In coming to Tule Lake, the Caucasians on the administrative staff faced the necessity of living and working among Japanese-Americans. These staff members with their various backgrounds and skills differed in their response to the situation. It was not long before significant differences in attitude toward the evacuees were evident among the Caucasian staff members. Some were more successful than others in establishing satisfactory relations with the evacuees with whom they came into contact. A number of them took interest in the problems of the evacuees while others concerned themselves solely with their immediate job.

In analyzing the differences in their reactions, the Caucasians may be roughly divided into three categories. These three groups are characterized by important differences in their concepts of the W.R.A. and in their relations with the evacuee population.

First there is a group of staff members who have been termed the "sociologists" or more negatively "them damned sociologists". The terms probably came into use from the fact that Dr. Jacoby, one of the members of the group, is a former professor of sociology. This group includes those individuals who have given good evidence of their interest in the welfare of the Japanese-Americans, Issei and Nisei, and have developed a wide circle of friends and acquaintances among them.
There are at Tule Lake a number of Caucasians on the administrative staff whom Corlies Carter calls "operators"; they are neither 'for' nor 'against'. This second group is composed of individuals who are not much concerned with the problems of the evacuee community nor with the future of the Japanese-Americans in this country. As individuals, their main interest at Tule Lake lies in their work.

In the third category are included those Caucasians who have expressed freely deep prejudices against the evacuees or have displayed animosity towards them. There is, of course, a wide variation in the intensity of feeling against the colonists on the part of the members of this group. There are some individuals who might best be described by the current term "Jap-hater" and there are others far less intense in their antipathy.

The groups were in evidence from the beginning days of the project, although at first the lines were not clear. Individuals were drawn together who had certain interests in common, similar attitudes towards the people in the colony and a similar concept of the purpose of the War Relocation Authority.

It is logical that there should be differences in attitude towards the evacuees among the members of the appointed personnel. Caucasians who would, by virtue of their positions, come into contact with a large number of evacuees were usually chosen
with the importance of attitude in mind. It was obviously more important that the chief of the Community Services Division, or the co-op man, or the head of recreation have an ability to get along with evacuees than it was for some one in the Administrative Division who came into contact with only a few colonists. It is certain that special care was exercised in some cases, while in others there was a regrettable absence of such care.

During the first months the groups were rather loosely defined. It was during the months of August, September and October that the various differences of attitude became further developed and more evident. These differences became more important too. During these months the project went through a series of crises which contributed to the crystallization of attitudes among the Caucasians.

The members of the first group described, that is, the liberal administrators, have found that the social values of an individual are of far greater importance in a relocation center than in a normal community. The social values upon which the members of the staff base their relationships are of great import not only in relations with evacuees but in relations with other members of the Caucasian staff. The ideas on social problems are important in the formation of groups and individual friendships among the staff members.

On the outside, an individual can maintain a friendship with another whose ideas on racial problems and social questions...
are quite different. They have found it not so easy to be tolerant of differences in ideas and attitudes at Tule Lake. Members of the appointed personnel such as Corlies Carter, Don Elberson, and others, feel a deep interest in the affairs of the evacuees; they are deeply involved intellectually and emotionally. At the same time they must live and work in unusually close contact with people who differ sharply in their ideas. They have occasion to witness the consequences of others' negative attitudes. The fact that many Caucasians have not been successful in establishing satisfactory relations with the evacuees certainly reflects to the detriment of all Caucasians on the staff.

Mr. Houner’s inability to work with the evacuees in the furniture factory, the difficulties of Pilcher over mess management, Hayes’ perennial bungling of the coal issue, Huycke’s muddling of the leave process have made the work of Elberson in behalf of the co-operative more difficult and have made Dr. Jacoby’s work in Internal Security harder. The success or failure of some individuals to establish harmonious working relationships with the evacuees, has a direct influence upon the work of all the other staff members.
It is probably true that a majority of the colonists think of the army, F.B.I., Military Intelligence, the W.R.A., W.C.C.A., and the government in general as identical. A majority of the colonists likewise undoubtedly make little distinction among individual kedo on the administrative staff. Each failure of the W.R.A. or its appointed personnel to prevent issues from arising between the agency in charge of the camp and the colonists reflect to the detriment of each member of the staff.

