THE

MYSTICISM OF PLATO,

OR

SINCERITY RESTED UPON REALITY.

Επί σωτηρία γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἀναπεῖν.
For the preservation of truth to remove even our dearest errors.

ΑΡΙΣΤ. Εθικ.

Καταφρονοῦμενοι καὶ τὴν ἀληθή προσαναροῦσιν.
Falling into contempt they drag truth with them.

ΑΡΙΣΤ. Εθικ.

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DEDICATION.

to

THE HETERODOX AND ORTHODOX.

There can be no question about the importance of the subject treated in these pages, except to those who do not believe this world a theocracy, but imagine man permitted to maintain erroneous suppositions about human conduct, though this is not permitted respecting material nature. Those who admit the importance of the subject, but think it so important that it may not be handled by them, even though they treat it with the most serious spirit of enquiry, are committing an error similar to...
that of acknowledging the importance, but not examining the soundness, of the very key-stone of an arch on which they trust their lives and hopes. If the answer be made “Let those who have sufficient skill look to these matters, for on their report we rest our confidence,” let it be replied, that to them these few pages are especially addressed. Yet is it not commanded that every man shall be fully persuaded for himself, or, as it is expressed, in his own mind; and that he shall attain this state of reason and conscience by proving all things, for that by so doing he can alone be able to hold fast that which is good? The commandment is as plain in its meaning as it is reasonable in its requisitions. That the difficulties of working a gradual separation from error are indeed considerable, it is not attempted to be denied; but, on the other hand, the danger of continuing to confound truth with error is constantly on the
increase. And, let it also be remembered, every period has its own capability of progression; and if there be sincerity supported by caution, a difficulty may be surmounted gradually which it is perilous to attempt suddenly and at once.

_Est quadam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra._

The question to be decided is, not whether truth and usefulness can be arrested, but whether truth and usefulness shall be promoted. And this question ought not to be decided without keeping in view the actual progress of knowledge and the actual decrease of power; even were higher motives, relating to God’s will and man’s happiness, not allowed to decide the question. And, let it be remembered, there is the greatest difference between truth and usefulness being _led_ or _driven_ forward. The first implies _power_, honourable and honoured; the second implies _force_, irre-
sensible and dangerous. The former makes truth and usefulness the ground-work of a wholesome *authority*; the latter makes truth and usefulness the momentum of a perilous *anarchy*. The first promises to satisfy the reason; the last threatens to stimulate the passions.
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by truth only that the rational creature is able to comprehend the Being and the Will of his all-wise Creator, prove the importance of truth.

We speak emphatically of God's Truth, because we behold the Deity plainly in truth, whilst he is hidden from us by error. Truth has a divine mark which time and change cannot affect. There is an impiety in rejecting, and a sacrilege in outraging truth. The early consciousness of childhood intimates this, and the confirmed reason of manhood proves it. The nature of the human mind, the progress of knowledge, and the advance of improvement show that truth is the real foundation of a pious
usefulness. The directions of man's faculties are too plain, and the objects of God's designs are too evident, to allow of a doubt about the ultimate prevalence and blessedness of truth.

The question is, how may truth prevail with the least injury to the partial interests man has established. Erroneous feelings, when become matters of conscience, and erroneous principles, when become dictates of the reason, cannot be outraged with impunity; but, on the other hand, as it is quite impossible that errors in the conscience or in the reason should be preserved from assault and undermining, these weak points of conscience and reason should be removed in time. Not only ought they to be removed, as affording points of offence in reason and in conscience, but as endangering the sounder principles and feelings which are built up with them.

If those who have knowledge would do their duty, is there anything formidable, or rather is there not everything cheering in the fact, that the ebb and flow of opinion is continually taking something away from supposition, and is continually adding something to reality. If it
be more and more evident, on the one hand, that—

Mutandae sedes: non haec tibi littora suasit;
is there not an equally increasing evidence on
the other hand, that the omen is true,

Hic domus——cunctis dominabitur oris.

And in passing onward to that truth which shall
become all-powerful, is it necessary to leave
behind us the piety to which our feelings cling?

Tu, genitor, cape sacra manu, patriosque Penates.

It may not be amiss to point out a few of the
most striking points of connection between this
Essay on the Mysticism of Plato and a former
Essay on the Religion of Socrates. We also
would not attempt to set out from a point
we have not reached¹; yet there is no limit
short of truth and usefulness that we would
not attain². We also desire to distinguish the
deep truths of piety from the errors with which
they have been blended³; and would effect this
by using patient and diligent enquiry, mature
reflection, and deep conviction⁴. We also would

¹ page 31.
² page 33.
³ page 35.
⁴ page 30.
not allow the mystical figures of religion to be mistaken for its realities\textsuperscript{5}; but would receive that which is mystical in the sense in which alone it can be true\textsuperscript{6}. We also would remove the wall which is built up between piety and knowledge\textsuperscript{7}; and, by so doing, would avoid the evils of superstition and irreligion\textsuperscript{8}. We would surmount a stumbling block, over which mighty nations have fallen\textsuperscript{9}; for we see on every side proofs that \textit{God will not be mocked}\textsuperscript{10}.

God will not be mocked by an union of expediency and falsehood. God will not be mocked by an union of inexpediency and truth. It is as impossible to separate the present from the past as it is to separate the present from the future. The thread of time is ever being spun: as the wheel revolves, we may carefully add that which is true, and cautiously remove that which is false. We must do this; because as knowledge increases, the materials of which human hopes and fears are composed become more distinguishable from each other. Let us beware, on the one hand, that we break not this thread

\textsuperscript{5} page 38. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{6} page 28. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{7} page 39. \\
\textsuperscript{8} page 40. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{9} page 46. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{10} page 48.
by our temerity; and yet let us beware, lest we spin it of such worthless material that others may break it in their contempt.

To remove errors and to attain truth, to preserve individual interests and to obtain a common good, is to promote, in the soundest possible manner, physical and intellectual and moral happiness. When we estimate the fanaticism, and the bigotry, and the hypocrisy, and the indifference, and the scepticism, and the irreligion, and the tyranny, and the anarchy, which arise from false opinion; and when we consider the possibility of all the opposites of these evils being the results of conviction of truth, we feel that we are even less at liberty to sacrifice truth to individual feelings, opinions, and interests than we are to promote truth to the neglect of the feelings, opinions, and interests of individuals.

Human nature, arriving at marked periods in the world's history, resembles a wandering tribe which is divided from a beautiful and fruitful land by a deep and dangerous stream. Whilst

\[11 \text{ page 49.}\]
the faint-hearted are for turning back to the haunts of former barbarism, and the fool-hardy are for pushing the weak and the timid and the aged into a fierce and whirling current, it is the bounden duty of those who will not abandon their hopes, and cannot get rid of their fears, to seek some surer and safer passage.

Before entering upon the subjects to which these few pages are devoted, it is desirable to remove out of our way some prepossessions and prejudices produced by the common forms of language. Few words have a stronger, or a vaguer, or a more unfounded force than the terms orthodox and heterodox. It is plain from their derivations, that the former must have been taken, or rather self-assumed, as a title of honour, and that the latter must have been given to others as a name of reproach. The prevalence of these terms indicates which party had the superior power, and also the value they set on their own opinions, and the consideration they had for the opinions of others. But titles of honour taken to ourselves, and names of reproach given to others, though they may serve to keep up feelings of pride and
contempt, cannot prove the rightness or wrongness of either opinion.

It is always important to observe in what sense the term orthodox is used, and to consider what questions arise out of that sense. If we use the term orthodox in its *philological* sense, it will doubtless mean "correct in opinion," and then the question will be, *what* opinions are correct and deserve the title; and *this* question can only be settled by a diligent and impartial examination both of the opinions to which this title has been assumed, and of the opinions from which it has been withheld. If we use the term orthodox in its *historical* sense it serves to denote "a certain set of opinions," and then the question will be, *what* set of opinions have actually enjoyed this title; and *this* is a question which may be settled by collecting testimonies, Ante-Nicene and Nicene, and Post-Nicene, respecting the matter of fact. But it must be obvious that testimonies, which are perfectly decisive of the question what set of opinions *actually* have enjoyed this title, are not at all decisive of the question what set of opinions *deserved* to have enjoyed that title.
Infinite shades of meaning are given to the word orthodox by those who pronounce it of their own opinions; and these may be called the individual senses of the term orthodox. In all cases it is meant to be asserted, that the opinions of the party respecting whom the word is self-pronounced, are correct. But as contradictory opinions cannot be correct, though they may appear to each of the parties correct, there ought to be much diffidence and great good temper in applying the commendation of this self-praise. There are other senses of the term orthodox, which may be called its political meanings, namely, those in which it is employed to indicate the correctness in opinion of whole countries, and which enables statistical tables of the human mind to be constructed with all the apparent precision of physical statistics. Yet it must be obvious that, as different countries, for example, England, Ireland, and Scotland, will form their tables of political orthodoxy on different principles, unless there is in authority and power a similar diffidence and gentleness as we have stated to be desirable in individual orthodoxy, this political ortho-
doxy may lead to consequences as lamentable as they will be unreasonable.

The history of the origin, progress, and decay of orthodoxy in the mind of individuals might often be given in the following words. More active natures, however they may be misemployed or unemployed in childhood and youth, are forced, at the approach of manhood, by intellect, conscience, and feelings, and by the circumstances of life, to seek a larger development and higher objects. It is at this time that many, with the deepest impressions of the truth of piety, and of the piety of truth, prepare themselves, in all rectitude of feeling and single-mindedness of intellect, for the highest service. The mode in which orthodoxy is then built up in the mind is obvious, namely, either by taking as guides the ablest advocates of orthodoxy, and yielding the reason to their direction, or, in a few instances, by endeavouring to make out the meaning of the Scriptures, either in the Greek or in the English text, but with little consideration of the patristical, heretical, and philosophical opinions which bear upon its interpretation; in one word, drawing conclusions from
only one portion of a quadruple evidence. Now, if either of these courses of study is afterwards followed by a reading and reflection tending to support the opinions which have been thus adopted, it is probable that the individual will continue orthodox. But if the student have drunk at a purer fountain of truth, and have been trained in the school of a more impartial reasoning, he will proceed to examine the proportions and foundations of that orthodoxy into which his hopes, principles, and conduct have been thus built up. How far he may be an object of pity or contempt for the motives he is likely at this time to adopt, is a question which those only who can fairly estimate mixed motives can decide. But whatever censure or excuse may be awarded to motives, observation will warrant but one estimate of consequences. Whenever intellect declines the duties of truth it cannot retain its powers; and the consciousness of sincerity cannot be forfeited without incurring the consciousness of insincerity. As to that intermediate softer ground, which may be maintained painfully between truth and falsehood, and which is com-
patible with the preservation of a certain degree of sincerity, it will be found that the evils thus contrived to be turned aside from the individual will fall with a double force upon the public; and that they will eventually recoil upon the individual in some common calamity.

——— Et jam per mania clarior ignis
Auditur, propiusque aestus incendia volvunt:
Ergo age, chare pater.

A review of the Essay on the Religion of Socrates, which appeared in the orthodox pages of the British Critic, contained one argument amongst much derision and abuse. The common-place mystification of that argument may be exhibited in the formula the Review has supplied. “Grant only, my Aristodemus, that the very thing to be proved is the very thing to have been expected, and it will be easy to demonstrate any orthodoxy.” This has been called the argumentum à priori; is it not rather the petitio à præjudicio?

Hic Pietatis honos ? sic nos in sceptra reponis ?

In a spirit as distinct from a desire to impede, as from an attempt to precipitate truth, Professor Matter has written the following
words in the Introduction to his History of Gnosticism. As they contain the pleasing omen of attaining truth more obvious than the sterner omen of resigning errors, they may be adopted as the motto of these few pages. "Il n'y a qu'une seule manière de juger le christianisme; c'est de le puiser à sa source, et de le prendre, comme tout autre système, dans ses rapports avec tout ce qui l'a précédé, tout ce qui l'a motivé, tout ce qui l'a amené."

If we would avoid being bigoted, schismatical, and sceptical, if we would neither forbid all enquiry, nor exaggerate the importance of these questions, nor treat the gradual progress in conviction with contempt, this true and just process in evidence and reasoning must be attempted by every man for himself. All that can be done for him is to point out the way, and to recommend him able guides. And in doing this our object will be, not to perplex, nor to offend, but to afford conviction of reason and satisfaction of conscience. There can be, and there ought to be, no satisfaction of conscience till there is conviction of reason. The vehemence of fanaticism and the sternness
of bigotry and the carelessness of indifference are but the youth and the manhood and the old age of error. These are perfectly distinct from sufficiency of knowledge and clearness of reasoning and fullness of conviction, which are the youth, manhood, and age of truth. It is the standard of truth which ought to inform the intellect; it is a well-informed intellect which ought to regulate the conscience; and it is a well-regulated conscience which ought to influence the conduct. The dogmas of error are a false foundation, affording at one period every appearance of strength and beauty, but becoming at another period the key-stone of ruin and deformity. No possible care in the builder can compensate for unsoundness in the material; and it is deeply to be regretted that a persevering laboriousness should be worse than useless, when it might be made eminently useful.

