


*Rudolf Eucken.*

RUDOLF EUCKEN'S  
PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

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LONDON

ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK

1906

## PREFACE

THE chapters in this book were originally delivered as inter-collegiate lectures at Westfield College, University of London, during the Michaelmas term, 1905.

They arose out of the deep respect I feel for the work and personality of Professor Eucken, and from a profound sense of the importance of his teaching for philosophy, for religion, and for everyday life.

In the publication of these lectures I have been most generously assisted by the Hibbert Trustees. My sincerest thanks are due to them, not only for the grant defraying the expenses of publication, but for their sympathetic recognition of the value of Professor Eucken's work, and of the need for making it better known to English readers.

I gratefully acknowledge the help given me by my wife in the typing of the manuscript and the reading of the proofs. I am also most indebted in this connection to Professor Eucken himself, who very kindly read through all the proof-sheets, and assisted me in many ways with the most unfailing cordiality and goodwill.

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
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# RUDOLF EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

## CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY—EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHICAL PUBLICATIONS—  
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LIMINARY APPRECIATION AND CRITICISM—EUCKEN'S  
PHILOSOPHY A RALLYING-POINT FOR IDEALISTIC EFFORT  
—THE SOLIDARITY OF IDEALISM.

RUDOLF EUCKEN was born at Aurich, in East Frisia, on January 5, 1846. Being a Frisian by birth, he belongs to a branch of the Teutonic family which is closely related to the English people.

Eucken passed a somewhat strenuous youth. His father and his only brother died whilst he was still quite young, but he enjoyed the devoted care of his mother, who gave herself up to his education. The daughter of a capable, liberal-minded clergyman, she was herself a woman of warm sympathies and marked intellectual power. Many of the son's gifts appear to have been inherited from his mother. In the face of many difficulties, she was still able to give him a free and happy boyhood. Eucken attended the school in his native town, and was greatly influenced by one of his school-teachers, the theologian and philosopher Wil-

helm Reuter (brother of the writer on Church history). Reuter was deeply religious in a strict Lutheran sense, and was a pupil of the philosopher Krause. Teeming as his mind habitually was with philosophical problems, he exercised over Eucken a preponderating influence, indisputably greater than that exercised over him by any other academic teacher. From boyhood upwards Eucken showed a strong interest in religious problems, more particularly, however, on their philosophical side, as he never showed any inclination to study theology in the more technical sense of the term. His first bias had been towards mathematics, but he soon took to philosophy, and grew more and more exclusively devoted to it. He became early acquainted with the speculative post-Kantian philosophy, but it was only as a University student that he studied Kant himself. During this period he was more influenced by the books he read than by the men he met. He studied at Göttingen (where he made the acquaintance of many English students), and subsequently at Berlin. Lotze, who was at that time the leading philosopher in Göttingen, failed to attract or to influence him. Eucken found him too frigid and too subtle, and was in no way fascinated by the characteristic acuteness of his mind. Lotze's colleague Teichmüller, on the other hand, was the first to introduce Eucken to the study of Aristotle. Eucken took his doctor's degree at Göttingen, not in philosophy, but in classical philology and ancient history.

In Berlin he came into close personal relations with Trendelenburg, who made a practice of getting into near sympathetic touch with his scholars; and Eucken, though he could not ally himself with Trendelenburg's



philosophical system as a whole, was distinctly attracted both by its pronouncedly ethical character and by its attempt to bring philosophy and history into closer relation to each other.

On leaving the University, Eucken spent some years as a college - teacher. In the autumn of 1871 he accepted a call to the University of Bâle as Professor of Philosophy, and in 1874 he accepted a similar call to Jena. From that date onwards Eucken has loyally identified himself with the Jena University, and it is during these later years at Jena that his own characteristic philosophy has taken by degrees a definite shape.

In the development of this philosophy Eucken has been but little influenced by contemporaries. Of the great thinkers of the past, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Goethe, Kant, and Hegel have more particularly influenced him.

His thought has detached itself more and more both from the interest in history as such and from all tendency to specialize in any particular department of philosophy. It aspires to represent a philosophy of life and of reality as a whole.

From this brief account of the main influences that have conditioned Eucken's development as a philosopher, we see that outside the privacy of the family circle particular importance must be attached to the personalities of Reuter and of Trendelenburg.

The guiding ideas of Reuter's philosophy appear to have been borrowed from his master, Krause, of whose views we have an interesting sketch in Eucken's own pamphlet on Krause ('Zur Erinnerung an K. Ch. F. Krause, Festrede, gehalten zu Eisenberg am 100 Geburtstag des Philosophen.' Leipzig, 1881).

Krause's philosophy was essentially a philosophy of life. It was a constant aim with him to vitalize his ideas by relating them to the conditions of our intuitive experience. In this way he brought knowledge into close relation with human culture. At the same time, Krause laid the utmost stress on the solidarity of humanity. Eucken points to Krause's method of relating the total content of the universe to the inward life of humanity as the most characteristic feature of his philosophy.

Again, Krause's views of the true significance of history were deep and original. 'Against the hurry and loud show of the daily round,' he writes, 'a philosophy of history should uphold the calm strength of the eternal. A spirit of rest would then settle upon the life of humanity and inwardly pervade it.' Nor would this imply spiritual stagnation. On the contrary, 'Every moment,' he writes, 'there is fresh birth and renewal of all things under the sun.'

Finally, the power which social solidarity and individual regeneration confer upon man is his only through his relation to God. Krause's philosophy is, in last resort, to use his own expression, a 'panentheism,' a doctrine of the subsistence of all things in God.

In the religious inspiration of this philosophy, its spiritual view of the significance of history, its insistence on social solidarity, its intimate relation to the deeper human life, we find much that foreshadows the essentials of Eucken's own system. We might therefore have supposed that it was through the medium of Krause's ideas that Reuter exercised his influence over Eucken. But Eucken's own testimony in the matter does not bear out this supposition. His words show

clearly that it was Reuter's *personality* that told, rather than his philosophy. 'The influence which Reuter exercised over me,' he writes, 'was but little due to the ideas he had gained from Krause's philosophy. Of far greater import was his profound and truly human conception of religion and Christianity, and the exceptional warmth of affection with which he met the individual aspirations of his pupils—of my own self in particular. His interpretation of the Christian faith was moulded on the strict Lutheran model, and for this formulation of belief I had from boyhood but little sympathy; but through the narrow limitations of his orthodoxy the fundamental truths of religion broke with such force of personal conviction that he left on every spiritually sensitive nature an ineffaceable impression.

'To this whole effect Reuter's philosophy no doubt contributed: the genuine training in philosophical thought which he had received, not only from Krause, but from Hegel himself, constantly gave to his religious convictions a philosophical turn.

'I cannot, indeed, trace to Reuter my first interest in religious problems. I had a lively interest in these questions before I ever came under his influence. But it was Reuter who first gave to this interest its true force and depth, and brought it into close relations with philosophy' (quoted, with Professor Eucken's permission, from a letter, December 26, 1905).

Trendelenburg's influence over his distinguished pupil, though it does not seem to have been so deep or so permanent as that exercised by Wilhelm Reuter, is, perhaps for that very reason, more easy to trace.

In one of the earlier volumes which Eucken wrote we find an interesting characterization of Trendelenburg's philosophy. It was a leading conviction with Trendelenburg that every thinker, in his own subject, should attach himself to the past. 'Philosophy,' he writes, 'will never flourish from a firm root till, like all the other sciences, it learns to grow continuously and progressively, treating its problems in the light of their historical development.' This respect for history, notably for the tradition of Aristotle, was associated in Trendelenburg's case with a most scrupulous conscientiousness and scholarly accuracy. He held that the right of passing judgment on any topic belonged to those only who had carefully studied the facts with which that topic was concerned. Hence in his work we find philosophy treated in closest relationship with history and philology. These various characteristics of Trendelenburg's method are equally typical of Eucken's earlier work. A scholarly, historical interest inspires all his preliminary writing, and it was as an Aristotelian scholar that he first came into notice and repute. Eucken's first published works dealt with different aspects of Aristotle's philosophy. In 1870 he published a pamphlet on the Method and Fundamentals of the Aristotelian Ethics, and another on Aristotle's use of language, and of prepositions in particular. His inaugural address at Bâle in 1871 dealt with the present-day significance of Aristotle's philosophy, and a year later, 1872, he published the most important of his Aristotelian studies, entitled 'Aristotle's Method in its Relation to the Fundamental Principles of the Aristotelian Philosophy.'

On being called to Jena in 1874, he gave his in-

augural address on the value of the history of philosophy, following this up, after an interval of four or five years, with a 'History of Philosophical Terminology' (1879), and with a series of essays on the pioneers of German philosophy—Nicholas of Cusa, Paracelsus, and Kepler. Eucken's aim in these historical essays is partly to show that Germany played a more influential rôle than is usually supposed in the transition from medievalism to modern times, but more particularly to seize the great German philosophical movement, genetically, in its first beginnings. About this same time (1878) Eucken published the first of the two important works in which his historical studies find their completest and most characteristic expression. It was called the 'Fundamental Concepts (*Begriffe*) of the Present Day.' It is a study at once historical and critical of all the leading philosophical concepts—monism, evolution, society, etc. It has gone through three editions. In the third edition, published in 1904, the title has been changed to 'Spiritual Movements (*Strömungen*) of the Present Day.' The change from 'concept' to 'movement' is significant. It illustrates what is the most fundamental characteristic of Eucken's constructive period—its distrust of the abstractly intellectual. The implications of the word 'concept' were too intellectualistic, and for this reason the word 'movement' was substituted for it.

In this third edition the work, which in its original form belonged naturally to the historical period, is brought entirely over into the service of Eucken's constructive philosophy. The solutions given to all the various difficulties which the discussion of the concepts suggests are found one and all to point in

the same direction, and to be inspired by the fundamental convictions of the new idealism.

The 'Spiritual Movements of the Present Day' forms, then, a first link of connection between the historical and the constructive periods. A second link is furnished by what is probably Eucken's most famous and most popular work, 'The Problem of Human Life as viewed by the Great Thinkers from Plato to the Present Time.' It is the form in which Eucken has written his History of Philosophy,\* but it is at the same time illustrative of Eucken's own constructive convictions. For in this book Eucken aims at enforcing, through a vital treatment of the varied ways in which philosophers have dealt with fundamental life-problems, that essential and intrinsic intimacy between philosophy and life which it is the primary aim of his constructive philosophy to interpret and enforce.

Eucken's constructive philosophy is embodied in three main works: (1) 'The Unity of the Spiritual Life,' including an introductory volume of prolegomena; (2) 'The Struggle for a Concrete Spiritual Experience'; and (3) 'The Truth of Religion.' In the first of these, 'The Unity of the Spiritual Life,' published in 1888, Eucken criticises naturalism and intellectualism, and finds in both the radical defect

\* It would be truer to say that Eucken's 'History of Philosophy' is in two companion volumes: (1) 'The Lebensanschauungen,' (2) 'The Geistige Strömungen,' the former concentrating itself round philosophical personalities, the latter round philosophical problems. I might add that nothing is more significant of the quite remarkable unity of Eucken's whole philosophical work than the way in which the historical and constructive parts of it interpret and support each other.

of being anti-personal. In contrast with these two one-sided views, he develops his own personality—philosophy, his own personal idealism. In the second of these, 'The Struggle for a Concrete Spiritual Experience,' published 1896, we have the most central and complete expression of Eucken's own philosophical position. In this volume Eucken professes to have securely laid the foundations of a system of philosophy that does justice to all that is valuable in other systems, and may rightly claim to stand as the philosophy of the future. The third of these volumes, 'The Truth of Religion,' states Eucken's religious convictions in philosophical form. It was published in 1901, and in 1905 a second revised edition was brought out. Preparations are now being made to translate it into English. I might add, in this connection, that a translation of 'The Problem of Human Life' is now being undertaken jointly by Professor Williston S. Hough and the present writer.

In addition to these three main constructive works, Eucken has written smaller ones, and has published many essays in different periodicals. The most important of these writings have been gathered together quite recently (1903) in a book entitled 'Collected Essays.'

Here the bibliography closes for the present. Professor Eucken is very far from being worn out. He is still astonishingly vigorous in life and thought. In the youthful pleasure he takes in all that is good in life, as in the enthusiasm he still shows in promoting to the best of his ability all that is worthy, he is a splendid exemplar of that vital connection between philosophy and life of which he is the convinced and

earnest advocate. There is no reason why Professor Eucken's *magnum opus* should not still be in store for us.

As regards my own attitude to Professor Eucken's work, I may confess at once that I am profoundly convinced of its vitality and fundamental soundness. Defects and limitations there undoubtedly are, directions, for instance, in which the philosophy needs to be more definitely worked out. Thus Eucken's anti-intellectualism, which so largely constitutes his strength and originality as a thinker, leads him on more than one occasion to underrate the power which a concept well understood can exercise over the life. His treatment of psychology is again inadequate. Having identified psychology with the abstract empirical science which studies the mind in the same atomic way in which Nature is studied by experimental physics, Eucken has persistently refused to treat his subject-matter psychologically, and his contempt for the help which an empirical psychology can give to a philosophy of spirit has hindered him from considering a philosophical psychology, or recognising its indispensable function in the complete interpretation of the spiritual life.

But, when all has been said in the spirit of fair criticism—and we shall see later on that in these and other matters Eucken is his own best critic—there remains the fundamental fact that through his sustained and heroic appeal to what is most spiritual in man, Eucken has ennobled the significance and the mission of philosophy. He aims at developing, not a new category, but a new culture, and holds that it is the privilege of philosophy, by penetrating to what is



most inward in human nature, to bring a religious inspiration to bear upon the problems of the world of human labour. Eucken's philosophy is a philosophy of life. It is a philosophy of reality as well. It treats of the sources of man's strength, and the meaning and purpose of his spiritual endeavour. And can there be anything more real than the activity of a life that has consciously realized the true sources of its power and the goal of its ultimate aspiration ?

Perhaps the most impressive feature of Eucken's philosophy is the broad-spirited way in which it admits a limitation and seeks to press beyond it. I have discussed the lacunæ already noticed with Professor Eucken himself. He readily admits their existence. He pointed out to me that nicety in the manipulation of concepts was a bias of happy exercise to which the German disposition was particularly prone, and that in guarding against this national proclivity towards hair-splitting it was possible to go too far in an opposite direction. He also remarked that German thought, having had to bear the brunt of Hegel's intellectualism, had suffered more in the way of reaction than that of any other country ; and he admitted that, in his opinion, Hegel had been studied and developed more fruitfully in England and America than in Germany itself.

In a later communication,\* which Professor Eucken most kindly permits me to quote, he makes on this very point the following explicit statement :

‘ You are perfectly right in supposing that my distrust of intellectualistic philosophies has prevented me from fully recognising the value of an intellectual and

\* December 26, 1905.

logical manipulation of ideas. The fact that the conflict with intellectualism plays so prominent a part in my treatment may be largely accounted for by the conditions which influence our thinking in Germany to-day. We are veritably deluged with intellectualism. A man will believe that he has won the good life when he has reached satisfactory ideas upon the subject. Even the opponents of intellectualism relapse into the old prejudice when they claim to have vanquished intellectualism by the help of some fresh batch of ideas. My repudiation of these intellectualistic sophistries has, it is true, led me too far in the direction of irrationalism. But this acknowledgment on my part should not be misconstrued into a defence of voluntarism. Voluntarism I have always kept at arm's length, and insisted that it could do no more than replace one form of one-sidedness by another. Nor have I ever sought to establish religion on the mere impulse of feeling or conscience, but have always claimed for it the security of a speculative basis.'

With regard to the objection based on the inadequate attention given in his system to psychology, Professor Eucken has shown himself equally sincere and sympathetic. Referring to the criticisms passed in this present volume on his own handling of psychology, he frankly admits the inadequate development given in his works to the psychological aspect of experience.

'Here again it is my conflict with a one-sided error which is responsible for my having lapsed into one-sidedness myself. Psychological metaphysics (*der Psychologismus*) is a most influential force amongst us at the present time, and there is a widespread belief

that from our own states of consciousness as immediately experienced we can extract a trustworthy philosophical system. In opposition to these views, my one preoccupation has been to emphasize the independence of the spiritual life. But you are perfectly justified in claiming that this spiritual life must find its psychological expression, and that this requirement suggests some very interesting problems.

‘In my own case there is a tendency to use the term “psychology” ambiguously—now in that sense which includes all subjective happening (Erleben) *qua* immediate, now in the more specific sense of a mere associationistic psychology, with its reconstruction of total experiences out of mere isolated processes of mind. The ambiguity is important, and must in future be steadfastly avoided. It would indeed be an interesting problem to show how a well-established noölogical method can help us in framing a psychology of a noëtical kind.’\*

This breadth of sympathy on Eucken’s part is not only characteristic of the whole personality of the man, whose first instinct is always to see the positive good in every philosophy and every belief; it is born largely of the confidence he feels in the intrinsic comprehensiveness and elasticity of his own philosophy. I believe that that confidence is fully justified. The philosophy in this respect, as in most others, is like the man. It reaches so deep, is so alive to all the best thought of the past, whether in philosophy or in general literature, and is inspired by such a tolerant spirit, that it shows more inclusive power than any other philosophy I am acquainted with.

\* December 26, 1905.

It is precisely this comprehensive vitality of the new idealism that would justify its serving as a focus or rallying-point for the varied idealistic effort of the present day. This suggestion takes for granted that the solidarity of idealism is a desirable thing. I sincerely believe that it is. The maxim that union is strength is surely as applicable to philosophy as it is to strategy or to commerce. The old charge against philosophy that there are as many philosophies as there are philosophers, whereas there is only one science and one scientific attitude and spirit, is more than mere ignorant malice. It points to a real defect in the state of philosophy. It is frequently maintained that philosophy, unlike science, must reflect the personality of the philosopher, and as philosophic personalities have no less individuality than other human types, the history of philosophy will continue to be a record of systems as varied as the philosophic natures in which they have respectively taken root. The argument does not appear to be convincing. It is true that freedom is of the essence of philosophic development, but freedom, far from being a principle of disintegration, is at root a more potent principle of unity by far than the necessity which is the inspiration of science. For it is the essential condition of free service that those who serve should be in intimate and immediate relation with the object to whose service they are devoted, and so derive their inspiration from a common source. Oneness of central conviction, implying in its turn a fundamental unity in aim and endeavour, is a very great desideratum of idealism to-day.

The attempt to consolidate philosophical effort has

frequently been made in the history of philosophy. It has been made wherever a school has been formed. In particular, we have the great consolidation of philosophical opinion in medieval days, from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, round the authority of Aristotle. But this very example serves to bring out the essential difference between consolidation under authority and solidarity through freedom. For Aristotelianism, as we know, became a tyranny. Philosophy came to be synonymous with the interpretation and application of Aristotle's writings. The truth, it was held, had already been discovered in all its main outlines, and required simply to be understood and its implications brought out. Hence we find the free city of Geneva laying it down that no philosophy save that of Aristotle could be tolerated within its walls.

In a free solidarity, on the other hand, there is no name to conjure with except the name of 'Reason,' and so long as a philosophy does not commend itself to different shades of conviction as fundamentally true, there is no free solidarity possible. I shall be glad if the following pages show that the new idealism does pre-eminently answer to the requirements of a central *point de repère*, where idealists of all schools can meet each other reasonably, and win the strength that comes from intercommunion at a common fountain-head.

The two main sources for the study of Eucken's own constructive views are 'The Unity of the Spiritual Life' and 'The Struggle for a Concrete Spiritual Experience.' The earlier of these two works is very clearly arranged. Naturalism and intellectualism, not

as mere theories, but as living forces of the present day, are developed and criticised in turn, and their essential limitations are shown to be transcended by a personalism which vindicates the independence and absolute value of the spiritual life without doing injustice to what is of intrinsic worth in the two one-sided systems that are thus superseded.

In the later volume we have a profound and vital treatment of the relation of philosophy to life. The main opposition here is that between a life of sense and spiritual mediocrity on the one hand, and the life of heroic spiritual activity on the other. The necessity for a radical break with the former life and a victorious return upon it in the power of the spirit is reasoned out. In the course of the investigation the essential characteristics of Eucken's system are clearly set forth.

Eucken's work as a whole may be briefly described as a philosophical crusade against every form of spiritual lethargy and indifference. The need, he tells us, is great, and the venture to satisfy it must be boldly and thoroughly conceived. There must be a definite break with all that binds us to the conventional, unprincipled life that has grown easy to us, and we must not return to the old ways save as citizens of a new spiritual world.

If we have once clearly grasped the significance of this break with sense and mediocrity, and the nature of the spiritual reconquest of sense-existence—of the new spiritual culture that is to arise over the ashes of the old—we may consider ourselves as initiated into the fundamentals of Eucken's philosophy. In its bare outlines there is nothing particularly original in this presentation of a philosophy of freedom. It is the

familiar three-stage scheme over again : (1) the stage of Nature, the life under the authority of sense, expediency, and public opinion ; (2) the negative stage, the break with this conventional régime and the deepening of the individual life till it comes into immediate touch with the life of the absolute Spirit ; (3) the third and reconstructive stage, the stage of true spiritual liberty, in which, as persons, we assist in the spiritual transfiguration of the universe. Thus, in outline at least, more especially in the importance which it attaches to the *negative* moment, Eucken's philosophy is not unlike Hegel's ; and it also emphasizes the fundamental conviction of the religious consciousness that the spiritual life is possible only through renunciation and rebirth. This contact with Hegel and with religious belief implies at the same time, through its ethical break with sense, a rupture with Aristotle and with the whole plastic, æsthetic philosophy of Greece.

But once we get beyond the bare outline, Eucken's originality asserts itself. It shows itself particularly in its vindication of man's freedom as a spiritual being. There is indeed no more satisfying defence of freedom than that involved in the whole development of Eucken's philosophy. This originality asserts itself again most emphatically in Eucken's vitalistic re-handling of all the main philosophical problems, in the transference of the centre of philosophical interest from the conflict of theories to the conflict of culture-systems and life-philosophies. It is as a philosophy of life and freedom that we must look to Eucken's work for inspiration.

Passing on to this more inward view of the new

idealism, and surveying it broadly, our first care must be to anticipate an important misconception to which insistence on a negative movement always exposes a philosopher. The revolt against the world is liable to be construed into a fanatical impatience with the slow grinding of God's wheels, and a resolution to break with the continuity of the world's historical development. This break with the past is interpreted as heralding a new era of life and thought of such radiant promise that it shrivels the old out of all remembrance. This injustice to the present dispensation and to things as they are is naturally resented. The present, it is contended, must grow out of the past, for the simple reason that the past has grown into the present, and holds to it inwardly and vitally with a myriad inseparable tendrils. A break with the past, we are told, is the trumpet-call of revolution, whereas what the world needs is not revolution, but reform.

The contention is sound in the main, and to interpret the negative movement either as an ascetic renunciation of the world, or as a fanatical antagonism to the actual because it is not ideal, is simply to misinterpret it. We cannot redeem the world by deserting it. In the words of a recent writer,\* 'the effective reformer must find his fulcrum for raising society in things as they are. He must live within the world if he is to make it better, and arm himself with its powers in order to conquer it.' And this is true whether the principle of social regeneration express itself as revolution or as mere betterment or reform. A spiritual deluge is occasionally necessary. States and societies, like theories, may outgrow the

\* Professor Henry Jones, *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1905.



restrictions of their earliest principles and require drastic reconstruction. For 1,200 years astronomers tinkered with the Ptolemaic theory which represented the earth as the centre of the universe, and it was a genuine revolution when the heavens were reinterpreted first in the light of the Copernican theory, and then again in the light of the law of gravitation.

The negative movement, as Eucken understands it, implies no distrust of the good that is in the world, no ascetic aloofness from the world's progress. It implies rather a renunciation of any and every mode of social and personal life that hinders us from assisting in the betterment of what is spiritually genuine in the construction of society. It implies that we have given up the idea of abetting, by our passive acquiescence, a form of life which we inwardly feel to be vain and hollow. It implies the simple truth that if we wish to regenerate the world and the flesh, we must first renounce the devil.

But there is a further implication of the negative movement which is of central importance in Eucken's philosophy. It is the vindication of our *personality*. It implies a break with every attempt, theoretical or practical, to interpret personal life either as a mere prolongation of the natural life which has its roots in sense-experience, or as a mere incident in the life of God. It asserts the freedom of the personal agent, and proclaims that the relation of man both to Nature and to God can be understood only in the light of man's free agency. The self must assert itself as a subject as against all objects, actual or conceivable, and so justify its right, not only to understand Nature, but to control its operation in the interests of its own

spiritual life. Friendship, again, and the intimate intercommunion with other persons presupposes our personal integrity and free right to be ourselves even in self-sacrifice and service. The very acknowledgment of God's spiritual omnipresence, and power to penetrate our personal life with consoling and redeeming effect, postulates a form of interpenetration of the human and Divine which expresses, not the extinction of the human, but the reconciliation of our moral freedom with our religious dependence upon God.

A negative movement from a self-centred, self-enslaved individuality to a God-centred personality, a movement from the sense-world to the self, and through the self inwardly to God, is at once the assertion and the salvation of our true selfhood. It is a defence of our personality against all naturalizing and impersonalizing tendencies, and, as such, it is the indispensable preliminary to our faith in the efficacy of our freedom. The defence of personality is the defence of freedom, and it is in the defence of personality, as we have said, that lies the true significance of the negative movement. The positive movement consists in the redemption of the world into sympathy and harmony with those spiritual ideals—ideals of art, morality, and religion—apart from whose sustaining power our personality would shrink to a mere pendant of the mechanism of Nature. This redemptive process is grounded in the intimate harmony between our human freedom and the saving initiative and intention of God. In this fundamental conviction we have the union of morality and religion, the claim of a religious basis for ethics, and the establish-

ment of Eucken's philosophy as an ethico-religious philosophy of life.

