the working relationships and friendships that I had developed with a number of the members of the board, and singled out in particular Clair Burgener.

Mr. Burgener had been a member of the state legislature for many years, later a member of the United States Congress [1973-1983], representing the San Diego area, but had left that elected post sometime in the eighties.  As the lead person for the project [SSC] for the state, I had a lot of leeway to bring in help.  One of the helpers I brought in was Clair Burgener, as a consultant, because he really knew Washington and had a lot of connections and was a very sage advisor.

And that's when we developed our real friendship.  I knew him before, but not in a very close, personal way.  We worked together and became really good friends.  When I gave my final remarks, I made reference to the fact that I had come to know Clair Burgener in that fashion and ad libbed that the SSC was one of my great losses because, of course, it didn't come to California.  And Mr. Burgener ad libbed, "Well, what Bill says is altogether correct, and we gave it finally a decent burial in

¹. See Appendix.
Waxahachie, Texas.” In fact, the nearest town where it was located was Waxahachie, Texas. And it did go to Texas. We'll come back to some of the politics it involved. It eventually was disbanded and shut down. And because the work that had been done to that date—they were probably about halfway through the project—it was all underground. So to say it was given a decent burial was really accurate as well as symbolic of our efforts there.

California Collider Commission

LaBerge: Well, tell me a little bit about the beginning. You were the executive director?

Baker: I was the chairman of the executive steering committee.

LaBerge: And who appointed you to that?

Baker: President [David] Gardner did. It started out—it was interesting because it wasn't something that any of us had really heard much about, but rumblings through the physics community—of course, it was a high-energy physics project, so rumblings through the physics community, including Bill Frazer, who was vice president, brought it to our attention, and we had a number of meetings about it and what to do about it. Between Gardner and Frazer and myself particularly—I was involved because it involved a lot of politics. It was a highly politically charged issue. Bill Frazer, of course, was involved because it was an academic enterprise.

Moreover, it wasn't to be the University of California's project. It wouldn't be our project. It would be a federal project located in the state of California. That was an important distinction. We kind of struggled with what should our role be, since it wasn't going to be a UC project; it was a federal project, hopefully located someplace in California.

So ultimately we got the governor's office interested. That took some doing. Got the legislature interested. That took some doing—just to get them interested. After probably a year went by—I forget, but a long time went by, and the governor [George Deukmejian] appointed President Gardner as chairman of what was called the California Collider Commission. That was an invented name. I think there may have been legislation, even, authorizing that commission to act on behalf of the state. As I recall, that's correct.

Then Gardner, in turn, appointed me as chairman of the executive committee, which really was the people who did the work. That was an interesting tussle because Frazer wanted that job, and so did I.

LaBerge: And his field was physics.

Baker: That's his field. I was able to convince Gardner that this was more of a political issue and a funding issue than it was a physics issue, at that early stage. Of course, once it got built, it's completely a physics issue, but it wasn't in the beginning. So that was an
interesting, pleasant battle. There was no unhappiness about it, but I argued my case and Bill argued his case, and Gardner gave it to me, so that was one victory.

LaBerge: Why would you want to work on it?

Baker: Oh, because it's exciting. It was an exciting project. Imagine the largest scientific project ever built in the world, ever. It was really exciting. So I assembled some people. Jesse Shaw, who was my special assistant—I made him the chief of staff for this thing. He spent virtually his whole time on this for I guess a couple of years. And then there's also a physics group that dealt with--physics and engineering group—headed by a man named Dick Lander, professor of physics from Davis.

LaBerge: Did you also get other people from the state?

Baker: Yes, I had several consultants. Clair Burgener was one. I had some political consultants—really lobbyists. The physics-engineering group—I can't remember what they were called, but they were the scientific group. They had a number of—for example, once we examined sites, we had to do geotech studies and that sort of thing. They handled all that part of it.

**Finding the Site**

Baker: So the first order of business is where do we put it? Well, it's a fifty-three-mile ring, and so you needed to have something like 400 acres, some big piece of property. I can't recall right now, but it was a big piece of property. So it obviously had to be out in some rural area, simply because of the size. As we took a look at the state, we recognized a great number of earthquake faults. You know, the state is riddled with them. Possible sites became fairly limited because an earthquake fault was a key factor because there was concern about safety and so forth, and also concern about our competitiveness with other states. California is known as the earthquake state, and we had to dodge that image as best we could.

So we began looking at sites. The three that come to my mind—I'm sure there were more, but one was down at Edwards Air Force Base, and one was near Stockton—actually, near two small communities named Linden and Escalon, east of Stockton.

And one, which actually had the Davis campus in the center of it. So it went out as far as Winters. Interesting that those are the sites. A lot of people were quite excited about that. Well, one of the things I did when we were looking at Edwards Air Force Base is kind of a thrilling moment for me. I went and met with the Secretary of the Air Force in the Pentagon, Verne Orr, who had been an appointed regent and was a former director of the Department of Finance. So I knew Verne.

1. Jesse D. Shaw’s title was Special Assistant to the Vice President.
One anecdote: In those days, I had just begun to make Washington a regular monthly stop. I didn't know my way around too well. But I was always accompanied by my Washington staff wherever we went in town, whether it was to an agency, the Capitol or the White House, wherever we went. On this particular day I had to go to the Pentagon by myself. I was quite proud of the fact that I made it, because I'm somewhat directionally disabled, as my wife will testify. [Laughter]

Anyhow, there was the Pentagon. That was a crack-up because, having been in the army as a private--

LaBerge: Oh, and you've told me that story, as a barber.

Baker: They're all--yes, that's right! But the Pentagon--if you're anything less than a general, you're not much, there are generals everywhere. I thought that was amusing. So we had a very good meeting. Verne was very helpful. But it turned out the earthquake faults in that area knocked that site out, and so we ended up--it's a very short story--but it took a long time--we ended up with two sites near Davis and Linden-Escalon.

The Davis site had water problems that we would have had to overcome. You see, when you're in that kind of competition, it's kind of like the campus at Merced. In that kind of competition, the folks that come up with the perfect, flawless site have an edge because they can always point to these question marks, like the water table at Davis, or community opposition in the San Joaquin Valley area from the agricultural people. So we had to overcome those--and in fact, at the end of the game, we knew from inside information that those did hurt us--the water table question, which could have driven costs up, although from an engineering standpoint could certainly be overcome. And then the community opposition--you just hope you can get through that.

But in any event, some of the funny stories--I must have gone to a hundred community meetings to explain this to people. It got so I started believing the stuff about physics!

LaBerge: You knew what you were talking about?

Baker: I got so I sounded like I did. I surely didn't! Let me be clear about that. I surely didn't. Bill Frazer and I used to laugh about that, because he did a lot of that too, and I did his part and he'd do my part, just for fun! I got so I felt I sounded like I did. That was the key. And I think that's probably true, even though I sure never did.

I can think of several anecdotes. One of them was when I was up in Winters, which is west of Davis. There are a lot of issues because, you see, this great big ring was going to take people's property. It was all private property. There was one group of folks who couldn't wait to have their property taken at high market price. Others were wholly opposed to the family farm of six generations being taken by this thing. And so we let the community--you get a big table, as big as this table [approximately six feet by twenty feet], and you put what's called mylar, which is a plastic film, upon which the map of the area was imposed, and then this ring, and you could move it around.
And we had some physical constraints of one kind and other. For example, you
couldn't go under a reservoir, as an example. It wouldn't make any sense. So if you
move it around, you've got to dodge some of these things. And so I did this so many
times, I got kind of wound up in sort of an evangelical way. I was getting this crowd
whomped up because I was trying to build support for it everywhere I went. That was
my main job, whether it was in the communities or in the legislature--particularly
those two bodies--I was trying to build support for it. That was my job.

We talked about the location, and I said--Jesse Shaw is really going to laugh about
this--I said [speaking like a religious evangelist], "Come on down, and put your hands
on the mylar!"

LaBerge: [laughs]

Baker: And they did! And it was a kick. "Oh, let's move it here!" "Hey, we get old Charley's
farm here." "Let's move it"--"Oh, that's fine. Move it back, move it back." It was the
doggonedest thing. We didn't do that again but it was pretty unbelievable.

And then at all these community meetings, the local press is always there--all these
little weekly papers, some daily papers. So I always had a press conference
afterwards to try to explain where we were, what the prospects were, what the meeting
was about, how I felt about life in general. One that comes to mind was in Linden, a
small farming town. We had the meeting in some hotel and a press conference
afterwards. This guy from the Linden Herald Express, Examiner, Chronicle, Sun,
whatever it was called, a weekly paper--one guy--I think he wrote his story, printed it,
rolled up the newspaper, and tossed it to the porch. He was a one-man operation.

You may not recall this, but the concept is that protons will be shot around this ring at
speeds nearly the speed of light, and they'll collide. And when they collide, the
physicists--through their equipment, this very sophisticated equipment--could
examine what was happening and learn things about matter itself. That was the
theory.

So this guy from the Linden paper raises his hand. I say, "Yes, sir?" "Tell me, now,
Mr. Baker, what's one of these protons look like?" Well, I learned to take everybody
seriously because I don't like to embarrass people, so I said, "Well, sir, you know, it's
the darnedest thing. They're so small you actually can't see them with the naked eye." He
says, "How do you know they're there?" I said, "Sir, this is a government job.
You've got to trust us."

LaBerge: [laughs]

Baker: Well, that didn't go so well. It turned up in his story.

And then another time my mouth got away from me, I was in another place in the
Valley. I don't know where it was. I forget. But it was full of farmers. They were
worried about an earthquake. They had a vision of this tunnel, which is about eight
feet in diameter, severing and shooting protons all over, and they were worried about
what that might do to their livestock. I said, "Well, it's all good news. The good news is it's unlikely it'll happen. Moreover, if it did happen you could see your cattle at night. That would be a pretty good deal."

And then another time--do you remember the movie called *The Hoosiers*? Gene Hackman, basketball coach at Indiana?

LaBerge: Yes.

Baker: And he came into a very troubled situation, and the entire community was gathered in the gymnasium, pounding their feet on the stands. I was in Escalon right when that movie came out, and I was in the gymnasium. I looked up--probably sat four hundred people, most in their overalls, looking at me like they wanted to kill me. And they set a little microphone up on the court, just like they did in the movie. It was amazing. And I was only there with one guy. I didn't have any bodyguards or anything. One staff assistant who, as they started pounding the seats as I was going to talk to them--I saw him walk out the door.

LaBerge: [laughs]

Baker: Ernie Lopez, good guy. He's out of there because there wasn't anything he could do. I was able to calm the audience down and convince them that anarchy wasn't the best idea at that particular time. Those are a few of the things I can think of.

Now, the big problem we had--we had a lot of technical problems finding a site that would work.

LaBerge: Was there anything wrong with that site?

Baker: Mostly opposition from the ag folks. Took some prime farmland, and it would have meant for the people a fairly dramatic change in their rural life.

LaBerge: An influx of a lot of new people?

Baker: I was fully sympathetic with them. Yes, an influx of people. It just would have changed these little towns dramatically. And for half the people that was great; for half, it was awful. It was really kind of a mixture. In fact, a man who's now a state senator, Michael Machado--terrific guy. He was head of the San Joaquin County Farm Bureau. Every county has a farm bureau, which is sort of their activist body, and there's a statewide farm bureau--very influential in legislative affairs. Mike and I became pretty good pals.

He called me one day, just outraged because we had moved the site--once again, it's one of the things we did that was really a mistake: to the public it seemed like we willy-nilly would change that site around. You know, you just wipe out families if you move it an inch here on a map and make somebody wealthy, and move it over there. So that was a terrible problem for us. It was the engineering folks that did that, but we didn't do much to stop it, so I can't blame them. But that turned out to be not a good
process because every time we moved it we'd just cause havoc.

So I got this call from Mike, just outraged because we moved the site again. I said, "What problem does that cause?" "Well, my father," he says, "is absolutely outraged." "What happened to your father?" He says, "Well, you moved it just off his property, so now he can't sell his farm." [laughter] Which at the time I thought was really funny. A fenceline away. He said, "You moved my father's farm a fenceline away."

In any event, we had lots of problems in terms of finding a site that would work, for a variety of reasons. The physicists, on the one hand, and engineers looking for some perfect site--I was sort of at odds with them because I was looking for some political solutions. Both legitimate. It was just that we had different problems to try to solve.

But then we finally decided to offer two sites, which was sort of unusual in itself.

**California Legislature's Stance**

LaBerge: This is in your application or whatever it was called?

Baker: Yes, correct. In any event, the next big problem we had, which really was a parallel problem but the gravity of it came up after we picked the site--and that was being competitive. The State of Texas passed a one billion dollar bond issue for infrastructure and all kinds of facilities to go with it. And so we had to have something besides our application to be competitive. Getting that through the legislature was really tough. Ultimately, I think we got authorization for up to $600 million for that kind of thing. But we did get that, and it is true--you may recall that we had a person standing on the steps--

LaBerge: I would like you to tell that story.

Baker: Because we had so much difficulty getting the legislature to approve this.

LaBerge: Why did you? Did they not really support it?

Baker: They didn't think it was a high priority, given the state's needs. That was hard to argue with. It was a federal project with results that were impossible to quantify. All you can say is, "Well, when they put the first spaceship up, they invented Teflon." Which I think is a true story--and there was a whole lot of products that come out of this kind of scientific research. But this is the most basic of basic research.

LaBerge: What would it do for the state? Was it going to bring money to the state or create jobs?

Baker: It would have brought money and jobs, principally--and, of course, a huge construction project. That represented jobs and money. It ended up, by the way, starting with a budget of $4 billion, and when they finally laid it to rest, it was up to $10 billion and rising.
LaBerge: Wow.

Baker: Just in the time that I was in it, which might have been a couple of years, they went from $4 to $7 billion. And this kept on going. That's really what its fatal blow was. It finally got killed.

So John Garamendi, Sam Farr--Sam was an assemblymember; John was a senator--Pat Johnston from Stockton, a senator--they were just fantastic. Out of that, continued lifelong friendships developed for me. They were just terrific. Deukmejian was helpful, too. Governor Deukmejian was helpful. Skeptical, because I talked to him about it a number of times--skeptical, but he went along with it.

**Dramatic Delivery of Proposal in Washington, D.C.**

Baker: Well, our application was all written--many pages; it was in several binders--in it we described this legislative financing proposal, but we couldn't submit a document until it got approved.

LaBerge: By?

Baker: By the legislature and signed by the governor. The way it worked was the legislature had to approve it, the governor had to sign it, and this commission had to approve it. I was in Sacramento representing Gardner on the commission. Gardner was in his office in Berkeley. We had agents like Steve Arditti and others--I mean, our people, wherever we needed them, in Sacramento--and as soon as the legislature approved it and we got the governor to sign--it was just amazing.

Paul Sweet, who was then director of federal relations for us--this thing was due at noon Washington time on a certain day. He had the whole package in several boxes. He went in a truck, parked at the foot of the steps of this building--and I forget the building, but it was a federal agency in Washington--with a cell phone, waiting for the call, "Okay, deliver it." I was in Sacramento, sort of coordinating that part of it. The legislature approved it, the governor approved it, the commission approved it. I telephoned Gardner, who, as the commission head, gave Paul Sweet the authority to go ahead. I think he made it by about an hour, about eleven o'clock in the morning or eleven-thirty. It was very close. I mean, it was just amazing. It's like you couldn't believe you were there. It was out of some kind of movie, Woody Allen movie, I'd say!

LaBerge: [laughs] And was that commented on?

Baker: Yes, actually, there was an article in the *Washington Post* at the time about that, with a picture of Paul Sweet holding the cell phone, leaning against his truck! It was really something.
So we made our submittal. And Texas got it. There was never a lot of information coming out of the National Science Foundation.

**Environmental and Political Considerations in Awarding the Site to Texas**

LaBerge: That was one group of it, I think.

Baker: Yes. NSF made the decision on choosing a site. They were, to their credit, quite close-mouthed about what happened, but the best we could tell, was that there was a lot of concern among that committee of scientists about the environmental opposition. That was a big concern. Having the site near the Davis campus was a wonderful plus, a wonderful plus; but the water table was a problem.

How much influence then-Vice President Bush had is a question.

LaBerge: Right. And Reagan--so one from Texas and one from California.

Baker: Yes, but Reagan never had much allegiance to California, anything I ever saw. I mean, contrast to President Bush and President [Jimmy] Carter, even President [William] Clinton. They have an allegiance to their home state, in a variety of ways. Reagan--I never observed that. He had an allegiance to Eureka College, which is a small private college in Illinois where he went. I remember Secretary Ted Bell, who was Secretary of Education during the Gardner era, a good friend of David's, told me a story about how Reagan had made a decision to eliminate a great big package of student financial aid because his view was students ought to make it on their own. Bell had no success whatsoever in convincing him on the merits until he told him, "Do you realize, Mr. President, what this means to the Eureka College students? They will lose"--and he had it calculated exactly--"Twelve hundred and fifty-two students will lose this"--and Reagan changed his mind, based on that. Interesting how it worked.

But in any event, how much influence George Bush had is always a question. I believe the Speaker of the House at the time was a Texan, too.

LaBerge: I'm trying to remember who it was.¹

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¹ Thomas P. [Tip] O'Neill, Jr., from Massachusetts was speaker from 1977-1987. James C. Wright, Jr., from Texas was speaker from 1987-1989. Thomas S. Foley from Washington was speaker from 1989-1994.
**Anywhere But California**

LaBerge: You were saying ABC.

Baker: Yes, Anywhere But California. California does in fact get more than a pro rata share of federal resources. In those days particularly, with 25 percent of all defense spending in California, 11 to 12 percent of all federal grants come to California, and the other forty-nine states, looking out for their constituents, adopted this unspoken code of Anywhere But California. And we think that might have worked against us as well.

But anyhow, we didn't get it, which of course--I like to characterize it as one of my great losses, but what a victory it was not to get it because we would have expended huge energy to get it underway and getting it going and whatnot, and then ended up disrupting people just terribly in terms of their life, and then end up with a dead tunnel in the ground. And they're still trying to close it down.

But I suppose that's kind of the story of it. We did some interesting things, like in the beginning, because it's fifty-three miles around, which is about seventeen miles across. We took a helicopter at low level and flew all the way around it. This guy had the coordinates to do that. And you could really see what it was we were going to sacrifice to pull it off. That was a fascinating little journey I took.

**Academic Reaction and Major Players**

LaBerge: How did that academic community feel about it?

Baker: Oh, quite mixed, quite mixed because that was such an enormous sum of money. This may be an overstatement, but if you weren't a high-energy physicist, you would be opposed to it because there's only so much money available for research of whatever kind, all the research. So it was clear to any thinking person that should that go ahead, it was going to shrink available funds for other things. For those who are not interested in high-energy physics, [it was] very difficult to understand the wisdom of spending that much money on one field, a fairly narrow field at that. So there was, I'd say, general opposition among the academic community, not because they didn't like physicists, but they didn't like seeing so much of the money that might be available for all of research--so much of it going to one project.

LaBerge: Where is Jesse Shaw right now?

Baker: Jesse Shaw lives in Healdsburg.

LaBerge: Okay. Retired up there?
Baker: Yes. He took one of the VERIPs, the last one, and he served for a while as executive director of the California Business and Higher Education Forum, as an outside contractor. And then that disbanded. He actually left that before it disbanded. He now is the executive director of the UC Davis Department of Enology Viticulture Foundation, and doing some other consulting, including doing some food and wine tours as a small business entrepreneur.

LaBerge: And what about Dick Lander? Is he still at Davis?

Baker: I believe—as far as I know, he's still at Davis. I haven't seen him for a bit. Just those two would—an hour each—we just spent forty-five minutes—an hour would, I think, be a nice fill-in to this little story, which probably hasn't come up—I don't know if Frazer talked about that or not.

LaBerge: Minuscule—and Gardner, minuscule.

Baker: So this would be an interesting piece of the history.

LaBerge: Yes.

Baker: And if people—if Willa [Baum] and others wanted it—flesh out the interview.

You would have had a number of the members of the legislature, the governor's office, and John Geohagen [pronounced GAY-gen], who was the Secretary of Business and Transportation.

LaBerge: I think his name is on there.

Baker: Yes, yes. He and I were involved a lot. And you know Clair Burgener. You can think of probably a dozen, maybe, that might be helpful; but get those two [and] you're going to have most of it because they were really involved full time. They were both essentially on leaves of absence to do this.

LaBerge: Full time, wow.

Baker: Jesse was kind of running the politics, and Steve Arditti was involved, too, of course, naturally. And Dick Lander. That would be a good idea. I hadn't thought of that. To fill in and correct my errors of memory!
IV UC SYSTEMWIDE, 1978-1983

Background

LaBerge: Okay. Last time we ended when you were appointed assistant vice president for budget and planning, and you were appointed by--

Baker: Tom Jenkins.

LaBerge: Yes, okay. So he was the vice president, and he was your immediate boss.

Baker: Actually, at the time he was associate vice president. I don't know how much is on here, but I'll back up and maybe repeat a little bit.

LaBerge: Okay. I have written down Loren Furtado left.

Baker: Okay. If you go back, say, to about 1974, Vice President McCorkle--remember, in 1970 Joe McGuire was brought in as vice president for planning. That didn't seem to work out, and in '74 he left. McCorkle reorganized the whole budget function, and made Loren Furtado assistant vice president for budgetary planning, reporting directly to McCorkle. Furtado built his team by appointing Chuck Courey as director of the general campus operating budget. Larry Hershman, who I hadn't known, came from UC San Francisco to be the director of the health sciences budget. I was appointed director of capital budget. I had been on the engineering and construction side.

LaBerge: That's right. You just had to change your spots.

Baker: That's right. Joe McGuire was the one who told me to do that, or suggested that. Milt Von Damm was made director of state legislative relations for the budget, working with the Sacramento office. He was housed in the budget office but spent most of his time in Sacramento. And a man named Barry Clagett was named director of data management, which had to do with enrollment planning, those kinds of things. So this was, for us, each of us, for the first time in our careers really had our own place in the sun. It was quite an exciting time. Those years-- '74, '75, '76, '77--were just terrific. Really in many ways the most exciting time of my career because it was the first time I had my own railroad to run. It was great.
Well, McCorkle brought in a number of assistants. A woman named Sandy [Sandra] Archibald was one, who was, oh, quite theoretical in her approach to budget and planning, I'll say. Furtado began to run into some conflicts. And then, as a favor to--as I understood it--as I favor to then-Chancellor [William] McElroy of San Diego, who had been head of NSF--this guy Bud [Bernard] Sisco he brought into San Diego and Tom Jenkins--all worked on the Apollo program. That, I guess, ended, and he was helping these guys get relocated.

**Associate Vice President Tom Jenkins and Monday Night Meetings**

Baker: Jenkins showed up, from our perspective, just out of nowhere, to be an assistant vice president.

LaBerge: And this was under Saxon?

Baker: Saxon was president, McCorkle was the vice president--like executive vice president--I think that was his title. And I remember Loren Furtado just being really bothered by all this because--as I would have been--all of a sudden, some guy you never knew was your shadow.

LaBerge: And had never heard of.

Baker: And every time Furtado went to see McCorkle, which would be a routine, as his supervisor, there was Tom Jenkins. And gee, it used to bother him. And it wasn't long before Furtado stepped down. Whether he did it because he had enjoyed about as much as he could stand or it was suggested--I don't know the circumstances, but it wasn't pleasant. He was very unhappy about that. He's a wonderful, wonderful man, very able guy.

LaBerge: What did he go on to do?

Baker: He actually retired. He did a fair amount of consulting for a while. He must be somewhere in his seventies now. I'm not quite sure how old he is, probably in his mid-seventies. Jenkins became--this is important: Furtado was assistant vice president. Jenkins--they made him associate vice president.

LaBerge: Okay, and is associate higher?

Baker: Yes.

LaBerge: I never knew.

Baker: Yes, an assistant VP or an assistant vice chancellor is lower than an associate. Associate--it is just the way the hierarchy works. And then you get vice chancellor or vice president. These titles get carried away. Anyhow, so Furtado's spot as AVP was now vacant. Jenkins sought to fill it. A very interesting thing happened. Jenkins was a very tough guy to work for. He liked to have meetings at five o'clock in the evening
and go till maybe ten. I didn't see Monday night football for about three years. That's true. He would drone on and on and on and on.

This is a sidebar, but it was Hershman and Richard West (he's now at CSU), Jesse Shaw, me, and Nancy Nakayama, and Verna Osborn, Jenkins’ assistants. Nancy used to bring in Kentucky Fried Chicken and Coke. That's what he ate. He had his Monday staff meetings always scheduled at three. We'd always get these phone calls --delay, delay--sometimes they didn't start till seven. And Jenkins would drone on, almost verbatim, about what happened at every meeting he had ever been to.

So I started bringing my mail with me, and I'd sort of peek a little bit and see what was there, scribble something, and put it on this pile over here. "I'll send that to somebody." I'd just sort of route my mail--things I had to read and study, I'd set aside, but I'd kind of get through my mail. There was always a half a foot of mail every day.

