COLLEGE SERIES OF GREEK AUTHORS
EDITED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF
JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE, LEWIS R. PACKARD, AND THOMAS D. SEYMOUR.

PLATO

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES

AND

CRITO

EDITED ON THE BASIS OF CRON'S EDITION

BY

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BOSTON:
PUBLISHED BY GINN & COMPANY.
1902.
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1885, by

JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE AND THOMAS D. SEYMOUR,

In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.

J. S. CUSHING & Co., PRINTERS, BOSTON.
PREFACE.

This edition of the *Apology of Socrates* and the *Crito* is based upon Dr. Christian Cron's eighth edition, Leipzig, 1882. The Notes and Introduction here given have in the main been confined within the limits intelligently drawn by Dr. Cron, whose commentaries upon various dialogues of Plato have done and still do so much in Germany to make the study of our author more profitable as well as pleasanter. No scruple has been felt, however, in making changes. I trust there are few if any of these which Dr. Cron might not himself make if he were preparing his work for an English-thinking and English-speaking public.

No editor of Plato in England or America can escape the influence of Dr. Jowett's labors upon Plato; certainly not one who owes so much to Dr. Jowett's teaching and friendship as I do. This is a debt which, because it is contracted unconsciously for the most part, can hardly be adequately acknowledged. Riddell's valuable edition has suggested many changes and additions in the Notes, and Stallbaum has been assiduously consulted.

The Appendix to the Introduction differs very materially from the corresponding portion of Dr. Cron's book. There as elsewhere I have been constantly advised and as constantly enlightened by my kind friend and former teacher, Professor W. W. Goodwin. But this list of my creditors must necessarily remain incomplete, for I cannot mention those who have helped me most, nor can I record here the names of all my pupils, past and present, whose needs have been my guide and my impulse in preparing this book.
The Text is substantially that of Dr. Cron's edition; where there is alteration, reasons are given in the Critical Appendix. In no case have the illustrative citations of the German commentary been inconsiderately omitted; so far as possible, indeed, further citations have been made. The dramatists, especially Euripides, have been constantly drawn upon for new citations. It is easy to underrate the importance of Euripides to the reader of Plato; it is impossible to overstate in the interests of higher scholarship the desirability of having even the youngest students of Greek letters discipline themselves in the reading and heeding of citations offered to illustrate their author.

LOUIS DYER.
INTRODUCTION.

The endowment of philosophical thought with a beautiful form of its own was the last literary triumph of Greece. Guided by a wonderful law of growth, the Greeks, before dealing with philosophy, had already displayed in the elaboration of various kinds of literature their singular susceptibility to beauty. Epic and lyric composition first ran their full course and then the drama succeeded them. Indeed not poetry only but also history and oratory preceded philosophy, for when the drama was perfect they were nearly so. Philosophy, meanwhile, still lacked an outward form for the expression of what she was bound to say. This lack involves more than a question of clothing: the body itself of Greek thought was as yet but imperfectly developed. Since thought (ratio) is the soul of which the body is utterance (oratio), we cannot wonder at finding a single Greek word (λόγος) for both, nor can we fail to see that the soul of philosophy was not full-grown until it had fashioned for itself a body in which to stand forth free and independent.

INTRODUCTION.

philosophers; and even those famous worthies, the seven wise men, belong rather to the history of politics and civilization in general, than to the special history of philosophy. The name of Thales, one of the wise seven, stands at the beginning in Greek philosophy. He, and with him his fellow-townsmen and successors, Anaximander and Anaximenes, asked this question: What is that something out of which everything in Nature grows and is made? At Miletus, a town whose political and intellectual vigor gave it preëminence among the Ionian colonies in Asia Minor, these three men lived and sought for something omnipresent and unchanging, for the real substance which underlies the unceasing surface-changes offered to man's senses in the world. They all found this in elementary matter of some description. Thales described it as water, Anaximander as τὸ ἄπειρον, the unlimited. Anaximenes called it air. But this elementary matter no one of the three opposed to Spirit; for the opposition of “spiritual” and “material,” or of “matter” and “mind” came much later. To the Milesian philosophers matter was a something which, if not divine, was instinct with divine energy.

Yet a far less material notion of this permanent something underlying all change was undoubtedly arrived at by the Pythagoreans. Born at Samos, Pythagoras emigrated to Croton, where about 530 B.C. he founded the half religious and half political society which bore his name. These Pythagoreans believed that number was the essence of things, the permanent and real part of the world, or, to give their second way of putting the doctrine, that the elements of numbers are the elements of things. This doctrine admits of application not only to the physical world, but also to


Matter stripped of limits or boundary-lines; a something which, being everything and anything, is, according as it is limited in one way or another, “everything by turns and nothing long.”
the moral world,—to the whole field of human action. But the Pythagoreans framed no philosophy of right and wrong. They contented themselves with a few practical maxims which were useful in the work of their society. Among the various doctrines attributed to Pythagoras and his school, we can with certainty connect only one with Pythagoras himself. He certainly maintained the theory of the Transmigration of Souls. Philolaus, probably an elder contemporary of Socrates and Democritus, first stated the tenets of this school in writing. He came to Thebes, where he taught, nearly at the same time with Lysis, his well-known brother—Pythagorean. Of the book by Philolaus entitled Περὶ Φύσεως, such fragments as have been preserved are collected by Boeckh, and supply an invaluable source for the history of the old-school Pythagoreanism. Of the later Pythagoreans Archytas of Tarentum, who lived in the fourth century B.C., is the most noteworthy. He distinguished himself in politics and in mathematics.

The Pythagoreans approached a comparatively spiritual conception of nature, but the Eleatics went further in the same direction. Xenophanes of Colophon, the reputed originator of this new doctrine, was probably a contemporary of Pythagoras. Looking upon the world as a whole, he maintained that the All is the One, and that the One is God. This utterance implies a deep-seated moral conviction that God is perfection. Parmenides, who was born about 515 B.C., at Elea, a Phocaean colony in Italy, first devel-

1 Number is the law and the bond that holds the world together; everything, if we are to know it, must be numbered, i.e. odd or even. Odd numbers are limited, even numbers are unlimited, and all cases of opposition are, as it were, cases of the opposition of odd to even so that the following list of opposites may be made κατὰ συστοιχίαν, under two heads:

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2 Cf. The Merchant of Venice, Act IV. Scene I. 130 ff.; also Ovid, Metam. XV. 165 ff.

3 Philolaos des Pythagoreers Lehren nebstden Bruchstücken seines Werkes, von August Boeckh. Berlin, 1819. The authenticity of these fragments has recently been called in question.

4 To fix this date cf. Plato's Theaetetus, p. 183 e, and Parmenides, p. 127 b, where it is said that Socrates, in early youth, saw both Zeno and Parmenides, and that the latter was a very old man. The age of Parmenides was sixty-five, while Zeno's is placed at
op ed the doctrines of Xenophanes, saying that what has not Being but is many does not exist. He maintained the Oneness of all that is, calling it Being, pure and simple. Following Xenophanes, Parmenides set forth his doctrine in a long didactic poem in epic verse. Zeno supported this theory by indirect demonstration, pointing out the contradictions in which we are involved by maintaining the opposite view, that what is many has Being or exists.  

Finally, Melissus of Samos, well known as a Samian general in the revolt of that island from Athens, about 440 B.C., accepted the views of Parmenides, and, unlike Zeno, argued directly that Being is eternal, infinite, one and unchangeable.

The physical first cause of Pythagoreanism suggests the possibility of a systematic theory of right and wrong, that is of Ethics. The Eleatic first cause gives promise of a coming system of philosophic reasoning, of Dialectic. For all this we must not call Zeno the originator of Dialectic. Any inclination to do so ought to disappear after a consideration of his method in controversial reasoning and proof. He argues, not to win truth from the heart of his facts, but to defend a ready-made doctrine and to thrust it upon those whose attention he gains. At its best this is rhetoric, at its worst it is sophistry.

Conflicting authorities leave us uncertain whether it was before or after the completer statement of the Eleatic doctrines by Parmenides, that Heraclitus of Ephesus flatly contradicted the saying forty. This is not history, but it gives a chronological clue.

1 Assert that the many things seen in the world really exist, and you must admit that they are at the same time *limited* and *limitless*. For if these things are real there must be a definite sum of them, not more and not less. Hence they are *limited*. But they are also *limitless*; because, taking their definite sum and subdividing it as often as we please, we still can go on with the subdivision indefinitely and without limit.

2 If there is no Being, why do we talk of anything as being? If there is Being, either it always existed or it came into existence at some time. If it came into existence it must have grown out of something of which we could have said it is or it is not. Out of that which is not nothing can grow, therefore Being can only have grown out of Being.


4 *Cf.* the placing of “good” and “bad” on the Pythagorean list of pairs, p. 3, note 1 above.
INTRODUCTION.

of his older contemporary Xenophanes that the One admits neither motion nor change. Heraclitus is said to have flourished about the sixty-ninth Olympiad, 500 B.C. The elaborate superstructure of his teaching rested upon the following statement: "Everything is moving like a stream, and nothing stands still; all things are forever coming into existence and ceaselessly flowing away. The world was from the beginning, and always will be, ever-living fire, kindling by fixed degrees and by fixed degrees dying down. Everything has its price in terms of Fire, and Fire pays for the world as gold buys goods and goods are sold for gold." The phraseology here used abundantly shows that Heraclitus, in speaking of fire as he does, is not following the older Ionic philosophers by taking his turn at describing anew a permanent substratum in their sense. Under the veil of his oracular words the meaning is given as it were in a parable. Ever-living Fire stands for the restless impulse which underlies the process of BECOMING or transformation. This process he also calls the upward and the downward way, meaning the constant shifting of things growing up and dying down. This he thought was the common life in all Nature. Such was the picture which he drew of the world. In the same vein Heraclitus said, "The father of all things is war," meaning by war the united play of opposites or things contradictory. "Concord," he said, "is the daughter of strife."

By making his system account for the world of sensible things Heraclitus undoubtedly improves upon the Eleatics. And this, too, in spite of his substantial agreement with them in certain leading conclusions. In the first place, both schools agree in rejecting all sensible impressions as wholly untrustworthy; reaching this conclusion, however, from points of view diametrically opposed. This agreement is most obvious in their respective accounts of particular (sensible) things. Heraclitus's stream of ceaseless transformation or Becoming allows to no single thing an instant of real and permanent existence, and thus practically relegates all things that we see in the world to a state of non-existence. Parmenides regards the sensible world as non-existent, opposing to it pure existence one and indivisible. But the Eleatics provide no means
for connecting pure Being on the one hand with Not-being on the other, and, unlike Heraclitus, they cleave the world in twain and find no way of uniting the two parts. In the second place, Parmenides teaches that outside of the thought of the One there is no true thinking but only deceptive 'opining,' while Heraclitus urges that the 'universal' which pervades all things (τὸ ξυνὸν = τὸ κοινὸν) alone has understanding. This understanding the 'individual' shares only in proportion to the degree of its submission to and submersion in the 'universal.' Here is substantial agreement, but here again Heraclitus takes a wider view than Parmenides, and accordingly makes a fuller provision for the facts.

7 Though Heraclitus did not follow the example of Xenophanes and Parmenides, but wrote his work in prose, he expressed himself most obscurely. It was on this account that the ancients themselves nicknamed him ὁ σκοτεινός, the man of darkness. We hear that Socrates, when asked by Euripides for his opinion of Heraclitus's book, gave this answer: "All that I could fathom was excellent; what I could not fathom is no doubt the same, only we had better send to Delos for a man to do the diving." Aristotle says that Heraclitus is obscure because it is impossible to decide how his words are to be combined, and of the parts of his book that are preserved not a few justify this statement. For instance, a passage that has been much discussed ἐν τῷ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγει οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνός οὐνομά gives rise to two questions, neither of which can be satisfactorily answered. Shall we put a comma before or after καὶ ἐθέλει? How are the various words in the sentence to be construed?

8 Empedocles of Agrigentum stated his doctrines in a didactic poem after the manner of Xenophanes and Parmenides. He chose the epic form, and his work was the model after which Lucretius wrote his De rerum natura. Empedocles flourished in the eighty-fourth Olympiad, near the middle of the fifth century B.C. This date is confirmed by the report that he visited the newly founded

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1 Schleiermacher has collected and explained the fragments that are preserved (Museum der Alterthumswissenschaft, I.3, Berlin, 1808; or, Werke zur Philosophie, II. 1). See the attempted restoration of the original sequence of the fragments, Hermle von Ephesus, by Dr. P. Schuster, Leipzig, 1873. See also Heracliti Ephesii reliquae, ed. I. Bywater, London, 1877.
INTRODUCTION.

colony of Thurii. His system is closely connected with the Eleatic as well as with the Heraclitan scheme of things, and also shows traces of Pythagorean influence. Starting from the first principle, that Not-being can no more come to be than Being can decay and cease to be, he concludes that what men call growth and decay are respectively cases of the combination and of the disintegration of primal elements. His four elements are the familiar ones, to each of which his imaginative genius gives a mythological name. Fire, described as flaming Aether, he names Zeus; Air, Hera; Earth, Aëdoneus; Water, Nestis. These four elements were at the beginning inseparably united within the eternal Globe (Σφαίρος), which in all its parts was of like consistency. But outside of this globe ruled Strife (Νίκος), who finally invaded it, causing complete disintegration. The resisting impulse of Love (Φιλία) reacted from within and brought about a partial reintegration. This reaction and reintegration gave rise to the frame of the world (Κόσμος) with all the particular things which it comprises. In his detailed account of sensible perception, feeling, and intellectual apprehension of the good and the bad, Empedocles applies his fundamental principle with an unsteady hand, and is often involved in contradictions. His religious theories are set forth in a separate work called Καθαρμοί.

Neither the date nor the place of the birth of Leucippus can be determined, but we know that he founded the school of the Atomists. Democritus of Abdera, born in the eightieth Olympiad, about 460 B.C., was certainly his younger contemporary, and probably his disciple. Upon Democritus devolved the task of developing this new system of thought. The Atomists were unwilling to say either with Heraclitus (1) Being is a process of constant change, or with Parmenides (2) Being immovable and unchangeable exists apart from all particular things, but like Empedocles they said (3) A number of original elements exists. Instead, however, of four elements, they supposed an unlimited number of atoms (αἱ ἄτομα, sc. οὐσίαι or ὑζίαι). These indivisible Atoms were in-

1 For the interesting fragments of his well-written work, cf. Mullach’s referred to above, p. 4, note 3.

2 Democriti Abderitae operum frag-
wardly alike in essence, and so small as to be indistinguishable; they differed in shape, arrangement, and position. Their combination means growth; their separation means decay and destruction; the difference in their situation and arrangement is at the bottom of such variety and change as we see in the world. But why, we may ask, should these Atoms combine or separate? Because, says the Atomist, necessity forces them to move. This necessary motion comes, not from any source or cause beyond and above them, but is derived partly from an original rotary motion, a twist which they take at the start, and partly from their constant collision one with another and the consequent reaction. But to move at all they need room to move in. This room is a vacuum which offers no resistance; it is free and empty space or void, while the atoms are space compacted and filled full, or fulness. Reality consists solely of these Atoms, and hence they are Being, while the Void is Not-being. And yet Not-being in this sense has a relative existence. Therefore the Atomists did not hesitate to say: Being no more is than Not-being. By Atoms not the physical world of the senses only, but also the soul, is explained. The body is the cabin, σκήνα, of the soul, and on this basis an attempt is made to explain mental activity and the life of the soul. Here the shortcomings of the Atomistic explanation of the world show themselves. Still, against the Atomists the point is not well taken that, by necessity, an Atomist must mean chance or what is arbitrary, and all praise is due to the determined logic with which they apply their principle consistently to every detail. Democritus is credited with a number of admirable moral maxims; they express, however, the plain common-sense of a man who means to make the most of life, rather than a matured philosophy of conduct.

10 Anaxagoras of Clazomenae was born in the seventieth Olympiad, about 500 B.C., and thus his birth preceded that of Empedocles and Democritus; but he must be counted as belonging to a maturer phase of thought.1 When Anaxagoras said: “Order is introduced

1 Aristotle, Metaphysics A, 3: Ἀνα-ξαγόρας... τῇ μὲν ἡλικίᾳ πρῶτερον ἔν τού-του (Ἔμπεδοκλέους), τοῖς δ᾽ ἐργαῖς ὅστε-ρος, ἀπείρους εἶναι φησὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς. Of his book Περὶ Φύσεως a number of fragments are preserved. Schaubach has
INTRODUCTION.

into the All by mind,” there was no further use either for the half-mythological forces of Empedocles, or for the blind necessity of the Atomists. And yet, there was much upon which all the three schools would have agreed; Democritus and Empedocles would have welcomed Anaxagoras’s dictum, “The Greeks are wrong in believing that there is such a thing as growing to be out of nothing or perishing away into nothing; nothing grows to be and nothing perishes, but all things are the mingling together and the falling apart of elements that really exist. So, therefore, to grow into being is properly to-be-compounded, and to perish is to-fall-apart.” These elements that really exist Anaxagoras did not define as Empedocles defined his elements or as the Atomists defined their atoms. He often calls his elements seeds, σπέιραμα, and they have certain determinate qualities which make them the seeds of this, that, or the other particular kind of thing, e.g. gold, wood, bone. Flesh, blood, and bone are respectively combinations of parts, each one of which parts has the peculiar properties of the whole of which it is one part, and the whole has the properties of each of its parts. In speaking of such a whole, as well as of its parts, Aristotle used the word ὁμοιομερή (ὁμοιος, like, and μέρος, part); therefore, the whole theory has often been called ομοιομερή. In the beginning, the sum of things infinitesimally small and infinite in number, no one of which could be perceived on account of its smallness, lay in a mass together. Finally mind intervened, separating like from unlike and introducing order. The most delicate and purest of essences, mind enters into combination with nothing else; it understands all things for and by itself, and over all it rules supreme. In such unmistakable terms as these did Anaxagoras set forth the idea of an all-wise and all-powerful essence completely distinct from matter. The words which he chose are no doubt inadequate because borrowed from the domain of the senses, but their import is clear. The fact that he reached this conception of mind gives to Anaxagoras a conspicuous place in the history of Greek philosophy, and yet he hardly knew the

published them: Anaxagorae Clazomenii fragmenta collecta et illustrata, Lips. 1827. Mullach has also put them into his book. See on Apology, p. 26 d.
full bearing of his discovery. Mind, he says, when in the begin­ning all things lay in a motionless mass, gave them their first im­pulse and lent the motion which brought order into all. In other respects Anaxagoras's explanation of nature is materialistic, the same in kind with those of his predecessors and contemporaries. This is what Plato and Aristotle say, and it is of this that they both complain. In order that the conception of mind reached by Anaxagoras might be made fruitful, there was need that it be com­pletely worked out, and for this the foundations of philosophy had to be laid anew. For this necessary work of reconstruction no more favorable place could have been found than Athens. Indeed, it was at Athens, and in the society of its most noteworthy men, especially of Pericles and Euripides, that Anaxagoras himself lived. He was, however, finally accused of atheism and exiled by the enemies of his great friend Pericles. Leaving Athens, he retired to Lampsacus, and there ended his days.

11 After numerous attempts to account for the world of sensible things on a physical basis, the very school of thinkers who sought to explain matter by matter began to feel the need of some first cause which should lie outside of matter and above it. Henceforward the one thing indispensable for the full recognition of such a first cause was a vigorous impulse which, aroused and uplifting the moral energy of national thought, should re-shape Philosophy by the help of this new conception. This required impulse was found in the practical demand, now for the first time made upon philosophers, that they abandon the retirement in which, with little or no reference to what was going on about them, they had up to this time carried on their speculations.¹ Now the time had come when the world demanded a new departure in education, and now was the opportunity for Philosophy to try her strength. At first this trial seemed to lead rather to destruction than to reconstruc­tion; the wear and tear of practice threatened completely to swallow up all theory. Various tendencies, indeed, the obvious

¹ They show no little impatience and disdain of every-day men like ourselves. It matters little to them whether we keep pace with their dis­cussions or fall behind,—every man of them steadily goes on his chosen way. Plato, Sophist, p. 243 a.
results not a few of them of doctrines previously taught, accomplished nothing but their own destruction. But this very destruction served to point a moral, since it showed that the engrossing aim of sound philosophy must not be to adorn its devotees with irresponsible cleverness and to train their faculties in that kind of intellectual dexterity whose chief reward is success. For it became evident that a moral ideal was required which, in the teaching of the Sophists, was absent. This lack of a freshly grasped and high moral standard, coupled with the effort to turn their disciples into dextrous performers on the stage of life, characterized many different teachers at this time. These teachers were the Sophists, and their teaching is usually called not Sophistry but Sophistic. This term is accordingly applied to the teaching of men who, in the details of their theories, often had little or nothing in common. Men who appeared as public professors of wisdom called themselves Sophists, and were so called by the public. They gathered about them old and young, and, for a stated fee, gave lectures to hearers fresh from the heat of a keen and active political strife in such branches of knowledge as were likely to interest men so pre-occupied. In short, the practical needs of political life led them to annex the widening territory of rhetoric to the traditional domain of philosophy. They devoted much energy to the art of vigorous speech-writing and of finished speech-making. These were the outward graces which a Sophist used in order to make his teachings and lectures attractive. Rhetoric and Sophistic were sister arts, inseparable from the outset, and for every man who was anxious to find the best market for his proficiency in

1 Grote, in his History of Greece (ch. 67), is certainly right in rejecting this designation, if it must mean that the teachings and principles of all Sophists were the same or that all of them taught in the same way. The word Sophistic may, however, be said to imply such similarity in methods of teaching and in doctrine as would (1) fairly distinguish the Sophists from Socrates, and (2) lead us to class the Sophists together. Three negative statements apply to all the Sophists which do not apply to Socrates: first the Sophists did not teach free of charge, second they did not in any strict sense lay foundations for the future development of philosophy, third they did not cast their lot either with their own or with any adopted country.
these arts, Athens, at that time the centre of all the intellectual activity of the day, was a natural place of abode.

Among the representatives of the new turn which thought had taken, Protagoras and Gorgias are especially prominent. Accordingly, more than all the rest, these two have earned a place in the history of philosophy. Protagoras of Abdera was the first who claimed as his distinguishing title the name of Sophist. When he was born and when he died cannot be satisfactorily determined. At all events, he was a contemporary of Socrates, though considerably his elder. Protagoras, during his long life of seventy years more or less, made repeated and protracted visits to Athens. He was, however, forced to discontinue them on account of a vote of the Athenian assembly condemning him as an atheist. His philosophical theory was based upon the dictum of Heraclitus that all things are constantly in a state of flux. But, in applying this principle to human thought and human action, he reached conclusions which were not infrequently opposed to those of the great Ephesian. In place of Heraclitus's \( \xi n\nu\delta\varsigma \lambda\gamma\omicron\varsigma \) he maintained that \textit{Man is the measure of all things; of things that are that they are, of things that are not that they are not.} By man he understood man as this or that only by the right man; by an ideally perfect man endowed with ideally perfect knowledge. In saying that Protagoras did not mean this ideal man Cron agrees with the following account, translated (\textit{freely}) from Plato's \textit{Theaetetus}, p. 161 c: "In other respects I am charmed with the doctrine of Protagoras that what seems to each man is, but I can never swallow his beginning. Why did he not commence by saying the measure of all things was a hog or a dog-faced baboon or some still worse monster, and that so far as wisdom went he himself was no wiser than a tadpole? If each man is his own best judge and all that he decides upon is right and true, how then is Protagoras wise enough to teach the rest of us, and to charge us roundly for it?"
individual. This amounted to cutting away all footing for knowl-
edge, after reducing knowledge to the sensation or sensible per-
ception of a given individual.

Gorgias of Leontini, in Sicily, appeared at Athens in 427 B.C., on 13
an embassy from his native town. His mission was successful, and his brilliant oratory won such golden opinions that large num-
bbers crowded to listen to his show speeches and paid him hand-
somely for his trouble. Later he revisited Athens and travelled to
various places in Greece (Xen. Anab. ii. 6. 16 ff.), always with
the same success. It is said that he was a hundred years old
when he died. His philosophical views and method of reason-
ing were based upon the Eleatic system, and are summed up in the
following words from his book (περὶ φύσεως ἢ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, Nature,
or THAT WHICH IS NOT): "Nothing is; if anything is, it cannot be
known; if anything can be known, it cannot be communicated.”
But the chief concern of Gorgias was the teaching of rhetoric; here he sought to win fame. Still, his instruction seems to have
been confined to practical hints in regard to details and he objected
to being called a Sophist.

Among the other distinguished Sophists, Hippias of Elis and 14
Prodicus of Ceos were especially famous. Hippias was chiefly
noted for his extensive knowledge of genealogy and of mathemati-
cal astronomy, but he also plumed himself upon his miscellaneous
accomplishments in various practical directions. Prodicus is best
known for his nice discriminations between words of similar mean-
ing, and for his moral lectures. Xenophon (Mem. ii. 1. 21) has pre-
served one of these, the very clever story of the Choice of Heracles.

The bustling activity of these and of other Sophists who had no 15
fixed abiding-place, produced no marked effect upon philosophy
beyond making clear the insufficiency of all previous speculation.
After a hundred years and more, Greek thought had reached the
conclusion that to talk of real truth was idle, and that all knowl-

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1 This same name is applied to the inhabitants. Ptolemaeus is alone in
calling the town Λέοντιον.
2 Diodorus xii. 53. Thuc. iii. 86 does not mention him by name.
3 The dates given for his birth vary
from 496 B.C. (Foss) to 483 B.C. (Frei); for his death, from 384 B.C. to 375 B.C.
4 See on Apol., p. 18 b.
INTRODUCTION.

Knowledge depends solely upon sensible perception and sensation. So, therefore, knowledge could at most change worse sensations into better ones,—more profitable and pleasanter ones.

This doctrine virtually involved the destruction of all philosophy. Therefore Socrates, who won the day against it, is rightly called the deliverer and the new founder of philosophy.

Socrates, the son of a sculptor Sophroniscus, was born at Athens, and as a boy followed his father's occupation. Soon, however, he abandoned sculpture and devoted himself to the profession to which he thought God called him; this was a continuous warfare carried on against the conceit of sham knowledge in all its forms. Wherever and whenever he met it he was bound to expose sham knowledge as real ignorance. As for himself, he claimed no knowledge beyond the capital fact that he knew nothing. By this, however, he did not mean that real knowledge was as the Sophists maintained impossible. For though Socrates said that God alone was really wise, his meaning was that the whole duty of man was comprised in the struggle toward that real knowledge which alone gives the power to do right. And just here Socrates declared that all virtues, ἀρεταί, were essentially forms of knowledge, and were based upon the understanding of some class of things. This involved the final identification of virtue in general with understanding. If virtue is understanding, it follows that no one does wrong knowingly; men sin only in so far as they are in ignorance of what is right. A man who knows the right, who has real knowledge, will do the right, for then that knowledge will be stronger within him than any desire. Naturally the standard of this genuine knowledge is not arbitrary, nor is it borrowed from anything outside of the soul. Socrates based all knowledge upon necessary obedience to the commandment inscribed upon the temple at

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1 The ordinary date given for his birth is Ol. 77, 3 or 4 = 470/09 B.C.: probably Ol. 77, 2 or 1 = 472/1 B.C. is nearer the truth. Cf. infra note on § 30, and Apol., p. 17 d.

2 Cf. Apol., p. 29 d ff., particularly the explanation of ε, ἐφήσῳμαυ κρέ.

3 It cannot be denied that even in Socrates' conception of ἀρετή, the old notion so manifest in Homer (cf. Döderlein, Hom. Gloss., p. 536) of 'skill' or cleverness was still very strong. The German word 'Tugend' and its corresponding idea are similarly connected with 'Tauglichkeit' and 'Tüchtigkeit.'
INTRODUCTION.

Delphi, Γνώθι σεαυτόν. Xenophon (Mem. iv. 2) gives an account of Socrates's explanation of this.\(^1\)

Two questions arise concerning Socrates's idea of knowledge as the foundation of righteousness, (1) What constitutes this knowledge? (2) What is the field in which it works? Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle vie with one another in declaring that Socrates would always ask about everything under discussion: What is the general idea of which this, that, or the other is a particular instance? Τι ἑκαστὸν ἔστι τῶν δυτῶν. Let every man first answer this question, and then he is a fit guide for his friends; otherwise it is a case of 'the blind leading the blind.' Hence, when Socrates found a man who claimed the possession of knowledge, his test question was, Can you define the thing which you say you know? And he usually found his man incapable of giving the required definition, and accordingly showed up the boasted knowledge as ignorance.

In applying this test, and in taking the steps by which he led up to and determined the definition required, consisted the peculiar method of Socrates. He always began with everyday facts, and then proceeded by the method of question and answer, either (1) to the definition and general idea required, or (2) to the irresistible conclusion that some definition in vogue which he had taken up was wrong. The steps taken in going from a given class of particulars to their universal, which is the general idea including them all, are called ἐπαγωγή, induction. Hence, Aristotle ascribes to Socrates the discovery of the epagogic or inductive method (τοὺς ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους), and of the definition of universals (τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου, — hence ὅρος = definitio).

By the dialectic (διαλεκτική) of Socrates is meant simply his acuteness in so guiding a series of questions and answers that something was finally done toward determining a general conception and reaching some measure of truth. This process required a living issue raised between a man skilled in questioning and some one willing to answer him. But, soon after the day of Socrates,

\(^1\) We may summarize the philosophical situation as follows: Protagoras said: Man is the measure; Socrates met this by asking: What is man? Gorgias said: We cannot have real knowledge; Socrates met this by saying: Before we give up knowledge let us seriously try to know ourselves.
INTRODUCTION.

'dialectic' became a philosophical term applied particularly to the more developed and many-sided method of Plato; indeed, it finally became identified with Plato's logic or theory of ideas. Quite apart from Socrates's dialectic is the controversial art of certain Sophists (ἀντιλογική), for, whereas this controversial art only sought perpetual controversy, the essential peculiarity of the dialectic of Socrates was that it aimed at the understanding of truth.

The discussions of Socrates were almost always ethical. Nearly all questions which up to his day had engrossed philosophers he summarily excluded from the field of his investigation. He asked: What is virtue? what is holiness? what is justice? what is courage? And his answer, in every case, was understanding,—the understanding of what is good in reference now to one and now to another class of facts. Courage, for instance, is the understanding of what is good in relation to things terrible and dangerous; and he has courage whose conduct is right in cases of terror and danger. Yet Socrates recognized that the original bent with which the individual is born here disclosed itself; since he saw that, just as one man's body is born stronger than his neighbor's, so one man's soul was born more courageous than his neighbor's. Yet he maintained that every man, be the qualities born in him what they might, could advance in excellence (πρὸς ἀρετήν) by learning and practice.

Such is Socrates's doctrine in its outlines, as Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle have represented it in their writings. Socrates himself, as is well known, was the author of no books. We have, therefore, no direct statement of his views at first hand. The most important authority for his teachings is Xenophon, especially his four books of "Memoirs of Socrates" (ἀπομνημονεύματα, commentarii, Memorabilia). In this work the writer undertakes to defend the memory of his friend and master against the accusations and slanders of all enemies. With this in view, he sets forth all that he can remember of the conversations of Socrates. All must be ready to allow that Xenophon, who was nothing if not a man of action, failed to understand Socrates's position in

1 It has been claimed that the Memorabilia are referred to by Horace (A. P. v. 310), as Socratieae chartae. The poet's allusion, however, is probably more vague.
the history of Greek philosophy; he could not adequately appreciate him as a philosopher. But of the man his portrait is invaluable, in spite of this or perhaps on account of this. Writing from a popular point of view, he corrects Plato’s ideal representation of the master Socrates, and helps us to the facts about Socrates as he lived and taught. Further, in the judicious remarks scattered here and there through Aristotle’s writings, we have always a most welcome supplement, and often a most wholesome corrective; by drawing from all these sources we are enabled to bring our ideal Socrates within the limits of historical fact.

An account of Socrates’s theory gives no adequate knowledge of his historical significance. A necessary aid must be sought in some description of his personality, of Socrates during life and Socrates facing death.¹

It has already been said that Socrates thought his life consecrated to the service of a higher power and his every act the fulfilment of a task laid on him by God. This it was that forbade his following any of the pursuits which engross the majority of men. He was poor,² but his poverty was not so complete as his frugality. The fulfilment of God’s command imposed upon him abstention from politics, except in cases where to abstain would be to neglect the plain duties of a citizen. He served as a hoplite in three campaigns,³ and showed in battle that he was no mere talker about courage. This same temper, this unterrified obedience to duty, unswerving in the way of right and law, he displayed as one of the senators⁴ and prytanes on the occasion of the memorable popular assembly which illegally condemned the generals victorious at Arginusae. Here he faced the arbitrary caprice of the people with the same strength of mind which made him

¹ When Xenophon is used as our authority, it should be remembered that the subtler qualities of such a man as Socrates were likely, either to escape so unimaginative a mind, or, if felt, to be represented inadequately by a writer comparatively destitute of dramatic power. These are just the qualities which distinguish Socrates from all other teachers, and these are given by Plato alone. Cf. ‘Socrates,’ a translation of the Apology, Crito, and parts of the Phaedo. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York.
² Apology, p. 23 e and note; also Xen. Mem. I. vi.
³ Apology, p. 28 e and note; also Laches, pp. 181 a b, 188 e, and Symposium, pp. 219 e–221 e.
⁴ Apology, p. 32 b with note
afterwards\(^1\) prefer death to a cowardly and unrighteous submission to the thirty tyrants.

24 Critias, like Alcibiades, was for a time a disciple of Socrates chiefly for the reason that he expected in that capacity to learn certain useful accomplishments. Later, as the leading spirit among the Thirty, this same Critias undertook to make the habitual occupation of Socrates uncomfortable for him. The conversation between the two is preserved by Xenophon (Mem. i. 2. 31 ff.). The passage is characteristic of both speakers, and should certainly be read by all, for it familiarizes us with the plan of active operations to which Socrates devoted all of his life and energy.

25 Xenophon tells us that Critias, and with him Charicles who was also an influential member of the Thirty, had been irritated by Socrates's freedom of speech. They pointedly reminded him of the terms of a law which they had promulgated to meet his particular case, and threateningly bade him obey its behests: \(λόγων \, τέχνην \, μη \, διδάσκειν\), \textit{no one shall teach the art of words}. It is no matter for surprise that this law should have been aimed at Socrates, for two reasons: first, because of the tendency to classify Socrates as one of the Sophists. Indeed, he seems to have been looked upon simply as the most popular and effective of Sophists, and hence he became for the comic poets the representative Sophist.\(^2\) The second reason is, that the words \(λόγων \, τέχνη\), taken in their widest sense, do apply to Socrates's characteristic way of question and answer, as well as to rhetoric; and yet there were really many outer and palpable marks which distinguished Socrates and his teaching from the Sophists and their art. A Sophist charged for his instruction, and hence would usually teach in some place of private resort; Socrates, since he was the servant

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\(^1\) Apology, p. 32 c d with note.\(^3\)

\(^2\) In the Clouds, first put on the stage in B.C. 423, Aristophanes brings Socrates before his audience in that capacity. An added piquancy was given by Socrates's peculiar personal appearance, which fell so very far short of the Hellenic ideal of beauty. Indeed Socrates himself frequently compares himself with the statues of Silenus (Xenophon, Symposium, ch. 5; Plato, Symposium, ch. 33). How then could we expect the comic poets to abstain from caricaturing one so easy to caricature? Anybody could recognize a mask which was meant for Socrates.
INTRODUCTION.

of God, would take no man's pay. Hence, he naturally pre­ferred the most public places, such as the market, the gymnasium, a public porch, or some workshop. Being no respecter of persons he was ready to discuss with every man, and eager to share the search for truth with any new comer. The genuineness of this desire for coöperation was undoubted, for he declared himself unable alone to get at any knowledge. To exemplify this his homely description of his art as intellectual midwifery (μαιευτική) and his comparison of it with the profession of his mother, the midwife Phaenarete, may be mentioned.1 This idea made him protest against being called any man's teacher, indeed he stoutly denied that he had any pupils. As substitutes for these names of teacher and pupil, Xenophon and Plato use words which all of them describe the pursuit of truth on equal and friendly terms.

The chief delight of Socrates was to gather about him young men of good parts who were eager for knowledge. This led him to frequent places where they habitually assembled, such as the palaes­tra or the gymnasium. No doubt the Thirty bore this in mind when they bade him not to consort with any one under thirty years of age. But Socrates was ready to talk with men of all ages and all stations, no matter where he found them. He was often seen con­versing eagerly with workmen, and this led him to draw freely upon their familiar surroundings and occupations for topics and for illustrations. And hence we hear the frequent complaint that he was continually harping upon cobbling, cobbler, carpenters, smiths, and the like. He was considered a bore who repeated the same thing about the same subject ad nauseam; whereas, the Soph­ists were at infinite pains never to use the same phraseology twice in discussing the same thing. Of course this implied that their attention was riveted upon the way of putting things: they dazzled their hearers and drew from them tumultuous applause, little caring if the enthusiasm lasted but for a moment. But the whole energy of Socrates was absorbed by the central purpose of rousing a right understanding and of implanting a firm and fruitful conviction. That the knowledge itself which Socrates strove for was far other

1 Cf. Alcibiades I., p. 431 c; Theaetet., p. 149 a.
than that which the Sophists so glibly taught, is best shown by a contrast between one characteristic attribute of his discourse and theirs. The Sophists made a great flourish of trumpets (ἰππίδιίξιε); they began with a perfectly rounded self-complacency. Socrates began by protesting that he was sure of one thing only, — his own ignorance. Wisdom, he declared, is of God; and this, said he, was the meaning intended by the oracle at Delphi by the words: No man is wiser than Socrates. This self-knowledge is nothing more than a purified form of the genuinely Greek idea of temperance, σωφροσύνη. It is based upon the immemorial belief that the gods are jealous and refuse to tolerate men who put themselves upon a pedestal.\(^1\) The conceit of self-knowledge with which the Sophists were puffed up, Socrates undoubtedly considered a case in point. Against this conceit he waged war with his incomparable irony,\(^2\) before which all their wisdom became as nothing. He made it plain to them, and to whomsoever it might concern, that all their general notions were confused and worthless. A tempered form of his irony is seen in his treatment of young and enthusiastic votaries of learning. First of all, he helps them to an understanding of their ignorance, but yet he leaves in their souls such a sting as stirs them to an earnest struggle for real insight. Indeed, we have seen that the humility of Socrates's self-measurement was by no means incompatible with a fixed determination to win the truth which leads to righteousness. Socrates said, in short: Let no man call himself a σοφιστή, owner of wisdom, but let every man be a φιλόσοφος, lover of wisdom.

There is, indeed, no uncertain ring in the religious tone of Socrates's philosophy. By his conversations\(^3\) he strove to rouse in others the religious sense, and at the same time he exhibited in his own life a heartfelt piety, rooted in the purest gratitude for the goodness of God, and manifested in the most scrupulous conformity to all the outward rites and observances of public worship. Even the popular practice of consulting oracles and interpreting omens, he did not, according to Xenophon,\(^4\) reject. He merely sought to confine it

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\(^1\) Hdt. I. 32.  
\(^2\) Cf. Apology, p. 37 e; Republic, p. 337 a: ἐκεῖνη ἡ ἔλεσθιν ἐρωτεύει Σωκράτους.  
\(^3\) See Xen. Mem. i. 4 and iv. 3.  
\(^4\) Cf. particularly Mem. I. i. 2 sqq., especially 6–9; see also Anabasis iii. 1. 5–7.
to difficulties for dealing with which God had given to man neither the knowledge nor the capacity. In all these cases, Socrates himself was singularly favored in that he possessed a gift sent of God,—a heavenly voice of warning. Whenever this voice spoke within him he knew that what he was about to do would result in harm and that therefore he must abstain from it; when the voice was silent he was the stronger in his purpose and strengthened others in theirs.¹ Socrates most certainly did not conceive of this voice as an emanation from a special and independent divinity, but as a revelation of the love and the wisdom of God. Such a revelation, he thought,² might well come to any man, though perhaps not in the same way. Still Socrates may have been uncommonly sensitive to this influence, and more conscientious than most men in doing what it prompted. Be this as it may; what we know about the matter serves to prove that his trust in God was exceptional; indeed this is nowhere made clearer than in cases where Socrates did not hear the voice, and yet, without its warning to direct him, was deaf to the clamors of selfish fears which greatly disturb other men,—cases where he did what he knew was right without petty anxiety as to the end.

Intimately connected with this remarkable strength of moral character is the absolute control in which his body was held by his mind. The capital manifestation of this is to be found in the accounts which have been preserved of his 'staying power' while he was engaged in following up a train of thought. The best instance of this Plato gives in the following story of Socrates at the siege of Potidæa.³ Early one day a subject of thought occurred to Socrates while he was walking, and he stopped; for twenty-four hours he stood stock-still, because he could not come to any conclusion until


² Schleiermacher proves this in his note on Apology, p. 27b, by showing that Plato and Xenophon alike use δαμάων as an adjective. Cf. on Apol., p. 31d.

³ Sympos., p. 220c, d; see also, on the credibility of the story, Zeller II., p. 69.
the next morning. In other respects as well his endurance was remark-

able: he was hardened to every privation. Winter and sum-
mer alike he went barefoot, and always wore clothes of the same
texture and thickness. This, in fact, made the rigours of a winter
in Thrace tell upon him far less than upon his comrades in arms.1
Apart from his soldiering, hardly anything could induce Socrates
to leave Athens, as he is made to say himself in the Crito.2 As for
temperance and frugality, we have seen that he was remarkable
for both.

29 The outline given above may be regarded as an historically trust-
worthy account of the character of Socrates. And now we need
hesitate no longer in agreeing with the enthusiastic estimate of
Socrates given at the end of the Memorabilia. But all this cer-
tainly leaves us but ill-prepared for the manner of the great man’s
‘taking off.’ Prosecuted in his declining years, on a most serious
charge, he was, after a legal trial, sentenced to death. And all
this happened, not during any oligarchical or democratic reign of
terror, but at the very time when everybody was admiring the
moderate spirit of the newly-restored Athenian democracy. It was
shortly after the archonship of Euclides and the deposition of the
thirty tyrants by Thrasybulus. As far as history has determined
them, the facts about this trial are as follows: —

30 In the first year of the ninety-fifth Olympiad, while Laches was
archon, and when Socrates had already passed the limit of three-
score years and ten,3 Meletus, seconded by Anytus and Lyco, came
forward with his accusation. In Plato’s Euthyphro Meletus is
described as an insignificant youth, and in the Apology he is
treated with a measure of contempt. Some identify him with the
poet Meletus,4 others say he was the poet’s son,5 though ‘a chip
of the old block,’ since the words (Apol. 23 e) ἐπὶ τῶν ποιητῶν

1 Sympos., p. 220 a b.
2 Crito, ch. XIV. with note on p. 53 a.
3 Apol., p. 17 d and supra, p. 14,
note 1. Ol. 95, 1 = 400/399 n.c.
4 Aristoph. Frogs, v. 1302.
5 K. F. Hermann, in his Disputatio
de Socratis accusatoribus, maintains
that there were four different persons

named Meletus, (1) the accuser of
Socrates, (2) the poet referred to in
the Frogs, (3) the Meletus, cf. Apol.,
p. 32 e d, who obeyed the thirty, and
arrested the unoffending Leon of Sala-
mis, (4) the Meletus of Xen. Hell. ii.
4. 36. Frohberger argues against this
INTRODUCTION.

άχθομενος imply that he was poetically inclined. He led the prosecution, the other two being technically his συνήγοροι. It is plain, however, that the substantial man of the three was Anytus, since it was the influence of Anytus which chiefly secured the verdict.¹ Anytus, who had inherited a handsome property and had filled the highest offices in the commonwealth, was at this particular time one of the most popular men in public life. He had worked with all his might to help Thrasybulus expel the Thirty and to restore the democracy. Not only did he condemn Socrates as being one of the Sophists against all of whom his bitterness was uncompromising, but in addition he owed him an especial grudge. For Socrates, it appears, had made certain indiscreet and irritating comments upon his private affairs.² Lyco is absolutely unknown beyond what is said in the Apology (22 e). There he is represented as a professional speech-maker, and it is reasonable to infer that as such he contributed far more than Meletus toward the success of the prosecution.

The indictment was submitted by Meletus to the ἄρχων βασιλεύς, ³ whose jurisdiction covered all cases involving religion. Its formal terms were: ³ Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods believed in by the state, and also of introducing other new divinities. Moreover, he is further guilty of corrupting the young. The penalty proposed is death. This was an indictment for an offence against the state⁴; accordingly it was technically a γραφή (public suit), and, as further qualified by the specific charges, a γραφή ἀδεβίας (a public suit on the count of impiety).

As to the negative clause of the first count (οὐς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει ³² θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων), it certainly is difficult to see any fact to justify such an accusation, inasmuch as Socrates expressly recognized the law of the land (νόμος πολεως) as the final arbiter in all that concerned the worship of the gods; and, indeed, himself scrupulously

¹ Apol., p. 36 a.
² [Xen.] Apol. 29, sqq. Probably there is some reference to Anytus’s unjust hatred of Socrates in Xen. Cyrop. iii. 1. 38 sqq.
³ 'Αδικεὶ Σωκράτης οὐς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἐτερα δὲ καὶνα δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος (or εἰσφέρων with Xen. Mem. i. 1. 1). ἀδικεὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦς νέους διαψθίγων.
⁴ See infra, § 67, and Apol., p. 19 b.
⁵ Apol., p. 26 d.
observed all its requirements.\(^5\) The terms of the second (affirmative) clause (έτερα δὲ καὶ νὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος) apparently refer to the much mooted δαιμόνιον, — the mysterious communication from God to Socrates. This allegation was a slander, but had it been true could hardly have had much weight at Athens, where the introduction of new divinities was not a crime.

It is, however, probable that the first count was introduced as a foil to the second, and was primarily intended as a means for giving a legal foothold to the suit. For among all known provisions of Athenian law there is not one under which Socrates could have been prosecuted on the second count (άδικε δὲ καὶ τοὺς νεόνις διαφθοράς). This view is confirmed by the difficulty which even the thirty tyrants had in interfering officially with Socrates’s dealings with young men. They had to pass a special law for the purpose, and that law was doubtless abolished when the democracy was restored. At all events it is certain that in the accuser’s mind the second count was the most important. We have only to remember the prejudices of Anytus, and to recall the fact that he was still smarting under Socrates’s sharp criticism of the way in which he educated his son. We can understand his indignation, though we do not share it. Now Anytus was a citizen in excellent standing, and naturally felt sure of success against such heresies in any appeal to the law. What, then, is easier to understand than his eagerness to take advantage of any pretext that offered itself against Socrates? He was eager to save his country by redressing his own grievance. Nor is it difficult to see why many of the judges should have been inclined to sympathize with him. They were enthusiastic for the democracy, and looked with disfavour upon any man like Socrates who had so often and so sharply criticized institutions dear to the democrat’s heart. Still, it is more than questionable whether such criticisms were amenable to the law of a commonwealth whose shibboleth was \textit{free speech} (παρρησία). A connection, on Socrates’s part, with overt or covert attempts at revolution cannot be thought of; any suggestion of the kind falls by its own weight, for it is pure and unadulterated slander. But still it was urged that Alcibiades and Critias, notorious scourges of the body politic, were for some time
INTRODUCTION.

the companions of Socrates. And, though Xenophon has abundantly shown the injustice of remembering this against Socrates, the judges could not forget it. The memory of these men's crimes was still so fresh that every one was inclined to mistrust the man to whose teaching many attributed the misdeeds which had so lately made life unbearable. This teaching they were therefore determined to stop, and nothing could better have served their purpose than the first count of the indictment, an accusation of atheism, for at Athens it had often gone hard in the courts with those who had to meet this charge.

This whole accusation was from the first met calmly and collect­edly by Socrates, and he showed the same temper at the bar of the court. There is a story, told twice of Socrates,¹ which brings this unruffled spirit vividly before us, and Plato's Theaetetus does the same more subtly. Plato represents that intricate and abstruse philosophical discussion, carried on by Socrates with phenomenal fair-mindedness and consummate ease, as taking place immediately before the great teacher was compelled by the summons of Meletus to appear for preliminary examination before the magistrate² (ἄρχων βασιλεύς). It was a sense of duty only which forced Socrates to appear, both at this time and afterwards, at the trial. It was his duty, he thought, to appear in his own case and to make his own plea,³ though he made it without real hope or serious

¹ "Hermogenes, the son of Hippocrates," a friend of Socrates, "noticed that Socrates, though he conversed freely on things in general, avoided any allusion to the impending suit. 'My dear Socrates,' said he, 'surely you ought to be attending to your brief.' 'Why, do I not seem to you,' answered Socrates, 'to have passed my life with my brief constantly in view?' 'What do you mean by that?' asked Hermogenes. 'I mean that I have shunned evil all my life, that, I think, is the most honorable way in which a man can bestow attention upon his own defence.'" [Xen.] Apol., § 3 sqq. Cf. Mem. iv. 8. 4 sqq., where the story is almost verbally repeated.

² Theaet., p. 210 c d.

³ Cicero (De oratore I. 54) is our chief authority for the following tale about Socrates's defence. The celebrated orator Lysias, out of the fulness of his friendship for Socrates, wrote him a speech for his defence. Socrates declined it when offered, because he thought it would be undignified for him to use it, and in spite of the fact that it was a marvel of pleasing. The story is probably founded on the fact that upwards of six years after Socrates's execution Lysias wrote a rhetorical exercise (declamatio) on the theme of Socrates's defence, as an answer to
desire of escaping the death-penalty proposed by his accuser. His defence was made without previous preparation, and there breathed in it such noble pride and such uncompromising independence that its effect must rather have irritated than conciliated his judges. In the court-room as on the battle-field Socrates was always the same fearless champion of his own and his country's honour. Where other men consulted their own safety, God required Socrates to be faithful and to obey orders.

And so it came to pass that the judges brought in the verdict of 'guilty,' but by no large majority. In cases of this nature the law did not fix the penalty beforehand, and Socrates had still the right of rating his guilt at his own price, ἀντιμᾶσθαι, his accuser having proposed, τιμάσθαι, the penalty of death. After the defendant had named his counter-penalty, the court was bound to choose one of the two. Just as in his plea Socrates had disinclined the ordinary means of working upon the feelings of the court by tears and supplications, so now he scorned the obvious way of safety still open to any man whose guilt had been affirmed by verdict. He absolutely refused to suggest any real counter-penalty, and hence an increased majority sentenced him to death.

The same courage which had animated him while speaking his defence, the same rooted conviction that they who love God need fear no evil, supported him now when his execution had become a question of days and hours, and prevented him from countenancing any plan for disobeying the laws of the state. Exceptional circumstances delayed the execution of his sentence for thirty days after a speech on the other side of the case by the rhetorician Polycrates. For a discussion of the matter, see Spengel (Συναγωγή τεχνῶν, p. 141) and Rauchenstein (Philol. XVI. 1).

1 "But when they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak: for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak." Matthew x., v. 19.

2 Apol., p. 36 a and ibid. note on ει τρισκόντα κτέ.

3 Ibid., p. 35 d and infra, § 73.

4 § 73.

5 It is said that the adverse majority was increased by eighty votes which had previously been cast for a verdict of 'not guilty.'

6 Crito, p. 43 c with note on τὸ πλοῖον. Cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 8. 2: "He was constrained to live for thirty days after his case was decided because it was the month of the yearly festival and embassy to Delos, and the law prohibited all public executions until the return of the sacred envoys.
INTRODUCTION.

it was rendered, and his friends, perhaps with the connivance of the authorities, offered him means of escape and also opportunity to use them. But he was firm in refusing these, just as while on trial he had been firm in rejecting every opportunity to secure either a favourable verdict or a lighter penalty. The tale that shortly after his death the Athenians repented and actually called the accusers to account rests on such slender authority that it must not be taken as history.

Of all the companions of Socrates none more deeply revered the master's noble life than Plato, and no heart was more deeply stirred by the pathos of his death. At the time Plato was still young, barely thirty years of age.  

Aristo his father and his mother Perictione were both of good old Athenian stock. Codrus was one of his ancestors on his father's side, and by his mother he was descended from Solon. At the age of twenty he became a disciple of Socrates, having until that time devoted his energies to poetry. It is said that he was already so much of a poet that he was on the eve of bringing out a tetralogy; but when he became a disciple of Socrates he gave himself entirely to philosophy. At last he had found a field which was to be all his own, a field where his genius was soon to work wonders; for his philosophy was to guide the spiritual and intellectual life of his countrymen to a new and splendid consummation. Before this he had not been acquainted from Delos. During this time not one of his familiar friends could detect in his case any change in the manner of his life from what it had always been. And as for his previous career, he certainly always commanded unparalleled admiration for living a cheerful and contented life. The annual festival and embassy to Delos — another festival, also called Δηλα, was celebrated every four years — came in the tenth or eleventh month of the Athenian year (Μουμεχων or Θαργηλιων), hence the death of Socrates probably occurred in Thargelion (our May and June); the year was 399 B.C.

1 Various dates are given for Plato's birth. (1) The usually accepted one depends on Athenaeus, and is the archonship of Apollodorus, Ol. 87, 3 = 430/29 B.C. (2) Diogenes Laertius gives Ol. 87, 4 = 429/28 B.C., Epameinon's year as archon, and the year of Pericles's death. (3) Zeller follows Hermodorus, a pupil of Plato, and fixes upon 428/27 B.C. The birthday is said to have been the seventh day of Thargelion, a day sacred to Apollo. In the year 428/27 B.C. this came on May 26/27, or, as others claim, May 29/30. Cf. Steinhart.
with philosophy, and we are told that Cratylus had initiated him into the mysteries of Heraclitus; but not until he met Socrates had he found the guide and friend who was to lead him in all his speculations toward the goal of truth.

It is not possible to decide whether some of Plato’s earliest writings (e.g. the Lysis) were produced during Socrates’s life, or all of them after the master’s death. The bias of opinion now-a-days inclines to the latter view, and insists upon the unhistorical and ideal picture of Socrates which Plato everywhere alike has drawn. At all events, the questions dealt with by Plato’s earliest works were just the ones constantly discussed by Socrates, though even here and at the outset Plato displays originality. His vocation was to connect together the definitions insisted upon by Socrates and to reduce them to an ordered system by the application of a single law or principle. At the very outset he took up the same lines which his whole life was devoted to following out, and he ended by establishing dialectic as a science. Yet he never lost sight of Socrates, who always moved before him as the perfect philosopher. He valued philosophical writing only so far as it mirrored the ways, the wisdom, and the words of the ideal philosopher, and his works are pictures of the marvellous personality of Socrates. Hence it is that Plato, when he wrote, could not dispense with the peculiarly Socratic form of question and answer, but in his hands the dialogue is fashioned and developed into a new form of literature. His early interest in art and his familiarity with all the forms of poetry naturally stood him in good stead here, and we need not wonder that the poetic fire and dramatic vividness of his dialogues are universally admired.

Among the dialogues which he first wrote the Protagoras is perhaps the one which most conspicuously exemplifies these great qualities. Both in the subject dealt with, and in the conclusions arrived at, the Protagoras belongs to the school of Socrates. Virtue is there defined as knowledge of what is good, and in this are contained and summed up all particular virtues. Therefore, (1) virtue can be taught, and (2) no man is wicked freely and of his own proper choice. Wickedness is ignorance of what is good, and perfect goodness belongs only to God. Man’s virtue is incomplete
and tentative only,—it is a constant struggle; God alone is invariably and forever good. There is nothing discussed here which was not an every-day topic with Socrates and his friends.

In the Gorgias Plato discusses the relation of goodness to pleasure, a matter barely touched upon in the Protagoras. The opposition between rhetoric and dialectic is most effectively drawn by contrasting the sophist and his scheme of morals with the true philosopher. Rhetoric is a sham art of living, the beau-ideal of which is the unbridled indulgence by each individual of every passing whim, a fool's paradise where the bodily appetites are gorged. The true art of living, on the other hand, seeks and finds everywhere law, order, and righteousness (δικαιοσύνη), even though in so doing all temporal happiness and life itself be sacrificed. Higher than this earthly life is life eternal and the hereafter, where he only is blessed who has walked upon earth in the paths of righteousness. Therefore, it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong. The former does harm that lasts but a day, the latter brings enduring contamination.

This bare outline is enough to suggest that the fate of Socrates was in the mind of the writer of the Gorgias. This is confirmed by the merciless directness of its arguments, and by the tone of severity and almost bitterness which pervades the whole work. The Gorgias contains the moral teachings of Socrates and a great deal more, for there we find them as it were transfigured. Moreover, we get a glimpse of Plato's political creed. An aristocrat by birth, he could hardly have learned the love of democracy from Socrates, though even without this master there was enough in contemporary political events to incline him to the views which he held. It has been supposed that Pericles died in the course of the same year which saw the birth of Plato.¹ Plato's earliest impressions about politics may therefore best be understood by reading in Thucydides the history of that time. It was the era of decay in Athenian morals both public and private, an era which Thucydides described with a heavy heart. If Plato went a step further and, in seeking for the cause of so much harm, attributed this

¹ This chronological coincidence is not certain. See p. 27, note 1.
INTRODUCTION.

degeneration to Pericles, it surely can be urged that such a view of the great statesman’s leadership is not absolutely untenable even when judged by the strictest standard of historical impartiality.\(^1\) But though Plato loved democracy less, it was not because he loved the thirty tyrants more. Two of his mother’s kin, his uncle Charmides and also Critias, were conspicuous among the Thirty, but Plato was neither of them nor with them. What Socrates had to endure revealed to his disciple the infancy of the Thirty and their lust for power, while any dawning hopes from the moderate temper shown by the newly restored democracy which supplanted them was more than obscured by Socrates’s trial and condemnation. He found in these events new reasons for adopting the plan of life which of old had been congenial to him, and he was thus confirmed in his inclination to serve his country by shunning all active participation in his country’s affairs. It would surely be rashness to urge that, in deciding upon the manner of his life, Plato lacked either patriotism or common sense.

\(^{42}\) To avoid political entanglements, and at the same time to add to his intellectual attainments, Plato left Athens shortly after Socrates’s death, and retired to Megara, the home of a group of his philosophical friends. Euclides of Megara, a warm friend of Socrates, was the central figure among them. Like many other disciples of Socrates, Antisthenes for example, Euclides was at great pains to reconcile the Socratic definitions or general ideas with the Eleatic doctrine of the oneness of pure being. Plato who, in the Euthyphro, early foreshadows a more abstruse account of these general ideas than Socrates had given, naturally sought to profit, while thinking out his own views, by those of Euclides. But the Eleatic motionless Being worked apparently like a palsy upon the Megarians, for Plato gained no new light from his friends at Megara. However he certainly was impelled by his sojourn

\(^1\) The opinion of Pericles expressed by Thucydides (ii. 65) is very favourable. Grote warmly defends the reputation of Pericles against the less favourable comments of Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and a certain number of modern writers. Recently Büchsenschütz in his ‘Besitz und Erwerb im griechischen Alterthume’ has again accentuated the other side, and Herzberg in turn argues, Jahrbücher für Ph. u. P. 100, 5, in favour of Pericles.
there to supplement what he knew of the Eleatic doctrine by more thorough studies. If the Socratic philosophy may be called the ground in which the tree of Plato's knowledge took firm root, what he gained at Megara, and the familiarity with the Eleatic doctrines which he soon acquired, may be compared to the showers which watered that ground, and enabled the roots of the tree to strike deeper, and helped its branches to a fuller growth.

This same end was subserved by his further travels. He first went to Cyrene,—perhaps by way of Ephesus, where he may have wished to become acquainted with the living representatives of Heraclitus's school,—and there spent some time with Theodorus the mathematician. Though Theodoras was the reputed exponent of Protagoras's philosophy, Plato was chiefly drawn to him as a great mathematician and geometer. The Athenians certainly were not likely to forget the learning which he had exhibited when he visited their city.\(^1\) The importance attached by Plato to mathematics as a necessary part of right education\(^2\) is notorious, as is also his own proficiency in that branch of learning.\(^3\) After a visit to Egypt, he proceeded to Magna Graecia that he might there consort with the Pythagoreans, from whose learning he obviously expected to derive great benefit. The chief man among them was Archytas of Tarentum. Distinguished alike for statesmanship and as a general, Archytas had originated the analytic method in mathematics, and had solved many problems in geometry and mechanics, besides achieving a great name in philosophy. The society of Archytas and his school revived Plato's interest in practical government, which had died with Socrates. As a sight-seer Plato extended his tour to Sicily, and was there introduced by Dio to the court of the elder Dionysius. But his Athenian visitor was too outspoken for that tyrant, and finally incurred his ungovernable resentment. At the time, just before the peace of Antalcidas, there was war between Athens and the Peloponnesians,—and so it

\(^1\) Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 10.
\(^2\) Over the door of his lecture-room was written, it is said: Let no one unversed in geometry enter here, \(\mu\nu\delta\varepsilon\\varsigma\ \alpha\gamma\varepsilon\omega\mu\epsilon\tau\rho\tau\sigma\varsigma\\varsigma\ \epsilon\iota\lambda\iota\omega\).
\(^3\) It is very commonly asserted that he solved the Delian problem (the doubling of a cube), and on doing so, criticized the usual manner of dealing with mathematics.
occurred to Dionysius that his guest should become Sparta's prisoner of war. He was sold and carried as a slave to Aegina, whence he was finally ransomed by the generous zeal of Anniceris of Cyrene.¹

At the age of forty Plato was again in Athens, and he brought with him great treasures of knowledge and of experience. During his absence, moreover, he had been busy writing, and the Theaetetus serves as a reminder of his sojourn at Megara and at Cyrene. It is a dialogue within a dialogue; the introductory conversation may be called Plato's dedication of the whole work to his friends at Megara. The question, What is knowledge? is asked, and every typical answer to it, beginning with the most obvious one, Knowledge is sensation (αἰσθησις), and ending with the most abstruse one, is first stated with fairness and then with equal fairness refuted. In this dialogue we find Socrates and Theaetetus represented more effectively than anywhere else in Plato's writings, while in the companion pictures, so eloquently drawn by Socrates, of the philosopher and the practical man or lawyer, Plato seems to be vindicating himself against fault-finders.²

¹ This whole account of Plato's being sold as a slave and then ransomed is not well substantiated by trustworthy authorities.

² It is important at this point to have clearly before the mind some statement of Plato's theory of ideas. In the Theaetetus (p. 210 a) Socrates is made to say: "Then, Theaetetus, knowledge is not (1) sensation (αἰσθησις); nor is it (2) true opinion (δόξα ἀληθής); nor again, (3) true opinion coupled with definition (λόγος προσγεγραμμένος)." This of course represents the view of Plato and not of Socrates, for (3) is very nearly what Socrates would have called knowledge. Without any direct allusion to his theory of ideas, Plato shows in this dialogue that no definition of knowledge is logically possible unless the definition itself contains the term defined. To define true opinion we must distinguish, and to distinguish we must have already a true opinion of the characteristic differences between one notion and another. Plato's way out of the difficulty, which closes in on all sides and seems to leave no avenue of escape, is a recourse to his theory of ideas, and for a statement of this theory we have to go to his other dialogues. He did not reject Socrates's definitions, but rather erected them into a symmetrically organized scheme of thought, of reality. These ideas are the realities dimly suggested by the world around us; but neither they nor anything else would ever be suggested to us or known by us if we had not lived in another and a better world where these ideas exist. We know things in this world because, before coming here, we have seen
INTRODUCTION.

In the Sophist, the Politicus, and the Parmenides, we have works more or less obviously connected with the Theaetetus. These are the dialectical dialogues, so called because they are devoted to a connected account of dialectic. At the same time they contain a searching criticism of Heraclitus and of the Eleatics. One characteristic of the three works last named is that in them it is not Socrates who leads the discussion.

As soon as Plato returned to his native land he gathered pupils about him in the Academy, a suburban gymnasium close to his own house and garden. Here he taught with but few interruptions throughout the remaining forty years of his life. About the matter or manner of his teaching in the Academy we know nothing, unless we find it in those of his writings which were written while he was engaged in teaching.

There are weighty reasons for surmising that the Phaedrus was written at the beginning of this period, and accordingly it is prefaced, appropriately enough, by a graceful sketch of the scenery near Athens. Here dialectic is treated as something more than the science of that which really is (ideas); it is that and also the genuine art of putting things or oratory, and as such it is as far superior to ordinary rhetoric as reality is to sham or instruction to persuasion. Both teaching and learning are based upon the history of the human soul, and consist in a revival of memories (άνάμνησις) which are stored away in every soul while it is yet living in the divine world of ideas and before it comes to dwell on earth in a mortal frame. The relation of teacher and learner is spoken of as under the control of the pure and heaven-sent passion of love. The two become as one in order to bring forth knowledge from those original shapes of which things here are poor copies. Dialectic is the means of education and the perfected activity of thought by which we learn to neglect the bad copies and fix our minds upon the originals, which are in heaven. There they are all in their right place, and there goodness and truth shine upon them, enabling us to see them aright.