"If any person does not see the agency of an established Providence herein, it is he who will not be taught by real facts, whilst it is he also who rejects sound principles. However it may be hidden from himself, it is he who is
irreligious, and will cause in others, if he do not himself practice, impiety. Knowledge is power, even in the hands of those who will most abuse it; and truth will prevail, even though it be turned to man's destruction. But knowledge might be made authority, and truth might be made peace. If, indeed, the most important truths, piety, and obligation are united with insincerity and falsehood, it cannot but follow that knowledge will be united with impiety and

12 In the following attempt to throw some light upon truth, it is hoped that no offence which could possibly have been avoided is offered to piety. In examining erroneous principles, whose removal may perhaps be difficult, but whose gradual downfall must cause, first, insincerity, then impiety, and then recklessness, and whose sudden ruin would shake all the foundations of piety and obligation and society, it is impossible to avoid giving some offence to opinion and feeling. But if an opinion is clearly shown to be unfounded at the very time that it is contradicted, and if a feeling is proved to be unwarranted at the very time that it is opposed, it is hoped that no idle shock to convictions of obligation, or to feelings of piety, will have been given. It must be evident to the reader, that a popular stile has been altogether avoided, and that these arguments have been addressed to those minds only which are not offended by being convinced, because they have consciences capable of being regulated by their intellects. In a word, these few pages are addressed to those who are not more convinced of the truth
anarchy. It is of no use to hide that from ourselves in principle which we cannot avoid in fact."

of piety, namely, that it is the duty of rational creatures to love and to serve God, than of the piety of truth, namely, that it is by truth only that rational creatures are taught to adore God for the designs of his Wisdom, and to serve God by carrying into effect the intentions of his Goodness. Those who are convinced that it is the ignorance of man which leaves incomplete the manifestation of God's power, will not consider an attempt to remove a fundamental error to be obnoxious to any charge of irreligion or impiety; and they will be aware, that, as it is only by frequent and large discussion that error can be removed and truth established, every individual, however humble, may and must do his part; though this, as every other liberty and duty, may be perverted and abused.

Essay on the Religion of Socrates, page 106. In the same Essay (page 52) it is said, that "the doctrines of the Trinity and Providence, if treated in the spirit of true learning and sound science, could never cease to be at once interesting and convincing." In what sense the doctrine of the Trinity can never cease to be interesting will be seen in the following Essay. In what sense the doctrine of the Trinity can never cease to be convincing will be explained in an Essay on the Orientalism of Plato. If it is not to be denied that students of learning are often anything but clear-seeing, it may be safely asserted that desirers of truth are often anything but well-informed. If the Ancients did not attain to all truth, it does not follow that they had attained only to falsehood. What should we say of a metaphysician or a physiologist who should deny the assertion that power must have preceded creation, and
that creation has been followed by conservation. But it is a fair retribution that esoteric truth, when it has assumed the garb of insincerity, should come to be despised as falsehood. It is the agency of Nemesis which causes it to be forgotten, that the arcane and the popular are but the same truth expressed in different languages.
GREAT errors have been caused in religious belief by dogmatists realising, if the expression be allowable, that is, setting forth as realities, doctrines which, as there is the fullest evidence in their meaning and their history, were in their original conception, and therefore are in their only true sense, mystical, however early and however generally they may have been set forth and received as real\(^1\).

These errors may be contrasted with that which fanatics have caused in religious belief by mystifying, that is, by setting forth as a my-

\(^1\) The doctrine of the real presence, which still lingers in the words "verily and indeed taken and received," derived from the text *This is my body*, is become a most notorious instance of this kind of perversion. The extent of its erroneousness and mischievousness is now understood and acknowledged.
stery inscrutable to the human intellect, a doctrine which, as there is the fullest evidence in physical and moral knowledge, is a simple enunciation of a reality, and is capable of the most definite explanations and the most precise proofs, however early and however generally it may have been set forth and received as mysterious\(^2\). The presumption with which dogmatism has endeavoured to give a real and precise sense to the mystical figures in which supernatural agency has been dimly shadowed forth, by means of expressions and thoughts actually borrowed from a singular system of philosophic theosophy\(^3\), is strongly opposed to the weakness with which fanaticism has laboured to give an unreal and vague sense to the plain declarations in which natural agency is spoken

\(^2\) The doctrine of an interruptive physical and moral Providence founded on such texts as these—*Not a sparrow falleth to the ground without your Heavenly Father, and God worketh with us both to will and to do*, must become instances of this perversion.

\(^3\) The doctrine which has been derived from those mystical expressions, *the Word was God, and the Word was made flesh*, will be shown to be a perversion of this kind. May the time not be far distant when it will have become a notorious instance of perversion.
of, namely, in expressions and thoughts taken from the common language of right feeling and sound sense. It would seem that the audacity of dogmatising about the Divine Nature, as if man could analyse and measure, and even number the properties of Deity, was to be counterbalanced by the imbecility of doubting about Divine Providence, as if man could not analyse and measure, and even number the effects of God’s power, wisdom, and goodness. As the dogmatist insists that learning should be arrogant in its opinions, from having been prejudiced in its enquiries, so fanaticism will not allow science to be decided in its convictions, though it is accurate in its observations. And, as fanaticism will not permit men to observe

4 The doctrines of unnatural Human Corruption, and supernatural Divine Grace, derived from such expressions as For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing, and My grace is sufficient for thee, have been shown in the Essays on Cowper, Newton, and Heber, to be perversions of this kind.

5 In the fifth essay of the work just referred to, two cases of scientific imbecility and learned arrogance, both of them founded on perversions of religion, and leading to the most mischievous consequences, have been briefly, but it is hoped plainly, set forth.
and be convinced, by the plainest evidence, of the manner and measure in which God dispenses his physical and intellectual blessings, so dogmatism requires men to adopt, without diligent and impartial enquiry, and on imperfect evidence and unsatisfactory reasoning, disputed opinions about the most mysterious subjects.

Can it be wondered at, when this arrogance of learning, and this deficiency of knowledge, bear hard on men's opinions, feelings, and interests, and when there appears little thought or care about removing these burdens from the conscience, but rather a determination to enforce them, by so much of ecclesiastical anathema and social excommunication as the times will tolerate; can it be wondered at that there should arise a desire to shake off this yoke, and

6 The same persons, for example, who will not permit us to obtain the requisite checks to population, by using means which do harm to none, will insist upon our causing the most grievous destruction of population by means cruel to whole nations. The fanda atque nefanda are inverted, when the "quiver full of arrows," not needed for defence, is employed in destruction.

7 When they perplex and agitate the mind; when they divert attention from sound knowledge and real happiness; when they
that it should be even still less modified by a sense of what is due to the opinions, feelings, and interests of others, seeing that they are not as regardful as they should be of truth and happiness. But would it not be a much sounder and safer process, if these opponents in opinion would enquire for some right means of establishing truth without periling usefulness; of removing superstition without endangering religion; in a word, of getting rid gradually of both error and scepticism?

The error which must have been observed, not only by the philosophic sceptic, but by the learned divine; and which cannot fail to become known to the most credulous and to the least informed believer; and which must blend dissatisfaction and doubt with piety and obligation, chill affection and interrupt social intercourse; when they prevent worldly success, or couple it with degradation of mind; when they stand in the way of much physical, intellectual, and moral happiness, both in individual conduct and public policy, they do bear hard on men’s opinions, feelings, and interests.

8 The world may in matters of belief be divided into the bigoted, or those who adhere to opinions from prejudice; the fanatical, or those who embrace them from feeling; the indifferent, or those who merely acquiesce in them from habit; the
is simply this, that the mystery of the *Logos*, which the orthodox derive principally from St. John's Gospel, is, not only in *word* but also in *idea*, all but a copy of a mysticism which Plato published long before the times of St. John; a system which prevailed in the times and countries in which St. John published his Gospel, and St. Paul his Epistles; and a system with which the writings of the Evangelist and the Apostle show them to have been conversant. In the present state of knowledge and of enquiry, the continuance of doubt, dissatisfaction, or ignorance about such subjects, even were it desirable, which, for the sake of truth and happiness, it is not, would rapidly become impossible. It is as inevitable as it is desirable that error should be removed, and truth at length attained, on this question.

The last writer of authority on this perplexed sceptical, or those who will remain in a state of doubt; and, lastly, the two classes which, from having examined the evidence on both sides with a certain degree of diligence and impartiality, more deserve the names of believers, unbelievers, and disbelievers of whatever that evidence would establish.

Each of these facts will be established presently. This must be received at present as a statement of the case to be proved.
subject, a writer whose great learning is a pledge that he is not likely to make important admissions on slight grounds, and whose high station in the Church is a guarantee that he can have no temptations to make unorthodox admissions, has, in a most valuable and interesting work on the heresies of the first century, fully admitted that the remarkable expression *Logos*, which certainly was used by Plato to express a singular mystical idea, and which the orthodox say was used by St. John to express a singular mysterious reality, was borrowed by St. John from the vocabulary of the Platonic Philosophy. "It is plain," says the Regius Professor of Divinity, "that the term itself was borrowed from the school of Plato; and if it had not been for the Gnostics it would never have been ap-

10 The conviction of reason, and the satisfaction of conscience, are the most perfect states of the mind in reference to evidence. These are the states of mind towards which the gradual weakening of error, and the gradual strengthening of truth, is always tending. The faculties and capacities of the mind, the properties and the effects of truth, equally indicate these as the ultimate states of the intellect and conscience.

11 An Enquiry into the Heresies of the Apostolic Age, by the Rev. Edward Burton, D. D. Regius Professor of Divinity, and Canon of Christ Church.
plied to Christ, nor would St. John have used it in his Gospel."—page 223.

The Regius Professor of Divinity proceeds immediately to support orthodoxy, which so startling an admission may have alarmed, if not shaken, by insisting on certain distinctions between the philosophical mysticism which Plato employed this term *Logos* to indicate, and the mysterious reality which St. John is asserted by the orthodox to declare by this same term *Logos*. “Let it once be proved,” continues the Regius Professor of Divinity, “that St. John borrowed his *doctrine* of the Logos from Plato, and I will abandon the hypothesis, not only as untenable but wicked.”—page 223. Does the Regius Professor of Divinity mean to say, that if the Evangelist shall once be *proved* to have borrowed the *idea* as well as the *word* from the philosopher, that then he (the Regius Professor of Divinity) will *revoke* his admission, that St. John borrowed even the word from Plato? Allowing all fair latitude for strong and hasty expressions, and not catching at this strange mode of stating the fact, that the Regius Professor of Divinity would not have made this
admission if he had considered it prejudicial to the cause of orthodoxy, it may be received as a declaration, that the Regius Professor of Divinity does not suppose himself to have made a concession prejudicial to orthodox opinions.

The fact is, that this apparently frank and bold, but really well-considered and cautious admission respecting the term Logos, as connected with this declaimer respecting the doctrine Logos, involves an ingenious theological theory, not altogether unworthy of the tactics

12 There is the same clinging to orthodoxy, in which the manner of giving up that interpolated text, which has long ceased to prove any thing except the unscrupulous means by which it was thought pious to support orthodoxy, namely, by falsifying authorities. " I may be charged with weakness, and perhaps with bigotry," says the Regius Professor of Divinity; " but I confess I give up the genuineness of the text (for there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and these three are one,) with reluctance." — And the degree of that reluctance felt by him had before been expressed by the metaphor, " I should part with the 7th verse, not as from a friend who had sought to betray me, and whose duplicity I had detected and exposed, but as from one who had been incautiously recommended, and whose powers I had found unequal for the services for which he was engaged.—page 523. Does not this longing lingering look behind suggest the question, whether orthodoxy is loved because it is true, or whether truth is only to be loved because and in so far as it is orthodox?
of Warburton's theological strategy. And let it be said in passing, that if sincerity consists in giving up just so much as is no longer tenable, and truth may be defined, the defending to the last gasp the least untenable position among the outworks of error, then the deep sagacity, the large knowledge, and the unshrinking boldness of Warburton, (altogether constituting a Titanic strength, equally admirable and fearful) were the perfection of sincerity and the completion of truth. But to return to the Regius Professor's theory.

A theory is brought forward as an answer to enquirers, who, being amazed at finding that a remarkable expression employed by St. John to declare (so at least the orthodox interpret his Gospel) a singular and it might be supposed an unique mysterious reality, is the very expression in which Plato, as all scholars are well aware, indicated a singular, and, as it might be supposed, an unique philosophical mysticism, are still further confounded at the striking resemblance, which no attempt to draw distinctions will conceal, subsisting between the doctrine which the orthodox consider the most
hidden mystery, and the system which the Platonists had long before published as a theosophic mysticism.