These are Eucken's central convictions, and we shall attempt to develop them in the lectures that follow. Our first step will be to consider Eucken's philosophical interpretation of the meaning of history. —

## CHAPTER II

EUCKEN'S VIEWS ON THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO HISTORY, PARTICULARLY TO THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, ILLUSTRATED BY HIS OWN HANDLING OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTINE—EUCKEN'S METHOD: REDUCTIVE AND NOOLOGICAL.

IN the preceding chapter we noted two well-marked stages in Eucken's philosophical career. These we respectively designated as 'historical' and 'constructive.' It must not, however, be supposed that the two stages are in any way disconnected. On the contrary, there is a profound and inward intimacy between them, the nature of which we propose to consider in the present chapter.

In the importance which Eucken attaches to the history of philosophy he follows the tradition with which the great names of Aristotle and of Hegel are so closely connected. It was a principle of Aristotle not to write on any subject without first inquiring what his predecessors had had to say on the same matter, with the result that the whole reflective work of the Greek mind from the days of Thales on to Aristotle's own time finds in his philosophy its most developed and most systematized expression.

Whether we are to see in Eucken's work the ripe out-

come of the great speculative movement that originated in the critical philosophy of Kant is a question for the future to decide ; but the most cursory view of his writings shows quite clearly that his philosophy has grown up under the salutary influence of the Aristotelian principle to which we have just referred. It is as impossible to understand Eucken's philosophy without appreciating his profound respect for history as it is to understand the true nature of this reverence for the past apart from the fundamental principles of his philosophy.

When Eucken received the call to Jena some thirty years ago (1874), he devoted his inaugural address to a discussion of the value of a historical study of philosophy.

A deep reverence for a spiritual life that immeasurably transcends the conscious experience of any individual or society of individuals is, in Eucken's view, the first essential to a profitable study of the history of philosophy. There are some who make their own petty individual standard the measure of what is significant in history, and to these that study can bring no further advantage than the strengthening of their original one-sidedness. But when a cosmic interest that transcends all partialities of time, place, and opinion possesses the student of history, his efforts to appropriate the past are the struggle through which he reaches down to the central depths of his own soul. This reverential interest is essentially that wonder which ancient thought held to be the inspiration of science. The magic of wonder consists in this, that it transforms facts into problems, and in the place of an old answer which, through long familiarity, has

ceased to move us, leaves the mystery and quickening power of a new question. To relive the experience of the great thinkers who have devoted their lives to the answering of the questions in which this world-wonder took form for them, is to shake off the lethargy of habit and open our eyes to the marvels of our own deeper life. And with the enlightenment that we thus receive there comes also a quietness and steadiness into the heat of our defence of what is good and true. For fanaticism weakens in proportion as the barriers that keep up our individualism are broken down. The vision trained in historical reflection to realize its own unfinished imperfection will be quick to suspect that combatants who press their differences upon each other are at bottom battling for one and the same truth.

We have spoken of the assimilation of the past as a 'living into' the experience of our predecessors. But what is implied in this 'inliving' process? It is certainly no mere passive assimilation. Nothing that is truly great is transmitted like an heirloom from generation to generation. It must be reappropriated in the form in which it answers our questions and fulfils our wonder.

Again, the appropriation of the past must be the expression of our personal freedom. Eucken lays great stress on this point, both in the inaugural address and in other parts of his work. He has pointed out in eloquent language how the past may tyrannize over the present. Forgetful that the past has its true life only as the perennial inspiration of our present experience, we allow it to unroll itself like a fate over which we claim no personal control. The long labour of man — appeals to us, not as makers of history, but as dis-

interested spectators. The inward reconstructive insight fails us. We find ourselves worshipping, not the hero, but his mausoleum ; or, if we worship the hero, we worship blindly, instead of making his own life the effective inspiration of our own. We believe *in* our heroes instead of believing *with* them, and our reverence becomes the very means whereby we separate ourselves from that inward companionship which can alone bring us into contact with the true greatness of what we worship.

We must hold our own, we read, against the greatest thinkers. Only between free souls can there be true friendship. The sacrifice of independence is not worship, but idolatry. Hence, there can be no such thing as a simple restoration of the past. Certain ages and peoples, wearied of the perplexities into which a slavish conception of history threw them when they attempted to learn its lesson and apply it to their own case, have endeavoured to fall back upon the simpler traditions of some more classic age. But note the inevitable result. The form of the tradition is reinstated, but in the place of the creative energy which originally informed it we have the feeble inspiration that felt itself too weak to wrestle directly and relevantly with the problems of its own time. On the other hand, the attempt to demonstrate one's independence by a complete break with historical antecedents and tendencies, and to fall back upon Nature and the isolated present for inspiration, is not only a policy of starvation. It *is* that. It is also the characteristic expression of a certain people at a certain stage of their historic development, and so enters into the very historic movement it seeks to stop or to divert. The Nature-philosophy

sophers of the eighteenth century believed themselves to be freed from all historical connections, but all their thought and striving is stamped with the mark of the eighteenth century. To get away from history man must first get away from himself.

We can keep our historic independence only by taking a truer view of history. We must overcome the mechanical coercion of the mere time-order of events by spiritually grasping the fleeting past within a timeless present. We must reevaluate mere successions of past events as present *experiences* that have an inward and abiding significance for life. The past must become our present, the event an experience, and the 'present experience' must be that of our timeless spiritual nature. History thus becomes an inward possession, a vast and vital enrichment of our present experience. We are familiar with the reminder that, as citizens of an empire, we should learn to think imperially. In a similar sense, as members of society, we should learn to realize events in their social significance. So, again, as the inheritors of a great world-history, we should rouse ourselves to appropriate this inheritance in that deep-sighted, spiritual way which sees where the greatness lies, and what it is that must never be forgotten.

Two great conceptions thus stand out as indispensable guides to the true interpretation of history—the conception of an *eternal spiritual present*, in which the past relives with a new spiritual meaning and value in the consciousness that has made it its own; and the conception of a *free appropriative activity*, that sustains this immortalized past, and is perpetually going back upon the prosaic record of events, and drawing new



strength from it in the light of new ideas. Thus, the past enters, refined and spiritualized, as an integral factor, into the spiritual activity upon whose work the fate of the future depends. History so conceived is not a burden upon the present, but a power within it; not a mere given fact that must be just accepted and cannot be in any way modified, but a problem calling perpetually for fresh interpretation and fresh appropriation. From this point of view, it is only a shallow insight into the past which pronounces that it cannot be undone.\* The effective appropriation of the past, its transformation into realized experience, is a perpetual undoing of the past. It is this living adoption of the past into the spiritual present as an inspiration or as a warning, that first enables us to

\* The classical expression of this view that the past is always present and remediable is Maeterlinck's essay on 'The Past' in 'The Buried Temple.' This essay was written in 1901. But the same thought is present in Philip Wicksteed's essay on 'The Religion of Time and of Eternity' ('Studies in Theology,' by J. Estlin Carpenter and P. H. Wicksteed), delivered originally as an Essex Hall Lecture in 1899. 'Though we know not what is coming, we know what has come, and our deepest and richest experiences gather into themselves the past, and at the same time transform it. So that even that seeming irrevocability which we think of as the great characteristic of the past turns out to be an illusion. The past is not, in any effective sense, irrevocable. We may yet make it, in large measure, what we will. For detached experiences are in themselves mere unintelligible fragments. It is when they are taken as parts of a whole that they have their meaning. And what is the whole of which our past is a part? Is that irrevocably fixed beyond our control? Nay, our past as well as our future shall be what we shall make it. It is a fragment that awaits its interpretation—nay, awaits its full being, its true creation, from the whole' (*ibid.*, p. 24).

realize philosophically the possibility of its forgiveness and redemption.

In direct opposition to this idea we have the Buddhist doctrine of Karma, which remorselessly rivets the present to the past in a sense which leaves no room for that undoing of the past which in Western thought goes by the names of grace, forgiveness, salvation, redemption. It would be impossible at this point to enter into the philosophical significance of this conflict between the two Oriental doctrines of religious justice and religious love, as represented respectively in the Buddhist doctrine of Karma and the Christian doctrine of grace. Nor has Eucken explicitly developed the distinction from this point of view, though it is centrally implied in his philosophy, for a freedom philosophy cannot be other than a philosophy of grace. Even our coolest intellectual thought is constantly reverting upon its previous errors with a saving insight that transfigures the old error into a power that henceforth works in the name of truth. I would like, however, to add, in defence of Eucken's philosophical interpretation of the meaning of history, that the refusal, characteristic of an important school of Protestant thought to-day, to accept any philosophical meddling with historical fact, seems to me to leave the doctrine of grace a miracle, and a doctrine of iron justice the only reasonable alternative. For I cannot convince myself that the past can be redeemed and the failures of our life transfigured into blessings, unless present insight can in some effective sense penetrate and reinspire the past.

For the application to the interpretation of history of these two fundamental conceptions—that of an

eternal spiritual present on the one hand, and that of a free appropriative activity on the other—we must turn to Eucken himself, to the ‘*Lebensanschauungen der Grossen Denker.*’ In the introduction to this important book we find the point of view brought out which determines how these conceptions are to be applied.

The main emphasis is laid upon the intimacy of the relation between philosophy and life. The free spiritual activity through which we bring history down into our own deeper consciousness finds its natural satisfaction, not in mere theories as such, but in convictions which illuminate the meaning of life. These life-convictions, however, can further our own spiritual striving only when we understand the term ‘life-philosophy’ (*Lebensanschauung*) in a deeper sense than we are usually accustomed to put upon it. The term cannot imply for us a carefully-chosen set of utterances concerning the life and fate of man, nor yet a selection of occasional reflections and confessions. For such spring frequently from the mere mood of the moment, and do not necessarily point to any steadfast struggle for a true spiritual experience. Indeed, shallow natures not infrequently show a leaning to confessions of an edifying kind. Hence, what must concern us is not the reflections about life which thinkers have made, but the way in which life itself has taken shape in their reflection. With this direction of the philosophical interest, the history of philosophy shows a more inward unity and a more vital present-day significance. So long as the interest is set on the mere theories as products of an abstract intellectual movement, the differences of the various philosophers appear

hopelessly antagonistic ; but when our interest is sunk deep into the life-philosophy itself, we find that many convictions which, when concentrated into sharp conceptual form, seemed irreconcilable with each other, are at bottom co-operative attempts to make life's meaning clearer and richer.

When we penetrate to the creative energies that have moulded the convictions of the great thinkers, we see that they are inwardly urged by the same questions as those on which depend our own weal and woe. Hence, a living community of interest which not only brings us into sympathetic and fruitful touch with these old philosophies, but reveals the philosophers themselves as co-workers in one and the same great task—that, namely, of reclaiming for this present existence the reason and the soul which are its spiritual birthright.

We should note, finally, that in the immediate contact which is thus established between the reader and the thinker whom he studies, Eucken sees more than a mere subjective warmth and satisfaction. For it is the main function of the creative life that thus streams into ours to free us from the narrowness of the moment, and acclimatize us to a present that has the steadfastness and organized variety of a world. Against the rush of daily life and work, the narrowing influences of party strife, the vagueness and uncertainty of our moral valuations, we have, says Eucken, dire need of such a stable, spiritual present.

In illustration of Eucken's historical method, we may instance his account of the life-view of Augustine. Of the actual or outward life of this great Christian philosopher nothing is told us ; nor, on the other hand,

are we offered a psychological analysis of the movements of Augustine's mind. Neither the chronicling of events nor the analysis of states of consciousness is what Eucken has in view when he proposes to consider the life of a philosopher. His aim is rather to lay hold of the fundamental ideas that have sustained the thought and the feeling of the thinker, and to trace the way in which they have worked themselves out, systematically developed themselves, and entered as living forces into the culture of the thinker's own age and of the ages that followed it.

The *method* that is here adopted is distinctive of Eucken's procedure throughout. On its analytic side, he refers to it as *reductive* ; on its synthetic side, as *noological*.

These expressions are first met with in the volume entitled 'Prolegomena to the Unity of the Spiritual Life.' Reduction, we find, is essentially a method which, instead of passing direct from part to part of a total object, as a progressive or inductive procedure would do, considers the part directly in relation to an inward whole. Its aim is to bring all questions back to their inward roots, to inward unity. This movement inwards and wholewards is the distinctive feature in Eucken's analytic and critical work. To his distinctively *constructive* method Eucken gives the name 'noological.' He draws a contrast between two equally one-sided methods of philosophical construction : the cosmological, which treats of the world out of relation to the individual consciousness ; and the psychological, which treats of the individual out of relation to a world. Reference is then made to a third method, which envelops both these abstract methods, and in

the conception of *spirit* or spiritual life overcomes the opposition of the world and the individual soul. It is this method which Eucken, in his 'Prolegomena,' proposes to call the *noological* method. The choice of the term, emphasizing as it does the distinction between *νοῦς* and *ψυχή*, appears to indicate that it is the one-sided *psychological* point of view with which the noological is more especially contrasted.

In his discussion of the life-convictions of the great philosophers, Eucken uses both methods—the reductive and the noological. His first care is to reach inwards, reductively, to principles of living significance, to the spiritual experience of the thinkers he is studying. From this central point of vantage he follows up the inner dialectic of these concrete and inward principles, and the procedure becomes more or less completely noological. The principles are left to criticise themselves through their own systematic development, the noological method essentially implying this principle of immanent criticism.

In discussing Augustine, Eucken notes at the outset the extraordinary oppositions of thought and feeling which characterize his writings. The reductive development of these oppositions reveals a profoundly deep and genuine nature, which is in intimate contact at all points with the passions and yearnings of men's hearts, everywhere at touch with reality, though still at discord with itself. Fired by a passionate desire for personal happiness, with philosophic instincts making for freedom, width and selflessness of vision, yet haunted at the same time by the depression of the sinking epoch in which he lived, Augustine follows out each tendency of his manifold nature with pas-

sionate earnestness, and develops a multiple personality which it is as impossible as it is undesirable to compress into a unity. Further, the development of the main tendencies of Augustine's nature, the philosophico-religious, the specifically Christian, and the specifically ecclesiastic, takes us far beyond the age of Augustine himself. Right through the heart and full extent of the Middle Ages we can trace the growth of the convictions that first took shape in the life and work of this great personality. We are led to see, in the light of the life-standard which Eucken holds up, that greatness of personality is less a matter of consistent organization than of many-sided living contact with reality. The man whose convictions, taken as a whole, are shot through with contradictions, is summed up by Eucken as one of the few personalities from whom all times and all persons in their struggle with the great permanent problems of human life may gain strength and inspiration.

Of these great problems no one is more central than that of the relation of man to God. Let us, then, consider Augustine's handling of this problem as discussed by Eucken himself.

A deep dissatisfaction with the existing conditions of human life is fundamental with Augustine. Hence he can explain the universal striving apparent everywhere in Nature, as in man, to persevere in life at all costs, only by the presence of a reality that has deeper satisfaction to offer than this world can bestow. He accepts it as axiomatically evident that it is in God's own life alone that such aspirations can be solaced and justified. So surely as we are more than merely natural, we are grounded in God's being and enriched by His life.

The treatment of the relation between man and God which flows from this religious conviction of Augustine's is partly mystical, partly ethical. The ethical development is the more characteristically and strongly worked out. It is at once vexed and stimulated by a deep-lying opposition : the vital intimacy between the human and Divine life on the one hand, and on the other a sense of the immeasurable distance between them. Augustine's solution is the distinctively Christian one—that the distance is accounted for by man's sin, and the intimacy by God's free act of forgiveness. But Augustine does not stop at this solution. He develops it into what he holds to be its inevitable consequences. The emphasis laid on the indispensableness and the absoluteness of God's grace serves to diminish to its lowest capacity man's freedom and worth as man ; and as the grandeur of God is conceived to be increased by the humbleness of man, it becomes an act of Christian piety with Augustine to set human nature in its worst possible light. In particular, all self-confidence or self-assertion on man's part is sin. No being has any value in itself except God's. Hence, to conceive any human end as an end in itself is to conceive a falsehood. Again, the love of parent or child or friend or fatherland for its own sake is no true love. We must love them for God's sake only.

The strength of such a view is obvious. It is strong in the emphasis it lays on the intimacy of man's inmost soul with the life of God. But it is a view in which the meaning of the 'apartness' between the human and the Divine has been inadequately grasped. If it is really true that in loving mother or father or friend it



is not the human creature that we are to love, but only God Himself, the doubt at once suggests itself whether it would not be more economical to seek God directly through meditation, prayer, and ecstasy than to seek Him thus lamely and indirectly through His creatures.

Moreover, the grace through which the apartness between man and God is cancelled is so conceived as to deprive man of all claim to free action. Augustine makes this quite clear in his treatment of the problem of evil. He starts from the conviction that, as the work of the Perfect Spirit, the world must be good, and argues that if it were not so good that there should be evil in the world, the Almighty Source of all good would never have tolerated it. Augustine has therefore to prove that the world would be less perfect than it is were there no evil in it. To this end he accepts, in the first place, the distinctively Neoplatonic contention that evil has no independent nature, but simply denotes a privation of good. Evil deprives what is injured by it of some good, for where there is nothing good to harm, no harm can be done. It is only the man who sees that can be blinded. The very presence of moral evil is therefore proof that the nature which experiences the evil is itself striving after the good. For were it not striving after good, it could not be deprived of good, and therefore could not have incurred evil or committed it.

But, it may be argued, though it be true that evil always witnesses to the presence of good, it is still a *privation* of good, so that the world would be more perfect without it. This objection Augustine meets by what may be called the argument from æsthetics. If the right point of view is taken, if the universe is

considered in its unity and solidarity, the evil which one part suffers will be seen to be the good of another, and, like the well-placed discord in a piece of music, add an additional richness to the beauty and harmony of the whole. Seen piecemeal, as we see the world, the unmatched evil cannot be construed into a good ; but seen as God sees it, the evil in the world increases its perfection.

Evil having been shown to be good from the point of view of the Creator, it remained for Augustine to adjust his solution to his Christian conviction concerning the justice and the love of God. He does this by showing that the evil in the world ceases to be irrational when viewed as an indispensable means for bringing out God's moral perfection—His justice as a Judge, His love as a Redeemer. Augustine's precise method of procedure at this point is dictated by his speculative views concerning the Divine grace and its relation to human sin. We have seen that Augustine gave no credit whatever to human nature, and saw in the Divine forgiveness a gift that no mortal could claim as his due. The grace of God was a perfectly free expression of Divine favour that had no root in men's own doings. Redemption is entirely a matter of God's mercy. The contrast here is not between human works and human faith, but between human works and Divine grace. The way is therefore left open to the disastrous solution that the moral perfection of God—the balance between justice and love—is satisfied by placing all men as original sinners into two groups, and assigning to one group the *just* penalty of perdition and to the other a redemption through love. And from the point of view of the

Divine perfection, the picture as a whole is accepted as beautiful. God's ways to man are justified by the consideration that the Fall and its consequences were the means for bringing into harmonious play the justice and the love of God. That this doctrine of predestination should involve the loss of man's freedom, and leave to the individual only the torment of uncertainty as to whether he shall be saved or lost, is in this connection viewed complacently by Augustine, though when he comes to develop his views ecclesiastically and practically, it is only fair to add that he finds a place for the very freedom which he has thus speculatively abolished.

It will be seen from this typical discussion of Augustine's position that in his treatment of the history of philosophy Eucken does not steer clear of those problems which lie nearest to man's eternal interests, for the reason that they are theological. The barrier of a mutual aloofness between philosophy and theology breaks down altogether when philosophy passes out of its agelong intellectualism and becomes, as with Eucken, a philosophy of life.

## CHAPTER III

EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (*continued*)—THE PAMPHLET ON SCHILLER—THE MEANING OF A HISTORICAL FACT—EUCKEN'S THEORY OF THE SYNTAGMA—THE SYNTAGMA OF NATURALISM.

THE spirit in which Eucken approaches the study of a great thinker is well illustrated by an article which he quite recently wrote on the occasion of the Schiller centenary. The article is entitled 'How can Schiller help us to-day?' It gives no details of Schiller's life or work, and yet it is fundamental, vital, personal.

Speaking to his compatriots in the first instance, he reminds them that in Schiller's day the political and national relations of German life were uncertain, but that, on the other hand, there was a fresh and steadfast confidence in the power and significance of the spiritual life. He then points out that whilst the national and political relations of his country to-day are far more steady and self-confident than they were in Schiller's time, the grasp on spiritual reality is correspondingly less certain and productive. 'To regain our spiritual confidence,' he writes, 'none can help us more effectively than Schiller.' In Schiller we find, in the first place, a concentrated purpose. A

passionate interest in a few main problems suffices to give to his work not only a supreme unity and central simplicity, but a vitality and a force that make the veriest minutiae of his writing expressive of the great ideas in whose service he works. Of these ideas two were pre-eminently influential : the idea of humanity and the idea of art.

Schiller's central interest was 'humanity.' 'Of our great poets,' says Eucken, 'none has held humanity in higher honour, or so consistently allowed the idea of it to penetrate and inspire his artistic activity.' Schiller's whole work breathes the life and the warmth of this great controlling idea.

For Schiller it was man's moral nature that made him great, not the superficial individuality that hugs its own narrowness and shrinks from sacrifice, nor the still more superficial social life which makes no inward demand upon the soul that would clash with established usage and convention. Man's moral greatness, as Schiller conceived it, lay in the power of man's free spirit to establish within the world a moral order, a realm of ideals that should adequately express his spirituality and his freedom. In this conception of a realm of ideals Schiller carries to artistic completeness the conviction and work of Kant, ensouling it with the freshness and gladness of poetic feeling. The living devotion to the ideals of a spiritual order which characterized the poet's long struggle with circumstance and ill-health passed, immortal, into his work. There, in the grandeur of the language with which it is invested, the idea of humanity, ennobled through art, appeals to us to-day with peculiar force. For art is not a luxury for the specialist ; it is a necessity

for man. We have need of art to counteract the downward drag of the many mechanisms and conventions of our present culture, to sustain the inwardness of our life in face of the ceaseless call made upon it by the outer world, and to preserve its individuality from lapsing to the dead level of a soulless mediocrity. We need the gladdening, freshening touch of art to relieve the pressure and work-weariness of our everyday life. In the interests of self-preservation, art should therefore play its right part in the life, making it more lyrical and persuasive, more truly expressive of the spiritual emotion at our heart. And if there is any longing to-day for an art which, instead of unworthily refining our sensibility, may both open our heart to the great problems of life and prove our faithful ally in labouring for their solution, making the labour light through love and inward gladness, then, says Eucken, we can hope to find no truer friend, no safer guide, than Schiller.\*

In this appeal to Schiller as to one who being dead yet speaketh, we catch again the leading motive in Eucken's philosophical treatment of history. The significant question is: What does history mean *for us*? How can it help us to realize the heights and depths of the human soul? How can it bring home to us the necessity of working for the good that we honour and against the evil that we condemn? How

\* For an interesting confirmation of Eucken's view of the importance of morality and art as national interests of the most fundamental kind, see *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1905, article by the editor, entitled 'Is the Moral Supremacy of Christendom in Danger?' where the present greatness of Japan is shown to be intimately bound up with its vital acceptance of morality and art as 'national interests.'

can the truth of history become a personal truth—a truth that approves itself through the creative force with which it shapes the future so as to respond to its ideal? Eucken has the greatest respect for the accurate historical scholarship as represented in the ordinary work of history professors—he has himself done work of this kind in classical and other literature—but he steadfastly holds that such work is essentially preliminary. When we have, with impersonal disinterestedness, edited and worked up our records, we have done important historical work, but we have not got to the heart of the history we have been considering. We have still to interpret the fact as a message, and to personalize it by realizing and acting out its present-day significance.

And this brings us back to the question as to what we are to understand by a historical fact. If the essential function of a fact is to yield its living meaning to the present in some imperishable form, the fact itself must first own and exercise the life which it surrenders. No atomic conception of 'fact' is therefore admissible. In Eucken's language, the fact must be a *Lebenssystem*, some systematized whole of life. Isolated events are not facts, but abstractions from them. The fact must have a certain independence and capacity for development in accordance with its own nature. If it has less than this it is only a mutilated and fractional fact. Goethe's saying, that everyone must either be a whole in himself or attach himself to some whole as an integral part of it, is accurately true of what Eucken understands by a 'fact.' A fact must in itself be some systematic whole, and a fact of history must be some historic movement with at least

a beginning and a middle, even if it lack a finish. So understood, a historical fact is a true historical *unit*, and the essential significance of 'unit' is 'unity.' A historical fact is a historical unity.


Such unities, it is true, do not lie on the surface of life. Neither history nor Nature can be said to thrust facts upon us. The chaotic impressions of our unsystematized and unprincipled sense-consciousness are, in Eucken's language, mere *phenomena* ('Prolegomena,' p. 42). It requires spiritual insight to pass from *phenomenon* to *fact*. A fact of science is not the mere sense-impression from which the investigation starts. The long and tedious path of theory would be inexplicable, as Eucken puts it, if *fact*, which it is the whole aim of science to ascertain and fix, were present to the investigator from the very outset.

The conception of fact here referred to is the only one possible where thought is dealing with a subject-matter that shows growth and development. Hence, in modern psychology, as a psychology of mental development, the atomic concept commonly known as a 'state of consciousness' is being dropped as inadequate. When the purely empirical standpoint is still adhered to, as in Professor James's psychology, the continuous 'stream' takes the place of the rope of sand of the older associationists. When the psychological standpoint is teleological, as with Professor Stout, an 'interest' takes the place of the metaphorical 'stream,' and we have as the psychological unit an interesting process or an apperceptive system, some striving or conation that seeks what it has not got and is not satisfied until it gets it. This is the psychology to which Eucken fails to do justice, though its funda-



mental conception of an interest-process as the psychical unit is entirely in accord with his conception of a historical or social fact as a *Lebenssystem*.