The so-called sociologists dislike the attitudes of certain individuals because they can anticipate the damage such attitudes will do not only to their own relationships with the colonists, but more than that they can also foresee the hurt and distress that a lack of consideration can cause the evacuees. Some Caucasians can see no need for consideration, nor found any necessity for a sympathetic response to their problems of the colonists.

There are a number of Caucasians on the staff who have found a stimulus in the realization that they are members of the dominant racial group. It is true that a semi-caste situation is intimated in the conditions of the relocation center—the forced confinement of the evacuees, differential in living conditions, wages, administrative control by Caucasians, etc. A large number of Caucasians have come to accept that situation as good and reasonable, giving substance to their feelings of superiority. This brings to mind the words of David Locke,
"All men, without distinction uv sex, are fond of flatrin theirselves that somebody's lower down in the scale uv humanity than they is. Ef 'twan't for niggers, what wood Dimokrasy do for sumbody to look down upon?"

On the other hand there are a number of the administrators and a large proportion of the teachers who have tried to keep themselves free from the least trace of such feelings despite the implications of caste in the relocation center situation. These people do not accept ideas of racial psychology, or racial inequalities, or the superiority of one race over another. They wished to establish relations with evacuees without the element of race entering the picture. They did not want it to be a barrier in their relations with the people in the community.

The War Relocation Authority asked members of the appointed personnel in relocation centers to watch the terms they used in referring to the evacuees and to the center.

The words that we use in correspondence, in reports, and in conversation with the evacuees exercise a great deal of influence in determining the attitude of the evacuees and of the American public toward the activities of the War Relocation Authority. It is, therefore, distinctly worthwhile for employees of the authority to make an effort to avoid using certain terms that are misleading and inappropriate.

It is inaccurate to refer to the persons who have been evacuated from the West Coast as "Japanese." The Japanese are the people who live in Japan. The persons who have been evacuated from the West Coast are people of Japanese ancestry, but they are not "Japanese" in all cases. With a few exceptions, they have come to the United States because they want to live here, and two-thirds of them are citizens of the United States.
It is even more objectionable, of course, to refer to the evacuees as "Japs". They do not like the word; nor would you if you were an American of Japanese ancestry. "Japs" means the subjects of the Japanese Emperor, living in Japan.

The term "camp", when used to refer to a relocation center, is likewise objectionable. It leads people to confuse the relocation centers administered by the War Relocation Authority with detention camps and internment camps administered by other agencies.

The evacuees are not "internees". They have not been "interned." Internees are people who have individually been suspected of being dangerous to the internal security of the United States, who have been given a hearing on charges to that effect, and have then been ordered confined in an internment camp administered by the army.

There are a large number of Caucasians who have shown little disposition to observe the niceties of language or to take into consideration the sensitivity of many evacuees to the matter of race. It is necessary for them, however, to conform somewhat to W.R.A. regulations on terminology and attitude at least in public utterances. In actual practice a considerable number of people refer to the evacuees, especially among Caucasians, as the "Japs". Often the reference is even more offensive. For example, Mr. Bergman, a plumber from Tulelake employed on the project, has the habit of calling the evacuees "monkeys", not only in reference to evacuees when in the presence of Caucasians but even in addressing the evacuees themselves. He has absolutely no regard for their feelings.

1. Memorandum to All Staff Members from Elmer Shirrell, October 2, 1942, which consisted of a memorandum issued by D.S. Myer to Regional Directors and Project Directors.
Fortunately he doesn't come into contact with many colonists, but there are some like him who do. Mr. Hoover, Assistant Project Steward, is more careful of his terms.

Under the stress of circumstance the terminology often deteriorates farther and becomes even harsher. During the registration crisis, for example, references were frequently made to the evacuees or groups of them as "those yellow sons-of-bitches...", "those goddamned yellow bastards...", and "those slant-eyed..." and other similar terms.

The importance of the use of certain terms lies in the fact that it betrays certain attitudes towards the evacuees. Some individuals who are concerned with the evacuees as human beings who are at present faced with hard adjustments are careful to give them no further hurt by careless words. Others have shown little concern for their feelings. They do not understand or are indifferent to the need for consideration or sympathetic understanding of the problems faced by the people in the community.