To explain this remarkable identity in words, and this extraordinary coincidence in ideas, namely between an orthodox mystery and a philosophic mysticism, this is the answer given;—we admit that the other three Evangelists, who wrote their Gospel before St. John, have made no mention of this remarkable Logos, and have not set forth this mysterious reality; we assert that, during the times between the death of Christ and first preaching the Gospel to the heathen, the term *Logos* was gradually becoming applied to Christ by the Gnostics, who were corrupters of Platonism and Christianity; and we assert that this was the reason which in-

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13 "Most persons have been struck," says the Regius Professor of Divinity, with the opening of St. John's Gospel; not only for the high and mysterious doctrines which it propounds so abruptly, and in a manner so entirely different from the other Evangelists, but also for the use of a totally new term, which none of those Evangelists had used before."—page 205.

"We may therefore consider the opening of his Gospel as the earliest writing in which Christ is plainly and unequivocally spoken of as the *Logos* or Word."—page 210.

14 "It appears from what has been said above," says the
duced St. John and also St. Paul to adopt this Platonic word, which had not been employed by the former Evangelists\textsuperscript{15}; but we deny that there exists such a resemblance between the mysticism which Plato had expressed by that word, and the mystery which the orthodox say St. John expressed by that word; that there is ground for supposing the orthodox doctrine to have been suggested by the Platonic system\textsuperscript{16}.

Regius Professor of Divinity, "that thirty years may have elapsed between the date of this Gospel and any other of the Apostolic Writings; a fact which has perhaps not been sufficiently attended to, but which is of the greatest consequence in the present discussion. We must remember that Christianity itself was then in its infancy; and every term which was appropriated to the Gospel was either altogether new, or at least new in its application.—page 210.

\textsuperscript{15} "I cannot see," says the Regius Professor of Divinity, "why we should not allow, or even why we should not expect, that the language and phraseology of the Gospel would bear some marks of the philosophy which it had to encounter."—page 212.

"Though we cannot fix the precise period when Gnosticism began, we may say generally that it was taking deep root at the time of our Saviour's appearing upon earth."—page 231.

"There is reason therefore to suppose that in many countries, before they were visited by an Apostle, the name of Christ was introduced in a corruption of the Platonic doctrine, and that the \textit{logos} which was used by Plato for the \textit{reason}, was now changed to signify the \textit{word of God}."—page 217.
In one word, we are at issue with those who say that the Platonic mysticism was—not only in word but in idea connected with, not only in time, place, and persons a forerunner of, but also in substance a foreshower of, the orthodox mystery. We, in opposition to them, deny that Plato's mysticism is all but a type of the mystery the orthodox derive from St. John's Gospel, and that the mystery the orthodox derive from St. John's Gospel is all but a fulfilment of Plato's mysticism. In other words, the Regius Professor of Divinity admits, (how could any one ever have denied that, which none will hereafter be able to deny) that St. John adopted the term Logos from the Platonic vocabulary. The Regius Professor of Divinity denies, (how could a Regius Professor ever admit that, which he must cease being a Regius Professor were he to

16 "If it be meant that the Apostles did not suffer any particle of heathen philosophy to corrupt the doctrine of the Gospel, never, I conceive, was a more demonstrable truth pronounced by the Apostles themselves."—page 212.

"Enough perhaps has been said to prove, that though the term itself was borrowed from the Platonists, nothing could be more opposite than the Platonic or Gnostic doctrine concerning the Logos, and that which was declared by St. John."—p. 224.
allow\textsuperscript{17} ?) that there is such a resemblance between the orthodox mystery and the Platonic mysticism, that the idea must have been borrowed from Plato’s system as well as the word.

Those who, it is expected, will be sufficed by this admission, that “the term itself was borrowed by St. John from the school of Plato,” and will not feel dissatisfied at this assertion, that “the doctrine was not borrowed by the Fathers from the Platonists,” reply to this answer, that they are willing to allow the Regius Professor of Divinity to make his own statement of the metaphysical distinctions between Platonism and orthodoxy, and to give his own account of the historical connection between orthodoxy and Platonism, and then leave the decision of the question, namely, whether Platonism was the suggester, as well as the forerunner, of orthodoxy, to the reason and conscience\textsuperscript{18} of all fair reasoners.

\textsuperscript{17} Candour requires us to make allowances for the difficulties which oppose the advance of truth; but truth requires our stating the probable effects of those difficulties.

\textsuperscript{18} Reason enables us to enquire into the truth of all we learn
“Whoever,” says the Regius Professor of Divinity, “has studied the works of that speculative writer Plato, must be aware that the mind or the reason (logos) of the Deity held a very conspicuous place in his theological system. The mind (logos) of the Deity was the seat of those ideas, those eternal but unsubstantial prototypes of all things, from which the material creation received its qualities and forms. Hence we find the work of creation attributed sometimes to God, sometimes to the mind or reason, sometimes to the ideas. But we must remember Plato never spoke of the reason of God as a distinctly existing person; it was only a mode or relation in which the operations of the Deity might be contemplated. There are passages in the works of Plato which might mislead us, and which might be quoted, without a careful observ-

and teach; conscience suggests the duty of enquiring into the truth of all we teach, and the importance, not to say duty, of enquiring into the truth of all we learn.

19 The only liberty taken with the quotations will be to print in italics the words to which attention is particularly requested, and to bring together passages which are to be viewed in connection.

20 And therefore may have misled others, and may have been
vation, as proving that Plato ascribed a distinct existence to a second cause, or God begotten of the first. He speaks, indeed, of God being the Father of a Being who is God, the Son of God, and even the only begotten; but it is quite plain that he is here speaking of the intellectual world, the first substantial effect of that creative faculty which the ideas in the mind of God possessed. The Stoics also made great use of the reason of God in their philosophical system; and they seem to have been the inventors of that distinction by which Logos came to be spoken of in two different characters. It was either the λογος ενδιαθετος, or what may properly be called reason, or the λογος προφορικος, or this same conception embodied in speech or sound. The Greek language allowed the term λογος to be used in both these senses, for reason or a word."

"It might, perhaps, be shown," says the Re-
quoted by them as proving, &c. &c. The question is not what is the real meaning of Plato, but what meaning may have been, and what meaning actually has been, derived from his mysticism, or rather attached to his mysticism.

21 The Regius Professor must mean quite certain, for he has already admitted that it is not quite plain. It were to be
gius Professor of Divinity, "that the Stoics differed from the Platonists in speaking more plainly of the Governor of the world being a different being or principle from the Creator of it. It is probable that they were at first spoken of as different operations of the same mind or reason; and hence we may trace the process by which, in later times, the Reason of the Deity came to be personified as a second cause. The same term, reason, was applied to both these operations of the Deity; and it seems certain that the Stoics invented the distinction of the λογος ενδιάθετος and the λογος προφορικος. The former was applied to the Deity when only employed in thinking or reflecting; the latter was applied to his external manifestation. It is certain that no such verbal distinction is to be met with in the writings of Plato; and though he employs λογος to express the internal or reflective operation of the mind of God, he shows in one place this wished that the Regius Professor had not employed, in other instances, an equivocation of words which has the appearance of disingenuousness.

22 No ingenuous or acute-minded person will fail to examine those most important periods in opinions or institutions which may be called transition states.
was not the strict and literal meaning\textsuperscript{23}. Διανοια and Λογος, he says, are the same thing; but the internal communing of the soul with itself, which is carried on without sound, this we call διανοια; but that which flows from it through the mouth with sound is called λογος. Plato, therefore, considered the term λογος to be applied properly to the external manifestation of the Deity; and this two-fold meaning of the term was expressed by the Stoics with the addition of the terms ενδιαθετος and προφορικος. No person can read the works of the Fathers without perceiving that these two expressions held a conspicuous place in their philosophical vocabulary\textsuperscript{24}.

\textsuperscript{23} "Notwithstanding this remark of Tertullian," says the Regius Professor of Divinity, "that ratio is a fitter translation of logos than sermo, I cannot help thinking that the distinct personality of the Son is more plainly intimated by his being called the Word of God." For the same reason, the translation Holy Ghost may be preferred to the translation Holy Spirit, namely, as the word Ghost conveys something more of the idea of personality than the word Spirit.

\textsuperscript{24} The learned Regius Professor of Divinity would confer an obligation on divines, if he would illustrate his Testimonies of the Anti-Nicene Fathers with parallel passages taken from Plato and the earlier Platonists. The amount of the verbal and ideal argument would then be evident.
Both of them soon came to be applied to the Son of God. He was the λόγος ενδιαθέτος, as residing eternally with the Father, as intimately connected with him as a man with his own mind or thought; he was the λόγος προφορικός as having a separate existence, a being put forth from God, and manifested to the world. The Arians wished to establish that the Son was only the λόγος προφορικός, by which they assigned to him a beginning, inasmuch as the thought must precede the sounds which give it utterance. Athanasius and the Catholics asserted that the Son was the λόγος ενδιαθέτος as well as προφορικός; and it may be supposed that a controversy like this gave room to great subtleties."—page 547.

A few more extracts from this learned and interesting volume will be sufficient, without requiring the aid of note or comment, to show what possibility there was of Plato's mysticism being converted into a mysterious reality, and what probability of Christianity being affected by its contact with the various forms of Platonism.

"One of the first steps in the Gnostic Philosophy," says the Regius Professor of Divinity, "seems to have been to personify the operations
of the Deity. And we may say with truth, that between the genuine followers of Plato and the corrupters of his doctrines, the Gnostics, the whole learned world, at the time of our Saviour's death, from Athens to Alexandria, and from Rome to Asia Minor, was beset with philosophical systems, in every one of which the term Logos held a conspicuous place.”—page 215.

“ It appears from the passages we have considered in the apostolic writings, that the Gnostic doctrines made their way earlier in the east than in the west. Justin Martyr particularly mentions the Samaritans as having embraced the tenets of their countryman, Simon Magus. The whole of Palestine seems to have been infected; and we may infer, though we cannot exactly assign the cause, that Asia Minor, and particularly Ephesus, very eagerly embraced the new philosophy.”—page 232.

“ The situation of Jerusalem between the rival kingdoms of Syria and Egypt, brought them into

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25 The two works of Professor Matter, namely, *Essai historique sur l'Ecole d'Alexandrie* and *Histoire Critique du Gnosticisme*, are spoken of in terms of high and deserved praise by the Regius Professor of Divinity.
perpetual contact with Grecian institutions; and though Antiochus Epiphanes, when he tried to force the Jews to change their customs, met with that resistance which persecution always creates; though zealous and inflexible patriots were found who resisted every innovation, yet in times of security, and when the enemy was not at their gates, they were eager enough to depart from their national habits, and to adopt the superstitions of their more polished neighbours.”—page 72.

"If any person should doubt what has been said concerning the effect of Platonism upon the Jews, he may satisfy himself by reading the Apocryphal Book of Wisdom, which was certainly written some time in the second century before our Saviour. The writer of it evidently thought that matter was not created; and he speaks of the Word or Logos of God exactly in the same sense. At a later period than this, and contemporary with the rise of Christianity, we have a stronger evidence in the works of Philo Judæus, who was so decided a copier of Plato that the coincidence grew into a proverb.”—page 73.
“Bryant has put his view of the subject in a strong light, when he brings together all the expressions applied by Philo to the Logos\textsuperscript{26}, and shows that he has called it the Son of God, his beloved Son, the first-begotten Son, the second God, the second cause, the Image of God, the Creator, the Mediator between God and man, the High Priest, &c. &c. All these expressions are applied by Philo to the Logos; but there is, perhaps, not one of them which Plato would not have applied to the intellectual world, as being not only the pattern of all material things, but the cause of their existence; and he did actually call it the Son of God, the only begotten, and the Image of God.”—p. 552.

“Philo entirely forgot Moses in his desire to follow Plato, when he said that the man who was made after the image of God (Gen. i. 26), was totally different from the material man (Gen. ii. 7). \textit{He supposed the first to be the invisible image or archetype of the second}, and to

\textsuperscript{26} The Regius Professor of Divinity would still further increase the value of his Testimonies of the Anti-Nicene Fathers if he would add to the parallel passages from Plato and the earlier Platonists illustrations from Philo.
be seated, like all the other ideas, in the mind of God. Hence because this invisible man was no where else but in the Logos, he actually calls the Logos ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα ἄνθρωπος, the man after God's own image, as in the following passage: 'although no one ever yet deserved to be called the Son of God, let him endeavour to adorn himself after his first-born Logos, the eldest angel, who, as an archangel, has many names; for he is called the Principle, and the Name of God, and Logos, and the man after the image.' It is perfectly astonishing that Bryant should have allowed himself to quote this passage as a proof that Philo spoke of the Logos as appearing in a human form, when Philo himself expressly classes the κατ' εἰκόνα ἄνθρωπος among the invisible immaterial archetypes in the mind of God. It is equally extraordinary that Mangey should propose to read ον κατ βικονα άνθρωπος, because Philo never speaks of the Logos as a man, or as formed after an image, since he is himself the image after which man is formed. But this is precisely what Philo meant to signify by ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα ἄνθρωπος, the invisible or intellectual man, who is after the image of God in the mind of
God; and it never entered into his conception to speak of the Logos as a material man."

—page 553.

