THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

RUMORS IN A CRISIS SITUATION

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

BY

TAMOTSU SHIBUTANI

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
SEPTEMBER, 1944
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

RUMORS IN A CRISIS SITUATION

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

BY

TAMOTSU SHIBUTANI

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
SEPTEMBER, 1944
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.</strong></td>
<td>APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF RUMOR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The Significance of Rumors</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The Contribution of Psychopathology to Rumor Theory</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Miscellaneous Theories of Rumor</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Empirical Studies of Rumor</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Statement of the Problem</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II.</strong></td>
<td>THE BACKGROUND OF PRE-EVACUATION RUMORS</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The Factors Affecting Race Relations</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The Social Structure of the Japanese Communities</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>From Pearl Harbor to Evacuation</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>The State of Wartime Communication</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III.</strong></td>
<td>THE WAR TIME STATUS OF PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Pre-War Status Relationships</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Wartime Regulations and Legal Status</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The Position of Nisei in the U.S. Army</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Agitation, Discrimination, and Social Status</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>The Issei in Relation to the World Struggle</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV.</strong></td>
<td>THREATS AGAINST PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Threats of Physical Violence</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Attacks by Filipinos</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The F.B.I. Raids and Incarceration</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Threats from Within the Group</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V.</strong></td>
<td>VOLUNTARY AND ENFORCED EVACUATION</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Chronology of Events</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The Period of Voluntary Evacuation</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The Program of Enforced Evacuation</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The Nature of Camp Conditions</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# VI. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Characteristics of the Period</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Emergence of Rumors</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Content of Rumors</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Spread of Rumors</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Effects of Rumors</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The Disappearance of Rumors</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Rumors in a Critical Situation</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Note on the Collection of Data</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Dated Rumors Chronologically Arranged</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Undated Rumors Arranged by Areas</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. San Francisco Bay Region</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sacramento Area</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Los Angeles Area</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Stockton Area</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Statistics on Voluntary Migration</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. General Theory</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Theories and Studies of Rumor</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Case Materials and Popular Literature on Rumor</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. The Japanese in the United States</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Since December 7, 1941, the status of the Americans of Japanese ancestry has become an issue of national importance. In spite of the numerical insignificance of this group, considerable attention has been given to its activities. The evacuation of persons from the Pacific Coast on a racial basis has led to the emergence of legal issues pertaining to the constitutionality of such a move, and questions have been raised as to the effects of such a program on the ideological battle for democratic life.¹

The study that follows was made in the midst of a trying situation. There was considerable confusion, and everyone seemed to know what was happening. In the heat of the excitement many things occurred that differed substantially from what might have happened under more normal circumstances. Some of the remarks quoted in the following pages may be misinterpreted by professional disbelievers as "proof" that the group was not worthy of trust. Even today, agitators stand ready to condemn the entire group for the misdeeds of a few. In spite of the dangers of misinterpretation, the study that follows attempts to give as far as possible an objective account of what actually happened. There are no attempts made to condemn or to justify the actions of individuals—only to describe them.

The aim of the study is to present the rumors that spread among the alien Japanese and their American-born children in four different areas in California—the San Francisco Bay Region, Los Angeles, Sacramento, and Stockton—during the period between Pearl Harbor and evacuation. An attempt has been made to present the rumors in the setting in which they emerged.

and spread. Some pre-war background material has been introduced in order to make the picture more intelligible. It is through a case study of pre-evacuation rumors, then, that an attempt will be made to analyze the nature and function of rumor in a critical situation.

What follows is not a study of psychological distortion. Attention will not be devoted to the problem of the similarities and differences between the contents of rumors and verified facts. The primary objective of this study is to analyze the relationship between rumor and the social situation in which rumor flourishes.

Theoretical separated from descriptive

1st & last chapters - 1st: survey lit. to see what problems have concerned students

last: show bearing of data on some of problems.

Most problems left unanswered.

The 1st & last chapters are theoretical. An effort has been made to summarize the more important discussions of rumor to list the problems which students of rumor have been concerned. A selected nos. of relevant problems have been analyzed in terms of the empirical data presented in the descriptive portion of the study. This treatment is for most conclusive & various several more problems.
CHAPTER I

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF RUMOR

Since the outbreak of the current war, there has been an increase of interest in rumor. The use of rumors has been made an integral part of the techniques of psychological warfare. Not only have the Nazis made skillful use of rumors in breaking the resistance of their enemies, but they have also managed to create suspicions through rumors that have tended to make difficult wholehearted cooperation between the Allies.1

The Office of War Information has found it necessary to take special precautions against these attacks,2 and the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety has set up a special rumor clinic.3 During the past few years considerable attention has been devoted to the task of making the American people rumor-conscious.4

Although rumors have undoubtedly flourished in previous periods of history, it was only during the past thirty years that the phenomenon has been considered worthy of objective investigation. Some knowledge about


4. Bibliography C contains a list of articles on rumor in current periodicals.
Rumors have been incorporated into the folk wisdom of many peoples, and the literature of Western European civilization is abundant with references to the nature and effects of unverified tales. It was not until World War I, however, that any systematic study was undertaken. Since then, fragmentary works have appeared from time to time, but the existing information is scattered and poorly organized.

A fairly consistent body of rumor theory has been developed by a group of psychopathologists who were among the first to direct their attention to the phenomenon. They seem to conceive of the origin and spread of rumor as essentially a process of distortion, and their efforts center around the task of accounting for an individual's repeating an account markedly different from what he had seen or heard.

Among the earliest systematic treatises on rumor is that of Hart, whose work first appeared in 1916. The study was not based upon any systematic body of data. He defines rumor as:

"... a complex phenomenon consisting essentially in the transmission of a report through a succession of individuals. It may be provisionally regarded as the product of a series of witnesses, each of whom bears testimony to a statement imparted to him by his predecessor in the series."

Hart finds the origin of rumors in "complexes"; people tend to pick out of their environment those things which for some reason are interesting to them, and their perceptions may not correspond with the objects actually


6. Ibid., p. 94.

7. "Complex" is defined as "a system of related ideas possessing a certain affective load which tends to produce in consciousness trains of thought leading in a definite direction."
presented to them. Thus individuals perceive what they expect to perceive.

Hart distinguishes between three types of rumors, each arising from different mechanisms: (1) Rumors directly connected with the threat to the group are the products of tension and anxious expectations induced when the group is in danger. This condition is conducive to perversions and phantasies. (2) Rumors result from wish-fulfillment. Hart declares that all men have a tendency to create a pleasant world of phantasy. (3) The third group of rumors arises when certain widespread and fundamental complexes are given the appropriate stimulation. There are certain complexes which are a part of the psychological structure of every human being and are capable of being excited in large numbers of people. Some of these complexes are repressed and the rumors give them expression.

In discussing the mechanisms of the spread of rumors, Hart provides two explanations. There is a desire on the part of men to occupy the center of attention, and telling the latest rumor is a means of achieving a position of importance in another person's mind. The second explanation is in terms of the desire of men to identify themselves with the group. Rumors are passed on to promote the group welfare.

Another study of rumor that appeared during the same year is that of Jung. There is a discussion of a story told by a girl who dreamed about having illicit sex relations with one of her teachers. Three girls who heard the story directly from her and eight persons who had heard the story from others were asked to write what they had heard. It is essentially a

---

8. What Hart seems to have in mind is that there are certain impulses, toward cruelty or sex for example, that are concealed because of tradition. These impulses or "instincts" are a part of "nature". Therefore, people will get a "fascination" out of rumors that provide them with opportunities to give expression to these "instincts" and still remain within the bounds of tradition. Ibid., p. 120.

study of distortion. In the analysis Jung declares that interpolations were made to supply logical relationships. Jung accounts for the additions that had been made to the original story in terms of the similar aetiological requirements of the girl and her companions, and states that the additions were the result of the "inner participation" of the companions in the meaning of the girl's dream. He declares that the story spread rapidly because it was a fit expression for something that was already "in the air."

Martin's brief account of rumor was written in 1920. He explains that the repeating of unfounded reports by men who would ordinarily scrutinize the evidence has its origin in the unconscious mechanisms of "crowd-minded" people. Every crowd is prone to believe rumors and to accuse those who do not accept them as being in the sympathy of the enemy. The hateful wishes of the crowd will appear in the consciousness whenever the unconscious can fabricate such defense mechanisms as will provide it with a fiction of moral justification. The crowd man must defend this justification. Rumors for Martin, then, are defense mechanisms to justify acts of brutality.

In connection with his discussion of conventional practices, the social psychologist Bernard includes a brief treatment of rumors. He accounts for the instability in the form of rumors by the fact that they are not recorded but travel from mouth to ear. His major explanation of the phenomenon is in terms of repression. Following Jung, he declares that frequently the background of fact in a rumor is as much or more in the behavior of the elaborators to whom it has served as a release for repressed desires than in that of the person whom the rumor is about. Rumors are transformed

12. Bernard gives no concise definition of rumor, and like Jung he identifies rumor and gossip.
during their spread because they are augmented by the daydreams and wishes, the envies and jealousies, of the minds through which they pass. Rumor, then, meets the needs of the average mind for an outlet for repressed wishes.

Since the outbreak of the current war, there have been several fragmentary studies of rumor. One of these is that of the psychoanalyst Glover. Glover considers rumors in terms of their emotional content, and declares that rumors consist of "fears returned through the lips of others." He explains wartime rumors in terms of "frustrated strategy"; that is, rumor-mongers are those who are not actively participating in the war effort who engage in the game of "civilian strategy." They have an irresistible temptation to tell others what might have happened, but the listeners assume that these things have happened. He also recognizes the use of rumors for the purpose of enhancing the prestige of the bearer. Glover declares further that man is by nature a dreamer, and that rumors may originate from the imagination. He does not exclude the possibility that shocking stories are told in order to gain satisfaction out of frightening others. Timid people pass on frightening rumors in the hopes of having them contradicted. Rumors spread most rapidly when there is ignorance, disappointment of hopes and wishes, and doubt. Thus, Glover's analysis is in terms of the psychological mechanisms of adjustment to a new situation.

The psychopathologists account for the phenomenon of rumor in terms of repressed urges. A rumor is repeated and additions accrue to the original story because the content of the rumor gives expression to wishes that have been pushed into the unconscious. Telling a rumor gives the individual an opportunity for release without social condemnation.

This body of theory, although suggestive, is not based upon empirical data, but rather seems to have been deduced from the conceptual framework of the psychoanalysts. The contribution of the psychopathologists, then, is in calling attention to the phenomenon of rumor as a subject worthy of investigation and raising problems particularly with reference to the spread of rumors that have engaged the attention of others.

**Miscellaneous Theories of Rumor**

Several theories of rumor have been presented during the past three decades; some are based upon a cursory examination of data while others seem to be entirely speculative. Some writers have discussed rumors incidentally to the main purpose of their work.

Among the earliest of the general theories is that of Trotter which appeared in 1917.\textsuperscript{14} In his discussion of the sensitivity of the individual to the behavior of the group, Trotter declares that the individual group accepts group suggestions and rejects anything that dissociates a suggestion from the group.\textsuperscript{15} To illustrate his treatment of rumor, he discusses the initial reaction of the English people to the outbreak of war. There was a dread of isolation. Loneliness became intolerable and people sought one another's companionship. The rumors therefore spread rapidly in all classes of society, and the people were irresistibly drawn to the acceptance of popular beliefs. During a dangerous struggle the social instinct receives a stimulus of greater intensity. Rumors cross class lines because in war man acts as a member of a national group; whereas in peacetime he is but a member of his class. A threat to the herd is the most intense stimulus to


\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., pp. 32-33.
the potentialities of man's sensitivity to his fellow beings. That rumors spread rapidly is evidence of the sensitiveness to herd opinion. The stronger the threat, the greater the sensitivity to one's fellows. Pessimistic rumors are spread by those whose instinctive response to the call of the herd has been frustrated. For Trotter, therefore, rumor is an expression of instinctive reactions to a threat to the group and has the biological function of making the group alert and prepared for action.

The historian Oman made his contribution in 1918. In a general discussion of rumors current on the British Isles during the World War, Oman states that the war provided an excellent opportunity for the spread of rumors because of the curtailment of normal communication by the censorship and the closing of telegraphic facilities. He refers to rumors as "ten-denious" because they "bore witness to a psychological state of expectation of certain desired or dreaded events, and declared that they had actually taken place." Some rumors turn out to be true because they were simply realizations of a rational expectation. Rumors can be explained only in terms of the psychological needs of the people. They are believed because they are convenient to those who wish to credit them. According to Oman, then, rumors are an expression of "reasoned expectation."

A novel and rather interesting discussion of rumor can be found in an essay by Morley, which appeared in 1919. Morley conceives of rumors as indices of what is to happen. He declares that whenever some event is about to take place the preliminary events provide cues for surmises and conjectures as to what will take place. Someone who is familiar with the field in which the particular event is expected will be able to interpret these preliminaries, and the rumors starting from these individuals may turn out to be actual forecasts of coming events. He warns against taking rumors at face value,

16. Ibid., pp. 141-49.
18. Ibid., p. 50.
however, and states that coming events "discharge both positive and negative currents, just as a magnet is polarized by an electric coil." Because of their "mental habit" some people are likely to catch the negative vibrations and thus spread rumors quite contrary to the coming events. When something is about to happen, people sense it. They become attentive to anything connected with the future event. The rumor may not indicate what is going to happen, but it does indicate that something is going to happen in a certain sector of public interest.

20. Ibid., p. 178.

Another brief discussion of rumor appeared in 1921. Smith and Guthrie wrote that whenever the subject matter of a report is not controlled by a common habit of the group, the statement will undergo successive modification as it passes from speaker to speaker. The error is due to the uninhibited reaction tendencies of the successive narrators. Inaccurate imitation results in areas where people have not formed a habit of acting in a like way. The modification of opinion as it is passed from one person to another is greatest when its expression is not a common habit in the group. Unless people possess a habitual response to a stimulus, cumulative errors will appear during transmission.

One of the most systematic treatments available is that of Rysow which was translated from the Russian in 1928 and 1929. Quoting the historian Bernheim, he writes, "We define that report as rumor when events of pre-

23. Einleitung in die Geschichtswissenschaft, 1905.
sent-day are concerned, events which the reporter has not experienced himself and whose report has gone through the mouths of many unknown persons."24 He points out that the experience with which the rumor deals must be of interest to the group because of its expected consequences; otherwise, no one would be likely to retell the story. In the retelling process, the individual may evaluate and modify the account from the point of view of what he conceives to be the group interest. Bysow distinguishes between the intellectual and emotional content of rumors—the former being identical with what the words express, while the latter is a matter of feelings with which the rumor is received. Rumor is conserved in form and transmitted in conversation, but the contents change in the process of spread. Bysow believes that the tendency to believe a rumor arises from the fact of a widely spread because of the influence of general conviction. He notes that rumors tend to evoke reactions particularly in times of crisis so that they lend themselves to deliberate use by interested persons or groups. Finally, he distinguishes between rumor in the village and that in the city, stating that rumors spread more rapidly in cities because of the nature of interpersonal relations in urban society.

In a study of race relations which appeared in 1928, Bogardus touches briefly on the subject of rumor.25 He defines rumor as a "currently started and unverified statement," and accounts for their origin in the following manner:

"Almost any person in a moment of fear—fear for his own social and economic status or for the status of his group—may impetuously give vent to startling remarks. If he wishes to secure a hearing, he exaggerates or speaks with greater force than the circumstances warrant."26

26. Ibid., p. 234.
In an atmosphere of tension, these exaggerations pass quickly from person to person, becoming distorted as they spread. If the rumor persists, it becomes a myth.

The only full-length book on rumor is that by Chadwick published in 1931. He defines rumor as "an unverified report passing from person to person" and discusses numerous instances in history when the course of events was effected by unverified information. Sometimes he identifies the term rumor with instances of distortion; in other pages he refers to accounts with no basis of fact as rumor; in other sections he discusses myths, catchwords, and blackmail under the label "rumor". He declares that rumor is a practical necessity of human existence. Rumors spread because they satisfy and appeal to the same "social instincts" that mold individuals into communities. Chadwick's work consists of an assorted collection of historical data, some of which are relevant to a study of rumors.

LaPiere's treatment of rumors is largely in terms of the mechanisms by which rumors spread. He states that a "rumor is simply a story attached to some actual rather than fictitious person or to some actual rather than imaginary event." He declares that the direct and immediate consequence of participation in a congenial-type situation is the satisfaction of individual needs for play. "Fugitive patterns", such as rumors, are the products of the rivalry for leadership which occurs in such situations. The telling of a dramatic story is a common attention-getting device used in the bid for leadership. This is only temporary leadership, and in order to arouse interest, the subject must of necessity be a person or a thing which is

already interesting to the members. Thus the creative efforts are always limited by the nature of the situation. Other individuals, under the stimulation of rivalry for leadership, add their contributions. Since most individuals are incapable of creating entirely new stories, they must rely upon past inventions. In the course of many such congenial situations a rumor spreads. The rumor changes because it is distorted by faulty memory, supplemented by individual bias, and perhaps elaborated in retelling to make it still more effective. An attempt is generally made to attribute the story to some source whose veracity cannot be questioned; then the story is more credible and likely to receive more attention. Rumors will tend to disappear when almost all members of the community have heard it, since the story ceases to provide an effective bid for leadership. Lapiere recognizes that rumors spread rapidly in a period of crisis when the channels of communication are suspected of being disrupted, but he does not treat this problem systematically.

The origin and spread of rumors are explained in terms of the bid for leadership in a congenial situation.

A systematic study of rumor was made by Chen in China in 1939. Chen considers rumors psycho-social phenomena which occur in extraordinary situations as a collective response of the people. He notes the three characteristics of rumor as: (1) involvement of emotional elements, such as anxieties, hatred, and fears, (2) change by simultaneous accumulations, and (3) a powerful disintegrative and consolidating effect on the crowd.

Perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of rumors available is to be found in a dissertation by Rose. He defines rumor as:
means so long as it is not communicated with the conscious intent to modify behavior, referring to an event considered to be of some importance to the group, rather than to an entertaining incident or report."32

After a careful examination of the existing literature, he presents the thesis that "rumor represents an attempt on the part of people to render meaningful an event which is not self-explanatory and which is considered important."33 He declares that rumors arise in situations where people do not feel that they have adequate information about an event or condition that concerns them. Rumors are rational attempts to fill in gaps in the news; they arise through a logical rather than empirical process. As a rumor becomes widespread within a group, the individual's belief in the validity of the report increases and he repeats the story to others. Some may be motivated by desires of gaining prestige as a source of "inside information", or in aiding a group that he thinks is endangered. The number of people spreading a rumor declines rapidly after people become aware of the fact that everyone interested has heard the rumor or when other information becomes available.

Rumors emerge more often and spread more rapidly in critical situations. This is not surprising in view of the fact that rumors grow up around those events and conditions which the group conceives to be important. Both the crowd and the public created by crises are characteristics of urban life, and since rumors are most prevalent in these types of collective bodies, rumor is a characteristic of urban civilization. The counterpart of rumor in a rural community is gossip.

Lowe's brief article on rumor appeared in 1941.34 He writes that rumors spread by four mechanisms: suggestion, eye-witness fallibility, perversion

---

32. Ibid., p. 194.
33. Ibid., p. 1.
of testimony, and ambiguity. A rumor acquires credibility when presented in an interesting and dramatic manner and when it arouses emotions and transitory feelings of vanity in the rumor-monger.

The latest work on rumors has been done by a group of students at the Harvard University. Rumor is defined as a "specific but unverified proposition for belief, disseminated through a series of persons." They are classified in several different ways, but the one most frequently referred to is the classification in terms of "emotional colorings": (1) the wish rumor, (2) the hostile rumor, and (3) the anxiety rumor. Pessimists tend to accept anxiety rumors; the optimist the wish rumors. Persons harboring anxiety and the idle, bored, and disorganized persons are more likely to accept rumors and transmit them as a means of creating excitement.

Typical patterns of motivation for the passing of rumor are: (1) exhibitionism, (2) reassurance of emotional support, (3) projection or "externalization" of fears, wishes, and hostilities that are unperceived, (4) aggression against some third party, and (5) bestowing a favor upon the hearer.

The content of rumor depends upon three classes of determinants: perceptual, cultural, and motivational. Under perceptual factors are included those characteristics of the "mind in general" which limit the accuracy of perceiving and reproducing rumors; cultural determinants include distortion forces exercised by traditions as well as the immediate condition or circumstances; among motivational determinants are the wishes, hostilities, and hopes of the people which tend to distort the content of a rumor toward the expression of these sentiments. Rumors are most likely to spread in a situa-


tion in which there is (1) a high degree of social interaction, (2) intensity and homogeneity of wishes and fears, (3) unsatisfied need for information, and (4) monotony, enforced inactivity, and idleness.  

Rumors persist because they spring from human needs—the fears, hopes, and hatreds that the rumor satisfies. Everyone likes to repeat a story that is timely and impressive. The most persistent rumor-mongers, however, are those who feel emotionally insecure and are not well adjusted to life. These individuals are emotionally upset more easily and also lack and need prestige.

Some of the twelve theories of rumor just surveyed are based upon a superficial examination of data. It is possible that the Harvard group made a collection of empirical data, but none appears in their work and it seems highly unlikely that the propositions that they present were derived from an examination of such data. On the whole, these theories are based upon introspection and everyday observations. They constitute a system of what might be called extensions of common sense judgments about rumor. Many of the theorists had written before them, and most of them have attempted to interpret the phenomenon of rumor in terms of some conceptual framework developed independently of the study of rumor or any similar form of communication. Nevertheless, some of these writers pose problems worthy of further investigation. Several propositions have been introduced which may be regarded as being of a hypothetical nature, awaiting testing by empirical data. In the last analysis, however, any reliable body of knowledge about rumor must be based upon a solid foundation of empirical research.

37. Ibid., passim.
Empirical Studies of Rumor

The most comprehensive empirical study of rumor available is that made by van Langenhove in 1916. In a study of the rise of legends in Germany about the attacks allegedly made by the Belgian francs-tireurs on the invading German Army, he describes the circumstances in which these accounts arose, traces the mechanisms involved in their dissemination, and shows how these unverified accounts became rooted in the popular beliefs of the German people. Since the spread of these rumors resulted in attacks against the Catholic Church which attained such acuteness that the internal peace of Germany was threatened, a thorough investigation was conducted, both by the Church and by the government. This study is based almost exclusively upon these sources. The material is arranged by what is referred to as "thematic motives", such as, treason, the discovery of machine guns on church towers, and the mutilation of the wounded.

The German soldiers invaded Belgium anticipating no resistance and were shocked by the guerilla warfare conducted by the Belgian Army. They immediately interpreted these ambushes in terms of what they had learned about the French francs-tireurs of 1870 in their military manuals and in the popular literature. The soldiers were prepared for treachery, and fortuitous occurrences were interpreted in terms of their preconceived ideas. The possibilities of errors in observation were increased because the men were not living in their accustomed mode of life and were experiencing extraordinary events. The francs-tireurs became the major preoccupation of the troops, and as the stories spread they were distorted in accordance to their beliefs.

The stories reached Germany through the wounded soldiers and through

letters, and spread rapidly among a population eager for news. Van Langenhove states that the desire to occupy a position of prominence was a factor in the spread and distortion of these accounts. These rumors were reinforced by Germans who had formerly lived in Belgium who told of atrocities directed against them by the Belgian population. Once these stories spread in Germany they became crystallized in print and became fixed in the minds of the people. The spread of these stories resulted in the change in the German conception of the Belgian people, and new and unsuspected traits were ascribed to the Belgian national character.

According to van Langenhove, then, the rumors about the Belgian franc-tireurs arose out of the misinterpretations of fortuitous occurrences in terms of preconceived notions. As they passed from mouth to mouth, they changed in form to fit the preconceptions more closely. He declares that people told these accounts in order that they might be in the center of attention. The author presents a substantial body of documentary evidence in support of most of the propositions he sets forth. To support some of his comments concerning distortions he draws upon the results of experimental studies. Although the evidence he presents does not necessarily justify some of his conclusions, the weight of circumstantial evidence seems to support his interpretations.

A brief discussion of rumors can be found in the report on the race riot in Chicago in 1919. According to the report:

"Rumors which significantly affect race relations consist largely of unfounded tales, incorrectly deduced conclusions, or partial statements of fact with significant content added by the narrator, all of which are given easy and irresponsible circulation by a credulous public during the excitement of a clash."

After presenting a series of examples, the writers focus their attention

41. Ibid., p. 568.
on the effects of the rumors. They declare that rumors produce a state of mind that prepares the mob for direct suggestions impelling otherwise law-abiding citizens to atrocities. Rumors create resentment, fear, and a desire for retaliation; rumor, then, is a step in the formation of a crowd. The origin and spread of rumors is explained in terms of a desire on the part of excited individuals to tell a big story to create a sensation. Because of the feelings of animosity that existed at the time, some made an effort to tell the worst story they could. While this explanation is quite plausible, no direct evidence is presented to substantiate it.

The second systematic study of rumor is that of Prasad.\(^42\) Prasad's analysis is based upon an examination of thirty rumors collected immediately after the great Indian earthquake of 1934. These rumors are classified into three groups: (1) exaggerations and fabrications, (2) astrological forecasts, and (3) attempts at explanation. He then describes the characteristics of the type of social situation which he believes to be conducive to the spread of rumors. The typical situation in which rumors thrive is one which sets up an emotional disturbance, one which is uncommon and unfamiliar to the people, one with many aspects unknown to the individuals affected, one involving unverifiable factors, and one in which the group interest is aroused. Fear is the dominating mood in such a situation. The situation in which rumors are most likely to flourish is one in which the initial shock is converted into persistent emotional instability by other events and rumors. This condition may last until the people become accustomed to the situation so that it no longer seems strange.\(^43\) Rumor is considered a group response to such a situation.


\(^43\) This study is of particular interest because of the similarity in the type of social situation described and that in which the persons of Japanese ancestry in America found themselves after the outbreak of war.
More specifically, rumors arise when there is a gap in the knowledge of
of the people:

"So long as a change in the environment remains unaccounted for, it leaves a
disturbing sense of incompleteness, and arouses a tendency to try to understand the meaning of the changed situation by a
process of completing the incomplete. This same process is sometimes
regarded as essentially nothing but rationalization. The point is
that what is wanting in the given situation, viz., a knowledge of the
causes of the change must be supplied in some way or other so that the
tension of incomplete apprehension may be relieved. Nor can the popular
mind postpone its judgments on the phenomenon until a thorough
and scientific investigation has provided a rational account of it. The
gap must be filled up immediately, the tension must be relieved
quickly, and to do this explanations must be promptly invented. The
explanations adopted are determined by group mentality, for they are
couched in terms of the traditional and cultural heritage peculiar
to the group. The second class of rumors ... are attempts on the
part of the popular mind to comprehend a strange phenomenon in such
forms of thought as are inherited by, and prevalent in, the group,
and acceptable to all its members." 44

People must have an explanation for a change in their environment. The
excitement caused by the shock lowers the critical ability of the individuals
and the rumors tend to be accepted and passed on without examination. Fur-
thermore, in a disaster comradeship is heightened by the realization that
everyone is in the same circumstances, and there tends to be an increase in
the sharing of reports.

In these studies, a considerable body of data is presented. However,
it is quite obvious that the generalizations made in the data alone were not suggested
by the data alone. Considered in the light of the data, however, all of
these generalizations seem far more plausible than those presented by the
theorists.

Although there have been only a few experimental studies dealing with
rumors as such, there have been several investigations in several fields
that throw light upon the study of rumors. There have been studies on the
accuracy of observation45 and others on the reliability of court testimony. 46

44. Ibid. p. 7.
45. See, for example, Dorothy S. Thomas, Observational Studies of
46. See D. Slesinger and E.M. Filpelt, "Legal Psychology: A Bibliography
Since the work of Stern in 1902, there have been numerous experimental studies of psychological distortion. Two experimental studies which purport to deal with rumor may be considered.

Kirkpatrick conducted a classroom experiment to investigate (1) the distortion that takes place with the transmission of rumor, (2) the reports of students in regard to pleasant as compared with unpleasant rumors, (3) the influence of a precautionary phrase such as "it is rumored that", and (4) the influence of sex and intelligence upon belief. Students passed on to each other several stories that had been prepared in advance and then wrote down what they thought they had heard. Considerable distortion took place, and they were largely those of condensation, expansion and filling in gaps, and attempts to increase plausibility. There was contradictory evidence with reference to belief in pleasant and unpleasant reports. It was found that the phrase "it is rumored" had little or no effect.

Hartgenbusch also investigated the changes that take place when individuals tell a story. Sentences were read to subjects who were required to write down immediately what they heard. The omissions and changes were then noted. It was found that the central part of the report, judged by the experimenter as the essential idea, remained relatively constant. Peripheral ideas, however, were distorted. He concluded that the peripheral part of a rumor is changed more easily in the process of spread, although the central idea can also be changed.

Aside from these studies of rumor, there is a body of data which may

47. Arnold M. Rose, Op. Cit. Chapter II contains a summary of the studies of psychological distortion that are relevant to the study of rumor.
be quite useful. The works of Ponsonby50, Chadwick51, and Brit52, contain a large collection of rumors. Studies of critical situations, such as those of Mackay53, Prince54, and Cantril55, are also quite helpful. A thorough investigation of historical sources would undoubtedly uncover a considerable body of case materials for a study of rumor.56

---

**The Statement of the Problem**

In spite of the paucity of theories and empirical studies of rumor, the material is relatively rich in suggestions of problems for research and in plausible hypotheses. In spite of the divergence in viewpoints, virtually all students of rumor have centered their attention upon certain fundamental problems.

Various definitions of rumor have been offered, but all writers agree that the phenomenon is somehow involved in the process of communication. Most students have either implied or stated explicitly that rumor is a social phenomenon, although some have attempted to analyze the process of rumor-spreading in terms of the mechanisms of the individual's mind. For the purposes of this study, rumor may be defined as a report, true or false, about events of interest to the group, which is transmitted without verification from person to person among a fairly extensive portion of the interested collective body.

---

51. Thomas Chadwick, *On* C.
56. Bibliography C contains a brief list of source materials on rumor.
Rumor may be distinguished from other similar forms of communication. Bysow distinguished between rumor and gossip by stating that gossip is private and intimate and is concerned with the conduct of concrete persons. Rumor, on the other hand, has a public character and is concerned with important events. This distinction may be refined further. Rumors may be about persons, providing the activities of those persons are thought to be of importance to the entire group. Gossip is concerned with the trivial and personal; rumor, with that which is of significance to virtually all members of the group.

Rumor may also be distinguished from legends, myths, and folktales. The latter phenomena are passed on from generation to generation, but rumors generally last for only a few weeks or a month. The criteria of differentiation is the time span of these unverified accounts.

In spite of the paucity of theories and empirical studies of rumor, the material is relatively rich in suggestions of problems for research and in plausible hypotheses. In spite of the divergence in viewpoints, virtually all students of rumor have centered their attention upon certain fundamental problems. These basic problems may be reviewed briefly, even though all of them will not be considered in this study.

Several writers have been concerned with the problem of origins. They have sought to explain the origin of rumors in terms of false perception and misinterpretations of fortuitous occurrences, but origins are extremely difficult to determine. Unless an investigator is extremely fortunate, it is highly unlikely that he will be able to gather verifiable data on the origin of any rumor. To lead to more fruitful research, the problem may be restated: what is the nature of the circumstances in which rumors emerge? With reference

58. Arnold M. Rose, Op. Cit., Chapter I, contains a series of distinctions between rumor and a number of similar phenomena.
to this problem, Prasad has presented a plausible hypothesis. He declared that rumors arose to fill gaps in the public knowledge about events thought to be of importance by the group. Van Langenhove has demonstrated that rumors arise when the attention of the group is focused upon some object. Knapp has suggested that rumors emerge in situations in which there is a high degree of social interaction.

A few writers have concerned themselves with the problem of the determination of the contents of rumors. It is difficult to speak of the specific content of a rumor because rumors frequently change in form as they spread. However, the problem may be stated: what are some of the factors involved in determining the specific form taken by rumors both in their original and distorted forms? Van Langenhove has shown how the existing beliefs of the people influence the form taken by rumors, and Oman has presented the hypothesis that the content of a rumor is determined by "reasoned expectation." The psychopathologists have suggested that the content of rumors express certain fundamental but repressed desires of the individuals spreading the rumors.

Virtually all students of rumor have been concerned with the mechanisms involved in the spread of rumors. How can one account for the uncritical acceptance and retelling of unverified and perhaps suspicious reports? Several writers, particularly Lapiere, have presented the hypothesis that rumors spread because they provide individuals with an opportunity for enhancing their position in their group. Others have suggested that rumors spread in crisis situations because individuals have a lower critical ability when they are in circumstances that are not conventionally defined. Prasad has suggested that in critical situations people conceive of themselves as having been reduced to similar circumstances and attempt to assist each other by providing everyone with the latest information. Bysow and some of the recent writers have called attention to the use of rumors...
by interested persons or groups for some ulterior purpose.

Closely related to the problem of the spread of rumors is that of the disappearance of rumors. Under what circumstances do rumors disappear and under what circumstances are they perpetuated until they become a part of the traditional beliefs of the people? Only scant attention has been paid to this problem. LaPiere declared that rumors disappeared as soon as everyone had heard them, and Rose has suggested that rumors disappear when definite news appears or when people lose interest in the object with which the rumor deals.

Some writers have been concerned with the problem of the effect of rumors. Van Langenhove demonstrated how rumors changed the attitudes of the German people, and the study of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations shows how rumors serve to mobilize people for action. Prasad presents the hypothesis that rumors perform the function of explaining a situation that was hitherto a mystery.

One additional question may be raised which has not concerned any student of rumor. Most writers have assumed that rumors become distorted as they spread, and some have even conceived of rumor as a process of distortion. This problem is worthy of further investigation. Do all rumors change in the process of retelling? If not, what are the conditions under which distortions are most likely to occur? Eysow has suggested certain conditions under which rumors would remain relatively constant in form, but his hypothesis remains to be investigated.

These problems refer to the nature of rumor as such, and they will be kept in mind; however, the study to follow will be oriented along somewhat different lines. The study to follow is concerned with the function of rumor in a certain type of critical situation—a situation characterized by sustained collective insecurity.

The fundamental assumption upon which the organization of the study and
the selection of data have been based is that rumor cannot be studied in isolation from the social situation in which they flourish. By definition rumor is a social phenomenon, and its transmission necessarily involves a process of communication between at least two persons. Rumors gain their character in the interaction between persons. Since rumors do not arise spontaneously from a vacuum, it is not possible to understand the phenomenon without a knowledge of the setting in which they emerged and spread. Rumors deal with events, and one must know what events occurred and how they were interpreted by the people in order to understand the rumors. Rumors, therefore, cannot profitably be studied in terms of what is intrinsic in the rumor itself, but must be studied in terms of the condition of experience of the people among whom they spread. Consequently, in the study that follows, attention will be given not to the nature of rumor itself but rather to the relation of rumor to the social situation.

During the first twenty weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the persons of Japanese ancestry in California were characterized by uncertainty and apprehensions. Numerous events occurred that seemed to threaten the very existence of the group. Contradictory announcements added to the confusion, and no one knew exactly what to anticipate. This period was marked by the emergence of thousands of rumors. Internal cleavages within the community were seldom effective in holding rumors within limited areas of communication, for the impending events with which the rumors dealt seemed to affect the security of the entire group. An ideal situation for the emergence and spread of rumors was presented.

This thesis is centered around the problem of how rumors function in this type of critical situation. In considering the function of rumor in a critical situation, we shall be concerned with the following sub-problems:
(1) What are the characteristics of the specific situations in which rumors emerge?

(2) What are some of the factors involved in determining the specific forms taken by rumors?

(3) What are the specific circumstances in which rumors spread?

(4) What are the circumstances in which rumors disappear?

What are the effects of rumors in a critical situation?

All of these problems will be considered with reference to the role of rumor in a critical situation.

59. The term "function" is here used in the sense defined by Radcliff-Brown: "the contribution which a partial activity makes to the total activity of which it is a part. The function of a particular social usage is the contribution it makes to the total social life as the functioning of the total social system." A.R. Radcliff-Brown, "On the Concept of Function in Social Sciences," American Anthropologist, XXXVII (1935), p. 397.

60. Not all critical situations have the same characteristics. Critical situation in general may be defined as a situation in which the conventional understandings guiding behavior are no longer operative. The "type" of critical situation with which we are concerned in this study is one in which the condition of unrest resulting from an initial shock is sustained by a series of events which make adjustment impossible.

The restriction of the problem in this study raises the question of whether rumors in a stable situation differ from those in critical situations, but this matter is beyond the scope of the study. Some students of rumor apparently made their observations in relatively stable situations, and consequently the failure of these studies to substantiate their hypotheses may not necessarily invalidate their contentions.
CHAPTER II

THE BACKGROUND OF PRE-EVACUATION RUMORS

Of the 126,947 persons of Japanese ancestry who were residing in the United States in 1940, 112,353 lived in the three Pacific Coast states. There were 93,717 in California alone.\(^1\) The vast majority of these individuals, especially in California, lived in the tightly-knit communities frequently referred to as "Little Tokyo's." It was within the texture of social relations in these ghettos that many Nisei spent their lives, leaving it only for school and for the market. These communities were socially self-sufficient, and it was possible for individuals to live their entire lives within these microcosms.\(^2\) The aspirations of the Nisei and the values they lived by were molded in associations with others in the confines of the communities. Although many left to earn a living elsewhere, their behavior was guided by patterns sanctioned in the Japanese community; it was in the Japanese group that the activities of most Nisei took meaning.

Factors Affecting Race Relations

Although most Nisei lived in accordance to the conventional understandings of the Japanese, it was inevitable that they would have contacts with others.


2. 79,642 of the Japanese population were American citizens by birth. The term "Nisei" refers to those who were born and educated in the United States. The term "Issei" refers to the alien immigrants, and the term "Kibei" is used to refer to those born in the United States and educated in Japan. These groups were by no means homogeneous in composition.

3. There were some Issei women who never went further than a half mile from their homes in all the time that they had been in the country.
the remainder of the population. In school and at work and in their patronage of commercialized recreation facilities, the Nisei mingled to some extent with Caucasians. Although there was no established code of race relations guiding the relationships between Orientals and Caucasians, there were certain understandings which guided the behavior of both groups. The inferior status of a colored minority was assumed by many Nisei, and some made special efforts to copy their Caucasian friends in order to become "American". Inter-racial marriage was forbidden by law, but the contacts were of such secondary nature that it was unlikely that substantial numbers would have mixed in this manner. Certain restaurants and hotels were believed to be closed to Nisei. Although such discriminatory practices were forbidden by law, very few Nisei patronized establishments reputed to be "anti-Nisei". Those who did rarely had the expected difficulty. There were a multitude of tales of discrimination, but the number who actually experienced it was rather small. Thus, even before the outbreak of the war, most Nisei conceived of their status as being inferior and expected discriminatory treatment in their associations with Caucasians.

Actually, the "imagined" discrimination cannot be understood except in terms of the historical experiences of the group. The conflicts that had taken place between the Orientals and the Caucasians on the Pacific Coast had given rise to a number of legends on the part of both groups.

Before 1891 the number of Japanese immigrants in the continental United States was small, never exceeding more than 1,000 in any single year; however, from this point onward the number increased considerably. In the decade from 1890 to 1900 between 25,000 and 30,000 came to this country, and in the following decade some 50,000 more followed. The employment was the one sphere in which discrimination was quite marked.

increasing number of Japanese in California led to riots and agitation, as had the coming of the Chinese a few decades before. The exclusionist activities in California remained sporadic and ineffectual until 1905, when, under the stimulus of the Russo-Japanese war, they flared up with vigor. The number of incidents, such as stoning and spitting on the Japanese residents, increased, and several business establishments were damaged. The Japanese and Korean Exclusion League was organized in 1905, and in spite of the efforts of President Theodore Roosevelt the agitation continued. In 1908 the "Gentlemen's Agreement" was signed, but since "picture brides" were still admitted the agitation was continued until 1924 when the Oriental Exclusion Act was passed by Congress. Among the popular beliefs about the Japanese at that time were that they bred very rapidly and that they were importing women for immoral purposes. Other common beliefs were that the Japanese worked inhumanly long hours and were seeking to drive their Caucasian competitors out of business. Much of the antagonism against the Japanese was the incidental result of the efforts on the part of land-owners to perpetuate the system of large-scale intensive farming. After the heat of the conflict had passed, there were but a few outbreaks of violence, but many of the popular beliefs took a legendary form.

