PART II. THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE TULE LAKE RELOCATION CENTER.

I. The W.R.A. Administrative Organization of the Tule Lake Project.
   A. The Administrative Plan and the Appointed Personnel.
   B. Total Organization and Individual Demands.

II. The Significant Lines of Community Relationships.
   A. Two Worlds: The Caucasians, and the Evacuees.
   C. Sectional Differences.
   D. Rural-Urban Differences.
   E. Social Classes in a Center Community.
   F. "The Block" as the Unit of the Community.

III. Political Organization.
   A. The Community Council.
   B. The Planning Board.
   C. The Block Managers.
   D. Voluntary Political Associations.
   E. Protest Activities and Leadership.

IV. Channels of Communication.
   A. Official Channels of Communication.
   B. The Project Newspaper.
   C. Some Problems of Transportation.
   D. Informal Methods of Communication.
   E. Contacts with the Outside World.

V. Economic Organization.
   A. Employment Opportunities and Incentives.
   D. The Canteens and Other Consumer Functions.

VI. Family Organization.
   A. The Effect of Center Conditions on Family Relations.
   B. Crisis Rites in the Center.
   C. Family Disorganization.
   D. "The Bachelors."

VII. Protective and Welfare Organizations.
   A. Agencies for Law and Order.
   B. Fire Protection.
   C. The Project Hospital.
   D. Welfare Assistance.

VIII. Other Institutional Aspects of the Center Community.
   A. Education.
   B. Organized Recreation.
   C. Religion.

IX. Social Life in the Relocation Center.
   (To include all miscellaneous items not included above.)

X. The Mess Hall Organization.
   A. Mess Hall Relationships.
   B. Supplementary Eating.
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   A. The Effect of Center Conditions of Family Relations.
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   C. Family Disorganization.
   D. "The Bachelors."

VII. Housing.
   A. The Formal Administration of Housing.
   B. Housing Problems and Informal Adjustments.
   C. Personal and Social Disorganization Related to Housing.

VIII. Mass Hall and Feeding Problems.
   A. The Formal Administration of Feeding.
   B. Informal Adjustments to Mass Feeding.
   C. Effects of Mass Feeding on Family Life.

IX. Protective and Welfare Organization.
   A. Law and Order.
   B. Fire Protection.
   C. The Project Hospital.
   D. Welfare Assistance.
X. Educational Organization.
   A. School Administration and the Teaching Personnel.
   B. Pupil Adjustments to the Project Schools.

XI. Organized Recreation.
   A. Centralized Organization of Recreation.

XII. Religious Organization.
   A. The Administration and the Churches.
   B. The Christians.
   C. The Buddhists.

XIII. Social Life in the Relocation Center.
EVACUEE ADJUSTMENTS IN THE TULE LAKE PROJECT

Problem: What was the nature of the restrictions upon personal freedom and the threats to personal security felt by the evacuees of the Tule Lake Center, and how did they attempt to maintain personal and social organization under these conditions?

I. What were the conditions which the evacuees interpreted as a threat to their collective life?
   A. What were the historical experiences of evacuees prior to the period of the relocation center which influenced the evacuees’ interpretation of the restrictions in the relocation center?
   B. How did the evacuees define the attacks and threats from the Caucasian world?
   C. What were the new problems of the evacuee community, in terms of (a) the main lines of cleavage, and (b) the process of community growth, that were conceived to threaten their collective lives.

II. How did these restrictions affect the main channels of community life?
   A. Familial activities.
   B. Economic
   C. Political
   D. Religious
   E. Social-Recreational
   F. Educational

III. Through what collective means did the evacuees attempt to cope with these restrictive conditions?
   A. How did the evacuees arrive at their definitions of situations?
      1. The modes of communication influencing the formation of definitions.
      2. Their statements of the problems, the possibilities expressed, and the process of selecting goals of collective action.
   B. How was collective action organized for release, for protection, and for control?
      1. What types of collective action groups formed, and under what conditions? What determined the alignments?
      2. What were the roles of "agitators", "minus", leaders, followers, advisors, etc.?

IV. What were some of the typical careers of experience of evacuees in their effort to maintain personal organization?
   A. How did individual evacuees rationalize, sublimate, objectify, and suppress his desires of expression to adjust to the conditions of the center.
   B. What were the different means used by various individuals to adjust to similar conditions?
A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN AND THE APPOINTED PERSONNEL

The Organization Chart and Functional Plan

Robert Redfield says of the relocation centers, "Nothing quite like these communities has ever appeared before in the history of America."

In attempting to find some suitable comparison of these communities to more familiar aspects of our society, he comments upon their suggestiveness of an Army camp, an Indian reservation, an F.S.A. camp of the Department of Agriculture, and an internment camp, but he also finds that the relocation center is different from each of these. If the communities are unique, the form of their administration is also unique being quite unlike the usual forms of city or town government.

The peculiar form of the relocation center administration was prescribed by the conditions arising from the evacuation, and it is therefore desirable to consider those conditions which especially determined the choice of administration organization. First, from the government standpoint the people involved, persons of Japanese ancestry, were a suspected group but not a condemned group, and, in fact, large sections of the population were believed to be innocent of any basis for suspicion. There was therefore an obligation to see that a minimum of coercion be applied that the dislocations of evacuation create the minimum of hardship. Voluntary movement had been

initially permitted, but this had proved a failure due to the unpreparedness of the evacuees to voluntarily migrate and the unwillingness of interior states to accept them. The relocation centers were therefore created to provide the evacuees with a point of relocation; they were meant to be normal communities to the extent possible, and were not conceived as internment or concentration camps. Second, the evacuation was an emergency measure requiring hurried establishment of these communities of relocation for the evacuees. The Army, who was given the task of constructing the physical aspects, used familiar Army camp designs, and planned the communities only for temporary occupation. Moreover, the communities were populated as rapidly as they were constructed, and there was no time for the gradual evolution of those traditional features which mark the normal, outside communities. Third, the centers were under government authority, and many features of community life which normally appear under conditions of free enterprise could not be permitted within the relocation centers. For example, no center resident could engage in private business, and all residents therefore could gain employment only through the supervising agency. Because the population was a suspected group for whom the bulk of the American public felt little sympathy, the Government could not permit high wages to the evacuees. Without an adequate economy, this population was dependent for its subsistence—food, clothing, medical care, education, etc.—upon the Government, and the supervising agency required the administrative organization to provide the community with these subsistence items.

These and other pre-conditions of the relocation center predicated that the War Relocation Authority, the agency authorized to
administer the centers, be so organized that it could provide for the employment, housing, feeding, medical care and education of large communities of people. It may readily be seen that for this purpose the highly centralized and systematized type of administration found in Army camps is most suitable, and this was the form selected, but the organization required adaptation to meet the needs of a civilian population composed of families of young and old of both sexes.

Chart I shows the organizational plan of the Tule Lake Project which was followed, substantially without alteration, from its first days in May 1942. Executive authority and responsibility rested with the Office of the Project Director, mediated by the Office of the Assistant Project Director. Immediately below the executive offices, the primary functions of the community were served by the "Divisions", such as the administrative, employment and housing, transportation and supplies, and community services divisions; and the Divisions were in turn sub-divided into their minor departments known as "Sections", such as the community activities (recreation), education, social welfare, nursery schools and civic organization sections within the Community Services Division. The line of authority descended from the Project Director, through the Assistant Project Director where authority was delegated to the latter, to the Division Chiefs, and from the latter through the Section Supervisors to the people of the community. It was possible for problems arising among the people or the lower offices which could not be dealt with adequately by the immediately superior office to be referred directly to one of the higher offices or to the executive office itself, but where matters fell within the clearly defined func-
tions of the Divisions or Sections, the understanding was that they should be brought up through the proper organizational channels.

The project administration was not autonomous but was directly responsible to the national offices of the War Relocation Authority in Washington, D.C., the departments of which duplicated with but minor differences the departments at the project level. During the early months of the W.R.A., there existed an intermediate level, similarly organized, known as the Regional Office of the W.R.A. in San Francisco, and the hierarchy of authority as well as the channel of communication descended from the national through the regional to the project office, or vice versa, in the ascending line. The Regional Office, however, was discontinued in early December 1942 because of the complications involved in communicating through an intermediate office, and only a field office with a small staff was left in San Francisco. After December 1942, administrative communication was made directly between the Washington office and the projects, and the project division chiefs and section supervisors addressed their Washington correspondence to their parallel offices at the national level although generally it was first required to cross the desk of the Project Director. On the whole, it may be said that the W.R.A., as a federal agency, attempted to practice "good government procedure", by which, presumably, was meant an adherence to lines of authority while allowing flexibility at the sound discretion of the administrators.

The clearest account of the administrative structure of the Tule Lake Project is that presented in Project Instruction No. 29, "Functional Organization of the Tule Lake Relocation Center," dated
March 4, 1943, which was both a description of the then operative administrative organization as well as a clarification and elaboration of it. This instruction undoubtedly was written with the approval of, if not by, Harvey M. Coverley who was then the Project Director and was known to be a "stickler" for careful functional planning of the administrative organization and of strict adherence to the defined lines of authority. No such emphasis upon strict adherence to the defined organization was evident in the administration of his predecessor, Elmer L. Shirrell, who was rather inclined to disregard proper procedural channels when the personnel or the "red tape" involved interfered with the immediate disposition of administrative duties. While the general plan of administrative organization was essentially the same under both men, the administrative policies and practices differed according to their respective administrative philosophy and temperament and a certain amount of comparison of the two administrations will therefore be made in describing the organization of the Tule Lake Project.

Referring to the executive offices of the Project Director and the Assistant Project Director, Instruction No. 29 defines their respective functions as:

Functions of the Project Director

A. Responsible to the Director (national) for carrying out the functions of the War Relocation Authority on the project in accordance with prescribed policies and procedures.

B. To organize, train and administer a staff of personnel to assist him in accomplishing the foregoing.

C. To direct personally the following Divisions and all functions delegated thereto:
   1. Agriculture
   2. Community Services
   3. Consumer Enterprises
   4. Employment
   5. Office of Project Reports
   6. Project Attorney
The Administrative Plan

Functions of the Assistant Project Director

A. Responsible to the Project Director for assigned functions and to serve as acting Project Director during the absence of the Project Director.

B. Supervise activities of the following divisions:
   1. Administrative
   2. Internal Security
   3. Public Works
   4. Transportation and Supply
   5. Industrial Division (Tent Factory and Furniture Factory)

C. Working in close collaboration with the Project Director, the Assistant Project Director assists in coordinating divisional responsibilities in order to insure unity of action and harmonious working relationships between divisions.\[1/\]

It is hardly worth while recording these dry details, except that in the Shirrell administration the separation of supervisory authority over the division chiefs between the Project Director and his Assistant was much less clearly defined. Where Coverley delegated considerable responsibility and authority to the Assistant Director, J. O. Hayes, but Mr. Shirrell gave much less authority to Mr. Hayes. In part this was because Mr. Shirrell did not fully trust Hayes' judgement and turned rather toward some of his division chiefs for assistance and advice, but it was also because of his desire to maintain contact with all branches of the project. Hence, Shirrell supervised all the divisions himself; every Division Chief, Section Head, and even the evacuees with business, had ready access to him; and Hayes was delegated most of the routine duties of the executive offices.

Mr. Shirrell is a man easily typed because of the definiteness of his characteristics. In his philosophy, he might be described as a pragmatist, especially in his educational views and his emphasis upon the value of the individual personality; in his personality, he

The Administrative Plan

impatient, direct, is an informal, sociable, energetic, experimental, enthusiastic and fundamentally honest man. While language and talk were filled with observations which suggested a "hard-boiled" realism, this belied his basic tender-heartedness that restrained him from hurting others unless absolutely required to do so, and an impulsive and optimistic that sometimes trend/submerged any doubts raised by the practical situation. In many respects, Shirrell's strong points were the other facade of his weaknesses, and the latter were serious enough in the eyes of his superior officers to cause his removal as project director.

The two main criticisms of Shirrell's administration were (1) that he was a poor administrator in the sense of failing to conform to prescribed regulations, and (2) that he lacked discipline over his staff and particularly over the evacuees. With regard to occasional the first, the case may be illustrated by his frequent deviation from a principle held by those trained in government service, that the administrator must be made to fit the position, rather than the particular job be fitted to the administrator. Billigmeier indicates that:

"In several instances, Mr. Shirrell had adjusted the functions of certain positions according to the abilities and qualifications of the individual holding the position. To illustrate this process the following example might be cited. Frank Smith is Chief of the Division of Housing and Employment. Labor relations clearly fall within the jurisdiction of his position, but he knew nothing about labor problems. Recognizing this fact, Mr. Shirrell gave increasing responsibility in this field to Don Elberson, then Assistant Chief of Consumer Enterprises, who had training and experience in labor relations."

Mr. Shirrell upon occasion deviated from correct procedural practices and called upon individuals in his staff for advice when it was necessary, irrespective of the position of the individual. He relied heavily, for example, upon the advice of the community extremely able Paul Fleming. On the other hand, Mr. Coverley has relied for advice upon J. O. Hayes by

virtue of his position as Assistant Project Director. Thus he is doing the administratively correct thing.1/

There were advantages as well as disadvantages in this practice. By assigning functions to those men most capable of serving those tasks, whether or not their formal classification justified their use in such positions, Shirrell was able to gain the assistance of persons who were most helpful to him and most congenial to his policies. On the other hand, the burden of responsibility was heavy on the shoulders of a relatively few men. More important, the practice tended to confuse the responsibilities of given positions, increase overlapping of functions, and add to the difficulties of holding the staff members responsible for their special duties.

On the whole, Shirrell proved himself a man strong on general ideas and purposes for improving the project, but/often impatient and sometimes inattentive to the details of the means for achieving those ends. His facile mind evolved innumerable plans for improving the conditions of life in the center community; and by dint of sheer personal energy and enthusiasm, he pushed programs along which seemed impossible of accomplishment. In the fall months of 1943, he had in progress at the same time such devious major programs as: the construction of a tent factory, community-built theater, high and school buildings, community church; the institution of a junior college and university correspondence courses including such fields as nurses training, bakery, fire control, stenography, accounting, mathematics, auto mechanics, farming, and education; the farm program; and the furniture factory. Tule Lake was successful in operating the largest farm program of any of the centers, and produced school furni-

1/ Billigmeier, op. cit., p. 96.
for the other projects, but much of its construction and its educational programs met with failure due to the indifference of the evacuees, the lack of materials and equipments, and other insurmountable barriers. While many of these programs failed of accomplishment, insofar as they were attempted, they kept a sizeable force of workers occupied. Three Misci evacuees who transferred from the Tule Lake Project to Minidoka independently offered the same view in comparing the two centers:

"It's not as interesting at Minidoka. There isn't as much activity going on here, and the people seem kind of dead."

Shirrell was deeply imbued with the view that every person should be allowed opportunities to develop his initiative and capacity to the fullest degree, and his administrative policies were largely shaped on the basis of this philosophy.

Shirrell's correspondence file shows that he was occasionally censured by others for poor or incorrect administrative procedure. Two examples may be cited, the first of which concerned the routing of mail in the administrative offices during the early days of his administration. The head of the mail and files section of the Regional Office comments:

On July 23 (1943), I arrived at the Tule Lake Project to assist in the establishment of a mail and files procedure that would conform to that used in the Regional Office.

The main difficulty at Tule Lake seemed to be the routing of incoming mail. I found that all of the mail was sent to the Project Director for his review, then to the Administrative Officer, and after they had finished it was distributed to the various divisions. This delayed the delivery of the mail to the pertinent divisions and was causing considerable confusion in the office.

Telegrams were being received on the postal printer, five copies made and delivered to the Project Director's desk for routing.

