

Plato, de a. Socrates, 1895

COLLEGE SERIES OF GREEK AUTHORS

EDITED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE, LEWIS R. PACKARD, AND THOMAS D. SEYMOUR.

PLATO

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES

AND

CRITO

EDITED

ON THE BASIS OF CRON'S EDITION

BY

LOUIS DYER

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY.



BOSTON:

PUBLISHED BY GINN & COMPANY.

1895.

Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1885, by
JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE AND THOMAS D. SEYMOUR,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.

J. S. CUSHING & Co., PRINTERS, BOSTON.

B365
A2D9
1895

PREFACE.

THIS edition of the *Apology of Socrates* and the *Crito* is based upon Dr. Christian Cron's eighth edition, Leipzig, 1882. The Notes and Introduction here given have in the main been confined within the limits intelligently drawn by Dr. Cron, whose commentaries upon various dialogues of Plato have done and still do so much in Germany to make the study of our author more profitable as well as pleasanter. No scruple has been felt, however, in making changes. I trust there are few if any of these which Dr. Cron might not himself make if he were preparing his work for an English-thinking and English-speaking public.

No editor of Plato in England or America can escape the influence of Dr. Jowett's labors upon Plato; certainly not one who owes so much to Dr. Jowett's teaching and friendship as I do. This is a debt which, because it is contracted unconsciously for the most part, can hardly be adequately acknowledged. Riddell's valuable edition has suggested many changes and additions in the Notes, and Stallbaum has been assiduously consulted.

The Appendix to the Introduction differs very materially from the corresponding portion of Dr. Cron's book. There as elsewhere I have been constantly advised and as constantly enlightened by my kind friend and former teacher, Professor W. W. Goodwin. But this list of my creditors must necessarily remain incomplete, for I cannot mention those who have helped me most; nor can I record here the names of all my pupils, past and present, whose needs have been my guide and my impulse in preparing this book.

M634981

The Text is substantially that of Dr. Cron's edition; where there is alteration, reasons are given in the Critical Appendix. In no case have the illustrative citations of the German commentary been inconsiderately omitted; so far as possible, indeed, further citations have been made. The dramatists, especially Euripides, have been constantly drawn upon for new citations. It is easy to underrate the importance of Euripides to the reader of Plato; it is impossible to overstate in the interests of higher scholarship the desirability of having even the youngest students of Greek letters discipline themselves in the reading and heeding of citations offered to illustrate their author.

LOUIS DYER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
July, 1885.

INTRODUCTION.

THE endowment of philosophical thought with a beautiful form 1 of its own was the last literary triumph of Greece. Guided by a wonderful law of growth, the Greeks, before dealing with philosophy, had already displayed in the elaboration of various kinds of literature their singular susceptibility to beauty. Epic and lyric composition first ran their full course and then the drama succeeded them. Indeed not poetry only but also history and oratory preceded philosophy, for when the drama was perfect they were nearly so. Philosophy, meanwhile, still lacked an outward form for the expression of what she was bound to say. This lack involves more than a question of clothing: the body itself of Greek thought was as yet but imperfectly developed. Since thought (*ratio*) is the soul of which the body is utterance (*oratio*), we cannot wonder at finding a single Greek word (*λόγος*) for both, nor can we fail to see that the soul of philosophy was not full-grown until it had fashioned for itself a body in which to stand forth free and independent.

The merest glance at the history of philosophy¹ justifies this 2 statement. Greek philosophy first gave signs of life in the cosmogonies and theogonies of early poets who were anything but

¹ The most important facts are to be found: (1) in Plato's writings, (2) in Aristotle's writings, especially in the first book of his *Metaphysics*. The chief modern books are: (1) *Historia Philosophiae Graecae et Romanae ex fontium locis contexta*. Locos colleg. H. Ritter et L. Preller. Ed. 5. (2) Brandis, *Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch-Römischen Philosophie*. 2 Theile. (3) Zeller, *die Philosophie der Griechen*, translated by various hands, and published by Longmans in

five volumes, i. and ii. "The Pre-Socratic Philosophy," iii. "Socrates and the Socratic Schools," iv. "Plato and the Older Academy," v. "The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics." (4) F. Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie des Alterthums*, History of Philosophy from Thales to the present time, Vol. I. "Ancient Philosophy." (5) G. H. Lewes's *Biographical History of Philosophy*. (6) J. F. Ferrier's *Lectures*. (7) The best book for young students is J. B.

philosophers; and even those famous worthies, the seven wise men, belong rather to the history of politics and civilization in general, than to the special history of philosophy. The name of Thales, one of the wise seven, stands at the beginning in Greek philosophy. He, and with him his fellow-townsmen and successors, Anaximander and Anaximenes, asked this question: What is that something out of which everything in Nature grows and is made? At Miletus, a town whose political and intellectual vigor gave it preëminence among the Ionian colonies in Asia Minor, these three men lived and sought for something omnipresent and unchanging, for the real substance which underlies the unceasing surface-changes offered to man's senses in the world. They all found this in elementary matter of some description. Thales described it as WATER, Anaximander as τὸ ἀπείρον, the UNLIMITED.¹ Anaximenes called it AIR. But this elementary matter no one of the three opposed to Spirit; for the opposition of "spiritual" and "material," or of "matter" and "mind" came much later. To the Milesian philosophers matter was a something which, if not divine, was instinct with divine energy.

- 3 Yet a far less material notion of this permanent something underlying all change was undoubtedly arrived at by the Pythagoreans. Born at Samos, Pythagoras emigrated to Croton, where about 530 B.C. he founded the half religious and half political society which bore his namē. These Pythagoreans believed that NUMBER was the essence of things, the permanent and real part of the world, or, to give their second way of putting the doctrine, that the elements of numbers are the elements of things. This doctrine admits of application not only to the physical world, but also to

Mayor's Sketch of Ancient Philosophy from Thales to Cicero. Cambridge, 1881. Pitt Press Series. Special works on Plato are: (1) K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie. (2) Steinhart, Einleitung zu Platon's Sämmtlichen Werken, übersetzt von H. Müller, und Platons Leben. (3) Susemihl, die genetische Entwicklung der Platonischen Philo-

sophie, 2 Theile. (4) The Dialogues of Plato translated into English by B. Jowett. (5) Grote, Plato and the other companions of Sokrates.

¹ Matter stripped of limits or boundary-lines; a something which, being everything and anything, is, according as it is limited in one way or another, "everything by turns and nothing long."

the moral world,—to the whole field of human action.¹ But the Pythagoreans framed no philosophy of right and wrong. They contented themselves with a few practical maxims which were useful in the work of their society. Among the various doctrines attributed to Pythagoras and his school, we can with certainty connect only one with Pythagoras himself. He certainly maintained the theory of the Transmigration of Souls.² Philolaus, probably an elder contemporary of Socrates and Democritus, first stated the tenets of this school in writing. He came to Thebes, where he taught, nearly at the same time with Lysis, his well-known brother-Pythagorean. Of the book by Philolaus entitled *Περὶ Φύσεως*, such fragments as have been preserved are collected by Boeckh,³ and supply an invaluable source for the history of the old-school Pythagoreanism. Of the later Pythagoreans Archytas of Tarentum, who lived in the fourth century B.C., is the most noteworthy. He distinguished himself in politics and in mathematics.

The Pythagoreans approached a comparatively spiritual concep- 4
tion of nature, but the Eleatics went further in the same direction. Xenophanes of Colophon, the reputed originator of this new doctrine, was probably a contemporary of Pythagoras. Looking upon the world as a whole, he maintained that the ALL is the ONE, and that the One is God. This utterance implies a deep-seated moral conviction that God is perfection. Parmenides, who was born about 515 B.C.,⁴ at Elea, a Phocæan colony in Italy, first devel-

¹ Number is the law and the bond that holds the world together; everything, if we are to know it, must be numbered, *i.e.* odd or even. Odd numbers are limited, even numbers are unlimited, and all cases of opposition are, as it were, cases of the opposition of odd to even so that the following list of opposites may be made *κατὰ συστοιχίαν*, under two heads:—

| | | | |
|---------------|------------|----------------|-----------------------|
| (A) | (B) | (A) | (B) |
| Limited . . . | Unlimited. | Rest . . . | Motion. |
| Odd . . . | Even. | Straight . . . | Crooked. |
| One . . . | Many. | Light . . . | Darkness. |
| Right . . . | Left. | Good . . . | Bad. |
| Male . . . | Female. | Square . . . | Oblong |
| | | | (<i>Rectangle</i>). |

² *Cf. The Merchant of Venice*, Act IV. Scene I. 130 ff.; also Ovid, *Metam.* XV. 165 ff.

³ Philolaos des Pythagoreers Lehren nebst den Bruchstücken seines Werkes, von August Boeckh. Berlin, 1819. The authenticity of these fragments has recently been called in question.

⁴ To fix this date *cf.* Plato's Theætetus, p. 183 e, and Parmenides, p. 127 b, where it is said that Socrates, in early youth, saw both Zeno and Parmenides, and that the latter was a very old man. The age of Parmenides was sixty-five, while Zeno's is placed at

oped the doctrines of Xenophanes, saying that what has not Being but is many does not exist. He maintained the Oneness of all that is, calling it Being, pure and simple. Following Xenophanes, Parmenides set forth his doctrine in a long didactic poem in epic verse. Zeno supported this theory by indirect-demonstration, pointing out the contradictions in which we are involved by maintaining the opposite view, that what is many has Being or exists.¹ Finally, Melissus of Samos, well known as a Samian general in the revolt of that island from Athens, about 440 B.C., accepted the views of Parmenides, and, unlike Zeno, argued directly² that Being is eternal, infinite, one and unchangeable.³

The physical first cause of Pythagoreanism suggests the possibility of a systematic theory of right and wrong, that is of Ethics.⁴ The Eleatic first cause gives promise of a coming system of philosophic reasoning, of Dialectic. For all this we must not call Zeno the originator of Dialectic. Any inclination to do so ought to disappear after a consideration of his method in controversial reasoning and proof. He argues, not to win truth from the heart of his facts, but to defend a ready-made doctrine and to thrust it upon those whose attention he gains. At its best this is rhetoric, at its worst it is sophistry.

- 5 Conflicting authorities leave us uncertain whether it was before or after the completer statement of the Eleatic doctrines by Parmenides, that Heraclitus of Ephesus flatly contradicted the saying

forty. This is not history, but it gives a chronological clue.

¹ Assert that the many things seen in the world really exist, and you must admit that they are at the same time *limited* and *limitless*. For if these things are real there must be a definite sum of them, not more and not less. Hence they are *limited*. But they are also *limitless*; because, taking their definite sum and subdividing it as often as we please, we still can go on with the subdivision indefinitely and without limit.

² If there is no Being, why do we

talk of anything as being? If there is Being, either it always existed or it came into existence at some time. If it came into existence it must have grown out of something of which we could have said it is or it is not. Out of that which is not nothing can grow, therefore Being can only have grown out of Being.

³ *Fragmenta philosophorum Græcorum collegit recensuit vertit F. G. A. Mullachius. Parisiis, 1860.*

⁴ *Cf. the placing of "good" and "bad" on the Pythagorean list of pairs, p. 3, note 1 above.*

of his older contemporary Xenophanes that the One admits neither motion nor change. Heraclitus is said to have flourished about the sixty-ninth Olympiad, 500 B.C. The elaborate superstructure of his teaching rested upon the following statement: "Everything is moving like a stream, and nothing stands still; all things are forever coming into existence and ceaselessly flowing away. The world was from the beginning, and always will be, ever-living FIRE, kindling by fixed degrees and by fixed degrees dying down. Everything has its price in terms of Fire, and Fire pays for the world as gold buys goods and goods are sold for gold." The phraseology here used abundantly shows that Heraclitus, in speaking of fire as he does, is not following the older Ionic philosophers by taking his turn at describing anew a permanent substratum in their sense. Under the veil of his oracular words the meaning is given as it were in a parable. Ever-living Fire stands for the restless impulse which underlies the process of BECOMING or transformation. This process he also calls the upward and the downward way, meaning the constant shifting of things growing up and dying down. This he thought was the common life in all Nature. Such was the picture which he drew of the world. In the same vein Heraclitus said, "The father of all things is war," meaning by war the united play of opposites or things contradictory. "Concord," he said, "is the daughter of strife."

By making his system account for the world of sensible things 6 Heraclitus undoubtedly improves upon the Eleatics. And this, too, in spite of his substantial agreement with them in certain leading conclusions. In the first place, both schools agree in rejecting all sensible impressions as wholly untrustworthy; reaching this conclusion, however, from points of view diametrically opposed. This agreement is most obvious in their respective accounts of particular (sensible) things. Heraclitus's stream of ceaseless transformation or Becoming allows to no single thing an instant of real and permanent existence, and thus practically relegates all things that we see in the world to a state of non-existence. Parmenides regards the sensible world as non-existent, opposing to it pure existence one and indivisible. But the Eleatics provide no means

for connecting pure Being on the one hand with Not-being on the other, and, unlike Heraclitus, they cleave the world in twain and find no way of uniting the two parts. In the second place, Parmenides teaches that outside of the thought of the One there is no true thinking but only deceptive 'opining,' while Heraclitus urges that the 'universal' which pervades all things (τὸ ξυνόν = τὸ κοινόν) alone has understanding. This understanding the 'individual' shares only in proportion to the degree of its submission to and submersion in the 'universal.' Here is substantial agreement. but here again Heraclitus takes a wider view than Parmenides, and accordingly makes a fuller provision for the facts.

7 Though Heraclitus did not follow the example of Xenophanes and Parmenides, but wrote his work¹ in prose, he expressed himself most obscurely. It was on this account that the ancients themselves nicknamed him ὁ σκοτεινός, *the man of darkness*. We hear that Socrates, when asked by Euripides for his opinion of Heraclitus's book, gave this answer: "All that I could fathom was excellent: what I could not fathom is no doubt the same, only we had better send to Delos for a man to do the diving." Aristotle says that Heraclitus is obscure because it is impossible to decide how his words are to be combined, and of the parts of his book that are preserved not a few justify this statement. For instance, a passage that has been much discussed ἐν τὸ σοφὸν μόνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς οὖνομα gives rise to two questions, neither of which can be satisfactorily answered. Shall we put a comma before or after καὶ ἐθέλει? How are the various words in the sentence to be construed?

8 Empedocles of Agrigentum stated his doctrines in a didactic poem after the manner of Xenophanes and Parmenides. He chose the epic form, and his work was the model after which Lucretius wrote his *De rerum natura*. Empedocles flourished in the eighty-fourth Olympiad, near the middle of the fifth century B.C. This date is confirmed by the report that he visited the newly founded

¹ Schleiermacher has collected and explained the fragments that are preserved (*Museum der Alterthumswissenschaft*, I. 3, Berlin, 1808; or, *Werke zur Philosophie*, II. 1). See the at-

tempted restoration of the original sequence of the fragments, Heraklit von Ephesus, by Dr. P. Schuster, Leipzig, 1873. See also Heracliti Ephesii reliquae, ed. I. Bywater, London, 1877.

colony of Thuri. His system is closely connected with the Eleatic as well as with the Heraclitan scheme of things, and also shows traces of Pythagorean influence. Starting from the first principle, that Not-being can no more come to be than Being can decay and cease to be, he concludes that what men call growth and decay are respectively cases of the combination and of the disintegration of primal elements. His four elements are the familiar ones, to each of which his imaginative genius gives a mythological name. Fire, described as flaming Aether, he names Zeus; Air, Hera; Earth, Aïdoneus; Water, Nestis. These four elements were at the beginning inseparably united within the eternal Globe (**Σφαῖρος**), which in all its parts was of like consistency. But outside of this globe ruled Strife (**Νεῖκος**), who finally invaded it, causing complete disintegration. The resisting impulse of Love (**Φιλία**) reacted from within and brought about a partial reintegration. This reaction and reintegration gave rise to the frame of the world (**Κόσμος**) with all the particular things which it comprises. In his detailed account of sensible perception, feeling, and intellectual apprehension of the good and the bad, Empedocles applies his fundamental principle with an unsteady hand, and is often involved in contradictions. His religious theories are set forth in a separate work called **Καθαροί**.

Neither the date nor the place of the birth of Leucippus can 9 be determined, but we know that he founded the school of the Atomists. Democritus of Abdera, born in the eightieth Olympiad, about 460 B.C., was certainly his younger contemporary, and probably his disciple. Upon Democritus devolved the task of developing this new system of thought.¹ The Atomists were unwilling to say either with Heraclitus (1) Being is a process of constant change, or with Parmenides (2) Being immovable and unchangeable exists apart from all particular things, but like Empedocles they said (3) A number of ORIGINAL ELEMENTS exists. Instead, however, of four elements, they supposed an unlimited number of ATOMS (**αἱ ἄτομοι**, sc. **οὐραῖα** or **ἰδέαι**). These indivisible Atoms were in-

¹ For the interesting fragments of his well-written work, cf. Mullach's "Democriti Abderitae operum frag-

menta," Berol. 1843. Also his work referred to above, p. 4, note 3.

wardly alike in essence, and so small as to be indistinguishable; they differed in shape, arrangement, and position. Their combination means growth; their separation means decay and destruction; the difference in their situation and arrangement is at the bottom of such variety and change as we see in the world. But why, we may ask, should these Atoms combine or separate? Because, says the Atomist, NECESSITY forces them to move. This necessary motion comes, not from any source or cause beyond and above them, but is derived partly from an original rotary motion, a twist which they take at the start, and partly from their constant collision one with another and the consequent reaction. But to move at all they need room to move in. This room is a vacuum which offers no resistance; it is free and empty space or VOID, while the atoms are space compacted and filled full, or FULNESS. Reality consists solely of these Atoms, and hence they are Being, while the Void is Not-being. And yet Not-being in this sense has a relative existence. Therefore the Atomists did not hesitate to say: Being no more is than Not-being. By Atoms not the physical world of the senses only, but also the soul, is explained. The body is the *cabin*, *σκήνος*, of the soul, and on this basis an attempt is made to explain mental activity and the life of the soul. Here the shortcomings of the Atomistic explanation of the world show themselves. Still, against the Atomists the point is not well taken that, by necessity, an Atomist must mean chance or what is arbitrary, and all praise is due to the determined logic with which they apply their principle consistently to every detail. Democritus is credited with a number of admirable moral maxims; they express, however, the plain common-sense of a man who means to make the most of life, rather than a matured philosophy of conduct.

- 10 Anaxagoras of Clazomenae was born in the seventieth Olympiad, about 500 B.C., and thus his birth preceded that of Empedocles and Democritus; but he must be counted as belonging to a maturer phase of thought.¹ When Anaxagoras said: "Order is introduced

¹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A, 3: 'Αναξαγόρας . . . τῇ μὲν ἡλικίᾳ πρότερος ἂν τοῦ του ('Εμπεδοκλέους), τοῖς δ' ἔργοις ὕστερος, ἀπείρους εἶναι φησι τὰς ἀρχάς. Of his book *Περὶ Φύσεως* a number of fragments are preserved. Schaubach has

into the All by MIND," there was no further use either for the half-mythological forces of Empedocles, or for the blind necessity of the Atomists. And yet, there was much upon which all the three schools would have agreed; Democritus and Empedocles would have welcomed Anaxagoras's dictum, "The Greeks are wrong in believing that there is such a thing as growing to be out of nothing or perishing away into nothing; nothing grows to be and nothing perishes, but all things are the mingling together and the falling apart of elements that really exist. So, therefore, to grow into being is properly to-be-compounded, and to perish is to-fall-apart." These elements that really exist Anaxagoras did not define as Empedocles defined his elements or as the Atomists defined their atoms. He often calls his elements *seeds*, σπέρματα, and they have certain determinate qualities which make them the seeds of this, that, or the other particular kind of thing, e.g. gold, wood, bone. Flesh, blood, and bone are respectively *combinations of parts, each one of which parts has the peculiar properties of the whole of which it is one part, and the whole has the properties of each of its parts*. In speaking of such a whole, as well as of its parts, Aristotle used the word ὁμοιομερῆ (ὅμοιος, like, and μέρος, part); therefore, the whole theory has often been called HOMIO-MERIC. In the beginning, the sum of things infinitesimally small and infinite in number, no one of which could be perceived on account of its smallness, lay in a mass together. Finally MIND intervened, separating like from unlike and introducing order. The most delicate and purest of essences, mind enters into combination with nothing else; it understands all things for and by itself, and over all it rules supreme. In such unmistakable terms as these did Anaxagoras set forth the idea of an all-wise and all-powerful essence completely distinct from matter. The words which he chose are no doubt inadequate because borrowed from the domain of the senses, but their import is clear. The fact that he reached this conception of mind gives to Anaxagoras a conspicuous place in the history of Greek philosophy, and yet he hardly knew the

published them: Anaxagorae Clazomenii fragmenta collecta et illustrata, Lips. 1827. Mullach has also put

them into his book. See on Apology, p. 26 d.

full bearing of his discovery. Mind, he says, when in the beginning all things lay in a motionless mass, gave them their first impulse and lent the motion which brought order into all. In other respects Anaxagoras's explanation of nature is materialistic, the same in kind with those of his predecessors and contemporaries. This is what Plato and Aristotle say, and it is of this that they both complain. In order that the conception of mind reached by Anaxagoras might be made fruitful, there was need that it be completely worked out, and for this the foundations of philosophy had to be laid anew. For this necessary work of reconstruction no more favorable place could have been found than Athens. Indeed, it was at Athens, and in the society of its most noteworthy men, especially of Pericles and Euripides, that Anaxagoras himself lived. He was, however, finally accused of atheism and exiled by the enemies of his great friend Pericles. Leaving Athens, he retired to Lampsacus, and there ended his days.

- 11 After numerous attempts to account for the world of sensible things on a physical basis, the very school of thinkers who sought to explain matter by matter began to feel the need of some first cause which should lie outside of matter and above it. Henceforward the one thing indispensable for the full recognition of such a first cause was a vigorous impulse which, arousing and uplifting the moral energy of national thought, should re-shape Philosophy by the help of this new conception. This required impulse was found in the practical demand, now for the first time made upon philosophers, that they abandon the retirement in which, with little or no reference to what was going on about them, they had up to this time carried on their speculations.¹ Now the time had come when the world demanded a new departure in education, and now was the opportunity for Philosophy to try her strength. At first this trial seemed to lead rather to destruction than to reconstruction; the wear and tear of practice threatened completely to swallow up all theory. Various tendencies, indeed, the obvious

¹ They show no little impatience and disdain of every-day men like ourselves. It matters little to them whether we keep pace with their dis-

cussions or fall behind, — every man of them steadily goes on his chosen way. Plato, *Sophist*, p. 243 a.

results not a few of them of doctrines previously taught, accomplished nothing but their own destruction. But this very destruction served to point a moral, since it showed that the engrossing aim of sound philosophy must not be to adorn its devotees with irresponsible cleverness and to train their faculties in that kind of intellectual dexterity whose chief reward is success. For it became evident that a moral ideal was required which, in the teaching of the Sophists, was absent. This lack of a freshly grasped and high moral standard, coupled with the effort to turn their disciples into dextrous performers on the stage of life, characterized many different teachers at this time. These teachers were the Sophists, and their teaching is usually called not Sophistry but SOPHISTIC.¹ This term is accordingly applied to the teaching of men who, in the details of their theories, often had little or nothing in common. Men who appeared as public professors of wisdom called themselves Sophists, and were so called by the public. They gathered about them old and young, and, for a stated fee, gave lectures to hearers fresh from the heat of a keen and active political strife in such branches of knowledge as were likely to interest men so pre-occupied. In short, the practical needs of political life led them to annex the widening territory of rhetoric to the traditional domain of philosophy. They devoted much energy to the art of vigorous speech-writing and of finished speech-making. These were the outward graces which a Sophist used in order to make his teachings and lectures attractive. Rhetoric and Sophistic were sister arts, inseparable from the outset, and for every man who was anxious to find the best market for his proficiency in

¹ Grote, in his History of Greece (ch. 67), is certainly right in rejecting this designation, if it must mean that the teachings and principles of all Sophists were the same or that all of them taught in the same way. The word Sophistic may, however, be said to imply such similarity in methods of teaching and in doctrine as would (1) fairly distinguish the Sophists from Socrates, and (2) lead us to class the

Sophists together. Three *negative* statements apply to all the Sophists which do not apply to Socrates: *first* the Sophists did not teach free of charge, *second* they did not in any strict sense lay foundations for the future development of philosophy, *third* they did not cast their lot either with their own or with any adopted country.

these arts, Athens, at that time the centre of all the intellectual activity of the day, was a natural place of abode.

- 12 Among the representatives of the new turn which thought had taken, Protagoras and Gorgias are especially prominent. Accordingly, more than all the rest, these two have earned a place in the history of philosophy. Protagoras of Abdera was the first who claimed as his distinguishing title the name of Sophist.¹ When he was born and when he died² cannot be satisfactorily determined. At all events, he was a contemporary of Socrates, though considerably his elder.³ Protagoras, during his long life of seventy years more or less, made repeated and protracted visits to Athens. He was, however, forced to discontinue them on account of a vote of the Athenian assembly condemning him as an atheist. His philosophical theory was based upon the dictum of Heraclitus that all things are constantly in a state of flux. But, in applying this principle to human thought and human action, he reached conclusions which were not infrequently opposed to those of the great Ephesian. In place of Heraclitus's *ἕνός λόγος* he maintained that *Man is the measure of all things; of things that are that they are, of things that are not that they are not.*⁴ By man he understood man as this or that

¹ See Plato's Protagoras, p. 317 a, b.

² His birth is variously placed between 490 and 480 B.C. (in 487, 485, or 481), and his death between 420 and 408 B.C.

³ Plato's Protagoras, p. 317 c: *οὐδενός θρον οὐ πάντων ἂν ὑμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατήρ εἴην, there is not a man of you all whose father I might not be so far as years go.*

⁴ The original words as given by Diog. Laert. (ix. 51) are: "*πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.*" This is sometimes so interpreted as to mean simply that nothing can be measured, *i.e.* known, unless there is some one to measure or know. This might then mean that the right measure of all things would be taken

only by the right man; by an ideally perfect man endowed with ideally perfect knowledge. In saying that Protagoras did not mean this ideal man Cron agrees with the following account, translated (*freely*) from Plato's Theaetetus, p. 161 c: "In other respects I am charmed with the doctrine of Protagoras that what seems to each man is, but I can never swallow his beginning. Why did he not commence by saying the measure of all things was a hog or a dog-faced baboon or some still worse monster, and that so far as wisdom went he himself was no whit wiser than a tadpole? If each man is his own best judge and all that he decides upon is right and true, how then is Protagoras wise enough to teach the rest of us, and to charge us roundly for it?"

individual. This amounted to cutting away all footing for knowledge, after reducing knowledge to the sensation or sensible perception of a given individual.

Gorgias of Leontini¹ in Sicily appeared at Athens in 427 B.C., on an embassy from his native town.² His mission was successful, and his brilliant oratory won such golden opinions that large numbers crowded to listen to his show speeches and paid him handsomely for his trouble. Later he revisited Athens and travelled to various places in Greece (Xen. Anab. ii. 6. 16 ff.), always with the same success. It is said that he was a hundred years old when he died.³ His philosophical views and method of reasoning were based upon the Eleatic system, and are summed up in the following words from his book (*περὶ φύσεως ἢ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*, *Nature, or THAT WHICH IS NOT*): “*Nothing is; if anything is, it cannot be known; if anything can be known, it cannot be communicated.*” But the chief concern of Gorgias was the teaching of rhetoric; here he sought to win fame. Still, his instruction seems to have been confined to practical hints in regard to details and he objected to being called a Sophist.

Among the other distinguished Sophists, Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of Ceos were especially famous. Hippias was chiefly noted for his extensive knowledge of genealogy and of mathematical astronomy,⁴ but he also plumed himself upon his miscellaneous accomplishments in various practical directions. Prodicus is best known for his nice discriminations between words of similar meaning, and for his moral lectures. Xenophon (Mem. ii. 1. 21) has preserved one of these, the very clever story of the Choice of Heracles.

The bustling activity of these and of other Sophists who had no fixed abiding-place, produced no marked effect upon philosophy beyond making clear the insufficiency of all previous speculation. After a hundred years and more, Greek thought had reached the conclusion that to talk of real truth was idle, and that all knowl-

¹ This same name is applied to the inhabitants. Ptolemaeus is alone in calling the town *Λεόντιον*.

² Diodorus xii. 53. Thuc. iii. 86 does not mention him by name.

³ The dates given for his birth vary from 496 B.C. (Foss) to 483 B.C. (Frei); for his death, from 384 B.C. to 375 B.C.

⁴ See on Apol., p. 18 b.

edge depends solely upon sensible perception and sensation. So, therefore, knowledge could at most change worse sensations into better ones, — more profitable and pleasanter ones.

16 This doctrine virtually involved the destruction of all philosophy. Therefore Socrates, who won the day against it, is rightly called the deliverer and the new founder of philosophy.

17 Socrates, the son of a sculptor Sophroniscus,¹ was born at Athens, and as a boy followed his father's occupation. Soon, however, he abandoned sculpture and devoted himself to the profession to which he thought God called him; this was a continuous warfare carried on against the conceit of sham knowledge in all its forms. Wherever and whenever he met it he was bound to expose sham knowledge as real ignorance.² As for himself, he claimed no knowledge beyond the capital fact that he knew nothing. By this, however, he did not mean that real knowledge was as the Sophists maintained impossible. For though Socrates said that God alone was really wise, his meaning was that the whole duty of man was comprised in the struggle toward that real knowledge which alone gives the power to do right. And just here Socrates declared that all *virtues*, ἀρεταί, were essentially forms of knowledge, and were based upon the understanding of some class of things. This involved the final identification of virtue in general with understanding. If virtue³ is understanding, it follows that no one does wrong knowingly; men sin only in so far as they are in ignorance of what is right. A man who knows the right, who has real knowledge, will do the right, for then that knowledge will be stronger within him than any desire. Naturally the standard of this genuine knowledge is not arbitrary, nor is it borrowed from anything outside of the soul. Socrates based all knowledge upon necessary obedience to the commandment inscribed upon the temple at

¹ The ordinary date given for his birth is Ol. 77, 3 or 4 = 470/69 B.C.: probably Ol. 77, 2 or 1 = 472/1 B.C. is nearer the truth. Cf. *infra* note on § 30, and Apol., p. 17 d.

² Cf. Apol., p. 29 d ff., particularly the explanation of ε, ἐρήσσομαι κτέ.

³ It cannot be denied that even in

Socrates' conception of ἀρετή, the old notion so manifest in Homer (cf. Doederlein, Hom. Gloss., p. 536) of 'skill' or cleverness was still very strong. The German word 'Tugend' and its corresponding idea are similarly connected with 'Tauglichkeit' and 'Tüchtigkeit.'

Delphi, Γνωθι σεαυτόν. Xenophon (Mem. iv. 2) gives an account of Socrates's explanation of this.¹

Two questions arise concerning Socrates's idea of knowledge 18 as the foundation of righteousness. (1) What constitutes this knowledge? (2) What is the field in which it works? Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle vie with one another in declaring that Socrates would always ask about everything under discussion: *What is the general idea of which this, that, or the other is a particular instance?* τί ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων. Let every man first answer this question, and then he is a fit guide for his friends; otherwise it is a case of 'the blind leading the blind.' Hence, when Socrates found a man who claimed the possession of knowledge, his test question was, Can you define the thing which you say you know? And he usually found his man incapable of giving the required definition, and accordingly showed up the boasted knowledge as ignorance.

In applying this test, and in taking the steps by which he led up to and determined the definition required, consisted the peculiar method of Socrates. He always began with everyday facts, and then proceeded by the method of question and answer, either (1) to the definition and general idea required, or (2) to the irresistible conclusion that some definition in vogue which he had taken up was wrong. The steps taken in going from a given class of particulars to their universal, which is the general idea including them all, are called ἐπαγωγή, *induction*. Hence, Aristotle ascribes to Socrates the discovery of the *epagogic* or *inductive method* (τοὺς ἐπακτικὸς λόγους), and of the *definition of universals* (τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου, — hence ὄρος = *definitio*).

By the DIALECTIC (διαλεκτική) of Socrates is meant simply his 19 acuteness in so guiding a series of questions and answers that something was finally done toward determining a general conception and reaching some measure of truth. This process required a living issue raised between a man skilled in questioning and some one willing to answer him. But, soon after the day of Socrates,

¹ We may summarize the philosophical situation as follows: Protagoras said: Man is the measure; Socrates met this by asking: What is man?

Gorgias said: We cannot have real knowledge; Socrates met this by saying: Before we give up knowledge let us seriously try to know ourselves.

'dialectic' became a philosophical term applied particularly to the more developed and many-sided method of Plato; indeed, it finally became identified with Plato's logic or theory of ideas. Quite apart from Socrates's dialectic is the *controversial art* of certain Sophists (*ἀντιλογική*), for, whereas this controversial art only sought perpetual controversy, the essential peculiarity of the dialectic of Socrates was that it aimed at the understanding of truth.

- 20 The discussions of Socrates were almost always ethical. Nearly all questions which up to his day had engrossed philosophers he summarily excluded from the field of his investigation. He asked: What is virtue? what is holiness? what is justice? what is courage? And his answer, in every case, was understanding, — the understanding of what is good in reference now to one and now to another class of facts. Courage, for instance, is the understanding of what is good in relation to things terrible and dangerous; and he has courage whose conduct is right in cases of terror and danger. Yet Socrates recognized that the original bent with which the individual is born here disclosed itself; since he saw that, just as one man's body is born stronger than his neighbor's, so one man's soul was born more courageous than his neighbor's. Yet he maintained that every man, be the qualities born in him what they might, could advance *in excellence* (*πρὸς ἀρετήν*) by learning and practice.
- 21 Such is Socrates's doctrine in its outlines, as Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle have represented it in their writings. Socrates himself, as is well known, was the author of no books. We have, therefore, no direct statement of his views at first hand. The most important authority for his teachings is Xenophon, especially his four books of "*Memoirs of Socrates*" (*ἀπομνημονεύματα*,¹ *commentarii*, Memorabilia). In this work the writer undertakes to defend the memory of his friend and master against the accusations and slanders of all enemies. With this in view, he sets forth all that he can remember of the conversations of Socrates. All must be ready to allow that Xenophon, who was nothing if not a man of action, failed to understand Socrates's position in

¹ It has been claimed that the Memorabilia are referred to by Horace (A. P. v. 310), as *Socraticae chartae*.

The poet's allusion, however, is probably more vague.

the history of Greek philosophy; he could not adequately appreciate him as a philosopher. But of the man his portrait is invaluable, in spite of this or perhaps on account of this. Writing from a popular point of view, he corrects Plato's ideal representation of the master Socrates, and helps us to the facts about Socrates as he lived and taught. Further, in the judicious remarks scattered here and there through Aristotle's writings, we have always a most welcome supplement, and often a most wholesome corrective; by drawing from all these sources we are enabled to bring our ideal Socrates within the limits of historical fact.

An account of Socrates's theory gives no adequate knowledge 22 of his historical significance. A necessary aid must be sought in some description of his personality, of Socrates during life and Socrates facing death.¹

It has already been said that Socrates thought his life consecrated 23 to the service of a higher power and his every act the fulfilment of a task laid on him by God. This it was that forbade his following any of the pursuits which engross the majority of men. He was poor,² but his poverty was not so complete as his frugality. The fulfilment of God's command imposed upon him abstention from politics, except in cases where to abstain would be to neglect the plain duties of a citizen. He served as a hoplite in three campaigns,³ and showed in battle that he was no mere talker about courage. This same temper, this unterrified obedience to duty, unswerving in the way of right and law, he displayed as one of the senators⁴ and prytanes on the occasion of the memorable popular assembly which illegally condemned the generals victorious at Arginusae. Here he faced the arbitrary caprice of the people with the same strength of mind which made him

¹ When Xenophon is used as our authority, it should be remembered that the subtler qualities of such a man as Socrates were likely, either to escape so unimaginative a mind, or, if felt, to be represented inadequately by a writer comparatively destitute of dramatic power. These are just the qualities which distinguish Socrates from all other teachers, and these

are given by Plato alone. Cf. 'Socrates,' a translation of the Apology, Crito, and parts of the Phaedo. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

² Apology, p. 23 c and note; also Xen. Mem. I. vi.

³ Apology, p. 28 e and note; also Laches, pp. 181 a b, 188 e, and Symposium, pp. 219 e-221 e.

⁴ Apology, p. 32 b with note

afterwards¹ prefer death to a cowardly and unrighteous submission to the thirty tyrants.

24 Critias, like Alcibiades, was for a time a disciple of Socrates chiefly for the reason that he expected in that capacity to learn certain useful accomplishments. Later, as the leading spirit among the Thirty, this same Critias undertook to make the habitual occupation of Socrates uncomfortable for him. The conversation between the two is preserved by Xenophon (Mem. i. 2. 31 ff.). The passage is characteristic of both speakers, and should certainly be read by all, for it familiarizes us with the plan of active operations to which Socrates devoted all of his life and energy.

25 Xenophon tells us that Critias, and with him Charicles who was also an influential member of the Thirty, had been irritated by Socrates's freedom of speech. They pointedly reminded him of the terms of a law which they had promulgated to meet his particular case, and threateningly bade him obey its behests: *λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν*, *no one shall teach the art of words*. It is no matter for surprise that this law should have been aimed at Socrates, for two reasons: first, because of the tendency to classify Socrates as one of the Sophists. Indeed, he seems to have been looked upon simply as the most popular and effective of Sophists, and hence he became for the comic poets the representative Sophist.² The second reason is, that the words *λόγων τέχνη*, taken in their widest sense, do apply to Socrates's characteristic way of question and answer, as well as to rhetoric; and yet there were really many outer and palpable marks which distinguished Socrates and his teaching from the Sophists and their art. A Sophist charged for his instruction, and hence would usually teach in some place of private resort; Socrates, since he was the servant

¹ Apology, p. 32 c d with note.

² In the *Clouds*, first put on the stage in B.C. 423, Aristophanes brings Socrates before his audience in that capacity. An added piquancy was given by Socrates's peculiar personal appearance, which fell so very far short of the Hellenic ideal of beauty. Indeed Socrates himself frequently

compares himself with the statues of Silenus (Xenophon, *Symposium*, ch. 5; Plato, *Symposium*, ch. 33). How then could we expect the comic poets to abstain from caricaturing one so easy to caricature? Anybody could recognize a mask which was meant for Socrates.

of God, would take no man's pay. Hence, he naturally preferred the most public places, such as the market, the gymnasium, a public porch, or some workshop. Being no respecter of persons he was ready to discuss with every man, and eager to share the search for truth with any new comer. The genuineness of this desire for coöperation was undoubted, for he declared himself unable alone to get at any knowledge. To exemplify this his homely description of his art as intellectual *midwifery* (μαευτική) and his comparison of it with the profession of his mother, the midwife Phaenarete, may be mentioned.¹ This idea made him protest against being called any man's teacher, indeed he stoutly denied that he had any pupils. As substitutes for these names of teacher and pupil, Xenophon and Plato use words which all of them describe the pursuit of truth on equal and friendly terms.

The chief delight of Socrates was to gather about him young 26 men of good parts who were eager for knowledge. This led him to frequent places where they habitually assembled, such as the palaestra or the gymnasium. No doubt the Thirty bore this in mind when they bade him not to consort with any one under thirty years of age. But Socrates was ready to talk with men of all ages and all stations, no matter where he found them. He was often seen conversing eagerly with workmen, and this led him to draw freely upon their familiar surroundings and occupations for topics and for illustrations. And hence we hear the frequent complaint that he was continually harping upon cobbling, cobblers, carpenters, smiths, and the like. He was considered a bore who repeated the same thing about the same subject *ad nauseam*; whereas, the Sophists were at infinite pains never to use the same phraseology twice in discussing the same thing. Of course this implied that their attention was riveted upon the way of putting things: they dazzled their hearers and drew from them tumultuous applause, little caring if the enthusiasm lasted but for a moment. But the whole energy of Socrates was absorbed by the central purpose of rousing a right understanding and of implanting a firm and fruitful conviction. That the knowledge itself which Socrates strove for was far other

¹ Cf. Alcibiades I., p. 431 e; Theaetet., p. 149 a.

than that which the Sophists so glibly taught, is best shown by a contrast between one characteristic attribute of his discourse and theirs. The Sophists made a great flourish of trumpets (*ἐπιδειξις*); they began with a perfectly rounded self-complacency. Socrates began by protesting that he was sure of one thing only, — his own ignorance. Wisdom, he declared, is of God; and this, said he, was the meaning intended by the oracle at Delphi by the words: No man is wiser than Socrates. This self-knowledge is nothing more than a purified form of the genuinely Greek idea of *temperance*, *σωφροσύνη*. It is based upon the immemorial belief that the gods are jealous and refuse to tolerate men who put themselves upon a pedestal.¹ The conceit of self-knowledge with which the Sophists were puffed up, Socrates undoubtedly considered a case in point. Against this conceit he waged war with his incomparable irony,² before which all their wisdom became as nothing. He made it plain to them, and to whomsoever it might concern, that all their general notions were confused and worthless. A tempered form of his irony is seen in his treatment of young and enthusiastic votaries of learning. First of all, he helps them to an understanding of their ignorance, but yet he leaves in their souls such a sting as stirs them to an earnest struggle for real insight. Indeed, we have seen that the humility of Socrates's self-measurement was by no means incompatible with a fixed determination to win the truth which leads to righteousness. Socrates said, in short: Let no man call himself a *σοφιστής*, *owner of wisdom*, but let every man be a *φιλόσοφος*, *lover of wisdom*.

There is, indeed, no uncertain ring in the religious tone of Socrates's philosophy. By his conversations³ he strove to rouse in
 27 others the religious sense, and at the same time he exhibited in his own life a heartfelt piety, rooted in the purest gratitude for the goodness of God, and manifested in the most scrupulous conformity to all the outward rites and observances of public worship. Even the popular practice of consulting oracles and interpreting omens, he did not, according to Xenophon,⁴ reject. He merely sought to confine it

¹ Hdt. I. 32.

² Cf. Apology, p. 37 e; Republic, p. 337 a: ἐκεῖνη ἢ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεῖα Σωκράτους.

³ See Xen. Mem. i. 4 and iv. 3.

⁴ Cf. particularly Mem. I. i. 2 sqq., especially 6-9; see also Anabasis iii. 1. 5-7.

to difficulties for dealing with which God had given to man neither the knowledge nor the capacity. In all these cases, Socrates himself was singularly favored in that he possessed a gift sent of God, — a heavenly voice of warning. Whenever this voice spoke within him he knew that what he was about to do would result in harm and that therefore he must abstain from it; when the voice was silent he was the stronger in his purpose and strengthened others in theirs.¹ Socrates most certainly did not conceive of this voice as an emanation from a special and independent divinity, but as a revelation of the love and the wisdom of God. Such a revelation, he thought,² might well come to any man, though perhaps not in the same way. Still Socrates may have been uncommonly sensitive to this influence, and more conscientious than most men in doing what it prompted. Be this as it may, what we know about the matter serves to prove that his trust in God was exceptional; indeed this is nowhere made clearer than in cases where Socrates did not hear the voice, and yet, without its warning to direct him, was deaf to the clamors of selfish fears which greatly disturb other men,—cases where he did what he knew was right without petty anxiety as to the end.

Intimately connected with this remarkable strength of moral 28 character is the absolute control in which his body was held by his mind. The capital manifestation of this is to be found in the accounts which have been preserved of his ‘staying power’ while he was engaged in following up a train of thought. The best instance of this Plato gives in the following story of Socrates at the siege of Potidaea.³ Early one day a subject of thought occurred to Socrates while he was walking, and he stopped; for twenty-four hours he stood stock-still, because he could not come to any conclusion until

¹ Cf. *Apol.*, pp. 31 c d, 40 a b; Xen. *Mem.* i. 2, 1-5. In the Appendix to his edition of the *Memorabilia*, Breitenbach enters into this whole question. See also Susemihl in Bursian's *Jahresbericht* I. 5, p. 546, and Zeller II., pp. 69-83 of the third edition. Cf. Riddell's *Apology*, Appendix A, and Cardinal Manning's *The Daemon*

of Socrates, Longmans and Green, 1872.

² Schleiermacher proves this in his note on *Apology*, p. 27 b, by showing that Plato and Xenophon alike use *δαίμωνιον* as an adjective. Cf. on *Apol.*, p. 31 d.

³ *Sympos.*, p. 220 c d; see also, on the credibility of the story, Zeller II., p. 69.

the next morning. In other respects as well his endurance was remarkable: he was hardened to every privation. Winter and summer alike he went barefoot, and always wore clothes of the same texture and thickness. This, in fact, made the rigours of a winter in Thrace tell upon him far less than upon his comrades in arms.¹ Apart from his soldiering, hardly anything could induce Socrates to leave Athens, as he is made to say himself in the *Crito*.² As for temperance and frugality, we have seen that he was remarkable for both.

29 The outline given above may be regarded as an historically trustworthy account of the character of Socrates. And now we need hesitate no longer in agreeing with the enthusiastic estimate of Socrates given at the end of the *Memorabilia*. But all this certainly leaves us but ill-prepared for the manner of the great man's 'taking off.' Prosecuted in his declining years, on a most serious charge, he was, after a legal trial, sentenced to death. And all this happened, not during any oligarchical or democratic reign of terror, but at the very time when everybody was admiring the moderate spirit of the newly-restored Athenian democracy. It was shortly after the archonship of Euclides and the deposition of the thirty tyrants by Thrasybulus. As far as history has determined them, the facts about this trial are as follows:—

30 In the first year of the ninety-fifth Olympiad, while Laches was archon, and when Socrates had already passed the limit of three-score years and ten,³ Meletus, seconded by Anytus and Lyco, came forward with his accusation. In Plato's *Euthyphro* Meletus is described as an insignificant youth, and in the *Apology* he is treated with a measure of contempt. Some identify him with the poet Meletus,⁴ others say he was the poet's son,⁵ though 'a chip of the old block,' since the words (*Apol.* 23 e) ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν

¹ *Sympos.*, p. 220 a b.

² *Crito*, ch. XIV. with note on p. 53 a.

³ *Apol.*, p. 17 d and *supra*, p. 14, note 1. Ol. 95, 1 = 400/399 B.C.

⁴ *Aristoph.* *Frogs*, v. 1302.

⁵ K. F. Hermann, in his *Disputatio de Socratis accusatoribus*, maintains that there were four different persons

named Meletus, (1) the accuser of Socrates, (2) the poet referred to in the *Frogs*, (3) the Meletus, *cf.* *Apol.*, p. 32 c d, who obeyed the thirty, and arrested the unoffending Leon of Salamis, (4) the Meletus of *Xen. Hell.* ii. 4. 36. Frohberger argues against this in the *Philol. Anzeiger* II. 7.

ἀχθόμενος imply that he was poetically inclined. He led the prosecution, the other two being technically his συνήγοροι. It is plain, however, that the substantial man of the three was Anytus, since it was the influence of Anytus which chiefly secured the verdict.¹ Anytus, who had inherited a handsome property and had filled the highest offices in the commonwealth, was at this particular time one of the most popular men in public life. He had worked with all his might to help Thrasybulus expel the Thirty and to restore the democracy. Not only did he condemn Socrates as being one of the Sophists against all of whom his bitterness was uncompromising, but in addition he owed him an especial grudge. For Socrates, it appears, had made certain indiscreet and irritating comments upon his private affairs.² Lyco is absolutely unknown beyond what is said in the Apology (22 e). There he is represented as a professional speech-maker, and it is reasonable to infer that as such he contributed far more than Meletus toward the success of the prosecution.

The indictment was submitted by Meletus to the ἄρχων βασιλεύς, 31 whose jurisdiction covered all cases involving religion. Its formal terms were:³ Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods believed in by the state, and also of introducing other new divinities. Moreover, he is further guilty of corrupting the young. The penalty proposed is death. This was an indictment for an offence against the state⁴; accordingly it was technically a γραφή (*public suit*), and, as further qualified by the specific charges, a γραφή ἀσεβείας (*a public suit on the count of impiety*).

As to the negative clause of the first count (οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει 32 θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων), it certainly is difficult to see any fact to justify such an accusation, inasmuch as Socrates expressly recognized the *law of the land* (νόμος πόλεως) as the final arbiter in all that concerned the worship of the gods; and, indeed, himself scrupulously

¹ Apol., p. 36 a.

² [Xen.] Apol. 29, sqq. Probably there is some reference to Anytus's unjust hatred of Socrates in Xen. Cyrop. iii. 1. 38 sqq.

³ Ἄδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις

νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγόμενος (or εἰσφέρων with Xen. Mem. i. 1. 1). ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.

⁴ See *infra*, § 67, and Apol., p. 19 b.

⁵ Apol., p. 26 d.

observed all its requirements.⁵ The terms of the second (affirmative) clause (ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος) apparently refer to the much mooted δαιμόνιον, — the mysterious communication from God to Socrates. This allegation was a slander, but had it been true could hardly have had much weight at Athens, where the introduction of new divinities was not a crime.

- 33 It is, however, probable that the first count was introduced as a foil to the second, and was primarily intended as a means for giving a legal foothold to the suit. For among all known provisions of Athenian law there is not one under which Socrates could have been prosecuted on the second count (ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων). This view is confirmed by the difficulty which even the thirty tyrants had in interfering officially with Socrates's dealings with young men. They had to pass a special law for the purpose, and that law was doubtless abolished when the democracy was restored. At all events it is certain that in the accuser's mind the second count was the most important. We have only to remember the prejudices of Anytus, and to recall the fact that he was still smarting under Socrates's sharp criticism of the way in which he educated his son. We can understand his indignation, though we do not share it. Now Anytus was a citizen in excellent standing, and naturally felt sure of success against such heresies in any appeal to the law. What, then, is easier to understand than his eagerness to take advantage of any pretext that offered itself against Socrates? He was eager to save his country by redressing his own grievance. Nor is it difficult to see why many of the judges should have been inclined to sympathize with him. They were enthusiastic for the democracy, and looked with disfavour upon any man like Socrates who had so often and so sharply criticized institutions dear to the democrat's heart. Still, it is more than questionable whether such criticisms were amenable to the law of a commonwealth whose shibboleth was *free speech* (παρρησία). A connection, on Socrates's part, with overt or covert attempts at revolution cannot be thought of; any suggestion of the kind falls by its own weight, for it is pure and unadulterated slander. But still it was urged that Alcibiades and Critias, notorious scourges of the body politic, were for some time

the companions of Socrates. And, though Xenophon has abundantly shown the injustice of remembering this against Socrates, the judges could not forget it. The memory of these men's crimes was still so fresh that every one was inclined to mistrust the man to whose teaching many attributed the misdeeds which had so lately made life unbearable. This teaching they were therefore determined to stop, and nothing could better have served their purpose than the first count of the indictment, an accusation of atheism, for at Athens it had often gone hard in the courts with those who had to meet this charge. X

This whole accusation was from the first met calmly and collect- 34
edly by Socrates, and he showed the same temper at the bar of the court. There is a story, told twice of Socrates,¹ which brings this unruffled spirit vividly before us, and Plato's *Theaetetus* does the same more subtly. Plato represents that intricate and abstruse philosophical discussion, carried on by Socrates with phenomenal fair-mindedness and consummate ease, as taking place immediately before the great teacher was compelled by the summons of Meletus to appear for preliminary examination before the magistrate² (*ἀρχων βασιλεύς*). It was a sense of duty only which forced Socrates to appear, both at this time and afterwards, at the trial. It was his duty, he thought, to appear in his own case and to make his own plea,³ though he made it without real hope or serious

¹ "Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus," a friend of Socrates, "noticed that Socrates, though he conversed freely on things in general, avoided any allusion to the impending suit. 'My dear Socrates,' said he, 'surely you ought to be attending to your brief.' 'Why, do I not seem to you,' answered Socrates, 'to have passed my life with my brief constantly in view?' 'What do you mean by that?' asked Hermogenes. 'I mean that I have shunned evil all my life, that, I think, is the most honorable way in which a man can bestow attention upon his own defence.'" [*Xen.*] *Apol.*, § 3 *sqq.* Cf. *Mem.* iv. 8. 4 *sqq.*, where

the story is almost verbally repeated.

² *Theaetetus*, p. 210 c d.

³ Cicero (*De oratore* I. 54) is our chief authority for the following tale about Socrates's defence. The celebrated orator Lysias, out of the fulness of his friendship for Socrates, wrote him a speech for his defence. Socrates declined it when offered, because he thought it would be undignified for him to use it, and in spite of the fact that it was a marvel of pleading. The story is probably founded on the fact that upwards of six years after Socrates's execution Lysias wrote a *rhetorical exercise* (*declamatio*) on the theme of Socrates's defence, as an answer to

desire of escaping the death-penalty proposed by his accuser. His defence was made without previous preparation,¹ and there breathed in it such noble pride and such uncompromising independence that its effect must rather have irritated than conciliated his judges. In the court-room as on the battle-field Socrates was always the same fearless champion of his own and his country's honour. Where other men consulted their own safety, God required Socrates to be faithful and to obey orders.

35 And so it came to pass that the judges brought in the verdict of 'guilty,' but by no large majority.² In cases of this nature the law did not fix the penalty beforehand,³ and Socrates had still the right of rating his guilt at his own price, ἀντιτιμάσθαι, his accuser having proposed, τιμάσθαι, the penalty of death. After the defendant had named his counter-penalty, the court was bound to choose one of the two.⁴ Just as in his plea Socrates had disdained the ordinary means of working upon the feelings of the court by tears and supplications, so now he scorned the obvious way of safety still open to any man whose guilt had been affirmed by verdict. He absolutely refused to suggest any real counter-penalty, and hence an increased majority⁵ sentenced him to death.

36 The same courage which had animated him while speaking his defence, the same rooted conviction that they who love God need fear no evil, supported him now when his execution had become a question of days and hours, and prevented him from countenancing any plan for disobeying the laws of the state. Exceptional circumstances⁶ delayed the execution of his sentence for thirty days after

a speech on the other side of the case by the rhetorician Polycrates. For a discussion of the matter, see Spengel (*Συναγωγή τεχνῶν*, p. 141) and Rauchenstein (*Philol.* XVI. 1).

¹ "But when they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak: for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak." Matthew x., v. 19.

² *Apol.*, p. 36 a and *ibid.* note on εἰ τριάκοντα κτέ.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 35 d and *infra*, § 73.

⁴ § 73.

⁵ It is said that the adverse majority was increased by eighty votes which had previously been cast for a verdict of 'not guilty.'

⁶ *Crito*, p. 43 c with note on τὸ πλοῖον. Cf. *Xen. Mem.* iv. 8. 2: "He was constrained to live for thirty days after his case was decided because it was the month of the yearly festival and embassy to Delos, and the law prohibited all public executions until the return of the sacred envoys

it was rendered, and his friends, perhaps with the connivance of the authorities, offered him means of escape and also opportunity to use them. But he was firm in refusing these, just as while on trial he had been firm in rejecting every opportunity to secure either a favourable verdict or a lighter penalty. The tale that shortly after his death the Athenians repented and actually called the accusers to account rests on such slender authority that it must not be taken as history.

Of all the companions of Socrates none more deeply revered the 37 master's noble life than Plato, and no heart was more deeply stirred by the pathos of his death. At the time Plato was still young, barely thirty years of age.¹ Aristo his father and his mother Perictione were both of good old Athenian stock. Codrus was one of his ancestors on his father's side, and by his mother he was descended from Solon. At the age of twenty he became a disciple of Socrates, having until that time devoted his energies to poetry. It is said that he was already so much of a poet that he was on the eve of bringing out a tetralogy; but when he became a disciple of Socrates he gave himself entirely to philosophy. At last he had found a field which was to be all his own, a field where his genius was soon to work wonders; for his philosophy was to guide the spiritual and intellectual life of his countrymen to a new and splendid consummation. Before this he had not been unacquainted

from Delos. During this time not one of his familiar friends could detect in his case any change in the manner of his life from what it had always been. And as for his previous career, he certainly always commanded unparalleled admiration for living a cheerful and contented life." The annual festival and embassy to Delos — another festival, also called *Δήλια*, was celebrated every four years — came in the tenth or eleventh month of the Athenian year (*Μουνοχιών* or *Θαργηλιών*), hence the death of Socrates probably occurred in Thargelion (our May and June); the year was 399 B.C.

¹ Various dates are given for Plato's birth (1) The usually accepted one depends on Athenaeus, and is the archonship of Apollodorus, Ol. 87, 3 = 430/29 B.C. (2) Diogenes Laertius gives Ol. 87, 4 = 429/28 B.C., Epameinon's year as archon, and the year of Pericles's death. (3) Zeller follows Hermodorus, a pupil of Plato, and fixes upon 428/27 B.C. The birthday is said to have been the seventh day of Thargelion, a day sacred to Apollo. In the year 428/27 B.C. this came on May 26/27, or, as others claim, May 29/30. Cf. Steinhart.

with philosophy, and we are told that Cratylus had initiated him into the mysteries of Heraclitus ; but not until he met Socrates had he found the guide and friend who was to lead him in all his speculations toward the goal of truth.

38 It is not possible to decide whether some of Plato's earliest writings (*e.g.* the *Lysis*) were produced during Socrates's life, or all of them after the master's death. The bias of opinion now-a-days inclines to the latter view, and insists upon the unhistorical and ideal picture of Socrates which Plato everywhere alike has drawn. At all events, the questions dealt with by Plato's earliest works were just the ones constantly discussed by Socrates, though even here and at the outset Plato displays originality. His vocation was to connect together the definitions insisted upon by Socrates and to reduce them to an ordered system by the application of a single law or principle. At the very outset he took up the same lines which his whole life was devoted to following out, and he ended by establishing dialectic as a science. Yet he never lost sight of Socrates, who always moved before him as the perfect philosopher. He valued philosophical writing only so far as it mirrored the ways, the wisdom, and the words of the ideal philosopher, and his works are pictures of the marvellous personality of Socrates. Hence it is that Plato, when he wrote, could not dispense with the peculiarly Socratic form of question and answer, but in his hands the dialogue is fashioned and developed into a new form of literature. His early interest in art and his familiarity with all the forms of poetry naturally stood him in good stead here, and we need not wonder that the poetic fire and dramatic vividness of his dialogues are universally admired.

39 Among the dialogues which he first wrote the *PROTAGORAS* is perhaps the one which most conspicuously exemplifies these great qualities. Both in the subject dealt with, and in the conclusions arrived at, the *Protagoras* belongs to the school of Socrates. Virtue is there defined as knowledge of what is good, and in this are contained and summed up all particular virtues. Therefore, (1) virtue can be taught, and (2) no man is wicked freely and of his own proper choice. Wickedness is ignorance of what is good, and perfect goodness belongs only to God. Man's virtue is incomplete

and tentative only, — it is a constant struggle; God alone is invariably and forever good. There is nothing discussed here which was not an every-day topic with Socrates and his friends.

In the *GORGIAS* Plato discusses the relation of goodness to 40 pleasure, a matter barely touched upon in the *Protagoras*. The opposition between rhetoric and dialectic is most effectively drawn by contrasting the sophist and his scheme of morals with the true philosopher. Rhetoric is a sham art of living, the beau-ideal of which is the unbridled indulgence by each individual of every passing whim, a fool's paradise where the bodily appetites are gorged. The true art of living, on the other hand, seeks and finds everywhere law, order, and righteousness (*δικαιοσύνη*), even though in so doing all temporal happiness and life itself be sacrificed. Higher than this earthly life is life eternal and the hereafter, where he only is blessed who has walked upon earth in the paths of righteousness. Therefore, it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong. The former does harm that lasts but a day, the latter brings enduring contamination.

This bare outline is enough to suggest that the fate of Socrates 41 was in the mind of the writer of the *Gorgias*. This is confirmed by the merciless directness of its arguments, and by the tone of severity and almost bitterness which pervades the whole work. The *Gorgias* contains the moral teachings of Socrates and a great deal more, for there we find them as it were transfigured. Moreover, we get a glimpse of Plato's political creed. An aristocrat by birth, he could hardly have learned the love of democracy from Socrates, though even without this master there was enough in contemporary political events to incline him to the views which he held. It has been supposed that Pericles died in the course of the same year which saw the birth of Plato.¹ Plato's earliest impressions about politics may therefore best be understood by reading in Thucydides the history of that time. It was the era of decay in Athenian morals both public and private, an era which Thucydides described with a heavy heart. If Plato went a step further and, in seeking for the cause of so much harm, attributed this

¹ This chronological coincidence is not certain. See p. 27, note 1.

degeneration to Pericles, it surely can be urged that such a view of the great statesman's leadership is not absolutely untenable even when judged by the strictest standard of historical impartiality.¹ But though Plato loved democracy less, it was not because he loved the thirty tyrants more. Two of his mother's kin, his uncle Charmides and also Critias, were conspicuous among the Thirty, but Plato was neither of them nor with them. What Socrates had to endure revealed to his disciple the infamy of the Thirty and their lust for power, while any dawning hopes from the moderate temper shown by the newly restored democracy which supplanted them was more than obscured by Socrates's trial and condemnation. He found in these events new reasons for adopting the plan of life which of old had been congenial to him, and he was thus confirmed in his inclination to serve his country by shunning all active participation in his country's affairs. It would surely be rashness to urge that, in deciding upon the manner of his life, Plato lacked either patriotism or common sense.

42 To avoid political entanglements, and at the same time to add to his intellectual attainments, Plato left Athens shortly after Socrates's death, and retired to Megara, the home of a group of his philosophical friends. Euclides of Megara, a warm friend of Socrates, was the central figure among them. Like many other disciples of Socrates, Antisthenes for example, Euclides was at great pains to reconcile the Socratic definitions or general ideas with the Eleatic doctrine of the oneness of pure being. Plato who, in the *Euthyphro*, early foreshadows a more abstruse account of these general ideas than Socrates had given, naturally sought to profit, while thinking out his own views, by those of Euclides. But the Eleatic motionless Being worked apparently like a palsy upon the Megarians, for Plato gained no new light from his friends at Megara. However he certainly was impelled by his sojourn

¹ The opinion of Pericles expressed by Thucydides (ii. 65) is very favourable. Grote warmly defends the reputation of Pericles against the less favourable comments of Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and a certain number

of modern writers. Recently Büchschütz in his 'Besitz und Erwerb im griechischen Alterthume' has again accentuated the other side, and Herzberg in turn argues, *Jahrbücher für Ph. u. P.* 100, 5, in favour of Pericles

there to supplement what he knew of the Eleatic doctrine by more thorough studies. If the Socratic philosophy may be called the ground in which the tree of Plato's knowledge took firm root, what he gained at Megara, and the familiarity with the Eleatic doctrines which he soon acquired, may be compared to the showers which watered that ground, and enabled the roots of the tree to strike deeper, and helped its branches to a fuller growth.

This same end was subserved by his further travels. He first ⁴³ went to Cyrene, — perhaps by way of Ephesus, where he may have wished to become acquainted with the living representatives of Heraclitus's school, — and there spent some time with Theodorus the mathematician. Though Theodorus was the reputed exponent of Protagoras's philosophy, Plato was chiefly drawn to him as a great mathematician and geometer. The Athenians certainly were not likely to forget the learning which he had exhibited when he visited their city.¹ The importance attached by Plato to mathematics as a necessary part of right education² is notorious, as is also his own proficiency in that branch of learning.³ After a visit to Egypt, he proceeded to Magna Graecia that he might there consort with the Pythagoreans, from whose learning he obviously expected to derive great benefit. The chief man among them was Archytas of Tarentum. Distinguished alike for statesmanship and as a general, Archytas had originated the analytic method in mathematics, and had solved many problems in geometry and mechanics, besides achieving a great name in philosophy. The society of Archytas and his school revived Plato's interest in practical government, which had died with Socrates. As a sight-seer Plato extended his tour to Sicily, and was there introduced by Dio to the court of the elder Dionysius. But his Athenian visitor was too outspoken for that tyrant, and finally incurred his ungovernable resentment. At the time, just before the peace of Antalcidas, there was war between Athens and the Peloponnesians, — and so it

¹ Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 10.

² Over the door of his lecture-room was written, it is said: Let no one unversed in geometry enter here, *μηδὲς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσέλτω*.

³ It is very commonly asserted that he solved the Delian problem (the doubling of a cube), and on doing so, criticized the usual manner of dealing with mathematics.

occurred to Dionysius that his guest should become Sparta's prisoner of war. He was sold and carried as a slave to Aegina, whence he was finally ransomed by the generous zeal of Anniceris of Cyrene.¹

44 At the age of forty Plato was again in Athens, and he brought with him great treasures of knowledge and of experience. During his absence, moreover, he had been busy writing, and the THEAETETUS serves as a reminder of his sojourn at Megara and at Cyrene. It is a dialogue within a dialogue; the introductory conversation may be called Plato's dedication of the whole work to his friends at Megara. The question, What is knowledge? is asked, and every typical answer to it, beginning with the most obvious one, Knowledge is *sensation* (αἴσθησις), and ending with the most abstruse one, is first stated with fairness and then with equal fairness refuted. In this dialogue we find Socrates and Theaetetus represented more effectively than anywhere else in Plato's writings, while in the companion pictures, so eloquently drawn by Socrates, of the philosopher and the practical man or lawyer, Plato seems to be vindicating himself against fault-finders.²

¹ This whole account of Plato's being sold as a slave and then ransomed is not well substantiated by trustworthy authorities.

² It is important at this point to have clearly before the mind some statement of Plato's THEORY OF IDEAS. In the Theaetetus (p. 210 a) Socrates is made to say: "Then, Theaetetus, knowledge is not (1) *sensation* (αἴσθησις); nor is it (2) *true opinion* (δόξα ἀληθής); nor again, (3) *true opinion coupled with definition* (λόγος προσγγυόμενος)." This of course represents the view of Plato and not of Socrates, for (3) is very nearly what Socrates would have called knowledge. Without any direct allusion to his theory of ideas, Plato shows in this dialogue that no definition of knowledge is logically possible unless the definition itself contains the term defined. To

define true opinion we must distinguish, and to distinguish we must have already a true opinion of the characteristic differences between one notion and another. Plato's way out of the difficulty, which closes in on all sides and seems to leave no avenue of escape, is a recourse to his theory of ideas, and for a statement of this theory we have to go to his other dialogues. He did not reject Socrates's definitions, but rather erected them into a symmetrically organized scheme of thought, of reality. These ideas are the realities dimly suggested by the world around us; but neither they nor anything else would ever be suggested to us or known by us if we had not lived in another and a better world where these ideas exist. We know things in this world because, before coming here, we have seen

In the *SOPHIST*, the *POLITICUS*, and the *PARMENIDES*, we have 45 works more or less obviously connected with the *Theaetetus*. These are the dialectical dialogues, so called because they are devoted to a connected account of dialectic. At the same time they contain a searching criticism of Heraclitus and of the Eleatics. One characteristic of the three works last named is that in them¹ it is not Socrates who leads the discussion.

As soon as Plato returned to his native land he gathered pupils 46 about him in the Academy, a suburban gymnasium close to his own house and garden. Here he taught with but few interruptions throughout the remaining forty years of his life. About the matter or manner of his teaching in the Academy we know nothing, unless we find it in those of his writings which were written while he was engaged in teaching.

There are weighty reasons for surmising that the *PHAEDRUS* was 47 written at the beginning of this period,² and accordingly it is prefaced, appropriately enough, by a graceful sketch of the scenery near Athens. Here dialectic is treated as something more than the science of that which really is (ideas); it is that and also the genuine art of putting things or oratory, and as such it is as far superior to ordinary rhetoric as reality is to sham or instruction to persuasion. Both teaching and learning are based upon the history of the human soul, and consist in a revival of memories (*ἀνάμνησις*) which are stored away in every soul while it is yet living in the divine world of ideas and before it comes to dwell on earth in a mortal frame. The relation of teacher and learner is spoken of as under the control of the pure and heaven-sent passion of love. The two become as one in order to bring forth knowledge from

those original shapes of which things here are poor copies. Dialectic is the means of education and the perfected activity of thought by which we learn to neglect the bad copies and fix our minds upon the originals, which are in heaven. There they are all in their right place, and there goodness and truth shine upon them, enabling us to see them aright.

¹ Lately there has been a revival of the doubt as to whether Plato wrote these three dialogues.

² Schleiermacher considers the *Phaedrus* as Plato's maiden discourse; with this view other writers of eminence either wholly agree, or at least place it among Plato's earliest works.

the learner's soul. The SYMPOSIUM (*συμπόσιον*, *banquet*) and the PHAEDO like the Phaedrus are masterpieces of style and may be called companion pictures: the Symposium represents the philosopher in his moments of conviviality; the Phaedo portrays him face to face with death. The PHILEBUS contains an inquiry into the idea of the good and is not so conspicuous for the charm of its style, since it deals with most abstruse ethical and dialectical (metaphysical) points. In the course of the dialogue a great deal is said of the Pythagorean philosophy as stated by Philolaus.¹

- 43 In the Philebus, more than in any of his previous works, Plato strives to throw the light of philosophy upon the facts of life, and this he does to a still greater extent in those of his works which usually are considered his latest: the REPUBLIC (*πολιτεία*), the TIMAEUS and the CRITIAS, all three of which are closely connected, and the LAWS. These discourses, because they are attempts to mould facts into harmony with ideal principles, to construct the world as it should be, are called his constructive works. The most celebrated of these, and indeed the most admirable of all Plato's works, is the Republic. Beginning with the question, "What is justice?" the writer soon develops the fact that justice, belonging as it does to the state as much as to any individual citizen, can most easily be seen in the former, where it is 'write large.' Recognizing three classes of citizens as natural and necessary in the state, he connects them with his tripartite division of the soul.² His class of rulers correspond to the *reason* (*τὸ λογιστικόν*); his class of warriors to the (irascible) *impulsive part* (*τὸ θυμοειδές*); his class of producers to the *appetites* (*τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*). These three classes in combination work out the happiness of the whole state, and it is the happiness of all which determines the teaching and training of each. The rulers follow wisdom (*σοφία*); the warriors, *courage* (*ἀνδρεία*); rulers, warriors, workers in unison

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 3, n. 3.

² This division into three parts is based in the Timaeus upon a division into two parts. The soul has (1) its immortal or rational part, and (2) its irrational or mortal part. This last (2) is subdivided into (a) a noble part

(*θυμός*) and (b) an ignoble part (*ἐπιθυμία*). These three divisions are explained as faculties of the soul by Wildauer, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Psychologie, in the Philosophische Monatschrift, 1873.

follow *self-control* (σωφροσύνη). Justice (δικαιοσύνη), the virtue of virtues, works toward the determining ideal for the sake of which the limbs of the body politic cooperate; and while the collective happiness of all citizens depends on justice, justice is gained by having each of the three classes pursue its characteristic perfection or virtue. This certainly is not the Socratic doctrine of the unity of all virtues, but a modification of it.¹ With this great work are connected the *Timaeus* and the (unfinished) *Critias*. The *Timaeus* describes the universe as an organic and rational creation, just as the state is described in the *Republic*. The *Critias* represents the ideal state as having existed in Attica before the deluge. There is also the story of their wars with the Atlantids. The dates and the facts thus given are of course purely mythical, and purport to be derived from foreign traditions. In what relation the twelve books of Plato's *Laws* stand to the ten books of the *Republic* is a question still under discussion, as is also the question whether Plato himself put the finishing touches upon his *Laws* as they have come down to us. Whether he wrote it as it actually stands or not, the work, in spite of the many eccentric views and odd turns of speech which it contains, is broadly conceived and of very great interest.

The general drift of these last works prepares us for Plato's last 49 two visits to Sicily, where the younger Dionysius showed such promise both intellectual and moral that Plato hoped with his help to realize his new theories of government and of education. At the instance of Dio he accepted an invitation from the younger Dionysius, and again went to Syracuse in spite of the harsh treatment which had so precipitately terminated his former sojourn in that city. The too irascible elder Dionysius had died Ol. 103, 1 = 368-7 B.C. On his arrival Plato carried everything before him and it became the court fashion to imitate young Dionysius's enthusiasm for the new philosophy; but back-stairs intrigues soon turned the tables upon the reformer. His friend Dio was incau-

¹ Socrates said that wisdom was virtue. Plato said (1) wisdom acquired and exercised for the whole state is the ruler's virtue, (2) wisdom

in boldly executing the ruler's commands is the warrior's virtue, (3) wisdom in obedient service to his betters is the workman's virtue.

tious, and his indiscretion was promptly punished with banishment by the same clique of flattering courtiers which soon after brought about, against the wishes of Dionysius, the dismissal of Plato. But the repentant king again urged Plato to come back, promising that Dio should be recalled. The Pythagorean circle at Tarentum urged acceptance, and finally, still hoping to carry his pet theories into effect at Syracuse,¹ Plato made his third visit to Syracuse. It was not long, however, before all the influence of Archytas was required to get our philosopher back to Athens alive. How little Plato's high hopes of the younger Dionysius were realized, is but too plain from the character of that tyrant as afterwards exhibited.

50 The remainder of Plato's life was engrossed by teaching and writing. Of his pupils many were from foreign parts, and among his numerous Athenian hearers there were not a few marked men, statesmen and generals such as Chabrias Timotheus and Phocion, orators such as Lycurgus and Demosthenes. Though hard to prove, it is easy to believe that Demosthenes's keenness and irresistible readiness in argument was stimulated and perfected by a training in the dialectic of Plato. Plato lived to a green old age,² and death finally surprised him in the full possession of all his faculties when upwards of eighty (Ol. 108, 1 = 348-7 B.C.). The vigor of his mind at the time is brought home to us by the tale that after death they found under his pillow a draft of the opening passage of the Republic, which he had covered with erasures and corrections. Pausanias, who made his 'grand tour' in the second century after Christ, saw the tomb of Plato in the Ceramicus (Κεραμεικός), not far from the Academy. The post left vacant by Plato, the charge of his school which became known as the older Academy, was undertaken by Speusippus, a son

¹ Cf. Laws iv., p. 709e *sqq.* This passage irresistibly suggests the general condition of things which Plato, on the occasion of his last two journeys, expected to find at Syracuse, and indeed largely what he actually did find.

² Seneca is probably repeating an 'idle tale' when he says that Plato

died on his birthday, just as he had completed his eighty-first year. A similarly unauthenticated tale is repeated by Cicero, who says (Cato major 5. 13): "uno et octogesimo anno scribens est mortuus." Perhaps his word "scribens" is simply a version of the story of the tablet discovered under the philosopher's pillow.

of Plato's sister. The Chalcedonian Xenocrates succeeded Speusippus.