1 Lately there has been a revival of the doubt as to whether Plato wrote these three dialogues.

2 Schleiermacher considers the Phaedrus as Plato's maiden discourse; with this view other writers of eminence either wholly agree, or at least place it among Plato's earliest works.
the learner’s soul. The *Symposium* (*συμπόσιον, banquet*) and the *Phaedo* like the Phaedrus are masterpieces of style and may be called companion pictures: the Symposium represents the philosopher in his moments of conviviality; the Phaedo portrays him face to face with death. The *Philebus* contains an inquiry into the idea of the good and is not so conspicuous for the charm of its style, since it deals with most abstruse ethical and dialectical (metaphysical) points. In the course of the dialogue a great deal is said of the Pythagorean philosophy as stated by Philolaus.¹

In the *Philebus*, more than in any of his previous works, Plato strives to throw the light of philosophy upon the facts of life, and this he does to a still greater extent in those of his works which usually are considered his latest: the *Republic* (*πολιτεία*), the *Timaeus* and the *Critias*, all three of which are closely connected, and the *Laws*. These discourses, because they are attempts to mould facts into harmony with ideal principles, to construct the world as it should be, are called his constructive works. The most celebrated of these, and indeed the most admirable of all Plato’s works, is the Republic. Beginning with the question, “What is justice?” the writer soon develops the fact that justice, belonging as it does to the state as much as to any individual citizen, can most easily be seen in the former, where it is ‘writ large.’ Recognizing three classes of citizens as natural and necessary in the state, he connects them with his tripartite division of the soul.² His class of rulers correspond to the *reason* (*τὸ λογιστικόν*); his class of warriors to the (irascible) *impulsive part* (*τὸ θυμοειδή*); his class of producers to the *appetites* (*τὸ ιπθυμητικόν*). These three classes in combination work out the happiness of the whole state, and it is the happiness of all which determines the teaching and training of each. The rulers follow wisdom (*σοφία*); the warriors, *courage* (*άνδριε*); rulers, warriors, workers in unison

¹ Cf. supra, p. 3, n. 3.
² This division into three parts is based in the *Timaeus* upon a division into two parts. The soul has (1) its immortal or rational part, and (2) its irrational or mortal part. This last (2) is subdivided into (a) a noble part (*θυμός*) and (b) an ignoble part (*ἐπιθυμία*). These three divisions are explained as faculties of the soul by Wildauer, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Psychologie, in the *Philosophische Monatschrift*, 1873.
follow self-control (σωφροσύνη). Justice (δικαιοσύνη), the virtue of virtues, works toward the determining ideal for the sake of which the limbs of the body politic cooperate; and while the collective happiness of all citizens depends on justice, justice is gained by having each of the three classes pursue its characteristic perfection or virtue. This certainly is not the Socratic doctrine of the unity of all virtues, but a modification of it. With this great work are connected the Timaeus and the (unfinished) Critias. The Timaeus describes the universe as an organic and rational creation, just as the state is described in the Republic. The Critias represents the ideal state as having existed in Attica before the deluge. There is also the story of their wars with the Atlantids. The dates and the facts thus given are of course purely mythical, and purport to be derived from foreign traditions. In what relation the twelve books of Plato’s Laws stand to the ten books of the Republic is a question still under discussion, as is also the question whether Plato himself put the finishing touches upon his Laws as they have come down to us. Whether he wrote it as it actually stands or not, the work, in spite of the many eccentric views and odd turns of speech which it contains, is broadly conceived and of very great interest.

The general drift of these last works prepares us for Plato’s last two visits to Sicily, where the younger Dionysius showed such promise both intellectual and moral that Plato hoped with his help to realize his new theories of government and of education. At the instance of Dio he accepted an invitation from the younger Dionysius, and again went to Syracuse in spite of the harsh treatment which had so precipitately terminated his former sojourn in that city. The too irascible elder Dionysius had died Ol. 103, 1 = 368–7 B.C. On his arrival Plato carried everything before him and it became the court fashion to imitate young Dionysius’s enthusiasm for the new philosophy; but back-stairs intrigues soon turned the tables upon the reformer. His friend Dio was incau-

1 Socrates said that wisdom was virtue. Plato said (1) wisdom acquired and exercised for the whole state is the ruler’s virtue, (2) wisdom in boldly executing the ruler’s commands is the warrior’s virtue, (3) wisdom in obedient service to his betters is the workman’s virtue.
tious, and his indiscretion was promptly punished with banishment by the same clique of flattering courtiers which soon after brought about, against the wishes of Dionysius, the dismissal of Plato. But the repentant king again urged Plato to come back, promising that Dio should be recalled. The Pythagorean circle at Tarentum urged acceptance, and finally, still hoping to carry his pet theories into effect at Syracuse, Plato made his third visit to Syracuse. It was not long, however, before all the influence of Archytas was required to get our philosopher back to Athens alive. How little Plato’s high hopes of the younger Dionysius were realized, is but too plain from the character of that tyrant as afterwards exhibited.

The remainder of Plato’s life was engrossed by teaching and writing. Of his pupils many were from foreign parts, and among his numerous Athenian hearers there were not a few marked men, statesmen and generals such as Chabrias Timotheus and Phocion, orators such as Lycurgus and Demosthenes. Though hard to prove, it is easy to believe that Demosthenes’s keenness and irresistible readiness in argument was stimulated and perfected by a training in the dialectic of Plato. Plato lived to a green old age, and death finally surprised him in the full possession of all his faculties when upwards of eighty (Ol. 108, 1 = 348–7 B.C.). The vigor of his mind at the time is brought home to us by the tale that after death they found under his pillow a draft of the opening passage of the Republic, which he had covered with erasures and corrections. Pausanias, who made his ‘grand tour’ in the second century after Christ, saw the tomb of Plato in the Ceramicus (Κεραμεικόδ), not far from the Academy. The post left vacant by Plato, the charge of his school which became known as the older Academy, was undertaken by Speusippus, a son

1 Cf. Laws iv., p. 709 e sqq. This passage irresistibly suggests the general condition of things which Plato, on the occasion of his last two journeys, expected to find at Syracuse, and indeed largely what he actually did find.

2 Seneca is probably repeating an ‘idle tale’ when he says that Plato died on his birthday, just as he had completed his eighty-first year. A similarly unauthenticated tale is repeated by Cicero, who says (Cato major 5.13): “uno et octogesimo ano scribens est mortuus.” Perhaps his word “scribens” is simply a version of the story of the tablet discovered under the philosopher’s pillow.
INTRODUCTION.

of Plato’s sister. The Chalcedonian Xenocrates succeeded Speusippus.

We may well call it a lucky chance that has preserved for us all 51 of Plato’s works.\(^1\) They are an exhaustless treasurehouse filled to overflowing with thoughts which have been the inspiration and the delight of successive generations of men, for they appeal alike to the philosopher and to the poet; to the former by the fulness of their wisdom, to the latter by the beauty of their style. Plato chose the form of question and answer, and in presenting philosophical truth dramatised the process by which such truth is reached. Once chosen, that form became, in the hands of so great a master both of thought and of style, something new under the sun, and took its place among the other exemplars of literary art created by the Greeks as the Greek method of presenting philosophy. The various forms in which previous philosophical speculations had appeared were but the imperfect statements of unperfected theories. The one thing which these forms perfectly represented was the lack of completeness which characterized the early systems of philosophy.\(^2\) Socrates brought down Philosophy from the clouds of heaven to the needs of life upon earth,\(^3\) and, the uncompromising ordeal of his cross-questioning once passed, her worth and strength became manifest. Then at last, transfigured as it were by Plato’s genius, she appeared in all the beauty of a form of literature quite worthy of her message. This is the moment which at the opening of this sketch was anticipated. In Plato’s dialogues

\(^1\) Besides the works already enumerated and the Apology and Crito, there are quite a number of others. Some of these Plato has been supposed not to have written. Those whose authenticity has been questioned connect themselves with the Protagoras; they are: the Ion, Hippias Maior and Minor, the first and second Alcibiades, Lysis, Charmides, Laches Euthyphro. Then there are dialogues connected with the so-called dialectical discourses: the Meno, the Euthydemus, the Cratylus. The Menexenus remains, and the only dialogues with which it can be in any way compared are the Apology and the Phaedrus. Of course no mention is here made of such other short discourses as have been falsely attributed to Plato but are now admitted by all to be spurious.

\(^2\) The best account of the comparative inefficiency of these early philosophers is Plato’s own. Cf. the passage from the Sophist quoted supra, p. 10, note 1.

\(^3\) Cicero, Tusc. v. 4, 10, and Academ. i. 4, 15.
the central purpose and the crowning result is to stimulate in every reader a self-reliant vigo* of understanding which shall grapple boldly with the self-imposed task of seeking after the fundamental idea, and achieve in the end a clear insight into the whole subject discussed. Without this effort of mind no man can ever emerge from darkness into light. That Plato did not overestimate the value of his own or of any writings is clearly shown in the Phaedrus. The views there expounded probably influenced him to choose the dialogue-form, which is a reproduction, a mirror, as it were, of the words of living truth spoken by the living teacher. That he did not however underestimate the value of philosophical writing he shows rather in deed than in word. For how, otherwise, can we account for the long series of writings produced by him from the age of thirty until the time of his death, — a period of fifty years? By writing he increased the number of those who felt his influence, and this he might well seek to do while still believing that, compared with the spoken word, the written word was dead.

The many resources of Plato’s artistic imagination are apparent in the varied settings of his dialogues. The simplest form (1) has no introduction or preamble, but is a dialogue, with occasional interruptions from interested bystanders, in which one of the parts is taken throughout by the same speaker, usually Socrates, while the other may be successively assumed by various persons. Instances of this form of dialogue are the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, which best exemplify the dramatic power of Plato even in this simplest form of dialogue. More intricately dramatic and effective are the narrated dialogues, to which the second and third classes belong. These are (2) without preface and with no account of the persons to whom the narration or reading, as the case may be, is made, — *e.g.*, the Republic; or (3) introduced by a short dialogue between the narrator and his friends, who soon become his attentive listeners. In (3) sometimes, though rarely, the narrated dialogue is momentarily interrupted before the close, and at the close a few words are commonly exchanged between the narrator and his auditors. Dialogues of this kind are the Symposium and the Phaedo. Just as these various forms are used accord-
ing to the demands of the subject discussed or the artistic plan of the author, so in certain of Plato’s later writings, in fact very commonly where very abstruse points are considered, the dramatic form is subordinated and all but disappears.

Something must now be said of the two works before us. They are both of them closely connected with the trial and death-sentence of Socrates. Of the two the first is

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

If we heeded our first impressions on reading the Apology, we should pronounce it a report of what Socrates actually said in court, since it is given as a speech made by Socrates and we feel convinced that Socrates would naturally have made just such a speech. But there is nothing in this fact alone that necessarily bears such a construction, for Plato’s dialogues are all of them conversations more or less fictitious, and yet are represented as carried on in the most life-like manner by historical personages. To reach any trustworthy conclusion as to the historic accuracy of the Apology would require more information than that supplied by Plato himself, and yet Plato is the only witness whom we can trust. We have, therefore, to depend chiefly upon internal evidence.

There is no doubt that, not Plato only, but any disciple and friend of Socrates who had been present on such a momentous occasion would have been more than eager to spare no pains in accurately reproducing the words of his master,—of the father of his soul’s new-birth. He would have left no stone unturned in striving to reach and to write, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

1 We are not warranted in pinning our faith to Xenophon’s (? ’Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους, a production whose origin and value are equally doubtful. Xenophon’s Memorabilia, on the other hand, is inadequate for our purpose.

2 Schleiermacher and Zeller uphold the accuracy of Plato’s report. The former argues that the speech suits all the circumstances too well to allow of its not being an exact report, while the latter strives to deal with the arguments used to prove his untrustworthiness. Ueberweg lately has taken this same point of view with great decision. In the admirable introduction of Steinhart is to be found the best presentation of the opposite view.
truth,' that it might live as a monument of the great man's moral
and intellectual worth forever. And individually Plato must have
regarded such an undertaking as his opportunity to appeal to the
supreme court of intelligent and unprejudiced mankind from the
death-sentence pronounced by an unjust court upon the incom­
parable master. In such an enterprise Plato's memory would
undoubtedly do good service. Yet it is hard to see how a mind
like his, distinguished rather for its devotion to speculative truth
and for its obedience to the laws of artistic and poetical symmetiy
than for its submission to the inelastic canons of history, could,
even in such a case as this, have endured the straight-jacket of
stenographic accuracy. Plato doubtless heard with attentive ears
and held with retentive memory all that was spoken before the
court by the man he loved best. And indeed no hand was better
trained than his in presenting faithfully the peculiar conversational
genius of Socrates. But for all that, and by means of it all, he
has gained and used the second sight of a sympathetic and creative
imagination; he has given us more than the actual defence of Soc­
rates in court. In Plato's Apology, Socrates on trial for his life
stands before us in clear outline, sharply contrasted with any typical
presentation of the drift of contemporary public opinion; for public
opinion, so far as it opposed him and his ways, is personified by
his named and unnamed accusers.1 He is condemned in court,
but before the tribunal of the eternal fitness of things he and his
life-work stand acquitted.

However, we have no right to assume that this could not all be
accomplished without unduly sacrificing historical accuracy. The
nobler, the more appropriate we suppose Socrates's actual words to
have been,—and no one will incline to say they were not appro­
priate and noble,—the less would Plato feel called upon to depart
from a simple report of what he had actually heard. In the
absence of anything like convincing proofs of the contrary, it is
reasonable, with due allowance for Plato's artistic bent and after
taking into consideration the circumstances under which he wrote,
to conclude that his Apology of Socrates resembled very closely

1 Cf. Apology, p. 18 a b sqq.
the speech actually made in court by Socrates. The circumstances under which Plato wrote lead however to the following qualification of this statement of substantial identity. Any speech reported in writing necessarily differs from the speech as originally made, and no orator even can write down from memory the words he has used, — as for Socrates he spoke on the spur of the moment without previous notes or preparation of any kind.\(^1\) Plato heard him just as Thucydides heard Pericles, and as Thucydides, with the most earnest desire to reproduce as a part of history Pericles’s speeches,\(^2\) could not avoid making them by his manner of statement to some extent his own, so it was with Plato and the speech of Socrates. He could not, in spite of the accuracy which he observed in reproducing the situation at the trial and the words to which he had so attentively listened, avoid giving the Apology of Socrates in a way which makes it a work of his own, though at the same time it is the genuine defence of Socrates.\(^3\) The success with which Plato brings before us the living persons concerned in Socrates’s trial is the best proof that he allowed himself a certain freedom of expression in presenting the matter and manner of Socrates himself. Among Plato’s many works distinguished for vividness of dramatic characterization, the Apology is one of the most noteworthy. In the Apology we have the most life-like of Plato’s many portraits of Socrates.

We find many inequalities in the speech of the Apology, and 55

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1 Cf. Apology, p. 17 c. Those unconvinced by the genuine ring of this passage may still doubt. We know Socrates chiefly from Plato, hence discussions of Plato’s trustworthiness are apt to beg the question.


3 There is an important difference between the relation of Thucydides to Pericles and that of Plato to Socrates. The intimacy of ten years’ standing between the two latter made their case one of ideal friendship, where, at least in intellectual matters, what belonged to Socrates was Plato’s, and vice versa. Therefore Plato, if he made the defence of Socrates characteristically his own, could be sure that it was also and for that reason characteristically Socrates’s. Was not Plato, therefore, better prepared to deal with Socrates, the friend of his youth, than was Thucydides to deal with Pericles, who certainly was not one of his intimates?
indeed a tendency here and there to repetition and circumlocution.\footnote{Cf. Apol., p. 26b ad fin. and e, also p. 28e sqq.} This is not only characteristic of Socrates in general, but particularly characteristic of him or of any one when speaking off-hand. Equally characteristic of Socrates is the cross-examination\footnote{Cf. Apol., pp. 24d–27e.} and the frequent recourse which is had to the dialogue form;\footnote{Cf. supra, § 31.} for Socrates undoubtedly went as far in this direction as the rules of Athenian pleading would allow.

No matter whether we take the speech as a verbal report or as, in the main, an invention of Plato, if we once admit that its aim was to vindicate Socrates before the whole world no less than to influence the particular men who were his judges, it is easy to understand the line of defence taken in the Apology. The counts in the indictment against him are summarily dealt with, for Socrates is chiefly anxious to show that the sole cause of his accusation is the wide-spread prejudice against him. This prejudice he grapples with, and seeks by analyzing to remove it, appealing in justification of all that he had habitually said and done to his commission from God. The careless way in which he quotes\footnote{Cf. supra, § 31.} the terms of the indictment,—he reverses the order of the counts against him and deals with them in that order,—would prove the speaker’s indifference to the opinion of his judges, if such laxities were not known to be very common in the Athenian courts. Far more important, therefore, or rather all important, is the fact that he does not meet the accusation of disbelief in the gods of Athens. We have seen that nothing would have been easier than a triumphant refutation of this charge; yet the matter is passed over, and Socrates prefers to merge the narrower question in a consideration of the more sweeping charge of downright atheism, of disbelief in all gods. Evidently Socrates cared little for winning his case, but much for the opportunity afforded him to enlighten his fellow-citizens as to the wider and deeper import of the point at issue. The device by which the terms of the accusation to be met were enlarged\footnote{Cf. Apol., p. 26b sqq.} was one sanctioned by the traditional procedure in

\footnote{Cf. Apol., p. 26b ad fin. and e, also p. 28e sqq.}\footnote{Cf. Apol., p. 20a–c; p. 29c at the end sqq. and elsewhere.}\footnote{Cf. supra, § 31.}\footnote{Cf. Apol., p. 26b sqq.}
INTRODUCTION.

courts\(^1\) at Athens. Under cross-examination on the meaning of his bill of indictment, the accuser himself gave to Socrates the wider interpretation best suited for the answer with which it was to be met.

The manner in which Socrates talks of death and of the hereafter is very striking. There is more than a conviction that compared with wickedness death is no evil, for that conviction is made the firmer by the comforting hope that death is but the door which leads to everlasting life and happiness. If this be considered not Plato's addition but Socrates's literal statement, then the moral steadfastness and the joy with which Socrates hailed death's deliverance was the best re-enforcement for Plato's own doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which is stated in the Phaedo and elsewhere.

The closing words on immortality play an important part in the tragic development of the situation; for the first part and the verdict of guilty which succeeds it awaken a sense of cruel injustice, which, by the second part and the ensuing sentence of death, is soon brought to a second climax but is finally mitigated by the closing words of Socrates. This third part bears we may say to the two parts that precede it a relation similar to that borne by the Eumenides of Aeschylus to the preceding plays of the Oresteian trilogy, and solves a tragic situation by merging a narrowed view of justice in a broader one by which it is superseded.

The first of these three subdivisions, which is the defence proper, is complete in itself. Though all the laws of oratorical art are here carefully observed, the usual practices of oratory are sharply criticised. The five natural heads of the argument certainly are unmistakable, since, by carefully following the connection of thought, we can easily mark the words in which the speaker dismisses one point and takes up another.

\(^1\) Cf. infra, § 71, note 2.
INTRODUCTION.

ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST PART, OR THE DEFENCE PROPER,
cc. I–XXIV.

(a) c. i. **Introduction (προοίμιον, exordium)**

= {principium.

  insinuatio (ἐφόδος).

(b) c. ii. **Statement (πρόθεσις, propositio) of the case and of the plan in the plea.**

(c) cc. iii–xv. **Refutation (λύσις, confutatio)**

= { of former accusers, cc. iii–x.

  of Meletus, cc. xi–xv.

(d) cc. xvi–xxii. **Digression (παρέκκλασις, digressio) on Socrates's life.**

(e) cc. xxiii, xxiv. **Peroration (ἐπίλογος, peroratio).** This is an attack upon the usual form of peroration, and ends with a confession of trust in God.

An introduction (a) is always intended to prepare the hearers for listening to the speaker's plea. This is especially hard in the face of prejudice against the speaker's person or against his case. The rules of speech-writing here prescribe recourse to *insinuation* ἐφόδος, a subtle process by which the speaker wins over the sympathies of his audience. He may do this (1) by attacking his opponent, (2) by conciliating his audience, (3) by strongly stating his personal hardship in the case, or (4) by putting concisely the difficulties involved in dealing with the facts. After the introduction follows (b) the statement πρόθεσις. This is commonly a plain unvarnished tale covering the matters of fact involved. If such an account be unnecessary the statement sets forth simply the plan of the plea. This plan is not unfrequently accompanied by a *subdivision (partitio)*, which is sometimes simply a *summary of heads (enumeratio)*, ¹ and sometimes a *detailed account of topics (expositio).*² Here, again, Socrates's defence follows the rules of oratory. Next comes the most important part, the proof (πράττεις, probatio), represented by (c) the refutation which naturally falls, as indicated above, under two heads. In the manner

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¹ Rhet. ad Herenn. I. 10, 17: Enumeratone utemur, cum dicensus numero, quot de rebus dicturis simus.

² Ibid. Expositio est, cum res, quibus de rebus dicturi sumus, exponimus breviter et absolute.
of refutation here given, the genuine Socrates is in his element, and here he is pictured to the life. After proof or refutation, as the case may be, comes, in the programme of oratorical orthodoxy, (d) a digression. This was the orator's opportunity to try his wings. The theme chosen in a digression needed no more than an indirect bearing upon the argument of the case, and the ornamental part which the digression often played has led to the use of another term for it, i.e. exornatio or embellishment. This, too, can be found in Socrates's speech, and so perfect is its beauty that the laws of school- oratory are more than satisfied. Yet, embellishment though it be called, this part of the speech has nothing that is far-fetched or beside the point; in the Apology it is the complement of the preceding negative refutation, its positive and required reinforcement (confirmatio). The transition to (e) the peroration is plainly marked. At this point the orator, and more than ever if he were on trial for his life, made a desperate appeal to the feelings of his hearers. No means of moving the judges were left untried. Recourse to such methods Socrates condemned as equally dishonest and dishonorable. This part of

1 Rhet. ad Herenn. II. 29, 46: Exornatio constat ex similibus et exemplis et rebus indicatis et amplificationibus et ceteris rebus quae pertinent ad exaugendam et collocupletandam argumentationem.

2 Cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 4: “οὐδὲν ἥθελησε τῶν εἰσώματων ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ποιῆσαι, ἵνα λείψῃ τὴν ἐν τοῖς καθίσμασιν ἔργον ἐν τοῖς παραλλαγοῖς τοῦ ἀριττοῦ τούτου. Τὰ δὲ τούτα ἐναρέως ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἔχουσαν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς νόμοις ποιημένα τὰ κάθετα μητέρως τοῖς καθίσμασιν τοῦ δικαστηρίου.” It appears that there was no special law forbidding in so many words an oratorical appeal to the emotions of the judges in the ordinary courts. This is confirmed, indeed, by Aristotle in his Rhetoric (I. 1, a passage particularly important in connection with the Apology). There Aristotle first criticizes various rhetorical practices, and then proceeds to say: “prejudice, pity, anger, and all such emotions of the soul have nothing to do with facts, but affect only the judge himself. Hence, if all legal proceedings were regulated as in certain states distinguished for particularly good laws, these emotions would play no part whatever. Indeed, all agree on this point, some urging that the law should prescribe this course, while others enforce the principle, and rule out any plea which is off the point. This is the rule of procedure before the Areopagus, and a very good rule it is. A judge should certainly never have his mind warped by the influence of anger, of jealousy, or of pity brought to bear upon him. To have recourse to these is exactly the same as for a carpenter to give a twist to his rule before using it.” To the procedure of the Areopagus we may perhaps apply Quintilian's words (VI. 1, 7): “Athe-
the Apology is an attack upon the ordinary practice of pleaders in court. Not unmanly subserviency to men, but manly submission to God’s will are heard in the closing words of this defence.

60 Such was the temper of the Apology written for Socrates by Plato, and as such, whether intentionally or unintentionally, it must have been in striking contrast with the drift of the plea which Lysias is said to have elaborated for the same case.\(^1\) The tradition that Plato undertook to plead in the capacity of Socrates’s advocate (συνήγορος) but was not allowed to do so rests on very slight authority. It is therefore ridiculous to suggest that this plea, which Plato did not prepare, was the first outline afterwards worked up in the Apology.

61 The second and third parts, which come respectively after the first and the second verdict, can hardly be expected to answer all the requirements of a set speech. And yet these are symmetrically arranged, and their topics skilfully set before us. The second part naturally opens with an allusion to the verdict of ‘guilty’ just rendered; any regular peroration would have been out of place before the third, which is the suitable conclusion both for the first part and the second. And where, indeed, is there a more eloquent and nobly impressive ending than this? That part of it addressed to the judges who voted for Socrates’s acquittal is certainly made most prominent and very appropriately so. For these judges, they who alone are worthy of that title, are his chosen friends; to their kindred souls he confides the unspeakable hopes of happiness after death that are stirring within him, and invites them to be of good cheer and not to fear death. In so doing, even while death stares him in the face, he does not blench, but obeys his captain and works as the servant of God.

62 Closely connected with the Apology is the dialogue called the CRITO.

This dialogue belongs to the first class\(^2\) of Plato’s dialogues; it is a conversation pure and simple, neither narrated nor read to an

\(^{1}\) Cf. supra, § 34 and note.
\(^{2}\) Cf. supra, § 52.
INTRODUCTION.

47

audience introduced at the beginning. There are two speakers only, Socrates and Crito. Their close friendship has been mentioned in the Apology (p. 33 d). This intimacy was unbroken, and though Crito was much absorbed by the care of his extensive property, yet, in all the fortunes of Socrates's life, Crito had been his firm friend. And now that a sentence which he could not but regard as unjust had been pronounced upon his friend, Crito rebelled against its execution and against the shame of seeing Socrates die a criminal's death. To prevent this he was willing to risk his fortune and his civil rights. The lucky combination of circumstances which furthered the plans made for this end has already been explained.\(^1\) Apparently, nothing prevented Socrates's escape from prison but Socrates. At this juncture Socrates stands before us as the ideally loyal citizen. Though opposed to the principles of the democracy at Athens, he submits without reservation to its laws and exhorts all others to do the like. This, he declares, is the first and the most imperative duty of every citizen. Such is the historical groundwork of the dialogue. The dramatic picture given of this situation admits of the application of various terms used to designate the development of the plot in a Greek tragedy.

Analysis of the Crīto.

(a) cc. i, ii. Prologue (προσλόγος); the characters and their mental situation (ηθοδ καί πάθος).

(b) cc. iii-x. Entanglement (δέσις or πλοκή) of the logical situation.

1. c. iii. The threats of the multitude.
2. c. iv. The prayers of friends.
3. c. v. The jeers of enemies.

1. cc. vi, vii. The threats are many but duty is one.
2. c. viii. Nothing should warp our idea of duty.
3. cc. ix, x. It is wrong to run away from prison, and wrong should not be done, even in retaliation.

\(^1\) Cf. supra, § 36 and note.
INTRODUCTION.

(c) cc. xi-xv. Clearing up (λύσις). The laws of Athens require his submission and his death.
1. cc. xi, xii. Socrates owes them life liberty and happiness.
2. cc. xiii, xiv. They require and he has promised obedience.
3. c. xv. He will gain nothing by disobedience.

(d) cc. xvi, xvii. Epilogue (ἐπιλογος). There are laws in Hades which can reach him who disobeys law upon earth.

64 Like the Apology, this work bears memorable witness to the nobility of Plato's mind, and it reveals especially his lofty patriotism. As for Socrates, we see both these works that not words only but deeds prove him a more law-abiding citizen than scores of men whose spurious good-citizenship is well portrayed on many pages of the Crito (e.g. p. 45 ε). The very laws of the land, as well as the example of Socrates submitting to his unjust sentence of death, declare in no uncertain tones to every Athenian what true patriotism is and how it is preserved.

65 The Crito is by no means simply the chronicle of a conversation actually held; though it is based upon facts, it must still be recognized as Plato's work. This is proved by the finished skill both of plan and execution displayed in this dialogue, short and simple though it is. Moreover, in the Crito we see that Plato has made a step forward in his notion of duty. For here is the earliest statement of Plato's 'golden rule': Injustice always is wrong; it is wrong to retaliate injustice by injustice. In the Gorgias (see supra, § 40) this rule is applied more universally and put upon its rational basis. Indeed, from a philosophical point of view we may regard the Crito and the Apology as a suitable preface to the Gorgias, if we do not forget that both are primarily pictures of the one great master whom Plato in all his works most delighted to honor.

1 For most of the details of the analysis given above Cron is not responsible, though it is substituted for his § 63, where there is a less detailed analysis of the dialogue on the same principle.
2 See on ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οὐνται, Crito, p. 40 b.
Six thousand Athenian citizens were entrusted with the power to decide law-suits. Choice was made by lot every year of six hundred men from each of the ten tribes (φυλαι), and any citizen over thirty years of age was eligible. Every one thus chosen was liable, after taking the prescribed oath of office, to be called upon to act as a δικαστής; δικασταί, jurymen, was the official name by

1 The chief authority is Meier and Schömann, Der Attische Process, Calvary (Berlin, 1884). See also K. Fr. Hermann, Lehrbuch der griechischen Staatsalterthümer, and G. F. Schömann, Griechische Alterthümer, 2 volumes, of which the first has been translated into English, and published under the title Antiquities of Greece by Rivingtons (London, 1880).

2 The oath, which is cited in the speech of Demosthenes against Timocrates (149–151), is of doubtful authenticity. Schömann and Lipsius (p. 153, note 17), by omissions and bracketed additions change the formula there given into the following, which, excepting the last bracketed clause,—a conjecture of Frankel's,—is not far from the real form: ψηφιούμαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῶν πεντακόσιων, [περὶ δὲν δὲν νόμοι μὴ δοσι, γνώμη τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ καὶ οὗτο χάριτος ἕνεκα οὗτοι ἡχθρας],... καὶ ἀδρόδοσις τοῦ τε κατηγόρου καὶ τοῦ ἀπολογουμένου ὄμοιως ἄμφοτε, καὶ ψηφιούμαι περὶ αὐτοῦ οὗτος ἄν ἢ δίωξις, [καὶ εὐροκόντι μὲν μοι εἰς πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά, ἐπιροκόντι δὲ εξόλεια αὐτῷ τε καὶ γένει], I will vote in accordance with the laws and enactments of the Athenian people and of the Senate of Five Hundred, [and where there is no law, in accordance with my best knowledge of what is just, unmoved alike by favor and by enmity],... and I will give impartial hearing both to the accuser and to the defendant, and vote on the question at issue in the suit. [If I keep this oath let blessings be my portion; if I break it let ruin seize on me and all my kindred.] See on ὅμωμοκεν κτλ., Apol., p. 35 ε.

3 The use, in other connexions, of δικαστῆς with the meaning of judge leads many to translate δικασταί judges and not jurymen. Neither of these words is satisfactory, but to describe a body of citizens without any technical knowledge of the law as judges is certainly more misleading from a modern point of view than to call them jurymen. It must be remembered, however, that the presiding magistrate did not perform the duties of a modern judge in any important respect, so that the δικασταί had the substantial powers both of judge and jury in all cases brought before them.

4 The customary form in addressing them was ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταί, but this could be varied. We have sometimes ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖος, sometimes ὁ ἄνδρες, and once and again ὁ Ἀθηναῖος. Cf. Apol., pp. 17 a, 22 c, 26 d, 30 b.
which they were addressed. These six thousand were divided into a reserve of one thousand, to be used as substitutes etc., and a main body of five thousand for regular service. A subdivision of the five thousand was then made into ten courts, of five hundred each, called δικαστήρια, for, like the English word court, δικαστήριον may mean a judicial body as well as the place where such a body sits in judgment. Sometimes a court was composed of less than five hundred jurymen, e.g. of two or four hundred; sometimes we find two or more courts of five hundred sitting as one, but it is doubtful whether the whole six thousand ever sat as one court. The even numbers, 200, 500, 1000, etc., were habitually increased by one, and for that purpose a δικαστής was drawn from the 1000 supernumeraries. This precaution was taken to avoid a tie vote.

On days appointed for holding court each of the subdivisions above mentioned was assigned by lot to one of the places used as court-rooms, and there tried the suit appointed for that time and place. Each jurymen received as the badge of his office a staff (βακτηρία) corresponding in color to a sign over the door of his court. He also received a ticket (συμβολον), by showing which he secured his fee after his day’s service. Cf. Dem. De Cor. 210. A fee of one obol (about three cents) for every day’s session was introduced by Pericles, and afterwards trebled by Cleon.

Almost all cases except those of homicide were tried in these Heliastic courts, and the jurymen were called also ηλιασταί from the name ηλιαία, given to the largest court-room in Athens. The most general term to designate a law-suit is δίκη, though the same word also has the narrower meaning of a private suit. According as the complaint preferred involves the rights of individuals or of the whole state, δίκαι in the wider sense were subdivided into (1) δίκαι in the narrower sense, *private suits*, and (2) γραφαλ, *public suits*. Since the state was the real plaintiff in public suits, any fine which in such suits might be imposed upon the defendant went to the state; accordingly in public suits, the accuser, as a rule, was entitled to no part of the penalty.

In the ordinary course of procedure, every plaintiff was required to present his indictment (γραφή), or complaint (λήξις), in writing to the particular magistrate whose department included the matters
involved. Most suits thus came before the nine archons, commonly before one of the first three or before all of the remaining six. The first archon, — called ὁ ἄρχων par excellence, — dealt especially with charges involving family rights and inheritance; the second archon, called βασιλεύς, with those involving the regulations and requirements of religion and public worship; the third archon, called πολέμαρχος, dealt with most cases involving foreign-residents (μίτοικοι) and foreigners; the remaining six, — called the Thesmothetae, — dealt with almost all cases not especially assigned to the first three. There were, however, cases which were disposed of by other magistrates, or otherwise especially provided for.

The accusation had to be made in the presence of the accused, who had previously been served with due notice to appear. Legal notice required the presence of two witnesses to the summons (κλητῆρες). If the magistrate allowed proceedings in the case, the terms of accusation were copied and posted in some public place, and at the time of this publication a day was fixed, upon which both parties were bound to appear before the magistrate for the preliminary investigation (ἀνάκρισις). There the plaintiff's charges and the defendant's answer, both of them already written down and handed in, were reaffirmed under oath, and both parties submitted to the magistrate such evidence as they intended to use. The reaffirmation or confirmation under oath was called διωμοσία, sometimes ἀντωμοσία. The evidence submitted consisted in citations from the laws, documentary evidence of various kinds, the depositions of witnesses, and particularly any testimony given under torture (βάσανος) by slaves, which had been taken and written down in the presence of witnesses. The magistrate fixed his official seal

1 Cf. (Dem. xlv. 46) the written charge (λῆγις) in a private suit: 'Απολλόδωρος Πασίωνος Ἀχαρνεὺς Στέφανος Μενεκλέους Ἀχαρνεῖ ψευδομαρτυρίων, τίμιμα τάλαντον. Τὰ ψευδή μου κατεμαρτυρησε Στέφανος μαρτυρήσας τὰ ἐν τῷ γραμματείῳ γεγραμμένα, Ἀπολλόδωρος Ἀχαρνιαῖος, θεατητής τῆς καταγωγῆς Στέφανος, Accuses Stephanus the Acharnian, son of Pasion, for giving false testimony; the damages named are fixed at one talent. Stephanus testified falsely against me in the statements recorded in the evidence submitted. The answer is: Στέφανος Μενεκλέους Ἀχαρνεῖ τάλαντη ἐμαρτυρησε μαρτυρήσας τὰ ἐν τῷ γραμματείῳ γεγραμμένα, the testimony which I ... gave is true as recorded in the evidence submitted.

2 διωμοσία refers strictly to the double oath of the two parties; ἀντωμοσία to the defendant's oath. But both are used for each singly.
upon all the documents thus submitted, and took charge of them against the day when the case was to be tried.

On the day (ἡ κυρία) when a court was to sit upon any case, the magistrate who had presided over the preliminary investigation proceeded to the appointed court-room, where he met the δικασταὶ assigned by lot (ἐπικεκληρωμένοι) to the case. Both parties to the suit, having been previously notified, were required to put in an appearance. Proceedings in court were opened by some religious ceremony; then the clerk (γραμματεύς) read aloud the written accusation and the reply, and finally the parties to the suit were successively called forward to state their case. This was the opening of the case (εἰσαγωγή τῆς δίκης) by the magistrate (εἰσαγωγεύς). Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 860 ff., Antipho, vi. 42.

The law required that every man should conduct his own case in person, and hence those who were not themselves skilful pleaders generally recited speeches which had been written for them by others. Still, the law permitted a man to appear in court accompanied by advocates (συνήγοροι), who came as his friends, and therefore were not supposed to be paid for their trouble; not infrequently, after a short speech from the principal, the most important part of his plea was made by one of his advocates. E.g. Demosthenes's speech on the Crown was made as Ctesipon's advocate. The water-clock (κλεψύδρα, sometimes called simply τὸ ύδωρ) was used to measure the time allotted to each for pleading before the court. When called for, the written documents offered in evidence were read by the clerk, and meanwhile the clock was stopped. By way of precaution, the witnesses whose depositions were read had to be present in court and acknowledge their testimony. While making his plea a man was protected by law from interruption by his opponent, and the law required his opponent to answer his questions. The jurymen had a right to interrupt the speaker

1 To this correspond the words ἐισόδος τῆς δίκης, Crito, p. 45 e, just as we find εἰσάγειν used both of τὴν δίκην and of τοὺς ἀμφισβητούντας. Correspondingly, we find εἰσέρχεσθαι and εἰσίνειαι said both of the suit and of the parties to the suit, meaning substantially the same thing. Hence the presiding magistrate, ἡγεμὼν τοῦ δικαστηρίου, is also called δ ο εἰσαγωγεύς.

2 According to the terms of the νόμος quoted in Dem. xlvi. 10: τοῖν ἀντιδίκων ἑπάναγκες ἐναὶ ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἐρωτόμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μὴ,
(1) if in their opinion he was off the point, (2) if they required fuller explanation on any point whatsoever. Of course, there were frequent attempts to prejudice the jurymen instead of enlightening them, and nothing was commoner than to make appeal to their sympathies. It was by no means an unusual occurrence for a defendant to appear in court with his wife and children, or with infirm and helpless parents, and sometimes with friends of great popularity or of high character; he depended upon these to act as his intercessors with the court. Such practices, though manifestly tending to disarm the severity of the law and to defeat the ends of justice for which the court was organized, seem never definitely to have been prohibited in any court except the Areopagus.

When the pleas had been made, the jurymen proceeded without preliminary consultation to decision by a secret vote. In public suits, only one speech was allowed to the plaintiff, and one to the defendant. In private suits, two were allowed to each. The jurors generally voted with bronze balls or discs, either solid (to denote acquittal) or perforated (to denote condemnation). These were called ψήφοι. If the vote was a tie, the case went in favor of the defendant; and, in a public suit, if less than one-fifth of the votes were for the plaintiff, he was fined, and also debarred from ever again acting as plaintiff in a similar suit. This fine was fixed at 1000 drachmas, about $170. The plaintiff in such a suit also incurred both these penalties if, without good and sufficient excuse, he failed to appear in court, and thus by his own act allowed that his case was bad. If the defendant failed to appear, the case went against him by default (see on ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντις, Apol. 18 e), and he was pronounced guilty in contumaciam. In most private suits, the plaintiff, under similar circumstances, forfeited one-sixth of the sum which he claimed; this forfeiture was called ἐπωβελία, one obol for every drachma.

Suits, both public and private, were divided into (1) αὐγώνες τιμητοί, in which, if it decided against the defendant, the court had still to determine the degree of punishment to be inflicted

the two parties to the suit are required to answer each what question the other asks, but cannot give testimony as witnesses. Cf. Apol., p. 25 d.
(τίμημα), because no penalty was fixed by law; and (2) ἀγώνες ἀτιμήτων, in which, after deciding against the defendant, the court had no further decision to make, because the penalty was fixed by law. In cases of the former kind, if they were public suits, —like the γραφή δοσεβείας brought against Socrates,— the accuser proposed the penalty which he considered adequate,¹ and the accused, if convicted, had the right to make a counter-proposition; then followed the decision of the court.² It is still a moot point whether the judges were confined to a choice between these two propositions or could, if they saw fit, inflict a third penalty midway between the two.

74 The ordinary penalties for crimes against the state were death, banishment, loss of rights of citizenship (ἀτιμία), confiscation of property, and fines. All these are summed up in the formula constantly used at Athens: ὃ τι χρή παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι,³ what a man must suffer or pay for his offence. In case the convicted defendant was not an Athenian by birth, he might be sold into slavery, and thus additionally punished by the loss of his freedom.

75 The magistrates who had to oversee the execution of the punishment of death were called the Eleven (οἱ ἐνδίκα). Ten men on this board were chosen by lot every year, one from each of the ten tribes; the eleventh was a scribe, γραμματεῖς. They had general charge of all prisons, and they issued the order requiring their subordinates⁴ to execute the penalty of death.

¹ Cf. supra, § 31; also, § 69 and note. ² The technical terms which were used are found in Apol., pp. 36 b, 37 c. ³ Cf. Phaed., p. 116 b.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ἈΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΣ.

I. "Ὁ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὁ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ ὁδὸν: ἐγὼ δὲ οὖν καὶ αὐτῶς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὁλίγον ἐμαντοῦ ἐπελαθόμην: οὔτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθὲς γε ὡς ἔποσ εἰπεῖν οὕδεν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὁν ἐφεύσαντο, τούτῳ ἐν ὑπ’ ἐλεγον ὡς ἵπο ὑπᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατη-

17 I. 1. ').' τι μὲν ὑμεῖς. ἐγὼ δὲ: not ὑμεῖς μὲν. ἐγὼ δὲ because the clauses as wholes, not ὑμεῖς and ἐγὼ, are contrasted.

2. δ’ οὖν: introduces an asserted fact, which is contrasted with the preceding statement of uncertainty, but at any rate, Lat. cerner. Cf. Xen. An. i. 3. 5, eἰ μὲν δίκαια ποιήσω οὐδ᾽ ὁδα, αἱρήσομαι δ’ οὖν ὑμᾶς κτέ., whether I shall be doing what is right I do not know, but at any rate I will choose you. Hdt. iii. 80, καὶ ἀλέξθησαν λόγοι ἐπιστοῖ μὲν ἐνοίων Ἑλλήνων, ἀλέξθησαν δ’ ἄν, and arguments were urged which to some Greeks seem apocryphal, but at any rate they were urged.

καὶ αὐτός: even myself, sc. "How then may not you have been affected!"

3. ὁλίγον: sc. δεῖν, used abs. G. 1534; H. 956 and 743 b. Cf. 22 a.—πιθανῶς, ἀληθὲς: these words state and contrast the respective aims of rhetoric and of dialectic (philosophy).

4. ὡς ἔποσ εἰπεῖν: qualifies the sweeping denial in οὐδὲν, hardly anything. G. 1534; H. 956. For an equiv. idiom in Herodotus, cf. Hdt. ii. 15, τὸ Δέλτα ἐστὶ κατάρρυτόν τε καὶ νεωστί, ἡμι λόγοι εἰ πεῖν, ἀναπεφηνός, has only recently, so to speak, come to light.

5. αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν: connect both gens. with ἐν. αὐτῶν, about them, designates the persons who are responsible for the ἐν (cf. below b, τοῦτο μοι ἐθαύμα αὐτῶν ἀναιρεχυντότατον). τῶν πολλῶν gives the sum of which ἐν is part. See also on τῶν πολλῶν in 18 b.—τοῦτο: explaining ἐν and in appos. with it.—ἐν ζ: refers to the passage where the statement is made.

6. χρη: the original warning was χρη εὐλαβεῖσθαι. χρεία, but not χρὴν, would be grammatically possible. G. 1487; H. 932. For the use of χρὴν, cf. 33 d, 34 a, and Lach. 181 c. G. 1400; H. 897.
θητε ώς δευνον όντος λέγεν. το γαρ μη αισχυνθήναι ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμον ἐξελεγχθήσοντα ἑργώ, ἐπειδ' ὁπωςτιον φαίνωμαι δευνὸς λέγενν, τοῦτο μοι ἐδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀνασχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μη ἂρα δευνὸν καλοῦσιν οὕτω θητε ὡς Βευνον οντος λεγευν. το yap μη αυσχυνθὴναυ δτυ αντίκα νπ εμον εξελεγχθησονταυ εργω,

επειδά ν μη&

οπωστυονν φαίνωμαυ 8ευνος λεγευν, τοντο μου ε&οζεν αντων 

άναυσχνντότατον εϊναυ, ευ μη άρα Sen>ον καλονσυν οντου 

eyiv τον τάληθη λεγοντα 

eι μεν yap τοντο λεγονσυν, 

ομολογουην αν εγωγε ον κατα τοντονς εΐναυ ρητωρ. οντου 

μεν yovv, ώσπερ 

εγώ λέγω, 

η τυ η 

ούδε 

ν αληθές ευρηκασυν 

νμευς 8έ μον άκονσεσθε πάσαν την άληθευαν. ον μεντου 

10: unless perchance, Lat. nisi forte. In order to sug­

gest that the one safest way out of the 

difficulty is to beg the whole question 

at issue, ἂρα introduces a definition of 

good speaking, and ironically con­

nects with it the assertion that Soc­

rates is a good speaker.

11. ετ μὲν: if indeed. This use of 

μὲν, like many others, shows its con­

nexion with μην. The supposition is 

merely restated.

12. οὐ κατὰ τούτουσ: but not after 

their pattern. A parenthetical state­

ment, which he proceeds to explain 

(see on μόνοις, 21 b, and cf. 27 c). The 

explanation begins with οὐ μέντοι and 

ends with the chapter. Pending this 

explanation, these words mean a bet­

ter or a worse speaker than they, i.e. 

one not on their level.

13. γούν: at all events. — ἦ τι ἡ 

οὐδέν: little or nothing. Cf. IIdt. iii. 

140, ἀναβεβηκένη ἦ τις ἡ οὐδείς κω 

παρ' ἡμέας αὐτῶν, hardly a single one of 

them has ever been here. Xen. Cyr. vii. 

5. 45, τούτων δὲ τῶν περιεστηκότων 

ἡ τινὰ ἡ οὐδένα αἴσθη, now of these by­

standers I know next to no one at all.

14. ὑμείς δὲ μοι ἄκούσεσθε: instead of 

ἐμοὶ δ' ἄκούσεσθε. The position of 

ὑμείς suggests a contrast with ὁτι ου 

μέν; the sense calls for ἐμοὶ δὲ (ὑμείς) 

ἄκονσεσθε. This collocation leaves op-

portunity for bringing out πάσαν τὴν 

ἀλήθειαν with great prominence. For

a similar shifting of emphasis, cf. 

Xen. An. iii. 1. 25, καθώ δὲ, εἰ μὲν 

ὑμεῖς θέλετε ἔξορμαν ἐπὶ ταῦτα, ἔσεσθαι 

ὑμῶν βούλομαι, εἰ δ' ὑμείς τὰ τετε 

με ἡγεῖσθαι, οὐδὲν προφασίζομαι τὴν 

ἁλίκλαν, now I for one, if you are 

minded to bestir yourselves to accom­

plish this, am ready to follow your lead; 

if you however appoint me to lead you I 

make no excuse on the score of my age. 

See App.

15. κεκαλλιεπημενους κτέ.: in Crat. 

390a b Διὶ φιλὸς is quoted as a ῥήμα; 

when changed to Διφιλὸς it becomes 

an ὑνομ. Here ὑνοματα means words, 

ῥήματα means phrases. In grammar 

ὑνομα means noun, ῥήμα means verb. 

The κόσμος τῶν λόγων (ορνατος) 

means specifically the use of tropes 

and figures of speech. Orators took 

great pains in the choice of single 

words, and in the collocation and 

suitable arrangement of their words 

in phrases. Accordingly, in Symp. 

198b, Socrates is made to bestow un­

stinted praise upon Agathon's speech: 

τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὑμομάτων κα 

ῥημάτων τίς οὐκ εξεπλάγη ἀκονων, 

who would not have been beside himself 

on hearing words and phrases of such 

marvellous beauty? Then he contrasts 

his own fashion of speaking with Aga-
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

15 μὰ Δία, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιπεπχόμένους γε λόγους, ἠσπερ οἱ τούτοι, ἰήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκὴ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν εἰ ὀνόμασι: πιστεύω γαρ δίκαια εἰνά δ λέγω, καὶ μήδεις ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἂλλως: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δὴπον πρέποι, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς, τήδε τῇ ήλικίᾳ ᾠσπερ μειρακίων πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσινεί. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρέμαι: εὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητε μου ἀπολογούμενον δι᾽ ὁσπερ εἰώθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν

17 thon's as follows: ἔρα ὀὖν εἰ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον δέει, περὶ 'Ερωτὸς τόληθή λεγόμενα ἀκόςειν, ὀνόμασι δὲ καὶ θέσει: ἤσομας τοιαύτῃ, ὅπως δὲ ἄν τις τόχῃ ἐπέλθοι, consider now whether you feel the need of such a speech as this, of hearing the truth told about love in words and phrases arranged just in the way they suggest themselves (cf. εἰκὴ λεγόμενα). See Introd. 55.

c 17. εἰκῇ τοῖς ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν ὀνόμασι: the same fact stated under two different but parallel aspects, σχῆμα ἐκ παραλλήλων. See on πάλαι κτ., 18 b, and on καὶ αὐτὸν κτ., Crit. 48 d, and for the facts Introd. 34. Also for freq. sneers at the unrefined illustrations and homely vocabulary of Socrates, cf. Corg. 489 b–491 c. Cf. also Xen. Mem. i. 2. 37, ὦ δὲ Κριτίας, "ἄλλα τῶν ὑμῶν σε ἀπέχεσα" ἔφη "δεήσει, ὦ Σωκράτες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκεῶν καὶ γὰρ οἱμαί αὐτῶν ἢδη κατατετρήθαι διαφυλαχθέντος ὑπὸ σου." 18. ἡ λέγω: referring to the speech which follows, my plea. — μήδεις προσδοκησάτω: for the aor. inv. third pers. in prohibitions, see GMT. 260; G. 1347; Η. 874 b.

20. τήδε τῇ ήλικίᾳ: for a man as old as I. πλάττοντι agrees in gender with ἐμοὶ, i.e. the person involved in πλάττοντι and suggested, though not explicitly, by τήδε (equiv. to τῇ ἐμι). The comparison is attracted into the dat., i.e. ᾠσπερ μειράκιων stands for ὁσπερ μειράκιων ἂν πλάττοι.

21. εἰς ύμᾶς: before you, sc. τοῖς δικαστάς, i.e. τῷ δικαστήρion. Cf. the similar use of ἐν.— καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ: yes, and most fervently too. καὶ μέντοι = a rhetorical 'yes,' the second καὶ adds a specification of the intensity with which the request is made, "and indeed I beg of you, and I beg you most fervently too."

22. δέομαι καὶ παρέμαι: cf. 27 b, παρρησάμην. — τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων: "this has respect primarily to the conversation with Meletus, which is prefaced by the request, 27 b, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐὰν ἐν τῇ εἰώθῃ τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιώμαι. But, as something like this was recognized under the name of ἐρωτήσεις (see Introd. 71), the reference here prob. extends to the conversations rehearsed (20 a), alluded to (21 c sqq., 23 e), and imagined (28 b, 29 c), in the course of the defence; perhaps also to the castigation intermingled with it (30 d, 31 e, 35 b, e).” R.

23. καὶ ἐν ἅγορᾳ καὶ ἀλλοθι: see Introd. 25.
24. τραπεζών: τράπεζαι (banks) as well as shops, esp. those near the market place, were favorite lounging places at Athens. Cf. Lys. ix. 5, καμοι μεν τα προερημένα διείλεκτο επι τη Φιλίου τραπεζή, now the facts just recited I gathered from a conversation at Philius's bank. Cf. also Id. xxiv. 19-20, where, to meet the charge that his shop is the resort of evil minded persons without visible means of support, the defendant says: ταῦτα λέγων ούδεν εμοι κατηγορεί μάλλον ή των ελλων δυο τέχνας έχουσι (who follow trades), ουδέ των ως εμε εισιόντων (my customers) μάλλον ή των ως τοις ελλων δημιουργόντες (tradesmen). έκαστος γαρ οντωσί. ην εγω πρώτον επι δικαστήριον άναβεβηκα, ετη γεγονως πλείω έβδομη κοντά· άτεχνως ονν ζενως εχω της ενθάδε λεζεως. ώσπερ ουν, εϊ τω οντι εξος ετύγχανον ων, εινεγιγνωσκετε δήπου άν μοι ει έν εκείνη

17 25. θορυβεῖν: θορυβεῖν and θόρυβος describe noisy demonstrations whether of approval or disapproval, and are used esp. of large assemblies. Cf. Rep. vi. 492 δ, θανατευόμενοι αθρόοι οι πολλοι εις εκκλησίας ή εις δικαστήρια ή θεατρα ή στρατόπεδα ή είνα άξοναν κατά θόρυβον δημος έλθειν της θυμοσιν τω εις έναν αξιον εκβολαν και κροτουντες κτλ., whenever the multitude gathers and crowds the seats of assemblies, courts, theatres, or camps, or collects in any place where crowds commonly resort, and there makes a great uproar with shouting and clapping of hands meting out praise to this and blame to that in a speech or a play, etc.

26. επι δικαστήριον: "the prep. has the notion of presenting one's self to the court. Cf. Isae. Frg. (Dion H. de Isae. 10), λέγειν επί δικαστήριον. The αναβεβηκα refers to the βήμα." R.

27. εβδομήκοντα: see Introd. 17 and App. Cf. also Lys. xix. 55, έγω γαρ έτη γεγονως την τριάκοντα άντε τω ιπτατι ουδέν πάποτε άντειποιν, ουτε των πολιτων ουδες μοι ενεκάλεσεν (brought accusation), εγγος τε οικων της αροσ ουδέ προς δικαστηρια ουδέ προς θουλευτηρια άφθην ουδεπότε, πριν αιτησης την συμφοραν γενοσθαι.

28. ένθάδε: i.e. εν δικαστηρίοισ. The gen. της λέξεως depends upon εξώς (G. 1147; H. 757 a), the adv. of εξος,—used almost in the same sense of απειρος,—which in this sense takes the gen., but is rare in Att. prose.

δεπερ ουν άν κτε.: for the position
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

30 τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον ἐν ὀσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμᾶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὡς γέ μοι δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἕως — ῥητορος δὲ μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ῥητορος δὲ βελτίων ἃν εἰθ — αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἡ μῆ. δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἁρετῇ, ρήτορος δὲ τάληθη λέγειν.

Π. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιος εἰμί ἁπολογησασθαι, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τά πρῶτα μου ψευδή κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγόρους, ἐπειτὰ δὲ πρὸς τὰ υστέρα καὶ τοὺς υστέρους. ἐμοὶ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατηγόροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ὡς γέ μοι δοκῶ, τον μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἔπειτα, δὲν γὰρ αὐτῇ ἁρετῇ, ρήτορος δὲ τάληθῃ λέγειν.

17 and repetition of ἄφι, see GMT. 223; d G. 1312; H. 864.

30. φωνῇ: dialect, with esp. reference to pronunciation, while τρόπῳ, style of speech, describes more generally any unusual choice and combination of words.

18 ἐτεθράμμην: had been brought up, belongs to the supposed case. See on ὃς ἔμελλεν, 20 a. Foreigners were allowed to appear in court only in exceptional cases. Ordinarily their ἱένος, guest-friend, or their πρόξενος, resident consul, represented them in court and was surety for them.

31. καὶ δὴ καὶ: takes the place of ὅτι καὶ after ὃσπερ; δὴ calls attention to the case in point here cited.— νῦν: not now in contrast to then, but as it is—contrasted with as it would have been. "Now that I am not a stranger in Athens, but only a stranger in courts." Lat. nunc is used in the same way. Cf. Liv. ii. 12.

14. — ὡς γε μοι δοκῶ: rather than ὡς γε ἐμοί, the reading of inferior Mss. adopted by many edit. The important word is ὡς, not μοι, which is the least emphatic form in which the pron. could be introduced. Here the pers. pron. is used instead of the refl. H. 684. For the analogous use of the oblique cases of αὐτῶς instead of the ind. refl., see G. 992; H. 684 a.

32. ῥητορος, ῥητορος: the reason urged is a general one. The influence of style, if felt at all, will be felt just in those cases where the style of the plea is better or worse than the case deserves,— just where it interferes with true judgment. For similar phraseology, cf. Xen. Cyr. iv. 3. 2, ῥητορος μὲν οὖν ὅστως ἔχει, ῥητορος δὲ καὶ ποιουσιν αὐτῷ τῇ ἱδονῇ χαριζόμενοι (for their own satisfaction). Two Gen. of Ver. i. 1, If haply won perhaps a hapless gain; If lost, why then a grievous labor won.

35. αὐτῇ: in place of τοῦτο, by assimilation to the gender of the pred. ἁρετῇ. It refers to the preceding clause αὐτὸ ... μῆ.

Π. 1. δίκαιος εἰμι κτῆ.: for certain adjs. used pers. with the inf., see GMT. 762; G. 1527; H. 952.

2. ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα: not ψευδώς, because in the act. the idiom is κατηγορεῖν τι τίνος.

4. ἐμοὶ γὰρ κτῆ.: introducing the reason why Socrates is to speak first πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα ... κατηγόρους.

πρὸς ψυμᾶ: with κατηγοροι γεγόνασι,
5 ύμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἵδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὐς ἕγω μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀνυτοῦν, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινοὺς· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἳ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἔστι τις Σω-
10 κράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστῆς καὶ τὰ ύπο

which is equiv. to κατηγορήκασι. Cf. Euthyrh. 2 c, ἔρχεται κατηγορήσαν μοι πρὸς τὴν πάλιν, where πρὸς relates to those to whom the accusation is addressed.

5. καὶ, καὶ: the first καὶ emphasizes πάλαι, the second requires no comment. —πάλαι πολλὰ ἵδη ἔτη: see on εἰκῇ κτὲ., 17 c. πάλαι goes back to the beginning of the accusations while πολλὰ κτὲ. follows out their long continuance. This has been going on more than twenty years at the very least, for the Clouds was first put upon the stage in 423, and Socrates was tried in 399.

6. τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀνυτοῦν: when followed by the acc. of a person’s name, οἳ περὶ and οἳ ἀμφὶ mean the person and those connected with him (subjects, followers, companions, adherents). G. 952, 2; H. 791, 3 ἐν. Anytus was the most influential accuser. See Introd. 30.

8. τοὺς πολλοὺς: most of you. The art. is not used here (as in 17 a above, τῶν πολλῶν) to call up something familiar; it contrasts most of them, who were caught young and taught to abhor Socrates, with the few, implied in the part. gen. ἰμῶν, to whom this may not have happened. G. 965, 967; H. 665 and 673 b.

παραλαμβάνοντες: this word often is used of one who takes charge of a child and educates it. Cf. Alc. I. 121 e, διὸ ἐπὶ δὲ γενόμενον ἔτων τὸν παίδα παραλαμβάνον σιν ὡς ἐκεῖνοι βασιλεῖους παιδαγωγοὺς ὄνομάζουσιν. But this sense is too narrow for the present context. More to the point is Gorg. 483 c, where λαμβάνειν is used in a wider sense, which is analogous to that of παραλαμβάνειν here, τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἰμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὅπερ λέοντας καταπλάσσοντες κτε., taking the best and most vigorous of our number in our earliest youth, and by incantations subduing us as if we were young lions.

9. ἐπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν: prejudiced you against me by unceasing accusations. Strictly speaking κατηγοροῦντες ἐπειθόν is required, but coordination here idiomatically takes the place of subordination. —τις Σωκράτης: τὶς with prop. names conveys an indefiniteness and uncertainty which are always uncomplimentary and which in this case amount to scorn, an individual (somebody or other) named Socrates. Cf. what d’ you call him? used colloquially in Eng.

10. σοφὸς ἀνήρ: these words are practically intended to mean a Sophist. “The title σοφὸς ἀνὴρ would at once be understood as a class-appellation, cf. 23 a, 34 c; in it the meaning and associations of Philosopher are uppermost, yet not so distinctly as to exclude those of Sophist.” R. — τὰ τε μετέωρα . . . ἄνεξητηκῶς: popular prejudice coined this phrase, or something like it, to stigmatize all
scientific investigation into nature. With such investigation began and ended the earliest Greek philosophy (Introd. 2-12), and even Socrates' contemporaries, the Sophists,—notably Hippias,—were much addicted to it. See Introd. 14. Cf. Prot. 315 c, ἄφαντο δὲ πρὸς φύσεως τε καὶ τῶν μετεωρῶν ἀστρονομικα ἥττα διερωτᾶν τὸν Ἰππίαν, and they (Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and Andron) appeared to be plying Hippias with astronomical questions about nature and the heavenly bodies. The phrase τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς (where ὑπὸ has the very unusual sense of beneath and covered by) does not refer to definite matters searched into, but is part and parcel of a sweeping assertion that nothing either high or low, nothing "in heaven above or in the earth beneath or in the waters under the earth" is safe from their fatuous and futile curiosity. This popular view is amusingly exaggerated and dramatized by Aristophanes in the Clouds, 184-234. Here the word ἄπαντα adds a final touch of exaggeration. — φροντιστὴς: used trans. here like φροντιζεῖν with acc.. For a dat. similarly governed, cf. τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν, 30 a, where see note. See also App.—"This 'accusation,' σοφὸς ... ποιῶν, both as given here, and as repeated with mock formality in 19 b, is nothing more than a vivid way of representing, for a rhetorical purpose, the popular prejudice, in which the court shared. The charges it contains are two-edged, being borrowed partly from the vulgar representation of the Philosopher, partly from that of the Sophist; the μετέωρα φροντιστῆς points to the Philosopher, the τὸν ... ποιῶν to the Sophist." R.

11. τὸν ἑττω λόγον κτέ.: any teaching of rhetoric, as such, must contain hints as to the most effective means for making the best of a bad case by presenting it skilfully. How far this must be condemned should not be decided without reference to circumstances and facts. To-day it is equally impossible to assert that a lawyer in all cases is bound not to defend a client whose cause he knows to be unjust. Popular opinion at Athens seems to have been convinced that the Sophist's single aim in teaching rhetoric was to communicate the art of proving that black was white. Cf. the Clouds, 889-1104, where Aristophanes introduces the δίκαιος λόγος and the ἀδίκος λόγος respectively. They have an argument in which the ἀδίκος λόγος wins. Cf. Cic. Brut. 8, where the excellent Claudius says of the Sophists: docere se profitebantur quemadmodum causa inferior (ita enim loquebantur) dicendo fieri superior posset. His opposuit sese Socrates, qui subtilitate quadem disputandi refellere eorum instituta solebat verbis.

13. οἱ δεινοὶ: in the pred. The c accusers just mentioned as καὶ ἐξοχὴν δεινοῖ.  

14. οὐδὲ θεοὺς κτέ.: the investigations alluded to above were, it was charged, not only a foolish waste of
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

15 ἐπειτα ἐσών οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἦδη κατηγορηκότες, ἐτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἡ ἀν μάλιστα ἐπιστεῦσατε, παίδες ἄντες, ἐνοι δ᾿ ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογομένου οὐδενός. δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἱ τε αντών εἶπεν καὶ εἶπεῖν, πλὴν εἰ τις κωμῳδιοῖσιν πυρχάνει ὃν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ

18 useful time, but actually (hence the oúde, not even, in the text) led to atheism. See Introd. 10, 12, and 33 fin.

16. ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ: with ὑμᾶς.

17. ἐν ἡ ἄν ἐπιστεῦσατε: for the potential ind. with ἄν denoting what may have happened and perhaps did happen, see G. 1337. See the examples in L. and S. s.v. ἄν B. I. c.

18. ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες: supply δίκην. The fem. termination is used in this idiom, though ἐρήμος is more commonly of two terminations, and κατηγορῶν ἐρήμον, in exactly the sense required here, occurs in Dem. xxi. 87. The acc. is cognate with κατηγοροῦντες. G. 1051; H. 715 b. Cf. also the common law phrases, διώκειν γραφήν, prosecute an indictment, φεύγειν γραφήν, defend a suit at law. The sense of the whole is repeated in untechnical language by the appended ἀπολογομένου οὐδενός. In fact the case they prosecuted always went by default, with none to speak for the defendant. When either party to a lawsuit failed to appear, the court, as we say, entered a default against him, ἐρήμην καταγιγνώσκει τινός, and either one of the two parties to the suit who appeared ἐρήμην κρατεῖ or ἐρήμην αἱρεῖ, sc. δίκην. In such a case a plaintiff, if present, ἐρήμην κατηγορεῖ (δίκην) and the absent defendant ἐρήμην ὄφλισκάνει δίκην. — ἄτεχνως: absolutely, i.e. without artifice, and hence simply, as a matter of course.

19. δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον κτέ.: τοῦτο, the correlative of ὅ, is suppressed for brevity's sake. τοῦτο εἶτιν must be read between the lines. The clause with ὅτι stands in appos. to this suppressed antec. Often a further step toward brevity is taken, and in place of such a clause as this one with ὅτι we have an independent clause, sometimes even introduced by γάρ. Cf. Isoc. viii. 63, ὅ δὲ πᾶντων σχετλιώτατον, οὐς γὰρ διολογίσαμεν ἀν πονηροτάτους εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν τούτους πιστοτάτους φύλακας ἑγομένας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι, but, what is of all things most grievous! we are wont to consider those the commonwealth's most trustworthy guardians whom we should count as the meanest of our citizens.

21. κωμῳδιοῖσιν: the Clouds of d Aristophanes (see Introd. 25) is here more esp. alluded to, since it contains the specific charges just mentioned. Cratinus, Ameipsias, and Eupolis also ridiculed Socrates.

ὅσοι δὲ κτέ.: the clause οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι enlarges the scope of φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι. As it is appended as an after-thought, the sense of the leading verb is casually reiterated in ἄλλους πείθοντες. Strictly speaking πεπεισμένοι is subordinated to πείθοντες. Logically the sense requires: ὅσοι δὲ, οἱ μὲν φθόνῳ ... χρώμενοι, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι, ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον. The first δὲ goes back to the
Through the anonymous accusers, — or they and
other lay witnesses, — you were persuaded not to believe
it, and you were not convinced.

απειθοντες, — οι δὲ καὶ αυτοὶ πεπεισμένοι

ούδεν άναβιβάσασθαι οδον τ’ εστιν αυτῶν ἐνταυθοὶ οὐδὲ

οἱ καὶ άναγκὴ ἀτεχνῶς άστερ σκιαμαχεῖν

ἀπολογούμενον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου.

αξιώσατε οὔ καὶ άμεις, άστερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττοὺς μοι τοὺς

catargorou s γεγονέναι, ἐπέρους μὲν τοὺς ἁρτι καταγορή-

σαντας, ἐπέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι οὔς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰάθητε ε

δεῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνοις πρῶτον με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γαρ

ὑμεῖς ἐκεῖνοι πρῶτον ἴκουστε καταγοροῦντων, καὶ πολὺ

μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν ὑστερον· εἰν· ἀπολογητέοι δὴ, ὡ

ἀνδρε Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέοιν ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν

διαβολήν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἐσχετε, ταύτην ἐν

main statement of the preceding sent.

about the anonymous accusers, δὲ...

On the loose conversational structure of such sents., see

Introd. 55.

25. ἀστερ σκιαμαχεῖν κτὲ.: τὲ καὶ

used here to connect, not two different

ideas, but two different ways of putting the same idea. Socrates would

be sure always to use his favorite method of question and answer, and

therefore σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον

for him would be practically ἐλέγχειν

μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. By thus saying

one and the same thing twice over,

the speaker expresses his idea all the

ever more effectively.

27. αξιώσατε: the two notions of

ἀξιον, worth (price) and right, are as

usual blended in this word, duly grant.

Notice the persistent recurrence in

various forms of the idea conveyed

by ἀστερ ἐγὼ λέγω. See Introd. 55.

29. οὔς λέγω: refers to b above.