1/ Miyamoto Notes, April 12, 1943.
Since this system did not seem to be working to the satisfaction of all concerned in the office, it was agreed that they should be indexed with the original routed to the proper division or section for handling, and one copy made for the Project Director's information.

During a discussion with Mr. Shirrell and Mr. Niesse, we agreed on the proposed indexing of mail and routing to the division or section according to the subject matter, eliminating the prior review by several people.1/

The second example concerned the personnel personnel efficiency ratings made by Mr. Shirrell of members of his staff prior to his departure from the Project, which ratings Mr. Coverley considered inaccurate. Mr. Coverley wrote asking for new ratings.

May I point out that under the government efficiency rating system, work that is thoroughly competent in all respects but is not outstanding should be rated "good". Work that is exceptionally meritorious and shows ability far above the average should be rated "very good". Only the most unusual and outstanding persons should receive the rating "excellent". Ordinarily not more than one or two percent of an organization will receive this rating. By far the largest majority of personnel should be found in the "good" classification. I am mentioning this only because the ratings you have submitted for Messrs. Fleming, M. C. Cook, Kendall Smith, J. D. Cook, Jacoby, Slattery, Conner, Young and Hayes are all "excellent". Some of these ratings will have to be changed, as the rules require that to be "excellent" all underlined elements must be marked plus and no element marked minus. In the case of Mr. Conner, for example, many of the underlined elements are not marked with a plus.2/

Shirrell, who is very much an individualist, "cut red tape" frequently, probably much more than is usual in government practice. He chafed at the existence of the Regional Office which circumvented direct communication with the national office, and there are some suggestions that he incurred the enmity of some of the regional officers because of a tendency to sidetrack their authority. Because of the restrictions of a bureaucratic system, he himself admitted he was not a "good government man".

1/ Memorandum, Helen F. Collins, Head, Mail and Files, to Duncan Mills. September 1, 1942.
The other main criticism directed at Shirrell was his failure to discipline either his own staff or the evacuees. A Division Chief, although an admirer of Mr. Shirrell and a sympathizer of his point of view, nevertheless felt that criticism of this failing was justified. Sakoda reports this staff officer's comments:

Shirrell had been replaced with Coverley because the higher authorities did not like Shirrell's administrative policy. It was Shirrell's habit not to fire an incompetent person on the staff, but turn over his more difficult tasks to some other department. Elberson was practically a "utility man" and was asked by Shirrell to work in the Placement Office (because Fagen could not do the work), to be head of the block managers, and be the labor relations man. Coverley was sent because he was a good administrator. He made it definite to the personnel staff that each person was going to be required to carry out the functions attached to his position, and if he were not capable of carrying out those functions, he was going to be removed from office. It was unfortunate that he came at a time of crisis (the registration), since this method of organization was not suited to meet emergencies, although it would probably have been a better than Shirrell's in normal times.1/

More embittered than any criticism of his failure to discipline his staff members, however, was the criticism of his failure to discipline and eliminate the undesirable elements of the evacuee population. Assistant Field Director Cozzens who held a low estimate of the Shirrell administration voiced this opinion at the time of the registration crisis, holding him responsible for the basis of the registration difficulties, and thus defending his friend, Coverley.

The Tule Lake problem is one which has really baffled everyone. The condition there and the refusal to register, preceded the registration period. From observation, it is my belief that there are a number of groups of disloyal people within the center proper. These groups, through the management prior to January 1 (under Shirrell), had an opportunity to grow and prosper.2/

Among the appointed personnel on the project, those who cri-

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1/ Sakoda Journal, April 19, 1943.
2/ Letter, Cozzens to Myer, March 10, 1943.
ticized him for this failing and those who defended him could be distinguished by the degree of their sympathy for the evacuees. Those who agreed with Shirrell in his policy of giving latitude to the evacuees in developing their interests with a minimum of interference from the administration were called "the sociologists" by the other group, frequently a quite vocal one, who were generally of the opinion that the evacuees did not deserve as much unlimited freedom as they received. One expression of this view of the latter group is the following:

From the onset, it was apparent that no firm policy of discipline was to be inaugurated. In the eight months of operation of the Project before I left I was never aware of any actual punishment, although "suspended" sentences were handed out freely. I am a firm believer in a fair but strict system of discipline. This type, I feel, protects the individual in the community who is making a sincere effort to fit into a cooperative program. Lack of fair punishment for even minor infractions such as theft, insubordination, and deliberate neglect in care of property gives tacit consent of the administration to a continuance of such practices. He thus failed to "back" the better elements of that community. What could be expected other than a marked decline in morale? I have many expressions from the leaders of the Japanese, some in writing, re: the above. Here again a distinction must be made between liberty and license.1/

In reply to this letter, Dillon Myer wrote:

Your first point regarding lack of discipline is one that I am afraid is all too true, and it is something we could not immediately sense from this distance, but it became more and more evident as months went on. It was, of course, a major factor in the change of directors at Tule Lake. We have also been remiss in not having some top internal security officers at the Washington level who could follow up more closely on matters of this kind.2/

Antagonism to Shirrell was concentrated in a certain group that had been consistently opposed to Shirrell's lax discipline throughout his presence at the Project. During the latter's directorship

1/ Letter, A. B. Carson to Myer, (No date given)

2/ Letter, Myer to A. B. Carson, April 3, 1943.
this group, composed of people like Ralph Peck, Chief Steward, Anthony O'Brien, Project Attorney, and J. D. Cook, Project Reports Officer, continually murmured against the Director's policy but feared to verbalize their views too openly, but after his departure, they were openly critical of the conditions which had existed prior to Coverley's arrival as Project Director. Peck, who was probably the most antagonistic to the evacuees, remarked at the time of the registration difficulties.

I don't see how that guy Shirrell can sleep nights. He used to stand there in front of us and tell us that 90 percent of these people are loyal. Well, this is showing us what 100 percent Americans they are. Now they can't hide behind Shirrell. There is just a handful of people here who are all right and another handful who are already contaminated, but could be saved if they were separated. The rest are rotten.1/

In the national office of the W.R.A. it was customary, about the spring of 1943, to speak of Harry Stafford at the Minidoka Project as the best project director and to contrast his administrative policies with those of Shirrell. Project Attorney O'Brien of all was of the opinion that Stafford "is by far the most capable/project directors" and he often attacked Shirrell for not maintaining a similarly firm hand over the Tule Lake evacuees. John Province, national Division Chief of Community Services, in expressing favor of the Stafford administration, declared:

Mr. Stafford, I think, is the best of our project directors. He has a very interesting theory about his personnel. He divides them into those whom he calls the "sociologists", who try to understand the evacuees, and those whom he calls the "economists", who may have less understanding of the evacuees than the former but have a sounder knowledge of administrative organization. Mr. Stafford sees his own function as that of balancing one view with the other. I think he has a sound picture of his problem. Mr. Shirrell failed in not seeing this administrative situation clearly.2/

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1/ Billings, op. cit., p. 106.
2/ Miyamoto Notes, April 16, 1943.
In defense of Mr. Shirrell, it should be said that the W.R.A. officials' exclusive stress upon the administration and especially the project director as the chief influence determining the effectiveness of a project completely overlooks other factors which were no less significant aspects of the project situation. The difficulties of an administration were great or small according to the size of the project, the background of its evacuee population, the maturity of W.R.A. policies at the time of the project opening, the attitudes of the public in the surrounding area, and the ability of high administrative officers in certain key positions. That stricter discipline would have proved the correct antidote for the unrest at Tule Lake is hardly proved by the cases of Poston and Manzanar where the imprisonment of trouble-makers immediately led to outbreaks of riot proportions. Even if it be said that administrative control increased after these outbreaks had been quelled, there was a loss, particularly at Manzanar, in the increased hostility of the evacuees to the administration and the Government. It is certainly hazardous speculation to assume that had Mr. Stafford been project director at Tule Lake he would have been more successful than Mr. Shirrell; it might as readily be said that had Mr. Shirrell been project director at Minidoka, with the more tractable population of that project as contrasted to Tule Lake, that he would have succeeded even better than Mr. Stafford.

Criticism of Mr. Shirrell for his poor organizational policy seems, on the whole justified, but if this fault appeared egregious, it seems not unlikely that the shortcoming was emphasized by the circumstances under which he administered. His unwillingness to ap-
ply strict discipline to either the appointed personnel or the evacuees was a phase of the same weakness in Mr. Shirrell as an administrator, his too ready willingness to absolve the faults of others, but the strong personal loyalty and respect which he received from several of his most capable administrative officers and a large number of evacuees suggests that this shortcoming was related to other characteristics which drew the admiration of others.

Mr. Harvey M. Coverley arrived at the Tule Lake Project in late December 1942 following the close of the Regional W.R.A. Office where he had been the division chief of community services. In personality and as an administrator, Mr. Coverley was in many respects a direct contrast of Mr. Shirrell. If the latter had been too flexible in his administrative policies, the latter, it might be said, was too inflexible. If Mr. Shirrell was a relativist, Mr. Coverley was an absolutist. The latter's correspondence even from the time of his duties in the Regional Office reveals a deep concern with adherence to prescribed rules of administration, a proclivity for order and regularity. A more formal, reserved and less sociable person than efficient Mr. Shirrell, Mr. Coverley showed more/administrative ability within a narrower field of activity than did Shirrell, but he accomplished this at at the expense of the good will of his staff and the evacuees. For instance, because of the difficulties of access to Mr. Coverley, except by appointment, his strong emphasis upon adherence to lines of authority, and his somewhat formal mannerisms, some of the wits among the staff took to saluting him with a "Heil, Coverley," behind his back. It may be surmised that because of the talk
about Mr. Shirrell's "mistakes" as director at the Tule Lake Project, Mr. Coverley may have made a special effort not to repeat those mistakes.

An account of Mr. Coverley's position at Tule Lake and a comparison of his administration to that of Mr. Shirrell, is given by Billigmeier who was familiar with the administrative personnel.

Harvey Coverley, the project director of Tule Lake, came to the project in late December. Since his arrival here he has led a secluded personal life which stands in sharp contrast to that of Elmer Shirrell, who was project director before him. While at Tule Lake, Mr. Shirrell developed a number of friendships and a substantial portion of his staff developed a strong personal loyalty to him. In contrast, Mr. Coverley has shown no apparent desire to establish friendships among the Caucasians working with him. The comment of Paul Fleming upon meeting Coverley, though brief, implies a great deal. Fleming upon meeting Coverley "I do not think," he remarked drily, "that we'll be calling Mr. Coverley, 'Harvey.'" That comment is particularly significant for it characterizes the relations, personal and administrative which exist between Coverley and the members of his staff.

When Mr. Coverley assumed the directorship of the relocation center, certain marked changes in administrative practices and procedures were inaugurated. One of the basic principles which Coverley sought to establish here was this, that an administrator must be made to fit a given position, rather than the particular job being fitted to the administrator. In other words, if a person is not capable of performing the functions of his position he should be dismissed...........

(Billigmeier then describes Shirrell's use of Elberson in the field of labor relations though his official position had no connection with labor problems)

Such a shift of function is contrary to Coverley's concepts of correct administrative procedure. The result has been that labor relations are no longer handled by Don Elberson, and in as much as Smith knows nothing about labor problems, no one is concerned with them now. Smith, however, remains despite his inability to perform this portion of his functions.

One of the first steps taken by Coverley upon assuming his position was to make it clear to his staff that he would deal with section heads only through their respective division chiefs. The division chiefs he would see only by appointment. He has in actual practice abided rigidly to his concepts of hierarchy in administrative procedure. Relationships with mem-
bers of his staff have been in harmony with these concepts.

Mr. Shirrell, upon occasion, deviated from correct procedural practices and called upon individuals in his staff for advice when it was necessary, irrespective of the position of the individual. He relied heavily, for example, upon the advice of the extremely able Paul Fleming. On the other hand, Mr. Coverley has relied for advice upon J. O. Hayes by virtue of his position as assistant project director. Thus he is doing the administratively correct thing.

During the registration crisis, this factor was of tremendous importance. During this period, Coverley gathered about him people like Frank Smith and J. O. Hayes. The former because registration concerned leave clearance which is within his jurisdiction, and the latter because he is assistant project director.

Members of the staff who have a fundamental understanding of the evacuees and their problems were not consulted nor was their advice asked. There were a number of people, such as Fleming, Elberson and Carter, who could have contributed a great deal in this period.

Relations of the project director to the evacuees have altered substantially under the directorship of Mr. Coverley. These changes reflect fundamental differences in viewpoint. Mr. and Mr. Shirrell, upon occasion, would refer to the evacuees as their "children". This expression arose naturally from the fact that they looked upon Mr. Shirrell's position in terms of human relations -- to them the job chiefly concerned human problems and relationships. In contrast, it may be fairly stated that Coverley regards his job as an administrative task. Obviously he is chiefly concerned with establishing an efficient administrative organization and places less importance upon human relations.

These fundamental differences in viewpoint are highly important, for they have significant manifestations. That is especially true in times of crisis. On the one hand, Coverley feels that Shirrell was too paternalistic in his administration. It is his belief that the former director dealt with too many evacuee groups and delegations. These groups met with Shirrell and received concessions from him -- there was a bargaining process between them. This, Coverley has stated, encouraged the evacuee population to feel that it had everything to gain by attempting to wring as many concessions from the WRA as possible. That fact has, he asserts, contributed to the difficulties of the WRA in the registration program. The people think that the WRA can be pleaded with and cajoled into changing its policies when the evacuees find objection to them.

There are several members of the administrative staff who hold similar views in this regard. For example, Anthony
O'Brien, the project attorney, expressed himself in this fashion, "We lost the registration when we lost the first strike. The WRA has never run this camp that has been the main trouble in Tule Lake."

On the other hand there are those individuals in the staff who believe that this is not an ordinary government agency which can be effectively administered through a rigid system of procedures. It is, they maintain, something more complex. There are fifteen thousand people in this center and administering such a community requires something in addition to good administrative organization. The establishment of efficient administration is essential but it can not be relief upon to the exclusion of the human factors involved. There are occasions when those charged with administration can be most effective when human factors are taken into consideration -- attitudes, resentment, frustration, wants, fears, etc. Some times a position of the administration might be administratively correct but in terms of human relations it might be wrong.1/

It was scarcely more than a month after his arrival at the Tule Lake Project that Mr. Coverley was given the task of carrying out the registration program at his center. As events turned out, the greatest difficulties in the registration were encountered at the Tule Lake Project, more than at any other project, and as a result Coverley's administration was thrown in a bad light almost from the beginning. One member of the appointed personnel who is generally given to fair evaluations of his fellow workers remarked that:

Coverley was the victim of circumstances in the present registration. Roughly, he gave three reasons why things had worked out adversely here at Tule Lake--Coverley was new here, his administrative policy did not fit into an emergency situation, and the circumstances of his arrival were against him. The most obvious fact was that Coverley was new here. He did not know his staff very well, and therefore could not have known on whom to rely even if he wanted to select out people with special aptitude to do certain jobs. He was not acquainted with the many problems that had kept cropping up. He had to learn his whole job before he could really begin his public relation work, turning over the more mechanical part to someone else. This was a great disadvantage to him.

The second point was that his administrative policy was

such that it worked against him at the time of the registration. Coverley was sent because he was a good administrator. He made it definite to the personnel staff that each person was going to be required to carry out the functions attached to his position, and if he were not capable of carrying out these functions, he was going to be removed from office. It was unfortunate that he came at a time of crisis, since this method of organization was not suited to meet emergencies, although it would probably have been a better than Shirrell's in normal times.