When Japan emerged as a world power, there arose a series of stories which tended to reinforce the already existing beliefs of the people. As


6. Varden Fuller, in his carefully documented study, writes, that the Japanese labor "enabled the perpetuation of an organizational structure which had been founded with the Chinese. In the interval between plentiful Chinese and Japanese labor, the structure had been maintained by depression-opportunity whites. The Japanese came at a strategic moment of prosperity-opportunity for the local whites and carried the system through until recurring depression again gave it security." See "The Supply of
one writer wrote:

In a long series of alarms, beginning with the San Francisco public school troubles, the Japanese have been accused of preparing for war with us by buying 750,000 rifles from the Crucible Steel Co. (1908); of plotting against us in Hawaii and the Philippines (1909); of discriminating against our commerce by means of transportation rebates on the Manchurian railways (1909); of excluding Americans from the Manchurian mining fields (1909); of seeking to monopolize the truck-farming lands in California (1909); of sinking the drydock Dewey in Manila Bay (1910); of planting mines in that same bay (1910); of taking soundings and making charts of California harbors (1910); of secretly taking photographs and making maps on the coast of Alaska (1911); of trying to get supreme control of Manchuria under pretense of fighting the bubonic plague (1911); of conspiring the Mexican insurgents against us (1912); of persecuting the American missionaries in Korea and trying to abolish Christianity there (1912); of conspiring with Germany to overthrow the Monroe Doctrine (1912); of attacking the American consul in New Chang (1912); of forming an alliance with our West Coast Indians against us (1912); of threatening to attack Java, thus compelling the Dutch to seek our support (1912); of trying to buy Lower California from Huerta (1914); of attempting to get spies into the fortifications of the Panama Canal (1915); of seeking to secure a foothold in Lower California by running a vessel ashore there and sending warships to assist in salvage operations (1915); of conspiring with Germany to get control of the San Ignas Indians in Panama (1916); of conspiring with Russia against us at least two or three times in the last ten years. 7

In 1915, the Hearst papers, which had been leading the "Yellow Peril" campaign, ran the headline: JAPAN'S PLANS TO INVADE AND CONQUER THE UNITED STATES REVEALED BY ITS OWN BERNHARDI. 8 In 1917, in the Zimmerman note publicity, the Japanese were alleged to have planned an alliance with Mexico to fight against the United States. 9 In 1920, the people of California voted to remove the right of the Japanese to lease land. After the passage of the Oriental Exclusion Act in 1924 the feeling against the Japanese began to wane, but from 1931 when Japan invaded Manchuria to the time of Pearl Harbor the feeling against Japan rose. During this latter period,

Agricultural Labor as a Factor in the Evolution of Farm Organization in California. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor (U.S. Senate) 76th Congress, Part 54, p. 19840.
These charges led to considerable excitement, and in 1920, the people of California voted to remove the right of the Japanese to lease land. The Immigration-Oriental Exclusion Act was passed in 1924.

The Issei were well aware of the charges that had been made about their alleged activities in the United States, and there was resentment. Since many of the Issei had gone through the experience of violence during the early part of the century, exaggerated accounts of these events spread among the Japanese. The Japanese had their own legends. Caucasians were referred to as "keto" and were believed to be untrustworthy individuals who were just waiting for opportunities to take advantage of helpless Orientals. An unusual propensity for committing acts of violence against the Japanese was attributed to them. Recurrent rumors were quite common about specific incidents in which certain individuals were supposed to have been spit on or in which someone's hotel was alleged to have been burned by hoodlums. The Issei made fun of the "strange" ways of the "keto." Most Nisei were familiar with these accounts, but they were less inclined to give credence to them than their parents because of their reasonably satisfactory relationships with Caucasians. However, the Nisei were hesitant in their contacts with Caucasians, and they frequently expected the worst. Caucasians who were friendly to the Japanese were considered exceptionally fine individuals; while the others were looked upon as typical "keto."

After the passage of the Oriental Exclusion Act, there seemed to be a progressive waning of the agitation against the Japanese. After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the feeling against Japan seemed to mount, but in spite of the gravity of the international situation, the antagonism against the local Japanese residents and their children continued to decline. Although

10. "Keto" means literally "hairy barbarian" and is a derogatory term used to refer to Caucasians.
the trend of international relations had some effect on the adjustment of
the Nisei, in spite of this the relations between the two groups improved.
As the Nisei began mixing with the other American children in schools, the
local anti-Japanese measures were removed one by one. In 1941, for example,
the segregation of Nisei students in Florin, California, came to an end.12

Thus, out of a turbulent past, definite beliefs developed on the part
of both the Caucasians and the Japanese. These beliefs remained in the
memories of the people and served as points of reference whenever some cri-
tical situation arose. Since relatively few members of the two groups
met in informal situations marked by congeniality, even after the open con-
flicts had ceased, the beliefs remained and became ingrained in the tradi-
tional beliefs of the people.

11. See Forrest E. LaViolette, "The American-Born Japanese and the
World Crisis," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, VII
(November, 1941), pp. 517-27.
12. Shin Se-Kai, May 29, 1941. Florin was the center of some of the
most violent anti-Japanese demonstrations. The segregated schools in the
Walnut Grove area were continued until the time of evacuation.
The Structure of the Japanese Communities

In spite of the seemingly stable atmosphere, the nihonmachi were undergoing drastic change at the time of the outbreak of war. The areas of activity which were conventionally defined were getting smaller and smaller. Conflict between the generations was becoming common.

Spurned by the American public, the Issei had built a community which was essentially Japanese. The social structure was based on the ethical code of Japan which defined roles and set up a network of mutual obligations. There was considerable in-group feeling in everything except economic competition where the Japanese engaged in cut-throat competition. Crimes committed by Japanese were not reported to the police unless they were of a drastic nature, for fear that having a Japanese jailed would reflect upon the reputation of the group. Minor offenses were forgotten, and the phrase "nihon-jin de-shi da-ka-ra" was quite common. The social organization was based essentially on kinship, and the group managed to maintain its solidarity to the time of the war.

The Nisei, however, did not accept the traditional practices of their parents. To begin with, the two generations had difficulties in commun-

---

14. A rough translation would be "after all, we are all Japanese".
eating with each other because of differences in language, and the influence of the values taught in the public schools and in American movies was quite noticeable. The Nisei got images of their expected roles from the movies and from the behavior of their classmates, and as they began coming of age in the late thirties, conflicts became more vigorous between the two generations.\textsuperscript{16} By 1940, however, the older generation began to back down. The older Nisei had borne the brunt of parental displeasure, but their younger brothers and sisters had less difficulty in getting consent to attend dances since the parents were already familiar with the American practice and had found it useless to oppose. Activities like the "dance-practice" became common among the Nisei, and courtship patterns among the Nisei became essentially American.

As the Nisei came of age in large numbers, they did not go out into the American community. Rather they tended to develop a society of their own. Among the Issei, prestige was based upon family background, economic status, and occupation; among the Nisei prestige was based upon athletic prowess, scholastic ability to some extent, and personal characteristics. The Nisei society was essentially an American society, with the major preoccupations of the members being on the dances, sports contests, and pageants. In spite of this, however, rarely did a Nisei participate in affairs held by Caucasians; in fact, the Nisei who did mingle with Caucasians were criticized as individuals who "think they are too good for us." The Nisei developed a set of conventional understandings among themselves. They therefore lived in a society within a society within a society.

The Nisei as a group seem to have been characterized by insecurity. From their early childhood, they had been told about the endeavors of the American-Japanese population in America, because of the cessation of immigration in 1924. The major part of the Nisei were born between 1915 and 1925. According to the 1930 Census, the largest age groups at that time were 5-9 and 45-54. From their early childhood, they had been told about the endeavors of the

\textsuperscript{16} The Japanese population in America has a rather odd age distribution because of the cessation of immigration in 1924. The overwhelming majority of Nisei were born between 1915 and 1925. According to the 1930 Census, the largest age groups at that time were 5-9 and 45-54. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, "Population," II, p. 586.
Caucasians to mistreat them; some had been segregated into separate schools for Orientals. They could not conceive of themselves as being Americans on an equal level with all others. At the same time, many Nisei realized that they were not Japanese and could not get along in Japan. Many who had gone to Japan returned after a miserable experience. The Nisei did not know where they stood. Some Issei taught their children that the job of the Nisei was to introduce Japanese culture into America and bring American culture to Japan, but this rather common belief was often not satisfying. It was therefore almost impossible for a Nisei to develop a relatively consistent picture of his future except in terms of the Nisei society. As more and more Nisei graduated from colleges and found themselves doing menial work in fruit stands and farms, the difficulties were accentuated.

The Nisei by no means a homogeneous group. They were split among themselves by hostilities sometimes stronger than those directed against outsiders. In some cities the Christians and the Buddhists did not get along; the Kibei, the Hawaiian Nisei, and the continental Nisei were fighting among themselves. In the scramble for prestige within the Nisei groups, strong animosities were created. Some were studious and conscientious; others thought only "suckers" worked. Some obeyed every wish of their parents; others hardly ever paid attention to their elders. Many older Nisei businessmen voted Republican; some of the younger were Communists. In spite of this heterogeneity, however, there was an in-group feeling, based primarily on a recognition of the fact that none of them could be accepted at an equal status with other Americans. Almost all Nisei looked upon themselves as members of a colored minority.

From Pearl Harbor to Evacuation

The attack on Pearl Harbor came like a thunderstorm from a clear and cloudless sky. For persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States it initiated a period of emotional crisis, extreme insecurity, conflicts of loyalty, misunderstanding, and persecution. Everything that could be vaguely identified with Japan was denounced as having a partnership in the treachery. Innocent activities were suddenly looked upon as spy rings and schools for saboteurs, and Jap-baiting became a safe and profitable pastime for politicians and super-patriots. As shocked as the general American population was, to no segment of the population did the attack strike harder than to those of Japanese ancestry. As one Nisei later remarked:

"Right after the war broke out, I really thought that the worst would come. I thought that the Nisei would be beaten up and lynched right and left. I kept wondering what I would do if a mob came after me. Those were the kind of things I thought about. It couldn’t be helped. You just thought of those things, that’s all. The only consolation that I had was the feeling that after all all of us won’t be killed. Some of us will come out of it alive. Then I figured we could live again like human beings. I figured the best thing to do was to sit tight and hope for the best. I remembered that one of my teachers told me once that when you didn’t know what to do, you ought to sit tight because then you couldn’t make the situation any worse. I figured that you could wait until it was all over and then you could think of the exciting experiences that you went through.”

The report of the attack was an unbelievable nightmare, no less fantastic than the Orson Welles dramatization of the attack from Mars. Small groups gathered everywhere and excitedly discussed the one obvious topic. In the midst of the excitement, everyone seemed to be at a loss as to what to do. Rumors spread quickly explaining in detail exactly what had happened at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. Among the current rumors that affected

18. 23-year old Nisei, December 13, 1943.
19. For a general account of the American reaction to the attack, see "The U.S. at War," Time, XXXVIII (December 15, 1942), pp. 17-19; and the Time-Life-Fortune News Bureau, War Comes to the U.S.—Dec. 7, 1941; The First 30 Hours, (Chicago, 1943).
the resident Japanese population were the following:20

(1) One of the Japanese pilots shot down over Pearl Harbor was wearing an American-made watch and had papers showing that he was a graduate of the University of California.

(2) Japanese residents in Hawaii served as fifth columnists and drove trucks in the way of military personnel rushing to their positions to defend the island.

(3) Resident Japanese in Hawaii took their arms and fired upon the American soldiers defending the island.

(4) Japanese farmers in Hawaii had planted their crops in such a fashion that the rows pointed to the airfields and other important defense installations.21

In spite of these accusations and the excitement, the American public was surprisingly tolerant, and incidents involving the Japanese were rare and scattered. Before the initial adjustment could be made, there was indecision, hesitancy, and fear. Persons of Japanese ancestry did not know what to do, where to turn, what to expect. The Caucasians also seemed to be perplexed, not knowing what to expect from the Japanese. As the federal government issued a series of restrictions curtailing the activities within the nihonmachi, fear within the small colonies mounted. Curious crowds surrounded the "Little Tokyo's" to see what was happening, and in some cities the areas inhabited by Japanese were patrolled by local police, shore patrols, and military police to prevent any outbreaks of violence. These precautions, while they were appreciated by the Japanese, only tended to make them more apprehensive. All normal functions of the communities ceased, and the nihonmachi were desolate. "What is to become of us?" was the question foremost in the minds of the people.

20. For other rumors of this nature see George Britt, Rumors (made in Germany). (New York: Council for Democracy, 1942).

21. All of these rumors were spread throughout the nation, and some of them were incorporated into movies like Air Force. However, the Department of Justice announced later that "there was no sabotage committed there (Pearl Harbor) prior to December 7, on December 7, or subsequent to that time." U.S. House of Representatives, Fourth Interim Report of the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, 77th Congress, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 48.
The Treasury Department immediately seized all Japanese businesses, and all Japanese assets were placed under Federal control. All travel was forbidden for enemy aliens, and even the Nisei could not travel unless they could present birth certificates proving their citizenship. The F.B.I. arrested all suspicious aliens. By the end of the first week 1,370 Japanese, 1,002 Germans, and 169 Italians were seized throughout the nation.

During the second week of the war businesses were reopened, and travel restrictions were relaxed. The excitement of the first few days began to wane. There were only a few incidents involving Japanese, although some Nisei suffered uncomfortable experiences. The Issei were still fearful of their fate and avoided all contacts with Caucasians. Many Japanese lost their jobs, but otherwise there were but few outward expressions of hostility. Since almost everyone had expected the worst, amazement was expressed at the tolerance of Caucasians who sometimes went out of their way to express their sympathies. Many Caucasians, especially those who were acquainted with Nisei, made a distinction between the enemy and the resident Japanese population.

This period of quiet uncertainty lasted until late in December when there were sporadic outbursts of violence by Filipinos. These attacks on the Japanese followed the news of the bombing of the open city of Manila and its subsequent capture by Japanese forces. The terrorism was deplored and condemned both by Filipino leaders and the authorities. These attacks brought terror to the Japanese, and exaggerated reports further increased the intense fear of Filipinos. The attention of the people centered around the problem of how to cope with the attacks. Special precautions were taken, and whenever people got together they discussed the matter.

It was not until December 27, that Attorney General Biddle declared all short-wave radios, cameras, and firearms contraband for enemy aliens and required them to be turned in to officials by December 29. On New Year's Day the Justice Department released a drastic order which placed strict limitations on the travel of enemy aliens, but on January 8 this travel ban was again eased. No restrictions were placed on the Nisei. The constant changing of regulations and the fact that they did not apply to all persons of Japanese ancestry caused considerable confusion.

During this period some of the Japanese took advantage of the situation and began profiteering, but in general the in-group feeling increased. Japanese hotel owners allowed tenants to stay without paying rent, and professional men rendered services without fees. Because of the absence of agitation and violence, many came to feel that things would not be as bad as they had anticipated. As one Issei remarked:

"I really don't think that the way that we are being treated is so bad. After all, just imagine what would happen to us if we were enemies in Japan. I remember some of the things that they used to do. Only with a small incident, people would crowd around some embassy and start throwing stones. The Japanese people were that way, but the Americans are more intelligent. Yes, if we were enemies in Japan we would have been mobbed long ago. This treatment really isn't so bad." 23

It was toward the end of January that the pleas for tolerance by public officials were replaced by demands for action against the Japanese in America. Although some agitation had started prior to this time, not much attention had been paid to it. Gradually, however, the tide began to mount. John S. Hughes began to attack the group in his radio programs, and the Dies Committee attributed the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor to fifth-columnists.

On January 29, the Attorney General established prohibited zones from

23. 60-year old Issei, January 11, 1942.
which all enemy aliens were to be excluded. Subsequent orders were issued on January 31, February 2, February 4, February 5, and February 7. Since the Japanese had nowhere to go, they simply moved out of the prohibited areas and started living with friends or relatives nearby—often adjacent to the area from which they had been forced to leave. During the middle of February the Justice Department announced that it could not act against Nisei except within the limits prescribed by law, and on February 19, President Roosevelt signed an executive order authorizing the Army to prescribe military areas from which any person could be excluded.

On February 23, as President Roosevelt addressed the nation, an enemy submarine emerged about seven miles north of Santa Barbara and fired shells at an oil refinery for 20 minutes. On the following night, "enemy planes" were reported over Los Angeles and anti-aircraft batteries fired away for almost two hours causing considerable damage throughout the city. This was a period of pessimism. The enthusiasm that had marked the first month when most people were confident that the enemy could be beaten in a short while gave way to a more sober realization that defeat might be possible. As the Japanese Army continued its successful campaigns, anxieties began to develop. To quote Time:

This was the worst week of the war. The nation took one great trip-hammer blow after another—vast, numbing shocks. It was a worse week for the U.S. than the fall of France; it was the worst week of the Century. Such a week had not come to the U.S. since the blackest days of the Civil War. Now, as in 1864, the fate of the nation was plainly in the balance. Now, as in 1864, only immediate and sustained miracles of effort and speed could tip the scales in the nation's favor.

It was during this period of gloom that the campaign against the resident Japanese population took root. Various local and state officials as

well as professional agitators began demanding the removal of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast. At first the attacks were directed against aliens, but in time the Nisei were included. The F.B.I. raids continued as they had in the past, but the Pacific Coast press suddenly began to give them prominent attention. Sensational charges were printed. By March 19, when the announcement was made that there had been no sabotage in Hawaii, it was too late, and many newspapers did not carry the report at all.

As the hysteria began to mount, the reaction of the Japanese and particularly the Nisei was one of bitterness and resentment. The people were confused and did not know what to expect. Rumors became prevalent, and they added to the confusion. Since the newspaper headlines constantly referred to the F.B.I. raids, the attention of the Japanese became focused upon this object. There was fear on the part of most Issei that they were next in line for arrest. Many persons scrutinized their past records searching for possible reasons for arrest. As innocent men were arrested, there was resentment, and suspicions suspicions about "stool-pigeons" became widespread. Anything that might possibly be conceived as evidence against them was destroyed, and the problem of avoiding arrest became the central preoccupation of the Japanese. Rumors of ill-treatment after arrest added to the fears and resentments. Whenever people gathered, there were speculations as to why certain individuals had been arrested and what constituted contraband. There was considerable excitement about this.

On March 2, General DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, designated as a military area approximately half the states of Washington, Oregon, and California and a small strip of Arizona.²⁷

In the news release that accompanied the proclamation, he intimated that if certain classes of individuals did not leave this area voluntarily, they may be forced to leave at a later date. Since the press had been predicting that evacuation was imminent, many interpreted this announcement as an evacuation order. Some groups left the areas voluntarily, but it was not long before reports came back to the communities that these individuals had been mistreated. The people did not know what to do. At first they did not know whether or not they were to be evacuated. After the announcement, they did not know whether or not to leave voluntarily. No definite information was available, and no one knew what was to be expected or what was to be done. No one knew when evacuation was coming or who would be evacuated. Whenever the Japanese gathered, these questions were thoroughly discussed, and every hint dropped by the authorities was carefully scrutinized and interpreted. During March the question of evacuation occupied the center of attention among the Japanese. There was still considerable uncertainty over whether or not citizens would be evacuated and whether or not members of a family would be separated.

On March 14, the W.C.C.A. (Wartime Civil Control Administration) was established as an agency of the Western Defense Command to have direct supervision of the evacuation program. The Federal Reserve Bank and the Farm Security Administration were authorized as agencies to assist the evacuees with their problems. On March 18, the President signed an executive order creating the War Relocation Authority. By this time, evacuation became certain, and the agitation began to decrease in tempo. Most of the Japanese came to accept the fact that they would eventually be evacuated, but they still were unable to lay their plans because they did not know when.

28. The classes of persons referred to were Japanese aliens, Americans of Japanese ancestry, German aliens, Italian aliens, and others considered dangerous by the Army. There was no certainty attached to this announcement. General DeWitt simply stated that these classes "may be" affected by subsequent evacuation orders.
In spite of the fact that persons of Japanese ancestry were faced with one of the greatest crises that ever confronted the group, they had no definite information other than that sooner or later they would be asked to leave their homes.

On March 23, a group of 1,000 volunteers from Los Angeles left for Manzanar to assist in preparing the new community for the later arrival of the others. On the same day, the Army issued its first exclusion order evacuating all persons of Japanese ancestry, aliens and citizens alike, from Bainbridge Island.29 On March 25, the Army announced new curfew and travel regulations for all persons of Japanese ancestry, requiring them to be in their places of residence between the hours of 8 P.M. and 6 A.M., forbidding possession of contraband, and barring travel of more than five miles from their homes without special permits.30 Voluntary evacuation was allowed to continue until March 29, and then was prohibited. On March 30, 3,000 people were ordered to evacuate Terminal Island by April 5 and to move to the Santa Anita Assembly Center. Exclusion orders for other areas came in rapid succession, and by June 6, all persons of Japanese ancestry31 were evacuated to the 17 Assembly Centers from which they were subsequently transferred to the 10 relocation centers.32

30. Western Defense Command and the Fourth Army, Public Proclamation No. 3, (Presidio in San Francisco, March 24, 1942). This was the first official order that affected citizens and aliens alike. After this order it became definite that the Army would treat citizens and aliens alike.
31. The evacuation was strictly on a racial basis, and all persons with more than a certain percentage of "Japanese blood" were excluded from the military areas. Persons of Japanese ancestry who had married Caucasians, Filipinos, Chinese, or Negroes, as well as their children were all evacuated and were not allowed to leave the centers until several months later.
32. An Assembly Center is "a convenient gathering point within the military area, where evacuees live temporarily while awaiting the opportunity for orderly, planned movement to a Relocation Center outside of the military area." A Relocation Center is "a pioneer community, with basic housing and protective services provided by the Federal Government, for occupancy by evacuees for the duration of the war." War Relocation Authority, Questions and Answers for Evacuees, (Washington, D.C., 1942).
As the evacuation actually got under way, the Japanese seemed quite relieved. They accepted their fate almost cheerfully, although naturally no one was pleased at the prospect of leaving home. It was the indefiniteness that had weighed heavily upon the Japanese. Many sighed in relief, glad that the suspense and waiting was over, and went about the business of clearing up their affairs and preparing for camp life. Everywhere the evacuation orders were greeted with relief; "At last it has come. Now we know what to do." The public hysteria also began to wane. Newspapers began carrying pictures of evacuee life in Manzanar, and the Japanese made preparations with these in mind. The people were preoccupied with the problem of what to do about their property and how to prepare adequately for their new lives. Occasional resentments were aroused against the profiteers who preyed upon the people. Those who had gone ahead in advance crews wrote their friends about what was to be expected, and these letters were discussed avidly. Rumors began to circulate about the poor conditions in camp, and there was some concern over the future. Everyone was busily engaged in making preparations and all other things were of secondary importance.

With the outbreak of war, the persons of Japanese ancestry were thrown into a condition of sustained collective insecurity. The disruption brought about by the initial shock of the attack on Pearl Harbor was sustained through a series of contradictory announcements, alarms and reassurances, and lack of definite information that made collective adjustment impossible. There was confusion and uncertainty. There was no definite news about what was to happen and yet the people had a feeling that something was about to happen to them. The Japanese were quick to realize their own position. The country with which they were identified by the public was at war with the country in which they lived. The attack on Pearl Harbor had been of such a nature as to arouse hatred and thoughts of vengeance. Because of the
1. Rapid changes that disrupted normal routines
2. Need for you to get in action in
3. Absence of clear cut info.
4. Collective excitement resulting from collective insecurity
5. Marked interdependence of each other — de-pendence on each other’s info & opinions

Importance of pending event collective nature of need for info

Rapport
stories that they had heard of the treatment of Germans in the last war, they had fears of retaliation. The Nisei insisted that they were American citizens, but they well realized that they were not recognized as such by a large part of the American population. There was the feeling that they were at the mercy of something beyond their control. Their fate rested in the hands of Caucasians who in the past had been antagonistic and discriminatory. There were vague fears and apprehensions. The people were unable to act because they did not know what to anticipate. It was only when the exclusion orders were issued that they knew definitely what was going to happen, but when they heard about the camp conditions they were again fearful. The experience of persons of Japanese ancestry during the twenty weeks after the outbreak of war was indeed trying.

The State of Wartime Communication

There were several restrictions imposed by the government which tended to affect the modes of normal communication between the Japanese colonies. However, since the regulations were announced and retracted so frequently, many did not know precisely what they could do and what they could not do. Alien travel was restricted from the first day of the war. The two San Francisco Japanese newspapers were ordered closed by the Treasury Department, and it was not until December 29 that one of them was able to reopen. The other newspapers never did resume publication, and the Nichi Bei was the only Japanese language paper serving northern and central California. The curfew for aliens made visiting in the evenings impossible. Thus, many aliens were forced to rely upon their children and the American newspapers for their information. Because of the inability of many Issei to read English and because of the traditional distrust of American newspapers, there was really no source of information upon which the Issei could rely.
Furthermore, certain expectations of the Issei tended to hinder communication. It seemed only natural to them that in wartime letters should be censored. Many of the Issei recalled their experiences during World War I when all letters from Japan were censored. Many consequently feared to write, and when they later discovered that mail was not tampered with they expressed some surprise. Furthermore, the Japanese realized the position that they were in. They did not wish to do anything that might possibly arouse undue suspicions on the part of the American public. Consequently, meetings were discontinued, and the various activities which had hitherto provided media for communication were suspended. All-Japanese affairs were frowned upon on the grounds that the group would be too conspicuous and would invite criticism. Thus, some of the normal avenues of communication were disrupted.

It was almost inevitable that information would spread in a restricted manner largely through word of mouth. People even hesitated to use telephones for fear that they might be tapped. They realized that they were under suspicion. As various members of the family heard news at school, at work, in stores, and in barber shops, they would relate these accounts to the other members of the household at night. Because many Issei lacked sufficient facility in the use of the English language to read the complicated government orders and since the Nisei lacked sufficient knowledge of the Japanese language to translate them for their parents, misinterpretations were bound to arise.

When it became known that letters were not censored, people began to

33. As one Nisei who was anti-Japan remarked, "Some of these god damn Japs just can't see around their own noses. They will believe anything bad that is said about Chinese or hakujin, but when anybody says anything about the rape of Nanking, they claim that it's propaganda. Anything bad about Japan is propaganda; anything good is news. Why don't these damn bastards get on a ship and go back to the old country? They don't belong here." 21-year old Nisei student, October 30, 1941.
write their friends of what they had heard. This information was then discussed avidly in the circle of friends in which the letter was received.

Whenever people got together the subject of the conversation was the same: the war and the position of the Japanese in America. If the conversation did not center around the progress of the war, it was about the latest government regulation, moves on the part of individuals and groups to initiate action against the resident Japanese and Nisei, or about the special difficulties of the people. In December, the people were primarily preoccupied with their status in America and their physical well-being; late in December and early in January everyone was concerned about the problem of averting Filipino attacks; in February the conversations centered about the F.B.I. raids and the Japanese "stool-pigeons"; in the latter part of February and in March there was much discussion of whether or not evacuation would take place; and in April the attention of the people was focussed on camp conditions and how to prepare to meet them.

Since very few people knew the facts, any information heard was quickly passed on. People shaped their expectations in accordance to rumors; made plans in accordance to rumors; and were thrown into dejected states of mind as a result of rumors. It was impossible for anyone to check on these unconfirmed reports because no one—not even the authorities—knew what was to happen. One W.C.C.A. employee later related:

"To give you some idea of the mess that was going on, I'll tell you about one thing that happened to me when I was working for the W.C.C.A. I went to work one morning and every phone call that came in asked me if it were true that evacuation had been announced. They said that it was in the papers. I didn't know anything about it so about 10 o'clock I phoned the San Francisco office to ask them whether it was true. They said that they didn't know anything about it either but that since it was in the newspapers they thought it must be true. The man told me that the Army had apparently notified the press, but did not tell the federal agencies that were assisting in the program."34

Thousands of rumors spread during these twenty weeks.

34. 24-year old Nisei girl, March 27, 1944. Conversations with other W.C.C.A. workers--Nisei and Caucasians--revealed that this was not an isolated instance.
CHAPTER III

THE WAR TIME STATUS OF PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY

Since no definite etiquette of race relations had crystallized on the Pacific Coast, the relationship between the Caucasians and the Oriental minorities in California had never been clearly defined. The Nisei, however, came to look upon themselves as a persecuted minority, especially because of difficulties in finding employment and because of their traditional beliefs about discriminatory practices. The Japanese immigrants had also accepted the role of a racial minority. On the whole, with the exception of those individuals who were members of intellectual or organized labor groups, very little distinction was made between citizens and non-citizens. People conceived of themselves as nihonjin. Those who were citizens of the United States took the matter for granted, but generally expected differential treatment from other citizens. Regardless of citizenship, they thought they would be treated as nihonjin.

Within the group, there was some confusion as to the status of the Nisei. There was agreement that Nisei were legally American citizens, although many held dual-citizenship. However, the Nisei were not treated as Americans by their fellow citizens. On the other hand, it was well known that the Nisei who had gone to Japan had not been treated as Japanese, and that many had had difficulties because they were considered "foreigners." Racial ties were emphasized by many parents; citizenship was stressed in schools. There was therefore no clearcut definition of where the Nisei stood. The Issei had a country, but the Nisei had nothing definite to hang on to. There was actually more confusion in the United States than there

1. This term means "Japanese"
was in Japan, where Nisei were generally considered Americans.

In this confusion there developed a theory of Nisei destiny. A common belief was that the function of the Nisei was to show the American people some of the values of Japanese culture and to serve as "ambassadors of good will." This point was emphasized by several Japanese officials and was widely believed by the Issei. Some Nisei accepted this theory sincerely; others refused to have anything to do with Japan; still others did not give the matter any thought.

The status of the Issei was more definite. They were Japanese subjects, and they were not eligible for citizenship in the United States. It was believed, therefore, that their welfare rested upon the prestige of the Japanese government. The Issei often pointed to the Negroes and Chinese in contempt and stated that the latter were treated as they were because there were no powerful governments to insist upon their rights. All Issei, however, did not lean upon the Japanese government. Those who had American children considered themselves residents of the United States even though they were legally aliens.

What conventional practices that did exist guiding the relationships between Caucasians and Japanese broke down with the attack on Pearl Harbor. There was considerable confusion, and the Japanese did not know what to anticipate in their relationships with Caucasians. Persons of Japanese ancestry were unable to define their position in the wartime community.

Wartime Regulations and Legal Status

The outbreak of the war brought into sharp relief the fact that Nisei were American citizens. The Nisei suddenly became aware of certain rights that all citizens had. Because of the differential treatment of citizens and aliens by federal authorities, the aliens were subjected to drastic regulations, but the citizens were allowed to go about unmolested. The
Nisei were not treated as *nihonjin*, but as citizens.

The Issei were quick to realize that their children were Americans, and emphasized that the Nisei must be loyal to the United States. Issei leaders made pronouncements to this effect, and there were many Nisei protestations of loyalty. Many Nisei volunteered for the Army. If there was any opposition to this view, those who held them were hardly in a position to speak out. That the Nisei were to serve the United States, then, became the common view in the communities.

The Issei who thought that their position and well-being depended upon the Japanese government realized that they had nothing to fall back upon other than the citizenship of their children. They came to define their own position as those of enemy aliens, or at least as people who might be identified as such. Most Issei felt that they were at the mercy of the Americans and that they had no rights. On the whole, they expected the worst. They were certain that the full fury of American wrath and vengeance would descend upon them. The situation immediately brought back stories of the violence suffered by the Issei during the early years of the century.

The following were the official regulations that were imposed immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor:

1. All travel was forbidden for enemy aliens.

2. All business establishments owned or managed by enemy aliens were closed by order of the Treasury Department, pending examination of the books to determine the legitimacy of the business.

3. All bank accounts of enemy aliens were frozen, pending an examination by federal investigators.

4. Suspicious individuals were incarcerated, pending the clarification of their status.

In addition, local officials, fearing mob violence, made unofficial requests that:

1. All Japanese should avoid being on the streets and public places unless their presence is necessary.
2. They discontinue such activities that might arouse suspicion and misunderstanding.

In time, the regulations changed. Some were cancelled, and new ones came in rapid succession. The following are some of the changing regulations to which enemy aliens were subjected.

With reference to travel:

1. From December 7 onward, all cars operated by Japanese crossing the San Francisco Bay Bridge were carefully searched and registered.

2. During the second week of the war, travel restrictions were relaxed.

3. On January 1, new travel restrictions forbade aliens from leaving the municipality in which they had resided except for stated purposes unless they had special permission from the U.S. Attorney in their district.

4. On January 8, the travel ban was eased and aliens were allowed to travel freely within 50 miles of their homes.

With reference to business and financial resources:

1. During the second week of the war, the Treasury Department "unfroze" some of the alien funds; businesses were allowed to reopen.

2. On January 29, the Treasury Department announced that all enemy aliens with property valued over $1,000 must file a form at the Federal Reserve Bank.

3. On January 31, Governor Olson authorized the State Department of Agriculture to revoke food product licenses of enemy aliens.

4. On February 19, State Attorney General Warren ruled that the Trading with the Enemy Act did not allow for the wholesale revocation of professional and vocational licenses merely on the basis that people were enemy aliens.

With reference to legal status:

1. On January 6, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the right to sue would be denied to enemy aliens for the duration.

2. On February 19, Attorney General Biddle announced that enemy aliens could seek redress in courts.

Among other regulations were:

1. On December 27, all short-wave radios, cameras, and firearms were declared contraband for enemy aliens and had to be turned in to local officials by December 29.
2. On January 8, Attorney General Biddle announced that a re-registration of 1,100,000 enemy aliens would be undertaken from February 2 to 9.

3. On January 29 and on successive days, Attorney General Biddle designated prohibited zones from which all enemy aliens were ordered to move. Restricted zones were set up within which enemy aliens were subjected to curfew and a five mile travel limit.

As the regulations continued to change, the people did not know where they stood. Some of the new regulations seemed contradictory to the previous ones. The people did not know what they were supposed to do and what they could not do. They were anxious for definite information. The following rumors spread among the Japanese:

1. Japanese cannot go across the San Francisco Bay Bridge. (189)
2. All insurance policies held by Japanese are automatically cancelled. (323)
3. One man was arrested by the F.B.I. for staying out after curfew. (324)
4. The Japanese American News was closed by the F.B.I. (326)
5. No Japanese can travel on buses or trains. (396)
6. No one can sell books unless he has his birth certificate to prove that he is a citizen. (329)
7. The F.B.I. is stopping cars on all highways. One must always have his birth certificate. (330)
8. Aliens cannot travel over the San Francisco Bay Bridge unless they are with Nisei. (331)
9. All Nisei must sign in at the sentry box before they can cross the Bay Bridge. (332)

These rumors reflect the confusion that existed during this period.

1. All the rumors that spread among the Japanese are numbered consecutively in the text for easy reference. The numbers following the rumors correspond to the numbers assigned to these rumors in the chronological and area lists appearing in Appendices B and C.
With the exception of the first rumor, all have some basis of fact. Because of the uncertainty, people seized upon any bit of information that they could get and passed it on to their friends. During the first week of the war, the people were ready to believe almost anything, but as the weeks went by, they became more skeptical. Rumor (2) was widely believed, and Japanese insurance agents were deluged with phone calls asking what could be done about salvaging funds. The rumors about travel were apparently taken seriously, for aliens were quite careful about staying within the bounds of the law as they understood it. The aliens in particular were naturally concerned with incarceration and wanted to know all the regulations so that they would know what not to do. Actually the existence of these rumors only confused the situation more, but they served to make the aliens more cautious.

Rumors like tended to arouse resentment against railway and bus companies like the Southern Pacific and Greyhound Lines. Such companies were avoided.

As a result of these and similar rumors and the contradictory announcements, there was considerable confusion as to where the Issei stood. The Issei had expected to be deprived of everything, but certain announcements indicated that this would not be the case. What was the legal status of Issei? In this connection, the following rumors spread:

1. Aliens cannot get relief unless they are absolutely destitute. They are not treated on the same basis as others. (51)
2. People accepting federal relief will be deported at the end of the war. (55)
3. They are going to give Issei American citizenship. The J.A.C.O. is instigating such a program. (235)

The first two rumors are directly contradictory to the official announcements. Because they were long-time residents in the various counties, the Issei were eligible for relief under ordinary circumstances, but because of the war the people were a bit hesitant about applying. On the whole,
As a result of some of these regulations, some of the people were forced to suffer severe economic strain. In order to alleviate this situation, some of the following announcements were made:

1. On January 7, the California State Employment office announced that aliens in need and out of work were eligible to receive unemployment insurance checks.

2. On January 7, the San Francisco Public Welfare Agency agreed to aid Japanese families in need on the same basis as any other applicant.

3. On February 8, the Social Security Board announced that aliens losing jobs because of having to leave prohibited areas were eligible for unemployment compensation.

These announcements were contradicted by rumors that were quite widespread in the San Francisco Bay Region.

(10) Aliens cannot get relief unless they are absolutely destitute. They are not treated on the same basis as others. (61)

(41) People accepting federal relief will be deported at the end of the war. (66)

Because they were long-time residents in the various counties, the Issei were eligible for relief under ordinary circumstances, but because of the war the people were a bit hesitant about applying. On the whole, the Japanese rarely became relief clients even if they were destitute because of their fear of the sanctions of the community. However, with the outbreak of war many families and individuals found themselves without money and without any means of earning a livelihood. In many families the wage-earner was jailed. They were not able to impose upon their neighbors because they too were having difficulties. Although the community sanctions against relief never lifted, some individuals
were forced by the circumstances to consider the possibilities of applying. Very few Japanese had ever had contact with public welfare agencies before the war and did not know what to do. Furthermore, they did not know what the status of a person receiving relief would be. The Japanese had looked upon relief as something “wrong” and disgraceful and expected some penalty. Some destitute individuals were at a loss as to what to do. When in the relief-receiving class, some these rumors provided answers.

One 54-year old Issei woman said:

“I feel very sorry for Mr. Nagai. He has been all alone for so many years since he sent his wife and children to Japan. He sent every cent her earned to them and consequently has no money left now. He is out of work. Mr. Oyama suggested that he go to the county and ask for help, but I told him not to do that because then he might suffer later.”

As a result of these and similar rumors and the contradictory announcements, there was considerable confusion as to the legal status of the Issei. The Issei had expected to be deprived of everything, but certain announcements indicated that this would not be the case.

In this connection, the following rumor spread:

(12) They are going to give the Issei American citizenship. The J.A.C.I. is instigating such a program. (268)

The J.A.C.I. did at one time make a request to that effect, but nothing came of it. This rumor may have provided some hope to those Issei who wanted citizenship, but to the others it was only a matter of passing interest. Actually this rumor only confused the situation more than it was before.

2. Not all assistance from outside groups was defined as relief. Only the receiving money from public welfare agencies was frowned upon. The use of a County Hospital, for example, was sanctioned.

Other rumors arose which took into account some of the general restrictions naturally anticipated in wartime. One rumor that spread in Stockton led to large-scale purchases of Japanese foodstuffs.

Only one carload of rice is allowed in a given period. Therefore no more rice is shipped to the Coast from Arkansas. (392)

Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the Japanese store owners were flooded with orders for Japanese food which the people naturally did not expect to get any longer. Soy-sauce, canned Japanese food, and rice were sold at high prices. After the price of Japanese food skyrocketed, people began to realize that rice was not imported and that therefore there was really no cause for alarm. It was at this time, that this rumor arose. Some, who took the rumor seriously, continued to lay their stores of rice at the profiteers' prices.

4. Several Stockton people have attributed this rumor to one Issei woman who managed one of the larger Japanese food stores. Immediately after the outbreak of war, this woman phoned all her customers and took huge orders at extremely high prices. She fell into disrepute, but had no alternative but to continue to buy Japanese goods from her at her prices because of previous commitments.
the Japanese had rarely become relief clients even if they were destitute because of their fear of the sanctions of the community. However, with the outbreak of war many families and individuals found themselves without money and without any means of earning a livelihood. In many families the wage-earner was jailed. They were not able to impose on their neighbors because they too were having difficulties. Although the community sanction against relief was never lifted, some individuals were forced by the circumstances to consider the possibilities of applying. Very few Japanese had ever had contact with public welfare agencies before the war and did not know what to do. Furthermore, they did not know what the status of a person receiving relief would be. To some, these rumors provided the answers.