With the conception of a *Lebenssystem* we reach a concept of central significance in Eucken's philosophy. The first definite application of it on an important scale occurs in the volume entitled 'The Unity of the Spiritual Life.' There we find two great *Lebenssystemen* — naturalism and intellectualism — pitted against each other, and presenting mutually antagonistic solutions of the problem of life. The main issue does not turn here upon the relative value of concepts or conceptual systems, the conflict of theory with theory, as Eucken tersely puts it (p. 61), being a mere affair of outposts. It is a conflict of two great world-powers, each of which claims the whole universe for its sole sphere of action, and in particular the exclusive right of systematizing and regulating the social life. The great *facts* with which Eucken is here concerned are not *Lehrsystemen*, but *Lebenssystemen* — not systematizations of theory, but organizations of life. To these organizations Eucken gives the name *Syntagmen*, understanding by them specific organizations of human culture, world-forces rooted in definite historical movements, each of them aiming at a characteristic and thorough-going reconstitution of existence in the light of some single specific conviction. Thus the various *Syntagmen* possess certain common marks. They are all opposed to any inert acceptance of first impressions, to any mere acquiescence with what is *given*. Each is an organized reconstruction of the given. Each aims in particular at recasting the world of human labour, at reconcentrating its



activity in a certain special way, and inspiring the world's work with some central conviction as to its significance and value. Finally, each *Syntagma* claims to be all-sufficing and exclusive, so that whatever is not for a *Syntagma* must be against it.

In making the *Syntagma* or *Lebenssystem* a starting-point for the study of Eucken's philosophy, we do not bind ourselves to follow consistently Eucken's own order of treatment. We propose, rather, to adopt a plan that will best serve to introduce and bring out the more distinctive features of the new idealism. At the same time we shall find it convenient to start with that particular *Syntagma* which Eucken himself has adopted as starting-point both in the 'Unity of the Spiritual Life' and 'The Struggle for a Concrete Spiritual Experience,' the *Syntagma* of naturalism. The main thesis of naturalism—the specific conviction which inspires and determines its whole development—is formulated by Eucken in the statement that 'spiritual process is a mere continuation of natural process.' But what does naturalism understand by the term 'natural process'? To answer this question is to state the naturalistic theory in outline. This Eucken accordingly proceeds to do.

The dehumanizing of Nature, we read, is mainly the work of modern times. Nature is emancipated, in idea, from human caprice, and is conceived as having an independence of its own. It is held to be controlled not by any external agency, but solely through the effective operation of its own indwelling laws. The objection that Nature is indissolubly bound to man through man's senses is overcome—*e.g.*, by Descartes, through making Nature herself the cause of all quali-

tative differences of sense-impression. Nature, as a system of mechanically operating forces, produces our sense-impressions in us. The last fiction lending colour to the belief in Nature's dependence on man is thus held to be removed.

Then begins the counter-attack, the invasion of man by Nature. All the inner properties of mind, all qualitative differences in experience, are explained as the inevitable result of the variations in relative position of infinitesimal elementary centres of force. Man is thus dissolved back into Nature, and a pure mechanism stands out at last as the *truth* of that given world of sense-phenomena which a first impression superficially identified with Nature.

The spiritual world, interpreted here strictly as a world of inner sense, follows then the same fundamental law of uniformity as obtains in the world of outer sense. What does not follow this law, what is merely inward, is treated as epiphenomenal, a mere ineffective accompaniment of natural process. Sensations and feelings are conceived not as processes of an inner life, but as stimulations occasioned by contact with environment. Hence when naturalistic theory proceeds to develop its hold upon life, it is able to assert that the one main problem of life is to seek out and develop its true relation to environment. With this maxim disappears the last claim of the spiritual to have any initiative or any value of its own.

Nor is this conclusion in any way at variance with the extreme individualism that is so significant a concomitant of a naturalistic philosophy. Individualism is the creed that the individual alone is real

and is the sole source of social right. Each man has originally a right to everything, but as it is inexpedient to press this natural birthright and continue indefinitely a *bellum omnium contra omnes*, individuals agree to unite, and by social contract the State comes into being. But even when men thus combine into societies under the external stress of circumstance, the principle of individualism still rules. Life in society is still a struggle for existence and a survival of the fittest. There is no true principle of unity, but only a principle of separation. What unity there is is a *unitas compositionis*, and that is not a principle, but a result.

We have now to see what naturalism, with its epiphenomenalism and individualism, is able to say for itself. To succeed, it must recognise and justify a source of movement and development, and thence explain all the main facts of experience. It must show that it possesses the power of a system.

In this great venture naturalism is more successful than at first sight could be thought possible. The source of movement it identifies with the individual's self-assertion, understood, of course, in a naturalistic way, not as an act of will, not as a means to an end, but as a simple, given fact. The naturalistic thesis that spiritual process is simply a continuation of natural process here takes the following specific form: 'The individual's self-assertion is the adequate driving power of all the movements of social existence.' It is a pure fiction, in the eyes of naturalism, to talk of working for others or for some 'whole.'

Out of these centres of self-assertion and their relation to the environment and to each other, natural-

istic theory develops a connected apologia for solidarity. Self-assertion is shown to be not a principle of separation, but of connection. For what is meant when we speak of asserting the self? As the self is a mere centre of force, it can mean no more than the guarding and extending of the *relations* that connect these centres of social energy. Having no private life of its own to foster, the self must express itself through these relations. In this way self-interest, by its very functioning, provokes solidarity and social order. What the individual wins for himself must in last resort be won for the whole; for the whole, as naturalism conceives it, is nothing but the sum of the individual parts. Hence the good of society, which is in no way aimed at in the individual's self-assertion, actually results by a natural logic from the movements and counter-movements brought into action by the combined selfishness of the members of society. And this good of the whole is far more securely attained than it would ever be did it depend on the altruistic emotions of the so-called 'free' individuals. Where the total movement is not regulated by human caprice, the elementary forces can pursue undisturbed the lines of least resistance and the points of most useful application. The well-being of the community is thus more securely guaranteed where there is no *principle* at work, but only natural, unintended, inevitable *results*. In such wise has self-assertion proved the driving power of the most comprehensive and well-equilibrated social culture.

Naturalism is no less ingenious in its attempt to explain the development of an inner life without appealing to any originative power on the part of the

self. It must be remembered that a mechanical theory is not opposed to mental activity as such, but only to a spontaneous, self-originated activity. Its aim, in this connection, is therefore to show how, through the outward pressure of the environment alone, an inner world could have grown up. It starts, in its habitual way, with sense-impressions which, through repetition, become generic images, and eventually fade off into the abstract ideas which, in summation, constitute the so-called inward life of thought. Such inward life is conceived as standing to outward sense-experience as potential energy stands to kinetic energy. And just as in Nature potential and kinetic energy are conceived as two grades of one and the same fundamental energy, so the inner life of the individual and his outer sense-life are conceived to be mere gradations of existence within one and the same cosmic system. On this view the inner world, of course, forfeits all independence, and naturalism consistently insists on a deterministic solution of the problem of freedom. With equal consistency it insists that the reality of all striving consists solely in what is actually carried into effect in the sense-world. The performance is alone real; motives and desires, mere shadows that thirst to be realized through expression in the world of sense. Man's striving after happiness can find its ultimate justification only in the improvement of the material conditions of human life.

The naturalistic thesis is considerably strengthened by the skill with which the various changes in the development of social life are traced to the coercive influence of environment, and the gradual transforma-

tion of primitive impulses of self-assertion. Thus the exchange of one country for another of different climate and character, in the life-history, say, of a pastoral people, can effect a radical change even in its religious beliefs, as witness the transformation of Aryan thought and feeling as its tribes passed southwards from northernmost India into the sweltering plains of Bengal. Again, how often have ideas and principles been represented as ideal and disinterested, when, in truth, the driving impulse has been a selfish interest. It seems, indeed, easy to generalize this phenomenon and to maintain that all ideals and principles are mere refinements of material interests, abstractions from the sense-life that have conveniently forgotten their sense-origin.

In the foregoing account we have a comprehensive sketch of the significance and strength of the naturalistic thesis. The spiritual, *quâ* independent, force is explicitly disallowed. Consciousness is only the receptacle for its successive states, in no way their origin, and the realm of spirit is no new reality, but a mere continuation of the realm of Nature.

But how, it may be asked, can such a hollow scheme of life have ever recommended itself? The simple answer is that it does full justice to the life of pleasure and pain, and lays the utmost stress on utilitarian considerations. The call to the pursuit of pleasure and of utility is a simple and intelligible appeal that wins easy allegiance. And if deeper spiritual tendencies arise in protest against this régime, they may so easily be shaken off as mere illusions, as the illusions of child-life which will disappear with riper years. Naturalistic theory allows the presence of these

'questionings of sense and outward things'; it admits that the idea of a scheme of life in which our spiritual activity counts for something will long continue to vex the growing soul with its illusions. Naturalism has its own world of illusion—the spiritual world—and in its protest against it as illusory we have the negative phase in its development to that *positive* stage where Nature, definitely relieved of all spiritual witchery, can work unimpeded in its own blind, infallible way for what is most useful and gives most pleasure.

It is, therefore, no easy task to reduce naturalism to silence. It has not only developed a general philosophy of life, but has applied its fundamental tenets consistently over the whole domain of thought. Eucken brings this out very clearly. Let us briefly summarize the results, as, when taken collectively, they are eloquent and instructive :

The psychology of naturalism is the psychology of states of consciousness, a psychology without a soul.

Its political philosophy recognises no community except in the sense of a summation of individuals, and no origin of society except artificially through contract.

In history it exclusively emphasizes the decisive influence of *environment*. It maintains an optimistic ideal of perpetual progress, but admits no essential oppositions and no qualitatively different stages.

The right that naturalism recognises is *force*, and its morality the right of the majority.

It recognises no theory of knowledge, no metaphysics, and religion only as illusory mythology.

Its philosophy is a generalized statement, from some fruitful point of view—*e.g.*, that of natural evolution—



of the methods and results of the various sciences. It follows on the track of science, and synthesizes its main ideas.

Science itself, as naturalism conceives it, is *descriptive*, not explanatory: its fundamental method is the *inductive* method.

Finally, it holds to strict realism in art. Where ideals are held to be illusory, it cannot be the function of art to express the ideal. The truth of art can consist simply in the faithful imitation of phenomenal reality.

At this point Eucken breaks off his consideration of the naturalistic *Syntagma* in order to take up that of intellectualism. But the main significance of the invasion of the spiritual by natural forces, which is the main thesis of a naturalistic philosophy, is recapitulated in another volume ('The Struggle for a Concrete Spiritual Experience'), and presented in a new and striking form. We are made to see that the systematic vigour and comprehensiveness of the naturalistic view, as presented in the earlier volume, is, paradoxically enough, a natural consequence of the very thoroughness with which Nature has been subdued by the human mind. By no power has Nature been so thoroughly mastered as by science and its technical applications. Yet never has victor been so inwardly vanquished as man has been by the Nature he has brought under scientific control. Bacon truly said that to rule Nature man must first serve her. He forgot to add, says Eucken, that, as her ruler, he is still destined to go on serving her.

This subjugation of man to the power he has mastered is seen with peculiar clearness in the sphere of tech-

nically applied science. *Pari passu* with the development of mechanical industry a natural process has been developed within our social life, claiming for itself in the first instance all our working interests, passing thence into our sentiment, from our feelings into our essence, and eventually filling our whole being. Our social culture comes to work like a machine, and presents itself as a mere continuation, in and through human society, of the mechanical processes of Nature. We thus reach, says Eucken, the very contrary of what we wished to reach: we intended to subjugate Nature to reason, but find our reason, and indeed our whole personality, private and social, subjugated to Nature. It is as Emerson expressed it:

‘To-day is the day of the chattel. . . .  
Web to weave, and corn to grind;  
Things are in the saddle, and ride mankind.’

## CHAPTER IV

EUCKEN'S CRITICISM OF NATURALISM — NATURALISM AND INTELLECTUALISM — SENSATIONALISTIC AND ETHICAL NATURALISM — THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE ESCAPE FROM NATURALISM—HUXLEY'S PROTEST AGAINST NATURALISTIC ETHICS—METCHNIKOFF'S SCIENCE OF RENUNCIATION.

IN the previous chapter we considered at some length Eucken's case for naturalism. It was impossible, under the conditions, to do justice to a treatment which, in point of sympathetic fairness and vitality of insight, is peculiarly impressive. Naturalism is treated with the respect due to a system that has comprehensively and consistently applied its own principles, and it is shown to possess not only the power of a system, but the vitality and the interest of a thorough-going philosophy of life. Its claim to have naturalized the spiritual is not a mere impertinence. It is to an alarming extent incontrovertibly substantiated by the facts of our social culture. It is a great foe, in brief, and must be greatly met.

This sympathetic handling of a great world-movement is distinctive of Eucken's whole philosophical manner. For nothing, save insincerity and sheepish mediocrity, does he ever show irreverence. As for these, they have no developable capacity for freedom, and therefore no spiritual mission. To have tran-

scended them is to have done with them. But when a movement shows any capacity for self-development and self-expression, it obtains at once the fullest sympathy of one who is in the truest sense of the word a philosopher of freedom. The sympathetic development of the naturalistic position with which the volume on 'The Unity of the Spiritual Life' opens is itself an application of Eucken's fundamental category. Sympathetic, immanental criticism is at all times a sign that an author is, at least unconsciously, applying a genuine principle of freedom. But with Eucken the cordial recognition of the right of every movement to be at least heard and understood, from the point of view of its own activity, is conceived not as a mere act of tolerance on the part of a free philosophy, but as an act of self-preservation. For every movement that responds to the stimulus of *principle* has endless possibilities of development, and under favourable conditions may extend and organize its claim over the whole universe. Hence, though the principle be held to be philosophically false, it is still of supreme importance to treat it with adequate respect. It is a recognised maxim of war, I believe, that when an enemy starts upon a false move, he should be allowed ample time to develop his mistake. So in philosophy the free development of a false principle exposes at length the full range of its harmful application. It can then be met and thwarted in each of the various forms in which, in different spheres of human activity, it has variously expressed itself. It is in a similar spirit that Eucken meets the systematic activity of naturalism. He gives it the amplest room for developing its own paradoxical conclusions. But he does

more than this. He recognises in naturalism a permanent opponent of a spiritual philosophy—permanent, that is, in so far as our social culture, by its depression of the spiritual into the service of sense, continues to suggest a naturalistic explanation of its meaning and value.

The nature of the criticism which Eucken gives in his first main work when dealing with the naturalistic *Syntagma* may be stated as follows. The first stage of it consists in showing that, as a matter of actual fact, the claim of this *Syntagma* to be the absolute philosophy of life is resisted along its whole line by a counter-*Syntagma*, inspired by a principle which is the precise opposite of the naturalistic principle. This is the *Syntagma* of speculative intellectualism, the main thesis of which may be expressed in the formula 'Natural process is a mere derivative or product of spiritual process,' the term 'spiritual' being here understood in a purely intellectualistic sense.

A second stage in the criticism consists in a critical review of each of the two rival *Syntagmen*. The net result of this review is to show that naturalism and intellectualism agree in banishing freedom and personality from the universe. They disagree in this, that whilst naturalism insists on the sense world as the fundamental reality, the thought universe being a mere shadowy superstructure upon a sensory foundation, intellectualism insists on thought as the fundamental and originative reality which develops the sense world out of itself.

In attempting to decide between the several claims, we might conceivably adopt the abstract test of common agreement. This test in its simplest logical

form insists that the truth between two diverging claims lies in the matter wherein they agree. The adoption of this criterion, which Eucken stigmatizes as a means for glorifying mediocrity at the expense of what is original and characteristic, would in this case leave us with the result that, whether the universe is rooted in sense or in thought, in either case freedom and personality are illusory ideals.

This comfortable reconciliation of naturalism and intellectualism on the basis of an anti-personalism has, however, the disadvantage of leaving the differences between the two *Syntagmen* as irreconcilable as ever. Eucken prefers, therefore, to fall back upon his own reductive method.

He shows that the sense world, as reconstructed by naturalism, rests on the originative work of thought as its indispensable substructure. The latter cannot, therefore, be removed without entailing the complete collapse of naturalism. It is further shown that the spiritual world, as reconstructed by a radical intellectualism, depends for its realization upon the existence of a sense world which it can conquer and transfigure. If all independent reality be denied to the sense world, the intellectual world remains a mere shadow-land that hovers ineffectively over life without the power to penetrate and explain it. Hence to dismiss the sense world cavalierly as an illusion is to condemn the originative powers of thought to abject ineffectiveness, and implies the collapse of intellectualism. The universe can therefore dispense neither with the originative activity of thought nor with the reality of sense. A new principle must therefore be discovered capable of guiding to its com-

pletest maturity a *Syntagma* that shall do justice to both these characteristic requirements, and at the same time correct their abstractness and bring their functions under a single unity. This principle Eucken discovers in *personality*.

The line of thought which has here been briefly outlined is developed by Eucken in his treatise on 'The Unity of the Spiritual Life,' and it would be most instructive to make use of this treatment as a highway into Eucken's philosophy. But there is a more direct development from the naturalistic position as starting-point, mainly worked out in the later treatise, 'The Struggle for a Concrete Spiritual Experience.' This we propose to adopt, reserving special points of particular value in the earlier treatise for consideration at a later stage.

The first step in this second line of criticism is common to both the treatments in question. It consists in showing that the original synthetic activity of consciousness, which is denied in the statement of the naturalistic thesis, is conspicuously present in the very structure that professes to explain it away. For naturalism is not a mere copy of Nature thrust upon us through the simple act of sense-perception; it is a scientific reconstruction of it. It is a natural *order*, and order is found in Nature only on condition of its being sought there. But the search for order can spring only from the demand made by the scientific consciousness that Nature shall be scientifically intelligible. This demand for a natural order and the search for it are therefore prior to the development of that mechanical view of the universe which essentially characterizes naturalism. Thus science itself,

when reductively studied, reveals the originating and supporting presence of spiritual activity. Moreover, if, whilst admitting the presence of the activity, naturalism still insists that the activity is derivative, Eucken is able to show that in that case it cannot carry out the work required of it. If consciousness is conceived as a mere receptacle, with no spontaneity of its own, it must be consistently conceived as possessing the characteristic properties of a receptacle. As such it can do no more than suffer various impressions to remain side by side within it. It cannot possibly bring them into mutual relation. A receptacle cannot logically pose as an active principle of synthesis. Again, it is quite profitless to parade the self as a mere point of reference for relations. The real question is rather what the nature of a so-called *point* must be that can perform the characteristic functions of intellect, transfigure a manifold of sense into a unity of science, and be at the same time conscious of its own performance. These simple arguments appear so irrefutable that we are bound to believe that the power which naturalism has wielded and continues to wield over modern culture can hardly lie in the intrinsic strength of its sensationalistic theory. Indeed, the dogma of the sense-derivation of the spiritual has already given way in most naturalistic circles to a hopeless, colourless doctrine of psychophysical parallelism. The real strength of naturalism lies in the weakness of the world's spiritual life. Naturalism is most formidable when it takes its point of departure not theoretically from mere sense-data, but practically from the inertness and slavishness of the spiritual life of the human community. The old sensationalistic



thesis may be waived as after all irrelevant, and a new thesis set up—to wit, that spirit, whether it be an original activity or not, can fulfil a useful function only as the slave of sense. The priority of sense over spirit, the subordination of spirit to sense, is the principle for which this ethical naturalism contends.

The distinction here suggested between radical sensationalistic naturalism and what we have called ethical naturalism, though it is not explicitly drawn by Eucken, is yet clearly implied in his treatment, and it is very similar to a distinction which he actually does draw in a later chapter between a radical intellectualism which he calls noëtism, and a modified intellectualism which, while it asserts the priority and primacy of thought, does not assert, as noëtism does, thought's absolute self-sufficiency. Thus in its ethical bearing this modified intellectualism would be a hard stoicism in which reason controls and dominates sense, keeping it under and allowing it no rights of its own.

The type of culture which we have in mind when we speak of an ethical naturalism consistently carried out, is one in which sense-directed impulses are active and spiritual activity sluggish, if not altogether dormant. The interests of the senses have set the standard of life, whilst the will and the intellect exhaust themselves in the struggle to obtain for the senses their means of enjoyment. Hence a soulless type of epicureanism, attached to a dispiriting mediocrity-ideal, and a slave to habit, precedent, custom, and public opinion. Eucken frequently refers to this barren life of mediocrity as the kind of life-philosophy to which the naturalistic thesis of the priority of sense logically

condemns the human soul. Its gods are utility and pleasure. Science, art, law, morality, religion are mere devices for ministering to the public use and contributing to its prosperity. The useful usurps the place of the good in the public interest. What is useful for society is treated as good in itself, and a fluctuating public opinion sets the standard of true and false. Here not the individual man but the collective social average becomes the measure of all things. Prudential considerations are alone determinative, and the heroic in every department of life is avoided as useless, and indeed extravagant. To observe convention and behave correctly is the sum of all wisdom. Hence a continual slavishness, insincerity, and hypocrisy. If we pretend to think, we find ourselves following the lead of the phrases we are accustomed to, instead of fashioning our speech to suit our thought. Our emotions, instead of spontaneously championing the good and the true, champion our own vanity and pride. We are immeasurably mortified over a mere indiscretion or breach of etiquette, whilst we bear with equanimity gross indignities to conscience that find no way to the public ear. And this (quaking respect for rules and formulæ that have no root in principle affects what is most inward and personal in our life.) The lamp of the spirit is quenched, and when, in revolt against the irksomeness of a creed of social convention and social use, we try to be *ourselves* instead of being either correct or useful, we find the liberated ego running swiftly and selfishly after its own pleasure.

This type of culture breeds a distinctive type of man, the man of restless intelligence and refined

sensuality. (He is ready, adaptable, and knows something about everything, but inwardly he is empty, having no spiritual experience to draw from.) Moreover, since virtue has still a marketable value, and there is no inwardness in his life to supply it, he must needs affect it. He must play the hypocrite,] the leading rôle, by-the-by, in this kind of life where true culture, with its conscience, its heart, and its humour, has shrunk without knowing it or feeling it, to a [mere comedy of manners] (*ibid.*, p. 233). It is not surprising that with this picture before him Eucken should ask whether in this subordination to sense and the law of least exertion the spiritual can be said to be fulfilling its true distinctive function, and whether we must not rather be prepared to admit that the only true function of spirit is to assert its own free nature against the thralldom of sense, and to assert it earnestly, persistently, wholeheartedly.

There is an interesting chapter in the history of modern speculation which it may be instructive to consider at this point, as it illustrates in a very living way the philosophical limitations of a protest of this very kind when dissociated from any positive belief in the reality of the spiritual.

Huxley's Romanes Lecture on 'Evolution and Ethics,' delivered at Oxford in 1893, contains as strenuous a defence of man's ethical nature against the self-assertion of natural impulse as could be desired or expected from the most ardent of spiritual idealists.

'The practice of that which is ethically best,' we read, 'involves a course of conduct which in all respects is opposed to that which leads to success in the

cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion it demands self-restraint, in place of thrusting aside or treading down all competitors it requires that the individual shall not merely respect but shall help his fellows ; its influence is directed not so much to the survival of the fittest as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence . . .' (pp. 81, 82). 'Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it' (p. 83). 'Moreover, the cosmic nature born with us, and, to a large extent, necessary for our maintenance, is the outcome of millions of years of severe training, and it would be folly to imagine that a few centuries will suffice to subdue its masterfulness to purely ethical ends. Ethical nature may count upon having to reckon with a tenacious and powerful enemy as long as the world lasts' (p. 85).

The significance of this opposition between man's nature as moral and his anti-moral impulses is made much clearer by a helpful analogy which Huxley develops at length in the Prolegomena to the Romanes Lecture. He compares the 'horticultural process' through which a patch of soil is preserved as a garden, with the cosmic process which obtains outside the garden walls. 'The patch is cut off from the rest by a wall ; within the area thus protected the native vegetation has, as far as possible, been extirpated, while a colony of strange plants has been imported and set down in its place. In short, it has been made into a garden. . . . Trees, shrubs, and herbs, many of them appertaining to the state of nature of remote

parts of the globe, abound and flourish. Moreover, considerable quantities of vegetables, fruits, and flowers are produced of kinds which neither now exist, nor have ever existed, except under conditions such as obtain in the garden, and which, therefore, are as much works of the art of man as the frames and glass-houses in which some of them are raised. That the "state of art" thus created in the state of nature by man is sustained by and dependent on him would at once become apparent if the watchful supervision of the gardener were withdrawn, and the antagonistic influences of the general cosmic process were no longer sedulously warded off or counteracted. The walls and gates would decay, quadrupedal and bipedal intruders would devour and tread down the useful and beautiful plants; birds, insects, blight, and mildew would work their will; the seeds of the native plants, carried by winds or other agencies, would immigrate, and in virtue of their long-earned special adaptation to the local conditions, these despised native weeds would soon choke their choice exotic rivals. A century or two hence, little beyond the foundations of the wall and of the houses and frames would be left, in evidence of the victory of the cosmic powers at work in the state of nature, over the temporary obstacles to their supremacy set up by the art of the horticulturist' (p. 9). 'If it is urged that the cosmic process cannot be in antagonism with that horticultural process which is part of itself, I can only reply that if the conclusion that the two are antagonistic is logically absurd I am sorry for logic, because, as we have seen, the fact is so. The garden is in the same position as every other work of man's art; it is a result of the cosmic process

working through, and by human energy and intelligence; and, as is the case with every other artificial thing set up in the state of nature, the influences of the latter are constantly tending to break it down and destroy it. No doubt the Forth Bridge and an ironclad in the offing are, in ultimate resort, products of the cosmic process, and so much so as the river which flows under the one, or the sea-water on which the other floats. Nevertheless every breeze strains the bridge a little, every tide does something to weaken its foundations, every change of temperature alters the adjustment of its parts, produces friction, and consequent wear and tear. From time to time the bridge must be repaired just as the ironclad must go into dock, simply because Nature is always tending to reclaim that which her child, man, has borrowed from her, and has arranged in combinations which are not those favoured by the general cosmic process (p. 12). Huxley's conclusion is expressed in these words (p. 44): 'That which lies before the human race is a constant struggle to maintain and improve, in opposition to the state of nature, the state of art of an organized polity, in which and by which man may develop a worthy civilization capable of maintaining and constantly improving itself until the evolution of our globe shall have entered so far upon its downward course that the cosmic process resumes its sway, and once more the state of nature prevails over the surface of our planet.'

