The attached report was hurriedly written following a two day visit to Manzanar and the Death Valley CCC camp. It is based, therefore, on hasty observations and an incomplete understanding of the background factors. Furthermore, except for certain phases of the activities of December 6, it is completely undocumented. The report is thus more of an impression than anything else. It is subject to addition and drastic revision. The analysis of causal factors is tenuous, but one that I think will be corroborated as the additional reports become available.

The Manzanar incident provides an instructive comparison with the Gila and Poston affairs. With a few variations to suit the local scenes, the pattern in each of the three camps is clearly similar.
Part I. - Pre-Evacuation

If one thing can be said with complete certainty in regard to the beating of Fred Tayama on December 5 at Manzanar and of the tragic events following that beating, it is that the roots of the affair lie in the days before evacuation and, indeed, before Pearl Harbor itself.

Mr. Fred Tayama, a well-to-do Los Angeles businessman, if the chief protagonist of the Manzanar affair. It was his being beaten that set off the unrest at Manzanar. It was the summary disposal of one of the people suspected of participating in the beating that caused the first mass meetings and the first threats of the riot. It was an attempt to free this suspected assailant of Mr. Tayama that the killing of two Japanese by the military occurred. Mr. Tayama's pre-evacuation activities are important for an understanding of this sequence of events.

Tayama for many years was a restaurant owner in Los Angeles. Though this business prospered, he left the restaurant business in 1940 and opened the Pacific Service Bureau. The latter organization served as a means by which the Japanese, and especially the non-literate Issei, could be given advice in regard to real estate and legal matters and insurance. Tayama himself was not a lawyer but he employed attorneys and his Service Bureau was exceedingly prosperous. He had one of the finest Japanese homes in the Los Angeles area. At the same time he was rather thoroughly disliked because of what people thought were
excessive charges for his services. Tayama served, just before evacuation, as the President of the Southern Branch of the Japanese-American Citizens League.

Two specific charges are laid against Tayama as a basis for the intense dislike of him that developed prior to the evacuation. In the first place, Tayama is accused of charging really exorbitant rates for aiding Japanese aliens in filling out legal forms that were required of them after the war began. When evacuation became imminent, Tayama is said to have charged from $25 to $35 per person for filling out identification and Federal Reserve Bank (or Farm Security Administration) forms.

It is said, further, that Tayama capitalized on his presidency of the J.A.C.L. in fattening his purse through advice on evacuation. Thus, one universally believed story is that Tayama instructed the secretary of his J.A.C.L. chapter to direct people who came to J.A.C.L. office to the office of the Pacific Service Bureau, which was several floors above in the same building. The incongruity of the J.A.C.L. making all sorts of offers to aid the Japanese in their troubles was very apparent to the sensitive Japanese community. Tayama became hated not only by the Issei whom he "milked" but also by many more liberal Nisei who completely disapproved of his actions. How completely they disapproved is demonstrated by the fact that the Nisei United Citizens Federation, which was formed rather late, is supposed to have charged 35 cents per person for the same service Tayama charged $35.

Tayama is supposed to have raised approximately $2000
for the specific purpose of aiding the Terminal Island Japanese after their sudden evacuation. This aid to the Terminal Islanders was supposed to be purely philanthropic. Tayama was doing the work in his capacity as J.A.C.L. President and he used the J.A.C.L's name for the raising of funds. According to every report that I have received, Tayama has never satisfactorily accounted for the $2000 he raised. Indeed, he is accused of lying about its disposition. Thus, he claimed that he spent a portion of the money having the Terminal people brought to Los Angeles. Later it developed that some Los Angeles produce man hauled the Terminal group to Los Angeles in the former's own trucks and at their own expense. Tayama supposedly refused to make any accounting for the money. The reaction of all the Japanese, regardless of their age, their loyalties or their position in the community, is one of resentment of this attitude of Tayama.

It should be noted that this observer has made no attempt to check on the accuracy or the truthfulness of the stories noted above. Tanaka is getting Tayama's own story of his actions during the pre-evacuation period. Regardless of the truth of the stories, however, there can be no doubt that (1) they are widely believed; (2) they are the basis for a profound mistrust and hatred for Tayama on the part of the entire Japanese community.

In addition to the specific charges against Tayama his activities with the J.A.C.L. added nothing to his popularity. To most of the Issei and by many Nisei the J.A.C.L's pre-evacuation policy of "we will be glad to evacuate if it will help the
country," was a mistake of the first order. Such a simple attitude, it is felt, was both foolish and, as the relocation experiences have demonstrated, pernicious, as far as the position of the Japanese in the American community is concerned. Every discomfort of Manzanar could be traced back to the J.A.C.L.'s acceptance of evacuation. As the President of the Southern California Branch of the J.A.C.L., Tayama bore the community's displeasure on this score. Fred Tayama's actions at Manzanar by no means mitigated the widespread hatred that was felt for him. Indeed, if anything, he fell into even greater displeasure. At Manzanar his most unpopular antics were those concerned with his demonstration of his Americanism. As one observer put it, "Tayama was not content to be a 100% American: he was a 350% American." Specifically, Tayama was very loose in his talk about disloyal Americans, openly informing the Administration about manifestations of disloyalty on the part of particular individuals at Manzanar. Tayama is said to have worked off his personal prejudices by accusing those he disliked of being pro-Japanese. He is also said to have informed on the basis of completely inadequate evidence. Tayama did his informing with some secrecy but the Japanese grapevine kept the community informed of his activity. Despite his knowledge of the grapevine at work, Tayama continued to inform without discrimination and indeed became even less reticent to let the community know what he was doing. (Others in community did same things, especially ToYe Blocans — who openly boasted of his informing.) Tayama's unpopularity reached its climax when, through political manoeuvring, he was chosen to represent Manzanar at the National J.A.C.L. convention at Salt Lake City November 17-25.
Whatever the truth of the charges against Tayama, there is no doubt that no more unrepresentative person could be chosen to present the views of Manzanar at the convention. The entire camp was wrathful at the choice and Tayama's actions at Salt Lake City did nothing to decrease this wrath. For he is said to have repeated the same loose charges in regard to un-American activities at Manzanar, specifically naming individuals and making specific suggestions to WRA officials on how to rid the camp of its troubles. When he returned to Manzanar at the end of November, Fred Tayama was a marked man.

