SEGREGATION

Development of the Policy

No policy shaped by WRA has received such painstaking attention and deliberative scrutiny as that of segregation. The method by which the sheep should be separated from the goats was a subject that interested a great variety of agencies and individuals, and many of these submitted proposals to WRA. The first suggestions were offered in May of 1942 by Lieutenant Commander E. D. Ringle, a Naval Intelligence Officer detailed to WRA in its early months to assist in developing a program. Commander Ringle's plan concentrated on the Kibei: all Kibei who had resided for a given number of years in Japan, together with their parents and minor children were to be segregated. After due consideration, WRA rejected this plan on the grounds that it advocated arbitrary segregation of a category of persons on the assumption that disloyal elements were concentrated in a particular group, and in recognition of the fact that such an arbitrary program would be unjust to many loyal American citizens within the Kibei group who are more sharply opposed to Japanese militarism that persons who have never brushed up against it.

In a letter of June 6, 1942, Mike Masaoka, Executive Secretary of the JACL wrote to Director Eisenhower to recommend segregation of a specific group of Kibei: those who had studied in Japan 5 or more years, all or part of that time falling after 1930, and all or part experienced after the age of 12. He recommended that parents who sent their children back to Japan to be educated
should be carefully investigated and that a wife should be classed with her husband, regardless of her status as an individual; children under 16 should be segregated with their parents but should be given a chance to declare for themselves as soon as they were of age. He recommended a full use of hearing boards and appeals to remedy any injustice that might be done.

Also in the first week of June, upon being asked by WRA to give his opinion, Dr. Robert Redfield, of the University of Chicago, spoke in terms of a separation of the Kibei from the Nisei. However, he warned that while in theory such segregation of the presumably disloyal should simplify the return to normal life of the loyal, there was a risk of disappointment, observing in conclusion: "The good will we may hope to gain by this measure may not be realized.

On June 15, the day before he left WRA, Director Eisenhower addressed a memorandum on this subject to John Provins, Chief of Community Management:

"1. Essentially the favorable argument is that, with the separated from the potentially dangerous, we will have a better opportunity to gain recognition for the former. The loyal would be encouraged by governmental recognition of that fact, even though public attitudes might not change sufficiently to warrant a diminution of restraints during the war. Failure to segregate may lead to strife in the centers, the disaffection of some who are now loyal, and a public insistence upon believing that all Japanese are potentially dangerous.

"2. The unfavorable argument is that it is undemocratic to condemn the Kibei by definition. Segregation, if undertaken, should be on the basis of individual examination. Further, segregation may not lead to a changed public attitude toward the Nisei, particularly so long as aliens and citizens are intermingled, as they must be if we are to avoid separating families. Then, too, we should proceed positively on the basis that democratic processes will win out over the undemocratic, whereas segregation implies that this is not possible. Finally, segregation is filled with administrative difficulty; it would be necessary to shift about between Parker, Tule Lake, and Manzanar and then handle the
balance of the segregation at the assembly centers.

"3. If segregation is not undertaken we must find an alternative method of achieving the goals sought by segregation. Is there a good alternative? Certainly we must soon launch a carefully planned information program designed to convince the American public that 75 to 85 per cent of the Nisei are loyal; that 50 per cent of the Issei are passively loyal. We must recognize loyalty and citizenship at every turn.

"4. What do persons of Japanese descent think of all this? Should you, through the regional office, try to get some quick judgments, such as from the advisory councils in selected assembly and relocation centers?

"As I say, I'd like to settle the question. I am strongly inclined toward avoiding segregation by definition, but to try to find better methods of achieving the results sought."

At the time of the San Francisco Policy Conference in August of 1943, when echoes of a meeting held by Manzanar's group of stridently pro-Japanese Kibei were still resounding in administrative ears, the executives of WRA all agreed that the disloyal should be separated from the loyal evacuees, but no satisfactory criteria for determining the disloyal could at that time be devised.

In September of 1942, Mr. Provinse, Chief of Community Management for WRA, called on Lieutenant Kingsbury at the Los Angeles Office of Naval Intelligence to inquire his opinion on the subject of segregation. The Lieutenant had spent 20 years in Japan prior to his association with ONI. Mr. Provinse conveyed the suggestions made by Lieutenant Kingsbury to the Director in a memorandum dated September 22.

"He favors segregation insofar as it can be applied without injustice and particularly any move which will put the loyal citizens outside the present relocation centers. Repatriates, he states, should be segregated. The ONI has records over the past 20 years which are kept up to date as much as possible and would be available for checking.

"With regard to movement of the citizens out of the re-
location centers, he suggests that we locate those who are wanting to go out, check with the ONI and possibly the FBI, and let them go. He would favor a careful investigation of all Kibei and Issei, but thinks that even many of these could be allowed to go out without danger. Here again he emphasizes positive discrimination in favor loyalty."

By far the most drastic proposals for segregation were submitted by General John L. DeWitt in a memorandum of September 9, 1942. Physically, his plan involved the conversion of Poston II and Poston III to segregation camps, and the removal of the original inhabitants of these 2 Colorado River communities to various other relocation centers. The categories of people he advised moving were as follows: repatriates, parolees from internment camps, evacuees with police records in assembly and relocation centers, evacuees listed as potentially dangerous by the intelligence services, members of families such as might elect to accompany segre-gants, and their children under 16 years of age. His objectives in executing such a sweeping program were twofold: to avoid "increasing necessity for use of troops in maintaining order", and to avoid "loss of a useful war manpower reservoir."

Several interesting and pertinent memoranda on the subject of the General's plan and on the general issue of segregation were presented to the Director by key men on the WRA staff. Under the date of November 3, 1942, Leland Barrows, then Executive Officer but later Acting Director of WRA, wrote:

"General DeWitt's several proposals on this subject nowhere include a sound formula or guide to the selection of dangerous, pro-Axis or un-American evacuees. The long report from the anonymous block leader at Manzanar, which is evidently presented in support of General DeWitt's recommendations, is typical of the con-
traditions and confusions which are involved in the question of segregation. A large part of the document, for example, points to the Issei as dangerous, yet the author is himself presumably an Issei, and he mentions that there are other Issei who are loyal and who should be given what I suppose might be called 'honorary citizenship' when the segregation program is initiated. He also points to the Kibei, and in that respect he is in agreement with a number of observers, and both he and General DeWitt are careful to qualify their complaint about the Kibei by indicating they mean only those individuals who have been indoctrinated with a pro-Japanese point of view. In fact, a careful reading of all these documents indicates that sound administration of a program of segregation would require the examination of individuals through the medium of loyalty boards or some other administrative device competent to separate the good from the bad. ... The block leader's report sent in by General DeWitt undoubtedly throws light on the situation, but it must be read in relation to a great deal of other evidence which we are in a better position to accumulate and evaluate than is the Army.

"At best, segregation is a negative approach to the problems outlined in these documents. If we are to retain the full loyalty of those evacuees who as General DeWitt says, have 'a strong desire to be loyal and to demonstrate their loyalty', we must take a much more positive stand. We must provide decent family housing (not merely 'optimum' housing which disregards family groups); we must provide adequate schools; a reasonable opportunity for religious worship and community activities; and most important of all, for the permanent return of loyal evacuees to normal life. If we do these positive things, I doubt that segregation of any, except those who desire repatriation, would be necessary. If we do not do these positive things, I think there is grave danger that further moving of people from center to center on an arbitrary basis (and remember that any segregation such as has been proposed will involve breaking up families and severing of community ties of all kinds) will embitter the entire population almost beyond hope. People and communities are too complex to be disposed of on any such simple categorical basis as 'Issei', 'Nisei', and 'Kibei'. Really the only segregation I favor is that arising through the release of loyal evacuees from centers."

Under the date of November 6, 1942, the Solicitor of WRA addressed the Director in terms of his thinking on the subject of segregation and the establishment of a separate center for segregated evacuees, reaffirming his conviction that WRA could not "condemn people by categories in the absence of evidence in individual cases" and mentioning that at the time of Commander Ringle's recommendations, WRA had felt that segregation of in-
individuals on the basis of evidence available in the individual case was impractical because WRA had neither the time nor the facilities for making investigations essential to the accumulation of necessary evidence. He continued:

"Since the foregoing decisions were made the leave regulations have been published and the Administrative Instruction to implement the leave regulations is now being mimeographed. Under the leave regulations we shall secure, on the application for leave and in the project investigation record, considerable information about each applicant. Also, in the case of each application for indefinite leave, we shall be checking each applicant with the Department of Justice. That Department will check not only the records of FBI but also the records of Military and Naval Intelligence.

"Still further, the Administrative Instruction on the leave regulations provides for securing advance leave clearance for all evacuees as rapidly as possible. Under the advance leave clearance procedure we shall be checking with the Department of Justice all evacuees, even before they have asked for indefinite leave. It is perfectly possible, therefore, that within the next few months we shall know specifically the names of the individual evacuees to whom we shall want to deny an indefinite leave if applied for, on the ground that free movement of the evacuee throughout the United States will endanger internal security.

"When we deny an evacuee an indefinite leave or an advance leave clearance, we shall be stating for the record that we believe the particular evacuee is dangerous to the internal security of the United States. It seems to me this will inevitably raise the question whether he isn't just as dangerous to internal security within one of our relocation centers as he would be if allowed to move freely throughout the United States. Also, such persons may very well become sources of anti-American disturbance within the relocation centers, and may interfere with the purposes we have in mind in administering the centers. We should consider, also, that the state of mind of these people may become definitely worse after they have been denied an indefinite leave or an advance leave clearance.

"Still further, to keep in a relocation center a person to whom we have denied indefinite leave or advance leave clearance will make the relocation centers look, to some extent, like prisons. I wonder whether it is appropriate to have a single relocation center serve both as a place of confinement for evacuees whom we regard as dangerous to internal security and as a place of work and residence for other evacuees whom we are in process of relocating.

"I want to raise the question therefore, whether the action
that we shall take in denying indefinite leave or advance leave clearance to any evacuee will not inevitably suggest the necessity for establishing a separate place where such persons can live and work.

"I want to raise the further question whether we should not try to get the Army to agree to administer the special center to be set aside for such segregated evacuees. I don't believe there will be a large number of evacuees that will fall in this group, and it would certainly simplify our administrative problem if we did not have to provide a separate center for them and did not have to determine what modification in our administrative policies and procedures will be needed for administration of such a center.

"There is also a legal reason for asking the Army to administer the center for segregated evacuees. In the case of the aliens we shall not have much litigation trouble for those who are denied indefinite leave or advance leave clearance. In the case of the citizens, however, we shall be in this dilemma: if the evidence is very strong it will presumably lead to a reference of the case to the United States Attorney for the institution of a criminal prosecution. If the evidence falls short of justifying such a prosecution, it would seem that we shall necessarily have a rather weak case for justifying continued detention. The courts will, however, be much more reluctant to upset such continued detention where it is exercised by the Army than where it is exercised by a civilian agency."

Comments of Dr. Embree, at the time employed as Senior Archivist by WRA, but functioning as social analyst in large measure, even then, present a third opinion on General DeWitt's plan and the segregation issue:

"The categories of people which it is proposed to move are very heterogeneous. Many perfectly law-abiding people who wish to return to Japan will be put together with a group of people who have police records and another group with subversive records. A segregee camp made up of such groups will have no way of building up a responsible public opinion within itself for law and order, and so will need full military control. Furthermore, the placing of repatriates and anti-social law-breakers together is not very just. The legal basis for again removing thousands of people without a hearing is also doubtful, especially in areas outside the Western Area.

"The effects of the Segregation Plan are not likely to be those which are desired. First of all, more military guards will be needed at Parker than at present." (Colorado River Relocation Center was in early days referred to as Parker) "Secondly the other centers, due to increased disorganization as a result of temporary martial law and the carrying out of the Segregation
Plan, will also need more guarding. Thirdly, the useful manpower reservoir in the centers will be virtually dried up due to the removal of many thousands to Parker and the effects of the carrying out of the Segregation Plan on the population of the remaining centers.

"The above program is virtually evacuation all over again, with all of its attendant difficulties and unpleasant after-effects. It would remove the last vestige of citizenship rights of Japanese Americans and fly in the face of the Four Freedoms we are fighting for. Furthermore, it would solve none of the present problems of WRA.

"During the process, WRA would abdicate authority to a segregation director (representing the Army) and would have to assume responsibility for the after-effects of the plan in the relocation centers, a situation not unlike that following the assembly center period.

"It might be pointed out in this connection that the proposed Plan is completely negative. Simply removing thousands of individuals from present centers to a segregation center does not remove the causes of social disorganization in relocation centers. This disorganization has been brought about by the original evacuation experience, which seriously undermined the family and community organization of the evacuees. Together with this social disorganization there has been produced, inevitably a breakdown in the social controls exercised by family and community organization. Added to this have been the serious psychological wounds suffered by the American citizen group, (two-thirds of the total). These factors together with the conditions of center life (families in single rooms, common mess halls, barbed wire fences, etc.) produce social conditions requiring a constructive administration if the evacuee population is not to be completely lost.

"The WRA has already commenced a positive program within the centers for reconstructing community life and providing for the constructive psychological readjustment of the individuals. Despite the handicaps indicated above, some progress along these lines is being made. Plans are at present under way for segregating repatriates, since they have expressed a desire to return to Japan and do not have much in common with the rest of the evacuees who look toward America for their future."

After full consideration of DeWitt's plan, the Acting Director of WRA stated in a letter to the Assistant Secretary of War, dated November 30, 1942, the synthesized thinking of WRA on the subject at that time:

"In one sense, segregation is already getting under way under our new indefinite leave program which became effective on
October 1. As it looks now, a steadily increasing number of evacuees with clean records will be leaving the relocation centers in the months ahead to take their places in the economic life of the country in interior areas where they will again be exposed to the Americanizing influences largely lacking in the relocation centers. In a second sense, a certain though inadequate degree of segregation was accomplished through the internment of suspected aliens immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

"Unquestionably, however, there is remaining in the centers a group of indeterminate size whose sympathies are clearly with Japan. There are the applicants for repatriation, for example, who, though they do not now appear to be a particular source of trouble, have made their choice and should be segregated from the others. This we hope to accomplish, provided facilities can be obtained and a practical program can be worked out.

"We are of the opinion that, except for the applicants for repatriation, segregation should be undertaken on the basis of the individual records of the evacuees—records in the possession of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the other intelligence services, and our own internal security officers. Some months ago we considered seriously a proposal to segregate arbitrarily those whose schooling in their impressionable years was taken in Japan. We have abandoned this idea in favor of approaching the problem on a basis of individual records even though a large program of segregation should appear to be desirable as we gain more experience."

However, WRA was at this time unable to find or otherwise provide the facilities required to care for the repatriate group in a separate center—at the close of 1942, the number of applicants for exchange or repatriation was only 3,396. Informal suggestions from the War Department continued to bear on the segregation issue, and on December 30, in response to the request of the Director of WRA, the War Department outlined a comprehensive plan for segregation which discarded the categorical approach and adopted the idea of "screening" on the basis of individual records.

In January 1943, with the establishment of Moab as isolation center, WRA initiated a segregation of citizen troublemakers, and at about the same time entered an agreement with the Depart-
ment of Justice whereby Justice should take over aliens on WRA recommendation. However, it was not until after the mass registration program of February and March, that WRA had in its possession the information which would allow a rational determination of persons to be segregated. On March 12, after the results of the registration had been analyzed, the Director of WRA wrote to the Assistant Secretary of War:

"It is my judgment that the objective of a program of segregation should be to remove the restrictions from those who are cleared by the segregation process and thereby restore fully to the loyal group those rights which are enjoyed by the rest of the public. Restrictions were placed upon the group as a whole because it contained disloyal elements. Remove the disloyal elements and the need for restrictions disappears.

Most of the plans advocated thus far have been based in too large part on certain assumptions. For example, it has been assumed that certain categories of people—Kibei, aliens, old bachelors, parolees, repatriates, to name a few—contain the dangerous elements, although few people seem to agree on the same set of categories. We now know from preliminary analysis of the results of registration, that segregation on a categorical basis would not have accomplished the purposes hoped for. We would have picked up most of the undesirables, no doubt; but along with them we would have picked up many loyal people while leaving behind some disloyal among the Nisei. However, the results of the registration at last give us a basis for forming judgments as to an individual person's loyalty that may be reasonably sound."
"The carrying out of Plan C would require the closest kind of collaboration between the War Department, the War Relocation Authority, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Department of Justice. The War Relocation Authority is quite willing to leave it to the War Department, ONI, and the Justice Department, including the FBI, to determine who should be segregated and placed under closer surveillance in internment camps and who should be permitted free movement, or restricted movement, as outlined in Plan C. We should, of course, offer every possible assistance. Perhaps the board established to clear citizens for war work in relation to the registration program would be the proper body to handle this assignment.

"As I visualize the operation of the plan, two kinds of centers would be required after segregation had been completed: One kind for people of questionable loyalty who must be held for the duration of the war with Japan; another kind for those who, though cleared by the screening process, cannot immediately relocate but should. It would be my hope that only a few of this second kind of center would be necessary after a little while. I would recommend that the first kind of center be operated either by the War Department or by the Department of Justice.