The third reason for Coverley's difficulties with the registration can be lumped under circumstances. In fact, most of Coverley's difficulties could be attributed to 'circumstances.' For one thing, when he first came he scared the people by talking about relocation too much. When he spoke to the warden supervisors, for instance, he over-emphasized relocation. Not having the trust of the people, this was not a very good thing for a new Project Director to do. This person felt that Coverley's administrative policy is fundamentally sound, and that his character is also sound.

In spite of the many criticisms directed at Mr. Coverley during the registration crisis by both evacuees and members of the appointed personnel, his conduct during the disturbance revealed no insincerity or any signs of malicious intent toward the evacuees. It was certainly his misfortune that he became involved in the delicate registration program at a time when he was yet unprepared for it. It is even possible that he might have succeeded as project director better than did Shirrell had not the registration crisis seriously undermined at the outset, his relations with the evacuees.

However, Mr. Coverley's shortcomings as a project director cannot be dismissed by any sweeping inclusion of them under the guise of 'circumstances.' Mr. Coverley possessed what Mr. Shirrell lacked, the ability to concentrate upon creating organizational efficiency, but he lacked the human understanding which Mr. Shirrell possessed. That his concern for adherence to the defined form

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1/ Sakoda Journal, April 17, 1943.
The Administrative Plan

of the administration blinded him to the need of flexibility in his dealings with his staff as well as the evacuees is suggested in the instance of his meeting with Dillon Myer, and a group of evacuee leaders at Tule Lake, following the close of the registration when the lessons from the crisis were discussed.

Myer discussed with them the summary of lessons to be learned from registration. The first one deals with the further use of certain members in the administrative personnel who have a good understanding of evacuee problems. To this Myer replied, "I certainly agree with you on that. It isn't always easy to get such people but if there are such people they should be used."

"Now there is one thing," said Coverley, "that makes that difficult; that is administrative lines of authority. I can't very well ask a member of one division to advise in the affairs of another division. If there is something that pertains to employment I can't call in some one whose work is unrelated."

"That's the point we've tried to make," Harry Mayeda answered. "The affairs of one division are very often closely related to project affairs in general. Functional lines shouldn't be followed when in doing so one ignores those with experience in human relations who could give invaluable advice."

Mr. Myer then spoke, "Now, Harvey, I think that this can be worked out through extra-curricular activity. In one center they have worked out a system; occasionally a gathering is held in the evening at the home of the project director. People in the administrative staff who have a particularly deep understanding of evacuees attend along with certain leaders in the community. An informal discussion is held. No administrative lines are violated in such a gathering."  

Shirrell had his enemies, but he also had a strong following among both the appointed personnel and the evacuees; Coverley, on the other hand, failed to gain any appreciable following partly because of the adverse circumstances of his brief administration but also because of his more formal relations with his staff and the people. One Nisei in assessing the various attitudes of the community towards Mr. Shirrell and Mr. Coverley summarizes them by stating:

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1/ Billigmeier, op. cit., pp. 119-120.
While Shirrell received a great deal of adverse criticisms while he was in office here as Project Director, Coverley is getting it, too. At first, Coverley was an unknown quantity, and many people felt that with his experience he ought to make a good administrator. The coop people have some contact with him and he seemed willing to help the co-op as much as possible, more so than Shirrell. However, recent opinions expressed about him are definitely channelled.

Some persons say that Coverley is a good administrator. He does not make rash promises or lose his temper as Shirrell. He also carries out generally what he promised. He can take orders and carry them out. However, he does not seem able to adjust himself in emergency situations. Even when there is a great deal of trouble going on he insists on having people make appointments, state what his business is, and how long he wants to see him. Some people have refused to see him for this reason. He does not seem to make exceptions and 'play ball.' Some people express this quality in Coverley by saying that 'He is too small a man.' Another said that Coverley was too bureaucratic; he had been in government service too long. He can take orders and carry them out, but that is about all. The same sort of thing is hinted when it is said that Coverley would make a good Assistant Project Director. If Shirrell were the Project Director and Coverley the Assistant Project Director, they might have been able to get along together very well. Several persons have expressed great dislike for Coverley. But none of the colonists seem to look upon Coverley as a little dictator, as do some members of the staff.1/

One of the Kibei removed to the isolation camp during the registration wrote to his wife in pointed criticism of Coverley, and while this letter may not reflect a representative opinion because of the circumstance under which it was written, it nevertheless reflects the same general criticism that was repeatedly made of Coverley. The Kibei said: "Mr. Shirrell was a good politician, setting up the City Council & the Planning Board & respected them & us altogether. Mr. Coverley's not a good politician, instead of it he is the wizard of Gestapo blitz such as kidnapping me under the false pretense...."2/

Following the unfortunate beginning in the registration crisis,

1/ Sakoda Journal, April 3, 1943.
2/ Letter, Yoshio Yamato to his wife, March 16, 1943.
Coverley never was able to gain control over his staff or the community. In April 1945, a number of the appointed personnel sought to resign from their post, partly because of disappointment with the results of the registration, but also because of their differences of opinion with Mr. Coverley. Coverley himself turned in his resignation in the summer of 1945, and he was succeeded by Mr. Ray Best.

Office of the Assistant Project Director: This office was occupied during both the Shirrell and Coverley administrations by J. O. Hayes. As stated previously, the functions of this office varied under the two administrations since Coverley divided his executive responsibilities with Hayes, but Shirrell delegated little authority to the latter. While the latter was project director, it is not clear how he divided his functions with Mr. Hayes, but it seems that Hayes had responsibility for at least three divisions, the transportation and supply, public works, and agriculture and industry. In addition, he supervised the relations of the administrative personnel, and was the project director's representatives on a number of administrative committees, such as the Merit Rating Board, and otherwise served in a capacity of assistant to the Project Director. Shirrell, however, did not strongly insist upon conformance to lines of authority, and because Hayes was not well regarded among the bulk of the personnel, the tendency was for the staff to take its problems directly to Shirrell shunting aside whatever authority Hayes may have had.

Coverley, on the other hand, not only gave Assistant Project Director considerable responsibility and authority, but he insisted
The Administrative Plan

upon adherence to lines of authority and rigorously conformed to
the policy of refusing to deal with any problem that properly did
not belong within his sphere of function. Thus, Mr. Hayes went to
Washington for the conferences of the W.R.A. and the War Department
on the plan of registration, and he was therefore influential in
determining the plan that should be followed at Tule Lake in the
registration program. As indicated on the organizational plan of
the administration, Mr. Hayes was responsible in the Coverley ad-
ministration for the supervision of the Administrative, Internal
Security, Public Works, Transportation and Supply, and Industrial
Divisions, and at Coverley's insistence, there was little deviation
from this defined relationship between Mr. Hayes and these division
chiefs.

Unfortunately, before Mr. Coverley's arrival at the project,
Hayes had gained a reputation of being one of the weakest members
of the administrative staff. "Without a doubt," Billigmeier says,
"Hayes is the most widely disliked man on the project -- both by
Caucasians and evacuees. He is regarded as somewhat of a buffoon
at
and is frequently referred to as 'the Rover Boy\textsuperscript{2} Tule Lake.'" \footnote{Billigmeier, op. cit., p. 109.}

Criticism of his started as early as the date of his appointment
as Assistant Project Director some time early in June 1942. He
had originally arrived as the Division Chief for Transportation and
Supply, but about the time it was determined that Mr. Shirrell was
to remain permanently at the Tule Lake Project as Project Director,
Hayes' appointment as Assistant Project Director was confirmed.
The appointment came as a surprise to both the administrative per-
sonnel as well as the evacuees working in the administrative offices,
The teachers had been promised beds and chests of drawers. Many became quite resentful when the furniture was not issued; they were told that the furniture had not yet arrived. When it was found that the beds and dressers had been in the project warehouses for months, resentment against Joe Hayes flared. Both in the matter of housing and the issuance of furniture Hayes, who was in-charge of personnel housing, was particularly insensitive to the needs of the teachers...

After a time, a few apartments were vacated in the administrative area and several of the teachers were allowed to move into these apartments. Those who arrived on the project first were, according to announcement, given priority in housing. Families, however, were given special consideration if they could impress their needs upon Joe Hayes. That was not very easy to do. Often the wife would have to break into tears in Hayes' office and the gentleman of the family would have to threaten to resign before Hayes would display any willingness to consider their pleas. This happened when several members of the high school staff tried to secure needed housing facilities for their families. The Arthur Rameys and Glenn Walkers experienced that. The high school principal, Mr. Wilder, had serious difficulty with Hayes when he attempted to arrange for an apartment for his family. Frequently Hayes would finally grant the things requested, but usually he made things exceedingly unpleasant for all people concerned before they got what they demanded. He made promises often with no thought of actually abiding by them. For these endearing qualities which he
Hayes won the intense dislike of most teachers--a dislike which persists to this day.1/

Criticisms of Hayes' management of personnel housing was not limited to the teachers, but was equally evident among the administrative personnel. One of the many legends concerning perverseness is told of his pre-emption of lumber secured by Mr. Connor, Chief of the Administrative Division.

Connor, like most Caucasians at Tule Lake, had his difficulties with Joe O. Hayes, the Assistant Project Director. Legends abound at Tule Lake which attest to Hayes' monumental stupidity and cussedness. Some of them are true, others partly true, and others are true only in the sense that they have captured his spirit. Here is an incident which reportedly happened a month or so before Connor received his transfer. It is hard to say whether or not it is true in all details, but it circulated widely among the Caucasians and was cited as further evidence, if such were needed, of Hayes complete dastardy.

Connor is a diabetic and in need of a special diet. He found it difficult to eat at the mess hall because of the special foods he required. Connor asked for the right to have a kitchen built into his apartment so that his wife could prepare his special diet. Finally Hayes promised that the addition could be constructed if Connor could arrange to get the lumber. Connor secured the lumber, but before he could use it, Hayes pre-empted it and used it to build an addition to his own apartment, for his expected baby.2/

The evacuees, no less than the administrative personnel, held a low opinion of Mr. Hayes. In his first appearance before the Community Council following the farm strike, Hayes made a poor impression upon the members as he pleaded and threatened in asking for more cooperation from the evacuees but failed in discussing with the councilmen the grievances which were felt to be at the source of the community difficulties. This poor impression of him was strongly reinforced during the coal crew problem in early September 1942 when "everyone in the Council was griped at Hayes" for the manner in which he demanded that the community volunteer for the coal crew or go with-

1/ Billigmeier, "Education Section," p. 6-7.
2/ Billigmeier, Administrative Division, p. 6.
out coal during the winter months. 1/

Mr. Hayes' work under the Coverley administration, when he was given greater executive duties than under Shirrell, indicates that he was not without ability to execute routine functions particularly when under the guidance of a supervisor who directed his work closely. His limited capacity for responsibility and initiative, however, seemed most clearly demonstrated during the registration crisis period of planning for the registration when, as the representative to Washington from Tule Lake, it was his responsibility to suggest to Mr. Coverley the most suitable plan of presenting the program to the people. However, according to the information of one person attending the meetings at Washington, an account supported by others who were there, "Hayes was in attendance at the meetings in a very sporadic manner (in other words, he got drunk and stayed away)." 2/ His paucity of ideas concerning the manner of its presentation, and his dependence upon the Army team to plan the registration, would indicate that Hayes failed to fulfil his function as project representative to the meetings. Even disregarding the question of his ability to execute his duties, however, the fact that he was unable to gain the confidence and respect of his fellow workers was a strong consideration against his remaining as the Assistant Project Director. Both the Shirrell and Coverley administrations suffered because of Hayes' shortcomings as an assistant who could be counted upon to advise and execute the duties of the Office of the Project Director.

1/ Miyamoto Notes, August 13, 1942. also September 2, 1942.

The Administrative Division: The broad functions of this office, which were maintained by the largest staff of appointed personnel of any administrative unit, may be seen from the variety of services which it was required to provide. The functions of the division were:

To provide general administrative service for the entire Project including:

2. Cost Accounting.
3. Cash Advances to Evacuees.
4. Timekeeping & Payrolls.
5. Personnel Work (Appointed Personnel)
7. Property Control.
8. Warehousing (Receiving & Issuing)
9. General Office Services (Stenographic Pool, etc.)
10. Telephone and Teletype Office.
11. Project Post Office.

At the opening of the project, Mr. Gilbert Niesse was the Chief of this division, but since his assignment to Tule Lake was temporary and he was reassigned to another project a few months after the opening, not much is known of his activities as division chief. On the whole, it seems he was regarded a capable administrator with experience in federal agencies; although the evacuee opinion of him was that he was reserved and difficult to approach. But whether it was due to the complexities of establishing the division in a new project, or to the failings of his junior officers, the administrative division encountered numerous difficulties during the early months. This was particularly noticeable in those units of the division dealing directly with the evacuees, as in the timekeeping and payroll unit, agent cashier unit, procurement of services and supplies section, and the project post office.

By September/1942, there were 6,420 evacuee employees on the project, all of whom were on the payroll of the W.R.A. and were oc-

1/ Project, Instruction No. 20, op. cit. p. 5.
occupied in a wide variety of jobs. It was the task of the timekeeping and payroll unit of the Fiscal Section to keep time records and prepare payrolls for all evacuees. The maintenance of the employment and time records of all workers was the responsibility of the Employment Division, but the difficulties encountered by the timekeepers of the Employment Division in submitting accurate records of the persons working, those transferring from one job to another, and their amount of time worked, necessarily affected the efficiency of the timekeeping and payroll unit in the Administrative Division.

To illustrate the difficulties: the W.R.A. desired a daily but no time-clocks were available, check-in and check-out record of all workers. One of the first methods tried was that of having the workers themselves write out on standard-sized slips the number of hours worked each day, which were then submitted to the timekeepers, but it was found that the workers would frequently forget to submit their slips, make errors (deliberate or accidental), and even ignore the regulation on the ground that it was too much trouble for the small wages involved. The method was tried of using master sheets for each work group unit on which the individual workers would sign-in and out, but the payroll section had difficulty in handling the large sheets as the records were copied into the books. Finally, the practice was followed of having the timekeepers transfer the data of the master sheets to individual cards so that the payroll section might copy the data more efficiently. It was months before a workable system of timekeeping was established and workers became habituated to the practice of "punching the clock" so that the payrolls could be made out with reasonable efficiency, but in the meantime, there were several weeks delay in the payment of early wages, and the delays in
wage payments became one of the chief sources of early discontent.

Similarly, the Procurement Section of the Administrative Division was one of those whose functions during the early months was extremely important to the harmony of the community. In a new project, one of the critical needs was to get innumerable supplies and equipment for the maintenance of anything like a normal community life, and the failure to procure needed lumber, medical supplies, farm machinery, and office equipment, among other things, caused inefficiency and delays in project development. To begin with, the section was confronted with the wartime shortages of material and a low priority rating. There were transportation delays and governmental "red tape" in procurement regarding which there was little the section could do. Moreover, the administrative staff as well as the evacuees had to be taught the correct procedure in government procurement, and most troublesome of all, the functions of the procurement section had to be coordinated with the warehousing section and the transportation division.

Mr. John C. Stubbs, Head of the Procurement Section, was regarded a quiet and easy-going but capable officer with experience in the field of government procurement services, but whatever efficiency his office displayed, it was not infrequently nullified by delays at other points in the procurement procedure. In the critical question of medical supplies, for example, orders submitted in early June began to dribble in only in September as the Army Quartermaster Depots, released with reluctance supplies which were also much needed elsewhere. In the meantime, the procurement office was made to feel the considerable pressure being exerted upon the Chief Medical Officer at the hospital by his evacuee medical staff.
for certain supplies which were considered absolute necessities in any adequate medical service. The inadequate method of filing bills of lading for goods received at the warehouses likewise led to difficulties at the procurement section.