— οἵπητε κτέ.: it was common for

a speaker to ask the court to approve

of some order of topics which he pro-

posed to follow. For a fuller descrip-
tion of ἐκεῖνος, see b above; notice

that it refers to ἐπέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι.

These old-time accusers, though the

last-mentioned, were the most remote

in thought, for Anytus and his crew

were actually present as τῶν ὑστερον shows.

 nord b.

32. ἐν: well, pointing to what has

just been said, and implying that the

whole must be accepted by his hear-

ers as a matter of course. It is like

"So far, so good!" ἵστω often has

the same force. Grammatical argu-

ments are used to prove that this ἐν

is nothing more nor less than the al-

ternative form used not infrequently

in place of the opt. ἐνοςαν. The force

of δὴ is very much that of

ἐν, for it

indicates that the duty of making

some plea must be taken for granted.

33. τὴν διαβολήν: the prejudice pro-

duced by the slanders just described.

34. ἐσχετε: acquired. See on ἐσχοχο-

20 d, and cf. Hdt. i. 14, τὴν τυραννίδα
35 οὖτως διάγως χρόνώς. Βουλούμην μὲν οὖν ἃν τοῦτο οὖτως 19
gενέσθαι, εἰ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοὶ, καὶ πλέον τί με
pοιήσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἴμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλέπτων εἶναι, καὶ
οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἴον ἐστιν. ὃμως δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἢν ὅπε
τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

III. Ἀναλάβαμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἔστιν
eξ ἡς ἡ εμὴ γεγονεν, ἡ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητος b
με ἐγράφατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἶεν· τί δὴ λέγουντες
διεβαλλον οἱ διαβαλλόντες; ὦσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν
5 ἀντωμοσίαν δἐι ἀναγνώναι αὐτῶν. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ
περιεργάζεται ζητών τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν
idiom in comparisons; the leading and dependent clauses are briefly
blended in one; ἀναγνώναι as well as ἀντωμοσίαν are involved in this
consolidation. The reference is to the
formal reading of the documents in
a suit before the full court. On
ἀντωμοσία, see Introd. 69.

5. ἀδικεῖ: very commonly, as here,
ἀδικεῖν has almost the force of a pf.
One of its obvious meanings is ἀδικός
εἰμι, which practically signifies, I have
done wrong or I am guilty. GMT. 27;
H. 827.

6. περιεργάζεται: is a busybody. A
busybody either minds other people's
business or makes too much of his
own. Socrates is accused of the first;
for a good case of the second, cf.
Arist. i. 4, sibi non placere quod
tam cupidie elaborasset, ut
praeter ceteros Iustus appel-
laretur. Cf. 20c, περιττότερον πραγ-
ματευόμενον, and see on τὰ
καὶ οὐράνια (the unuttered
ἈΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

7. άλλους ... διδάσκοντες: see Introd. 11 and 25.

8. οὐχ ὡς ατιμάζων: cf. in e below, καὶ τοιοῦτο γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν ἐἶναι. “Such knowledge is a fine thing, if any one has it.” Socrates ironically hints that no one has it. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 11, οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἦπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι, διελέγετο, σκοπῶν ὅπως τοῖς πυρετάνων κόσμων ἔργον, καὶ τίσιν ἁνάγκαι (by what necessary laws) ἔκαστα γίγνεται τῶν οὐθενῶν· ἄλλα καὶ τὸ τὸν φροντιζόντας τὰ τοιαύτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυεν. Those who pursued these studies were crazy, he thought, because man ought first to know himself (cf. id. i. 1. 12, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐσκόπει, πῶτερα ποιεῖσθαι αὐτοὶ ἔλεγε, καὶ τῶν φύσεων οἶκος τοῖς πυρετάνων κόσμων ἔργον, καὶ τίσιν ἁνάγκαι εἰς τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων φροντιζέων, and 38 a below), and because these physicists looked into questions which were really beyond the sphere of man (ibid., ἡ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπεια παρένεσθε, τὰ δαιμονία δὲ σκοποῦντες, ἡ γὰρ τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν, and therefore arrived at impotent conclusions (cf. id. iv. 7. 6-7). See on ἐκ τῆς κτέ., 26 e, and Introd. 10.

10. τὸν οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων (that you ought to do) ποιοῦντων ἡμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματα ἔχει. See on ἤ τι ἢ οὐδέν, 17 b.

19. plans in man’s thought). In Prot. 315 c, Plato satirizes the astronomical lore of Hippias.

7. ταὐτα γάρ εωράτε: in the Clouds, Aristophanes put before the Athenians their own feelings against Socrates, he dramatized a prejudice already existing.

9. οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων (that you ought to do) ποιοῦντων ἡμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματα ἔχει. See on ἤ τι ἢ οὐδέν, 17 b.
15 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὥς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοῦς ὡμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἰσιοῦ ὡμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοὶ πώποτε ἄκηκόατε διαλεγομένους. πολλοὶ δὲ ὡμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν. φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλους, εἰ πώποτε ἡ μικρὸν ἡ μέγα ἦκουσέ τις ὡμῶν ἐμοὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένους καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιοῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τάλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ὃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστὶν, οὔτε γ' εἰ τινος ἄκηκόατε ὡς ἐγώ παideύεων ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρηματα πράττομαι, οὔτε τούτο ἀληθές. ἐπει καὶ τούτο γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ τις οἶδε τ' εἰη παideύεων ἀνθρώπῳ ποιοις ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς εἰπεῖ, καὶ ἐκ τούτων γαρ έκάστος, ὥς ἀνδρεῖς, τούτων γὰρ ἐκαστος, ὥς ἀνδρεῖς, case, sc. the one just mentioned; hence the art. is used.

22. περὶ ἐμοῦ: the colloquial tone is marked in the position of these words. Instead of “the other stories which people tell about me,” Socrates says, “the other stories about me, which people tell.” The rel. clause is appended as an apparent afterthought.

IV. 1. ἀλλὰ γὰρ: in turning to a new topic, a glance is thrown backward (οὔτε ὡς ἐστιν), and the new departure begins with the emphatic αὐθέντες (ἐστιν).

3. ἐπεί: although. Strictly a connecting thought must be supplied.

4. εἰ τις εἰ: the regular apod. καλὸν ἂν εἰη is represented by its equiv. in sense, δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι. GMT. 502, and compare 555.

5. ὁστέρ Γοργιάς: on Gorgias, see Introd. 12-14. Protagoras was not living at this time. See Introd. 12.

6. τούτων γὰρ ἐκαστος κτε.: the
ironical surprise of Socrates is reproduced by the anacoluthon in this sent. With ἐστιν the speaker apparently leads up to πείθειν, but the emphatic τούτου (in which the clause τοὺς νέους ἐν λόγῳ is summed up) is followed by πείθουσι instead. (The pl. after ἐκάστος is not uncommon. H. 609 a.) Then comes the statement of a fact which is surprising, they pay these men, and finally the climax is capped by their giving them thanks to boot. To give this last point ροσειδέναι, which should be a partic. like διδόντας, is put on a par with ξυνείναι. For a fuller account of these teachers, see Prot. 316 c ff.

19. ἐπεί καὶ ἄλλος: “the men just named are not the only ones, for also, etc.”

20. τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

politikēs, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἷμα γάρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ 20
tῶν υἱῶν κτῆσιν. ἐστι τις, ἔφην ἔγώ, ἢ οὐ; Πάνω
γε, ἢ δἐ ὃς. Τίς, ἢν δἐ ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσον δι-
25 δάσκει: Εὐήνος, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν
καὶ ἐγώ τῶν Εὐήνων ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὅσ ἀληθῶς ἔχοι ταύτην
τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγώ οὖν καὶ ε
αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡμεροὺς αὐν, εἰ ἡπιστάμην
ταύτα· ἄλλ’ οὐ γάρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

V. 'Τεκλάβοι ἃν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἱσως· ἄλλ’, ὁ Σώκρατες,
tὸ σον τι ἐστι πράγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοι αὑτὶ γε-

25. Εὐήνος κτ.
20 et «χοί καὶ διδάσκει: in the original statement which Socrates
may be supposed to have in mind, both of these were in the indec.
Both might change to the opt. (GMT. 696; H. 983) after ἐμακάρισα.
The change to the opt. from ἔχει throws ei ἔχοι, as it were, into the background, leaving
οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει, which contains a very pointed insinuation, in the
more vivid indic. See App.

27. ἐμμελῶς: synonymous with ἀρθός. Its opposite is παραμελῶς (dis-
cordantly or falsely, of a false note).
The word also appeals by innuendo
the notion that the teaching of Eve-
nus is cheap, and this is the point here
made. In Crit. 106 b, μετρίως and
παρὰ μέλος, παραμελῶς and ἐμμελῆς are
used as contradictories.

V. All error is distorted truth; until
a man sees the truth which a particu-
lar error caricatures, he will not re-
nounce his error; to denounce error
as such is therefore not enough.
Thus far Socrates has argued against
the grossly erroneous popular opinion
of himself; now he proceeds to exhibit
the truth. His upright conduct has
been exasperating, for obedience to
God has led him to defy men.

1. ἄλλ’, ὁ Σώκρατες κτ.: objections
2. τὸ σον πράγμα: What is that you
have been about? or better, What is this
about you? Accordingly πράγμα is used
either in the sense of pursuit, study, or
plan of life; or it has no independent
meaning, but is joined with the art.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

20. το ονόμα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν: sc. ἀλλ' ἦ. Τοι ονομα is only as bringing out the bad repute which was their result. Cf. the Lat. n o m e n . The words τὴν διαβολὴν show that ονόμα is not to be taken in its usual sense of good name or fame, but closely with διαβολὴν, both the name and the blame.

11. ἄλλ' ἦ: this collocation with οὐδέν indicates that ἄλλ' ἦ arose from the use of ἄλλος. For a case where ἄλλος precedes it, cf. 34 b.

12. ἐσχηκα: I have become possessed of and still have. See on ἐσχετε, 19 a, and Phaedr. 241 b, νοῦν ἦδη ἐσχηκὼς καὶ σεσωφρονικός, after he had come to full understanding and gained self-control.

τοίαν ... ταύτην: this question treads upon the heels of the preceding sent. so closely that διὰ is not repeated. τοίαν is in the pred.; we might expand to τοία σοφία ἐστὶν αὕτη δι' ἦν τοῦτο ... ἐσχηκα. H. 618.

13. ἢπερ: sc. διὰ ἐκείνην τοῦτο ... ἐσχηκα, ἢπερ κτέ., just that which.
κινδυνεύω ταύτην είναι σοφός· ούτω δὲ τάχ’ ἂν οὐς ἀρτι. 15 ἐλεγον μείζω τινὰ ἣ κατ’ ἄνδρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἰσιν, ἣ ε’ οὐκ ἔχω μείζω τὶ λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγγυες αὐτὴν ἐπίσταται, ἀλλ’ ὅστις φησίν ἓθευδέτατε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολὴ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ μοι, ὃ ἄνδρες Αθηναίοι, μὴ θορυβηθήσετε, μηδ’ εὰν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ ἔμων ἑρώ τὸν λόγον ὃν ἂν λέγω, 20 ἀλλ’ εἰς ἄξιόχρεως ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. θ’ τῆς γὰρ

15. ἢ οὖκ ἔχω κτε.: ironical. Such wisdom is one of two things, either superhuman or no wisdom at all.

18. μὴ θορυβηθήσετε: do not interrupt me with noise, strictly referring to the moment fixed by ἐὰν δόξω κτε. In 21 a, and 30 c, the pres. is used (μὴ θορυβείτε) because the request is less precise, make no disturbance. GMT. 259; H. 874 a.

19. μέγα λέγειν: not of course in the sense of speaking out loud (cf. Rep. v. 449 b, ὁ Ἀδείμαντος μέγα ἢδη λέγων, beginning to speak above his breath), but in that of μεγαληγορεῖν, as μέγα φρονεῖν is used in the sense of μεγαλοφρονεῖν. Cf. Rich II. iii. 2,

Boys with women’s voices
Strive to speak big, and clap their female joints
In stiff unwieldy arms against thy crown.

— οὐ γὰρ ἔμων κτε.: a compressed form of statement, made effective with the audience by the allusion to certain Euripidean strains. (Cf. Eur. Frg. 488, κοῦκ ἔμως δ’ μῦθος ἅλλ’ ἐμῆς μῆτρος πάρα, not mine the word, I heard it from my mother. This line is parodied in Symp. 177 a, ἢ μέν μοι ἄρχῃ τοῦ λόγου ἐστι κατὰ τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίππην· οὐ γὰρ ἔμως δ’ μῦθος ἅλλ’ Φαίδρου τοῦ. The same sentiment is found in Eur. Hel. 513, λόγος γὰρ ἐστιν οὐκ ἐμὸς, σοφῶν ὑ’ ἐμὸς, not mine the word; by clerkly men 'twas spoken. Hor. Sat. ii. 2, 2, nec meus hic sermo est sed quae præcepit Ofellus.) For a similarly compressed statement, cf. ikανὸν τὸν μάρτυρα, 31 c. “A pred. adj. or subst. is often a brief equiv. for one clause of a compound sent.” H. 618. ἐμὼν and ἄξιόχρεως are both preds., and special point is given them by their position. This sent. is far more telling than what might be spun out of it, sc. λέγω γὰρ λόγον καὶ ὃ λόγος ὃν ἔρω ἐμὸν ἔστι, ἀλλ’ ἄνοίσω (sc. τὸν λόγον) εἰς τὸν λέγοντα ὑμῖν ἐστίν.— ὁν ἂν λέγω: equiv. to ὃν μέλλω λέγειν, though it is formally a hypothetical rel. clause with indef. antec., "the word I shall utter, whatever the word may be, that I say, will not be mine, etc." Cf. Crit. 44 c.


τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἶ κτε.: it required skill as well as modesty to avoid blunting out here with τῆς ἐμῆς σοφίας. The εἶ δὴ τῆς ἐστὶ interrupts just in time. Cf. Isocr. xv. 50, περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐμῆς εἶτε βούλεσθε καλεῖν δυνάμεως, εἴτε φιλοσοφίας, εἴτε διατριβῆς, ἄκηκατε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, now you have heard all the truth about my talent or methodical study or pursuit, whichever you like to call it.
ΑΠΟΛΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

ἐμῆς, εἰ δή τίς ἐστὶ σοφία καὶ οἰα, μάρτυρα ὕμῶν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφώντα γὰρ ἵστε ποι. οὗτος ἐμὸς τῆς ἐπαίρος ὡν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὕμῶν τῷ πλῆθει ἐπαίρος τῇ καὶ ἡνεύφυγε τῇ φυγῇ ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὕμῶν καθήλθε. καὶ ἵστε δὴ οἴος ἦν Χαιρεφών, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἔφ' ὁ τι ὅρμησε. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἑλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύεσθαι· καὶ ὅπερ λέγω μὴ θορνβεῖτε, ὃ ἀνδρεύρετο γὰρ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἐμοὺ εἰς σοφώτερος. ἀνείλεν οὖν

20. ὁία: goes back to πολιον in d above.

21. Χαιρεφώντα: certainly, if the Athenians did not know Chaerephon, many a joke of Aristophanes at Chaerephon’s expense was lost on them; see below on line 25. He is mentioned by Xen. (Mem. i. 2. 48) as one of those friends of Socrates of ἐκεῖνων συνήσαν οὐχ ἵνα δημηγορικὸ γένοιτο, ἀλλ’ ἵνα καλὸ τῇ κἀκαθότερῳ γενόμενοι καὶ οἷς καὶ οἰκέσαι καὶ φίλους καὶ πόλεις καὶ πολιτείς δύνασθαι καὶ οἰκεῖ. είναι οὗτος χρήσται. 22. Χαιρεφώντάς: certainly, if the Athenians did not know Chaerephon, many a joke of Aristophanes at Chaerephon’s expense was lost on them; see below on line 25. He is mentioned by Xen. (Mem. i. 2. 48) as one of those friends of Socrates of ἐκεῖνων συνήσαν οὐχ ἵνα δημηγορικὸ γένοιτο, ἀλλ’ ἵνα καλὸ τῇ κἀκαθότερῳ γενόμενοι καὶ οἷς καὶ οἰκέσαι καὶ φίλους καὶ πόλεις καὶ πολιτείς δύνασθαι καὶ οἰκεῖ. είναι οὗτος χρήσται. 23. τῆν φυγήν ταύτην: an allusion, which no one present could fail of understanding, to the exile from which all conspicuous democrats had only four years before returned (in 403 n.c.). The Thirty Tyrants were the authors of this banishment; cf. Xen. Hell. ii. 4. 1, προείπον μὲν τοῖς ἐξο τοῦ καταλόγου (not registered on their catalogue of 3000 oligarchical sympathizers) μὴ εἰσέναι εἰς τῷ ἀκτυν. φευγόντων δὲ εἰς σὺν Πειραια, καὶ ἐνετεύχθην πολλοῖς ἁγουτεῖν ἐνεπλήσθην καὶ τὰ Μέγαρα καὶ τὰς Ἐθῆς τῶν ὑποχωροῦντων. All these allusions had the effect of influencing the court in favor of what they were about to hear.

25. σφοδρός: Chaerephon was a born enthusiast. Cf. Charm. 153 b, Χαιρεφώντας ἐπ' ὅσον τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῆς ίνα αἰσθανόμενοι καὶ ὑμῶν κατηλθε. καὶ Ἰστε, ὃς ἦν Χαιρεφών, ώς σφοδρος εφ' ὁ τι ὅρμησε. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἑλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύεσθαι· καὶ ὅπερ λέγω μὴ θορνβεῖτε, ὃ ἀνδρεύρετο γὰρ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἐμοὺ εἰς σοφώτερος. ἀνείλεν οὖν

26. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ κτέ.: well then really once. Cf. 18 a. The regular way of introducing a particular instance of what has been stated generally. What Chaerephon did at Delphi was an instance of his σφοδρότης.
Η Πυθία μηδένα σοφότερον εἶναι· καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ 
30 ἄδελφος ὑμῶν αὐτοῦ οὐτοσὶ μαρτυρῆσε, ἐπειδή ἐκεῖνος 
tetelēugtikēn.

VI. Σκέφασθε δὲ ὃν ἐνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ ἐμαντω 
21 σοφότερος; Εὐριπίδης |

VI. τί ποτε αἰνίττεται: through 
modesty Socrates takes it for granted 
that this is “a dark saying.” For a 
genuinely enigmatical oracle, cf. Paus. 
vi. 3. 5, γίνεται δὲ τοῖς βασιλεύσιν (Temenus and Creshontes) αὐτῶν λόγιον τόδε, ἡγεμόνα τίς καθόδου ποιεῖται τὸν στραβάλον, that they 
should make “the three-eyed” leader of 
their home return. The “three-eyed” 
turned out to be Oxylus, son of Ar-
draemon, whom they met riding on a 
one-eyed mule; acc. to Apollodorus, 
Oxylus was one-eyed and bestrode a 
two-eyed horse. See an essay on Greek 
Oracles by F. W. H. Myers, in his 
volume entitled Essays Classical (Lon-
don, 1883).

5. σοφός ὁν: see on ἐπίσταμένην, 22 ε. 
—λέγει φάσκων: λέγει here refers to 
the meaning and φάσκων to the words 
in which it was conveyed.

6. οὗ δήπου: of course I do not sup-
pose. ποῦ adds a shade of uncer-
tainty to the stress of δή. Notice 
that Socrates’s long struggle (μόγις 
pάν) is dramatized in these short, 
quick sents., which suggest a man 
talking to himself.—οὐ γὰρ θέμας: it 
would be against his nature. God, 
being by nature truthful, could not 
lie; cf. Rep. ii. 382 ε, πάντη γὰρ 
ἀψευδότα ὁ θεός τὸ δαμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ θείον, 
the nature of divinity and of God is 
absolutely void of falsehood. The 
implicit faith of pious Greeks in oracles, 
esp. in those of Apollo, is proved 
directly by such words as Pindar’s 
ψευδόν οὐχ ἀπεται, he (Apollo) sets 
not his hand to falsehood (Pyth. iii. 9), 
τὸν οὗ θειόν ψευδέι τρέγει, ‘tis unlawful 
for him to have part in a lie (Pyth. 
ix. 42). It is also shown indirectly 
by the horror, expressed so often by 
the tragedians, at finding Phoebus’s 
speech untrue. Against all blasphem-
ous attribution of falsehood to the 
gods, Plato defends the faith in 
Rep. ii. 383 β, where he reproubs the 
following lines of Aeschylus (spoken by 
Thetis in a lost play), ἡγὼ τὸ Φοίβου 
θείον ἀψευδότα στόμα | ἦλπιζον εἶναι μα-
tηκὴ βρόντων τέχνη (with skill prophetic 
fraught) δ’ αὐτὸς ἄγιον ἀγίος ἐν ὑμιν παρὼν (marriage-feast) αὐτὸς τάδ’ εἰπὼν, 
αὐτὸς ἐστιν ὁ κτανὸν ὁ τοῦ παιδὸς τὸν 
ἐμόν. The hesitating tone adopted by
The gods why question? Nay, we rather should With sacrifice approach them, and a prayer For what is good, disdaining prophecy, ... What prophecy will lead the sluggard man to thrift? Of prophets best good counsel is and sense.

Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 9, δαίμοναν (were crazed) ἐφι δὲ καὶ τὸς μαντευομένους καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μαθούσι διακρίνειν (to learn and know thoroughly).

8. μόνης πάνυ: after a long struggle, a qualification of ἐπείτα ἐτραπόμην which repeats parenthetically the idea of πάνυ χρόνον. For a similar parenthetical qualification, see on οὗ κατὰ τῶν, 17 b. For the position of πάνυ, see on οὗ πάνυ, 19 a.—τοιαύτη τινα: sc. ζήτησιν, purposely vague, “which I began in some such way as this.” See on τοιαύτη τις, 19 c.

10. ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ: the oracle is personified.

11. ὅτι: introducing direct quotation, GMT. 711; H. 928 b.—ἐστὶ: really is. This whole clause was spoken with special emphasis.

13. πρὸς ὑπὸ ἐπάθον: cf. Gorg. 485 b, ὑποστατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ἄσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ψευλομένους καὶ παλξουτας, in the case of philosophers I feel just as I do about people who lis and are childish. Contrast the use of πρὸς in such expressions as πρὸς ἐμαυτον σκοπῶν, pondering in my mind; πρὸς ἄλλοις σκοπούμενοι, we consider among ourselves (cf. πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἔλογιζόμην in d below).

14. καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ: strictly speaking, this covers the same ground as διασκοπῶν τοῦτον. Socrates has no test except by conversing with his man.

15. ἐδοξε μοι: idiomatically substituted before δοκεῖν (to seem) to avoid ἐδοξα in the unusual but possible sense, I came to the opinion. The same anacoluthon occurs both when the nom. part. precedes (cf. Xen. An. iii. 2. 12, καὶ εὐδεμενοι τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι ὄψιν ἄν κατακάνοι τῶν πολεμίων τοσαῦτας χιμαίρας καταθύσει τῇ θεῷ, ἐπεὶ οὐκ εἴχον ἱκάνα εὐρέην, ἐδοξεν αὐτοῖς κατ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν πεντακοσίας θύειν κτ.), and when it follows (cf. Th. iii. 36, καὶ ἥν οὖν ὡς ἐδοξεν αὐτοῖς οὐ τοὺς παρόντας μόνον ἀποκτεῖναι ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς ἔπαινας Μυτιληναίος θοῦ ἡβόσι, ἐπι-
καλούντες τὴν ἀπόστασιν, taxing them with their revolt).

19. πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν . . . ἔνοχιόμην: see on line 13 above.

20. ὅτι . . . εἴμι: not really dependent like ὅτι οἴσοιτο in line 17, but like ὅτι οὐσίοιτο . . . ἔστι in line 11 above.

23. ὥσπερ οὖν: the οὖν leads back to κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ κτὲ, which in turn contains a reaffirmation of ἐγὼ γὰρ . . . σοφός ὦν, b above. Here οὖν, not οὐδὲν, is used, because the antithesis is between not-knowing and false assumption of knowledge. — ἐσώκα γ' οὖν: now it seems at least that, etc. γ' οὖν is a better reading than γοῦν, since ἐσώκα and τοῦτον require precisely the same stress in the connexion of thought. One of the many examples of γέ repeated in Hom. is II. v. 258, τοῦτο οὖν πάλιν ἀδικία ἀπολύσαν ὕκκες ὀποι | ἐμφω ἀφ' ἥμελων, εἴ γ' οὖν ἔτερος γε φύγραυν.

24. αὐτῷ τούτῳ: serves to prepare the way for the clause with ὅτι, which gives a detailed specification of what is indefinitely stated in σμικρῷ τινι.

VII. 1. οὖν: pointing back to the end of 21 b. — ἀπ' η: straightway or immediately, vividly bringing up the moment of past time alluded to.

2. ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην: this gives the fact of which Socrates says he was always conscious (αισθανόμενοι), so that he was constantly tormented (λυποῦμενοι) and terrified (κυπρομένει). With λυποῦμενοι and δεδιῶς, ὅτι would mean because; these two parts, should there­fore be attached to αἰσθανόμενοι. Notice, however, that αἰσθανόμενοι followed by ὅτι (that) is a very uncommon const. Cf. ἀπηχθανόμην in d above with ἀπηχθανόμην, here in something like the sense of the colloquial "was getting myself disliked."

21. ὅμως δὲ ἐδόξει: correl. with αἰσθανόμενοι μὲν καὶ λυποῦμενοι καὶ δεδιῶς ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὅμως δὲ
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

άναγκαιον ἔδοκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖ-21
σθαί· ἵτεν οὖν σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμοῦ τί λέγει ἐπὶ ἄπαν-
5 τας τοὺς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. καὶ νη τὸν κύνα, ὥ ἄνδρες
'Aθηναίοι— δεὶ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τάληθῇ λέγειν— ἣ μὴν 22
ἔγω ἐπάθον τι τουοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εἰδοκυμοῦντες
ἐδοξάν μοι ὁλίγον δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεῖες εἶναι ζητοῦντι
κατὰ τὸν θεὸν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαινότεροι ἐπιμικρόστε-
10 ἰδιαὶ ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὡμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι ὡσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος, ῥα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ή ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διηθράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἀλλούς, ῥα ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοφύρων καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθεστέρον ἐκείνων ὑπερτείναι ὠσπερ πόνους πονοῦντος ἦν ἐμήν πλάνην ἐπιΒεΐζαι ὡσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος, ῥα μοι ἐδόκει αὐτὸμοι καταληψόμενος ἀμαθεστερον εκείνων ὑπερτείναι ὡσπερ πόνους πονοῦντος ἦν ἐμήν πλάνην ἐπιΒεΐζαι ὡσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος, ῥα μοι ἐδόκει

22 him in thinking that he understood it.

11. ὡσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος: my Herculean labors, as I may call them; the gen. agrees with ἐμοῦ implied in its equiv. ἐμὴν. G. 1001; II. 691. The words πόνους πονοῦντος were sure to remind his hearers of several passages in the tragedians, where Heracles, a character endeared to them chiefly by his heroic struggles, recounts his labors. Socrates compares his own intellectual encounters with the physical ones endured by Heracles, and recounts in a half-tragic vein these “labors” imposed of God. Cf. Soph. Trach. 1046 f. and 1089 ff.,

In many a heat, by fearful odds hard pressed,
With arms and straining back ere now I strove ...

Hands, hands, my back, my breast, O arms of mine,
Still, still, ye are the same whose sometime strength
In haunts Nemean smote the shepherd’s bane,
And tamed the lion whom none dared approach,
Or look on, etc.

Cf. Eur. II. F. 1255–1280, and esp. the chorus, 348–455; Browning in Aristophanes’ Apology translates the whole of this play. — ἵνα μοι καὶ κτῆ.: Socrates, assuming for the sake of his point an attitude of opposition, says that he thought he was refuting the oracle (cf. 22 c) while really he was proving it to be irrefutable. This achievement is ironically stated as his real purpose. Cf. ἵνα used by Hom. in indignant or ironical questions, e.g. II. xiv. 364 f., Ἀργείοι, καὶ ἐδὲ μεθελεμένοι “εἰκοτρίνην | Πριαμίδη, ἵνα μία ἐλη καὶ κύδος ἄρτητα, Ἀργίνοι, and must we to Priam’s son Hector again yield the day, that he on our ships may lay hands and be sure of renown? Socrates was, he here implies, guided to just the result which he least expected. This might easily suggest the irony of fate, so tragically exemplified in Sophocles’s Oedipus the King, which was first performed about 429 B.C. and presumably was familiar to the court. In clauses with ἵνα (ἐπεὶ, and ἐπείδη), καὶ is freq. used simply for greater stress. Cf. Gorg. 501 c, συγχωρώ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῆ ὁ λόγος, just to help your argument on to its close. This is not like καὶ μανθάνοιμι below, b, where καὶ means also. The opt. clause ἵνα γένοιτο depends upon πονοῦντος, which represents the impf. G. 1289; H. 856 a.

14. καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοὺς: see the passage from the Ion quoted in the note on c below. The κωμψδιοποιοί are hardly included here. The idea that the genuine poet was a being endowed with exceptional wisdom was common in ancient times. Cf. Arist. Poet. 9. 3,
μάλιστα πεπραγματεύσθαι αυτοίς, διηρώτων ἃν αὐτοὺς τι 22
λέγουν, ὥς ἀμα τι καὶ μανθάνομι παρ’ αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνο-
mai ouν ὡς εἴπειν, ὃ ἄνδρες, τάληθη· ὃμως δὲ βρήτεον.
20 ὡς ἔτοσ γὰρ εἴπειν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἀπαντεῖς οἱ παρόντες ἃν
βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν
καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τούτῳ, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖν ε ἃ
ποιοῖν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὡσπερ οἱ
θεομάντει καὶ οῖ χρησμωδοὶ· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν
25 πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἰσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ἃν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τι
μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες· καὶ ἀμα

17. φύσει: by (grace of) nature. Here
used to express what Plato elsewhere
means by θεία μοίρα, by the grace of
heaven. Acts done φύσει are done
unconsciously, are inspired by something
below the surface of our every-day
selves, whereas conscious acts are, if
right, guided by τέχνη and σοφία, art
and wisdom. Cf. Ion, 533 e–534 c, πάν-
tes γὰρ οἱ τῶν ἐπών ποιηταὶ (epic
poets) οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης (out
of knowledge of their art) ἀλλ’ ἐνθεοί
(inspired) δῦνες καὶ κατεχόμενοι (pos-
sessed) πάντα ταύτα τὰ καλὰ λέγουσι
ποίημα, καὶ οἱ μελοποίοι (lyric poets)
oi ἀγαθοὶ ἀσατῶς... ἀπε οὖν οὐ τέχνη
ποιοντες (writing poetry) ἀλλ’ θείᾳ
μοίρᾳ, τούτῳ μόνῳ οἶδ’ τέ κακοτοί
ποιεῖν καλῶς, ἐφ’ ἂ ω Μοῦσα αὐτὰν
ἀμφεσιν, ὃ μὲν διθυράμβους (one can
write dithyrambs), δ’ ἐγκώμια (hymns
of praise), δ’ ἐπορχήματα (choral
songs, accompanied by a lively dance),
δ’ ἐπορχήματα (epics), δ’ ἰάμβους (iambics)
... διὰ ταύτα δὲ θεός ἐξαιρούμενος
τοιοῦτων τού ὑόν (taking all reason
out of them) τοῖς χρήσιμοις καὶ τοῖς μάντεσι
toi θείοις.
... ανθρώπων αύτών. Απή αυτο καὶ έντενθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἶομενοσ περιγεγονέναι ζητερ καὶ τῶν 
30 πολιτικῶν.

VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τούς χειροτέχνας ἦν. ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ ἐξινήδεων οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔσος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δὲ γ᾿ ἤδεω ὅτι εὑρήσωμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὖν ἐφεύσθην ἥπιος, ἀλλ᾿ ἦπισταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὖν ἦπι-
5 στάμην, καὶ μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ᾿, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, ταύτων μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὁπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί: διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην κα-
λῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἐκαστος ἡξίου καὶ τάλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτὴ ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκεῖνην

22. ἦσθομὴν οἰομένων: like ἀκονομο- 

tes ἐξεταζομένων, 28c. The acc. oc-
curs in 20a, ὧν ἦσθομὴν ἐπιδημοῦντα. 
Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 2. 1, αἰσθάμενός ἡ 
tὸ τε Λαμπροκλῆ τὸν πρεσβύτατον 
vίδιν ἑαυτῷ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα χαλέπα-
νοντα (in a passion with his mother).

28. σοφώτατων: pred. agreeing with 
οἰομένων, which contains the subj. of 
εἶναι. — ἀνθρώπων: part. gen. G. 1088; 
H. 650.— δὲ οὖν ἦσαν: sc. σοφοί. Cf. 
Xen. Mem. iv. 6. 7, ὃ ἐπίσταται ἐκαστος, 
τοῦτο καὶ σοφὸς ἐστιν. On the acc. of 
specification, see G. 1058; H. 718.

VIII. 1. τελευτῶν: finally. For 
particiles used adverbially, see 
GMT. 834; G. 926; H. 968 a and 
619 a.

2. ἐπισταμένῳ: cf. 21b. — δὲ γ᾿: 
γέ gives stress to τούτους, but yields 
the first place to δὲ (cf. 24c, ἐγὼ δὲ γέ); 
μὲν also takes the same preced-
ence. As a rule, γέ comes immedi-
ately after the word which it empha-
sizes, or else between the noun and 
it art.

4. ἦπισταντο: they knew, without 
any implication that they have ceased 
to know at the time when he speaks.

6. ὅπερ καὶ, καὶ οἱ κτέ.: this repe-
tition of καὶ is idiomatic in correl.
sents., and may be represented by one 
Eng. word, also. With οἱ ποιηταῖ it 
is easy to supply ἔχοντιν from the 
ἔχειν of the leading clause; similar 
cases are very frequent in Greek.

7. διὰ τὸ κτέ.: here begins the ex-
planation which the preceding clause 
demands. γὰρ might have been added, 
i.e. διὰ γὰρ τὸ . . . ἐξεργάζεσθαι, or, τὴν 
γὰρ τέχνην ἐξεργάζομεν κτέ.

8. ταλλα τὰ μέγιστα: adjs. used 
subst. take the art. after δ ἄλλος quite 
as commonly as subs. do. τὰ μέγιστα 
refers to affairs of state and of the 
common weal, as in Rep. iv. 426c, 
σοφῶς τὰ μέγιστα and Gorg. 484c, 
γνῶσει, ἃν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἔθησ, ἔδοξα 
ἡδὴ φιλοσοφιαν, you shall know if once 
you proceed to affairs of larger concern 
and give up philosophy once for all. 
Cf. also Xen. An. ii. 6. 16, and in
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

10 την σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν, ὠστε με ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἃν οὐκ ωσπερ ἡχὼ ἡχεῖν μήτε τι σοφὸς ἃν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμάθης τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἣ ἀμφότερα δὲ ἐκεῖνοι ἡχουσιν ἡχεῖν. ἀπεκρίαμην οὐν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοὶ ὡσπερ ἡχὼ ἢ.

IX. Ἐκ ταυτησί δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαῖ μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἳ ἐχεῖ καὶ βαρύταται, ὡστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονεῖν, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἶναι γάρ

11. δεξαίμην ἃν: that is “if it were mine to choose.” εἶ μοι γένοιτο ἡ ἀρεσίς is implied. Notice the idioms ὡσπερ ἡχὼ ἡχεῖν and δὲ ἐκεῖνοι ἡχουσιν ἡχεῖν. In both the order is just the reverse of the natural Eng. one. In Lat., the corresponding idioms follow the same order with the Greek.

12. μήτε τί: τί strengthens the negation μήτε. Cf. εἶτ' μήτε.

IX. 1. δ.: here used by way of closing and summing up the previous line of argument. On ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, see Introd. p. 49, n. 4.

22 a Menex. 234 a, ἐπὶ τὰ μεῖκοι ἐπινοεῖ τρέπεσθαι καὶ ἡρχεῖν ἡμῶν ἐπιχειρεῖσιν.

9. πλημμέλεια: see on ἐμελεῖσιν, 20 c.

10. ὡστε με: not ὡστ' ἐμέ, which would be too emphatic. It represents ἀνηρώτων ἐμαυτὸν without εγώ.

Cf. e below, and see App. — ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ: in the name of and, as it were, on behalf of the oracle.

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23 a 2. οἵαν χαλεπώτατα: sc. εἰσι, explained by places where the same idiom is expanded, e.g. Xen. Mem. iv.

8. 11, ἔμι μὲν δὴ ἐδόκει [Σωκράτης] τοιοῦτο ἐίναι ὁδὸς ἄν ἐν ἄρτι τῷ καὶ οἰκεῖον ὡστε τοῦτο λέγεσθαι: instead of ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο ἐλεγομην. Although δὲ co-ordinates the whole with πολλαῖ μὲν κτε. and the two form the leading clause, yet the inf. λέγεσθαι half incorporates these words with the ὡστε clause. This irregular const. is perfectly clear in a conversational style like that of Socrates. It has the effect of stating more distinctly the fact that this epithet σοφός, as applied to Socrates, is the capital instance of πολλαί διαβολαὶ and results from them.—σοφὸς: introduced to explain precisely what is meant by ὄνομα τοῦτο. The nom. σοφὸς leads back to the main statement πολλαὶ διαβολαὶ and results from them. — ἂν ὄνομα τοῦτο λέγεσθαι: instead of understood, this nom. would not have been possible. — εἶναι: the inf. εἶναι is idiomatically used with pred. nouns or adjs. after ὄνομαζειν, ὄνομαζεσθαι, and the like. Cf. Rep. iv. 428 e, ὄνομαζοντα των εἶναι, are called by certain names. Prot. 311 e, σοφίστην ὄνομαζονοι τὸν άνδρα εἶναι. Lach. 192 a, ὁ Σωκράτης, τί λέγεις τοῦτο δ' ἐν πάσιν
5 με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἀν 23 ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω. τὸ δὲ κυδυνεύει, ὥς ἄνδρες, τῷ ὁυτὶ ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τούτῳ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνῃ σοφίᾳ ὅλιγον τῶν ἄξιων ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός. καὶ φαίνεται τούτῳ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ τῷ ἔμῳ ὄνοματι ἐμὲ παράσειμεν, ὥσπερ ἄν εἴη ἐποίητο ὅτι υἱόν ὥς ἄνθρωποι, σοφῶτατος ἐστιν, ὡστε ὑπερ Σωκράτης ἐγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἐστὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν περιών. ἐπὶ ἄν

8. καὶ οὐδενὸς: brought in as a climax after ὅλιγον. Cf. Theat. 173ε, ἡ δὲ διὰν ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη συμπλάκα καὶ οὐδὲν, but his (the philosopher's) mind regarding all this as little or nothing at all. The Lat. idiom is much the same as the Greek. Cic. Or. 16.52, rem difficilem, di m mortales, atque omnium difficillimam, a thing which, heaven knows, is hard; or rather, hardness can no farther go.

9. τοῦτο λέγειν: sc. ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνῃ σοφία κτέ. The argument runs as follows: “People credit me with knowing all the things which I convict my neighbors of not knowing. The truth is far otherwise, for God alone has real knowledge. The meaning of his dark saying about my being the wis est of men is simply that ‘human wisdom is vanity.’ He does not mean that Socrates has any other than human wisdom. He only uses the name ‘Socrates’ because he needs a particular instance.” The double acc. with λέγειν closely resembles the idiom κακά λέγειν τινά. Cf. Crit. 48a. See App.

10. ὥσπερ ἄν εἶ: in this compressed idiom ἄν alone represents a whole clause, which the context readily suggests. GMT. 483 f.; H. 905. 3. For a case where the ellipsis is a simpler one, cf. Xen. Cyr. i. 3. 2, ἡσαλίκα τε αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἄν (sc. ἂσαλίκα) εἶ τε πάλαι συντεθραμμένοι καὶ πάλαι φιλῶν ἂσαλίκαν. The Lat. idiom is much the same as the Greek. Cic. Or. 16.52, rem difficilem, di m mortales, atque omnium difficillimam, a thing which, heaven knows, is hard; or rather, hardness can no farther go.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

καὶ ἔρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἄστων καὶ ξένων ἄν

15 των οἷων σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ τῷ θεῷ
βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὃτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφὸς. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης
τῆς ἁγιολίας οὕτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως προξαί μοι σχολὴ
gέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὕτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλὰ ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία εἰμὶ
dια τῆς τού θεοῦ λατρείας.

Χ. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες οἰς

14 καὶ ξένων: notice the not un-

usual grouping under one art. of two

words connected by καὶ.

15 τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν: cf. on ὑπὲρ τοῦ

χρησμοῦ, 22 ε.

16 ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ: cf. Legg. iii.

677 ε., μυρίαν τινὰ φοβερὰν ἐφησαν; Ῥεπ.


Oecon. ii. 1-4, where Critobulus and

Socrates converse substantially as fol-

lows: "C. I have gained reasonable

self-control; therefore, Socrates, give

me any hints you can: tell me the best

way to manage my property. But

perhaps you think me already quite

rich enough. S. That is my own

case, not yours. I am sure that I am

a rich man, but I consider you pov-

terty-stricken, and sometimes I am

quite worried about you. C. I like

that, Socrates! For heaven's sake

do be good enough to tell me what

price you imagine that your property

would fetch, if sold, and what mine

would sell for. S. I am sure a fair

buyer would be glad of the chance of

getting my house and all my property

for five minas (about eighty-five

dollars). I am sure you are worth

more than a hundred times that sum.

C. How comes it then that you are

so rich and I so poor? S. My

income provides amply for all my

wants, but for your wants you need

three times as much as you have.”

The possession of five minas must have

placed Socrates in the lowest of the

four classes established by Solon, that

of the θήτες. Originally this lowest

class had few political duties and

no political rights; later on, a law

proposed by Aristides gave them the

same rights as the others.

19 τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείας: cf. c

Phaedr. 244 ε., ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ

προφητεύοσας οἷς ἔδει, ἀπαλαγην εὐρε-

το, καταφυγοῦσα τρὸς θεῶν ἐχάς τε καὶ

λατρειάς, madness intervened and by

prophesying to those who were in straits

found relief by recourse to prayer unto

the gods and the observance of their rites.

The dat. (less freq. the gen.) with ver-

bal nouns occurs chiefly after nouns

such as λατρεία and ἐυχή, which ex-

press the abstract idea of the act
denoted by the verb; but Plato uses

both the gen. and dat. with ὑπηρέτης,

and the gen. with ἐπίκουρος; while the
dat. with βοηθός is familiar in many

Greek authors. In the const. with

ὑπηρεσία below, 30 α, the dat. τῷ θεῷ

takes the place of the gen. here.

Χ. 2. αὐτόματοι: of their own motion,
χαίρουσιν ἄκοντες ἐξετάζομενων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ 23
αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτ’ ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους
ἐπιθαυμάζοντες, κατέπειτα, οὖμαι, εὑρίσκοντοι πολλήν ἀφθονίαν
οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὅλην ἡ
οὐδὲν. ἄντευθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἐξετάζομενοι ἐμοὶ ὄργι-
ζονται, ἀλλ’ οὖχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς οἱ
ἐστὶ μιαρώτατος καὶ ὁμίλει τοὺς νέους, καὶ τις αὐτῶν ἐρωταὶ τις
ἐρωταί, εἰς τίς μιαρώτατος καὶ ὁμίλει τοὺς νέους, καὶ τά κατὰ
πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέ-
γουσιν, ὅτι τά μετέωρα καὶ τά ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ θεοῦ μὴ νομή-

3. χαίρουοην κτΙ.: Plato compares
the disconcerting effect of Socrates's
homely method with the charm ex-
cercised by the smooth discourse of
men like Protagoras and Gorgias.
Compare the ironical account of the
persuasive charms of Gorgias, Prodi-
cus, and Hippias in 19 e above, where
especially the implication of τούτων
πελώνωι should be noticed. Cf. Prot.
317 e–319 a, where Protagoras is rep-
resented as giving a very taking ac-
count of his own teaching for the
benefit of young Hippocrates.
4. μιμοῦνται, εἰτ’ ἐπιχειροῦσιν κτέ.: they are for imitating me, and then they
undertake, etc. No strict sequence in
time is here marked by εἰτα, although
their readiness to imitate must logi-
cally have preceded the acts in which
their imitation consisted. For a most
lively description of the early symp-
539 b. In other editt. μιμοῦνται is sub-
stituted for μιμοῦνται, needlessly, since
this use of εἰτα, where κέτα would
seem more natural, is quite common.
Cf. 31 a, and also Xen. Mem. ii. 2, 14,
tοὺς ἀνθρώπους φυλάξῃ μὴ σε αἰσθόμενοι
τῶν γονέων ἀμελοῦντα πάντες ἀτίμασω-
σιν, εἰτα ἐν ἑρμήλια φιλῶν ἀναφανί.
6. ὅλην ἡ οὐδέν: see on ἡ τι ὅλην,
17 b, and on ὅλην καὶ οὐνόμαι, 23 a.
An. ii. 1. 10, where καὶ οὐ is used with
the same meaning. See App. — Σω-
κράτης τίς: see on τίς Σωκράτης, 18 b.
11. ἀλλ’ ἀγνοοῦσιν: see App.
12. τά κατά πάντων κτέ.: ταῦτα
means the familiar well-worn com-
monplaces. These may be found in the
Clouds of Aristophanes. Xenophon,
referring specifically to the λόγων
tέχνη, which is not lost sight of here,
uses almost the words of our text in
Mem. i. 2. 31, τοῦ κοινοῦ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις
ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον ἐπιφέρων
ἀντί, (Critias) making against him the
charge made by the many against phi-
osophers in general. Cf. 18 b c, 19 b,
and see on εἰ γὰρ ἐφέλον, Crito, 44 d.
13. ὅτι τά μετέωρα κτέ.: the sense
requires that from line 10 διδάσκοντων
should be understood, or rather δι-
δάσκοντων διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. On this
implied διδάσκοντων depend (1) the two
accs. τά μετέωρα, τά ὑπὸ γῆς, and (2)
the two infs. νομίζειν and ποιεῖν. Cf.
26 b and 19 b.
ἈΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

ζευ καὶ τὸν ἦττῳ λόγῳ κρείττῳ ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, 23
15 οἷμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἑθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίγνονται
προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἀτε οὖν,
οἷμαι, φιλότημοι ὄντες καὶ σφιδροὶ καὶ πολλοὶ καὶ ξυντε-
ε ταγμένος καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περί ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν
ύμῶν τὰ πρᾶτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν σφιδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ
20 τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων,
Μέλητος μὲν ύπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἄξθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ
ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ύπὲρ τῶν ῥητώρων. ὥστε, ὅπερ ἄρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμά-

14. τὰ ἀληθῆ: the truth, namely ὁτι κατάδηλοι κτε. Eng. idiom requires a sing. or an abstract noun more frequently than the Greek, e.g. ταυτά often means this. H. 635. Cf. Phaed., 62 d, ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἀνθρωπος τάς ἂν οἴηθε φαίνεται, but a fool might perhaps think this, that he ought to run away from his master.

15. εἰδέναι: one man claims knowledge of this, and another, knowledge of that: the absurdity is in all cases the same, i.e. their claiming knowledge at all.

16. ξυντεταγμένος: either (1) in phrases well combined, or (2) with their forces drawn up, or (3) = κατὰ τὸ ξυντε-
tεταγμένον, i.e. according to a concerted plan. (2) and (3) make it refer to the united efforts of those represented by the three accusers. ξυντεταγμένος, the reading adopted by Schanz, means about the same as σφιδρῶς below, i.e. contente, with might and main. This would really amount to the same as (2), and suits the context far better than (1) or (3).

19. ἐκ τούτων: "it is upon this footing, namely that of an old general prejudice, aggravated by supervening personal animosity,—that I am now attacked by, etc." R. In spite of 19 a, ὥς ἐκαὶ πιστεύουν Μέλητος, which states the fact here alluded to, "in consequence of" would here be an inappropriate translation for ἐκ. On the accusers, see Introd. 30.

21. ύπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν, δημιουργῶν, πολιτικῶν, ῥητῶρων: we must not press the word ὑπέρ. The accusers merely represented the feelings of their respective classes. The ῥήτορες have not been explicitly mentioned before. For the ποιητα, cf. 22 a; for the πολιτικος, cf. 21 c; for the δημιουργος, cf. 22 d. Prob. the ῥήτορες were thought of under the general designation of πολιτικος. This is the more likely because the line between men who habitually spoke on public questions, and what we may call professional speakers, was not yet clearly drawn at Athens. All this lends weight to the suggestion that the words καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν are a later addition, for which Plato is not responsible. See App. In favor of keeping the words, however, is the fact that Anytus, who, like Cleon, was a βυρσοδέψης, tanner, came into collision with the views of Socrates rather as a πολιτικός than as a
84 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ζωμ’ ἄν εἰ οἶος τ’ εἰην ἐγὼ ύμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξε- 24
25 λέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὁλίγω χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονυίαν. ταύτ’ ἐστων ὑμῶν, ὃ ἀνδρες 'Αθηναίοι, τάληθη, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὕτε μέγα οὕτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυφάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ’ ὑπο-
στελλάμενος. καίτοι οίδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀπεχθά-
νομαι· ὃ καὶ τεκμηρίου ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὐτή ἐστὶν
30 η διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταύτα ἐστί. καὶ ἕαν τε νῦν
eάν τε αὖθις ξητήσητε ταύτα, οὕτως εὑρήσετε.

XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν διὸν οἱ πρῶτοι μοι κατήγοροι κατηγό-
ρουν αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς· πρὸς δὲ Με-
λητὸν τὸν ἁγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὡς φησι, καὶ τοὺς
υστέρους μετὰ ταὐτά πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὖθις
5 γὰρ δὴ, ὦσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων οὖντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν
23 δημιουργός. It may be that Socrates
had aristocratic views about the de-
basing effect of manual labor similar
to those of Plato and Aristotle. Cf.
Xen. Oecon. iv. 2 and 3, where Socrates
is represented as saying that the
mechanical arts enervate men's bodies
and womanize their souls. Also (ibid.
ii. 7) where Socrates again is made
to say that in case of an invasion the
24 τεχνίται will prove cowards.
26. ταύτ’ ἐστων ὑμῖν: there you have,
etc., "just what I promised to tell
you at the beginning of my speech."
27. ὑποστελλάμενος: the meaning
here is illustrated by many places in
Dem., e.g., xxxvii. 48, καὶ τῷ μηδὲν
ὑποστελλάμενον μηδ’ ἀσχυνόμενον κλα-
χόνειν καὶ διδυμεῖσθαι, by his readiness
to resort to absolutely undisguised and
shameless wailing and lamentation. See
also xix. 237, ἀνάγκη δὲ, ὃ ἀνδρες 'Αθη-
ναιοι, μετα παρρησία διαλεχθήναι μηδὲν
ὑποστελλάμενον.
28. τοῖς αὐτοῖς: sc. by just such un-
disguised and unmitigated statements.
29. αὐτή, ταύτα: both pred.
31. οὕτως εὑρήσετε: supply ἔχοντα. 24
The finite verb is also left out in such
cases, cf. Rep. ii. 360 d, ταύτα μὲν οὖν
δὴ οὕτως, sc. ἔχει.
32. πρὸς ὑμᾶς, πρὸς Μελητὸν: b
Cf. 19 a, ἀπολογήσασθαι πρὸς τὰ υπόστερα
(sc. κατηγορημένα) καὶ τοὺς υστέρους (sc.
κατηγόρους); the Greek idiom is ἀπολο-
γεῖσθαι πρὸς (1) τοὺς δικαστὰς, (2) τοὺς
κατηγόρους, (3) τὰ κατηγορημένα. In
Eng. the idiom is to plead (1) before
the court, (2) against the accusers,
(3) against (to) the accusations.
3. τὸν ἁγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν:
that upright and patriotic man. The
addition of ὃς φησι suggests that few
or none encourage Meletus in "laying
this flattering unction to his soul."
4. αὖθις . . . αὖ: once more . . . in
turn. A strong distinction is made
between the serious accusation of the
first accusers, those who have preju-
diced the public mind, and that of
Meletus.
5. ὦσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων οὖντων κα-
tηγόρων: as if these were a second set
of accusers. Cf. 19 b, ὦσπερ οὖν κατηγό-
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δὲ πῶς ὀδεῖ. Σωκράτης φησιν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὗς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἔτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καὶνά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλημα τοιοῦτον ἐστὶν. οὐ τούτῳ δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἔκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἔγω δὲ γε, ὡς ἀνδρεὺς Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημὶ Μελητον, ὧτι σπουδὴ χαριεντίζεται ῥαδίως εἰς ἁγῶνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώποις, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζει καὶ ἱδεσθαι ὡσεὶν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὡσ δὲ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τῶν ἐσχατῶν ἐκεῖνον ἐπισκέψομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι.

XII. Καὶ μοι δεῦρο, ὡς Μέλητα, εἶπεν ἄλλο τι ἣ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι εσονται;

Socrates distinguishes between two sets of accusers, but maintains that the charges preferred by his actual accusers (Anytus, Meletus, and Lycon) are based upon those of his real accusers (public prejudice and misrepresentation).

6. ἔχει δὲ πῶς ὀδεῖ: πῶς, substantially, implies that the quotation is not literal. See Introd. 31 and 56. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 21, Ἀρδίκες . . . περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνεται ὡσ πῶς λέγων. 7. φησίν: Meletus, already named as the chief accuser.

9. τὸ ἐγκλημα: see Introd. 68.
11. ἐγὼ δὲ γε: see on 22 d.
12. σπουδὴ χαριεντίζεται: this is an ὁξύμωρον; for χαριεντίζεσθαι is akin to παιδεῖν, the subst. to which, παιδιά, is the contradictory of σπουδή. “Meletus treats a serious business (an accusation involving life and death) as playfully as though the whole matter were a joke.” Cf. 27 a.
13. εἰς ἁγῶνα καθιστάς: ἁγῶν is the usual word for a suit at law; hence the phrase ἁγῶνιζεσθαι δίκην, contend in a law-suit. The sing. is used distributively, involving men in a law-suit. Cf. Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 4, ἕφοροι . . . κύριοι ἄρχοντας . . . καταπαύσαι καὶ εἴρξαι τε καὶ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς ἁγώνα καταστήσαι, the ephors had power both to supersede and to imprison the magistrates and to bring them to trial for their lives.
14. ὡσ: not dependent upon οὐδὲν which is an adv. acc. See on τοῦτων, 26 b.
15. τοῦτο: gives greater vividness than αὕτω would give.
16. καὶ οὐδὲν: “so that you can see it as plainly as I can.”

XII. 1. δεῦρο, εἰπέ: come and tell me. Cf. below, ἔρχεσθαι διὰ τῆς πρωτος ἐκλογῆς, come, summon him hither, that face to face he may tell me himself. On the cross-examination, see Introd. 71.—ἄλλο τι ἡ:
Ἐγὼ γε. Ἡθί δὴ νῦν εἰπὲ τούτοις τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δὴ λογο γάρ ὅτι οἷοῦσα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρὼν, ἡς φής, εἰσάγεις τούτους καὶ κατηγορεῖς. τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἥθι εἰπὲ καὶ μῆνυσον αὐτοὺς τίς ἐστίν. ὀρᾶς, ὦ Μέλητε, ὦ σιγᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἤχεις εἰπεῖν; καὶ τοι οὐκ αἰσχρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἰκανὸν τε-κμήριον ό δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὥτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ’ εἰπὲ, ἄγαθε, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἀλλ’ οὖ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, βελτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἀνθρωπος, ὡς εἰσάγεις τούτοις καὶ κατηγορεῖς. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε; οἴδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἴοι τέ εἰσί καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσι; Μά- λιστα. Πότερον ἀπαντείς, ὃ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ’ οὐ; Ἀπαν- τες. Ἐν γε νῆ τῷ Ἡραν λέγεις καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὡφελοῦντων. τί δὲ δὴ; οίδε οἱ ἀκροαταί βελτίους ποιοῦ- σιν ἡ οὐ; Καὶ οὐτοί. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βου-
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

λενταί. Ἀλλ' ἀρα, ὡς Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ εἰν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ 25 ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κάκεινοι βελτίους ποιοῦσι ἀπάντητε; Κάκεινοι. Πάντες ἀρα, ὡς ἐοικεν, Ἀθηναίοι καλοῦς κάγαθος ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; Πάνω σφόδρα ταύτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ' ἐμοῦ κατέγγυκας δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι 25 ἀπόκρυναί. ἢ καὶ περὶ ὑποποὺς οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἐχεῖν· οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοῦς πάντες ἀνθρώποι εἶναι, εἰς δὲ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἢ τούναντιόν τούτον πῶν εἰς μὲν τις ὁ βελτίους οἶδας τε ὅν ποιῶν ἢ πᾶν ὑλίγοι, οἱ ὑπικοὶ· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ, ἐάνπερ ἐξιώνθη καὶ χρώνυται ὑποποῖ, διαφθείρον-

25 σὺν: οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ὑποποὶ καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων ἔσων; πάντως δῆτον, εάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἀνυ-

τος οὐ φήτε εάν τε φήτε· πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἰ ἡ 25

26 19. ἀλλ' ἀρα κτέ.: cf. Euthyd. 290 e, σεπ. ἀλλ' ἀρά, ὡς πρὸς Δίως, μὴ ὁ Κτήσιπ-

ποσ ἢ ὁ ταύτ' εἰπάν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι; ΚΡ. ποῖος Κτήσιππος; S. Why then, good graces! have I forgotten, and was it Ctesippus who said it? C. Ctesippus? rubbish! Questions with μὴ take a negative answer for granted. The use of ἀρα here marks the last stage in Socrates's exhaustive enumeration. Only the ἐκκλησιασταί are left. "Somebody in Athens is corrupting the youth. We have seen that it is nobody else, hence possibly it is these gentlemen."

But this is absurd, hence πάντες ἀρα Ἀθηναίοι κτέ. — οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί: this has probably crept into the text, and was originally a marginal note, put in by way of giving a word parallel to ἀκροαταί and βουλευταί. There was good reason for varying the sameness of discourse by saying οἱ εἰν τῇ ἐκκλη-

σίᾳ. There seems less reason for putting this last idea in two ways. All Athenians twenty years of age in full standing (ἐπίτιμοι) were members of the public assembly (ἐκκλησία) at Athens.

27. τούναντιόν πῶν: quite the re-

verse, an adv. acc. perhaps of measure or content. Cf. Gorg. 516 e, ἀλλὰ τὰδε μοι εἰπέ ἐπὶ τοῦτο, εἶ λέγονται οἱ Ἀθηναίοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονόντα, ἢ πῶν τούναντιον διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. In Crit. 47 b c d, Socrates appeals from the many and ignorant to the few, or to the one who has special knowledge.

29. διαφθείρον: by its emanci-

pation from the government of δοκεῖ this statement is made especially vig-

orous. The transition has already been half made by εἰς μὲν τις, where in-

stinctively we supply εἰς στί in spite of δοκεῖ.

31. πάντως δῆτον: before this So-

crates waits a moment, to give Meletus opportunity to answer.

32. οὐ φήτε: the answer no is made prominent by the order of clauses. Εάν οὐ φήτε, ἢ εἰ εἰς, οὐ σα νο, ἢν μὴ φήτε,
περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν μόνον αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἰ δὲ 25 ἀλλοι ὕφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, δὲ Μέλητε, Ικανὸς ἐπιδεῖ- 35 κνυσαὶ ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφροντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰςάγεις.

XIII. Ἐτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὅ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, πότερόν ἐστών οἰκεῖν ἀμενον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖ τῇ πονηροῖς; ὅ τάν, ἀπόκρυναις οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπῶν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς αἰε ἐγγυτάτω ἐαυτῶν

if you do not say yes. οὐ φητε must be taken closely together as equiv. to a verb of denying. See GMT. 384. Cf. Lys. xiii. 76, ἐὰν μὲν φάσκῃς Δρύνην ἀποκτεῖναι, τούτων μὲν μεμνησθε . . . ἐὰν δ' οὐ φάσκῃ, ἐρεσθε κτε. For the use of μή, cf. Dem. xxi. 205, ἐν τι' ἐγὼ φῶ, ἐν τε μὴ φῶ. — πολλη . . . εὐδαιμονία: here τις is applied to an abstraction particularizes it. Thus the εὐδαιμονία is represented as of some sort; this makes the form of statement more specific though still vague.

33. εἰ διαφθείρει, ὕφελοῦσιν: the pres. indic. here is not used in the prot. that immediately belongs to the apod. πολλη . . . ἐν εἶη. See GMT. 503. The connexion of thought requires an intervening prot., or some qualifying adv. like εἰκότως. This implied prot., with its apod., goes with εἰ διαφθείρει, ὕφελοῦσιν. Cf. 30 b and, for a case where δικαίως represents the prot. required by the sense, Xen. An. vii. 6. 15, εἴ δὲ πρόσθεν αὑτῷ πάντων μᾶλλον φιλὸς ἡν, νῦν πάντων διαφόρωστας (most at variance) εἰμι, πῶς ἐν εἰτε δικαίως . . . ὃς ὑμῶν αἰτίαν ἐχομι; 34. ἐπιδείκνυσαι: the mid. perhaps implies criticism of Meletus's bearing, since ἐπιδείκνυσαι and ἐπιδείξεις are used of pretentious performances. Here, however, ἐπιδείκνυσαι means primarily ἐπιδείκνυσαι σαυτὸν. G. 1242; H. 812. For the added δτι clause, see the next note, and on τις εἰπτιν. 24 d.

36. ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι κτε.: appended to explain τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν. Here at last is the pun upon Meletus's name (cf. also 26 b), for which the constant recurrence of the idea of μεμέληκε (variously expressed, ἐμέλησαι and περὶ ὃλου τοιεὶ in 24 c, μέλον γέ σοι and μεμέληκεν in 24 d) has already paved the way. For similar plays upon words, cf. Soph. O. T. 395, δ μηδέν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπος, Symp. 185 c, Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου, and the obvious play upon Agathon's name, ib. 174b; Rich. II. ii. 1,

Old Gaunt indeed, and gaunt in being old, . . . Within me grief hath kept a tedious fast; Gaunt am I for the grave; gaunt as a grave.

XIII. 1. ὅ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε: for the same order, cf. Men. 71 d, σοὶ δὲ αὐτὸς, ὅ πρὸς θεῶν Μενών κτε. For a different order, see 26 b, Crit. 46 a. In 26 e the voc. is not expressed.

3. ὅ τάν: my friend, or my good friend. Cf. Dem. 1. 26, ἀλλ' ὅ τάν, οὐχὶ βουλήστεται. The orthography is much disputed, and we find ὅ τάν, ἄταν, and ὅ 'τάν.

4. τοὺς ἐγγυτάτω ἐαυτῶν ἄντας: i.e. those who were most unavoidably influenced by them.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

5 δοντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν τι; Πάνυ γε. Ἐστιν οὖν οὕτως βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἔννοσων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὦφελεί-α σθαί; ἀποκρίνου, δ' ἀγαθέ· καὶ γὰρ δ' νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐσθ' οὕτως βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δὴ τα. Φέρε δὴ, πότερον εἰμὲ εἰςἀγείς δεύρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἂκοντα;

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Εἰκόνα ἡγε. Τί δὴ τα, ὥς Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμὸν σοφότερος εἰ τηλικοῦτον ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὄν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἐγρωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται ἢ ἐν τούς μάλιστα πλησίον ἐαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς ἐ

15 τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἢκω, ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο ἀγνοῤῥ., ὅτι, ἢὲν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ἔννοσων, κινδυνεύσω κακὸν τι λα- 

16 βείν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔκων ποιῶ, ὡς φης σὺ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι ὑπείρως, ὥς ἐν τηλικοντος τηλικόσδε.

20 εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὥστε σὺ γε κατ' ἀμφοτερα ὕπειρε. εἰ 26 δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιοῦτων καὶ ἀκοσιῶν ἀμαρτη-

7. ἀποκρίνου: after a pause. — ἄνομος κτέ.: see Introd. 71 with note 2.

11. τοσοῦτον σὺ κτέ.: τηλικοῦτος and τηλικόσδε, acc. to the context, mean indifferently so young or so old. See Introd. 30. Notice the chiastic order:

Cf. below, 26 ο ἐ ἐς τετανάντρια καὶ ὄσον τοιοῦτον ἐπι-γραντον δὲ, a young person who, I conceive, is not much known: his name is Meletus and Pitthis is his deme, —perhaps you remember a Meletus of Pitthis, who has rather a beak, a scrubbed beard, and lank long hair.

15. ἀγνοῶ: for the indic. with ὅστε, see GMT. 582; ᾿Η. 927.

16. κακὸν τι λαβείν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ: in the case supposed the κακὸν is the natural result. It is stated, however (c. the equiv. idiom ἀγαθῶν τι λαβείν παρά τινος), as something which the victim goes out of his way to obtain.

18. οἴμαι οὐδένα: cf. Lach. 180 a, κοινωνεῖν έτοιμος (sc. εἰμι), οἴμαι δὲ καὶ Ἀκάθητα τόνδε (sc. ἐτοιμον εἶναι).

19. ἢ, ἄκων: the verb is supplied from its subordinate clause, εἰ δια-

21. καὶ ἄκουσιν: strictly speaking this is superfluous, since τοιοῦτων takes a
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

μάτων ού δεύρο νόμος εισάγεων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἰδία λαβόντα 26
dιδάσκειν καὶ νουθετοῖν. δὴλον γὰρ ὦτι ἐὰν μάθω παύσο-
μαι ὃ γε ἄκων ποιώ. οὔ δὲ ἐξυγγενέσθαι μὲν μου καὶ δι-
25 δάξαι ἐφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἥθελησας, δεύρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ
νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ' οὐ
μαθήσεως.