The Manzanar situation.

No hatred directed at a particular individual could have itself have precipitated the riot and the shooting at Manzanar on November 6. Conditions at Manzanar, in common with those at Gila, Tule Lake and Poston, were conducive to general unrest and dissatisfaction in the community. No attempt can be made here to describe these factors in any detail. They are simply listed below:

1. **General dissatisfaction with concentration camp living.** Inadequate housing and mess hall diets are of course fundamental. To these at Manzanar must be added the severe dust storms and, more recently, the severe cold. Each of the evacuees' apartments has a small oil stove. (In marked contrast incidentally to the apartments of the Administration) The heating units are remarkably efficient, but the difficulty is that oil is strictly rationed to the Japanese. As a consequence of this rationing it is doubtful if some of the Japanese get warm during
the time they spend out of bed. Indeed, many of them spend much of their time in bed as the only way of keeping warm. It is hard to over-estimate the wrath that must be aroused within a father who sees his children remain in bed until late in the afternoon "just to keep warm."

The Activity of the General Malecontents. There can be no doubt from the evidence at hand that a group of older men have consciously worked to embarrass the Administration and to make Manzanar life as unpleasant as possible. As early as the first part of August, Tanaka recorded in his Historical Document on Manzanar a sharp disagreement about the advisability of any self-government at Manzanar. Those who argued against self-government took the position that the Japanese were virtually prisoners of war and that there was no point in trying to govern themselves under concentration camp conditions. On August 6, Tanaka and Masaoka commented that this group could "destroy all hope of success for the WRA program within the centers themselves."

This report of Masaoka and Tanaka is attached as annex I to this report as evidence of a vocal anti-American sentiment at Manzanar as early as August 6, 1942. A document from Masaoka and Tanaka later in August commenting on the Nisei-Issei clash is also attached.

The activities of the pro-Japanese was not limited to mere words. What was apparently the first gang action at Manzanar, directed specifically against the Administration, occurred on November 11 when Tom Imai, a member of the Manzanar internal police, was soundly beaten and kicked by a group of unidentified assailants. This attack apparently resulted from the fact that Imai had
been instrumental in stopping the flow of contraband liquor that was being brought into the camp by returning beet field workers. On almost the same day, a group of young people threw rocks through the windows of one of the police women (Yo Tabuchi) in the camp who was also supposed to participate in the search for contraband goods.

Several organized groups are supposed to have exerted leadership among the anti-administration pro-Japanese forces. These groups carry a bewildering assortment of names but, from the evidence on hand, the following seem most important:

a. The Blood Brothers (Yuho Kesshidan).—This is a secret group whose only activity as a group has been the posting of threats on messhall bulletin boards against members not only of the Caucasian administration, but also against Japanese who were over-friendly to that administration. (Tayama's name incidentally appeared on everyone of the Blood Brothers' lists). In addition to direct threats, the Blood Brothers posted notices opposing self-government and in addition addressed specific letters to Japanese co-operating with the Administration, arguing the futility of their cooperation and threatening "punishment from heaven" if they continued to cooperate. Speculating without evidence, it seems reasonable to assume that men with the temerity to undertake such activities would also be the men who would provoke direct action against the Administration, when the occasion presented itself. In other words, it is suggested here that the members of the Blood Brothers corps are very probably the people who led the agitation on December 6.

b. The Terminal Island Gang, also known as the Yogores, or
the San Pedro bunch. It is this group that is supposed to have beaten up Imai on November 11. It is claimed that there are as many as 500 young men in their early twenties, led by 20 habitual trouble-makers, in this gang. They are characterized according to Masoaka and Tanaka by: "their previous occupation has been either that of fishermen or cannery worker; their deep resentment against the government and anyone in authority, as a result of the manner in which they were evacuated; their outspoken bitterness against what they describe as "unjust imprisonment of my old man by the F.B.I." (Almost all Terminal Island older men—the fathers of these youths—were taken into custody) their crude manners, uncouth dress and speech, the latter being a mixture of Japanese and English to a greater extent than is usual among the Nisei." This Terminal Island gang has had a record at Manzanar of gang violence in sports, at dances and in their relations with other residents of the project. Obviously, the Terminal Island group is inspired in many of its activities by older people.

c. The Dunbar Gang or the Zoot-suits. Like the Terminal Islanders, the Zoot-suiters are primarily a young bunch of rowdies with no respect for the law and especially no respect for concentration camp law. Like the Terminal Islanders, also, this group is important to the current investigation because it apparently has been influenced in its actions by older, politically minded anti-administration leaders.

d. There are other anti-administration groups supposed to be active including one known as the "Purple Dragons" and another
as the "Black Caps."

The Masoaka-Tanaka document No. 52 of November 11 discusses these groups, though without great detail. Both Tanaka and Chester have been asked to do complete descriptions of the membership and activities of the various gangs.

2. The Absence of Nisei leadership.

More than in any other camp, the Nisei have remained in the background at Manzanar. The lack of leadership among the Nisei was remarked upon by every person to whom I talked. The greatest factor in the lack of Nisei leadership since August at least (when the greatest troubles have come) is accounted for in my opinion by the fact that a great number of the young men of Manzanar left for the harvest fields.
Even after returning from the fields, these potential Nisei leaders did not accept responsibility within the camp. In some cases there was a simple refusal to participate because of the personal danger involved. In some cases, the fact that older men now controlled block groups made it impossible for the returning workers to gain leadership positions. In some cases, finally, the nisei based their refusal to take leadership on the fact that they wanted to leave the camp immediately, either permanently or for further short term employment. Whatever the causes, at Manzanar, more than at any other camp, the issei controlled the Japanese community and the liaison positions between the Japanese and the administration. (I have asked Chester to write this up in detail.)