The third rumor is a slight exaggeration. The JACL at one time did make a request to that effect, but nothing came of it. This rumor may have provided hope to those Issei who wanted citizenship, but to the others it was a matter of passing interest because they realized that most Issei did not know enough English to qualify anyway. Actually, these rumors confused the situation more than it was before.

There were many rumors among Caucasians about sabotage and espionage by Japanese on December 7. There were other rumors about fifth columnists in the country such as the following:

1. The Japanese farmers in central California have machine guns hidden away. I know of an actual instance when one small child unwittingly told his school teacher of his father's guns.

2. All fishing vessels in Terminal Island owned by Japanese are equipped with guns and over half the men running them are a part of the Japanese Imperial Navy.

3. There was an elderly couple in the vicinity of San Diego who worked as domestics. They were trusted and also were "nice" people. When the F.B.I. raided their place, they found a short-wave receiver and sending set.

---

2. Note all assistance from outside groups was considered relief. Only the money received from public welfare agencies was sanctioned. The use of a County Hospital, for example, was sanctioned.
Most Japanese were inclined to laugh at these rumors, but whether they believed them or not, they realized that they were under suspicion. They therefore placed certain restrictions upon themselves in order to avoid all situations that might be considered suspicious. Among some of these self-imposed restrictions were: (1) the curtailment of all recreational activities that would bring together large numbers of Nisei; (2) the curtailment of the use of the Japanese language in public, and (3) remaining indoors at night. Anything that tended to make the group conspicuous was avoided. Realizing the gravity of the situation, local community leaders warned the people. For example, on December 7, Joseph Hikida, secretary of the Japanese Association of America, requested all residents in Japanese quarters to remain indoors to avoid incidents. Since these practices sometimes became widespread, they were sometimes confused with the official regulations. Sometimes the people did not know which rules were official and which were not. The following rumors reflect this uncertainty:

1. A Nisei walking around during a blackout was arrested by the F.B.I.
2. The Berkeley Hills are covered with fortifications and any Nisei caught there will be turned in by the F.B.I.

It seemed to be "common sense" that the Nisei should not go wandering about during a blackout where they might be mistaken for saboteurs, but there were no blackout rules applying to Nisei that did not apply to the general population. Furthermore, it seemed reasonable to assume that the Berkeley Hills overlooking the San Francisco Bay would be fortified, but there were no announced restrictions applying to Nisei.

Because of their close identification with Japan, the Buddhists were considerably more under suspicion than the remainder of the Japanese. The

Buddhists, recognizing this, made certain rules in order to avoid any additional stigma. Some Buddhist priests were arrested by the F.B.I., but others were not even questioned. Not much was known about what actually happened, and rumors like the following spread:

(16) The F.B.I. placed all Buddhist reverends in San Francisco in confinement in their quarters. (325)

(17) No sermons could be delivered in the Japanese language in the Buddhist Church. (327)

Since the Japanese were accused of all kinds of diabolical acts, they anticipated these restrictions. The farmers were quite handicapped in their work because of certain expressed or imagined criticisms from their neighbors.

Rumors spread among the Japanese of the difficulties that some suspected individuals were having:

(18) Japanese, alien and Nisei, cannot use arsenic to control pests on their farms. They are accused of using unusually large quantities of it. They are unable to purchase it. (72)

(19) Several Japanese farmers, Issei and Nisei, have lost their tomato crop because white paper caps cannot be put on the plants to prevent frost damage. Whenever the caps are put on it seemingly points to some defense industry. Rather than take the chance of mob violence, the farmers are not capping tomatoes in many areas. In other areas, vegetable planting has been curtailed because of accusations that are made. The claim is that the fields have been arranged and planted to point out a defense or other vital industries and areas. (75)

(20) Japanese farmers are not planting tomato and celery seed beds because chemicals needed for the controlling of diseases are not available to them. Copper sulfate used to prevent "damping off" of celery seedlings cannot be purchased because the public is afraid of copper sulfate being dumped into their water supply. (147)

These rumors only served to restrict further the activities of Japanese. Not only were the official restrictions not definitely known, but rumors about opposition to certain practices tended to narrow the area of activity in which they could engage. The Japanese did not wish to break any regulations but the rumors and contradictory announcements made it impossible for them to know definitely what they could do and what they were forbidden to do. There was utter confusion.
If Japanese farmers do not plant crops, they will be arrested by the F.B.I. (395)

These rumors further confused the Japanese. Not only were the official restrictions not definitely known, but rumors about opposition to certain practices tended to narrow the area of activity in which they could engage. The Japanese did not wish to break any regulations but the rumors and contradictory announcements made it impossible for them to know definitely what they could do and what they were forbidden to do. There was utter confusion.

There were fears and resentments that arose out of the confusion. One Nisei later remarked:

"At that time my father called all of us together and told us to be careful. He said, 'Don't do anything to get into trouble. Don't do anything that might be misinterpreted. Just be careful and go about your affairs as you always did.' My father told me that all the time."

A student at the University of California said:

"Hell, I haven't necked a gal up in the Berkeley Hills for ages. All the guys used to go up to Grizzly Peak, but it's not so good for nihonjin now. They might think you're trying to take a picture of the San Francisco Bay or something. We haven't gone around much anyway lately. I guess you can't help these things."

2. 21-year old Nisei, February 27, 1942.
Another 23-year old Nisei remarked:

"God dammit, why don't they make up their minds? First they tell you you're an American citizen so you can do what you want and then they tell you you can't. I guess all a guy can do is stay home and twiddle his thumb. We figured that was the safest thing to do, but I don't like it very much. My girl doesn't want to go out though. She says we might make a mistake and do something wrong and then gur folks would get worried."

3. 23-year old Nisei, March 10, 1942.
Virtually all of the rumors concerning regulations spread during the first three months of the war. They created resentments on the part of those who felt that they were being denied the right to do what they conceived to be a harmless activity. The effect of these rumors was to increase the already existing confusion and to make the Japanese more cautious. Some were fearful of anything without first checking with their friends to see whether or not it would be permissible. During the month of January, however, it became obvious that many of these restrictions did not exist.

Nothing happened to those who did the supposedly forbidden things. During February and March, the status of the Japanese was not much clearer than it was previously, but this type of rumor began to disappear. The people became preoccupied with other matters, such as the F.B.I. raids and the impending evacuation.

Despite the differential treatment accorded the aliens and citizens by federal authorities, as the agitation began late in January, the distinction between the two groups became blurred. The question of Nisei status again became confused. Events and announcements, such as the following, tended to add to the uncertainty:

1. On February 19, the Department of Justice was criticized in Congress for announcing that it could not legally remove American citizens from the Coast.

2. On February 5, the Department of Justice announced that it was considering the possibility of asking Congress for legislation authorizing them to permit a "protective custody" arrest of a citizen.

3. On March 23, the Senate Immigration Subcommittee opened hearings on a measure to exclude American-born Japanese from citizenship.

4. On March 1, the State Board of Equalization suspended all Nisei employees and rescinded all liquor licenses held by Nisei.

5. On March 13, the directors of four state departments—Motor Vehicles, Employment, Public Works, and Institutions—announced that they did not contemplate arbitrary mass suspension of Nisei employees.
Early in March, the Army proclamation establishing military areas listed Americans of Japanese ancestry along with German, Italian, and Japanese aliens as a class of individuals to be affected by subsequent Army orders. The Nisei were the only American citizens included in the list. As the date of evacuation approached, it became quite obvious that no distinction was to be made between citizens and aliens in the case of Japanese, whereas such a distinction was being made in the case of Germans or Italians. On the other hand, there was no announcement indicating that the citizenship of the Nisei would be revoked nor that the rights of Nisei citizens would be suspended by the government. It was in this atmosphere that rumors concerning the status of the Nisei arose.

One 20-year old girl in Southern California, reflecting on her activities during this period said:

"The money always was at Long Beach. My father was a respected old-timer there. . . . After the war I switched my account to Gardena because Long Beach got pretty bad. I guess we felt it more than the people really felt it. I guess we were oversensitive, I guess. The prejudice seemed pretty bad. I used to shop in Long Beach, but after the war I did everything in Gardena. It was about the first part of January that I transferred my account. It was more convenient to have my money nearby. When my brother became a soldier I transferred the major portion of the money to him because people were saying before evacuation that bank accounts would be taken away from evacuees."

Another Nisei remarked:

"Fortunately my father for some reason or another transferred his bank account to my name last June. That's why we didn't have our funds frozen like the other families. If we're going to evacuate, though, I'll have to take all that dough out and take it along, I guess, because you can't tell what they'll do to us once we get in the camps. I took out over half of it already because I heard that they might confiscate Nisei funds too."

2. This was about the time that the trade treaty between Japan and the United States was abrogated and war seemed to be imminent.
3. 24-year old Nisei, March 18, 1942.
Rumor deals with the question of dual-citizenship. Most Nisei at one time had dual-citizenship, but many of them dropped their connections with Japan. However, in most instances there was no way in which a Nisei could prove that he was not a dual-citizen since the records in the Japanese consulate had been destroyed and those in Japan were inaccessible. Since dual-citizens were regarded with suspicion by the Caucasians, restrictions on that class of individuals were to be anticipated.

These rumors were considered quite seriously by most Nisei. Some felt that such moves were impossible; others were quite concerned. These rumors caused resentment and bitterness, but there was nothing that any Nisei could do. The Nisei were helpless. The rumors about Nisei citizenship spread among both the Issei and the Nisei; both groups were vitally concerned. They appeared during the month of March when the question of who was to be evacuated was tantamount, and disappeared when the people became more concerned about the immediate problem of preparing for evacuation.

At the time of the outbreak of war, the Japanese expected the worst. When the expected violence did not take place, they were puzzled as to where they stood. As they had anticipated, strict rules were imposed, but these rules were later revoked or changed. The Japanese did not wish to violate any regulations, but they were unable to tell which rules were in effect. Restrictions which they placed upon themselves in recognition of the fact that they were a suspected group only added to the confusion. As the agitation for evacuation got underway, the legal status of the Nisei became confused. No one knew what his rights were or what he was supposed to do. There was confusion and uncertainty. It was in this situation that various rumors emerged. They simply added to the confusion. People were unable to define their position, and the uncertainty was enhanced by the presence of these rumors. These unverified reports persisted until definite information cleared up the questions until the people became preoccupied with more immediate problems.
The Position of Nisei in the U.S. Army

Prior to the outbreak of war, the Nisei had been drafted into the Army on the same basis as all other Americans and were placed in regular non-segregated units. Their record was apparently satisfactory, and some soldiers won high praise from their officers. The Issei accepted Army duty for their children as the moral obligation of citizens, and went so far as to make *sen-nin-barai* and gave banquets and send-off parties for inductees. They felt that it was only natural. The Nisei seemed pleased that they were given better treatment than were the Negro troops, and many Issei took pride of the successes of their sons in the U.S. Army.

Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the question arose as to what would happen to Nisei soldiers in the Army. Even more important, there was the realization that what happened to the soldiers would inevitably reflect upon the status of the remainder of the Nisei group. Many Nisei were well aware that their citizenship status was safe as long as there were some Nisei serving in the Army. The Nisei were naturally under suspicion, but would men in uniform defending their country also be beyond suspicion? The status of all soldiers was enhanced by the outbreak of war, but where did the Nisei stand? Would the Nisei soldiers be trusted as soldiers or would they be suspected as persons of Japanese ancestry? As might be expected, the War Department did not release any definite information about their policies with regard to Nisei troops, and the activities in all Army camps were clouded with wartime secrecy. No one knew what was happening.

The first rumor about Nisei soldiers appeared soon after the first

---

6. Literally, this means "thousand people needle". It refers to a piece of cloth wound around the stomach, in which stitches are placed by a thousand different women. These are worn by Japanese soldiers. The superstition is that when a soldier wears such a belt, he will never die.
troop movement after the beginning of the war.

Nisei soldiers from the Midwest camps who were sent to San Francisco to embark for the battle area in the Pacific were returned to their camps while their comrades went on to the Philippines. (22)

This rumor started in December and persisted throughout the month of January. The general interpretation given was that the U.S. Army did not wish to risk having the Nisei soldiers confused with real Japanese troops. On the other hand, some interpreted this move as being a discriminatory act on the part of the Army and were quite resentful.

Among the hundreds of rumors about the treatment of Nisei in the Army the following spread in the San Francisco Bay Region:

- Nisei in the Army were locked up for 21 days after the war began. (23)
- There are many anti-Nisei riots in the Army. (27)
- The Army is planning to have the Nisei and especially the Kibei draftees go into the same regiment with the Negroes so that all can be educated together. (38)
- Nisei in the Army are being discharged after a year's training. (45)
- The Army is discriminating against the Nisei. John Ishida took the Army intelligence examination used to place men in special fields. He was one of the men receiving very high grades. His slip which contained his ex grade was cancelled by the word "Japanese." All of his Caucasian friends passing high in the exam were surprised when Johnny was not included in the detachment leaving camp for special training. Many of them expressed remarks about the undemocratic army. John was sent to Arkansas with the rest of the Nisei after doing nothing for three weeks at a Pacific Coast camp. (49)
- Many Nisei are getting honorable and dishonorable discharges from the Army. (58)
- Nisei are being given the worst and dirtiest jobs in the Army. (59)
- TomiAiso was honorably dismissed from the Army. They did not give him any reason. He served for 13 months. (66)
- All the Nisei will be kicked out of the Army now that all Japanese will be sent to concentration camps. It won't seem right to have parents in a concentration camp and a son in the Army. (70)
Two Nisei in the Army who are skilled in jiu-jitsu were attacked by Caucasian soldiers. They fought back to back and fought off a dozen soldiers. (394)

Nisei soldiers in the guardhouse were allowed by guards to go to the canteen to buy things. Some were given rifles for rifle practice. (397)
Over 500 Nisei draftees have been discharged from the Army. (88)

Nisei in the Army are being kicked from behind when they are off guard. When some retaliated with jiu-jitsu, they were mobbed. (97)

Nisei in the U.S. Army are being discharged. (177)

Kibei in the Army were put in the guard-houses and their guns were taken away from them. (178)

All Nisei in the Army are getting honorable discharges. (198)

All Nisei in the Army are being discharged. (199)

In Washington, the Nisei soldiers were segregated from the others and placed in a stockade. (200)

The Nisei in the Army are being yanked out of their positions on the West Coast and are being transferred to Texas. (235)

Firearms were taken away from the Nisei in the infantry and artillery and they were transferred to K.P. and other undesirable duties. (236)

Nisei soldiers are not trusted by the Caucasians and they are under suspicion regardless of what they do. (237)

The following rumors spread in Stockton.

The Nisei in the Army are either being sent home or are being given jobs as farmers, gardeners, K.P., or latrine detail. (238)

There are more fights between the Japanese and Filipino soldiers in the Army than there are between the whites and Japanese. (239)

27 Nisei soldiers in a Midwest camp were confined for two weeks for their protection. (357)

All Nisei soldiers have been moved out to Midwest camps. (358)

Some Nisei soldiers were given dishonorable discharges. (359)

All Nisei troops had their rifles taken away from them. (360)

It is harder for Nisei to get promotions than the others. They are transferred and their ranks are broken. (361)

These separate rumors are actually variations upon six major themes:

Nisei soldiers suffered violence at the hands of their fellow men; they
were placed in guardhouses, sometimes for their own protection and sometimes because they were under suspicion; they were discriminated against in giving promotions and were given the most undesirable jobs; they were being discharged without cause; their firearms were being taken away from them; and they were being transferred to units away from the Pacific Coast.

The rumors about violence and discrimination were quite common, and such action was expected as a matter of course. Rumor B refers to Negro troops. It had been taken for granted that Negro troops had the least enviable positions in the Army, and stories of how they had been treated in the last war were well known to the Japanese. Therefore, the information that the Nisei and the Negroes were being treated alike was considered a stinging insult to the Nisei and was thoroughly resented. The Nisei had come to look upon themselves as the most unfortunate minority in America, and this rumor associating the Nisei with a position traditionally assigned to Negroes spread widely.

The fundamental assumption underlying most of these rumors is that the Caucasians do not trust anyone of Japanese ancestry. Since the press and radio continually referred to the "sneaky", "treacherous", and "back-stabbing" Japs and since they were being identified racially with this untrustworthy enemy, it seemed only natural that the Nisei should not be trusted.

It was not very long before the fact that Nisei were being discharged from the Army without any specific charges against them was confirmed, and the question of why they had been discharged arose. No official announcement was made by the War Department or by any official explaining
this action, nor did those who had been discharged know specifically why
the action was taken. Furthermore, there were still many Nisei in the
Army who had not been dismissed and who still held the ranks that they had
held in the past. This left a rather confused picture, and several rumors
began to circulate about the reasons why certain Nisei had been dismissed:

Some Nisei or Kibei in Washington set fire to the Army
barracks as soon as they heard that Japanese planes were
attacking Pearl Harbor. (24)

All the Nisei will be kicked out of the Army now that all
Japanese will be sent to concentration camps. It won't
seem right to have parents in a concentration camp and a
son in the Army. (70)

Nisei men have been let out from the Army if they have
made any statement which may be construed as being anti-
United States. (73)

When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, some Kibeis in the U.S.
Army at Fort Ord yelled "Banzai!" Some went as far as to
set fire to their barracks. Nisei and Kibei soldiers were
then segregated and questioned whether they would fight
against Japan. Some said, "No". Thereafter, some Nisei
and most Kibei were sent home and those who remained or
who were recently called were segregated. (76)

The Nisei soldiers who have been given honorable discharges
from the United States Army were Kibei. (109)

One Kibei soldier denounced the United States. He said he
didn't want to stay in the Army. He was beaten up. (363)

Rumor (56) gives a logical explanation for the Army's action. No one
could deny the inconsistency of having one member of a family detained in
a concentration camp for suspected disloyalty while another member was
serving in the armed forces. This inconsistency seemed so obvious that some
anticipated the mass discharge of all Nisei from the Army. The following
are some of the comments of Nisei on this point:

"I really don't know how Jim's getting along in the Army.
He used to like it, but he hasn't been writing much lately. He
was transferred to Texas and I don't know why they sent him
there. We need him at home if we have to move and I guess they'll
release him so that he can come and help us." 7

7. 21-year old girl referring to her brother. March 12, 1942.
"I don't suppose I'll mind camp life so much if Toshio could only come with me. I'd hate to be stuck with these damn Japs alone. I'd have to do things their way, but if he were with me I wouldn't care. I think the Army will release him pretty soon. All the other fellows got their honorable discharges."

Some Issei comments were:

- "These baka-tare ketō can't seem to make up their minds about what they are going to do with us. But when Noboru comes back from the Army he can take care of everything for us. I can't understand English but he knows all about it. I expect him back any day now, and then we can clear up this mess."

- "My son is the only boy. Papa died many years ago and I have been living on his insurance. Now they tell me that I have to evacuate. Packing is not so much a problem for me, but I won't be able to see my boy. But I suppose I should not worry. They will release him so that he can go with me. I just heard that Mrs. Ishida's son was released from the Army."

Thus, some of the rumors about the dismissal of men from the Army aroused the hopes of their families. These rumors aroused the hopes that the young men could be with them during the coming crisis. On the other hand, the rumors about the action of the Kibei which were alleged to be responsible for the Army's taking a suspicious attitude toward the Nisei as a whole aroused hostility and resentment. The Nisei and the Kibei never did get along well together, and many Nisei looked upon the Kibei with suspicion. Many Kibei were known to be pro-Japan, since they had expressed their opinions to the Nisei in heated arguments. Kibei also had a reputation of being "hot tempered" as well as being willing to do anything, even at the risk of their lives, for the emperor of Japan. Consequently it was natural for Nisei to feel that if there had been any trouble in the Army, the Kibei who had been drafted were the ones who were responsible.

---

8. 24-year old girl referring to her fiance. March 28, 1942.
9. Derogatory term referring to a stupid individual.
10. 61-year old Issei farmer referring to his eldest son. March 13, 1942.
11. 52-year old Issei woman. April 10, 1942.
12. This was actually an unjust conclusion to reach, since many Kibei were quite different from the popular stereotype in the Nisei's minds. To those educated in Japan, Issei and Kibei, the idea of loyalty to one's country regardless of what country it was more important than loyalty to Japan. Since the United States was considered the country of those born here, the natural thing was loyalty to the United States.
These rumors also aroused resentment against the Army and disillusioned many young men who had been looking forward to fighting. One Nisei who was planning to volunteer said:

A. "I've been thinking of going into the Army for a long time. I'm not getting anywhere sticking around here, and I figured I could learn something in there and do some good besides. But hell, if they're going to treat us like that, there's no sense in joining up.”

Some of the reactions against the already unpopular Kibei were almost violent:

A. "I hear those god damn Kibei bastards butchered up our chances in the Army. If those son of a bitches like Japan so much why did they come over here in the first place? I never did like those guys anyway. They came over here with their Japenese ideas and try to change all America to suit themselves. They don't seem to realize that 130,000,000 people might be right."  

A. "I really don't blame the Army for booting the Kibei out. I wouldn't trust those guys either. Some of them are O.K., but a lot of them don't belong in this country. You can't tell what they'd do. They might shoot the guns the wrong way. But, Jesus Christ, they didn't have to wreck everything for us Nisei by burning the barracks.”

A. "Those Kibei are the guys we have to watch. They're so damn hot-headed they will do anything. Then all the rest of us have to suffer just because they happened to be technically American citizens too. It'll get so the hakujin won't trust any Nisei.”

A. "I hear some Kibei ran wild after December 7. I'd like to castrate some of those bastards.”

The rumors about the position of Nisei in the Army aroused hopes, resentments, and fears. There were hopes that sons and sweethearts might be released to join them in evacuation. There were resentments both against the Army and against those individuals who were thought responsible for the Army's action. There were fears of the collective security of the group being jeopardized by the rash acts of a few individuals.

16. This term refers to Caucasians.  
17. 21-year old Nisei. February 16, 1942.  
The rumors about the Army started a few days after Pearl Harbor and were widespread throughout the state of California until March. Nothing definite was learned from the returning servicemen, but the attention of the Japanese became focused upon other problems as the evacuation approached. Those with friends or relatives still in the Army continued to wonder whether they would be released, but others became preoccupied with their immediate problems. In general, these rumors added to the uncertainty and confusion.

Agitation, Discrimination, and Social Status

Aside from legal status, the problem arose as to how persons of Japanese ancestry stood in relation to Caucasians. Some Japanese lived in districts near Italian immigrants, and since both groups thought of themselves as being in similar positions, no difficulties arose. But among strangers, the Japanese did not know what to expect. Would there be violence? Accentuated discrimination? The common question immediately after the outbreak of war was: "What is to become of us?" In asking this, the Japanese were probably more concerned about their relationships with the Caucasian public rather than legal difficulties.

The reactions of the Caucasians who had had contact with Japanese in the past varied. Some gardeners, domestics, and other employees were immediately discharged. On the whole, however, the Caucasians were quite tolerant and understanding, and those who knew the Japanese went out of their way to assist those in difficulty. When alien funds were frozen, Caucasian friends and employers rushed to lend them money. Employers told their workers not to worry because everything would be just as it had been. As curious crowds milled around Los Angeles' "Little Tokyo", one policeman is said to have remarked:
"The God damn fools. I've worked in this district for years. I like these nice clean people. They're a damn sight cleaner than those lousy wops and spiks cafes a few blocks from here. But these damn fool Sunday drivers have to come down here to have a look at it. Maybe they expect a bomb or some Jap to cut his guts out in the middle of First St. They are the same guys who would drop their water if a single bomb dropped, but would come out later to look at the hole without sense enough to worry about when the next bomb was going to drop. And the same guys would help lynch a poor bastard Japanese who might be trying to earn a living down here selling his countrymen's junk. We gotta protect the Japs against the Americans, not the other way around."

Since they expected violent repercussions, the Japanese were quite surprised at this treatment. In spite of their relief, however, they were inclined to tread rather carefully, realizing that things were not quite the same as they were before the war. If anything, the failure of the Caucasians to act as the Japanese had anticipated only puzzled them. They did not know where they stood. Minor rebuffs here and there tended to confirm their suspicions, but the Japanese could not define their position. Where did they stand? They did not know what to expect or what to do in their associations with Caucasians.

Among the early rumors in the San Francisco Bay Region were those pertaining to the action of the Red Cross against persons of Japanese ancestry. Many Nisei tried to volunteer for duty after the outbreak of war, but some misunderstandings developed. The action of the Red Cross was resented, and served to define the position of the Nisei with reference to certain service organizations. To some, the stand taken by the Red Cross was an index of the American attitude toward Nisei participation in the war effort. The following are examples of what apparently happened:

(a) Several days after the war three Nisei girls decided to help the surgical department because they had heard that there were not sufficient volunteer workers rolling bandages. When they applied they were asked to form a group of girls between the ages of 18 to 21. This the girls did. They obtained 20 names after approximately five hours of visiting friends and

acquaintances alike. When they arrived at the information desk, they were asked their nationality. 'Japanese-Americans', they answered. They were immediately turned down without an explanation. . . .

(b) The leader (of a woman's organization) applied to the headquarters and was referred to the Y.W.C.A. across the street for their equipment to knit. When she applied at the office, she met a difficult person whose dislike for the Japanese race and its people was very plain. It was after much difficulty . . . (that) the Nisei leader was able to win her friendship and understanding (and) her organization received the material and equipment for 20 individuals. A little later when they applied for more work the Production Department was not able to supply the demand. . . .

(c) The girls (one Nisei and one Issei) . . . appeared at the Production Department and asked for equipment. The Caucasian woman picked out the material and gave it to the individuals. Just then the vice-president of the . . . department happened to come by. Seeing the girls she approached them and asked them their nationality. They told her truthfully they were Japanese American and Japanese alien respectively. When asked if they had registered at the registration desk, they answered no. The vice-president told them they must register but that no Japanese alien was permitted to be given work. However since both were interested she suggested they go to the Y.W.C.A. across the street. The Japanese girls left hurt and bitter. Why should they go to the Y.W.C.A. across the street when they were not members? They wanted to serve as individuals . . . .

These incidents led to a flood of rumors. Once these rumors began spreading only the adventurous Nisei or those who always insisted upon their rights applied for work. Others took it for granted that they would be discriminated against and avoided the Red Cross. They were resentful. It was not long before other rumors arose about why the Red Cross had taken this action. One of the common rumors was:

(61) The Red Cross is not accepting help from Japanese groups because they are afraid that ground glass will be put in the bandages and that poison will be substituted for sterilizing agents. (26)

This rumor was accepted as an explanation of the action. Since the Japanese thought that the Caucasians considered them treacherous, the explanation

---

21. Ibid., p. 4.
22. Ibid. Miss Okuma discovered upon investigation that some of the new volunteer workers had been prejudiced and tactless but that the organization had not adopted a discriminatory policy. Furthermore, there had been so many who wished to work that the supplies had been exhausted.
seemed quite plausible to them. These rumors were actually effective in preventing some Nisei from volunteering. As one 21-year old Nisei coed at the University of California remarked:

"I was planning to sign up for Red Cross work since I'm carrying only a light load this semester. I thought that we Nisei ought to do something to contribute to the war effort. But if they are going to discriminate like that, I don't see any reason why I have to go over there to be insulted. I think I'll sign up for Civilian Defense or something else. Of all organizations, I should think the Red Cross would be the most understanding. They should be ashamed of themselves."23

Another common remark was:

"Did you try yet? Well, I hear the Nisei are being discriminated against because of the war."24

These rumors persisted throughout the months of December and January. By February, some adventurous individuals had gone to insist upon their rights, and those who were still interested in the work were accepted. Since many who had complained about the discrimination were actually not interested in the work, the news of the non-discriminatory policy did not particularly affect them. Furthermore, by this time, their attention was focused upon other matters.

In time, minor incidents accumulated. Each incident was reported so often and repeated that the impression was given of widespread attacks against the Nisei. Since the Nisei were expecting greater discrimination, they were more sensitized to information of this nature. Slight rebuffs were interpreted as potential attacks. Since no definite pattern of discrimination was discernable, the Japanese were anxious for information on what to avoid.

The following rumors about discrimination spread in the San Francisco area:

25. This is a December 7 rumor and emerged in the excitement of the day when everyone was listening to radio broadcasts from all parts of the world. It was taken seriously on that day but later became the target of jokes.
Since the outbreak of war, Hollywood night-clubs have "No Admittance" signs out to the Japanese. (6)

The Hastings clothing stores refused to serve two Nisei youths on two different occasions. They were asked whether they were Chinese or Japanese; when they claimed that they were of latter descent, they were told that their business was not wanted. (95)

The Communist party kicked out all of the Japanese members because the C.P. did not wish to be harboring dangerous elements. Thus the Japanese communists who have endured years of persecution in the Japanese community, hunger strikes, picket line duties, hard labor, and other things for the "cause" have been thrown out. The Japanese members were happy to make this sacrifice. The C.P. attitude is similar to that of other organizations making the racial issue the weapon for ousting Nisei members. (110)

Aliens cannot buy anything in any of the stores. (190)

All domestics and gardeners are losing their jobs. (193)

In Sacramento:

Caucasian people walk into a store and then walk right out without purchasing a thing as soon as they heard that it was being run by Japanese. (219)

In Los Angeles:

There are several Los Angeles restaurants that will not allow Japanese to enter. They have signs saying that they will not serve Japs. (230)

There are some theatres in Los Angeles that will not sell tickets to Japanese. (231)

It is better not to ride street cars because one is made to feel uncomfortable by the Caucasians. No one will let a Japanese sit down, and many insulting remarks are made. (232)

Many Issei and Nisei are being laid off their jobs. In Roberts Market everyone of Japanese ancestry was fired. Many gardeners have lost their customers. (233)

Sales people in several stores refused to serve Japanese. (234)

In Stockton:

Several prominent Stockton restaurants have refused to serve Japanese. (262)

Nisei cannot travel on buses or trains, except on the Santa Fe where the officials have been kind enough to allow us. (328)
Greyhound buses will not take Nisei passengers, even with a birth certificate. (337)

In Stockton Junior College the attitude of some of the teachers toward Japanese has changed. Some, like Miss Jones, have become unfriendly. (339)

All civil service workers in San Francisco were fired. (344)

Some prostitutes will no longer accept Nisei trade. (345)

Some barber shops will not accept Nisei trade. (346)

Many Japanese gardeners have been fired by their employers. (390)

These rumors about discrimination express bitterness and resentment. The fact that they were so widespread reflects the existence of such attitudes. Before the war most Nisei did not reflect seriously upon issues as those pertaining to their "rights" as citizens; there were resentments about discrimination, but they were passed off. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, there developed a greater awareness of the value of citizenship. Furthermore, whereas the Nisei had been little interested in politics and international affairs, after December 7 they became more aware of certain pronouncements about fighting for a "democratic" world. Therefore, in spite of the fact that they anticipated greater discrimination, they were more resentful. They were resentful because they felt that they were misunderstood. They were trying to be Americans, but they were still suspected.

Some of the rumors, such as those of gardeners losing their jobs, were spreading simultaneously in widely separated communities. These common rumors might have resulted from communication, but it seems more likely that these rumors started when some person actually experienced discrimination. These rumors spread among the Issei and Nisei alike, creating uncertainty in both groups.

Some of these rumors brought fears to the Issei. Referring to rumor (66), one Nisei girl who was familiar with the history of the rumor had the

26. Miss Jones (pseudonym) was one the most popular instructors in the college and had always been sympathetic to the Nisei in the past.
"My father went to the Western Auto Supply to get something, and the salesmen wouldn't serve him. He got sore and his reaction was that the キレ are バカタレ so if they didn't want to sell, he didn't care to buy. He was really mad because he couldn't buy an auto part. He was raving away and I guess he told Rev. Ishikawa about it. Rev. Ishikawa is an excitable individual, and he thought that it was a general policy of all stores. He called up Galen Fisher\textsuperscript{27}, and they went to investigate at the store. They talked to the manager, and the manager told them that he didn't give such an order and that the individual salesman was at fault. When the church people heard this, they were relieved because they didn't go to buy anything. They were embarrassed about going for fear of not being served.\textsuperscript{28}

Thus, in this instance, the experience of one man gave rise to the rumor that stores were not serving Japanese. The other Japanese hesitated to go to stores for fear of being refused.

Rumors about discrimination appeared soon after the outbreak of war and continued to spread until about the middle of March. By that time, the agitation against the Japanese had become so prevalent that the people resigned themselves to fate. Instances of discrimination came to be taken more for granted than they were during the uncertain days at the beginning of the war. Furthermore, attention was focused upon the question of evacuation, and rumors about discrimination received but passing attention.

As the agitation against the Japanese mounted, there was further confusion. Most of the Japanese were well aware of the official announcements assuring them that they could continue to live as they had in the past. On the other hand, many of them experienced unpleasant incidents or knew individuals who had. Many incidents did occur, and there were warnings from national officials, civic leaders, and leaders within the Japanese communities cautioning the people. These warnings were often followed by reassurances of all kinds. Many of the Japanese discovered that their Caucasian friends

\textsuperscript{27.} Mr. Fisher was adviser to the Institute of Pacific Relations and secretary to the Committee on National Security and Fair Play.
\textsuperscript{28.} 24-year old Nisei girl, March 27, 1944.
felt as they always had in the past. Confusion was the result. Where did the Japanese stand? What were they to anticipate in their dealings with Caucasians?

As the agitation got under way, the following events and announcements caught the attention of the Japanese:

1. On January 6, Attorney General Biddle denounced as "stupid and un-American" the activities of employers who had dismissed workers simply on the ground that they were aliens.


3. On January 16, a resolution aimed at barring Nisei from the state civil service was introduced into the State Senate.

4. During the Middle of January, a super-patriot in Alameda began sending letters to those hiring Japanese gardeners reading: "Just to remind you that there is a fine for hiring Japanese who are not citizens of the United States," and signing them "An American."

5. During the middle of January, John S. Hughes began to "Jap-bait" in his radio programs.

6. On January 28, Martin Dies announced that the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor was due to fifth column activity of resident Japanese.

7. On January 28, Mayor Bowron of Los Angeles announced that 39 Nisei employed by the city had been given a "leave of absence" for the duration and that Nisei on the waiting list had been suspended.

8. On January 28, the State Personnel Board announced that it would refuse to certify Nisei for work, to receive any new applications from Nisei, and that it would begin investigation of those already working for the state civil service.

9. On February 2, the American Civil Liberties Union challenged the action of the Personnel Board.

10. On February 7, State Attorney General Warren announced that the action of the Personnel Board was unconstitutional.

11. On February 21, State Attorney General Warren testified before the Tolan Committee investigating interstate migrations that the Nisei were more dangerous than the alien Japanese.

12. On February 26, the State Personnel Board began its investigation of Nisei employees.

These announcements caused considerable confusion. Questions arose
as to where the Japanese stood with reference to certain segments of the
American population. Who were for the Japanese and who were against them?

The following two rumors spread on the University of California campus:

(32) In a meeting of the U.C. Alumni Association, every member
present except two, Sibley and Spindt, favored the evacuation
of all Japanese, including citizens of the United
States. (25)

(33) The University of California fraternities council voted to
petition the removal of all Japanese from California. (47)

Other rumors were:

(34) Numerous members of the Masonic Club of Berkeley expressed
the idea that if the Army does not get the "damn Japs" out
of this area in a hurry, they will take the matter into
their own hands. (31)

(35) An instructor at Selma High is anti-Japanese. He is from
Porterville. He is spreading stories about us. He has
not yet influenced other teachers. The principal is against
him, but cannot fire him. He has written in the local
papers. He is beginning to influence the Caucasians around
him. He has even influenced Mr. Jones, the defense coordi-
nator at whose home he is staying. The latter has been
very friendly to the Japanese farmers for a great many years.
This instructor was formerly of Fresno State College, but
he was kicked out from there. (125)

(36) There are several Caucasian groups that are trying to con-
fiscate all personal and real property from the Japanese
so that they can benefit from it themselves. (240)

(37) There was talk that the Japanese were going to poison all
the crops, and therefore the Caucasians are demanding that
aliens be taken out of the farms and fruit stands. (246)

(38) The Italians and Germans are asking for the evacuation of
all Japanese. They are trying to save themselves. (373)

These rumors began to appear during the latter part of January and con-
tinued up to the time-of-evacuation period just preceding evacuation. At
first, some Nisei were inclined to be skeptical of these rumors since they
had been treated so unexpectedly well. However, in February and March, it
became obvious that there were many latent hostilities against the group.
More and More, the Nisei began looking upon themselves as an unjustifiably
persecuted group, and these rumors tended to reinforce these conceptions.
As the evacuation approached, many found themselves helpless. They had such little time to do so many things. Several Caucasian service organizations and church groups volunteered aid. The Japanese were quick to accept this help. As one Nisei later remarked, "It was like a drowning man grasping for any twig that came floating down the river." Prior to the war, the Japanese had rarely accepted assistance from outsiders. Even after the war began, non-Christians hesitated accepting help from church groups. However, as the deadline approached, the people became desperate. Since many thought that all Americans were against them, news of individuals a groups assisting the Japanese spread rapidly.

Three church groups have given self-addressed postcards to the members of the Japanese M.E. church. These are to be sent to the issuing churches filled in with their address at their destination. The hands of those evacuated can then write to these Caucasian churches which in turn will forward the mail to the evacuated person. (105)

Many Caucasian house owners have given Japanese preference for housing because they know that we are in a fix. They can't come out for the Japanese openly but many are doing their best for us. (127)

The Churches are helping the Japanese by helping them get transportation to the centers. (195)

The church council in Stockton is helping the Japanese. They have offered to take care of property for the duration. (264)

The Italian landowner visited the Miyoshi's on the rent days with his kid and wife. They are much nicer to them after the war. (341)

The American Friends Service Committee is helping the Japanese by preparing bundles. They are planning to send books to camps, and they are working on relocating students. (342)

These rumors began to appear about the middle of March and continued to spread until the eve of evacuation. Most Japanese did not avail themselves of the assistance offered and simply passed on the information to others who might be interested. Some were skeptical of the sincerity of those who were allegedly offering help; others felt thankful that some...
Caucasians had not deserted them at a time of need. Many of the Christians stored their goods in churches, but the Buddhists organized among themselves to provide for storage and simply talked about the assistance being rendered by Caucasian churches. In a time of dire need, any gesture that held any semblance of hope was seized upon and passed on to the next person.

The Issei in Relation to the World Struggle

The Japanese had long been taught that Japan had won all her wars and that she could not lose. Some question of war with the United States arose from time to time, but those who lived in this country could not believe that such a thing could happen. No group in the country was more shocked by the outbreak of war than the resident Japanese population. Once the initial shock was over, however, some Issei could not see how the United States could win. The Issei had traditionally distrusted all American newspapers as "propaganda" sheets and were inclined to view war news with skepticism. However, when even the American newspapers began to write of Japanese victories, they thought that the war was almost over since they expected American newspapers to minimize enemy gains. Some Issei thought that Japan would win the war in a few months, and some of the news they read tended to support this belief. Obviously, their status would be changed if Japan won the war.

As among all other groups, whenever the Issei gathered, they discussed the progress of the war. Most Issei, especially those with American-born children, were very careful about what they said. They clandestinely discussed the progress of the war when they were among themselves, but they immediately started talking about some other subject when a Nisei entered the room. No one was trusted. Since they did not trust American newspapers and since they were not allowed to listen to short-wave radio broadcasts, they did not have any source of information at which to verify any reports
to their satisfaction. Some Issei, claiming that they had heard something from someone else who heard a Japanese broadcast, spread reports about the progress of the war materially different from anything in the newspapers. Others attempted to "read between the lines" in the American newspapers and speculated as to what was really happening.

