PLATO

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES

AND

CRITO

EDITED
ON THE BASIS OF CRON'S EDITION
BY

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PREFACE.

This edition of the *Apology of Socrates* and the *Crito* is based upon Dr. Christian Cron's eighth edition, Leipzig, 1882. The Notes and Introduction here given have in the main been confined within the limits intelligently drawn by Dr. Cron, whose commentaries upon various dialogues of Plato have done and still do so much in Germany to make the study of our author more profitable as well as pleasanter. No scruple has been felt, however, in making changes. I trust there are few if any of these which Dr. Cron might not himself make if he were preparing his work for an English-thinking and English-speaking public.

No editor of Plato in England or America can escape the influence of Dr. Jowett's labors upon Plato; certainly not one who owes so much to Dr. Jowett's teaching and friendship as I do. This is a debt which, because it is contracted unconsciously for the most part, can hardly be adequately acknowledged. Riddell's valuable edition has suggested many changes and additions in the Notes, and Stallbaum has been assiduously consulted.

The Appendix to the Introduction differs very materially from the corresponding portion of Dr. Cron's book. There as elsewhere I have been constantly advised and as constantly enlightened by my kind friend and former teacher, Professor W. W. Goodwin. But this list of my creditors must necessarily remain incomplete, for I cannot mention those who have helped me most; nor can I record here the names of all my pupils, past and present, whose needs have been my guide and my impulse in preparing this book.
The Text is substantially that of Dr. Cron's edition; where there is alteration, reasons are given in the Critical Appendix. In no case have the illustrative citations of the German commentary been inconsiderately omitted; so far as possible, indeed, further citations have been made. The dramatists, especially Euripides, have been constantly drawn upon for new citations. It is easy to underrate the importance of Euripides to the reader of Plato; it is impossible to overstate in the interests of higher scholarship the desirability of having even the youngest students of Greek letters discipline themselves in the reading and heeding of citations offered to illustrate their author.

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Harvard University,
July, 1885.
INTRODUCTION.

The endowment of philosophical thought with a beautiful form of its own was the last literary triumph of Greece. Guided by a wonderful law of growth, the Greeks, before dealing with philosophy, had already displayed in the elaboration of various kinds of literature their singular susceptibility to beauty. Epic and lyric composition first ran their full course and then the drama succeeded them. Indeed not poetry only but also history and oratory preceded philosophy, for when the drama was perfect they were nearly so. Philosophy, meanwhile, still lacked an outward form for the expression of what she was bound to say. This lack involves more than a question of clothing: the body itself of Greek thought was as yet but imperfectly developed. Since thought \((\text{ratio})\) is the soul of which the body is utterance \((\text{oratio})\), we cannot wonder at finding a single Greek word \((\lambdaο\upsilonος)\) for both, nor can we fail to see that the soul of philosophy was not full-grown until it had fashioned for itself a body in which to stand forth free and independent.

The merest glance at the history of philosophy\(^1\) justifies this statement. Greek philosophy first gave signs of life in the cosmogonies and theogonies of early poets who were anything but

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philosophers; and even those famous worthies, the seven wise men, belong rather to the history of politics and civilization in general, than to the special history of philosophy. The name of Thales, one of the wise seven, stands at the beginning in Greek philosophy. He, and with him his fellow-townsmen and successors, Anaximander and Anaximenes, asked this question: What is that something out of which everything in Nature grows and is made? At Miletus, a town whose political and intellectual vigor gave it preëminence among the Ionian colonies in Asia Minor, these three men lived and sought for something omnipresent and unchanging, for the real substance which underlies the unceasing surface-changes offered to man's senses in the world. They all found this in elementary matter of some description. Thales described it as water, Anaximander as τὸ ἄπειρον, the unlimited.¹ Anaximenes called it air. But this elementary matter no one of the three opposed to Spirit; for the opposition of "spiritual" and "material," or of "matter" and "mind" came much later. To the Milesian philosophers matter was a something which, if not divine, was instinct with divine energy.

Yet a far less material notion of this permanent something underlying all change was undoubtedly arrived at by the Pythagoreans. Born at Samos, Pythagoras emigrated to Croton, where about 530 B.C. he founded the half religious and half political society which bore his name. These Pythagoreans believed that number was the essence of things, the permanent and real part of the world, or, to give their second way of putting the doctrine, that the elements of numbers are the elements of things. This doctrine admits of application not only to the physical world, but also to

¹ Matter stripped of limits or boundary-lines; a something which, being everything and anything, is, according as it is limited in one way or another, "everything by turns and nothing long."
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...the moral world,—to the whole field of human action. But the Pythagoreans framed no philosophy of right and wrong. They contented themselves with a few practical maxims which were useful in the work of their society. Among the various doctrines attributed to Pythagoras and his school, we can with certainty connect only one with Pythagoras himself. He certainly maintained the theory of the Transmigration of Souls. Philolaus, probably an elder contemporary of Socrates and Democritus, first stated the tenets of this school in writing. He came to Thebes, where he taught, nearly at the same time with Lysis, his well-known brother-Pythagorean. Of the book by Philolaus entitled Περὶ Φύσεως, such fragments as have been preserved are collected by Boeckh, and supply an invaluable source for the history of the old-school Pythagoreanism. Of the later Pythagoreans Archytas of Tarentum, who lived in the fourth century B.C., is the most noteworthy. He distinguished himself in politics and in mathematics.

The Pythagoreans approached a comparatively spiritual conception of nature, but the Eleatics went further in the same direction. Xenophanes of Colophon, the reputed originating of this new doctrine, was probably a contemporary of Pythagoras. Looking upon the world as a whole, he maintained that the All is the One, and that the One is God. This utterance implies a deep-seated moral conviction that God is perfection. Parmenides, who was born about 515 B.C., at Elea, a Phocaean colony in Italy, first devel-

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1 Number is the law and the bond that holds the world together; everything, if we are to know it, must be numbered, i.e. odd or even. Odd numbers are limited, even numbers are unlimited, and all cases of opposition are, as it were, cases of the opposition of odd to even so that the following list of opposites may be made κατὰ συντομίαν, under two heads:

2 Cf. The Merchant of Venice, Act IV. Scene I. 130 ff.; also Ovid, Metam. XV. 165 ff.

3 Philolaos des Pythagoreers Lehren nebst den Bruchstücken seines Werkes, von August Boeckh. Berlin, 1819. The authenticity of these fragments has recently been called in question.

4 To fix this date cf. Plato’s Theaetetus, p. 183 e, and Parmenides, p. 127 b, where it is said that Socrates, in early youth, saw both Zeno and Parmenides, and that the latter was a very old man. The age of Parmenides was sixty-five, while Zeno’s is placed at
oped the doctrines of Xenophanes, saying that what has not Being but is many does not exist. He maintained the Oneness of all that is, calling it Being, pure and simple. Following Xenophanes, Parmenides set forth his doctrine in a long didactic poem in epic verse. Zeno supported this theory by indirect-demonstration, pointing out the contradictions in which we are involved by maintaining the opposite view, that what is many has Being or exists.1 Finally, Melissus of Samos, well known as a Samian general in the revolt of that island from Athens, about 440 B.C., accepted the views of Parmenides, and, unlike Zeno, argued directly2 that Being is eternal, infinite, one and unchangeable.3

The physical first cause of Pythagoreanism suggests the possibility of a systematic theory of right and wrong, that is of Ethics.4 The Eleatic first cause gives promise of a coming system of philosophic reasoning, of Dialectic. For all this we must not call Zeno the originator of Dialectic. Any inclination to do so ought to disappear after a consideration of his method in controversial reasoning and proof. He argues, not to win truth from the heart of his facts, but to defend a ready-made doctrine and to thrust it upon those whose attention he gains. At its best this is rhetoric, at its worst it is sophistry.

Conflicting authorities leave us uncertain whether it was before or after the completer statement of the Eleatic doctrines by Parmenides, that Heraclitus of Ephesus flatly contradicted the saying forty. This is not history, but it gives a chronological clue.

1 Assert that the many things seen in the world really exist, and you must admit that they are at the same time limited and limitless. For if these things are real there must be a definite sum of them, not more and not less. Hence they are limited. But they are also limitless; because, taking their definite sum and subdividing it as often as we please, we still can go on with the subdivision indefinitely and without limit.

2 If there is no Being, why do we talk of anything as being? If there is Being, either it always existed or it came into existence at some time. If it came into existence it must have grown out of something of which we could have said it is or it is not. Out of that which is not nothing can grow, therefore Being can only have grown out of Being.


4 Cf. the placing of "good" and "bad" on the Pythagorean list of pairs, p. 3, note 1 above.
of his older contemporary Xenophanes that the One admits neither motion nor change. Heraclitus is said to have flourished about the sixty-ninth Olympiad, 500 B.C. The elaborate superstructure of his teaching rested upon the following statement: “Everything is moving like a stream, and nothing stands still; all things are forever coming into existence and ceaselessly flowing away. The world was from the beginning, and always will be, ever-living fire, kindling by fixed degrees and by fixed degrees dying down. Everything has its price in terms of Fire, and Fire pays for the world as gold buys goods and goods are sold for gold.” The phraseology here used abundantly shows that Heraclitus, in speaking of fire as he does, is not following the older Ionic philosophers by taking his turn at describing anew a permanent substratum in their sense. Under the veil of his oracular words the meaning is given as it were in a parable. Ever-living Fire stands for the restless impulse which underlies the process of becoming or transformation. This process he also calls the upward and the downward way, meaning the constant shifting of things growing up and dying down. This he thought was the common life in all Nature. Such was the picture which he drew of the world. In the same vein Heraclitus said, “The father of all things is war,” meaning by war the united play of opposites or things contradictory. “Concord,” he said, “is the daughter of strife.”

By making his system account for the world of sensible things Heraclitus undoubtedly improves upon the Eleatics. And this, too, in spite of his substantial agreement with them in certain leading conclusions. In the first place, both schools agree in rejecting all sensible impressions as wholly untrustworthy; reaching this conclusion, however, from points of view diametrically opposed. This agreement is most obvious in their respective accounts of particular (sensible) things. Heraclitus’s stream of ceaseless transformation or Becoming allows to no single thing an instant of real and permanent existence, and thus practically relegates all things that we see in the world to a state of non-existence. Parmenides regards the sensible world as non-existent, opposing to it pure existence one and indivisible. But the Eleatics provide no means
for connecting pure Being on the one hand with Not-being on the other, and, unlike Heraclitus, they cleave the world in twain and find no way of uniting the two parts. In the second place, Parmenides teaches that outside of the thought of the One there is no true thinking but only deceptive 'opining,' while Heraclitus urges that the 'universal' which pervades all things (τὸ ἱερὸν = τὸ κοινὸν) alone has understanding. This understanding the 'individual' shares only in proportion to the degree of its submission to and submersion in the 'universal.' Here is substantial agreement, but here again Heraclitus takes a wider view than Parmenides, and accordingly makes a fuller provision for the facts.

7 Though Heraclitus did not follow the example of Xenophanes and Parmenides, but wrote his work in prose, he expressed himself most obscurely. It was on this account that the ancients themselves nicknamed him ὁ σκοτανώς, the man of darkness. We hear that Socrates, when asked by Euripides for his opinion of Heraclitus's book, gave this answer: "All that I could fathom was excellent: what I could not fathom is no doubt the same, only we had better send to Delos for a man to do the diving." Aristotle says that Heraclitus is obscure because it is impossible to decide how his words are to be combined, and of the parts of his book that are preserved not a few justify this statement. For instance, a passage that has been much discussed ἐν τῷ σοφῷ μοὖν λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἔθελε καὶ ἔθελα Ζηνὸς οὖν μα gives rise to two questions, neither of which can be satisfactorily answered. Shall we put a comma before or after καὶ ἔθελαι? How are the various words in the sentence to be construed?

8 Empedocles of Agrigentum stated his doctrines in a didactic poem after the manner of Xenophanes and Parmenides. He chose the epic form, and his work was the model after which Lucretius wrote his De rerum naturae. Empedocles flourished in the eighty-fourth Olympiad, near the middle of the fifth century B.C. This date is confirmed by the report that he visited the newly founded

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1 Schleiermacher has collected and explained the fragments that are preserved (Museum der Alterthumswissenschaft, I.3, Berlin, 1808; or, Werke zur Philosophie, II. 1). See the attempted restoration of the original sequence of the fragments, Heraklit von Ephesus, by Dr. P. Schuster, Leipzig, 1873. See also Heracliti Ephesii reliquae, ed. I. Bywater, London, 1877.
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colony of Thurii. His system is closely connected with the Eleatic as well as with the Heraclitan scheme of things, and also shows traces of Pythagorean influence. Starting from the first principle, that Not-being can no more come to be than Being can decay and cease to be, he concludes that what men call growth and decay are respectively cases of the combination and of the disintegration of primal elements. His four elements are the familiar ones, to each of which his imaginative genius gives a mythological name. Fire, described as flaming Aether, he names Zeus; Air, Hera; Earth, Aëdoneus; Water, Nestis. These four elements were at the beginning inseparably united within the eternal Globe (Σφαιρός), which in all its parts was of like consistency. But outside of this globe ruled Strife (Νέκως), who finally invaded it, causing complete disintegration. The resisting impulse of Love (Φιλία) reacted from within and brought about a partial reintegration. This reaction and reintegration gave rise to the frame of the world (Κόσμος) with all the particular things which it comprises. In his detailed account of sensible perception, feeling, and intellectual apprehension of the good and the bad, Empedocles applies his fundamental principle with an unsteady hand, and is often involved in contradictions. His religious theories are set forth in a separate work called Καθαρμός.

Neither the date nor the place of the birth of Leucippus can be determined, but we know that he founded the school of the Atomists. Democritus of Abdera, born in the eightieth Olympiad, about 460 B.C., was certainly his younger contemporary, and probably his disciple. Upon Democritus devolved the task of developing this new system of thought.¹ The Atomists were unwilling to say either with Heraclitus (1) Being is a process of constant change, or with Parmenides (2) Being immovable and unchangeable exists apart from all particular things, but like Empedocles they said (3) A number of original elements exists. Instead, however, of four elements, they supposed an unlimited number of atoms (αἱ ἄτομα, sc. οὐσία or ἰδέα). These indivisible Atoms were in-

¹ For the interesting fragments of his well-written work, cf. Mullach's "Democriti Abderitae operum fragmenta," Berol. 1843. Also his work referred to above, p. 4, note 3.
wardly alike in essence, and so small as to be indistinguishable; they differed in shape, arrangement, and position. Their combination means growth; their separation means decay and destruction; the difference in their situation and arrangement is at the bottom of such variety and change as we see in the world. But why, we may ask, should these Atoms combine or separate? Because, says the Atomist, necessity forces them to move. This necessary motion comes, not from any source or cause beyond and above them, but is derived partly from an original rotary motion, a twist which they take at the start, and partly from their constant collision one with another and the consequent reaction. But to move at all they need room to move in. This room is a vacuum which offers no resistance; it is free and empty space or void, while the atoms are space compacted and filled full, or fulness. Reality consists solely of these Atoms, and hence they are Being, while the Void is Not-being. And yet Not-being in this sense has a relative existence. Therefore the Atomists did not hesitate to say: Being no more is than Not-being. By Atoms not the physical world of the senses only, but also the soul, is explained. The body is the cabin, σκήνος, of the soul, and on this basis an attempt is made to explain mental activity and the life of the soul. Here the shortcomings of the Atomistic explanation of the world show themselves. Still, against the Atomists the point is not well taken that, by necessity, an Atomist must mean chance or what is arbitrary, and all praise is due to the determined logic with which they apply their principle consistently to every detail. Democritus is credited with a number of admirable moral maxims; they express, however, the plain common-sense of a man who means to make the most of life, rather than a matured philosophy of conduct.

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae was born in the seventieth Olympiad, about 500 B.C., and thus his birth preceded that of Empedocles and Democritus; but he must be counted as belonging to a maturer phase of thought. When Anaxagoras said: "Order is introduced

1 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A, 3: Ἀναξάγορας...τῇ μὲν ἡλίκῃ πρῶτερος διὸ τότου (Ἐμπεδοκλέους), τοῖς δὲ ἐργοῖς ὑπερ-ροσ. ἀπείρους εἶναι φησὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς. Of his book *Περὶ Φύσεως* a number of fragments are preserved. Schaubach has
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into the All by mind," there was no further use either for the half-mythological forces of Empedocles, or for the blind necessity of the Atomists. And yet, there was much upon which all the three schools would have agreed; Democritus and Empedocles would have welcomed Anaxagoras's dictum, "The Greeks are wrong in believing that there is such a thing as growing to be out of nothing or perishing away into nothing; nothing grows to be and nothing perishes, but all things are the mingling together and the falling apart of elements that really exist. So, therefore, to grow into being is properly to-be-compounded, and to perish is to-fall-apart." These elements that really exist Anaxagoras did not define as Empedocles defined his elements or as the Atomists defined their atoms. He often calls his elements seeds, σπέρματα, and they have certain determinate qualities which make them the seeds of this, that, or the other particular kind of thing, e.g. gold, wood, bone. Flesh, blood, and bone are respectively combinations of parts, each one of which parts has the peculiar properties of the whole of which it is one part, and the whole has the properties of each of its parts. In speaking of such a whole, as well as of its parts, Aristotle used the word ὀμοιομερή (ὁμοιος, like, and μέρος, part); therefore, the whole theory has often been called ὁμοιομερικ. In the beginning, the sum of things infinitesimally small and infinite in number, no one of which could be perceived on account of its smallness, lay in a mass together. Finally mind intervened, separating like from unlike and introducing order. The most delicate and purest of essences, mind enters into combination with nothing else; it understands all things for and by itself, and over all it rules supreme. In such unmistakable terms as these did Anaxagoras set forth the idea of an all-wise and all-powerful essence completely distinct from matter. The words which he chose are no doubt inadequate because borrowed from the domain of the senses, but their import is clear. The fact that he reached this conception of mind gives to Anaxagoras a conspicuous place in the history of Greek philosophy, and yet he hardly knew the published them: Anaxagorae Clazomeni fragmenta collecta et illustrata, Lips. 1827. Mullach has also put

them into his book. See on Apology, p. 26 d.
full bearing of his discovery. Mind, he says, when in the beginning all things lay in a motionless mass, gave them their first impulse and lent the motion which brought order into all. In other respects Anaxagoras's explanation of nature is materialistic, the same in kind with those of his predecessors and contemporaries. This is what Plato and Aristotle say, and it is of this that they both complain. In order that the conception of mind reached by Anaxagoras might be made fruitful, there was need that it be completely worked out, and for this the foundations of philosophy had to be laid anew. For this necessary work of reconstruction no more favorable place could have been found than Athens. Indeed, it was at Athens, and in the society of its most noteworthy men, especially of Pericles and Euripides, that Anaxagoras himself lived. He was, however, finally accused of atheism and exiled by the enemies of his great friend Pericles. Leaving Athens, he retired to Lampsacus, and there ended his days.

After numerous attempts to account for the world of sensible things on a physical basis, the very school of thinkers who sought to explain matter by matter began to feel the need of some first cause which should lie outside of matter and above it. Henceforward the one thing indispensable for the full recognition of such a first cause was a vigorous impulse which, arousing and uplifting the moral energy of national thought, should re-shape Philosophy by the help of this new conception. This required impulse was found in the practical demand, now for the first time made upon philosophers, that they abandon the retirement in which, with little or no reference to what was going on about them, they had up to this time carried on their speculations. Now the time had come when the world demanded a new departure in education, and now was the opportunity for Philosophy to try her strength. At first this trial seemed to lead rather to destruction than to reconstruction; the wear and tear of practice threatened completely to swallow up all theory. Various tendencies, indeed, the obvious

1 They show no little impatience and disdain of every-day men like ourselves. It matters little to them whether we keep pace with their discussions or fall behind,—every man of them steadily goes on his chosen way. Plato, Sophist, p. 243 a.
results not a few of them of doctrines previously taught, accomplished nothing but their own destruction. But this very destruction served to point a moral, since it showed that the engrossing aim of sound philosophy must not be to adorn its devotees with irresponsible cleverness and to train their faculties in that kind of intellectual dexterity whose chief reward is success. For it became evident that a moral ideal was required which, in the teaching of the Sophists, was absent. This lack of a freshly grasped and high moral standard, coupled with the effort to turn their disciples into dextrous performers on the stage of life, characterized many different teachers at this time. These teachers were the Sophists, and their teaching is usually called not Sophistry but Sophistic. This term is accordingly applied to the teaching of men who, in the details of their theories, often had little or nothing in common. Men who appeared as public professors of wisdom called themselves Sophists, and were so called by the public. They gathered about them old and young, and, for a stated fee, gave lectures to hearers fresh from the heat of a keen and active political strife in such branches of knowledge as were likely to interest men so pre-occupied. In short, the practical needs of political life led them to annex the widening territory of rhetoric to the traditional domain of philosophy. They devoted much energy to the art of vigorous speech-writing and of finished speech-making. These were the outward graces which a Sophist used in order to make his teachings and lectures attractive. Rhetoric and Sophistic were sister arts, inseparable from the outset, and for every man who was anxious to find the best market for his proficiency in

1 Grote, in his History of Greece (ch. 67), is certainly right in rejecting this designation, if it must mean that the teachings and principles of all Sophists were the same or that all of them taught in the same way. The word Sophistic may, however, be said to imply such similarity in methods of teaching and in doctrine as would (1) fairly distinguish the Sophists from Socrates, and (2) lead us to class the Sophists together. Three negative statements apply to all the Sophists which do not apply to Socrates: first the Sophists did not teach free of charge, second they did not in any strict sense lay foundations for the future development of philosophy, third they did not cast their lot either with their own or with any adopted country.
these arts, Athens, at that time the centre of all the intellectual activity of the day, was a natural place of abode.

12 Among the representatives of the new turn which thought had taken, Protagoras and Gorgias are especially prominent. Accordingly, more than all the rest, these two have earned a place in the history of philosophy. Protagoras of Abdera was the first who claimed as his distinguishing title the name of Sophist. When he was born and when he died cannot be satisfactorily determined. At all events, he was a contemporary of Socrates, though considerably his elder. Protagoras, during his long life of seventy years more or less, made repeated and protracted visits to Athens. He was, however, forced to discontinue them on account of a vote of the Athenian assembly condemning him as an atheist. His philosophical theory was based upon the dictum of Heraclitus that all things are constantly in a state of flux. But, in applying this principle to human thought and human action, he reached conclusions which were not infrequently opposed to those of the great Ephesian. In place of Heraclitus's ξύνος λόγος he maintained that Man is the measure of all things; of things that are that they are, of things that are not that they are not. By man he understood man as this or that

1 See Plato's Protagoras, p. 317 a, b.
2 His birth is variously placed between 490 and 489 B.C. (in 487, 485, or 481), and his death between 420 and 408 B.C.
3 Plato's Protagoras, p. 317 c: οὐδενὸς ὄτος ὁ τάν τέων ἄν ἄμων καθ ἡλικίαν πατήρ ἐνυ, there is not a man of you all whose father I might not be so far as years go.
4 The original words as given by Diog. Laert. (ix. 51) are: "πάντων χρημάτων μέτρων ἂνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἐστι, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἐστιν." This is sometimes so interpreted as to mean simply that nothing can be measured, i.e. known, unless there is some one to measure or know. This might then mean that the right measure of all things would be taken only by the right man; by an ideally perfect man endowed with ideally perfect knowledge. In saying that Protagoras did not mean this ideal man Cron agrees with the following account, translated (freely) from Plato's Theaetetus, p. 161 c: "In other respects I am charmed with the doctrine of Protagoras that what seems to each man is, but I can never swallow his beginning. Why did he not commence by saying the measure of all things was a hog or a dog-faced baboon or some still worse monster, and that so far as wisdom went he himself was no whit wiser than a tadpole? If each man is his own best judge and all that he decides upon is right and true, how then is Protagoras wise enough to teach the rest of us, and to charge us roundly for it?"
individual. This amounted to cutting away all footing for knowledge, after reducing knowledge to the sensation or sensible perception of a given individual.

Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily appeared at Athens in 427 B.C., on an embassy from his native town. His mission was successful, and his brilliant oratory won such golden opinions that large numbers crowded to listen to his show speeches and paid him handsomely for his trouble. Later he revisited Athens and travelled to various places in Greece (Xen. Anab. ii. 6. 16 ff.), always with the same success. It is said that he was a hundred years old when he died. His philosophical views and method of reasoning were based upon the Eleatic system, and are summed up in the following words from his book (πελαυτλως ἢ πελτ τὸν μὴ ὑντος, Nature, or that which is not): “Nothing is; if anything is, it cannot be known; if anything can be known, it cannot be communicated.” But the chief concern of Gorgias was the teaching of rhetoric; here he sought to win fame. Still, his instruction seems to have been confined to practical hints in regard to details and he objected to being called a Sophist.

Among the other distinguished Sophists, Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of Ceos were especially famous. Hippias was chiefly noted for his extensive knowledge of genealogy and of mathematical astronomy, but he also plumed himself upon his miscellaneous accomplishments in various practical directions. Prodicus is best known for his nice discriminations between words of similar meaning, and for his moral lectures. Xenophon (Mem. ii. 1. 21) has preserved one of these, the very clever story of the Choice of Heracles.

The bustling activity of these and of other Sophists who had no fixed abiding-place, produced no marked effect upon philosophy beyond making clear the insufficiency of all previous speculation. After a hundred years and more, Greek thought had reached the conclusion that to talk of real truth was idle, and that all knowl-

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1 This same name is applied to the inhabitants. Ptolemaeus is alone in calling the town Λέοντιου.
2 Diodorus xii. 53. Thuc. iii. 86 does not mention him by name.
3 The dates given for his birth vary from 496 B.C. (Foss) to 483 B.C. (Frei); for his death, from 384 B.C. to 375 B.C.
4 See on Apol., p. 18 b.
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edge depends solely upon sensible perception and sensation. So, therefore, knowledge could at most change worse sensations into better ones,—more profitable and pleasanter ones.

16 This doctrine virtually involved the destruction of all philosophy. Therefore Socrates, who won the day against it, is rightly called the deliverer and the new founder of philosophy.

17 Socrates, the son of a sculptor Sophroniscus, was born at Athens, and as a boy followed his father's occupation. Soon, however, he abandoned sculpture and devoted himself to the profession to which he thought God called him; this was a continuous warfare carried on against the conceit of sham knowledge in all its forms. Wherever and whenever he met it he was bound to expose sham knowledge as real ignorance. As for himself, he claimed no knowledge beyond the capital fact that he knew nothing. By this, however, he did not mean that real knowledge was as the Sophists maintained impossible. For though Socrates said that God alone was really wise, his meaning was that the whole duty of man was comprised in the struggle toward that real knowledge which alone gives the power to do right. And just here Socrates declared that all virtues, ἀρετή, were essentially forms of knowledge, and were based upon the understanding of some class of things. This involved the final identification of virtue in general with understanding. If virtue is understanding, it follows that no one does wrong knowingly; men sin only in so far as they are in ignorance of what is right. A man who knows the right, who has real knowledge, will do the right, for then that knowledge will be stronger within him than any desire. Naturally the standard of this genuine knowledge is not arbitrary, nor is it borrowed from anything outside of the soul. Socrates based all knowledge upon necessary obedience to the commandment inscribed upon the temple at

1 The ordinary date given for his birth is Ol. 77, 3 or 4 = 470/69 B.C.: probably Ol. 77, 2 or 1 = 472/1 B.C. is nearer the truth. Cf. infra note on § 30, and Apol., p. 17 d.

2 Cf. Apol., p. 29 d ff., particularly the explanation of e, ἐφῆγομαι κτέ.

3 It cannot be denied that even in Socrates' conception of ἀρετή, the old notion so manifest in Homer (cf. Doderlein, Hom. Gloss., p. 536) of 'skill' or cleverness was still very strong. The German word 'Tugend' and its corresponding idea are similarly connected with 'Tauglichkeit' and 'Tüchtigkeit.'
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Delphi, Γεώτρι σεαντῶν. Xenophon (Mem. iv. 2) gives an account of Socrates's explanation of this.¹

Two questions arise concerning Socrates's idea of knowledge as the foundation of righteousness. (1) What constitutes this knowledge? (2) What is the field in which it works? Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle vie with one another in declaring that Socrates would always ask about everything under discussion: What is the general idea of which this, that, or the other is a particular instance? τι ἐκαστὸν ἢ ἡτο τῶν ὄντων. Let every man first answer this question, and then he is a fit guide for his friends; otherwise it is a case of 'the blind leading the blind.' Hence, when Socrates found a man who claimed the possession of knowledge, his test question was, Can you define the thing which you say you know? And he usually found his man incapable of giving the required definition, and accordingly showed up the boasted knowledge as ignorance.

In applying this test, and in taking the steps by which he led up to and determined the definition required, consisted the peculiar method of Socrates. He always began with everyday facts, and then proceeded by the method of question and answer, either (1) to the definition and general idea required, or (2) to the irresistible conclusion that some definition in vogue which he had taken up was wrong. The steps taken in going from a given class of particulars to their universal, which is the general idea including them all, are called ἐπαγωγή, induction. Hence, Aristotle ascribes to Socrates the discovery of the epagogic or inductive method (τοὺς ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους), and of the definition of universals (τὸ ὀρθοταύτα καθόλου, — hence ὁρθὸς = definitio).

By the dialectic (διαλεκτική) of Socrates is meant simply his acuteness in so guiding a series of questions and answers that something was finally done toward determining a general conception and reaching some measure of truth. This process required a living issue raised between a man skilled in questioning and some one willing to answer him. But, soon after the day of Socrates,

¹ We may summarize the philosophical situation as follows: Protagoras said: Man is the measure; Socrates met this by asking: What is man? Gorgias said: We cannot have real knowledge; Socrates met this by saying: Before we give up knowledge let us seriously try to know ourselves.
‘dialectic’ became a philosophical term applied particularly to the more developed and many-sided method of Plato; indeed, it finally became identified with Plato’s logic or theory of ideas. Quite apart from Socrates’s dialectic is the controversial art of certain Sophists (ἁπτίλογική), for, whereas this controversial art only sought perpetual controversy, the essential peculiarity of the dialectic of Socrates was that it aimed at the understanding of truth.

20 The discussions of Socrates were almost always ethical. Nearly all questions which up to his day had engrossed philosophers he summarily excluded from the field of his investigation. He asked: What is virtue? what is holiness? what is justice? what is courage? And his answer, in every case, was understanding,—the understanding of what is good in reference now to one and now to another class of facts. Courage, for instance, is the understanding of what is good in relation to things terrible and dangerous; and he has courage whose conduct is right in cases of terror and danger. Yet Socrates recognized that the original bent with which the individual is born here disclosed itself; since he saw that, just as one man’s body is born stronger than his neighbor’s, so one man’s soul was born more courageous than his neighbor’s. Yet he maintained that every man, be the qualities born in him what they might, could advance in excellence (πρὸς ἀρετὴν) by learning and practice.

21 Such is Socrates’s doctrine in its outlines, as Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle have represented it in their writings. Socrates himself, as is well known, was the author of no books. We have, therefore, no direct statement of his views at first hand. The most important authority for his teachings is Xenophon, especially his four books of “Memoirs of Socrates” (ἅπομυημονεύματα, commentarii, Memorabilia). In this work the writer undertakes to defend the memory of his friend and master against the accusations and slanders of all enemies. With this in view, he sets forth all that he can remember of the conversations of Socrates. All must be ready to allow that Xenophon, who was nothing if not a man of action, failed to understand Socrates’s position in

1 It has been claimed that the Memorabilia are referred to by Horace (A. P. v. 310), as Socraticae chartae. The poet’s allusion, however, is probably more vague.
the history of Greek philosophy; he could not adequately appreciate him as a philosopher. But of the man his portrait is invaluable, in spite of this or perhaps on account of this. Writing from a popular point of view, he corrects Plato's ideal representation of the master Socrates, and helps us to the facts about Socrates as he lived and taught. Further, in the judicious remarks scattered here and there through Aristotle's writings, we have always a most welcome supplement, and often a most wholesome corrective; by drawing from all these sources we are enabled to bring our ideal Socrates within the limits of historical fact.

An account of Socrates's theory gives no adequate knowledge of his historical significance. A necessary aid must be sought in some description of his personality, of Socrates during life and Socrates facing death.

It has already been said that Socrates thought his life consecrated to the service of a higher power and his every act the fulfilment of a task laid on him by God. This it was that forbade his following any of the pursuits which engross the majority of men. He was poor, but his poverty was not so complete as his frugality. The fulfilment of God's command imposed upon him abstention from politics, except in cases where to abstain would be to neglect the plain duties of a citizen. He served as a hoplite in three campaigns, and showed in battle that he was no mere talker about courage. This same temper, this unterrified obedience to duty, unswerving in the way of right and law, he displayed as one of the senators and prytanes on the occasion of the memorable popular assembly which illegally condemned the generals victorious at Arginusae. Here he faced the arbitrary caprice of the people with the same strength of mind which made him

1 When Xenophon is used as our authority, it should be remembered that the subtler qualities of such a man as Socrates were likely, either to escape so unimaginative a mind, or, if felt, to be represented inadequately by a writer comparatively destitute of dramatic power. These are just the qualities which distinguish Socrates from all other teachers, and these are given by Plato alone. Cf. 'Socrates,' a translation of the Apology, Crito, and parts of the Phaedo. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

2 Apology, p. 23 e and note; also Xen. Mem. I. vi.

3 Apology, p. 28 e and note; also Laches, pp. 181 a b, 188 e, and Symposium, pp. 219 e-221 e.

4 Apology, p. 32 b with note.
afterwards prefer death to a cowardly and unrighteous submission to the thirty tyrants.

24 Critias, like Alcibiades, was for a time a disciple of Socrates chiefly for the reason that he expected in that capacity to learn certain useful accomplishments. Later, as the leading spirit among the Thirty, this same Critias undertook to make the habitual occupation of Socrates uncomfortable for him. The conversation between the two is preserved by Xenophon (Mem. i. 2. 31 ff.). The passage is characteristic of both speakers, and should certainly be read by all, for it familiarizes us with the plan of active operations to which Socrates devoted all of his life and energy.

25 Xenophon tells us that Critias, and with him Charicles who was also an influential member of the Thirty, had been irritated by Socrates's freedom of speech. They pointedly reminded him of the terms of a law which they had promulgated to meet his particular case, and threateningly bade him obey its behests: λόγων τέχνην μη διδάσκειν, no one shall teach the art of words. It is no matter for surprise that this law should have been aimed at Socrates, for two reasons: first, because of the tendency to classify Socrates as one of the Sophists. Indeed, he seems to have been looked upon simply as the most popular and effective of Sophists, and hence he became for the comic poets the representative Sophist. The second reason is, that the words λόγων τέχνη, taken in their widest sense, do apply to Socrates's characteristic way of question and answer, as well as to rhetoric; and yet there were really many outer and palpable marks which distinguished Socrates and his teaching from the Sophists and their art. A Sophist charged for his instruction, and hence would usually teach in some place of private resort; Socrates, since he was the servant

1 Apology, p. 32 c d with note.
2 In the Clouds, first put on the stage in B.C. 423, Aristophanes brings Socrates before his audience in that capacity. An added piquancy was given by Socrates's peculiar personal appearance, which fell so very far short of the Hellenic ideal of beauty. Indeed Socrates himself frequently compares himself with the statues of Silenus (Xenophon, Symposium, ch. 6; Plato, Symposium, ch. 33). How then could we expect the comic poets to abstain from caricaturing one so easy to caricature? Anybody could recognize a mask which was meant for Socrates.
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of God, would take no man's pay. Hence, he naturally pre-
ferred the most public places, such as the market, the gymnasium,
a public porch, or some workshop. Being no respecter of persons
he was ready to discuss with every man, and eager to share the
search for truth with any new comer. The genuineness of this
desire for coöperation was undoubted, for he declared himself
unable alone to get at any knowledge. To exemplify this his
homely description of his art as intellectual midwifery (μαγευτική)
and his comparison of it with the profession of his mother, the
midwife Phaenarete, may be mentioned. This idea made him
protest against being called any man's teacher, indeed he stoutly
denied that he had any pupils. As substitutes for these names
of teacher and pupil, Xenophon and Plato use words which all of
them describe the pursuit of truth on equal and friendly terms.

The chief delight of Socrates was to gather about him young men of good parts who were eager for knowledge. This led him to
frequent places where they habitually assembled, such as the palaes-
stra or the gymnasium. No doubt the Thirty bore this in mind when
they bade him not to consort with any one under thirty years of
age. But Socrates was ready to talk with men of all ages and all
stations, no matter where he found them. He was often seen con-
versing eagerly with workmen, and this led him to draw freely upon
their familiar surroundings and occupations for topics and for
illustrations. And hence we hear the frequent complaint that
he was continually harping upon cobbbling, cobblers, carpenters,
smiths, and the like. He was considered a bore who repeated the
same thing about the same subject ad nauseam; whereas, the Soph-
ists were at infinite pains never to use the same phraseology twice
in discussing the same thing. Of course this implied that their
attention was riveted upon the way of putting things: they dazzled
their hearers and drew from them tumultuous applause, little caring
if the enthusiasm lasted but for a moment. But the whole energy
of Socrates was absorbed by the central purpose of rousing a right
understanding and of implanting a firm and fruitful conviction.
That the knowledge itself which Socrates strove for was far other

1 Cf. Alcibiades I., p. 431 e; Theaet., p. 149 a.
than that which the Sophists so glibly taught, is best shown by a contrast between one characteristic attribute of his discourse and theirs. The Sophists made a great flourish of trumpets (ἰπτιδεξίας); they began with a perfectly rounded self-complacency. Socrates began by protesting that he was sure of one thing only,—his own ignorance. Wisdom, he declared, is of God; and this, said he, was the meaning intended by the oracle at Delphi by the words: No man is wiser than Socrates. This self-knowledge is nothing more than a purified form of the genuinely Greek idea of temperance, σωφροσύνη. It is based upon the immemorial belief that the gods are jealous and refuse to tolerate men who put themselves upon a pedestal.¹ The conceit of self-knowledge with which the Sophists were puffed up, Socrates undoubtedly considered a case in point. Against this conceit he waged war with his incomparable irony,² before which all their wisdom became as nothing. He made it plain to them, and to whomsoever it might concern, that all their general notions were confused and worthless. A tempered form of his irony is seen in his treatment of young and enthusiastic votaries of learning. First of all, he helps them to an understanding of their ignorance, but yet he leaves in their souls such a sting as stirs them to an earnest struggle for real insight. Indeed, we have seen that the humility of Socrates's self-measurement was by no means incompatible with a fixed determination to win the truth which leads to righteousness. Socrates said, in short: Let no man call himself a σοφιστής, owner of wisdom, but let every man be a φιλόσοφος, lover of wisdom.

There is, indeed, no uncertain ring in the religious tone of Socrates's philosophy. By his conversations³ he strove to rouse in others the religious sense, and at the same time he exhibited in his own life a heartfelt piety, rooted in the purest gratitude for the goodness of God, and manifested in the most scrupulous conformity to all the outward rites and observances of public worship. Even the popular practice of consulting oracles and interpreting omens, he did not, according to Xenophon,⁴ reject. He merely sought to confine it

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¹ Hdt. I. 32.
² Cf. Apology, p. 37 e; Republic, p. 337 a: ἐκείνη ἡ ἐμφύεια εἰρανεία Σωκράτους.
³ See Xen. Mem. i. 4 and iv. 3.
⁴ Cf. particularly Mem. I. i. 2 sqq., especially 6–9; see also Anabasis iii. 1. 5–7.
to difficulties for dealing with which God had given to man neither the knowledge nor the capacity. In all these cases, Socrates himself was singularly favored in that he possessed a gift sent of God,—a heavenly voice of warning. Whenever this voice spoke within him he knew that what he was about to do would result in harm and that therefore he must abstain from it; when the voice was silent he was the stronger in his purpose and strengthened others in theirs. Socrates most certainly did not conceive of this voice as an emanation from a special and independent divinity, but as a revelation of the love and the wisdom of God. Such a revelation, he thought, might well come to any man, though perhaps not in the same way. Still Socrates may have been uncommonly sensitive to this influence, and more conscientious than most men in doing what it prompted. Be this as it may, what we know about the matter serves to prove that his trust in God was exceptional; indeed this is nowhere made clearer than in cases where Socrates did not hear the voice, and yet, without its warning to direct him, was deaf to the clamors of selfish fears which greatly disturb other men,—cases where he did what he knew was right without petty anxiety as to the end.

Intimately connected with this remarkable strength of moral character is the absolute control in which his body was held by his mind. The capital manifestation of this is to be found in the accounts which have been preserved of his 'staying power' while he was engaged in following up a train of thought. The best instance of this Plato gives in the following story of Socrates at the siege of Potidaea. Early one day a subject of thought occurred to Socrates while he was walking, and he stopped; for twenty-four hours he stood stock-still, because he could not come to any conclusion until

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2 Schleiermacher proves this in his note on Apology, p. 27 b, by showing that Plato and Xenophon alike use δαιμόνιον as an adjective. Cf. on Apol., p. 31 d.

3 Sympos., p. 220 c d; see also, on the credibility of the story, Zeller II., p. 69.
the next morning. In other respects as well his endurance was remark­able: he was hardened to every privation. Winter and summer alike he went barefoot, and always wore clothes of the same texture and thickness. This, in fact, made the rigours of a winter in Thrace tell upon him far less than upon his comrades in arms. Apart from his soldiering, hardly anything could induce Socrates to leave Athens, as he is made to say himself in the Crito. As for temperance and frugality, we have seen that he was remarkable for both.

29 The outline given above may be regarded as an historically trustworthy account of the character of Socrates. And now we need hesitate no longer in agreeing with the enthusiastic estimate of Socrates given at the end of the Memorabilia. But all this certainly leaves us but ill-prepared for the manner of the great man’s ‘taking off.’ Prosecuted in his declining years, on a most serious charge, he was, after a legal trial, sentenced to death. And all this happened, not during any oligarchical or democratic reign of terror, but at the very time when everybody was admiring the moderate spirit of the newly-restored Athenian democracy. It was shortly after the archonship of Euclides and the deposition of the thirty tyrants by Thrasybulus. As far as history has determined them, the facts about this trial are as follows:

30 In the first year of the ninety-fifth Olympiad, while Laches was archon, and when Socrates had already passed the limit of three-score years and ten, Meletus, seconded by Anytus and Lyco, came forward with his accusation. In Plato’s Euthyphro Meletus is described as an insignificant youth, and in the Apology he is treated with a measure of contempt. Some identify him with the poet Meletus, others say he was the poet’s son, though ‘a chip of the old block,’ since the words (Apol. 23 e) ἰπτερ τῶν ποιητῶν

1 Sympos., p. 220 a b.
2 Crito, ch. XIV. with note on p. 53 a.
3 Apol., p. 17 d and supra, p. 14, note 1. Ol. 95, 1 = 400/399 B.C.
4 Aristoph. Frogs, v. 1302.
5 K. F. Hermann, in his Disputatio de Socratis accusatoribus, maintains that there were four different persons named Meletus, (1) the accuser of Socrates, (2) the poet referred to in the Frogs, (3) the Meletus, cf. Apol., p. 32 e d, who obeyed the thirty, and arrested the unoffending Leon of Salamis, (4) the Meletus of Xen. Hell. ii. 4. 36. Frohberger argues against this in the Philol. Anzeiger II. 7.
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αὐθόμενος imply that he was poetically inclined. He led the prosecution, the other two being technically his συνήγορος. It is plain, however, that the substantial man of the three was Anytus, since it was the influence of Anytus which chiefly secured the verdict. Anytus, who had inherited a handsome property and had filled the highest offices in the commonwealth, was at this particular time one of the most popular men in public life. He had worked with all his might to help Thrasybulus expel the Thirty and to restore the democracy. Not only did he condemn Socrates as being one of the Sophists against all of whom his bitterness was uncompromising, but in addition he owed him an especial grudge. For Socrates, it appears, had made certain indiscreet and irritating comments upon his private affairs. Lyco is absolutely unknown beyond what is said in the Apology (22 e). There he is represented as a professional speech-maker, and it is reasonable to infer that as such he contributed far more than Meletus toward the success of the prosecution.

The indictment was submitted by Meletus to the ἀρχων βασιλεύς, whose jurisdiction covered all cases involving religion. Its formal terms were: Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods believed in by the state, and also of introducing other new divinities. Moreover, he is further guilty of corrupting the young. The penalty proposed is death. This was an indictment for an offence against the state; accordingly it was technically a γραφή (public suit), and, as further qualified by the specific charges, a γραφή ἀσεβείας (a public suit on the count of impiety).

As to the negative clause of the first count (οὐς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει), it certainly is difficult to see any fact to justify such an accusation, inasmuch as Socrates expressly recognized the law of the land (νόμος πόλεως) as the final arbiter in all that concerned the worship of the gods; and, indeed, himself scrupulously

1 Apol., p. 36 a.
2 [Xen.] Apol. 29, sqq. Probably there is some reference to Anytus's unjust hatred of Socrates in Xen. Cyrop. iii. 1. 38 sqq.
3 Ἀδικεῖς Ζωκράτης οὐς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζον, ἔτερα δὲ καίνα δαμόνα εἰσπηγούμενος (or εἰσφέρων with Xen. Mem. i. 1. 1). Ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διασφείρων.
4 See infra, § 67, and Apol., p. 19 b.
5 Apol., p. 26 d.
observed all its requirements. The terms of the second (affirmative) clause (ἦτερα δὲ καὶ νὰ δαμόνια εἰσηγούμενος) apparently refer to the much mooted δαμόνιον, — the mysterious communication from God to Socrates. This allegation was a slander, but had it been true could hardly have had much weight at Athens, where the introduction of new divinities was not a crime.

It is, however, probable that the first count was introduced as a foil to the second, and was primarily intended as a means for giving a legal foothold to the suit. For among all known provisions of Athenian law there is not one under which Socrates could have been prosecuted on the second count (δίκαιεὶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νεόνις διαφθείρων). This view is confirmed by the difficulty which even the thirty tyrants had in interfering officially with Socrates's dealings with young men. They had to pass a special law for the purpose, and that law was doubtless abolished when the democracy was restored. At all events it is certain that in the accuser's mind the second count was the most important. We have only to remember the prejudices of Anytus, and to recall the fact that he was still smarting under Socrates's sharp criticism of the way in which he educated his son. We can understand his indignation, though we do not share it. Now Anytus was a citizen in excellent standing, and naturally felt sure of success against such heresies in any appeal to the law. What, then, is easier to understand than his eagerness to take advantage of any pretext that offered itself against Socrates? He was eager to save his country by redressing his own grievance. Nor is it difficult to see why many of the judges should have been inclined to sympathize with him. They were enthusiastic for the democracy, and looked with disfavour upon any man like Socrates who had so often and so sharply criticized institutions dear to the democrat's heart. Still, it is more than questionable whether such criticisms were amenable to the law of a commonwealth whose shibboleth was free speech (παρρησία). A connection, on Socrates's part, with overt or covert attempts at revolution cannot be thought of; any suggestion of the kind falls by its own weight, for it is pure and unadulterated slander. But still it was urged that Alcibiades and Critias, notorious scourges of the body politic, were for some time
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the companions of Socrates. And, though Xenophon has abundantly shown the injustice of remembering this against Socrates, the judges could not forget it. The memory of these men's crimes was still so fresh that every one was inclined to mistrust the man to whose teaching many attributed the misdeeds which had so lately made life unbearable. This teaching they were therefore determined to stop, and nothing could better have served their purpose than the first count of the indictment, an accusation of atheism, for at Athens it had often gone hard in the courts with those who had to meet this charge.

This whole accusation was from the first met calmly and collectedly by Socrates, and he showed the same temper at the bar of the court. There is a story, told twice of Socrates,¹ which brings this unruffled spirit vividly before us, and Plato's Theaetetus does the same more subtly. Plato represents that intricate and abstruse philosophical discussion, carried on by Socrates with phenomenal fair-mindedness and consummate ease, as taking place immediately before the great teacher was compelled by the summons of Meletus to appear for preliminary examination before the magistrate² (ἀρχων βασιλεύς). It was a sense of duty only which forced Socrates to appear, both at this time and afterwards, at the trial. It was his duty, he thought, to appear in his own case and to make his own plea,³ though he made it without real hope or serious

¹ "Hermogenes, the son of Hippocrates," a friend of Socrates, "noticed that Socrates, though he conversed freely on things in general, avoided any allusion to the impending suit. 'My dear Socrates,' said he, 'surely you ought to be attending to your brief.' 'Why, do I not seem to you,' answered Socrates, 'to have passed my life with my brief constantly in view?' 'What do you mean by that?' asked Hermogenes. 'I mean that I have shunned evil all my life, that, I think, is the most honorable way in which a man can bestow attention upon his own defence." [Xen.] Apol., § 8 sqq. Cf. Mem. iv. 8. 4 sqq., where the story is almost verbally repeated.

² Theaet., p. 210 c d.

³ Cicero (De oratore I. 54) is our chief authority for the following tale about Socrates's defence. The celebrated orator Lysias, out of the fulness of his friendship for Socrates, wrote him a speech for his defence. Socrates declined it when offered, because he thought it would be undignified for him to use it, and in spite of the fact that it was a marvel of pleading. The story is probably founded on the fact that upwards of six years after Socrates's execution Lysias wrote a rhetorical exercise (declamatio) on the theme of Socrates's defence, as an answer to
desire of escaping the death-penalty proposed by his accuser. His defence was made without previous preparation, and there breathed in it such noble pride and such uncompromising independence that its effect must rather have irritated than conciliated his judges. In the court-room as on the battle-field Socrates was always the same fearless champion of his own and his country’s honour. Where other men consulted their own safety, God required Socrates to be faithful and to obey orders.

35 And so it came to pass that the judges brought in the verdict of ‘guilty,’ but by no large majority. In cases of this nature the law did not fix the penalty beforehand, and Socrates had still the right of rating his guilt at his own price, ἀψιμάσθαι, his accuser having proposed, τιμᾶσθαι, the penalty of death. After the defendant had named his counter-penalty, the court was bound to choose one of the two. Just as in his plea Socrates had disdained the ordinary means of working upon the feelings of the court by tears and supplications, so now he scorned the obvious way of safety still open to any man whose guilt had been affirmed by verdict. He absolutely refused to suggest any real counter-penalty, and hence an increased majority sentenced him to death.

36 The same courage which had animated him while speaking his defence, the same rooted conviction that they who love God need fear no evil, supported him now when his execution had become a question of days and hours, and prevented him from countenancing any plan for disobeying the laws of the state. Exceptional circumstances delayed the execution of his sentence for thirty days after

a speech on the other side of the case by the rhetorician Polycrates. For a discussion of the matter, see Spengel (Συμμαχία τεχνών, p. 141) and Rauchenstein (Philol. XVI. 1).

1 "But when they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak: for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak." Matthew x., v. 19.

2 Apol., p. 36a and ibid. note on el τρίακοντα κτέ.

3 Ibid., p. 35d and infra, § 73.

4 § 73.

5 It is said that the adverse majority was increased by eighty votes which had previously been cast for a verdict of ‘not guilty.’

6 Crito, p. 43e with note on ἐν πλοίοις. Cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 8. 2: “He was constrained to live for thirty days after his case was decided because it was the month of the yearly festival and embassy to Delos, and the law prohibited all public executions until the return of the sacred envoys.
it was rendered, and his friends, perhaps with the connivance of the authorities, offered him means of escape and also opportunity to use them. But he was firm in refusing these, just as while on trial he had been firm in rejecting every opportunity to secure either a favourable verdict or a lighter penalty. The tale that shortly after his death the Athenians repented and actually called the accusers to account rests on such slender authority that it must not be taken as history.

Of all the companions of Socrates none more deeply revered the master's noble life than Plato, and no heart was more deeply stirred by the pathos of his death. At the time Plato was still young, barely thirty years of age.\(^1\) Aristo his father and his mother Perictione were both of good old Athenian stock. Codrus was one of his ancestors on his father's side, and by his mother he was descended from Solon. At the age of twenty he became a disciple of Socrates, having until that time devoted his energies to poetry. It is said that he was already so much of a poet that he was on the eve of bringing out a tetralogy; but when he became a disciple of Socrates he gave himself entirely to philosophy. At last he had found a field which was to be all his own, a field where his genius was soon to work wonders; for his philosophy was to guide the spiritual and intellectual life of his countrymen to a new and splendid consummation. Before this he had not been unacquainted from Delos. During this time not one of his familiar friends could detect in his case any change in the manner of his life from what it had always been. And as for his previous career, he certainly always commanded unparalleled admiration for living a cheerful and contented life." The annual festival and embassy to Delos — another festival, also called Δήλια, was celebrated every four years — came in the tenth or eleventh month of the Athenian year (Μουνεχιφών or Θαργηλίδων), hence the death of Socrates probably occurred in Thargelion (our May and June); the year was 399 B.C.

\(^1\) Various dates are given for Plato's birth. (1) The usually accepted one depends on Athenaeus, and is the archonship of Apollodorus, Ol. 87, 3 = 430/29 B.C. (2) Diogenes Laertius gives Ol. 87, 4 = 429/28 B.C., Epameinon's year as archon, and the year of Pericles's death. (3) Zeller follows Hermodorus, a pupil of Plato, and fixes upon 428/27 B.C. The birthday is said to have been the seventh day of Thargelion, a day sacred to Apollo. In the year 428/27 B.C. this came on May 20/27, or, as others claim, May 29/30. Cf. Steinhart.
with philosophy, and we are told that Cratylus had initiated him into the mysteries of Heraclitus; but not until he met Socrates had he found the guide and friend who was to lead him in all his speculations toward the goal of truth.

It is not possible to decide whether some of Plato's earliest writings (e.g. the Lysis) were produced during Socrates's life, or all of them after the master's death. The bias of opinion now-a-days inclines to the latter view, and insists upon the unhistorical and ideal picture of Socrates which Plato everywhere alike has drawn. At all events, the questions dealt with by Plato's earliest works were just the ones constantly discussed by Socrates, though even here and at the outset Plato displays originality. His vocation was to connect together the definitions insisted upon by Socrates and to reduce them to an ordered system by the application of a single law or principle. At the very outset he took up the same lines which his whole life was devoted to following out, and he ended by establishing dialectic as a science. Yet he never lost sight of Socrates, who always moved before him as the perfect philosopher. He valued philosophical writing only so far as it mirrored the ways, the wisdom, and the words of the ideal philosopher, and his works are pictures of the marvellous personality of Socrates. Hence it is that Plato, when he wrote, could not dispense with the peculiarly Socratic form of question and answer, but in his hands the dialogue is fashioned and developed into a new form of literature. His early interest in art and his familiarity with all the forms of poetry naturally stood him in good stead here, and we need not wonder that the poetic fire and dramatic vividness of his dialogues are universally admired.

Among the dialogues which he first wrote the Protagoras is perhaps the one which most conspicuously exemplifies these great qualities. Both in the subject dealt with, and in the conclusions arrived at, the Protagoras belongs to the school of Socrates. Virtue is there defined as knowledge of what is good, and in this are contained and summed up all particular virtues. Therefore, (1) virtue can be taught, and (2) no man is wicked freely and of his own proper choice. Wickedness is ignorance of what is good, and perfect goodness belongs only to God. Man's virtue is incomplete.
and tentative only,—it is a constant struggle; God alone is in-variably and forever good. There is nothing discussed here which was not an every-day topic with Socrates and his friends.

In the Gorgias Plato discusses the relation of goodness to pleasure, a matter barely touched upon in the Protagoras. The opposition between rhetoric and dialectic is most effectively drawn by contrasting the sophist and his scheme of morals with the true philosopher. Rhetoric is a sham art of living, the beau-ideal of which is the unbridled indulgence by each individual of every passing whim, a fool’s paradise where the bodily appetites are gorged. The true art of living, on the other hand, seeks and finds everywhere law, order, and righteousness (δικαιοσύνη), even though in so doing all temporal happiness and life itself be sacrificed. Higher than this earthly life is life eternal and the hereafter, where he only is blessed who has walked upon earth in the paths of righteousness. Therefore, it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong. The former does harm that lasts but a day, the latter brings enduring contamination.

This bare outline is enough to suggest that the fate of Socrates was in the mind of the writer of the Gorgias. This is confirmed by the merciless directness of its arguments, and by the tone of severity and almost bitterness which pervades the whole work. The Gorgias contains the moral teachings of Socrates and a great deal more, for there we find them as it were transfigured. Moreover, we get a glimpse of Plato's political creed. An aristocrat by birth, he could hardly have learned the love of democracy from Socrates, though even without this master there was enough in contemporary political events to incline him to the views which he held. It has been supposed that Pericles died in the course of the same year which saw the birth of Plato. This chronological coincidence is not certain. See p. 27, note 1.

1 Plato's earliest impressions about politics may therefore best be understood by reading in Thucydides the history of that time. It was the era of decay in Athenian morals both public and private, an era which Thucydides described with a heavy heart. If Plato went a step further and, in seeking for the cause of so much harm, attributed this
degeneration to Pericles, it surely can be urged that such a view of the great statesman’s leadership is not absolutely untenable even when judged by the strictest standard of historical impartiality.\(^1\) But though Plato loved democracy less, it was not because he loved the thirty tyrants more. Two of his mother’s kin, his uncle Charmides and also Critias, were conspicuous among the Thirty, but Plato was neither of them nor with them. What Socrates had to endure revealed to his disciple the infamy of the Thirty and their lust for power, while any dawning hopes from the moderate temper shown by the newly restored democracy which supplanted them was more than obscured by Socrates’s trial and condemnation. He found in these events new reasons for adopting the plan of life which of old had been congenial to him, and he was thus confirmed in his inclination to serve his country by shunning all active participation in his country’s affairs. It would surely be rashness to urge that, in deciding upon the manner of his life, Plato lacked either patriotism or common sense.

To avoid political entanglements, and at the same time to add to his intellectual attainments, Plato left Athens shortly after Socrates’s death, and retired to Megara, the home of a group of his philosophical friends. Euclides of Megara, a warm friend of Socrates, was the central figure among them. Like many other disciples of Socrates, Antisthenes for example, Euclides was at great pains to reconcile the Socratic definitions or general ideas with the Eleatic doctrine of the oneness of pure being. Plato who, in the Euthyphro, early foreshadows a more abstruse account of these general ideas than Socrates had given, naturally sought to profit, while thinking out his own views, by those of Euclides. But the Eleatic motionless Being worked apparently like a palsy upon the Megarians, for Plato gained no new light from his friends at Megara. However he certainly was impelled by his sojourn

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\(^1\) The opinion of Pericles expressed by Thucydides (ii. 65) is very favourable. Grote warmly defends the reputation of Pericles against the less favourable comments of Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and a certain number of modern writers. Recently Büchenschütz in his ‘Besitz und Erwerb im griechischen Alterthume’ has again accentuated the other side, and Herberg in turn argues, Jahrbücher für Ph. u. P. 100, 5, in favour of Pericles
there to supplement what he knew of the Eleatic doctrine by more thorough studies. If the Socratic philosophy may be called the ground in which the tree of Plato's knowledge took firm root, what he gained at Megara, and the familiarity with the Eleatic doctrines which he soon acquired, may be compared to the showers which watered that ground, and enabled the roots of the tree to strike deeper, and helped its branches to a fuller growth.

This same end was subserved by his further travels. He first went to Cyrene,—perhaps by way of Ephesus, where he may have wished to become acquainted with the living representatives of Heraclitus's school,—and there spent some time with Theodorus the mathematician. Though Theodorus was the reputed exponent of Protagoras's philosophy, Plato was chiefly drawn to him as a great mathematician and geometer. The Athenians certainly were not likely to forget the learning which he had exhibited when he visited their city.1 The importance attached by Plato to mathematics as a necessary part of right education2 is notorious, as is also his own proficiency in that branch of learning.3 After a visit to Egypt, he proceeded to Magna Graecia that he might there consort with the Pythagoreans, from whose learning he obviously expected to derive great benefit. The chief man among them was Archytas of Tarentum. Distinguished alike for statesmanship and as a general, Archytas had originated the analytic method in mathematics, and had solved many problems in geometry and mechanics, besides achieving a great name in philosophy. The society of Archytas and his school revived Plato's interest in practical government, which had died with Socrates. As a sight-seer Plato extended his tour to Sicily, and was there introduced by Dio to the court of the elder Dionysius. But his Athenian visitor was too outspoken for that tyrant, and finally incurred his ungovernable resentment. At the time, just before the peace of Antalcidas, there was war between Athens and the Peloponnesians,—and so it

1 Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 10.
2 Over the door of his lecture-room was written, it is said: Let no one unversed in geometry enter here, μηδεὶς ἄγεωμέτρητος εἰσιν.
3 It is very commonly asserted that he solved the Delian problem (the doubling of a cube), and on doing so, criticized the usual manner of dealing with mathematics.
occurred to Dionysius that his guest should become Sparta's prisoner of war. He was sold and carried as a slave to Aegina, whence he was finally ransomed by the generous zeal of Anniceris of Cyrene.¹

⁴ At the age of forty Plato was again in Athens, and he brought with him great treasures of knowledge and of experience. During his absence, moreover, he had been busy writing, and the Theaetetus serves as a reminder of his sojourn at Megara and at Cyrene. It is a dialogue within a dialogue; the introductory conversation may be called Plato's dedication of the whole work to his friends at Megara. The question, What is knowledge? is asked, and every typical answer to it, beginning with the most obvious one, Knowledge is *sensation* (*αἴσθησις*), and ending with the most abstruse one, is first stated with fairness and then with equal fairness refuted. In this dialogue we find Socrates and Theaetetus represented more effectively than anywhere else in Plato's writings, while in the companion pictures, so eloquently drawn by Socrates, of the philosopher and the practical man or lawyer, Plato seems to be vindicating himself against fault-finders.²

¹ This whole account of Plato's being sold as a slave and then ransomed is not well substantiated by trustworthy authorities.

² It is important at this point to have clearly before the mind some statement of Plato's *theory of ideas*. In the Theaetetus (p. 210a) Socrates is made to say: "Then, Theaetetus, knowledge is not (1) *sensation* (*αἴσθησις*); nor is it (2) *true opinion* (*δόξα ἀληθῆς*); nor again, (3) *true opinion coupled with definition* (*λόγος προσγεγραμμένος*)." This of course represents the view of Plato and not of Socrates, for (3) is very nearly what Socrates would have called knowledge. Without any direct allusion to his theory of ideas, Plato shows in this dialogue that no definition of knowledge is logically possible unless the definition itself contains the term defined. To define true opinion we must distinguish, and to distinguish we must have already a true opinion of the characteristic differences between one notion and another. Plato's way out of the difficulty, which closes in on all sides and seems to leave no avenue of escape, is a recourse to his theory of ideas, and for a statement of this theory we have to go to his other dialogues. He did not reject Socrates's definitions, but rather erected them into a symmetrically organized scheme of thought, of reality. These ideas are the realities dimly suggested by the world around us; but neither they nor anything else would ever be suggested to us or known by us if we had not lived in another and a better world where these ideas exist. We know things in this world because, before coming here, we have seen
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In the Sophist, the Politicus, and the Parmenides, we have 45 works more or less obviously connected with the Theaetetus. These are the dialectical dialogues, so called because they are devoted to a connected account of dialectic. At the same time they contain a searching criticism of Heraclitus and of the Eleatics. One characteristic of the three works last named is that in them it is not Socrates who leads the discussion.