"I have, perhaps, said enough to show that Philo never conceived the idea of Logos being a person distinct from God, though he may have gone much further than Plato in personifying the Logos and the other attributes of God; and we can easily understand how the Gnostics at this very time were extracting from the Platonic philosophy their endless genealogies of Æons. If this be so, Bryant’s hypothesis can hardly be admitted, that Philo borrowed many ideas and expressions from the apostolic writings. I would by no means assert this was chronologically impossible; and Bryant appears much nearer the truth than Mangey, when he argues that Philo survived our Saviour by several years."—page 558.

27 This specimen of the evidence which the Regius Professor of Divinity has thought it important, I had almost said worth the trouble, to insist upon, namely, that the Logos of Plato and Philo is not a material, but an intellectual being, or, if he prefers the term, a property of Deity, is given, because, first, it is fair to allow the full weight to the distinction the Regius Professor would draw; and, secondly, because this very distinction will
"He (Philo) quotes the Pythagoreans in one of his treatises; and in another, he speaks of them as the most sacred band of the Pythagoreans. He quotes Zeno and Heraclitus by name; and his agreement with the Stoical philosophy has been observed by his editor, Mangey. But Plato was the master to whom he made the greatest surrender of his reason and his fancy; and in following the speculations of that writer upon the nature and the operations of the Deity, he seems almost to have forgotten that his own Scripture proceeded from God himself."—page 347.

It is on the above quotations that the reader has to exercise his judgement, namely, in deciding whether it was possible that the orthodox Logos could be, whether it is probable that the orthodox Logos would be, whether there is evidence that the orthodox Logos actually was, de-

28 Should the reader of these few pages desire to see a fuller developement of Platonism, he may obtain it in Brucker's History of Philosophy, and in the Introductions to Plato's Dialogues in the Translation of Taylor. Should he wish a more precise information respecting the circumstances which brought Pla-
rived from the Platonic Logos, not in word only, but in idea also. But, as there is some more evidence against this possibility and probability yet to be considered, let the decision be suspended until it has been examined.

It appears the Fathers, i. e. the orthodox, were as resolute as the Regius Professor of Divinity, in denying the orthodox Logos to have been derived from the Platonic Logos; and although "they speak of Plato as teaching the purest and sublimest philosophy" (page 197), and although "many of them had been familiar with Plato before they had become Christians" (page 218), yet "so far are they from making Platonism the rule to which Christianity was to
be accommodated, that, in some points at least, they did exactly the reverse. They assert, with very little evidence and often contrary to sound reason, that Plato borrowed from the Jewish Scriptures; and it is demonstrated that, in their zeal to make Plato agree with revelation, they represent him as saying what he never said, such as that matter was not eternal but created by God.”—page 198. Is it on the testimonies of persons, be they called Fathers or Holy, or be they accredited by any other venerable title—29—is it on the testimonies of persons, be they anti-Nicene or Nicene, or be they packed by periods or in councils—is it, we repeat, on the testimonies of persons, who at one time represent Plato “saying what he never said,” namely, when they want to have Plato found agreeing with themselves, but at another time, namely, when they are fearful of being themselves found agreeing with Plato, asserting, “with very lit-

29 A striking and remarkable distinction is observable between the New Testament and the writings of the Fathers; and amongst the errors orthodoxy has committed against the interests it is supposed to defend, is a tendency to place these writings, if not in the same class, at least in almost equal honour with the apostolic writings.
tle evidence and often contrary to sound reason,” that he is indebted for his opinions to the Jewish Scriptures—is it to the testimonies of such witnesses, when they are decidedly opposed to such evidence, internal and external, as we have been lately examining, that we are to surrender our judgements? Yet it is of the testimonies of such witnesses that the Regius Professor of Divinity has composed a book, the object of which is to prove that all the anti-Nicene Fathers testify the divinity of Christ.\[30\].” Though the testimonies on the other side have been lost, or rather destroyed, and we have only these ex parte testimonies all on the side of orthodoxy, still these testimonies supply such suspicions against their own fairness, that they cannot be received as an external testimony of any weight, compared with the mass of strong internal evidence which is certainly in the scale

\[30\] If the reader desires a collection of the early testimonies which support orthodoxy, he will find a laborious one in a work of the Regius Professor of Divinity, entitled “Testimonies of the Anti-Nicene Fathers to the divinity of Christ.” It must be remembered that these testimonies are all on one side; and that the testimonies of those who held the opposite opinions are, with few exceptions, either lost or destroyed.
of their opponents. Before the Regius Professor of Divinity can expect any adequate credit to be given to these ex parte testimonies, as to enable them to weigh against a heavy internal evidence, he must write another book to establish their credibility. It is not sufficient to warn us against the work of Beausobre, and to tell us that “it has for its object to depreciate the Fathers, and to prove that their statements are worthy of no credit,” so long as this advocate of the Fathers is forced to allow, respecting his favourite Fathers, “that they have in many cases misrepresented the early heretics, and circulated calumnies concerning their enormities;” and, on the other hand, is compelled to grant that Beausobre “has shown the most unwearied industry and the most profound critical acuteness in detecting their falsehoods, and in plac-

31 The Regius Professor of Divinity charges Beausobre with having shown favouritism to the heretics. That Beausobre should have espoused their cause for any less worthy reason than to establish truth and expose falsehood, is difficult to reconcile with his high character for intellectual ability and honourable principle; especially when we remember that, as a clergyman, he was an ornament to his church, and, as a divine, he ranks very high for his more orthodox as well as his heterodox work.
ing several points of history in a new and true light.”—Introduction, page 21. And when the Regius Professor of Divinity speaks of Beausobre's History of Manicheanism in these terms, "it is so full of information, it so completely exhausts the subject of which it treats, that it is impossible not to recommend it to every student of ecclesiastical history," can he suppose himself to have invalidated the authority of that most learned, acute, and honest work, by adding, "it is impossible not to regret the spirit in which it is written." If, instead of regretting this spirit, the Regius Professor of Divinity would point out any errors of importance into which it has betrayed Beausobre, he would be doing more for his favourites the Fathers, than by contradicting an estimate which he almost appears to countenance. "They are, in fact, the

32 If the reader desires to have all that remains of testimonies respecting this heresy, among which he will find much that bears upon this present question, and thinks it fair to give the few remains of the oriental heretics as attentive a consideration as the work of the Regius Professor on the Testimonies of the anti-Nicene Fathers secures to his favourites, he must read this most acute, learned, and profound work of Beausobre. The principle audi alteram partem requires this impartiality from him.
only original works to which we can appeal; and though the minds of men will differ exceedingly as to the degree of credit to be given to the Fathers in particular instances, yet we cannot reject them altogether; and the most critical or most sceptical reader must consent to receive the little which he admits to be true, in ecclesiastical history, upon the testimony of the Fathers."—Introduction, page 9. Those who have read Dr. Middleton's unanswerable work, entitled, "A Free Enquiry into the Miraculous Powers which are supposed to have subsisted in the Christian church from the earliest ages, through several successive centuries," will be better able to say whether the *ex parte testimonies* of the anti-Nicene Fathers can be considered of much weight against such internal evidence as we have been considering.

We may now return to the decision of the question which the Regius Professor of Divinity has proposed, and for the *satisfactory* decision of which he has supplied us with all *necessary* information. And our decision of this question, namely, "whether orthodoxy was derived from Platonism," will be found to have been
rendered more easy, instead of having been made more difficult, by the acuteness and precision with which the Regius Professor of Divinity has established his favourite distinction between Platonism and orthodoxy, viz. that the Platonic *Logos* was an *idea*, but the orthodox *Logos* is a *person*. The full and entire establishment of this distinction, we repeat, is so far from having rendered our decision more difficult—so far from supplying an additional grain of evidence to the scale which the Regius Professor of Divinity desires to make preponderate, that it places another heavy weight in the opposite scale of heterodoxy. The orthodox were not only not accused, at least by their more judicious and better-informed opponents, of having derived their *doctrine* so directly from Platonism, as to have kept the orthodox mystery and the Platonic mysticism identically the same,—so far were their best-informed opponents from contending that orthodoxy and Platonism were, in idea as well as in word, exactly *one and the same*, that they most distinctly and specifically asserted the contrary. This fact the Regius Professor urges with good effect, when
contending against the opinion of the later Unitarians, who have, so his hypothesis appears to imply, considered Platonism and orthodoxy identical. It is not only of no importance against the hypothesis of his more formidable opponents, but it is of great importance in support of that very hypothesis. "The Platonists of the four first centuries," says the Regius Professor of Divinity, "asserted that the Christians (meaning the Orthodox) had taken their doctrine of the Logos from Plato, but reproached them for using it in a totally different sense."—page 199. In answer to this real state

33 It would give the author of these Essays the greatest satisfaction to find them approved by a body of Christians whom he has so many causes for respecting; but it will be seen that he has not made any sacrifice of what appeared to him real evidence and sound reasoning to attain this object. This note is addressed, with great respect, to Mr. Shepherd, it is a mere form to add, of Liverpool.

34 The last translator of Plato, himself a genuine Platonist, makes exactly the same estimate of Platonism and orthodoxy, namely, "that there can be no such thing as a trinity in the theology of Plato in any respect analogous to the Christian Trinity;" adding, immediately afterwards, "what that trinity, however, is in the theology of Plato, which doubtless gave birth to the Christian Trinity, will be evident," &c.—vol. i. page 35.
of the case, what becomes of the Regius Professor's hypothesis, which would insist upon the personality of the orthodox Logos, as if it were an important distinction on his side of the question, namely, as proving the orthodox Logos not to have been derived from the Platonic Logos? The Platonists themselves not only grant but actually insist upon this very distinction; and it is their hypothesis, and not his own hypothesis, which the Regius Professor has been, not only unintentionally, but against his intention, establishing. The very question to be decided is, whether there is not a sufficient internal and external evidence (after making all due allowance for the ex parte testimonies of the Fathers), that orthodoxy was borrowed from Platonism, yet that, in transferring the idea as well as the word, what was abstract in Platonism was made personal in orthodoxy, what was mystical was made real, and, in one word, a Platonic mysticism was converted into an orthodox reality.

But the reader may still hesitate to come to a decision, from fear lest, in deciding against orthodoxy, he may, unintentionally, injure Chris-
Christianity. Let us then approach, and in the most equitable and most conciliating spirit, this great difficulty, the close resemblance between the Platonic Mysticism and the Christian Mystery, not doubting, from the deep benevolence and the large beneficence, the striking sincerity and the important truths, which are characteristic of Christianity, that there must be a solution of this difficulty. There is a solution, not less sound in the evidence it submits to the more learned Christian, than fitted to draw the philosophic sceptic towards Christianity, and tending to lead both the sceptic and believer towards the original conception and the true meaning of Christianity. The solution of that fact, that Plato's mysticism is all but a type of that mysterious reality which the orthodox Fathers have derived from St. John's Gospel, must be sought in this fact, that the

35 Should any ask, will so complete a truth be obtained by this admission, as that nothing will be left to desire? he may be asked in return, can perfect truth be obtained whilst there remains any ignorance or error, or, in scriptural language, whilst we see through a glass darkly? But can we even approach truth except by going onward from the point, be it where it may, at which we are arrived.
Founder of Christianity was set forth by his followers as the founder of an Universal Religion, that is, of a religion which was to supersede all other religions, and into which every other religion was to be absorbed, as rivers flow into the sea. In order that this flowing in of Jew and Gentile into Christianity might be accomplished, each people was to be addressed in the language of its own intellect and conscience, so that not only might the Jew find in Jesus the promised Christ, the messenger of mercy instead of the denouncer of justice, but the Greek might see in him a Teacher, wiser than his philosophers and more authoritative than his legislators, and embodying a mystic doctrine, in which the Greek and the Oriental were united, and which had already pervaded all minds.

36 I cannot subscribe to the hypothesis of those who attempt to solve the difficulty we have been considering, by bringing evidence of Platonism being a subsequent interpolation into Christianity. There are too many incidental allusions in the New Testament to allow of this supposition. Still less can I assent to the philology of those who would explain away such texts bit by bit. The attempt leads to a disingenuous and unscholarly tone of criticism. But the real fact, which has been here offered as the solution of what all parties feel to be a real difficulty, at once gets rid of an insufficient learning and an un-
These Mysteries, which spoke to every man in his own language, adopting analogies to which long usage had attached him, came too early to be set forth in that harsh and uncompromising language of reality, which, in converting metaphysical truth into actual errors, kindled fires of bigotry and whetted the sword of persecution, and divided men's minds and feelings into schismatic opinions instead of uniting them in a catholic piety. Restored, gradually, to its original conception and its real meaning, Christianity is at once a key to the opinions of the countries in which it was first preached—a learned commentary on the wisdom of the most ancient times—a precious record of the infancy and youth of the world, and, at the same time, a striking appeal to all that is most satisfactory scholarship; and both gives and receives confirmation on other points of equally irresistible evidence.