The following rumor was quite widespread:

[(45) Four or five families have short-wave radios and listen every night to the Japanese broadcasts. (351)]

No one would reveal which families had these radios on the grounds that there were too many spies about who would report them to the F.B.I. The alleged existence of the short-wave radios and the alleged access to the "real" news made possible the spread of rumors such as the following:

In the San Francisco Bay Region:

[(46) The Army is tightening up on the Issei because Japan has bombed Alaska. (137)]

[(47) Hindus in Marysville celebrated the fall of Singapore by getting drunk. Hindus and Burmese in Singapore had a great deal of fun shooting the British defense lines when the Japanese attacked. (143)]

[(48) The Indian situation is the same as that of Burma. One cannot push people around for 300 years and expect them to fight on your side. They will help Japan. It is too late anyway for India to organize since they have no weapons, tools, or planes. (144)]

[(49) General McArthur is dead. (150)]

In Sacramento:

[(100) Japan will invade California in the near future. (220)]

In Stockton:

[(101) There are some Japanese soldiers in America already. (269)]

[(102) The Japanese have taken Pearl Harbor. (292)]


30. This rumor was recorded on March 27, 1942; Japanese planes did not attack Dutch Harbor until June 3, 1942.

31. This rumor spread during the first few weeks of the war.
General MacArthur is dead. (348)
The war will be over in six months to a year, and Japan will win. (349)
The entire U.S. fleet has been annihilated. (350)
Japanese troops have landed in northern Australia. (352)
An Allied convoy on route to Australia was completely destroyed. (355)
The Japanese could have taken Pearl Harbor, but they did not because it would have lengthened their lines of communication. (356)
The Japanese Army is going to land in Mexico and drive upward. (362)

There were other rumors that reflected racial pride and justification of the war in the minds of some Issei:

Some colored soldiers wanted to and got transferred to California from Eastern camps because they were afraid of the Germans out there. Now that the United States and Japan are at war, they would rather go back East. They are more afraid of the "little devils" than they are of the Germans. (57)

A preacher of the Congregational Church in Oakland spoke at the Plymouth House in Berkeley to a group of Nisei. He claims that Pearl Harbor was no surprise. Secretary Knox’s letter to Japan was insulting. No nation could take it sitting down. No nation would have bothered to answer the letter, but Japan did. (118)

These rumors emerged immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor and continued to spread even after evacuation. Virtually all of them were attributed to sources that claimed that they had heard the news over Japanese radio broadcast, but rarely were the exact sources revealed. No one claimed that he had heard the news himself, but each person "knew" someone who had. Some Nisei took these rumors seriously, but most Nisei considered them preposterous and fantastic. They often made fun of Issei who sat around in disgust or as a joke something that he had heard from his parents or parents’ friends. It was almost impossible to get a collection of these rumors because of the circumstances.

32. Many of these rumors were recorded when some Nisei repeated in disgust or as a joke something that he had heard from his parents or parents’ friends. It was almost impossible to get a collection of these rumors because of the circumstances.
hope that the war would be over in a few months.

These rumors seemed to have had considerable effect. As the evacuation deadline approached, most sober Issei worked feverishly to settle their business and to prepare to leave. However, there were a few Issei who apparently thought that Japan would win the war in such a short time that there was no necessity for them to leave their homes or to make extensive preparations for a long absence from their homes. Some had to settle their affairs at the last moment.

These rumors provided hope for some Issei, while they tended to confuse others. Since they viewed a Japanese victory as inevitable, some looked forward with keen anticipation to what they considered would be a throwing off of the yoke of "white supremacy." On the other hand, many Issei, particularly those with American-born children, were only confused by these reports. These rumors seemed plausible to them in many respects, and yet printed reports contradicted them. Furthermore, their children refused to give credence to them. Consequently, they could not form in their minds a clear picture of events to be anticipated.

Hearing and telling these rumors undoubtedly reinforced the pride of the Issei who had been made the target of ridicule, criticisms, and attacks. Not only had the Issei come into disrepute among the American public, but even in affairs of their community they had been forced to step down and yield leadership to the American-born. These rumors reinforced their racial pride.

All of these rumors functioned in an attempt on the part of the people to get some definition of a confused situation, their positions and roles in a confused situation. The existence of these rumors only served to confuse the situation more than it was before.
Chapter IV

THREATS AGAINST PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY

Fear more than anything else was probably the state of mind that characterized this group during the pre-evacuation days. During the period of sustained uncertainty, there was considerable insecurity and the individuals were highly sensitized to receive cues of threats to their personal welfare as well as to the well-being of the entire group. The people were generally not wholly aware of their fears, nor were the fears stable. The fears changed as the situation changed. Events occurring in rapid succession focused the attention of the people on one set of objects after another.

It was only natural that those considered themselves identified with the enemy by the general populace, mistakenly or otherwise, should be fearful for their well-being. Persons of Japanese ancestry had special reasons. The Japanese in the United States had a long history of being objects of persecution. Furthermore, the group had built up a body of legendary beliefs about this persecution which had become a point of reference in their thoughts. Most Issei had been in the United States during World War I and had seen the treatment of the Germans at that time. Others had heard of the experiences of persons of German ancestry during the war. The outbreak of the war brought back to the memories of the people vivid images of this persecution. Furthermore, the Japanese were well aware that they were more easily recognizable than were the Germans because of their physical characteristics. They felt that because of their physical features there would be no escape for them. Finally, the only protection that they had was that provided by Caucasian law-enforcement

1. For an account of the experiences of the German-Americans during the last war, see Carl Wittke, Op. Cit.
officers, whom they did not trust entirely. The police were identified with the general public. There was therefore the feeling of not being wanted, of being suspected and hated, of being lost, of being all alone. Many of the Japanese later admitted that they had vivid images of being objects of mob violence. They thought of themselves as being helpless and at the mercy of a hostile population.

On December 7, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors warned citizens not to exercise "any police powers" and to report any persons acting in a suspicious manner to federal authorities. On the following day, Attorney General Biddle released the following statement:

"There are in the United States many persons of Japanese extraction whose loyalty to this country, even in the present emergency, is unquestioned. It would therefore be a serious mistake to take any action against these people. State and local authorities are urged to take no direct action against Japanese in their communities but should consult with representatives of the F.B.I."2

Governor Olson endorsed this statement and added:

"Without doubt, we must separate the sheep from the wolves. All alien enemies should be interned, but we also must make sure that loyal Japanese are protected."3

On January 10, Mr. Biddle made a further statement:

"The Federal Government is fully aware of the dangers from disloyal aliens as well as disloyal citizens and it has control of their activities. . . . take no action against the children, families, or relatives of axis nationals. Let us not subject them to the fears that people living in Axis countries have, for those are the fears we are fighting against. Let us set a good example of what we mean by the American way in our own neighborhoods."4

These statements, while reassuring, were hardly effective in allaying the fears of the people.

2. San Francisco Chronicle, December 9, 1941.
3. Ibid.
The legends of the violence during the first decade of the century had become so entrenched that even during peacetime Caucasians were distrusted. Even before the war, many Japanese felt that only a slight crisis would be necessary to tip the balance against them. Immediately after the news of Pearl Harbor, fear of violence was foremost in the minds of the people. Almost everyone, including the police, expected it. Many Caucasians, curious to see the reaction of the Japanese in America, thronged to the Oriental quarters in large numbers. In San Francisco, fifty policemen were called to disperse the crowd, and the entire area of Nihonmachi was placed under a heavy guard of foot, motorized, and mounted police. The entire district was blocked off. To the Japanese, the curious crowds seemed like a mob seeking vengeance.

Actually there was very little violence other than the attacks by the Filipinos. Early in January, a few men damaged some property in a Japanese hotel in San Francisco. On January 15, three men posing as F.B.I. agents abducted a 19-year old Nisei girl in Sacramento and attempted to assault her. They were arrested on the following day and identified as Folsom Prison guards. There were but few other isolated instances of violence. In spite of this, violence was expected and the few instances became magnified in the minds of the Japanese because the accounts were repeated so often.

When the expected violence did not occur in the home community, questions as to how their friends and relatives in other communities were getting along were raised. Because of the temporary breakdown of communication between the Japanese communities, the people were anxious and became highly sensitized to receive news of attacks on Japanese elsewhere. Almost immediately

5. All Pacific Coast metropolitan papers carried articles on the activities in their respective "Little Tokyos". See also the Time-Life-Fortune News Bureau, Op. Cit., reports from Los Angeles and San Francisco.
6. Nichi Bei, January 16 and 17, 1942.
after the arrival of the news of the Pearl Harbor disaster, rumors about violence began circulating in the Japanese communities. These rumors continued to spread throughout the five months leading to the evacuation. There were rumors about beatings, sex crimes against Nisei girls, shootings, arson, tar and feather parties, and lynchings.

The following rumors spread in the San Francisco Bay Region:

(12) San Francisco's Japanese town is surrounded by sailors. Crowds are milling around the streets and the people are threatening to boycott the Japanese stores. (2)

(13) On Terminal Island American soldiers went in to arrest the aliens and while they were there they attacked several Nisei girls. (3)

(14) In Fresno, a group of Nisei were riding by an airfield when they were taken out of their car by a group of hoodlums and badly beaten. (4)

(15) Near Stockton, some people fired on some Japanese working in their fields. They accused the Japanese of planting their crops in such a way as to point to the airport. (5)

(16) In Los Angeles, a Nisei involved in a minor traffic scrape was immediately mobbed without question. (7)

(17) A Nisei girl was attacked during a blackout. Some hoodlums broke all the windows of the Japanese stores. (9)

(18) When the Nisei girl in Sacramento was abducted by a group of men posing as F.B.I. agents, her mother kneeled down and prayed as they were about to attack her daughter, and when the men saw this, they spared her daughter. (16)

(19) A Nisei girl was abducted and attacked by a group of F.B.I. agents in Sacramento. (17)

(20) In Oregon, a church where some Nisei were having a social was burned down by some hoodlums. (32)

(21) A group of Nisei girls coming out of a social were abducted by a group of hoodlums in Oregon and mistreated and attacked. (33)

(22) A party on Saturday, December 6, the night before Pearl Harbor, was suspected of having been conducted by enemies of the United States. It was supposedly a means of drawing the sailors and soldiers from the camps and ships. Especially because Nisei were serving at the tables they were thought to be the instigators. The Army took many Nisei waiters at random and shot them. (48)
On December 7, the U.S. Army went into the Japanese section of Honolulu and killed many men, women and children. They raped the Japanese girls. You can't trust the U.S. Army no more than any other army. All this talk of discipline in the U.S. Army is phooey.

There have been a dozen cases of "tar and feather" parties. In one instance, an airplane flew over a Japanese community in the Fresno area and dumped hot tar on the Japanese below.

A Japanese in Chicago who was looking for a job was beaten up very badly.

Fifteen were supposed to have been lynched near Fresno. There were also cases down in Los Angeles, but the number of incidents down there is not known. These individuals were all Nisei.

Seventeen Japanese have been lynched in the South.

There have been three cases of rape on Terminal Island. These occurred when the Nisei were being evacuated. The cases were hushed up by the Army. George Nishi of Marysville told me. His dope is directly from his sister who was at Terminal Island at that time. He says he can supply the names. Mrs. Okura of Los Angeles said she surprised a soldier in an ally trying to rape another Nisei girl.

My friend in Fresno has been tarred and feathered.

Some people were moving from Los Angeles to Fresno when they were forced out of Terminal Island and since they had nowhere to stay they camped in a field. Some vigilantes came along and burned the whole family to death.

In Los Angeles:

A Japanese farmer was shot in the Salinas area.

A Japanese man and his family were beaten up on their farm in the San Luis Obispo area.

A Japanese man was severely beaten in the Imperial Valley near Brawley.

A Chinese in Los Angeles was beaten up when he was mistaken for a Japanese.

In Stockton:

Japanese women are being attacked by Caucasians whenever an opportunity presents itself.

On McDonald Island, some Caucasians came, threatened, and shot five Japanese. 22 more were huddled up when the police came and saved them.
Rocks were thrown against the windows of a car as Japanese ride by. (338)

Almost without exception, the rumors about the violent treatment of Japanese in the hands of Caucasians referred to events in areas other than the communities in which the rumors spread. With the breakdown of some of the normal means of communication, people were curious about what was happening in other areas. In the absence of any real knowledge of the events that were occurring elsewhere, any bit of news that came in letters or through visiting Nisei was immediately circulated. Prior to the outbreak of war the Japanese had been little concerned with the happenings in distant communities. There were two factors, however, that may have increased their interest in outside areas. After the announcement of the establishment of prohibited zones, there was the possibility of voluntary migration from their homes to areas further away from the Pacific Coast. They were curious to know how other Japanese were getting along in these areas. Another factor was the plausibility of non-local news. The people expected violence, and yet very little occurred in the local community. Rumors about violence in the local community were easily checked by telephone and consequently did not get very far. The reports that the people received about distant communities, which they were unable to verify, fitted into their beliefs and expectations much more closely than what they knew happened in their home town.

Many of the violence rumors were about soldiers in the U.S. Army. For several years the Japanese on the Pacific Coast had heard Americans condemning the atrocities of the Japanese soldiers in the "rape of Nanking" and other instances during the war with China. The Japanese, particularly the older generation, had denied these charges or else had claimed that any soldier acted in that manner in times of war. References had been made to the activities of American doughboys in France during the World War and to the
activities of the American Legionnaires in their conventions. A person brought up in this atmosphere could not help but expect the worst from American soldiers.

The fears manifested by the spread of these rumors are probably typical of those of any group that considers itself at the mercy of another group which looks upon them as the enemy. There were fears of being beaten, of being humiliated, of being misunderstood and as a consequence being killed. Particularly noticeable were the fears for the safety of women, especially young girls who might seem sexually attractive to outside men. Fear of violence was the major fear; people were preoccupied with it. They expected violence and were anxious for information. When some bit of information was heard, it was taken immediately and passed on. The Japanese were in a state of mind to believe almost anything about violence.

By March and April, however, when it became known that some of the early reports were not true, some became skeptical. By this time, there had been ample opportunity to check these rumors by mail. Although most of the people continued to take these rumors seriously, within some Nisei circles rumors such as the following began to circulate:

7. According to the Army, there has been news of violence against the Japanese in Los Angeles, but there is no factual information to substantiate these reports. Therefore, the reports are not true. (85)

The rumors of lynching and the tar and feather cases in the Fresno area are not true. They are being spread by those who want to use them as a means of keeping the Japanese away from Fresno. (123)

These denial rumors spread only within a limited group and were not taken seriously by most people.

The effect of these rumors was widespread. They helped to define the

7. These are not simply denials of rumors. They were verbal reports which were unverified, which passed from person to person within certain Nisei college circles.
situation. The people had arrived at an interpretation of their position logically, and these rumors merely reinforced this definition. They reinforced the anxieties and fears that already pervaded the community.

The members of the various communities looked upon themselves as "underdogs", misunderstood and completely at the mercy of individuals who suspected them and were prepared to attack them at the slightest provocation. These rumors reinforced the feeling of helplessness in the face of circumstances that were beyond the control of any individual.

Several new behavior patterns developed as a result of the redefinition of the situation. Extra precautions were taken. More people, particularly the Issei, made a regular practice of staying home at night. Large gatherings were avoided, and most social functions were suspended. As one Issei said:

"I always stay home with mama nowadays because you can't tell what will happen. I have always been a good and honest man, but people do not know may not understand. I am old and feeble, but I want to be here to protect my family, with my life if necessary, just in case some maniac should break in."  

A Nisei student remarked:

"It's getting to a hell of a state of affairs. We can't even have big dances anymore because everybody's afraid some American Legion lunatic is going to throw a rock in the window. We don't have any fun any more."  

The rumors about physical violence had very little basis of fact. Once they got under way, however, they spread rapidly throughout the "Little Tokyos". The rumors fitted the expectations of the people so well that they were widely believed and people took special precautions against violence. They reinforced the feelings of fear that had already pervaded the communities.

The Attacks by Filipinos

The relative calm that characterized the first few months after the
Another Nisei expressed his resentment:

"Christ sakes! We can't help it if our parents came from Japan! Maybe we went to Japanese schools but we didn't learn nuthin'. Greek kids go to Greek school and Chinks go to Chink school. I don't see anything wrong with that. These bastards pick on us and beat us up for nothing. It doesn't get them anywhere either."  

attack on Pearl Harbor was marred by the outbreak of violence throughout the state of California between the resident Japanese and Filipino populations. Although the difficulties were attributed by many to the arrival of stories of Japanese atrocities in the Philippine Islands which were believed to have aroused the Filipinos to seek vengeance on the Pacific Coast, there had been difficulties between the two groups for several years. If the news of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in any way influenced the action of the Filipinos, it merely served as a "trigger" that set off long-smouldering antagonisms. It is significant that the most violent outbreak took place in Stockton where the relations between the two groups had long been strained.

The Filipinos and the Japanese occupied somewhat complementary roles in the farm structure of California. The Japanese had begun to arrive in California in large numbers in 1890, and by 1920 many of them had already established themselves as farm owners or as foremen in the large farms. The Filipinos, on the other hand, did not arrive in large numbers to engage in agricultural work until the decade of 1920-1930. Like all new immigrant groups to California farms, the Filipinos were engaged as migratory laborers.10 While the Filipinos made several attempts to organize, none of their unions were powerful enough to bargain effectively until late in the '30s. For years the Filipinos had been employed by the Japanese and by other groups to work in the fields doing "stoop labor" for wages that ranged from 15 to 30 cents an hour. During the summer of 1940 there was considerable tension

in central California when the Japanese farmers attempted to play one Filipino union—the Filipino Agricultural Laborers Association—against the other—the Filipino Federation of America.\textsuperscript{11} The difficulties in the fields had repercussions in the cities, where the Japanese and Filipinos were living in a somewhat symbiotic fashion.

A large number of the non-rural Japanese made their living by operating establishments in "skid road" which catered to other Japanese, to Negroes, and to Filipinos and Mexicans. Some pool-halls, soft drink stores, and cleaning establishments were almost entirely dependent upon Filipino trade. Japanese hotels were also dependent upon Filipino trade, and the Filipino customers were often preferred to Caucasians seeking rooms for 10 to 25 cents a night. In several instances fast friendships were made and it was not unusual for a Filipino worker to entrust all his money in the care of a Japanese hotel keeper rather than to deposit it in a bank or to keep it with him where he would run the risk of robbery. When the trouble developed in the fields in the summer of 1940, all of these relationships were disturbed and some of the Japanese storekeepers suffered considerable economic strain.

The in-group feeling was strong in both groups. This was best demonstrated during the summer of 1940 when the Japanese store owners whose businesses depended upon Filipino trade refused to assist their customers. As one shopowner remarked:

"I personally think that the Japanese farmers are being unreasonable in not giving the Filipinos a raise of a few cents an hour. It's such a trivial thing. However, I do not feel that I should do anything to encourage the Filipinos to continue their strike. After all, nihon-jin doshi dekara, ne?\textsuperscript{12} I do not think the Filipinos will back down this time and that means

\textsuperscript{11} Details of this struggle can be found in the files of the Stockton Record for the summer of 1940. Other material can be found in the Nichi Bei and the Shin Se-ka as well as the Filipino newspapers published in Stockton.

\textsuperscript{12} Roughly translated: "After all, we are all Japanese, aren't we?"
that I shall suffer until the Japanese back down. But I shall stick by my fellow Japanese rather than support those barbarians."13

In spite of past friendly relations, the Japanese looked down upon the Filipinos in contempt. There was also considerable fear of certain propensities that the Filipinos were reputed to have. Filipinos were suspected of having strong propensities toward wooing white and oriental women. They were also reputed to have violent tempers, and every news item that appeared about Filipinos killing or wounding someone in a fight over some woman was interpreted in terms of these "inborn" traits.

Stories about Filipinos becoming violent in arguments over attractive white girls had become legendary in California.14 It was generally known that the sex ratio of the Filipino population was abnormally high. According to one source, 93.3 per cent of the Filipinos who entered the United States between 1920 and 1929 were male.15 Because of this unusual sex distribution the Filipinos were forced to seek the favors of women of other groups. Taxi-dance halls were common and many of the Japanese, recognizing this, had their daughters serve in their stores in an effort to attract Filipino customers. The use of Japanese women for this purpose, however, was strongly condemned in the community. There was a constant dread among the Issei about having their daughters stolen by Filipinos, and extra precautions were taken to guard all women in the presence of Filipinos. This was partly due to the Japanese conceptions of the family and marriage. A marriage with a Filipino would be considered as a black mark against the entire family and its members might have difficulties in finding mates for generations to come.16

13. 57-year old Issei, August 24, 1940.
15. California State Department of Industrial Relations, Facts About Filipino Immigration into California, Speical Bulletin No. 3, (San Francisco, 1930), p. 35.
16. The Nisei conception of marriage and the family was quite different, but the Issei naturally thought in terms of their own conceptions.
In general, the Japanese feared and despised the Filipinos in spite of the fact that many of them earned their livelihood by trading with them. There was the general belief that the P.I.'s (pea-eyes) were a savage race of people who could do only very menial farm labor. According to the stereotyped conceptions of the Japanese, the P.I.'s spent all their money in purchasing expensive tailor-made clothing—trousers that reached up to their chests and coats with broad shoulders. The P.I.'s always had well-groomed haircuts in which every lock of hair was oiled and kept in place. Every Filipino was supposed to have a knife in his pocket to defend himself because of his small stature. There were stories about how the Caucasian firms refused to sell automobiles to Filipinos on time plans and how the Filipinos therefore had to purchase cars in groups of five to ten in order to make cash payments. There were stories of how the Filipinos helped each other win women of other groups, how when one man felt that he had some prospects of success the others would allow him to use their car and would lend him money to finance his courtship. Stories about the relationships between Filipinos and white women were plentiful and an occasional murder that occurred would reinforce the traditional beliefs. Filipino "line-ups" were discussed quite frequently among the Nisei. Those who knew Filipinos well were inclined to make exceptions for their friends rather than change their views about the group.

Difficulties between the two groups were renewed soon after the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese Army. On December 23, in Los Angeles, a Nisei who had recently been honorably discharged from the Army was found stabbed to death on the sidewalk. Two Filipinos were alleged to

17. "In a line-up one of the men brings a prostitute to some room in the district and allows his friends to have intercourse with her, each man paying the girl for the privilege." William F. Whyte, "A Slum Sex Code," American Journal of Sociology, XLIX (July, 1943), p. 27.
have been the last with the Nisei. The most violent outbreak came in Stockton on Christmas day. Gangs of Filipinos broke windows of numerous Japanese business houses; many Japanese were manhandled; a 55-year old attendant of a Japanese garage was killed as he stood talking to a friend; and the Filipinos announced a boycott of Japanese stores and farms. Stockton police immediately took the situation in hand. They closed the local Filipino dance hall; they ordered all Japanese to remain off the streets at night; all meetings were banned; additional patrolmen were placed on the "skid row" beat; and all West End liquor establishments were ordered closed.

In spite of precautions, however, as the open city of Manila was bombed on December 27 and the Japanese Army continued its campaign in the Philippines, the violence continued. On December 29, a 57-year old alien was shot in Sacramento. On the same night, a window was broken in a Japanese establishment located in the Filipino district in Oakland. On January 2, five shots were fired into the home of a Costa Mesa couple. On the following day, two Japanese were seriously wounded in Gilroy when more than fifty shots were pumped into their home. That night an elderly couple was slain in El Centro as they slept. On January 6, five shots were fired into the home of a Mount Eden Nisei. On January 9, a young San Jose Nisei mother was shot in a night attack. On January 15, another Japanese became victim to a Filipino knife wielder in Stockton. Throughout the state local officials responded promptly to the reign of terror and heavy patrols were set up wherever Japanese were congregated in large numbers. Filipinos were

18. Oakland Tribune, December 24, 1941.
19. Stockton Record, December 26 and 28, 1941; San Francisco Examiner, December 26, 1941; and Nichi Bei, December 29, 1941.
20. Oakland Tribune, December 30, 1941.
22. Ibid., January 2, 1942.
23. Ibid., January 3, 1942.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., January 7, 1942.
26. Ibid., January 10, 1942.
27. Ibid., January 16, 1942.
arrested and disarmed.

The attacks ceased about the middle of January. Although a few minor difficulties arose after that time, there were no more outbreaks of violence. During this brief period, the attention of the Japanese was focused upon the Filipinos. Everywhere, everyone was talking about the latest attack. At home, the Filipinos were the major topic of conversation, and each member of the family related what he had heard during the day. Since the Filipinos were considered "savages" who "could not think", there was a dreaded fear of being at their mercy. Special precautions were taken and parents warned their children against wandering about alone.

Although the attacks centered in Stockton, rumors about the Filipinos spread throughout the state. Among the most common rumors in the San Francisco Bay Region were the rumors about the New Year's Eve attack:

(14) On New Year's Eve the San Francisco Filipinos are going to attack the Japanese in force. (137)

(14) Filipinos from Sacramento and Stockton are planning to come to San Francisco on New Year's Eve to create a disturbance against the Japanese. (188)

This report was widespread. Local community leaders warned the people to remain indoors. Celebrations were cancelled; dates were called off; parties were called off. New plans were made for the evening, and most of the people remained off the streets. A Nisei girl later remarked:

"On New Year's Eve we were supposed to go to a social in San Francisco. A couple of nights before, the fellows we were supposed to go with called me up and told me not to come because the Filipinos were coming from Stockton and Sacramento to create a big disturbance. A lot of parties and dances had been planned. I know a lot of church kids who wanted to go, but couldn't." (28)

Among other rumors that spread in the San Francisco area were:

(142) Filipinos are running wild all over California. They have organized into gangs and are attacking all the Nisei girls they can find. They are breaking into stores and stealing everything they can get. (10)

(143) A Filipino walked into Mr. Inouye's store and before anyone could do anything, he threw a bottle through a big mirror.
He pulled out a knife and chased everyone around the store. Other people there chased him out. (11)

One night some Filipinos drove up to a deserted ranch and chased the father and mother of the family away. They then attacked the two daughters of the household. (12)

A girl was going home from work when some Filipinos tried to force her into their car. When she ran away, they tried to run over her. (13)

Some Japanese boys were working on the farm near Acampo when the Filipinos working there attacked them with knives. Fortunately no one was hurt. (14)

On Terminous Island, a shack in which many Japanese workers were sleeping was covered with gasoline and set afire during the night by a group of Filipinos. (15)

On New Year's Eve, many Filipinos ran wild and terrorized the Japanese in Stockton. Fifteen windows were broken, one man was killed, and many were injured. (16)

One of the Filipinos arrested by the police told the judge that if he had a chance to kill Japs again he would gladly do it. He had no regrets about having committed murder. (17)

Nisei girls, two sisters, were attacked by Filipinos in Gilroy. They were attacked and also shot. One girl was shot in the leg. (18)

The following rumors spread in Stockton:

Everybody who walks by Filipino town will get a neck-trim. (19)

The Filipino steal things from the Japanese and then claim they are being patriotic. (20)

Filipinos are attacking Nisei girls. (21)

Filipinos keep their hands in their pockets and when a Japanese passed by, they pull out knives and attack them. (22)

One University of California girl had both parents killed by Filipinos. (23)

In Gilroy, the father and mother were killed and a girl raped by Filipinos. (24)

The windows of all Japanese stores on El Dorado Street have been broken and goods have been looted. (25)

28. 24-year old Nisei girl, March 27, 1944.
29. Terminous Island is in the delta land near Stockton and is not to be confused with Terminal Island near Los Angeles.
One Japanese baseball player was knifed. (297)

All Filipinos are out to get the Japanese. Don't go out on the streets because they are standing about waiting for Japanese to come along. (301)

All Filipinos are organized to beat up the Japanese. (302)

In Imperial Valley, one whole family was wiped out by the Filipinos. (304)

Thus, there were rumors about shootings, murder, beatings, knifings, arson, and rape. Everyone was preoccupied with these attacks. Whenever people got together, they exchanged information. One Nisei later remarked:

"I heard the rumor about the Filipinos in a discussion about a man being killed. One of the hotel keepers was killed in Stockton and a group was talking about it. Then somebody said that every Filipino kept his hands in his pockets and pulled out a knife every time a Jap walked by."30

It was a known fact that numerous incidents had occurred, but the newspapers did not elucidate all the details that the people wanted to know. Furthermore, once the word got around that the Filipinos were on the rampage the people expected considerably more violence than what actually took place. Finally, the newspapers printed only the verified accounts and consequently many of the reports that the Japanese had heard from "reliable" sources did not appear at all. The people were anxious to know what to expect of Filipinos and the newspapers did not carry enough information.

The contents of these rumors were in line with the traditional beliefs of the people. Since the Japanese had looked upon the Filipinos as uncouth barbarians with uncontrollable tempers, stories about Filipino atrocities found a ready audience. As one older Nisei remarked:

"When you get a P.I. mad, you may as well get out of his way. A mad P.I. is like a mad bull. He's crazy and nothing will stop him from committing a crime."31

Furthermore, after the arrival of news of the Japanese atrocities on the

30. 22-year old Nisei, January 13, 1944.
31. 27-year old Nisei, January 4, 1942.
Rumor, which spread both in Berkeley and in Stockton, was apparently the result of considerable exaggeration.

Mr. Inouye himself, had the following to say:

"My boy was sweeping the front of the store when a young Filipino came in asking for my daughter. My boy, who is a little slow in the head, told him he could not come in. I suppose he thought that the Filipino wanted to commit some rash act. When the two started to shove each other some police came by and took the Filipino away. As you can see, nothing has happened to my store, although I no longer get any Filipino business any more."

1. 54-year old Issei, January 13, 1942.
Philippine Islands, some sort of retaliation was expected as a matter of course. Rumors about the sex crimes against Nisei girls also fitted into the beliefs of the Japanese, and for that matter, the American public. Sex crimes were expected as soon as the reign of terror began.

On the whole, the Japanese attributed these instances of violence to the "barbaric instincts" of the Filipinos. However, other explanations for the attacks appeared and spread as rumors:

- **Mean*Filipinos are out for blood. They are being used by some anti-Japanese Caucasian elements to stir up trouble. They are being told that now is the time to strike against the Japanese because we are defenseless.** (259)
- **Town*Filipinos are encouraging the outbreaks to get business for themselves.** (300)
- **Filipinos don't want Japanese in the canneries where the Japanese have a separate union.** (305)

After the Filipinos had announced their boycott, some Filipinos had approached Japanese hotel owners about purchasing their establishments. This was taken as evidence that rumor (305) was true.

In spite of the fact that only a few bands of Filipinos had committed the crimes while many of them were neutral or remained loyal to their employers, the rumors were predominantly about atrocities. When some Filipino leaders deplored these attacks and appealed to the members of their group to cease, other rumors became prevalent among the Japanese.

- **One of the Filipino leaders speaking out against all the violence was badly beaten. His office was wrecked by a group of hoodlums.** (21)
- **Some Filipinos are all right but the other Filipinos are threatening them and are forcing them to boycott Japanese business.** (299)
- **A Filipino in French Camp who was working for a Japanese for ten years was threatened by a group of other Filipinos. They told him to quit, and he had to go into hiding.** (336)

There were also rumors about what happened to the Filipinos as a result of their boycott:
The Filipinos have a camp outside of Stockton. It is a hobo camp. Since they boycotted the Japanese, there are no hotels for them to go to. No other cheap-room hotels will take them. (335)

This rumor was told with glee and a spirit of vengeance.

Because of the rumors about the attacks and because of government restrictions very few Japanese ventured about during this period. Consequently they were unable to find out very much about what others were doing. Several rumors arose about the reaction of the Japanese to the attacks:

Stockton Japanese do not dare go out at night because the Filipinos will kill them if they do. (186)

The Japanese cannot walk around in Stockton because the Filipinos are wild. (218)

The Nisei in Stockton are forming a "good" squad to beat up the Filipinos. (298)

A group of Filipinos knocked on Mr. Ito's door late at night. He looked through a crack and did not open the door. (303)

These rumors led to an extreme fear of Filipinos. People stayed home nights, and took extra precautions in carefully locking doors. One mother wrote to her son at the University of California:

"I wish that you would be careful and stay home at night because I heard that there are many Filipinos in Berkeley. People like you who go around with their mouths open are likely to be beaten up. Just pay attention to your studies and stay home at night..."32

One Stockton Issei woman said:

"Papa and I have been staying home every night since these Filipino incidents broke out. You just can't trust savages. They do not think like civilized people and you cannot expect to reason with them. They are nothing more than ya-ban-jiin33 and there is no sense in going out to provoke them. We just sit at home around the fire and read. That way you don't get into trouble."34

A University of California coed who had been asked by a Filipino

---

32. Excerpt from a letter, December 29, 1941. This student had remained in Berkeley over the Christmas vacation to make up work.

33. This term means "barbarian."
whether she was Chinese or Japanese while she was in a soda fountain related:

"Gee, I was so scared I didn't know what to do. The man didn't do anything but ask me and then he went away. I was so scared that I just sat there for a long time. We thought of calling the police, but after a long time we peeked outside and saw that he wasn't there. We all ran home. I thought that he was going to pull out a knife or something. Gee. . . ."35

These rumors then tended to intensify the fear of violence and reinforced the prejudices that already existed against Filipinos. Perhaps the rumors rather than the actual attacks themselves tended to define the Filipino as the "enemy". There were retaliatory acts. One Nisei recalled:

"They told us not to go out in the streets, so we went to see what was going on. We went out on Center Street and noticed that all the Japanese stores were closed. When we were standing at the corner, some Filipinos walked by. They seemed to be leering at us, so I said, 'Let's get 'em!' The Filipinos started walking faster and they kept looking back even when they were almost a block away."36

A Nisei from Sacramento recalled:

"I remember after the war started when they beat up some Filipinos in Sacramento. When the Filipino got tough with some Hawaiian, he just went up and got the rest of the boys. They just waited in the alley for some Filipinos to come along and just beat hell out of them. I think they laid out nine or ten of them before the cops got wise and chased them away."37

The intense fear of the Filipino continued until the end of January, and even after that time people were hesitant in their relationships with Filipinos. The rumors first appeared toward the end of December, particularly after the outbreak in Stockton, and persisted throughout the month of January. After that time, the rumors disappeared. The attacks ceased, and the attention of the people became focused upon the F.B.I. raids.

35. 21-year old Nisei girl, January 20, 1942.
36. 24-year old Nisei, March 30, 1944.
37. 28-year old Nisei, October 16, 1943.
The F.B.I. Raids and Incarceration

During the month of February, the major preoccupation of the Japanese was the F.B.I. raids. It was not so much the fact that Japanese were being arrested that turned their attention to this, since the incarceration of enemy aliens was considered a natural thing, but the daily publicity given to the raids in the Pacific Coast newspapers. It was during this period that rumors about the F.B.I. became prevalent in the communities.

The F.B.I. as an organization was known to the Japanese even before the war. Because of the publicity in the newspapers, magazines, movies, radio dramas, and particularly the comic strips about the work of the F.B.I. in capturing spies, the Japanese were well aware of the functions of the organization. Furthermore, because of the publicity given to the "Fifth Column", particularly after 1939, the Japanese were well aware that they would be under the suspicion of the F.B.I. Minor Japanese spy scares had occurred in the past, and in each instance the F.B.I. was involved.

Soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor the F.B.I. went to work and systematically rounded up all suspicious individuals. However, Attorney General Biddle announced that there had been "absolutely no evidence of fifth column activities, sabotage or espionage." Those seized were persons whom the department felt "it would be unwise not to apprehend" and had been selected as much as a year before. By the end of December, it was reported that 1,291 Japanese had been taken into custody.

On February 2, four Bay area Japanese were arrested by the F.B.I. On the 6th, nine more were seized in Vallejo. On the 10th, extensive raids were made in Monterey, Salinas, and Watsonville. On the 17th, Sacramento

40. Nichi Bei, December 30, 1941.
was raided, and on the 21st extensive raids began in southern California.41
These arrests continued week by week, but it was not until the end of the
month of January and during the month of February that these raids were
given widespread publicity in the newspapers. Headlines such as the following
appeared in newspapers throughout the state:

- F.B.I. SEIZES 21 AXIS ALIENS IN VALLEJO SPY RING HUNT42
- TWO JAPANESE ARMY RESERVE OFFICERS SEIZED BY F.B.I. IN S.F.
  RAID.43
- MORE JAPS ARRESTED IN SACRAMENTO AREA44
- F.B.I. ARRESTS ALIENS IN ROUNDUP HER45
- ALL-OUT ALIEN ROUNDUP ON46
- MASS RAIDS TRAP SCORES IN COAST'S GREATEST SPY HUNT47

Lengthy write-ups followed these headlines, but very few Japanese be-
lieved what they read in the papers. This was partly because they did not
trust the American press anyway, but mostly because many of the people knew
the men who had been arrested and felt that these men were innocent. Further-
more, some of the reasons given for arrest seemed preposterous. Some rather
typical comments at the time were:

"I don't see why in hell they had to pinch Bill's old man. that old guy is so feeble that he couldn't do anything even if
he wanted to. He's just a nice old gran'pa and is perfectly harmless."48

"They got Teiko's father. I think they must have gotten
him for teaching kendo.49 I don't see that Black Dragon stuff
though. If he really is a member of the Black Dragon, he was
sure good at keeping it hidden. I personally don't think the
old boy's smart enough to be a spy."50

41. Nichi Bei, February 3, 7, 11, 15, 18, and 21, 1942.
42. San Francisco Chronicle, February 6, 1942.
43. Ibid., February 14, 1942.
44. Ibid., February 18, 1942.
47. San Francisco Examiner, February 22, 1942.
48. 21-year old Nisei, March 1, 1942.
49. Kendo is Japanese fencing.
50. 19-year old Nisei, February 16, 1942.
"Mr. Yagio, Mr. Hamada, and Mr. Asami were taken a few days ago. I cannot see why the F.B.I. takes such feeble and helpless men like them. They must have enemies. If those men are considered dangerous, I can think of hundreds that ought to be arrested first. No one in this community could be a spy. Being a spy requires much training and no one I know of around here is smart enough to have such training. People say that Japan is a backward nation, but they are not so backward as to depend on stupid farmers around here for espionage."

"I wonder what the hell the big idea is. I can't see what the F.B.I. could have on my old man. He never did anything. All he did was work on the fields all day. How in the hell could he blow up a bridge if he doesn't even know what it looks like? Maybe somebody wanted him out of the way, but even then I can't see why."

The raids themselves had been anticipated by the people. However, the huge newspaper headlines and their reasons given for the arrests, such as, membership in the Black Dragon Society, focussed the attention of the people on this topic. The subject of the F.B.I. raids became foremost in the preoccupations of the people. As long as people were being arrested for something wrong that they had done, most Issei had nothing to worry about, since they had done nothing that could conceivably be interpreted as espionage or sabotage. However, when people were being arrested for no reason at all, the fear of incarceration struck everyone. Who would be taken next? What will happen to my family if I am arrested?

As the raids and the publicity continued, two questions arose which could not satisfactorily be answered by the press. The first question referred to the reasons for arrest. Whenever a man was arrested, there was considerable speculation as to the reasons why he was arrested, but no matter what plausible reason anyone presented the Issei knew of some other person who had engaged in the same activity and who had not been arrested. The explanations given in the newspapers were not satisfactory because the sensational stories about caches of ammunition and Black Dragon espionage

51. Excerpts from a letter from an Issei woman, February 21, 1942.
52. 21-year old Nisei, March 3, 1942.
agents were simply fantastic, especially when they were printed with reference
to some very simple and hard-working farmer. Consequently there was
considerable uncertainty, and people continued to wonder what the men had
been picked up for. No one seemed to know the answer and all attempts to
get the answer from the F.B.I. were apparently unsuccessful. It was in this
atmosphere that rumors arose.