Feelings of racial superiority have been clearly evident in the use of terminology by the Caucasians. But more important are the manifestations of racial consciousness in the working relationships between the Caucasians and evacuees.

It can be definitely asserted that fewer of the Caucasians in the third group of administrators have been able to establish satisfactory relations with the evacuees working with them. Sometimes the failure to work harmoniously with colonists was important enough to have community wide repercussions. Mr.
Keener failed in the furniture factory. The failure was so complete that as long as he remained in charge of that factory, the evacuee workers refused to go back to work. He was not willing to respect them, human beings and treat them accordingly. When Clarence Benz was placed in charge of the furniture factory the workers immediately returned to their jobs and worked harmoniously with Benz, who was willing to grant them the respect they wanted.¹ He exercised his authority with special care for he felt that the evacuation had made many evacuees hyper-sensitive to authority. He was willing to make special efforts to establish harmonious relations with the workers in his unit.

Hoover and Peck in the mess management section are notorious in their bad relationships with the evacuees. So was Pilcher before he was dismissed. Both Caucasian medical officers, Dr. Carson and Dr. Pedicord, have been unable to establish harmonious relations with the professional staff members in the hospital. In May, petitions to oust Dr. Pedicord were started in several blocks, before evacuee doctors asked that they be withdrawn. Lorne Huycke, head of the Leave Section, has made an outstanding failure in handling people when it was highly important that he be successful.

Others in this group have been able to establish satisfactory relations with the few with whom they come into close contact. Although Mrs. Charlotte Stephens has strong prejudices against the evacuees she has been able to work well with the girls in the Mail and File Section who work with her. In no case however have they been as successful as the members of the liberal group.

¹ See Section on Labor Relations
There are fundamental differences among the Caucasians in their basic conceptions of the W.R.A. The liberal members are determined to keep the relocation center community as much like outside communities as possible. They are interested in preserving as much democracy in the center as they possibly can. They are mindful of the fact that a great majority of the evacuees are native-born Americans. In this fact they see important implications for the administration of the community. The liberal staff members and many of the teachers are deeply concerned with making the W.R.A. an instrument which will contribute much to the present and future welfare of the evacuee population. In general, their conception of the W.R.A. is in harmony with the pronouncements of national policy by Dillon S. Myer.

There are many other Caucasians at Tule Lake, a majority of them, whose conceptions of the W.R.A. is fundamentally different. Many look upon the relocation center as an internment camp where people dangerous to our national safety must be herded and presided over with a strong hand. One concept is basically democratic, the other authoritarian. To the latter group of administrators the evacuee problem has little relation to American democracy.

At Tule Lake one frequently hears the conviction expressed that the government and the W.R.A. in particular are showing too much concern over the welfare of the evacuees. The administration
is allegedly too conciliatory, stronger controls should be imposed upon the people confined here. A strong hand should be applied to the administration of the community. This refrain is heard time and again, especially during community crises.

Instead of being content with what is provided them, the colonists try to bargain with the administration or they beg or steal or cajole the administrators into giving them what they want. The difficulties over the unloading of coal, the mess trouble, the conflicts at the farm are all allegedly due to the laxity of the Shirrell administration. Mr. Shirrell was too soft—he entertained too many delegations from the community and listened to too many community leaders. The Evacuees became convinced that they could force the government to reverse its position whenever they saw fit to exert the needed pressure. This O'Brien and others have regarded as the basic difficulty underlying the registration crisis. "We lost the registration when we lost the first strike." O'Brien asserts, "The W.R.A. has never run this camp."

Among these Caucasians there is no fear that the use of force will reduce the relocation center to an internment camp or worse. If the evacuees aren't duly grateful for what the government has done for them, if they aren't obedient to the rules and policies of the W.R.A., the only solution is to apply force to the extent required to secure compliance. When the civil agency fails the army should step in.
One of the persons who most frequently decries the ingratitude of the evacuees is Ralph Peck. "These people don't appreciate what you do for them, they're spoiled. They're always belly-aching for something." In specific reply to this assertion Don Elberson expressed a fundamentally different position.