Altogether aside from the general group hatred of Tayama, these three factors made for general unrest in the camp, which was by no means mitigated by the frequent changes of project directors, following the departure of Mr. Nash. As early as August, a slow-down in work was noticed by the Caucasian staff in the camouflage factory as well as in the various intra-camp projects. Furthermore, the ascendancy of issei leadership was clearly marked at the end of the summer by the wholesale resignation of foremanship jobs and the refusal of many competent people to accept positions of responsibility. This stood in marked contrast to the early days of camp life, when foremanship jobs were widely sought for their prestige value. With the growth of disillusionment over relocation camp conditions,
and the rise of the issei to dominant positions within the Japanese community, a prestige job became a marked liability rather than an asset. It subjected its holder, to threats of violence, or to violence itself.

It is undoubtedly true that part of this situation was created by genuine pro-Japanese, anti-American issei elements. (Tanaka will develop this point in his report.) At the same time, a part of it was caused by simple non-political anti-administration feeling that grew stronger as time went on. This anti-administration sentiment was demonstrated in many ways and was based in large part on a long series of promises that were never kept. These promises included 1) the grant of greater freedom for evacuees in the hinterland of the camp; 2) better heating facilities; 3) the improvement of food, and 4) the amelioration of housing hardships. How high this sentiment is can be seen by the fact that a substantial portion of the Manzanar community is firmly convinced that ex-camp director Roy Nash is languishing somewhere in a federal penitentiary for misuse of funds and malfeasance in office. It is apparently impossible to convince the community of the truth, i.e., that Mr. Nash has a very lucrative Washington position. As Okazaki said: "You could show the issei a picture of Mr. Nash sitting under the Washington monument. They still wouldn't believe he wasn't in jail."

The hatred of Mr. Nash, when he left, was transferred in large part to
Ned Campbell, assistant project director, and Joseph Winchester, chief steward. Both of these names appeared on virtually every list that the Blood Brothers posted. One of the most unfortunate aspects of the development of the shooting situation was the fact that Mr. Campbell, "the most hated and least trusted man on the project," necessarily made most of the decisions because of the inexperience of Mr. Merritt, the camp director who took over his position on November 17.

Messrs Campbell and Winchester were involved in a camp crisis preceding the affair of December 5 and 6. This was in regard to an alleged theft on their part of some 6,000 pounds of sugar. An understanding of the ramifications of the "sugar deal" is indispensable to an understanding of the later shooting. The main facts are these: Harry Uyeno, a check-off man in the commissary, an outspoken pro-Japanese Kibei leader, publicly accused Campbell and Winchester of setting aside 6,000 pounds of sugar intended for the evacuees. Uyeno's charge does not specify whether the sugar was set aside for Caucasian use, or for later resale by Winchester and Campbell. In any case, it was claimed that the two men were milking the Japanese of something that was rightfully theirs. Though a report was made by these two men denying the charge, it was never circularized among the colonists. On the eve of December 5, therefore, Harry Uyeno was somewhat of a camp hero in the eyes of even those who did not agree with him politically. He had challenged
the administration on a matter of vital concern to the community and his challenge had not been refuted.

**Part III: December 5 and 6.**

On the evening of Saturday, December 5, Fred Ayame was met in the shower room by one Keiji Arataka. After bathing, Ayame was followed home by Arataka and a group of others, who attacked him and beat him severely. Approximately a half dozen men participated in the beating. All of them wore their Government Issue blue pea-jackets with collars up, their black leather winter caps which covered their ears and a portion of their faces, and fastened under their chins, and thick, heavy goggles which are used extensively by Manzanar resident as a protection against the dust. Ayame was taken to the hospital on Saturday evening, where it was found that he was not critically damaged. The incident would probably have passed as just another in the growing series of acts of mob violence. But early the next morning of Sunday, December 6, several suspects were whisked from Manzanar and lodged in the County Jail at Independence. Among these suspects was Harry Uyeno.

The reaction to Uyeno's summary disposition was on the part of one of immediate and growing wrath on many segments of the population. The public anger had been at least three main bases. In the first place, there was a widespread
satisfaction over the fact that Tayama had finally got what was coming to him. The following comments are typical:

"It was hard to find a single person at Manzanar who expressed sympathy for Tayama." "Even the highly Americanized and cooperative nisei were of the opinion that though the approach was unorthodox, Tayama deserved the beating. Since there was no other way of his getting punished, the beating fit the situation perfectly." Thus, under the best of circumstances, the punishment of Tayama's assailants would have been a delicate, administrative task, altogether aside from the difficult judicial task of identifying the well-disguised attackers.

It can be said without doubt that the majority of the people at Manzanar did not believe anyone, guilty or not, should be punished for beating Fred Tayama. Tayama was a public nuisance. His assailants were to be praised, not punished.

The spirited away of Harry Uyeno was the second large contribution to public wrath. No administrative officer bothered to explain on what basis Uyeno had been incarcerated. As early as 10:30 on the morning of December 6, just two hours after Uyeno had been removed from camp, the story was being told and retold that Uyeno's arrest had been caused by any connection with the Tayama beating. Rather, "everyone said that Campbell and Winchester had got Uyeno because he knew too much about the sugar deal. Everyone said no proof existed in regard
to Uyeno's implication in the beating. He was taken away only because of the sugar deal."

Again, the truth of the statement is less important than the existence of the belief. Actually, it appears that Tayama's wife identified Uyeno as one of her husband's assailants. Uyeno's publicly expressed attitude, furthermore, does not indicate that he would have been loath to administer a beating to Tayama and others of his acquaintance. The first of these facts was unknown, and the second unconsidered on the morning of December 6. The points that were emphasized were only 1) Tayama deserved his beating and 2) Uyeno was being punished because of his solicitude for the community as evidenced by his accusations in regard to the theft of the community's sugar.