As soon as Plato returned to his native land he gathered pupils about him in the Academy, a suburban gymnasium close to his own house and garden. Here he taught with but few interruptions throughout the remaining forty years of his life. About the matter or manner of his teaching in the Academy we know nothing, unless we find it in those of his writings which were written while he was engaged in teaching.

There are weighty reasons for surmising that the Phaedrus was written at the beginning of this period, and accordingly it is prefaced, appropriately enough, by a graceful sketch of the scenery near Athens. Here dialectic is treated as something more than the science of that which really is (ideas); it is that and also the genuine art of putting things or oratory, and as such it is as far superior to ordinary rhetoric as reality is to sham or instruction to persuasion. Both teaching and learning are based upon the history of the human soul, and consist in a revival of memories (ἀληθής) which are stored away in every soul while it is yet living in the divine world of ideas and before it comes to dwell on earth in a mortal frame. The relation of teacher and learner is spoken of as under the control of the pure and heaven-sent passion of love. The two become as one in order to bring forth knowledge from those original shapes of which things here are poor copies. Dialectic is the means of education and the perfected activity of thought by which we learn to neglect the bad copies and fix our minds upon the originals, which are in heaven. There they are all in their right place, and there goodness and truth shine upon them, enabling us to see them aright.

1 Lately there has been a revival of the doubt as to whether Plato wrote these three dialogues.

2 Schleiermacher considers the Phaedrus as Plato’s maiden discourse; with this view other writers of eminence either wholly agree, or at least place it among Plato’s earliest works.
the learner’s soul. The Symposium (συμπόσιον, banquet) and the Phaedo like the Phaedrus are masterpieces of style and may be called companion pictures: the Symposium represents the philosopher in his moments of conviviality; the Phaedo portrays him face to face with death. The Philebus contains an inquiry into the idea of the good and is not so conspicuous for the charm of its style, since it deals with most abstruse ethical and dialectical (metaphysical) points. In the course of the dialogue a great deal is said of the Pythagorean philosophy as stated by Philolaus.¹

In the Philebus, more than in any of his previous works, Plato strives to throw the light of philosophy upon the facts of life, and this he does to a still greater extent in those of his works which usually are considered his latest: the Republic (πολιτεία), the Timaeus and the Critias, all three of which are closely connected, and the Laws. These discourses, because they are attempts to mould facts into harmony with ideal principles, to construct the world as it should be, are called his constructive works. The most celebrated of these, and indeed the most admirable of all Plato’s works, is the Republic. Beginning with the question, “What is justice?” the writer soon develops the fact that justice, belonging as it does to the state as much as to any individual citizen, can most easily be seen in the former, where it is ‘writ large.’ Recognizing three classes of citizens as natural and necessary in the state, he connects them with his tripartite division of the soul.² His class of rulers correspond to the reason (τὸ λογιστικὸν); his class of warriors to the (irascible) impulsive part (τὸ θυμαεῖς); his class of producers to the appetites (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν). These three classes in combination work out the happiness of the whole state, and it is the happiness of all which determines the teaching and training of each. The rulers follow wisdom (σοφία); the warriors, courage (ἀνδρεία); rulers, warriors, workers in unison

¹ Cf. supra, p. 3, n. 3.
² This division into three parts is based in the Timaeus upon a division into two parts. The soul has (1) its immortal or rational part, and (2) its irrational or mortal part. This last (2) is subdivided into (a) a noble part (θυμός) and (b) an ignoble part (ἐπιθυμία). These three divisions are explained as faculties of the soul by Wildauer, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Psychologie, in the Philosophische Monatschrift, 1873.
follow *self-control* (σωφροσύνη). Justice (δικαιοσύνη), the virtue of virtues, works toward the determining ideal for the sake of which the limbs of the body politic cooperate; and while the collective happiness of all citizens depends on justice, justice is gained by having each of the three classes pursue its characteristic perfection or virtue. This certainly is not the Socratic doctrine of the unity of all virtues, but a modification of it. With this great work are connected the Timaeus and the (unfinished) Critias. The Timaeus describes the universe as an organic and rational creation, just as the state is described in the Republic. The Critias represents the ideal state as having existed in Attica before the deluge. There is also the story of their wars with the Atlantids. The dates and the facts thus given are of course purely mythical, and purport to be derived from foreign traditions. In what relation the twelve books of Plato's Laws stand to the ten books of the Republic is a question still under discussion, as is also the question whether Plato himself put the finishing touches upon his Laws as they have come down to us. Whether he wrote it as it actually stands or not, the work, in spite of the many eccentric views and odd turns of speech which it contains, is broadly conceived and of very great interest.

The general drift of these last works prepares us for Plato's last two visits to Sicily, where the younger Dionysius showed such promise both intellectual and moral that Plato hoped with his help to realize his new theories of government and of education. At the instance of Dio he accepted an invitation from the younger Dionysius, and again went to Syracuse in spite of the harsh treatment which had so precipitately terminated his former sojourn in that city. The too irascible elder Dionysius had died Ol. 103, 1 = 368–7 B.C. On his arrival Plato carried everything before him and it became the court fashion to imitate young Dionysius's enthusiasm for the new philosophy; but back-stairs intrigues soon turned the tables upon the reformer. His friend Dio was incau-

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1 Socrates said that wisdom was virtue. Plato said (1) wisdom acquired and exercised for the whole state is the ruler's virtue, (2) wisdom in boldly executing the ruler's commands is the warrior's virtue, (3) wisdom in obedient service to his betters is the workman's virtue.
tious, and his indiscretion was promptly punished with banishment by the same clique of flattering courtiers which soon after brought about, against the wishes of Dionysius, the dismissal of Plato. But the repentant king again urged Plato to come back, promising that Dio should be recalled. The Pythagorean circle at Tarentum urged acceptance, and finally, still hoping to carry his pet theories into effect at Syracuse, Plato made his third visit to Syracuse. It was not long, however, before all the influence of Archytas was required to get our philosopher back to Athens alive. How little Plato's high hopes of the younger Dionysius were realized, is but too plain from the character of that tyrant as afterwards exhibited.

The remainder of Plato's life was engrossed by teaching and writing. Of his pupils many were from foreign parts, and among his numerous Athenian hearers there were not a few marked men, statesmen and generals such as Chabrias Timotheus and Phocion, orators such as Lycurgus and Demosthenes. Though hard to prove, it is easy to believe that Demosthenes's keenness and irresistible readiness in argument was stimulated and perfected by a training in the dialectic of Plato. Plato lived to a green old age, and death finally surprised him in the full possession of all his faculties when upwards of eighty (Ol. 108, 1 = 348-7 B.C.).

The vigor of his mind at the time is brought home to us by the tale that after death they found under his pillow a draft of the opening passage of the Republic, which he had covered with erasures and corrections. Pausanias, who made his 'grand tour' in the second century after Christ, saw the tomb of Plato in the Ceramicus (Κεραμεικός), not far from the Academy. The post left vacant by Plato, the charge of his school which became known as the older Academy, was undertaken by Speusippus, a son of...

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1 *Cf. Laws iv., p. 709 e sqq.* This passage irresistibly suggests the general condition of things which Plato, on the occasion of his last two journeys, expected to find at Syracuse, and indeed largely what he actually did find.

2 Seneca is probably repeating an 'idle tale' when he says that Plato died on his birthday, just as he had completed his eighty-first year. A similarly unauthenticated tale is repeated by Cicero, who says (Cato major 5.13): "uno et octogesimo anno scribens est mortuus." Perhaps his word "scribens" is simply a version of the story of the tablet discovered under the philosopher's pillow.
of Plato's sister. The Chalcedonian Xenocrates succeeded Speusippus.

We may well call it a lucky chance that has preserved for us all 51 of Plato's works. They are an exhaustless treasurehouse filled to overflowing with thoughts which have been the inspiration and the delight of successive generations of men, for they appeal alike to the philosopher and to the poet; to the former by the fulness of their wisdom, to the latter by the beauty of their style. Plato chose the form of question and answer, and in presenting philosophical truth dramatised the process by which such truth is reached. Once chosen, that form became, in the hands of so great a master both of thought and of style, something new under the sun, and took its place among the other exemplars of literary art created by the Greeks as the Greek method of presenting philosophy. The various forms in which previous philosophical speculations had appeared were but the imperfect statements of unperfected theories. The one thing which these forms perfectly represented was the lack of completeness which characterized the early systems of philosophy. Socrates brought down Philosophy from the clouds of heaven to the needs of life upon earth, and, the uncompromising ordeal of his cross-questioning once passed, her worth and strength became manifest. Then at last, transfigured as it were by Plato's genius, she appeared in all the beauty of a form of literature quite worthy of her message. This is the moment which at the opening of this sketch was anticipated. In Plato's dialogues

1 Besides the works already enumerated and the Apology and Crito, there are quite a number of others. Some of these Plato has been supposed not to have written. Those whose authenticity has been questioned connect themselves with the Protagoras; they are: the Ion, Hippias Maior and Minor, the first and second Alcibiades, Lysis, Charmides, Laches Euthyphro. Then there are dialogues connected with the so-called dialectical discourses: the Meno, the Euthydemus, the Cratylus. The Menexenus remains, and the only dialogues with which it can be in any way compared are the Apology and the Phaedrus. Of course no mention is here made of such other short discourses as have been falsely attributed to Plato but are now admitted by all to be spurious.

2 The best account of the comparative inefficiency of these early philosophers is Plato's own. Cf. the passage from the Sophist quoted supra, p. 10, note 1.

3 Cicero, Tusc. v. 4, 10, and Academ. i. 4, 15.
the central purpose and the crowning result is to stimulate in
every reader a self-reliant vigor of understanding which shall
grapple boldly with the self-imposed task of seeking after the
fundamental idea, and achieve in the end a clear insight into the
whole subject discussed. Without this effort of mind no man
can ever emerge from darkness into light. That Plato did not
overestimate the value of his own or of any writings is clearly
shown in the Phaedrus. The views there expounded probably
influenced him to choose the dialogue-form, which is a reproduc­
tion, a mirror, as it were, of the words of living truth spoken by
the living teacher. That he did not however underestimate the
value of philosophical writing he shows rather in deed than in
word. For how, otherwise, can we account for the long series of
writings produced by him from the age of thirty until the time of
his death,—a period of fifty years? By writing he increased the
number of those who felt his influence, and this he might well seek
to do while still believing that, compared with the spoken word,
the written word was dead.

52 The many resources of Plato's artistic imagination are appa­
rent in the varied settings of his dialogues. The simplest form
(1) has no introduction or preamble, but is a dialogue, with occa­sional interruptions from interested bystanders, in which one of
the parts is taken throughout by the same speaker, usually Soc­
rates, while the other may be successively assumed by various
persons. Instances of this form of dialogue are the Gorgias and
the Phaedrus, which best exemplify the dramatic power of Plato
even in this simplest form of dialogue. More intricately dramatic
and effective are the narrated dialogues, to which the second and
third classes belong. These are (2) without preface and with no
account of the persons to whom the narration or reading, as the
case may be, is made,—e.g., the Republic; or (3) introduced by
a short dialogue between the narrator and his friends, who soon
become his attentive listeners. In (3) sometimes, though rarely,
the narrated dialogue is momentarily interrupted before the close,
and at the close a few words are commonly exchanged between the
narrator and his auditors. Dialogues of this kind are the Sympo­sium and the Phaedo. Just as these various forms are used accord­
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ing to the demands of the subject discussed or the artistic plan of
the author, so in certain of Plato's later writings, in fact very
commonly where very abstruse points are considered, the dramatic
form is subordinated and all but disappears.

Something must now be said of the two works before us. They are both of them closely connected with the trial and death-sen-
tence of Socrates. Of the two the first is

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

If we heeded our first impressions on reading the Apology, we
should pronounce it a report of what Socrates actually said in
court, since it is given as a speech made by Socrates and we feel
convinced that Socrates would naturally have made just such a
speech. But there is nothing in this fact alone that necessarily
bears such a construction, for Plato's dialogues are all of them
conversations more or less fictitious, and yet are represented as
carried on in the most life-like manner by historical personages.
To reach any trustworthy conclusion as to the historic accuracy of
the Apology would require more information than that supplied by
Plato himself, and yet Plato is the only witness whom we can trust.¹

We have, therefore, to depend chiefly upon internal evidence.²
There is no doubt that, not Plato only, but any disciple and friend
of Socrates who had been present on such a momentous occasion
would have been more than eager to spare no pains in accurately
reproducing the words of his master,—of the father of his soul's
new-birth. He would have left no stone unturned in striving to
reach and to write, 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

¹ We are not warranted in pinning
our faith to Xenophon's (?) 'Απολογία
Σωκράτους, a production whose origin
and value are equally doubtful. Xen-
ophon's Memorabilia, on the other
hand, is inadequate for our purpose.

² Schleiermacher and Zeller uphold
the accuracy of Plato's report. The
former argues that the speech suits
all the circumstances too well to allow
of its not being an exact report, while
the latter strives to deal with the ar-
guments used to prove his untrust-
worthiness. Ueberweg lately has taken
this same point of view with great de-
cision. In the admirable introduction
of Steinhart is to be found the best
presentation of the opposite view.
truth,' that it might live as a monument of the great man's moral and intellectual worth forever. And individually Plato must have regarded such an undertaking as his opportunity to appeal to the supreme court of intelligent and unprejudiced mankind from the death-sentence pronounced by an unjust court upon the incomparable master. In such an enterprise Plato's memory would undoubtedly do good service. Yet it is hard to see how a mind like his, distinguished rather for its devotion to speculative truth and for its obedience to the laws of artistic and poetical symmetry than for its submission to the inelastic canons of history, could, even in such a case as this, have endured the straight-jacket of stenographic accuracy. Plato doubtless heard with attentive ears and held with retentive memory all that was spoken before the court by the man he loved best. And indeed no hand was better trained than his in presenting faithfully the peculiar conversational genius of Socrates. But for all that, and by means of it all, he has gained and used the second sight of a sympathetic and creative imagination; he has given us more than the actual defence of Socrates in court. In Plato's Apology, Socrates on trial for his life stands before us in clear outline, sharply contrasted with any typical presentation of the drift of contemporary public opinion; for public opinion, so far as it opposed him and his ways, is personified by his named and unnamed accusers. He is condemned in court, but before the tribunal of the eternal fitness of things he and his life-work stand acquitted.

However, we have no right to assume that this could not all be accomplished without unduly sacrificing historical accuracy. The nobler, the more appropriate we suppose Socrates's actual words to have been,—and no one will incline to say they were not appropriate and noble,—the less would Plato feel called upon to depart from a simple report of what he had actually heard. In the absence of anything like convincing proofs of the contrary, it is reasonable, with due allowance for Plato's artistic bent and after taking into consideration the circumstances under which he wrote, to conclude that his Apology of Socrates resembled very closely

1 Cf. Apology, p. 18 a b sqq.
the speech actually made in court by Socrates. The circumstances under which Plato wrote lead however to the following qualification of this statement of substantial identity. Any speech reported in writing necessarily differs from the speech as originally made, and no orator even can write down from memory the words he has used,—as for Socrates he spoke on the spur of the moment without previous notes or preparation of any kind. Plato heard him just as Thucydides heard Pericles, and as Thucydides, with the most earnest desire to reproduce as a part of history Pericles’s speeches, could not avoid making them by his manner of statement to some extent his own, so it was with Plato and the speech of Socrates. He could not, in spite of the accuracy which he observed in reproducing the situation at the trial and the words to which he had so attentively listened, avoid giving the Apology of Socrates in a way which makes it a work of his own, though at the same time it is the genuine defence of Socrates. The success with which Plato brings before us the living persons concerned in Socrates’s trial is the best proof that he allowed himself a certain freedom of expression in presenting the matter and manner of Socrates himself. Among Plato’s many works distinguished for vividness of dramatic characterization, the Apology is one of the most noteworthy. In the Apology we have the most life-like of Plato’s many portraits of Socrates.

We find many inequalities in the speech of the Apology, and

1 Cf. Apology, p. 17 c. Those unconvinced by the genuine ring of this passage may still doubt. We know Socrates chiefly from Plato, hence discussions of Plato’s trustworthiness are apt to beg the question.


3 There is an important difference between the relation of Thucydides to Pericles and that of Plato to Socrates. The intimacy of ten years’ standing between the two latter made their case one of ideal friendship, where, at least in intellectual matters, what belonged to Socrates was Plato’s, and vice versa. Therefore Plato, if he made the defence of Socrates characteristically his own, could be sure that it was also and for that reason characteristically Socrates’s. Was not Plato, therefore, better prepared to deal with Socrates, the friend of his youth, than was Thucydides to deal with Pericles, who certainly was not one of his intimates?
indeed a tendency here and there to repetition and circumlocution.\footnote{Cf. Apol., p. 26 b \textit{ad fin.} and \textit{c}, also p. 28 e \textit{sqq.}} This is not only characteristic of Socrates in general, but particularly characteristic of him or of any one when speaking off-hand. Equally characteristic of Socrates is the cross-examination\footnote{Cf. Apol., pp. 24 d–27 e.} and the frequent recourse which is had to the dialogue form;\footnote{Cf. supra, § 31.} for Socrates undoubtedly went as far in this direction as the rules of Athenian pleading would allow.

No matter whether we take the speech as a verbal report or as, in the main, an invention of Plato, if we once admit that its aim was to vindicate Socrates before the whole world no less than to influence the particular men who were his judges, it is easy to understand the line of defence taken in the Apology. The counts in the indictment against him are summarily dealt with, for Socrates is chiefly anxious to show that the sole cause of his accusation is the wide-spread prejudice against him. This prejudice he grapples with, and seeks by analyzing to remove it, appealing in justification of all that he had habitually said and done to his commission from God. The careless way in which he quotes\footnote{Cf. supra, § 31.} the terms of the indictment,—he reverses the order of the counts against him and deals with them in that order,—would prove the speaker’s indifference to the opinion of his judges, if such laxities were not known to be very common in the Athenian courts. Far more important, therefore, or rather all important, is the fact that he does not meet the accusation of disbelief in the gods of Athens. We have seen that nothing would have been easier than a triumphant refutation of this charge; yet the matter is passed over, and Socrates prefers to merge the narrower question in a consideration of the more sweeping charge of downright atheism, of disbelief in all gods. Evidently Socrates cared little for winning his case, but much for the opportunity afforded him to enlighten his fellow-citizens as to the wider and deeper import of the point at issue. The device by which the terms of the accusation to be met were enlarged\footnote{Cf. Apol., p. 26 b \textit{sqq.}} was one sanctioned by the traditional procedure in
courts\(^1\) at Athens. Under cross-examination on the meaning of his bill of indictment, the accuser himself gave to Socrates the wider interpretation best suited for the answer with which it was to be met.

The manner in which Socrates talks of death and of the hereafter is very striking. There is more than a conviction that compared with wickedness death is no evil, for that conviction is made the firmer by the comforting hope that death is but the door which leads to everlasting life and happiness. If this be considered not Plato's addition but Socrates's literal statement, then the moral steadfastness and the joy with which Socrates hailed death's deliverance was the best re-enforcement for Plato's own doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which is stated in the Phaedo and elsewhere.

The closing words on immortality play an important part in the tragic development of the situation; for the first part and the verdict of guilty which succeeds it awaken a sense of cruel injustice, which, by the second part and the ensuing sentence of death, is soon brought to a second climax but is finally mitigated by the closing words of Socrates. This third part bears we may say to the two parts that precede it a relation similar to that borne by the Eumenides of Aeschylus to the preceding plays of the Oresteian trilogy, and solves a tragic situation by merging a narrowed view of justice in a broader one by which it is superseded.

The first of these three subdivisions, which is the defence proper, is complete in itself. Though all the laws of oratorical art are here carefully observed, the usual practices of oratory are sharply criticised. The five natural heads of the argument certainly are unmistakable, since, by carefully following the connection of thought, we can easily mark the words in which the speaker dismisses one point and takes up another.

\(^1\) Cf. infra, § 71, note 2.
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Analysis of the First Part, or the Defence Proper, cc. i–xxiv.

(a) c. i. **Introduction** (προοίμιον, exordium)

- principium.
- insinuatio (ἐφόδος).

(b) c. ii. **Statement** (πρόθεσις, propositio) of the case and of the plan in the plea.

(c) cc. iii–xv. **Refutation** (λύσις, confutatio)

- of former accusers, cc. iii–x.
- of Meletus, cc. xi–xv.

(d) cc. xvi–xxii. **Digression** (παρέκκλησις, digressio) on Socrates's life.

(e) cc. xxiii, xxiv. **Peroration** (ἐπίλογος, peroratio). This is an attack upon the usual form of peroration, and ends with a confession of trust in God.

An introduction (a) is always intended to prepare the hearers for listening to the speaker's plea. This is especially hard in the face of prejudice against the speaker's person or against his case. The rules of speech-writing here prescribe recourse to insinuation ἐφόδος, a subtle process by which the speaker wins over the sympathies of his audience. He may do this (1) by attacking his opponent, (2) by conciliating his audience, (3) by strongly stating his personal hardship in the case, or (4) by putting concisely the difficulties involved in dealing with the facts. After the introduction follows (b) the statement πρόθεσις. This is commonly a plain unvarnished tale covering the matters of fact involved. If such an account be unnecessary the statement sets forth simply the plan of the plea. This plan is not unfrequently accompanied by a subdivision (partitio), which is sometimes simply a summary of heads (enumeratio), and sometimes a detailed account of topics (expositio). Here, again, Socrates's defence follows the rules of oratory. Next comes the most important part, the proof (πρωτις, probatio), represented by (c) the refutation which naturally falls, as indicated above, under two heads. In the manner

1 Rhet. ad Herenn. I. 10, 17: Enumeratione utemur, cum dicemus numero, quot de rebus dicturi simus.

2 Ibid. Expositio est, cum res, quibus de rebus dicturi sumus, exponimus breviter et absolute.
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of refutation here given, the genuine Socrates is in his element, and here he is pictured to the life. After proof or refutation, as the case may be, comes, in the programme of oratorical orthodoxy, (d) a digression. This was the orator's opportunity to try his wings. The theme chosen in a digression needed no more than an indirect bearing upon the argument of the case, and the ornamental part which the digression often played has led to the use of another term for it, i.e. exornatio or embellishment. This, too, can be found in Socrates's speech, and so perfect is its beauty that the laws of school-oratory are more than satisfied. Yet, embellishment though it be called, this part of the speech has nothing that is far-fetched or beside the point; in the Apology it is the complement of the preceding negative refutation, its positive and required reinforcement (confirmatio). The transition to (e) the peroration is plainly marked. At this point the orator, and more than ever if he were on trial for his life, made a desperate appeal to the feelings of his hearers. No means of moving the judges were left untried. Recourse to such methods Socrates condemned as equally dishonest and dishonorable. This part of

1 Rhet. ad Herenn. II. 29, 46: Exornatio constat ex simillibus et exemplis et rebus indicatis et amplificationibus et ceteris rebus quae pertinere ad exaugendam et collocupletandam argumentationem.

2 Cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 4: "οὗ δὲν ἢθέλησε τῶν εἰσαχθέντων ἐν τῷ δικαστήρῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ποιῆσαι, ἵνα λειτουργήσῃ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον τῶν πράξεων ἐπιπλησθείσων ἐπὶ τῶν κακών ἀνακαλέσθαι." It appears that there was no special law forbidding in so many words an oratorical appeal to the emotions of the judges in the ordinary courts. This is confirmed, indeed, by Aristotle in his Rhetoric (I. 1, a passage particularly important in connection with the Apology). There Aristotle first criticizes various rhetorical practices, and then proceeds to say: "prejudice, pity, anger, and all such emotions of the soul have nothing to do with facts, but affect only the judge himself. Hence, if all legal proceedings were regulated as in certain states distinguished for particularly good laws, these emotions would play no part whatever. Indeed, all agree on this point, some urging that the law should prescribe this course, while others enforce the principle, and rule out any plea which is off the point. This is the rule of procedure before the Areopagus, and a very good rule it is. A judge should certainly never have his mind warped by the influence of anger, of jealousy, or of pity brought to bear upon him. To have recourse to these is exactly the same as for a carpenter to give a twist to his rule before using it." To the procedure of the Areopagus we may perhaps apply Quintilian's words (VI. 1, 7): "Athel-
the Apology is an attack upon the ordinary practice of pleaders in court. Not unmanly subserviency to men, but manly submission to God's will are heard in the closing words of this defence.

Such was the temper of the Apology written for Socrates by Plato, and as such, whether intentionally or unintentionally, it must have been in striking contrast with the drift of the plea which Lysias is said to have elaborated for the same case. The tradition that Plato undertook to plead in the capacity of Socrates's advocate (σοφήματος) but was not allowed to do so rests on very slight authority. It is therefore ridiculous to suggest that this plea, which Plato did not prepare, was the first outline afterwards worked up in the Apology.

The second and third parts, which come respectively after the first and the second verdict, can hardly be expected to answer all the requirements of a set speech. And yet these are symmetrically arranged, and their topics skilfully set before us. The second part naturally opens with an allusion to the verdict of 'guilty' just rendered; any regular peroration would have been out of place before the third, which is the suitable conclusion both for the first part and the second. And where, indeed, is there a more eloquent and nobly impressive ending than this? That part of it addressed to the judges who voted for Socrates's acquittal is certainly made most prominent and very appropriately so. For these judges, they who alone are worthy of that title, are his chosen friends; to their kindred souls he confides the unspeakable hopes of happiness after death that are stirring within him, and invites them to be of good cheer and not to fear death. In so doing, even while death stares him in the face, he does not blench, but obeys his captain and works as the servant of God.

Closely connected with the Apology is the dialogue called the CRITO.

This dialogue belongs to the first class of Plato's dialogues; it is a conversation pure and simple, neither narrated nor read to an

nisi affectus movere etiam per praecoxem prohibebatur orator."

1 Cf. supra, § 34 and note.
2 Cf. supra, § 52.
audience introduced at the beginning. There are two speakers only, Socrates and Crito. Their close friendship has been mentioned in the Apology (p. 33 d). This intimacy was unbroken, and though Crito was much absorbed by the care of his extensive property, yet, in all the fortunes of Socrates's life, Crito had been his firm friend. And now that a sentence which he could not but regard as unjust had been pronounced upon his friend, Crito rebelled against its execution and against the shame of seeing Socrates die a criminal's death. To prevent this he was willing to risk his fortune and his civil rights. The lucky combination of circumstances which furthered the plans made for this end has already been explained.\(^1\) Apparently, nothing prevented Socrates's escape from prison but Socrates. At this juncture Socrates stands before us as the ideally loyal citizen. Though opposed to the principles of the democracy at Athens, he submits without reservation to its laws and exhorts all others to do the like. This, he declares, is the first and the most imperative duty of every citizen. Such is the historical groundwork of the dialogue. The dramatic picture given of this situation admits of the application of various terms used to designate the development of the plot in a Greek tragedy.

**Analysis of the Crito.**

\((a)\) cc. i, ii. Prologue (προλογος); the characters and their mental situation (ηθος τε καὶ πάθος).

\((b)\) cc. iii–x. Entanglement (δέσσις or πλοκή) of the logical situation.

1. c. iii. The threats of the multitude.
2. c. iv. The prayers of friends.
3. c. v. The jeers of enemies.

1. cc. vi, vii. The threats are many but duty is one.
2. c. viii. Nothing should warp our idea of duty.
3. cc. ix, x. It is wrong to run away from prison, and wrong should not be done, even in retaliation.

\(^1\) Cf. supra, § 36 and note.
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(c) cc. xi-xv. **Clearing up** (λύσις).1 The laws of Athens require his submission and his death.
1. cc. xi, xii. Socrates owes them life liberty and happiness.-
2. cc. xiii, xiv. They require and he has promised obedience.
3. c. xv. He will gain nothing by disobedience.

(d) cc. xvi, xvii. **Epilogue** (ἐπιλογος). There are laws in Hades which can reach him who disobeys law upon earth.

64 Like the Apology, this work bears memorable witness to the nobility of Plato’s mind, and it reveals especially his lofty patriotism. As for Socrates, we see in both these works that not words only but deeds prove him a more law-abiding citizen than scores of men whose spurious good-citizenship is well portrayed on many pages of the Crito (e.g. p. 45 e). The very laws of the land, as well as the example of Socrates submitting to his unjust sentence of death, declare in no uncertain tones to every Athenian what true patriotism is and how it is preserved.

65 The Crito is by no means simply the chronicle of a conversation actually held; though it is based upon facts, it must still be recognized as Plato’s work. This is proved by the finished skill both of plan and execution displayed in this dialogue, short and simple though it is. Moreover, in the Crito we see that Plato has made a step forward in his notion of duty. For here is the earliest statement of Plato’s ‘golden rule’: Injustice always is wrong; it is wrong to retaliate injustice by injustice.2 In the Gorgias (see supra, § 40) this rule is applied more universally and put upon its rational basis. Indeed, from a philosophical point of view we may regard the Crito and the Apology as a suitable preface to the Gorgias, if we do not forget that both are primarily pictures of the one great master whom Plato in all his works most delighted to honor.

1 For most of the details of the detailed analysis of the dialogue on the same principle.
2 See on ὃς of πολλοὶ οὐνται, Crito, p. 49 b.
Six thousand Athenian citizens were entrusted with the power to decide law-suits. Choice was made by lot every year of six hundred men from each of the ten tribes (φυλαί), and any citizen over thirty years of age was eligible. Every one thus chosen was liable, after taking the prescribed oath of office, to be called upon to act as a δικαστής; δικασταί, jurymen, was the official name by

1 The chief authority is Meier and Schömann, Der Attische Process, Calvary (Berlin, 1884). See also K. Fr. Hermann, Lehrbuch der griechischen Staatsalterthümer, and G. F. Schömann, Griechische Alterthümer, 2 volumes, of which the first has been translated into English, and published under the title Antiquities of Greece by Rivingtons (London, 1880).

2 The oath, which is cited in the speech of Demosthenes against Timocrates (149–151), is of doubtful authenticity. Schömann and Lipsius (p. 153, note 17), by omissions and bracketed additions change the formula there given into the following, which, excepting the last bracketed clause,— a conjecture of Frenkel's,— is not far from the real form: ψηφούμαι κατὰ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῶν πειστικῶν, [περὶ δὲ ἰν νόμοι μὴ δοί, γνώμη τῇ δίκαιοτάτῃ καὶ ὀστε χάριτος ἐνεκα οὐτ' ἐξήθρασι], ... καὶ ἀκροάσιμα τοῦ τε κατηγόρου καὶ τοῦ ἀπολογουμένου ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ψηφούμαι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡδ οὐ ἢ δὲ διώξεις, [καὶ εὑροκοῦντι μὲν μοι ἐνη πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά, εἰπωροκοῦντι δὲ ἐξέλεια αὐτῷ τε καὶ γένει,] οἶ νιλλοφ στὰς χρηστάς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐστάσισι, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μεγάλο ἔσχη καὶ νένει, I will vote in accordance with the laws and enactments of the Athenian people and of the Senate of Five Hundred, [and where there is no law, in accordance with my best knowledge of what is just, unmoved alike by favor and by enmity], ... and I will give impartial hearing both to the accuser and to the defendant, and vote on the question at issue in the suit. [If I keep this oath let blessings be my portion; if I break it let ruin seize on me and all my kindred.] See on ὁμοφωκεν κτέ., Apol., p. 35 e.

3 The use, in other connexions, of δικαστής with the meaning of judge leads many to translate δικασταί judges and not jurymen. Neither of these words is satisfactory, but to describe a body of citizens without any technical knowledge of the law as judges is certainly more misleading from a modern point of view than to call them jurymen. It must be remembered, however, that the presiding magistrate did not perform the duties of a modern judge in any important respect, so that the δικασταί had the substantial powers both of judge and jury in all cases brought before them.

4 The customary form in addressing them was ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταί, but this could be varied. We have sometimes ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίων, sometimes ὁ ἄνδρες, and once and again ὁ Ἀθηναίων. Cf. Apol., pp. 17 a, 22 e, 26 d, 30 b.
which they were addressed. These six thousand were divided into a reserve of one thousand, to be used as substitutes etc., and a main body of five thousand for regular service. A subdivision of the five thousand was then made into ten courts, of five hundred each, called δικαστήρια, for, like the English word court, δικαστήριον may mean a judicial body as well as the place where such a body sits in judgment. Sometimes a court was composed of less than five hundred jurymen, e.g. of two or four hundred; sometimes we find two or more courts of five hundred sitting as one, but it is doubtful whether the whole six thousand ever sat as one court. The even numbers, 200, 500, 1000, etc., were habitually increased by one, and for that purpose a δικάστης was drawn from the 1000 supernumeraries. This precaution was taken to avoid a tie vote.

On days appointed for holding court each of the subdivisions above mentioned was assigned by lot to one of the places used as court-rooms, and there tried the suit appointed for that time and place. Each juryman received as the badge of his office a staff (βακτηρία) corresponding in color to a sign over the door of his court. He also received a ticket (σύμβολον), by showing which he secured his fee after his day’s service. Cf. Dem. De Cor. 210. A fee of one obol (about three cents) for every day’s session was introduced by Pericles, and afterwards trebled by Cleon.

67 Almost all cases except those of homicide were tried in these Heliastic courts, and the jurymen were called also ἡλιασταὶ from the name ἡλιαῖα, given to the largest court-room in Athens. The most general term to designate a law-suit is δίκη, though the same word also has the narrower meaning of a private suit. According as the complaint preferred involves the rights of individuals or of the whole state, δίκαι in the wider sense were subdivided into (1) δίκαι in the narrower sense, private suits, and (2) γραφαί, public suits. Since the state was the real plaintiff in public suits, any fine which in such suits might be imposed upon the defendant went to the state; accordingly in public suits, the accuser, as a rule, was entitled to no part of the penalty.

68 In the ordinary course of procedure, every plaintiff was required to present his indictment (γραφὴ), or complaint (ἀξίσ), in writing to the particular magistrate whose department included the matters
involved. Most suits thus came before the nine archons, commonly before one of the first three or before all of the remaining six. The first archon, — called ὁ ἀρχόν par excellence, — dealt especially with charges involving family rights and inheritance; the second archon, called βασιλεύς, with those involving the regulations and requirements of religion and public worship; the third archon, called πολέμαρχος, dealt with most cases involving foreign-residents (μέτοικοι) and foreigners; the remaining six, — called the Thesmothetae, — dealt with almost all cases not especially assigned to the first three. There were, however, cases which were disposed of by other magistrates, or otherwise especially provided for.

The accusation had to be made in the presence of the accused, who had previously been served with due notice to appear. Legal notice required the presence of two witnesses to the summons (κλητήρες). If the magistrate allowed proceedings in the case, the terms of accusation were copied and posted in some public place, and at the time of this publication a day was fixed, upon which both parties were bound to appear before the magistrate for the preliminary investigation (ἀνάκρισις). There the plaintiff’s charges and the defendant’s answer, both of them already written down and handed in, were reaffirmed under oath, and both parties submitted to the magistrate such evidence as they intended to use. The reaffirmation or confirmation under oath was called διωμοσία, sometimes ἀντωμοσία. The evidence submitted consisted in citations from the laws, documentary evidence of various kinds, the depositions of witnesses, and particularly any testimony given under torture (βάγανος) by slaves, which had been taken and written down in the presence of witnesses. The magistrate fixed his official seal
upon all the documents thus submitted, and took charge of them against the day when the case was to be tried.

70 On the day (ἡ κυρία) when a court was to sit upon any case, the magistrate who had presided over the preliminary investigation proceeded to the appointed court-room, where he met the δικασταὶ assigned by lot (ἐπικεκλημένοι) to the case. Both parties to the suit, having been previously notified, were required to put in an appearance. Proceedings in court were opened by some religious ceremony; then the clerk (γραμματεύς) read aloud the written accusation and the reply, and finally the parties to the suit were successively called forward to state their case. This was the opening of the case (ἐισαγωγῆ τῆς δίκης) by the magistrate (ἐισαγωγεύς). Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 860 ff., Antipho, vi. 42.

71 The law required that every man should conduct his own case in person, and hence those who were not themselves skilful pleaders generally recited speeches which had been written for them by others. Still, the law permitted a man to appear in court accompanied by advocates (συνήγοροι), who came as his friends, and therefore were not supposed to be paid for their trouble; not infrequently, after a short speech from the principal, the most important part of his plea was made by one of his advocates. E.g. Demosthenes’s speech on the Crown was made as Ctêsipon’s advocate. The water-clock (κλέψυδρα, sometimes called simply τὸ ὅδωρ) was used to measure the time allotted to each for pleading before the court. When called for, the written documents offered in evidence were read by the clerk, and meanwhile the clock was stopped. By way of precaution, the witnesses whose depositions were read had to be present in court and acknowledge their testimony. While making his plea a man was protected by law from interruption by his opponent, and the law required his opponent to answer his questions. The jurymen had a right to interrupt the speaker

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1 To this correspond the words ἐἰσόδως τῆς δίκης, Crito, p. 45e, just as we find ἐισάγεται used both of τῆς δίκης and of τῶν ἀμφισβητούντως. Correspondingly, we find εἰσέρχεσθαι and εἰσίναι said both of the suit and of the parties to the suit, meaning substantially the same thing. Hence the presiding magistrate, ἠγεμὼν τοῦ δικαστηρίου, is also called ὁ εἰσαγωγεύς.

2 According to the terms of the νόμος quoted in Dem. xli. 10: τοῖν ἀντιδίκοιν ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἐρωτόμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μὴ,
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(1) if in their opinion he was off the point, (2) if they required fuller explanation on any point whatsoever. Of course, there were frequent attempts to prejudice the jurymen instead of enlightening them, and nothing was commoner than to make appeal to their sympathies. It was by no means an unusual occurrence for a defendant to appear in court with his wife and children, or with infirm and helpless parents, and sometimes with friends of great popularity or of high character; he depended upon these to act as his intercessors with the court. Such practices, though manifestly tending to disarm the severity of the law and to defeat the ends of justice for which the court was organized, seem never definitely to have been prohibited in any court except the Areopagus.

When the pleas had been made, the jurymen proceeded without preliminary consultation to decision by a secret vote. In public suits, only one speech was allowed to the plaintiff, and one to the defendant. In private suits, two were allowed to each. The jurors generally voted with bronze balls or discs, either solid (to denote acquittal) or perforated (to denote condemnation). These were called ψήφοι. If the vote was a tie, the case went in favor of the defendant; and, in a public suit, if less than one-fifth of the votes were for the plaintiff, he was fined, and also debarred from ever again acting as plaintiff in a similar suit. This fine was fixed at 1000 drachmas, about $170. The plaintiff in such a suit also incurred both these penalties if, without good and sufficient excuse, he failed to appear in court, and thus by his own act allowed that his case was bad. If the defendant failed to appear, the case went against him by default (see on ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες, Apol. 18 e), and he was pronounced guilty in contumaciam. In most private suits, the plaintiff, under similar circumstances, forfeited one-sixth of the sum which he claimed; this forfeiture was called ἐπωβελία, one obol for every drachma.

Suits, both public and private, were divided into (1) ὀγγνες τιμητοῦ, in which, if it decided against the defendant, the court had still to determine the degree of punishment to be inflicted

the two parties to the suit are required to answer each what question the other asks, but cannot give testimony as witnesses. Cf. Apol., p. 25 d.
(τίμημα), because no penalty was fixed by law; and (2) ἀγῶνες ἄτιμονοι, in which, after deciding against the defendant, the court had no further decision to make, because the penalty was fixed by law. In cases of the former kind, if they were public suits, — like the γραφὴ ἄνθελιας brought against Socrates, — the accuser proposed the penalty which he considered adequate,1 and the accused, if convicted, had the right to make a counter-proposition; then followed the decision of the court.2 It is still a moot point whether the judges were confined to a choice between these two propositions or could, if they saw fit, inflict a third penalty midway between the two.

74 The ordinary penalties for crimes against the state were death, banishment, loss of rights of citizenship (ἄτιμα), confiscation of property, and fines. All these are summed up in the formula constantly used at Athens: οὖν χρή παθεῖν ἂν ἀποτίσαι,3 what a man must suffer or pay for his offence. In case the convicted defendant was not an Athenian by birth, he might be sold into slavery, and thus additionally punished by the loss of his freedom.

75 The magistrates who had to oversee the execution of the punishment of death were called the Eleven (οἱ ἑνδέκα). Ten men on this board were chosen by lot every year, one from each of the ten tribes; the eleventh was a scribe, γραμματεύς. They had general charge of all prisons, and they issued the order requiring their subordinates4 to execute the penalty of death.

1 Cf. supra, § 31; also, § 69 and note. (sc. ἐαυτῷ) τινός but also ἄποτιμᾶσθαι (Xen. Apol. 23) were used.
2 The technical terms which were used are found in Apol., pp. 36 b, 37 c.
3 Cf. Apol., p. 36 b.
4 Cf. Phaed., p. 116 b.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΑΠΟΔΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΣ.

I. "Ο τι μὲν ύμεῖς, δ' ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεποίητε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν καθηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὁλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμουν· οὔτω πιθανῶς ἐλέγον. καίτοι ἀληθεῖς γε ὁς ἐποὺ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαίμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὑμῶν ἐφεξῆς τούτο ἐν ὧ ἐλέγον ὃς χρῆ ύμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῖ ἐξαπατη-

3. ὁλίγου: sc. δεῖν, used abs. G. 1534; H. 956 and 743 b. Cf. 22 a.—πιθανῶς, ἀληθεῖς: these words state and contrast the respective aims of rhetoric and of dialectic (philosophy).

4. ὃς ἐποὺ εἰπεῖν: qualifies the sweeping denial in οὐδὲν, hardly anything. G. 1534; H. 956. For an equiv. idiom in Herodotus, cf. Hdt. ii. 15, τὸ Δέλτα ἐστὶ κατάρρυτον τὸ καὶ νεωστὶ, ὃς λόγῳ εἰπεῖν, ἀναπεφηνός, has only recently, so to speak, come to light.

5. αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαίμασα τῶν πολλῶν: connect both gens. with ἐν. αὐτῶν, about them, designates the persons who are responsible for the ἐν (cf. below b, τοῦτο μοι ἐβούλεσθαι αὐτῶν ἀνασχυντότατον). τῶν πολλῶν gives the sum of which ἐν is part. See also on τοῦς πολλοὺς in 18 b.—τοῦτο: explaining ἐν and in appos. with it.—ἐν γ': refers to the passage where the statement is made.

6. χρῆ: the original warning was χρῆ εὐλαβεῖσθαι. χρῄμ, but not χρῆν, would be grammatically possible. G. 1487; H. 932. For the use of χρῆν, cf. 33 d, 34 a, and Lach. 181 c. G. 1400; H. 897.
unless perchance,

10. unless perchance, Lat. nisi forte. In order to suggest that the one safest way out of the difficulty is to beg the whole question at issue, ἀρα introduces a definition of good speaking, and ironically connects with it the assertion that Socrates is a good speaker.

11. if indeed. This use of μέν, like many others, shows its connexion with μήν. The supposition is merely restated.

12. but not after their pattern. A parenthetical statement, which he proceeds to explain (see on μόνος, 21 b, and cf. 27 c). The explanation begins with οὐ μεντοι and ends with the chapter. Pending this explanation, these words mean a better or a worse speaker than they, i.e. one not on their level.

13. at all events. — η τι η οὐδέν: little or nothing. Cf. Hdt. iii. 140, ἀναβέβηκε... ὁ οὐδεὶς καὶ παρ’ ἡμέας αὐτῶν, hardly a single one of them has ever been here. Xen. Cyr. vii. 5. 45, τούτων δὲ τῶν περιστηκότων η τινα η οὐδένα ὁδα, now of these bystanders I know next to no one at all.

14. ζῷεις δὲ μου ἀκούσισθε: instead of ζῷοι δ’ ἀκούσισθε. The position of ζῷεις suggests a contrast with οὖντοι μὲν; the sense calls for ζῷοι δὲ (ζῷεις) ἀκούσισθε. This collocation leaves opportunity for bringing out πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν with great prominence. For a similar shifting of emphasis, cf. Xen. An. iii. 1. 25, καίῳ δὲ, εἰ μὲν ζῷεις ἐθέλετε ἐξορμάω ἐπὶ ταῦτα, ἐπεσκοι ὑμῖν βοῶμαι, εἰ δ’ ζῷεις τά τετετέ μὴ γεγίσθαι, οὐδὲν προφασίζομαι τὴν ἡλικίαν, now I for one, if you are minded to bestir yourselves to accomplish this, am ready to follow your lead; if you however appoint me to lead you I make no excuse on the score of my age. See App.

15. κεκαλλυτημένους κτέ.: in Crat. 390 a b Διί φίλος is quoted as a βῆμα; when changed to Διίφιλος it becomes an ονόμα. Here ονόμα means words, βῆμα means phrases. In grammar ονόμα means noun, βῆμα means verb. The κάλλος τῶν λόγων (ornatus) means specifically the use of tropes and figures of speech. Orators took great pains in the choice of single words, and in the collocation and suitable arrangement of their words in phrases. Accordingly, in Symp. 198 b, Socrates is made to bestow unstinted praise upon Agathon's speech: τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ονόματων καὶ θημάτων τις οὐκ ἂν ἐξεπλάγη ἄκοφων, who would not have been beside himself on hearing words and phrases of such marvellous beauty? Then he contrasts his own fashion of speaking with Aga-
15 μὰ Δία, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασι τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσων ὄνόμασι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἀ λέγω, καὶ μηδεῖς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἃν δὴποι πρέποι, ὃ 20 ἀνδρεὶς, τῇ δὲ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγοις εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι· καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνι, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρέμαι· ἐάν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων, ἀκούστε μοι ἀπολογουμένου δὲ ὥσπερ εἰσθα λέγεω καὶ ἐν thon's as follows: ὥρα οὖν εἵ τι καὶ τοιούτων λόγου δεῖ, περὶ ἑρωτος τάλαθη λεγόμενα ἀκόνει, ὄνόμασι δὲ καὶ θέσει ρήματων τοιαύτη, ὅπως δὲ ἄν τις τόχη ἐπελθόνσα, consider now whether you feel the need of such a speech as this, of hearing the truth told about love in words and phrases arranged just in the way they suggest themselves (cf. εἰκῇ λεγόμενα). See Introd. 55.

17 εἰκῇ, τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσων ὄνόμασι: the same fact stated under two different but parallel aspects, σχῆμα ἐκ παραλλήλων. See on ρά ζαι κτ. 18 b, and on καὶ αὐτοί κτ., Crit. 48 d, and for the facts Introd. 34. Also for freq. sneers at the unrefined illustrations and homely vocabulary of Socrates, cf. Gorg. 489 b–491 c. Cf. also Xen. Mem. i. 2. 37, ὅ δὲ Κριτίας, "ἀλλὰ τώνδε τοῖς αἰνέχεσθαι" ἐφ' "δεῖσθαι, ο Ἱάκρατες, τῶν σκέπων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκῶν· καὶ γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτῶν ὅθεν κατατετρίβησα διαδρομουμένους ὑπὸ σου.

18. ἀ λέγω: referring to the speech which follows, my plea. — μηδεῖς προσδοκησάτω: for the aor. inv. third pers. in prohibitions, see GMT. 260; G. 1347; H. 874 b.

20. τῇ δέ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ: for a man as old as I. πλάτατοντι agrees in gender with ἐμοί, i.e. the person involved in πλάτοντι and suggested, though not explicitly, by τῇ δέ (equiv. to τῇ ἑμί). The comparison is attracted into the dat., i.e. ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ stands for ὥσπερ μειράκιον ἄν πλάττοι.

21. εἰς ὑμᾶς: before you, sc. τούς δικαστάς, i.e. τὸ δικαστήριον. Cf. the similar use of ἐν. — καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνι: yes, and most fervently too. καὶ μέντοι = a rhetorical 'yes,' the second καὶ adds a specification of the intensity with which the request is made, "and indeed I beg of you, and I beg you most fervently too."

22. δέομαι καὶ παρέμαι: cf. 27 b, παρηθησάμην. — τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων: "this has respect primarily to the conversation with Meletus, which is prefaced by the request, 27 b, μὴ δορυθεῖν εὖν ἐν τῷ εἰσώθη τρόπῳ τῶν λόγων ποιώμαι. But, as something like this was recognized under the name of ἐρώτησις (see Introd. 71), the reference here prob. extends to the conversations rehearsed (20 a), alluded to (21 c sqq., 25 e), and imagined (28 b, 29 c), in the course of the defence; perhaps also to the castigation intermingled with it (30 d, 31 e, 35 b, c)."

23. καὶ ἐν ἄγορᾷ καὶ ἄλλῳ: see Introd. 25.
γαρ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, οἷν ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκρηκόασι, καὶ 25 ἀλλοθεί, μῆτε θαυμάζειν μῆτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἐνεκα. Ἐχει δὲ γὰρ οὕτως. ὡν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβήβηκα, ἐτῆ γεγονός πλεῖώ εἴσοδοι εἰς ἡς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὡσπερ οὖν ἄν, εἰ τῷ ὑπὲρ ἐξός ἐτύγχανον ὡν, ἐξενεγυγώσκετε δῆτον ἄν μοι εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ

24. τραπεζῶν: τράπεζαι (banks) as well as shops, esp. those near the market place, were favorite lounging places at Athens. Cf. Lys. ix. 5, καὶ μὲν τὰ προειρημένα διείλεκτο ἐπὶ τῇ φιλίᾳ τραπεζῆς, now the facts just recited I gathered from a conversation at Philius’s bank. Cf. also Id. xxiv. 19–20, where to meet the charge that his shop is the resort of evil-minded persons without visible means of support, the defendant says: ταύτα λέγων οὐδὲν ἐμὸν κατηγορεῖ μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν ἀλ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­�
30 τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον ἐν οἴσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ ὁ ὁντό νῦν οὕτω μὲν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὃς γε μοι δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἔχει, ἵσως μὲν γὰρ χεῖρων, ἵσως δὲ βελτιών ἂν εἴη — αὐτῷ δὲ τούτῳ σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἡ μή. Δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τάληθι λέγειν.

Π. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιος εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὁ ἀνδρέσ. Ἀθηναίοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μου ἴσως καθηγορημένα καὶ τούς πρῶτους καθηγόρους, ἐπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὑστερα καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ καθήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς b

17 and repetition of άν, see GMT. 223; G. 1312; H. 864.

30. φωνῇ: dialect, with esp. reference to pronunciation, while τρόπῳ, style of speech, describes more generally any unusual choice and combination of words.

18 ἐτεθράμμην: had been brought up, belongs to the supposed case. See on ὃς ἔμελλεν, 20 a. Foreigners were allowed to appear in court only in exceptional cases. Ordinarily their ξένος, guest-friend, or their πρόξενος, resident consul, represented them in court and was surety for them.

31. καὶ δὴ καὶ: takes the place of οὗτω καὶ after οἴσπερ; δὴ calls attention to the case in point here cited.—νῦν: not now in contrast to then, but as it is contrasted with as it would have been. "Now that I am not a stranger in Athens, but only a stranger in courts." Lat. nunc is used in the same way. Cf. Liv. ii. 12.

14. — ὃς γε μοι δοκῶ: rather than ὃς γ' ἔμοι, the reading of inferior Mss. adopted by many editt. The important word is ὃς, not μοι, which is the least emphatic form in which the pron. could be introduced. Here the pers. pron. is used instead of the

refl. H. 684. For the analogous use of the oblique cases of τοῦτο instead of the ind. refl., see G. 902; H. 684 a.

32. ἴσως, ἴσως: the reason urged is a general one. The influence of style, if felt at all, will be felt just in those cases where the style of the plea is better or worse than the case deserves,—just where it interferes with true judgment. For similar phraseology, cf. Xen. Cyn. iv. 3.

2. ἴσως μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἴσχει, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ποιῶσιν αὐτά τῇ ἠδονῇ χαριζόμενοι (for their own satisfaction). Two Gen. of Ver. i. 1.

If haply won perhaps a hapless gain; If lost, why then a grievous labor won.

35. αὕτη: in place of τοῦτο, by assimilation to the gender of the pred. ἀρετή. It refers to the preceding clause αὐτῶ... μή.

Π. 1. δίκαιος εἰμι κτέ.: for certain adjs. used pers. with the inf., see GMT. 762; G. 1527; H. 952.

2. ψευδή καθηγορημένα: not ψευδῶς, because in the act. the idiom is καθηγορεῖν τί τινος.

4. ἐμοῦ γὰρ κτέ.: introducing the b reason why Socrates is to speak first πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα... καθηγόρους.

πρὸς ὑμᾶς: with καθήγοροι γεγόνασι,
which is equiv. to κατηγορόκασι. Cf. Euthyph. 2 c, ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μου πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, where πρὸς relates to those to whom the accusation is addressed.

5. καὶ, καὶ: the first καὶ emphasizes πάλαι, the second requires no comment. — πάλαι πολλὰ ἢδη ἐτη: see on εἰκῇ κτέ., 17 c. πάλαι goes back to the beginning of the accusations while πολλὰ κτέ. follows out their long continuance. This has been going on more than twenty years at the very least, for the Clouds was first put upon the stage in 423, and Socrates was tried in 399.

6. τοὺς ἄμφι Ἀντων: when followed by the acc. of a person’s name, οἱ περὶ and οἱ ἄμφι mean the person and those connected with him (subjects, followers, companions, adherents). G. 952, 2; H. 791, 3 fin. Anytus was the most influential accuser. See Introd. 30.

8. τοὺς πολλοὺς: most of you. The art. is not used here (as in 17 a above, τῶν πολλῶν) to call up something familiar; it contrasts most of them, who were caught young and taught to abhor Socrates, with the few, implied in the part. gen. ὅμως, to whom this may not have happened. G. 965, 967; H. 665 and 673 b.

παραλαμβάνοντες: this word often is used of one who takes charge of a child and educates it. Cf. Lec. I. 121 c, δἰς ἐπτὰ δὲ γενόμενον ἔτων τῶν παῖδα παραλαμβάνουσιν ὅσι ἐκεῖνοι βασιλεῖοι παθαγωγοὶ ὤνομάζουσιν. But this sense is too narrow for the present context. More to the point is Gorg. 483 c, where λαμβάνειν is used in a wider sense, which is analogous to that of παραλαμβάνειν here, τοὺς βελτιστοὺς καὶ ἐφρομενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὡσπερ λέοντας κατατζουντες κτέ., taking the best and most vigorous of our number in our earliest youth, and by incantations subduing us as if we were young lions.

9. ἐπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν: prejudiced you against me by unceasing accusations. Strictly speaking κατηγοροῦντες ἐπειθόν is required, but coordination here idiomatically takes the place of subordination. — τις Σωκράτης: tis with prop. names conveys an indefiniteness and uncertainty which are always uncomplimentary and which in this case amount to scorn, an individual (somebody or other) named Socrates. Cf. what d’you call him? used colloquially in Eng.

10. σοφός ἄντρ: these words are practically intended to mean a Sophist. “The title σοφός ἄντρ would at once be understood as a class-appellation, cf. 23 a, 34 e; in it the meaning and associations of Philosopher are uppermost, yet not so distinctly as to exclude those of Sophist.” R. — τά τε μετέωρα . . . ἀνεξηγητικός: popular prejudice coined this phrase, or something like it, to stigmatize all
scientific investigation into nature.

With such investigation began and ended the earliest Greek philosophy (Introd. 2-12), and even Socrates' contemporaries, the Sophists,—notably Hippias,—were much addicted to it. See Introd. 14. Cf. Prot. 315e, ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τῶν μετέφορων ἀπορομνικὰ ἄττα διερωτάν τῶν Ἴππιαν, and they (Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and Andron) appeared to be plying Hippias with astronomical questions about nature and the heavenly bodies. The phrase τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς (where ὑπὸ has the very unusual sense of beneath and covered by) does not refer to definite matters searched into, but is part and parcel of a sweeping assertion that nothing either high or low, nothing "in heaven above or in the earth beneath or in the waters under the earth" is safe from their fatuous and futile curiosity. This popular view is amusingly exaggerated and dramatized by Aristophanes in the Clouds, 184-234. Here the word ἄπαντα adds a final touch of exaggeration.—φοντιστῆς: used trans. here like φοντίζειν with acc. For a dat. similarly governed, cf. τὴν ἐμῆν τῷ θεῷ ὑπερ-πείλαι, 30a, where see note. See also App.—"This 'accusation,' σοφὸς...ποιῶν, both as given here, and as repeated with mock formality in 19b, is nothing more than a vivid way of representing, for a rhetorical purpose, the popular prejudice, in which the court shared. The charges it contains are two-edged, being borrowed partly from the vulgar representation of the Philosopher, partly from that of the Sophist; the μετέφορα φροντιστῆς points to the Philosopher, the τῶν... ἄπαντα to the Sophist." R.

11. τὸν ἄπαντα λόγον κτέ.: any teaching of rhetoric, as such, must contain hints as to e most effective means for making . . best of a bad case by presenting it skillfully. How far this must be condemned should not be decided without reference to circumstances and facts. To-day it is equally impossible to assert that a lawyer in all cases is bound not to defend a client whose cause he knows to be unjust. Popular opinion at Athens seems to have been convinced that the Sophist's single aim in teaching rhetoric was to communicate the art of proving that black was white. Cf. the Clouds, 889-1104, where Aristophanes introduces the δίκαιος λόγος and the ἄδικος λόγος respectively. They have an argument in which the ἄδικος λόγος wins. Cf. Cic. Brut. 8, where the excellent Claudius says of the Sophists: d o c e r e s e p r o f i t e b a n t u r q u e m a d m o d u m c a u s a i n f e r i o r (i t a e n i m l o q u e b a n t u r) d i c e n d o f i e r i s u p e r i o r p o s s e t. His opposuit sese Socrates, qui subtilitate quadam dispensandis refellere eorum instituta solebat verbis.

13. οἱ δεινοί: in the pred. The e accusers just mentioned as κατ᾽ ἔξοχήν δεινοί.

14. οὔδε θεοὶ κτέ.: the investigations alluded to above were, it was charged, not only a foolish waste of
15 ἐπειτὰ εἰσὶ πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἡ κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἡ ἀν μάλιστα ἐπιστεῦσατε, παῖδες ὅντες, ἵνα ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὃτι οὐδὲ
20 τὰ ὅνοματα οὖν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἰ τις δὲ κωμῳδιοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὁν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ

useful time, but actually (hence the oúde, not even, in the text) led to athe­
18

18. ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες: supply δίκην. The fem. termination is used in this idiom, though ἐρήμος is more commonly of two terminations, and κατηγορῶν ἐρήμον, in exactly the sense required here, occurs in Dem. xxi. 87. The acc. is cognate with κατηγο­
ροῦντες. G. 1051; H. 715b. Cf. also the common law phrases, δίκαιον γραφήν, prosecute an indictment, φεύγειν γραφήν, defend a suit at law. The sense of the whole is repeated in untechnical lan­
guage by the appended ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. In fact the case they prosecuted always went by default, with none to speak for the defendant. When either party to a lawsuit failed to appear, the court, as we say, entered a default against him, ἐρήμην καταγγελόσκει τι­

19. ὁ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον κτέ.: τοῦτο, the correlative of ὃ, is sup­

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χρώμενοι ύμᾶς ἀνέπειθον,—οί δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι 18 
θάλους πεθοῦντες,—οὕτωι πάντες ἀπορώτατοι εἰσὶν· οὐδὲ 
γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἴον τ' ἐστίν αὐτῶν ὑπαυθοὶ οὖν 25 
ἐλέγχει οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὦσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογοῦμενον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκριμαγόμενον. ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὦσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διότι γίνος μου τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἐτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορη-
σαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι οὖς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οὐθητε 30 
δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτον με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ 
ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγοροῦντων, καὶ πολὺ 
μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ὑστερον ἔγεν· ἀπολογητέων δὴ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέων ὑμῶν ἐξελέσται τὴν 10 
διαβολήν, ὃν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἐσχέτε, ταύτην ἐν 

d main statement of the preceding sent. about the anonymous accusers, δὲ 25 7 εἰσίν. On the loose conversa-
tional structure of such sents., see Introd. 55. 
25. ὦσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν κτέ.: τὴν καὶ 
used here to connect, not two different 
ideas, but two different ways of put-
ting the same idea. Socrates would 
be sure always to use his favorite 
method of question and answer, and 
therefore σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον 
for him would be practically ἐλέγχειν 
μηδενὸς ἀποκριμαγόμενον. By thus 
saying one and the same thing twice over, 
the speaker expresses his idea all the 
more effectively. 
27. ἀξιώσατε: the two notions of 
ἐξιν, worth (price) and right, are as 
usual blended in this word, duly grant. 
Notice the persistent recurrence in 
various forms of the idea conveyed 
by ὦσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω. See Introd. 55. 
29. οὐς λέγω: refers to b above. 
—οὐθητε κτέ.: it was common for 
a speaker to ask the court to approve 
of some order of topics which he pro-
posed to follow. For a fuller descrip-
tion of ἐκείνους, see b above; notice 
that it refers to ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι. 
These old-time accusers, though the 
last-mentioned, were the most remote 
in thought, for Anytus and his crew 
were actually present as τῶν ὑστερον shows. 
H. 696 b. 
32. ἑδέ: well, pointing to what has 
just been said, and implying that the 
whole must be accepted by his hear-
ers as a matter of course. It is like 
"So far, so good!" ἑστὶν often has 
the same force. Grammatical argu-
ments are used to prove that this ἐὴ εἰ 
is nothing more nor less than the al-
terative form used not infrequently 
in place of the opt. ἐστιν. The force 
of ἐὴ is very much that of ἐηε, for it 
indicates that the duty of making 
some plea must be taken for granted. 
33. τὴν διαβολήν: the prejudice pro-
duced by the slanders just described. 
34. ἐσχέτε: acquired. See on ἐσχέτε 
20 d, and cf. Hdt. i. 14, τὴν τυπάνθιδα
35 οὐτως ὁλίγῳ χρόνῳ. Βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἀν τούτῳ οὖτως γενέσθαι, εἰ τι ἁμείνον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἑμοί, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιήσαι ἀπολογοῦμενον· οἴμαι δὲ αὐτῷ χαλέπτον ἐμαι, καὶ οὐ πάντως με λαμβάνει οἴνον ἐστιν. οἴμος δὲ τούτῳ μὲν ίτω ὀπτῇ τῷ θεῷ φίλου, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

III. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν έξ άρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστίν έξ ἡ ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἡ δὲ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητος με ἐγράφατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἰεν· τί δὲ λέγοντες διεβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν 5 ἀντωμοσιαν δεὶ ἀναγγόνωι αὐτῶν· Σωκράτης άδικεί καὶ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν

πλέον ποιεῖν: proficere.