The following rumors about reasons for arrest spread in the San Francisco
Bay Region:

(173) Mr. Kondo was arrested by the F.B.I. They couldn't find
anything in the way of evidence so they took a Yearbook with
the addresses and some Popular Mechanics magazines
with pictures of radio parts in them. (39)

(174) Mr. Baba had a radio shop, but they did not arrest him for
his radios. They took him because he had a dictionary and
a Bible written in Japanese. (40)

(175) Adachi nurseries in Richmond was raided by the F.B.I. and
an alien was picked up. The reason given was that he was
 teaching the boys there Japanese naval maneuvers.
The alien concerned was playing with toy lead ships on the
shop floor with a small Japanese boy at the time of the
raid. (43)

(176) A licensed Nisei amateur radio man was taken in by the
F.B.I. for having a radio transmitter. (96)

53. For example, in one widely publicized raid in Sacramento it was
alleged in the newspapers that the men were arrested for having contraband
materials. Among the articles seized were: Japanese army uniforms, aerial
bomb casings, a wrestling banner, some samurai swords, detached headlights,
maps, technical books on radio, and cameras, among other things. (San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, February 18, 1942) The newspaper did not point out, how-
ever, that Japan has long had universal military conscription and that anyone
who had been in Japan when he was older than 16 years of age probably had
some military training and consequently may have a uniform. It was not
indicated that the bomb casings were empty and that they had been used
for theatrical purposes. The fact that wrestling banners were awarded for
skill in sumo and jūdo, two types of Japanese wrestling, neither of which
had been forbidden by Federal authorities, was completely ignored. Fur-
thermore, maps and detached auto parts can be found almost anywhere. It
is interesting to note that a directory containing a list of all Japanese
in America had been listed in newspapers as contraband; such a directory
had been given to all subscribers of Japanese newspapers annually.
In the Stockton area, Issei have been picked up by the F.B.I. for possessing broken camera lenses. In one case, a daughter had a fifteen-cent store camera which was smashed so much that it was useless, but the F.B.I. took the father for having contraband goods. (108)

In Los Angeles:

A Santa Barbara storekeeper was arrested for sending huge quantities of money to Japan. He never had that much, but his customers used to bring large checks and ask him to send their balances to Japan for them in their names. Since he sent them, his name was connected with them, and he was arrested. (257)

In Stockton:

One man in the country had a broken down radio set, but was arrested and accused of having a short-wave set. (276)

The F.B.I. raided a sporting goods store and arrested the owner. There was a big play in the papers about finding 50,000 rounds of ammunition, but the man was released the next day. (307)

In Monterey the F.B.I. arrested a family for having a telescope. They were released the next day. It was played up big in the papers, but it was just a broken down thing in the yard with no lenses. (308)

The F.B.I. is taking all kendo officials and leaders according to their book. (309)

The F.B.I. is arresting all Buddhist priests. (310)

One man in Sacramento was arrested for having radio parts in his house. (313)

A Nisei had a short-wave set, and the F.B.I. raided the place. (314)

Thus, the people did not know why the arrests were being made. They were anxious to know what the charges were so that they would know whether or not they themselves would be taken. They ridiculed the stories about spies and were certain that there must be some other basis for the arrests. They wished to know in order that they might know what they were not supposed to do. There had been no official declaration stating that anything other

54. The "book" to which this rumor refers has been much discussed since that time. It was the kendo yearbook of the Hoku-bei Butoku Kai. A picture of Mutsuru Toyama, leader of the Black Dragon Society, appeared in the frontispiece; consequently all persons connected with the organization have been under suspicion. The Butoku Kai was a fencing society.
than firearms, cameras, and short-wave radios were contraband, and yet the newspapers were full of articles stating that certain individuals had been arrested for having maps, directories, pictures of the Emperor of Japan. There was confusion. The question was: what is contraband and what is not?

The fear of unconsciously doing something that might lead to incarceration was great. There was considerable speculation, and in order to be on the safe side many Issei destroyed anything that had a vague association with Japan. It was during this period that rumors about what constituted contraband spread.

The following rumors spread in the San Francisco area:

- Any maps and newspaper clippings are sources of suspicion by the F.B.I., and they pick up individuals just for having them. (44)
- Knives longer than 8 inches are contraband. (207)
- Knives longer than 12 inches are contraband. (208)

In Stockton:

- Any Japanese literature is contraband. (271)
- Any Japanese phonograph records are contraband. (272)
- Any picture other than a portrait of oneself is contraband. If any scenery, showing the landscape in the background, the picture was contraband. (315)
- All Golden Gate Exposition pictures are contraband. (316)
- All pictures of airplanes are contraband. (317)
- Any knife over six inches in length is contraband. (318)
- All field glasses are contraband. (319)
- One is certain to be arrested if he has any kendo paraphernalia. (320)
- All documents written in Japanese are contraband. (321)
- All maps are contraband. (322)
- All communist literature is contraband. (347)

The rumors about the reasons for the arrests left everything in more confusion than ever. People did not know what they could do and what they could not do. They did not know what they could possess and what was
contraband. This led to the widespread practices of burning all books printed in Japanese (sometimes including Bibles and dictionaries), all maps, magazines, yearbooks, pictures of the Emperor. Japanese phonograph records were destroyed. Anything that might possibly be misinterpreted as evidence indicating the owner's allegiance to Japan was destroyed. At first, people did not know what to do, but the news that a friend--particularly a respected friend--had burned his things suggested similar patterns of action. The following remarks indicate what happened as a result of the rumors:

"We heard that knives longer than 12 inches were contraband. This caused a lot of trouble because everyone had sashimi knives. My mother took her knife to the next door neighbor so that it could be taken care of."\(^{56}\)

"Papa and I burned all the books that we had in Japanese. We kept only my dictionaries and English grammar books left. I saved them because I didn't think they were offensive. We did not know why people were being arrested, but we wanted to play safe. We heard that many other people were doing this too."\(^{57}\)

"I heard that Mrs. Nakayama burned all her things, and Mrs. Miyoshi told me that she intended to do it too. I guess we may as well get rid of some of these things. My boy tells me that it is about time I destroyed these things. He is very happy about it."\(^{58}\)

"I personally doubt if the F.B.I. could arrest us for having innocuous things like this around, but you can't tell. Mr. Uyeno was arrested for having a map. The others are burning their things, and so will we."\(^{59}\)

"The Berkeley Buddhist Church had a huge map of Japan. It was an expensive one too. The crazy guys were going to burn it, so I asked the reverend why we couldn't donate it to the university. After all, it seemed wasteful to burn a big map like that. We had a long discussion and finally I brought it down to the political science office. Gee, they were glad to get it. They couldn't take it as a gift without a lot of red tape so we let them have it as a loan for the duration. And those crazy guys wanted to burn it!"\(^{60}\)

---

55. Sashimi is raw fish, and long knives were necessary to cut it.
56. 24-year old Nisei girl, March 27, 1944.
57. 51-year old Issei woman, January 28-29, 1942, February 12, 1942.
58. 51-year old Issei woman, February 10, 1942.
59. 61-year old Issei man, February 23, 1942.
60. 24-year old Nisei, March 30, 1944.
"For the last few weeks we were not sure of what we should do about all the things that we had piled up. We used to subscribe to Japanese magazines and naturally have the many maps and pictures and games they gave away with their New Year editions. The old man (grandfather) asked Mr. Ouchi whether it was advisable to burn them. Papa was in favor of it. He did not wish to take chances. When the old man found out that Mr. Ouchi had already burned his things, he consented to burn our things too."

The second question that came to people's minds was: how are the men treated when they are arrested by the F.B.I.? There was considerable apprehension about this. Many Nisei had been reading and hearing about the treatment of prisoners in Nazi concentration camps, and they were fearful for the fate of their relatives and friends who had been interned. Since it was rather difficult for anyone other than close relatives to visit those who had been arrested, first hand information could not be had. The following rumors spread rapidly:

1. In Concord, Mas Marumoto said that when the F.B.I. raided the Japanese homes they herded the old folks out into the yard very early in the morning. These people froze. They requested a bathrobe, blanket or a coat to cover their thin nightgowns but were refused. (41)

2. When the F.B.I. raided Mr. Suzuki's home, they would not let him change his clothes or even go to the lavatory. (51)

3. Some F.B.I. agents are fine, but others are individually mean. Some of them are just cruel. They don't even give people time to pack. (52)

4. The F.B.I. forced a girl with mumps to get out of her bed in order to search the place. (53)

5. The F.B.I. won't allow wives of the arrested Japanese to speak to their husbands in Japanese. (54)

6. Persons who are arrested by the F.B.I. are usually empty-walleted by the time they reach the police stations, city halls, or wherever they are taken. They don't know who takes the money. (56)

7. The F.B.I. took away the people without giving them notice or time to make preparations. (179)

8. The F.B.I. took men with the assurance that they would be allowed to return to clear up their affairs, but did not keep their promise. (180)

61. 52-year old Issei woman, February 4, 1942.
One Nisei summed up the effects of these rumors nicely:

"Among the Japanese it sure was tough. We all knew we were suspected even if we never did anything. We didn't know what contraband was and heard all sorts of rumors. We just assumed that anything that had anything to do with Japan was contraband. Nobody knew what the hell was going on. Everybody burned their art works, their King magazines, and naturally their Japanese flags. It was just one sad mess."

61½. 23-year old Nisei, January 26, 1944.
In an F.B.I. raid, if anyone was sick, the agents just knocked them out of bed to look around. (203)

When the F.B.I. went to raid Baba's place no one was home so they just slit the screen and got it. They tore up the place and then just waited for them to come home. They smoked and threw all the ashes on the nice rugs. (204)

At jail, the internees were treated cruelly. Relatives are not allowed to see the men. (206)

The F.B.I. men are very antagonistic and manhandle the old Japanese people. They leave the homes in a mess because they take everything they think could be used against the person including any trophies that he had won. (242)

When the F.B.I. went to raid San Pedro, they went in the middle of the night. The men could pack one bag. They didn't tell the family where the men were going. The families had to evacuate 24 hours later and couldn't correspond for months. (311)

The F.B.I. looks everywhere and at everything, even the rubbish. They leave the places in a mess. (312)

The treatment that the Japanese anticipated in the hands of the F.B.I. agents was along the lines of their traditional expectations about the treatment of spies by the police—particularly Japanese police. The Japanese police have a reputation of being very blunt and harsh upon their prisoners, and this fact probably had some influence on the Issei thinking. Furthermore, the F.B.I. men were classified as tan-tei (detectives) because they wore plain clothes, and the tan-tei were especially feared in Japan. The Japanese police were supposed to have dealt harshly with spies caught in Japan, and it was natural to assume that anyone arrested and accused in the United States under similar circumstances would be treated in a similar manner. Thus, the Issei expected the worst.

As a result of some of the rumors about the treatment of the people during and subsequent to their arrest, there developed a fear of being caught unprepared. Those individuals who thought that they had engaged in some activity in the past that might lead to their arrest accepted their fate and calmly made preparations for their internment. Those who expected
to go packed their suitcases and were prepared to go at a moment's notice.
The packing of suitcases and the clearing up of business affairs was prob-
ably due to the rumors that the F.B.I. did not give people sufficient time
to settle their affairs. One Nisei girl whose father was later arrested
recalled:

"About my Dad, we had expected him to be picked up. He
was connected with Japanese language schools. He was a cabinet
member of the Japanese Language Association. A lot of his
friends were picked up after December 7 or soon afterwards. We
packed a suitcase just in case they came for him. We had that
suitcase packed for a long time. I tried to stay home just in
case they came."62

There were rumors about other inconveniences caused by arrests:

(214) One person in Monterey was taken by the F.B.I. and then
was released. It was a false arrest, but he lost all
his Caucasian friends. They stated that they could not
trust a Jap. (340)

There were other rumors about the F.B.I.:

(215) F.B.I. agents speak perfect Japanese and know everything
about the Japanese. (181)

(216) Everybody in Berkeley will be raided by the F.B.I. as soon
as they are through with Oakland. (202)

(217) F.B.I. men come in without search warrants and just make
themselves at home. (243)

(218) Some F.B.I. men are kind; those were the old-timers and
regular F.B.I. men. The new recruits who were sworn in
to meet the emergency were the bad ones. (244)

(219) The F.B.I. is searching every house where Japanese are
living regardless of whether they are under suspicion or
not. (245)

(220) The F.B.I. was going to go through the names of
Japanese suspects once, but instead they are going through
them three or four times. (273)

There were also rumors about Caucasians posing as F.B.I. agents and

warnings against them:

(221) When the Nisei girl in Sacramento was abducted by a group
of men posing as F.B.I. agents, her mother kneeled down
and prayed as they were about to attack her daughter, and
when the men saw this, they spared her daughter. (16)

These rumors emerged out of the confusion caused by the publicity given to the F.B.I. raids. People did not know what they could do. The existence of rumors further complicated the situation. The rumors were of a nature that seemed to fit into the picture of the kind the treatment the Japanese themselves expected. There was fear and resentment, particularly against what were considered unjustifiable arrests. The Issei were more inclined to believe these rumors than were the Nisei, although many Nisei took them seriously. The existence of these rumors intensified the fears of the people and added to the already existing confusion. The rumors about the reasons for arrests led to widespread destruction of anything that might be thought to be suspicious.

The rumors about the F.B.I. raids ceased to circulate as widely after the month of February, even though the arrests continued. In March and April, the newspapers ceased sensationalizing the raids, and the attention of the Japanese was directed toward a question of far greater importance to the entire group—the impending evacuation. Furthermore, many of those who had been jailed had been released, and the reassuring news that many of them brought back helped to alleviate the tension.

Threats From Within the Group

When men who were thought to be entirely innocent were arrested, the question naturally arose as to why they had been taken. The rumors about contraband provided a partial answer, but another set of rumors provided a more plausible explanation: someone within the group had "squealed" on their personal
enemies. It was in this connection that several rumors arose about stool-
pigeons.

These rumors about stool-pigeons were a natural outcome of the situation. The members of the Japanese communities had always assumed that no one outside of their group knew anything about the activities within the community. The in-group feeling was rather strong and special efforts were made to keep all undesirable news about the Japanese community among the Japanese. If some member of the community did not conform to the mores, there was considerable gossip within the community, but no one thought of "showing their dirty linen" to the hakujin. Misdemeanors committed by Japanese were considered a disgrace to the people and consequently were not reported to officials unless they became quite serious. Thus, the Issei and Nisei had always assumed that no Caucasian had any intimate knowledge of the activities among the Japanese. Therefore, when specific individuals were arrested by the F.B.I. and were supposedly charged with things that only the members of the community were expected to know, the natural conclusion was that someone within the group had turned traitor. Those who were specifically named in the rumors were generally persons who were marginal to the two racial groups--marginal in the sense that they had business or social contacts in the Caucasian community as well as among the Japanese.

The one group that was specifically accused of betraying the Japanese was the JACL. Since many of the Issei community leaders had been interned, JACL officials had to work in close cooperation with the authorities on various problems that arose in the communities. Since not much was known about the Japanese communities, some JACL chapters announced that they were contemplating surveys in order to gather factual

63. The Japanese American Citizens League is the only national all-
Nisei organization in the country. When the Japanese Associations were closed, this was the only organization that could serve as intermediaries between the people and the authorities.
data. These efforts to collect information to serve as a basis for planning were misinterpreted by some as attempts to inform on the Japanese. The move that touched off considerable hostility was the announcement of the Kibei Survey during the middle of February. This proposed survey aroused a round of criticism from the Kibei and the Nisei as well. When questions about informers arose, therefore, the JACL was naturally under suspicion.

The following are some of the rumors that spread during this period:

(225) The JACL was instructed by Naval Intelligence to send questionnaires to all members to report on their parents.

(226) The FBI ordered the JACL to make the Kibei survey.

(227) The JACL started their survey on the Kibei in order to turn in information to the FBI. They are taking this as a protective move to whitewash themselves by blaming others.

(228) In Delano and Santa Maria, some men from the Los Angeles JACL came up as spies. They worked with the FBI and all the male heads of families were taken.

(229) All JACL leaders are inu's.

Although resentment was aroused against the JACL and many were suspicious of JACL men, there was not much that could be done. Many Nisei were members of the organization, and all of the leaders were well known in the communities. The rumors about the Kibei Survey led to so many accusations that the JACL was trying to trap the FBI that the national secretary of the organization had to release the following statement:

"Nothing could be further from the truth. Our desire is to help and to protect you from as many humiliations, persecutions and misunderstandings as possible. Because of your alleged training and background in Japan, many unjust and unfounded accusations have been hurled at you. . . . If we know the truths and facts regarding you and your position, we can present your case more effectively. . . ."

64. Nichi Bei, February 15, 1942.
65. Inu literally means "dog", but the term refers to informers. This term later had a colorful history in the various relocation centers where numerous individuals were accused of betraying the confidence of the group.
66. Nichi Bei, February 20, 1942.
Another factor that may have influenced the stool-pigeon rumors was the fact that some individuals in the community had saved enough money so that they were able to live comfortably even though they had lost their means of livelihood. During this period of bitterness and suspicion, anyone with spending money was likely to be suspected of having been paid by the F.B.I. Those with money were often the successful individuals who had many enemies who would not hesitate to take advantage of the situation to attack them. The people were highly sensitized to reports of this nature, and many unjust accusations were made. An excellent opportunity was presented for jealous competitors to attack their personal enemies. Individuals genuinely disliked were also accused.

The following rumors spread in the San Francisco area:

- Japanese are being turned in to the F.B.I. by two or three stool-pigeons in each community. The stool-pigeons are sometimes those who are the most guilty of all. (78)
- The people in Lodi and Stockton area are jittery because there are spies in the Japanese communities reporting real and imagined suspicions to the F.B.I. Many times, these are just unfounded accusations. They have picked up most of the leaders of the Japanese communities. Recently the teachers of kendo and judo have been picked up. The Kibei instructors have not yet been touched. (111)
- Mr. Shoji is protected from any raids because one of his friends is an informer and gave him the O.K. to the F.B.I. (182)

In Sacramento:

- Some Nisei who think they are patriotic are turning in names of their friends to the F.B.I. (222)

In Los Angeles:

- There are many stool pigeons in the Japanese community. Some people are even turning in their relatives for $25. a head. (247)
- You can't trust anybody any more. Two ladies were talking in the market, and one lady said that it was hard for her and that she wished that her son in the Army would be released so that she could have someone to advise her in the confusion. Just for this remark the woman and her husband were arrested by the F.B.I. Some neighbor's son turned them in. (248)
The government put ads in the papers asking for Nisei men, preferably university men, to work in the federal civil service. One engineer from Cal went to apply for a job and he was told that the ad was just a means of getting F.B.I. agents. They told him that he was just supposed to stand around where Nisei congregate and call the F.B.I. whenever he heard something suspicious. He was to be paid $250 a month, but if he is caught by the Japanese, the federal government has no responsibility for his welfare or safety. This Nisei fellow said, 'No.'

In Stockton:

Mr. Fukumoto, Mr. Ishida, and the young Nisei couple across the street from Yashiro's theatre are the stool-pigeons turning in names to the F.B.I. Wait until we get them at Owens Valley; we'll fix them.

There are Japanese in the pay of the F.B.I. who are going around to suspected individuals and offering to clear their names off the lists for a bribe of $500.

The Japanese government announced over the radio the names of the stool-pigeons in each of the areas.

All insurance men are stool-pigeons.

Yamaguchi admitted that he was a stool-pigeon and said that it was for the good of the community and besides that he got $100 for each person he turned in.

Another widespread rumor was:

Some Koreans are working for the F.B.I.

When the rumors about how badly the Japanese had been treated by the F.B.I. became current, there was even greater fear of being arrested and an even greater hatred and resentment against the kuni. The tension was high. No one knew what to expect or when he would be visited by the dreaded tan-tei. People were extremely suspicious of each other because they were certain that there had been a "leak" somewhere, but they did not know where the "leak" really was. No one knew whom they could trust. Many Issei refused to discuss the war in the presence of their own children. There was much speculation over the identity of the informers and whenever Issei gathered they pieced together bits of evidence to see whether or not they could determine who had talked. There was bitterness against those who
allegedly had betrayed the group, and thoughts of vengeance in the centers was common. As one Nisei later remarked:

"... Another time I remember when people were wondering who the dogs were who were squealing on the Japanese to the F.B.I. One of the men said that he heard from a broadcast from Japan that the Japanese government announced who was an imu in each district. He said he didn't remember any names for this district. Then they went on to talk about why each suspected guy might be an imu. I think he included the lie about the Japanese broadcast to try to make the imu fearful and to try to stop their squealing." 67

All of these rumors intensified the fear of the F.B.I. Furthermore, the unfavorable publicity in the newspapers about the F.B.I. raids was interpreted by the Japanese as constituting another threat upon their collective security because of the adverse public opinion that might be aroused as a result of it. Consequently the search for and the resentment against stool-pigeons was intensified. The people were preoccupied with the subject. Whenever a man was arrested, suspicion pointed to another man in similar circumstances who was thought to be equally guilty of whatever the charges happened to be. Why was the second man not arrested? Had he saved himself by becoming a government witness? Did he have a friend who worked for the F.B.I.? Had he paid protection money?

The rumors about the stool-pigeons appeared mainly in February and March when the publicity about the F.B.I. raids was at its height. Prior to that time there had been occasional reports about Nisei turning in their parents. These individuals were looked upon in contempt, and a few comments had been made, but there was no excitement such as that which accompanied these rumors. Since it seemed quite reasonable that some person within the community was working with the government, these reports were widely believed by the Issei and Nisei alike. Although the resentment against the

67. 23-year old Nisei, January 18, 1944.
The extreme suspicion of anyone who might conceivably have turned
government witness is reflected in the following remark of a Nisei:

"Our place was raided three times. Each time my father
was taken to the station and then released. They made a mis-
take each time. First they got him for some Heimushakai1 dona-
tion charge, but they found that they had the wrong man. It
was another man with the same name that they wanted. The
second time they got him for being in the Nihonjinkai2, but
they released him because of illness. The third time they
got him for being active in kendo, but because he was sick
they let him go again. We went to the Health Center and asked
to have him released. Anyway, it seemed that every time my
father was released then three or four more Japanese were
taken. The F.B.I. was taking fright along anyway, but it looked
a little bad. After that, when I talked to fellows whose
fathers were taken, they never said anything, but I felt that
something was different. They didn't seem quite so close.
One woman, who is very talkative and blunt, came right up to
me and said, 'Isn't it strange that your father was released
after two or three hours?' You know what she was hinting at.
The fourth time the F.B.I. came, they took him for good, so
they all shut up."3

1. The Heimushakai was an organization that devoted itself to the
task of collecting funds to aid the Japanese war effort against China.
The men active in this organization were among the very first to be
arrested by the F.B.I. after the outbreak of the war. The Japanese them-
selves felt that it was only natural that leaders of this organization
should be arrested.

2. The Nihonjinkai was the Japanese Association of America, a mutual
aid service organization.

3. 24-year old Nisei, March 30, 1944.
individuals who were labelled by the rumors continued to the relocation center days, the rumors themselves disappeared as the evacuation approached. Since everyone was to be interned, some looked forward to revenge in the centers where they thought the *Inu* would be without the protection of the F.B.I. As evacuation approached, however, people were too busy packing to be concerned with the matter.

Aside from the reports about stool-pigeons, there were other rumors about threats from within the group. There were fears that weakness in leadership would be detrimental to the welfare of the group. There were fears of being betrayed by the leaders who were alleged to have been seeking personal aggrandisement rather than the well-being of the entire group. There were also fears that the rash act of a single individual would jeopardize the safety of everyone. There were rumors expressive of all of these fears, and most of them were about the J.A.C.L.

Contrary to the general belief that all Japanese were united in whatever they did and that they were well organized, there was considerable disunity among the Nisei after the outbreak of the war. There was increased social solidarity in the sense that everyone recognized the cleavage between the Japanese and the out-group quite clearly, but within the collectivity the various factions tore at each other with increased vigor. There was a recognition that the collective security of the group rested to a large extent upon the action taken by the leadership, and since the various factions did not trust each other and did not wish to trust their own security to those toward whom they had feelings of contempt, the struggle for power and leadership was intensified. Throughout the state of California various groups of Nisei fought each other almost to the eve of evacuation.

68. The Manzanar riot in December, 1942, developed from a severe beating administered a man reputed to have been an *Inu* during this period. The difficulties developed when the people protested the arrest of the men alleged to have administered the beating.
With the outbreak of war, all the offices of the Japanese Association of America were closed, leaving most Japanese without a central place where they could go for advice. The Japanese consul's office was likewise no longer accessible. Within a few months the F.B.I. had arrested many of the prominent Issei in the various localities, and the people were forced to turn to the J.A.C.L. for leadership. Since it was the only national body among the Japanese, the authorities dealt directly with it. The J.A.C.L. thus became the central organization.

In the San Francisco Bay Region, the J.A.C.L. was opposed by the Young Democrats of Oakland, a small group of "intellectual liberals" affiliated with the Democratic Youth Federation of America. The J.A.C.L. leadership had always looked with suspicion on the Y.D.'s and had frequently accused the group of being "Communist-inspired". There was apparently a deep-seated fear on the part of some J.A.C.L. men that the "radicals" might do something rash and bring disaster to the community. On the other hand, the Y.D.'s looked upon the J.A.C.L. as a large organization controlled by a small minority of "reactionary" businessmen who used the body as a means of getting business connections and personal prestige. The Y.D.'s felt that the J.A.C.L. men did not have the welfare of the people in mind and that they were simply seeking glory for themselves by identifying themselves with organizations like the American Legion, the Chamber of Commerce, and the various lodges.

During the height of the conflict, both groups spread rumors about the activities of the other, and these rumors spread rapidly throughout the community. Although neither group purposely manufactured rumors about the other, there was no hesitation about spreading an accusation that was certain
other, there was no hesitation about passing on one that was heard.

Among the rumors about the J.A.C.L. which spread in the San Francisco Bay Region were the following:

(243) The plan for cooperative farming drawn up by Korematsu and accepted by the F.S.A. has been held up because Kido felt that he had been left out. (28)69

69. Korematsu's plan was one of the many utopian schemes that appeared during this period. He proposed that the Japanese join in a Christian cooperative farming project in some area outside the Western Defense Command. The proposal attracted considerable attention in the San Francisco area and this rumor consequently caused considerable resentment.

Saburo Kido, referred to in the rumor, was national commander of the J.A.C.L.
The J.A.C.L. is opposed to the F.S.A. rehabilitation plan. Kido is opposed because the J.A.C.L. is not officially "in". (29)

The J.A.C.L. in Alameda is charging $5 as a "professional fee" to help aliens moving from restricted areas and registering. They claim that the $5 is not a fee, but that 50 cents is charged for notarizing and that the remainder is to be considered a donation for the cause. (31)

The J.A.C.L. is charging a $5 "professional fee" when aiding aliens in registering. (36)

The J.A.C.L. has refused to cooperate with the F.O.R. and the F.S.A. because the leaders have personal grudges. (37)

The J.A.C.L. has burned its copies of the constitution of their organization. They burned every copy as soon as the war began. (38)

Saburo Kido is to resign from his position as national commander of the J.A.C.L. (113)

The J.A.C.L. is bargaining with the Army officials to get whatever they could for themselves. (163)

The J.A.C.L. knew all about the evacuation weeks before it was announced. (184)

In Sacramento:

The J.A.C.L. is trying to be patriotic and they are supporting the evacuation program. They do not have the welfare of the Japanese people at heart. (223)

In Los Angeles:

The J.A.C.L. men are being sucked in by the Army. They were so confused that they had no stand when the Tolon Committee hearings came on. (250)

In Stockton:

Since the J.A.C.L. cabinet is going to Salt Lake City or Denver at the time of evacuation, they didn't care about the other Japanese being evacuated. That's the reason why they support evacuation. (277)

The J.A.C.L. supports the idea of cooperating with the government and evacuating voluntarily because then they
could go in and buy up all the goods in Japanese stores at robbery prices and make a substantial profit. (278)

(256)

(278) The J.A.C.L. big shots have their fingers in the graft. They are getting something out of the evacuation. (279)

(257)

(279) The Alameda J.A.C.L. is charging people money to give them information they could get anywhere. (364)

(258)

(280) The J.A.C.L. favors Christians over Buddhists, Nisei over Issei in their efforts to prevent the whole group from being evacuated. (365)

(259)

(260) The J.A.C.L. is in favor of evacuation. (366)

(261)

(261) The J.A.C.L. is not doing a darn thing. They are being pushed around by the government. (368)

(262)

Masaoka butched up everything at Sunday's Tolan Committee hearing. (369)\footnote{71}

(263)

(370) The J.A.C.L. is charging aliens for information that the aliens could get anywhere.

(264)

(371) The J.A.C.L. is planning the evacuation with the officials. They are mixing with high government officials.

(265)

(372) The J.A.C.L. insists upon the evacuation.

Many of these rumors apparently had their origin in the boasting of the J.A.C.L. men themselves, who were seeking to enhance the prestige of the organization by associating its leadership with government officials. Other rumors were spread purposely by those who opposed the organization.\footnote{72}

The fact that these rumors spread indicates, however, that there was a basic distrust of the J.A.C.L. leadership. Otherwise these rumors would not have been so widespread. Issei were inclined to look askance at the performance of young people, and the Nisei group was split by many personal animosities. At a time when strong leadership was admittedly most essential, many of the Japanese felt that it was lacking. The rumors only served to

\footnote{70. This was a claim made by J.A.C.L. officials themselves.}

\footnote{71. Masaoka was the national executive secretary. The Sunday hearing to which this rumor refers was closed to the public and was devoted to the testimony of Army officials. Masaoka did not testify on February 22.}
Many of these rumors apparently had their origin in the boasting of the J.A.C.L. men themselves, who were seeking to enhance the prestige of their organization by associating its leadership with government officials. Other rumors, such as, (243), (244), (245), (247), and (263), were passed on by those who opposed the organization. Although members of organizations like the Y.D.'s probably did not start these rumors, they repeated them without making any effort at verification. The rumors fitted into the conceptions that had of the calibre of J.A.C.L. leaders and were furthermore quite useful in their efforts to show the people what kind of an organization the J.A.C.L. "really" was. One Nisei later confessed:

"I passed on all the stories I heard about the Filipinos, the land-grabbing, and the J.A.C.L. without checking up on them. That was because I didn't like the J.A.C.L. anyway and any remark against them was O.K. to me. I wanted the other guys to know what rats they were. I didn't like the P.I.'s either and I guess I felt good reinforcing my prejudice against them. I told others about the Caucasians gipping the Japanese because I wanted them to watch out and I wanted to be on the lookout for rotten deals I might get caught in."

The fact that these rumors spread indicates, however, that there was a basic distrust of the J.A.C.L. leadership. Otherwise these rumors would not have been so widespread. Issei were inclined to look askance at the performance of young people, and the Nisei group was split by many personal animosities. At a time when strong leadership was admittedly most essential many of the Japanese felt that it was lacking. The rumors only served to increase the distrust of the leadership. There was the fear that those with power were fools and that their leadership would bring catastrophe to the entire group.

72. 23-year old Nisei, January 18, 1944. This Nisei was not a Y.D.
increased the distrust of the leadership. There was the fear that those with power were fools and that their leadership would lead to a catastrophe for the entire group.

These rumors about the J.A.C.L. leadership began to spread during the month of February and continued—until have continued to spread ever since. While these rumors were at first believed only by those Nisei who for one reason or another distrusted the J.A.C.L. leaders and by the Issei who did not have faith in the younger men's judgments, these reports came to be taken for granted when the evacuation program was actually announced. At first, when the announcement was made, the people were quite relieved that the suspense was over, but once they got into the centers and experienced some hardships, the J.A.C.L. was made the scapegoat. Many Nisei who were members of the organization refused to support it any longer and disclaimed any connection with it. J.A.C.L. men were extremely unpopular in all the centers, and some met with physical violence.

These reports, however, did not have any immediate effect during the pre-evacuation period. The people were so busy in preparing for evacuation that they had no time for other problems. Furthermore, the J.A.C.L. was busily engaged in assisting the people. Once in the centers, however, the assistance rendered was apparently forgotten. Accusations continued to mount and the organization fell into disrepute.

Since the entire Japanese population in the United States has always been treated as a group and since the individuals within the community considered the racial group the in-group, it was only natural that the people felt that the action of a single individual might reflect upon the standing

73. This period marked the beginning of the downfall of the J.A.C.L. Prior to the war, the organization steadily gained in membership and following the attack on Pearl Harbor became the major organization in the country. Since evacuation, its prestige has waned considerably and many are convinced that the J.A.C.L. "sold them down the river" at evacuation. Virtually all Japanese who were beaten in the relocation centers were J.A.C.L. leaders.
The disunity among the groups in the Bay Region reached its peak when the Tolan Committee opened its hearings on the Japanese in San Francisco. The J.A.C.L. was scheduled to testify, but other groups, feeling that the J.A.C.L. did not represent their views, did their utmost to get an opportunity to testify. After some difficulty, two other groups were given a hearing.
On February 23, the J.A.C.L. suffered one of the most miserable failures in its history. The entire testimony that had been planned was disrupted by the reading of a letter sent by some Nisei to discredit the organization. The J.A.C.L. claimed that they represented the vast majority of the Nisei and began testifying upon a theme of extreme patriotism when Representative Sparkman read excerpts from a letter which he claimed he had received from a Nisei student:

"I do not know what weight is given to testimony presented by representatives of the Japanese American Citizens League. However, I think that I can safely state that many thinking people have condemned that organization as a spokesman for the Japanese population. Its officials are notoriously fearful of answering questions directly or formulating upon policy which will reflect the desires and opinions as well as actions of the group which they are purported to represent. Moreover, it is a political organization and, hence, cannot be representative of those who prefer to hold their own political views."

After the reading of this letter, the testimony of the J.A.C.L. representatives was of a different calibre. They were visibly shocked and caught off guard. The questioning became more severe, and the general impression of the audience seemed to be that the J.A.C.L. testimony was a miserable failure.

Those present felt that the letter had a damaging effect. No one knew, or no one admitted he knew, who had sent the letter. The reaction of the Y.D.'s present was that the letter should never have been sent even if the contents expressed what they considered to be the truth. The Y.D.'s were as surprised by the letter as the others and had a special session during the lunch hour to revise their planned testimony to meet the situation.

---

75. Ibid., p. 11142.
J.A.C.L. leaders were naturally perturbed. They claimed that they had been "stabbed in the back", and began speculating as to who could have sent the letter. Since Mr. Sparkman had said that some student had sent it, the first to be suspected were the "radical" students at the University of California, since businessmen felt that the campus was a "hotbed" of communism. It was known that there was a group of students there who hated the J.A.C.L. and everything it stood for. It was not long, however, before the suspicion shifted, and a rumor began circulating that:

(265) The J.A.C.L. made an excellent showing at the Tolan Committee hearings, but the Young Democrats threw a wrench into the whole thing by sending a letter discrediting Mike Masaoka. (67)

This rumor was used by some of the local J.A.C.L. men in their efforts to point out the danger of the Y.D.'s and in their campaign to have the organization disowned by the community. Since some of the J.A.C.L. men had personal enemies within the Y.D.'s group this rumor was quite convenient for their purposes.

After the disastrous day at the Tolan Committee hearings, the J.A.C.L. leaders decided that something should be done to prevent further dissension within the group. They made a major concession to the outsiders by inviting non-members to their meeting. The March 6 meeting to which representatives from all major outside groups were invited turned out to be a free-for-all discussion with accusations being hurled bluntly across the room. The meeting did nothing to reconcile the factions, and although the Y.D.'s agreed not to attack the J.A.C.L. any longer, they continued to spread rumors discrediting the organization, such as the following:

(10) The J.A.C.L. has burned copies of its constitution. They burned every copy as soon as the war began. (60)

(11) Saburo Kido is to resign from his position as national commander of the J.A.C.L. (113)
Since the entire Japanese population in the United States was apparently being treated as a group and since the individuals within the community considered the racial group the in-group, it was only natural that the people felt that the action of a single individual might reflect upon the standing
of the entire group. The people were well aware that everyone was under suspicion, and they thought that their treatment depended upon their good conduct. In spite of the in-group feeling, however, the Japanese community was split into many factions and there were mutual animosities which disposed individuals to expect the worst behavior of each other. The Nisei feared that some Kibei or Issei might lose his head and say or do things that might hurt everyone. The Issei, on the other hand, were fearful that some young and irresponsible Nisei might do something rash. Because of the consciousness and recognition of the fact that one rash act might do considerable damage, there was a genuine fear of this in each community. People were fearful because no individual was in a position to do anything about this.

There were rumors that gave expression to this fear:

(266) A Japanese gardener told his employer that the first thing he would do when war was declared between the United States and Japan or when the invasion came was to kill her. (15)

(267) The J.A.C.L. made an excellent showing at the Tolan Committee hearings, but the Young Democrats threw a wrench in the whole thing by sending a letter criticizing Mike Nakashita. (37)

(268) Some Nisei radical student sent in a letter to the Tolan Committee to discredit the J.A.C.L. (79)

(269) The Japanese Communists are plotting with the government. They feel that if they cooperate with the government against the other Japanese, they can save themselves. (115)

There were also rumors about supposedly stupid things done by responsible Japanese which were costly to the group:

(270) The Friends Service Committee of the East Bay approached the Y.M.C.A. (107) of the San Francisco Japanese asking them if any help could be rendered them by the Quakers. The response was half-hearted and no request was made. The society is now helping some Oakland church groups. (107)

(271) Saburo Kido turned down an offer from the Friends Service Committee of $2,000,000 to help the Japanese. (391)
Rumors of this nature were more common from February on, when there was some possibility of evacuation in sight. They only tended to reinforce animosities that already existed between the groups. They helped to create resentments that later led to outbreaks of violence in the relocation centers.

As the difficulties continued, the people did not hesitate to express their opinions. The following are remarks by Issei:

"I don't see what is wrong with you Nisei. For all these years you have been crying that you did not have a chance to do anything because the Issei dominated everything. Now that you have this opportunity to do what you were bragging about in one of the greatest crises our people has faced, look what you are doing. You are fighting among yourselves like a bunch of women. You are just talking and talking while the JACL make fools of you. Nisei just do not have the strength nor the intelligence to take over the leadership. Now you understand why we Issei hesitated to turn over the control of the community to you." 76

"I am an ignorant peasant woman and I do not know much about these affairs, but it seems to me that the Nisei are wasting too much time fighting each other. It is all right to disagree, but you ought to take a less critical moment to do your fighting. No matter how much you may dislike each other, just remember that we are all Japanese underneath and must try to make the best of it." 77

Some of the Nisei also voiced their opinions:

"I've been hearing and reading about what all these guys (JACL) are supposed to be doing for the Japanese. What the hell! So far as I can see there's just a lot of backstabbing among ourselves and we're not getting anywhere. I guess each guy has to look after himself." 78

"What's all this silly argument about anyway? We're all on the same frying pan together and we may as well get together and do something." 79

"I know that the JACL guys just blow the wind and don't do much, but at least they're trying. That's more than most people are doing. Most people are selfish and think only of themselves. But if the JACL did something instead of just talking about doing it, it might be a lot better." 80

76. 61-year old Issei, March 22, 1942.
77. 58-year old Issei woman, March 12, 1942.
78. 24-year old Nisei, March 18, 1942.
79. 21-year old Nisei, April 4, 1942.
80. 26-year old Nisei, February 27, 1942.
"It's too bad the J.A.C.L. men are so selfish as to take advantage of the people at a time like this. My brother was saying that he was going to beat up some of them when they got to camp. I guess they've got it coming to them."

"Those god damn Y.D.'s are just a bunch of trouble-makers. I always thought they were a bunch of queers, but I didn't think they were so dumb as to cut their own throats. You can't tell about those guys. They go to college, but when they get out they're just as dumb as they were at first."

Thus, the real and imagined threats against the individual and collective security of the Japanese led to a flood of rumors. The Japanese wanted information in order that they might be able to meet the situations that arose. Because of the lack of information there was confusion, and the appearance of rumors, many of which were quite plausible, added to the confusion. The people could not act. They did not know what to do. Fear pervaded the communities, and the people waited for their fate.

---

81. 22-year old Nisei girl, March 17, 1942.
82. 27-year old Nisei, March 19, 1942.
CHAPTER V

VOLUNTARY AND ENFORCED EVACUATION

The demand for the evacuation of Japanese from the Pacific Coast did not become vocal until late in January, 1942. Among the early and isolated demands was that of the General Hunter Liggett Chapter of the Military Order of the Purple Heart which voted a letter to President Roosevelt asking that all Japanese be moved inland. On January 23, the Los Angeles County Supervisors adopted a resolution asking that all aliens be removed from the Coast, and two days later similar resolutions were passed by the Supervisors of Alameda and San Francisco Counties. On February 9, Martin Dies advocated the removal of all Japanese, as did Speaker Garland of the California Assembly on February 26. It was during this period that vicious articles began to appear in the Hearst press:

"I am for immediate removal of every Japanese on the West Coast to a point deep in the interior. I don't mean a nice part of the interior either. Herd 'em up, pack 'em off and give 'em the inside room in the badlands. Let 'em be pinched, hurt, hungry and dead up against it.

"Sure, this would work an unjustified hardship on 80 per cent or 90 per cent of the California Japanese. But the remaining 10 or 20 per cent have it in their power to do damage. They are a serious menace and you can't tell me that an individual's rights have any business being placed above a nation's safety."