It is difficult to estimate the extent of the spontaneous wrath aroused by the arrest of Uyeno because it is impossible to follow the activity of the anti-administration (or pro-Japanese) agitators. There can be no doubt that these agitators were busy. Their activity constitutes the third base for the build-up of community wrath. The situation was made to order for a popular anti-administration demonstration. The issue cut through political and cultural lines. The question could be put as one involving administrative integrity and fairness to the evacuees. The demonstrations that followed, though seemingly engineered by the genuine pro-Jap-
nese elements in the camp, were not pro-Japanese demonstrations. Rather, they were simply demonstrations against an administrative policy that jailed on flimsy evidence one of the community's benefactors. Long series of administrative errors -- the community's tolerance was at an end and the agitator's took advantage of this fact.

Uyeno was held at Block 22. Mr. John Gilkey, the acting chief of internal security, received estimates from his patrolemn that at least 2,000 persons were at this meeting. Early Japanese who were present, however, estimate the crowd at fewer than six hundred. Anticipating trouble, Mr. Merritt put a call in to have the military police stand ready at the camp gate. Mr. Campbell was not allowed to investigate the meeting because of the warning from the Japanese police force that Campbell's life would be in danger if he went. Leaving Mr. Campbell at the police station, Mr. Merritt, with Mr. Gilkey, went to the meeting. When they arrived, however, the meeting was over and they were told that a committee of the Japanese was on the way to the administration building to see Mr. Merritt. Mr. Merritt and Mr. Gilkey immediately drove back to await the committee. By this time, the group of military police had appeared on the scene. When the committee of Japanese approached, it was followed by a large crowd.

The meeting at Block 22, after hearing from leaders who had emphasized Tayama's perniciousness, the "railroading" of Uyeno, and the accumulated charges against the administration, had decided to demand the immediate return of Uyeno from the County Jail.
Taneke, in his report, will name and describe the leaders of this group and their arguments. By the time the leaders of the mob approached, the military police, under Captain Hall, had marched inside the camp gates to a point opposite the police station and had formed a line across the road.

In his official report of the affair, Mr. Gilkey describes what then happened:

- Capt. Hall, Mr. Merritt and myself walked out to meet the mob. The leaders stopped the mob in a line in front of the administration building entrance. Merritt was approached by the leaders and a demand was made to immediately release Harry Ueno (Uyeno) from the County jail and return him to the Manzanar jail.

Merritt said that he would not be swayed by the demands of a mob, but that he would be very glad to meet with the committee and discuss this or any other matter that they desired. The mob roared in return and the leaders demanded that Mr. Ueno be returned at once. The spokesman talked and acted in a violent manner, making this and other demands in a loud and ringing tone of voice, in my opinion deliberately inciting the mob to further demonstration.

Mr. Merritt, at last convinced the committee, according to Mr. Gilkey, that they should try to get the
The mob to go home. This, however, they were unable to do. They again asked Mr. Merritt to give in to return Uyeno. All the while, the mob was growing in size, becoming more openly obscene and more openly contemptuous of the soldiers, and pushing further and further towards where the soldiers stood. After almost an hour, Mr. Merritt, Capt. Hall and Mr. Gilkey decided that "in order to avoid possible bloodshed it was best to concede to the demands of the mob, as far as Uyeno was concerned."

The committee and Merritt and myself went around the corner of 1-1-1 and talked. They were told by Mr. Merritt that Uyeno would be returned to Manzanar jail within one hour after the mob had dispersed and the camp became quiet. The understanding being that Uyeno would stay in jail here, stand trial before the judicial committee, who would decide whether Uyeno should be tried here or in an outside court. That in turn, no attempt would be made to release Uyeno, that the committee would meet with Merritt and decide on any other matter they wished to discuss. That they would assist in apprehending the persons responsible for the beating of Fred Tayama, and that peace would reign in camp. I returned Uyeno to camp as promised and explanation was also made to Teller at this time. The committee shook hands and left the building apparently satisfied.
Thus, by the late afternoon of December 6, the community had won in its first battle with the administration. Yet the conditions imposed by Mr. Merritt before returning Uyeno to camp made the solution seem an equitable one. For the committee of the people, led by Joe Kurihara, promised that the following conditions would be observed:

1) The committee guaranteed there would be no more mobs or mass meetings.

2) The committee guaranteed there would be no attempt to free Uyeno from the Manzanar jail once he was returned.

3) The committee guaranteed there would be no attempted meetings of any sort until conditions at camp had returned to normalcy.

4) The committee agreed to help maintain law and order within the center. As a partial fulfillment of this pledge they agreed to work with the police for the apprehension of those who had beaten Tayama. (These points from the message of Mr. Merritt to the people of Manzanar on Sunday, December 13.)

At least these are the conditions of the settlement as understood by Mr. Merritt and the administration. It is very likely, however, that something altogether different was understood by the mob as it dispersed on Sunday afternoon. Several people, though unable to give details, have said that the translations of all that Mr. Merritt
said was completely garbled, and made to suit the wishes of the leaders of the mob. Presumably, this may have applied to the four points enumerated above which were decided in a private conference, as well as to the statements shouted directly to the mob by Mr. Merritt. (Both Chester and Tanaka have been asked to get specific details of the mistranslations.)