"The program envisioned in Plan C will take some little time to develop. In the interim period it will be necessary for the War Relocation Authority to continue its small scale program of segregating known trouble makers and subversives in order that relocation center administration may continue on somewhat of an even keel as we look forward to a more positive program."
"As you know from our conversations, it is my considered opinion that segregation of the disloyal without offering compensatory benefits to the loyal would result in something very close to disaster. All evacuees, loyal as well as disloyal, would look upon such action as a tightening of governmental restrictions upon a whole racial group; and so would the public. It could serve only to intensify those anxieties and fears which have led steadily to deterioration of the faith of the evacuees in America. How far this deterioration has gone is perhaps indicated in a comparison of registration figures in Hawaii and in relocation centers. It is time to take positive steps to reverse an obvious trend."

During the spring of 1943 a special sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs conducted a Congressional investigation of WRA, and, in the report approved by the full Military Affairs Committee on May 7, recommended, among other things, that those who answered "No" to the loyalty question on the questionnaires used in the execution of the registration program should be placed in internment camp at the earliest possible date.

The week of May 24, a meeting of all project directors was held in Washington, and the subject of segregation was thoroughly discussed. The Committee on Segregation, under the chairmanship of Acting Director Elmer Rowalt drew up a program which was adopted. In a vote taken to determine whether WRA should execute the segregation program in the immediate future, the project directors were unanimously in favor of doing so. The Director went on the record with a statement that he was going ahead with this type of segregation reluctantly, as he remained of the opinion that relocation is the only civilized way of segregation; that, developed to its fullest possibilities, relocation would leave behind in the centers only those who could not be relocated. In view of the attitude expressed by the project directors, Mr. Myer said, he had no alternative to agreeing to conducting this other kind of segregation.
The Segregation Policy

Three categories were established for purposes of segregation:

1. All persons who had filed applications for repatriation or expatriation and, as of July 1, 1943, had not retracted their requests.

2. All persons who had answered the loyalty question on the registration form in the negative or had failed or refused to answer it and who showed no disposition to change their answers or, having shown disposition to change their answers, failed to satisfy the Project Director that the change was made in good faith.

3. All persons to whom the Director has denied leave clearance on a basis of individual hearings because,
   a) they were the subject of adverse reports from a federal intelligence agency;
   b) they changed their answers from the negative or qualified to the affirmative on the loyalty question;
   c) they retracted applications for repatriation or expatriation to Japan;
   d) they were not recommended for leave clearance by the Japanese-American Joint Board established in the Provost Marshal General's office; or
   e) they were for other reasons believed to be loyal to Japan.

In addition to these groups of legal segregants, there was a fourth and considerable group composed of the immediate families and dependent relatives of the segregants. People in the first two categories were scheduled to be segregated in the first mass movements of September and October of 1943. The persons who were designated for removal after hearings for one of the reasons listed under #3 would be transferred from time to time.

On June 25, the National Director wrote to the Assistant Secretary of War regarding plans for segregation and recommended
approval of Tule Lake as the segregation center. Tule Lake was selected because: 1) it had a capacity of 16,000; 2) its original population held more potential segregants than was the case with any other center; 3) it had a large acreage of land available for immediate cultivation; and 4) being within the evacuated area, it is subject to special Western Defense Command regulations which do not apply to most of the centers.

Execution of the Policy

Unquestionably the execution of the segregation program in the latter half of 1943 represented a milestone in WRA history. The only major policy of comparable significance in the history of the agency was the mass registration program of the previous spring, which had accented the need of separating the pro-Japanese minority from the pro-American majority of the evacuees, obtained the information essential to any equitable selection of segregants, and provided WRA with a backlog of experience invaluable to the planning and conducting of subsequent major programs. The importance of having such a backlog was demonstrated by the impressive smoothness with which the segregation operations were carried out: not one of the administrative difficulties encountered during the mass registration arose during the execution of the segregation program.

It was generally agreed that the confusion and misunderstanding which characterized the mass registration at most centers were due to the fact that insufficient time was allowed between conception and execution of the policy to allow adequate presentation of its purposes and processes to either appointed staff or evacuees. Pre-execution planning for segregation was complete
and practical: it set forth in a manual a uniform conception of objectives and procedures, outlining a flexible plan of organization of the work entailed at the projects and providing the means of uniformity in essential detail while allowing latitude in project organization to accommodate special circumstances existing at the individual centers. The procedures recognized the need of a well-informed staff and a well-informed resident population.

At a conference held on July 26 and 27 in Denver, the Director and key members of the Washington staff met with Project Directors and their key staff members to clarify by discussion and unify interpretation of the segregation policy. Thoroughly conversant with the program, the Project Directors returned to their centers to meet with staff members and with representatives of the evacuee population to inform them fully of the work to be accomplished. Information was channeled steadily to the blocks through evacuee committees; project newspapers disseminated information and performed a valuable service in checking rumors.

In August a special board of qualified staff members was set up at each center to hold individual hearings for those persons who had answered the loyalty question in the negative or had failed or refused to answer it. Only those persons who had filed applications for repatriation or expatriation to Japan, and, as of July 1, 1943, had not retracted them were consigned to the segregation center at Tule Lake without individual hearing. Each person who had given a negative answer (or none at all) to the loyalty question was asked if he wished to change his answer.
If he said he did not wish to change, the conversation ended at that point. On the other hand, if he said that he wanted to change to an affirmative answer, he was questioned extensively as to his motives for changing, and at the close of the hearing the board made a recommendation to the Project Director as regards the disposal of the case.

The Welfare Department conducted interviews with segregants concerning family matters and health problems. The Chief Medical Officer determined which transferees, by reason of age or infirmity, required pullman accommodations—the regulation accommodations being coach—and which cases, by reason of health conditions, justified deferment of transfer. Detailed plans for the packing and handling of checkable luggage and freight were worked out by the Evacuee Property Office and carried out with an exactness that permitted this phase of the operations to proceed without delay or confusion.

On August 19th, a field station of WRA was set up at Fort Douglas, Utah to act in Liaison between the Ninth Service Command of the Army and WRA to facilitate the physical transfer of the evacuees. Prior to the first entrainment, a two-day conference was held at Fort Douglas, during which all military personnel, train commanders, mess officers, medical officers and other staff members received detailed instruction regarding transportation operations. The efficiency and smoothness with which these operations were carried out were attributed to the adequacy of these instructions and to the excellent cooperation of military, WRA personnel, and evacuees.
Between mid-September and mid-October, 33 train trips transported 14,825 persons, 6,250 being transferred from Tule Lake and 8,575 to Tule Lake. Each train trip of segregants was accompanied by a military detachment of 50 persons and a WRA staff member whose duty it was to be alert to safety measures, health and sanitary conditions, answer questions, and delegate to evacuee train monitors and coach captains responsibilities of getting volunteers for work en route and keeping the cars in a sanitary condition. Evacuee volunteers served the regular meals prepared by army cooks, operated the auxiliary diners which furnished meals for the ill and infirm in sleeping cars, and maintained a high standard of sanitation and neatness in the coaches, kitchens, lavatories and diners; car mothers looked after children, and formula girls assisted the army nurses in the preparation of formulas and infant diets. Arrangements for meals en route were made by the Army, with WRA supplying perishables, fuel for the gasoline stoves, and ice for refrigeration. In the course of these movements, 129,846 meals were served. The Army showed every consideration in providing for the comfort and well-being of the aged, the sick, expectant mothers, and mothers with small babies. Sickness en route was at a minimum. There were no deaths or births on any train. Six persons were removed from trains for hospitalization. No case of unrest, violence, disorderly conduct, or intentional resistance was observed by military personnel or WRA train rider on any trip. In view of war time conditions, the service of the railroads was excellent in respect to both equipment and schedules. Although some trains were delayed in departure beyond scheduled time, only two arrived later than scheduled time.
At Tule Lake the mechanical details and coordination of necessary factors of transfer operations were worked out to a point where, at the end of the operations, departure trains were being loaded and evacuees counted in 30 minutes, while arrival trains accomplished the count and unloading in 21 minutes. Housing assignments and deliveries of baggage were made in record time.

With one exception the program was carried out according to plan: it was found that housing at Tule Lake could not accommodate the total number of segregants; consequently the transfer of approximately 1900 people from Manzanar was ordered postponed until additional housing units could be constructed. When it became apparent that the movement of the Manzanar people would be delayed until mid-winter, one trip was scheduled in early November to move 290 of the Manzanar segregants whose health required that they make the trip before the onslaught of winter.

Every step in the execution of this program demonstrated the value of adequate planning and effective dissemination of information, of having a well-informed community to work with and well-informed staff to work with the community, and of utilizing evacuee leadership.

Problems of Administration at Tule Lake Center

Like the WRA program as a whole, segregation center administration had no precedent. In speeches, articles, reports and Congressional investigations, it has been affirmed and reaffirmed that the management in the United States of America of a population in enforced evacuation and detention, a population composed principally of American citizens, poses a high complex problem. Attempts to simplify that problem have tended to boomerang. Segregation, which was regarded as a means of over-all simplification, offered
two knotty problems in itself; first, the basis upon which to determine who should be segregated; second, how to administer the community of segregants.

Already WRA was detaining, if only temporarily, tens of thousands of American citizens without guarantee that such detention was constitutionally valid. No habeas corpus case had yet reached the Supreme Court to test the validity of such detention. Segregation meant a further detention under greater restrictions, and again the problem was complicated by the presence of many American citizens among the segregants. The basis of segregation was made disloyalty. Whether or not disloyalty may be validly established on the basis of administrative investigation without trial before a court of law is a question which has not yet been answered.

WRA's compromise between necessity and questionable legality has been to conduct painstaking hearings for every individual who for any reason failed to swear unqualified loyalty to the United States, documenting each case, and arranging for a panel composed of persons detached from WRA and politics to serve as a court of appeal.

The administration of the segregation center posed an even more baffling problem. If all the segregants were aliens and all proved guilty of subversive activity, they would not be at Tule Lake but in an internment camp administered by the Department of Justice. Application for repatriation in itself has been regarded by the United States Attorney General as insufficient reason for internment, and more than half the people at Tule Lake are in the category of repatriates or expatriates. If the population at Tule Lake Center were 100 per cent adult, whether aliens or citizen,
and all proved guilty of disloyalty, it might be defensible to pattern the administration of Tule Lake upon that of genuine internment camp. However, by the most complete figures available, 71 per cent of the people at Tule Lake are American citizens, and 26.7 per cent of the total population are not only American citizens but also are minor children, of whom many are Sansei, or third-generation Americans. Nominally these children are segregants, but it must be remembered that they live at Tule Lake only because their parents or guardians have applied for repatriation or did not answer the loyalty question in the affirmative. Similarly it must be remembered that many adult residents of Tule Lake are there only because they are dependent upon an actual segregant.

The policy of keeping families together throughout evacuation was enunciated by Lieutenant General DeWitt before WRA came into the picture. WRA has consistently followed that policy. To have set it aside at the time of segregation would have been to depart from humanitarian and democratic principles and would have added to WRA's problems the establishment and maintenance of a large orphanage to care for the thousands of children affected. As the children at Tule Lake reach the age of 17, they will register and be processed for leave clearance. Those who qualify, will be sent to a regular center, from which point they will be free to resume normal American life as soon as suitable work can be found for them.

Thus WRA is confronted by the necessity of maintaining a rule strict enough to cope with the minority of positively disloyal and yet flexible enough to accommodate the many young Americans who are as yet innocent of blame and whom WRA desires to keep that way. It has proved hard enough to conduct a convincing American-
zation program behind the single fence of barbed wire and under the
eyes of a comparatively small unit of military guards in the ordi-
nary center. It is infinitely more difficult to conduct one in a
center enclosed by a double, man-proof fence with a whole battalion
of military guards patrolling it and with a concentration of the
heretofore scattered disloyal and jingoistic element within the
center.

Prior to the segregation movements, WRA decided that admini-
strative policy under which normal centers operate could not be
utilized without alteration at the segregation center. Certain
modifications were definitely set forth before the segregation
movement; others were anticipated. First, no indefinite leave
would be granted from Tule Lake Center. Second, since Tule Lake
was set aside specifically for people who believe their future lies
with Japan, attendance at the public schools maintained by WRA
would be voluntary rather than compulsory, and Japanese parents
could at their own expense establish Japanese language schools for
the instruction of their children. Third, it was recognized that
internal security at the segregation center would present a some-
what different problem from that presented by relocation centers.
External security has always been the responsibility of the Army,
and it was a military decision, WRA concurring, that increased the
military guard at Tule Lake to a battalion, erected a double, eight-
foot, man-proof fence around the center, and installed turn-stiles
to make it impossible for any unauthorized person to enter or leave
the center. Internal Security, at Tule Lake and elsewhere, is and
always has been completely under the jurisdiction of WRA. At the
time of segregation authorized civil service positions on Internal
Security at the centers were established with a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 6 per community unit. Under the supervision of these members of the appointed staff, evacuee wardens performed the two-fold function of patrolling the residence area and handling minor infractions of WRA regulations on the one hand and protecting government property on the other.

In view of the predominant character of the population at Tule Lake, it was recognized that the number of appointed personnel on the police force would need to be increased and that the function of protecting government property would devolve upon such appointed personnel. Immediately after the Denver Conference of July 26 and 27, the National Acting Chief of Internal Security was detailed to Tule Lake to be on hand throughout the mass movement so that he could observe the situation at first hand and make recommendations.

As a fourth deviation from over-all policy, it was generally agreed that community government as it existed at the relocation centers would not be instituted at Tule Lake; in its place, as soon as the people had moved in and gotten settled, there would be a representative council of evacuees to function in an advisory capacity with the administration, but its scope of activity would be considerably more limited than that of the community councils of the relocation centers. The administration believed that it would be impractical to lay down any hard and fast policy for management of Tule Lake until the population was actually in residence; only then could the details of center management be worked out on a reasonable and realistic basis. It was necessary to study the population and evaluate its temper before determining
what kind of administration was required. Against the possibility that conditions might conceivably justify a rigid policy of management, was the probability that conditions would justify placing emphasis upon cooperation from the community in the problem of community management. If the effort to secure the cooperation of the community succeeded, it meant not only a more democratic type of administration but a smoother operation than could be hoped for under coercive tactics and also it meant a material financial economy.

Before transfer operations began, a number of WRA staff members from the National Office were sent out to Tule Lake to study the problem at the center and make recommendations. However, once the mass movement began, it was necessary to utilize all available staff, including the visitors from Washington, in the immediate and pressing matters of transfer, housing, and day-to-day maintenance operations in the disorganized center. During those weeks, there was little if any time for conscious and deliberate study of the community, but certain phenomena were noted, definite trends recognized. As of November 4, one important recommendation had been carried almost to completion; had it been completed by that date, it is not going too far to say that the violent incident of that night could not have occurred. This recommendation was for a new motor pool located in the administration area, adjacent to the military compound and to be enclosed by a strong fence. Had this fence-enclosed new motor pool been in use on November 4, the trucks which played a conspicuous part in the events of the evening could not have been
obtained by the evacuees.

Toward the end of October, with the mass movement virtually completed and with people getting settled in their new quarters, ideas on policy were beginning to emerge, recommendations were taking shape, and the visit of the National Director scheduled for the first of November was anticipated as an opportunity to work out with him a definite policy for the administration of the center.

Background of the Tule Lake Incident

Struggle for Power.

During the month of October it became apparent that an undercover movement to get control of the community of segregants was in progress. It was not until October 26 that the leaders openly declared themselves. The mass demonstration of November 1 was recognized at once as the culmination of this struggle for power; subsequent investigation produced information and evidence which proved beyond a doubt that this was so.

The leaders were not old residents of Tule Lake, but men who had gained some prominence as minority leaders in the centers from which they were transferred to Tule Lake; chiefly they were from Jerome, Poston, and Heart Mountain. They were men who in pre-evacuation days had failed to achieve leadership in their communities, some of them having been repudiated as fanatics and cranks. Under the tensions and stresses of the evacuation,
they had managed to win minority leaderships within the relocation centers, and there they had gained expert knowledge of center politics and evacuee psychology. The segregation center appealed to these men as a place where the minority groups of the ordinary center would doubtless constitute a majority and where their own desire for power and leadership could be more fully gratified. From the centers of their previous residence has come evidence that well before the transfer, certain of these men developed detailed plans for seizing control of the community at Tule Lake.

They were skilful in making capital of the discomforts and dissatisfaction common to the disorganized period when people were moving in and out of Tule Lake in large numbers and when every-day operations were maintained with difficulty and considerable irregularity. They were quick to recruit the rowdy element, many of whom were Hawaiian Kibeis but some of whom were merely ordinary young American toughs who had never been out of the United States, and use this group to intimidate and control the hesitant or uncooperative. They made appeals shrewdly calculated to win a following: one made on the basis of specific improvements in living conditions far-reaching and as effective with the soberer element as with the hotheads. Appeals made on the basis of moral justice were potent with many, especially the protests against discriminatory aspects of evacuation and of segregation itself and the stressing of the need for solidarity and loyalty to the group. They sponsored private language schools, distinct from the recognized Japanese language schools set up by an evacuee board of education. The purpose of the private schools was to indoctrinate the young with the most flamboyant Japanese militaristic propaganda, and
pressure was brought upon Nisei who knew little if any Japanese
to attend these irregular schools; the pressure was deeply re-
sented by the many young people who had gone to Tule Lake only
for family reasons and felt that their future lay in America.
The Americanized young especially resented what they characterized
as "Gestapo* methods and they were wont to refer to the agents of
intimidation as "storm troops". Many older people were indignant
at being forced into line by arrogant young strangers who behaved
like gangsters. However, until a crisis brought leaders and strong-
arm squads into the open, their intimidation of the opposition
was consistently effective.