In American we shouldn't expect gratitude from people when they are given things they consider their just possession. That is a characteristic of the American people, that they expect certain things in life they consider necessary human requirements. Some people expect the sort of gratitude a serf would feel when the feudal lord bestowed some good upon him."

It would be to misrepresent the "sociologists" to intimate that they were in favor of giving the evacuees all that any group demanded. They were fully aware that many evacuees had a desire to get as much from the W.R.A., the kento, as possible by conflag or conflict. Whereas a great many Caucasians saw in the demands and the strikes a need for greater control and a wider exercise of force, a minority of administrators showed a desire to see behind the surface of the situation. They wanted to treat causes rather than effects. Rather than exercise greater force they wished to encourage in every way the growth of community government and the development of responsible leadership. They sought to administer the community with the evacuees not against them.
There is an important difference in frame of mind and in mental equipment among the Caucasians at Tule Lake. These differences have proved of immense importance in determining individual reactions to life and work at the center. Some persons on the administrative and educational staffs have given evidence of a willingness to make an attempt at understanding the evacuee community. Not all of them were successful. Don Elberson has made the assertion that an initial good will towards the colonists was not enough. It soon wore away unless it was implemented and bulwarked by a willingness and an ability to look beyond the superficial. Don Elberson found that it requires some degree of understanding of social processes to preserve the goodwill that one began with.

Ralph Peck was one of the people who failed in this regard. When he first arrived at Tule Lake, he frequently expressed, with an apparent sincerity, his affection for the evacuees and his deep interest in them as a down-trodden people. With time and as his contacts with the people in the colony widened his protestations of affection and interest grew feebler and feebler until they ceased altogether. "The more I see of these people," he has stated, "the more I dislike them." In working with them he has found the evacuees ungrateful, uncooperative, and difficult to manage; their behavior differed from the behavior of people in normal communities and he could not fully understand why this should be. When he couldn't understand he became bewildered and then resentful and a dislike of the evacuees developed.
The experience of Dr. Carson at Tule Lake was similar. "I came up here without any prejudices against these people," he explained, "but I cannot say that I am leaving without them. I've never seen such pettiness and bickering in my life. We've tried so hard and have met with so little response. There are a few people here who I think a great deal of, but most of them aren't worth a thing. I wouldn't mind being in a position where I could kill a few of their kind." Dr. Carson left the project for the armed services.

Those who lost their goodwill, or never possessed any, only had their prejudices re-enforced at Tule Lake. When evacuees didn't accept job offers on the outside, Lorne Huycke, the Leave Officer, could find no adequate explanation except the general perversity of the evacuee people. His prejudices against the colonists deepened. The same thing is true of Clara Bogorod who works with Huycke, and it is likewise true of many others in the Caucasian staff.

The problems involved in administering such a community are manifold and complex. One can deny that. A barrier of language, race, and circumstance lay between a great portion of the evacuees and those who administer the affairs of the community. Some administrators sought to perform their functions better by gaining a deep understanding of the people.
in the community and their problems as possible. Certainly they are better administrators because of these efforts. In viewing the work of Dorothy Montgomery in social welfare the fruits of those efforts are in evidence. No one could possibly deny that Fleming, Jacoby, Elberson and Carter have an especially good understanding of the evacuee community. This fact has enabled them to occasionally forecast with substantial accuracy public reactions to W.R.A. policies. Today it is enabling them to do much to make the segregation process at Tule Lake far less serious. The new Project Director, Ray Best is showing a readiness to avail himself of their experience.

It is true that the "Christians", as they are sometimes called, have much to learn about the community. That they are willing to grant freely, the important thing is that they are interested in acquiring some degree of understanding.

Individually and as a group, the liberal staff members are cognizant of the fact that a great proportion of the Japanese-Americans, both aliens and citizens, have a deep bitterness arising out of the evacuation and the preceding years of discrimination. How deep that bitterness is was manifest during the registration crisis.
Basic in every community issue at Tule Lake is the evacuation. The evacuation issue permeates every major problem arising in the community. In the issue over the theatre, the broadcast affair, and certainly in the registration crisis the question was ultimately asked, Why were we evacuated, why were we put here?" As soon as an issue becomes community wide, all the seething discontent related to the evacuation and subsequent confinement is soon reflected in that issue and it becomes tremendously magnified. The evacuation has left a deep scar that must be understood and reckoned with in the administration of the community. Some people realize that fact, others do not.