38. οὗ πάντως: not at all. Here certainly hardly would not be adequate. Cf. μόνις πάνυ, 21 b.

39. τῷ θεῷ: the divine will or God. The art. is used not because any particular god is referred to, but with a generic or collective force. Cf. Crit. 43 d, and see on τῷ θεῷ, 35 d and 42 a, and ὁ θεός, Crit. 54 e.

III. 2. πιστεύων: not as above, 18 c, fidem habens, but rather confidens or fretus. Cf. Alc. I. 123 c, τί οὖν ποτε ἐστιν ὃτι πιστεύει τῷ μειράκιον; Come now, on what does the youth rely? — Μέλητος: see Introd. 30, and for γραφήν, Ibid. 67.

4. ὡσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων: a freq. idiom in comparisons; the leading and dependent clauses are briefly blended in one; ἀναγγόνωι as well as ἀντωμοσιαν are involved in this consolidation. The reference is to the formal reading of the documents in a suit before the full court. On ἀντωμοσια, see Introd. 69.

5. άδικεί: very commonly, as here, άδικεῖν has almost the force of a pf. One of its obvious meanings is άδικός έιμι, which practically signifies, I have done wrong or I am guilty. GMT. 27; H. 827.

6. περιεργάζεται: is a busybody. A busybody either minds other people’s business or makes too much of his own. Socrates is accused of the first; for a good case of the second, cf. Nep. Arist. 1.4, sibi non placere quod tam cupide elaborasset, ut praeter ceteros Iustus appellassetur. Cf. 20 c, περιττότερον πραγματευμένου, and see on τὰ μετέωρα in 18 b. — οὐράνια: the art. is omitted because ἐνδιὰ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια form one conception. Cf. Xen. Mem. I. i. 19, Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα ηγεῖτο θεοῦ εἰδέναι, τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραπτόμενα καὶ τὰ στιγμώς λινόμενα (the unuttered
... plans in man's thought). In Prot. 315c, Plato satirizes the astronomical lore of Hippias.

7. ἄλλους... διάδασκων: see Introd. 11 and 25.

c 8. τοιαύτη τις: Socrates alone is responsible for the exact words; the accusation itself is vague.—ταύτα γάρ ἐωράτε: in the Clouds, Aristophanes put before the Athenians their own feelings against Socrates, he dramatized a prejudice already existing.

9. Ἀδράτη τινα κτέ.: in appos. with ταύτα. For the force of τινά, see on τις Ἀδράτης, 18 b; it implies that Socrates in the Clouds bears no close resemblance to the real Socrates. Cf. Clouds, 218–225, where Strepsias des on entering Socrates's thinking-shop says: Who is this man up there in the basket? Hearing it is Socrates, he asks him what he's about. Socrates answers ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον, on air I tread and oversee the sun.

10. φάσκοντα κτέ.: subordinated to περιφερόμενον.

11. δὲ: referring to all statements of the sort above mentioned.—οὕτε μέγα οὕτε μικρὸν: a reénforcement of the οὕτε stated disjunctively. Cf. 21 b and 24 a; also for a similar location, cf. Dem. ix. 5, οὕτε μικρὸν οὕτε μέγα οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων (that you ought to do) ποιούντων ἵματι κακῶς τὰ πράγματα ἔχει. See on ἕ τι ή οὐδὲν, 17 b.

12. οὐχ ὡς ἀτμοίζων: cf. in e below, καὶ τούτῳ γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι. “Such knowledge is a fine thing, if any one has it.” Socrates ironically hints that no one has it. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 11, οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἢ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι, διελέγοντο, σκοπῶν ὅπως δέ καλούμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν σφορίων κόσμος ἔφυ, καὶ τίσιν ἀνάγκαις (by what necessary laws) ἔκαστα γίγνεται τῶν οὐρανίων· ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα μορφάντων ἀπεδείκνυεν. Those who pursued these studies were crazy, he thought, because man ought first to know himself (cf. id. i. 1. 12, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἑκάστην, πότερά ποτε νομίσαντες ἵκανός ἦν τὰ γορώπινα εἰδέναι ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φυσικῶν, and 38 a below), and because these physicists looked into questions which were really beyond the sphere of man (ibid., ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπεια παρέστη, τὰ δαμανὰ δὲ σκοτούμενα, ἡγούνται τὰ προσήκοντα πράστειν) and therefore arrived at impotent conclusions (cf. id. iv. 7. 6–7). See on ἐκ τῆς κτέ., 26 e, and Introd. 10.

14. μῆ... φύγουμι: Schanz brackets these words: “quia sanam interpretationem spernunt.” Stallbaum punctuates “μῆ... φύγουμι!”
15 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, δὲ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοῦς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξίω ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκεις τε καὶ φράζεις, ὦσοι ἐμοὶ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιούτοι ἐστιν· φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλους, εἰ πώποτε ἢ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἱκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοί περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου· καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἔστι καὶ τάλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὔδὲ γ᾽ εἰ τυνὸς ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἔγω παυδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρηματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τούτο ἄληθές· ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτο γέ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ τις οἶος τ᾽ εἴη παυδεύειν ἀνθρώποις ζῶσερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντίνως καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος. τούτων γὰρ ἔκαστος, δὲ ἄνδρες,

The meaning certainly appears to be, may I never by any chance have to defend myself against Meletus on so serious a charge! δικαίον is often best represented in translation by the sing. For ὡς with φέργειν, see on πεπόνθατε, 17 a. If Socrates despised the wisdom of the natural philosophers, he would be pretending to know what he did not know. Meletus then would have a strong case against him, for the charge would be so serious that Socrates could not attempt to defend himself. Socrates ironically attributes to Meletus and the courts his own strong disapproval of pretended knowledge.

15. ἀλλὰ γὰρ: but the truth is, the truth, namely, which contradicts the notion that Socrates pretends to know what he is ignorant of, and also gives the reason why Aristophanes's attack does not touch him, but the physicists only.

18. οἱ τοιούτοι εἶσον: are in that case, sc. the one just mentioned; hence the art. is used.

22. περὶ ἐμοῦ: the colloquial tone is marked in the position of these words. Instead of "the other stories which people tell about me," Socrates says, "the other stories about me, which people tell." The rel. clause is appended as an apparent afterthought.

IV. 1. ἀλλὰ γὰρ: in turning to a new topic, a glance is thrown backward (οὔτε... ἔστιν), and the new departure begins with the emphatic ἐπεί. ἔστιν is equiv. to the following ἀληθές (ἔστιν).

3. ἐπεί: although. Strictly a connecting thought must be supplied.

4. εἰ τις εἶη: the regular apod. καλὸν ἂν εἴη is represented by its equiv. in sense, δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι. GMT. 502, and compare 555.

5. ἵστερ Γοργίας: on Gorgias, see Introd. 12-14. Protagoras was not living at this time. See Introd. 12.

6. τούτων γὰρ ἔκαστος κτι.: the
ironical surprise of Socrates is reproduced by the anacoluthon in this sent. With oíóς τ’ ἐστὶν the speaker apparently leads up to πελευν, but the emphatic τοὺς (in which the clause τῶν νέοις ὅτι...βασιλεύσαι is summed up) is followed by πείθουσι instead. (The pl. after ἐκάστην is not uncommon. H. 609 a.) Then comes the statement of a fact which is surprising, they pay these men, and finally the climax is capped by their giving them thanks to boot. To give this last point προτειδέουσι, which should be a partic. like διδόντας, is put on a par with ξυνείναι. For a fuller account of these teachers, see Prot. 316 c ff.

Sophists, were welcomed. Callias’s fondness for Sophists is humorously brought out in the Protagoras, where he is almost crowded out of house and home by them. The indulgence of this and of other tastes exhausted his resources, and he died in poverty. His father Hipponicus fell in the battle at Delium (424 n.c.).

17. ὃς ἔμελλεν: for ἔμελλον and the inf., without ἀν, expressing a past likelihood which was not realized, see GMT. 428 a. Here is a present likelihood (see ib. a for an analogous use of ἔμελλε) which is not realized, who would, in the case supposed (ei...μαθῶσασθαί), proceed to make them, etc.

21. τῆς ἄνθρωπινης κτῆ.: sc. the b boys must be civilized and humanized. Civilization involves the existence of the family and the state, and these require education. Cf. Arist. Pol. 1. 2. 9, ἄνθρωπος φύει πολιτικόν (φύον, man is by nature a political animal.
πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἑστίν; οὔμα γὰρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ 20
tὴν τῶν νεῶν κτῆσιν. ἑστὶ τις, ἐφην ἡγώ, ἦ οὗ; Πάννυ
gε, ἥ δ' ὅς. Τίς, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσον δι-25
dᾶσκει; Ἔννοιος, ἐφη, ὃ Σῶκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν·
cαὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐνύνον ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ως ἄληθῶς ἔχοι τάυτῃ
tὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγώ οὖν καὶ ε-
αὐτῶς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ᾧβρυνόμην ἂν, εἰ ἱπιστάμην
tαύτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὃ ἀνδρείς 'Ἄθηναίοι·
V. Ἄπολάβοι ἃν οὖν τις ἰμῶν ἱσως· ἀλλ', ὃ Σῶκρατες,
tὸ σὸν τί ἐστὶ πράγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοι αὐταὶ γε-
25. Ἔννοιος κτ.: not a word is wasted in this answer, upon the brevity of which largely depends the humor of the story. Evenus is elsewhere mentioned as a teacher of oratory and a writer of elegiacs. A few such poems attributed to him still exist. Here he is introduced as a Sophist and a teacher of virtue. The small-
ness of his charge for instruction prob. measures accurately the value attached to it by his contemporaries, and places him and his teaching in the second rank. Protagoras charged 100 minas. There have been attempts to distinguish between a younger and an elder Evenus, both of whom came from Paros and wrote elegiacs. If there were two, allusion is here made to the elder.
26. εἰ ἔχει καὶ διδάσκει: in the original statement which Socrates may be supposed to have in mind, both of these were in the indic. Both might change to the opt. (GMT. 696; Η. 937) after ἐμακάρισα. The change to the opt. from ἔχει throws εἰ ἔχει, as it were, into the background, leaving οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει, which contains a very pointed insinuation, in the more vivid indic. See App.

27. ἐμμελῶς: synonymous with ὀρθῶς. Its opposite is πλημμελῶς (discordantly or falsely, of a false note). The word also conveys by innuendo the notion that the teaching of Evenus is cheap, and this is the point here made. In Crit. 106 b, μετρίως and παρὰ μέλος, πλημμελῶς and ἐμμελῆς are used as contradictories.

V. All error is distorted truth; until a man sees the truth which a particular error caricatures, he will not renounce his error; to denounce error as such is therefore not enough. Thus far Socrates has argued against the grossly erroneous popular opinion of himself; now he proceeds to exhibit the truth. His upright conduct has been exasperating, for obedience to God has led him to defy men.
1. ἀλλ', ὃ Σῶκρατες κτ.: objections dramatized and put in the form of questions. The argument is: "there must be some cause." Hence the γὰρ in οὗ γὰρ δῆτον.
2. τὸ σὸν πράγμα: What is that you have been about? or better, What is this about you? Accordingly πράγμα is used either in the sense of pursuit, study, or plan of life; or it has no independent meaning, but is joined with the art.
γόνασων; οὐ γὰρ δὴπου σοῦ γε οὐδέν τὰν ἄλλων περιττό- 20
terov πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος
5 γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τι ἐπραττεσ ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. λέγει οὖν
ημῶν τι ἐστιν, ἣν μὴ ἤμεις περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν.
tαυτὶ μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἀγὼ ἦμῶν πειρά-
σομαῖ ἀποδείξαι τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τούτῳ δ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τὸ τε
ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν. ἀκοῦετε δή. καὶ ἵσως μὲν δόξω
10 τοὺς ἤμων παίζειν, εὖ μέντοι ἵστε, πᾶσαν ἦμῶν τὴν ἀλῆ-
θειαν ἤρω. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλα ἢ
διὰ σοφίαν τῶν τούτω τὸ ὄνομα ἐσχηκα. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν
tαύτην; ἢπερ ἐστὶν ἵσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ ὀντὶ γὰρ

and ὁν, the whole being a paraphrase for ἱσκρᾶτης. See on τὸ τοῦ ἱσκρᾶτους
πράγμα, Crit. 53 d.

3. περιττότερον: what overpasses the limit restraining common men,
and hence provokes suspicion. See on περιττογάνισα, 19 d, and cf. Soph.
Ἀντ. 68, τὸ γὰρ περιττὰ πράσειν οὐκ ἔχει νοῦν οὐδένα. Eur. Bacch. 427 ff.,
σοφῶν δ' ἀπέχει πραπτά φρένα τε περισσῶν παρὰ φωτιν' τὸ πλῆθος
δ' τὸ παυλότερον ἐνόμισε χρήσται τε (whate'er the multitude of lowlier men
puts faith in and practises) τὰ' ἀν δεχοίμαν. That σοῦ ... πραγματευο-
μένου (although as you say you have been doing nothing) conveys a statement
of fact, not a supposition, is shown by οὐδέν. The ἐπείτα points the con-
trast between two statements of fact, (1) σοῦ (gen. after φήμη)
πραγματευο-

11. ἄλλα ἢ: this collocation with οὐδέν indicates that ἄλλα ἢ arose
from the use of ἄλλος. For a case where ἄλλος precedes it, cf. 34 b.

12. ἐςχήκα: ἦν have become pos-

sent. so closely that διά is not
repeated. ποια is in the pred.; we
might expand to ποιὰ σοφία ἐστὶν αὕτη
di ἦν τοῦτο. ... ἐςχήκα. H. 618.

13. ἢπερ: sc. διὰ ἐκείνην τοῦτο ... ἐςχήκα, ἢπερ κτ., just that which.
κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· ουτοὶ δὲ τάχ’ ἀν οὐς ἄρτι
15 ελεγον μείζω τινὰ ἡ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶνεν, ἐν
οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐγώγη αὐτὴν ἐπίστασαι, ἀλλ’
ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἔπι διαβολὴ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ
μοι, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ’ εὰν δόξῳ τι
ήμων μέγα λέγεω· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἔρω τὸν λόγον ὅν ἄν λέγω,
20 ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τὸς γὰρ
εἴσ.

15. ἡ οὐκ ἔχω κτὲ.: ironical. Such
wisdom is one of two things, either
superhuman or no wisdom at all.

18. μὴ θορυβήσητε: do not interrupt
me with noise, strictly referring to the
moment fixed by ἐὰν δόξῳ κτέ. In
21 a, and 30 c, the pres. is used (μὴ
θορυβεῖτε) because the request is less
precise, make no disturbance. GMT.
259; H. 874 a.

19. μέγα λέγεων: not of course in
the sense of speaking out loud (cf. Rep.
v. 449 b, ὁ Ἀδελίμαντος μέγα ἢδη λέγων,
beginning to speak above his breath), but
in that of μεγαληγορεῖν, as μέγα φρο-
νεῖν is used in the sense of μεγαλο-
φονεῖν. Cf. Rich. II. iii. 2,

Boys with women's voices
Strive to speak big, and clap their female
joints
In stiff unwieldy arms against thy crown.

— οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν κτέ.: a compressed
form of statement, made effective
with the audience by the allusion to
certain Euripidean strains. (Cf. Eur.
Frg. 488, καὶ ἤμοι δ' ἡμῶν ἀλλ' ἄμοι
μὴρῶς πάρα, not mine the word, I heard
it from my mother. This line is para-
died in Symp. 177 a, ἡ μὲν μοι ἄρχῃ
tοῦ λόγου ἔστι κατὰ τὴν Εὐριπίδου
Μελανίππην· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὅ μῦ-
θος ἀλλὰ Φαιδροῦ τοῦ. The same
sentiment is found in Eur. Hel. 513,
λόγος γὰρ ἔστιν οὐκ ἐμὸς, σοφῶν δ' ἔστος,
not mine the word; by clerical men 'twas
spoken. Hor. Sat. ii. 2, 2, nec meus
hic sermo est sed quae prae-
cepit Ofellus.) For a similarly
compressed statement, cf. ἰκανὸν τὸν
μάρτυρα, 31 c. "A pred. adj. or subst.
is often a brief equiv. for one clause
of a compound sent." II. 618. ἐμὸν
and ἀξιόχρεων are both preds.,
and special point is given them by their
position. This sent. is far more tell-
ing than what might be spun out of
it, sc. λέγω γὰρ λόγον καὶ δ' ὁ λόγος ἄν ἔρω
οὐκ ἔμοι ἔστι, ἀλλ' ἄνοισω (sc. τὸν
λόγον) εἰς τὸν λέγοντα δὲ ἀξιόχρεως ὑμῖν
ἔστιν.—ὅν ἄν λέγω : equiv. to δι' ἐμὸ-
λω λέγεων, though it is formally a
hypothetical rel. clause with indef.
antec., "the word I shall utter, whatever
the word may be, that I say, will not be
mine, etc." Cf. Crit. 44 c.

20. ἀνοίσω: in the sense of shifting
responsibility. For ἀναφορά in that
ἡμῖν ἀναφορά τῆς ἐμφοράς . . . Φαῖ-
βος κελεύεις μητρὸς ἐκπραξέω φάνον.

τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ κτέ.: it required
skill as well as modesty to avoid
blurtling out here with τῆς ἐμῆς σοφίας.
The ei δὴ τῆς ἔστι interrupts just in
time. Cf. Isocr. xv. 50, περὶ μὲν οὖν
tῆς ἐμῆς εἶτε βούλευεθε καλεῖν δυνά-
μεως, εἶτε φιλοσοφίας, εἶτε διατριβής,
ἀνεκάλεσα πάνω τὴν ἄλλης, now you
have heard all the truth about my talent
or methodical study or pursuit, which-
ever you like to call it.
20  21. *οία: goes back to τολαν in 14 of this speech.
22. Χαιρεφώντα: certainly, if the Athenians did not know Chaerephon, many a joke of Aristophanes at Chaerephon's expense was lost on them; see below on line 25. He is mentioned by Xen. (Mem. i. 2. 48) as one of those friends of Socrates oί ἐκείνων ἀνηζήσαν οίχ διημηχρισμένοι γένοιντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα καλῶι τὲ γάγαθοι γενήμαινοι οὐκ ἔπαθαι καί ὀὐκέταισι καί φίλοις καὶ πάλαι καὶ πολλαῖς δύναντο καλῶς χρησθαι.
23. ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει: the ἱλιασταί are here taken as representing the whole people; and here, as often, πλῆθος is equiv. to δῆμος, and means democratic party. Cf. Lys. passim.—ἐταῖρος: partisan. Cf. Gorg. 510 a, η συμπαθείας πολιτείας ἐταϊροί εἶναι, to be a partisan of the government in power.
24. τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην: an allusion, which no one present could fail of understanding, to the exile from which all conspicuous democrats had only four years before returned (in 403 B.C.). The Thirty Tyrants were the authors of this banishment; cf. Xen. Hell. ii. 4. 1, προεπόν μὲν τοῖς ἔξω τοῦ καταλόγου (not registered on their catalogue of 3000 oligarchical sympathizers) μὴ εἰσίνει τις τὸ ἄστυ. φευγόταν δὲ εἰς τὸν Πειραιά, καί ἐνετεύχθην πολλοὺς ἄγοντες ἐνεπλήσαν καὶ τὰ Μέγαρα καὶ τὰς Ἐθῆς τῶν ὑποχωρούντων. All these allusions had the effect of influencing the court in favor of what they were about to hear.
25. σφοδρός: Chaerephon was a born enthusiast. Cf. Charm. 153 b, Χαιρεφῶν δὲ, ἵπτε καὶ μανικὸς ὦν, ἀνάπηδησας ἐκ μέσων ἐθεί πρὸς με. Aristophanes calls Chaerephon "a bat" (Birds, 1554); Chaerephon and Socrates belong to the jaundiced barefoot brotherhood (Clouds, 104). Browning, Aristophanes's Apology,
In me 'twas equal balanced flesh rebuked
Excess alike in stuff-guts Glauketes
Or starveling Chaerephon; I challenge both.
26. καὶ δὴ ποτὲ καὶ κτέ.: well then really once. Cf. 18 a. The regular way of introducing a particular instance of what has been stated generally. What Chaerephon did at Delphi was an instance of his σφοδρότης.
τούτῳ: a cognate acc. after μαντεύσασθαι in anticipation of ἰπτετω κτέ. For τοῖσον referring forward, see H. 690 a. For a similar acc. after μαντευσασθαι, cf. Eur. Ion. 346 f., οὐκ αὕτως ἐκδεικνύει παῖς τοὺς ἄτοστος, εἰσόραφος ἀλικί (alive)! ΚΡ. οὐκ οὗν οὖν οὐδὲς ἐκατομένων τάτα καὶ μαντεύσομαι.
27. ἅπερ λέγω: I repeat, lit. just what I am saying. Cf. 17 c and 20 c.
28. ἀνέφελον οὖν ἡ Πυθα: oν closes an explanatory digression and leads back to μαρτυρα υμῖν παρέξομαι. The
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

η Πυθία μηδένα σοφότερον εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτον πέρι ὁ 21
30 ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὕτως μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος
tετελεύτηκεν.

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὃν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ ὁ
ὑμᾶς διδάξειν οἶδε καὶ ἡ διαβόλη γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ ἔγω
ἀκόουσας ἐνεργοῦμην οὕτωσι· τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί
ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἔγω γὰρ δὴ οὕτω μέγα οὕτε σμικρὸν
δὲ ἐννοια ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὡς· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἡμὲ
σοφότατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ ἁπτὸν ζευδεταί γε· οὐ γὰρ

oracle in question is lost, but we have a
very fair substitute in Σοφός Σωφικής
σοφότερος ὁ Ἑυρίπιδης ἣν ἄνδρον δὲ πάντων
(οὐ ἀπάντων) Σακράτης σοφότατος. See the Schol. on Arist. Clouds, 144.

We are told that once, when the two
were at variance, Socrates intervened

b VI. 3. τί ποτε αἰνίττεται: through
modesty Socrates takes it for granted
that this is "a dark saying." For a
genuinely enigmatic oracle, cf. Paus.
v. 3. 5, γίνεται δὲ τοῖς βασιλείσσιοι
(Temenus and Creshphontes) αὐτῶν
λόγιον τόδε, ἡγεμόνα τῆς καθήσου
ποιεῖσθαι τὸν τριφθαλμόν, that they
should make "the three-eyed" leader of
their home return. The "three-eyed"
turned out to be Oxylus, son of An-
draemon, whom they met riding on a
one-eyed mule; acc. to Apollodorus,
Oxylus was one-eyed and bestrode a
two-eyed horse. See an essay on Greek
Oracles by F. W. H. Myers, in his
volume entitled Essays Classical
(London, 1883).

5. σοφός ὡς: see on ἐπισταμένοι, 22 ε. —λέγει
φάσκων: λέγει here refers to
the meaning and φάσκων to the words
in which it was conveyed.

6. οὐ δήποτε: of course I do not sup-
pone. ποῦ adds a shade of uncer-
tainty to the stress of ὁ. Notice
that Socrates's long struggle (μακρὰ
πάνυ) is dramatized in these short,
quick sents., which suggest a man
talking to himself.—οὐ γὰρ θέμιται: it
would be against his nature. God,
being by nature truthful, could not
lie; cf. Rep. ii. 382 ε, πάντη γὰρ
ἀφεδές τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ θείον,
the nature of divinity and of God is
absolutely void of falsehood. The
implicit faith of pious Greeks in oracles,
esp. in those of Apollo, is proved
directly by such words as Pindar's
ὑπὲρ τὰς σφαγές he (Apollo) sets
not his hand to falsehood (Pyth. iii. 7),
tὸν θείον ἀφεδὲς τῆς τριφθαλμοῦ,
ὑπὲρ τὰς σφαγές, 'tis unlaw-
ful for him to have part in a lie (Pyth.
ix. 42). It is also shown indirectly
by the horror, expressed so often by
the tragedians, at finding Phoebus's
speech untrue. Against all blaspe-
themous attribution of falsehood to the
gods, Plato defends the faith in Rep.
ii. 383 b, where he reprobrates the fol-
lowing lines of Aeschylus (spoken by
Thetis in a lost play), καγὼ τὸ φοιδὸν
θείον ἀφεδὲς στόμα | ἠπιστοῖν εἶναι μα-
tικῇ βρονυν τέχνῃ (with skill prophetic
fraught) δ ὧν αὐτὸς ἀναίνει, αὐτὸς ἐν θειῇ
παρὼν (marriage-feast) αὐτὸς τὰ δ' εἶπον,
αὐτὸς ἐστίν ὁ κταῖων | τὸν παῖδα τὸν
ἔμοι. The hesitating tone adopted by
The gods why question? Nay, we rather should With sacrifice approach them, and a prayer For what is good, disdaining prophecy, . . . What prophecy will lead the sluggard man to thrift? Of prophets best good counsel is and sense. 

Cf. Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 9, δαιμονίων (were crazed) ἐφ' ἐκεῖ καὶ τοὺς μαντευμένους καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μαθοῦνει διακρίνειν (to learn and know thoroughly).

8. μόνος πάνω: after a long struggle, a qualification of ἐπειτα ἐπιτραπέζην which repeats parenthetically the idea of πάνω χρόνον. For a similar parenthetical qualification, see on ὄν κατὰ τούτους, 17 b. For the position of πάνω, see on ὄν πάνω, 19 a. 

10. ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ: the oracle is personified.

11. ὅτι: introducing direct quotation, GMT. 711; H. 928 b. — ἐστὶ: really is. This whole clause was spoken with special emphasis.

13. πρὸς ὑμῖν ἐπαθὼν: cf. Gorg. 485 b, διοικήσατον πάσχων πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας διώκει πρὸς τοὺς ψελλοσκόμους καὶ παλαίστας, in the case of philosophers I feel just as I do about people who lisp and are childish. Contrast the use of πρὸς in such expressions as πρὸς ἐμαυτῶν σκοπῶν, pondering in my mind; πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοποῦμεν, we consider among ourselves (cf. πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἐλογιζόμην in d below).

14. καὶ διαλεγόμενοι αὐτῷ: strictly speaking, this covers the same ground as διαλεγόμενοι τούτων. Socrates has no test except by conversing with his man.

15. ἐδοξῆς μοι: idiomatically substituted before δοκεῖν (to seem) to avoid ἔδοξα in the unusual but possible sense, I came to the opinion. The same anacoluthon occurs both when the nom. part. precedes (cf. Xen. An. iii. 2. 12, καὶ εὖ διαμοιράσει τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι ὡς ὡς ἐν κατακόμμαι τῶν πολεμιῶν τοπαίτας χιμαιρᾶς κατάθεσεν τῇ θῷο, ἐπεὶ οὐκ εἶχον ἰκανοὶ εὑρεῖν, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐμαυτῶν πεπαλαιᾶσαι θείῳ κτλ.) and when it follows (cf. Th. iii. 36, καὶ ὡς ὁρᾷ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς οὖ τοῖς παρόντας μόνον ἀποκτεῖναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀπαντας Μυτηναλοὺς δοσι γῆς ἡβάσει, ἐπὶ-
άλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἐαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' 21
ου· κἀπείται ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι ὅτι οἴσιο τοῦν εἶναι
σοφός, εἴη δ' οὖν. ἐνετύθεν οὖν τοῦτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ ὁ
πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων· πρὸς ἐμαυτῷ δ' οὖν ἀπίην ἐλο-
20 γιζόμην ὅτι τούτῳ μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερος εἰμι·
kωδυνεύει μὲν γάρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλῶν κάγαθὸν
εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὕτως μὲν οἶσται τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ,
ὡσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶμαι. ἔοικα γ' οὖν τούτῳ γε
ςμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τοῦτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μη οἶδα
25 οὐδὲ οἶμαι εἰδέναι. ἐνετύθην ἐπ' ἄλλον ἃ τῶν ἐκεί
δοκούντων σοφώτερον εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταῦτα ταῦτα ἔδοξε· ε
καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκεινω καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἃ αἰσθανόμενος μὲν
καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδώς ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὃμως δὲ
gives a detailed specification of what is inde­

21 καλοὶ ντές την ἀπόστασιν, taxing them
with their revolt).

d 19. πρὸς ἐμαυτῷ ... ἐλογιζόμην:
see on line 13 above.

20. ὁτι ... ἐμι: not really de­
pendent like ὅτι οἷητο in line 17, but
like ὅτι οὐτοι ... ἐστι in line 11
above.

23. ὡσπερ οὖν: the οὖν leads back
to κανονεῖν μὲν γάρ κτε., which in turn
contains a reaffirmation of ἐγὼ γάρ ... 21
σοφὸς ἢν, b above. Here οὖν, not οὐδέν,
is used, because the antithesis is be­
tween not-knowing and false assump-
tion of knowledge. — ἔοικα γ' οὖν: now
it seems at least that, etc. γ' οὖν is a bet­
ter reading than γοῦν, since ἔοικα and
τοῦτον require precisely the same stress
in the connexion of thought. One of
the many examples of γέ repeated in
Hom. is Il. v. 258, τοῦτω δ' οὖν πάλιν
ἀδικός ἀπολύσαν ὄκεας ἵπποι | ἀμφότεροις ἰμελέων, ε' γ' οὖν ἐτερός γε φύγχον.

24. αὐτῶ τοῦτῳ: serves to prepare
the way for the clause with ὅτι, which
άναγκαιον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖν—21 σθαι. ἵτευν ὅτι σκοποῦντι τὸν χρήσιμον τι λέγει ἐπὶ ἀπαντήσας τούς τί δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. καὶ νῦ τὸν κύνα, ὥς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι—δεὶ γὰρ πρὸς ὡμᾶς τάληθη λέγειν—ἡ μὴν ἐγὼ ἐπαθὼν τοὺς τοιούτους· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκεῖτο τῇ ἐλδοξίᾳ μοι ἀλλοῦ δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεικνύειν ἐνωτεριστεὶ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστερον εἰς ἀναλογίαν κατά τὸν θεὸν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστερον εἰς ἀναλογίαν.

3. τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ: the interest of the god, which required of Socrates that he should refute or confirm the oracle.

4. ἵτευν: a change to the direct discourse strikingly introduced by the narrator. Such a transition is often resorted to for the sake of vividness.

Cf. Xen. An. v. 5. 24, παρεκθέν φ' αὐτῶν ἄλλος εἶπεν ὅτι οὐ πόλεμον ποιήσαμεν ἦκοι, ἄλλο γὰρ ἐπιδέοντες ὅτι φιλοί εἰσιν. καί ἐφεξῆς, ἦν μὲν ἐλήθητε κτῆ. Id. vii. 1. 30, where the transition is the reverse, μάλα μάλις, ἐφη, διαπραξάμενον ἦκοι· λέγειν γὰρ ἂν ἐναξιόθιον ὅτι κτῆ. Still more striking is Id. Hell. i. 1. 27, παρῆσαν ἄνδρας ἄγαθος εἶναι, μεμημένους δεια τε ναυμαχίας αὐτοὶ καθ' αὐτοὺς νεικήκατε, ταῦτα ἐπέχοντο καὶ ὑποβαναί, ἵνα τὰ στόχα τὰς τε καὶ ἐπάνω, τοιαύτα δὲ καὶ οἱ Σωκράτεως ὄρκοι. A humorous turn is given to this oath in Gorg. 482 b, μὰ τὸν κύνα τῶν Ἀνγκρατίων τεὸν. Socrates would swear by the Egyptian god, but not by any of the gods whom he worshipped. His objection to doing this may be illustrated by the reasons for “An act to restrain the abuses of players,” 3 James I. c. 21. “For the preventing and avoiding of the great abuse of the holy name of God in Stage-plays, Enterludes, May-games, shews, and the like.” See Clarke and Wright on Merch. of Ven. i. 3.

6. ἡ μὴν: expresses solemn asseveration, and is introduced to corroborate the preceding oath. The Schol. explains it as meaning ὅτι ἦν ἔνθισις δῆθεν, in very truth. It is, however, the usual formula for beginning any affirmation prefixed by a solemn oath.

9. κατὰ τὸν θεὸν: under the god’s command. The inquiry was commanded of God, because it was possible to understand the meaning of the oracle only by experience, and Socrates’s experience had not yet justified
10 ροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεὶ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν 22 ἐμὴν πλάνην ἑπιδείξαι ὦσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος, ὡς μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἦλ έπὶ τοὺς πονητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τοῦμοι; δευθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἑνταῦθα ἐπ᾽ θ
15 αὐτός ὀφίοις καταληψόμενοι ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκεῖνων ὄντα: ἀναλαμβάνων ὃν ἀυτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἀ μοί ἐδόκει

10 If you think that he understood it.
11. ὦσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος: my Herculean labors, as I may call them; the gen. agrees with ἔμοι implied in its equiv. ἑμὴ. G. 1001; H. 691. The words πόνους πονοῦντος were sure to remind his hearers of several passages in the tragedians, where Heracles, a character endeared to them chiefly by his heroic struggles, recounts his labors. Socrates compares his own intellectual encounters with the physical ones endured by Heracles, and recounts in a half-tragic vein these “labors” imposed of God. Cf. Soph. Trach. 1046 f. and 1080 ff.,

In many a heat, by fearful odds hard pressed, With arms and straining back ere now I strove...

Hands, hands, my back, my breast, O arms of mine, Still, still, ye are the same whose sometime strength
In haunts Nemean smote the shepherd’s bane, And tamed the lion whom none dared approach, Or look on, etc.

Cf. Eur. H. F. 1255–1280, and esp. the chorus, 348–455; Browning in Aristophanes’s Apology translates the whole of this play. — ἴνα μοι καὶ κτέ.: Socrates, assuming for the sake of his point an attitude of opposition, says that he thought he was refuting the oracle (cf. 22 e) while really he was proving it to be irrefutable. This achievement is ironically stated as his real purpose. Cf. ἴνα used by Hom. in indignant or ironical questions, e.g. Il. xiv. 304 f., 'Ἀργείοι, καὶ ὅ ἀτέ μεθεμεν' ἐκτοι νίκην | Πραιάμηθ, ἴνα νήσι ἐλη καὶ κύδος ἄρτηται, Argives, and must we to Priam’s son Hector again yield the day, that he on our ships may lay hands and be sure of renown? Socrates was, he here implies, guided to just the result which he least expected. This might easily suggest the irony of fate, so tragically exemplified in Sophocles’s Oedipus the King, which was first performed about 429 B.C. and presumably was familiar to the court. In clauses with ἴνα (ἐπέι, and ἐπέιδθ), kal is freq. used simply for greater stress. Cf. Gorg. 501c, σουχρών, ἴνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ δ λόγος, just to help your argument on to its close. This is not like καὶ μαθά-νομι below, where kal means also. The opt. clause ἴνα γένοιτο depends upon πονοῦντος, which represents the ἴ

11. 14. καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους: see the passage from the Ion quoted in the note on c below. The καὶμεδιστοι are hardly included here. The idea that the genuine poet was a being endowed with exceptional wisdom was common in ancient times. Cf. Arist. Poet. 9. 3,
μάλιστα πεπραγματεύσθαι αυτοῖς, διηρώτων ἃν αὐτῶν τί 22
λέγοιεν, ἵνα ἀμα τι καὶ μανθάνομει παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνο-
μαι όν ὡς ἐπεί τι, ὡς ἀνδρείς, τάληθοι· ὃμως δὲ μητέων.
20(διὸς ἐποὺς γὰρ εἰτείν ὀλίγουν αὐτῶν) ἀπαίτεται οἱ παρόντες ἂν
βέλτιον ἐλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποίηκεσαν. ἐγὼν γὰρ
καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τούτω, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν ἢ
ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάξοντες ὡσπέρ οἱ
θεομάντες καὶ οἱ χρησμοφόδοι· καὶ γὰρ οὕτω λέγονσι μὲν
25 πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἵσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ἃν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτον τι
μοι ἔφαγνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες· καὶ ἅμα

22 φιλοσοφότερον (more philosophical) καὶ
σπουδαστέρον (worthier) ποίησις ἱστορία (prose narrative of facts) ἐστίν.
17. πεπραγματεύσθαι: used here
as a pass., as is made evident by αὑτοῖς, the dat. of the agent. G. 1186
and 1238, 1; H. 769. See also
App.—διηρώτων ἃν: see on 20 be-
low.
18. ἵνα κτὲ.: mentioned as a
subordinate end to be reached by the
way. For καὶ, see on 11 above.—
αἰσχύνομαι: this discovery was dis-
creditable to the poets, and Socrates
hesitates to mention it. For this same
borrowing of shame from another's
actions, see Crit. 45 d and e. When
αἰσχύνεσθαι means feel shame at the
thought of an action, it takes the inf., as
here, instead of the partic. Socrates
feels shame at the idea of telling
what nevertheless must be told, be-
cause it is the truth.
20. οἱ παρόντες: those who were
present, i.e. the bystanders. Hence ἂν
ἐλεγον, used with the same iterative
force as διηρώτων ἃν above. GMT.
162; G. 1296; H. 835.
23. φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες:
the dat. φύσει and nom. partic. charac-
terize the same subj. in two parallel
ησθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τάλλα σοφώτατων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπὴκ οὖν καὶ ἑντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰομένοις περιγεγονέναι ὅπερ καὶ τῶν
30 πολιτικῶν.

VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἦν. ἐμαντῶ γὰρ ἠννηδεῖν οὖδὲν ἐπισταμένως ὡς ἑποὺς ἐπείναι, (τούτους δὲ ἄ γῆ ἦδειν) ὅτι εὑρήσωμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὖν ἐφεύσθην, ἀλλ’ ἡπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὖν ἕπι-5 στάμην, καὶ μου ταύτῃ σοφότεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ’, ὅ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, ταῦτον μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοὶ. διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην κα-λῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἐκαστὸς ἦξιον καὶ τάλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτὴ ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην


VIII. 1. τελευτῶν: finally. For participles used adverbially, see GMT. 834; G. 926; H. 968 a and 619 a.

2. ἐπισταμένως: cf. 21 b. —δὲ γῆ: γῆ gives stress to τούτους, but yields the first place to δὲ (cf. 24 c, ἐγὼ δὲ γῆ); μὲν also takes the same precedence. As a rule, γῆ comes immediately after the word which it emphasizes, or else between the noun and its art.

4. ἡπίσταντο: they knew, without any implication that they have ceased to know at the time when he speaks.

6. ὅπερ καὶ, καὶ οἱ κτέ.: this repetition of καὶ is idiomatic in correl. sent.s., and may be represented by one Eng. word, also. With οἱ ποιηταί it is easy to supply ἐξ. ὑσιν from the ἐχειν of the leading clause; similar cases are very frequent in Greek.

7. διὰ τὸ κτέ.: here begins the explanation which the preceding clause demands. γὰρ might have been added, i.e. διὰ γὰρ τὸ . . . ἐξεργάζεσθαι, or, τὴν γὰρ τέχνην ἐξεργαζόμενος κτέ.

8. τάλλα τὰ μέγιστα: adjs. used subst. take the art. after δὲ ἅλλος quite as commonly as subs. do. τὰ μέγιστα refers to affairs of state and of the common weal, as in Rep. iv. 426 c, σοφὸς τὰ μέγιστα and Gorg. 484 c, γνώσει, ἣν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζων ἔλθης, ἐδόσας ἣδη φιλοσοφίαν, you shall know if once you proceed to affairs of larger concern and give up philosophy once for all. Cf. also Xen. An. ii. 6. 16, and in
10 τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν, ὡστε με ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτω ὁσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν (μήτε τι σοφὸς ἂν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν) μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἣ ἀμφότερα ἢ ἐκείνοι ἐχουσίν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοὶ ὁσπερ ἔχω

15 ἔχειν.

IX. Ἐκ ταυτῆς δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἴαι χαλεπῶταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὡστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέ-ναι, ὅνομα δὲ τούτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονταί γάρ

22 Menex. 234 a, ἐπὶ τὰ μείζων ἐπινοεῖ τρέπεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν ἡμῶν ἐπιχείρεις.

9. πλημμέλεια: see on ἐμμελέως, 20 e.

10. ὡστε με: not ὡστ' ἐμι, which would be too emphatic. It represents ἀνηργῶν ἐμαυτῶν without ἐγώ.

11. δεξιάμην ἂν: that is "if it were mine to choose." εἰ μοι γένουτο ἡ αἵρεσις is implied. Notice the idioms ὡσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν and ἢ εκείνοι ἐχουσίν ἔχειν. In both the order is just the reverse of the natural Eng. one. In Lat., the corresponding idioms follow the same order with the Greek.


IX. 1. δὴ: here used by way of closing and summing up the previous line of argument. On ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθη­ναίοι, see Introd. p. 49, n. 4.

23 2. οἴαι χαλεπῶταται: sc. εἰσὶ, explained by places where the same idiom is expanded, e.g. Xen. Mem. iv.

8. 11, ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ ἐθάνη [Σωκράτης] τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷον ἂν εἶναι θρόστος τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεύτατος.

4. ὅνομα δὲ τούτῳ λέγεσθαι: instead of ὅνομα δὲ τούτῳ ἐλεγόμην. Although δὲ co-ordinates the whole with πολλαὶ μὲν κτὲ. and the two form the leading clause, yet the inf. λέγεσθαι half incorporates these words with the ὡστε clause. This irregular const. is perfectly clear in a conversational style like that of Socrates. It has the effect of stating more distinctly the fact that this epithet σοφὸς, as applied to Socrates, is the capital instance of πολλαὶ διαβολαὶ and results from them.—σοφὸς: introduced to explain precisely what is meant by ὅνομα τούτῳ. The nom. σοφὸς leads back to the main statement πολλαὶ ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι, which, however, dwells in the speaker's mind as ἀπέχθημα. σοφὸς agrees acc. to rule with the nom. subj. of this ἀπέχθημα. G. 927; H. 940. If ἐμε, the acc. subj. of λέγεσθαι, had been expressed instead of understood, this nom. would not have been possible.—εἶναι: the inf. εἶναι is idiomatically used with pred. nouns or adjs. after ὁμοιάζειν, ὁμοιάζονται, and the like. Cf. Rep. iv. 428 e, ὁμοιάζονται τίνες εἶναι, are called by certain names. Prot. 311 e, σοφίστην ὁμοιάζοντι τίνι ἄνδρα εἶναι. Lach. 102 a, ὁ Ζάκρατες, τι λέγεις τούτῳ δ ἐν πάσιν
5 me ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν, ἀν 23 ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω· τὸ δὲ καὶ δυναίει, ὡς ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ο θέος σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τούτῳ λέγειν, ὥστιν ἁνθρωπόνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδένος· καὶ ἀρέστε τούτῳ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτην, προσκεφαλήθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὄνοματι ἐμὴ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐποίη ὅτι οὗτος ἦμων, ὡς ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὥστε δὲ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδένος ἀξίος ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' ὠν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ἰητῶν

Or. 16.52, rem difficilem, di immortales, atque omnium difficillimam, a thing which, heaven knows, is hard; or rather, hardness can no farther go.

9. τοῦτο λέγειν: sc. ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπόνη σοφία κτλ. The argument runs as follows: “People credit me with knowing all the things which I convict my neighbors of not knowing. The truth is far otherwise, for God alone has real knowledge. The meaning of his dark saying about my being the wisest of men is simply that ‘human wisdom is vanity.’ He does not mean that Socrates has any other than human wisdom. He only uses the name ‘Socrates’ because he needs a particular instance.” The double acc. with λέγειν closely resembles the idiom κακὰ λέγειν τινὰ. Cf. Crit. 48 a. See App.

10. ὅσπερ ἂν εἶ: in this compressed idiom ἂν alone represents a whole clause, which the context readily suggests. GMT. 483 f.; H. 905, 3. For a case where the ellipsis is a simpler one, cf. Xen. Cyr. i. 3. 2, ἥπατο τε αὐτὸν ὅσπερ ἂν (sc. ἀσπάζοντο) εἰ τις πάλαι συντεθραμμένοι καὶ πάλαι φιλῶν ἀσπάζοντο.

13. ταῦτ' ὠν: cf. Prot. 310 e, ἀλλ' ἂν αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἴκω παρὰ σέ, that's
APOLÒGIA ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ἔχων ἄν

15 τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ

βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφὸς. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης

τῆς ἀσχολίας ὀὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολή

γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου ὀὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία

εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἑπακολουθοῦντες οἵς

μάλιστα σχολή ἔστω, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι

23 just why I have come to you. G. 1060 f.;

H. 719 c. The object is omitted

as in Gorg. 503 d, ἐὰν ζητῆσας καλῶς,

eὐφημείς, if you search in the right way,

you shall find. Cf. εἰδίναυ below in d.

14. καὶ ἔχων: notice the not un­

usual grouping under one art. of two

words connected by καὶ.

15. τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν: cf. op |πέρ τοῦ

χρησμοῦ, 22 e.

18. ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ: cf. Legg. iii.

677 e, μυρίᾳ τινα φοβερὰν ἐρμήλαν; Rep.


Oecon. ii. 1–4, where Critobulus and

Socrates converse substantially as fol­

lows: "C. I have gained reasonable

self-control; therefore, Socrates, give

me any hints you can: tell me the best

way to manage my property. But

perhaps you think me already quite

rich enough. S. That is my own

case, not yours. I am sure that I am

a rich man, but I consider you pov­

erty-stricken, and sometimes I am

quite worried about you. C. I like

that, Socrates! For heaven's sake

do be good enough to tell me what

price you imagine that your property

would fetch, if sold, and what mine

would sell for. S. I am sure a fair

buyer would be glad of the chance of

getting my house and all my property

for five minas (about eighty-five

dollars). I am sure you are worth

more than a hundred times that sum. C.

How comes it then that you are

so rich and I so poor? S. My

income provides amply for all my

wants, but for your wants you need

three times as much as you have."

The possession of five minas must have

placed Socrates in the lowest of the

four classes established by Solon, that

of the ὁπτες. Originally this lowest

class had few political duties and

no political rights; later on, a law

proposed by Aristides gave them the

same rights as the others.

19. τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν: cf. c

Phaedr. 244 e, ἡ μανία ἐγγενεμένη καὶ

προφητεύσασα ὡς ἔδει, ἀπαλλαγὴν εὑρέ­

το, καταφένοισα πρὸς θεῶν εὐχὰς τε καὶ

λατρείας, madness intervened and by

prophesying to those who were in straits

found relief by recourse to prayer unto

the gods and the observance of their rites.

The dat. (less freq. the gen.) with ver­

bal nouns occurs chiefly after nouns

such as λατρεία and εὐχή, which ex­

press the abstract idea of the act
denoted by the verb; but Plato uses

both the gen. and dat. with ἐπηρέτης,

and the gen. with ἐπικουρος; while the
dat. with βοηθός is familiar in many

Greek authors. In the const. with

ἐπηρέτησα below, 30 a, the dat. τῶ θεῷ

takes the place of the gen. here.

X. 2. αὐτόματοι: of their own motion,
χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζόμενων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἰτ' ἐπιχειρουῦν ἄλλοις 5 ἐξετάζειν· καπείτα, οἷμαι, εὐρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὀλύγα ἢ ὀυδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὁργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὐ χαίροντες, καὶ λέγοντες ὡς Σωκράτης τὸς 10 ἐστὶ μιαρῶτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδὰν τὸν γονέων ἀμελεύοντα πάντες ἀτιμάσωσι, εἰτ' ἐν ἐρημίᾳ φίλων ἀναφαίνει.
3. χαίρουσιν κτέ.: Plato compares the disconcerting effect of Socrates's homely method with the charm exercised by the smooth discourse of men like Protagoras and Gorgias. Compare the ironical account of the persuasive charms of Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias in 19ε above, where especially the implication of ταῦτα παῦντας should be noticed. Cf. Prot. 317ε-319α, where Protagoras is represented as giving a very taking account of his own teaching for the benefit of young Hippocrates.
4. μιμοῦνται, εἰτ' ἐπιχειρουῦσιν κτέ.: they are for imitating me, and then they undertake, etc. No strict sequence in time is here marked by εἰτα, although their readiness to imitate must logically have preceded the acts in which their imitation consisted. For a most lively description of the early symptoms of such imitators, cf. Rep. vii. 539β. In other editt. μιμοῦνται is substituted for μιμοῦντα, needlessly, since this use of εἰτα, where κατὰ would seem more natural, is quite common. Cf. 31α, and also Xen. Mem. ii. 2, 14, τόσο ἀνθρώπος φυλάξῃ μη ἐν αἰσθάμενοι τῶν γονέων ἀμελεύοντα πάντες ἀτιμάσωσι, εἰτ' ἐν ἐρημίᾳ φίλων ἀναφαίνει.
6. ὀλύγα ἢ ὀυδέν: see on ητ' ἢ οὐδέν, 17β. and on ὀλύγα καὶ οὐδένως, 23α.
8. ἀλλ' οὐχ: instead of. Cf. Xen. An. ii. 1, 10, where καὶ οὐ is used with the same meaning. See App. — Σωκράτης τις: see on τὶς Σωκράτης, 18β.
11. ἀλλ' ἀγνοοοῦσιν: see App.
12. τὰ κατὰ πάντας κτέ.: ταῦτα means the familiar well-worn commonplaces. These may be found in the Clouds of Aristophanes. Xenophon, referring specifically to the λόγων τέχνης, which is not lost sight of here, uses almost the words of our text in Mem. i. 2. 31, τὸ κοινὴ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον ἐπιφέρον αὐτῷ, (Critias) making against him the charge made by the many against philosophers in general. Cf. 19β, and see on εἰ γὰρ ἄφελν, Crit. 44α.
13. ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα κτέ.: the sense requires that from line 10 διδάσκων should be understood, or rather διδάσκων διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. On this implied διδάσκων depend (1) the two accs. τὰ μετέωρα, τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, and (2) the two infs. νομίζειν and ποιεῖν. Cf. 19β and 26β.
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SOΚPATΟΥS.

15 οὖμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίγνονται προσσημένοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ὥστε ὁμαι, ἀν δύναι, ἐν εἰσόδεοις καὶ σφοδροῖς καὶ πολλοῖς καὶ ξυντε- 

tαγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὅτα καὶ πᾶλαι καὶ νῦν σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ 

20 τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Λυντός καὶ Λύκων, 2 a. Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Λυντός δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ 24 

tῶν ἤρτορών· ὥστε, ὅπερ ἄρχομενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμά-

14. τὰ ἀληθῆ: the truth, namely ὅτι κατάδηλοι κτέ. Eng. idiom requires a 
sing, or an abstract noun more fre-

quently than the Greek, e.g. ταύτα 
often means this. H. 635. Cf. Thaet., 
62 d, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωποι μὲν ἀνθρώποι τάχ' 
ἀν οὐδεὶς ταύτα, φευκτὲοι εἶναι ἀπὸ 
τοῦ δεσπότου, but a fool might perhaps 
think this, that he ought to run away 
from his master.

16. εἰδέναι: one man claims knowl-
dge of this, and another, knowledge 
of that; the absurdity is in all cases 
the same, i.e. their claiming knowl-
dge at all.

17. ἐνυπεταγμένως: either (1) in 
phrases well combined, or (2) with their 
forces drawn up, or (3) = κατὰ τὰ ἐνυπε-
tαγμένων, i.e. according to a concerted 
plan. (2) and (3) make it refer to 
the united efforts of those represented 
by the three accusers. ἐνυπεταγμένως, 
the reading adopted by Schanz, means 
about the same as σφοδρῶς below, i.e. 
contente, with might and main. This 
would really amount to the same as 
(2), and suits the context far better 
than (1) or (3).

19. ἐκ τούτων: "it is upon this foot-
ing,—namely that of an old general 
prejudice, aggravated by supervening 

personal animosity,—that I am now 
attacked by, etc." R. In spite of 
19 a, ἐδὲ καὶ πιστεῶν Μέλητος, which 
states the fact here alluded to, “in 
consequence of” would here be an 
inappropriate translation for ἐκ. On 
the accusers, see Introd. 30.

21. ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν, δημιουργῶν, 
πολιτικῶν, ἤρτορῶν: we must not press 
the word ὑπέρ. The accusers merely 
represented the feelings of their respec-
tive classes. The ἤρτοραι have not been 
explicitly mentioned before. For the 
pοιηταλ, cf. 22 a; for the πολιτικᾶ, cf. 
21 e; for the δημιουργῶν, cf. 22 d. 
Prob. the ἤρτοραι were thought of 
under the general designation of πολι-
tικὰ. This is the more likely because 
the line between men who habitually 
spoke on public questions, and what 
we may call professional speakers, 
was not yet clearly drawn at Athens. 
All this lends weight to the sugges-
tion that the words καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν 
are a later addition, for which Plato 
is not responsible. See App. In 
favor of keeping the words, however, 
is the fact that Anytus, who, like 
Cleon, was a βουρσοδέης, tanner, came 
into collision with the views of Socra-
tes rather as a πολιτικὸς than as a
It may be that Socrates had aristocratic views about the de­
basimg effect of manual labor similar to those of Plato and Aristotle. Cf.
Xen. Oecon. iv. 2 and 3, where Socrates is represented as saying that the
mechanical arts enervate men’s bodies and womanize their souls. Also (ibid.
vi. 7) where Socrates again is made to say that in case of an invasion the
\[\text{τεχνώτατα} \] will prove cowards.

28. τοῖς αὐτοῖς: sc. by just such undisguised and unmitigated statements.

29. αὐτή, ταύτα: both pred.

31. \[\text{oὐτὼς εὐφράστη}: \text{supply ἔχωντα.} \] The finite verb is also left out in such cases, cf. Rep. ii. 360 \(\delta\), ταύτα \(μὲν \) \(οὖν \) \(δὴ \) \(οὕτως\), sc. \(ἔχει\).

XI. \(\text{Περὶ \ μὲν \ οὖν \ δὲν \ οἱ \ πρῶτοι \ μον \ κατηγόρου κατηγό}
ρουν αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἱκανή ἀπολογία πρὸς \(\upsilon \) \(μᾶς\) \(πρὸς \) \(δὲ \) \(Μελητον \) \(τὸν \) ἀγαθὸν \(τὸ \) \(καὶ \) \(φιλόπολιν\), \(ὡς \) \(φησι, \) \(καὶ \) \(τοὺς \) \(ὑστέρους \) \(μετὰ \) \(ταύτα \) \(πειράσομαι \) \(ἀπολογεύοντι\). \(αὐθίς\) \(γὰρ \) \(δὴ\), \(ὡσπερ \) \(ἐτέρων \) \(τούτων \) \(ὀντων \) \(κατηγόρων, \) \(λάβωμεν\)

32. \(\text{δημιουργός.} \) It may be that Socrates had aristocratic views about the de­
basimg effect of manual labor similar to those of Plato and Aristotle. Cf.
Xen. Oecon. iv. 2 and 3, where Socrates is represented as saying that the
mechanical arts enervate men’s bodies and womanize their souls. Also (ibid.
vi. 7) where Socrates again is made to say that in case of an invasion the
\[\text{τεχνώτατα} \] will prove cowards.

26. \(\text{ταύτῃ \ ἐστὶν \ ύμῖν:} \) \text{there you have, etc., “just what I promised to tell you at the beginning of my speech.”}

27. \(\text{ὡποστελάμενος:} \) the meaning here is illustrated by many places in Dem., e.g., xxxvii. 48, \(καὶ \) \(τῷ \) \(μηδὲν \) \(ὡποστελάμενον \) \(μηδὲ \) \(ὡποστελάμενον \) \(κλα-
μεν \) \(καὶ \) \(ὁπρεῖσθαι, \) \(by \) \(his \) \(readiness \) \(to \) \(resort \) \(to \) \(absolutely \) undisguised and shameless weeping and lamentation. See
also xix. 237, \(ἀνάγκη \) \(δὲ, \) \(ἵνα \) \(ἄθι-
ναίοι, \) \(μετὰ \) \(παρηγομένης \) \(διαλεχθῆναι \) \(μηδὲν \) \(ὡποστελάμενον. \)

28. \(\text{τοῖς αὐτοῖς:} \) sc. by just such undisguised and unmitigated statements.

30. \(\text{ἡ \ διαβολὴ \ ἡ \ ἔμη \ καὶ \ τὰ \ αἰτία \ ταύτα \ ἐστὶ.} \) \(καὶ \) \(ἐὰν \) \(τε \) \( νῦν \) \(ἐὰν \) \(τε \) \( αὐθίς \) \(ζητήσητε \) \(ταύτα, \) \(οὕτως \) \(εὐφράστητε. \)
Socrates distinguishes between two sets of accusers, but maintains that the charges preferred by his actual accusers (Anytus, Meletus, and Lycon) are based upon those of his real accusers (public prejudice and misrepresentation).

6. ἔχει δὲ πως ἰδεῖ: πῶς, substantially, implies that the quotation is not literal. See Introd. 31 and 56. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 21, Πρόδικος . . . περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνεται ἵδε πῶς λέγων.

7. φησίν: Meletus, already named as the chief accuser.

9. τὸ ἐγκλήμα: see Introd. 68.

11. ἐγώ δὲ γε: see on 22 d.

12. σπουδὴ χαριντϊζεται: this is an ἔχομαι; for χαριντϊζεθαί is akin to παίζειν, the subst. to which, παιδία, is the contradictory of σπουδή. “Meletus treats a serious business (an accusation involving life and death) as playfully as though the whole matter were a joke.” Cf. 27 a.

13. εἰς ἀγώνα καθιστάς: ἀγών is the usual word for a suit at law; hence the phrase ἀγωνίζεσθαι δίκαιον, contend in a law-suit. The sing. is used distributively, involving men in a law-suit. Cf. Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 4, ἐφοροὶ . . . κύριοι ἀρχοντα . . . καταπαύσαι καὶ εἰρήξαι τε καὶ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς ἀγώνα καταστήσαι, the ephors had power both to supersede and to imprison the magistrates and to bring them to trial for their lives.

14. δὲν: not dependent upon οὐδέν which is an adv. acc. See on τοῦτων, 26 b.

15. τοῦτο: gives greater vividness than ἀντὶ would give.

16. καὶ ὃμι: “so that you can see it as plainly as I can.”

17. τῇ ὑπερτεροίς: see below, τῷ δὴ νῦν εἰπέ. δεῖρο is freq. found instead of ἔρχον, ἔλθε. Cf. Theaet. 144 d, Θεατήτη, δεῖρο παρῇ Σωκράτη, come here, Theaetetus, and sit by Socrates. Homer has a similar idiom. Cf. Od. xvii. 529, ἔρχεο, δεῖρο καλέσοιν ἵν' ἄντον αὑτός ἐνίσχyp, come, summon him hither, that face to face he may tell me himself. On the cross-examination, see Introd. 71. — ἀλλο τι ἢ:
‘Εγώγε. Ἡθι δή νῦν εἶπὲ τούτοις τίς αὐτοῦς βελτίων ποιεῖ; δήλον γὰρ ὧτι οἴσθα, μελῶν γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρῶν, ὡς φής, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τούτωσι καὶ κατηγορεῖς. τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίων ποιοῦντα ἢθι εἰπὲ καὶ μὴν ὡς αὐτοῦς τίς ἐστιν. ὀρᾶς, ὡ Μέλητε, ὧτι συγῆς καὶ ὡς ἔχεις εἰπὲιν; καίτοι ὁν εἰςγρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἰκανῶν τε-κμήριον οὐ δὴ ἔγω λέγω, ὧτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλὰ εἰπὲ, ὡγαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἁμείνους ποιεῖ; ὡ νόμοι. Ἀλλ’ οὐ τούτο ἐρωτῶ, ὡ βελτίωτε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος, ὡτίς εἰς πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τούτο οἴδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὕτω, ὡ Σώ-κρατες, ὡ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὡ Μέλητε; οἴδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἴοι τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίων ποιοῦσι; Μά-λιστα. Πότερον ἀπαντῆτε, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, ὡ δ’ οὐ; Ἀπαν-τες. Ἐδ γε νὴ τῆ Ἡραν λέγεις καὶ πολλῆν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ἀφελοῦντων. τί δὲ δή; οἴδε οἱ ἀκροαταί βελτίων ποιοῦν-σιν ἢ οὐ; Καὶ οὕτω. Τί δὲ οἱ Βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ Βου-
λευταί. 'Αλλ' ἀρα, ὁ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἡ κάκεινοι βελτίων ποιοῦσιν ἀπαντεῖς; Κάκεινοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὃς ἔσκευ, Ἀθηναίοι καλοὺς κάγαθος ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. ὦτω λέγεις; Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ' ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι 25 ἀπόκρωναι. ἦ καὶ περὶ ἅπαντος οὔτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν· οἱ μὲν βελτίως ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἀνθρωποὶ εἶναι, εἰς δὲ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἦ τοῦναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἰς μὲν τις ὁ βελτίως οἶς τε ὡν ποιεῖν ἡ πάνυ διλόγου, οἱ ἱππικοὶ· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ, έάνπερ ξυνώσοι καὶ χρώνται ἱπποὺς, διαφθείρουσι: 30 οὖν· οὐχ ὦτος ἔχει, ὁ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἅπαντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων �监察ν; πάντως δήποτε, ἐάν τε σοῦ καὶ Ἀνυτος οὐ φήτε ἐάν τε φήτε; πολλῇ γὰρ ἀν τις εἰδαμωνία εὖ

19. ἀλλ' ἀρα κτέ.: cf. Euthyd. 290 e, ἔρει. ἀλλ' ἀρα, ὁ πρὸς Διός, μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἵν ὁ παῦρ εἰπὼν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι; KP. κτσίς διάτυτρησις; S. Why then, good gracious! have I forgotten, and was it Ctesippus who said it? C. Ctesippus? rubbish! Questions with μὴ take a negative answer for granted. The use of ἀρα here marks the last stage in Socrates's exhaustive enumeration. Only the ἐκκλησιασταί are left. "Somebody in Athens is corrupting the youth. We have seen that it is nobody else, hence possibly it is these gentlemen."