We may well call it a lucky chance that has preserved for us all 51 of Plato's works.¹ They are an exhaustless treasurehouse filled to overflowing with thoughts which have been the inspiration and the delight of successive generations of men, for they appeal alike to the philosopher and to the poet; to the former by the fulness of their wisdom, to the latter by the beauty of their style. Plato chose the form of question and answer, and in presenting philosophical truth dramatised the process by which such truth is reached. Once chosen, that form became, in the hands of so great a master both of thought and of style, something new under the sun, and took its place among the other exemplars of literary art created by the Greeks as the Greek method of presenting philosophy. The various forms in which previous philosophical speculations had appeared were but the imperfect statements of unperfected theories. The one thing which these forms perfectly represented was the lack of completeness which characterized the early systems of philosophy.² Socrates brought down Philosophy from the clouds of heaven to the needs of life upon earth,³ and, the uncompromising ordeal of his cross-questioning once passed, her worth and strength became manifest. Then at last, transfigured as it were by Plato's genius, she appeared in all the beauty of a form of literature quite worthy of her message. This is the moment which at the opening of this sketch was anticipated. In Plato's dialogues

¹ Besides the works already enumerated and the *Apology* and *Crito*, there are quite a number of others. Some of these Plato has been supposed not to have written. Those whose authenticity has been questioned connect themselves with the Protagoras; they are: the *Ion*, *Hippias Maior* and *Minor*, the first and second *Alcibiades*, *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Laches* *Euthyphro*. Then there are dialogues connected with the so-called dialectical discourses: the *Meno*, the *Euthydemus*, the *Cratylus*. The *Menexenus*

remains, and the only dialogues with which it can be in any way compared are the *Apology* and the *Phaedrus*. Of course no mention is here made of such other short discourses as have been falsely attributed to Plato but are now admitted by all to be spurious.

² The best account of the comparative inefficiency of these early philosophers is Plato's own. Cf. the passage from the *Sophist* quoted *supra*, p. 10, note 1.

³ Cicero, *Tusc.* v. 4, 10, and *Academ.* i. 4, 15.

the central purpose and the crowning result is to stimulate in every reader a self-reliant vigor of understanding which shall grapple boldly with the self-imposed task of seeking after the fundamental idea, and achieve in the end a clear insight into the whole subject discussed. Without this effort of mind no man can ever emerge from darkness into light. That Plato did not overestimate the value of his own or of any writings is clearly shown in the Phaedrus. The views there expounded probably influenced him to choose the dialogue-form, which is a reproduction, a mirror, as it were, of the words of living truth spoken by the living teacher. That he did not however underestimate the value of philosophical writing he shows rather in deed than in word. For how, otherwise, can we account for the long series of writings produced by him from the age of thirty until the time of his death, — a period of fifty years? By writing he increased the number of those who felt his influence, and this he might well seek to do while still believing that, compared with the spoken word, the written word was dead.

- 52 The many resources of Plato's artistic imagination are apparent in the varied settings of his dialogues. The simplest form (1) has no introduction or preamble, but is a dialogue, with occasional interruptions from interested bystanders, in which one of the parts is taken throughout by the same speaker, usually Socrates, while the other may be successively assumed by various persons. Instances of this form of dialogue are the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, which best exemplify the dramatic power of Plato even in this simplest form of dialogue. More intricately dramatic and effective are the narrated dialogues, to which the second and third classes belong. These are (2) without preface and with no account of the persons to whom the narration or reading, as the case may be, is made, — *e.g.*, the Republic; or (3) introduced by a short dialogue between the narrator and his friends, who soon become his attentive listeners. In (3) sometimes, though rarely, the narrated dialogue is momentarily interrupted before the close, and at the close a few words are commonly exchanged between the narrator and his auditors. Dialogues of this kind are the Symposium and the Phaedo. Just as these various forms are used accord-

ing to the demands of the subject discussed or the artistic plan of the author, so in certain of Plato's later writings, in fact very commonly where very abstruse points are considered, the dramatic form is subordinated and all but disappears.

Something must now be said of the two works before us. They 53 are both of them closely connected with the trial and death-sentence of Socrates. Of the two the first is

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

If we heeded our first impressions on reading the Apology, we should pronounce it a report of what Socrates actually said in court, since it is given as a speech made by Socrates and we feel convinced that Socrates would naturally have made just such a speech. But there is nothing in this fact alone that necessarily bears such a construction, for Plato's dialogues are all of them conversations more or less fictitious, and yet are represented as carried on in the most life-like manner by historical personages. To reach any trustworthy conclusion as to the historic accuracy of the Apology would require more information than that supplied by Plato himself, and yet Plato is the only witness whom we can trust.¹ We have, therefore, to depend chiefly upon internal evidence.² There is no doubt that, not Plato only, but any disciple and friend of Socrates who had been present on such a momentous occasion would have been more than eager to spare no pains in accurately reproducing the words of his master,—of the father of his soul's new-birth. He would have left no stone unturned in striving to reach and to write, 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

¹ We are not warranted in pinning our faith to Xenophon's (?) *Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους*, a production whose origin and value are equally doubtful. Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, on the other hand, is inadequate for our purpose.

² Schleiermacher and Zeller uphold the accuracy of Plato's report. The former argues that the speech suits

all the circumstances too well to allow of its not being an exact report, while the latter strives to deal with the arguments used to prove his untrustworthiness. Ueberweg lately has taken this same point of view with great decision. In the admirable introduction of Steinhart is to be found the best presentation of the opposite view.

truth,' that it might live as a monument of the great man's moral and intellectual worth forever. And individually Plato must have regarded such an undertaking as his opportunity to appeal to the supreme court of intelligent and unprejudiced mankind from the death-sentence pronounced by an unjust court upon the incomparable master. In such an enterprise Plato's memory would undoubtedly do good service. Yet it is hard to see how a mind like his, distinguished rather for its devotion to speculative truth and for its obedience to the laws of artistic and poetical symmetry than for its submission to the inelastic canons of history, could, even in such a case as this, have endured the straight-jacket of stenographic accuracy. Plato doubtless heard with attentive ears and held with retentive memory all that was spoken before the court by the man he loved best. And indeed no hand was better trained than his in presenting faithfully the peculiar conversational genius of Socrates. But for all that, and by means of it all, he has gained and used the second sight of a sympathetic and creative imagination; he has given us more than the actual defence of Socrates in court. In Plato's *Apology*, Socrates on trial for his life stands before us in clear outline, sharply contrasted with any typical presentation of the drift of contemporary public opinion; for public opinion, so far as it opposed him and his ways, is personified by his named and unnamed accusers.¹ He is condemned in court, but before the tribunal of the eternal fitness of things he and his life-work stand acquitted.

54 However, we have no right to assume that this could not all be accomplished without unduly sacrificing historical accuracy. The nobler, the more appropriate we suppose Socrates's actual words to have been,—and no one will incline to say they were not appropriate and noble,—the less would Plato feel called upon to depart from a simple report of what he had actually heard. In the absence of anything like convincing proofs of the contrary, it is reasonable, with due allowance for Plato's artistic bent and after taking into consideration the circumstances under which he wrote, to conclude that his *Apology* of Socrates resembled very closely

¹ *Cf.* *Apology*, p. 18 a b *sqq.*

the speech actually made in court by Socrates. The circumstances under which Plato wrote lead however to the following qualification of this statement of substantial identity. Any speech reported in writing necessarily differs from the speech as originally made, and no orator even can write down from memory the words he has used, — as for Socrates he spoke on the spur of the moment without previous notes or preparation of any kind.¹ Plato heard him just as Thucydides heard Pericles, and as Thucydides, with the most earnest desire to reproduce as a part of history Pericles's speeches,² could not avoid making them by his manner of statement to some extent his own, so it was with Plato and the speech of Socrates. He could not, in spite of the accuracy which he observed in reproducing the situation at the trial and the words to which he had so attentively listened, avoid giving the Apology of Socrates in a way which makes it a work of his own, though at the same time it is the genuine defence of Socrates.³ The success with which Plato brings before us the living persons concerned in Socrates's trial is the best proof that he allowed himself a certain freedom of expression in presenting the matter and manner of Socrates himself. Among Plato's many works distinguished for vividness of dramatic characterization, the Apology is one of the most noteworthy. In the Apology we have the most life-like of Plato's many portraits of Socrates.

We find many inequalities in the speech of the Apology, and 55

¹ Cf. Apology, p. 17 c. Those unconvinced by the genuine ring of this passage may still doubt. We know Socrates chiefly from Plato, hence discussions of Plato's trustworthiness are apt to beg the question.

² For the best account of this whole matter, cf. Professor R. C. Jebb's article on the speeches of Thucydides, published in a volume of Oxford Essays called *Hellenica*, edited by E. Abbott, Rivingtons, 1871.

³ There is an important difference between the relation of Thucydides to Pericles and that of Plato to Socrates.

The intimacy of ten years' standing between the two latter made their case one of ideal friendship, where, at least in intellectual matters, what belonged to Socrates was Plato's, and *vice versa*. Therefore Plato, if he made the defence of Socrates characteristically his own, could be sure that it was also and for that reason characteristically Socrates's. Was not Plato, therefore, better prepared to deal with Socrates, the friend of his youth, than was Thucydides to deal with Pericles, who certainly was not one of his intimates?

indeed a tendency here and there to repetition and circumlocution.¹ This is not only characteristic of Socrates in general, but particularly characteristic of him or of any one when speaking off-hand. Equally characteristic of Socrates is the cross-examination² and the frequent recourse which is had to the dialogue form;³ for Socrates undoubtedly went as far in this direction as the rules of Athenian pleading would allow.

56 No matter whether we take the speech as a verbal report or as, in the main, an invention of Plato, if we once admit that its aim was to vindicate Socrates before the whole world no less than to influence the particular men who were his judges, it is easy to understand the line of defence taken in the Apology. The counts in the indictment against him are summarily dealt with, for Socrates is chiefly anxious to show that the sole cause of his accusation is the wide-spread prejudice against him. This prejudice he grapples with, and seeks by analyzing to remove it, appealing in justification of all that he had habitually said and done to his commission from God. The careless way in which he quotes⁴ the terms of the indictment, — he reverses the order of the counts against him and deals with them in that order, — would prove the speaker's indifference to the opinion of his judges, if such laxities were not known to be very common in the Athenian courts. Far more important, therefore, or rather all important, is the fact that he does not meet the accusation of disbelief in the gods of Athens. We have seen that nothing would have been easier than a triumphant refutation of this charge; yet the matter is passed over, and Socrates prefers to merge the narrower question in a consideration of the more sweeping charge of downright atheism, of disbelief in all gods. Evidently Socrates cared little for winning his case, but much for the opportunity afforded him to enlighten his fellow-citizens as to the wider and deeper import of the point at issue. The device by which the terms of the accusation to be met were enlarged⁵ was one sanctioned by the traditional procedure in

¹ Cf. Apol., p. 26 b *ad fin.* and c, also p. 28 e *sqq.*

² Cf. Apol., pp. 24 d-27 e.

³ Cf. Apol., p. 20 a-c; p. 29 c at the end *sqq.* and elsewhere.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, § 31.

⁵ Cf. Apol., p. 26 b *sqq.*

courts¹ at Athens. Under cross-examination on the meaning of his bill of indictment, the accuser himself gave to Socrates the wider interpretation best suited for the answer with which it was to be met.

The manner in which Socrates talks of death and of the here-⁵⁷ after is very striking. There is more than a conviction that compared with wickedness death is no evil, for that conviction is made the firmer by the comforting hope that death is but the door which leads to everlasting life and happiness. If this be considered not Plato's addition but Socrates's literal statement, then the moral steadfastness and the joy with which Socrates hailed death's deliverance was the best re-enforcement for Plato's own doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which is stated in the *Phaedo* and elsewhere.

The closing words on immortality play an important part in ⁵³ the tragic development of the situation; for the first part and the verdict of guilty which succeeds it awaken a sense of cruel injustice, which, by the second part and the ensuing sentence of death, is soon brought to a second climax but is finally mitigated by the closing words of Socrates. This third part bears we may say to the two parts that precede it a relation similar to that borne by the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus to the preceding plays of the *Oresteian* trilogy, and solves a tragic situation by merging a narrowed view of justice in a broader one by which it is superseded.

The first of these three subdivisions, which is the defence ⁵⁹ proper, is complete in itself. Though all the laws of oratorical art are here carefully observed, the usual practices of oratory are sharply criticised. The five natural heads of the argument certainly are unmistakable, since, by carefully following the connection of thought, we can easily mark the words in which the speaker dismisses one point and takes up another.

¹ Cf. *infra*, § 71, note 2.

ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST PART, OR THE DEFENCE PROPER,

CC. I-XXIV.

- (a) c. i. **Introduction** (προόμιον, *exordium*)
 = { *principium*.
 { *insinuatio* (ἐφοδος).
- (b) c. ii. **Statement** (πρόθεσις, *propositio*) of the case and of the
 plan in the plea.
- (c) cc. iii-xv. **Refutation** (λύσις, *confutatio*)
 = { of former accusers, cc. iii-x.
 { of Meletus, cc. xi-xv.
- (d) cc. xvi-xxii. **Digression** (παρέκβασις, *digressio*) on Socrates's life.
- (e) cc. xx'ii, xxiv. **Peroration** (ἐπιλογος, *peroratio*). This is an attack
 upon the usual form of peroration, and ends with
 a confession of trust in God.

An introduction (a) is always intended to prepare the hearers for listening to the speaker's plea. This is especially hard in the face of prejudice against the speaker's person or against his case. The rules of speech-writing here prescribe recourse to *insinuation* ἐφοδος, a subtle process by which the speaker wins over the sympathies of his audience. He may do this (1) by attacking his opponent, (2) by conciliating his audience, (3) by strongly stating his personal hardship in the case, or (4) by putting concisely the difficulties involved in dealing with the facts. After the introduction follows (b) the statement πρόθεσις. This is commonly a plain unvarnished tale covering the matters of fact involved. If such an account be unnecessary the statement sets forth simply the plan of the plea. This plan is not unfrequently accompanied by a *subdivision* (*partitio*), which is sometimes simply a *summary of heads* (*enumeratio*),¹ and sometimes a *detailed account of topics* (*expositio*).² Here, again, Socrates's defence follows the rules of oratory. Next comes the most important part, the proof (πίστις, *probatio*), represented by (c) the refutation which naturally falls, as indicated above, under two heads. In the manner

¹ Rhet. ad Herenn. I. 10, 17: Enumerationem utemur, cum dicemus numero, quot de rebus dicturi simus.

² *Ibid.* Expositio est, cum res, quibus de rebus dicturi sumus, exponimus breviter et absolute.

of refutation here given, the genuine Socrates is in his element, and here he is pictured to the life. After proof or refutation, as the case may be, comes, in the programme of oratorical orthodoxy, (d) a digression. This was the orator's opportunity to try his wings. The theme chosen in a digression needed no more than an indirect bearing upon the argument of the case, and the ornamental part which the digression often played has led to the use of another term for it, *i.e.* *exornatio* or *embellishment*.¹ This, too, can be found in Socrates's speech, and so perfect is its beauty that the laws of school-oratory are more than satisfied. Yet, embellishment though it be called, this part of the speech has nothing that is far-fetched or beside the point; in the Apology it is the complement of the preceding negative refutation, its positive and required *reinforcement* (*confirmatio*). The transition to (e) the peroration is plainly marked. At this point the orator, and more than ever if he were on trial for his life, made a desperate appeal to the feelings of his hearers. No means of moving the judges were left untried. Recourse to such methods Socrates condemned as equally dishonest and dishonorable.² This part of

¹ Rhet. ad Herenn. II. 29, 46: Exornatio constat ex similibus et exemplis et rebus iudicatis et amplificatiombus et ceteris rebus quae pertinent ad exaugendam et collocupletandam argumentationem.

² Cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 4: "ὁδὲν ἠθέλησε τῶν εἰωθῶτων ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ποιῆσαι, he lent himself to none of the violations of law which were customarily committed in courts." It appears that there was no special law forbidding in so many words an oratorical appeal to the emotions of the judges in the ordinary courts. This is confirmed, indeed, by Aristotle in his Rhetoric (I. 1, a passage particularly important in connection with the Apology). There Aristotle first criticizes various rhetorical practices, and then proceeds to say: "prejudice, pity, anger, and all such emotions of

the soul have nothing to do with facts, but affect only the judge himself. Hence, if all legal proceedings were regulated as in certain states distinguished for particularly good laws, these emotions would play no part whatever. Indeed, all agree on this point, some urging that the law should prescribe this course, while others enforce the principle, and rule out any plea which is off the point. This is the rule of procedure before the Areopagus, and a very good rule it is. A judge should certainly never have his mind warped by the influence of anger, of jealousy, or of pity brought to bear upon him. To have recourse to these is exactly the same as for a carpenter to give a twist to his rule before using it." To the procedure of the Areopagus we may perhaps apply Quintilian's words (VI. 1, 7): "Athe-

the Apology is an attack upon the ordinary practice of pleaders in court. Not unmanly subserviency to men, but manly submission to God's will are heard in the closing words of this defence.

60 Such was the temper of the Apology written for Socrates by Plato, and as such, whether intentionally or unintentionally, it must have been in striking contrast with the drift of the plea which Lysias is said to have elaborated for the same case.¹ The tradition that Plato undertook to plead in the capacity of Socrates's *advocate* (*συνήγορος*) but was not allowed to do so rests on very slight authority. It is therefore ridiculous to suggest that this plea, which Plato did not prepare, was the first outline afterwards worked up in the Apology.

61 The second and third parts, which come respectively after the first and the second verdict, can hardly be expected to answer all the requirements of a set speech. And yet these are symmetrically arranged, and their topics skilfully set before us. The second part naturally opens with an allusion to the verdict of 'guilty' just rendered; any regular peroration would have been out of place before the third, which is the suitable conclusion both for the first part and the second. And where, indeed, is there a more eloquent and nobly impressive ending than this? That part of it addressed to the judges who voted for Socrates's acquittal is certainly made most prominent and very appropriately so. For these judges, they who alone are worthy of that title, are his chosen friends; to their kindred souls he confides the unspeakable hopes of happiness after death that are stirring within him, and invites them to be of good cheer and not to fear death. In so doing, even while death stares him in the face, he does not blench, but obeys his captain and works as the servant of God.

62 Closely connected with the Apology is the dialogue called the

CRITO.

This dialogue belongs to the first class² of Plato's dialogues; it is a conversation pure and simple, neither narrated nor read to an

nis affectus movere etiam per praeconem prohibebatur orator."

¹ *Cf. supra*, § 34 and note.

² *Cf. supra*, § 52.

audience introduced at the beginning. There are two speakers only, Socrates and Crito. Their close friendship has been mentioned in the Apology (p. 33 d). This intimacy was unbroken, and though Crito was much absorbed by the care of his extensive property, yet, in all the fortunes of Socrates's life, Crito had been his firm friend. And now that a sentence which he could not but regard as unjust had been pronounced upon his friend, Crito rebelled against its execution and against the shame of seeing Socrates die a criminal's death. To prevent this he was willing to risk his fortune and his civil rights. The lucky combination of circumstances which furthered the plans made for this end has already been explained.¹ Apparently, nothing prevented Socrates's escape from prison but Socrates. At this juncture Socrates stands before us as the ideally loyal citizen. Though opposed to the principles of the democracy at Athens, he submits without reservation to its laws and exhorts all others to do the like. This, he declares, is the first and the most imperative duty of every citizen. Such is the historical groundwork of the dialogue. The dramatic picture given of this situation admits of the application of various terms used to designate the development of the plot in a Greek tragedy.

ANALYSIS OF THE CRITO.

63

- (a) cc. I, II. **Prologue** (πρόλογος); the *characters* and their *mental situation* (ἡθός τε καὶ πάθος).
- (b) cc. III-X. **Entanglement** (δέσις or πλοκή) of the logical situation.
1. c. iii. The threats of the multitude.
 2. c. iv. The prayers of friends.
 3. c. v. The jeers of enemies.
1. cc. vi, vii. The threats are many but duty is one.
 2. c. viii. Nothing should warp our idea of duty.
 3. cc. ix, x. It is wrong to run away from prison, and wrong should not be done, even in retaliation.

¹ Cf. *supra*, § 36 and note.

- (c) cc. xi-xv. **Clearing up** (λύσις).¹ The laws of Athens require his submission and his death.
1. cc. xi, xii. Socrates owes them life liberty and happiness.
 2. cc. xiii, xiv. They require and he has promised obedience.
 3. c. xv. He will gain nothing by disobedience.
- (d) cc. xvi, xvii. **Epilogue** (ἐπιλογος). There are laws in Hades which can reach him who disobeys law upon earth.

64 Like the Apology, this work bears memorable witness to the nobility of Plato's mind, and it reveals especially his lofty patriotism. As for Socrates, we see in both these works that not words only but deeds prove him a more law-abiding citizen than scores of men whose spurious good-citizenship is well portrayed on many pages of the Crito (*e.g.* p. 45 c). The very laws of the land, as well as the example of Socrates submitting to his unjust sentence of death, declare in no uncertain tones to every Athenian what true patriotism is and how it is preserved.

65 The Crito is by no means simply the chronicle of a conversation actually held; though it is based upon facts, it must still be recognized as Plato's work. This is proved by the finished skill both of plan and execution displayed in this dialogue, short and simple though it is. Moreover, in the Crito we see that Plato has made a step forward in his notion of duty. For here is the earliest statement of Plato's 'golden rule': Injustice always is wrong; it is wrong to retaliate injustice by injustice.² In the Gorgias (see *supra*, § 40) this rule is applied more universally and put upon its rational basis. Indeed, from a philosophical point of view we may regard the Crito and the Apology as a suitable preface to the Gorgias, if we do not forget that both are primarily pictures of the one great master whom Plato in all his works most delighted to honor.

¹ For most of the details of the analysis given above Cron is not responsible, though it is substituted for his § 63, where there is a less

detailed analysis of the dialogue on the same principle.

² See on *ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται*, Crito, p. 49 b.

APPENDIX

ON ATHENIAN COURTS OF LAW.¹

Six thousand Athenian citizens were entrusted with the power 66 to decide law-suits. Choice was made by lot every year of six hundred men from each of the ten tribes (φυλαί), and any citizen over thirty years of age was eligible. Every one thus chosen was liable, after taking the prescribed oath² of office, to be called upon to act as a δικαστής; δικασταί, *jurymen*,³ was the official name⁴ by

¹ The chief authority is Meier and Schömann, *Der Attische Process*, Calvary (Berlin, 1884). See also K. Fr. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der griechischen Staatsalterthümer*, and G. F. Schömann, *Griechische Alterthümer*, 2 volumes, of which the first has been translated into English, and published under the title *Antiquities of Greece* by Rivingtons (London, 1880).

² The oath, which is cited in the speech of Demosthenes against Timocrates (149–151), is of doubtful authenticity. Schömann and Lipsius (p. 153, note 17), by omissions and bracketed additions change the formula there given into the following, which, excepting the last bracketed clause, — a conjecture of Fränkel's, — is not far from the real form: ψηφιοῦμαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων, [περὶ ὧν δ' ἂν νόμοι μὴ ᾖσι, γνώμη τῇ δικαιοσάτῃ καὶ οὔτε χάριτος ἔνεκα οὐτ' ἔχθρας], . . . καὶ ἀκροάσομαι τοῦ τε κατηγοροῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀπολογομένου ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ψηφιοῦμαι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὃν ἂν ᾖ ἢ διώξις, [καὶ εὐορκοῦντι μέν μοι εἴη πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ, ἐπιορκοῦντι δὲ ἐξῶλεια αὐτῷ τε καὶ γένει], *I will vote in accordance with the laws and enactments of the Athenian people and of the Senate*

of Five Hundred, [and where there is no law, in accordance with my best knowledge of what is just, unmoved alike by favor and by enmity], . . . and I will give impartial hearing both to the accuser and to the defendant, and vote on the question at issue in the suit. [If I keep this oath let blessings be my portion; if I break it let ruin seize on me and all my kindred.] See on δῶμοκεν κτέ., Apol., p. 35 c.

³ The use, in other connexions, of δικαστής with the meaning of *judge* leads many to translate δικασταί *judges* and not *jurymen*. Neither of these words is satisfactory, but to describe a body of citizens without any technical knowledge of the law as judges is certainly more misleading from a modern point of view than to call them jurymen. It must be remembered, however, that the presiding magistrate did not perform the duties of a modern judge in any important respect, so that the δικασταί had the substantial powers both of judge and jury in all cases brought before them.

⁴ The customary form in addressing them was δῖ ἄνδρες δικασταί, but this could be varied. We have sometimes δῖ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, sometimes δῖ ἄνδρες, and once and again δῖ Ἀθηναῖοι. Cf. Apol., pp. 17 a, 22 e, 26 d, 30 b.

which they were addressed. These six thousand were divided into a reserve of one thousand, to be used as substitutes etc., and a main body of five thousand for regular service. A subdivision of the five thousand was then made into ten *courts*, of five hundred each, called **δικαστήρια**, for, like the English word court, **δικαστήριον** may mean a judicial body as well as the place where such a body sits in judgment. Sometimes a court was composed of less than five hundred jurymen, *e.g.* of two or four hundred; sometimes we find two or more courts of five hundred sitting as one, but it is doubtful whether the whole six thousand ever sat as one court. The even numbers, 200, 500, 1000, etc., were habitually increased by one, and for that purpose a **δικαστής** was drawn from the 1000 supernumeraries. This precaution was taken to avoid a tie vote.

On days appointed for holding court each of the subdivisions above mentioned was assigned by lot to one of the places used as court-rooms, and there tried the suit appointed for that time and place. Each jurymen received as the badge of his office a staff (**βακτηρία**) corresponding in color to a sign over the door of his court. He also received a ticket (**σύμβολον**), by showing which he secured his fee after his day's service. *Cf.* Dem. *De Cor.* 210. A fee of one obol (about three cents) for every day's session was introduced by Pericles, and afterwards trebled by Cleon.

67 Almost all cases except those of homicide were tried in these Heliastic courts, and the jurymen were called also **ηλιασταί** from the name **ηλιαία**, given to the largest court-room in Athens. The most general term to designate a law-suit is **δικη**, though the same word also has the narrower meaning of a private suit. According as the complaint preferred involves the rights of individuals or of the whole state, **δίκαι** in the wider sense were subdivided into (1) **δίκαι** in the narrower sense, *private suits*, and (2) **γραφαί**, *public suits*. Since the state was the real plaintiff in public suits, any fine which in such suits might be imposed upon the defendant went to the state; accordingly in public suits, the accuser, as a rule, was entitled to no part of the penalty.

68 In the ordinary course of procedure, every plaintiff was required to present his indictment (**γραφή**), or complaint (**λήξις**), in writing to the particular magistrate whose department included the matters

involved. Most suits thus came before the *nine* archons, commonly before one of the first *three* or before all of the remaining *six*. The first archon, — called *ὁ ἄρχων par excellence*, — dealt especially with charges involving family rights and inheritance; the second archon, called *βασιλεύς*, with those involving the regulations and requirements of religion and public worship; the third archon, called *πολέμαρχος*, dealt with most cases involving foreign-residents (*μέτοικοι*) and foreigners; the remaining six, — called the *Thesmothetae*, — dealt with almost all cases not especially assigned to the first three. There were, however, cases which were disposed of by other magistrates, or otherwise especially provided for.

The accusation had to be made in the presence of the accused, 69 who had previously been served with due notice to appear. Legal notice required the presence of two *witnesses to the summons* (*κλητήρες*). If the magistrate allowed proceedings in the case, the terms of accusation were copied and posted in some public place, and at the time of this publication a day was fixed, upon which both parties were bound to appear before the magistrate for the *preliminary investigation* (*ἀνάκρισις*). There the plaintiff's charges and the defendant's answer,¹ both of them already written down and handed in, were reaffirmed under oath, and both parties submitted to the magistrate such evidence as they intended to use. The reaffirmation or *confirmation under oath* was called *διωμοσία*, sometimes *ἀνωμοσία*.² The evidence submitted consisted in citations from the laws, documentary evidence of various kinds, the depositions of witnesses, and particularly any testimony given under torture (*βάσανος*) by slaves, which had been taken and written down in the presence of witnesses. The magistrate fixed his official seal

¹ Cf. (Dem. xlv. 46) the written charge (*λῆξις*) in a private suit: Ἀπολλόδωρος Πασίωνος Ἀχαρνέως Στεφάνῳ Μενεκλέους Ἀχαρνεὶ ψευδομαρτυριῶν, τίμημα τάλαντον. τὰ ψευδῆ μου κατεμαρτύρησε Στέφανος μαρτυρήσας τὰ ἐν τῷ γραμματείῳ γεγραμμένα, *Apollodorus the Acharnian, son of Pasion, accuses Stephanus the Acharnian, son of Meneceles, for giving false testimony; the damages named are fixed at one talent. Stephanus*

testified falsely against me in the statements recorded in the evidence submitted. The answer is: Στέφανος Μενεκλέους Ἀχαρνέως τῆλθθῆ ἔμαρτύρησα μαρτυρήσας τὰ ἐν τῷ γραμματείῳ γεγραμμένα, the testimony which I . . . gave is true as recorded in the evidence submitted.

² *διωμοσία* refers strictly to the double oath of the two parties; *ἀνωμοσία* to the defendant's oath. But both are used for each singly.

upon all the documents thus submitted, and took charge of them against the day when the case was to be tried.

70 On the day (ἡ κυρία) when a court was to sit upon any case, the magistrate who had presided over the preliminary investigation proceeded to the appointed court-room, where he met the δικασταὶ assigned by lot (ἐπικεκληρωμένοι) to the case. Both parties to the suit, having been previously notified, were required to put in an appearance. Proceedings in court were opened by some religious ceremony; then the clerk (γραμματεὺς) read aloud the written accusation and the reply, and finally the parties to the suit were successively called forward to state their case. This was the opening of the case (εἰσαγωγή τῆς δίκης¹) by the magistrate (εἰσαγωγεὺς). Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 860 ff., Antipho, vi. 42.

71 The law required that every man should conduct his own case in person, and hence those who were not themselves skilful pleaders generally recited speeches which had been written for them by others. Still, the law permitted a man to appear in court accompanied by advocates (συνήγοροι), who came as his friends, and therefore were not supposed to be paid for their trouble; not infrequently, after a short speech from the principal, the most important part of his plea was made by one of his advocates. E.g. Demosthenes's speech on the Crown was made as Ctêsipon's advocate. The water-clock (κλέψυδρα, sometimes called simply τὸ ὕδωρ) was used to measure the time allotted to each for pleading before the court. When called for, the written documents offered in evidence were read by the clerk, and meanwhile the clock was stopped. By way of precaution, the witnesses whose depositions were read had to be present in court and acknowledge their testimony. While making his plea a man was protected by law from interruption by his opponent, and the law required his opponent to answer his questions.² The jurymen had a right to interrupt the speaker

¹ To this correspond the words ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης, Crito, p. 45e, just as we find εἰσάγειν used both of τὴν δίκην and of τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας. Correspondingly, we find εἰσέρχεσθαι and εἰσιέναι said both of the suit and of the parties to the suit, meaning sub-

stantially the same thing. Hence the presiding magistrate, ἡγεμὼν τοῦ δικαστηρίου, is also called ὁ εἰσαγωγεὺς.

² According to the terms of the νόμος quoted in Dem. XLVI. 10: τοῖν ἀντιδίκων ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μί,

(1) if in their opinion he was off the point, (2) if they required fuller explanation on any point whatsoever. Of course, there were frequent attempts to prejudice the jurymen instead of enlightening them, and nothing was commoner than to make appeal to their sympathies. It was by no means an unusual occurrence for a defendant to appear in court with his wife and children, or with infirm and helpless parents, and sometimes with friends of great popularity or of high character; he depended upon these to act as his intercessors with the court. Such practices, though manifestly tending to disarm the severity of the law and to defeat the ends of justice for which the court was organized, seem never definitely to have been prohibited in any court except the Areopagus.

When the pleas had been made, the jurymen proceeded without 72 preliminary consultation to decision by a secret vote. In public suits, only one speech was allowed to the plaintiff, and one to the defendant. In private suits, two were allowed to each. The jurors generally voted with bronze balls or discs, either solid (to denote acquittal) or perforated (to denote condemnation). These were called ψήφοι. If the vote was a tie, the case went in favor of the defendant; and, in a public suit, if less than one-fifth of the votes were for the plaintiff, he was fined, and also debarred from ever again acting as plaintiff in a similar suit. This fine was fixed at 1000 drachmas, about \$170. The plaintiff in such a suit also incurred both these penalties if, without good and sufficient excuse, he failed to appear in court, and thus by his own act allowed that his case was bad. If the defendant failed to appear, the case went against him by default (see on ἐρήμην κατηγορούντες, Apol. 18 c), and he was pronounced guilty *in contumaciam*. In most private suits, the plaintiff, under similar circumstances, forfeited one-sixth of the sum which he claimed; this forfeiture was called ἐπωβελία, *one obol for every drachma*.

Suits, both public and private, were divided into (1) ἀγῶνες 73 τιμητοί, in which, if it decided against the defendant, the court had still to determine the degree of punishment to be inflicted

the two parties to the suit are required to answer each what question the other asks, but cannot give testimony as witnesses.
Cf. Apol., p. 25 d.

(τιμῆμα), because no penalty was fixed by law; and (2) ἀγῶνες ἀτιμητοί, in which, after deciding against the defendant, the court had no further decision to make, because the penalty was fixed by law. In cases of the former kind, if they were public suits, — like the γραφή ἀσεβείας brought against Socrates, — the accuser proposed the penalty which he considered adequate,¹ and the accused, if convicted, had the right to make a counter-proposition; then followed the decision of the court.² It is still a moot point whether the judges were confined to a choice between these two propositions or could, if they saw fit, inflict a third penalty midway between the two.

74 The ordinary penalties for crimes against the state were death, banishment, loss of rights of citizenship (ἀτιμία), confiscation of property, and fines. All these are summed up in the formula constantly used at Athens: ὅ τι χρη παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι,³ *what a man must suffer or pay for his offence*. In case the convicted defendant was not an Athenian by birth, he might be sold into slavery, and thus additionally punished by the loss of his freedom.

75 The magistrates who had to oversee the execution of the punishment of death were called the Eleven (οἱ ἕνδεκα). Ten men on this board were chosen by lot every year, one from each of the ten tribes; the eleventh was a scribe, γραμματεὺς. They had general charge of all prisons, and they issued the order requiring their subordinates⁴ to execute the penalty of death.

¹ Cf. *supra*, § 31; also, § 69 and note.

² The technical terms which were used are found in Apol., pp. 36 b, 37 c. It is noticeable that not only τιμᾶσθαι

(sc. ἐαυτῷ) τινός but also ὑποτιμᾶσθαι (Xen. Apol. 23) were used.

³ Cf. Apol., p. 36 b.

⁴ Cf. Phaed., p. 116 b.

I. Ὅ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἑμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμεν· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθές γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα
5 δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρὴ ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἑμοῦ) ἔξαπατη-

17
a I. 1. Ὅ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς· ἐγὼ δέ: not ὑμεῖς μὲν· ἐγὼ δέ because the clauses as wholes, not ὑμεῖς and ἐγὼ, are contrasted.

ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι: instead of the more usual and technical ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, which Socrates reserves for his closing words (40 a to the end) addressed to those who voted for his acquittal. See on ὦ ἄνδρες κτέ., 26 d, and Introd. p. 49, note 4. — πεπόνθατε: have been affected, though act. in form is pass. in meaning, and therefore takes ἐπὶ with the gen.

2. δ' οὖν: introduces an asserted fact, which is contrasted with the preceding statement of uncertainty, but at any rate, Lat. certe. Cf. Xen. An. i. 3. 5, εἰ μὲν δίκαια ποιήσω οὐκ οἶδα, αἰρήσομαι δ' οὖν ὑμᾶς κτέ., whether I shall be doing what is right I do not know, but at any rate I will choose you. Hdt. iii. 80, καὶ ἐλέχθησαν λόγοι ἄπιστοι μὲν ἐνίοισι Ἑλλήνων, ἐλέχθησαν δ' ὧν, and arguments were urged which to some Greeks seem apocryphal, but at any rate they were urged.

καὶ αὐτός: even myself, sc. "How then may not you have been affected!"

3. ὀλίγου: sc. δεῖν, used abs. G. 1534; H. 956 and 743 b. Cf. 22 a. — πιθανῶς, ἀληθές: these words state and contrast the respective aims of rhetoric and of dialectic (philosophy).

4. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: qualifies the sweeping denial in οὐδὲν, hardly anything. G. 1534; H. 956. For an equiv. idiom in Herodotus, cf. Hdt. ii. 15, τὸ Δέλτα ἐστὶ κατάρρυτόν τε καὶ νεωστί, ὡς λόγῳ εἰπεῖν, ἀναπεφνήσ, has only recently, so to speak, come to light.

5. αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν: connect both gens. with ἐν. αὐτῶν, about them, designates the persons who are responsible for the ἐν (cf. below b, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον). τῶν πολλῶν gives the sum of which ἐν is part. See also on τοὺς πολλοὺς in 18 b. — τοῦτο: explaining ἐν and in appos. with it. — ἐν ᾧ: refers to the passage where the statement is made.

6. χρῆ: the original warning was χρῆ εὐλαβεῖσθαι. χρεῖη, but not χρῆν, would be grammatically possible. G. 1487; H. 932. For the use of χρῆν, cf. 33 d, 34 a, and Luch. 181 c. G. 1400; H. 897.



θῆτε ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυρῆναι ὅτι ¹⁷_b
 αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὴν μηδ'
 ὀπωστιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν
 10 ἀναισχυρτότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι
 λέγειν τὸν τάληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν,
 ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε ὅτι κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι
 μὲν γοῦν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν·
 ὑμεῖς δέ μου ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι

¹⁷_b 10. εἰ μὴ ἄρα: *unless perchance*,
 Lat. nisi forte. In order to sug-
 gest that the one safest way out of the
 difficulty is to beg the whole question
 at issue, ἄρα introduces a definition of
 good speaking, and ironically con-
 nects with it the assertion that Soc-
 rates is a good speaker.

11. εἰ μὲν: *if indeed*. This use of
 μὲν, like many others, shows its con-
 nexion with μὴν. The supposition is
 merely restated.

12. οὐ κατὰ τούτους: *but not after
 their pattern*. A parenthetical state-
 ment, which he proceeds to explain
 (see on μόγις, 21 b, and cf. 27 c). The
 explanation begins with οὐ μέντοι and
 ends with the chapter. Pending this
 explanation, these words mean a bet-
 ter or a worse speaker than they, *i.e.*
one not on their level.

13. γοῦν: *at all events*. — ἢ τι ἢ
 οὐδέν: *little or nothing*. Cf. Hdt. iii.

140, ἀναβέβηκε ἢ τις ἢ οὐδεὶς κω
 παρ' ἡμέας αὐτῶν, *hardly a single one of
 them has ever been here*. Xen. Cyr. vii.
 5. 45, τούτων δὲ τῶν περιστηκότων
 ἢ τινα ἢ οὐδένα οἶδα, *now of these by-
 standers I know next to no one at all*.

14. ὑμεῖς δέ μου ἀκούσεσθε: instead
 of ἐμοῦ δ' ἀκούσεσθε. The position of
 ὑμεῖς suggests a contrast with οὗτοι
 μὲν; the sense calls for ἐμοῦ δὲ (ὑμεῖς)
 ἀκούσεσθε. This collocation leaves op-

portunity for bringing out πᾶσαν τὴν ¹⁷_b
 ἀλήθειαν with great prominence. For
 a similar shifting of emphasis, cf.
 Xen. An. iii. 1. 25, καὶ γὰρ δέ, εἰ μὲν
 ὑμεῖς ἐθέλετε ἐξορῶν ἐπὶ ταῦτα, ἐπεσθαι
 ὑμῖν βούλομαι, εἰ δ' ὑμεῖς τάττετέ
 με ἡγεῖσθαι, οὐδὲν προφασίζομαι τὴν
 ἡλικίαν, *now I for one, if you are
 minded to bestir yourselves to accom-
 plish this, am ready to follow your lead;
 if you however appoint me to lead you I
 make no excuse on the score of my age*.
 See App.

15. κεκαλλιετημένους κτέ.: in Crat.
 399 a b Διὶ φίλος is quoted as a ῥῆμα;
 when changed to Διφιλος it becomes
 an ἔνομα. Here ὄνόματα means *words*,
 ῥήματα means *phrases*. In grammar
 ἔνομα means *noun*, ῥῆμα means *verb*.
 The κόσμος τῶν λόγων (*ornatus*)
 means specifically the use of tropes
 and figures of speech. Orators took
 great pains in the choice of single
 words, and in the collocation and
 suitable arrangement of their words
 in phrases. Accordingly, in Symp.
 198 b, Socrates is made to bestow un-
 stinted praise upon Agathon's speech:
 τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ
 ῥημάτων τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐξεπλάγη ἀκούων,
*who would not have been beside himself
 on hearing words and phrases of such
 marvellous beauty?* Then he contrasts
 his own fashion of speaking with Aga-

15 μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, 17
 ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμη-
 μένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῆ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσιν c
 ὀνόμασι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς
 ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήπου πρόποι, ὦ
 20 ἄνδρες, (τῆδε τῆ ἡλικία * ὥσπερ μεираκιῶ πλάττοντι λόγους
 εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιεῖναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνν) ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
 τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων
 ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου δι' ὧνπερ εἰῶθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν

17
 b thon's as follows: ὄρα οὖν εἴ τι καὶ τοιοῦτου λόγου δέει, περὶ Ἐρωτος τὰληθῆ λέγόμενα ἀκούειν, ὀνόμασι δὲ καὶ θέσει ῥημάτων τοιαύτη, ὅποια δὴ ἂν τις τύχῃ ἐπελθοῦσα, consider now whether you feel the need of such a speech as this, of hearing the truth told about love in words and phrases arranged just in the way they suggest themselves (cf. εἰκῆ λεγόμενα). See Introd. 55.

c 17. εἰκῆ, τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσιν ὀνόμασι: the same fact stated under two different but parallel aspects, σχῆμα ἐκ παραλλήλου. See on πάλα κτέ., 18 b; and on καὶ αὐτοὶ κτέ., Crit. 48 d, and for the facts Introd. 34. Also for freq. sneers at the unrefined illustrations and homely vocabulary of Socrates, cf. Gorg. 489 b-491 c. Cf. also Xen. Mem. i. 2. 37, ὁ δὲ Κριτίας, "ἀλλὰ τῶνδὲ τοῖ σε ἀπέχεσθαι" ἔφη "δέήσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκῶν· καὶ γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὺς ἤδη κατατετρίφθαι διαθρυλουμένους ὑπὸ σου."

18. ἃ λέγω: referring to the speech which follows, my plea. — μηδεὶς προσδοκησάτω: for the aor. imv. third pers. in prohibitions, see GMT. 260; G. 1347; H. 874 b.

20. τῆδε τῆ ἡλικία: for a man as old as I. πλάττοντι agrees in gender with ἐμοί, i.e. the person involved in πλάτ-

τοντι and suggested, though not explicitly, by τῆδε (equiv. to τῆ ἐμῆ). The comparison is attracted into the dat., i.e. ὥσπερ μεираκιῶ stands for ὥσπερ μεираκιον ἂν πλάττοι.

21. εἰς ὑμᾶς: before you, sc. τοὺς δικαστάς, i.e. τὸ δικαστήριον. Cf. the similar use of ἐν. — καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνν: yes, and most fervently too. καὶ μέντοι = a rhetorical 'yes,' the second καὶ adds a specification of the intensity with which the request is made, "and indeed I beg of you, and I beg you most fervently too."

22. δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι: cf. 27 b, παρητησάμην. — τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων: "this has respect primarily to the conversation with Meletus, which is prefaced by the request, 27 b, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰῶθτι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. But, as something like this was recognized under the name of ἐρώτησις (see Introd. 71), the reference here prob. extends to the conversations rehearsed (20 a), alluded to (21 c seq., 23 c), and imagined (28 b, 29 c), in the course of the defence; perhaps also to the castigation intermingled with it (30 d, 31 c, 35 b, c)." R.

23. καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ καὶ ἄλλοι: see Introd. 25.

ἀγορᾶ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ 17
 25 ἄλλοθι, μῆτε θαυμάζειν μῆτε θορυβεῖν (τούτου ἕνεκα) ἔχει d
 γὰρ οὕτωςί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα,
 ἕτη γεγωνῶς πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω
 τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν, εἰ (ἔῳ οἴντι) ξένος
 ἐτύγγανον ὦν, ξυνεγιγνώσκετε δήπου ἄν μοι | εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ

17
 c 24. **τραπεζῶν:** *τράπεζαι* (banks) as well as shops, esp. those near the market place, were favorite lounging places at Athens. Cf. Lys. ix. 5, *κἀμοὶ μὲν τὰ προειρημένα διείλεκτο ἐπὶ τῇ Φιλίου τραπέζῃ*, now the facts just recited I gathered from a conversation at Philius's bank. Cf. also Id. xxiv. 19–20, where, to meet the charge that his shop is the resort of evil minded persons without visible means of support, the defendant says: *ταῦτα λέγων οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖ μάλλον ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι τέχνας ἔχουσι (who follow trades), οὐδὲ τῶν ὡς ἐμὲ εἰσιόντων (my customers) μάλλον ἢ τῶν ὡς τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργοῦς (tradesmen). ἕκαστος γὰρ ὑμῶν εἴθισται προσφοιτᾶν (frequent, lounge in) ὁ μὲν πρὸς μυροπολεῖον (perfumer's), ὁ δὲ πρὸς κουρεῖον (barber-shop), ὁ δὲ πρὸς σκυτοτομεῖον (cobbler's), ὁ δ' ὅποι ἂν τύχη, καὶ πλείστοι μὲν ὡς τοὺς ἐγγυτάτω τῆς ἀγορᾶς κατασκευασμένους (keeriny shop), ἐλάχιστοι δὲ ὡς τοὺς πλείστον ἀπέχοντας αὐτῆς.* On the last point, cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 1, where Socrates *αἰσθανόμενος αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν Εὐθύδημον) διὰ νεότητα (because he was so young) οὕτω εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν εἰσιόντα, εἰ δέ τι βούλοιο διαπράξασθαι, καθίζοντα εἰς ἡνιοποιεῖσθαι (a harness-maker's) τῶν ἐγγύς τῆς ἀγορᾶς, εἰς τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸς ἦει κτέ.*

d 25. **θορυβεῖν:** *θορυβεῖν* and *θόρυβος* describe noisy demonstrations whether of approval or disapproval, and arc

used esp. of large assemblies. Cf. 17
 d Rep. vi. 492 b, *ὅταν συγκαθεζόμενοι ἄθροοι οἱ πολλοὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θεάτρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἢ τινα ἄλλον κοινὸν πλήθους ξύλλογον ξὺν πολλῷ θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινώσιν . . . καὶ ἐκβοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες κτέ., whenever the multitude gathers and crowds the seats of assemblies, courts, theatres, or camps, or collects in any place where crowds commonly resort, and there makes a great uproar with shouting and clapping of hands meting out praise to this and blame to that in a speech or a play, etc.*

26. **ἐπὶ δικαστήριον:** "the prep. has the notion of presenting one's self to the court. Cf. Isae. Erg. (Dion H. de Isae. 10), *λέγειν ἐπὶ δικαστηρίου.* The *ἀναβέβηκα* refers to the βῆμα." R.

27. **ἐβδομήκοντα:** see Introd. 17 and App. Cf. also Lys. xix. 55, *ἐγὼ γὰρ ἕτη γεγωνῶς ἤδη τριάκοντα οὔτε τῷ πατρὶ οὐδὲν πώποτε ἀντίειπον, οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδέίς μοι ἐνεκέλεσεν (brought accusation), ἐγγύς τε οἰκῶν τῆς ἀγορᾶς οὐδὲ πρὸς δικαστηρίῳ οὐδὲ πρὸς βουλευτηρίῳ ὤφθην οὐδέπω ποτε, πρὶν ταῦτην τὴν συμφορὰν γενέσθαι.*

28. **ἐνθάδε:** i.e. ἐν δικαστηρίοις. The gen. τῆς λέξεως depends upon ξένως (G. 1147; H. 757 a), the adv. of ξένως, — used almost in the sense of *ἄπειρος*, — which in this sense takes the gen., but is rare in Att. prose.

ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν κτέ.: for the position

30 τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, 18
καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ,
τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἔαν— ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χεῖρων,
ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη— αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ
35 γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τάληθῆ λέγειν.

II. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὧ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα
καὶ τοὺς πρώτους κατηγοροὺς, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα καὶ
τοὺς ὑστέρους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς b

17 and repetition of *ἀν*, see GMT. 223;
a G. 1312; H. 864.

30. φωνῆ: *dialect*, with esp. refer-
ence to pronunciation, while *τρόπος*,
style of speech, describes more gener-
ally any unusual choice and combi-
nation of words.

18 ἐτεθράμμην: *had been brought up*,
a belongs to the supposed case. See
on *ὄς ἐμελλεν*, 20 a. Foreigners were
allowed to appear in court only in
exceptional cases. Ordinarily their
ξένος, *guest-friend*, or their *πρόξενος*,
resident consul, represented them in
court and was surety for them.

31. καὶ δὴ καί: takes the place of
οὕτω καὶ after *ᾧσπερ*; *δὴ* calls atten-
tion to the case in point here cited.—
νῦν: not *now* in contrast to *then*, but
as it is contrasted with *as it would*
have been. "Now that I am not
a stranger in Athens, but only a
stranger in courts." Lat. *nunc* is
used in the same way. Cf. Liv. ii. 12.
14.—*ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ*: rather than *ὥς*
γ' ἐμοί, the reading of inferior Mss.
adopted by many edit. The impor-
tant word is *ὥς*, not *μοί*, which is
the least emphatic form in which the
pron. could be introduced. Here the
pers. pron. is used instead of the

refl. H. 684. For the analogous use
of the oblique cases of *αὐτός* instead of
the ind. refl., see G. 992; H. 684 a.

32. ἴσως, ἴσως: the reason urged
is a general one. The influence of
style, if felt at all, will be felt just
in those cases where the style of
the plea is better or worse than the
case deserves,—just where it inter-
feres with true judgment. For simi-
lar phraseology, cf. Xen. Cyr. iv. 3.
2, ἴσως μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἴσως δὲ
καὶ ποιούσιν αὐτὰ τῇ ἡδονῇ χαρίζομενοι
(for their own satisfaction). *Two Gen.*
of Ver. i. 1,

If haply won perhaps a hapless gain;
If lost, why then a grievous labor won.

35. αὕτη: in place of *τοῦτο*, by
assimilation to the gender of the
pred. *ἀρετή*. It refers to the preced-
ing clause *αὐτὸ . . . μὴ*.

II. 1. δίκαιός εἰμι κτέ.: for certain
adjs. used pers. with the inf., see
GMT. 762; G. 1527; H. 952.

2. ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα: not *ψευδῶς*,
because in the act. the idiom is *κατη-*
γορεῖν τί τινας.

4. ἐμοῦ γὰρ κτέ.: introducing the b
reason why Socrates is to speak first
πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα . . . κατηγόρους.

πρὸς ὑμᾶς: with *κατήγοροι γεγόνασι*,

5 ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέ. 18
 γοντες, οὐδ' ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον,
 καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς· ἀλλ' ἐκείνοι δεινότεροι,
 ὧ ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβά-
 νοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἔστι τις Σω-
 10 κράτης, σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστῆς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ

18

^b which is equiv. to κατηγορήκασι. Cf. *Euthyphr.* 2 c, ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μου πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, where πρὸς relates to those to whom the accusation is addressed.

5. καί, καί: the first καί emphasizes πάλαι, the second requires no comment. — πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη: see on εἰκῆ κτέ., 17 c. πάλαι goes back to the beginning of the accusations while πολλὰ κτέ. follows out their long continuance. This has been going on more than twenty years at the very least, for the *Clouds* was first put upon the stage in 423, and Socrates was tried in 399.

6. τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον: when followed by the acc. of a person's name, οἱ περὶ and οἱ ἀμφὶ mean the person and those connected with him (subjects, followers, companions, adherents). G. 952, 2; H. 791, 3 *fin.* Anytus was the most influential accuser. See *Introd.* 30.

8. τοὺς πολλοὺς: *most of you*. The art. is not used here (as in 17 a above, τῶν πολλῶν) to call up something familiar; it contrasts most of them, who were caught young and taught to abhor Socrates, with the few, implied in the part. gen. ὑμῶν, to whom this may not have happened. G. 965, 967; H. 665 and 673 b.

παραλαμβάνοντες: this word often is used of one who takes charge of a child and educates it. Cf. *Alc.* I. 121 e, δις ἑπτὰ δὲ γενόμενον ἐτῶν τῶν

παῖδα παραλαμβάνουσιν οὓς ἐκείνοι βασιλείου παιδαγωγὸς ὀνομάζουσιν. But this sense is too narrow for the present context. More to the point is *Corinth.* 483 e, where λαμβάνειν is used in a wider sense, which is analogous to that of παραλαμβάνειν here, τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπείζοντες κτέ., *taking the best and most vigorous of our number in our earliest youth, and by incantations subduing us as if we were young lions.*

9. ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν: *prejudiced you against me by unceasing accusations*. Strictly speaking κατηγοροῦντες ἔπειθόν is required, but co-ordination here idiomatically takes the place of subordination. — τις Σωκράτης: τις with prop. names conveys an indefiniteness and uncertainty which are always uncomplimentary and which in this case amount to scorn, *an individual (somebody or other) named Socrates*. Cf. *what d' you call him?* used colloquially in Eng.

10. σοφὸς ἀνὴρ: these words are practically intended to mean a Sophist. "The title σοφὸς ἀνὴρ would at once be understood as a class-appellation, cf. 23 a, 34 c; in it the meaning and associations of Philosopher are uppermost, yet not so distinctly as to exclude those of Sophist." R. — τά τε μετέωρα . . . ἀνεήθηκός: popular prejudice coined this phrase, or something like it, to stigmatize all

18

b

γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκῶς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. 18
 οὔτοι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατα- c
 σκεδάσαντες οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶ μου κατήγοροι. οἱ γὰρ ἀκού-
 οντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομῆξέειν.

18
 b scientific investigation into nature. With such investigation began and ended the earliest Greek philosophy (Introd. 2-12), and even Socrates' contemporaries, the Sophists, — notably Hippias, — were much addicted to it. See Introd. 14. Cf. Prot. 315 c, ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἀστρονομικὰ ἅττα διερωτᾶν τὸν Ἴππίαν, and they (Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and Andron) appeared to be plying Hippias with astronomical questions about nature and the heavenly bodies. The phrase τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς (where ὑπὸ has the very unusual sense of beneath and covered by) does not refer to definite matters searched into, but is part and parcel of a sweeping assertion that nothing either high or low, nothing "in heaven above or in the earth beneath or in the waters under the earth" is safe from their fatuous and futile curiosity. This popular view is amusingly exaggerated and dramatized by Aristophanes in the *Clouds*, 184-234. Here the word ἅπαντα adds a final touch of exaggeration. — φροντιστής: used trans. here like φροντί-ζειν with acc.. For a dat. similarly governed, cf. τὴν ἐμὴν τῶ θεῶ ὑπερίσταν, 30 a, where see note. See also App. — "This 'accusation,' σοφὸς . . . ποιῶν, both as given here, and as repeated with mock formality in 19 b, is nothing more than a vivid way of representing, for a rhetorical purpose, the popular prejudice, in which the court shared. The charges it contains are two-edged, being borrowed partly from the vulgar representation

of the Philosopher, partly from that of the Sophist; the μετέωρα φροντιστής points to the Philosopher, the τὸν . . . ποιῶν to the Sophist." R.

11. τὸν ἥττω λόγον κτέ.: any teaching of rhetoric, as such, must contain hints as to ὁ most effective means for making ῥ, best of a bad case by presenting it skilfully. How far this must be condemned should not be decided without reference to circumstances and facts. To-day it is equally impossible to assert that a lawyer in all cases is bound not to defend a client whose cause he knows to be unjust. Popular opinion at Athens seems to have been convinced that the Sophist's single aim in teaching rhetoric was to communicate the art of proving that black was white. Cf. the *Clouds*, 889-1104, where Aristophanes introduces the δίκαιος λόγος and the ἄδικος λόγος respectively. They have an argument in which the ἄδικος λόγος wins. Cf. Cic. Brut. 8, where the excellent Claudius says of the Sophists: docere se profitebantur quemadmodum causa inferior (ita enim loquebantur) dicendo fieri superior posset. His opposuit sese Socrates, qui subtilitate quadam disputandi refellere eorum instituta solebat verbis.

13. οἱ δεινοί: in the pred. The c accusers just mentioned as κατ' ἐξοχὴν δεινοί.

14. οὐδὲ θεοὺς κτέ.: the investigations alluded to above were, it was charged, not only a foolish waste of

15 ἔπειτά εἰσιν οἶτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον 18
 ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες
 πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες,
 ἔτι ἂν ὑμῶν καὶ μεираκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες
 ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὁ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ
 20 τὰ ὀνόματα οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἶδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις α
 κωμωδιοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὦν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ

18 useful time, but actually (hence the
 οὐδὲ, not even, in the text) led to athe-
 18 c ism. See Introd. 10, 12, and 33 *fin.*

16. ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ: with ὑμᾶς.

17. ἐν ᾗ ἂν ἐπιστεύσατε: for the potential ind. with ἂν denoting what may have happened and perhaps did happen, see G. 1337. See the examples in L. and S. *s.v.* ἂν B. I. c.

18. ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες: supply δίκην. The fem. termination is used in this idiom, though ἐρημος is more commonly of two terminations, and κατηγορῶν ἐρημον, in exactly the sense required here, occurs in Dem. XXI. 87. The acc. is cognate with κατηγοροῦντες. G. 1051; H. 715 b. *Cf.* also the common law phrases, δῖάκειν γραφήν, prosecute an indictment, φεύγειν γραφήν, defend a suit at law. The sense of the whole is repeated in untechnical language by the appended ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. *In fact the case they prosecuted always went by default, with none to speak for the defendant.* When either party to a lawsuit failed to appear, the court, as we say, entered a default against him, ἐρήμην καταγινώσκει τινός, and either one of the two parties to the suit who appeared ἐρήμην κρατεῖ or ἐρήμην αἰρεῖ, *sc.* δίκην. In such a case a plaintiff, if present, ἐρήμην κατηγορεῖ (δίκην) and the absent defendant ἐρήμην ὀφλισκάνει δίκην. — ἀτεχνῶς: absolutely, *i.e.* without artifice, and hence simply, as a matter of course.

19. ὁ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον κτέ.: 18
 τοῦτο, the correlative of ἔ, is sup-
 c pressed for brevity's sake. τοῦτο
 ἔστιν must be read between the lines. The clause with ἔτι stands in appos. to this suppressed antec. Often a further step toward brevity is taken, and in place of such a clause as this one with ἔτι we have an independent clause, sometimes even introduced by γάρ. *Cf.* Isoc. VIII. 53, ὁ δὲ πάντων σχετλιώτατον, οὗς γὰρ ὀμολογήσαιμεν ἂν πονηροτάτους εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν τοῦτους πιστοτάτους φύλακας ἡγούμεθα τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι, but, what is of all things most grievous! we are wont to consider those the commonwealth's most trustworthy guardians whom we should count as the meanest of our citizens.

21. κωμωδιοποιός: the *Clouds* of d
 Aristophanes (see Introd. 25) is here more esp. alluded to, since it contains the specific charges just mentioned. Cratinus, Ameipsias, and Eupolis also ridiculed Socrates.

ὅσοι δὲ κτέ.: the clause οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι enlarges the scope of φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι. As it is appended as an after-thought, the sense of the leading verb is casually reiterated in ἄλλους πείθοντες. Strictly speaking πεπεισμένοι is subordinated to πείθοντες. Logically the sense requires: ὅσοι δὲ, οἱ μὲν φθόνῳ . . . χρώμενοι, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι, ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον. The first δέ goes back to the

χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, — οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ¹⁸
 ἄλλους πείθοντες, — οὔτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ
 γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἶόν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδ'
²⁵ ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν
 ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου.
 ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττούς μου τοὺς
 κατηγοροὺς γεγονέναι, ἐτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορή-
 σαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε ^ε
³⁰ δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ
 ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων, καὶ πολὺ
 μᾶλλον ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον· εἶεν· ἀπολογητέον δὴ, ὧ
 ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν ¹⁹
 διαβολήν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν

¹⁸
^d main statement of the preceding sent. about the anonymous accusers, ὁ δὲ ... εἰπεῖν. On the loose conversational structure of such sents., see *Introd.* 55.

25. ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν κτέ.: τὲ καὶ used here to connect, not two different ideas, but two different ways of putting the same idea. Socrates would be sure always to use his favorite method of question and answer, and therefore σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον for him would be practically ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. By thus saying one and the same thing twice over, the speaker expresses his idea all the more effectively.

27. ἀξιώσατε: the two notions of ἔξιον, worth (price) and right, are as usual blended in this word, *duly grant*. Notice the persistent recurrence in various forms of the idea conveyed by ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω. See *Introd.* 55.

^ε 29. οὓς λέγω: refers to **b** above. — οἰήθητε κτέ.: it was common for a speaker to ask the court to approve

of some order of topics which he proposed to follow. For a fuller description of ἐκείνους, see **b** above; notice that it refers to ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι. These *old-time accusers*, though the last-mentioned, were the most remote in thought, for Anytus and his crew were actually present as τῶνδε shows. *H.* 696 b.

32. εἰεν: *well*, pointing to what has just been said, and implying that the whole must be accepted by his hearers as a matter of course. It is like "So far, so good!" ἔστω often has the same force. Grammatical arguments are used to prove that this εἰεν is nothing more nor less than the alternative form used not infrequently in place of the opt. εἴησαν. The force of δὴ is very much that of εἰεν, for it indicates that the duty of making some plea must be taken for granted.

33. τὴν διαβολήν: the *prejudice* produced by the slanders just described. ¹⁹
^a

34. ἔσχετε: *acquired*. See on ἔσχηκα, 20 d, and cf. *Hdt.* i. 14, τὴν τυραννίδα

35 οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως 19
γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλεόν τί με
ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ
οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω
ὄπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

III. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστὶν
ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἧ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητος ¹⁹
με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἶεν· τί δὴ λέγοντες
διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγορῶν τὴν
5 ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν· Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ
περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν

¹⁹
a οὗτω ἔσχον οἱ Μερμηάδαι. When ἔχειν
means, *be in possession*, ἔσχον means,
came into possession. G. 1260; H.
841. — ταύτην: resumptively after
the interrupting clause of explanation
introduced by ἦν.

36. εἴ τι: *if at all*. — ἄμεινον: used
without an expressed standard of
comparison because the opposite in-
evitably suggests itself, “better in
any way than that I should not ac-
complish anything.”

πλεόν ποιεῖν: *proficere*.

38. οὐ πάνυ: *not at all*. Here cer-
tainly *hardly* would not be adequate.
Cf. μόγισ πάνυ, 21 b.

39. τῷ θεῷ: *the divine will or God*.
The art. is used not because any par-
ticular god is referred to, but with a
generic or collective force. *Cf. Crit.*
43 d, and see on τῷ θεῷ, 35 d and 42 a,
and δ θεός, *Crit.* 54 e.

III. 2. πιστεύων: not as above,
18 c, *fidem habens*, but rather *con-
fidens* or *fretus*. *Cf. Alc. I.* 123 c, *τί
οὖν ποτέ ἐστιν ὅψ πιστεῦει τὸ μει-
ράκιον; Come now, on what does the
youth rely?* — Μέλητος: see *Introd.*

b 30, and for γραφὴν, *ibid.* 67.

4. ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγορῶν: a freq.

idiom in comparisons; the leading
and dependent clauses are briefly
blended in one; ἀναγνῶναι as well as
ἀντωμοσίαν are involved in this con-
solidation. The reference is to the
formal reading of the documents in
a suit before the full court. On
ἀντωμοσία, see *Introd.* 69.

5. ἀδικεῖ: very commonly, as here,
ἀδικεῖν has almost the force of a pf.
One of its obvious meanings is ἀδικός
εἶμι, which practically signifies, *I have
done wrong* or *I am guilty*. *GMT.* 27;
H. 827.

6. περιεργάζεται: *is a busybody*. A
busybody either minds other people's
business or makes too much of his
own. Socrates is accused of the first;
for a good case of the second, *cf. Nep.*
Arist. I. 4, *sibi non placere quod
tam cupide elaborasset, ut
praeter ceteros Iustus appella-
retur*. *Cf.* 20 c, *περιττότερον πραγ-
ματευομένου*, and see on τὰ μετέωρα in
18 b. — οὐράνια: the art. is omitted
because ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια form one
conception. *Cf. Xen. Mem.* i. 1. 19,
*Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα ἡγήτο θεοῦς εἰδέναι,
τὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα
καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα (the unuttered*

ἤττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα δι-¹⁹
 δάσκων. τοιαύτη τίς ἐστι· ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωράτε καὶ αὐτοὶ c
 ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περι-
 10 φερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν
 φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε
 μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαῖω. } καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοι-
 αύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστι·
 μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φύγοιμι·

¹⁹
 b plans in man's thought). In Prot. 315 c, Plato satirizes the astronomical lore of Hippias.

7. ἄλλους . . . διδάσκων: see Introd. 11 and 25.

c 8. τοιαύτη τις: Socrates alone is responsible for the exact words; the accusation itself is vague. — ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωράτε: in the *Clouds*, Aristophanes put before the Athenians their own feelings against Socrates, he dramatized a prejudice already existing.

9. Σωκράτη τινὰ κτέ.: in appos. with ταῦτα. For the force of τινὰ, see on τις Σωκράτης, 18 b; it implies that Socrates in the *Clouds* bears no close resemblance to the real Socrates. Cf. *Clouds*, 218-225, where Strepsiadēs on entering Socrates's thinking-shop says: Who is this man up there in the basket? Hearing it is Socrates, he asks him what he's about. Socrates answers ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον, on air I tread and oversee the sun.

10. φάσκοντα κτέ.: subordinated to περιφερόμενον.

11. ὧν: referring to all statements of the sort above mentioned. — οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρόν: a reënforcement of the οὐδὲν stated disjunctively. Cf. 21 b and 24 a; also for a similar locution, cf. Dem. ix. 5, οὔτε μικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων (that you ought

to do) ποιοῦνταν ὑμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματα ἔχει. See on ἡ τι ἢ οὐδέν, 17 b.

12. οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων: cf. in e below, καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι. "Such knowledge is a fine thing, if any one has it." Socrates ironically hints that no one has it. Cf. Xen, *Mem.* i. 1. 11, οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἥπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι, διελέγεται, σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλοῦμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔφυ, καὶ τίσις ἀνάγκαις (by what necessary laws) ἕκαστα γίγνεται τῶν οὐρανίων· ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μαραινόντας ἀπεδείκνυεν. Those who pursued these studies were crazy, he thought, because man ought first to know himself (cf. *id.* i. 1. 12, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐσκόπει, πότερά ποτε νομίσαντες ἰκανῶς ἤδη τὰνθρώπινα εἰδέναι ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φροντίζειν, and 38 a below), and because these physicists looked into questions which were really beyond the sphere of man (*ibid.*, ἡ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπεια παρέντες, τὰ δαιμόνια δὲ σκοποῦντες, ἡγοῦνται τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν) and therefore arrived at impotent conclusions (cf. *id.* iv. 7. 6-7). See on ἐκ τῆς κτέ., 26 e, and Introd. 10.

14. μή . . . φύγοιμι: Schanz brackets these words: "quia sanam interpretationem spernunt." Stallbaum punctuates "μή . . . φύγοιμι!"

¹⁹
 c

15 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστι. 19
 μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ^d
 ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ
 πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦ-
 τοί εἰσι· φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰ πώποτε ἢ μικρὸν ἢ
 20 μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγο-
 μένου· καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τᾶλλα
 περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὐδέ γ' εἴ τις
 ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρή-
 ματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ^e
 μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἴός τ' εἶη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώ-
 5 πους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κείος
 καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος. τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὧ ἄνδρες,

19
 c The meaning certainly appears to be, *may I never by any chance have to defend myself against Meletus on so serious a charge!* δίκαι is often best represented in translation by the sing. For ὑπό with φεύγειν, see on πεπόνθατε, 17 a. If Socrates despised the wisdom of the natural philosophers, he would be pretending to know what he did not know. Meletus then would have a strong case against him, for the charge would be so serious that Socrates could not attempt to defend himself. Socrates ironically attributes to Meletus and the courts his own strong disapproval of pretended knowledge.

15. ἀλλὰ γάρ: *but the truth is*, the truth, namely, which contradicts the notion that Socrates pretends to know what he is ignorant of, and also gives the reason why Aristophanes's attack does not touch him, but the physicists only.

d 18. οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσι: *are in that*

case, sc. the one just mentioned; hence the art. is used. 19
 d

22. περὶ ἐμοῦ: the colloquial tone is marked in the position of these words. Instead of "the other stories which people tell about me," Socrates says, "the other stories about me, which people tell." The rel. clause is appended as an apparent afterthought.

IV. 1. ἀλλὰ γάρ: in turning to a new topic, a glance is thrown backward (οὔτε . . . ἔστιν), and the new departure begins with the emphatic οὐδέ. ἔστιν is equiv. to the following ἀληθές (ἔστιν).

3. ἐπεὶ: *although*. Strictly a connecting thought must be supplied.

4. εἴ τις εἶη: the regular apod. καλὸν ἐν εἶη is represented by its equiv. in sense, δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι. GMT. 502, and compare 555.

5. ὥσπερ Γοργίας: on Gorgias, see Introd. 12-14. Protagoras was not living at this time. See Introd. 12.

6. τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος κτέ.: the

οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἰῶν εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς 19
 ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βού-
 λωνται, — τούτους πείθουσι τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολι- 20
 10 πόντας σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα δίδοντας καὶ χάριν προσ-
 ειδέειναι. ἔπει καὶ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐστὶ Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφός,
 ὃν ἐγὼ ἡσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν
 ἀνδρὶ ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες
 οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἴππονίκου· τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην —
 15 ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱέε — ᾧ Καλλία, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰ μὲν
 σου τῷ υἱέε πῶλῳ ἢ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῦ
 ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ
 τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν· ἣν δ' b
 ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἵππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δ'
 20 ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὸν, τίνα αὐτοῦ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην
 λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ

19
 e ironical surprise of Socrates is repro-
 duced by the anacoluthon in this sent.
 With οἷός τ' ἐστὶν the speaker appar-
 ently leads up to πείθειν, but the em-
 phatic τούτους (in which the clause
 τοὺς νέους οἷς . . . βούλωνται is summed
 up) is followed by πείθουσι instead.
 (The pl. after ἑκαστος is not uncom-
 mon. H. 609 a.) Then comes the
 statement of a fact which is surpris-
 ing, *they pay these men*, and finally the
 climax is capped by their giving them
thanks to boot. To give this last point
 προσειδέειναι, which should be a partic.
 like δίδοντας, is put on a par with
 ξυνεῖναι. For a fuller account of these
 teachers, see *Prot.* 316 c ff.

20
 a 11. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλοι: "the men just
 named are not the only ones, for
 also, etc."

12. ἡσθόμην: see on ἡσθόμην οἰομέ-
 νων, 22 c.

14. Καλλία: at Callias's house
 foreigners, and particularly foreign

Sophists, were welcomed. Callias's
 fondness for Sophists is humorously
 brought out in the *Protogoras*, where
 he is almost crowded out of house
 and home by them. The indulgence
 of this and of other tastes exhausted
 his resources, and he died in poverty.
 His father Hipponicus fell in the
 battle at Delium (424 B.C.).

17. ὃς ἔμελλεν: for ἔμελλον and the
 inf., without ἂν, expressing a *past*
 likelihood which was not realized, see
 GMT. 428 a. Here is a *present*
 likelihood (see *ib.* a for an analogous
 use of ἔδει) which is not realized, *who*
would, in the case supposed (εἰ . . . μισθώ-
 σασθαι), *proceed to make them, etc.*

21. τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης κτέ.: sc. the b
 boys must be civilized and human-
 ized. Civilization involves the exist-
 ence of the family and the state, and
 these require education. Cf. *Arist. Pol.*
 i. 2. 9, *ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον*,
man is by nature a political animal.

πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γάρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ 20
τῆν τῶν υἱέων κτήσιν. ἔστι τις, ἔφη ἐγώ, ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ
γε, ἢ δ' ὄς. Τίς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσου δι-
25 δάσκει; Εὐήνος, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν·
καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐήνον ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχοι ταύτην
τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ c
αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμεν τε καὶ ἠβρυνόμεν ἄν, εἰ ἠπιστάμην
ταῦτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

V. Ὑπολάβοι ἄν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως· ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες,
τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοι αὐται γε-

20
b

25. Εὐήνος κτέ.: not a word is wasted
in this answer, upon the brevity of
which largely depends the humor
of the story. Evenus is elsewhere
mentioned as a teacher of oratory
and a writer of elegiacs. A few such
poems attributed to him still exist.
Here he is introduced as a Sophist
and a teacher of virtue. The small-
ness of his charge for instruction
prob. measures accurately the value
attached to it by his contemporaries,
and places him and his teaching in
the second rank. Protagoras charged
100 minas. There have been attempts
to distinguish between a younger and
an elder Evenus, both of whom came
from Paros and wrote elegiacs. If
there were two, allusion is here made
to the elder.

26. εἰ ἔχοι καὶ διδάσκει: in the
original statement which Socrates
may be supposed to have in mind,
both of these were in the indic. Both
might change to the opt. (GMT. 696;
H. 937) after ἐμακάρισα. The change
to the opt. from ἔχει throws εἰ ἔχοι, as
it were, into the background, leaving
οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει, which contains
a very pointed insinuation, in the
more vivid indic. See App.

27. ἐμμελῶς: synonymous with
ὀρθῶς. Its opposite is πλημμελῶς (*dis-*
cordantly or falsely, of a false note).
The word also conveys by innuendo
the notion that the teaching of Eve-
nus is cheap, and this is the point here
made. In *Criti.* 106 b, μετρίως and
παρὰ μέλος, πλημμελῶς and ἐμμελής are
used as contradictories.