The bitterness of the colonists has been clearly reflected in the relations of the evacuees to the project administration. Often added to this is the fact that the W.R.A. has itself/given cause for a negative attitude on the part of the colonists, both because of its policies and the people who administer them. Promises were made by various administrators who were not able to live up to their promises. The Assistant Project Director has a long record of lamentable lack of honesty and common sense. Many administrators have carried out their functions with little efficiency. A long list could be compiled.

The liberal administrators do not expect the loyal cooperation of the community as a whole. Perhaps they did at first, but not now. They are cognizant of the wide anti-administration, anti-W.R.A. feeling. They have sought to
dispell it not by force but by acting with personal integrity and sincerity, to give every evidence of good faith. They have advocated the development of effective methods of propaganda to explain and with care W.R.A. policies and programs to both citizens and aliens. They have sought to prevent the development of serious issues because of the failure to anticipate community reactions. Dr. Jacoby, Don Elberson, Paul Fleming, and Corlies Carter have been especially interested in providing means for the growth of responsible leadership in the community.

To some administrators the anti-administration feeling on the part of individual evacuees is conclusive evidence that the individuals are anti-America and therefore pro-Japan. When Haruo Tajima openly and severely criticized the inefficiency of the farm administration and Joe Hayes, the latter gentleman wanted to put him on the list of those whose allegiance was subject to doubt. This was prevented by another staff member.

Many evacuees have become disillusioned with American democracy; they are filled with bitterness. But rather than condemn people for this loss of faith and regarding that loss as evidence of anti-American tendencies, the "sociologists" have sought to combat bitterness and disillusionment. This they have done so that these things will not ruin the relocation center or prevent or impede the individual's re-entry into American life.
Certainly Mr. Gunderson, Mrs. Jaderquist, and various others connected with the schools have exerted substantial efforts in this direction.

It has been the notion of a number of Caucasians that the "sociologists", Jacoby in particular, feel that the evacuees can do not wrong. In their minds this attitude characterizes the liberal administrator. They see in their willingness to understand, to take circumstances into consideration merely a desire to excuse—a desire often born of unwarranted pity and weakness.

One thing needs to be clearly stated. The liberal group are not so deeply involved intellectually and emotionally in the problems at Tule Lake that they have lost their objectivity. They have been concerned with some of the reactions of the evacuees. But the criticisms they make are based more upon reasoned judgment rather than a blanket dislike and distrust for the evacuees.

As a group they are very much concerned with the lack of good leadership among the Nisei. They opposed the efforts of Walter Tsukamoto and his J.A.C.L. clique to establish themselves in a position of political dominance. Elberson has been disturbed by the lack of initiative of the Nisei, their unwillingness to see challenge in relocation. He is likewise much concerned over a widespread desire to conform to the most conservative elements in American communities in order to gain acceptance. All of the members of the group are distressed over the widespread lack of interest among the Nisei
in social problems that concern them. They are individually far more aware than the others of problems and conflicts in the community.

Among the so-called sociologists, there is evident an ability to treat evacuees as individuals. Especially during times of crises many members of the staff regard the evacuees as a single group or think of them either as Nisei, Kibei, or Issei, as though the groups were highly homogeneous.

During the crisis over registration there were Caucasians who condemned the evacuee population in toto. An even larger number distrusted all evacuees. Frank Smith and John D. Cook agreed that "You can't trust any of the evacuees." Smith went on to explain that he never talked about anything important in front of his evacuee assistant because he could not longer feel safe to do so.