But this is absurd, hence πάντες ἄρα 'Ἀθηναίοι κτε.—οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί: this has probably crept into the text, and was originally a marginal note, put in by way of giving a word parallel to ἀκροαταί and βουλευταί. There was good reason for varying the sameness of discourse by saying οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ. There seems less reason for putting this last idea in two ways. All Athenians twenty years of age in full standing (ἐπίτυμοι) were members of the public assembly (ἐκκλησία) at Athens.

20. τοῦναντίον πᾶν: quite the reverse, an adv. acc. perhaps of measure or content. Cf. Gorg. 516 e, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔσκευ μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ τοῦτο, εἴ ἔλεγονται οἱ Ἀθηναίοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίων γεγονέναι, ἡ πᾶν τοῦναντίον διαφθείρων ὁν' ἐκείνον. In Crit. 47 b c d, Socrates appeals from the many and ignorant to the few, or to the one who has special knowledge.

21. ἐκκλησιασταί: by its emancipation from the government of δοκεῖ this statement is made especially vigorous. The transition has already been half made by εἰς μὲν τις, where instinctively we supply ἦστι in spite of δοκεῖ.

22. πάντως δήποτε: before this Socrates waits a moment, to give Meletus opportunity to answer.

23. οὐ φήτε: the answer no is made prominent by the order of clauses. ἐάν οὐ φήτε, if you say no, ἐάν μὴ φήτε,
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perί τοις νέοις, εί είς μὲν μόνος αυτούς διαφθέρει, οἱ δ' ἀλλοι ὦφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, οἱ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπίδεικνυσιν κνυσι τινὶ οὐδεπόστε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἁμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι μεμέληκε περί ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

XIII. Ἐτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὁ πρὸς Δίως Μέλητε, πότερον ἔστων οἰκεῖων ἁμένων ἐν πολίταις χρηστῶς ἢ πονηρῶς; ὃ τάν, ἀπόκριμα: οὐδὲν γάρ τῷ χαλεπῶν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακοῖς τῷ ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτως εαυτῶν.

if you do not say yes. οὐ φήμε must be taken closely together as equiv. to a verb of denying. See GMT. 384. Cf. Lys. xiii. 76, ἐὰν μὲν φάσκῃ φωνικώς ἀποκτείνα, τούτων μέμνησθε ... ἐὰν δ' οὐ φάσκῃ, ἔρειθε κτεί. For the use of μή, cf. Dem. xxi. 205, ἐὰν τ' ἐγὼ φῶ, ἐὰν τε μὴ φῶ. — πολλὴ ... εὐδαιμονία: here τις applied to an abstraction particularizes it. Thus the εὐδαιμονία is represented as of some sort; this makes the form of statement more specific though still vague.

33. εἰ διαφθέρει, ὦφελοῦσιν: the pres. indic. here is not used in the prot. that immediately belongs to the apod. πολλή ... ἐὰν εἴη. See GMT. 503. The connexion of thought requires an intervening prot., or some qualifying adv. like εἰκότως. This implied prot., with its apod., goes with εἰ διαφθέρει, ὦφελοῦσιν. Cf. 30 b and, for a case where δικαίως represents the prot. required by the sense, Xen. An. vii. 6. 15, εἰ δὲ πρόσθεν αὐτῷ πάντων μᾶλλον φίλος ἢν, νῦν πάντων διαφοράτιάς (most at variance) εἰμι, πῶς δὲν ἐν εἰκότως ... ὃ φ' ἡμῶν αἰτιὰν ἔχωμι;

34. ἐπιδείκνυσι: the mid. perhaps implies criticism of Meletus's bearing, since ἐπιδείκνυσθαι and ἐπιδείξεις are used of pretentious performances. Here, however, ἐπιδείκνυσι means primarily ἐπιδείκνυσι σαυτῶν. G. 1242; c H. 812. For the added ὅτι clause, see the next note, and on τις ἐστιν, 24 d.

36. ὅτι οὐδέν σοι κτε.: appended to explain τὴν σαυτοῦ ἁμέλειαν. Here at last is the pun upon Meletus's name (cf. also 26 b), for which the constant recurrence of the idea of ἁμέλεια (variously expressed, ἁμέλεσιν and περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ in 24 c, μέλον γέ σοι and μεμέλεσθην in 24 d) has already paved the way. For similar plays upon words, cf. Soph. Ο. Τ. 395, ὅ μηδὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους, Σύμπ. 186 c, Παισιῶν δὲ πανασέμων, and the obvious play upon Agathon's name, ib. 174 b; Rich. Π. ii. 1,

Old Gaunt indeed, and gaunt in being old,... Within me grief hath kept a tedious fast; Gaunt am I for the grave; gaunt as a grave.

XIII. 1. ὁ πρὸς Δίως Μέλητε: for the same order, cf. Men. 71 d, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς, ὁ πρὸς θ' ἐν Ἔνων κτε. For a different order, see 26 b, Crit. 46 a. In 26 c the voc. is not expressed.

3. τὰν: my friend, or my good friend. Cf. Dem. i. 26, ἀλλ' ὃ τάν, οὐχὶ βούλησαι. The orthography is much disputed, and we find ὃ τάν, ὃ τάν, and ὃ τάν.

4. τοὺς ἐγγυτάτως εαυτῶν ὄντας: i.e. those who were most unavoidably influenced by them.
5 ὅντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν τί; Πάνω γε. Ἑστὶν οὐν ὡς ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξισότων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ὄψεις αὐτῶν; ἀποκρίνω, ὡς ἀγαθῇ· καὶ γὰρ οὐνόμας κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐσθ' ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὔ δὴν. Φέρε δὴ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθειρόντα τοὺς νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἀκόντα; Ἐκόντα ἔγωγε. Τί δή, ὡς Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφότερος εἰ τηλικοῦτον ὄντος τηλικός· ὅταν, ὡστε σὺ μὲν ἐγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τὶ ἐργάζονται αἰεὶ τοὺς μᾶλιστα πλησίον ἐστῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν· ἔγω δὲ δὴ εἰς ὑμᾶς μοχθηρὸν ποιῶν τῶν ἐξισότων, κυνδυνεύωσι κακὸν τί λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὡστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φήσε καὶ ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι ὡς πείθομαι, ὥς Μέλητε, οἴμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ οὐ.

15 τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἢκω, ὡστε καὶ τοῦτο ἄγνου, ὅτι, ἐὰν τινα μοχθηρόν ποιῶν τῶν ἐξισότων, κυνδυνεύωσι κακὸν τί λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὡστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φήσε καὶ ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι ὡς πείθομαι, ὥς Μέλητε, οἴμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ οὐ.

7. ἀποκρίνου: after a pause. — ὁ νόμος κτέ.: see Introd. 71 with note 2.

11. τοσοῦτον σὺ κτέ.: τηλικοῦτος and τηλικός· acc. to the context, mean indifferently so young or so old. See Introd. 30. Notice the chiastic order: — σὺ ἐμοῦ τηλικοῦτος τηλικός·

Cf. below, 26 ἐν. See Euthyrh. 26, 27. See GMT. 582; H. 392. 25 ὁ ἄγνοο: for the indic. with ὠς τε, see GMT. 582; H. 392.

16. κακὸν τί λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ: in the case supposed the κακὸν is the natural result. It is stated, however (cf. the equiv. idiom ἀγαθῶν τί λαβεῖν παρά τινος), as something which the victim goes out of his way to obtain.


19. ἢ ἄκων: the verb is supplied from its subordinate clause, ἢ διαφθείρω. More usually the verb of the subord. clause is implied and that of the leading clause expressed. Socrates believed that all sin was involuntary, οὐδέλες ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει. See Introd. 17.

21. καὶ ἀκοῦσιον: strictly speaking this is superfluous, since τοιοῦτον takes...
the necessary meaning from its relation to ἄκως. Here is another case of Socrates's homely fashion of repeating himself. See Introd. 55.—For the gen. of the charge after εἰσάγεων, see on εἰσάγειν, 24 d.

23. παύσομαι κτέ.: from παύω we must supply παύον with παύσομαι. Such an ellipsis as this is obvious, and therefore not uncommon. See App. 25. ἐφυγες κτέ.: you declined. Socrates offered Meletus every opportunity for such an effort. See Introd. 25. The compound διαφεύγειν in this sense is more common, but cf. Eur. Her. 505 f., αὐτὸ δὲ προστιθέντες (imposing) ἄλλους πάσον, παρὼν σεσώθαι (when they might be wholly spared), φευξόμεσθα μὴ θανεῖν. From this quotation it appears that μὴ might have been used before εὑρείησαι and διδάξαι. See Arnold's edit. of Madvig's Syntax, 156, Rem. 3. For cases of ἐκφεύγειν qualified by a neg. and followed by τὸ μὴ οὐ and μὴ οὐ, cf. Soph. 225 b, οὐκὲτε ἐκφεύξεσθαι (sc. ὀ σοφιστής) . . . τὸ μὴ οὐ τοῦ γένους (kind) εἶναι τοῦ τῶν βασιλευ-

μάτων οὐ δεύρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἰδία λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐάν μάθω παύσομαι ἡ γε ἄκως ποιῶ. οὐ δὲ ἐξυγγενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ δι- δάξαι ἐφυγεῖ καὶ οὐκ ἡθέλησας, δεύρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμοις ἐστίν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ' οὐ μαθῆσες.

XIV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὁ ἀνδρές Ὄθηναιοι, τούτῳ μὲν δῆλον ὃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τούτῳ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν τὸ πόστε ἐμέλησεν. ὁμοίος δὲ δὴ λέγει ἡμῖν, πῶς μὲ φής δια-

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οτι διδασκων διαφθείρω; Πάνυ μεν ουν σφόδρα ταύτα 26 λέγω. Πρός αυτών τοινυν, ά Μέλητε, τούτων τών θεών διν νυν ο λόγος έστίν, ειτε έτι σαφέστερον και έμοι και τούς ἀνδράσι τουτοισί. έγω γάρ ου δύναμαι μαθεῖν πότερον ο λέγεις διδάσκεις με νομίζεις είναι τινας θεούς, καί αυτός άρα νομίζω είναι θεός, καί ουκ είμι το παράπαν άθεος ουδε ταύτη ἁδικῶ, ού μέντοι οὔσπερ γε η πόλις, ἄλλ' έτέρους, καί τούτ' έστιν ο μοι έγκαλεῖς, οτί έτέρους· η παντά-πασί με φης ούτε αυτῶν νομίζεις θεούς τούς τε ἄλλους ταύτα διδάσκειν. Ταύτα λέγω, άς το παράπαν ου νομί-ζεις θεούς. Ω θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ίνα τί ταύτα λέγεις;

7. πάνυ μεν οὖν κτέ.: Meletus agrees and asserts with all his might and main, I assure you exactly that is what I do mean. πάνυ and σφόδρα give strength to the assertion ταύτα λέγω (cf. 25 a), οὖν signifies agreement with Socrates, and μεν (a weakened μην) gives him the assurance of it.

8. άν ο λόγος: that is, ους λέγομεν. A prep. is more usual, but compare Thuc. i. 140. 3, τό Μεγαρέων ψφίσμα, with id. 139. 1, τό περι Μεγαρέων ψφίσμα. There are many cases where the gen. is used without a prep. (esp. where περι would seem appropriate). Kr. Ἑρ. 47, 7, 6. Stallbaum, however, insists that περι is not implied here, and distinguishes between περι άν ο λόγος and άν ο λόγος, just as between λέγειν (have in mind) τινα and λέ-γειν περι τινα. That such a distinction sometimes holds good is plain from other passages in Plato. Cf. Stallb. in loc. and Soph. 260 a, οὖν ἢργον δη φράζειν περι ού τ' ἐστι καί άτον (sc. ά δ λόγος).

10 ff. πότερον λέγεις κτέ.: the two horns of this dilemma are, I. πότερον ... άτι έτέρους, and II. ή ... διδάσκειν. In I. there are two subdivisions: (a) διδάσκειν ... τινας θεούς and (b) καί αυτός άρα ... άτι έτέρους, — which is described as the inevitable result of (a). In II. there are two subdivisions: (c) ουτε ... θεούς, — which contradicts (b), — and (d) τούτοι ζε ... διδάσκειν, — which contradicts (a), but is not stated as the result of (c). After making his first point (a), Socrates, carried away by the minute zeal of explanation, states (b) independently of λέγεις. Therefore it would be clearer to print καί αυτός άρα ... άτι έτέρους in a parenthesis if it were not for έγκαλεῖς, which in sense reënforces λέγεις. καί αυτός άρα, being strongly affirmative, is followed by καί ουκ (rather than ονθε) ελιμ. This, in turn, being strongly neg., is followed by ουδε (rather than ονθε) ἁδικω. Although the sense connects ου μέντοι ... έτέρους with νο-μίζειν ... θεούς preceding, the syntax connects it with νομίζω ειναι θεούς. From this we supply the ellipsis with ητι έτέρους, sc. νομίζω θεούς.

14. τούτ' έστιν: τούτο and ά μοι έγκαλεῖς are not corrol. See on τούτ άν ειη, 27 d.

17. ίνα τι, κτέ.: sc. γένηται, what makes you talk like that? See on ίνα μοι καλ, 22 a.
ousז ἡλιον ousζ σελήνην ἅρα νομίζω θεούς εἰναι, ὡσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωποί; Μᾶ Δή, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν 20 ἡλιον λίθον φησίν εἰναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἄναξαγόρου οἱ κατηγορεῖν, δόλιε Μέλητε, καὶ οὔτω καταφρονεῖς τώνδε καὶ οἰεὶ αὐτοῦς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἰναι, ὡστε οὐκ

18. οὔδε ... οὔδε: not even ... nor yet.—ἄρα: the insinuation of Meletus was both startling and unwelcome to Socrates, who nevertheless meets it in a tone of playful irony. Every religious-minded Greek reverenced the sun. No appeal was more solemn and sincere than that to ἡλιον πανόπτης. Accordingly this appeal is constantly met with in the most moving situations created by tragedy. Ajax, when in despair he falls upon his sword, and outraged Prometheus from his rock, both cry out to the sun. Ion, before entering upon his peaceful duties in the temple, looks first with gladness toward the sun. Both Heracles and Agave are saved from madness when they once more can clearly recognize the sun. That Socrates habitually paid reverence with exemplary punctiliousness to this divinity not made by human hands is here suggested and is still more plainly shown in Symp. 220 d, where, after some account of a brown study into which Socrates had fallen, we read: ὃ δὲ [Σωκράτης] εἰστήκει μέχρι ἔως ἐγένετο καὶ ἡλιος ἀνέσχεν· ἑπείτα φέρετ ἀπὸ προσευξάμενος τῷ ἡλιῳ, ἀνὴρ ὁ ἄρα, τῆς προσευξίας τοῦ ἡλιον ἔλεγεν. The argument here is: "apparently you take me for Anaxagoras, and forget that it is Socrates whom you are prosecuting." Diogenes Laertius, ii. 3. 5, gives a startling story about Anaxagoras: ὁ σοφὸς δ' αὐτὸν προσετούν (προφητεύειν) τὴν πετραίαν τοῦ ἁλαθίας την ἐλεύθερον Κυκλάδων (Ἀργοστοπατινί) τοῦ λίθον πτωσίν (the fall of the stone), δν εἴπερ ἢ τοῦ ἡλιον πεθεῖσθαι. 21. οὔτω: qualifying ἀπείρουs below as well as καταφρονεῖς.

22. γραμμάτων: in literature. γράμματα stand in the same relation to μαθήματα as litterae to disciplinae. Plato meant to be outspoken in dealing with the stupidity which led the court to pronounce Socrates guilty.
—οὐκ εἰδέναι: οὐ because Socrates wishes to suggest the most positive form of statement: οὕτως ἀπειρο ἑραμμένον εἰς τύπον οὐκ ἵσασιν ὅτι κτέ. This vivid use of οὐ for μὴ in inf. clauses after ὅτε is not uncommon where it is indifferent whether the indic. or infin. is used; thus here ὅτε οὐκ ἴσασιν οὐκ μὴ εἰδέναι would be equally regular and διότι οὐκ εἰδέναι is a mixture of the two. See GMT. 594; H. 1023 b.

23. βιβλία: cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 3. 8, πρῶτος (sc. of the philosophers) δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ βιβλίον ἡξίδωκε (published) συγγραφῆς.

24. καὶ δὴ καὶ: and now you expect people to believe that it is from me, etc.

25. ἕκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πραιμένου: sc. the doctrines, not the books.

—ἔνοτε: that is when, as they often might, they chanced to see a play in which these doctrines were promulgated, as in Eur. Orest. 982,

Where hangs a centre-stone of heaven and earth
With linked chains of gold aloft suspended,
Where whirls the clod erst from Olympus flung,
There I would go.

It is said that, in the lost play of Phaethon, Euripides called the sun χρυσάεν βάλον, a clod of gold. Such utterances could be heard by any who paid the price of admission and listened to this poet’s choral odes, which were sung ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας. The price of admission to the theatre of Dionysus thus appears to have been at most (εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ) one drachma. Ordinary spectators paid two obols, one-third of a drachma, or about six cents. Pericles passed a law providing that Athenians who asked for it should receive two obols for this purpose from the public treasury. The mention here of a maximum admission price of one drachma suggests that the better places may have been reserved by the manager (called θεσπρώνης or θεσπρωξόλης, sometimes even ἀρχιτέκτων) for those who could pay more than six cents. In the account rendered (see Rangabe, Antiquités Helléniques, the inscription numbered 57, lines 30–33, also C. I. A. 324, pp. 171, 175) for building the Erechtheum (407 n.c.) is found the following item: ἀναλώματα· ἀνθήματα· χάρας ἐνθησεν δόξο ἐς καὶ τὰ ἀντιγραφα ἐνεργάζω ποιοὺς ἐξ ἐκποιήσεως: purchases: [item] bought two sheets of paper upon which we wrote our accounts, 2 drachmas and 4 obols. It is accordingly absurd to suggest that a volume of Anaxagoras at this time could have cost as little as one drachma, even if it could be proved that books were sold in the orchestra of the theatre of Dionysus; or if, that failing, we were content with the notion of a book-market close to the Agora. The part of the ἀγορά where the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton stood bore the name ὀρχήστρα, but nothing goes to show that books were sold there.

27. ἄλλως τε καὶ... ἀτοπα: the more so because of their singularity. "With-
out taking even that into account, the youths must know well enough that these are not my doctrines.” Etymologically ἐκωστα suggests not absurd, but uncommon, eccentric. See the preceding note.

28. ἀλλ' ὁ πρὸς Δίος; see on ὁ πρὸς κτλ., 26 e, and cf. Dem. ix. 15, ἀλλ' ἔστιν, ὁ πρὸς τοῦ Δίος, ὡστις ἐὰν φρονών . . . σκέφασθ' ἂν; This marks the transition to a second argument against the charge of atheism, and hence Meletus repeats the charge. Socrates has already shown the absurdity of the charge viewed as a statement of fact. Now he considers it as a statement of opinion (οὕτως σοι δοκῶ;) and urges that Meletus is not entitled to hold such an opinion because it conflicts with another of Meletus’s own views. See App.

29. ἀπιστος εἰ . . . σαντιγ: you are discrediting . . . your own (proper) self. Cf. the use of πιθανός in the contrary sense, e.g. Phaed. 67 e, εἰ τι οὖν δὴν πιθανότερος εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις δικασταίς, ἐὰν ἔχωι.

33. ὑβρεί τυλι καὶ ἀκολαστῇ καὶ νεότητι: in a spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado. — ἐοικε ἐννιτθέντι: there are three possible conseqts. with ἐοικέων: (1) it may be followed by the dat. part. as here, (2) it may take the nom. part., (3) it may take

34. διαπεφωμένος: “one participial clause (ὡσπερ ἐννιτθέντι) within another (διαπεφωμένος); as Rep. viii. 555 e, τόν ἅδε ὑπελκοῦντα ἐνεῖντες ἄργον τιτρώσκοντες, they (the business men) inserting their sting, that is, their money, into any who yields them opportunity, keep inflicting wounds. Notice that it is ὡσπερ αἰνιγμα, a ‘mock-riddle,’ one which has no answer.” R. Cf. for the use of the pres. partic. Phaed. 116 e d, οἶδα γὰρ ἡ ἁλῶν ἄγγέλλων. Xen. Hell. ii. 4. 37, ἦκεμπον . . . λέγοντας δι' κτέ. An. ii. 4. 24, ὁ Γλοῦσ αὐτοῖς ἐπιφάνη . . . σκοπῶν ἐν διαβάλοντες τῶν ποταμῶν. Id. iv. 5. 8, βρωτῶν (eatables) διειδόου καὶ διήπτεται διἀντας κτέ. See on σκοποῦντι, 21 e. Usually διαπεφωμάθαι takes the gen., but here the question which follows explains the nature of the διάπεραι.

35. ὁ σοφὸς δή: that enlightened man, spoken with irony. — ἐμοῦ χαρι-
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

5 τι ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἡ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους 27 τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέ-
γειν αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἰποὶ. ἀδικεῖ
Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καίτοι
40 τούτῳ ἔστι παίζοντος.

XV. Ἐπωπυσκέψασθε δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἢ μοι φαίνεται
taῦτα λέγειν· σοὶ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὁ Μέλητε· ὑμεῖς δὲ,
ὄπερ καὶ ἄρχας ὑμᾶς παρηγορήσαμεν, μέμησθε μοι μὴ ἡ
θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰσθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι.
5 ἔστων ὅστις ἄνθρώπων, ὁ Μέλητε, ἄνθρωπεία μὲν νομίζει
πράγματ' εἶναι, ἄνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινόμεθα,
ὃ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτο· ἔσθ' ὅστις—
ἰππούς μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππικά δὲ πράγματα; ἡ αὐλητάς
μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικά δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστων, ὃ
10 ἀριστε ἄνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βουλεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγώ σοι

27 εντικομένου: for the gen. of noun
and partic. with γράψεται, see exam-
ples cited in note on ἱσόθυμην, 22 c.
36. τοὺς ἄλλους: see on τοὺς ἄλλους,
b below.
37. τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ
κτῆ.: to contradict himself in so many
words. A more positive phrase than
ἐναντία ἐμαυτῷ λέγειν above.
XV. 2. ταῦτα λέγειν: sc. ἀδικεῖ
Σωκράτης . . . θεοὺς νομίζων κτῆ.

b 4. τοὺς λόγους: the art. has nearly
the force of a poss. here. See G.
949; H. 658. In many such cases as
here the art., strictly speaking, points
out something which the context has
already suggested. To all such sug-
gestions a Greek audience was very
sensitive. Hence the freq. and deli-
cate use of the dem. art. in Greek.
G. 981 f.; H. 654. On the method of
Socrates, see Introd. 18, 21, 25, 26.
7. ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτο: be al-
y ways trying to get up a disturbance;
more lit., disturbing in one way and
another. Cf. Xen. An. i. 5. 12, καὶ οὗτος
μὲν (Menon's soldier) αὐτὸν ἡμαρτε
迢 άλλος δὲ ἀλφ (sc. ἦν τοῦ
Κλεάρχου) καὶ ἄλλος, είτα πολλὸν
κραυγής γενομένης. Ibid. vii. 6. 10, μετὰ
τοῦτον ἄλλος ἀνέστη ὁμιώος καὶ ἄλλος.
See also Euthyd. 273 b, ὅτε Διονυσό-
δώρος καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρῶτον μὲν ἐπι-
στάτες (stopped) διελεγότων ἄλληλοι,
ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντες εἰς
ὑμᾶς (now and then glancing at us).
The acc. is after the analogy of ὅθρυ-
βων θορυβεῖν, i.e. a cognate acc. G.
1051; H. 715. Here Meletus (cf. 25 d)
gives no answer apart from such
demonstrations of disgust as Socra-
tes complains of. The words in c
below, ὅταν τοιαύτα ἀναγκαζόμενοι sug-
gest that the court was finally forced
to interpose. Of course many "waits"
of one kind or another may have oc-
λέγω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι· ἔσθ' ὅστις δαμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστων. Ἡς ὁνήσας ὅτι μόνις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαμόνια μὲν φής με καὶ νομίζει καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν καὶ νῶν εἶτε παλαία· ἀλλ' οὖν δαμόνια γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω πρὸ τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαμόνια νομίζω καὶ δαίμονας δῆπον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μὲ ἔστων· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δ' ἡ τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδή οὐκ ἀποκρίνει· τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας

27 b curred during such a cross-examination as is here given.

11. τοῖς ἄλλοις: all except the accuser and the accused: the audience (a above) and more esp. the δικασταί.
—τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι: please to answer the next question. "This will go to the bottom of the whole matter." ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ is almost the same as μετὰ τοῦτο. ἐπὶ with the dat. easily passes from the meaning of nearness to the kindred sense of immediate succession in time. The acc. is like τοῦ ἐρωτηθέν (the question which has been asked) or τοῦ ἐρωτώμενον, the question which is being asked, freq. used with ἀποκρίνομαι.

13. ὡς ὁνήσας: Oh! thank you! Used absolutely, like in var. in Lat.
—μόνις: see on μόνις πάνω, 21 b.

16. ἄλλ' οὖν: not essentially different from οὖν οὖν. See on 17 a. —δαμόνια γε: "To make the reasoning sound, δαμόνια here and δαμόνια πράγματα above ought to mean the same; which it must be acknowledged they do not. It must be observed, however, that the original perversion lay with Meletus, whose charge of δαμόνια καὶ νᾶ was based simply on Socrates's τὸ δαμόνιον. Now by this Socrates meant a divine agency, but Meletus had wrested it into the sense of a divine being. So that here the equivocation of Meletus is simply returned upon himself. Contrast, where Socrates is speaking uncontroversially of his monitor, the distinctly adj. use, θείου τι καὶ δαμόνιον, 31 c." R.

17. τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ: elsewhere and in its stricter use this means the written affidavit put in as a rejoinder by the accused; rarely as here, the accusation or the written affidavit of the accuser. So in Hyper. Eux. §§ 4, 33 (Col. 20, 40). Harpocratian on the word ἀντιγραφή says, evidently referring to this passage: Πλάτων δὲ ἐν τῇ Σωκράτους ἀπολογία τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖ ἀντωμοσίαν καὶ ἀντιγραφήν. See Introd. 69 and κ. 1 and 2.

19. ἔχει: repeated by way of answering yes after οὕτως ἔχει; similarly the simple verb is often repeated after a compound form. See on Crit. 44 d. —δῆ: certainly. Such an affirmation is not only self-evident (justified by common sense), but also follows from the admission which Meletus already has made.

20. τοὺς δαίμονας κτέ.: the definition here given is consistent with
Greek usage from Homer to Plato. In Homer θεὸς and δαίμον, applied to any divinity in particular or to divinity in general, are all but interchangeable terms. The distinction between them, if distinction there is, suggests itself rather in the adjs. derived from them than in the two nouns themselves. Hesiod, Op. 108-125, calls the guardian spirits that watch over men δαίμονες; to the rank of δαίμονες he says those were raised who lived on earth during the golden age. He distinguishes between θεοί, δαίμονες, and ἥρωες, and this same distinction is attributed to Thales. On this Plato based the fancy expressed in the Symposium (202c): πάν τὸ δαίμονιον μεταξὺ (intermediate) ἐστι θεὸς τε καὶ θυτήτω ... ἐρμηνευόν καὶ διαπρομευόν (interpreting and conveying) θεοὶ τὰ παρ’ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν μὲν τὰς δέησεις καὶ θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἀμοιβάς (commands and rewards) τῶν θυσίων.

21. φῆς ἡ οὖ: three Eng. words, yes or no?, will translate this. See on οὐ φῖτε, 25b.

22. εἰπέρ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι κτλ.: a complex prot., which falls into two simpler conditions, each of which excludes the other. The latter apply the broader supposition εἰπέρ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι in turn to alternative apodoses, both of which it limits. Cf. Χειρ. Αν. vii. 6. 15, for a very similar construction: ἔτει γε μὴν ψεύδεσθαι ἥρατο Χείθης περὶ τοῦ μισθοῦ, —this might readily have taken the form of a prot., — εἰ μὲν ἐπαινῶ αὐτὸν, δικαίως ἢ καὶ ἀιτιῷθε καὶ μισοῦτε· εἰ δὲ πρόσθεν αὐτῷ ... φίλος ἢ νῦν ... διαφορώτατο εἰμι, πῶς ἢν ἔτι δικαίως ... δι’ ἤμων αἰτίαν ἔχοιμι; On the combination of indic. and opt., see GMT. 503, and on εἰ διαφθείρει, κτλ., 25b above.

23. τοῦτ’ ἢ εἰ: by τοῦτο the preceding conditions, εἰπέρ ... ἡγοῦμαι and εἰ ... δαίμονες, are grasped into one; and, thus combined in τοῦτο, they become the subj. whose pred. is the suppressed (ἐκείνῳ) antec. of ὅ. To ὅ σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι is appended φάναι, which explains it and has the same subj.; all this points back to θεοῖς οὐ νομίζον ἀλλὰ θεοῖς νομίζων, 27a.

27. ἃν: equiv. to ἐκ ἃν, for “when the antecedent stands before the relative, a preposition (in this case ἐκ) belonging to both usually appears only with the first.” See II. 1007.— δῆ: you know.
30 δας ἡγοῖτο [ἡ] καὶ ὄνων, τούς ἡμιόνους, ἵπτους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὂς Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ [ταύτα] οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράφω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἂ ἀπορών ὅ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδικήματος ὅπως δὲ σὺ τωσ πείθοις ἀν καὶ σμικρῶν νοῦν ἐχοντα ἀν-
35 θρόπων, ὡς [ὀ] τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγείσθαι, καὶ αὕτο τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαιμόνια μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἡρωας, οὖνδεμια μηχανῆ ἔστιν.

XVI. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἄδικώ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἰκανὰ καὶ ταύτα. ὂ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλῆς μοι ἀπέχεινα γέγονε καὶ
5 πρὸς πολλοὺς, εἶ ἵστε ὅτι ἀληθὲς ἐστι. καὶ τούτ' ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἰρή, οὐ Μέλητος οὔτε Ἀνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διάβολη τε καὶ φθόνος. ὃ δὴ πολλοῦς καὶ

27 30. τοὺς ἡμιόνους: these words do not interfere with the grammar, although they make sad havoc with the sense, unless ἡ disappears.

33. ἡ ἀπορών ὅ τι, κτε.: this no doubt was Socrates's real view of the case of Meletus (cf. 23d), whereas all that precedes is only to bring home to the court how foolish and self-contradictory the charge is. ἀπορών and ἀποπειρώμενος, in connexion with ἐγράφω, refer to continued action in past time. — ἐγκαλοῖς: the opt. represents Meletus's original reflexion τὶ ἐγκαλῶ; The subjv. might have been retained. GMT. 677.

34. ὅπως δὲ σὺ κτε.: here Socrates closes his argument to the effect that it is a contradiction in terms to say of one and the same man (1) that he is a complete atheist, and (2) that he believes in δαιμόνια. The second τοῦ αὐτοῦ must be regarded as redundant, a simple repetition of the first one which might be dispensed with. See App.—πείθους ἀν ὡς [ὀ] : is not simply pleonastic, as in the case of two negatives in the same clause, but it is irrational, and can hardly be right. ὅπως means how or by which after μηχανῆ. A similar use of ὡς is explained GMT. 329, 2.

XVI. 1. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ... ταύτα: this phrase dismisses one topic to make room for the next one.

5. ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἰρή: will be the condemnation of me, if condemnation it is to be. αἰρεῖν and ἀλίσκεσθαι are technical terms of the law, as is the case with φθέγχαι and διάκειν.

7. δὴ: certainly. The allusion is to facts generally known and acknowledged, cf. 31 d.—πολλοῦς καὶ ἄλλος καὶ ἀγαθοῦς: instead of καὶ ἄλλος πολλοῦς καὶ ἀγαθοῦς. The first καὶ is the idiomatic καὶ of comparisons. Cf. 22 d, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ, and the idiom εἰ τις καὶ ἄλλος. The second καὶ is
αλλου καὶ ἀγαθοῦς ἀνδραὶς Ἰησοῦν, οὔμαί δὲ καὶ αἰρήσεως. 28
οὐδὲν δὲ δεινόν μὴ ἐν ἑν ἐμοὶ στῆ. ἦσος δ’ ἄν οὐν ἐποι τις. εἰτ’ ἐ
10 οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὦ Σωκράτες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτήδευσας,
ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυν ἀπόθανεν; ἐγὼ δ’ τούτῳ ἄν δίκαιον
λόγον ἀντείποιμ, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἀνθρωπε, εἰ οὐεὶ
δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζήν ἡ τεθναίαν ἀνδρα
τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὀφελός ἑστων, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκείνῳ μόνον
15 σκοπεῖν, οταν πράττῃ, πότερα δίκαια ἡ ἀδικα πράττει καὶ
ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἡ κακοῦ./ φαύλου γὰρ ἄν τοῦ γε σφ
λόγῳ εἰεν τῶν ἡμιθέους ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελεύτηκασιν οὐ τε το
αλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου
28 equally idiomatic, and joins πολλοῖς
with a second adj. Cf. πολλοὶ καὶ
σοφοὶ ἀνδρεῖς.
9. οὐδὲν δὲ δεινόν μὴ ἐν...στῇ: the
rule is in no danger of breaking down in
my case. Cf. Phaed. 84 b, οὐδὲν δεινὸν
μὴ φοβηθῇ, we need not apprehend that
the soul will have to fear. Gorg. 520 d,
and Rep. ν. 465 b. There is a touch of
irony in this way of saying “I do
not think.” Socrates as it were en-
lists on the side of the rule. This
idiom throws no light on οὐ μὴ with
subjv. or fut. indic. GMT. 294,
295. For the quasi-impersonal use
of στῇ, come to a stand-still, cf. Aris-
Eth. Nic. vi. 9, 9, στήσεται γὰρ κάκη.
Theaet. 153 d, ἐς μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ
κινομένη καὶ ὁ ἡλιος, πάντα ἔστι καὶ
σώζεται... εἰ δὲ σταῖ τοῦτο ὅσοδε
δεῖν (tethered), πάντα χρήσιτ' ἀν δια-
φαρείν. In such contexts the aor.
στῆνα denotes the entrance into a
state of quiet or collapse. GMT. 55,
b 56. — ἐτ’ οὐκ αἰσχύνει: a question
indicating surprise. The perversity
of Socrates, in view of the fact just
recited, is unreasonable. When such
a question is accompanied by an
urgent statement of the reason for
surprise (here τοιοῦτον... εἰ οὗ, κτέ.), it
may be introduced by εἶτα or ἔπειτα,
otherwise not.
11. ἐγὼ δ’ κτέ.: cf. Crit. 48 d for
the same thought, and Xen. An. iii. 1.
43, for its application to the risks of
war. In the Ajax of Sophocles, 473–
480, the same idea is brought to the
following climax:—
Honor in life or honorable death
The nobly born and bred must have.
13. κίνδυνον τοῦ ζήν ἡ τεθναία: the
question of life or death. Cf. for
theuse and omission of the art., Rep.
i. 334 e, κινδυνεύομαι (perhaps we, etc.)
οὐκ ὅθεσ φίλον καὶ ἡχόρον
θέσατι (have defined). Cf. for the
thought, Aj. 475–476:—
τι γὰρ παρ’ ἤμαρ ἡμέρα τίρπειν ἔχει,
προσθείσα κάπακες τοῦ γε καθανεῖς;
15. ὡταν πράττῃ: whenever he does
anything. GMT. 532. See App.
17. τῶν ἡμιθέων: i.e. τῶν ἥρων.
Hesiod, W. and D. 158, calls the
fourth race, ἀνδρῶν ἥρων θεῖον γένος ὁ
καλέστατι ἡ ἡμιθέοι κτέ., and he counts
among their number the heroes that
laid siege to Thebes and to Troy.
18. ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός: any appeal c
to the example of Achilles was always
very telling. The enthusiasm with which all Greeks regarded this hero was shown by temples raised in his honor and by countless works of art in which he appeared. Homer, Od. xi. 489, tells how Achilles found his favored condition in the lower world hardly to be endured. The post-homeric story-tellers said that he was living in the islands of the blest. Cf. Symp. 179 e, where this same scene between Thetis and Achilles is quoted, and the scholion (Bergk 10) to HARMODIUS:—

No, sweet Harmodius, thou art not dead,
But in the Islands of the Blest men say,
Where lives swift-foot Achilles far away,
And Tydeus' son, they say, brave Diomed.

We hear that Ibycus, and after him Simonides, wishing no doubt to make Achilles's happiness complete, represented him as married to Medea in Elysium.

21. THEOS OUSIA: added in a very unusual way, because the circumstance has unusual weight. The utterance of Thetis was not only prompted by the natural anxiety of a mother for her son, but also was inspired by the unerring wisdom of a goddess. Cf. Horn. Od. iv. 379 and 468, theol de te panta iasai. The passage from Horn. II. xviii. 70 ff., is quoted rather loosely in part (oibwai pos), and partly word for word.

22. DE TAUTA AKOUSAS KTE.: at this point OSTE is forgotten. The long speech and explanation given to Thetis makes this break in the const. very natural. In fact, this clause is as independent as if a co-ord. clause (with or without MENV) had preceded it.—TOU BANATOU: notice the exceptional use of the art., which is usually omitted with BANATOS as an abstract noun. Cf. 28 e, 29 a, 32 c, 38 e, 39 a b, Crit. 52 e. For the art. used as here, cf. 29 a, 40 d, 41 c.

29. MHI . . . OEI: see on ALL' APA, 25 a.

31. EI YP' ARKONTOS TAQVIS: instead of EI YP' ARKONTOS KLEON THES or even TAQVIS. Some such expression is called for grammatically by the form of the first alternative EI YHPSAMENOS.
This irregular interjection of the finite const. represents the facts better. The commander's order, if given at all, was peremptory, and requires a more positive statement than the less urgent ἡγησάμενος κτέ. In the sense ὅπ' ἀρχοντος ταχθῇ is the alternative of ἐαυτῷ τάξης. See App.

33. ὑπολογιζόμενον: as in b above, ὑπολογίζεσθαι means take into account, i.e. in striking a balance. Cf. Crit. 48d, where nearly the same idea is expressed. For a detailed description of the process of striking a balance involved in ὑπολογίζεσθαι, cf. Phaedr. 231b, οἱ μὲν ἐρωτεῖς σκοπούσιν ἃ τε κακῶς διέθετο ... καὶ ἁ πεποίηκασιν εὖ, καὶ δὲ ἐμὲν πόνον προστιθέντες ἥγονταί πάλαι τὴν ἄξιαν ἀποδεδεικνύων χάριν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις. τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρωτεῖς οὔτε τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀμέλειαν διὰ τοῦτο ἐστὶ προφασίζεσθαι οὔτε τοὺς παρεληθοῦσας πόνους ὑπολογίζεσθαι κτέ. The force of ὑπό here is very near to that of ἀντί, and, so far from primarily indicating a process of subtraction, it involves first of all an addition.

34. πρὸ τοῦ ἀλοχοῦ: moral turpitude (turpe), not death, was the harm which Socrates struggled to avoid at any and every price. Cf. 29b and Soph. Ant. 95ff., Nay, leave me and my heart's untoward plan To suffer all thou fear'st; naught will I suffer That shall estop me from a righteous death.

XVII. Having established the proposition that disgrace is more frightful than death, Socrates can now answer the question of 28b, if he can prove that it would have involved, and would still involve, disgrace for him not to have followed the pursuit which has brought him in danger of his life. This point he makes clear by an appeal to the analogy of military discipline, which, as he claims, applies to his relations to the gods. He is a soldier in the army of Apollo.

1.  ἐφώ οὖν δεινὰ ἄν εἶπῃ εἰργασμένος, ὃ ἄνδρες
'Ἀθηναίοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, οὐς ὑμεῖς ἐιλεσθε ἄρχειν μον, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ

28 ἐνταῦθα δ' ἐξῆλθον γίγνεσθαι τὰς κακοθήκας, ἵνα (they knew) that while among those who have neither established safeguards nor penalties for such crimes nor any strict organization of justice, that while among these, I say, even righteous characters are corrupted; at the same time, where wrong-doers find it easy neither to conceal their transgressions nor to secure condonation when detected, there I say (they knew that) evil dispositions end by dying out. Cf. also Gorg. 512 a. Notice that the μὲν clause is important only with reference to the δὲ clause, upon which the main stress is laid; the δὲ clause is made prominent through the contrast afforded by the logically subordinate μὲν clause. This same relation is indicated in the Eng., French, and German idiom by the use of some word like "while" in the μὲν clause.

2. οἱ ἄρχοντες: not the nine archons, but, as the context shows, the generals in command upon the field of battle.—ὑμεῖς εἰλέουσθε: the δικαισταὶ are here taken as representing the whole δῆμος, from which they were selected by lot. See Introd. 66. Perhaps Socrates has also in mind the other Athenians present at the trial. See on 24 c and 25 a. The generals were elected by show of hands (χειροτονία) and their electors were the ἐκ-κλησισταῖ. Cf. 25 a.

3. ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ...Δηλώ: Potidaeans to revolt from Athens, which they did in 432 B.C. The Potidaeans, with the reinforcements sent them by the Peloponnesians, were defeated by the Athenian force under Callias. For two whole years the town was invested by land and blockaded by sea, and finally made favorable terms with the beleaguering force. In the engagement before the siege of Potidaea, Socrates saved Alcibiades's life. Cf. Symp. 219 c–220 e, where Alcibiades gives a most enthusiastic and witty account of the bravery and self-denial of Socrates during the whole Potidaean campaign, and says of the battle in question: ὅτε γὰρ ἡ μάχη ἦν ἐξ (after) ἦν ἔμω καὶ τάρσειᾳ (the prize for gallantry in action) ἔδρασαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ, οὐδὲς ἀλλὸς ἔμε ἐσώ-σεν ἀνθρώπων ὡς ὀφεῖς, τετρωμένον (when I was wounded) οὐκ ἔθελον ἀπολεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ συνθέσασθαι καὶ τὰ ὅπλα καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμέ. Alcibiades says that Socrates ought to have had the prize which was given to himself by favoritism. Cf. Charm. 153 b–c.—The battle at Amphipolis, an Athenian colony on the Strymon in Thrace, took place in the year 422. The Athenians were defeated, and their general, Cleon, perished in the rout, while Brasidas, the Spartan general, paid for victory with his life.

—Delium was an enclosure and a temple sacred to Apollo in Boeotia near Oropus, a border town sometimes held by the Athenians and sometimes by the Boeotians. The battle, which was a serious check to the power of Athens, resulted in the defeat and death of their general, Hippocrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 5, 4, ἀφ' οὗ ἦ τε σύν Τολύμη τῶν χιλίων ἐν Δε—
An anonymous text from the Apologia of Sokrates.

The text discusses Sokrates' conduct during battles, noting that it was well known at Athens. It mentions that Alcibiades, who was mounted, could observe Socrates' behavior better than at Potidaea. Alcibiades' testimony is compared to that of Laches, as mentioned in Laches. The text also highlights the repeated allusions to Sokrates' brave conduct in Plato's dialogues, indicating its widespread knowledge at Athens.

The text concludes by discussing the indef. subj. in Greek, emphasizing the repetition of strong statements. It notes that the third person, when it means vaguely "any one," is often used in these contexts.
15 τὸν οὖν εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὃν 20 τῶν ἁγαθῶν, δεδίασί δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἔστιν. καὶ τούτῳ πῶς οὖν ἁμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ε' ἐπονείδιστος ἡ τοῦ οἴσθαι εἰδέναι ἡ οὖν οἶδεν; ἔγω δ', ὡς ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἑνταῦθα ἵσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφότερῷ τοῦ φαίνεται εἶναι, τούτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὖν εἰδὼς ἰκανώς περὶ τῶν ἐν "Αϊδῶν οὖτω καὶ οἰομαι οὖν εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἄδικες καὶ ἀπειθεῖς τῷ βελτίων, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οἶδα, ἢ ῥόθι ὑμῶν τῶν κακῶν ἄν οἶδα ὅτι κακὰ ἐστιν, ἀ μὴ οἶδα εἰ 25 ἁγαθὰ ὅμως τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβῆσομαι οὖνδ' φεύξομαί· ὡστε οὖν εἰ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἄφιετε Ἀνύτω ἀποιστῆσαντες, ὅς εἰ

29 not expressed.—τὸν θάνατον οὖσ' εἰ: by prolepsis for οὖσ' εἰ ὁ θάνατος, not even whether, i.e. whether death may not actually be. Thus he is as far as possible from knowing that death is the greatest of harms. For a fuller statement, cf. 37 b. See on τὸν θάνατον, 28 c, for the use of the art.

15. ὅν: here, as usual, in the gender of ἁγαθόν, which is implied in the pred. μέγιστον τῶν ἁγαθῶν.

17. τούτῳ: not in the gender of ἁμαθία. This makes a smoother sent. than αὕτη πῶς οὖν ἁμαθία ἐστιν αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος: that very same reprehensible, limiting ἁμαθία and recalling the whole statement made above, 21 b–23 e.

19. τούτῳ, τούτῳ ἄν: repeated for the greater effect. Both represent the same point of superiority, i.e. ἢ κτῆ. Notice the cleverness of the ellipsis after ἄν. Socrates thus evades any too circumstantial praise of himself. For the ellipsis in the leading clause, see on ἢ... ἁκων, 25 e.—καὶ ἑνταῦθα: here too.

20. εἰ δή: if really, i.e. if, as the oracle suggests.

21. οὖκ εἰδὼς...οὖτω: i.e. ἄστερ οὖκ οἶδα...οὖτω. οὖτως sums up a previous partic. clause, and its force is nearly so likewise. Cf. Men. 80 c, παντὸς μᾶλλον αὕτος ἀπορῶν οὖτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπορεῖν ποίω.

24. ἄν...ἐστιν: a notable instance of assimilation. G. 1031; H. 994. See on ἄν εἰ οὖσ' ἢτι κακῶν ὑντων, 37 b. κακὰ is related to ἁγαθά in the next line is related to α. —οἶδα εἰ: see on τὸν θάνατον κτῆ., above a.

26. εἰ ἄφιετε...εἰ οὖν ἄφιομαι, εἰπομήν ἄν: the speaker weakens εἰ νῦν ἄφιετε (if you are now ready to acquit me) by the explanatory detail of εἰ μοι εἰπομήν and by various reiterations of the conditions upon which this release may be granted, until the weaker clause εἰ ἄφιομαι comes of itself to his lips as all that is left of the more positively worded prot. with which he began.—ἀποίσισαντες: conveys the idea of disregarding rather than that of disbelieving. This meaning


\[ \text{APOLODIA \ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.} \ 105 \]

\[ \epsilonφη ἣ τὴν ἀρχήν οὐ δειν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἦ, ἑπειδὴ 29 εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἶνον τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς, εἰ διαφεύγουμην, ἦδη ἄν ὑμῶν οἱ νεῖς 30 ἐπιηθεὶς ὡς Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφαρησοῦνται—ἐν μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε ὡς Ἀγκρα- 


tes, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτω οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ 

tοῦτῳ μέντοι ἐφ' ὅτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρί- 


bein μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· εὰν δὲ ἄλλος ἐτι τοῦτο πράττων, 


35 ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίουτε, α 


ἐποιμ' ἄν υἱῶν ὅτι ἐγὼ υἱῶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίου, ἀστάζω- 


μαί μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἣ υἱῶν, κα 


ἐως ὁπὸ ἄν ἐμπνεῦσαι καὶ οἶδας τε ὡς, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλο-


σοφῶν καὶ υἱῶν παρακλησομένοις τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος 


40 ὅτῳ ἂν ἄεὶ ἐνυγχάνω υἱῶν, λέγων οἴσπερ εἶσθα, ὅτι, ὡ 


of ἀπιστεῖν is not uncommon in Plato. 


Cf. Laws, 941 c, ὁ μὲν οὖν πεισθέως ἦμαν τῷ λόγῳ εὑρίσχει διὰ καὶ εἰς χρό- 


νον ἀπαντεῖς εὑρίσχοι, ὁ δὲ ἀπιστήσασι τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τοιαύτῃ τινι μαχέσθω νομα. 


27. οὐ δειν, οὐδὲν τε εἶναι: in the 


original form this would be οὐκ ἔδει: and οὐδὲν ἐδεῖ τε ἐστιν. GMT. 119; 


H. 863 a.—ἐισελθεῖν: on this use of 


eἰσέρχεσθαι, see Introd. 70 with the 


note. Anytus probably argues: "If 


Socrates had not been prosecuted, 


his evil communications might have 


been ignored; once in court, his case 


allows but one verdict. To acquit him 


is to sanction all his heresies."


29. ἐπιποιμ' ἄν υἱῶν ὅτι ἐγὼ υἱῶς, 


ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ἀστάζο- 


μαί μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἣ υἱῶν, κα 


ἐως ὁπὸ ἄν ἐμπνεῦσαι καὶ οἶδας τε ὡς, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλο-


σοφῶν καὶ υἱῶν παρακλησομένοις τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος 


40 ὅτῳ ἂν ἄεὶ ἐνυγχάνω υἱῶν, λέγων οἴσπερ εἰσθα, ὅτι, ὡ 


36. ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι: a fictitious 


apostrophe. Cf. Dem. viii. 36, εἰ οἱ 


"Ελληνες ἐρώτθημεν ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, 


πέμπτε ὡς ἦμας ἐκάστοτε πρέβεις 


κτὲ. See App.—ἀποθανεῖ καὶ φι- 


λῶ: you have my friendship and my 


love, but, etc. ἀποθανεῖ διακρίνει the 


greeting of friends. Cf. Od. iii. 34–35, 


where Nestor and his sons see Tele-


machus and Mentes, ἄφροι ἢλθον ἔπαι-


νετες, ἐν χρόνιον τῇ ἡσαύροντο κα 


ἔφυγατο: ὁ ἄνωγον. Cf. also II. x. 542, 


tοι δὲ χαίρετες | δεξιά ἡ ἡπάστοντο 


ἐπέσατε τε μελιχίσσαν. 


37. πείσομαι: cf. Acts iv. 19, ὡς ὡς 


Πέτρος καὶ Ἰωάννης ἀποκριθέντες εἶπον 


πρὸς ἄντων: εἰ δηλαδὴ ἐστὶν ἐνώπιον 


(in the sight) τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς ἦμι ἄκουεις 


μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ κρίσατε, ibid. 


ν. 28, πειθαρχεῖν (obey) δεῖ θεῷ 


μᾶλλον ἂν ἄνθρώπως. 


38. οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι: see on oúdeν 


κτέ., 28 a. For οὐ μὴ with the subj. 


in strong denials, see GMT. 295; H. 


1032.
106

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ἀριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναίος ὁν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ 29 ἐυδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν ὅν καὶ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἐσται ὡς πλεῖστα καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ἐν ψυχῆς ὅπως ἐλπίζει, ἣν ἀντιστοιχίαν ἔχει, καὶ εὰν τις ὁμοι ἀμφισβήτησι καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφῆσιν αὐτῶν οὔδ᾽ ἀπειμί, ἀλλ᾽ ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἔξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ εὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτηθῆσαι ἄρετήν, φάναι δὲ, ὁνειδῶ ὅτι τὰ πλεῖστον ἄξια περὶ ἐλα- 50 χίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλεῖονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὡς ἄν ἐνυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ἐξεῖ καὶ ἀστῶ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὧς μοι ἐγγυ-


42. εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν: for the full meaning, cf. 38 c–39 d, also Thuc. ii. 40, 41. Here ἰσχύς means the strength which rules the kingdom of the mind (σοφία). Cf. Thuc. i. 138, where he says of the typical Athenian Themistocles: ὧν γὰρ ὁ Ἐρμιστοκλῆς, βεβαιώτατα δὴ ϕύσεως ἰσχύν δηλώ- σας, καὶ διαφεράντως τι ἐς αὐτῷ μᾶλλον ἐτέρου ἄξιος θαμασάται. This ψυχῆς, when circumstances disclosed its perfection, was σοφία, the virtue of virtues, chiefly prized by Socrates as including all others.

χρημάτων ... ἰσχύς: the same prolep- sis as that in 29 a, where τὸν θάνα- τον is pointedly mentioned before its time. Notice the significant use of the art. with ἰσχύς, a word which like σῶμα often appears without the art. in cases that seem to require it; τῆς accordingly has the force of a possessive pron. G. 049; H. 658.

43. οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ: see on ὅμως δὲ εἴδοκει, 21 e.

47. ἔρησομαι, ἔξετάσω, ἐλέγξω: these words in this order represent the process by which Socrates so often disconcerted his fellow-countrymen. Beginning with a harmless question or two, his method soon proved uncomfortably scrutinizing (ἔξετάσω), and generally ended by convicting (ἐλέγξω) of ignorance.

50. ταύτα νεωτέρῳ ποιήσω: ποιεῖν, like πράττειν and ἔργαζεσθαί, often takes in addition to the acc. of the thing done a dat. of the person for whom the thing is done, but the acc. of the person to whom it is done is. Cf. Xen. An. iii. 2. 3, οὖν γὰρ ἢμᾶς τινατα παθεῖν ὁ τούτως ἐχθροῖς τοις ποιήσαν. Ibid. 24, καὶ ἢμῖν γὰρ ὅτι τρισάμενον (thrice gladly) ταῦτα ἐπόλει, εἰ ἐώρα ἢμᾶς μένειν παρα- σκευαζόμενοι.

52. ὅσω ... ἐστε γενεῖ: the thought
30 of Socrates insensibly returns to his hearers, in whom he sees embodied the whole people of Athens. The correlative of ὅσο readily suggests itself with μάλλον. Cf. the same case, 30 d. Cf. Euthyph. 12 e, καὶ μην νεώτερος γε μον εἰ οὖκ ἔλαττον ἡ ὅσο σοφότερος.

55. τὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν: see on δοῦλος, Crit. 50 e, and contrast τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν, 23 c; cf. also τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ὅσον ώμιν, d below; see also on τὰ μετέωρα φρονιστήθης, 18 b. ὑπηρεσία takes the same dat. of interest which is found with the verb from which it is derived. The Lat. idiom is the same, e.g. Cic. de Legg. i. 15. 42, Quod si iustitia est ottemperatio scriptis legibus institutisque populum, etc.

58. πρότερον: sc. ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς, which has to be supplied out of ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς. μὴ δὲ is not a third specification with μήτε...μήτε. It serves only to connect οὕτω σφόδρα with πρότερον, and is neg. only because the whole idea is neg.

60. εἰ ἀρετῆς χρήματα: the foundation of real prosperity is laid in the character; the best of windfalls is natural good sense sharpened by experience; this is the making of your successful man's character, and the mending of his fortunes; this is ἀρετή (skill in the art of right living), i.e. wisdom (σοφία). See on εἰς σοφίαν, 29 d. Such is in substance Socrates's theory of getting on in the world, which may be gathered from Xenophon's Memorabilia in many places: see (i. 6) his defence against the σοφιστής Antiphon, who accuses him of being κακοδαμωνίας διδάσκαλος; (ii. 5) his hint to a parsimonious friend, ἔξετάξειν ἑαυτὸν ὅποιον τοῖς φίλοις λέον εἴη; (ii. 6. 22-25) his analysis of what makes a καλὸς τε κάγαθος (gentleman), where of all such he says, δύναται πεινώτερες (fasting) καὶ διψώτερες ἄλληκας σίτου καὶ ποτοῦ κοινωκεῖν...δύναται δὲ καὶ χρημάτων ὅποι μόνον τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν (selfish greed) ἀπεχόμενοι, νομίμως (righteously) κοινωκεῖν ἄλλα καὶ ἐπαρκεῖν ἄλληκαί; and see particularly (ii. 7, 8, 9, and 10) the success which his practical advice brought to his friends Aristotle, Euthērs, Crito, and Diodorus in their various difficulties. For a full elaboration of Socrates's rule of right living in the abstract, see his conversation on ἐδ' πράττειν with young Callias, τὸ Ἀξίον μειράκιον, Euthyd. 278 c-282 d, where Cleinias is startled to learn that σοφία is εὐτυχία (good-luck). The gods endow us with such
λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, τάυτ' ἂν εἰς βλαβερά· εἰ δὲ τὶς μὲ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἡ τάυτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς τάυτα, φαίνῃ ἂν, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἡ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτω ἢ μή, καὶ ἡ ἀφίετε ἡ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' ἐι μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλα ἐμμείνατε μοι οἷς ἔδειξαν ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἔγω οἴμαι, ὄνησεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ ὄντα ὑμῖν ἔρειν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἰσώς common sense as we have, Euthyph. 15 a, Rep. ii. 366 c, 370 c-e, 379 b c; we owe it to them that it is possible to thrive and in the end to win, Rep. x. 613, 617 e.

62. ταύτ' ἂν εἰς βλαβερά: this ταύτα, all this, covers more ground than the ταύτα above. The first means what Socrates says, the second means that and also the fact that he says it. "If this corrupts the youth, my practice in saying it would do harm; but the truth cannot corrupt them, therefore my speaking it can do no harm. To prove that I am a corrupter of the youth, you must prove that I have said something else; that cannot be proved, for it is not true." With ἐι διαφθείρω, τάυτ' ἂν εἰς, cf. ἐι ὄφελος, 25 b, where see note.

63. πρὸς ταύτα: wherefore.

65. ὡς ἐμοῦ κτε.: knowing that I should never alter my ways. ποιήσοντος ἂν represents ποίησω ἂν. GMT. 216; H. 845 and 861. Cf. Dem. xix. 342, τούτων ὁτιοῦν ἂν ἐκεῖνο ποίησον τὰς ἀντικριστές ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐσεσθε. See on διαφθερήσοντα, 29 c. For an important question of Ms. reading here, see App. For the ἐι μέλλω used as periphrastic fut. see GMT. 73; H. 846. For the indic. fut. or subjv. pres. in prot. depending upon the opt. in apod. with ἂν, see GMT. 503; H. 901 a.

66. πολλάκις: many times or many e deaths. The Eng. idiom like the Greek requires no definite specification such as "to die a hundred deaths." In certain cases in Greek as in Eng. a large number is specified. Cf. ἀκήκοας μυριάκις ἄγω βούλομαι, Ar. Nub. 738; ἐτνοὺς (for pea-soup?); βαβαίας, μυριάκις ἐν τῷ βίῳ, Ran. 63. Cf. προσάμενος, quoted from Xen. An. iii. 2. 24 on 30 a. Demosthenes not unnaturally uses μυριάκις where he exclaims (ix. 65), τεθν' ἂν ἂν ἰδ' μυριάκις κρείττον ἡ κολακέα τι ποῖσαι Φιλέπ- 

Σθον. — τεθνάναι: the absolute contradictory of ἦν, here used rather than the somewhat weaker ἀποθνῄσκειν. This distinction is, however, not strictly maintained. Cf. 39 ε, 43 d, and the similar use of καλεῖν and κεκληθαῖν, γιγνάσκειν and ἐγιγνωκέναι, μιμήσειν and μεμιμηθαί, κτάσθαι and κεκτήσθαι.

XVIII. 2. οἷς ἔδειξαν ὑμῶν: he asked them μὴ θορυβεῖν. See above on θορυβεῖν, 17 d, and on μὴ θορυβηθοῦτε, 20 e.

3. καὶ γὰρ, μέλλω γάρ, εὗ γὰρ ἠττο: the first γὰρ is closely connected with ἀκούειν, the second goes back to the leading clause μὴ θορυβεῖν and accounts for the renewal of a request which the speaker has made three
5 Βοήσεσθε: ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιῆτε τούτο. εὖ γὰρ ἦστε, 30 ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὁντα οἶνον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ύμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὔδεν ἂν βλάψεις ὁντε Μέλητος ὁντε ‘Ἀντος· οὔδε γὰρ ἂν δύναυτο· οὐ γὰρ οἰόμαι θεμιτῶν εἶναι ἀμείωνι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χέιρονος α
10 βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μεντὰν ἴσως ἢ ἐξελάσσειν ἢ ἀτιμώσειν: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὕτως μὲν ἴσως οἴεται καὶ ἄλλος τίς ποιεῖ. ἐγὼ δ’ οὐκ οἴομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ καλλον οὕτως νῦν ποιεῖ, ἀνδρὰ ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτείνων. νῦν οὖν, ὡς ἀνδρέσ Ἀθηναίοι, πολλοῦ δέω
15 ἐγὼ υπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεώσομαι, ὡς τίς ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλὰ υπὲρ ὑμῶν, μὴ τί ἔξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν υμῶν ἐμοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνῃτε, ε

5 times already. The third γὰρ, now, merely points the new statement for which Socrates has been preparing the court. Compare the use of γὰρ after prons. and advs., e.g. 31 b after εὐθείας, and in general after any prefatory form of words to give point to any statement which is expected, as in τίς γὰρ ἤμης, 20 e. γὰρ with this force is esp. freq. after δὲ (τὸ δὲ) μέγιστον, δειμνατον, also after σημείον δὲ, τεκμήριον δὲ and other favorite idioms of like import in Plato and the orators.

H. 1050, 4 a.

5. Βοήσεσθε: this is more than a disturbance (θρομβεύν); it is an outcry.

9. θεμιτῶν ἀμείωνι ἀνδρὶ βλάπτεσθαι: cf. 21 b. θεμιτῶν takes the dat., and, after the analogy of ἐξετιν, an inf. (βλάπτεσθαι) is added. The pass. βλάπτεσθαι makes this const. appear more unusual than e.g. in Phaedo, 67 b, μή καθαρῷ (unclean) γὰρ καθαρὸν ἐφάπτεσθαι μή οὐθ θεμιτῶν. For the import of the words θέμις and θεμιτῶν, see on ω γὰρ θέμις, 21 b.

10. ἀποκτείνειε μεντὰν, ἢ ἀτιμώσειν: ἀποκτείνειε is used here secondarily of the δικασταὶ and the whole people, and primarily of the accusers whose prosecution aims at compassing Socrates's death. ἀτιμία involved the forfeiture of some or of all the rights of citizenship. In the latter case the ἀτιμία was looked upon by the state as dead, i.e. he had suffered “civil death” (la morte civile), and his property, having no recognized owner, was confiscated. Cf. Rep. viii. 553 b, εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα ὑπὸ συνομοντῶν ἢ ἀποθανόντα ἢ ἐκτεθοῦντα ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπασαν ἀποβαλόντα. See App.

11. ἄλλος τίς ποιεῖ: many another. See on ἄλλος, 28 e.