Well, Jesse and Larry and I finally made a deal. We were very close. We made a deal that every Monday night one of us would have some reason they couldn't be there: my mother's in town or--

LaBerge: It was really Monday night football.

Baker: Well, not necessarily football, but always Monday night. Well, just to get some relief because to have all three of us there was--

LaBerge: Ridiculous.

Baker: Absolutely. So we made that deal that one of us--we'd just take turns. "I'm sorry. Larry can't be here. His mother's in town." It only happened about once a month--the meetings happened about three times a month, so once a month, one of us took turns with a night off. And Jenkins never caught on to that.

LaBerge: [laughs]

Baker: So one time Jesse and I were there. Richard always paid attention, and Nancy paid close attention, and Jesse--Jesse started picking up my habit of doing his mail. You'd kind of listen. If your name came up, you'd say, "Could you run that by me again, Tom? I was thinking about something else." And he'd run it by again, and you'd answer the question.

Well, Jesse and I were so engrossed in our mail that neither of us heard that Jenkins was calling on one or the other of us--because we'd cover for each other. We were awakened from the intensity of our reading--awakened by the silence. And [laughter] we were caught red-handed, not having a clue about what he was talking about, not a clue. So we had to be a little more vigilant after that.
**Acting Assistant Vice President Baker**

Baker: Anyhow, Jenkins was a very tough guy to work for. So what he did when Furtado left, he did something interesting. He made me acting AVP, which was--

LaBerge: Acting.

Baker: Acting. It was quite flattering because that was a big promotion, and I guess I was basically in competition with several others who might have been that. And what I didn't know was he had previously said to Hershman, "I want to make you director of the budget, the whole budget." And Larry says, "I'll do it only if you make Bill AVP." I didn't know that. So when he said to me, "I want you to be acting AVP," I said, "I'll do it only if you make Hershman director of the budget." We had not rehearsed that or talked about it.

LaBerge: Wow.

Baker: And he said, "Okay, it's a deal." So I was acting AVP. Then he made me go through a full search. Dan Aldrich, then chancellor of Irvine, chaired the committee. I remember that. Adrian Harris was on that committee from UCLA. A bunch of people. A full search, advertisement, candidates. I was acting AVP for sixteen months, which is tough because I was doing okay. I was doing a good job, I believe. Why don't they just give it to me? And if they gave it to someone else, I was going to be really shattered, you know. So it was a hard emotional time for me. I had to go through the interview process, and I got the job. Became a real AVP in 1979.

**Lowell Paige, Tom Jenkins, and Sacramento Relations**

Baker: Boy, Tom was tough to work for. At that time, the head of the Sacramento office was Lowell Paige. He was called special assistant to the president for state governmental relations--something like that. He wasn't a director and he wasn't VP. His predecessor had been a VP, Jay Michael. Jay Michael was one of three vice presidents that Saxon axed when he became president. Saxon axed three vice presidents: Frank Kidner, a long-time Berkeley faculty member; Travis Cross, who had been vice president for university relations; and Jay Michael.

Jay Michael. He was vice president for governmental relations. Saxon brought in his buddy, Lowell Paige, a professor of mathematics from UCLA. Had been at NSF, so he had some experience, but--

LaBerge: No experience with legislative relations.

Baker: Not at all, not at all. And Paige was--he and Jenkins just did not exchange Valentines. Gosh, they just didn't like each other. Of course, when you're working the budget,
you've got to really work close with Sacramento. I mean, it's hand in glove. It couldn't be more close. And Steve Arditti was Paige's assistant. Arditti was ordered--ordered--by Paige not to talk to us, and we were ordered by Jenkins not to talk to him. So we used to meet in secret places in Sacramento, Arditti and Hershman and I, to map out our strategy. We'd meet in a hotel room or someplace, literally in secret because we knew, to get the job done, we had to work together, and we all liked each other and had been working together for years. It was just ludicrous that these two guys took that view.

LaBerge: Yes. And did the president know that was going on, do you think?

Baker: No, I don't think so. I don't think so.

LaBerge: Would it have been out of place for you to say anything?

Baker: I guess I was chicken [laughs].

LaBerge: Just not at the right spot on the totem pole?

Baker: Well, I'll tell you, Germaine, I knew how to get the job done in spite of this. I didn't have to worry about that part of it because I knew how to get it done, and so did Steve and so did Larry. I mean, I don't want to take the credit. We did it together. We knew how to get the job done, and we did, and so we did it in spite of what was going on.

Well, Jenkins meantime began to get a pretty bad reputation for his work in Sacramento. He was not a forthcoming witness, shall we say.

LaBerge: This is a bad reputation from the legislators?

Baker: Yes, yes. And the Legislative Analyst and Department of Finance and so on. About 1980 he began to get in trouble, and by about '81 he was actually fired. Saxon did it because he--well, let's just say he was less than forthcoming both with Saxon and the legislature--I can't give you details--it doesn't serve any purpose.

Oh, Verna Osborn. That was another lady who was in the Monday night meeting picture. She was Jenkins' assistant. Took all the notes. She'd take notes and tape record it. He used to bring in a typist at midnight to type up the notes from our meeting, verbatim. I forgot about that. That was just ridiculous.

LaBerge: These were these Monday night meetings.

Baker: Yes. One time he started to have regular meetings on Saturday with his larger staff--say, everybody two levels down, twenty people. We revolted. "We're just not coming." And he made a big pitch: "When I was at NASA, we had a problem with the Apollo program, and I wanted a meeting with everybody there"--because we were complaining there were too many people there and it was Saturday--"everybody there. We had 2000 people in that meeting, and there wasn't one single person that didn't need to be there." I remember that. That was quite a standard to maintain, a standard
of measurement about sizes of meetings.

So he was a very tough guy. Those were tough years for us. Furtado, our pal, kind of got eased out; Jenkins came in, and he was tough to work for; McCorkle was at that time in a lot of personal trouble--you know, he had a relationship with his assistant; her husband beat him up.

Everybody was there. He was in a sling and had a black eye. Everybody knew what had happened. It was no secret. Tough times.

LaBerge: It wasn't a team the way you had--

Baker: I'm a trust guy, relationships. I work out of friendship. That's the way I am. And that's the way most of us were. It wasn't just me. We worked as a team. We liked each other. We worked hard. We got the job done. We were good at it. We accomplished a lot of things. This was just a miserable time.

Assistant to the President for the University Budget and Assistant Vice President for Budget and Planning

Baker: So in '81 Saxon decided that I (by this time, Jenkins had become a vice president. I can't remember how that happened--from associate vice president to vice president) would replace Jenkins but he wouldn't make me vice president because Paige, Lowell Paige, was special assistant to the president. David Wilson, who was the administrative officer for the Office of the President, was also special assistant to the president.

So Saxon made me special assistant to the president for university budget and assistant vice president of budget and planning. I reported to Saxon as special assistant to the president for budget. I reported to Bill Fretter as assistant vice president for budget and planning.

LaBerge: Now, had Bill Fretter been there all along, too?

Baker: Bill Fretter was brought in by Saxon to replace McCorkle, who--I think about 1980 or so--was also asked to return to the laboratory.

That was my first confrontation with Saxon because I thought, well, this is my chance. If I'm going to do the same job, why shouldn't I be vice president? The answer was no, but it was a fairly confrontational negotiation, which he won. I lost. But I certainly was glad to have the chance to prove my mettle.

I had one more confrontation with Saxon. It was over a trivial issue. Back then, in the early eighties, there was an energy crisis. It was then that we decided to close campuses down at the Christmas break.
LaBerge: And that came from the Office of the President.

Baker: For budget reasons, everybody wanted to do it. The issue was--in the Office of the President there are always some people that think they're so important they can't shut down, which is just baloney. I mean, it's really baloney. So that was kind of the battle. In Saxon's cabinet, I got impatient with this discussion. I said, "Why don't we just close it?" I must have said it in kind of a sassy way. He just unloaded on me. He later apologized. As a matter of fact, he resigned shortly after that. He called me to tell me he was going to resign. He says, "You know, one of the reasons I'm resigning is that I blow up at people like you over trivial issues." And that was the issue, which was, of course, trivial.

What I wanted to say is, "Let's just knock off this whining and just close it. It's real easy." But he was trying to juggle all these people who--

LaBerge: Right. And did you close it or not? I can't remember. For a few days?

Baker: No, I don't think we did. I don't think University Hall--

LaBerge: I don't think so, either.

Baker: I don't believe so. That just proves, Germaine, that being in show business is a hard job.

LaBerge: Right! [laughter]

Baker: It's a hard job. But actually, Saxon was quite complimentary of both Larry and me for our work on the budget.

Changing the Budget Process While Jenkins Vacations

Baker: One of the anecdotes that I might have told you: Probably about 1979, when I was acting AVP, Jenkins took his first vacation. He went away for three weeks. He was a guy who never took vacations, at all, ever--just because he couldn't trust people and was a workaholic--all the kinds of reasons that people don't take vacations. "I never missed a work day in my life," he said. I don't know what that says about me, but I took my vacations.

When he was gone, the first day, Saxon called Larry and I in, and he says, "I want you to make some real changes in the budget process." The budget process at that time had become, under McCorkle and carried by Jenkins for that '79 period, just a black box. I mean, the campuses were just absolutely in the dark, deliberately held in the dark, did not know--their submittals would come in, and they didn't know what happened to it. Something would come out, and the process was about as closed and secretive as it could be.
I've done a lot of consulting at a dozen universities around the country over time, on the budget process, and invariably it becomes secretive and closed, and you've got to open it back up again. That's usually what happens because it's power. The budget is power. So Larry and I scrambled around, went out and visited every campus, and in three weeks' time we completely changed the budget process.

Jenkins came back, absolutely furious. I will never forget. "I will never take another vacation in my life. This is what happens when you take a vacation." You know, confirming his behavior of twenty, thirty years. That was really something. The budget is pretty much the same today--open.

LaBerge: The same way ever since.

Baker: Yes, I think so, I think so.

LaBerge: You were doing both the operating and the capital budget?

**Building a Team, 1978-1983**

Baker: When I became AVP, I replaced myself with a new director of capital planning, Trudi Heinecke, who's still around, who I brought up from Irvine.

LaBerge: Whom you knew from--

Baker: Yes. Actually, that's not quite right. At the beginning, I made my lead capital planner the director of capital planning, a fellow named Pat Henry. Pat was absolutely the best analyst ever for capital. He could look at this stuff and figure out exactly how many square feet were supposed to be where in about a minute and a half. He was really good. But promoting him was a mistake because it was just beyond his skills. He has a different set of skill levels. Managing people was not where he was really good. That didn't work, and so I had to relieve him from that, and I brought Trudi Heinecke in. She was director of capital planning and, I think, stayed in that post for quite a while, and there were more reorganizations. But she's still around now, doing the planning for the Merced campus.

LaBerge: Okay. So she did that, and who did the operating budget? You were over both.

Baker: Yes, I was over both. As AVP, I had Larry as the director of the operating budget for health sciences and general campuses since we brought those back together. Trudi was director of the capital budget. I still had construction--Jack Burnett was the director of facilities management and construction.

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Baker: Ralph Young, the director of resource administration. Basically, once we got the
money, it was Ralph's job to get it to the right places and make sure it was accounted for correctly. He had a team of a half dozen people who were accountants by general nature. They probably won't like me to say that. Loren Furtado once told me that an accountant is a bookkeeper who drinks. I was never quite sure what that meant, but I do remember he said that.

For a long time I wanted to have a small think tank, a small group of three or four people, bright, top people who could really study our longer-range problems for us, because the budget itself was absolutely wrapped up in the legislative process. I mean, getting the materials from the campus, getting the budget prepared, getting it through the regents, and getting it through the legislature--that was just an absolute intense--

LaBerge:  Day-to-day--

Baker:  Day-to-day. Every day there were problems to solve, and there was not a minute for anybody to sit down and think ahead a little bit. And the same with the capital budget. So I finally convinced Jenkins I wanted to have an analysis group. He finally funded it, and I hired to be my first director of that group John Woods, who had been with the legislative analyst. Top guy, terrific guy, doctor of economics from Stanford, MBA from Berkeley, BA from Berkeley--just a terrific guy. What a talent. He's now the vice chancellor for administration at UC San Diego. I mean, he is top of the line. He is really competent, and a wonderful person to boot.

He hired as his first staff, among others, Sandy Smith, who's now AVP-academic planning. When John left to go to San Diego, Sandy became director of analysis. That was a good group of people. We were able to position ourselves far better in reacting to the day-to-day crises of what we all did all the time. That was a good plan.

And I think Jenkins liked the idea, actually. He was sold on it. To get the money took a while. So I had then Hershman and Trudi and Ralph Young and Jack Burnett and John Woods. That was my staff. Sharon Avalos was my secretary, later executive assistant. Joanne Catton came in sometime along the way, but I forget when. Great team of people, just great. That was from about '78 to '83, about five years.

LaBerge:  Okay, so before David Gardner came in.

Baker:  Yes.

LaBerge:  So one of the innovations you did was this analysis group, this think tank.

Baker:  Yes. That was really good--
How a Budget Should Be Developed

LaBerge: These campus visits and opening up the budget--

Baker: A lot of people say, "Well, here's what we need." They say, "We need a 35 percent increase in the budget. We really need that." Well, it's ludicrous--with the one exception of Gardner's big budget increase, which was a separate story which I think we talked about\(^1\) --but ordinarily you can't maintain credibility with the governor and the legislature unless you ask for something which is at least within the ballpark of reasonableness. It's got to be reasonable.

So you first decide how much we think we ought to ask for, so you kind of add up some big pieces--well, salary is the biggest piece because 80 percent of our whole budget is salaries, and you get a 5 percent salary increase, that's a 4 percent increase in the budget right there. So you first decide, based on a lot of data, what your increase for salaries ought to be. And then you've got to maintain a lot of things. There's an inflation factor--commodities that we purchase--utilities and lab supplies and so forth --those go up, so you've got to make some adjustments. So you kind of decide what you need just to maintain, and then how much dare we ask for. You develop a number with some very rough ideas, and you start there.

And for that part of the budget, which might be a new program or augmentations to existing programs, we'd go to the campuses to get a sense of what their priorities are. Have an all-day meeting with the chancellor and vice chancellors and budget people. And we'd get a picture of how they're doing and where they're going and where their needs are, and we get a feel for the campus--that's where the work is, what's on the campuses. We don't have students or faculty or alumni. They have them.

LaBerge: Right.

Baker: So then we come back and sort that out and determine what the campuses really needed the most--and what we could sell. I always thought it was foolhardy to go all out for something you had no chance to get. I used to ask this question when I was on the campuses, when they would be pounding away at me on something. I'd say, "Let me ask you this question: I want you to decide something for me. Shall you ask me to go and seek money for something for which we have absolutely no chance, or would you like to have me go seek money for something for which we have some chance?" They always chose the latter.

LaBerge: But people need that pointed out to them.

Baker: Oh, sure, sure. And I had the advantage of knowing things they didn't know because they didn't spend time in Sacramento. Of course, they knew stuff I didn't know. That's kind of how we did that. That's really the process that we opened up, in its

\(^1\) See Appendix.
simplest form. I think it works--and on the campus you've got to be open. People have got to know. So we go back to the campus to tell why we made our decisions. We take heat, but one of the things I'm proudest of is, that I believe the campuses thought I was square with them. I've been told that a lot of times, particularly, "Well, we sure miss you because"--people really believe I was square with them, because I would tell them.

LaBerge: You know, another person--I don't know if I told you I interviewed Bob Campbell?

Baker: Oh, yes, Bob, yes.

LaBerge: Who just praised you so much. He said if it weren't for you--

Baker: That's nice.

LaBerge: --if it had only been the higher administration, the money wouldn't have come. It was you who went in there and could put a human face on--

Baker: I was straight.

LaBerge: Yes. That's what he said.

Baker: If we were wrong, I'd say we were wrong. I was never afraid to admit we were wrong or made a mistake.

LaBerge: Yes.

Baker: Geez, I make them all the time! If I didn't do that, I'd be useless because I make them all the time. That's a proud accomplishment, I think, as testified by Bob Campbell. That's certainly what I tried to do. With the campuses as well, and campus people still today tell me that they appreciated that. I spent a lot of time on the campuses just talking with people and sharing what I knew; they shared what they knew; we'd get a sense of it. Then I felt more confident because the one thing I never felt comfortable doing was anything by myself. I didn't have the confidence to do something by myself! I had to have it all lined up. Then I'd go for it because I knew that I had the votes, so to speak.

There's an old adage: Never call for the question till you've counted the votes. And many people make the mistake of calling for the question before they've counted the votes. And that's a life adage.

LaBerge: What about in this whole budget process--what was your relationship with the treasurer? Or didn't the treasurer even come into that?

Baker: Well, the treasurer was involved in projects which were non-state funded because we'd borrow money. Those shifted more to the vice president of business and finance--Wayne Kennedy today, Ron Brady during most of my time as vice president. He and the treasurer were at odds pretty regularly, as I recall. I got along with the treasurer quite well.
LaBerge: But you didn't have that much--

Baker: Not that much--some--not that much. Herb Gordon is a consummate Bear Backer, so we shared in common an avid interest in Cal sports--I'd see him at the ball games. He was and is a friend. I didn't have too many official dealings with him--some, but always good. I dealt with his real estate officer, Gary DeWeese, quite a bit; his assistant treasurer, Steve Morange, quite a bit. But usually solving mutual problems of one kind or another, and they were always helpful to me--just like the general counsel.

LaBerge: You didn't need--

Baker: I dealt with them a lot in my early career, when I was managing construction--a lot because there was always construction contract issues and claims and language in contracts and so forth, so I dealt with those folks a lot in my early--my first ten years, especially.

**Legislative Analyst’s Office and Department of Finance**

LaBerge: What about the Legislative Analyst and the Department of Finance?

Baker: Well, the Leg Analyst and the Department of Finance were very important people in our lives. First, in the beginning of the process--the process really starts in July, when the current year budget is approved, so the budget for '99-2000 just got approved. Those folks are now working on the 2000-2001 budget: what gaps need filling that we didn't get. They're doing what I said: how much should we ask for and so forth.

But you've got to start with the Department of Finance early on, too, because you can't wait--see, the regents don't approve the budget officially till November. Well, you've got a lot of work to do before December, when the governor wraps it up, so they're now beginning to work, putting together our budget and are beginning to work on the known pieces--for example, furnishing data on faculty salaries. They're beginning to do that with the Department of Finance.

It's at the beginning of that process which goes on indefinitely, but basically you start in July and you end in July, but you've got the last year's budget to wrap up and the next year's--so you've got three budgets at once you're always working on. But the budget that you're going to submit to the governor and pass by the legislature starts roughly in July and ends the next July.

What you do in the beginning: you put a huge amount of energy into getting everything you can into the governor's budget because over history it is changed very little by the legislature. A little up, a little down, but at the margin.
The 1948 minutes of the Board of Regents meeting--I found this years ago; I might even have given you a copy--the 1948 minutes indicate that President Sproul reported that "he had presented the budget to Governor [Earl] Warren, who indicated it was as fine a budget as he ever had seen, and he's sending it without change to the legislature." That's in the minutes. A serious contrast to the battles that we go through with the Department of Finance today.

And the Leg Analyst also--because they technically--or theoretically--don't get the budget until it's released in January, and the report to the legislature is due in February. Well, they've got to start working way in advance, too. So we start working with them on what's going to be in our budget, what are the issues, what data do you need to help overcome your objection? We start work on that, leading up to the governor's budget, which gets wrapped up in December and presented to the legislature in January.

So relationships with Department of Finance people and the Leg Analyst’s people are very, very important. They've got to be your brand-new best friends because they've got the power to say no. Nobody's got the power to say yes, but, man, they've got thousands of them that have the power to say no. And so that's really important. I worked hard at that with the Leg Analyst, who's been Elizabeth Hill for quite some time; Bill Hamm before her, Alan Post before.

The Leg Analyst people in my day, who were included in the operating budget, were Hal Giogue and John Woods--till I stole him away. The capital budget was Jerry Beavers. The Department of Finance were people like Stan Stancil and Bob Gibbs and Nancy Day. I'd take them to football games. Every year I'd have the Department of Finance and the Leg Analyst’s staff down to a football game. Never talked one bit of business. That was where Arditti and Hershman and I have a little different approach. They never stop talking business. My philosophy was let's build friends first, then talk business.

We used to go on the road because we'd take a round of visits to every campus every year with those staff people, so we traveled together and sort of lived together, in a sense, so I always worked hard at those friendships. I had some good times. They were just doing their job.

LaBerge: So you took the Department of Finance staff to the campuses and the Legislative Analyst's staff together or separately?

Baker: Together, which is a little unseemly.

LaBerge: Yes. But maybe not!

Baker: Unseemly in the sense that--

LaBerge: They all saw the same thing.

Baker: But there wasn't time to do it in a sequential fashion. It had to be done concurrently, which was awkward a lot of times because of the personalities. In the days when Bob
Gibbs was the capital analyst for the Department of Finance and Jerry Beavers was the Leg Analyst capital analyst. Gibbs simply would not put anything in the budget that the analyst didn't already pre-approve, which was hard for me, very hard—not how it's supposed to be, but that's how it was. So I used to stick with them day in and day out, late in the night.

And those people are still friends. I still see them around occasionally. Still friends. And they'll say the kind of things Bob Campbell said because I was straight. And I've picked up complaints over the years about other people who weren't straight. Some of my staff would say, "Well, we've got to go get these guys." You know, politically. I said, "We're not going to go "get" anybody because there's something you have to remember: Never burn your bridges. Today's analyst is tomorrow's director of the Department of Finance or legislative member. Never burn bridges." I had to preach that to people because they would really want me to--because I was sort of the same level as Elizabeth Hill, the Leg Analyst, or the legislature, or the director of Finance. I reported to the president; they reported to the legislature or the governor--so we were kind of at that level. And I was good friends with most all of them. I could go in, and they'd listen to me. Maybe take some action. The last thing I wanted was for them to take action against their staff because of something I said. Then I'm history! I wasn't into history. I was into getting the job done, so that was a philosophy of mine, an approach I took, which is maybe different than some.

Legislators

LaBerge: What about other legislators besides Bob Campbell you thought were particularly good to work with or not easy to work with?

Baker: People like Senator Petris and Senator Gary Hart, who was an assembly member before. They all worked on our budget committee. Jack O'Connell, now a senator, former assemblyman. All friends. Pat Johnston, John Garamendi, Sam Farr, Bill Leonard, Barry Keene, Tom Hannigan, Walter Stiern, Ken Maddy, Al Alquist, Bill Jones. There's many more. I'd have to get a list and look at it, but those are some that come to mind. Mike Machado, who was the former farm bureau guy, became an assembly member, and then a senator. Later in my career, Bruce McPherson from Santa Cruz--a really terrific, top guy. John Vasconcellos. Some may be surprised, but I think the world of John. He's a good friend.

LaBerge: That's good. I'm going to be interviewing him. A full-life thing, and part of it--a big chunk is going to be the university.


LaBerge: It is, because he often criticizes the university.

Baker: Yes. John's heart was always in the right place. He wasn't always as practical as some. I think he often had a hard time understanding why other people's hearts
couldn't overcome the impracticalities of the things he wanted to do. But John is honest, straight, and he and I, I think, had a very good relationship, and we still do. He writes me occasionally about something or other.

Deukmejian was wonderful as a governor, Deukmejian. We've talked about that.¹

LaBerge: Yes.

Baker: Other legislators. I'd have to really look at a list to see.

LaBerge: How about Tom Hayden?

Baker: Well, Tom Hayden--

LaBerge: Some people were critical of the university--

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**Quentin Kopp and the Audit of the Searles Fund**

Baker: [Quentin] Kopp was a tough one, but I was straight with him, and he backed off on a few things.

LaBerge: Do you have any examples?

Baker: Yes, I do, actually. This is a piece that we didn't ever talk about, I don't think. It really belongs in the Gardner era. But we had an audit--when all this--I might have talked about it. When all this blew up--

LaBerge: This is the retirement--

Baker: The Gardner retirement package and the perks and that whole scene about 1991 or so, I guess. The state auditor general decided to audit the use of our discretionary fund, the non-state fund, called the Searles Fund. A man by the name of Searles many years ago gave a substantial gift that was untargeted, as a gift to be used as the president deems necessary. And that fund today, which is worth a lot, pays for all of the chancellors’ houses and their maintenance, the president's house, all expense accounts of all the chancellors and vice chancellors and vice presidents.

It was the policy of that fund--

LaBerge: And it's called the president's discretionary fund?

1. See Appendix for other interview.
Baker: Well, it's really called the Searles Fund, but it is the president's discretionary fund. I'm not quite sure exactly of the title, but the regents actually have to approve the allocation of it each year. It was that fund that was our entertainment account. The policy at the time of Gardner allowed you to use that fund for first-class air travel, sending flowers to people, entertaining—all that sort of thing.

So when they did the audit, they picked up, for example, that Vice President Hopper had bought a tuxedo with that fund. Well, the purpose he bought it was for university business.