At first any evidence of the movement toward political
organization of the center was of an inconclusive nature. In the
second week of October there was a minor labor dispute arising
from the crew assigned to handle coal. Three men who were not
members of the crew and who were recent arrivals from Central
Utah tried to inject themselves into the arbitration, insisting
that they "represented the community". However, their claims
and their suggestions were ignored by the coal crew, and the dis-
pute was settled without the would-be leaders having been allowed
a part in proceedings.

On October 15 there occurred an accident which provided
the aspiring politicians with a better opportunity to bring the
community together and unify sentiment. An evacuee driver of a
truck carrying workers to the farm attempted to overtake another
truck and ran off the road, overturning his own truck and injur-
ing a number of his passengers. One of the injured men, pre-
viously a resident of Topaz, died of his injuries a day or two
later. After the accident no farm workers reported for duty. The evacuee leaders campaigned for a public funeral. Understanding that the widow preferred a private funeral, the administration discouraged (although it did not actually prohibit) a public ceremony. Facilities for making a large-scale public ceremony effective were denied by the administration, but finally, on October 23, the funeral was held in the largest firebreak where the evacuees had thrown together a makeshift stage. There was an attendance of about 2000, and strong-arm squads patrolled the edges of the crowd, showing a surly temper toward the few members of the appointed staff who appeared on the scene.

In the meantime the administration's most pressing problem was to get the crops harvested before frost could spoil them. The Project Director issued a public request shortly after the accident, calling for representatives of the farm workers to discuss the matter and setting October 21 as the deadline for arbitration. No committee appeared, but it was informally suggested to the administration that the people were not interested in harvesting the crops. The administration promptly terminated the Tule Lake farm workers and recruited evacuee volunteers from the regular centers to save the crops. The recruitment was so successful that by October 26, the day set for a meeting with an evacuee committee which had belatedly appeared and asked for a meeting with the administration to discuss the farm situation, many recruits from other centers were already encamped at the farm and at work in the harvest fields. The committee had lost its chance to effect a settlement of the current farm trouble,
but the meeting was scheduled to discuss the issue in terms of future policy.

The center politicians had made full use of the interval between the death of the farm laborer and the day of the conference to organize the community. They achieved their status as negotiating committee by the force of their own determination rather than by orthodox community election. The mass of the residents remained unaware that a committee was being formed until after it materialized.

At the meeting with the Project Director on October 26, the committeemen were vague in their explanation of how their committee had come into existence. Mr. Best, the Project Director, refused to recognize them as representatives of the whole community, but stated his willingness to entertain suggestions from them and hear what they had to say. They presented 5 points for discussion:

1) the legal status of the segregants and a recommendation for a re-segregation at Tule Lake of those who really wished to return to Japan from those who did not,
2) settlement of the farm situation on a basis of confining production exclusively to the needs of Tule Lake;
3) the establishment of an evacuee governing body which, they felt, should be worked out among the evacuees themselves;
4) criticism of the food, with implications that its distribution was being mishandled,
5) various physical improvements needed within the center.

The committee was informed that segregant status was not a matter that the project administration could decide. It was agreed that farm production should henceforward be limited to the needs of Tule Lake Center. The administration suggested that the committee or any other group had the privilege of working
out plans for a governing body and also for physical improvements within the center and submitting these plans to the administration for consideration. The committee was invited to conduct an investigation of the food situation and make a report.

In view of the attitude of this committee, Mr. Best did not see fit to announce the fact that the harvest was being completed by volunteers from the relocation centers. That very night (the 26th) appointed staff members transferred 32,000 pounds of staple foods from the center warehouses to the farm camp for the maintenance of volunteer harvesters. The next day evacuee warehouse workers observed that this food was missing. In San Francisco, at about the same time, the Field Assistant Director of WRA announced to the press that the Tule Lake crops were being harvested by loyal evacuees from other centers. Tule Lake politicians were not slow to connect the removal of food from the warehouses with the presence of outside workers at the farm. On October 30 another accident played into the hands of the aspiring leaders: an evacuee infant, playing in his mother's apartment and presence, fell into a bucket of scalding water and died after treatment in the hospital. A report rapidly circulated among the residents of the center that the negligence of a Caucasian doctor was responsible for the child's death.

The Demonstration of November 1

At about ten o'clock in the morning of November 1, Mr. Myer arrived at Tule Lake on a routine visit. He was accompanied by Mr. Cozzens, the Field Assistant Director from the San Francisco Office. No sooner had the National Director arrived than members of the negotiating committee appeared to request a conference
with him. They were received by one of the assistant project
directors, who, after consulting with Mr. Myer, scheduled a con-
ference for 1:30 p.m. the following day. In a very short time the
delегation returned to ask that the conference be held that after-
noon instead of the next day; their request was denied.

At noon unauthorized announcements were made by satellites
of the evacuee politicians in evacuee mess halls, urging all
people to go to the administration building immediately after
lunch. Some announcers said that the Director was going to make a
speech to the community; others said that the people should go to
"back up the committee" which was presenting demands for the better-
ment of living conditions. Young men posted at each block directed
the people coming out of the mess halls to go directly to the
administration building.

During the noon hour word was brought to the National
Director and to the Project Director that a crowd was gathering
around the administration building. They and Mr. Cozzens got in
a car and made a reconnaissance of the colony, with a view to de-
termining whether the situation warranted calling in the military.
They saw people walking from every block toward the administration
area. Old and young, women with babies in arms or in baby carri-
ages, and children of all sizes were moving in a steady stream
toward the administration building. The presence of these women,
babies, and elderly people in the crowd convinced the Directors
that violence was not part of the plan. The three men went to
the Project Director's office in the administration building to
await developments.

By one-thirty about 5000 evacuees had congregated about
the administration building. Young men at the edges of the crowd discouraged anyone from leaving the area. For more than three hours the crowd stood, silent or talking quietly, only children and half-grown boys displaying restlessness. Some of the latter clambered over parked cars and did some minor damage: they put dirt in a couple of gas tanks, bent a few radio aerials, and removed a few windshield wipers and radiator caps. Other than these instances, there was no destruction of property by any of the crowd gathered around the administration building. Groups of evacuee men requested appointed personnel throughout the administration area to go to the main administration building. With the exception of a few staff members who combined diplomacy with reasonable excuses for leaving, those who tried to leave the administration building were prevented from doing so. The restraint was courteously imposed except in a few instances where men resisted instructions; these were pushed inside the building.

The organizers of the demonstration wanted to protest grievances and request to the National Director; furthermore, they wanted the bulk of the administrative staff accounted for during the conference with the Director, and they wanted the mass of the evacuee population assembled, as evidence that the community was solidly behind the committee. As a result of their maneuvers, they succeeded in getting about two-thirds of the administrative staff inside the building during the demonstration and about one-third of the evacuee population outside the building.

A project official kept in close touch by telephone with the commanding officer of the Military Police, who stood by, ready to rush in soldiers at a moment's notice. Early in the afternoon the
tanks in the military area were warned up to be in readiness for emergency. However, the announcers in the mess halls had instructed the people to take no weapons or anything that might be regarded as such and to do nothing that might bring the Army into the picture. The most conclusive evidence that the demonstration was intended to be a peaceful one lay in the inclusion of elderly people, women and small children in the crowd.

As soon as the crowd had assembled, the negotiating committee appeared and requested an audience with the Director. Seventeen men were in the group, and hence it was known as the "Committe of 17"; however, there were actually only 15 members of the committee, one man being there quite inadvertently. They were received in Mr. Best's office by WRA officials for a meeting. Simultaneously an evacuee public address system was set up at the front of the building, and throughout the afternoon the crowd was instructed intermittently over the loudspeaker to be patient, as the committee was negotiating, and that the Director of WRA would soon speak to them.

In the Project Director's office, the conference proceeded, with certain interruptions which shall be accounted for further on, for 3 hours. The committee chairman, formerly of Jerome, was spokesman. He presented the point brought up at the October 26 meeting, now enlarged and supplemented. The committee attempted to get confirmation of their suspicious concerning the removal of staple foods from the warehouses, but was informed that the food was WRA property and need not be accounted for to the evacuees. An attempt was made to fix responsibility for the death of the
farm worker upon the administration. The committee protested the termination of the Tule Lake farm workers, who had stopped work and failed to make use of the opportunity given them to negotiate with the administration. Protests were made in regard to food, sanitary facilities, center dust, and hospital administration. Criticism focused upon various project officials, including the Chief Steward, an Assistant Project Director, the Chief of Agriculture, the Junior Property Supply Officer, the Chief Medical Officer and his entire staff of appointed personnel, the National Acting Chief of Internal Security, and the Project Director himself. The final demand of the committee was for the removal from Tule Lake of all the personnel just named.

The Director stated clearly that while the administration welcomed suggestions from any and all groups, it did not operate on a basis of demands; that no terminations of personnel would be made except on a basis of thorough investigation; and that the administration was not prepared to consider the present committee as being a genuinely representative body. The chairman of the committee then asked the Director to speak to the crowd. The Director did so, repeating in general what he had said to the committee. The Project Director also made a very brief speech, after which an evacuee interpreter reproduced both speeches in Japanese. A WRA staff member who speaks fluent Japanese was present and vouched for the accuracy of the interpreter's version of what was said. A committee member, who is a Buddhist priest with strong Shinto coloring, made a short speech in Japanese, and at its conclusion the evacuee who had served as announcer throughout the afternoon stepped forward and told the crowd to bow. The majority of the people obeyed, facing the entrance of
the administration building where the speakers were assembled. Immediately after bowing, the crowd dispersed.

The Hospital Incident of November 1

No single episode of the critical period of November 1 to 4 at Tule Lake suffered more general misunderstanding and exaggeration than the Hospital incident of the afternoon of November 1. Certain inevitable omissions in the transcript of the meeting in the Project Director's office proved misleading; rumor tangled with fact, and opinion in some instances was accepted as factual evidence; there was considerable disparity between what actually happened and what some eye witnesses thought was happening. At the time when hearings were being conducted by various investigating committees, the parts had not yet been fitted into a whole, and some important connecting links were yet missing. Since that time, by means of a careful checking and rechecking of affidavits, statements, and testimony, and a further questioning of reliable eye-witnesses, it has been possible to supply the connecting links and fit the details into proper sequence.

On the afternoon of November 1, just as the conference in the Project Director's office was about to begin and while the Project Director's secretary was getting the names of the committee men for the record, the Project Director received a telephone message from a doctor in the hospital reporting the one instance of violence which occurred within the center on that day. Mr. Best asked the chairman of the committee what was going on at the hospital. The chairman answered: "I don't know." Mr. Best informed the group that the Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Pedicord, had been beaten and that property was being destroyed. At this
point, every WRA staff member in the room was conscious of the surprise and consternation which the news produced in the committeemen; it was obvious that this episode in the hospital was not a part of the committee's plan for the afternoon. Recovering himself, the chairman said: "We will stop it," and sent some of his men to the hospital. Discussion stopped until the men returned and reported that the Chief Medical Officer was being cared for and that all was quiet in the hospital. The conference continued. A few minutes later, a second telephone call from the hospital reported that evacuees were milling about in the wards. Again the committee sent some men over, and again the conferees waited until the report came back that everything was quiet at the hospital. The conference continued for fifteen minutes or more until another interruption occurred in the form of a message from the Medical Social Consultant who had just arrived in the outer office; the message indicated that the hospital situation required further attention. The Director asked the National Acting Chief of Internal Security, Mr. Schmidt, to go to the hospital. Mr. Schmidt hurried to the hospital, being joined outside by an evacuee who elected to go with him. In a few moments he returned to the meeting to report that everything was under control at the hospital.

About an hour before the crowd congregated around the administration building, an evacuee employee in the hospital took Dr. Pedicord aside and informed him that there was going to be a demonstration that afternoon, but that no trouble was expected at the hospital. The Chief Medical Officer soon observed that groups of three to five evacuees who were not hospital employees kept coming in at intervals and circulating among the hospital
employees, presumably to get them to leave work and join in the demonstration. He told the intruders to leave, and they did so, but he noticed that fifteen or twenty were congregated on the steps outside. He commissioned another Caucasian doctor to guard the door and let no one in, and then went into his office, which is at the right of the entrance and entered by way of an outer office.

The young men on the steps pushed past the doctor at the door and began to crowd into the outer office used by Dr. Pedicord's secretary. The secretary screamed; the Chief Medical Officer thrust his head out from his own office to see what was happening and had his glasses removed by an intruder, who laid them carefully on a shelf. Dr. Pedicord struck this man, whereupon the others moved up, pressing the doctor back into his office. Five of the group took an active part in the attack; the others stood on the sidelines. The assailants got the doctor down, kicked him twice, once in the side of the face and once in the body, and dragged him outside the building. The doctor's special nurse rushed out to the rescue, the leader of the gang gave the order to stop the beating, and the gang took itself off. Other hospital attendants came out, carried the doctor inside and administered treatment for his injuries, which were painful rather than serious. In the course of the struggle, a railing outside the doctor's office was knocked over. There was no destruction of property.

The fight was over, the injured doctor was receiving medical attention, and the assailants had vanished before the doctor who had been commissioned to the guard the front door put his call through to Mr. Best. Naturally there was nervous tension in the
hospital. Few of the hospital attendants had witnessed the violent incident, but word of such an event spreads rapidly. Despite the nervous strain, all but two or three persons remained at their posts of duty until their regular hour of release. The second telephone call to the Project Director was made by a nurse who looked down the long corridor which connects the row of wards and saw evacuees going in and out through a door midway along the corridor and opening toward the administration area. A steady stream of people entering the corridor and passing into a wing of the ward section of the building was, in view of the recent disturbance, alarming enough to make her call the Project Director. The second delegation sent by the evacuee committee investigated and reported correctly enough that there was no disorder in the hospital.

At about this time Miss Shipps, the Medical Social Consultant from the Washington office, had gone to the Out-Patient clinic, located at one side of the main entrance of the hospital, close to the spot where the attack on the Chief Medical Officer ended. She went to the clinic to stand by and reassure nurses and attendants who might be overwrought by the recent occurrence. From her position she observed a young man stationed in front of the hospital about 50 feet from the entrance. She addressed him in Japanese, asking him what he was doing, and he replied that he was guarding the hospital. She signified that she thought little of his method, as his distance from the door left it unprotected, and other doors leading into the hospital were not guarded at all. The young evacuee moved closer to the door and agreed to set guards at other entrances. Miss Shipps then pro-
ceeding toward the administration building with the doctor who had telephoned the first message concerning the attack on Dr. Pedicord. On the way, however, Miss Shipps stopped to recover the keys of a car for the wife of Dr. Pedicord from an evacuee who had entered the car and was starting away with it. The doctor was escorted to the administration building, but Miss Shipps after delivering the car keys to Mrs. Pedicord, paused to tell her of what had happened at the hospital and advise her to go to her husband. Miss Shipps arrived at the administration building shortly after the doctor, who had been informing the assistant project director of conditions in the hospital and asking that the Army be called in. The time of her arrival was approximately half an hour later than the time of the original message concerning the attack. Talking with the assistant project director in an office adjoining the conference room, she could look through the glass panels across the conferees and see evacuees from the crowd going in and out of a door in the middle of the long hospital corridor, and was troubled by the situation, pointing it out to the assistant project director, whereupon he delivered the message which interrupted the conference for the third time and resulted in an investigation by Mr. Schmidt.

In subsequent hearings a good deal of attention was given to the contradiction in reports from the hospital. Unfortunately the witnesses called were not in possession of the simple and entirely natural explanation of the conflict between reports. There was no disorder in the hospital once the assailants of Dr. Pedicord took themselves off, but there was a fairly steady stream of evacuees from the crowd passing in and out of one door, which led...
across the corridor to a wing of the ward section which was not used for patients but which contained class rooms and, what is highly significant in this instance, rest rooms. The residents, herded from lunch to the administration area and not allowed to leave the area for more than three hours, were understandably making use of the rest rooms available within the area.

Effects of the Demonstration.

Once the demonstration was over, the reaction from the period of confinement in the administration building set in, and rumors thrived among the appointed personnel, stimulated by the quick publicizing by the press of hysterical versions of what had happened. While a gratifying number refused to become excited, continuing to regard the demonstration as a peaceful one, others gave way to nerves and began to think that they had seen indications of incendiary intentions in the crowd and an assortment of vicious weapons. According to the testimony of the more stable personnel, some of whom were consciously looking for just such evidence and were in a position to see for themselves, there was no sign of straw, whether oil-soaked or pure of oil—there was a small cardboard box with excelsior in it carried by an evacuee as he left the post office; substantial clubs diminished to the walking sticks habitually carried by the older evacuees at all centers; villainous knives and swords degenerated into a few jack knives in the hands of some half-grown boys who entertained themselves during the tedious period of waiting by playing mumbly-peg and whittling.