37 "There is a force," says the Regius Professor of Divinity, "in the remark of Michaelis, that the Evangelist would not have said of John the Baptist, He was not that light, unless some person had asserted that he was; and if there were persons who held the opinions of the modern Sabeans, we perhaps shall not be able to give so good an explanation of the frequent mention of light, as by supposing the Evangelist to have had them in his view."—page 556. Surely the Regius Professor of Divinity,
vated in human nature; an address to the feel-
ings, consciences, and reasons of men, conveyed in a language which will be intelligible to the end of time. By the adoption of their distinct and appropriate languages, it brought into one faith the Jew and the Oriental, the Greek and the Roman, causing them to dissolve their dif­ferences of opinion and rites in that catholic union of piety and obligation which worships and obeys a common Father, and listens to the accents of a common Master. These are the realities of religion, which appeal to the testi-
monies of learning and the principles of science; and it must be an union of sound learning and real science which, leading men from the letter to the spirit of religion, will remove every error and preserve every truth, and gradually lead

after having read the profoundly learned and singularly acute work of Beausobre, is very sceptical when he uses the word "perhaps" respecting that large and striking evidence. All that relates to the Prince of the Air, the Malignancy of matter, and the Purification of souls, constitute a coincidence even stronger and more irresistible than that we have been consider-
ing in the case of Plato's mysticism. As this will form a more appropriate illustration of the Utilitarianism of Aristotle, we will defer the consideration of it for the present.
forward into all truth. Is not this a progression, as manifestly called for by the times as it is called for by truth?

It may be said that the removal of such errors as we have been considering can have no practical good effect, and that the retaining of them can cause no practical evil. It may be said that these are not the times of bigotry and persecution, and that the happiness of life is not interrupted by acrimonious feelings and unreasonable conduct proceeding from such opinions. It may be said, moreover, that these opinions are so much in possession of the public mind that they cannot be affected by any evidence, and that if they could, the parting with them would agitate the mind, and would give a fearful shake to many sound principles. These are specious reasons for the supineness of public teachers, whose business it might seem to be to detect errors and establish truth; and these must be the only reasons on which they can vindicate to themselves much of what they permit to be taught, and much of what they themselves teach. At the same time these arguments must be found very unsatisfactory by many who have
to excuse what they hear and what they say, to
themselves if not to others. If we consider
the question what is our duty respecting truth
and falsehood, in the abstract, we must acknow­
ledge that, whether we regard man's admira­
ble capacity for truth, or whether we admit
truth to be the best discipline for man's facul­
ties and the proper fulfilment of man's capaci­
ties, or whether we perceive the fact that truth
is the best foundation for human happiness, or
whether we are convinced by the evidence that
it is through truth that God discovers his eter­
nal designs to man, we cannot conceal from
ourselves that the better-informed and the more
intelligent are not warranted in acquiescing in
errors, and still less excused for propagating

38 Why perplex the public mind with such enquiries?—
But does enquiry, honestly undertaken and plainly conducted,
tend to perplex? Do you expect the slightest attention from
those who influence public opinion?—But is not public opinion
making its own way, and a little leaven of truth may help to
leaven the lump. Is this anarchical process desirable?—But is
it not unavoidable, and is not the object to render it less anar­
chical? It is not truth that is anarchical, but error.

39 The author of the Essay on the Religion of Socrates has no
fault to find with the British Critic for assuming him to be al­
together in error, but his complaint lies against the British Cri­
them. There is no prior claim to that of truth, says the Roman statesman; and the Grecian philosopher tells us that it is pious to prefer truth. The most primary and the most irrepressible feelings of childhood, and the strongest and the most incessantly recurring convictions of manhood, coincide in proving that all error is opposed to first principles in our nature and to a large evidence from knowledge.

And if we consider the question, in so far as it bears at this time upon the greatest and most increasing interests of life, we shall observe that we are approaching an inevitable practical solution. It is an obvious fact that the human mind, stimulated into energy by religious enthusiasts, developed in its faculties...
and capacities by education, and roused to a consciousness of its powers by the course of events, is at the eve of needing, if not desiring, a stronger and more satisfying food. If such a food is not ministered in a wholesome state and by fitting persons, it will be sought in an unwholesome state and from improper persons. It is truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, to which the mind is strongly tending. There is a scepticism gaining ground, which nothing but truth will convince; a growing disobedience, which nothing but truth will govern; a restless energy, for which nothing but truth will find employment. The real question, as it relates to important public interests, is, not whether this or that opinion shall prevail amongst the religious, but whether the

41 This cannot be considered unimportant, if truth in the thing believed, and a sufficiency of evidence to produce conviction, are more valuable both for belief and discipline than error in the thing believed, and an evidence constantly decreasing in power. But it is a far more important view of this subject to be aware that these errors, like the Real Presence of the Romanist, are so satisfying to those who will and can believe them, that they obstruct that which would prove a far more convincing belief and a far more effective discipline. Is not every well-informed clergyman conscious that he has the means
church will make a progress in belief and in discipline, which, by making her a copious source of all wholesome and interesting knowledge, will restore to her that influence over the great body of the people, which is equally necessary for her own safety and for their civilization. It is surely no Utopia of speculation to imagine the church a fountain, not flowing one day only in seven, of all the knowledge which can develope the counsels of God's Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, of whatever is most fitted to acquire influence on the human mind, and of whatever is most likely to turn it through truth to happiness.

The Logos of Plato, taken in its simplicity, is a true and noble conception, which, having distinguished mind from matter, elevates mind above matter. Contemplating the unnumbered infinites of matter, each pregnant with design, adaptation, and effect, and conscious of a power in his own hands of arresting the attention, and commanding the conviction, and disciplining the minds of his parishioners, if he were but at liberty to make use of them in an effective manner? If there is one curse more heavy upon this nation than another, it is that dangerous timidity which locks up stores of intellectual strength when they are so manifestly needed.
of *classing* these into distinct ideas, and of *abstracting* their essential perfections from the accidental imperfections which mar their completeness, Plato ascended from Human Mind (thus capable of conceiving real existences and combining imaginary beings) to the Divine Mind, which originated all real existences and can create any other forms of being; and Plato proceeded from these real existences, often imperfect and depraved, to the Ideas of the Divine Mind, proved to be perfect and complete by Realities being capable of greater degrees of perfectness.\textsuperscript{42}

This was a true and noble conception, and, had Plato been content to fill it with the realities of mind and matter, it would have formed an enduring temple, unique in plan and various

\textsuperscript{42} It does not follow, because the ignorant and violent imagine *contradictory* combinations, that therefore the selfish and obstinate are right in denying the *feasibleness* of every combination not already in existence. The arts prove practically that there may be an *a priori* truth and usefulness in the sciences. Those whose political prudence, if listened to in the first French Revolution, would have saved this country from war and debt, may well appeal to the *consequences* of resisting that improvement of institutions, for *proofs* that they were right then, and probably are right now.
in detail, and instinct with a Spirit of Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, real as the temple it would have informed and hallowed. But it did not suffice the restlessness of Plato to have comprehended an universe instead of acquiescing in fragments, and to have pervaded it with Deity instead of abandoning it to the anarchy of Matter; but he indulged a prurient imagination, in substituting ideas for realities, and in employing the creating and conserving Mind in imaginary operations. Partly from the arrogance of penetrating adyta from which the veil had not then been withdrawn, partly from the pride of veiling in mystery realities which had then been discovered, Plato founded that ideal school which filled the world rather with human fancies than divine realities. It cannot be matter for wonder that strong and daring minds rejected with scorn the teasing abortions of Ideality, and grasped the solider satisfaction of Materialism. A better and redeeming service was done in measuring and numbering and analysing the real materials of the temple, instead of setting up supposititious ideas in every part of it; but they erred in not remembering that
Deity resided there, because the idealists had peopled it with fanciful combinations.

A contrast between Socrates’s Religion and Plato’s Mysticism would lead to the development of a most important difference in intellectual and moral discipline. Socrates, fixing the *Realities* of mind and matter as his basis, ascended step by step to the highest human principles and the largest conceptions of the Divine Nature; Plato, by an inverse process, commenced by Suppositions of the highest and most abstract principle, and derived from that idea all the streams of thought. Socrates ascended from the many to the one; Plato, whatever dialectics he may have exhibited to his followers, descended from the one to the many. Socrates commenced by the enquiries of a diligent observation; Plato began with the decisions of a restless imagination. Socrates would have led men forward to such *truth* and *power* as man’s nature may obtain; Plato carried those who heard him into error and pretence, by promising a divine truth and a divine power, but *subjecting* them to their own inventions. Socrates would have emancipated
the mind from a sensual polytheism, and placed it under the government of that system which is indeed really divine; Plato changed that superstitious thraldom from a poetical to a metaphysical imagination, and subjected the human mind to the tyranny of an intellectual polytheism. Socrates's reasonings could never have wandered far from truth, because they appealed to reality, and could always be referred to that standard; Plato's speculations were capable of the infinite aberration of error, because they had no more fixed measure than hypothesis, and gloried in stretching that to its extremest limit. The Genius of Socrates was conscience and reason, appealing to first principles and universal effects; the Daemons of Plato were imagination and theory, inventing principles and supposing consequences. Plato's influence has lasted long, but must be eventually overthrown; Socrates's influence, as established by his great pupil, Aristotle\textsuperscript{43}, must be more and more extended in

\textsuperscript{43} It is very probable that Aristotle's disgust at the idealism of Plato may have caused him to push the realism of Socrates into something verging upon materialism. He certainly has not put forward piety, or admiration of the divine nature and obli-
proportion as it is better understood. The Socratic or Aristotelic philosophy did for the *morals* of theosophy in that day what Bacon did for the *physics* of theosophy in his day. The most perfect physical developments of God’s wisdom and power and goodness have been consequent upon the reception of *physical truth*; and the most miserable moral defeating of God’s wisdom, power, and goodness has been consequent upon the rejection of *moral truth*. It is, for example, because no person can be found to dispute truths relating to the *physics* of expansion and compression, that such amazing displays of power and mercy, in which the fool alone sees only man’s ingenuity, and overlooks God’s wisdom, are developed. It is because thousands are forward to dispute truths relating to the *morals* of over-population and gation, or the duty of carrying into effect the divine system, so much as might be desired, and as the soundness of his data and reasonings would lead us to expect. Still Aristotle follows his great master in investigating and not inventing facts, and in inferring not in supposing consequences.

44 Or perhaps it would be more correct, and open a larger field of speculation, to condemn the error of not estimating the *morals* of this and other questions from a fair estimate of their
checks to population, that frightful evidences of weakness and misery, in which the fanatic sees only God’s will, and does not discern man’s folly, are evident.

It is cruel to the individual to require him to teach or believe, to rest his hopes, principles, and conduct, on a decreasing evidence. It is cruel to the community to cause the strongest of all human principles, religion, to be converted into a subject for scepticism and anarchy. It is cruel to the government of any country to burden it with the defence of error instead of giving it the support of truth. The ignorant are ever eager to learn God’s workings and God’s will; these are the very best discipline for the mind, and direct it in the track of civilization; and it is, therefore, in this knowledge and discipline that conviction and power reside. May we not say then that it is cruel to God’s physics. It is amazing to consider the quantity of mere specious nonsense which is talked by men who will not make a proper use of their senses. Touch not, taste not, handle not, is a dogma on which much false reasoning and much false feeling are built. If the reader wishes to see two enormous specimens of this ideality, he will find them in the fifth Essay in a volume on Cowper, Newton, and Heber.
system to pervert the very source of conviction and power into disbelief and anarchy.

By what progress the full authority of truth may be restored to religion, and the human mind, being compelled to conviction, may be induced to obedience, may be difficult to foresee. But it is not the flattery of a partisan to assert, that the hope of establishing God's truth as man's discipline, may be placed in those who rest their power neither on the prejudices nor on the passions of the people. How far it might have been possible for the government which rested authority on force and circumstances, not on knowledge and principles, to have approached nearer and nearer to truth, is a question now of no importance. The beneficent power of advancing, even gradually, towards truth was deliberately resigned; and it is to be hoped that those who would not use that power for progression, may never again have the means of abusing it for delay. Let us make a distinction between those who command and those who have to obey. The heads of the church, who possess means of advancing the cause of God's truth, and of removing a bur-
den from reasons and consciences over which they are "put in authority," must answer for themselves.

The usefulness and interests of the church are connected with the civilization and happiness of the community. On this subject it may be allowed to repeat what has been already briefly and plainly urged. "It is an obvious fact that the human mind, stimulated into energy by religious enthusiasts, developed in its faculties and capacities by education, and roused to a consciousness of its powers by the course of events, is at the eve of needing, if not desiring, a stronger and more satisfying food. If such a food is not ministered in a wholesome state and by fitting persons, it will be sought in an unwholesome state and from improper persons. It is truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, to which the mind is strongly tending. There is a scepticism gaining ground, which nothing but truth will convince; a growing disobedience, which nothing but truth will govern; a restless energy, for which nothing but truth will find employment. The real question, as it relates to important public interests,
is, not whether this or that opinion shall prevail amongst the religious, but whether the church will make a progress in belief and in discipline, which, by making her a copious source of all wholesome and interesting knowledge, will restore to her that influence over the great body of the people, which is equally necessary for her own safety and for their civilization. It is surely no Utopia of speculation to imagine the church a fountain, not flowing one day only in seven, of all the knowledge which can develop the counsels of God's Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, of whatever is most fitted to acquire influence on the human mind, and of whatever is most likely to turn it through truth to happiness."