There were several people of the Caucasian administration who believed that giving in to the mob had been a mistake, on the theory that once the agitators had tasted blood they would not let up. The majority, however, inside the camp, both Caucasian and Japanese, seemed reasonably satisfied with the compromise of Sunday afternoon. But no satisfaction existed among the soldiers of the 322nd Military Police Battalion, who had been marched to the scene of what they thought was battle and then marched home again. Most of the soldiers had been off duty when the call from the camp had come. They had had time only to grasp their weapons and run. They had therefore presented a motley appearance to the Japanese mob. Almost all were unshaved; several had on fatigue uniforms; others had put service jackets on over pajama tops. As the mob had approached Mr. Merritt, the soldiers had marched forward in wedge-shaped, mob breaking formation, but had been stopped just short and lined up behind Merritt and Mr. Gilkey, who were joined by Capt. Hall, commanding officer of the M.P. unit.
For more than an hour, the soldiers had patrolled with bayonets drawn, listening to the mob jibe at their appearance, taunt their effectiveness, and scoff at their power. For more than an hour, the soldiers watched with rising anger and increasing impatience, their captain with the two civilian leaders of the camp negotiate with the heads of the mob. To the soldiers, all the talk was unnecessary nonsense. Their job was to guard the Japs and to keep order in the camp. This was great disorder and the way to stop it was with bayonets, clubs, or a few machine gun bullets. The soldiers themselves have testified to their overwhelming desire "to bust the whole damn thing up." "There wasn't one of us who wouldn't have given two weeks' pay to take a crack at the Japs," one of the privates said, with the approval of half a dozen of his fellows, when discussing the affair several weeks later. Officers of the group, however, exerted every effort to keep their men under control, sending one particularly belligerent soldier to guard the gate to the road, far in the rear.

When the men were marched off, without being allowed any contact with the Japanese mob, their reaction was one of utter disgust. They went back to their barracks and under the leadership of Private Nick Cirillo, composed a commemorative ditty which they called "The Glorious Retreat of Manzanar".

Few data exist to explain the action of the
Japanese community between the dispersal of the mob in front of the Administration Building at approximately two o'clock and the convening of the new mass meeting at the firebreak in Block 22 at 6:00 p.m. Apparently it was during this time that the genuine pro-Japanese agitators were busiest, because the known results of the two o'clock meeting were plainly satisfactory to the majority of the people in the camp. Uyeno was not to be punished without a trial of his peers. He would not be made to pay for his disclosures in the sugar deal. The leaders of the hated "ayema-assailants" were still at large and might remain unapprehended. There was no cause for further uproar.

Nevertheless further uproar occurred, and it seems directly traceable to the activities of the small group of active, elder apologists of the anti-American cause. Our Banzener observers are now trying to document the activities of this small group. The evidence against them now is almost purely circumstantial. Only two facts are known:

1) many mess-halls held meeting at which they exerted great pressure to have people in the block attend the six o'clock mass meeting. Open intimidation was used, parents being told that they and their children would be branded as inu, if they did not attend the mass meeting.

Furthermore, there was much indefinite talk about a meeting that had been scheduled with Mr. Merritt, at which Mr. Merritt had not appeared. This was paraded as an evidence of further duplicity on the part of the administration and
as the justifiable cause of a new mass meeting of protest. 
(The basis of the story of a meeting that Mr. Merritt did not attend has not been found.) 2) At six p.m. a crowd estimated at 2,000 people gathered in the firebreak at Block 22 and listened to harangues from their leaders. After twenty minutes, the crowd itself demanded action.

It is not clear whether the crowd immediately split into two groups (the first heading for the hospital to get Tayama again, the second going to the hospital to release Uyeno) or whether the mob went first to the hospital and afterwards to the jail when it was unable to find Tayama. Newspapers carried the second version of the story, though official accounts of the Internal Security Division at Manzanar indicate that the two mobs started almost simultaneously. In any case, the mob headed for the hospital was heard from first.

Its progress, and the measures taken to meet it, are best followed from the account of Arthur L. Williams, assistant chief of internal security:

6-20 PM.. Received a telephone call from Dr. Goto at the hospital stating a mob was marching on the hospital from Block #22. The Doctor said there were approximately two thousand men in this gang; so the Doctor's informant had told him. He said they were coming after Fred Tayama. He asked for protection, adding that Fred Tayama was in Ward #3.

6-25 PM.. I called Mr. Merritt, and explained the
situation. He asked me to telephone the M. P. Barracks and ask them for an escort, to meet the hospital ambulance at the rear of the hospital. He requested them to take a circuitous route.

6:28 PM.. I called the M. P. Barracks and asked for Captain Hall, they stated Captain Hall wasn't present. I asked them to call one of the commissioned officers to the telephone. Lt. Kunkler answered the telephone, he stated they had their own ambulance and would be glad to cooperate in this matter. They would see that an escort was furnished and they would follow the road through the gardens and stay clear of Block Number 22.

6:28 PM.. Dr. Goto called and said the gang was approaching, help was badly needed. I told him the army ambulance would pick Tayama up at the back of the hospital.

6:30 PM.. I again called and was told by the Seargent answering the telephone at the army barracks that the ambulance was leaving. I immediately called the hospital and told the nurse this information.

6:35 PM.. Dr. Little telephoned and requested help he stated the mob was there. I told him the army should arrive any minute.

6:40 PM.. I called Mr. Merritt.
Actually, the army ambulance did not arrive at the hospital until some minutes after the mob. Indeed, several of the leaders had searched the hospital looking for Tayama before the Military Police arrived. Further violence to Tayama was avoided only because he was hidden under an operating table. Unable to find its victim, the hospital group joined those at the Police Station. Tayama was taken by the Military to the Army barracks where he was joined the next day by others who had cause to fear the crowd's violence. This group was subsequently moved to the Death Valley CCC camp.

The main action and the shooting occurred near the Police Station at the front of the camp. Just ten minutes after the hospital had telephoned its last call for help to Mr. Williams at the Police Station, Mr. Williams recorded (at 6:45 P.M.) that "Jack Shimatsu, 14-6-2 a Japanese policeman came in the station, he stated, his father had attended the meeting in Block 22. He said a mob of about two thousand were coming to the station to kill all the police. He said they blame all the police for the arrests which have been made." Mr. Williams immediately (6:47 P.M.) called Captain Hall and requested that a guard be sent to protect the Police Station. His report continues:

6-50PM... The mob could be heard approaching, they were cheering and shouting in Japanese as they reached the Police Station. They came in the side door and front door almost at the same instant they came in the chief's office where I was. They filled the entire police station to overflowing. I went to the front
office of the station and when I returned someone had given them the keys to the jail and it was also filled with men. The sentry at the front gate fired three shots evidently for help. I met the same men who had served on the committee representing the mob earlier in the day with them when I walked into the front office. They demanded the release of Harry Ueno, who was being held in jail on a charge of attack with a deadly weapon. I told them I had no authority to do so, but it looked as if they had taken matters in their own hands...