ΧΙΩ. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τούτῳ μὲν δὴλον
ὁ ἐγὼ ἑλεγον, ὦτι Μελήτῳ τούτῳ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν τὴ
pώποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὁμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆς δια-
ϕθείρειν, ὃ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ὥ δὴλον δὴ ὦτι, κατὰ
5 τὴν γραφὴν ἂν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζεων οὐδὲ
ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἔτερα δὲ δαίμονια κανά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις

the necessary meaning from its relation to ἄκων. Here is another case of
Socrates's homely fashion of repeating
himself. See Introd. 55. — For the
gen. of the charge after εἰσάγειν, see
on εἰσάγειν, 24 d.

23. παύσομαι κτε.: from ποιώ we
must supply ποιῶ with παύσομαι. Such
an ellipsis as this is obvious, and
therefore not uncommon. See App.

25. ἐφυγες κτε.: you declined. So-
crates offered Meletus every op-
portunity for such an effort. See
Introd. 25. The compound διαφέυγειν
in this sense is more common, but cf.
Eur. Heracl. 595 Ι., αὐτοὶ δὲ προστι-
θέντες (imposing) ἄλλοις πάνους, πα-
ρὸν σεσώσθαι (when they might be wholly
spared), φευξόμεσθα μὴ θανεῖν.
From this quotation it appears that
μὴ might have been used before ἐξυ-
gγενέσθαι and διδάξαι. See Arnold's edit.
of Madvig's Syntax, 156, Rem. 3.
For cases of ἐκφεύγειν qualified by a
neg. and followed by τὸ μὴ οὗ and μὴ
οὗ, cf. Soph. 225 b, οὐκετέ ἐκφέυξεται
(sc. οὐ σοφιστῆς) . . . τὸ μὴ οὗ τὸν
γένους (kind) εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυματο-
ποίων τις εἰς. GMT. 811. Phaedr.
277 δ ὥ, τὸ γὰρ ἄγνοιειν ... οὐκ ἐκφεύξει
tῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ οὐκ ἐπονεῖσθον εἶναι.
GMT. 807. For an entirely differ-
ent case, cf. 39 a, where τὸ ἀποθανεῖν
represents θάνατον.

ΧΙΩ. 2. τούτων: see on ὦ, 24 c. b
—οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν: a stronger
way of saying οὐδὲν. The whole is
adv., and therefore in the cognate
acc. rather than in the gen. See G.
1060 and 1054; H. 719 b.

3. ὁμως δὲ δὴ: all the carelessness
of Meletus is accumulated in ὁμως,
and thus the adversative force of δὲ
is enhanced, while δὴ brings the state-
ment of contradiction to a point; that
is, δὴ marks transition from a general
to a special account of τὴν τοῦ Μελή-
του ἀμέλειαν.

4. ὥ δὴλον: appends a more precise
and pressing question to the first, and
anticipates the answer. In Lat. an
is used in this way. The ellipsis in
ὁτι κατὰ κτε. is to be supplied from
πῶς με φῆς διαφθείρειν;

6. ταῦτα: does not go with λέγεις
but with διδάσκων.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

7. πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τούς, ὁ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν δὲν νῦν δό λόγος ἐστὶν, εἰτέ ἐτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοί καὶ τοὺς ἀνδράς τουτοις. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν πότερον εὐθέως διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Τίάνν μεν οὖν σφοδρὰ ταντά λεγω. Πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῖς, ὡ Μελητε, τοὺς τῶν θεών ὦν νῦν ο λόγος εστιν. εἶπε ετι σαφεστερον καὶ ἐμοί καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τούσιοις. εγώ γαρ ον δύναμαι μαθειν πότερον ετι λεγεις διδασκειν με νομίζειν εἰναί τινας θεούς, καὶ αὐτός ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεούς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀθεος οὔδε ταύτη ἀδικω, οὐ μέντοι οὐσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἐτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὦ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὦτι ἐτέρους. ἦ πάντα πασί με φης οτε αὐτων νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἀλλος ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταυτα λεγω, ὡς το παράπαν οτι νομίζεις θεούς. θανμάσιε Μελητε, ἢνα τι ταῦτα λέγεις;

7. πάνυ μὲν οὖν κτέ.: Meletus agrees and asserts with all his might and main, I assure you exactly that is what I do mean. πάνυ and σφόδρα give strength to the assertion ταντά λεγω (cf. 25 a), οὖν signifies agreement with Socrates, and μὲν (a weakened μήν) gives him the assurance of it.

8. ἢν δο λόγος: that is, ἢν λέγομεν. A prep is more usual, but compare Thuc. i. 140. 3, τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα, with id. 139. 1, τὸ περὶ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα. There are many cases where the gen. is used without a prep. (esp. where περὶ would seem appropriate). Kr. Spr. 47, 7, 6. Stallbaum, however, insists that περὶ is not implied here, and distinguishes between περὶ διον δ λόγος and ἢν δ λόγος, just as between λέγειν (have in mind) τινι and λέγειν περὶ τινος. That such a distinction sometimes holds good is plain from other passages in Plato. Cf. Stallb. in loc. and Soph. 260 a, σὺν δραγον διά φράσειν περὶ οὗ τ' εστὶ καὶ θαν (sc. ὢν λόγος).

10 ff. πότερον λέγεις κτέ.: the two horns of this dilemma are, I. πότερον ... ὦτι ἐτέρους, and II. ἢ ... διδάσκειν. In I. there are two subdivisions: (a) διδάσκειν ... τινας θεοὺς and (b) καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα ... ὦτι ἐτέρους,—which is described as the inevitable result of (a). In II. there are two subdivisions: (c) οὔτε ... θεοὺς,—which contradicts (b), — and (d) τοὺς τε ... διδάσκειν,—which contradicts (a), but is not stated as the result of (c). After making his first point (a), Socrates, carried away by the minute zeal of explanation, states (b) independently of λέγεις. Therefore it would be clearer to print καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα ... ὦτι ἐτέρους in a parenthesis if it were not for εγκαλεῖς, which in sense reenforces λέγεις. καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα, being strongly affirmative, is followed by καὶ οὐκ (rather than οὔδε) εἶμι. This, in turn, being strongly neg., is followed by οὔδε (rather than καὶ οὐκ) ἀδικω. Although the sense connects οὐ μέντοι ... ἐτέρους with νομίζειν ... θεοὺς preceding, the syntax connects it with νομίζω εἰναί θεοὺς. From this we supply the ellipsis with ὦτι ἐτέρους, sc. νομίζω θεούς.

14. τοῦτ' ἐστιν: τοῦτο καὶ δ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς are not correl. See on τοῦτ' ἀν εἶη, 27 d.

17. ἢν τι, κτέ.: sc. γένησαι, what makes you talk like that? See on ἢν μοι καὶ, 22 a.
οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ἀσπερ οὶ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι; Μὰ Δ', ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησίν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἄναξαγόραν οἰς κατηγορεῖς, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὐτῳ καταφρονεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων γραμμάτων εἶναι, ἀστε οὐκ ἀρα: the insinuation of Meletus was both startling and unwelcome to Socrates, who nevertheless meets it in a tone of playful irony. Every religious-minded Greek reverenced the sun. No appeal was more solemn and sincere than that to ἡλίος πανοπτης. Accordingly this appeal is constantly met with in the most moving situations created by tragedy. Ajax, when in despair he falls upon his sword, and outraged Prometheus from his rock, both cry out to the sun. Ion, before entering upon his peaceful duties in the temple, looks first with gladness toward the sun. Both Heracles and Agave are saved from madness when they once more can clearly recognize the sun. That Socrates habitually paid reverence with exemplary punctiliousness to this divinity not made by human hands is here suggested and is still more plainly shown in Symp. 220 d, where, after some account of a brown study into which Socrates had fallen, we read: ὅ δὲ [Σωκράτης] εἰστήκει μέχρι τῶς ἐγνέστο καὶ ἡλίος ἀνέσχεν· ἔπειτα ᾧ δὲ προσευξάμενος τῷ ἡλίῳ, then, after a prayer to the sun, he took his departure. On Socrates's religion, see Introd. 32.

19. ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί: Meletus uses this form of address, which Plato is careful not to put into the mouth of Socrates. See on ὦ ἄνδρες κτ., 17 a.

20. Ἄναξαγόρου: see Introd. 10. Diog. Laert. ii. 3. 4, reports that Anaxagoras declared τὸν ἥλιον μύδρον εἶναι διάπυρον (a red hot mass of stone or iron) καὶ μείζω τῆς Πελοποννήσου... τὴν δὲ σελήνην οἰκήσεις ἔχειν καὶ λόφους καὶ φάραγγας (ravines). From this last apparently the public inferred that Anaxagoras held the belief which Meletus attributes so wrongfully to Socrates, i.e. τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. The real view of Socrates in regard to such an account of the "all-seeing sun," as was attributed to Anaxagoras, is perhaps represented by the parenthetical refutation introduced by Xenophon in Mem. iv. 7. 7. For a criticism of Anaxagoras which is more worthy of Socrates himself, see the one attributed to him in the Phaedo, 97 c–99 d. The capital objection there made to Anaxagoras is that he unfolds his dogmatic views ἀμελήσας τὰς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λεγεῖν. The argument here is: "apparently you take me for Anaxagoras, and forget that it is Socrates whom you are prosecuting." Diogenes Laertius, ii. 3. 5, gives a startling story about Anaxagoras: φασὶ δ' αὐτῷ προειπεῖν (prophecied) τὴν περὶ Ἀγάς πυταμὸν (Aegospotami) τοῦ λίθου πτώσιν (the fall of the stone), ὧν εἶπεν ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου πεσεῖσθαι. 21. οὖτω: qualifying ἀπείρους below as well as καταφρονεῖς.

22. γραμμάτων: in literature. γράμματα stand in the same relation to μαθήματα as litterae to disciplinae. Plato meant to be outspoken in dealing with the stupidity which led the court to pronounce Socrates guilty.
εἴδεναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ’ ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν, ἀ εξεστιν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένους Ἀσκράτους καταγελάν, ἕαν επρόσποιται ἕαυτον εἶναι, ἀλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὑντα.

— οὐκ εἴδεναι: οὐ because Socrates wishes to suggest the most positive form of statement: οὔτως ἀπειρο γραμμάτων εἴοιν ὅπερ οὐκ ἰσασι ὑτι κτέ. This vivid use of οὐ for μή in inf. clauses after ὅπερ is not uncommon where it is indifferent whether the indic. or infin. is used; thus here ὅπερ οὐκ ἰσασι οὐ καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι would be equally regular and ὅπερ οὐκ εἴδεναι is a mixture of the two. See GMT. 594; H. 1023 b.

23. βιβλία: cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 3. 8, πρῶτος (sc. of the philosophers) δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ βιβλίον ἐξέδωκε (published) συγγραφής.

24. καὶ δὴ καὶ: and now you expect people to believe that it is from me, etc.

25. ὅτι τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένους: sc. the doctrines, not the books.

— ἐνίοτε: that is when, as they often might, they chanced to see a play in which these doctrines were promulgated, as in Eur. Orest. 982,

Where hangs a centre-stone of heaven and earth
With linked chains of gold aloft suspended,
Where whirls the clod erst from Olympus flung,
There I would go.

It is said that, in the lost play of Phaethon, Euripides called the sun χρυσέαν βολον, a clod of gold. Such utterances could be heard by any who paid the price of admission and listened to this poet’s choral odes, which were sung ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας. The price of admission to the theatre of Dionysus thus appears to have been at most (ei πάνυ πολλοῦ) one drachma. Ordinary spectators paid two obols, one-third of a drachma, or about six cents. Pericles passed a law providing that Athenians who asked for it should receive two obols for this purpose from the public treasury. The mention here of a maximum admission price of one drachma suggests that the better places may have been reserved by the manager (called θεατρώνις or θεατροπώλης, sometimes even ἀρχιτέκτων) for those who could pay more than six cents. In the account rendered (see Rangabe, Antiquités Helleniques, the inscription numbered 57, lines 30–33, also C. I. Δ. I. 324, pp. 171, 175) for building the Erechtheum (407 B.C.) is found the following item: ἀναλώματα· ώνήματα· χάρται· εωνήθησαν δύο· ες· τα· αντίγραφα· ενεγράψαμεν· II 1 1 1 1, expenditures: purchases: [item] bought two sheets of paper upon which we wrote our accounts, 2 drachmas and 4 obols. It is accordingly absurd to suggest that a volume of Anaxagoras at this time could have cost as little as one drachma, even if it could be proved that books were sold in the orchestra of the theatre of Dionysus; or if, that failing, we were content with the notion of a book-market close to the Agora. The part of the ἄγορα where the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton stood bore the name ὀρχήστρα, but nothing goes to show that books were sold there.

27. Ἀλλως τε καὶ... ἄτοπα: the more so because of their singularity. "With-
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

αλλ' δ' πρὸς Διός, οὕτωσί σοι δοκῶ ουδένα νομίζειν θέων 26 εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δ' οὖδ' ὁπωσοτιών. "Απιστός γ' εἶ,

30 ὁ Μελητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὃς ἔμοι δοκεῖσ, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ οὕτωσί, ὃ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πάνι εἶναι ὑβριστὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖ τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ νεότητι γράφασθαι. ἐοίκε γὰρ ὡσπερ ἀνίγμα ἔμνεύειν διαπειρωμένον, ἅρα γνώσῃ.

35 ταί Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοὶ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ ἐναντιώντων οὐκ ἐοίκει οὔτωσί σοι δοκῶ; Οὐ μεντοῖ μὲν Διός ὡστε ὁδοκεῖσ, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ οὕτωσί, ὃ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πάνι εἶναι ὑβριστὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖ τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ νεότητι γράφασθαι. ἐοίκε γὰρ ὡσπερ ἀνίγμα ἔμνεύειν διαπειρωμένον, ἅρα γνώσῃ.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

95

t' ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἡ ἐξαπατησμένος αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἂν τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέ-

27
gειν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐποι. ἀδικεὶ Σωκράτης θεῶς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεῶς νομίζων. καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶ παιζοντος.

XV. Ἐννεπισκέψασθε δή, ὥ ἄνδρες, ἡ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν. σοὶ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὥ Μέλητε. ὥ μεῖς δὲ, ὥσερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρηγησάμην, μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ τὸν τὸντο εστὶ παίζοντος.

5 ἐστιν ὡστὶς ἀνθρώπων, ὥ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπωσι μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὥ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτως ἐσθ' ὡστὶς Ἰπποντος μὲν οι νομίζει εἶναι, ιππικά δὲ πράγματα; ἡ αὐλητάς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικά δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἐστιν, ὥ 10 ἀριστεῖ ἄνδρων. εἰ μὴ σοὶ υπεύθυνος ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγώ σοι.
λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἄλλα τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπό-κριναι. ἔσθ' ὡστις δαίμονια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ε δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὅς ὄνησας οτι μό-γις ἀπεκρίνῳ ὑπὸ τοῦτων ἄναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαίμο-νια μὲν φής με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν κανά εἰτε παλαιά· ἄλλ' οὖν δαίμονια γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σῶν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαίμονια νομίζεω καὶ δαίμονας δῆπον πολλή ἀνάγκη νομί-ζεων μὲ ἔστιν· οὐχ οὔτως ἔχει; ἔχει δή· τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδ' οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας curried during such a cross-examination as is here given.

11. τοῖς ἄλλοις: all except the accuser and the accused; the audience (a above) and more esp. the δικασταί.

—τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι: please to answer the next question. "This will go to the bottom of the whole matter." ἐπὶ τούτῳ is almost the same as μετὰ τοῦτο. ἐπὶ with the dat. easily passes from the meaning of nearness to the kindred sense of immediate succession in time. The acc. is like τὸ ἐρωτηθέν (the question which has been asked) or τὸ ἐρωτήματος, the question which is being asked, freq. used with ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

13. Ὅς ὄνησας: Oh! thank you! Used absolutely, like iuvare in Lat.

—μόγις: see on μόγις πάνω, 21 b.

16. ἄλλ' οὖν: not essentially different from δ' οὖν. See on 17 a.—δαίμονια γε: "To make the reasoning sound, δαίμονα here and δαίμονια πράγκειμα above ought to mean the same; which it must be acknowledged they do not. It must be observed, however, that the original perversion lay with Meletus, whose charge of δαίμονια κανά was based simply on Socrates's τὸ δαίμονιον. Now by this Meletus meant a divine agency, but Meletus had wrested it into the sense of a divine being. So that here the equivocation of Meletus is simply returned upon himself. Contrast, where Socrates is speaking uncontroversially of his monitor, the distinctly adj. use, θείον τι καὶ δαίμονιον, 31 c."

17. τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ: elsewhere and in its stricter use this means the written affidavit put in as a rejoinder by the accused; rarely as here, the accusation or the written affidavit of the accuser. So in Hyper. Ἑυκ. §§ 4, 33 (Col. 20, 40). Harpocration on the word ἀντιγραφῇ says, evidently referring to this passage: Πλάτων δὲ ἐν τῇ Σωκράτους ἀπολογία τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ καὶ ἀντιμοσίαν καὶ ἀντιγραφὴν. See Introd. 69 and n. 1 and 2.

19. έξει: repeated by way of answering yes after οὔτως έξει; similarly the simple verb is often repeated after a compound form. See on Crit. 44 d.—δῆ: certainly. Such an affirmation is not only self-evident (justified by common sense), but also follows from the admission which Meletus already has made.

20. τοὺς δαίμονας κτέ.: the definition here given is consistent with
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

οὐχ ἦτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγούμεθα ἡ θεῶν παιδὰς; φής ἡ οὐ;...

Πάνυ γε. Οὐκὼν εἶπερ δαίμονας ἡγούμαι, ὡς σὺ φής, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τούτ’ ἂν εἰή ὦ ἐγὼ φημὶ σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον

25 φάναι εἰμεθ’ θεοὺς ἢ ἤγεισθαι πάλιν, ἑπεδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγούμαι. εἰ δ’ αὐξὶ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδες εἰσί νόθοι τινὲς ἢ εκ νυμφῶν ἢ εκ τινῶν ἄλλων, ὅπως καί λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγούτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἶν, ὥστε ἂν εἰ τις ἰπτών μὲν παῖ-

27 Greek usage from Homer to Plato.
In Homer θεός and δαίμων, applied to any divinity in particular or to divinity in general, are all but interchangeable terms. The distinction between them, if distinction there is, suggests itself rather in the adjs. derived from them than in the two nouns themselves. Hesiod, Op. 108–125, calls the guardian spirits that watch over men δαίμονες; to the rank of δαίμονες he says those were raised who lived on earth during the golden age. He distinguishes between θεοῖς, δαίμονες, and ἥρωες, and this same distinction is attributed to Thales. On this Plato based the fancy expressed in the Symposium (202 e): πάν τὸ δαίμονιον μεταξύ (intermediate) ἔστι θεοῦ τε καὶ θητοῦ... ἐρμηνευοὶ καὶ διαπορθμεῦοι (interpreting and convoying) θεοὶ τὰ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν μὲν τὰς δεήσεις καὶ θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τὰς καὶ ἄμοιβὰς (commands and rewards) τῶν θυσιῶν.

27. φής ἡ οὐ: three Eng. words, yes or no?, will translate this. See on ὦ φήτε, 25 b.

22. εἶπερ δαίμονας ἡγούμαι κτῆ.: a complex prot., which falls into two simpler conditions, each of which excludes the other. The latter apply the broader supposition εἰπερ δαίμονας ἡγούμαι in turn to alternative apodoses, both of which it limits. Cf. Xen. An. vii. 6. 18, for a very similar construction: ἐπεὶ γε μὴν ψεύδοσθαι ἤξετο σεβόσι περὶ τοῦ μισθοῦ, — this might readily have taken the form of a prot., — εἰ μὲν ἐπανῶ αὐτὸν, δικαίως ἂν μὲ καὶ αἰτίσφε οἱ καὶ μισοί: εἰ δὲ πρόθεσθε αὐτῷ... φίλος δὲν γὰν... δια-φοράστατο εἰμι, πῶς ἂν ἔτι δικαίως... φῆ ἡμῶν αἰτίαν ἱκώμι; On the combination of indic. and opt., see GMT. 503, and on εἰ διαφθείρει, κτέ., 25 b above.

23. τοῦτ’ ἂν εἰ: by τοῦτο the preceding conditions, εἰπερ... ἡγούμαι and εἰ... δαίμονες, are grasped into one; and, thus combined in τοῦτο, they become the subj. whose pred. is the suppressed (ἐκεῖνο) antec. of δ. To δὲ σε αἰνίττεσθαί καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι is appended φάναι, which explains it and has the same subj.; all this points back to θεοὺς ὁ νομίζων ἂλλα θεοὺς νομίζων, 27 a.

27. ὅν: equiv. to ἐκ ὅν, for “when the antecedent stands before the relative, a preposition (in this case ἐκ) belonging to both usually appears only with the first.” See H. 1007.— δὴ: you know.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ


XVI. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὅ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδίκω κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπορών, ὅπως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθέν εἶλεν, ὅτι πολλή ἡμοῖ οὐκ ἔπειραμένος γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εὖ ἵστε ὅτι ἄληθες ἐστι. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν δὲ έμε αἰρήσει, εάνπερ αἱρή, οὐ Μέλητος οὔδε Άνωτος, ἄλλ' ή τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. ά δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ

27. τοὺς ἡμιόνους: these words do not interfere with the grammar, although they make sad havoc with the sense, unless ἡ disappears.

33. ἡ ἀπορών ὁ τι κτέ: this no doubt was Socrates's real view of the case of Meletus (cf. 23d), whereas all that precedes is only to bring home to the court how foolish and self-contradictory the charge is. ἀπορῶν and ἀποπειρώμενος, in connexion with ἐγράψω, refer to continued action in past time. — ἐγκαλοῦσ: the opt. represents Meletus's original reflexion τι ἐγκαλῶ; The subjv. might have been retained. GMT. 677.

34. ὅπως δὲ σὺ κτέ: here Socrates closes his argument to the effect that it is a contradiction in terms to say of one and the same man (1) that he is a complete atheist, and (2) that he believes in δαιμόνια. The second τοῦ αὐτοῦ must be regarded as redundant, a simple repetition of the first one which might be dispensed with. See App.—πείδους ἀν ὡς [οὐ]: is not simply pleonastic, as in the case of two negatives in the same clause, but it is irrational, and can hardly be right. ὅπως means how or by which after μηχανή. A similar use of ὡς is explained GMT. 329, 2.

XVI. 1. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ... ταῦτα: this phrase dismisses one topic to make room for the next one.

5. δὲ έμε αἰρήσει, εάνπερ αἱρή: will be the condemnation of me, if condemnation it is to be. αἱρέιν and ἀλακεσθαι are technical terms of the law, as is the case with ψεύγειν and διώκειν.

7. δὴ: certainly. The allusion is to facts generally known and acknowledged, cf. 31 d. — πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἄγαθους: instead of καὶ ἄλλους πολλούς καὶ ἄγαθους. The first καὶ is the idiomatic καὶ of comparisons. Cf. 22 d, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, and the idiom εἶ τις καὶ ἄλλος. The second καὶ is
Δόλους καὶ ἄγαθους ἀνδρας ἤρηκεν, οἷμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσειν. 28 οὔδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μῆ ἐν ἡμοί στηρ. ἵσως δὲ ἄν οὖν εἴποι τύσ. εἰτ' ἃν
10 οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὁ Σῶκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, εἰς οὐ κυνικυνεῖς νυν ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἄν δίκαια
λόγον ἀντείπομι, ὡς οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὁ ἀνθρωπε, εἰ οἷς δὲιν κῦνιν ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅταν τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον
15 σκοτεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερα δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει καὶ ἄνδρος ἁγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακῶ. φαίλοι γὰρ ἄν τῷ γε σῷ
λόγῳ εἶν τῶν ἡμιθεῶν ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἱ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος νῦσ, ὅς τοιοῦτον τοῦ κῦνινου

equally idiomatic, and joins πολλοῖς with a second adj. Cf. πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἄνδρες.
9. οὔδεν δὲ δεινὸν μη ἐν... στῃ: the rule is in no danger of breaking down in my case. Cf. Phaed. 84 b, οὐδὲν δεινὸν μή φοβηθῇ, we need not apprehend that
the soul will have to fear. Gorg. 520 d, and Rep. v. 465 b. There is a touch of irony in this way of saying "I do not think." Socrates as it were en-
lists on the side of the rule. This idiom throws no light on
subjv. or fut. indic. GMT. 294, 285. For the quasi-impersonal use
κινομένη καὶ δ ἡλιος, πάντα ἐστι καὶ σώζεται... εἰ δὲ σταὶ τοῦτο δοσὲρ δεῖν (tethered), πάντα χρήσατ' ἂν δια-
φαρεῖν. In such contexts the aor. στήσεται denotes the entrance into a
state of quiet or collapse. GMT. 55, b 56. —εἰτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει: a question indicating surprise. The perversity
of Socrates, in view of the fact just recited, is unreasonable. When such
a question is accompanied by an urgent statement of the reason for
surprise (here τοιοῦτον... εἰς οὖ, κτئ.), it may be introduced by εἰτα or ἔπειτα, otherwise not.
11. ἐγὼ δὲ κτέ.: cf. Crit. 48 d for the same thought, and Xen. An. i. 43, for its application to the risks of
war. In the Ajax of Sophocles, 473–480, the same idea is brought to the
following climax:—
Honor in life or honorable death
The nobly born and bred must have.
i. 334 c, κυνικυνεομεν (perhaps we, etc.) οὐκ ἰθὼς τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν
θείαι (have defined). Cf. for the thought, Aj. 475–476:—
tί γὰρ παρ' ἡμέρᾳ τίπειν ἔχει
προσδεία κάναθεια τοῦ γε καταθείν;
15. ὅταν πράττῃ: whenever he does
anything. GMT. 532. See App.
17. τῶν ἡμιθεῶν: i.e. τῶν ἡρώων.
Hesiod, W. and D. 158, calls the
fourth race, ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖων γένος οἱ
καλόνται | ἡμιθεοὶ κτέ., and he counts
among their number the heroes that
laid siege to Thebes and to Troy.
18. ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος νῦσ: any appeal c
to the example of Achilles was always
κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ἀπεὶ ἐπειδὴ ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμομένων Ἑκτορᾶ ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὖσα, ὠτωσί πῶς, ὅπως ἐγὼ ὁμαί. δὲ παῖ, ἐν τῷ τῆς τιμωρί- σεως Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἑκτορᾶ ἀποκτε- νεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ. αὐτίκα γαρ τοῖ, φησὶ, μεθ' Ἑκτορᾶ πότμος ἐτοίμος· ὅ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν
25 θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ἠλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μάλλον δεῖγας τὸ ξῆν κακὸς ἄν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φησὶ, τεθναίην δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ὡς μὴ ἐνθάδε μένων καταγέλαστος παρὰ νυσί κορωνίσθαι ἄρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἰεὶ φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ 30 κινδύνου; οὗτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς 'Αθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὗ ἀν τις εαυτὸν τάξη ἡ ἡγησάμενος βελτιστον ἐναι ἢ ὑπ' εἰς
very telling. The enthusiasm with which all Greeks regarded this hero was shown by temples raised in his honor and by countless works of art in which he appeared. Homer, Od. xi. 489, tells how Achilles found his favored condition in the lower world hardly to be endured. The post-homeric story-tellers said that he was living in the islands of the blest. Cf. Symp. 179 ε, where this same scene between Thetis and Achilles is quoted, and the scholion (Bergk 10) to Harmonius:

No, sweet Harmonius, thou art not dead, But in the Islands of the Blest men say, Where lives swift-foot Achilles far away, And Tydeus' son, they say, brave Diomed.

We hear that Ibycus, and after him Simonides, wishing no doubt to make Achilles's happiness complete, represented him as married to Medea in Elysium.

21. θεὸς οὖσα: added in a very unusual way, because the circumstance has unusual weight. The utterance of Thetis was not only prompted by the natural anxiety of a mother for her son, but also was inspired by the unerring wisdom of a goddess. Cf. Hom. Od. iv. 379 and 468, ἄτλ δέ τε πάντα ἱσα. The passage from Hom. II. xviii. 70 ff., is quoted rather loosely in part (ἡστὸ πῶς), and partly word for word.

24. δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας κτὲ.: at this point ἦστε is forgotten. The long speech and explanation given to Thetis makes this break in the const. very natural. In fact, this clause is as independent as if a co-ord. clause (with or without μὲν) had preceded it.—τοῦ θανάτου: notice the exceptional use of the art., which is usually omitted with θανάτος as an abstract noun. Cf. 28 e, 29 a, 32 c, 38 c, 39 a, b, Crit. 52 e. For the art. used as here, cf. 29 a, 40 d, 41 e.

29. μὴ... οἷε: see on ἀλλ' ἄρα, 25 a. d

31. ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχὺ: instead of ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος κελευθεῖν or even ταχθέεις. Some such expression is called for grammatically by the form of the first alternative ἡ ἡγησάμενος.
prove that it would have involved, and would still involve, disgrace for him not to have followed the pursuit which has brought him in danger of his life. This point he makes clear by an appeal to the analogy of military discipline, which, as he claims, applies to his relations to the gods. He is a soldier in the army of Apollo.

1. δεινά ἄν εἰην . . . λίπομι την τάξιν: much here depends upon disentangling past, pres., and fut. See GMT. 509. The protasis (limiting the apod. δεινά ἄν εἰην κτε., lit. I should prove to have done a dreadful thing) includes various acts in the past which are looked upon from a supposed time in the fut. It falls into two parts: one, marked off by μέν, states (in the form of a supposition) well-known facts in the past; the other, distinguished by δὲ, states a supposed future case in connexion with certain present circumstances. See on 5. The outrageous conduct for him would be with this combination of facts and convictions, after his past fidelity to human trusts, at some fut. time to desert his divinely appointed post of duty: if while then I stood firm I should now desert my post. The repetition of μέν and δὲ respectively is for the sake of clearness. For the same repetition cf. Isocr. vii. 18, παρ’ οίς μὲν γὰρ μῆτε φυλακὴ μῆτε ζημία τῶν τοιούτων καθέστηκε μήθ’ αἱ κρίσεις ἀκριβεῖς εἰσο, παρὰ τούτοισ μὲν διαφθειρόθηκαι καὶ τὰς ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν φόβων, ἐπ’ οἷς δὲ μῆτε λαθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι βίθιον ἐστὶ μῆτε φανεροῖς γενομένοις συγγνώμης τιχείν,
Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἀρχοντες ἐταττον, οὖς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἀρχεῖν μον, καὶ ἐν Ποτίδαιᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐν τῇ Ποτίδαιᾳ ἦν ἐξίσους γίνεσθαι τὰς κακοθείας, for (they knew) that while among those who have neither established safeguards nor penalties for such crimes nor any strict organization of justice, that while among these, I say, even righteous characters are corrupted; at the same time, where wrong-doers find it easy neither to conceal their transgressions nor to secure condonation when detected, there I say (they knew that) evil dispositions end by dying out. Cf. also Gorg. 512 a. Notice that the μὲν clause is important only with reference to the δὲ clause, upon which the main stress is laid; the δὲ clause is made prominent through the contrast afforded by the logically subordinate μὲν clause. This same relation is indicated in the Eng., French, and German idiom by the use of some word like “while” in the μὲν clause.

2. οἱ ἀρχοντες: not the nine archons, but, as the context shows, the generals in command upon the field of battle. — οἱ ἐλεσθὲ: the δικασταὶ are here taken as representing the whole δῆμος, from which they were selected by lot. See Introd. 66. Perhaps Socrates has also in mind the other Athenians present at the trial. See on 24 e and 25 a. The generals were elected by show of hands (χειροτονία) and their electors were the ἐκκλησιασταὶ. Cf. 25 a.

3. ἐν Ποτίδαιᾳ . . . Δῆλῳ: Potidaea, a Corinthian colony on the peninsula Chalcidice, which became a tributary ally of Athens without wholly abandoning its earlier connexion with Corinth. Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, took advantage of this divided allegiance to persuade the Potidaeans to revolt from Athens, which they did in 432 b.c. The Potidaeans, with the reinforcements sent them by the Peloponnesians, were defeated by the Athenian force under Callias. For two whole years the town was invested by land and blockaded by sea, and finally made favorable terms with the beleaguering force. In the engagement before the siege of Potidaea, Socrates saved Alcibiades's life. Cf. Symp. 219 e–220 e, where Alcibiades gives a most enthusiastic and witty account of the bravery and self-denial of Socrates during the whole Potidaean campaign, and says of the battle in question: ὅτε γὰρ ἡ μάχη ἦν (after) ἦς ἄμοι καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν (the prize for gallantry in action) ἔδωκαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ, οὐδές ἂλλος ἐμὲ ἔσωσεν ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὡθητος, τετρωμένων (when I was wounded) οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀπολέσειν, ἄλλα συνδιέσωσε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμε. Alcibiades says that Socrates ought to have had the prize which was given to himself by favoritism. Cf. Charm. 153 b c. — The battle at Amphipolis, an Athenian colony on the Strymon in Thrace, took place in the year 422. The Athenians were defeated, and their general, Cleon, perished in the rout, while Brasidas, the Spartan general, paid for victory with his life. — Delium was an enclosure and a temple sacred to Apollo in Boeotia near Oropus, a border town sometimes held by the Athenians and sometimes by the Boeotians. The battle, which was a serious check to the power of Athens, resulted in the defeat and death of their general, Hippocrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 4, ἀρὰ ἡ τῇ σὺν Τολμίδῃ τῶν χιλίων ἐν Δε-
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

103

έπι Δηλη, τότε μέν οὖν ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἐμενον ὁστερ καὶ 28
5 ἄλλος τις καὶ ἕκυφυνεν ἄποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος,
ός ἐγὼ φήσθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντα με δεῖν ἥν
καὶ ἐξετάζουσα ἐμαντῶ ταῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς
ἡ θάνατον ἡ ἄλλο ὑποτόν πράγμα λίπομυ τὴν τάξιν. 29
dεινὸν τὰν ἐγώ, καὶ ὡς ἄληθῶς τῶν ἁν με δικαῖος εἰσάγων
tις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοῦ εἶναι ἀπειθῶν
τῇ μαυτείᾳ καὶ δεδώσας θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι
οὐκ ἄν. τὸ γὰρ τοῦ θάνατον δεδείναι, ὡς άνδρες, οὔδὲν
ἀλλο ἐστίν ἡ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὤντα. δοκεῖν γὰρ
εἰδέναι ἐστίν ἄν οὐκ οἴδεν. οἴδε μὲν γὰρ οúdeis τὸν θάνα-

28 βαδέα συμφορά ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ μεθ' ἰπποκράτους ἐπὶ Δηλη, ἐκ τοῦ
τῶν τεταπείνωται (has been humbled) μὲν ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τῶν
Βοιωτῶν κτε. Notice that both Plato
and Xen. say ἐπὶ (not ἐν) Δηλη, be-
cause at the time there was no ex-
tended settlement at or near the place.
For the gallantry of Socrates in the
retreat, cf. Symp. 221 a b. Alcibiades
was mounted, and therefore could ob-
serve better than at Potidaea how
Socrates behaved, and he says: ἔξω
ἤν θεάσασθαι Σωκράτη, τε αἰτι
Ἀλήπου φυγῆ διεχόμεθα το στρατόπεδον . . . πρῶ-
tον μὲν δόσιν περιήν Δάχητος (his com-
ppanion in flight) τῷ ἐμφροῦν εἶναι:
ἐπειτα δηλοὶ ἄν . . . ὅτι εἰ τίς ἀναται
τοῦτον τοῦ ἐνδρός, μάλα ἐρωτικῶς ἀμ-
nεῖται. See also the similar testimony
of Laches in Lach. 181 b.

4. ἐμενον καὶ ἕκυφυνεν ἄποθανεῖν:
The repeated allusions which are scat-
tered through Plato's dialogues to the
brave conduct of Socrates in these
battles show that it was well known
at Athens. — ὁστερ καὶ ἄλλος τις:
just like many another man. He is
careful not to make too much of the
facts. The indef. τοί here means
some, i.e. any indefinite person, be-
cause many persons are thought of
under ἄλλος.

5. τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος: i.e. now
that my post is assigned me by the god,
a circumstance of the supposition εἰ
λίπομυ, which is repeated in ἐνταῦθα.

6. ὡς ἐγὼ φήσθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον:
as I thought and understood, sc. when
I heard the oracle which was given
to Chaerephon. — δεῖν: depends on
the force of commanding in τάττοντος.
Apollo gives him an injunction, to
the effect that he must live, etc.

8. λίπομυ τὴν τάξιν: so worded as
to suggest λιποταξίου γραφῆ, a techni-
cal phrase of criminal law. Any one
convicted of λιποταξία forfeited his
civil rights, i.e. suffered ἀτιμία.

9. τάν: τολ, truly, emphasizes this
repetition of the strong statement
which begins the chapter.

14. οὐκ εἰδέναι: sc. δ δοκῶν εἰδέναι,
i.e. the same indef. subj., which is to be
thought of with the preceding infs.
Cf. below b, and 39 d. As a rule, the
third person, when it means vaguely
any one (the French on) or anything, is
15 τον οὖν εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὃν 29
tῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδιασὶ δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν
cακῶν ἐστὶ· καὶ τούτῳ τῶς οὐκ ἄμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἴδεν; ἐγὼ δ', ὦ ἄνδρε, τούτῳ καὶ ἑνταῦθα ἵσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀν·
20 θρόπων, καὶ εἶ δὴ τῷ σοφότερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδός ἰκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἀιδοῦ οὖτω καὶ οἴο-
μαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπείθεῖν τῷ βελτίων, καὶ θεῖ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρῶν ἐστίν οὖδα.
πρὸ ὅν τῶν κακῶν ὃν οἴδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἀ μὴ οἴδα εἰ
25 ἄγαθα ὑντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβῆσομαι οὐδὲ φεῦξομαι· ἀντε οὐδ' εἰ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε ὑπειστῆσαντες, ὃς c

not expressed.—τὸν θάνατον οὖδ' εἰ: by prolepsis for οὖν οὐδ' ὃς θάνατος, not even whether, i.e. whether death may not actually be. Thus he is as far as possible from knowing that death is the greatest of harms. For a fuller statement, cf. 37 b. See on τοῦ θανά-
tου, 28 c, for the use of the art.

15. ὅν: here, as usual, in the gender of ἀγαθῶν, which is implied in the pred. μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν.
17. τούτῳ: not in the gender of ἄμαθία. This makes a smoother sent. than αὕτη πῶς οὐκ ἄμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ κτέ., which was the alternative.—

b αὐτῇ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος: that very same reprehensible, limiting ἄμαθία and re-
calling the whole statement made above, 21 b–23 e.

19. τούτῳ, τούτῳ ἄν: repeated for the greater effect. Both represent the same point of superiority, i.e. ὅτι κτέ. Notice the cleverness of the ellipse after ἄν. Socrates thus evades any too circumstantial praise of him-
self. For the ellipse in the leading clause, see on ἦ ... ἄκων, 25 e.—

καὶ ἑνταῦθα: here too.

20. εἰ δῆ: if really, i.e. if, as the oracle suggests.
21. οὐκ εἰδός ... οὖτω: i.e. ἄσπερ οὐκ οἴδα ... οὖτω. οὖτως sums up a previous partic. clause, and its force is nearly so likewise. Cf. Men. 80 c, παντὸς μᾶλλον αὕτος ἀπορῶν οὖτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπορεῖν ποιῶ.
24. ἄν ... ἐστίν: a notable in-
stance of assimilation. G. 1031; H. 994. See on ἄν εἰ οὖν οὐθ' ὅτι κακῶν ἀντὶ τῶν, 37 d. κακά is related to ἂν as ἀγαθά in the next line is related to ἃ.

—οἴδα εἰ: see on τὸν θάνατον κτέ., above a.

26. εἰ ἀφίετε ... οὖν ἀφιέτε, ἐκείνου ἄν: the speaker weakens εἰ νῦν ἀφίετε (if you are now ready to acquit me) by the explanatory detail of εἰ μαί ἐκείνου and by various reiterations of the conditions upon which this re-
lease may be granted, until the weaker clause εἰ ἀφίετε comes of itself to his lips as all that is left of the more positively worded prot. with which he began.—ἀποπτῆσαντες: conveys c the idea of disregarding rather than that of disbelieving. This meaning
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

εφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχήν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεύτερο εἰσελθὲν ἢ, ἐπειδὴ 29 εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἶν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι μὲ, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὃς, εἰ διαφεύξῃμη̇ν, ἢδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νιέῖς 30 ἑπιτηδεύνοντες ὁ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρῆσονται— ὁ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐηποτε. ὁ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀντίτω οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἀφίεμέν σε, ἔτι τούτῳ μέντοι ἐντ' οὐτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ᾳτήσει διατρίβεω μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἢν δὲ ἀλῆς ἐπὶ τούτῳ πράττων, 35 ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οἶν με, ὅπερ ἐηποτε, ἔτι τούτῳ ἀφίουτε, α ἐηπομυς τ.tag ἰ ἢ γων ὑμᾶς, ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναίοι, ἀπαξομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πεισόμαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἡ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἐωςπερ ἀν ἐμπνεύσαι καὶ οἶν τε δὲ, οὐ μὴ παῦσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελεύσεως τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενον 40 ὅτι ἂν ἐκ ἐντυγχάνων ὑμῶν, λέγων οἶαπερ εἰωθα, ὅτι, ὁ

29 of ἀπιστεῖν is not uncommon in Plato. Cf. Laws, 941 c, ὁ μὲν οὖν πεισθεὶς ἡμῶν τῷ λόγῳ εὐτυχεί τε καὶ εἰς χρόνον ἀπαυτὰ εὐνυχοί, ὅ δὲ ἀπιστεῖσας τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὐδέτεις τῶν μαχέσθω νῦν.

27. οὐ δεῖν, οὐν τε εἶναι: in the original form this would be οὐν ἐδεί καὶ οὐν οὐν τε ἐστιν. GMT. 119; H. 853 a.—εἰσελθεῖν: on this use of εἰσέρχεσθαι, see Introd. 70 with the note. Anytus probably argues: “If Socrates had not been prosecuted, his evil communications might have been ignored; once in court, his case allows but one verdict. To acquit him is to sanction all his heresies.”


33. ἐντ' οὐτε: for const. with inf., see GMT. 610; H. 999 a.

35. οἶν: after a digression.

36. ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναίοι: a fictitious apostrophe. Cf. Dem. viii. 35, εἰ οἱ Ἑλλήνες ἔρωιθ' ὑμᾶς, ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναίοι, πέμπετε ὡς ἡμᾶς ἠκάλατο τοὺς πρέσβεις κτέ. See App.—ἀπαξομαί καὶ φιλῶ: you have my friendship and my love, but, etc. ἀπαξομαί designates the greeting of friends. Cf. Od. iii. 34–55, where Nestor and his sons see Telemachus and Mentes, ἀφοί ἢλθον απαντες, ἡ ἡμῶν τοῖς εἰς χρόνον ἰησπάζοντο καὶ ἐδριάσθαι ἐνωγον. Cf. also II. x. 542, τοῖς δὲ χαρέντες δὲ εἰς ἡ σοπάζοντο ἐπεσοὶ τε μελιχιοίσι.


38. οὐ μὴ παῦσωμαι: see on οὐδὲν κτέ., 28 a. For οὐ μὴ with the subj. in strong denials, see GMT. 295; H. 1032.
άριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἄθηναῖοι ὄν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ 29 εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἴσχυν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλείστα καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονίσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φρονίζει; Υπὲρ καὶ εάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητήτη καὶ φη ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὕθως ἀφῆσον αὐτὸν οὖδὲ ἀπεμιᾶξαι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ εάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσαι ἁρέτην, φάναι μὲν ἐνεργεύσω δέ τις ἄξια περὶ ἐλαττωμάτων ποιήσω, τά 30 καὶ νεωτέρος καὶ πρεσβύτερος, ὅτι ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἁστῶσι, ὅσῳ μοι ἐγγυ-


42. εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἴσχυν: for the full meaning, cf. 38 c-39 d, also Thuc. ii. 40, 41. Here ἴσχυς means the strength which rules the kingdom of the mind (σοφία). Cf. Thuc. i. 138, where he says of the typical Athenian Themistocles: ἦν γὰρ δ Θεμιστοκλῆς, βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεις ἰσχὺν δηλῶσας, καὶ διαφέροντι τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἵπτερον δέξαι βαλάσαι. This φύσεως ἰσχύς, when circumstances disclosed its perfection, was σοφία, the virtue of virtues, chiefly prized by Socrates as including all others.

χρημάτων ... ψυχῆς: the same prolepsis as that in 29 a, where τῶν θανάτων is pointedly mentioned before its time. Notice the significant use of the art. with ψυχῆς, a word which like σῶμα often appears without the art. in cases that seem to require it; τῆς accordingly has the force of a possessive pron. G. 949; Η. 658.

45. οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ: see on ἄμως δὲ οὔδε νῦν, 21 e.

47. ἐρήσομαι, ἐξετάσω, ἐλέγξω: these words in this order represent the process by which Socrates so often disconcerted his fellow-countrypeople. Beginning with a harmless question or two, his method soon proved uncomfortably scrutinizing (ἐξετάσω), and generally ended by convicting (ἐλέγξω) of ignorance.

50. ταῦτα νεωτέρως ποιήσω: ποιεῖν, like πράττειν and ἐργάζεσθαι, often takes in addition to the acc. of the thing done a dat. of the person for whom the thing is done, but the acc. of the person to whom it is done. cf. Xen. An. iii. 2, 3, ὅπως γὰρ ήμᾶς τοιαῦτα παθεῖν οἱ τούτων ήθοι τις οἵθ' ήμας μενείν παρασκευαζόμενος. Ibid. 24, καὶ ήμῶν γ' ἀν ὀλ' ἄν τρισάσμενοι (thrice gladly) ταῦτ' ἐπολεί, εἰ έδόξα ήμᾶς μενείν παρα-

52. ὁσφις ... ἔστε ἴσιν: the thought
of Socrates insensibly returns to his hearers, in whom he sees embodied the whole people of Athens. The correlative of ὅσφ readily suggests itself with μᾶλλον. Cf. the same case, 39 d. Cf. Euthyph. 12 c, καὶ μὴν νεώτερός γε μου εἴ οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ δυσοφάτερος.

55. τὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν: see on δοῦλος, Crit. 60 e, and contrast τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν, 23 c; cf. also τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν υμῖν, d below; see also on τὰ μετέωρα φροντιστής, 18 b. ὑπηρεσία takes the same dat. of interest which is found with the verb from which it is derived. The Lat. idiom is the same, e.g. Cíc. de Legg. i. 15. 42, Quod si iustitia est obtemperatio scriptis legibus institutisque populorum, etc.

58. πρότερον: sc. ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς, which has to be supplied out of ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς. μὴδέ is not a third specification with μήτε ... μήτε. It serves only to connect οὕτω σφόδρα with πρότερον, and is neg. only because the whole idea is neg.

60. έξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα: the foundation of real prosperity is laid in the character; the best of windfalls is natural good sense sharpened by experience; this is the making of your successful man's character, and the mending of his fortunes; this is ἀρετή (skill in the art of right living), i.e. wisdom (σοφία). See on εἰς σοφίαν, 29 d. Such is in substance Socrates's theory of getting on in the world, which may be gathered from Xenophon's Memorabilia in many places: see (i. 6) his defence against the σοφιστής Antiphon, who accuses him of being κακοδαιμονίας διδάσκαλος; (ii. 5) his hint to a parsimonious friend, ἔξετάζειν ἐαυτὺν ὅπως τοῖς φίλοις ἐξίος εἴη; (ii. 6. 22–25) his analysis of what makes a καλός τε καλός (gentleman), where of all such he says, δύναναι πεινώτες (fasting) καὶ διψώτες ἀλύπως σίτου καὶ ποτού κοινωνεῖν ... δύναναι δὲ καὶ χρημάτων οὐ μόνον τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν (selfish greed) ἀπεχόμενοι, νομίμως (righteously) κοινωνεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑπαρκεῖν ἀλλήλοις; and see particularly (ii. 7, 8, 9, and 10) the success which his practical advice brought to his friends Aristarchus, Euthêrus, Crito, and Diodorus in their various difficulties. For a full elaboration of Socrates's rule of right living in the abstract, see his conversation on ἐπὶ πράττειν with young Callias, τὸ Ἀξίοχου μειράκιον, Euthyd. 278 e–282 d, where Cleinias is startled to learn that σοφία is εὐτυχία (good-luck). The gods endow us with such
λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ’ ἂν εἴη βλαβερά· εἴ δὲ τίς μὲ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαῖνη ἃν, ἢ Ἀθηναίοι, ἢ πείθοντε Ἀνύτω ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἄφιετε ἢ μὴ ἄφιετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὐδ’ εἰ μῆλλον πολλάκις τεθνάναι.

ΧVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ἀλλὰ ἐμμείνατε μοι ὡς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἡ ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἴμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μῆλλο γὰρ ἂν ἄπτα ὑμῖν ἑρέιν καὶ ἄλλα, ἢ δὲ ἰσός ἰσώς common sense as we have, Euthyph. 15 a, Rep. ii. 366 c, 375 c-e, 379 b c; we owe it to them that it is possible to thrive and in the end to win, Rep. x. 613, 617 e.

62. ταῦτ’ ἂν εἴη βλαβερά: this ταῦτα, all this, covers more ground than the ταῦτα above. The first means what Socrates says, the second means that and also the fact that he says it. “If this corrupts the youth, my practice in saying it would do harm; but the truth cannot corrupt them, therefore my speaking it can do no harm. To prove that I am a corrupter of the youth, you must prove that I have said something else; that cannot be proved, for it is not true.” With εἰ διαφθείρω, ταῦτ’ ἂν εἴη, cf. εἰ ἄφελοῦσιν, 25 b, where see note.

63. πρὸς ταῦτα: wherefore.

65. ὡς ἐμοῦ κτ.: knowing that I should never alter my ways. ποιήσοντος ἂν represents ποιήσω ἂν. GMT. 216; H. 845 and 861. Cf. Dem. xix. 342, τοῦτος οὕτως ἂν εἶ χειν ποιήσοντας ἀνειρηκότες εἰ τῆς πόλεως ἔσοσθε. See on διαφθείρονται, 29 c. For an important question of Ms. reading here, see App. For the εἰ μῆλλο used as periphrastic fut. see GMT. 73; H. 846. For the indic. fut. or subjv. pres. in prot. depending upon the opt. in apod. with ἵν, see GMT. 503; H. 901 a.

66. πολλάκις: many times or many deaths. The Eng. idiom like the Greek requires no definite specification such as “to die a hundred deaths.” In certain cases in Greek as in Eng. a large number is specified. Cf. ἀκήκοας μῦριάκις ἦν ἀγω βοῦλομαι, Ar. Nub. 738; ἐνούς (for pea-soup?); βαβαιάξ, μῦριάκις ἐν τῷ βλαφ. Ran. 63. Cf. τρισάσμενος, quoted from Xen. An. iii. 2. 44 on 30 a. Demosthenes not unnaturally uses μῦριάκις where he exclaims (ix. 65), τεθνάναι δὲ μῦριάκις κρείττον ἡ κολακείτι ποίησαι Φιλιπποῦ. — τεθνάναι: the absolute contradiction of ζῆν, here used rather than the somewhat weaker ἀποθνήσκειν. This distinction is, however, not strictly maintained. Cf. 39 ε, 43 d, and the similar use of καλεῖν and κεκλήσθαι, γιγνώσκειν and ἐγγικάναι, μιμήσακεν καὶ μεμυηθαί, κτάσατε καὶ κεκτήσατε.

ΧVIII. 2. οἰς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν: he asked them μὴ θορυβεῖν. See above on θορυβεῖν, 17 d, and on μὴ θορυβήσητε, 20 ε.

3. καὶ γάρ, μῆλλο γὰρ, εἰ γάρ ἵστη: the first γάρ is closely connected with ἀκοῦειν, the second goes back to the leading clause μὴ θορυβεῖν and accounts for the renewal of a request which the speaker has made three
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

5 βοήσεσθε: ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποεῖτε τούτο. εὐ γὰρ ἵστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον οὖν οἶνον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζων βλάψει μὴ τὸν Μέλητον οὕτε "Ανυτος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν δύναντο· οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνοι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος α

10 βλάσπεσθαί. ἀποκτείνειε μεντάν ἵσως ἡ ἐξελάσειεν ἡ ἀτιμώσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὕτος μὲν ἵσως οἴεται καὶ ἄλλοσ τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ', οὐκ οἴομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἃ οὕτωσι νυν ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἁδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτιννύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ υπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὡς τις ἄν οὕτω, ἄλλῃ υπὲρ υμῶν, μὴ τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν υμῶν ἐμὸν καταφησιμάμενοι. εὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, ε

30 ε

c times already. The third γὰρ, now, merely points the new statement for which Socrates has been preparing the court. Compare the use of γὰρ after prons. and advs., e.g. 31 b after ἐνθένδε, and in general after any pre­

atory form of words to give point to any statement which is expected, as in τῆς γὰρ ἑις, 20 ε. γὰρ with this force is esp. freq. after δὲ (τὸ δὲ) μεγίστον, δεινότατον, also after σημείον δὲ, τεκμήριον δὲ and other favorite idioms of like import in Plato and the orators. H. 1060, 4 a.

5. βοήσεσθε: this is more than a disturbance (θορυβεῖν); it is an outcry.

9. θεμιτὸν ἀμείνοι ἀνδρὶ βλάσπεσθαί: cf. 21 b. θεμιτὸν takes the dat., and, after the analogy of ἐξεστὶν, an inf. (βλάσπεσθαί) is added. The pass. βλάσπεσθαι makes this const. appear more unusual than e.g. in Phaedo, 67 b, μὴ καθαρῷ (unclean) γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ή. For the import of the words θέμις and θεμιτὸν, see on οὖ γὰρ θέμις, 21 b.

10. ἀποκτείνειε μεντάν, ἡ ἀτιμώσειεν: ἀποκτείνειε is used here secondarily of the δικασταῖ and the whole people, and primarily of the accusers whose prosecution aims at compassing Soc­

crates's death. ἀτιμία involved the for­

feiture of some or of all the rights of citizenship. In the latter case the ἀτιμὸς was looked upon by the state as dead, i.e. he had suffered "civil death" (la morte civile), and his property, having no recognized owner, was confiscated. Cf. Rep. viii. 553 b, εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν ἢ ἀποβαλόντα ἢ ἐκπεσόντα ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπασαν ἀποβαλόντα. See App.

11. ἄλλος τῖς ποιο: many another. See on ἄλλος, 28 e.

15. ἄλλῳ ὑπὲρ υμῶν: cf. Euthyphro's remark just before the trial, Euthyph. 5 b c, εἰ δὲ σὺ ἐπιχειρήσει (ὁ Μέλη­

tos), εὑροῦμήν ἂν, ὡς οἷοι, ὡς σαθρὸς (rotten) ἐστι, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἢ μὲν πρό­

τερον περὶ ἐκεῖνον λόγος γένοιτο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.
οὐ ραδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὑρῆσετε, ἄτεχνως, εἴ καί γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ], ὥστεν ἢππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μάνωπος τινος· οἴον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι, τοιοῦτον τινα ὃς ύμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ οἰνειδίζων ἐνα ἐκα-

18. ἄτεχνως ... προσκείμενον: added instead of a clause with οἷος to explain τοιοῦτον. See on οἷος δεδόσθαι, 31 a.—εϊ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν: though it sounds rather absurd to say so, or better, “if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech.” This is thrown in to prepare his hearers for the humorous treatment of a serious subject which follows. A close scrutiny of the simile shows that Socrates mistrusted the sovereign people. προσκείμενον is the regular pass. of προστιθέμενον. See below (22) for the same idea put actively. See App. for the reading ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, and for the remaining difficulties here involved.

21. ὑπὸ μάνωπος τινος: by a gadfly. For this word, cf. Aesch. Supp. 307, 308, βοηλάτης (ox-driving) μύωψ κυντήριον (urging on), οἰστρόν (gadfly) καλοῦσιν αὐτὸν οἱ Νείλοι πέλας. Also in the Prometheus Io’s tormentor is called οἰστρός (567) and δύστομος μύωψ (674 f.). Here the tormentor of Athens is a ιππηλάτης μύωψ. Notice how humorously (γελοιότερον) the situation is met. First the Athenians are compared to a horse bothered out of inaction by a buzzing horse-fly. The metaphor of the horse is not pressed, but that of the μύωψ is ingeniously elaborated as follows: “Socrates gives them no rest but bores them all day long (προσκαθίζων), and does not allow them even a nap; he bothers them incessantly when they are drowsing (οἱ μυστάζωντες). Then they make an impatient dash (κρούσατες) at him which deprives them forever of his company.” For similar irony, cf. Verg. Aen. vi. 90, nec Teucris addita Juno|Usquam abe­rit. μύωψ is by some taken in its later and metaphorical sense of spur. See App.—τινὸς: like the Lat. quidam used to qualify an expression which is starting. —οἶν δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ... προστεθεικέναι: lit. in which capacity God seems to me to have fastened me upon the state,—such an one (in fact) as never ceases, etc., a repetition of προσκείμενον [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ]. Avoid the awkwardness of too lit. translation. Notice that οἶνον really refers not to the μύωψ simply but to the μύωψ engaged in enlivening the horse. This is implied by τοιοῦτον τινα and the explanatory clause with ὅσ.

23. οἰνειδίζων ἐκαστον: οἰνειδίζων alone requires the dat. Cf. Il. ii. 254, τῷ νῦν Ἀτρείδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ποιμένι λαῶν ἤσαν ὁ οἰνειδίζων, and below 41 e. The acc. here is due to the preponderating influence of πείθων; both πείθων and οἰνειδίζων are however introduced simply to explain ἐγείρων, with which they are as it were in apposition. The awakening process here thought of as prob. consisted of questions persuasive in part and partly reprehensive.

24. τὴν ἡμέραν ... προσκαθίζων: this specifies the means by which the
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

στον ούδέν παύομαι τήν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθή- 31
25 ζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ βάδιως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ω ἄν-
δρες, ἀλλ’ έαν ἐμοὶ πέιθομαι, φείσεσθε μου ὑμεῖς ὑ’ ὑσι
ταχ’ ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὅσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγείρόμενοι,
κρούσαντες ἂν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτω, βάδιως ἂν ἀποκτε-
ναίτε, εἰτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτ ἂν, εἰ
30 μὴ τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιτέμψειε κηδόμενος ὑμῶν.
ὅτι δ’ ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὅν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ
πόλει διδόοται, ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσατε· ὦ γὰρ ἄνθρω-
πίνῳ έουκε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι
καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἴκεων ἀμελουμένων τοσάντα ἡδή ἐτη,
35 τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἂεί, ἵδια ἐκάστῳ προσιό-
νστέρα ἢ ἄδελφον πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμε-
λεῖσθαι ἄρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τοῦτον ἀπέλανον
καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελέουμην, έιχον ἂν τινα
λόγον. νῦν δὲ ὀράτε ἢ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατηγοροῦν τάλ-
40 λα πάντα ἀναίσχυντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτο γε

31 a process of awakening, indicated by
32 the three preceding parties., was made
33 possible. Pres. and aor. parties. ex-
34 press the means, as the fut. partic. ex-
35 presses purpose. GMT. 832 f.; H. 969.
36 τοιως τάχ’ ἂν: may be perhaps, a combination which is by no means infrequent. The importance of βδιως
37 is well indicated by the repetition of the ἂν, which has already served to emphas-
38 ize κρούσαντες. Notice, however,
39 that grammatically it is required only once and goes with the verb of the
40 apod. ἀποκτείνατε. See on ὅσπερ οὖν
41 ἂν, 17 d.
42 ὅσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες κτέ.: like
43 men disturbed in their nap. This sar-
44 casc could not fail to raise a laugh at Athens where the δικαστὴς νυστά-
45 ζον was a common sight. Cf. Rep.
46 405 c, μὴ δὲν δείσθαι νυστάζοντος
47 δικαστοῖ. Cf. Quint. Inst. iv. 1. 73.
48 29. εἶτα: see on μιμούνται κτέ., 23 c.
50 For the inf. without the art., limiting
51 certain adj.s and advs., see GMT. 759;
52 H. 1000.
53. οὐ γὰρ: see on καὶ γάρ, 30 c. — b
54 ἀνθροπίνῳ: the neut. used subst. Cf.
55 Phaed. 62 d, έουκε τοῦτο ἄτο π. φ. Common-
56 ly the neut. is used predicatively, e.g. έουκε τοῦτο ἄτονον εἶναι.
57 34. ἀνέχεσθαι ἀμελουμένων: for the
58 acc. or gen. allowed with this verb, and for the added partic. see GMT.
59 879; H. 983.
60. εἰ μέντοι: if, to be sure. τοῖς in-
61 fluences the apod. (είχον ἄν κτέ.) as well, then at least I should have some
62 reason, i.e. there would be an obvious explanation of my conduct. Cf. 34 b,
63 αὐτοὶ τάχ’ ἂν λόγον ἐξοικέ κτέ.
οὐχ οἶοι τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγὼ ποτὲ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ήτησα. ἵκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

XIX. Ἐσως ἄν οὖν δόξειν ἀτοπον εἶναι ὅτι δή ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν τάντα ἐμμβουλεύω περιών καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ἐκὲν ἔνθωμεν ἀτοπον εἶναι ὅτι δή ἐμμβουλεύω περιών καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον.

41. οὖχ οἶοι τε: “They would doubtless make the assertion, cf. 19 d; but what they did not find it practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it.” R. The leading idea of the clause ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι . . . μάρτυρα is expressed in the partic., not in ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι. For cases where ἀισχνεσθαι, used with a partic., does not contain the main idea, cf. 28 b, 29 d, Crit. 53 c. — τοῦτο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι: sc. τά δὴ τὴν ἀναισχυντίαν ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι. ἄποικος in this compound contributes the idea of completion, which in the case of shamelessness involves going to an extreme, to go to such an extreme with their shamelessness, or, to be so absolutely shameless as this. The kindred notion of fulfilling a task undertaken is also involved. Cf. Xen. An. iii. 2. 13, ἀποθύουσιν, meaning pay off the arrears of a promised sacrifice.

43. τὸν μάρτυρα: sc. παρέχομαι μάρτυρα καὶ ὃς ἀν παρέχομαι ἵκανος ἐστίν. Cf. 20 e. ἵκανον is used predicatively, and the necessity of the art. is obvious.

XIX. 1. Ἐσως ἄν οὖν δόξειν ἀτοπον: Socrates has two good reasons: (1) his divine mission, (2) the personal disaster involved in any other course. Of these the first really includes the second. That he did not regard abstention from public duty as in itself commendable is proved by his conversation with Charmides (Xen. Mem. iii. 7), ἀξιόλογον μὲν ἄνδρα ὃντα, ὃν ὑπέρτην δὲ προσιέναι τῷ δήμῳ (to address the people) καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. He pointedly asks Charmides: εἰ δὲ τις, δυνάτος ἄν τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελέσας τὴν τε πόλιν αἰσθένει (advance the common weal) καὶ αὐτὸς διὰ τούτου τιμᾶται, ὡς γὰρ τὸ τότε πράττειν ὁ παντὸς δειλές νομίζει; See also ibid. i. 6. 15.

2. πολυπραγμονῶ: an a busybody. See on περιεργάζεται, 19 b. Nothing short of a divine mission could justify this. Plato invariably uses the word in an unfavorable sense. Cf. Gorg. 526 c, ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπράγμων 

There is a subtle irony in πολυπραγμονῶ as here used by Socrates. It was his business to mind other people's business, therefore he was far from being really πολυπράγμων. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 11. 16, καὶ δὶς Σωκράτης ἐπισκόπτων (ridiculing) τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπαγορευμένην (abstention from business), "Ἄλλα ὡς ἢ Θεοδότη, ἐφε, "οὔ πάνυ μοι ἡμίας ἐστι σχολασίαι (be at leisure): καὶ γὰρ ἢ σοφία πράγματα πολλὰ καὶ δημοσίᾳ παρέχει μοι ἀσχολίαι (keep me busy).” Cf. 33 a b.

3. ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος: there is no implication, as in 17 d, of ἐπὶ τοῦ βῆμα. The πλῆθος commonly assembled in the Pnyx, to which Socrates
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

2. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

5. ικανοὶ πολλακις ἀκηκοάτε πολλαχοι λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖον τι καὶ δαμόνιον γίγνεται, [φωνῆ], ὅ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἀπεκκομισθῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνῆ τις γιγνομένη, ἢ ὅταν γένηται αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτο ὅ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὕτως· τοῦτό ἐστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦταί τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γε μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· ἐδ' ὅπορ ἱστε, ὅ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεξείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολολῆκη καὶ οὐτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὕφεληκη οὔτε τὰ έμενοι οὕτως ἂν εμαντδν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἀξιεσθῆναι ὅ λέγοντι τὰλθῃ· ὅ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται ὅν τὸν τιν έπικωμώδων· τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέετερον: see on τῷ πλῆθει, 21 a. 15.

5. θείον τι καὶ δαμόνιον γίγνεται, [φωνῆ]: see Introd. 27, with first n. on p. 21, and 32. φωνῆ is explanatory of the vague θείον τι καὶ δαμόνων, and is in the pred.: a something divine and from God manifests itself to me, a voice. This thought is earnestly reiterated below in nearly the same words. See App.

6. δ' ὅδε καὶ: see on δ' ὅδε καὶ, 28 a. — ἐπικωμώδων: Meletus caricatured Socrates's utterances about the θείον τι καὶ δαμόνιον by making them out to be the belief in καὶ θεία ἀρξάμενον. Cf. 26 e. 7. ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον: ever since my boyhood. This partic. followed by ἀπὸ or ἐκ, when time is referred to, corresponds to various idioms, here to ever since. The case of the partic. is that of the word which it limits. Cf. Legg. ii. 661 b, ταυτά ἐστιν δαιμόνια καὶ καταμαιεύοντα, ἀρξάμενα ἐπὶ τής ὑμείας.

9. ἀποτρέπει, ἐναντιοῦσθαι πράττειν: cf. 32 b, and see on μηδὲν ποιεῖν. — τοῦτο: governed by πράττειν, which is expressed in the subordinate clause. Cf. Lach. 179 a, ἀνείπει αὐτός ὅ τι βούλονται ποιεῖν, to leave them free to do what they wish.