V. All error is distorted truth; until
a man sees the truth which a particu-
lar error caricatures, he will not re-
nounce his error; to denounce error
as such is therefore not enough.
Thus far Socrates has argued against
the grossly erroneous popular opinion
of himself; now he proceeds to exhibit
the truth. His upright conduct has
been exasperating, for obedience to
God has led him to defy men.

1. ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες κτέ.: objections
dramatized and put in the form of
questions. The argument is: "there
must be some cause." Hence the γάρ
in οὐ γὰρ δήπου.

2. τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα: *What is that you
have been about?* or better, *What is this
about you?* Accordingly πρᾶγμα is used
either in the sense of pursuit, study, or
plan of life; or it has no independent
meaning, but is joined with the art.

20
c

γόνασω; οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττό- 20
 τερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος
 5 γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες ἄλλοιου ἢ οἱ πολλοί. λέγε οὖν
 ἡμῖν τί ἐστίν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν.
 ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἀγὼ ὑμῖν πειρά- d
 σομαι ἀποδείξαι τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τό τε
 10 τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν, εἶ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλή-
 θειαν ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ
 διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποῖαν δὲ σοφίαν
 ταύτην; ἢπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρώπινη σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ

20
 c and *σόν*, the whole being a paraphrase for Σωκράτης. See on τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα, *Crit.* 53 d.

3. περιττότερον: what overpasses the limit restraining common men, and hence provokes suspicion. See on περιεργάζεται, 19 b, and cf. *Soph. Ant.* 68, τὸ γὰρ περισσὰ πράσσειν οὐκ ἔχει νοῦν οὐδένα. *Eur. Bacch.* 427 ff., σοφὸν δ' ἀπέχειν πραπίδα φρένα τε περὶ σῶν παρὰ φωτῶν· τὸ πλήθος ὅτι τὸ φαυλότερον ἐνόμισε χρήται τε (*whate'er the multitude of lowlier men puts faith in and practises*) τὸδ' ἂν δεχοίμαν. That σοῦ . . . πραγματευομένου (*although as you say you have been doing nothing*) conveys a statement of fact, not a supposition, is shown by οὐδέν. The ἔπειτα points the contrast between two statements of fact, (1) σοῦ (gen. after φήμη) πραγματευομένου, and (2) τοσαύτη φήμη γέγονεν. The words εἰ μὴ τι . . . οἱ πολλοί (see App.) re-state (1) more mildly and as a supposition. "The evil report did not arise about you while you were doing nothing out of the way, unless your behaviour was eccentric." A man may be eccentric and yet keep

within bounds; cf. below d and e, also 23 a.

8. τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν: sc. d σοφός. To be distinguished from φήμη τε καὶ λόγος only as bringing out the bad repute which was their result. Cf. the Lat. nomen. The words τὴν διαβολήν show that ὄνομα is not to be taken in its usual sense of *good name* or *fame*, but closely with διαβολήν, both the name and the blame.

11. ἄλλ' ἢ: this collocation with οὐδέν indicates that ἄλλ' ἢ arose from the use of ἄλλος. For a case where ἄλλος precedes it, cf. 34 b.

12. ἔσχηκα: I have become possessed of and still have. See on ἔσχετε, 19 a, and *Phaedr.* 241 b, νοῦν ἦδη ἔσχηκώς καὶ σεσσωφρονηκώς, after he had come to full understanding and gained self-control.

ποῖαν . . . ταύτην: this question treads upon the heels of the preceding sent. so closely that διὰ is not repeated. ποῖαν is in the pred.; we might expand to ποῖα σοφία ἐστὶν αὐτῆ δι' ἣν τοῦτο . . . ἔσχηκα. H. 618.

13. ἢπερ: sc. διὰ ἐκείνην τοῦτο . . . ἔσχηκα, ἢπερ κτε., just that which.

κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἂν οὖς ἄρτι 20
 15 ἔλεγον μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ ε
οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ'
 ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καί
 μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ' εἰς δόξω τι
 ὑμῶν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον ὃν ἂν λέγω,
 20 ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῶν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ

20
 e 15. ἢ οὐκ ἔχω κτέ.: ironical. Such wisdom is one of two things, either superhuman or no wisdom at all.

18. μὴ θορυβήσητε: *do not interrupt me with noise*, strictly referring to the moment fixed by εἰς δόξω κτέ. In 21 a, and 30 c, the pres. is used (μὴ θορυβεῖτε) because the request is less precise, *make no disturbance*. GMT. 259; H. 874 a.

19. μέγα λέγειν: not of course in the sense of *speaking out loud* (cf. *Rep.* v. 449 b, δ' Ἀδείμαντος μέγα ἤδη λέγων, *beginning to speak above his breath*), but in that of *μεγαληγορεῖν*, as μέγα φρονεῖν is used in the sense of *μεγαλοφρονεῖν*. Cf. *Rich.* II. iii. 2,

Boys with women's voices
 Strive to *speak big*, and clap their female
 joints
 In stiff unwieldy arms against thy crown.

— οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν κτέ.: a compressed form of statement, made effective with the audience by the allusion to certain Euripidean strains. (Cf. *Eur.* *Fig.* 488, *κοῦκ ἐμὸς δ' μῦθος ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα*, *not mine the word, I heard it from my mother*. This line is parodied in *Symp.* 177 a, ἡ μὲν μοι ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίππην· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς δ' μῦθος ἀλλὰ Φαιδροῦ τοῦδε. The same sentiment is found in *Eur. Hel.* 513, *λόγος γὰρ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐμὸς, σοφῶν δ' ἔπος*, *not mine the word; by clerkly men 'twas*

spoken. *Hor. Sat.* ii. 2, 2, *nec meus hic sermo est sed quae praecepit Ofellus.*) For a similarly compressed statement, cf. *ἱκανὸν τὸν μάρτυρα*, 31 c. “A pred. adj. or subst. is often a brief equiv. for one clause of a compound sent.” H. 618. ἐμὸν and ἀξιόχρεων are both preds., and special point is given them by their position. This sent. is far more telling than what might be spun out of it, *sc. λέγω γὰρ λόγον καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃν ἐρῶ οὐκ ἐμὸς ἐστὶ, ἀλλ' ἀνοίσω (sc. τὸν λόγον) εἰς τὸν λέγοντα ὃς ἀξιόχρεος ὑμῶν ἐστίν.* — ὃν ἂν λέγω: equiv. to *ὃν μέλω λέγειν*, though it is formally a hypothetical rel. clause with indef. antec., “*the word I shall utter, whatever the word may be, that I say, will not be mine, etc.*” Cf. *Crit.* 44 c.

20. ἀνοίσω: in the sense of shifting responsibility. For ἀναφορὰ in that sense, cf. *Eur. Orest.* 414 ff., ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡμῶν ἀναφορὰ τῆς ξυμφωρᾶς . . . Φοῦβος κελεύσας μητρὸς ἐκπράξαι φόνον.

τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ κτέ.: it required skill as well as modesty to avoid blurting out here with τῆς ἐμῆς σοφίας. The εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστὶ interrupts just in time. Cf. *Isocr.* xv. 50, *περὶ μὲν ὃν τῆς ἐμῆς εἶτε βούλεσθε καλεῖν δυνάμεις, εἶτε φιλοσοφίας, εἶτε διατριβῆς, ἀκηκάτε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, now you have heard all the truth about my talent or methodical study or pursuit, whichever you like to call it.*

ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστί σοφία καὶ οἶα, μάρτυρα ὑμῶν παρέξομαι 20
 τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που. οὗτος
 ἐμὸς τε ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρός τε 21
 καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατήλθε.
 25 καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἶος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὃ τι ὀρμή-
 σσει. [καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο
 μαντεύσασθαι· καὶ ὅπερ λέγω μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες·
 ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ εἰ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν

20
 e 21. οἶα: goes back to ποίαν in d above.

22. Χαιρεφῶντα: certainly, if the Athenians did *not* know Chaerephon, many a joke of Aristophanes at Chaerephon's expense was lost on them; see below on line 25. He is mentioned by Xen. (*Mem.* i. 2. 48) as one of those friends of Socrates *οἱ ἐκέλευφ συνῆσαν οὐχ ἵνα δημηγορικοὶ γένοιντο, ἀλλ' ἵνα καλοὶ τε κάγαθοὶ γενόμενοι καὶ οἴκφ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει καὶ πολίταις δύναιτο καλῶς χρῆσθαι.*

21
 a 23. ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει: the ἤλιασταί are here taken as representing the whole people; and here, as often, πλῆθος is equiv. to δῆμος, and means democratic party. Cf. *Lys. passim.* — ἐταῖρος: partisan. Cf. *Gorg.* 510 a, τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἐταῖρον εἶναι, *to be a partisan of the government in power.*

24. τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην: an allusion, which no one present could fail of understanding, to the exile from which all conspicuous democrats had only four years before returned (in 403 B.C.). The Thirty Tyrants were the authors of this banishment; cf. Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 1, προεῖπον μὲν τοῖς ἔξω τοῦ καταλόγου (not registered on their catalogue of 3000 oligarchical sympathizers) μὴ εἰσιέναι εἰς τὸ ἄστυ. φεγγόντων δὲ εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν πολλοὺς ἄγοντες ἐπέπλησαν καὶ τὰ Μέγαρα καὶ τὰς Θήβας τῶν ὑποχωροῦ-

των. All these allusions had the effect of influencing the court in favor of what they were about to hear.

25. σφοδρὸς: Chaerephon was a born enthusiast. Cf. *Charm.* 153 b, Χαιρεφῶν δέ, ἄτε καὶ μανικὸς ὢν, ἀπατηδῆσας ἐκ μέσων θεοῖ πρός με. Aristophanes calls Chaerephon "a bat" (*Birds*, 1554); Chaerephon and Socrates belong to the jaundiced barefoot brotherhood (*Clouds*, 104). Browning, *Aristophanes's Apology*,

In me 'twas equal balanced flesh rebuked
 Excess alike in stuff-guts Glauketes
 Or starveling Chaerephon; I challenge both.

26. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ κτέ.: *well then really once.* Cf. 18 a. The regular way of introducing a particular instance of what has been stated generally. What Chaerephon did at Delphi was an instance of his σφοδρότης.

τοῦτο: a cognate acc. after μαντεύσασθαι in anticipation of ἤρετο κτέ. For τοῦτο referring forward, see H. 696 a. For a similar acc. after μαντεύεσθαι, cf. Eur. *Ion.* 346 f., ἰο. ὁ δ' ἐκτεθεῖς (exposed) παῖς ποῦ ἴστω; εἰσορᾷ φάος (alive)? KR. οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδεὶς ταῦτα καὶ μάντεῦομαι.

27. ὅπερ λέγω: I repeat, lit. just what I am saying. Cf. 17 c and 20 e.

28. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία: οὖν closes an explanatory digression and leads back to μάρτυρα ὑμῶν παρέξομαι. The

21
 a

ἡ Πυθία μῆδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ 21
30 ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὔτοςι μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος
τετελεύτηκεν.

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ 1
ὑμᾶς διδάξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ
ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτωςι· τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί
ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν
5 ξύνουδα ἐμαντῶ σοφὸς ὢν· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ
σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δῆπου ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ

21
a oracle in question is lost, but we have a very fair substitute in Σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς σοφώτερος δ' Εὐριπίδης | ἀνδρῶν δὲ πάντων (οἱ πάντων) Σωκράτης σοφώτατος. See the Schol. on Arist. *Clouds*, 144.

29. ὁ ἀδελφός: sc. Chaerecrates. We are told that once, when the two were at variance, Socrates intervened as peacemaker. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* ii. 3. 1.

b VI. 3. τί ποτε αἰνίττεται: through modesty Socrates takes it for granted that this is "a dark saying." For a genuinely enigmatical oracle, cf. Paus. v. 3. 5, γίνεται δὲ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν (Temenus and Cresphontes) αὐτῶν λόγιον τὸ δε, ἡγεμόνα τῆς καθόδου ποιεῖσθαι τὸν τριόφθαλμον, that they should make "the three-eyed" leader of their home return. The "three-eyed" turned out to be Oxylus, son of Andraemon, whom they met riding on a one-eyed mule; acc. to Apollodorus, Oxylylus was one-eyed and bestrode a two-eyed horse. See an essay on Greek Oracles by F. W. H. Myers, in his volume entitled *Essays Classical* (London, 1883).

5. σοφὸς ὢν: see on ἐπισταμένω, 22 c. — λέγει φάσκων: λέγει here refers to the meaning and φάσκων to the words in which it was conveyed.

6. οὐ δῆπου: of course I do not suppose. πού adds a shade of uncer-

tainty to the stress of δῆ. Notice that Socrates's long struggle (μόγις πάνυ) is dramatized in these short, quick sents., which suggest a man talking to himself. — οὐ γὰρ θέμις: it would be against his nature. God, being by nature truthful, could not lie; cf. *Rep.* ii. 382 e, πάντα γὰρ ἀψευδὲς τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον, the nature of divinity and of God is absolutely void of falsehood. The implicit faith of pious Greeks in oracles, esp. in those of Apollo, is proved directly by such words as Pindar's ψευδέων οὐχ ἄπτεται, he (Apollo) sets not his hand to falsehood (*Pyth.* iii. 5), τὸν οὐ θεμιτὸν ψεύδει θιγεῖν, 'tis unlawful for him to have part in a lie (*Pyth.* ix. 42). It is also shown indirectly by the horror, expressed so often by the tragedians, at finding Phoebeus's speech untrue. Against all blasphemous attribution of falsehood to the gods, Plato defends the faith in *Rep.* ii. 383 b, where he reprobates the following lines of Aeschylus (spoken by Thetis in a lost play), καὶ γὰρ τὸ φοίβου θεῖον ἀψευδὲς στόμα | ἥλιπον εἶναι μαντικῆ βρῦνον τέχνη (with skill prophetic fraught) ὁ δ' αὐτὸς ὑμῶν, αὐτὸς ἐν θοινῇ παρῶν (marriage-feast) αὐτὸς τὰδ' εἰπὼν, αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ κτανῶν | τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐμὸν. The hesitating tone adopted by

θέμις αὐτῷ. καὶ πολλὸν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουσιν τί ποτε λέγει, 21
 ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ (τοιαύτην τινα) ἔτρα-
 πόμην. ἦλθον ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς
 10 ἐνταῦθα, εἶπερ πον, ἐλέγξω τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν c
 τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι οὐτοσὶ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ
 ἔφησθα. διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον — ὀνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέο-
 μαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν
 15 τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι — καὶ διαλεγό-
 μενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς

21
 b Socrates in mentioning this oracle (21 a), and his interpretation here, suggest that he himself would never have asked Chærephon's question; the question could be settled by human means and in such cases Socrates's practice agreed with the sentiment in Eur. *Hel.* 753 ff.,

The gods why question? Nay, we rather should
 With sacrifice approach them, and a prayer
 For what is good, disdaining prophecy, . . .
 What prophecy will lead the sluggard man
 to thrive?
 Of prophets best good counsel is and sense.

Cf. Xen. *Mem.* i. i. 9, *δαμονᾶν* (were crazed) *ἔφη δὲ καὶ τοὺς μαντειομένους ἂ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μαθοῦσι διακρίνειν* (to learn and know thoroughly).

8. *μόγις πάνυ*: after a long struggle, a qualification of *ἔπειτα ἔτραπόμην* which repeats parenthetically the idea of *πόλυν χρόνον*. For a similar parenthetical qualification, see on *ὄδὸν κατὰ τούτους*, 17 b. For the position of *πάνυ*, see on *ὄδὸν πάνυ*, 19 a. — *τοιαύτην τινα*: sc. *ζήτησιν*, purposely vague, "which I began in some such way as this." See on *τοιαύτη τις*, 19 c.

c 10. *ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ*: the oracle is personified.

11. *ὅτι*: introducing direct quotation, GM¹. 711; H. 928 b. — *ἔστί*: really

is. This whole clause was spoken 21
 with special emphasis. c

13. *πρὸς ὃν ἔπαθον*: cf. *Gorg.* 485 b, *δμοίωτατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας*, in the case of philosophers I feel just as I do about people who tisp and are childish. Contrast the use of *πρὸς* in such expressions as *πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκοπῶν*, *pondering in my mind*; *πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοποῦμεν*, *we consider among ourselves* (cf. *πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἐλογιζόμεν* in d below).

14. *καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ*: strictly speaking, this covers the same ground as *διασκοπῶν τοῦτον*. Socrates has no test except by conversing with his man.

15. *ἔδοξέ μοι*: idiomatically substituted before *δοκεῖν* (to seem) to avoid *ἔδοξα* in the unusual but possible sense, *I came to the opinion*. The same anacoluthon occurs both when the nom. part. precedes (cf. Xen. *An.* iii. 2. 12, *καὶ ἐν ἔξάμενοι τῇ Ἀρτέμειδι ὀπίσθους ἂν κατακάνοιεν τῶν πολεμίων τοσαύτας χιμαῖρας καταθύσειεν τῇ θεῷ, ἐπεὶ οὐκ εἶχον ἱκανὰς εἰρεῖν, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν πεντακοσίας θύειν κτέ.*) and when it follows (cf. Th. iii. 36, *καὶ ὑπὸ ὀργῆς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς οὐ τοὺς παρόντας μόνον ἀποκτείνειν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἅπαντας Μυτιληναίους ὄσοι ἦβῶσι, ἐπι-*

ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' 21
 οὐ· κάπειται ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι ὅτι οἶοιτο μὲν εἶναι
 σοφός, εἴη δ' οὐ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ a
 πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων· πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλο-
 20 γιζόμεν ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι·
 κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κάγαθὸν
 εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἶεται τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ,
 ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶομαι. ἔοικά γ' οὖν τούτου γε
 σμικρῷ τι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μὴ οἶδα
 25 οὐδὲ οἶομαι εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου
 δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καί μοι ταῦτα ταῦτα ἔδοξε· e
 καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκείνῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα αἰσθανόμενος μὲν
 καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς ὅτι ἀπηχθάνομην, ὅμως δὲ

21 c καλοῦντες τὴν ἀπόστασιν, taxing them
 with their revolt).

d 19. πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν . . . ἐλογιζόμεν: see on line 13 above.

20. ὅτι . . . εἰμί: not really dependent like ὅτι οἶοιτο in line 17, but like ὅτι οὐτασί . . . ἔστι in line 11 above.

23. ὥσπερ οὖν: the οὖν leads back to κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ κτέ., which in turn contains a reaffirmation of ἐγὼ γὰρ . . . σοφός ἄν, b above. Here οὐκ, not οὐδὲν, is used, because the antithesis is between not-knowing and false assumption of knowledge. — ἔοικα γ' οὖν: now it seems at least that, etc. γ' οὖν is a better reading than γοῦν, since εοικα and τούτου require precisely the same stress in the connexion of thought. One of the many examples of γέ repeated in Hom. is *Il.* v. 258, τούτω δ' οὐ πάλιν αἰθῆς ἀποίσετον ὠκέες ἴπποι | ἄμφω ἀφ' ἡμέλων, εἴ γ' οὖν ἕτερός γε φύγησιν.

24. αὐτῷ τούτῳ: serves to prepare the way for the clause with ὅτι, which

gives a detailed specification of what 21
 is indefinitely stated in σμικρῷ τι. d

VII. 1. οὖν: pointing back to the end of 21 b. — ἦδη: straightway or immediately, vividly bringing up the moment of past time alluded to. e

2. ὅτι ἀπηχθάνομην: this gives the fact of which Socrates says he was always conscious (αἰσθανόμενος), so that he was constantly tormented (λυπούμενος) and terrified (δεδιώς). With λυπούμενος and δεδιώς, ὅτι would mean because; these two parts should therefore be attached to αἰσθανόμενος. Notice, however, that αἰσθανόμενος followed by ὅτι (that) is a very uncommon const. Cf. ἀπηχθόμην in d above with ἀπηχθάνομην, here in something like the sense of the colloquial "was getting myself disliked."

ὅμως δὲ ἔδοκει: correl. with αἰσθανόμενος μὲν, breaks out of the partic. const. Socrates, in stating his determination to do his duty, adopts a conversational style. See on ἔδοξε μοι in

ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖ- 21
σθαι· ἰτέον οὖν σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμὸν τί λέγει ἐπὶ ἅπαν-
5 τας τοὺς τι δοκοῦντας εἶδέναι. καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὃ ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναῖοι — δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τάληθῆ λέγειν — ἥ μὴν 22
ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκίᾳ τῶν
ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητῆρῶντι
κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστε-

21
e c above, and on ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν in 34 e below. Cf. also *Lach.* 196 e, τοῦτο λέγω οὐ παίζων ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον οἶμαι κτέ., *I say this not by way of a joke, but I think it absolutely unavoidable, etc.*

3. τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ: the interest of the god, which required of Socrates that he should refute or confirm the oracle.

4. ἰτέον οὖν: a change to the dir. discourse strikingly introduced by the narrator. Such a transition is often resorted to for the sake of vividness. Cf. Xen. *An.* v. 5, 24, παρελθὼν δ' αὐτῶν ἄλλος εἶπεν ὅτι οὐ πόλεμον ποιησόμενοι ἤκοιεν, ἀλλ' ἐπιδείξοντες ὅτι φίλοι εἰσὶ. καὶ ξενίοις, ἦν μὲν ἔλθητε κτέ. *Id.* vii. 1. 39, where the transition is the reverse, μάλα μόλις, ἔφη, διαπραξάμενος ἤκω· λέγειν γὰρ Ἀναξίβιον ὅτι κτέ. Still more striking is *Id.* *Hell.* i. 1. 27, παρήνεσαν ἄνδρας ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, μεμνημένους ὄσας τε ναυμαχίας αὐτοὶ καθ' αὐτοὺς νενικήκατε, *they charged them to be brave men and not to forget in how many sea-fights, "with only your own forces, you have been victorious."* — σκοποῦντι: not σκεφόμενῳ, for Socrates simply proceeds as he began. Hence the subj. of σκοποῦντι is not expressed. See on διαπειρωμένῳ, 27 a.

5. νῆ τὸν κύνα: this form of asseveration is a whim of Socrates, upon which the Schol. says, Ῥαδαμάνθους ὄρκος οὗτος δὲ κατὰ κυνὸς ἢ χηνὸς (*goose*)

ἢ πλατάνου (*plane-tree*) ἢ κριοῦ (*ram*) ἢ 21
e τινος ἄλλου τιοῦτον· οἷς ἦν μέγιστος ὄρκος ἅπαντι λόγῳ κύων, | ἔπειτα χήν· θεοὺς δ' ἐσίγων (*they named no god*), Κρατῖνος Χείρωσι (*i.e. in the Chirons*). κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ νόμος ὀμνῶναι ἵνα μὴ κατὰ θεῶν οἱ ὄρκοι γίνωνται, τοιοῦτοι δὲ καὶ οἱ Σωκράτους ὄρκοι. A humorous turn is given to this oath in *Gorg.* 482 b, μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν. Socrates would swear by the Egyptian god, but not by any of the gods whom he worshipped. His objection to doing this may be illustrated by the reasons for "An act to restrain the abuses of players," 3 James I. c. 21. "For the preventing and avoiding of the great abuse of the holy name of God in Stage-plays, Enterludes, May-games, shews, and the like." See Clarke and Wright on *Merch. of Ven.* i. 3.

6. ἥ μὴν: expresses solemn asseveration, and is introduced to corroborate the preceding oath. The Schol. explains it as meaning ὄντως δῆ, *in very truth*. It is, however, the usual formula for beginning any affirmation prefaced by a solemn oath.

9. κατὰ τὸν θεόν: *under the god's command*. The inquiry was commanded of God, because it was possible to understand the meaning of the oracle only by experience, and Socrates's experience had not yet justified

22
a

10 ροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῶν τὴν 22
 ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς ποιοῦντος, ἵνα
 μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γένοιτο. } μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς
 πολιτικοὺς ἦα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τραγωιδῶν καὶ
 τοῦ μούσι· διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' 2
 15 αὐτῶν καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων
 ὄντα· ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἐδόκει

22
 a him in thinking that he understood
 it.

11. ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς ποιοῦντος :
 my Herculean labors, as I may call
 them; the gen. agrees with ἐμοῦ im-
 plied in its equiv. ἐμὴν. G. 1001;
 H. 691. The words πόνους ποιοῦντος
 were sure to remind his hearers of
 several passages in the tragedians,
 where Heracles, a character endeared
 to them chiefly by his heroic strug-
 gles, recounts his labors. Socrates
 compares his own intellectual encoun-
 ters with the physical ones endured
 by Heracles, and recounts in a half-
 tragic vein these "labors" imposed of
 God. Cf. Soph. *Trach.* 1046 f. and
 1089 ff.,

In many a heat, by fearful odds hard pressed,
 With arms and straining back ere now I
 strove . . .

Hands, hands, my back, my breast, O arms
 of mine,
 Still, still, ye are the same whose sometime
 strength

In haunts Nemean smote the shepherd's bane,
 And tamed the lion whom none dared ap-
 proach,
 Or look on, etc.

Cf. Eur. *H. F.* 1255-1280, and esp.
 the chorus, 348-455; Browning in
Aristophanes's Apology translates the
 whole of this play. — ἵνα μοι καὶ κτέ. :
 Socrates, assuming for the sake of
 his point an attitude of opposition,
 says that he thought he was refuting

the oracle (cf. 22 c) while really he 22
 was proving it to be irrefutable. This a
 achievement is ironically stated as
 his real purpose. Cf. ἵνα used by
 Hom. in indignant or ironical ques-
 tions, e.g. *Il.* xiv. 364 f., Ἀργεῖοι, καὶ
 δ' αὖτε μεθίμεν Ἑκτορι νίκην | Πριαμίδῃ,
 ἵνα νῆας ἐλθῆ καὶ κῦδος ἄρῃται, *Argives,*
and must we to Priam's son Hector again
yield the day, that he on our ships may
lay hands and be sure of renown? Soc-
 rates was, he here implies, guided to
 just the result which he least ex-
 pected. This might easily suggest
 the irony of fate, so tragically ex-
 emplified in Sophocles's *Oedipus the*
King, which was first performed about
 429 B.C. and presumably was familiar
 to the court. In clauses with ἵνα
 (ἐπεὶ, and ἐπειδή), καὶ is freq. used
 simply for greater stress. Cf. *Gorg.*
 501 c, συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περὶ τῆ
 δ λόγος, just to help your argument on to
 its close. This is not like καὶ μανθά-
 νοιμι below, b, where καὶ means also.
 The opt. clause ἵνα γένοιτο depends
 upon ποιοῦντος, which represents the 1
 impf. G. 1289; H. 856 a.

14. καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους: see the pas- b
 sage from the *Ion* quoted in the note
 on c below. The κωμφοδιοποιοί are
 hardly included here. The idea that
 the genuine poet was a being endowed
 with exceptional wisdom was common
 in ancient times. Cf. *Arist. Poet.* 9. 3,

μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί 22
λέγοιεν, ἢ ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνο-
μαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τάληθῆ· ὁμως δὲ ῥητέον.
20 (ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγων αὐτῶν) ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν
βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν
καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῦεν
ἃ ποιοῦεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ
θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν
25 πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιούτῳν τι
μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες· καὶ ἅμα

22
b φιλοσοφώτερον (*more philosophical*) καὶ
σπουδαιότερον (*worthier*) ποίησις ἱστο-
ρίας (*prose narrative of facts*) ἐστίν.

17. πεπραγματεῦσθαι: used here
as a pass., as is made evident by
αὐτοῖς, the dat. of the agent. G. 1186
and 1238, 1; H. 769. See also
App. — διηρώτων ἂν: see on 20 be-
low.

18. ἢ ἅμα κτέ.: mentioned as a
subordinate end to be reached by the
way. For καί, see on 11 above.—
αἰσχύνομαι: this discovery was dis-
creditable to the poets, and Socrates
hesitates to mention it. For this same
borrowing of shame from another's
actions, see *Crit.* 45 d and e. When
αἰσχύνεσθαι means *feel shame at the*
thought of an action, it takes the inf., as
here, instead of the partic. Socrates
feels shame at the idea of telling
what nevertheless must be told, be-
cause it is the truth.

20. οἱ παρόντες: those who were
present, *i.e. the bystanders*. Hence ἂν
ἔλεγον, used with the same iterative
force as διηρώτων ἂν above. GMT.
162; G. 1296; H. 835.

c 23. φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες:
the dat. φύσει and nom. partic. charac-
terize the same subj. in two parallel

ways. Hence they are appropriately
coupled by means of καί. Cf. 18 b.—
φύσει: by (*grace of*) *nature*. Here
used to express what Plato elsewhere
means by *θεία μοῖρα*, *by the grace of*
heaven. Acts done *φύσει* are done un-
consciously, are inspired by something
below the surface of our every-day
selves, whereas conscious acts are, if
right, guided by *τέχνη* and *σοφία*, *art*
and *wisdom*. Cf. *Ion*, 533 e-534 c, *πάν-*
τες γὰρ οἱ τε τῶν ἐπῶν ποιηταὶ (epic
poets) οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης (out
of knowledge of their art) ἀλλ' ἐνθεοὶ
(inspired) ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι (pos-
essed) πάντα ταῦτα τὰ καλά λέγουσι
ποιήματα, καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ (lyric poets)
οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὡσαύτως... ἅτε οὖν οὐ τέχνη
ποιοῦντες (writing poetry) ἀλλὰ θεία
μοῖρα, τοῦτο μόνον οἶός τε ἕκαστος
ποιεῖν καλῶς, ἐφ' ᾧ ἡ Μοῦσα αὐτὸν
ἔρησεν, ὃ μὲν διθυράμβους (one can
write dithyrambs), ὃ δὲ ἐγκώμια (hymns
of praise), ὃ δὲ ὑπορχήματα (choral
songs, accompanied by a lively dance),
ὃ δ' ἔπη (epics), ὃ δ' ἰάμβους (iambics)
... διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἐξαιρούμενος
τούτων τὸν νοῦν (taking all reason
out of them) τούτοις χρήται ὑπέρταταις
καὶ τοῖς χρησμοδοῖς καὶ τοῖς μάντεσι
τοῖς θεοῖς.

22
c

ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποιήσιν οἰομένων καὶ τᾶλλα ²²
σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν καὶ
ἐντεύθει τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι ᾧπερ καὶ τῶν
³⁰ πολιτικῶν.

VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἦα. ἐμαυτῷ
γὰρ ξυνῆδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, (τούτους δέ α
γ' ἡδεύ) ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ
τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπι-
⁵ στάμην, καί μου ταύτη σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ᾧ ἄνδρες
Ἰθηναῖοι, ταυτόν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ
ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην κα-
λῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἡξίου καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα
σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἢ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην

²²
^c 27. ἡσθόμην οἰομένων: like ἀκούον-
τες ἐξεταζομένων, 23 c. The acc. oc-
curs in 20 a, ἔν ἡσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα.
Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 2. 1, αἰσθόμενός
ποτε Λαμπροκλέα τὸν πρῶτον
ἴδοντα ἐαυτοῦ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα χαλεπαί-
νοντα (in a passion with his mother).

28. σοφωτάτων: pred. agreeing with
οἰομένων, which contains the subj. of
εἶναι. — ἀνθρώπων: part. gen. G. 1088;
H. 650. — ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν: sc. σοφοί. Cf.
Xen. Mem. iv. 6. 7, ὃ ἐπίσταται ἕκαστος,
τοῦτο καὶ σοφός ἐστιν. On the acc. of
specification, see G. 1058; H. 718.

VIII. 1. τελευτῶν: finally. For
participles used adverbially, see
GMΓ. 834; G. 926; H. 968 a and
619 a.

^d 2. ἐπισταμένῳ: cf. 21 b. — δέ γ':
γέ gives stress to τούτους, but yields
the first place to δέ (cf. 24 c, ἐγὼ δέ
γε); μὲν also takes the same prece-
dence. As a rule, γέ comes imme-
diately after the word which it empha-
sises, or else between the noun and
its art.

4. ἠπίσταντο: they knew, without
any implication that they have ceased
to know at the time when he speaks.

6. ὅπερ καί, καὶ οἱ κτέ.: this repe-
tition of καί is idiomatic in cor-
rel. sents., and may be represented by one
Eng. word, also. With οἱ ποιηταί it
is easy to supply ἐχ.σιν from the
ἔχειν of the leading clause; similar
cases are very frequent in Greek.

7. διὰ τὸ κτέ.: here begins the ex-
planation which the preceding clause
demands. γάρ might have been added,
i.e. διὰ γὰρ τὸ . . . ἐξεργάζεσθαι, or, τὴν
γὰρ τέχνην ἐξεργαζόμενος κτέ.

8. τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα: adjs. used
subst. take the art. after ὁ ἄλλος quite
as commonly as substs. do. τὰ μέγιστα
refers to affairs of state and of the
common weal, as in Rep. iv. 426 c,
σοφὸς τὰ μέγιστα and Gorg. 484 c,
γνώσει, ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἔλθῃς, ἐάσας
ἤδη φιλοσοφίαν, you shall know if once
you proceed to affairs of larger concern
and give up philosophy once for all.
Cf. also Xen. An. ii. 6. 16, and in

10 τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτε, ὥστε με ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ ²²_c
 τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτω ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν
 (μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν) μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν
 ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφοτέρω ἀ ἐκείνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην
 οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῦ ὥσπερ ἔχω
 15 ἔχειν.

IX. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
 πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθεται μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται ²³
 καὶ βαρύτεραι, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέ-
 ναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γάρ

²²
^d *Menex.* 234 a, ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἐπινοεῖς πρέ-
 πεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν ἡμῶν ἐπιχειρεῖς.

9. πλημμέλεια: see on ἐμμελῶς,
 20 c.

10. ὥστε με: not ὥστ' ἐμέ, which
 would be too emphatic. It repre-
 sents ἀνηρώτων ἐμαυτὸν without ἐγώ.

^e Cf. e below, and see App.—ὑπὲρ τοῦ
 χρησμοῦ: in the name of and, as it
 were, on behalf of the oracle.

11. δεξαίμην ἂν: that is "if it were
 mine to choose." εἰ μοι γένοιτο ἢ ἀρε-
 σις is implied. Notice the idioms
 ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν and ἀ ἐκείνοι ἔχουσιν
 ἔχειν. In both the order is just the
 reverse of the natural Eng. one. In
 Lat., the corresponding idioms follow
 the same order with the Greek.

12. μήτε τι: τι strengthens the
 negation μήτε. Cf. οὐτι, μήτι.

IX. 1. δῆ: here used by way of
 closing and summing up the previous
 line of argument. On ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
 ναῖοι, see Introd. p. 49, n. 4.

²³
^a 2. οἶαι χαλεπώταται: sc. εἰσὶ, ex-
 plained by places where the same
 idiom is expanded, e.g. Xen. Mem. iv.
 8. 11, ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ ἐδόκει [Σωκράτης]
 τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἶος ἂν εἴη ἄριστός τε καὶ
 εὐδαιμονέστατος.

4. ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι: instead

of ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο ἐλεγόμεν. Although
 δὲ co-ordinates the whole with πολλαὶ
 μὲν κτέ. and the two form the leading
 clause, yet the inf. λέγεσθαι half in-
 corporates these words with the ὥστε
 clause. This irregular const. is per-
 fectly clear in a conversational style
 like that of Socrates. It has the
 effect of stating more distinctly the
 fact that this epithet σοφός, as ap-
 plied to Socrates, is the capital in-
 stance of πολλαὶ διαβολαὶ and results
 from them.—σοφός: introduced to
 explain precisely what is meant by
 ὄνομα τοῦτο. The nom. σοφός leads
 back to the main statement πολλαὶ
 ἀπέχθεται μοι γεγόνασι, which, how-
 ever, dwells in the speaker's mind as
 ἀπέχθημαι. σοφός agrees acc. to rule
 with the nom. subj. of this ἀπέχθημαι.
 G. 927; H. 940. If ἐμέ, the acc.
 subj. of λέγεσθαι, had been expressed
 instead of understood, this nom. would
 not have been possible.—εἶναι: the
 inf. εἶναι is idiomatically used with
 pred. nouns or adjs. after ὀνομάζειν,
 ὀνομάζεσθαι, and the like. Cf. Rep. iv.
 428 e, ὀνομάζονται τινες εἶναι, are called
 by certain names. Prot. 311 e, σοφίστην
 ὀνομάσουσι τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι. Lach. 192 a,
 ὧ Σωκράτες, τί λέγεις τοῦτο ὃ ἐν πᾶσι

5 με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἃ ἂν 23
 ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω· τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς
 σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ
 ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ
 φαίνεται τοῦτο λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρησθαι δὲ τῷ
 10 ἐμῷ ὀνόματι ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ
 εἴποι ὅτι οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις b
 ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἀξίός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ
 πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιμῶν ζητῶ

23
 a ὀνομάσεις ταχυτήτα εἶναι, *Socrates; what do you mean by (how do you define) this common quality which in all these expressions you call quickness?*

5. ταῦτα: see on ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν, 22 c.
 — ἃ: cf. *Euthyd.* 295 a, ἥδιστα ταῦτα ἐξελέγχομαι, *I am most pleased to be self-convicted of this.* Change ἐξελέγχομαι from pass. to act., and the acc. of the person reappears; ταῦτα in the quoted passage, like ἃ in the text, is a cognate acc., which, in such collocations, is almost invariably a pron. of some sort. G. 1051, 1076; H. 725 c.

6. τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει: τὸ δέ, *in fact*, is adv., meaning practically the same as τούναντίον, for it introduces an assertion which, being true, necessarily contradicts the previous false statement. Plato is particularly fond of this use of τὸ δέ. See, for the adv. use of the art. in Attic, G. 982; H. 654 b. — τῷ ὄντι: serves to point the contrast between this true statement and the false one which people believe (οἴονται).

8. καὶ οὐδενός: brought in as a climax after ὀλίγου. Cf. *Theaet.* 173 e, ἡ δὲ διάνοια ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδὲν, *but his (the philosopher's) mind regarding all this as little or nothing at all.* The Lat. idiom is much the same as the Greek. Cic.

Or. 16. 52, rem difficilem, di immortales, atque omnium difficillimam, a thing which, heaven knows, is hard; or rather, hardness can no farther go.

9. τοῦτο λέγειν: sc. ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία κτέ. The argument runs as follows: "People credit me with knowing all the things which I convict my neighbors of not knowing. The truth is far otherwise, for God alone has real knowledge. The meaning of his dark saying about my being the wisest of men is simply that 'human wisdom is vanity.' He does not mean that Socrates has any other than human wisdom. He only uses the name 'Socrates' because he needs a particular instance." The double acc. with λέγειν closely resembles the idiom κατὰ λέγειν τινά. Cf. *Crit.* 48 a. See App.

10. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ: in this compressed idiom ἂν alone represents a whole clause, which the context readily suggests. GMT. 483 f.; H. 905, 3. For a case where the ellipsis is a simpler one, cf. Xen. *Cyr.* i. 3. 2, ἡσπάζετό τε αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἂν (sc. ἀσπάζοιτο) εἰ τις πάλαι συνθετραμμένος καὶ πάλαι φιλῶν ἀσπάζοιτο.

13. ταῦτ' οὖν: cf. *Prot.* 310 e, ἀλλ' b αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἤκω παρὰ σέ, *that's*

καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν 23
 15 τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ
 βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης
 τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολή
 γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενία μυρία c
 εἰμι διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες οἷς
 μάλιστα σχολή ἐστίν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι

23
 b just why I have come to you. G. 1060 f.;
 H. 719 c. The object is omitted
 as in *Gorg.* 503 d, ἐὰν ζητῆς καλῶς,
 εὐρήσεις, if you search in the right way,
 you shall find. Cf. εἰδέναι below in d.

14. καὶ ξένων: notice the not un-
 usual grouping under one art. of two
 words connected by καί.

15. τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν: cf. on ὑπὲρ τοῦ
 χρησμοῦ, 22 e.

18. ἐν πενία μυρία: cf. *Legg.* iii.
 677 c, μυρίαν τινὰ φοβερὰν ἐρημίαν; *Rep.*
 vii. 520 c, μυρία βέλτιον. Cf. *Xen.*
Oecon. ii. 1-4, where Critobulus and
 Socrates converse substantially as fol-
 lows: "C. I have gained reasonable
 self-control; therefore, Socrates, give
 me any hints you can: tell me the best
 way to manage my property. But
 perhaps you think me already quite
 rich enough. S. That is my own
 case, not yours. I am sure that I am
 a rich man, but I consider you pov-
 erty-stricken, and sometimes I am
 quite worried about you. C. I like
 that, Socrates! For heaven's sake
 do be good enough to tell me what
 price you imagine that your property
 would fetch, if sold, and what mine
 would sell for. S. I am sure a fair
 buyer would be glad of the chance of
 getting my house and all my property
 for five minas (about eighty-five
 dollars). I am sure you are worth

more than a hundred times that sum. 23
 C. How comes it then that you are
 so rich and I so poor? S. My
 income provides amply for all my
 wants, but for your wants you need
 three times as much as you have."
 The possession of five minas must have
 placed Socrates in the lowest of the
 four classes established by Solon, that
 of the θῆτες. Originally this lowest
 class had few political duties and
 no political rights; later on, a law
 proposed by Aristides gave them the
 same rights as the others.

19. τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν: cf. c
Phaedr. 244 e, ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ
 προφητεύσασα οἷς ἔδει, ἀπαλλαγὴν εὔρε-
 το, καταφυγούσα πρὸς θεῶν εὐχάς τε καὶ
 λατρείας, madness intervened and by
 prophesying to those who were in straits
 found relief by recourse to prayer unto
 the gods and the observance of their rites.
 The dat. (less freq. the gen.) with ver-
 bal nouns occurs chiefly after nouns
 such as λατρεία and εὐχή, which ex-
 press the abstract idea of the act
 denoted by the verb; but Plato uses
 both the gen. and dat. with ὑπηρετής,
 and the gen. with ἐπίκουρος; while the
 dat. with βοηθός is familiar in many
 Greek authors. In the const. with
 ὑπηρεσία below, 30 a, the dat. τῷ θεῷ
 takes the place of the gen. here.

X. 2. αὐτόματοι: of their own motion,

χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ 23
 αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμούνται, εἴτ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους
 5 ἐξετάζειν· κάπειτα, οἶμαι, εὐρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν
 οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδόντων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ
 οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργί-
 ζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς α
 ἐστὶ μιαιώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδὴν
 10 τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ ὃ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὃ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν
 οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν,
 τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέ-
 γουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομί-

23
 c to be construed with ἐπακολουθοῦντες.

3. χαίρουσιν κτέ.: Plato compares the disconcerting effect of Socrates's homely method with the charm exercised by the smooth discourse of men like Protagoras and Gorgias. Compare the ironical account of the persuasive charms of Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias in 19 e above, where especially the implication of τούτους πείθουσι should be noticed. Cf. *Prot.* 317 e-319 a, where Protagoras is represented as giving a very taking account of his own teaching for the benefit of young Hippocrates.

4. μιμούνται, εἴτ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν κτέ.: they are for imitating me, and then they undertake, etc. No strict sequence in time is here marked by εἶτα, although their readiness to imitate must logically have preceded the acts in which their imitation consisted. For a most lively description of the early symptoms of such imitators, cf. *Rep.* vii. 539 b. In other editt. μιμούμενοι is substituted for μιμούνται, needlessly, since this use of εἶτα, where κᾶτα would seem more natural, is quite common. Cf. 31 a, and also *Xen. Mem.* ii. 2, 14, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους φυλάξῃ μή σε αἰσθόμενοι

τῶν γονέων ἀμελοῦντα πάντες ἀτιμάσω- 23
 σιν, εἶτα ἐν ἐρημίᾳ φίλων ἀναφανῆς. c

6. ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν: see on ἢ τι ἢ οὐδέν, 17 b, and on ὀλίγου καὶ οὐδένος, 23 a.

8. ἀλλ' οὐχ: instead of. Cf. *Xen. An.* ii. 1. 10, where καὶ οὐ is used with the same meaning. See App. — Σω- d
 κράτης τις: see on τίς Σωκράτης, 18 b.

11. ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν: see App.

12. τὰ κατὰ πάντων κτέ.: ταῦτα means the familiar well-worn commonplaces. These may be found in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes. Xenophon, referring specifically to the λόγων τέχνη, which is not lost sight of here, uses almost the words of our text in *Mem.* i. 2. 31, τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον ἐπιφέρων αὐτῷ, (Critias) making against him the charge made by the many against philosophers in general. Cf. 18 b c, 19 b, and see on εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον, *Crito*, 44 d.

13. ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα κτέ.: the sense requires that from line 10 διδάσκων should be understood, or rather διδάσκων διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. On this implied διδάσκων depend (1) the two accs. τὰ μετέωρα, τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, and (2) the two infs. νομίζειν and ποιεῖν. Cf. 26 b and 19 b.

ζευ καὶ τὸν ἦττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ,²³
 15 οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίνονται ^{κίωμα}
 προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἶδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἅτε οὖν,
 οἶμαι, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοὶ καὶ ξυντε-
 ταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν
 20 τούτων καὶ Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, 20 α. μ.
 Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ
 ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ
 24 τῶν ῥητόρων· ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμά-

²³
 d 14. τὰ ἀληθῆ: the truth, namely ὅτι
 κατάδηλοι κτέ. Eng. idiom requires a
 sing. or an abstract noun more fre-
 quently than the Greek, e.g. ταῦτα
 often means this. H. 635. Cf. *Phaed.*,
 62 A, ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ'
 ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ
 τοῦ δεσπότου, but a fool might perhaps
 think this, that he ought to run away
 from his master.

16. εἰδέναι: one man claims knowl-
 edge of this, and another, knowledge
 of that; the absurdity is in all cases
 the same, i.e. their claiming knowl-
 edge at all.

e 17. ξυντεταγμένως: either (1) in
 phrases well combined, or (2) with their
 forces drawn up, or (3) = κατὰ τὸ ξυντε-
 ταγμένον, i.e. according to a concerted
 plan. (2) and (3) make it refer to
 the united efforts of those represented
 by the three accusers. ξυντεταμένως,
 the reading adopted by Schanz, means
 about the same as σφοδρῶς below, i.e.
 contente, with might and main. This
 would really amount to the same as
 (2), and suits the context far better
 than (1) or (3).

19. ἐκ τούτων: "it is upon this foot-
 ing,—namely that of an old general
 prejudice, aggravated by supervening

personal animosity,—that I am now
 attacked by, etc." R. In spite of
 19 a, ἦ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητος, which
 states the fact here alluded to, "in
 consequence of" would here be an
 inappropriate translation for ἐκ. On
 the accusers, see *Introd.* 30.

21. ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν, δημιουργῶν,
 πολιτικῶν, ῥητόρων: we must not press
 the word ὑπέρ. The accusers merely
 represented the feelings of their respec-
 tive classes. The ῥήτορες have not been
 explicitly mentioned before. For the
 ποιηταί, cf. 22 a; for the πολιτικοί, cf.
 21 e; for the δημιουργοί, cf. 22 d.
 Prob. the ῥήτορες were thought of
 under the general designation of πολι-
 τικοί. This is the more likely because
 the line between men who habitually
 spoke on public questions, and what
 we may call professional speakers,
 was not yet clearly drawn at Athens.
 All this lends weight to the sugges-
 tion that the words καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν
 are a later addition, for which Plato
 is not responsible. See *App.* In
 favor of keeping the words, however,
 is the fact that Anytus, who, like
 Cleon, was a βυρσοδέψης, tanner, came
 into collision with the views of Socra-
 tes rather as a πολιτικός than as a

ζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἶός τ' εἶην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξε- 24
 25 λέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλήν γεγυυῖαν.
 ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῶν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάλθηθῆ, καὶ ὑμᾶς
 οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ' ὑπο-
 στειλάμενος. καίτοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθά-
 νομαι· ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν
 30 ἡ διαβολὴ ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἷτια ταῦτά ἐστι. καὶ ἕαν τε νῦν
 ἕαν τε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε. b

XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγό-
 ρουν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἰκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς· πρὸς δὲ Μέ-
 λητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὡς φησι, καὶ τοὺς
 ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὖθις
 5 γὰρ δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν

²³
 e δημιουργός. It may be that Socrates had aristocratic views about the debasing effect of manual labor similar to those of Plato and Aristotle. Cf. Xen. *Oecon.* iv. 2 and 3, where Socrates is represented as saying that the mechanical arts enervate men's bodies and womanize their souls. Also (*ibid.* vi. 7) where Socrates again is made to say that in case of an invasion the
 24 τεχνῖται will prove cowards.

²⁴
 a 26. ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν: *there you have, etc.*, "just what I promised to tell you at the beginning of my speech."

27. ὑποστειλάμενος: the meaning here is illustrated by many places in Dem., e.g., xxxvii. 48, καὶ τῶ μηδὲν ὑποστειλλόμενον μηδ' αἰσχυρόμενον κλαῖσειν καὶ ὀδυρεῖσθαι, *by his readiness to resort to absolutely undisguised and shameless wailing and lamentation.* See also xix. 237, ἀνάγκη δέ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μετὰ παρρησίας διαλεχθῆναι μηδὲν ὑποστειλλόμενον.

28. τοῖς αὐτοῖς: *sc. by just such undisguised and unmitigated statements.*

29. αὕτη, ταῦτα: both *pred.*

31. οὕτως εὐρήσετε: supply ἔχοντα. ²⁴
 a The finite verb is also left out in such cases, cf. *Rep.* ii. 360 d, ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ οὕτως, *sc. ἔχει.*

XI. 2. πρὸς ὑμᾶς, πρὸς Μέλητον: b
 cf. 18 a, ἀπολογησασθαι πρὸς τὰ ὑστερα (*sc. κατηγορημένα*) καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους (*sc. κατηγορούς*); the Greek idiom is ἀπολογεῖσθαι πρὸς (1) τοὺς δικαστάς, (2) τοὺς κατηγόρους, (3) τὰ κατηγορημένα. In Eng. the idiom is to plead (1) *before* the court, (2) *against* the accusers, (3) *against* (to) the accusations.

3. τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν: *that upright and patriotic man.* The addition of ὡς φησι suggests that few or none encourage Meletus in "laying this flattering unctio[n] to his soul."

4. αὖθις . . . αὖ: *once more . . . in turn.* A strong distinction is made between the serious accusation of the first accusers, those who have prejudiced the public mind, and that of Meletus.

5. ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόρων: *as if these were a second set of accusers.* Cf. 19 b, ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγό-

αὐτὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δέ πως ᾧδε· Σωκράτη 24
 φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ
 θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα
 δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. c
 10 τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἑκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ
 γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δέ γε, ᾧ
 ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χα-
 ριεντίζεται ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ
 πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κηδεσθαι ὧν
 15 οὐδέν τούτῳ πρόποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει
 πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι. X

XII. Καὶ μοι δεῦρο, ᾧ Μέλητε, εἰπέ· ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ
 πολλοῦ ποιεῖ ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται;

24
 b ρων, as if we were dealing with accusers. Socrates distinguishes between two sets of accusers, but maintains that the charges preferred by his actual accusers (Anytus, Meletus, and Licon) are based upon those of his real accusers (public prejudice and misrepresentation).

the phrase ἀγωνίεσθαι δίκην, contend in a law-suit. The sing. is used distributively, involving men in a law-suit. Cf. Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 4, ἔφοροι . . . κύριοι ἔρχοντας . . . καταπαῦσαι καὶ εἰρῆσαι τε καὶ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς ἀγῶνα καταστήσαι, the ephors had power both to supersede and to imprison the magistrates and to bring them to trial for their lives.

6. ἔχει δέ πως ᾧδε: πῶς, substantially, implies that the quotation is not literal. See Introd. 31 and 56. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 21, Πρόδικος . . . περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνεται ᾧδε πως λέγων.
 7. φησὶν: Meletus, already named as the chief accuser.

14. ὧν: not dependent upon οὐδέν which is an adv. acc. See on τούτων, 26 b.

c 9. τὸ ἔγκλημα: see Introd. 68.

15. τούτῳ: gives greater vividness than αὐτῷ would give.

11. ἐγὼ δέ γε: see on 22 d.

16. καὶ ὑμῖν: "so that you can see it as plainly as I can."

12. σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται: this is an ἀξέμωρον; for χαριεντίζεσθαι is akin to παίζειν, the subst. to which, παιδιά, is the contradictory of σπουδή. "Meletus treats a serious business (an accusation involving life and death) as playfully as though the whole matter were a joke." Cf. 27 a.

XII. 1. δεῦρο, εἰπέ: come and tell me. Cf. below, ἴθι δὴ νῦν εἰπέ. δεῦρο is freq. found instead of ἔρχου, ἐλθέ. Cf. Theaet. 144 d, Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὲ Σωκράτη, come here, Theaetetus, and sit by Socrates. Homer has a similar idiom. Cf. Od. xvii. 529, ἔρχεο, δεῦρο καλέσσω ἵ' ἀντίον αὐτὸς ἐνίσπη, come, summon him hither, that face to face he may tell me himself. On the cross-examination, see Introd. 71.— ἄλλο τι ἢ:

13. εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστὰς: ἀγῶν is the usual word for a suit at law; hence

Ἔγωγε. ἴθι δὴ νῦν εἰπέ τούτοις τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; ²⁴
 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἴσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθεί- ^d
 5 ροντα ἐξευρών, ὡς φῆς, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοισὶ καὶ κατηγο-
 ρεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιῶντα ἴθι εἰπέ καὶ μῆνυσον
 αὐτοῖς τίς ἐστίν. ὄρας, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις
 εἰπεῖν; καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχροὺ σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἰκανὸν τε-
 κμήριον οὗ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ'
 10 εἰπέ, ὠγαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἄλλ'
 οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις ^e
 πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὔτοι, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε; οἶδε τοὺς
 νέους παιδεύειν οἳοί τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιούσι; Μά-
 15 λιστα. Πότερον ἅπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ; Ἄπαν-
 τες. Εὐ γὰρ νῆ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν
 ὠφελούντων. τί δὲ δῆ; οἶδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιού-
 σιν ἢ οὐ; Καὶ οὔτοι. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βου- ²⁵

²⁴
^c this idiom, in Plato generally with-
 out the ἦ, is an abbreviated form of
 question, *is it otherwise than, etc.*,
 which always leads up to the answer
 "assuredly" or "most undoubtedly."
 H. 1015 b. Here the answer is im-
 plied by ἔγωγε.

^d 4. τὸν διαφθείροντα: *having discovered their corrupter in me, you bring me before this court and make your accusation.* In Eng. clearness requires a repetition of the ἐμέ, which in Greek goes only with εἰσάγεις.

5. εἰσάγεις: *you summon into court,* commonly with εἰς δικαστήριον or εἰς τοὺς δικαστάς, instead of which τουτοισὶ is used. Sometimes also εἰσάγειν is found. with the gen. of the charge. Cf. 26 a. The word, strictly speaking, should be used only of the magistrates (Introd. 70), but not infrequently it is said of the plaintiff, whose charge

occasions the magistrate εἰσάγειν, to ²⁴
bring into court, the suit. ^d

6. τὸν ποιῶντα εἰπέ καὶ μῆνυσον: for the acc. after μῆνύειν, cf. *Andoc.* i. 13, τοῦσδε Ἀνδρόμαχος ἐμήνυσεν.

7. τίς ἐστίν: cf. *King Lear*, i. 1, where Cordelia says to her sisters: I know you what you are.

9. λέγω: the pres. because Socrates is only maintaining what he has just asserted. The ellipsis with μεμέληκεν is readily supplied from the context.

12. οὔτοι, οἱ δικασταί: *these men, the judges.* The οὔτοι is isolated by the voc. from οἱ δικασταί. The οἶδε which follows includes, strictly speaking, only the ἡλιασταί who were present at the trial; but they are evidently taken as representing all δικασταί.

17. οἱ ἀκροαταί: *the audience,* all except the δικασταί, who have been mentioned. See on 27 b.

λευταί. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ 25
 20 ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κάκεῖνοι
 βελτίους ποιούσιν ἅπαντες; Κάκεῖνοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς
 ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς ποιούσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ
 δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα
 λέγω. Πολλὴν γ' ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καί μοι
 25 ἀπόκριναι· ἢ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν· οἱ
 μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἰς b
 δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἢ τούναντιον τούτου πᾶν εἰς μὲν τις
 ὁ βελτίους οἶός τε ἂν ποιῶν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἵππικοί· οἱ
 δὲ πολλοί, εἰάνπερ ξυνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, διαφθείρου-
 30 σιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων ἀπάντων ζώων; πάντως δήπου, εἰάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυ-
 τος οὐ φῆτε εἰάν τε φῆτε· πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη

25
 a 19. ἀλλ' ἄρα κτέ.: cf. *Euthyd.* 290 e, ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὦ πρὸς Διός, μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ ταῦτ' εἰπών, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι; ΚΡ. ποῖος Κτήσιππος; S. Why then, good gracious! have I forgotten, and was it Ctesippus who said it? C. Ctesippus? rubbish! Questions with μὴ take a negative answer for granted. The use of ἄρα here marks the last stage in Socrates's exhaustive enumeration. Only the ἐκκλησιασταί are left. "Somebody in Athens is corrupting the youth. We have seen that it is nobody else, hence possibly it is these gentlemen." But this is absurd, hence πάντες ἄρα Ἀθηναῖοι κτέ.—οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί: this has probably crept into the text, and was originally a marginal note, put in by way of giving a word parallel to ἀκροαταί and βουλευταί. There was good reason for varying the sameness of discourse by saying οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ. There seems less reason for putting this last idea in two ways. All Athenians twenty years of age in full

standing (ἐπίτιμοι) were members of the public assembly (ἐκκλησία) at Athens. a

27. τούναντιον πᾶν: quite the reverse, an adv. acc. perhaps of measure or content. Cf. *Gorg.* 516 e, ἀλλὰ τὸδε μοι εἰπέ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τούναντιον διαφθαρήναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. In *Crit.* 47 b c d, Socrates appeals from the many and ignorant to the few, or to the one who has special knowledge.

29. διαφθείρουσιν: by its emancipation from the government of δοκεῖ this statement is made especially vigorous. The transition has already been half made by εἰς μὲν τις, where instinctively we supply ἐστὶ in spite of δοκεῖ.

31. πάντως δήπου: before this Socrates waits a moment, to give Meletus opportunity to answer.

32. οὐ φῆτε: the answer no is made prominent by the order of clauses. εἰάν οὐ φῆτε, if you say no, εἰάν μὴ φῆτε,

περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἷς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' 25
 ἄλλοι ὠφελούσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδεί- c
 35 κνυσαι ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς
 ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι μεμέληκε
 περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

XIII. Ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἶπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, πότερόν
 ἐστὶν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ πονηροῖς;
 ὦ τάν, ἀπόκριναι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ
 μὲν πονηροὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς αἰεὶ ἐγγυτάτω ἑαυτῶν

25 b if you do not say yes. οὐ φῆτε must
 be taken closely together as equiv. to
 a verb of denying. See GMT. 384.
 Cf. Lys. xiii. 76, ἐὰν μὲν φάσκη Φρόνιχον
 ἀποκτεῖναι, τούτων μὲνησθε . . . ἐὰν δ'
 οὐ φάσκη, ἔρεσθε κτέ. For the use of
 μή, cf. Dem. xxi. 205, ἂν τ' ἐγὼ φῶ, ἂν
 τε μή φῶ. — πολλή . . . εὐδαιμονία:
 here τῆς applied to an abstraction par-
 ticularizes it. Thus the εὐδαιμονία is
 represented as of some sort; this makes
 the form of statement more specific
 though still vague.

33. εἰ διαφθείρει, ὠφελούσιν: the
 prot. indic. here is not used in the
 prot. that immediately belongs to the
 apod. πολλή . . . ἂν εἴη. See GMT. 503.
 The connexion of thought requires an
 intervening prot., or some qualifying
 adv. like εἰκότως: This implied prot.,
 with its apod., goes with εἰ διαφθείρει,
 ὠφελούσιν. Cf. 30 b and, for a case
 where δικαίως represents the prot. re-
 quired by the sense, Xen. An. vii. 6.
 15, εἰ δὲ πρόσθεν αὐτῷ πάντων μάλιστα
 φίλος ὢν, νῦν πάντων διαφορώτατός
 (most at variance) εἰμι, πῶς ἂν ἔτι
 δικαίως . . . ὑπ' ὧν αἰτίαν ἔχοιμι;

c 34. ἐπιδείκνυσαι: the mid. perhaps
 implies criticism of Meletus's bearing,
 since ἐπιδείκνυσθαι and ἐπίδειξις are
 used of pretentious performances.
 Here, however, ἐπιδείκνυσαι means

primarily ἐπιδεικνύς σαυτόν. G. 1242;
 H. 812. For the added ἔτι clause, see
 the next note, and on τῆς ἐστίν, 24 d.

36. ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι κτέ.: appended to
 explain τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν. Here at
 last is the pun upon Meletus's name
 (cf. also 26 b), for which the constant
 recurrence of the idea of μεμέληκε
 (variously expressed, ἐμέλησεν and
 περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ in 24 c, μέλον γέ σοι
 and μεμέληκεν in 24 d) has already
 paved the way. For similar plays
 upon words, cf. Soph. O. T. 395, ὁ
 μηδὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους, Symp. 185 c, Παν-
 σαν. οὐν δὲ Πασσαμένου, and the obvious
 play upon Agathon's name, *ib.* 174 b;
Rich. II. ii. 1,

Old Gaunt indeed, and gaunt in being old, . . .
 Within me grief hath kept a tedious fast;
 Gaunt am I for the grave; gaunt as a grave.

XIII. 1. ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε: for
 the same order, cf. Men. 71 d, σὺ δὲ
 αὐτός, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν Μένων κτέ. For
 a different order, see 26 b, *Crit.* 46 a.
 In 26 e the voc. is not expressed.

3. ὦ τάν: my friend, or my good
 friend. Cf. Dem. i. 26, ἀλλ' ὦ τάν,
 οὐχὶ βουλήσεται. The orthography is
 much disputed, and we find ὦ τάν,
 ὄταν, and ὦ τάν.

4. τοὺς ἐγγυτάτω ἑαυτῶν ὄντας:
i.e. those who were most unavoidably
 influenced by them.

5 ὄντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν τι; Πάνυ γε. *Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις 25
 βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖ- α
 σθαι; ἀποκρίνου, ὦ ἀγαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀπο-
 κρίνεσθαι. ἔσθ' ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δῆτα.
 Φέρε δῆ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς
 10 νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα;
 Ἐκόντα ἔγωγε. Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ
 σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὢν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν
 ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται αἰεὶ τοὺς μά-
 λιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς ε
 15 τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἤκω, ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι, ἐάν τινα
 μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακόν τι λα-
 βεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ,
 ὡς φῆς σύ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶμαι
 20 εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὥστε σύ γε κατ' ἀμφοτέρα ψεύδει. εἰ 26
 δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτη-

25
 d 7. ἀποκρίνου: after a pause. — ὁ νόμος κτέ.: see Introd. 71 with note 2.

11. τοσοῦτον σὺ κτέ.: τηλικούτος and τηλικόσδε, acc. to the context, mean indifferently *so young* or *so old*. See Introd. 30. Notice the chiasmic order: —

σὺ ἔμοῦ
 τηλικούτου τηλικόσδε.

Cf. below, 26 e *fin.*, and *Euthyphr.* 2 b, νέος γὰρ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνώσ· ὀνομάζουσι μέντοι αὐτόν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, Μέλητον, ἔστι δὲ τὸν δῆμον Πιθθεὺς, εἴ τιν' ἐν νῶ ἔχεις Πιθθεά Μέλητον, οἷον τετανότριχα καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον, ἐπίγρυπον δέ, a young person who, I conceive, is not much known: his name is Meletus and Pitthis is his deme, — perhaps you remember a Meletus of Pitthis, who has rather a beak, a scrubbed beard, and lank long hair.

15. ἀγνοῶ: for the indic. with ὥστε, see GMT. 582; H. 927.

16. κακόν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ: in the case supposed the κακόν is the natural result. It is stated, however (cf. the equiv. idiom ἀγαθόν τι λαβεῖν παρὰ τινος), as something which the victim goes out of his way to obtain.

18. οἶμαι οὐδένα: cf. *Lach.* 180 a, κοινωνεῖν ἔτοιμος (sc. εἰμί), οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Δάχρητα τόνδε (sc. ἔτοιμον εἶναι).

19. ἢ, ἄκων: the verb is supplied from its subordinate clause, εἰ διαφθείρω. More usually the verb of the subord. clause is implied and that of the leading clause expressed. Socrates believed that all sin was involuntary, οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει. See Introd. 17.

21. καὶ ἀκουσίων: strictly speaking 26
 a this is superfluous, since τοιούτων takes

μάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα 20
 διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐὰν μάθω παύσο-
 μαι ὃ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ξυγγενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ δι-
 25 δάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ
 νόμος ἐστίν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ' οὐ
 μαθήσεως.

XIV. Ἄλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον
 ὃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελέτην τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν 2
 πώποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆς δια-
 φθεῖρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι, κατὰ
 5 τὴν γραφὴν ἣν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζεω οὐς
 ἢ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις

26
 a the necessary meaning from its rela-
 tion to ἄκων. Here is another case of
 Socrates's homely fashion of repeating
 himself. See *Introd.* 55.—For the
 gen. of the charge after εἰσάγειν, see
 on εἰσάγειν, 24 d.

23. παύσομαι κτέ.: from ποιῶ we
 must supply ποιῶν with παύσομαι. Such
 an ellipsis as this is obvious, and
 therefore not uncommon. See *App.*

25. ἔφυγες κτέ.: you declined. So-
 crates offered Meletus every op-
 portunity for such an effort. See
Introd. 25. The compound διαφεύγειν
 in this sense is more common, but *cf.*
Eur. Heracl. 595 f., αὐτοὶ δὲ προστι-
 θέντες (imposing) ἄλλοισιν πόνους, πα-
 ρὸν σεσῶσθαι (when they might be wholly
 spared), φευξόμεσθα μὴ θανεῖν.
 From this quotation it appears that
 μῆ might have been used before ξυγ-
 γενέσθαι and διδάξαι. See *Arnold's edit.*
 of *Madvig's Syntax*, 156, *Rem.* 3.
 For cases of ἐκφεύγειν qualified by a
 neg. and followed by τὸ μὴ οὐ and μὴ
 οὐ, *cf. Soph.* 225 b, οὐκέτ' ἐκφεύζεται
 (sc. ὁ σοφιστής) . . . τὸ μὴ οὐ τοῦ
 γένους (kind) εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυματο-

ποιῶν τις εἰς. *GMT.* 811. *Phaedr.* 26
 277 d e, τὸ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν . . . οὐκ ἐκφεύγει
 τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ οὐκ ἐπονείδιστον εἶναι.
GMT. 807. For an entirely differ-
 ent case, *cf.* 39 a, where τὸ ἀποθανεῖν
 represents θάνατον.

XIV. 2. τούτων: see on ὦν, 24 c. b
 —οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν: a stronger
 way of saying οὐδέν. The whole is
 a.c., and therefore in the cognate
 acc. rather than in the gen. See *G.*
 1060 and 1054; *H.* 719 b.

3. ὅμως δὲ δὴ: all the carelessness
 of Meletus is accumulated in ὅμως,
 and thus the adversative force of δέ
 is enhanced, while δὴ brings the state-
 ment of contradiction to a point; that
 is, δὴ marks transition from a general
 to a special account of τὴν τοῦ Μελέ-
 του ἀμέλειαν.

4. ἢ δῆλον: appends a more precise
 and pressing question to the first, and
 anticipates the answer. In *Lat.* an
 is used in this way. The ellipsis in
 ὅτι κατὰ κτέ. is to be supplied from
 πῶς με φῆς διαφθεῖρειν;

6. ταῦτα: does not go with λέγεις
 but with διδάσκων.

ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα 26
λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν ὧν
νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰπέ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς
10 ἀνδράσι τουτοισί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν πότερον c
λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζεις εἶναι τινας θεούς, καὶ αὐτὸς
ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεούς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμί τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος
οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι οὕσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἐτέ-
ρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὁ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέρους· ἢ παντά-
15 πασί με φῆς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζεις θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους
ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομι-
ζεις θεούς. Ὡ θανμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις;

26
b 7. πάνυ μὲν οὖν κτέ.: Meletus agrees and asserts with all his might and main, *I assure you exactly that is what I do mean*. πάνυ and σφόδρα give strength to the assertion ταῦτα λέγω (cf. 25 a), οὖν signifies agreement with Socrates, and μέν (a weakened μήν) gives him the assurance of it.

8. ὧν ὁ λόγος: that is, οὗς λέγομεν. A prep. is more usual, but compare Thuc. i. 140. 3, τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα, with *id.* 139. 1, τὸ περὶ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα. There are many cases where the gen. is used without a prep. (esp. where περί would seem appropriate). Kr. Spr. 47, 7, 6. Stallbaum, however, insists that περί is not implied here, and distinguishes between περί ὧν ὁ λόγος and ὧν ὁ λόγος, just as between λέγειν (*have in mind*) τινά and λέγειν περί τινος. That such a distinction sometimes holds good is plain from other passages in Plato. Cf. Stallb. *in loc.* and Soph. 260 a, οὖν ἔργον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὗ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ οὗτο (sc. ὁ λόγος).

c 10 ff. πότερον λέγεις κτέ.: the two horns of this dilemma are, I. πότερον . . . ὅτι ἐτέρους, and II. ἢ . . . διδάσκειν. In I. there are two subdivisions:

(a) διδάσκειν . . . τινας θεοὺς and (b) καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα . . . ὅτι ἐτέρους, — which is described as the inevitable result of (a). In II. there are two subdivisions: (c) οὔτε . . . θεοὺς, — which contradicts (b), — and (d) τοὺς τε . . . διδάσκειν, — which contradicts (a), but is not stated as the result of (c). After making his first point (a), Socrates, carried away by the minute zeal of explanation, states (b) independently of λέγεις. Therefore it would be clearer to print καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα . . . ὅτι ἐτέρους in a parenthesis if it were not for ἐγκαλεῖς, which in sense reënforces λέγεις. καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα, being strongly affirmative, is followed by καὶ οὐκ (rather than οὐδέ) εἰμί. This, in turn, being strongly neg., is followed by οὐδέ (rather than καὶ οὐκ) ἀδικῶ. Although the sense connects οὐ μέντοι . . . ἐτέρους with νομίζεις . . . θεοὺς preceding, the syntax connects it with νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς. From this we supply the ellipsis with ὅτι ἐτέρους, sc. νομίζω θεοὺς.

14. τοῦτ' ἐστίν: τοῦτο and ὁ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς are not correl. See on τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη, 27 d.

17. ἵνα τί, κτέ.: sc. γένηται, *what makes you talk like that?* See on ἵνα μοι καί, 22 a.

26
c

οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν 20 ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου οἶε κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἶε αὐτοὺς ἀπίερους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ

26
d

18. οὐδὲ . . . οὐδέ: *not even . . . nor yet*. — ἄρα: the insinuation of Meletus was both startling and unwelcome to Socrates, who nevertheless meets it in a tone of playful irony. Every religious-minded Greek revered the sun. No appeal was more solemn and sincere than that to ἥλιος πανόπτῃς. Accordingly this appeal is constantly met with in the most moving situations created by tragedy. Ajax, when in despair he falls upon his sword, and outraged Prometheus from his rock, both cry out to the sun. Ion, before entering upon his peaceful duties in the temple, looks first with gladness toward the sun. Both Heracles and Agave are saved from madness when they once more can clearly recognize the sun. That Socrates habitually paid reverence with exemplary punctiliousness to this divinity not made by human hands is here suggested and is still more plainly shown in *Symp.* 220 d, where, after some account of a brown study into which Socrates had fallen, we read: ὁ δὲ [Σωκράτης] εἰσθῆκει μέχρι ἕως ἐγένετο καὶ ἥλιος ἀνέσχεν· ἔπειτα ῥῆξετ' ἀπὼν προσευξάμενος τῷ ἡλίῳ, then, after a prayer to the sun, he took his departure. On Socrates's religion, see *Intro.* 32.

19. ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί: Meletus uses this form of address, which Plato is careful *not* to put into the mouth of Socrates. See on ὦ ἄνδρες κτέ., 17 a.

20. Ἀναξαγόρου: see *Intro.* 10. *Diog. Laert.* ii. 3, 4, reports that An-

axagoras declared τὸν ἥλιον μύδρον εἶναι διάπυρον (a red hot mass of stone or iron) καὶ μείζω τῆς Πελοποννήσου . . . τὴν δὲ σελήνην οὐκῆσαι ἔχειν καὶ λόφους καὶ φάραγγας (ravines). From this last apparently the public inferred that Anaxagoras held the belief which Meletus attributes so wrongfully to Socrates, i.e. τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. The real view of Socrates in regard to such an account of the "all-seeing sun," as was attributed to Anaxagoras, is perhaps represented by the parenthetical refutation introduced by Xenophon in *Mem.* iv. 7. 7. For a criticism of Anaxagoras which is more worthy of Socrates himself, see the one attributed to him in the *Phaedo*, 97 c-99 d. The capital objection there made to Anaxagoras is that he unfolds his dogmatic views ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν. The argument here is: "apparently you take me for Anaxagoras, and forget that it is Socrates whom you are prosecuting." *Diogenes Laertius*, ii. 3, 5, gives a startling story about Anaxagoras: φασὶ δ' αὐτὸν προειπεῖν (prophesied) τὴν περὶ Αἰγῶς ποταμὸν (Aegospotami) τοῦ λίθου πῶσιν (the fall of the stone), ὃν εἶπεν ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου πεσεῖσθαι.

21. οὕτω: qualifying ἀπίερους below as well as καταφρονεῖς.

22. γραμμάτων: in literature. γράμματα stand in the same relation to μαθήματα as litterae to disciplinae. Plato meant to be outspoken in dealing with the stupidity which led the court to pronounce Socrates guilty.

εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει 26
 τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ
 μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἕξεστω ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς
 ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένους Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν ε
 προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα.