Even more frequent is the practice of thinking of Kibei and Issei as distinct, easily defined, and homogeneous groups. During the crisis over the registration program, the Kibei were generally regarded as those chiefly responsible for the difficulties. At that time one frequently heard blanket condemnation levelled against all Kibei. The Project administration concentrated on apprehending Kibei who refused to register. In the hearings held for those who wouldn't comply with instructions to register the Project Attorney, Anthony Ó Brien, referred to the toughest characters as following a "typical Kibei pattern." The younger and less defiant defendants were referred to as following a "typical Nisei pattern." That meant that he recommended lighter sentences for them.
A majority of the Caucasian administrators have expressed strong feelings against those whose loyalty to the United States is not firmly established. There have been some strong expressions of feeling towards those whose loyalty is undecided and towards those who give evidence of loyalty to Japan. When there were long lines of evacuees seeking applications for repatriation during the registration crisis, O'Brien expressed his impulse to take a machine gun and "whittle down the lines." Dr. Pedicord suggested that the applicants be taken out in the middle of the ocean and drowning them. Peter Kristovich of the Internal Security Division thought of a bomb.

Among many Caucasians there is the distinct tendency to regard evacuees as good in proportion to their assimilation. A "good" evacuee is one who has shown himself wholly assimilated. If an evacuee "can't stand the Japs" that is often accepted as an indication that the individual is a very good evacuee. There are a number of stories, some of them true, about young colonists who have had difficulty in adjusting to the evacuees about them.
Social relations among the Caucasians on the administrative staff are closely related to the factors responsible for the formation of groups. Social relations among the administrators and their families are largely within the group. Inter-group friendships are the exception.

Among the members of the first group, social life is highly developed. Ties of friendship are strong. The Jacobys, Elber-sons, Carters, Flemings, Dorothy Montgomer, Marianne Robinson, along with a number of the teachers form a close group. Less closely associated are the Harknesses, Gundersons, and Mrs. Jaderquist.

New staff members whose ideas are akin to their own are quickly accepted into the group. Members look forward to new additions to their group. They value new members for social reasons, but even more important, the new comers are welcomed because they will add strength to their attitudes towards the evacuees and the W.R.A. They are conscious of a certain balance of power in the administrative staff. They are a minority which is conscious of the need to constantly fight to have its concepts prevail. Each new recruit for the group is regarded as an aid in the internal struggle against the reactionaries in the staff.

When Corlies Carter came to Tule Lake, the work were immediately accepted. When Dr. H.E. Bass arrived, he quickly joined the group. In late May, when Dr. Marvin Cpler, the new social analyst arrived, the members of the group hoped that he would lend his strength to their position. When Mr. Shirrell left the
project, and Harvey Coverley succeeded him, the latter was watched to see whose counsel he would accept.

There is an unusual degree of internal unity in the group. The members are in close accord as far as ideas and attitudes are concerned; there is a close agreement among them upon fundamental issues. There is also a deep mutual respect for each other as administrators. They work harmoniously together, Fleming, Carter, Jacoby and Elberson.

The members of this group have the largest amount of social contact with the evacuees. Members of the other two groups have almost none. Friendships are almost wholly with highly assimilated evacuees. It is one of the most interesting features of the relations between the evacuees and these Caucasians that the evacuees are often far more critical of the colonists in general, especially the Issei, than the members of the Caucasian group.

During the registration crisis, Ralph Peck asserted that ninety per cent of the evacuees at Tule Lake were rotten or tainted with pro-Japan sentiment. One of the evacuee young people closely associated with the Caucasians agreed with the proportions that Peck had given, "For once Peck is right." None of the Caucasians in this group would have accepted such a percentage. Dr. Baba was disgusted with the evacuees in general after the crisis. He felt that the evacuees had acted like "animals". Soon afterwards he left for Illinois with the hope of practicing in a wholly Caucasian community. Chester Ogi and his wife were glad to leave the center and to again
live in a Caucasian community.

Despite the fact that sometimes the statements of a few of these Nisei would seem to indicate that their attitudes towards the evacuees more resembled those of the first group than those of the liberal administrators, they would not think of associating with the former group. Between some of the evacuees and the liberal administrators firm deep friendships have developed. Chester Ogi wants to be able to work in behalf of the co-operative movement under Don Elberson some day. Father Dai and Harry Mayeda would like to work under Corlies Carter in the field of resettlement. There are numerous other personal friendships which have developed.

Elberson and Carter speak with many of the Nisei honestly and openly about W.R.A. policies and about the men who administer them. They will defend those policies when they think the policies are the right ones, and they will freely admit the errors of the agency. They likewise criticize other Caucasians on the staff when they are convinced that criticism is due. They have shown a readiness to discuss questions freely and honestly with the evacuees they know. In return the evacuees have spoken to them about things in the colony with equal frankness and through this they have gained at least some insight into the community that they would not have gained otherwise.