15. ἂλλ’ υπὲρ ὑμῶν: cf. Euthyphro’s remark just before the trial, Euthyph. 5 b c, εἰ ἢμα ἔμε ἐπιχειρήσει (ὁ Μέλητος), εἴρομαι ἂν, ὡς οἴμαι, ὡς σαφῆς (rotten) ἐστι, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἡ μῆλον πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος γένοι το ἐν τῷ δικαστήριῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.
18. ἀτεχνῶς ... προσκείμενον: added instead of a clause with οἷον to explain τοιοῦτον. See on οἷον δεδώθη, 31 a. — εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἶπεῖν: though it sounds rather absurd to say so, or better, "if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech." This is thrown in to prepare his hearers for the humorous treatment of a serious subject which follows. A close scrutiny of the simile shows that Socrates mistrusted the sovereign people. προσκείμενον is the regular pass. of προστιθέναι. See below (22) for the same idea put actively. See App. for the reading ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, and for the remaining difficulties here involved.

21. ὑπὸ μισοτὸς τίνος: by a gadfly. For this word, cf. Aesch. Supp. 47, 308, Βοσλατήν (ox-driving) μισόπος κυνήγητος (urging on), οἶστρον (gadfly) καλούσην αὐτὸν οἱ Νεῖλοι πέλας. Also in the Prometheus Io's tormentor is called οἶστρον (507) and δεξάστομος μύωψ (674 f.). Here the tormentor of Athens is a ἵππηλήτης μύωψ. Notice how humorously (γελοιότερον) the situation is met. First the Athenians are compared to a horse bored out of inaction by a buzzing horse-fly. The metaphor of the horse is not pressed; but that of the μύωψ is ingeniously elaborated as follows: "Socrates gives them no rest but bores them all day long (προσκαθίζων), and does not allow them even a nap; he bothers them incessantly when they are drowsing (οἷον νυστάζοντες). Then they make an impatient dash (κρούσαντες) at him which deprives them forever of his company." For similar irony, cf. Verg. Aen. vi. 90, nec Teucris addita Juno|U squam ab urbe. μύωψ is by some taken in its later and metaphorical sense of spur. See App. — τίνος: like the Lat. quidam used to qualify an expression which is startling. — οἷον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ... προστεθεικέναι: lit. in which capacity God seems to me to have fastened me upon the state,—such an one (in fact) as never ceases, etc., a repetition of προσκείμενον [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ]. Avoid the awkwardness of too lit. translation. Notice that οἷον really refers not to the μύωψ simply but to the μύωψ engaged in enlivening the horse. This is implied by τοιοῦτον τίνα and the explanatory clause with ὅς.

23. ὅνειδιζον ἐκαστόν: ὅνειδιζον alone requires the dat. Cf. Il. ii. 254, τῷ νῦν Ἀτρείδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ποιμένι λαῶν ἑσσαὶ ὅνειδίζων, and below 41 e. The acc. here is due to the preponderating influence of πείθων; both πείθων and ὅνειδιζον are however introduced simply to explain ἐγείρων, with which they are as it were in apposition. The awakening process here thought of prob. consisted of questions persuasive in part and partly reprehensive.

24. τὴν ἡμέραν ... προσκαθίζον: this specifies the means by which the
στον οὔδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθί- 31
25 ζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ βαδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὥ ἄν-
дрес, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πειθησθε, φείσεσθε μοι. ὑμεῖς δ' ἱσως
tάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὡσπερ οἱ νυστάξοντες ἐγειρόμενοι,
kρούσαντες ἂν με, πειθόμενοι 'Ἀνύτω, βαδίως ἂν ἀποκτεί-
ναίτε, ἐίτα τῶν λοιπῶν βίων καθεύδοντες διατελοῦτ ἂν, εἰ
30 μὴ τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιτείμησεν κηδόμενος ὑμῶν.
ἵνα δ' ἔγα τυγχάνω ἂν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ
πόλει δεδοσθαί, ἐνθένε ἂν κατανοήσαίτε. οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρω-
pίνῳ ἐοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι
καὶ ἀνέχεσθαί τῶν οὐκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἡδὴ ἐπη, 35
tὸ δὲ ύμέτερον πράττειν ἄεί, ἰδία ἐκάστῳ προσφέρα
ὡσπερ πατέρα ἡ ἄδελφον πρεσβύτερον, πειθοῦντα ἐπιμε-
λείσθαι ἄρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυνον
καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελεύσαν, εἴχον ἂν τινα
λόγον. νῦν δὲ ὀρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὡς οἱ κατήγοροι τάλ-
40 la πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τούτῳ γε

31 process of awakening, indicated by the three preceding parties, was made possible. Pres. and aor. parties express the means, as the fut. partic. expresses purpose. GMT. 832 f.; H. 969.
26. ὡσπερ τάχ' ἂν: may be perhaps, a combination which is by no means infrequent. The importance of βαδίως is well indicated by the repetition of the ἂν, which has already served to emphasize κρούσαντες. Notice, however, that grammatically it is required only once and goes with the verb of the apod. ἀποκτείνατε. See on ὡσπερ oßn ἂν, 17 d.
27. ὡσπερ οἱ νυστάξοντες κτέ.: like men disturbed in their nap. This sarcasm could not fail to raise a laugh at Athens where the δικαστὴς νυστά-
ζον was a common sight. Cf. Rep. 405 c, μηδέν δείσθαι νυστάξοντος
31 δικαστοῦ. Cf. Quint. Inst. iv. 1. 73.
29. ἐίτα: see on μικρὸνται κτέ., 23 c.
30. οἷος δεδοσθαί: cf. Crit. 46 b. For the inf. without the art., limiting certain adjs. and advs., see GMT. 759; H. 1000.
32. οὐ γὰρ: see on καὶ γὰρ, 30 c. — b ἀνθρωπίνῳ: the neut. used subst. Cf. Phaed. 62 d, ὡς τὸ τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐοικε. Commonly the neut. is used predicatively, e.g. ὡς τὸ τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐοικε.
34. ἀνέχεσθαί ἀμελουμένων: for the acc. or gen. allowed with this verb, and for the added partic. see GMT. 879; H. 983.
37. καὶ μέντοι: if, to be sure. τοι influences the apod. (ἐξοίκον ἂν κτέ.) as well, then at least I should have some reason, i.e. there would be an obvious explanation of my conduct. Cf. 34 b, αὐτῷ τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἐχοιεν κτέ.
οὐχ οἶοι τε ἐγένοντο ἀπανασχυντῆσαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγώ ποτὲ τυν ἡ ἐπραξάμην μιθὼν ἡ ἦτησα. ἰκανὸν γὰρ, οἴμαι, ἐγώ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀλήθη λέγω, τὴν πανίαν.

XIX. Ἰσως ἄν οὖν δόξειν ἀτοπον εἶναι ὃτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίας μὲν ταῦτα ἐξιμβουλεύω περιῶν καὶ πολυπραγμονῷ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον.

41. οὐχ οἶοι τε: “They would doubtless make the assertion, cf. 19 d; but what they did not find it practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it.” R. The leading idea of the clause ἀπανασχυντῆσαι ... μάρτυρα is expressed in the partic., not in ἀπανασχυντῆσαι. For cases where αἰσχῦνεθαί, used with a partic., does not contain the main idea, cf. 28 b, 29 d, Crit. 53 c. — τοῦτο ἀπανασχυντῆσαι: sc. ταύτην τὴν ἀνασχυντῆσαι ἀπανασχυντῆσαι. ἂν in this compound contributes the idea of completion, which in the case of shamelessness involves going to an extreme, to go to such an extreme with their shamelessness, or, to be so absolutely shameless as ἀ-his. The kindred notion of fulfilling a task undertaken is also involved. Cf. Xen. An. iii. 2. 13, ἀποθέουσι, meaning pay off the arrears of a promised sacrifice.

43. τὸν μάρτυρα: sc. παρέχομαι μάρτυρα καὶ ὁ μάρτυς ὃν παρέχομαι ἰκανός ἐστίν. Cf. 20 c. ἰκανόν is used predicatively, and the necessity of the art. is obvious.

XIX. 1. Ἰσως ἄν οὖν δόξειν ἀτόπον: Socrates has two good reasons: (1) his divine mission, (2) the personal disaster involved in any other course. Of these the first really includes the second. That he did not regard abstention from public duty as in itself commendable is proved by his conversation with Charmides (Xen. Mem. iii. 7), ἀξιόλογον μὲν ἄνδρα ὑπάτα, ὑκνοῦτα δὲ προσιέναι τῷ δήμῳ (to address the people) καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελεῖται. He pointedly asks Charmides: εἴ δὲ τίς, δυνάτος ἄν τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελόμενος τὴν τε πόλιν αἰθεῖν (advance the common weal) καὶ αὐτὸς διὰ τοῦτο τιμᾶται, ὑκνοῦτο δὲ τοῦτο πράττειν οὖν ἐν εἰκόνας δεῖλος νομίζοιτο; See also ibid. i. 6. 15.

2. πολυπραγμονόν: am a busybody. See on περιεργάζεται, 19 B. Nothing short of a divine mission could justify this. Plato invariably uses the word in an unfavorable sense. Cf. Gorg. 526 c, ἄνδρας φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτῶν πράξεις καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονότατος ἐν τῷ βίῳ. There is a subtle irony in πολυπραγμονόν as here used by Socrates. It was his business to mind other people's business, therefore he was far from being really πολυπράγμων. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 11. 16, καὶ δὲ καράτης ἐπισκόπων (ridiculing) τὴν αὐτῶν ἀπαγχομοσύνην (abstention from business), “Ἀλλ’, ὁ Θεοδότη,” ἔφη, “οὐ πάνω μοι βριδίων ἐστι σχολάσαι (be at leisure), καὶ γὰρ ἔδει πράγματα πολλὰ καὶ δημοσίᾳ παρέχει μοι ἄσχολαν (keep me busy).” Cf. 33 a b.

3. ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος: there is no implication, as in 17 d, of ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα. The πλῆθος commonly assembled in the Pnyx, to which Socrates
rov ἐμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτον δὲ αἰτίων ἐστὶν ὃ ὑμεῖς 31
5 ἐμὸν πολλάκις ἀκηκοάτε πολλαχοὺ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θείον
τι καὶ δαμόνιον γίγνεται, [φωνῇ], ὁ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ α
ἐπικωμφώδων Μέλητος ἐγράφατο· ἐμὸ δὲ τούτο ἐστὶν ἐκ
παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνῇ τὸς γιγυμοκήνη, ἢ ὅταν γένηται ἀεὶ
ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὅ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὖν—
10 ποτὲ· τούτῳ ἐστὶν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν.
καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὖ γὰρ ἤστε, ὃ
ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἶ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεξείρησα πράττειν τὰ
πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἀν ἀπολώλῃ καὶ οὔτ', ἀν ὑμᾶς
 английскη οὐδὲν οὔτ', ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἀχθεσθεν 31
15 λέγοντι τάληθῃ· οὖ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὡστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται
οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλῆθει οὐδενὶ γνησίῳ ἐναντιούμενος
καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἀδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει
γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ τὸν τῷ ὅντι μαχούμενον 32

31 thus would, like every one else, be
obliged to ascend. Cf. Dem. xviii.
160, ὑμεῖς δ' εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν
ἐπορεύεσθε καὶ . . . πάς ὁ δῆμος ἀνω
καθήσοντα.—τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ψέμερον: see
ο ὁ πλῆθει, 21 a.
5. θείον τι καὶ δαμόνιον γίγνεται,
[φωνῇ]: see Introd. 27, with first n. on
p. 21, and 32. φωνῆ is explanatory of
the vague θείον τι καὶ δαμόνιον, and
is in the pred.: a something divine and
from God manifests itself to me, a voice.
This thought is earnestly reiterated
below in nearly the same words. See
App.
6. δ' δὲ καὶ: see on δ' δὲ καὶ, 28 a.
—ἐπικωμφώδων: Meletus caricatured
Socrates's utterances about the θείον τι
καὶ δαμόνιον by making them out to
be the belief in καὶ ἅμα δαμόνια. Cf. 28 e.
7. ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον: ever since
my boyhood. This partic. followed by
ἀπὸ or ἐκ, when time is referred to,
corresponds to various idioms, here to
ever since. The case of the partic. is
that of the word which it limits. Cf.
Legg. ii. 661 b, ταῦτα ἄτις ἀδικος κά-
κιστα ἱκμαία, ἀρξάμενα ἀνδή ἀτῆς
ψυχας.
9. ἀποτρέπει, ἐναντιοῦται πράττειν:
Cf. 32 b, and see on μηδὲν ποιεῖν.—
toūτο: governed by πράττειν, which is
expressed in the subordinate clause.
Cf. Lach. 179 a, ἀνεύναι αὐτοὺς δ' τι
βούλονται ποιεῖν, to leave them free to do
what they wish.
12. πάλαι . . . πάλαι: the rights and
duties of Athenian citizenship began
as soon as a man was twenty.
13. ἀπολώλῃ, ἀγγέλη: the earlier
Att. writers rarely use the plpf. in
-εν. G. 777, 4; H. 458 a.
15. οὖ, οὔτε, οὔτε, οὔδεν: a re-
markable repetition of the neg. Cf.
34 e.
16. γνησίως: uprightly or openly.
υπέρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μὲλλει ὄλγον χρόνον σωθῆσε- 32
20 σθαί, ἰδιωτεύειν, ἄλλα μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δὲ ἔγγυε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι
τούτων, οὖ λόγοι, ἄλλος ὑμείς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκού-
σατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ἔμμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδήτε ὅτι οὐ
ἄν ἐνὶ ύπεικάθομι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ

5 ύπείκων δὲ ἁμα ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ

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19. καὶ εἰ: introduces a very extreme form of supposition, implying that even then the conclusion is unsailable; εἰ καὶ (cf. 30 ε) introduces a condition implying that in that case, as in many others, the conclusion remains. See H. 1053, 1, 2.

20. ἄλλα μὴ: and not. The Eng. idiom avoids the Greek abruptness. For ἄλλα in abrupt transitions, see H. 1046, 2 b.

XX. 2. οὐ λόγους κτ.: as Demosthenes says (11. 12), ἀπὸς μὲν λόγοι, ἀν ἀπὸ τὰ πράγματα (deeds), ματαιών τι (folly) φαίνεται καὶ κερῶν. Cf. Lach. 188 c-e, where the harmony of a man's deeds and words is spoken of as τῇ ὑπὲρ ζῆν ἡμοσιμένοι αὐτὸς ὅπως τῶν θείων σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστ... ὑπὲρ μόνη Ἑλληνικὴν ζωὴν ἠμοιαία, ῥειγματισμοῦ ἐν ὑπαίθρει, περὶ δὲ

οὗων αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ λέγοντες (raising side issues) ἐνίοτε ἡξαπατῶσιν, ὑμῖν ἀποδεικνύντες ὅσα στρατιώται ἁγαθοὶ ἐίσιν κτ.: For another instance of this practice indulged in, cf. 28 ε-29 α.

3. οὐδ' ἄν ἐνι: stronger than οὐδένι ἐν. Cf. Gorg. 512 ε, τὴν εἰμαρμένην (fate) οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐκφύσιν, and ibid. 521 ε, ὅς μοι θεόκειται, ὁ Σώκρατες, πιστεύων μηδ' ἄν ἐν τοῖς παθεῖν... Ἡ ταυτάτη σαφῆς, ἐν τοῖς παθεῖν... Hoow confident you seem, Socrates, that you never will suffer any of these things! G. 378; H. 290 α.

4. ύπεικάθομι: second aor. opt. from ύπεικεῖν with αθ appended to the stem, i.e. ύπεικ.: See G. 779; H. 494 and α. The present ύπεικάθειν, like διωκάθειν (διώκειν), διμυκάθειν (ἀμύκειν) and σχέθειν (ἐχεῖν), is prob. a fiction. It is hard to prove that this θ adds strength to the meaning of ύπεικεῖν. In certain cases this θ is appended in the pres. τελέθειν, φαέθειν, φλέγθειν. Cf. Curt. Griech. Etym. pp. 62 and 63.

5. ἁμα ἀπολοίμην: if this, as Schanz maintains, is what Plato really wrote, the necessary άν gets itself supplied from οὐδ' ἂν ἐνi above. Cron, following Stallbaum, writes ἁμα καὶ ἁμα άν; Riddell defends Ast's conjecture, ἁμα καν. The text here still remains hard to establish. See App. — φορτικα καὶ δικανικα: cheap and tedious commonplace, a collocation which suggests the words of Callicles, who,
by way of reproof, says to Socrates (Gorg. 482 c) : σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὃ Σῶκρατες, εἰς τοιαύτα ἄγεις φορτίκα καὶ δημηγορίκα, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν φορτίκα. Cf. Rep. ii. 367 a, ταῦτα ... ὑπὲρ δικαίωσίνης τε καὶ ἄδικαις λέ­γοις ἂν, μεταστρέψων τούτων τὴν δύναμιν φορτίκας, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. For δημηγορικά, which has the sense of in bad taste, cf. Gorg. 494 c, where Callicles, shocked at Socrates’s remarks, says ὡς ἄτοπος εί, ὃ Σῶκρατες, καὶ ἄτεχνος δημηγόρος. See also on κεκαλλιετησμένους, 17 c. It was com­mon in the courts and assemblies at Athens for the speakers to call a spade a spade. Of course they always declared that they must speak the truth, and the whole truth. This duty was often made the pretext for utterances not strictly in good taste.

7. ἐβούλευσα δέ: but I was chosen to the senate, i.e. the senate of five hundred, chosen by lot. One of this senate’s chief duties was to act as a committee, so to speak, before whom came, in the first instance, the questions to be dealt with by the ἐκκλησία (assembly). A preliminary decree (προβούλευμα) from this senate was the regular form in which matters came before the assembly.

8. ἐτυχεν ... πρυτανεύοντα: the fifty representatives in the senate of each of the ten tribes (each φυλή taking its turn in an order yearly determined by lot) had the general charge of the business of the senate, and directed the meetings both of the senate and of the popular assembly, for 35 or 36 days, i.e. one tenth of the lunar year of 354 days, or in leapyears, for 38 or 39 days. Of this board of fifty (whose members were called πρυτάνεις during its term of office) one member was chosen every day by lot, as ἐπιστάτης, or president. The ἐπιστάτης held the keys of the public treasury and of the public repository of records, also the seal of the commonwealth, and, further, presided at all meetings of the senate and of the assembly. Later (prob. in 378 B.C., the archonship of Nausinicus, when the board of nine πρόεδροι, whom the ἐπιστάτης chose every morning by lot from the non-prytanising tribes, was established) a new officer, the ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρόεδρων, relieved him of this last duty. In Socrates’s time, the φυλή πρυτανεύουσα, and the ἐπιστάτης of the day, had the responsibility of putting to the vote (ἐπιψηφίσεως) any question that arose or of refusing to allow a vote. Socrates belonged to the δῆμος Ἀλωπεκή, in the φυλή Ἀντιοχίς. Notice the addition of Ἀντιοχίς here without the art. and as an afterthought; ἡμῶν ἡ φυλή would have been sufficient, though less circumstantial. — ὅτε ύμεῖς κτέ.: after the Athenian success off the islands called Arginusae, in 406 B.C. This battle is also spoken of as ἡ περὶ Δέ­σβων ναυμαχία, Xen. Hell. ii. 32-35. The victorious generals were promptly prosecuted for remissness in the performance of their duty. Accused of having shown criminal neglect in failing to gather up the dead and save those who, at the end of the engagement, were floating about on wrecks, they pleaded “not guilty.” The squad-
barely detailed for this duty had been hindered, they said, by stress of weather. The main fleet went in pursuit of the worsted enemy. The details of the case for and against them cannot satisfactorily be made out, though the reasons are many and strong for thinking them innocent. The illegality of the procedure by which they were condemned is undoubted. They were condemned because judgment was passed upon them apart, i.e. apart from appeal, — this was illegal, since not only the general practice at Athens, but the decree of Cannonus (τὸ Καννωνοῦ ψῆφισμα) provided διὰ (apart) ἕκαστον κρίνειν, — (2) because they had not reasonable time allowed them for preparing and presenting their defence. Cf. Xen. Hell. i. 7. 5, βραχεια ἐκαστὸς ἀπελογήσατο, οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν σφισι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον. See Xen. Hell. i. 6. 33 ff. and 7; Mem. i 1. 18; iv. 4. 2.

9. τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς: the round number of all the generals is given here. One of the ten, Archestratus, died at Mitylene, where Conon, another of them, was still blockaded when the battle was fought. Of the remaining eight who were in the battle, two, Protonomus and Aristogenes, flatly refused to obey the summons to return to Athens. Thus only six reached Athens, and these, Péricles, Lysias, Diomedon, Erasinides, Aristocrates, and Thrasyllus, were put to death. — τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας: not only the dead but those who were floating about in danger of their lives. Cf. Xen. Hell. i. 7. 11, παρηλθὲ
tōn prutánēōn ἡναντιώθην μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους 32 -
[καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην], καὶ ἐτόιμων ὠντων ἐνδεικνύει
μὲ καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων καὶ ὑμῶν κελευντῶν καὶ
15 βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ὄμην μᾶλλον μὲ
δεῖν διακυνδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βου
λευμένων φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν
ἣν ἐτὶ δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως! ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία
ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμφάμενοι μὲ πέμπτον
20 αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἁγαγεῖν έκ Σαλαμῖνος

12. ἡναντιώθην: used absolutely as often. — μηδὲν ποιεῖν: after the
neg. idea in ἡναντιώθην. GMT. 807, c ;
H. 963 and 1029. But cf. 31 d e.
13. καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην: and I
voted against it, i.e. allowing the ques
question to be put. See App. Socrates was
ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων on this day
and followed up this opposition,—manifested when in consultation with
the other πρυτάνεως,—by absolutely
refusing to put the question to vote.
Cf. Gorg. 474 a ; Xen. Mem. i. 18 ; iv.
4. 2. For a different account of the
facts, see Grote's Greece, c. 64, fn.
Connect ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην with μόνος
τῶν πρυτάνεων. — ἐνδεικνύειν, ἀπάγειν:
ἐνδείξις and ἀπαγωγή were two sum
mary methods of procedure in mak
making prosecutions. Both dispensed
with the usual delay, and allowed the
magistrates (in ἐνδείξις, it was the
board of the Thesmothetae; in ἀπα
γωγή, it was usually the board called
οἱ ἐνδείκτα) to deal summarily with cer
tain charges. ἐνδείξις was a form of
summary indictment, laying informa
tion usually against one who dis
charged functions or exercised rights
for which he was legally disqualified,
as when an ἐτιμος entered public
places in Athens; ἀπαγωγή was the
summary arrest and giving in charge
of a man caught in actual crime. Cf.
Poll. viii. 49, ἢ δὲ ἀπαγωγή, ὅταν
tis ἤστην ἐνδείξις εἰς τίνα παρά
νόμον ἲστην ὑπάρχειν λαβὼν
ἀπαγώγη. The two processes might
therefore be used in the same case.
14. τῶν ῥητόρων: these professional
speakers had no class privileges; only
their more frequent speaking distin
guished them from ordinary citizens.
15. βοώντων: cf. Xen. Hell. i. 7, 12,
to δὲ πλήθος έβδο εισὶν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τίς
ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττει δ ἐν βούλη
ται. Apparently the crowd jeered
at Socrates. Cf. Gorg. 474 a, πέρσου
(ἀυτὸς ἀρήγος) Βουλευτέων λαχῶν,
ἐπείδη ἡ φυλή ἐπιτάξεις καὶ ἐδώ με προφυβλέξεις,
γέλωτα παρέξου καὶ οὐκ ἡ πι
σταμέν ἐπιψηφίζεις.
16. μηδ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι: to place e
myself on your side.
19. οἱ τριάκοντα: they were called
the Thirty rather than the Thirty Ty
rrants.— αὖ: in turn. Both democ
racy and oligarchy, however opposed
in other respects, agreed in attempt
ing to interfere with the independence
of Socrates.
20. εἰς τὴν θόλον: the Rotunda.
The name σκίδας was also applied to it
from its resemblance to a parasol.
Cf. Harp. (s.v. θόλος) who further
says it was the place ὅπου ἐστιν ταῖ
Δέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον ἵνα ἀποθάνοι. οὖν δὴ καὶ ἄλλος ἔκεινοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον βουλόμενοι ὡς πλεί- στος ἀναπλησαι αἰτιῶν· τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ ὡς λόγῳ ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ αὐτ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἔμοι θανάτον μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ 25 ἀγροικότερον ἢν εἰπεῖν, οὔτ' ὅτι οὖν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργαζομαι, τοῦτον δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἔμε γὰρ ἐκεῖνη ἡ ἄρχη οὐκ ἔξεπληξεν οὖτως ἱσχυρὰ ὡσά, ὥστε ἀδικον τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξῆλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέταρτοι ϕύσιντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἡγα-

21. Δέοντα: Leon of Salamis was an Athenian general. He, like Lyssias's brother Polemarchus and many others (Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 39), fell a victim of the rapacity of the Thirty. — οἷα: i.e. τοιαῦτα γὰρ. Cf. Cic. Cat. iii. 10. 25, quale bellum nulla ... barbaria ... gessit. — δὴ: in speaking of an incontrovertible fact, indeed. Notice the order of words.

23. ἀνάπλησαι: implicate, the Lat. implicere, or contaminare. ἀνάπλως is used similarly. Cf. Phaed. 67 a, ἢν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλώμεν τῷ σῶματι μηδὲ κοινωνώμεν, ὅτι μη (except so far as) πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπλώμεθα τὰς τούτων φύσεως. With this passage cf. especially Antipho, ii. a. 10, συγκαταπλᾶσαι τούς ἀναπίστους. For the facts, cf. Lys. xii. 93, συνοφειδεῖσα μὲν γὰρ ὅμας οὐκ ἥξιον, συνδιαβάλλεσθαι δ' ἡνάγκαζον. See also Critias's speech in the Odeum, Xen. Hell. ii. 4. 9: δὲ αὖν ὅμας, ὑποπερ καὶ τιμῶν μεθέ- ἔξετε οὖτω καὶ τῶν κινδύνων μετέχειν. τῶν οὖν κατειληγμένων ἔλευσινος κα- 

24. εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢν εἰπεῖν: a supposition contrary to fact with suppressed apod. used by way of showing hesitation. Cf. the same const. in Euthyd. 283 e, ὥς ἐτε Θούρας, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢν εἰπεῖν, εἰπον ἀν “οὐ εἰς κεφαλήν,” ὅ τι μαθὼν μοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταφεύγει κτέ. The usages of gentle speech at Athens adopted this formula to soften and excuse a strong expression. Cf. Gorg. 509 a, ταῦτα . . . κατέχεται καὶ δέθεναι, καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερον εἰπεῖν ἑτοῖς, σιδηρότης καὶ αδαμαντίνοις λόγοις. The ἀγροικότερον τι, for which Socrates apologizes, is undoubtedly the curt and blunt colloquialism of μέλει μοι οὖν ὅτι οὖν. Such an apology perhaps would prepare the less sensitive modern for language not less curt and blunt, but far more “colloquial.”

26. τούτου δὲ: pointedly summarizes the preceding clause.

28. ὥστε: not the correlative of οὖτως, but to be connected immediately with ἔξεπληξεν. The idiom ἐκ- 

29. ϕύσιντο, ψόμην: went straight
30 οὖν Δέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ψυχόμην ἀπιὼν οίκαδε. καὶ ἵσως ἄν διὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη καὶ τούτων υμῶν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.  

γ ΧΧΙ. "Αρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴσεθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοηθοῦν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ, ὡσπερ χρή, τούτο περὶ πλείοντος ἐποιούμην; πολλοῖ γε δεῖ, ὃ ἀνδρὲς 'Αθηναῖοι· οὐδὲ 5 γὰρ ἂν ἄλλοις ἀνθρώπων οὖν ὑμεῖς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημόσια τε, εἰ πού τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἵδια ὃ αὐτὸς ὁ οὗτος, οὐδὲν πῶτοτε ἐγγυωρῆσας οὖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλες οὔτε τούτων οὐδενὶ, οὐς ὅ διαιβάλλοντες ἐμὲ φασώ ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκα.  

10 ὅσ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πῶτοτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δὲ τὸς μον λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκούειν, εἰτε νεώτερος 30 ὁ φράσματος γενεται, εἰ δὲ μακρὰ, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημόσια τε, εἰ πού τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἵδια ὃ αὐτὸς ὁ οὗτος, οὐδὲν πῶτοτε ἐγγυωρῆσας οὖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλες οὔτε τούτων οὐδενὶ, οὐς ὅ διαιβάλλοντες ἐμὲ φασώ ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκα.  

31. διὰ ταχέων: a common expression with Thucydides and Xenophon, equiv. to διὰ τάχους. Cf. διὰ βραχέων, Prot. 330 a; Gorg. 449 a. The Thirty were only eight months (June 404–Febr. 403) in power, for they ceased to rule when Critias fell at Munychia in the engagement with Thrasybulus and the returned exiles. In the interim before the restoration of the democracy, ten men, doubtless one for each φυλή, were put in their place. Cf. Xen. Hell. ii. 4. 23.  

32. μάρτυρες: possibly proceedings were here interrupted for these witnesses, though it seems quite as likely that Socrates is appealing to the δικασταὶ themselves to be his witnesses. Hermann, who thus understands it, reads υμῶν instead of υμών, an unnecessary change.  

XXI. 1. ἀρ' οὖν: by οὖν we are referred to what immediately precedes for our answer to this question.  

2. ἔπραττον: distinctly refers to a continued course, a line of action.  

3. τοῖς δικαίοις: whatever was just, neut., a concrete way of expressing an abstraction.  

5. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ: i.e. "however it may be with others, as for me, I, etc."  

6. τοιοῦτος: explained by ἐγγυωρήσας. This amounts to a very direct appeal to the facts, and may be regarded as a shorter substitute for τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι ὡςτε (ὅτι οἷος) μηδενὶ ἐγγυωρήσαι, καὶ γὰρ φανοῦμαι μηδενὶ ἐγγυωρήσας. For the commoner but more vague idiom, cf. Crit. 46 b.  

9. ἐγὼ δὲ κτῆ.: see Introd. 25, fin.  

11. τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος: see on πολυπράγμων, 31 c. ἐπιθυμεῖ does not exclude either ἐπιθυμήσας or ἐπιθυμήσει, but rather implies them. Cf. τινάχανε in 18 d. The notion of habitual action is conveyed in the form of the same single act indefinitely repeated.
XXII. 'Allla dia τι δή ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρονσι των 33
πολλῶν χρόνων διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθη-
ναῖοι. πᾶσαν ύμῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἴπον, ὅτι ἀκούοντες
χαίρονσιν ἑξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰωμένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς,
5 οὖσι δ' οὖν ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἀπῆδες. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτῳ, ὥς ἐγὼ
φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαν-
τείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνιῶν καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἤπερ τίς ποτε καὶ
ἀλλὰ θεία μοῦρα ἀνθρώπω καὶ ὅτι οὖν προσετάξε πράτ-
τεν. ταύτα, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστι καὶ εὐέλεγκτα.
10 εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐγὼγε τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διὰ
δέφθαρκα, χρήν δήποτε, εἰτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι
33 to ἡδία, which takes the place of the
more usual ἡμοῦ; Socrates calls atten-
tion to the publicity of the places
where he talks (cf. 17 c) and to the
opportunity of conversing with him
offered to all alike.

e XXII. 3. εἶπον: the διὰ τι . . . διατρίβοντες; but
grammatically it is an appended ex-
planation of τὴν ἀλήθειαν, and is gov-
erned by εἴπον. — ἀκούοντες, ἑξεταζομένο-
νος: both are in close relation with
χαίρονσι; contrast the const. of the
same parties. In 23 c.

5. οὐκ ἀπῆδες: i.e. ἢδιοτον, a case of
λιτότης (simplicity), or μείωσις (diminu-
tion), quite like the Engl. not at all un-
pleasant. Such are the common ὤχ
ἡκιστα (πάντων μάλατα) and οὐ πάνω
(cf. not quite). Socrates perhaps agreed
with La Rochefoucauld, Maximes, 31,
Si nous n'avions point de défauts,
ous ne prendrions pas tant de plai-
sir à en remarquer dans les autres.—
ὡς ἐγὼ φημι: as I maintain, implying
not so much that he makes his asser-
tion now as that he now emphatically
calls attention to the assertion al-
ready made and substantiated. For
the analogous use of the pres. express-
ing continued result of past action,
see GMT. 27; H. 827. Here φημι
almost means I am maintaining and
have maintained. See on ὑπερέλγω 21 a,
and cf. Lach. 193 c, βούλει ὃν ἢ ἀ-
γεμ. μεν πειθῶμεθα τὸ γε τοσοῦν; . . .
τῷ λόγῳ δὲ καρπερέως κελεύει.
6. ἐκ μαντείων, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ: a
phrase which suggests that ἐκ παντὸς
tρόπου has made room for παντὶ τρόπῳ.
The καὶ before παντὶ is best rendered
and generally. For the facts, cf.
21 b and Crit. 44 a.

7. τίς ποτε καὶ ἀλλὰ: ever at any
time at all, any other.

8. θεία μοῖρα: will of Providence.
What is appointed by the Deity is
contrasted with a man's own choice;
the phrase freq. qualifies what man
attains or enjoys through no effort or
desert of his own but almost ἀγαθὴ
μοῖρα (by the grace of good luck). Cf.

9. εὐέλεγκτα: easy to prove, not easy
to disprove. So ἐλέγχεω means prove
a point by disproving its contradictory.
10. εἰ γὰρ δή: for if really, i.e. as we
must suppose if Meletus speaks truth.

11. χρήν κατηγορεῖν: ἄν is not re-
d}
gabenemenei ygunosan oti neous oysin autous eyw kakon p伍-

Pote ti xwneboulevsa, vun autous anaabainontas emou

catnygorin kai tymwreisthai: ei de m autou therelov, tong

15 oikeioi twas tov ekivow, pateras kai adelfoi kai

allous tov prosoikontas, eiper y' emou ti kakov epe-
povtheasen autow o i oikeioi, vyn memnisthai [kai tymwreis-

thai]. pantiws de paeisw autow polloi entauith ois

eyw orw, prwtov m'en Krivin outosi, emos ylikwthi kai

20 dymothi, Krivbooulo toude patir: epieita Lusaniaas de

elusion states an unfulfilled obligation. H. 897. All the prots. here expressed,

including ei diapherei and ei epevnot-

thesav, belong to the first class (GMT.

415; H. 893), and the apod. xreito

involves its own unfulfilled condition.

But see GMT. 417. xreito together

with this implied prot. forms the

apod. which goes with ei diapherei

wv. GMT. 510. This prot. is dis-

junctively elaborated in two parallel

clauses, (1) eite eynosav, (2) e de m

autoi thelov. See on eiper wv. 27 d.

Instead of eite ... eite we have eite

... ei de (like oite ... oite), which gives a certain independence to the

second member. Hence it is treated

as a condition by itself, and the lead-

ing protasis, ei diapherei, is substanc-

ially repeated in eiper epevnothesav.

If (as Meletus urges) I am corrupting

some young men, and have corrupted

others, (if they were doing their
duty) they would, supposing some of

them convinced on growing older that

in their youth I, etc., now stand forth,

eits.

13. anaabainontas: see on eite diak-

osthron, 17 d.

15. tov ekivow: on the repetition

of the art. here, see G. 959, 2; H.

608.

16. tov prosoikontas: Eng. idiom

suggests either tov prosoikontos or

prosoikontas without the art. After

the detailed enumeration, pateras ...

allous, tov prosoikontas is introduced

appositively to sum up, and therefore

the article is used.

17. kal tymwreisthai: combine with

mevnisthai, and the idea is that of

muhsiakaei, a word which had lately been

much used in the political turmoils at

Athens. Cf. the final agreement be-
tween oligarchs and democrats, Xen.

Hell. ii. 4. 43, hé mén me muhsiaká-

seiv.

18. pantiws: as in answers, cer-
tainly. — entauithi: connect with

paeisw, which thus denotes the result

of pairénai. We might call it here

the perf. of pairénai. Cf. Xen. An. i.

2. 2, kal labontes ta òpla parhoun eis

sárdies. For the converse, cf. 36 c,

entauitha ouk òa.

19. Krivin: it is he whose name is

given to the well-known dialogue

of Plato. See Introd. 62.

20. dymothi: see on étvex prostaev-

oussa, 32 b. — Krivbooulo: although

his father Crito modestly declares

(Euthyd. 271 b) that he is thin (sklep-

phos) in comparison with his exquisite

playmate Clinias (cousin of Alcibiades),

Critobulus was famous for his beauty. See Xen. Symp. 4. 12 ff.
He was one of Socrates's most constant companions. The Oeconomicus of Xenophon is a conversation between Socrates and Critobulus. The affection between Socrates and Crito is best shown by the pains taken by the former in furthering Critobulus's education. In the Memorabilia (i. 3. 8 ff.) Socrates indirectly reproves Critobulus by a conversation in his presence held with Xenophon. The same lesson he reinforces (ii. 6. esp. 31 and 32). That it was needed appears from the impetuous character shown by Critobulus in Xenophon's Symposium. Cf. 3. 7, τί γὰρ σὺ, ἔφη, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ἐπὶ τίνι μέγιστον φρονεῖς (of what are you proudest?); ἐπὶ κἀκεῖ, ἔφη. That Critobulus perplexed his father is shown in Euthyd. 306 d, where, speaking of his sons, Crito says: Κριτόβουλος δὲ ὡδὴ ἡλικιῶν ἔχει (is getting on) καὶ δεῖται τίνος, διότι ἂν τὸν ὄνησε. — ὁ Σφήττως: of the δῆμος Σφήττος in the φυλὴ Ἀκαματίς.

21. Αλσκίλου: like Plato, Xenophon, and Antisthenes, Aeschines (surnamed ὁ Σωκρατικός) carefully wrote down the sayings of Socrates after the master's death. Three dialogues preserved among the writings of Plato have been attributed to Aeschines the Socratic. The Eryxias possibly is by him, but hardly either the Axiochus or the treatise περὶ ἀρετῆς. Aeschines was unpractical, if we can trust the amusing account given by Lysias (fr. 3) of his attempt to establish, with borrowed money, a τέχνη μυρεψική (salve-shop). His failure in this venture may have led him to visit Syracuse, where, according to Lucian (Parasit. 32), he won the favor of Dionysius. — Ἀντιφὼν: Aeschines and Antiphon here present should not be confused with their more celebrated namesakes, the orators. This Antiphon was of the δῆμος Κυψεία in the φυλὴ Ἐρεχθής, but nothing further is known of him.

22. Ἐπιγένους: the same whom Socrates saw (Xen. Mem. iii. 12) νέῳ τε ὀντα καὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶς ἔχοντα. Socrates reproached him then and there for not doing his duty to himself and to his country by taking rational exercise. — τὸν: moreover, a transition. The fathers of some have been named, now he passes on to the case of brothers.

23. ταύτη: i.e. the one in question. 25. ἔκεινος γε: he at least, i.e. ὁ ἔκει = ὁ ἐν Ἀδων, Θεόδωτος, named last but the more remote. Cf. Euthyd. 271 b, where ἔκεινος refers to Critobulus just named.— αὐτοῦ: Νικόστρατος, of whom he is speaking. Since his brother is dead, Nicostratus will give an absolutely unbiased opinion. — καταδεηθεὶς: lit. deprecari, but really it means here overpersuade, i.e. persuade a man against his better judgment. Cf. καταχαρίζεσθαι, 35 e.

26. Θεάγης: this brother of Para-
lus is known through Rep. vi. 496 b, where Plato uses the now proverbial expression, ὁ τοῦ Θέαγους χαλινός, the bridle of Theages, i.e. ill health. Such was the providential restraint which made Theages, in spite of political temptations, faithful to philosophy; otherwise, like Demodocus, his father, he would have gone into politics. Demodocus is one of the speakers in the Theages, a dialogue wrongly attributed to Plato.

27. Ἀδείμαντος: son of Aristo and brother of Plato and of Glaucon (Xen. Mem. iii. 6. 1); both of Plato's brothers were friends of Socrates. Glaucon and Adimantus are introduced in the Republic; Adimantus is older, and is represented as not on so familiar a footing with Socrates as his younger brother.

28. Ἀπολλόδωρος: surnamed ὁ μανικός because of his intense excitability. Cf. Symposium. 173 d. This is nowhere better shown than in the Phaedo, 117 d, where he gives way to uncontrollable grief as soon as Socrates drinks the fatal hemlock. In the Symposium, 172 e, he describes his first association with Socrates with almost religious fervor. In the Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους (28), attributed to Xenophon, he is mentioned as ἐπιθυμήτης μὲν ἵσχυρᾶς αὐτῶν (Σωκράτους), ἅλως δὲ εὐθῆς (a simpleton). Of the persons here mentioned, Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Aeantodorus, are not elsewhere mentioned; and of the eleven here named as certainly present at the trial (there is doubt about Epigenes) only four (or five with Epigenes), Apollodorus, Crito, Critobulus, and Aeschines, are named in the Phaedo as present afterwards in the prison.

29. μάλιστα μὲν: by all means. In the clause beginning with ἐν δὲ, ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῷ is referred to by τότε and contrasted with νῦν παρασχέσθω.

31. ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ: parenthetical. "The full expression occurs Aeschin. iii. 165, παραχωρῶ σοι τὸ βῆματος, ἐως ἄν εἰπης." R. The time used for introducing evidence was not counted as a part of the time allotted for the pleadings, but the water-clock (τὸ ωδόρ) was stopped while a witness was giving account of his evidence. Cf. Lys. xxiii. 4, 8, 11, 14, and 15, καὶ μοι ἔπλαιβε (addressed to an officer of the court) τὸ ωδόρ. See App.

35. γὰρ: calls upon us to draw a b conclusion suggested by the preceding clause. Socrates means: this fact (πάντας βοηθεῖν, κτλ.) proves my inno-
οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ’ ἄν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ὡς ἀνδρεῖς, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχονσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ’ ἦ τὸν ὀρθὸν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ξυνίσασι. Μελήτῳ μὲν

ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι; X

XXIII. Εἶεν δὴ, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς· ἀ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιεν ἄν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδόν ἐστὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἵσως τοιαῦτα. τάχα δὲ ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεὶς ἐαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάσσω πτερωτοῦ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγώνιζος ἡμείς ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἴκετευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ὅτι ἡ μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλος τῶν οἰκεῖων καὶ φίλων πολλοῦς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων,

34 b cence; for how else can we account for the following? γὰρ applies to both clauses ἄντι μὲν and ὁ δὲ; more especially to the latter. For λόγον ἔχοιεν, see on εἰ μέντοι, 31 b.

37. οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες: this partic., like ἄρχων and συνάρχων, has by usage become substantially a noun. The poets apparently were the first to use parties, in this way. Cf. Aesch. Pers. 245, ἰόντων τοὺς τε καισοῦς; Eur. El. 335, ἡ ἐκείνων τεκών. The participial use and the use as a noun subsisted side by side. Cf. Legg. ix. 868 b, τῶν προσηκῶντων τῷ τελευτήσαντι, and ibid. τοὺς προσήκοντας τοῦ τελευτήσαντος. GMT. 828; H. 906.

38. ἀλλ’ ἦ: see on ἀλλ’ ἦ, 20 d.

XXIII. 1. εἶεν δὴ: this closes the argument proper of the defence, and marks the beginning of the peroration.

2. ἵσως τοιαῦτα: in much the same strain.

3. ἀναμνησθεὶς ἐαυτοῦ: many δικασταί had been defendants.
ός ἀν δόξαμι, τὸν ἐσχατὸν κίνδυνον. τάχ' οὖν τις ταῦτα 34
10 ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἄν πρὸς με σχοίη, καὶ ὅργισθεὶς
αύτοῖς τούτοις θείτο ἄν μετ' ὅργης τὴν ψήφον. εἰ δὴ τις
ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει—οὐκ ἄξιω μὲν γὰρ ἔγγει; εἰ δ' οὖν, α
ἐπιείκη ἄν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἐμοί, ὦ
ἄριστε, εἰσὶν μὲν ποὺ τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο
15 αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, οὐδ' ἔγω ἀπὸ δρύνος οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης
πέφυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὡστε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοι εἰσί καὶ
νίεις, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἡδή,
δύο δὲ παιδία· ἀλλ' ὦμως οὐδένα αὐτῶν δεύτερο ἀναβιβα-
σάμενος δεήσομαι ύμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί δὴ οὖν
20 οὐδὲν τούτων πονήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
ναῖοι, οὐδ' ύμᾶς ατιμάζων· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἔγω ἔχω ο

9. οὐς ἀν δόξαμι: of course Socrates is far from believing himself
that the risk he runs is a desperate one.
10. αὐθαδέστερον σχοίη: would be too easily offended, more lit.
represented by more (than otherwise) self-willed. The δικασταί might easily be
too proud to submit to criticism of their own conduct in like cases; the
more so because Socrates said that he was too proud (cf. e below) to follow
their example. Cf. La Rochefoucauld, Machines, 34. Si nous n'avions
point d'orgueil, nous ne nous plain-
drions point de celui des autres.
11. αὐτοῖς τοῦτοι: causal.—εἰ δὴ: see on εἰ δῇ, 29 b.
12. γὰρ: "(I say if,) for though I
do not expect it of you yet (making
the supposition) if it should be so.”
The force of εἰ δ' οὖν is resumptive.
13. ἐπιείκη: not harsh, i.e. conciliatory.
14. καὶ οἰκείοι: "I am not alone in
the world, but I too have relatives."—
tοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου: this idiom
(with the gen. of the proper name) is
common in quotations. No verb is
expressed, and the quotation is in ap-
position with τοῦτο, etc. Cf. Theaet.
183 e, Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ
tοῦ Ὀμήρου, αἰδοίος τέ μοι ἄμα
δεινός τέ. This const. is not con-
fined to quotations. Cf. the freq. use
of οὐν τάτερον as in Phaed. 66 e,
δυοῦν τάτερον, ἡ οὐδαμῶν ἔστιν κει-
σάσθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἔτελευτήσασιν. The
quotation is from Hom. Od. xix. 163,
οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρύνος ἔσσι παλαιφάτου οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης.
16. καὶ, καί: not correlative. The
first καί means also, while the second
introduces a particular case under
οἰκείοι and means indeed or even.
17. τρεῖς: not added attrib. but
appositively, three of them. Their
names were Lamprocles (Xen. Mem.
ii. 2. 1), Sophroniscus, and Menexe-
nus. Diog. Laert. II. 26; Phaed. 116 b.
20. αὐθαδιζόμενοι: it is not in a
vein of self-will or stubbornness. See
on ε above.
21. εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἔχω κτῆ.: e
whether I can look death in the face or not. At this point the grammatical consistency breaks down. "Allā ought to be followed by a partic. (οἵματος perhaps), but "οὐ μοι δοκεῖ " is the only trace of it. See on ὁμώς δὲ ἐδόκει, 21 e. The anacoluthon (H. 1063) is resorted to because Socrates wishes to mention his real motive, and yet to avoid saying bluntly "I am too brave to do anything so humiliating." Having said "εἰ μὲν ταραττέως κτέ. the next clause (πρὸς δ᾿ οὖν κτέ.) shapes itself accordingly.

22. ἄλλος λόγος: another question or matter. Cf. Dem. ix. 16, εἰ μὲν γὰρ μικρὰ ταῦτα ή μηδὲν οἷον αὐτῶν ἔμελλεν, ἄλλος δὲν εἰ ὁ λόγος οὗτος.—δ᾿ οὖν: but at all events or at any rate, like certe after sive—sive. See on δ᾿ οὖν, 17 a.

24. οὖδέν: see on ἀποτρέπει, 31 d. —τοῦτο τούνομα: sc. σοφὸς. See on ὁνόμα δὲ κτέ., 23 a. Socrates purposely avoids using the word σοφὸς either here or below.

25. ψεύδος: used as the contrary of the adj. ἄληθὲς. Cf. Euthyd. 272 a, εάν τε ψεύδος, εάν τε ἄληθὶς ἦ. Sometimes it is even used attrib. with a noun. Cf. Polit. 281 b, παράδοξον τε καὶ ψεύδος ὀνόμα. Cf. Hom. II. ix. 115, τὸ γέρον, οὕτως εὐθὺς ἔμας ἄτας κατελέξας.—ἄλλ' οὖν δεδομένον γέ ἐστι: however that may be, people have arrived at the opinion. Cf. Prot. 327 c, ἀλλὰ ὁ ὁν γίνηται γοῦν πάντες ἦσαν ἵκων ὥς πρὸς τοὺς ἱδίωτας (non-professionals).

26. τὸ: used here to indicate that what follows is quoted. G. 955, 2.

27. οἱ δοκοῦντες: those generally reputed. Here Socrates may have had Pericles in mind, if Plutarch’s gossip is truth. Cf. Pericl. 32. 3, Ἀσπασίαν μὲν οὖν ἐξρήσατο, πολλὰ πάνω πάρα τὴν δίκην, ὡς Ἀισχύλης φησίν, ἀφελεῖ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς δάκρυα καὶ δειηθεῖς τῶν δικαστῶν, he begged Aspasia off, though Aeschines says it was by a flagrant disregard of justice, by weeping for her and beseeching the jurors.

32. ἀθανάτων ἑσομένων: the subj. of this gen. abs. is the same as that of ἀποθανοῦνται. This is not the regular const., for usually the gen. abs. expresses a subord. limitation, and clearness demands an independent subj. Here, and in many cases where it introduces an independent idea, it depends
On the leading clause for its subj. Cf. Xen. An. i. 4. 12, καὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν ἑναι, ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτοῖς χρήματα δίδω, ὁπερ καὶ τοῖς προτέροις μετὰ Κύρου ἀναβαίνως ... καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐπὶ μακρῷ ἱόν-των. G. 1152 and 1568; H. 972 a d. 36. οὔτω: a very pointed reiteration.

39. ἡμεῖς, ὑμᾶς: the defendant and the dikasts. Cf. c below.

40. τοῦ εἰσάγοντος: the one who, etc., or 'him who,' here conveying the notion of quality, the man so shameless as to. G. 1506; H. 966. The phrase is borrowed from the stage. Cf. Legg. viii. 838 c, ὅταν ἡ Θυνέστας ἡ τινας Ὀἰδή-νοθας εἰσάγων. XXIV. 1. χρώσις δὲ τῆς δόξης, οὐδὲ δίκαιον: after the unseemly practice has been condemned by reference to τὸ καλὸν (δόξα), it is found still more inconsistent with τὸ δίκαιον, and this is conclusive against it. The second οὐδὲ (with ἀποτελεῖται) is merely the idiomatic correlative of the first one. On the argument involved, see b Introd. 71, fin.

3. διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν: perhaps c the full idea would be, διδάσκειν καὶ διδάξαντα (or διδακτόν) πείθειν. For, strictly speaking, πείθειν may be the result of mere entreaties, but this Socrates would probably have called βιάζεσθαι rather than πείθειν. Cf. d below.

4. ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι: this explains ἐπὶ τοῦτο καταχαρίζεσθαι τῷ δίκαιον, "make a present of justice." Notice the evil implication of κατὰ in composition.

5. ὁμομοκεν: part of the oath taken by the dikastes was, καὶ ἄκροδάμωμαι τοῦ τε κατηγόρου καὶ τοῦ ἀπολογουμένου ὄμως ἄμφως. The orators were always referring to this oath. Cf. Aeschin. iii. 6 ff.; Dem. xviii. 6, etc. See Introd. p. 49, note 2. Cf. also the sentiment, grateful to Athenian hearers, with which Iolaus be-
35 begins his appeal to Demophon, king of Athens, Eur. Heracl. 181 ff., ἀνείνετο τὸ δῆμον τῆς συνήκουσας, ἐπὶ τὸν ἀθηναίον τοιαύτα μὲν ἡμῶν πρᾶττεν, ἐν 10 μήπερ ἡγούμαη καλά ἤναι μήπερ δίκαια μήπερ ἰσία, ἄλλως τε μέντοι νη Δία [πάντως] καὶ ἁσβείας φεύγουση ὑπὸ Μελητοῦ τοῦτο. σαφῶς γὰρ ἄν, εἰ πείθομαι ἦμας καὶ τῷ δείσθαι βιαζόμενον ὁμομοκατα, θεοὺς ἁν διδάσκοι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ἦμας ἤναι, καὶ ἀτεχνώς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγο-

See App. There is an intended humor in this accumulated agony of emphasis which leads up to what Socrates has called Mecletus's practical joke. Cf. 26 e, δοκεὶ νεότητα γράφασθαι καὶ 27 a, τοῦτο ἑστι παίζοντος. Cf. also the ironical allusions to this charge throughout the Euthyphro, particularly (3 b) φοινικὸς γὰρ ποιητὴν (almost, manufacturer) ἐλναν θεοὺς, καὶ (16 a) οὐκέτι αὐτοσχεδίαζο (deal at random) οὐδὲ κανονιμοὶ (have new-fangled notions) περὶ αὑτά (τὰ θεῖα).

12. πείθομαι καὶ τῷ δείσθαι βιαζόμεναι: a double opposition which forcibly brings out (1) the absurdity of doing any real violence (βιαζόμενος is a strong word) by simple entreaties, (2) the incompatibility between πείθεσι καὶ βιαζόμενος. All this gives in a nutshell the drift of Socrates's earnest objection to the practice of irrelevant appeals for pity and mercy. For the full force of βιαζόμενος, cf. Rep. vi. 488 d, ἡ πείθοντες ἡ βιαζόμενον, (by persuasion or by violence) τὸν ναύκλημον.

13. ἐναι: extraordinarily separated, giving great emphasis to ἐναι. The whole arrangement of words here is intended to arrest the attention and thus prevent their important meaning from being slighted.
15 ροῦν ἄν ἐμαυτοῦ ὡς θεοῦς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ 35 οὗτως ἔχειν: νομίζω τε γάρ, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναίοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ἐμὶ ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὡς μέλλει ἐμοὶ τε ἀριστά εἶναι καὶ ἐμὶ.

XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναίοι, ε ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μον κατεψηφίσασθε, ἀλλὰ τε 36

15. πολλοῦ δεῖ κτέ.: this is far from (lacks much of) being the case (so).
17. ἐπιτρέπω τῷ θεῷ: cf. 42 a, ἀδύνατον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ. Socrates sees a divine providence in any decision that may be rendered, and concludes his plea with words of submission.

18. ἀριστα: what Socrates understood to be ἀριστον for every man may be read in the Euthydemus (279 a–281 e), where Socrates discusses happiness with Clinias; and at the end of the Phaedrus in his prayer: ὅ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇ δε θεῷ, δοθέντε μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τάνδοθεν (within). ἐξεβαιν (outward acts and fortunes) ὅ δέ σα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντοῖς εἶναι μοι φίλα. πλούσιοι δὲ νομίζομι τὸν σοφὸν. τὸ δὲ χρυσὸν πλῆθος εἰ μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναι τὸν ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σόφων. — καλ ὑμῖν: he is loyal to the δικασταί; since they represent Athens, they are his friends. Cf. the words of Phaedrus at the end of the prayer, καὶ ἐμοὶ ταῦτα συνεβοῦν: κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν φίλων.

XXV. Here ends Socrates’s plea in answer to Meletus, Anytus, and ἅγος. But much remained to be discussed and decided before the case was disposed of. The pleadings in a γραφή ἀσβεσια, like those in a γραφή παρανυμπον, were (1) a speech of the prosecution, (2) a speech of the defendant in reply, (3) a vote on the defendant’s guilt or innocence. This would end the matter if the defendant were acquitted. But the judges found a verdict of guilty against Socrates. After such a verdict there remained always (4) a speech from the prosecution urging the penalty already proposed or a compromise, and (5) a speech on behalf of the defendant in which he actually proposed some penalty to be inflicted (ἀντιτίμησις) in place of his opponent’s. Cf. Aeschin. i. 197 f. After c. xxiv. comes the verdict of the δικασταί, which is followed by the τίμησις of Meletus. Then with c. xxv. begins the ἀντιτίμησις of Socrates. Then comes the final vote fixing the penalty. See Introd. 74.

1. τὸ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν: the inf. with ζε is placed at the beginning of the clause, and depends upon a word of prevention expected instead of ἐξιμβάλλαται. “Many things contribute toward my not grieving,” i.e. prevent me from grieving. G. 1551 and 1558; H. 961. — The first that I feel no disposition to make an outcry, results from many causes, etc. Cf. Rep. i. 331 b, τὸ μὴ δὲ ἀκοντά τινα ἐξαπατήσαι... μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἢ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσις συμβάλλεται, where the parallel is complete except that, because of the long and intricate specifications (omitted in quot.
An OAO Aria, 209 Patsy.

1. τὸ γεγονός τοῦτο, ἄλλα πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμᾶζω ἐκατέρων  

2. ότι μου κατεψήφισαςθε: a definition of τοῦτο τὸ γεγονότι.

3. καὶ... γέγονε: a departure from the beaten track. καὶ ὤτι οὐκ κτε., though regular, would have been cumbersome. The important fact detaches itself from any connective like ὃτι. This is often the case in clauses connected with τέ... καὶ, οὔτε... οὔτε, μὲν... δέ. See on ὄμως δὲ ἐδόκει, 21 e, and διαφθείρονσθα, 25 b. — οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον: no surprise, i.e. not unexpected. Compare φόμην just below almost in the sense of ήπισεν. The use of ἐλθειν and ἐπίλειν and the like to express anticipation, without reference to the pleasure or pain involved in the event expected, is common enough in Greek; sometimes even the context makes the expectation one of pain or harm to come. In English, hope is rarely used in the sense of mere expectation, but cf. Rich. III. ii. 4, I hope he is much grown since last I saw him; Mer. of Ven. ii. 2, As my father, being I hope an old man, shall fruitify unto you.

4. οὔτω παρ’ ἄλγον: so close. οὔτως is separated from ἄλγον by παρά, a case of apparent hyperbaton. See on ἄλλως τε κτ., 35 d. The combination παρά ἄλγον is treated as inseparable, because the whole of it is required to express the idea "a little beyond," i.e. close. The whole idea of by a small majority is qualified by οὔτως. The ἄλγον was thirty votes. Cf. Dem. xxiv. 138, Φιλίππου τὸν Φιλίππου τοῦ ναυκλήρου μικροί (almost) μὲν ἀπεκτείνατε, χρημάτων δὲ πολλῶν αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου ἀντιτιμημένου παρ᾿ ἄλγας ψήφους (within a small majority) ἡττιμώσατε. The subj. of ἐσεθαί is of course to be supplied from τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. — ὃς ἐοικη: used freq. (like the Eng. "as it appears") in cases even of the greatest certainty.

5. οἱ τριάκοντα κτε.: strictly speaking 31. Diog. L. ii. 5, 41, says: κατεδιακάσθη, διακοσίαις ὄντος κοιντὰ μίᾷ πλεοσὶ τῶν ἀπολουσῶν (sc. ψήφων). The total number of votes against him was therefore 281; so that 220 of the 501 δικασταὶ (see Introd. 66) must have voted in his favor. Socrates probably counted the numbers roughly, as he heard them, and said that thirty votes would have turned the scale. When Aeschines was acquitted of the charge of παραπρασβεία, betrayal of trust when on an embassy, brought by Demosthenes, his majority is said to have been also thirty votes. For Demosthenes, as here for Socrates, such defeat was, under the circumstances, victory. See Introd. 72.

6. ἀποπέφευγα: i.e. alone, Meletus could not have got 100 votes, since with two helpers he failed to get 300.
10 toûto ge, òti, eî ìµì ànèβὴ Ανυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορή-
σουτες έμοι, kàν ὀδφλε χιλίας δραχμᾶς οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ b
πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

XXVI. Τιμάται δ’ οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. εἶνεν:
ekte fē ἀνή τινος υμίν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι;
ἡ δὴ λογοὶ ὁτί τής ἁξίας; τί οὖν; τί ᾧζος εἰμὶ παθεὶν ἡ
ἀποτίσαι, ὡ τι μαθῶν ἐν τῷ βῶ ὁυχ ἡσυχίαν ἔγον, ἀλλ’
5 ἀμελῆσας ὄντες οἱ πολλοὶ, κρήματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονο-

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a 10. eî ìµì ànèβὴ: for the accusers and
their respective importance, see Introd. 30. Notice ànèβὴ... κατηγορήσουτες.

b — τὸ πέμπτον μέρος: (cf. Dem. xviii.
103, τὸ μέρος τῶν ψήφων οὐκ ἔλαβεν) the
indispensable fifth part, not a fifth part. The acc. is used because the
whole fifth is meant. Cf. Prot. 329 e,
μεταλαμβάνουσιν... τῶν τής ἄρετής
μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο οἱ δὲ ἄλλο. Xεν.
Απ. iv. 5, 5, οὗ προσέθησαν πρὸς τὸ
πῦρ τοῦς άψυχοντας, εἰ μὴ μεταδοεῖν αυ-
τοῖς πυροῦσ... ἔθα δὴ μετεδίδοσαν
ἄλληλοι δὲ εξ ὑλῶν ἐκαστοί.

XXVI. 1. τιμάται θανάτου: fixes
my penalty at death. See Introd. 73.
For the omission of the art. when
θάνατος means the penalty of death,
cf. 37 b, and see on τοῦ θανάτου, 28 c.

2. ύσιν: ethical dat. G. 1171; H. 770.

3. ἡ δὴ λογοὶ κτὲ: with ἡ (an) is ap-

pended the interrogative answer to
the first question, which is merely
rhetorical. — τής ἁξίας: sc. τῆς. This,
ellipsis is so common that ἡ ἁξία is
treated as a noun; here τῆς may
easily be supplied from the verb. On
παθεῖν ἡ ἀποτίσαι, see Introd. 74.

4. ὁ τι μαθῶν: strictly speaking,
this is the indir. form of τὶ μαθῶν,
which hardly differs from τί παθῶν.
See GMT. 839; H. 908 c. Both
idioms ask, with astonishment or dis-

approval, for the reason of an act.
They resemble two English ways of
asking ‘why?’ ‘what possessed (μα-
θῶν) you?’ ‘what came over (παθῶν)
you?’ So ὁ τι μαθῶν = an emphatic
because. The indir. question here is
loosely connected with the leading
clause. Such connexion as there is
depends upon the notion of deciding a
question implied in τί ᾧζος... ἀπο-
tίσαι, “what sort of a penalty do I
deserve to pay since the question in-
volved is what possessed me,” etc. This
is more striking than the regular
phrase οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἀγών οὐ γαγάγων.
Cf. Euthyd. 299 a, δικαιότερον ἀν τὸ
ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτομι οὐ τι παθῶν
σοφῶς νιεῖς οὕτως ἔφοσεν.— ἀλλ’ ἀμε-
λῆσας: this is more fully explained
below by ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἦν, for which see
on 9 below.