LaBerge: He didn't need it for--

Baker: I actually thought it was okay, but it got quite publicized in the newspapers. They picked up first-class travel, mostly Gardner. They picked up on me a couple of times. There had been a fellow--this is a little story--a fellow named Ron Kolb, who was my director of news and communications. He married a woman named Becky deKalb. Both terrific people. Becky deKalb was an assistant to Brady, and Ron was on my staff. Both of them had a lot of friends in each of the respective offices. I thought I'm going to put on a little gathering for them. I'll put a little party on to honor them because it would bring together—I had a real motive here.

LaBerge: You wanted to bring together the two staffs.

Baker: To bring Brady's staff--many of his--and mine together in a social setting that you couldn't find an excuse to do otherwise. It was perfect. I had it at my home. When my assistant--I wanted to get some flowers, a little flower bouquet for the buffet table—not a big deal, just a little bouquet of flowers. When she ordered them, the person on the phone said, "Well, what sort of occasion?" "Well, some people got married. We're honoring them." Well, on the receipt (which I never saw) it said "wedding reception." The auditor picked that up, and in the audit accused me of using that fund for a wedding reception when, of course, it was not. It was exactly as I just described it.

And then another clerk in my office had—I didn't pay attention to my sick leave. I mean, I didn't ignore it, but I didn't keep track of it. Someone else kept track of it, and she had missed about ten days of sick leave that I--

LaBerge: Had taken?

Baker: Sick leave I had taken but not recorded, or some days of vacation I had taken but she hadn't recorded them. I mean, I always fill this little form out. She somehow--

LaBerge: You just signed it or something.

Baker: I paid no attention to it. They picked that up. But on the other hand, they picked up a whole lot of positive things about my use of the fund, like all these tailgate parties with all the legislators and the staff and all that. That was terrific. But they picked up and hammered me for--
LaBerge: But that was okay. They didn't object to the tailgate parties for the legislators.

Baker: No, it was actually a complementary piece of the audit.

LaBerge: Because they could say--

Baker: It was what it was. But they hammered me--hammered poor old Hopper for his tuxedo. They hammered me for my sick leave error. I had, when I retired, about 2,000 hours of sick leave, so it wasn't like--

LaBerge: Right.

Baker: And they also got me for that reception. So then there was a hearing, Kopp's committee, the legislative audit committee.

LaBerge: And so were you all sitting there together?

Baker: No, no, I represented the university at the hearing. There were probably at least fifty citations of questionable use--nothing bad, but to the public's eye it didn't look good. That's for sure. Why should you be sending flowers to someone just because their mother died, right? And I was the person called upon by the president to represent the university in this hearing about the audit.

Kopp, who could be mean as a junkyard dog, you know--I went to see Quentin. I was always friendly with Quentin, and I said, "Look, I want you to know that I'm in this audit, and here's what happened." I told him just like I'm telling you. That same day at the hearing--never touched me, and eased off on everybody else. So it's because I went to see him, and I didn't try to hide anything, that I was wrong--"Here's how it happened." These other things--"This was probably not a good idea. It looks bad." I kind of went through the whole thing with him. And we got off very easy, and he never touched me once.

I was scared to death! The press was all there, you know. Geez, the blasted "wedding reception." It was not a wedding reception! But that's what they called it. And I later saw the piece of paper, which was a receipt. I mean, it's twenty-five bucks or something. It was a receipt: one flower arrangement, "wedding reception," delivered to my house! [laughter] My name and my address but paid for out of this fund.

**Tom Hayden**

Baker: Hayden. Hayden's kind of interesting. I always got along okay with Tom. Our issues with him were sort of off-the-wall kinds of issues. They weren't usually in the mainstream of the budget, so Arditti handled most of that kind of stuff. But I do remember a funny story about Hayden. Steve [Arditti] and I were going to see him one day and, as is typical, you sit in the waiting room because they're always backed
up with their appointments and so you just learn that's how it works.

The door was open, and we could see inside, talking to Senator Hayden, were two about twenty-five-year-old absolutely scrubbed-clean kids, all in their business suits. What in the world? Who is he talking to? In order to be briefed on Department of Energy laboratory issues, each regent has to have to have a clearance, a top-secret clearance. They call it a Q clearance.

LaBerge: Oh, really?

Baker: Speaker [Willie] Brown, who was an ex officio regent, would not get a clearance because he refused to be fingerprinted. It was against his principles. Finally, he found it necessary to be able to vote on a regental lab issue, so he was going to try to get a clearance. That's a little background.

So we asked Hayden, "Who were those guys?" He says, "Well, you won't believe this. They're FBI agents. Willie Brown used me as a reference for his clearance.” [laughter] So here were these two crewcut, scrubbed-clean kids talking to Hayden as a reference to Willie Brown. I thought that was pretty interesting!

So Hayden was okay.

David Roberti

Baker: Tough ones. [David] Roberti was tough. Roberti was a senator.

LaBerge: Yes.

Baker: Senator Roberti, before he became pro tem. And back in about the seventies, when the student unrest was at its peak, I was trying to get money for capital budgets. He just unloaded on me, me personally, about what was going on on the campuses. I just happened to be the guy in the chair! I remember that. He was really tough.

By and large, I found members of the legislature to be pretty good people. Really, for the most part, I liked them. I really did. They had a hard job. They're all a bit full of themselves. I mean, there's an ego ingredient that seems to come with the territory. It's interesting. I would be hard pressed to find a member of the legislature that wasn't pretty high up on the ego chain--the Congress as well. It just seems to be what gets them there somehow or other. It's not the money. I think it's the prestige and power, ego satisfaction. People are fawning themselves all over them all the time, and that probably adds to it.

##
Bill Leonard and Walter Stiern

Baker: I've got another memory of Bill Leonard, another guy I worked with a lot who's really good.

LaBerge: Was he in the senate or assembly?

Baker: Both. He's been an assembly member, went to the senate and got termed out of the senate and went back to the assembly. He's one of the few who have been able to go up and--

LaBerge: And back down. And was he on the Education Committee?

Baker: He was on the assembly budget subcommittee, the committee that John Vasconcellos chaired for many years and Gary Hart chaired for many years and Bob Campbell chaired for many years. He was on that committee. I forget which era. I like Bill. Very conservative, very conservative guy. One of the few people who voted against the bond measure because he's got a Libertarian bent. But I always liked Bill Leonard. Straight.

Walter Stiern is an old-timer. Wonderful man, wonderful man. I gave a presentation to him once because he was leaving the senate. I remember saying that Walter Stiern not only has a marvelous record as a legislator, yada, yada, but "he's such a nice man, if I could choose him for an uncle, I would." I make this stuff up. I don't know where it comes from.

LaBerge: I don't know where it comes from, either! Some of your expressions are so great!

Baker: I don't know where they come from.

LaBerge: But, I'm sure your attitude makes a difference with legislators who have big questions or big beefs with the university, so it takes somebody who understands where the other person is coming from, too.

Baker: People who have been just terrific, who I developed a personal friendship with would include John Geohagen, who was the Secretary of Business and Transportation, and I got to know him in the SSC days. He's a lobbyist now. I still see him around Sacramento once in a while. Wonderful guy.

Peter Mehas. Terrific. He was Governor Deukmejian's education advisor, which means he's basically the secretary of education. Gary Hart has that position now for Governor [Gray] Davis. Peter was just terrific. He was superintendent of schools at Clovis, which is adjacent to Fresno, so I've come to know him quite well on a variety of issues. He's a marvelous, marvelous guy.
Governor Pete Wilson and Staff

LaBerge: What about Pete Wilson or any of his staff?

Baker: Well, that's an interesting story because when Gardner became president and Pete was running for governor, I guess, in 1990, right? Yes, in 1990.

LaBerge: That sounds right.

Baker: When we learned he was going to be running--this would have been '89 or '88, probably '88--Gardner wanted to see him, and he couldn't get an appointment with him. Well, my wife, Judith, was a television reporter in San Diego. Came to know Bob White quite well. Bob White was Mayor of San Diego Pete Wilson's chief of staff, Assemblymember Pete Wilson's chief of staff, U.S. Senator Pete Wilson's chief of staff and Governor Pete Wilson's chief of staff. And Judith knew Bob very, very well.

I was lamenting to her, "I can't get this appointment." Well, she called Bob White, and I had the appointment in about an hour, [snaps fingers]--like that. She was the one who actually got the appointment. Gardner and I went back to Washington and met with Senator Wilson. Had a good meeting and, I think, established a relationship. His life was smaller in those San Diego days. They all became good friends. So that gave me some wonderful instant credibility with the governor.

You know, when you're in those kinds of positions, a scrap of information puts you at the head of the class. Everybody else is a sea of unknowns.

LaBerge: That's right.

Baker: You can go to a football stadium and if you see one person you know, you feel connected. You look around, and there's thousands of people there, and you don't have a clue who they are. Well, the governor has thousands, hundreds of thousands--doesn't know who they are. He comes into a Board of Regents meeting. There were a few Republican regents on the board. Who does he know? He knows me. The same with Deukmejian. That little edge makes a big difference.

So Wilson was always--I mean, I didn't agree with his political philosophy, I must argue, but we were always okay with each other. I think he respected me; I respected him. Just didn't agree with him philosophically, but that aside, he was very helpful in the big budget crunch. It was the economy of the state, which was just in the tank. It was he and the legislature that allowed us to take the cuts where we wanted, which was an important factor.

So I thought that Wilson, from that standpoint--I guess I fell apart with him on the affirmative action issue. That was a real troublesome issue for me.

LaBerge: We covered that, too.
Baker: Yes. So Bob White was a good friend--all the Department of Finance directors from my time as vice president--Jesse Huff--I knew him quite well. Became close friends with Tom Hayes and Russ Gould--they were in succession--and still see them a fair amount now. Another guy, a Democrat, who was Wilson's deputy chief of staff, was a guy named Bill Hauck, who I've become close friends with and is now chairman of the board of CSU, so I see him in my role there. As a matter of fact, I'm going to have lunch with him next week in Sacramento.

Someone used to ask me, "Who is this Bill Hauck?" I said, "Well, all I know is every time we go see the governor, he's there. That's really all you need to know." And it was true. It would be a very small meeting--six, eight people--Director of Finance and the governor and Gardner and me and Hershman--five people--maybe another one--and Bill Hauck. Always there. He's a good guy. He's a terrific guy. He's now the president of the California Business Roundtable.

LaBerge: Oh, I knew I had seen the name before.

Baker: And chairman of the board of trustees at CSU.

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1. Pages 90a-90r are sealed until 2025.
V DAVID GARDNER’S PRESIDENCY, 1983-1992

[Interview 4: August 25, 1999]

**Jack Peltason and the Compact with Governor Wilson**

LaBerge: Let me just say, anything more on the university? Okay, you talked a little bit about Jack Peltason. What about [Richard] Atkinson?

Baker: I can talk a little on Peltason and Atkinson. Peltason really did come in and right the ship. There's no question about that. With a little reflection now, it was sinking--it was in worse shape than at the time we might have thought because it's such a big enterprise; it keeps on going. But beyond that, Jack wasn't much of a leader. He didn't take us--. He couldn't. He was only here three years.

LaBerge: Right.

Baker: I'll tell you. He was so attuned to the campuses and saw the world through a chancellor's eyes, not through a president's eyes, that he never really became president. He was really more like a chairman of the board of chancellors. But that's what he was. Had he been a president for a normal time, who knows? But he came in. We spent a year just untangling this mess, a tough year, to untangle all this.

Then we hit the budget tank, the worse budget crisis since the Depression. Many believed it was worse than the Depression, because in a Depression you had deflation, not inflation. So Jack spent his whole time, all the first year, undoing David Gardner and the whole three years in this budget tank, making huge cuts, huge cuts. We didn't know where it was going to end.

I remember--this is an interesting piece about Jack. The director of the Department of Finance and the governor's deputy chief of staff--the director of the Department of Finance Russell Gould, and the deputy chief of staff was named Bill Hauck, now the chairman of the board of the CSU trustees. A good friend. Both good friends. They had gone to Barry
Munitz to try to work out some kind of a deal to stop the hemorrhaging.

LaBerge: Okay, Barry Munitz was then what?

Baker: Chancellor at CSU. And they came to me. They came to me because they didn't think Jack Peltason could keep this to himself, because he's such a sharing person--and I don't mean this in a pejorative way--he shares everything, all information. And they were quite right. His instincts would have been immediately to talk to all the chancellors and talk to everybody, and this secret plan to save higher ed would have been out, and we couldn't have pulled it off. So they had to find out if we were interested. The result was the four-year compact--

LaBerge: With the governor.

Baker: With the governor, where we didn't get nearly as much as we would like to have had, but we stopped the hemorrhaging. My judgment was that's what we had to do. So I had to work on that by myself. I couldn't even talk to Larry Hershman about it because they asked me not to. And then Barry and I and Russ and Bill Hauck met up at Lake Tahoe, at Squaw Valley, and worked out the details, worked out this plan. There was a conference up there, and we were all there. We worked out the four-year compact.

And then I said, "Okay, I've got to talk to Hershman about this. He's our chief budget person, and I've got to be sure that all these pieces will work." And there were multiple pieces to it. There was some increase, there was some salary money for faculty, there was some $10 million a year in savings we would make by working harder--it was a multi-faceted package.

So Hershman, it was okay with him, after some discussions. But we couldn't tell the president yet. We have an annual meeting with the governor around the first of December, and an annual meeting with the director of finance around the first of November to lead up to the final budget. We were about to have our annual meeting with the director of finance, Russ Gould, who's now with the Getty, by the way, who is now senior vice president for Barry Munitz.

Russ, in our private meeting, was going to lay out the details of our plan. I said, "Russ, I've got to tell the president if we are meeting tomorrow." [laughs] So Larry and I went to see the president, and I laid out this plan, and you know what he said? "That's the greatest news I've ever heard. Now I can retire." Because he didn't want to leave with the university still in this budget crisis. He didn't ask any questions. I laid out the deal. "That's the most wonderful news. Now I can retire." And we went up, talked to Russ, sewed it up, and that's how it worked.

But I was in a very tough spot because they would not let me talk to him about it. It wasn't a matter of distrust. It was a matter that they knew him, and they knew he couldn't share that kind of stuff with others, and pretty soon it was going to be out, and this was a very tough negotiation because the governor was willing to set higher education aside from the rest of the world and keep us whole.
He was willing to keep us whole, and no other part of state government. The hemorrhaging—the budget crisis was not over, was not over. But the governor knew the value of CSU and UC. He knew the value to the state's economy and its social well-being, and he was convinced—I don't know who else convinced him—he came to the conclusion that we had to do something, and he asked Russ and Bill Hauck to talk to Barry and to me to try to work something out.

These are unsung achievements because I could never tell anybody this. I could never tell anybody that I had to keep it a secret from the president! Imagine that.

So that was Jack's time, really. It was a hectic time, and we didn't have time to do anything else but clean up the mess and worry about the budget.

Atkinson--

Search for the Next President

LaBerge: Were you surprised at that transition, that Atkinson became president?

Baker: Yes.

LaBerge: You were? How come?

Baker: Well, was I surprised? I guess no, I wasn't surprised. Strike that. I wasn't surprised. He wasn't the first choice. He was about the third choice. They couldn't get—the first choice was this fellow from Ohio State [E. Gordon Gee]. During that search, the search committee, made up of regents, invited each vice president to come and talk to them. They invited them as a group, but I had to be in Washington and I couldn't come when the group went, so I had to go by myself, which was a lot better. I'm glad I remembered this. On the plane coming back from Washington, I had to go from Washington to L.A., where that meeting was, I think. I thought, "What am I going to say to these people?" Well, what kind of characteristics do you want? Ending with: "Must be able to leap a building in a single bound," you know? Like Superman. So all these—open, forthcoming, courageous—all that stuff. That was not going to be anything new and helpful.

What if I—I thought on the plane when I was coming back—what if I took each president whom I've known and write down their best qualities—each one, the best qualities. That's the set of qualities we want. Let's see if I can remember them because they were never written down anywhere.

Sproul—it was his presence. Huge presence. Robert Gordon Sproul was an icon, a huge presence. No other president has been like that, largely because times have changed so much, but he was the university. Twenty-eight years as president, twenty-eight years. Presence.
Kerr—I think it was his vision. Clark Kerr was the one who invented the university as we know it today. Enormous vision.

[Harry] Wellman--he was just there for a year. I don't know if I can add a comment about him.

Who was next?

LaBerge: Hitch.

Baker: Hitch was a manager. He really was a business manager. He was the first of the presidents who really knew how to manage the enterprise. That was his great strength, to manage a huge complex enterprise.

Saxon--it was his integrity. No one I ever have served had greater integrity than David Saxon. I mean, he wouldn't do anything that wasn't completely open and above board. He just had enormous integrity.

Gardner--it was his genius with people. I mean, he played the regents like a whole orchestra of Stradivarius violins. He was brilliant. He was brilliant in the legislature, with the governor. That was his strength, great brilliance.

Peltason was just a wise man. And of course, Atkinson hadn't come yet.

So I told them that. I laid all that out for them. Laid it all out for them. Roy Brophy was on that committee. They all thought that was fascinating. They really did. I must say I had an engaging conversation when I talked about each one of them because none of them knew that because they hadn't thought of it or been around. Brophy says, "Well, that's interesting, really interesting. Now I'd like you to tell us the worst faults of each one."

LaBerge: [laughs]

Baker: Wow! I think I ducked. I did. I ducked it. I didn't answer. But I later thought about it! I don't remember if I told them or not. But Sproul was a terrible micromanager. I've read in some of the history about him that he handled 3000 pieces of paper a month. Everything had to be--everything--you couldn't buy a pencil without the president signing off on it. So micromanaging was his worst [fault].

Kerr was kind of an intellectual egghead, if you will. A brilliant president, no doubt, but he was not Mr. Personality in that sense.

Hitch was kind of a stodgy guy. Saxon had a terrible temper. Gardner we've read about.

LaBerge: We've rehearsed.
Baker: Gardner--well, he certainly looked out for his own interests. I don't know if I had one for Jack. I forget. Well, I actually thought about it--so I did tell them. Now I remember I did tell them. That was kind of interesting.

LaBerge: Did they ask you to comment on candidates or not?

Baker: No. Gordon--the guy's name was Gordon Gee. I was in Washington, D.C., right when his appointment was happening. He was in fact president for about twenty-four hours. The man who is the president of NASULGC [pronounced nah-SOHL-ghik], the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, Peter McGrath [pronounced McGRAW], a very good friend of mine--I always visit him when I'm in Washington--I was in his office. We keep in close touch. And the phone rang, and he had to take a call. It was a call he had to interrupt our conversation to take because it was the chairman of the board of the Ohio State Board of Regents. He asked me to stay. I said, "Should I leave?" He said, "No, no, stay here." So I heard his half of the following conversation: the chairman of the board asking Peter McGrath's advice on how to keep Gordon Gee as the president. "What do we do to keep him? What do we do to keep him?"

Anyhow, Gordon Gee--I'll go back--he was in Asia and couldn't be reached by either the chairman of his board or the chairman of our board. He was on an airplane. In part due to the advice of my friend, Peter McGrath, (I was listening), Gordon Gee was met at the airport in Columbus, Ohio, by the marching band and the mayor, by all of the members of the Board of Regents, by half the Ohio State world--with banners, "Please stay" and all this kind of stuff. And he did.

Mrs. Baker: They didn't want him to go.

Baker: Yes, I know. So it worked. He stayed. After having accepted the UC position, he called and talked to the chairman of the search committee, I suppose, and said he couldn't do it. Well, in the voting of the board, Atkinson couldn't get the votes. There was another person. Larry Vanderhoef was in there, too. He couldn't get enough votes. Gee became the president because he got enough votes. That was crazy. And then, when he turned it down, they went back and they decided, "Even though this isn't our best choice, we ought to do it," rather than going back out and starting over.¹

State Legislative Leaders Conference

LaBerge: We have left the state legislative leaders conference and arbitration.

Baker: I can do them each in five minutes apiece.

¹Page 95a is sealed until 2025.
LaBerge: Okay, let's do it.

Baker: Okay. State legislative leaders conference. It is a group started initially twenty-five, thirty years ago through a Ford Foundation grant to study the following issue: elected state leaders—that is, the speaker of the house, the president of the senate--the elected state leaders, elected by their peers--suddenly find themselves managing a large enterprise, rarely have any experience in managing. So the idea was to have an annual conference or a series of seminars for these elected officials.

They started having them at Boston University because that's where this original fellow, Steve Lakis, had his start. And he became close with a man named William Bulger, president of the Massachusetts State Senate for about fifteen years, now president of the University of Massachusetts, a brilliant guy, a brilliant scholar, a brilliant legislator. Willie Brown, among others, was on the board of directors of this group. They had a board. Still have a board. Willie was complaining that California—they were having all these things in Boston, that California ought to be a player.

He directed this Lakis to contact me. We talked several times and came up with an idea to have an issues forum. The University of California would have a two-day seminar at one of the UC campuses each year. Emerging Issues Forum, it was called. We did Pacific Rim, we did aging of America, we did telecommunications, we did K-12 education--we did a bunch of them.

I went to a meeting in Hawaii, which was nice. They asked me to come out to Hawaii to lay out my plan. I did, they accepted it, and we had for ten years an annual event. The justification for UC doing it was one, it puts UC on the map of legislative leaders; second, many of these people become members of the Congress; we would have personal connections with members of other states, and it was, I think, a good thing. The campuses were very cooperative, and it really worked.

They also have relationships with the parliaments of other countries, and we had a marvelous trip for about three or four days in London. Met directly with the parliament. Stayed with all these legislative leaders. We did it with the Berlin parliament as well, in 1987, so we had some marvelous experiences. It ended about 1995 or '96--

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Baker: The lobbyists paid for it, because they came to this annual event, too. That's how you pay for it. You get lobbyists to pick up the freight. They get to have this extraordinary valuable one-on-one experience with members from all over the country. So it was a lobbying deal.

California legislators weren't too interested in it. I just couldn't get them interested in it. I got a few of them--maybe ten of them were interested over the course of ten years. I should have had thirty or forty. The lobbyists couldn't raise much money in California. The organization, called the State Legislative Leaders Foundation, couldn't raise the money in California, so they decided--I couldn't disagree--to discontinue those seminars.
But it was a great experience for me and for the university to have these. The president would come sometimes. The chancellor would always be at that campus. I went around—we did it at seven other campuses. Went to Berkeley twice, someplace else twice. It was a great experience.

**Arbitration Work**

Baker: Arbitration. It has become a very important part of my life. Back in the sixties, the university’s construction contracts did not have any provision for resolving a dispute short of litigation. The industry complained about that, and in response to the industry's demands, we established an in-house construction review board, much like the federal government has had for years. There's a Board of Contract Appeals, they call it.

We set this up—I was the chairman, appointed by the president. I picked about six of the top people from the different campuses who were in the construction program to be in my pool. We got the language so that if a contractor had a claim or the owner had a claim, they could bring it to this board, and it was a binding decision. We got the industry to agree to that. The industry audited all of our hearings. They had somebody come and sit in and watch us. And without knowing what I was doing, it turned out I was arbitrating. I had instincts that I didn't know I had. For about ten years I chaired that board, and we heard—I don't know—a hundred claims or more—some big number.

After having done this for a couple of years—it was about 1970—I was reading a construction industry daily newspaper called the *Daily Pacific Builder*, which I read just to keep up on construction matters, because that's what I was doing for the university in those days. I saw a story about an organization called the American Arbitration Association, which I'd never heard of, and they were having a seminar on construction disputes. I thought, "Boy, there's something I ought to go take part in. Maybe I can learn something."

So I did learn something. I went to that seminar. It was in San Francisco, and I thought, "My gosh, this is exactly what I've been doing for the last two or three years." I asked a young assistant, who's now a national senior vice president of the American Arbitration Association—Chuck Cooper is his name. He became a very good friend. I told him what I was doing at the university and I said, "How do you do this?" It's like entering the university in the fifties. You fill out a 3 x 5 card and you're in, you know?

So I became an instant arbitrator. I have subsequently served as an arbitrator for the American Arbitration Association [AAA] on probably another hundred cases, and I've become a mediator, and I've mediated probably fifty cases. I have become one of the few members of the Blue Ribbon Panel of arbitrators in the nation. I have been appointed—I'm actually in my last of three four-year terms as a member of the board of directors of the AAA.
I've been on the executive committee for the last five years of the American Arbitration Association. I was chairman of a national organization called the Dispute Avoidance and Resolution Task Force. We were trying to change the culture of the industry to resolve disputes amicably, not through litigation. I'm on the faculty of the AAA, and I teach arbitrator training all over the country. I've got one in Houston and one in San Diego in a couple of months. I did about fifteen, twenty. I've conducted mediation training for the American Arbitration Association, as well, across the country.

I've lectured at Boalt Hall School of Law, Golden Gate Law School, the UCB business school on what we call ADR, alternative dispute resolution. I'm very active in it still. Now I'm teaching and actually doing cases. Oh, I guess I do ten cases a year, something like that. That's about as much as you can get in. Got a big one coming up in October. Just did a little one in Sausalito last week, a dispute between the owner of a houseboat and a contractor who did some work for her. That took half a day. The one in October is going to take three weeks. They come in varying sizes.