12. πάλαι...πάλαι: the rights and duties of Athenian citizenship began as soon as a man was twenty.

13. ἀπολολῆκη, ὕφεληκη: the earlier Att. writers rarely use the plpf. in -εῖν. G. 777, 4; H. 458 a.

15. οὔ, οὔτε, οὔτε, οὔδεν: a remarkable repetition of the neg. Cf. 34 e.

16. γνησίως: uprightly or openly.
ύπερ τοῦ δίκαιου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγου χρόνου σωθῆσεν. ἄλλα μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δ' ἐγὼγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέχομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἄλλα δ' ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἐργα. ἀκούσα τῇ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβέβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδήτε ὦτι οὔ ἄν ἑν ὑπεικάθομι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεῖσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ᾠμα ἀπολοίμῃν. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ

19. καὶ εἰ: introduces a very extreme form of supposition, implying that even then the conclusion is unsailable; εἰ καὶ (cf. 30 ε) introduces a condition implying that in that case, as in many others, the conclusion remains. See H. 1053, 1, 2.

20. ἄλλα μὴ: and not. The Eng. idiom avoids the Greek abruptness. For ἄλλα in abrupt transitions, see H. 1046, 2 b.

XX. 2. οὐ λόγους κτ. : as Demosthenes says (ι. 12), ἡπα μὲν λόγος, ἐν ἀπῇ τὰ πράγματα (deeds), ματαιόν τι (folly) φαίνεται καὶ κενόν. Cf. Lach. 188 ε—ε, where the harmony of a man's deeds and words is spoken of as τῷ ὠντι ζῆν ἡμισυνταῦτα αὐτὸς αὐτῶν τὸν βιον σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστὶ . . . ἤπερ μόνη Ἑλληνικὴ ἔστιν ἄρμοσια, really living in tune, where a man makes his own life a concord of words and deeds, composed really in the Dorian mode, which is the only true Greek harmony.—δ ϖ ὑμεῖς κτ. : the audience as representing the Athenians in general. “You appreciate facts only, there is no nonsense about you.” Here appears what amounts to the common τόπος of rehearsing a man's services in his own defence, of which practice Lysias (xii. 38) says, οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄτρο προσήκει ποίησαι, ήπερ ἐν τίδε τῇ πόλει εἰσισμένον ἐστί, πρὸς μὲν τὰ κατηγορημένα μηδὲν ἀπολογείσθαι, περὶ δὲ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐτερα λέγοντες (raising side issues) ἐνιοτε ἐξαπατῶς, ὑμῖν ἀποδεικνύοντες ὡς στρατιῶται ἄγαθοι εἰσίν κτ. For another instance of this practice indulged in, cf. 28 ε—29 α.

3. οὐδὲ ἐν ἑνι: stronger than οὐδὲν ἐν. Cf. Gorg. 512 ε, τὴν εἰμαρμολην (fate) οὐδὲ ἐν εἴ ἐκφύοι, and ibid. 521 ε, ὃς μοι δοκεῖς, ἄ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδὲ δ' ἐν τούτων παθεῖν . . . . How confident you seem, Socrates, that you never will suffer any of these things! G. 378; H. 290 α.

4. ὑπεικάθομι: second aor. opt. from ὑπείκειν with ἄθ appended to the stem, i.e. ὑπείκ. See G. 779; H. 494 and α. The present ὑπεικάθειν, like διωκάθειν (διώκειν), ἀμυνάθειν (αμύνειν) and σχέθειν (ἐχειν), is prob. a fiction. It is hard to prove that this θ adds strength to the meaning of ὑπεικάθειν. In certain cases this θ is appended in the pres. τελέθειν, φαθεῖν, φλεγάθειν. Cf. Curt. Griech. Etym. pp. 62 and 63.

5. ἄμα ἀπολοίμην: if this, as Schanz maintains, is what Plato really wrote, the necessary άν gets itself supplied from οὐδέν ἐν ἑνι above. Cron, following Stallbaum, writes ἄμα καὶ ἄμα ἐν; Riddell defends Ast's conjecture, ἄμα κἂν. The text here still remains hard to establish. See App.—φορτικά καὶ δικανικά: cheap and tedious commonplaces, a collocation which suggests the words of Callicles, who,
by way of reproof, says to Socrates (Gorg. 482 e) *by yap τῷ δντι, δ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαύτα λέγεις φορτικά καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκον τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν φορτικά. Cf. Rep. ii. 367 a, by ταυτά ... Θαυμώματοσ τε καὶ ἄλλος ποὺ τις ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἢ, μεταστρεφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν φορτικῶς, δίς γ᾽ εμοί δοκεί. For δημηγορικά, which has the sense of in bad taste, cf. Gorg. 494 c, where Callicles, shocked at Socrates's remarks, says ὅσ᾽ ἄτοπος εἶ, δ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος. See also on κεκαλλιερημένους, 17c. It was common in the courts and assemblies at Athens for the speakers to call a spade a spade. Of course they always declared that they must speak the truth, and the whole truth. This duty was often made the pretext for utterances not strictly in good taste.

7. ἔδωκεν οὖσα δὲ: but I was chosen to the senate, i.e. the senate of five hundred, chosen by lot. One of this senate's chief duties was to act as a committee, so to speak, before whom came, in the first instance, the questions to be dealt with by the ἐκκλησία (assembly). A preliminary decree (προβούλεμα) from this senate was the regular form in which matters came before the assembly.

8. ἐπικεφαλής ... πρυτανεύσα: the fifty representatives in the senate of each of the ten tribes (each φυλή taking its turn in an order yearly determined by lot) had the general charge of the business of the senate, and directed the meetings both of the senate and of the popular assembly, for 35 or 38 days, i.e. one tenth of the lunar year of 354 days, or in leap-years, for 38 or 39 days. Of this board of fifty (whose members were called πρυτάνεις during its term of office) one member was chosen every day by lot, as ἐπιστάτης, or president. The ἐπιστάτης held the keys of the public treasury and of the public repository of records, also the seal of the commonwealth, and, further, presided at all meetings of the senate and of the assembly. Later (prob. in 378 B.C., the archonship of Nausinicus, when the board of nine πρόεδροι, whom the ἐπιστάτης chose every morning by lot from the non-prytanising tribes, was established) a new officer, the ἐπιστάτης τῶν προέδρων, relieved him of this last duty. In Socrates's time, the φυλή πρυτανεύσα, and the ἐπιστάτης of the day, had the responsibility of putting to the vote (ἐπιψηφίζειν) any question that arose or of refusing to allow a vote. Socrates belonged to the δήμος Ἀλώπεκη, in the φυλή Ἀντιοχίς. Notice the addition of Ἀντιοχίς here without the art. and as an afterthought; ἡμῶν ἡ φυλή would have been sufficient, though less circumstantial. — ὅτε ύμεις κτέ.: after the Athenian success off the islands called Arginusae, in 406 B.C. This battle is also spoken of as ἡ περὶ Δέσβου ναυμαχία, Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 32-35. The victorious generals were promptly prosecuted for remissness in the performance of their duty. Accused of having shown criminal neglect in failing to gather up the dead and save those who, at the end of the engagement, were floating about on wrecks, they pleaded “not guilty.” The quad-
ουκ άνελομενους τους εκ της ναυμαχίας εβούλεσθε άθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ώς εν τῷ ύστερῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν υμῖν ἐδοξε. τότ’ ἐγὼ μόνος ἰόν δείκτης τὴν ἐκκλησίαν φάσκων ἐπὶ τεύχους ἀλφίτων (on a meal-barrel) σωθῆναι· ἐπιστέλλειν (enjoined upon) δ’ αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀπολυμένους (those who were drowning), εἰς σωθῆναι ἀπαγγέλλει τῷ δήμῳ, ὥστε οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἄνελομενοι (rescued) τοὺς ἀριστούς υπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους. Cf. Xen. An. i. 2. 3, where τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πάλεων is equiv. to τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πάλεισιν ὄντας ἐκ τῶν πάλεων.

Here the fuller expression would perhaps be οὐκ ἄνελομενος ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας τούς ἐναυμαχήσαντας τε κακῶς πεπραγότας. See G. 1225; Η. 788 a. For this subst. use of οἱ ἐκ with the gen. there are many parallels; such subst. use is common with preps. denoting close relation to their object, — in, on, from, etc. Notice the point given to παρανόμως by its position; it comes in almost as if it began an independent sent. Cf. Lach. 183 Β, τοιγάρτοι ἰόν ὁπερίται τραγῳδίαν καλῶς ποιεῖν . . . εὖθυς δεύρο φερεται καὶ τοῖς ἐπιδείκνυσι εἰκότως. Xenophon says that the Athenians soon repented of their rash and illegal action. Cf. Xen. Hell. i. 6. 35, καὶ οὐ πόλλῳ χρόνῳ ὅστε ποιεῖ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ἐφηφισάντο, οἵτινες τὸν δήμον εξηπάτησαν (deceived) προβολὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι (their case was thus prejudiced by an informal vote of the assembly) καὶ ἐγγυητᾶς καταστῆσαι, ἐως ἢν κριθῶσιν. The fate of these generals was remembered thirty years afterward by the Athenian admiral Chabrias. He won a great victory off Naxos (b.c. 376) but neglected to pursue the enemy, in order to save the men on the wrecks and bury the dead. Cf. Diod. xv. 35.
τῶν πρυτάνεων ἡναντίώθην μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους 32 [καὶ ἑναντία ἐψηφισάμην], καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων ἐνδεικνύει
καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥήτωρόων καὶ ὕμων κελευόντων καὶ
βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ὄμην μᾶλλον με
δεῖν διακυβεύειν ἡ μεθ' ὕμων γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βου-
λευμένων φοβηθέντα δεσμόν ἡ θάνατον, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν
ην ἐτι δημοκρατομενῆς τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδή δὲ ὀλυγαρχία
ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὐτομεταξύμενοι με πέμπτον
αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν θολον προσέταξαν ἄγαγειν ἐκ Σαλαμίνος

12. ἡναντίωθην: used absolutely as often.—μηδὲν ποιεῖν: after the
neg. idea in ἡναντίωθην. GMT. 807, c;
H. 963 and 1092. But cf. 31 d e.

13. καὶ ἑναντία ἐψηφισάμην: and I voted against it, i.e. allowing the ques-
tion to be put. See App. Socrates was εὐστάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων on this day and
followed up this opposition,—manifested when in consultation with
the other πρυτάνεως,—by absolutely refusing to put the question to vote.
Cf. Gorg. 474 a; Xen. Mem. i. 1. 18; iv. 4. 2. For a different account of the
facts, see Grote's Greece, c. 64, fin. Connect ἑναντία ἐψηφισάμην with μόνος
tῶν πρυτάνεων. — ἐνδεικνύειν, ἀπάγειν: ἐνδείδεις and ἀπαγωγή were two sum-
mary methods of procedure in making prosecutions. Both dispensed
with the usual delay, and allowed the magistrates (in ἐνδείδεις, it was the
board of the Thesmothetae; in ἀπαγωγή, it was usually the board called
ὁ ἐνδείκτης) to deal summarily with cer-
tain charges. ἐνδείδεις was a form of summary indictment, laying informa-
tion usually against one who dis-
charged functions or exercised rights
for which he was legally disqualified,
as when an ἄτιμος entered public
places in Athens; ἀπαγωγή was the
summary arrest and giving in charge
of a man caught in actual crime. Cf.
Poll. viii. 49, ἡ δὲ ἀπαγωγή, ὅταν
tις ἐν ἔτων ἐνδείδεις σαφείς μὴ παρὸντα
tοῦτον παροντα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρφ λαβῶν
ἀπαγώγη. The two processes might
therefore be used in the same case.
14. τῶν ῥήτωρόων: these professional
speakers had no class privileges; only
their more frequent speaking distin-
guished them from ordinary citizens.
15. βοώντων: cf. Xen. Hell. i. 7. 12,
τὸ δὲ πλήθος ἔβα θειὼν ἐναι, εί μή τις
ἐδαι τὸν δήμον πράττειν ὀλυμπη-
tαι. Apparently the crowd jeered
at Socrates. Cf. Gorg. 474 a, πέροιο
(a year ago) βουλεύειν Χαχών, ἐπειδή
ἡ φυλή ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ οὐκ ἐπί-
στάμενον ἐπιψηφίζειν.
16. μεθ' ὕμων γενέσθαι: to place c
myself on your side.
19. οἱ τριάκοντα: they were called
the Thirty rather than the Thirty Ty-
rants.—αὖ: in turn. Both democ-
racy and oligarchy, however opposed
in other respects, agreed in attempt-
ing to interfere with the independence
of Socrates.
20. εἰς τὴν θολόν: the Rotunda.
The name σκίας was also applied to it
from its resemblance to a parasol.
Cf. Harp. (s.v. θόλος) who further
says it was the place ὅπου ἐστιν
Δέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον ἵνα ἀποθάνῃ· ὅ τι δὴ καὶ ἄλλως ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέτατον θουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλησαί αἰτίων· τότε μέντοι ἔγω οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἐργῷ αὐ ἐνεδείξαμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτον μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἄγροικότερον ἢν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὄτιον, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἔμε γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ψιχοντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἦγα-

21. Δέοντα: Leon of Salamis was an Athenian general. He, like Lysias's brother Polemarchus and many others (Xen. Hell. ii. 39), fell a victim of the rapacity of the Thirty. 

22. άναίΓλήσαι: implicate, the Lat. impleare, or contaminare. άνάπλεως is used similarly. Cf. Phaed. 67 a, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν διμιλήμεν τῷ σῶματι μηδὲ κοινωνώμεν, ὅτι μὴ (except so far as) πάσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀνατιμιπλαμέθα τῆς τούτου φόσεως. With this passage cf. especially Antipho, ii. a, 10, συγκαταπλάναι τοὺς ἀνατιμοί. For the facts, cf. Lys. xii. 98, συνωφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ ὅμως οὐκ ἡξιῶν, συνδιδαλλεσθαι 8' ἡνάγκαςον. See also Critias's speech in the Odeum, Xen. Hell. ii. 4.

24. εἰ μὴ ἄγροικότερον ἢν εἰπεῖν: a supposition contrary to fact with suppressed apod. used by way of showing hesitation. Cf. the same const. in Euthyd. 283 ε, ο ἐνε Θωρίε, εἰ μὴ ἄγροικότερον ἢν εἰπεῖν, εἰπον αὐ "οι εἰς κεφαλὴν," ὅ τι μαθών μου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταψεύδει κτε. The usages of gentle speech at Athens adopted this formula to soften and excuse a strong expression. Cf. Gorg. 509 a, ταύτα . . . κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, καὶ εἰ ἄγροικότερον εἰπεῖν ἐστι, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντῖνοι λόγοις. The ἄγροικότερον τι, for which Socrates apologizes, is undoubtedly the curt and blunt colloquialism of μέλει μοι οὐδ' ὄτιον. Such an apology perhaps would prepare the less sensitive modern for language not less curt and blunt, but far more "colloquial."

26. τούτου δὲ: pointedly summarizes the preceding clause.

28. ἄστε: not the correlative of ὅτιος, but to be connected immediately with ἐξέπληξεν. The idiom ἐκπλήττειν τινά εἰς τι is similar.

29. ψιχοντο, ψιχόμην: went straight
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

30 γον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ψιχόμην ἀπίων οἰκάδε. καὶ ἵσως ἀν 32 διὰ ταῦτ' ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχή διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη· καὶ τούτων ύμῖν ἐσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

XXI. Ἅρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴσθε τοσάδε ἐτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἐπραττὼν τὰ δημόσια καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοὺς δικαίους καὶ, ᾠσπερ χρῆ, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; πολλοὺ γε δει, ὥ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι. οὐδὲ 5 γὰρ ἂν ἀλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδείς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ 33 βίου δημοσία τε, εἰ ποὺ τι ἐπράξα, τοιοῦτος φαινόμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὅ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πάποτε ἐγγισθήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενὶ, οὐς οἱ διαβάλλοντες ἐμὲ φασώ ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκα- 10 λος μὲν οὐδενος πάποτ' ἐγενόμην; εἰ δὲ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἄκοινεν, εἰτε νεώτε-

32 d off. The recurrence of the same word only makes more plain the difference of the courses pursued.

31. διὰ ταχέων: a common expression with Thucydides and Xenophon, equiv. to διὰ τάχους. Cf. διὰ βραχέων, Prot. 389 a; Gorg. 449 a. The Thirty were only eight months (June 404–Febr. 403) in power, for they ceased to rule when Critias fell at Mnuchia in the engagement with Thrasybulus and the returned exiles. In the interim before the restoration of the democracy, ten men, doubtless one for each φυλή, were put in their place. Cf. Xen. Hell. ii. 4. 23.

32. μάρτυρες: possibly proceedings were here interrupted for these witnesses, though it seems quite as likely that Socrates is appealing to the δικασταί themselves to be his witnesses. Hermann, who thus understands it, reads ὅμων instead of ὅμιν, an unnecessary change.

XXI. 1. Ἅρ' οὖν: by οὖν we are referred to what immediately precedes for our answer to this question.

2. ἐπραττὼν: distinctly refers to a continued course, a line of action.

3. τοῖς δικαίοις: whatever was just, neut., a concrete way of expressing an abstraction.

5. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ: i.e. “however it may be with others, as for me, I, etc.”

6. τοιοῦτος: explained by ἐγγισθήσας. This amounts to a very direct appeal to the facts, and may be regarded as a shorter substitute for τοιοῦτος φαινόμαι ὡστε (or οἷς) μηδενὶ ἐγγισθήσαι, καὶ γὰρ φαινόμαι μηδενὶ ἐγγισθήσας. For the commoner but more vague idiom, cf. Crit. 46 b.

9. ἐγὼ δὲ κτῆ.: see Introd. 25, ἄν.

11. τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος: see on πολυπραγμονῶ, 31 c. ἐπιθυμεῖ does not exclude either ἐπεθύμησε or ἐπιθυμήσει, but rather implies them. Cf. τυχάνει in 18 d. The notion of habitual action is conveyed in the form of the same single act indefinitely repeated.
ρος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐ δειν πάποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι, μή λαμβάνων δὲ οὔ, ἀλλ' ὀμοίως καὶ πλούσιω καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτῶν, 15 καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούεις δὲν ἄν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἄν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχομι, δὲν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδὲν μηδὲν πάποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαχα· εἰ δὲ τίς φησι παρέχω ἐμοῦ πάποτε τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι ἵδια ὃ τί μή καὶ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὐ ὑστε ὑτι οὖκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

12. οὔδε: applies neither to the μὲν nor to the δέ clause separately, but to their combination. See on δεινά ἂν εἴην, 28 d.

15. ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν: characteristic of the Socratic συνουσία. See Introd. 19. — ἀκούειν κτέ.: first ἀκούειν is to be construed with βούληται (see on τούτων, 31 d), then παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἀκούειν is to be supplied from the preceding. After παρέχω, ἀκούειν, like ἐρωτάν above, expresses purpose. See G. 1532 and H. 951; also, for the use of the act. voice, see G. 1529 ; H. 952 a. Socrates means: I am ready for questions, but if any so wishes he may answer and hear what I then have to say.

16. τούτων ἐγὼ κτέ.: ἐγὼ is placed next to τούτων for the sake of contrast, while τούτων, though it is governed by τίς, inevitably adheres to τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχομι. This last corresponds as a pass. to αἰτίαν ἐπιφέρειν or προστίθεναι. The notion of responsibility is colored, like the Eng. “have to answer for,” with the implication of blame. For an account of those whom Socrates had chiefly in mind, see Introd. 24 and 33.

17. ὑπεσχόμην: is meant probably as a side thrust at imposing promises like the one attributed to Protagoras about his own teaching in Prot. 319 a. Socrates himself followed no profession strictly so called, had no ready-made art, or rules of art, to communicate. His field of instruction was so wide that he can truly say that, in the accepted sense of διδάσκειν and μανθάνειν at Athens, his pupils got no learning from him. They learned no μάθημα, acquired no useful (professional) knowledge. He put them in the way of getting it for themselves. Plato makes Socrates decline to become the tutor of Nicias's son (Lach. 207 d). He taught nothing positive, but removed by his searching questions the self-deception which prevented men from acquiring the knowledge of which they were capable. See his successful treatment of the conceited Εὐθύδημος ὁ καλὸς, in Xen. Mem. iv. 2.

19. ἄλλοι πάντες: not very different in meaning from ἄλλοι τις, 28 e. It differs from οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, the common reading here, just as πάντες ἀνθρωποί (all conceivable men) differs from πάντες οἱ ἀνθρωποί. In such cases if the noun alone would not have taken the art., it does not take it when qualified by πᾶς and the like. Compare all others and all the others. Here we have a complete antithesis
XXII. 'Αλλὰ διά τί δὴ ποτὲ μετ' ἐμοὶ χαίρουσί των 33 πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθη-ε ναῖοι. πάσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ ἐἴπον, ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζόμενοι τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, 5 οὖσι δ' οὐ. ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀδέσ. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτῳ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστετακταί υπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαν-τείων καὶ εἰ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὃπερ τίς ποτὲ καὶ ἀλληθεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπω καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὦ Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ ἀληθὴ ἐστι καὶ ἐνελεγκτα.

10 εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐγὼ γε τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διὰ Βυάθαρκα, χρήν δὴπο, εἴτε των αὐτῶν προσβύτεροι

b to ἰδία, which takes the place of the more usual δημοσία; Socrates calls attention to the publicity of the places where he talks (cf. 17 c) and to the opportunity of conversing with him offered to all alike.

c XXII. 3. εἴπον: the δὴ clause really answers διὰ τί ... διατρίβοντες; but grammatically it is an appended explanation of τὴν ἀλήθειαν, and is governed by εἴπον. — ἀκούοντες, ἐνεταζόμενοι: both are in close relation with χαίρουσι; contrast the const. of the same parties, in 23 c.

5. οὐκ ἀδέσ: i.e. ἢδιατο, a case of λιτότης (simplicity), or μείωσις (diminution), quite like the Eng. not at all unpleasant. Such are the common οἷς ἢκιστα (πάντων μάλιστα) and οὐ πάνυ (cf. not quite). Socrates perhaps agreed with La Rochefoucauld, Maximes, 31, Si nous n'avions point de défauts, nous ne prendrions pas tant de plaisir à en remarquer dans les autres. — ὡς ἐγώ φημι: as I maintain, implying not so much that he makes his assertion now as that he now emphatically calls attention to the assertion already made and substantiated. For the analogous use of the pres. expressing continued result of past action, see GMT. 27; H. 827. Here φημι almost means I am maintaining and have maintained. See on ἐπερλέγω 21 a, and cf. Lach. 193 e, βούλει οὐν ὃς λέγομεν πειθώμεθα τὸ γε τοσοῦτον; ... τῇ λόγῳ δὲ καρτερεῖν καὶ εὐελεγκτα.

6. ἐκ μαντείων, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ: a phrase which suggests that ἐκ παντὶ τρόπου has made room for παντὶ τρόπῳ. The καὶ before παντὶ is best rendered by and generally. For the facts, cf. 21 b and Crit. 44 a.

7. τίς ποτὲ καὶ ἀληθή: ever at any time at all, any other.

8. θεία μοίρα: will of Providence. What is appointed by the Deity is contrasted with a man's own choice; the phrase freq. qualifies what man attains or enjoys through no effort or desert of his own but almost ἄγαθος μοίρα (by the grace of good luck). Cf. Rep. 403 a; Arist. Eth. i. 9. 1.

9. εὐελεγκτα: easy to prove, not easy to disprove. So ἐνελεγχεῖν means prove a point by disproving its contradictory.

10. εἰ γὰρ δὴ: for if really, i.e. as we must suppose if Meletus speaks truth.

11. χρῆν κατηγορεῖν: an is not required. See GMT. 415. The con-
γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πώ·
ποτὲ τι ἔξυπνολέυσα, νυνὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμὸν
κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἦθελον, τὰν
15 οἰκείων τοῖς τῶν ἑκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ
ἀλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, ἔπερ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπε-
πώθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκείοι, νῦν μεμνήσθαι [καὶ τιμωρεῖ-
σθαι]. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοῖς ἐνταυθοῖ ὃς
ἔγω ὅρω, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὐτοσὶ, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ
20 δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦτο πατήρ. ἐπειτα Ἀλυσανίας ὁ

elusion states an unfulfilled obligation.
H. 897. All the prots. here expressed,
including εἰ διαφθείρω and εἰ ἐπετόνθεσαν, belong to the first class (GMT.
415; H. 893), and the apod. χρὴν in­
volves its own unfulfilled condition.
But see GMT. 417. χρὴν together
with this implied prot. forms the
apod. which goes with εἰ διαφθείρω κτε. GMT. 510. This prot. is dis­
junctively elaborated in two parallel
clauses, (1) εἰτέ ἐγνώσαν, (2) εἰ δὲ μὴ
αὐτοὶ ἦθελον. See on εἰτέ κτε. 27 d.
Instead of εἰτέ ... εἰτε we have εἰτέ
... εἰ δὲ (like οὕτε ... οὐδέ), which
gives a certain independence to the
second member. Hence it is treated
as a condition by itself, and the lead­
ing protasis, εἰ διαφθείρω, is substan­
tially repeated in εἰτέ ἐπετόθεσαν.
If (as Meletus urges) I am corrupting
some young men, and have corrupted
others, then (if they were doing their
duty) they would, supposing some of
them convinced on growing older that
in their youth I, etc., now stand forth,
etc.

13. ἀναβαίνοντας: see on ἐν δικα­
στήριον, 17 d.
15. τῶν ἑκείνων: on the repetition
of the art. here, see G. 959, 2; H.
668.
16. τοὺς προσήκοντας: Eng. idiom
suggests either τῶν προσήκοντων or
προσήκοντας without the art. After
the detailed enumeration, πατέρα ... ἐπε­
πώθεσαν, τῶν προσήκοντας is introduced
appositively to sum up, and therefore
the article is used.

17. καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι: combine with
μεμνήσθαι, and the idea is that of μη­
σικακεῖν, a word which had lately been
much used in the political turmoils at
Athens. Cf. the final agreement be­
tween oligarchs and democrats, Xen.
Hell. ii. 4. 43, ἡ μὴ μὴ μησισκακή­
σειν.

18. πάντως: as in answers, cer­
tainly.— ἐνταυθὸς: connect with πά­
ρεισιν, which thus denotes the result
of παρείναι. We might call it here
the perf. of παρείναι. Cf. Xen. An. i.
2. 2, καὶ λαβόντες τὰ ὀνόμα παρῆσαν εἰς
ξάφεις. For the converse, cf. 36 c,
ἐνταθα ὦν ἧ.

19. Κρίτων: it is he whose name
is given to the well-known dialogue
of Plato. See Introd. 62.

20. δημότης: see on ἐνταχεῖε πρωτανά­
ουσα, 32 b.— Κριτοβούλου: although
his father Crito modestly declares
(Euthyd. 271 b) that he is thin (σκλη­
φρός) in comparison with his exquisite
playmate Clinias (cousin of Alci­
biades), Critobulus was famous for
his beauty. See Xen. Symp. 4. 12 ff.
The page contains a section of Greek text, which appears to be a dialogue or a letter, discussing the relationships and character traits of various individuals. The text references Socrates, Critobulus, Xenophon, and other figures from ancient Greek philosophy and literature. It discusses the affection between Socrates and Critobulus, the education of Critobulus, and the character traits of other figures. The text also references works by Lysias and other scholars, and mentions the practical and unpractical nature of Aeschines. The language is technical and scholarly, indicating a discussion within the realm of classical Greek philosophy and rhetoric.
οδε δε Ἄδείμαντος ὁ Ἀρίστωνος οὗ ἄδελφος οὗτος Πλατ. των, καὶ Διαντόδωρος οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος οδε ἄδελφος. καὶ ἀλλους πολλοὺς ἔγω ἐχω ύμῶν εἰπειν, διν τια ἐξρην μᾶ.

30 λιστα μὲν εν τῳ ἐαυτῷ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγώ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἰ τι εἴξει τοιοῦτων. ἀλλὰ τούτων πάν τοιναντίων εὐρήσετε, ὅ ἄνδρεσ, πάντας ἔμοι βοήθειν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκεῖους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασί Μέλητος καὶ Ἀνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ β

lus is known through Rep. vi. 496 b, where Plato uses the now proverbial expression, ὁ τοῦ Θεάγους χαλινός, the bridle of Theages, i.e. ill health. Such was the providential restraint which made Theages, in spite of political temptations, faithful to philosophy; otherwise, like Demodocus, his father, he would have gone into politics. Demodocus is one of the speakers in the Theages, a dialogue wrongly attributed to Plato.

27. Ἄδείμαντος: son of Aristo and brother of Plato and of Glaucon (Xen. Mem. iii. 6. 1); both of Plato’s brothers were friends of Socrates. Glaucon and Adimantus are introduced in the Republic; Adimantus is older, and is represented as not so familiar a footing with Socrates as his younger brother.

28. Ἀπολλόδωρος: surnamed ὁ μανυκός because of his intense excitation. Cf. Sympos. 173 d. This is nowhere better shown than in the Phaedo, 117 d, where he gives way to uncontrollable grief as soon as Socrates drinks the fatal hemlock. In the Symposium, 172 e, he describes his first association with Socrates with almost religious fervor. In the Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους (28), attributed to Xenophon, he is mentioned as ἐπιθυμή-

33 της μὲν ἰσχυρῶς ἀστῶ (Σωκράτους), ἀλλως ὡς εὐθηνὸς (a simpleton). Of the persons here mentioned, Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Aecandorus, are not elsewhere mentioned; and of the eleven here named as certainly present at the trial (there is doubt about Epigenes) only four (or five with Epigenes), Apollodorus, Crito, Critobulus, and Aeschines, are named in the Phaedo as present afterwards in the prison.

29. μᾶλιστα μὲν: by all means. In the clause beginning with εἰ δὲ, εν τῷ ἐαυτῷ is referred to by τότε and contrasted with νῦν παρασχέσθω.

31. ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ: parenthetical. "The full expression occurs Aeschin. iii. 165, παραχωρῶ σοι τῷ βήματος, ὡς ἐν εἰπτίς." R. The time used for introducing evidence was not counted as a part of the time allotted for the pleadings, but the water-clock (τῷ υδῷρ) was stopped while a witness was giving account of his evidence. Cf: Lys. xxiii. 4, 8, 11, 14, and 15, καὶ μοι ἐπιλαβε (addressed to an officer of the court) τῷ υδῷρ. See App.

35. γὰρ: calls upon us to draw a conclusion suggested by the preceding clause. Socrates means: this fact (πάντας βοήθειν, κτλ.) proves my inno-
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

οί διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν λόγου ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ 34 ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἡδή ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλου ἔχοιεν λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἄλλ' ἡ τοῦ ὄρθου τε καὶ δίκαιου, ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν 40 ψευδομένων, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἄλθευντι;

XXIII. Εἴεν δῆ, ὁ ἄνδρες· ἢ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ' ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδόν ἐστι ταύτα καὶ ἄλλα ἰσώς τοιαῦτα. τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὡμῶν ἀγανακτήσεις ἀναμυνθήθησαι ἐκτὸς τούτων, τίνα ἄλλον λόγον βοηθεῖν ἐμοὶ ἄλλ', ἢ τὸν ὀρθὸν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ζνίσασι Μελετῶν μὲν

4. εἰ ἔδεηθη κτέ.: see, esp. for the force of μὲν and δ', on δειν' ἂν εἴην, 28 δ. — οὗ λόγους: the μέγιστος ἄγων was one involving a man's franchise and his life. Cf. Dem. xxi. 99, παιδία ἢ ἄνωτος, καὶ τοῦτον ἀναβιβάσθεται, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλοὺς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταύτα κινδυνευών,
126

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ος ἰν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἐσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ, οὖν τις ταῦτα |

10 ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἀν πρὸς με σχοίη, καὶ ὅργισθεις |

αὐτοῖς τούτοις θείτο ἀν μετ' ὅργης τὴν ὕψην. εἰ δὴ τις |

ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει—οὐκ ἄξιοι μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε· εἰ δ' οὖν, α' |

ἐπεικὴ ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ότι ἐμοί, ὃ |

ἄριστε, εἰσίν μὲν ποὺ τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο |

15 αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, οὔδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης |

πέφυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὡστε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοι εἰσὶ καὶ |

νιεῖς, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἰσὶ μὲν μειράκιον ἐδη, |

δύο δὲ παιδία· ἀλλ' ὦμως οὔδένα αὐτῶν δεύρο ἀναβιβα- |

σάμενος δεήσομαι ύμῶν ἀποψῆσασθαι. τί δὴ οὖν |

20 οὔδεν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενοι, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθη- |

ναῖοι, οὔδ' ὦμᾶς ἀτιμάζων· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἐχω ἐν|

9. ὃς ἰν δόξαιμι: of course Socrates is far from believing himself |

that the risk he runs is a desperate |

one. |

10. αὐθαδέστερον σχοίη: would be |

too easily offended, more lit. rep- |

resented by (than otherwise) self- |

willed. The δικασταί might easily be |

too proud to submit to criticism of |

their own conduct in like cases; the |

more so because Socrates said that |

he was too proud (cf. e below) to fol- |

low their example. Cf. La Roche- |

foucauld, Maximes, 34. Si nous na- |

vions point d'orgueil, nous ne nousplain- |

drians point de celui des autres. |

11. αὐτοῖς τούτοις: causal.—εἰ δὴ: |

see on εἰ δή, 29 ε. |

12. γὰρ: "(I say if,) for though I |

do not expect it of you yet (making |

the supposition) if it should be so." |

The force of εἰ δή of is resumptive. |

13. ἐπεικὴ: not harsh, i.e. concili- |

atory. |

14. καλ οἰκεῖοι: "I am not alone in |

the world, but I too have relatives."— |

tοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου: this idiom |

(with the gen. of the proper name) is |

common in quotations. No verb is |

expressed, and the quotation is in ap- |

position with τοῦτο, etc. Cf. Theaet. |

183 ε, Παρμενίδης δὲ μοι φανεται, τὸ |

τοῦ Ὀμήρου, αἴδοϊδς τέ μοι ἄμα |

dεινός τε. This const. is not con- |

fined to quotations. Cf. the freq. use |

of δυοῖν θάτερον as in Phaed. 66 ε, |

δυοῖν θάτερον, ἡ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστι κτή- |

σασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἤ τελευτασθαι. The |

quotation is from Hom. Od. xix. 163, |

οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἔστι παλαιφάτον οὐδ' |

ἀπὸ πέτρης. |

16. καὶ, καὶ: not correlative. The |

first καὶ means also, while the second |

introduces a particular case under |

οἰκεῖοι and means indeed or even. |

17. τρεῖς: not added attrib. but |

appositively, three of them. Their |

names were Lamprocles (Xen. Mem. |

ii. 2. 1), Sophroniscus, and Menexeu- |

nus. Diog. Laert. II. 26; Phaed. 118 δ. |

20. αὐθαδιζόμενοι: it is not in a |

vein of self-will or stubbornness. See |

on c above. |

21. εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐχω κτέ.: e
πρὸς θάνατον ἡ μη, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δοξαν καὶ ἐμοι καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ διὰ τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καὶ καὶ καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦτο.

25 νομα ἔχοντα, εἰτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἰτ' οὖν ψεῦδος· ἄλλ' οὖν δεδομένον γε ἐστὶ τὸ Σωκράτη διαφέρειν των τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν υμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἰτε σοφία εἰτε ἀνδρεία εἰτε ἄλλη ἡ τιμίων ἀρετῆς τουτού έσονται, αἰσχρόν ἃν εἰτ. οὖνπεσπέρ εγώ πολλὰς τινὰς, ἄν δεδομένον γε τὸ Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τινι τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἴ οὖν νυμών οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφερειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρεία εἴτε άλλη ἡ τιμίων ἀρετή τοιοντοι εσονται, ἀσχρόν ἃν εἰτ. οὖνπεσπέρ εγώ πολλὰς τινὰς, ἄν δεδομένον γε τὸ Σωκράτη διαφερειν τινι τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἴ οὖν νυμών οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφερειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρεία εἴτε άλλη ἡ τιμίων ἀρετή τοιοντοι εσονται, ἀσχρόν ἃν εἰτ. οὖνπεσπέρ εγώ πολλὰς τινὰς, ἄν δεδομένον γε τὸ Σωκράτη διαφερειν τινι τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἴ οὖν νυμών οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφερειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρεία εἴτε άλλη ἡ τιμίων ἀρετή τοιοντοι εσονται, ἀσχρόν ἃν εἰτ. οὖνπεσπέρ εγώ πολλὰς τινὰς, ἄν δεδομένον γε τὸ Σωκράτη διαφερειν τινι τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἴ οὖν νυμών οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφερειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρεία εἴτε άλλη ἡ τιμίων ἀρετή τοιοντοι εσονται, ἀσχρόν ἃν εἰτ. οὖνπεσπέρ εγώ πολλὰς τινὰς, ἄν δεδομένον γε τὸ Σωκράτη διαφερειν τινι τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἴ οὖν νυμών οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφερειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρεία εἴτε άλλη ἡ τιμίων ἀρετή τοιοντοι εσονται, ἀσχρόν ἃν εἰτ. οὖνπεσπέρ εγώ πολλὰς τινὰς, ἄν δεδομένον γε τὸ Σωκράτη διαφερειν τινι τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἴ οὖν νυμών οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφερειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρεία εἴτε άλλη ἡ τιμίων ἀρετή τοιοντοι εσονται, ἀσχρόν ἃν εἰτ. οὖνπεσπέρ εγώ πολλὰς τινὰς.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ἀποκτείνητε· οἱ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περι. 35 ἀπτεῖς, ὥστ' ἂν τινα καὶ τῶν ἔξων ὑπολαβέων ὅτι οἱ δια-
35 φέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετήν, οὗς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἐν τῇ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρονσι. ταῦτα γάρ, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθη-
ναίοι, οὗτε ύμᾶς χρῆ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ οἰτιοῦν εἶναι, οὔτ' ἂν ἰμαῖς ποιῶμεν ύμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τούτο
40 αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἔλεευνα ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ὁ τῷ ἡσυχίαν ἀγοντος.

XXIV. Ἀριστ. δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς, οὐδὲ δίκαιον μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποθείγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκει καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ καθηταὶ δικαστῆς, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ διδάσκουσιν ὃς χαριέσθαι

35 on the leading clause for its subj. Cf. Xen. An. i. 4. 12, καὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν ἵναν, ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτοῖς χρῆματα δίδῳ, ὡσπερ καὶ τοῖς προτέροις μετὰ Κύρου ἀναβαίνοντο καὶ τάτα οὐκ ἐπὶ μαχηθε ν.ον. G. 1152 and 1568; H. 972 a d.

b 36. οὖντο: a very pointed reiteration.

39. ήμείς, ύμᾶς: the defendant and the δικασταί. Cf. e below.

40. τοῦ εἰσάγοντος: the one who, etc., or 'him who,' here conveying the notion of quality, the man so shameless as to. G. 1560; H. 966. The phrase is borrowed from the stage. Cf. Legg. viii. 838 ε, δεν ἢ θεύσας ἢ τινας οἰδίποδας εἰσάγων.

XXIV. 1. Ἀριστ. δὲ τῆς δόξης, οὐδὲ δίκαιον: after the unseemly practice has been condemned by reference to τῷ καλῷ (δόξα), it is found still more inconsistent with τῷ δίκαιον, and this is conclusive against it. The second οὐδὲ (with ἀποθείγειν) is merely the idiomatic correlative of the first one. On the argument involved, see Introd. 71, fin.

3. διδάσκει καὶ πείθειν: perhaps the full idea would be, διδάσκει καὶ διδάσκειν (or διδάσκοντα) πείθειν. For, strictly speaking, πείθειν may be the result of mere entreaties, but this Socrates would probably have called βιάζεσθαι rather than πείθειν. Cf. d below.

4. ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι: this explains ἐπὶ τούτῳ. καταχαρίζεσθαι τῷ δίκαιων, "make a present of justice." Notice the evil implication of κατα in composition.

5. οὐκ ἠμέροκεν: part of the oath taken by the δικασταῖς, καὶ ἀκροάσομαι τοῦ τε κατηγόρου καὶ τοῦ ἀπολογουμένου ὀμολογόν ἀμφότερον. The orators were always referring to this oath. Cf. Aeschin. iii. 6 ff.; Dem. xviii. 6, etc. See Introd. p. 49, note 2. Cf. also the sentiment, grateful to Athenian hearers, with which Iolaus be-
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

οΐς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὔκον 35 χρῆ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν οὔθ ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι. οὐδὲτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβῶι. μὴ οὖν ἄξιοτε ὑπὲρ, ὢ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττεν, ἄ

10 μὴτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μὴτε δίκαια μὴτε θεία, ἀλλως τε μέντοι ὑπὸ Δία [πάντως] καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Με- λητοῦ τοιοῦτοι. σαφῶσ γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείθομι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζόμην ὄμωμοκότας, θεοὺς οἱ διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγο-

35 gins his appeal to Demophon, king of Athens, Eur. Heracl. 181 ff., ἂνα ὑπάρ-

χει μὲν τὸν ἐν τῇ σῇ χειμί, | εἰ πείθειν ἀκόησα: τ' ἐν μέρει πάρεστὶ μοι,| κούδεις μ' ἀπάσει πρόθεθεν, ὅπερ ἐλλα-

θεν. οὐ δεῖσθαι μὴ θεία, μὴ θεῶν ἀείδη, καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸν ἔλεος τοῦ ἔπιθειν. ἔπει

40 νοῦ καὶ τοῦτον λόγον μηδεναμενος ἐπιθεῖσθαι. Ἦσας εἰς ἀγών τοῦτον, ὅτι ἂν ἔλεος

τοῦ ἄνθρωπον. οὐδὲ δεῖσθαι τοῦ τὸν τοῖς ἐπιθεῖσθαι. οὐδὲ δεῖσθαι τοῦ τὸν τοῖς ἐπιθεῖσθαι.

7. ἐθίζεσθαι: allow yourselves to be habituated.

8. ήμῶν: includes both the speaker and the court referred to above by ἡμᾶς and ήμας respectively.

9. α μήτε ήγοῦμαι: notice the order. Socrates adds μήτε δικαια last because he remembers the ἐπιορκεῖν above. Perjury involves wrong to the gods named in the violated oath, hence οὐδέτεροι εὐσεβῶι.

10. ἀλλως . . . καὶ: the hyperbaton (H. 1062) consists in interrupting the familiar phrase ἀλλως τε καὶ to make room for μέντοι ἔν Δία, after which ἀλλως is forgotten and πάντως is brought in with καὶ, ten thousand times less so too because I actually, etc.
XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, δὲ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ε ἐπί τούτω τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μον κατεψήφισατο, ἀλλὰ τέ ἀριστα εἶναι καὶ ὕμῖν.

15 ροίην ἄν ἐμαυτοῦ ὡς θεοῦς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ ὁ σὺς ἔχειν. νομίζω τε γὰρ, δὲ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὔδεις τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὕμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅτι μέλλει ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀριστον εἶναι καὶ ὕμῖν.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

μοι πολλὰ ἐξιμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον μοι γέγονε 36 τὸ γεγονός τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμὸν. οὗ γὰρ ὄμην ἐγὼ γεγονος τούτο, καὶ οὐκ άνελπιστόν μοι, τὸ γεγονὸς τούτο, αλλὰ πολὺ νῦν δέ, ώς ἐοικέν, εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπέφευγη ἂν. Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον

above), there is a repetition of the inf. in οὐκ άνελπιστόν μοι.

2. ὡς μου κατεψηφίσασθε: a definition of τούτο γεγονότι.

3. καὶ... γί' γονε: a departure from the beaten track, καὶ, οὔτε... οὔτε, μέν... δέ. See on δῆμοι δέ ἔδωκε, 21 e, and διαφθείρουσιν, 25 b. — οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον: no surprise, i.e. not unexpected. Compare φόμην just below οὐκ άνελπιστόν, οὐ μόνον άποπεφευγα, αλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον.

4. οὐτω ἐτω ολίγον: so close. οὐτως is separated from ὠλίγον by παρά, a case of apparent hyperbaton. See on ἄλλας τε κτὲ, 35 d. The combination παρ' ὠλίγον is treated as inseparable, because the whole of it is required to express the idea "a little beyond," i.e. close. The whole idea of by a small majority is qualified by οὕτως. The ὠλίγον was thirty votes. Cf. Dem. xxiv. 138, Φιλίππιον τὸν Φιλίππου τοῦ ναυκληρου νῦν μικροῦ (almost) μὲν ἀπεκτείνατε, χρημάτων δὲ πολλῶν αὐτοῦ έκεῖνου ἀντισυνεμένου παρ' ὠλίγας ψήφους (within a small majority) ἠτίμωσατε. The subj. of ἐσεσθαι is of course to be supplied from τῶν γεγονότα ἀριθμῶν. — ὡς έοικέν: used freq. (like the Eng. “as it appears”) in cases even of the greatest certainty.

7. εἰ τριάκοντα κτέ.: strictly speaking 31. Diog. L. ii. 5. 41, says: κατεψηφίσα, διακοσλαίς ἄνδοκοντα μὲν πλείσι τῶν ἀπολυουσών (sc. ψήφους). The total number of votes against him was therefore 281; so that 220 of the 501 δικασταί (see Introd. 66) must have voted in his favor. Socrates probably counted the numbers roughly, as he heard them, and said that thirty votes would have turned the scale. When Aeschines was acquitted of the charge of παραπρεσβεία, betrayal of trust when on an embassy, brought by Demosthenes, his majority is said to have been also thirty votes. For Demosthenes, as here for Socrates, such defeat was, under the circumstances, victory. See Introd. 72.

8. ἀποπέφευγα: i.e. alone, Meletus could not have got 100 votes, since with two helpers he failed to get 300.
10 τούτο γε, ὦτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἀντώς καὶ Δύκων κατηγορήσεστε ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὄφελε χιλίας δραχμὰς οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ β' πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

XXVI. Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. εἰεν· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐπὶ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὥς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δὴλον ὅτι τῆς ἄξιας; τί οὖν; τί ἄξιος εἰμὶ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, οὐ μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὖν ἡσυχίαν ἤγον, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας δύνησάτε οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονο-

36 a 10. εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη: for the accusers and their respective importance, see Introd. 30. Notice ἀνέβη... κατηγορήσεστε. 11. χιλίας δραχμᾶς: see Introd. 72. b — τὸ πέμπτον μέρος: (cf. Dem. xviii. 103, τὸ μέρος τῶν ψήφων οὐκ ἐλαβεν) the indispensable fifth part, not a fifth part. The acc. is used because the whole fifth is meant. Cf. Prot. 329 ε, μεταλαμβάνουσιν... τῶν τῆς ἄρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἀλλοι οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι. Xen. An. iv. 5, 3, οὐ προσίεσαν πρὸς τὸ πῦρ τοῦ δύσοντας, εἰ μὴ μεταδόθην αὐτοῖς τοὺς πυροῦ... ἐνθά δὴ μετεδιόθησαν ἄλλοι πόνος ὑπ' εἰχὸν ἐκαστοῦ.

XXVI. 1. τιμᾶται θανάτου: fixes my penalty at death. See Introd. 73. For the omission of the art. when θανάτος means the penalty of death, cf. 37 b, and see on τοῦ θανάτου, 28 c.

2. υμῖν: ethical dat. G. 1171; H. 770.

3. ἡ δήλον κτε.: with ἡ (αν) is appended the interrogative answer to the first question, which is merely rhetorical.—τῆς ἄξιας: sc. τιμῆς. This ellipsis is so common that ἡ ἄξια is treated as a noun; here τιμῆς may easily be supplied from the verb. On παθεῖν ἡ ἀποτίσαι, see Introd. 74.

4. δ' τι μαθὼν: strictly speaking, this is the indir. form of τί μαθὼν, which hardly differs from τί παθών. See GMT. 830; H. 968 c. Both idioms ask, with astonishment or dis-

approval, for the reason of an act. They resemble two English ways of asking 'why?' 'what possessed (μαθὼν) you?' 'what came over (παθών) you?' So δ' τι μαθὼν = an emphatic because. The indir. question here is loosely connected with the leading clause. Such connexion as there is depends upon the notion of deciding a question implied in τί ἄξιος... ἀποτίσαι, "what sort of a penalty do I deserve to pay since the question involved is what possessed me," etc. This is more striking than the regular phrase οὔχ ἡσυχίαν ἤγον οὔτε ἡσυχίαν οὔτε ἐκείνην ἐφύσεν.—ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας: this is more fully explained below by ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἠποτίσει, for which see on 9 below.

5. δύνησάτε οἱ πολλοί: sc. ἐπιμελοῦνται, supplied from ἀμελήσας. Cf. Hdt. vii. 104. ἀνώγει δὲ τωῦτο αἰέτι, οὐκ ἐόν φεύγειν οὓδεν πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἢ μάχησι, ἀλλὰ μένοντες εἰς τῇ τάξι ἐπικρατέσαν ἡ ἀπόλλυσθαι (sc. κελεύσας). ἐκαστος is often to be supplied from οὖδεις. For a similar ellipsis, see Hom. Od. vii. 193, ὅτι οὖν ἐσθήσατε δεσμάτων οὐτὲ τεν ἀλλου | δῶν ἐπείχετ' ἐκέννησεν ταλαπαίριον ἀντικαταντα (sc. μὴ δείκνυσαί). Socrates's specifications cover both public and private life.
μίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 38 ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσίων καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ἑντεικέστερον εἶναι ἣ ὡστε εἰς ταύτ' ἱόντα σφυζευθαί, ἑνταύθα μὲν οὐκ ε ἦν ἡ ἐλθὼν μὴ τὸν ἐμαυτὸν ἐμελλὸν μηδέν ὁφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἱδία ἐκαστον [ἰὼν] εὐφρενεῖτων τὴν μεγίστην εὐφρενείαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἑνταύθα ἦν ἐπιχειρῶν ἐκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μὴ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελείσθησαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθῇ ὡς ἐπιτιθητός καὶ φρονιμῶτατος ἑσοίτο, μὴ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τρόπον 15 καὶ φρονιμῶτατος ἐσοίτο, μὴ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τρόπον 36

6. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν κτέ.: and magistracies besides and plots and factions. ἄλλων is attrib. to ἄρχων ξυνωμοσίων, and στάσεων. Cf. Phaedo, 110 e, καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῆ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φιόις (as well as in animals) τε καὶ φυτοῖς. Homer uses a similar idiom, Od. i. 132, πάρ δ' αὖτὸς κλισαὶν βῆτο πούκλιαν ἐκτοθεν ἄλλων κυριωθήσαν. Socrates means to include all performances which bring a citizen into public life; he talks of responsible public offices as on a par with irresponsible participation in public affairs. Of course στρατηγία is a public office, and among the most important; but δημηγορία is not so, even in the case of the βήτορες. For the facts, cf. 32 b.

7. ξυνωμοσίων καὶ στάσεων: the former relates to political factions, the so-called ἐταιρίαι, instituted to overthrow the existing government, the latter to revolutions, whether from democracy to oligarchy, or from oligarchy to democracy. Such combinations and seditions were rife toward the end of the Peloponnesian war. See Grote, c. lxxv.

8. ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτόν κτέ.: freq. the pron. is not given, and then the const. is different. Cf. Xen. An. v. 4. 20, ἢκα νοὶ ἠγησάμενοι εἶναι ... ταύτα πράττειν κτέ. Like the present case is Soph. 234 e, οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἐκαστῶν ἀφαντοθέτων εἶναι.

9. εἰς ταύτ' ἱόντα: the reading ἱόντα can hardly be defended. See App.

11. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἱδία κτέ.: but toward privately benefiting individuals. This is strictly the completion of the thought introduced by ἄλλ' ἀμελήσας, which, though ἑνταύθα μὲν οὐκ ἦν ἐπιτιθητός, still requires a positive expression to explain ἐνταύθα, as is often the case with ὀστος, is resumptive, and restates ἐπὶ τὸ ἱδία ἐκαστόν κτέ. The whole period is full of repetitions, but ἱόντα comes in most unaccountably. See App. See on τούτων γὰρ ἐκαστός, 19 e.

13. μὴ πρότερον κτέ.: cf. 30 a b.

14. πρὶν ἐπιμεληθῇ: πρὶν takes the opt. on the principle of ὀρατίο ὀβλικα, since the tense of the leading verb (ἢ) is secondary. GMT. 644; H. 924.

15. ὀπωσ' ἐσοίτο: GMT. 339; H. 885 a.

16. τῶν τε ἄλλων: not a third specification in line with μὴτε ... μὴτε, but connected with the whole μὴ πρό-
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ἢν; ἀγαθὸν τι, ὥς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δὲι γε κατὰ τὴν ἄξιαν τῆς ἀληθείας τιμάσθαι· καὶ ταὐτά γε ἄγαθὸν τοιοῦτον, ὦ τι ἀν
20 πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἄνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτη, δεομένω ἁγεων σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον, ὥς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὐτως, ὅς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ συτείσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ τις ὑμῶν ἰππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ξεύγει νενίκηκεν
25 Ὀλυμπίασιν. ὦ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαιμονίας δοκεῖ εἰναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰναι· καὶ ὦ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ

36 εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν πρότον: repeats εἰς παραλλήλου the thought conveyed by οὕτω, which points back to μὴ πρότερον . . . πρὶν, i.e. so that what was essential might not be neglected in favor of what is unessential.

d 17. τί οὖν κτέ.: a return to the question asked above, with omission of what does not suit the new connexion. Notice in the next line the position of δεῖ, which is emphasized by the γέ that follows, if you insist that, etc.

20. ἄνδρι πένητι εὐεργέτη: a poor man who has richly served the state. He is poor, and therefore needs the σίτησις, which he deserves because he is an εὐεργέτης. εὐεργέτης was a title of honor, bestowed under special circumstances upon citizens and non-citizens.

22. μᾶλλον πρέπει οὔτως: with colloquial freedom Socrates combines two idioms οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον πρέπει ἢ and δεῖ πρέπει οὔτως ὥς. See App.

23. ἐν πρυτανείῳ συτεύσθαι: those entertained by the state (1) were invited once or (2) were maintained permanently. Socrates is speaking of (2), i.e. maintenance in the prytaneum. The archons dined in the βεσμοθέσιο; the senatorial Prytanes dined in the θόλος, and in later times also those called Δείσιτοι,—certain Eleusinian priests, scribes, heralds, etc. See on εἰς τὴν θόλον, 32 c. The public guests sat at table in the Πρυτανείων, which was at the foot of the northeast corner of the Acropolis. Some of them earned the distinction by winning prizes in the national games, some received it on account of their forefathers' benefactions to the state, e.g. the oldest living descendants of Harmodius and of Aristogeiton respectively were thus honored. The most ancient Πρυτανείων on the Acropolis was in historic times used only for certain religious ceremonies.

24. ίππῳ κτέ.: i.e. κέλητι, race-horse; ξυνωρίδι, a pair; ξεύγει, four horses abreast. Since a victory in the great panhellenic festivals was glorious for the country from which the victor came, he received on his return the greatest honors, and even substantial rewards. Cf. Rep. v. 465 d, where Plato speaks of the μακαριστὸς βίος ὑπὸ ὦν ὠλυμπιονίκαι ζωῆς, the blissful life Olympian victors lead.

26. οὐδὲν δεῖται: only rich men ε could afford to compete.
Δὲ δὲόμαι. ἐὰν οὖν δὲι με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ συνήσεως.

XXVII. Ἡσὼς οὖν ὕμων καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὁσπερ περὶ τοῦ οὐκτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολῆσεως, ἀπαυθαδίζομενοι· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστω, ὥς Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἴναι 5 μηδένα ἀδικεὶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ἀλλὰ τούτῳ οὐ πείθω· ὅλιγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλους διελέγομεθα· ἐπεὶ, ὥς ἐγὼμα, εἰ ἣν υμῶν νόμος, ὦσπερ καὶ ἀλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ βανᾶτον μὴ μίαν ἥμεραν μόνον κρίνεω, ἀλλὰ πολλὰς, ἐπείσθητε δ' ἀν· νῦν δ' οὖν ῥάδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὅλιγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύσεται. πέπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεὶν πολλοῦ δὲν ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσεων καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτὸν ἐρεῖν αὐτός, ὡς ἀξίος εἰμὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιοῦτον τινὸς ἐμαντῶ· τί δεῖσαι; ἢ μὴ πάθω τούτῳ οὗ Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται, ὁ φημὶ οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ ἄγαθον οὔτ' εἰ κακῶν.

28. ἐν πρυτανείῳ συνήσεως· cf. above τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν πρυτανείῳ συνήσεως. The art. is omitted, since this is thrown in merely to explain τοιοῦτον.

XXVII. 3. ἀπαυθαδίζομενοι: in the spirit of stubbornness. This serves to explain παραπλησίας κτ. For the facts, see on τῷ διείσθαι βιαζόμην, 35 ὁ.—τὸ δὲ· refers to the act which has been only incidentally touched upon (ταυτὶ λέγων = διὰ τὰ ταῦτα λέγω). ὥδε, οἷ δὲ, τὸ δὲ, are used without a preceding μέν when they introduce some person or topic in contrast to what has just been dwelt upon, here περὶ τοῦ οὐκτοῦ κτ. For a different use of τὸ δὲ, see on τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, 23 a.

4. ἐκὼν εἶναι: an apparently superfluous inf. G. 1535; H. 956 a. For the facts, see on ἢ ἐκὼν, 25 e.

7. ὦσπερ καὶ ἀλλοις· for instance the Lacedaemonians. Cf. Pseudo Plut. Aporph. Lac. s.v. Ἀναξανδρίδου or Ἀλεξανδρίδου, c. 6, ἐρωτώντος τινος αὐτόν, διὰ τὰς περὶ τοῦ βανᾶτος δίκας πλεοσιν ἡμέρας οἳ γέροντες κρίνουσιν, πολλαῖς, ἐφε, ἡμέραις κρίνουσιν, δι' ἐκεῖ θανάτου τοῖς διαμαρτάνουσιν (those who go completely wrong) οὐκ ἔστι μεταβουλεύσασθαι (to reconsider). Thucydides also says in his account of Pausanias, i. 132. ὅ, χρόμενοι τῷ τρόπῳ φίλος εἰλάβασιν εἰς σφᾶς αὐτῶς (their own countrymen), μὴ ταχείς εἶναι περὶ ἀνδρῶν Σπαρτιάτου ἄνευ ἀναμφίβολης τεκμηρίας βουλεύσασι τι ἀνήκεστον.

11. ἀδικήσεων, ἐρέων, τιμήσεσθαι: the fut. is used to disclaim the fut. (GMT. 113; H. 855) intention.

13. τί δεῖσαι: what fear is there to b induce me? Supply verbs from the three infs. above.

14. φημὶ: see above 28 e—30 b.
15 ἐστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἐλωμαι ὃν ἐν δικαὶ ὑπήκοουν, τοῦτον τυμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δει ζῆν ε ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δουλευόντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἐνδεκάς; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἔσω ἄν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ ταύτων μοι ἐστιν ὁπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον· οὐ γὰρ
20 ἐστι μοι χρήματα ὁποθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμῆσωμαι; ἵσως γὰρ ἄν μοι τούτου τιμῆσατε. πολλὴ μεν- τὰν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ ὤτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι ὡς ἡ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖται μου ὑπὸ οἴοι τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκείν τᾶς ἐμᾶς διατρῆβας καὶ τοὺσ ἀ

37

15. ἐλωμαι ὃν ... ὄντων: a remarkable const., arising from ἐλωμαι τι ἐκεῖνων & ἐν ὑπήκοουν κακὰ ὑπήκοα, by the assimilation of ἐκεῖνων & to ἐν and of κακὰ ὑπήκοα to κακῶν ὑπήκοων, and the insertion of ὑπήκοα after ὑπήκοα. ἐν ὑπήκοων and ὑπὴκοα ὑπήκοα occur freq. (in parenthesis) where ὑπήκοα is superfluous. See on δηλον ὑπήκοα, Crito, 53 a, and cf. Dem. xix. 9, μημονεύοιτας ὑμῶν ὑπήκοα ὑπήκοα τοῦτο ἐπομνησῆς, to remind you, although I know that most of you remember it. Cf. Gorg. 481 d, αἰσθάνομαι οὐν σοὶ ἐκάστοτε ... ὑπήκοα ἃ ἄν φη σοι τὰ παιδικὰ ... οὐ δυναμεύον ἀντίλεγειν. So the acc. and inf. may follow ὑπήκοα and ὑπήκοα.

16. τοῦτον κτῆ.: a part (τι) of ὑπήκοα, by fixing my penalty at that. See App.

17. δουλεύοντα: as a man in prison, who ceases to be his own master.

18. τοῖς ἐνδεκάς: see Introd. 75 and cf. οἱ ἐρχονται, 39 e.—ἀλλὰ χρημάτων: a neg. answer to the preceding rhetorical question is here implied; otherwise ὑπήκοα might equally well have been used. The second ἀλλὰ introduces an objection, which answers the question immediately preceding it.—καὶ δεδέσθαι κτῆ.: to remain in prison. GMT. 110. Cf. in Dem. xxiv. 63, the document which winds up with:
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

37 λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγονασι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε γητείτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι. ἀλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι βαδίσως; πολλοὶ γε δεῖ, ὡς Ἀθηναίοι. καλὸς οὖν ἄν μοι ὁ βίος εἰπέ ἐξελθόντι τηλικῷδι ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἀλλῆς πόλεως ἀμείβομενος καὶ ἐξελανυμένῳ ζην. εὖ γὰρ οἴδ ζητεῖτε αντων νννι άπαλλαγηναι. άλλοι δὲ ἀντάς οΐσονσι ραδίως; πολλον γε δεῖ, ὡς Ἀθηναίοι, καλὸν ἄν μοι δ βίος εἰη εξελθόντι τηλικῳδί ἄνθρωποι, ἀμείβομενω καὶ εζελαννομενω ζην. ἐν γάρ οίδ τι, ἂν ελθω, λεγοντος εμον άκροάσονται οί νέοι ὡσπερ ἐνθάδε. κάν μεν τοντος ἐξελωσι πείθοντες τον ἀρχιερεύρους; εάν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαννω, οί τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκείοι δι αὐτούς τούτους.

XXVIII. Ἰσωσ οὖν ἂν τις εἰποι· σιγων δὲ καὶ ἰσυκχίαν ἄγων, ὅ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷος τ' ἐσεὶ ἡμίν ἐξελθόντι ζην. τουτί δὴ ἐστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον πεΐσαί τινας ὑμών. ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὃτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθείν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ 5 καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἰσυκχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθε μοι.

— ἄλλην ἐξ ἀλλῆς κτ.: cf. Xen. An. ν. 4. 31, ἀναβοάντων ἀλλήλων ἰσυκχίαν πόλιοιν εἰς τὴν ἐτεραν ἐκ τῆς ἐτεραν πόλεως. Elsewhere we find the substantive repeated, e.g. τόποι . . . τόπον, 40 c. The whole expression suggests the restless life led by the so-called sophists. Cf. Soph. 224 b, where the typical sophist is described as τὸν μαθήματα ξυνωνομένον πόλιν τε ἐκ τῶν νόμον αὐτοὺς ἀμείβοντα, one who goes from town to town buying up and selling knowledge for coin. Cf. also Prot. 313 a—314 b.

33. δι' αὐτούς τούτους: to describe the involuntary cause in contrast to οὕτως αὐτόν.

XXVIII. 2. ἐξελθόν ζήν: to live on in exile. This forms a unit to which σιγών and ἰσυκχίαν ἄγων are added by way of indicating the manner of life he will lead. The meaning of ἰσυκχίαν ἄγων is plain from 36 b.

3. τουτί δὴ: that is the thing of which, etc.; cognate acc. after πείσα. — τινάς:
ώς εἰρωνευομένως· ἐάν τ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγις
στὸν ἁγαθὸν ὅτι ἀνθρώπω τοῦτο, ἑκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρε-
tῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν περὶ ἄν ὑμεῖς ἡμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτόν καὶ ἀλλοὺς ἐξετά-
ζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπω, ταῦτα
δ’ ἔτι ηττον πείσεσθε μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως
ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς, πείθεν δὲ οὐ τάδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ
ἀμα οὐκ εἰθισμαί ἐμαυτὸν ἀξίων κακοῦ οὖν δια λέγομεν καὶ ἐμαυτόν καὶ άλλον έξετάζοντος, ό δε άνεξέταστος βίος ον βιωτος ἀνθρώπω, ταντα δ* ετι ηττον πείσεσθε μοι λεγοντι. τά δε εχει μεν όντως
ὡς εγώ φημι, ώ άνδρεις, πείθεν δε ον ράδιον. και εγώ
άμα οικ ειθισμαι εμαυτον κακον ουδενος. ει μεν
γαρ ήν μοι χρηματα, ετιμησαμην ου χρηματων δσα εμελ-
λον εκτίσειν· ουδεν γαρ αν εβλαβην νυν δε—ου γαρ
εστων, ει μη άρα δσον αν εγω δυναμην εκτισαι, τοσουτων

12. καλ έγω αμ’ οικ ειθισμαι: after Socrates, in 28 e–30 c and here, has shown that he neither can nor should abandon his customary manner of living, and has thus proved that he neither can nor should live in exile; he further adds (cf. the reasons given in 37 b) that he cannot propose banishment as his penalty. Banishment he has already (28 e ff.) rejected, though here he rejects it in a somewhat altered form.

13. ει μεν γαρ ην κτι: γαρ is related to the thought which lies unuttered in the previous explanation: not from love of money do I refuse to make a proposition. The apod. includes δσα έμελλον κτι. See on δε έμελλεν, 20 a.

15. νυν δε—ου γαρ: but as it is, (I name no sum of money,) for money I have none. The connexion is similar to ἀλλα γαρ (19 d, 20 c), where the unexpressed thought alluded to by γαρ is easily supplied. νυν δε expresses forcibly the incompatibility of facts with the preceding supposition. Cf. Lach. 184 d, νυν δε εδ έγει έχει άκοουαι και σου.