Units such as the timekeeping and payroll, and the warehousing section, were extremely important on the projects, but they were given relatively low ratings on the civil service scale. The type of personnel which they pay commanded, therefore, was frequently of a quality lower than that actually demanded by the difficulties of the job.

In August 1942, Mr. Niesse was succeeded by Mr. Fred Connor as Chief of the Administrative Division. The latter had wide administrative experience before accepting the W.R.A. position, and had worked for a number of federal agencies as a civil service employee for a number of years, among them the Forestry Service. He at one time held an administrative position in a leper colony in the South. Evidently, little attention was given to Mr. Connor's attitudes toward the evacuees, for unlike other positions for which the personnel was carefully selected on the basis of their probable behavior towards the evacuees, the Chief of the Administrative Division required relatively little contact with the people of the community, and the criteria in choosing Mr. Connor were his background and the shortage of available men with his experience and training.

Mr. Connor's stay at the project, which lasted until April 1943, was marked by a series of conflicts, both with the evacuees and with the appointed personnel. Billigmeier classes him among the "Jap-haters" of the administrative group.

Connor gave clear evidence of his deep-rooted prejudices against the Japanese Americans. He was one of the Caucasians
to object most strenuously to the practice of allowing evacuee guests to eat in the personnel mess hall. Connor was bitter in his denunciation of this practice and exerted pressure on the Chief Steward to prohibit evacuee guests from dining with Caucasians.

It was Connor's contention that he was doing all that could logically be expected of him by working with evacuees all day. The administration building was full of them, his secretaries and clerical help were largely evacuees. He expressed the conviction that Caucasians shouldn't be required to eat with the colonists, too, just because a few teachers believed in fraternization. It was hard enough for him to adjust to the evacuee waitresses employed in the personnel mess. According to one of his colleagues, Connor suggested that Caucasian waitresses be employed in the personnel mess hall, so that the Caucasians could be free from the sight of Japanese faces during meals and be able to talk without restraint.1/

Relatively few evacuees had contact with Mr. Connor and, as in the case of a great number of the personnel, only those working under his supervision had any knowledge or opinions of him. One comment fairly well circulated among the Nisei in the administrative offices was that Mr. Connor liked to "make a play for the girls" and gossip linked his name with a Nisei girl who had gained some notoriety and was popularly called "Warehouse Sally" because of her alleged frequenting of the warehouses. Billigeimer who picked up similar reports states:

There were a number of persistent reports which circulated among both Caucasians and evacuees which seemed to indicate that Connor had another kind of difficulty with his evacuee secretaries. These reports stated that Connor made 'advances' to the evacuee girls who worked with him, that he was, in the current terminology, a 'Wolf', and that he was unable to keep decent girls in his office for any length of time. Obviously such reports are positively verified only with great difficulty. It can only be definitely stated that the reports did receive rather wide circulation.2/

From time to time reports of conflicts between Mr. Shirrell and Connor were heard in the administration offices. An important basis of disagreement was Mr. Connor's unwillingness to be pushed

1/ Billigeimer, "Administrative Division," p.3.
2/ Ibid., p. 4.
in the accomplishment of his duties. As one administrator expressed it, "People like Fred Connor who have been in civil service for a long time feel they know government service, that there's no use trying to get things rushed through, and that if they follow orders they're doing all that their job calls for." In particular, it seems that Mr. Connor disapproved of Mr. Shirrell's inclination to take procedural liberties, while the latter regarded the former something of an obstructionist.

According to Anthony O'Brien who was at the regional office at the time, both Connor and Mr. Shirrell went to the San Francisco office to register complaints against the other. Each charged the other with incompetence. Mr. Shirrell was assertedly trying to get rid of Connor when the former was sent to Chicago to head the W.R.A. relocation work in that area. However, Connor could not be ousted without a Civil Service Board hearing, O'Brien stated.

Mr. Connor also came into sharp conflict with the members of his staff in the Administrative Division. Within that division there were long enduring under-currents little known to people outside the division. Billigmeier isolates three causes for the difficulties between Connor and his Caucasian colleagues.

In the first place most of them found Connor personally obnoxious. Second they found him extremely difficult to work with; he was dogmatic, highly opinionated, and uncompromising. In the third place, a majority of them regarded him as a poor administrator. How much substance there was to this latter charge it is hard to say. It can be stated that the members of the opposition were old civil service employees.

The intra-divisional conflict came to a head in March 1943 and a number of important members of the staff, including:

- Mr. Carlos Busselle, Principal Fiscal Accountant
- Mrs. Ruth Busselle, Asst. Personnel Officer
- Mr. Elmo DeWitt, Fiscal Accountant
- Mr. William A. Leigh, Fiscal Accountant
- Mr. Dick Tracy, Cost Accountant

all submitted their resignation because they found it impossible to work with him any longer. Since all of these people refused...
to remain on the Project unless Connor left Tule Lake, it was decided to transfer him to the Administrative Division in another project and appointing Mr. Carlos Busselle as the Acting Chief of the Administrative Division pending the appointment of a permanent head.

Members of the Administrative Division whom Corlies Carter calls 'operators', "That is those whose main interest at Tule Lake lies in their jobs and not in the people with whom they are dealing," tended to remain much to themselves.

The Connors had few friends at Tule Lake. They remained much to themselves. Mr. and Mrs. Busselle likewise lived a quiet private life at Tule Lake; so do Mr. and Mrs. Dick Tracy. The Jacoby's, Carter's, and Elbersons have a great deal of respect for both the Busselles and the Tracys. They regarded them as efficient in their work and fine people personally. They did not so regard the Connors.

Transportation and Supply Division: Except for the The division is divided into three sections the functions of which are described as:

1. Garage Section

Maintains the machine and equipment shop, the function of which is to service and repair all heavy and light automotive equipment.

2. Motor Pool Section

Houses, dispatches, and operates all automotive equipment and distributes gasoline and oil; greases and services all automotive equipment, tire and miscellaneous repairs and adjustments.

3. Mess Operations Section

Responsible for determining and preparing all food rations for the Project community, including the requisitioning, storing, and distribution of subsistence supplies.

The functions of the first two sections should be reasonably clear from the outline. Virtually all motor vehicles on the pro-

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1/ Billigmeier, op. cit., p. p. 4.
2/ Ibid., p. 6.
The Administrative Plan

ject, except a very few owned and operated by members of the appoint-
ed personnel or the teaching staff, were under the control of the
Transportation Division. Evacuees were not permitted to have their
own automobiles on the project, and they were therefore dependent
for their movement on the project almost entirely upon walking or
an occasional lift from a taxi or truck. The appointed personnel
likewise were largely dependent upon the Motor Pool for the use of
vehicles, and because of the great shortage of trucks as well as
motor passenger cars, there was a continuous contest among the per-
sonnel for the right to get the use of W.R.A. cars.

Several types of government-owned automotive equipment, all of
which was concentrated in the Motor Pool, were available on the Pro-
ject. First, there were the tractors tractors used on the farm and
the grading equipment largely used by the public works division,
for road maintenance, ditch digging and other similar services.
Moreover a certain number of trucks, both light and heavy duty, as
well as station wagons or reasonable substitutes for such were more
or less permanently assigned to the farm group. Second, there were
initially over one hundred heavy duty trucks borrowed from the Ci-
vilian Conservation Corp, but most of these were recalled by the CCC
in early September 1942. One of the immediate consequence of this
loss was that the administration office workers who had hitherto had
taxi service on the trucks during the noon lunch hour to and from
the offices to their mess halls were deprived of this service. A
more serious consequence was that the trucking of harvested vege-
tables from the farm to the packing plant was frequently delayed
such that the packing house workers were often forced to wait for
their materials of work. Likewise, the coal crew strike of September
was in part the consequence of the increased difficulty of their work following the loss of dump trucks and other trucking equipment. It was only gradually through the purchases of trucks in various Western states that the serious situation of the truck shortage was in some degree reduced. Finally, there were a number of W.R.A.-owned passenger cars. Some of these were more or less permanently assigned, as, for example, to the internal security division for the wardens' patrol cars, but a few were retained in the Motor Pool as taxis for the general business use of appointed personnel and evacuees.

Because of the distances on the project and the scattering of a number of administrative offices in various parts of the project, taxi service was frequently essential for the quick transaction of business. The limited number of telephones on the project added to the importance of taxis as means of communication. A special use of taxi service was the transporting of patients to and from the hospital. Because of these various needs and the extreme shortage of motor vehicles, the Motor Pool was constantly being taxed by the demands of various offices to have vehicles made available to them.

An illustration of the kind of problem faced by the Motor Pool Section is presented in the following letter from Mr. M. C. Cooke to Mr. Joe Hayes replying to complaints from Mr. O'Brien about the transportation service.

Prior to dictating my memorandum dated April 21st, we agreed that Mr. O'Brien's trips outside the project on government business were infrequent and he could well call upon the Motor Pool for outside cars when needed.

Except for one week, during the early part of February, Mr. O'Brien has had a car permanently assigned to him for the past three months and I think it is an overstatement when he says that his experiences with the Motor Pool has been bad when endeavoring to obtain cars for government business. I do agree,
however, that a few cars available for outside use are heavily
taxed and anyone requiring a car might be subjected to some
delay, although on the whole, we have been doing a pretty good
job of taking care of assignments to date.

Some months ago, we had five taxis in service but owing
to the ever-increasing demands by important, government offi-
cials for permanent assignments, this taxi service has been re-
duced to one taxi. Needless to say, it is not available at
a moment's notice. Mr. O'Brien's experience with the taxi ser-
vice could only have been limited to a period of one week, as
mentioned before, he has had a car assigned permanently to him
for the past three months and had no occasion to call for a
taxi. If Mr. Coverly wishes to have me assign a car permenantly
to Mr. O'Brien, I shall re-assign 600-27. In this connection,
I assume that Mr. O'Brien will be permitted to use the car at
his discretion off the project and outside regular working
hours.

As I have been instructed not to require trip assignment
requests from officials for permanently assigned cars, it is
impossible for us to properly control the passenger car situa-
tion. If all passenger cars were assigned to the Pool as per
Washington's instructions, they could be controlled in the same
manner that the trucks are now being controlled. May I recom-
mand that all passenger cars be turned into the Pool at 5:30
p.m. each day and none assigned out until 8:00 p.m. in the
morning without first obtaining my signature or yours. 1/

Except for the first month of the project when Hayes was still
the Chief of the Transportation and Supply Division, Mortimer C.
Cooke was continuously the Chief of that division. He had lived
a great many years in the Orient and there gained some acquaint-
ance with the Japanese language and culture. While this background
evidenced itself in a better than average understanding of the
evacuee Japanese, his knowledge about the Japanese and sympathy for
them was much less than might have been expected of a man who had
spent years of life in Japan. As Billigmeier says, "He has little
affection for the evacuees, and for that matter, he has little af-
fection for the members of the Caucasian staff."2/

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evacuees. Cooke's dislike of the Japanese is not widely known because he does not give voice to his feelings as many others do.\textsuperscript{1}

His personal life is quiet and singularly poor in social relationships. He remains aloof from people. He shares a one room apartment with Frank Fagan who he has learned to tolerate, but there is little friendship between them. Cooke is an extremely reserved and unresponsive man, not because he is retiring by nature or because he has any feelings of inferiority, but simply because he lacks interest in the people about him. \textsuperscript{2}

The only time Cooke came in contact with community problems was during the Mess Hall Strike when, as the Chief of the division which includes mess operations, he represented the administration in the effort to reach a settlement. Among the evacuees, Cooke's part in the affair was regarded as being largely innocuous; his chief concern seemed that of removing disturbances and of regaining quiescence simply for the sake of having peace. He neither bargained nor used threats, but only pleaded with the evacuee mess workers for cooperation so that the work of the mess operations section might continue. Credit for the settlement of the differences in this issue was largely given to Elberson who was then representing the Project Director in issues of labor relations.

Contrary to the title of the division, the only supplies handled in this division were food supplies distributed through the mess management section and those materials which were transported by the trucking crews of this division at the request of other departments. Procurement, warehousing, and all other functions of supplies were dealt with largely by the Administrative Division.

The Mess Management Section, however, was more or less autonomous.

\textsuperscript{1} Hilligmeier, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., p. 1.
in the procurement of foods since its requisitions were not channeled through the Procurement Section. It was the responsibility of the Head of the Mess Management Section to prepare food rations for the entire evacuee population 45 days prior to the day of expected delivery and maintain a constant supply in the food warehouses so that shortages would not occur. Initially, the requisitions were first cleared by the Regional Office and then sent to the Army Quartermaster Depot which served as the food procuring agent, but as this procedure was found cumbersome and delaying, the practice was quickly established of having direct communication between the project and the Quartermaster Depot. The supplies of food which were received at the warehouses were then redistributed on a quota basis, according to the size of the population in the block.

The problem of the mess management section was an extremely delicate one. The requirement was that roughly 15,000 people be fed in 64 different mess halls on standard diets not to exceed 45c per person per day but generally at a somewhat lower unit cost. While this problem may not seem to differ from that of Army mess services, the project and indeed food procurement was handled by the Army Quartermaster Corp, there were at least three important differences that complicated the problem for the W.R.A. Mess Management Section. (1) The population in the relocation center varied considerably more than any Army group, since it included both sexes and all ages and constituted a cultural group accustomed to foods different from the majority population on the outside. For example, beside the regular menus of the mess halls, it was necessary to establish baby diet stations for families with infants and little children. (2) Because of the authority of the Army, it could commandeer food supplies much more readily than could
the W.R.A. In fact, because the latter was supplying a population acutely subject to criticism from the public, the W.R.A. needed to exercise extreme caution against reducing food supplies in any given local area by requisitioning for the project, of adhering closely to a minimum cost of food allotments, and of otherwise avoiding any kind of mess hall practices that might lead to an accusation of evacuee "coddling" or food wastage. (3) Because the civilian population in the project could not be disciplined to accept any food served in the mess halls, as might be done in the Army, food complaints frequently led to revolts over which the W.R.A. had no direct control.

To keep complaints at a minimum, the need was to maintain uniform diets in all mess halls of reasonably satisfactory menus, for differences in the quality of foods served at different mess halls were found to be the immediate source of food complaints. One step in the direction of achieving standard rations in all mess halls was to make supplies allotment according to the size of the block population. Initially this was accomplished on a gross basis, that is, of basing the amount of food supplied to the blocks on gross categories of 225 to 249 people, 250 to 274 people, and 275 to 299 people. Evacuee mess supervisors, however, complained that this led to gross inequalities since, for example, 100 pounds of meat might be adequate for 225 people but would not be adequate for 249 people. The system was revised in September 1942 reducing the allotments to each block to pounds and ounces and correlating the amount supplied to the specific number of individual residents of the blocks. Refinements of this type, however, could not overcome differences in the mess halls resulting from the ability of the cooks, the degree of
strictness of the Chief Cooks in permitting petty food grafts, and the differences in tastes of the resident majority in the blocks.

The Mess Management Section was headed during the first three months of the project by Luther Stults who was the only Caucasian mess administrator until the arrival in early August 1942 of Mr. Pilcher, who was assigned as Assistant Mess Supervisor. Mr. Stults was known to the evacuees for his conscientious effort to meet the subsistence needs of the evacuees, but the period of initial adjustments in the mess halls were filled with numerous petty as well as major difficulties, and during the food crisis of early August at Tule Lake, Stults submitted his resignation and requested a transfer to another project. Despite requests from evacuee mess committees asking Mr. Stults to remain at his position, Stults left the project and was replaced as the Head of the Mess Management Section by Ralph Peck.