Of the profound sincerity of Huxley's defence of our moral and specifically human nature against the self-asserting claims of primitive impulse, there can be no possible doubt. The note struck by the essay is

not only ethical but heroic (p. 86): 'We are grown men, and must play the man—

'Strong in will  
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield,

cherishing the good that falls in our way, and bearing the evil in and around us with stout hearts set on diminishing it.'

It is only when the further question is raised as to *how* this evil is to be diminished that we realize the intrinsic incapacity of an agnostic philosophy to set before the will an adequate goal. That an explicit and theoretical belief in a spiritual principle is not essential to heroic conduct is a commonplace of our human experience, which many a life beside Huxley's would abundantly illustrate. But where the *substance* of what is spiritual is dissolved into the mist of the unknowable, and neither God nor the foretaste of an immortal destiny is present to sustain the will's belief in its own freedom, there is an inherent restriction set, not, indeed, upon the practical energies of the will, but upon the conception of its ideal and the means for realizing it. In substantiation of this we may turn to a logical development of the Huxleian position by Elie Metchnikoff, of the Pasteur Institute at Paris, in the book recently translated into English under the title 'The Nature of Man.' The main aim of the book, which is interesting and stimulating to a high degree, is to suggest the best available remedy for the various disharmonies to which our human nature is liable. Of these disharmonies the most formidable is *death*, and the central interest of the book is bound up with the discussion of this fundamental disharmony. The efficacy of philosophical and

religious remedies in dealing with the death problem is critically considered in the light of the history of philosophical and religious thought. Philosophy, as Metchnikoff conceives it, can find no solution save in pessimism and renunciation; nor does religious conviction take us any further. Science alone is left, and it is to science that our author turns. An analysis of the physiological conditions of old age shows that old age is a disease which becomes the disharmony that it is only because it attacks us too soon. Metchnikoff's belief is that if we could only contrive to live long enough—say, for 140 years—a natural desire for extinction would take the place of the instinct of self-preservation, and the call of death would then harmoniously satisfy this legitimate craving of a ripe old age. The author holds—on what authority I do not know—that the patriarchs who were gathered unto their fathers 'full of days' had lived sufficiently long to be genuinely weary of life. 'Full of days' is interpreted as meaning 'satiated of existence.' Now, as science alone can analyze the conditions of this full old age, science alone can intelligently prescribe the means for reaching it. The disharmony of death can be overcome only by this new instinct for death taking the place of the old inherited instinct for life. Science can instruct us so to lengthen out our days as to give this death-instinct time to mature. We shall then subside into the nothingness that awaits us without pang or regret.

This is Metchnikoff's Buddhism in science—his *science* of renunciation. We renounce the desire of life not through severe ascetic discipline, but through the impulsive force of a newborn instinct that makes



our old age seek for death as our youth seeks for life. What is of special significance in Metchnikoff's naturalistic theory is the logical appropriateness of the direction in which it seeks for a solution to the problems of pain and death. Granted that there is no awakening from the sleep of death, and granted, further, that there is no spiritual reality of any kind, whether self or God, to be seriously considered, our freedom can hardly busy itself better than in adapting what ghostly residue of life is left to the cult of the body and the conditions of a painless extinction.

That the solution would not have satisfied the strong ethical temper of Huxley himself is undeniable. But an attitude of heroic defiance, a will to believe in one's self in the teeth of one's own philosophy, though it is a practical factor of the greatest importance, is no satisfactory argument. And one looks in vain beyond the moral heroism of Huxley for any ground in his philosophy that could logically justify a more spiritual application of it to the problems of life than that suggested by Metchnikoff.

In the two succeeding chapters we propose to consider Eucken's own treatment of the negative movement and the positive interest which inspires it. We shall find that philosophical speculation on the meaning of life's mysteries does not necessarily lead, as Metchnikoff supposes, to the quiet pessimism of a final renunciation.

## CHAPTER V

EUCKEN'S DISCUSSION OF THE NEGATIVE MOVEMENT—TYPES OF PHILOSOPHY WHICH DO NOT ALLOW FOR IT—THE NEGATIVE MOVEMENT ESSENTIAL TO A RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY—THE BREAK WITH ARISTOTELIANISM AND AQUINISM AS ILLUSTRATING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEGATIVE MOVEMENT AS A BREAK WITH THE PAST QUA PAST.

IN the preceding chapter we dealt with the break from naturalism, both from its sense-basis and from the soulless mediocrity-ideal that inevitably dominates a society in which spiritual activity is degraded to the service of sense. The conception of a negative movement, as we have already seen, is characteristic of Eucken's philosophy. His treatment of the movement is seen on analysis to have a twofold aim: (1) The exposure of the inadequacy of all philosophical systems which attempt to dispense with it. The treatment here is mainly negative and critical. (2) The statement of the meaning which the movement has in a philosophy which, like his own philosophy of life, holds it to be indispensable, and endeavours to apply it with appropriate thoroughness and consistency. Here the treatment is essentially positive and constructive.

So far in our exposition of Eucken's system we have been working towards this more positive and con-

structive position. We have endeavoured in discussing Eucken's philosophical interpretation of history to interpret and to justify the break with the past *qua* past, and, again, in our discussion of the naturalistic *Syntagma*, to insist on the necessity of a radical break with the principles and requirements of naturalism. We shall return to both these essential positions in due course, but to do so with added weight and effectiveness we must first follow our author in his exposure of the inadequacy to which a philosophy condemns itself through failure to incorporate a negative movement into its scheme of reality.

It is Eucken's conviction that a philosophy that has failed to do justice to this negative movement must have falsely gauged the facts of life, and abstractly interpreted the process of development. We state this conviction in its most radical form when we add that no philosophy can be personalistic or ethico-religious which neglects the negative movement.

A religious philosophy, as Eucken understands it, is a philosophy that takes due account of three fundamental facts: (1) Nature, (2) Self, (3) God. In particular no philosophy that minimizes the importance of the self can claim to be of the religious type; for the discontent with Nature that leads to union with God must be the discontent of an individual self, and the struggle through which the shifting of the life-centre from the natural to the spiritual is effected must be the individual's own struggle. He must be the *fighter*, and not the mere arena where the fight takes place. The negative movement can, in fact, mean nothing for a philosophy that fails to do justice to the underived reality of the

individual's inward experience. If Nature and God are held to be the only factors of real significance, the insistence on negation is superfluous. The grandiose picture of a God that returns from the blindness and tumult of Nature back again into His own eternal light and rest, loses all its glory so soon as the human sufferer is removed from the canvas. The conception of a God redeeming Himself in a solitude unbroken by any human cry is flat and unprofitable. The descent of the Divine into Nature presupposes the existence of the human soul.

A religious philosophy must, then, be personalistic, and the emphasis which it lays on a negative movement must in last resort depend on its personalistic convictions. Not only must it set man between Nature and God, and so fill him with a religious unrest; it must not allow the inwardness and freedom of the human creature to be dwarfed into insignificance either by the vastness of Nature or by the majesty of God.

As a typical non-religious philosophy, allowing no scope for a genuine negative movement, we may take up once again the philosophy of naturalism. Naturalism is simply content with Nature, and with the ideal of a perpetual progress that continuously develops from an original sense-basis.\* This progress depends in no direct way upon human activity. Each individual pursues his own interest, and in so doing indirectly forwards a beneficent fatality which out of the tangled threads of human eagerness and passion weaves the harmonious web of a common good. Here, at any rate, there is no negative movement, no movement against Nature and away from the sense-basis through which

\* Cf. 'Einheit des Geisteslebens,' p. 192.

man is linked to it. Such movement would indeed be impossible, for every form of self-assertion is nothing more than a natural fact, and every development of it a refinement of Nature. A struggle *from* Nature can here mean no more than a finer spinning of primitive natural ties. It is true that naturalism does authorize a certain type of negative movement. It insists on the return from illusion to Nature—to Nature, that is, as Naturalism understands it—a return from the childish ideals of God, freedom and immortality, back to the solid ground of positive fact. But where there is neither spontaneity on the part of the mover nor any final causality on the part of the entities that cause the movement, the movement can be negative only in the name. The return from illusion to Nature can be nothing more than a mere fact as exhaustively explicable by psychological analysis as the origination of the illusion itself. The whole process is therefore a purely positive development of the mechanical order of things within which naturalism has its being.

With this criticism of naturalism, which falls, in last resort, upon its attempt to apply the principle of continuity rigorously from a sense-basis as starting-point, Eucken associates a criticism of Leibnitz. The fundamental concepts which Leibnitz uses (*e.g.*, his concept of force) and his very methods are indeed only refinements and developments of naturalistic concepts and methods. Leibnitz wished to subdue mechanism through metaphysics; in truth, he has simply raised a mechanical philosophy to the level of a metaphysic. Again, the fundamental doctrine of continuity, as Leibnitz conceived it, is directly opposed to the theory of a twofold source of experience—a

sensual and a spiritual. This is the Kantian *dualism* which in Eucken's developmental philosophy becomes a *negative movement*, and as such a permanent characteristic of the constructive, problematical monism in which that philosophy culminates.) In this modified acceptance of the Kantian dualism as necessarily constitutive of any constructive monism that would also be a true philosophy of life, we have the fundamental note of agreement between Eucken and Kant.)

But there are other types of philosophy besides naturalism which allow no room for a genuine negative movement. Intellectualism, at least in its more radical forms, is equally incapable, according to Eucken,\* of justifying any such movement. For an intellectualistic freedom cannot go beyond recognising the logical *necessity* which inspires the world's dialectic, and acquiescing in it. We do not, however, propose at present to press the deficiencies of intellectualism. It will be more profitable at this point to emphasize at once the radical defect in the interpretation of the ethico-religious consciousness which lies at the root of all non-negational philosophies—namely, the disregard of human endeavour as a real factor in the shaping of events.) This defect is characteristic of all philosophies and all philosophical attitudes which are predominantly logical or æsthetical as opposed to ethical or religious. Thus, in connection with the problem of evil we have an æsthetical optimism which insists that the evil is only evil because our range of moral vision is so limited. From the point of view of the world's own Maker, who can take the whole in at a glance, evil is in itself a good, an essential

\* Cf. 'Einheit des Geisteslebens,' p. 124.

element in the complete harmony of the whole. The world is really perfect, but to see it as such we must see it from the right point of view. What Eucken calls *logical optimism* comes to a similar conclusion by a different line of argument. The so-called evil in the world is seen to be merely apparent when we consider its place in the causal chain of events. We have only to recognise the complete rationality of the universe to acquiesce in every evil as the most reasonable thing that could possibly have happened. There is a peace that cometh with understanding, but to enjoy it we must learn to look at the universe *sub specie æternitatis*. This is the optimism of Spinoza. It agrees essentially with the æsthetic type in its acquiescence in the eternal perfection of the universe. The real is already harmonious and rational. We have not to make it such, but only to see it as such. There is no call to forsake the world, to break with it, to reconquer it; we have only to forsake our dream of it, and be reconciled at once to a reality that is good, beautiful, and true beyond any human improving. Both optimisms agree, then, in the passive rôle they assign to the individual. He has only to accept a given reality and learn to feel it and to know it for what it is.

The same counsel of inertia is implied in pantheism. Here again we have an easy monism and a treacherous optimism, purchased at the expense of the rights of personality. In reactionary opposition to the popular dualism between God and the world, pantheism melts God and world more or less compactly into one. If the Divine element is preponderant, it may pass over into a mysticism which sees God as alone real and the world as illusory. If the natural element preponderates, it

may pass more or less completely into atheism, to which the world alone is real and God illusory. But in genuine pantheism, God is identified with the absolute as immanent in the world, and the world-process therefore is regarded as in its essence Divine. With God thus identified with the universe, the universe is naturally conceived as already maximally real, the best of all possible worlds. It lies there perfect to the true insight that can pierce beneath the material veil, and so realize the given immediacy of God in Nature. Thus here again a rational world has not to be worked for and fought for on regenerative and redemptive lines. Its rationality has only to be discovered and recognised and its apparent irrationality explained as the illusion of our ignorance. Hegel's famous dictum that the real is rational is exposed to the same fundamental objection. 'The final purpose of the world,' he says,\* 'is accomplished no less than ever accomplishing itself. . . . The good is radically and really achieved.' No subtlety of apologetics can avoid the fatalistic moral here implied. Every incentive to assert our spiritual dignity to break from the given must vanish when we see that in so doing we are breaking from the very truth we wish to realize. Hence it comes to pass that the thinker who has done more than any other to emphasize the significance of the negative movement in history and thought, and to enforce with logical insight and vigour the Gospel secret of 'dying to live,' has slighted the only basis from which this negative movement can have any human significance—the basis of free individual initiative.

\* 'Logic,' Tr. Wallace, p. 373.



So far, in our attempt to develop in Eucken's manner the significance of the negative movement or break with the given, we have proceeded on a negative tack. We have considered various philosophic systems and points of view which in different ways seek to justify the given without any recourse to a negative movement—*e.g.*, by the prospect of a perpetual progress, or by the present perfection which it possesses for such insight as can bear the discovery. We have now to take a more positive view of the problem, and consider the function which Eucken himself attributes to negation in the development of the spiritual life.

The problem of a negative movement first gains real and pressing significance when it is recognised, not only that the oppositions which agitate our life are real and persistent, but also that the human will, or human personality *qua* active, is an indispensable factor in the process through which they are to be overcome. When, on the contrary, the reality and persistent character of the oppositions which bring restlessness and discord into the very heart of our modern culture are not recognised, the problem of a negative movement cannot be said to have even arisen. And when it is felt that patchwork and compromise, a little tinkering here and a little refinement there, are all that is needed to make life smooth and satisfactory, that life's oppositions are superficial or only apparent, that sense and spirit may profitably agree to adjust outstanding differences and live on terms of equal friendship—when the antagonisms of life have been so conceived, there can have been no perception of the vital incompatibility of the claims involved. And if, further, it is held that the oppositions cannot be so serious but that a

calmer, deeper penetration of their nature must reveal them as the beneficent agencies of a perfect dispensation, and that to press our puny personal zeal into the cause of reform is to doubt the fundamental perfection of the universe, then the problem of negation, loosed from all reference to our own striving, is no longer our own problem, but the sole affair of Fate. We have but to take Voltaire's advice ('Candide'), and just work on without thinking.

But when the oppositions of our modern culture vex us as a life-problem, and as our own life-problem, the incitement to a negative attitude is irresistible. For when inwardly held and realized, these antagonisms oppress the thought with intolerable contradictions; they stir our feeling with alternate disgust and indignation, and they reduce our activity to a state of impotent tension, at once eager to do something and yet unable to carry out any project consistently. It is when thus vitally realized as a challenge to our personal freedom and a scandal to our spiritual nature, that the discords of our life betray their true beneficent character. They operate forcefully in stimulating a revolt against the mediocrity-ideals and shallow contentments of a life which regards given conditions as authoritative, and adaptation to environment as the supreme law of its being. They compel us to realize that the given conditions are at fundamental variance with each other, and that a radical break with a culture that confuses sense and spirit hopelessly together is not a matter of choice, but of spiritual necessity.

When the oppositions inherent in our modern culture become thus vividly present to us the negative movement has already begun. At first it may have

little force and depth. It may express itself discontinuously, and more or less blindly and subjectively. The essential step is not taken until the negative movement connects itself with positive conviction; then comes the 'break' or spiritual conversion in its most general form. For the so-called 'break' or 'conversion' is just that critical stage in a continuous process of negation where the negative, without ceasing to be negative, acquires a positive significance and a positive justification.

With a psychological analysis of this conversion process such as Starbuck and William James have recently given us, Eucken is not concerned. The absolute life in intimate contact with our own here takes the place of the subconscious. Eucken is content to emphasize the two main conditions upon which the reality and vitality of the conversion depends. These are—(1) a new immediacy of experience, (2) the sustaining of the negative movement through the whole subsequent process of spiritual upbuilding. But before we can press forward to these more positive positions we must lay special stress on that aspect of the negative movement which bears on the relation of the ethico-religious consciousness to historical tradition. We have to see what is involved in the break with the past *qua* past, and to illustrate the point from Eucken's own writings.

In a most interesting pamphlet entitled 'Thomas Aquinas and Kant: a Conflict of Two World-Philosophies,' Eucken has analyzed Thomas of Aquinas's great attempt to harmonize the conflicting beliefs of his own time, and has considered its significance for modern thought. The necessity for breaking with Thomas

Aquinas is then insisted on, not out of any negative disrespect for the historic greatness of the man, but out of a positive respect for the overshadowing greatness of the human spirit, which in every new age must express itself afresh, *be* itself, in a word, and not the ghost of a departed glory, however great.

But what is this system of Thomas Aquinas? What is this Aquinism, as we may perhaps be allowed to call it? It is a union of Aristotelian philosophy with the doctrine of the Christian Church. Hence whatever claim is made in support of the abiding value of this synthesis must substantiate itself by showing—(1) that the Aristotelian philosophy is still qualified to retain the old supremacy it held in the days of Thomas Aquinas as the one permanent foundation of the search after truth, and (2) that it is logically possible to unite the requirements of the old Greek philosophy with those of Christian conviction.

I am personally, says Eucken, a great friend of the Aristotelian philosophy, and in my youth was known as an Aristotelian. For Thomas Aquinas I also entertain a great respect, though I do not consider him a thinker of the first rank. Moreover, both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas have a historical importance it would be hard indeed to exaggerate. And yet the main question still remains: What is the *abiding* worth of these respective systems? How can Aristotle help us in settling the movements of the modern spirit?

To this question Eucken gives no uncertain answer. He points unhesitatingly to the essential time limitations of the Aristotelian philosophy. Only a superficial study of Aristotle's work, he says, can leave the impression that it transcends the limitations of the

time at which it was written, and can therefore be accepted as eternally valid. The more one penetrates beneath the surface of this philosophy, the more does this intimate relation in which it stands to the life of classic Greece and to the peculiar conditions of the time become clear and unmistakable. In Aristotle's philosophy we find embodied in one imposing system, and in conceptualized form, all the maturest developments of the old Greek culture. No other thinker is so pre-eminently the philosopher of classic Hellenism. And so emphatically is this the case that Aristotle has failed to do justice to just those movements of his own time which lay outside the limits of this typical *Weltanschauung*—astronomy, for instance, mathematics, medicine, the philosophy of Democritus. The Aristotelian system presents in conceptual form a historical position which the world in its progress has now left definitely behind it. In particular the antagonism between the Greek and the Christian philosophies is deep-rooted and essential.

The mediæval Church sought to reconcile its position with that of Aristotelianism by the simple device of a division of labour. In the truth concerning this world Aristotle was held to be the great authority; the Church, on the other hand, spoke the supreme word on whatever concerned the next world or the conditions for its enjoyment. This, however, was a compromise which could not hope for success except in so far as the philosophy of *this* world was held *subordinate* to the revealed truth concerning the other. Aristotelianism, in brief, must be prepared to leave all ultimate questions to be settled by Church theology. Unfortunately, Aristotle has himself given answers to these

very questions, and they directly conflict with those required by Christian doctrine. In no sense does his system constitute a propædeutic to religious conviction ; indeed, its most striking peculiarity is that it accepts the age of classic Greek culture as a final expression of reality, and limits the whole duty of man to this present world. Aristotle's view of history strengthened, if it did not determine, this conception of the limitations of the spiritual horizon. He held to a catastrophic theory of historical development,\* to the idea that, at certain recurring periods, floods and other convulsions of Nature made such havoc of civilization and its records that it was indispensable to make a fresh beginning. With this general conviction he united the more specific belief that one of these great periods had reached its culmination in the golden age just gone, and was now waning towards an inevitable extinction in the more or less remote future. Under the influence of such a belief, it is natural that Aristotle should have concentrated his energies upon the task of systematizing this now perfected stage of historical development, and bringing out its full and finished meaning. In sympathy with this whole point of view, Eucken points out in his 'Essay on Aristotelian Method' that Aristotle shows a remarkable indifference to the scientific and political movements of his own day, and this despite the fact that the conquests of Alexander were opening up to him in every direction entirely new fields of research. Pervading the whole work of Aristotle we have, then, this central conviction that the worthiest has already been historically realized, and

\* Eucken gives the following references : Meteor, 339, b. 28 ; De Caelo, 270, b. 19 ; Metaphy, 1074, b. 10.

that it only remains to systematize and apply a closed revelation of the truth. This is particularly true of Aristotle's views of politics and æsthetics, but it is also true of his scientific convictions. As Eucken pointedly puts it, the truth of a general scientific theory was never held by Aristotle to be modifiable in any way by subsequent discoveries and observations.

The anti-Christian character of this *Weltanschauung* of Aristotle's is brought out most clearly when we consider Aristotle's views on questions of specific religious interest. It is true that Aristotle countenances the idea of a God, but he holds to it rather as a concept for explaining the unity of the world and the origin of its movement, than as an idea that could influence in any way the lives and activities of human beings. Aristotle has no theory of Providence; he recognises no individual immortality, no religious basis for ethics. And the life that is led apart from the inspiration of these great ideas does not appear to him in any way perplexed or defective, but as a closed and rational whole, as a life that can adequately satisfy all justifiable desires. In a word, his whole philosophical effort is directed towards making his age contented with the real possibilities of its earthly lot, and reconciling its activities and its emotions to the task of discovering and realizing the attainable good for man.

If Christianity is to reconcile itself with such a doctrine, it must pay the price. Either it must yield up all colour and individuality, or else both doctrines, the Aristotelian and the Christian alike, shorn of their distinctive features, must fade simultaneously into mere neutral values.)

That the alternative did not present itself so drastically to Thomas Aquinas was partly due to the fact that following the precedent set by the Arabian interpreters of Aristotle, he read the latter in the light of neoplatonic ideas, and so gave to the Aristotelian philosophy a more inward and religious meaning than it can really bear. But there is a deeper reason why this great representative of mediæval Christianity should have failed to realize the intrinsic incompatibility of the two systems between which its veneration was divided—the reason, namely, that the ideal of mediæval thought was not freedom, but order. It did not recognise the right of principles to struggle for existence under the sole banner of reason, but held by order and the weight of traditional authority as the imperative essentials which the freedom of the reason must not endanger.

Hence, if the objection is raised that mediæval Christianity with its compromise between Aristotle and Christian dogma was for centuries a vast and imposing power, Eucken's answer is that this historical weight and importance, which he would be the last to contest, is explained by the fact that the nature of the compromise fitted the formal conceptions of the Middle Ages. In the mediæval era, a system of ideas was not conceived as a living unity animated by a single principle that expressed itself afresh in every detail of the system, but rather as a collection of propositions which could quite well fit in with other groups of propositions representative of other similar systems of ideas. In this way it is quite possible to bring Aristotle and Christianity into friendly relation with each other. But it is also just as easy, and



indeed easier in some cases, to bring other religious systems into harmony with Aristotle. Thus Aristotelianism is decidedly more akin to Mohamedanism and Judaism than it is to Christianity. A compromise of this kind which satisfied the intellectual requirements of the Middle Ages cannot therefore satisfy us, who require that our systems shall be much more than well-ordered aggregates of an eclectic character.

And the Roman Catholics of the more liberal school are coming quite clearly to realize this. Thus from an address delivered by Bishop Spalding of America in the greatest of the Jesuitical churches, the Church al Gesu at Rome, on 'Education and the Future of Religion,' Eucken quotes the following words: 'Is it credible that if St. Thomas of Aquinas were now alive he would content himself with the philosophy and science of Aristotle, who knows nothing either of creation or of providence, and whose knowledge of Nature, compared with our own, is that of a child?'

Aquinism, then, cannot be adopted *in toto* by any intelligent community that makes the freedom of the spiritual life its primary requisite! The new time must have its own appropriate philosophy. And what applies to Aquinism applies to every other system that time has yet evolved. Eucken on this point is consistent and thoroughgoing. He censures the inconsistency of Protestants who, whilst blaming the Romanists for their return upon Aquinism, have yielded themselves to some form of Lutheranism in precisely the same unhistorical spirit, or are endeavouring, like Tolstoy, to revive Christianity in its oldest and most primitive form. So, again, the return to Kant or to Hegel or to Schopenhauer as oracles of

philosophical truth involves in each case precisely the same misuse of the historical sense. The true historical sense, according to Eucken, is the intuitive appreciation of the distinction between the eternal and the specifically temporal, the power to grasp past and future alike as effectively convergent within present spiritual experience. But before we can reassimilate the essence of past history in this living way we must have broken with the past in all less inward respects. To reanimate the past in and through present inward experience we must already have broken with it *qua* event. To enlarge our own life freely in contact with the great spiritual heritage of history, we must have broken from every embodied organization that would simply absorb us back into itself. We must claim our right to reinterpret, to further, to reorganize, if necessary, whatever organizations we eventually ally ourselves with. Organizations were made for man, and not man for organizations, but to apply this central truth of earliest Christendom we must radically break with every form of traditional authority that puts the organization before the man. This is the fundamental requisite of every philosophy of history that speaks in the name of freedom.