So that has become the most important part of my professional life now. I'm in my third year as a consultant to CSU, but I've cut back some on that, and I'll likely phase that out at the end of this next contract next July because I want to be a little more retired, because I'm really not, and I want to limit what I do mostly to dispute resolution in the construction industry.

I've done some other things. I don't know if I told you about three, four months ago I was called on by the Indiana [University] Board of Trustees.

LaBerge: You did.

Baker: To do the performance evaluation of the president. So I'm still dabbling in higher ed. I'm probably right now--oh, I'm probably at one-third of my time is in higher ed, and one-third in arbitration/mediation, and one-third retired. But I've become so inefficient. You know the rule you only touch a piece of paper once?

LaBerge: Right.

Baker: Once! Are you kiddin'? I'm five times before the morning is over!
I. FAMILY BACKGROUND, EDUCATION, EARLY WORK EXPERIENCE

[Interview 1: June 19, 1997] ##1

Strong Family Ties to the University

LaBerge: Well, we always like to start with the beginning, so why don’t you tell me the circumstances of your birth?

Baker: Alta Bates Hospital, Berkeley, California.

LaBerge: Okay, you are a local boy.

Baker: I’m a fourth generation Californian, of which there are few.

LaBerge: That’s right.

Baker: My great grandmother was born in Lafayette, California in 1852. And my father—well, let’s start with me, June 1, 1935. And born right here in Alta Bates Hospital. My parents lived in the same house for nearly fifty years, a street called Bonnie Lane, which is one block long, just above Marin and Euclid. It goes off and connects to Hilldale. That’s where I lived almost all my early life, from age two or so.

I went to the Berkeley schools. Cragmont School, which has been leveled since. Garfield, it was called in those days, the junior high. Berkeley High School. And off to Cal, because of my long history. My uncle was the class of 1918 at Berkeley.

LaBerge: Okay, what was his name?

1.## This symbol indicates that a tape or tape segment has begun or ended. A guide to the tapes follows the transcript.
Baker: Sam Trefts, T-r-e-f-t-s. My father, the class of ’24.

LaBerge: What’s his full name?


LaBerge: T for Trefts?

Baker: Yes. My sister, Jane Lotter, L-o-t-t-e-r. Her husband was also a great Bear. He was the star of the football and baseball teams. Rose Bowl, that kind of stuff, World Series in baseball. First World Series. He was a catcher on the Cal team that beat the Yale team in the first College World Series, and [President] George Bush played first base for Yale.

LaBerge: Oh, my gosh. And what’s his name?

Baker: Will Lotter. And the bat boy for that team was Bill Baker.

LaBerge: Really? I wonder how he got that job.

Baker: Connections.

LaBerge: So, you always knew you were going to college.

Baker: Not only college, I thought it was a state law that I had to go to Cal. [laughter] So, I pulled out a three-by-five-card, this is what you did in those days, walked across the street and entered, fall of 1953. In my remarks to the [University of California Board of] Regents is a text of a marvelous letter I uncovered, in fact I’ll just read a tiny piece of it, just to give you the flavor of it. I read this to the board, because it was so terrific. Here it is, it was dated January 5, 1954. And I have the original envelope, I discovered this when my father passed away. And it has a two-cent stamp on it, which is kind of interesting.

I’ll read it fast, “Dear Lewis and Mrs. Baker, When I recently learned that your son William had enrolled in the university, I was not exactly surprised, because it is by no means a unique experience to have non-academic employees send their most prized possessions to the university, for which they’ve labored so mightily. Nevertheless, I want you to know that I am glad that William is now one of us. And we promise you that we shall do our best to see that he gets what he came for, be it an education or a job. Therefore, if any problems arise, I am within handy reach of memorandum from you, if you or William ever feel the need for help. I say this with enthusiasm and sincerity, because I remember Jane, whom you contributed only a few years ago, and what a fine girl she was. Robert Gordon Sproul.” Pretty neat.

LaBerge: Wow!
Baker: So, I read that. It’s in my remarks.

LaBerge: That’s amazing. I mean that doesn’t happen nowadays.

Baker: It’s a real treasure.

LaBerge: You may not have ever seen that letter before?

Baker: Oh, that’s correct. I don’t have any recollection of it. And as my sister and I went through all the possessions, when my father passed away, I discovered that letter in a box of stuff. And I just suddenly got this idea one day, as I was beginning to clean out my office. I had it in my office, and I found it. I’ll find some way to use that, and I ended up reading the whole thing.

Documents

LaBerge: Now, speaking about cleaning up your office, you’re not throwing any papers away are you?

Baker: Well--

LaBerge: I mean, if you want to throw them away, let us look at them first.

Baker: All right, sure, sure.

LaBerge: Because we’ve found that too many people have thrown away some of the important documents.

Baker: I have one interesting set of things--I just got in the habit--we always had a clipping service in my office, when I was vice president. And every time there was an article that I was in, I’d just tear off that sheet, it’s a stack that high. [motioning one foot] So, I have all those. Every press account, which is kind of interesting, there are some interesting things in there. And I have every speech. I have a huge box of speeches, because I’ve kept them on file, because I would go back to them.

That is really interesting, because that traces, in a sense, some fascinating part of the vice presidential time. Where one year you’re talking about enrollment shrinking, and two years later you’re talking about building new campuses. It’s just amazing to go back and see what I was talking [about] to audiences in those time periods.
LaBerge: Same thing if you have memos from other people. Anytime you think you want to throw it away, put it in a pile, and I’ll take it.

Baker: Okay, I will. I threw a lot of stuff away, but I don’t think anything of any great value. I threw out boxes of stuff. But I still have about ten big cartons in my garage. One of my problems was, as I went through my career, I got promotions and every time I got a bigger office.

LaBerge: You had more space.

Baker: If I had a small office, I would have thrown stuff away. [laughter]

**Civil Engineering Major at Cal, 1953-1958**

Baker: So, yes, I went to UC Berkeley.

LaBerge: And majored in--


LaBerge: Is that a four-year or a five-year program?

Baker: It was a five-year program for me. [laughter] I always planned it five years. I never had any intention of four. And the reason for that was that I could take a little less of a load. I even encouraged my kids--all three of my kids went to Berkeley. I encouraged them to take five years. Because then you could afford it. You can’t afford it now. But you could still afford it, because life is short and college is--so, my kids graduated, one in four years, one in five years, one in six years.

LaBerge: Well, why don’t you give me your kids’ names and your wives’ names?

Baker: Okay. My children are John B. Baker, who is class of ‘84. Kristin Baker about to be Nemmers; she’s going to marry in August. I’m not quite sure of her class, because she dropped out for a couple of years and went back; she taught at the Montessori school in Kensington. And Kara B. Franklin, mother of my two grandkids. She would be the class of ‘89. Let’s see, she was born in ‘67, so she would have been ‘89.

My first wife was Ann W. Baker, still carries that name.

LaBerge: And did you meet her at Cal?
Baker: Yes, she graduated in ‘59. And my wife, Judith Woodard, attended ‘64 to ‘66, but did not finish. She was one of those who got blown up.

LaBerge: In the Free Speech Movement.

Baker: It just was terrible for her. It was a terrible time for her. That whole period of disruption, just was awful for her. She was not a demonstrator, but she was a serious student and had to work and support herself entirely. And just found it impossible. And her father was very ill, and she had a tough time, so she had to drop out. Anyhow.

LaBerge: Okay. You finished in civil engineering. Did you always know you wanted to be an engineer?

Baker: Yes, actually, it’s interesting about that. It’s funny how you remember these things. But in my sixth-grade graduation ceremony, you were asked to stand up and indicate your future plans. And I said then, at that time, I’m going to be a mechanical engineer. Then when I later found out what that kind of work was like I decided I really wanted to be an architect. My son is an architect. So, I took in high school the prerequisite courses for architecture, and that was my plan. My dad said to me one day, “You know, you ought to go up on campus and wander around the architecture building,” which was then over on Hearst. And I did. I was probably a junior in high school. To my shock, I discovered that you painted stuff. I mean there were art things. That’s not me.

So, I changed to civil engineering, which is a close cousin. That’s really a true story. So, I was always in engineering. And I really had anticipated I’d be building an Aswan Dam someplace or another. I never dreamed I would end up doing what I’m doing.

**Construction Work and Caltrans**

LaBerge: And so what did you do straight out of college?

Baker: I went to work. I had worked every summer for a construction contractor, heavy highway contractor, working on the Nimitz freeway. A friend of mine, from high school--his father was the contractor. And I got on, first as a laborer, then as an engineer, doing surveying work on the Nimitz freeway, pieces of the Nimitz freeway. The last two years we worked down by Fremont. The first two years were nearer to Oakland.

So, I worked every year, every summer, for long hours. I mean, I would even go to work immediately after finals, and I would register late for the fall semester. In those days you could have a late registration. So, I could work every last minute. And I
always ran out of money in April. It made no difference how much I made, I ran out of money. It’s interesting, every year. [laughter] And I made a lot money for those days.

So, I had an offer from this contractor. But he gave me some wise advice. He says, Go to work for what’s now Caltrans--it wasn’t then--and first, get your license. They have in-house training programs, and they really help you work at getting a license. An engineering license is like passing the bar, or CPA [Certified Public Accountant], or an architectural exam. It’s a hard exam, and once you pass it, you become a licensed engineer, licensed to practice under the laws of the state of California. All these professions have these kinds of exams.

So, I took his advice, and went to work for what’s now Caltrans, but then it was called the Division of San Francisco Bay Toll Crossings. And what were they doing? Well, they were changing the Bay Bridge from what it was, originally built with trucks and trains on the lower deck, two-way auto traffic on the upper deck, to what it is today, as you know, one-way traffic on each deck. And I went to work on that project.

They also built the Richmond-San Rafael Bridge, and the San Mateo Bridge, and the Benicia Bridge. All those toll crossings. They’ve long since been swept into Caltrans. But I went to work for them on the bridge. They have a training program, so you’ve got to be in design for a while, and you’ve got to be in the surveying section for a while. None of which I cared for at all, more like doing homework.

### Resident Engineer

Baker: So, I got transferred as soon as I could to the construction group, which meant outside in the field overseeing the project. Because of some very interesting events, in a fairly short time, I became what they call the resident engineer, which is the chief engineer of the project in the field. The circumstances were--and if I go on too long and don’t get to what you want to get to, just stop me, because I can talk about this stuff forever.

LaBerge: Okay.

Baker: I don’t know if you were around then.

LaBerge: I wasn’t here.

Baker: The tunnel had to be lowered eighteen inches to meet interstate highway standards, which were determined by the height of the missile on a truck, in those days. And had to lower that under traffic with 125,000 cars a day, so it was a complicated project. We had traffic backed up to Mississippi, it was really amazing. [laughter]
And the contractor, the low bidder, was a guy named Charlie Harney, who was an old world New-Jersey-style contractor, owned the city of San Francisco, in the sense of how a contractor might own the city. He got all the work, without having to bid on it. He built Candlestick Park. He sold the city of San Francisco a garbage dump he owned, and then built upon it Candlestick Park. There was a grand jury investigation or inquiry, and he was indicted eventually. But anyway, because of this guy’s power, he was able to have the resident engineer dismissed off the bridge project, because the engineers were too tough on making sure the project was built properly. He’d have the guy thrown off. And he got rid of three of them.

And I moved up very fast. It’s sort of like a field commission in a war. You know, the officers are getting shot, and the private becomes the officer. So, I became the resident engineer. And in my first foray in public relations, I decided something, I can’t imagine I did this, but I did. I thought, well, I think I’ll go pay Mr. Harney a social call. And I went down to his office in South San Francisco to see him.

LaBerge: Had you met him before?

Baker: Never met him. I had seen him, never met him. He used to come out in a limousine on the project, and every time he came out, which wasn’t often, he’d fire several people. He’d see some laborer not working at that moment, and he’d fire him. And I went to see him. I was, mind you, twenty-seven, or twenty-eight years old. I was really a kid.

And he said, “What do you want?” I said, “Mr. Harney, I’m Bill Baker. I’m the new resident engineer.” He said, “Well, what the hell are you doing here?” I said, “Well, it just struck me that maybe you and I might sit down and figure out how to get this project finished.” “My God, young man, no one has come to see me before.” It worked, it worked. And he backed off, and we never had any more problems. And it was really amazing. We finished the project. So, it was for me a big deal at the time.

So that project finished. I got my license, I passed the exam. I knew for certain that I didn’t want to work for Caltrans for the rest of my life. And I just did not know what I wanted to do. I pursued about fifty opportunities. Probably got fifteen interviews, and six or eight job offers. But I didn’t know whether I wanted to work for a consultant, or for a contractor, or for the government. For a civil engineer, that’s kind of what it is. And there were lots of jobs around those days, so it wasn’t difficult. But nothing just felt right.

Interview with UC-Systemwide

Baker: So, one of my sources was the Alumni Placement Center, which then was right over here [on the Berkeley campus] in South Hall. And they called me one day and said,
“There’s a job at the university; it looks like you might be qualified.” So I got the form, and it didn’t look at all like I was qualified, from how they described it. But I had at the time a two-and-a-half-year-old son, and at the time I interviewed I had an eight-and-a-half-month pregnant wife, for my second child who was born January 2. And I started February 3. I lived in Berkeley. I love the university. [I thought,] I’ll look at it.

It wasn’t a temporary position, but for me it was temporary. So I thought I’d interview. Well, it turned out that the vice president was Elmo [Morgan].

LaBerge: And had you met him before?

Baker: No. But I knew about him, because he was my father’s boss.

Father, Lewis Baker

LaBerge: Well, tell me that connection too, before you tell me about the interview, what your father did.

Baker: My father was a fraternity brother of [UC President] Robert Gordon Sproul. Although different in age by ten years, they knew one another because life was small in those days. My dad graduated from school, went to work in San Francisco for some office supply company; he had a business degree. Got a call from Sproul, he said, “Do you want to come work for the university?” And he did, in 1925, and forty years later he retired. So we had a little overlap. So we had seventy-two years of unbroken service, my dad and I.

He became the Berkeley campus purchasing agent. And then when decentralization took place in 1958--curiously the year I graduated--he became the chief purchasing agent for then the brand new UC systemwide administration.

Anyhow, one of the problems I had--and this is how dumb kids are--I thought, I can’t work in the same office as my father. He worked for Elmo, he reported to Elmo. Because in those days, Elmo was vice president for business, which included business functions, and construction, and physical planning, it was all those together. And that just bothered me a lot. But I overcame it. I got the interview.

Frank Crouch, who reported to Elmo, was actually my first boss, who hired me. I remember he wrote a memo, which I believe I have, to Elmo, that “the top candidate seems to be Bill Baker. The only concern I have is that he is Lew Baker’s son. Do you have a problem with that?” Elmo wrote back, “No. No problem.” So I took the job.

**Associate Engineer**

LaBerge: What were you going to be doing?

Baker: Well, the title was associate engineer. And in those days we were building three new campuses, Irvine, San Diego, and Santa Cruz. We were just beginning, that is, the construction was just beginning. And they had huge infrastructure projects, because we were building these huge campuses in open space, for the most part, building roads and pipes and wires and all that.

Frank Crouch was the only engineer on the systemwide staff, and he needed some help in reviewing campus proposals for infrastructure. In those days construction contracts were executed centrally. So he needed some help in reviewing the construction contracts before he could sign them. He was overworked. And they got a position to help him out.

And what happened, the track I took was--and most of this is in my remarks to the regents--that the budget people, the capital planning people, were also in Elmo’s office, guy named Bob Walen. Bob Walen and his colleagues were having difficulty with some of our infrastructure projects in Sacramento. Because the legislature, and the Department of Finance, each had an engineer on staff reviewing these projects, before they would sign off on them. And they were raising a lot of questions, which we weren’t answering and we weren’t getting infrastructure projects funded in some cases.

And Elmo asked me if I might go up and meet these guys, and see if I could help out. So, I did, and it was a slam dunk, because I understood the questions. They weren’t hard. I’d run back to campus, get the answer, go back to Sacramento. So, I solved the problem. So that’s how I got into that part of the work. And it wasn’t long before I was actually testifying before the legislature on support of some of our projects, our infrastructure projects.

And that then led, in 1974, which is ten years after I started, to a reorganization. It’s interesting. The three biggest promotions I’ve gotten flowed from a vice president being fired.
Director of Capital Planning and Budget

LaBerge: Really. So, who was fired?

Baker: [Joseph W.] Joe McGuire, who was vice president for planning was fired, and sent back to the laboratory, as we like to say. And they reorganized. [C.O.] Chet McCorkle was the executive vice president then, and he asked me to take a new position called director of capital planning and budget. So, there was a natural transition from engineering to my involvement with the building program in the infrastructure projects, to my being director of the capital budget.

And those were heady days. First time I had my own watch, so to speak. I actually got to hire a secretary, and had a staff, and it was a hot time. And we had a team of people. Larry Hershman and I came together; he was at UC San Francisco, he became the director of health sciences budgeting. A guy named Chuck [Charles] Courey was the head of the general campus operating budget, and Barry Clagett and Milt Van Damm. Five of us were all directors, reporting to Loren Furtado, who was assistant vice president for budgetary planning. A lot of fun in those days.

LaBerge: Who was the president then? Charles Hitch?

Baker: Yes. Seventy-four was Hitch.

LaBerge: And then it became [David] Saxon.1

Baker: That’s correct. About ‘76 or so was Saxon, if I remember right. And when I started, [Clark] Kerr was president. And I did work for Sproul.

LaBerge: And we didn’t talk about that. Tell me about that.

Baker: In my mail duties, I worked a couple of years almost every afternoon, because I had some lab courses, but most every afternoon, three to six. And what I did, usually, was to go around the campus in a pickup truck and pick up the mail, because campus staff put mail in these out-boxes in all the buildings. And I went to every building and I picked up the mail. And the last thing I did at about five forty-five was deliver President Sproul’s evening mail to his home. To the back door where Mrs. Sproul would often offer me a cookie. Rarely did I ever see the president. I don’t know that I ever did. But I always saw her at the back door; Ida Sproul was her name.

I also worked in the engineering testing lab.

1. Charles Hitch was president from 1968 to 1975; David Saxon from 1975 to 1983.
LaBerge: Is this as a student?

Baker: Yes, as a student. I had a lot of jobs, but those were the two student jobs I had. So, where were we?

**Assistant Vice President for Budget and Planning**

LaBerge: You become a vice president?

Baker: No, no. Director of the capital budget. And then in 1978, McCorkle got the boot. Saxon and he didn’t get along. McCorkle thought he was the president. He forgot that Saxon was the president. [laughter] He got the boot. Another reorganization, and they made me assistant vice president for budget and planning. So, I had the capital budget and the operating budget, both.

LaBerge: Okay, this is the first time you had them combined?

Baker: That’s right, ‘78. Then [David] Gardner came in ‘83 and decided what I thought was quite a genius move. We were in deep budget trouble at the time. Larry Hershman and I went to Salt Lake City to see him.

LaBerge: Before he came here.

Baker: Before he came here. It was in July of 1983. Because I had to convince him that, like it or not, the 1984-85 budget was going to be his budget. And he didn’t want it to be his budget. It was going to be written and done before he got here. But I thought, he has got to have a hand in this, because it’s going to be his budget.

LaBerge: He has to work with it.

Baker: He has got to. So, we went back there [to Salt Lake City], and we spent a whole day there. Laid it all out for him. And he had no idea what bad shape we were in. I don’t know if he told you this in his interview, but he had said that he thought he had made a mistake, and never should have taken this job. He told me that he told his wife that night, “I’ve made the mistake of my life. This place is in bad shape.” He didn’t know it.

So, we convinced him that it was going to be his budget. And in an amazingly bold stroke, he asked for a 32 percent increase in the budget, and we got it. Anyhow, he decided that the best way to secure funding, which is really the president’s primary job, is to have the support of the legislature and the Congress. And the best way to have their support for the budget is to have the support of the people. So he says, “I think I’ll take Washington, and Sacramento, and what we call university relations, and
the budget, and put them all together.” The strangest bunch of bedfellows really. And across the country the people just couldn’t understand that.

But it really made sense. Because we would--as an example--the editorials in favor of faculty salaries were driven by us. And the alumni advocacy programs were driven by us. And we coordinated the legislative activities and the congressional activities.

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Baker: When I took the job as director of capital planning, I turned it down first.

LaBerge: This is the one under Loren Furtado?

Baker: Yes, this is 1974. I turned it down, because I’m a construction guy. I can’t be a budget person, what will my friends say? [laughter] That would be embarrassing. I really did. I turned it down because of that. Well, really, more because I didn’t think I could ever become vice president of the budget, but I really thought I could do the administrative stuff. I mean, Elmo was a civil engineer, just like me. I thought I could do that. He was my role model. Seriously, my role model.

The guy who had been fired, Joe McGuire, I saw by chance the next morning. I told him what I had done; he was a good guy. He said, “Well, you ought to think that over. Sometimes to advance yourself, you need to change your spots.” And I went home and thought it over, came back and took the job after all. And I came that close to not taking it.
II ADMINISTRATION OF DAVID GARDNER, 1983-1992

Personal Background

Baker: I didn’t mind governmental relations, because that’s really what I was doing anyway. Public relations, on the other hand, was a problem. I’m a budget guy, what are my friends going to say? They’ll laugh at me. I can’t do that. But it became clear that I had to work hard to negotiate with David Gardner to become vice president. He initially wasn’t going to make me vice president.

LaBerge: I wanted to ask you how that came about, too.

Baker: As he developed his--oh, I’ll tell you a funny story, a Gardner story. When he came out before he took office, to visit with people, he had appointments all day long. My time was the dinner slot. And of course I’ve known him a long time; we went to grammar school together.

LaBerge: That’s right. And high school. All the way up through school?

Baker: All the way up. He was two years older, though, and fifth graders and third graders don’t mix. So we were not boyhood chums as people think. But we certainly knew each other. He had a brother in my sister’s class, and a sister in my brother’s class. So, we knew each other. And we had the same Boy Scout troop, too. But in any event, he came to see me for dinner, and he was late as he often was.

But I had decided that I had to have some kind of a prank here. I can’t just do this straight. So, I went to my old trunk and got out all my yearbooks from junior high school and high school, looking for, “Dear Bill, What a great year we had; wasn’t Germaine a funny teacher?” You know, “Your pal, Dave.” Well, there was nothing in sight and there were twelve books, because they had two classes, the fall and the spring class, for six years.
Nowhere did I find a David Gardner autograph, but I did discover that he had been the student body president in junior high and high school. And further discovered that in the yearbook, they had something called the “president’s message.” And the president’s message in senior high school was almost verbatim the same as the message from junior high school. So, I made a xerox of those two things. I had this very formal folder. And I said, “David, before we go to dinner, there’s a problem to work out here.” I opened it up. “My God, the problem is, it’s verbatim,” I said. And he said, “Well, you find something that works, you use it.” He’s very quick. [laughter]

In any event, he was considering making me executive assistant to the president for the budget, or special assistant, something. And I knew this was my one shot. If I didn’t make it this time, I wasn’t going to make it.

**Earning the Title of Vice President-Budget and University Relations**

LaBerge: Had you already been to Salt Lake City to see him?

Baker: Yes. So, it wasn’t any question of, was I going to keep my job? But, was I going to be vice president or not? And I knew that was my one shot. I mean, in a way these jobs are so rare and so few of them, and [there are] so many people. If you make it that far, you’ve got a lot of luck on your side. And so I just convinced him that wasn’t going to work. I went up and down the elevator about eight times that day. I was on the second floor, he was on the seventh floor.

And finally he says, “Okay, here’s what we’ll do. We’ll combine these things.” God, I did not want that. I did not want that. I just wanted to be vice president of the budget. That’s the only vice president I care about. [laughter] But I also was smart enough to realize that that was it. When you negotiate, you have got to have a sixth sense about when the final offer is on the table. You just have to have it. And I accepted that. So, that’s how all that came together.

LaBerge: So, you had to sort of invent the job. Or figure out how to work it out together.

Baker: Well, yes, because it had never been done that way before. I was well acquainted in Sacramento. That was easy. I spent a lot of time in Sacramento. I had for years, that was a natural. I had been doing the budget for, well, the capital budget for ten years, and operating budget for five years. So, those were natural pieces. I didn’t know anything about Washington, D.C. And I didn’t know much about media, public relations, alumni relations, development, all that stuff.
LaBerge: Although, it sounds like you’re a natural at that. Even though you hadn’t done it. I mean, just in going to see Mr. Harney.

Baker: Yes. I mean, it wasn’t hard, I just had never done it. So, the first thing I had to do was make a change in Washington; our person there had been in that job sixteen years, had eight bosses, and every one of them was unhappy with him, but nobody did anything about it. I could see I had to do something about that. He’s a nice guy; he just wasn’t what we needed for the time.

LaBerge: So, he was the full-time UC lobbyist there?

Baker: Yes. And then the Sacramento job was vacant, because Lowell Paige who had had that position retired when David Saxon retired. Saxon brought in several people from UCLA.