While relations between the evacuees and Mr. Peck rapidly became strained, it was the difficulties surrounding Mr. Pilcher which produced the first major conflict in the mess section. Pilcher had been mess supervisor at the Walerga Assembly Center, where the Sacramento residents at Tule Lake had been temporarily located, and considerable trouble had been experienced between Mr. Pilcher and the evacuees at the Walerga Center. It was contended that his main interest in mess supervision was to keep food costs to the government at a minimum, while allowing the evacuees to suffer, and a system which he adopted of allotting food to the mess halls sufficient for one day at a time was claimed to be a conservation measure that placed great difficulties upon the evacuee cooks who were thus permitted no flexibility in the preparation of food. Because of this
background, Pilcher met antagonism from the evacuees from the first day of his advent into the mess section at Tule Lake. Whether he was a capable mess supervisor, as the administration claimed, was immaterial for the defiance of the evacuee mess workers was such that there was little hope of peace in the mess department while he remained. It was claimed that he was deeply prejudiced against the evacuees. He was suspected and accused of graft. A petition for his ouster signed by 9,000 evacuees was submitted in September 1942, but the administration refused to recognize it because no evidence of the accusations supporting the accusations were submitted. An investigation was made by a joint committee of evacuees and appointed personnel, and the report of the findings, which only the Caucasians signed, cleared Mr. Pilcher of all charges against him. One of the major demands in the mess strike of October 1942 was the ouster of Mr. Pilcher which Mr. Shirrell continued to refuse, but Pilcher's resignation was finally accepted at the advice of Mr. Myer.

Mr. Peck's attitude toward the evacuees was initially conciliatory, but as his department became involved in the conflict between Mr. Pilcher and the evacuees, he became rapidly obstreperous in his relations with the evacuees. Referring to his own background, Peck declared:

"I was born into a poor family and still am poor, as a matter of fact. I was brought up with colored children and have always fought against racial prejudice and religious bigotry. But being brought up poor has taught me to be grateful for the things people do for me. These Japanese expect the W.R.A. to hand them everything on a platter; they aren't grateful for the things done for their benefit. Mr. Shirrell has given generously of his time and energy and even personal resources to help these people, but they don't appreciate that fact. They refer to him as 'Shirrell', not Mr. Shirrell. I'm sensitive to that sort of thing."\(^1\)

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\(^1\) Billigmeier, op. cit., p. 5.
Since mess hall problems were generally dealt with as public issues by the evacuees, an evacuee Mess Committee within the Fair Employment Practice Committee was formed which on frequent occasions confronted with Mr. Peck with demands from the evacuee residents towards the improvement of food and mess hall conditions. Mr. Peck resented having to deal with these committees, and referred to instances of evacuee cooks' refusal to comply with his orders as "insubordination", a usage much resented by the evacuees who felt they had the right to protest if they had cause to question any order.1/

In his mind, the Japanese should be grateful for the many blessings they are receiving in the relocation center, especially for the good which he provides them. Their efforts to present a cause to him or to state a complaint are looked upon as the highest audacity and ingratitude. Because of this attitude Don Elbersen once accused him of having a "white man's burden" complex, but Peck heatedly denied this accusation.2/

This attitude toward the evacuees was expressed with especial vigor in the issue between the teachers and certain members of the appointed staff over the question of inviting evacuee guests to the Personnel Mess Hall. The problem developed in September shortly after the arrival of the teachers who, as a matter of course, occasionally invited evacuees as guests to the Personnel Mess Hall. Lacking apartment facilities at the time, the teachers felt this was the most satisfactory manner of entertaining their friends, but because of the large numbers of the teachers as well as the appointed personnel eating at the mess hall, the Caucasians were sometimes required to wait while the evacuee guests were served first. Following a certain amount of pressure from members of the appointed personnel upon Peck to prohibit the inviting of evacuee guests,

The matter of issuing prohibitions against evacuee guests was brought to Mr. Shirrell several times but he absolutely refused to consider the issuance of any such orders. Finding Shirrell intractable, Peck lost his temper and his reason and

Footnote: See reverse side.
1/ Miyamoto Notes, Council Meeting, September 28, 1948.
2/ Billigmeier, op. cit., p. 10.
decided to exercise control over the situation by other devices.

During the winter months the school administration wanted to make it possible for school lunches to be served high school students who lived long distances from the high school. The efforts of the school authorities were blocked for a period of a month or more. Peck wanted the Superintendent of Education to issue specific orders to teachers prohibiting them from bringing any evacuee guests to the Caucasian mess hall. Harkness was not willing to grant the quid pro quo which Peck desired. He felt that it was not his function to issue any such orders, nor would he if he could. If any orders were to be issued they would have to emanate from the Project Director and apply equally to all Caucasians, not just teachers. The planning board got interested in the problem of student lunches and Peck, unable to offer any substantial objection, was obliged to arrange for the lunches. 1/

Peck, though failing in this device, has been more successful in exercising the control he desired in another fashion. When a Caucasian, usually a teacher, brings an evacuee guest to the mess hall, Peck makes an attempt to embarrass the parties. Sometimes he will rise from his seat and stare at them angrily or walk slowly past the table glaring intently at the people concerned, in an obvious attempt to make the dinner as unpleasant as possible for all people concerned. He tries to make it obvious to the evacuee guests that they are not wanted there, that they are out of place and hence they will not venture to return again. At the same time he aims at humiliating the people bringing guests so that their embarrassment will be so keen that they will not repeat their offense.

Peck has largely won his battle, but at the same time he has won the intense dislike of many people. Only the most rabid "Jap-haters" associate with him.

Peck, with O'Brien, but with even greater acerbity than the latter, "railed against the 'sociologists' and teachers" and openly criticized their policy of leniency towards the evacuees. No one was more vituperative in the matter of evacuee stealing of government property, particularly of food from the storage warehouses, although he was somewhat embarrassed to learn that Caucasians were taking parts of their meals and extra pints of milk home under the critical scrutiny of evacuee workers in the Personnel Mess Hall. Dr. Jacoby was the chief target of Peck's vitriolic criticisms, and

1/ Billmgser, op. cit., p. 6-7.
Mr. Shirrell was only a slightly lesser target for his maudlin sentiments and feelings of humanity towards the evacuees which had ruined the project. A rather vivid picture of the basically tense relations which existed among some of those holding opposing views is offered in the following passage:

Peck has displayed at times a certain amount of wit, however crude. While drunk, which is frequently enough, he will sing a number of the songs which he has written and published. He considers himself to have some ability in writing plays. The creative instinct in him was aroused by the theft of a pig by an evacuee, and in honor of that event he outlined the plot and the Dramatis Personae of a play "The Mystery of the Purloined Porker". For several weeks he gave a resume of the plot and listed the characters for the benefit of anyone who would listen. One of the chief characters in the play was Dr. Jehovah—who was the counterpart of 'They-can-do-no-wrong' Jacoby. Another villain was Joe Blow (Joe Hayes). This characterization illustrates the persistent conception rooted in the minds of Peck, and others of his school of thought, as to what Jacoby's function and policy should be. Dr. Jacoby was to this way of thinking Chief of the Division of Internal Security, in other words, a police man and in virtue of that fact one who should act like a policeman. That is, a theft among the people in the colony should be treated like a theft in any normal community and punishment should be meted out correspondingly. Peck and O'Brien became obsessed with the notion that Jacoby believed the evacuees could do no wrong and that in consequence they were getting away with all sorts of heinous activities. The two men also became obsessed with the desire to see convictions established against offenders and strong sentences imposed. There was no disposition shown by either of them to understand what Jacoby was really doing, or what his purposes were and how he was seeking to achieve them. Peck and O'Brien, both of them extremely emotional, conceived a blind condemnation of Jacoby. The bitterness of these men towards Jacoby was reflected in the business relationships as well as personal relationships. In staff meetings the issue of crime and punishment came frequently to the fore. Coverley took a position more similar to that of Jacoby.1

A frequently changing group of Caucasian assistants completed the administrative personnel of the Mess Management Section, but they played but minor roles in the activities of the section during the period of this account.

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1/ Billigmeier, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
The Community Services Division: As originally organized this division included as sections under its authority both internal security and medical service, as well as the several other sections which were always under its supervision, but the former two sections were separated from Community Services and established as independent divisions and will therefore be treated separately in the present discussion.

In the Project Instruction the functions of the Community Services Division are broadly defined as:

To provide educational services; to promote a leisure-time program; to maintain social welfare services; to further the development of democratic institutions and the practice of democratic methods among the evacuees.1/

To offer a crude delineation of the functions of this division as contrasted to other departments of the administration, it might be said that its aim was primarily "socializing" whereas the purposes of the remaining divisions might be described as either "managerial" or "economic". In this sense, the Community Services Division performed a unique role in the community. Its functions required that the members of this Division look upon their relations with the evacuees as more social and human than in other divisions, and it is not surprising that the heaviest concentration of those interested in evacuee problems as human problems were in this division.

This philosophy of the Community Services Division was the natural outcome of the general W.R.A. policies which embraced not only the administrative and economic management of the centers to provide subsistence living for the evacuees, but which gave equal emphasis

1/ Project Instruction No. 29, op. cit., p. 9.
to the aim of providing "a setting in which normal activities of life can go on as nearly as possible like those of an ordinary American community."¹ But because the functions of this division were less clearly defined than in other divisions—the generality of its name attests to the ill-defined scope of its functions—, its program evolved more by experiment and assessing the needs of the evacuees than by the systematic pursuit of pre-defined regulations. The major functions of the division may be understood, however, from its sections which included: (a) community activities (recreation), (b) education, (c) social welfare, (d) nursery schools, and (e) civic organizations.

Chief of the division was Mr. Paul Fleming who was well-liked and respected among both the Caucasians and the evacuees, and retained a substantial reputation for sagacity and good judgement. He is quiet and reserved and these characteristics have led some people to conclude that he is cool and aloof, but those who know him less superficially are aware of his deep human understanding. Prior to accepting a position with the W.R.A. in June 1942, when he was appointed Chief of the Community Services Division, he served for many very progressive years as vice-principal of the Oakland Polytechnic High School and occasionally taught courses in education at the University of California. His background eminently fitted him for supervision of education at Tule Lake, but his broad social interests also served him well in the supervision of the other sections of his division.

In further description of his personality, Billigmeier states:

Paul Fleming is noted for his calm and steady disposition. Mr. Shirrell once remarked that he was convinced that the whole community could collapse and Mr. Fleming would still remain

cool and collected, puffing meditatively on his pipe planning the steps to be taken.1/

The nature of his work as an administrative chief of a division permitted only limited contacts with the evacuees during the working day. However, he was one of the few members of the appointed personnel who frequently attended meetings of the community council, one of the best single sources for gauging the trend of community sentiments, and under Mr. Shirrell he was frequently called for consultation when evacuee groups visited the Project Director to discuss particularly acute problems of the community. Thus, despite his quiet, unassuming manner which was deceiving of his capability, those who knew him well recognized in him a shrewd observer of the community.

While Project Director, Mr. Shirrell placed great value on the advice of certain members of his staff; first among them was Paul Fleming. In his farewell speech to the Caucasians on the Project, Mr. Shirrell expressed his gratitude to Mr. Fleming for his special contributions. He acknowledged the fact that he had leaned heavily upon Fleming's counsel during his regime at Tule Lake.

When Coverley became Project Director at Tule Lake, a new administrative policy was adopted. Fleming did not look upon the new policy with favor. Like other liberal members of the staff he regarded Coverley's administration as an attempt to convert the local W.R.A. machinery into an old line governmental agency. Like the others in this group, he felt that such a change in administrative policy could contribute little good, for the local administrative unit must be kept in close contact with the people in the community. Though he spoke of his disagreement with the new policy, Fleming is unalterably opposed to it. "I am one of those," he once said, "who do not feel we were in need of administrative reform."2/

During the registration, Mr. Fleming had little part in either planning or administering it since his division, in Mr. Coverley's administrative plan, had nothing to do with the question. When he

2/ Ibid., p. 2.
was asked to assist, Mr. Coverley requested that he preside in place of the Project Director at the hearings held for the evacuees who had been removed to the isolation center for refusing to register. "Fleming disliked this task immensely," according to Billigmeier. "It was from his wife that we learned how much."1/

Not long after, Mr. Fleming submitted his resignation to be effective June 15. According to his statement he was leaving the W.R.A. after one year's service as he had always intended to do. Others saw in his resignation a dissatisfaction with the changes in the project administration, and in the concept of the W.R.A. itself. The project administration had altered profoundly in that first year.2/

In many respects the success of an administrator was to be measured by the degree of absence of criticism directed against him from both his colleagues and the evacuees. By the nature of the limitations of the W.R.A. in giving adequate service to the evacuees, it was difficult to determine success in terms of achievement. If the absence of criticism was a criterion of success, Mr. Fleming was one of the most successful administrators at the Tule Lake Project.

The largest section within the Community Services Division was the Education Section which was responsible for the establishment of elementary and secondary schools, adult education classes, and vocational courses in preparation for relocation. At the head of this section was Mr. Kenneth Harkness whose functions were similar to those of a superintendent of city schools.

Mr. Harkness had been a school superintendent in South Dakota before accepting a position with the War Relocation Authority. He has had a rather varied educational experience having spent ten years as an educator in district religious schools in Mozambique, Africa, before returning to South Dakota schools. Mr. Harkness learned of the opportunity for him in

1/ Billigmeier, op. cit., p. 3.
2/ Ibid., p. 4.
the project schools at Pule Lake through his brother, Dr. James Harkness, an East-Baby doctor who is a friend of Mr. Shirrell.  

Except for the first months of the project when Mr. Fleming worked closely with Mr. Harkness in planning the project schools, the latter was allowed almost complete autonomy in the management of school affairs, although Mr. Fleming at all times worked closely with the school superintendent. The relations of these two men were always amiable and cooperative. Mr. Harkness gained a reputation for being an able administrator noted for his practical nature and his brisk pursuit of business. However, he was often abrupt with people, often offended others, and was highly opinionated. As one teacher stated, "Harkness loves to see people squirm. Don't cry in front of him, that gives him satisfaction." However, he was at times very considerate and people were, in general, lenient in their net appraisal of him.

Below Mr. Harkness in the order of rank were Mr. Floyd Wilder, Principal of the High School, Mr. Martin Gunderson, Principal of the Elementary School, and the respective Vice-Principals, Mr. Glenn Walker and Miss Mary Durkin. With the exception of Mr. Wilder, they composed an unusually capable group of school supervisors who, despite the handicaps of the project schools, accomplished much toward the establishment of reasonably decent schools. It is needless to enter into a detailed discussion of the administrative troubles of the schools at this point, but it may be said that the enormity of the problems and the ensuing confusion in the project schools are scarcely to be imagined in schools elsewhere. At the source of the difficulty


\[2/\] Ibid., p. 2.
strangely enough, was the intense desire of the school administrators and many of the teachers to maintain a high standard of instruction, a level high enough to be acceptable to the California Board of Education. The schools, however, were hampered by its newness—the bulk of work in teacher recruiting, laying out of programs, and so on, were done scarcely a month prior to the opening of the schools--; the governmental "red tape" in acquiring teachers, supplies, and procedural authority; and, in general, the lack of facilities and supplies with which to carry on even a minimum basis of instruction.

In the matter of supplies, for example, none of the school administrators were experienced in government procurement procedures and an almost chaotic situation existed for a time. In addition, the Tule Lake school administrators encountered what they considered serious "obstructionism" from the Regional Office, particularly from a Mr. Gibson of that office, who felt that Tule Lake was making unreasonable demands for supplies when the Regional Office had to accommodate all other projects as well. When the supplies arrived at Tule Lake, a certain amount of conflict developed between Mr. Wilder and Mr. Gunderson as each accused the other of pirating more than belonged to him.

Harkness came into conflict with the men under him when they could not follow or agree with his methods of ordering and distributing supplies. Harkness is not a diplomatic man and he offended some of his colleagues by his sharp rebukes. Gunderson and Walker, the vice-principal of the high school, were able to overlook most of these incidents but Wilder, the high school principal, took offense.