Fully aware that the atmosphere was tense, the administration officials went directly from the mass meeting to confer with the commanding officer of the military police and make detailed
arrangements for assuring protection of life and property within
the center in any emergency that might arise. The military stood
in readiness to take immediate occupation of the center, and it
was agreed that authority to summon military assistance should be
extended to any internal security officer, whereas previously only
the Project Director—or the National Director himself—was auth-
orized to call in the Army.

At the suggestion of Dr. Pedicord, the Caucasian hospital
staff was relieved from duty that night and sent home to get some
rest. One nurse remained on duty until the evening rounds were
made, however, and Miss Shipps remained on duty through the night,
and continued to stay at the hospital. A few members of appointed
personnel spent the night in Klamath Falls or Tulelake (the nearest
town). The next day there was a series of staff meetings, culmi-
nating in one with the Director and Project Director, during which
the demand for a fence between administration and evacuee communi-
ties was revived—certain staff members had asked for this fence
during the segregation movement. The request for a fence was
granted, and arrangements were started with the Army Engineers for
its immediate construction. The Project Director issued an order
prohibiting public gatherings of evacuees in the administration,
WRA residential, hospital and warehouse areas. Nightly patrols of
these areas were maintained, beginning Monday, by four members of
the Internal Security staff; 2 guards were assigned to a night
watch at the high school area; Mr. Schmidt was on general surveil-
ance, and the Chief of Internal Security from Central Utah, tem-
porarily detailed to Tule Lake, augmented the others. Patrol off-
icers checked in hourly to the sergeant of the military guard
and the officer of the day, with the understanding that the military should investigate if any check-in were more than five minutes overdue. With these precautionary measures in operation, the National Director left the center, Tuesday evening, November 2, as per schedule.

In general the effect of the demonstration on the evacuees was to stimulate the radical element to more open exhibitions of pro-Japan sentiment, and to make the more thoughtful group uneasy. The leaders, actually having failed in their attempt to obtain a promise from the administration that no more food would be taken from the center warehouses to feed the harvest crew, asserted to their following that the promise had been given but hinted that it would be well for the young men to keep an eye on warehouses and the motor pool to make certain that no more food vanished.

On the morning of November 3, young evacuee men rounded up evacuee workers and herded them to an unauthorized ceremony commemorating the birthday of the late Emperor Meiji Setsu, grandfather of the reigning Emperor of Japan. The workers returned to their jobs as soon as the ceremony ended. That afternoon the Honorable F. de Amat, Consul of the Spanish Embassy, in the presence of a representative of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, met with a group of 21 evacuee representatives, whose chairman was the chairman of the Negotiating Committee and whose number included the leaders of the Monday demonstration. Aside from complaints about the food situation and the hospital, the major issue brought before the Spanish Consul was clarification of the segregants' status: they petitioned the Consul to take up with the Japanese government the possibility of bestowing
Japanese citizenship upon Tule Lake Nisei.

On the night of November 3, the Acting Project Director, while riding around the project on an observation tour, saw groups of evacuees stationed in the vicinity of the warehouses and near the motor pool. The next day, details having been cleared with the U.S. Engineers at San Francisco, work began on the fence between administration and evacuee areas.
CHAPTER XX.

1. SEGREGATION

No policy of the War Relocation Authority was discussed more fully than the policy of segregation for the "disloyal." None was subjected to greater Congressional pressure or to greater criticism from extremists in the War Department. No policy was planned more carefully or executed more neatly. None produced more doubtful results.

Early Consideration

The first discussions on segregation were initiated in May, 1942 by Lieutenant Commander K. D. Ringle, a Naval Intelligence officer and a specialist in Japanese matters, who had been detailed to the WRA. Commander Ringle believed that the most potentially dangerous groups within the Japanese-American population were (1) Kibei, American citizens of Japanese ancestry who had "spent a number of the formative years of their life, from the age of 13 to the age of 20, in Japan and who have returned to the United States," and (2) those Issei "who have retained sufficient of their Japanese ideology and patriotism so that they are in spirit loyal citizens of the Japanese empire." He believed that a special center should be established for these groups.

Commander Ringle recommended that broad definitions be utilized in the segregation process. Kibei, for segregation purposes, would be all persons who had spent three years or more in Japan since the age of 13. Dangerous Issei would include the parents and dependents of Kibei, persons who had made repeated voyages to Japan within recent years, officials of Japanese nationalistic organizations, persons classified as dangerous by military or civilian security agencies, and all aliens who had entered the United States since 1933.
Once segregated, these two classes would be regarded as enemy internees. They would be refused employment in private industry and put under special guard. They would be handled in a blanket fashion on the presumption that they were guilty unless proved innocent. Families would not be divided except at their own request. Children under 17 would take the classification of their parents or guardian, one consideration being given the predominant family position held by the male in Japanese society. A review board would be constituted for final appeals and to consider cases of possible injustice. The Commander recommended that solemn assurance be given all who desired to announce themselves as loyal to Japan that they could do so "without fear or prejudice," would be accorded the legal status of internees and that, unless sooner exchanged for American citizens held by the Japanese government, they would be repatriated to Japan at the conclusion of the war. 1/

In a later memorandum, Commander Ringle emphasized his belief in the potential danger of Kibei, strongly advocated that groups of loyal Nisei be used to aid in the sifting of the disloyal, and added, on the positive side, a comment that strongly colored the thinking of WRA personnel in subsequent segregation considerations:

I firmly believe that the potentially dangerous can be readily sifted out, leaving a balance of about three-fourths of the total Japanese population which could be safely accepted as American citizens, trusted to harvest crops, work on many essential war supplies, and ultimately permitted to seek their places in private life as genuinely loyal American Citizens. 2/


2/ Memorandum, Ringle to Cress, Factors Making the Kibei a Dangerous Group, May 27, 1942. Italics supplied.
Commander Ringle had been one of several professional intelligence officers opposed to the original mass evacuation. It was his opinion that Japanese in America, as a group, were of no uncontrollable danger to the war effort, that evacuation would have the effect of embittering loyal persons and reversing the trend towards greater assimilation, and that "the only practical, permanent solution of this problem is to indoctrinate and absorb these people, accept them as an integral part of the United States population, even though they remain a racial minority, and officially extend to them the rights and privileges of citizenship, as well as demanding of them its duties and obligations." 1/ Because of the Lieutenant Commander's experience in Japanese matters, and because of the very moderation of his larger views, officials of WRA were much impressed by his segregation proposals.

The Naval Commander's views were buttressed by those of Dr. Robert Redfield, social anthropologist of the University of Chicago, who had been consulted. Dr. Redfield added one proviso: he favored segregation only if the Nisei themselves were in favor of it. Segregation would enable the WRA to announce that, since the loyal Japanese had been separated from the disloyal, restrictions placed upon the former group might be relaxed during the wartime, and return to normal life for the loyal group might be made easier at the end of the war. The Japanese themselves would be encouraged by the humanity of the policy and would therefore better accept the circumstances of confinement. Finally, segregation would show advocates of a severe policy that more stringent restriction of the more dangerous group had been undertaken.

The task is to identify the truly dangerous and confine or deport them, and to re-introduce the rest into American life. Separation is a step in this direction. It reduces the degree to which all may be supposed to be dangerous (while increasing the degree of suspicion attaching to a segregated minority); and it provides a mechanism whereby individuals may be moved from the prima facie dangerous group to the group which is not dangerous. 1/

Dr. John Provinse, head of the Community Management Division of WRA, became the first high-ranking official within the Authority to advocate at least a separation of the Kibei. He was impressed with the cogency of Dr. Redfield’s analogy to "typhoid Mary." Because of the inability to isolate certain "carriers" dangerous to the national war effort, WRA had been forced to assume a quarantine control over all evacuees for the dual purpose of protecting the public welfare and the suspect group, itself. It was therefore necessary to work toward a constant refinement of the total group in order to discover the "carriers." The proposed Kibei segregation was a step in the refinement process with which Dr. Provinse was in earnest agreement. 2/

Further point was given the segregation discussion at this time by the public recommendation of Carey McWilliams that "a sound policy for the evacuation program would strengthen the position of the loyal elements and weaken that of the suspect elements." 3/

In the middle of the month the segregation proposal was summarized by Director Eisenhower. He stated the case as follows:

1/ Memorandum, Robert Redfield, The Separation of Nisei and Kibei, June 6, 1942.
2/ Memorandum, Provinse to Eisenhower, June 8, 1942.

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Favorable

Essentially, the favorable argument is that, with the loyal separated from the potentially dangerous, we will have a better opportunity to gain recognition for the former. The loyal would be encouraged by governmental recognition of that fact, even though public attitudes might not change sufficiently to warrant a diminution of restraints during the war. Failure to segregate may lead to strife in the centers, the disaffection of some who are now loyal, and a public insistence upon believing that all Japanese are potentially dangerous.

Unfavorable

The unfavorable argument is that it is undemocratic to condemn the Kibei by definition. Segregation, if undertaken, should be on the basis of individual examination. Further, segregation may not lead to a changed public attitude toward the Nisei, particularly so long as aliens and citizens are intermingled, as they must be if we are to avoid separating families. Then, too, we should proceed positively on the basis that democratic processes will win out over the undemocratic, whereas segregation implies that this is not possible. Finally, segregation is filled with administrative difficulty; it would be necessary to shift about between Parker, Tule Lake, and Manzanar and then handle the balance of the segregation at the assembly centers.

Certainly we must soon launch a carefully planned information program designed to convince the American public that 75 to 80 percent of the Nisei are loyal; that 50 percent of the Issei are passively loyal.

I'd like to settle the question. I am strongly inclined toward avoiding segregation by definition, but to try to find better methods of achieving the results sought. 1/

At the same time, the National Director advised consultation with the evacuee advisory groups at both the assembly and relocations centers making clear that "unless the Japanese overwhelmingly favor segregation I would not approve it." Obviously, he added, there had to be a substitute program to achieve the objectives sought by those who favor segregation. Such a program would give special recognition to loyal Americans and would include (a) a statute which would enable WRA to offer repatriation to those who wished it; (b) an extensive educational program; (c) a set of individual records which would eventually permit WRA "to issue

1/ Memorandum, Eisenhower to Provine, June 15, 1942.
honorable discharges and perhaps awards of merit to loyal American citizens; (d) preference in project government to loyal American citizens; and (e) an arrangement through which the Japanese, themselves, could shape an Americanization program. 1/

These first segregation discussions produced no program. In the face of what seemed overshadowing negative arguments, (1) the arbitrary undemocratic character of the Kibei definition, and (2) the doubtful results in terms of more favorable public sentiment, the Kibei-Issei segregation program was dropped. Other matters -- center construction, the transfer of evacuees, procurement difficulties, personnel problems -- were more immediately pressing, and the change in directors on June 30 was a further deterrent to immediate action. The new Director faced the segregation proposal at one of his first staff meetings, at which time he tabled the matter pending his own further education. 2/

The first faint approach to the alternative to segregation, e.g., individual relocation of loyal evacuees throughout the interior states, was announced in an Administrative Instruction on July 20, 1942. 3/ The cumbersome, initial procedure limited relocation to citizens who had never visited Japan. This first relocation policy was not designed to be, nor was it adequate as a segregation substitute. As the policy developed, however, it developed consciously into a positive segregation program by the process of allowing and encouraging "loyal" evacuees to leave the centers.

1/ Memorandum, Eisenhower to Rowalt, June 16, 1942.
2/ Dillon S. Myer interview, Grodzins' Notes, September 29, 1943.
3/ Administrative Instruction No. 22.
First Policy -- But No Implementation

Prior to the general policy conferences in San Francisco in August 1942, the first serious disturbances were felt at the Manzanar center. Two meetings of the Manzanar Citizens' Federation, a group constituted to draw up a constitution for the Project, drew forth expressions of dissatisfaction with, and criticism of, the Federal Government's evacuation program. On August 8, a meeting of some 600 Kibei was held, ostensibly in protest over the discrimination against Kibei contained in the newly issued Administrative Instruction on leave clearance. Conducted entirely in Japanese, this assembly was noisy and ill-tempered. A veteran of the first World War, a Japanese-American, wounded in action, shouted "If anyone here, any Nisei, thinks he's an American I dare him to try to walk out of this prison. This is no place for us. It's a white man's country." Another speaker: "I've been in Manchuria, China, in teh Southe Seas, and now I'm in America. This is the stinkiest, rottenest place I've ever been in ..." Such remarks drew applause, whereas loud boos and shouts greeted the dissenting views of those who argued moderation and cooperation in the WRA program.

These meetings were straws in the wind. Evacuation was reaping its first large-scale harvest of frustration, despair, and discontent. Those with a reputation for collaboration were threatened. The camp was disturbed by shots from a watch tower, presumably aimed at a person attempting to escape. It was rumored that tomatoes and rocks were being gathered for use at a scheduled talk of the Project Director, which was subsequently cancelled. The camouflage net factory was closed by strikers.1/

1/ Cf. Togo Tanaka and Joe Masuoka, Documentary Report Number 47, August 12, 1942, Manzanar Relocation Center.
These events were, of course, most disturbing to WRA officials even then preparing to lay down the Authority's basic policies. Their thoughts on segregation were bolstered on August 10 and again on August 13 by letters from Manzanar residents urging that segregation be carried out.

A separate camp should be set up for all American citizens of Japanese ancestry. This should be on a voluntary basis as some may choose to remain with their parents who are Japanese nationals.

As each day goes by it is self-evident that the camp, at Manzanar, is divided into two factions - one for America and the other for the axis. This has been more definite since the 'Kibei' meeting held on August 8th. Threats of bodily harm against outspoken Americans is increasing by members of the 'Dunbar Club' and other individuals. On or about August 9th, James Oda, passing by Block 9 was pointed out by a group of San Pedro boys, who said: 'You dirty American, we'll get you some day.' John Fumita, timekeeper of Kitchen 4 and a Kibei - got in an argument with a Block 4 resident - saying that 'if anyone had any Japanese blood in them they would not be loyal to this country.'

A citizen camp of loyal Americans will eliminate activities of anti-American elements and make it possible to carry on a democratic program . . .

A 'Hearing Board' should be instituted for Japanese nationals and those found to be loyal to democracy be given the choice to go to 'Citizen camps.'

This will minimize the splitting of families a great deal. It is my hope and belief that more than half of the Japanese nationals will be able to join citizen camps with their children. And in the long run majority of Japanese nationals will change their minds and want to stay in this country. This is true especially of those who have American children.

I want to quote from a letter sent me from Tule Lake Center by an alien friend: '... There is one thing I want to tell you, it is true that in here many people have reactionary element as pro-Japan and pro-militarist ... whenever I hear that they discussing about military subject, indoors or outdoors, I do have indescribable lousy feeling and wish I do get out from here to other place where there are no Japanese. If I should be here as long as war, perhaps I will be insane.' 1/

1/ Karl Yoneda to D. S. Myer, letter, August 13, 1942.
In a similar fashion, the Nisei Manzanar Documentarians, Togo Tanaka, and Joe Masaoka, recommended "sustaining and giving aid and comfort" to those loyal to America despite evacuation by the "drastic survey" of maintaining separate camps for those of opposing loyalties and ideologies.¹

To those national WRA officials, particularly Philip Glick, who witnessed the effect on Manzanar of these initial disturbances, the arguments thus made for segregation were most persuasive. During the San Francisco policy meetings of August 13-20, they strongly advocated the segregation policy. Mr. Myer, like his predecessor, was suspicious of categorical definitions and unwilling to separate whole classes of people. He was willing to move on segregation only on the merits of individual cases.

'Remove the troublemakers,' I was urged. 'How can we pick them out?' I replied. Nobody could answer that question. We had no records, no dockets on individuals. We had only the knowledge that troublemakers existed. After much discussion, I told the group that I was ready to move those people who had clearly decided to throw in their lot with Japan, that is, the repatriates and the expatriates. I told them we would move with this much of a segregation policy if we could find a place to put those who wanted to go to Japan.²

Thus the first segregation policy was set in August, 1942.

Those people who desired to live in Japan after the war would be moved to a separate camp, if a separate camp could be found. Actually, no existing center could be found and priority considerations made new construction difficult. Without exhausting all possible alternatives for securing a center for repatriates (no request was made to the Army Engineer Corps, for example) the matter was tacitly dropped. Policy existed but policy waited for administrative implementation.

¹/ Togo Tanaka-Joe Masaoka, op. cit., p. 8.
²/ Dillon S. Myer interview, Grodzins' Notes, September 29, 1943.
It is noteworthy that the first decision was to segregate those who had requested repatriation (and expatriation) rather than those who had been leaders in the Manzanar troubles. There was no belief or proof that repatriates constituted either the mass of troublemakers or even its leadership. Nevertheless, the logic of this first policy seemed unanswerable: the very presence of a group whose stake had been definitely cast with Japan would have an adverse effect on those whose loyalties were still with America. Removal of the repatriates and expatriates would thus remove pressure from the larger group, and at the same time it might aid the Authority's difficult public relations program. Further, evacuation of the repatriates would be on an individual basis. The injustices inherent in definition of the disloyal by groups would be avoided.