However, on February 2, Japanese were evacuated from Terminal Island. On February 4, federal authorities revealed that a wholesale evacuation of aliens was not contemplated, but on the following day, the Justice Department announced that it was considering "protective custody" arrests of citizens. On February 15, certain prohibited areas were cleared of aliens, and a few days later the Justice Department announced that it could not

1. This was probably the first instance of agitation for evacuation. Nichi Bei, January 3, 1942.
legally remove citizens. On February 19, the President signed Executive
Order No. 9066 authorizing the Army to take control of the situation. On
February 25, Thomas Clark, Alien Coordinator, told the Tolan Committee that
neither the Army nor the F.B.I. had plans for a mass evacuation, but a few
days later the Examiner carried a banner headline:

OUTER OF ALL JAPS IN CALIFORNIA NEAR

On March 3, the Army announced that the western half of California,
Oregon, Washington, and the southern half of Arizona had been declared a
military area from which "such persons or classes of persons as the situation
may require will by a subsequent proclamation be excluded." Among these
"classes of persons" were: (1) all persons suspected of espionage, sabotage,
fifth-column or other subversive activity, (2) Japanese aliens, (3) American-
born persons of Japanese lineage, (4) German aliens, and (5) Italian aliens.
In a newspaper release that accompanied the proclamation, General DeWitt
encouraged these individuals to leave the area and assured them that if
they left voluntarily they were not likely to be disturbed again. Thus,
the period of voluntary evacuation was initiated.

Although it was emphasized that this proclamation did not constitute
an exclusion order, it was widely interpreted as such. On March 5, Thomas
Clark announced that Japanese would not be taken outside of the states in
which they resided, and on the following day the Army announced that "reception
centers" would be established for the Japanese. This was due to the
barrage of protests that arose in the Rocky Mountain states about having
their territory made into "dumping grounds for Japs."

On March 6, the American Civil Liberties Union protested that a whole-

---

3. San Francisco Examiner, February 27, 1942.
4. Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Public Proclamation No. 1,
(Presidio in San Francisco, March 2, 1942)
5. San Francisco Examiner, March 4, 1942.
6. For examples see U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the
sale movement of citizens without hearings would be unconstitutional, but on March 14, the Army announced the formation of the W.C.C.A. to care for the problems arising out of the proposed evacuation. On March 16, the Army released another proclamation designating more military areas, but emphasized that this did not constitute an evacuation order. On March 23, a caravan of 1,000 volunteers left Los Angeles for Manzanar to serve as an advance crew, and on the following day the first exclusion order was issued. All persons of Japanese ancestry were to be evacuated from Bainbridge Island by March 29 and sent to Manzanar.  

free-voluntary-migration-out-of-the-military-area-was-stopped-by-proclamation-Nov-4  

On March 24, a curfew and travel limits were imposed upon the Nisei by the Army. Free voluntary migration out of the military area was stopped by Proclamation No. 4. After March 29, permission to leave the area was granted only after an investigation of each case.  

By the beginning of April the long-awaited enforced evacuation began to get underway. Assembly Centers were established throughout the four states affected. Arrangements were made for storing property and selling farms and automobiles. On March 30, the newly-created War Relocation Authority and the Army issued a joint statement concerning wage rates for evacuees. On April 1, San Francisco received its first exclusion order, and on the 6th, 660 Japanese left for Santa Anita Race Track. On April 12, the announcement was made that the entire program would be over by May 20.  

7. The Wartime Civilian Control Administration opened offices on March 17.  
10. Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Public Proclamation No. 4, (Presidio in San Francisco, March 27, 1942).  
11. San Francisco Examiner, April 12, 1942.
After the middle of April the exclusion orders were issued in rapid succession, and one by one the areas were cleared of Japanese.

This period was marked by confusion and uncertainty. As the authorities later admitted:

"Complex as these operational aspects were, the problem was further compounded by the public relations aspect of the program. Rumors were rampant, public feeling ran high, the affected groups were in a state of confusion, and unscrupulous interests were seeking to take advantage of misfortune. There was, therefore, an impelling necessity for the formulation of a definitive public information and public relations program."12

At first the question in the minds of the Japanese was: is there to be evacuation or not? Then, who is to be evacuated? Would citizens be included? Should they leave voluntarily to go to the centers? Which communities are to be evacuated and which are to be spared? When is evacuation coming? What kind of preparations should be made? With reference to each of these questions there were contradictory announcements and rumors. No one, including those working in the W.C.C.A. offices, seemed to know the final answer. In the absence of definite information, rumors emerged. The uncertainty and the confusion added substantially to the heartbreaks of the period.

The Period of Voluntary Evacuation

As the agitation for the removal of Japanese from the Coast got under way, some, expecting that they would eventually be forced to leave, moved further inland, especially to central California. Some of the people who had been forced to leave prohibited areas in February also settled in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley. Even at this time there was some public

resistance to the inland movement of large numbers of Japanese. After the issuance of Public Proclamation No. 1, small groups of Japanese began migrating. As the program progressed, it became more difficult because of the widespread hostility which developed in almost every state and community.

Most of those who did migrate went to areas where Japanese already lived, areas outside the military zone in California and in cities like Denver and Salt Lake City. Counties split by or immediately adjacent to the boundary of Military Area 1, especially Fresno, Tulare, and Placer, received large numbers of voluntary evacuees. The number leaving was relatively small, until the end of March when, after Proclamation 4 was issued, there was a rush to leave the military area before the "freeze" on March 29.

Proclamation No. 1 left the Japanese community in a state of indecision. After this announcement, the people were quite certain that evacuation was coming, and had the alternative of either going to a camp or leaving for states further east. There was considerable discussion in the communities about the advisability of voluntary migration. The relative merits of the two alternatives—internment or freedom in a strange place—were discussed whenever a group got together. People did not relish the idea of going to a concentration camp; on the other hand, they hesitated to leave because of the uncertainty of their acceptance in the new community. Most Issei had never been very far away from their own localities except on infrequent trips, and they balked at the idea of going away to a strange place where they knew no one and where they did not know what to expect. Some individuals did migrate, and those who remained behind awaited with eager curiosity to know how these people had fared. During the entire month of March, until
the time that Proclamation No. 4 made voluntary migration impossible, rumors about conditions in the outside communities were prevalent.

The following rumors about what happened to people who left voluntarily spread in the San Francisco Bay Region:

(271) Nisei who have started their trek Eastward have been rejected in every community and are still travelling. (35)

(272) About 150 Terminal Island evacuees and their families have gone to Texas. They cannot find a place to settled because the country is hostile to them. (77)

(273) Many of the people who had left the state by themselves instead of being evacuated from government orders have not been heard of since they left. (98)

(274) Many Japanese have been stranded in other states when they left California because the gas stations would not sell them gasoline. (99)

(275) Evacuees' squatter camps are springing up all over in the central valley. (146)

(276) Voluntary evacuees were stranded in Nevada because they were unable to purchase gas. (185)

(277) Some people were moving from Los Angeles to Fresno when they were forced out of Terminal Island and since they had nowhere to stay they camped in a field. Some vigilantes came along and burned the whole family to death. (191)

(278) A Berkeley family went voluntarily to Reno where some friends had arranged a job for them. When they got there they were persecuted. The Caucasians gave them jobs just to take advantage of them. (210)

(279) A family that evacuated voluntarily was tarred and feathered. (211)

(279) A family of voluntary evacuees was run out of the town where they went. (212)

In Sacramento:

(280) People who left voluntarily for the east were stranded in Nevada because no one would sell gasoline to them. (224)

In Los Angeles:

(281) A number of Japanese who evacuated from California voluntarily are being shot at in Nevada and Arizona. (251)

(282) Some voluntary evacuees were not allowed to stay in the towns where they went. They were given 24 hours to get out. (252)
Vigilante committees are being formed through the Mid-West to deal with voluntary evacuees. (253)

No one in the Middle West will rent houses to the voluntary evacuees and the stores refuse to serve Japanese. (254)

In Stockton:

Vigilante committees in central California are shooting Japanese. (262)

People who left California on their own were stranded in Nevada because they were refused gasoline. (280)

Those who went to Denver were told that they couldn't stay. Everywhere they went they were told to move on. (374)

Families which went to the "White Zone" are living five or six families to a house. (375)

Some people went to Nevada and their car was stopped and searched. They were thought to be spies. (376)

In the midst of contradictory announcements about what the government intended to do, rumors such as the following emerged:

The government will provide protection only for small groups who move on their own. (91)

There were other rumors about losses resulting from voluntary evacuation:

People who left their homes in Los Angeles to go elsewhere have had their furniture looted. (94)

Rumors about successful migrations were rare:

Bob Tsutsui, a wealthy Hawaiian-born Japanese grocer and Bill Ishimoto went to Utah to survey for the possibilities of having a ranch for the Japanese evacuees. The two did not together, but they made arrangements so that they would meet in Salt Lake City. They were armed with letters of introduction from the local chamber of commerce and others to the Salt Lake officials who in turn gave them letters of introduction and identification to the local farmers. They were able to obtain a ranch of fairly large size for operation. They claimed that the Caucasian ranchers received them very enthusiastically. They intend to return to Utah soon. It was hinted that they wish to take back about 20 families of Japanese with them. Working on a farm, they said, was better than going to a concentration camp. (103)

16. "White zone" refers to Military Area 2, that section of the Western Defense Command presumably not subject to evacuation.
Most Japanese contemplating migration planned to go where they had some friends, or where they knew other Japanese lived. There were rumors about specific areas where some were planning to go:

(244) Oroshi is just like Porterville, anti-Jap-like hell. The damn cops follow all Japanese, Nisei and Issei, around the town when anyone goes there. (124)

(245) The people in Selma and the surrounding towns of Kingsbury, Fowler, and Dinuba are very nice to the Japanese and sympathize with us. In Selma, the anti-Jap sentiment might arise if too many Japanese went there, particularly if they came in in large numbers at one time. (126)

(246) People are pouring into Parlier and Dinuba, but those who are already there believe that they will be moved, probably after the harvest. (129)

(247) No more Japanese, other than former residents, are wanted in Colusa. The Japanese themselves have asked that no more come in. The P.T.A. there has gone around to various stores telling them not to trade with Japs if they can. If they do they will be boycotted. (131)

Virtually all the rumors that came into the communities were unfavorable, and this probably had much to do with the fact that only a relatively small number evacuated voluntarily. To the Japanese, there was no distinction between California and the other states as far as their expectations of discrimination were concerned—all these areas were places populated by ketsu. Those who remained behind when the others left probably remained either because they were not sure or because they expected that the worst would befall those who did migrate. Furthermore, there was a real fear of being alone among Caucasians where they would have no Japanese community to fall back upon in the event there were another crisis. The people wanted information about outside communities badly. All kinds of rumors were spreading and there was no way to check the authenticity of any of the reports.

Without question some of these rumors had considerable influence on the decisions of heads of families on whether to leave their homes or not.
Naturally no one wished to go to a concentration camp. However, as long as these rumors persisted, the people could not view the voluntary migration as a way out. As long as these rumors were widespread, it was impossible for any collective movement to begin.

One Nisei girl recalled:

"We heard that a Berkeley family went voluntarily to Reno where some friends had arranged a job for them. When they got there, they were persecuted. Caucasians gave them jobs just to take advantage of them. When my father heard this, he decided that voluntary evacuation was no sense. Our family was in an uproar. We didn’t know whether to go out or not. First we were going to leave and then we weren’t and then we were again. Then when the evacuation began we heard that camp was even worse. Lord. I still remember that day when we were talking about it when a woman came screaming in. I remember that because she was generally a very quiet and dignified woman. She said she got a letter from a relative in Manzanar who said that everybody there was dying because of typhoid. Boy, she had us scared."

The following are the remarks of two Issei patriarchs:

"I will go where the government says. There will be the safest. Supposing you are on the outside and supposing something happens? Supposing some white person decides to harm you? What can you do? The hakujin have always persecuted the Japanese. I remember when I first came to this country. The treatment we received was much worse than this. So far the hakujin have treated us fairly well, but you cannot tell what will happen later on. When the war in the Pacific really begins, thousands of American boys will be killed. There will be thousands of people who will blame the death of their relatives on to the Japanese people. If we are out in the East alone, they can come over and burn our houses down and we could do nothing. The government can watch things like that if we are all together like we will be in camp, but the government does not have enough men to watch us if we spread all over the country. Hakujin are still barbarians at heart. They have not had the advantage of an old and mellow tradition to train them. Their country is still young and many of them are cultured only skin deep. If you scratch them a little, you will find that they are savages. No, I will go to the camp like the government says."

"I suppose that I will go to the government camp. I do not feel that it is a disgrace because this is war and there is nothing that can be done about it. I have thought of going out to Utah or Colorado, but I heard that those communities are not so nice to Japanese. I am really too old to start again, especially if I have to put up with prejudice. I had to fight when I was

18. 24 year old Nisei girl, March 27, 1944.
19. 61 year old Issei, March 22, 1942.
young, but I do not have the strength to go through that again. My credit is good at the banks here, but if I go to an unfriendly community I won't be able to borrow any money from a bank. You cannot do anything without money. I think I'll go along with the people. 20

Thus, it seems that the rumor about the fate of voluntary evacuees, some of which apparently had some basis of fact, spread widely throughout the month of March and was quite effective in preventing any mass movement. They created fears of violence. Added to this was the feeling of not being wanted. When the Issei heard these rumors many became convinced that going to camp was the safest thing to do. At least there one would have protection from violence. These rumors further reinforced the conceptions that the people had of expected treatment in wartime. After March 29, most of these rumors disappeared. People were still interested in the problem of migrating since there was still a chance of leaving by special permission, but most of the Japanese had by this time become reconciled to the fate of going to camp. Their attention became directed elsewhere, and everyone busied himself making preparations for camp life.

Evacuation

The Program of Enforced Evacuation

At first the agitation against the Japanese consisted of demands that aliens be moved inland, but gradually demands arose that citizens should be included in the mass exodus. Some officials hinted such action; other denied that anything of the kind was even contemplated. The proclamation setting up the military zones was interpreted by many Japanese as an evacuation order, but even then there was no certainty as to whether citizens would be included or not. As the Army report states:

20. 60-year old Issei, March 17, 1942.
The statistics on the voluntary evacuation show that less than 5,000 persons of Japanese ancestry left Military Area 1 and those portions of California that were in Military Area 2. Even when they were confronted with the choice of going to a concentration camp or going out alone to a strange but free area, the vast majority of the Japanese either could not or did not choose to move. Furthermore, the statistics show that of those who did move, a large number went to areas already inhabited by other Japanese.\textsuperscript{20d}

\textsuperscript{20d} For statistics on voluntary evacuation, see Appendix D.
"There was much conjecture that this was the forerunner of a general enemy alien evacuation. Mr. Clark and his Anti-Trust Division staff were deluged with inquiries and comments. Public excitement in certain areas reached a high pitch, and much confusion, the result of conflicting reports and rumors, characterized the picture."\(^{21}\)

It was not until the end of March that those in the Coastal areas knew definitely that they were to evacuate, and those living in areas near the boundary of the military area did not know until much later.

The impending evacuation was a major crisis in the lives of the people involved. They would be forced to sever the ties that they had had for decades; they would have to give up their homes; they would have to face a new life in an unknown world. Because of this, the Japanese naturally wanted more information about the regulations which would make such drastic changes in their lives. They wanted to know so that they could prepare adequately to meet the situation. It was not so much the fact of moving itself that disturbed the Japanese, but the uncertainty. One Issei laundry-owner expressed his feelings:

"The more I think about it the more sick I become. I just don't know what to do. I don't know whether to sell out or not. If we can stay, all right; if not, I may as well sell. I wish they would hurry up and make up their minds. I don't like this hanging in the air. A man came in and offered me a good price for my plant. If I knew I had to leave I would sell immediately. But if we're not going, I would be a fool to sell because then I would not be able to support my family. I don't know what to do."\(^{22}\)

At first, the question was: is there to be evacuation or not? No one knew, and no definite announcements were made. Among the rumors that spread in this connection were:

\(^{22}\) All Japanese, including Nisei, in Washington and Oregon must move east of the Cascades; those in California must go east of the Sierras. (65)
There will be no evacuation of the Japanese until fall because the Army cannot possibly put up all the camps until then. (119)

Some people went to Owens Valley only to find nothing there. They had to put up tents. (120)

There will be no evacuation in Stockton. At the last moment the deadline will be extended. (281)

There were also uncertainties about who would be included in the exclusion order. The following rumors about who would evacuate:

The Chinese will be forced to evacuate along with the Japanese. (50)

All persons who are nationals of Axis nations will be evacuated from the West Coast, but their children who are citizens will not be. (241)

Large farmers on the islands are willing to hire and pay guards on their farms so that the Japanese can continue to work on the ranches. In this manner they can protect the Japanese from harm and also guarantee the Army that the Japanese cannot do any harm either. (265)

All persons in the Army will not be evacuated. (395)

There were also rumors about the difficulties caused by the uncertainty:

Farmers in the Concord area are not planting their crops because they do not know when they will be evacuated. Furthermore, they are uncertain as to the availability of insecticides, fungicides, and water. (69)

Farmers in Concord, Danville, San Jose, Hayward and nearby places are not taking care of their crops any more. They are letting their things go, except for seedlings which are about to sprout. (104)

People in Selma are moving to Colorado. We don't know when they have to go. The farmers are doing the minimum of work. Those who own their farms are still there, but they are prepared to go. (128)

Students in high school and junior college in San Francisco have quit school. Their time is now spent in loafing, movies, and there has been a conspicuous increase in the number of Nisei frequenting dance halls, pool rooms and gambling tables. (171)

The farmers near Stockton are not working in the fields because they do not know whether they are to be evacuated or not. (389)
About the middle of March, most Japanese concluded that sooner or later they would be evacuated. However, there was the question of when. This was an extremely important question since most people had property that had to be arranged for. Business connections had to be severed. All of these things took time. The Japanese did not want to be caught unprepared, and yet if they severed their connections too soon they would be without any means of livelihood. The following rumors about the date of evacuation spread at this time:

1. Everyone must evacuate by April 15. (136)
2. All contracts for the building of reception centers are for completion by April 15. (138)
3. An F.B.I. agent came to the Nippon Laundry and told the owner to close out because the evacuation order would come out on April 7. (148)
4. Evacuation is coming on April 1. (213, 255)
5. There will be no evacuation until the end of May because the centers are not ready. (377)

The rumor about the deadline being April 15 was quite common in the San Francisco Bay Region and also in the Stockton area. Rumors only tended to substantiate this rumor. This deadline appeared in some newspapers, and when those spreading the rumor were questioned concerning the source of their information, they often pointed to the newspaper announcement or attributed the statement to some prominent official or J.A.C.L. man.

Many decisions were influenced by this rumor:

Mr. Yashima had always believed in planning ahead and being prepared so that he would not be caught at the last moment. When he heard that the Stockton Record announced that everyone must leave by the 15th, he immediately contacted a furniture company and sold all his belongings. He and his wife spent weeks packing, paid up their insurance for five years, and with the assistance of their Cau-

---

23. Rumors about evacuation deadlines ranged from March 15 to the end of May. The most common, however, was the April 15 rumor.
People in California want the Japanese to harvest their crops before they leave. Evacuation will not come until after the harvest season. (225)
casian neighbors disposed of everything they owned. Mr. Yashima sold his car and by April 15, all the furniture was taken out of the house. Since there was no stove, the elderly couple had to eat in restaurants. Since they had sold their car, they had to walk or take a taxi. Since they had no beds, they had to sleep on the floor in the sleeping bags they had purchased for camp life. Neighbors, feeling sorry for them, often brought cooked food over to them. Stockton was not evacuated until the latter part of May, and the couple was forced to live under these circumstances in an empty house for over a month.24

Bill Inamasu and Dorothy Yamane had been trying to get married for several months but were having difficulties getting parental consent. Mr. and Mrs. Inamasu wrote ambiguous letters and Mrs. Yamane was at first not satisfied that the Inamasu's had approved of her daughter. However, when she heard that the Japanese were to be evacuated on April 15, she decided that the ceremony would have to take place soon, or else the young couple would have to take the chance of being separated by the evacuation. She made a long distance call and tried to make arrangements at once. On the following day, one of Bill's close friends came in with the news that the evacuation order for Berkeley would be issued on April 7. The group conjectured that after the order was issued no one would be allowed to move and that it was therefore imperative that Bill and Dorothy get married before that date so that they could at least live together until the deadline. If they were not married by the 7th, Dorothy may not be allowed to change her residence. The couple was allowed to marry before the deadline despite the fact that there was no formal approval from the Inamasu.25

These instances were not isolated. As one Nisei who worked for the W.C.C.A. later said:

"I know from my W.C.C.A. experience that a lot of people were all packed and ready to go in March. Evacuation didn't come until April and May, but they were all set because they didn't want to be caught off guard."26

There were also rumors about where each group of people was to be sent and the procedures involved in the migration:

(317)

When the Army evacuates us from the Bay Region, those of one locality will be sent to one area or camp and those of another will be sent elsewhere. (86)

(319)

In Owens Valley, prefabricated houses are being put up. Los Angeles will be evacuated first at the rate of 200 every two days. San Francisco will be next. (106)

24. Adapted from field notes and letters, 1942.
25. Adapted from manuscript document, 1942.
26. 24-year old Nisei girl, March 27, 1944.
There was also an epidemic of selling. Owners of stores made a desper- 
ate effort to get rid of their stocks well in advance of the date when 
they thought they might have to leave. Valuables were sold at ridicu- 
ulously low prices to anyone who had the money to buy. Homes and ranches were sold 
and leased. The epidemic of selling, of course, was due to the circumstances 
rather than the rumors, but the rumors undoubtedly helped to create the 
general mood and tension in which people acted almost as though they were 
in a stampede. Some rather typical comments were:

"Boy, I got a swell cigarette lighter for fifty cents. It must be worth at least ten 
bucks. The Japanese man at the store was so anxious to sell that he told me to name my own 
price. I wish I had more money with me. There were a lot of things I'd like to have. Hell, he could sell that stuff to some 
firm for a lot more than that."

"The Japanese store-owners in San Francisco are going 
crazy. They're trying to sell everything. They're practically 
giving things away. They're trying to throw out all that stuff 
they've been storing in their places for the last twenty years. It's sure busy out there, and the Jews are moving in to clean 
up."

The period just prior to evacuation was also characterized by many 
mariages. Because of the uncertainty as to where the boundary lines separa- 
ting evacuation units would be and the uncertainty as to which locality would 
go to which center, the only way to insure being evacuated together was to 
marry. The epidemic of marriages was not the direct result of rumors, but 
rumors undoubtedly contributed to the prevailing state of mind which made 
these marriages possible.

22-year old Nisei, April 25, 1942.
23-year old Nisei, April 16, 1942.
Statistics quoted by Leonard Bloom indicated a marked increase in 
mariage, but a careful study of the vital statistics has not yet been made. 
See "Familial Adjustments of Japanese-Americans to Relocation: First Phase," 
A concentration camp for San Francisco people is to be constructed in Chico. (117)

A camp for Berkeley people will be set up near Mt. Lassen. (134)

The 1,000 volunteer workers from Los Angeles who went to Manzanar were forced to go at bayonet points. The soldiers went into the bars and saloons and forced them to go. (132)

Mike Manzaka of the JACL has requested that regions be moved at the same time to the same place so that local community groups can be kept intact. (172)

Berkeley people are going to a race track in Richmond. (214)

The rumors about the area to which people were being sent were quite important because the Japanese wanted to know what kinds of climate to expect in camp. In making their preparation, they wanted to know whether or not they should purchase heavy clothing for snow or light clothing for wear in a desert. There was also considerable concern about separation of the members of the family. One of the hopeful rumors in this regard was the following:

40 per cent of the interned men have been released so that they could evacuate with their families. (140)

Because of the uncertainty the agencies assigned the task of advising the Japanese were flooded with questions. Since even the officials did not know the answers to many of the questions raised, rumors about the work of these agencies began to spread:

The Treasury Department (Federal Reserve Bank) is doing nothing about alien or citizen property. The people there just tell you to sell everything and get out of the prohibited area immediately. (122)

The War Relocation Authority has a regional director, and the director, Eisenhower, will be back only for visits. (163)

The U.S. is aiding all Japanese on any matter. They will help. They have been given the responsibility. (343)

There were also rumors about the nature of restrictions and rules to be followed in making preparations for evacuation. Although the official regulations were posted by the Army, they were quite inadequate to answer
all the questions that arose. Since this was an entirely new experience, no one knew what to expect. What could be done and what could not be done? What could be taken and what had to be left behind? How much could be taken to camp? What kind of things should be taken to camp?

The following rumors appeared in San Francisco area:

When we evacuate, the Army will permit evacuees only one suitcase per person. (83)
The Army will allow evacuees only one suitcase per family unless there is a baby. (92)
When evacuation becomes inevitable, the Japanese families will be allowed only one trunk per family. (101)
Automobile and money will be confiscated when we go to camp. (215)

In Los Angeles:
The government will issue evacuation orders in the morning paper and you will have to move on the following day. (256)
Trucks owned by Japanese which are left unsold will be confiscated by the Army. (258)

In Stockton:
If you bring a car to the camp, the Army will confiscate it. (284)
The Army will confiscate anything that is left unsold. (285)
One suitcase and one bedroll and all you can carry is all that you are allowed to take. (379)
One must bring his own plates and eating utensils, as well as winter and summer clothes and boots. (380)
Portable chairs and tables must be taken. (384)

The confusion reflected in these rumors made planning extremely difficult. There were further anxieties when rumors began spreading about the losses suffered by the Japanese who had already evacuated:

William Tamura has about 12,000 tomato seedlings but there is no way for him to dispose of them. (74)
In San Luis Obispo, the Japanese pea farmers lost $50,000 to the Okies when they were forced to evacuate a week before the harvest. (112)

In Alameda, tenants that had occupied the homes of the evacuees walked off with the furnishings of the home. (176)

Some Alameda people bought furniture only a year before, and when the prohibited area was moved out they had to sell cheaply to the junkman. The Jews cleaned everyone out. (194)

Farmers are getting a raw deal because they have to sell their crops at 25 or 40 per cent of the original prices. People are putting the squeeze play on them. (282)

There are some Caucasian automobile dealers who bought cars from Japanese at low prices and then turned around and sold them for a 200 per cent profit. (283)

As the actual instances of profiteering and rumors of this nature increased, there was resentment. There had been some individuals who felt that citizens should resist evacuation and demand their rights. On the whole, however, the people were much too busy to pay attention to anything but the problems involved in preparing for camp life. They had resolved themselves to fate and were accepting it. The J.A.C.L. announced that it was opposed to any test cases because the "welfare of the greatest number" required that "care be exercised in the demand for civil liberties." A few Nisei were still concerned about the problem, but most Issei felt that they should evacuate. The following rumors fitted into this discussion:

Nisei and Issei were accused of lighting flares and signal lights at the recent Los Angeles air raid when anti-aircraft guns fired at imaginary planes. Every incident is blamed upon the Japanese. Perhaps it is better for us to remove ourselves from places of vital importance to national defense. (139)

On the day that the Japanese are all in camps, Japan will invade Alaska. (201)

Japan is going to time her attack on Alaska so that the attack will begin at the moment the last evacuee steps into the center. This is revenge for the evacuation. (221)

27. This refers to the earlier evacuation of aliens from zones prohibited by the Department of Justice.
28. Nichi Bei, April 11, 1942. The J.A.C.L. went so far as to "Red-bait" the American Civil Liberties Union for demanding the constitutional rights of Nisei.
We may as well go to the center because we can collect $10,000 in indemnities later on.  

We will be released in six months because of the crop shortage. They cannot get along without the Japanese.

These rumors provided rationalizations for going to the camps without resistance. As one Nisei girl remarked:

"I remember some Issei telling me that it was a good thing that we are being evacuated and that we should go willingly because it was for our own protection. Japan will attack and it would be better for us to be in camp."

Very few Japanese would have questioned the fact that evacuation was not necessary. Very few Nisei would have argued that it was justified.

It seems that the major reason why the Japanese accepted evacuation without any resistance was the fact that they had been living in a condition of uncertainty for so long that when the evacuation made their future certain, any certainty, no matter how bad, was better than continued uncertainty.

However, it is quite possible that belief in some of these rumors may have been a contributing factor.

As the program was developing, other questions appeared. Why was the Army pushing the evacuation program? Why was it necessary? Among the rumors explaining the evacuation were the following:

- The Army is tightening up on the Issei because Japan has bombed Alaska. (137)
- The "Freezing Order" was put into effect because the Army wanted to sever connections between spies. (141)
- The evacuation is being rushed because of a fear of a Japanese invasion. (381)

As the evacuation got under way, certain individuals were given exemptions, and rumors began to spread about them.

Sam Morita and his wife are to go to Iowa. The G-2 is shifting its headquarters there. Sam in an instructor for the Japanese Language School for Army G-2. (168)

29. Belief in this rumor was the source of considerable difficulty in the various relocation centers.
30. 24-year old Nisei girl, March 27, 1944.
Mr. and Mrs. Shiro Nakashoji will be allowed to stay in the Bay Region. Shiro is teaching Japanese to the Naval Intelligence people at U.C. Dr. Yanaga is also to be allowed to stay. (169)

Not all instructors can stay. Some have a chance, but Yamato's wife may not be able to get a permit to stay. Yamato may not marry if she can't stay with him. (170)

All of these rumors about the evacuation program emerged in a period of confusion. At first the people did not know what to expect, and there were rumors about what was to happen. Later, when the people knew that evacuation was coming, they did not have sufficient details in order to prepare to meet the situation. Everyone was preoccupied with the question of evacuation. Everything else was of secondary concern or was seen in the perspective of an expected evacuation.

The rumors about evacuation began to appear in February and spread in the main during March and the first part of April. They continued to spread in the various communities until the exclusion order for that particular community was posted. Then there was no more uncertainty about where they were going or when. Many of these rumors were quite plausible. It seemed logical to assume, for example, that the Army could not provide housing for 100,000 people in a few weeks. The people realized further that there was a danger of food shortage and that the crops of the Japanese farmers would be needed badly; therefore, there were conjectures about being allowed to remain until after the harvest season.

These rumors reflect fears of all kinds. There were fears of violence if evacuation did not come; there were fears of separation from other members of the family if evacuation did come. There were fears of having to live a primitive kind of existence, and fears of losing everything they had worked for. There were also resentments, and thoughts of vengeance. Some of the rumors were quite effective in leading to action, and strongly influenced the nature of preparations that were made for camp life. In general, however,
the major effect of these rumors was that of creating more confusion. The Japanese were unable to distinguish between rumors and announcements, since many could not read English and since many of the rumors were attributed to official or semi-official sources. There were so many contradictory reports that the people were unable to act.

The Nature of Camp Conditions

The process of the evacuation of the Japanese from their homes into the Assembly Centers took over two months. A whole month passed between the time that the first group went to Manzanar from Los Angeles and Bainbridge Island to the time that the majority of people were cleared from the San Francisco Bay Region. The first group to leave San Francisco went on April 6; Oakland was not evacuated until more than a month later. Areas in central California were not cleared until the latter part of May. Virtually all of the camps were still in the process of being built, and since many of the intended facilities were not yet completed, those who went in the vanguard suffered many trying experiences. Sanitary facilities were not ready. Mess hall crews were not well organized. Many had difficulty in adjusting themselves to sleeping on straw ticks rather than mattresses. Those who had gone ahead in the advance groups wrote back to their friends advising them on what to expect and what to bring. Since there was no censorship of the mails, some of the distasteful truth of the actual conditions of the centers got to the outside. Rumors about the camp conditions spread rapidly throughout the remaining communities and a mad rush was made to prepare to meet the conditions described by these rumors.

31. T. Nakashima, "Concentration Camp: U.S. Style," New Republic, CVI (June 18, 1942), pp. 921-923, gives a description of camp life. Although the government's federal authorities publicly denied that conditions were so bad, the truth of the matter is that the article gives a fairly good description of the first few weeks in camp. After the initial period, adjustments and improvements were made.
Everyone was looking forward to a new experience. The officials had repeatedly stressed that these centers would not be concentration camps and that the people would be treated humanely. Entire families were being evacuated and the people were being asked to build new communities. The attention of everyone was keyed to camp life and everyone was curious to know what they were stepping into. Past differences and grievances were temporarily forgotten and everyone scrambled to make individual preparations for the new life. The people expected almost anything. The camp that had received the most widespread publicity was Manzanar, which was located in the middle of a desert miles away from civilization. Pictures had been published showing the barren surroundings, and these no doubt helped the shape the expectations of the people. When the reports about terrible conditions began to circulate, the expectations of the people suddenly became colored. There were fears of all kinds.

There were a few rumors about camps, however, that were spread before any of the centers had opened; these may have had some influence in coloring the picture people had of camp life:

(356) When we get sent to camp, we will lose all contact with the outside world. There will be no radios, no letters, no newspapers, nothing. (55)

(357) Japanese in the Hawaiian concentration camps are being starved to death. (100)

(358) The people in the Hawaiian concentration camps are starving and are being treated like cattle. Some have been murdered. (102)

(359) No letters can be exchanged between those in the camps and outsiders. (116)

(360) The government camps are to be for men only. (121)

All of these rumors conform to conventional beliefs about concentration camps, but many of the fears of the people were temporarily allayed by assurances from officials that everyone would be treated humanely.
As the letters about camp conditions began to pour into the communities awaiting evacuation, rumors such as the following spread:

**About food:**

- No green food will be served in the camps. (149)
- There is not enough food served at Santa Anita. Everyone is hungry and must constantly get pies at 60 cents each. (164)
- People are all getting diarrhea because of the terrible food in camp. (197)
- All camp food is bad. (383)

These rumors about food led to the stocking up of foodstuffs to bring to the centers. Many, not expecting Japanese food in the centers, had already planned to bring Japanese food along, but the appearance of these rumors led to large purchases of canned goods. Individuals who were ill and needed special diets became alarmed and made special arrangements. Mothers with small children became alarmed and purchased baby food in large quantities. Those who did not have time to purchase food made arrangements to have food shipped into the centers.

**About housing:**

- The San Francisco evacuees were sent to Santa Anita instead of Manzanar because a windstorm blew down half the barracks at Manzanar. (151)
- Evacuees from San Francisco were being sent to Santa Anita because there was a terrific hurricane which toppled over the houses that had been built in Manzanar. Several people were killed and had to be removed. (174)
- Everyone must live in rooms with 36 other people. (385)

**About climate:**

- The dust is so thick at Manzanar that every time the wind blows the whole house, even food, is filled with dust. (153)
- The mud is a foot deep in Tanforan and we need boots. (162)
- The dust is bad in all camps. (386)
About other physical facilities:

There are no recreational facilities in Manzanar. (157)

There are no educational facilities at all in camps. (159)

There are 2,000 women at Santa Anita and only three showers for all of them. (165)

The showers in the camp are bare. (216)

Sanitation facilities are bad in Santa Anita. (385)

All of these rumors influenced the people in the things that they decided to take to camp. Since everyone thought that they could take only a limited number of things, they wanted to take those things that would be useful. The rumors helped decide what was to be taken. Some individuals purchased goggles to cope with dust; other purchased boots for the mud; girls purchased several pairs of slacks for the outdoor life. Others decided to restrict the number of things they were planning to take since they would be crowded. One girl remarked:

"The girls were kind of shocked when they heard that the showers were bare and that people could see them naked. People told me to take shower curtains because then I could put it around me when I took a shower."32

There were rumors about work and pay:

The maximum pay in camps will range from $5. to $15. a month. (142)

When we are evacuated, everyone will get the same type of jobs that they have been doing. (173)

In camp, you have to work to earn enough money to pay for your own food and lodging. (286)

Cooks and those in the advance crew will get $150. a month. (378)

The question of pay engaged considerable attention. At first it was announced that evacuees might get the same pay as union workers doing the same kind of work, but this aroused protests in Congress. Then it was announced that evacuee pay would not exceed that of soldiers, but a few months later the pay of soldiers was raised from $21. to $50. The rumor about all persons having to earn their room and board caused considerable anxiety on the part of the old who were no longer able to do heavy work.
There were rumors about restrictions:

(380) There are no knives allowed in camps—not even eating knives or pocket knives. (154)

(381) All radios must be off by 8 o'clock and all lights must be out by 10 o'clock. (166)

These rumors were also effective in restricting the number of things taken to camp.

Some of the more irresponsible individuals had stated that they were looking forward to going to the centers where they would be free to "raise hell". As a consequence, a breakdown in morals was anticipated. Rumors substantiating these expectations began to spread:

(382) Gang fights are abundant in camps. (155)

(383) Unmarried boys and girls in the dormitories are raising hell in camp. (156)

(384) There are no locks in the camps and theft is common. (160)

(385) There have been two (forced) marriages at Owens Valley already. (167)

Most people looked forward to living in a pioneer community. In the absence of police, they anticipated a certain amount of lawlessness. The rumors about delinquency in the centers appealed to some of the young men. These rumors gave them something to look forward to. One young man reputed to be "tough" remarked:

"Hell, there are a couple of guys I've been trying to get for a long time. When we get in camp, I can get them some time and beat hell out of 'em."

Another young man remarked:

"I hear there are plenty of nice chicks in there just waitin' to be jizzed. I'm the man. Boy, are we going to have a lot of fun!"

Married men with children were more concerned:

"I think it's going to be a hell of a place. I'm worried about Betty. She's just beginning to go into adolescence. When

32. 24-year old Nisei girl, March 27, 1944.
33. 25-year old Nisei, April 8, 1942.
34. 19-year old Nisei, April 19, 1942.
I talk to these unmarried guys in Oakland, I get the impression that they think they're going to a picnic of some kind. They're really looking forward to raising hell. I don't care if Betty had clean fun with fellows, but I'd hate to have her running around with those bastards. I don't see how I'm going to keep her in hand without getting tough."35

Another common group of rumors were about typhoid fever:

35

(384) There is a typhoid fever epidemic in Manzanar. (152)

(387) Typhoid fever is killing and disabling a large number at Tanforan. (161)

(388) People are dying of a typhoid epidemic in Manzanar. (196)

(399) People are all getting sick in camp. (387)

Since the people were being sent to places far away from hospitals other than those in the centers and since they were to live close together, the Army required all evacuees to be inoculated against typhoid fever and smallpox. Some evacuees, in order to avoid having the discomforts of typhoid shots in camp where the facilities would not be so good, began having their shots administered by their physicians before entering camps. Those who went to the centers without this treatment were treated in camp, and many became quite ill. When news of this illness reached the outside, there was a mad dash to get typhoid shots before induction into centers. The rush for medical treatment flooded the offices of local physicians, and some JACL chapters attempted to meet the rush by arranging temporary clinics. This led to charges that the JACL was trying to make money from the people's misfortunes, and much petty bickering was initiated. In Sacramento, the fight over typhoid shots led to conflicts of such proportions that it led to serious consequences in the Tule Lake Relocation Center.36

There were also rumors expressive of fears of losing contact with the

35 34-year old Missi, April 10, 1942.

36 One of the early difficulties which eventually led to the conversion of Tule Lake into a Segregation Center arose from the resentment of a large number of Sacramento people against a prominent physician. While there were other reasons why the doctor was unpopular, one of the major charges against him was that he sought to prevent the administering of inexpensive typhoid shots.
outside world:

Once we get into camps, we cannot get out. (135)

All camp mail will be censored. (382)

There were rumors expressive of fears of being separated from other members of the family:

Families must be separated. Men will go to work camps on various government projects and women cannot go with them. (156)

This rumor seemed quite plausible to those familiar with some of the charges that were being made against resident Japanese. An old argument that had been used since 1900 was that the Japanese had too many children. During this period, one agitator had gone so far as to advocate the castration of all males of Japanese ancestry.

Other rumors were:

The Oakland Young Democrats are plotting with the other Japanese Communists to communize the camps. (114)

There are dead horses still left in the stables of Tanforan. They didn’t even clean up. (217)

All of these rumors reflect fears of what would happen in the camps. There were fears that immediate needs, such as food, would not be adequately provided, fears of being at the mercy of Caucasians that they did not trust, fears of losing contact with the outside world, fears of separation from other members of the family, fears for the breakdown of law and order. These rumors emerged in large numbers during the month of April and continued throughout the evacuation program. Even after the people got into the centers, there were rumors about conditions in other centers. The rumors were effective in bringing about a stampede to prepare to meet the worst. They colored the expectations of the people of camp life, and created fears.

As these rumors became widespread even among the Caucasians, protests went to the Army, and Colonel Bendetson, director of the W.C.C.A., formally
denied that they were true. He added:

"Some individuals . . . have been spreading rumors which discredit the Assembly Centers. These persons are speaking without factual knowledge and often are activated by unhealthy reasons."37

This official denial, however, had no effect on the Japanese. *Issei* were familiar with Bendetson's remarks, but the word of a *koto* was never given equal weight with the word of a Japanese friend.