In the Fall of 1942, shortly after the opening of the schools, the high schools were closed at the request of the administration.
to permit the students to work in the fields to supplement the shortage of harvesters. The school authorities were reluctant to close the schools, but relented as no choice was open to them. In the resulting confusion, of poor work supervision, transportation breakdowns, and inadequate meals, for the school children, a series of conflicts appeared between the school administrators and the Farm Supervisor as well as the Transportation and Supply officers.

At this same time a conflict within the Education Section itself developed. During the harvest period, Mr. Wilder wanted to go to Idaho to get his wife and child and bring them back to Tule Lake. Mr. Harkness, however, was much opposed to his going, because he contended that Mr. Wilder was needed on the project more than ever in order to organize the work of the students on the farm. Wilder felt he had to leave then or not at all. Harkness had been regularly postponing Wilder's departure until the latter was unwilling to delay it further. He left for Idaho despite the opposition of Harkness though he didn't know whether he would still have a job waiting for him when he returned to Tule Lake. The rancor that this incident caused persisted and increased as time went on.1/

After the registration of February and March 1943, Wilder resigned from his position and for a time took charge of the personnel housing. Gunderson succeeded Wilder as principal of the high school, and Mary Durkin succeeded Gunderson as principal of the elementary schools. Harkness later resigned to take up colonial administration work in connection with the Navy program, and for a time there was talk of Wilder becoming either the superintendent of schools or even of replacing Mr. Fleming after his departure in June. "Mr. Cozzens of the regional office promised him a good position, 'We won't let you go, we want to keep you. Just wait until I get to Washington next week.' Wilder waited many weeks but nothing materialized from the abundant promises Cozzens made and Wilder finally left the project and the W.R.A."2/

1/ Ibid., p. 16-17
2/ Ibid., p. 17.
The source of the conflicts and recriminations among the school administrators rested, apart from difficulties of maintaining the schools under the generally inadequate and disturbed conditions of the project, largely in Mr. Wilder's own inadequacies and his sensitivity to criticism.

Mr. Wilder felt extremely bitter against both Mr. Harkness and Mr. Gunderson. He accused the latter of trying to undermine his position at Tule Lake, and of aspiring to his principalship. There was not basis for this accusation, certainly. Gunderson has always been very careful in word and action about criticizing anyone on the project staff. He always expressed the conviction that Wilder was an able school administrator who was well grounded both in educational theory and in practice. Many teachers, however, felt that Wilder was a very pleasant gentleman who was not very capable but had the wisdom to leave the affairs of the high school to the hands of Mr. Walker, Miss Jaderquist, and to his evacuee secretary, Rose Katagiri. Mr. Wilder, realizing this general criticism of him, tried to impress upon people the fact that he had always worked in close co-operation with Glen Walker and the work that the latter had accomplished was substantially his own contribution. Walker, the vice-principal, was an unusually capable young man of 27 upon whom a great share of the burden of school administration fell.

Wilder began to feel that almost everyone on the project was against him. Certainly the teachers on the high school staff preferred Gunderson as a principal, and this probably contributed to the bitterness Wilder felt against Gunderson. A great deal of personal unpleasantness occurred from Wilder's bitterness despite the fact that Gunderson, who was at loss to understand the resentment tried to minimize the friction which existed.1/

Because the thirty to forty teachers (it constantly varied) constituted a large proportion of the Caucasian personnel on the project, and unlike the administrative staff the teachers were largely women, their presence contributed to the social life of the appointed staff. The group varied widely in ability for a few unusually capable teachers and personalities were attracted to the pro-

ject by considerations other than salaries alone, but because of the general teacher shortage and the difficulties of inducing people to work and live in the limited circumstances at Tule Lake, the staff included a goodly proportion of colorless people as well. One of the few compensations of life at Tule Lake for the teachers was the almost total absence of community restrictions on the personal lives of the teachers as a consequence of which they were able to enter into the social life of the administrative area without inhibitions. At the same time, the administrative personnel were inclined to look upon the teachers as a group somewhat apart and lower than themselves in status, who were rather to be endured than accepted. Only a limited number of the more interesting personalities among them were drawn into the round of life characterizing the community of the personnel.

The Adult Education Section headed by Dr. Frances, while nominally under the direction of Mr. Harkness, largely functioned as an autonomous section within Community Services. Courses taught in the section included a wide variety of vocational training, liberal arts and science subjects, largely instructed by evacuee teachers. The type of courses offered, therefore, depended in a large degree upon the teachers available, and their systematization into a well-rounded curriculum was extremely difficult under the circumstance. Most of Dr. Frances' duties concerned supervision over her evacuee instructors, and her concern with the administrative affairs of other departments were limited. Among the few evacuees who knew her, she was sometimes referred to as "the dictator" and "the battle-axe" because of her cold, business-like efficiency and

\[1/\] Tulean Dispatch, August 3, 1942, p. 3.
occasional demands for a comparable efficiency from her staff, but she was also respected for her long experience and knowledge of the field of adult education.

The Nursery School program was under the supervision of Miss Marianne Robinson, a Vassar graduate whose mode of thought and outward mien bespoke her background at the college. Although quiet and somewhat difficult to approach, she was well liked by her staff of evacuee girl assistants and respected for her intelligence. Like all other educational functions on the project, this program too was limited by the lack of supplies and equipment as well as of trained teacher material.

In the original plan of administrative organization, the Social Welfare Section constituted a sub-section of the Internal Security Section which was also included within Community Services. Because of the disturbances to normal family life resulting from the evacuation and the extent to which the federal agency invaded the personal lives of people within the relocation center, the functions of this social welfare department were at once unique and extensive. Included among its functions were:

- Certification of need for public assistance and eligibility for clothing allowances; investigation of eligibility for transfers between projects; service to families in case of funerals; receipt and distribution of donated clothing to needy persons; investigation of requests of families to join interned relatives; operation of housekeeping services on a need basis, case work activities in all cases involving pre-delinquent minors; care and placement of orphans; prostitution; illegitimacy; family disputes and domestic problems; physically handicapped cases; psychiatric problems; and general services to families of mixed racial marriages.

The section was first headed by Mrs. Louise Halle who had practical social welfare experience in a highly organized department.

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1/ Project Instruction No. 29, p. 10.
in California prior to coming to Tule Lake, but who experienced considerable difficulty in organizing her own department under the conditions at the project. "Mrs. Halle couldn't operate without an elaborate set of rules and procedures. At the same time she lacked the ability to draw up such a set of rules and procedures for the department. Although she had worked in various social agencies she was unable to organize such a department and make it function efficiently." She desired more supervision from her immediate superior, Dr. Jacoby, but rebelled against the supervision that was offered. The lack of trained personnel among the evacuees not only upset her, but she found difficulty in working with those who were selected from among the number of applicants.

Halle had difficulty in establishing harmonious relations with the evacuees working in her department. For one thing she was conscious of race, and was more conscious of being "white" and a member of the governing elite than were Elberson, Jacoby, or Paul Fleming. Her workers felt that she had a condescending attitude towards them and was unsympathetic towards the people in the colony. Certainly she inspired little confidence on the part of the evacuees.

Facial tics, extreme nervousness and other idiosyncrasies, which became progressively worse as her administrative problems increased, caused members of the appointed staff to refer to her as "the shaky lady" and "off her trolley". When the Internal Security Section was separated from Community Services and formed into a division, Social Welfare was assigned to the former, but Mrs. Halle raised inane accusations against Dr. Jacoby, of poor management, and her section was returned to the Community Services Division to relieve the conflict. The change produced no improvement in Mrs. Halle's relations within the administration, but the difficulty

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1/ Billigmeier, "Community Services Division," p. 10.
2/ Ibid., p. 2.
3/ Ibid., p. 10.
The Administrative Plan

was solved when Mrs. Halle suffered a nervous breakdown, took a leave of absence and did not return. It was said that domestic difficulties with her husband from whom she was separated contributed to her state of personal disorganization.

In the absence of a Caucasian supervisor, Miss Naoko Hoshino, a certified Nisei social worker recently graduated from the University of California, took charge of the department. There were conflicting opinions from her evacuee assistants as to her competence in handling the work herself, some contending that she was too young and inexperienced for a supervisory and organizing function, while others felt that she was fully as capable as any Caucasian would be and that considerations of race shouldn't be permitted to prevent her assignment as section head. In November 1942, Corlies Carter, whose training was largely in anthropology, joined the Community Services Division to serve a general utility position under Fleming. While he was made nominal head of the Social Welfare Section, most of the supervisory function of the section was turned over to Dorothy Montgomery who arrived a few weeks after Carter. Carter restricted his contacts with the affairs of the department, but Montgomery had the task of winning over the evacuee workers after their unfortunate experience under Mrs. Halle and the belief of some that Miss Hoshino should have been retained as head of the section. This she successfully accomplished over a period of time.

Dorothy Montgomery works hard and spends many hours after work making calls or helping people who call at her apartment. In contrast to Mrs. Halle, she has a sincere interest in the welfare of the evacuees. Miss Montgomery is especially interested in preventative work and has frequently talked to teachers and students and to other groups on problems of young people and juvenile delinquency. She makes great efforts to get to know the evacuees and to secure their confidence.
She has learned various Japanese greetings to put Issei at ease and erase some of the barriers they may feel in talking with her. It is generally agreed among the Caucasians that she is doing a good job.1/

A fourth section within Community Services was Community Activities, another name for recreation. In the W.R.A. policy, this was one of the community functions which it was felt should largely be activated and maintained by the evacuees themselves, and it was proposed that even in the financing of recreational activities, the evacuees should contribute as much as possible from their own purses. The responsibility of the section head, therefore, was principally to stimulate and assist the community's recreational activities rather than to supervise it, which is clearly stated in the definition of the function of the section:

Responsible for assistance to the colonists in the establishment, maintenance, and coordination of all formal and informal associations in leisure-time pursuits in which the colonists participate.... It is the responsibility of the section to stimulate as large a participation as possible.2/

The first head of the section was Theodore Waller, a young man of about thirty who had had varied work experiences during and between his studies of public administration at the University of Chicago and the University of California, and had headed a large staff of NYA workers prior to his acceptance at Tule Lake. Although he was friendly and widely known among the evacuees, both the Caucasians and evacuees found many of his characteristics objectionable.

He clearly possessed many signs of personal disorganization. While he was active and energetic, in the extreme, much of his activity might be described as wasted motion and undisciplined energy. Frequently, he would throw himself headlong into a sentence and midway through would develop an agonizing scream of stuttering as words failed him. He was impetuous in the extreme making judgements verbally as fast as they came to mind and also making frequent errors because of the lack of clear forethought, but he was also he assumed airs of unconventionality, exhibited an unnatural extroversion as of one who had cultivated it, and expressed his sociability through

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1/ Ibid., p. 15.
2/ Project Instruction No. 23, p. 9.
a back-slapping, strong hand-shake technique. The administrative personnel regarded him as one of their more difficult members, but those who understood his problems, like Mrs. Shirrell, frequently 'stepped on him' in a good-natured way to keep him in line.

On the other hand, such traits as his enthusiasm and liking for 'grand plans' were a definite asset in the production of major recreational events such as the 4th of July and the Labor Day festivities, and the Popularity Contest. The magnitude of these programs (for a relocation center), the considerable work put into them, and the wide publicity given them probably had much to do with their success.

Although Waller was liked for his friendliness and sociability, he often irritated others by his frequent and uninhibited expression of ill-considered ideas, and his poor administrative habits. On one occasion, he almost precipitated a fight between J. D. Cook and himself when Waller attempted to direct the affairs of the Reports Division during Cook's absence. In the total assessment of his work as Head of the Community Activities Section, it seems that he was effective in stimulating interest in recreational activities, but he failed in providing administrative assistance, such as in procurement, which the department needed badly. Waller left in October 1942 when he was drafted.

For a time, Corlies Carter provided administrative supervision over Community Activities, but Harry Mayeda, who had served under Wilber as Assistant Supervisor, was appointed to Head the Section and thereby became the first evacuee to gain a supervisory position within the administration. Mayeda, who was regarded as the outstanding Nisei leader, was well accepted by the appointed personnel, and also enjoyed the respect of most of his evacuee staff. Although Mayeda exercised a great deal of immediate control, he

1/ Miramoto Report, "Recreational Organization" (preliminary report), p. 27.
often consulted Corlies Carter in the formation of policy, and in establishing contacts between the Community Activities Section and other divisions.

Carter's position in the Community Services Division was never clearly defined, but it emerged over time into a position of assistant to Mr. Fleming in the administration of the division. Although Carter was officially listed as Head of the Social Welfare Section, he was regarded by Mr. Fleming and others who knew of his work as Associate Chief of the Community Services Division. Mr. Fleming retained direct supervision over the education section because of his long-standing interest in that field, as well as the awkwardness of placing Mr. Carter over Mr. Harkness who ranks higher than the former both in age and civil service rating. Fleming also retained supervision of the civic organizations, but Carter worked closely with Mr. Fleming in all other functions of the division.

Paul Fleming has delegated his supervisory responsibility for the Social Welfare Section and the Community Activities Sections to Corlies Carter. Carter has also been given overall divisional responsibility for cost accounting, property control, and for the requisitioning of supplies and equipment. In addition he supervises the buildings and transportation which was, until his recent departure, under the immediate direction of Joe Fujii. Paul Fleming and Corlies Carter worked closely together in drawing up the budget for the Community Services Division.1/

Finally, there existed in the Community Services Section Division, the Civic Organization Section, which according to the outline of the division was:

Responsible for community government by the evacuees to further the development of democratic institutions and the practice of democratic methods, involving legislative, judicial, and executive functions in governing the colony within the limitations prescribed by the War Relocation Authority.2/

1/ Ibid., p. 6.
2/ Project Instruction No. 29., p. 10.
While the intent of the statement is that the Community Services Division should supervise the activities of the Community Council, in actual practice the Division interfered very little in the affairs of the Council. Mr. Fleming, as well as Don Elberson, Head of Civic Organizations, frequently sat in with the Council in an advisory capacity, but they served more as observers than as supervisors. Because Harry Mayeda was a section head within the division, and he was also President of the Council, certain amount of consultation on community government problems were carried on informally within the Division.

The Division, however, was administratively responsible in organizing, assisting and supervising the block managers who were not a political group but rather the evacuee extension of the administration. The function of the block managers, one of whom was appointed for each block, was to communicate administrative information to the block residents and serve as liaison between the administration and the evacuees in providing the household and personal needs of the latter. Don Elberson served from June to December 1942 as Head of Civic Organization, and achieved considerable success with his evacuee staff by following a policy of delegating maximum responsibility to the evacuees themselves and himself acting largely in a liaison capacity. Among the evacuees, Elberson was regarded as one of the very small group in the appointed personnel with "an understanding of the evacuees"; and at least under Shirrell, he was often called in to assist in dealing with the evacuees in conflicts between them and the administration. Elberson became Chief of Community Enterprises in December 1942, when the Co-op was formally established at Tule Lake, and his place in
the Civic Organization Section was taken by Bob Ota, an evacuee, and still later by Dan Sakahara.

The Health Division: While the health division is formally placed within the Community Services as a section, it has always been treated as a division since the line of authority and communication has generally been directly from the Project Director to the Chief Medical Officer. All medical, dental, hospital, and general services, were centralized in the base hospital, and it was the responsibility of the Chief Medical Officer to supervise and maintain these services for the physical welfare of the community. The hospital has at times been called a "Cooperative Clinic" and this is descriptive of its purpose within the project.

The first Chief Medical Officer was Dr. A. B. Carson, a man of about forty, who had been practicing in the Bay Area before his appointment to Tule Lake.