5. ὄντες οἱ πολλοὶ: sc. ἐπιμελοῦνται,
104, ἀνώγει δὲ τωτῷ αἰεί, οὐκ ἐὼς ἰδο-
νεὶς οὐδὲν πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐκ
μάχης, ἀλλὰ μένοντες ἐν τῇ τάξι ἐπικρατεῖν ἡ
ἀπόλλυσαι (sc. κελεύων). ἐκαστὸς is
often to be supplied from οὐδείς. For
a similar ellipsis, see Hom. Od. vi.
193, οὐ δὲν ἐσθήτος δει λέει ἐντεῦ τοῦ
ἀλλου ὥ τε οὖν ἐπίστη δικτύν ταλαι-
πείροιν ἀντίσαντα (sc. μὴ δεύεσθαι).
Socrates’ specifications cover both public
and private life.
μίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσίων καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γεγομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὑμνίῳ ἐπεικέστερον εἶναι ἡ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ' ἱόντα σωζέσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ εἰ 10 ἦ, οἱ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἐμελλόν μηδέν ὀφελός εἶναι, ἐπί δὲ τὸ ἱδία ἐκαστὸν [ἰδὼν] εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην ἐυεργεσίαν, ὡς ἕγω φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦ, ἐπιχειρῶν ἐκαστὸν ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἐαυτοῦ μηδενῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὸν ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθείη ὁπως ὡς βέλτιστος 15 καὶ φρονιμότατος ἐσοτερ, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τῶν ἀλλῶν οὔτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον const. is different. Cf. Xen. An. v. 4, 20, ἀλλόν ἡγησάμενοι εἶναι . . . ταύτα πράττειν κτέ. Like the present case is Soph. 234 ε, οἵμα δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἐπὶ πόρρωθεν ἀφεστηκότων εἶναι.

9. εἰς ταῦτ' ἱόντα: the reading ὄντα can hardly be defended. See App.

11. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἱδία κτέ.: but toward privately benefiting individuals. This is strictly the completion of the thought introduced by ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας, which, though ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦ furnishes its verb, still requires a positive expression to explain ὧν ἱστύχαν ἡγον. ἐνταῦθα, as is often the case with ὄντως, is resumptive, and restates ἐπὶ τὸ ἱδία ἐκαστὸν κτέ. The whole period is full of repetitions, but ἱδία comes in most unaccountably. See App. See on τούτων γὰρ ἐκαστος, 19 ε.

13. μὴ πρότερον κτέ.: cf. 30 a b.

14. πρὶν ἐπιμεληθεῖν; πρὶν takes the opt. on the principle of oratio obliqua, since the tense of the leading verb (ἢ) is secondary. GMT. 644; H. 924.

15. ὄπως ἐσοτερo: GMT.339; H.885 a.

16. τῶν τῶν ἀλλῶν: not a third specification in line with μήτε . . . μήτε, but connected with the whole μὴ πρό-
Platonos

ἐπιμελεῖσθαι: τί οὖν εἴμι ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὄν; ἀγαθόν τι, ὃς ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἄξιαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τυμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἂγαθὸν τοιοῦτον, ὃ τι ἄν 20 πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἄνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτῃ, δεο­μένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει, οὔκ ἔσθ' ὃ τι μᾶλλον, ὃς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ συτείσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλ­λον ἐὰν τις υἱῶν ἵππω ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγην νενίκηκεν 25 Ὅλυμπίσσων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ υἱός ποιεῖ εὐδαιμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἀγω δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ ε

36 τερον . . . πλέως. — κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρό­πον: repeats ἐκ παραλήλου the thought conveyed by οὕτω, which points back to μὴ πρότερον . . . πρὶν, i.e. so that what was essential might not be neglected in favor of what is unessential.

d 17. τι οὖν κτέ.: a return to the question asked above, with omission of what does not suit the new connexion. Notice in the next line the position of δει, which is emphasized by the γε that follows, if you insist that, etc.

20. ἄνδρι πένητι εὐεργέτῃ: a poor man who has richly served the state. He is poor, and therefore needs the σέβης, which he deserves because he is an εὐεργέτης. εὐεργέτης was a title of honor, bestowed under special circumstances upon citizens and non-citizens.

22. μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως: with colloquial freedom Socrates combines two idioms οὐκ ἔσθ' ὃτι μᾶλλον πρέπει καὶ οὐτὶ πρέπει οὕτως ὡς. See App.

23. ἐν πρυτανείῳ συτείσθαι: those entertained by the state (1) were invited once or (2) were maintained permanently. Socrates is speaking of (2), i.e. maintenance in the pryta­neum. The archons dined in the θεσμο­θέσιον; the senatorial Prytanes dined in the θόλος, and in later times also those called διεστι, — certain Eleusinian priests, scribes, heralds, etc. See on εἰς τὴν θόλον, 32 c. The public guests sat at table in the Πρυτανείον, which was at the foot of the northeast corner of the Acropolis. Some of them earned the distinction by winning prizes in the national games, some received it on account of their forefathers' benefactions to the state, e.g. the oldest living descendants of Harmodius and of Aristogeiton respectively were thus honored. The most ancient Πρυτανείοι on the Acropolis was in historic times used only for certain religious ceremonies.

24. ἵππω κτέ.: i.e. κέλπτι, race-horse; ξυνωρίε, a pair; ζεύγη, four horses abreast. Since a victory in the great panhellenic festivals was glorious for the country from which the victor came, he received on his return the greatest honors, and even substantial rewards. Cf. Rep. v. 465 d, where Plato speaks of the μακαριστός βίος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀληθονικοῦ καὶ ἥξιος, the blissful life Olympian victors lead.

26. οὐδὲν δεῖται: only rich men could afford to compete.
Δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεὶ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ συνήσεως.

XXVII. Ἰσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολῆς, ἀπανθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ ὦκ έστιν, ὦ Ἀθηναίοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιώδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαί ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι 5 μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τούτῳ οὐ πείθων ὀλίγον χάρ χρόνου ἀλλήλους διειλέγμενα· ἐπεὶ, ὡς ἐγώμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμοι, ὡσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανατοῦ μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνον κρύων, ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπείσθητε τὸ ἀν· νῦν δὲ οὖ ῥέδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύσεσθαι. πέπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δὲν ἐμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσει καὶ κατ᾿ ἐμαυτὸν ἐρεῖν αὐτὸς, ὃς ἀξίος εἰμὶ του κακοῦ, καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιοῦτον τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ· τί δεῖσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τούτῳ οὐ Μέλητος μοι τιμᾶται, ὃ φημὶ οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτʼ εἰ ἀγάθον οὔτʼ εἰ κακὸν

37 28. ἐν πρυτανείῳ συνήσεως: cf. above τὸν τιοῦτον ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιν εἰ σθαί. The art. is omitted, since this is thrown in merely to explain τοιοῦτον.

XXVII. 3. ἀπανθαδιζόμενος: in the spirit of stubbornness. This serves to explain παραπλησίως κτέ. For the facts, see on τὸ δείσαθαι βιαζόμην, 35 d.

— τὸ δὲ: refers to the act which has been only incidentally touched upon (ταυτὶ λέγων = ὅτι ταυτὰ λέγω). ὁ δὲ, οἰ δὲ, τὸ δὲ, are used without a preceding μὲν when they introduce some person or topic in contrast to what has just been dwelt upon, here περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου κτέ. For a different use of τὸ δὲ, see on τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, 28 a.

4. ἐκὼν εἶναι: an apparently superfluous inf. G. 1535; H. 956 a. For the facts, see on ἡ ἐκὼν, 25 e.

7. ὡσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις: for instance the Lacedaemonians. Cf. Pseudo Plut. Aroth. Lac. s.v. Ἀναξανδρίδου or Ἀλεξανδρίδου), c. 6, ἐρωτώντος τινὸς αὐτοῦ, διὰ τὸ τὰς περὶ τοῦ θανάτου δικαίως πλεοσίν ἡμέρας οἱ θέρμες κρίμους, πολλαῖς, ἐφε, ἡμέραις κρίνοισιν, ὧτ τερὶ θανάτῳ τοῖς διαμαρτάνοισιν (those who go completely wrong) οὐκ ἔστι μεταβουλεύσασθαι (to reconsider). Thucydides also says in his account of Pausanias, i. 132. 6, χρόμενοι τῷ τρόπῳ ὑπερ εἰσάσαι ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοῦς (their own countrymen), μὴ ταχεῖς εἶναι περὶ ἀνδρὸς Σπαρτιάτου ἄνευ ἀναμφισβητήτων τεκμηρίων βουλεύσασθαι τι ἀνήκεστον.

11. ἀδικήσειν, ἔρειν, τιμήσεσθαι: the fut. is used to disclaim the fut. (GMT. 113; H. 856) intention.

13. τί δείσας: what fear is there to b induce me? Supply verbs from the three infs. above.

14. φημὶ: see above 28 e–30 b.
15 ἔστων; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαι ὧν εὐ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, τούτου τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ, καὶ τί με δεῖ ἥν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἁεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ, τοὺς ἔνθα; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἐως ἄν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν μοι ἐστων ὀπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον· οὐ γάρ ἐστι μοι χρήματα ὄποθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι; ἰσως γάρ ἂν μοι τούτον τιμήσατε. πολλὴ μεν-τῶν με φιλοψυχίᾳ ἔχοι, εἰ οὔτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὦμείς μὲν ὄντες πολίται μου οὐχ οὐδε τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς 

37 b 15. ἔλωμαι ὧν . . . ὄντων: a remarkable const., arising from ἔλωμαι τι ἐκείνων ἐν ὑβα κακὰ ὑπτα, by the assimilation of ἐκείνων ἐν τὶν and of κακὰ ὑπτα το κακῶν ὄντων, and the insertion of ὦτι after ὑπτα. εὐ ὑβα ὦτι and ὑβα ὦτι occur freq. (in parenthesis) where ὦτι is superfluous. See on δὴν ὦτι, Cris, 53 a, and cf. Dem. xix. 9, μνημονεύοντα ὑμῶν ὑβα ὦτι τοὺς πολλούς ὑπομύσσαι, to remind you, although I know that most of you remember it. Cf. Eog. 481 δ, αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σὺν ἐκάστοτε . . . ὦτι ὑπτα ἣν ὑπτα σου τὰ παδικὰ . . . οὐ δυναμένους ἀντιλέγεσθαι. The acc. and inf. may follow ὦτι and ὧν.

16. τοῦτον κτέ.: a part (τι) of ὧν, by fixing my penalty at that. See App.

17. δουλεύοντα: as a man in prison, who ceases to be his own master.

18. τοῖς ἐνδέκα: see Introd. 75 and cf. οἱ ἀρχοντες, 39 e. — ἀλλὰ χρημάτων: a neg. answer to the preceding rhetorical question is here implied; otherwise ἦ might equally well have been used. The second ἀλλὰ introduces an objection, which answers the question immediately preceding it.— καὶ δεδέσθαι κτέ.: to remain in prison. GMT. 110. Cf. in Dem. xxiv. 63, the document which winds up with: 

37 c 19. νῦν δὴ: just now.

20. ἐκτίσω: for the fut. with rel. denoting purpose, see GMT. 565; H. 911. — ἀλλὰ δὴ: but then. See on ἀλλὰ δὴ, Crit. 54 a. The ἀλλὰ points to the impossibility just asserted of Socrates's paying a fine himself, while δὴ introduces the one possible alternative.

22. φιλοψυχία: clinging to life, which is opposed to εὐφυχία (courage). Cf. Eur. Hec. 315, πότερα μαχαμεθ', ἡ φιλοψυχία καμεμε; ibid. 348, κακὴ φαναομαι καὶ φιλοψυχιος γυνη; also the speech where Macaria chooses to die, Her. 516 ff., κοι τοῖς ενδομ один δῆτ', ἐὰν δη τις λέγῃ | "τι δεἀν ἀφικεσθ' ἱκέσθαι σὺν κλάδοις | αὐτοὶ φιλοψυχοῦντες; ἥστο χονος . . ." with the admiring words of Iolaus, ibid. 597 ff., ἀλλ' ἐ μέγιστον ἐκπέεθον εὐφυχία | μαχαμεθ' . . . εἰ. . . . εἰμι: cf. 30 b, and see on διαφθείρουσαν, 25 b.

23. ὅτι ὦμείς μὲν: that (if) you, my fellow-citizens, proved unable to bear my company. After this we look for something like this: "then others will prove still less able to bear it." But instead, we find a question with ἄρα, will others then, etc., answered by πολ-
25 λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυν ἀπαλλαγῆναι. ἀλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς αἴσθουσι βραδίως; πολλοὶ γε δεῖ, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἀν μοι ὁ βίος εἴή εξελθόντι τηλικῷ άνθρώπω ἀλλήν ἐξ ἀλλής πόλεως ἀμείβομεν καὶ εξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ 30 γὰρ οἴδ᾽ ὅτι, ἀν ἐλθὼν, λέγοντος ἐμοῖν ἀκροάσωνται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε· κἂν μὲν τούτων ἀπελαῦνω, οὐτοί ἐμὲ αὐτοῖς εἶ ἐξελῶσι πεῖθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· εὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαῦνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἴκετοι δὲ αὐτοῖς τούτοις.

XXVIII. Ἡσυς οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· σιγῶν δὲ καὶ Ἑνυχίαν ἁγών, ὁ Σωκράτες, οὐχ οἷς τ᾽ ἔσει ἢμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; τούτι δὴ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον πείσαι τινας ὑμῶν. εάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπεθεῖν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ 5 καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀδύνατον Ἑνυχίαν ἁγών, οὐ πείσεσθε μοι.

37 λοῦ γε δεῖ. The dependence of the whole upon δεῖ is forgotten because of the intervening detailed statement.

ε 25. βαρύτεραι; fem. because τὰς ἔμας διαστρίβας is the most important idea and τῶν λόγους is incidentally added by way of explanation. For agreement with the most prominent noun, see G. 924 b.

δ 28. ὁ βίος: the art. as here used has something of its original demonstrative force; accordingly ἐξελθόντι . . . ζῆν is appended as if to a dem. pron., that would be a glorious life for me, to be banished at my time of life. Notice that ἐξέρχεσθαι means go into exile; φεύγειν, live in exile; and κατεί- ναι, to come back from exile. Instead of τηλικῷ άνθρώπῳ, the commoner idiom would be τηλικῷ άντι. But cf. τηλικῷ ἁνδρέες, Crit. 49 a.; Euthyd. 293 b., πολὺ γὰρ βῶν ἡ μανθάνειν τηλικῷ άνδρα, and Legg. i. 634 d, ὅτι γὰρ ἄν τηλικῷ ἁνδραί πρέποι τὸ τοιοῦτον.

38. δι αὐτοῖς τούτοις: to describe the involuntary cause in contrast to οὕτωι αὐτοῖς.

XXVIII. 2. ἐξελθὼν ζῆν: to live on in exile. This forms a unit to which σιγῶν and Ἑνυχίαν ἁγών are added by way of indicating the manner of life he will lead. The meaning of Ἑνυχίαν ἁγών is plain from 36 b.

3. τούτι δή: that is the thing of which, etc.; cognate acc. after πείσαι.
Socrates probably means almost all of the Athenians. (28 e–30 c and here, has shown that he neither can nor should abandon his customary manner of living, and has thus proved that he neither can nor should live in exile; he further adds (cf. the reasons given in 37 b) that he cannot propose banishment as his penalty. Banishment he has already (28 e ff.) rejected, though here he rejects it in a somewhat altered form.

Socrates, in 28 e–30 c and here, has shown that he neither can nor should abandon his customary manner of living, and has thus proved that he neither can nor should live in exile; he further adds (cf. the reasons given in 37 b) that he cannot propose banishment as his penalty. Banishment he has already (28 e ff.) rejected, though here he rejects it in a somewhat altered form.

6. ἐπωνυμένω: see Introd. 26.—καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθόν: it is not duty only, it is the highest good and gives the greatest pleasure.

8. τοὺς λόγους: his speeches.

10. ἀνεξέταστος: this may mean unexamined, unscrutinized, or without scrutiny, in which latter case a man neither examines himself nor others, that is, his life is unthinking. Verbal adj. in τοὺς, esp. with a privative, occur with both an act. and a pass. sense. Here the act. meaning substantially includes the pass. in so far as it involves self-examination (καὶ ἐμαντὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος). —βιωτός: worth living. Cf. ἰεκτός, blame-worthy, and ἐπαινετός, praiseworthy. —ταύτα δ’ εἶτι: δέ introduces apod. (GMT 512) in order to bring it into relation with the preceding οὗ πέσεσθε μοι. The two correspond very much like the two introductory clauses ἐάν τε... ἐάν τ’ αὖ. See on δεινὰ δὲν ἐγν κτῆ., 28 d.

11. τὰ δέ: see on τὸ δέ, 37 a.

12. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμ’ οὐκ ἐθυμαί: after Socrates, in 28 e–30 c and here, has shown that he neither can nor should abandon his customary manner of living, and has thus proved that he neither can nor should live in exile; he further adds (cf. the reasons given in 37 b) that he cannot propose banishment as his penalty. Banishment he has already (28 e ff.) rejected, though here he rejects it in a somewhat altered form.

13. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν κτῆ.: γὰρ is related to the thought which lies unuttered in the previous explanation: not from love of money do I refuse to make a proposition. The apod. includes οὐκ ἐμελλον κτῆ. See on ἐς ἐμελλεν, 20 a.

15. νῦν δὲ—οὐ γὰρ: but as it is, b (I name no sum of money,) for money I have none. The connexion is similar to ἀλλὰ γὰρ (19 d, 20 c), where the unexpressed thought alluded to by γὰρ is easily supplied. νῦν δὲ expresses forcibly the incompatibility of facts with the preceding supposition. Cf. Lach. 184 d, νῦν δὲ εὖ δὴ ἔχει ἀκούσαι καὶ σοῦ.

16. εἰ μη ἄρα: see on εἰ μη ἄρα, 17 b.
BOÜLESÖTE MOI TMIHSAI. УСΩS δ' ΆΝ ΔΥΝΑΙΜΗΝ ΕΚΤΙΣΑΙ ΥΜΙΝ 38
ΜΗΝ ΆΡΓΥΡΙΟΥ· ΤΟΣΟΥΤΟΥ ΟΥΝ ΤΙΜΩΜΑΙ. ΠΛΑΤΩΝ δὲ οἴδη,
δ' ἀνδρες ἈΘΗΝΑΙΟI, καὶ ΚΡΙΤΩΝ καὶ ΚΡΙΤΟΒΟΥΛΟΣ καὶ
20 ΑΠΟΛΛΟΔΩΡΟΣ ΚΕΛΕΥΟΝΤΙ ΜΕ ΤΡΙΑΚΟΝΤΑ ΜΗΝ ΤΙΜΗΣΑΣΘΑΙ,
ΑΥΤΟΙ δ' ἘΓΓΥΑΣΘΑΙ· ΤΙΜΩΜΑΙ ΟΥΝ ΤΟΣΟΥΤΟΥ, ἘΓΓΥΗΤΑΙ δ' ὙΜῼΝ ἘΣΟΝΤΑΙ ΤΟΥ ἈΡΓΥΡΙΟΥ ΟΥΝΟΙ ΑΞΙΟΧΡΕΩ.

XXIX. Οὐ·πολλοῦ γ' ἑνεκα χρόνου, δ' ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἔστε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε· ἀνδρα σοφόν· φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμὶ, οἱ βουλόμενοι τῷ ὑμῖν ούνειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν περιμειώνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἄν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὄρατε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὅτι πόρρω ἡδή ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγνύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ύμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς

18. μὴν ἄργυρίον: about seventeen dollars. This is certainly small compared with the fines imposed in other cases, e.g. upon Miltiades, Pericles, Timotheus.

21. αὐτόι δ' ἔγγυασθαί: sc. φασίν, to be supplied from κελεύοντι. Their surety would relieve Socrates from imprisonment.

22. ἀξιόχρεοι: responsible, an assurance hardly needed in Crito's case.

XXIX. Here ends Socrates's ἀντίτιμησις, and it was followed by the final vote of the court determining Socrates's penalty. With this the case ends. Socrates has only to be led away to prison. See note on c. xxv. above, 35 d. See Introd. 35 and 36. In the address that follows, Socrates is out of order. He takes advantage of a slight delay to read a lesson to the court.

c 1. οὐ·πολλοῦ γ' ἑνεκα χρόνου: a compressed expression. By condemning Socrates, his judges, in order to rid themselves of him, have hastened his death by the few years which remained to him; thus, to gain a short respite, they have done a great wrong.

2. ὄνομα ἔστε καὶ αἰτίαν: the name and the blame. See on τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν, 20 d, and ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο κτῆ., 23 a. — υπό: as if with ὄνομασθήσεθε and αἰτίασθήσεθε. See on πεπόνθητε, 17 a. Some periphrasis like ὄνομα ἔστε κτῆ. was often preferred by the Greeks to their somewhat cumbersome fut. pass. (of which there are only two examples in Hom.).

7. πόρρω τοῦ βίου: far on in life. For the gen. with advs. of place, see G. 1148; H. 757. — θανάτου δὲ ἐγνύς: and near unto death. The contrast introduced by δὲ is often so slight that but overtranslates it. Cf. Xen. Cypr. i. 5. 2, ὁ Κυαέρης ὁ τοῦ Ἀστυγόνου
toûs ἐμοὶ καταψηφισμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε ἐν
10 πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἵσως µὲ οἴεσθε, ὅ ἀνδρεῖς,
ἀπορία λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἂν ὑµᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ
ἂµην δὲιν ἀπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν ὡστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν
dίκην. πολλοῦ γε δει. ἀλλ' ἀπορία µὲν ἐαλωκα, οὐ µέν-
tοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλµης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τού ἐθέλεων
15 λέγειν πρὸς ὑµᾶς τοιαῦτα, οῖ ἂν ὑµῖν ἓδηστα ἢν ἀκούειν,
θρηνούτος τὲ µου καὶ ὁδυροµένου καὶ ἀλλὰ ποιοῦντος
cal λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐµοῦ, ὦ σὲ γῷ φηµῆς. οἶδα ε
δὴ καὶ εἴθηθε ὑµεῖς τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε
ψίθην δὲιν ἕνεκα τοῦ κωδίου πράξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον,
20 οὔτε νῦν µοι µεταµέλει αὐτῶς ἀπολογησµένος, ἀλλὰ πολὺ
µάλλον ἀἱροῦµαι ζῇν ἀπολογησάµenos τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκεῖνος
ζῆν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέµῳ οὔτ' ἐµὲ οὔτ' ἀλλον
οὐδένα δει τούτο µηχανάσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν
οὐδέν: see on οὐδέν, 34 e.
19. οὐδέν: see on οὐδέν, 34 e.
21. ζῇν ἀπολογησάµenos: in this way, etc., i.e. after such a defence.
oὗτος above means as I have, and that idea is vividly repeated by ζῇν.
Thus its contrast with ἐκεῖνος (sc. ἀπολογησάµenos) is made all the more
striking.—τεθνάναι: see on τεθνάναι, 30 e.
23. πᾶν ποιῶν: by doing anything and everything. Cf. πανόμφρον, a ras-
cal. Cf. 38 d.
θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γι- 39
25 γινείται ὅτι τὸ γε ἀποθανεῖν ἄν τις ἐκφύγω καὶ ὅπλα ἀφεῖς καὶ ἐφ’ ἱκετεῖαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλῃ µηχαναὶ πολλαὶ εἴσω ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις ὠστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἐὰν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἄλλα µὴ οὗ τοῦτ’ ᾧ χαλέπων, ὥ ἀνδρεῖς, θάνατον 30 ἐκφυγεῖν, ἄλλα πολὺ χαλέπωτέρου πονηρίαν· θάττων γὰρ θανάτου θεί. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ µὲν ἀτε βραδὺς ὅν καὶ πρε- β σβύτης ύπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οἱ δ’ ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἀτε δεμοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄτες ύπὸ τοῦ θάττου, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ µὲν ἀπείμη Ϝ’ ύµῶν θανάτου δίκην ὄφλων, 35 ὁτιοι δ’ ύπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὀφληκότες µωχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ τιµήµατι ἐµµένω καὶ οὐτοὶ. οἰ µέν 30 τοῦ ὠς ὀυτῷ καὶ ἐδει σχειν, καὶ ὀµῖα αὐτὰ µετρίως ἐχεῖν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ µετὰ τούτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑµῖν χρησµωθῆ- 39

28. ὡστε: cf. µηχανάσθαι ὡς just above, and see on ὡστε ἀποφυγεῖν, 38 a.

29. µὴ... ἤ: substituted rhetorically for a statement of fact. See on µὴ σκέµµατα ἤ, Crit. 48 c. For the idea of fearing implied, see GMT. 366.

30. ἄλλα πολὺ κτέ.: fully expressed we should have ἄλλα µὴ πολὺ χαλέπωτερον ἤ πονηρίαν ἐκφυγεῖν. — θάττου θανάτου θεί: flies faster than fate, to preserve the alliteration, which here, as often, is picturesque. For the thought, cf. Henry V. iv. 1, “Now if these men have defeated the law and outrun native punishment, though they can outstrip men, they have no wings to fly from God.” In the thought that wickedness flies faster than fate, we have perhaps a reminiscence of Homer’s description of Ἀττι, II. ix. 505 ff., ἢ δ’ Ἀττη σβεναρῆ te καὶ ἀρτιόσω, οὐνεκα πάσας | πολλῶν ὑπεκπροθεῖ, φθανε θέ δ’ τε πάσαν ἐπ’ αλαν | βλάπτους’ ἄνθρώποισ.

34. θανάτου δίκην ὄφλων: with ὄφλισκάνειν, whether used technically (as a law term) or colloquially, we find the crime or the penalty either (1) in the acc. or (2) in the gen. with or without δίκην. On the accent, see App.

36. καὶ ἐγὼ κτέ.: i.e. they escape their punishment just as little as I escape mine. The καὶ before ἐδει makes a climax: “perhaps it was necessary for the matter actually to shape itself just as it really has.”

37. σχειν: on the meaning of σχειν and ἔχειν respectively, see on ἐσχετε, 19 a.

XXX. 1. τὸ δὲ δὴ µετὰ τούτο: τὸ δὲ is used adverbially; see on τὸ δὲ, 37 a. χρησµωθῆσαι, declare a prophecy.
IIAATONOS

σαι δι καταψηφισάμενοι μοι καὶ γάρ εἰμι ἦδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐν δι ἡ μάλιστ' ἄνθρωποι χρησμοδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. Φημὶ γάρ, δι ἄνδρες, οἳ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, δι τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἤξεσι εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸν ἕμον θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νη Δίᾳ ἡ οἰκὲ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τούτῳ εἰργάσασθε οἷομενοὶ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἐλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἑναντίον ἀποβῆσεται, ὦς ἐγὼ φήμι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοιτοι, οὐς νῦν ἐγὼ κατείχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ ὑμῶν ἠσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἐσον- ταί ὑσφ νεῶτεροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε.

εἰ γάρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνωντες ἄνθρώπους ἐπισχήσεων τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὅρθως ἤστε, οὐκ ὅρθώς δια-

39 3. ἄνθρωποι χρησμοδοῦσιν κτῆ.: prob. Socrates has in mind such cases as Homer mentions, II. xvi. 851 ff., where Patroclus as he dies prophesies truly to Hector, ὅθεν ὦ οὖν ἕνως ἐντὸς διήνυμ βής, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἁθῆ | ἀγχι παρέστηκεν θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταῖ, and xxii. 358 ff., where Hector's last words foretell the killing of Achilles by Paris and Phoebus Apollo. Cf. Verg. Aen. x. 739,

Ille autem expirans: Non me, quicumque es, multo, Victor, nec longum laetabere; te quoque fata Prospectant paria, atque eadem mox arva tenebris.

Cf. also Xen. Cyr. viii. 7, 21, ἢ δὲ τοῦ ἄνθρώπου ψυχὴ τότε (at the hour of death) ἐδόθη θεοτάτη καταφαίνεται καὶ τότε τι τών μελλόντων προφῆς· τότε γάρ, ὡς θυκε, μάλιστα ἐλευθεροῦται. The same idea is found in many literatures. Cf. Brunhild in the song of Sigfried (Edda),

I prithee, Gunther, sit thee here by me, For death is near and bids me prophecy. See also John of Gaunt's dying speech, Rich. II. ii., —

4. ἀπεκτόνατε: sc. by their verdict, and by the penalty which they voted after Socrates had made his counter-proposition (of a penalty), ἀντίτι-μημα.

6. οἴν έμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε: this is after the analogy of τιμωρίας τιμωρεῖσθαι τινα, without some reminiscence of which it would hardly occur to any one to say θάνατον or τιμωρίαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε. ἀπεκτόνατε is substituted, as more vivid and concrete, for the expected τετιμωρήση. Similarly we have μάχην, μικρὸν or ἡττᾶσθαι as more specific equivalents of μάχην μάχεσθαι. — νῦν: expresses reality. This use of νῦν is akin to its very frequent use in contrast to a supposition contrary to fact (cf. 38 b, Lach. 184 d and 200 e); but here it is connected with a false account of what will come to pass, in contrast with the true prophecy of Socrates.

8. τὸ δὲ κτῆ.: for a similar idiom, though more strongly put, cf. Soph.
vocifere. οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἢ ἀπαλλαγῇ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴν 30
15 οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ράστη, μὴ τούς ἀλλοὺς κολούνειν, ἀλλ' ἐαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὁς βέλτιστος. ταύτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισμένοις ἢδέως ἄν διάλεγοντος ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τοιουτοῦ πράγματος, ἐν δὴ οἱ ἀρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἁγιούσι καὶ οὕτω ἔρχομαι οἴ έλθόντα με δει τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μου, ὃ ἄνδρεσ, παραμείνατο τοσοῦ-
5 τοιοῦτον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλή-
λους ἦς ἐξεστίν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλουσι οὕσων ἔπιδείξαι ἐπὶ θέλει τὸ νυν μοι ἐσυμβεβηκός τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοί γὰρ, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί — ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὅρθως ἂν καλοῦν — θαυμάσιον τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰσώθυτα μοι

5. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει: indicates the calm self-possession of Socrates, so strongly contrasted with the ordinary attitude of those under sentence of death.—διαμυθολογῆσαι: more friendly and familiar than διαλέγεσθαι. Thus Socrates prepares to open his heart upon matters not strictly relevant, which only those of whom he is fond and who care for him need hear. Cf. Phaed. 61 ε, ἵσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μελλοντα ἐκεῖς ἀποδημεῖν διασκο-
40 πεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεί, πολιν τινά αὐθὴν οἰκομεθα εἴναι.

8. ὑμᾶς γὰρ κτῆ.: see on ὅ τι μὲν ὁμοίως, 17 α.

9. ἡ γὰρ εἰσώθυτα κτῆ.: notice how many short statements of fact crowd one upon the other. This serves to arrest the attention. The θαυμάσιον τι is that now, when Socrates has such a fate before him, the voice is silent, while previously, etc. See on δεινὰ ἂν εἴην (f. i.), 28 ε.
10 μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ 40
πάνω πυκνῇ ἄεὶ ἢν καὶ πάνω ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιομενή, ἐ
τι μέλλουμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ ἐμπλέβηκέ μοι,
ἀπερ ὀράτε καὶ αυτοὶ, ταυτὶ ἂ γε δὴ οἰηθεὶ γὰρ τὸ τι καὶ
νομίζειται ἐσχάτα κακῶν εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντε ἐσθεν
15 οἴκοθεν ἡναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἄνε· ἡ
βασιν ἐνταύθαι ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντι τι ἔρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἀλλοις λόγοις πολ-
λαχὸν δὴ μὲ ἐπέσχε τέ λέγοντα μεταξὺ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ
περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξειν οὔτ’ ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ’ ἐν λόγῳ
20 ἡναντιώτατι μοι. τι οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἔγω
ὑμῖν ἔρω· κινδυνεύει γὰρ μοι τὸ ἐμπλέβηκός τοῦτο ἄγαθόν
γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐσθ’ ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν
ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμή-
ριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ’ ὅπως οὐκ ἡναντιώθη ἂν
25 μοι τὸ εἰσθῆς σημεῖον, εἰ μη τὶ ἐμελλον ἐγὼ ἄγαθόν
πράξειν.

10. ἡ τοῦ δαμονίου: see on δαμο-
νίον, 31 d. See App.
11. πάνω ἐπὶ σμικροῖς: see on οὕτω
παρ’ ἀλγον, 36 a.
12. ὀρθῶς πράξειν: i.e. so that all
would be for the best, an expression
which is closely allied to ἔθ πράσσων.
Cf. below c, ἀγαθὸν πράσσειν. Cf. 45 d.
13. ἂ γε δὴ κτέ.: γέ emphasizes the
idea expressed, and δὴ appeals to
the patent fact. Cf. φάσκοντά γε δὴ, Crit. 45 d. — καὶ . . . νομίζεται: a shift
from act. to pass. Cf. Charm. 156 c,
ταῦτα οὕτα λέγοντι τε καὶ ἔχει. Perhaps
as νομίζεται expresses the opinion
actually in vogue, it should be strength-
ened in translation by some adv.
Xen. An. iv. 4. 8; vi. 3. 23; and Hom.
Od. i. 372.
17. πολλαχοῦ δή: in many situa-
40
40
40
40
tions, and hence, often.
18. λέγοντα μεταξύ: for this and
other advs. with the temporal partic.,
see G. 1572; H. 976. Usually μεταξύ
is prefixed, not appended.
19. περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξειν: in re-
gard to this whole affair, referring to
the whole trial, and including every-
thing that led up to it.
20. ὑπολαμβάνω: not subjv., since
there is no question of doubt. The
question is only a vivid fashion of
speech, of which Plato is very fond.
22. ἡμεῖς: to be connected imme-
diately with ὅσα. This use of the
pron. gives a genial color to the <
whole; in Eng. we should use a par-
titive expression, all those among us.
25. ἐμελλον: referring definitely to
XXXII. 'Εννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. ὃνὶν γὰρ θάτερον ἔστι τὸ τεθνάναι. ἂ γὰρ οἶνον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ ἀισθησίων μηδὲ μίαν μηδενὸς ἐχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἂ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα
5 μεταβολὴ τις τυγχάνει οὕσα καὶ μετοικησίς τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε μηδεμία ἀισθησίς ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ οἶνον ὑπνὸς ἐπειδὰν τις καθεῦδων α ἰ ἰ ὑδὲν ὁρᾶς, θαυμάσαντον κέρδος ἂν εἰῇ ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν ὁμαι, εἰ τινὰ ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταῦτην τὴν

past time but still containing the idea of continued action. Cf. Xen. An. v. 8. 13, εἰ δὲ τούτῳ πάντες ἐπιστομέν (had done), ἰπαντεῖ ἂν ἀπολογεῖαι. For the facts, see Introd. 27, fin.

XXXII. 1. καὶ τῇδε: after an argument based upon the silence of his inner voice, Socrates considers the question upon its merits.


3. οὖν μηδὲν εἶναι: without definitely expressed subj. (cf. οὖν ἀποδήμησαι in e below), to be dead is as to be nothing, i.e. its nature is such that a man when dead is nothing.

4. τοῦ τεθνότα: the subj. of ἐχειν (not of εἶναι), which is an after-thought.—κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα: Socrates associates his idea of the life hereafter with stories and traditions which are themselves a development of Homer's utterances about the Ἑλλασὶν πεδίον and Hesiod's account of the μακάρων νῦσον. The later poets, e.g. Pindar, continued what Homer and Hesiod began. And Pindar, furthermore, incorporates into his descriptions of life after death Orphic and Pythagorean accounts of metempsychosis. Here and in the Phaedo (70 c–72 a) Socrates appeals to a παλαιὸς λόγος.

5. τῇ ψυχῇ: a dat. of interest. G. 1165; H. 771. The gen. would express the subject of the action designated.—τοῦ τόπου: governed by μεταβολὴ καὶ μετοικησίς. Of these two the latter repeats the former in more specific form. The gen. corresponds to the acc. with μεταβάλλων and (rarely) μετοικεῖν. Cf. Theaet. 181 c, ὡς τῷ χάρων ἐκ χάραι μεταβάλλῃ.

6. τοῦ ἐνθένδε: see on τοῦς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας, 32 b. See also App. —καὶ εἴτε: the second member is introduced by εἰ ἢ ἢ in line 19.


8. κέρδος: not ἀγαθὸν, because Soc- rates does not consider such a condition as in itself a good.

9. ἂν ομαί: ἂν belongs to εἰρεῖν, and on account of the length of the prot. is repeated first with ομαί in 14, and again just before the inf.; similarly δέοι is twice used in the prot. See on ὕσως τὰς ἂν, 31 a. —ἐκλεξάμενον καὶ
νύκτα, ἐν ἡ οὔτω κατέδαρθεν ὡστε μηδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τάς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τάς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἄμενοι καὶ Ὑδίων ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτῃς τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, ὅμως ἄν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώ- 

15 τὴν τυπά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὑρεῖν ἐ φιλox σταὶ τῶν ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας, εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἐγγὺς λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλεῖον ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὔτω δὴ ἐναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημήτσαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθέδε 

20 εἰς ἀλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστι τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς ἁρα ἐκεῖ εἰσὶν ἀπαντες οἱ τεθνεῖτε, τι μείζων ἄγαθόν τουτόν εἰη ἂν, ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἄφικόμενοι εἰς Ἀιδοῦ, ἀπαλλαγεὶς τοῦτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν ἐναι, εὑρή- 

σει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἶπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεὶ δικα- 

25 ζεω, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥάδαμανθὺς καὶ Λίκακος καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἀλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν 

40 ἀντιπαραθέντα σκεψάμενον: the first two parties, coupled by καὶ are subordinated to σκεψάμενον, just as it is subordinated in turn to εἰπεῖν. See on ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, 21 e. 

14. μη ὅτι, ἀλλὰ κτέ.: not to speak of any one in private station, no, not the Great King, etc. ἀλλὰ is used here to introduce a climax. See H. 1035 a. 

16. αὐτόν: this pron. gives a final touch of emphasis to βασιλέα. Socrates talks of the king of Persia in the strain which was common among Greeks in his day. Polus, in the Gorgias (470 e), is startled because Socrates refuses to take it for granted that the king of Persia is happy. 

17. κέρδος λέγω: sc. αὐτόν.—καὶ γὰρ κτέ.: for thus the whole of time appears no more than a single night, etc. 

20. ὡς ἁρα: a conclusion derived immediately from the admission that death is a migration from earth to some other place. 

23. δικαστῶν: for case, see G. 931; H. 940 a. 

25. Μίνως κτέ.: connected grammatically with the rel. sent. rather than with τῶς δικαστάς. Cf. Phaed. 66 e, τότε ἡμῖν ἦσται οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦ- μέν τε καὶ φανέρασαί εἰναι, φρονή- σως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν κτέ. The three first mentioned, Minos, Rhadamantys, and Aeacus, were sons of Zeus, and while living had earned great fame by their scrupulous observance of justice. They are also named in the Gorgias as the ministers of justice in the world below. In Dante's Inferno (v. 4-17) Minos, curi-


28. ëpti pòsòf: price stated in the form of a condition. — The repetition of ãv has an effect comparable to the repeated neg. The first ãv is connected with the most important word of the clause, while the second takes the place naturally belonging to ãv in the sent. GMT. 223. Cf. 31 a.


30. ἐμοιγε καὶ αὐτω: for me myself more particularly.

31. ὁπότε: when (if at any time) I b met.

32. Παλαμήδης: the son of Nauplius, a king in Euboea. The wisdom of Palamedes provoked the jealousy of Odysseus, Diomedes, and Agamemnon, and was his ruin. Acc. to the post-homeric story Odysseus plotted so successfully, by forging a message to Palamedes from Priam, that Palamedes was suspected of treason and stoned by the Greeks. Cf. Verg. Aen. 82 ff. and Od. iii. 56 ff. The title is preserved of a lost tragedy by Sophocles called Palamedes and of one by Euripides. The fate of Ajax is well known through Homer. Od. xi. 541 ff. See also Met. xiii. and the Ajax of Sophocles.

33. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι: a case of asyndeton (H. 1039), which occurs not infrequently where as here a sent. is thrown in by way of explanation.
τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖνον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἴμαι, οὐκ ἂν 41 35 ἀνδρῶν εἰς. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἑρευνῶντα ὡσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστι, καὶ τίς οἶται μὲν, ἐστὶ δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν τις, δ' ἀνδρεῖς δικασταί, δεξιαῖο ἐξετάζασι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἄγοντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιὰν ἢ Ὄδυσσεά ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους c 40 μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγονται καὶ ἐννεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἰς εὐδαιμονίας. πάντως οὐ δήποτε τοῦτο γε ἐνέκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσιν· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονεστέροι εἰσών οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἦδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοι εἰσών, 45 εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ.

41 b μοὶ is easily supplied from the preceding ἐμοίγε. The partic. is used as with ἥδεσθαι, to which οὐκ ἂν ἀνδρῆς εἶναι is substantially equivalent. Cf. also the partic. with impers. expressions like ἀμεινὸν ἐστι, μεταμέλει μοι, etc.

35. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον: and what after all is the greatest thing. Then follows, in the form of a clause in apposition, explanation of the μέ­γιστον. The whole is equivalent to τὸ μέγιστον ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ἐξετάζοντα διά­γειν (with an indef. personal subj.). See on οὗν μὴν εἶναι, 40 c.

38. ἄγοντα: not ἀγαύντα because it represents ὡς ἦγε. GMT. 140; H. 856 a. Cf. Tim. 25 b c, where the fabled might of prehistoric Athens is described, τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἑγουμένη... κρατῆσα τῶν ἐπιθυμών τρόπαια ἐκτύπησε. This loose use of the impf. instead of the aor. is not uncommon where extreme accuracy is not aimed at.


40. οἵς διαλέγονται καὶ ἐννεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν: when verbs governing different cases have the same object, the Greek idiom usually expresses the object once only, and then in the case governed by the nearest verb.

41. ἀμήχανον εὐδαιμονίας: more blessed than tongue can tell. Cf. Theaet. 175 a, ἀτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας (pettifogging), and Rep. viii. 567 c, where χρῆμα, something like which is probably implied in the above cases, is expressed, ἢ μακά­ριον λέγεις τυράννου χρῆμα. Cf. also Rep. i. 328 c, σοῦ ἠδὲ ἂν πυθόλι­μη...πότερον χαλεπὸν τοῦ βλου ἢ πῶς ὁν αὐτῷ ἐξαγγέλλεις.

42. πάντως οὐ δήποτε: in any event, we know that they kill no man there, etc. — τοῦτο γε ἐνέκα: spoken point­edly and not without an intended thrust at those who voted his death; the reason given certainly proves more than the point here made.
XXXIII. * Αλλά καὶ ὑμᾶς χρῆ, ὥ ἄνδρες δικασταί, 41 εὐθελπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τῷ τούτῳ διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν αὐτῇ ζωτικής τελευτήσαντο, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ 5 τούτων πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλον ἔστι τούτῳ, ὅτι ἡ θέων καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἂν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταθνησμαμένοις μοι καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαῖς.

10 καί τούτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεβησθῆκατο μοι καὶ κατηγόροις, ἀλλ' οἰκομενοὶ βλάπτειν· τούτῳ αὐτῶι ἄξιον μέμησθαι. τοσόνδε μέντοι δέομαι αὐτῶι· τοὺς νικεῖς μου

41 XXXIII. 2. ἐν τί τούτῳ: this one thing above all. The position of τούτῳ, coming as it does after instead of before ἐν τί, is very emphatic.

d 6. τεθνάαι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι: the pf. is used, because to speak of the completion of the change, i.e. to be dead, is the most forcible way of putting the idea. πράγματα applies to the trouble and the unrest of a busy life.

7. βέλτιον ἂν: Socrates considers the whole complication of circumstances in which he is already involved, or in which he must, if he lives, sooner or later be involved. Deliverance from this he welcomes as a boon. Cf. 39 b. — διὰ τούτῳ κτῆ.: cf. 40 a c. Socrates argued from the silence of τὸ δαίμόνιον that no evil was in store for him when he went before the court. This led him to conclude that his death could be no harm. On further consideration, he is confirmed in this, because death is never a harm. Applying this principle to his own actual circumstances, its truth becomes the more manifest, so that, finally, he can explain why the divine voice was silent. Contrast the opposite view expressed by Achilles (Hom. Od. xi. 489 ff.), and in Eur. I. A. 1240-1252, where Iphigenia, pleading for life, says, ἐν συντερμώσα πάντα μικῆς λόγων. τὸ φῶς τὸς ἀνθρώπους ἡπιστόν βλέπειν, τὰ νέρθε 3' οὐδέν· μαίνεται 3' δὲ εἴχεται γιὰ κανέν. κακῶς ξῆν κρείσσων ἢ καλῶς θανεῖν.

11. βλάπτειν: used abs. without acc. of the person or of the thing, because the abstract idea of doing harm is alone required. — τούτῳ . . . ἄξιον μέμησθαι: so far it is fair to blame them. Contrast 17 b, τοῦτῷ μοι ἀξίων αὐτῶι, this...about them; and cf. Symp. 220 e, τοῦτῷ γέ μοι οὔτε μέμησι κτῆ. They deserve blame for their malicious intention and for the reason given in 29 b. — ἄξιον: it is fair. Cf. e Gorg. 465 e, ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμὸν συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστί.

12. τοσόνδε μέντοι: "although they certainly are far from wishing me well, yet I ask so much as a favor," i.e. so little that they can well afford to grant it. Then follows an explanation of τοσόνδε.
έπειδαν ἡβήσωσι τιμωρήσασθε, δὲ ἀνδρεῖς, ταῦτα ταῦτα 41
λυποῦντες ἀπέρ ἑγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύσων, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ
15 χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς,
καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδέν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς
ὡς ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὃν δὲ καὶ οἰονταί
τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιήτε, δίκαια
πεπονθῶς ἐγὼ ἐσομαι υφ' ὑμῶν, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ νῖεῖς. 42
20 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡδὴ ὁρὰ ἀπίεναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανομένως, ὑμῖν
dὲ βιωσομένως: ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμενον
πράγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλήν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.

13. ἡβήσωσι: see on ἐσχετε, 19 a.  
Cf. Hes. Op. 131, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡβῆσεις καὶ
ἡθες μέτρον ἱκουτο.  
16. ὀνειδίζετε: see on ὀνειδίζων ἐκα-
στον, 30 e.  
18. δίκαια πεπονθῶς: to be under-
stood in the light of cc. xviii. and
xxvi. Socrates looks upon what is
usually taken as the most grievous in-
jury as the greatest possible blessing.

19. αὐτός τε κτέ.: for ἐγὼ αὐτὸς
461, ἐνάξιος μὲν Οἰδίπους κατοικτίσαι, αὐτός τε παιδές θ' αὐθε.

20. ἀλλὰ γὰρ κτέ.: serves to close the
speech, giving at the same time the
reason for coming to an end.
22. πλήν ἦ: pleonastic like ἀλλ' ἦ
in 20 d. See App.— τῷ θεῷ: cf. the
subtly ironical way in which the same
thought is put in the Euthyphro
(3 d e), where, speaking of his accu-
sers, Socrates says, εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὄ ν ἢ
ἐλεγον,μέλλοιεν μου καταγελάν, ἃσπερ σὺ
φῆς σαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐτῇ ἀνήδες παίζοντας
καὶ γελάντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διαγα-
γεῖν τοῦ δὲ σπουδάσονται, τοῦτ'
ἡ δὲ διπρ ἀποβήσεται θὰνον
πλήν υμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν. See.
on ἀριστα, 35 d.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

TA TOY DIALOYOT PROΣΩPA

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

St. 1. p. 43.

I. ΣΩ. Τι τηνικάδε ἀφίξαι, ὁ Κρίτων; ἢ ού πρω ἐστί ἐστίν;

ΚΡ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;

5 ΚΡ. Ὅρθρος βαθύς.

ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω ὅπως ἥθελησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι.

ΚΡ. Ἐπνύθης ὑδὸ μοί ἐστών, ὡ Σῶκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολι- λάκις δεύρο φοιτάν, καί τι καὶ ἐνεργεύτηται ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ.

10 ΣΩ. Ἀρτι δὲ ἥκεις ἡ πάλαι;

1. Κρίτων: see Introd. 62. See on Apol. 33 d, fin., and cf. 38 b, fin.

4. τηνίκα μάλιστα, about what time is it? In Lat. maxime and admodum are so used, e.g. locus patens ducentos maxime pedos, Liv. x. 38. 5; locus in pedum mille admodum altitudinem abruptus, id. xxi. 36. 2.

5. Ὅρθρος βαθύς: the adj. limits Ὅρθρος, so that the whole expression means rather the end of night than the beginning of day. Cf. the time when the Protagoras begins (310 a), τῆς παρελθόσες νυκτὸς ταυτής, ἐτί βαθός Ὅρθρος. The description in the same dialogue of young Hippocrates feeling his way through the dark to Socrates's bedside shows that Ὅρθρος means, just before daybreak. Cf. Xen. An. iv. 3. 8 ff., where Xenophon dreams a dream, ἐπεὶ δὲ Ὅρθρος ἦν . . . ἤδετο τε καὶ ὡς τάξιστα ἐως ὑπέφαινεν ἐθοντό. Here Ὅρθρος means the dark before the dawn. Cf. also ἀμφιλοχή νύξ, Hom. Il. vii. 433, ἦμος δ᾽ ὅπερ ἢ πω ἡδος, ἔτι δ᾽ ἀμφιλοχή νύξ, | τῆς ἦμος ἄρ' ἀμφι πυρήν κρίτος ἔγρετο λάδις Ἀχαιῶν.


9. καλ. . . . καλ κτέ.: and what is more, I've done a little something for him. τί is equiv. to ἐνεργεύσαν τινά (a tip).
ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικὸς πάλαι.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ συγῆ 

παρακάθησαι;

ΚΡ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἥθελον
15 ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ
πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος ὡς ἤδεως καθευδεῖς: καὶ
ἐπίτηδες σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἤδεως διάγγης. καὶ πολ-
λάκοις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμό-
νυσα τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νῖν παρεστῶση
20 ἐνμοφορά ὡς ῥάδιως αὐτὴν καὶ πράξεις φέρεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἄν, θ Κρίτων, πλημμελές εἰς ἀγανακτεῖν
τηλικοῦτον ὦντα, εἰ δεὶ ἢδη τελευτᾶν.

ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ε
ἐνμοφοραῖς ἄλισκονται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἢ ἡλι-
25 καὶ τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρουσίᾳ τύχῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἐστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρὸ ἀφίξεια;

ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὁ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπῆν, οὐ σοὶ,
ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηθείοις πᾶσι
καὶ χαλεπῆν καὶ βαρείαν, ἂν ἐγὼ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς
30 βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι.

12. ἔτα: refers to ἐπιεικὸς πάλαι in a vein of wonder or perhaps of gentle reproof.
14. οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία: the neg. belonging to the clause that follows is inserted by anticipation in the oath. The answer to Socrates's question is implied clearly in the use of οὐδὲν, and becomes categorical in καὶ ἐπίτηδες κτέ.
15. ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ κτέ.: τέ is introduced after τοσαύτῃ, which belongs to both subs. This position of τέ is very common after the art. or a prep.—ἀλλὰ καὶ: but furthermore.
17. ἦν διάγγης: for the subjv. after a secondary tense, see GMT. 318; H. 881 a.
18. εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου: for the gen. of cause, see G. 1126; H. 744. At the end of the sentence, a clause with ὡς (equiv. to ἢτι οὕτω) is introduced in place of the gen. — For the facts, see Introd. 36 and note 6, p. 26.
21. πλημμελές: cf. Apol. 22 d and see on ἐμμελώς, Apol. 20 c.
25. τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν: ἐπιλύεται εἰ is here qualified by οὐδέν, and is used in the sense of preventing. Hence the doubled neg. GMT. 95, 2, n. 1 b; H.1034.
29. καὶ χαλεπῆν καὶ βαρείαν: an effective and almost pathetic reitera-
ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἣ τὸ πλοῖον ἁφίκται ἐκ Δήλου, οὗ 43
deὶ ἄφικομένου τεθνάναι με;

ΚΡ. Οὖν δὴ ἁφίκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἥξειν τήμερον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἥκοντες τινὲς ἀπὸ Σομύου καὶ 35 καταλείποντες ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων [τῶν ἄγγελων] ὅτι ἥξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὖριον ἔσται, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτάν.

II. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ὁ Κρίτων, τῶν ἄγαθή. εἰ ταύτη τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτη ἐστώ. οὐ μέντοι ὦμαι ἥξειν αὐτὸ τῆμερον.

κατάλειψην, made all the stronger by the doubled καί.

30. ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατον ἢν ἐνέγκαμι: in Hdt., Thuc., Plato, and later writers, ἐν τοῖς, about, is idiomatically used to limit the superl. Thus ἐν τοῖς becomes an adverb, which describes not absolute precedence but an average and comparative superiority. Cf. Thuc. iii. 17, ἐν τοῖς πλείσται, among the most numerous (not ‘the very most numerous,’ since Thuc. adds that the number was exceeded once) where the gender of πλείσται is noticeable. Cf. also id. i. 6, 3, ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν τε σίδηρον κατέθεντο κτέ. Here the position of δὲ shows that ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι is taken almost as one word, i.e. πρῶτοι limited so as to mean practically the first, or substantially the first of those who laid down, etc.

31. τίνα ταύτην: connect with φέ­ρων above. For ἣ, see on ἥ δήλον, Ἀπ. 30 ε. — τὸ πλοῖον κτέ.: cf. Phaedo, 58 a: τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ πλοῖον, ὥς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ὧν ὦθεσαν τὸν κρήτην τοὺς δίς ἐπτὰ ἑκείνους (the seven couples to be sacrificed to the Minotaur) φιλοτέκνων καὶ ἑκείνων τοῖς ἑκατὸν ἐκατοκυρίων. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνοι εὐχαριστοῦν, ὧς λέγεται, τότε εἰ σωθεῖν, ἐκατοστὸν ἑκατοκυρίων (a solemn embassy) ἀπέδειξεν εἰς Δήλον. ἦν δὲ

deὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔκεινον κατ’ ἐναυ­τόν (every twelfth month) τῷ θεῷ πέμπων. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀρξύτηται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστίν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ κρύσῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτε­νώναι (to put no one to death by public execution), πρὶν ἐν εἰς Δήλον ἁφί­κητα τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεύρο κτέ. Cf. Introd. 36.

32. τεθνάναι: see on τεθνάναι, Ἀπ. 30 ε.

33. δοκεῖ μὲν: with no following δέ. In such cases the original affinity of μὲν with μὴν is usually apparent. Its meaning is, indeed, surely.

35. τῶν ἄγγελων: can hardly have been written by Plato, since ἄγγελος in the sense of ἄγγελα is not used except by later writers (Polybius), while ἐκ prevents us from taking ἄγγελων as referring to persons. See App.

II. Ἀλλ’, ὁ Κρίτων, τῶν ἄγαθή: it’s all for the best, Crito. ἀλλὰ introduces in vivid contrast to Crito’s despondency the cheerful hope of Socrates. — τῶν ἄγαθή: a hopeful invocation often prefixed to a solemn statement. Cf. Symp. 177 ε, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄγαθῆς καταρχῆς Φαίδρου, let Phaedrus make a beginning and good luck to him. Used freq. like the
KR. Póthēn touto tekmiaírei;

5 ΣΩ. 'Eγώ σοι ἐρῶ. τῆ γάρ πον ὑστεραίᾳ δεῖ με ἀποθυγκέων ἦ ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῦν.

KR. Φασί γε τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τούτων τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἥξεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἔτερας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τινος ἐνυπνίου ὁ 10 ἔωρακα ὀλγόν πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ των οὐκ ἔγειραί με.

KR. Ἡν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνυπνίου;

ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἰμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ ἔπειτ' ὡς Σώ- 15 κρατεῖ, ἥματι κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἕκοιο.

KR. Ἀτοπον τὸ ἐνυπνίου, ὡ Σώκρατες.

43 Lat. quod bonum felix fause tumque sit, or quod bene vertat. Cf. Dem. iii. 18, ἔτερος λέγει τις βελτίων ταύτα ποιεῖτε ἁγαθὴ τύχη. Cf. also the comic perversion of it in Ar. Av. 436, κρεμάσατον τὸ χαγαθή | ἐς τὸν ἰπνόν εἶναι πλησίον τοπιστάτου. For the most formal use of this word, see many inscriptions and the decree, Thuc. iv. 118. 11, Λάψις ἔπετο τύχη ἁγαθὴ τῇ Ἀθηναίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐκεχερίαν (armistice). In Xen. Hell. iv. i. 14, it is used of a betrothal: ἐμοὶ μὲν τολνυν, ἐφη, δοκεῖ, ὁ Ἀγεσίλαος, σὲ μὲν, δὲ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, τὸ χρὴ ἁγαθὴ διδόναι "Οτινὶ τὴν θυγατέρα. Cf. also Xen. Cyr. iv. 5. 51, ἀλλὰ δέχομαι τε, ἐφη, καὶ ἁγαθὴ τύχη ἠμεῖς τε ἐπίπεις γενοίμεθα καὶ ἠμεῖς διέλοιπε τὰ κοινά.

44 a 5. τῇ γάρ ποτὶ κτὲ.: this is the first premis that follows the conclusion stated above in οὗ μέντοι ἥξειν τὴμερον, the second is contained in the account of the dream.

7. οἱ τούτων κύριοι: see Introd. 76, and cf. Apol. 39 e.

8. τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας: means the same as τὴμερον, for Socrates is now thinking of the fact that day has not yet dawned. See on ὃρθος βαθὺς, 43 a.

10. ταύτης τῆς νυκτός: in the course of this night. The vision came after midnight, a circumstance of the greatest importance, according to Mosch. Idyll. ii. 2, νυκτὸς ὅτε τριτῶν λάχος ἱσταται, ἐγγύθη δ' ἡμά... εἶναι καὶ ἀτρεκέως ποιμαίνεται θεὸς ὅλερων. Cf. Hor. Sat. i. 10. 92 ff., —

Atque ego cum Graecos facerem, natus mare citra, Versiculos, vetuit me tall voce Quirlinus Post medium noctem visus, cum somnia vera.

11. ἐν καρφῳ τιν.: usually expressed by the shorter ἐν καρφ., opportune. Cf. Legg. iv. 708 e, ἐὰν πρὸς καρφόν τινα λέγωμεν. The τις has the effect of a litotes, as e.g. in ἐξει τινὰ λάγον, there is good and sufficient reason for it.

15. ἥματι κτὲ.: quoted from Hom. b Il. ix. 363, ἥματι κε τριτάτῳ Φθίνῃ ἐρίβωλον ἔκοιο.

16. Ἀτοπον κτὲ.: sc. ἐστὶ, an excl. which nearly approaches the form of a regular sent. Cf. Hom. II. i. 231,
ΣΩ. 'Εναργείς μὲν οὖν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Κρίτων.

III. ΚΡ. Δίαν γε, ὡς ἔσοικεν. ἀλλ' ὁ δαμώνε Σωκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἔμοι πεἶθον καὶ σώθητι: ὡς ἐμοὶ, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνητι, οὐ μία ἕμφορά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ χορίς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερήσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου, οἶνον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μὴ ποτε εὐρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοὺς δόξω, οἳ ἐμὲ καὶ σε μὴ σαφῶς ἱσασθε, ὡς οἶδος τε ὡς σε σφέξῃ, εἰ ἦθελον ἀναλίσκειν εὐχήματα, ἀμελήσαι. καίτις ἄν αἰσχίνων εἰη ταῦτης δόξα ἡ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείωνοι ποιεῖσθαι ἡ φίλους;

44 δημοβόρος βασιλέως, ἐπεὶ οὐτιδανοίσιν ἀνάσεις, καὶ ἰδι. ν. 408, σχέτωσας, ἀθρομαργήσῃς, ὡς ὁ νῦν θέτῃ (recked not) αὐτολα ἰέως. See App.

17. ἑναργεῖς μὲν οὖν: it is surely plain enough, immo evidens. The full meaning can hardly be understood without reading the context of the verse (363) which is quoted. Cf. Hom. Ι. ix., vv. 356-368. Socrates thinks of dying as going home, and Phthia was the home of Achilles. — γέ μοι: not γ' ἐμοι. The emphasis falls on the verb rather than on the pron. See on ἐκεῖνος ἔσων, ἀποτιμάσας, ἄπαθος πληθαυσάς, ἀπεφανήσας 44 ἀναλίσκειν. See App.

2. ἔτι καὶ νῦν: this gives a hint as to what Crito has planned. It is developed later. See Introd. 62.

3. ἕμφορά ἐστιν: more vivid and natural than ἐστιν.— χωρίς μὲν ἔτι δὲ: quite apart from my losing, etc. . . . I shall further, etc. See App.

4. ἐστερήσθαι: the pf. inf. with χωρίς.—οὐδένα μὴ ποτε: equiv. to ὡς μὴ ποτὲ τινα, and so here with the fut. indic., I shall certainly never, etc.

GMM. 295; H. 1032.

6. ὡς οἶδος τε ὡς κτέ.: I shall seem to many to have neglected you whereas I was able to save you. οἶδος τε δὴ σφέξεων represents οἶδος τε ἦν σφέξεων, I might have saved you, if I had wished. GMT. 421; H. 897.

8. ἡ δοκεῖν . . . φίλους: explaining εὐχήματα, which covers an idea already contained in what precedes. Cf. Gorg 500 c, περὶ τούτου εἰδίν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι, αὐτὸ τι ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσει τις (than which what would a man be more inclined to pursue with diligence) . . . ὧ τούτο, ὡς τινα χρὴ τρόπον ἄλιν κτέ. Where the gen. after a comp. is a dem. or
οὐ γὰρ πεῖσονται οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦθέλησας. 10 ἀπείναι ἐνθέδε ἡμῶν προθυμομένων.