That the leaders of the crowd were astute men is demonstrated by the fact that, notwithstanding Mr. Williams' true statement that they had taken matters in their own hands, they refused to move Ueno from the jail. Apparent confusion reigned. As many people as possible had crowded into the Police Station building and the rest of the crowd milled around outside cheering, swearing and jeering. But the crowd's leaders refused to leave the jail with Ueno without official sanction. Instead, as Mr. Williams records:

The spokesman of this committee then told me they didn't intend to take Ueno that way. If I couldn't do it (release Ueno) they wanted to see Mr. Merritt, in fact they wanted to see him anyway.

Mr. Williams tried to temporize with the group. "I pointed out to them that someone would probably be killed or at least wounded unless they disbanded and returned to their homes." He replied that we don't care if we are killed we are ready to die." In the ensuing conversation, the Japanese rational for the late afternoon mass meeting as well as for the
then action became apparent.

I reminded him (the spokesman) that he had promised Mr. Merritt, Captain Hall and Chief Gilkey in the afternoon that there wouldn't be another illegal demonstration like the one which had occurred earlier that afternoon. He said during the meeting held in Block 22 he and the others had talked to the crowds that had gathered and the crowd had insisted upon coming to the police station and securing the release of Ueno. He said I no longer have any control over them.

When his arguments failed, Mr. Williams had to accede to the demands of the committee and call Mr. Merritt. His report of meeting with them at this point may be taken as an accurate statement of why the Camp Director did not appear at any time during the course of events that evening.

The committee insisted that I call Mr. Merritt, which I did. He asked what they wanted. I explained they demanded the release of Ueno, and that they wanted to see him. He asked, how does it look, and I replied very bad. Mr. Merritt said call Captain Hall and ask him to take command, if necessary declare martial law. The committee will have to do their negotiating with Captain Hall, they have failed to keep their promise with me. I turned from the telephone and told the group Mr. Merritt was not at home and that we would have to wait a short while...

Mr. Williams immediately relayed Mr.
Merritt's orders to Captain Hall, the Japanese standing alongside and making no attempt to interfere. Shortly afterwards, the first detachment of soldiers appeared upon the scene under command of Lieutenant Zwaik. The soldiers immediately cleared the front of the Police Station but allowed the committee to remain at Mr. Williams request. In addition, five Japanese policeman, three of whom had come for their protection, were allowed to remain inside the building. Once the building was cleared, the soldiers made their way by pushing the mob away from the outside of the building. First to a line even with the west side of the building, then about eight feet further back to the east side of the Manzanar Free Press Building. As this was movement was being carried out, Captain Hall arrived with another detachment of Military Police. The soldiers joined into the patrol, while Captain Hall immediately went into conference with the leaders of the mob inside the Police Station.

The conference lasted more than half an hour. Mr. Williams report of it is brief:

The Captain made an honest effort to come to a peaceful understanding. When all efforts apparently failed in this direction with the committee, the Captain went outside, walked past the first line of his soldiers and while between his men and the gang of Japanese rioters he asked them in a clear calm voice so that all could hear to return to their homes. His talk was met by several Japanese throwing large stones. I don't know who the target was, but
they narrowly missed Captain Hall, and stones fell among his soldiers.

One of the Japanese, who was in the jail throughout the complete negotiations, sitting by the stove and taking notes all the time, gives a more complete account of the preceding events as well as of the conversation between Captain Hall and the committee representing the mob:

... One of the committee came in at 6:50. Mr. Kurihara and Capt. Williams was talking with Yamagouchi. Then the M.P. arrived. Williams states that Capt. Gilkey is not in. So the committee ask if they can talk to Mr. Merritt but Williams calls and there is no answer. Then he calls Mr. Campbell and there is no answer. Finally one of the M.P. was to Mr. Williams then Williams state they are under martial law. Then Capt. Hall came in. By that time I sat by the stove, listening to the conversation of Mr. Kurihara asking Capt. Hall for unconditional release of Mr. Harry Uyeno and Mr. Tateishi are saying the same. He the captain say he can't do it because the committee didn't keep their promise and tell the committee to remove the mob immediately. Mob starts to shout. Captain tells us to keep the mob quiet. I went out with Mr. Kurihara and tell them to keep quiet and then we come back to the Police
Station.

7:10 the telephone rang four times. Hospital was calling for help. Mr. Kurakawa answered, he said even the Police Station was out of order.

7:20 a few more Military Police arrive. At 7:30 they are talking to Capt. Hall again. He does not answer... At 8:30 the committee is asking Capt. Hall again and he say he can't do it. 9:10 the Captain come in station again. This time committee of six asked Capt. Hall. This time I hear Mr. Yamagouchi say he is chairman of the committee and saying their condition is growing worse. Finally Mr. Kurihara pleaded. "Keep me in jail and release Uyeno." But the captain still answers no. Then Mr. Yamagouchi tell the Captain, "Keep all of us in jail and temporarily release Uyeno." The Captain still answered no.