LaBerge: Archie Kleingartner.

Baker: Archie Kleingartner and Lowell Paige. I still see Archie pretty often actually. So Sacramento was open. I was handed, by [William] Bill Fretter, who was the departing vice president, a binder that had in it seventeen finalists for Lowell Paige’s job. They had begun a recruitment. And Steve Arditti was acting. But Gardner gave me a caution, he says, “Don’t just automatically give this to Arditti, just check it out.” That was good advice. I learned a lot from David. I mean, I really learned a lot from David.

In fact, I should get you a copy of the letter I wrote him. He and I were a bit estranged for a while, following his unpleasant departure. And I wrote him a long letter, just recently, and he wrote me back. And that might be useful stuff for you to see. Because it’s an interesting set of correspondence when you consider the set of events that took place.

Organizing the Office

Baker: So I did check out Arditti, I called a lot of people. He simply was the best guy for the job. I appointed him director of state governmental relations.

LaBerge: And who did you appoint for Washington?

Baker: In the interim I had Jesse Shaw, who was my special assistant. In my organization, the way I organized--and this really goes back to your question about how you do this--I decided to have four departments. Sacramento department, the Washington
department, the university relations department, and the budget department. So Hershman became assistant vice president, really replacing, taking my job, as it was, just about exactly.

LaBerge: And did you appoint him? Or was he appointed by the president?

Baker: Well, I had to develop an organizational structure, and the president approved it. Some of them had to go to the regents, since assistant vice presidents are considered officers of the regents, and they had to go to the regents. David and I worked this out together. I mean, I didn’t do it in a vacuum. And I made Arditti director of state governmental relations. Assistant vice president--what did we call Hershman? Oh, assistant vice president and director of the budget, that’s the one, because he wanted that title. And assistant vice president of university relations. Now that position was in place, that was Judith Woodard.

LaBerge: She was already there?

Baker: Yes. She had become Saxon’s PR person, and she was a special assistant to the president but then later as she and Saxon rebuilt the university relations office--Saxon had demolished it when he came in, and that didn’t work, and the regents pushed him to rebuild it. And he did, and hired her on.

Jesse Shaw had been associate director of the budget, and I made him my special assistant because with that many functions, there wasn’t enough of me to go around. And he knew the budget backwards and forwards. He was terrific with people, the greatest people skills of anybody you could have known. He was perfect in that position to be my special assistant and basically fill in for me in any variety of ways, all over the place.

Well, I made him interim director of Washington. He and his wife actually moved to Washington for about a year. But he didn’t want the job. They had a personal tragedy and really needed family support and all that, so he didn’t want to stay in Washington. He wishes today he had, but he didn’t.

So, I recruited through a national search, and got a guy named Paul Sweet, who had been a UC Santa Barbara grad, had been Leo McCarthy’s representative in Washington, when Leo was speaker of the house [California state assembly]. He had represented the Democratic caucus, when they had a person doing that, in those days in Washington. And also worked for the National Conference of State Legislatures, which is a big organization that the state legislatures formed. So, he was well experienced and well qualified.

So, I had a five-person principal staff. State, federal, special assistant, budget, university relations. And I had an office manager and a personal secretary, that was my team. Sharon Avalos was my personal secretary. And Joanne Catton, who had been Elmo’s secretary, was my office manager. She retired, took one of the early VERIPs. I
made Sharon the office manager, and Maria Barros-Lee my secretary. So, that was my team.

One of the things that I did my last day of work, which was May 2, was to have a luncheon for everybody who had a direct reporting relationship to me, over twenty years.

LaBerge: How many were there?

Baker: I think eighteen. I said to them, “This is the group of people who sat around different tables with me trying to figure out what the hell to do.” [laughter] And it was.

And that was how I organized it, with lots of consultation with David because it was his invention. And those years, working with David, were just wonderful years in the beginning.

**Introduction to Governor Deukmejian**

LaBerge: Tell me about that, since you worked under so many presidents, what was his style like? How did it change when he came in?

Baker: He was brilliant as a manager of people. And brilliant as a manager of the regents. Genius as a manager of the regents. And in the kinds of things that I did, he was genius, with the legislature. I mean, he could just--he just knew how to do it. He’d charm them, he’d answer them, and they just loved him.

LaBerge: Can you give me an example?

Baker: Well, one example is Governor [George] Deukmejian.

LaBerge: How did he get that increase the first year?

Baker: Well, I had something to do with that, most people don’t realize. But I had a pretty close personal relationship with Deukmejian before Deukmejian became governor. The reason is my college roommate and one of my best friends’ sons had married Deukmejian’s daughter.

LaBerge: Can you give me some names?

Baker: Well, yes, sure. My friend’s name is Sheldon Gebb. He lives in Long Beach, as the Deukmejians did. And his son Michael married Leslie Deukmejian; they were high school classmates. When George was elected governor--I knew him a little as a
legislator, but not well--I said to my pal, “I need a favor. I would like you to arrange a dinner party for just the Deukmejians and me and you.” And he did, in between the election and when he became governor. From the first week of November to the third week of January, he was governor-elect.

LaBerge: And what were you doing at this time?

Baker: I was assistant vice president for budget, so this is serious stuff. I spent an evening with my friend and his wife, and George and Gloria Deukmejian. Talking about the university. My friends were both UC graduates, and close friends from school. Deukmejian knew little about the University of California.

LaBerge: Where did he go to school?

Baker: To a private school in the East, and St. John’s Law School. Surprisingly, for a state legislator, and he was also attorney general, he knew little about the university. It was amazing. His view of the university was Berkeley in a radical period of time. And we had a most fascinating discussion for like four hours, eight to midnight, with George, the governor-elect.

Well, when he became governor and became a regent, I was the only one in the university he knew. So, we had an instant friendship. And Gardner used that properly. And they became friends, too; they were soulmates. Gardner is a Mormon, and Deukmejian is Armenian. They shared the history of being persecuted minorities.

I was almost always with Gardner when he was with the governor. And the governor greeted me like a long-lost friend every time I saw him, in any setting. I would go to events, any setting, he sought me out. Because he liked me, and I liked him.

LaBerge: And you had made an overture to him.

Baker: Overture, and I’m always straight as a string. I am Mr. Straight. I have a reputation for telling it like it is, which hasn’t always been easy in our history. But you will see in some of these resolutions [from the retirement book], that that’s something that they picked up on. But I always tell it like it is.

The Regents and the Media

Baker: And I would tell these regents, “If you don’t like your quotes in the newspaper, you ought not to speak out. Because you know what newspapers do? They print what you say. And they write about what you do. So, if you don’t like what they print about
what you say, you ought to not say it. And if you don’t like them writing about what
you do, you ought to not do it.” It’s a message they never got.

LaBerge: Right, and you told them that.

Baker: Yes, and they still haven’t gotten it. And I told them that in my message.

LaBerge: Well, I only saw a paragraph about affirmative action.

Baker: No, there was one about the media. I have two messages for the board. One of them
was about diversity, and the other was about the media. Because they used to just
pound me about the bad press. “Why are we getting such bad press? Why aren’t your
people getting us good press?” It doesn’t work that way. And today, they still don’t
get that message. They’re still getting what they call bad press, because they’re a
bunch of loose cannons.

LaBerge: Well, when did you start going to regents’ meetings? Before you became vice
president?

Baker: Yes, when I became AVP, assistant vice president. I mean, I would go to some
regents’ meetings as director of the capital budget, when the budget was discussed.
But I started going always, when I became the assistant vice president.

LaBerge: So, you knew how the regents’ meetings worked, and you knew the regents and you
were comfortable.

Baker: Do you know how many regents I’ve served under? Eight presidents. Forty vice
presidents. Fifty-one chancellors, and 169 regents. I counted them all, because I
thought it was kind of fun.

David Gardner and the Regents

LaBerge: Well, tell me about David Gardner and the regents. Give me some examples about
how you think he was brilliant.

Baker: Well, the regents then, as now, are a disparate group of people. They’re all over the
lot, in terms of their brain power, their style, their personalities, their backgrounds.
While one likes to say they’re all alike, because they’re mostly white male
Republicans, they’re not all alike. They are a real cross-section of that category, if
you’re going to categorize people. Okay, let’s say all the Republicans in the world,
they’re a cross-section of that bunch. They’re a cross-section; they’re quite different.
They choose to play different roles as a regent, in terms of how active they are. Some like to work behind the scenes, some like to show off in front of company and make big speeches at the regents’ meetings. So, when a complicated issue was before us, David had this way of first—he worked the board before the meeting. So, there weren’t surprises. He knew where everybody was, and I was his vote counter. And I worked with him.

LaBerge: So, how would you--by calling them?

Baker: You’d call them, talk to them, go see them. One of my jobs was to make every new regent my brand-new best friend. I worked at that, because that was the role--part of what David liked me to do. And I thought it was a good thing to do. It made sense, so I worked hard to be on good terms with all the regents. New ones I’d go see, I’d call, and try to socialize with them to some degree.

So, he knew where people were. We would sit and try to figure out where they were going to go on some issues.

LaBerge: Divestment.

Baker: Divestment was a huge one, yes. But there’s lots--every meeting, there was a huge agenda of stuff. But then, how forcefully they’d state their position would vary. And he’d listen to all that. Then at just precisely the right time, and here is the genius, there is no book on this, he’d know when to make his comments. And he could tell. You could just almost see the wheels turning. He always sat next to the chairman.

And he would eloquently summarize what everybody had said, making everybody feel good about the fact that he heard what they said. And if he down played it or up played it to his advantage, they didn’t notice. And then he’d say, “In summary, here is what I think we ought to do.” And he mesmerized them, and they’d do just what he thought they ought to do. Except for divestment, that was a different matter; we can talk about that. But he was a genius at that board.

Terrific with the press. Did brilliant post-meeting interviews with the press. Because he followed a simple rule of thumb dealing with the media. Do you know what it is? “Answer the question.” You can’t believe how many people either answer a question that wasn’t asked, or dodge; just answer the question. And, “I don’t know,” is an okay answer, if you don’t know. The second rule about the press--there’s only two, one of them is answer the question; the other is “Tell the truth.” Now, why do you do that? Because you don’t have to remember what you said. And it’s hard to remember what you said. [laughter] Especially when you get older, harder and harder. So, he was just wonderful at that.

He was our star. We’d take him to Sacramento, we’d try to get him up there one day a month, or something like that. And Arditti and I would troop him around, and he’d
just be terrific. I’d get him to Washington as often as I could, which wasn’t nearly as often as I would have liked. It was too much of a time commitment for him. We’d go around to campuses and talk to alumni. He was good, the guy was good.

**Three Great Presidents: Sproul, Kerr, and Gardner**

Baker: He was, in my view, one of the three great presidents of this university: Sproul, Kerr, and Gardner. I really believe that. Sproul had incredible presence, you’ve heard the Sproul stories. Do you know the one about his booming voice?

LaBerge: No.

Baker: Cute story. He had a booming voice. He didn’t even need a microphone all that often. He was in his office one day, in Sproul Hall, talking on the phone, and one of his vice presidents had an appointment with him. He said to Agnes Robb--you may have heard of her.

LaBerge: Oh, I have, yes.

Baker: He said “Miss Robb”—she always went by Miss Robb. “Miss Robb, who’s the president talking to?” Because you could hear his voice coming through the wall. “Well, sir, I believe he’s talking to Sacramento.” And this guy said, “Well, tell him next time he ought to use the telephone.” [laughter] Legendary story.

He was the president and he was a figure in this state. You couldn’t be that--Bill Clinton couldn’t be a figure like Sproul was in this state today because it’s too big and complicated. Too many disinterested people. But Kerr had the great vision. The university is what it is today because of his vision. No question about it.

LaBerge: The Master Plan [for Higher Education]?

Baker: The Master Plan, and the nine-campus system, all that. Nothing like it in the world. And Gardner was just the great people person, manager. He was a skilled president.

**How Decisions Were Made**

LaBerge: How were the decisions made in the president’s office?
Baker: Well, there were several forums. We had a cabinet meeting every week, the vice presidents only, and the president.


Baker: [James] Jim Kendrick, for much of the time, and [Cornelius] Conn Hopper. There were five of us. Just the vice presidents. And we had an agenda, his agenda. Didn’t come out in advance, which used to bother us, we sort of liked to be prepared. The agenda might have to do with borrowing money for a housing project. You know, if there was a whole scheme about borrowing money; we had a lot of meetings about the early retirements. We met hours about early retirement. Jim Holst often joined us.

LaBerge: The general counsel?

Baker: General counsel, yes. And, you know, we would collectively labor over this stuff, a group meeting, led by the president. And we’d just work away at trying to figure out how to get some problem solved.

LaBerge: Whether it was in your area or not?

Baker: Yes, right. Sometimes there were a lot of two-way conversations. He and Frazer used to--which could have more efficiently been done without everybody else there, but that’s just what happens sometimes. And we always had assignments; we always got assignments. I would say to him, “Slow down, boss, I can’t write that fast.” And as my staff would say, “What are you complaining about, you don’t keep them.” Because my style is when I write, take my notes, I’ve got an assignment, as I write it, I decide who is going to get it. I write their initials. I take my notepad, and go walk down the hall giving the assignments. By the time I get to my office, I don’t have any.

LaBerge: You delegate.

Baker: Quickly. Immediately. And if a person is not there, because they’re on travel or just not there, I sit down and dictate a memo to them before I do anything else. So, before I take a breath my assignments are all dished out. It’s a theory of management, never leave the discussion with the monkey on your back. If it was your boss, make sure the boss has the assignment. If it’s a subordinate, make sure the subordinate has his assignment. I always try to do that.

LaBerge: Well, do you feel that David Gardner worked that way too? Your assignments were a delegation.

Baker: Yes. And how much I learned that from him or if it was reinforced, I don’t know. I sort of did it that way. Although, he was a much more assignment-oriented person than anybody I had ever worked for. So, that’s one forum.
Another forum, every vice president had their weekly one-on-one with the president. And I had a folder on my desk, DPG, and every time I thought of something I needed to bring up with him--my agenda was a running agenda, so by the time the week was up, I’d go in there. His was all typed up, he had Nancy [Nakayama] do it, he had a collection of things.

LaBerge: So, for your one-on-one, you had an agenda and he had an agenda?

Baker: And he always asked me to go first. I don’t know how he did it with the others.

LaBerge: But that’s good to know; I’ll ask Vice President Frazer.

Baker: Yes, I got my answers. And then he says, “Okay,” get his folder, it would scare me to death. What is he going to do?

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Baker: “How are we doing on this?” Half of it was that kind of stuff. He’d get phone calls from somebody wanting to inquire about a worry. He’d say, “I was down in Los Angeles, and I talked to X. Could you call him, and see if we can solve his problem?” Stuff like that. I was always nervous. A little tension is good for you.

LaBerge: Right, keeps you on your toes.

Baker: And I would march right out and get rid of those assignments fast. And then I gave them to my secretary, and we could kind of keep track of them, make sure they got done. My system was more informal.
III THE BUDGET

The President's Involvement in the Budget

LaBerge: Well, how involved was he in the budget compared to previous presidents?

Baker: Very involved, more involved than any president. He was the budget officer. It wasn't me, it wasn’t Hershman. He was the budget officer, very involved. Hershman and I would probably spend, maybe two hours a week with him, one two-hour session with him every week on the budget. Great details. He knew the budget in great detail.

Hershman and I were very much campus visit-oriented. We went to campuses all the time, and we built some trusts that had fallen off. Because when McCorkle was vice president, he held everything to himself. The black box, they called it. The black box. And McCorkle got asked to leave, Jenkins became vice president, he just perpetuated McCorkle’s black box.

LaBerge: I’m not sure if I understand the black box.

Baker: The campuses had no idea how the budget worked. They had no idea how much money we had, no idea of what to ask for, what not to ask for. It was a mystery. And they complained about it mightily. Jenkins took a vacation, only one he ever took. And Saxon asked us, in his absence, to redo the budget process, open it up. Jenkins came back and he was just furious. He got fired soon after.

Visiting the Campuses

Baker: We opened it up. How did we do that? We went to the campuses and explained it all to them.
LaBerge: To the chancellor?

Baker: Chancellor, vice chancellor, campus budget officer. There would probably be three or four people out there, maybe five. And we opened up the process. And the campuses liked that.

LaBerge: In fact, you know Chancellor Robert Sinsheimer has an oral history that he did at Santa Cruz, and he mentions you and Larry Hershman as both having a fondness, he thought, for UCSC, but also for being very open. And that for the first time they knew what was going on, and they felt that they were a part of the process. That’s a kind of university relations.

Baker: I guess, I guess. People told me this, they appreciated my coming down to the campus, because I would sit down with them and tell them what’s going on. I was always open and honest. And I gave them bad news and good news. I had a lot of campus visits. I just was at Riverside last week, where I got my last hurrah. The Riverside Alumni Association gave me a lifetime achievement award. I’m very proud of it. The first non-UC Riverside alum to get it. And it really had to do with the fact that I helped the campus a lot.

LaBerge: And they’re kind of the forgotten campus.

Baker: Yes. They’re the self-ordained orphan. They bring it on themselves. But anyhow, the irony of that last week was that my very first campus visit was Riverside. Monday morning, February 3, 1964, at nine o’clock. I had been there an hour, and Frank Crouch, my boss, came in and said, “Mr. Morgan was at Riverside last week, and he saw something he’d like for you to check on.” I didn’t know where Riverside was. [laughter] I didn’t, so two days later, I was off to Riverside.

And in those days, this is mind-numbing, but in those days, they had a helicopter service. A heliport at the foot of University Avenue. For free, it took you to SFO, fly to LAX, take another helicopter to Riverside. I started at six in the morning on that helicopter; I got home at midnight. I said, “Man, this is quite a job.” [laughter] Helicopters, airplanes, flying around.

And the problem was with a new building that was being built. Elmo, the civil engineer, saw a potential drainage problem. Well, he was right. And I have the original hand-written draft of my memo that I wrote for Elmo to send to the chancellor about that drainage problem. I don’t know why I kept it, but I found it recently.

Well, the irony was that that was my very first campus visit, and the very last campus visit was Riverside. Because it was after I retired actually. Just by virtue of the timing of their meeting. And I recounted that first visit. I said, “It was the first of what would become more than a hundred campus visits to Riverside.” I did a little calculation. So, I really spent a lot of time on campuses. Because I always felt that’s where the work is. That’s where the work is.

LaBerge: Yes. The students are.

Baker: So, back to Gardner, this is the purpose of this. Isn’t it?

The Process

LaBerge: Yes, but not just him, but what happened during that administration. But that’s how you opened up the budget process, by going to the campuses. I don’t know how much detail we should go into the budget itself. But, when you’d go to the campuses, besides explaining to them, what did they want to know?

Baker: Well, the way it was done before we opened it up was the campuses were asked to submit huge binders with their budget requests. They ship them up, huge binders, big. And the budget people would pore over these things, burning the midnight oil. And write them a letter back saying no. It was ridiculous. Huge effort coming in, and huge effort going out.

So what we did, Larry and I were true partners, that’s the right word for us, we viewed the budget as a political document. It’s not a budget budget, it’s a political document. And what you ask for from the state, you ask for as much as you dare ask, and maintain your credibility. This is the great gamble Gardner took, asking for that 32 percent, unheard of. It was all legitimate, faculty salaries were 16 percent behind in those days. And we were in trouble.

He used to like to say, “When I was at Utah,” I don’t know if this is true or not, but he said it. “When I was at Utah, we were routinely recruiting faculty away from Berkeley.” He used that to show how bad things were at Berkeley, because of the salaries. I don’t believe faculty went to Utah. [laughter] I never checked, it was such a great story, and it worked so well. So I decided, I don’t need to know. You don’t need to know everything.

LaBerge: That sounds worse than Harvard, doesn’t it?

Baker: Yes, yes. “Routinely,” he used that word, “routinely.” I never wanted to know if that was true or not, because it served our purpose so well. So, our plan was to get those
salaries back up over a three-year period. Gardner and Deukmejian--Gardner said something, I forget how he put it, “Let’s do it all at once,” and Deukmejian said, “Okay.”

So, the budget is a political document really. There’s not enough money in the world to satisfy the campuses. But it makes sense not to ask for more than is legitimate--because then you don’t have the credibility. So, we always worked hard. The first thing we always worked at was how much you asked for, not what you asked for, but how much. Is 5 percent, or 8, or 9, or 10, 15. What’s in the ballpark? We use a range, if you get higher than the range, it’s not credible, lower than the range, it’s not responsible. Then we’d build the budget up from that.

And we’d work with the campuses on what we could get. I always used to say to them, “Shall we spend our energy asking for something that’s impossible to get, or shall we spend our energy asking for something for which there’s a chance to get?” I gave that statement a thousand times. When campuses would be beating on me, I would say, “Let me just ask you a question. Should we do that, and ask for something for which we have no chance at all, or ask for something for which we have a chance?” And it worked, and I got them off on the we-want-more kick.

**Budgets under Charles Hitch and David Saxon**

Baker: So then our budget became quite credible. We made it credible. That was an earned reputation that Larry and I had, was to make our budget credible, for it hadn’t been with McCorkle. See, McCorkle was the budget officer, and Charlie Hitch let him be. See, Charlie was the kind of guy, he was the outside guy, and Chet ran the place.

LaBerge: He was the outside guy, meaning?

Baker: He worked with the regents, particularly. He didn’t run the university. There’s different structures of management, you can do it any way you want it, they all work. But Hitch took on the external role; Chet ran the place. Well, when David [Saxon] became president, Chet didn’t realize that Saxon might want to do it differently maybe. Chet thought he was president. [laughter] I’ll always have this vision of the two of them meeting in the hall, and McCorkle saying, “Who are you?” “Well, I’m David Saxon, the president.” “I didn’t know that. When did this happen?” [laughter] Those were interesting times. We’ll get to that.

LaBerge: How would you characterize David Saxon? If Charles Hitch was kind of a figurehead. And how did he work with the budget?
Baker: Saxon, his great strength was integrity. He had incredible integrity. I can think of many issues. Incredible integrity. But he was an academic first, last, and always. He was a faculty member. He didn’t like the legislature, he hated that part of his job. Disliked alumni events. And it’s stuff the president is supposed to do, you know. But he was a brilliant guy, but he wasn’t Mr. Outsider. The external part of the president’s job, he was not comfortable with, and therefore not great at it. And he was involved with the budget.

I had an interesting time with it, because after Jenkins--I was AVP under Jenkins, and Jenkins left, and Saxon wouldn’t make me vice president, even though I replaced Jenkins. He wouldn’t make me vice president. He made me assistant vice president and special assistant to the president. We had quite a debate about that; I lost the debate. [laughter] Lost a few debates in my life. But anyway, I lost that one. So, I had a dual reporting relationship. I reported to Saxon as special assistant to the president, reported to Bill Fretter as assistant vice president.

And Bill Fretter was the sweetest man in the whole world. I took all the bad news to Fretter and the good news to Saxon. And that worked pretty well, because Saxon had quite a temper.

LaBerge: I’ve never heard that.

Baker: Yes, he had quite a temper. So, Saxon’s involvement was not nearly as great. So, under Hitch, McCorkle was the budget guy, he played the great detailed role, as Gardner did. And under Saxon, I did it. And then under Gardner, he made all the budget decisions.

I had allocation authority up to $50,000, and I had a quarterly report on that, which worked fine. That covered 95 percent of the stuff. That worked fine. Under Saxon, I had no allocation authority. Fretter did, Bill Fretter.

**The Incremental Budget**

LaBerge: Well, once you got a budget, how did you allocate it to the campuses? Is that what you’re talking about?

Baker: Well, our budget, there’s lots of different kinds of budgets. There’s something called a base budget, which means that every year you start from scratch.

And there’s a program budget. So, you have a program. You have so much for your automobile program, so much for food program, so much for entertainment program, clothes program, every program is looked at.
We had a better budget, it’s the incremental budget. Nobody messes with what’s in it, we only mess with what we add to it, which is just remarkable that we get away with it. It’s just remarkable.

LaBerge: Has it always been like that?

Baker: No, that was part of our changing the process, that Larry and I did. I don’t know how we got away with it.

LaBerge: But it makes sense.

Baker: Oh, yes. It’s great. You got what you got now; let’s see how much bigger we can make it. Incremental budget, I call that. So we would decide what percentage increase, the parameters, you know, inflation was a factor, faculty salaries was a factor. You know how that works? We have these eight universities--this is an agreement that we have with the state--four privates and four publics. And we paid our salaries at the average.

Which is a really good deal, because the four privates are Harvard, Stanford, Yale, and MIT. And the four publics are the highest paid publics in the country: Virginia, Illinois, Michigan, and SUNY-Buffalo. And we’d pay at the average. We’d calculate what the lag is, that’s a percentage. We’d calculate what inflation is, on the inflation part of the budget, supplies, telephones, and utilities, and stuff.

Then we’d add some money for what’s hot this year. Well, affirmative action used to be a hot topic. We could always get a little money for affirmative action, now you can’t, or remedial education, or a new program in computer research. Stuff that we could sell. We’d go around the campuses and hear what ideas they had, and we picked the stuff we could sell. That’s how we built the budget.