Σ. Ἀλλὰ τι ἡμῖν, ὡς μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὡς μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζεω, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπράξθαι ὡσπερ ἄν πραχθῇ.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ’ ὡρᾶς δὴ ὅτι ανάγκη, ὡς Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλεων. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἴοι τε εἰσών οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ συμκρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, ἐὰν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ἦ.

Σ. Εἰ γὰρ ὡφελον, ὡς Κρίτων, οἴοι τε εἰσών οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἴοι τε ἦσαν καὶ ἁγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἴχεν· νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἴοι τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὕτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιήσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅ τι ἄν τύχωσιν.

IV. ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχετω· τάδε δέ, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μου· ἀρά γε μὴ ἐμὸν προμηθεί καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

rel. pron., an explanatory clause (here with the inf., cf. Eur. Her. 207) introduced by ἦ, may always be appended. Cf. 53 b c.

13. ὡσπερ ἀν πράξῃ: see on ὅν ἂν λέγω, Apol. p. e. The aor. subjv. has the force of the fut. pf. GMT. 90; H. 898 c.

15. ὡρᾶς δὴ: Crito means to point at the case in hand. “The fact is that the many are really in a position, etc.” Crito has profited but little by what Socrates has said in the court-room. Cf. Apol. 30 d, 34 c, 40 a, etc.

20. εἰ γὰρ ὡφελον κτῆ.: a wish the object of which is not attained. ἵνα οἴοι τε ἦσαν expresses an unattained purpose depending on the preceding unfulfilled wish. GMT. 333; H. 884. See on ὅς ἐμελλεν, Apol. 20 a. 21. ἐργάζεσθαι: serves as a repetition of ἐξεργάζεσθαι above. Such repetition of the simple verb is common. Cf. 49 c d and Lys. 209 c, τι ποι’ ἂν εἴη το ἄτιον, ὅτι ἐναίθα μὲν οὐ διακωλύουσιν, ἐν αἷς δὲ ἀρτι ἐλέγομεν καλὸς καταν. 22. καλῶς κτῆ.: indeed (i.e. if this wish were granted) it would be delightful. — νῦν δὲ: introduces the fact. Supply ἐργάζεσθαι here, and ποιήσαιτε with ὅ τι ἄν τύχωσιν. In hypothetical and rel. sents. τυχάνειν may be used without the partic., which is always suggested by the leading clause.

IV. 2. ἀρά γε μὴ: like μὴ alone e (Apol. 25 a), ἀρά μὴ looks for a neg. answer, but it may also (see on μὴ, 45 e) convey an insinuation that in spite
κρίτων.

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8. δικαίως ἐσμεν κτέ.: see on δικαίως εἰμι, Ἀρ. Ἀρ. 18 a.

9. ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου, μη...ποίει: no, no! do as I say. ἄλλα with the inv. introduces a demand or a request made in opposition to an expressed refusai or to some unwillingness merely implied or feared. This vigorous request is reinforced by the neg. μη ποίει, do this and do not do that. Cf. 46 a.

13. μήτε: the second clause, which we miss here, appears below (b) in the resumptive statement ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε κτέ.—φοβοῦ: reiterating φοβεῖ above, be fearful. It is a part of Crito's character to return again and again to his point. Cf. 43 d, and see Introd. 62. Further he had here a welcome opportunity for airing his grievances against the sycophants (blackmailers). Crito had been himself the victim of these rascals until he found a vigorous friend, *Ἀρχέδημον, πάνυ μὲν ἰκανὸν εἶπεν τε καὶ πρᾶξα, πέντε δὲ, as Xenophon puts it, who delivered him from them. This good riddance was due to the advice of Socrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 9. 4, οὐκ ἂν ὦ̄ν θρέφαις καὶ ἀνδρα (sc. just as you keep dogs to protect sheep from wolves), ὥστε ἐθέλει τε καὶ δυνατό σου ἀπερίκειν τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας ἀδικεῖν σε.

15. τούτοις: said with scorn. Cf. 48 c, τούτοις τῶν πολλῶν, and Dem. xixii. 140, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καὶ φέρειν ἱδώνας, ὡς ἐσκεῖν, ἡ πόλις καὶ τοῖς ποιοῖς λανθάνειν (this fellow could do...undetected).
ἀργυρίον; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἔγω ὅιμαι, ἵκανά· ἐπείτα καὶ εἰ τι ἐμοὶ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἴει δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τὰμά, ξένοι οὕτῳ ἐνθάδε ἐτοιμοὶ ἀναλί-20 σκεῖν· εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργύριον ἵκαι-νόν, Συμμίας ὁ Ὁχαῖος· ἐτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὦστε, ὦπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος ἀποκάμης σαυτόν σώσαι, μήτε ὁ ἔλεγης ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ δυσχερέας σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἔξελεθὼν ὃ τι χρῶσ
25 σαυτῷ· πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκῃ ἀγαπήσονοι σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ ἐἰς Ἡθαλίαν ἰέναι, εἰςὸν ε ἐμοὶ ἐκεὶ ξένοι, οὐ δὲ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφαλείαν σοι παρέξονται ὦστε σε μηδένα λυπέων τῶν κατὰ Ἡθαλίαν. X

V. Ἡτὶ δὲ, δ Ἡκάραται, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπι-χειρεῖν πράγμα, σαυτόν προδοῦναι, ξένον σωβήναι· καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτόν γενέσθαι, ἀπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύσαιν τε καὶ ἐσπευσαν σὲ διαφθεῖραι

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a 17. σοὶ δὲ: the argument is as follows: the amount required to settle with these sycophants, I should be ready enough to expend for almost any one, but for you, etc.—ὑπάρχει: cf. Παράσαιτ ... ὁ π̄ ῥ̄ χε τῷ Κύρφ, φιλοῦσα αὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἢ κτὲ, Χεν. Ἀν. i. 1. 4; καὶ ὑπάρξει υἱῶν ἢ ἔμη πόλις· ἐκοντες γὰρ με δεξονται, ibid. v. 6. 23. —ός ἐγὼ οἴμαι: said with reference to the appositive ικανά.

b 18. οὐκ οἶμαι: Crito recollects what Socrates had said (45 a, in connexion with 44 e). See on οὐ φῆτε, Apol. 25 b.

19. ξένοι οὕτωι: cf. Apol. 33 e, ἄλλοι τοῖνυν οὕτῳ κτέ. The pron. calls up the ξένοι as present in Athens, and, for rhetorical purposes, within sight. The art. is omitted because ξένοι is a pred., these others who are ξένοι.

21. Κέβης: Cebees also was from Thebes, and the two play a very important part in the Phaedo.

23. ἀποκάμης σαυτόν σώσαι: get tired of trying, etc. Here is no implication that Socrates has already tried to get away. Crito only hints that any other course is nothing short of moral cowardice. See App.—δ ἔλεγης: cf. Apol. 37 e d.

24. χρῶσ: the opt. representing the subj. of doubt. GMT. 186.

25. ἄλλοσε: for ἄλλοθι, which we expect after πολλαχοῦ on account of ὅποι. This is attraction, or inverse assimilation. Cf. Soph. O. C. 1226, βήναι κείθην ὀδηγο ήκεῖ.

V. 4. σὲ διαφθεῖραι: σὲ is accented e for emphasis and to disconnect it from ἐσπευσαν.
5. θουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς υἱὲς τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἐμουγε δοκεῖς προδοδόναι, οὐς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέαμαι καὶ α ἐκπαιδεύσαι. οἷχήσει καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ σών μέρος, ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τούτῳ πράξοντων· τεῦξονται δὲ, ως τὸ εἰκὸς, τοι ῥήτωρ οἰάπερ εἰσθε γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὁρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανοῦς. ἦ γὰρ οὐ χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι παῖς, ἢ ξυνισταλαπερέων καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· οὐ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ βαθυμότατα αἱρεῖσθαι. χρῆ δὲ, ἀπερ ἂν ἔνερ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρείου ἐλοίτο, ταῦτα αἱρεῖσθαι, φαίνεται γε δὴ ἀρετής διὰ πάντος τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ὡς ἔγινε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, ε μὴ δόξη ἂπαν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρίας τῳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπράξχαι, καὶ ἢ εὔσωδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικα στήριον ὡς εἰσηλθὲν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθὲν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἄγων

5. V. 7. τὸ σῶν μέρος: pro tua parte or quod ad te attinet.—ο τι ἂν τύχωσι: see on vūn δέ, 44 d.

8. τούτῳ πράξοντων: cf. εὖ, κακῶς, and even ἄγαθον (used adv.) with πράττειν (Apol. 40 e). See on μὴ ὄρθως πράξειν, Apol. 40 a.

10. ἦ γὰρ κτέ.: the γάρ is connected with an unexpressed reproof.

13. φάσκοντα γε δή: sc. σέ, at all events you who maintain, etc., or particularly when you maintain. See on ἄ γε δή, Apol. 40 a.

16. μὴ: see on ἄρα γε μὴ, ἄρα. The notion of fear is remotely implied. For this constr., very common in Plato, see GMT. 265; Η. 587. —ἀνανδρία τω τῆς κτέ.: a certain sort of cowardice on our part. Notice the emphasis given to τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ, for which we are responsible. If Crito and the rest, by showing more energy, by using all possible influence against Meletus and his abettors, had carried the day, they would have been more genuinely ἀνδρεῖς in the proper sense of the word. They failed ἀνανδρία τυλι. Cf. Euthyphro's boast, εὐρομή ἄν ὑπη σαθρός ἐστι, Euthyph. 5 e.

17. καὶ ἢ εὔσωδος... καὶ ὁ ἄγων: in apposition with ἂπαν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ σέ. On the meaning of the technical terms, see Intr. 70, with note 1, p. 52. Precisely how the trial of Socrates could have been avoided except by flight from Athens is not clear. There is a wholly untrustworthy tradition that Anytus offered him terms of compromise. Probably there were abundant means at hand for raising legal technicalities and for securing in this way an indefinite delay. All that Crito necessarily suggests is that flight was open to Socrates before proceedings began. At Athens, as at Rome, the law allowed a man to go into voluntary exile. See Intr. 72.

18. ὁ ἄγων: the management of the case. See on εἰς ἀγώνα καθιστάς, Apol. 24 e.
19. τὸ τελευταῖον τούτῳ: the scene of this act is laid in the prison.

20. κατάγελως: because, in Crito's opinion, all who were involved made themselves a common laughing-stock by their weak-minded negligence and irresolution. Cf. Cymbeline, i.,—

Howssoever 'tis strange, Or that the negligence may well be laughed at, Yet it is true, sir.

In the whole drift of Crito's phraseology, the notion of acting a part on the stage before the Athenian public is prominent. — κακία κτέ.: this is really in Crito's eyes the culmination of disgrace (connect with τὸ τελευταῖον) in a matter that has been disgracefully mismanaged. Here is a return to the leading thought and a departure from the regular grammatical sequence. The anacoluthon is most obvious in the repetition of ὅκειν after δόξῃ.

21. διαπεφυγέναι ἡμᾶς: people will think they allowed every advantage and every opportunity, especially the possibility of escape which now engrosses Crito's thoughts, to pass unimproved. ἡμᾶς is the object. Cf. Charm. 150 ε, τούτο ἀπίστ αὐτὸν διαφεύγειν τοῦ παρὰ τοῖς Ἐλληνικοῖς ἰατρῶν τὰ πολλὰ νοσήματα, i.e. the reason why Greek doctors fail to cure most diseases.

22. οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν: sc. ἐσώσασα. Critio hints at Socrates's part, then recurs to his own. The interjection of such a clause in a relative sent. is irregular. — οἶνον τε ὅν: like ἔξον above. For the fact, cf. 45 b, e.

24. ἀμα τῷ κακῷ: ἀμα is used as πρὸς freq. is. Cf. Symp. 195 e, καλὸς γὰρ εἰ . . . πρὸς δὲ τῷ κακῷ (in addition to your beauty) εὖ ἐποίησας μὲ κτέ.— ἀλλὰ: cf. line 28 below, and see on ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πεῖδουν, 45 a. This speech has the dignity which genuine feeling alone can give. Cf. Rich. III. iv. 3,—

Come, I have learned that fearful commenting Is leaden servitor to dull delay; Delay leads impotent and snail-paced beggary; Then fiery expedition be my wing.

On βεβουλεύσθαι, to have done with deliberation, cf. Dem. viii. 3, οἷμαι τὴν παχίστην συμφέρειν βεβουλεύσεις καὶ παρεσκευάσθαι, and iv. 10, ταῦτα . . . πᾶσι δεδόχθαι φημὶ δεῖν. GMT. 109; Π. 851 a.


27. εἰ δὲ τί περιμενοῦμεν: this adv. use of τί is developed out of the cognate acc. (kindred signification). Cf. the Eng. idiom, "to delay somewhat (a bit)." G. 1054; Η. 715.
καὶ οὐκέτι οἶδον τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὅ Σωκρατες, πεί. 46 θου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει. X

VI. Σ. Ω. ᾿Ω φίλε Κρίτων, ἥ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ β ἀξία, εἰ μετὰ τινος ὄρθότητος εἴη. εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσω μείζων, τοσούτω χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρή ἧμᾶς εἰτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἰτε μή· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεί τοιούτος οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πεῖθεσθαι ἡ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅσον μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τούς δὲ λόγους οὕς ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαινειν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἦδε· ἡ τὐχή γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ομοιοι φαίνονται μοι, καί τούς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καί τιμῶ οὕσπερ ε 10 καὶ πρότερον· ὃν ἐάν· μη βελτίων ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ

46 b VI. 2. ἀξία: sc. ἐστίν, in spite of the opt. in the protasis. GMT. 501; H. 901 b. — εἰ εἴη: not if it should be, but if it should prove to be. Cf. δεινὰ ἐν εἴην ἐφαρμαθέν, Apol. 28 d. For the present, Socrates does not decide whether Crito's zeal is right or wrong.

4. οὐ μόνον κτέ.: Socrates maintains that "truth is truth to th' end of reckoning" (Measure for Measure, v.1). νῦν and ἀεί might almost change places, since the important point is that Socrates, after proclaiming the supremacy of reason (cf. Apol. 38 a) in prosperity, finds his belief still firm in adversity. Cf. 53 c and e. Cf. As You Like It, ii. 1. —

Socrates meets in his trial and death-sentence "the counsellors that feelingly persuade him what he is." For collocations similar to this combination of νῦν and ἀεί, cf. 49 e; Hom. II. ix. 105, οἷον ἐγὼ νοεῖν, ὡμέν πάλαι ἦδ' ἐτί καὶ νῦν. Cf. also Eur. Med. 292, οὐ νῦν μὲ πρῶτον ἀλλὰ πολλάκις, Κρέων, ἤ ἐθλαφέ δόξα κτέ., and Soph. Phil. 965, ἐμοί μὲν οίκτος δεινὸς ἐμπέπτωτε τις | τοῦ άν- δρός, οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλαι.

5. τοιούτος οἷος: for the omission (rare except with the third person) of the copula, cf. Gorg. 487 d, καί μὴν ὅτι γε οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι, εὐκίν. τὸ ὅτι τοιούτος εἰ οἷος κτέ. For οἷος πείθεσθαι, see on τοιοῦτος, Apol. 33 a. — τῶν ἐμῶν κτέ.: τὰ ἐμα includes all the faculties and functions both of body and of mind. Among these λόγοι is included, since it means man's reason as well as his reasons and his reasonings,—his utterances and his principles. Cf. below 47 e, εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειδοῦντος καὶ 47 e, ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων.

6. τούς δὲ λόγους κτέ.: these words imply a measure of reproof at least when spoken to Crito, who had in general approved of Socrates's principles.

8. ομοιο: not different in sense from οἱ αὐτῷ, and to be understood in the light of what immediately follows. See on καὶ πρότερον, 48 b. "They seem like what they formerly were."
Supply καὶ πρότερον (from what follows) with δήμοιν.

c 11. πλείες μορμολύττηται: uses more hobgoblins to scare us. μορμολύττεσθαι has the double acc. like βλάπτειν τινά τι. Μορμώ, like ἔμποουσα, was one of the fictitious terrors of the Greek nursery. Cf. Gorg. 473; Ar. Ar. 1244, πότερα Λυδὸν ἢ Φόργα | ταυτι λέγουσα μορμολύττεσθαι δοκεῖς; The Schol. there suggests that the alarm began ἀπὸ τῶν προσωπείων (masks) τῶν ἐν ταῖς πραγματίαις ὑποκρίτων, ἐκάλουν μορμολυκεία. πιούοντος δὲ καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ παιδία φοβοῦσιν. Cf. Phaed. 77 ε.

13. δεσμοῦς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα κτέ: by confronting us with bonds, with death, with loss of worldly goods. These are the usual punishments, to the harshest of which Socrates has been condemned. The plural is used to put an abstract idea more vividly and concretely, as it were, by a process of multiplication. Cf. the use of mortes, nées, and the common poetical use of θάνατοι to describe a violent and premature death, and in general the free use of the plural by the poets in phrases like πτετὼν κλημάκων προσαμβάσεις, Eur. Phoen. 489, and Bacch. 1213, δωμάτων προσαμβάσεις, I. T. 97, εἰσβάσεις, ibid. 101, also the common use of διαλλαγάν both in poetry (Eur. Phoen. 701) and in prose (Lys. xii. 53; xiii. 80, etc.). That such plurals were only a stronger way of putting the singular is clearly shown in Eur. Bacch. 1350, αἱ, δε δόκται, πρέσβυ, τλῆμονες φυγαί. For θάνατος, meaning the penalty of death, see on Apol. 36 b.

15. εἰ ἀναλάβομεν: I think, if we should begin by taking up your point, etc. That is, such thorough consideration (44 b, 45 e) of Crito's (ἔν σὺ λέγεις) point involves considering the whole question whether, etc.

18. ἢ πρὶν μὲν κτέ: with ἢ (αν) a second question is superadded, which substantially forestalls the answer to the first. Cf. Apol. 26 b. Here the answer suggested by ἀρα is to be taken ironically. See on ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, Apol. 37 ε, and cf. 47 ε below, and esp. 50 ε and 51 a, where we find ἢ πρός μὲν ἀρα οὐ τῶν πατέρα .. . πρός δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἀρα.

19. Ἀλλως: not at all seriously, as a mere joke, i.e. in a sense other than its proper one; the expression is a strong one. Cf. Phaedo, 76 ε, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐστι ταῦτα, Ἀλλος ἐν ὧν ὁ λόγος ὅδος
 KPITON.

θυμῶ δ᾽ ἐγών ἐπισκέψασθαι, οὔ Κρίτων, κοινὴ μετὰ σοῦ, 46
ei tī mou allōioterōs faneītai, ἐπειδὴ ὥδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός, 
καὶ ἐάσομαι χαίρειν ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δὲ πῶς, 
ὡς ἐγόμαι, ἐκάστοτε ὥδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν,
25 ὡστερ νῦν δὴ ἐγώ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν ἃς οἱ ἄνθρωποι 
δοξάζουσι δέοι τάς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τάς δὲ μη. e 
τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὁ Κρίτων, οὔ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; 
σὺ γὰρ, ὃσα γε τάνθρωπεια, ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνῄ-
σκευν αὐριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακροῦι ἡ παροῦσα ξυμ- 47
30 φορά: σκόπει δὴ, οὐχ ἰκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ 
πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἄνθρωπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς 
mēν, τὰς δ᾽ οὐ; τί φῆς; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;
KP. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς
35 μῆ;

KP. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Χρησταί δὲ οὖχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ 
tῶν ἀφρόνων;

KP. Πῶς δ᾽ οὖ;

46 εἰρημένος εἶ. ἐνεκα λόγου, for the 
d form's sake (dicis causa)—quite 
different from λόγου χάριν (exempli 
causa)—is brought in ἐκ παραλήλου. 
See on εἰκὴ κτέ., Apol. 17 c.

24. τὰ λέγειν: the contradictory of 
οὐδὲν λέγειν. Cf. Apol.30 b. It means, 
"to say something that can be de-
pended upon, that amounts to some-
ting." Cf. Lach. 195 c, τί δοκεῖ 
Λάχης λέγειν, ὧ Νυκία; έοικε μέντοι 
lέγειν τι, to which Nicias humorously 
responds, καί γὰρ λέγει γέ τι, οὔ μέντοι 
ἀληθές γε.

25. νῦν δὴ: just now.

28. οὐσα γε τάνθρωπεια: humanly 
speaking. Cf. Dem. xviii. 300, οὐσον 
ἂν ἄνθρωπινο λογισμῷ δυνατόν, as fur 
as human calculation could. For the 
adv. acc. ἰσα, see G. 1060; H. 719. 
One who is but a man can be sure 
of his life for no single moment, though 
his may have a reasonable confidence. 
Cf. Henry V. iv. 1, "I think the king is 
but a man, as I am; the violet smells 
to him as it doth to me; all his senses 
have but human conditions." Notice 
the force of γέ. Cf. 54 d, ἰσα γε τὰ 
νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦτα.

30. ἰκανῶς: sufficiently, satisfac-
tively, and hence rightly or truly. ἰκανῶς 
very commonly appears in conjunc-
tion with μετρῶς or καλῶς, to either 
one of which it is substantially equiv. 
Cf. Symp. 177 e and Phaed. 96 d.

32. For an omission here, see App.
VII. Σ. Φέρε δή, πώς αὖ τὰ τουαύτα ἐλέγετο; γνώριμον καὶ τὸ τῆς πράξεως πότερον παντὸς ἄνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγως καὶ δόξῃ τῶν νοῶν προσέχει, ἡ ἐνός μόνου ἐκείνου ὃς ἀν τυγχάνῃ ἱατρὸς ἡ παιδοτρίβης ὁν; ΚΡ. Ἐνός μόνου.

Σ. Οὐκδέν φοβεῖσθαι χρῆ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνός ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δή.

VII. 1. πώς αὖ ἐλέγετο: the impf. because the new question (ἂν) involves a matter which has already been discussed. GMT. 40; H. 833. — τὰ τουαύτα: refers to what follows. The definite instance given is only one of many possible illustrations of the kind. On the inductive method, see Introd. 18, and for further examples, cf. Apol. 25. Cf. also Lach. 184c-185b, where the same example is elaborated to establish the same principle that approval and instruction alike should, if we are to heed them, come from the one man who has made himself an authority, ὁ μαθὼν καὶ εἰπτηδέσας, while the praise and blame of the many is to be neglected. There also the importance of deciding aright in regard to gymnastic training is strongly insisted upon, as follows: ἦν πρέπει συμφέρων σε ὑμᾶς καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἄλλου περὶ τοῦ τούτου τοῦ κτήματος, ὥς τῶν ἰσοτέρων μέγιστον ἢν τυχάνει, ... ὅπως ἐν ταις οἱ παιδεῖς γένονται.

2. τοῦτο πράττων: a man who makes this his work, and hence is an expert in earnest about it. One whose opinion professionally given is worth more than any layman's would be. Cf. Menex. 244 ε, ἡ γνώμην τῶν Λακεδαιμόνων ... σφέτερον ἡ ἐργον εἶναι κατά-

δολούσθαι τοῖς ἅλλοις, ταῦτ' ἐπραττοῦ. As this ταῦτα refers to καταδολούσθαι, so the τοῦτο in question refers to the notion of gymnastics implied in γνωρίμονον; the whole phrase means, a person who wishes to make an athlete of himself. Cf. Hdt. vi. 105, ἀποτελούσθαι εἰς Σπάρτην κήρυκα Φειδίππιδος Ἀθηναίον μὲν ἄνδρα, ἀλλος δὲ ήμεροδρόμου τε καὶ τοῦτο μετατόντα.

4. ἱατρὸς ἡ παιδοτρίβης: often coupled together as having special charge of bodily vigor and health. The ἱατρὸς was expected to cure and to prevent disease by a prescribed regimen (διαιτητικής); the παιδοτρίβης professed and was expected (Gorg. 452 b) καλοῦσ περὶ τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ πολεῖτος ἄνθρωπος τὰ σώματα; he it was who really gave instruction in gymnastics. For fuller details, see Schömann, Antiquities of Greece, I. 505 f. Icicus of Tarentum, glorified as a successful gymnast, is reputed to have been most strict in regard to a temperate diet. Cf. the proverbial phrase Ἰκκοῦ δεῖπνον. Sometimes medicine and gymnastics were both made the business of the same man, as in the case of Herodias of Selymbria. Cf. Prot. 316 d, εἴνοις δὲ τίνας ἡ σθήναι καὶ γυμναστικήν (sc. professed teachers
10 ΣΩ. Ταύτη ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἢ ἃν τῷ ἐνί δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαύντυ, μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ ἐξώμασται τοῖς ἄλλοις;
ΚΡ. Ἑστὶ ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Ἐνευ. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνί καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦς, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαινότων, ἄρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;
ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
ΣΩ. Τί δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο καὶ ποῖ τείνει καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;
20 ΚΡ. Δὴλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα. τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλυσιν.
ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰλλα, ὦ Κρίτων, οὔτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διώμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ δὲν νῦν ἡ βουλὴ ἡμῖν ἐστίν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεσθαί καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτήν, ἡ τῇ τοῦ ἁ ἐνός, εἰ τίς ἐστὶν ἐπαινῶν, ὅπερ καὶ τοῖς μήσων καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ἐξώμαστα τοῖς ἄλλοις; ὥς εἰ μὴ ἀκο-

11. καὶ ἐδεστέον γε: γέ σερβε where various points are enumerated, to mark a new departure, i.e. a fact different in kind from the preceding ones and thus belonging to a new class. Cf. Gorg. 450 δ, ἀριθμητική καὶ λογιστική (calculation) καὶ γεωμετρική καὶ πεττευτική (draught-playing) γ—καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι. Theaet. 190 b,

15. τοὺς λόγους: states collectively e what has been subdivided into δόξα, φόγος, ἐπαινοῦς.
16. καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαινότων: of those in fact who have no special knowledge whatever. See App.
18. εἰς τὶ κτ.: see on τῶν ἐμῶν, 46 b.
22. καὶ δὴ καὶ: and then also, of course. See on καὶ δή καὶ, 18 a. Here Socrates has at last reached his goal; his point has been established by induction. Notice the doubly chiastic arrangement,—

δικαλῶν × αἰσχρῶν × ἀγαθῶν
ἀδίκων × καλῶν × κακῶν.
lovesthese me, diafratheroimen ekeino kai woveta, ou tò 47
men dikaios bëtov iegyneto, tò de adikos apollusto. h
30 ou'den esti toûto;
KP. Oimai egwhe, w Sôkrateis.

VIII. 5. Oô. Fere dé, ean to upo toû ousiou men bët-
tovugnûmenon upo toû vosoudous de diafratheromevon
dioloswmen, peithomevoi mh tû tòn epaionton dox, ãra
bivtov h'min esti diapharmenon autòv; esti de pou toûto e
5 to sôma. h oukí;
KP. Naì.

5. Oô. 'Allla met' ekeino ãra h'min bivtov diapharmen-
nov, ã to adikov men lówbatai to de dikaiouv ònyínew; h
faulkoterov hgnûmena einai toû sômatos ekeino, ã ti pot'

29. iegyneto, apollusto: i.e. iegyvan-
shai, apollusshai iegyeta, the so-called
philosophical impf., which carries a
statement of the admitted results of
a previous discussion back to the
well-remembered time when the facts
stated were established in argument.
i. 40. 143, itaque, quae erant prudenciae pròpria, suo loco
dicta sunt.

VIII. 3. peithomevoi mh kte.: by its
position mh contradicts tû ... dox, but not peithomevoi, and implies allà
tû tôn mh epaionton dox. The effect
of writing peithomevoi mh instead of mh
peithomevoi is to lay greater stress on
both words, and the failure to say
distinctly whose opinion it is which,
is obeyed leaves all the more stress
on mh. ãra bivtov kte.: see on
anexetaostos bios, Apol. 38 a. The
meaning is that life is worthless, i.e.
oi wuvslitei, oûk ëxion ëm. Cf. 53 c,
and Rep. iv. 445 a, h'min esti skëps-
shai, pòteron av wuvslitei (rayas) dikaià
tê pråttêw kai kallà epiptëdw ênew kai
einai dikaiow ... ã dikew tê kai díkwn
einai. The expressions diapheromewn
and diioloswmen bring us to the point
of extreme deterioration at which
life becomes impossible.

10. òllá ... ãra: ironically op-
posed to the preceding negative
statement, but at the same time requiring
no for its answer. This last must be
indicated, by the tone in which the question is asked. See on ãra, 46 d.

11. ã: after both verbs, though
ònnanai does not govern the dat. See
on ñs ... eñtaðew, Apol. 41 c. Even
lòwbshai usually takes the acc.

12. ò ti pot' esti: it was not speci-
fied above (d), and there is no reason
for arguing about its name (ψωχή) here.

18. οὐκ ἄρα πάνω οὔτω: then we must not ... at all ... so much as all that, etc. οὔτω refers back to the drift of Crito's argument. Here again Socrates takes the last step in a long induction.

19. τι ... οτι: a not unusual combination of the dir. and indr. forms of question. Cf. Gorg. 500 a, ἄρε'o όνων παντὸς ἀνθρώπος ἠστιν ἐκλεξαθαι ποία ἀγαθα τῶν ἥδεων ἑστι καὶ ὅποια κακά, ἡ τεχνικὸν (specialist) ἰδει εἰς ἐκαστὸν; The double acc. as in κακά (κακὰς) λέγειν ἴνα.

20. αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια: i.e. Truth, speaking with the lips of ἐπαίτων, or appearing as the result of strict and patient inquiry.

23. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ: again Socrates reproves Crito, this time for his appeal to the Athenian public (44 d).

—μὲν δὴ: certainly, equiv. to μὴν or nearly so.

25. δὴλα δὴ κτῆ.: Crito eagerly catches at this objection and strengthens it with καλ. Thus he implies that there is more than meets the eye, i.e. that there are many other valid objections. Cf. 45 a. See App.

26. οὕτως τε ὁ λόγος κτῆ.: τε corresponds to καλ ... ἀδ following. For a similar καλ ... καλ ἀδ, see Lach. 181 d, καλ τοῦτον πέρι ἔγωγε πειράζομαι συμβουλεύειν ἐν τι δύνομαι καλ ἀδ καὶ προ- κάλε τάντα ποιεῖν. The connexion of thought would not hinder us from subordinating the first clause: "as our discussion just closed agrees with what we argued formerly (when dealing with the same matter), so, etc."

29. δτι οὔτο ζῆν κτῆ.: cf. Apol. 28 b ff.
ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταῦταν ἐστὶ, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;
ΚΡ. Μένει.

ΙΧ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὀμολογουμένων τούτῳ σκεψέως, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένει πειράζοντι ἐξίσου εἰ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων, ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνεται τὸ δίκαιον, πειρόμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐνώμεν. ἂς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς 5 σκέψεις περὶ τὰ ἀναλόγες χρημάτως καὶ δόξης καὶ παῖδων τροφής, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὥς Κρίτων, σκέμματα ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων ἀποκτινώντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γὰρ ἂν, εἰ οἷον τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ, οὐδὲν ἵνα νῦν τούτων τῶν πολιτῶν. ἢ μὲν δ’, ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτεῖν ἢ ἢ 10 ὀπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξειμεν καὶ χρηματα τελοῦντες τοῦτος τοὺς ἐμὲ ἐνθένει ἐξάξουσι καὶ ἐνδεχόμενος. See on μή οὐ τοῦτ’ ἣν, Ἀπόλ. 39 α.

7. καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γὰρ ἂν: and would bring them to life again too. The ἂν forms with this partic. the apod. ἀναβιωσκομένων is used here like ἀναβιωσκομένων in Phaed. 89 d. Usually it is intransitive, like ἀναβιώσασθαι. 9. ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ: the argument has prevailed thus far. Cf. Hor. Sat. i. 3, 115, nec vincet ratio hoc, tantundem ut pecceit idemque | qui teneros caules alieni fregerit horti | et qui nocturnus sacra divum legere. Ibid. ii. 3, 223, vincet enim stultos ratio insanire nepotes, and 250, si puerilius his ratio esse evincet amare. It is rare to find this idiom with an acc. of the persons discussing, as in Rep. x. 607 b, ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἢρει. — μή . . . ἢ: as in 6 above.
χάριτας καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντες τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ὡς τῇ ἄληθείᾳ ἄδικης θεία ἄδικομεν πάντα ταύτα ποιοῦντες. κἂν φαινόμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέη ὑπολογίζομεθα οὔτε ἐπὶ ἀποθνῄσκουσιν διε παραμένοντας καὶ ἰσονίων ἀγνώτας οὔτε ἀλλο ὄτιον πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἄδικεών.

ΚΡ. Καλῶς μέν μοι δοκεῖσι λέγειν, ὡς Ξώκρατες. ὅρα δὲ τί δρομεῖν.

Σ.Ο. Σκοπῶμεν, ὃς ἀγαθεῖ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἰ τῇ ἔχεις ἀντίλεγον, ἔρυχοι ἐνεγοτοῖς, ἀντίλεγε, καὶ σοι πείςομαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ, εἰ παῦσαι ήδη, ὃ μακάρε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὥς χρῆ ἐνθάνται ἀκόμων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπίναν. ὃς ἔγω περὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦμαι πεῖςας σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τῇ ἀρχῇ, ἐὰν

12. καὶ αὐτῷ κτῆ: καὶ αὐτῶι, we ourselves too, stands for Crito and Socrates. Crito is responsible, in the supposed case, not only for his expenditure of money (χρήματα τελοῦντες), but also for instigating the act of Socrates, or rather for persuading him to allow various things to be done for him. — ἐξαγόμενοι: the pass. is especially strong, "we ourselves are both rescuers and rescued."

15. οὔτε πάσχειν: sc. εἰ δεῖ, to be supplied from the preceding clause.

16. πρὸ τοῦ ἄδικεν: cf. Apol. 28 b d. The sense is, "there must be no question about submitting to the uttermost (ὅτιον πάσχειν) rather than committing unrighteousness." See also 54 b, where, as in this case, a choice is involved, and πρὸ is used in the sense of in preference to or instead of.

23. οὐς: inasmuch as, equiv. to ἐπεὶ. Cf. quippe in Lat.

24. ἀλλὰ μη ἄκοντος: opposed distinctly to πεῖςας σὲ, with your approval. Cf. 49 e fin., and Xen. An. ν. 6. 29, ἐξηνεκε γὰρ τὸν λόγον, ὡς ἐγὼ πράττειν ταῦτα διανοοῦντες ἡ δὴ οὐ πεῖςας ὑμᾶς. The vivid contrast of these two clauses makes the omission of σου, the subj. of ἄκοντος, the easier. Indeed, cases are common where a personal or a dem. pron. or some vague general notion of persons or things is the subj. implied. For a somewhat similar case, cf. Hom. Od. iv. 645 ff., ὡρ' εὖ εἰδὼ ἢ σε βίῳ ἄκοντος ἀπηρα νύμα τέλαιναι, ἣ ἐκών οἱ δώκασ. — ἐὰν λέγῃτα: in case the statement shall satisfy you. εὰν does not like εἰ (cf. 48 b) mean whether. GMT. 71, n. 1. Cf. Phaedo, 64 c, σκέψαι δή, ἀγαθεῖ, ἐὰν ἀρα καὶ σοι ξυνδοκῇ κτῆ. The subj. of the dependent sent. is made by anticipation (prolepsis) the object of ὥρα. Cf. Milton, Sonnet to Sir Henry Vane, xvii., "Besides to know | Both spiritual power and civil, what each means, | What severs each, thou hast learned, which few have done." Cf. below (49 d). Socrates is earnestly enforcing a principle.
25 σοι ἵκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτάμε- 49
νον ἃν μάλιστα οὐῃ.
ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.
Χ. ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἴναι,
ὁ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὐ; ὡς οὐδαμῶς τὸ γε
ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθον οὔτε καλὸν, ὡς πολλάκις ἰμῖν καὶ ἐν
τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὀμολογήθη; [ὁπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο.] 5 ἡ
πᾶσαι ἦμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὀμολογιάν ἐν ταῖς
dιάλυσις ἴμεραι ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσίν, καὶ πᾶλαι, ὡς Κρίτων,
ἀρα τηλικοίδει [γέροντες] ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῇ
dιαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἦμᾶς αὐτοὺς παῖδων οὐδὲν διαφέ-
ρουτες; ἡ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει ὀσπέρ τότε ἐλέγετο
10 ἦμῖν, εἰτε φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ εἰτε μή, καὶ εἰτε διὲ ἦμᾶς ἐτι
τῶν ἱματαπώτερα πάσχειν εἰτε καὶ πρόστερα, ὠμως τὸ γε

26. ἡ οὐῃ: sc. κατά τὸ ἄλλης ἡν
ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτάμενον. μάλιστα ἂς
in the question τῇ μάλιστα; Cf. Rep.
vii. 537 d, οὐ ἄν μᾶλιστα τα δοσοῦν δοι,
tούτους εἰς μείζους τιμᾶς ἐκκεχυμέναι.
Χ. 1. ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον: sc. ἰμᾶς.
The const. with the acc. corresponds
to the equivalent διί with the acc.
and inf. GMT. 923; H. 611 a. For
the facts, see Introd. 65.
2. ἡ οὐδαμῶς κτέ.: here the first
member of the disjunctive question
is resumed, so that the questioner
gives notice to the questioned, as it
were, of his opinion. For the accent
of τινὶ when (exceptionally) it begins
its clause, see G. 144, 1; H. 119 a.
4. ὡς οὐδαμῶς κτέ.: prob. not
written by Plato. If genuine, it can-
not refer to anything here, but relates
to the drift of 46 b and 48 b. See
App.
5. ἡ πᾶσαι κτέ.: here and in the
words ἡ παντὸς μᾶλλον κτέ. below, we
see how hard Crito finds it to assent.

After each double question (1) οὐδὲν
... ὀμολογήθη; (2) ἡ πᾶσαι... παντὶ
tρόπῳ; Socrates has looked at Crito
for an answer. Finally he extorts
the briefest assent by the pointed
φασέν ἢ οὕ; in line 13 below.
6. ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσί: thrown away.
Cf. Henry VIII. iii. 2, “Cromwell, I
charge thee, fling away ambition,”
and Soph. Phil. 13, μή καὶ μάθη μ’
Ἦχοντα κακχέω τὸ πᾶν σφίσμα, τῷ μὲν
αὐτίκ’ αἰρήσεων δοκῶ. Similar is the
Lat. effundere gratiam, labo-
rem.—καὶ πάλαι κτέ.: one of the
two parties. forms the predicative
complement of ἐλάθομεν, the other
stands in opposition to the pred. By
the added τηλικοίδει ἄνδρες (see on το-
σοῦν αὐτό, Apol. 25 d), this opposition
is put still more strongly. ἀρα gives
point to the irony. See on ἀρ’ οὖν, 47 e.
11. ὠμος παντὶ τρόπῳ: a more dis-
tinct reiteration of what ἡ παντὸς μᾶλ-
λον κτέ. has already stated. There-
fore one as much as the other belongs
αδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει δι' ὦν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμὲν ἢ οὐ;
KR. Φαμέν.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεὶ ἀδικεῖν.
KR. Οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικοῦμεν ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἶονται, ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεὶ ἀδικεῖν.

17. ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἶονται: that 'doing harm to one's enemies' was part and parcel of the popularly accepted rule of life is plain from many passages like that in Isocrates to Demonicus I., 26, ὅτε δὲς ἀστραπὸς νύμφη τῶν ἐξήρων οὐκάσθαι τάς κακοποίαις καὶ τῶν φίλων ἡπτᾶσθαι τάς εὖ ἐργα ἐσίαις. Compare the character of Cyrus the younger, Xen. An. i. 9, 11, φανερὸς δ' ἦν, καὶ εἰ τίς τι ἄγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ποιήσειν αὐτὸν, νυκὰν περιμένειν κτέ. Cf. also Meno's definition, Men. 71 ε, αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπος ἄρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράστειν, καὶ πράστοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὐ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐξήρων κακῶς. Plato eloquently defends his more Christian view throughout the first book of the Republic, in the Gorgias, and elsewhere. That the many do assert this, Socrates might say is not only made probable by the known tendencies in human character, but it is proved by every-day experience in dealing with men. Many recognized authorities encouraged them in such a view. Cf. Archil. Frg. 65, εὖ δ' ἐπισταμαι μέγα, τὸν κακὸν μὲ δράωντα δεινὸς ἀνταμβείθεθαι κακῶς. Solon, Frg. 13, 5, where he prays to the Muses that they would grant him εἶναι δὲ γλυκὸν δὲ διοιδαὶ, ἐξήρωσε δὲ ... δὲ δεινὸν ἰδειν. In Soph. Aj. 79, it is Athena herself who asks, ὅκουν γέλασα ἣδιστος εἰς ἐξήρων γελᾶν; Con.

Contrast Soph. Ant. 523 f.: KR. οὕτω ποθ' ὀδυρόν, ὄνδ' ὡταν βάνη, φιλος. AN. οὕτω συνερχέσθων, ἀλλὰ συμφιλέαν ἐφον. Cf. Eur. Andr. 520 ff., where Menelaus says it is folly to spare the offspring of one's foes, ἀνοια μεγάλη λέιτεων ἐξήρων εὔχρων, ἔβην κτείνειν, and ibid. 1007, where Orestes says, ἐξήρων γὰρ ἀνδρῶν μαίρων εἰς ἀναστροφήν (for us to destroy it) δὰίμων δίδωσι. Cf. Eur. Heraclid. 1040 ff., the grim humor of Alcmena, who says of Eurystheus, ἐξήρως μὲν ἀνήρ, ὠφελεὶ δὲ καταβάνων. See also Bacch. 1344-1348, where Agave admits her guilt but asks for mercy, and Dionysus refuses mercy because he has been offended. Agave answers: ὡργὰς πρέπει θεοὺς ὅχι ὄρνουσθαι βροτοῖς. This shows an ideal of moral conduct for the gods, such as Plato preaches for men. Compare Soph. Aj. 679-682, ὁ τ' ἐξήρως ἡμῖν ἐς τοσοῦτο θ' ἐχθαρτός, ὡς καὶ φιλήσων ἀδικίς, ἐς τὲ τοῦ φίλου τοσαῦθ' ὑπουργῶν ὠφελεῖν βουλήσομαι ὡς αἶν ὁ μενοῦτα, with Henry VIII. iii. 2, "Love thyself last, cherish those that hate thee; still in thy right hand carry gentle peace | to silence envious tongues. Be just and fear not." Shakspeare thus expresses the view of the Platonic Socrates and of Plato in contrast to that of the Greek public at large. That the historical (in contrast to the Platonic) Socrates at least
did not contradict this maxim of popular morality is perhaps evident from one place in the Memorabilia (ii. 6. 35), where, apparently with the ready approval of Critobulus, Socrates says, 东营 东营 fungas όνδρός όμερην εἶναι νικάν τούς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιούσα, τούς δὲ ἑκθροὺς κακῶς. This does not make him precisely responsible for the maxim, since he practically quotes it from the mouth of The Many. Indeed, the context has a playful color, which ought to warn us not to take Socrates precisely at his word.

19. οὐ φαίνεται: plainly not. As οὐ φημι means I deny rather than I do not assert, so οὐ φαίνεται means not it does not appear, but it does appear not.

20. κακουργεῖν: this word, like κακῶς ποιεῖν, covers more cases than ἀδίκειν: it includes ἀδίκειν and also cases of harm done where there is little or no question of right and wrong involved. Apparently, it was more commonly used in every-day matters than ἀδίκειν. In Crito’s answer his uncertain certainty is indicated by όμερην; had he meant that he was perfectly certain, he would have used ὑμῆς.

28. οὐτε ἀρα κτέ.: the completest presentation of this precept must be sought in the teaching of Christ. Cf. Luke vi. 27, ἄλλα ὡμῖν λέγω τοῖς ἀκούσακτοις ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἑκθροὺς ὡμῶν, καλῶς ποιεῖτε τοῖς μισοῦσιν ὡμᾶς κτέ.

30. καθομολογών, ὀμολογῆς: see on εἶ γὰρ ὤφελον, 44 d.

32. τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κτέ.: this is strongly set forth in the Gorgias, where the Sophist and the true Philosopher represent respectively these two clashing theories. See Introd. 65.

34. βουλεύματα: counsels, i.e. their manner of thinking and acting.
35 μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεὶ σοι, καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεύθεν βουλεύομενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὅρθως ἔχοντος οὕτε τοῦ ἄδικεὶν οὕτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὕτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς: ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν εἰ 40 ἔτι δοκεῖ· σοὶ δ' εἰ πῇ ἄλλῃ δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δὲ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκονε. 

ΚΡ. 'Ἀλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἄλλα λέγε.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ τό μετὰ τούτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ· πότερον ἀν τῷ τῆς ὀμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαιᾳ οὖντα ποιητέον ἢ 45 ἐξαπατητέον;

ΚΡ. Ποιητέον. 

XI. ΣΩ. Ἐκ τοῦτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπίοντες ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τυχαί ποιοῦν, καὶ ταῦτα οὖς ἥκιστα δεῖ ἡ οὖ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὀμολογήσαμεν δικαίως οὖσιν ἡ οὖ;

43. μᾶλλον δὲ: or rather. Cf. Lach. 196 ε, λέγε δὲ μοι ὃς Νικλα, μᾶλλον δ' ἥμιν.
KR. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὅ ἐρω — 50
tὰς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ·

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' φίλε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθέδε
eἰτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἶθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὁνομάσαι τούτο, ἐλθόν-
tες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἐρωτο-
το. 10 εἰπέ μοι, ὁ Σῶκρατες, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἀλλο τι ἡ
tούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ ὃ ἐπιχειρεῖς διανοεῖ τοὺς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἢ
ἀπολέσαι καὶ ἐξύπασαι τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἡ δοκεῖ

50 νομε̣ν. ὁμολογήσαμεν would require
the acc. as in 49 e above.

5. οὐκ ἔχω κτέ.: Crito seems afraid
of understanding what is meant; the in-
evititable consequences involved alarm
him. See on κακουργεῖν, 49 c. This
natural state of mind on his part gives
good and sufficient reason for a
reconsideration of the whole subject
from a new point of view.

7. μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν: for the dat., cf.
Symp. 192 d, εἰ αὐτοῖς ... ἐπιστάς ὁ
"Ηφαιστὸς ... ἐρωτο. Prot. 321 e, ἀπο-
ρούντες δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς. See
on ὧ, 47 e. The statement there given
covers a very large number of cases
where a partic. and a finite verb are
combined like ἐλθόντες ἐρωτο.

8. εἴθ' ὅπως κτέ.: this softening
phrase is used purely out of consider-
ation for Crito. To use the word
applied to runaway slaves might give
offence. One of the annoying mis-
haps that befell a well-to-do Athenian
was to have to give chase when a
slave ran off to Megara or Oenoe.
Cf. Prot. 310 c, where Hippocrates
nearly lost his dinner, μάλα γε ὅψ
ἀφικόμενος ἡξ Oἰονύς. ὃ γὰρ τοι παῖς
με δ Ἐλτύροσ ἀπέδρα. Of course such
courage on the slave's part was con-
sidered despicable. Cf. 52 d, δοῦλος
φακόλατρος. The δοῦλος χρηστός, who
appears in tragedy more frequently
than in real life, would not run away,
because of his attachment to his mas-
ter. Cf. Eur. Med. lines 54 f., χρη-
στοις δοῦλοις ἔμφορα τὰ δεσποτῶν | κα-
κάς πινδώνα καὶ φρενῶν ἀνθρώπηται,
the first of which recurs in the Bacchae
(1029), Alc. 708-77; and cf. also Eur.
Andr. 50-59, where the slave says to
Andromache, εὖν δὲ καὶ οὐ ζωντε ἡ
τῷ σῷ φῶς. In Xen. Oec. 7. 37
and 38, and 9. 11–13, is an interesting
account of the position of slaves in
the household.

9. τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως: the com-
monwealth. Cf. Xen. An. v. 7. 18, and
Hdt. i. 67, Σπαρτιτέων τῷ κοινῷ δια-
πειμομένους, sent by the commonwealth
of Sparta. So Cicero says commune
Siciliae. The personification of the
state and the laws which here follows
is greatly admired and has been abun-
dantly imitated, e.g. by Cicero in his
first Catilinarian Oration (7. 18). The
somewhat abrupt transition from ἡμῖν
above to δ Ἐλκράτες suggests the fact
that Socrates considered himself alone
responsible to the laws in this matter.

10. ἄλλο τι τῇ: see on ἄλλο τι ἦ, Ἀπολ. 24 c.

11. τοὺς τε νόμους: notice the order
and cf. 53 a, ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι.

12. τὸ σὸν μέρος: see on τὸ σὸν δ
μέρος, 45 d. Here it is about the same
in sense with καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι, 51 a.
σοι οίνων τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ἂν αἰ γενόμεναι δίκαιοι μηδὲν ἵσχύοντων, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἴδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίγνονται καὶ διαφθείρουνται; τί ἐρούμεν, ὃ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχοι ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὃς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθεῖσας προστάτευε κυρίας εἶναι. ἡ ἐρούμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι
20 ἢ δίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὅρθως τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε; ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐρούμεν;

ΚΡ. Ταῦτα ἡ Δία, ὃ Σῶκρατες.

ΧΙΙ. ΣΩ. Τί οἶν, ἄν εἰπωσων οἱ νόμοι; ὃ Σῶκρατες, ἡ καὶ ταῦτα ἀμολογητο ἡμῶν τε καὶ σοὶ, ἡ ἐμμένεν τοῖς δίκαιοι αἰς ἂν τὴν πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οἶν αὐτῶν θαυμάζομεν λεγόντων, ἵσως ἂν εἰποιεν ὅτι, ὃ Σῶκρατες, μὴ θαυμάζετά τὰ
5 λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου, ἔπειδὴ καὶ εἰσώθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γὰρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῶν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτές ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανεν τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτους ἡμῶν,

13. ἐναί: the attention is drawn to ἐναί, exist, by the negative statement of the same idea in μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, not to be utterly overturned, which follows. GMT. 109.

17. ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ: a side thrust at the trained speakers which recalls the irony of the opening page of the Apology. — ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου: on behalf of this law whose existence is in jeopardy. Cf. below δ, ἐπιχειρεῖ ἀπολλύναι. This notion of threatened action is often attached to the pres. and impf. of this verb. See GMT. 32 and 38; H. 828. Cf. Ἀπ. ν. 8. 2, ὅπου τῷ ῥήτει ἀπωλλύμεθα. The whole wording of this passage recalls the Athenian usage which required that a law, if any one proposed to change or repeal it, should be defended by regularly-appointed state-advocates (συνήγοροι).

19. ὅτι ἢ δίκει γὰρ: ὅτι followed by direct quotation, as in 21 c. Notice how spirited and quick the answer is made by γὰρ. "Yes (I certainly have this intention) for, etc."

ΧΙΙ. 2. καὶ ταῦτα: sc. that in certain cases the sentence of the laws may and should be set at nought. — ἡ ἐμμένεν: or (was the agreement between us) simply to abide by, etc.

3. αἰς ἂν δικάζῃ: cf. 50 b and 51 c.

5. ἔπειδη κτέ.: see Introd. 19.
Socrates was thinking particularly of the laws governing marriage which established the legitimacy of children (γυναικεία). See Schoemann, Antiquities of Greece, p. 357.

Instead of ἐπειδή δὲ ἐγένος καὶ ἐξετάφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἦχοι ἀν ἐπείν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἥσθα καὶ ἐκγονος καὶ δούλος, αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τούθ' οὕτως derstood the whole system of diet and exercise which, varying with the customs of different states, had for its common object the production of bodily health and strength, and the preparation for military service.” Hellenica, The Theory of Education in Plato’s Republic, by R. L. Nettleship, M.A., p. 88. See on τοῦτο πράττων, 47 a. See also Schoemann, Greek Antiquities, pp. 359 ff.

17. δουλός: opposed to δεσπότης. Cf. Hdt. vii. 104, where Demaratus says to Xerxes that the Lacedaemonians εἰλεύθεροι ἔνοικες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροι εἰσί. Ἐπειτά γὰρ σφί δὲ ἐποίησεν νόμος. Elsewhere Plato uses δουλείαν of the obedience which the law requires, e.g. Legg. 762 e, ὅ μὴ δουλεύσας ὑμᾶς ἀν δεσπότης γένοσται ἄξιος ἐπαινοῦ, καὶ καλλωπίζεσαι (cf. ἐκκαλλωπίζεσαι, Apol. 20 c) χρῆ τῇ καλῶς δουλεύσαι μᾶλλον ἡ τῷ καλῶς ἄρξαι, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, ὡς ταύτην τοῖς θείοις ὀδύουν δουλείαν, ἐπείτα τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις κτέ. Cf. Apol. 23 b, 30 a, and also Eur. Orest. 418, where Orestes says in a very different spirit, δουλεύειν θείος, ὥς τι ποτ' εἰσὶν οἱ θεοὶ. Cf. 52 ἃ. This high standard of obedience, unhesitating and unqualified, to the established law, was familiar to the Athenians before Plato wrote.
Among many passages in the tragedians, cf. Soph. Ant. 603 ff., οὕτως δ' ὑπερβαίνει η' νόμος μείζόντα | η' τούτων τάσειν τοὺς κρατήσαντα νοεί; | οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιλογὴν τοῦτον ἐξ ἐμοῦ τυχεῖν. | ἄλλα δὲν πάλις στήσει, τοῦτο χρῆ κλέων | καὶ σεικρά καὶ δίκαια καὶ τάναντα. Cf. also Cic. Clu. 53. 146, legum ideicerco omnes servi sumus, ut liberius esse possumus, and cf. in Eur. Suppl. 429 ff., the speech of Theseus, beginning, οὔτεν τυφλόν δυσμενέστερον πόλει νῦν τῶν μὲν πρώτων οὐκ εἰσὶν νόμοι | κουμόλ, κρατεῖ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν νόμων κεκτημένου | αὐτὸς παρ' αὐτῷ, καὶ τόθ' οὐκέτι ἔστιν ισών. Cf. also ibid. 316-353, 403-408, and the words of Aethra, 312 f., τὸ γὰρ τινὸς συνέχους (bond of union) ἀνθρώπων πόλεως | τοῦτ έσθ' ἐσθ', δταν τις τοὺς νόμους σἀκη καλώς. Many lines in the Heraclidae of Euripides show that ready and free obedience to law distinguished Athens, τάν εὖ χαρίτων ἐξουσιάν πάλιν, (370 f.). Cf. 181-198, 305 f., 329-332, 420-424.

18. αὐτὸς τে κτε.: see on αὐτός τε κτέ., Apol. 42 a.

21. ἦ πρὸς μὲν ... πρὸς δὲ κτέ.: the first clause is logically subordinate. See on δεῖνα ἢ δὲ ἐν, Apol. 28 d. ἥρα is ironical. See on ἄλλα ... ἥρα, 47 e, and particularly on ἡ πρῶτα μὲν κτέ., 46 a, where ἥρα occurs only in the second clause. For the repetition, see Prot. 325 b c, ἐδικαστὶν δὲ ὅτως καὶ ἑρέπαντον (sc. ἑρέτης) τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ ἥρα τοὺς νόμους ἐπιλάτοντες η' ζημία, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιστῶντες, ἐφ' ἣν δὲ ... ταῦτα δ' ἥρα οὐ διδακτοῖται, οὐδ' ἐπικεκληται τὰν ἔπικελείαν; Notice the position of σοι, which is nevertheless not the emphatic word.

22. ἦν: "when you were under your father or perhaps your master." The past (ἦν) is opposed to the fut. (ἔσται).—καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην: for the δοῦλος χρήστος, see on δοῦλος in 17 above.

23. ἀπέρ πάσχοις: anything that was (at any time) done to you. GMT. 532; II. 914 B (2). Though subordinate, to ὅστε ... ἀντιποιεῖν, this clause is also limited by the neg. statement οὐκ ἔστιν ἦν, which limits the clause ὅστε ... πολλά.

24. οὔτε ... πολλά: an explanation of ὅστε ... ἀντιποιεῖν, in which the neg. of οὐκ ἔστιν ἦν is repeated. —κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν: equiv. to λοιποδόμημεν ἀντιλαμβάνειν.

27. ὅστε καὶ σὺ δὲ ἑπιχειρήσεις: so that you in your own turn will, etc. σὺ, when expressed in Att., has emphatic position. καὶ indicates equality,
IIAATONOS

toús nómos kai tìn patrída kath' ósouν dýnastai épìcheirή-
seis ántapollúνai, kai φήσεις táüta poiòν díkaia prát-
tevn, ó tē ἀλήθεια τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος; ἡ οὖτως εἶ
σοφός, ὡστε λέληθέν σε ὅτι μητρός τε καὶ πατρός καὶ τῶν
ἀλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμιώτερον ἔστιν ἡ πατρίς καὶ
σεμνότερον καὶ ἀγνώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μούρα καὶ παρὰ
θεοῦ καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι
35 δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπείκει καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαῖνυν-
σαν ἡ πατέρα, καὶ ἡ πείθειν ἡ ποιεῖν ἀν κελεύῃ, καὶ

51 a δέ points the contrast between ὑ and ἡμεῖς.
30. ταῦτα ποιῶν δικαία πράττειν: cf. Dem. ix. 15, καὶ τοιαῦτα πράτταν
ti ἐποιεῖ; and iν. 2, οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων ποιοῦντων... πάντα & προσήκε πραττόν-
tων. And yet Aristotle often makes a careful distinction between ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν.
30. ὁ ἐπιμελόμενος κτλ.: for the art., see on τοῦ εἰσάγωντος, Apol. 35 b. The irony comes out in ὡτὸς (i.e. not ταῦτα) εἰ σοφός, ὡστε λέληθέν σε.
ἡ conveys very vigorously the covert reproof of the whole question, are you really? ἡ would be comparatively weak. See App.
31. μητρός: for a similar order of words, cf. Prot. 346 a, ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις
συμβάλλα (sc. autem επαναγκάζεις φιλεῖν καὶ επανεῖν) μητέρα ἡ πατέρα ἀλλόκο-
tον ἡ πατρίδα ἡ ἓλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. Cf. also Hom. Od. ix. 367, μητέρ ἡδὲ
πατήρ ἡδὲ ἓλλο πάντες ἐπαίροι.
32. ἡ πατρίς: by the addition of the art. the definite fatherland of each and every man is indicated. Cf. below, b, and 54 c. For the art. used as a poss., see G. 141, x. 2; Η. 658. Cf. Henry V. iv. 6, “He smiled me in the
parentes, cari liberi, propin-
qui, familiares; sed omnes
omnia caritates patria una
complexa est, pro qua quis
bonus dubitet mortem oppo-
tere, si ci sit profuturus? Cf.
also Hector’s eis oinwos ἀριστος, ἀνοί-
γεθαί περὶ πάτρης, Hom. ΙL xii. 248.
33. ἐν μείζονι μοῖρα: after the
analogy of Homeric expressions like
that used by Poseidon of Zeus, Η. χv.
195, μενέτω τριτάτῃ ἐν μοῖρῃ, i.e. in
the one of the three parts of the
world allotted to him as one of the
1491, τής σφοδρείνης μοίρας ἐπάλαμον
δύτας, and Hdt. ii. 172, τὰ μὲν πρὸτα
τῶν Ἀμασίων Ἀιγύπτιοι ἐν οἵδειμη ἀρη
μεγάλη ἡγον (considered of little or no
account, nullo magnopere loco
habebant).
34. σέβεσθαι κτλ.: the subj. of σέ-
βεσθαι is an implied timά, not ἡ πατρίς.
35. πατρίδα χαλεπαίνυναν: the
acc. after σέβεσθαι, ὑπείκειν, and θω-
πεύειν, though ὑπείκειν should be
followed by the dat. See on θ, 47 e.
Cf. Liv. xxvii. 34. 14, ut paren-
tium saevitiam, sic patriae pa-
tiendo ac ferendo leniendum
esse.
36. πείθειν: used absolutely, as in
Apol. 35 c, to change her mind, to
convert to your way of thinking; some-
κριτών.

πάσχειν, ἐάν τι προστάττῃ παθεῖν, ἰσχυόν ἄγοντα, ἐάν 
τε τύπτεσθαι ἐάν τε δεῖσθαι, ἐάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἀγγὶ τρω-
θησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανοῦμεν, ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δι-
καίον οὐτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεκτέον οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον 
οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστη-
ρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἢ ἄν κελευθή ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ 
πατρίς, ἢ πείθεων αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέψκε, βιάζοσθαι δὲ 
οὐχ οἴσων οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τοῦτων ἔτι 
ἵττον τὴν πατρίδα; τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὥς Κρίτων; 
ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὖ; 

ΚΡ. Ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ.

XIII. ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοῖνυν, ὥς Σῶκρατες, φαῖεν ἄν ἵσως 
οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ 
δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖσι δρᾶν ἢ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖσι. ἡμεῖς γὰρ 
σε γενικι

50. καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεκτέον: a neg. re-
termination of ποιήτων ταῦτα. We must not draw back, we must not retreat, we must not leave the ranks. Corresponding to these three duties, there were three forms of indictment, ἀστρα-
telas, δειλια, λιποταξία. On the last, cf. Apol. 28 e-29 a. ἁτίμια was the 
penalty involved in all these cases.

43. ἢ πείθεων: the inf. coming after e 
an impersonal verbal often depends 
on an implied δει even when no δει 
precedes. GMT. 925; H. 991 a. 
Cf. Gorg. 492 δ, τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας 
φήσιν κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἶνον 
δεί εἶναι ἐξώτα δὲ αὐτάς ὡς 
μεγάλης πλήρους αὐτάς ἥμοδεν γέ 
ποθεν ἑτοιμάζειν. 
— ἢ . . . πέψκε: quomodo ius-
tum comparatum sit, an expla-
nation of πείθεων, which implies διδά-
σκειν (cf. Apol. 35 c, διδάσκειν καὶ 
pείθειν).