By this time the mob is saying in Japanese "We want Uyeno's release." Soon they started to shout "Remove Campbell and Winchester." Then they started to sing a song. Then Mr. Yamagouchi stated, "If Capt. Hall does not release Uyeno something is liable to happen. But we are not responsible any more. We can't keep the mob quiet." Then the Captain said "Yes I will take all the responsibility for whatever happens now." Then he left the police station.
The first soldiers had arrived at the police station shortly after 7:00 o’clock. It was now 9:20. The soldiers had managed to push the crowd completely away from the police station and up against the east side of the Manzanar Free Press building, the excess of the crowd spilling across the road in front of the Administration Building to the south and away from the Free Press building into the open space to the north. The soldiers, themselves, armed with submachine guns, shotguns, and rifles, were lined up with their backs to the east side of the police station, the line extending across the main street of the camp. Machine gun emplacements were at either end of the line, one several feet north of the end of the police station, another across the main street and approximately opposite the northwest corner of the Administration Building. Other soldiers were deployed to the rear of the Administration Building and around the nearby quarters of the Caucasian administration. (See map on next page for positions as well as for diagram of subsequent action.) During all the time that the committee of the mob had conferred with Mr. Williams and Capt. Hall, the mob had grown in size and had become increasingly bold, shouting obscenities and insults at the Military Police. Immediately after Capt. Hall terminated his conference with the committee he ordered his men to don gas masks. A lieutenant stepped out under cover of the machine gun at the north end of the soldiers’ line and a number of gas bombs were thrown into the center of the Japanese crowd. The result was instantaneous panic.
The Japanese fled wildly and blindly in every direction. More than a dozen ran with terrific force and piled up against a telephone pole that was just east of the front end of the Free Press Building. Others ran into the street separating the police station from the Free Press Building in the direction of or parallel with the line of soldiers.

The soldiers fired at these wildly onrushing people. Within two minutes after the gas bombs had been thrown, no Japanese were to be seen except the wounded ones lying in the street. A short time later a small crowd reformed and started an automobile which was parked north of the Free Press Building, aiming the car at the opposite machine gun emplacement. The car was badly aimed and curved away from the machine gun, crashing through the northwest corner of the police station and finally inst one of the army trucks parked west of the police station. Several bursts were fired by the machine gunner at the car as it swung across the road. The empty car was hit several times, one of the bullets ricocheting off it and wounding Corporal Schafer of the Military Police in the head.

Notices to the press about the shooting incident were apparently slanted to purposely give an erroneous impression of how the shooting itself occurred. Thus the San Francisco Call-Bulletin of Monday, December 7, in its page one story
"Troops had entered the camp in response to Merritt's earlier demands that the military take over policing of the camp where police duties are usually entrusted to a staff of Japanese and Caucasian peace officers.

The soldiers with fixed bayonets and mounted machine guns were successful in quelling the early stages of the rioting, but later, as the crowd gathered into a mob, the soldiers were forced to resort to firing a barrage of tear gas.

The gas dispersed the mob, but the rioters reassembled soon after the choking fumes drifted off into the night air.

The shooting occurred as angered members of the crowd began hurling stones and rushing the line of soldiers."

The San Francisco Chronicle on the next day (page one) indirectly quoted Mr. Merritt as follows:

Part of the crowd surged towards the soldiers and were met with tear gas bombs. The fumes were blown away, however, and the Japs swept forward hurling stones. The soldiers then opened fire. This halted the shouting, gesticulating mob, and sullenly they obeyed order to return to their bungalows.

Every eye-witness interviewed testifies to the complete falsity of the view presented in the newspapers that the shooting occurred some time after the throwing of the
tear gas and after the crowd had reformed and directly attacked the line of soldiers. Mr. Williams, in his report, does not describe the sequence of events. Raymond Haria’s report puts it this way: "At 9:27 all of us in the police station saw the soldiers putting on gas masks. At 9:28 we saw soldiers throw gas bombs on the mob. Thirty seconds later we heard shots." Jack Shimatsu, one of the internal policemen who watched the proceedings from inside the station, recalls that "the shooting followed the bomb throwing immediately. The puff of smoke had not even cleared before the shots were heard and men were falling." This statement is directly corroborated by Private George Ehalt, Jr., one of the Military Police actually in the line: "The shooting was just a part of the bomb throwing. There were no orders to shoot. Soldiers don’t need orders under such circumstances. The fumes of the bombs scattered the Japs. Some of the Japs who ran away ran toward us and we just naturally shot." Tanaka has talked to at least a dozen soldiers, all of whom tell the same story. Chester quotes one of the lieutenants on the scene as telling exactly the same story. Goldberg has the official hospital reports which show that virtually every wound inflicted on the Japanese was from the left side, which indicates (cf. the diagram) that the Japanese fleeing from the directions in which the bombs were thrown were running more parallel to the line of soldiers than actually towards them.
In all, ten people were treated for gunshot wounds, though the soldiers believed others were hurt but did not ask for treatment for fear they might be implicated as ringleaders in the affair. One person died almost immediately. He was James Ito, a young nisei with a reputation for loyal Americanism and with one of his brothers serving in the United States Army. A second person, James Kanagana, died on December 11 from complications ensuing from his wounds. Kanagana, too, had a reputation for loyalty. He was nineteen years old. (Goldberg and Chester will supply us with the official hospital dates on all the wounded persons.)

Following the shooting the crowds dispersed and the wounded were taken to the hospital. Throughout the night the Military Police, augmented by State Guardsmen from Independence, patrolled the interior of the camp. The cry among the Japanese was "Remember Manzanar." There can be no doubt that the shooting converted the opinion of virtually the entire population of the camp to a violent anti-American feeling. By common consent, shifts were arranged at each mess hall bell, and the bells tolled loudly and continuously throughout the entire night and late into the morning. The next day, the storehouse was broken into and several bolts of black cloth stolen. Following messhall meetings, every Japanese man in Manzanar wore a black band on his arm, every woman a black ribbon in her hair. Many nisei who previously had
actively opposed such tactics, voluntarily wore their mourning stripes. Others were openly coerced, mothers being told that their children would be mercilessly beaten unless all participated in the demonstration.