— οὐκ εἰδέναι: οὐ because Socrates wishes to suggest the most positive form of statement: οὕτως ἄπειροι γραμμάτων εἰς ὅστε οὐκ ἴσασι ὅτι κτέ. This vivid use of οὐ for μή in inf. clauses after ὅστε is not uncommon where it is indifferent whether the indic. or infin. is used; thus here ὅστε οὐκ ἴσασι or ὅστε μή εἰδέναι would be equally regular and ὅστε οὐκ εἰδέναι is a mixture of the two. See GMT. 594; H. 1023 b.

23. βιβλία: cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 3. 8, πῶτος (sc. of the philosophers) δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ βιβλίον ἐξέδωκε (published) συγγραφῆς.

24. καὶ δὴ καί: and now you expect people to believe that it is from me, etc.

25. ἃ . . . ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένους: sc. the doctrines, not the books. — ἐνίοτε: that is when, as they often might, they chanced to see a play in which these doctrines were promulgated, as in Eur. *Orest.* 982,

Where hangs a centre-stone of heaven and earth

With linked chains of gold aloft suspended,
 Where whirls the clod erst from Olympus flung,

There I would go.

It is said that, in the lost play of *Phaethon*, Euripides called the sun χρυσέαν βῶλον, a clod of gold. Such utterances could be heard by any who paid the price of admission and listened to this poet's choral odes, which were sung ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας. The price of admission to the theatre of Dionysus thus appears to have been at most (εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ) one drachma.

Ordinary spectators paid two obols, one-third of a drachma, or about six cents. Pericles passed a law providing that Athenians who asked for it should receive two obols for this purpose from the public treasury. The mention here of a maximum admission price of one drachma suggests that the better places may have been reserved by the manager (called θεατρῶνης or θεατροπώλης, sometimes even ἀρχιτέκτων) for those who could pay more than six cents. In the account rendered (see Rangabé, *Antiquités Helléniques*, the inscription numbered 57, lines 30–33, also *C. I. A. I.* 324, pp. 171, 175) for building the Erechtheum (407 B.C.) is found the following item: ἀναλώματα· ἄνηματα· χάρται ἐωνήθησαν δύο ἐς ἃ τὰ ἀντίγραφα ἐνεγράψαμεν †††††, expenditures: purchases: [item] bought two sheets of paper upon which we wrote our accounts, 2 drachmas and 4 obols. It is accordingly absurd to suggest that a volume of Anaxagoras at this time could have cost as little as one drachma, even if it could be proved that books were sold in the orchestra of the theatre of Dionysus; or if, that failing, we were content with the notion of a book-market close to the Agora. The part of the ἀγορά where the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton stood bore the name ὀρχήστρα, but nothing goes to show that books were sold there.

27. ἄλλως τε καὶ . . . ἄτοπα: the more so because of their singularity. "With-

26
d

ἀλλ' ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ οὐδένα νομίζων θεὸν 26
 εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί' οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν. Ἄπιστός γ' εἶ,
 30 ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῶ. ἐμοὶ
 μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ οὕτωςί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι
 ὑβριστῆς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην
 ὑβρεῖ τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι. ἔοικε
 γὰρ ὥσπερ αἰνιγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ, ἔρα γνώσε- 27
 35 ται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ ἐναν-

²⁶_c out taking even that into account, the youths must know well enough that these are not my doctrines." Etymologically *ἔτοπα* suggests not *absurd*, but *uncommon, eccentric*. See the preceding note.

28. ἀλλ' ὦ πρὸς Διός: see on ὦ πρὸς κτέ., 25 c, and cf. Dem. ix. 15, ἀλλ' ἔστιν, ὦ πρὸς τοῦ Διός, ὅστις εὐ φρονῶν . . . σκέψαιτ' ἄν; This marks the transition to a second argument against the charge of atheism, and hence Meletus repeats the charge. Socrates has already shown the absurdity of the charge viewed as a statement of fact. Now he considers it as a statement of opinion (οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ;), and urges that Meletus is not entitled to hold such an opinion because it conflicts with another of Meletus's own views. See App.

29. ἄπιστος εἶ . . . σαυτῶ: you are discrediting . . . your own (proper) self. Cf. the use of *πίθανός* in the contrary sense, e.g. *Phaed.* 67 e, εἶ τι οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίῃ ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὐ ἂν ἔχοι.

33. ὑβρεῖ τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ νεότητι: in a spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado. — ἔοικε ξυντιθέντι: there are three possible consts. with *εοικέαι*: (1) it may be followed by the dat. part. as here, (2) it may take the nom. part., (3) it may take

the inf. With the partic. nom. or dat. *εοικέαι* means *to offer the appearance of (to seem like unto one) being*; with the infinitive it means *to seem, on consideration, to be*. For the inf. const. cf. 21 d above; for the rarer nom. partic. cf. *Cratyl.* 408 b, ἢ γε ἴρις ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶρειν (an old-fashioned word meaning *tell*) *εοικε κε κλημένη*, and Xen. *Hell.* vi. 3. 8, *εοικατε τυραννίσι μάλλον ἢ πολιτείαις ἢ δόμοις*.

34. διαπειρωμένῳ: "one participial 27
 clause (ὥσπερ ξυντιθέντι) within another (διαπειρωμένῳ); as *Rep.* viii. 555 e, τὸν ἀεὶ ὑπέκοντα ἐνιέντες ἀργύριον τιτρώσκοντες, they (the business men) inserting their sting, that is, their money, into any who yields them opportunity, keep inflicting wounds. Notice that it is ὥσπερ αἰνιγμα, a 'mock-riddle,' one which has no answer." R. Cf. for the use of the pres. partic. *Phaed.* 116 c d, *οἶσα γὰρ ἂ ἦλθον ἀγγέλλων*. Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 37, *ἐπεμπον . . . λέγοντας ὅτι κτέ.* An. ii. 4. 24, *ὁ Γλοῦς αὐτοῖς ἐπεφάνη . . . σκοπῶν εἰ διαβαίνουεν τὸν ποταμόν*. *Id.* iv. 5. 8, *βρωτῶν (eatables) διεδίδου καὶ διέπεμπε διδόντας κτέ.* See on *σκοποῦντι*, 21 e. Usually *διαπειρᾶσθαι* takes the gen., but here the question which follows explains the nature of the *διάπειρα*.

35. ὁ σοφὸς δὴ: that enlightened man, spoken with irony. — ἐμοῦ χαρι-

τί' ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους 27
 τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέ-
 γειν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ εἶποι· ἀδικεῖ
 Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καίτοι
 40 τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.

XV. Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἢ μοι φαίνεται
 ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκρισαι, ὦ Μέλητε· ὑμεῖς δέ,
 ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρητησάμην, μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ ἅ
 θορυβεῖν, εἰάν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότῳ τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι.
 5 ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει
 πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ^ρ
 ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω· ἔσθ' ὅστις—
 ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ ἀλλήτας
 μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, ἀλλητικά δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ
 10 ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοι

27
^a ἐντιζόμενον: for the gen. of noun and partic. with γνώσεται, see examples cited in note on ἡσθόμην, 22 c.

36. τοὺς ἄλλους: see on τοῖς ἄλλοις, b below.

37. τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ κτέ.: to contradict himself in so many words. A more positive phrase than ἐναντία ἐμαυτῷ λέγειν above.

XV. 2. ταῦτα λέγειν: sc. ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης . . . θεοὺς νομίζων κτέ.

b 4. τοὺς λόγους: the art. has nearly the force of a poss. here. See G. 949; H. 653. In many such cases as here the art., strictly speaking, points out something which the context has already suggested. To all such suggestions a Greek audience was very sensitive. Hence the freq. and delicate use of the dem. art. in Greek. G. 981 f.; H. 654. On the method of Socrates, see *Intro.* 18, 21, 25, 26.

7. ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω: be al-

ways trying to get up a disturbance; more lit., disturbing in one way and another. Cf. *Xen. An.* i. 5. 12, καὶ οὗτος μὲν (Menon's soldier) αὐτοῦ ἤμαρτεν (missed) ἄλλος δὲ λίθῳ (sc. ἴησι τοῦ Κλεάρχου) καὶ ἄλλος, εἶτα πολλοὶ κραυγῆς γενομένης. *Ibid.* vii. 6. 10, μετὰ τοῦτον ἄλλος ἀνέστη ὁμοίως καὶ ἄλλος. See also *Euthyd.* 273 b, ὅτε Διονυσόδωρος καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστάντες (stopped) διελεγέσθην ἀλλήλων, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντες εἰς ἡμᾶς (now and then glancing at us). The acc. is after the analogy of *θέρυβον θορυβεῖν*, i.e. a cognate acc. G. 1051; H. 715. Here Meletus (cf. 25 d) gives no answer apart from such demonstrations of disgust as Socrates complains of. The words in c below, ὑπὸ τουνανὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος suggest that the court was finally forced to interpose. Of course many "waits" of one kind or another may have oc-

27
 b

λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπό-
 κρῖναι· ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι,
 δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὡς ὠνησας ὅτι μό-
 γις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωῖ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμό-
 15 νια μὲν φῆς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ
 εἶτε παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν
 λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ
 δαιμόνια νομίζω καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομί-
 ζειν μέ ἐστιν· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δῆ· τίθημι γάρ σε
 20 ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας

27
 b curred during such a cross-examina-
 tion as is here given.

11. τοῖς ἄλλοις: all except the ac-
 cuser and the accused; the audience
 (a above) and more esp. the δικασταί.
 — τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀποκρίναι: *please
 to answer the next question.* “This will
 go to the bottom of the whole mat-
 ter.” ἐπὶ τούτῳ is almost the same as
 μετὰ τοῦτο. ἐπὶ with the dat. easily
 passes from the meaning of *nearness*
 to the kindred sense of immediate
 succession in time. The acc. is like
 τὸ ἐρωτηθέν (*the question which has been
 asked*) or τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, *the question
 which is being asked*, freq. used with
 ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

c 13. ὡς ὠνησας: *Oh! thank you!*
 Used absolutely, like *i u u a r e* in Lat.
 — μόγις: see on μόγις πάνν, 21 b.

16. ἀλλ' οὖν: not essentially differ-
 ent from δ' οὖν. See on 17 a.—δαι-
 μόνιά γε: “To make the reasoning
 sound, δαιμόνια here and δαιμόνια πράγ-
 ματα above ought to mean the same;
 which it must be acknowledged they
 do not. It must be observed, how-
 ever, that the original perversion lay
 with Meletus, whose charge of δαιμό-
 νια καινὰ was based simply on Soc-
 rates's τὸ δαιμόνιον. Now by this

Socrates meant a divine agency, but
 Meletus had wrested it into the sense
 of a divine being. So that here the
 equivocation of Meletus is simply re-
 turned upon himself. Contrast, where
 Socrates is speaking uncontroversi-
 ally of his monitor, the distinctly adj.
 use, *θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον*, 31 c.” R.

17. τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ: elsewhere and
 in its stricter use this means the
 written affidavit put in as a rejoinder
 by the accused; rarely as here, the
accusation or the *written affidavit* of
 the accuser. So in Hyper. *Eux.* §§ 4,
 33 (Col. 20, 40). Harpocration on
 the word ἀντιγραφῆ says, evidently
 referring to this passage: Πλάτων δὲ
 ἐν τῇ Σωκράτους ἀπολογίᾳ τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖ
 ἀνωμοσίαν καὶ ἀντιγραφῆν. See *Introduct.*
 69 and n. 1 and 2.

19. ἔχει: repeated by way of an-
 swering *yes* after οὕτως ἔχει; simi-
 larly the simple verb is often repeated
 after a compound form. See on
Crit. 44 d.—δῆ: *certainly*. Such an
 affirmation is not only self-evident
 (justified by common sense), but also
 follows from the admission which
 Meletus already has made.

20. τοὺς δαίμονας κτ.ε.: the defi-
 nition here given is consistent with

οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεοὺς γε ἠγοῦμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῆς ἢ οὐ; ²⁷_d
 Πάνν γε. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἠγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φῆς, εἰ
 μὲν θεοὶ τιές εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγὼ φημί
 σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἠγοῦμενον
 φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἠγείσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας
 ἠγοῦμαι· εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές εἰσι νόθοι τινές
 ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινων ἄλλων, ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν
 ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἠγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μῆ;
 ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖ-

Greek usage from Homer to Plato. In Homer *θεός* and *δαίμων*, applied to any divinity in particular or to divinity in general, are all but interchangeable terms. The distinction between them, if distinction there is, suggests itself rather in the adjs. derived from them than in the two nouns themselves. Hesiod, *Op.* 108–125, calls the guardian spirits that watch over men *δαίμονες*; to the rank of *δαίμονες* he says those were raised who lived on earth during the golden age. He distinguishes between *θεοί*, *δαίμονες*, and *ἥρωες*, and this same distinction is attributed to Thales. On this Plato based the fancy expressed in the *Symposium* (202 e): *πάν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ (intermediate) ἐστὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ . . . ἐρμηνεύον καὶ διαπορθμεύον (interpreting and conveying) θεοῖς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν μὲν τὰς δεήσεις καὶ θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἀμοιβὰς (commands and rewards) τῶν θυσίων.*

21. φῆς ἢ οὐ?: three Eng. words, *yes or no?*, will translate this. See on οὐ φῆτε, 25 b.

22. εἴπερ δαίμονας ἠγοῦμαι κτέ.: a complex prot., which falls into two simpler conditions, each of which ex-

cludes the other. The latter apply the broader supposition *εἴπερ δαίμονας ἠγοῦμαι* in turn to alternative apodotes, both of which it limits. Cf. Xen. *An.* vii. 6. 15, for a very similar construction: *ἐπεὶ γε μὴν ψεύδεσθαι ἤρξατο Σεύθης περὶ τοῦ μισθοῦ*, — this might readily have taken the form of a prot., — *εἰ μὲν ἐπαιῶ αὐτόν, δικάως ἂν με καὶ αἰτιώσθε καὶ μισοῖτε· εἰ δὲ πρόσθεν αὐτῷ . . . φίλος ἂν νῦν . . . διαφορώτατός εἰμι, πῶς ἂν ἔτι δικάως . . . ὑφ' ὑμῶν αἰτῶν ἔχοιμι*; On the combination of indic. and opt., see GMT. 503, and on *εἰ διαφθείρει, κτέ.*, 25 b above.

23. τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη: by *τοῦτο* the preceding conditions, *εἴπερ . . . ἠγοῦμαι* and *εἰ . . . δαίμονες*, are grasped into one; and, thus combined in *τοῦτο*, they become the subj. whose pred. is the suppressed (*ἐκεῖνο*) antec. of *ᾧ*. To *ᾧ* *σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι* is appended *φάναι*, which explains it and has the same subj.; all this points back to *θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων*, 27 a.

27. ὧν: equiv. to *ἐξ ὧν*, for “when the antecedent stands before the relative, a preposition (in this case *ἐκ*) belonging to both usually appears only with the first.” See H. 1007.—*δῆ*: *you know*.

27
d

30 δας ἡγοῖτο [ἦ] καὶ ὄνων, τοὺς ἡμίονους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ²⁷
 ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως
 σὺ [ταῦτα] οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν
 ταύτην ἢ ἀπορῶν ὃ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα.
 ὅπως δὲ σὺ τινα πείθεις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀν- ⁶
 35 θρώπων, ὡς [οὐ] τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα
 ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε
 ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν. 28

XVI. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ
 ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ
 εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα. ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονε καὶ
 5 πρὸς πολλοὺς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθὲς ἐστὶ. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ
 ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, εἴνπερ αἰρή, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ'
 ἦ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. ἃ δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ

²⁷
^e 30. τοὺς ἡμίονους: these words do not interfere with the grammar, although they make sad havoc with the sense, unless ἡ disappears.

33. ἢ ἀπορῶν ὃ τι, κτέ.: this no doubt was Socrates's real view of the case of Meletus (cf. 23 d), whereas all that precedes is only to bring home to the court how foolish and self-contradictory the charge is. ἀπορῶν and ἀποπειρώμενος, in connexion with ἐγράψω, refer to continued action in past time. — ἐγκαλοῖς: the opt. represents Meletus's original reflexion τί ἐγκαλῶ; The subjv. might have been retained. GMT. 677.

34. ὅπως δὲ σὺ κτέ.: here Socrates closes his argument to the effect that it is a contradiction in terms to say of one and the same man (1) that he is a complete atheist, and (2) that he believes in δαιμόνια. The second τοῦ αὐτοῦ must be regarded as redundant, a simple repetition of the first one

which might be dispensed with. See ²⁷
 App. — πείθεις ἂν ὡς [οὐ]: is not ^e
 simply pleonastic, as in the case of two negatives in the same clause, but it is irrational, and can hardly be right. ὅπως means *how* or *by which* after μηχανή. A similar use of ὡς is explained GMT. 329, 2.

XVI. 1. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ... ταῦτα: this ²⁸
 phrase dismisses one topic to make ^a
 room for the next one.

5. ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, εἴνπερ αἰρή: will be the condemnation of me, if condemnation it is to be. αἰρεῖν and ἀλίσκεσθαι are technical terms of the law, as is the case with φεύγειν and διώκειν.

7. δὴ: certainly. The allusion is to facts generally known and acknowledged, cf. 31 d. — πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς: instead of καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς. The first καὶ is the idiomatic καὶ of comparisons. Cf. 22 d, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, and the idiom εἴ τις καὶ ἄλλος. The second καὶ is

ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας ἤρρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσειν· 28
 οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή. ἴσως δ' ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· εἴτ' b
 10 οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτηδεύμα ἐπιτηδεύσας,
 ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυκτὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον
 λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἶε
 δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα
 ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνο μόνον
 15 σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττη, πότερα δίκαια ἢ ἀδίκαια πράττει καὶ
 ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῶ
 λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἳ τε c
 ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου

28
 a equally idiomatic, and joins πολλούς with a second adj. Cf. πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἄνδρες.

9. οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν... στή: the rule is in no danger of breaking down in my case. Cf. Phaed. 84 b, οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῆ, we need not apprehend that the soul will have to fear. Gorg. 520 d, and Rep. v. 465 b. There is a touch of irony in this way of saying "I do not think." Socrates as it were enlists on the side of the rule. This idiom throws no light on οὐ μὴ with subjv. or fut. indic. GMT. 294, 295. For the quasi-impersonal use of στή, come to a stand-still, cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. vi. 9. 9, στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. Theaet. 153 d, ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, πάντα ἔστι καὶ σώζεται... εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὡσπερ δεθέν (tethered), πάντα χρήματ' ἂν διαφθαρείη. In such contexts the aor. στήναι denotes the entrance into a state of quiet or collapse. GMT. 55, b 56. — εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει: a question indicating surprise. The perversity of Socrates, in view of the fact just recited, is unreasonable. When such a question is accompanied by an urgent statement of the reason for

surprise (here τοιοῦτον... ἐξ οὗ, κτέ.), it may be introduced by εἴτα or ἔπειτα, otherwise not. 28
 b

11. ἐγὼ δὲ κτέ.: cf. Crit. 48 d for the same thought, and Xen. An. iii. 1. 43, for its application to the risks of war. In the Ajax of Sophocles, 473-480, the same idea is brought to the following climax:—

Honor in life or honorable death
 The nobly born and bred must have.

13. κίνδυνον τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι: the question of life or death. Cf. for the use and omission of the art., Rep. i. 334 e, κινδυνεύομεν (perhaps we, etc.) οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρὸν θέσθαι (have defined). Cf. for the thought, Aj. 475-476:—

τί γὰρ παρ' ἡμῶν ἡμέρα τέρπειν ἔχει
 προσθεῖσα κἀναθεῖσα τοῦ γε καταβαίνειν;

15. ὅταν πράττη: whenever he does anything. GMT. 532. See App.

17. τῶν ἡμιθέων: i.e. τῶν ἡρώων. Hesiod, W. and D. 158, calls the fourth race, ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῶν γένος οἱ καλέονται | ἡμίθεοι κτέ., and he counts among their number the heroes that laid siege to Thebes and to Troy.

18. ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός: any appeal c to the example of Achilles was always

κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομῆναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ 28
 20 εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἑκτορα ἀποκτείνειν,
 θεὸς οὔσα, οὕτωςί πως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρή-
 σεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἑκτορα ἀποκτε-
 νεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ'
 Ἑκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος· ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν
 25 θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὀλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον
 δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὦν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, α
 αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίην δίκην ἐπιβείς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα
 μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν
 ἄχθος ἀρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἶε φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ
 30 κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ·
 οὐδ' ἂν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἢ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ'

28
 c very telling. The enthusiasm with which all Greeks regarded this hero was shown by temples raised in his honor and by countless works of art in which he appeared. Homer, *Od.* xi. 489, tells how Achilles found his favored condition in the lower world hardly to be endured. The post-homeric story-tellers said that he was living in the islands of the blest. Cf. *Symp.* 179 e, where this same scene between Thetis and Achilles is quoted, and the scholion (Bergk 10) to Harmodius:—

No, sweet Harmodius, thou art not dead,
 But in the Islands of the Blest men say,
 Where lives swift-foot Achilles far away,
 And Tydeus' son, they say, brave Diomed.

We hear that Ibycus, and after him Simonides, wishing no doubt to make Achilles's happiness complete, represented him as married to Medea in Elysium.

21. θεὸς οὔσα: added in a very unusual way, because the circumstance has unusual weight. The utterance of Thetis was not only prompted by

the natural anxiety of a mother for her son, but also was inspired by the unerring wisdom of a goddess. Cf. Hom. *Od.* iv. 379 and 468, θεοὶ δὲ τε πάντα ἴσασιν. The passage from Hom. *Il.* xviii. 70 ff., is quoted rather loosely in part (οὕτωςί πως), and partly word-for-word.

24. ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας κτέ.: at this point ὥστε is forgotten. The long speech and explanation given to Thetis makes this break in the const. very natural. In fact, this clause is as independent as if a co-ord. clause (with or without μέν) had preceded it.—τοῦ θανάτου: notice the exceptional use of the art., which is usually omitted with θάνατος as an abstract noun. Cf. 28 e, 29 a, 32 c, 38 c, 39 a b, *Crit.* 52 c. For the art. used as here, cf. 29 a, 40 d, 41 c.

29. μή . . . οἶε: see on ἀλλ' ἔρα, 25 a. d

31. ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῆ: instead of ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος κελευσθείς or even ταχθείς. Some such expression is called for grammatically by the form of the first alternative ἢ ἡγησάμενος

ἄρχοντος ταχθῆ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κιν- 28
δυνεύειν μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο
μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δευνὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες

28

^d κτέ. This irregular interjection of the finite const. represents the facts better. The commander's order, if given at all, was peremptory, and requires a more positive statement than the less urgent ἡγησάμενος κτέ. In the sense ὑπ' ἀρχοντος ταχθῆ is the alternative of ἐαυτὸν τάξῃ. See App.

33. ὑπολογιζόμενον: as in **b** above, ὑπολογίεσθαι means *take into account*, i. e. in striking a balance. Cf. *Crit.* 48 **d**, where nearly the same idea is expressed. For a detailed description of the process of striking a balance involved in ὑπολογίεσθαι, cf. *Phaedr.* 231 **b**, οἱ μὲν ἐρώντες σκοποῦσιν ἅ τε κακῶς διέθεντο . . . καὶ ἅ πεποιθήκασιν εὔ, καὶ ἂν εἶχον πρόνον προστιθέντες ἡγόνται πάλα τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδεδοκῆναι χάριν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις. τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρώσιν οὔτε τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀμέλειαν διὰ τοῦτο ἔστι προφασίεσθαι οὔτε τοὺς παρελλυθότας πρόνους ὑπολογίεσθαι κτέ. The force of ὑπό here is very near to that of ἀντί, and, so far from primarily indicating a process of subtraction, it involves first of all an addition.

34. πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ: moral turpitude (turpe), not death, was the harm which Socrates struggled to avoid at any and every price. Cf. 29 **b** and *Soph. Ant.* 95 ff.,

Nay, leave me and my heart's untoward plan
To suffer all thou fear'st; naught will I suffer
That shall estop me from a righteous death.

XVII. Having established the proposition that disgrace is more frightful than death, Socrates can now answer the question of 28 **b**, if he can

prove that it would have involved, and would still involve, disgrace for him not to have followed the pursuit which has brought him in danger of his life. This point he makes clear by an appeal to the analogy of military discipline, which, as he claims, applies to his relations to the gods. He is a soldier in the army of Apollo.

1. δευνὰ ἂν εἶην . . . λιπούμι τὴν τάξιν: much here depends upon disentangling past, pres., and fut. See *GMT.* 509. The protasis (limiting the apod. δευνὰ ἂν εἶην κτέ., lit. *I should prove to have done a dreadful thing*) includes various acts in the past which are looked upon from a supposed time in the fut. It falls into two parts: one, marked off by μέν, states (in the form of a supposition) well-known facts in the past; the other, distinguished by δέ, states a supposed future case in connexion with certain present circumstances. See on 5. The outrageous conduct for him would be with this combination of facts and convictions, after his past fidelity to human trusts, at some fut. time to desert his divinely appointed post of duty: *if while then I stood firm I should now desert my post*. The repetition of μέν and δέ respectively is for the sake of clearness. For the same repetition cf. *Isocr.* vii. 18, παρ' οἷς μὲν γὰρ μήτε φυλακὴ μήτε ζῆμία τῶν τοιοῦτων καθέστηκε μήθ' αἱ κρίσεις ἀκριβεῖς εἶσι, παρὰ τοῦτο μὲν διαφθείρεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν φύσεων, ὅπου δὲ μήτε λαθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι βῆδιδόν ἔστι μήτε φανεροῖς γενομένοις συγγνώμης τυχεῖν,

28

^d

Ἄθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταπτον, οὓς ὑμεῖς^{28 e}
εἴλεσθε ἄρχην μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ

^{28 d} ἐν ταῦθα δ' ἐξητήλους γίνεσθαι τὰς κακοηθείας, for (they knew) that while among those who have neither established safeguards nor penalties for such crimes nor any strict organization of justice, that while among these, I say, even righteous characters are corrupted; at the same time, where wrong-doers find it easy neither to conceal their transgressions nor to secure condonation when detected, there I say (they knew that) evil dispositions end by dying out. Cf. also *Gorg.* 512 a. Notice that the μὲν clause is important only with reference to the δέ clause, upon which the main stress is laid; the δέ clause is made prominent through the contrast afforded by the logically subordinate μὲν clause. This same relation is indicated in the Eng., French, and German idiom by the use of some word like "while" in the μὲν clause.

2. οἱ ἄρχοντες: not the nine archons, but, as the context shows, the generals in command upon the field of battle.—ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε: the δικασταί are here taken as representing the whole δῆμος, from which they were selected by lot. See *Introd.* 66. Perhaps Socrates has also in mind the other Athenians present at the trial. See on 24 e and 25 a. The generals were elected by show of hands (χειροτονία) and their electors were the ἐκκλησιασταί. Cf. 25 a.

3. ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ . . . Δηλίῳ: Potidaea, a Corinthian colony on the peninsula Chalcidice, which became a tributary ally of Athens without wholly abandoning its earlier connexion with Corinth. Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, took advantage of this divided allegiance to persuade the Po-

tidaeans to revolt from Athens, which they did in 432 B.C. The Potidaeans, with the reinforcements sent them by the Peloponnesians, were defeated by the Athenian force under Callias. For two whole years the town was invested by land and blockaded by sea, and finally made favorable terms with the beleaguering force. In the engagement before the siege of Potidaea, Socrates saved Alcibiades's life. Cf. *Symp.* 219 e–220 e, where Alcibiades gives a most enthusiastic and witty account of the bravery and self-denial of Socrates during the whole Potidaean campaign, and says of the battle in question: ὅτε γὰρ ἡ μάχη ἦν ἐξ (after) ἧς ἐμοὶ καὶ τὰριστεία (the prize for gallantry in action) ἔδρσαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ, οὐδὲν ἄλλος ἐμὲ ἔσωσεν ἀνθρώπων ἢ οὗτος, τετραμένον (when I was wounded) οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀπολαίειν, ἀλλὰ συνδιέσωσε καὶ τὰ ὄπλα καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμέ. Alcibiades says that Socrates ought to have had the prize which was given to himself by favoritism. Cf. *Charm.* 153 b c.—The battle at Amphipolis, an Athenian colony on the Strymon in Thrace, took place in the year 422. The Athenians were defeated, and their general, Cleon, perished in the rout, while Brasidas, the Spartan general, paid for victory with his life.—Delium was an enclosure and a temple sacred to Apollo in Boeotia near Oropus, a border town sometimes held by the Athenians and sometimes by the Boeotians. The battle, which was a serious check to the power of Athens, resulted in the defeat and death of their general, Hippocrates. Cf. *Xen. Mem.* iii. 5. 4, ἀφ' οὗ ἦ τε σὺν Τολμίδῃ τῶν χιλίων ἐν Λε-

^{28 e}

ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὐδ' ἐκείνοι ἔταπτον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ 28
 5 ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος,
 ὡς ἐγὼ ᾤθηθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφούντά με δεῖν ζῆν
 καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβη-
 θεῖς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. 29
 10 τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν
 τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιῶς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι
 οὐκ ὤν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὧ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν
 ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ
 εἰδέναί ἐστιν ἂ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνα-

28
 e βαδεῖ συμφορὰ ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ μεθ' ἱπποκράτους ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, ἐκ τούτων τεταπεινώται (has been humbled) μὲν ἢ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς κτέ. Notice that both Plato and Xen. say ἐπὶ (not ἐν) Δηλίῳ, because at the time there was no extended settlement at or near the place. For the gallantry of Socrates in the retreat, cf. *Symp.* 221 a b. Alcibiades was mounted, and therefore could observe better than at Potidaea how Socrates behaved, and he says: ἄξιον ἦν θεάσασθαι Σωκράτη, ὅτε ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυγῆ ἀνεχώρει τὸ στρατόπεδον . . . πρῶτον μὲν ὄσον περιῆν Λάχτος (his companion in flight) τῷ ἔμφρων εἶναι· ἔπειτα δῆλος ὢν . . . ὅτι εἴ τις ἕψεται τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρος, μάλα ἔρρωμένως ἀμυνεῖται. See also the similar testimony of Laches in *Lach.* 181 b.

4. ἔμενον καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν: The repeated allusions which are scattered through Plato's dialogues to the brave conduct of Socrates in these battles show that it was well known at Athens. — ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις: just like many another man. He is careful not to make too much of the

facts. The indef. τις here means some, i.e. any indefinite person, because many persons are thought of under ἄλλος.

5. τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος: i.e. now that my post is assigned me by the god, a circumstance of the supposition εἰ λίποιμι, which is repeated in ἐνταῦθα.

6. ὡς ἐγὼ ᾤθηθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον: as I thought and understood, sc. when I heard the oracle which was given to Chaerephon. — δεῖν: depends on the force of commanding in τάπτοντος. Apollo gives him an injunction, to the effect that he must live, etc.

8. λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν: so worded as to suggest λιποταξίου γραφή, a technical phrase of criminal law. Any one convicted of λιποταξία forfeited his civil rights, i.e. suffered ἀτιμία.

9. τᾶν: τοί, truly, emphasizes this repetition of the strong statement which begins the chapter.

14. ἄ οὐκ οἶδεν: sc. ὁ δοκῶν εἰδέναί, i.e. the same indef. subj. which is to be thought of with the preceding infs. Cf. below b, and 39 d. As a rule, the third person, when it means vaguely any one (the French on) or anything, is

28
 e

29
 a

15 τον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὄν 29
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν
 κακῶν ἐστὶ. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ β
 ἐπονειδιστος ἢ τοῦ οἰεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δ', ὦ
 ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀν-
 20 θρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ
 ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου οὕτω καὶ οἴο-
 μαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι,
 καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν οἶδα.)
 πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ
 25 ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φευξομαι·
 ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς c

29
 a not expressed.—τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ:
 by prolepsis for οὐδ' εἰ ὁ θάνατος, *not even whether, i.e. whether death may not actually be.* Thus he is as far as possible from knowing that death is the greatest of harms. For a fuller statement, cf. 37 b. See on τοῦ θανάτου, 28 c, for the use of the art.

15. ὄν: here, as usual, in the gender of ἀγαθόν, which is implied in the pred. μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

17. τοῦτο: not in the gender of ἀμαθία. This makes a smoother sent. than αὕτη πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ κτέ., which was the alternative.—

b αὕτη ἢ ἐπονειδιστος: *that very same reprehensible, limiting ἀμαθία and recalling the whole statement made above, 21 b-23 e.*

19. τούτῳ, τούτῳ ἄν: repeated for the greater effect. Both represent the same point of superiority, *i.e. ὅτι κτέ.* Notice the cleverness of the ellipsis after ἄν. Socrates thus evades any too circumstantial praise of himself. For the ellipsis in the leading clause, see on ἡ . . . ἔκων, 25 e.—καὶ ἐνταῦθα: *here too.*

20. εἰ δὴ: *if really, i.e. if, as the* 29
 oracle suggests. b

21. οὐκ εἰδὼς . . . οὕτω: *i.e. ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδα . . . οὕτω.* οὕτως sums up a previous partic. clause, and its force is nearly *so likewise.* Cf. Men. 80 c, παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπορεῖν ποιῶ.

24. ὧν . . . ἐστὶν: a notable instance of assimilation. G. 1031; H. 994. See on ὧν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὕντων, 37 b. κακά is related to ὧν as ἀγαθὰ in the next line is related to ἄ.—οἶδα εἰ: see on τὸν θάνατον κτέ., above a.

26. εἰ ἀφίετε . . . εἰ οὖν ἀφίετε, εἴπομαι ἄν: the speaker weakens εἰ νῦν ἀφίετε (*if you are now ready to acquit me*) by the explanatory detail of εἴ μοι εἴποιτε and by various reiterations of the conditions upon which this release may be granted, until the weaker clause εἰ ἀφίετε comes of itself to his lips as all that is left of the more positively worded prot. with which he began.—ἀπιστήσαντες: conveys c
 the idea of disregarding rather than that of *disbelieving.* This meaning

ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ, ἐπειδὴ 29
 εἰσηλθόν, οὐχ οἶόν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων
 πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς, εἰ διαφενξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς
 30 ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἅ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι
 διαφθαρήσονται — εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἵποιτε / ὦ Σώκρα-
 τες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ
 τούτῳ μέντοι ἐφ' ὅτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσῃ διατρί-
 βειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· εἰ δὲ ἀλλῶς ἐτι τοῦτο πράττων, ^{50. οὐκ}
 35 ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίετε, α
 * εἵπομαι ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζο-
 μαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ
 ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἶός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλο-
 σοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος
 40 ὅτῳ ἂν αἰεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἰάπερ εἶωθα, ὅτι, ὦ

29
 c of ἀπιστεῖν is not uncommon in Plato.
 Cf. *Laus*, 941 c, δ μὲν οὖν πεισθελς
 ἡμῶν τῷ λόγῳ εὐτυχεῖ τε καὶ εἰς χρό-
 νον ἅπαντα εὐτυχοῖ, δ δὲ ἀπιστήσας
 τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τοιφῶδέ τιμι μαχέσθω
 νόμῳ.

27. οὐ δεῖν, οἶόν τε εἶναι: in the
 original form this would be οὐκ ἔδει
 and οὐχ οἶόν τε ἐστίν. GMT. 119;
 H. 853 a. — εἰσελθεῖν: on this use of
 εἰσερχεσθαι, see Introd. 70 with the
 note. Anytus probably argues: "If
 Socrates had not been prosecuted, his
 evil communications might have been
 ignored; once in court, his case al-
 lows but one verdict. To acquit him
 is to sanction all his heresies."

29. εἰ διαφενξοίμην: fut. opt. in
 indir. disc. GMT. 128; 667; H. 855 a.
 — ἂν . . . διαφθαρήσονται: an un-
 common apod. See GMT. 197; H.
 845. See App.

33. ἐφ' ὅτε: for const. with inf.,
 see GMT. 610 ♣ H. 999 a.

35. οὖν: after a digression.

36. ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι: a fictitious 29
 apostrophe. Cf. Dem. viii. 35, εἰ οἱ
 "Ἕλληνες ἔριον" ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
 πέμπετε ὡς ἡμᾶς ἐκάστοτε πρόσβεις
 κτέ. See App. — ἀσπάζομαι καὶ φι-
 λῶ: you have my friendship and my
 love, but, etc. ἀσπάζεσθαι designates the
 greeting of friends. Cf. *Od.* iii. 34-35,
 where Nestor and his sons see Tele-
 machus and Mentos, ἀθρόοι ἦλθον ἅπαν-
 τες, | χερσίν τ' ἠσπάζοντο καὶ
 ἐδριάσθαι ἄνωγον. Cf. also *Il.* x. 542,
 τοὶ δὲ χαρύντες | δεξιῇ ἠσπάζοντο
 ἔπεσσι τε μελιχίσιον.

37. πείσομαι: cf. *Acts* iv. 19, δ δὲ
 Πέτρος καὶ Ἰωάννης ἀποκριθέντες εἶπον
 πρὸς αὐτούς· εἰ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐνώπιον
 (in the sight) τοῦ θεοῦ, ὑμῶν ἀκούειν
 μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ κρίνατε, *ibid.*
 v. 28, πειθαρχεῖν (obey) δεῖ θεῷ
 μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις.

38. οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι: see on οὐδὲν
 κτέ., 28 a. For οὐ μὴ with the subj.
 in strong denials, see GMT. 295; H.
 1032.

ἀριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ 29
 εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ
 αἰσχύνηι ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλείστα καὶ
 δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς e
 45 ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντί-
 ζεις; καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητῇ καὶ φῆ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,
 οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἀπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν
 καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι
 ἀρετήν, φάναι δέ, ὄνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλα-
 50 χίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα 30
 καὶ νεωτέρω καὶ πρεσβυτέρω, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω,
 καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῶ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυ-

29
 d 41. πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης κτέ.: cf. Xen. An. vii. 3. 19, προσελθὼν δὲ καὶ Ξενοφῶντι ἔλεγε· σὺ καὶ πόλεως μεγίστης εἶ καὶ παρὰ Σεύθῃ τὸ σὺν ὄνομα μεγιστόν ἐστι. The gen. is in appos. with Ἀθηναῖος = Ἀθηνῶν ὢν. Cf. Hipp. Ma. 281e, ἡ ὑμετέρα τῶν σοφιστῶν τέχνη. G. 913, κ.; H. 691. For the points of superiority, cf. Thuc. ii. 35-46.

42. εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν: for the full meaning, cf. 38 c-39 d, also Thuc. ii. 40, 41. Here ἰσχὺς means the strength which rules the kingdom of the mind (σοφία). Cf. Thuc. i. 138, where he says of the typical Athenian Themistocles: ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς, βεβαίωτατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχὺν δηλώσας, καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἑτέρου ἄξιος θαυμάσαι. This φύσεως ἰσχὺς, when circumstances disclosed its perfection, was σοφία, the virtue of virtues, chiefly prized by Socrates as including all others.

χρημάτων . . . ψυχῆς: the same prolepsis as that in 29 a, where τὸν θάνατον is pointedly mentioned before its time. Notice the significant use of the art. with ψυχῆς, a word which

like σῶμα often appears without the art. in cases that seem to require it; τῆς accordingly has the force of a possessive pron. G. 949; H. 658.

45. οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ: see on ὅμως δὲ e ἐδόκει, 21 e.

47. ἐρήσομαι, ἐξετάσω, ἐλέγξω: these words in this order represent the process by which Socrates so often disconcerted his fellow-countrymen. Beginning with a harmless question or two, his method soon proved uncomfortably scrutinizing (ἐξετάσω), and generally ended by convicting (ἐλέγξω) of ignorance.

50. ταῦτα νεωτέρω ποιήσω: ποιεῖν, like πράττειν and ἐργάζεσθαι, often takes in addition to the acc. of the thing done a dat. of the person for whom the thing is done, but the acc. of the person to whom it is done. Cf. Xen. An. iii. 2. 3, οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς τοιαῦτα παθεῖν οἷα τοὺς ἐχθροὺς οἱ θεοὶ ποιήσονται. Ibid. 24, καὶ ἡμῖν γ' ἂν οἷδ' ὅτι τρισάσμενος (thrice gladly) ταῦτ' ἐποίηε, εἰ ἐώρα ἡμᾶς μένειν παρασκευαζομένους.

52. ὅσῳ . . . ἐστὲ γένοι: the thought

τέρω ἐστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εἰ ἴστε, καὶ 30
 ἐγὼ οἶμαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ
 55 πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο
 πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους
 καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρη-
 μάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ^b
 ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων· οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται,
 60 ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
 πους ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίαι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα

30
^a of Socrates insensibly returns to his hearers, in whom he sees embodied the whole people of Athens. The correlative of ὅσῳ readily suggests itself with μάλλον. Cf. the same case, 39 d. Cf. *Euthyphr.* 12 c, καὶ μὴν νεώτερός γε μου εἰ οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ὅσῳ σοφώτερος.

55. τὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν: see on δοῦλος, *Crit.* 50 e, and contrast τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν, 23 c; cf. also τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν, d below; see also on τὰ μετέωρα φροντιστής, 18 b. ὑπηρεσία takes the same dat. of interest which is found with the verb from which it is derived. The Lat. idiom is the same, e.g. Cic. *de Legg.* i. 15. 42, Quod si iustitia est obtemperatio scriptis legibus institutisque populorum, etc.

58. πρότερον: sc. ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς, which has to be supplied out of ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς. μηδέ is not a third specification with μήτε . . . μήτε. It serves only to connect οὕτω σφόδρα with πρότερον, and is neg. only because the whole idea is neg.

^b 60. ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα: the foundation of real prosperity is laid in the character; the best of windfalls is natural good sense sharpened by experience; this is the making of your successful man's character, and

the mending of his fortunes; this is ἀρετή (skill in the art of right living), i.e. wisdom (σοφία). See on εἰς σοφίαν, 29 d. Such is in substance Socrates's theory of getting on in the world, which may be gathered from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* in many places: see (i. 6) his defence against the σοφιστής Antiphon, who accuses him of being κακοδαιμονίας διδάσκαλος; (ii. 5) his hint to a parsimonious friend, ἐξετάζειν ἑαυτὸν ὀπόσου τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος εἶη; (ii. 6. 22-25) his analysis of what makes a καλὸς τε ἀγαθὸς (gentleman), where of all such he says, δύνανται πεινῶντες (fasting) καὶ διψῶντες ἀλύτως σίτου καὶ ποτοῦ κοινωνεῖν . . . δύνανται δὲ καὶ χρημάτων οὐ μόνον τοῦ πλεονεκτηῖν (selfish greed) ἀπεχόμενοι, νομίμως (righteously) κοινωνεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαρκεῖν ἀλλήλοις; and see particularly (ii. 7, 8, 9, and 10) the success which his practical advice brought to his friends Aristarchus, Euthērus, Crito, and Diodorus in their various difficulties. For a full elaboration of Socrates's rule of right living in the abstract, see his conversation on εἰδὲ πράττειν with young Callias, τὸ Ἀεῖδου μείρακιον, *Euthyphr.* 278 e-282 d, where Cleinias is startled to learn that σοφία is εὐτυχία (good-luck). The gods endow us with such

30
^b

λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἶη βλαβερά· εἰ δέ 30
 τίς μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς
 ταῦτα, φαίην ἄν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μῆ,
 65 καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε ἢ μῆ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος
 ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλὰ ἐμμί-
 νατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω,
 ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες.
 μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἅττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως

30
 b common sense as we have, *Euthyphr.*
 15 a, *Rep.* ii. 366 c, 375 c-e, 379 b c;
 we owe it to them that it is possible
 to thrive and in the end to win, *Rep.*
 x. 613, 617 e.

62. ταῦτ' ἂν εἶη βλαβερά: this ταῦτα,
all this, covers more ground than the
 ταῦτα above. The first means what
 Socrates says, the second means that
 and also the fact that he says it.
 "If this corrupts the youth, my practice
 in saying it would do harm; but
 the truth cannot corrupt them, there-
 fore my speaking it can do no harm.
 To prove that I am a corrupter of the
 youth, you must prove that I have
 said something else; that cannot be
 proved, for it is not true." With εἰ
 διαφθείρω, ταῦτ' ἂν εἶη, cf. εἰ ὄφελουσιν,
 25 b, where see note.

63. πρὸς ταῦτα: *wherefore*.

65. ὡς ἐμοῦ κτέ.: *knowing that I*
should never alter my ways. ποιήσον-
 τος ἂν represents ποιήσω ἂν. GMT.
 216; H. 845 and 861. Cf. *Dem.* xix.
 342, τοὺς ὀτιοῦν ἂν ἐκείνω ποιήσον-
 τας ἀνηρηκότες ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἔσεσθε.
 See on διαφθαρήσονται, 29 c. For an
 important question of Ms. reading
 here, see App. For the εἰ μέλλω used
 as periphrastic fut. see GMT. 73;
 H. 846. For the indic. fut. or subjv.
 pres. in prot. depending upon the opt.

in apod. with ἂν, see GMT. 503; 30
 H. 901 a. b

66. πολλάκις: *many times or many* c
deaths. The Eng. idiom like the
 Greek requires no definite specifica-
 tion such as "to die a hundred
 deaths." In certain cases in Greek as
 in Eng. a large number is specified.
 Cf. ἀκήκοας μυριάκις ἀγὼ βούλομαι,
Ar. Nub. 738; ζῆτους (*for pea-soup?*);
 βαβαιᾶξ, μυριάκις ἐν τῷ βίφ, *Ran.* 63.
 Cf. τρισάσμενος, quoted from *Xen. An.*
 iii. 2. 24 on 30 a. Demosthenes not
 unnaturally uses μυριάκις where he
 exclaims (ix. 65), τεθνάναι δὲ μυριά-
 κισ κρέττον ἢ κολακία τι ποιῆσαι Φιλίπ-
 που. — τεθνάναι: the absolute contra-
 dictory of ζῆν, here used rather than
 the somewhat weaker ἀποθνήσκειν.
 This distinction is, however, not strict-
 ly maintained. Cf. 39 e, 43 d, and the
 similar use of καλεῖν and κεκλησθαι,
 γινώσκειν and ἐγνωκέαι, μιμνήσκειν
 and μεμνήσθαι, κτᾶσθαι and κεκτῆσθαι.

XVIII. 2. οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν: he
 asked them μὴ θορυβεῖν. See above on
 θορυβεῖν, 17 d, and on μὴ θορυβήσῃτε, 20 e.

3. καὶ γάρ, μέλλω γάρ, εὖ γάρ ἴστε:
 the first γάρ is closely connected with
 ἀκούειν, the second goes back to the
 leading clause μὴ θορυβεῖν and ac-
 counts for the renewal of a request
 which the speaker has made three

5 βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, 30
 ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ
 μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλά-
 ψειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιντο·
 οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος α
 10 βλάπτεσθαι· ἀποκτείνειε μεντὰν ἴσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ
 ἀτιμώσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἶεται καὶ ἄλλος
 τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἴομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλ-
 λον ποιεῖν ἢ οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν
 ἀποκτινύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω
 15 ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἑμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλ'
 ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μὴ τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν
 ὑμῖν | ἐμοῦ καταληφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, e

30
 c times already. The third γὰρ, now, merely points the new statement for which Socrates has been preparing the court. Compare the use of γὰρ after prons. and advs., e.g. 31 b after ἐνθένδε, and in general after any prefatory form of words to give point to any statement which is expected, as in τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, 20 e. γὰρ with this force is esp. freq. after δ δὲ (τὸ δὲ) μέγιστον, δεινότατον, also after σημείον δέ, τεκμήριον δέ and other favorite idioms of like import in Plato and the orators. H. 1050, 4 a.

5. βοήσεσθε: this is more than a disturbance (θορυβεῖν); it is an outcry.

9. θεμιτὸν ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ βλάπτεσθαι: cf. 21 b. θεμιτόν takes the dat., and, after the analogy of ἐξεστίν, an inf. (βλάπτεσθαι) is added. The pass. βλάπτεσθαι makes this const. appear more unusual than e.g. in *Phaedo*, 67 b, μὴ καθαρῶ (unclean) γὰρ καθαρῶ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἤ. For the import of the words θεμίς and θεμιτόν, see on οὐ γὰρ θέμις, 21 b.

10. ἀποκτείνειε μεντὰν, ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν: ἀποκτείνειν is used here secondarily of the δικασταὶ and the whole people, and primarily of the accusers whose prosecution aims at compassing Socrates's death. ἀτιμία involved the forfeiture of some or of all the rights of citizenship. In the latter case the ἄτιμος was looked upon by the state as dead, i.e. he had suffered "civil death" (la morte civile), and his property, having no recognized owner, was confiscated. Cf. *Rep.* viii. 553 b, εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν ἢ ἀποθανόντα ἢ ἐκπεσόντα ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν ἀποβαλόντα. See App.

11. ἄλλος τίς που: many another. See on ἄλλος, 28 e.

15. ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν: cf. Euthyphro's remark just before the trial, *Euthyphr.* 5 b c, εἰ ἄρα ἐμὲ ἐπιχειρήσειε (ὁ Μέλητος), εἰρομί' ἂν, ὡς οἶμαι, ὅση καθρὸς (rotten) ἐστί, καὶ πολλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος γένοιτο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

30
 d

οὐ ραδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελιοί- 30
 τερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ], ὥσπερ
 20 ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθε-
 στέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος· οἶον
 δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι, τοιοῦτόν
 τινα ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὄνειδιζὼν ἓνα ἕκα-

30
 e 18. ἀτεχνῶς... προσκείμενον: added instead of a clause with οἶος to explain τοιοῦτον. See on οἶος δεδῶσθαι, 31 a.—εἰ καὶ γελιοτέρου εἰπεῖν: *though it sounds rather absurd to say so, or better, "if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech."* This is thrown in to prepare his hearers for the humorous treatment of a serious subject which follows. A close scrutiny of the simile shows that Socrates mistrusted the sovereign people. προσκείμενον is the regular pass. of προστιθέναι. See below (22) for the same idea put actively. See App. for the reading ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, and for the remaining difficulties here involved.

21. ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος: *by a gadfly.* For this word, cf. Aesch. *Supp.* 97, 308, *Βοηλάτην* (*ox-driving*) μύωπα κινήτηριον (*urging on*), οἶστρον (*gadfly*) καλοῦσιν αὐτὸν οἱ Νείλου πέλας. Also in the *Prometheus* Io's tormentor is called οἶστρος (567) and δξύστομος μύωψ (674 f.). Here the tormentor of Athens is a ἵππηλάτης μύωψ. Notice how humorously (γελιοτέρου) the situation is met. First the Athenians are compared to a horse bothered out of inaction by a buzzing horse-fly. The metaphor of the horse is not pressed, but that of the μύωψ is ingeniously elaborated as follows: "Socrates gives them no rest but bores them all day long (προσκαθίζων), and does not allow them even a nap; he bothers them incessantly when they

are drowsing (οἱ νυστάζοντες). Then they make an impatient dash (κρούσαντες) at him which deprives them forever of his company." For similar irony, cf. Verg. *Aen.* vi. 90, nec Teucris addita Juno|Usquam ab erit. μύωψ is by some taken in its later and metaphorical sense of *spur*. See App.—τινός: like the Lat. quidam used to qualify an expression which is startling.—οἶον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεός... προστεθεικέναι: lit. *in which capacity God seems to me to have fastened me upon the state,—such an one (in fact) as never ceases, etc.,* a repetition of προσκείμενον [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ]. Avoid the awkwardness of too lit. translation. Notice that οἶον really refers not to the μύωψ simply but to the μύωψ engaged in enlivening the horse. This is implied by τοιοῦτόν τινα and the explanatory clause with ἓς.

23. ὄνειδιζὼν ἕκαστον: ὄνειδίζειν alone requires the dat. Cf. *Il.* ii. 254, τῷ νῦν Ἄτρειδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ποιμένι λαῶν ἦσαι ὄνειδίζων, and below 41 e. The acc. here is due to the preponderating influence of πείθων; both πείθων and ὄνειδίζων are however introduced simply to explain ἐγείρων, with which they are as it were in apposition. The awakening process here thought of prob. consisted of questions persuasive in part and partly reprehensive.

24. τὴν ἡμέραν... προσκαθίζων: 31
 this specifies the means by which the 41

στον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὄλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθί- 31
 25 ζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥαδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἀν-
 δρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου· ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως
 τάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι,
 κρούσαντες ἂν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτεί-
 ναιτε, εἶτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῦτ' ἂν, εἰ
 30 μὴ τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψει κηδόμενος ὑμῶν.
 ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὡν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ
 πόλει δεδόςθαι, ἐνθὲνδε ἂν κατανοήσαίτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρω- 3
 πίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἑμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκῆναι
 καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη,
 35 τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν αἰεὶ, ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ προσιόντα
 ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμε-
 λείσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλανον
 καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμεν, εἶχον ἂν τινα
 λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὀράτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τᾶλ-
 40 λα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε

31
 a process of awakening, indicated by the three preceding participles, was made possible. Pres. and aor. participles express the means, as the fut. partic. expresses purpose. GMT. 832 f.; H. 969.

26. ἴσως τάχ' ἂν: *may be perhaps*, a combination which is by no means infrequent. The importance of ῥαδίως is well indicated by the repetition of the ἂν, which has already served to emphasize κρούσαντες. Notice, however, that grammatically it is required only once and also goes with the verb of the apod. ἀποκτείναιτε. See on ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν, 17 d.

27. ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες κτέ.: *like men disturbed in their nap*. This sarcasm could not fail to raise a laugh at Athens where the δικαστῆς νυστάζων was a common sight. Cf. Rep. 405 c, μηδὲν δεῖσθαι νυστάζοντος

δικαστοῦ. Cf. Quint. Inst. iv. 1. 73. 31
 a

29. εἶτα: see on μιμούνται κτέ., 23 c.

31. οἷος δεδόςθαι: cf. Crit. 46 b. For the inf. without the art., limiting certain adjs. and advs., see GMT. 759; H. 1000.

32. οὐ γάρ: see on καὶ γάρ, 30 c. — b ἀνθρωπίνῳ: the neut. used subst. Cf. Phaed. 62 a, ἔοικε τοῦτο ἀτόπῳ. Commonly the neut. is used predicatively, e.g. ἔοικε τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι.

34. ἀνέχεσθαι ἀμελουμένων: for the acc. or gen. allowed with this verb, and for the added partic. see GMT. 879; H. 983.

37. εἰ μέντοι: *if, to be sure*. τοὶ influences the apod. (εἶχον ἂν κτέ.) as well, then at least I should have some reason, i.e. there would be an obvious explanation of my conduct. Cf. 34 b, αὐτοὶ τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν κτέ.

οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντήσαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρ-³¹
τυρα, ὡς ἐγώ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα.
ικανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ
λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

XIX. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ
ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλευῶ περιῶν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ,
δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτε-

³¹
b 41. οὐχ οἰοί τε: "They would doubt-
less make the assertion, cf. 19 d; but
what they did not find it practicable
to do was to bring evidence in sup-
port of it." R. The leading idea of the
clause ἀπαναισχυντήσαι . . . μάρτυρα is
expressed in the partic., not in ἀπαναι-
σχυντήσαι. For cases where αἰσχύ-
νεσθαι, used with a partic., does not
contain the main idea, cf. 28 b, 29 d,
Crit. 53 c. — τοῦτο ἀπαναισχυντή-
σαι: sc. ταύτην τὴν ἀναισχυντίαν ἀπα-
ναισχυντήσαι. ἀπό in this compound
contributes the idea of completion,
which in the case of shamelessness
involves going to an extreme, to go to
such an extreme with their shamelessness,
or, to be so absolutely shameless as 'his.
The kindred notion of fulfilling a
task undertaken is also involved. Cf.
Xen. An. iii. 2. 13, ἀποθύουσιν, meaning
pay off the arrears of a promised sacri-
fice.

c 43. τὸν μάρτυρα: sc. παρέχομαι μάρ-
τυρα καὶ ὁ μάρτυς ὃν παρέχομαι ἱκανός
ἐστίν. Cf. 20 e. ἱκανόν is used predi-
catively, and the necessity of the art.
is obvious.

XIX. 1. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτο-
πον: Socrates has two good reasons:
(1) his divine mission, (2) the per-
sonal disaster involved in any other
course. Of these the first really in-
cludes the second. That he did not
regard abstention from public duty
as in itself commendable is proved

by his conversation with Charmides³¹
(Xen. Mem. iii. 7), ἀξιόλογον μὲν ἄνδρα
ἕντα, ὀκνοῦντα δὲ προσίεσαι τῷ δήμῳ
(to address the people) καὶ τῶν τῆς
πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. He
pointedly asks Charmides: εἰ δέ τις,
δυνατὸς ὢν τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων
ἐπιμελόμενος τήν τε πόλιν ἀξίειν (ad-
vance the common weal) καὶ αὐτὸς διὰ
τοῦτο τιμᾶσθαι, ὀκνοίη δὴ τοῦτο πράττειν
οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως δεῖλδς νομίζοιτο; See
also *ibid.* i. 6. 15.

2. πολυπραγμονῶ: am a busybody.
See on περιεργάζεται, 19 b. Nothing
short of a divine mission could jus-
tify this. Plato invariably uses the
word in an unfavorable sense. Cf.
Gorg. 526 c, ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτοῦ
πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος
ἐν τῷ βίῳ. There is a subtle irony in
πολυπραγμονῶ as here used by Soc-
rates. It was his business to mind
other people's business, therefore he
was far from being really πολυπρά-
γμων. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 11. 16, καὶ ὁ
Σωκράτης ἐπισκώπτων (ridiculing) τὴν
αὐτοῦ ἀπραγμοσύνην (abstention from
business), "Ἄλλ', ὦ Θεοδότη," ἔφη, "οὐ
πάνυ μοι βῆδιδόν ἐστι σχολάσαι (be at
leisure) καὶ γὰρ ἴδια πράγματα πολλὰ
καὶ δημοσία παρέχει μοι ἀσχολίαν (keep
me busy)." Cf. 33 a b.

3. ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος: there
is no implication, as in 17 d, of ἐπὶ
τὸ βῆμα. The πλῆθος commonly assem-
bled in the Pnyx, to which Socrates

ρον ξυμβουλευέειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ αἰτιόν ἐστιν ὁ ὑμεῖς 31
 5 ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖον
 τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, [φωνή], ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ α
 ἐπικωμωδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐκ
 παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται αἰεὶ
 ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐ- X
 10 ποτε· τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν.
 καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὐ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ
 ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ
 πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὐτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς
 ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε e
 15 λέγουσι τάληθῆ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται
 οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλω πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος
 καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει
 γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῶ ὄντι μαχοῦμενον 32

31^c thus would, like every one else, be obliged to ascend. Cf. Dem. xviii. 169, ὑμεῖς δ' εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐπορεύεσθε καὶ . . . πᾶς ὁ δῆμος ἔνω κάθητο. — τὸ πλήθος τὸ ὑμέτερον: see on τῶ πλήθει, 21 a.

5. θεῖον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, [φωνή]: see Introd. 27, with first n. on p. 21, and 32. φωνή is explanatory of the vague θεῖον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον, and is in the pred.: a something divine and from God manifests itself to me, a voice. This thought is earnestly reiterated below in nearly the same words. See App.

d 6. δ δὴ καί: see on ὃ δὲ καί, 28 a. — ἐπικωμωδῶν: Meletus caricatured Socrates's utterances about the θεῖον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον by making them out to be the belief in *καὶνὰ δαιμόνια*. Cf. 26 e.

7. ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον: ever since my boyhood. This partic. followed by ἀπό or ἐκ, when time is referred to,

corresponds to various idioms, here to ever since. The case of the partic. is that of the word which it limits. Cf. Legg. ii. 661 b, ταῦτά ἐστι ἄδικοις κάκιστα ξύμπαντα, ἀρξάμενα ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας.

9. ἀποτρέπει, ἐναντιοῦται πράττειν: cf. 32 b, and see on μηδὲν ποιεῖν. — τοῦτο: governed by πράττειν, which is expressed in the subordinate clause. Cf. Lach. 179 a, ἀνεῖναι αὐτοὺς δ τὶ βούλονται ποιεῖν, to leave them free to do what they wish.

12. πάλαι . . . πάλαι: the rights and duties of Athenian citizenship began as soon as a man was twenty.

13. ἀπολώλη, ὠφελήκη: the earlier Att. writers rarely use the plpf. in -ειν. G. 777, 4; H. 458 a.

15. οὐ, οὔτε, οὔτε, οὐδενί: a remarkable repetition of the neg. Cf. 34 e.

16. γνησίως: uprightly or openly.

ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσε- 32
20 σθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι
τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμάτε, ἔργα. ἀκού-
σατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ'
5 ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ
5 ὑπέικων ~~δὲ ἅμα ἀπολοίμην~~. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικά μὲν καὶ

32
a 19. καὶ εἰ: introduces a very extreme form of supposition, implying that *even* then the conclusion is unsailable; εἰ καὶ (cf. 30 e) introduces a condition implying that in that case, as in many others, the conclusion remains. See H. 1053, I, 2.

20. ἀλλὰ μὴ: *and not*. The Eng. idiom avoids the Greek abruptness. For ἀλλά in abrupt transitions, see H. 1046, 2b.

XX. 2. οὐ λόγους κτέ.: as Demosthenes says (II. 12), ἅπας μὲν λόγος, ἂν ἀπὴ τὰ πράγματα (deeds), ματαιὸν τι (folly) φαίνεται καὶ κενόν. Cf. Lach. 188 c-e, where the harmony of a man's deeds and words is spoken of as τῶ ὄντι (ἦν ἡρμωσμένος αὐτὸς ὡτοῦ τὸν βίον σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστὶ . . . ἥπερ μόνῃ Ἑλληνικῇ ἔστιν ἁρμονία, really living in tune, where a man makes his own life a concord of words and deeds, composed really in the Dorian mode, which is the only true Greek harmony.—δ ὑμεῖς κτέ.: the audience as representing the Athenians in general. "You appreciate facts only, there is no nonsense about you." Here appears what amounts to the common τόπος of rehearsing a man's services in his own defence, of which practice Lysias (XII. 38) says, οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὐδὲ τοῦτο αὐτῶ προσήκει ποιῆσαι, ὅπερ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει εἰθισμένον ἔστί, πρὸς μὲν τὰ κατηγορημένα μὴ δὲ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, περὶ δὲ

σφῶν αὐτῶν ἕτερα λέγοντες (raising side issues) ἐνίοτε ἐξαπατῶσιν, ὑμῖν ἀποδεικνύντες ὡς στρατιώται ἀγαθοὶ εἰσιν κτέ. For another instance of this practice indulged in, cf. 28 e-29 a.

3. οὐδ' ἂν ἐνί: stronger than οὐδὲν ἂν. Cf. Gorg. 512 e, τῇν εἰμαρμένην (fate) οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐκφύγοι, and *ibid.* 521 c, ὡς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μὴ δ' ἂν ἐν τούτων ταθεῖν. . . . How confident you seem, Socrates, that you never will suffer any of these things! G. 378; H. 290 a.

4. ὑπεικάθοιμι: second aor. opt. from ὑπέικειν with *αθ* appended to the stem, i.e. ὑπεικ-. See G. 779; H. 494 and a. The present ὑπεικάθειν, like διωκάθειν (διώκειν), ἀμννάθειν (ἀμύνειν) and σχέθειν (ἐχειν), is prob. a fiction. It is hard to prove that this *θ* adds strength to the meaning of ὑπέικειν. In certain cases this *θ* is appended in the pres. τελέθειν, φαέθειν, φλεγέθειν. Cf. Curt. *Griech. Etym.* pp. 62 and 63.

5. ἅμα ἀπολοίμην: if this, as Schanz maintains, is what Plato really wrote, the necessary *ἔν* gets itself supplied from οὐδ' ἂν ἐνί above. Cron, following Stallbaum, writes ἅμα καὶ ἅμα ἔν; Riddell defends Ast's conjecture, ἅμα κἄν. The text here still remains hard to establish. See App.—φορτικά καὶ δικανικά: cheap and tedious commonplaces, a collocation which suggests the words of Callicles, who,

δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν 32
 ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἤρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· b
 καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε

32
 a by way of reproof, says to Socrates
 (*Gorg.* 482 e) *σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρα-
 τες, εἰς ταῦτα ἄγεις φορτικά καὶ
 δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν
 διώκειν φορτικά. Cf. Rep. ii. 367 a,
 ταῦτα . . . Θρασύμαχος τε καὶ ἄλλος πού-
 τις ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέ-
 γοιεν ἔν, μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν
 δύναμιν φορτικῶς, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.*
 For *δημηγορικά*, which has the sense
 of *in bad taste*, cf. *Gorg.* 494 c, where
 Callicles, shocked at Socrates's re-
 marks, says *ὡς ἄσποσ εἰ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος*. See also on
κεκαλλιεπημένους, 17 c. It was com-
 mon in the courts and assemblies at
 Athens for the speakers to call a
 spade a spade. Of course they al-
 ways declared that they must speak
 the truth, and the whole truth. This
 duty was often made the pretext for
 utterances not strictly in good taste.

b 7. *ἐβούλευσα δέ*: but I was chosen
 to the senate, i.e. the senate of five
 hundred, chosen by lot. One of this
 senate's chief duties was to act as a
 committee, so to speak, before whom
 came, in the first instance, the ques-
 tions to be dealt with by the *ἐκκλησία*
 (*assembly*). A preliminary decree (*προ-
 βούλευμα*) from this senate was the
 regular form in which matters came
 before the assembly.

8. *ἔτυχεν . . . πρυτανεύουσα*: the
 fifty representatives in the senate of
 each of the ten tribes (each *φυλὴ* tak-
 ing its turn in an order yearly deter-
 mined by lot) had the general charge
 of the business of the senate, and
 directed the meetings both of the
 senate and of the popular assembly,
 for 35 or 36 days, i.e. one tenth of the

32
 b lunar year of 354 days, or in leap-
 years, for 38 or 39 days. Of this board
 of fifty (whose members were called
πρυτάνεις during its term of office) one
 member was chosen every day by lot,
 as *ἐπιστάτης*, or president. The *ἐπι-
 στάτης* held the keys of the public
 treasury and of the public repository
 of records, also the seal of the com-
 monwealth, and, further, presided at
 all meetings of the senate and of the
 assembly. Later (prob. in 378 b.c.,
 the archonship of Nausinicus, when
 the board of nine *πρόεδροι*, whom the
ἐπιστάτης chose every morning by
 lot from the non-*prytanising* tribes,
 was established) a new officer, the
ἐπιστάτης τῶν προέδρων, relieved him
 of this last duty. In Socrates's time,
 the *φυλὴ πρυτανεύουσα*, and the *ἐπι-
 στάτης* of the day, had the responsi-
 bility of putting to the vote (*ἐπιψη-
 φίζειν*) any question that arose or of
 refusing to allow a vote. Socrates be-
 longed to the *δῆμος Ἀλωπεκῆ*, in the
φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς. Notice the addition of
Ἀντιοχίς here without the art. and as
 an afterthought; *ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ* would
 have been sufficient, though less cir-
 cumstantial.—*ὅτε ὑμεῖς κτέ.*: after
 the Athenian success off the islands
 called Arginusae, in 406 b.c. This
 battle is also spoken of as *ἡ περὶ Λέ-
 σθον ναυμαχία*, Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 32-35.
 The victorious generals were promptly
 prosecuted for remissness in the per-
 formance of their duty. Accused of
 having shown criminal neglect in fail-
 ing to gather up the dead and save
 those who, at the end of the engage-
 ment, were floating about on wrecks,
 they pleaded "not guilty." The squad-

10 ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ 32
 τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλεσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς
 ἐν τῷ ὑστέρω χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότ' ἐγὼ μόνος

32
 b ron detailed for this duty had been hindered, they said, by stress of weather. The main fleet went in pursuit of the worsted enemy. The details of the case for and against them cannot satisfactorily be made out, though the reasons are many and strong for thinking them innocent. The illegality of the procedure by which they were condemned is undoubted. They were condemned ἀνόμως (1) because judgment was passed upon them ἀθρόους, i.e. μιᾷ ψήφῳ ἅπαντας, — this was illegal, since not only the general practice at Athens, but the decree of Cannonus (τὸ Κανωνοῦ ψήφισμα) provided δίχα (apart) ἕκαστον κρίνειν, — (2) because they had not reasonable time allowed them for preparing and presenting their defence. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* i. 7. 5, βραχέα ἕκαστος ἀπελογήσατο, οὐ γὰρ προὔτεθ' ἡ σφίσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον. See Xen. *Hell.* i. 6. 33 ff: and 7; *Mem.* i. 1. 18; iv. 4. 2.

9. τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς: the round number of all the generals is given here. One of the ten, Arcestratus, died at Mitylene, where Conon, another of them, was still blockaded when the battle was fought. Of the remaining eight who were in the battle, two, Protomachus and Aristogenes, flatly refused to obey the summons to return to Athens. Thus only six reached Athens, and these, Pericles, Lysias, Diomedon, Erasinides, Aristocrates, and Thrasylus, were put to death. — τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας: not only the dead but those who were floating about in danger of their lives. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* i. 7. 11, παρήλθε

δέ τις εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν φάσκων ἐπὶ 32
 τεύχους ἀλφίτων (on a meal-barrel) 32
 σωθῆναι· ἐπιστέλλειν (enjoined upon) δ' αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀπολλυμένους (those who were drowning), ἐὰν σωθῆ ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ δήμῳ, ὅτι οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἀνείλιοντο (rescued) τοὺς ἀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους. Cf. Xen. *An.* i. 2. 3, where τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πόλεων is equiv. to τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὄντας ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. Here the fuller expression would perhaps be οὐκ ἀνελομένους ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ ναυμαχίᾳσαντάς τε καὶ κακῶς πεπραγότας. See G. 1225; H. 788 a. For this subst. use of οἱ ἐκ with the gen. there are many parallels; such subst. use is common with preps. denoting close relation to their object, — in, on, from, etc. Notice the point given to παρανόμως by its position; it comes in almost as if it began an independent sent. Cf. *Lach.* 183 b, τοιγάρτοι δς ἂν οἴηται τραγωδίαν καλῶς ποιεῖν . . . εὐθὺς δεῦρο φέρεται καὶ τοῖσδ' ἐπιδείκνυσιν εἰκρότως. Xenophon says that the Athenians soon repented of their rash and illegal action. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* i. 6. 35, καὶ οὐ πόλλῳ χρόνῳ ὕστερον μετέμελε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο, ὅτινες τὸν δῆμον ἐξηπάτησαν (deceived) προβολὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι (their case was thus prejudiced by an informal vote of the assembly) καὶ ἐγγυητὰς καταστήσαι, ἕως ἂν κριθῶσιν. The fate of these generals was remembered thirty years afterward by the Athenian admiral Chabrias. He won a great victory off Naxos (b.c. 376) but neglected to pursue the enemy, in order to save the men on the wrecks and bury the dead. Cf. *Diod.* xv. 35.

τῶν πρυτάνεων ἡναντιώθην μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους 32
 [καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην], καὶ ἐτοιμῶν ὄντων ἐνδεικνύναι
 με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ρητόρων καὶ ὑμῶν κελουόντων καὶ
 15 βωόντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ᾧμην μᾶλλον με c
 δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βου-
 λουομένων φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν
 ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως! ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία
 ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμφάμενοί με πέμπτον
 20 αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος

³²
 b 12. ἡναντιώθην: used absolutely
 as often.—μηδὲν ποιεῖν: after the
 neg. idea in ἡναντιώθην. GMT. 807, c;
 H. 963 and 1029. But cf. 31 d e.

13. καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην: and I
 voted against it, i.e. allowing the ques-
 tion to be put. See App. Socrates was
 ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων on this day
 and followed up this opposition,—
 manifested when in consultation with
 the other πρυτάνεις,—by absolutely
 refusing to put the question to vote.
 Cf. Gorg. 474 a; Xen. Mem. i. 1. 18; iv.
 4. 2. For a different account of the
 facts, see Grote's Greece, c. 64, fin.
 Connect ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην with μόνος
 τῶν πρυτάνεων.—ἐνδεικνύναι, ἀπάγειν:
 ἐνδειξις and ἀπαγωγή were two sum-
 mary methods of procedure in mak-
 ing prosecutions. Both dispensed
 with the usual delay, and allowed the
 magistrates (in ἐνδειξις, it was the
 board of the Thesmothetae; in ἀπα-
 γωγή, it was usually the board called
 οἱ ἑνδεκα) to deal summarily with cer-
 tain charges. ἐνδειξις was a form of
 summary indictment, laying informa-
 tion usually against one who dis-
 charged functions or exercised rights
 for which he was legally disqualified,
 as when an ἄτιμος entered public
 places in Athens; ἀπαγωγή was the
 summary arrest and giving in charge

of a man caught in actual crime. Cf. ³²
 Poll. VIII. 49, ἡ δὲ ἀπαγωγή, ἔταν
 τις ὄν ἔστιν ἐνδείξασθαι μὴ παρόντα
 τοῦτον παρόντα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ λαβὼν
 ἀπαγωγή. The two processes might
 therefore be used in the same case.

14. τῶν ρητόρων: these professional
 speakers had no class privileges; only
 their more frequent speaking distin-
 guished them from ordinary citizens.

15. βωόντων: cf. Xen. Hell. i. 7. 12,
 τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα δειῶν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τις
 ἑάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν ὃ ἂν βοῦλη-
 ται. Apparently the crowd jeered
 at Socrates. Cf. Gorg. 474 a, πέρυσι
 (a year ago) βουλεύειν λαχῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ
 φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευσεν καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίσειν,
 γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ οὐκ ἦπι-
 στάμην ἐπιψηφίσειν.

16. μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι: to place c
 myself on your side.

19. οἱ τριάκοντα: they were called
 the Thirty rather than the Thirty Ty-
 rants.—αὖ: in turn. Both democ-
 racy and oligarchy, however opposed
 in other respects, agreed in attempt-
 ing to interfere with the independence
 of Socrates.