Thus, when rumors about the weather poured into the communities, there was a rush to buy heavy, warm clothing. When news of the camp housing conditions came in, the people sold their furniture and automobiles and purchased one-burner stoves, tools, electrical appliances, and other portable items. When news and rumors about the kind of food served spread in the community, the people rushed to purchase canned foods. Some individuals spent hundreds of dollars to stock up canned food.38

Thus it was through rumors that the Japanese got a picture of the kind of life to anticipate in camp. Official regulations and announcements were read, but reports from friends were given more credence. Throughout this period of confusion, rumor played an important role in shaping the conceptions of the people.

38. On several occasions in 1943, charges were made by Congressmen and particularly by the Hearst press that the Japanese in the centers were being over-fed by the W.R.A. Some individuals purchased so much food before evacuation that they still had huge quantities left in 1943.
CHAPTER VI

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese in California lived until the evacuation in a condition of sustained collective insecurity. This period was characterized by vague fears and apprehensions, restlessness and demoralization, a breakdown of the traditional structure of social relationships, the emergence of utopian schemes, an internal struggle for power and at the same time an increased social solidarity based upon a recognition that every member of the group was in a similar position, and the prevalence of rumors. The lives of the people were disrupted by the outbreak of war, and the condition of insecurity that followed was sustained by a series of contradictory announcements, events, and rumors. There was confusion. The people had nowhere to turn. They did not know what to believe or what to do.

The Emergence of Rumors

What are the characteristics of the specific situations in which rumors emerge?

The attack on Pearl Harbor suddenly created for the resident Japanese population in the United States a series of undefined situations, situations in which behavior could not be guided by conventional understandings. The people did not know quite what to anticipate in their relations with members of the out-group. The outbreak of war was followed by a series of events, some of which marked turning points in the lives of the people. Events were important, and the attention of the group was focused upon them. It was with reference to specific events that rumors emerged.
There were other factors that facilitated the emergence of rumors. People were naturally excited, and in their excitement they became preoccupied with certain objects which they thought were of importance to their welfare. During periods of excitement, much of the conversation of various members of the group centered upon the source of excitement. It was in this process of heightened interaction that the rumors spread.

People wanted to know what was happening. They did not know where they stood or what they were supposed to do. They wanted information, but because of the nature of the circumstances the reports that they received could not be verified. Wartime regulations appeared which further curtailed the avenues of normal communication, and restrictions that the Japanese imposed upon themselves also served to restrict communication. Finally, the inability of the Issei to understand English adequately and the inability of the Nisei to understand Japanese with sufficient facility for adequate translation provided further barriers to the accurate circulation of information. The people wanted information badly, but they were unable to get reliable reports.

Several rumors emerged in the confusion during this period and by their existence created further confusion. With reference to the questions dealing with wartime regulations for Japanese and with the proposed evacuation, there were so many contradictory announcements that the people did not know what to believe. No definite information was available. Many rumors about wartime restrictions arose in this confusion. The people were unable to define their status in the new situation because of contradictory and changing announcements. They did not know what to do, but they were anxious not to break any rules. Regulations which the Japanese had made themselves in order to avoid undue suspicion further confused the picture. It was in this atmosphere that rumors about various rules
made their appearance.

This was also true of rumors about the evacuation. Would there be evacuation? If so, who would be evacuated? Are Nisei to be evacuated? Where are the people to be sent? When is the program to begin? How can one best prepare for evacuation? The answers to these questions were of vital importance to all persons of Japanese ancestry, but no definite information was available. It was in the absence of definite information that rumors arose.

Other rumors apparently had their origin in reports of actual occurrences; however, the information available was only fragmentary and there were no means of verification. The Filipinos had actually attacked some Japanese, and since these attacks appeared sporadically throughout the state of California, the Japanese thought that an organized campaign of violence against them had begun. People were preoccupied with the matter, and they wanted to know what to anticipate. The fact that some Filipinos had committed acts of violence was known, but the details were not available. The rumors provided these details.

The Red Cross in San Francisco had rejected several Nisei volunteers; there was agitation against the Japanese; friendly Caucasians were assisting the Japanese. However, here again, complete information was not available. Rumors about the nature of camp conditions apparently had their origin in fact. Here again, the people who were still packing had no definite information on what to anticipate. They wanted to know in order that their preparations might be better, and the rumors supplied answers to their questions. When the Japanese were given an opportunity to migrate voluntarily, they wanted to know how they would be treated in outside communities before they took the fatal step; however, no definite information was available. Some individuals did experience hardships,
and unverified reports about their experience spread throughout the various communities. Rumor (66) is an excellent example of a rumor that started from an actual experience. One Issei was refused service in a store, and as a consequence the rumor spread in Berkeley that all Issei were not being served.

Rumors about accentuated discrimination were quite widespread in all of the communities studied. The people expected discrimination and were consequently more sensitized to receive cues along those lines. Discrimination actually did occur, and the reports spread rapidly. Rumors such as those dealing with the discharging of gardeners probably emerged independently in the various communities where gardeners were actually dismissed. In such instances, since discrimination was expected, no verification was necessary. People took the matter for granted. Thus, we may conclude that at least some of the pre-evacuation rumors had their origin in actual experiences which became exaggerated as the report passed from mouth to mouth. The fact that the people had to some extent a common scheme of interpretation, that is, they conceived of themselves as a group of people under suspicion and identified by the public as related somehow to the enemy, suggests that some of the common rumors might have emerged independently from the similar experiences of the people. Even when the rumors had some factual basis, however, they were widespread only when the message that it contained was thought to be of importance to the group and when definite and more complete information was not available.

There were other common rumors that had no basis of fact. While a large number of Nisei in the Army were placed in reserves, there were no verified instances of Nisei soldiers being attacked. Instances of physical violence were rare, and there are no verified accounts of cruel treatment of prisoners by the F.B.I. Finally, the rumors that spread
among the Issei about the progress of the war, such as the rumor about the death of General MacArthur, were purely speculative. All of the rumors without any basis of fact were about things that were expected. The Issei had been taught that Japan could not lose a war—not even against the United States. Consequently, when even the American newspapers began admitting Japanese victories, some Issei concluded that the war was about over. Furthermore, violence was expected because of the treatment of the Germans in the United States during the last war and because of the beliefs of the Japanese that Caucasians were just waiting for opportunities to attack them. When the expected violence did not occur in the home community, rumors arose about violence elsewhere. It is interesting to note that not a single rumor about violence that was recorded dealt with anything that happened in the community in which the rumor spread.

Rumors arose when certain things were unexplained. When the Filipino attacks began, the Japanese never thought of the manner in which they had themselves aroused the antagonism of the Filipinos by vying one union against another. But the question arose: why are the Filipinos acting this way? Some attributed the whole thing to barbarism, but others spread rumors about certain individuals with vested interests who were provoking the gangs, as in rumors (162), (183), and (164). When Nisei were discharged from the Army without any reason, the question arose as to why it happened. No definite information was to be had. Rumors began spreading about how the Kibei had set fire to barracks and had otherwise shown their loyalty to Japan. When the F.B.I. raids began and men were arrested who were apparently innocent, the question naturally arose as to why they had been taken. Rumors immediately began spreading about contraband goods and about stool-pigeons. Since the supposedly innocent men were being arrested, everyone—even those who had never done anything that might be construed as being pro-Japan—became fearful of being arrested. They wanted to know what they should
not do. They wanted information but it was not available. When the evacuation program was finally announced, some could not understand why such a thing was necessary. No reason was given by officials other than the vague and general one of "military necessity", which did not make sense to those who were convinced that no spies and saboteurs could be found among the Japanese. Here again, rumors emerged. The evacuation was being conducted because Japan had attacked Alaska and invasion was forthcoming.

Some rumors thus emerged from reports of actual occurrences; some rumors emerged in the midst of confusion; other rumors had no factual basis whatsoever but dealt with events that were expected. The one thing that is common in all the situations in which rumors emerged is that definite information was not available or else people felt that the news was not complete when it actually was. The normal channels of communication were disrupted, and news could not be verified. It was when definite information was lacking about something about which people wanted to know that rumors emerged.

It seems that rumors emerge out of the necessity of acting in an undefined situation, where there are no conventional understandings to guide one's behavior. Some elements in the situation are known, but others are not. Some of these elements must be known in order that individuals might define the situation. Gaps in the knowledge of the person must be filled in order that he can get some orientation to the new situation.

When the customary modes of life are disrupted, life becomes subject to the vicissitudes of events over which people have little or no control. Various events mark turning points in the lives of the people. Attention is therefore focused on these events. Whenever adequate information is not available about such occurrences or imagined occurrences which
When events are thought to be of importance to the group, rumors emerge. Rumors appear, then, when there is insufficient information about events thought to be of importance by the group, to render these events meaningful.

This confirms a hypothesis rather common in the literature on rumor and stated most explicitly by Prasad that rumors emerge to fill gaps in the public knowledge.

The Content of Rumors

What are some of the factors involved in determining the specific forms taken by rumors?

It seems that virtually all of the pre-evacuation rumors were in accord with the expectations of the people. Persons of Japanese ancestry realized that they were under suspicion. They defined their position as that of a suspected group at the mercy of Caucasians who stood ready to attack them at the slightest provocation. Considering the perspective through which the Japanese viewed various events, many of the rumors were simply logical.

Since San Francisco had an important harbor, it seemed only logical that the Berkeley Hills overlooking the Bay would be fortified. It was also reasonable to believe that any Nisei—a member of a suspected group—would be arrested if he wandered about the fortifications. Thus rumor (15) is quite logical. The Red Cross rumor about the fear of having ground glass in the bandages is likewise logical when we consider the fact that the Nisei realized that they were being suspected of having a partnership in diabolical Japanese plots. The Nisei expected greater discrimination because of the circumstances, and that violence would occur if war broke

out was a matter that was taken for granted. Since Italy was in the war on the side of the Axis, it was reasonable to believe that resident Italians would be more friendly to the Japanese than other Caucasians; hence, rumor (93). By March, after the newspapers had printed such sensational stories about how dangerous the Japanese were, it seemed only logical that no one would want the Japanese in their community. The rumors about the treatment of voluntary evacuees, therefore, fitted the expectations of the people. Rumors about camp conditions were also easy to believe since the Japanese were familiar with some fragmentary descriptions of life in Nazi concentration camps.

The rumors about the Hindus helping the Japanese against the British, (97) and (98), were quite plausible to Japanese who themselves felt persecuted and who could project their own feelings to the Hindus. Rumors about anything being associated with Japan being contraband were also logical. When the F.B.I. arrested men for reasons presumably unknown to persons outside the Japanese community, the inevitable conclusion was that someone had "squealed." There were two rumors pointing out the inconsistency of having sons in the Army and parents in concentration camps. One rumor was that persons with sons in the Army would not be evacuated (305), and the other was that all Nisei soldiers would be discharged (36). This inconsistency was so obvious that the rumor could not be questioned. There were other rumors about evacuation being delayed until fall (299), and these rumors were logical when one considers the difficulties involved in building housing for over 100,000 people within a few months and the fact that food was badly needed for the war effort was being produced by Japanese. Rumors thus arose through a logical, rather than an empirical, process.

Another factor involved in the determination of the content of rumors
was the traditional beliefs and prejudices of the people. In several instances, these beliefs entered into the rumors quite clearly. The rumors about acts of violence committed by American soldiers against Nisei soldiers and against Nisei women were more plausible because of the beliefs of the Japanese about the wildness and sexual appetites of American men. The traditional belief that recipients of relief had done something "wrong" and that they were expected to make some retribution apparently had something to do with rumors (10) and (11). Since many had always felt that Nisei would be treated as *nihonjin* rather than as citizens, rumors about the denial of rights to Nisei were more acceptable. The Nisei had always thought of Kibei as being hot-tempered and pro-Japan, and this stereotype fitted quite well with the rumors that the Kibei were responsible for the dismissal of Nisei from the Army. Rumors about violence and discrimination also fitted closely with the traditional beliefs of the people. Rumors about sex crimes committed by Filipinos against Nisei girls also fitted legendary beliefs about the alleged propensities of Filipinos. The extreme fear of the F.B.I. was probably intensified by the identification of the F.B.I. by the Issei to the Japanese *tan-tei* (plain clothes police) who were reputed to treat their prisoners very harshly. The strong Japanese prejudice against Koreans probably added credence to rumor (242) about Koreans working for the F.B.I.

In virtually every rumor the expectations of the people and their traditional beliefs entered in as factors determining its form, so that one is justified in declaring that rumors cannot be studied adequately except in terms of the condition of experience of the people and the background of beliefs through which the people view their perspective. A rumor that fitted the expectations of the group and was consistent with their beliefs is far more likely to spread widely and quickly. If there
is no spread, a report does not become a rumor, since rumor by definition gains its character through its spread.

Even in a critical situation, part of the situation is defined. While the nature of the total situation is unknown, attempts are made to define important aspects of the unknown in terms of what is conceived to be known. When people are confronted with a necessity of acting in an unknown situation, an attempt is made to define it. The individual is confronted by a new demand and he finds it necessary to assemble a large number of elements in order to gain a new orientation. He consults his friends to see what they think and picks cues from the various elements in order to work out a new scheme of conduct. There is a tendency for the individual to pick out of the clutter of elements those which seem to make sense in terms of what is known to him. He tends to accept those things which seem logical in terms of what he already knows.

Traditional beliefs apparently enter into the picture in a similar fashion. Certain particulars are known, and there may be any number of possible combinations of these particulars. One possible combination rather than another is selected if it is consistent with the traditional beliefs and prejudices of the people. In other words, the part of the situation which is defined sensitizes the individuals toward receiving cues that are consistent with the definition.

The factors involved in determining the specific content of rumors are (1) the character of the events which the people conceive to be of importance to their welfare, (2) those expectations developing from those aspects of the situation that are defined, and (3) the traditional beliefs and prejudices that enter into the definition of a situation which sensitizes the individuals to receive one cue rather than another.
The Spread of Rumors

What are the specific circumstances in which rumors spread?

One of the noticeable points about pre-evacuation rumors is that some of them were facilitated in their spread by their use for ulterior purposes. Although there is no definite evidence that any individual or group manufactured rumors to suit their interests, there is evidence that rumors were passed on purposely by individuals who stood to profit by their dissemination. This is not surprising since the internal struggle for power was one of the salient characteristics of this period. Whether or not rumors are used for ulterior purposes in critical situations in general depends upon the problem of whether or not an internal struggle for power is a phenomenon generic in this type of social situation. On the other hand, there were rumors like (13), which helped to sell rice at profiteer's prices but did not contribute directly to the internal strife within the group. There were rumors like (95), about the families listening to the short-wave broadcasts from Japan, which were used for the purpose of giving the weight of authority to other rumors about Japanese victories. Rumors like (237) were used for the purpose of frightening potential stool-pigeons. By and large, however, most of these rumors were used in the struggle for political control. In the San Francisco Bay Region, the leadership of the J.A.C.L. was challenged by the Y.D.'s of Oakland and the two groups were active in spreading rumors tending to discredit the other. J.A.C.L. men frequently made use of rumors like (298) in an effort to raise the prestige of their organization by posing as sources of "inside information." Rumors about stool-pigeons were spread by some Issei in order to dispose

2. During the fall of France, a situation not unlike that which confronted the Japanese was artificially created by the Nazis. One of the characteristics of this period in France was the petty bickering that was carried on until the time of final disaster. See Edmund Taylor, Op. Cit.
of their competitors and personal enemies. What is significant about these rumors is the fact that not all persons who spread these rumors have the ulterior purposes. The majority of people spread the rumors unwittingly, and the problem is that of seeking the nature of the circumstances in which rumors spread even without the incentive or the anticipation of special interests.

Strictly speaking, a rumor has its origin in its spread, for unless it spreads it is not a rumor. The nature of a rumor that does spread, as contrasted to those that do not, provides a clue as to the nature of circumstances in which rumors spread. There seems to be a tendency for rumors to be expressive of the sentiments and states of mind that are common among the people. The rumors among the Nisei about the treatment of Nisei soldiers, about discrimination, and about the denial of rights, are all expressive of resentment. On the other hand, the rumors about violence are quite clearly expressive of deep-seated fears. Finally, the rumors about the progress of the war among the Issei seem to be expressive of hope. It should be noted that rumors which have no basis of fact are expressive.

Rumors are a part of the content of communication and mingle in with charges, complaints, and expressions of sentiments. Under certain conditions certain types of expression are more likely to be sanctioned by the group than another. For example, when most members of a group are fearful, they are highly sensitized to receive cues that might be interpreted as threats. People in this state of mind are disposed to frame their utterances to give expression to their fears, and their remarks are tinged with their feelings. People are sensitized to pick up and pass on those rumors that are consistent with their feelings. All this facilitates the spread of rumors that reflect this condition; they arise almost spontaneously and spread rapidly throughout the group. There are certain conditions of society when certain types of expressions are unconsciously suppressed.
while others are sanctioned. Some expressions are readily believed while others are scoffed at. It is significant, therefore, that some unverified statements spread and become rumors; while others remain items of interest only to a few individuals. One of the factors involved in the spread of rumors, therefore, seems to be the consistency of the feelings they express with the prevailing sentiments among the people.

The spread of rumor is limited by the area of interest of its subject matter. This is well demonstrated by the fact that the rumors about the Japanese victories were restricted almost wholly to the Issei. This was partly due to the fear of spies among the Nisei, but it seems doubtful whether the Nisei would have taken them seriously even if they were allowed to hear all of them. The progress of the Japanese forces was of far more vital concern to Issei than it was to the Nisei, and on this point there was no general communality of interest between the two groups. On all other issues that arose in this period, both Issei and Nisei were directly affected, but the prospects of a Japanese victory did not strike the Nisei in the same manner as it did some of their parents. When the Nisei spread these rumors, they reinterpreted the entire report for their audience. These rumors were generally repeated as jokes, and the parents became the targets for considerable mirth because of their credulity.

What is most striking about the spread of pre-evacuation rumors is the apparently relationship between the rumors that are prevalent and the collective excitement of the people. In collective excitement, the people develop a common preoccupation with certain objects, particularly with reference to those events upon which the course of their lives are thought to depend. The preoccupation of each individual is reinforced by the excitement of the others, and there tends to develop a common mood.
Various complaints, charges, and expressions of feelings become involved in the process of circular reaction. There is considerable discussion about the event, and rumors grow up around those events that stimulate the excitement.

Throughout the twenty week period under consideration, the people were very much concerned over their personal safety, and the rumors about physical violence persisted throughout the entire period. During the first few months of the war, people were anxious to keep within the law. The interest of the people centered about this question, and rumors about the nature of regulations spread only during this period. The hypothesis about the relation of rumors to collective excitement is borne out most clearly by four sets of rumors.

During the end of December and early in January, the Japanese were preoccupied with the problem of dealing with attacks by Filipino gangs. Everywhere people were fearful and were deeply concerned with the matter. Whenever people got together, the attacks were discussed. It was during this period that the Filipino rumors flourished, and when the Japanese became preoccupied with the F.B.I. raids in February, the Filipino rumors virtually disappeared.

The excitement over the F.B.I. raids did not result from the raids themselves. Raids had begun soon after the outbreak of the war, but relatively few rumors about the raids spread during the first two months. Rumors therefore do not necessarily arise directly out of actual events. It was only in February, when all of the Pacific Coast newspapers began to print sensational stories about spies and saboteurs that the attention of the Japanese was directed toward this matter. It was at this time that the people became excited, and it was at this time that the rumors about the F.B.I. and their Stool-pigeons flourished.
During the month of March, however, in spite of the fact that the F.B.I. raids continued, the people became more preoccupied with the problem of evacuation. Were they to be evacuated? Who would have to go to camp? What were the procedures? This question became the center the attention, and thousands of rumors about evacuation emerged. These rumors persisted until the actual evacuation got under way in the latter part of the month, and then the center of attention fell upon the question of the nature of camp conditions.

During the month of April, the people were so preoccupied with the task of preparing for their new life in the centers that everything else became matters of secondary concern. Virtually all rumors during this period dealt with camp conditions. What should be taken and what should be sold? This was one of the fundamental questions, and almost everyone everywhere was discussing the matter.

It is almost obvious that rumors do not arise in a vacuum; however, there is no close one-to-one relationship between rumors and events. The relationship, if any, is that between rumors and those events that become objects of collective excitement.

Rumors spread, therefore, when people are preoccupied with an object. The extent of the spread of a rumor is dependent upon the extent of the interest and excitement in the object. Rumors spread rapidly if they give expression to those sentiments and states of mind that are more or less common to most members of the group.

These propositions constitute an elaboration of the obvious; however, there are several writers who apparently do not recognize this point. When people are preoccupied with something, say the Filipino attacks, it is only natural that they will talk about it much more than they will talk about other things. Rumors spread in the ordinary media of communication and it is only natural that rumors should spread about subjects which are at the center of attention.
The Effects of Rumors

What are the effects of rumors in a critical situation?

One might assume that the most effective rumor is one that is widely believed. This is only partially true. A rumor need not necessarily be believed to be effective. Some rumors simply give expression to sentiments that have been aroused and by their presence in the context of communication serve to disseminate those feelings. Furthermore, a person who does not believe a report may repeat it to someone else who will take it seriously. Although on the whole the Issei tended to be more susceptible to the pre-evacuation rumors, the Nisei were by no means free of their influence. Because reports could not be verified and because of the use of special techniques, such as attributing the rumor to "government sources" or to the Japanese radio, the rumors were taken quite seriously and were effective in inducing individual, mass, and collective action.

Most of the pre-evacuation rumors performed the function of defining situations. In the process of definition, the individuals sought to assemble a large number of elements, many of which were rumors, in order to gain a new orientation to the situation. Rumors rendered meaningful events which were otherwise incomprehensible. The most obvious instances of this are the rumors that sought to explain various events. The evacuation was explained in terms of an attack on Alaska and the impending invasion (347). Attacks by Filipinos were explained in terms of the desire of city Filipinos to rid themselves of Japanese competitors. The discharge of Nisei from the Army without any specific charges against them was explained in terms of the activities of pro-Japanese Kibei. Rumors thus place events that are not self-explanatory into some context in which they can be interpreted.
Rumors are effective in shaping sentiments and beliefs and are particularly effective in reinforcing already existing attitudes. There was already some dissension in the community, when the rumors about the activities of the J.A.C.L leaders emerged, and greatly facilitated the crystallization of antagonistic feelings against these men. Rumors about the activities of Kibei soldiers in the Army also served to reinforce Nisei prejudices against the Kibei as a whole. Rumors about physical violence served to confirm already existing beliefs about the desire of Caucasians to inflict injuries on Japanese, and the rumors about discrimination aroused resentment and thoughts of vengeance.

Rumors not only emerged and spread around events stimulating collective excitement, but by their existence probably intensified the excitement. The rumors about violence in the hands of Filipinos, by entering into the communicative process, served to further preoccupy the people with the problem. Rumors about ill-treatment of prisoners in the hands of the F.B.I. were apparently quite effective in arousing the people and inducing fears. Rumors therefore not only helped to define situations but entered into the non-symbolic interaction of the people and contributed to the dissemination of an atmosphere of fear, of resentment, and sometimes of hope. Rumors were effective, then, in those stages preliminary to action, and it is in this manner that they contributed to the making of decisions.

The influence of rumor on decision is shown quite clearly in the instance of rumors about the fate of voluntary evacuees. Even when they were faced with the alternative of internment for the duration of the war, the vast majority of the Japanese chose not to leave their homes. There is clear evidence that many of these individuals made their decisions after hearing rumors about the trials of those who had departed. Similarly, rumors about the treatment of Nisei in the Army were effective in guiding
the thoughts of those who were contemplating joining the colors themselves. Some were so embittered by these rumors that they decided against volunteering. The rumors about discrimination by the Red Cross prevented many Nisei from volunteering for work, and rumors about the deadline for evacuation were effective in influencing decisions about marriage, about selling homes and furniture, and about disposing of business obligations. In all of these instances the rumors so oriented the individuals that the decisions were substantially different from what they might have been were the rumors absent.

Once the situation was defined and once the people had similar beliefs and sentiments, action followed. When rumors about the nature of camp conditions began spreading in the communities awaiting evacuation, there was a stampede to sell those things that had been labelled as useless by the rumors and to purchase those things that would be useful in a kind of place pictured by the rumors. When rumors about contraband and F.B.I. arrests spread, the people destroyed anything that might conceivably be used against them as evidence of sympathy for Japan. Some families burned treasured items. Japanese subjects burned Japanese flags and portraits of the Emperor; Christians burned Bibles printed in Japanese. When rumors spread that those who accepted relief would be deported, some who were almost destitute did not apply for aid. When a rumor spread in Berkeley that all stores were refusing to serve Japanese (66), many Issei did not go shopping. Some Issei took seriously the rumor that Japan would win the war in six months and made no preparations for evacuation, thinking such preparations were unnecessary. When rumors of violence spread, meetings were cancelled and people stayed home nights—even to the extent of disrupting courtship patterns of the young. Rumors about people dying of typhoid fever in the camps led to a rush for typhoid shots that flooded
the offices of local physicians. Rumors about stool-pigeons eventually led to the singling out of certain individuals as informers and serious beatings in the various relocation centers. In virtually all of these instances, the action induced by rumors was of a mass nature, that is, a number of individuals were acting separately in a similar manner. Without question, however, the action of one individual undoubtedly influenced the decision of the others.

Some of the rumors did not lead to action. On the contrary, some of the rumors created so much confusion that action was impossible. The rumors about the nature of wartime restrictions were of this nature, as were the rumors about the evacuation procedure. There were so many contradictions that the people did not know what to do or what to believe. The difference between rumors that led to action and those that did not, however, does not lie in differences in the intrinsic nature of these rumors, but rather in the nature of the circumstances. In the case of the rumors about regulations and those about evacuation, the rumors contradicted other rumors and furthermore the rumors and the known facts and announcements were contradictory. Some people believed one thing and others believed other things. Many of the rumors that were contradictory were equally plausible and logical in terms of the expectations and beliefs of the people.

Thus, rumors served as media for the expression of sentiments and thereby provided a mechanism for the dissemination of certain feelings. Since only rumors consistent with the expectations and beliefs of the people became widespread, they were plausible to the people and they served to define situations. When rumors were contradicted by other equally plausible rumors or by actual facts, there was considerable confusion; but when the rumors were accepted and incorporated into the definition of the situation,
individual and mass behavior often followed. The major functions of rumors in critical situations, then, are in disseminating a mood and in helping to define the situation.

The Disappearance of Rumors

What are the circumstances in which rumors disappear?

It is with reference to the question of the disappearance of rumors that one can gain an insight into the nature of the relationship between rumor and the social situation. While it seems logical to assume that rumors disappear when the events that apparently precipitated the rumors disappear or become modified, the study of pre-evacuation rumors fails to bear out this supposition. The evidence supports the hypothesis of the relationship between the spread of rumor and collective excitement instead. Rumors, then, are not related directly to objective social conditions, but rather to the conceptions of the people. Rumors are not automatic responses to the stimulation of objective events.

Most of the pre-evacuation rumors disappeared when the interests and the objects of preoccupation of the people changed. During the first few months of the war the people were concerned with the nature of regulations that applied to them and rumors about restrictions flourished. By February, when most of these rumors disappeared, the status and rights and perlegatives of the people were no clearer than they were two months before, but the people simply became more preoccupied with something else. Furthermore, they simply got accustomed to their restricted and cautious lives so that the matter ceased to become an object of attention.

This was also true in the instance of rumors about the Nisei in the Army. In March, when most of these rumors disappeared, there was no more
definite information about the matter other than the fact that large numbers
of Nisei had been discharged. By this time, however, the interests of the
people shifted.

The rumors about the Filipino attacks did not cease when the attacks
ceased, but disappeared when the interests of the people in the Filipino
question gave way to a preoccupation with F.B.I. raids. The rumors about
temporal
the F.B.I. raids likewise had no relation to actual events since the raids
began in December and continued to the day of evacuation; whereas the
rumors were centered in the month of February. These rumors disappeared
when the people became preoccupied with the question of evacuation. Al-
most all rumors disappeared as the actual evacuation approached. The
people were preoccupied with making preparations for camp life, and every-
thing else was of secondary importance.

Some rumors disappeared when the facts became widely known. The
rumors about the date of evacuation naturally stopped circulating as soon
as the Army posted the official Exclusion Order. Rumor (66) about aliens
not being able to purchase things in Berkeley stores ceased circulating
within the particular church group in which it flourished when the facts
became known, although it may have continued spreading elsewhere. In
February, the facts about the Red Cross discrimination became known, but
by this time the Nisei were interested in other matters. The rumors about
the fate of voluntary evacuees, while they did not disappear entirely,
ceased to spread as widely after the closing of all voluntary migration
by the Army. While friends and relatives of those who had left were
concerned over their welfare, the others were much too busy making pre-
parations for their evacuation.

Thus, while some rumors disappeared when the facts became known,
most of the rumors disappeared even when the facts were not known when
the preoccupations of the people shifted. The people lost interest as issues that were conceived to be of greater importance arose, and the rumors ceased to circulate.

Some of the pre-evacuation rumors did not disappear, and some of them are still spreading today (1944). The rumors about violence and discrimination persisted throughout the twenty weeks, although the number of these rumors apparently declined just prior to evacuation. Once the people were in the centers, however, these rumors reappeared. It must be remembered, however, that these expressions are consistent with and are a part of the legendary beliefs of the people. These rumors provide a point of reference by which the Japanese can orient themselves to life in America.

Another set of rumors that have persisted are those about the J.A.C.L. If anything, these rumors became far more widespread after evacuation. Although no one looked forward to a vacation in paradise, very few had been able to visualize the actual hardships that would be experienced in the Assembly Centers. Once in the centers, the realities of camp life were much too harsh and a search began for scapegoats. Since the J.A.C.L. had advocated blind cooperation with the government as a part of the "Nisei's contribution to the war effort" and since the organization had strongly opposed all court cases testing the constitutionality of the move, it was naturally given the blame. Once the organization fell into disrepute, others who had previously even supported the J.A.C.L. joined the cry against its leaders and gave expression to rumors they had heard during the pre-evacuation period. Many Nisei today are firmly convinced that the J.A.C.L. "sold them down the river", and they continue to subject the organization to scathing criticism and to spread rumors about its leaders.

Rumors disappear then when the facts become known in such a way that the people believe them or when the preoccupations of the people shift.
The rumors that did not disappear were those that dealt with matters which for one reason or another continued to remain of interest to the people.

**Rumors in a Critical Situation**

What is the function of rumor in a critical situation?

Rumors seem to be generic to critical situations. They arise out of the necessity of acting in an undefined situation. In a critical situation there are gaps in the knowledge of the people which must be filled before a definition can be made. Thus rumors arise when definite information is lacking. Rumors are about events because in a critical situation life becomes subject to the vicissitudes of events.

The form taken by the rumors is shaped by the expectations and the traditional beliefs of the people. Certain particulars about a situation are known, and in their attempts to define the situation, cues about the unknown are interpreted in terms of the known. Since a rumor gains its character by its spread, any report inconsistent with the expectations of the people will not become a rumor because it will not spread.

Rumors emerge and spread about those events about which the people are preoccupied. There is therefore a close relationship between the collective excitement of the people and the nature of rumors spreading at that time. When the preoccupation shifts, the rumors tend to disappear or spread only sporadically and at a slower rate.

The effects of rumors in a critical situation are in serving as media for disseminating a mood and in providing elements going into a definition of the situation. Once the situation is defined, individual and mass action may follow.
There can be no collective activity unless the individuals can organize their behavior into some orderly patterns so that their lines of behavior fit together. Human beings act together when they share a common definition of the situation, where each person knows what is expected of him and what he can expect of others. When the individual does not know what to do, collective behavior breaks down.

When a group is confronted by a crisis, their life is generally characterized by unrest. Attention is more or less continually alert, and interest is strong in every event that has any relation to the more general cause of the difficulty. There is no common definition of the situation; therefore, the individuals are more susceptible to the play of external influences. Fortuitous events, therefore, become quite important. In a crisis where the people feel impotent to control the situation, attention is naturally focused on events that affect the collective security of the group. When people become aware that some event has occurred or might occur that will affect their security, there is excitement. Attention is focused upon that object and the people become preoccupied with it. When there is no definite information about the object, the people become sensitized for any information about it. When there is a common object of attention, the people are thrown into a condition of rapport and become highly susceptible to suggestions from each other. They therefore become highly susceptible to rumors.

When people have no common definition of a situation, they cannot act by any pre-established channels of expression. Behavior and imagery therefore tends to be of a random nature. This conditions renders an individual susceptible to rumors that seem to lend some definiteness.

In a critical situation the people are characterized by fears and apprehensions of all kinds. They become susceptible to declarations about anything affecting their condition. When people have fears, they project
When society is in a condition of unrest, as was the Japanese community during the period prior to evacuation, the individuals are restless and in a state of tension. He wants to do something, but he does not know what he wants to do. He has impulses to act, but he cannot carry them out. His impulses are blocked because there is no consistent goal toward which the action can be oriented. The individual cannot act because there are no forms for him to follow and can act only in a random fashion. The restless person's mind is flooded with disconnected images which are not integrated into a pattern. This instability is one which increases the suggestibility of the individual. He is more suggestible with reference to cues and possibilities of releasing tensions that he has. His instability means that he is not able to analyze and evaluate things as he would normally. Hence the individual is more susceptible to rumors.

In a critical situation the people are characterized by fears and apprehensions of all kinds. They become susceptible to declarations about anything affecting their condition. When people have fears, they project
their feelings into their conceptions of their position and tend to see their world in terms of their personal feelings. People in this condition have a tendency to frame utterances to give expression to these fears. Others in this condition are sensitized to this, and remarks that hit upon this condition are picked up. Rumors thus operate along lines in which the group interprets its world. Why do some rumors spread while others die soon after their origin? In certain conditions, certain expressions are sanctioned and others are not. Rumors that give expression to the prevailing mood will gain acceptance, for they will seem more plausible to the group. Distortions occur sometimes when attempts are made to fit the rumor into a form acceptable to the group.

Rumor is a form of communication and is therefore a vital part of the process of adjustment to a crisis. The process of interaction involves rumors. People sent up their definitions in their conversations. Alternative definitions are set up and communicated. Rumors are a part of this communication. When the excitement over an object becomes collective and the people become preoccupied with it, rumors about the object become involved in the process of circular reaction. At first, each individual may believe a rumor for his own reason, but in the process of interaction a more general view develops and rumor is involved in this. Finally, each person believing a rumor and acting upon it makes the next person more inclined to believe the report. The belief of this person reinforces the belief of the first person.

Aside from being simply expressive, the spread of rumor also involves an exchange of meaning. Some rumors do not spread because they do not fit into any scheme of interpretation. A rumor is a report that need not be communicative. If it is communicated it calls up images in the recipient which are naturally associated with his past experiences. A rumor will not call up these images unless it can somehow be associated
with some scheme of interpretation. This, then, is the relationship between
the content of rumor and the traditional beliefs of the group.

Rumor, then, is involved in the process of interaction out of which a
common definition of a situation arises. If a rumor helps to define a si-
tuation, it makes action possible. By entering as a factor in the defini-
tion of the situation, therefore, rumors serve to influence decisions, to
mobilize people for action, to create or reinforce a mood. Rumors explain
something that was hitherto unintelligible. If they are accepted, they
change the conceptions of the people.

What, then, are the conditions in which rumors disappear? Rumors often
disappear when definite news appears, when the people redefine the situation
in accordance to verified information. On the other hand, rumors disappear
when even for definite information is not available. When people become pre-
occupied with another object or when they lose interest, rumors about the
specific object that had formerly brought about excitement die out because
they are no longer involved in the process of interaction.

When a number of contradictory rumors are circulating, the acceptance
of a common definition of a situation becomes impossible. Collective action
therefore becomes impossible. There is nothing but confusion, and not having
anything definite to believe, people are turned inward.

Thus, in a critical situation rumors arise with slight provocation and
tend to recur until the state of feeling and thought of the people changes.
Rumors follow events of great consequence that suddenly and unexpectedly
occur. They will arise to interpret the event and elucidate its details.
In a period of crisis rumors refer to anything that may be thought to threaten
the collective security of the group or promise to relieve such a threat. The
most trivial incidents may set off a flood of rumors. Rumors appear where
people are preparing for some action, but where they have insufficient
information by which to plan their action. Action is generally preceded by a definition of the situation. As W.I. Thomas writes:

Preliminary to any self-determined act of behavior there is always a stage of examination and deliberation which we may call the definition of the situation. And actually not only concrete acts are dependent on the definition of the situation, but gradually a whole life-policy and the personality of the individual himself follows from a series of such definitions.  

During the period between Pearl Harbor and evacuation, information which the Japanese wanted was incomplete and contradictory. There was considerable uncertainty at a time when information was needed badly. Rumors emerged and "logically" filled in the gaps in the public knowledge. For some, the message imparted by the rumor was sufficient to define the new situation and action followed. For others, the rumors were contradictory; further confusion arose; and a condition was created for the rise of more rumors.

APPENDIX A

Note on the Collection of Data

The original list of rumors on which this study is based was compiled before evacuation. Since that time, considerable data has been added, but these additions have been kept separate from the original list.

The dated rumors were collected between December 7, 1941, and May 1, 1942, in the San Francisco Bay Region with the assistance of several Nisei and Caucasian friends. Two Japanese barber shops—one in Oakland (Isssei and Nisei) and one in Berkeley (Isssei)—were set up as listening posts. Other rumors were collected at random on the field. The rumors were collected on forms which indicated the following about the individuals spreading the rumor: name, age, sex, occupation, citizenship, residence, place and time that the rumor was passed on, attributed original source, and the circumstances in which the person told the rumor. Some of this data has been utilized, but since complete information was not available in most instances nothing more has been done with this data.

Almost 300 sheets were handed in during the period when the rumors were being collected. Many of these have been lost, and of those that remained, many had to be discarded either because they were repetitious or because they were not rumors. From what was left a basic list of 176 rumors was prepared. The rumors were then classified by date and by content. It was from an examination of these lists that the present organization of the study emerged.

1. In a surprisingly large number of instances more than one person heard a given individual tell the same rumor at the same time. Hence the same instance was reported more than once. The same rumor told under different circumstances or by different individuals are not counted as repetitions.
2. Many of the sheets simply contained expressions of attitudes.
After the first draft had been prepared, it became apparent that there were some serious gaps. The writer himself could recall several rumors that he had heard but of which no record was available. An interview schedule, based upon the original list of rumors, was made out and several Nisei who had had many contacts during the period in question were interviewed. Because of the nature of the situation, most of the persons interviewed had vivid memories of their experiences. There are several difficulties involved in this procedure, however, and the rumors collected in this fashion have been used in a supplementary fashion. The basic organization of the study rests upon the original list of dated rumors. There was a great danger that some individuals might confuse rumors that they had heard in relocation centers with those before evacuation, and this was constantly guarded against. If any rumor seemed suspicious, further questions concerning the circumstances in which the informant heard the rumor were asked. Another difficulty was that since the questions were based upon the original list, unless the informant had an unusual memory the rumors different from the types originally collected could not be recalled. The rumors collected in this fashion were checked with other individuals who had lived in these areas at that time. As a result, over 200 additional rumors from four different areas in California were collected.

Certain difficult methodological problems arose. For one thing, rumors are often dynamic in form. Since the form of rumor is preserved in conversation, only the essential meaning is kept reasonably constant. The specific content of a rumor, as they have been used in this study, depended upon where and at what time the particular rumor was recorded. Some rumors may become distorted beyond recognition, but no way of checking was available at that time.

3. Because of the intense fear of spies, anyone asking too many questions was under suspicion.
It is logical to assume that some rumors are more effective than others because of their wider circulation. However, it is almost impossible to ascertain accurately how widespread a rumor was other than perhaps by checking the instances when rumors touched off some action on the part of individuals who believed them. Even this is not an accurate measure, for many who had heard and believed the rumors could not do anything. The fact that a single observer in a community heard the same rumor on several occasions does not necessarily mean that the rumor was widespread. As Allport wrote:

"Hearing a remark from two or three distinct sources, or hearing it with the added suggestion that 'they are saying it', generally produces in the listener an impression that the statement is being universally accepted and widely discussed."

Actually, the rumor may have spread only within a limited social circle.