## CHAPTER VI

THE GREAT ALTERNATIVE: NATURE OR SPIRIT; INDIVIDUALITY OR PERSONALITY—THE PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW—THE BEING-FOR-SELF AND THE PRINCIPIUM INDIVIDUATIONIS—EUCKEN'S CATEGORY OF ACTION—THE NEW SPIRITUAL IMMEDIACY.

WE had occasion to point out in the preceding chapter that the vitality and efficiency of a conversion from sense to spirit, to put it briefly, depended on the vivid apprehension of a new immediacy, a spiritual immediacy that could give to the life a steadiness and a power no sense-immediacy could possibly give. The point is crucial, and this Eucken clearly recognises. With a philosophic inspiration that never flags, he emphasizes and re-emphasizes his central conviction that such an immediacy is the most real thing in the universe, but can become vitally ours only in so far as we co-operate in the great task of transfiguring the universe into a realm of spiritual ideals. In the present chapter we propose to try and reach the point of view from which Eucken's essential meaning in this connection can be adequately understood.

The first step in philosophy, according to Eucken, is to realize the significance of the great alternative, the great 'Either—Or,' as he calls it. Its significance lies in the fact that our human nature, though one in idea

and aspiration, is, in actuality, twofold, being partly natural, partly spiritual.] The great question, however, is not whether we shall or shall not entirely sever all connection with the natural order. That is out of the question. Our human nature in this present dispensation is virtually bound on its lower side to this natural order, and would perish if severed from it. Nature remains, and may even show its power over us most irresistibly when we have ascetically renounced it. The alternative is a question of primacy and supremacy. A spiritual world with new values of its own, the Good, the Beautiful, the True, is also in partial possession of our divided nature, and we have to decide whether we shall bend our energies towards leaving it in full control of the whole, or whether we shall allow the natural incentives of use and comfort and individual ambition to dominate and control the values of the spiritual realm. Until we have consciously realized the significance of this choice, there can be no genuine philosophy for us. For the measure and standard of our thought is fixed by the measure and standard of our life. The primary issues are *vital*, they affect our place in the Cosmos, and the first questions in philosophy are therefore addressed, not to the speculative intellect, but to our personality as a whole.]

Eucken is most emphatic on this point. There is, he urges, a fundamental cleavage in our being. Our life does not move on a single surface, but on two different levels at once, the levels of nature and of spirit. The reality of the natural level cannot be contested. The world as given to us cannot be taken away by the ascendancy of the spiritual. However

sublimated our being may become, we remain, as men and women, vitally involved in a natural system. But this natural system is capable of radical improvement. To seek to better it in the sole light of natural ideals is simply to rivet more securely the fetters which bind us to it. What is primarily needed is not an improvement of its defects and discomforts, but a reconstitution of the whole in the light of the values of the upper level.

We have, then, to take sides upon this great issue. For a point of view such as Eucken requires for his constructive philosophy can give us no more than a dream of the infinite, until we establish ourselves there in the spirit of warriors bent on enacting their best insight and carrying it through. Indeed, of all philosophies extant there is none so saturated with the spirit of battle as is the philosophy of Eucken. It is not bellicose in the unpleasant sense of the word. German philosophers have been accused, not without injustice, of treating each other with scant courtesy. Eucken's attitude to predecessors and contemporaries alike is courteous to the heart. But he has realized that strife and conquest are of the essence of a divided human nature, and has expressed himself accordingly. Those who have felt the force of James's remark that if we put away our weapons of steel and powder, we must find 'a moral equivalent for war,' will find the theory of the moral equivalent exhaustively systematized in Eucken's philosophy.

It might appear from the above that, in Eucken's conviction, life comes before philosophy, and that philosophy has no function other than that of analyzing and recording movements over whose direction it has

exercised no control. But Eucken's view is a much truer and deeper one than this. He holds, not that life precedes philosophy, as the day the dusk, but that philosophy is a part of life. Hence Eucken's philosophy of life is not a mere theory about life, but is itself a factor in the great work of spiritual redemption with which life at its deepest is identified. The fuller discussion of this point is reserved for a later lecture. We cannot profitably consider it at this stage, as its significance depends on the very point of view which it is our present endeavour to reach.

We may give this point of view a name. We may call it the *personal point of view*, and we may define our main object at present as that of reaching the deepest and most fundamental meaning which Eucken gives to this personal standpoint. We may start at once by pointing out what the 'personal' does not mean for Eucken. It does not mean the merely subjective or individual. If we decide for the individual, we decide against the 'personal.' For in the microcosm which asserts itself as an independent centre against the macrocosm on which it prospers, we have the subjective, individual caricature of personality which is pre-eminently Eucken's *bête noire*. An alliance with a thorough-going naturalism would be more congenial to Eucken than to be associated in any way with an individualism which, in addition to being in essence naturalistic, has the supreme defect of pretending to be something other than it is. For in individualism we have the form of personality allied with a naturalistic content. We have the assertion of a spontaneous self-hood combined with a self-interested procedure, the rationale of which can be

supplied only from the naturalistic point of view. If it is held that the function of a spontaneous self-centre is to assert itself, then the justification for such a view can be found only in the theory that these individualistic self-assertions are the expression of blind, natural forces, which a wise fatality overrules, conspiring that the selfishness of the units shall be the means for promoting the common good. In a word, selfishness can be justified on naturalistic theory, but then the self must cease to claim any spontaneity or free initiative. Hence it is that though individualism speaks in the name of freedom, it acts in the spirit of a slave. It mistakes the call of its natural impulses for the voice of reason and of conscience, and degrades the dignity of humanity to the level of the brute.

At the same time, despite the profound gulf between the individualistic and the personal standpoints, there is a feature which is, in a certain limited sense, characteristic of both alike, and constitutes a link of connection between the two. I refer to what German philosophy calls a 'being-for-self.' In recognising a 'being-for-self,' individualism separates itself from the naturalistic policy which it otherwise so consistently supports. It can no longer share the sensationalistic basis so congenial to naturalism, or reduce intellect and will to complexes of sensations; it must allow a certain reality to man *qua* rational which he does not possess *qua* sensual. We find, then, on the lower level of nature where spirit still remains in the service of sense, the presence of a 'being-for-self.' To admit this, is indeed to allow that we may exercise a real freedom in the pursuit of the lower natural values,

for we cannot enjoy the self-feeling and self-immediacy which a 'being-for-self' implies, without realizing that we are intrinsically capable of free initiative. And this is what we should naturally expect. Were we not free to serve a lower as well as a higher necessity, the appeal to forego the former would have no meaning

This 'being-for-self' is the primary condition, the permanently initial fact, of all personal life, and Eucken accepts it in this sense. Indeed, the common criticism which he passes upon naturalism and intellectualism is that neither leaves room for any genuine personal experience. To naturalism, the 'being-for-self' is a mere fact like any other; to intellectualism, it is a mere *formal* immediacy that implies no real freedom for the individual who possesses it. The Hegelian weakness in this fundamental particular has been excellently dealt with by Dr. Rashdall.\* He specifies the fallacy as 'the assumption that what constitutes existence for others is the same as what constitutes existence for self.' 'I detect that fallacy,' he writes, 'in almost every line of almost every Hegelian thinker (if I may say so with all respect) whom I have read, and of many who object to that designation.' Let me quote the passage in full: 'What a person is for himself is entirely unaffected by what he is for any other, so long as he does not know what he is for that other. No knowledge of that person by another, however intimate, can ever efface the distinction between the mind as it is for itself, and the mind as it is for another. The essence of a person is not what he is for another, but what he

\* 'Personal Idealism: Personality, Human and Divine,' pp. 382-384.



is for himself. It is there that his *principium individuationis* is to be found—in what he is when looked at from the inside. All the fallacies of our anti-individualist thinkers come from talking as though the essence of a person lay in what can be known about him, and not in his own knowledge, his own experience of himself. And that, in turn, arises largely from the assumption that knowledge, without feeling or will, is the whole of reality. Of course, I do not mean to deny that a man is made what he is (in part) by his relations to other persons, but no knowledge of these relations by any other than himself is a knowledge which can constitute what he is to himself. However much I know of another man, and however much by the likeness of my own experience, by the acuteness of the interpretation which I put upon his acts and words, by the sympathy which I feel for him, I may know of another inner life, that life is for ever a thing quite distinct from me, the knower of it. My toothache is for ever my toothache only, and can never become yours; and so is my love for another person, however passionately I may desire—to use that metaphor of poets and rhetoricians which imposes upon mystics, and even upon philosophers—to become one with the object of my love, for that love would cease to be if the aspiration were literally fulfilled. If *per impossibile* two disembodied spirits, or selves, were to go through exactly the same experiences—knew, felt, and willed always alike—still they would be two, and not one.'

I know of no passage in Eucken's writings where the real personal inwardness of the 'being-for-self' is insisted on with such vigour and directness. Eucken,

indeed, seems to take it for granted. Yet, though he can hardly be said to have given any very specific development of this central position, the respect for this *principium individuationis* is implied in his whole treatment of the problem of freedom. If nature has a permanent independence of its own relative to human thought and human development, it is at least equally true that the individual consciousness has, as such, a sanctity of its own, its *Fürsichsein*, which constitutes the possibility as well as the essence of its freedom.

At any rate Eucken does not suppose that when individualism deepens to personality, this *Fürsichsein*, this self-immediacy of experience, evaporates into some single grandiose immediacy of divine consciousness. On the contrary, he maintains that the individual *Fürsichsein* is developed, deepened, rendered more sensitively private and immediate through coming into direct contact with the divine life. Eucken distinguishes sharply, it is true, between the sense-immediacy of the lower human nature and the self-immediacy of our spiritual nature, and would not allow the former any possibility of development except along its own line. There is no transition from the natural to the spiritual for Eucken, no birth of spirit out of nature. But he holds firmly to the belief in the intrinsic infinity of our spiritual human experience, to the belief that as spiritual we have the capacity of indefinitely appropriating all the possibilities of the spiritual realm and are hindered from so doing not because we are too human but because we are not spiritual enough. And when he comes to consider the spiritual inter-relations of individuals, Eucken frankly accepts what we may call the great law of

spiritual space, the law which maintains that no two spirits shall, as spiritual presences, share the same immediacy of experience, but must each of them give the other sufficient soul-room to be its own spiritual self. He holds that our spiritual integrity, or discreteness, as he calls it, is the indispensable condition of our spiritual intimacies with others, and that to be one in spiritual aim and feeling we must at least be two in spiritual endeavour.

A personal standpoint implies, then, for Eucken, an inward point of view, the inward point of view of the personal experient. But it implies more than this. It is a point of view from which the whole universe is inwardly apprehended. It implies a self to which nothing in the world can be said to be alien—a self, in a word, which is also a world. In considering what Eucken understands by this further step in the development of his personalistic position, we shall eventually be answering, or attempting to answer, the question we originally set out to discuss. We shall discover what are those deepest immediacies in the spiritual universe in which the life that has broken with the immediacies of sense and appetite may fix and root itself, and return victoriously upon the sense world with reconstructive earnestness and power.

In our discussion of the personal point of view as a 'being-for-self,' we reached an immediacy of self-feeling and self-awareness which we saw to be indispensable to any realization of personality. Eucken is, indeed, too much absorbed in the further development of a 'being-for-self' to devote much care to this initial, germinal position. He does not attach that importance to the problem of self-introspection and self-intuition which

some would consider necessary for a clear development of the subsequent positions. But if he minimizes the significance of this first step, he does full justice to those that follow. A 'being-for-self' once accepted as essential, Eucken seeks to catch it, as it were, at work. The essence of self-consciousness, for Eucken, is self-activity, but the activity of a self that is not *eo ipso* directed upon a world is to him as meaningless a conception as that of a cause that produces no effects. In the idea of *action* or *deed* we have then the characteristic expression of our spiritual consciousness. Elsewhere Eucken refers to it as work (*Arbeit*), but not all action is dignified by the name of work. Work is purposeful action, action inspired by an ideal, action directed to an end.

Now, as it is impossible to get outside our own experience and realize what is happening beyond it, the object of our activity must be as integral a part of that experience as the activity itself. The very meaning of an inward point of view, let alone a personal, implies this. In a personal *action* we have, then, a synthesis in which the opposition between a subjective function and an objective reference and application no longer exists. It is at this interaction between subject and object that Eucken takes his stand as a personalist. He tells us ('*Einheit*,' p. 354) that the principle of personality which he proposes to defend and represent is not a mere state of personal experience which exists in entire indifference to objective fact, but a life of action which includes and envelops an objectivity within itself, and transfigures it in so doing.

In the stress which he lays upon the synthesis of

action as the true spiritual *fact* (*Tatsache*) in its simplest form, Eucken gives a clear and definite expression to what is at bottom an equally fundamental tenet of the so-called philosophical psychology, as represented, for instance, by Professor Stout. The interest which unifies a psychical process implies at the same time a series of events beyond that process. It is this unification of events that first constitutes the object upon which all the interest is directed. A unity of idea or aim as expressed in the action through which the idea works itself out, or the aim is accomplished, separates itself into two concomitant processes which remain relatively independent of each other. The nature of the object upon which a scientific interest, for instance, is directed, determines the result of the scientific inquiry, though the variations of the interest as it branches or darts from one method or hypothesis into another are in no sense mere reactions to the stimulus of the object. Thus the pragmatic and the functional aspects of the total process, to use Eucken's own expressions, co-operate in transforming an indeterminate intention, or indeterminate total idea, into a determinate unity which we may describe indifferently as an object understood, or an activity rooted in objective knowledge.

In a simple process of this kind we have what Eucken distinctively refers to as a *Volltat*, a self-contained deed or complete action. There is no real difference for Eucken between a *Tat* and a *Volltat*, but he makes use of the latter term as a concession to the ordinary consciousness which is accustomed to look upon an action either from the subjective side only, as a mere doing, or from the objective side only, as a mere result.

The analysis of a *Volltat* brings out the following as its distinctive characteristics :

1. The spiritual principle which sunders itself into subjective activity and objective counterpart, whilst it develops itself through this self-cleavage, still retains its identity throughout. The *Volltat* is a *unity*.

2. This unity develops itself through a real dialectical process of which a self-diremption and a self-synthesis are the essential moments.

3. Each of the two processes, the subjective and the objective, develops in relative independence of the other and also of the spiritual principle which envelops both. At the same time each is inseparable, spiritually inseparable, both from the sister-process and the parent principle which it helps to develop. In a word, the *Volltat* is throughout the expression of a *free* principle. Its dialectic is that, not of logical necessity, but of freedom.

The duality of subject and object for Eucken does not amount, then, to a dualism. The duality itself first appears as the mode through which a personal unity attains to its own self-realization. It is the form which development from the indeterminate to the determinate assumes when such development is the development of a *personal* life. It is the evolutionary method of *freedom*. There can be no *action*, says Eucken, without this duality : 'Keine Tat ohne Zweiheit' ; and the duality itself is indigenous to the action ; it is both *grounded* within it and *overcome* within it.

The problem of the relation of subject to object is therefore solved by Eucken, not intellectually, through the help of some supreme logical category,

but by means of the concrete idea of *action*. The opposition arises within what Eucken would call a vital process, and can be consummated only through the spiritual energy of that process. The belief that in studying the opposition closely it will be seen to vanish is, in Eucken's conviction, an academical illusion, born of the vapours of intellectualism. The opposition arises within the action because it is necessary to the action's own self-development. Once power or force of any kind is put forth, the diremption has already taken place, for power *per se* with nothing against which it can be directed is unthinkable. And when, as in the contemplation of a perfect work of art or the frictionless exercise of a formed habit, there is felt neither subjective stress nor any answering strain of resistance in the object, it is because the object has yielded to the ideal and the ideal is embodied in it. The reconciliation is here achieved within the very action that brought the opposition into being. Similarly the answer to a question, or the satisfaction of a wonder, is given within the very same interest-process in which the question was first put or the wonder first awoke.

But when we pass from these lesser actions on a small human scale, actions in which subjective and objective divide only to coalesce harmoniously in some achievement of purpose or ideal, to similar-spirited actions of a world-wide scope and significance; when we consider the questions which humanity has asked from its cradle and is still asking to-day, we find many a diremption that has not yet closed, and, indeed, many that have not even been opened, and yet cannot be evaded. This suggests that we are by no means

entitled to assert that the opposition between the self and the world, or, in intellectualistic form, between subject and object, has as yet been wholly overcome. This is perfectly true. But in the great *deeds* of which history is the record, the oppositions have already been so nobly transcended and in such fruitful ways, as to inspire us with confidence that fuller and still richer reconciliations are in store for us. The world of our present experience, as Eucken never wearies of reminding us, is not a finished world, and we are still privileged to play our part in its more satisfactory reconstruction. That we shall still leave the task unfinished when we die need not trouble us, for our task as world-workers is neither to begin nor to finish, but to carry on. And this is the true freedom philosophy. A philosophy that has already achieved the solution of all human oppositions may leave much for our reflection, but leaves nothing for our freedom.

Eucken's philosophy is not of this type. It leaves much to human courage in the future. But it points us to a supreme, all-enveloping action, the action of a spiritual life that is at once the life of a person and the life of a world. I say 'points' advisedly, for Eucken makes no pretence at a systematic proof of this supreme life whose penetrating presence in our lives is the source of all their power and hope. It cannot be proved *in the ordinary sense*, for there is no higher tribunal at which to test its claims. But the need for postulating it is, in Eucken's belief, a necessity more vital and more cogent than any mere logical ground could ever be, and the true proof of its existence is given by the spiritual fruitfulness with which it invests the lives that are inspired by belief in it.



Religion would be in a bad way, says Eucken, were her working activity dependent on the conviction which the proofs of God's existence exercise over men's intellects. And where would morality be, he asks, if we were not justified in speaking the truth until the duty of truthfulness had been made clear as the daylight? And what place would art have in our lives had we to suspend our appreciation of the beautiful till we had become experts in æsthetic theory? Eucken's own explicit conviction is that the immediate revelation of this all-inclusive spiritual life to ours, and its power to maintain itself steadily in presence of the perils and limitations of our human nature, is an axiomatic fact, apart from which there can be no root of truth or of reason in our lives at all. It is in this intimacy of our life with God's that Eucken finds the new immediacy that can alone satisfy the life that has broken from the immediacy of sense, and inspire our human frailty for its redemptive mission in the world.\*

In our next chapter I hope to show what Eucken precisely understands by this new immediacy and the redemptive task which it renders possible.

\* For further information on the points raised in this chapter, more particularly as regards Eucken's *personalistic* position, and the *Tatcharakter* of his philosophy, the reader who can read German should consult H. Leser of Erlangen's brief but able appreciation of the new idealism, entitled 'Der Grundcharakter der Euckenschen Philosophie' (May, 1906).

## CHAPTER VII

### EUCKEN'S VIEW OF REVELATION—THE PROBLEM OF THE UNION OF HUMAN AND DIVINE—EUCKEN'S 'IRRATIONALISM' IN THE LIGHT OF HIS OWN THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

WE have already seen that the inward point of view of a 'being-for-self' necessitates our conceiving all experience, and all spiritual development in particular, as a personal realization. This personal realization, as Eucken understands it, is not a mere feeling, however mystical and self-convinced that feeling may be, nor can it be identified with a mere intellectual persuasion, nor yet with the intuitive awareness we have of our own resolutions. For *qua* personal it must be subjective and objective in one, and this it can be only in and through effective action. In the satisfactions of earnest fruitful labour that winnows all the pettiness and subjective self-centredness from our life, we have a genuine form of personal realization.

But a man's work or labour is not ultimate. It may even come to tyrannize over him. He has then to remember that he is more than his work, and to fight it as a hindrance to his true personal development. It may be necessary, at the call of family, society, or state to sink one's own life-work in a more important cause. A man must, therefore, sit loose from his work. But

he could not be justified in sitting loose from it if it were ultimate.//

We are speaking now of work as personal realization, of work that is not only objective, but, in the sense of involving a 'being-for-self,' genuinely subjective as well. With work that is not a personal realization but simply serves to strengthen a non-spiritual order of things—*e.g.*, a merely utilitarian or pleasure-seeking dispensation—we are not concerned.

Our point is, then, that genuine personal work into which a Goethe might have concentrated the powers of his soul may come, even through the very concentration that ennobles it, to be a narrowing or a hardening influence. It then becomes essential, in the interest of the personality represented in the work, to fall back upon the more absolute principles of which the work is only a specific form of concentration.

It is when our personal activity presses thus earnestly inwards to the secret sources of its life and strength that, in Eucken's view, it becomes susceptible to the presence and power of those redeeming spiritual activities which are the deepest revelation within our personal consciousness. Our moral activities seeking for the sources of their inspiration receive in the depths of our nature a reawakening and renewal that can only be called religious, our human freedom is uplifted and consecrated by a grace that is no mere product of our own activity but a salvation straight from God.

This is the essence of Eucken's view of revelation, a view entirely in harmony with the whole groundwork of his philosophy, as a philosophy at once of action and of spiritual inwardness. There is a tendency for

religious feeling to oppose to the strife and unrest of human weakness a divinity of peace and calm. In uniting itself with the divine, the human is conceived as passing from the storm of the open sea to the stillness of the protecting haven. Mystical emotion again is apt to rest in the vision of God or in the sense of His nearness, as though God were just a presence surrounding and penetrating the soul as space may be said to surround and penetrate the body. Such views have a deep preliminary significance, but they inadequately represent the requirements of religious emotion which seeks its essential fulfilment not in blessedness but in remedial action. To a philosophy which is at once a philosophy of action, inwardness, and personality, revelation appears actively as salvation, and God as intrinsically a Saviour.

The point at issue is the nature of the relation of the human to the divine. Inwardly viewed it must be a personal realization, and as such must be more than any mere heightening of subjective experience. For personal realization is the experience that transcends the opposition of subject and object.

Again, personal realization is essentially the realization of personality through action. But *whose* is the action? Suppose that the deed, which in its inwardness embodies and realizes the personality, is disinterestedly inspired by the great ideals we are accustomed to refer to as Truth, Beauty, Goodness. *Whose*, then, is the deed? If I say 'It is mine,' what do I mean by 'mine'? I mean 'mine as inspired by the ideal.' But, again, what does this mean? How can I be inspired by this breath of the ideal? The solution is here wrapped up in a metaphor, and we must unravel

the metaphor by personalizing its terms. If we keep on an abstract intellectualistic level, we may, it is true, reduce the 'I' to an 'idea,' and retain the term 'ideal' to denote the most perfect expression of that idea, but if we retain the 'I' in its full concreteness as the I of personal realization, then the ideal, to be effective over it, must itself be a personality enveloping and penetrating the 'I' or 'Me' at least as intimately as the ideal envelopes and penetrates the idea.

To fall back upon the *principle* which inspires and idealizes one's personal work is therefore to fall back, not upon a concept or a mere abstract, unappropriated activity, but upon the ultimate personality—for nothing can be more ultimate than a principle—in whom the power of the ideal is finally vested.

The deed done in the name of the ideal is then both God's and mine. It cannot be mine only, for it may not express my private interest at all; it may mean the laying down of my life, when the life-work I have planned is beckoning me to live on for the sake of completing it. Nor can it be God's only in any sense of the idea that minimises the importance of the human 'I.' The personal point of view with its insistence on a 'being-for-self' forbids this. It is then God's and mine, and if we wish to gain a preliminary conception of the relation of the two activities to each other, we may compare the directionless and inward unrest of an idea uninspired by an ideal, with the oneness of aim and the inward quiet of an idea which, in working itself forth, is fulfilling its ideal. So the activity which meets our own when we fall back upon principle is an activity which gives unity and inward confidence to ours, directs it towards aims that have

absolute significance, and in this way saves it from its own weakness and blindness.

This active transfiguration of the human self through this divine renewal and redirection has in its first inception a germinal significance only. God and man initially meet where man is most inward. The deepest immediacy of experience, where the spirit comes into direct contact with its own vital principle, the hearth and focus of all our spiritual life, and the centre of its unceasing birth and renewal, is what Eucken calls *Gemüth*. The *Gemüth* is the birth-place of the spiritual life. It is no mere feeling or emotion but a personal immediacy, and the concentration-centre of our full personal experience. It is the spiritual home to which our life incessantly returns for its revivification. It is also the vital starting-point for that constructive philosophy of life which Eucken has called the new idealism.

It is at this crucial point that we first come across what it is perhaps not unjust to describe as an irrationalistic tendency in Eucken's philosophy. For when we come to look deeper into his treatment of the relation of human and divine, and of other fundamental relations of our experience, we find Eucken resigning himself in respect to these problems to an irrationalism which is radically inconsistent with his own theory of knowledge.

Let us first of all consider the direct answers which Eucken gives to the fundamental questions of our spiritual experience.

In his inaugural address at Jena in 1874 we find already the following definite statement: 'How the universal indeed can enter into the particular and

there take on a peculiar form, the macrocosm being mirrored afresh within the microcosm, this is a problem of which the radical explanation surpasses the capacity of the human reason.'