16. ει μη άρα: see on ει μη άρα, 17 b.
βούλεσθέ μοι τιμήσαι. ἵσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ὑμῖν 38
μναν ἀργυρίου· τοσοῦτον οὖν τιμῶ. Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὥς ἀνδρες 'Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ
20 Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσι με τριάκοντα μναν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυνάσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσοῦτον, ἐγγυνηταί δ' ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὕτωι αξίοχρεω.

XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἐνεκα χρόνου, ὥς ἀνδρες 'Αθηναίων, οὖνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λουδορίν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἀνδρὰ σοφον· φήσουσι γὰρ ἡ σοφόν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμὶ, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὑνεδίζειν. εἰ οὖν περιμενεῖτε ὅλιγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὅρατε γὰρ ἡ τὴν ἡλυκίαν ὁτι πόρρω ἤδη εστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύ. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἈΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 139

18. μναν ἀργυρίου: about seventeen dollars. This is certainly small compared with the fines imposed in other cases, e.g. upon Miltiades, Pericles, Timotheus.

21. αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυάσθαι: sc. φασίν, to be supplied from κελεύουσι. Their surety would relieve Socrates from imprisonment.

22. αξίοχρεω: responsible, an assurance hardly needed in Crito's case.

XXIX. Here ends Socrates's ἀντιτίμησις, and it was followed by the final vote of the court determining Socrates's penalty. With this the case ends. Socrates has only to be led away to prison. See note on c. xxv. above, 35 d. See Introd. 35 and 36. In the address that follows, Socrates is out of order. He takes advantage of a slight delay to read a lesson to the court.

1. οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἐνεκα χρόνου: a compressed expression. By condemning Socrates, his judges, in order to rid themselves of him, have hastened his death by the few years which remained to him; thus, to gain a short respite, they have done a great wrong.

2. οὖνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν: the name and the blame. See on τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν, 20 d, and ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο κτῆ., 23 a. — ὑπό: as if with ὄνομασθήσετε and αἰτιασθήσετε. See on πεπάνθησε, 17 a. Some periphrasis like ὄνομα ἔξετε κτῆ. was often preferred by the Greeks to their somewhat cumbersome fut. pass. (of which there are only two examples in Hom.).

7. πόρρω τοῦ βίου: far on in life. For the gen. with advs. of place, see G. 1148; H. 757.—θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύ: and near unto death. The contrast introduced by δ' is often so slight that but overtranslates it. Cf. Xen. Cyr. i. 5, 2, ὁ Κυαξάρης ὁ τοῦ Ἀστυδάγους
ποιόν καταψηφυσαμενον θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε τοὺς ἠνδρεῖς, ἀπορία λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιοῦτον, οἷς ἂν χωρὶς ἑπειστά, εἴ ἔμην δεῖν ἀπαντάτην ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν ὡςτε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεί. ἀλλ' ἀπορία μὲν ἐαλωκά, οὐ μὲν τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντικὰς καὶ τοῦ ἔθελεν λέγειν πρὸς χωρὶς ἢδηστα ἢν ἰκόνες, θρηνοῦσθα τέ μου καὶ ὑποκλείσαμον καὶ ἀλλὰ ποιοῦντο καὶ λέγοντος πολλά καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγώ φημι: οἶδα δὴ καὶ εἰδός τε ἰμεῖς τῶν ἀλλῶν ἰκόνες. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε φήσθην δεῖν ἐνεκα τοῦ κυνδύνου πράζαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, 10 οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησάμενοι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἴροιμαι ὡς ἀπολογησάμενοι τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκεῖνως την θρῆνον οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἀλλον οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύγεται πᾶν ποιῶν ώστε ἀποφεύγεται.

38 e παῖς, τῆς δὲ Κύρου μητρὸς ἀδελφὸς κτέ. An. i. 7, εἰπέρ Δαρείου ἐμὲ ταῖς παῖσιν, εἶπος δὲ ἀδελφὸς, οὐκ ἀμαχί ταῦτ' ἐγὼ λήψομαι.

12. ὡστε ἀποφυγεῖν: so as to escape, i.e. in order to escape. The Greek idiom expresses not so much purpose as result. There really seems very little difference between this ὡστε with the inf. and an obj. clause with ἐπ' ὡς and the fut. ind. GMT. 582 and 339; H. 963 and 885. Cf. Phaedr. 252 e, πάν ποιεῖν ὡς τοιοῦτος (sc. φιλόσωφος) ἐσται, and Phaed. 114 c, χρὴ πάντα ποιεῖν ὡστε ἀτρετής καὶ φρονί- σεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν. Cf. also ὡστε διαφεύγειν, 39 a below.

14. τόλμης: in its worst sense, like the Lat. audacia. Cf. εὰν τίς τοι- μα, 39 a below, and Crit. 53 c.

16. θρηνοῦτος κτέ.: a development of the idea in τοιοῦτα, οἷς ἂν τέ. Here is a transition from the acc. of the thing (sound) heard to the gen. of the person heard, unless θρηνοῦτος... φημι is looked upon as a gen. absolute thrown in as an afterthought for the sake of a more circumstantial and clearer statement. For the facts, cf. Gorg. 522 d, where (evidently with reference to the point here made) Plato puts the following words into Socrates's mouth: εἰ δὲ κολακικής βητορικής (rhetorical flattery) ἑνδεία τελεντψην ενεκα, εν ὅτι βαδίως ἰδοις ἢν με φεροντα τοῦθανον. 38 d

19. οὕτως: see on οὕτως, 34 c.

21. ὡς ἀπολογησάμενοι: in this way, etc., i.e. after such a defence. οὕτως above means as I have, and that idea is vividly repeated by ὡς. Thus its contrast with ἐκείνως (sc. ἀπολογησάμενοι) is made all the more striking. — τεθνάναι: see on τεθνάναι, 30 c.

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

θάνατον, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γί- 39
25 γεται ὅτι τὸ γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφύγων καὶ ὅπλα
ἀφεῖς καὶ ἐφ’ ἰκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ
ἀλλαί μηχαναὶ πολλὰ εἰσών ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις
ὡστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἕαν τις τολμᾶν πάντα τοιοῦ καὶ
λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ’ ἢ χαλεπόν, ὃ ἄνδρες, θάνατον
30 ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηριαν· θάττον γὰρ
θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἡγομέν οτὰ βραδὺς ὅν καὶ πρε-
σβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδύτερον ἔαλων, οἱ δ’ ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι
ἀτε δεινοὶ καὶ οξεῖς ὅνεται ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας.
καὶ νῦν ἡγομέν ἡμεῖς χαλεπὼτερον ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδύτερου
35 ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἁληθείας ἀφληκτότες μοχθηρίων καὶ ἀδι-
κίαν. καὶ ἡγομέν τὰ μεν οὔτως οὐτω καὶ ἕξει σχεῖν, καὶ
ουτοὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθύμημα ὑμῶν χρήσιμοθε-
σαι, δι' ἐναντίων τοίον μον. καὶ γάρ εἰμὶ ὡδη ἑνταῦθα,
ἐν δὲ μάλιστ' ἀνθρώπου χρησμοδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γάρ, δὲ ἄνδρες, οἳ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε,
5 τιμωρίαν ὡμίν ἥξεν εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸν ἑμῶν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νὴ Δία ἡ οἷαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργάσασθε οἴομενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἐλέγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὡμὺν πολὺ ἑναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγώ φημί. πλείον ἔσονται ὥμας ὁι ἐλέγχοντες, οὐς νῦν ἐγὼ
10 κατείχον, ὡμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἕθανεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἐσον- 
ται ὅσω νεώτεροι εἰσί, καὶ ὡμεῖς μᾶλλον ἄγανακτήσετε.
εἰ γάρ οἷεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχῆσεν τοῦ ὁνειδίζειν τινὰ ὡμίν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ξῆτε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δια-
39κτε. prob. Socrates has in mind such cases as Homer mentions, II. xvi. 851 ff., where Patroclus as he dies prophesies truly to Hector, ὥθων ὤνδ' ἄπαθ' ἄπυπτ' ἄρην βέρ', ἀλλά τιν ἥδεν ἄγχι παρέστηκεν θάνατος καὶ μοίρα κραταῖ, and xxii. 358 ff., where Hector's last words foretell the killing of Achilles by Paris and Phoebus Apollo. Cf. Verg. Aen. x. 739, —
3. ἀνθρώποι χρησμοδοῦσιν κτε.: prob. Socrates has in mind such cases as Homer mentions, II. xvi. 851 ff., where Patroclus as he dies prophesies truly to Hector, ὥθων ὤνδ' ἄπαθ' ἄπυπτ' ἄρην βέρ', ἀλλά τιν ἥδεν ἄγχι παρέστηκεν θάνατος καὶ μοίρα κραταῖ, and xxii. 358 ff., where Hector's last words foretell the killing of Achilles by Paris and Phoebus Apollo. Cf. Verg. Aen. x. 739, —
Ille autem expirans: Non me, quicumque es, multo,
Victor, nec longum laetabere; te quoque fata
Prospectant paria, atque eadem mox arva
tenebris.
Cf. also Xen. Cyr. viii. 7. 21, ἢ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆ τότε (at the hour of
death) δὴπο θειοτάτη καταφαίνεται καὶ 
tότε τι τῶν μελλόντων προορᾶ: τότε 
γάρ, ὡς ἔσοι, μάλιστα ἐλευθεροῦται. The same idea is found in many litera-
tures. Cf. Brunhild in the song of Sigfried (Edda), —
I prithee, Gunther, sit thee here by me,
For death is near and bids me prophecy.
See also John of Gaunt's dying speech,
Rich. II. ii., —
Methinks I am a prophet new-inspired,
And thus expiring do foretell of him:
His rash fierce blaze of riot cannot last,
For violent fires soon burn out themselves.
4. ἀπεκτόνατε: sc. by their verdict,
and by the penalty which they voted
after Socrates had made his counter-proposition (of a penalty), ἀντίτι-
μημα.
6. οἷαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε: this is after
the analogy of τιμωρίαν τιμωρεῖσθαι
τινα, without some reminiscence of
which it would hardly occur to any
one to say θάνατον οὐ τιμωρεῖ
ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε. ἀπεκτόνατε is substituted,
as more vivid and concrete, for the
expected τετιμώρησθε. Similarly we
have μάχην νικάν or ἡττάσθαι as more
specific equivalents of μάχην μάχεσθαι.
— νῦν: expresses reality. This use
of νῦν is akin to its very frequent use
in contrast to a supposition contrary
to fact (cf. 38 b, Lach. 184 d and 200 e);
but here it is connected with a false
account of what will come to pass, in
contrast with the true prophecy of
Socrates.
8. τὸ δὲ κτε.: for a similar idiom,
though more strongly put, cf. Ἑσπ.
νοείσθε. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' αὐτή ἥ ἀπαλλαγή οὐτε πάνυ δυνατ' 39
15 οὔτε καλῆ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλιστῇ καὶ ράστῃ, μὴ τοὺς
ἀλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ' ἐαυτὸν παρασκεύαζειν ὅπως ἔσται
ὡς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισμέ-
νοις μαντευσάμενοι ἀπαλλάσσομαι.

XXXI. Τοὺς δὲ ἀποψηφισμένους ἢδέως ἀν διαλε-
χθεῖν ύπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τοῦτοι πράγματος, ἐν δὲ οἱ
ἀρχοντες ἀσχολιάν ἀγονιστι καὶ οὔπω ἔρχομαι οἱ ἐλθόντα
μὲ δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, δὲ ἄνδρες, παραμείνειτε τοσο-5
τον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογήσαι πρὸς ἀλλή-
λους ἐως ἐξεστιν· ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλους οὖσιν ἐπιδείξαι
40 ἔθελω τὸ νῦν μοι ἐξυμβεβηκός τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ, δὲ
ἄνδρες δικασταί----ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστάς καλῶν ὅρθῶς ἀν
καλοῖν—θαυμάσιον τι γέγονεν. ἕ γὰρ εἰωθυνιά μοι

244 a, ἵνα... τὸ δὲ τούτου γίγνηται
πάν τοῦ τοῦτον.
14. ἔσθ' αὐτή: not οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' κτε.,
as Schanz has it. The position of
ἔστι near οὐ at the beginning of the
clause justifies the accent. G. 144,
5; H. 480, 3.
15. μη τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν: to op-
press no man, corresponding to the pre-
ceding ἀποκτείνοντες... ἐπισχήσειν κτε.
XXXI. 2. ὑπὲρ: has just the same
meaning with περί. See L. and S. s.v.
ὑπέρ, fin. Socrates speaks about what
has befallen him, which he looks upon
as for the best since it is the will of
Divine Providence.—οἱ ἀρχοντες: see
Introd. 75, and cf. 37 e.
3. ἀσχολιάν ἀγονιστι: are busy. They
were occupied with the arrangements
for conveying Socrates to prison. For
τεθνάναι, see on τεθνάναι, 30 c.
4. ἀλλὰ: used freq., for the sake
of greater vivacity, before the inv.
or subjv. of command. See on ἀλλ' ἐμοι κτε., Crit. 45 a.
5. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει: indicates the
calm self-possession of Socrates, so
strongly contrasted with the ordinary
attitude of those under sentence of
death.—διαμυθολογήσαι: more friend-
ly and familiar than διαλέγεσθαι. Thus
Socrates prepares to open his heart
upon matters not strictly relevant,
which only those of whom he is fond
and who care for him need hear. Cf.
Phaed. 61 e, ἵσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει
μέλλοντα ἔκεισι ἀποδημεῖν διασκο-
πεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς
ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεί, ποίαι τινὰ αὐτὴν
οἴδημεν εἶναι.
8. ὑμᾶς γὰρ κτε.: see on ὅ τι μὲν
δημεῖς, 17 a.
9. ἔγρα εἰωθυνιά κτε.: notice how
many short statements of fact crowd
one upon the other. This serves to
arrest the attention. The θαυμάσιον
τί is that now, when Socrates has such
a fate before him, the voice is silent,
while previously, etc. See on ἐκείναι ἄν
eῖν (fin.), 28 e.
μαντική ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνῇ ἄεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικρῶι ἑναντιομεμένην, εἴ τι μέλλομι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ ἐξιμβέβηκέ μοι, ἀπερ ὁράτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ α ἢ δη οἰηθεὶν ἃν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἐσχατα κακῶν εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἔξιόντι ἐωθεν

15 οἴκοθεν ἑναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἣνίκα ἄνεβαινον ἐνταυθοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντι τι ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἀλλοισ λόγοις πολ·

10 λαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε χάλας μεταξὺ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταυτὴν τὴν πράξεν οὔτε ἐν ἔργῳ οὔδεν οὔτε ἐν λόγῳ

20 ἑναντιώτατη μοι. τι οὐν αἰτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ οὕτως ἑρῴ· κινδυνεῖι γάρ μοι τὸ ἐξιμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονείναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐσθ᾽ ὡς ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὅσοι οἰκομεθα κακῶν εἶναι τὸ τεθανάναι. μέγα μοι τεκµή·

15 ριον τοῦτον γέγονεν· οὐ γάρ ἑσθ᾽ ὡς οὐκ ἑναντιώθη ἃν

25 μοι τὸ εἰσόθος σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἐμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

10. η τοῦ δαιμονίου: see on δαιμονίων, 31 d. See App.

11. πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικρῶι: see on οὕτω παρ᾽ ὀλίγον, 36 a.

12. ὀρθῶς πράξειν: i.e. so that all would be for the best, an expression which is closely allied to ἐπὶ πράττειν.

Cf. below c, ἀγαθὸν πράξειν. Cf. 45 d.

13. α ἢ δη κτ.: γέ emphasizes the idea expressed, and δη appeals to the patent fact.

Cf. φάσκοντά γε δη, Crit. 45 d. — καὶ... νομίζεται: a shift from act. to pass.

Cf. Charm. 156 c. ταῦτα οὕτω λέγουσι τε καὶ ἐχει. Perhaps as νομίζεται expresses the opinion actually in vogue, it should be strengthened in translation by some adv.

14. ἐωθεν: in the morning. Cf. Xen. An. iv. 4. 8; vi. 3. 23; and Hom. Od. i. 372.

17. πολλαχοῦ δη: in many situations, and hence, often.

18. λέγοντα μεταξὺ: for this and other advs. with the temporal partic., see G. 1572; H. 976. Usually μεταξὺ is prefixed, not appended.

19. περὶ ταυτὴν τὴν πράξεν: in regard to this whole affair, referring to the whole trial, and including everything that led up to it.

20. ὑπολαμβάνω: not subjv., since there is no question of doubt. The question is only a vivid fashion of speech, of which Plato is very fond.

22. ἡμεῖς: to be connected immediately with δη. This use of the pron. gives a genial color to the whole; in Eng. we should use a partitive expression, all those among us.

25. ἐμελλον: referring definitely to c
XXXII. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇ ως πολλή ἐλπίς

40 ἔστω ἁγαθῶν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυνών γὰρ θάτερόν ἔστι τὸ

tεθνάναι. ἦ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδ' αἰσθησιν μηδε-

μέναν μηδὲν ἔχει τῶν τεθνάωτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα

5 μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὐσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ
tόπου τοῦ ἔνθεντε eἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἰτε μηδὲμία

αισθησίς ἔστων, ἀλλ' οἷον ὑπνός ἐπειδὰν τις καθεύων 

a μηδ' ὄναρ μηδεν ὄρι, θαυμάσιος κερδος ἢ εἴη ὁ θάνατος.

ἔγω γὰρ ἄν οἴμαι, εἰ γινεῖ κτελεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν

past time but still containing the idea
8. 13, εἰ δὲ τότε πάντες ἐποιοῦμεν (had
done), ἔπαντες ἀν ἀπωλόμεθα. For the
facts, see Introd. 27, fin.

XXXII. 1. καὶ τῇ: after an argu­
ment based upon the silence of his
inner voice, Socrates considers the
question upon its merits.

2. εἶναι: not ἔσεσθαι. G. 1286;
οὐτω πον μᾶλα ἐκπετεί′ γίας 'Αχαιῶν | 
ἀπολέομεν τ' ἔμεναι καὶ ἀνδρικάς ὡς ἀγορεύεις; Cf. also Il. xiii. 390, ἐπεὶ
οὐ ποτὲ ἐπιτρέπαται ὡς ἐπεὶ
τὸν τεθνεῶτα: the subj. of
εχεῖν (not of ελών), which is an after­thought.—κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα: Socrates
associates his idea of the life hereafter
with stories and traditions which are
themselves a development of Homer's
utterances about the Ἡλύσιον ἑδίων
and Hesiod's account of the μακάρων
νήσοι. The later poets, e.g. Pindar,
continued what Homer and Hesiod
began. And Pindar, furthermore, in­
corporates into his descriptions of life
after death Orphic and Pythagorean
accounts of metempsychosis. Here
and in the Phaedo (70 c–72 a) Socrates
appeals to a παλαιὸς ἱδοις.

5. τῇ ψυχῇ: a dat. of interest.
G. 1165; H. 771. The gen. would
express the subject of the action
designated.—τοῦ τόπου: governed by
μεταβολή καὶ μετοίκησις. Of these two
the latter repeats the former in more
specific form. The gen. corresponds to
the acc. with μεταβάλλειν and (rarely)
μετοικεῖν. Cf. Theaet. 181 c, ὅταν τὶ
χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλειν.

6. τοῦ ἔνθεντε: see on τοῦ ἐκ τῆς
ναυμαχίας, 32 b. See also App.—καὶ
eίτε: the second member is introduced
by εἰ δ' αὐτ in line 19.

79 f., καὶ τῷ ἵδομοι ὑπνός ὥπλι βλεφά-
rουσιν ἔπιπτε | νῆρετος ἱδιστος, θανάτῳ 
ἀχυστος εἶναι.

8. κέρδος: not ἁγαθῶν, because Soc­
drates does not consider such a con­
dition as in itself a good.

9. ἄν οἴμαι: ἄν belongs to εἰρέειν,
and on account of the length of the
prot. is repeated first with οἴμαι in 14,
and again just before the inf.; similarly
dεό is twice used in the prot. See on
ἴσω τὰχ' ἄν, 31 a.—ἐκλεξάμενον καὶ
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

146 νύκτα, εν ἦ οὔτω κατεδαρθέν ὡστε μηδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς νυκτές τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραβαθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεφάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἀμεων καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτές ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἐαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἴμαι ἄν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώ-

15 της τις, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτος ἀν εὑρέιν ἐν τοιούτον θάνατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἔγγει. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὃ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὔτω δὴ εἰναι ἢ μία νύξ. οἴδα ὅτι ἄποδημήσαν ἐστιν δ θάνατος ἐνθένδε καὶ ἀληθή εστὶ τὰ λεγάμενα ως άρα ἐκεί εἰσαν ἀπαντες οἱ τεθνεότες, τί μεῖζον άγαθον τούτων εἰη ἄν, ὡς ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς ἂνδον, ἀπαλλαγεῖς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἰναι, εὑρήσει τοὺς ἄληθῶς δικαστάς, οὔπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικά-

20 εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ως ἂρα ἐκεῖ εἰσαν ἀπαντες οἱ τεθνεότες, τί μεῖζον άγαθον τούτων εἰη ἄν, ὡς ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς ἂνδον, άπαλλαγεῖς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἰναι, εὑρήσει τοὺς ἄληθῶς δικαστάς, οὔπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικά-

25 ζεω, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι εὐγένειο ἐν τῷ ἐαυτῶν

40 αὐτοπαραβιβάζεται σκεφάμενον: the first two parties, coupled by καὶ are subordinated to σκεφάμενον, just as it is subordinated in turn to εἰπεῖν. See on ἐν οἰρηθυθυμήσει, 21 e.

14. μὴ ὅτι, ἀλλὰ κτῆ.: not to speak of any one in private station, no, not the Great King, etc. ἀλλὰ is used here to introduce a climax. See H. 1035 a.

16. αὐτὸν: this pron. gives a final touch of emphasis to βασιλέα. Socrates talks of the king of Persia in the strain which was common among Greeks in his day. Polus, in the Gorgias (470 e), is startled because Socrates refuses to take it for granted that the king of Persia is happy.

17. κέρδος ἄγα: sc. αὐτὸν. — καὶ γὰρ κτῆ.: for thus the whole of time appears no more than a single night, etc.

20. ὡς ἂρα: a conclusion derived immediately from the admission that death is a migration from earth to some other place.

23. δικαστῶν: for case, see G. 931; H. 940 a.

25. Μίνως κτῆ.: connected grammatically with the rel. sent. rather than with τῶν δικαστῶν. Cf. Phaed. 660 e, τότε ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν τε καὶ φαμεν ἐρασταί εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτῆσωμεν κτῆ. The three first mentioned, Minos, Rhadamantyus, and Aeacus, were sons of Zeus, and while living had earned great fame by their scrupulous observance of justice. They are also named in the Gorgias as the ministers of justice in the world below. In Dante’s Inferno (v. 4–17) Minos, curi-
When the spirit evil-born
Cometh before him, wholly it confesses;
And this discriminator of transgressions
Seeth what place in Hell is meet for it;
Girds himself with his tail as many times
As grades he wishes it should be thrust down.

In Ar. Frogs, Aeacus is Pluto's footman. For a painting representing the judges of the underworld, see Gerhard's Vasenbilder, plate 239.

Τριττόλεμος: a son of Eleusis, glorified in the traditions of Demeter θεσμοφόρος. He was the disseminator of intelligent agriculture. Plato uses here the freedom which characterizes all his mythical digressions, and adapts the myth to the point which he desires to make. δικάζει implies action in two capacities: (1) as judge, pronouncing upon the deeds and misdeeds of every soul that has lived and died (this is the account of Minos in the Gorgias), and (2) as king and legislator. Cf. Hom. Od. xi. 568 ff., where Minos is shown χρύσειόν σκηπτρὸν ἔχων, θεμιστεύοντα νεκροσίν. Probably here the prevailing idea is that of king and legislator. Homer (Od. iv. 564 ff.) places Rhadamantys among the blessed in the Elysian fields.

27. Ὀρφέας κτλ.: Orpheus and Musaeus with Homer and Hesiod were honored as the most ancient bards and seers of Greece.

28. ἐπὶ πόσῳ: price stated in the form of a condition. — The repetition of ἂν has an effect comparable to the repeated neg. The first ἂν is connected with the most important word of the clause, while the second takes the place naturally belonging to ἂν in the sent. GMT. 223. Cf. 31 a.


30. ἐμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ: for me myself more particularly.

31. ὅποτε: when (if at any time) I met.

32. Παλαμήδει: the son of Nauplius, a king in Euboea. The wisdom of Palamedes provoked the jealousy of Odysseus, Diomedes, and Agamemnon, and was his ruin. Acc. to the post-homeric story Odysseus plotted so successfully, by forging a message to Palamedes from Priam, that Palamedes was suspected of treason and stoned by the Greeks. Cf. Verg. Aen. 82 ff. and Ov. Met. xiii. 56 ff. The title is preserved of a lost tragedy by Sophocles called Palamedes and of one by Euripides. The fate of Ajax is well known through Hom. Od. xi. 541 ff. See also Met. xiii. and the Ajax of Sophocles.

33. ἀντιπαραβαλλόντι: a case of asyndeton (H. 1039), which occurs not infrequently where as here a sent. is thrown in by way of explanation.
πάντως ού δή ττου: — τούτου γε ενεκα: spoken pointedly and not without an intended thrust at those who voted his death; the reason given certainly proves more than the point here made.

38. ἀγαντα: not ἀγαντα because it represents ὡς ἴγε. GMT. 140; H. 856 α. Cf. Tim. 25 b c, where the fabled might of prehistoric Athens is described, τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγουμένη ... κρατήσασα τῶν ἐπίστων τρόπαια ἐστήσε. This loose use of the impf. instead of the aor. is not uncommon where extreme accuracy is not aimed at.

39. Σισυφόν: cf. Hom. II. vi. 153 ff., Od. xi. 593 ff. — The most comprehensive clause, ἦ ... γνώμακας, escapes from the grammatical const., a not uncommon irregularity. Cf. Gorg. 483 d e, ποίος δικαίως χρώμενος ζέρεις ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τκύθα; τὰ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἄθανατοί εἰσιν, ἀμήχανον εὔδαιμον: more blessed than tongue can tell. Cf. Theaet. 175 a, ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας (pettifogging), and Rep. viii. 567 ε, where χρήμα, something like which is probably implied in the above cases, is expressed, ἦ μακάριον λέεις τυρόν, χρῆμα. Cf. also Rep. i. 328 ε, σου ἴδεων ἄν πυθομην . . . πότερον χαλεπά τοῦ βίου ἢ πώς σοὶ αὐτῷ ἐξαγγέλλεις.

40. οῖς διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἱνεῖναι καὶ ἔποιηκεί σοι: when verbs governing different cases have the same object, the Greek idiom usually expresses the object once only, and then in the case governed by the nearest verb.

41. ἀμήχανον εὐδαιμονίας: and what after all is the greatest thing. Then follows, in the form of a clause in apposition, explanation of the μέγιστον. The whole is equivalent to τοῦ μέγιστον ἐστι τούτο, ἐξετάζοντα διάγειν (with an indef. personal subj.). See on οἴον μήδεν εἷσθαι, 40 c.

42. πάνως οὐ δήπον: in any event, we know that they kill no man there, etc. — τούτου γε ἐνεκα: spoken pointedly and not without an intended thrust at those who voted his death; the reason given certainly proves more than the point here made.
XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ύμᾶς χρή, ὥ ἀνδρές δικασταί, 41 εὐθείας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τῷ τούτῳ διανοεῖσθαι, ἄλλα, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστιν ἀνδρὶ ἁγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν αὑτὸ τὸ πρῶτο τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλον ἐστὶν τούτῳ, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τούτῳ καὶ ἐμὲ οὕδαμον ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἐγὼ γιὰ τὸ καταψήφισαν τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνω χαλεπάνως. 10 καὶ οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντο μοι καὶ κατηγόροι, ἀλλ' οὕδαμον βλάπτειν· τούτῳ αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεται. τοσόνδε μέντοι δέομαι αὐτῶν· τοὺς νίεσ μοι

41 XXXIII. 2. ἐν τῷ τούτῳ: this one thing above all. The position of τούτῳ, coming as it does after instead of before ἐν τῷ, is very emphatic.

d 6. τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι: the pf. is used, because to speak of the completion of the change, i.e. to be dead, is the most forcible way of putting the idea. πράγματα applies to the trouble and the unrest of a busy life.

7. βλάπτειν ἦν: Socrates considers the whole complication of circumstances in which he is already involved, or in which he must, if he lives, sooner or later be involved. Deliverance from this he welcomes as a boon. Cf. 39 b.—διὰ τοῦτο κατέ.: cf. 40 a c. Socrates argued from the silence of τὸ δαιμόνιον that no evil was in store for him when he went before the court. This led him to conclude that his death could be no harm. On further consideration, he is confirmed in this, because death is never a harm. Applying this principle to his own actual circumstances, its truth becomes the more manifest, so that, finally, he can explain why the divine voice was silent. Contrast the opposite view expressed by Achilles (Hom. Od. xi. 489 ff.), and in Eur. I. A. 1249–1252, where Iphigenia, pleading for life, says, ἐν συντετευγμένα πάντα νικήσιων λόγοιν· τὸ φῶς τὸδ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἡδιστὸν βλέπειν, τὰ νέρθε 8' οὔδένι· καὶ τασμείνα 8' δ' εὑχεται | θανεῖν. κακῶς ζήν κρείσσον ἢ καλῶς βανεῖν.

11. βλάπτειν: used abs. without acc. of the person or of the thing, because the abstract idea of doing harm is alone required.—τοῦτο . . . ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι: so far it is fair to blame them. Contrast 17 b, τοῦτῳ μοὶ ἔδοξαν αὐτῷ ἀντίων, this. . . about them; and cf. Symp. 220 e, τοῦτο γέ μοι οὕτε μέμφεις κτέ. They deserve blame for their malicious intention and for the reason given in 29 b.—ἄξιον: it is fair. Cf. e Gorg. 465 e, ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστί.

12. τοσόνδε μέντοι: "although they certainly are far from wishing me well, yet I ask so much as a favor," i.e. so littlē that they can well afford to grant it. Then follows an explanation of τοσόνδε.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

επειδὰν ήβήσωσιν τιμωρήσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ταῦτα ταῦτα
41 λυποῦντες ἄπερ ἡγή ὦ μᾶς ἐλύσων, ἐαν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἣ
15 χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου τοῦ πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς,
καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσι τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοὺς
ὡστε ἡγῆ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὃν δὲι καὶ οἴονται
τι εἶναι ὄντες οὔδενος ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῆτε, δίκαια
πεπονθὼς ἡγῆ ἐσομαι ψφ ὑμῶν, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ νιῆς. 42
20 ἄλλα γὰρ ἡδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανομένῳ, ὑμῖν
dὲ βωσομένους· ὅποτεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμενῳ
πράγμα, ἀδηλὸν παντὶ πλὴν ἥ τῷ θεῷ.

41 13. ἡβήσωσι: see on ἔσχετε, 19 a. 
16. ὀνειδίζετε: see on ὀνειδίζον ἐκαστον, 30 e.
18. δίκαια πεπονθὼς: to be understood in the light of cc. xviii. and 
xxvi. Socrates looks upon what is usually taken as the most grievous in-
jury as the greatest possible blessing.
19. αὐτοὺς τε κτ.: for ἡγῆ αὐτὸς κτ. 
Cf. Crit. 50 e. Cf. Soph. O. C. 
461, ἐπάξιος μὲν Οἰδίπους κατοικτίσαι, αὐτὸς τε παιδεσθε θ' αἰδέ.
42 20. ἄλλα γὰρ κτ.: serves to close the
speech, giving at the same time the reason for coming to an end.
22. πλὴν ἥ: pleonastic like ἀλλ' ἥ 
in 20 d. See App.—τῷ θεῷ: cf. the subtly ironical way in which the same 
thought is put in the Euthyphro (3 de), where, speaking of his accu-
sers, Socrates says, εἶ μὲν οὖν, δὲ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγομέλλοιν μου καταγελάν, ἦσσερ εἰς 
φιλς σαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἄν εἰη ἄθης παῖζοντας 
καὶ γελῶντας ἐν τῷ δικαστῆρᾳ διαγα-
γείν· εἰ δὲ σπονδάσονται, τοῦτ' ἢδη δὴ ἀποβήσεται ἄδηλον 
πλὴν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν. See 
on ἄριστα, 35 d.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

I. ΣΩ. Τί τηνικάδε ἀφίξαι, δι Κρίτων; ἥ οὖ πρὶ ἐτὶ ἐστὶν;

ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;

5 ΚΡ. Ὄρθρος βαθύς.

ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου

φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι.

ΚΡ. Ἐννήθης ἦδη μοὶ ἐστὼ, δι Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολ-

λάκις δεύρο φοιτᾶν, καὶ τι καὶ εὐφρενήτηται ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ.

10 ΣΩ. Ἀρτι δὲ ἥκεις ἡ πάλαι;

1. Κρίτων: see Introd. 62. See on ἀπόλ. 33 d, fin., and cf. 38 b, fin.

4. τηνίκα μάλιστα, about what time is it? In Lat. maxime and ad-

modum are so used, e.g. locus pat-

tens ducentes maxime pedos, Liv. x. 38. 5; locus in pedum mille admodum altitudinem abruptus, id. xxi. 36. 2.

5. Ὅρθρος βαθύς: the adj. limits Ὅρθρος, so that the whole expression

means rather the end of night than the beginning of day. Cf. the time

when the Protagoras begins (310 a), τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτής, ἐτι βαθέως Ὅρθρος. The description in the

same dialogue of young Hippocrates

feeling his way through the dark to

Socrates’s bedside shows that Ὅρθρος

βαθύς means, just before daybreak. Cf.

Xen. An. iv. 3. 8 ft., where Xenophon

dreams a dream, ἐπεὶ δὲ Ὅρθρος ἦν...

ἡδετὸ τε καὶ ὡς τάχιστα ἐκ ὑπέφαινεν

ἔθυοντο. Here Ὅρθρος means the dark

before the dawn. Cf. also ἀμφιλύκη νύξ, Hom. I. vii. 433, ἡμὸς ὃ ὑπερ' ἐρ

πω ἡώς, ἐτι ὃ ἀμφιλύκη νύξ, | τῆς ἀρ' ἀμφὶ πυρῆν κριτὸς ἔγρευτο λάδι Ἀχαιῶν.

6. ἠθέλησε ὑπακούσαι: did not re-

fuse to let you in. Cf. Xen. An. i. 3. 8

for ὅπω ἠθελέ, he refused. With ὑπα-


1. 11, Φίλιππος ὃ ὡς ἡμετοποίως κρόοσ

τὴν θύραν εἶπε τῷ ὑπακούσαντι (the por-

ter) εἰσαγεῖν ὅσις τε ἐτὶ κτῆ.

9. καὶ ... καὶ κτ.: and what is

more, I’ve done a little something for him.

τί is equiv. to εὐεργεσίαν τινά (a tip).
ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς ὅνι εὖθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγῆ ἡ παρακάθησαι;

ΚΡ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σῶκρατε, οὐδ’ ἄν αὐτὸς ἦθελον 15 ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμᾶξα αἰσθανόμενος ὡς ἦδεως καθεύδεις καὶ ἐπίτηδες σε οὔκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἥδιστα διάγης. καὶ πολ- λάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμο- νία τοῦ τρόπον, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστώσῃ 20 ξυμφορᾷ ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρᾶξις φέρεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, ὁ Κρίτων, πλημμελές εἰη ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα, εἰ δεὶ ἦδη τελευτάν.

ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὁ Σῶκρατε, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ἐξυμφοραῖς ἀλίσκονται, ἀλλ’ οὔθεν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἠλι- 25 κία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἐστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρὸ ἄφιξαι;

ΚΡ. Ἀγγελιάν, ὁ Σῶκρατε, φέρον χαλεπῆν, οὐ σοὶ, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδεῖοις πᾶσιν καὶ χαλεπῆν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἦν ἐγὼ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ ἐν τοῖς 30 βαρύτατ’ ἀν ἐνέγκαμι.
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

ΣΩ. Τίνα ταὐτην; ἥ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκται ἐκ Δήλου, οὐ 43
deī ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με;

ΚΡ. Οὗτοι δὴ ἀφίκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἥξειν τῆμε-
ρον ἡ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἥκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ
35 καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό.

II. 'Αλλ', ὤ Κρίτων, τύχη ἄγαθη. εἰ ταύτη τοῖς
θεοῖς φιλον, ταύτη ἐστώ. οὐ μέντοι οἴμαι ἥξειν αὐτὸ τῆ-
μερον.

30. ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατοι ἀν ἐνεγκαίμι:
in Hdt., Thuc., Plato, and later writers,
vοτοῖς, about, is idiomatically used to
limit the superl. Thus ἐν τοῖς be-
comes an adverb, which describes not
absolute precedence but an average
and comparative superiority. Cf.
Thuc. iii. 17, ἐν τοῖς πλείσται, among
the most numerous (not 'the very most
numerous,' since Thuc. adds that the
number was exceeded once) where the
gender of πλείσται is noticeable. Cf.
also id. i. 6. 3, ἐν τοῖς πρώτοι ἔδε
Ἀθηναῖοι τόν τε σίδηρον κατέθεντο
cτε. Here the position of ἔδε shows that
ἐν τοῖς πρώτοι is taken almost as one word,
i.e. πρώτοι limited so as to mean prac-
tically the first, or substantially the first
of those who laid down, etc.

31. τίνα ταὐτην: connect with φέ-
ρων above. For ἢ, see on ἦ δήλων, Apol.
26 b. — τὸ πλοῖον κτε.: cf. Phaedo,
58 a: τούτῳ ἐστὶ τὸ πλοῖον, ὅ ἂν Ἀθη-
ναίοι, ἐν δὲ Θεσσαλoupon τοῖς ἐδὲ Κρή-
τοις διὸ ἐπίτα ἐκεῖνον (the seven couples
to be sacrificed to the Minotaur) φέρον
ἀγῶν καὶ ἑξωσόκα τοις καὶ αὐτοῖς έσώθη. τῷ
οὗ Απόλλων ἐβαλὼν, ὅς λέγεται, τότε
ei σωθεῖν, ἑκάστου ἑτοῖς θεωρήσεται (a sol-
emn embassy) ἀπέδεικν εἰς Δήλον· ἦν δὴ
c tion of the first χαλεπής, made all the
stronger by the doubled καί.
33. δοκεῖ μὲν: with no following
dε. In such cases the original affinity
of μὲν with μήν is usually apparent.
Its meaning is, indeed, surely.
35. τῶν ἀγγέλων: can hardly have
been written by Plato, since ἀγγέλοι
in the sense of ἀγγελία is not used
except by later writers (Polybius),
while ἐκ prevents us from taking
ἀγγέλων as referring to persons. See
App.

Π. 1. Ἀλλ', ὥς Κρίτων, τύχη ἄγαθη:
it's all for the best, Crito. ἀλλὰ intro-
duces in vivid contrast to Crito's de-
spondency the cheerful hope of Soc-
rates. — τύχη ἄγαθη: a hopeful in-
vocation often prefixed to a solemn
statement. Cf. Symp. 177 ε, ἀλλὰ
tύχη ἄγαθη καταρχῆς Φαίδος, let
Phaedrus make a beginning and good
luck to him. Used freq. like the
ΚΡ. Πάθεν τοῦτό τεκμαίρει;

5  ΣΩ. Ἑγώ σοι ἐρώτῃ τῇ γάρ ποιν ύστεραι δεῖ με ἀποθυμήσκειν ἢ ἢ ἄν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.

ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τούτων τῆς ἐπιούσῃς ὧμέρας οἴμαι αὐτὸ ἢξεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἕκ τινος ἐνυπνίου δὲ

10 ἐώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καρφο τοῖς οὖκ ἐγείραί με.

ΚΡ. Ἡν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνυπνίον;

ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τῖς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ εὐεργετὴς, λευκὰ ἑρμαῖνα ἐξουσία, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν· ὡς

15 κρατεῖ, ἦματι κεν τριτάτῳ Ψθίνῃ ἐρίβωλον ἱκόιο.

ΚΡ. Ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνυπνίον, ὡ Σώκρατες.

43 Lat. quod bonum felix faustum sit, or quod bene verter. Cf. Dem. iii. 18, ἕτερος λέγει τὸς βελτίων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἄγαθὴν τύχη. Cf. also the comic perversion of it in Ar. Av. 436, κρεμάσατον τὸ καλόν καλὸν ἁπάτων τοῦτον τὸ πλοῖον. For the most formal use of this word, see many inscriptions and the decree, Thuc. iv. 118. 11, Λάχης εἶπε τῆς δύναμις ἄγαθης τῷ Ἀθηναίων ποιεῖται τῇς ἐκεχειρίας (armistice). In Xen. Hell. iv. 1. 14, it is used of a betrothed: ἐμι καὶ τῶν, ἐφι, δοκεῖ, δ Ἀγειλαοῦ, σὲ μὲν, ὡς ἐπιθυμία, τὸ τύχη ἄγαθη διδαναι "Οσίῳ τῇ θυγάτερᾳ. Cf. also Xen. Cyr. iv. 5. 51, ἀλλὰ δέχομαι τε, ἐφι, καὶ ἄγαθη τύχη ἥμεις τε ἵππες γενομεθα καὶ ἥμεις διέλοιτε τὰ κοινά.

5. τῇ γάρ ποιν κτέ.: this is the first premiss that follows the conclusion stated above in οὐ μέντοι ἔξειν τῷμερον, the second is contained in the account of the dream.

7. οἱ τούτων κύριοι: see Introd. 75, and cf. Apol. 39 e.

8. τῆς ἐπιούσῃς ὧμέρας: means the same as τῷμερον, for Socrates is now thinking of the fact that day has not yet dawned. See on ὄρθρος βαθύς, 43 a.

10. ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς: in the course of this night. The vision came after midnight, a circumstance of the greatest importance, according to Mosch. Idyll. ii. 2, νυκτὸς θετε τριτάτῳ λάχος ἱσταται, ἐγγύθι δ' ἡ ᾳος ... εἶναι καὶ ἄτρεκέων τοῦ ποιεῖται θνοῦ ὄνειρον. Cf. Hor. Sat. i. 10. 32 ff.,—

Atque ego cum Graecos facerem, natus mare citera,
Versicus insertus, vetuit me tali voce Quirinus
Post medium noctem visus, cum somnia vera.

11. ἐν καιρῷ τοι: usually expressed by the shorter ἐν καιρῷ, opportune. Cf. Legg. iv. 708 e, ἐδὲ πρὸς καιρῶν τῶν λέγωμεν. The τῆς has the effect of a litotes, as e.g. in ἐξει τινὰ λόγον, there is good and sufficient reason for it.

15. ἦματι κτέ.: quoted from Hom. b Il. ix. 363, ἦματι κε τριτάτῳ Ψθίνῃ ἔριβωλον ἱκόμην.

16. Ἄτοπον κτέ.: sc. ἐστὶ, an excl. which nearly approaches the form of a regular sent. Cf. Hom. Il. i. 291,
ΣΩ. Ἑναργῆς μὲν οὖν, ὡς γε μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων.

ΠΙ. ΚΡ. Λίαν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν. Ἀλλ', ὦ δαίμονε Σῶκρατες, ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πέθου καὶ σώθητι. ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία ἐμφορά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερηθαί του οὖν ἐπιτηδείου, οἷον ἐγὼ οὔδενα μὴ ποτὲ εὑρήσω, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξῳ, ὦ ἔμε καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἓσασίν, ὡς οἷος τε ὦν σε σῷζειν, εἴ ἦθελον ἀναλίσκειν εἰς χρημάτα, ἀμελήσαι. καίτις τις ἀν αἰσχίνων εἰς ταύτης δόξαν ἕκε ὦ δοκεῖν χρημάτα περὶ πλεῖονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους;

δημοβόρος βασιλεύς, ἐπεὶ οὐτίδανον ἀνάσσει, καὶ ἰδιίτερος, ὡς οὖν ὦθεσ' (recked not) αὐθεντικά δέξατο. See Αρρ. 17. ἐναργῆς μὲν οὖν: it is surely plain enough, immo evidens. The full meaning can hardly be understood without reading the context of the verse (363) which is quoted. Cf.: Hom. Il. ix., vv. 356–368. Socrates thinks of dying as going home, and Phthia was the home of Achilles. —γε μοι: not γε ἐμοί. The emphasis falls on the verb rather than on the pron. See on ἵδις γέ μοι δοκέω, Apol. 18 a.

III. 1. ὦ δαίμονε: most excellent, meaning about the same as ὦ θαυμάσιε, or ὦ μακάριε, rather stronger than ὦγαθέ. Of course no color of irony is given here. Cf.: Symp. 219 b, τοισὶ τῷ δαιμονίῳ ὡς ἀγαθὸς καὶ θαυμαστῷ, and Gorg. 456 a, where Socrates is speaking of the scope (δύναμις) of rhetoric: δαιμονία γάρ τις 'ἔμαχε καταφαίνεται τῷ μέγεθος οὔτω σκοττοῦντι. The word δαιμόνιος, which was used by Homer only in addressing persons, received from Pindar an enlarged meaning, so as to include whatever proceeds from the gods. This was adopted by Att. writers, and of course its adoption involved applying it to things. Plato still further enlarged the ground which it covers. In addressing persons, he gives it a flattering or an ironical implication; applied to things, he uses it for what is extraordinary, superhuman. See on εἰπέρ δαιμόνας κτέ., Apol. 27 d.

2. ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν: this gives a hint as to what Crito has planned. It is developed later. See Introd. 62.

3. ἐμφορά ἐστιν: more vivid and natural than ἐσται. —χωρὶς μὲν . . . ἐτὶ δέ: quite apart from my losing, etc. . . . I shall farther, etc. See App.

4. ἐστερηθαί: the pf. inf. with χωρίς. —οὔδενα μὴ ποτὲ: equiv. to οὐ μὴ ποτέ τινα, and so here with the fut. indic., I shall certainly never, etc. GMT. 295; H. 1032.

6. ὦς οἷος τε ἄν κτέ.: I shall seem to many to have neglected you whereas I was able to save you. οἷος τε ἄν σφιξειν represents οἷος τε ἄν σφιξειν, I might have saved you, if I had wished. GMT. 421; H. 897.

8. ἦ δοκεῖν . . . φίλους: explaining ετὶ ταύτης, which covers an idea already contained in what precedes. Cf.: Gorg. 500 c, περὶ τούτου εἰσὶν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι, οὐ τί ἄν μᾶλλον σουδασίας τίς (than which what would a man be more inclined to pursue with diligence) . . . οὗ τούτο, ἄν τινι χρῆ τρόπον ἄν κτέ. Where the gen. after a comp. is a dem. or
ου γαρ πεισονται οι πολλοι ως ου αυτος ουκ ηθελησας 44

απειναι ενθενδε ημων προθυμουμενων.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλα τι ημιν, δο μακαριε κριτων, ουτω της των

πολλων δοξης μελει; οι γαρ επιεικεστατοι, δου μαλλον

ξινον φρονησεων, ηγησονται αυτα ουτω πεπραξθαι οσπερ

αν πραξθη.

15 КР. 'Αλλ' ορδει δη οτι αναγκη, δο σωκρατες, και της α

των πολλων δοξης μελειν. αυτα δε δηλα τα παροντα

νυν, οτι οιοε τε εισων οι πολλοι ου τα σμικροτατα των

κακων εξεργαζεσθαι, αλλα τα μεγιστα σχεδον, εαν τις εν

αυτοις διαβεβλημενοι η.

15 ΣΩ. Εϊ γαρ αφελων, δο κριτων, οιοε τε ειναι οι πολλοι

τα μεγιστα κακα εργαζεσθαι, ινα οιοε τε θαναι και άγαθα

τα μεγιστα, και καλως Αν ειχεν νυν δε ουδετερα οιοε τε

ουτε γαρ φρονιμων ουτε αφρονα δυνατοι πουησαι, πουουσι

dε τουτο ο τι αν τυχωσιν.

IV. КР. Ταυτα μεν δη ουτως εχετω ταδε δε, δο σωκ- 

αρα γε μη εμου προμηθει και των αλλων

κρατεσ, ειπε μοι Αρα γε μη εμου προμηθει και των αλλων

44 rel. pron., an explanatory clause (here with the inf., cf. Eur. Her. 297) introduced by δ, may always be appended. Cf. 53 b c.

13. άστερ ην πραξθη: see on δν ην λέγω, Apol. 20 ε. The aor. subjv. has the force of the fut. pf. GMT. 90; H. 898 c.

15. ορδει δη: Crito means to point at the case in hand. "The fact is that the many are really in a position, etc." Crito has profited but little by what Socrates has said in the court-room. Cf. Apol. 30 d, 34 ε, 40 a, etc.

20. eι γαρ αφελων κτε.: a wish the object of which is not attained. ινα οιοε τε θαναι expresses an unattained purpose depending on the preceding unfulfilled wish. GMT. 333; II. 884. See on δο εμελλεν, Apol. 20 a.

21. εργαζεσθαι: serves as a repetition of εξεργαζεσθαι above. Such repetition of the simple verb is common. Cf. 49 c d and Lys. 209 c, τη ποτε ειν τα αιτια, και ενα ενα δε και διαπωνοισι, εν οις δε αριτε πληγομεν καλουσαι.

22. καλως κτε.: indeed (i.e. if this wish were granted) it would be delightful. — νυν δε: introduces the fact. Supply εργαζεσθαι here, and ποιησαντες with δ τι αν τυχωσιν. In hypothetical and rel. sents. τυχανειν may be used without the partic., which is always suggested by the leading clause.

IV. 2. αρα γε μη: like μη alone ε (Apol. 25 a), αρα μη looks for a neg. answer, but it may also (see on μη, 45 c) convey an insinuation that in spite
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

157

επιτηδείων, μή, εάν συ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθης, οἱ συκοφάνται 44 ἢμῖν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὡς σε ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασιν, καὶ 5 ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἥ καὶ πάσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἥ συχνά χρήματα, ἥ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν; εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἐασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν. Ἦμεις γὰρ 45 που δίκαιοί ἐσμὲν σώσαντες σε κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον καὶ εάν δὴ ἐτὶ τοῦτον μείζω. ἄλλα ἐμοὶ πείθου

καὶ μὴ ἄλλος ποίει.

Σ.Ω. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὁ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΚΡ. Μὴτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ, καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τάργυρίων ἔστω, δὲ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σώσαί σε καὶ 15 ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. Ἐπειτα οὐχ ὀρᾶς τούτους τούς συκοφάντας ὡς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πολλοῦ

of the expected denial the facts really would justify an affirmative answer; you surely don't, though I imagine you do, is Crito's meaning. The μή which follows προμηθεί is obviously connected with the notion of anxiety in that verb. The same idea is again presented in φοβεί (are fearful) below. The subjv. παρέχωσιν conveys an idea of action indefinitely continued, whereas ἐξέλθης and ἀναγκασθῶμεν denote simply the occurrence of the action.

8. δίκαιοι ἐσμὲν κτλ.: see on δίκαιος εἰμί, Apol. 18 a.

9. ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου, μὴ... ποίει: no, no! do as I say. ἄλλα with the inv. introduces a demand or a request made in opposition to an expressed refusal or to some unwillingness merely implied or feared. This vigorous request is reinforced by the neg. μὴ ποίει, do this and do not do that. Cf. 46 a.

13. μὴτε: the second clause, which we miss here, appears below (b) in the resumptive statement ὅπερ λέγω, μὴτε κτλ.—φοβοῦ: reiterating φοβεῖ above, be fearful. It is a part of Crito's character to return again and again to his point. Cf. 43 d, and see Introd. 62. Further he had here a welcome opportunity for airing his grievances against the sycophants (blackmailers). Crito had been himself the victim of these rascals until he found a vigorous friend, Ἀρχέδημον, πάνυ μεν Ἰκαβε εἰ- πεῖν τε καὶ πράξαι, πέντα δέ, as Xenophon puts it, who delivered him from them. This good riddance was due to the advice of Socrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 9. 4, οὐκ ἄν οὖν βρέφαις καὶ ἀνδρα (sc. just as you keep dogs to protect sheep from wolves), ὅτι εἴδε- λοι τε καὶ δύναιτο σου ἀπερέπε καὶ τῶν ἐπιχειροῦται ἀδικεῖν σε.

15. τούτους: said with scorn. Cf. 48 e, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν, and Dem. xviii. 140, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καὶ φέρειν ἡδοναθ', ὡς θικεῖ, ἡ πόλει καὶ ποιῶν οὖτος λαβάνειν (this fellow could do...undetected).
άργυρίου; σοι δὲ υπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἰκανά· ἐπειτα καὶ εἰ τι ἐμοὶ κηδόμενοι οὔκ οἶει δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τὰμα, ξένου οὐθοὶ ἐνθάδε ἐτοιμοὶ ἀναλί- σκειν· εἰς δὲ και κεκόμικεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἀργύριον ἰκανόν, Συμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἐτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνω. ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβοῦμενος ἀποκάμης σαυτόν σῶσαι, μήτε ὁ ἐλέγεις ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὧτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχους ἐξελθὼς ὁ τι χρῷον 

25 σαυτῷ· πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὁτι ἄν ἀφίκη ἀγαπήσοντοι σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ εἰς Θεταλίαν ἰέναι, ἐστὶν ε ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἳ σε περὶ πολλοὶ ποιήσουνται καὶ ἀσφαλείαν σοι παρέξονται ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θεταλίαν.

V. Ἐπὶ δὲ, ὦ Ὁσκράτες, οὐδὲ δικαῖον μοι δοκεῖς ἐπι- χειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτόν προδοῦναι, ἔξοι σωθῆναι· καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτόν γενέσθαι, ἀπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἔχθροι σου σπεύσαιεν τε καὶ ἐσπευσαν σε διαφθειράι

45 a 17. σοὶ δὲ: the argument is as follows: the amount required to settle with these sycophants, I should be ready enough to expend for almost any one, but for you, etc.—ὑπάρχει: cf. Παριστατις . . . δ ἔκρε χε τῷ Κόρῳ, φιλούσα αὐτόν μᾶλλον ἢ κτή., Χερ. Άπ. 1. 1. 4; καὶ ἄπατει ὅμων ἤ ἐμὴ πάλις· ἐκόντες γὰρ μὲ δέξονται, ibid. v. 6. 23. —ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι: said with reference to the appositive ἰκανά.

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21. Κέβης: Cebe also was from Thebes, and the two play a very important part in the Phaedo.

22. ἀποκάμης σαυτόν σῶσαι: get tired of trying, etc. Here is no implication that Socrates has already tried to get away. Crito only hints that any other course is nothing short of moral cowardice. See App.—ὁ ἐλέγης: cf. Άπ. 37 c d.

24. χρῷον: the opt. representing the subjv. of doubt. GMT. 186.

25. ἀλλος: for ἀλλαθὶ, which we expect after πολλαχοῦ on account of ὁτι. This is attraction, or inverse assimilation. Cf. Soph. Ο. C. 1226, βήναι κείθεν δεντερῇ ἴκει.

45 b 20. σκευως· εἰς δὲ και κεκόμικεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἀργύριον ἰκα

νόν, Συμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἐτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνω. ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβοῦμενος ἀποκάμης σαυτόν σῶσαι, μήτε ὁ ἐλέγεις ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὧτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχους ἐξελθὼν ὁ τι χρῷον 

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V. ὁ δὲ διαφθειράι: σὲ is accented c for emphasis and to disconnect it from ἐσπευσαν.
κριτών.

5 Βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτους καὶ τοὺς νεῖσι τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὐς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ α ἐκπαιδεύσαι οἰχήσει καταλιπὼν, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, δὲ τὸ ἄν τοῦτο πράξουσιν· τεῦξονται δὲ, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς, τοι- 10 ὧν οἴαντει ἐσθε γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανοὺς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι παίδας, ἢ ξυνδιατάλα- πωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παίδευοντα· σῷ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς τὸ βαθυμότατα αἵρεῖσθαι· χρῆ δὲ, ἀπερ ἀν ἄγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἐλοιπό, ταῦτα αἵρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντα γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ὡς ἔγω ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, ε 15 μὴ δόξη ἂν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ σε ἀνανδρία τινι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπράξῃ, καὶ ή εἰσοδὸς τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικα- στήριον ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθέν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἁγὼν ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, ε μὴ δόξη ἂν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ σε ἀνανδρία τινι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπράξῃ, καὶ ή εἰσοδὸς τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικα- στήριον ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθέν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἁγὼν ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, ε μὴ δόξη ἂν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ σε ἀνανδρία τινι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπράξῃ, καὶ ή εἰσοδὸς τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικα- στήριον ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθέν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἁγὼν

45 V. 7. τὸ σὸν μέρος: pro tua parte or quod ad te attinet.— δὲ τι ἄν τῶν χωσι: see on νῦν δέ, 44 d.
8. τοῦτο πράξουσιν: cf. εἰ, κακῶς, and even ἄγαθὸν (used adv.) with πρᾶττειν (Apol. 40 c). See on μὴ δρᾶς πράξειν, Apol. 40 a.
10. ἢ γὰρ κτί.: the γὰρ is connected with an unexpressed reproof.
13. φάσκοντα γε δὴ: sc. σε, at all events you who maintain, etc., or particularly when you maintain. See on καὶ γε 45 δῆ, Apol. 40 a.
16. μὴ: see on ἄρα ὑπὲρ μὴς, 44 e. The notion of fear is remotely implied. For this const., very common in Plato, see GMT. 265; H. 867. — ἀνανδρία τινι κτί.: a certain sort of cowardice on our part. Notice the emphasis given to τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ, for which we are responsible. If Crito and the rest, by showing more energy, by using all possible influence against Meletus and his abettors, had carried the day, they would have been more genuinely ἀνδρεῖος in the proper sense of the word. They failed ἀνανδρία τινι. Cf. Euthyphro's boast, εὑρομεν' αν δη σαθρός εστί, Euthyph. 5 c.
17. καὶ ή εἰσοδὸς... καὶ ο ἁγὼν: in apposition with ἂπαν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ σε. On the meaning of the technical terms, see Introd. 70, with note 1, p. 52. Precisely how the trial of Socrates could have been avoided except by flight from Athens is not clear. There is a wholly untrustworthy tradition that Anytus offered him terms of compromise. Probably there were abundant means at hand for raising legal technicalities and for securing in this way an indefinite delay. All that Crito necessarily suggests is that flight was open to Socrates before proceedings began. At Athens, as at Rome, the law allowed a man to go into voluntary exile. See Introd. 72.
18. ο ἁγὼν: the management of the case. See on εἰς ἁγώνα καθιστάς, Apol. 24 c.
τῆς δίκης ώς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τοῦτο ὁστερ 45
κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως κακία των καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ τῇ ἴμε-
tέρᾳ διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, ὦτινές σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσα-
μεν οὐδὲ σῦ σαυτόν, οἴον τε ὄν καὶ δυνατόν, εἰ τι καὶ
μικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν, ταῦτα οὖν, ὥς Σώκρατες, ὥρα μὴ
ἀμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρᾷ ή σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βου-
20 λεύον, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι ἐτὶ ἁρα, ἀλλὰ βεβο-
λεύσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς πάντα
tαῦτα δεῖ πεπράξθαι. εἰ δὲ τι περιμένοιμεν, ἀδύνατον

19. τὸ τελευταῖον τούτω: the scene of this act is laid in the prison.
20. κατάγελως: because, in Crito's opinion, all who were involved made
themselves a common laughing-stock by their weak-minded negligence and
irresolution. Cf. Cymbeline, i.,—
Howso'er 'tis strange,
Or that the negligence may well be laughed at,
Yet it is true, sir.

In the whole drift of Crito's phrase-
ology, the notion of acting a part on
the stage before the Athenian public
is prominent. — κακία κτλ.: this is
really in Crito's eyes the culmination
of disgrace (connect with τὸ τελε-
υταῖον) in a matter that has been dis-
gracefully mismanaged. Here is a
return to the leading thought and a
departure from the regular gram-
matical sequence. The anacoluthon
is most obvious in the repetition of
dοκεῖν after δῆξι.

21. διαπεφευγέναι ήμᾶς: people will
think they allowed every advantage
and every opportunity, especially the
possibility of escape which now en-
grosses Crito's thoughts, to pass unim-
proved. ήμᾶς is the object. Cf. Charm.
166 ε, τούτο αὖτον τοῦ διαφεύγειν
tοὺς παρὰ τοῖς ἔλλησιν ἰστρόω τὰ πολλὰ
νοσήματα, i.e. the reason why Greek doc-
tors fail to cure most diseases.

22. οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν: sc. ἔσωσας.
Crito hints at Socrates's part, then
recurs to his own. The interjection
of such a clause in a relative sent.
is irregular. — οἶον τε ὄν: like ἐξ ὄν
above. For the fact, cf. 45 b c.

24. ἀμα τῷ κακῷ: ἀμα is used as
πρὸς freq. is. Cf. Symp. 195 ε, νέος
μὲν οὖν ἐστι, πρὸς δὲ τῷ νέῳ ἀπαλός, ἦ
is young and in addition to his youth he
is tender. Cf. also Theaet. 186 ε, καλὸς
γὰρ εἰ ... πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ (in addition
to your beauty) εὖ ἐποίησάς με κτλ.—
ἀλλὰ: cf. line 28 below, and see on
ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου, 45 a. This speech
has the dignity which genuine feeling
alone can give. Cf. Rich. III. iv. 3,—
Come, I have learned that fearful commenting
Is leaden servitor to dull delay;
Delay leads impotent and snail-paced beg-
gary;
Then fiery expedition be my wing.
On βεβολεύοσθαι, to have done with de-
liberation, cf. Dem. viii. 3, οἴμαι τὴν
ταχίστην συμφέρειν βεβολεύω σθαι
καὶ παρεσκευάσθαι, and iv. 19, ταῦτα ... 
πάσι δεδοχθαί φημὶ δείν. GMT. 109;
H. 851 a.

26. τῆς ἐπιούσης: cf. 44 a.
27. εἰ δὲ τι περιμένοιμεν: this adv.
use of τι is developed out of the cog-
nate acc. (kindred signification). Cf.
the Eng. idiom, “to delay somewhat
(a bit).” G. 1054; H. 715.
καὶ οὔκετί οἶον τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὥς Σώκρατες, πεί. 46 θοῦ μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποιεῖ.

VI. ΣΩ. Ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἀξία, εἰ μετά τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη· εἰ δὲ μη, ὅσῳ μείζων, τοσοῦτοι χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι ώς χρὴ ἦμᾶς εἰτε ταῦτα πρακτέων εἰτε μη· ὃς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄει 5 τοιοῦτος οἶον τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενί ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἡ τῷ λόγῳ, δόσ ἂν μοι λογιζομένω βελτιστός φαίνηται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους οὕς ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπεὶ δὲ μὴ, δυνήμεν εἴη, ἄλλα σχεδόν τι ἵματι φάνονταί μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτούς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ οὔσπερ 10 καὶ πρότερον· δὲν ἐὰν μη βελτίω ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ

VI. 2. ἀξία: sc. ἐστίν, in spite of the opt. in the protasis. GMT. 501; H. 901 b. — εἰ εἴη: not if it should be, but if it should prove to be. Cf. δεινά ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, Apol. 28 d. For the present, Socrates does not decide whether Crito's zeal is right or wrong.

4. οὐ μόνον κτὲ.: Socrates maintains that "truth is truth to th' end of reckoning " (Measure for Measure, v.1). νῦν and ἄει might almost change places, since the important point is that Socrates, after proclaiming the supremacy of reason (cf. Apol. 38 a) in prosperity, finds his belief still firm in adversity. Cf. 53 c and e. Cf. As You Like It, ii. 1,—

Sweet are the uses of adversity,
Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head.

Socrates meets in his trial and death-sentence "the counsellors that feelingly persuade him what he is." For collocations similar to this combination of νῦν and ἄει, cf. 49 e; Hom. Il. ix. 105, οὖν ἐγώ νοεῖ, ἥμεν πάλαι ῥή ἐτι καὶ νῦν. Cf. also Eur. Med. 292, οὐ νῦν με πρῶτον ἀλλὰ πολλάκις, Κρέον, | Ἑβαφε

δόξα κτέ., and Soph. Phil. 965, ἐμοὶ μεν ἅλτος δεινὸς ἐμπέπτωκε τίς | τοῦ άν·δρός, οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλαι.

5. τοιοῦτος οἶος: for the omission (rare except with the third person) of the copula, cf. Gorg. 487 d, καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε οἰος παρρησιάζεσθαι, equiv. to ὅτι τοιοῦτος οὐ οἶος κτέ. For οἶος πειθεσθαί, see on τοιοῦτος, Apol. 33 a. — τῶν ἐμῶν κτέ.: τὰ ἐμὰ includes all the faculties and functions both of body and of mind. Among these λόγος is included, since it means man's 'reason as well as his reasons and his reasonings,—his utterances and his principles. Cf. below 47 e, εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος καὶ 47 e, ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων.

6. τοὺς δὲ λόγους κτέ.: these words imply a measure of reproof at least when spoken to Crito, who had in general approved of Socrates's principles.

8. ὅμοιοι: not different in sense from οἱ αὐτοῖ, and to be understood in the light of what immediately follows. See on καὶ πρότερον, 48 b. "They seem like what they formerly were."
παρόντι, εἰ ἵσθι ὦτι οὐ μή σοι ἐξερχόμενος, οὔτε ἂν πλεῖστον τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὀστρερ παιδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττεσθαι, δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμψουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. πώς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκο-15 πομεθα αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τούτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβομεν, ὃν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὔ, ὃτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχεις τὸν νόμον, ταῖς δὲ οὔ. ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθησόμεθα καλῶς ἢ ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο, ὃτι ἄλλως ἔνεκα 20 λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἢν δὲ παιδαὶ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς; ἐπι-

Supply καὶ πρῶτου (from what follows) with ὄμοιον.