20. εἰς τὴν θόλον: the Rotunda.
 The name σκιάς was also applied to it
 from its resemblance to a parasol.
 Cf. Harp. (s.v. θόλος) who further
 says it was the place ὅπου ἐστῶνται

Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον ἵνα ἀποθάνοι· οἶα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκείνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταπτον βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλήσαι αἰτιῶν· τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὐτῷ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ 25 ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μῆδ' ἐν ἀδικῶν μῆδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἢ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὔσα, ὥστε ἀδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ὥχοντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἡγα-

³²
c (dine) οἱ πρυτάνεις. Cf. also Poll. viii. 155, ἡ θόλος ἐν ἧ συνεδείπνου ἐκάστης ἡμέρας πενήκοντα τῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων βουλῆς, ἢ πρυτανεῦ-
ουσα φυλή. Cf. E. M. s.v. θόλος ὄροφην εἶχε περιφερῆ οἰκοδομητήν, οὐχὶ ξυλίνην, ὡς τὰ ἄλλα οἰκοδομήματα. The Thirty used the θόλος as their official residence.

21. Λέοντα: Leon of Salamis was an Athenian general. He, like Lysias's brother Polemarchus and many others (Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 39), fell a victim of the rapacity of the Thirty. — οἶα: i.e. τοιαῦτα γὰρ. Cf. Cic. Cat. iii. 10. 25, quale bellum nulla . . . barbaria . . . gessit. — δη: in speaking of an incontrovertible fact, indeed. Notice the order of words.

23. ἀναπλήσαι: implicate, the Lat. implere, or contaminare. ἀνάπλεως is used similarly. Cf. Phaed. 67 a, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μῆδ' ἐν ὀμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μῆδ' ἐν κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ (except so far as) πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μῆδ' ἐν ἀναπλήρωματι τῆς τούτου φύσεως. With this passage cf. especially Antipho, ii. a, 10, συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτιούς. For the facts, cf. Lys. xii. 93, συνωφελεῖσθαι μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἤξιον, συνδιεβάλλεσθαι δ' ἠνάγκαζον. See also Critias's speech in the Odeum, Xen. Hell. ii. 4.

9: δεῖ οὖν ὑμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ τιμῶν μεθέξετε οὕτω καὶ τῶν κινδύνων μετέχειν. τῶν οὖν κατειλεγμένων Ἑλευσινίων καταψηφιστέον ἐστίν, ἵνα ταῦτ' ἡμῖν καὶ θαρρήτε καὶ φοβῆσθε.

24. εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν: a supposition contrary to fact with suppressed apod. used by way of showing hesitation. Cf. the same const. in Euthyd. 283 e, ὡς ἔξενε Θούριε, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, εἶπον ἂν "σοὶ εἰς κεφαλὴν," ὅτι μαθὼν μου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταψεύδει κτέ. The usages of gentle speech at Athens adopted this formula to soften and excuse a strong expression. Cf. Gorg. 509 a, ταῦτα . . . κατέχεται καὶ δέεται, καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερον εἰπεῖν ἐστί, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις. The ἀγροικότερόν τι, for which Socrates apologizes, is undoubtedly the curt and blunt colloquialism of μέλει μοι οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν. Such an apology perhaps would prepare the less sensitive modern for language not less curt and blunt, but far more "colloquial."

26. τούτου δε: pointedly summarizes the preceding clause.

28. ὥστε: not the correlative of οὕτως, but to be connected immediately with ἐξέπληξεν. The idiom ἐκπλήττειν τινα εἰς τι is similar.

29. ὥχοντο, ὥχόμεν: went straight

30 γον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὀχόμην ἀπιῶν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν 32
διὰ ταυτ' ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἢ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη·
καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες. e

γ XXI. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι,
εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ
ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καί, ὥσπερ χρῆ, τοῦτο περὶ πλεί-
στου ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· οὐδὲ
5 γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ 33
βίου δημοσίᾳ τε, εἴ πού τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανούμαι, καὶ
ιδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ
τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὓς οἱ διαβά-
λοντες ἐμέ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκα-
10 λος μὲν οὐδεὶς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τις μου λέγοντος
καὶ τὰ ἑμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεότε-

32
d *off.* The recurrence of the same word only makes more plain the difference of the courses pursued.

31. διὰ ταχέων: a common expression with Thucydides and Xenophon, equiv. to διὰ τάχους. Cf. διὰ βραχέων, Prot. 339 a; Gorg. 449 a. The Thirty were only eight months (June 404–Febr. 403) in power, for they ceased to rule when Critias fell at Munychia in the engagement with Thrasybulus and the returned exiles. In the interim before the restoration of the democracy, ten men, doubtless one for each φυλή, were put in their place. Cf. Xen. Hell. ii. 4. 23.

e 32. μάρτυρες: possibly proceedings were here interrupted for these witnesses, though it seems quite as likely that Socrates is appealing to the δικασταὶ themselves to be his witnesses. Hermann, who thus understands it, reads ἑμῶν instead of ὑμῖν, an unnecessary change.

XXI. 1. ἄρ' οὖν: by οὖν we are

referred to what immediately precedes for our answer to this question. 32 e

2. ἔπραττον: distinctly refers to a continued course, a line of action.

3. τοῖς δικαίοις: whatever was just, neut., a concrete way of expressing an abstraction.

5. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ: i.e. "however it may be with others, as for me, I, etc." 33 a

6. τοιοῦτος: explained by ξυγχωρήσας. This amounts to a very direct appeal to the facts, and may be regarded as a shorter substitute for τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι ὥστε (or οἷος) μηδενὶ ξυγχωρήσαι, καὶ γὰρ φανοῦμαι μηδενὶ ξυγχωρήσας. For the commoner but more vague idiom, cf. Crit. 46 b.

9. ἐγὼ δὲ κτέ.: see *Introd.* 25, *fin.*

11. τὰ ἑμαυτοῦ πράττοντος: see on πολυπραγμοῦν, 31 c. ἐπιθυμεῖ does not exclude either ἐπεθύμησε or ἐπιθυμήσει, but rather implies them. Cf. τυγχάνει in 18 d. The notion of habitual action is conveyed in the form of the same single act indefinitely repeated.

ρος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρή-
 ματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ'
 ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἑμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν,
 15 καὶ εἴαν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω.
 καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστός γίγνεται εἴτε μὴ, οὐκ ἂν
 δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μῆτε ὑπεσχόμενῃ μηδενὶ
 μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μῆτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δὲ τίς φησι παρ'
 ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι ἰδίᾳ ὃ τι μὴ καὶ ἄλλοι
 20 πάντες, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

33

a 12. οὐδέ: applies neither to the
 μὲν nor to the δέ clause separately,
 but to their combination. See on
 δεινὰ ἂν εἴην, 28 d.

b 15. ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν: charac-
 teristic of the Socratic *συνουσία*. See
 Introd. 19.—ἀκούειν κτέ.: first ἀκού-
 ειν is to be construed with βούληται
 (see on τούτω, 31 d), then παρέχω
 ἑμαυτὸν ἀκούειν is to be supplied from
 the preceding. After παρέχω, ἀκού-
 ειν, like ἐρωτᾶν above, expresses pur-
 pose. See G. 1532 and H. 951; also,
 for the use of the act. voice, see
 G. 1529; H. 952 a. Socrates means:
 I am ready for questions, but if any
 so wishes he may answer and hear
 what I then have to say.

16. τούτων ἐγὼ κτέ.: ἐγὼ is placed
 next to τούτων for the sake of con-
 trast, while τούτων, though it is gov-
 erned by τίς, inevitably adheres to
 τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι. This last cor-
 responds as a pass. to αἰτίαν ἐπιφέρειν
 or προστιθέναί. The notion of respon-
 sibility is colored, like the Eng. "have
 to answer for," with the implication
 of blame. For an account of those
 whom Socrates had chiefly in mind,
 see Introd. 24 and 33.

17. ὑπεσχόμενῃ: is meant probably
 as a side thrust at imposing prom-
 ises like the one attributed to Pro-

tagoras about his own teaching in
Prot. 319 a. Socrates himself fol-
 lowed no profession strictly so called,
 had no ready-made art, or rules of
 art, to communicate. His field of
 instruction was so wide that he can
 truly say that, in the accepted sense
 of διδάσκειν and μαθάνειν at Athens,
 his pupils got no learning from him.
 They learned no μάθημα, acquired no
 useful (professional) knowledge. He
 put them in the way of getting it
 for themselves. Plato makes Socra-
 tes decline to become the tutor of
 Nicias's son (*Lach.* 207 d). He taught
 nothing positive, but removed by his
 searching questions the self-deception
 which prevented men from acquiring
 the knowledge of which they were
 capable. See his successful treatment
 of the conceited *εὐθύδημος ὁ καλός*,
 in *Xen. Mem.* iv. 2.

19. ἄλλοι πάντες: not very differ-
 ent in meaning from ἄλλος τις, 28 e.
 It differs from οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, the
 common reading here, just as πάντες
 ἄνθρωποι (*all conceivable men*) differs
 from πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι. In such
 cases if the noun alone would not
 have taken the art., it does not take
 it when qualified by πᾶς and the like.
 Compare *all others* and *all the others*.
 Here we have a complete antithesis

XXII. Ἄλλὰ διὰ τί δή ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί τινες ³³
 πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη- ^c
 ναῖοι· πάσαν ὑμῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον, ὅτι ἀκούοντες
 χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζόμενοι τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς,
⁵ οὐσι δ' οὐ· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ
 φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαν-
 τείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὅπερ τίς ποτε καὶ
 ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὀτιοῦν προσέταξε πράτ-
 τειν. ταῦτα, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἔστι καὶ εὐλέγκτα.
¹⁰ εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐγώ γε τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ ^a
 διέφθαρκα, χρῆν δήπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρᾶσβύτεροι

³³
^b to *ἰδία*, which takes the place of the more usual *δημοσία*; Socrates calls attention to the publicity of the places where he talks (*cf.* 17 c) and to the opportunity of conversing with him offered to all alike.

^c XXII. 3. εἶπον: the ὅτι clause really answers διὰ τί . . . διατρίβοντες; but grammatically it is an appended explanation of τὴν ἀλήθειαν, and is governed by εἶπον. — ἀκούοντες, ἐξεταζόμενοι: both are in close relation with χαίρουσι; contrast the const. of the same partic. in 23 c.

5. οὐκ ἀηδές: *i.e.* ἡδιστον, a case of *λιτότης* (*simplicity*), or *μείωσις* (*diminution*), quite like the Eng. *not at all unpleasant*. Such are the common οὐχ ἡκίστα (πάντων μάλιστα) and οὐ πάνν (*cf. not quite*). Socrates perhaps agreed with La Rochefoucauld, *Maximes*, 31, Si nous n'avions point de défauts, nous ne prendrions pas tant de plaisir à en remarquer dans les autres. — ὡς ἐγὼ φημι: as *I maintain*, implying not so much that he makes his assertion now as that he now emphatically calls attention to the assertion already made and substantiated. For the analogous use of the pres. express-

ing continued result of past action, ³³
^c see GMT. 27; H. 827. Here φημί almost means *I am maintaining and have maintained*. See on ὅπερ λέγω 21 a, and *cf.* *Lach.* 193 e, βούλει οὖν ᾧ λέγομεν πειθώμεθα τό γε τοσοῦτον; . . . τῷ λόγῳ ὃς καρτερεῖν κελύει.

6. ἐκ μαντείων, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ: a phrase which suggests that ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου has made room for παντὶ τρόπῳ. The καὶ before παντὶ is best rendered by *and generally*. For the facts, *cf.* 21 b and *Crit.* 44 a.

7. τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλῃ: *ever at any time at all, any other*.

8. θεία μοῖρα: *will of Providence*. What is appointed by the Deity is contrasted with a man's own choice; the phrase freq. qualifies what man attains or enjoys through no effort or desert of his own but almost ἀγαθῆ μοίρα (*by the grace of good luck*). *cf.* *Rep.* 493 a; *Arist. Eth.* i. 9. 1.

9. εὐλέγκτα: *easy to prove, not easy to disprove*. So ἐλέγειν means *prove a point by disproving its contradictory*.

10. εἰ γὰρ δὴ: *for if really, i.e. as we must suppose if Meletus speaks truth*.

11. χρῆν κατηγορεῖν: ἔν is not required. See GMT. 415. The con-

γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πώ- 33
 ποτέ τι ξυμβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ
 κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον, τῶν
 15 οἰκείων τιὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφούς καὶ
 ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπε-
 πόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκείοι, νῦν μεμνήσθαι [καὶ τιμωρεῖ-
 σθαι]. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ οὖς
 ἐγὼ ὀρώ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὐτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ
 20 δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατήρ· ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ e

33
d elusion states an unfulfilled obligation. H. 897. All the prots. here expressed, including εἰ διαφθείρω and εἰ ἐπεπόνθεσαν, belong to the first class (GMT. 415; H. 893), and the apod. χρῆν involves its own unfulfilled condition. But see GMT. 417. χρῆν together with this implied prot. forms the apod. which goes with εἰ διαφθείρω κτέ. GMT. 510. This prot. is disjunctively elaborated in two parallel clauses, (1) εἴτε ἔγνωσαν, (2) εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον. See on εἴπερ κτέ. 27 d. Instead of εἴτε . . . εἴτε we have εἴτε . . . εἰ δέ (like οὔτε . . . οὐδέ), which gives a certain independence to the second member. Hence it is treated as a condition by itself, and the leading protasis, εἰ διαφθείρω, is substantially repeated in εἴπερ ἐπεπόνθεσαν. *If (as Meletus urges) I am corrupting some young men, and have corrupted others, then (if they were doing their duty) they would, supposing some of them convinced on growing older that in their youth I, etc., now stand forth, etc.*

13. ἀναβαίνοντας: see on ἐπὶ δικαστήριον, 17 d.

15. τῶν ἐκείνων: on the repetition of the art. here, see G. 959, 2; H. 668.

16. τοὺς προσήκοντας: Eng. idiom

suggests either τῶν προσήκωντων or προσήκοντας without the art. After the detailed enumeration, πατέρας . . . ἄλλους, τοὺς προσήκοντας is introduced appositively to sum up, and therefore the article is used.

17. καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι: combine with μεμνήσθαι, and the idea is that of μνησικακεῖν, a word which had lately been much used in the political turmoils at Athens. Cf. the final agreement between oligarchs and democrats, Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 43, ἧ μὴν μὴ μνησικακέσειν.

18. πάντως: as in answers, *certainly*.—ἐνταυθοῖ: connect with πάρεισιν, which thus denotes the result of παριέναι. We might call it here the perf. of παριέναι. Cf. Xen. *An.* i. 2. 2, καὶ λαβόντες τὰ ὄπλα παρήσαν εἰς Σάρδεϊς. For the converse, cf. 36 c, ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἦα.

19. Κρίτων: it is he whose name is given to the well-known dialogue of Plato. See *Introd.* 62.

20. δημότης: see on ἔτυχε πρυτανεύουσα, 32 b.—Κριτοβούλου: although his father Crito modestly declares (*Euthyd.* 271 b) that he is thin (σκληροφός) in comparison with his exquisite playmate Clinias (cousin of Alcibiades), Critobulus was famous for his beauty. See Xen. *Symp.* 4. 12 ff.

Σφήττιος, Αισχίνου τούδε πατήρ· ἔτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφι- 33
 σιεύς οὔτοςί, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ· ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὔτοι ὦν
 οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασι, Νικόστρατος
 ὁ Θεοζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος
 25 τετελεῦτήκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεηθείη
 —καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε ὁ Δημοδόκου οὐ ἦν Θεάγης ἀδελφός·

³³
 d He was one of Socrates's most constant companions. The Oeconomicus of Xenophon is a conversation between Socrates and Critobulus. The affection between Socrates and Crito is best shown by the pains taken by the former in furthering Critobulus's education. In the Memorabilia (i. 3. 8 ff.) Socrates indirectly reproves Critobulus by a conversation in his presence held with Xenophon. The same lesson he reinforces (ii. 6. esp. 31 and 32). That it was needed appears from the impetuous character shown by Critobulus in Xenophon's Symposium. Cf. 3. 7, τί γὰρ σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ἐπὶ τίνι μέγιστον φρονεῖς (of what are you proudest?); ἐπὶ κάλλει, ἔφη. That Critobulus perplexed his father is shown in *Euthyd.* 306 d, where, speaking of his sons, Crito says: Κριτόβουλος δ' ἤδη ἡλικίαν ἔχει (is getting on) καὶ δεῖταιί τινος, ὅστις ἀ-
 e τὸν ὀνήσει.—ὁ Σφήττιος: of the δῆμος Σφηττός in the φυλὴ Ἀκαμαντίς.

21. Αἰσχίνου: like Plato, Xenophon, and Antisthenes, Aeschines (sur-named ὁ Σωκρατικός) carefully wrote down the sayings of Socrates after the master's death. Three dialogues preserved among the writings of Plato have been attributed to Aeschines the Socratic. The Eryxias possibly is by him, but hardly either the Axiochus or the treatise περὶ ἀρετῆς. Aeschines was unpractical, if we can trust the amusing account given by

Lysias (fr. 3) of his attempt to establish, with borrowed money, a τέχνη μυρεψικὴ (*salve-shop*). His failure in this venture may have led him to visit Syracuse, where, according to Lucian (*Parasit.* 32), he won the favor of Dionysius.—Ἀντιφῶν: Aeschines and Antiphon here present should not be confused with their more celebrated namesakes, the orators. This Antiphon was of the δῆμος Κηφισιά in the φυλὴ Ἐρεχθίδης, but nothing further is known of him.

22. Ἐπιγένους: the same whom Socrates saw (*Xen. Mem.* iii. 12) νέον τε ὄντα καὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶς ἔχοντα. Socrates reproached him then and there for not doing his duty to himself and to his country by taking rational exercise.—τοίνυν: moreover, a transition. The fathers of some have been named, now he passes on to the case of brothers.

23. ταύτη: i.e. the one in question.

25. ἐκείνός γε: he at least, i.e. ὁ ἐκεῖ = ὁ ἐν Ἀίδου, Θεόδοτος, named last but the more remote. Cf. *Euthyd.* 271 b, where ἐκείνος refers to Critobulus just named.—αὐτοῦ: Νικόστρατος, of whom he is speaking. Since his brother is dead, Nicostratus will give an absolutely unbiassed opinion.—καταδεηθείη: lit. *deprecari*, but really it means here *overpersuade*, i.e. persuade a man against his better judgment. Cf. *καταχαρίζεσθαι*, 35 c.

26. Θεάγης: this brother of Para-

³³
 e

ὄδε δὲ Ἀδείμαντος ὁ Ἀρίστωνος οὐ ἀδελφὸς οὕτως Πλά- 34
των, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος οὐ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὄδε ἀδελφός. | καὶ
ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινα ἐχρῆν μά-
30 λιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον
μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ
παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου
πάν τούναντίον εὐρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν
ετοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκεί-
35 οὺς αὐτῶν, ὡς φασὶ Μέλητος καὶ Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ b

33
e lus is known through *Rep* vi. 496 b, where Plato uses the now proverbial expression, ὁ τοῦ Θεάγου χαλινός, the *bridle of Theages*, i.e. ill health. Such was the providential restraint which made Theages, in spite of political temptations, faithful to philosophy; otherwise, like Demodocus, his father, he would have gone into politics. Demodocus is one of the speakers in the Theages, a dialogue wrongly attributed to Plato.

34
a 27. Ἀδείμαντος: son of Aristo and brother of Plato and of Glaucon (*Xen. Mem.* iii. 6. 1); both of Plato's brothers were friends of Socrates. Glaucon and Adimantus are introduced in the Republic; Adimantus is older, and is represented as not on so familiar a footing with Socrates as his younger brother.

28. Ἀπολλόδωρος: surnamed ὁ μαυρικός because of his intense excitability. Cf. *Sympos.* 173 d. This is nowhere better shown than in the Phaedo, 117 d, where he gives way to uncontrollable grief as soon as Socrates drinks the fatal hemlock. In the Symposium, 172 c, he describes his first association with Socrates with almost religious fervor. In the Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους (28), attributed to Xenophon, he is mentioned as ἐπιθυμή-

της μὲν ισχυρῶς αὐτοῦ (Σωκράτους), ἄλ- 34
λως δ' εὐήθης (a simpleton). Of the persons here mentioned, Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Acontodorus, are not elsewhere mentioned; and of the eleven here named as certainly present at the trial (there is doubt about Epigenes) only four (or five with Epigenes), Apollodorus, Crito, Critobulus, and Aeschines, are named in the Phaedo as present afterwards in the prison.

29. μάλιστα μὲν: by all means. In the clause beginning with εἰ δέ, ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ is referred to by τότε and contrasted with νῦν παρασχέσθω.

31. ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ: parenthetical. "The full expression occurs Aeschin. iii. 165, παραχωρῶ σοι τοῦ βήματος, ἔως ἂν εἴπῃς." R. The time used for introducing evidence was not counted as a part of the time allotted for the pleadings, but the water-clock (τὸ ὕδωρ) was stopped while a witness was giving account of his evidence. Cf. *Lys.* xxiii. 4, 8, 11, 14, and 15, καὶ μοι ἐπίλαβε (addressed to an officer of the court) τὸ ὕδωρ. See App.

35. γάρ: calls upon us to draw a b conclusion suggested by the preceding clause. Socrates means: this fact (πάντας βοηθεῖν, κτέ.) proves my inno-

οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ 34
 ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρῆσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσή-
 κοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἄλλ'
 ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν
 40 ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι; X

XXIII. Εἶεν δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχομι' ἂν ἀπο-
 λογεῖσθαι, σχεδόν ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦτα.
 τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεῖς ἑαυτοῦ, c
 εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτοῦ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζό-
 5 μενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν
 δακρύων, παῖδιά τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὅτι μά-
 λιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλοὺς,
 ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύω,

34
 b cence; for how else can we account
 for the following? γάρ applies to
 both clauses αὐτοὶ μὲν and οἱ δέ; more
 especially to the latter. For λόγον
 ἔχοιεν, see on εἰ μέντοι, 31 b.

37. οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες: this
 partic., like ἄρχων and συνάρχων, has
 by usage become substantially a noun.
 The poets apparently were the first
 to use partic. in this way. Cf. Aesch.
Pers. 245, ἰόντων τοῖς τε κοῦσι; Eur.
El. 335, ὁ ἐκείνου τεκῶν. The parti-
 cipial use and the use as a noun sub-
 sisted side by side. Cf. *Legg.* ix.
 868 b, τῶν προσπύκτων τῷ τελευτή-
 σαντι, and *ibid.* τοὺς προσήκοντας τοῦ
 τελευτήσαντος. GMT. 828; H. 966.

38. ἄλλ' ἢ: see on ἄλλ' ἢ, 20 a.

XXIII. 1. εἶεν δὴ: this closes the
 argument proper of the defence, and
 marks the beginning of the perora-
 tion.

2. ἴσως τοιαῦτα: in much the same
 strain.

3. ἀναμνησθεῖς ἑαυτοῦ: many δικα-
 σταί had been defendants.

4. εἰ ἐδεήθη κτέ.: see, esp. for the
 force of μὲν and δέ, on *δεινὰ ἂν εἶην*,
 28 a. — ἐλάττω ἀγῶνα: the μέγιστος
 ἀγῶν was one involving a man's fran-
 chise and his life. Cf. Dem. xxi. 99,
 παῖδιά γὰρ παραστήσεται καὶ κλάσει
 καὶ τούτοις αὐτὸν ἐξαιτήσεται, and 186,
 οἶδα τοῖνυν ὅτι τὰ παῖδιά ξχων ὀδυ-
 ρεῖται (the defendant will bring his
 children and burst into lamentations) καὶ
 πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ ταπεινοὺς ἐρεῖ, δα-
 κρύων καὶ ὡς ἐλεεινότατον ποιῶν
 αὐτόν. For another appeal which was
 customary in Athenian courts, see on
 οὐ λόγους and φορτικὰ καὶ δικανικά,
 32 a.

6. παῖδιά αὐτοῦ: see App.

8. ἐγὼ δὲ ἄρα: and then finds that I.
 To be sure Socrates had enough
 friends and to spare who were pres-
 ent in court, but he refused to make
 such wrongful use of their presence
 and sympathy. ἄρα implies that any
 one who knew Socrates of course
 would be surprised at such unseemli-
 ness where he was concerned.

ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ' οὖν τις ταῦτα 34
 — 10 ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίῃ, καὶ ὀργισθεὶς
 αὐτοῖς τούτοις θεῖτο ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δὴ τις
 ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει — οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε· εἰ δ' οὖν, α
 ἐπεικῆ ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἐμοί, ᾧ
 ἄριστε, εἰσὶν μὲν πού τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο
 15 αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης
 πέφυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοί μοι εἰσι καὶ
 υἱεῖς, ᾧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἦδη,
 δύο δὲ παῖδια· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδένα αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβιβα-
 σάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί δὴ οὖν
 20 οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ᾧ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
 ναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω e

34
 c 9. ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι: of course Soc- rates is far from believing himself that the risk he runs is a desperate one.

10. αὐθαδέστερον σχοίῃ: would be too easily offended, more lit. represented by more (than otherwise) self-willed. The δικασταὶ might easily be too proud to submit to criticism of their own conduct in like cases; the more so because Socrates said that he was too proud (cf. e below) to follow their example. Cf. La Rochefoucauld, *Maximes*, 34, Si nous n'avions point d'orgueil, nous ne nous plaindriens point de celui des autres.

11. αὐτοῖς τούτοις: causal. — εἰ δὴ: see on εἰ δὴ, 29 b.

d 12. γάρ: "(I say if,) for though I do not expect it of you yet (making the supposition) if it should be so." The force of εἰ δ' οὖν is resumptive.

13. ἐπεικῆ: not harsh, i.e. conciliatory.

14. καὶ οἰκεῖοι: "I am not alone in the world, but I too have relatives." — τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου: this idiom

(with the gen. of the proper name) is 34
 d common in quotations. No verb is expressed, and the quotation is in apposition with τοῦτο, etc. Cf. *Theaet.* 183 e, Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, αἰδοῖός τε μοι ἅμα δεινός τε. This const. is not confined to quotations. Cf. the freq. use of δυοῖν θάτερον as in *Phaed.* 66 e, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστι κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδένα ἢ τελευτήσασιν. The quotation is from Hom. *Od.* xix. 163, οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἔστι παλαιφάτου οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης.

16. καί, καί: not correlative. The first καί means also, while the second introduces a particular case under οἰκεῖοι and means indeed or even.

17. τρεῖς: not added attrib. but appositively, three of them. Their names were Lamprocles (*Xen. Mem.* ii. 2. 1), Sophroniscus, and Menexenus. *Diog. Laert.* II. 26; *Phaed.* 116 b.

20. αὐθαδιζόμενος: it is not in a vein of self-will or stubbornness. See on e above.

21. εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἔχω κτέ.: e

πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μή, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ 34
 ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι
 ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ-
 25 νομα ἔχοντα, εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ' οὖν
 δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι τὸ Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τιτὶ τῶν πολλῶν
 ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφία 35
 εἴτε ἀνδρεία εἴτε ἄλλη ἡτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται,
 αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη· οἴουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἐώρακά τινας,
 30 ὅταν κρίνωνται, δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι, θανμάσια δὲ ἐργα-
 ζομένους, ὡς δεινὸν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦν-
 ται, ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων, ἂν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ

34
 e whether I can look death in the face or not. At this point the grammatical consistency breaks down. ἀλλά ought to be followed by a partic. (οἰόμενος perhaps), but οὐ μοι δοκεῖ is the only trace of it. See on ὅμως δὲ ἐδοκεῖ, 21 e. The anacoluthon (H. 1063) is resorted to because Socrates wishes to mention his real motive, and yet to avoid saying bluntly "I am too brave to do anything so humiliating." Having said εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως κτέ. the next clause (πρὸς δ' οὖν κτέ.) shapes itself accordingly.

22. ἄλλος λόγος: another question or matter. Cf. Dem. ix. 16, εἰ μὲν γὰρ μικρὰ ταῦτα ἢ μηδὲν ὑμῖν αὐτῶν ἐμελλεν, ἄλλος ἂν εἴη λόγος οὗτος.—δ' οὖν: but at all events or at any rate, like certe after sive—sive. See on δ' οὖν, 17 a.

24. οὐδέν: see on ἀποτρέπει, 31 d. —τοῦτο τοῦνομα: sc. σοφός. See on ὄνομα δὲ κτέ., 23 a. Socrates purposely avoids using the word σοφός either here or below.

25. ψεῦδος: used as the contrary of the adj. ἀληθές. Cf. Euthyd. 272 a, ἐάν τε ψεῦδος, ἐάν τε ἀληθές ἢ. Sometimes it is even used attrib. with a

noun. Cf. Polit. 281 b, παράδοξόν τε καὶ ψεῦδος ὄνομα. Cf. Hom. Il. ix. 115, ὃ γέρον, οὔτι ψεῦδος ἐμὰς ἀτας κατελέξας.—ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι: however that may be, people have arrived at the opinion. Cf. Prot. 327 c, ἀλλ' οὖν ἀληθῆ γοῦν πάντες ἦσαν ἱκανοὶ ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας (non-professionals).

26. τό: used here to indicate that what follows is quoted. G. 955, 2.

27. οἱ δοκοῦντες: those generally 35
 a reputed. Here Socrates may have had Pericles in mind, if Plutarch's gossip is truth. Cf. Pericl. 32. 3, Ἄσπασίαν μὲν οὖν ἐξητήσατο, πολλὰ πάνυ παρὰ τὴν δίκην, ὡς Αἰσχίνης φησὶν, ἀφελὲς ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς δάκρυα καὶ δεηθεὶς τῶν δικαστῶν, he begged Aspasia off, though Aeschines says it was by a flagrant disregard of justice, by weeping for her and beseeching the jurymen.

32. ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων: the subj. of this gen. abs. is the same as that of ἀποθανοῦνται. This is not the regular const., for usually the gen. abs. expresses a subord. limitation, and clearness demands an independent subj. Here, and in many cases where it introduces an independent idea, it depends

ἀποκτείνητε· οἱ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνῃν τῇ πόλει περι- 35
 ἀπτειν, ὥστ' ἂν τινα καὶ τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ δια-
 35 φέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετὴν, οὓς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἐν τε β
 ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι
 γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
 ναῖοι, οὔτε ὑμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὀτιοῦν
 εἶναι, οὔτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο
 40 αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ
 ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν
 πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος.

XXIV. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν
 μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀπο- c
 φεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ
 κἀθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια,
 5 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὁμῶμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι

35
 a on the leading clause for its subj. Cf. Xen. An. i. 4. 12, καὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν ἰέναι, ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτοῖς χρήματα διδῶ, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς προτέροις μετὰ Κύρου ἀναβάσι . . . καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐπὶ μαχῇ ἰδν- των. G. 1152 and 1568; cf. 972 a d.

b 36. οὗτοι: a very pointed reiteration.
 39. ἡμεῖς, ὑμᾶς: the defendant and the δικασταί. Cf. c below.

40. τοῦ εἰσάγοντος: the one who, etc., or 'him who,' here conveying the notion of quality, the man so shameless as to. G. 1560; H. 966. The phrase is borrowed from the stage. Cf. Legg. viii. 838 c, ὅταν ἢ Θεύστας ἢ τινας Οἰδίποδας εἰσάγωσιν.

XXIV. 1. χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, οὐδὲ δίκαιον: after the unseemly practice has been condemned by reference to τὸ καλόν (δόξα), it is found still more inconsistent with τὸ δίκαιον, and this is conclusive against it. The second οὐδέ (with ἀποφύγειν) is merely the idiomatic correlative of the first

35
 b on the argument involved, see Introd. 71, fin.

3. διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν: perhaps c the full idea would be, διδάσκειν καὶ διδάξαντα (or διδάσκοντα) πείθειν. For, strictly speaking, πείθειν may be the result of mere entreaties, but this Socrates would probably have called βιάζεσθαι rather than πείθειν. Cf. d below.

4. ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι: this explains ἐπὶ τούτῳ. καταχαρίζεσθαι τὸ δίκαιον, "make a present of justice." Notice the evil implication of κατὰ in composition.

5. ὁμῶμοκεν: part of the oath taken by the δικασταί was, καὶ ἀκρόασμαι τοῦ τε κατηγοροῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀπολογουμένου ὁμῶς ἀμφοῖν. The orators were always referring to this oath. Cf. Aeschin. iii. 6 ff.; Dem. xviii. 6, etc. See Introd. p. 49, note 2. Cf. also the sentiment, grateful to Athenian hearers, with which Iolaus be-

οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκ οὖν 35
 χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιπορκεῖν οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι.
 οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιῶντέ με,
 ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἀ
 10 μῆτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μῆτε δίκαια μῆτε ὄσια, ἄλλως
 τε μέντοι νῆ Δία [πάντως] καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Με- α
 λήτου τουτουῖ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ
 δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὁμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ
 ἡγέσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγο-

35
 c
 gins his appeal to Demophon, king of Athens, Eur. *Heracl.* 181 ff., ἀναξ ὑπάρχει μὲν τόδ' ἐν τῇ σῆ χθονί, | εἰπεῖν ἀκοῦσα: τ' ἐν μέρει πάρεστί μοι, | κοῦδεις μ' ἀπάσει πρόσθεν, ὥσπερ ἄλλοθεν. οὐ belongs to ὁμώμοκεν not to the inf., for otherwise the negative would be μὴ and not οὐ. (Cf. *Phaedr.* 236 e, ὕμνυμι γὰρ σοι . . . ἢ μὴν . . . μηδέποτε σοι ἕτερον λόγον μηδένα μηδενὸς ἐπιδείξειν). He has sworn not that he will, etc., but that he will, etc. See Dr. Gildersleeve's article in the *American Journal of Philology*, Vol. I. p. 49.

7. ἐθίζεσθαι: allow yourselves to be habituated.

8. ἡμῶν: includes both the speaker and the court referred to above by ἡμᾶς and ὑμᾶς respectively.

9. ἀ μῆτε ἡγοῦμαι: notice the order. Socrates adds μῆτε ὄσια last because he remembers the ἐπιπορκεῖν above. Perjury involves wrong to the gods named in the violated oath, hence οὐδέτεροι ἂν εὐσεβοῖεν.

10. ἄλλως . . . καί: the hyperbaton (H. 1062) consists in interrupting the familiar phrase ἄλλως τε καὶ to make room for μέντοι νῆ Δία, after which ἄλλως is forgotten and πάντως is brought in with καί, ten thousand times less so too because I actually, etc.

See App. There is an intended humor 35
 c
 in this accumulated agony of emphasis which leads up to what Socrates has called Meletus's practical joke. Cf. 26 e, δοκεῖ νεότητι γράψασθαι and 27 a, τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος. Cf. also the ironical allusions to this charge throughout the *Euthyphro*, particularly (3 b) φησὶ γὰρ με ποιητὴν (almost, manufacturer) εἶναι θεῶν, and (16 a) οὐκέτι αὐτοσχεδιάζω (deal at random) οὐδὲ καινοτομῶ (have new-fangled notions) περὶ αὐτὰ (τὰ θεῖα).

12. πείθοιμι καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοί- d
 μην: a double opposition which forcibly brings out (1) the absurdity of doing any real violence (*βιάζεσθαι* is a strong word) by simple entreaties, (2) the incompatibility between πείθειν and βιάζεσθαι. All this gives in a nutshell the drift of Socrates's earnest objection to the practice of irrelevant appeals for pity and mercy. For the full force of βιάζεσθαι, cf. *Rep.* vi. 488 d, ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιάζόμενοι, (by persuasion or by violence) τὸν ναύκληρον.

13. θεοὺς . . . εἶναι: extraordinarily separated, giving great emphasis to εἶναι. The whole arrangement of words here is intended to arrest the attention and thus prevent their important meaning from being slighted.

15 ροίην ἂν ἐμαντοῦ ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ 35
 οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς
 τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρί-
 ναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ε
 ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἀλλὰ τέ 36

35
 d 15. πολλοῦ δεῖ κτέ.: *this is far from (lacks much of) being the case (so).*

17. ἐπιτρέπω τῷ θεῷ: cf. 42 a, ἄδηνον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ. Socrates sees a divine providence in any decision that may be rendered, and concludes his plea with words of submission.

18. ἄριστα: what Socrates understood to be ἄριστον for every man may be read in the Euthydemus (279 a-281 e), where Socrates discusses happiness with Clinias; and at the end of the Phaedrus in his prayer: ὦ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῆδε θεοί, δοίητέ μοι καλῶ γενέσθαι τὰνδ' ἄθροον (with-in)· ἔξωθεν (outward acts and fortunes) δ' ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναι μοι φίλια. πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν. τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλήθος εἶη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτ' ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σάφρων.— καὶ ὑμῖν: he is loyal to the δικασταί; since they represent Athens, they are his friends. Cf. the words of Phaedrus at the end of the prayer, καὶ ἐμολ ταῦτα συνεύχου· κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν φίλων.

XXV. Here ends Socrates's plea in answer to Meletus, Anytus, and Zeyco. But much remained to be discussed and decided before the case was disposed of. The pleadings in a γραφή ἀσβετίας, like those in a γραφή παρανόμων, were (1) a speech of the prosecution, (2) a speech of the defend-

ant in reply, (3) a vote on the defendant's guilt or innocence. This would end the matter if the defendant were acquitted. But the judges found a verdict of guilty against Socrates. After such a verdict there remained always (4) a speech from the prosecution urging the penalty already proposed or a compromise, and (5) a speech on behalf of the defendant in which he actually proposed some penalty to be inflicted (ἀντιτίμησις) in place of his opponent's. Cf. Aeschin. III. 197 f. After c. xxiv. comes the verdict of the δικασταί, which is followed by the τίμησις of Meletus. Then with c. xxv. begins the ἀντιτίμησις of Socrates. Then comes the final vote fixing the penalty. See *Intro.* 74.

1. τὸ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν: the inf. with e of the art. is placed at the beginning of the clause, and depends upon a word of prevention expected instead of συμβάλλεται. "Many things contribute toward my not grieving," i.e. prevent me from grieving. G. 1551 and 1058; H. 961. *The fact that I feel no disposition to make an outcry, results from many causes, etc.* Cf. *Rep.* i. 331 b, τὸ μὴ δὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατήσαι. . . μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἢ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσις συμβάλλεται, where the parallel is complete except that, because of the long and intricate specifications (omitted in quot.

μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε 36
 τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρων
 5 τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ὥδημην ἔγωγε
 οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ· νῦν δέ, ὡς
 ἔοικεν, εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπε-
 φεύγη ἄν. Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀπο-
 πέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον

35 e above), there is a repetition of the
 inf. in *εἰς τοῦτο*.

36 a 2. *ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε*: a defini-
 tion of *τοῦτ' ἢ γέγονε*.

3. *καὶ . . . γέγονε*: a departure from
 the beaten track. *καὶ ὅτι οὐκ κτέ.*,
 though regular, would have been cum-
 brous. The important fact detaches
 itself from any connective like *ὅτι*.
 This is often the case in clauses con-
 nected with *τέ . . . καί, οὔτε . . . οὔτε,*
μὲν . . . δέ. See on *ὅμως δὲ ἔδοκει*,
 21 e, and *διαφθείρουσιν*, 25 b. — *οὐκ*
ἀνέλπιστον: *no surprise, i.e.* not unex-
 pected. Compare *ὥδημην* just below
 almost in the sense of *ἤλπιζον*. The
 use of *ἐλπῖς* and *ἐλπίζειν* and the
 like to express expectation, without
 reference to the pleasure or pain in-
 volved in the event expected, is com-
 mon enough in Greek; sometimes
 even the context makes the expecta-
 tion one of pain or harm to come.
 In English, hope is rarely used in the
 sense of mere expectation, but *cf.*
Rich. III. ii. 4, I hope he is much
 grown since last I saw him; *Mer. of*
Ven. ii. 2, As my father, being I hope
 an old man, shall fruitify unto you.

6. *οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον*: *so close*. *οὕτως*
 is separated from *ὀλίγον* by *παρά*, a
 case of apparent hyperbaton. See on
ἔλλως τε κτέ., 35 d. The combination
παρ' ὀλίγον is treated as inseparable,
 because the whole of it is required to
 express the idea "a little beyond," *i.e.*

close. The whole idea of *by a small* 36
majority is qualified by *οὕτως*. The
ὀλίγον was thirty votes. *Cf.* *Dem.* xxiv.
 138, *Φιλίππου τὸν Φιλίππου τοῦ ναυκλή-*
ρου νῦν μικροῦ (almost) μὲν ἀπεκτεί-
νατε, χρημάτων δὲ πολλῶν αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου
ἀντιτιμωμένον παρ' ὀλίγας ψήφους
(within a small majority) ἠτιμώσατε. The
 subj. of *ἔσεσθαι* is of course to be
 supplied from *τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν*. —
ὡς ἔοικεν: used freq. (like the Eng.
 "as it appears") in cases even of the
 greatest certainty.

7. *εἰ τριάκοντα κτέ.*: strictly speak-
 ing 31. *Diog. L.* ii. 5. 41, says: *κατε-*
δικάσθη, διακοσίαις ὀγδοήκοντα
μιᾷ πλείοσι τῶν ἀπολυουσῶν (sc. ψή-
φων). The total number of votes
 against him was therefore 281; so
 that 220 of the 501 *δικασταί* (see
Intro. 66) must have voted in his
 favor. Socrates probably counted
 the numbers roughly, as he heard
 them, and said that thirty votes would
 have turned the scale. When *Aes-*
chines was acquitted of the charge
 of *παραπροσβεία, betrayal of trust when*
on an embassy, brought by *Demos-*
thenes, his majority is said to have
 been also thirty votes. For *Demos-*
thenes, as here for *Socrates*, such de-
 feat was, under the circumstances,
 victory. See *Intro.* 72.

8. *ἀποπέφευγα*: *i.e.* alone, *Meletus*
 could not have got 100 votes, since
 with two helpers he failed to get 300.

10 τοῦτό γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορή- 36
 σουτες ἐμοῦ, κὰν ὄφλε χιλίας δραχμὰς οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ β
 πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

XXVI. Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. εἶεν·
 ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι;
 ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἀξίός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ
 ἀποτίσαι, ὃ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἀλλ'
 5 ἀμελήσας ὦνπερ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονο-

36
 a 10. εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη: for the accusers and
 their respective importance, see Introd.
 30. Notice ἀνέβη . . . κατηγορήσουτες.

11. χιλίας δραχμὰς: see Introd. 72.
 b — τὸ πέμπτον μέρος: (cf. Dem. xviii.
 103, τὸ μέρος τῶν ψήφων οὐκ ἔλαβεν)
 the indispensable fifth part, not a fifth
 part. The acc. is used because the
 whole fifth is meant. Cf. Prot. 329 e,
 μεταλαμβάνουσιν . . . τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς
 μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο οἱ δὲ ἄλλο.
 Xen. An. iv. 5. 5, ὃ προσέειπεν πρὸς τὸ
 πῦρ τοὺς ὀψίζοντας, εἰ μὴ μεταδοίεν αὐ-
 τοῖς πυρούς . . . ἔνθα δὴ μετεδίδουσαν
 ἀλλήλοισι ὦν εἶχον ἕκαστοι.

XXVI. 1. τιμᾶται θανάτου: fixes
 my penalty at death. See Introd. 73.
 For the omission of the art. when
 θάνατος means the penalty of death,
 cf. 37 b, and see on τοῦ θανάτου, 28 c.

2. ὑμῖν: ethical dat. G. 1171; H. 770.

3. ἢ δῆλον κτέ.: with ἢ (an) is ap-
 pended the interrogative answer to
 the first question, which is merely
 rhetorical. — τῆς ἀξίας: sc. τιμῆς. This
 ellipsis is so common that ἢ ἀξία is
 treated as a noun; here τιμῆς may
 easily be supplied from the verb. On
 παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, see Introd. 74.

4. ὃ τι μαθὼν: strictly speaking,
 this is the indir. form of τί μαθὼν,
 which hardly differs from τί παθὼν.
 See GMT. 839; H. 968 c. Both
 idioms ask, with astonishment or dis-

approval, for the reason of an act.
 They resemble two English ways of
 asking 'why?' 'what possessed (μα-
 θῶν) you?' 'what came over (παθὼν)
 you?' So ὃ τι μαθὼν = an emphatic
because. The indir. question here is
 loosely connected with the leading
 clause. Such connexion as there is
 depends upon the notion of deciding a
 question implied in τί ἀξίος . . . ἀπο-
 τίσαι, "what sort of a penalty do I
 deserve to pay since the question in-
 volved is what possessed me," etc. This
 is more striking than the regular
 phrase οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων or ἀγαγών.
 Cf. Euthyd. 299 a, δικαιοτέρον ἂν τὸν
 ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτοιμι ὃ τι παθὼν
 σοφοὺς υἱεῖς οὕτως ἔφυσεν. — ἀλλ' ἀμε-
 λήσας: this is more fully explained
 below by ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἦα, for which
 see on 9 below.

5. ὦνπερ οἱ πολλοί: sc. ἐπιμελοῦνται,
 supplied from ἀμελήσας. Cf. Hdt. vii.
 104, ἀνάγει δὲ ταῦτ' αἰεὶ, οὐκ ἔῶν φε-
 γειν οὐδὲν πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐκ μάχης,
 ἀλλὰ μένοντες ἐν τῇ τάξῃ ἐπικρατεῖεν ἢ
 ἀπόλλυσθαι (sc. κελεύων). ἕκαστος is
 often to be supplied from οὐδεὶς. For
 a similar ellipsis, see Hom. Od. vi.
 193, οὐτ' οὖν ἐσθῆτος δευήσεται οὐτέ τευ
 ἄλλου | ὦν ἐπέοιχ' ἰκέτην ταλαπείριον
 ἀντίσαντα (sc. μὴ δεύεσθαι). Socrates's
 specifications cover both public
 and private life.

μίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 36
 ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει
 γιγνομένων, ἠγῆσάμενος ἑμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον
 εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα σφύζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ
 10 ἦα, οἱ ἐλθὼν μῆτε ὑμῖν μῆτε ἑμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφε-
 λος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον [ἰῶν] εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγί-
 στην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦα, ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκα-
 στον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μῆτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς
 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθεῖν ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος
 15 καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μῆτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρὶν αὐτῆς
 τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον

36
 b 6. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν κτέ.: and magistracies besides and plots and factions. ἄλλων is attrib. to ἀρχῶν ξυνωμοσιῶν, and στάσεων. Cf. *Phaedo*, 110 e, καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῆ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις (as well as in animals) τε καὶ φυτοῖς. Homer uses a similar idiom, *Od.* i. 132, πᾶρ δ' αὐτὸς κλισμὸν θέτο ποικίλον ἔκτοθεν ἄλλων μνηστήρων. Socrates means to include all performances which bring a citizen into public life; he talks of responsible public offices as on a par with irresponsible participation in public affairs. Of course *στρατηγία* is a public office, and among the most important; but *δημηγορία* is not so, even in the case of the *ῥήτορες*. For the facts, cf. 32 b.

7. ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων: the former relates to political factions, the so-called *ἐταιρίαι*, instituted to overthrow the existing government, the latter to revolutions, whether from democracy to oligarchy, or from oligarchy to democracy. Such combinations and seditions were rife toward the end of the Peloponnesian war. See Grote, c. LXV.

8. ἠγῆσάμενος ἑμαυτόν κτέ.: freq. the pron. is not given, and then the

const. is different. Cf. *Xen. An.* v. 4. 20, ἱκανοὶ ἠγῆσάμενοι εἶναι . . . ταῦτ' ἀπράττειν κτέ. Like the present case is *Soph.* 234 e, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἔτι πόρρωθεν ἀφεστηκότων εἶναι.

9. εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα: the reading ὄντα can hardly be defended. See App.

11. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ κτέ.: but toward privately benefiting individuals. This is strictly the completion of the thought introduced by ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας, which, though ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα furnishes its verb, still requires a positive expression to explain οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον. ἐνταῦθα, as is often the case with ὄδτος, is resumptive, and restates ἐπὶ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον κτέ. The whole period is full of repetitions, but ἰῶν comes in most unaccountably. See App. See on τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, 19 e.

13. μὴ πρότερον κτέ.: cf. 30 a b.

14. πρὶν ἐπιμεληθεῖν: πρὶν takes the opt. on the principle of *oratio obliqua*, since the tense of the leading verb (ἦα) is secondary. GMT. 644; H. 924.

15. ὅπως ἔσοιτο: GMT. 339; H. 885 a.

16. τῶν τε ἄλλων: not a third specification in line with μῆτε . . . μῆτε, but connected with the whole μὴ πρό-

ἐπιμελείσθαι· τί οὖν εἶμι ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὢν; ἀγαθόν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῆ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον, ὅ τι ἂν
 20 πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτη, δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρα παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν
 25 Ὀλυμπιάσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ ε

36
 c τερον... πόλεως. — κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον: repeats ἐκ παραλλήλου the thought conveyed by οὕτω, which points back to μὴ πρότερον... πρὶν, i.e. so that what was essential might not be neglected in favor of what is unessential.

d 17. τί οὖν κτέ.: a return to the question asked above, with omission of what does not suit the new connexion. Notice in the next line the position of δεῖ, which is emphasized by the γέ that follows, *if you insist that, etc.*

20. ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτη: a poor man who has richly served the state. He is poor, and therefore needs the στήσις, which he deserves because he is an εὐεργέτης. εὐεργέτης was a title of honor, bestowed under special circumstances upon citizens and non-citizens.

22. μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως: with colloquial freedom Socrates combines two idioms οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον πρέπει ἢ and ὅτι πρέπει οὕτως ὡς. See App.

23. ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι: those entertained by the state (1) were invited once or (2) were maintained permanently. Socrates is speaking of (2), i.e. maintenance in the *prytaneum*. The archons dined in the *θεσμο-*

θέσιον; the senatorial Prytanes dined in the *θόλος*, and in later times also those called *ἀεῖσιτοι*, — certain Eleusinian priests, scribes, heralds, etc. See on *εἰς τὴν θόλον*, 32 c. The public guests sat at table in the *πρυτανεῖον*, which was at the foot of the northeast corner of the Acropolis. Some of them earned the distinction by winning prizes in the national games, some received it on account of their forefathers' benefactions to the state, e.g. the oldest living descendants of Harmodius and of Aristogeiton respectively were thus honored. The most ancient *πρυτανεῖον* on the Acropolis was in historic times used only for certain religious ceremonies.

24. ἵππῳ κτέ.: i.e. κέλητι, race-horse; ξυνωρίδι, a pair; ζεύγει, four horses abreast. Since a victory in the great panhellenic festivals was glorious for the country from which the victor came, he received on his return the greatest honors, and even substantial rewards. Cf. *Rep.* v. 465 d, where Plato speaks of the μακαριστὸς βίος ἢν οἱ ὀλυμπιονίκαι ζῶσι, the blissful life *Olympian victors lead*.

26. οὐδὲν δεῖται: only rich men e could afford to compete.

δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶ- 36
σθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως. 37

XXVII. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλη-
σίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβο-
λήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι,
τοιούτου, ἀλλὰ τοιούδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι
5 μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω·
ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα· ἐπεὶ, ὡς ἐγῶμαι,
εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανά-
του μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰς, ἐπέισθητε
ἄν· νῦν δ' οὐ ρᾶδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς
10 ἀπολύεσθαι. πεπεισμένοι δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ
δέω ἐμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτός,
ὡς ἀξίος εἰμί του κακοῦ, καὶ τιμῆσεσθαι τοιούτου τιδὸς
ἐμαυτῷ. τί δέισας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο οὐ Μέλητος μοι
τιμᾶται, ὃ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὐτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὐτ' εἰ κακόν

37
a 28. ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως: cf. above
τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι.
The art. is omitted, since this is
thrown in merely to explain τούτου.

XXVII. 3. ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος: in the
spirit of stubbornness. This serves to
explain παραπλησίως κτέ. For the
facts, see on τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζόμενῃ, 35 d.
— τὸ δέ: refers to the act which has
been only incidentally touched upon
(ταυτὶ λέγων = ὅτι ταῦτα λέγω). ὁ δέ,
οἱ δέ, τὸ δέ, are used without a pre-
ceding μέν when they introduce some
person or topic in contrast to what
has just been dwelt upon, here περὶ
τοῦ οἴκτου κτέ. For a different use of
τὸ δέ, see on τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, 23 a.

4. ἐκὼν εἶναι: an apparently super-
fluous inf. G. 1535; H. 956 a. For
the facts, see on ἡ ἕκων, 25 e.

7. ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις: for instance
the Lacedaemonians. Cf. Pseudo

Plut. Apophth. Lac. s.v. Ἀναξανδρίδου ἢ
'Αλεξανδρίδου), c. 6, ἐρωτῶντός τινος
αὐτόν, διὰ τί τὰς περὶ τοῦ θανάτου δίκας
πλείοσιν ἡμέραις οἱ γέροντες κρίνουσι,
πολλὰς, ἔφη, ἡμέραις κρίνουσιν,
ὅτι περὶ θανάτου τοῖς διαμαρτάνουσι
(those who go completely wrong) οὐκ ἔστι
μεταβουλευσάσθαι (to reconsider).
Thucydides also says in his account of
Pausanias, i. 132. 5, χρώμενοι τῷ
τρόπῳ ἦπερ εἰῶθασιν ἐς σφᾶς αὐ-
τοὺς (their own countrymen), μὴ ταχεῖς
εἶναι περὶ ἀνδρῶν Σπαρτιάτου ἄνευ ἀναμ-
φισβητήτων τεκμηρίων βουλευσαί τι
ἀνῆκεστον.

11. ἀδικήσειν, ἐρεῖν, τιμῆσεσθαι: the
fut. is used to disclaim the fut. (GMT.
113; H. 855) intention.

13. τί δέισας: what fear is there to b
induce me? Supply verbs from the
three infs. above.

14. φημί: see above 28 e-30 b.

15 ἔστιν ; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαι ὧν εἶ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, 37
 τούτου τιμησάμενος ; πότερον δεσμοῦ ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν
 ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ,
 τοῖς ἔνδεκα ; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτί-
 σω ; ἀλλὰ ταυτόν μοι ἔστιν ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ
 20 ἔστι μοι χρήματα ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμή-
 σωμαι ; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε. πολλὴ μεν-
 τᾶν με φιλοψυχία ἔχει, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι ὥστε μὴ
 δύνασθαι λογιζέσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖταί μου οὐχ
 οἰοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς d

37
b

15. ἔλωμαι ὧν . . . ὄντων : a remarkable const., arising from ἔλωμαι τι ἐκείνων ἃ εἶ οἶδα κακὰ ὄντα, by the assimilation of ἐκείνων ἃ to ὧν and of κακὰ ὄντα to κακῶν ὄντων, and the insertion of ὅτι after οἶδα. εἶ οἶδ' ὅτι and οἶδ' ὅτι occur freq. (in parenthesis) where ὅτι is superfluous. See on δῆλον ὅτι, *Crito*, 53 a, and cf. *Dem.* XIX. 9, *μνημονεύοντας ὑμῶν οἶδ' ὅτι τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπομνήσαι, to remind you, although I know that most of you remember it* Cf. *Gorg.* 481 d, *αἰσθάνομαι ὄν σου ἐκάστοτε . . . ὅτι ὁπόσ' ἂν φῆ σου τὰ παιδικὰ . . . οὐ δυναμένον ἀντιλέγειν*. So the acc. and inf. may follow ὅτι and ὥς.

16. τούτου κτέ. : a part (τι) of ὧν, by fixing my penalty at that. See App.

c 17. δουλεύοντα : as a man in prison, who ceases to be his own master.

18. τοῖς ἔνδεκα : see *Introd.* 75 and cf. οἱ ἄρχοντες, 39 e. — ἀλλὰ χρημάτων : a neg. answer to the preceding rhetorical question is here implied ; otherwise ἢ might equally well have been used. The second ἀλλά introduces an objection, which answers the question immediately preceding it. — καὶ δεδέσθαι κτέ. : to remain in prison. *GMT.* 110. Cf. in *Dem.* xxiv. 63, the document which winds up with :

ἐὰν δ' ἀργυρίου τιμηθῆ, δεδέσθω τέως (ἕως) 37
 ἂν ἐκτίσῃ ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῦ καταγνωσθῆ. c

19. νῦν δῆ : just now.

20. ἐκτίσω : for the fut. with rel. denoting purpose, see *GMT.* 565 ; *H.* 911. — ἀλλὰ δῆ : but then. See on ἀλλὰ δῆ, *Crit.* 54 a. The ἀλλά points to the impossibility just asserted of Socrates's paying a fine himself, while δῆ introduces the one possible alternative.

22. φιλοψυχία : clinging to life, which is opposed to εὐψυχία (*courage*). Cf. *Eur. Hec.* 315, *πότερα μαχοῦμέθ', ἢ φιλοψυχῆσομεν ;* *ibid.* 348, *κακῆ φανοῦμαι καὶ φιλόψυχος γυνή ;* also the speech where Macaria chooses to die, *Heracl.* 516 ff., *κοῦκ αἰσχυνοῦμαι δῆτ', ἐὰν δῆ τις λέγγ' | "τί δεῦρ' ἀφίκεσθ' ἰκεσίοισι σὺν κλάδοις | αὐτοὶ φιλοψυχοῦντες ; ἔξτε χθονός."* with the admiring words of Iolaus, *ibid.* 597 ff., *ἀλλ' ὦ μέγιστον ἐκπρέπουσ' ἐψυχία | πασῶν γυναικῶν, . . . — εἰ . . . εἰμί :* cf. 30 b, and see on *διαφθείρουσιν*, 25 b.

23. ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν : that (if) you, my fellow-citizens, proved unable to bear my company. After this we look for something like this : "then others will prove still less able to bear it." But instead, we find a question with *ἄρα*, *will others then, etc.*, answered by *πολ-*

25 λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, 37
 ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα
 αὐτὰς αἰσοῦσι ῥαδίως; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς
 οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην
 ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαννομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ
 30 γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι
 ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε· καὶ μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ
 ἐξελῶσι πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· εἰάν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω,
 οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκείοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

XXVIII. Ἴσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυ-
 χίαν ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἰός τ' ἔσει ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν
 ζῆν; τουτὶ δὴ ἔστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον πείσαι τινὰς
 ὑμῶν. εἰάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἔστι
 5 καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι

37
 c λου γε δεῖ. The dependence of the whole upon *στι* is forgotten because of the intervening detailed statement.

d 25. βαρύτεραι; fem. because τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβάς is the most important idea and τοὺς λόγους is incidentally added by way of explanation. For agreement with the most prominent noun, see G. 924 b.

28. ὁ βίος: the art. as here used has something of its original demonstrative force; accordingly ἐξελθόντι . . . ζῆν is appended as if to a dem. pron., that would be a glorious life for me, to be banished at my time of life. Notice that ἐξέρχασθαι means go into exile; φεύγειν, live in exile; and κατιέναι, to come back from exile. Instead of τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ, the commoner idiom would be τηλικῶδε ὄντι. But cf. τηλικοῖδε ἄνδρες, *Crit.* 49 a; *Euthyd.* 293 b, πολλὸν γὰρ ῥῆζον ἢ μανθάνειν τηλικῶδε ἄνδρα, and *Leqq.* i. 634 d, οὐ γὰρ ἂν τηλικοῖσδε ἀνδράσι πρόποι τὸ τοιοῦτον.

— ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης κτέ.: cf. *Xen. An.* v. 4. 31, ἀναβοώντων ἀλλήλων ξυνηκούον εἰς τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρας πόλεως. Elsewhere we find the substantive repeated, e.g. τόπου . . . τόπον, 40 c.

The whole expression suggests the restless life led by the so-called sophists. Cf. *Soph.* 224 b, where the typical sophist is described as τὸν μαθήματα ξυνονούμενον πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα, one who goes from town to town buying up and selling knowledge for coin. Cf. also *Prot.* 313 a-314 b.

33. δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους: to describe e the involuntary cause in contrast to οὗτοι αὐτοί.

XXVIII. 2. ἐξελθὼν ζῆν: to live on in exile. This forms a unit to which σιγῶν and ἡσυχίαν ἄγων are added by way of indicating the manner of life he will lead. The meaning of ἡσυχίαν ἄγων is plain from 36 b.

3. τουτὶ δὴ: that is the thing of which, etc.; cognate acc. after πείσαι. — τινάς:

37
 d

ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· ἐάν τ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγι- 38
 στον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρε-
 τῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς
 ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἑμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετά-
 10 ζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα
 δ' ἔτι ἦττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως
 ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ράδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ
 ἅμα οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἑμαυτὸν ἀξιούην κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν
 γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελ- 6
 15 λον ἐκτίσειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ—οὐ γὰρ
 ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι, τοσοῦτο

37
 e some, used habitually by the orators where they will not or cannot be definite. Socrates probably means almost all of the Athenians.

6. εἰρωνευομένῳ: see Introd. 26.—
 38
 a καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθόν: it is not duty only, it is the highest good and gives the greatest pleasure.

8. τοὺς λόγους: *his speeches*.

10. ἀνεξέταστος: this may mean *unexamined, unscrutinized, or without scrutiny*, in which latter case a man neither examines himself nor others, that is, his life is unthinking. Verbal adjs. in *τος*, esp. with a privative, occur with both an act. and a pass. sense. Here the act. meaning substantially includes the pass. in so far as it involves self-examination (καὶ ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος).—
 βιωτός: *worth living*. Cf. ψεκτός, *blame-worthy*, and ἐπαινετός, *praiseworthy*.—
 ταῦτα δ' ἔτι: δέ introduces apod. (GMT. 512) in order to bring it into relation with the preceding οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι. The two correspond very much like the two introductory clauses ἐάν τε . . . ἐάν τ' αὖ. See on δεινὰ ἂν εἶην κτέ., 28 d.

11. τὰ δέ: see on τὸ δέ, 37 a.

12. καὶ ἐγὼ ἄμ' οὐκ εἴθισμαι: after 38
 a Socrates, in 28 e-30 e and here, has shown that he neither can nor should abandon his customary manner of living, and has thus proved that he neither can nor should live in exile; he further adds (cf. the reasons given in 37 b) that he cannot propose banishment as his penalty. Banishment he has already (28 e ff.) rejected, though here he rejects it in a somewhat altered form.

13. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν κτέ.: γὰρ is related to the thought which lies unuttered in the previous explanation: *not from love of money do I refuse to make a proposition*. The apod. includes ὅσα ἔμελλον κτέ. See on ὅς ἔμελλεν, 20 a.

15. νῦν δὲ—οὐ γὰρ: *but as it is, b* (I name no sum of money,) *for money I have none*. The connexion is similar to ἀλλὰ γὰρ (19 d, 20 c), where the unexpressed thought alluded to by γὰρ is easily supplied. νῦν δέ expresses forcibly the incompatibility of facts with the preceding supposition. Cf. *Lach.* 184 d, νῦν δὲ εἶδη ἔχει ἀκούσαι καὶ σοῦ.

16. εἰ μὴ ἄρα: see on εἰ μὴ ἄρα, 17 b.

βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ὑμῖν 38
 μνᾶν ἀργυρίου· τοσούτου οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὄδε,
 ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ
 20 Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμῆσασθαι,
 αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου, ἐγγυηταὶ δ'
 ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεω.

XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη- c
 ναῖοι, ὄνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν
 πόλιν λαιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν·
 φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμε-
 5 νοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίξεν. εἰ οὖν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον,
 ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁράτε γὰρ δὴ
 τὴν ἡλικίαν ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ
 ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς

38
 b 18. μνᾶν ἀργυρίου: about seventeen
 dollars. This is certainly small compared with the fines imposed in other cases, e.g. upon Miltiades, Pericles, Timotheus.

21. αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι: sc. φασίν, to be supplied from κελεύουσι. Their surety would relieve Socrates from imprisonment.

22. ἀξιόχρεω: responsible, an assurance hardly needed in Crito's case.

XXIX. Here ends Socrates's ἀντιπίμησης, and it was followed by the final vote of the court determining Socrates's penalty. With this the case ends. Socrates has only to be led away to prison. See note on c. xxv. above, 35 d. See Introd. 35 and 36. In the address that follows, Socrates is out of order. He takes advantage of a slight delay to read a lesson to the court.

c 1. οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου: a

compressed expression. By condemning Socrates, his judges, in order to rid themselves of him, have hastened his death by the few years which remained to him; thus, to gain a short respite, they have done a great wrong.

2. ὄνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν: the name and the blame. See on τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν, 20 d, and ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο κτέ., 23 a. — ὑπό: as if with ὀνομασθήσεσθε and αἰτιασθήσεσθε. See on πεπόνθατε, 17 a. Some periphrasis like ὄνομα ἔξετε κτέ. was often preferred by the Greeks to their somewhat cumbersome fut. pass. (of which there are only two examples in Hom.).

7. πόρρω τοῦ βίου: far on in life. For the gen. with advs. of place, see G. 1148; H. 757. — θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς: and near unto death. The contrast introduced by δέ is often so slight that but overtranslates it. Cf. Xen. Cyr.

i. 5. 2, ὁ Κνωξάρης ὁ τοῦ Ἀστυάγου

39
 c

τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε ³⁸
 10 πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες,
 ἀπορία λόγων ἐάλωκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ
 ὤμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν
 δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορία μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μὲν-
 15 τοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν
 λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οἷ' ἂν ὑμῖν ἥδιστα ἦν ἀκούειν,
 θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιούντος
 καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι· οἶα ^e
 δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε
 ὤήθην δεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πράξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελευθερον,
 20 οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ
 μᾶλλον αἰρούμαι ᾧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως
 ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον
 οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν ³⁹

³⁸
^c παῖς, τῆς δὲ Κύρου μητρὸς ἀδελφὸς κτέ. ³⁸
 An. i. 7. 9, εἴπερ Δαρείου ἐστὶ παῖς, ^d
 ἐμὸς δὲ ἀδελφός, οὐκ ἀμαχεὶ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ
 λήψομαι.

^d 12. ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν: so as to escape,
 i.e. in order to escape. The Greek
 idiom expresses not so much purpose
 as result. There really seems very
 little difference between this ὥστε
 with the inf. and an obj. clause with
 ὅπως and the fut. ind. GMT. 582 and
 339; H. 953 and 885. Cf. *Phaedr.*
 252 e, πᾶν ποιούσιν ὅπως τοιούτους (sc.
 φιλόσοφος) ἔσται, and *Phaedr.* 114 e,
 χρὴ πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονή-
 σεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν. Cf. also
 ὥστε διαφεύγειν, 39 a below.

14. τόλμης: in its worst sense, like
 the Lat. *audacia*. Cf. *ἐάν τις τολ-
 μᾶ*, 39 a below, and *Crit.* 53 e.

16. θρηνοῦντος κτέ.: a development
 of the idea in *τοιαῦτα, οἷ' ἂν κτέ.* Here
 is a transition from the acc. of the
 thing (sound) heard to the gen. of

the person heard, unless *θρηνοῦντος*... ³⁸
φημι is looked upon as a gen. absolute ^d
 thrown in as an afterthought for the
 sake of a more circumstantial and
 clearer statement. For the facts, cf.
Gorg. 522 d, where (evidently with refer-
 ence to the point here made) Plato
 puts the following words into Socra-
 tes's mouth: *εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς*
(rhetorical flattery) ἐνδεία τελευτήην
ἔγωγε, εὐ οἶδα ὅτι βραδίως ἴδοις ἂν με
φέροντα τὸν θάνατον.

19. οὐδέν: see on *οὐδέν*, 34 e. ^e

21. ᾧδε ἀπολογησάμενος: in this
 way, etc., i.e. after such a defence.
οὔτως above means *as I have*, and
 that idea is vividly repeated by *ᾧδε*.
 Thus its contrast with *ἐκείνως* (sc.
ἀπολογησάμενος) is made all the more
 striking. — *τεθνάναι*: see on *τεθνάναι*,
 30 e.

23. πᾶν ποιῶν: by doing anything ³⁹
 and everything. Cf. *πανούργος*, a ras- ^a
 cal. Cf. 38 d.

θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γί-
 25 γνεται ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἄν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὄπλα
 ἀφεῖς καὶ ἐφ' ἰκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ
 ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις
 ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, εἰάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ
 λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἦ χαλεπόν, ὧ ἄνδρες, θάνατον
 30 ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν· θάπτου γὰρ
 θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄτε βραδύς ὢν καὶ πρε-
 σβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι
 ἄτε δευοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάπτονος, τῆς κακίας.
 καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὀφλῶν,
 35 οὔτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδι-
 κίαν. καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὔτοι. ταῦτα μὲν
 πον ἴσως οὔτω καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.
 XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησμοφδῆ-

39
 28. ὥστε: cf. μηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως just
 above, and see on ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν,
 38 d.

29. μὴ . . . ἦ: substituted rhetori-
 cally for a statement of fact. See on
 μὴ σκέμματα ἦ, *Crit.* 48 c. For the
 idea of fearing implied, see GMT.
 366.

30. ἀλλὰ πολὺ κτέ.: fully expressed
 we should have ἀλλὰ μὴ πολὺ χαλεπώ-
 τερον ἢ πονηρίαν ἐκφυγεῖν. — θάπτου
 θανάτου θεῖ: *flies faster than fate*, to
 preserve the alliteration, which here,
 as often, is picturesque. For the
 thought, cf. *Henry V.* iv. 1, "Now if
 these men have defeated the law and
 outrun native punishment, though
 they can outstrip men, they have no
 wings to fly from God." In the
 thought that wickedness flies faster
 than fate, we have perhaps a remi-
 niscence of Homer's description of
 Ἄτη, *Il.* ix. 505 ff., ἣ δ' Ἄτη σθεναρῆ

39
 τε καὶ ἀρτίπος, οὐνεκα πάσας | πολλὰν
 ὑπεκπροθέει, φθάνει δέ τε πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἶαν |
 βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους.

34. θανάτου δίκην ὀφλῶν: with b
 ὀφλισκάνειν, whether used technically
 (as a law term) or colloquially, we
 find the crime or the penalty either
 (1) in the acc. or (2) in the gen. with
 or without δίκην. On the accent, see
 App.

36. καὶ ἐγὼ κτέ.: i.e. they escape
 their punishment just as little as I
 escape mine. The καὶ before ἔδει
 makes a climax: "perhaps it was
 necessary for the matter actually to
 shape itself just as it really has."

37. σχεῖν: on the meaning of σχεῖν
 and ἔχειν respectively, see on ἔσχετε,
 19 a.

XXX. 1. τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο:
 τὸ δέ is used adverbially; see on
 τὸ δέ, 37 a. χρησμοφδῆσαι, *declare a*
prophecy.

σαι, ὦ καταψηφισάμενοί μου. καὶ γὰρ εἶμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα, ³⁹
 ἐν ᾧ μάλιστ' ἄνθρωποι χρησμοδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν
 ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημί γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε,
 5 τιμωρίαν ὑμῶν ἤξεν εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺν
 χαλεπωτέραν νῆ Δία ἢ οἶαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο
 εἰργάσασθε οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον
 τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῶν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγὼ
 φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ
 10 κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἤσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσου- **d**
 ται ὄσω νεώτεροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. **e**
 εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχῆσειν τοῦ
 ὄνειδιζειν τινὰ ὑμῶν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δια-

³⁹
 3. ἄνθρωποι χρησμοδοῦσιν κτέ.:
 prob. Socrates has in mind such
 cases as Homer mentions, *Il.* xvi.
 851 ff., where Patroclus as he dies
 prophesies truly to Hector, οὐ θνη οὐδ'
 αὐτὸς δηρὸν βέη, ἀλλὰ τοι ἤδη | ἄγχι
 παρέστηκεν θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή,
 and xxii. 358 ff., where Hector's last
 words foretell the killing of Achilles
 by Paris and Phoebus Apollo. Cf.
Verg. Aen. x. 739, —

Ille autem expirans: Non me, quicumque es,
 multo,
 Victor, nec longum laetabere; te quoque fata
 Prospectant paria, atque eadem mox arva
 tenebris.

Cf. also Xen. *Cyr.* viii. 7. 21, ἡ δὲ τοῦ
 ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ τότε (at the hour of
 death) δήπου θειοτάτη καταφαίνεται καὶ
 τότε τι τῶν μελλόντων προορᾷ· τότε
 γάρ, ὡς εἶκε, μάλιστα ἐλευθεροῦται. The
 same idea is found in many litera-
 tures. Cf. Brunhild in the song of
 Sigfried (*Edda*), —

I prithee, Gunther, sit thee here by me,
 For death is near and bids me prophecy.

See also John of Gaunt's dying speech,
Rich. II. ii., —

Methinks I am a prophet new-inspired,
 And thus expiring do foretell of him:
 His rash fierce blaze of riot cannot last,
 For violent fires soon burn out themselves.

4. ἀπεκτόνατε: sc. by their verdict,
 and by the penalty which they voted
 after Socrates had made his coun-
 ter-proposition (of a penalty), ἀντιτί-
 μημα.

6. οἶαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε: this is after
 the analogy of τιμωρίαν τιμωρεῖσθαι
 τινα, without some reminiscence of
 which it would hardly occur to any
 one to say θάνατον or τιμωρίαν ἐμὲ
 ἀπεκτόνατε. ἀπεκτόνατε is substituted,
 as more vivid and concrete, for the
 expected περιμώρησθε. Similarly we
 have μάχην νικᾶν or ἠττᾶσθαι as more
 specific equivalents of μάχην μάχεσθαι.
 — νῦν: expresses reality. This use
 of νῦν is akin to its very frequent use
 in contrast to a supposition contrary
 to fact (cf. 38 b, *Lach.* 184 d and 200 e);
 but here it is connected with a false
 account of what will come to pass, in
 contrast with the true prophecy of
 Socrates.