Then we’d march ourselves up there and sell it. Never get it all, but our goal was to get most of it, and we usually did. Until the disaster of the early nineties.

**Strategies in the Face of Budget Cuts**

LaBerge: When the disaster hit, what strategies did you have?

Baker: Well, the first thing we had to do was be sure that we knew there was nothing they could do about it. Here’s another relationship example: we were close friends with the Department of Finance people. I’d have them to my house. And the directors of finance, they were my personal friends. Take them to ball games, court them. Why do I do that? So I can operate on a friendship basis, and they’ll be honest with me, and
I can trust them. So when the director of the Department of Finance tells me, “Here’s our problem,” I believe him.

LaBerge: And he believes you, too.

Baker: And he believes me. So I knew, as I would report back to President Gardner, that this was the true stuff. We were not getting jacked around. It wasn’t because we were a low priority, it wasn’t because somebody was mad at us. This is the real truth. And David believed me, because we had this trust business going on.

So now the question is what do we do about it? In these cabinet meetings, we would sit around and talk about how high should fees go? It was politics. And there was financial aid. So you had people arguing different points of view. But there’s not only the cabinet forum and the one-on-one forum, there’s also the Council of Chancellors forum. By then though, we knew where we were going.

I’ll come back to that. About how David ran his COC meetings. It was another piece of his genius. You know, it’s not easy to deal with all these big egos. [laughter] There are some fairly large-sized egos floating around. That’s one of the things that you find in this business is that you’ve got to deal with the chancellors, you’ve got to deal with the legislature, they have quite significant egos, and the Congress people.

LaBerge: Faculty.

Baker: Faculty, yes. I mean, it is really something to deal with all of these egos. You learn to do a lot of listening. Nod, and a lot of body language. Everyone likes to think you’re listening. [laughter] So, the budget, I guess we’ll talk about that.

LaBerge: You were talking about the cabinet meetings. How high should the fees go?

Baker: How high should the fees go? What are the politics of that? What about aid? People had different pieces of information to add, different points of view. What about faculty salaries? Do we cut faculty salaries? Do we cut staff salaries? I mean, huge cuts we’re getting, $400 million, real dollars. So we would debate about whether or not we should cut staff salaries. I was in favor of it, because 80 percent of our budget is salary, 80 percent. So if you make a little cut in the salaries, then you make up a lot of your money.

I was opposed most of the time on that one, particularly on the faculty salary. They had the easiest jobs in the world, for gosh sakes. Perfect jobs and they can’t be fired. [laughter] We never cut faculty salaries and we cut staff salaries a little, temporarily, one year. Heavily debated, because this is not easy stuff. One of the most important aspects of those bad years, ‘91 to ‘94, was that because of the trust that we had rebuilt, from Deukmejian on to Governor [Pete] Wilson--Wilson, another piece of this is, I’ve known him for a long time, before Gardner knew him.
Meetings with Pete Wilson and John Sununu

Baker: But even better, my wife was a personal friend of Governor Wilson. Because she was a television reporter in San Diego when he was mayor. His chief of staff, Bob White, and Judith [Woodard] became very close personal friends. So I had another stroke of luck with that governor as well as the preceding governor. It makes a huge difference.

LaBerge: Did you go to talk to him too, before he became governor?

Baker: Yes, with David Gardner. And I could not get an appointment, could not do it. Judith called Bob White, like that [snapped figures]. Senator Wilson and David Gardner and I had lunch, in the senate lunch room together. Got it in a New York minute. I tried all the usual avenues, impossible. Called Bob White, got it. Interesting how this life works.

I had another one trying to get in to see John Sununu, when he was [President] George Bush’s chief of staff, could not get in. Gardner wanted to see him, could not get in. I was involved with legislatures around the country for ten years in a program I did. And I called a friend of mine, who was then the speaker of the New Hampshire house. Sununu had been governor of New Hampshire. One call, and I got the appointment.

Sununu’s secretary was named Jackie Kennedy, by odd chance. She greeted me like a long-lost cousin. And boy, was President Gardner impressed. [laughter] Went to see Sununu, which was a whole trip in itself. And I swear to goodness, we had exactly fifteen minutes with Sununu, and he had an aide with a stop watch. And Sununu gave a monologue about all the terrible problems in higher education, and faculty don’t teach and all this on and on, useless research. He gave a monologue for fourteen minutes, and the aide said, “One minute, Governor.” Sununu says, “Oh yes, what did you come to me about?” And Gardner, in sixty seconds, had to outline what he came to see him about. And we were out of there. They stood up. Sununu stood up, the aide escorted us out. To the second.

LaBerge: And what did Gardner say in the sixty seconds?

Baker: Something to do with graduate education. And a federal program for graduate fellowships or something like that. When you go see people like that, you’ve got to have some business to transact. Our effort was to get on the radar screen, and that’s what it was. And we laughed about that. By absolute coincidence, a week later--I’ve been very active, another part of me, with the American Arbitration Association. In fact I’ll show you my new business card.

LaBerge: Is this your new job?
Baker: Well, I have two jobs. I’m a consultant to Barry Munitz at the CSU system, and I’m an arbitrator-mediator.

LaBerge: So you have an office in San Francisco, too. Can I have this?

Baker: Yes. In any event, the American Arbitration Association has an annual luncheon. It’s a civic lunch, a thousand people, something like that. And because I’m on the national board of directors of the American Arbitration Association, I sit at the head table at all these luncheons. So I was sitting there, and there was some guy sitting next to me, some local civic guy whose name is Sununu. So I’m making conversation. Just a week later—and I said, “This is very interesting; this is the second time in a week I’ve met with a person named Sununu.” And he says, “Oh, you know my uncle.” And I said, “Yes, he’s a very interesting guy.” And this guy says, “Yes, the family doesn’t like him either.” [laughter] That was really too much.

**Layoffs, VERIPs, Student Fees**

LaBerge: Okay, we were talking about how you were going to cut $400 million. And so you were talking about faculty salaries.

Baker: I was going to say, this trust that we had developed made for a situation in which the governor and the legislature allowed us to take the cuts the way we wanted to take them. It was very important. Rather than the legislature saying, “Okay, we’re going to cut a hundred million this year. And it’s going to be cutting pay, it’s going to be none of this,” and whatever. We convinced them, it wasn’t easy, both the governor’s office and the legislature. Let us take the cuts; we’ll take the cuts.

We were convinced that it was going to happen. We couldn’t avoid it. Let us decide how we take our cuts. And that really was the greatest measure of public trust that I’ve experienced. They let us decide how to take our cuts.

We raised student fees, which accounted for about a fourth of the $400 million. No faculty or staff salary increases for about three years. It allowed us to hold the line. The early retirement program allowed us to get rid of five thousand people.

LaBerge: Through VERIP?

Baker: Yes, not all, but mostly. We had some layoffs. I had to lay off some people who were friends; that was hard, really hard. I had to have a box of Kleenex in my office, really hard times. The first VERIP, you didn’t even notice it because, mostly, it was people who were getting ready to retire anyhow.
LaBerge: And where did that idea come from?

Baker: Ron Brady.

LaBerge: And we’ll leave that subject until next time; too long.

Baker: Ron Brady, brilliant guy. If not loved, clearly brilliant. [laughter] And that was a great idea. The second VERIP began to hurt, because valuable people who weren’t really ready to retire left. The third one really hurt, we really lost some pretty young people, people in their fifties. That really hurt, at least from my view of the staff. The faculty difference was, the good ones got recalled to teach. So, I really think that was less of a hurt than on the staff side.

Here’s an interesting statistic, two years ago, out of all of our employees--120,000 employees--62 percent have been with the university less than five years. I don’t know what it is today, but that was two years ago. A function of VERIP. And very high turnover in a lot of the lower-level jobs. Sixty-two percent, five years or less. That just was amazing.

So, institutional memory is really sadly lacking. People like me leaving it, not just me but people like me, really lacking. It is like a survey I just read in the paper, “What is the 25th anniversary of Watergate?” Roughly 33 percent of the people surveyed had no idea what Watergate was.

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LaBerge: But it’s great, it’s great, because you do have the institutional memory. And you’ve seen a lot of different things. This is perfect.

We’re really trying to focus on the budget and the different things--you got the kind of cuts you wanted because of the trust.

Baker: We didn’t get the kind of cuts we wanted, we didn’t want cuts. We were able to choose how we took the cuts, yes. Because of the trust. I think that was a very important piece of our history. And I think that maybe ten years before we might not have gotten away with that.

LaBerge: Under a different governor and different president.
Gardner’s Ability to Communicate with Ease

Baker: One of the Gardner notions that I’ve often thought about, since he was so good with legislators and governors, I wonder how he would have done with Jerry Brown. It’s sort of like saying, “Would Babe Ruth be as good today? Who’s better, Willie Mays or Babe Ruth, or Muhammad Ali or Joe Lewis?” There are lots of sports comparisons people make. Was Jesse Owens really better than...? People do that with sports analogies. How would David have done? I just wonder if he would have made it. Talk about different people, goodness me.

LaBerge: You wonder if anybody would have.

Baker: Yes, because David Saxon sure didn’t. Because Gardner, a very conservative Republican, politically got along fine with Governor Deukmejian and Governor Wilson. So he didn’t have the liberal politics to have to get over. And he wasn’t a fuzzy-headed academic. He didn’t have that image at all. Some did. But I just wonder. We’ve talked about it. How would that have been, if Gardner and Brown had mixed? And I dare say, if we had to take those cuts during the Jerry Brown administration, I don’t think we would have had--

LaBerge: You wouldn’t have had the choice.

Baker: I don’t think so. I don’t know. That was a very important piece.

LaBerge: [Speaker of the Assembly] Willie Brown and David Gardner got along, is that right?

Baker: Yes, they did. They had a great respect for one another. They were straight with each other. And they got along fine. Gardner had the ability to behave in a different way with different people, that would make them like him and trust him.

Do you want to know another Gardner story? Arditti and I were taking him around Sacramento one day. And there was an assemblyman named Rusty Areias, and he’s a cool guy, you know, Mr. Showbiz, playboy type of guy. We see him in the hall, and Arditti said, “Rusty, Rusty, I want you to meet President Gardner.” And he said, “Hi Preston, what do you do?” [laughter]

LaBerge: So what was the response to that?

Baker: That’s a good example. Gardner laughed and took it right in stride, without embarrassing him. He said, “I’m the president of the university.” He said, “Oh, really, that’s great, nice to meet you.” That’s a good example of how he was, he could laugh about it, and just get right there with it. He’s very adaptable to people and the different styles that people might have.
Dealings with Specific Regents

LaBerge: Do you have an example of a regent that might have presented a difficult relationship?

Baker: Ward Connerly.

LaBerge: Okay. Was he a regent when David Gardner was still president?

Baker: No.

LaBerge: So has he had dealings with him?

Baker: I don’t think so.

LaBerge: But you have?

Baker: Oh, I have. Ward Connerly. As Will Rogers would have said, “I never met a man I didn’t like until I met Ward Connerly.” [laughter] Will Rogers would have said that. Is that the right guy? Jack Peltason was having a terrible time with Connerly, when he first came on the board, when Jack was first president. Micromanaging, arguing against whatever it was Jack was trying to do, just being contrary. And Jack asked me to go talk to my pals in Sacramento and see if I could figure out what to do with this guy Connerly.

LaBerge: Had you gone to greet him as a new regent the way you had done with other regents?

Baker: Yes. And he was a tough guy. So I went to see the current director of finance, Russ Gould, the former director of finance, Tom Hayes, and the governor’s political advisor, Bill Hauck, who were friends of mine. And I said, “I’ve got a problem.” We had lunch, I can remember where, I can remember the restaurant. I saw the three of them yesterday in Sacramento, as a matter of fact, as part of my CSU work. I reminded them of that bad advice they gave me. I said, this guy Connerly, we’re having a tough time, laid it out. What do I do? They said, “You’ve just got to work with him. Deep down he’s okay. You’ve just got to work with him.”

That was the short version of their advice. So that was their advice. And I reminded them yesterday about the bad advice they gave. [laughter] They said, “Oh jeez, yes, we didn’t help you on that one.” Connerly is pretty impossible.

Frank Clark, in his later years, has become a bit hard to deal with. And I think that David would have had a hard time with him. Because Frank doesn’t listen. I like Frank, and he’s a fine guy, but he’s become hard to work with.
LaBerge: What about Glenn Campbell?

Baker: Glenn Campbell liked Gardner, didn’t like Bill Frazer. He was tough on Frazer. He liked me. Didn’t like Frazer. He liked Gardner. And part of the reason he liked Gardner is that he was on a search committee that brought Gardner in--he took credit for it. He was chairman of the board when Gardner became president.

I think that Dean Watkins was chairman of the search committee, but Campbell was chairman of the board. And he takes full credit for getting Gardner here, which I think he doesn’t deserve, but he takes it. [laughter] And he would often say that, so whatever Gardner did, he wasn’t going to get blamed for it, so he took credit for it until the end, when nobody wanted credit then. We’ll get to that, it’s an unfortunate chapter in our history.

LaBerge: Well, how about next time--and you know when you get the transcript, you can add things, but I think we’re going to close up with the budget. And next time we’ll talk about the relationships between the vice presidents, and the retirement packages. We’ve got a lot more to cover, but we’ll try to do it. Superconducting supercollider. Well, you have the list. We’ll just have to keep it small.

Baker: Okay, whatever works for you.

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Baker’s Speech to the Regents at His Retirement, 1997

[Interview 2: July 3, 1997] ##

LaBerge: We were just talking about your speech to the regents when you retired. And you were telling me you did have a speech writer.

Baker: I had a regular speech writer who also had other duties, her name was Laurie Itow. She was one of the news people, so she handled writing, she handled media, and wrote stories, like in the UC Focus. She would frequently be a contributor to that. She is a good writer, and she captured my thoughts, usually, quite well. This time it came out like just another speech to the Fresno Rotary Club or something. [laughter] It just didn’t cut it.

So, I sat down and spent a good long while working on it myself. Especially, some of the messages that I had, I had two in particular, which were quite nicely captured by William Rodarmor in the California Monthly.
LaBerge: I thought so, too.

Baker: One was a message to the regents, which was responding in a sense to frequent complaints that they made to me about the media. And as I said in my comments, the media writes about what people do, and prints what they say. So, the message is: if you don’t want them to write about what you do, then you better not do it. And if you don’t like what they quote, then quit saying it. Because the media does not make stuff up.

They put spins on things, which is a little irritating. And the headline writers, of course, who are not the same person to write the story, they’re a different group altogether. And they sit there and read a story about which they know nothing, and write a headline. So a lot of times the headlines are inflammatory in nature and they needn’t be.

But in any event, I wanted to tell the regents in a polite way that they ought to quit misbehaving, and they won’t get bad press. And they ought to quit misspeaking, or speaking inappropriately.

My second message was, of course, about affirmative action. I had my former speech writer, Rick Malaspina, who’s also the assistant news director, help me. He is always a good help. That word “passion.” “I urge you with all the passion I can muster,” that came from him. I was trying to figure out a way to say something as hard and as deeply and as strongly as I could. That came out really well. And I really believed it.

I think the regents have made, in my opinion, the two biggest mistakes the regents have made. By and large over time, the board really has served us quite well. But the decision on affirmative action, I think, was a terrible, terrible mistake. And we’re being proven right as we look at the admissions. And the decision on the tenth campus. They just picked the wrong site, in my opinion.
IV OTHER ISSUES DURING GARDNER’S PRESIDENCY

Affirmative Action, 1975-1997

LaBerge: Well, we want to talk about that. Let’s talk about affirmative action. All the years that you were here, how did you see the policy develop, for more diversity?

Baker: It’s very interesting how the board has changed so much. I was assistant vice president for the budget in 1978, and then the capital budget before that. So, in the seventies, late seventies. I may be a little off on my timing, but that’s approximately right. We had several board members who come to mind, five come to mind immediately: Stanley Sheinbaum, Sheldon Andelson, Vilma Martinez, Yvonne Brathwaite Burke, and Yori Wada.

At least those five, probably more, but at least those five come right to my mind, who pressed us, even badgered us, urged us to reach out with affirmative action programs. They generated support from the board, they put special funds into our first affirmative action programs. They pleaded with us to put money in the budget for affirmative action programs, or ordered us to, if you will. Well, instructed us to. Really pushed us hard.

And there wasn’t a meeting that went by for month after month after month, that one of those didn’t raise the issue in some context of something that came up. Perhaps an appointment. Perhaps, an appointment for a vice chancellor, or a vice president, some personnel appointment that had to come to the board. Or, an appointment of an architect, or contract issues. Always affirmative action, constantly, constantly, constantly.

Then the legislature, led probably by [Assemblyman] John Vasconcellos as much as anybody, but many others, pushing us hard, demanding reports from us as to how well we were doing. They wanted to see the numbers every year, how had we done, give us the breakdown by ethnic background of your students, your faculty, your staff. Let’s see all of your new faculty appointments, women as well as minority. It was topic A. It was number one.
And [Berkeley Chancellor Ira M.] Mike Heyman, my great champion, and dear friend, really did a brilliant job. He just took the bull by the horns and went for it, and really turned this campus into a wonderfully diverse place. He was clearly the leader in the university. But an interesting historical notion is that we were pressed hard at every turn from, I’m guessing, ’75 to ’85, ten-year period.

And then those board members began to drop off. Then who was governor? Well, we had Deukmejian and Governor Wilson for sixteen years. So, they began to appoint conservative Republicans, for the most part. And little by little those voices faded, because they were no longer there at the table. Then it came all the way to where it is today.

It’s just heartbreaking to those of us who believe so strongly in the need. And why do I feel so strongly about this? It’s not social, it’s not political. It’s strategic. Take a look at our youngsters in K-12, today as we sit. There’s no ethnic majority today, there’s five and a half million kids, maybe six million kids, there’s no ethnic majority. In the year 2020, you know, not very far away, 75 percent of then ten million K-12 kids will be nonwhite.

Two questions: one, what kind of a society do we want, educated or not? Second, to maintain our worldwide economic competitive edge, we have to have a trained work force, what is the force? It’s those six million today, and ten million tomorrow, those kids. So we have to educate them.

It has nothing to do with social—it can, but it doesn’t have anything to do with social views or political views. It has to do with strategic planning. How about we educate our youngsters for the future of California? So that my granddaughter can live in a wonderful state, and come to this university, I hope. We have to train them.

The math needs no other explanation. And that’s what troubles me so much, that people don’t see that. I mean, people see it when I give the talk, and that issue comes up every time, no matter where I am. I give those statistics, and the room is silent, end of topic. It really works, end of topic. I don’t get dramatic, I just say, “I have two questions for you. One, what kind of society would you like for your grandchildren, educated or not?” Of course, they gasp when I give the statistics, they just gasp, audible gasp from the audience. It’s very interesting.

LaBerge: Did you speak to the regents when all of this was going on?

Baker: No. That was a day to be remembered. There were three hundred media people. I was sitting right next to Jesse Jackson in the audience, as it turned out.

LaBerge: Just by accident?
Baker: Well, semi by accident. I mean, he happened to sit down near where I was. And I thought, I think I’ll grab that seat next to him. [laughter] Semi-accident. The accident was, I happened to be near where he decided to sit down. But, I went for it, just because I thought it would be interesting. I introduced myself. It was a little bit embarrassing, because the spotlight was on him, and he spoke and got up and led everybody in prayer. Nobody quite knew what to do with it at the time. It was really interesting. But nonetheless, I had John Vasconcellos on my left and Jesse Jackson on my right. Because John knows me, he saw me and decided to come sit next to me. Interesting.

LaBerge: It sounds like, for the most part, the administration, from the Office of the President to the campuses really support affirmative action.

Baker: Absolutely. I know of no one, I must say, I personally know of no one who doesn’t. I know of no one who doesn’t, no one.

Pete Wilson’s Part

LaBerge: Do you think it would have happened if there weren’t a Ward Connerly?

Baker: No, no. Of course, the governor had a big hand in this. And I know for a fact that he did make the calls that he’s alleged to have made. There’s a lawsuit still pending, that has to do with what’s called a serial meeting, which means that the Board of Regents cannot have a meeting without the public being invited, except for some exceptions, like a personnel matter, not many exceptions. So, if I decided I wanted to call eight regents to line up their vote, that can be called a serial meeting, meaning you had the meeting in a series, rather than all at once. And so the allegation is that he had such a meeting, violating the open meeting laws—that’s the lawsuit.

I can’t speak to the technicalities of the serial meeting issue, but I know he made those calls, because I was counting votes on behalf of the president. So, I talked to them and I chummed out of them what their vote was going to be, and there were a few I didn’t get, who were either undecided or who wouldn’t tell me. I guessed, and I had it within one. I knew it was going to pass. Pass means the end of affirmative action. I had it within one; I forgot who it was I missed.

I also know that some regents voted against their principles, and that bothered me deeply, and they’re regents who I happen to like a lot. They voted against their principles. I knew where their principles were regarding affirmative action for women and minorities. And they were pressured, and they voted against their principles. Just three that I can tell.
And others simply believe it, I mean that’s their view. That’s the democracy. But no doubt, no question, without Ward Connerly and the governor, the governor figured centrally in this—whether Ward was being the governor’s front man or not is an open question. Early, I thought for sure that’s what the case was. But as I’ve watched Ward go off on his own—I’m not so certain.

LaBerge: Yes, he’s come off with some different views.

Baker: One theory says that the governor ran for president, he was not even on the charts, he needed something. And he asked Ward to take this on, get it on the front page, which indeed he did. And that’s one theory. Then Ward, flushed with success, decided to take his show on the road. But it’s clearly the Connerly show today. I really believe it was the Wilson-Connerly show before. But that’s speculation.

What If David Gardner Had Been There

LaBerge: Do you think if David Gardner had still been president that wouldn’t have happened?

Baker: Possibly not, and one of the great interesting reasons—I didn’t even realize I was doing it until you just asked me that question, but in my letter to David, I said to him, “We miss you, many of your colleagues miss you.” How many times have I heard “miss you” on issues like affirmative action, like a difficult board, and the tenth campus decision? How many times have I heard people say, “If only David were here...” And it’s interesting that I did that unconsciously, because those are the three particularly big issues for me, this tenth campus, affirmative action, and the difficult board.

So, good question. It would have depended upon what David wanted to do, where he was personally. If he was on Connerly’s side of the issue, and he may well have been, I don’t know, he may well have been, then it would have been a slam dunk. If he had been opposed to it, I don’t think it would have passed; it was too close. Now, he was opposed to divestment, and he lost that one because the governor, same situation, the governor called in his chips. No question about it, the governor called in his chips. And David was against that one, and he could not turn it around.

One of his few defeats, I can’t off-hand think of any others. But he was good at bringing a board around; he was good. People still use the word genius around that. So, I don’t know, it clearly would have depended upon where he stood. And given that the vote was close, I think he could have pulled it off. But I don’t know where he would have been. My guess is that he might well have been opposed to sacking affirmative action.
I’ll tell you why. He was one who fully understood the trend that I’ve described to you, fully. We had many conversations about that. And he, like I, had to deal with angry parents, whose kids didn’t get in, and alleged that a less qualified student got in. So, he dealt with that a lot; I did too. He always said this great line, “Those who think they have the solution don’t understand the problem. And those who understand the problem don’t have a solution.” That’s true today, that’s true now. I thought those were wonderful words to remember.

So, he may well have--because he understands the problem. And I think he would have recognized that ending affirmative action was not the solution to the problem. Obviously, it exacerbated the problem. Did he talk about this at all in your discussion?

LaBerge: I didn’t interview him, Ann Lage did, and I have skimmed it.¹ I don’t think that he did. In fact, I think the interviews were finished by the time that vote came.

Baker: He’s so politically savvy, that he might well not want to declare, since he doesn’t have to. Divestment, he had to declare. He didn’t have to declare, so he may not have. I’m feeling quite clear to speak my mind these days [now that I am retired]. Because of my job, I’ve been bottled up a lot.

LaBerge: Because you were representing the university.

Baker: Yes. I’m out there, the university’s chief spokesperson. And I have to represent the university.

LaBerge: Is that why you had parents calling you?

Baker: Oh, sure. Calling me or often it would be varieties of informal gatherings, or formal gatherings. I gave a lot of talks around the state, and lots of people knew me. And I get lots of calls from friends of friends. Those are the ones I like the best, friends of friends--come on. They either complain, or they want football tickets. [laughter] I don’t know if I told you this, but I did lots of tailgates at the football games. One of my principal entertaining mechanisms was to take people to football games. Have a big elegant tailgate that my wife and I really knew how to do. We figured out how to do this. We had catering help, but we did it.

And in my last tailgate, I decided to invite all the hangers-on. Because I would have official parties. I’d have legislators, or regents, or staff from Sacramento. And then lots of other UC folks would come by. I’d always have the party at the same place, the Kleeburger parking lot. So I’d entertain ten or fifteen and have twenty or thirty. So,

the last game, we sent out a notice, “the final tailgate.” We made up this invitation. And on it we had a little building, on the corners of the paper, a little building, with a little window in it. Over the one building it says ticket office, and over the other building it says parking office. And each of them had a little sign in the window that said closed. [laughter] Because I was seriously in the ticket and parking business. Not as much as campus folks, of course, but for the president’s office.