11. πλεῖστον μὲν τούτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβομεν: uses more hobgoblins to scare us. μορμολύττεσθαι has the double acc. like βάπτειν τινὰ τι. Μορμώ, like ἑμποουσα, was one of the fictitious terrors of the Greek nursery. Cf. Ἐρόμ. 473; Λρ. Λύ. 1244, πότερ Λυδῶν ἡ Τρύγα | ταὐτλ ἑμποουσα μορμολύττεσθαι δοκεῖς; The Schol. there suggests that the alarm began ἀπὸ τῶν προσωπείων (masks) τῶν ἐν ταῖς πραγματίαις ὑποκρίτων, δὲ ἐκάλων μορμολυκεῖα. τοιοῦτοι δὲ καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ παιδία ψοβοῦσιν. Cf. Phaed. 77 ε.

13. δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμ-46 σουσα κτέ.: by confronting us with bonds, with death, with loss of worldly goods. These are the usual punishments, to the harshest of which Socrates has been condemned. The plural is used to put an abstract idea more vividly and concretely, as it were, by a process of multiplication. Cf. the use of τῆς μεν κτε. and, the common poetical use of ἔθνατοι to describe a violent and premature death, and in general the free use of the plural by the poets in phrases like πηκτῶν κλιμάκων προσαμβάσεις, Eur. Phoen. 489, and Bacch. 1213, δωμάτων προσαμβάσεις, I. T. 97, εἰσβάσεις, ibid. 101, also the common use of διαλάθαι both in poetry (Eur. Phoen. 701) and in prose (Lys. xi. 53; xii. 80, etc.). That such plurals were only a stronger way of putting the singular is clearly shown in Eur. Bacch. 1359, αἰαί, δεδόκται, τλῆμονε φυγαλ. For ἔθνατοι, meaning the penalty of death, see on Apol. 36 δ. 15. ἐπὶ ἀναλάβομεν: I think, if we should begin by taking up your point, etc. That is, such thorough consideration (44 δ, 45 ε) of Crito's (ὅν σοι λέγεις) point involves considering the whole question whether, etc. 18. ἢ πρὶν μὲν κτέ.: with ἡ (αν) a d second question is superadded, which substantially forestails the answer to the first. Cf. Apol. 26 δ. Here the answer suggested by ἄρα is to be taken ironically. See on ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, Apol. 37, and cf. 47 ε below, and esp. 50 ε and 51 α, where we find ἡ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα ... πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα. 19. ἄλλως: not at all seriously, as a mere joke, i.e. in a sense other than its proper one; the expression is a strong one. Cf. Phaedo, 76 ε, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐστὶ ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὦ λόγος οὕτωσ
θυμῶ δ’ ἐγω’ ἐπισκέψασθαι, δ’ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σου, 46
ei τί μοι ἄλλοιστερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδή ὡδὲ ἔχω, ἣ ὁ αὐτὸς,
καὶ ἐάσομεν χαῦρειν ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δὲ πως,
ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἐκαστοτε ὡδὲ ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν,
25 ὥσπερ νῦν ὑή ἔγω ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν ἅς οἱ ἄνθρωποι
δοξάζουσι δεό τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μῆ. ε
τούτο πρὸς θεῶν, δ’ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεbatis καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι;
οὐ γὰρ, ὥσα γε τάνθρωπεσα, ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλεσθαι ἀποθή-
σεως αύριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακρονοι ἡ παροῦσα ἔμμ—
30 φορά. σκόπει δη, οὐχ ικανῶσ δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ
πάσας χρῆ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἄνθρωπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς
μὲν, τὰς δ’ οὐ; τὶ φήσ; ταύτα οὐχι καλῶσ λέγεται;
ΚΡ. Καλῶς.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοὖν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ ποινρᾶς
35 μῆ;
ΚΡ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Χρησταὶ δ’ οὐχ αἲ τῶν φρονίμων, ποινραὶ δ’ αἲ
τῶν ἀφρόνων;
ΚΡ. Πῶς δ’ οὐ;

46 εἰρημένος εἰ. ἕνεκα λόγου, for the
form's sake (dicis causa)—quite
different from λόγου χάριν (exem pli
causa)—is brought in ἐκ παραλλήλων.
See on εἰκῇ κτ., Apol. 17 c.
24. τι λέγειν: the contradictionary of
οὐδὲν λέγειν. Cf. Apol. 30 b. It means,
"to say something that can be de-
pended upon, that amounts to some-
thing." Cf. Lach. 195 c, τί δοκεῖ
Λάχης λέγειν, ὥσα, ὥσα μέντοι
λέγειν τι, to which Nicias humorously
responds, καὶ γὰρ λέγει γέ τι, οὐ δέον
ἀλθὲσ γε.
25. νῦν δὴ: just now.
28. δοκεῖ γε τάνθρωπεσα: humanly
speaking. Cf. Dem. xviii. 300, δοκεῖ
ἡν ἄνθρωπιν χαῦρην δυνατὸν, as far
as human calculation could. For the
adv. acc. δοκεῖ, see G. 1060; H. 719.
One who is but a man can be sure
of his life for no single moment, though
he may have a reasonable confidence.
Cf. Henry V. iv. 1, "I think the king is
but a man, as I am; the violet smells
to him as it doth to me; all his senses
have but human conditions." Notice
the force of γέ. Cf. 54 d, δοκεῖ γε τὰ
νῦν ἄγοι δοκοῦντα.
30. ικανῶς: sufficiently, satisfacto-
riy, and hence rightly or truly. ικανῶς
very commonly appears in conjunc-
tion with μετρίως or καλῶς, to either
one of which it is substantially equiv.
Cf. Symp. 177 c and Phaed. 96 d.
32. For an omission here, see App.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

VII. Σ. Φέρε δή, πώς αὖ τὰ τοιαύτα ἐλέγετο; γν- 47 
μαζόμενος ἄνηρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἄνδρὸς ὁ ἐπαίνω καὶ ψόγω καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ὃ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου δὲ ἀν τυγχάνῃ ιατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὡν;

ΚΡ. Ἐνὸς μόνου.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.

ΚΡ. Δήλα δή.

VII. 1. πώς αὖ ἐλέγετο: the impf. because the new question (αὖ) involves a matter which has already been discussed. GMT. 40; H. 833. - τὰ τοιαύτα: refers to what follows. The definite instance given is only one of many possible illustrations of the kind. On the inductive method, see Introd. 18, and for further examples, cf. Apol. 25 b. Cf. also Lach. 184 c-185 b, where the same example is elaborated to establish the same principle that approval and instruction alike should, if we are to heed them, come from the one man who has made himself an authority, ὁ μαθὼν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσας, while the praise and blame of the many is to be neglected. There also the importance of deciding aright in regard to gymnastic training is strongly insisted upon, as follows: ἢ περὶ σμικροῦ οἷεσθε νυνι κινδυνεύειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Λυσίμαχος, ἀλλ' οὖ περὶ τοῦτο τοῦ κτήματος, ὁ τῶν ἴμετρών μέγιστον δὲν τυχάναι, ... ὅποιοι ἀν τῖνες οἱ παῖδες γενόνται.

2. τοῦτο πράττων: a man who makes this his work, and hence is an expert in earnest about it. One whose opinion professionally given is worth more than any layman’s would be. Cf. Menex. 244 c, ἶησομένουι Δακεδαμώνιοι ... σφέτερον ὡς ἡγηθον εἶναι κατά- 

δουλοῦσθαι τοὺς ἄλλους, ταῦτα ἐπραττον. As this ταῦτα refers to καταδουλοῦσθαι, so the τοῦτο in question refers to the notion of gymnastics implied in γυμναζόμενος; the whole phrase means, a person who wishes to make an athlete of himself. Cf. Hdt. vi. 105, ἀποστέμπουσιν ἐς Σπάρτην κήρυκα Φειδιππίδην Ἀθηναῖον μὲν ἀνδρα, ἄλλως δὲ ἡμεροθρόμον τε καὶ τοῦτο με- 

λετῶντα.

4. Ιατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης: often coupled together as having special charge of bodily vigor and health. The Ιατρὸς was expected to cure and to prevent disease by a prescribed regimen (διαιτητική); the παιδοτρίβης professed and was expected (Gorg. 452 b) καλὸς καὶ ἀσθενῶς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα, he it was who really gave instruction in gymnastics. For fuller details, see Schömann, Antiquities of Greece, I. 505 f. Iccus of Tarentum, glorified as a successful gymnast, is reputed to have been most strict in regard to a temperate diet. Cf. the proverbial phrase ἢκκου δεῖπνον. Sometimes medicine and gymnastics were both made the business of the same man, as in the case of Herodias of Selymbria. Cf. Prot. 316 Δ, ἐνὸς δὲ τινας ἱσθαμαι καὶ γυμναστικήν (sc. professed teachers
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

10 ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ ἀρα αὐτῷ πρακτεύς καὶ γυμναστεύει καὶ ἐδεστεύει γε καὶ ποτέν, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἔνι δοκῆ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπιμετέρω, μᾶλλον ἡ ἡ ἐξυπατεῖ τοῖς ἀλλοίς; 
ΚΡ. Ἐστι ταύτα.

ΣΩ. Εἶν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἔνι καὶ ἀτμασάς αὐτοῦ εἰ 15 τήν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἑπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἑπαίνουτων, ἀρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;
ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο καὶ ποῖ τείνει καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τού ἀπειθοῦντος;

20 ΚΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα. τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλυσιν.
ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τάλλα, ὃ Κρίτων, οὔτως, ἢν μὴ πάντα διώμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἁγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ δὲ νῦν ἡ βουλή ἡμῶν ἐστιν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἑπαίνουμεν καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτήν, ἡ τῇ τοῦ τοῦ ἐνός, εἰ τίς ἑστὶν ἑπάθων, δὲν δὲ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ἐξυπατεῖ τοὺς ἀλλούς; φεὶ μὴ ἀκο—

18 a. Here Socrates has at last reached his goal; his point has been established by induction. Notice the doubly chiastic arrangement,—
11. καὶ ἐδεστεύει γε: γε serves where various points are enumerated, to mark a new departure, i.e. a fact different in kind from the preceding ones and thus belonging to a new class. Cf. Gorg. 460 d, ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττευτικὴ (draught-playing) γε καὶ ἀδικοὶ πολλαὶ τέχναι. Theaet. 156 b, ὀψεῖς (sights) τε καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ δοφρήσεις (smells) καὶ ψόγος (chills) τε καὶ καυτὰς (burns) καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ ἐπιθυμίας (desires) κτέ. 15. τοὺς λόγους: states collectively what has been subdivided into δόξα, ψόγος, ἑπαίνου. 16. καὶ μηδὲν ἑπαίνουτον: of those in fact who have no special knowledge whatever. See App. 18. εἰς τί κτέ.: see on τῶν ἐμῶν, 46 b. 22. καὶ δὴ καὶ: and then also, of course. See on καὶ δὴ καὶ, 18 a. Here Socrates has at last reached his goal; his point has been established by induction. Notice the doubly chiastic arrangement,—
λουθήσομεν, διαφθειρομένειν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὥ τῷ μὲν δικαίω βέλτιον ἐγύγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἄδικῳ ἀπαλλυτο. ἡ

30 οὖν ἦστι τούτο:

ΚΡ. Ὅμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

VIII. Σ. Ω. Φέρε δή, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐγνενοῦ μὲν βελτιον γηγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον
dιολέσωμεν, πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαίοντων δόξῃ, ἀρα βιωτὸν ἦμῖν ἐστι διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; ἐστὶ δὲ ποιν τούτῳ ε ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἦν οὐχί;

ΚΡ. Ναι.

Σ. Ω. Ἀρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἦμῖν ἐστὶν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ
dιεφθαρμένου σώματος;

ΚΡ. Οὐδάμως.

10 Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνον ἄρα ἦμῖν βιωτόν διεφθαρμένον, ὃ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνύνησιν; ἡ

ψυχὴ τῆς ἁπαλάτερα ἐπιλέγεται τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὃ τι τοῦτο

meaning is that life is worthless, i.e. ὡδ λυπητέλει, ὡδ ἄξιον ζῆν. Cf. 53 c, and Rep. iv. 445 a, ἦμῖν ἦστι σκέψισθαι, πότερον ἀδ λυπητέλει (παίως) δίκαια τε πράττειν καὶ καλά ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον ... ἢ ἄδικεῖν τε καὶ ἄδικον εἶναι. The expressions διαφθειρόμενον and διολέσωμεν bring us to the point of extreme deterioration at which life becomes impossible.

10. ἀλλὰ ... ἄρα: ironically opposed to the preceding negative statement, but at the same time requiring no for its answer. This last must be indicated by the tone in which the question is asked. See on ἄρα, 46 d.

11. ὃ: after both verbs, though ὀνύνησιν does not govern the dat. See on ὅς ... ἐξετάζειν, Apol. 41 c. Even λωβᾶται usually takes the acc.

12. ὃ τι ποτὲ ἦστι: it was not specified above (d), and there is no reason
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

έστι τών ἡμετέρων, περὶ δὴ η τε ἄδικα καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη 48 ἐστὶν;

15 ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.
Σ.Α. 'Αλλὰ τιμιώτερον;

Σ.Ο. Οὐκ ἄρα, δὲ βέλτιστε, πάνιν ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὁ τι ὁ ἐπαθὼν περὶ 20 τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων, ὁ εἶς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἁληθεία. ὡστε πρῶτων μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖται, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἁγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἀν τις, οὗτοι τε εἰσών ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτιννύαι.

25 ΚΡ. Δήλα δὴ καὶ ταύτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ὡ Σώκρατες. ἂν.
Σ.Ο. 'Αληθή λέγεις. ἂλλ', ὡ θαυμάσιε, οὖν τε δι' Ἀλήθειας ὑποδεικνύει οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπόκτισθαι. καὶ πρότερον πάντων των, καὶ τόνθε αὐτὸς οἰκτίσησθαι τινα, τί ἕναντίσθαι, ὡστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ἐσθήσει, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἁγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων.

48 for arguing about its name(ψυχή)here.

18. οὐκ ἄρα πάνιν οὕτω: then we must not ... at all ... so much as all that, etc. οὕτω refers back to the drift of Crito's argument. Here again Socrates takes the last step in a long induction.

19. τί ... ὑπ. a not unusual combination of the dir. and indr. forms of question. Cf. Gorg. 500 a, ἀρ' οὖν παρ- τὸς ἀνδρός ἐστὶν ἐκλεξαθκαί ποῖα ἁγαθά τῶν ἡδήν ἐστί καὶ ὅποια κακά, ἢ τεχνικὸν (specialist) δεῖ εἰς ἐκαστὸν; The double acc. as in κακά (κακῶς) λέγειν τινα.

20. αὐτή ἡ ἁληθεία: i.e. Truth, speaking with the lips of ὁ ἐπαθὼν, or appearing as the result of strict and patient inquiry.

23. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή: again Socrates reproves Crito, this time for his appeal to the Athenian public (44 d).
30 ΚΡ. Ἄλλα μένει.
ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαῖος ὑπὶ ταὐτὸν ἐστι, 
μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;
ΚΡ. Μένει.
IX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογομένων τούτῳ σκεπ-
tέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειράσθαι εξιέναι μὴ 
ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων, ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνηται 
δίκαιον, πειρόμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐδομεν. ἂς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς 
5 σκέψεις περὶ τέ αναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παῖ-
δων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὥς Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ 
tῶν βαδίων ἀποκτινώντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν, εἰ 
οὐδὲ τῇ ἡσαν, οὐδενὶ ἐξω νῦ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῶν δ', 
ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεί, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἢ 
10 ὁπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαιον πράξουμεν καὶ χρή-
ματα τελοῦντες τούτως τοῖς ἐμ'. ἐνθένδε ἐξάζονσι καὶ 
β 31. τὸ δὲ εὖ κτέ.: this is needed because of the confused ideas which 
many associate with εὖ ζήν, e.g. (1) plain living and high thinking, or (2) 
high living and no thinking. For the 
latter meaning, cf. Rep. i. 329 a, oи 
ον πλείστοι (τῶν πρεσβυτῶν) τᾶς ἐν τῇ 
νεότητι ζῶνα ποιοῦντες ἀγανακτούσιν 
ὡς μεγάλων τινῶν ἀπεστερημένοι, καὶ 
tάτε μὲν εὖ ζῶνα, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶν-
ta. On this whole subject consult 
the discussion in Prot. 351 b ff.
ε IX. 4. τᾶς σκέψεως: drawn into the 
const. of the rel. clause, to which pre-
cedence has been given. The art. is 
commonly not retained in such a case, 
e.g. οὐς ἡ πόλις νομίζει ἥμας οὐ νομίζων. 
The corresponding demonst. τῶν ἐν 
οίοι τῷ ζῶναν, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶνα-
tes. This on whole subject consult 
the discussion in Prot. 351 b ff.
6. μη...γτε.: sc. ὅπα κτέ. Look to it, 
Crito, lest all this, at bottom, may prove 
to be, etc. A milder way of saying 
tαῦτα σκέμματα ἡντα φαίνεται, strength-
ced by ὡς ἀληθῶς. See on μη οὐ 
tοῦτ' γ', Apol. 39 α.
7. καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν: and 
would bring them to life again too. The 
ἁν forms with this partic. the apod. 
ἀναβιωσκομένων is used here like ἀναβιω-
σομένων in Phaed. 89 d. Usually it is 
intransitive, like ἀναβιώναι.
9. ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεί: the argu-
ment has prevailed thus far. Cf. Hor. 
Sat. i. 3, 115, nec vincet ratio 
hoe, tantundem ut peccec 
< missing text > et qui nocturnus sacra divum lege-
rit. Ibid. ii. 3, 225, vincet enim 
stultos ratio insanire nepo-
tes, and 250, si puerilius his 
ratio esse cvincet amare. It 
is rare to find this idiom with an acc. 
of the persons discussing, as in Rep. 
x. 007 b, δ γὰρ λόγος ἡμάς ἡμεί.—μη 
...γτε.: as in 6 above.
χάριτας καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔξαγοντες τε καὶ ἔξαγόμενοι, ἥ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν πάντα ταύτα ποιοῦντες· κἂν φανώμεθα ἄδικοι. ἀδικοὶ αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οῦ δὲν υπολογίζεσθαι οὖτε εἰ 15 ἀποθνήσκεις δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας οὔτε ἀλλο ὄτιον πάσχει πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὃ Σώκρατε· ὄρα δὲ τὶ δρῶμεν.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὃ ἀγαθὲ, κοινὴ, καὶ εἰ πη ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν: εἰ δὲ μὴ, ο παῦσαι ὡδῇ, ὃ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρῆ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπίεναι· ὡς ἐγὼ πεὺ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσας σε ταύτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκόντος. ὃρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τῆς ἀρχῆς, εάν

12. καὶ αὐτοὶ κτέ.: καὶ αὐτοὶ, we ourselves too, stands for Crito and Socrates. Crito is responsible, in the supposed case, not only for his expenditure of money (χρήματα τελούντες), but also for instigating the act of Socrates, or rather for persuading him to allow various things to be done for him.—ἔξαγόμενοι: the pass. is especially strong, "we ourselves are both rescuers and rescued."

15. οὔτε πάσχειν: sc. ei δὲν, to be supplied from the preceding clause.

16. πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν: cf. Apol. 28 b d. The sense is, "there must be no question about submitting to the uttermost (ὅτιον πάσχειν) rather than committing unrighteousness." See also 54 b, where, as in this case, a choice is involved, and πρὸ is used in the sense of in preference to or instead of.

23. ὡς: inasmuch as, equiv. to ἐπεῖ. Cf. quippe in Lat.

24. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκόντος: opposed distinctly to πείσας σε, with your approval. Cf. 49 e fin., and Xen. An. v. 6. 29, ἔχθεινε γὰρ τὸν λόγον, ὡς γέω πράττειν ταύτα διανοοῖμην ἡδῆ οὗ πείσας ὑμᾶς. The vivid contrast of these two clauses makes the omission of σοῦ, the subj. of ἁκόντος, the easier. Indeed, cases are common where a personal or a dem. pron. or some vague general notion of persons or things is the subj. implied. For a somewhat similar case, cf. Hom. Od. iv. 645 ff., ὦρφ’ ἐκάθισεν θεός ὁ ἀκόντος ἀπηύρα νηα μέκαινα, ἥ εἰκὼν οἱ ὥκας.—εὰν λέγητα: in case the statement shall satisfy you. εάν does not like el (cf. 48 b) mean whether. GMT. 71, n. 1. Cf. Phaedo, 64 c, σκέψαι δὴ, ἀγαθέ, εὰν ὡρα καὶ σοι ἐνδοκή κτέ. The subj. of the dependent sent. is made by anticipation (prolepsis) the object of ὡρα. Cf. Milton, Sonnet to Sir Henry Vane, xvii., "Besides to know | Both spiritual power and civil, what each means, | What sever each, thou hast learned, which few have done." Cf. below (49 d). Socrates is earnestly enforcing a principle.

X. Σ.Ω. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμέν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τοῖς μὲν ἀδικητέοι τρόπῳ, τοῖς δὲ οὐ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τὸ γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἄγαθον οὔτε καλόν, ὡς πολλάκις ἦμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεθεὶν χρόνῳ ἀμολογηθῆ; [ὁπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο·]

5 ἡ πᾶσαι ἦμῖν ἑκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ἀμολογίαι ἐν ταῖς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἡμᾶς αὐτῶς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὔτως ἔχει ὃσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν, εἰτε φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ εἰτε μὴ, καὶ εἰτε δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἐτὶ τῶν καλοπόρτερα πάσχειν εἰτε καὶ πρόστερα, ὡμώς τὸ γε

After each double question (1) οὐδὲν . . . ἀμολογηθῆ; (2) ἡ πᾶσαι . . . παντὶ τρόπῳ; Socrates has looked at Crito for an answer. Finally he extorts the briefest assent by the pointed φαμέν ὁ; in line 13 below.

6. ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰστὶ: thrown away. Cf. Henry VIII. iii. 2, "Cromwell, I charge thee, fling away ambition," and Soph. Phil. 13, μὴ καὶ μάθη μ' ἡμοῦντα κάκχεω τὸ πάν σοφίσμα, τῷ μὲν αὐτίχ' αἱρήσειν δοκᾶ. Similar is the Lat. effundere gratiam, laboris. — καὶ πάλαι κτέ.: one of the two parties, forms the predicative complement of ἐλάθομεν, the other stands in opposition to the pred. By the added τηλικοίδε ἀνδρεὶς (see on τοὐστὸν σῷ, Apol. 25 d), this opposition is put still more strongly. ἀρα gives point to the irony. See on ἀρ' ὀβι, 47 ε.

11. ὡμός παντὶ τρόπῳ: a more distinct reiteration of what ἡ παντὸς μᾶλλον κτέ. has already stated. Therefore one as much as the other belongs.
KRITON.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἀρα δεὶ ἀδικεῖν.
KR. Οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. Οὔδὲ ἀδικοῦμεν ἀρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ ὀντανταῖ, ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεὶ ἀδικεῖν.

to the twofold disjunctive prot. ἐστε...

17. ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ ὀντανταί: that 'doing harm to one's enemies' was part and parcel of the popularly accepted rule of life is plain from many passages like that in Isocrates to Demonicus I., 20, ὥστες ἀλοχὸν νόμος τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἵκασθαι ταῖς κακοσκολοιαῖς καὶ τῶν φίλων ἐπτάσθαι ταῖς ἐπιρρησαῖς. Compare the character of Cyrus the younger, Xen. An. i. 9. 11, φανερῶς δὲ ἦν, καὶ εἰ τὸ τι ἄγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ποιήσειν αὐτὸν, νυκτὶ πεῖραμένως κτλ. Cf. also Meno's definition, Men. 71 e, αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνθρόπος ἀρετή, ἵκανον εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους ἐπὶ τούτων, τοὺς δὲ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς. Plato eloquently defends his more Christian view throughout the first book of the Republic, in the Gorgias, and elsewhere. That the many do assert this, Socrates might say is not only made probable by the known tendencies in human character, but it is proved by every-day experience in dealing with men. Many recognized authorities encouraged them in such a view. Cf. Archil. Frg. 65, ἦν δὲ ἐπισταμαὶ μέγα, τὸν κακῶς μὲ δρόμην δεινοὶ ἀνταμελεθθαι κακοῖς. Solon, Frg. 13, 5, where he prays to the Muses that they would grant him εἶναι δὲ γλυκὸν δὲ φίλοις, ἐχθροῦς δὲ ... ὥστε δεινῶν. In Soph. Αψ. 79, it is Athena herself who asks, οὐκοῦν γέλως ἤδιος εἰς ἐχθροὺς γελᾶν; Contrast Soph. Ant. 523 f.: KR. οὕτως ποιήσω, δέδομαι ὧν θάρη, φίλοις. AN. οὕτως συνέχθην, ἀλλὰ συμφιλεῖν ἐφ' ὑμῖν. Cf. Eur. Andr. 520 ff., where Menelaurus says it is folly to spare the offspring of one's foes, ἀνάλημα λείπειν ἐχθροὺς ἐχθρῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἐξοξεύειν, and ibid. 1007, where Orestes says, ἐχθρῶν γὰρ ἀνδρῶν μοῦραν εἰς ἀναστροφὴν (for us to destroy it) δαίμων δίδωσι. Cf. Eur. Heraclid. 1049 ff., the grim humor of Alcmena, who says of Eurystheus, ἐχθρός μὲν ἄνηρ, ὑφελεῖ δὲ καθανών. See also Bacch. 1344–1348, where Agave admits her guilt but asks for mercy, and Dionysus refuses mercy because he has been offended. Agave answers: ὄργας πρέπει θεοὺς οὐχ διοιδοῦσαι βροτοῖς. This shows an ideal of moral conduct for the gods, such as Plato preaches for men. Compare Soph. Αψ. 679–882, ἃ τ' ἐχθροῖς ἡμῖν ἐς τοσόνδ' ἐχθρατέος, ὡς καὶ φιλήσων αὖθις, ἐς τὸν φίλον τοσαύτ' ὑποργών ὑφελεῖ βουλήσομαι ὧς αἴνων οὐ μενώντα, with Henry VIII. iii. 2, "Love thyself last, cherish those that hate thee; still in thy right hand carry gentle peace | to silence envious tongues. Be just and fear not." Shakspere thus expresses the view of the Platonic Socrates and of Plato in contrast to that of the Greek public at large. That the historical (in contrast to the Platonic) Socrates at least
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΧ

KR. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ δή; κακουργεῖν δεί, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ;

KR. Οὐ δεῖ δῆτον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασί, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;

KR. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γὰρ πον κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἄδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

KR. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀντιδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἄν ὅτι τῶν πάσχῃ ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ ὅρα, ὦ

ΚΡίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὀμολογήσῃ γῆς. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἳς οὖν οὔτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μη, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὀρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐὰν

19. οὐ φαίνεται: plainly not. As οὐ φημι means I deny rather than I do not assert, so οὐ φαίνεται means not it does not appear, but it does appear not.

20. κακουργεῖν: this word, like κακῶς ποιεῖν, covers more cases than ἄδικεῖν: it includes ἄδικεῖν and also cases of harm done where there is little or no question of right and wrong involved. Apparently, it was more commonly used in every-day matters than ἄδικεῖν. In Crito's answer his uncertain certainty is indicated by δή-ου; had he meant that he was perfectly certain, he would have used δή.

28. οὔτε ἄρα κτέ.: the completest presentation of this precept must be sought in the teaching of Christ. Cf. Luke vi. 27, ἀλλὰ ὃμων ἰησοῦς ἡμῶν τοῖς ἀκούσαί τοὺς ἐφη: ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν, καλῶς ποιεῖτε τοῖς μισοῦσιν ὑμᾶς κτέ.

30. καθομολογῶν, ὀμολογήσῃ: see on οὐ χαρῆς, 44 d.

32. τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κτέ.: this is strongly set forth in the Gorgias, where the Sophist and the true Philosopher represent respectively these two clashing theories. See Introd. 65.

34. βουλεύματα: counsels, i.e. their manner of thinking and acting.
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

35 μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεί σοι, καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεύθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδείποτε ὅρθως ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς. ἢ ἄφιστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὔτω καὶ νῦν ἐτι δοκεῖ· σοὶ δ' εἰ πη ἄλλη δεδοκταί, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δὲ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούε.

ΚΡ. 'Αλλ' ἐμμενω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεί μοί· ἄλλα λέγε.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετά τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἑρωτώ· πότερον ἂν τις δικαιούτων ὡς ῥεμαλογήσῃ τῷ δίκαιῳ οἴσαι οὔτα λεγητέον ἃ

45 ἐξαπατητέον;

ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

XI. ΣΩ. 'Εκ τούτων δὴ αὖθει. ἀπίστως ἐνθέντε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς ποιοῦν· και ταύτα οὔς ἥκιστα δεῖ ἢ οὔ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἶς ὠμολογήσαμεν δικαίοις οἴσων ἢ οὔ;

49  ἐκ τούτων: a statement of what is involved in ἐντεύθεν, which is equiv. to ἐκ τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου (taking this principle for granted). ὡς with the gen. abs. is used in this same way also after λέγειν. Cf. Men. 95 ε,  οὐδ' ὅτι ἐν τούτοις μὲν ἐς διδακτού ὁμολογήσας τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει; 39. τῆς ἀρχῆς: cf. καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεύθεν above. ἀρχή is the starting-point of an investigation,—a principle, a conviction.—καὶ πάλαι κτέ.: see on οὐ μόνον κτέ., 40 b. 41. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο: not what results, but what comes next. It may be taken adv. (like τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔρχεται and the like) and translated further. What is referred to is expressed in πότερον κτέ. below. 43. μᾶλλον δὲ: or rather. Cf. Lach. 196 ε, λέγε δὲ μοι ἃ Νικία, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμῖν. 44. ἡ ἐξαπατητέον: Socrates says this rather than ἢ οὐ ποιητέον because of the preceding ἢ καὶ τοις ῥεμαλογηθῇ τῷ. Such an admission pledges a man to put his principle in practice. ἐξαπατάν is not only construed with an acc. of the person, here easily supplied from τῷ, but furthermore takes the acc. of the thing. Cf. Xen. An. v. 7. 11, εἰ δὲ τις ὑμῶν ἢ αὐτὸς ἐξαπατηθῇ ἢν οἴσαι παύτα ἢ ἀλλον ἐξαπατήσας τα παῦτα, λέγων διδακτέως. XI. 1. ἐκ τούτων: in the light of this. See on 48 c, ἐκ τῶν δικαιομομενῶν, and cf. Henry IV. i. 1, "For more is to be said and done than out of anger can be uttered." The particular plan of flight Socrates considers in the light of, or out of, the general conclusion just approved. 3. οὐς οἴσων: the dat. is assimilated regularly to the omitted obj. of ἐμμέ-
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

5 ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατε, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς δ ἔρω- 50 τὰς, οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ὃ δεικτεῖ. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθέντες ἐπίσταντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐρωτεύοντο.

5 εἰπὲ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατε, τί εἰν νῦν ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ ἢ ἐπιχειρεῖς διανοεῖς τοὺς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς τ' ἀπολέσαι καὶ ἐξυμπασάν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἦ δοκεὶ

50 νομεν. ἀμολογῆσαι would require the acc. as in 49 ε above.

5. οὐκ ἔχω κτ.: Crito seems afraid of understanding what is meant; the inevitable consequences involved alarm him. See on κακουργών, 49 ε. This natural state of mind on his part gives good and sufficient reason for a reconsideration of the whole subject from a new point of view.

7. μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν: for the dat., cf. Συμπ. 192 δ, εἰ αὐτῶς... ἐπιστάς ν Ἡραίας... ἔρωτο. Προτ. 321 ε, ἀποροκτί δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς. See on §, 47 ε. The statement there given covers a very large number of cases where a partic. and a finite verb are combined like ἐλθόντες ἔρωτο.

8. εἰθ’ ὅπως κτ.: this softening phrase is used purely out of consideration for Crito. To use the word applied to runaway slaves might give offence. One of the annoying mishaps that befell a well-to-do Athenian was to have to give chase when a slave ran off to Megara or Oenoe. Cf. Προτ. 310 ε, where Hippocrates nearly lost his dinner, μᾶλα γε ὃς ἀφικόμενος εἰς Οίνόης. ο γὰρ τοι παῖς με δ Σάτυρος ἀπέθανε. Of course such conduct on the slave’s part was considered despicable. Cf. 52 δ, δοῦλος φαυλοτάτος. The δοῦλος χρηστὸς, who appears in tragedy more frequently than in real life, would not run away, a because of his attachment to his master. Cf. Ευρ. Μεδ. lines 54 f., χρηστοῖσι δοῦλοις ἐμφαροτα τὰ δεσποτῶν | κακώς πινυότα καὶ φρενῶν ἀνδάπτεται, the first of which recurs in the Βακχαί (1029), Aλc. 768-77; and cf. also Ευρ. Ανδρ. 56-59, where the slave says to Andromache, εὖνοσ δὲ καὶ σοι ἵκαι τ’ ἵν τῷ σφ πόσει. In Χέν. Οεκ. 7. 37 and 38, and 9. 11-13, is an interesting account of the position of slaves in the household.

9. τῷ κοινῷ τῆς πόλεως: the commonwealth. Cf. Χέν. Αν. ν. 7. 18, and Ηδι. i. 67, Σπαρτητέων τῷ κοινῷ διαμετομένους, sent by the commonwealth of Sparta. So Cicero says communia Siciliae. The personification of the state and the laws which here follows is greatly admired and has been abundantly imitated, e.g. by Cicero in his first Catilinarian Oration (7. 18). The somewhat abrupt transition from ἡμῖν above to δ Σώκρατες suggests the fact that Socrates considered himself alone responsible to the laws in this matter.

10. ἄλλο τι: see on ἄλλο τι ἢ, Απολ. 24 ε.

11. τοῦς τε νόμοις: notice the order and cf. 53 α, ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι.

12. τὸ σὸν μέρος: see on τὸ σὸν δ μέρος, 45 δ. Here it is about the same in sense with καθ’ δόσον δύνασαι, 51 α.
κριτών.

σοι οίον τε ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατράφθαι, ἐν ᾗ αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι καὶ μηδὲν ἵσχύουσιν, ἀλλ’ υπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἀκυροὶ τε γίγνονται καὶ διαφθείρονται; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὥς Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τουαῦτα; πολλά γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχου ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦτον τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὅσ τὰς δίκαις τὰς δικασθείσας προστάτευ κυρίας εἶναι. ἡ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι ἡδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὅρθως τὴν δίκην ἐκρίνε; ε ὑπάτα ἡ τί ἐροῦμεν;

ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νὴ Δία, ὥς Σώκρατες.

Χ. Σ. Ω. Τὶ οὖν, ἂν εἰπωσιν οἱ νόμοι: ὥς Σώκρατες, ἡ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολόγητο ἢμῖν τε καὶ σοὶ, ἡ ἐμμένευν ταῖς δίκαιας αἰς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζομεν λεγόντων, ἵσως ἂν εἰπον ὅτι, ὥς Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ 5 λεγόμενα, ἀλλ’ ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἰσῆθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἔρωταν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γὰρ, τὶ ἐγκαλῶν ἢμῖν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὖ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸς λέγοντας, ἢ ἢμῶν ἔλαμβανεν τὴν μητέρα σου ὅ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν,

13. εἰναι: the attention is drawn to εἰναι, exist, by the negative statement of the same idea in μὴ ἀνατράφθαι, not to be utterly overthrown, which follows. GMT. 109.

17. ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ: a side thrust at the trained speakers which recalls the irony of the opening page of the Ἀπολογία. — ὑπὲρ τοῦτον τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου: on behalf of this law whose existence is in jeopardy. Cf.: below d, ἐπιχειρεῖς ἀπολλύναι. This notion of threatened action is often attached to the pres. and impf. of this verb. See GMT. 32 and 38; Ἡ. 828. Cf. An. ν. 8. 2, ὅπως τῷ βρέχει ἀπολλύμεθα. The whole wording of this passage recalls the Αθηναῖον usage which required that a law, if any one proposed to change or repeal it, should be defended by regularly-appointed state-advocates (συνήγοροι).

19. ὅτι ἡδίκει γὰρ: ὅτι followed by direct quotation, as in 21 c. Notice how spirited and quick the answer is made by γὰρ. “Yes (I certainly have this intention) for, etc.”

Χ. Τ. 2. καὶ ταῦτα: sc. that in cer- one cases the sentence of the laws may and should be set at nought.— ἡ ἐμμένευν: or (was the agreement between us) simply to abide by, etc.

3. αἰς ἂν δικάζῃ: cf. 60 b and 51 e.

5. ἐπειδὴ κτ.: see Introd. 19.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

10 τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμψει τι ὃς οὐ καλὸς ἔχουσιν; οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίνην ἂν. ἄλλα τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφὴν τε καὶ παιδείαν ἐν ἥ καὶ σὺ ἑπαδεύθης; ἥ οὐ καλῶς προσέτατον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτους τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλουτες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σὲ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδείᾳ; καλῶς, φαίνην ἂν. εἰεν. ἐπειδή δὲ ἐγένον καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἑπαδεύθης, ἔχους ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἡσθα καὶ ἐκγονος καὶ δούλος, αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως

50 ἄλλα: instead of ἐπειτὰ δὲ, which would have been written here to correspond to πρῶτον μὲν if Socrates’s answer had not intervened.

14. ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ: these words cover the whole of education (παιδεία), as Plato, Rep. ii. 376 e, says, έτει που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώματι γυμναστικῇ, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσικῇ. “The education of the average Greek gentleman, like that of the average English gentleman, comprised a certain amount of mental cultivation and a certain amount of athletic exercise. The former, besides reading, writing, and some elementary mathematics, consisted mainly in the reciting and learning by heart of poetry, along with the elements of music, and sometimes of drawing. Perhaps because so much of the poetry was originally sung or accompanied, the word ‘music’ was sometimes applied to the education in literature as well as in music proper, and it is in this wider sense that Plato habitually uses it. Under the term ‘gymnastic’ was understood the whole system of diet and exercise which, varying with the customs of different states, had for its common object the production of bodily health and strength, and the preparation for military service.”

17. δούλος: opposed to δεσπότης. e Cf. Hdt. vii. 104, where Demaratus says to Xerxes that the Lacedaemonians ἐλεύθεροι ἐόντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροι εἰσιν. “The education which the law requires, e.g. Legg. 762 e, δ μὴ δουλεύσας οὐδ' ἐν δεσπότῃς γένοιτο ἐξίος ἐπαίνου, καὶ καλλωπίζεσθαι (cf. ἐκαλλωπίζεσθαι, Apol. 20 e) χρὴ τῷ καλῶς δουλεύσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ καλῶς ἄριστα, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, ὡς ταύτην τοῖς θεοῖς ὁσάν δουλεύαν, ἐπειτα τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις κτλ.” Cf. Apol. 23 b, 30 a, and also Eur. Orest. 418, where Orestes says in a very different spirit, δουλεύωμεν θεοῖς, ὅ τι ποτέ εἶσθιν οἱ θεοὶ. Cf. 52 d. This high standard of obedience, unhesitating and unqualified, to the established law, was familiar to the Athenians before Plato wrote.
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

εχει, αρ' εξ ίσου οιει ειναι σοι το δικαιον και ήμιν, και 50
20 αττ' αν ήμεις σε επιχειρωμεν ποιειν, και σοι ταυτα αντι-
ποιειν οιει δικαιον ειναι; η προσ μεν άρα σοι τον πατερα
ουκ εξ ίσου ήν το δικαιον και προσ τον δεσποτην, ει σοι
ουν ετυγχαινειν, ουστε, απερ πράσχους, ταυτα και αντιποιειν,
ουτε κακως άκουοντα αντιλε'ειν ουτε τυπτόμενον αντιτυπ-
25 τειν ουτε άλλα τοιαυτα πολλα'. προσ δε την πατρίδα άρα
και τους νόμους έσται σοι, ουστε, έαν σε επιχειρωμεν
ημεις άπολλυινα δικαιον ήγούμενοι ειναι, και ιν σοι ήμις.

Among many passages in the tragedians, cf. Soph. Ant. 663 ff., δοτις δ' άπερβας ή νόμους βιαζεται | η' τουτι-
tάσειν τοις κρατουσιν νοεί, | ουκ εστιν έπαινον έπουν έγρι ρυχ 
ην πολις στησειε, τοσδε χρη κλουει | και σμικρα και δικαια και τά-
nαντια. Cf. also Cic. Clu. 53. 146, legum idcirco omnes servi 
sumus, ut liberi esse possi-
mus, and cf. in Eur. Suppl. 429 ff., the speech of Theseus, beginning, 
ουδεν τυραννον δυσμενησετον πολει: | δοτι το μεν πρωτιστον ουκ εισιν νο-
μοι | κωνοι, κρατει δ' εις τον νομον 
κεκτημενος | αυτος παρ' αυτος, και 
tοθ' ουκετ' εστιν ίσου. Cf. also ibid. 
316–353, 408–408, and the words of 
Aethra, 312 f., τo γαρ τοι συνεχον (bond 
of union) ανθρωπων πολεις |
τοιι' εστιν | δοτι πολλα· |
προς δε την πατριδα άρα 
και τους νομους έσται σοι, ουστε, έαν σε επιχειρωμεν 
ημεις άπολλυινα δικαιον ήγούμενοι ειναι, και ιν σοι ήμις.

22. ήν: "when you were under 
your father or perhaps your master." 
The past (ήν) is opposed to the fut. 
(εσται). — και προσ τον δεσποτην: for 
the δουλος χρηστος, see on δουλος 
in 17 above.

23. άπερ παςχους: anything that was 
(at any time) done to you. GMT. 532; 
H. 914 B (2). Though subord. to 
ωστε ... αντιποιειν, this clause is also 
limited by the neg. statement ουκ εξ 
ισου ήν, which limits the clause ωστε 
... πολλα.

24. ουτε ... πολλα: an explana-
tion of ωστε ... αντιποιειν, in which 
the neg. of ουκ εξ ίσου ήν is repeated. 
— κακως άκοουντα αντιλε'ειν: equiv. 
to λοιδορουμενον αντιλοιδορειν.

27. ωστε καλ ου δε επιχειρησει: 
so that you in your own turn will, etc. 
ου, when expressed in Att., has em-
phatic position. καλ indicates equality,
τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθ’ ὁσον δύνασαι ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φῆσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὅ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος; ἢ οὔτως εἰ σοφὸς, ἥστατε λέληθέν σε ὧτι μητρὸς τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμωτέροιν ἢ την ἁρεῖς καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἀγιώτερον καὶ ἑν μείζον μοῖρα καὶ παρὰ τούτοις νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπείκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ λέληθέν σε. ἢ νῦν ἐκαθόρισε καὶ παρὰ τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπείκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ λέληθεν σε. ἢ νῦν ἐκαθόρισε καὶ παρὰ τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπείκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ λέληθεν σε.
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

πάσχειν, ἐάν τι προστάτη ταθείν, ἄναγκαι ἁγοντα, ἐάν τε τύπτεσθαί ἐάν τε δείσθαι, ἐάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγη τρω-θησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταύτα, καὶ τὸ δι-καιον όντως ἢ, καὶ οὐκ ὑπεικέτεον οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειτεύν ς τήν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστη-
ρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε, βιάζεσθαι δ' οὐχ ὀσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἐτι ἁπτον τήν πατρίδα; τί φησον πρὸς ταύτα, ὦ Κριτών; ἀληθὴ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

XIII. ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοῖνυν, ὦ Σωκράτες, φαίεν ἃν ἵσωσ
οἰ νόμοι, ἢ ἤμεῖς ταήτα ἀληθῇ λέγομεν, ὦτι ὦν δίκαια
ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἢ ἤμεῖς γάρ σε γεν-

51

times to propitiate, as in Hom. II. i.
100, τὸτε κέν μιν (Ἀπόλλωνα) ἱλαρ-
σᾶμενοι πειθομεν. Cf. c below. The first two ἐάν τε clauses (like εἴτε...εἴτε, sive...sive), with
προστάτη παθειν, while the third takes a new verb with a new
apod. The two former are specifi-
cations under πάσχειν, the third in-
stances analogous cases where un-
qualified obedience to the state is
necessary. The emergencies of war
are taken as typical of a host of
others, and then with ἐν δικαστη-
rίῳ the argument is brought to a head.
This elaboration of the period leaves
to its own devices ποιητέον ταύτα
(which, grammatically, is subordinate
to λέληθέν σε).

40. καὶ οὐχι ὑπεικέτεον: a neg. re-
teration of ποιητέον ταύτα. We must
not draw back, we must not retreat, we must not leave the ranks. Corre-
sponding to these three duties, there
were three forms of indictment, ἀστρα-
tείασ, δειλίας, λιποταξίαν. On the last,
cf. Apol. 28 ε—29 α. ἀτμία was the
penalty involved in all these cases.

43. ἡ πείθειν: the inf. coming after c
an impersonal verbal often depends
on an implied δει even when no δεi
precedes. GMT. 925; H. 991 a.
Cf. Gorg. 492 δ, τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φης
οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οὖν δει εἶναι
ἐωτα δὲ αὐτάς ἡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν
αὐτάς ἀμόθεν ἃ ποθὲν ἐτοιμάζειν.

— ἢ...πέφυκε: quomodo ius-
tum comparatum sit, an expla-
nation of πείθειν, which implies διδά-
σκει (cf. Apol. 35 ε, διδασκει καὶ
πείθειν).

XIII. 1. σκόπει τοῖνυν κτέ.: an
application of the universal truth to
a particular instance.

2. ὀτι κτέ.: the relation of δίκαια
tο ἀ κτέ. is the same in which ἀλη-
θη of the clause preceding stands
to ταύτα. Supply an inf. govern-

15
νήσαντες, ἐκθρεψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταβόντες ἀπάντων 51

5 ὁ νοῦ τε ἕμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσιν πολίταις, ἀδραστεύομαι, ὑπειδίαν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἵδη τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ὥς ἄν μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἥμεις, ἔξειναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτῶν ἀπειναί ὅποι ἄν βούληται.

καὶ οὕδεις ἥμων τῶν νόμων ἐμποδῶν ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀπαγορεύει, ἕαν τε τις βούληται ἥμων εἰς ἀποικίαν ἑναί, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἥμεις τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, ἕαν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσε ποι ἐλθὼν, ἑναί ἐκεῖσθαι ὅποι ἄν βούληται ἐχοντα τὰ αὐτῶν. δὲ δ' ἂν ἥμων παραμείνῃ, ὁρών ὅν τρόπον ἡμῶν εἰμίν εστὶν ὁδ' ἀπαγορεύει, εάν τε τις βούληται ἤμοι εἰς ἀποικίαν ἑναί, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἥμεις καὶ τὴν πόλιν, εάν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσε ελθὼν ἥμων εἰς ἀποικίαν, ἀπαντᾷ ὁποί ἄν βούλησθαι ἄρεσκοιμεν ἤμεις, εἰναι εκείσεν ὑμῶν θεοί, εἰναι αὐτύς ἕμεις θεοί εἰναι καὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἡμῶν τρίχης μετοικεῖν, ὅτι τοὐ τε καὶ τά τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῆς πόλεως ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐν τῷ ἐπηκόον τῆς πόλεως τοῦτον ἔμοι ἑναί εἰναι τῶν σωμάτων τῆς πόλεως, εἰναι εἰς τοῦτον τὰς πόλεως τοῖς νόμοις, ἐναί ὅποι ἄν βούλησται εἰς καὶ ἵδη τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, εἰ ἄρεσκοιμεν ἤμεις τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, εάν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσε ελθὼν ἥμων εἰς ἀποικίαν ἑναί, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκοιμεν ἤμεις καὶ τὴν πόλιν, εάν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσε ελθὼν ἥμων εἰς ἀποικίαν, ἀρεσκοιμεν εἰς τοῖς νόμοις, εἰ ἄρεσκοιμεν ἤμεις τε καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἐναί ὅποι ἄν βούλησται εἰς καὶ ἵδη τὰ ἐν τῃ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ἐναί ὅποι ἄν βούλησται εἰς καὶ ἵδη τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ἐναί ὅποι ἄν βούλησται εἰς 

9. λαβόντα: the dat. might stand here, but cf. Symp. 176 d, Rep. iii. 414 a, Euthyph. 5 a, Eur. Heracl. 693, Soph. El. 479 ff., Aesch. Cho. 410 f., and Symp. 188 d, οὕδεις . . . πάσαν ἥμιν εὐδαιμονίαν παρασκευάζει καὶ ἄλλης δυνάμενος ὁμίλει καὶ φίλους εἴη τοῖς κρείττοσιν ἥμιν δεός, here is what makes ready for us all happiness, what makes us capable of being friends and familiars of our fellow-men and also of the gods, who are mightier than we. See G. 928, 1; H. 941.

11. ἕαν . . . βούληται . . . εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκομεν: ἕαν βούληται, as well as ὅποι ἄν βούληται in line 9 is a future supposition and depends on the future force of ἑναί in line 13 (cf. φίλοις in 8 above). Then εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκομεν comes in naturally as a vaguer supposition subordinated to the others. If any of you wants (shall want) to go off to a colony, supposing we and the state should not satisfy him. The notion of a citizen's not being suited by the law is so monstrous that it is stated as remotely as possible.

12. εἴνα τε μετοικεῖν: cf. 52 e, also the picturesque use of μετοικέως, Aesch. Pers. 319, and by Eurystheus, in speaking of his own body buried in foreign soil, Eur. Heracl. 1030 ff., θανόντα γὰρ μεθαφέθει οὖν τὸ μόρασμον, . . . καὶ εἰ μὲν εὖνοι καὶ πόλει σωτῆροι μέτοικοι ἐνείησομαι κατὰ χθόνος.
κριτών.

ΦΕΝΣΙ, καὶ ὅτι ὀμολογήσας ἦμῖν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται 51
οὔτε πείθει ἦμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέντων
ημῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιταττόντων ποιεῖν ἄ ἄν κελεύωμεν, 52
ἀλλὰ ἑφιέντων δυοῦν θάτερα, ἥ πείθεων ἦμᾶς ἥ ποιεῖν, τοῦ-
tων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

XIV. Ταύταις δὴ φαμεν καὶ σέ, Σώκρατες, ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνεξεσθαι, ἐπερ ποιήσεις ἀ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἡκιστά Αθη-

ναιών σέ, ἄλλ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἴπομι: διὰ
tι δῆ; ἦς ὁ μον δικαιῶς καθάπτουτο λέγοντες, ὡτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Αθη-

ναιών ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὀμολογηκὼς τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὀμολογίαν. Φαίεν γὰρ ἄν ὃτι, Ὄ Σώκρατες,

μεγάλα ἦμῖν τούτων τεκμηρία ἔστιν, ὡτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἡ

ήρεσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτὲ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθη-

ναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμημες, εἰ μή σοι
diapherontos ἥρεσκε, καὶ οὔτε ἐπί θεωρίαν πώποτ' ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως ἐξηλθες, [ὅτι μὴ ἀπαξ εἰς Ἰσθμὸν,] οὔτε ἄλλοσ ὀντε

οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μή ποι ὀπερευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδή-

19. ὀμολογήσας πείθεσθαι: not πεί-

σεσθαι, although πείθομαι would mean

about the same. See GMT. 100. 

Cf. 52 d below, where πολεμεῖσθαι is
twice used similarly, with 52 c in.

20. προτιθέντων ημῶν: η πείθομαι

ἡ πείθειν must be supplied from what

precedes. The same idea is then

expressed negatively and once again

positively. ἀρεσκὶν προτιθέναι is also

used, meaning to leave a man free to

choose. Socrates can never repeat

too often that the state is right, as

against those who seek to evade the

authority of its law. This fact ac-

counts for the clause which follows:

τοῦτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ, a mere repeti-

tion of οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἦμᾶς.

22. θάτερα: the notion of plurality

has here practically disappeared, as is

often true also in the case of ταύτα.
μίαν ἑποιήσω πώποτε ὡσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωποι, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σὲ ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδὲ ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, 15 ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἦμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὐτωσ' σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἤροῦ καὶ ἁμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσασθαι τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παίδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἑποιήσω ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τούνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκοῦσης τῆς 20 πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσης ποιῆσαι. οὐ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζον ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν εἰ δεοὶ τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλὰ ἤροὺ, ὡς ἐφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμᾶς τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθείραι, πράττεις τε ἀπερ ἀν δούλος αὐτοῦ 25 φαυλότατος πράξεων, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς ἔννοικάς τε καὶ τὰς ἁμολογίας, καθ' ἁς ἡμῖν ἔκασθον πολιτεύσασθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἠμῖν τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν φάσκεις σε ἐμοῦλογηκεναι πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἡμῖν ἄρα της πόλεως ἐπίχειρε καὶ δεικνύεις τιμῆσαι, εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκοῦσης τῆς πόλεως επιχειρείς, τότε ἐκούσης ποιῆσαι. συ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζον ώς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν εἰ δεοὶ τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλὰ ἤροὺ, ὡς ἐφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμᾶς τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθείραι, πράττεις τε ἀπερ ἀν δούλος αὐτοῦ 30 πρὸς ταῦτα, ὥς Κρίτων; ἀλλοὶ Μόροις; ἀλλοὶ τι ἡ ἁμολογώμεν; 14. εἰδέναι: added for the sake of clarity and precision. The result is that the preceding gen. seems to be a case of prolepsis. Cf. Hom. Il. ii. 720, τόξων εἰ εἴδοτες ἰμαχούσθαι. Soph. El. 542 f., ή τῶν ἐμῶν "Αἰδης τιν' ἱμερον τέκνων | ή τῶν ἐκείσθης ἐσχέ διαςασθαί πλέον. The subj. or obj. of the inf. is often put by anticipation as the obj. of its governing verb, noun, or adj. 17. καὶ... ἑποιήσω: is freed from its connexion with ἁμολόγεις, to which, however, τά τε ἄλλα is still attached. See on καὶ γέγονε, Apol. 36 a. This irregularity was hardly avoidable, since a participle would have been clumsy, and the idea does not suit a clause with ὡς. Accordingly it was hardly possible to subordinate it to πολιτεύεσθαι. 18. ἔτι τούνυν: transition to a new point, which, however, remains closely connected with the leading idea. 19. φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι: cf. Apol. 37 c and see on τιμᾶτα βανάτου, Apol. 38 b. 20. τότε μὲν: cf. Apol. 37 c—38 a. 21. ἐκαλλωπίζου: cf. Apol. 20 c, ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡμετέρας αἰσχραίνων ἰτ. 23. ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύ- νεῖ: not ashamed of those words, but, ashamed to face those words. H. 712. The words are personified and confront him with his disgrace. Cf. 46 b.
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. 183

ΣΩ. Ἀλλο τι οὖν ἄν φαίην ἣ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὔχ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας οὔδε ἀπατηθεῖσι, οὔδὲ ἐὰν ὁλίγῳ ἰχρών ἰᾶγκα.

35 σοθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐτέσων ἐβδομηκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξήν σοι ἀπίεναι, εἰ μὴ ἤρεσκομεν ἡμεῖς μὴδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι καὶ ὁμολογίαν ἦναι. οὐ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαιμονικαὶ μονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς ἐκ ἕκαστοτε φῆς εὐνομείς 

2 Ω. ἄν λλο τι οὖν ἀν φαΐεν η ἑνθηκας τὰς προς ἡμᾶς ἀντονς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὔτε ἦναι ἀνάγκῃς ὁμοβλογησάς ὁδε ἀπατηθεις ὁὐδὲ ἐκείνῳ χρονῳ ἰᾶγκα- 

35 σοθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐτέσων ἐβδομηκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξήν σοι ἀπίεναι, εἰ μὴ ἤρεσκομεν ἡμεῖς μὴδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι καὶ ὁμολογίαν ἦναι. οὐ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαιμονικαὶ μονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς ἐκ ἕκαστοτε φῆς εὐνομείς 

29. ἄλλα οὐ λόγῳ: not merely in your professions. That ὁμολογηκέναι is the verb with which ἦγη is connected appears from the context. Cf. 51 e.

30. ἀλλὰ τι ἡ: see on ἀλλὰ τι ἡ, Apol. 24 c, and cf. Phaed. 79 e quoted below.

32. ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς: without any reflexive meaning. Cf. Phaed. 79 a, ἀλλὰ τι ἡ μᾶν αὐτῶν τί το μὲν σωμά ἔστι, το δὲ ψυχή. But cf. 54 c.

35. ἐν ἐτέσων ἐβδομηκοντα: cf. Apol. 17 d. Socrates here speaks less accurately than in 51 d.

38. ὡς δὴ ἐκάστοτε κτ.: Plato, like many others, often praises these states, whose similar institutions were all of them based upon the common character due to their Dorian origin. In the Memorabilia, Xenophon, himself the ardent admirer of Sparta, reports various conversations where Socrates praises Dorian institutions. See (Mem. iii. 5. and iv. 4) his commendation of the strict obedience to law at Sparta and of the education which prepares men for it. The education of Spartan women was less admired and less admirable. Cf. Eur. Andr. 595 ff., οὐδ' ἂν εἰ βουλοῖτο τις σώφρων γένοιτο Σπαρτιτῶν κόρη...| δρόμους παλαστρας τ' οὐκ ἀνασχετος ἐμοί κοινας εχουσι. κατα θαυμάζειν χρεῶν ει μή γυναῖκας σώφρονας παιδεύετε;

40. ὅλαττο ἀπεδήμησας: cf. Phaedr. 230 c, where Phaedrus says to Socrates as they are taking a walk in the country: οὐ δὲ γε, ὡς εὐνομεῖς, ἀνασχετος τις φαίνει. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ξεναγομένης (a stranger come to see the sights in town) τινι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρφή ἑυκας· οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ λατεστος οὕτ' εἰς την ὑπερορίαν (foreign parts) ἀποδημεῖς, οὕτ' ἐξω τέχους ἔμοι γονεῖς το παράπαν ἔξιναι. Socrates answers: συγγίγνωσκε μοι, ὡς ἄριστε, φιλομαθῆς γὰρ εἰμι· τα μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τα δείνδρα οὐδὲν μ' ἠθέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ λατεστε ἐκθρονισθοίν. 43. δὴλον ὅτι: appended at the end of the sent. by way of emphasis without having any place in the const.
νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμένεις τοῖς ὁμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἦμιν γε 53
45 πείθη, ὡς Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἐσεὶ ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως ἐξελθὼν.

XV. Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτά
νων τι τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδε
ους τοὺς σαυτοῦ; ὥστε μὲν γὰρ κυνωνεύουσοι γέ σου οὐκ ἐπι
τηθείοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγεις καὶ στερηθήναι τῆς πόλεως ἢ
5 τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδὸν τι δὴλον· αὐτοῦ δὲ πρώτον
μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατα τινὰ πόλεων ελθης, ή Θῆβας ἢ
Μεγαρᾶς, —ἐνυμοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφότεροι—πολέμιοι ἦσεις,
ὡς Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὁσοιπερ κηδονται
τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψονται σε διαφθορέα ἤγομεν·

53 a See on ἄν ἄντων, Apol. 37 b. Η. 1049,
ἐνοκεν, οὐ σάφει 'ολ' ὅτι, κήρυξ. Αρ.
Clouds, ἀδικονωτ' ἀδικεισθάν καὶ κακω
γονωτ', 'ολ' ὅτι. Its stress is given
chiefly to καὶ ἤμεις οἱ νόμοι.
44. οὐκ ἐμμένεις: a more vivid form
of question than ἐμμένεις. The laws
give answer to their own question in
ἐάν ἦμιν γε πείθη, which implies ἀλλ’
ἐμμενείς. Socrates might have said
ἀλλ’ ἐμμενον.
45. καταγέλαστός: with reference
to his preceding operations. Cf. 52 c
above, σὺ δὲ τότε καὶ μὲν κτέ.
XV. 1. σκοτεί: prefixed to an
independent sent. just as ὅπος often
is. Cf. 47 a and Prot. 336 b. — παρα
βὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνων: this = ἐὰν παρα
βὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνης. The pres. marks
the continuance of the action.
5 b 5. σχεδὸν τι: this adv. use of τι
is common with πάνω, σχεδὸν, πλέον,
μᾶλλον and πολύ. — πρώτον μὲν: the
corresponding clause follows below
(d) in a different form. See on ἄλλα,
50 d.
7. Μέγαρᾶς: see App. and also G.
61; Η. 219. — ἐνυμοῦνται γὰρ: for the
facts, see on ἄν δὴ ἐκάστοτε, 52 e, and
cf. Soph. O. C. 919 ff., καίτοι σε Θήβα
γ’ οὐκ ἐπαίδευσαν κακόν· ὃς γὰρ φιλο-
νιν ἄνδρας ἐκδίκουν τρέφειν. In Thebes,
before and during the Peloponnesian
war, there was a moderate oligarchy
(διαρχία ἴσονος, different from the
δυναστεία ὀλίγων of the time of the
Persian wars) in political sympathy
with Sparta. Megara also had an
oligarchical form of government, and
had been, since the battle of Coroneia
(447 B.C.), on the Spartan side.
8. τούτων: referring either to the
cities (instead of ἐν τούτων) or to
xxiii. 319, ἥδ’ ἦς Τηλέπυλον Λαιστρ
γονίην ἄφικοντο, | ο’ νηάς τ’ ὀλείσαν καὶ
ἐκμηθματὰ σταῖρον; | ὃς δὲ Ἐλληνες ὧν
9. ὑποβλέψονται: suggestive of the
Homerικό ὑπόδρα ἱδ' ὁδ. “They will look
upon you with suspicion.” The im-
plication of suspicion is conveyed by
the ὕπο in ὑφοράν, ὑποψία, as in Xen.
Ἀν. ii. 4. 10, οἱ δὲ Ἐλληνες ὧφοράν
τες τούτους αὐτὸι ἐρ’ ἑαυτῶν ἔχουσιν
ἡγεμόνας ἄχοντες.
10 νοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν 53 ὅστε δοκεῖν ὅρθως τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὅστις γὰρ νόμων καὶ διαφθορέως ἔστι, σφόδρα τὸν δοκεῖν ἀν νέων γε καὶ ἀνωτῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφθορέως εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τὰς τε εὐνομομένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτά·
15 τους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἀρα ἀξίων σοι ξῆν ἔσται; ἣν πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυνθήσεις διαλεγόμενοι—τῶν λόγων, ὅ Σωκρατες; ἡ οὔστος ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετή καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὖν οἰεὶ ἀσχημονὲν ἀν φανεῖσθαι
20 τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πράγμα; οἶεσθαί γε χρή. ἂλλ᾿ ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρείς, ἦξεις δὲ εἰς Θεταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ἕξενους τοὺς Κρίτωνος: ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἡ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἢσως ἄν ἠδέως σου ἁκούοιεν ὡς γελοίως ἐκ τοῦ διαμιμητρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες σκευήν τε τῶν περίθε·
25 μενος, ἡ διφθέραν λαβών ἡ ἄλλα οία δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευά·

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. 185

10. καὶ βεβαιώσεις κτέ.: δόξα and dòxai in the same sense, as in 44 c. "Indicibus opinionem confirmabimus ut recte videantur tulisse sententiam." Wolf.

17. ἦ: see App.

19. ἂν φανεῖσθαι: see on οὖν ἂν ποιησόντος, Apol. 30 b.

20. τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πράγμα: little more than a periphrasis for Σωκράτης. Cf. τὸ σὺν πράγμα, Apol. 20 c.; Hippiocr. Ma. 296 e, φαίλον γὰρ ἄν εἰς τὸ ἐμὸν πράγμα καὶ ἰδιωτικὸν, I should be a wretched ignoramus. Eur. Heracl. 57 f., οὐ γὰρ τις ἔστω διὰ φάροθι αἴρεσαι | τὴν σὴν ἀρχείον δύναμιν ἀντ' ἐνυρνίσικος.—οἰεσθαί γε χρή: a very common way of answering one's own question. Cf. 54 b.

22. ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἥ: κτέ.: Socrates speaks as if the fact were familiar to Crito. The nobles of Thessaly were rich and hospitable, and bore the reputation of being violent and licentious. Some light is thrown upon the whole subject by the character of Meno given by Xenophon, An. ii. 6. 21 ff. Cf. also Dem. i. 22, τά τῶν Θεταλίων ἀπίστα ἡν δῆτον φύσει καὶ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις. This chiefly relates to their political character. Cf. also the ironical words of Socrates on the Thessalians in Plato's Meno, 70 a b.

24. σκευὴν τε τῶν κτέ.: to this first clause the disjunctive ἡ διφθέραν ἡ ἄλλα is subordinated. The διφθέρα was, according to the Schol. on Ar. Nub. 73, a ποιμενικόν περιβόλαν. σκευὴ and ἐνσκευάζεσθαι refer to change of costume, and are also used of the costumes of actors. Cf. Ar. Achar. 383 f., where Dicaeopolis, before beginning his defence, says: νῦν οὖν με πρῶτον πρὶν λέγειν ἔσαστε ἐνσκευάζα·
ζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας: ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνήρ, συμκρού χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὁντος ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἐτόλμησας ὡς αἰσχρῶς ἐπὶ-θυμεῖν ἥν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβᾶς, οὐδεὶς δὲ ἐρεῖ;

30 ἵσως, ἄν μὴ τω ἔλπις· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀκούσει, δὲ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχύμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων· ὥς ποιῶν ἡ εὐωχύμενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ, ὥστε ἐπὶ δείπνον ἀποδεδημηκὼς εἰς Θετταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποιῆσαι, ἦν καὶ τούτῳ ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ,

σαλμὸν ἔλευσαν. Cf. also ibid. 436. σχῆμα, on the other hand, relates to the other disguises of face and figure necessary to complete the transformation.

28. ὡς τὸ εἰκός: that is according to the law of nature. — ἐτόλμησας: see on τόλμης, Apol. 38 d, and App.

29. οὐδεὶς δὲ: will there be nobody to say this? i.e. "absolutely every one," expressed interrogatively. Here, as in many common idioms, the verb "to be" is omitted.

30. εἰ δὲ μὴ: otherwise. See GMT. 478; H. 906, 6. — ἀκούσει...ἀνάξια: like ἀκούειν κακά (ὑπὸ τινος) is the passive of λέγειν κακά. Cf. 50 e. The καὶ between πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια should not be translated.