XIII. 1. σκόπει τοῖνυν κτὲ.: an 
application of the universal truth to 
a particular instance.

2. δι κτέ.: the relation of δίκαια 
to κτέ. is the same in which ἀλη-
θή of the clause preceding stands 
to ταῦτα. Supply an inf. govern-
ing ἢ.
νήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων 51 δ' οὖν ὁ δι' ἡμεν καλῶν σοι καὶ τοῖς ἁλλοις πᾶσι πολιταῖς, ἀ ὁμος προαγορεύομεν, τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἵδη τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ὃ ἂν μὴ ἄρεσκομεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπειναί ὅποι ἄν βούληται. 10 καὶ οὕδεις ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδῶν ἐστίν οὖν ἀπαγο- ρεύει, ἐάν τέ τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποκίαν ἑναι ἡ μὴ ἄρεσκομεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ τῇ πόλις, ἕαν τε μετοικεῖν ἅλλοστε ποι ἐλθὼν, ἑναι ἐκεῖστε ὅποι ἄν βούληται ἑξοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ. ὅσ δ' ἄν ὑμῶν παραμεθνη, ὅρων ἄν τρόπου ἡμεῖς τάς τε ε 15 δύκας δυκάζομεν καὶ τάλα τῇ πόλιν διωκομεῖν, ἤδη φαμέν τούτον ἀρμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν ἂν ἄν ἡμεῖς κελεύομεν ποιήσειν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τρικήφιον ἀδι- κεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖς οὕδεν ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ οἴ τρο-
feño, καὶ ὁτι ὀμολογήσας ἡμῶν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται
20 οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέντων
ημῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιταττόντων ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύμεθαν, 52
καὶ ἄλλα ἐφίεντων δυοῖν θάτερα, ἥ πείθεων ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν, τού
των οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

XIV. Ταύταις δὴ φαμεν καὶ σὲ, Σώκρατες, ταῖς αἴτιαις
ἐνέξεσθαι, εἰπέρ ποιήσεις ἅ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἡκιστα Ἀθη-
ναῖων σὲ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. εἰ οὖν ἐγώ εἴπομι. διὰ
tί δὴ; ἵσως ἂν μοι δικαίως καθάπτοντω λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν
5 τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοὺς ὀμολογήκως τυγχάνω
ταύτην τὴν ὀμολογίαν. 

19. ὀμολογήσας πείθεσθαι: not πεί-
σθαι, although πείσθαι would mean
about the same. See GMT. 100.

20. προτιθέντων ἡμῶν: ἥ πείθεσθαι
ἡ πείθεων must be supplied from what
precedes. The same idea is then
expressed negatively and once again
positively. αὑρέσιν προτιθέναι is
also used, meaning to leave a man free to
choose. Socrates cannot repeat too often that the state is right, as
against those who seek to evade the
authority of its law. This fact ac-
counts for the clause which follows:
tούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ, a mere repeti-
tion of οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς.

22. θάτερα: the notion of plurality
has here practically disappeared, as is
often true also in the case of ταύτα.

4. ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα: see on ἐν τοῖς
θεωρίαι πόσοτ' ἢ κτῆς
πόλεως ἐξήλθες, [ὅτι μὴ ἀπαξ εἰς Ἰσθμόν,] οὔτε ἀλλος
οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευομένος, οὔτε ἀλλήν ἀποδι-

9. ἐν τοῖς ἀπολαγόμενοι: not ἀπο-
λαγόμενοι, although ἀπολαγο-
μένοι would mean
about the same. See GMT. 100.

10. καὶ ὄντε ... οὔτε: the promi-
nence of the hypothetical expression
(όν γὰρ ἂν κτέ.) grows less here, and
completely disappears with ὄνθε, as
the contradictory ἀλλὰ plainly shows.
θεωρία means not only a state embassy
to games and festivals (see the pas-
sage from the Phaedo quoted on τὸ
πλαῖον, 43 c) but also attendance at
religious festivals, particularly at the
great national games, on the part of
private individuals. See on ἐλάστω
ἀπεδήμησας, 53 a.

12. εἰ μή ποι στρατευομένος: for
the campaigns of Socrates, see on εν Ποτιδαίοις, Ἀπολ. 28 e. Euphony, perhaps, prevented the addition of οὐδεμιᾶν after ἀπόδημιαν. Cf. 52 e and 54 b.

14. εἰδέναι: added for the sake of clearness and precision. The result is that the preceding gen. seems to be a case of prolepsis. Cf. I om. II. ii. 720, τόδεν εἰδότες ἴρι μάχεσθαι. Soph. Eı. 542 f., ἡ τών ἐμῶν "Αἰδής τῶν ἰμερὸν ἵππων τέκνων ἢ τῶν ἐκείσες ἐπχεῖ διάσασθαι πλέον. The subj. or obj. of the inf. is often put by anticipation as the obj. of its governing verb, noun, or adj.

c 17. καλ... ἐποιήσω: is freed from its connexion with ἀμοιλόγεις, to which, however, τά τε ἄλλα is still attached. See on καλ γέγονε, Ἀπολ. 36 a. This irregularity was hardly avoidable, e since a participle would have been clumsy, and the idea does not suit a clause with ὅτι. Accordingly it was hardly possible to subordinate it to πολιτεύεσθαι.

18. ἐτι τοῖνυν: transition to a new point, which, however, remains closely connected with the leading idea.

19. φυγής τιμήσασθαι: cf. Ἀπολ. 37 e and see on τιμᾶτα θανάτου, Ἀπολ. 36 b.


21. ἐκαλλωπίζου: cf. Ἀπολ. 20 c, ἐκαλλωπίζου τε καὶ ἠθερόδημον ἀν.

23. ἐκείνου τοῦς λόγους ἀλαχύνει: not ashamed of those words, but, ashamed to face those words. H. 712. The words are personified and confront him with his disgrace. Cf. 46 b.
\textbf{KPITON.}

\textbf{KR.} 'Ανάγκη, ὤ Σώκρατες.

\textbf{ΣΩ.} Ἀλλο τι οὖν ἄν φαίνει ἡ ἐξωθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς. καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεῖς οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκα-35 σθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ἄλλ' ἐν ἐστειν ἐβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἔξην σοι ἀπτείναι, εἰ μὴ ἤρεσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαύνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι. σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαι-μονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ὃς δὴ ἐκάστοτε φής εὐνομε-σθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν 40 βαρβαρικῶν, ἄλλα ἐλάττω εξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χω-λοὶ τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι. οὔτω σοὶ διαφε-ρόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δήλον ὅτι τίνι γὰρ ἄν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων;

\textbf{29. ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ:} not merely in your professions. That ὁμολογηκέναι is the verb with which ἔργῳ is connected appears from the context. Cf. 51 e.

\textbf{30. ἄλλο τι ἡ:} see on ἄλλο τι ἡ, Apol. 24 c, and cf. Phaed. 79 c quoted below.

\textbf{32. ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς:} without any reflexive meaning. Cf. Phaed. 79 a, ἄλλο τι ἡ μονὴ αὐτῶν ἡ τὸ μὲν σωμα ἐστὶν, τὸ δὲ ψυχή. But cf. 54 e.

\textbf{35. ἐν ἐστειν ἐβδομήκοντα:} cf. Apol. 17 d. Socrates here speaks less accurately than in 51 d.

\textbf{38. ὃς δὲ ἐκάστοτε κτέ.:} Plato, like many others, often praises these states, whose similar institutions were all of them based upon the common character due to their Dorian origin. In the Memorabilia, Xenophon, himself the ardent admirer of Sparta, reports various conversations where Socrates praises Dorian institutions. See (Mem. iii. 5. and iv. 4) his commendation of the strict obedience to law at Sparta and of the education which prepares men for it. The education of Spartan women was less admired and less admirable. Cf. Eur. Andr. 595 ff., οὐδὲ ἄν εἰ βούλοιτο τίς σώφρων γένοιτο Σπαρτιατίδων κόρη... ἃρμον παλαίστρας τ' οὐκ ἀνασχετούσος ἐμοὶ καὶ κοίνας ἔχουσι. κατὰ βαυμάζειν χρέων ἡ μὴ γυναῖκα σώφρονα παιδεύετε;

\textbf{40. ἐλάττω ἀπεδήμησας:} cf. Phaedr. 230 c, where Phaedrus says to Socrates as they are taking a walk in the country: οὖ δὲ γε, ὃς βαυμαζέεις, ἀτοπώ-τατος τίς φαίνει. ἀπεκχωρώς γὰρ ἡμαγού-μένῳ (a stranger come to see the sights in town) τινι καὶ οὖν ἐπιχώριῳ ἐοικας. οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἀστευς οὔτ' εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολὰν (foreign parts) ἀποδείκνει, οὔτ' ἐξω τει-χους ἐμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν εξείναι. Socrates answers: συγγιγνοσκε μοι, ὃ ἀρίσττε, φιλόμαθ' ἡμαῖρ᾽ εἰμί. τὰ μὲν οὖν χαρά καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδὲν με θέλει διδά-σκειν, οἵ δ' ἐν τῷ ἀστεί ἄνθρωποι.

\textbf{43. δήλον ὅτι:} appended at the end of the sent. by way of emphasis without having any place in the const.
νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμένεις τοῖς ὁμολογημένοις; έὰν ἥμων γε
45 πείθῃ, ὡς Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἐσεὶ ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως ἐξελθῶν.

XV. Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβάς καὶ ξαμαρτά
νων τι τούτων τί ἁγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδεί
ους τοὺς σαυτοῦ; ὦτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύονσι γὰς σου οἱ
ἐπιτηδειοὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἢ
5 τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδὸν τι δήλον· αὕτως δὲ πρῶτον
μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατα τινα πόλεων ἔλθῃ, ἢ Θῆβαις ἢ
Μέγαρας, —ἐυνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφότεροι—πολέμοις ἴσες,
ὡς Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὀσοπερ κήδονται
tῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψατον σε διαθρόει ἡγούμενος.

53 a See on ἄν ὄντων, Apol. 37 b. H. 1049,
a 1 a. Cf. Eur. Suppl. 396, ἱδαμῖος, ὡς
ἐοικεῖν, ὡς σὰρ' οἷς ὅτι, κῆρυξ. Λγ.
Clouds, ἄδικοντι ἄδικεύοντα καὶ κακοποργοῦντι, οἷς ὅτι. Its stress is given
chiefly to καὶ ἴδιοὶ οἱ νόμοι.
44. οὐκ ἐμμένεις: a more vivid form
of question than ἐμμενεῖς. The laws
give answer to their own question in
ἐὰν ἥμων γε πείθῃ, which implies Ἰλλ'
ἐμμενεῖς. Socrates might have said
Ἀλλ' ἐμμένων.
45. καταγέλαστος: with reference
to his preceding operations. Cf. 52 c
above, αὖ δὲ τότε μὲν κτε.
 XV. 1. σκόπει: prefixed to an
independent sent. just as ὅρας often is.
Cf. 47 a and Prot. 336 b. —παρα-
βάς καὶ ξαμαρτάνων: this = εὰν παρα-
βάς καὶ ξαμαρτάνης. The pres. marks
the continuance of the action.
5 b 5. σχεδὸν τι: this adv. use of τι
is common with πάνω, σχεδὸν, πλέον,
μᾶλλον and πολλ. —πρῶτον μὲν: the
 corresponding clause follows below
(d) in a different form. See on ἄλλα,
50 d.
7. Μέγαρας: see App. and also G.
61; H. 219. —ἐυνομοῦνται γὰρ: for the
facts, see on ἄν δὴ ἐκαστοτε, 52 e, and
Cf. Soph. O. C. 919 ff., καίτοι σε Θῆβαις
γ' οὐκ ἐπαιδευσαν κανον· ὡς γὰρ φιλοῦ-
σιν ἄνδρας ἐκδίκους τρέφειν. In Thebes,
before and during the Peloponnesian
war, there was a moderate oligarchy
(ἄλγαρχία ἰδίωνοι, different from the
dynastiai ἀλλήων of the time of the
Persian wars) in political sympathy
with Sparta. Megara also had an
oligarchical form of government, and
had been, since the battle of Coroneia
(447 B.C.), on the Spartan side.
8. τούτων: referring either to the
cities (instead of ἐν τούτοις) or to
xxiii. 319, ἣς ὡς Τιθέμενον Δαιστρυ-
γονήν ἀφίκετο, οἷς νῆας τ' ὑλεσαν καὶ
ἐκενήμασι ἑταῖρους.
9. ὑποβλέψατοι: suggestive of the
Homeric ὑπόδρα ἰδών. "They will look
upon you with suspicion." The im-
plication of suspicion is conveyed by
the ὑπὸ in ὑφοράν, ὑποψία, as in Xen.
An. ii. 10, οί δὲ Ἔλληνες ὑφὸ ῥων-
tεσ τούτου αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἐχώρουν
ἡγεμόνας ἑχοντες.
10 'noi tovov vómov, kai bébetaóseis tois dikastáis tivn dóxan óoste dokein órthos tivn díkhn dikasai: ós tis gar nómov e diaphorofeús esti, sphiódra pou doxei an vénw ge kai anoi- twv anbropón diaphorofeús éinai. póteron oin feúzei tás te evnomouménavs dóleis kai tován anbropón toús kosmawtá-15 tous; kai touto pouonuó aéra á dzi on sou oivn ésta; h plhspísases toútois kai anauchoxútheis diáleghómenos— tivás lógyous, ò Zoikrates; h óúster epíñade, ws h árjeta kai h dikaiosúnh pleistou á dzi on tois anbropous kai ta vóumia kai oi vómov; kai oúk oiei ásychilem anv fanéisba 20 to toú Zoikráton prágma; oíesbaí ge chrí. all'é ek mév a toútwn tovón topówn ápereís, h'xeis de eis Thetalíaan para toúso ézévov toús Krítwnos: ékei gar di pléisth átaxia kai akoláxia, kai ísos an ́hdeése sou ankoúon wós geloiws ék tov désmowhtérioú apédídpraskes skevnyn té tina periód-25 mevos, h diaphéron labón h álala oia h éiáthasou énsekevá-
ζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτὸν μεταλλάξας. ὃ ἐκ γερῶν ἀνήρ, σμικρὸν χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιπὸν ὄντος ὡς τὸ ἐκός, ἑτολμησάς οὐτως αὐσχρῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν, νόμος τοὺς μεγίστους παραβᾶς, οὐδεὶς ὃς ἔρει; ἵσως, ἂν μὴ τινα λυπῆς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀκούσει, ὡς Ἁσώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτὸν. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων· τί ποιῶν ἡ εὐωχούμενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ, ὀσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκός εἰς Θετταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παῖδων ἕνεκα βούλει 54 ἕνων, ἦν αὐτοῦς ἐκθρέψεις καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί δὲ; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἄγαγων θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ἐξόν τοι τούτο ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἣ τούτο μὲν οὖ,

σβὰι μ’ οἴνον ἀθλιώτατον. Cf. also ibid. 436. σχῆμα, on the other hand, relates to the other disguises of face and figure necessary to complete the transformation.

28. ὃς τὸ εἰκός: that is according to the law of nature. — ἔτολμησας: see on τόλμησις, Apol. 38 d, and App.

29. οὐδεὶς ὁς: will there be nobody to say this? i.e. "absolutely every one," expressed interrogatively. Here, as in many common idioms, the verb "to be" is omitted.

30. εἰ δὲ μῆ: otherwise. See GMT. 478; Η. 006, 6. — ἀκούσει . . . ἀνάξια: like ἀκούειν κακά (ὑπὸ τινος) is the passive of ἔγειν κακά. Cf. 50 ε. The καὶ between πολλὰ and ἀνάξια should not be translated.

31. δῆ: accordingly. He must make up his mind to it, he has no choice.

32. καὶ δουλεύων: better understood absolutely than with an implied dat. Here we have a blunt statement of the fact which Socrates had in mind in saying ὑπερχόμενοι. — τί ποιῶν ἡ κτῆ.: the partic. goes with the verb of the foregoing clause. This cannot be reproduced in Eng., "in fact how can you live there except in one continual round of revelry, as if you had come to Thessaly to eat and drink." No ἀλλὰ is needed after τί.

35. ἀλλὰ δὴ: a new objection raised and answered by the laws themselves in respect of what Crito said, 45 ε-46 α. — ἀλλὰ: relates to the preceding thought: of course these sayings are nowhere, "but are you actually willing?" etc. See on Apol. 37 c.

38. ὡς καὶ τοῦτο κτῆ.: i.e. in addition to all other obligations. ἀπολαύσω is often used, as here, ironically. How a Greek looked upon exile is plain from passages like Eur. El. 1311 ff., ϋχ 5° | οἰκτρά. Δι. πέπονθεν, πλὴν ὅτι λείπει πόλιν Ἀργείων. ΟΠ. καὶ τινὲς ἄλλαι στοναχαὶ μείζους | ἱ γῆς πατρόφας ὄρον ἕκλεισεν; and Phoen. 388 ff., where Polynices, answering Io- casta's question, τί τὸ στέρεσθαι πατρίδος; ἢ κακὸν μέγα; σαῦς μέγαστον ἔργον δ' ἐστι μείζων ἢ λόγῳ. Cf. Richard II. i. 3, —
αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζωντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ 54
παύδευσονται, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτηδειοὶ
οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον ἐὰν εἰς Θετταλίαν
ἀποδημήσῃς ἐπιμελήσονται, ἐὰν δὲ εἰς Ἀιδοῦ ἀποδημή-
σῃς οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἰπερ γε τι ὁφελος αὐτῶν ἐστι
τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι, οἰεσθαί γε χρή. 54

XVI. 'Αλλ', ο Σώκρατες, πείθόμενος ἡμῶν τοῖς σοῖς
τροφεύοι μήτε παῦς περὶ πλεόνος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν
μήτε ἀλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἦν εἰς Ἀιδοῦ ἐλθὼν
ἐχῆς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἑκεῖ ἄρχουσιν·
5 οὕτε γὰρ ἐνβάδε σα σαῦντας ταῦτα πράπτοντι ἀμενον
εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὀσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἀλλο τῶν σῶν
οὐδενί, οὕτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένῳ ἀμενον ἐσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν
μὲν ἡδικημένος ἀπει, εὰν ἀπίης, οὐχ ψφ ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων
ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως ἀισχρῶς ἀντα-
10 δικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας
te καὶ ἕυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργα-

54 a What is my sentence then but speechless
death,
Which robs my tongue from breathing na-
tive breath?

and Dante, Paradiso, xviii., —
Thou shalt abandon everything beloved
Most tenderly, and this the arrow is
Which first the bow of banishment shoots
forth.

Cf. also many well-known passages in
the Odyssey, e.g. Od. i. 58, ἰέμενος καὶ
καταλ ἀποβράσκοντα νοῦσαι ἃς γαῖς,
x. 27 f., οὕ τοι ἐγὼ γε ἃς γαῖς δύνα-
μαι γλυκερώτερον ἀλλο ἰδέσθαι, xx. 90.
39. θρέψονται καὶ παυδεύσονται: see
on ἐνέξεσθαι, 52 a.
44. τῶν . . . ἐνα: explanation of
αὐτῶν. σοι is not to be connected
b with φασκόντων. —οἰεσθαί γε χρή: cf.
55 c.

XVI. 3. πρὸ: after περὶ πλεὸνος.
See on πρὸ τοῦ ἄδικευτ, 48 d.
5. ἀμενον . . . δικαίοτερον: see on
ἀμενον, Apol. 10 a.
6. οὐδὲ ἀλλωτῶν σῶν: the laws add
this for Crito's benefit. Cf. 45 c-46 a.
7. νῦν μὲν: assuming that Socrates
has made up his mind not to take
Crito's advice.
8. οὐχ ψφ ἡμῶν κτε.: the laws add
this in the vein of what has gone
before.
9. ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων: referring to the e
fallible mortals who act as guardians
and representatives of the blameless
24 d, ἀνθρώπως, ὡστὶς πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ
tοῦτο οἶδε, τῶν νόμων.
11. παραβὰς, ἐργασάμενος: subor-
dinated to the foregoing parties.
σάμενος τούτοις οὖς ἥκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τε σοι· χαλεπανούμεν ζῶντι, καὶ ἐκεί οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοί οἱ ἐν Ἁλίδου νόμοι οὐκ εὑμε-15 νῶς σε ὑποδέχονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπο-λέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μὴ σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἄ-λεγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς.

XVII. Ταῦτα, ὁ φίλε ἐταύρε Κρίτων, εὖ ἵσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὡσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦ-σιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ ἡ ἡχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλὰ ἕστιν, ὃσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐὰν λέγης παρά ταῦτα, μάτην ἑρείς. ὅμως μέντοι εἰ τι οἷον πλέον ποιήσεως, λέγει.

ΚΡ. 'Ἀλλ', ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.


15. οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες: κορυβαντιῶν means act like the Corybantes. These were priests of Phrygian Cybele, whose orgiastic rites were accompanied by dances and deafening music. Here a species of madness seems to be indicated, under the influence of which men imagined that they heard the flutes that were used in Corybantian revels. Cf. Iou, 534 a, ὡσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες οὐκ ἐμφρονεῖν ὡντες ὀρ-χούνται, οὕτω καὶ οἱ μελασιοὶ οὐκ ἐμ-φρονεῖν ὡντες τὰ καλά μέλη ταῦτα ποιοῦ-σιν, and the song of the bacchants in Eur. Bacch. 114-129 and 155-161, —

Soon shall the country rejoice in the dance;
Soon with his revellers Bacchus advance;
Into the hills, the hills shall he fare, Joining the host of his women-folk there.
Far from their homes and their weaving they came, Goaded by Bacchus and stung by his name.
O wild Curetes' vaulted lair!
O hallowed haunts of Crete!
Where new-born Zeus found faithful care, And kind protection meet
In caverns safe from every snare.

Corybantes, wearing helms three-rimmed, stretched skins to make my drum's full round;
Then they, in hollowed caves, lithe-limbed,
With drums, and, with the flute's shrill sound
Full Phrygian, bacchic ditties hymned.

Sing Dionysus, and praised let him be;
Beat ye the deep-sounding drums as of old;
Sing to the Evian god evoe!
Greet him with Phrygian cries, and let flutes Trill in your revels and ripple shrill joy;
Instruments holy the holy employ.

5. ὃσα γε κτῆ.: a limitation added to soften the assertion. See on ὃσα γε ταῦθα πεσειν, 46 e. No obj. is needed with λέγης. λέγειν παρὰ κτῆ. comes
ΣΩ. Ἐκ τοῖνυν, ὅ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτη, ἐπεὶ

δὴ ταύτη ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

very near the meaning of ἀντιλέγειν.
Cf. 48 d. Cf. also the omission of
the obj. ἐμὲ with the preceding ποιεῖ
μὴ δύνασθαι κτέ.

8. ἡ: used abs. with a following
subjv. or inv. to dismiss a matter
under discussion. Cf. Charm. 163 e,
ἐὰ, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ· μὴ γάρ πω ὁ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν
σκοπῶμεν ἄλλ' ὁ σὲ λέγεις νῦν. Euthyd.
302 c, ἐὰ, ὁ Διονυσσόδωρος, εὐφήμει τε
καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς μὲ προδίδασκε.—

ταύτη: the repetition of the same word is
effective.

9. ὁ θεὸς: see on τῷ θεῷ, Apol.
19 a. Here, as at the end of his de-
fence proper, Apol. 35 d, and at the
end of his closing words in court,
Apol. 42 a, Socrates mentions ὁ θεὸς.
Dante closes each one of the three
parts of his great poem with a refer-
ence to the stars. This is no accident
in either case, though Plato had a
philosopher's reason which Dante
could not give, except for the closing
line of the Paradiso, which is ὁ θεὸς
translated into the language of the
poet, “L' Amor che muove il Sole e
l' altre stelle,” The love which moves
the sun and the other stars.
MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.

Since all the extant Mss. of Plato follow or attempt to follow Thrasyllus in his subdivision into nine tetralogies or groups consisting of four members each, and since Thrasyllus was instructor to the emperor Tiberius, it follows that the origin of no Ms. of Plato now known to exist can be assigned to a date much earlier than the middle of the first century A.D. The following is a table exhibiting Thrasyllus's tetralogies, and also naming the best Ms. in which each tetralogy is preserved:

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<td>II</td>
<td>Cratylus.</td>
<td>Theaetetus.</td>
<td>Sophist.</td>
<td>Statesman.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<td>IV</td>
<td>Alcibiades I.</td>
<td>Alcibiades II.</td>
<td>Hipparchus.</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>Theages.</td>
<td>Charmides.</td>
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Of the three Mss., the most trustworthy is Clarkianus, and the least trustworthy is Venetus T. Schanz constructs the pedigree of the existing Mss. of Plato, and traces them all to an original or Archetypus. This parent Ms. consisted of two volumes: Vol. I. contained the first seven tetralogies; Vol. II. contained the last two tetralogies, together with a number of works attributed with more or less confidence to Plato. The copies made of Vol. I. were of two kinds, (1) incomplete, omitting the seventh tetralogy, and (2) complete. The best Ms. now preserved represents an incomplete copy of Vol. I. of the Archetypus; this is the codex Clarkianus, the capital authority for the first six tetralogies. The complete copy of Vol. I. is represented by the much less trustworthy codex Venetus T, the best authority for the seventh tetralogy.

The best representative of Vol. II. of the Archetypus is codex Parisinus A.
The leading facts about these three Mss. are as follows:—

I. **Codex Clarkianus**, referred to by the single letter B for brevity's sake and because the Ms. is called also Bodleianus. It is now in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and is "the fairest specimen of Grecian caligraphy which has descended to modern times." Daniel Clarke found this Ms., in October, 1801, in the library of a monastery on the island of Patmos. It was beautifully written on parchment, in the year 896 A.D., by a skilful scribe, one Joannes, for the use of Arethas, who afterwards became archbishop of Caesarea. See M. Schanz, Novae Commentationes Platonicae, pp. 105–118; and Daniel Clarke, Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

II. **Codex Venetus T**, Bekker's t. This Ms. is now in the Library of St. Mark's in Venice, and is chiefly valuable where the Clarkianus entirely fails, i.e. for the seventh tetralogy. For a more detailed account, see M. Schanz, Ueber den Platocodex der Marcus-Bibliothek in Venedig; also the preface to Vol. IX. of the same author's critical edition of Plato's works. The date of this Ms. is very uncertain.

III. **Parisinus A**, No. 1807 (formerly 94 and 2087). This Ms. is now in the National Library at Paris; it was probably written early in the tenth century after Christ. It comprises the eighth and ninth tetralogies of Thrasyllus, together with seven spurious dialogues. The Crito-phon, with which it begins, is numbered twenty-nine. See M. Schanz, Studien zur Geschichte des Platonischen Textes, and the general introduction to his critical edition of Plato's works. There are many other Mss. of Plato, for some account of which also see Schanz in his general introduction, and in Bursian's Jahresbericht (9, 5, 1, pp. 178–188), where he summarizes his results and defends them against Jordan and Wohlrab.

**Important Editions of Plato's Complete Works.**


In all modern editions of Plato, numbers and letters which refer to the pages of the edition of Stephanus are found in the margin. This is the most convenient mode of reference, and is now universally employed to the exclusion of the less well-established subdivision into chapters. The edition of Stephanus (Henri Estienne) is in three volumes, but to give the volume is superfluous, since the name of the dialogue is given in every reference. Each page is divided into five parts by the letters (a) b c d e placed down the margin.
Platonis Dialogi. (Gr. et Lat.) Ex recensione Imm. Bekker. 3 Partes. in 8 Voll. Commentaria crit. et scholia. 2 Voll. Berolini, 1816–1823. (This edition contains the first systematic collation of Mss., and the result is a great improvement upon the Stephanus text.)


Platonis Opera omnia. Rec. prolegomenis et comment. illustr. Gdfr. Stallbaum. 10 Voll. Lipsiae, 1827–1877. (In the Bibliotheca Graeca of Jacobs and Rost.)


Platonis Dialogi secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi. Ex recognitio Caroli Friderici Hermanni. 6 Voll. Lipsiae (1851, 1853), 1873, 1874.


Important or convenient editions of the Apology and of the Crito.


Platonis Apologia Socratis et Crito. Ed. V. aliquanto auct. et. emendat. quam cur. M. Wohlrab. Lipsiae (1827), 1877. (This is Vol. I., Section 1, of Teubner’s ten-volume publication of Stallbaum’s complete Plato mentioned above.)
MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.


Plato’s Apology and Crito, with notes. By W. S. Tyler. New York, 1860.

Plato’s Apology of Socrates and Crito, with notes. By W. Wagner. Cambridge, England, 1869. (Boston, 1877.)

Platons Verteidigungsrede des Socrates und Kriton. Erklärt von Dr. Christian Cron. Achte Auflage. Leipzig, 1882. (This edition is the basis of the present work, and is the first part of an edition of the selected works of Plato, edited for the use of schools by Dr. Cron and Dr. Julius Deuschle.)
CRITICAL NOTES.

These notes are Dr. Cron’s necessary explanation of the text which he has adopted. Where departures have been made from Dr. Cron’s text, they are in turn discussed. The first reading is the one adopted in this edition. B denotes Codex Clarkianus (= Bodleianus). T denotes Codex Venetus T. S denotes the reading adopted by Schanz, W that adopted by Wohlrab. Bem. denotes Dr. Cron’s “Kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen zu Platons Apologie, Criton, und Laches. Separat Abdr. aus dem fünften Supplement-band der Jahrb. für classische Philologie,” pp. 64–132. Leipzig, 1864. Teubner.

APOLOGY.

17 a, p. 55 (1). ὅ τι: with S. Cron writes ὅτι, following the analogy of ὅστις, ἦτις, but ὅ τι is unquestionably needed for clearness.

17 b, p. 56 (13). γοῦν: with inferior Ms. and B (second hand). οὖν, B (first hand) and Cron following S.

17 b, p. 56 (14). δέ μοι: δ' ἐμοί, SW with Heindorf.

17 c, p. 57 (17). ἄλλα: with Bessarion’s Ms. (Venetus E). ἄλλα, Cron and S following B.

17 c, p. 57 (18). ὄνομασι: with B. ὄνομαςιν, Cron and S with Bessarion’s Ms. and Venetus 185 (Bekker’s Π).

17 d, p. 58 (27). πλεῖω ἐβδομηκόντα: Cron with S following B omits the πλεῖω, which is found only in inferior Mss. Hermann adopted πλεῖω ἐβδομηκόντα.

18 a, p. 59 (31). ὡς γε μοι: with S. ὡς γ' ἐμοί, W.

18 a, p. 59 (2). ψευδή κατηγοριμένα: [ψευδή] κατηγοριμένα, S with Hirschig.

18 a, p. 59 (4). γεγόνασι: with the best Mss. γεγόνασιν, Cron following S. There are marks of correction in B and other Mss., but no Mss. cited by S reads γεγόνασιν.

18 b, p. 60 (9). ἐμοὶ: the Mss. read ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθῆς. Hermann bracketed μᾶλλον . . . ἀληθῆς as a gloss, while the Zürich edition lets the words stand. S writes ἐμοῦ μὰ τὸν . . . οὐδὲν ἀληθῆς. Bekker and Stallbaum, following Mss. of slight value, read ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν ἀληθῆς. The suggestion of Schanz is the best unless these words are simply to be cut out. Riddell says “the rhythm would be intolerable without the three words μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθῆς.”

18 b, p. 60 (10). φροντιστῆς: Albert von Bamberg (Fleckeisen’s Jahrbücher,
113, 10) proposes to cut out φροντιστῆς, because no exact parallel to this acc. of the dir. obj. has been found in prose. So far he is right, even against Krüger's citation of various adjs. joined with εἴναι, for such combinations are very closely akin to verbal forms. On the other hand, to make such a point of the distinction between the indir. (or remoter) obj. which Bamberg would allow, and the dir. obj. which he proposes to disallow, is to ignore the difference in this particular between Greek and Latin syntax. In the shifting of voice from act. to pass., for instance, the distinction between dir. and indir. obj. is far less scrupulously defined in Greek than in Latin. To be sure Xenophon twice uses the gen. with φροντιστῆς (cf. Symp. 6. 6, τῶν μετεώρων φροντιστῆς and Mem. iv. 7. 6, τῶν οὐρανῶν φροντιστῆς). It should be remembered that consistency may be too much insisted upon. Furthermore ἀπαξ εἴρημένα are not surprising in a speech, which, like the Apology, aims to give Socrates's personal hobbies in language as in thought.

18 c, p. 61 (12). οἱ ταύτην: Heindorf. ταύτην, W following the Mss.
18 c, p. 61 (13). ἀκούσατε: ἀκούσαντες, S following B (first hand).
18 d, p. 62 (21). κοιμώδιστοι: with S following B. Elsewhere κοιμώδιστοί (τραγῳδιστοί) is found in the best Mss.
18 c, p. 63 (32). Uhlig quotes (Rhein. Mus. 19, 1, and Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 121, 10) the authority of several grammarians to prove that the exclamation εἶνε has no connexion with εἴναι. He maintains that it is and always was an interjection, and that there was originally an aspirate at the beginning of the second syllable, like εὕλει, εὕίν (bacchic interjections), and the Attic ταῦσ.
19 c, p. 65 (13). σοφός ἐστι· μὴ φύγωμι: with Riddell. σοφός ἐστι, μὴ φύγωμι, Cron.
19 d, p. 66 (19). μικρὸν: with Cron and S following B. σμικρὸν, inferior Mss. Judging from other cases, cf. below (28 b) and in the Crito (46 a), σμικρὸν and μικρὸν have about equal claims in any given place.
19 d, p. 66 (1). οὐδὲν ἐστίν: with S. οὐδέν [ἐστίν], Cron. οὐδέν ἐστίν, W.
19 e, p. 67 (7). οἶς τ' ἐστίν: [οἶς τ' ἐστίν], S.
19 e, p. 67 (9). πείθουσα: πείθουσιν, S.
20 a, p. 67 (10). σφίσιν: with B (second hand) and other Mss. σφίσιν, Cron following S with B (first hand).
20 a, p. 67 (17). καλὰ τε καὶ ἄγαθο: following B with S W. Venetus T reads καλὰ κάγαθω. In his preface to Vol. II., Schanz very emphatically rejects the reading of B and defends T, but he has not the courage of his convictions, and finally retains the reading of B.
20 c, p. 68 (26). ἐχοι: B. ἐχει, S W.
20 c, p. 69 (5). εἰ μὴ τί... πολλὸι: [εἰ μὴ τί... πολλοί], S and Cobet. Bobrik (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 113, 5) argues against bracketing the words, "that the meaning of περιττῶν is quantitative while that of ἄλλοιον is qualitative." S (Bursian's Jahresbericht, 9, 5, 1, p. 188) is not convinced.
CRITICAL NOTES.

20 d, p. 69 (8). ἐστὶ: ἐστίν, S W — "ἐστὶν ὑπὲρασά β Δ," S.

20 d, p. 69 (8). πεποίηκε: πεποίηκεν, S W.

20 e, p. 70 (18). μηδε εἶν: with Heusde (Spec. crit. p. 11). μηδὲ ἄν, Cron following S with B.

20 e, p. 70 (20). τὸν λέγοντα: τὰ λεξεῖται, Liebhold.

20 e, p. 71 (21). ἐστὶ: ἐστιν, S W.

21 a, p. 71 (23). ἐταιρὸς τε καὶ: [ἐταιρὸς τε καὶ], S with Ludwig. Müller-Strübing gives at too great length (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 121, 2) his too ingenious account of Ar. Clouds, 1072 ff.; but in a note (pp. 90, 91) he very acutely suggests that Σφήττος was a nickname bestowed by Aristophanes in the Clouds upon Chaerephon, "πικρὸι γὰρ οἱ Σφήττοι καὶ συκαφάνται," Schol. on Ar. Plut. 720. Cf. Laches, 197 ε, fin., with Stallbaum's note.

21 e, p. 73 (11). σοφὸτερος ἐστι: with S W. But the reading of B, as Gaisford specifically says, is ἐστὶ.

21 e, p. 73 (14). καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ: [καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ], S. Wex includes these words in the parenthesis and connects them with πρὸς ὅν κτε.

21 d, p. 74 (23). ἔωσκα γ' οὖν: with Bäumlein. ἔωσκα γοῦν, S W.

21 e, p. 74 (2). καὶ λυπούμενος: [καὶ] λυπούμενος, S with Cobet.


22 b, p. 77 (17). μάλιστα: Schanz (Philol. 28, 3, p. 556) suggests κάλλιστα without venturing to introduce it into the text. With this use of μάλιστα might be compared Hor. Sat. i. 10, 58, Versiculos magis factos et euntes mollius.

22 c, p. 78 (29). τῷ αὐτῷ: τῷ αὐτῷ αὐτῶν, S with Bekker following inferior Mss. See, however, Heindorf's Annotatio critica in Apologiam Socratis, p. IX. Berolini MDCCCXCV.

22 d, p. 78 (7). καὶ...δημιουργοῖ: [καὶ...δημιουργοῖ], S with Hirschig.


23 c, p. 82 (8). οὐχ αὐτοῖς: οὐκ αὐτοῖς, W following inferior Mss. with H. Stephanus and Engelhardt, who refers αὐτοῖς, of course, to the young. But it is by no means natural that men who are found out should not be angry with their discoverers. Their natural anger is, however, turned against Socrates, the real instigator of their discomfiture. Socrates is not saying that they should not be angry with him, but rather urges that they should be angry with themselves, i.e. with their own conceit of knowledge. This is the meaning demanded by the context, see d below, ad fin. Further, τοῦτοι would give the sense required by W far more clearly than αὐτοῖς.

23 d, p. 82 (11). ἄγνοοντιν: ἄμφιγνοοσίν, S. ἀποροοῦσιν, Ast. Cobet ex-
pungs the words ἀλλ' ἄγνοούσιν. There is, however, no sound objection either to the way in which the words are introduced or to the words themselves.

23 e, p. 83 (15). οἴμαι: with Stallbaum. οἴμαι, Cron following S and all good Mss. In this chapter B has οἴμαι twice, see lines 5 and 17. It looks like superstition to write οἴμαι here.

23 e, p. 83 (17). ξυντεταμένως: ξυντεταμένως, S with Hermann following Bessarion's Ms.

23 e, p. 83 (22). καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν: [καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν], S with Cobet.

24 a, p. 84 (30). ἐστι: Cron and S write ἐστιν because there are traces of erasure in B.

24 b, p. 84 (5). ὠπερ: ὡς, Rieckher.

24 d, p. 86 (5). τοῦτοι: εἰς τοῦτοι, S with Cobet. See Kr. Spr. 48, 11, 4.

24 e, p. 86 (14). τοῦτοι: Cron following S writes τοῦτοι because of traces of erasure in B; similar traces after ἐστι in this line do not lead them to write ἐστιν.

25 a, p. 87 (19). οἱ ἐκκλησιασταὶ: [οἱ ἐκκλησιασταὶ], S with Hirschig and Cobet. See Bem. p. 93.

25 c, p. 88 (1). πότερον ἐστιν: with the Mss. πότερον ἐστιν, S W.

25 c, p. 88 (3). ὅ τάν: with S, who deviates but little from ὅ τάν, the reading of B. ὅταν, Cron. W reads ὅ τάν. Krause explains it as meaning ὅ Ζεῦ

25 d, p. 89 (7). ἀποκρίνοντα: ἀπόκριναι, W.

25 e, p. 89 (19). ἤ, ἐν διαφθείρω, ἄκων: ἤ διαφθείρω ἄκων, S with Stephanus Naber reads ἤ, ἐν διαφθείρω, διαφθείρω ἄκων.

26 a, p. 89 (21). καὶ άκουσίων: bracketed as a gloss by S with Cobet.

26 a, p. 90 (24). ὅ: οὐ, S. Heindorf reads ὅ ... ποιώ, ποιῶν.

26 a, p. 90 (1). δηλον: with Cron's seventh edition following B. δηλον ἡδη ἐστιν, Cron's eighth edition with Schanz, who, however, says of the two words (Novae Commentationes Platonicae, p. 163), "Verba minime necessaria velim deleantur."

26 c, p. 91 (10). τοῦτοι: with B (second hand) and Vaticanus 1029 (Bekker's ι). Cron following S writes τοῦτοι with Venetus 185 (Bekker's Π). τοῦτος, B.

26 c, p. 91 (13). ἀλλ': with Bessarion's Ms. Cron following S writes ἀλλά with B and other Mss.

26 d, p. 92 (20). Ἀναξαγόρου: [Ἀναξαγόρου], S. Baiter requires Σωκράτους.

26 e, p. 93 (26). ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις: Birt (Das antike Buchwe sen, Berlin, 1882, p. 434, Rem. 4) says, "The notion that these writings were themselves sold ἐν τῇ ὀρχήστρᾳ is not conveyed here, for, if so, why should οἴστε have been used? In fact, καὶ δῆ καὶ appends to the βιβλία something else which is sold for a drachma and which, therefore, cannot have been the βιβλία."

26 e, p. 94 (28). σοι δοκῶ ... νομίζειν: σοι [δοκῶ] ... νομίζω, S who follows B in respect of νομίζω.
27 b, p. 95 (10). ἐγὼ σοι: following B. ἐγὼ σοι, S W with Heindorf. As the emphasis is wholly on ἐγὼ, there seems to be no good reason for disregarding the reading of B.

27 e, p. 98 (30). [ἡ] καὶ ὄνον, τοὺς ἡμόνους: with S. ἡ [καὶ] ὄνον [τοὺς ἡμόνους], Cron. A change of some kind is unavoidable; the least possible change is to bracket ἡ with Forster, who is followed by Heindorf and Cobet. This yields perfectly good sense, better, in fact, than Cron obtains by bracketing καὶ and τοὺς ἡμόνους.

27 e, p. 98 (32). [ταύτα] . . . τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην: with S. ταύτα . . . [τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην], Cron. S and Cron agree that both expressions cannot stand. S is probably right in saying that not τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην but ταύτα should be bracketed, as a gloss added to explain ἀποστειρωμένος.

27 e, p. 98 (35). [οὐ] τοῦ αὐτοῦ: οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, S W. Wecklein says (Rhein. Mus. 36, 1, p. 145), “Any one who grasps the argument summarized at this point in the Apology ought to agree to the following completion of it: ὅτως δὲ σὺ τῖνα πείθοις . . . ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν καὶ δαίμονα καὶ θεία [καὶ δαίμονας καὶ θεοὺς] ἡγείθαι καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ [μὴτε δαίμονα μὴτε θεία] μὴτε δαίμονας μὴτε θεοὺς, οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν.” Goebel, in the Programm of the Gymnasium at Fulda, first rejects all the interpretations made with a view to retaining οὐ before τοῦ αὐτοῦ, and then proceeds to defend it by arguing that πείθοις is used in an absolute sense, while the clause beginning with ὡς he takes as a causal parenthesis. The chief objection to this explanation is that it explains the whole sentence away, leaving it not a leg to stand on. It is better, therefore, to reject οὐ and to consider that μὴτε ἡρῶας was added along with the rest in Meletus’s anxiety to make his charge of irreligion a sweeping one. A religious-minded Athenian certainly believed in gods and in heroes. The term δαίμονες, since the precise meaning of the word was hard to fix, might — so far as Meletus’s immediate purpose went — have been omitted, but the preceding δαίμονα make its introduction here indispensable. On Meletus’s ascription to Socrates of belief in δαίμονα is based Socrates’s assertion that so far from being an atheist, he believes like any other Greek in gods and demi-gods, called δαίμονες or more commonly ἡρῶες.

27 e, p. 98 (36). αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ: αὖ [τοῦ αὐτοῦ], S with Hirschig.

28 a, p. 98 (7). καὶ ἄλλοις: καλοῦς, S with Hirschig.


28 c, p. 100 (21). ὃ πάτι: S omits these words which are added in the margin of B.

28 d, p. 100 (31). τὰξιν ἦ: with B and other best Mss. Cron following S writes τὰξιν with Bessarion’s Ms., strengthened by various authors who quote τὰξιν omitting the ἦ.

29 a, p. 103 (9). δεινόν τὰν: δεινὸν τὰν, S W.

29 b, p. 104 (22). ἀδικεῖν: Otto Erdmann proposes (Fleckeisen’s Jahrb. 119, 5, p. 412) to substitute ἀπιστεῖν.
CRITICAL NOTES.

29 c, p. 105 (31). διαφθαρησονται: following B. διαφθαρησοντο, Hirschig following Bessarion's Ms.

29 d, p. 105 (30). ἄνδρες: following B. ὁ ἄνδρες, inferior Mss.

29 d, p. 106 (43). αἰσχύνει: B. αἰσχύνη, other Mss.

29 d, p. 106 (43). ἐπιμελομένους: B. ἐπιμελομένους, Bessarion's Ms.


30 b, p. 107 (59). λέγων' οὐκ: λέγων, ὥτι οὐκ, W.


30 c, p. 109 (6). οἶον ἐγὼ λέγω: Wecklein (Rh. Mus. 33, 2, p. 307) requires οἶον ἄν ἐγὼ λέγω, because these words are to be closely connected with the detailed statement that follows, προσκείμενον . . . μῦστος, 30 e. But Socrates plainly has this thought in mind already, as is proved by his postponing its amplification until after another thought introduced with ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ κτῆ is also in the closest connexion with the leading idea τοιοῦτον ὠντα.


30 e, p. 110 (19). [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ]: S with Hirschig. ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, Riddell.

30 e, p. 110 (21). ὑπὸ μῦστος τινος: unless ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ above is bracketed, this comes in very awkwardly.

30 e, p. 110 (21). οἶον is taken by Goebel as a neuter, and he does not connect ὦς with τοιοῦτον τινα, but with ἐμὲ. He does not urge that the other way is ungrammatical, but apparently he thinks that the sense is in favor of his explanation. His argument is hardly convincing.

31 a, p. 111 (29). διατελεῖτ' ἄν: διατελεῖτε ἄν, Cron following S with the best Mss.

31 a, p. 111 (30). ἐπιτεύμψει: with B and other Mss. Cron following S writes ἐπιτεύμψει on the authority of Venetus 185 (Bekker's Π) and of an erasure in B.

31 b, p. 111 (37). μέντοι: μέν, S with Cobet and Hermann.


31 c, p. 112 (2). πολυπραγμονι: πολυπραγμονῶν, S following inferior Mss.

31 d, p. 113 (6). [φωνῇ]: bracketed by Forster, whom F. A. Wolf followed. φωνῇ, B. Cron omits the word.

31 d, p. 113 (12). ταλάς: bracketed by S with Cobet.

32 a, p. 113 (18). ἄλλα: with S and Bessarion's Ms. ἄλλα', Cron.

32 a, p. 114 (5). ἀμα ἀπολομήν: with S, who now appeals to Venetus T. ἀμα καὶ ἀμα ἄν, Cron following B. S, previously to his collation of Venetus T, argued as follows: "Plato scripsit ἀμα, quo cum dittographia ἀμα ἄν conjuncta est; inde lectionum varietas nata; ἄν ex antecedentibus posse supplendi notum."

32 b, p. 115 (8). Ἀντιοχῆς: bracketed by Hirschig and S. The preceding ἣμὶν certainly makes it plausible that Ἀντιοχῆς may have been introduced as a marginal gloss. See Bem. p. 104.

32 b, p. 117 (12). ἡματιώθην: ἡματιώθην ἡμῖν, W. Döring (Fleckeisen's
Jahrb. 119, 1, p. 15) supposes that Horace had this passage (chap. xx.) in his mind when he wrote the third ode of the third book of his Odes.

32 b, p. 117 (13). [καὶ ἑναντία ἐψηφώσαμην]: Hermann brackets these words but W believes them to be genuine. If they are retained, it follows either (1) that Socrates was not (in spite of reasonable evidence—that he was) the ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρῶτανεων, and therefore voted against the unlawful proposition when it came up in the assembly as any member might have done, or (2) that Socrates voted alone in a preliminary meeting of the prytanes against having the question put to the people in an unlawful form. (2) explains the context best. But when all is said and done, the whole wording is clumsy and repetitious, since ἑναντιώθην would do quite as well alone, and the cumulative effect of καὶ is tiresome.

33 b, p. 120 (14). ἵραταν: Goebel prefers ἵρωταν.
33 b, p. 120 (19). ἄλλοι: following B. οἱ ἄλλοι, S W.
33 c, p. 123 (24). οἱ Θεοστίδου: with Bessarion’s Ms. Θεοστίδου, Cron with S following B. Sauppe argues that the art. is not necessary here; it certainly is desirable.

34 a, p. 124 (32). τοῦτο: Goebel prefers τούτους.
34 c, p. 125 (3). ἀναμνησθεὶς: ἀναμνησθείς, Cron and S following B, where ἀναμνησθεῖς is read.

34 c, p. 125 (6). αὐτόν: B. αὐτοῦ, W. Heller argues in favor of τὰ αὐτοῦ. He is right in so far that the ordinary idiom would give us the art.; but after all the art. would be indispensable only if τὰ παιδία (meaning all his children) had preceded.

34 d, p. 126 (14). εἰσὶν μὲν ποὺ τῖνες: with S and Stallbaum. εἰσὶ μὲν ποὺ τῖνες, Cron.
34 d, p. 126 (17). τὰς: P. Foucart (Revue de Philologie, I. 35) bases upon Attic inscriptions the following remarks as to the orthography of this word: “une série d’exemples depuis le cinquième siècle jusqu’au deuxième avant notre ère montre que au moins en prose, les Athéniens employaient toujours la forme vos... A partir de la conquête romaine, vos se rencontre dans les inscriptions attiques, ainsi que vos; la forme de la langue commune finit par l’emporter, et c’est la seule qu’emploient les copistes.” The Attic form without is preserved only in Parisinus (Α). See S, Vol. XII. pp. viii. and ix.

34 e, p. 127 (26). τὸ ἱκρατή: τῷ ἱκράτει, S W with Riddell. This dat. was preferred by Bernhardt. Nevertheless, the analogy of προσήκεν and ἀψέκειν does not bear unqualified application to δεδοχθαι. The reading of B is τοὺ ἱκρατῆ, which suggests that the interlinear correction may be the right reading. If the dat. be adopted here, then appeal would have to be made to Hdt. iv. 59, δεδοκται τοῖσι πρῶτοι τῶν μαντίσων αὐτοίσι ἀπολλυοῦσαί. The saying is preserved only in Parisinus (Α). See S, Vol. XII. pp. viii. and ix.

35 b, p. 128 (38). ὑμᾶς: B. ἡμᾶς, S W.
35 d, p. 129 (11). [πάντως]: with S W. Stallbaum brackets νὴ Δία πάντως. πάντως, Cron following B.
CRITICAL NOTES.

36 a, p. 131 (4). τὸ γεγονός τοῦτο: [τὸ γεγονός] τοῦτο, S with Cobet, who, indeed, rejects these three words because he thinks they have come into the text from the margin. There is certainly room for doubt.


36 c, p. 133 (11). [τῶν]: S with S W following E. οὖν, Cron following B. Hermann was for doing away with ἐνταῦθα ᾯα. But certainly δὲ requires a finite verb. Simply bracket ἱόν and the whole difficulty is solved. The word was apparently added by an interpolator who construed ἐνταῦθα ᾯα closely with ἐπιχειρῶν, after the analogy of Phaedo 200 b, ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι. Of course ἐνταῦθα makes any such explanation absurd.”

36 d, p. 134 (22). μᾶλλον: Liebhold proposes, not to bracket μᾶλλον, but to change it into γε ἄλλο. 36 d, p. 134 (25). δοκεῖν ἐναι: δοκεῖν [ἐναι], S with Hermann.


37 c, p. 136 (18). τοῖς ἐνδεκα: [τοῖς ἐνδεκα], S with Heindorf.

37 c, p. 136 (22). μενταύ: μένταν, W.

37 e, p. 137 (4). ἐστὶ: Cron following S writes ἐστὶν because of signs of erasure in B.

37 e, p. 137 (5). τοῦτ' : with Bessarion’s Ms. Cron following S writes τοῦτο with B.


39 b, p. 141 (36). μὲν ποι: Heller proposes μὲν οὖν, which is added by a later (second) hand in the margin of B and is also the reading of some inferior Ms., which, however, also retain ποι.

39 c, p. 142 (7). εἰργάσασθε οἶμενοι: εἰργάσασθε με οἶμενοι, S with Winckelmann. εἰργάσασθε οἶμενοι, W. Hermann added μὲν after οἶμενοι on the strength of signs of erasure in B, which were also detected by S.

39 d, p. 143 (14). οὗ γὰρ ἐσθ': following B according to Gaisford. οὗ γὰρ ἐσθ', S and W, who neither of them make any mention of Gaisford’s report on the reading of B.

40 a, p. 144 (10). ὅ τοῦ δαμονίον: [ὅ τοῦ δαμονίον], S with Schlieermercher.

40 c, p. 145 (5). τοῦ τόπου τοῦ: bracketed as a gloss by S with Hirschig.

41 a, p. 147 (29). ἐθέλω: with Bessarion’s Ms. Cron following S writes θέλω with the best Ms. Here, and Phaedr. 249 b, we have the only two clear cases where the best Ms. credit Plato with using θέλω after a word ending in a consonant.

41 a, p. 147 (30). ταῦτα ἐστίν: following S with Bessarion’s Ms. ταῦτ' ἐστίν, Cron with best Ms.
CRITICAL NOTES.

41 b, p. 147 (33). τέθνηκεν. ἀντιπαραβαλλόντι: τέθνηκεν, ἀντιπαραβαλλόντι, S.

41 b, p. 148 (34). ἑκείνων, ὡς: ἑκείνων. ὡς, S.

41 b, p. 148 (35). δῆδες: B. δῆδες, W with several Mss.

41 b, p. 148 (36). τίς αὐτῶν: with W. The best Mss. read τίς ἀν αὐτῶν.

41 b, p. 148 (37). ἔστι: with Mss. ἔστιν, Cron and S, because there are signs of erasure in B, and Venetus 185 (Beckler's π).


42 a, p. 150 (22). πλήν ἦ: πλὴν εἶ, S following D. The reading of B can not be made out, but Gaisford and S incline to think it is πλὴν εἶ.

CRITO.

43 a, p. 151 (1). πρὸ ἐτι ἔστιν: with B. πρὸ ἔστιν, S following inferior Mss. and the Zürich edition.

43 b, p. 152 (19). νῦν: νυν, W.

43 b, p. 152 (20). πράως: πράως, S following the Mss. The subscript is an essential part of the word. See Curtius, Grundzüge, No. 379. The Mss. authorities leave the matter doubtful, though for Plato πράως is the prevailing orthography. πράως is always without υ. S has lately made up his mind to write πράως even in Plato. See Vol. XII. p. 6.


43 d, p. 153 (35). τοῦτον [τῶν ἄγγελων]: τοῦτων τῶν ἄγγελων, W.

44 b, p. 155 (3). ξυμφορά ἔστιν: ξυμφορά ἔσται, S with Hirschig.


44 b, p. 155 (5). ἐτι δέ: ἐτι δῆ, S. Rieckner strikes out ὡς before ὡς τε.

45 b, p. 158 (19). ξένοι οὗτοι ἐνθάδε: ξένοι [οὗτοι] ἐνθάδε, S. ξένοι ἐτι ἐνθάδε, W with the explanation prae trea, prae ter me. See Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 1877, pp. 222 ff. and Cron's Bem. p. 117. It certainly seems far more natural to take ἐνθάδε as a gloss explaining οὗτοι than to regard οὗτοι as a gloss.

45 b, p. 158 (23). ἀποκάμης: ἀποκνῆς, S with Jacobs. Here S, contrary to his usual practice, has not been able to resist a tempting but unnecessary emendation.

46 b, p. 161 (4). οὗ μοῦν νῦν: οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, S with A. Nauck. See the preface to the third edition of Cron's Apology and Crito (p. xiv. f.).
46 d, p. 162 (19). **νῦν δὲ**: S (XII. p. xviii.) proposes to write **νυνθῆ** following B. But see S, VIII. p. 159.

47 a, p. 163 (30). **οὐχ ἰκανῶς**: οὐχὶ καλῶς, S with Hirschig.
47 a, p. 163 (32). **τὰς 6 οὐ**: with S. τὰς 6 οὐ; [οὐδε πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν 6 οὐ;], Cron with W. The words bracketed do not occur in B, and S rejects them as a confusing interpolation (Nov. Comm. p. 162). They occur in the margin of B and in inferior Mss.

47 c, p. 165 (15). **τὴν δοξαν καὶ τοὺς ἑπαίνους**: τὴν δοξαν [καὶ τοὺς ἑπαίνους], S. τὴν δοξαν καὶ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ τοὺς ἑπαίνους, Stallbaum. τοὺς ψόγους καὶ τοὺς ἑπαίνους, Hirschig.

47 c, p. 165 (18). **ἐστιν**: ἐστιν, all editions. But the emphasis should be carefully kept on τι, on τοι, and on εἰς τι, and not put on the verbs.
47 e, p. 165 (20). **διολλυσιν**: so it stands corrected in B. διολλυσι, S following inferior Mss.

47 e, p. 165 (24 ff.). The simpler punctuation of Cron’s seventh edition has been preferred to that of the eighth. In the latter Cron follows Goebel.

48 b, p. 167 (25). **Δηλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα**; given to Socrates by W with Buttmann. S brackets φαίν γὰρ ἄν and makes Crito’s speech include ἀλήθη λέγεις. Goebel proposes Δηλα γὰρ δὴ καὶ ταῦτα, φαίν γ’ ἄν, ὧν Σώκρατες. If anything is to be omitted, ἀλήθη λέγεις could best be spared.

48 d, p. 169 (15). **οὔτε ἄλλο**: οὔτε ἄλλο, S with Forster.

48 e, p. 169 (23). **πεισασ σὲ**: with Buttmann. πεισαι σὲ, W following the Mss. See Cron’s preface to his first edition of the Apol. and Crito, p. xii., also Bem. p. 117 f. Meiser (Fleckeisen’s Jahrb. 109, 1, p. 41) favors a change of order πεισαι σὲ, ἄλλα μὴ ἀκοντος ταῦτα πράττειν. Goebel urges παύσαι σὲ, which would, however, be intolerable after παύσαι ἤθη.

49 a, p. 170 (4). **[ὄπερ καὶ ἱρτι ἐλέγετο]**: Meiser proposes to find room for this between ἤ and παύσαι.

49 b, p. 170 (7). **τηλικοίδε [γέροντες]**: with Jacobs. τηλικοίδε γέροντες, W. Some authority for not bracketing would perhaps be found in Lach. 180 α.

50 c, p. 175 (2). **ἐμμένειν**: ἐμμενεῖν, S with Hirschig.
50 d, p. 176 (10). **τοῖς νόμοις**: [τοῖς νόμοις], S with Hirschig.
50 d, p. 176 (14). **νόμοι**: [νόμοι], S with Hirschig.
50 e, p. 177 (20). **σολ: σοῦ** is preferred by Buttmann, Stallbaum, Hirschig, Goebel.

51 a, p. 177 (26). **ἐσται**: S. ἐξίσται, W following the Mss. ἐξ ὦσον ἐσται, Hirschig.

51 a, p. 178 (30). **ἡ**: ἤ, W following the Mss. S says the first hand in B wrote ἤ. See on 53 c.

51 d, p. 180 (12). **ἀρέσκομεν**: ἀρέσκομεν, S with Madvig.
51 e, p. 181 (19). **πεῖθεσθαι**: πεῖθεσθαι, S with Buttmann.

52 a, p. 181 (1). **σὲ, Σώκρατες, ταῖς**: B. σὲ [Σώκρατες] ταῖς, S. σὲ, ὧν Σώκρατες, ταῖς, W.

52 b, p. 181 (11). **ἐξῆλθας, [οὐτὶ ... Ἰσθμον] οὔτε**: ἐξῆλθας, οὔτε, S. S gives
reasons as follows: Verba òtr . . . 'Ισθμόν, quae jam Athenaeus 5, 15, legisse videtur, in marg. add. bc, inclusions Turicenses delevit MS [i.e. Schanz himself]. See his Nov. Comm. p. 162.

52 d, p. 182 (28). πολιτεύεσθαι: B. πολιτεύσεσθαι, S with inferior Mss.

53 a, p. 183 (43). δῆλον . . . νόμων: bracketed by S with H. Stephanus and Hirschig, who also both reject οἱ νόμοι.

53 a, p. 184 (44). ἐμμένειν: B. ἐμμενεῖς, S W following the second hand in B.

53 b, p. 184 (7). Μέγαραδε: Μεγάραδε, W. Gaisford remarks on Phaedr. 227 d: “Μέγαραδε ήντι μέγαρα δὲ p. m.” Is this the reading of B in this passage also?

53 c, p. 185 (17). η: B. η, S W. As in 51 a, p. 178 (30), where the reading of B is harder to make out, so here also S writes η. The more vigorous η (really) is better suited to the context than η, which simply makes affirmation a matter of course.

53 e, p. 186 (28). αἰσχρός: with S and W. Still γλίσχρωσ, which is added on the margin of B, deserves attention, and perhaps should be preferred. Cf. in the preceding line (27) the undoubtedly correct καταλλάξας, which is on the margin of B, while in the text we find καταλλάξας, which both S and W reject.


54 a, p. 187 (41). ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν, πότερον: [ἐπιμελησόνται] αὐτῶν πότερον, S.

54 b, p. 187 (1). πειθόμενος ημῖν: Meiser inserts after these words τοῖς σοῖς γεννήτοις καὶ (Fleckeisen’s Jahrb. 109, 1, p. 41).

54 d, p. 188 (1). Κρίτων: [Κρίτων], S.
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IMPORTANT additions have been made in this edition to the notes of Büchsenhütsch in the way of material drawn from other sources, particularly from the commentaries of Breitenbach, Kurz, and Grosser. Special attention has been paid to the language. The orthography has been made to correspond as closely as possible with the Attic usage of Xenophon’s day, as determined by the testimony of contemporary inscriptions, while syntactical peculiarities receive careful consideration. An Introduction by the American editor gives a review of the salient events in the history of the important period covered by the text. Besides an Appendix devoted to matters of textual criticism, the book contains a full grammatical index and an index of proper names.

The Prometheus Bound of Æschylus.


The book is a translation, with some freedom as to form of expression, of Wecklein’s second edition (1878). A few changes in text and commentary have been requested by the German editor, and references to American grammatical works, replacing in some cases the original references to Krüger, have been added by the translator. In the transcription of the metrical schemes into the notation commonly used in this country, the translator has assumed a somewhat greater responsibility than elsewhere, but here too he has endeavored to follow the editor’s intentions. The copious explanatory commentary is followed by a critical appendix.
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The Introduction covers 32 pages, and includes a valuable Chronological Table. The commentary is complete. A summary of Weidner’s method in establishing the text is given in the Appendix, where the main changes that he has made are also noted.

The Gorgias of Plato.

The American editor has adhered in the main to the lines of literary interpretation adopted by the German editor. The Introduction has been enlarged by the addition of a full summary of the dialogue. In the notes on syntax especial attention has been paid to the labors of English and American scholars. References to American manuals have been inserted when required.
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