As nice as this demonstration may be, repatriate and expatriate segregation could not solve the fundamental problem of camp unrest, and this is perhaps the best explanation of the administration laxity that left the first segregation a paper policy only. Those who had requested to be sent to Japan were largely Issei and largely passive in attitude towards the WRA administration. Though some repatriates were thought to be in the background of center troubles, the discernable locus of trouble was centered in the Kibei and in certain outspoken Issei, the greatest proportion of whom had not asked to be sent to Japan at all. Further, the largest part of camp difficulty arose from leadership unknown to WRA officials. Finally, no one was certain whether camp difficulties were the result of the agitation of disloyal Americans or the result of general discontent springing from evacuation and from abnormalities of Relocation Center life.
The larger purpose of segregation was to separate those whose faith and future were in America from those favorable to Japan and scornful of the America of evacuation. This larger purpose in the formative days of WRA policy was made synonymous with the desire to make for a peaceful camp administration. It was clear that the segregation of repatriates would not achieve this latter purpose. There was no basis on which to proceed to a more inclusive segregation. The dilemma was sharply pointed: Repatriates could be segregated with few injustices and with probably negligible results in quieting camp unrest or "troublemakers" could be segregated through arbitrary definition of classes with the possibility of greater results and the certainty of great injustices. What was to be done?

Interim Policy - "Isolation."

Nothing. Discussions were picked up periodically, the old arguments reviewed and the status quo retained. The first actual step in segregation did not come until January, 1943, and it was an attack on the problem opposite to the August policy. This was the establishment of the "Isolation Center" for troublemakers at a special camp, first at Moab, Utah, later at Leupp, Arizona.

There had been no let up in camp tensions following the first Manzanar strike. Each of the early camps, Manzanar and Tule Lake in California, Gila and Poston in Arizona, went through a cycle of growing discontent capped by an "incident"
of riot or near riot proportions. Climaxes were reached in a general strike at Poston in November, and in a violent demonstration at Manzanar in December. The Poston strike was settled by WRA and Indian Office officials but the Manzanar riot ended in tear gas bombings and the death of two Japanese Americans before the guns of the Military Police.

Immediately following the Manzanar incident, E.R. Fryer, National Deputy Director, submitted a twofold program for separation of the Japanese population:

Two steps must be taken at once before we can expect law and order and loyalty to become the prevailing factor. Those who menace community living must be isolated. Those known to be disloyal or suspected of disloyalty and those with strong cultural ties with Japan must be segregated.

The isolation contemplated was for "social misfits and other persons who jeopardize normal community living." The segregation was much more inclusive. The Authority had to recognize that the continued residence in relocation projects of persons loyal to Japan and persons with strong Japanese cultural ties was jeopardizing the status of the Japanese American citizens. Japanese aliens without roots in this country could generally be considered loyal to their mother country. Japanese who had requested repatriation had removed all doubt as to their allegiance. It was therefore recommended that the following classes be placed in a separate segregation center: (1) all persons who had requested repatriation; (2) all alien bachelors and alien couples without
children, except those specifically exempted by the Project Director; (3) all parolees or former internees, except those exempted by positive action by the Project Director. Further, after these groups had been moved it was recommended that hearings be held as a basis for the segregation of Kibei.

Hearings on the project should not be held for persons during the original segregation. Segregation had to be on a categorical basis. There would be some injustices. However, injustices could be eliminated when the process of segregation had been completed.¹

Even before submitting these recommendations, Mr. Fryer announced to residents of that camp that a move was underway for the "immediate segregation of known Axis sympathizers and other unruly elements."² This was a premature statement; the only segregation thus far had been the jailing of leaders of the Manzanar crowds and no other policy was then contemplated. That a segregation policy for troublemakers (and not for "known Axis sympathizers") did follow, was less the result of planning than of administrative misunderstanding:

Speaking very frankly, and I hate to admit it, Moab was a pure accident. Fryer made promises to the Project Directors ... that he would make it possible for them to remove the troublemakers from the camps. The Project Directors put the screws on us. Fryer had committed us to a policy but it was one that I was afraid of. I was very worried about the legal basis of any isolation program for troublemakers; due process was completely absent, and I was mainly worried about this. These were very trying

¹ Memorandum, Fryer to Myer, A Report Concerning the Incident at the Manzanar Relocation Center, December 22, 1942, pp.11-12.
² Pacific Citizen, December 17, 1942, p. 1.
days in my relationships with Fryer. Finally, in the face of his insistence and his commitments to Project Directors, I approved the establishment of the Moab camp.¹

The first announcement that sixteen of the Manzanar troublemakers had been moved to the abandoned CCC camp at Moab was made on January 13.² An Administrative Instruction regularizing procedures was not issued until a month later.³ This Instruction set forth procedures "to govern the removal of aggravated and incorrigible troublemakers from the relocation centers" for the purpose of facilitating law and order. It specifically disclaimed any purpose of (1) segregating evacuees "solely on the basis of evidence or presumptive evidence of loyalty or disloyalty" or of (2) serving as a means of silencing those critical of WRA administration. The person subject to isolation "must be in fact a responsible agent in fomenting disorder or threatening the security of center residents, addicted to trouble making, and beyond the capacity of regular processes within the relocation center to keep under control." Three recommendations were possible in such cases: (a) transfer to the isolation center; (b) transfer to another relocation center (desirable in the case where such transfer would remove the evacuee from influences motivating his conduct); (c) in the cases of aliens, certification to the Department of Justice for internment in centers

¹ Dillon Myer interview, Grodzins' notes, September 29, 1943
² Manzanar Free Press, January 16, 1943.
for dangerous enemy aliens.\textsuperscript{1} Dockets were to be supplied, with recommendations, by the Project Director to the National Director. A Special Board was established in the National office to review cases coming from the projects and to make recommendations to the National Director, in whom the decision for final disposition of the cases rested.\textsuperscript{2}

As a whole, it was the opinion of the WRA authorities that the program of removing troublemakers from the projects proved a suitable and workable, if a limited, procedure. On the project level, it had "a great deal to do with keeping the so-called Kibei group in hand." The prospect of isolation from friends and family in company with a group of persons considered "incorrigible" had a salutory effect on potential troublemakers. On the National level, the

\footnotesize{1. Procedures for these transfers were worked out in Washington. Edward Ennis, Alien Enemy Control Unit to Philip Glick, December 31, 1942. Glick to Myer, Confidential, December 30, 1942.

2. On June 5, 1943, Administrative Instruction \#95 was issued, replacing and slightly revising the unnumbered Instruction. The principal change instituted was the requirement that the evacuee be afforded a hearing before being sent to the Leupp camp. In announcing the new Instruction, Mr. Myer wrote to the Project Directors on May 5: "It is becoming increasingly evident that transfer to the isolation center is a punishment . . . It is hardly appropriate to provide a punishment without giving the transferee a hearing and an opportunity to present his side of the case." Emergency transfers with later hearings were provided, however.}
isolation center removed one of the principal complaints of the field workers against the central bureaucracy and, generally, made for smoother intra-administration relations. On the level of public relations, the isolation center was a factor in answering critics that evacuees were coddled and in demonstrating WRA's sincerity in seeking a solution to the problem of segregating the good Japanese from the bad.  

On the other hand, the isolation center suffered from a lack of definition. "We don't know whether it's a jail, a rehabilitation center, or what." The camp essentially was an administrative expedient. In it were placed persons who were considered troublemakers, but against whom the WRA had not sufficient evidence to bring into a regular court. Further, the project directors at first saw in the isolation center an easy way out of their own difficulties. In the early days of the camp, project directors wanted to use it to accommodate their gamblers, their petty thieves, their more outspoken critics and nearly everyone else who appeared in the role of even slightly potential troublemakers. This was a perversion of the original purpose in setting up the camp and one against which the National office continuously fought.

But there were two much more fundamental objections to the policy and operation of the isolation center. In the first place, it was clearly illegal.
Don't put me on the spot about the legality of Leupp. I have said from the first that it's illegal, and I still think so. I am not at all proud of it, even though it has been effective. At first, we weren't even giving hearings to those people sent there. Now of course we are providing a hearing but that does not improve matters.¹

In the second place, the isolation center was a poor and halting step in the direction of segregation as it was originally conceived, and as it continued to be developed. Camp malcontents were not necessarily persons disloyal to the United States. It could reasonably be presumed that most "incorrigible troublemakers" were, to say the least, not friendly toward the government of the United States. On the other hand, allegiance is a mental, not necessarily a physical, state. No one believed that Moab or Leupp filtered off even a fraction of those who by ordinary definition could be called disloyal.

As an expedient, and an illegal expedient at that, to remove difficult people from the projects, the isolation center had reasonable success. As a measure of segregating the loyal from the disloyal, or of achieving essential camp harmony, the isolation center had no claim to success. All this was readily acknowledged by WRA officials who did not conceive of the isolation center as a true step toward segregation and who, indeed, looked forward to the center's liquidation from almost the very day of its establishment.

¹ Myer Interview, Grodzins' notes, September 29, 1943.
(Before approving the isolation center, Mr. Myer met with national officials of the American Civil Liberties Union in which he explained the principle of the isolation camp and the fact that it was an emergency matter.)
Just as it was accidentally established, however, so it existed: the events of the army registration and of the larger segregation program occupied the energies and facilities of the WRA to such an extent that a thoughtful re-evaluation of the isolation center was continuously postponed. Nevertheless, at a staff meeting on October 6, 1943, Mr. Myer announced that discussions were underway that looked forward to the final abolishment of the isolation center.

Further Inconclusive Discussion

As we have seen, the isolation procedures were undertaken to safeguard the peace of the community. Protection of the status of loyal Japanese Americans by segregation of the disloyal\(^1\) continued to be the problem of fundamental perplexity and Mr. Myer appointed a three-man committee to formulate a Statement of Policy on segregation. The Washington Committee labored for more than a month without reaching agreement. Replies from the Project Directors and Field Assistant Directors to a letter circulated by the Committee\(^2\) clearly showed the pro-segregation attitude of key personnel in the field. They also suggested the practical difficulties of such a step. Twelve of thirteen

\(^{1}\) War Relocation Authority, Quarterly Report, October 1, 1942 to December 31, 1942, p. 40.

\(^{2}\) Myer to Project and Field Assistant Directors, December 24, 1942.
Project and Field Directors believed segregation "desirable or necessary." But only seven of the thirteen thought there were people in the projects "agitating for disloyalty and wilfully obstructing the program of the Authority," while only five of the group thought that segregation would have a salutary effect within the projects. The Directors of the West Coast Projects were unanimously in favor of segregation, in their belief that the effect would be beneficial to the projects, and in feeling that disloyal or obstructive people could be named. But the Directors of the inter-mountain and Arkansas projects expressed a highly skeptical attitude. Thus, Mr. Merritt of Manzanar believed segregation would aid the orderly operation of the center; he named a group of disloyal people whom he wanted removed; he believed the majority of evacuees "would like to see all those who disrupt the peace removed." ¹ On the other hand, Mr. Lindley of Granada had no proof in which to recommend segregation and believed the program would "cause more trouble than it is worth" with respect to center administration. As a whole, these answers increased the belief that something should be done in the way of segregation without at all contributing to the essential problems of who and in what manner.

At least a partial solution to these problems appeared possible with the issuance of new leave regulations

¹ Merritt to Myer, Confidential, January 7, 1943.
which provided for securing advance leave clearances for evacuees.\(^1\) Since this meant an investigation of each person who applied for leave, it became clear that the Authority would build up a file of individual evacuees to whom it would deny indefinite leave on the ground that free movement of these evacuees would endanger the internal security of the United States.

... this will inevitably raise the question whether he isn't just as dangerous to internal security within one of our relocation centers as he would be if allowed to move freely throughout the United States. Also, such persons may very well become sources of anti-American disturbance within the relocation centers, and may interfere with the purposes we have in mind in administering the centers. We should consider, also, that the state of mind of these people may become definitely worse after they have been denied an indefinite leave or an advance leave clearance.

Still further, to keep in a relocation center a person to whom we have denied indefinite leave or advance leave clearance will make the relocation centers look, to some extent, like prisons. I wonder whether it is appropriate to have a single relocation center serve both as a place of confinement for evacuees whom we regard as dangerous to internal security and a place of work and residence for other evacuees whom we are in the process of relocating.

This reasoning led again to a consideration of a separate center for disloyal evacuees, disloyal evacuees now being defined as persons denied leave clearance after individual examination.

Mr. Glick suggested that the Army administer the special center set aside for evacuees. He did not believe the segregated group would be a large one, and Army control of the separate camp would considerably lessen the
WRA's administrative burden. At the same time, Army control was preferable for legal reasons: continued detention of citizens in such a camp without sufficient evidence for a criminal prosecution might be unconstitutional. Army control might strengthen this legal case.

Further, an announcement that all evacuees had been individually examined and the disloyal ones segregated "would greatly improve the willingness of the public to accept the evacuees to whom we are willing to give indefinite leave." It might even be possible to dispense entirely with Military Police protection at some of the other centers. As soon as indefinite leaves supplied the room, the centers in Military Area No. 1 could be closed. The relocation centers remaining could be made genuinely American communities. Evacuees would have the alternatives of cooperating willingly in relocation center activities, or of moving away if they didn't like those activities.¹

There were three propositions of fundamental importance contained in this line of reasoning: (1) Basing segregation on denial of leave clearance; (2) Asking the War Department to administer the segregation center; (3) Using segregation as a means of (a) insuring greater acceptance of the larger group, and (b) making relocation centers normal American communities. It was at this time that Mr. Myer was optimistically writing that "I am inclined to believe that

¹ Glick to Myer, Confidential Memorandum, November 6, 1942.
segregation on a large scale will not become necessary. He was putting great faith in the "positive" segregation of relocation. Except for repatriates, he had definitely determined that there would be no segregation by a definition of groups. If it could be said that WRA had a segregation policy at all on November, 1942, it was a policy of awaiting a substitute for segregation, and/or the acquisition of sufficient information with which to base a policy of individual evaluation. At the turn of the year it was hoped that relocation would more and more supply the substitute for segregation and that data being collected in consideration of individuals for relocation would provide a basis for individual segregation, if segregation were necessary at all. This trend of affairs was altered by pressure from the Western Defense Command of the Army; by the unexpected results of Army and Leave clearance registration, and by the activities of two Congressional Investigating Committees.

The Western Defense Command and Segregation

The recommendations of Commanding General J. L. DeWitt of the Western Defense Command were made known in a series of six remarkable messages to the Army Chief of Staff, and later transmitted to the War Relocation Authority.

1. On August 23, 1942, General DeWitt recommended the

segregation of Kibei and "the forfeiture through appropriate legal processes . . . of the U.S. citizenship of all such Kibei . . . and their internment for the duration of the war with a view to their repatriation as rapidly as opportunity affords."

The General defined Kibei as persons of Japanese ancestry, born in the United States, who "have been educated and indoctrinated in Japan during their formative years." "Between one-third and one-quarter of all American-born Japanese fall within the Kibei classification," General DeWitt wrote. Most American-born Japanese were dual citizens and it was "legally possible for a dual citizen to forfeit one of the two citizenships he possesses by action showing an election." Kibei had "by their action indicated an intention to bear allegiance to the Emperor of Japan. If this proposition can be established, the persons within this classification become enemy aliens, subject to internment." The co-mingling of Kibei with Nisei was dangerous and tended further "to alienate all Nisei by constant exposure to Japanese doctrination." Finally, the presence of Kibei in the interior of the United States was dangerous to the national security, and the plan to intern and repatriate Kibei should include all Kibei who resided outside the coastal areas and who had not been evacuated.¹

2. On September 8, 1942, General DeWitt transmitted to

¹. DeWitt to Chief of Staff, Confidential Memorandum, August 23, 1942.
the Chief of Staff a report from an alien resident of Manzanar on the early difficulties in that camp. This report, according to the General's analysis, showed a dangerous trend in disloyalty among the Manzanar residents, especially the Kibei. The co-mingling of all classes of Japanese in the evacuation process had exposed the second generation Japanese to the danger of "complete and irreconcilable alienation by the Japanese indoctrinated Kibei." The recommendation was even more inclusive than that in the previous communication:

The recommendations contained in my letter [of August 23] are reiterated and emphasized and the early separation of "Kibei" and "Issei," or alien Japanese, from "Nisei" and the adoption of appropriate steps for the eventual repatriation of segments of the former two classes, is urgently recommended.¹

3. General DeWitt's first proposal had been to segregate and send the Kibei to Japan, and the second had been to segregate and send to Japan unspecified segments of the Kibei and Issei groups. His recommendation of October 5, 1942, was a third step in the same direction. He advocated that the War Department "undertake to provide for the retention of all persons evacuated in the relocation centers as a measure of urgent military necessity" until the segregation of segments of Issei and Kibei could be completed, and until "the development of a technique and plan of operation to acquire maximum data about the Japanese as a

¹. DeWitt to Chief of Staff, Confidential Memorandum, September 8, 1942.
race with a view to furthering the conduct of actual and psychological warfare against the enemy."\(^1\)

4. On October 9, 1942, General DeWitt transmitted to the Chief of Staff a report on certain Japanese at Manzanar by a special agent of the FBI. This report emphasized the increasing influence of Kibei and Issei. The General noted, "the Nisei are said to be despairing of their future." It was patently necessary to segregate immediately the presumptively good Japanese from the essentially bad Japanese. "To leave them together much longer is bound to atrophy what loyalty some of the Japanese (number unknown) may have had to this country, and perhaps to make them perpetually pro-Japanese." General DeWitt reiterated the recommendations made in his previous three communications.\(^2\)

5. On October 19, 1942, General DeWitt again strengthened his recommendations. In this communication General DeWitt also opposed further construction by the Army of any buildings in relocation centers, asserting that if the buildings already constructed were put to "optimum use" there would be space for 17,000 additional evacuees, enough space to accommodate all the evacuees scheduled for the centers.\(^3\)

6. On December 15, 1942, General DeWitt transmitted to

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1. DeWitt to Chief of Staff, Confidential Memorandum, October 5, 1942. In this memorandum, General DeWitt again made the point that appropriate restrictions of Japanese Americans, not residents of the West Coast, had not been made.