This same conviction that the problem is ultimate and insoluble is expressed in different forms in Eucken's later treatises. Thus in the volume on 'The Struggle for a Concrete Spiritual Experience' (p. 293), we read the following: 'The possibility of the identification of our humanity with the all-powerful Spirit can be established only through the fact of its realization. It is only the reality that can here prove the possibility.' In the same passage we have the free, self-originated, self-motived activity (*Schaffen*) which is ours through our union with the infinite, an activity independent of all given motives and presuppositions, characterized at once as the enigma of enigmas and the absolutely certain and immediate. In the same passage again (p. 294) we have the oneness of supremest freedom and profoundest dependence referred to as 'the great mystery and yet sun-clear truth of all fruitful spiritual life.'

In his later volume on 'The Truth of Religion' (p. 433) Eucken re-emphasizes these same convictions. The union of man with God, we read, is the great miracle upon which our spiritual life is founded. . . . The wonder of wonders is the human made divine through God's superior power.

We also have the following passage (p. 194) :

'The origination of freedom out of grace, of a self-sustaining activity out of a condition of dependence, is a fundamental fact that defies all explanation.) As the supreme condition of the spiritual life it has an

absolutely axiomatic character.' And Eucken goes on to add that there is a more general problem underlying this, the problem of the origination out of the system of the universe of thinking, feeling beings who maintain their own experience against everything else. If this latter problem can be solved, he adds, we may hope to proceed to the solution of the former.

In these quotations we see brought together three intimately related problems: (1) the union of the human and the divine; (2) the firstness, underivedness, and absoluteness of our freedom as spiritual beings; and (3) the oneness of this moral freedom with our deep religious dependence upon God; and all three problems are characterized as being at once insoluble mysteries and axiomatic certainties.

I am convinced that these conclusions of Eucken are liable, in the form in which they are expressed, to mislead the reader as to his real convictions concerning the possibilities of the human mind. Eucken's own premises, as we hope to show, justify, if they do not necessitate, a solution that does truer justice to the dignity of our spiritual reason.

Let us consider, in the first place, the paradoxical identification of the insoluble mystery and the axiomatic certainty.

Eucken's meaning here seems plain enough. The conviction which he states in this paradoxical form is that we can be *vitally* certain through actual experience of much that we cannot justify on rational grounds. Augustine's saying with regard to the meaning of 'time'—that he knew perfectly well what it meant so long as he was not questioned about it, but was lost in perplexities so soon as he tried to justify his confi-



dence—aptly illustrates the situation. The distinction is not between a mere subjective confidence and a failure to justify that confidence objectively, but between a certainty objectively grounded in experience and an intrinsic incapacity on the part of the reason to explain the ground of the certainty. It is fundamental with Eucken that doubt is not cured by meditation, but by action. Meditation by itself may very well give good answers to questions that have an academic interest only. The questions which mere meditation suggests may be answered by mere meditation, but the problems of our life-process can be solved only by the life-process itself. The nature of the solution, in fact, must correspond to that of the problem. Where the problem is vital, the solution must be vital. Here Eucken is surely on safe ground. We would not dispute for a moment the overwhelming persuasiveness of these vital synthetic solutions of problems as yet unsolved by intellectual analysis. As Eucken himself maintains, these inner proofs of the spirit spring forth with inexhaustible profusion and eternal freshness from the experiences of a life in which human and divine have inexplicably met. The creative energy remains with us, and meets every new obstacle with new spiritual insight. We have immediate experience of a new world of the spirit shaping itself in and through the glad devotion of our life. It is this perpetual wonder of God's presence in us that overcomes all doubt and gives us firm support through the ceaseless conflicts of existence. The issue, as Eucken insists, lies not with our analytic reason, but with the energy and sincerity with which we set ourselves to freely realize our spiritual resources. It is spiritual

heroism, and not an endless meditation, that solves the problems of our life. And what is needed above all is a courageous spiritual fellowship in the great task of shaping a true social culture, of creating a realm in which spiritual ideals are powers that perpetually realize themselves afresh in all the detail of existence, and all life and action are enveloped in a pervading spiritual atmosphere. This is far from being mere idealistic eloquence. I am convinced that Eucken is profoundly right in justifying the intuitive certainties that spring from heroic action, not, of course, as scientific conclusions, but as conclusions of fundamental personal value and significance. We may have axiomatic certainty of the personal kind, whilst the bases of our life and certainty, our absolute freedom, our oneness with God, our absolute dependence on Him, remain matters of simple faith, and apparently unintelligible to the reason.

But Eucken says more than this. He asserts, as we saw, that the reason is powerless to deal with these fundamentals, and that it must here *give place* to the heroic life. If Voltaire's 'Candide' recommends us to work without thinking, as the sole device for rendering our life tolerable, Eucken here recommends us to act without reasoning, as the sole device for rendering our life confident, and freeing it from the canker of doubt.

The recommendation is, however, out of keeping with the function which Eucken deliberately assigns to the reason in his criticism of its powers and limitations.\* Eucken's main contention in this matter is

\* The main discussion on this point is to be found in 'Die Einheit des Geisteslebens,' pp. 296-310, and in 'Der Kampf um einen Geistigen Lebensinhalt,' pp. 164-170, 343.

that the function of thought-categories can only be understood in intimate connection with the categories of life and personality. The ascending *concrete* stages of *reality*—the sensual, the subjective, the spiritual—are the genuine categories which we must realize as our own experience before we can hope to shape the problems they suggest in an intellectually intelligible form. So naturalism as a theory arises within naturalism as a vital process, and the new idealism as a theory has its origin within the spiritual life. Thus, when we speak of the world and the self as ideal or ideational constructions, we presuppose an active progressive spiritual life in which these constructions originate.

A similar conviction underlies Eucken's treatment of the truth problem. Truth, he holds, is primarily and essentially a *personal* ideal. The ultimate criterion of truth is not the clearness and the distinctness of our thinking, nor its correspondence with a given reality external to it; nor is it the systematic coherency of our knowledge, nor any other intellectualistic standard. It is *spiritual fruitfulness* as inwardly realized by the personal experient, inwardly realized as springing freshly and freely from the inexhaustible resources which our freedom gains from its dependence upon God.

It follows from these main contentions that our conception of knowledge, of its function and limits, must depend on the meaning we attach to life. If the activity of an epoch takes its start from sense-immediacies, and is concentrated upon the task of bringing disconnected first impressions into orderly and purposive, but still external, relations to each other; if things are accepted as given to an activity whose function,

it is felt, consists in systematically relating the given, the theory of knowledge which such a view of experience necessitates must be empirical or naturalistic in character. But where, as in Christian philosophy, the dominating view of life is inward, where the aim of labour is to realize one's personal endeavour by giving a personal expression to the world, the theory of knowledge will be correspondingly spiritual in conception. The question concerning the limits of our human knowledge cannot, then, be answered once and for all. The limits will correspond to the limits of the vital process which knowledge helps into self-expression. It is, therefore, greatly to be desired, says Eucken, that in the discussion of the principles of knowledge the intimate connection of the labour of thought with the whole historical life-process should be clearly recognised.

Let us set ourselves in imagination within the creative spiritual experience of the truly personal life in which human activity intimately co-operates with God. Within this full creative process which sustains and transfigures self and world alike, arises the true philosophic knowledge (*das Erkennen*), which is world-knowledge and self-knowledge in one. From its analytic sundering of self and object, continuously repeated, such knowledge returns as consistently to the concrete synthesis of the self-world, and through this real dialectic, a dialectic within the enfolding reality of the spiritual life, enlightens and deepens the whole spiritual process. This knowledge is, therefore, an essential factor in the spiritual experience. It does not develop alongside the spiritual reality it helps to interpret, but within it, opening new possibilities,

deepening and developing the reality itself. It is not a mere means to the uplifting of our experience, but is itself a spiritual uplifting. Knowledge is here less a knowledge *of* reality than a knowledge within reality, and as such cannot find the reality within which it develops strange or external to itself. The conception of a reality beyond the reach of knowledge is thus seen to be meaningless. A higher reality will be utterly beyond the reach of a lower form of knowledge—*e.g.*, spiritual life inexplicable in terms of scientific categories—but there can be no spiritual reality that is strange to the categories through which its own self-consciousness develops, no spiritual reality that is uninterpretable in the light of its own categories.\*

It is precisely this conclusion of his that Eucken appears to have neglected. In denying to the reason of our religious personality the capacity to deal adequately with the problems of its own spiritual level, he appears to me to have treated it as though it were the reason of an infra-religious stage. Our spiritual freedom and union with God cannot be illumined and developed by any reasoned inquiry which is not inspired by these spiritual experiences. Eucken himself has convincingly shown this in the important argument we have just been considering. But that such a reasoned inquiry cannot be forthcoming in the case of what is most fundamental in our spiritual experience, Eucken has certainly not proved. When insisting on the fact that the spiritual life brings its own new values and regulative concepts with it—truth, beauty, goodness, as spiritual values; freedom, revela-

\* Cf. especially 'Der Kampf um einen Geistigen Lebensinhalt,' pp. 168, 169.

tion, salvation, grace, as regulative concepts—he lays no stress on what Hegel would have called the categories of the Idea, categories commensurate with the spiritual experience within which they are conceived. And yet these are involved in the very presence of the new values: for the realization of beauty and goodness, as of truth also, is fostered and furthered, according to Eucken's own theory of knowledge, by the reason that responds to these ideals.

In one of the quotations we gave illustrating Eucken's paradoxical irrationalism, he mentions, as we saw, a problem one degree less dark than the three ultimate mysteries of our freedom, our union with God, and our free dependence on Him—a problem whose solution might entitle us to attack these further ones with some hope of success. This problem, to put it briefly, was the problem of the *origination* of conscious and self-conscious centres of self-assertion. If we can show *how* our lower subjective consciousness first comes into being, we may hope to show, runs the argument, how Divine grace can bring forth human freedom.

It must, of course, be remembered that when Eucken refers us to the origin of the spiritual, he has not in mind any mere question of psychological development. The question is, how spiritual centres can come into personal existence at all. But this is a question which Eucken himself has partially answered. He insists, as all idealistic philosophy does, that spirit has no temporal origin. It is 'spiritually born,' or 'eternal.' He also insists that the 'eternal' can maintain itself only through incessant self-renewal. The problem of origination is here identified with the problem of freedom, and its exercise under time-conditions. Hence,

to speak of the origin of freedom is to speak tautologically. The expression can mean no more than the freedom of freedom, and the real question reduces itself, therefore, to the following : What is the nature of our spiritual freedom ? We may, then, express Eucken's challenge as follows : ' If we can explain our freedom, we may then hope to explain how Divine grace is compatible with it, or, in other words, how a genuine human freedom is compatible with absolute dependence upon God.' And this, again, amounts to the following assertion : that we must first explain the fundamental principle of morality—namely, freedom—before we can hope to explain the fundamental principle of religion, which is the harmony of our human freedom with an absolute dependence upon God.

The suggestion here brought forward that the solution of a higher-level problem depends intrinsically upon the solution of a lower-level problem appears to me to involve a twofold breach of Eucken's own fundamental principles.

1. He emphatically maintains, as we have seen, in an argument of the first importance, that an intellectual explanation must spring from the very vital process it professes to explain—that all explanation, in a word, is self-explanation. But if this is so, then the solution of the religious problem must depend exclusively on an appropriate use of the categories of the religious consciousness. There need be no appeal to categories of a lower order, to the categories of the moral conceived in severance from the religious consciousness.

2. Eucken, as a finalist, holds that less developed forms find their explanation in the more developed

forms, and not *vice versâ*; that the more profoundly spiritual is needed to explain the less deeply spiritual, and not *vice versâ*. He holds, *i.e.*, to the view that explanation in matters spiritual is essentially teleological. But in this case it is religion that must explain morality, and not morality religion, and the converse of Eucken's statement expresses the truth of the situation: If the religious problem can be solved, we may then hope to understand the moral problem. And this, again, as a matter of fact, represents Eucken's own profound conviction.

And we must add this further remark: The infection of irrationalism spreads not upwards, but downwards. If the highest levels of experience cannot render a reasonable account of themselves, the lower ranges cannot hope to be articulate. For where rational development is concerned—and the dialectic of our personal experience is essentially, for Eucken, a rational development—the fumbings of our relatively undeveloped consciousness must wait for their intelligibility upon the insight of our highest spiritual achievement. But if the spiritual immediacy fails to be intelligible just when it is insuring our truest and deepest experience, this relieving light will be lacking, and in its place the shadow of unreasonableness will spread its darkness gradually downwards, till life in the fulness of its significance is wholly irrationalized.

However we look at the matter, we are thrown back on Eucken's theory of knowledge as the sole true remedy for his despair of the spiritual mysteries! That theory of knowledge, if consistently worked out, should bring out the full significance of spiritual knowledge for the spiritual life. } If freedom, immor-



tality, and God enter into that life at all, then, on Eucken's theory, it is reason itself which, as spiritual pioneer, helps the life to realize their presence, their meaning, and their value ; and in proportion as they are fundamental for the life they become the fundamental problems of the reason.

## CHAPTER VIII

EUCKEN'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (*continued*)—THE IMPORTANCE OF IMAGERY AND SIMILITUDE IN PHILOSOPHIC SPECULATION—EUCKEN'S METHOD OF DEALING WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL OPPOSITIONS OF PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT—THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN REALISM AND IDEALISM

IN the foregoing discussion of Eucken's theory of knowledge, we saw that, whilst the basis of that theory was essentially satisfactory, it stopped short of its just application at the very point where the problem became most fundamental and important. The distinctively religious problem of man's unity with God, and the compatibility of human freedom with an entire dependence upon Him, are left at once as unfathomable mysteries and as axiomatic certainties. Eucken presents us here with a new form of intuitionism, in which the standard of intuitive certainty is not clearness and distinctness of insight, nor yet an irresistible feeling or desire, but spiritual fruitfulness. On Eucken's own theory, however, an integral and essential factor in the process through which this spiritual fruitfulness is reached is the active reason itself. Not only does that theory recognise that the knowledge must be of the same order as the experience developed through it, but admits so close an alliance of the reason with the

total life-process, that it is inconceivable that the latter should enjoy axiomatic certainties which remain sealed enigmas to the former. It is perfectly true that the axiomatic certainty *may* exist and justify itself by a type of spiritual fruitfulness that evidences all the heroic virtues except that of an active philosophic reason. In this sense we may truly say that morality is independent of ethical philosophy, and that a reasoned theology is by no means essential to profound religious experience. The experience of a non-philosophical mind, though unreasoned, may yet be radically reasonable. Reason cannot be identified with reasons. The reasonableness of our conduct does not exclusively depend on our being able to give reasons for it. However, we are not concerned here with the question as to how far life can do without philosophy, but with the problem of a true philosophy of life. And a philosophy of life, as Eucken himself understands it, is not a philosophy that stands aloof from life, that it may see its meaning the more clearly and disinterestedly, but a philosophy that is an integral part of the life itself. His contention is that philosophy *is* life—not the whole of it, fortunately, but integrally one with the whole of it. Hence, when it is undeveloped, the life is to that extent undeveloped. Nor is there anything in this theory of the function of knowledge within experience to justify us in supposing that there is a point beyond which a reasoned grasp of principle is impossible and unnecessary. Eucken's criterion of spiritual fruitfulness, consistently understood, reacts with dissolving effect upon his spiritual intuitionism. The deed of faith cannot be *philosophically* fruitful except in so far as the principle which

prompts the deed is held to be at least as fundamental a life-problem as the fruitfulness of the deed itself.

The non-intellectualistic character of Eucken's theory of knowledge is interestingly illustrated in a little volume published in 1880; and entitled 'Images and Similitudes in Philosophical Writing.' Eucken wrote it under the conviction that the relation of philosophical thought to the imagery it utilized deserved more consideration than it was accustomed to receive, and this conviction is itself a consequence of the more general conviction expressed in his theory of knowledge—that knowledge can be properly understood only in the light of a larger spiritual context, in which the imaginative activity plays a most important part.

Philosophy, as a radical reconstruction of experience, has a twofold task—analytic and critical, on the one hand; synthetic and positive, on the other. Imagery has its peculiar use, says Eucken, in the service of the synthetic work of philosophy. It presents philosophical problems in an intuitive form which is easy to grasp and to handle, and in this way quickens our constructive activities through a genuinely positive stimulus, which is much pleasanter to the thinker than the strictly negative stimulus supplied through internal contradiction. The history of philosophy proves that in constructive epochs imaginative synthesis has preceded philosophical analysis, and prepared the way for it. What seemed at first no more than a mere similitude has eventually shown itself a profound forecast of some deep-lying truth. The transitions between older and newer modes of thought have thus been lightened, and a ladder provided to assist the intellect.

Unfortunately, the danger of metaphorical thinking is as genuine as the assistance which it undoubtedly renders. The danger lies not so much in the strength of the similitude, its richness and appeal to sense, as in the weakness of the thought that works with it. What was intended to serve the thought ends then by masking it. Instead of thought penetrating through the sensual imagery of the similitude, and using it as a prop and steadying-point for its own conceptual activity, the subtle associations which the familiar imagery recalls are insinuated into the thought, and weaken its force and independence. Whenever thought does not maintain its own high level of rigid analysis and conceptual synthesis, the power of a familiar similitude to become the substitute for a thought, instead of its faithful forerunner and attendant, is a danger that increases with the slackness and feebleness of the intellectual labour.

But whilst we most emphatically recognise thought's essential independence of the imagery which steadies its abstract, conceptual work, the fact remains that we cannot work effectively without that imagery. Our spiritual activity must express itself through the medium of a world of sense, and our use of sense-similitudes, images, metaphors, similes, parables, under the control of ideas, is one of the most effective ways for ennobling the sense-life and linking it to the life of thought. Hence, when a philosophy rides a metaphor too hard, the true remedy does not lie in getting rid of the mount, but in engaging a number of relays. There is safety in numbers even when the units happen to be metaphors.

Eucken illustrates these remarks by taking up a

number of important philosophical problems and considering the part played in their development by images and similitudes. It will be interesting to consider two or three of these problems. Let us start with the problem of knowledge as connected with the familiar image of the *tabula rasa*, and the similitude of an *awakening from sleep*.\*

‘The question as to the origin and shaping of our knowledge has given rise to a countless number of similitudes. Here where the process is immediate and inward, and yet so difficult for the mind to conceive as a whole, thinkers seem to have been compelled to lend to their theories, by means of images, a kind of outward shape. From the limitless wealth of such images there disengages itself in metaphorical form an opposition which runs through the whole history of philosophy. On the one hand, there is the image of the blank tablet on which little by little Experience writes her story. Plato’s comparison of memory-images with impressions upon wax may possibly have given the start to this metaphor. Of more decisive import, however, was the subsequent likening, in Aristotle, of a mind not yet in complete activity (*ἐνέργεια*) with a tablet not as yet covered by writing. The image here rests on the assumption that the mind which knows does not bring its content with it ready-made, but acquires it in the process of living. Nothing is said, however, as to the precise relation of that which comes from outside to that which arises from within. The metaphor is retained in the Aristotelian school

\* What follows is a translation of pp. 42-46 and 55-57 of the pamphlet entitled ‘Über Bilder und Gleichnisse in der Philosophie.’

with similar import. When in the later Middle Ages we come across controversial phrases like that of the *tabula rasa* and the *nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu*, we must beware of giving them that specific turn which familiarity with the more developed oppositions of modern philosophy might naturally lead us to attach to them.

‘But whenever the Aristotelian standpoint was abandoned in favour of the original spontaneity of mental activity—a change which took place in later antiquity, as well as at the end of the Middle Ages—the simile became clearly defined in the sense of empiricism. It now seemed to assert that the mind was, to begin with, empty and inactive; that it was first set in motion from outside; and that it received its content, therefore, in piecemeal fashion as a passive recipient.’ This was more than mere description in sense-imagery of the process in its phenomenal aspect. It was a kind of explanation—an explanation so plausible, at first sight, that the theory actually received some support from the metaphor.

‘So soon, however, as the matter had taken this turn, the opponents of the principle which underlay this imagery found themselves driven to a critical analysis of the image itself, and they found no difficulty in showing that it gave but a crude and sensual representation of the mind’s essential activity; that the inwardness of mental processes could not be represented in terms of sense; and that the unifying of a sense-manifold and the interpenetration of the factors in any act of knowledge could not possibly be pictured in that way. In some such fashion as this we find Plotinus and Boëthius, Taurellus, and

above all Leibnitz, attacking and demolishing the similitude.

‘ But these opponents of empiricism were not content with challenging the metaphor ; they proceeded to make positive substitutions of their own. Of these, one in particular had considerable vogue—the likeness, namely, of the growth of knowledge to an awakening out of dream and sleep. According to this likeness, the faculty of knowing is indigenous to mind ; what is outside the mind can do no more than supply the stimulus through which this faculty is brought into self-conscious operation. This image exists already in germinal form in the Platonic theory of reminiscence. It was then adopted by the Neoplatonists, who made much of it ; but even in medieval and more modern times it remained as the appropriate symbol of the creed of those who conceived all knowledge as, in last resort, innate in the mind itself. To this group belong not only Leibnitz himself, but the medieval mystics—above all, Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa, Paracelsus, and Kepler.

‘ What we find embodied in this similitude is the circumstance that, under the conditions of our present experience, we have acquaintance of different grades of consciousness, or degrees of reality ; and that we contrive somehow to retain on a lower level what is in the first instance presented to us in completer form at a higher level of experience. This fact is here utilized to impart a certain reasonableness to the view that the mind can be in possession of much of which it is not clearly conscious. It might, then, be contended that in case of other important evidence in favour of this theory of innate ideas being available,



the apparent emptiness of our empirical consciousness in its first beginnings could no longer be held to constitute a crucial case against it.

‘ But here, too, the similitude has not infrequently stiffened into a philosophical dogma, and paraded itself as an actual solution of the problem. As soon as this has happened, there has arisen a justification for the criticism which emphasizes the essential points of difference between the similitude and that of which it professes to be a likeness. The act of physical awakening is sudden ; it transposes us in a moment from one total condition to another. Our knowledge, on the contrary, is acquired very gradually, and at the cost of much painful labour. Again, what we perceive in dream . . . has its source in our waking experience, whereas in knowledge the mind, prior to being active at all, should on the view alleged be already in possession of its content. Does not the analogy, faithfully carried out, compel us to postulate a life prior to our present existence ? and would not this involve an infinite regress that could lead us nowhere ? Indeed, in this strife of images, the empirical metaphor had a decided advantage over its rival, since it admitted of a much more thorough-going development in detail. But both similitudes revealed this fundamental agreement between the two contesting parties—to wit, that each held the content of knowledge to be something given to the mind, something presented to its activity ; for was not the sole subject of contention just this—whether this assumed datum was to be sought within or without the mind ? Whoever chose to defend the theory of an actual origination of this content in and through the mind’s activity itself would be compelled

to reject both similitudes as equally inadequate. Such a one, however, would be debarred from representing his own conviction, even approximately, in metaphorical form, since it is quite as impossible to represent a genuine origination by means of sense-analogies as it would be so to represent freedom itself.'

Eucken further illustrates the part played by images in philosophical discussion in connection with certain important problems in psychology and ethics. Of these we select the following: the relation of motive to decision and the problem of evil (p. 32).

'The action of motives in the decision of the will,' we read, 'has since Plato's day been compared with the behaviour of weights in the pans of a balance, the decision being necessarily given in favour of the side that is the more heavily weighted. . . . This image has undoubtedly exercised a marked influence in favour of a deterministic theory of voluntary action. But, we ask, do motives appear thus ready-made, and do they operate mechanically after the fashion of weights? If they really did so, it would be folly to debate any longer over the problem of freedom. As a matter of fact, the image rests upon an assumption which begs the very issue in dispute, so that we are simply moving in a circle.'

The part played by imagery in the development of the problem of evil is treated by Eucken more fully.

'The justification for the presence of evil in the world,' he writes, 'was held to be adequately furnished by the instancing of cases in which what was at first thought to constitute a failure and a hindrance proved itself, in the light of some larger context or in respect of its final results, to be helpful and reasonable. An

image of great historical importance in this connection was the comparison of the world with a work of art. The simile which the comparison implies is frequent in the apologetics of ancient literature. It is a favourite with the Church Fathers and the writers of the Middle Ages, and we find it still in use in the discussions of modern times. As in a work of art the parts which in isolation appear quite valueless are yet of importance in relation to the whole, and as disharmonies and oppositions generally are helpful through the force and vital tension with which they enrich the nature of the total object, so, in the universe itself, what appears to be useless and disturbing may, after all, be essential to the full harmony of the whole. In epic and in tragic drama ordinary people are necessary, as well as heroes and heroines; pictures must have their dark patches, statues express what is less noble in the body as well as what is more spiritually significant, and even the harmonies of music require disharmonies to complete them, the object in every case being, not only to present what is better, through contrast, in a more favourable light, but actually and really to enrich the whole through the presence of the opposition. It was in this sense that the apprehension of the universe as a completed work of art became the means for getting rid of the problem of evil.

‘But let us examine this image more closely, and see what the similitude really implies, and to what extent it is relevant. It is undeniable that, when anything is set in a certain context, its meaning is thereby considerably modified; but the question remains whether this mere modification of meaning can be regarded as a sufficient solution of the problem in

question. The evil, which this process was to have annihilated, disappears only for that person who is competent to grasp the manifoldness of the universe as one complete unity. But what are we to say of the person who must be content, as all human beings, for instance, must be, with a partial apprehension of the whole? For us, disharmonies must remain disharmonies; we cannot enjoy the promised harmony except by laying aside our human nature. And even supposing such an uplifting beyond all human limitation were, in fact, accomplished, and we could grasp reality as a whole, we should still be maintaining towards the world and its sorrows an attitude analogous to the æsthetic relation in which the spectator stands to the object he admires. In other words, we should not be ourselves involved in the strife; we could not regard the whole process as concerning in any way our own personal destiny; we should not be in the universe at all, but out of it and beyond it. The parts of a work of art, taken singly, have for our æsthetic contemplation no independent existence and no value of their own; it is as parts of the whole that they first acquire æsthetic meaning. But are we to pretend that what has life and reason and can act and feel may be similarly absorbed within the totality of the universe?