The first of the two Chief Medical Officers to serve at Tule Lake was Dr. A. B. Carson, a middle-aged man, married, with several high-school aged children. Billigeimer says, "He is a small man and is very sensitive about his size. He has the somewhat defiant attitude often affected by small males." Before accepting a position with the W.R.A., he had practiced successfully for some years in the East Bay Area.

Although nominally Dr. Carson was responsible to the Chief of his division, Mr. Fleming, the latter disclaimed any knowledge of hospital administration, and the practice was established of direct communication between Dr. Carson and Mr. Shirrell, and the Chief Medical Officer had full authority over the hospital. The main work relations of the latter, therefore, were with the evacuee prof-

\[1/\] Billigeimer Report, "Hospital and Hospital Staff", p. 6.
The administrative plan

Professional and semi-professional staff, and with the few Caucasian doctors and nurses who completed the staff. Probably less due to the lack of ability on the part of Dr. Carson than due to the general situation of evacuee physicians following evacuation, criticism of his administration was prominent throughout his stay. The major complaint of the evacuee physicians was that Dr. Carson's efforts at procurement of medical supplies were inadequate, and that as a physician he lacked sufficient knowledge of its specialized fields to appreciate the inadequacies of the hospital. The evidence shows the Dr. Carson did make repeated and urgent requests to meet the demands of his staff, but to a large extent he was hampered by the W.R.A. policies and procedures in regards to medical supplies. He left the project in December 1942 to receive a commission in the Navy as a medical officer, but with an attitude thoroughly antagonistic to the bulk of evacuees.

Dr. Carson's successor, Dr. Reece M. Pedicord, was an older man in medicine who had practiced many years in West Virginia, where he, with several other doctors, staffed and administered a hospital. Dr. Pedicord's administration generated far more antagonism and discontent than had Dr. Carson's, and during under the new Chief Medical Officer, the evacuee physicians came to speak with comparative favor of Dr. Carson. Dr. Pedicord, who was a blunt, outspoken old man of retiring age, immediately imposed a program of economy in procurement which the staff severely criticized. Furthermore, he instituted a practice of supervising very closely the activities of all the doctors which the latter strongly resented since they were convinced of Dr. Pedicord's incompetence as a medical practitioner. The form
of supervision included countermanding of orders issued by evacuee doctors, postponed operations, altered medical charts and general criticisms of the practices of his subordinates. Although the relations of Dr. Pedicord with the evacuee physicians gradually improved, the latter's antagonism toward him was never completely erased. In June, 1943, a petition requesting Dr. Pedicord's removal and replacement with Dr. Colliers, who had served briefly but with success at Tule Lake, was sent to the national office, but Coverly refused to take action on the petition. Subsequently, Dr. Pedicord left the project when he was attacked during the November 1943 riot at Tule Lake, by which time the antagonism of the evacuee population toward him had risen to a high pitch. The characteristic complaint against him was that he was prejudiced, used the term, "Jap", continually, was dictatorial, and did not have the welfare of the community at heart.

The Internal Security Division: The division was originally included as a section within the Community Services Division but, for the purpose of rationalization, Internal Security was established as a separate unit in July 1942 with Dr. Harold Jacoby as the division chief. The division was composed of the Fire Control, Warden (police), and Probation and Parole Sections.

The Fire Control Section under the supervision of Chief Ernest Rhoads was a highly efficient and self-sustaining unit headed by a man both conscientious and able in his duties, and Dr. Jacoby did nothing to interfere with the functions of the department, except to perform the routine administrative reports, since he admittedly knew nothing about fire control. Chief Rhoads had learned his trade
municipal
in a California city fire department and evidently had learned it well. He imparted his knowledge to a group of young men whom he selected, and no administrative officer was more proud of his evacuee workers than Chief Rhoads. During the early months of the project, he undertook a vigorous campaign to warn the people of the acute fire hazards of the center structure. On the whole, he was very well liked and respected by those who worked under him.

Dr. Jacoby had been selected to head the warden's organization by Mr. Shirrell because the latter felt that law enforcement at a relocation center would differ from police work on the outside, and he desired a sociologist rather than a policeman for the supervisor of the department. Dr. Jacoby received his Ph. D. in sociology from the University of Pennsylvania, and taught for a number of years as Professor of Sociology at Pacific College in Stockton. Both he and his wife were among the best liked members of the appointed staff with the evacuees, and was much respected among the liberal members of the appointed staff. On the other hand, a long-standing disagreement and even hostility existed between Jacoby and O'Brien, the project attorney, abetted by Peck, Cook, and a few others, who were extremely critical of Jacoby's failure to apply stricter discipline to law violators among the evacuees. Because of the frustrating experiences of the registration crisis, when the administration encountered what seemed to them a deliberately planned defiance of W.R.A. policy, a large portion of the blame for the failure of this program was placed upon the lax law enforcement policy that had existed under Mr. Shirrell and Dr. Jacoby. In defense of this policy, Dr. Jacoby contended that he was not averse to punishing those who
were law-breakers, that he made every effort to apprehend those who committed acts of misdemeanor; but he disagreed with O'Brien on the definition of crimes at the project, and on the severity of the punishment that should be meted out. Because of the severe criticism of his policy during the registration, Jacoby submitted his resignation on April 1, 1945 to become effective one month later. At the same time, Dillon Myer requested investigation of charges against Jacoby of his incompetence as internal security supervisor, and Coverley in his reply cleared Jacoby hinting that the fault lay rather in the general policy of leniency adopted by Shirrell. Following Jacoby's refusal to reconsider his resignation, Mr. Coverley strongly urged that Dr. Jacoby be considered for Chief of Community Services replacing Mr. Fleming who was resigning, but since this involved a two-grade promotion for Dr. Jacoby (disapproved in Civil Service regulations on promotions), the appointment was not approved.1/

'Dr. Jacoby's relations with his Caucasian staff was generally amicable. His only assistant until the registration crisis was Mr. Peter Kristovitch, a recent graduate in police work. The latter resigned in March 1945 when he was drafted for military service. Additions to the staff during the registration were Mr. Delbert Cole, Mr. Lewis, and Mr. Borbeck, all of whom respected Dr. Jacoby's integrity. Mr. Cole served as Acting Chief of Internal Security after Jacoby's departure.

Public Works Division: Its functions are defined as "To execute all engineering, construction and maintenance programs arising in connection with the operation of this project."2/ Every phase of construction and maintenance on the project, except those involv-

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1/ Letter, Jacoby to Coverley, April 1, 1945.
Letter, Coverley to Myer, April 15, 1945.
The Administrative Plan

The authority of the Public Works Division and required clearance from that division before they could be undertaken. Before the opening of the projects, the national office of the W.R.A. had established a policy of leaving much of the project construction, of schools, factory buildings, and auditoriums, for the evacuee construction workers on the theory that this would provide an occupational outlet for them during the initial months. The policy failed to take account of the inefficiency that would exist in the evacuee construction crews which were unwilling to extend themselves for the nominal wages they received, and Dillon Myer later admitted that the policy had been a mistake. At the Tule Lake Project a large-scale construction, as well as maintenance, program was undertaken including the building of schools, factories and additions to the hospital and administration buildings, and the magnitude of its tasks therefore was duplicated only in the agricultural division.

Mr. F. W. Slattery, the Chief of the Public Works Division, was one of the most criticized men on the project largely because the work of his division affected almost every phase of the project, but also because it was felt that he was inefficient in disposing requests for construction and maintenance work. The fact that the Public Works Division was called upon to serve almost every other division and section on the project is an important consideration. Initially, strong pressure was exerted upon the division to complete the inside walls of the barrack residences in preparation for the anticipated severity of winter weather. At the same time, the
farm project which developed very rapidly in the summer of 1942 demanded improvements on irrigation ditches and roads, building of a farm mess hall, use of surveying equipment for determining the contour and sizes of farm plots, and otherwise required construction and maintenance service from the Public Works Division. The Administrative Division demanded new office space and re-partitioning of old offices and barracks. The hospital required, by August 1942, an annex to its main structure to meet the un-anticipated requirements upon medical service. At the same time, the project providing temporary classroom space schools placed urgent requests for reconstruction of barracks to permit the opening of classes in early September. The pressure of demands from all directions was felt by all members of the staff, and eventually affected the evacuee workers who constantly threatened to abandon one occasion did rebel against the demands of their supervisors.

The chief complaint against Mr. Slattery was that he maintained a too inflexible organization to meet these emergency demands, and that he himself desired personally to supervise all aspects of his division's functions. The head of the farm technical staff complained:

We've asked Mr. Slattery time and again for the use of surveying instruments so that we can determine accurately the contours of the land and the sizes of the farm plots. This is absolutely necessary in farm planning. Mr. Slattery promised us that he would send out his surveyers to make the measurements we want, but even after several inquiries nothing was done about it. We then asked him whether we might not be permitted to use the instruments ourselves, but he refuses to release them to us. I know that he has several that aren't in use because I've seen them lying around the public works building.1/

A frequent complaint was that Mr. Slattery too solicitous of

1/ Miyamoto Notes, August 12, 1942.
his authority over every section and phase of his division and too uncompromising in his requirement that others abide by his opinions. Assistant shortly Project Director Hayes who had authority over Slattery wrote to the latter concerning one of these complaints.

Shortly before our meeting Mr. Laflin (Washington office) visited the Project, and upon completion of his inspection expressed himself as being critical of the delegation of authority that thus far has been given Mr. Miller. He expressed himself being of the opinion that you were not realizing the full benefit of Mr. Miller's services by reason that you were personally maintaining too close a supervision over this phase of our program. If this be true, then I presume there are reasons.

Replying to this letter, Mr. Slattery commented:

I believe there is considerable difference of opinion between what you understood from Mr. Laflin and what Mr. Laflin really intended. If, however, Mr. Laflin did express dissatisfaction I think it was quite unfair to do so without giving me an opportunity to present the facts and cases. For your information, I battled the problem alone all last summer (1942) as Mr. Miller did not report to the Project until the tenth of September. Time after time it was necessary to explain the various procedures and combat the apparently unlimited amount of more or less crack-pot suggestions continually being proposed.

There has not been a month since Mr. Miller's arrival on the Project he has not been, some time or other, absent from the area. (Lists Miller's absences: 13 days unofficial, 20 days official, in five months)

If I had not kept in close touch with all the aspects of this development, situations would have been worse than it appears at this time. I realize that it is difficult to entirely turn over all operations to another person, especially when one is so familiar with all of the details, not only do they pertain to actual work on the project but to the understandings and agreements with other agencies. I believe we all may have some faults regarding the things we are anxious to get done. In fact, if you will analyze your own tendencies you will probably realize that you frequently assign work to my section heads without advising me of this action. I have been very tolerant of this as I understood it was an effort to get the job done. However, you must admit it sometimes is embarrassing for me to find one of my crews on a job I did not know was being undertaken.

I think you will find at the present time Mr. Miller has all the responsibility that he can take care of and we will make him fully responsible for all operations.1/  

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1/ Memorandum, Hayes to Slattery, March 18, 1945. 2/ Memorandum, Hayes to Slattery, March 22, 1945.
Conflicts between the agricultural and the public works divisions, which were frequent and almost continuous involved urgent demands from the farm supervisor for various construction work on the farm, disagreement as to the specifications for the construction, and frequent disagreement as to the spheres of authority of the two divisions. In the following letter, Mr. Hayes represents Slattery's reprimand to Farm Supervisor Kallam to the latter's division chief, Mr. Zimmer.

The responsibility for the installation of irrigation and drainage facilities at the Farm rests with the Public Works Division. Of late it would appear that Mr. Kallam has overstepped his prerogatives as Farm Superintendent and interfered excessively in this activity. I can recognize and appreciate that he is only trying to help, but on the other hand, should the interference continue, I can only see trouble developing and possibly some embarrassment. I realize full well that there is a very close relationship between the two divisions with regard to this activity, that is, to get the most emergent ditches installed first, the Public Works Division is naturally going to have to rely pretty much on your judgment as to the most emergent ditches. However, as far as specifications and installations are concerned, this is not for the Agriculture Division to be concerned with, and this is the activity in which Mr. Kallam has been interfering of which I am critical. I do not condone the recent discussions with the Bureau (U.S. Bureau of Irrigation and Reclamation) regarding specifications because I have not the slightest doubt that it has left with the Bureau an impression that there is confusion at the Project. Not only is it likely to leave bad impressions with the Bureau but as well creates bad morale problems in the Public Works Division who anticipates this function to be their responsibility and not that of the Agriculture Division.

Hayes himself had his conflicts with Slattery. Mr. Slattery, as a professional engineer, often voiced the view that his department was too much interfered with by laymen who knew nothing about the functions of his office. On the other hand, as frequently happens in the relations of professionals and their laymen clients,

1/ Letter, Hayes to Zimmer, April 16, 1945.
the project administrators who went to the Public Works Division for construction work, often disapproved of the professional ideas on how the construction should be done. While Mr. Hayes was critical of Mr. Kellem's interference with the Public Works Division, the following letter suggests that Mr. Hayes himself was guilty of similar interference, though perhaps with better reason. Correspondence addressed to Mr. Slattery discussing the partitioning of the Administration Buildings, Hayes wrote:

At the outset of our discussions I recollect having brought to your attention and to Mr. Donovan's (superintendent of constructions) as well that I did not approve the type of partitions that had previously been designed, i.e., that the construction was too elaborate and too strong and that afterwards the appearance was left that we were building a building within a building. In all it was my feeling, and I have not since changed, that as a result of this construction, there was a waste of man-hours and materials. To avoid recurrence I suggested that in the design to be prepared nothing stronger than a 2 x 2 be used except possibly for door jambs and that sheetrocks be placed on one side only. I further suggested that you use sheet glass in lieu of six light window sashes. At that time I was to some degree assured that in the design to be drawn up partitions would be constructed as I had outlined.

Following our discussions I was presented with a floor plan (not in any sense a detailed drawing) for approval. This covered the second and third wings of the group. This was substantially correct, and inasmuch as there had been considerable delay in the preparation thereof, I initialed and approved it without other than cursory examination. The approval was given, you may recall, in the hallway or corridor between wings 2 and 3 where you asked me to approve the plan.

Last Friday, April 9, and after three months, Mr. Donovan presented me with detailed plans, which much to my surprise were not as I had outlined to you. As a matter of fact, upon examination there was found to be an error of some 18 inches in the floor plan. This, in itself, was not so hard to understand as the fact that the type of construction I had recommended and authorized had not in any sense of the word been followed, and as a matter of fact the proposed drawing followed very closely the pattern of original partition installations with the exception of glass. Following this I called at your office with Mr. Donovan and expressed my disappointment over the plan that had been drawn and requested at that time that the con-
struction be altered following my original instructions. This was agreed with one exception—that 2 x 4's be left as shown—and rather reluctantly I agreed. On Saturday, however, and upon seeing what the construction would be with the use of 2 x 4's, I ordered that a little work that had been installed at that time be taken down and that 2 x 2's be substituted. The construction that is going on now is exactly as I wanted and, I might add, has met with the approval of all divisions that will receive benefit from the installation.

In all, it is my feeling that entirely too much emphasis was given in the drawing of details that were not required. I don't believe anything more than a sketch would have been required in this case. It would seem that the work of your draftsmen was not checked, a detail which I think should be given very close inspection if for no other reason than to insure efficient use of materials.\(^1\)

Whatever the reason, there was constant complaint that the Public Works Division could not be trusted to start work on any project without a long period of stalling.

The Agriculture and Industry Division: The Division was responsible for the planting, growing and harvesting of crops on its 2,600 acre farm; for the breeding, raising and slaughtering of hogs; and for the raising of poultry for eggs and meat production. There also was a marketing section responsible for the storage, packing, shipping, distribution and sale of all farm products. Although the initial plans for the Tule Lake Project included a fairly extensive industrial program, except for the furniture factory, there was virtually no development in this direction.