2. DeWitt to Chief of Staff, Confidential Memorandum, Oct.'42. A copy of this memorandum was not available and its contents were reconstructed from written commentaries by WRA officials. Leland Barrows wrote on November 3 that the General used "'optimum use' obviously to mean maximum crowding."

3. DeWitt to Chief of Staff, Confidential Memorandum, Oct.'42.
the Chief of Staff a comprehensive plan for segregation, which was forwarded to WRA by Assistant Secretary of War McCloy on December 30 "with the thought that you might find it of help in formulating your segregation procedure."\(^1\)

The Fourth Army Command's segregation plan provided for the moving, under conditions of strict military discipline, of more than 5,500 evacuees and their families to Units 2 and 3 of the Colorado River Center and removing the loyal residents of those units to other centers. Segregation was of such immediate urgency that the program could not wait for the construction of a new segregation center. Absolute secrecy was to be maintained on all plans until "X" date. On "X" date the segregation plan would be placed in operation. Complete military control would be established at every center. Communications to and from the centers, including mail, would be stopped and the centers would remain isolated for the unspecified number of days (or weeks) needed to accomplish the segregation. The Director of Segregation would be the only person authorized to issue public statements about the segregation program. All project activities carried on outside the living area (farming, etc.) and other activities within the centers would be suspended where suspension was necessary to establish security and to assure Military control.

\(^1\) DeWitt to Chief of Staff, Memorandum, December 15, 1942; McCloy to Myer, letter, December 30, 1942. Both documents were marked "SECRET." The large plan was drawn up in response to a request made to Mr. McCloy by Mr. Myer.
All leave furloughs, visiting privileges, and relocation activities would be suspended.

With the Project thus controlled and isolated, housing surveys would be initiated to determine all available space for transfers from (and to) the segregation center, the plan requiring, whenever necessary, the suspension of recreational and educational activities for the purpose of developing additional apartment space. Simultaneously, the main task of preparing segregation and train lists would be undertaken on the basis of previously prepared lists of disloyal persons. The following classes would be segregated:

1. All evacuees who had indicated their desire to accept repatriation or expatriation to Japan.
2. All parolees (aliens paroled from detention or internment camps) resident in relocation centers.
3. All evacuees having an evaluated internal security police record during assembly center or relocation center residence.
4. All evacuees who were listed and evaluated by the Intelligence Services as potentially dangerous.
5. Members of the immediate families of listed segregees in groups (2), (3), and (4) above, where the listed segree was a family head.

A "family head" was defined as a married, widowed or divorced man or woman, with a spouse and/or children in the project. "Immediate family" was defined as including the spouse, all unmarried or unemancipated children and dependent parents. All adults of the immediate family (i.e. spouse, children 16 or over and parents) were eligible to choose whether or not to accompany a segregee who was a family head. Children under 15 were bound by the election of the spouse of the segregee.

It was specifically provided that in questions concerning the eligibility of persons to accompany segregees, a strict construction would be placed and eligibility restricted.
The Director of Segregation would be selected jointly by the Secretary of War and the Director of the War Relocation Authority. He might be a military officer or a civilian official; in either case, he would have complete responsibility to take all necessary steps to insure the successful conclusion of the segregation program. During the segregation program, a Project Control Officer, appointed by the Director of Segregation, would have authority over the entire project staff, including the Project Director. Train movements would be planned by the Director of Segregation, commanded by Army officers, and staffed with representatives of the U.S. Public Health Service.

Controlling purpose of the segregation was prevention of complete alienation of Japanese Americans. At first, active members of militantly pro-Axis evacuees had been small but they had been able to develop an expanding program of alienation, intimidation and obstruction. Segregation would stop the trend toward complete alienation of the evacuee group. Most tangible and immediate results would avoid the

(1) "increasing necessity for use of troops in maintaining order," and would prevent (2) "loss of useful manpower reserve."

Civilian Reaction to Military Proposals

From time to time, staff members of the WRA gave their views on the suggestions of General DeWitt. On November 3, 1942, Leland Barrows, WRA executive officer, commented on the General's successive recommendations made up to that
On the general question of segregation... I think we must argue that it cannot be separated from all the other social and psychological aspects of the "relocation, maintenance, and supervision" of the evacuee population. I think we should flatly oppose the specific suggestion that all evacuees be held in Relocation Centers until a program of segregation has been completed.

General DeWitt's several proposals on this subject nowhere include a sound formula or guide to the selection of dangerous, pro-Axis or un-American evacuees... A careful reading of all these documents indicates that sound administration of a program of segregation would require the examination of individuals through the medium of loyalty boards or some other administrative device competent to separate the good from the bad.

... At best, segregation is a negative approach to the problems outlined in these documents. If we are to retain the full loyalty of those evacuees who, as General DeWitt says, have "a strong desire to be loyal and to demonstrate their loyalty", we must take a much more positive stand. We must provide decent family housing (not merely "optimum" housing which disregards family groups); we must provide adequate schools; a reasonable opportunity for religious worship and community activities; and most important of all, for the permanent return of loyal evacuees to normal life. If we do these positive things, I doubt that segregation of any, except those who desire repatriation, would be necessary. If we do not do these positive things, I think there is grave danger that further moving of people from Center to Center on an arbitrary basis (and remember that any segregation such as has been proposed will involve breaking up families and severing of community ties of all kinds) will embitter the entire population almost beyond hope. People and communities are too complex to be disposed of on any such simple categorical basis as "Issei", "Nisei", and "Kibei". Really, the only segregation I favor is that arising through the release of loyal evacuees from centers.

On approximately the same date, Dr. John Provinse, Head of Community Activities, wrote an opposite opinion:

... I think General DeWitt shows poor grace in his present urgent demands on WRA, and by resort to

1. Barrows to Myer, Confidential Memorandum, November 3, 1942.
logic or dialectic one can demolish him pretty easily . . . the loyal or near loyal Nisei in the Relocation Centers are much less amenable to pro-Axis influences because of the proximity of a few agitators among them than they are because of the original action (of evacuation) which negated their citizenship expectations and subsequent actions which hem them in an curtail them much beyond what appears reasonably necessary to win the war . . . . The Japanizing General DeWitt complains of began not in the Relocation Centers, but when he ordered the evacuation . . . .

Most of the above . . . is beside the point. The important thing is to consider whether we want segregation . . . we have studied it enough that we do not need to feel pushed into it . . . . I do not think our resettlement program will proceed rapidly enough to achieve all that must be done and I doubt if any educational program can of itself overcome the present resurgence of Japanese culture and values on the projects without eliminating some of the leaders most responsible for the anti-American talk and activity. I think we should begin at once to find a separate place for repatriates, for parolees, and for those others whose activities clearly demonstrate they are interested in sabotaging the war effort. Beyond this, I think the allegiance of the niseis and the loyal kibei and issei will be achieved not by closer supervision and restriction, but by sympathetic action taken to reinstate them in the American economy and way of life from which they have so suddenly been cut off . . . .

Following submission of the "Day" plan, comments of WRA authorities nicely illustrated the conflict of the civilian concept with the military.

Solicitor Philip Glick:

I believe this Segregation Plan is thoroughly bad. The entire procedure proposes to treat the evacuees as though they were so many blocks of wood, with complete disregard of the rights and liberties, not to mention the fears and sensibilities, they share with other human beings.

1. John Provinse, Confidential Memorandum (for files) undated.
If this plan were applied as proposed, I believe it would create widespread consternation and terror among the evacuees . . . .

I cannot refrain from saying that this document is much more compatible with the Nazi psychology of our enemies than with the democratic psychology we are fighting for.

Further, I have the most serious doubts as to the Plan's constitutionality, if applied to citizens of the United States.

. . . If this Plan were put into effect, it seems clear to me that on and after X-Date the relocation centers will become concentration camps.¹

Deputy Director Elmer Rowalt:

. . . . Any segregation by rule of thumb, whether on the basis of kibei-nisei, bachelorhood, parolee status, or any other arbitrary and categorical separation, is unfair; and unfair treatment is not expected of the United States Government. It very properly leads to trouble and may be justified only if national safety is involved. Certainly national safety is not here involved, whereas national self respect is.

. . . . I look upon the mass method suggested here as a . . . dangerous procedure. It smacks of Gestapo technique. To swoop in and attack at dawn on X date would do the quickly and efficiently, but the real casualty would be the WRA program. Evacuees will accept segregation as a policy, I'm sure, but not on the basis proposed. They'll accept it only if they believe the government is doing as fair a job as it knows how to do. This rules out arbitrary action and necessitates installing fair procedures such as I trust the committee on segregation is preparing.²

Social Analyst John Embree:

Any new large-scale relocation of people by groups without a hearing and under conditions of martial law as proposed in the Segregation Plan will renew and aggravate all the old frustrations and anxieties produced by the evacuation. What little sense of security may have been built up will be completely destroyed again.

1. Glick to Myer, Confidential Memorandum, January 8, 1943.
2. Rowalt to Myer, Confidential Memorandum, January 2, 1943.
Social disorganization will be produced . . . . the proposed plan is completely negative. Simply removing thousands of individuals from present centers to a segregation center does not remove the causes of social disorganization in relocation centers.

The effects of the Segregation Plan are not likely to be those which are desired. First of all, more military guards will be needed at Parker than at present. Secondly, the other centers, due to increased disorganization as a result of temporary martial law and the carrying out of the Segregation Plan, will also need more guarding. Thirdly, the useful manpower reservoir in the centers will be virtually dried up due to the removal of many thousands to Parker and the effects of the carrying out of the Segregation Plan on the population of the remaining centers.

The above program is virtually evacuation all over again, with all of its attendant difficulties and unpleasant after-effects. It would remove the last vestige of citizenship rights of Japanese-Americans and fly in the face of the Four Freedoms we are fighting for. Furthermore, it would solve none of the present problems of WRA.

The WRA has already commenced a positive program within the centers for reconstructing community life and providing for the constructive psychological readjustment of the individuals. Despite the handicaps indicated above, some progress along these lines is being made.

The ultimate aim of the present program is also to reduce the number of guards necessary and to return as many evacuees as possible to productive participation in the war effort and in American life. It is believed that the positive and constructive program now underway is more likely to produce the desired results rather than any purely negative measures such as large-scale segregation.¹

Relocation Planning Officer Ralph Stauber:

The proposal outlines essentially a new evacuation designed along much the same lines as the original. The similarity runs all the way from the selection of persons to be evacuated on the basis of an "a priori" classification, to the handling of the evacuation itself under strict military procedure.

... I believe it would be impossible to call in the military on the scale proposed, to select individuals

¹. Notes on Segregation Plans, Confidential Memorandum, January 2, 1943.
on the arbitrary basis proposed, and to relocate segregees and the present inhabitants of the second and third divisions of Poston, without completely destroying whatever confidence we may have developed in the minds of evacuees and the public. In short, if we accept this kind of segregation program, I believe we should turn the whole Japanese problem back to the Army and abandon completely and hope of anything other than a straight internment program.

The report does not recognize that neither reduced use of troops for maintaining order nor increased availability of a manpower reservoir hold much promise of attainment by a plan which would almost certainly fix in the minds of all evacuees the conviction that, protestations of Democracy, fair dealing, etc. notwithstanding, they are, in fact, in internment camps under the Army, and that WRA is simply window dressing.

The designation of five classes of segregees is without supporting factual foundation, and seems to contemplate no evaluation of evidence other than by the police or intelligence officers. The equivalent of a judicial weighing of evidence is not provided. The assumption that the designated lists include the majority of troublemakers may or may not be justified. Basing a segregee policy on such tenuous evidence without the equivalent of judicial process that will be recognized as fair is highly unjustifiable.

The adoption of such a proposal would certainly give the Axis a most excellent opportunity to broadcast to the world our adoption of dictator methods while protesting our war objectives in terms of the "Four Freedoms".

Field Assistant Director Joseph Smart:

It is naive to think that there are no disloyal (Japanese) or that there can be no trouble in any Center; but it is fantastic to suggest that the threat of trouble will be removed or any problems solved by the mass segregation of a large and arbitrarily selected list of people such as was attached to the plan. The purpose outlined and the method devised smacks too much of the Nazi way and my stomach is not strong enough for it.

These independently written commentaries very

2. Smart to Myer, Confidential letter, January 8, 1943.
adequately demonstrate WRA's unanimously adverse reactions to the final segregation plan of General DeWitt. That there continued to be disagreement within the authority with respect to the necessity and scope of segregation, makes even more pointed the unanimous condemnation of the method proposed by the author of the original evacuation orders.

**Optimistic Hopes that Segregation Would be Unnecessary**

WRA officials did not believe that General DeWitt spoke for the War Department as a whole. The Fourth Army Command had a backlog of experience in Japanese matters, and had ordered and carried through the original evacuation. And it was presumed that any military segregation would be carried out principally by officers of General DeWitt's command. However, each of the recommendations of the several were transmitted to WRA "for information and advice"; at no time were they presented as official War Department recommendations.

Nevertheless, the General's words were not without influence, a point which was of considerable concern to WRA officials. Even the Assistant Secretary of War, who was considered liberal in his attitude towards the Japanese, was moved sufficiently, on October 30, 1942, to report to Mr. Myer on information he had received from a civilian official of the Fourth Army Command. Pro-Japanese influence of Kibei and Issei was being more and more felt by the younger generation who were well-disposed toward America,
Mr. McCloy wrote. Though not concurring in General DeWitt's then current recommendation that all evacuees be kept within the centers nor even that the entire Kibei group be segregated, the Assistant Secretary of War wondered whether "arrangements could not be made fairly readily " to segregate those persons (a) who had asked for repatriation, and (b) who had been paroled from the Justice Department internment centers." In the absence of a more stringent internal police system and a segregation policy, "there is not only a constant danger that incidents will arise in the relocation centers which will finally result in serious disorders, but of a progressive deterioration of the morale of the loyal element." The War Department was interested in any development that might require the employment of troops. Apart from that "unwelcome consideration", the condition constituted an increasing obstacle to the prompt rehabilitation of the Japanese.\(^1\)

At the time that this letter was written, WRA was moving rapidly on its new all-important policy of relocation. On September 29, a revised and more liberal leave program was described in the Federal Register, and on November 12, Mr. Myer announced to the staff that the main emphasis of his administration would be on relocating loyal persons outside the center. To further this objective, camp administra-

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tion would be simplified.¹

In view of this new program, Mr. Myer, in conference with Mr. McCloy on November 11, voiced a reluctance to move into a segregation policy, of even repatriates. It was too disturbing to evacuees, and to administration, and if it involved trading people among the centers, it would constitute a definite deterrent to the success of the new relocation program. Mr. McCloy's reaction "was that he did not want me to throw that out the window too soon. He is very strongly sold on the segregation policy, particularly in regard to repatriates. He thinks we should move toward a segregation policy, in which I agree with him, but I told him we had all these other considerations . . . I said that . . . I hoped we could work out something where it would not require the shifting of people . . . ."²

A week later, Mr. Myer's thinking had progressed to the point where he was even less certain about the necessity of segregation:

In one sense, segregation is already under way under our new indefinite leave program which became effective on October 1. As it looks now, a steadily increasing number of evacuees with clean records will be leaving the relocation centers in the months ahead to take their places in the economic life of the country in interior areas where they will again be exposed to the Americanizing influences largely lacking in relocation centers. In a second sense, a certain though inadequate degree of segregation was accomplished through the internment of suspected aliens immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

2. Conversation reported by Mr. Myer to Staff meeting, November 12, 1942, Minutes, p. 28.
Unquestionably, however, there is remaining in the centers a group of indeterminate size whose sympathies are clearly with Japan. There are the applicants for repatriation, for example, who, though they do not now appear to be a particular source of trouble, have made their choice and should be segregated from the others. This we hope to accomplish, provided facilities can be obtained and a practical program can be worked out.