8. τὸ δὲ κτέ.: for a similar idiom,
 though more strongly put, cf. *Soph.*

νοείσθε. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' αὕτη ἢ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ 39
 15 οὔτε καλὴ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς
 ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται
 ὡς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμέ-
 νοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν διαλε- e
 χθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουῦ πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ
 ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὔπω ἔρχομαι οἱ ἐλθόντα
 με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦ-
 5 τον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλή-
 λους ἕως ἔξεστιν· ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδειξάι 40
 ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι ξυμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ
 ἄνδρες δικασταί— ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν
 καλοῖην— θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι

30 244 a, ἵνα . . . τὸ δὲ τούτου γίγνηται
 c πᾶν τούναντιον.

d 14. ἔσθ' αὕτη: not οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' κτέ.,
 as Schanz has it. The position of
 ἔσται near οὐ at the beginning of the
 clause justifies the accent. G. 144,
 5; H. 480, 3.

15. μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν: to op-
 press no man, corresponding to the pre-
 ceding ἀποκτείνοντες . . . ἐπισχῆσαι κτέ.

e XXXI. 2. ὑπὲρ: has just the same
 meaning with περί. See L. and S. s.v.
 ὑπέρ, fin. Socrates speaks about what
 has befallen him, which he looks upon
 as for the best since it is the will of
 Divine Providence.—οἱ ἄρχοντες: see
 Intro. 75, and cf. 37 c.

3. ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι: are busy. They
 were occupied with the arrangements
 for conveying Socrates to prison. For
 τεθνάναι, see on τεθνάναι, 30 c.

4. ἀλλὰ: used freq., for the sake
 of greater vivacity, before the impv.
 or subjv. of command. See on ἀλλ'
 ἐμοὶ κτέ., Crit. 45 a.

5. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει: indicates the
 calm self-possession of Socrates, so
 strongly contrasted with the ordinary
 attitude of those under sentence of
 death.—διαμυθολογῆσαι: more friend-
 ly and familiar than διαλέγεσθαι. Thus
 Socrates prepares to open his heart
 upon matters not strictly relevant,
 which only those of whom he is fond
 and who care for him need hear. Cf.
 Phaed. 61 e, ἵσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει
 μέλλοντα ἐκείσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκο-
 πεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς
 ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεῖ, ποῖαν τινὰ αὐτὴν
 οἴομεθα εἶναι.

8. ὑμᾶς γάρ κτέ.: see on ὃ τι μὲν
 ὑμεῖς, 17 a.

9. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖα κτέ.: notice how
 many short statements of fact crowd
 one upon the other. This serves to
 arrest the attention. The θαυμάσιόν
 τι is that now, when Socrates has such
 a fate before him, the voice is silent,
 while previously, etc. See on δεῖν ἂν
 εἶην (fin.), 28 e.

10 μαντική ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ 40
 πάνυ πυκνὴ αἰεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ
 τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβέβηκέ μοι,
 ἄπερ ὀράτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ ἄ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ
 νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιώντι ἔωθεν
 15 οἴκοθεν ἤναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἠνίκα ἀνέ- b
 βαιων ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
 οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολ-
 λαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ
 περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ
 20 ἤναντιώταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ
 ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν
 γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν
 ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμή- c
 ριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἤναντιώθη ἂν
 25 μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν
 πράξειν.

40
 a 10. ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου: see on δαιμό-
 νιον, 31 d. See App.

11. πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς: see on οὕτω
 παρ' ὀλίγον, 36 a.

12. ὀρθῶς πράξειν: i.e. so that all
 would be for the best, an expression
 which is closely allied to εἰ πράττειν.
 Cf. below c, ἀγαθὸν πράξειν. Cf. 45 d.

13. ἄ γε δὴ κτέ.: γέ emphasizes
 the idea expressed, and δὴ appeals to
 the patent fact. Cf. φάσκοντά γε δὴ,
 Crit. 45 d. — καὶ . . . νομίζεται: a shift
 from act. to pass. Cf. Charm. 156 c,
 ταῦτα οὕτω λέγουσὶ τε καὶ ἔχει. Perhaps
 as νομίζεται expresses the opinion actu-
 ally in vogue, it should be strength-
 ened in translation by some adv.

14. ἔωθεν: in the morning. Cf.
 Xen. An. iv. 4. 8; vi. 3. 23; and Hom.
 Od. i. 372.

17. πολλαχοῦ δὴ: in many situa- 40
 tions, and hence, often. b

18. λέγοντα μεταξύ: for this and
 other advs. with the temporal partic.,
 see G. 1572; H. 976. Usually μεταξύ
 is prefixed, not appended.

19. περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξιν: in re-
 gard to this whole affair, referring to
 the whole trial, and including every-
 thing that led up to it.

20. ὑπολαμβάνω: not subjv., since
 there is no question of doubt. The
 question is only a vivid fashion of
 speech, of which Plato is very fond.

22. ἡμεῖς: to be connected imme-
 diately with ὅσοι. This use of the
 pron. gives a genial color to the
 whole; in Eng. we should use a par-
 titive expression, all those among us.

25. ἔμελλον: referring definitely to c

XXXII. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆδε ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς 40
 ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστι τὸ
 τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἶον μὴδὲν εἶναι μὴδ' αἴσθησι μὴδε-
 μίαν μὴδενὸς ἔχει τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα
 5 μεταβολὴ τις τυγχάνει οὔσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ
 τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε μὴδεμία
 αἴσθησις ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἶον ὕπνος ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων α
 μὴδ' ὄναρ μὴδὲν ὄρα, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος.
 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν

40
 c past time but still containing the idea of continued action. Cf. Xen. An. v. 8. 13, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο πάντες ἐποιοῦμεν (*had done*), ἅπαντες ἂν ἀπαλόμεθα. For the facts, see Introd. 27, *fin*.

XXXII. 1. καὶ τῆδε: after an argument based upon the silence of his inner voice, Socrates considers the question upon its merits.

2. εἶναι: not ἔσσεσθαι. G. 1286; H. 948 a. Cf. Hom. Il. ix. 40, δαιμόνι, οὕτω που μάλα ἔλπειαι υἱὰς Ἀχαιῶν | ἀπολέμους τ' ἔμεναι καὶ ἀνάλκιδας ὡς ἀγορεύεις; Cf. also Il. xiii. 309, ἐπεὶ οὐ ποθὶ ἔλπομαι οὕτως | δένεσθαι πολέμοιο κάρη κομῶντας Ἀχαιοῖς.

3. οἶον μὴδὲν εἶναι: without definitely expressed subj. (cf. οἶον ἀποδημήσαι in e below), *to be dead is as to be nothing*, i.e. its nature is such that a man when dead is nothing.

4. τὸν τεθνεῶτα: the subj. of ἔχειν (not of εἶναι), which is an afterthought.—κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα: Socrates associates his idea of the life hereafter with stories and traditions which are themselves a development of Homer's utterances about the Ἡλύσιον πεδῖον and Hesiod's account of the μακάρων νῆσοι. The later poets, e.g. Pindar, continued what Homer and Hesiod began. And Pindar, furthermore, in-

40
 c corporates into his descriptions of life after death Orphic and Pythagorean accounts of metempsychosis. Here and in the Phaedo (70 c-72 a) Socrates appeals to a παλαῖος λόγος.

5. τῇ ψυχῇ: a dat. of interest. G. 1165; H. 771. The gen. would express the subject of the action designated.—τοῦ τόπου: governed by μεταβολὴ καὶ μετοίκησις. Of these two the latter repeats the former in more specific form. The gen. corresponds to the acc. with μεταβάλλειν and (rarely) μετοικεῖν. Cf. Theaet. 181 c, ὅταν τι χῶραν ἐκ χῶρας μεταβάλλῃ.

6. τοῦ ἐνθένδε: see on τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας, 32 b. See also App.—καὶ εἴτε: the second member is introduced by εἰ δ' αὖ in line 19.

7. οἶον ὕπνος: cf. Hom. Od. xiii. 79 f., καὶ τῷ ἦδρυμος ὕπνος ἐπὶ βλεφάροισιν ἐπιπέτε | νήγρετος ἤδιστος, θανάτω ἄγχιστα ἑοικῶς.

8. κέρδος: not ἀγαθόν, because Socrates does not consider such a condition as in itself a good.

9. ἂν οἶμαι: ἂν belongs to εὐρεῖν, and on account of the length of the prot. is repeated first with οἶμαι in 14, and again just before the inf.; similarly δέοι is twice used in the prot. See on ἴσως τάχ' ἂν, 31 a.—ἐκλεξάμενον καὶ

10 νύκτα, ἐν ᾗ οὕτω κατέδαρθεν ὥστε μηδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ 40
 τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ
 ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν,
 πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς
 νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώ-
 15 τῆν τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμητόν ἂν εὐρεῖν e
 αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν
 τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ
 οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία
 νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἶον ἀποδημησαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε
 20 εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ
 εἰσιν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεώτες, τί μείζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἶη
 ἂν, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἄιδου,
 ἀπαλλαγεῖς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρή- 41
 σει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικά-
 25 ζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθους καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος
 καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν

40
 d ἀντιπαραθέντα σκεψάμενον: the first
 two parts, coupled by καὶ are subor-
 dinated to σκεψάμενον, just as it is
 subordinated in turn to εἰπεῖν. See
 on ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, 21 e.

14. μὴ ὅτι, ἀλλὰ κτέ.: *not to speak
 of any one in private station, no, not the
 Great King, etc.* ἀλλά is used here to
 introduce a climax. See H. 1035 a.

e 16. αὐτόν: this pron. gives a final
 touch of emphasis to βασιλέα. Socra-
 tes talks of the king of Persia in the
 strain which was common among
 Greeks in his day. Polus, in the Gorgias
 (470 e), is startled because Socra-
 tes refuses to take it for granted
 that the king of Persia is happy.

17. κέρδος λέγω: *sc. αὐτόν.* — καὶ
 γὰρ κτέ.: *for thus the whole of time ap-
 pears no more than a single night, etc.*

20. ὡς ἄρα: a conclusion derived 40
 immediately from the admission that
 death is a migration from earth to
 some other place.

23. δικαστῶν: for case, see G. 931; 41
 H. 940 a.

25. Μίνως κτέ.: connected gram-
 matically with the rel. sent. rather
 than with τοὺς δικαστάς. Cf. Phaed.
 66 e, τότε ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗδ' ἐπιθυμοῦ-
 μέν τε καὶ φαμεν ἔρασταί εἶναι, φρονή-
 σεως, ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσωμεν κτέ. The
 three first mentioned, Minos, Rhada-
 manthys, and Aeacus, were sons of
 Zeus, and while living had earned
 great fame by their scrupulous ob-
 servance of justice. They are also
 named in the Gorgias as the ministers
 of justice in the world below. In
 Dante's *Inferno* (v. 4-17) Minos, curi-

βίῳ, ἄρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἢ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὖ Ὀρφεὶ ξυγγε- 41
 νέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὀμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ
 ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω
 30 τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ
 θαυμαστῆ ἂν εἴη ἢ διατριβῆ αὐτόθι, ὅποτε ἐντύχομι b
 Παλαμῆδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν
 παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι

41
 a ously transformed into a demon with a long tail, still fulfills the same duties,—

... When the spirit evil-born
 Cometh before him, wholly it confesses;
 And this discriminator of transgressions
 Seeth what place in Hell is meet for it;
 Girds himself with his tail as many times
 As grades he wishes it should be thrust
 down.

In Ar. *Frogs*, Aeacus is Pluto's footman. For a painting representing the judges of the underworld, see Gerhard's *Vasenbilder*, plate 239. — **Τριπτόλεμος**: a son of Eleusis, glorified in the traditions of Demeter *θεσμοφόρος*. He was the disseminator of intelligent agriculture. Plato uses here the freedom which characterizes all his mythical digressions, and adapts the myth to the point which he desires to make. *δικάζειν* implies action in two capacities: (1) as judge, pronouncing upon the deeds and misdeeds of every soul that has lived and died (this is the account of Minos in the *Gorgias*), and (2) as king and legislator. Cf. Hom. *Od.* xi. 568 ff., where Minos is shown *χρῆσειον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν*. Probably here the prevailing idea is that of king and legislator. Homer (*Od.* iv. 564 ff.) places Rhadamanthys among the blessed in the Elysian fields.

27. Ὀρφεὶ κτέ.: Orpheus and Musaeus with Homer and Hesiod were honored as the most ancient bards and seers of Greece.

28. ἐπὶ πόσῳ: price stated in the form of a condition. — The repetition of ἂν has an effect comparable to the repeated neg. The first ἂν is connected with the most important word of the clause, while the second takes the place naturally belonging to ἂν in the sent. GMT. 223. Cf. 31 a.

29. **πολλάκις τεθνάναι**: cf. Dem. ix. 65, *τεθνάναι δὲ μυριάκις κρείττον κτέ.* Cf. 30 c.

30. **ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ**: for me myself more particularly.

31. **ὅποτε**: when (if at any time) I b met.

32. **Παλαμῆδει**: the son of Nauplius, a king in Euboea. The wisdom of Palamedes provoked the jealousy of Odysseus, Diomedes, and Agamemnon, and was his ruin. Acc. to the post-homeric story Odysseus plotted so successfully, by forging a message to Palamedes from Priam, that Palamedes was suspected of treason and stoned by the Greeks. Cf. Verg. *Aen.* 82 ff. and Ov. *Met.* xiii. 56 ff. The title is preserved of a lost tragedy by Sophocles called *Palamedes* and of one by Euripides. The fate of Ajax is well known through Hom. *Od.* xi. 541 ff. See also *Met.* xiii. and the *Ajax* of Sophocles.

33. **ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι**: a case of *asyndeton* (H. 1039), which occurs not infrequently where as here a sent. is thrown in by way of explanation.

τὰ ἔμαντοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ⁴¹
 35 ἀηδὲς εἶη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ
 ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός
 37 ἐστὶ, καὶ τίς οἶεται μὲν, ἐστὶ δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν τις, ὧ
 ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἄγοντα
 τὴν πολλὴν στρατιὰν ἢ Ὀδυσσεά ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους ^c
 40 μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, οἷς ἐκεῖ
 διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἶη
 εὐδαιμονίας. πάντως οὐ δήπου τούτου γε ἔνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ
 ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ
 ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν,
 45 εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ.

⁴¹
 b μοί is easily supplied from the pre-
 ceding ἔμοιγε. The partic. is used
 as with ἴδεσθαι, to which οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς
 εἶη is substantially equivalent. Cf.
 also the partic. with impers. expres-
 sions like ἀμεινὸν ἐστὶ, μεταμέλει μοι, etc.

35. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον: and what
 after all is the greatest thing. Then
 follows, in the form of a clause in
 apposition, explanation of the μέ-
 γιστον. The whole is equivalent to
 τὸ μέγιστόν ἐστι τούτο, ἐξετάζοντα διά-
 γειν (with an indef. personal subj.).
 See on οἶον μῆδὲν εἶναι, 40 c.

38. ἄγοντα: not ἀγαγόντα because
 it represents ὅς ἦγε. GMT. 140; H.
 856 a. Cf. Tim. 25 b c, where the
 fabled might of prehistoric Athens is
 described, τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγουμένη . . .
 κρατήσασα τῶν ἐπιούτων τρόπαια ἔστησε.
 This loose use of the impf. instead of
 the aor. is not uncommon where ex-
 treme accuracy is not aimed at.

c 39. Σίσυφον: cf. Hom. Il. vi. 153 ff.,
 Od. xi. 593 ff. — The most comprehen-
 sive clause, ἢ . . . γυναῖκας, escapes from
 the grammatical const., a not uncom-
 mon irregularity. Cf. Gorg. 483 d e,

ποῖα δίκαια χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν ⁴¹
 Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ
 ἐπὶ Σκύθας; ἢ ἄλλα μυρία ἂν τις ἐχοι
 τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ^c

40. οἷς διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ
 ἐξετάζειν: when verbs governing differ-
 ent cases have the same object, the
 Greek idiom usually expresses the
 object once only, and then in the case
 governed by the nearest verb.

41. ἀμήχανον εὐδαιμονίας: more
 blessed than tongue can tell. Cf. Theaet.
 175 a, ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς
 μικρολογίας (pettifoggery), and Rep.
 viii. 567 e, where χρῆμα, something
 like which is probably implied in the
 above cases, is expressed, ἢ μακά-
 ριον λέγεις τυράννου χρῆμα. Cf.
 also Rep. i. 328 e, σοῦ ἡδέως ἂν πυθό-
 μην . . . πότερον χαλεπὸν τοῦ Βλου ἢ πᾶς
 σὺ αὐτὸ ἐξαγγέλλεις.

42. πάντως οὐ δήπου: in any event,
 we know that they kill no man there,
 etc. — τούτου γε ἔνεκα: spoken point-
 edly and not without an intended
 thrust at those who voted his death;
 the reason given certainly proves more
 than the point here made.

XXXIII. Ἄλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, 41
 εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἔν τι τοῦτο διανο-
 εῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν α
 οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ
 5 τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου
 γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ
 ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ
 ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψη-
 φισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγοροῖς οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω.
 10 καίτοι οὐ ταύτη τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατη-
 γόρουν, ἀλλ' οἴομενοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμ- e
 φεσθαι. τοσόνδε μέντοι δέομαι αὐτῶν· τοὺς υἱεῖς μου

41
 c XXXIII. 2. ἔν τι τοῦτο: *this one thing above all*. The position of τοῦτο, coming as it does after instead of before ἐν τι, is very emphatic.

d 6. τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι: the pf. is used, because to speak of the completion of the change, i.e. to be dead, is the most forcible way of putting the idea. πράγματα applies to the trouble and the unrest of a busy life.

7. βέλτιον ἦν: Socrates considers the whole complication of circumstances in which he is already involved, or in which he must, if he lives, sooner or later be involved. Deliverance from this he welcomes as a boon. Cf. 39 b. — διὰ τοῦτο κτέ.: cf. 40 a c. Socrates argued from the silence of τὸ δαιμόνιον that no evil was in store for him when he went before the court. This led him to conclude that his death could be no harm. On further consideration, he is confirmed in this, because death is never a harm. Applying this principle to his own actual circumstances, its truth becomes the more manifest, so that, finally, he can explain why the divine

voice was silent. Contrast the opposite view expressed by Achilles (Hom. *Od.* xi. 489 ff.), and in Eur. *I. A.* 1249-1252, where Iphigenia, pleading for life, says, ἐν συντημοῦσα πάντα νικήσω λόγον· | τὸ φῶς τὸδ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἡδιστον βλέπειν, | τὰ νέρθε δ' οὐδὲν· μαίνεται δ' ὅς εὐχεται | θανεῖν. κακῶς ζῆν κρείσσον ἢ καλῶς θανεῖν.

11. βλάπτειν: used abs. without acc. of the person or of the thing, because the abstract idea of doing harm is alone required. — τοῦτο . . . ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι: *so far it is fair to blame them*. Contrast 17 b, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν ἀντῶν, *this . . . about them*; and cf. *Symp.* 220 e, τοῦτό γέ μοι οὐτε μίμψει κτέ. They deserve blame for their malicious intention and for the reason given in 29 b. — ἄξιον: *it is fair*. Cf. e *Gorg.* 465 e, ἄξιον μὲν ὄν ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστὶ.

12. τοσόνδε μέντοι: “although they certainly are far from wishing me well, yet I ask so much as a favor,” i.e. so little that they can well afford to grant it. Then follows an explanation of τοσόνδε.

ἐπειδὴν ἠβήσωσι τιμωρήσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ταῦτα ταῦτα 41
 λυποῦντες ἄπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν, εἰάν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ
 15 χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς,
 καὶ εἰάν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὄνειδίξετε αὐτοῖς
 ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ καὶ οὔονται
 τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἀξιοί. καὶ εἰάν ταῦτα ποιῆτε, δίκαια
 πεπονθῶς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς. 42
 20 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένῳ, ὑμῖν
 δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον
 πράγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.

41
 e 13. ἠβήσωσι: see on ἔσχετε, 19 a. Cf. Hes. Op. 131, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἠβήσειε καὶ ἠβης μέτρον ἵκοιτο.

16. ὄνειδίξετε: see on ὄνειδίζων ἕκαστον, 30 e.

18. δίκαια πεπονθῶς: to be understood in the light of cc. xviii. and xxvi. Socrates looks upon what is usually taken as the most grievous injury as the greatest possible blessing.

42
 a 19. αὐτός τε κτέ.: for ἐγὼ αὐτός κτέ. Cf. Crit. 50 e. Cf. Soph. O. C. 461, ἐπάξιός μὲν Οἰδίπους κατοικτίσαι, | αὐτός τε παῖδες θ' αἶδε.

20. ἀλλὰ γὰρ κτέ.: serves to close the

speech, giving at the same time the reason for coming to an end. 42
 a

22. πλὴν ἢ: pleonastic like ἀλλ' ἢ in 20 d. See App. — τῷ θεῷ: cf. the subtly ironical way in which the same thought is put in the Euthyphro (3 d e), where, speaking of his accusers, Socrates says, εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, μέλλοιόν μου καταγελαῖν, ὥσπερ σὺ φῆς σαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἀηδὲς παίζοντας καὶ γελῶντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διαγαγεῖν· εἰ δὲ σπουδάσσονται, τοῦτ' ἤδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται ἄδηλον πλὴν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν. See on ἄριστα, 35 d.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

Σ Ω Κ Ρ Α Τ Η Σ, Κ Ρ Ι Τ Ω Ν.

St. 1.
p. 43.

I. ΣΩ. Τί τηνικάδε ἀφίξαι, ᾧ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρῶ ἔτι ἐστίν;

ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;

5 ΚΡ. Ὁρθρος βαθύς.

ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακοῦσαι.

ΚΡ. Ξυνήθης ἤδη μοί ἐστιν, ᾧ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολ-
λάκις δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ.

10 ΣΩ. Ἄρτι δὲ ἤκεις ἢ πάλαι;

43
a 1. Κρίτων: see Introd. 62. See on *Apol.* 33 d, *fin.*, and cf. 38 b, *fin.*

4. πηνίκα μάλιστα, about what time is it? In Lat. maxime and admodum are so used, e.g. locus patens ducentos maxime pedos, *Liv.* x. 38. 5; locus in pedum mille admodum altitudinem abruptus, *id.* xxi. 36. 2.

5. ὄρθρος βαθύς: the adj. limits ὄρθρος, so that the whole expression means rather the end of night than the beginning of day. Cf. the time when the Protagoras begins (310 a), τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἐτι βαθέος ὄρθρον. The description in the same dialogue of young Hippocrates feeling his way through the dark to Socrates's bedside shows that ὄρθρος

βαθύς means, just before daybreak. Cf. 43
a Xen. *An.* iv. 3. 8 ff., where Xenophon dreams a dream, ἐπεὶ δὲ ὄρθρος ἦν . . .

ἤδετό τε καὶ ὡς τάχιστα ἔως ὑπέφαιεν ἐθύοντο. Here ὄρθρος means the dark before the dawn. Cf. also ἀμφιλύκη νύξ, *Hom. Il.* vii. 433, ἤμος δ' οὐτ' ἔρπω ἡὼς, ἐτι δ' ἀμφιλύκη νύξ, | τῆμος ἔρ' ἀμφι πυρὴν κριτὶδς ἔγρετο λαὸς Ἀχαιῶν.

6. ἠθέλησε ὑπακοῦσαι: did not refuse to let you in. Cf. Xen. *An.* i. 3. 8 for οὐκ ἤθελε, he refused. With ὑπακοῦσαι, cf. *Acts* xii. 13, and Xen. *Symp.* i. 11, Φίλιππος δ' ὁ γελωτοποῖδς κρούσας τὴν θύραν εἶπε τῷ ὑπακούσαντι (the porter) εἰσαγγεῖλαι ὅστις τε εἴη κτέ.

9. καλ . . . καλ κτέ.: and what is more, I've done a little something for him. τι is equiv. to εὐεργεσίαν τινά (a tip).

ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

43

ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ ὁ παρακάθῃσαι;

ΚΡ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον
15 ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ
πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος ὡς ἡδέως καθεύδεις· καὶ
ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἡδιστα διάγῃς. καὶ πολ-
λάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμό-
νισα τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστῶσῃ
20 ζυμφορᾷ ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρᾶως φέρεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελὲς εἶη ἀγανακτεῖν
τηλικούτων ὄντα, εἰ δεῖ ἤδη τελευτᾶν.

ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικούτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ε
ζυμφοραῖς ἀλίσκονται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἢ ἡλι-
25 κία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρουσίῃ τύχῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρὸ ἀφίξαι;

ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπὴν, οὐ σοί,
ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπίτηδέοις πᾶσιν
καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἣν ἐγὼ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς
30 βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι.

⁴³
b 12. εἶτα: refers to ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι in a vein of wonder or perhaps of gentle reproof.

14. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία: the neg. belonging to the clause that follows is inserted by anticipation in the oath. The answer to Socrates's question is implied clearly in the use of οὐδέ, and becomes categorical in καὶ ἐπίτηδες κτέ.

15. ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ κτέ.: τέ is introduced after τοσαύτη, which belongs to both subst. This position of τέ is very common after the art. or a prep. — ἀλλά καί: but furthermore.

17. ἵνα διάγῃς: for the subjv. after

a secondary tense, see GMT. 318; ⁴³
H. 881 a. b

18. εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου: for the gen. of cause, see G. 1126; H. 744. At the end of the sentence, a clause with ὡς (equiv. to ὅτι οὕτω) is introduced in place of the gen. — For the facts, see Introd. 36 and note 6, p. 26.

21. πλημμελές: cf. *Apol.* 22 d and see on ἐμμελῶς, *Apol.* 20 c.

25. τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν: ἐπιλύεται c is here qualified by οὐδέν, and is used in the sense of preventing. Hence the doubled neg. GMT. 95, 2, n. 1 b; H. 1034.

29. καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρεῖαν: an effective and almost pathetic reitera-

ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκται ἐκ Δήλου, οὗ 43
δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με; d

ΚΡ. Οὗτοι δὴ ἀφίκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἦξιεν τήμε-
ρον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἦκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ
35 καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων [τῶν ἀγγέ-
λων] ὅτι ἦξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὔριον ἔσται, ὧ
Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

II. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', ὧ Κρίτων, τύχη ἀγαθῆ. εἰ ταύτη τοῖς
θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτη ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἦξιεν αὐτὸ τῆ-
μερον.

43 c tion of the first *χαλεπὴν*, made all the
stronger by the doubled *καί*.

30. ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι:
in *Hdt.*, *Thuc.*, *Plato*, and later writers,
ἐν τοῖς, *about*, is idiomatically used to
limit the superl. Thus ἐν τοῖς be-
comes an adverb, which describes not
absolute precedence but an average
and comparative superiority. *Cf.*
Thuc. iii. 17, ἐν τοῖς πλείεσται, among
the most numerous (not 'the very most
numerous,' since *Thuc.* adds that the
number was exceeded once) where the
gender of πλείεσται is noticeable. *Cf.*
also *id.* i. 6. 3, ἐν τοῖς πρώτοι δὲ
'*Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν τε σῆδηρον κατέθεοντο κτέ.*
Here the position of δέ shows that ἐν
τοῖς πρώτοι is taken almost as one word,
i.e. πρώτοι limited so as to mean *practically*
the first, or *substantially the first*
of those who laid down, etc.

31. τίνα ταύτην: connect with φέ-
ρον above. For ἦ, see on ἡ δῆλον, *Apol.*
26 b. — τὸ πλοῖον κτέ.: *cf.* *Phaedo*,
58 a: τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὧ φασιν
'*Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Ἰησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην*
τοὺς δις ἐπτὰ ἐκείνους (the seven couples
to be sacrificed to the Minotaur) ἔχρητο
ἔγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ
οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὐχάντο, ὡς λέγεται, τότε
εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἐκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν (a sol-
emn embassy) ἀπέδειν εἰς Δῆλον· ἦν δὴ

αἰεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν 43
(every twelvemonth) τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. c
ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἐρξάνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος
ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύ-
ειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀπο-
κτινῶναι (to put no one to death by
public execution), πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δῆλον ἀφί-
κηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο κτέ.
Cf. *Introduct.* 36.

32. τεθνάναι: see on τεθνάναι, *Apol.* d
30 c.

33. δοκεῖ μὲν: with no following
δέ. In such cases the original affinity
of μὲν with μήν is usually apparent.
Its meaning is, *indeed, surely.*

35. τῶν ἀγγέλων: can hardly have
been written by *Plato*, since ἀγγελος
in the sense of ἀγγεῖλα is not used
except by later writers (*Polybius*),
while ἐκ prevents us from taking
ἀγγέλων as referring to persons. See
App.

II. 1. ἄλλ', ὧ Κρίτων, τύχη ἀγαθῆ:
it's all for the best, Crito. ἀλλὰ intro-
duces in vivid contrast to *Crito's*
despondency the cheerful hope of *Soc-*
rates. — τύχη ἀγαθῆ: a hopeful in-
vocation often prefixed to a solemn
statement. *Cf.* *Symp.* 177 e, ἀλλὰ
τύχη ἀγαθῆ καταρχέτω *Φαίδρος*, let
Phaedrus make a beginning and good
luck to him. Used freq. like the

ΚΡ. Πόθεν τοῦτο τεκμαίρει;

44

5 ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἔρω. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραία δεῖ με ἀπο-
θηήσκειν ἢ ἢ ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.

ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἦξειν,
ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἕκ τινος ἐνυπνίου ὃ
10 ἑώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυ-
νεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι οὐκ ἐγεῖραί με.

ΚΡ. Ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον;

ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ εὖει-
δής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν· ὦ Σώ- b
15 κρατες, ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἴκοιο.

ΚΡ. Ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

43 d Lat. quod bonum felix faus-
tumque sit, or quod bene ver-
tat. Cf. Dem. iii. 18, ἕτερος λέγει τις
βελτίω· ταῦτα ποιεῖτε ἀγαθὴ τύχη. Cf.
also the comic perversion of it in Ar.
Av. 436, κρεμάσατον τὸ ἄγαθὸν | ἐς τὸν
ἰπνὸν εἰσω πλησίον τούπιστάτου. For
the most formal use of this word, see
many inscriptions and the decree,
Thuc. iv. 118. 11, Λάχης εἶπε τύχη
ἀγαθὴ τῇ Ἀθηναίων ποιέσθαι τὴν ἐκεχει-
ρίαν (armistice). In Xen. Hell. iv. i. 14,
it is used of a betrothal: ἐμολ μὲν τοί-
νυν, ἔφη, δοκεῖ, ὃ Ἀγασίλαος, σέ μὲν,
ὦ Σπιθριδάτα, τὴν ἄγαθὴν διδόναι
"Οτυὶ τὴν θυγατέρα. Cf. also Xen. Cyr.
iv. 5. 51, ἀλλὰ δέχομαί τε, ἔφη, καὶ
ἀγαθὴ τύχη ἡμεῖς τε ἰππέεις γενοίμεθα
καὶ ὑμεῖς διέλοιστε τὰ κοινά.

44 a 5. τῇ γάρ που κτέ.: this is the first
premiss that follows the conclusion
stated above in οὐ μέντοι ἦξειν τήμε-
ρον, the second is contained in the
account of the dream.

7. οἱ τούτων κύριοι: see Introd.
75, and cf. Apol. 39 e.

8. τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας: means the

same as *τῆμερον*, for Socrates is now
thinking of the fact that day has not
yet dawned. See on ὕρθος βαθύς, 43 a.

10. ταύτης τῆς νυκτός: in the course
of this night. The vision came after
midnight, a circumstance of the great-
est importance, according to Mosch.
Idyll. ii. 2, νυκτός ὅτε τρίτατον λάχος
ἴσταται, ἐγγύθι δ' ἠώς... εὔτε καὶ ἀτρε-
κέων ποιμαίνεται ἔθνος ὄνειρων. Cf.
Hor. Sat. i. 10. 32 ff.—

Atque ego cum Graccos facerem, natus mare
citra,
Versiculos, vetuit me tali voce Quirinus
Post mediam noctem visus, cum somnia vera.

11. ἐν καιρῷ τινι: usually expressed
by the shorter ἐν καιρῷ, *opportunely*.
Cf. Legg. iv. 708 e, ἐὰν πρὸς καιρὸν τινα
λέγωμεν. The *τις* has the effect of a
litotes, as e.g. in ἔχει τινὰ λόγον,
there is good and sufficient reason for it.

15. ἡματι κτέ.: quoted from Hom. b
Il. ix. 363, ἡματί κε τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρί-
βωλον ἴκοιμην.

16. ἄτοπον κτέ.: sc. ἐστὶ, an excl.
which nearly approaches the form of
a regular sent. Cf. Hom. Il. i. 231,

ΣΩ. Ἐναργές μὲν οὖν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων. 44

III. ΚΡ. Λίαν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε Σώκρα-
τες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ σώθητι· ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ
ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία ξυμφορὰ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ
ἑστερηῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου, οἶον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μὴ ποτε
5 εὐρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οἱ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς
ἴσασιν, ὡς οἴός τε ὦν σε σφῆξιν, εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν
χρήματα, ἀμελήσαι. καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἶη ταύτης
δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους;

44
b δημοβόρος βασιλεύς, ἐπεὶ οὐτιδανοῖσιν
ἀνάσσεις, and *ibid.* v. 403, σχέτλιος,
ὄβριμοεργός, ὃς οὐκ ἔθελ' (*recked not*)
αἴσυλα βέζων. See App.

17. ἐναργές μὲν οὖν: *it is surely plain enough, immo evidens.* The full meaning can hardly be understood without reading the context of the verse (363) which is quoted. Cf. Hom. *Il.* ix., vv. 356-363. Socrates thinks of dying as going home, and Phthia was the home of Achilles. — γέ μοι: not γ' ἐμοί. The emphasis falls on the verb rather than on the pron. See on ὡς γέ μοι δοκῶ, *Apol.* 18 a.

III. 1. ὦ δαιμόνιε: *most excellent*, meaning about the same as ὦ θαυμάσιε, or ὦ μακάριε, rather stronger than ὦ γαθέ. Of course no color of irony is given here. Cf. *Symp.* 219 b, τουνῶ τῶ δαιμονίῳ ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ θαυμαστῶ, and *Gorg.* 456 a, where Socrates is speaking of the scope (δύναμις) of rhetoric: δαιμονία γάρ τις ἐμογε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι. The word δαιμόνιος, which was used by Homer only in addressing persons, received from Pindar an enlarged meaning, so as to include *whatever proceeds from the gods*. This was adopted by Att. writers, and of course its adoption involved applying it to things. Plato still further enlarged the ground which it

covers. In addressing persons, he 44
gives it a flattering or an ironical b
implication; applied to things, he uses it for what is extraordinary, superhuman. See on *εἴπερ δαίμονας κτέ.*, *Apol.* 27 d.

2. ἔτι καὶ νῦν: this gives a hint as to what Crito has planned. It is developed later. See *Intro.* 62.

3. ξυμφορὰ ἐστίν: more vivid and natural than *ἔσται*. — χωρὶς μὲν . . . ἔτι δέ: *quite apart from my losing, etc. . . . I shall further, etc.* See App.

4. ἑστερηῆσθαι: the pf. inf. with *χωρὶς*. — οὐδένα μὴ ποτε: equiv. to οὐ μὴ ποτέ τινα, and so here with the fut. indic., *I shall certainly never, etc.* GMT. 295; H. 1032.

6. ὡς οἴός τε ὦν κτέ.: *I shall seem to many to have neglected you whereas I was able to save you.* οἴός τε ὦν σφῆξιν represents οἴός τε ἦν σφῆξιν, *I might have saved you, if I had wished.* GMT. 421; H. 897.

8. ἢ δοκεῖν . . . φίλους: explaining *ε*
ταύτης, which covers an idea already contained in what precedes. Cf. *Gorg* 500 c, περὶ τούτου εἰσὶν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι, οὐ τίς ἂν μάλλον σπουδάσειέ τις (*than which what would a man be more inclined to pursue with diligence*) . . . ἢ τοῦτο, ὄντινα χρῆτρόπον ζῆν κτέ. Where the gen. after a comp. is a dem. or

οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας 44
10 ἀπιένα ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὧν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἠγγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπραᾶχθαι ὥσπερ ἂνπραχθῆ.

15 ΚΡ. Ἄλλ' ὄρας δὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς α τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἰοί τε εἰσιν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, εἴαν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ᾖ.

20 ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἰοί τε εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἰοί τε ἦσαν καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχεν· νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἰοί τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιούσιν δὲ τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν.

IV. ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω· τάδε δέ, ὦ Σώ- e
κρατες, εἰπέ μοι· ἄρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων

44
c rel. pron., an explanatory clause (here with the inf., cf. Eur. *Her.* 297) introduced by ἦ, may always be appended. Cf. 53 b c.

13. ὥσπερ ἂν πράχθη: see on ἂν ἐν λέγω, *Apol.* 20 e. The aor. subjv. has the force of the fut. pf. GMT. 90; H. 898 c.

15. ὄρας δῆ: Crito means to point at the case in hand. "The fact is that the many are really in a position, etc." Crito has profited but little by what Socrates has said in the court-room. Cf. *Apol.* 30 d, 34 c, 40 a, etc.

d 20. εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον κτέ.: a wish the object of which is not attained. ἵνα οἰοί τε ἦσαν expresses an unattained purpose depending on the preceding unfulfilled wish. GMT. 333;

H. 884. See on ὅς ἐμελλεν, *Apol.* 20 a. 44
d

21. ἐργάζεσθαι: serves as a repetition of ἐξεργάζεσθαι above. Such repetition of the simple verb is common. Cf. 49 c d and *Lys.* 209 e, τί ποτ' ἐν εἴη τὸ αἴτιον, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐ διακωλύουσιν, ἐν οἷς δὲ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν κωλύουσιν.

22. καλῶς κτέ.: indeed (i.e. if this wish were granted) it would be delightful. — νῦν δέ: introduces the fact. Supply ἐργάζεσθαι here, and ποιήσαντες with ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν. In hypothetical and rel. sents. τυγχάνειν may be used without the partic., which is always suggested by the leading clause.

IV. 2. ἄρά γε μῆ: like μῆ alone e (*Apol.* 25 a), ἄρα μῆ looks for a neg. answer, but it may also (see on μῆ, 45 e) convey an insinuation that in spite

ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθῃς, οἱ συκοφάνται 44
 ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασιν, καὶ
 5 ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ
 συχνὰ χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν; εἰ
 γάρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν· ἡμεῖς γάρ 45
 που δίκαιοί ἐσμεν σώσαντές σε κινδυνεύειν τούτον τὸν
 κίνδυνον καὶ ἐὰν δέῃ ἔτι τούτου μείζω. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου
 10 καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθεύμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα
 πολλά.

ΚΡ. Μῆτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ
 τάργυρίον ἐστίν, ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σώσαί σε καὶ
 15 ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὀργᾶς τούτους τοὺς συκο-
 φάντας ὡς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πολλοῦ

44
 e of the expected denial the facts really
 would justify an affirmative answer;
you surely don't, though I imagine you do,
 is Crito's meaning. The μή which fol-
 lows προμηθεῖ is obviously connected
 with the notion of anxiety in that
 verb. The same idea is again pre-
 sented in φοβεῖ (*are fearful*) below.
 The subjv. παρέχωσιν conveys an idea
 of action indefinitely continued, where-
 as ἐξέλθῃς and ἀναγκασθῶμεν denote
 simply the occurrence of the action.

45
 a 8. δίκαιοί ἐσμεν κτέ.: see on δι-
 καίος εἰμι, *Apol.* 18 a.

9. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου, μή . . . ποίει:
no, no! do as I say. ἀλλά with the
 impv. introduces a demand or a request
 made in opposition to an expressed re-
 fusals or to some unwillingness merely
 implied or feared. This vigorous re-
 quest is reinforced by the neg. μή
 ποίει, *do this and do not do that.* Cf. 46 a.

13. μήτε: the second clause, which
 we miss here, appears below (b) in the
 resumptive statement ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε

κτέ. — φοβοῦ: reiterating φοβεῖ above, 45
be fearful. It is a part of Crito's char-
 acter to return again and again to his
 point. Cf. 43 d, and see *Introd.* 62.
 Further he had here a welcome oppor-
 tunity for airing his grievances against
 the sycophants (blackmailers). Crito
 had been himself the victim of these
 rascals until he found a vigorous
 friend, Ἀρχέδημον, πάνυ μὲν ἱκανὸν εἰ-
 πείν τε καὶ πράξαι, πένητα δέ, as Xeno-
 phon puts it, who delivered him from
 them. This good riddance was due
 to the advice of Socrates. Cf. Xen.
Mem. ii. 9. 4, οὐκ ἂν οὖν θρέψαις καὶ
 ἄνδρα (*sc.* just as you keep dogs to
 protect sheep from wolves), ὅστις ἐθέ-
 λου τε καὶ δύναιτό σου ἀπερύκειν τοὺς
 ἐπιχειροῦντας ἀδικεῖν σε.

15. τούτους: said with scorn. Cf. 48 c,
 τούτων τῶν πολλῶν, and Dem. xviii.
 140, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καὶ φέρειν ἠδύναθ',
 ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ πόλις καὶ ποιῶν οὐτος
 λανθάνειν (*this fellow could do...un-*
detected).

ἀργυρίου; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγὼ⁴⁵
οἶμαι, ἱκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἴ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἶει^b
δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τὰμά, ξένοι οὗτοι ἐνθάδε ἔτοιμοι ἀναλί-
20 σκειν· εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργύριον ἱκα-
νόν, Συμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἔτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι
πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος
ἀποκάμης σαυτὸν σῶσαι, μήτε ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ
δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχουσι ἐξελθῶν ὃ τι χρῶο
25 σαυτῷ· πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκη
ἀγαπήσουσί σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλη εἰς Θετταλίαν ἰέναι, εἰσὶν
ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἳ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφά-
λειάν σοι παρέξονται ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ
Θετταλίαν. ✕

V. Ἐπι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπι-
χειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθῆναι· καὶ
τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἅπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ
ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσαν σὲ διαφθεῖραι

⁴⁵
a 17. σοὶ δέ: the argument is as follows: the amount required to settle with these sycophants, I should be ready enough to expend for almost any one, but for you, etc.—ὑπάρχει: cf. Παρύσσις . . . ὑπῆρχε τῷ Κύρῳ, φιλοῦσα αὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἢ κτέ., Xen. An. i. 1. 4; καὶ ὑπάρξει ὑμῖν ἢ ἐμῇ πόλις· ἐκόντες γὰρ με δεξονται, *ibid.* v. 6. 23.—ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι: said with reference to the appositive ἱκανά.

18. οὐκ οἶει: Crito recollects what Socrates had said (45 a, in connexion with 44 e). See on οὐ φῆτε, *Apol.* 25 b.

b 19. ξένοι οὗτοι: cf. *Apol.* 33 e, ἄλλοι τοῖνυν οὗτοι κτέ. The pron. calls up the ξένοι as present in Athens, and, for rhetorical purposes, within sight. The art. is omitted because ξένοι is a pred., these others who are ξένοι.

21. Κέβης: Cebes also was from Thebes, and the two play a very important part in the *Phaedo*.

23. ἀποκάμης σαυτὸν σῶσαι: get tired of trying, etc. Here is no implication that Socrates has already tried to get away. Crito only hints that any other course is nothing short of moral cowardice. See App.—ὃ ἔλεγες: cf. *Apol.* 37 c d.

24. χρῶο: the opt. representing the subjv. of doubt. GMT. 186.

25. ἄλλοσε: for ἄλλοθι, which we expect after πολλαχοῦ on account of ὅποι. This is attraction, or inverse assimilation. Cf. Soph. *O. C.* 1226, βῆναι κείθεν ὄθενπερ ἦκει.

V. 4. σὲ διαφθεῖραι: σέ is accented c for emphasis and to disconnect it from ἔσπευσαν.

5 βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ 45
 ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὓς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ α
 ἐκπαιδεῦσαι οἰχήσει καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὃ τι ἂν
 τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξουσιν· τεύξονται δὲ, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς, τοι-
 οὔτων οἰάπερ εἴωθε γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς
 10 ὀρφανούς. ἡ γὰρ οὐ χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι παιῖδας, ἡ ξυνδιαταλαι-
 πωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς
 τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι· χρῆ δέ, ἅπερ ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς
 καὶ ἀνδρείος ἔλοιτο, ταῦτα αἰρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντά γε δὴ
 ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ
 15 ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, e
 μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σέ ἀνανδρία τινὶ τῇ
 ἡμετέρᾳ πεπραῆχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικα-
 στήριον ὡς εἰσηλθὲν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν

45
 d V. 7. τὸ σὸν μέρος: pro tua parte or quod ad te attinet.— ὃ τι ἂν τύχωσι: see on νῦν δέ, 44 d.

8. τοῦτο πράξουσιν: cf. εὖ, κακῶς, and even ἀγαθόν (used adv.) with πράττειν (*Apol.* 40 c). See on μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν, *Apol.* 40 a.

10. ἡ γὰρ κτέ.: the γὰρ is connected with an unexpressed reproof.

13. φάσκοντά γε δὴ: sc. σέ, at all events you who maintain, etc., or particularly when you maintain. See on ἃ γε δὴ, *Apol.* 40 a.

e 16. μὴ: see on ἔρα γε μὴ, 44 e. The notion of fear is remotely implied. For this const., very common in Plato, see *GM.T.* 265; *H.* 867. — ἀνανδρία τινὶ κτέ.: a certain sort of cowardice on our part. Notice the emphasis given to τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ, for which we are responsible. If Crito and the rest, by showing more energy, by using all possible influence against Meletus and his abettors, had carried the day, they would have been more

45
 e genuinely ἀνδρες in the proper sense of the word. They failed ἀνανδρία τινί. Cf. Euthyphro's boast, εἰρομὲν ἂν ὅπη σαθρὸς ἐστί, *Euthyphr.* 5 c.

17. καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος... καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν: in apposition with ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σέ. On the meaning of the technical terms, see *Introd.* 70, with note 1, p. 52. Precisely how the trial of Socrates could have been avoided except by flight from Athens is not clear. There is a wholly untrustworthy tradition that Anytus offered him terms of compromise. Probably there were abundant means at hand for raising legal technicalities and for securing in this way an indefinite delay. All that Crito necessarily suggests is that flight was open to Socrates before proceedings began. At Athens, as at Rome, the law allowed a man to go into voluntary exile. See *Introd.* 72.

18. ὁ ἀγὼν: the management of the case. See on εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστάς, *Apol.* 24 c.

τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτὶ ὡσπερ 45
 20 κατάγελως τῆς πράξεώς κακία τι καὶ ἀνανδρία τῇ ἡμε-
 τέρα διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οὔτινές σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσα- 46
 μεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτὸν, οἷόν τε ὄν καὶ δυνατὸν, εἴ τι καὶ
 μικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὄρα μὴ
 ἅμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρᾷ ἧ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῶν. ἀλλὰ βου-
 25 λεύου, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλευέσθαι ἔτι ὦρα, ἀλλὰ βεβου-
 λεύσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς πάντα
 ταῦτα δεῖ πεπράχθαι. εἰ δέ τι περιμενούμεν, ἀδύνατον

45
 c 19. τὸ τελευταῖον τουτὶ: the scene of this act is laid in the prison.

20. κατάγελως: because, in Crito's opinion, all who were involved made themselves a common laughing-stock by their weak-minded negligence and irresolution. Cf. *Cymbeline*, i.,—

How so'er 'tis strange,
 Or that the negligence may well be laughed at,
 Yet it is true, sir.

In the whole drift of Crito's phraseology, the notion of acting a part on the stage before the Athenian public is prominent.—κακία κτέ.: this is really in Crito's eyes the culmination of disgrace (connect with τὸ τελευταῖον) in a matter that has been disgracefully mismanaged. Here is a return to the leading thought and a departure from the regular grammatical sequence. The anacoluthon is most obvious in the repetition of δοκεῖν after δόξη.

21. διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς: people will think they allowed every advantage and every opportunity, especially the possibility of escape which now engrosses Crito's thoughts, to pass unimproved. ἡμᾶς is the object. Cf. *Charm.* 156 c, τοῦτο αἴτιον τοῦ διαφεύγειν τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἰατροὺς τὰ πολλὰ νοσήματα, i.e. the reason why Greek doctors fail to cure most diseases.

22. οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτὸν: sc. ἐσώσας. 46
 a Crito hints at Socrates's part, then recurs to his own. The interjection of such a clause in a relative sent. is irregular.—οἷόν τε ὄν: like ἐξόν above. For the fact, cf. 45 b c.

24. ἅμα τῷ κακῷ: ἅμα is used as πρὸς freq. is. Cf. *Symp.* 195 c, νέος μὲν οὖν ἐστί, πρὸς δὲ τῷ νέῳ ἄπαλός, he is young and in addition to his youth he is tender. Cf. also *Theaet.* 185 e, καλὸς γὰρ εἶ . . . πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ (in addition to your beauty) εὐ ἐποίησάς με κτέ.—

ἀλλά: cf. line 28 below, and see on ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου, 45 a. This speech has the dignity which genuine feeling alone can give. Cf. *Rich. III.* iv. 3,—
 Come, I have learned that fearful commenting
 Is leaden servitor to dull delay;
 Delay leads impotent and snail-paced beggary;

Then fiery expedition be my wing.

On βεβουλευέσθαι, to have done with deliberation, cf. *Dem.* viii. 3, οἶμαι τὴν ταχίστην συμφέρειν βεβουλευέσθαι καὶ παρεσκευάσθαι, and iv. 19, ταῦτα . . . πᾶσι δεδόχθαι φημι δεῖν. GMT. 109; H. 851 a.

26. τῆς ἐπιούσης: cf. 44 a.

27. εἰ δέ τι περιμενούμεν: this adv. use of τι is developed out of the cognate acc. (kindred signification). Cf. the Eng. idiom, "to delay somewhat (a bit)." G. 1054; H. 715.

καὶ οὐκέτι οἶόν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὦ Σώκратες, πεί- 46
θου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει. ✕

VI. ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ β
ἀξία, εἰ μετὰ τίνος ὀρθότητος εἶη· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσῳ μείζων,
τοσοῦτῳ χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρῆ ἡμᾶς εἶτε
ταῦτα πρακτέον εἶτε μή· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ
5 τοιοῦτος οἶος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ,
ὃς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὲ λό-
γους οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβα-
λεῖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἦδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι
φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ οὔσπερ c
10 καὶ πρότερον· ὧν ἐὰν. μὴ βελτίῳ ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ

46
b VI. 2. ἀξία: sc. ἐστίν, in spite of
the opt. in the protasis. GMT. 501;
H. 901 b. — εἰ εἶη: not *if it should be*,
but *if it should prove to be*. Cf. δεινὰ
ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, *Apol.* 28 d. For
the present, Socrates does not decide
whether Crito's zeal is right or wrong.

4. οὐ μόνον κτέ.: Socrates main-
tains that "truth is truth to th' end
of reckoning" (*Measure for Measure*,
v. 1). νῦν and ἀεὶ might almost change
places, since the important point is
that Socrates, after proclaiming the
supremacy of reason (cf. *Apol.* 38 a)
in prosperity, finds his belief still firm
in adversity. Cf. 53 c and e. Cf.
As You Like It, ii. 1, —

Sweet are the uses of adversity,

Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head.

Socrates meets in his trial and death-
sentence "the counsellors that feel-
ingly persuade him what he is." For
collocations similar to this combina-
tion of νῦν and ἀεὶ, cf. 49 e; Hom. *Il.* ix.
105, οἶον ἐγὼ νοέω, ἡμέτερον πάλαι ἦδ' ἔτι καὶ
νῦν. Cf. also Eur. *Med.* 292, οὐ νῦν με
πρῶτον ἀλλὰ πολλὰκις, Κρέον, | ἔβλαψε

46
b δόξα κτέ., and Soph. *Phil.* 965, ἐμοὶ μὲν
οἶκτος δεινὸς ἐμπέπτωκέ τις | τοῦδ' ἀν-
δρός, οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλαι.

5. τοιοῦτος οἶος: for the omission
(rare except with the third person) of
the copula, cf. *Gorg.* 487 d, καὶ μὴν
ὅτι γε οἶος παρησιάξασθαι, equiv. το
ὅτι τοιοῦτος εἶ οἶος κτέ. For οἶος πεί-
θεσθαι, see on τοιοῦτος, *Apol.* 33 a. —
τῶν ἐμῶν κτέ.: τὰ ἐμά includes all the
faculties and functions both of body
and of mind. Among these λόγος is
included, since it means man's *reason*
as well as his reasons and his reason-
ings, — his utterances and his princi-
ples. Cf. below 47 e, εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ
ἀπειθοῦντος and 47 e, ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν
ἡμετέρων.

6. τοὺς δὲ λόγους κτέ.: these words
imply a measure of reproof at least
when spoken to Crito, who had in
general approved of Socrates's prin-
ciples.

8. ὅμοιοι: not different in sense
from οἱ αὐτοί, and to be understood in
the light of what immediately follows.
See on καὶ πρότερον, 48 b. "They
seem like what they formerly were."

παρόντι, εἶ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοι ξυγχωρήσω, οὐδ' ἂν πλείω 46
 τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὥσπερ παῖδας
 ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται, δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα
 καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκο-
 15 ποίμεθα αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοι-
 μεν, ὃν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο
 ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὐ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν
 νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὐ· ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς α
 ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἄλλως ἕνεκα
 20 λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἣν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς; ἐπι-

46
 b Supply καὶ πρότερον (from what fol-
 lows) with ὅμοιοι.

c 11. πλείω μορμολύττηται: uses more
 hobgoblins to scare us. μορμολύττεσθαι
 has the double acc. like βλέπτειν τινά
 τι. Μορμῶ, like Ἔμπουσα, was one of
 the fictitious terrors of the Greek
 nursery. Cf. Gorg. 473; Ar. Av.
 1244, πότερα Λυδὸν ἢ Φρύγα | ταυτὶ
 λέγουσα μορμολύττεσθαι δοκεῖς; The
 Schol. there suggests that the alarm
 began ἀπὸ τῶν προσωπέων (masks) τῶν
 ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ὑποκριτῶν, ἃ ἐκάλουν
 μορμολυκεῖα. τοιοῦτοις δὲ καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες
 τὰ παιδιὰ φοβοῦσιν. Cf. Phaed. 77 e.

13. δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμ-
 πουσα κτέ.: by confronting us with bonds,
 with death, with loss of worldly goods.
 These are the usual punishments, to
 the harshest of which Socrates has
 been condemned. The plural is used
 to put an abstract idea more vividly
 and concretely, as it were, by a process
 of multiplication. Cf. the use of
 mortis, neces, and the common
 poetical use of θάνατοι to describe a
 violent and premature death, and in
 general the free use of the plural by
 the poets in phrases like πηκτῶν κλι-
 μάκων προσαμβάσεις, Eur. Phoen. 489,
 and Bacch. 1213, δωμάτων προσαμβά-

46
 c seis, I. T. 97, εἰσβάσεις, *ibid.* 101, also
 the common use of διαλλαγῆαι both in
 poetry (Eur. Phoen. 701) and in prose
 (Lys. xii. 53; xiii. 80, etc.). That such
 plurals were only a stronger way of
 putting the singular is clearly shown
 in Eur. Bacch. 1350, αἰαί, δε δόκται,
 πρέσβυ, τλήμονες φυγαί. For θάνα-
 τος, meaning the penalty of death, see
 on Apol. 36 b.

15. εἰ ἀναλάβοιμεν: I think, if we
 should begin by taking up your point, etc.
 That is, such thorough consideration
 (44 b, 45 e) of Crito's (ὃν σὺ λέγεις)
 point involves considering the whole
 question whether, etc.

18. ἢ πρὶν μὲν κτέ.: with ἢ (an) d
 second question is superadded, which
 substantially forestalls the answer to
 the first. Cf. Apol. 26 b. Here the
 answer suggested by ἄρα is to be taken
 ironically. See on ἄλλα χρημάτων,
 Apol. 37 c, and cf. 47 e below, and esp.
 50 e and 51 a, where we find ἢ πρὸς
 μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα . . . πρὸς δὲ τὴν
 πατρίδα ἄρα.

19. ἄλλως: not at all seriously, as a
 mere joke, i.e. in a sense other than
 its proper one; the expression is a
 strong one. Cf. Phaedo, 76 e, εἰ δὲ μὴ
 ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὕτως

θυμῷ δ' ἔγωγ' ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὦ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ, 46
 εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ᾧδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός,
 καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δέ πως,
 ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἐκάστοτε ᾧδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν,
 25 ὡσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν ἅς οἱ ἄνθρωποι
 δοξάζουσι δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μή. e
 τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι;
 σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε τὰνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνή-
 σκειν αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἄν σε παρακρούοι ἢ παροῦσα ξυμ- 47
 30 φορά· σκόπει δὴ, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ
 πάσας χρῆ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς
 μὲν, τὰς δ' οὐ; τί φῆς; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;

ΚΡ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς
 35 μῆ;

ΚΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ
 τῶν ἀφρόνων;

ΚΡ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

46
 d εἰρημένος εἶη. ἔνεκα λόγου, for the
 form's sake (dicis causa)—quite
 different from λόγου χάριν (exempli
 causa)—is brought in ἐκ παραλλήλου.
 See on εἰκῆ κτέ., *Apol.* 17 c.

24. τὴ λέγειν: the contradictory of
 οὐδὲν λέγειν. Cf. *Apol.* 30 b. It means,
 "to say something that can be de-
 pended upon, that amounts to some-
 thing." Cf. *Lach.* 195 c, τί δοκεῖ
 Λάχης λέγειν, ὦ Νικία; εἶοικε μέντοι
 λέγειν τι, to which Nicias humorously
 responds, καὶ γὰρ λέγει γέ τι, οὐ μέντοι
 ἀληθές γε.

25. νῦν δὴ: just now.

e 28. ὅσα γε τὰνθρώπεια: humanly
 speaking. Cf. *Dem.* xviii. 300, ὅσον
 ἦν ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ δυνατόν, as fur

as human calculation could. For the 46
 adv. acc. ὅσα, see G. 1060; H. 719. e
 One who is but a man can be sure of
 his life for no single moment, though
 he may have a reasonable confidence.
 Cf. *Henry V.* iv. 1, "I think the king is
 but a man, as I am; the violet smells
 to him as it doth to me; all his senses
 have but human conditions." Notice
 the force of γέ. Cf. 54 d, ὅσα γε τὰ
 νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα.

30. ἱκανῶς: sufficiently, satisfacto- 47
 rily, and hence rightly or truly. ἱκανῶς a
 very commonly appears in conjunc-
 tion with μετρίως or καλῶς, to either
 one of which it is substantially equiv.
 Cf. *Symp.* 177 e and *Phaed.* 96 d.

32. For an omission here, see App.

VII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο; γυ- 47
μναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἢ
ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου
ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἱατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρύβης ὢν;

5 ΚΡ. Ἐνὸς μόνου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπά-
ζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς
τῶν πολλῶν.

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δῆ.

47
a VII. 1. πῶς αὖ ἐλέγετο: the impf. because the new question (αὖ) involves a matter which has already been discussed. GMT. 40; H. 833. — τὰ τοιαῦτα: refers to what follows. The definite instance given is only one of many possible illustrations of the kind. On the inductive method, see Introd. 18, and for further examples, cf. *Apol.* 25 b. Cf. also *Lach.* 184 c-185 b, where the same example is elaborated to establish the same principle that approval and instruction alike should, if we are to heed them, come from the one man who has made himself an authority, ὁ μαθὼν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσας, while the praise and blame of the many is to be neglected. There also the importance of deciding aright in regard to gymnastic training is strongly insisted upon, as follows: ἢ περὶ σμικροῦ ὀέσθε νυκὶ κινδυνεύει καὶ σὺ καὶ Λυσίμαχος, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τούτου τοῦ κτήματος, ὃ τῶν ὑμέτερων μέγιστον ὄν τυγχάνει, . . . ὁποῖοι ἂν τινες οἱ παῖδες γένωνται.

b 2. τοῦτο πράττων: a man who makes this his work, and hence is an expert in earnest about it. One whose opinion professionally given is worth more than any layman's would be. Cf. *Menex.* 244 c, ἡγησάμενοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι . . . σφέτερον ἤδη ἔργον εἶναι κατα-

δουλοῦσθαι τοὺς ἄλλους, ταῦτ' 41
ἔπραττον. As this ταῦτα refers to καταδουλοῦσθαι, so the τοῦτο in question refers to the notion of gymnastics implied in γυμναζόμενος; the whole phrase means, a person who wishes to make an athlete of himself. Cf. Hdt. vi. 105, ἀποπέμπουσιν ἐς Σπάρτην κήρυκα Φειδιππίδην Ἀθηναίων μὲν ἄνδρα, ἄλλως δὲ ἡμεροδρόμον τε καὶ τοῦτο μελετῶντα.

4. ἱατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρύβης: often coupled together as having special charge of bodily vigor and health. The ἱατρὸς was expected to cure and to prevent disease by a prescribed regimen (διαιτητική); the παιδοτρύβης professed and was expected (*Gorg.* 452 b) καλοῦς τε καὶ ἰσχυροῦς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σῶματα; he it was who really gave instruction in gymnastics. For fuller details, see Schömann, *Antiquities of Greece*, I. 505 f. Iccus of Tarentum, glorified as a successful gymnast, is reputed to have been most strict in regard to a temperate diet. Cf. the proverbial phrase Ἴκκου δεῖπνον. Sometimes medicine and gymnastics were both made the business of the same man, as in the case of Herodias of Selymbria. Cf. *Prot.* 316 d e, ἐνίους δέ τινας ἴσθηται καὶ γυμναστικὴν (sc. professed teachers

10 ΣΩ. Ταύτη ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ 47
 ἔδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἢ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ
 ἐπαίοντι, μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ ξύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις ;

ΚΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ ε
 15 τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν
 λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαίωντων, ἄρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται ;

ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο καὶ ποῖ τείνει καὶ εἰς
 τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος ;

20 ΚΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα. τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλυσιν.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα, ὧ Κρίτων,
 οὔτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διώωμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων
 καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχυρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν,
 περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλή ἡμῶν ἐστίν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν
 25 δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔπεισθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτήν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ α
 ἑνός, εἴ τίς ἐστὶν ἐπαίων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φο-
 βεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους ; ᾧ εἰ μὴ ἀκο-

47
 b of), οἷον Ἰκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος, καὶ ὁ νῦν
 ἐπι δὲ οὐδενὸς ἤττων σοφιστῆς Ἡρό-
 δικος ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον
 Μεγαρέυς. The great physician Hero-
 dicus is ridiculed for coddling his
 bodily infirmities, *Rep.* iii. 406 b, παρα-
 κολουθῶν γὰρ τῷ νοσήματι θανασίμφ
 δυτι οὔτε ἰάσασθαι, οἶμαι, οἷός τ' ἦν ἑαυ-
 τόν, ... δυσθανατῶν (*dying hard*) δὲ
 ὑπὸ σοφίας εἰς γήρας ἀφίκετο.

11. καὶ ἔδεστέον γε: γέ serves
 where various points are enumerated,
 to mark a new departure, i.e. a fact
 different in kind from the preceding
 ones and thus belonging to a new
 class. Cf. *Gorg.* 450 d, ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ
 λογιστικὴ (calculation) καὶ γεωμετρικὴ
 καὶ πεπτευτικὴ (draught-playing) γ' καὶ
 ἄλλα πολλὰ τέχνηαι. *Theaet.* 150 b,

ὑψεις (*sights*) τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὀσφρήσεις
 (*smells*) καὶ ψύξεις (*chills*) τε καὶ καύ-
 σεις (*burns*) καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λῦπαι
 καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι (*desires*) κτέ.

15. τοὺς λόγους: states collectively c
 what has been subdivided into δόξα,
 ψόγος, ἔπαινος.

16. καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαίωντων: of those
 in fact who have no special knowledge
 whatever. See App.

18. εἰς τί κτέ.: see on τῶν ἐμῶν, 46 b.

22. καὶ δὴ καί: and then also, of
 course. See on καὶ δὴ καί, 18 a. Here
 Socrates has at last reached his goal;
 his point has been established by in-
 duction. Notice the doubly chiasmic
 arrangement, —

| | | |
|---------|----------|--------|
| δικαίων | αἰσχυρῶν | ἀγαθῶν |
| ἀδίκων | καλῶν | κακῶν. |

λουθήσομεν, διαφθερούμεν ἐκείνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ 47
 μὲν δικάϊω βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἦ
 30 οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο;

KP. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δῆ, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλ-
 τιον γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον
 διολέσωμεν, πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαιόντων δόξῃ, ἄρα
 βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστι διεφθαρμένον αὐτοῦ; ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο e
 5 τὸ σῶμα· ἦ οὐχί;

KP. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ
 διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

KP. Οὐδαμῶς.

10 ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρα ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμέ-
 νον, ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβάται τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνύνησιν; ἦ
 φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκείνο, ὃ τι ποτ'

47
 d 29. ἐγίγνετο, ἀπώλλυτο: i.e. γίγνε-
 σθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι ἐλέγετο, the so-called
 philosophical impf., which carries a
 statement of the admitted results of
 a previous discussion back to the
 well-remembered time when the facts
 stated were established in argument.
 GMT. 40; H. 833. Cf. Cic. *Off.*
 i. 40. 143, itaque, quae erant
 prudentiae propria, suo loco
 dicta sunt.

VIII. 3. πειθόμενοι μὴ κτέ.: by its
 position μὴ contradicts τῇ . . . δόξῃ,
 but not πειθόμενοι, and implies ἀλλὰ
 τῇ τῶν μὴ ἐπαιόντων δόξῃ. The effect
 of writing πειθόμενοι μὴ instead of μὴ
 πειθόμενοι is to lay greater stress on
 both words, and the failure to say
 distinctly whose opinion it is which
 is obeyed leaves all the more stress
 on μὴ. — ἄρα βιωτὸν κτέ.: see on
 ἀνεξέταστος βίος, *Apol.* 38 a. The

meaning is that life is worthless, i.e. 47
 d οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, οὐκ ἄξιον ζῆν. Cf. 53 c,
 and *Rep.* iv. 445 a, ἡμῖν ἐστὶ σκέψα-
 σθαι, πότερον αὐ λυσιτελεῖ (*rays*) δικάϊά
 τε πράττειν καὶ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ
 εἶναι δίκαιον . . . ἢ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἄδικον
 εἶναι. The expressions διαφθειρόμενον
 and διολέσωμεν bring us to the point
 of extreme deterioration at which
 life becomes impossible.

10. ἀλλὰ . . . ἄρα: ironically op- e
 posed to the preceding negative state-
 ment, but at the same time requiring
 no for its answer. This last must be
 indicated by the tone in which the
 question is asked. See on ἄρα, 46 d.

11. ᾧ: does both verbs, though
 ὀνύνησι does not govern the dat. See
 on οἷς . . . ἐξετάζειν, *Apol.* 41 c. Even
 λωβᾶσθαι usually takes the acc.

12. ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστὶ: it was not speci-
 fied above (d), and there is no reason

ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἢ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἢ δικαιοσύνη 48
ἐστίν;

15 ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ τιμιώτερον;

ΚΡ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάνν ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντι-
στέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ὁ ἐπαῖων περὶ
20 τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἶς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἢ ἀλήθεια. ὥστε
πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγηεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς
τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων
καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δῆ,
φαίη γ' ἄν τις, οἷοί τέ εἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτινύναι.

25 ΚΡ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες. b

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ
λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὅμοιος εἶναι [τῷ]
καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὐ,
ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

48 for arguing about its name (ψυχῆ) here.

a 18. οὐκ ἄρα πάνν οὕτω: then we must
not . . . at all . . . so much as all that,
etc. οὕτω refers back to the drift of
Crito's argument. Here again Socrates
takes the last step in a long induction.

19. τί . . . ὅ τι: a not unusual com-
bination of the dir. and indir. forms of
question. Cf. *Gorg.* 500 a, ἀρ' οὖν παν-
τός ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ
τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶ καὶ ὅποια κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ
(specialist) δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον; The double
acc. as in κακὰ (κακῶς) λέγειν τινά.

20. αὐτὴ ἢ ἀλήθεια: i.e. Truth,
speaking with the lips of ὁ ἐπαῖων, or
appearing as the result of strict and
patient inquiry.

23. ἀλλὰ μὲν δῆ: again Socrates
reproves Crito, this time for his ap-
peal to the Athenian public (44 d).

— μὲν δῆ: certainly, equiv. to μὲν or 48
nearly so. a

25. δῆλα δῆ κτέ.: Crito eagerly b
catches at this objection and strength-
ens it with καί. Thus he implies that
there is more than meets the eye, i.e.
that there are many other valid ob-
jections. Cf. 45 a. See App.

26. οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος κτέ.: τέ cor-
responds to καὶ . . . αὖ following. For
a similar καὶ . . . καὶ αὖ, see *Lach.*
181 d, καὶ τούτων περὶ ἔγωγος πειράσομαι
συμβουλευεῖν ἂν τι δύναμαι καὶ αὖ ἂ προ-
καλεῖ πάντα ποιεῖν. The connexion
of thought would not hinder us from
subordinating the first clause: "as
our discussion just closed agrees with
what we argued formerly (when deal-
ing with the same matter), so, etc."

29. ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν κτέ.: cf. *Apol.* 28 b ff.

30 ΚΡ. Ἄλλὰ μένει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εἶ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστι, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

ΚΡ. Μένει.

IX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπ-
τέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι μὴ
ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων, ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ εἰ μὲν φαίνηται
δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔωμεν. ἄς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς
5 σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παί-
δων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὧ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ
τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινύντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν, εἰ
οἰοί τ' ἦσαν, οὐδεὶν ξὺν νῶ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῶν δ',
ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἢ
10 ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρή-
ματα τελούντες τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσιν καὶ α

48
b 31. τὸ δὲ εἶ κτέ.: this is needed because of the confused ideas which many associate with εἶ ζῆν, e.g. (1) plain living and high thinking, or (2) high living and no thinking. For the latter meaning, cf. *Rep.* i. 329 a, οἱ οὖν πλείστοι (τῶν πρεσβυτῶν) τὰς ἐν τῇ νεότητι ἡδονὰς ποθοῦντες ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὡς μεγάλων τιῶν ἀπεστερημένοι, καὶ τότε μὲν εἶ ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶντες. On this whole subject consult the discussion in *Prot.* 351 b ff.

c IX. 4. τὰς σκέψεις: drawn into the const. of the rel. clause, to which precedence has been given. The art. is commonly not retained in such a case, e.g. οὓς ἢ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων. The corresponding demonst. ταῦτα is attracted into the gender of the pred.

6. μὴ . . . ἢ: sc. ὅρα κτέ. *Look to it, Crato, lest all this, at bottom, may prove to be, etc.* A milder way of saying ταῦτα σκέμματα ὄντα φαίνεται, strength-

ened by ὡς ἀληθῶς. See on μὴ οὐ 48 c
τοῦτ' ἢ, *Apol.* 39 a.

7. καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν: and would bring them to life again too. The ἄν forms with this partic. the apod. ἀναβιώσασθαι is used here like ἀναβιώσασθαι in *Phaed.* 89 d. Usually it is intransitive, like ἀναβιώναι.

9. ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ: the argument has prevailed thus far. Cf. *Hor. Sat.* i. 3, 115, nec vincet ratio hoc, tantundem ut peccet idemque | qui teneros caules alieni fregerit horti | et qui nocturnus sacra divum legerit. *Ibid.* ii. 3, 225, vincet enim stultos ratio insanire nepotes, and 250, si puerilius his ratio esse evincet amare. It is rare to find this idiom with an acc. of the persons discussing, as in *Rep.* x. 607 b, ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἤρει. — μὴ . . . ἢ: as in 6 above.

χάριτας καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀλη- 48
θείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντες· κὰν φαινώμεθα
ἀδिका αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέη ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὐτ' εἰ
15 ἀποθνήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας οὔτε
ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὄρα
δὲ τί δρῶμεν.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ πῃ ἔχεις ἀντιλέ-
20 γειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καὶ σοι πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μῆ, ο
παῦσαι ἤδη, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν
λόγον, ὡς χρῆ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι·
ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσας σε ταῦτα πράττειν,
ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος. ὄρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐάν

48

d 12. καὶ αὐτοὶ κτέ. : καὶ αὐτοί, *we ourselves too*, stands for Crito and Socrates. Crito is responsible, in the supposed case, not only for his expenditure of money (χρήματα τελού-τες), but also for instigating the act of Socrates, or rather for persuading him to allow various things to be done for him.—ἐξαγόμενοι: the pass. is especially strong, “we ourselves are both rescuers and rescued.”

15. οὔτε πάσχειν: *sc. εἰ δεῖ*, to be supplied from the preceding clause.

16. πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν: *cf. Apol. 28 b d*. The sense is, “there must be no question about submitting to the uttermost (ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν) rather than committing unrighteousness.” See also 54 b, where, as in this case, a choice is involved, and πρὸ is used in the sense of *in preference to or instead of*.

23. ὡς: *inasmuch as*, equiv. to ἐπεὶ. *Cf. quippe in Lat.*

c 24. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος: opposed distinctly to πείσας σε, *with your approval. Cf. 49 e fin.*, and *Xen. An. v. 6. 29,*

ἐξήνεγκε γὰρ τὸν λόγον, ὡς ἐγὼ πρά-
τειν ταῦτα διανοοίμην ἤδη οὐ πείσας
ὑμᾶς. The vivid contrast of these
two clauses makes the omission of
σοῦ, the subj. of ἄκοντος, the easier.
Indeed, cases are common where a
personal or a dem. pron. or some
vague general notion of persons or
things is the subj. implied. For a
somewhat similar case, *cf. Hom. Od.*
iv. 645 ff., ὄφρ' εἰδῶ ἢ σε βίη ἀέκον-
τος ἀπήρα νῆα μέλαιναν, ἧὲ ἑκὼν οἱ
δῶκας.—ἐάν λέγηται: *in case the state-
ment shall satisfy you.* ἐάν does not
like εἰ (*cf. 48 b*) mean *whether*. *GMT.*
71, n. 1. Cf. Phaedo, 64 c, σκέψαι
δὴ, ἠγαθέ, ἐάν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῆ
κτέ. The subj. of the dependent sent.
is made by anticipation (prolepsis)
the object of ὄρα. *Cf. Milton, Sonnet*
to Sir Henry Vane, xvii., “Besides to
know | Both spiritual power and civil,
what each means, | What severs each,
thou hast learned, which few have
done.” *Cf. below (49 d).* Socrates
is earnestly enforcing a principle.