The question is, shall we use the power, or will we resist the force of truth. The decision of this question implies no humiliating recantation. The first step is to relieve Sincerity from her shackles. This obvious step towards truth would be a step also towards power. It is a debt due equally to the individual and to the community, to God's truth and man's interests.
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX.

As it is scarcely possible to select from the more mystical dialogues of Plato fragments which will do justice to the general effect of the matter and manner of his Greater Mysteries; and as the author of these few pages is anxious to derive his authorities from the least questionable sources, and to be answerable only for the reasoning; it is thought desirable to add the following estimate of the Mysticism of Plato from the eloquent Introduction of the last English translation of his works.

"I shall in the first place present the reader with the outlines of the principal dogmas of Plato's philosophy. The undertaking is indeed no less novel than arduous, since the author of it has to tread in paths which have been untrodden for upwards of a thousand years, and to bring to light truths which for that extended period have been concealed in Greek. Let not the reader, therefore, be surprised at the solitariness of the paths through which I shall attempt to conduct him, or at the novelty of the objects which will present themselves in the journey: for perhaps he may fortunately recollect that he has travelled the same road before, that the scenes were once familiar to him, and that the country through which he is passing is his native land. At
least, if his sight should be dim, and his memory ob-
livious (for the objects which he will meet with can
only be seen by the most piercing eyes), and his ab-
sence from them has been lamentably long, let him
implore the power of wisdom,

From mortal mists to purify his eyes,
That God and man he may distinctly see.

"Let us also, imploring the assistance of the same
illuminating power, begin the solitary journey.

"Of all the dogmas of Plato, that concerning the first
principle of things as far transcends in sublimity the
doctrine of other philosophers of a different sect, on
this subject, as this supreme cause of all transcends
other causes. For, according to Plato, the highest God,
whom in the Republic he calls the good, and in the Par-
menides the one, is not only above soul and intellect,
but is even superior to being itself. Hence, since every-
thing which can in any respect be known, or of which
any thing can be asserted, must be connected with the
universality of things, but the first cause is above all
things; it is very properly said by Plato to be perfectly
ineffable. The first hypothesis therefore of his Par-
menides, in which all things are denied of this immense
principle, concludes as follows: 'The one therefore is
in no respect. So it seems. Hence it is not in such
a manner as to be one, for thus it would be being, and

1 Αχλυν δ' αυ τοι απ' οφθαλμων ελον, η πρι επην,
Οφρεν γυναικις ημεν Θεον, ηδε και ανθρα.
Iliad V. v. 127, &c.
participate of essence; but as it appears, the one neither is one, nor is, if it be proper to believe in reasoning of this kind. It appears so. But can any thing either belong to, or be affirmed of, that which is not? How can it? Neither therefore does any name belong to it, nor discourse, nor any science, nor sense, nor opinion. It does not appear that there can. Hence it can neither be named, nor spoken of, nor conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being. So it seems.' And here it must be observed that this conclusion respecting the highest principle of things, that he is perfectly ineffable and inconceivable, is the result of a most scientific series of negations, in which not only all sensible and intellectual beings are denied of him, but even natures the most transcendentally allied to him, his first and most divine progeny. For that which so eminently distinguishes the philosophy of Plato from others is this, that every part of it is stamped with the character of science. The vulgar indeed proclaim the Deity to be ineffable; but as they have no scientific knowledge that he is so, this is nothing more than a confused and indistinct perception of the most sublime of all truths, like that of a thing seen between sleeping and waking, like Phaæcia to Ulysses when sailing to his native land.

That lay before him indistinct and vast,

A broad shield amid the wat'ry waste.

In short, an unscientific perception of the ineffable nature of the Divinity resembles that of a man, who, on

*Odyss. vii. 281.*
surveying the heavens, should assert of the altitude of its highest part, that it surpasses that of the loftiest tree, and is therefore immeasurable. But to see this scientifically, is like a survey of this highest part of the heavens by the astronomer: for he, by knowing the height of the media between us and it, knows also scientifically that it transcends in altitude not only the loftiest tree, but the summits of air and æther, the moon, and even the sun itself.

"Let us therefore investigate what is the ascent to the ineffable, and after what manner it is accomplished, according to Plato, from the last of things, following the profound and most inquisitive Damascius as our leader in this arduous investigation. Let our discourse also be common to other principles, and to things proceeding from them to that which is last; and let us, beginning from that which is perfectly effable and known to sense, ascend to the ineffable, and establish in silence, as in a port, the parturitions of truth concerning it. Let us then assume the following axiom, in which as in a secure vehicle we may safely pass from hence thither. I say, therefore, that the unindigent is naturally prior to the indigent. For that which is in want of another is naturally adapted from necessity to be subservient to that of which it is indigent. But if they are mutually in want of each other, each being indigent of the other in a different respect, neither of them will be the principle. For the unindigent is most adapted to that which is truly the principle. And if it is in want of any thing, according to this it will not be the principle. It is however necessary that the prin-
principle should be this very thing, the principle alone. The unindigent therefore pertains to this, nor must it by any means be acknowledged that there is anything prior to it. This, however, would be acknowledged, if it had any connection with the indigent.”—Taylor's Translation of the Works of Plato, Introduction, page iv.

"Further still, intellect understands and is understood, is intellective of and intelligible to itself, and both these. Hence the intellectual is indigent of the intelligible, as of its proper object of desire; and the intelligible is in want of the intellectual, because it wishes to be the intelligible of it. Both also are indigent of either, since the possession is always accompanied with indigence, in the same manner as the world is always present with matter. Hence a certain indigence is naturally coessentialized with intellect, so that it cannot be the most proper principle. Shall we, therefore, in the next place, direct our attention to the most simple of beings, which Plato calls the one being, ev ov? For as there is no separation there throughout the whole, nor any multitude, or order, or duplicity, or conversion to itself, what indigence will there appear to be in the perfectly united? And especially what indigence will there be of that which is subordinate? Hence the great Permenides ascended to this most safe principle, as that which is most unindigent. Is it not, however, here necessary to attend to the conception of Plato, that the united is not the one itself, but that which is passive to

4 See the Sophista of Plato, where this is asserted.
it? And this being the case, it is evident that it ranks after *the one*: for it is supposed to be the *united* and not *the one itself*. If also *being* is composed from the elements *bound* and *infinity*, as appears from the *Philebus* of Plato, where he calls it that which is mixt, it will be indigent of its elements. Besides, if the conception of *being* is different from that of *being united*, and that which is a whole is both united and being, these will be indigent of each other, and the whole which is called *one being* is indigent of the two. And though *the one* in this is better than *being*, yet this is indigent of being, in order to the subsistence of one being. But if *being* here supervenes *the one*, as it were, form in that which is mixt and united, just as the idiom of man in that which is collectively rational-mortal-animal, thus also *the one* will be indigent of *being*. If, however, to speak more properly, *the one* is two-fold, *this* being the cause of the mixture and subsisting prior to being, but *that* conferring rectitude on being,—if this be the case, neither will the indigent perfectly desert this nature. After all these, it may be said that *the one* will be perfectly unindigent. For neither is it indigent of that which is posterior to itself for its subsistence, since the truly one is by itself separated from all things; nor is it indigent of that which is inferior or more excellent in itself; for there is nothing in it besides itself; nor is it in want of itself. But it is one, because neither has it any duplicity with respect to itself. For not even the relation of itself to itself must be asserted of the truly one; since it is perfectly simple. This, therefore, is the most unindigent of all things. Hence
this is the principle and the cause of all; and this is at once the first of all things. If these qualities, however, are present with it, it will not be the one. Or may we not say that all things subsist in the one according to the one? And that both these subsist in it, and such other things as we predicate of it, as, for instance, the most simple, the most excellent, the most powerful, the preserver of all things, and the good itself? If these things, however, are thus true of the one, it will thus also be indigent of things posterior to itself, according to those very things which we add to it. For the principle is and is said to be the principle of things proceeding from it, and the cause is the cause of things caused, and the first is the first of things arranged posterior to it. Further still, the simple subsists according to a transcendency of other things, the most powerful according to power with relation to the subjects of it; and the good, the desirable, and the preserving, are so called with reference to things benefitted, preserved, and desiring. And if it should be said, to be all things according to the preassumption of all things in itself, it will indeed be said to be so according to the one alone, and will at the same time be the one cause of all things prior to all, and will be this and no other according to the one. So far, therefore, as it is the one alone, it will be unindigent; but so far as unindigent, it will be the first principle and stable root of all prin-

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5 For a thing cannot be said to be a principle or cause without the subsistence of the things of which it is the principle or cause. Hence, so far as it is a principle or cause, it will be indigent of the subsistence of these.
ciples. So far, however, as it is the principle and the first cause of all things, and is pre-established as the object of desire to all things, so far it appears to be in a certain respect indigent of the things to which it is related. It has, therefore, if it be lawful so to speak, an ultimate vestige of indigence, just as on the contrary matter has an ultimate echo of the unindigent, or a most obscure and debile impression of the one. And language indeed appears to be here subverted. For so far as it is the one, it is also unindigent, since the principle has appeared to subsist according to the most unindigent and the one. At the same time, however, so far as it is the one, it is also the principle; and so far as it is the one it is unindigent, but so far as the principle, indigent. Hence so far as it is unindigent, it is also indigent, though not according to the same; but with respect to being that which it is, it is unindigent; but as producing and comprehending other things in itself, it is indigent. This, however, is the peculiarity of the one; so that it is both unindigent and indigent according to the one. Not indeed that it is each of these, in such a manner as we divide it in speaking of it, but it is one alone; and according to this is both other things, and that which is indigent. For how is it possible it should not be indigent also so far as it is the one? Just as it is all other things which proceed from it. For the indigent also is something belonging to all things. Something else, therefore, must be investigated which in no respect has any kind of indigence. But of a thing of this kind it cannot with truth be asserted that it is the principle, nor can it even be said
of it that it is most unindigent, though this appears to be the most venerable of all assertions. For this signifies transcendency, and an exemption from the indigent. We do not, however, think it proper to call this even the perfectly exempt; but that which is in every respect incapable of being apprehended, and about which we must be perfectly silent, will be the most just axiom of our conception in the present investigation; nor yet this as uttering anything, but as rejoicing in not uttering, and by this venerating that immense unknown. This then is the mode of ascent to that which is called the first, or rather to that which is beyond every thing which can be conceived, or become the subject of hypothesis."—page 12.

"But it is also necessary that the principle of all things should possess the highest, and all, power. For the amplitude of power consists in producing all things from itself, and in giving subsistence to similars prior to things which are dissimilar. Hence the one principle produces many principles, many simplicities, and many goodesses, proximately from itself. For since all things differ from each other, and are multiplied with their proper differences, each of these multitudes is suspended from its one proper principle. Thus, for instance, all beautiful things, whatever and wherever they may be, whether in souls or in bodies, are suspended

6 See the extracts from Damascius in the additional notes to the third volume, which contain an inestimable treasury of the most profound conceptions concerning the ineffable.
from one fountain of beauty. Thus too, whatever possesses symmetry, and whatever is true, and all principles, are in a certain respect connate with the first principle, so far as they are principles and fountains and goodesses, with an appropriate subjection and analogy. For what the one principle is to all beings, that each of the other principles is to the multitude comprehended under the idiom of its principle. For it is impossible, since each multitude is characterized by a certain difference, that it should not be extended to its proper principle, which illuminates one and the same form to all the individuals of that multitude. For the one is the leader of every multitude; and every peculiarity or idiom in the many is derived to the many from the one. All partial principles therefore are established in that principle which ranks as a whole, and are comprehended in it, not with interval and multitude, but as parts in the whole, as multitude in the one, and number in the monad. For this first principle is all things prior to all: and many principles are multiplied about the one principle, and in the one goodness many goodesses are established. This too is not a certain principle like each of the rest: for of these, one is the principle of beauty, another of symmetry, another of truth, and another of something else, but it is simply principle. Nor is it simply the principle of beings, but it is the principle of principles. For it is necessary that the idiom of principle, after the same manner as other things, should not begin from multitude, but should be collected into one monad as a summit, and which is the principle of principles.
"Such things therefore as are first produced by the first good, in consequence of being connascent with it, do not recede from essential goodness, since they are immovable and unchanged, and are eternally established in the same blessedness. They are likewise not indigent of the good, because they are goodnesses themselves. All other natures, however, being produced by the one good, and many goodnesses, since they fall off from essential goodness, and are not immovably established in the hyparxis of divine goodness, on this account they possess the good according to participation."—page 25.