The evacuee leaders of the planning board and members of its research staff gave a dinner in May in honor of some members of the Caucasian administrative staff. They took this
means to thank the Caucasian guests for their efforts in behalf of the welfare of the evacuee community. Present were Martin Gunderson, Dr. Jacoby, Paul Fleming, Corlies Carter, Don Elberson, and the writer.

"The operators" have little social contact with the evacuees. Joe Belloy the Sr. Administrative Assistant, C. J. Benz, the Assoc. Manufacturing Superintendent, the Carlos Busselles of the Richard Tracys rarely have occasion to meet the evacuees socially. As a whole the solidarity of the first group is quite lack among these people, their social relations are less highly developed.

Most Caucasians on the administrative staff have had very little social contact with the evacuees, even with the Nisei who are most assimilated. Among them there is little evident disposition to fraternize. As a number of them have remarked, "I see them all day, why should I invite them over in the evening?" Many of the Caucasians want as little to do with the evacuees as possible, they regard the fraternization of other members of the staff negatively. When one of the Caucasian teachers was frequently seen in the company of a young evacuee man, Frank Fagan, Mortimer Cooke, and Jim Davis were prepared to make an issue of the matter. The issue was avoided when the left the project for another reason. Some members of the staff have protested strongly against evacuee guests at the personnel mess hall.
The third group is numerically larger than the first group and lacks its unity and cohesiveness. Some of the Caucasians live outside the project. One of the members of this group, Stanley Glick, a driver in the Transportation Division, lives in Klamath Falls. Another, Peter Bergman, a plumber, lives in Tulelake.

The social life of one clique has revolved largely around a nearby bar, Sieglers. Among those in this clique the following could be included. Ralph Peck, the Project Steward, Anthony O'Brien, the Project Attorney, James Davis, Supt. of Equipment Maintenance, and Seemah Battat, Clara Bogorad, Margaret Lucas, Charlotte Stephens, clerks. Another clique is composed of Harry Kirkman, Sr. Storekeeper, George Lueck, assoc. Fire Protection Officer, and Leslie Thaler, Procurement Officer.

Mortimer Cocks, Chief of the Transportation and Supply Division, and Frank Fagan, Employment Officer, spend most of their spare time in each other's company, although that delights neither of them, they just happen to be roommates.

When the Caucasians first came to Tule Lake in the beginning days of the project, there was a general enthusiasm among them. Many of the Caucasians felt the same sort of enthusiasm pioneers feel when they set out to build a new community and embark upon a new social experiment. There was a great deal of challenge to the staff members in the new community. The work
which lay before them was monumental in its proportions. Some
of the personnel found appeal in the opportunities present to
be of service, to aid a group of people who needed help. Diff-
culties, inconveniences and hardships were shared by all the
personnel along with plans and hopes.

Mr. Shirrell, Paul Fleming, Don Elberson, Harold Jacoby and
others have not infrequently remarked that those people who
weren't at Tule Lake during the first weeks and months cannot
understand the full meaning of the experience. Mr. Fleming, to
illustrate the Zeitgeist of the period, cites the incident sur-
rounding the issuing of the first project newspaper. One day
Mr. Shirrell made the statement that it would be nice to have
some sort of a community journal. That same day a group of staff
members gathered together and the next day the first issue of
the paper was mimeographed.

The early enthusiasm gradually diminished as time went on.
The colonists were not generally receptive to plans for a co-
operating community. There had been an evacuation and with it
came bitterness which deepened with time. Problems faced the
administration which were more varied and more complex than any
one could have anticipated. The Caucasian personnel changed.
Some Caucasians left and others arrived. The staff grew larger
and spread into one addition and then another.

The administration of the community became increasingly
routine, especially after the arrival of Harvey Coverley. Em-
phasis changed. The policy of resettlement dealt a telling
blow to remaining ambitions for a model community. Emphasis
changed from production to resettlement, from a "good" commun-
ity to an empty one. Many of those who had been most interested in the beginning lost most of their initial enthusiasm as events occurred and conditions changed.