48

e

25 σοι ἰκανῶς λέγῃται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμε- 49
νον ἢ ἂν μάλιστα οἴη.

KP. Ἄλλὰ πειράσομαι.

X. ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμέν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι,
ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὐ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε
ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν
τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὠμολογήθη; [ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο.]
5 ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς
ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσίν, καὶ πάλαι, ὦ Κρίτων,
ἄρα τηλικοῖδε [γέροντες] ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῆ
διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέ- 6
ροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο
10 ἡμῖν, εἴτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς εἶτι
τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πραότερα, ὅμως τό γε

49
a 26. ἢ οἴη: sc. κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἂν ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον. μάλιστα as in the question πῆ μάλιστα; Cf. *Rep.* vii. 537 d, οἱ ἂν μάλιστα τοιοῦτοι ὄσι, τοῦτους εἰς μείζους τιμὰς καθιστάναι.

X. 1. ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον: sc. ἡμᾶς. The const. with the acc. corresponds to the equivalent δεῖ with the acc. and inf. GMΓ. 923; H. 611 a. For the facts, see *Introd.* 65.

2. ἢ οὐδαμῶς κτέ.: here the first member of the disjunctive question is resumed, so that the questioner gives notice to the questioned, as it were, of his opinion. For the accent of τινὶ when (exceptionally) it begins its clause, see G. 144, 1; H. 119 a.

4. ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο: prob. not written by Plato. If genuine, it cannot refer to anything here, but relates to the drift of 46 b and 48 b. See *App.*

5. ἢ πᾶσαι κτέ.: here and in the words ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον κτέ. below, we see how hard Crito finds it to assent.

After each double question (1) οὐδενὶ 49
... ὠμολογήθη; (2) ἢ πᾶσαι ... παντὶ a
τρόπῳ; Socrates has looked at Crito for an answer. Finally he extorts the briefest assent by the pointed φαμέν ἢ οὐ; in line 13 below.

6. ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσίν: *thrown away.* Cf. *Henry VIII.* iii. 2, "Cromwell, I charge thee, *fling away* ambition," and *Soph. Phil.* 13, μὴ καὶ μάθη μ' ἤκοντα κἀκχέω τὸ πᾶν σόφισμα, τῷ μιν αὐτίχ' αἰρήσειν δοκῶ. Similar is the Lat. *effundere gratiam, laborem.* — καὶ πάλαι κτέ.: one of the two parties. forms the predicative complement of ἐλάθομεν, the other stands in opposition to the pred. By the added τηλικοῖδε ἄνδρες (see on τοσοῦτον σύ, *Apol.* 25 d), this opposition is put still more strongly. ἄρα gives point to the irony. See on ἄρ' οὖν, 47 e.

11. ὅμως παντὶ τρόπῳ: a more distinct 6
reiteration of what ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον κτέ. has already stated. Therefore one as much as the other belongs

ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχροὺν τυγχάνει ὃν 49
παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμέν ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡ. Φαμέν.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ
οἴονται, ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

49
b to the twofold disjunctive prot. εἶτε
... εἶτε, καὶ εἶτε . . . εἶτε.

17. ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται: that 'doing harm to one's enemies' was part and parcel of the popularly accepted rule of life is plain from many passages like that in Isocrates to Demonicus I., 26, ὁμοίως αἰσχροὺν νόμιζε τῶν ἐχθρῶν νικᾶσθαι ταῖς κακοποιήσασιν καὶ τῶν φίλων ἠττάσθαι ταῖς εὐεργεσίαις. Compare the character of Cyrus the younger, Xen. An. i. 9. 11, φανεροὺς δ' ἦν, καὶ εἰ τίς τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ποιήσειεν αὐτόν, νικᾶν πειρώμενος κτέ. Cf. also Meno's definition, Men. 71 e, αὐτῆ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς. Plato eloquently defends his more Christian view throughout the first book of the Republic, in the Gorgias, and elsewhere. That the many do assert this, Socrates might say is not only made probable by the known tendencies in human character, but it is proved by every-day experience in dealing with men. Many recognized authorities encouraged them in such a view. Cf. Archil. Frg. 65, ἐν δ' ἐπίσταμαι μέγα, | τὸν κακῶς με δρῶντα δεινοῖς ἀνταμείβεσθαι κακοῖς. Solon, Frg. 13, 5, where he prays to the Muses that they would grant him εἶναι δὲ γλυκὸν ὡδὲ φίλοις, ἐχθροῖσι δὲ . . . | . . . δεινὸν ἰδεῖν. In Soph. Aj. 79, it is Athena herself who asks, οὐκουν

49
b γέλωσ ἡδιστος εἰς ἐχθροὺς γελᾶν; Contrast Soph. Ant. 523 f.: ΚΡ. οὔτοι ποθ' οὐχθρὸς, οὐδ' ὅταν θάνῃ, φίλος. | ΑΝ. οὔτοι συνέχευιν, ἀλλὰ συμφιλεῖν ἔφυν. Cf. Eur. Andr. 520 ff., where Menelaus says it is folly to spare the offspring of one's foes, ἀνοία μεγάλη λείπειν ἐχθροὺς ἐχθρῶν, ἐξὸν κτείνειν, and *ibid.* 1007, where Orestes says, ἐχθρῶν γὰρ ἀνδρῶν μοῖραν εἰς ἀναστροφὴν (for us to destroy it) δαίμων δίδωσι. Cf. Eur. Heraclid. 1049 ff., the grim humor of Alcmena, who says of Eurystheus, ἐχθρὸς μὲν ἀνὴρ, ὠφελεῖ δὲ κατθανών. See also Bacch. 1344-1348, where Agave admits her guilt but asks for mercy, and Dionysus refuses mercy because he has been offended. Agave answers: ὄργας πρέπει θεοὺς οὐχ ὁμοιοῦσθαι βροτοῖς. This shows an ideal of moral conduct for the gods, such as Plato preaches for men. Compare Soph. Aj. 679-682, ὅ τ' ἐχθροὺς ἡμῖν ἐς τοσόνδ' ἐχαρτέος, | ὡς καὶ φιλήσων αὐθις, ἐς τε τὸν φίλον | τοσαυτ' ὑπουργῶν ὠφελεῖν βουλήσομαι | ὡς αἰὲν οὐ μενοῦντα, with Henry VIII. iii. 2, "Love thyself last, cherish those that hate thee; | still in thy right hand carry gentle peace | to silence envious tongues. Be just and fear not." Shakspeare thus expresses the view of the Platonic Socrates and of Plato in contrast to that of the Greek public at large. That the historical (in contrast to the Platonic) Socrates at least

KP. Οὐ φαίνεται.

49
c

20 ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δῆ; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ;

KP. Οὐ δεῖ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασι, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;

KP. Οὐδαμῶς.

25 ΣΩ. Τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

KP. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὅτιοῦν πάσχη ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ ὅρα, ὦ
30 Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολο- a
γῆς. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει.
οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μὴ, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ
βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶν-
τας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλευματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εἶ

19
b did not contradict this maxim of popular morality is perhaps evident from one place in the Memorabilia (ii. 6. 35), where, apparently with the ready approval of Critobulus, Socrates says, ὅτι ἐγνωκας ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι νικᾶν τοὺς μὲν φίλους εἰ ποιοῦντα, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς. This does not make him precisely responsible for the maxim, since he practically quotes it from the mouth of The Many. Indeed, the context has a playful color, which ought to warn us not to take Socrates precisely at his word.

c 19. οὐ φαίνεται: *plainly not*. As οὐ φημι means *I deny* rather than *I do not assert*, so οὐ φαίνεται means *not it does not appear*, but *it does appear not*.

20. κακουργεῖν: this word, like κακῶς ποιεῖν, covers more cases than ἀδικεῖν: it includes ἀδικεῖν and also cases of harm done where there is

49
c little or no question of right and wrong involved. Apparently, it was more commonly used in every-day matters than ἀδικεῖν. In Crito's answer his uncertain certainty is indicated by δῆπου; had he meant that he was perfectly certain, he would have used δῆ.

28. οὔτε ἄρα κτέ.: the completest presentation of this precept must be sought in the teaching of Christ. Cf. Luke vi. 27, ἀλλὰ ὑμῖν λέγω τοῖς ἀκούουσιν· ἀγαπάτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν, καλῶς ποιεῖτε τοῖς μισοῦσιν ὑμᾶς κτέ.

30. καθομολογῶν, ὁμολογῆς: see on εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον, 44 d.

32. τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κτέ.: this is d strongly set forth in the *Gorgias*, where the Sophist and the true Philosopher represent respectively these two clashing theories. See *Introd.* 65.

34. βουλευματα: *counsels*, i.e. their manner of thinking and acting.

35 μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι, καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ^e 40 ἔτι δοκεῖ· σοὶ δ' εἴ πῃ ἄλλη δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δὲ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε.

ΚΡ. Ἄλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ· πότερον ἂ ἄν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον ἢ 45 ἐξαπατητέον;

ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

XI. ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπίοντες ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινας ποιοῦ- 50 μεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὓς ἤκιστα δεῖ ἢ οὐ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν δικαίοις οὔσιν ἢ οὐ;

49 ^d 36. ὡς οὐδέποτε κτέ.: a statement of what is involved in ἐντεῦθεν, which is equiv. to ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου (taking this principle for granted). ὡς with the gen. abs. is used in this same way also after λέγειν. Cf. Men. 95 e, οἷσθ' ὅτι ἐν τούτοις μὲν ὡς διδακτοῦ οὔσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει;

39. τῆς ἀρχῆς: cf. καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν above. ἀρχή is the starting-point of an investigation, — a principle, ^e a conviction. — καὶ πάλαι κτέ.: see on οὐ μόνον κτέ., 46 b.

41. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο: not what results, but what comes next. It may be taken adv. (like τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε and the like) and translated further. What is referred to is expressed in πότερον κτέ. below.

43. μᾶλλον δέ: or rather. Cf. Lach. 196 c, λέγε δέ μοι ὦ Νικία, μᾶλλον δ' ἡμῖν.

44. ἢ ἐξαπατητέον: Socrates says ^e this rather than ἢ οὐ ποιητέον because of the preceding ἂ ἄν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ. Such an admission pledges a man to put his principle in practice. ἐξαπατᾶν is not only construed with an acc. of the person, here easily supplied from τῷ, but furthermore takes the acc. of the thing. Cf. Xen. An. v. 7. 11, εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν ἢ αὐτὸς ἐξαπατηθῆναι ἂν οἴεται ταῦτα ἢ ἄλλον ἐξαπατῆσαι ταῦτα, λέγων διδασκέτω.

XI. 1. ἐκ τούτων: in the light of this. See on 48 c, ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων, and cf. Henry IV. i. 1, "For more is to be said and done | than out of anger can be uttered." The particular plan of flight Socrates considers in the light of, or out of, the general conclusion just approved.

3. οἷς οὔσιν: the dat. is assimilated ^a regularly to the omitted obj. of ἐμμέ-

5 ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὃ ἔρω- 50
τῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ᾧδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε
εἶτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόν-
τες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἔρουντο·
10 εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἢ
τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ ᾧ ἐπιχειρεῖς διανοεῖ τούς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἢ
ἀπολέσαι καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ δοκεῖ

50
a νομεν. ὁμολογήσαμεν would require
the acc. as in 49 e above.

5. οὐκ ἔχω κτέ.: Crito seems afraid
of understanding what is meant; the in-
evitable consequences involved alarm
him. See on κακουργεῖν, 49 c. This
natural state of mind on his part
gives good and sufficient reason for a
reconsideration of the whole subject
from a new point of view.

7. μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν: for the dat., cf.
Symp. 192 d, εἰ αὐτοῖς . . . ἐπιστὰς ὁ
"Ἡφαιστος . . . ἔροιτο. *Prot.* 321 c, ἀπο-
ροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεύς. See
on φ, 47 e. The statement there given
covers a very large number of cases
where a partic. and a finite verb are
combined like ἐλθόντες ἔρουντο.

8. εἴθ' ὅπως κτέ.: this softening
phrase is used purely out of consid-
eration for Crito. To use the word
applied to runaway slaves might give
offence. One of the annoying mis-
haps that befell a well-to-do Athenian
was to have to give chase when a
slave ran off to Megara or Oenoe.
Cf. *Prot.* 310 c, where Hippocrates
nearly lost his dinner, μάλα γε ὀψὲ
ἀφικόμενος ἐξ Οἰνόης. ὁ γὰρ τοι παῖς
με ὁ Σάτυρος ἀπέδρα. Of course such
conduct on the slave's part was con-
sidered despicable. Cf. 52 d, δοῦλος
φαιλότατος. The δοῦλος χρηστός, who
appears in tragedy more frequently

than in real life, would not run away, 50
because of his attachment to his mas-
ter. Cf. Eur. *Med.* lines 54 f., χρη-
στοῖσι δούλοις ξυμπορὰ τὰ δεσποτῶν | κα-
κῶς πιτνύντα καὶ φρενῶν ἀθάπτεται, the
first of which recurs in the Bacchae
(1029), *Alc.* 768-77; and cf. also Eur.
Andr. 56-59, where the slave says to
Andromache, εὔνοος δὲ καὶ σοι ζῶντί τ'
ἦν τῷ σῶ πόσει. In Xen. *Oec.* 7. 37
and 38, and 9. 11-13, is an interesting
account of the position of slaves in
the household.

9. τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως: the com-
monwealth. Cf. Xen. *An.* v. 7. 18, and
Hdt. i. 67, Σπαρτητέων τῷ κοινῷ δια-
πεμπομένους, sent by the commonwealth
of Sparta. So Cicero says communis
Siciliae. The personification of the
state and the laws which here follows
is greatly admired and has been abun-
dantly imitated, e.g. by Cicero in his
first Catilinarian Oration (7. 18). The
somewhat abrupt transition from ἡμῖν
above to ὦ Σώκρατες suggests the fact
that Socrates considered himself alone
responsible to the laws in this matter.

10. ἄλλο τι ἢ: see on ἄλλο τι ἢ,
Apol. 24 c.

11. τούς τε νόμοις: notice the order
and cf. 53 a, ἡμῖς οἱ νόμοι.

12. τὸ σὸν μέρος: see on τὸ σὸν
μέρος, 45 d. Here it is about the same
in sense with καθ' ὅσους δύνασαι, 51 a.

σοι οἶόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατε- 50
 τράφθαι, ἐν ᾗ αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἰσχύουσιν, ἀλλ'
 15 ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίνονται καὶ διαφθείρονται; τί
 ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ
 γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχοι ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου
 τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὃς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας
 προστάττει κυρίας εἶναι. ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι
 20 ἡδίκηκε γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἢ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε; ἢ
 ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;

ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νῆ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XII. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι· ὦ Σώκρατες,
 ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ ἐμμένει ταῖς
 δίκαις αἷς ἂν ἢ πόλις δικάζη; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζομεν
 λεγόντων, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ
 5 λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι τῷ
 ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν
 καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν α
 σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανεν τὴν μητέρα
 σου ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν,

50
 b 13. εἶναι: the attention is drawn to
 εἶναι, exist, by the negative statement
 of the same idea in μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι,
 not to be utterly overturned, which fol-
 lows. GMT. 109.

17. ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ: a side
 thrust at the trained speakers which
 recalls the irony of the opening page
 of the *Apology*. — ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ
 νόμου ἀπολλυμένου: on behalf of this
 law whose existence is in jeopardy. Cf.
 below d, ἐπιχειρεῖς ἀπολλύναι. This
 notion of threatened action is often
 attached to the pres. and impf. of
 this verb. See GMT. 32 and 38;
 H. 828. Cf. *An. v.* 8. 2, ὅπου τῷ ῥίγει
 ἀπωλλύμεθα. The whole wording of

this passage recalls the Athenian 50
 usage which required that a law, if
 any one proposed to change or repeal
 it, should be defended by regularly-
 appointed state-advocates (*συνήγοροι*).

19. ὅτι ἡδίκηκε γάρ: ὅτι followed by
 direct quotation, as in 21 c. Notice
 how spirited and quick the answer is
 made by γάρ. "Yes (I certainly have
 this intention) for, etc."

XII. 2. καὶ ταῦτα: sc. that in cer- c
 tain cases the sentence of the laws
 may and should be set at naught. —
 ἢ ἐμμένειν: or (was the agreement be-
 tween us) simply to abide by, etc.

3. αἷς ἂν δικάζη: cf. 50 b and 51 c.

5. ἐπειδὴ κτέ.: see *Introduct.* 19.

10 τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφει τι ὡς οὐ καλῶς 50
 ἔχουσιν; οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίην ἄν. ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ
 γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν ἐν ἧ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης;
 ἧ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένοι
 νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῶ σε ἐν μουσικῇ
 15 καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν; καλῶς, φαίην ἄν. εἶεν. ἐπειδὴ e
 δὲ ἐγένου καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχouis ἄν εἰπεῖν
 πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δού-
 λος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως

50
 d 10. τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους: probably Socrates was thinking particularly of the laws governing marriage which established the legitimacy of children (*γνησιότης*). See Schoemann, *Antiquities of Greece*, p. 357.

11. ἀλλά: instead of *ἔπειτα δέ*, which would have been written here to correspond to *πρῶτον μὲν* if Socrates's answer had not intervened.

14. ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ: these words cover the whole of education (*παιδεία*), as Plato, *Rep.* ii. 376 e, says, *ἔστι που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική*. "The education of the average Greek gentleman, like that of the average English gentleman, comprised a certain amount of mental cultivation and a certain amount of athletic exercise. The former, besides reading, writing, and some elementary mathematics, consisted mainly in the reciting and learning by heart of poetry, along with the elements of music, and sometimes of drawing. Perhaps because so much of the poetry was originally sung or accompanied, the word 'music' was sometimes applied to the education in literature as well as in music proper, and it is in this wider sense that Plato habitually uses it. Under the term 'gymnastic' was un-

derstood the whole system of diet and exercise which, varying with the customs of different states, had for its common object the production of bodily health and strength, and the preparation for military service." *Hellenica*, The Theory of Education in Plato's Republic, by R. L. Nettleship, M.A., p. 88. See on *τοῦτο πρᾶτταν*, 47 a. See also Schoemann, *Greek Antiquities*, pp. 359 ff.

17. δούλος: opposed to *δεσπότης*. e
 Cf. *Hdt.* vii. 104, where Demaratus says to Xerxes that the Lacedaemonians *ἐλεύθεροι ζόντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπεστι γὰρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος*. Elsewhere Plato uses *δουλεύειν* of the obedience which the law requires, e.g. *Legg.* 762 e, *ὁ μὴ δουλεύσας οὐδ' ἂν δεσπότης γένοιτο ἄξιος ἐπαίνου, καὶ καλλωπίσσειν* (cf. *ἐκαλλυνόμεν*, *Apol.* 20 c) *χρῆ τῷ καλῶς δουλεύσαι μάλλον ἢ τῷ καλῶς ἄρξαι, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, ὡς ταύτην τοῖς θεοῖς οὔσαν δουλείαν, ἔπειτα τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις κτέ.* Cf. *Apol.* 23 b, 30 a, and also *Eur. Orest.* 418, where Orestes says in a very different spirit, *δουλεύομεν θεοῖς, ὅ τι ποτ' εἰσιν οἱ θεοί.* Cf. 52 d. This high standard of obedience, unhesitating and unqualified, to the established law, was familiar to the Athenians before Plato wrote.

ἔχει, ἄρ' ἐξ ἴσου οἶε εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ 50
 20 ἅτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς σὲ ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντι-
 ποιεῖν οἶε δίκαιον εἶναι; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοὶ τὸν πατέρα
 οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, εἴ σοι
 ὦν ἐτύγχανεν, ὥστε, ἅπερ πάσχοις, ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν,
 οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε τυπτόμενον ἀντιτύπ- 51
 25 τεῖν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά· πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα
 καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔσται σοι, ὥστε, εἰάν σὲ ἐπιχειρῶμεν
 ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς

60
 6 Among many passages in the tragedians, cf. Soph. *Ant.* 663 ff., ἔστις δ' ὑπερβὰς ἢ νόμους βιάζεται | ἢ τοῦπιτάσσειν τοῖς κρατύνουσιν νοεῖ, | οὐκ ἔστ' ἐπαίνου τούτου ἐξ ἐμοῦ τυχεῖν. | ἄλλ' ἔν πόλις στήσειε, τοῦδε χρὴ κλύειν | καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ναυγία. Cf. also Cic. *Clu.* 53. 146, legum idcirco omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus, and cf. in Eur. *Suppl.* 429 ff., the speech of Theseus, beginning, οὐδὲν τυράννου δυσμενέστερον πόλει | ἔπου τὸ μὲν πρῶτιστον οὐκ εἰσὶν νόμοι | κοινοί, κρατεῖ δ' εἰς τὸν νόμον κεκτημένος | αὐτὸς παρ' αὐτῶ, καὶ τὸδ' οὐκέτ' ἔστ' ἴσον. Cf. also *ibid.* 316-353, 403-408, and the words of Aethra, 312 f., τὸ γὰρ τοι συνέχον (bond of union) ἀνθρώπων πόλει | τοῦτ' ἔσθ', ἔταν τις τοὺς νόμους σώζῃ καλῶς. Many lines in the *Heraclidæ* of Euripides show that ready and free obedience to law distinguished Athens, τὰν εὖ χαρίτων ἔχουσαν πόλιν, (379 f.). Cf. 181-198, 305 f., 329-332, 420-424.

18. αὐτὸς τε κτέ.: see on αὐτὸς τε κτέ., *Apol.* 42 a.

21. ἢ πρὸς μὲν . . . πρὸς δὲ κτέ.: the first clause is logically subordinate. See on δεινὰ ἂν εἶην, *Apol.* 28 d. ἄρα is ironical. See on ἀλλὰ . . . ἄρα, 47 e,

and particularly on ἢ πρὶν μὲν κτέ., 50
 6 46 d, where ἄρα occurs only in the second clause. For the repetition, see *Prot.* 325 b e, διδακτοῦ δὲ ἔντος καὶ θεραπευτοῦ (sc. ἀρετῆς) τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα τοὺς υἱεῖς διδάσκονται, ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἢ ζημία, εἰάν μὴ ἐπιστάνται, ἐφ' ᾧ δὲ . . . ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται, οὐδ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν; Notice the position of σοί, which is nevertheless not the emphatic word.

22. ἦν: "when you were under your father or perhaps your master." The past (ἦν) is opposed to the fut. (ἔσται).—καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην: for the δούλος χρηστός, see on δούλος in 17 above.

23. ἅπερ πάσχοις: anything that was (at any time) done to you. GMT. 532; H. 914 B (2). Though subord. to ὥστε . . . ἀντιποιεῖν, this clause is also limited by the neg. statement οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν, which limits the clause ὥστε . . . πολλά.

24. οὔτε . . . πολλά: an explanation of ὥστε . . . ἀντιποιεῖν, in which the neg. of οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν is repeated.—κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν: equiv. to λοιδορούμενον ἀντιλοιδορεῖν.

27. ὥστε καὶ σὺ δὲ ἐπιχειρήσεις: so that you in your own turn will, etc. σὺ, when expressed in Att., has emphatic position. καὶ indicates equality, 51
 a

τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι ἐπιχειρή- 51
σεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράτ-
30 τειν, ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος; ἢ οὕτως εἰ
σοφός, ὥστε λέληθέν σε ὅτι μητρός τε καὶ πατρός καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμιώτερόν ἐστιν ἢ πατρίς καὶ
σεμνότερον καὶ ἀγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρα καὶ παρὰ ὁ
θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι ὁ
35 δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπέικειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνου-
σαν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἂ ἂν κελεύῃ, καὶ

51
a δέ points the contrast between *σύ* and *ἡμεῖς*.

29. ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν: cf. Dem. ix. 15, καὶ τοιαῦτα πράττων τι ἐποίει; and iv. 2, οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων ποιοῦντων . . . πάνθ' ἂ προσῆκε πραττόντων. And yet Aristotle often makes a careful distinction between *ποιεῖν* and *πράττειν*.

30. ὁ ἐπιμελόμενος κτέ.: for the art., see on τοῦ εἰσάγοντος, *Apol.* 35 b. The irony comes out in οὕτως (ita not tam) εἰ σοφός, ὥστε λέληθέν σε. ἢ conveys very vigorously the covert reproach of the whole question, are you really? ἢ would be comparatively weak. See App.

31. μητρός: for a similar order of words, cf. *Prot.* 346 a, ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβῆναι (sc. αὐτὸν ἐπαναγκάζειν φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν) μητέρα ἢ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον ἢ πατρίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. Cf. also Hom. *Od.* ix. 367, μήτηρ ἠδὲ πατήρ ἠδ' ἄλλοι πάντες ἑταῖροι.

32. ἢ πατρίς: by the addition of the art. the definite fatherland of each and every man is indicated. Cf. below, b, and 54 c. For the art. used as a poss., see G. 141, x. 2; H. 658. Cf. *Henry V.* iv. 6, "He smiled me in the face." Cf. c below. On the facts, cf. Cic. *Off.* I. 17. 57, cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propin-

qui, familiares; sed omnes 51
omnium caritates patria una
a complexa est, pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus? Cf. also Hector's εἰς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος, ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης, Hom. *Il.* xii. 243.

33. ἐν μείζονι μοίρα: after the analogy of Homeric expressions like that used by Poseidon of Zeus, *Il.* xv. 195, μενέτω τριτάτῃ ἐνὶ μοίρῃ, i.e. in the one of the three parts of the world allotted to him as one of the three sons of Cronos. Cf. Eur. *I. T.* 1491, τῆς σφρομένης μοίρας εὐδαίμονες ὄντας, and Hdt. ii. 172, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα τὸν Ἀμασιν Αἰγύπτιοι ἐν οὐδεμῇ μοίρῃ μεγάλην ἦγον (considered of little or no account, nullo magnopere loco habebant).

34. σέβεσθαι κτέ.: the subj. of σέ- b
βεσθαι is an implied τινά, not ἡ πατρίς.

35. πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν: the acc. after σέβεσθαι, ὑπέικειν, and θωπεύειν, though ὑπέικειν should be followed by the dat. See on φ, 47 e. Cf. Liv. xxvii. 34. 14, ut parentium saevitiam, sic patriae patientiando ac ferendo leniendam esse.

36. πείθειν: used absolutely, as in *Apol.* 35 c, to change her mind, to convert to your way of thinking; some-

πάσχειν, ἕάν τι προστάτῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα, ἕάν 51
 τε τύπτεσθαι ἕάν τε δεῖσθαι, ἕάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγῃ τρω-
 θησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δι-
 40 καιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον
 οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστη-
 ρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ
 πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε, βιάζεσθαι δ'
 οὐχ ὅσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι
 45 ἦττον τὴν πατρίδα; τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων;
 ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

XIII. ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοῖνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως
 οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια
 ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γάρ σε γεν-

51
 b times to propitiate, as in Hom. *Il.* i.
 100, τότε κέν μιν (Ἀπόλλωνα) ἱλασ-
 σάμενοι πεπιθοίμεν. Cf. c below.
 The first two ἕάν τε clauses (like
 εἴτε... εἴτε, sive... sive), with
 προστάτῃ understood, are explanatory
 of ἕάν τι προστάτῃ παθεῖν, while the
 third takes a new verb with a new
 apod. The two former are specifi-
 cations under πάσχειν, the third in-
 stances analogous cases where un-
 qualified obedience to the state is
 necessary. The emergencies of war
 are taken as typical of a host of
 others, and then with ἐν δικαστηρίῳ
 the argument is brought to a head.
 This elaboration of the period leaves
 to its own devices ποιητέον ταῦτα
 (which, grammatically, is subordinate
 to λέληθέν σε).

40. καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον: a neg. re-
 iteration of ποιητέον ταῦτα. *We must
 not draw back, we must not retreat,
 we must not leave the ranks.* Corre-
 sponding to these three duties, there

were three forms of indictment, ἀσπρα- 15
 τείας, δειλίας, λιποταξίου. On the last, b
 cf. *Apol.* 28 c-29 a. ἀτιμία was the
 penalty involved in all these cases.

43. ἢ πείθειν: the inf. coming after c
 an impersonal verbal often depends
 on an implied δεῖ even when no δεῖ
 precedes. GMT. 925; H. 991 a.
 Cf. *Gorg.* 492 d, τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῆς
 οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἶον δεῖ εἶναι
 ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν
 αὐταῖς ἀμύθεν γέ ποθεν ἐτοιμάζειν.
 — ἢ . . . πέφυκε: quomodo ius-
 tum comparatum sit, an explana-
 tion of πείθειν, which implies διδά-
 σκειν (cf. *Apol.* 35 c, διδάσκειν καὶ
 πείθειν).

XIII. 1. σκόπει τοῖνυν κτέ.: an
 application of the universal truth to
 a particular instance.

2. ὅτι κτέ.: the relation of δίκαια
 to ἃ κτέ. is the same in which ἀλη-
 θῆ of the clause preceding stands
 to ταῦτα. Supply an inf. govern-
 ing ἃ.

νήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων 51
 5 ὧν οἰοί τε ἡμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι πολίταις, α
 ὅμως προαγορεύομεν, τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων
 τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῆ καὶ ἴδῃ τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει
 πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν
 10 ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται.
 καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδῶν ἐστὶν οὐδ' ἀπαγο-
 ρεύει, εἴαν τέ τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν ἰέναι, (εἰ μὴ
 ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, εἴαν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ
 ποι ἐλθῶν, ἰέναι ἐκείσε ὅποι ἂν βούληται ἔχοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ.
 ὅς δ' ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὄρων ὃν τρόπον ἡμεῖς τὰς τε e
 15 δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τᾶλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἥδη φαμὲν
 τοῦτον ὠμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν ἂ ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύομεν
 ποιήσειν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τριχῆ φαμὲν ἀδι-
 κεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖς οὖσιν ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τρο-

51
 d 7. ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῆ: there was strict examination (δοκιμασία) into every youth's claim to be declared an Athenian citizen when he had completed his eighteenth year. If he proved of Athenian parentage, and otherwise qualified, he was declared of age, and registered in the *ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον* of his deme. See Schömann, *Antiq. of Greece*, pp. 359 f.

9. λαβόντα: the dat. might stand here, but cf. *Symp.* 176 d, *Rep.* iii. 414 a, *Euthyphr.* 5 a, *Eur. Heracl.* 693, *Soph. El.* 479 ff., *Aesch. Cho.* 410 f., and *Symp.* 188 d, οὗτος . . . πᾶσαν ἡμῖν εὐδαιμονίαν παρασκευάζει καὶ ἀλλήλοις δυναμένους ὑμιλεῖν καὶ φίλους εἶναι καὶ τοῖς κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν θεοῖς, here is what makes ready for us all happiness, what makes us capable of being friends and familiars of our fellow-men and also of the gods, who are mightier than we. See G. 928, 1; H. 941.

11. εἴαν . . . βούληται . . . εἰ μὴ ἀρέ- 15
 d σκωμεν: εἴαν βούληται, as well as ὅποι ἂν βούληται in line 9 is a future supposition and depends on the future force of ἰέναι in line 13 (cf. ᾧ ἂν ἀρέσκωμεν in 8 above). Then εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν comes in naturally as a vaguer supposition subordinated to the others. If any of you wants (shall want) to go off to a colony, supposing we and the state should not satisfy him. The notion of a citizen's not being suited by the law is so monstrous that it is stated as remotely as possible.

12. εἴαν τε μετοικεῖν: cf. 52 e, also the picturesque use of μέτοικος, *Aesch. Pers.* 319, and by Eurystheus, in speaking of his own body buried in foreign soil, *Eur. Heracl.* 1030 ff., θανόντα γὰρ με θάψεθ' οὐ τὸ μῦρσιμον, . . . | καὶ σοὶ μὲν εὖνος καὶ πόλει σωτήριος | μέτοικος αἰεὶ κείσομαι κατὰ χθονός.

φεῦσι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται 51
 20 οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιούμεν, προτιθέντων
 ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιταπτόντων ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύωμεν, 52
 ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν, τού-
 των οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

XIV. Ταύταις δὴ φαμεν καὶ σέ, Σώκρατες, ταῖς αἰτίαις
 ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἃ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθη-
 ναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἴπομι· διὰ
 τί δὴ; ἴσως ἂν μου δικαίως καθάπτωτο λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν
 5 τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὁμολογηκῶς τυγχάνω
 ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαῖεν γὰρ ἂν ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμήριά ἐστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς b
 ἡρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθη-
 ναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μὴ σοι
 10 διαφερόντως ἤρεσκε, καὶ οὐτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτ' ἐκ τῆς
 πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, [ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν,] οὔτε ἄλλοσε
 οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδη-

51
c

19. ὁμολογήσας πείθεσθαι: not πεί-
 σεσθαι, although πείσεσθαι would mean
 about the same. See GMT. 100.
 Cf. 52 d below, where πολιτεύεσθαι is
 twice used similarly, with 52 c in.

20. προτιθέντων ἡμῶν: ἢ πείθεσθαι
 ἢ πείθειν must be supplied from what
 precedes. The same idea is then
 expressed negatively and once again
 positively. ἀίρειν προτιθέναι is also
 used, meaning to leave a man free to
 choose. Socrates can never repeat
 too often that the state is right, as
 against those who seek to evade the
 authority of its law. This fact ac-
 counts for the clause which follows:
 τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ, a mere repeti-
 tion of οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς.

52
a

22. θάτερα: the notion of plurality
 has here practically disappeared, as is
 often true also in the case of ταῦτα.

XIV. 2. ἐνέξεσθαι: cf. 54 a, θρέψον-
 ται καὶ παιδεύονται. These are cases
 of the anomalous use of the fut. mid.
 of these verbs for the fut. pass. —
 καί: and what is more.

4. ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα: see on ἐν τοῖς
 βαρύτατα, 43 c.

10. καὶ οὔτε . . . οὔτε: the promi- b
 nence of the hypothetical expression
 (οὐ γὰρ ἂν κτέ.) grows less here, and
 completely disappears with οὐδέ, as
 the contradictory ἀλλὰ plainly shows.
 θεωρία means not only a state embassy
 to games and festivals (see the pas-
 sage from the Phaedo quoted on τὸ
 πλοῖον, 43 c) but also attendance at
 religious festivals, particularly at the
 great national games, on the part of
 private individuals. See on ἐλάττω
 ἀπεδήμησας, 53 a.

52
a

12. εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος: for

μίαν ἐποιήσω πρόποτε ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, οὐδ' ἐπι- 52
 θυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδὲ ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι,
 15 ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ ἡμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὕτω
 σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἡροῦ καὶ ὠμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσε- c
 σθαι τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παιδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω ὡς ἀρεσκού-
 σης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆμ σοι
 φυγῆς τιμησασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς
 20 πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσης ποιῆσαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν
 ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν εἰ δέοι τεθνάαι σε, ἀλλὰ
 ἡροῦ, ὡς ἐφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὐτ' ἐ-
 κείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέ-
 πει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθεῖραι, πράττεις τε ἄπερ ἂν δούλος a
 25 φαυλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς
 ξυνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ' ἃς ἡμῖν ξυνέθου πολι-
 τεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀπόκριαι, εἰ
 ἀληθῆ λέγομεν φάσκοντές σε ὠμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι
 καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ, ἣ οὐκ ἀληθῆ. τί φῶμεν
 30 πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν;

52
 b the campaigns of Socrates, see on
 ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ, *Apol.* 28 e. Euphony, per-
 haps, prevented the addition of οὐδε-
 μίαν after ἀποδημίαν. Cf. 52 e and 54 b.

14. εἰδέναι: added for the sake of
 clearness and precision. The result
 is that the preceding gen. seems to
 be a case of prolepsis. Cf. Hom. *Il.*
 ii. 720, τῶξων ἐδ' εἰδότες Ἴφι μάχεσθαι.
 Soph. *El.* 542 f., ἢ τῶν ἐμῶν Ἄιδης τιν'
 ἡμερον τέκνων | ἢ τῶν ἐκείνης ἔσχε δαί-
 σασθαι πλέον. The subj. or obj. of
 the inf. is often put by anticipation
 as the obj. of its governing verb,
 noun, or adj.

c 17. καὶ . . . ἐποιήσω: is freed from
 its connexion with ὠμολόγεις, to which,
 however, τά τε ἄλλα is still attached.
 See on καὶ γέγονε, *Apol.* 36 a. This

irregularity was hardly avoidable, 52
 since a participle would have been c
 clumsy, and the idea does not suit a
 clause with ὅτι. Accordingly it was
 hardly possible to subordinate it to
 πολιτεύεσθαι.

18. ἐτι τοίνυν: transition to a new
 point, which, however, remains closely
 connected with the leading idea.

19. φυγῆς τιμησασθαι: cf. *Apol.* 37 c
 and see on τιμᾶται θανάτου, *Apol.* 36 b.

20. τότε μὲν: cf. *Apol.* 37 c-38 a.

21. ἐκαλλωπίζου: cf. *Apol.* 20 c,
 ἐκαλλυνόμεν τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμεν ἄν.

23. ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύ-
 νει: not ashamed of those words, but,
 ashamed to face those words. H. 712.
 The words are personified and con-
 front him with his disgrace. Cf. 46 b.

ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

52

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ἂν φαίεν ἢ ξυνηθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς· καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεὶς οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκα-
 35 σθεις βουλευσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν ἐβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἠρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι. σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαί-
 μονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ ἐκάστοτε φῆς εὐνομεῖ-
 σθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν
 40 βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χω- 53
 λοί τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι· οὕτω σοι διαφε-
 ρόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκειν ἢ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς
 οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι· τίμη γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων;

52

d 29. ἄλλ' οὐ λόγῳ: not merely in your professions. That ὁμολογηκέναι is the verb with which ἔργῳ is connected appears from the context. Cf. 51 e.

• 30. ἄλλο τι ἢ: see on ἄλλο τι ἢ, Apol. 24 c, and cf. Phaed. 79 c quoted below.

32. ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς: without any reflexive meaning. Cf. Phaed. 79 a, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἢ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή. But cf. 54 c.

e 35. ἐν ἔτεσιν ἐβδομήκοντα: cf. Apol. 17 d. Socrates here speaks less accurately than in 51 d.

38. ἃς δὴ ἐκάστοτε κτέ.: Plato, like many others, often praises these states, whose similar institutions were all of them based upon the common character due to their Dorian origin. In the Memorabilia, Xenophon, himself the ardent admirer of Sparta, reports various conversations where Socrates praises Dorian institutions. See (*Mem.* iii. 5. and iv. 4) his commendation of the strict obedience to law at Sparta and of the education

which prepares men for it. The education of Spartan women was less admired and less admirable. Cf. Eur. *Andr.* 595 ff., οὐδ' ἂν εἰ βούλοιτό τις | σάφρων γένοιτο Σπαρτιατῶν κῆρη. . . | δρόμων παλαίστρας τ' οὐκ ἀνασχετοὺς ἐμοὶ | κοινὰς ἔχουσι. κᾶτα θαυμάζειν χρεῶν | εἰ μὴ γυναῖκας σάφρονας παιδεύετε;

40. ἐλάττω ἀπεδήμησας: cf. Phaedr. 230 c, where Phaedrus says to Socrates as they are taking a walk in the country: σὺ δὲ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἀποπάτατό τις φαίνει. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ξεναγομένῳ (a stranger come to see the sights in town) τινὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ ἕοικας· οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος οὐτ' εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν (foreign parts) ἀποδημῆς, οὐτ' ἐξω τείχους ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν ἐξίεναι. Socrates answers: συγγίγνωσκέ μοι, ὦ ἄριστε, φιλομαθῆς γὰρ εἰμι· τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδὲν μ' ἐθέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἄνθρωποι.

43. δῆλον ὅτι: appended at the end of the sent. by way of emphasis without having any place in the const.

52

e

53

a

νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμένεις τοῖς ὠμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε
45 πείθῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστος· γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως ἐξελθῶν.

XV. Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνων
τι τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδεί-
ους τοὺς σαυτοῦ; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύουσὶ γέ σου οἱ
ἐπιτηδείοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἢ
5 τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδόν τι δῆλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον
μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθῃς, ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ
Μέγαράδε, — εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφότεροι — πολέμιος ἦξεις,
ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὅσοι περ κῆδονται
τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέπονται σε διαφθορέα ἡγοῦμε-

⁵³ See on ὦν ὄντων, *Apol.* 37 b. H. 1049,
^a 1 a. Cf. Eur. *Suppl.* 396, Καδμείος, ὡς
ἔοικεν, οὐ σ' ἀφ' οἷδ' ὄτι, κῆρυξ. Ar.
Clouds, ἀδικούντ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ κακουρ-
γούντ', οἷδ' ὄτι. Its stress is given
chiefly to καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι.

44. οὐκ ἐμμένεις: a more vivid form
of question than ἐμμενεῖς. The laws
give answer to their own question in
ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ, which implies ἀλλ'
ἐμμενεῖς. Socrates might have said
ἀλλ' ἐμμένω.

45. καταγέλαστος: with reference
to his preceding operations. Cf. 52 e
above, σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν κτέ.

XV. 1. σκόπει: prefixed to an
independent sent. just as ὄρας often
is. Cf. 47 a and *Prot.* 336 b. — παρα-
βὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνων: this = ἐὰν παρα-
βῆς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνῃς. The pres. marks
the continuance of the action.

^b 5. σχεδόν τι: this adv. use of τι
is common with πάνυ, σχεδόν, πλεον,
μᾶλλον and πολύ. — πρῶτον μὲν: the
corresponding clause follows below
(d) in a different form. See on ἀλλά,
50 d.

7. Μέγαράδε: see App. and also G.

61; H. 219. — εὐνομοῦνται γάρ: for the
facts, see on ἀς δὴ ἐκάστοτε, 52 e, and
cf. *Soph. O. C.* 919 ff., καίτοι σε Θῆβαί
γ' οὐκ ἐπαίδευσαν κακόν· | οὐ γὰρ φιλοῦ-
σιν ἄνδρας ἐκδίκους τρέφειν. In Thebes,
before and during the Peloponnesian
war, there was a moderate oligarchy
(ὀλιγαρχία ἰσόνομος, different from the
δυναστεία ὀλίγων of the time of the
Persian wars) in political sympathy
with Sparta. Megara also had an
oligarchical form of government, and
had been, since the battle of Coroneia
(447 B.C.), on the Spartan side.

8. τούτων: referring either to the
cities (instead of ἐν τούτοις) or to
their inhabitants. Cf. *Hom. Od.*
xxiii. 319, ἦδ' ὡς Τηλέπυλον Δαιστρυ-
γονίην ἀφίκοντο, | οἱ νῆας τ' ὄλεσαν καὶ
εὐκνήμιδας ἑταίρους.

9. ὑποβλέπονται: suggestive of the
Homeric ὑπόδρα ἰδῶν. "They will look
upon you with suspicion." The im-
plication of suspicion is conveyed by
the ὑπό in ὑφορᾶν, ὑποψία, as in *Xen.*
An. ii. 4. 10, οἱ δὲ Ἕλληγνες ὑφορῶν-
τες τούτους αὐτοὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἐχώρου
ἡγεμόνας ἐχοντες.

10 νοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν 53
 ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὅστις γὰρ νόμων c
 διαφθορεὺς ἔστι, σφόδρα που δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοή-
 των ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τὰς
 15 τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτά-
 τους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἄρα ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται; ἢ
 πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος—
 τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ οὔσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ
 καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ
 νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἶει ἄσχημον ἂν φανεῖσθαι
 20 τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἶεσθαί γε χρή. ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν d
 τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἤξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ
 τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία
 καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἠδέως σου ἀκούοιεν ὡς γελοῖως
 25 μενος, ἢ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἢ ἄλλα οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευά-

53
 b 10. καὶ βεβαιώσεις κτέ.: δόξα and
 δοκεῖν in the same sense, as in 44 c.
 "Indicibus opinionem confir-
 mabis ut recte videantur tu-
 lisse sententiā." Wolf.

c 17. ἢ: see App.

19. ἂν φανεῖσθαι: see on οὐκ ἂν
 ποιήσοντος, *Apol.* 30 b.

20. τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα: little
 more than a periphrasis for Σωκράτης.
Cf. τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα, *Apol.* 20 c; *Hipp.*
Ma. 286 e, φαῦλον γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐμὸν
 πρᾶγμα καὶ ἰδιωτικόν, *I should be a*
wretched ignoramus. Eur. *Heracl.* 57 f.,
 οὐ γὰρ τις ἔστιν δὲ πάροισ' αἰρήσεται |
 τὴν σὴν ἀχρεῖον δύνάμιν ἀντ' Εὐ-
 d ρυσθέως. — οἶεσθαί γε χρή: a very com-
 mon way of answering one's own ques-
 tion. *Cf.* 54 b.

22. ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ κτέ.: Socrates
 speaks as if the fact were familiar
 to Crito. The nobles of Thessaly

were rich and hospitable, and bore
 the reputation of being violent and
 licentious. Some light is thrown upon
 the whole subject by the character of
 Meno given by Xenophon, *An.* ii. 6.
 21 ff. *Cf.* also Dem. i. 22, τὰ τῶν Θεττα-
 λῶν ἕπιστα ἦν δῆπον φύσει καὶ ἀεὶ πᾶσιν
 ἀνθρώποις. This chiefly relates to their
 political character. *Cf.* also the ironi-
 cal words of Socrates on the Thessa-
 lians in Plato's *Meno*, 70 a b.

24. σκευὴν τέ τινα κτέ.: to this
 first clause the disjunctive ἢ διφθέραν
 ἢ ἄλλα is subordinated. The διφθέ-
 ρα was, according to the Schol. on
Ar. Nub. 73, a ποιμενικὸν περιβόλαιον.
 σκευὴ and ἐνσκευάζεσθαι refer to change
 of costume, and are also used of the
 costumes of actors. *Cf.* *Ar. Achar.*
 383 f., where Dicaeopolis, before be-
 ginning his defence, says: νῦν οὖν με
 πρῶτον πρὶν λέγειν ἐάσατε ἐνσκευάσα-

53
 d

ζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαντοῦ 53
 μεταλλάξας· ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνὴρ, σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίω
 λοιποῦ ὄντος ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἐτόλμησας οὕτως αἰσχροῦς ἐπι- e
 θυμῶν ζῆν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβάς, οὐδεὶς ὃς ἐρεῖ;
 30 ἴσως, ἂν μὴ τινα λυτῆς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀκούσει, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαντοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάν-
 τας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων· τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐχούμενος ἐν
 Θετταλία, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκῶς εἰς Θετταλίαν;
 λόγοι δὲ ἐκείνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς
 35 ποῦ ἡμῶν ἔσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα βούλει 54
 ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί δέ; εἰς Θετ-
 ταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους
 ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ,

53
 d
 σθαί μ' οἶον ἀθλιώτατον. Cf. also *ibid.* 436. σχῆμα, on the other hand, relates to the other disguises of face and figure necessary to complete the transformation.

28. ὡς τὸ εἰκός: that is according e to the law of nature. — ἐτόλμησας: see on τόλμησ, *Apol.* 38 d, and App.

29. οὐδεὶς ὃς: will there be nobody to say this? i.e. "absolutely every one," expressed interrogatively. Here, as in many common idioms, the verb "to be" is omitted.

30. εἰ δὲ μὴ: otherwise. See GMT. 478; H. 906, 6. — ἀκούσει . . . ἀνάξια: like ἀκούειν κακά (ὅπῃ τινος) is the passive of λέγειν κακά. Cf. 50 e. The καί between πολλά and ἀνάξια should not be translated.

31. δῆ: accordingly. He must make up his mind to it, he has no choice.

32. καὶ δουλεύων: better understood absolutely than with an implied dat. Here we have a blunt statement of the fact which Socrates had in mind in saying ὑπερχόμενος. — τί ποιῶν ἢ κτέ.: the partic. goes with the verb

of the foregoing clause. This cannot 53
 e be reproduced in Eng., "in fact how can you live there except in one continual round of revelry, as if you had come to Thessaly to eat and drink." No ἄλλο is needed after τί.

35. ἀλλὰ δῆ: a new objection raised and answered by the laws themselves in respect of what Crito said, 45 e-46 a. — ἀλλά: relates to the preceding thought: of course these sayings are nowhere, "but are you actually willing?" etc. See on *Apol.* 37 c. 54
 a

38. ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο κτέ.: i.e. in addition to all other obligations. ἀπολαύειν is often used, as here, ironically. How a Greek looked upon exile is plain from passages like Eur. *El.* 1311 ff., οὐχ ἦδ' | οἰκτρὰ. ΔΙ. πέπονθεν, πλὴν ὅτι λείπει πόλιν Ἀργείων. ΟΡ. καὶ τινες ἄλλαι στοναχαὶ μείζους | ἢ γῆς πατρῶας ὄρον ἐκλείπειν; and *Phoen.* 388 ff., where Polynices, answering Iocasta's question, τί τὸ στέρεσθαι πατρίδος; ἢ κακὸν μέγα; says μέγιστον· ἔργῳ δ' ἐστὶ μείζον ἢ λόγῳ. Cf. *Richard II.* i. 3, —

αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ 54
 40 παιδεύονται, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι
 οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον ἔαν εἰς Θετταλίαν
 ἀποδημήσης ἐπιμελήσονται, ἔαν δὲ εἰς Ἄιδου ἀποδημή-
 σης οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἴπερ γέ τι ὄφελος αὐτῶν ἐστι
 τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι, οἴεσθαί γε χρῆ. b

XVI. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς
 τροφεύσι μήτε παιδᾶς περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν
 μήτε ἄλλο μῆδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἄιδου ἔλθων
 ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν.
 5 οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον
 εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὀσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλω τῶν σῶν
 οὐδενί, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένω ἄμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν
 μὲν ἡδικοκῆμένος ἄπει, ἔαν ἀπίης, οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων
 ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων· ἔαν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχυρῶς ἀντα- c
 10 δικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας
 τε καὶ ξυνηθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἔργα-

54
 a What is my sentence then but speechless
 death,
 Which robs my tongue from breathing na-
 tive breath?

and Dante, *Paradiso*, xvii., —

Thou shalt abandon everything beloved
 Most tenderly, and this the arrow is
 Which first the bow of banishment shoots
 forth.

Cf. also many well-known passages in
 the *Odyssey*, e.g. *Od.* i. 58, *ἰέμενος καὶ*
καπνὸν ἀποθράσκοντα νοῆσαι ἧς γαίης,
 ix. 27 f., *οὐ τοι ἐγὼ γε | ἧς γαίης δύνα-*
μα γλυκερώτερον ἄλλο ἰδέσθαι, xx. 99.

39. *θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύονται*: see
 on ἐνέξεσθαι, 52 a.

44. *τῶν . . . εἶναι*: explanation of
 αὐτῶν. σοὶ is not to be connected
 b with φασκόντων. — οἴεσθαί γε χρῆ: *cf.*
 53 c.

XVI. 3. *πρό*: after *περὶ πλείονος*. 54
 See on *πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν*, 48 d. b

5. *ἄμεινον . . . δικαιότερον*: see on
ἄμεινον, *Apol.* 19 a.

6. *οὐδὲ ἄλλω τῶν σῶν*: the laws add
 this for Crito's benefit. *Cf.* 45 c-46 a.

7. *νῦν μὲν*: assuming that Socrates
 has made up his mind not to take
 Crito's advice.

8. *οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν κτέ.*: the laws add
 this in the vein of what has gone
 before.

9. *ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων*: referring to the c
 fallible mortals who act as guardians
 and representatives of the blameless
 laws. See *Intro.* 30-35. *Cf.* *Apol.*
 24 d, *ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ*
τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους.

11. *παραβὰς, ἐργασάμενος*: subor-
 dinated to the foregoing parties.

σάμενος τούτους οὐς ἤκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ φίλους 54
καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ζῶντι,
καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν Ἄιδου νόμοι οὐκ εὐμε-
15 νῶς σε ὑποδέχονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπο-
λέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μὴ σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ
λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς. d

XVII. Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων, εἰ ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ
δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦ-
σιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἡχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων
βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλὰ
5 ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐὰν λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα,
μάτην ἐρέεις. ὅμως μέντοι εἴ τι οἶει πλεον ποιήσῃς, λέγε.

ΚΡ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

54
c 14. οἱ ἐν Ἄιδου νόμοι: cf. Soph. Ant.
450 ff., οὐ γὰρ τί μοι Ζεὺς ἦν ὁ κηρύξας
τάδε, | οὐδ' ἡ ξύννοικος τῶν κάτω θεῶν
Δίκη κτέ.

d XVII. 1. ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων:
Socrates speaks with great tender-
ness in order to make his final re-
fusal the less hard to bear. The
exceptional feature in this form of
address lies in the mention of Crito's
name at the end.

2. οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες: κορυβαντιῶν
means *act like the Corybantes*. These
were priests of Phrygian Cybele,
whose orgiastic rites were accompa-
nied by dances and deafening music.
Here a species of madness seems to
be indicated, under the influence of
which men imagined that they heard
the flutes that were used in Coryban-
tian revels. Cf. *Ion*, 534 a, ὥσπερ οἱ
κορυβαντιῶντες οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες ὀρ-
χοῦνται, οὕτω καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οὐκ ἔμ-
φρονες ὄντες τὰ κατὰ μέλη ταῦτα ποιού-
σιν, and the song of the bacchantes in
Eur. Bacch. 114-129 and 155-161, —

Soon shall the country rejoice in the dance;
Soon with his revellers Bacchus advance;
Into the hills, the hills shall he fare,
Joining the host of his women-folk there.
Far from their homes and their weaving
they came,

Goaded by Bacchus and stung by his name.

O wild Curetes' vaulted lair!

O hallowed haunts of Crete!

Where new-born Zeus found faithful care,
And kind protection meet

In caverns safe from every snare.

Corybantes, wearing helmets three-rimmed,
Stretched skins to make my drum's full
round;

Then they, in hollowed caves, lithe-limbed,
With drums, and, with the flute's shrill
sound

Full Phrygian, bacchic ditties hymned.

Sing Dionysus, and praised let him be;
Beat ye the deep-sounding drums as of old;
Sing to the Evian god evoc!

Greet him with Phrygian cries, and let flutes
Trill in your revels and ripple shrill joy;
Instruments holy the holy employ.

5. ὅσα γε κτέ.: a limitation added
to soften the assertion. See on ὅσα
γε τὰνθρώπεια, 46 e. No obj. is needed
with λέγῃς. λέγειν παρὰ κτέ. comes

54
d

ΣΩ. Ἔα τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτη, ἐπει-⁵⁴
δὴ ταύτη ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται. ^e

⁵⁴
^d very near the meaning of ἀντιλέγειν. Cf. 48 d. Cf. also the omission of the obj. ἐμέ with the preceding ποιῶ μὴ δύνασθαι κτέ.

^e 8. ἔα: used abs. with a following subjv. or inv. to dismiss a matter under discussion. Cf. *Charm.* 163 e, ἔα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· μὴ γάρ πω τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν σκοπῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὃ σὺ λέγεις νῦν. *Euthyd.* 302 c, ἔα, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, εὐφήμει τε καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς με προδίδασκε.—ταύτη: the repetition of the same word is effective.

9. ὁ θεός: see on τῷ θεῷ, *Apol.* 19 a. Here, as at the end of his de-

fence proper, *Apol.* 35 d, and at the end of his closing words in court, *Apol.* 42 a, Socrates mentions ὁ θεός. Dante closes each one of the three parts of his great poem with a reference to *the stars*. This is no accident in either case, though Plato had a philosopher's reason which Dante could not give, except for the closing line of the *Paradiso*, which is ὁ θεός translated into the language of the poet, "L' Amor che muove il Sole e l' altre stelle," *The love which moves the sun and the other stars*.

MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.

SINCE all the extant Mss. of Plato follow or attempt to follow Thrasyllus in his subdivision into nine tetralogies or groups consisting of four members each, and since Thrasyllus was instructor to the emperor Tiberius, it follows that the origin of no Ms. of Plato now known to exist can be assigned to a date much earlier than the middle of the first century A.D. The following is a table exhibiting Thrasyllus's tetralogies, and also naming the best Ms. in which each tetralogy is preserved :—

| | | | | | |
|-------|----------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------|
| I. | Euthyphro. | Apology. | Crito. | Phaedo. | <i>Clarkianus</i> (B). |
| II. | Cratylus. | Theaetetus. | Sophist. | Statesman. | “ “ |
| III. | Parmenides. | Philebus. | Symposium. | Phaedrus. | “ “ |
| IV. | Alcibiades I. | Alcibiades II. | Hipparchus. | Anterastae. | “ “ |
| V. | Theages. | Charmides. | Laches. | Lysis. | “ “ |
| VI. | Euthydemus. | Protagoras. | Gorgias. | Meno. | “ “ |
| VII. | Hippias maior. | Hippias minor. | Io. | Menexenus. | <i>Venetus</i> T. |
| VIII. | Clitophon. | Republic. | Timaeus. | Critias. | <i>Parisinus</i> A. |
| IX. | Minos. | Laws. | Epinomis. | Letters. | “ “ |

Of the three Mss., the most trustworthy is *Clarkianus*, and the least trustworthy is *Venetus* T. Schanz constructs the pedigree of the existing Mss. of Plato, and traces them all to an original or Archetypus. This parent Ms. consisted of two volumes: Vol. I. contained the first seven tetralogies; Vol. II. contained the last two tetralogies, together with a number of works attributed with more or less confidence to Plato. The copies made of Vol. I. were of two kinds, (1) incomplete, omitting the seventh tetralogy, and (2) complete. The best Ms. now preserved represents an *incomplete* copy of Vol. I. of the Archetypus; this is the codex *Clarkianus*, the capital authority for the first six tetralogies. The complete copy of Vol. I. is represented by the much less trustworthy codex *Venetus* T, the best authority for the seventh tetralogy.

The best representative of Vol. II. of the Archetypus is codex *Parisinus* A.

The leading facts about these three Mss. are as follows:—

I. **CODEX CLARKIANUS**, referred to by the single letter B for brevity's sake and because the Ms. is called also *Bodleianus*. It is now in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and is "the fairest specimen of Grecian caligraphy which has descended to modern times." Daniel Clarke found this Ms., in October, 1801, in the library of a monastery on the island of Patmos. It was beautifully written on parchment, in the year 896 A.D., by a skilful scribe, one Joannes, for the use of Arethas, who afterwards became archbishop of Caesarea. See M. Schanz, *Novae Commentationes Platonicae*, pp. 105–118; and Daniel Clarke, *Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa*.

II. **CODEX VENETUS T**, Bekker's t. This Ms. is now in the Library of St. Mark's in Venice, and is chiefly valuable where the *Clarkianus* entirely fails, *i.e.* for the seventh tetralogy. For a more detailed account, see M. Schanz, *Ueber den Platocodex der Marcus-Bibliothek in Venedig*; also the preface to Vol. IX. of the same author's critical edition of Plato's works. The date of this Ms. is very uncertain.

III. **PARISINUS A**, No. 1807 (formerly 94 and 2087). This Ms. is now in the National Library at Paris; it was probably written early in the tenth century after Christ. It comprises the eighth and ninth tetralogies of Thrasyllus, together with seven spurious dialogues. The Clitophon, with which it begins, is numbered twenty-nine. See M. Schanz, *Studien zur Geschichte des Platonischen Textes*, and the general introduction to his critical edition of Plato's works. There are many other Mss. of Plato, for some account of which also see Schanz in his general introduction, and in Bursian's *Jahresbericht* (9, 5, 1, pp. 178–188), where he summarizes his results and defends them against Jordan and Wohlrab.

IMPORTANT EDITIONS OF PLATO'S COMPLETE WORKS.

PLATONIS OPERA QUAE EXTANT OMNIA. Ex nova Joannis Serrani interpretatione, perpetuis ejusdem notis illustrata. Henrici Stephani de quorundam locorum interpretatione judicium, et multorum contextus graece emendatio. — Excudebat *Henricus Stephanus*. M.D.LXXVIII. 3 vol. in fol.

In all modern editions of Plato, numbers and letters which refer to the pages of the edition of *Stephanus* are found in the margin. This is the most convenient mode of reference, and is now universally employed to the exclusion of the less well-established subdivision into chapters. The edition of *Stephanus* (*Henri Estienne*) is in three volumes, but to give the volume is superfluous, since the name of the dialogue is given in every reference. Each page is divided into five parts by the letters (a) b c d e placed down the margin.

PLATONIS DIALOGI. (Gr. et Lat.) Ex recensione *Imm. Bekker*. 3 Partes. in 8 Voll. Commentaria crit. et scholia. 2 Voll. Berolini, 1816-1823. (This edition contains the first systematic collation of Mss., and the result is a great improvement upon the Stephanus text.)

PLATONIS DIALOGI. Text. ad fidem codd. Florent., Paris., Vindobb. aliorumque recogn. *Gdfr. Stallbaum*. 12 Tom. Lipsiae, 1821-1825.

PLATONIS OPERA OMNIA. Rec. prolegomenis et comment. illustr. *Gdfr. Stallbaum*. 10 Voll. Lipsiae, 1827-1877. (In the Bibliotheca Graeca of Jacobs and Rost.)

PLATONIS OPERA QUAE FERUNTUR OMNIA. Recogn. *I. G. Baiterus*, *Ioa. C. Orellius*, *A. G. Winckelmannus*. Acced. variet. lectionis Stephanianae, Bekkerianae, Stallbaumianae, scholia, Timaei lexicon, nominum index. 2 Pts. Turici, 1839-1842.

PLATONIS DIALOGI secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi. Ex recognitione *Caroli Friderici Hermanni*. 6 Voll. Lipsiae (1851, 1853), 1873, 1874.

PLATONIS OPERA, QUAE FERUNTUR OMNIA, ad codd. denuo collatos, ed. *Martinus Schanz*. Ed. ster. Lipsiae, 1875-1877.

IMPORTANT OR CONVENIENT EDITIONS OF THE APOLOGY AND OF
THE CRITO.

PLATONIS DIALOGI V. Amatores, Euthyphro, Apologia, Crito, Phaedo. Recens. notisque illustravit *Nath. Forster*. Edit. III. Oxonii (1745), 1765.

PLATONIS DIALOGI IV. Euthyphro, Apologia, Crito, Phaedo. E rec. *Henr. Stephani*. Gr. Ad fid. codd. Mss. Tubing. August. aliorumque et librorum editorum veterum rec. animadvers. illustravit, tertium edid. *Ioa. Frid. Fischer*. Lipsiae, 1783.

PLATONIS DIALOGI IV. Meno, Crito, Alcibiades uterque cum annotatione critica et exegetica, cur. *I. Er. Biester*. Ed. V. Cur. *Ph. Buttmann*. Berolini (1780), 1830.

PLATONIS APOLOGIA, CRITO ET PHAEDO. Accedit emendationis specimen in nonnullis reliquorum dialogorum. Edidit *R. B. Hirschig*. Trajecti ad Rhen, 1853.

PLATONIS APOLOGIA SOCRATIS ET CRITO. Ed. V. aliquanto auct. et emendat. quam cur. *M. Wohlrab*. Lipsiae (1827), 1877. (This is Vol. I., Section 1, of *Teubner's* ten-volume publication of *Stallbaum's* complete Plato mentioned above.)

The APOLÓGY OF PLATO, with a revised text and English notes, and a digest of Platonic idioms. By the *Rev. James Riddell*, M.A. Oxford, 1867.

PLATO'S APOLOGY AND CRITO, with notes. By *W. S. Tyler*. New York, 1860.

PLATO'S APOLOGY OF SOCRATES AND CRITO, with notes. By *W. Wagner*. Cambridge, England, 1869. (Boston, 1877.)

PLATONS VERTEIDIGUNGSREDE DES SOCRATES UND KRITON. Erklärt von *Dr. Christian Cron*. Achte Auflage. Leipzig, 1882. (This edition is the basis of the present work, and is the first part of an edition of the selected works of Plato, edited for the use of schools by *Dr. Cron* and *Dr. Julius Deuschle*.)

CRITICAL NOTES.

THESE notes are Dr. Cron's necessary explanation of the text which he has adopted. Where departures have been made from Dr. Cron's text, they are in turn discussed. The first reading is the one adopted in this edition. B denotes Codex Clarkianus (= Bodleianus). T denotes Codex Venetus T. S denotes the reading adopted by Schanz, W that adopted by Wohlrab. *Bem.* denotes Dr. Cron's "Kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen zu Platons Apologie, Criton, und Laches. Separat Abdr. aus dem fünften Supplement-band der Jahrb. für classische Philologie," pp. 64-132. Leipzig, 1864. Teubner.

APOLOGY.

17 a, p. 55 (1). ὄτι: with S. Cron writes ὄτι, following the analogy of ὄστις, ἦτις, but ὄτι is unquestionably needed for clearness.

17 b, p. 56 (13). γούν: with inferior Ms. and B (second hand). οὖν, B (first hand) and Cron following S.

17 b, p. 56 (14). δέ μου: δ' ἐμοῦ, SW with Heindorf.

17 c, p. 57 (17). ἀλλ': with Bessarion's Ms. (Venetus E). ἀλλὰ, Cron and S following B.

17 c, p. 57 (18). ὀνόμασι: with B. ὀνόμασιν, Cron and S with Bessarion's Ms. and Venetus 185 (Bekker's Π).

17 d, p. 58 (27). πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα: Cron with S following B omits the πλείω, which is found only in inferior Mss. Hermann adopted πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα.

18 a, p. 59 (31). ὡς γέ μοι: with S. ὡς γ' ἐμοί, W.

18 a, p. 59 (2). ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα: [ψευδῆ] κατηγορημένα, S with Hirschig.

18 a, p. 59 (4). γεγόνασι: with the best Mss. γεγόνασιν, Cron following S. There are marks of correction in B and other Mss., but no Ms. cited by S reads γεγόνασιν.

18 b, p. 60 (9). ἐμοῦ: the Mss. read ἐμοῦ μάλλον οὐδέν ἀληθές. Hermann bracketed μάλλον . . . ἀληθές as a gloss, while the Zürich edition lets the words stand. S writes ἐμοῦ μὰ τὸν . . . οὐδέν ἀληθές. Bekker and Stallbaum, following Mss. of slight value, read ἐμοῦ οὐδέν ἀληθές. The suggestion of Schanz is the best unless these words are simply to be cut out. Riddell says "the rhythm would be intolerable without the three words μάλλον οὐδέν ἀληθές."

18 b, p. 60 (10). φροντιστής: Albert von Bamberg (Fleckesisen's Jahrbücher,

113, 10) proposes to cut out **φροντιστής**, because no exact parallel to this acc. of the dir. obj. has been found in prose. So far he is right, even against Krüger's citation of various adjs. joined with **εἶναι**, for such combinations are very closely akin to verbal forms. On the other hand, to make such a point of the distinction between the indir. (or remoter) obj. which Bamberg would allow, and the dir. obj. which he proposes to disallow, is to ignore the difference in this particular between Greek and Latin syntax. In the shifting of voice from act. to pass., for instance, the distinction between dir. and indir. obj. is far less scrupulously defined in Greek than in Latin. To be sure Xenophon twice uses the gen. with **φροντιστής** (*cf. Symp.* 6. 6, **τῶν μετεώρων φροντιστής** and *Mem.* iv. 7. 6, **τῶν οὐρανίων φροντιστής**). It should be remembered that consistency may be too much insisted upon. Furthermore **ἅπαξ εἰρημένα** are not surprising in a speech, which, like the Apology, aims to give Socrates's personal hobbies in language as in thought.

18 c, p. 61 (12). **οἱ ταύτην**: Heindorf. **ταύτην**, W following the Mss.

18 c, p. 61 (13). **ἀκούοντες**: **ἀκούσαντες**, S following B (first hand).

18 d, p. 62 (20). **εἴ τις**: **εἰ μή τις**, W. See his prolegg., p. 42.

18 d, p. 62 (21). **κωμφοδιοῖός**: with S following B. Elsewhere **κωμφοδιοῖός** (**τραγφοδιοῖός**) is found in the best Mss.

18 d, p. 63 (23). **πάντες**: **πάντων**, W. See his prolegg., p. 42.

18 e, p. 63 (32). Uhlig quotes (Rhein. Mus. 19, 1, and Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 121, 10) the authority of several grammarians to prove that the exclamation **εἶεν** has no connexion with **εἶναι**. He maintains that it is and always was an interjection, and that there was originally an aspirate at the beginning of the second syllable, like **εἰσὺ**, **εὐάν** (bacchic interjections), and the Attic **ταῶς**.

19 c, p. 65 (13). **σοφός ἐστι· μή φύγοιμι**: with Riddell. **σοφός ἐστι, μή φύγοιμι**, Cron.

19 d, p. 66 (19). **μικρόν**: with Cron and S following B. **σμικρόν**, inferior Mss. Judging from other cases, *cf.* below (28 b) and in the Crito (46 a), **σμικρόν** and **μικρόν** have about equal claims in any given place.

19 d, p. 66 (1). **οὐδέν ἐστιν**: with S. **οὐδέν [ἐστιν]**, Cron. **οὐδέν ἐστιν**, W.

19 e, p. 67 (7). **οἶός τ' ἐστιν**: [**οἶός τ' ἐστιν**], S.

19 e, p. 67 (9). **πείθουσι**: **πείθουσιν**, S.

20 a, p. 67 (10). **σφίσι**: with B (second hand) and other Mss. **σφίσιν**, Cron following S with B (first hand).

20 a, p. 67 (17). **καλῶ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ**: following B with S W. Venetus T reads **καλῶ κάγαθῶ**. In his preface to Vol. II., Schanz very emphatically rejects the reading of B and defends T, but he has not the courage of his convictions, and finally retains the reading of B.

20 c, p. 68 (26). **ἔχει**: B. **ἔχει**, S W.

20 c, p. 69 (5). **εἰ μή τι . . . πολλοί**: [**εἰ μή τι . . . πολλοί**], S and Cobet. Bobrik (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 113, 5) argues against bracketing the words, "that the meaning of **περιττόν** is quantitative while that of **ἀλλοῖον** is qualitative." S (Bursian's Jahresbericht, 9, 5, 1, p. 188) is not convinced.

20 d, p. 69 (8). ἔστι: ἔστιν, S W — “ἔστι(ν erasa) B D,” S.

20 d, p. 69 (8). πεποίηκε: πεποίηκεν, S W.

20 e, p. 70 (18). μηδ' ἄν: with Heusde (Spec. crit. p. 11). μηδέ ἄν, Cron following S with B.

20 e, p. 70 (20). τὸν λέγοντα: τὰ λεχθέντα, Liebhöhd.

20 e, p. 71 (21). ἔστι: ἔστιν, S W.

21 a, p. 71 (23). ἐταῖρός τε καί: [ἐταῖρός τε καί], S with Ludwig. Müller-Strübing gives at too great length (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 121, 2) his too ingenious account of Ar. *Clouds*, 1072 ff.; but in a note (pp. 90, 91) he very acutely suggests that Σφήττιος was a nickname bestowed by Aristophanes in the *Clouds* upon Chaerephon, “πικροὶ γὰρ οἱ Σφήττιοι καὶ συκοφάνται,” Schol. on Ar. *Plut.* 720. Cf. *Laches*, 197 c, *fin.*, with Stallbaum's note.

21 c, p. 73 (11). σοφώτερός ἐστι: with S W. But the reading of B, as Gaisford specifically says, is ἔστι.

21 c, p. 73 (14). καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ: [καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ], S. Wex includes these words in the parenthesis and connects them with πρὸς ὃν κτέ.

21 d, p. 74 (23). ἔοικά γ' οὖν: with Bäumlein. ἔοικα γούν, S W.

21 e, p. 74 (2). καὶ λυπούμενος: [καὶ] λυπούμενος, S with Cobet.

22 a, p. 76 (11). ἴνα μοι: ἴνα μή μοι, S with H. Stephanus, and Madvig. The latter (Adv. Crit. I. p. 367) says “Sed residet scrupulus in καί, quod aptum non est.”

22 b, p. 77 (17). μάλιστα: Schanz (Philol. 28, 3, p. 556) suggests κάλλιστα without venturing to introduce it into the text. With this use of μάλιστα might be compared Hor. *Sat.* i. 10, 58, Versiculos magis factos et euntes mollius.

22 c, p. 78 (29). τῷ αὐτῷ: τῷ αὐτῷ αὐτῶν, S with Bekker following inferior Mss. See, however, Heindorf's Annotatio critica in Apologiam Socratis, p. IX. Berolini MDCCCV.

22 d, p. 78 (7). καὶ . . . δημιουργοί: [καὶ . . . δημιουργοί], S with Hirschig.

23 a, p. 80 (9). τοῦτο: with Stallbaum following inferior Mss. τοῦτ' οὐ, S W with F. A. Wolf. The reading of B and all the best Mss. is τοῦτον, which Ast defends (Zeitschrift für Wissenschaft und Kunst, Vol. I. part 2, p. 104). See *Bem.* p. 90 f.

23 c, p. 82 (8). οὐχ αὐτοῖς: οὐκ αὐτοῖς, W following inferior Mss. with H. Stephanus and Engelhardt, who refers αὐτοῖς, of course, to the young. But it is by no means natural that men who are found out should not be angry with their discoverers. Their natural anger is, however, turned against Socrates, the real instigator of their discomfiture. Socrates is not saying that they should not be angry with him, but rather urges that they should be angry with themselves, *i.e.* with their own conceit of knowledge. This is the meaning demanded by the context, see d below, *ad fin.* Further, τοῦτους would give the sense required by W far more clearly than αὐτοῖς.

23 d, p. 82 (11). ἀγνοοῦσιν: ἀμφιγνοοῦσιν, S. ἀποροῦσιν, Ast. Cobet ex-

punges the words ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν. There is, however, no sound objection either to the way in which the words are introduced or to the words themselves.