"And here it is necessary to observe that nearly all philosophers prior to Jamblichus (as we are informed by Damascius?) asserted indeed that there is one superessential God, but that the other gods had an essential subsistence, and were deified by illuminations from the one. They likewise said that there is a multitude of superessential unities, who are not self-perfect subsistences, but illuminated unions with deity, imparted to essences by the highest God. That this hypothesis, however, is not conformable to the doctrine of Plato is evident from his Parmenides, in which he shows that

7 Τι δει πολλα λεγειν, οτε και τους θεους ουτως υποτιθεται τους πολλους, οι προ ίαμελικου σχεδου παντες ϕιλοσοφοι ενα μεν ειναι του υπερουσιον θεου λεγοντες, τους αλλους ουσιωδεις ειναι, ταις απο του ενος ελλαμψειν εκδηρμενους, και ειναι το των υπερουσιων πληθος εναιδων, ουκ αυτοτελων υποστασεων, αλλα των ελλαμπομενων απο του μονου θεου, και ταις ουσιαις ενυδιδομενων θεωσεων.—Damsc. Περι Άρχων, MS.
the one does not subsist in itself. (See vol. iii. p. 133.) For as we have observed from Proclus, in the notes on that Dialogue, every thing which is the cause of itself and is self-subsistent is said to be in itself. Hence as producing power always comprehends according to cause that which it produces, it is necessary that whatever produces itself should comprehend itself so far as it is a cause, and should be comprehended by itself so far as it is caused; and that it should be at once both cause and the thing caused, that which comprehends, and that which is comprehended. If therefore a subsistence in another signifies, according to Plato, the being produced by another more excellent cause (as we have shown in the note to p. 133, vol. iii.) a subsistence in itself must signify that which is self-begotten, and produced by itself. If the one therefore is not self-subsistent as even transcending this mode of subsistence, and if it be necessary that there should be something self-subsistent, it follows that this must be the characteristic property of that which immediately proceeds from the ineffable. But that there must be something self-subsistent is evident, since unless this is admitted there will not be a true sufficiency in any thing."—page 27.

"From this magnificent, sublime, and most scientific doctrine of Plato, respecting the arcane principle of things and his immediate progeny, it follows, that this ineffable cause is not the immediate maker of the universe, and this, as I have observed in the Introduction to the Timæus, not through any defect, but on the
contrary through transcendency of power. All things indeed are ineffably unfolded from him at once, into light; but divine media are necessary to the fabrication of the world. For if the universe was immediately produced from the ineffable, it would, agreeably to what we have above observed, be ineffable also in a secondary degree. But as this is by no means the case, it principally derives its immediate subsistence from a deity of a fabricative characteristic, whom Plato calls Jupiter, conformably to the theology of Orpheus. The intelligent reader will readily admit that this dogma is so far from being derogatory to the dignity of the Supreme, that on the contrary it exalts that dignity, and preserves in a becoming manner the exempt transcendency of the ineffable. If therefore we presume to celebrate him, for, as we have already observed, it is more becoming to establish in silence those parturitions of the soul which dare anxiously to explore him, we should celebrate him as the principle of principles, and the fountain of deity, or, in the reverential language of the Egyptians, as a darkness thrice unknown. Highly laudable indeed, and worthy the imitation of all posterity, is the veneration which the great antients paid to this immense principle. This I have already noticed in the Introduction to the Parmenides; and I shall only observe at present in addition, that in consequence of this profound and most pious reverence of the first God, they did not even venture to give a name to the summit of that highest order of divinities which is denominated intelligible. Hence, says Proclus, in his MSS. Scholia on the Cratylus, 'Not every genus of the gods
has an appellation: for with respect to the first Deity, who is beyond all things, Parmenides teaches us that he is ineffable; and the first genera of the intelligible gods, who are united to the one, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and ineffable. For that which is perfectly effable cannot be conjoined with the perfectly ineffable; but it is necessary that the progression of intelligibles should terminate in this order, in which the first effable subsists, and that which is called by proper names. For there the first intelligible forms, and the intellectual nature of intelligibles, are unfolded into light. But the natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known by intelligence. Hence the whole of the telestic science energizing theurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says, that this is first called by a name by the other gods; for the light proceeding from it is known to and denominated by the intellectual gods.’”—page xxxi.

“Lastly, from all that has been said, it must, I think, be immediately obvious to every one whose mental eye is not entirely blinded, that there can be no such thing as a trinity in the theology of Plato in any respect analogous to the Christian Trinity. For the highest God, according to Plato, as we have largely shown from irresistible evidence, is so far from being a part of a con-subsistent triad, that he is not to be connumerated with any thing; but is so perfectly exempt from all multitude, that he is even beyond being; and he so ineffably transcends all relation and habitude, that language is in reality subverted about him, and knowledge refunded
into ignorance. What that trinity however is in the theology of Plato, which doubtless gave birth to the Christian, will be evident to the intelligent from the notes on the Parmenides, and the extracts from Damascius. And thus much for the doctrine of Plato concerning the principle of things, and his immediate offspring, the great importance of which will, I doubt not, be a sufficient apology for the length of this discussion.”—page xxxv.

“Perceiving that we believe things incorporeal and unapparent from things apparent and corporeal, fables came to be adopted, that we might come from things apparent to certain unapparent natures; as, for instance, that on hearing the adulteries, bonds, and lacerations of the gods, castrations of heaven, and the like, we may not rest satisfied with the apparent meaning of such like particulars, but may proceed to the unapparent, and investigate the true signification. After this manner, therefore, looking to the nature of things, were fables employed.

“But from looking to our souls, they originated as follows: While we are children we live according to the phantasy; but the phantastic part is conversant with figures, and types, and things of this kind. That the phantastic part in us therefore may be preserved, we employ fables, in consequence of this part rejoicing in fables. It may also be said, that a fable is nothing

8 Vol. iii. near the end. See also the Notes on the Seventh Epistle of Plato, vol. v.
else than a false discourse shadowing forth the truth: for a fable is the image of truth. But the soul is the image of the natures prior to herself: and hence the soul very properly rejoices in fables, as an image in an image.”—page xxxviii.

"Thus from the Philebus we may receive the science respecting the one good, and the two first principles of things (bound and infinity) together with the triad subsisting from these. For you will find all these distinctly delivered to us by Plato in that dialogue. But from the Timæus you may obtain the theory about intelligibles, a divine narration about the demiurgic monad, and the most full truth about the mundane gods. From the Phædrus you may learn all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and the liberated orders of the gods, which are proximately established above the celestial circulations. From the Politicus you may obtain the theory of the fabrication in the heavens, of the periods of the universe, and of the intellectual causes of those periods. But from the Sophista you may learn the whole sublunary generation, and the idiom of the gods who are allotted the sublunar region, and preside over its generations and corruptions. And with respect to each of the gods, we may obtain many sacred conceptions from the Banquet, many from the Cratylus, and many from the Phædo. For in each of these dialogues more or less mention is made of divine names, from which it is easy for those who are exercised in divine concerns to discover by a reasoning process the idioms of each.”—page xliii.
"But if it be necessary to consider, in one Platonic dialogue, the all-perfect, whole and connected, extending as far as to the complete number of theology, I shall perhaps assert a paradox, and which will alone be apparent to our familiars. We ought however to dare, since we have begun the assertion, and affirm against our opponents, that the Parmenides, and the mystic conceptions of this dialogue, will accomplish all you desire. For in this dialogue, all the divine genera proceed in order from the first cause, and evince their mutual suspension from each other. And those indeed which are highest, connate with the one, and of a primary nature, are allotted a form of subsistence characterized by unity, occult and simple; but such as are last, are multiplied, are distributed into many parts, and excel in number, but are inferior in power to such as are of a higher order; and such as are middle, according to a convenient proportion, are more composite than their causes, but more simple than their proper progeny. And, in short, all the axioms of the theological science appear in perfection in this dialogue; and all the divine orders are exhibited subsisting in connexion. So that this is nothing else than the celebrated generation of the gods, and the procession of every kind of being from the ineffable and unknown cause of wholes. The Parmenides therefore enkindles in the lovers

9 The principle of all things is celebrated by Platonic philosophy as the cause of wholes, because through transcendency of power he first produces those powers in the universe which rank as wholes, and afterwards those which rank as parts, through these. Agreeably to this Jupiter, the artificer of the
of Plato the whole and perfect light of the theological science. But after this, the aforementioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline about the gods, and all of them, as I may say, participate of divine wisdom, and excite our spontaneous conceptions respecting a divine nature. And it is necessary to refer all the parts of this mystic discipline to these dialogues, and these again to the one and all perfect theory of the Parmenides. For thus, as it appears to me, we shall suspend the more imperfect from the perfect, and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit reasons assimilated to things, of which, according to the Platonic Timaeus, they are interpreters. Such then is our answer to the objection which may be urged against us; and thus we refer the Platonic theory to the Parmenides; just as the Timaeus is acknowledged by all who have the least degree of intelligence to contain the whole science about nature.”—page xlix.

“Syrianus10, in his commentary on the 13th book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, shows, in defence of Socrates, Plato, the Parmenidæans, and Pythagoræans, that ideas were not introduced by these divine men, according to the usual meaning of names, as was the opinion of Chry-

universe, is almost always called δημιουργὸς τῶν ολῶν, the demi-

10 See my translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, p. 347. If the reader conjoins what is said concerning ideas in the notes on that work, with the introduction and notes to the Parmenides in this, he will be in possession of nearly all that is to be found in the writings of the antients on this subject.
sippus, Archedemus, and many of the junior Stoics; for ideas are distinguished by many differences, from things which are denominated from custom. Nor do they subsist, says he, together with intellect, in the same manner as those slender conceptions which are denominated universals abstracted from sensibles, according to the hypothesis of Longinus: for if that which subsists is unsubstantial, it cannot be consubstantial with intellect. Nor are ideas according to these men notions, as Cleanthes afterwards asserted them to be. Nor is idea definitive reason, nor material form: for these subsist in composition and division, and verge to matter. But ideas are perfect, simple, immaterial, and impartible natures. And what wonder is there, says Syrianus, if we should separate things which are so much distant from each other? Since neither do we imitate in this particular Plutarch, Atticus, and Democritus, who, because universal reasons perpetually subsist in the essence of the soul, were of opinion that these reasons are ideas; for though they separate them from the universal in sensible natures, yet it is not proper to conjoin in one and the same, the reasons of soul, and an intellect such as ours, with paradigmatic and immaterial forms, and demiurgic intellections. But as the divine Plato says, it is the province of our soul to collect things into one by a reasoning process, and to possess a reminiscence of those transcendent spec-

11 It appears from this passage of Syrianus that Longinus was the original inventor of the theory of abstract ideas; and that Mr. Locke was merely the restorer of it.
tacles, which we once beheld when governing the universe in conjunction with divinity. Boethus the Peripatetic, too, with whom it is proper to join Cornutus, thought that ideas are the same with universals in sensible natures. However, whether these universals are prior to particulars, they are not prior in such a manner as to be denudated from the habitude which they possess with respect to them, nor do they subsist as the causes of particulars; both which are the prerogatives of ideas: or whether they are posterior to particulars, as many are accustomed to call them, how can things of posterior origin, which have no essential subsistence, but are nothing more than slender conceptions, sustain the dignity of fabricative ideas?"—page li.

"From this intelligible world, replete with omniform ideas, this sensible world, according to Plato, perpetually flows, depending on its artificer intellect, in the same manner as shadow on its forming substance. For as a deity of an intellectual characteristic is its fabricator, and both the essence and energy of intellect are established in eternity, the sensible universe, which is the effect or production of such an energy, must be consubsistent with its cause, or, in other words, must be a perpetual emanation from it. This will be evident from considering that every thing which is generated, is either generated by art, or by nature, or according

12 This was a Greek philosopher, who is often cited by Simplicius in his Commentary on the Predicaments, and must not therefore be confounded with Boetius, the Roman senator and philosopher.
to power. It is necessary, therefore, that every thing operating according to nature or art should be prior to the things produced; but that things operating according to power should have their productions coexistent with themselves; just as the sun produces light coexistent with itself; fire, heat; and snow, coldness. If therefore the artificer of the universe produced it by art, he would not cause it simply to be, but to be in some particular manner; for all art produces form. Whence therefore does the world derive its being? If he produced it from nature, since that which makes by nature imparts something of itself to its productions, and the maker of the world is incorporeal, it would be necessary that the world, the offspring of such an energy, should be incorporeal. It remains, therefore, that the demiurgus produced the universe by power alone; but every thing generated by power subsists together with the cause containing this power: and hence productions of this kind cannot be destroyed, unless the producing cause is deprived of power. The divine intellect therefore that produced the sensible universe caused it to be coexistent with himself."—page liv.

"And now having, with venturous yet unpresuming wing, ascended to the ineffable principle of things, and standing with every eye closed in the vestibules of the adytum, found that we could announce nothing concerning him, but only indicate our doubts and disappointment, and having thence descended to his occult and most venerable progeny, and passing through the luminous world of ideas, holding fast by the golden
chain of deity, terminated our downward flight in the material universe, and its undecaying wholes, let us stop awhile and contemplate the sublimity and magnificence of the scene which this journey presents to our view. Here then we see the vast empire of deity, an empire terminated upwards by a principle so ineffable that all language is subverted about it, and downwards by the vast body of the world. Immediately subsisting after this immense unknown we in the next place behold a mighty all-comprehending one, which, as being next to that which is in every respect incomprehensible, possesses much of the ineffable and unknown. From this principle of principles, in which all things causally subsist absorbed in superessential light and involved in unfathomable depths, we view a beauteous progeny of principles, all largely partaking of the ineffable, all stamped with the occult characters of deity, all possessing an overflowing fulness of good. From these dazzling summits, these ineffable blossoms, these divine propagations, we next see being, life, intellect, soul, nature, and body depending; monads suspended from unities, deified natures proceeding from deities. Each of these monads too, is the leader of a series which extends from itself to the last of things, and which, while it proceeds from, at the same time abides in and returns to its leader. And all these principles and all their progeny are finally centered and rooted by their summits in the first great all-comprehending one. Thus all beings proceed from and are comprehended in the first being; all intellects emanate from one first intellect; all souls from one first soul; all natures blossom from one first
nature; and all bodies proceed from the vital and luminous body of the world. And lastly, all these great monads are comprehended in the first one, from which both they and all their depending series are unfolded into light. Hence this first one is truly the unity of unities, the monad of monads, the principle of principles, the God of gods, one and all things, and yet one prior to all.