‘When Leibnitz . . . attempts to prove that the disorder in the world is but the appearance which the world presents from our restricted point of view, he is led by a very similar thought, though what he holds to in last resort is less the harmony than it is the purposiveness of the whole process. But here, too, the problem of evil reduces itself to a question of view-

point, and no one can accept the image as forceful and relevant who does not believe in the possibility of this reduction.'

The discussion of the oppositions which Eucken gives in this small volume clearly brings out the important part played by metaphor and similitude in philosophical speculation. But it does more than this. It indicates the line which Eucken himself takes up in dealing with the fundamental oppositions of our life-process. I use the word 'life-process' advisedly, for these familiar oppositions between unity and variety, subject and object, society and individual, monism and dualism, are not handled by Eucken as mere thought-oppositions, but as oppositions that first acquire a vital significance in relation to our freedom and concrete personal nature. Eucken does not dispute the subsidiary value of a purely reflective treatment of these oppositions. It serves, at any rate, to impress upon us the important truth that thought in its relation to the sense-world is a principle of unity, and that as science serves to bring coherency into our first interpretations of Nature, so philosophical thought can bring the reconciling strength of a powerful category—*e.g.*, that of organic unity—to bear dissolvingly upon the fundamental oppositions of our more developed experience.

But on nearer view these reconciliations are found to possess a formal value only. They are apt to impress and satisfy our thought because the process serves to bring out the characteristic capacity of our thinking to get beyond apparent contradictions into the self-sustaining security of a coherent intellectual system. But the solutions which satisfy thought as

thought are not calculated to satisfy the more living requirements of a concrete personality. Moreover, as merely intellectual solutions, they are, as Eucken points out, clearly illusory; for these so-called 'oppositions,' as logical thought handles them, are essentially self-made. They exist only so long as thought forbears to use the category that is adequate to reconcile them. Once this category is brought into play, the oppositions magically vanish, and the thinker finds himself at a point of view from which the universe appears infinitely rational and right. And the moral which consistent intellectualism draws from this victory over these oppositions (or contradictions, as it significantly prefers to call them) is that the truth, the whole and perfect truth, is already present in the universe, but is sealed from the gaze of all who cannot make use of that mysterious key—the right logical category.

I think it must be admitted, and I believe that Eucken would admit it himself, that in the ardour of his campaign against mere intellectualism, he has failed to do adequate justice to the power of a well-grasped logical category, when used in the service of a concrete personalistic philosophy. The omission, however, is the less important, as Eucken's own theory of knowledge demands in its own interest the fullest respect for the logical category as a means for clarifying and furthering the spiritual life. Still, it is much to be hoped that in the promised work on the Theory of Knowledge greater justice will be done in this respect to the work of Hegel, and also to that of the Neo-Hegelian school in this country.

But when all is said, Eucken's main contention

remains radically sound. The fundamental oppositions for philosophy are life-oppositions, oppositions which spring from our unperfected spiritual nature, and can only be overcome through our own spiritual energy and devotion. The reconciliation of these *real* oppositions, as he calls them, depends not on mere intellectual insight, but on our personal endeavour, on the courage and persistence with which we apply to the oppositions of our experience the radical remedy of a new life-principle. This is the high motive that is repeated in every chapter of Eucken's treatise on these real oppositions, 'Die Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart.' The spiritual life which develops in and through the progressive reconciliation of these oppositions is here represented as still militant. Our human duty lies within a world of strife. 'We live in the conviction,' writes Eucken (*Ibid.*, p. 10), 'that the possibilities of the universe have not yet been played out, as hoary-headed wisdom would have us believe, and that our spiritual life still finds itself battling in midflood, with much of the world's work still before it.' Hence, the solutions we have given to us are not finished solutions, conceptually rounded; they are indications, rather, of the way in which the various factors that enter into the upbuilding of our spiritual life, with tendencies pointing in variously opposed directions, may, through a more determinate orientation of our spiritual endeavour, co-operate in unifying and enriching a destiny which is not only ours, but God's and the world's.

These important convictions are not accidental in Eucken's philosophy. They spring directly from its fundamental principle—that of a *religious freedom*.

This distinctively religious category specifies the fundamental relation between man's freedom and God's grace. It stands for the idea that man's freedom is made spiritually effective through its dependence upon God. It is the fundamental category of the spiritual life. It is true that it is only in Eucken's later thought that this category comes to the front. In his previous work Eucken's fundamental real category has been freedom, *ethically* conceived as the power of man to be his own law-giver. In several distinct contexts he calls attention to the fact that in moral action so conceived and regulated we have the fundamental form of personal realization, and that the main problem both of the present and of the coming time is the incorporation of the ethical idea or moral principle of freedom in a new culture or comprehensive scheme of social life. The new idealism stands out, in fact, as an ethical idealism. But at the present time, in the light of Eucken's work in the philosophy of religion, it would be truer to characterize his idealism as ethico-religious, and its fundamental category as 'religious freedom.'

The distinctively ethical and religious interest which dominates Eucken's handling of the fundamental oppositions of our experience is well illustrated in his treatment of the oppositions between realism and idealism, between unity and variety.

The very definitions which Eucken gives betray his concrete, spiritual point of view. The essence of idealism, according to Eucken, is to be found in the conviction that there rises within our spiritual experience a new world, involving an entirely new set of categories (primarily the ethico-religious) and a new



set of values (truth, beauty, and goodness), and that this world, which has no end beyond its own self-realization, can develop itself only in antagonism to the world of sense and appetite, with its naturalistic concepts and values. Realism, on the other hand, denies or ignores the existence of such a spiritual realm. Its world is rooted not in any inward, religious immediacies, but in the immediacy of sense-perception, and the essence of its claim is that the necessities and actualities of our sense-experience must be respected, for they at least are real, and everything beyond is visionary and problematical.

The opposition between realism and idealism, as Eucken pictures it, is manifestly conceived as an opposition which has real significance for our human life. The reconciliation can, therefore, only come through our own free endeavour. It is not a question for contemplation, but for action, and the essential point is to clearly realize what direction this action must take. The direction is determined by the principle of freedom itself. Realism, in the first place, must be allowed its fullest and freest expression. The dependence of our spiritual activity on bodily conditions, the power of what is external and material, the troubles and cares of the daily round, the changes and uncertainties of all human relations, the brutal struggle for existence, the whole dark side of things, must be fully recognised.

Where this realistic insistence on sincerity to fact is not respected, we have either the easy tolerance and *laissez-faire* of respectable mediocrity, or a pseudo-idealism which sees in this 'mish-mash'—to adopt Eucken's expressive equivalent for the given dispensa-

tion—the best of all possible worlds. This pseudo-idealism has no religious belief in a new world with new values, but holds that a steadier insight will put our discontent to shame and reveal the perfection of the present state of things. The pantheism in which this pseudo-idealism finds its religious expression is itself pseudo-religious. The essential characteristic of all true religion, as Eucken understands it, is the demand for a new world. Whether it holds that the present dispensation should be ascetically renounced or redeemed through love, in either case it maintains that the given order cannot be final. But pantheism acquiesces in the given order, under the conviction that its observable defects are simply due to lack of religious insight. Pseudo-idealism is, therefore, pseudo-religious, and at heart fatalistic; for if the world is so good, it must needs be a pity to try and improve it.

If, on the other hand, the realistic claim is respected, there must result either a profound pessimism or a genuine idealistic optimism. The following little fable (which is doubtless familiar to the reader) happily illustrates the distinction between these two tendencies as Eucken understands them: Two frogs fell by night into a bowl of milk. One of them, after croaking out his misery, yielded to the discomfort and was drowned. The other, though in an equally miserable plight, started to swim vigorously round and round the bowl. The next morning he was discovered safe and triumphant, sitting on a lump of butter.

The presence of realistic insight acts upon the genuine idealist very much as the milk did on the active sense of the optimistic frog. It is a challenge to his spiritual activity. It drives home the funda-

mental truth that the natural order, unilluminated by faith in the ideal, cannot be tolerated by our spiritual nature. It emphasizes the necessity of a new spiritual order in which spiritual values shall rule in control of the natural. In this way the truth of realism prepares the way for the more comprehensive truth of the new idealism. Realism and idealism, so understood, are friends in a common cause, and against a common enemy. The common cause is a new order that shall not ignore or repudiate the old, but shall transfigure it ; the common enemy is the ideo-realism, the half-hearted mediocrity which, in attempting to trim with both tendencies, does radical injustice to both.

The further solution of the opposition lies in the redemptive energy with which the resources of a new spiritual world are brought to bear upon the old. The solution can only be progressive, but that is all that the religious and moral consciousness can demand. The new idealism is a philosophy of life in the making, not of life in which all problems are solved and freedom has become superfluous. In our next chapter we shall take the solution one step further, however, and make it one degree more definite, as we consider Eucken's treatment of the opposition between unity and variety.

## CHAPTER IX

UNITY AND MULTIPLICITY—SUBSTANCE AND EXISTENCE—  
NOOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL METHODS—EUCKEN'S  
TREATMENT OF THE ABOVE DISTINCTIONS, WITH CRITICAL  
APPRECIATION

WE saw in our last chapter that the reconciliation between realism and idealism is essentially an ethico-religious problem, and that its solution does not depend primarily upon the subtlety of our intellect, but upon the sincerity and energy of our free action as moral beings. The problem is a life-problem, and demands a vital solution.

It is in precisely the same spirit that Eucken attacks the closely related problem of unity and variety, of which the *general* solution is to be found in the *idea* of a principle. A principle is by definition a unity that expresses itself in and through a multiplicity. The mode of expression varies with the nature of the principle. The variety may be conceived as originally external to the unity, and the unifying process to consist in the gradual assimilation and subsequent organization of this multiplicity into an organic whole. In this way a scientific hypothesis may unify a number of apparently disconnected facts. Again, in the development of organic life, a principle of vital unity

may differentiate itself into a large number of organic processes, connected with corresponding differences in bodily structure, the closer integration of the whole structure proceeding *pari passu* with the extent and delicacy of its differentiation. Here, again, in this vital principle we have a reconciliation of unity and variety. A very similar transcendence of the contrast between the one and the many occurs whenever a strongly-grasped idea expands in the light and warmth of thought into a coherent essay or sermon or pamphlet or book.

But the principle which Eucken has in mind when discussing the opposition of unity and variety is what we in this country—since Green's day, at least—have been accustomed to refer to as a 'spiritual principle.' Eucken conceives it as the principle of our human freedom in its relation to the life and purpose of the eternal.

The opposition between unity and multiplicity, viewed from the ethico-religious standpoint of the spiritual principle, centres in the opposition between a spiritual *order* and a moral *freedom*, and the problem consists in the reconciling of our freedom with the ideal requirements of this spiritual order.

It is a fundamental conviction with Eucken, a conviction which expresses the essence of his doctrine of freedom, that every vital system, every system animated by an idea or principle of unity, however derivative, inevitably strives for its own independence. Even our work, in proportion as it acquires an individual shape, asserts itself against any subjective tampering on our part; it assumes a quasi-personal status and a corresponding independence of the action that first

inspired it. Every *Syntagma* or life-system on a large scale claims a thorough-going independence. It strives to compass the whole of man. The power that has conquered Nature, by understanding her and harnessing her powers to its own ends, may find itself vanquished in its most inward selfhood by the very Nature it has conquered. The natural, brought to self-expression by man's spiritual effort, brings its own systematized power to bear upon the mind that called it forth, and unless adequately resisted and controlled, asserts its real independence by invading, possessing, and naturalizing the spiritual life.

It is in the world of sense, under present limitations of time and space, that these deeds of ours take shape and enact their independence. Concentrated into centres of vital activity through the idea that animates them, and variously combining into the more powerful centres we know as the sciences, moralities, arts, industries, religions, they constitute collectively a sphere of multiplicity, of which each unit realizes its own free self-expression more or less at the expense of all the rest.

Where are we to find the unity that shall transcend all this multiplicity of free activity? That is the question we have here to discuss.

We cannot find it, says Eucken, in the hierarchical ideal of the Middle Ages. For the spiritual order which it stands for is not an order of freedom. Each unit has here its allotted place in an organized whole. There it may move without interference up to a certain point, but no further. The whole is present here in embodied form, and cannot suffer any insubordination on the part of its members, but rather presses into a pre-

arranged mould the endless variety of existence. The members may have a certain free play within the system, but no free rights against it.

On the other hand, the solution cannot be reached through a *laissez-faire* policy, which holds that the common good will assert itself in despite of the reckless self-centred freedom of the individual members; and, indeed, the more certainly, the more the individuals are absorbed each in his own task of busy self-assertion. For here the order has no inward significance for the freedom of the members. It is not their freedom's *own* spiritual order, but stands aloof from the inward life, and in no spiritual relation with it.

The first step towards a solution is taken when we recognise—

(1) That the spiritual order is not yet in principle achieved, as the hierarchical solution would have us admit, but is still in the making; and

(2) That this new spiritual order cannot develop itself over and above our personal intention, in accordance with the individualistic solution, but must be evolved in and through the freedom of the units interested. The spiritual order must be from the heart outwards an order of freedom.

The possibility of a solution depends on the possibility of realizing this spiritual order through the exercise of our own freedom. It depends on the capacity of our freedom to pledge itself to the support of the ideals of this spiritual realm, and to be loyal to the pledges which it gives. But the pledge can be given in the name of *freedom* only through virtue of that intimacy of union between the human and the Divine which guarantees that the pledge is not

given to any alien authority, but to our own veriest self. We are, therefore, most free when we are most deeply pledged, pledged irrevocably to the spiritual presence with which our own being is so radically and so finally implicated. And since the pledge lapses unless it is being continually renewed through a sustained spiritual *decision*, it follows that active loyalty must be of the very essence of effective freedom.

The problem, then, admits of being solved. The lines of free action that cross and recross in such apparent chaos in this present dispensation may, in virtue of the inward pledging of all human endeavour, be brought to converge to one and the same great spiritual issue—the triumph of our immortality over the conditions of our mortality, the victorious self-expression of what is most deeply inward in our life in and through—yes, and also infinitely beyond—all the detail and externality of our sense-existence. It is through this *convergence* of all free personal action towards a common goal, through this most intimate interplay between what is most inward in our life and what is most outward, that the realm of multiplicity must come to express more and yet more faithfully the unity of the spiritual order.

I have attempted in the foregoing to give what I consider to be Eucken's ethico-religious solution of the problem of unity and multiplicity. Eucken has, however, given a peculiar turn to the solution through what we may call a psychological, or rather a 'metapsychological,' mode of treatment—a treatment the significance and value of which we must now briefly consider.

It centres in a distinction upon which Eucken lays the greatest stress, as characteristic and distinctive of



his spiritual philosophy—the distinction, namely, between *substance* and *existence*. Our life is ‘substantial’ only in so far as the opposition between subject and object is in principle overcome. Where there is a wholeness of endeavour that reveals itself in a spiritual oneness of subject and object, our life may be described as substantially rooted. Where, on the contrary, our subjective activities assert their own psychical independence both against a world of objects and against each other, we are only semi-active, and the sphere of our activity is a world of psychical *existence* which has lost all contact with the *substance* of spiritual experience. The existential form is the home of variety, the sphere in which every phenomenon strives to assert its independence against everything else. Taken *per se*, it is that aspect of experience in which the individualistic tendency is supreme. What in substance is one and whole is, in existence, experienced as many and dismembered. What in substance is personality becomes, in existence, a collection of psychical powers—will, feeling, intellect, imagination. Hence, if the start in philosophy is made from this sphere of multiplicity, this home of variety, we obtain the one-sided apotheosis of some selected power of the soul—the will, say, or the intellect. We get a voluntarism that develops the significance of our volitional power at the expense of thought and feeling, or we get an intellectualism that develops the meaning of our rational life at the expense of feeling and will. The attempts to base philosophy on the reason, art on sense, religion on feeling, practical life on the will, are so many illustrations of the attempt to philosophize from the basis of mere existence.

The relation between substance and existence, as Eucken conceived it, is made clearer through his further contention that these two fundamental aspects of life are co-factors in its spiritual development. Our life is represented as moving to and fro between a central substantiality and a peripheral existence. Life's dialectic, we are told, essentially consists in a constant pass and repass between the oneness and fulness of the life on the one hand, and its freedom and varied expression on the other. This interchange of essence and existence owes its fruitfulness to the fact that the spiritual substance of our life passes total and undivided into each and all of its existential activities. Hence it is misleading to speak of a self-differentiation of substance in and through existence, for the substance does not split into parts of its original self, but in its total power and selfhood passes into the freedom of each separate activity. The principle of individuation here is not the substance itself, but the time-form of our psychical life, and the spatial conditions under which it can alone be active.

The possibility of such a spiritual dialectic depends, again, on the spiritual life not being as yet in any true sense perfected and fulfilled. If the unity and power of the life could not grow through the freedom of its existential activities, nor, through a reappropriation and reunification of these, strengthen and develop its own substantial nature, this dialectical reconciliation of our manifold freedom with a unity and wholeness of spiritual endeavour would lose all real significance.

It will be seen from this theory of interchange within one and the same life-process, that Eucken does not intend this distinction between the sub-

stantially or eternally spiritual, on the one hand, and the time-stream of experience on the other, to dichotomize the spiritual life. The spiritual life of each of us is *one*, not two. But, he adds, it makes the profoundest difference whether the life develops from the basis of its substance or from the basis of its existence, whether from centre to periphery, or *vice versâ*. In the latter case the centre of gravity of the life lies in the isolated, subjective individuality; in the former case, it lies in a personality which in aim and substance is one with a spiritual world.

With the distinction between substance and existence, Eucken connects the already familiar distinction between a noological and a psychological method.

The noological method is the method, at once immanent and personal, through which the problems of the spiritual life are handled from the standpoint of its *substance*. It is the distinctive method of the new idealism. The psychological method is the method of psychological empiricism, and handles the psychical life as existing and developing under time-conditions. It is a strictly scientific as opposed to a philosophical method, and is the method proper to a psychology of states of consciousness, to a psychology without a soul.

Eucken contrasts the noological method not only with this psychological method, but also with the speculative method of intellectualistic metaphysics. Here the attempt is made to grasp the meaning of the universe by the help of concepts carefully elaborated in the closed study of the intellect, but having no vital roots in personal experience. The solutions have accordingly a merely theoretical value. They shed a

new light over the universe, clothe the world in a new conceptual dress, but in its inwardness the universe remains unaffected. All philosophies of the universe which are not at the same time philosophies of life remain under this theoretical disability.

The distinction between spiritual substance and psychical existence, which Eucken enforces in closest connection with the corresponding distinction in method, suggests certain critical reflections which we now proceed to elaborate.

It appears to me as a matter for regret that Eucken has not rested a distinction of so fundamental a character upon the ethico-religious convictions which are distinctive of his whole point of view. He has preferred, instead, to rest it upon certain psychological and metapsychological convictions which, in my opinion, are open to very serious objections. The ethico-religious distinction between the *Kleinmenschlich* and the *Grossgeistig*, the petty human and the spiritually heroic, is easy to grasp, and to grasp as fundamental; and it seems to me to suggest an interpretation of the distinction between substance and existence which would be far more in keeping with the groundwork of Eucken's philosophy than the interpretation he has chosen to put upon it. That the condition of a substantial life should be a close inward intimacy with the absolute source of all spiritual riches, and that the absence of such intimacy of the soul with God should correspond to an insubstantial existence, is a distinction that could not only be readily understood and followed up in detail, but would fall in much more naturally with the fundamentals of Eucken's own position, which are essen-

tially of an ethico-religious character. It would, moreover, insure to the distinction the full reality which Eucken claims for it. The substantial life, as linked in deed and aspiration with the power and purpose of the redeeming personality, expresses a reality fundamentally different from that which presents itself to the petty and capricious life which knows no spiritual sense of kinship with God, but only the immediacies of sense and appetite.

It is also easy to see, from this ethico-religious point of view, what type of variety is irreconcilable with spiritual unity, and what other type is not only reconcilable with it, but essential to it. The chaotic variety of the *Kleinmenschlich* is irreconcilable with any conception of spiritual unity. As Eucken so emphatically insists, a break from this individualistic chaos is essential for any development of spiritual life, for any achievement of harmony between a spiritual principle and the manifold variety of our human freedom. And the reason is obvious. The *Kleinmenschlich* does not in any way stand for human freedom. It may have the illusory appearance of freedom, but it is really a slavery, a bondage under two great task-masters—private inclination and public opinion.

The type of variety which the spiritual life demands for its own development—the only type, consequently, that can by any moral possibility be reconciled with the requirements of a spiritual unity—is a variety that truly expresses our human freedom. It must be a principled variety. It is, indeed, essential to the development of the spiritual life that our innumerable human interests should work themselves out under the pressure of their own inward necessities; that the

harmful should be played out and abandoned once and for all, the helpful cherished and developed. It is, however, equally essential that this peripheral activity of self-determination should remain throughout in closest touch with a central spiritual experience that gives the true ideal standard of harmfulness and helpfulness, and so eventually insures the survival of the spiritually fit.

This ethico-religious solution of the problem is so distinctively Eucken's, that a psychological or metapsychological duplicate of it could prove acceptable only in so far as it provided a consistent psychical basis for the ethical original. This, however, it fails to do. Eucken identifies psychology with the old associationistic psychology, which is notoriously incapable of supplying any psychological basis for ethics or religion. It might stand as a psychology of the *Kleinmenschlich*, with its worship of inclination and its thralldom to the proper and conventional. Where a culture has no soul, a psychology without a soul may adequately explain its various superficialities. But, as we have seen, the variety of the *Kleinmenschlich* is not the variety through which any spiritual unity can hope to realize itself. The petty culture must first go, and with it the mechanical psychology adapted to its unspiritual pettiness and externality. The psychical life that can be said to *exist*, in a spiritual sense, is life that expresses in endless variety the great principle of our human freedom. If the *substance* stands for spiritual substance, *existence* must stand for a free existence. Otherwise, no form of spiritual dialectic can possibly reconcile the latter with the former.

What is wanted, then, is a distinction between a

method that can do justice to the variety of the psychical life as existing and developing in time, and do it in such a way as to co-operate fruitfully with a further method sufficiently powerful to deal justly with the fundamental unities of our spiritual substance. If the main problem is the reconciliation of unity and variety, the methods that correspond respectively to *unity* and *variety* cannot be so chosen as to render such reconciliation impossible.

There appears to me to be but one solution—the conception of what a true psychological method involves must be radically altered. It must have points of fundamental agreement with the noological method, and points of fruitful difference. It must presuppose the freedom of the developing individual and the solidarity of the various psychical functions, not only *inter se*, but with the object or world in and through which they develop. It must start, not from atomic states of consciousness, but from vital unities of interest and endeavour, and in this sense must be from the outset teleological in its tendency. This would be a genuine freedom-psychology, and give a true account of psychical existence.

With a psychological method of this character, the noological method would fruitfully co-operate. Its characteristic form would still be ethico-religious, as opposed to psychological, and it would imply the thorough-going application of the concrete categories of the spiritual life, through the exercise of which the victory of spirit over sense can be assured, and our humanity and human culture radically transfigured.

If we adopt this point of view, we can no longer acquiesce in Eucken's reiterated assertion, based on

an inadequate estimate of the significance of psychology, that there is between a psychological and a noological method a radical and irremediable opposition. Between the two methods there remains, indeed, a distinction, but it is a distinction which subserves the interests of co-operation. On the other hand, the opposition which Eucken draws between a noological and a speculative method remains most relevant and important, as the expression of the non-intellectualistic character of noological procedure. And this suggests what appears to me to be a truer interpretation of Eucken's meaning, in respect to these distinctions of method, than the interpretation which he explicitly puts upon them. I believe that Eucken has done injustice to his own originality in not connecting the noological method more definitely, emphatically, and exclusively with his own theory of *Erkennen* or philosophical knowledge, and by not defining it more rigorously as the method which applies that theory in its most distinctive and non-intellectualistic form. If this were consistently done, then, once the justice of Eucken's theory of knowledge were admitted, the noological method would have to be accepted as the only *true* philosophical method. In its application it would become differentiated, and we should have a noologico-psychological application on the one hand, and a deeper-reaching noologico-metapsychological application on the other. Less objectionable titles could, no doubt, be discovered, but the main fact would still stand that, if the distinction were drawn on the above basis, the whole structure of Eucken's philosophy could be made to rest on his theory of knowledge, and be developed by the one



method characteristic of that theory—the noological method. In no other way, I believe, could the profound originality of Eucken's philosophy be more strongly and vividly brought out, for the root of Eucken's originality is to be found in his theory of knowledge. Hegel's logic finds its counterpart in Eucken's noologic.

If this course were adopted, and the psychological and metapsychological treatments allowed to play intimately into each other, the sharp contrast which Eucken draws between psychical existence in time and substantial spiritual being out of time might be happily modified, and his own philosophical interpretation of history and the historic present rendered consistent with itself. The 'timelessness' of an experience, however substantial, cannot surely involve any out-of-relatedness to time. A system which, in its mutual connections, logical or noological, is independent of time-changes, and so indifferent to time, is conceivable, but a system which has its being out of all relation to time is quite inconceivable. That 'time' is one of the most fundamental of philosophical mysteries may readily be granted, and the search for an eternity that transcends time by transfiguring its present significance is, as Eucken insists, philosophically indispensable. But it seems equally imperative to grant that our present time-experience must express in germinal form any type of eternity-experience that is destined to transcend it.