23 c, p. 83 (15). οἶμαι: with Stallbaum. οἴομαι, Cron following S and all good Mss. In this chapter B has οἶμαι twice, see lines 5 and 17. It looks like superstition to write οἴομαι here.

23 e, p. 83 (17). ξυντεταμένως: ξυντεταμένως, S with Hermann following Bessarion's Ms.

23 e, p. 83 (22). καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν: [καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν], S with Cobet.

24 a, p. 84 (30). ἔστι: Cron and S write ἔστιν because there are traces of erasure in B.

24 b, p. 84 (5). ὡσπερ: ὡς, Rieckher.

24 d, p. 86 (5). τουτουσι: εἰς τουτουσι, S with Cobet. See Kr. Spr. 48, 11, 4.

24 e, p. 86 (14). ποιούσι: Cron following S writes ποιούσιν because of traces of erasure in B; similar traces after εἰσι in this line do not lead them to write εἰσιν.

25 a, p. 87 (19). οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί: [οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί], S with Hirschig and Cobet. See Bem. p. 93.

25 c, p. 88 (1). πότερόν ἐστιν: with the Mss. πότερον ἔστιν, S W.

25 c, p. 88 (3). ὦ πάν: with S, who deviates but little from ὦ τᾶν, the reading of B. ὦταν, Cron. W reads ὦ τᾶν. Krause explains it as meaning ὦ Ζεῦ

25 d, p. 89 (7). ἀποκρίνου: ἀπόκριναι, W.

25 e, p. 89 (19). ἦ, εἰ διαφθέρω, ἄκων: ἦ διαφθέρω ἄκων, S with Stephanus Naber reads ἦ, εἰ διαφθέρω, διαφθέρω ἄκων.

26 a, p. 89 (21). καὶ ἀκουσίων: bracketed as a gloss by S with Cobet.

26 a, p. 90 (24). δ: οὐ, S. Heindorf reads δ . . . ποιῶ, ποιῶν.

26 a, p. 90 (1). δηλον: with Cron's seventh edition following B. δηλον ἦδη ἔστιν, Cron's eighth edition with Schanz, who, however, says of the two words (Novae Commentationes Platonicae, p. 163), "Verba minime necessaria velim deleantur."

26 c, p. 91 (10). τουτουσι: with B (second hand) and Vaticanus 1029 (Bekker's r). Cron following S writes τούτοις with Venetus 185 (Bekker's Π). τούτοις, B.

26 c, p. 91 (13). ἀλλ': with Bessarion's Ms. Cron following S writes ἀλλὰ with B and other Mss.

26 d, p. 92 (20). Ἀναξαγόρου: [Ἀναξαγόρου], S. Baiter requires Σωκράτους.

26 e, p. 93 (26). ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις: Birt (Das antike Buchwesen, Berlin, 1882, p. 434, Rem. 4) says, "The notion that these writings were themselves sold ἐν τῇ ὀρχήστρᾳ is not conveyed here, for, if so, why should ἐνίοτε have been used? In fact, καὶ δὴ καὶ appends to the βιβλία something else which is sold for a drachma and which, therefore, cannot have been the βιβλία."

26 e, p. 94 (28). σοι δοκῶ . . . νομίζειν: σοι [δοκῶ] . . . νομίζω, S who follows B in respect of νομίζω.

27 b, p. 95 (10). *ἐγώ σοι*: following B. *ἐγώ σοι*, S W with Heindorf. As the emphasis is wholly on *ἐγώ*, there seems to be no good reason for disregarding the reading of B.

27 e, p. 98 (30). [*ἦ*] *καὶ ὄνων, τοὺς ἡμίονους*: with S. *ἦ [καὶ] ὄνων [τοὺς ἡμίονους]*, Cron. A change of some kind is unavoidable; the least possible change is to bracket *ἦ* with Forster, who is followed by Heindorf and Cobet. This yields perfectly good sense, better, in fact, than Cron obtains by bracketing *καὶ* and *τοὺς ἡμίονους*.

27 e, p. 98 (32). [*ταῦτα*] . . . *τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην*: with S. *ταῦτα . . . [τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην]*, Cron. S and Cron agree that both expressions cannot stand. S is probably right in saying that not *τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην* but *ταῦτα* should be bracketed, as a gloss added to explain *ἀποπειρώμενος*.

27 e, p. 98 (35). [*οὐ*] *τοῦ αὐτοῦ: οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, S W. Wecklein says (Rhein. Mus. 36, 1, p. 145), "Any one who grasps the argument summarized at this point in the Apology ought to agree to the following completion of it: ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθεις . . . ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα [καὶ δαίμονας καὶ θεοὺς] ἡγείσθαι καὶ αὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ [μήτε δαιμόνια μήτε θεῖα] μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς, οὐδεμία μηχανὴ ἐστίν." Gobel, in the Programm of the Gymnasium at Fulda, first rejects all the interpretations made with a view to retaining *οὐ* before *τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, and then proceeds to defend it by arguing that *πείθεις* is used in an absolute sense, while the clause beginning with *ὡς* he takes as a causal parenthesis. The chief objection to this explanation is that it explains the whole sentence away, leaving it not a leg to stand on. It is better, therefore, to reject *οὐ* and to consider that *μήτε ἥρωας* was added along with the rest in Meletus's anxiety to make his charge of irreligion a sweeping one. A religious-minded Athenian certainly believed in gods and in heroes. The term *δαίμονες*, since the precise meaning of the word was hard to fix, might—so far as Meletus's immediate purpose went—have been omitted, but the preceding *δαιμόνια* make its introduction here indispensable. On Meletus's ascription to Socrates of belief in *δαιμόνια* is based Socrates's assertion that so far from being an atheist, he believes like any other Greek in gods and demi-gods, called *δαίμονες* or more commonly *ἥρωες*.

27 e, p. 98 (36). *αὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ: αὐ [τοῦ αὐτοῦ]*, S with Hirschig.

27 e, p. 98 (36). *μήτε ἥρωας*: bracketed as a gloss by S.

28 a, p. 98 (7). *καὶ ἄλλους: καλοὺς*, S with Hirschig.

28 b, p. 99 (15). *πράττη: πρᾶττη τι*, W following Mss.

28 c, p. 100 (21). *ὦ παῖ*: S omits these words which are added in the margin of B.

28 d, p. 100 (31). *τάξῃ ἦ*: with B and other best Mss. Cron following S writes *τάξῃ* with Bessarion's Ms., strengthened by various authors who quote *τάξῃ*, omitting the *ἦ*.

29 a, p. 103 (9). *δεινὸν τᾶν: δεινὸν τᾶν*, S W.

29 b, p. 104 (22). *ὀδικεῖν*: Otto Erdmann proposes (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 119, 5, p. 412) to substitute *ἀπιστεῖν*.

29 c, p. 105 (31). διαφθαρῆσονται: following B. διαφθαρῆσιντο, Hirschig following Bessarion's Ms.

29 d, p. 105 (36). ἄνδρες: following B. ὦ ἄνδρες, inferior Mss.

29 d, p. 106 (43). αἰσχύνει: B. αἰσχύνη, other Mss.

29 d, p. 106 (43). ἐπιμελούμενος: B. ἐπιμελόμενος, Bessarion's Ms.

30 a, p. 107 (54). ἐν τῇ πόλει: Heller prefers καὶ τῇ πόλει.

30 b, p. 107 (59). λέγων' οὐκ: λέγων, ὅτι οὐκ, W.

30 b, p. 108 (65). ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε: ἢ μὴ, ἀφίετε, Schlenger, in Philol. 41, 3, p. 532 f.

30 c, p. 109 (6). οἶον ἐγὼ λέγω: Wecklein (Rh. Mus. 33, 2, p. 307) requires οἶον ἂν ἐγὼ λέγω, because these words are to be closely connected with the detailed statement that follows, προσκείμενον . . . μύωπος, 30 e. But Socrates plainly has this thought in mind already, as is proved by his postponing its amplification until after another thought introduced with ἐμὲ μὲν γάρ has been developed. The point is that ἐμὲ μὲν γάρ κτέ is also in the closest connexion with the leading idea τοιοῦτον ὄντα.

30 d, p. 109 (11). ἀτιμώσειεν: with Hermänn. ἀτιμάσειεν, W following Mss.

30 e, p. 110 (19). [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ]: S with Hirschig. ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, Riddell.

30 e, p. 110 (21). ὑπὸ μύωπος τινος: unless ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ above is bracketed, this comes in very awkwardly.

30 e, p. 110 (21). οἶον is taken by Goebel as a neuter, and he does not connect ὅς with τοιοῦτόν τινα, but with ἐμέ. He does not urge that the other way is ungrammatical, but apparently he thinks that the sense is in favor of his explanation. His argument is hardly convincing.

31 a, p. 111 (29). διατελοῖτ' ἂν: διατελοῖτε ἂν, Cron following S with the best Mss.

31 a, p. 111 (30). ἐπιπέμψειε: with B and other Mss. Cron following S writes ἐπιπέμψειεν on the authority of Venetus 185 (Bekker's Π) and of an erasure in B.

31 b, p. 111 (37). μέντοι: μέν, S with Cobet and Hermann.

31 b, p. 111 (38). εἶχον: εἶχεν, S with Wex.

31 c, p. 112 (2). πολυπραγμονῶ: πολυπραγμονῶν, S following inferior Mss.

31 d, p. 113 (6). [φωνῆ]: bracketed by Forster, whom F. A. Wolf followed. φωνή, B. Cron omits the word.

31 d, p. 113 (12). παλαι: bracketed by S with Cobet.

32 a, p. 113 (18). ἀλλὰ: with S and Bessarion's Ms. ἀλλ', Cron.

32 a, p. 114 (5). ἅμα ἀπολομένη: with S, who now appeals to Venetus T. ἅμα καὶ ἅμα ἂν, Cron following B. S, previously to his collation of Venetus T, argued as follows: "Plato scripsit ἅμα, quo cum dittographia ἅμα ἂν conjuncta est; inde lectionum varietas nata; ἂν ex antecedentibus posse suppleri notum."

32 b, p. 115 (8). Ἄντιοχίς: bracketed by Hirschig and S. The preceding ἡμῶν certainly makes it plausible that Ἄντιοχίς may have been introduced as a marginal gloss. See *Bem.* p. 104.

32 b, p. 117 (12). ἡναντιώθη: ἡναντιώθην ἡμῖν, W. Döring (Fleckeisen's

Jahrb. 119, 1, p. 15) supposes that Horace had this passage (chap. xx.) in his mind when he wrote the third ode of the third book of his Odes.

32 b, p. 117 (13). [καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην]: Hermann brackets these words but W believes them to be genuine. If they are retained, it follows *either* (1) that Socrates was not (in spite of reasonable evidence that he was) the ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων, and therefore voted against the unlawful proposition when it came up in the assembly as any member might have done, or (2) that Socrates voted alone in a preliminary meeting of the prytanes against having the question put to the people in an unlawful form. (2) explains the context best. But when all is said and done, the whole wording is clumsy and repetitious, since ἡγαντιώθην would do quite as well alone, and the cumulative effect of καὶ is tiresome.

33 b, p. 120 (14). ἐρωτᾶν: Goebel prefers ἐρωτῶν.

33 b, p. 120 (19). ἄλλοι: following B. οἱ ἄλλοι, S W.

33 c, p. 123 (24). ὁ Θεοφροῦτου: with Bessarion's Ms. Θεοφροῦτου, Cron with S following B. Sauppe argues that the art. is not necessary here; it certainly is desirable.

34 a, p. 124 (32). τούτου: Goebel prefers τούτους.

34 c, p. 125 (3). ἀναμνησθéis: ἀναμνησθείς, Cron and S following B, where ἀναμνησθείς is read.

34 e, p. 125 (6). αὐτοῦ: B. αὐτοῦ, W. Heller argues in favor of τὰ αὐτοῦ. He is right in so far that the ordinary idiom would give us the art.; but after all the art. would be indispensable only if τὰ παῖδια (meaning *all* his children) had preceded.

34 d, p. 126 (14). εἰσὶν μὲν πού τινες: with S and Stallbaum. εἰσὶ μὲν πού τινες, Cron.

34 d, p. 126 (17). υἱéis: P. Foucart (Revue de Philologie, I. 35) bases upon Attic inscriptions the following remarks as to the orthography of this word: "une série d'exemples depuis le cinquième siècle jusqu'au deuxième avant notre ère montre que au moins en prose, les Athéniens employaient toujours la forme υἱός. . . . A partir de la conquête romaine, υἱός se rencontre dans les inscriptions attiques, ainsi que υἱός; la forme de la langue commune finit par l'emporter, et c'est la seule qu'emploient les copistes." The Attic form without υ is preserved only in Parisinus (A). See S, Vol. XII. pp. viii. and ix.

34 e, p. 127 (26). τῷ Σωκράτῃ: τῷ Σωκράτει, S W with Riddell. This dat. was preferred by Bernhardt. Nevertheless, the analogy of προσήκειν and ἀρέσκειν does not bear unqualified application to δεδόχθαι. The reading

of B is τῷ^η σωκράτει, which suggests that the interlinear correction may be the right reading. If the dat. be adopted here, then appeal would have to be made to Hdt. iv. 59, δέδοκται τοῖσι πρώτοισι τῶν μαντιῶν αὐτοῖσι ἀπόλλυσθαι.

35 b, p. 128 (38). ἡμᾶς: B. ἡμᾶς, S W.

35 d, p. 129 (11). [πάντως]: with S W. Stallbaum brackets νῆ Δία πάντως. πάντως, Cron following B.

36 a, p. 131 (4). τὸ γεγονός τοῦτο: [τὸ γεγονός] τοῦτο, S with Cobet, who, indeed, rejects these three words because he thinks they have come into the text from the margin. There is certainly room for doubt.

36 a, p. 131 (7). ἀποπεφεύγη: S argues for ἀπεπεφεύγη in Vol. XII. p. xiii.

36 c, p. 133 (9). ἴοντα: with S W following E. ὄντα, Cron following B. Cron defends ὄντα in his *Bem.* p. 109 f. The example quoted from Tac. *Ann.* vi. 22 (where see Nipperdey's note) is not convincing.

36 c, p. 133 (11). [ἰών]: with S W. ἰών, Cron. S says (*Studien*, p. 35) of the whole passage: "Hermann was for doing away with ἐνταῦθα ἦα. But certainly δέ requires a finite verb. Simply bracket ἰών and the whole difficulty is solved. The word was apparently added by an interpolator who construed ἐνταῦθα ἦα closely with ἐπιχειρῶν, after the analogy of *Phaedo* 200 b, ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδειξασθαι. Of course ἐνταῦθα makes any such explanation absurd."

36 d, p. 134 (22). μάλλον: Liebhold proposes, not to bracket μάλλον, but to change it into γε ἄλλο.

36 d, p. 134 (25). δοκεῖν εἶναι: δοκεῖν [εἶναι], S with Hermann.

37 b, p. 136 (16). τοῦτου: τοῦ, S W with Meiser.

37 c, p. 136 (18). τοῖς ἑνδεκα: [τοῖς ἑνδεκα], S with Heindorf.

37 c, p. 136 (22). μεντᾶν: μέντ' ᾶν, W.

37 e, p. 137 (4). ἔστλ: Cron following S writes ἐστλν because of signs of erasure in B.

37 e, p. 137 (5). τοῦτ': with Bessarion's Ms. Cron following S writes τοῦτο with B.

38 a, p. 138 (12). ῥῥῥδιον: ῥῥῥδια, W. See Wohlrab's prolegomena, p. 39.

39 b, p. 141 (34). ὀφλών: Cobet and S, Vol. V. p. x. ὄφλων, W following B T. See Wohlrab in *Fleckeisen's Jahrb.* 1876, p. 127.

39 b, p. 141 (36). μέν που: Heller proposes μέν οὖν, which is added by a later (second) hand in the margin of B and is also the reading of some inferior Mss., which, however, also retain που.

39 c, p. 142 (7). εἰργάσασθε οἰόμενοι: εἰργάσασθέ με οἰόμενοι, S with Winckelmann. εἰργασθε οἰόμενοι, W. Hermann added μέν after οἰόμενοι on the strength of signs of erasure in B, which were also detected by S.

39 d, p. 143 (14). οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ': following B according to Gaisford. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ', S and W, who neither of them make any mention of Gaisford's report on the reading of B.

40 a, p. 144 (10). ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου: [ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου], S with Schleiermacher.

40 c, p. 145 (5). τοῦ τόπου τοῦ: bracketed as a gloss by S with Hirschig.

41 a, p. 147 (29). θέλω: with Bessarion's Ms. Cron following S writes θέλω with the best Mss. Here, and *Phaedr.* 249 b, we have the only two clear cases where the best Mss. credit Plato with using θέλω after a word ending in a consonant.

41 a, p. 147 (30). ταῦτά ἐστιν: following S with Bessarion's Ms. ταῦτ' ἐστλν, Cron with best Mss.

41 b, p. 147 (33). *τέθνηκεν. αντιπαραβάλλοντι: τέθνηκεν, αντιπαραβάλλοντι, S.*

41 b, p. 148 (34). *έκείνων, ώς: έκείνων. ώς, S.*

41 b, p. 148 (35). *αηδής: B. αηδης, W with several Mss.*

41 b, p. 148 (36). *τίς αὐτῶν: with W. The best Mss. read τίς αὐτῶν. τίς δὴ αὐτῶν, Cron with S, who adds the δὴ as his own conjecture.*

41 b, p. 148 (37). *ἔστι: with Mss. ἔστιν, Cron and S, because there are signs of erasure in B, and Venetus 185 (Bekker's Π).*

41 b, p. 148 (39). *ἄγοντα: B. ἀγαγόντα, S W following other Mss.*

41 c, p. 148 (46). *ἀληθῆ: with all Mss. Cron following S writes ἀληθῆ ἔστιν because it is added in the margin of B. S argues against admitting it in *Nov. Comm.* p. 161.*

42 a, p. 150 (22). *πλήν ἤ: πλήν εἰ, S following D. The reading of B can not be made out, but Gaisford and S incline to think it is πλήν εἰ.*

CRITO.

43 a, p. 151 (1). *πρῶ ἔτι ἔστιν: with B. πρῶ ἔστιν, S following inferior Mss. and the Zürich edition.*

43 b, p. 152 (19). *νῦν: νυνί, W.*

43 b, p. 152 (20). *πράως: πράως, S following the Mss. The ι subscript is an essential part of the word. See Curtius, *Grundzüge*, No. 379. The Mss. authorities leave the matter doubtful, though for Plato *πράως* is the prevailing orthography. *πραῦς* is always without ι. S has lately made up his mind to write *πράως* even in Plato. See Vol. XII. p. 6.*

43 d, p. 153 (33). *δοκεῖ . . . ἤξειν: δοκεῖν . . . ἤξει, S with Buttman.*

43 d, p. 153 (35). *τούτων [τῶν ἀγγέλων]: τούτων τῶν ἀγγελίων, W.*

44 b, p. 155 (3). *ξυμφορά ἔστιν: ξυμφορὰ ἔσται, S with Hirschig.*

44 b, p. 155 (3). *τοῦ ἔστερησθαι: Sallier. Hermann keeps the Mss. reading σου ἔστερησθαι. Madvig (*Adv.* p. 368) finds reason for writing σου ἔστερησσομαι in the strange combination of the inf. and fin. moods by μέν and δέ. Rieckher reads πρώτων μὲν σου ἔστερησσομαι.*

44 b, p. 155 (5). *ἔτι δέ: ἔτι δὴ, S. Rieckher strikes out ὡς before οἷός τε.*

45 b, p. 158 (19). *ξένοι οὔτοι ἐνθάδε: ξένοι [οὔτοι] ἐνθάδε, S. ξένοι ἔτι ἐνθάδε, W with the explanation praeter ea, praeter me. See Fleckeisen's *Jahrb.* 1877, pp. 222 ff. and Cron's *Bem.* p. 117. It certainly seems far more natural to take ἐνθάδε as a gloss explaining οὔτοι than to regard οὔτοι as a gloss.*

45 b, p. 158 (23). *ἀποκάμης: ἀποκνής, S with Jacobs. Here S, contrary to his usual practice, has not been able to resist a tempting but unnecessary emendation.*

46 b, p. 161 (4). *οὐ μόνον νῦν: οὐ νῦν πρώτων, S with A. Nauck. See the preface to the third edition of Cron's *Apology* and *Crito* (p. xiv. f.).*

46 d, p. 162 (19). *νῦν δέ*: S (XII. p. xviii.) proposes to write *νυνδη* following B. But see S, VIII. p. 159.

47 a, p. 163 (30). *οὐχ ἰκανῶς: οὐχὶ καλῶς*, S with Hirschig.

47 a, p. 163 (32). *τάς δ' οὐ*: with S. *τάς δ' οὐ*; [*οὐδέ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ' οὐ*]; Cron with W. The words bracketed do not occur in B, and S rejects them as a confusing interpolation (Nov. Comm. p. 162). They occur in the margin of B and in inferior Mss.

47 c, p. 165 (15). *τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους: τὴν δόξαν [καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους]*, S. *τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους*, Stallbaum. *τοὺς ψόγους καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους*, Hirschig.

47 c, p. 165 (18). *ἔστι*: *ἔστι*, all editions. But the emphasis should be carefully kept on *τί*, on *ποι*, and on *εἰς τί*, and not put on the verbs.

47 c, p. 165 (20). *διολλυσιν*: so it stands corrected in B. *διολλύει*, S following inferior Mss.

47 c d, p. 165 (24 ff.). The simpler punctuation of Cron's seventh edition has been preferred to that of the eighth. In the latter Cron follows Goebel.

48 b, p. 167 (25). *Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα*: given to Socrates by W with Buttman. S brackets *φαίη γὰρ ἄν* and makes Crito's speech include *ἀληθὴ λέγεις*. Goebel proposes *Δῆλα γὰρ δὴ καὶ ταῦτα, φαίη γ' ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες*. If anything is to be omitted, *ἀληθὴ λέγεις* could best be spared.

48 d, p. 169 (15). *οὔτε ἄλλο: οὔτ' εἰ ἄλλο*, S with Forster.

48 e, p. 169 (23). *πέισας σε*: with Buttman. *πέισαί σε*, W following the Mss. See Cron's preface to his first edition of the *Apol.* and Crito, p. xii., also *Bem.* p. 117 f. Meiser (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 109, I, p. 41) favors a change of order *πέισαί σε, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος ταῦτα πράττειν*. Goebel urges *παῦσαι σε*, which would, however, be intolerable after *παῦσαι ἤδη*.

49 a, p. 170 (4). [*ᾧπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο*]: Meiser proposes to find room for this between *ἦ* and *πάσα*.

49 b, p. 170 (7). *τηλικοῖδε [γέροντες]*: with Jacobs. *τηλικοῖδε γέροντες*, W. Some authority for not bracketing would perhaps be found in *Lach.* 180 d.

50 c, p. 175 (2). *ἐμμένειν: ἐμμενεῖν*, S with Hirschig.

50 d, p. 176 (10). *τοῖς νόμοις: [τοῖς νόμοις]*, S with Hirschig.

50 d, p. 176 (14). *νόμοι: [νόμοι]*, S with Hirschig.

50 e, p. 177 (20). *σοι: σὺ* is preferred by Buttman, Stallbaum, Hirschig, Goebel.

51 a, p. 177 (26). *ἔσται*: S. *ἔξέσται*, W following the Mss. *ἔξ ἔσου ἔσται*, Hirschig.

51 a, p. 178 (30). *ἦ: ἦ*, W following the Mss. S says the first hand in B wrote *ἦ*. See on 53 c.

51 d, p. 180 (12). *ἀρέσκομεν: ἀρέσκομεν*, S with Madvig.

51 e, p. 181 (19). *πέιθεσθαι: πείσεισθαι*, S with Buttman.

52 a, p. 181 (1). *σέ, Σώκρατες, ταῖς*: B. *σέ [Σώκρατες] ταῖς*, S. *σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῖς*, W.

52 b, p. 181 (11). *ἐξηλθες, [ὅτι... Ἰσθμόν,] οὔτε: ἐξηλθες, οὔτε*, S. S gives

reasons as follows: Verba ὄτι . . . Ἰσθμόν, quae jam Athenaeus 5, 15, legisse videtur, in marg. add. bc, incluserunt Turicenses delevit MS [*i.e.* Schanz himself]. See his Nov. Comm. p. 162.

52 d, p. 182 (28). πολιτεύεσθαι: B. πολιτεύσεσθαι, S with inferior Mss.

53 a, p. 183 (43). δῆλον . . . νόμων: bracketed by S with H. Stephanus and Hirschig, who also both reject οἱ νόμοι.

53 a, p. 184 (44). ἐμμένεις: B. ἐμμενεῖς, S W following the second hand in B.

53 b, p. 184 (7). Μέγαράδε: Μεγάραδε, W. Gaisford remarks on *Phaedr.* 227 d: "μέγαράδε Fuit μέγαρα δέ p. m." Is this the reading of B in this passage also?

53 c, p. 185 (17). ἦ: B. ἦ̇, S W. As in 51 a, p. 178 (30), where the reading of B is harder to make out, so here also S writes ἦ̇. The more vigorous ἦ̇ (*really*) is better suited to the context than ἦ̇, which simply makes affirmation a matter of course.

53 e, p. 186 (28). αἰσχροῦς: with S and W. Still γλίσχρως, which is added on the margin of B, deserves attention, and perhaps should be preferred. *Cf.* in the preceding line (27) the undoubtedly correct μεταλλάξας, which is on the margin of B, while in the text we find καταλλάξας, which both S and W reject.

53 e, p. 186 (32). καὶ δουλεύων· τί: καὶ [δουλεύων·] τίς, S with Schleiermacher.

53 e, p. 186 (32). ἐν Θετταλίᾳ: bracketed by S at Ast's suggestion.

54 a, p. 187 (41). ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν, πότερον: [ἐπιμελήσονται] αὐτῶν πότερον, S.

54 b, p. 187 (1). πειθόμενος ἡμῖν: Meiser inserts after these words τοῖς σοῖς γεννήταις καὶ (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 109, 1, p. 41).

54 d, p. 188 (1). Κρίτων: [Κρίτων], S.

GREEK INDEX.

[Numbers not followed by letters refer to paragraphs of the Introduction; numbers followed by letters refer to the Stephanus pages noted on the right of the Text.]

- ἀγροικότερον 32 *d*.
 ἀγών 73, 24 *c*.
 ἀδικῶ 19 *b*.
 αἰρῶ 28 *a*, 48 *c*.
 αἰσχρόν 28 *d*.
 αἰσχύνομαι 22 *b*.
 ἀκροαταί 24 *e*.
 ἀλίσκομαι 28 *a*.
 ἀλλά 32 *a*, 39 *e*, 43 *d*, 45 *a*.
 ἀλλά γάρ 19 *c*, *d*, 28 *a*.
 ἀλλά δὴ 37 *c*, 54 *a*.
 ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα 27 *b*.
 ἀλλ' ἢ 20 *d*, 34 *b*.
 ἄλλος 28 *e*, 30 *d*, 36 *b*.
 ἄλλο τι ἢ 24 *c*, 52 *d*.
 ἀλλ' οὖν 27 *c*.
 ἀλλ' οὐχ 23 *c*.
 ἄλλως 46 *d*.
 ἄμα 46 *a*.
 ἀμφί 18 *b*.
 ἄν 17 *d*.
 ἀνάκρισις 69.
 ἀναβαίνω 31 *c*, 33 *d*.
 ἀναπλήσθαι 32 *c*.
 ἀνεπίστον 36 *a*.
 ἀνεξέταστος 38 *a*.
 ἀνέχεσθαι 31 *b*.
 ἀνθρώπινος 31 *b*.
 ἀνόισω 20 *e*.
 ἀντιγραφὴ 27 *c*.
 ἀντωμοσία 69, 27 *c*.
 ἀξιώσατε 18 *d*.
 ἀπάγειν 32 *b*.
 ἀπιστήσαντες 29 *b*.
 ἄπιστος 26 *e*.
 ἀπό 31 *b*.
 ἀπολαύειν 54 *a*.
 ἀποφεύγω 36 *a*, 38 *d*.
 ἄρα 17 *b*, 25 *a*, 26 *d*, 34 *c*.
 ἀρετὴ 30 *b*.
 ἀρχή 49 *d*.
 ἄρχομαι 31 *d*.
 ἄρχοντες, οἱ, 28 *e*.
 ἄρχων, ὁ, 68.
 ἀσπάζομαι 29 *d*.
 ἀστρατεία 51 *b*.
 ἀσχολία 39 *e*.
 ἀτεχνῶς 18 *c*.
 ἀτιμία 74, 29 *a*, 30 *d*, 32 *b*,
 51 *b*.
 ἀτιμώσειεν 30 *d*.
 ἄτοπα 26 *d*.
 αὐθαδέστερον 34 *c*.
 αὐτόματοι 23 *c*.
 βακτηρία 66.
 βάσανος 69.
 βασιλεύς 31, 68.
 βιβλία 26 *d*.
 βιωτόν 47 *d*.
 βοᾶω 30 *c*, 32 *b*.
 βουλευταί 25 *a*.
 βουλεύω 32 *b*.
 γάρ 19 *c*, *d*, 28 *a*, 30 *c*, 34 *b*,
 38 *a*.
 γέ 21 *d*, 22 *d*, 46 *e*, 54 *d*.
 γελιοότερον 30 *e*.
 γνησιότης 50 *d*.
 γνησιῶς 31 *d*.
 γράμματα 26 *d*.
 γραμματεὺς, 70, 75.
 γραφὴ 31, 67, 68.
 γραφὴ ἀσεβείας 31, 73,
 35 *d*.
 δαίμονες 27 *c*.
 δαιμόνια 27 *c*.
 δαιμόνιε 44 *b*.
 δαιμόνιον 31 *c*, *cf.* 27,
 32.
 δέ 17 *b*, 38 *c*.
 δελία 51 *b*.
 δεῦρο 24 *c*.
 δὴ 22 *e*, 26 *b*, 28 *a*, 33 *c*.
 δημότης 33 *d*.
 διαβολή 19 *a*.
 διαμυθολογήσαι 39 *e*.
 διαπεφευγέναι 45 *e*.
 διὰ ταχέων 32 *d*.
 δικανικά 32 *a*.
 δικασταί 66 note 4, 17 *a*,
 26 *d*.
 δικαστήριον 66.
 δίκη 67.
 διώκω 18 *c*, 28 *a*.
 διωμοσία 69.
 δοκιμασία 51 *d*.
 δοκούντες 35 *a*.
 δόξης 35 *b*.
 δοῦλος 50 *e*.
 δ' οὖν 17 *a*.

- ἐθίζεσθαι 35 c.
 εἶεν 18 e.
 εἰκή 17 c.
 εἶναι 23 a.
 εἰρωνεύομενος 37 c.
 εἰς 17 c.
 εἰσάγω 24 d.
 εἰσαγωγή 70.
 εἰσελθεῖν 29 c.
 εἰσόδος 70, 45 e.
 εἶτα 23 c, 28 b, 31 a.
 ἐκ 23 e, 32 b, 49 e.
 ἐκείνος 33 e.
 ἐκκλησιασταί 25 a.
 ἐλέγξω 29 c.
 ἔμελλον 20 a.
 ἐμμελῶς 20 c.
 ἐναντία λέγειν 27 a.
 ἐνδεικνύμαι 32 b.
 ἔνδεκα, οἱ, 75, 32 b, 37 c,
 39 c, 44 a.
 ἐν τοῖς with superl. 43 c.
 ἐξετάσω 29 e.
 ζοικε 26 e.
 ἐπεὶ 19 e, 20 a.
 ἐπί 17 d, 27 b, 40 a, 41 a.
 ἐπιδείκνυσαι 25 c.
 ἐπιεικῆ 34 d.
 ἐπικεκληρωμένοι 70.
 ἐπιστάτης 32 b.
 ἐπίτιμος 25 a.
 ἐπιτυχοῦσιν 17 c.
 ἐπιψηφίζω 32 b.
 ἐπονείδιστος 29 b.
 ἐπωβελία 72.
 ἐρήμη 72; 18 c.
 ἔσχετε 19 a.
 ἔσχηκα 20 d.
 εὖ ζῆν 48 b.
 εὐέλεγκτα 33 c.
 εὐεργέτη 36 d.
 ἐφ' ᾧτε 29 c.
 ἔωθεν 40 a.
 ἦδη 21 e.
 ἠλιαία 67.
 ἦ μήν 22 a.
 ἡμιθέων 28 b.
 ἦ τι ἦ οὐδέν 17 b.
 θάνατος 28 c, 36 b, 37 a.
 θέμις 21 b.
 θεμιτόν 30 c.
 θεός 19 a, 27 c, 28 c, 35 d,
 42 a, 54 e.
 θεωρία 43 c.
 θόλος 32 c.
 θορυβεῖν 17 d.
 ἰατρός 47 b.
 ἰκανῶς 47 a.
 ἵνα 22 a.
 ἰσχύς 29 d.
 ἴσως 18 a.
 καί 22 a, d, 28 a.
 καί εἰ 32 a.
 καὶ δὴ καὶ 18 a.
 καὶ μέντοι 17 c.
 κακουργεῖν 49 c.
 κατὰ 35 c.
 καταγιγνώσκω 18 c.
 καταδέομαι 33 e.
 καταχαρίζεσθαι 35 c.
 κατηγορῶ 18 c.
 κεκαλιπημένους 17 b.
 κλέψυδρα 71, 34 a.
 κλητήρες 69.
 κοινόν, τὸ, 50 a.
 κορυβαντιῶνες 54 d.
 κυρία, ἡ, 70.
 κωμωδιοποῖς 18 d.
 λατρεῖαν 23 c.
 λέγειν 21 b, 23 a.
 ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον
 51 d.
 λῆξις 68.
 λιποῖμι 29 a.
 λιποταξία 29 a, 51 b.
 λόγος 26 b, 32 a, 34 c, 52 d.
 μάρτυρες 32 e.
 μέγιστα, τὰ, 22 d.
 μὲν 17 b, 43 d.
 μὲν . . . δέ 28 d, 34 c,
 50 e.
 μέντοι 31 b.
 μετοικεῖν 51 d.
 μή 25 a, 39 a, 44 e, 45 e,
 48 c.
 μόγις 21 b, 27 c.
 μοῖρα 51 a.
 μορμολύττηται 46 c.
 μύψω 30 e.
 νῦν 18 a, 38 b, 39 c.
 νυστάζοντες 31 a.
 ζυντεταγμένως 23 e.
 ζυνωμοσιῶν 36 b.
 ὄρθρος 43 a.
 ὄρχήστρας 26 d.
 ὀλίγου 17 a.
 ὅμοιοι 46 b.
 ὀνειδίζω 30 e.
 ὄνομα 17 b, 20 d, 38 c.
 ὅταν 28 b.
 ὅτι 21 c, e.
 ὅ τι μαθῶν 36 b.
 οὐ 26 d, 35 c.
 οὐδὲ . . . οὐδέ 26 d.
 οὐ μὴ 29 d.
 οὐν 21 a, d, e, 26 b, 29 c.
 οὐ πάνυ 19 a.
 οὔτε . . . οὔτε 19 c.
 οὗτος 21 a, 24 e.
 οὕτω 29 b.
 ὀφλισκάνω 18 c, 39 b.

παιδοτριβίης 47 *b*.
 πᾶν ποιῶν 39 *a*.
 πάντως 33 *d*.
 πᾶνυ 19 *a*, 26 *b*.
 παραλαμβάνω 18 *b*.
 παραπροσβεία 36 *a*.
 παραχωρῶ 34 *a*.
 πείθω 29 *d*, 35 *c*, 51 *b*.
 πεπόνθατε 17 *a*.
 περιεργάζεται 19 *b*.
 περιττότερον 20 *c*.
 πηνίκα 43 *a*.
 πιστεύων 19 *a*.
 πλέον ποιεῖν 19 *a*.
 πλήθος 21 *a*, 31 *c*.
 πλημμέλεια 22 *d*.
 πλημμελές 43 *b*.
 ποιήσω 30 *a*.
 πολέμαρχος 68.
 πολλάκις 30 *c*.
 πολυπραγμονῶ 31 *c*.
 πόνους 22 *a*.
 πρᾶγμα 20 *c*, 41 *d*, 53 *c*.
 πραγματεύεσθαι 22 *b*.
 πράττειν 40 *a*, 45 *d*, 51 *a*.
 πρῖν 36 *c*.
 προβούλευμα 32 *b*.
 πρόεδροι 32 *b*.
 πρόξενος 18 *a*.
 πρὸς 18 *b*, 21 *c*, 24 *b*, 30 *b*.
 πρυτανεύουσα 32 *b*.
 πρυτάνεις 32 *b*, *c*.
 πρυτανεῖω 36 *d*, 37 *a*.

ῥήμα 17 *b*.
 ῥήτορες, 23 *e*, 32 *b*, 36 *b*,
 50 *b*.
 σίτησις 36 *d*, 37 *a*.
 σκευήν 53 *d*.
 σκισμαχεῖν 18 *d*.
 σοφία 29 *d*.
 σοφός 18 *b*, 23 *a*, 27 *a*,
 34 *e*.
 στάσεων 36 *b*.
 στῆ 28 *a*.
 σύμβολον 66.
 συνήγοροι 30, 71, 50 *b*.
 Σφήτιος 33 *c*.
 σχῆμα 53 *d*.
 τεθνάναι 30 *c*, 43 *d*.
 τελευτῶν 22 *c*.
 τί λέγειν 46 *d*.
 τιμᾶσθαι 35, 36 *b*, 52 *c*.
 τίμησις 73, 35 *d*.
 τίς 18 *b*, 19 *c*, 25 *b*, 28 *e*,
 30 *e*, 37 *e*.
 τὸ δέ 23 *a*, 37 *a*, 39 *b*.
 τοί 29 *a*.
 τόλμης 38 *d*.
 τούναντιον 25 *b*.
 τρόπω 17 *d*.
 τύχη ἀγαθῇ 43 *d*.
 ὕδωρ, τὸ, 34 *a*.
 ὑπακοῦσαι 43 *a*.

ὑπάρχει 45 *a*.
 ὑπεικάθοιμι 32 *a*.
 ὑπηρεσία 30 *a*.
 ὑπέρ 22 *e*, 23 *e*, 39 *e*.
 ὑπό 17 *a*, 19 *c*, 38 *c*.
 ὑποβλέπονται 53 *b*.
 ὑπολογιζόμενος 28 *d*.
 ὑποστειλάμενος 24 *a*.
 φάσκω 21 *b*.
 φεύγω 18 *c*, 19 *c*, 26 *a*,
 28 *a*.
 φημί 25 *b*, 27 *d*.
 φιλοψυχία 37 *c*.
 φορτικά 32 *a*.
 φροντιστής 18 *b*.
 φύσει 22 *c*.
 φωνῇ 17 *d*.
 χαριεντίζεται 24 *c*.
 χρή 17 *a*, 33 *d*, 34 *a*.
 ψευδῆ 18 *a*.
 ψεῦδος 34 *e*.
 ψήφισμα 32 *b*.
 ψήφοι 72.
 ὠνησας 27 *c*.
 ὡς 30 *b*.
 ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν 17 *a*.
 ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ 23 *a*.
 ὡστε 25 *e*.
 ὦ τάν 25 *c*.

ENGLISH INDEX.

[Numbers not followed by letters refer to paragraphs of the Introduction; numbers followed by letters refer to the Stephanus pages noted on the right of the Text.]

- | | | |
|--|---|---|
| <p><i>Abstract noun</i> with τις 25 b.</p> <p><i>Acc. adv.</i> 25 b.</p> <p>cognate 21 a, 26 b, 27 b.</p> <p>double with λέγειν 23 a.</p> <p>with μηνύειν, 24 d.</p> <p>of specification with adj. 22 c, 23 a.</p> <p><i>Accusers</i> 30, 18 b, e, 23 e, 24 b.</p> <p><i>Achilles</i> 28 c.</p> <p><i>Adimantus</i> 34 a.</p> <p><i>Adj. used pers. with inf.</i> 18 a.</p> <p><i>Adv. with temporal particle</i> 40 b.</p> <p><i>Aeacus</i> 41 a.</p> <p><i>Aeantodorus</i> 34 a.</p> <p><i>Aeschines</i> 33 e, 34 a.</p> <p><i>Ajax</i> 26 d, 41 b.</p> <p><i>Alcibiades</i> 24, 33, 28 e.</p> <p><i>Alliteration</i> 39 a.</p> <p><i>Amphipolis</i> 28 e.</p> <p><i>Anacoluthon</i> 19 e, 21 c, 28 c, 34 e, 37 c, 45 e.</p> <p><i>Anaxagoras</i> 10, 26 d.</p> <p><i>Anaximander</i> 2.</p> <p><i>Anaximenes</i> 2.</p> <p><i>Antiphon</i> 33 e.</p> <p><i>Antithesis</i> 33 b.</p> <p><i>Anytus</i> 30, 23 e.</p> <p><i>Aor. Subjv. as fut. perf.</i> 44 c.</p> <p>as inv. 17 c, 20 e.</p> | <p><i>Apodosis</i> suppressed 32 d.</p> <p>with χρῆν 33 d.</p> <p><i>Apollodorus</i> 34 a.</p> <p><i>Apostrophe</i> 29 d.</p> <p><i>Appeals to jury</i> 71, 32 a, 34 c.</p> <p><i>Arginusae</i> 32 b.</p> <p><i>Aristo</i> 34 a.</p> <p><i>Aristogeiton</i> 36 d.</p> <p><i>Aristophanes, Clouds</i> 25, 18 b, d, 19 c, 23 d.</p> <p><i>Article</i> with δέ 37 a.</p> <p>as dem. 37 d.</p> <p>with ἐκ 32 b.</p> <p>generic with θεός 19 a.</p> <p>omitted 28 b.</p> <p>with πᾶς 33 b.</p> <p>with πολλοί 18 b.</p> <p>as possessive 27 b, 29 d, 34 a.</p> <p>repeated 33 d.</p> <p>with θάνατος 28 c, 36 b, 37 a.</p> <p><i>Assembly, members of</i> 25 a.</p> <p><i>Assimilation of case</i> 29 b, 37 b, 50 a.</p> <p>of gender 18 a.</p> <p>inverse 45 b.</p> <p><i>Astronomy</i> 19 b.</p> <p><i>Asyndeton</i> 41 b.</p> <p><i>Athenian citizenship</i> 31 d, 51 d.</p> <p>courts of law 66-75.</p> | <p><i>Athenian greatness</i> 29 d.</p> <p><i>Atomists</i> 9.</p> <p><i>Attraction of case in comparison</i> 17 c.</p> <p><i>Audience in court</i> 27 b.</p> <p><i>Books</i> 26 d.</p> <p><i>Callias</i> 20 a.</p> <p><i>Cebes</i> 45 b.</p> <p><i>Chaerecrates</i> 21 a.</p> <p><i>Chaerephon</i> 20 e, 21 a.</p> <p><i>Chiasitic order</i> 25 d, 47 c.</p> <p><i>Children in court</i> 71, 34 c.</p> <p><i>Citizenship, age of</i> 31 d.</p> <p><i>Clause in appos. with neut.</i> 18 c, 34 d, 41 b.</p> <p><i>Climax</i> 23 a.</p> <p><i>Clouds of Aristophanes</i> 25, 18 b, d, 19 c, 23 d.</p> <p><i>Comparison to Heracles</i> 22 a.</p> <p>idioms of 17 c, 19 b, 22 a, d, 28 a.</p> <p><i>Condition, complex</i> 27 d.</p> <p>mixed 19 e, 25 b, 30 b.</p> <p><i>Contrast</i> 48 e.</p> <p><i>Co-ordination</i> 18 b.</p> <p><i>Corybantes</i> 54 d.</p> <p><i>Critias</i> 24, 25, 33, 32 c, d.</p> <p><i>Crito</i> 62, 33 d, 34 a, 38 b, 43 a, 45 a.</p> <p><i>Critobulus</i> 33 d, 34 a.</p> |
|--|---|---|

- Daemonion* 27, 32, 27 c, 31 c.
- Dat.* with verbal nouns 23 c, 30 a.
with *ποιεῖν* 30 a.
- Death* 28 b, 40 c, d, e, 41 d.
- Delian ship* 43 c.
- Delium* 28 e.
- Demigods* 28 b.
- Democritus* 9.
- Demodocus* 33 e.
- Dilemma* 26 c.
- Direct discourse* 21 e.
- Disfranchisement* 30 d.
- Dream* 44 a.
- Education* 50 d.
- Eleatics* 4, 45.
- Eleven, the,* 75, 37 c, 39 e, 44 a.
- Ellipsis* 23 a, 24 d, 26 b, 36 b.
- Elysius* 28 c, 40 c.
- Empedocles* 8.
- Enemies, hated* 49 b.
- Epigenes* 33 e, 34 a.
- Euclides* 42.
- Evenus* 20 b.
- Exile, voluntary* 45 e, 54 a.
- Fatherland, precious* 51 a.
- Fines* 74, 38 b.
- Foreigners in court* 18 a.
- Future infin.* 37 a.
partic. 30 b.
- Gadfly* 30 e.
- Genitive abs.* 35 a.
with adv. 17 d, 38 c.
in appos. with adj. 29 d.
of cause, 43 b.
- Genitive partic. with αἰσ-
θάνομαι* 22 c, *γιγνώ-
σκω* 27 a, *ἀνέχεσθαι*
31 b.
with verbal noun 23 c,
26 b, 40 c.
- Glaucon* 34 a.
- God* 21 b, 54 e.
allwise 28 c.
- Golden rule* 49 b, c.
- Gorgias* 13, 19 e, 23 c.
- Great King* 40 d, e.
- Gymnastic training*
47 a, b.
- Hades* 41 a, b, c, 54 c.
- Harmodius* 36 d.
- Heracles* 22 a, 26 d.
- Heraclitus* 5, 6, 7, 45.
- Hippias* 14.
- Homer* 34 d.
- Hyperbaton* 35 c.
- Imperfect, philosophical,*
47 d.
- Imprisonment for a fine*
37 c.
- Inceptive aor.* 19 a, 28 a,
41 e.
- Indic. with ὥστε* 25 e.
- Infinitive with adj. and
adv.* 31 a.
after *ἐκόν* 37 a, *μέλλω*
20 a, *φεύγω* 26 a, *ἐφ’
ᾧτε* 29 c, *ὥστε* 38 d.
with a neg. idea 32 b,
35 e.
of purpose 33 b.
- Io* 30 e.
- Ion* 26 d.
- Irony* 20 e, 22 a, 28 a,
31 c, 47 e, 49 a, 51 a,
54 a.
- Islands of the blest* 28 c,
40 c.
- Juryman, form of ad-
dress.* 66 note 4, 17 a,
26 d.
asleep 31 a.
oath 66 note 2, 35 c.
- Law, majesty of,* 50 e, 51 e.
- Legal terms, ἀγῶνες τιμη-
τοί, ἀτιμητοί,* 73.
αἰρώ, ἀλλίσκομαι, 28 a.
ἀνάκρισις 69.
ἀντιγραφή 27 c.
ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι 35.
ἀντιτίμησις 35 d.
ἀνταμοσία 69, 27 c.
ἀπαγωγή 32 b.
ἀποφεύγω 36 a, 38 d.
ἄρχων, ὁ, 68.
ἀστρατεία 51 b.
ἀτιμία 74, 29 a, 30 d,
32 b, 51 b.
ἀτιμητοί 73.
βακτηρία 66.
βάσανος 69.
βασιλεύς 31, 68.
βουλευταί 25 a.
βουλεύω 32 b.
γνησιότης 50 d.
γραμματεὺς 70, 75.
γραμματεῖον 51 d.
γραφή 31, 67, 68.
γραφὴ ἀσεβείας 31, 73,
35 d.
γραφὴ παρανόμων 35 d.
δειλία 51 b.
δημότης 33 d.
δικαστήριον 66.
δικαστής 66, 24 e.
δίκη 67.
διόκω 18 c, 28 a.

- Legal terms, διωμοσία* 69.
δοκιμασία 51 *d.*
είσάγω 24 *d.*
είσαγωγή 70.
είσέρχομαι 70, 29 *c.*
είσοδος 70, 45 *e.*
ἐκκλησιασταί 25 *a.*
ἐνδειξις 32 *b.*
ἐνδεκα, οί, 75, 32 *b.*, 37 *c.*,
39 *e.*, 44 *a.*
ἐπικληροῦσθαι 70.
ἐπιστάτης 32 *b.*
ἐπίτιμος 25 *a.*
ἐπιψηφίζω 32 *b.*
ἐπωβελία 72.
ἐρήμη 72, 18 *c.*
εὐεργέτης 36 *d.*
ἡλιαία 67.
ἡλιασταί 67, 24 *c.*
καταγιγνώσκω 18 *c.*
κατηγορῶ 18 *c.*
κλέψυδρα 71, 34 *a.*
κλητήρης 69.
κυρία, ἡ, 70.
ληξιαρχικόν 51 *d.*
λήξις 68.
λιποταξία 29 *a.*, 51 *b.*
μάρτυρες 32 *e.*
μέτοικοι 68, 51 *d.*
ὄφλισκάνω 18 *c.*, 39 *b.*
παραπροσβεία 36 *a.*
πολέμαρχος 68.
προβούλευμα 32 *b.*
πρόεδροι 32 *b.*
πρόξενος 18 *a.*
πρυτανεῖω, πρυτάνεις,
32 *b.*, *c.*
σίτησις 36 *d.*, 37 *a.*
σύμβολον 66.
συνήγοροι 30, 71, 50 *b.*
τιμᾶσθαι 35, 36 *b.*, 52 *c.*
τίμησις 73, 35 *d.*
τιμητοί 73.
- Legal terms, τίμημα* 73.
ἕδωρ, τὸ, 34 *a.*
φεύγω 18 *c.*, 19 *c.*, 28 *a.*
ψηφισμα 32 *b.*
ψηφοί 72.
Leon 32 *c.*
Leucippus 9.
Litotes 33 *c.*, 44 *a.*
Love of country 54 *a.*
Lycō 30, 23 *e.*
Lysias 32 *c.*
- Marriage laws 50 *d.*
Megarian oligarchy 53 *b.*
Meletus 30, 23 *e.*, 25 *d.*, 26 *e.*,
27 *e.*, 35 *c.*
Minos 41 *a.*
Musaeus 41 *a.*
- Natural philosophy*
18 *b.*, *c.*, 19 *c.*
Negative pron. 32 *a.*
repeated 31 *d.*
with φημί 25 *b.*
Nestor 29 *d.*
Neuter adj. for fem. 29 *a.*
adj. as subst. 31 *b.*
art. with gen. 21 *e.*
with concrete force 32 *e.*
Nicostratus 33 *e.*, 34 *a.*
- Oath*, of Socrates 21 *e.*
of juryman 66 note 2,
35 *c.*
Object omitted 23 *b.*
Objections, dramatized
20 *c.*
Oligarchy 53 *b.*
Olympian victors 36 *d.*
Optative in indirect dis-
course 20 *b.*, 27 *e.*, 29 *c.*
with πρίν 36 *c.*
Oracle 21 *a.*, *b.*
- Orators 23 *e.*, 32 *b.*, 36 *b.*,
50 *b.*
Order of words 17 *b.*, 25 *c.*,
26 *e.*, 35 *d.*, 36 *d.*
chiastic 25 *d.*, 47 *c.*
Orpheus 41 *a.*
- Palamedes 41 *b.*
Paralus 33 *e.*, 34 *a.*
Parmenides 4.
Partic. used adv. 22 *c.*
with αἰσχύνομαι 31 *b.*
of means 30 *a.*
as noun 34 *b.*
subord. to another par-
tic. 21 *e.*, 27 *a.*
Penalties, how fixed, 73,
35 *d.*
Pericles 35 *a.*
Perfect, βεβουλευσθαι 46 *a.*
τεθνάναι 30 *c.*
Periphrasis 38 *c.*, 53 *c.*
Pers. pron. for refl. 13 *a.*
Personification 21 *c.*, 50 *a.*,
52 *c.*
Physicians 47 *b.*
Plato, Academy 46.
Apology 53–61.
Critias 48.
Crito 62–65.
death 50.
dialogues 52.
family 37, 34 *a.*
Gorgias 40–41.
journeys 42, 43, 49.
laws 48.
Parmenides 45.
Phaedo 47.
Phaedrus 47.
Philebus 47.
Politicalus 45.
Protagoras 39.
Republic 48.

- Plato, Sophist* 45.
Symposium 47.
Theaetetus 44.
Timaeus 48.
 as a writer 51.
- Pleonasm* 20 *d*, 34 *b*, 42 *a*.
Pluperfect in -ην 31 *d*.
Plural more concrete 46 *c*.
Pnyx 31 *c*.
Poets 22 *b*, *c*, 23 *e*.
Polemarchus 32 *c*.
Potidaea 28 *e*.
Potential indic. 18 *c*.
Present of habitual action
 33 *a*.
 result of past action
 33 *c*.
 vivid 44 *b*.
President of senate 32 *b*.
Prodicus 14.
Prolepsis 29 *a*, *d*.
Prometheus 26 *d*.
Prophecy at death 39 *c*.
Protagoras 12, 39, 19 *e*,
 20 *b*, 23 *c*.
Protasis implied 25 *b*.
Providence 33 *c*, 35 *d*.
Prytaneum 32 *c*, 36 *d*.
Pun 25 *c*.
Purpose with pres. partic.
 27 *a*.
Pythagoras 3.
- Question*, dir. and indir.
 48 *a*.
 of surprise 28 *b*.
 with μή 25 *a*, 44 *e*, 45 *e*.
Quotation, not exact 19 *c*,
 24 *b*, 28 *c*.
Quotations, Browning
 21 *a*.
 Dante 41 *a*, 54 *a*, *e*.
 St. Luke 49 *c*.
- Quotations*, Milton 48 *e*.
 Nettleship, *Education*
 50 *d*.
 La Rochefoucauld 33 *c*,
 34 *c*.
 Shakespeare,
As You Like It 46 *b*.
Cymbeline 45 *e*.
Henry IV. 49 *e*.
Henry V. 39 *a*, 46 *e*,
 51 *a*.
Henry VIII. 49 *a*, *b*.
King Lear 24 *d*.
Measure for Measure
 46 *b*.
Mer. of Venice 36 *a*.
Rich. II. 20 *e*, 25 *c*,
 39 *c*, 54 *a*.
Rich. III. 36 *a*, 46 *a*.
Two Gen. of Ver. 18 *a*.
- Repetition* 21 *c*, 28 *d*, 29 *b*,
 31 *a*, 36 *c*, 44 *d*, 49 *c*, *d*.
Rhadamanthys 41 *a*.
- Senate* 32 *b*.
Shops as lounging places
 17 *c*.
Short sent. 21 *b*, 40 *a*.
Simile of gadfly 30 *e*.
Sisyphus 41 *c*.
Slaves 50 *a*.
Socrates,
 accusation against 31,
 32, 33, 56, 23 *d*.
 accusers 30, 18 *b*, *e*, 23 *e*,
 24 *b*.
 age 17, 17 *c*, *d*, 52 *e*.
Apology by Plato 53–
 61.
 affair of Arginusae 32 *b*.
 a 'busybody' 19 *b*, 20 *c*,
 31 *c*.
- Socrates*, in the *Clouds* 25,
 18 *b*, *d*, 19 *c*, 23 *d*.
 convicted by few votes
 36 *a*.
 δαιμόνιον 27, 32, 31 *c*.
 defense 34.
 at Delium 28 *e*.
 deme and tribe 32 *b*.
 dialectic 19.
 distrust of people 30 *e*.
 feelings towards ene-
 mies 49 *b*.
 fortitude 46 *b*.
 friends at trial 34 *a*.
 highest good 35 *d*.
 imitators 23 *c*.
 independence 38 *d*.
 irony 26, 37 *e*.
 method 18, 19, 25, 26,
 17 *c*, 29 *e*, 33 *b*, 47 *a*.
 as midwife 25.
 mission from God, 22 *a*,
 31 *c*.
 moral courage, 28 *b*, *d*,
 48 *d*.
 not a natural philoso-
 opher 19 *c*, 23 *d*, 26 *d*.
 oaths 21 *e*.
 parents 17, 25.
 not a politician 31 *c*.
 at Potidaea 28, 28 *e*.
 poverty 23 *b*.
 practical views 30 *b*.
 religion 27, 32, 26 *d*.
 sons 34 *d*.
 'Sophist' 11 note, 18 *b*,
 23 *a*, 27 *a*, 34 *e*.
 sun-worshipper 26 *d*.
 style colloquial 55, 17
b, *c*, 18 *b*, *d*, 19 *d*, 21 *e*,
 23 *a*, 26 *a*, 32 *a*.
 teaching ethical 20, 27.
 no traveller 53 *a*.

- Socrates*, view of death
29 *a*, 40 *a*–41 *d*.
views of manual labor
23 *e*.
'Virtue is knowledge'
17, 18, 25 *e*.
writers on 21.
- Sophists* 11–15, 19 *e*, 20 *b*,
23 *c*, 33 *b*, 37 *d*.
- Spartan* institutions 52 *e*.
- Subjv.* after a secondary
tense 43 *b*.
with $\mu\eta$ 39 *a*, 48 *c*.
with $\delta\tau\alpha\nu$ 28 *b*.
- Subjv.* with $\omicron\delta\ \mu\eta$ 29 *d*.
Sun-worship 26 *d*.
Sycophants 45 *a*.
- Telemachus* 29 *d*.
Thales 2.
Theages 33 *e*.
Theatre 26 *d*.
Theban oligarchy 53 *b*.
Theodotus 34 *a*.
Thesmothetae 32 *b*.
Thessaly lawless 53 *d*.
Thetis 28 *c*.
The Thirty 21 *a*, 32 *c*, *d*.
- Trials*, length 37 *a*.
proceedings 66–73, 35 *d*.
Triptolemus 41 *a*.
- Vote of jury* 36 *a*.
- Water-clock* 71, 34 *a*.
Witnesses in court 71,
32 *e*.
- Xenophanes* 5.
Xenophon 21, 24, 25.
- Zeno* 4.

COLLEGE SERIES OF GREEK AUTHORS.

EDITED BY

PROFESSOR JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE AND

PROFESSOR THOMAS D. SEYMOUR.

THIS series will include the works either entire or selected of all the Greek authors suitable to be read in American colleges. The volumes contain uniformly an Introduction, Text, Notes, Rhythmical Schemes where necessary, an Appendix including a brief bibliography and critical notes, and a full Index. In accordance with the prevailing desire of teachers, the notes are placed below the text, but to accommodate all, and, in particular, to provide for examinations, the text is printed and bound separately, and sold at the nominal price of forty cents. In form the volumes are a square 12mo. Large Person type, and clear diacritical marks emphasize distinctions and minimize the strain upon the student's eyes. As the names of the editors are a sufficient guaranty of their work, and as the volumes thus far issued have been received with uniform favor, the Publishers have thought it unnecessary to publish recommendations.

Texts are supplied free to professors for classes using the text and note editions. See also the Announcements.

The Clouds of Aristophanes.

Edited on the basis of Kock's edition. By M. W. HUMPHREYS, Professor in University of Virginia. Square 12mo. 252 pages. Cloth: Mailing Price, \$1.50; for introduction, \$1.40.

TEXT EDITION. 88 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

SINCE the place of Aristophanes in American Colleges is not definitely fixed, the Commentary is adapted to a tolerably wide range of preparation.

The Bacchantes of Euripides.

Edited on the basis of Wecklein's edition. By I. T. BECKWITH, Professor in Trinity College. Square 12mo. 146 pages. Cloth: Mailing Price, \$1.35; for introduction, \$1.25.

TEXT EDITION. 64 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

THE Introduction and Notes aim, first of all, to help the student understand the purport of the drama as a whole, and the place each part occupies in the development of the poet's plan; and in the second place, while explaining the difficulties, to encourage in the learner a habit of broader study.

Introduction to the Language and Verse of

Homer.

By THOMAS D. SEYMOUR, Hillhouse Professor of Greek in Yale College. Square 12mo. 104 pages. Cloth: Mailing price, 80 cents; Introduction, 75 cents.

THIS is a practical book of reference designed primarily to accompany the forthcoming edition of Homer in the College Series of Greek Authors, but equally well adapted to any other edition. It clears away many of the student's difficulties by explaining dialectic forms, metrical peculiarities, and difficult points in Homeric style and syntax, with carefully chosen examples.

The Table of Contents occupies one page; the Index ten pages.

Homer's Iliad, Books I.-III. and Books IV.-VI.

Both edited on the basis of the Ameis-Hentze edition, by THOMAS D. SEYMOUR, Hillhouse Professor of Greek in Yale College. Square 12mo. Books I.-III. 235 pages. Cloth: Mailing price, \$1.50; for introduction, \$1.40.

Books IV.-VI. 214 pages. Cloth: Mailing price, \$1.50; for introduction, \$1.40.

TEXT EDITION of each. 66 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

THE editor has made many additions to the German edition in order to adapt the work more perfectly to the use of American classes. But he has endeavored to aid the teacher in doing scholarly work with his classes, not to usurp the teacher's functions. References have been made to the editor's Homeric Language and Verse for the explanation of Epic forms. Illustrations have been drawn freely from the Old Testament, from Vergil, and from Milton. A critical Appendix and an Index are added.

The second of these volumes contains the only full commentary published in this country on Books IV.-VI.

Homer's Odyssey, Books I.-IV.

Edited on the basis of the Ameis-Hentze edition. By B. FERRIN, Professor of Greek in Yale College. Square 12mo. 230 pages. Cloth. Mailing Price, \$1.50; introduction, \$1.40.

TEXT EDITION. 75 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

Homer's Odyssey, Books V.-VIII.

Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by B. FERRIN, Professor of Greek in Yale University. Square 12mo. Cloth. iv + 186 pages. Mailing price, \$1.50, for introduction, \$1.40.

TEXT EDITION. 62 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

THE German edition has been freely changed to adapt it to the needs of American college classes, but record is made in the appendix of all important deviations from the opinions of the German editors. References are rather liberally given to the leading American grammars, and also to Monro's *Homeric Grammar*. Much attention has been paid to the indication or citation of *iterati*, conventional phrases, and metrical *formulæ*. The latest accepted views in Homeric Archæology are presented. The Appendix gives not only strictly critical data, but also material which should enable a student with limited apparatus to understand the historical and literary status of controverted views.

The Apology and Crito of Plato.

Edited on the basis of Cron's edition. By LOUIS DYER, formerly Assistant Professor in Harvard University. Square 12mo. iv + 204 pages. Cloth. Mailing price, \$1.50; introduction, \$1.40.

TEXT EDITION. 50 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

THIS edition gives a sketch of the history of Greek philosophy before Socrates, a Life of Plato and of Socrates, a summarized account of Plato's works, and a presentation of the Athenian law bearing upon the trial of Socrates. Its claims to the attention of teachers rest, first, upon the importance of Schanz's latest critical work, which is here for the first time made accessible — so far as the *Apology* and *Crito* are concerned — to English readers, and second, upon the fulness of its citations from Plato's other works, and from contemporary Greek prose and poetry.

The Protogoras of Plato.

Edited on the basis of Sauppe's edition, with additions. By Professor J. A. TOWLE, formerly Professor of Greek in Iowa College, Grinnell, Iowa. Square 12mo. 175 pages. Cloth. Mailing price, \$1.35; for introduction, \$1.25.

TEXT EDITION. 69 pages. Paper. By mail, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

THE *Protogoras* is perhaps the liveliest of the dialogues of Plato.

In few dialogues is the dramatic form so skilfully maintained without being overborne by the philosophical development. By the changing scenes, the variety in the treatment of the theme, and the repeated participation of the bystanders, the representation of a scene from real life is vivaciously sustained.

Noticeable, too, is the number of vividly elaborated characters: Socrates, ever genial, ready for a contest, and toying with his opponents. Protogoras, disdainful toward the other sophists, condescending toward Socrates. Prodicus, surcharged with synonymic wisdom. Hippias, pretentious and imposing. The impetuous Alcibiades and the tranquil Critias.

Herr Geheim-Rath Sauppe was the Nestor of German philologists, and his Introduction and Commentary have been accepted as models by scholars.

The Antigone of Sophocles.

Edited on the basis of Wolff's edition. By MARTIN L. D'OOGHE, Ph.D., Professor of Greek in the University of Michigan. Square 12mo. 196 pages. Cloth. Mailing price, \$1.50; for introduction, \$1.40.

TEXT EDITION. 59 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

THE Commentary has been adapted to the needs of that large number of students who begin their study of Greek tragedy with this play. The Appendix furnishes sufficient material for an intelligent appreciation of the most important problems in the textual criticism of the play. The rejected readings of Wolff are placed just under the text. The rhythmical schemes are based upon those of J. H. Heinrich Schmidt.

Thucydides, Book I.

Edited on the basis of Classen's edition. By the late CHARLES D. MORRIS, M.A. (Oxon.), Professor in the Johns Hopkins University. Square 12mo. 353 pages. Cloth. Mailing price, \$1.75; for introduction, \$1.65.

TEXT EDITION. 91 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

Thucydides, Book III.

Edited on the basis of Classen's edition. By CHARLES FORSTER SMITH, Ph.D., Professor of Greek, University of Wisconsin. Square 12mo. xi + 320 pages. Cloth. Mailing price, \$1.75; for introduction, \$1.65.

TEXT EDITION. 75 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

Thucydides, Book V.

Edited on the basis of Classen's edition. By HAROLD NORTH FOWLER, Ph.D., Professor of Greek, Western Reserve University. Square 12mo. 213 pages. Cloth. Mailing price, \$1.50; for introduction, \$1.40.

TEXT EDITION. 67 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

Thucydides, Book VII.

Edited on the basis of Classen's edition. By CHARLES FORSTER SMITH, Ph.D., Professor of Greek, University of Wisconsin. Square 12mo. 202 pages. Cloth. Mailing price, \$1.50; for introduction, \$1.40.

TEXT EDITION. 68 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

THE main object of these editions of Books I., III., V., and VII. of Thucydides is to render Classen's Commentary accessible to English-speaking students. His text has been followed with few exceptions. The greater part of his notes, both exegetical and critical, are translated in full. But all the best commentaries on Thucydides, and the literature of the subject generally have been carefully studied to secure the best and latest results of Thucydidean research. Frequent reference is made not only to the standard grammars published in the United States, but also to the larger works of Krüger and Kühner.

Xenophon, Hellenica, Books I.-IV.

Edited on the basis of the edition of Büchschütz, by J. IRVING MANATT, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Greek Literature and History in Brown University. Square 12mo. 300 pages. Cloth. Mailing price, \$1.75; for introduction, \$1.65.

TEXT EDITION. 138 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

THIS work, treating of an extremely interesting period of Greek history, is admirably adapted to classes in rapid reading. The Commentary deals largely with the history and antiquities of the period, but provides grammatical information and suggestion for the review and inculcation of grammatical principles. Very full indexes are added.

Xenophon, Hellenica, Books V.-VII.

Edited on the basis of the edition of Büchschütz by CHARLES E. BENNETT, Professor of Latin in Cornell University. Square 12mo. 240 pages. Cloth. Mailing price, \$1.50; for introduction, \$1.40.
TEXT EDITION. 128 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

IMPORTANT additions have been made in this edition to the notes of Büchschütz in the way of material drawn from other sources, particularly from the commentaries of Breitenbach, Kurz, and Grosser. Special attention has been paid to the language. The orthography has been made to correspond as closely as possible with the Attic usage of Xenophon's day, as determined by the testimony of contemporary inscriptions, while syntactical peculiarities receive careful consideration. An Introduction by the American editor gives a review of the salient events in the history of the important period covered by the text. Besides an Appendix devoted to matters of textual criticism, the book contains a full grammatical index and an index of proper names.

The Prometheus Bound of Æschylus.

With the Fragments of the *Prometheus Loosed*. With Introduction and Notes by N. WECKLEIN, Rector of the Maximilian Gymnasium in Munich. Translated by F. D. ALLEN, Professor of Classical Philology in Harvard University. Square 12mo. iv + 179 pages. Cloth. Mailing price, \$1.50; for introduction, \$1.40.
TEXT EDITION. 57 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

THE book is a translation, with some freedom as to form of expression, of Wecklein's second edition (1878). A few changes in text and commentary have been requested by the German editor, and references to American grammatical works, replacing in some cases the original references to Krüger, have been added by the translator. In the transcription of the metrical schemes into the notation commonly used in this country, the translator has assumed a somewhat greater responsibility than elsewhere, but here too he has endeavored to follow the editor's intentions. The copious explanatory commentary is followed by a critical appendix.

Euripides' Iphigenia among the Taurians.

Edited by ISAAC FLAGG, Professor of Greek, University of California. Square 12mo. 200 pages. Illustrated. Cloth. Mailing price, \$1.50; for introduction, \$1.40.

TEXT EDITION. 72 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

THIS edition is an independent work from the hands of a scholar of established reputation. The Introduction, which is very full, treats of the Age and Celebrity of the Play, the Legend and its Growth, Plot and Scenic Adjustment, Artistic Structure, and Metres and Technique. The commentary is an admirable interpretation of one of the most interesting of the plays of Euripides, — a play especially well fitted, with its spirited adventure, thrilling suspense, and happy ending, to captivate young and ingenuous readers.

Aeschines against Ctesiphon.

Edited on the basis of Weidner's edition. By RUFUS B. RICHARDSON, Professor of Greek in Dartmouth College. Square 12mo. iv + 279 pages. Cloth. Mailing price, \$1.50; for introduction, \$1.40.

TEXT EDITION. 78 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

THIS edition puts into the hands of English-speaking students an oration, adequately interpreted and illustrated, of unique importance. The necessary connection between this oration and Demosthenes on the Crown has been kept in view.

The Introduction covers 32 pages, and includes a valuable Chronological Table. The commentary is complete. A summary of Weidner's method in establishing the text is given in the Appendix, where the main changes that he has made are also noted.

The Gorgias of Plato.

Edited on the basis of Deuschle-Cron's edition. By GONZALEZ LODGE, Associate in Bryn Mawr College. Square 12mo. iv + 308 pages. Cloth. Mailing price, \$1.75; for introduction, \$1.65.

TEXT EDITION. 117 pages. Paper. Mailing price, 45 cents; for introduction, 40 cents.

THE American editor has adhered in the main to the lines of literary interpretation adopted by the German editor. The Introduction has been enlarged by the addition of a full summary of the dialogue. In the notes on syntax especial attention has been paid to the labors of English and American scholars. References to American manuals have been inserted when required.

GREEK TEXT-BOOKS.

| | | INTROD. PRICE |
|---|--|---------------|
| Allen: | Medea of Euripides | \$1.00 |
| Baird: | Greek-English Word-List | .30 |
| Collar and Daniell: | Beginner's Greek Composition | .90 |
| Flagg: | Hellenic Orations of Demosthenes | 1.00 |
| | Seven against Thebes, \$1.00; Anacreontics | .35 |
| Goodwin: | Greek Grammar (Rev. Ed.) | 1.50 |
| | Greek Moods and Tenses (Rev. Ed.) | 2.00 |
| | Greek Reader | 1.50 |
| Goodwin & White: | New Anabasis, with Illustrated Vocabulary | 1.50 |
| | Selections from Xenophon and Herodotus | 1.50 |
| Hogue: | The Irregular Verbs of Attic Greek | 1.50 |
| Jebb: | Introduction to the Study of Homer | 1.12 |
| Leighton: | New Greek Lessons | 1.20 |
| Liddell & Scott: | Greek-English Lexicon, \$9.40; Abridged | 1.25 |
| Parsons: | Cebes' Tablet | .75 |
| School Classics: | Gleason's Gate to the Anabasis | .00 |
| Seymour: | Homer's Iliad (School Edition) with Vocabulary, Books I.-III., \$1.25; Books I.-VI. | 1.60 |
| | Language and Verse of Homer. Paper, 60 cts.; Cloth | .75 |
| | Homeric Vocabulary, 75 cts.; Selected Odes of Pindar | 1.40 |
| Sidgwick: | Greek Prose Composition | 1.50 |
| Tarbell: | Philippics of Demosthenes | 1.00 |
| Tyler: | Selections from Greek Lyric Poets | 1.00 |
| White: | Beginner's Greek Book, \$1.50; First Lessons | 1.20 |
| | Oedipus Tyrannus of Sophocles | 1.12 |
| | Passages for Translation at Sight, Part IV. | .80 |
| White & Morgan: | Anabasis Dictionary | 1.25 |
| Whiton: | Orations of Lysias | 1.00 |
| College Series. | Allen: Wecklein's Prometheus Bound of Aeschylus. Text and Note Edition. Paper, \$1.10; Cloth, \$1.40. | |
| | Beckwith: Bacchantes of Euripides. Paper, 95 cts.; Cloth, \$1.25. | |
| | Bennett: Xenophon's Hellenica, Books V.-VII. Pa., \$1.10; Clo., \$1.40. | |
| | D'Ooge: Antigone of Sophocles. Paper, \$1.10; Cloth, \$1.40. | |
| | Dyer: Plato's Apology and Crito. Paper, \$1.10; Cloth, \$1.40. | |
| | Flagg: Euripides' Iphigenia among the Taurians. Paper, \$1.10; Cloth, \$1.40. | |
| | Fowler: Thucydides, Book V. Paper, \$1.10; Cloth, \$1.40. | |
| | Humphreys: Clouds of Aristophanes. Paper, \$1.10; Cloth, \$1.40. | |
| | Lodge: Gorgias of Plato. Paper, \$1.35; Cloth, \$1.65. | |
| | Manatt: Xenophon's Hellenica, Books I.-IV. Pa., \$1.35; Clo., \$1.65. | |
| | Morris: Thucydides, Book I. Paper, \$1.35; Cloth, \$1.65. | |
| | Perrin: Homer's Odyssey, Books I.-IV. Paper, \$1.10; Cloth, \$1.40; Books V.-VIII., Cloth, \$0.00. | |
| | Richardson: Aeschines against Ctesiphon. Paper, \$1.10; Cloth, \$1.40 | |
| | Seymour: Homer's Iliad, Books I.-III. and Books IV.-VI. Each, Paper, \$1.10; Cloth, \$1.40. | |
| | Smith: Thucydides, Book III., Cloth, \$1.65. Book VII., Paper, \$1.10; Cloth, \$1.40. | |
| Towle: Protagoras of Plato. Paper, 95 cts.; Cloth, \$1.25. | | |

Editions of the Text are issued separately. Each, 40 cents.

Copies sent to Teachers for Examination, with a view to Introduction, on receipt of Introductory Price. The above list is not quite complete.

GINN & COMPANY, Publishers,

Boston, New York, and Chicago.