Feeling ran higher than ever against those who had previously cooperated with the administration. A mob actually formed outside the home of Togo Tanaka, one of the most actively pro-American nisei, but Tanaka was not at home. The story has it that Tanaka was actually a member of the mob that stormed his house. Tanaka and his family; Chief Mori, editor of the Manzanar Free Press; Tad Masaoka, brother of the J.A.C.L. national secretary; Tokie Slocum, an over-enthusiastic American Legionnaire; and approximately twenty others with their families were removed from the camp on Sunday for their own protection. They spent several days at the military barracks and were subsequently removed to the Death Valley C.C.C. camp, from which they are to be permanently relocated. (Tanaka will give us case histories on all these people.) For a week following the shooting, there was little or no rapport between the Japanese and the Caucasians. At first, only the messhall employees worked, but gradually, the camp returned to what now appears to be normalcy. A systematic seizure of the ringleaders of the mob has been carried on. They are to be relocated, along with malcontents from other camps, to a C.C.C. camp at Delton Creek, Utah. Mr. Ned Campbell,
whose presence at Manzaner did much to stir up the feeling that led to the shooting incident, and who was relieved of his duties at Manzaner following the shooting, is reported to have been selected as the director of the Delton Creek Camp.

The Manzaner shooting incident was attributed to "a celebration of Pearl Harbor by the pro-axis group among the Japanese." This entire report points to the doubtful validity of this statement. From the evidence at hand, there is no indication that a celebration of Pearl Harbor had anything to do with the affair. It would be crediting the Japanese with over-abundant prophetic powers to believe that they could foresee that Uyeno would be removed from the camp following the beating of Tayama. Uyeno did not come forward and confess, thus setting up an instant cause for reaction. Rather, the evidence indicates that he was identified by Tayama's wife on tenuous evidence, and removed from the camp over his own protest.

Furthermore, there is little evidence to corroborate the instant view that pro-axis sentiment was the main factor in creating the riot situation. Pro-axis elements appear to have been the catalysts at work. But the main dynamics are anti-administration rather than anti-American. The basis of this anti-administration feeling has been traced chronologically to at least the early part of August, and quantitatively to all segments of the
Manzanar population, old and young, American and non-American. That the anti-administration feeling came to a head on December 6 is pure chance. If it had come to a breaking point on December 25, Mr. Merritt, with equal validity, could have called it a Christmas celebration.

This is not to say that the pro-axis elements were not an important factor in the shaping of the riot situation. The history of this group has been touched on here and will be elaborated in the reports to come. Its potency was perhaps best shown in the burning of the Manzanar canteen just several weeks previous to the riot. Here, again, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, to disengage anti-American sentiments from anti-administration attitudes.

The size of the crowds that gathered at the various meetings on Sunday, December 6, are no indication whatever of the size of the pro-Japanese element. In the first place, it seems clear, the estimates of the crowds given in the newspapers and in the reports of the police officials are exaggerated. Thus, during the afternoon meeting in front of the administration building, it is said that 2,000 people were present. Chester's estimate of from four to five hundred appears much more accurate. While the meeting was going on, several basketball games were being witnessed by large audiences, a P.T.A. Bazaar was entertaining a capacity crowd, and numerous people have testified to Chester and Okazaki that they did not even know a meeting was being held. The point deserves further study.
every one of the meetings attracted a large group of the curious. Thus, in the afternoon, the spectators of a basketball game just finished joined the march to the Administration Building with no idea of the previous meeting at messhall 22 or of the purpose of the march to the front of the camp. The best evidence that a large element of the evening crowd was simply curious is the fact that both of the boys killed had reputations for being loyal and no record of ever having been numbered among the group of agitators.
Thomas Temple – Chief of Censor Services

and because “Baffinian bug”

Chief of Administration

But known close friend of Mr. –
a – project director –

Mr. has definite “no Baffinian bug”

My man who carried to Campbell’s

when he left was Temple. Hem – so

It was Temple’s attitude. He let Temple out

+ put his good friend, Brown in.

I don’t find Temple just put Brown

in. Put Brown’s Temple’s policy

responsible to Brown – we do

Vally men, too.
Union foreman asked to be removed.

If by 7 or Sunday afternoon.
Yes, 11.15, for Spencer 20 then to come.
back to have job... obvious that
not any. Chasker went to please, went
in excuse of language make mistake time
and I sped.

Sunday night.

[1] ground at hospital military
artillery.

[2] track with Control.

Decided tonight some to join one to
2/100 to hoy; 4/00 at
Work forces history &
Those aspects of care # you
Dec 4 - finished - after went to many
Dec 5 - finished - not a duty

where get Raymond? - p. 6-7

where get info on tiger hunting? - p. 8

where stage?
how do know?

and men died, famine and guns? - 19

died in dec 1

after why - any - more tells?

what telling in June 24?

Dec 19 - not to see
what else gone?
Campbell - Asst. Project Director
Joe. W. Wrencher - Chief Engineer

Lyman - accused thing flagrantly

when "arrested" for beating Rayana -
Fred's wife claimed it, bent red in up.
Community said Campbell + Wrencher
were getting Lyons for no deal (smile gape)

Sunday after party meeting - argument
Chuter knew about coming Sunday night.
By background.

People - not only against indiscriminate informants but also
just people who doing good job. New in.

1800/ Pro - this stuff come in.
Not with Rayana affair. So bad that

2 minutes on phone instead of search for stories.
Janet Goldberg - Bar. Del., Manzanar
201 Roosevelt Rd.
Long Beach, Calif
12-6th Grade Teacher, 1942-43.

Capt. T. S. - Fred Tayama - arrested.
Keiji Akechi, suspect, greased him in shower.
Followed home & attacked.

"Gray beard, Fred Tayama was the man.
No one looked for him." Even after attack.
No sympathy for T. even after he was
Sent to prison, hardship.

JACU, "Anti-Axis" Committee, all people as little.
After, after war, JACU hired two men, Issai and 7 businessmen.

Take over

June 6th by Akechi + Tayama for ever, Japa.
(25/00)

Also - supposed expecting to FBI at 25. on a hunch.

JACU withdrawn from United Citizens Federation when

Citize, Fed of Manzanar, near Joe Kurihara, offered to T. & others.