... As the leave program becomes more widely understood and moves into full swing, I feel confidence that many of the tensions and anxieties which are evident in relocation centers will gradually ease and perhaps be largely eliminated. I do not mean, of course, that we may expect the disloyal suddenly to turn loyal, but that we may expect, through our leave policy and program, to create an atmosphere much less favorable to the activities and influences of those who are pro-Japanese in their thoughts. 1

This somewhat optimistic statement was followed by the serious troubles within the West Coast centers that led to the establishment of the Isolation Center for "troublemakers." 2 Arrangements were made at the same time with the War Department to undertake a study of possible camp sites for a segregation center, 3 and procedures were set up in cooperation with the Justice Department to remove aliens who were "thought to be pro-Japanese and trouble makers" from the relocation centers to alien detention camps maintained by the Department of Justice. 4 In the face of these difficulties and of the almost unanimous opinion of the Project Directors that segregation should take place, the feeling

2. Cf. Supra
nevertheless grew that segregation might not be necessary.

This feeling grew directly out of what War Relocation Authority officials considered their greatest victory to that date: the formation of the Nisei Combat Unit. The re-institution of Selective Service had been urged and so the segregated combat team was a qualified victory. Though recognized and accepted as such (and not without some anticipation of trouble) the very fact that Japanese Americans were again to be accepted for Army service was considered of first importance in furthering the fundamental policy of returning loyal Japanese Americans to normal American life. That the return of Nisei to the Army had been made on the face of the unimplemented segregation recommendations of the Fourth Army Command made the acceptance of the Combat Unit even more remarkable.

Announcement of the Combat Unit was made on the same day that Mr. Myer was in conference with Project and Area officials at Denver, Colorado. The National Director was more than ever convinced that segregation might not be necessary:

[The best step in segregation is to get them (Japanese Americans) in the Army, WAACS, outside employment, etc. Then it is no longer our problem. Our biggest job to avoid the necessity of segregation is to get them out of the centers.]

Aliens (he continued), against whom there was a clear case, were easy to handle. The Justice Department would accept them for internment. The previous August he
thought WRA would establish a Center where people who wanted to go back to Japan could live together, but the problems of providing physical space, a new staff and construction materials, plus the difficulties of lifting a lot of people out of the present centers all "nearly outweigh my urge to have them segregated." Segregation was of doubtful practicability.

As for an all-out mass segregation program, it was just like another evacuation. It was arbitrary. It would wreck every conception of the program as conceived by the WRA.¹

Registration and Congressional Investigation

The course of events during the Registration for Army Service and Leave Clearance during February and March, 1943, drastically altered the bases of the segregation discussions. Registration brought to light more than 8,000 individuals who, in terms of their own action, might be considered disloyal to the United States. Included in this group were approximately 7,000 citizens who refused to "swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and forswear ... allegiance or obedience to the Japanese Emperor" and almost 2,000 aliens who refused "To swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States."

The number of people thus renouncing loyalty was surprisingly high to WRA officials, especially in view of their expectation that there would be little or no adverse reaction to the registration program. When the reports on registration first came to Washington, it was immediately suggested that non-affirmative answers to question 28 should form the basis of a segregation program. Mr. Myer, however, was impressed by "more thoughtful reports from Project Directors (that) . . . point out that a negative answer to question 28 given by a person who is suffering this complex of emotions, may have quite a different significance than such an answer would have if given by the average citizen under average circumstances."^1

There was some disposition on the part of WRA authorities to look at negative and qualified answers to the loyalty questions with a sympathetic awareness of their social content. This was more than balanced by the insistence of two Congressional Investigating Committees that the negative answers be accepted at their face value as a definite indication of disloyalty. The Chandler Subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee began its field investigation of the War Relocation Authority during the tense days of Registration.2 One of Senator Chandler's earliest public demands was a demand for segregation based on the registra-

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1. Myer to Biddle, March 1, 1943
2. Pacific Citizen, March 9, 1943.
tion. This issue was kept alive in the headlines through the summer, the Chandler investigating group reporting to the entire subcommittee on April 9 that testimony was "overwhelming" in urging "that all those answering 'no' on questions 27 and 28 of the registration schedules be interned for the duration of the war." The final report of the Subcommittee recommended that those answering "No" to the loyalty question . . . be forthwith placed in an internment camp, and that such determination should be made at the earliest possible date . . ." A special Subcommittee of the Dies Committee took up where Senator Chandler left off. Starting less than two weeks after the Senate Committee had made its report, this group was headed by Congressman John Costello of Los Angeles and was active for four months. Hardly a week went by in which California newspapers did not carry sensational charges directed against WRA administration by the Dies Subcommittee. The failure to segregate the disloyal Japanese was only a minor point in the group's total criticism though, significantly enough, one of the three recommendations of its final report in August urged "that the War Relocation Authority's belated announcement of its intention of segregating the disloyal from the loyal Japanese . . ."

1. Pacific Citizen, March 18, 1943.
2. Note to come.
... be put into effect at the earliest possible moment.  

A further note of Congressional insistence was added when Senator Downey of California introduced a resolution specifically requesting the WRA "to take such steps as may be necessary for the purpose of segregating persons of Japanese ancestry in relocation centers whose loyalty to the United States is questionable or who are known to be disloyal ... for the purpose of establishing additional safeguard against sabotage by such persons."  

The significance of Congressional activity and of the public sentiment stirred by this activity must be weighed against the primary line of WRA segregation policy. This, we have seen, had led up to March 1943 to: (1) rejection of segregation by groups except for repatriates, and any plans for a large-scale segregation carried out under conditions of strict military control; (2) acceptance of the principle of segregating disloyal persons by examination of individual records with the hope that segregation ought to result in a greater acceptance of the loyal group in the main stream of American life, and ought to make the relocation centers more normal communities. At the same time there existed the belief that a successful relocation program might make segregation altogether unnecessary or ...

2. 78th Congress, 1st Session, S. Res. 166, introduced July 2, approved July 6, 1943.
at least necessary for only a very small group. Records of leave investigations were beginning to supply the needed data on individuals, in case segregation was to be carried out. Finally, registration supplied a great mass of data on individuals which, though acknowledged to be faulty, was nevertheless available for segregation purposes and which made necessary a drastic upward revision in the estimates of the numbers which might have to be evacuated.

Plan "C" Offered as Qualified Segregation Program

Plan "C" was born out of those convictions and those facts. In essence, Plan "C" asked War Department concurrence for a twofold plan of (1) segregating the disloyal and (2) substantially lifting restrictions from the unsegregated group. A joint board representing the War Department, the Department of Justice and the Office of Naval Intelligence would screen all evacuees. Certain evacuees cleared by this board would be permitted to return to the evacuated areas of the West Coast and would be recommended for work in war plants throughout the country. Those not given such clearance would be eligible to return to private life outside the relocation centers and outside the evacuated areas under regular leave procedures. A third group of

1. Myer to Stimson, Confidential, March 11, 1943. This plan has been discussed at length in the preceding chapter.
2. Cf. Supra, p. , for activities of a similar Joint Board in the Army and Leave Clearance program.
evacuees would be designated by the Joint Board for intern-
ment (i.e. segregation).

On March 12, Mr. Myer elaborated upon these segrega-
tion views. It was his judgment that the objective of segre-
gation should be to remove the restrictions from those who were cleared by the segregation process and fully restore to these loyal people all the rights enjoyed by residents and citizens of America. "... segregation of the disloyal without offering compensatory benefits to the loyal would result in something very close to disaster." The preliminary analysis of registration results had demonstrated that segre-
gation on any of the categorical bases previously suggested would not have accomplished the desired results. Most of the disloyal would have been picked up; on the other hand, registration showed that many in the so-called disloyal groups (Kibei, parolees, etc.) were not disloyal. At the same time, registration showed that categorical segregation would have left behind some disloyal Nisei. In sum, reg-
istration had provided the first basis for forming reason-
ably sound judgments with respect to an individual's loyalty.

Unless, however, segregation of the disloyal was matched by benefits to the loyal, segregation would be of no value.

All evacuees, loyal as well as disloyal, would look upon such action as a tightening of governmental restrictions upon a racial group; and so would the public. It could serve only to intensify those anxieties and fears which have led steadily to
deterioration of the faith of evacuees in America. How far this deterioration has gone is perhaps indicated in a comparison of registration figures in Hawaii and in relocation centers.

As for the mechanics of this type of segregation, he continued, the War Relocation Authority was "quite willing" to leave to the War Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Justice Department, including the FBI, to determine who should be segregated and placed under closer surveillance in internment camps and who should be permitted free, or restricted, movement. After the Joint Board had completed its work, two kinds of centers would be required: one kind for persons of questionable loyalty who would be held for the duration of the war; another kind for those people who, though made eligible for leave by the Joint Board, needed time to arrange for their departure. It was hoped that only a few of the second type of center would be necessary, once Plan "C" was underway. It would be recommended that the detention center be administered either by the War Department or the Department of Justice.¹

This plan, it may be noted, was suggested well before the Congressional Investigating Committees had made their recommendations. It had been kept secret, though on April 13, 1943, Acting Director Rowalt, had suggested its essence in commenting on the segregation recommendation

¹ Myer to McCloy, March 12, 1943.
contained in an advance copy of Senator Chandler's report: "Since results of segregation were first reported to us by the projects, we have been giving this problem a great deal of thought. It is our opinion that a separation must be made, and we are planning to make one. We believe, however, that when the disloyal are removed, it will then be possible to relax or eliminate entirely the restrictions now placed against the loyal, permitting them freedom to reinstate themselves in normal life."  

Plan "C" Rejected

Two months passed before the War Department officially replied to Mr. Myer's all embracing proposal. Plan "C" definitely did not meet with the approval of the War Department. Segregation could not be accompanied by the restoration of full rights to those believed loyal. Segregation alone had to come first.

A serious deterioration in evacuee morale had been noted in recent months, Secretary of War Stimson wrote. This unsatisfactory development appeared to be the result in large measure of the activities of a vicious well-organized, pro-Japanese minority group found at each relocation project. Through agitation and by violence, these groups gained control of many aspects of internal project administration, so much so that it became disadvantageous, and sometimes dangerous, to express loyalty to the United

1. Rowalt to Chandler, April 13, 1943.
The fact that these groups were permitted to remain in power not only shook the confidence of the loyal ones in their Government, but also effectively stifled the expression of pro-American sentiment. It was the opinion of the War Department, already frequently expressed, that such trouble could have been avoided if troublemakers had been removed from the relocation centers and placed in rigorous confinement. Mr. Stimson wrote that the causes for internal disorders, listed by Mr. Myer in his letter of March 11, were important.

I am compelled, however, to the conclusion that failure to take aggressive action against those individuals who were actively working against the interests of this Government is a primary cause for the marked deterioration in evacuee loyalty.

It was the War Department's "considered opinion" (the Secretary of War continued) that the War Reestablishment Authority should take immediate steps to screen out from the centers and segregate in close confinement all individuals appearing to have pro-Japanese sympathies. This would include the already substantial number of individuals who had applied for repatriation, as well as the trouble makers. It was significant that the evacuees themselves proposed segregation as a necessary step too long delayed, and volunteered the opinion that the situation would grow worse at an accelerated rate if action was not taken immediately.

It seems clear to me that the problem of resettlement of persons of Japanese ancestry loyal to this country would be measurably simplified through segregation, as
it would constitute an assurance to the American public that the bad actors had been effectively dealt with.

The importance which the War Department attaches to segregation renders premature any consideration of relaxing the restrictions in force in the Western Defense Command against persons of Japanese ancestry, as suggested in your Plans B and C.

This decision did not mean that the War Department was committed, necessarily, to a policy of maintaining the West Coast restrictions for the duration of the war. The question could "easily be reconsidered" after the results of the segregation could be observed. In the meantime, the War Department would combine to assist WRA in the resettlement of loyal Japanese, as it had in the past.¹

WRA Capitulates to Army and Public Pressure

Though friendly, Mr. Stimson's letter was sharply and critically worded. So was Mr. Myer's reply:

To say that "the War Relocation Authority should take immediate steps to screen out from the centers and segregate in close confinement all individuals appearing to have pro-Japanese sympathies" in my judgment is to state the problem in over-simplified terms. To say that "it has been and remains the opinion of the War Department already frequently expressed to you that much trouble could have been avoided if these troublemakers had been removed from the relocation centers and placed in rigorous confinement" implies that the War Department has presented to this Authority a consistent approach to the problem of segregation, and that the War Relocation Authority has consistently ignored or opposed such suggestions.

I feel it is only fair to point out that if segregation could have been accomplished by the War Relocation Authority during 1942 and the early part of this year as easily as your letter implies, it could also have been accomplished by the War Department during the evacuation period. Substantially all the information about in-

¹ Stimson to Myer, Secret, May 10, 1943.
individual evacuees actually available to the War Reloca-
tion Authority prior to registration was available to
the Army at the time of evacuation and later. If mass
segregation on a fair and individual basis is so simple
that the War Relocation Authority is to be criticized
for not accomplishing it, it is difficult to see why a
wholesale evacuation of all persons of Japanese descent
was ever necessary. If the dangerous and potentially
dangerous individuals may be so readily determined as
your letter implies, it should have been possible to
evacuate only the dangerous from the Pacific Coast
area.

If military considerations other than the danger
from disloyal individuals, such as danger of civil
disorder, for example, prompted wholesale evacuation,
then I suggest the Army had a second opportunity to
effectuate segregation, that is, during the assembly
center period when plans for removal to relocation
centers were in preparation.

He had known for some time, Mr. Myer wrote, that
the Western Defense Command held a point of view on segre-
gation at variance with the War Relocation Authority, but
he had not realized until reading Mr. Stimson's letter that
the point of view of the Western Defense Command was the
settled opinion of the War Department. On August 23,
General DeWitt had suggested the segregation of Kibei and
on September 9 he "proposed not only the Kibei but also the
Issei be segregated and that repatriation be asked for both
groups." After full consideration, the War Relocation
Authority had rejected the idea of segregating entire cate-
gories of the population. "... the arbitrary removal of
an entire class would be unjust, unwise and seriously damaging
to evacuee morale ... ."

General DeWitt's letter of October 5, proposing both
1.(Strictly speaking, General DeWitt asked for segregation of
the entire Kibei and Issei groups and the repatriation of
unspecified "segments" of each.).
segregation and the retention of all evacuees in the centers for the purpose of a study to develop data of value in the war against the Japanese race was similarly rejected because it would have meant holding all evacuees in the centers. Mr. Myer continued. Only in two of the five categories specified for segregation by General DeWitt on December 30, was the idea of individual, as opposed to class, segregation proposed for the first time. A plan of segregation based upon the examination of individuals through the customary processes utilized by intelligence agencies, or by hearings, represented the only sound approach to segregation. Until the registration program had been completed, the War Relocation Authority had no adequate factual basis for conducting a large-scale segregation program based upon the examination of individual cases. The Japanese American population had been turned over to the War Relocation Authority progressively from May to November, 1942. No basic records were supplied the Authority by the Army. WRA had been denied the privilege of securing questionnaires from evacuees while they remained in assembly centers. WRA had been given no access to the intelligence records of the period prior to evacuation. WRA had no information about the individuals in its custody except that which was developed during the course of managing the centers. Since WRA did not have half the population until August 25, 1942, and did not secure all of the remainder until November 1, 1942, the Authority was compelled to move slowly in approaching the problem of screening out agitators.
As a practical matter, it was necessary to wait until the individuals made trouble on the centers. It was essential that the right people were determined before being moved.

Though registration now provided information on individuals sufficient for a large scale segregation, the only positive form of segregation was that involved in relocation of loyal individuals outside the centers, the WRA Director asserted. "In fact, if one looks primarily at the welfare of the Japanese American population, it (relocation) is the only process of wholesale segregation which has very much to recommend it." Segregation in other directions was certain to add to the frustration and insecurity of the total evacuee population. As for morale generally and the part played by disloyal elements:

I think it is elementary that the influence of agitators in any group of people depends more upon the receptivity of the group than upon the skill and energy of the agitators. The disloyal group, in my judgment, would have relatively little influence upon the majority of Japanese American population if they were not already badly demoralized as a result of the treatment they have received. We have definite evidence, for example, that the disloyal people have taunted the loyal and cooperative citizens about their citizenship and about how little it actually means. Now segregation may remove subversive ones who do the taunting, but it cannot remove that realization from the loyal population. The real cause of bad evacuee morale is evacuation and all the losses, insecurity, and frustration it entailed, plus the continual "drum drum" of certain harbingers of hate and fear whose expressions appear in the public press and are broadcast over the radio. A segregation program which imposes additional restrictions on the disloyal, without removing the restrictions and reestablishing the rights of the loyal, will not accomplish very much in improvement of morale.
Despite fundamental disagreement with virtually every point made by Secretary Stimson in his insistence on segregation as a prelude to the restoration of rights to evacuees, Mr. Myer told the Secretary that the War Relocation Authority would undertake a segregation program. The WRA director made it clear that segregation was not being undertaken primarily because it would counterbalance trends in evacuee allegiance or benefit evacuees generally. Rather, segregation was being adopted as a means of gaining more favorable public acceptance for relocating evacuees. In his letter of March 1 to the Attorney General, Mr. Myer touched on this point. At that time, he had expressed his doubts about the necessity of basing segregation on "no" answers to question 28 except insofar as segregation might "impede the effectiveness of the leave program by causing popular distrust of the loyalty of evacuees." In his letter to Secretary Stimson, Mr. Myer came to this point more directly.

From the point of view purely of the Japanese American population, the disadvantages (of segregation) appear to outweigh the advantages. However, if it will help to secure acceptance of the relocation program, we are willing to accept the consequences of segregation in the centers. Our real problem both in maintaining morale in the centers and in securing the relocation of evacuees arises not from the problems which segregation will solve, but from the public attitude often expressed that no Japanese can be trusted, from the point of view which engenders restrictive and discriminatory legislation, which seeks to deprive Japanese Americans of their citizenship, and to class all of them as enemies no matter what their individual records may be. Perhaps segregation will help us to deal with that point of view more effectively.