With this clear connection between the psychological and the metapsychological treatments, would be given the possibility of a more steady and detailed

development of a theory of logic, ethics, æsthetics, and religion. The lack of an adequate psychological basis in the treatment of the normative disciplines must always have the effect of leaving the treatment more or less in the air, for the spiritual immediacy which is presupposed in all this higher philosophy can be brought home to the individual consciousness, only by means of a psychological analysis of its conditions, and of its reality for the individual's experience. There is ample room for such a psychology within the limits of Eucken's philosophy, for the standpoint from which this philosophy is developed is not that of the impersonal spectator, but that of the active personal experient, and its fundamental categories are not the logical categories of the Idea, as with Hegel, but the noological categories of personal freedom.

## CHAPTER X

THE LIMITATIONS OF THE FOREGOING TREATMENT OF EUCKEN'S  
PHILOSOPHY—THE SPIRITUAL LIFE AS EUCKEN CONCEIVES  
IT: ITS INTRINSICALLY OPPOSITIONAL CHARACTER—  
EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY AS A PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM—  
THE NEW IDEALISM AS A RELIGIOUS IDEALISM

WE have attempted in the preceding chapters to present a connected account of the new idealism, considered as an ethico-religious philosophy of life. We have now to sum up the results of our inquiry, and to estimate the significance and value of the philosophy with which it has been concerned.

But before we proceed to this final review, we must try and define the limitations of our treatment. Our treatment has been essentially of the nature of an exposition. And though we have endeavoured, in this expository account, to present Eucken's philosophy in completed outline, it must be quite apparent that this claim to a substantial completeness of treatment can be understood only in a relative sense. For, quite apart from the limitations inevitably imposed upon an expounder who is obliged to concentrate into small compass the wealth of a many-volumed philosophy, there is the more serious limitation due to the specific meaning which the interpreter attaches to the function of exposition.

By a philosophical exposition we understand an exposition of a thinker's work in the light of its fundamental principles. An exposition so understood includes as integrally one with it a certain sympathetic criticism—a criticism, that is, which moves *within* the exposition, and is not passed judicially *upon* it; for a criticism from within, which endeavours to develop the exposition along the lines of maximal consistency, aims exclusively at bringing out the author's own deepest meaning, and in this sense and to this extent may be justly accepted as itself a part of the exposition. There is an important type of exposition, of a realistic kind, which makes it a matter of conscience to respect the very phrase of the original, and esteems it bad scholarship to make the author's meaning more explicit or emphatic than is his own actual statement. Where exposition is of this type, it would be absurd to suggest that a criticism, however sympathetic, should be included as an integral part of the exposition itself. And there are occasions when faithfulness to form and scientific exactness of reproduction are of the essence of true exposition. I am persuaded, however, that, for the philosophical exposition of a philosophical system, there is a truer way of interpreting the duty of an expositor. To expound a philosophy, as I understand this duty, is to interpret it, and to interpret it is to read its meaning in the light of its own fundamental *principles*. What an author *does* say is one thing, and what he means to say may be taken to coincide with what he does say; but what his principles, once duly laid down, logically compel him to say is a much more important matter, not only to the author himself, but to anyone else

who may be concerned in reaching down to the author's true meaning. Hence I take it to be a just canon of philosophical exposition that an interpreter should make it his official business to grasp the main principles of the system he is considering, and to check the actual statements of the author by a continuous back-reference to these principles and their necessary implications. Such a process involves, no doubt, what James would call the psychologist's fallacy; but the objection, if it were made, would be irrelevant, for the exposition of a philosophical system is not a mere matter of psychological analysis. It is a question of presenting a philosopher's grasp of the truth in the form which does most justice to the intention of the thinker.

Eucken's own interpretation of the history of philosophy is, at any rate, given in this very spirit; and he would, I know, be the last to complain of his own principle being applied to his own work. We gain true insight into a philosophy, according to Eucken, only when we have seen into that essence of it which has a present living significance for what is immortal in us—namely, our spiritual life. To see a philosophy aright we must see it and measure it in the light of its spiritual principle. This is the burden of Eucken's own studies of the life-views and world-views of the great philosophers, and it is desirable that a principle of exposition which he has applied to the thought of others, should be applied also to his own.

It must not be supposed that an exposition so conceived can afford to ignore the nature and extent of an author's deviations from his own principles. It may be as instructive, philosophically, to follow up a

deviation from principle, as it is to foster and develop the principle itself; and in so far as the history of philosophy is also the history of philosophers, these deviations have in addition a personal interest of their own. But the study of deviations, on the theory of exposition which we have adopted, cannot have more than a secondary importance. Hence, in the endeavour to interpret Eucken's philosophy, our purpose has been to cleave as faithfully as possible to his own fundamental principles, whilst laying only a secondary emphasis on such forms of exposition as appeared to express those principles in a misleading and unsatisfactory manner.

There is a further limitation in our treatment of Eucken's philosophy which is, however, closely connected with the foregoing. We have not attempted to follow up Eucken's principles into their varied applications in the different departments of philosophy. This detail work has not yet been carried out by Eucken himself on any systematic scale, either in psychology, logic, ethics, or æsthetics. There is a great deal of occasional work in all these departments scattered over Eucken's published writings, and, in the case of ethics in particular, such work, taken collectively, represents a more or less coherent treatment. But it is in religious philosophy alone that we have what we may justly call a systematic study of a departmental kind, if that term can indeed be applied to a study that necessarily takes in the whole nature of man.

Yet, though it would have been possible to include within our exposition of Eucken's philosophy this more detailed treatment of his religious views, we have not

been able to persuade ourselves that what is in some respects the most interesting of Eucken's works—the 'Truth of Religion'—required, from the general point of view of the present exposition, any specific consideration. That treatise, in our opinion, is most valuable for the light which it sheds back on the fundamental principles of a philosophy which from the outset and in essence is ethico-religious. The specific distinction between a universal and a characteristic religion, with which readers of Eucken's latest work will be familiar, can hardly be said to invest the more fundamental characterization of the religious principle with a deeper or more helpful meaning. Eucken's own attitude to the Christian religion, which he hails, in virtue of the depth and vitality of its spiritual message, as the religion of religions, has, it is true, a deep interest of its own, though here again Eucken's treatment of 'the eternal essence of Christianity' is but an important illustration of his general views regarding the philosophical interpretation of history.

The discussion of the limitations of our treatment of Eucken's philosophy has left it clear, we hope, that, whatever these may be, they do not trespass on any of its main principles. On the contrary, we trust that the concentration on essentials which these very limitations imply will serve to set in a more convincing light the leading principles of the new idealism.

Eucken's philosophy starts, we may say, from a certain definite conviction concerning the meaning of life. The life, of which the philosophy takes the form of the new idealism, is what Eucken calls the *Geistesleben*, the spiritual life. The *Geistesleben* is, accordingly, the central

conception in Eucken's philosophy. Until we know what Eucken understands by spiritual life we do not know what to understand by his life-philosophy.

No just conception of the meaning which Eucken attaches to this fundamental concept can possibly be gained so long as we fail to bear in mind that the spiritual life, however deep and divine our conception of it may be, is not an oppositionless experience, but shares, *qua personal*, the essential characteristic of all personal activity—that, namely, of developing dialectically through self-diremption and self-return. It is within the spiritual life itself that all oppositions are at once created and overcome. The opposition between life and death, which is the divinest stimulus of our human existence, is in this sense indigenous to the spiritual life. The conquest over death, though it raise the whole spiritual condition and profoundly modify our whole spiritual perspective, can hardly be held to cancel once and for all the oppositional, self-diremptive character of spiritual life. So, again, the opposition between moral freedom and religious dependence is an opposition within that *religious freedom* which is the true native breath of our spiritual being. Hence to conceive the spiritual life aright, we have not to abstract from its oppositional quality or conceive it as developing apart from the pain and the evil, the ignorance and the ugliness, which it resists. The oppositions which stimulate and perplex our mortality are themselves part of our immortal substance, for the latter can surely not be of that slumbrous quality which an abstract religious imagination is so apt to give it when, instead of being absorbed in the service of the undismembered religious life, it is lost in its



own self-service. The dictum that man is immortal till his work is done has more power to touch the eternal within us than the belief that we lay our work down with our mortality. But work, as Eucken insists, is itself a reconciliation of self-activity and world-resistance, and its indissociability from our life-scheme witnesses, therefore, to the radically oppositional character of our spiritual experience!

Eucken's view of immortality—which, unfortunately, he does not develop—is that it is as members of this spiritual life that we are immortal. This belief is trite enough when thus barely expressed, but when interpreted in the light of Eucken's own principles, it lives, works, and convinces. We realize, not, indeed, that we are immortal in virtue of our mortality—that would be a self-contradiction—but that as mortal presences, as children of men, we are already within an immortal destiny which we cannot disown without disowning our spiritual nature. As foci of the spiritual life, we are already in actuality and in prospect guardians and joint-possessors of a spiritual realm. Nor is our inability to see into the future a mortal limitation, for we can justly hold that as the past can be redeemed within the abysmal depths of our present personality, so the future can be confidently assured, redeemed inwardly and in advance, through an absolute loyalty to principle in the light and power of which death, the passing of our mortality, does not and cannot count.

Of the oppositions thus native to the spiritual life, there are two that agitate in a peculiar way the depths of Eucken's philosophy. I refer to the closely related oppositions between immanence and transcen-

dence, on the one hand, and between personalism and absolutism, on the other. In Eucken's earlier writings the emphasis falls rather on personalism and on immanence; in his later work it falls on absolutism and transcendence. The movement of Eucken's thought has been from a personal towards a religious idealism, and it is a mere matter of emphasis whether the one aspect or the other comes more to the front. The central fact remains that these oppositions, as they exist in Eucken's philosophy, are oppositions within the philosophy itself, fundamental antitheses, in grappling with which this greatly conceived scheme of life expresses its vitality, and grows in power and significance. They are originated within the philosophy itself, and must be overcome within it.

The spiritual life, as Eucken conceives it, is more than any of its oppositions. It cannot side with one pole against the other, since bipolarity is of its essence. A spiritual fact is either potentially or actually a spiritual opposition, and to be aware of any spiritual fact is to be aware at once of antagonistic factors and of the pressure which urges their deeper reconciliation. Granted the inward point of view, the point of view of the human *experient*, the problem of personality is at the same time the problem of the absolute, and the problem of immanence is essentially that of transcendence. Human freedom, truly interpreted, is seen to imply the Divine omnipresence, not as a mere postulate, a mere hope, a desire, or even a belief, but in the sense of the higher pantheism, as an intimacy closer to us than breathing and nearer than hands and feet. And yet this self-surrender through which we realize our spiritual absoluteness, our religious infinitude, far

from cancelling the privacy of our spiritual experience, and so allying us with the impersonal forces of a nature that knows not its own striving, indefinitely raises and refines our spiritual sensibility.

There is, then, no personality that is not rooted in an absoluteness so ultimate that to trespass beyond it would be to go not only beyond all spiritual values—reason, life, and love—but beyond the possible itself; for that beyondness in which we tend at times to dream ourselves away possesses its power as an illusion only through the aid of the very reality it challenges as insufficient. If the reality it thus seeks to overpass were withdrawn from its support, it would vanish tracelessly away. And so it is with immanence and transcendence. A philosophy of immanence is *eo ipso* a philosophy of transcendence. To conceive immanence apart from transcendence is to conceive it metaphorically in the light of the spatial distinction between inclusion and exclusion, and not as a spiritual immanence which, *qua* spiritual, includes within itself the oppositions of sameness and otherness, of self-surrender and true freedom. The Divine immanence implies, then, the Divine transcendence; or, to express the same truth in the simpler language of emotion, love implies reverence; intimacy, respect. And what in God must transcend all human appropriation is an inwardness of Divine experience, unapproachable save through an emotion of reverence, which is none other than love itself become aware of its own intrinsic limitation.

It is the failure to realize the necessarily oppositional character of the spiritual life which is responsible for certain fundamental misconceptions as to the true

nature of Eucken's philosophy which have from time to time been expressed. It has been urged, for instance, that Eucken in his later philosophy is a renegade to the personalism of his earlier work, that the point of view of the inward experient is eventually superseded by that of an absolutism sprung upon us from the heights of philosophical dogma, without proof or apology, and without even a transcendental deduction to introduce it.

It is impossible to deny that in Eucken's later writings, at any rate, the absolutist aspect overshadows the humanistic ; but this peculiarity of emphasis cannot blind us to the fact that Eucken's absolutism is only an aspect of his personalism, and that this personalism has its strongly developed humanistic side. And if it is contended that personalism and absolutism are mutually incompatible, the retort is plain. The incompatibility may well depend on the inadequacy with which the idea of personality is held and developed. The true incompatibles are absolutism and individualism, but as Eucken's personalism is emphatically anti-individualistic, this easy objection to his absolutism falls to the ground. Given an ethico-religious point of view, humanity and God must meet within it, and in such a way that the intrinsic divinity of the human is guaranteed. If this is not so, there can be no reasoned support for the statement that man's freedom is rooted in his dependence upon God, for a merely delegated freedom, even if such a thing be conceivable, can have no moral value to a being who holds to his freedom as the one power through which he can personally realize the infinite possibilities of his nature.

It has been maintained, in the second instance, that Eucken's absolutism is of such an overwhelming kind that it leaves no room for human freedom.

This objection, though closely related to the foregoing, is more plausibly conceived, and touches a real weakness in Eucken's system. In developing the absolutist aspect of his philosophy, in defending the immeasurable claims of the *Geistesleben*, Eucken tends to lose sight of his personalistic basis. The inadequacy of the German term *Erfahrung*, coupled with the woefully inadequate psychology which underlies it, is, I believe, largely responsible for this lapse. The term *Erfahrung* is identified with a sense-immediacy of experience, with an 'empirical' experience, or *Seelenleben*, as Eucken calls it; and though Eucken does on one or two occasions use the concept of a 'higher experience,' the reader is liable to be left with the impression that he must choose between 'experience' and 'spiritual life.' I cannot pretend to defend the evil consequences for philosophical doctrine of first adopting an abstract mechanical psychology, and then ignoring it as philosophically irrelevant. Until personal experience is justified as accessible to active introspection, I do not believe that any radical defence of human freedom is possible. We are thrown back upon a metaphor of which Eucken makes abundant use: the metaphor of a spiritual principle of freedom that breaks, blossoms, or differentiates itself afresh in every finite human centre—a conception which, in addition to being in essence pantheistic, leaves, not a realm of free personalities, but a single personality expressing its freedom in an infinite variety of personal

ways, and sharing with no one the glory and the peril of responsibility.\*

We are bound to recognise that Eucken does not bring out the full significance of the inward point of view which he none the less so emphatically adopts. Holding that the reconciliation of subject and object in its simplest and most central form is given in personal *action* or *work*, he tends to identify our personal experience with this spiritual labour, and he neglects to develop the still more central attitude in which the personal experient as self-conscious is inly at one with *himself*, and in intimate communion with *God*. The stress laid on action is determinative, as we saw, of the relation between human and Divine. This communion is no mystic consummation of any kind, but a revelation that inspires the drudgery of labour and makes it infinitely significant. This is, no doubt, the truth in its greater and more developed aspect, and philosophy owes much to Eucken for having insisted on it. But Eucken does inadequate justice, in my opinion, to the mystical element. He attempts no rationale of prayer, and appears suspicious of meditation, ecstasy, and worship; and yet if the experient's point of view is taken, and personal realization is, as Eucken holds it to be, essential to the complete idea

\* Eucken's defective treatment of psychology is again answerable, in my opinion, for a strange doctrine of his that our psychical faculties, whether of thought, feeling, or will, are mere existential appearances of the substantial oneness of the spiritual life. Eucken has not endeavoured to follow up the pseudo-mystic implications of this view, as Dr. McTaggart has so ably and so eloquently done in the 'Further Determination of the Absolute,' but, with a happy disregard of all psychological inadequacies, proceeds to develop his philosophy of freedom in his own way.

of truth, these more distinctively emotional relations of the soul with God are fundamental, and control the further developments of the religious consciousness in and through action and saving work.

This lacuna appears to me to be closely bound up with what we have called the irrationalistic element in Eucken's philosophy. There are, I think, three main ways in which injustice can be done to the mystical in life and in philosophy: (1) Through the adoption of a mere faith-philosophy, a philosophy which upholds a spiritual intuitionism in which reason has no share. The faith-philosophy of Jacobi was essentially of this character, and, as such, was exposed to the full force of Hegel's criticism. If the *principles* of a philosophy are to be sought in an emotional belief which cannot make itself reasonably articulate, the philosophy cannot be a reasoned philosophy—*i.e.*, it cannot be a philosophy at all. Whether such a mystic discipline means a mere fostering of ecstatic feeling, or, under the influence of an idea, bursts forth into heroic action, whatever the practical issues may be, such mysticism is *philosophically* undeveloped, and to that extent defective.

(2) The true mysticism may suffer equally at the hands of a Hegelian intellectualism. In developing the categories of the Idea, Hegel is indirectly the best friend of the true mystic; but his reactionary and purely intellectualistic standard of truth—that of systematic coherency of knowledge—when ruthlessly applied to the emotional intimacies, makes these appear intrinsically unreasonable. Hence the aversion shown by certain Neo-Hegelians in this country to a philosophy rooted in mystical experience. But

it may well be questioned whether the defect here does not lie rather with the abstractness of the truth-standard, than with the unreasonableness of the mystical attitude.

(3) The truth-standard, as with Eucken, may be personal and concrete ; it may involve a theory of knowledge that is eminently vital and satisfactory, and yet there may be an inconsistent halting at the furthest limit, a lapse into irrationalism which leaves the birthplaces of our spiritual experience as inaccessible to reason as are the years of our earliest infancy to memory. It follows inevitably that a philosopher who in principle attaches such just importance to the reason should tarry as little as possible among insoluble mysteries, though these are still recognised as the fountain-source of all our philosophical insight.

This is not the place to advance an apologia for mysticism. A truer theory of self-consciousness and self-knowledge is here, I believe, the main desideratum ; and in so far as all knowledge is ultimately brought within self-knowledge, to that extent will the philosophy of life, the philosophy of religious freedom, rest on a mystical foundation, a foundation that shall be transparent not only to the incommunicable insight of faith, but to the open universal witness of the spiritual reason.

The foregoing discussion has served, we hope, to bring out the degree of justice that there is in the complaint that Eucken's philosophy does not satisfy the requirements of personal freedom. It is just to say that in the irrationalism in which his philosophy illogically culminates, in the inadequacy of its psychological scheme, and in the failure to develop the full



significance of the experient's point of view, from which nevertheless the start is confessedly made, Eucken has done injustice to his own freedom-philosophy. The real strength of Eucken's defence of freedom lies in his constructive treatment of the problem from an ethico-religious point of view—a defence of free-will as identified with the freedom of the spiritual life. So conceived, the defence is admirable. It is the best that I know of—the most radical in its criticism, the most stable and satisfying in its reconstruction.

When we pass from the first and most inward foundations of a life-philosophy to the process which Eucken discusses under the name of a real dialectic, we find in his characterization of the negative movement a penetrating interpretation of that revolt from external authority, as such, which is essential to the development of true personal freedom. The dialectical endeavour of our personal life as it presses through the negations which limit its development and its service, into the positive and reconstructive activities of religious liberty, is the very movement of our freedom itself. Eucken has contrasted this movement both with the logical dialectic of Hegel, and with the many forms of non-negational process which interpret the requirements of continuity in development in a sense which stultifies the very conception of freedom. He has further deepened the originality of his own position as a freedom-philosopher by consistently interpreting and applying a view as to the philosophical significance of history which presents the spiritual reappropriation of the past as the unceasing assertion of our freedom in regard to it; and, moreover, the

exercise of that freedom has a redemptive significance which gives it a positive and religious value.

But it is the boldness, the pertinacity, and the explicitness with which Eucken has emphasized two old and simple truths, that constitutes the unrivalled greatness of his defence of freedom. The first of these is the view that a spiritual realm, a social culture in which spiritual ideals dominate and prevail, is still in the making; that it is for us to realize it, and that, apart from our devoted endeavour, the prospect must remain for humanity a mere illusion and a dream. The world is unfinished and our personal life rent by oppositions, but the furthering of the world's work, and the progressive reconciliation of the oppositions of our human culture, is the very task through which our freedom grows to its full stature.

The second of the two great truths is, if anything, older and simpler. It is the central conception in the idea of a religious freedom, the view that our moral freedom is rooted in the religious life, that our freedom as autonomous law-givers gains its deepest significance through that perpetual act of self-surrender which expresses our dependence upon God.

It is Eucken's central merit to have discerned the fundamental significance for philosophy of the religious categories. 'There is a tendency,' writes Dr. Forsyth,\* 'to dwell in a region where it seems narrow to personalize, immodest to define, and overbold to be as positive or ethical about spiritual process as a word like "redemption" implies. There are few who have not felt at least the germs of that common reluctance

\* 'Authority and Theology,' *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1905, p. 77.

to submit thought to the personal category and will to a personal control; and there are many, not unspiritual, who never overcome their repugnance to accepting redemption as the fundamental note of the religious and moral life.' Eucken's philosophy does not labour under the narrowing disability which is so clearly referred to in the words just quoted. Many indeed are the varieties of moral or ethical idealism, but these fail in different ways to develop their religious implications. Thus in regard to the problem of authority, we reach a moral ideal, or a categorical imperative of the practical reason, and it is usually felt that the only alternative for these is some form of external authority. Even Martineau's 'Conscience,' capable of discerning intuitively that one spring of action has over another 'a divine right of preference,' has a rigidity about it which makes it hard to reconcile either with an authority of reason or an authority of love. But with the reasoned justification of such religious categories as salvation; with the refunding of the more or less abstract norms, known variously as ideals, principles and concrete universals, into the authority of a personal Omnipresence accessible to love as well as to reverent obedience, the artificial limitations of ethicism or intellectualism are overcome, and we have an ethics rooted in religion, a personalism that is also and essentially an absolutism, and a freedom which in its profoundest emotions is thrilled by a power which purifies its striving, and in so doing directs, furthers, and completes it.

Eucken's philosophy of life is a religious idealism. The struggle for a concrete spiritual experience finds its explanation in the truth of religion. In Eucken's

work we find not only a philosophical justification for conceiving and fulfilling our life in the light of religious conviction; the philosophy is in itself a religion, a religious interpretation of the meaning of human life.

In this interpretation Eucken's theory of knowledge plays a central part. It presents knowledge to us as of the very tissue of life itself, the battle for light as constitutive of our spiritual development. It is knowledge which focusses the significance of experience within an eternal present, and thus interprets the present in the very act of foreshadowing the future or reilluminating the past: as the ghostly forerunner of experience, its purposive constructions at once idealize and fortify the present, and prepare the way for a more fruitful and effective future; as the interpreter of history, it consolidates our present endeavour, and illumines the energies that make for the redemption of the past. And since the ultimate sanction for the insight and the efficacy of knowledge is, on Eucken's view, a religious inspiration, his philosophy might not inappropriately be characterized as a Noologic, religiously inspired.<sup>1</sup>

But we may go a step further. We have called Eucken's philosophy a religious idealism. We might have described it still more specifically as a Christian idealism. Eucken's philosophy is essentially a Christian philosophy of life; a restatement and development in philosophical form of the religious teaching of Jesus.

Such a description fitly sums up the essential significance of Eucken's work, and condenses into the briefest possible compass the main contention of the present exposition. Let it, then, furnish our con-

cluding statement, as it also furnishes the key to all that we have urged in respect to this great religious philosophy. We have followed through all its more important bearings the outline of a scheme of truth which in a very genuine sense of the term will be the philosophy of the future, if the future proves worthy of it. Yet what Eucken has more at heart than the fortunes of his own philosophy is the success of the great cause for which that philosophy contends—the establishment, namely, of a human culture that shall express, through its whole complex fabric, the heroism and devotion of the spiritual life. To idealists of every shade of opinion this religious idealism should particularly appeal. The depth and the inclusiveness of Eucken's philosophy, its close alliance with life and religion, the comprehensiveness of its substructure, both historical and critical, and its stimulating personal quality, mark it out as the right rallying-point for the idealistic endeavour of the present day.

For the greater convenience of the reader we append the list of Professor Eucken's more important published works :

'Die Methode der Aristotelischen Forschung,' 1872.

'Die Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart,' 1878 (translated by Mr. Stuart Phelps, 1880). The third edition, 1904, was published under the title : 'Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart.'

'Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie,' 1879.

'Prolegomena zu Forschungen über die Einheit des Geisteslebens,' 1885.

'Beiträge zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie,' 1886 ; second edition, 1905.

'Die Einheit des Geisteslebens,' 1888.

'Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker,' 1890 sixth edition, 1905.

'Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt,' 1896.

'Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion,' 1901 ; second edition, 1905.

'Thomas von Aquino und Kant, ein Kampf zweier Welten,' 1901.


'Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Philosophie und Lebensanschauung,' 1903.

To be published shortly :

'Philosophie der Geschichte' (ein kurzer Abriss in dem grossen encyclopädischen Werke 'Kultur der Gegenwart').

'Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung.' An extract from this work has already been published in the *Deutsche Monatschrift* for October, 1906, under the title 'Die Lebensordnung des künstlerischen Subjektivismus.' The article is also issued separately in pamphlet form.

It may be worth adding, in the interest of those who understand Dutch, that an excellent essay on Eucken's philosophy, by Professor Van der Wyck of Utrecht, has been published in the Dutch periodical *Onze Eeuw*. Leser's pamphlet has already been noticed (*vide* p. 99). The reader may also be referred to a series of four articles on Eucken's religious philosophy published by Rev. Tudor Jones, Ph.D., in the *Inquirer* (January 6, 1906, and three succeeding numbers).



THE END