LaBerge: And only for the Berkeley campus, not for UCLA [University of California at Los Angeles]?

Baker: No, well, I didn’t live there. I lived here, and worked here, and decided this is my place. That was a lot of fun.

The Tenth Campus

LaBerge: Let’s go on to the tenth campus. Both your office’s involvement, and the decision, and doing the planning, and what the budget had to with that.

Baker: The budget didn’t have anything to do with that.

LaBerge: You didn’t have to make the projections or anything like that?

Baker: Oh, yes. But I mean the budget didn’t really--let me back up. David always wanted to make a mark for himself. Nothing wrong with that. Among all of the goals he had, one of them was to make a mark for himself. Like Clark Kerr and Sproul did. A president should do that. President Clinton is trying to do that. That’s okay.

And he was bothered, interestingly, by the fact that both Sproul and Kerr had had their pictures on the cover of Time magazine. And that was explicit. It wasn’t like I imagined it; it was not speculation. He was bothered by that. Not in a pejorative way, but they did, and he wanted to make a mark himself. Well, I never quite told him this, but those of us who knew about this said he has got to do something. Sproul was a huge figure and ran this huge university. And then Kerr came along and made it into the system that it now is.

Although David was clearly one of the great presidents in our history, he hadn’t done anything of the sort that might get you that kind of notoriety. So, we were often working on that. I never quite told him that you’ve got to do something. He and I talked a lot about this issue. One day he said to me, “You know, we’ve spent lots of time together. If you look ahead, the day is going to come, we’re not going to have any room.” Because at the time, the population of the state was growing really
dramatically, 750,000 people a year. That’s 2,000 a day. In six months, it’s as big as the state of Wyoming. I mean it’s just amazing.

And we got to talking about that. Because I was using that in my talks, those numbers. Because they made people sit up and realize that we have to think ahead. And the university needs to have more funding. I was always trying to get more money. He said it, “You know, one day, we’re going to run out of space.” And that led into the discussions about the need to develop new campuses, taking a page right out of Clark Kerr’s book, I mean he really did, many references to Clark in those discussions.

Enrollment Projections

Baker: So, he asked a group in Bill Frazer’s office to develop some enrollment projections. And then he asked each campus to develop their long-range plan indicating over what time period they would reach their desired maximum size. Generally, everyone agreed that Berkeley and UCLA were probably too big and shouldn’t grow, either of them. Campuses like Davis, and Santa Cruz, and Santa Barbara, and all the rest of them, except UCSF [University of California at San Francisco] nominally to 25,000 or 30,000.

The 27,500 number was Clark Kerr’s number, and that number really became a fixture. No clear reason, only that nobody wanted to be as big as Ohio State, or Minnesota, or University of Washington, 50,000, 60,000 students. Everybody agrees that’s too big. Fifteen thousand, it later was determined, was about the minimum for a comprehensive university. So, I don’t know where the twenty-seven five came in.

Well, we had a problem at Davis, because the community didn’t want to grow that big. Davis, at the time, was probably, sixteen or eighteen. I think they settled on twenty-five, or something like that. Problems at Santa Cruz, big problems at Santa Cruz, big problems. I got in the middle of that one. We finally compromised with the community at fifteen.

LaBerge: The same thing as Davis?

Baker: Yes, but much more intense. It was that fifteen number that we settled on, because Frazer’s office did another study to make a determination of what would be the smallest size for a comprehensive university, like ours. It doesn’t mean Brown and Yale aren’t great, they are. But for our kind of place. And a big part of that is that you’ve got to have enough students, to have enough faculty, based on our funding formula.

See, that’s where the small privates don’t have to worry. They can have a student-faculty ratio of, say, ten to one, and they have enough faculty to have the
A comprehensive range of programs. We have to have enough students to have that many faculty, to then divide them up into the disciplines.

So that was important. We sold that number to the community in Santa Cruz, the fifteen. And Santa Barbara had water problems, still does today. Santa Barbara’s number ended up at about twenty-two, I think. But then Riverside, Irvine, and San Diego all could go at twenty-seven five. Which meant, at the time, about forty-some thousand students more.

Riverside at the time was trying to grow to twenty-seven five, in way too short of a time frame. And that was a big battle between the then Chancellor Rosemary Schraer and Gardner. She was pushing to grow at a rate that would have been chaotic. All of us who had experienced the rapid growth in the sixties and seventies knew that anything over a thousand students a year was so chaotic, with housing, with counseling, with scheduling, with new faculty. I mean you just couldn’t do it. And that was quite a big battle.

I counseled Rosemary, I said, “You know, you don’t have to do this, because you’re going to grow, you’ll get there. So you’re really fighting a fight that you don’t have to fight.” I don’t think she really quite agreed with me. But finally Gardner just told her, this is it.

So having done that, we then could see that with the enrollment projection going up this way, and campus capacity coming up this way, at one point in time when each campus filled its place to its desired maximum size, the lines cross, you’re out of room. And that came at 2005, I think that’s where it came. I kind of forget the exact number, but the lines crossed; we used to talk about the lines crossing.

Well, they crossed—that is to say the projected shortage of space was so great that Gardner said, “Okay, we’re going to build three new campuses. We’re going to start one in 1998, we’re going to start one in 1999, and then start one in the year 2000. There’s going to be one in the north part of the state, one in the central, one in the south.” And I was asked to take the lead in doing it. I had had some experience in this sort of thing, because I led the superconducting supercollider search.

I wanted to conduct this campus site selection search the same way we did the SSC search, which was to have a clear set of requirements and invite proposals, evaluate the proposals and pick. Well, the first thing we did was that I started going up and down the state. I made 150 speeches in about six months, from Eureka to Chula Vista, all having to do with the tenth campus, building up community support.
Baker: I have a great T-shirt that says “UC Chula Vista.” Did I tell you this story? It was wonderful, it was hero time for me, because everybody courted me, it was great. It was the greatest time of my life. [laughter] Everybody wanted me. I had photo-ops and billboards, and marquees, and “Welcome Bill Baker” and all this stuff. Local TV stations, the smallest of which the reporter was also the camera person. [laughter] She asked me, “Could you hold this mike for me?” I said, “Sure.” She was trying to do the camera and ask the questions at the same time.

Anyhow, I was in Chula Vista, then Assemblyman, now Senator Steve Peace was there as were all these politicians. Most everywhere, they were there too, because it was a chance for some ink for them. So they had this T-shirt called UCCV, great big letters, “UCCV, UC Chula Vista, Gateway to International Education.” They give me this T-shirt, in fact, I grabbed a couple of them.

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Baker: I was in France in 1991 on a barge in Burgundy. One day when it was my assignment to go get some bread, up the towpath I’d go on my “bicyclette” and found this place, and I had that T-shirt on.

I walked into that store, which was about the size of this table. And here was this French woman, who was the clerk at the store, and there was another customer in there. And she looks at me, I didn’t know her, and looks at that shirt, and says, “My God, I never thought they’d put it there.” [laughter] Too funny. She was an American from California, who knew about the tenth campus search. And hadn’t kept track of it. And that was her response.

LaBerge: Oh, that’s funny.

**The Search Process**

Baker: Well, anyhow, we quickly decided that looking for three at the same time was just impossible. We could hardly do one. So, let’s pick one and then we’ll go on to the next one. And doing them that close together, starting construction in three consecutive years, again that’s what they did in the sixties, but that was not practical.

LaBerge: And were you involved in that?
Baker: In the sixties, no. The site was chosen, and when I came all three campuses—San Diego had one building that was up; Irvine had no buildings up, just foundations being poured; Santa Cruz was the same. San Diego was about a year ahead of the other ones. Elmo [Morgan] had been there before me, so he, of course, had been involved in the site selection.

The biggest single difference was CEQA, the California Environmental Quality Act. We didn’t have environmental impacts those days. So, an order of magnitude difference. We quickly realized—we being mostly me and my staff, and the president—it was impossible. So we picked the Central Valley first, on the grounds that it was the largest, fastest growing, and under-served by the university, place in the state.

Of course there was disappointment in the other locations, but we promised that they would soon be following. So, David didn’t want to do the search process the way I wanted to. He said what we should do is go find the sites, we should have a team of people that goes out and finds sites. Because he didn’t have faith that—maybe with good reason—but he didn’t have faith that the citizenry out there would have sufficient wherewithal and savvy to put together a good site and forward it to us.

We also had a requirement that I pushed hard on, and that one I won, which is that the minimum is 2,000 acres. The reason for that is that every single campus today is land short, even Davis because of its use of land in a different fashion. Berkeley, UCLA, with one exception and that’s Santa Cruz. But at Davis we recently bought some more land, at Riverside we recently bought some more land, Irvine, San Diego. We all recognize it. Once you decide, the world builds around you, and you’re locked in.

So that made us have to go out somewhere in the boondocks, because you couldn’t get 2,000 acres anyplace that was going to be near anything; that just wasn’t going to happen. So, the team set out.

LaBerge: Which route were you going? Were you going to find the site, or were you inviting the bids?

Baker: Oh, I was wanting to invite bids. And David didn’t want to do that.

LaBerge: So, what happened?

Baker: So, he decided that’s not how we’ll do it. We’re going to do it his way. Fair enough. So, away we went. We assembled a team of people from my staff. We had Jack
Burnett, Chris Adams, and Trudi Heinecke. And Gary De Weese, from the treasurer’s office. They were called the Site Selection Task Force, SSTF, executive staff.

Each of the vice presidents contributed a top staff member, I contributed two or three, Brady contributed, the treasurer contributed one, Frazer contributed somebody. They had a team of people, solid, really good people. And they set out to identify sites, and they identified eighty.

LaBerge: In the Central Valley?

Baker: In the Central Valley. From Stockton to Bakersfield, eighty sites. The actual site selection task force consisted of Brady, and me, and Frazer, three regents, and two chancellors, if I remember correctly, Chuck Young and [Chang-Lin] Tien. And then the regents were a bit ex officio, the chairman of Grounds and Buildings, an alumni regent, and somebody else.

LaBerge: Do you remember their names?

Baker: [Roy] Brophy was originally on there, I think. Walter Hoadley had been the alumni regent and then continued on. I think Sue Johnson originally, but they got rotated a bit. It ended up being Clair Burgener, Alice Gonzales, and Walter Hoadley, who just stayed on as the alumni rep. And at the end it was [Walter] Massey, and Wayne Kennedy, and myself, three vice presidents. Tien and Young stayed on all the way through. And the Academic Senate person ended up being Dan Simmons, at the time. That rotated, too.

Narrowing Sites from Eighty to Three

Baker: Well anyhow, that group would meet and then it would hear the staff. And then cut it down to twenty. That was easy, because in almost all cases, they were completely, way off in the hinterlands, or too small, too expensive, no roads to them even. So, we got it down to twenty pretty easily. Then we went from twenty to eight. Staff went and spent a lot of time on each of the twenty. They went from twenty to eight, a little tougher, but not too hard.

Eight, near Sonora was one, near Modesto was one, Merced, Madera County, Fresno County, one down in Tulare County, I kind of forget where they all were. But there were eight. Then it got harder. Lots of studies--we had the consultants studying water issues, consultants studying traffic issues, working with the local communities.

Finally, it went from eight to three. The three were the site in Merced; the best site, which was in Madera County, only seven miles from Fresno; and a Fresno County site.
Six hundred thousand in Fresno, sixty thousand in Merced, I rest my case. That’s the whole issue.

The Madera site was beautiful, right on the banks of the San Joaquin River, maybe ten or twelve miles from Madera, but only seven miles to Fresno--because the San Joaquin River is a border of the two counties. It’s right across the river, a beautiful site, just spectacular. The mountains and views. The so-called Table Mountain site.

The Fresno site was east of Clovis, and it was really, as Clair Burgener once told me on a field trip out there, he said, “Gosh, this is an ugly piece of ground.” [laughter] He was right. Anyhow, it still was in Fresno, it was in the right place. So, then we had to conduct an environmental impact study of the site selection.

**Keeping Issue Alive During Time of Budget Cuts**

Baker: So, I decided to keep it open as long as I can. I did conscious, deliberate footdragging all through the Valley. Some anger from people, Why are we so slow? Well, I got my redemption in a headline in the Merced paper, “Man Who Kept the Process Alive Retiring from University.” Because I did keep it alive. Everybody wanted to kill it. Most people wanted to kill it. I plead to keep it alive. So I kept it alive, kept it alive. Delaying, making up reasons why we couldn’t go ahead. I really made up a lot of stuff. But we kept it alive, and it was just sort of dormant.

Then it became political, and we got political heat from the Central Valley legislators. I was summoned, the only time in my thirty-three years, I got summoned to Sacramento. It was Senator [Dan] McCorkquodale, who hadn’t been involved in the process at all, but he assembled most of the Valley legislators in his office, and me.

At that time, it was in June of 1993, and we had two versions of the budget, the senate version and the assembly version. The senate version had $50 million more than the assembly version; that’s a lot of money. And they berated me up and down one side and the other.
LaBerge: For the budget?

Baker: For the delay. It would cost us a million and a half dollars to do the environmental studies. And we were not going to spend that money. We couldn’t--politically, internally we could not spend a million and a half bucks to do this at the time our budget was in such trouble. I mean that was the right decision. We couldn’t do it. I just took it for a long time. I learned a long time ago, that passive resistance is a highly useful tactic. You don’t fight back, just listen. And finally the senator said, “Well, Vice President Baker, what are you going to do about this?” I said, “Well, let’s review the bidding, Senator. Let’s start with the budget cuts.” And I traced them. I said, “We didn’t do that; you did that. We didn’t cut our budget. You cut our budget. And until the budget is fixed, we’re not in a position to move ahead.” Stunned them, because I put it right back on him. And I was right; I had the facts.

Senator [Ken] Maddy, who was my friend, said, “Well, I think we ought to back off. You guys ought to listen to what Bill is saying, he’s right. He didn’t do this; we did. The university didn’t do this; we did this. Bill, what would it take to change this?” I said, “Well, you could start by adopting the senate version of the budget.” Assemblyman Jim Costa asked me that. I said, “You can start, Jim”--I know him pretty well--”by adopting the senate version of the budget. And then if you do that, that’s a start. But then we have got to have the million and a half. So, that’s the answer to your question, sir.”

Well, I walked out of there, knees trembling, because I’m not usually that assertive. But I was up against the wall, and I was right. I knew I was right. So, next thing you know, they adopted the senate version of the budget. They did adopt the senate version, we got the $50 million, and they appropriated a separate million and a half.

LaBerge: For the environmental study, okay.

Baker: I remember President Jack Peltason saying to somebody at one time, “Well, I know what the price of going ahead with the tenth campus was, it was $50 million, that’s what the price was.” I really made a political deal. I made a political deal.

So then a funny thing happened. Because the governor--the million and a half was an augmentation of the governor’s budget; the governor vetoed it. He vetoed it, shock waves. Why did he veto it? He didn’t talk to us about it. He didn’t ask us. Well, it turned out he vetoed it, because the regents had earlier taken an official action to stop the process. Because we got in this budget crunch, and we had to do something with some splash. So we went to the board with an action. The regents actually took an action to suspend the site selection process.

Because that was the last thing the regents had done, the governor believed the regents didn’t want to go ahead with this, even though money was put in. Put in by Democrats. So we had to scramble like crazy. And we got a special bill to run
through, with [Steve] Arditti’s good help. A special bill run through to reappropriate the million and a half to go ahead.

LaBerge: And then did the regents have to--?

Baker: Yes, they had to go back. We had to take an action on the board and have them restart, lift their suspension and restart. And then we had a special bill, and we got it in by September or something like that we got it through. I forgot about that, that was really quite an amazing time. So we went ahead and did the environmental studies.

Then, this is fascinating--I don’t know if you want to do this now or later, but what happened was, the site selection task force, chaired by [Senior Vice President] Wayne Kennedy, because it was a big land transaction, that’s why he got it instead of me, which is fine. Wasn’t so fine when Brady got it, but it was fine when Kennedy had it, he was a good guy. [laughter] We decided not to entertain recommendations from the staff. In all the eighty to twenty, and eight to three decisions, the staff had made recommendations. But at the end, we wanted the staff to be neutral.

Choosing the Merced Site, a Difficult Decision

Baker: We had this day of infamy--in May of 1995--to make a decision, and a recommendation to the president. We were advisory to the president; we had no authority. We heard the presentations from the staff, which were neutral, just facts. About water, and land availability, and status of planning with the community, and all that kind of stuff. And we took a vote. We each spoke, each of us. There was Tien, Young, Dan Simmons, me, Kennedy, Massey, and three regents, nine in all. Then we took a vote.

Each of us spoke, we made a statement about why we’re voting the way we’re voting. We all agreed that’s what we should do. Private, no staff. And the vote was five to four, in favor of the Madera site. With Regent Alice Gonzales, Regent Burgener, Regent Hoadley, and Kennedy, the four votes in favor of Merced. And the other five of us, who knew the most about it, in favor of Madera.

Well, Jack was the president then. So that particular time must have been late ‘92 or ‘93. Burgener and Gonzales, the regents--because Hoadley was really a holdover alumni regent--they were the regents, and they went ballistic, because they felt that the administration had sandbagged them. They accused us of all sorts of things, vote swapping, this and that. All untrue, all untrue. So, Jack had a problem, he had the regents in the committee raising hell, and his staff urging him to stick with the recommendation.

We went through this process for five years, for gosh sakes. When you get to the end of it, you’ve got to stick with it. Well, Jack decided his only out was not to take a
recommendation to the board, but to come with no recommendation for it, indicating that it was very close, we’ll let the board decide.

LaBerge: But between those two sites, or still between--?

Baker: Between those two. Oh, I forgot to tell you that the so-called Academy site in Fresno had dropped out fairly early because during the environmental studies, they discovered Indian artifacts. Now, it’s probable that we could have worked around that, but none of us wanted to go through the hassle. And it wasn’t a great site anyhow. And Madera was a spectacular site, seven miles from Fresno, closer than the Fresno site to the population. It was an easy decision. The Fresno folks never understood it.

LaBerge: So, it went to the full board.

Baker: It went to the full board. Well, some things happened. First of all, the Fresno people wanted to make a presentation, even though they were ruled out. And I had worked behind the scenes quietly, I couldn’t be public on this. But I told the Madera folks, “You better do a couple of things.” One, there were issues--the land was not easily come by, because it was privately owned by seven or eight separate people who hadn’t joined together. And the water wasn’t clear, probable but not clear. “What you have got to do,” I said, “is make declarative statements. Say, ‘Yes, we are absolutely confident we can get the land, and we will have water.’ Just say it. And get the Fresno people to come up to bat for you, ‘We have joined with Madera. We are all together.’” I tried to coach them. Well, my coaching didn’t work; they didn’t listen. Because what happened was the Madera folks made an awful presentation, hemming and hawing, “Well, we might--I’m not sure--the land is going to be a problem--but maybe.” Just awful, not very positive. Not can do, it’s maybe. Well, most of the regents hadn’t been involved in this process at all. And most of them, by my count, were of an open mind walking in. A few of them had their minds made up, but most of them were open, because they hadn’t been engaged. So this was a big day.

The audience was packed with buses of people from the Valley. So, the Madera folks made an awful presentation. The Fresno people got up and complained about the process, arguing that their site is still the best, Madera is no good. Then Merced came up and gave one of the most beautiful, concise, clear presentations you ever saw. And they had water guaranteed, and the land was free, it was locked up because it was a trust.

And the trust, the so-called Virginia Smith Trust, had been set up a hundred years ago, or seventy-five years ago, by Virginia Smith, this woman. Set up in such a way that all the proceeds from the land, which was something like 7,000 acres--we only needed two--all the proceeds went to scholarships for Merced County students. In the trust, in 1925, which was a long time ago. And they had gone to court and gotten a judge to agree that it was a reasonable interpretation that those scholarships--because once the campus is built there, they wouldn’t be making a hundred thousand bucks off grazing land, which they do now. They’d be making millions--that could be spread more
broadly to students in the Valley. They had a court judgment that widened the potential distribution of the proceeds.

So, here we had a negative presentation by Fresno, a not very competent presentation by Madera, a superb presentation by Merced, highlighting the land, the trust, the water. I mean, they did a hell of a job. I was prepared to make, what I referred to as my last speech. And I was ready, I had it written, forcefully as I knew how, I would have said why I would be for the Madera site. But I saw the votes, and I realized--I made a judgment, which turned out to be right. But at the time you’ve got about a minute to make this judgment. I had my speech ready, in my lap, ready to go. I still have it some place, I came across it one day, might be interesting for your archives.

LaBerge: It would be.

Baker: But I could see it was hopeless. I would have been completely damaged goods politically. I would have been useless, I would have had to resign probably, if I had made the speech I was going to make. But I couldn’t win. If I could win, I’d be a hero. If I’d lose, I’d be history. Because I was going to tell the regents what for, I was going to tell them why Merced is a lousy site, I was going to tell them why Madera was great. And if I had lost, I’m not going to be very useful to the university.

I had to make a judgment call. So, I didn’t say anything, I kept quiet. I could have easily gotten recognized, all I had to do is raise my hand. I had a chance, because Ward Connerly, of all people, asked me a question. “On the issue of private fund raising, is it true that you do better if you’re near a big city?” And that’s not exactly how he said it, but that was the nature of the question. Well, the facts are that all of our campuses, including this one, get something like 80 percent of their private money outside the community, not even in the San Francisco Bay Area, UCLA, all of them. We did a study on that. In the interest of honesty, I passed on that opportunity to make my speech, and the rest is history. So, that’s how it got picked, interesting. It was not a clear-cut, decision-making process.

Once picked, I believed it was critical to call the campus UC San Joaquin, in order to convey the important message that the campus was for the citizens of the entire Central Valley, not just the tiny town of Merced. That was a commitment we had made to the people of the Valley. Well, they had now compounded the felony by naming it “UC Merced”.

Few within the university community wanted to build it. And no chancellor wants to build it, because it’s going to take resources from the existing campuses, even though we say it won’t, it’s going to, trust me.

LaBerge: So, you mean not one of the nine chancellors wants to build.
Baker: No, opposed to it. If David Gardner was still president, we’d have it built by now, I contend. Absolutely would have it built. But Peltason didn’t want to have anything to do with it, he just let it slide. And Dick [Atkinson] came in and said, “Why in the world did we pick this site? I can’t believe it--how did that happen?” So I told him how it happened.

And interestingly enough, up until, except for the one time when I got summoned to Sacramento, I had kept the politics at bay, both federally, with the Valley Congress members, and statewide, because I made regular visits to the members in the Valley to keep them up-to-date, hear the status reports.

Every couple of months I’d go meet them, status report, they were informed all the way along. Same in Congress. I talked to the people, the Valley congressmen, Rick Lehman, Calvin Dooley. Now, Gary Condit, and George Radanovich. I kept them informed on a regular basis. And they really appreciated that. Because they were the first to know what was going on, they knew. So, when we had some event that was going to take place or a milestone, I’d go see them in advance. And that really worked to keep the politics out of it.

Well, then politics have recently come back into it. Cruz Bustamante became speaker, he has got only two years because of term limits. He wants to make a name for himself, he’s committed to getting the campus funded. And if we don’t agree, the budget will get held up. So, we’re back in the politics. I’m out of it now, but that’s still ongoing. So, that’s more than you want to hear probably.

William Frazer and Ronald Brady

Baker: Do you find inconsistencies in people’s recollections of history? You must.

LaBerge: Both consistencies and inconsistencies, yes.

Baker: Because people saw things differently, and participated differently. Must be fascinating to hear. Have you talked to Frazer?

LaBerge: I have. I’ve had two interviews with him. Why don’t you tell me how the three of you, Mr. Brady, and Mr. Frazer, worked together? And what your take on that was.

Baker: Well, Brady was the tough customer, brilliant. He’s a brilliant guy, brilliant, but he was territorial. Always trying to get more. When he was in Illinois, he was the executive vice president at Illinois. When he left, they cut that job into two vice presidencies. He had acquired so much territory. His nickname in Illinois was Hoover, because he’d vacuum things up. [laughter] We didn’t call him that, but that’s what people called him there. He didn’t like to consult. He and I would be on opposite sides on practically any issue. But we coexisted, and worked together when we had to.
Bill [Frazer] and I got along, I think, quite well. He would like to have had the budget under his authority. The budget is a big deal. And everybody wanted to be in charge of the budget. Brady would have liked to have the budget, Bill certainly would have liked to, he told me that. But I thought that Bill and I worked pretty well together. We would meet one-on-one quite regularly, and were pretty open with each other. If his staff was fighting with my staff, we’d talk about it openly. And if he said something that I didn’t like, or I did something he didn’t like, we could talk about it. We communicated--

The Superconducting Supercollider ##

LaBerge: How did you work on the superconducting supercollider?