31. δὴ: accordingly. He must make up his mind to it, he has no choice.

32. καὶ δουλεύων: better understood absolutely than with an implied dat. Here we have a blunt statement of the fact which Socrates had in mind in saying ὑπερχύμενος. — τῷ τοῦτῳ η λέγειν: the partic. goes with the verb of the foregoing clause. This cannot be reproduced in Eng., "in fact how can you live there except in one continual round of revelry, as if you had come to Thessaly to eat and drink." No ἄλλο is needed after τί.

35. ἄλλα δὴ: a new objection raised and answered by the laws themselves in respect of what Crito said, 45 c-46 a. — ἄλλα: relates to the preceding thought: of course these sayings are nowhere, "but are you actually willing?" etc. See on Apol. 37 e.

38. ίνα καὶ τοῦτο κτῆ.: i.e. in addition to all other obligations. ἀπολαῦσαι is often used, as here, ironically. How a Greek looked upon exile is plain from passages like Eur. El. 1311 ff., οὐχ ἦδ’ | οἰκτρά. Δι. πέπουθεν, πλὴν ὅτι λείπει πόλιν Ἀργείων. Ὀρ. καὶ τίνες ἄλλαι στοναχαί μεῖζον | ἡ γῆς πατρίδος ὅριον ἐκλείπειν; and Phoen. 388 ff., where Polynices, answering Iocasta's question, τί τὸ στέρεσθαι πατρίδος; ἡ κακὸν μέγα; σαυς μέγιστον ἄργον δ’ ἐστὶ μεῖζον ἡ λόγος. Cf. Richard II. i. 3,—
αυτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζωντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ 54
40 παιδεύσονται, μη ξυνόντος σοῦ αυτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτηδείων
οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον εὰν εἰς Θετταλίαν
ἀποδημήσης ἐπιμελήσονται, εὰν δὲ εἰς "Αἰδοῦ ἀποδημή-
σης οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἰπερ γε τι ὀφελος αὐτῶν ἐστι
τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι, οὔσθαί γε χρή.  b

XVI. 'Αλλ', ὦ ᾽Σώκρατε, πειθόμενος ἡμῶν τοῖς σοῖς
tροφεῦσι μῆτε πάϊδας περὶ πλεόνος ποιοῦ μῆτε τὸ ζην
μῆτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ὅνα εἰς "Αἰδοῦ ἐλθῶν
ἐχὴς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσεασθαι τοῖς ἑκεὶ ἀρχουσιν.
5 οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἀμενον
εἰσὶν οὔδε δικαιότερον οὔδε δυσώτερον, οὔδε ἄλλο τῶν σῶν
οὔδεν, οὔτε ἑκεῖστε ἀφικόμενος ἀμενον ἐσται. ἀμα μὲν
μὴν ἡδικημένος ἀπεί, εὰν ἀπίς, οὐχ ὑπ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων
ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώτων· εὰν δὲ ἐξέλθης οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀντα-
10 δικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας
τε καὶ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργα-

54 What is my sentence then but speechless
death,
Which robs my tongue from breathing na-
tive breath?

and Dante, Paradiso, xvii., —
Thou shalt abandon everything beloved
Most tenderly, and this the arrow is
Which first the bow of banishment shoots
forth.

Cf. also many well-known passages in
the Odyssey, e.g. Od. i. 58, ἰέμενος καλ
κατειν ἀποδήσκοντα νοήσαι ἂς γαῖς,
ix. 27 f., οὗ τοι θεό γε ἄς γαῖς δύνα-

39. θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται: see
on ἐνεξεσθαί, 52 a.
44. τῶν . . . ἐναι: explanation of
αὐτῶν. so is not to be connected
b with φασκόντων. —οὔσθαί γε χρή: cf.
53 c.
Soon shall the country rejoice in the dance;
Soon with his revellers Bacchus advance;
Into the hills, the hills shall he fare,
Joining the host of his women-folk there.
Far from their homes and their weaving
they came,
Goaded by Bacchus and stung by his name.

O wild Curetes' vaulted lair!
O hallowed haunts of Crete!
Where new-born Zeus found faithful care,
And kind protection meet
In caverns safe from every snare.

Corybantes, wearing helms three-rimmed,
Stretched skins to make my drum's full round;
Then they, in hollowed caves, lithe-limbed,
With drums, and, with the flute's shrill sound
Full Phrygian, bacchic ditties hymned.

Sing Dionysus, and praised let him be;
Beat ye the deep-sounding drums as of old;
Sing to the Evian god evoe!
Greet him with Phrygian cries, and let flutes Trill in your revels and ripple shrill joy;
Instruments holy the holy employ.

5. ὅσα γε κτέ.: a limitation added to soften the assertion. See on ὅσα γε τάνθρωπεα, 46 ε. No obj. is needed with λέγης. λέγειν παρὰ κτέ. comes
ΣΩ. Ἐα τοίνυν, Ὡ Κρῖτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτῃ, ἐπεὶ δὴ ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

54 very near the meaning of ἀντίλέγειν. 
Cf. 48 d. Cf. also the omission of the obj. ἐμεί with the preceding ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι κτέ.

8. ἔα: used abs. with a following subjv. or inv. to dismiss a matter under discussion. Cf. Charm. 163 e, ἔα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ· μὴ γὰρ πω τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν σκοπῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὅ σὺ λέγεις νῦν. Euthyd. 302 c, ἔα, ὡς Διονυσόδωρε, εὐφήμει τε καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶ ὑμ. προδίδασκε.—ταύτῃ: the repetition of the same word is effective.

9. ὁ θεὸς: see on τῇ θεῷ, Apol. 19 a. Here, as at the end of his defence proper, Apol. 35 d, and at the end of his closing words in court, Apol. 42 a, Socrates mentions ὁ θεὸς. Dante closes each one of the three parts of his great poem with a reference to the stars. This is no accident in either case, though Plato had a philosopher's reason which Dante could not give, except for the closing line of the Paradiso, which is ὁ θεὸς translated into the language of the poet, "I' Amor che muove il Sole e l' altre stelle," The love which moves the sun and the other stars.
MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.

Since all the extant Mss. of Plato follow or attempt to follow Thrasyllus in his subdivision into nine tetralogies or groups consisting of four members each, and since Thrasyllus was instructor to the emperor Tiberius, it follows that the origin of no Ms. of Plato now known to exist can be assigned to a date much earlier than the middle of the first century A.D. The following is a table exhibiting Thrasyllus’s tetralogies, and also naming the best Ms. in which each tetralogy is preserved:

| II | Cratylus. | Theaetetus. | Sophist. | Statesman. | “” “” |
| IV | Alcibiades I. | Alcibiades II. | Hipparchus. | Anterastae. | “” “” |
| V | Theages. | Charmides. | Laches. | Lysis. | “” “” |
| VI | Euthydemus. | Protagoras. | Gorgias. | Meno. | “” “” |

Of the three Mss., the most trustworthy is Clarkianus, and the least trustworthy is Venetus T. Schanz constructs the pedigree of the existing Mss. of Plato, and traces them all to an original or Archetypus. This parent Ms. consisted of two volumes: Vol. I. contained the first seven tetralogies; Vol. II. contained the last two tetralogies, together with a number of works attributed with more or less confidence to Plato. The copies made of Vol. I. were of two kinds, (1) incomplete, omitting the seventh tetralogy, and (2) complete. The best Ms. now preserved represents an incomplete copy of Vol. I. of the Archetypus; this is the codex Clarkianus, the capital authority for the first six tetralogies. The complete copy of Vol. I. is represented by the much less trustworthy codex Venetus T, the best authority for the seventh tetralogy.

The best representative of Vol. II. of the Archetypus is codex Parisinus A.
The leading facts about these three Mss. are as follows: —

I. **Codex Clarkianus**, referred to by the single letter B for brevity's sake and because the Ms. is called also *Bodleianus*. It is now in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and is "the fairest specimen of Grecian caligraphy which has descended to modern times." Daniel Clarke found this Ms., in October, 1801, in the library of a monastery on the island of Patmos. It was beautifully written on parchment, in the year 896 A.D., by a skilful scribe, one Joannes, for the use of Arethas, who afterwards became archbishop of Caesarea. See M. Schanz, *Novae Commentationes Platonicae*, pp. 105-118; and Daniel Clarke, *Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa*.

II. **Codex Venetus T**, Bekker's t. This Ms. is now in the Library of St. Mark's in Venice, and is chiefly valuable where the Clarkianus entirely fails, *i.e.* for the seventh tetralogy. For a more detailed account, see M. Schanz, *Ueber den Platocodex der Marcus-Bibliothek in Venedig*; also the preface to Vol. IX. of the same author's critical edition of Plato's works. The date of this Ms. is very uncertain.

III. **Parisinus A**, No. 1807 (formerly 94 and 2087). This Ms. is now in the National Library at Paris; it was probably written early in the tenth century after Christ. It comprises the eighth and ninth tetralogies of Thrasyllus, together with seven spurious dialogues. The Clitophon, with which it begins, is numbered twenty-nine. See M. Schanz, *Studien zur Geschichte des Platonischen Textes*, and the general introduction to his critical edition of Plato's works. There are many other Mss. of Plato, for some account of which also see Schanz in his general introduction, and in Bursian's *Jahresbericht* (9, 5, 1, pp. 178-188), where he summarizes his results and defends them against Jordan and Wohlrab.

**Important Editions of Plato's Complete Works.**


In all modern editions of Plato, numbers and letters which refer to the pages of the edition of *Stephanus* are found in the margin. This is the most convenient mode of reference, and is now universally employed to the exclusion of the less well-established subdivision into chapters. The edition of Stephanus (Henri Estienne) is in three volumes, but to give the volume is superfluous, since the name of the dialogue is given in every reference. Each page is divided into five parts by the letters (a) b c d e placed down the margin.
Platonis Dialogi. (Gr. et Lat.) Ex recensione Imm. Bekker. 3 Partes. in 8 Voll. Commentaria crit. et scholia. 2 Voll. Berolini, 1816–1823. (This edition contains the first systematic collation of Mss., and the result is a great improvement upon the Stephanus text.)


Platonis Opera omnia. Rec. prolegomenis et comment. illustr. Gdfr. Stallbaum. 10 Voll. Lipsiae, 1827–1877. (In the Bibliotheca Graeca of Jacobs and Rost.)


Platonis Dialogi secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi. Ex recognitione Caroli Friderici Hermanni. 6 Voll. Lipsiae (1851, 1853), 1873, 1874.


Important or convenient editions of the Apology and of the Crito.


Platonis Apologia, Socratis et Crito. Ed. V. aliquanto auct. et. emendat. quam cur. M. Wohlrab. Lipsiae (1827), 1877. (This is Vol. I., Section 1, of Teubner’s ten-volume publication of Stallbaum’s complete Plato mentioned above.)
The APOLOGY OF PLATO, with a revised text and English notes, and a digest of Platonic idioms. By the Rev. James Riddell, M.A. Oxford, 1867.


Plato's APOLOGY OF SOCRATES AND CRITO, with notes. By W. Wagner. Cambridge, England, 1869. (Boston, 1877.)

Platon's Verteidigungsrede des Socrates und Kriton. Erklärt von Dr. Christian Cron. Achte Auflage. Leipzig, 1882. (This edition is the basis of the present work, and is the first part of an edition of the selected works of Plato, edited for the use of schools by Dr. Cron and Dr. Julius Deuschle.)
CRITICAL NOTES.

These notes are Dr. Cron's necessary explanation of the text which he has adopted. Where departures have been made from Dr. Cron's text, they are in turn discussed. The first reading is the one adopted in this edition. B denotes Codex Clarkianus (= Bodleianus). T denotes Codex Venetus T. S denotes the reading adopted by Schanz, W that adopted by Wohlrab. Bem. denotes Dr. Cron's "Kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen zu Platons Apologie, Criton, und Laches. Separat Abdr. aus dem fünften Supplement-band der Jahrb. für classische Philologie," pp. 64–132. Leipzig, 1864. Teubner.

APOLOGY.

17 a, p. 55 (1). ὁ τί: with S. Cron writes ὅτι, following the analogy of ὅστις, ἦτις, but ὁ τί is unquestionably needed for clearness.

17 b, p. 56 (13). γούν: with inferior Ms. and B (second hand). οὖν, B (first hand) and Cron following S.

17 b, p. 56 (14). δὲ μου: δ' εμοῦ, SW with Heindorf.

17 c, p. 57 (17). ἀλλ' : with Bessarion's Ms. (Venetus E). ἀλλά, Cron and S following B.

17 c, p. 57 (18). ὄνομασι: with B. ὄνομασιν, Cron and S with Bessarion's Ms. and Venetus 185 (Bekker's Π).

17 d, p. 58 (27). πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα: Cron with S following B omits the πλείω, which is found only in inferior Ms. Hermann adopted πλείω ἐβδομη­κοντα.

18 a, p. 59 (31). ὃς γέ μοι: with S. ὃς γ' ἐμοῖ, W.

18 a, p. 59 (2). ψευδή κατηγορημένα: ψευδή κατηγορημένα, S with Hirschig.

18 a, p. 59 (4). γεγο'νασι: with the best Mss. γεγο'νασιν, Cron following S. There are marks of correction in B and other Mss., but no Mss. cited by S reads γεγονασιν.

18 b, p. 60 (9). ἐμοῦ: the Mss. read ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδέν ἀληθεῖς. Hermann bracketed μᾶλλον... ἀληθεῖς as a gloss, while the Zürich edition lets the words stand. S writes ἐμοῦ μᾶ τὸν... οὐδὲν ἀληθεῖς. Bekker and Stallbaum, following Mss. of slight value, read ἐμοῦ οὐδέν ἀληθεῖς. The suggestion of Schanz is the best unless these words are simply to be cut out. Riddell says "the rhythm would be intolerable without the three words μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθεῖς."

18 b, p. 60 (10). φροντιστῆς: Albert von Bamberg (Fleckeisen's Jahrbücher,
113, 10) proposes to cut out φροντιστής, because no exact parallel to this acc. of the dir. obj. has been found in prose. So far he is right, even against Krüger's citation of various adjs. joined with εἶναι, for such combinations are very closely akin to verbal forms. On the other hand, to make such a point of the distinction between the indir. (or remoter) obj. which Bamberg would allow, and the dir. obj. which he proposes to disallow, is to ignore the difference in this particular between Greek and Latin syntax. In the shifting of voice from act. to pass., for instance, the distinction between dir. and indir. obj. is far less scrupulously defined in Greek than in Latin. To be sure Xenophon twice uses the gen. with φροντιστής (cf. Symp. 6. 6, τῶν μετεώρων φροντιστής and Mem. iv. 7. 6, τῶν οὐρανῶν φροντιστής). It should be remembered that consistency may be too much insisted upon. Furthermore ἀπαξ εἰρημένα are not surprising in a speech, which, like the Apology, aims to give Socrates's personal hobbies in language as in thought.

18 c, p. 61 (12). οἱ ταύτην: Heindorf. ταύτην, W following the Mss.
18 c, p. 61 (13). άκουόντες: άκουόντες, S following B (first hand).
18 d, p. 62 (21). κωμῳδοποιός: with S following B. Elsewhere κωμῷδοποιός (τραγῳδοποιός) is found in the best Mss.
18 e, p. 63 (32). Uhlig quotes (Rhein. Mus. 19, 1, and Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 121, 10) the authority of several grammarians to prove that the exclamation ἐδεν has no connexion with ἐίναι. He maintains that it is and always was an interjection, and that there was originally an aspirate at the beginning of the second syllable, like εὐόι, εὐάν (bacchic interjections), and the Attic ταώς.

19 c, p. 65 (13). σοφός ἐστι· μη φύγωμι: with Riddell. σοφός ἐστι, μη φύγωμι, Cron.
19 d, p. 66 (19). μικρόν: with Cron and S following B. σμικρόν, inferior Mss. Judging from other cases, cf. below (28 b) and in the Crito (46 a), σμικρόν and μικρόν have about equal claims in any given place.

19 d, p. 66 (1). οὐδὲν ἐστίν: with S. οὐδὲν [ἐστίν], Cron. οὐδὲν ἐστίν, W.
19 e, p. 67 (7). οἷος τ' ἐστίν: [οἷος τ' ἐστίν], S.
19 e, p. 67 (9). πείθουσι: πείθουσιν, S.
20 a, p. 67 (10). σφίσι: with B (second hand) and other Mss. σφίσιν, Cron following S with B (first hand).
20 a, p. 67 (17). καλῷ τε καὶ ἄγαθῳ: following B with S W. Venetus T reads καλῷ κἀγαθῷ. In his preface to Vol. II., Schanz very emphatically rejects the reading of B and defends T, but he has not the courage of his convictions, and finally retains the reading of B.

20 c, p. 68 (26). ἔχει: B. ἔχει, S W.
20 c, p. 69 (5). εἰ μή τι ... πολλοί: [εἰ μή τι ... πολλοί], S and Cobet. Bobrik (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 113, 6) argues against bracketing the words, "that the meaning of περιττών is quantitative while that of ἀλλοίον is qualitative." S (Bursian's Jahresbericht, 9, 5, 1, p. 188) is not convinced.
CRITICAL NOTES.

20 d, p. 69 (8). ἔστιν: ἔστιν, S W — "ἔστιν (v erasa) B D," S.
20 d, p. 69 (8). τεταράκτον: τεταράκτον, S W.
20 e, p. 70 (18). μηδὲ ἄνω: with Heusde (Spec. crit. p. 11). μηδὲ ἄνω, Cron following S with B.
20 e, p. 70 (20). τὸν λέγοντα: τὰ λεξέντα, Liebhold.
20 e, p. 71 (21). ἔστιν: ἔστιν, S W.
21 a, p. 71 (23). ἐταίρος τε καλ: [ἐταίρος τε καλ], S with Ludwig. Müller-Strübing gives at too great length (Fleckseis’s Jahrb. 121, 2) his too ingenious account of Ar. Clouds, 1072 ff.; but in a note (pp. 90, 91) he very acutely suggests that Σφηττιός was a nickname bestowed by Aristophanes in the Clouds upon Chaerephon, "πικρολ γάρ οί Σφηττιοι καί συκοφάντας," Schol. on Ar. Plut. 720. Cf. Laches, 197 c, fin., with Stallbaum’s note.
21 c, p. 73 (11). σοφώτερος ἔστιν: with S W. But the reading of B, as Gaisford specifically says, is ἔστι.
21 c, p. 73 (14). καὶ διαλέγομενοι αὐτῷ: [καὶ διαλέγομενοι αὐτῷ], S. Wex includes these words in the parenthesis and connects them with πρὸς ἐν κτέ.
21 d, p. 74 (23). έουκά γ’ οὖν: with Bäumlein. έουκά γ’ οὖν, S W.
21 e, p. 74 (2). καὶ λυπούμενος: [καὶ] λυπούμενος, S with Cobet.
22 b, p. 77 (17). μάλιστα: Schanz (Philol. 28, 3, p. 556) suggests κάλλιστα without venturing to introduce it into the text. With this use of μάλιστα might be compared Hor. Sat. i. 10, 58, Versiculós magis factos et euntes mollius.
22 c, p. 78 (29). τῷ αὕτῳ: τῷ αὕτῳ αὐτῷ, S with Bekker following inferior Mss. See, however, Heindorf’s Annotatio critica in Apologiam Socratis, p. IX. Berolini MDCCCV.
22 d, p. 78 (7). καὶ... δημοφυγοργόι: [καὶ... δημοφυγοργόι], S with Hirschig.
23 c, p. 82 (8). οὖξ αὐτοῖς: οὖξ αὐτοῖς, W following inferior Mss. with H. Stephanus and Engelhardt, who refers αὐτοῖς, of course, to the young. But it is by no means natural that men who are found out should not be angry with their discoverers. Their natural anger is, however, turned against Socrates, the real instigator of their discomfiture. Socrates is not saying that they should not be angry with him, but rather urges that they should be angry with themselves, i.e. with their own conceit of knowledge. This is the meaning demanded by the context, see d below, ad fin. Further, τούτων would give the sense required by W far more clearly than αὐτοῖς.
23 d, p. 82 (11). ἀγνοούσιν: ἀμφιγνοούσιν, S. ἀπορούσιν, Ast. Cobet ex-
punishes the words ἀλλ’ ἀγνοοῦσιν. There is, however, no sound objection either to the way in which the words are introduced or to the words themselves.

23 c, p. 83 (15). οἴματι: with Stallbaum. οἴματι, Cron following S and all good Mss. In this chapter B has οἴματι twice, see lines 5 and 17. It looks like superstition to write οἴματι here.

23 e, p. 83 (17). ἐμνηταγμένως: ἐμνηταγμένως, S with Hermann following Bessarion's Ms.

23 e, p. 83 (22). καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν: [καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν], S with Cobet.

24 a, p. 84 (30). ἵστι: Cron and S write ἵστιν because there are traces of erasure in B.

24 b, p. 84 (5). ὡσπέρ: ὡς, Rieckher.

24 d, p. 86 (5). τοιτοις: els τοιτοις, S with Cobet. See Kr. Spr. 48, 11, 4.

24 e, p. 86 (14). ποιοῦσι: Cron, following S writes ποιοῦσι because of traces of erasure in B; similar traces after ἐλοι in this line do not lead them to write ἐλοιν.

25 a, p. 87 (19). οἱ ἐκκλησιασταῖ: [οἱ ἐκκλησιασταῖ], S with Hirschig and Cobet. See Bem. p. 93.

25 c, p. 88 (1). πότερον ἐστιν: with the Mss. πότερον ἐστιν, S W.

25 c, p. 88 (3). ὥσταν: with S, who deviates but little from ὥσταν, the reading of B. ὥσταν, Cron. W reads ὥσταν. Krause explains it as meaning ὥσταν Ζεῦ.

25 d, p. 89 (7). ἀποκρίνον: ἀποκρίναι, W.

25 e, p. 89 (19). ἦν, εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων: εἰ διαφθείρω ἄκων, S with Stephanus Naber reads ἦν, εἰ διαφθείρω, διαφθείρω ἄκων.

26 a, p. 89 (21). καὶ ἄκουσιν: bracketed as a gloss by S with Cobet.

26 a, p. 90 (24). ἐ: ο, S. Heindorf reads ἐ... ποιῶ, ποιῶν.


26 c, p. 91 (10). τοιτοις: with B (second hand) and Vaticanus 1029 (Bekker's τ). Cron following S writes τοιτοις with Venetus 185 (Bekker's Π). τοιτοις, B.

26 c, p. 91 (18). ἀλλ': with Bessarion's Ms. Cron following S writes ἀλλά with B and other Mss.

26 d, p. 92 (20). 'Αναξαγόρον: ['Αναξαγόρον], S. Baiter requires Ἀκράτους.

26 e, p. 93 (26). ἐκ τῆς δράχμης πριαμένοις: Birt (Das antike Buchweisen, Berlin, 1882, p. 434, Rem. 4) says, “The notion that these writings were themselves sold ἐν τῇ δράχμῃ is not conveyed here, for, if so, why should ἄνιστε have been used? In fact, καὶ δῆ καὶ appears to the βιβλία something else which is sold for a drachma and which, therefore, cannot have been the βιβλία.”

26 e, p. 94 (28). σω δοκῶ... νομίζειν: σω [δοκῶ] ... νομίζει, S who follows B in respect of νομίζει.
27 b, p. 95 (10). ἐγώ σοι: following B. ἐγώ σοι, S W with Heindorf. As the emphasis is wholly on ἐγώ, there seems to be no good reason for disregarding the reading of B.

27 e, p. 98 (30). [ἡ] καὶ ὁνων, τοὺς ἡμιόνους: with S. η [κα] ὁνων [τοὺς ἡμιόνους], Cron. A change of some kind is unavoidable; the least possible change is to bracket η with Forster, who is followed by Heindorf and Cobet. This yields perfectly good sense, better, in fact, than Cron obtains by bracketing καὶ and τοὺς ἡμιόνους.

27 e, p. 98 (32). ταῦτα ... τὴν γραφὴν ταὐτὴν: with S. ταῦτα ... τὴν γραφὴν ταὐτὴν, Cron. S and Cron agree that both expressions cannot stand. S is probably right in saying that not τὴν γραφὴν ταὐτὴν but ταῦτα should be bracketed, as a gloss added to explain ἀποπειρώμενος.

27 e, p. 98 (35). οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ: οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, S W. Wecklein says (Rhein. Mus. 36, 1, p. 145), “Any one who grasps the argument summarized at this point in the Apology ought to agree to the following completion of it: ὅπως δέ συ τέκνα πείθοις ... ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεία [καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεία] ἤγεισθαι καὶ αὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ [μήτε δαιμόνια μήτε θεία] μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεός, οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν.” Goebel, in the Programm of the Gymnasium at Fulda, first rejects all the interpretations made with a view to retaining οὐ before τοῦ αὐτοῦ, and then proceeds to defend it by arguing that πείθοις is used in an absolute sense, while the clause beginning with ὡς he takes as a causal parenthesis. The chief objection to this explanation is that it explains the whole sentence away, leaving it not a leg to stand on. It is better, therefore, to reject οὐ and to consider that μήτε ἡρωας was added along with the rest in Meletus’s anxiety to make his charge of irreligion a sweeping one. A religious-minded Athenian certainly believed in gods and in heroes. The term δαιμόνες, since the precise meaning of the word was hard to fix, might — so far as Meletus’s immediate purpose went — have been omitted, but the preceding δαιμόνια make its introduction here indispensable. On Meletus’s ascription to Socrates of belief in δαιμόνια is based Socrates’s assertion that so far from being an atheist, he believes like any other Greek in gods and demi-gods, called δαιμόνες or more commonly ἡρωας.

27 e, p. 98 (36). αὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ: αὐ [τοῦ αὐτοῦ], S with Hirschig.

27 e, p. 98 (36). μήτε ἡρωας: bracketed as a gloss by S.

28 a, p. 98 (7). καὶ ἄλλοις: καλοῖς, S with Hirschig.

28 b, p. 99 (15). πρᾶττη: πρᾶττη τι, W following Mss.

28 c, p. 100 (21). ὁ παῖ: S omits these words which are added in the margin of B.

28 d, p. 100 (31). ταξιν ἡ: with B and other best Mss. Cron following S writes ταξιν with Bessarion’s Ms., strengthened by various authors who quote ταξιν, omitting the ἡ.

29 a, p. 103 (9). δεινὸν ταῦ: δεινὸν ταῦ, S W.

29 b, p. 104 (22). ἀδικεῖν: Otto Erdmann proposes (Fleckeisen’s Jahrb. 119, 5, p. 412) to substitute ἀπεσταίν.
CRITICAL NOTES.

29 c, p. 105 (31). Διαφθαρήσονται: following B. Διαφθαρησοντο, Hirschig following Bessarion’s Ms.


29 d, p. 106 (43). άλογυνη: B. αλογυνη, other Mss.

29 d, p. 106 (43). ἐπιμελουμενος: B. ἐπιμελομενος, Bessarion’s Ms.


30 b, p. 107 (59). λέγων οὐκ: λέγων, ὦτι οὐκ, W.


30 c, p. 109 (6). οἴον ἐγὼ λέγω: Wecklein (Rh. Mus. 33, 2, p. 307) requires οἴον ἐν ἐγὼ λέγω, because these words are to be closely connected with the detailed statement that follows, προσκείμενον . . . μισοτος, 30 e. But Socrates plainly has this thought in mind already, as is proved by his postponing its amplification until after another thought introduced with ἐμε μὲν γαρ has been developed. The point is that ἐμε μὲν γαρ κτε is also in the closest connexion with the leading idea τοιούτον οντα.


30 e, p. 110 (19). [ὑπο του θεου]: S with Hirschig. ὑπο του θεου, Riddell.

30 e, p. 110 (21). ὑπο μισοτος τινος: unless ὑπο του θεου above is bracketed, this comes in very awkwardly.

30 e, p. 110 (21). οἴον is taken by Goebel as a neuter, and he does not connect ος with τοιούτον τινα, but with ἐμε. He does not urge that the other way is ungrammatical, but apparently he thinks that the sense is in favor of his explanation. His argument is hardly convincing.

31 a, p. 111 (29). διατελοιτ’ αν: διατελοιτε αν, Cron following S with the best Mss.

31 a, p. 111 (30). ἐπιπέμψειε: with B and other Mss. Cron following S writes ἐπιπέμψειεν on the authority of Venetus 185 (Bekker’s Π) and of an erasure in B.

31 b, p. 111 (37). μέντοι: μέν, S with Cobet and Hermann.


31 c, p. 112 (2). πολυπραγμονω: πολυπραγμονων, S following inferior Mss.

31 d, p. 113 (6). [φωνη]: bracketed by Forster, whom F. A. Wolf followed.

31 d, p. 113 (12). πολαι: bracketed by S with Cobet.

32 a, p. 113 (18). ἀλλα: with S and Bessarion’s Ms. ἀλλα, Cron.

32 a, p. 114 (5). ἁμα ἀπολογμην: with S, who now appeals to Venetus T. ἁμα καλ ἁμα αν, Cron following B. S, previously to his collation of Venetus T, argued as follows: “Plato scripsit ἁμα, quo cum dittographia ἁμα αν conjuncta est; inde lectionum varietas nata; αν ex antecedentibus posse suppleri notum.”

32 b, p. 115 (8). 'Ἀντίοχος: bracketed by Hirschig and S. The preceding ημων certainly makes it plausible that 'Ἀντίοχος may have been introduced as a marginal gloss. See Bem. p. 104.

32 b, p. 117 (12). ἡμαντιωθην: ἡμαντιωθην ημων, W. Döring (Fleckeisen’s
Jahrb. 119, 1, p. 15) supposes that Horace had this passage (chap. xx.) in his mind when he wrote the third ode of the third book of his Odes.

32 b, p. 117 (13). [καὶ ἑναντία ἐψηφισάμην]: Hermann brackets these words but W believes them to be genuine. If they are retained, it follows either (1) that Socrates was not (in spite of reasonable evidence that he was) the ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων, and therefore voted against the unlawful proposition when it came up in the assembly as any member might have done, or (2) that Socrates voted alone in a preliminary meeting of the prytanes against having the question put to the people in an unlawful form. (2) explains the context best. But when all is said and done, the whole wording is clumsy and repetitious, since ἑναντιώθην would do quite as well alone, and the cumulative effect of καὶ is tiresome.

33 b, p. 120 (14). ἔρωτάν: Goebel prefers ἔρωτάν.  
33 b, p. 120 (19). ἄλλοι: following B. οἱ ἄλλοι, S W.

33 e, p. 123 (24). θεοσοτίδου: with Bessarion's Ms. θεοσοτίδου, Cron with S following B. Sauppe argues that the art. is not necessary here; it certainly is desirable.

34 a, p. 124 (32). τούτου: Goebel prefers τούτους.

34 c, p. 125 (3). ἀναμνησθῆς: ἀναμνησθῆς, Cron and S following B, where ἀναμνησθῆς is read.

34 c, p. 125 (6). αὐτοῦ: B. αὐτοῦ, W. Heller argues in favor of τὰ αὐτοῦ. He is right in so far that the ordinary idiom would give us the art.; but after all the art. would be indispensable only if τὰ παιδία (meaning all his children) had preceded.

34 d, p. 126 (14). έλθειν μὲν ποῦ τινες: with S and Stallbaum. έλθει μὲν ποῦ τινες, Cron.

34 d, p. 126 (17). νιέσ: P. Foucart (Revue de Philologie, I. 35) bases upon Attic inscriptions the following remarks as to the orthography of this word: "une série d'exemples depuis le cinquième siècle jusqu'au deuxième avant notre ère montre que au moins en prose, les Athéniens employaient toujours la forme ύο'ς. . . . A partir de la conquête romaine, νιέσ se rencontre dans les inscriptions attiques, ainsi que ύο'ς; la forme de la langue commune finit par l'emporter, et c'est la seule qu'emploient les copistes." The Attic form without ι is preserved only in Parisinus (A). See S, Vol. XII. pp. viii. and ix.

34 e, p. 127 (26). τὸ Σωκράτη: τῷ Σωκράτει, S W with Riddell. This dat. was preferred by Bernhardy. Nevertheless, the analogy of προσήκειν and ἀρέσκειν does not bear unqualified application to δεδο'χθαι. The reading η of B is τῶι Σωκράτει, which suggests that the interlinear correction may be the right reading. If the dat. be adopted here, then appeal would have to be made to Hdt. iv. 59, δεδοκταί τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν μαντίων αὐτοίσι απολλυσθαί. 

35 b, p. 128 (38). ψίμα: B. ημίμα, S W.

35 d, p. 129 (11). [πάντως]: with S W. Stallbaum brackets νῇ Διὰ πάντως. πάντως, Cron following B.
CRITICAL NOTES.

36 a, p. 131 (4). τὸ γεγονός τοῦτο: [τὸ γεγονός] τοῦτο, S with Cobet, who, indeed, rejects these three words because he thinks they have come into the text from the margin. There is certainly room for doubt.


36 c, p. 133 (9). οὕτω: with S W following E. οὕτα, Cron following B. Cron defends οὕτα in his Bem. p. 109 f. The example quoted from Tac. Ann. vi. 22 (where see Nipperdey’s note) is not convincing.

36 c, p. 133 (11). [τὸν]: with S W. τὸν, Cron. S says (Studien, p. 35) of the whole passage: “Hermann was for doing away with ἐνταύθα ἤν. But certainly δὲ requires a finite verb. Simply bracket τὸν and the whole difficulty is solved. The word was apparently added by an interpolator who construed ἐνταύθα ἤν closely with ἐπιχειρῶν, after the analogy of Phaedo 200 b, ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὲ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι. Of course ἐνταύθα makes any such explanation absurd.”

36 d, p. 134 (22). μάλλον: Liebhold proposes, not to bracket μάλλον, but to change it into γε ἀλλα.


37 c, p. 136 (18). τοῖς ἐνδεκά: [τοῖς ἐνδεκα], S with Heindorf.

37 c, p. 136 (22). μενταν: με'ντ άν, W.

37 e, p. 137 (4). ἔστι: Cron following S writes ἔστιν because of signs of erasure in B.

37 e, p. 137 (5). τοῦτι: with Bessarion’s Ms. Cron following S writes τοῦτο with B.


39 b, p. 141 (36). μεν που: Heller proposes μεν ούν, which is added by a later (second) hand in the margin of B and is also the reading of some inferior Mss., which, however, also retain που.

39 c, p. 142 (7). ἐλπισάσθε οἷμοι: ἐλπισάσθε με οἷμοι, S with Winckelmann. ἐλπισάσθε οἷμοι, W. Hermann added μεν after οἷμοι on the strength of signs of erasure in B, which were also detected by S.

39 d, p. 143 (14). οὗ γὰρ ἐσθ': following B according to Gaisford. οὗ γὰρ ἐσθ', S and W, who neither of them make any mention of Gaisford’s report on the reading of B.

40 a, p. 144 (10). ἃ τοῦ δαιμονίου: [ἃ τοῦ δαιμονίου], S with Schleiermacher.

40 c, p. 145 (5). τοῦ τόπου τοῦ: bracketed as a gloss by S with Hirschig.

41 a, p. 147 (29). ἔθλω: with Bessarion’s Ms. Cron following S writes ἔθλω with the best Mss. Here, and Phaedr. 249 b, we have the only two clear cases where the best Mss. credit Plato with using ἔθλω after a word ending in a consonant.

41 a, p. 147 (30). τοῦτα ἔστιν: following S with Bessarion’s Ms. τοῦτα ἔστιν, Cron with best Mss.
CRITICAL NOTES.

41 b, p. 147 (33). τέθνηκεν. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι: τέθνηκεν, ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι, S.
41 b, p. 148 (34). ἐκείνων, ὁς: ἐκείνων. ὁς, S.
41 b, p. 148 (35). ἀνθις: B. ἀπόθης, W with several Mss.
41 b, p. 148 (36). τίς αὐτῶν: with W. The best Mss. read τίς ἀν αὐτῶν. τίς δὲ αὐτῶν, Cron with S, who adds the δὲ as his own conjecture.
41 b, p. 148 (37). ἔστι: with Mss. ἔστιν, Cron and S, because there are signs of erasure in B, and Venetus 185 (Bekker's Π).
41 b, p. 148 (39). ἀγοντα: B. ἀγαγόντα, S W following other Mss.
43 a, p. 151 (1). πρῶ ἐτι ἔστιν: with B. πρῶ ἔστιν, S following inferior Mss. and the Zürich edition.
43 b, p. 152 (19). νῦν: νυνὶ, W.
43 b, p. 152 (20). πρᾶωσ: πράωσ, S following the Mss. The i subscript is an essential part of the word. See Curtius, Grundzüge, No. 379. The Mss. authorities leave the matter doubtful, though for Plato πρᾶωσ is the prevailing orthography. πρᾶωσ is always without i. S has lately made up his mind to write πρᾶωσ even in Plato. See Vol. XII. p. 6.
43 d, p. 153 (35). τούτων [τῶν ἀγγελῶν]: τούτων τῶν ἀγγελῶν, W.
44 b, p. 155 (3). ξυμφορά ἔστιν: ξυμφορά ἔσται, S with Hirschig.
44 b, p. 155 (5). ἦ: ἦ, S. Rieckher strikes out ὡς before οἶς τέ.
45 b, p. 158 (23). ἀποκάμης: ἀποκάμης, S with Jacobs. Here S, contrary to his usual practice, has not been able to resist a tempting but unnecessary emendation.
46 b, p. 161 (4). οὐ μόνον νῦν: οὖ νῦν πρῶτον, S with A. Nauck. See the preface to the third edition of Cron's Apology and Crito (p. xiv. f.).

CRITO.

43 a, p. 151 (1). πρῶ ἐτι ἔστιν: with B. πρῶ ἔστιν, S following inferior Mss. and the Zürich edition.
43 b, p. 152 (19). νῦν: νυνὶ, W.
43 b, p. 152 (20). πρᾶωσ: πράωσ, S following the Mss. The i subscript is an essential part of the word. See Curtius, Grundzüge, No. 379. The Mss. authorities leave the matter doubtful, though for Plato πρᾶωσ is the prevailing orthography. πρᾶωσ is always without i. S has lately made up his mind to write πρᾶωσ even in Plato. See Vol. XII. p. 6.
43 d, p. 153 (35). τούτων [τῶν ἀγγελῶν]: τούτων τῶν ἀγγελῶν, W.
44 b, p. 155 (3). ξυμφορά ἔστιν: ξυμφορά ἔσται, S with Hirschig.
44 b, p. 155 (5). ἦ: ἦ, S. Rieckher strikes out ὡς before οἶς τέ.
45 b, p. 158 (23). ἀποκάμης: ἀποκάμης, S with Jacobs. Here S, contrary to his usual practice, has not been able to resist a tempting but unnecessary emendation.
46 b, p. 161 (4). οὐ μόνον νῦν: οὖ νῦν πρῶτον, S with A. Nauck. See the preface to the third edition of Cron's Apology and Crito (p. xiv. f.).

47 a, p. 163 (30). οὔχ ἰκανῶς: οὐχὶ καλῶς, S with Hirschig.

47 a, p. 163 (32). τὰς δ ὡς: with S. τὰς ὡς; [οὖδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν θ᾽ ὡς;], Cron with W. The words bracketed do not occur in B, and S rejects them as a confusing interpolation (Nov. Comm. p. 162). They occur in the margin of B and in inferior Mss.

47 c, p. 165 (15). τὴν δοξὰν καὶ τοὺς ἑπάνους: τὴν δοξὰν [καὶ τοὺς ἑπάνους], S. τὴν δοξὰν καὶ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ τοὺς ἑπάνους, Stallbaum. τοὺς ψόγους καὶ τοὺς ἑπάνους, Hirschig.

47 c, p. 165 (18). ἐστὶ: ἐστι, all editions. But the emphasis should be carefully kept on τί, on ποί, and on ἐλ τί, and not put on the verbs.

47 c, p. 165 (20). διολλύσιν: so it stands corrected in B. διωλλυεί, S following inferior Mss.

47 e d, p. 165 (24 ff.). The simpler punctuation of Cron’s seventh edition has been preferred to that of the eighth. In the latter Cron follows Goebel.

48 b, p. 167 (25). Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα: given to Socrates by W with Buttmann. S brackets φαίη γὰρ ἀν and makes Crito’s speech include ἀληθὴ λέγεις. Goebel proposes Δῆλα γὰρ δὴ καὶ ταῦτα, φαίη γ’ ἀν, ὁ Σώκρατες. If anything is to be omitted, ἀληθὴ λέγεις could best be spared.


48 e, p. 169 (23). πείσας σε: with Buttmann. πείσαλ σε, W following the Mss. See Cron’s preface to his first edition of the Apol. and Crito, p. xii., also Bem. p. 117 f. Meiser (Fleckeisen’s Jahrb. 109, 1, p. 41) favors a change of order πείσαλ σε, ἀλλὰ μή ἀκοντὸς ταῦτα πράττειν. Goebel urges παύσαλ σε, which would, however, be intolerable after παύσαι ἡδή.

49 a, p. 170 (4). [ὃπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγετο]: Meiser proposes to find room for this between ἡ and πᾶσαι.

49 b, p. 170 (7). τηλικοίδε [γέροντες]: with Jacobs. τηλικοίδε γέροντες, W. Some authority for not bracketing would perhaps be found in Lach. 180 d.

50 c, p. 175 (2). ἐμμενείν: ἐμμενεῖν, S with Hirschig.

50 d, p. 176 (10). τοῖς νόμοις: [τοῖς νόμοις], S with Hirschig.

50 d, p. 176 (14). νόμοι: [νόμοι], S with Hirschig.

50 e, p. 177 (20). σοι: συ is preferred by Buttmann, Stallbaum, Hirschig, Goebel.

51 a, p. 177 (26). ἐσται: S. ἐξέσται, W following the Mss. ἐξ ἵσου ἐσται, Hirschig.

51 a, p. 178 (30). ἡ: ἦ, W following the Mss. S says the first hand in B wrote ἦ. See on 53 c.


52 b, p. 181 (11). ἕξηλθες, [ὁτι... Ἰσθμον,] οὔτε: ἕξηλθες, οὔτε, S. S gives
reasons as follows: Verba ὅτι ... Ἰσθμόν, quae jam Athenaeus 5, 15, legisse videtur, in marg. add. bc, incluserunt Turicenses delevit MS [i.e. Schanz himself]. See his Nov. Comm. p. 162.

52 d, p. 182 (28). πολιτεύσῃ: B. πολιτεύσῃ, S with inferior Mss.

53 a, p. 183 (43). δῆλον ... νόμων: bracketed by S with H. Stephanus and Hirschig, who also both reject οἱ νόμοι.

53 a, p. 184 (44). ἐμμένεις: B. ἐμμένεις, S W following the second hand in B.

53 b, p. 184 (7). Μεγαράδε: Μεγαράδε, W. Gaisford remarks on Phaedr. 227 d: "μεγαράδε Fuit μέγαρα δέ p. m." Is this the reading of B in this passage also?

53 c, p. 185 (17). η: B. η, S W. As in 51 a, p. 178 (30), where the reading of B is harder to make out, so here also S writes η. The more vigorous η (really) is better suited to the context than η, which simply makes affirmation a matter of course.

53 e, p. 186 (28). αἰσχρῶς: with S and W. Still γλίσχρως, which is added on the margin of B, deserves attention, and perhaps should be preferred. Cf. in the preceding line (27) the undoubtedly correct μεταλλάξας, which is on the margin of B, while in the text we find καταλλάξας, which both S and W reject.

53 e, p. 186 (32). καὶ δουλεύων· τί: καὶ [δουλεύων·] τίς, S with Schleiermacher.


54 a, p. 187 (41). ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν, πότερον: [ἐπιμελήσονται] αὐτῶν πότερον, S.

54 b, p. 187 (1). πειθόμενος ἡμῖν: Meiser inserts after these words τοῖς σοῖς γεννήταις καὶ (Fleckeisen’s Jahrb. 109, 1, p. 41).

54 d, p. 188 (1). Κρῖτων: [Κρῖτων], S.
GREEK INDEX.

[Numbers not followed by letters refer to paragraphs of the Introduction; numbers followed by letters refer to the Stephanus pages noted on the right of the Text.]

| αγροικότερον | 32 d. |
| αγών | 73, 24 c. |
| αδικά | 19 b. |
| αίρω | 28 a, 48 c. |
| αδικώ | 19 δ. |
| αίρω | 28 a, 48 c. |
| αίσχρόν | 28 d. |
| αίσχύνομαι | 22 δ. |
| ακροαταί | 24 e. |
| αλίσκομαι | 28 α. |
| αλλά | 32 α, 39 e, 43 d, 45 a. |
| αλλά γάρ | 19 c, d, 28 a. |
| αλλά καλ | ἄλλα 27 b. |
| αλλ' | 20 a, 34 δ. |
| αλλος | 28 e, 30, 36 b. |
| αλλο τι ή | 24 c, 52 d. |
| αλλ' ουν | 27 c. |
| αλλ’ ούχ | 23 c. |
| αρά | 17 δ. |
| αρτή | 30 α. |
| αρχή | 49 d. |
| αρχομαι | 31 d. |
| αρχων | 28 e, 38 δ. |
| αυτοκρατορίς, οί, | 28 e. |
| αυτοκρατορία | 51 d. |
| αβακτηρία | 66. |
| αβοάω | 30 c, 32 δ. |
| αυτοκρατορία | 27 c. |
| αύθαδάττέρον | 34 c. |
| αιτιστήρον | 32 e. |
| αιτο | 31 δ. |
| απολαύειν | 54 a. |
| αποφεύγω | 36 a, 38 d. |
| αρα | 17 b, 25 a, 26 d, 34 c. |
| αρετή | 30 b. |
| αγών | 73, 24 c. |
| αδικώ | 19 δ. |
| αίρω | 28 a, 48 c. |
| αίσχρόν | 28 d. |
| αίσχύνομαι | 22 δ. |
| ακροαταί | 24 e. |
| αλίσκομαι | 28 α. |
| αλλά | 32 α, 39 e, 43 d, 45 a. |
| αλλά γάρ | 19 c, d, 28 a. |
| αλλά καλ | ἄλλα 27 b. |
| αλλ' | 20 a, 34 δ. |
| αλλος | 28 e, 30, 36 b. |
| αλλο τι ή | 24 c, 52 d. |
| αλλ' ουν | 27 c. |
| αλλ’ ούχ | 23 c. |
| αρά | 17 δ. |
| αρτή | 30 α. |
| αρχή | 49 d. |
| αρχομαι | 31 d. |
| αρχων | 28 e, 38 δ. |
| αυτοκρατορίς, οί, | 28 e. |
| αυτοκρατορία | 51 d. |
| αβακτηρία | 66. |
| αβοάω | 30 c, 32 δ. |
| αυτοκρατορία | 27 c. |
| αύθαδάττέρον | 34 c. |
| αιτιστήρον | 32 e. |
| αιτο | 31 δ. |
| απολαύειν | 54 a. |
| αποφεύγω | 36 a, 38 d. |
| αρα | 17 b, 25 a, 26 d, 34 c. |
| αρετή | 30 b. |
GREEK INDEX.

εθίζεσθαι 35 c.
ελεν 18 e.
εική 17 c.
eίναι 23 a.
elωνενόμενος 37 e.
eἰς 17 c.
eσάγω 24 d.
eσαγωγή 70.
eσελθείν 29 c.
eσοδό 70, 45 e.
eτα 23 c, 28 b, 31 a.
eκ 23 e, 32 b, 49 e.
eκείνος 33 e.
eκκλησιασταί 25 a.
eλέγω 29 e.
εμελλον 20 a.
εμμελώς 20 e.
είτα 23 c, 28 δ, 31 a.
εκ 23 e, 32 δ, 49 e.
εκείνος 33 e.
εκκλησιασταί 25 a.
ελε'γξω 29 e.
εμελλον 20 a.
εμμελώς 20 e.
eίτα 23 c, 28 δ, 31 a.
eκ 23 e, 32 δ, 49 e.
eκείνος 33 e.
εκείνος 33 e.
εκκλησιασταί 25 a.
ελε'γξω 29 e.
εμελλον 20 a.
εμμελώς 20 e.
eίτα 23 c, 28 δ, 31 a.
eκ 23 e, 32 δ, 49 e.
eκείνος 33 e.
εκείνος 33 e.
εκκλησιασταί 25 a.
ελε'γξω 29 e.
εμελλον 20 a.
εμμελώς 20 e.
eίτα 23 c, 28 δ, 31 a.
eκ 23 e, 32 δ, 49 e.
eκείνος 33 e.
εκείνος 33 e.
εκκλησιασταί 25 a.
ελε'γξω 29 e.
εμελλον 20 a.
εμμελώς 20 e.
eίτα 23 c, 28 δ, 31 a.
eκ 23 e, 32 δ, 49 e.
eκείνος 33 e.
εκείνος 33 e.
εκκλησιασταί 25 a.
ελε'γξω 29 e.
εμελλον 20 a.
εμμελώς 20 e.
eίτα 23 c, 28 δ, 31 a.
eκ 23 e, 32 δ, 49 e.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greek word</th>
<th>Page numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>παιδοτρίβης</td>
<td>47 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πάν</td>
<td>ποιών</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πάντως</td>
<td>33 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πάνυ</td>
<td>19 a, 26 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παραλαμβάνω</td>
<td>18 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παραπροσβεία</td>
<td>36 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παραχωρώ</td>
<td>34 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πείθω</td>
<td>29 d, 35 c, 51 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>περιμετράται</td>
<td>19 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>περιτότερον</td>
<td>20 c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πηνίκα</td>
<td>43 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πιστεύων</td>
<td>19 α.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πλέον ποιείν</td>
<td>19 α.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πλήθος</td>
<td>21 α, 31 c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πλημμέλεια</td>
<td>22 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πλημμέλες</td>
<td>43 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ποιήσω</td>
<td>30 α.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πολεμάρχος</td>
<td>68.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πολλάκις</td>
<td>30 c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πολυπραγμονώ</td>
<td>31 c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πόνους</td>
<td>22 α.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πράγμα</td>
<td>20 c, 41 d, 53 c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πράττειν</td>
<td>40 α, 45 d, 51 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>προβούλευμα</td>
<td>32 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πρόσδοκει</td>
<td>32 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πρόσνας</td>
<td>18 b, 21 c, 24 b, 30 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>προτανέωνα</td>
<td>32 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>προτάνεις</td>
<td>32 b, c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>προτάνεις</td>
<td>36 d, 37 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ρήμα</td>
<td>17 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ρήτορες</td>
<td>23 e, 32 b, 36 b, 50 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σίτησις</td>
<td>36 d, 37 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σκευήν</td>
<td>53 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σκιαμαχεῖν</td>
<td>18 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σοφία</td>
<td>29 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σοφός</td>
<td>18 b, 23 a, 27 a, 34 e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>στάσεων</td>
<td>36 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>στή</td>
<td>28 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σύμβολον</td>
<td>66.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>συνήγοροι</td>
<td>30, 71, 50 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Σφήττιος</td>
<td>33 e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σχήμα</td>
<td>53 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σεθάναι</td>
<td>30 c, 43 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σελευτῶν</td>
<td>22 c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τι λέγειν</td>
<td>46 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τέστι</td>
<td>18 b, 19 c, 25 b, 28 e, 30 e, 37 e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τέστι</td>
<td>54 23 a, 37 a, 39 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τοί</td>
<td>29 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τόλμης</td>
<td>38 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τούνταν</td>
<td>25 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τρόπω</td>
<td>17 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>υδώρ</td>
<td>34 α.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>υπάρχει</td>
<td>45 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>υπεικάθομι</td>
<td>32 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>υπερασία</td>
<td>30 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>υπέρ</td>
<td>22 e, 23 e, 39 e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>υπό</td>
<td>17 a, 19 c, 38 c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>υπωβλέψοντα</td>
<td>53 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>υπολογιζόμενον</td>
<td>28 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>υποστειλάμενος</td>
<td>24 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χαριεντίζεται</td>
<td>24 c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χρή</td>
<td>17 a, 33 d, 34 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ψευδή</td>
<td>18 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ψεύδος</td>
<td>34 e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ψήφισμα</td>
<td>32 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ψήφοι</td>
<td>72.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>όνησις</td>
<td>27 c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ός</td>
<td>30 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ός ἐπος εἰπεῖν</td>
<td>17 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>όσπερ</td>
<td>ἐν ἔλ 23 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>όστηρ</td>
<td>25 e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ό τάν</td>
<td>25 c.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENGLISH INDEX.

[Numbers not followed by letters refer to paragraphs of the Introduction; numbers followed by letters refer to the Stephanus pages noted on the right of the Text.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstract noun with τίς</th>
<th>Apodosis suppressed 32 d. with ξηπήν 33 d.</th>
<th>Athenian greatness 29 d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acc. adv. 25 b.</td>
<td>Apostrophe 29 d.</td>
<td>Attraction of case in comparison 17 c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cognate 21 a, 26 b, 27 b.</td>
<td>Appeals to jury 71, 32 a, 34 c.</td>
<td>Audience in court 27 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accusers 30, 18 b, e, 23 e, 24 b.</td>
<td>Aristogeiton 36 d.</td>
<td>Cebe 45 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achilles 28 c.</td>
<td>Aristophanes, Clouds 25, 18 b, d, 19 c, 23 d.</td>
<td>Chaerocrates 21 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adimantus 34 a.</td>
<td>Article with έλει 37 a.</td>
<td>Chaerophon 20 e, 21 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. used pers. with inf. 18 a.</td>
<td>as dem. 37 d.</td>
<td>Chiastic order 25 d, 47 c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeacus 41 a.</td>
<td>generic with θέσις 19 a. omitted 28 b.</td>
<td>Citizenship, age of 31 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeantodorus 34 a.</td>
<td>with πάς 33 b.</td>
<td>Clause in appos. with neut. 18 c, 34 d, 41 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeschines 33 e, 34 a.</td>
<td>with πολλοί 18 b.</td>
<td>Climax 23 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajax 26 d, 41 b.</td>
<td>as possessive 27 b, 29 d, 34 a.</td>
<td>Clouds of Aristophanes 25, 18 b, d, 19 c, 23 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcibiades 24, 33, 28 e.</td>
<td>repeated 33 d.</td>
<td>Comparison to Heracles 22 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliteration 39 a.</td>
<td>with δένσις 28 c, 36 b, 37 a.</td>
<td>idioms of 17 c, 19 b, 22 a, d, 28 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphipolis 28 e.</td>
<td>Assembly, members of 25 a.</td>
<td>Condition, complex 27 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anacoluthon 19 e, 21 c, 28 c, 34 e, 37 c, 45 e.</td>
<td>Assimilation of case 29 b, 37 b, 50 a.</td>
<td>mixed 19 e, 25 b, 30 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anazagoras 10, 26 d.</td>
<td>of gender 18 a.</td>
<td>Contrast 48 e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaximander 2.</td>
<td>inverse 45 b.</td>
<td>Co-ordination 18 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaximenes 2.</td>
<td>Astronomy 19 b.</td>
<td>Corybantes 54 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiphon 33 e.</td>
<td>Asyndeton 41 b.</td>
<td>Critias 24, 25, 33, 32 c, d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antithesis 33 b.</td>
<td>Athenian citizenship 31 d, 51 d.</td>
<td>Crito 62, 33 d, 34 a, 38 b, 43 a, 45 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anytus 30, 23 e.</td>
<td>courts of law 66-75.</td>
<td>Critobulus 33 d, 34 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aor. Subj. as fut. perf. 44 c.</td>
<td>as inv. 17 c, 20 e.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENGLISH INDEX.

Daemonion 27, 32, 27 c, 31 c.

Dat. with verbal nouns
23 c, 30 a.

with ποιεῖν 30 a.

Death 28 b, 40 c, d, e, 41 d.

Delian ship 43 c.

Demigods 28 b.

Demodocus 33 e.

Dilemma 26 c.

Direct discourse 21 e.

Disfranchisement 30 d.

Dream 44 a.

Education 50 d.

Eleatics 4, 45.

Eleven, the, 75, 37 c, 39 e, 44 a.

Ellipsis 23 a, 24 d, 26 b, 36 b.

Elysium 28 c, 40 d.

Empedocles 8.

Enemies, hated 49 b.

Epigenes 33 e, 34 a.

Euclides 42.

Evenus 20 b.

Exile, voluntary 45 e, 54 a.

Fatherland, precious 51 a.

Fines 74, 38 b.

Foreigners in court 18 a.

Future infin. 37 a.

partic. 30 b.

Gadfly 30 e.

Genitive abs. 35 a.

with adv. 17 d, 38 c.

in appos. with adj. 29 d.

of cause, 48 b.

Genitive partic. with αἴσθάνομαι 22 c, γιγνώσκω 27 a, ἀνέχεσθαι 31 b.

with verbal noun 23 c, 26 b, 40 c.

Glauccon 34 a.

God 21 b, 54 e.

allwise 28 c.

Golden rule 49 b, c.

Gorgias 13, 19 e, 23 c.

Great King 40 d, e.

Gymnastic training 47 a, b.

Hades 41 a, b, c, 54 c.

Harmodius 36 d.

Hercules 22 a, 26 d.

Hippocrates 5, 6, 7, 45.

Hippias 14.

Homer 34 d.

Hyperbaton 35 c.

Imperfect, philosophical, 47 d.

Imprisonment for a fine 37 c.

Indic. with ὅτε 25 c.

Infinitive with adj. and adv. 31 a.

after ἐκών 37 a, μέλλων 20 a, φεύγω 26 a, ἐφ’ ὃτε 29 c, ὅτε 38 d.

of purpose 33 b.

Io 30 e.

Ion 26 d.

Irrory 20 e, 22 a, 28 a, 31 c, 47 e, 49 a, 51 a, 54 a.

Islands of the blest 28 c, 40 c.

Juryman, form of address, 66 note 4, 17 a, 26 d.

asleep 31 a.

oath 66 note 2, 35 c.

Law, majesty of, 50 e, 51 e.

Legal terms, ἄγώνες τιμητοί, ἀτιμητοί, 73.

ἀἱρὼ, ἀλίσκομαι, 28 a.

ἀνάκρισις 69.

ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι 35.

ἀντιτίμησις 35 d.

ἀντωμοσία 69, 27 c.

ἀπαγωγή 32 b.

ἀποφεύγω 36 a, 38 d.

ἀρχων, ὅ, 68.

ἀστρατεία 51 b.

ἀτιμία 74, 29 a, 30 d, 32 b, 51 b.

ἀτιμητοί 73.

βακτηρία 66.

βάσανος 69.

βασιλεύς 31, 68.

βουλευταί 25 a.

βουλευόμεθα 32 b.

γνησιότης 50 d.

γραμματείον 70, 75.

γραμματείος 51 d.

γραμματικός 31, 67, 68.

γραφή 27 c.

δειλία 51 b.

δημότης 33 d.

δικαστήριον 66.

δικαστήρια 66, 24 e.

δίκη 67.

διώκω 18 c, 28 a.
Legal terms, διωμοσία 69.
διωμοσία 69.
δοκιμασία 51 d.
έπικληρούσθαι 70.
έπικληρον 51 d.
εισάγω 24 d.
εισαγωγή 70.
εκκλησιασταί 25 a.
ενδειξις 32 d.
νδίκα, οί, 75, 32 b, 37 c, 39 e, 44 a.
επικληρούσθαι 70.
επίτι(ττάτη 53 32 b.
επίτιμος 25 a.
έπωβελία 72.
έρήμη 72, 18 c.
εύεργετής 36 d.
ηλιαία 67.
ηλιασταί 67, 24 e.
καταγιγνώσκω 18 c.
κατηγορώ 18 c.
κλεψύδρα 71, 34 a.
κλητήρες 69.
κυρία, ή, 70.
ληξιαρχικόν 51 d.
λήξις 68.
λιποταξία 29 a, 51 b.
μάρτυρες 32 a.
με'τοικοι 68, 51 d.
άφλισκάνω 18 c, 39 d.
παραπρεσβεία 36 c.
πολέμαρχος 68.
προβούλευμα 32 b.
πρόεδροι 32 b.
πρόξενος 18 a.
πρυτανεύω, πρύτανεις, 32 b, c.
σύμβολον 69.
σύμβολον 66.
συνήγοροι 30, 71, 50 b.
τιμάσθαι 32 a, 52 c.
τίμησις 36 d.
τιμητοί 73.
τιμήσις 73.

Legal terms, τίμημα 73.
τίμωρ, τò, 34 a.
φεύγω 18 c, 19 c, 28 a.
ψήφωμα 32 b.
ψήφοι 72.
Leon 32 c.
Leucippus 9.
Litotes 33 c, 44 a.
Love of country 54 a.
Lyco 30, 23 e.
Lysias 32 c.

Marriage laws 50 d.
Megarian oligarchy 53 b.
Meletus 30, 23 c, 25 d, 26 e, 27 e, 35 c.
Minos 41 a.
Musaeus 41 a.

Natural philosophy
18 b, c, 19 c.
Negative pron. 32 a.
repeated 31 d.
with φημί 25 b.
Nestor 29 d.
Neuter adj. for fem. 29 a.
adj. as subst. 31 b.
art. with gen. 21 e.
with concrete force 32 e.
Nicostratus 33 e, 34 a.

Oath, of Socrates 21 e.
of jurymen 66 note 2, 35 c.
Object omitted 23 b.
Objectives, dramatized 20 c.
Oligarchy 53 b.
Olympian victors 36 d.
Optative in indirect discourse 20 b, 27 e, 29 c.
with πρίν 36 c.
Oracle 21 a, b.

Orators 23 e, 32 b, 36 b, 50 b.
Order of words 17 b, 25 c, 26 e, 35 d, 36 d.
chiastic 25 d, 47 c.
Orpheus 41 a.

Palamedes 41 b.
Paralus 33 e, 34 a.
Parmenides 4.
Partic. used adv. 22 c.
with αιχύνομαι 31 b.
of means 30 a.
as noun 34 b.
subord. to another partic. 21 e, 27 a.
Penalties, how fixed, 73, 35 d.
Pericles 35 a.
Perfect, βεβουλεύσθαι 46 a.
tεβάναι 30 c.
Periphrasis 38 c, 53 c.
Pers. pron. for refl. 18 a.
Personification 21 c, 50 a, 52 c.

Physicians 47 b.
Plato, Academy 46.
Apology 53–61.
Critias 48.
Crito 62–65.
death 50.
dialogues 52.
family 37, 34 a.
Gorgias 40–41.
journeys 42, 43, 49.
laws 48.

Parmenides 45.
Phaedo 47.
Phaedrus 47.
Philebus 47.
Politicus 45.
Protagoras 39.
Republic 48.
ENGLISH INDEX.

Plato, Sophist 45.
Symposium 47.
Theaetetus 44.
Timaeus 48.
as a writer 51.
Pleonasm 20 d, 34 b, 42 a.
Pluperfect in -ν ἡ 31 d.
Plural more concrete 46 c.
Pnyx 31 c.
Poets 22 b, c, 23 e.
Polemarchus 32 c.
Potidaea 28 e.
Potential indic. 18 c.
Present of habitual action 33 a.
result of past action 33 c.
vivid 44 b.
President of senate 32 b.
Prodicus 14.
Prolepsis 29 a, d.
Prometheus 26 d.
Prophecy at death 39 c.
Protagoras 12, 39, 19 e, 20 b, 23 c.
Protasis implied 25 b.
Providence 33 c, 35 d.
Prytaneum 32 c, 36 d.
Pun 25 c.
Purpose with pres. partic. 27 a.
Pythagoras 3.

Question, dir. and indir. 48 a.
of surprise 28 b.
with μή 25 a, 44 e, 45 e.
Quotation, not exact 19 c, 24 b, 28 c.
Quotations, Browning 21 a.
Dante 41 a, 54 a, e.
St. Luke 49 c.

Quotations, Milton 48 e.
Nettleship, Education 50 d.
La Rochefoucauld 33 c, 34 c.
Shakespeare,
As You Like It 46 b.
Cymbeline 45 e.
Henry IV. 49 e.
Henry V. 39 a, 46 e, 51 a.
Henry VIII. 49 a, b.
King Lear 24 d.
Measure for Measure 46 b.
Mer. of Venice 36 a.
Rich. II. 20 e, 25 c, 39 c, 54 a.
Rich. III. 36 a, 46 a.
Two Gen. of Ver. 18 a.
Repetition 21 c, 28 d, 29 b, 31 a, 36 c, 44 d, 49 c, d.
Rhadamanthys 41 a.

Senate 32 b.
Shops as lounging places 17 c.
Short sents. 21 b, 40 a.
Simile of gadfly 30 e.
Sisyphus 41 c.
Slaves 50 a.
Socrates,
accusation against 31, 32, 33, 36, 23 d.
accusers 30, 18 b, e, 23 e, 24 b.
age 17, 17 c, d, 52 e.
Apology by Plato 53–61.
affair of Arginusae 32 b.
a ‘busybody’ 19 b, 20 c, 31 c.
Socrates, in the Clouds 25.
18 b, d, 19 c, 23 d.
convicted by few votes 36 a.
Σαμὸνος 27, 32, 31 c.
defense 34.
at Delium 28 e.
deme and tribe 32 b.
dialectic 19.
distrust of people 30 e.
feelings towards enemies 40 b.
fortitude 46 b.
friends at trial 34 a.
highest good 35 d.
imitators 23 c.
indipendence 38 d.
irony 26, 37 e.
method 18, 19, 25, 26.
17 c, 29 e, 33 b, 47 a.
as midwife 25.
mision from God, 22 a, 31 c.
moral courage, 28 b, 2, 48 d.
not a natural philos­opher 19 c, 23 d, 26 d.
oaths 21 e.
parents 17, 25.
not a politician 31 c.
at Potidaea 28, 28 e.
poverty 23 b.
practical views 30 b.
religion 27, 32, 26 d.
sons 34 d.
‘Sophist’ 11 note, 18 b, 23 a, 27 a, 34 e.
sun-worshipper 26 d.
style colloquial 55, 17 b, c, 18 b, d, 19 d, 21 e, 23 a, 26 a, 32 a.
teaching ethical 20, 27.
no traveller 53 a.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENGLISH INDEX.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socrates</strong>, view of death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 a, 40 a–41 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>views of manual labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Virtue is knowledge'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17, 18, 25 e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>writers on 21.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sophists</strong> 11–15, 19 e, 20 b,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 c, 33 b, 37 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spartan institutions</strong> 52 e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subject</strong> after a secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tense 43 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with <strong>μὴ</strong> 39 a, 48 c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with <strong>ὄνα</strong> 28 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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