"Such, according to Plato, are the flights of the true philosopher, such the august and magnificent scene which presents itself to his view. By ascending these luminous heights, the spontaneous tendencies of the soul to deity alone find the adequate object of their desire; investigation here alone finally reposes, doubt expires in certainty, and knowledge loses itself in the ineffable.

"And here perhaps some grave objector, whose little soul is indeed acute, but sees nothing with a vision healthy and sound, will say that all this is very magnificent, but that it is soaring too high for man; that it is merely the effect of spiritual pride; that no truths, either in morality or theology, are of any importance which are not adapted to the level of the meanest capacity; and that all that it is necessary for man to know concerning either God or himself is so plain, that he that runs may read. In answer to such like cant, for it is nothing more,—a cant produced by the most profound ignorance, and frequently attended with the most deplorable envy, I ask, is then the Delphic precept, know thyself, a trivial mandate? Can this be accomplished by every man? Or can any one properly know himself without knowing the rank he holds in the scale of being? And
can this be effected without knowing what are the natures which he surpasses, and what those are by which he is surpassed? And can he know this without knowing as much of those natures as it is possible for him to know? And will the objector be hardy enough to say that every man is equal to this arduous task? That he who rushes from the forge, or the mines, with a soul distorted, crushed, and bruised by base mechanical arts, and madly presumes to teach theology to a deluded audience, is master of this sublime, this most important science? For my own part I know of no truths which are thus obvious, thus accessible to every man, but axioms, those self-evident principles of science which are conspicuous by their own light, which are the spontaneous unperverted conceptions of the soul, and to which he who does not assent deserves, as Aristotle justly remarks, either pity or correction. In short, if this is to be the criterion of all moral and theological knowledge, that it must be immediately obvious to every man, that it is to be apprehended by the most careless inspection, what occasion is there for seminaries of learning? Education is ridiculous, the toil of investigation is idle. Let us at once confine Wisdom in the dungeons of Folly, recall Ignorance from her barbarous wilds, and close the gates of Science with everlasting bars.”—page lvi.
The initiation by which we have been admitted into Platonism coincides with the evidence which a close examination has drawn from the learned defender of orthodoxy; and both these testimonies will receive a further support from an enquiry into the Orientalism of Plato, which will form the second part of this Essay.

It may be said that such works as Dr. Burton's, Matter's, and Lardner's, and à fortiori the volumes of Mosheim, Beausobre, and Brucker, are not likely to become familiar to English readers. Were this cause of concealment of the truth likely to continue, it would still be the duty of instructors to carry their hearers forward from the point at which they have arrived into completer truth. Much self-deception is practised by those who, having a larger and sounder knowledge, but not willing to make any sacrifice for truth's sake, persuade themselves that the world is not yet ready to receive a higher discipline. Their unwillingness to proceed implies that man is a better judge than God on what foundations piety and obligation may be best rested. Though supposition may be received as reality in ignorant periods, yet whenever knowledge increases then that which is supposititious must be separated from that which is real; or what is supposititious, falling gradually into disbelief and contempt, will drag what is real down with it. The purity, elevation, and goodness of a character, the practicalness, simplicity, and authority of lessons, will lose their effect if they are then rested on any but their real claims to reverence; for
there is no deeper principle than the *incredulus odi*, which will assert truth even against usefulness. Except amongst the feeblest age, sex, and intellect, no permanent usefulness can be founded upon what is not real. Where there are such real claims to reverence, it is a most unhappy error to persist in urging claims which cannot be maintained. "There is no use in hiding that from ourselves in principle which we cannot avoid in fact." But even if these claims could be maintained, namely, that this divine character is "God the Son," "God of God," "God and Man," that "this is the catholic faith, which except a man believe faithfully he cannot be saved," still if it be not *true*, who will dare to maintain it when he shall have become convinced that it is not true? Conscience must be an idle word, and Providence an empty idea, if feelings and consequences could permit this. Few, it may be hoped, err so far; but is there no error in not enquiring impartially into the important truth, of which only a portion of the evidence is here detailed? The real fact is capable of being still concealed from the thousands who take their religion on trust; but the arguments urged here with an earnest desire to support piety and obligation, and accompanied with a most unfeigned hope that the church may be continually obtaining a more wholesome and more efficient influence, will be abused in the hands of the irreligious as weapons of destruction if not used for the advance of truth\textsuperscript{13}. That person must have observed

\textsuperscript{13} I call those irreligious who do not receive their blessings as coming directly from God, and do not cultivate a private and public gratitude. The power of public sympathy in a good
little, and reflected to no purpose, who does not see that truth is the power which will be firm when all the powers of heaven and earth are shaken. Force, imagination, habit, will in their turns desert authority; but if it have truth on its side the gates of anarchy shall not prevail against it.

What have been the effects of lowering the Nature of the Deity to human conceptions? A doubting about the distinct existence of the Deity; and a limiting of power, not by its own will but by the inefficiency of matter.

Natura species ratioque:
Principium hinc cujus nobis exordia sumet;
Nullam rem à nihilo gigni divinitūs unquam.

What has been the consequence of requiring a belief in the agency of an Interruptive Providence? A referring physical and moral causation, which are the effects and evidences of a Divine Providence, to an energy supposed to belong necessarily to matter.

Dum flamma sine tura liqueiscere lumine sacro
Persuadere cupit, credat Judæus Apella,
Non ego : namque deos didici securum agere ævum ;
Nec si quid miri faciat natura, deos id
Tristes ex alto cæli demittere tecto.14

cause is not to be neglected because it may be abused. And I call those irreligious who in employing the means of obtaining blessings do not feel a conviction that they have God’s institution and sanction. The world will be a material theocracy for evil, if man will not make it a moral theocracy for good.

14 When man constructs a machine he does but avail himself of fixed principles in matter; but when God constructs a ma-
What has been the effect of the belief and feelings supposition has forced upon mankind? A relapse into the licentiousness of practical atheism.

*Omnis enim per se divum natura, necesse est*  
*Ipsa sui pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri,*  
*Nec bene promeritis capitur nec tangitur ird.*  
*Humana ante oculos fede cum vita jaceret*  
*In terris oppressa gravi sub religione.*

What effects have these atheistic and material principles on communities? A gradual commotion of all the atoms of anarchy.

*--- --- Me vestigia terrent  
Omnia te adversum spectantia, nulla retrosum:*  
*Belua es multorum capitum: nam quid sequar aut quem?*

chine, he fixes those principles by creation, and supplies them from instant to instant by conservation. Does it follow, because he fixed them at creation in a certain manner, that he could not have fixed them in any other manner, had it so pleased him? Or does it follow, because he continues them invariably according to that manner, by conservation, he could not depart from that manner if it so pleased him? In the mind which dictates these ideas, and in the fingers which write these words, I believe there resides not one particle of power except what God supplies from instant to instant. But I as firmly believe that these intellectual and corporeal powers are supplied according to a fixed manner, and a fixed measure; of which manner and measure my own permitted knowledge and energy form an important part. These constitute me a responsible being, for it is through these that the precept *hoc age,* and the answer, *I will or I will not,* are constantly being given. Is this enthusiasm? Is it not rather plain evidence and sound reasoning? But it requires incessant exertion to keep it *practically* before the mind; and we are so constituted that few can do this without sympathy.
What is the most striking omen of an increasing anarchy? The soundest discipline gradually losing its effect, and sinking into contempt, weighed down by falsehood.

Labente deinde paulatim disciplind, velut dissidentes primo mores sequatur animo; deinde, ut magis magisque lapsi sunt; tum ire cæperint precipites; donec ad hæc tempora, quibus nec vitia nostra, nec remedia pati possimus, perventum est.

Is there any recovery from such anarchy? Truth, producing conviction; and conviction establishing a sound discipline.

— Tarda fluunt ingrataque tempora, quæ spem
Consiliumque morantur agendi gnawiter id quod
Æque pauperibus prodest, locupletibus æque;
Æque neglectum pueris senibusque nocet.

Without over-estimating the bulwark which each would build after his own manner, a wall of truth has many recommendations at a time when the tyranny and the anarchy of theory will shake the foundations of authority.

When we behold a country covered with an abundance of all produce, towns plenteous in all manner of stores, a people enjoying the rewards of their labour, governors seeking justice and loving mercy, and a priesthood teaching the truth of obligations in teaching obli-

2
ations to truth, we say, behold man's service and God's blessings.

But when we see a country overspread with unsatisfied labourers, towns thronged with rebellious workmen, a people brooding over their ill-paid and unemployed labour, a government withholding justice and mercy, and a priesthood teaching the falsehood of obligations in teaching obligations to falsehood, we say, behold man's folly and God's judgements.

Yet were we to see a priesthood earnest for a return to truth, a government full of compassion for the wretchedness, and labouring to increase the happiness, of the people, a people relying on their governors and listening to their instructors, every interest in town or country actively doing and patiently suffering what must be done and suffered, we would say, behold man's repentance and God's forgiveness.

The causes of evil must be removed before the effects will cease, and the causes of good must be employed before the effects will proceed. If the Creator be as wise in his moral and physical system as man is capable of learning the objects and the means of these systems, it must be as true in principle as it is real in fact, that supposition is the artificial ground-work of evil, and reality is the natural or rather the divine foundation of good.

A God-fearing, and a God-reverencing, and a God-loving, would also be a God-serving people. But fear, reverence, love, and service, cannot be rested permanently on unsound foundations. It is not the fault of the present times that such foundations have been raised;
but it will be our fault, and on us will the retribution fall, if such foundations are not gradually removed, and sounder foundations gradually substituted. We are manifestly approaching one of those epochs in the periods of the human mind, in which there must be pure truth, or there may arise the fanaticism of unknown tongues and the bigotry of schismatic feelings, but contrasted by the increasing impiety of the scoffer and irreligion of the anarchist.

Of this let us be entirely sure, that, as God is felt in his physical providence for good or for evil, according as man abuses or neglects or employs the real principles of matter; so will God be felt in his moral providence for good or evil, according as man abuses or neglects or employs the real principles of mind. But of this also let us be equally sure, that, as no supposition of man can supersede the real principles of matter, but the vortices of the philosopher and the suction of the vulgar have been exploded; so no supposition of man can supersede the real principles of mind, but the agency of an interruptive Providence, and the humanity of the Divine Nature must cease to be believed. And in this the parallel holds good, that what may be called the merely natural good effects of God’s physical and moral system will be produced, whether man supposes wrong or understands right; but what may be called the supernatural15 good effects of God’s physical and moral sy-

15 The word supernatural is here used to signify effects which natural capabilities will not produce, till compelled by the skill and energy of man into an artificial (or super-natural) efficiency.
stem altogether depend on man's understanding the real principles of matter and mind. The very foundation of truth is that man is the interpreter of realities and not the contriver of suppositions. Taking this as his principle, he will not depart from sincerity, and he will strive earnestly for truth. And however small an effect an individual may produce, he will remember that it can only be by every one doing his part that the whole work will at length be done. Without a gradual dis­abusing of men's minds by strong evidence and clear reasoning, changes of opinion will be unconvincing and unsatisfactory, will be triumphant for a time, but will have no abiding strength. Neither the force of supposition nor the strength of reality can be rightly estimated by those who believe either that prejudice will speedily be overthrown, or that knowledge can be permanently resisted. It may be very easy to bring about the anarchy in which supposition and reality are forced into violent collision, but the peaceful transition from supposition to reality is difficult, and can only be gradually effected; but then it is sound in principle, and will be permanent in effect. Is there not a fair hope of this progression? There has been a period of force; and there has been a period of habit; and there has been a period of ima­gination. Shall there not be a period of truth? Know­ledge, Sincerity, and Resolution, are its elements. These alone can build up a simple piety and a strong obligation: in one word, Religion, that supernatural bond, which, connecting the creature by every tie of reason and conscience to the Creator, sets forth God as the master, and man as the servant, and matter as the
instrument: for a plain truth can not be stated in too plain a language. And it may be permitted to ask every reasoning and feeling creature, had he himself created the physical and intellectual and moral world, with all their infinite capabilities, natural and supernatural, would he be satisfied to see them no better employed, and producing no better effects, than the world so largely exhibits? There has been a direct provision for breaking up the fountains of the great deep, if the causes which agitate the lowest depths are not strongly counteracted by purer truth in principle, and greater usefulness in practice.
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