The first Chief of the Division was Mr. Eric E. Eastman, and his chief assistants in agriculture were Mr. Clifford Kallam and Mr. George A. Hudson. Because Mr. Kallam was the first of this group to arrive at the Tule Lake Project, and, as a matter of fact, the land started much of the work towards preparing and planting crops, before Mr. Eastman's arrival on the project, the latter was some-

\(^{1}\) Letter, Hayes to Slattery, April 16, 1943.
what reluctant to impose his authority until he had acquainted himself with the farm and with Mr. Kallam. As Division Chief, it was Eastman's function to plan the farm program and organize its various technical aspects with the assistance of his section heads, Mr. Kallam and Mr. Hudson, and it was the duty of the latter to give direct supervision to the farm and the marketing procedure in coordination of the plans. Mr. Kallam who considered himself a practical farmer and had the practical man's scorn of theory, however, preferred to superintend the farm project by a rule-of-the-thumb method. He would not willingly cooperate with the accounting and technical staff in giving records of farm operations, ignored lines of authority and sometimes made major decisions without informing Mr. Eastman, and frequently went directly over the latter's head to Mr. Hayes and to Mr. Shirrell. Eastman, who was a rather quiet and unaggressive man, never gained full authority over Kallam or received full cooperation from the latter, and a certain amount of unarticulated hostility existed between them.

The relations between Mr. Kallam and Mr. Hudson, Head of the Marketing Section, were openly antagonistic and there were frequent instances of conflict between the two men as they accused each other of delinquency of duty or of encroaching upon areas not within the other's authority. A farm worker describing their relations says, "Hudson and Kallam are like dog and cat. They appear to be in bad terms again. Kallam watches Hudson's every move about the office; no words are exchanged."\footnote{Hisatomi Notes, Nov. 17, 1943.}
sonnel, the evacuee farm crew was one of the most demoralized work units on the project which, in part, they blamed upon Kallam's poor supervision of the farm, and the productivity of the farm was much below the hopes and demands of the Regional Office.

In the last week of November, 1942, Mr. Eastman suddenly quit his position, having been forced to resign. It was known that a heated argument had occurred between Mr. Eastman and Mr. Shirrell, and it was rumored that office politics in which Mr. Hayes and Mr. Kallam had a part were instrumental in bringing about the resignation. In fact, it was said that Mr. Kallam had been offered the position of Division Chief, which seems somewhat questionable.1/

No verified accounts were ever released of the reason for discharging Mr. Eastman, but the probable reasons deduced from scraps of information and gossip were:

Mr. Eastman had been held responsible for:
1. Severe losses of the farm enterprise at Tule Lake.
2. The failure to get written agreements in the hay deal of the Liskey Brothers, and for the leasing of the Taylor warehouse. Such contracts based only on verbal agreements were declared illegal and a federal offense.
3. Statements to the evacuee farm workers that the WRA had not lived up to its promises to the workers. 2/

It was also said that Mr. Eastman had been discharged to make room for Mr. Zimmer of the Regional Office since this office was being closed about this time.

Mr. C. E. Zimmer arrived on the project very shortly after to assumed control of the Agriculture and Industry Divisionx. He gave authority to his position which had been lacking under Mr. Eastman. An evacuee worker on the Technical Staff observed, "Mr. Kallam and Hayes are afraid to protest to any proposition put up by Zimmer.

1/ Hisatomi Notes, December 1, 1942.
2/ Hisatomi Notes, Dec. 5, 1942.
Kallam acts very timid towards all actions of Zimmer. Mr. Zimmer is aware of what went on in the past. This was somewhat in contrast to the behavior under Mr. Eastman. Under Mr. Zimmer, the agricultural division showed an improvement of administrative relations.

The Community Enterprises Division: The function of the division was to organize and maintain the business enterprises of the community. Since W.R.A. policy permitted no private businesses on the project, the alternatives were either that the W.R.A. operate all businesses under a centralized authority or that the people operate the community stores as cooperative enterprises. The W.R.A. chose in favor of the cooperatives, but until the Co-op could be established at the promotion of the people, the stores were established and maintained under trusteeship by the Chief of the Community Enterprises Division of the W.R.A. The only enterprises opened on the project were general merchandise stores which distributed household and personal commodities necessary for the normal life of the people.

Mr. Kendall Smith was the first Chief of the Division, and remained in this office until he was superseded following the establishment of the Co-op in December 1942. Among both the evacuees and the appointed personnel, it was agreed that Mr. Smith was a very shrewd and clever business man, but by the same token he tended to incur the suspicion of the people, that he was seeking gains for himself not to the benefit of the community. His thinking and his action, which were suffused with the sharp rationality of a cold-blooded, competitive business man, frequently gave the evacuees the impression that he measured all values in terms of monetary

\[1/\] Hisatomi Notes, Jan. 9, 1943.
profit and loss and that he would not permit human considerations to interfere with the realization of those values. While the evacuees were never able to rid themselves completely of this suspicion, there was very little in the sum of his activities to indicate that Smith made use of his office for personal gains.

At the same time, Don Elberson, Head of Civic Organizations, whose main objective on the project was to organize the Consumer Cooperative, was carrying on a program of education in the Co-op program and of its organization. Elberson, whose economic philosophy differed fundamentally from that of the individualistic Smith, was always distrustful of the latter's professed desire to see the people take over control of the stores. Smith, on his part, gave evidence of suspecting that Elberson, intentionally or unintentionally, was promoting a popular distrust of Smith's administration of the stores. Relations between the two men were generally cordial, but an element of personal rivalry and of disagreement over the fundamental tenets of their economic philosophy were frequently evidenced in the period of reorganization leading to the transfer of the stores from Mr. Smith's trusteeship to the consumer cooperative.

If Mr. Smith was one of the most distrusted members of the appointed personnel in the eyes of the evacuees, Mr. Elberson was one of the best liked. Elberson belonged to the liberal wing of the administrative staff, sympathized with the plight of the evacuees, carried the conviction that responsibility and authority should be delegated as much as possible to the evacuees, and had wider contacts among the evacuee population possibly more than any other members of
the appointed personnel. His position as promoter of a Co-op program that would lead to evacuee control of the much-criticized community enterprises gave him an initial advantage in gaining the confidence of the people. Equally important, his approach of giving full recognition to evacuee leadership and of allowing time for discussion among the evacuees of the desirability of the Co-op program struck a responsive chord in the evacuees.

The **Employment and Housing Division**: All employment and housing on the project were controlled within this division. Chief of the division was Mr. Frank C. Smith who was regarded by both the evacuees and the appointed personnel as a likeable, easy-going personality capable of carrying out the routine functions of his division but somewhat limited in ingenuity and leadership. His relations with the evacuees were generally characterized by hearty greetings and friendly smiles designed to put the other at his ease, but the evacuees were inclined to regard him as "all right" but somewhat superficial.

Head of the Placement Section which served as the employment office of the community was Mr. Frank Fagen, a bachelor in his middle age, a big man physically who likewise was considered "all right" but "with not much on the ball." There were frequent complaints that the procedures and records of his office were inefficiently maintained, a criticism that arose whenever there were complaints about the number of work hours accredited a worker.

The **Housing Section**, under Mr. Friedman, carried out all transactions with respect to the assignment and transfer of housing. Both he and his wife, who headed for a time the office services section, were somewhat set apart because of their Jewish parentage and their
personal shortcomings which came under criticism were often attributed to their Jewish background.

The Occupational Coding and Records Section maintained the personal records of all evacuee residents which had been acquired through the taking of a series of census and of the compilation of data from the housing and placement sections. As a record office, it had relatively limited relations to the activities of the project except insofar as it provided basic personal data at the request of any administrative department which requested such information.

The division was completed with the establishment of the Leaves Section in November 1942 when the W.R.A. definitely launched upon its policy of relocation for all evacuees. Mr. Loren E. Huycke, who had met with but limited success in previous administrative positions at the Tule Lake Assembly Center and the Minidoka Relocation Center, headed the section and came under repeated criticism from the evacuees as he was accused of obstructionism in the processing of leaves papers and of inefficiency in delivering to the Washington office the applications for leave which were made. There were several instances of complaint that applications for leave clearance were found not to have been sent several weeks after the papers had been submitted. Liberal members of the administrative staff also accused Mr. and Mrs. Huycke of bigotry in their attitude towards the evacuees.

**Project Reports Division:** Project Reports was not considered strictly speaking a division, but rather an office. However, the Reports Officer was directly responsible to the Project Director. The office served a varied function which included: public relations...
in the communities adjacent to the project; supervision and editorial direction over the project newspaper particularly in the communication of W.R.A. bulletins to the community; the preparation of reports on project activities acting for the project director; and compilation of historical and documentary material relating to the project.1/

The first project paper called Information Bulletin was published under the direction of Motton Gaba who very shortly left for the Gila River Project. Supervision of the project newspaper, by then called the Tulean Dispatch, was then given to Foster Goss who was transferred in July 1942 to Manzanar. His successor, John Douglas Cook, remained to supervise the Reports Office throughout the remainder of the year. Mr. Cook had long experience as a newspaperman, ten years of which were spent in Europe, as a drama, music and art critic in Paris, and as a political correspondent to the League of Nations and in France. For a time he worked in Hollywood as a script writer for radio programs and for motion pictures, and then accepted an associate editorship of a small magazine in San Francisco. He enjoyed magazine work greatly; but when this publication suspended operations, he accepted work as a civilian employee of the transportation division at Fort Mason in San Francisco. He found the work unattractive, and readily accepted the position at Tule Lake when the offer was made.

For a newspaperman of long experience, Mr. Cook showed rather limited ability both as a writer and analyst, but as Billigmeier remarks, "J. D. Cook has performed these functions without any notable success and yet not with any outstanding failure."2/ Both

1/ Project Instruction No. 29, p. 4.

2/ Billigmeier, Reports and Information Division, p. 3.
Mr. Shirrell and Mr. Coverley had no great confidence in Mr. Cook, and Mr. Cook on his part expressed dissatisfaction of his relations with both directors. He joined with O'Brien and Peck in their criticisms of the policy of leniency as practiced by Shirrell and Jacoby, but he also complained of Mr. Coverley's unwillingness to divulge information to him. Mr. Cook sought the friendship of a few evacuees whom he liked, but he was vacillating in his attitudes toward them as he was in most matters.

Most of Mr. Cook's problems were the results of a personal maladjustment. Despite his aspirations as a writer, he lacked the facility in writing as well as imaginative conception for success in his field, and one suspects that his background as a newspaperman was actually not as imposing as he reported it to be. His secretary, for instance, complained of his dictating and revising the same letter five times, an unusual behavior in a professional writer. He was extremely sensitive to slights from others, had prejudices underlying his cosmopolitan magnanimity, and was over-anxious for success at his position. He frequently expressed loneliness for his wife from whom he was separated.

The Office of the Project Attorney: The Project Attorney was responsible for giving legal advice to the project director and his staff, the various committees and institutions on the project, and any evacuees requesting such advice or service. He was also responsible for the work of the evacuee attorneys assigned to his office.

First of the Project Attorneys was Robert Throckmorton who was given responsibility for legal work in both the Tule Lake and Manzanar Projects.

Robert Throckmorton remained at Tule Lake as a part-time Project Attorney until January, 1945, when he received a defi-
nite full time appointment as the attorney for the Manzanar Project. He is a mild mannered and unobtrusive young man, whose personality and activities here form a great contrast to that of Anthony O'Brien who succeeded him. The routine work of the division was done by the evacuee lawyers, Tom Yego and the other members of the staff. Because he was gone so much of the time, Throckmorton could only supervise their activity periodically, in the meantime they were left pretty much on their own responsibility. In general, the relations between the staff and Throckmorton were good. Had he tried to impose very close supervision there might have been some difficulty with Henry Takeda and Walter Tsukamoto, both of whom have more legal experience than Bob Throckmorton and a superabundance of self assurance. Throckmorton who is only twenty-seven years old is only slightly younger than Takeda but over a decade the junior of Tsukamoto.

Dr. Jacoby, Don Elberson, Mr. Fleming, et al., regarded Throckmorton as a 'middle of the road' sort of fellow. He is not as liberal in his thinking as some of them are nor yet is he especially conservative. The same applied to his opinions of the affairs of the project. These things became evident in the occasional evenings these individuals spent with the Throckmortons. They feel that Throckmorton deserves a great deal of respect. That conviction has grown boundlessly since the experience of these men with Anthony O'Brien. As Jacoby expressed it, "Bob Throckmorton is the sort of person who gathers facts before he makes a decision and used the facts to guide him. O'Brien makes a decision based wholly on emotion and then seeks evidence to substantiate him." 1

Anthony O'Brien who succeeded Throckmorton in January 1943 was a lawyer from Madison, Wisconsin, near forty years of age.

According to his testimony he has been a teacher, a principal, traveling musician as well as lawyer. He spent a year as high school principal in a small Michigan town where the Ku Klux Klan had a strong influence. At the same time his brother was superintendent of the town's school system. The O'Brien brothers, being devout Irish Catholics, had a hard time enduring the anti-Catholic feeling in the community. But despite the antagonism they faced the two O'Briens finished the school year, according to the tale. Anthony O'Brien also spent several years with a vaudeville show as a musician. 1

O'Brien had worked in at least four different projects, and prior to his duties at Tule Lake had been at the Minidoka Project where he had developed a strong admiration for the Project Director, Mr. Stafford. Stafford, O'Brien claimed, had taken a strong grip

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1/ Billigmeier, "Office of the Project Attorney", p. 49.
2/ Ibid., p. 6.
on the community and asserted his dominance from the first day, of
made no promises except to give minimum subsistence requirements,
and thus maintained the most successful of the ten W.R.A. centers.
Although O'Brien was not acquainted with Shirrell, having arrived
at Tule Lake after Shirrell's departure, he contended that Shirrell's
policy of lax discipline had spoiled the Tule Lake Project. Speak-
ing of the registration difficulties at Tule Lake, O'Brien remarked,
"We lost the registration when we lost the first strike at Tule Lake,"
and "the project administration has never run Tule Lake."
O'Brien's position with regard to the evacuees was a somewhat ambiguous one.

According to O'Brien in every project the Community Ser-
vice and Community Enterprises Division are dominated by "people
who think the evacuees can do no wrong." They are over indul-
gent and do the evacuees far more harm than good. At Tule Lake
there are the teachers and the "sociologists", i.e., Elberson,
Jacob, et al. Oddly enough, O'Brien has on several occasions
classified himself as a "sociologist" though not an indulgent
one. By that he means that he is not a "Jap hater" as are
some people on the staff, but is interested in the welfare of
the Japanese. He is sincere when he makes such an assertion, but it is hard to square it with his conduct on the project
end with the statements he makes in the presence of others.
Yet Jacoby, who is certainly eminently just, and Carter will
grant that O'Brien is, in a peculiar fashion, interested
in the welfare of the evacuees. O'Brien is especially fond
of Carter who loses no opportunity to take issue with him on
any point and defends Jacoby's policies without reservation.
He has also expressed his admiration of Fleming. The point is
that O'Brien is highly emotional and unstable in his attitude.

O'Brien resigned from the Project and the W.R.A. on May 29, 1943
when he was advised by his doctor that the high altitude of Tule
Lake and his incessant drinking under the strain of his work were
decidedly harmful to him. Kent Silverthorne became the Project At-
torney, and according to Billigmeier, "The 'sociologists' were con-
siderably relieved by O'Brien's departure." They look upon Kent Sil-

silverthorne as a welcome change to his predecessor."