At another place in the same letter, the WRA director made even clearer his conviction that segregation was necessary not because of
the influence of the "disloyal" on other evacuees, but simply because of War Department pressure which made segregation necessary in order to continue with relocation emphasis:

...I should not like anyone to overestimate the benefits to the evacuee population which will result from segregation. I agree that, in view of the importance which has been attached to segregation by the War Department and by other agencies and individuals who are guided by the War Department position in this matter, public acceptance of the loyal evacuees will no doubt be facilitated by a program of segregation. For this reason primarily we believe it will be worth the effort and desolation it will entail.1

Disagreement Within the Authority

The actual administrative decision to undertake a segregation program, even without the balancing benefits to the unsegregated population, had finally been made during a series of conferences among members of the Washington staff and all Project Directors several weeks after Mr. Stimson's rejection of Plan "C" on May 12. As Mr. Myer's response to the Secretary's letter made very clear the former had no conviction that segregation would improve the unstable conditions of center life, or even substantially lift the "un-American" trend in the activities of the unsegregated population. For the separation to have a salutary effect on the Japanese American population as a whole, it was Mr. Myer's opinion that segregation of the disloyal had to be

matched by a lifting of the restrictions enforced upon the group as a whole. This plan the Army had rejected, insisting that segregation must be the first step. Mr. Myer, thereupon, had acceded to this point of view, though rejecting the Army's reasoning that "failure to take aggressive action against those...actively working against the interests of this country is a primary cause for the marked deterioration in evacuee loyalty" and rejecting the Army's assumption that removal of the so-called disloyal elements would, in itself, improve center conditions and reverse the deterioration of evacuee loyalty. Rather, Mr. Myer made it clear that his agency was undertaking evacuation (1) in response to the demand of the War Department, (2) for the purpose of increasing public acceptance of the Japanese American population and the relocation program.

He made clear, on the other hand, his belief that for this sort of segregation "from the point of view purely of the Japanese American population, the disadvantages appear to outweigh the advantages."

The skepticism displayed towards the value of segregation without balancing concessions, clearly expressed in Mr. Myer's letter of June 3,

1. At a press conference on May 14, Mr. Myer had made a similar statement on the over-all aspects of the proposed segregation: "Let me make (it) clear...I do favor segregation, but I think it has to be done on a practical basis... It may be possible that we'll have to move faster...because there is a general public sentiment, I think, growing up that we haven't done this job in the proper manner..." Press Conference, Verbatim Transcript, pp. 42-3.
showed in some degree the perplexity of members of the entire Administration. Disagreement among key members of the Washington staff were by no means ended by the "No" answers of registration. Those who advocated segregation on the basis of the "no" answers were definitely in the minority. Roughly, four schools of thought existed: At least one person believed that no segregation of any kind was necessary and even advocated the abolition of the Leupp Isolation Center. The only segregation he advocated was to offer repatriates and expatriates the opportunity to move voluntarily to separate places with their families. At least three staff members approved the then current isolation at Leupp but were opposed to any "enforced mass segregation whether of repatriates, parolees, indoctrinated Kibei or those who have answered "no" to question 28 in the military registration." This point of view advocated that families be allowed to join those people isolated at Leupp ("these trouble makers are such merely because of the special conditions of life in a relocation center and are not necessarily criminal types...") and that, if Leupp was to remain as a sort of penal establishment, full hearings should be given to potential segregees. A third point of view held completely to the current program. It approved Leupp, but disapproved further types of segregation. This group believed that families should not be permitted to accompany segregees to Leupp because it would be unfair to the families and especially to children. It regarded Leupp as a special kind of jail and opposed hearing for segregees on the ground that such hearings would make for tense relations...
within the centers. Finally, a fourth point of view accepted the Leupp center and advocated, in addition, a policy of segregating pro-Japanese evacuees, i.e. "Those who have asked for repatriation or expatriation, those who have answered "No" to question 28..., and such others as may fall within this class on the basis of individual investigation." Two staff members, at least, held this view.¹

For Washington personnel to be so much at odds is not as surprising as the continued differences among the Project Directors themselves. During a week of meetings at the end of May, during which the segregation policy was finally set, each of the Project Directors made known his views. Project Directors were unanimously in favor of segregation but the widest disparities still existed with respect to the criteria by which persons should be selected for segregation. Consequently, there were exceedingly wide differences in the estimates of the number of people to be segregated, though in every case, estimates were very much larger than those submitted in December and January. At that time, Mr. Bennett had suggested that forty-nine persons with their families be segregated from Gila and his had been the highest figure. At the May meeting, Mr. Coverley of Tule Lake believed that there were some 4,000 disloyal persons at his project; with their families, this would make the segregant group from Tule Lake number between 5,000 and 5,500 persons. On the other hand, Mr. Lindley of Granada believed that only 200 persons were disloyal at his project; adding family members he believed the maximum number to be segregated would total no more than

¹ This summary made in memorandum, Glick to Myer, Restricted, March 5, 1943.
300 people. Mr. Bennett of Gila thought 3,000 people should be segregated from his project, while Mr. Ernst had "no evidence that over 50 people" needed to be taken from Central Utah, though the latter added that he also had 650 repatriates who (with their families) should be segregated even though they presented no difficulty on the project. Mr. Taylor of the Jerome, Arkansas, project believed there were between 1,900 and 2,000 persons at his project who should be removed, while Mr. Johnston of the nearby Rohwer center, though favoring a segregation program, stated that "some of us are smart enough to pick the loyal from the disloyal," and gave no estimate of the number to be taken from his center.

At least three of the ten Project Directors expressed doubts about the significance of "no" answers to question 28. Mr. Ernst (Central Utah) completely discounted the "No" answers and advocated a review of the cases of all persons who wanted to change them. Mr. Merritt (Manzanar) stated that the "circumstances surrounding the "No" answers" deprived those answers of any loyalty significance. On the other hand, Mr. Coverley (Tule Lake) would accept the "No's" at their face value; he believed an objective test was necessary and deprecated any attempt to "gaze into hearts and minds to determine loyalty." Though less certain than Mr. Coverley, the other Directors were in general agreement with the idea of segregating those who had answered "No" to the loyalty question.

Out of these discussion of the Project Directors and the Washington staff, with all their differences of opinion, one basic fact emerged;
segregation would definitely take place and at the earliest practical moment. Action was immediately taken to decide (1) the persons who would be segregated; (2) the segregation center, and (3) the procedures of segregation. The first definite announcement of segregation was made off the record before the Costello Subcommittee of the Dies Committee on July 8, and an Administrative Instruction issued on July 15.

Mechanics of Segregation

Segregation, Mr. Myer reiterated many times, was not to be interpreted as a punitive measure. The country had demanded that those people who wanted to be Japanese should be separated from those who wanted to be Americans. The WRA was going to do the job "in a firm but kindly manner," so that the people who were segregated would know that retribution was not being taken against them. WRA would continue to treat those segregated "as human beings" and their relations would be kept "on that plane even though the news on the outside is not going to be to our liking." ¹

In the selection of persons to be segregated, the formal policy statement (Administrative Instruction No. 100, July 15, 1943) made it clear that the separate center was only for "those persons of Japanese ancestry residing in relocation centers who by their acts have indicated that their loyalties lie with Japan during the present hostilities," the segregation policy was not to be considered a substitute for the policy of removing aggravated trouble makers from relocation centers.

already established for the removal of trouble makers would remain ef-
fective and those people isolated at the Leupp Isolation Center as trouble
makers would not be transferred to the Tule Lake center as disloyal
persons.

Three groups of persons were segregated:

I. Those persons who made formal application for repat-
riation or expatriation before July 1, 1943, and did not retract their
applications before that date.

II. All persons who, during the February and March regis-
tration, (a) answered question 28 in the negative, or (b) failed or
refused to answer it, or (c) failed or refused to register at all and
(d) had not changed their answers or registered affirmatively prior to
July 15, 1943, and (e) were, in the opinion of the Project Director,
loyal to Japan, and not loyal to the United States.

III. All persons who were denied leave clearance after approp-
riate hearings. This category included (a) persons about whom there
was an adverse report by a Federal intelligence agency; (b) persons
who had answered 28 negatively and who changed their answers prior to
July 15; (c) persons who answered question 28 with a qualification;
(d) persons who had requested repatriation or expatriation and who had
retracted such requests prior to July 1, 1943, and persons who had re-
quested repatriation or expatriation subsequent to July 1; (e) persons
for whom the Japanese American Joint Board established in the Provost
Marshal General's office did not affirmatively recommend leave clearance;
(f) persons about whom there was other information indicating loyalty
to Japan.
For the first group of repatriates and expatriates, the segregation was nothing more nor less than a belated implementation of the policy decided eleven months previously. No further hearings were given or were allowed and, for them, segregation was completely automatic. For the other two groups, however, elaborate mechanisms were set up for the purpose of making certain that no mistakes were being made. Brief hearings were provided for every person in the second group, and elaborate investigations were made of all persons in the third group.

Group two, those who had refused to register, refused to answer question 28, or who had answered it negatively, was given a rapid screening by a Special Board of Review at each Project:

The basic problem...is this. Can we rely on their "No" as meaning what it says? Did the person know what he was saying? Did he understand the question? Does he still feel that way today? ...It will be more or less of a streamlined hearing. The function of the hearing is to determine that the man really said "No" to question 28 and knew what it meant and intended to say "No" and still wants to say "No". Or that he refused to register, that he really wants to be Japanese, that the refusal to register was an evidence of his wanting to be Japanese, or that his failure to answer question 28 represents a desire to be Japanese.1

It was specifically stated that no person in this category "shall be considered loyal to the United States unless he expressly changes his answer to question 28 to an affirmative and satisfied the Project Director that the changed answer is bona fide."2

1. Mr. Glick, Summary Notes, p. 8.
Further, "A strong presumption of loyalty to Japan exists in each case where there was an unqualified "No" to question 28."¹ The hearing provided was not only for the purpose of satisfying WRA officials that "No" answers (or their equivalent) meant what they appeared to mean, but also to be certain that those who changed their answers at the last minute were not doing so to avoid being sent to Tule Lake. The presumption of guilt existing in these cases, it was estimated that a maximum of 20 percent of the total Registrant Group would be removed from the group to be segregated. Actually, unofficial estimates show that the number of changed answers was considerably less even though, in the great majority of cases, a changed answer was accepted at its face value.

The immediate large scale segregation which started on September 13 was composed for the most part of persons in the Repatriate-Expatriate and Registrant categories. Whereas the hearings of Registrants were brief and to the single point of determining the validity of negative answers to question 28, investigation of persons in the third group of possible segregants was complete and intensive. A special group of high ranking officials at each camp, with the Project Director actively participating, conducted these investigations. Extensive testimony was taken, a full hearing being accorded in each case. Reports included personal history and background of the person being investigated, pre-evacuation history, and Assembly Center and Relocation Center record. Recommendations for clearance, or denial of clearance were made by the

¹. Manual of Evacuee Travel Operations, WRA, undated, p. 11.
Project Director, but the National Director made the final decision in all cases.  

These procedures for the investigation of persons of doubtful loyalty who had applied for leave clearance had been established on June 5, well before the segregation announcement. When these procedures were first established "doubtful persons" included cases of unqualified negative answers to the loyalty question (the Registrant Group for Segregation) and the Expatriates and Repatriates, as well as all persons who were processed for segregation under Group three, i.e. qualified answers to question 28, cases where an adverse intelligence report existed, cases not recommended for clearance by the Joint Board, etc. To put the matter in another way, segregation procedures simplified leave clearance by categorically denying leave clearance to (1) Repatriates and Expatriates who had not changed their requests before July 1, 1943 and (2) Absolute "no" answers (or non-answers) to the loyalty question where a board found the "No" answer was actually based on consideration of loyalty. This left in the category of "doubtful cases for leave clearance" only that group classified as "Group three" for segregation purposes. Thus, the end result was to completely amalgamate leave clearance and segregation. All those denied leave clearance were segregated, and all those not segregated were cleared for indefinite leave.

The total effect of this amalgamation substantially fulfilled one part of the program (Plan "C") proposed by the WRA in March and rejected by the War Department in May. That is to say, evacuees considered disloyal had been segregated and denied the privilege of relocation, and

1. Administrative Instruction #22 (Revised) Supplement 12, June 5, 1943.
all other evacuees became eligible to re-enter normal American life. This was as far as the WRA could go in implementing Plan "C"; the next step belonged to the War Department. In the opinion of WRA officials, the segregation would accomplish negligible results unless balanced by concessions that only the War Department (or a Supreme Court decision) could grant. Whether these concessions will be granted remains to be seen. Whether even they can accomplish the desired result by returning loyal Japanese Americans to normal life also is a question mark of the future.

Tule Lake as Segregation Center

The Tule Lake Project in Northern California was selected as the segregation center, four considerations entering into this decision. In the first place, preliminary analyses showed between 15,000 and 16,000 people would be involved in the segregation (actually subsequent events enlarged this figure to approximately 18,000) of whom approximately one-third were residents of Tule Lake. Tule Lake was one of the three centers capable of having so large a group and its choice lessened the administrative problem involved in effectuating the double moves which were necessary. In the second place, Tule Lake had the best possibilities for agricultural production and consequently for work opportunities. Since relocation was not to be permitted from the segregation center, these employment opportunities had to be provided to keep evacuees busy. Since the population would remain stable, food

1. Cf. infra, p. for reason that so large a proportion from Tule Lake.
production would be necessary and would make for considerable economic gain. Thirdly, Tule was not well situated for purposes of relocation, experience having shown that success with the leave program was much greater from those centers east of the evacuated zones where public sentiment was more friendly, and where it was unnecessary to surround residents with "tight restrictions." Finally, the other two large centers, (Poston and Gila River) were in Arizona, where public sentiment against Japanese Americans, rising to a new pitch, made it unwise to add to the feeling by the movement of disloyal persons to that area.¹

Persons segregated at Tule Lake were not eligible for leave clearance, nor did WRA policies with respect to evacuee self-government apply to that center. The entire area, further, was guarded more heavily than other Projects. Aside from these facts, it was planned to administer the segregation project no differently from the others. Policies of the WRA with respect to food, clothing, health, education, employment within centers, public assistance grants, consumer enterprises, evacuee property, and legal services continue to be applicable.²

Preliminary Comments

Measured against the program of registration—a comparable policy of major significance though of considerably less administrative difficulty—segregation proceeded smoothly. Unlike registration, it was

² Administrative Instruction #100, p. 1.
completed on schedule, it was accompanied by few misunderstandings, it
did not interrupt community living, it seemed to precipitate a minimum
amount of discernable ill-feeling toward the WRA. The purely administrative
lessons taught by the registration difficulties were well learned. On
the side of intra-Administration activities, two things were important:
(1) A sufficient amount of time was given for administrative planning,
and a wealth of detail went into that planning. List compilations, seg-
regation and welfare interviews, crating facilities, and mess operations—
down to the exact number of salt shakers and baby feedings—were mapped
with painstaking care. 1 (2) An intensive effort was made through
special meetings, as well as written communications, to acquaint Project
staff members with the full ramifications of the program and to anticipate
for them the possible difficulties of operation. 2 On the side of WRA
relations with evacuees, (1) center residents were given complete in-
formation and allowed sufficient time to adjust themselves to the new
program; and (2) committees of evacuees were allowed to participate on
the Project, especially in advisory and information-dispensing activities. 3

Malcolm Pitts, field assistant director assigned to segregation, was
responsible, in large part, for the detailed planning.
2. Cf. Summary Notes, cited above and The Segregation Program, A
Program, WRA, Washington, October 16, 1943. Also on evacuee information,
see Segregation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Relocation Centers,
WRA, Washington, August, 1943.
These factors—all absent during registration—were abetted by still another; segregation had been discussed and expected on the Projects for many months and, indeed, had been requested by some evacuees. Altogether, the difficulties of shuttling some 18,000 men, women, and children were kept at a minimum.

(When data becomes available, the breakdown of segregants (1) by center, (2) by age and sex, and (3) by classification of repatriates, (b) "no" answers, (c) denied leave for other reasons) will come here).

The undeniable success of the WRA in moving people from center to center must not be identified with success in separating loyal Japanese Americans from disloyal ones or with success in reversing the trend of deteriorating evacuee loyalty. The problem of moving people is physical and administrative. The problem of determining loyalty is social, political, and psychological. It is difficult to move more than 10,000 people an average distance of 1,000 miles each. It is infinitely more difficult to determine with accuracy that 10,000 adults are disloyal to the United States. Political allegiance is difficult to define in others under any conditions; under conditions of relocation camp living, and all that it represented, the definition of allegiance became especially doubtful. Officials of WRA, as we have seen, have been by no means unaware of this fact. After segregation was complete, it was noted that "decisions to go to Tule Lake or to stay in relocation centers were made for the most part with reference to questions of security rather than political allegiance;" and "...the conviction as to clear-cut results in terms of loyalty or sorting good from bad declined among
the staff as segregation proceeded. Our own evaluation of the success of segregation in terms of loyalty will be set in its larger context, i.e. it will be discussed as a part of the total impact of evacuation and its aftermath on the political allegiance of the Japanese American population.