Baker: Because the site selection was a political issue, not a physics issue, Gardner yielded to my desires to be in the lead. But we worked together. We gave talks all over the place for it. We were looking at Vandenberg Air Force base in California. I went to see the secretary of the air force, that was kind of exciting, who was Verne Orr, former regent, former director of finance. So, I knew him. It ended up not being a viable site, because of earthquake faults that run through the area.

We ended up picking a site in the Davis campus, right in the middle of it, and a site up northeast of Stockton, near Linden and Oakdale. You know when you go up to Sonora.

LaBerge: Yes, exactly.

Baker: That’s where it was. One little anecdote. We just had lots of community stuff. Every time I’d go to these little communities, their local press was always there to hold their press conference. There was a guy from the Linden Herald, Express, Tribune, Gazette, Chronicle, Times, whatever [laughter], who not only was the reporter, wrote the story, and printed it, he wrapped it up--he did it all, a one-man operation. [laughter]

And if you remember, the SSC was a huge ring, fifty-three miles around, within which would be these tunnels, within which they would shoot protons around, and they’d collide. And when they’d collide, physicists would look at the events that took place and figure stuff out, I never knew what. [laughter] Really, I never knew what, but I was out giving speeches about it. Anyhow, this reporter says, “What does one of these protons look like?” I didn’t want to make him feel bad. I said, “Well sir, it’s the darnedest thing, they’re so small, you can’t even see them.” He said, “How do you know they’re there?” I said, “I don’t know, that’s a good question.” [laughter] Pretty funny.

One other little story, when I was out doing tenth campus site selections, giving a talk to some community group, some guy haltingly asked me a question. He said,
“Weren’t you the guy out trying to sell us that collider?” I said, “Yes sir, same guy, new product.” [laughter] I was selling a campus this time.

**Teamwork with Coworkers**

Baker: So, Bill and I worked together quite a bit. And one of the issues that always, historically, takes place probably in every academic institution is that academic planning is supposed to lead. You’re supposed to decide, here’s my academic plan, I want to expand my physics department, or biological sciences. Academic planning should lead. And then the physical planning, what kind of building shall we build, ought to be based on what the academic plan is.

But because faculty have a difficult time coming to grips with that word called decision, the physical plan often ends up leading the academic plan. And certainly the budgetary plan, because the budget clock never stops ticking. You go from July 1, and you back up. And there are things you’ve got to do to get up to when there are legislative hearings, the governor’s budget, the regents have to approve the budget, I mean it’s back up to a date. The clock never stops. I can tell you exactly what Hershman has got to do today for the next budget, because the clock just keeps going.

So, budget people have to often make decisions. Because they have to act when academic people can’t.

LaBerge: You mean, you have to make the academic decisions?

Baker: You have to make some decisions, even if it’s academic in nature, because it relates to what you’re going to get money for, or not get money for. Bill often quoted me, he said, “Well, my friend, Bill Baker says ‘Billy, if you’re going to keep up with us, you better run a little faster.’”

LaBerge: He’d quote you to the Academic Senate.

Baker: Yes, trying to goose them into action. He said, “My friend Bill Baker said, ‘Billy, if you’re going to keep up with the budget folks, you have got to run a little faster.’” Something like that. He will tell you that.

I think we got along okay. You know, he’s a real academic and I’m not, so we had a lot of conflict. But more over our cultures than anything else.

LaBerge: And you need an academic in that position, and you need someone who’s not academic in your position.
Baker: Yes, conflict was probably quite natural. You’re probably always going to have that kind of conflict when you have two different people doing quite different jobs, but having to work quite closely together. The vice presidents almost never met as a group, never met as a group.

LaBerge: But just with the president?

Baker: We met with the president, just vice presidents and the president, once a week.

LaBerge: But then not alone.

Baker: Well, whenever we had to do business, but we never met together.

LaBerge: It wasn’t like you felt you were a team?

Baker: I did not feel like we were a team.

LaBerge: In other administrations have you felt you were a team?

Baker: Well, actually, Walter Massey, when he came in as provost, started these meetings, and we really did feel much more like a team. He started having the vice presidents meet without the president every week, and we worked on problems, worked on issues. The most I ever felt I was part of a team was under Loren Furtado, that was absolutely a team.

LaBerge: This was when you were first there?

Baker: No, this is when I first became, in ‘74, director of the capital budget. That was a real team. And we’re still lifelong friends, on that team; that was a four-year period. Then I felt that I had a real team, and I really was proud of my team. Team building was something I spent a lot of time on. So, my team felt like a team, and I think they would agree with that. My team, which was Hershman, and Jesse Shaw, and Sandy Smith, and Steve Arditti, and later Paul Sweet in Washington, and Ed Crawford, and Judith Woodard, Celeste [Rose]--I really worked hard building a team. We went on retreats, and I had a facilitator who worked with us the whole time. Really a team. I felt very proud--out of all my accomplishments, building that team was, I think, maybe the one I’m particularly proud of.

And then the last, when Peltason came in, he made some changes and that team kind of fell apart. It wasn’t really ever the same. My last four years were not like that; they were less comfortable for me.
LaBerge: I think we’ll save that for another interview. How about more on Mr. Brady? And the three of you vice presidents--were you vying for the president’s time?

Baker: David was great. I got time with him when I needed it. I would have liked to use him more externally, I’d like to cart him up to Sacramento more often, because he was wonderful. He was just terrific. He was like a gold mine to take him out on the road. But it’s just hard to get him to do it, because of time constraints. So, I ended up doing it instead. I traveled half the time, I was gone half the time.

LaBerge: Did you think that Ron Brady had too much power?

Baker: Yes. Brady really, really had a lot of power. And Ron was not the most popular guy, and it didn’t bother him. He once told me, “Having friends is not on my agenda in life.”

LaBerge: Not in life, not just at work.

Baker: It just wasn’t something he much cared about. I’m way the other way, I care too much about it. I mean, I really do. Ask my wife, she’ll tell you. I care too much about it. I worry that they won’t love me. I really spend an awful lot of my time building friendships. You know, university friends, on behalf of the university. He and I were at opposite ends on that.

Political consequences didn’t matter to him, whether internal or external. That’s a bit of an overstatement. He thus made himself not very popular.

LaBerge: Both with staff and people outside the university?

Baker: Yes. And he became, over the last couple of years, he was the one guy really close to Gardner. A lot of people blame Brady, but I believe that David, working with Brady, directed Brady’s development of this complicated compensation package. It was done with Gardner’s, in accordance with his wishes. Ron didn’t sit around and invent it; he did figure out some brilliant ways to do what he did. Just brilliant.

But, as I think I told you last time, David’s compensation package was assembled in fifteen separate transactions over an eight-year period. It was never in one place. And when he had to get those vesting dates changed, he had to go to the board. A regent asked Brady, who was the only staff person in the room at the time--the transcript is available now, you could probably have it--”What’s this all add up to?” Nobody had known. And when the answer finally came out, the rest of it is history. It was the notion of such a large supplementary package, without the regents’ knowledge, that was really the issue.
It’s unfortunate, in my view, that that lingers still in so many people’s minds. You know, it still comes up today. It came up just the other day in the newspaper. I forget what it was. It said, “Chuck Young--.”

LaBerge: It said that Chuck Young is leaving, and what his compensation benefits will be.

Baker: Yes, it came up again. So here we are five years later, and it still comes up. Over time, it will be forgotten, but it’s just too bad.

LaBerge: What about one of Mr. Gardner’s comments that if he turned it down and said, “Well, no, I don’t want that,” it would have affected the chancellors, his vice presidents, your packages, too?

Baker: That’s not true. Because the package in controversy was a supplementary annuity. And only he, Brady, who did turn his down, he--

LaBerge: Brady turned his down? Oh, I didn’t realize that.

Baker: Because it would have just raised such a ruckus, in my opinion. It might have been, the regents might not have let him have it, and he would have had to sue to get it. So Brady had one, Gardner had two or three. Brady had one, Chuck Young had a couple, and Jack Peltason had one. Jack got his as a condition of taking the job as chancellor at Irvine, back about ‘85 or so. Chuck got his just because he made a squawk about it, I guess, I don’t really know. Gardner said he was being courted by other institutions, and it was done in an effort to retain him.

I wasn’t privy to this conversation, so I don’t really know how it came out, that he got them, one or two of them. And Gardner had two or three of them. They’re supplemental annuities, which really means that instead of getting a hundred thousand as my retirement, I’m going to get an extra twelve a year from this one, and an extra twelve from that one, or fourteen, whatever it was.

LaBerge: What about Mr. Brady’s sabbatical year?

Baker: Well, very close to David’s last day, I don’t remember, very close to it, he wrote a letter granting Brady that leave.

LaBerge: Were any of you privy to that?

Baker: It surfaced, I forget how it surfaced. And Jack sat on the knowledge for quite a while, as I recall, because he didn’t know what to do. And in the end, Brady just forfeited. He agreed to forfeit it. Because at that time, of course, the hullabaloo was--. No, he didn’t forfeit the leave; he took the leave. He forfeited the supplemental package.
LaBerge: But then there was the hullabaloo about Ron Cowan.

Baker: Oh, yes. Brady became very close to Ron Cowan. Exactly why, I don’t really know. Or how it came about, I don’t know, but they became very close friends. And Cowan had his development in Alameda, which he eventually went bankrupt in. He went bankrupt. He had to dump his $15 million house at a huge loss. He had built this place in Tiburon. He had helicopters bring him mature oak trees and plant them. He had a heliport and helicopter. He was really big time.

And Brady became really thick with him. Then Brady brought Gardner into it, close relationship. And tried to get us in a variety of ways to place UC activities at Harbor Bay. Whether it would be a research park, or the systemwide offices or later the site for UCSF [University of California at San Francisco]. I remember, I was naive, I didn’t realize that Gardner was so close to Cowan, when I said what I’m going to tell you. I forget the issue, but it was a Cowan issue. A Cowan-Brady-led issue.

I went to Gardner and I said, “I smell a rat on this one. This does not smell right. Ron Brady is mixed up with Cowan, and it doesn’t smell right. We ought to steer clear of it.” Not knowing that Gardner was part of that deal, whatever the deal was. And that was about the beginning of my time, when Gardner brought Brady in close, and started to exclude everybody else, generally speaking. Those were difficult times. And the intensity surrounding Brady’s influence over Gardner, and Gardner’s behavior, increased. Things were not comfortable around the Kaiser Center in those days. Probably about a year or so there with Cowan.

The University’s Image and How Money Is Spent

Baker: Part of my job is to protect the president and give him bad news and steer him clear of things he shouldn’t get into. The airplane was another issue. Brady cooked this up, but we had a damned airplane.

LaBerge: You mean the university had an airplane?

Baker: We leased an airplane.

LaBerge: Like Air Force One?

Baker: Yes, that’s what it was. With planes going to Los Angeles every thirty minutes you really can’t--if you lived in Iowa, and you had nine campuses around Iowa, maybe you could justify an airplane, because you otherwise have to drive. But going to Los Angeles. So, that was a tough issue. The irony is that when we hired a guy named
Ron Kolb, who was our news director, he’s up at Lawrence Lab [Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory] now in Berkeley, one of the interview questions that Ron got just before this airplane incident was, “Okay, Ron, here’s the situation. The president decides to get an airplane. How do you handle the press?” It was a tough interview question. Three months later, he decided to get an airplane. So, we had the first-class travel and airplanes.

LaBerge: For everybody?

Baker: Yes, well, he always did. And each of us had an administrative fund, which was not state money, it was an endowment fund. And within the rules, you could use that to pay the difference for the first-class airfare. I only did it one time. Because in the beginning, I didn’t realize that Gardner always uses first class. I was going to Washington with him, my first trip, within the first few months of his time. So, I arranged to sit next to him, and I didn’t realize--my folks made the arrangements and it was a first-class ticket.

It was then that I had to deal with his Mormon practice of abstinence from alcohol, and my desire to have a glass of wine. And in first class, they just keep filling your glass up, it’s pretty cool. I thought, “Man, I have got to deal with this. I’m sitting right next to him.” I decided I can’t change my behavior, that’s the way I am.

So, I thought of this gimmick, and it’s amazing. We’re on the plane, and I said, “David, you’re lucky to have me as your vice president.” He said, “Oh, how’s that?” I said, “Well, there’s something in life called the average drinker, and between us we just make it.” [laughter] He laughed, and laughed, and laughed, and laughed. And from that point forward, he made a joke out of it. So, I’d call him in Sacramento to report on the day’s legislative hearings, he’d say, “Well, what bar are you calling from today?” See, he’d make a joke out of it. From then on it was smooth sailing.

LaBerge: Well, after this one trip on first class, you never took first class again?

Baker: If I could get upgraded, I would, which would happen once in a while. But I didn’t ever buy a first-class ticket. But I did buy upgrades, I still do today out of my own pocket. Because it’s worth it to me. But you don’t make it very often. I mean, lately I haven’t made it for a while. You don’t make it very often. I just pay for them out of pocket. And I have ever since the policy was changed, when Jack came in, right away. He made nineteen separate actions to reduce the benefits and perks. All kinds of things he did. We really went through it and cut things out.

He didn’t cut anything out that we couldn’t live with, it just got--with Ron [Brady] and David leading the way, our perks just got bigger, and bigger, and bigger. And it really got to be sometimes embarrassing. The Kaiser Building is an example.

LaBerge: Okay, I was going to ask you about that.
Baker: And his office in Irvine, where he had original Renoir paintings or something. Which were borrowed from UCLA's collection, so he didn't buy them, but nonetheless, the image was--David liked to have an image more like a CEO of a big private company. So the airplanes, and the office down at Irvine, which he almost never used, and the Kaiser Center, and the furnishings in the Kaiser office were all part of that image, which many of us felt were inappropriate for public officials. We are all volunteers, we all decided that public service is what we wanted to do. Nobody says we’ve got to do it. And there’s a different set of rules in the private sector.

Those were difficult issues with David, because he didn’t want to hear my views. And Ron had the opposite view, “Let me get you a new benefit.” He was always trying to help David with that image that David liked to have. And I was trying to go another direction, because of public perceptions. And the rest of the vice presidents were fairly neutral. So, those were the real Brady-Baker conflicts, those kinds of things more than anything else.

And, of course, it was bad because Brady was trying to do what Gardner wanted, and I was trying to get Gardner not to do them. So, there was some natural tensions and conflicts there. I don’t think we ever had any showdowns or anything. It was always in the air. And I had to be very careful about what I said outside in the world, because I had to support the president. To justify the airplane to a group was not my easiest thing.

LaBerge: What would you say?

Baker: Oh, I talked about scheduling, and time value, it’s the same rationale. And it’s okay to do it, it’s just that for a public agency in California, it’s just inappropriate. Other states, they’d probably get away with it. I know that some candidates, some of the regents have told me this, some candidates for the presidency. There has been at least, there’s the Gardner-Peltason search, and the Peltason-Atkinson search. Candidates will ask, “How many airplanes do you have?” Not what kind. Or, “What size of aircraft do you have?”

It’s just California politics, you just don’t do that. The governor doesn’t have a plane. Pat Brown was the last governor to have a plane. Governors don’t have planes. Governors don’t have limousines. In this state, the governor does not have a limousine. You think the governor of New York doesn’t have a limousine? Of course he has a limousine. [laughter] They all have limousines. This governor in this state does not have a limousine, and he flies coach.

And David was going counter to that culture. It was quite troublesome too. Not that we didn’t enjoy the benefits, because we surely did. Heck, I certainly enjoyed it, but felt uneasy about it. I felt uneasy about it. We enjoyed it, no question about that. But those were tough issues, for me. Because I really was at odds with the president, which isn’t a good place to be.

LaBerge: Did you ever think of resigning?
Baker: No.

LaBerge: Why not?

Baker: Because I love my job. I survived eight presidents. I’m not going to resign because I had a tiff with one. Not a tiff really, but a different viewpoint.

LaBerge: Difference of opinion.

Baker: And right out on the surface, it wasn’t sneaking around. David knew I don’t like that kind of stuff. So, that’s the way it went. I never thought of resigning. And never thought I was about to get fired either. In a lot of ways, I hated to leave my job. My job kind of ended when Atkinson became president. He just has such a different style. The last year or couple of years, I just felt like an independent contractor doing my job.

The Council of Chancellors

LaBerge: In the few minutes we have left, could you talk a little bit about the Council of Chancellors?

Baker: Well, the Council of Chancellors, I thought, were always quite a useful forum. Just for no other reason than to get them all together with the vice presidents, just to get us together.

LaBerge: All the vice presidents sat in on it too?

Baker: Yes. It wasn’t a place to do business unless you had the business done in advance. It was a place to ratify business but not to do business. And I learned that. I did plenty of business there, but it was just to confirm what everybody had agreed to already. And I learned that if I were in trouble, I’d get some chancellor to be my champion, let it be the chancellor’s idea, and I learned to do that too. So, I kind of worked the chancellors like any other political body.

You never call for the vote until you’ve counted the votes, that’s political rule number one. Do not call for the vote until you’ve counted. A lot of people make that mistake. In even small things. Even if there’s four of us sitting around and decide we’re going to go to lunch. And I really want to go someplace, and I say, “Guys, let’s go here.” And all of a sudden, “We’re not going here.” Just something simple as that. You need to know first, you know, where would Germaine like to be. Maybe I’ll mention it to her in the morning. So I kind of line up my vote before I call for the question. It’s very important to do that. I have a reputation for being good at that, if I dare be so bold to say.
The chancellors were like almost any other social order, those who like to talk about anything a lot; those who like to bully, Chuck Young would prance around and stand up and try to make his point; those who would whine. Just like any other group. You take any nine people, put them around a table, and there will be a whiner, there will be a chatterer, and there will be a bully. That’s just human nature, so they weren’t any different than in human nature.

LaBerge: Did work get done?

Baker: Under David more than other times. David was great at that. He knew what he wanted. And he would eventually get it, just by tweaking here, and tweaking there, listening to this point, acknowledging the importance of that point. He played the chancellors like the regents, like Leonard Bernstein. The guy was brilliant at working a group like that into consensus.

Brilliant. And if he was in trouble, and things weren’t going his way, he’d find a way to postpone it or defer. Again, he wouldn’t call for the question, until he knew he had the votes. And if he had an idea that really blew up, he’d make a joke out of it. The guy was--I have just never known anyone who was so good at that. We used to marvel at how he did that. And he would like to Monday-morning-quarterback about how he did it.

But, yes, I thought that we did more work under Gardner, as the Council of Chancellors, than any other president. I didn’t go to all of them under Saxon. Only the last year or two. And I was a newcomer, and I sort of sat back and mostly watched. But David Saxon used to be quite confrontational with the chancellors. And there was lots of sharpness around the table, whereas David Gardner worked them into consensus.

Jack’s style was whatever the chancellors want they get, and he would back off on positions we thought he ought to take. He was weak in a sense, he couldn’t stand up to chancellors.

LaBerge: Do you think because he had been a chancellor?

Baker: Oh, yes. It was almost like he was embarrassed. It was almost like he was embarrassed to chair the meeting of his group.

LaBerge: Yes. I can see that, can’t you?

Baker: Oh, yes. It’s not a bad thing. It was almost like Jack was embarrassed to be president when he was with the chancellors. Embarrassed isn’t quite the right word, but certainly uneasy. He was certainly uneasy about being the chairman of the chancellors, if you will. Because that was his group. He was a very collegial guy, and that was his gang. The chancellors, the chancellors, the chancellors. And then all of a sudden he was their boss. I don’t think he cared for that part.
LaBerge: Richard Atkinson doesn’t mind being in charge of the chancellors?

Baker: I don’t see that in him, as I did in Jack. I think David loved being president of the university. I really think he liked it, I think he just loved it.

Death of Libby Gardner

Baker: He’d still be president, had his wife not died.

LaBerge: I’m glad you brought that up. Could you address that a little bit? Could you see that physically affecting him?

Baker: Oh, yes. I felt personally close to David. And he said to me one time, “You know, the part about this”--this being his wife’s passing--”that’s so troubling, is that I never in my life dreamed that she would go first.” That particular aspect of her death just troubled him so deeply, almost more than the fact that she died. It was the fact that she went first. He hadn’t planned on that.

LaBerge: I think most men don’t.

Baker: He hadn’t planned on that. It really, in a sense, as I say, it threw him for a loop. Threw him out of sync, it really did. He was practically--that was an overstatement--he was somewhat dysfunctional. He showed signs of dysfunctionality, not being able to focus and address issues. And I really believe that--today he would be sixty-four, I have no reason to believe he wouldn’t be president. It’s just been five years, he’s two years older than I am. I think he’d still be president.

Diversity

Baker: I don’t think it’s so much fun these days, being president. Why is that? One reason it isn’t so much fun being president is that the term limits changed it dramatically, you just simply never get relationships with people in the legislature. It just doesn’t ever happen. It takes you years, and years, and years to get that. That’s one part of it. I don’t know, I kind of think that this state has a certain ticking time bomb aspect to it as we look ahead to growth and ethnic diversity in the state.
As you know, I’m affiliated with the American Arbitration Association. And I have been among a small group of faculty who have been going around the country teaching arbitration, mostly to lawyers. It’s a new mandatory training that all arbitrators have to go to. It’s a kind of continuing education sort of a program, that the association has put into place. And so I’ve been teaching, mostly West Coast, but I’ve been to Houston a couple of times, and the rest has been the West Coast.

This is a group of mostly attorneys, three-fourths attorneys. In groups of fifteen to twenty, each class. And fairly senior people, experienced people. I dare say nobody is in their forties, and most of them are in their fifties and sixties, senior people. I’ve now done a dozen of these classes. And in a dozen classes of fifteen to twenty people there have been about five women, one black man, and two Hispanics, something like that. It’s basically all white males, except for Hawaii. I did a class in Hawaii and it’s much more diverse. And in this state, and in corporate America, our society is not ready for what’s coming.

What’s coming isn’t bad, it’s just different. And it’s all manifested in my statement that by the year 2020, 75 percent of the youngsters in kindergarten to twelfth grade will not be white. It’s a different society. I teach a segment on diversity in my classes.

LaBerge: Does everybody?

Baker: Everybody does it now, but I started it. Now it’s part of the standard materials. People don’t want to hear it. They just don’t want to hear it. We have evaluation forms that we get, which you really want to read but you don’t want to read. You want to, but you don’t want to. [laughter] But they’ve been pretty good. But on the segment on diversity, I got a lot of comments, “Irrelevant. This segment was irrelevant.”

Why should we do it? Because as an arbitrator, you want to be neutral, to be fair. And you want to set your biases aside. So just because someone has a southern accent, you shouldn’t let that influence you. Or someone has dark skin, or someone is inarticulate, there’s a language barrier, or an aggressive woman attorney. All these stereotypes. You’ve got to learn to set those aside, and stay neutral. And there’s even some psychological techniques you use to stay neutral. I teach that stuff. “Irrelevant,” many write. I can’t think of anything more relevant than planning for the future, being prepared. Interesting stuff.

LaBerge: Is that a good place to end? It’s twelve.

Baker: Yes, if you like.

LaBerge: And we’re going to hope for more.
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October 2003

INTERVIEWS ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Documenting the history of the University of California has been a responsibility of the Regional Oral History Office since the Office was established in 1954. Oral history memoirs with University-related persons are listed below. They have been underwritten by the UC Berkeley Foundation, the University of California Office of the President, the Chancellor's Office, University departments, or by extramural funding for special projects. The oral histories, both tapes and transcripts, are open to scholarly use in The Bancroft Library. Bound, indexed copies of the transcripts are available at cost.

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Struve, Gleb. (In process.) Professor of Slavic Languages and Literature.


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Volume II: Includes interviews with Maggie Baylis, Elizabeth Roberts Church, Robert Glasner, Grace Hall, Lawrence Halprin, Proctor Mellquist, Everitt Miller, Harry Sanders, Lou Schenone, Jack Stafford, Goodwin Steinberg, and Jack Wagstaff.

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The Prytaneans: An Oral History of the Prytanean Society and its Members. (Order from Prytanean Society.)


Transcripts of sixteen interviews conducted during July-August 1985 documenting events on the UC Berkeley campus in April-May 1985 and administration response to student activities protesting university policy on investments in South Africa. Interviews with: Ira Michael Heyman, chancellor; Watson Laetsch, vice chancellor; Roderic Park, vice chancellor; Ronald Wright, vice chancellor; Richard Hafner, public affairs officer; John Cummins and Michael R. Smith, chancellor's staff; Patrick Hayashi and B. Thomas
Travers, undergraduate affairs; Mary Jacobs, Hal Reynolds, and Michelle Woods, student affairs; Derry Bowles, William Foley, Joseph Johnson, and Ellen Stetson, campus police. (Bancroft Library use only.)


Includes interviews with Josephine Smith, Margaret Murdock, Agnes Robb, May Dornin, Josephine Miles, Gudveig Gordon-Britland, Elizabeth Scott, Marian Diamond, Mary Ann Johnson, Eleanor Van Horn, and Katherine Van Valer Williams.

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*Cal Band Oral History Project.* An ongoing series of interviews with Cal Band members and supporters of Cal spirit groups. (University Archives, Bancroft Library use only.)


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