Rumors were abundant during this period, and it is obvious that the list presented here represents but a small portion of the total. There may have been a selective factor operating which in the collection of data which may have biased the conclusions of the study. Inasmuch as most of the persons collecting rumors were more familiar with the official announcements than the others, they were inclined to accept statements approximating the contents of these announcements as "facts", and recording as "rumors" only those remarks that were at variance with the official statements. This matter cannot be checked now, but every effort has been made to guard against placing too much reliance on the one-sided rumors.

In view of the fact that the social stratification of the Japanese communities was based in part upon barriers of communication, it is possible that within certain areas of communication certain types of rumors were current and there may have been some homogeneity in the types of rumors.

believed. The writer was cognizant of this possibility when he sought to
get the data about rumors listed above, but when a superficial analysis
of the material revealed nothing of significance, it was assumed that the
events about which the rumors dealt were of sufficient importance to affect
all persons of Japanese ancestry regardless of what factions to which they
happened to belong.

The sampling is uncertain. However, in spite of this, the contents of
these rumors seem to reflect quite well the prevailing preoccupations and
states of mind of the individuals in the community.

The study in the main is of the San Francisco Bay Region--San Francisco,
Alameda, Berkeley, and Oakland. The supplementary list contains rumors from
Los Angeles, Sacramento, and Stockton as well as additional rumors from
San Francisco. There were certain differences between these communities
that may have influenced the nature of the rumors that spread; for example,
Terminal Island, near Los Angeles, was evacuated as early as February 2, and
Stockton and Sacramento were both near the borderline of the Military Area.
APPENDIX B

Dated Rumors Chronologically Arranged

What follows makes up the basic list of rumors which provided the foundation for the study. All of these rumors were collected in the San Francisco Bay Region between December 7, 1941, and May 1, 1942. A few of the rumors apparently had their origin in other areas and were brought to the Bay Region by visitors and through the mails. Several of the rumors were recorded after conversations with Nisei students on the campus of the University of California.

No names are included, but the occupation, age, sex, citizenship status, residence, attributed original source, and the circumstances in which the rumor was told are indicated wherever the information is available. It must be remembered, however, that these data refer to the specific person spreading the rumor at the time that rumor was recorded. These individuals are not in any sense “typical” of the kinds of people who gave credence to any particular rumor.
December 7, 1941

1. Chinese restaurants in London have refused to serve Nisei.

   U.C. student, 20, male, Nisei, Berkeley, Radio broadcast, trying to persuade other Nisei to cancel pre-arranged date to eat in a Chinese restaurant in Berkeley.

2. San Francisco's Japanese town is surrounded by sailors. Crowds are milling around the streets and the people are threatening to boycott the Japanese stores.

   U.C. student, 23, male, Nisei, Berkeley, a friend who had been in San Francisco in the morning, general conversation on the campus.

December 8, 1941

3. On Terminal Island American soldiers went in to arrest the aliens and while they were there they attacked several Nisei girls.

   No data

4. In Fresno, a group of Nisei were riding by an airfield when they were taken out of their car by a group of hoodlums and badly beaten.

   No data

5. Near Stockton, some people fired on some Japanese working in their fields. They accused the Japanese of planting their crops in such a way as to point to the airport.

   No data
December 20, 1943

6. Since the outbreak of war, Hollywood night-clubs have "No Admittance" signs out to the Japanese.

Ghaffeur, 24, male, Nisei, Berkeley, friends in Los Angeles, discussion of discrimination against the Nisei since the outbreak of war.

7. In Los Angeles, a Nisei involved in a minor traffic scrape was immediately mobbed without question.

Same source as #6.

December, 1941 (No definite date)

8. A Nisei walking around during a blackout was arrested by the F.B.I.

No date

9. A Nisei girl was attacked during a blackout. Some hoodlums broke all the windows of the Japanese stores.

No date

10. Filipinos are running wild all over California. They have organizing into gangs and are attacking all the Nisei girls they can find. They are breaking into stores and stealing everything they can get.

Housewife, 52, female, Issei, Berkeley, some friends, advising children to be careful about Filipinos.

January, 1942 (No definite date)

11. A Filipino walked into Mr. Incuye's store and before anyone could do anything, he threw a bottle through a big mirror. He pulled out a knife and chased everyone around the store. Other people there chased him out.

Housewife, 50, female, Issei, Stockton, a friend who lived nearby, warning son against going out at night.

12. One night some Filipinos drove up to a deserted ranch and chased the father and mother of the family away. They then attacked the two daughters of the household.

Laundry worker, 22, female, Nisei, Berkeley, talk of her parents, general discussion of the Filipino menace with a group of Nisei.
13. A girl was going home from work when some Filipinos tried to force her into their car. When she ran away, they tried to run over her.

   Domestic, 24, female, Nisei, a friend, telling friends how frightened she is walking home from work.

14. Some Japanese boys were working on the farm near Acampo when the Filipinos working there attacked them with knives. Fortunately no one was hurt.

   Same source as 11.

15. A Japanese gardener told his employer that the first thing he would do when war declared between the United States and Japan or when the invasion came was to kill her (the employer).

   U.C. student, 22, male, Nisei, Berkeley, Herb Caen’s column in the San Francisco Chronicle, general discussion of Nisei problems.

16. When the Nisei girl in Sacramento was abducted by a group of men posing as F.B.I. agents, her mother kneeled down and prayed as they were about to attack her daughter, and when the men saw this, they spared her daughter.

   Housewife, 50, female, Issei, Berkeley, friend who knew the family, conversation with another ardent Christian Issei woman about the virtues of Christian religion.

17. A Nisei girl was abducted and attacked by a group of F.B.I. agents in Sacramento.

   Housewife, 52, female, Issei, Berkeley, the Nichi Bei, warning children to be careful.

18. On Terminous Island, a shack in which many Japanese workers were sleeping was covered with gasoline and set afire during the night by a group of Filipinos.

   Housewife, 50, female, Issei, Stockton, some friends of her husband who was a travelling salesman, warning her children to be careful of Filipinos.

19. On New Year’s Eve many Filipinos ran wild and terrorized the Japanese in Stockton. Fifteen windows were broken, one man was killed, and many were injured.

   Same source as #18.
20. One of the Filipinos arrested by the police told the judge that if he had a chance to kill Japs again he would gladly do it. He had no regrets about having committed murder.

Housewife, 50, female, Stockton, the Stockton Record, discussing with contempt the mentality of Filipinos.

21. One of the Filipino leaders speaking out against all the violence was badly beaten. His office was wrecked by a group of hoodlums.

Same source as #20.

22. Nisei who were sent West from the various Army camps in the Mid-west were returned to their respective camps while their Caucasian comrades were sent on overseas to the Philippines.

Domestic, 24, female, Berkeley, a friend, discussing her Nisei boy-friend in the Army.

23. Nisei in the Army were locked up for 21 days after the war began.

U.C. Student, 22, male, Berkeley, a friend, discussing their future if they should be drafted soon.

24. Some Nisei or Kibei in Washington set fire to the Army barracks as soon as they heard that Japanese planes were attacking Pearl Harbor.

U.C. Student, 23, male, Berkeley, a friend in the Army, explaining why Nisei are being treated badly in the Army.

January 35, 1942

25. In a meeting of the U.C. Alumni Association, every member present except two, Sibley and Spindt, favored the evacuation of all Japanese, including citizens of the United States.

U.C. Student, 21, male, Nisei, Berkeley, Mr. Blaisdell of the International House, trying to impress the Nisei in a special meeting of the gravity of the situation and trying to get their cooperation in forming a special committee of action.

February 1, 1942

26. The Red Cross is not accepting help from Japanese groups because they are afraid that ground glass will be put in the bandages and that poison will be substituted for sterilizing agent.
Stenographer, 30, female, Nisei, Berkeley, a friend, discussion of what U.C. students can do to help the war effort and counteract misunderstanding.

February 5, 1942

27. There are many anti-Nisei riots in the Army.

U.C. student, 21, male, Nisei, Berkeley, Professor Olson who heard from "confidential sources" and trying to impress students with importance of race, general discussion of lecture among Nisei students.

February 15, 1942

28. The plan for cooperative farming drawn up by Korematsu and accepted by the F.S.A. has been held up because Kido felt that he has been left out.

Agricultural advisor of the Japanese Association in America, 25, male, Nisei, Berkeley, a close friend in the F.S.A., expressing disgust of the J.A.C.L.

February 16, 1942

29. The J.A.C.L. is opposed to the F.S.A. rehabilitation plan. Kido is opposed because the J.A.C.L. is not officially "in."

Gardener, 29, male, Nisei, Berkeley, a friend, expressing concern over the future of Nisei.

30. The Berkeley Hills is covered with fortifications and any Nisei caught there will be turned in by the F.B.I.

U.C. student, 21, female, Nisei, Berkeley, relative of person arrested in the Berkeley Hills with a camera, warning students against roaming about in the Hills.

February 17, 1942

31. The J.A.C.L. in Alameda is charging $5.00 as a "professional fee" to help aliens moving from restricted areas and registering. They claim that the $5.00 is not a fee, but that 50 cents is charged for notarizing and that the remainder is to be considered a donation for the cause.

W.P.A. worker, 22, female, Nisei, Oakland, witnessed this herself while assisting an Issei friend of the family, expressing indignation against the J.A.C.L.
February 18, 1942

32. In Oregon, a church where some Nisei were having a social was burned down by some hoodlums.

Art studio employee, 28, male, Nisei, Berkeley, F.B.I., seeking members for the J.A.C.L. during a recruiting drive and trying to raise the J.A.C.L. prestige by claiming to have the confidence of the F.B.I.

33. A group of Nisei girls coming out of a social were abducted by a group of hoodlums in Oregon and mistreated and attacked.

Same source as #32.

34. The J.A.C.L. instructed by Naval Intelligence to send questionnaires to all members to report on their parents.

Stenographer, 30, female, Nisei, Berkeley, Mr. Blaisdell of the International House, expressing disgust over the suspicions of government agencies and the gullibility of the J.A.C.L.

February 19, 1942

35. Nisei who have started their trek Eastward have been rejected in every community and are still travelling.

U.C. student, 23, male, Nisei, Berkeley, Mr. Kington of the Y.M.C.A., discussing treatment of Nisei outside the Pacific Coast.

36. The J.A.C.L. is charging a $5.00 "professional fee" when aiding aliens in registering.

U.C. student, 23, male, Nisei, Oakland, a friend in Alameda, trying to get support for an anti-J.A.C.L. coordinating council in San Francisco.

February 21, 1942

37. The J.A.C.L. has refused to cooperate with the F.O.R. and the F.S.A. because the leaders have personal grudges.

Agricultural economist, 24, male, Nisei, Berkeley, some friends in the "inside", expressing his dislike for the J.A.C.L.
38. The Army is planning to have the Nisei and especially the Kibei draftees go into the same regiment with the Negroes so that all can be educated together.

U.C. student, 25, male, Kibei, Berkeley, heard from several Issei on several occasions, discussing the future status of Nisei.

39. Mr. Kondo was arrested by the F.B.I. They couldn't find anything in the way of evidence so they took a Yearbook with the addresses and some Popular Mechanics magazines with pictures of radio parts in them.

U.C. student, 19, male, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from a friend of the person arrested, discussing the arrests by the F.B.I. of various individuals throughout the state.

40. Mr. Baba had a radio shop, but they did not arrest him for his radios. They took him because he had a dictionary and a Bible written in Japanese.

Housewife, 49, female, Issei, Oakland, heard from a friend of the family, pointing out the inconsistency of the F.B.I. charges.

February 22, 1942

41. In Concord, Yas Marumoto said that when the F.B.I. raided the Japanese homes they herded the old folks out into the yard very early in the morning. These people froze. They requested a bathrobe, blanket or a coat to cover their thin nightgowns but were refused.

U.C. student, 24, male, Nisei, Oakland, heard directly from Yas Marumoto, discussion in a barber shop.

42. The Japanese living in the San Francisco Japanese town are giving coffee and donuts to the F.B.I. men watching Japanese property closed by the order of the Treasury Department each night at 8:00 p.m.

22, male, San Francisco.

February 24, 1942

43. Adachi nurseries in Richmond was raided by the F.B.I. and an alien was picked up. The reason given was that he was teaching the small boys there Japanese naval maneuvers. The alien concerned was playing with toy lead ships on the shop floor with a small Japanese boy at the time of the raid.

Cleaner and presser, 26, male, Nisei, Berkeley, from the man working there, Nisei meeting.
44. Any maps and newspaper clippings are sources of suspicion by the F.B.I. and they pick up individuals for just having them.

Barber, 58, male, Issei, Oakland, discussion in a barbershop.

45. Nisei in the Army are being discharged after a year’s training.

U.C. student, 24, male, Kibei, Berkeley, heard from friends, general discussion.

46. The F.B.I. ordered the JACL to make the Kibei survey.

Stenographer, 23, female, Nisei, San Francisco, some employees of the Institute of Pacific Relations, general discussion of the Nisei problem.

February 25, 1943.

47. The University of California fraternities council voted to petition the removal of all Japanese from California.

U.C. student, 20, female, Nisei, Berkeley, Caucasian friends, general committee meeting of a Nisei committee of action.

February 26, 1943.

48. A party on Saturday, December 6, the night before Pearl Harbor, was suspected of having been conducted by enemies of the United States. It was supposedly a means of drawing the sailors and soldiers from the camps and ships. Especially because Nisei were serving at the tables they were thought to be the instigators. The Army took many Nisei waiters at random and shot them.

20, male, Nisei, Oakland.

February 27, 1943.

49. The Army is discriminating against the Nisei. John Ishida took the Army intelligence examination used to place men in special fields. He was one of the men receiving very high grades. His slip which contained his exam grade was cancelled by the word "Japanese." All of his Caucasian friends passing high in the exam were surprised when Johnny was not included in the detachment leaving camp for special training. Many of them expressed remarks about the undemocratic army. John was sent to Arkansas with the rest of the Nisei after doing nothing for weeks at a Pacific Coast camp.

Civil service clerk, 23, female, Nisei, Oakland, letter from fiancee in Army, street gossip.
50. The Chinese will be forced to evacuate along with the Japanese.

Housewife, 55, female, Issei, Berkeley, saw it in a newspaper and heard from friends, general discussion with daughters.

51. When the F.B.I. raided Mr. Suzuki's home, they would not let him change his clothes or even go to the lavatory.

Same source as #50, heard from friends of Mr. Suzuki, lecture to her children about the F.B.I. and why they should not inform on any Japanese.

52. Some F.B.I. agents are fine, but other are individually mean. Some of them are just cruel. They don't even give people time to pack.

U.C. student, 25, female, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from relatives of arrested men, expressing resentment for the seizure of her uncle.

53. The F.B.I. forced a girl with mumps to get out of her bed in order to search the place.

Same source as #52.

54. The F.B.I. won't allow wives of the arrested Japanese to speak to their husbands in Japanese.

Housewife, 55, female, Japanese, Berkeley, heard from the wife of an arrested man, general conversation at meal-time.

February, 1942 (No specific date)

55. When we get sent to camp, we will lose all contact with the outside world. There will be no radios, no letters, no newspapers, --nothing.

Soy-bean cake manufacturer, 19, male, Nisei, Oakland, read it in a newspaper, in discussion saying that all Japanese will be evacuated and sent to camps.

56. Persons who are arrested by the F.B.I. are usually empty-walleted by the time they reach the police stations, city halls, or wherever they are taken. They don't know who takes the money.

Nursery worker, 21, male, citizen, San Leandro, heard from his brother who was taken and whose money was taken without being given a receipt, nursery men usually have money on route to or from the market and he was expressing fear that someone might be arrested on route.
Some colored soldiers wanted to and got transferred to California from Eastern camps because they were afraid of the Germans out there. Now that the United States and Japan are at war, they would rather go back East. They are more afraid of the "little devils" than they are of the Germans.

Laundry driver, 28, male, Nisei, Oakland, heard it from a colored soldier, emphasizing the fear that people have of the prowess of the Japanese soldiers.

Many Nisei are getting honorable and dishonorable discharges from the Army.

Nisei are being given the worst and dirtiest jobs in the Army.

The JACL has burned its copies of the constitution of their organization. They burned every copy as soon as the war began.

Aliens cannot get relief unless they are absolutely destitute. They are not treated on the same basis as others.

The JACL started their survey on the Kibei in order to turn in information to the FBI. They are taking this as a protective move to whitewash themselves by blaming others.

March 1, 1943

On December 7, the U.S. Army went into the Japanese section of Honolulu and killed many men, women and children. They raped the Japanese girls. You can't trust the U.S. Army no more than any other army. All this talk of discipline in the U.S. Army is phooey.
64. 150 Nisei have dropped out of the University of California during the week of February 23-28.

   U.C. student, 21, male, Nisei, Berkeley, telling an outsider the situation on the campus.

65. All Japanese, including Nisei, in Washington and Oregon must move east of the Cascades; those in California must go east of the Sierras.

   Optometrist, 30, male, Nisei, Berkeley, from J.A.C.L. friends, trying to get a church board interested in the evacuation problem and getting their support for the J.A.C.L.

66. People accepting federal relief will be deported at the end of the war.

   Chemist, 25, male, Nisei, Berkeley, read about this in Doho, discussing things about which the Issei are concerned.

67. The J.A.C.L. made an excellent showing at the Tolan Committee hearings, but the Young Democrats threw a wrench in the whole thing by sending in a letter discrediting Mike Massoka.

   Same source as #65, trying to show the church board that the Y.D.'s are not to be trusted and that the J.A.C.L. has the welfare of the people at heart.

March 2, 1942

68. Tom Aiso was honorably dismissed from the Army. They did not give him any reason. He served for 13 months.

   Cleaner and presser, 25, male, Nisei, Oakland, heard directly from Aiso, speaking at the East Bay Coordinating Council.

69. Farmers in the Concord area are not planting their crops because they do not know when they will be evacuated. Furthermore, they are uncertain as to the availability of insecticides, fungicides, and water.

   U.C. student, 21, male, Nisei, Concord, claims he observed himself, general discussion of impending evacuation.
70. All the Nisei will be kicked out of the Army now that all Japanese will be sent to concentration camps. It won't seem right to have parents in a concentration camp and a son in the Army.

Gardener, 25, male, Nisei, Oakland, discussion of impending evacuation.

71. There have been a dozen cases of "tar and feather" parties. In one instance, an airplane flew over a Japanese community in the Fresno area and dumped hot tar on the Japanese below.

U.C. student, 21, male, Nisei, Concord, letter from relatives of those alleged victims to a friend, general discussion during lunch hour.

March 3, 1943

72. Japanese, alien and Nisei, cannot use arsenic to control pests on their farms. They are accused of using unusually large quantities of it. They are unable to purchase it.

Nurseryman, 25, male, Nisei, Oakland, observation while on tour of inspection, at a S.F. Coordinating Council meeting at the Y.M.C.A.

73. Nisei men have been let out from the Army if they have made any statement which may be construed as being anti-United States.

Clerk, 29, male, Nisei, Oakland, explaining the Army policy on Nisei.

74. William Tamura has about 12,000 tomato seedlings, but there is no way for him to dispose of it.

Nurseryman, 25, male, Nisei, Oakland, general discussion in a political rally.

75. Several Japanese farmers, Issei and Nisei, have lost their tomato crop because white paper caps cannot be put on the plants to prevent frost damage. Whenever the caps are put on it seemingly points to some defense industry. Rather than take the chance of mob violence, the farmers are not capping tomatoes in many areas. In other areas, vegetable planting has been curtailed because of accusations that are made. The claim is that the fields have been arranged and planted to point out a defense or other vital industries and areas.

Nurseryman, 25, male, Nisei, Oakland, claims he saw for himself, complaining about injustice at a political meeting of the S.F. Coordinating Council.
76. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, some Kibeis in the U.S. Army at Fort Ord yelled "Banzai". Some went as far as to set fire to their barracks. Nisei and Kibei soldiers were then segregated and questioned whether they would fight against Japan. Some said, "no". Thereafter, some Nisei and most Kibei were sent home and those who remained or who were recently called were segregated.

U.C. student, 24, male, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from a Caucasian student who had a letter from a Nisei soldier, discussion in the campus bookstore.

77. About 150 Terminal Island evacuees and their families have gone to Texas. They cannot find a place to settle because the country is hostile to them.

Chauffeur, 26, male, Nisei, Berkeley, heard it in Los Angeles, meeting of the S.F. Coordinating Council where he was trying to prevent the formation of another "Jap Okie" group.

78. Japanese are being turned in to the F.B.I. by two or three stool-pigeons in each community. The stool-pigeons are sometimes those who are the most guilty of all.

U.C. student, 19, male, Nisei, Berkeley, heard during visit to hometown, expressing resentment over the arrest of his father whom he considered innocent but turned in by enemies.

79. Some Nisei radical student sent in a letter to the Tolon committee to discredit the J.A.C.L.

U.C. student, 22, male, Nisei, San Francisco, heard from J.A.C.L. men who "knew" who it was, expressing resentment against Communist students.

80. A Japanese in Chicago who was looking for a job was beaten up very badly.

Clerk in the county courthouse, 28, male, Nibeir, Oakland, heard from a professor at a friend's home, illustrating the hysteria.

March 4, 1942

81. Numerous members of the Masonic Club of Berkeley expressed the idea that if the Army does not get the "damn Japs" out of this area in a hurry, they will take the matter into their own hands.

U.C. student, 24, male, Nisei, Oakland, overheard a discussion of a member of the club who opposed such action, telling Nisei of Caucasians who backed them up.
82. The government is going to stop letting the Nisei draw out their money from the banks. Since we Nisei are no better off than the aliens now, the government might pass more laws and restrictions against us.

Soy bean cake manufacturer, 19y male, Nisei, Oakland.

March 5, 1942

83. When we evacuate, the Army will permit evacuees only one suitcase per person.

U.C. student, male, discussion at a meeting of the Y.M.W.C.A. Race Relations group.

84. Citizens of Japanese ancestry will lose their American citizenship after the war if America wins. Anything can happen if they go so far as to revoke all liquor licenses from citizens of Japanese ancestry.

Grocery store operator, 30, male, Nisei, own conclusion after losing own liquor license, expressing disgust and resentment.

85. According to the Army there has been news of violence against the Japanese in Los Angeles, but there is not factual material to substantiate these reports. Therefore, the reports are not true.

U.C. student, 21, male, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from an employee of the Institute of Pacific Relations who heard from the Army, meeting of the Race Relations group trying to convince others that maybe all these violence stories were not true.

86. When the Army evacuates us from the Bay Region, those of one locality will be sent to one area or camp and those of another will be sent elsewhere.

Mechanic, 44, male, Nisei, Oakland.

87. Fifteen were supposed to have been lynched near Fresno. There were also cases down in Los Angeles, but the number of incidents down there is not known. These individuals were all Nisei.

Florist, 55, male, Issei, heard from three sons who heard from the J.A.C.L. to which they belong, warning Nisei that they had better be careful in spite of their citizenship.
88. Over 500 Nisei draftees have been discharged from the Army.

U.C. student, 21, male, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from a social welfare worker who heard from J.A.C.L. headquarters, general discussion of Nisei problem during lunch hour at the Y.M.C.A.

89. Seventeen Japanese have been lynched in the South.

U.C. student, 25, female, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from a friend, discussing the situation between classes.

90. There will be no jobs for the Nisei in the federal civil service unless they can prove that they do not have dual-citizenship.

U.C. student, 25, male, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from an official of the State Department of Employment, telling other Nisei that they had better get rid of their dual-citizenship and taunting those who had not done so.

91. The government will provide protection only for small groups who move on their own.

Domestic, 24, female, Nisei, heard from a friend who heard at the Race Relations meeting, discussing possibilities of voluntary evacuation.

March 6, 1942

92. The Army will allow evacuees only one suitcase per family unless there is a baby.

U.C. student, 23, female, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from a friend who heard from officials, wondering what to do with her possessions.

93. Mr. Fukumoto, Mr. Ishida, and the young Nisei couple across the street from Yashiro's theatre are the stool-pigeons turning in names to the F.B.I. Wait until we get them at Owens Valley; we'll fix them.

Barber, 50, male, Issei, Stockton, discussing F.B.I. raids, suspicious of individuals who seemed to have plenty of money to spend in spite of the fact that their business had been disrupted or suspended by the outbreak of war.
94. People who left their homes in Los Angeles to go elsewhere have had their furniture looted.

U.C. student, 22, female, Nisei, Oakland, heard from parents who had a letter from Los Angeles friends, discussing the Nisei problem between classes.

March 7, 1942

95. The Hastings clothing stores refused to serve two Nisei youths on two different occasions. They were asked whether they were Chinese or Japanese; when they claimed that they were of latter descent, they were told that their business was not wanted.

Chauffeur, 26, male, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from the fellows who were discriminated against, in a general discussion on the way home from a meeting of the S.F. coordinating council.

March 8, 1942

96. A licensed Nisei amateur radio man was taken in by the F.B.I. for having a radio transmitter.

U.C. student, 23, male, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from a fellow amateur.

97. Nisei in the Army are being kicked from behind when they are off guard. When some retaliated with jiu-jitsu, they were mobbed.

Housewife, 53, female, Issei, Berkeley, heard from friends, discussing the situation with her children.

98. Many of the people who had left the state by themselves instead of being evacuated from government orders have not been heard of since they left.

Mechanic, 45, male, Nisei, Oakland, discussion of the fact that everyone had to move out sooner or later anyway and speaking of those who left the restricted areas.

99. Many Japanese have been stranded in other states when they left California because the gas stations would not sell them gasoline.

Mechanic, 45, male, Nisei, Oakland, same as #98.
100. Japanese in the Hawaiian concentration camps are being starved to death.

Housewife, 53, female, Issei, Berkeley, discussing the situation and expressing fear of what might happen to her family after evacuation.

101. When evacuation becomes inevitable, the Japanese families will be allowed only one trunk per family.

24, male, Kibei, San Francisco, heard from the J.A.C.L., speaking at the S.F. Coordinating Council and emphasizing some of the difficulties confronting the evacuees.

March 9, 1942

102. The people in the Hawaiian concentration camps are starving and are being treated like cattle. Some have been murdered.

Domestic, 23, female, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from a friend, fear of what will happen to her family.

103. Bob Tsutsui, a wealthy Hawaiian-born Japanese grocer and Bill Ishimoto went to Utah to survey for the possibilities of having a ranch for the Japanese evacuees. The two did not go together, but they made arrangements so that they would meet in Salt Lake City. They were armed with letters of introduction from the local chamber of commerce and others to the Salt Lake officials who in turn gave them letters of introduction and identification to the local farmers. They were able to obtain a ranch of fairly large size for operation. They claimed that the Caucasian ranchers received them very enthusiastically. They intend to return to Utah soon. It was hinted that they wish to take back about twenty families of the Japanese with them. Working on a farm, they said, was better than going to a concentration camp.

Barber, 58, male, Issei, Oakland, heard from Tsutsui and his friends, general discussion in the barbershop.

March 10, 1942

104. Farmers in Concord, Danville, San Jose, Hayward and nearby places are not taking care of their crops any more. They are letting their things go, except for seedlings which are about to sprout.

Farmer, 22, male, Nisei, Danville, claims he knows from his own observation, telling others in the barbershop that there was not much sense in working in the field if he knew he had to be evacuated.
March 11, 1942

105. Three church groups have given self-addressed post cards to the members of the Japanese M.E. church. These are to be sent to the issuing churches filled in with their address at their destination. The friends of those evacuated can then write to these Caucasian churches which in turn will forward the mail to the evacuated person.

Bookkeeper, 23, female, Nisei, Oakland, heard from a member of the church, discussing friendly Caucasian groups in a political meeting.

106. In Owens Valley, prefabricated houses are being put up. Los Angeles will be evacuated first at the rate of 200 every two days. San Francisco will be next.

Male, Nisei, heard from the J.A.C.L.

107. The Friends Service Committee of the Easy Bay approached the Y.M.C.A. of the San Francisco Japanese asking them if any help could be rendered them by the Quakers. The response was half-hearted and no request was made. The society is now helping some Oakland church groups.

Same source as #105, discussing with contempt various Nisei leaders and organizations.

108. In the Stockton area, Issei have been picked up by the F.B.I. for possessing broken camera lenses. In one case, a daughter had a fifteen-cent-store camera which was smashed so much that it was useless, but the F.B.I. took the father for having contraband goods.

Farmer, 55, male, Issei, Lodi, heard from friends, discussion of F.B.I. raids in a barber shop.

109. The Nisei soldiers who have been given honorable discharges from the United States Army were Kibei.

U.C. student, 19, female, Nisei, Oakland, discussion in a family circle.

March 12, 1942

110. The Communist party kicked out all of the Japanese members because the C.P. did not wish to be harboring dangerous elements. Thus the Japanese communists who have endured years of persecution in the Japanese community, hunger strikes, picket line duties, hard labor, and other things
for the cause have been thrown out. The Japanese members were happy to make this sacrifice. The C.P. attitude is similar to that of other organizations making the racial issue the weapon for ousting Nisei members.

Stenographer, 27, female, Nisei, Berkeley, was present at a meeting in which the announcement was made by a Japanese communist, discussing the backgrounds and reputations of various Bay Region Communists and stating that there was no Japanese communist organization in existence any more.

111. The people in the Lodi and Stockton area are jittery because there are spies in the Japanese communities reporting real and imagined suspicions to the F.B.I. Many times, these are just unfounded accusations. They have picked up most of the leaders of the Japanese communities. Recently the teachers of kendo and judo have been picked up. The Kibei instructors have not yet been touched.

Sugar-beet field foreman, 54, male, Issei, Lodi, discussion in barber shop.

112. In San Luis Obispo, the Japanese pea farmers lost $50,000 to the Okies when they were forced to evacuate a week before the harvest.

Housewife, 33, female, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from a J.A.C.L. official, discussion of the evacuation with her parent's family.

March 15, 1942

113. Saburo Kido is to resign from his position as national commander of the J.A.C.L.

Widespread rumor, no specific data recorded.

114. The Oakland Young Democrats are plotting with the other Japanese Communists to communize the camps.

U.C. student, 20, female, Nisei, heard from the J.A.C.L. authorities, worried about her chastity in a communized center.

115. The Japanese Communists are plotting with the government. They feel that if they cooperate with the government against the other Japanese, they can save themselves.
116. No letters can be exchanged between those in the camps and outsiders.

Unemployed, 20, female, Nisei, Brentwood, heard from a friend, discussing future of Nisei.

March 16, 1942

117. A concentration camp for San Francisco people is to be constructed in Chico.

UC student, 24, male, Nisei, Berkeley, a discussion of rumors about Marysville camp.

118. A preacher of the Congregational Church in Oakland spoke at the Plymouth House in Berkeley to a group of Nisei. He claims that Pearl Harbor was no surprise. Secretary Knox's letter to Japan was insulting. No nation could take it sitting down. No nation would have bothered to answer the letter, but Japan did.

Shop-keeper, 21, male, Nisei, Oakland, heard at the meeting, discussing international affairs.

119. There will be no evacuation of the Japanese until fall because the Army cannot possibly put up all the camps until then.

UC student, 21, male, Nisei, Berkeley, discussion with friends worried about immediate evacuation.

120. Some people went to Owens Valley only to find nothing there. They had to put up tents.

Gardener, 45, male, Issei, Berkeley, heard from friends, talking to Nisei students living with him.

121. The government camps are to be for men only.

UC student, 19, female, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from friends, wondering whether she will be separated from her fiancé.

March 18, 1942

122. The Treasury Department (Federal Reserve Bank of S.F.) is doing nothing about alien or citizen property. The people there just tell you to sell everything and get out of the prohibited area immediately.
Mechanic, 40, male, Nisei, Oakland, heard from a friend who visited the office, expressing dissatisfaction over service rendered by officials.

123. The rumors of lynching and the tar and feather cases in the Fresno area are not true. They are being spread by those who want to use them as a means of keeping the Japanese away from Fresno.

Chemist, 25, male, Nisei, Selma, discussing rumors about violence.

124. Orosi is just like Porterville, anti-Jap like hell. The damn cops follow all Japanese, Niseei and Issei, around the town when anyone goes there.

Grocery man, 31, male, Issei, Selma.

125. An instructor at Selma High is anti-Japanese. He is from Porterville. He is spreading stories about us. He has not yet influenced other teachers. The principal is against him, but cannot fire him. He has written in the local papers. He is beginning to influence the Caucasians around him. He has even influenced Mr. Jones, the defense coordinator at whose home he is staying. The latter has been very friendly to the Japanese farmers for a great many years. This instructor was formerly of Fresno State College, but he was kicked out from there.

Same source as #124.

126. The people in Selma and the surrounding towns of Kingsbury, Fowler, and Dinuba are very nice to the Japanese and sympathize with us. In Selma, the anti-Jap sentiment might arise if too many Japanese went there, particularly if they came in in large numbers at one time.

Same source as #124.

127. Many Caucasians house owners have given Japanese preference for housing because they know that we are in a fix. They can't come out for the Japanese openly but many are doing their best for us.

Same source as #124.

128. People in Selma are moving to Colorado. We don't know when they have to go. The farmers are doing the minimum of work. Those who own their farms are still there, but they are prepared to go.

Same source as #124.
129. People are pouring into Parlier and Dinuba, but those who are already there believe that we will be moved, probably after the harvest.

Farmer, 48, female, Issei, Parlier.

March 19, 1942

130. Nisei funds will be frozen, just like those of the Issei. American citizenship is no more of any good.

Mechanic, 20, male, Nisei, Oakland.

March 20, 1942

131. No more Japanese, other than former residents, are wanted in Colusa. The Japanese themselves have asked that no more come in. The P.T.A. here has gone around to various stores telling them not to trade with Japs if they can. If they do they will be boycotted.

U.C. student, 19, male, Nisei, Colusa, letter from parents, trying to discourage voluntary migration to his home town.

132. The 1,000 volunteer workers from Los Angeles who went to Manzanar were forced to go at bayonet points. The soldiers went into the bars and saloons and forced them to go.

Newspaperman, 27, male, Nisei, San Francisco, discussion at a political meeting.

March 23, 1942

133. There have been three cases of rape on Terminal Island. These occurred when the Nisei were being evacuated. The cases were hushed up by the Army. George Nishi of Marysville told me. His dope is directly from his sister who was at Terminal Island at that time. He says he can supply the names. Mr. Okura of Los Angeles said she surprised a soldier in an ally trying to rape another Nisei girl.

Architect, 28, male, Nisei, Palo Alto, general discussion in barber shop.

March 25, 1942

134. A camp for Berkeley people will be set up near Mt. Lassen.

Housewife, 53, female, Issei, Berkeley, heard from her son's scoutmaster, planning to get heavy clothing for the camp.
March 26, 1942

135. Once we get into a camp, we cannot get out.

Housewife, 45, female, Issei, Stockton, read in the newspapers, telling her son that she will never see him again if he leaves for school.

136. Everyone must evacuate by April 15.

Housewife, 50, female, Issei, Berkeley, heard from everyone, telling her children to hurry their preparations for evacuation.

March 27, 1942

137. The Army is tightening up on the Issei because Japan has bombed Alaska.

U.C. student, 23, male, Nisei, San Francisco, heard from all the Issei he lived with who had heard from other Issei friends, making fun of the things that Issei believe.

138. All contracts for the building of reception centers are for completion by April 15.

U.C. student, 22, male, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from a close friend who is a "big shot" in the JACL, comment on the general belief that the evacuation deadline is April 15.

March 29, 1942

139. Nisei and Issei were accused of lighting flares and signal lights at the recent Los Angeles air raid when anti-aircraft guns fired at imaginary planes. Every incident is blamed upon the Japanese. Perhaps it is better for us to remove ourselves from places of vital importance to national defense.

General discussion at the Young Democrats meeting.

140. Forty percent of the interned men have been released so that they could evacuate with their families.

U.C. student, 22, male, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from father who is interned, hoping father will be released.

March 31, 1942

141. The "Freezing Order" was put in to effect because the Army wanted to sever connections between spies.
The maximum pay in camps will range from $5 to $15 a month.

Hindus in Marysville celebrated the fall of Singapore by getting drunk. Hindus and Burmese in Singapore had a great deal of fun shooting the British defense lines when the Japanese attacked.

The Indian situation is the same as that of Burma. One can't push people around for 300 years and expect them to fight on your side. They will help Japan. It is too late anyway for India to organize since they have no weapons, tools, or planes.

My friend in Fresno has been tarred and feathered.

U.C. student, 21, male, Nisei, San Francisco, letter from a friend, telling others that a Nisei has no chance when he is caught alone and that the mob hysteria against the Japanese is terrible.

April 3, 1942

Evacuee's squatter camps are springing up all over in the central valley.

Japanese farmers are not planting tomato and celery seed beds because chemicals needed for the controlling of diseases are not available to them. Copper sulfate used to prevent "damping off" of celery seedlings cannot be purchased because the public is afraid of cooper sulfate being dumped into their water supply.

Nurseryman, 25, male, Nisei, Oakland, claims he observed this himself while in the area, general discussing during a political meeting.
April 4, 1942

148. An F.B.I. agent came to the Nippon Laundry and told the owner to close out because the evacuation order would come out on April 7.

_ U.C. student, 22, male, Nisei, Berkeley, heard directly from the laundry owner, discussing the imminence of the order._

April 6, 1942

149. No green food will be served in the camps.

_Domestic, 24, female, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from friends, eating Italian dinner and saying this may be the last good food for a long time._

150. General MacArthur is dead.

_Widespread rumor, no specific data recorded._

April 9, 1942

151. The San Francisco evacuees were sent to Santa Ahita instead of Manzanar because a windstorm blew down half the barracks at Manzanar.

_Cleaner, 28, male, Nisei, Oakland, heard from a brother-in-law in the Army, discussing evacuation and what camp Oakland may be sent to._

April 11, 1942

152. There is a typhoid fever epidemic in Manzanar.

_Domestic, 24, female, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from an official of the J.A.C.L., discussing wisdom of getting typhoid shots at the J.A.C.L. office._

April 12, 1942

153. The dust is so thick at Manzanar that every time the wind blows the whole house, even food, is filled with dust.

_Agricultural economist, 24, male, Nisei, Berkeley, heard from the J.A.C.L., telling friends what preparations he is making for camp life._

154. There are no knives—not even eating knives or pocket knives—to be allowed in camps.

_Same source as #153._
April 16, 1942

164. There is not enough food served at Santa Anita. Everyone is hungry and must constantly get pies at 60 cents each.
   
   U.C. student, 21, female, Nisei, San Francisco, letter from a friend in camp, telling other Nisei friends to bring food to camp.

165. There are 2,000 women at Santa Anita and only three showers for all of them.

   Same source as #164.

166. All radios must be off by 8 o'clock and all lights must be out by 10 o'clock.

   Same source as #166.

167. There have been two marriages at Owen's Valley already.

   Housewife, 55, female, Issei, Berkeley, heard from friends who had friends in camp, expressing fears about the future of her daughters in camp.

April 19, 1942

168. Sam Horita and his wife are to go to Iowa. The G-2 is shifting its headquarters there. Sam is an instructor for the Japanese language school for Army G-2.

   Laundry worker, 23, female, Nisei, Oakland, Sam is her brother-in-law, telling friend of exceptions in the evacuation order.

April 21, 1942

169. Mr. and Mrs. Shiro Nakashoji will be allowed to stay in the Bar Y Region. Shiro is teaching Japanese to the Naval and Military Intelligence people at U.C. Dr. Yanaga is also to be allowed to stay.

   U.C. student, 24, male, Nisei, Oakland, heard from Mr. Nakashoji, telling other Nisei of exceptions to the evacuation order.

170. Not all instructors can stay. Some have a chance, but Yamato's wife may not be able to get a permit to stay. Yamato may not marry if she can't stay with him.

   Same source as #169.
171. Students in high school and junior college in San Francisco have quit school. Their time is now spent in loafing, movies, and there has been a conspicuous increase in the number of Nisei frequenting dance halls, poolrooms and gambling tables.

Volunteer assisting evacuation, 25, female, Nisei, heard from friends in San Francisco, expressing concern over behavior of younger Nisei in camps.

April, 1942 (No specific date)

172. Mike Masaoka of the J.A.C.L. has requested that regions be moved at the same time to the same place so that local community groups can be kept intact.

U.C. student, 24, male, Nisei, Alameda, heard from the J.A.C.L. officials, discussion at a political meeting.

173. When we are evacuated, everyone will get the same type of jobs that they have been doing.

Laundry worker, 22, male, Nisei, Oakland, heard from the J.A.C.L. leaders, discussion of Nisei wondering what kind of work they will be doing in the centers.

174. Evacuees from San Francisco were being sent to Santa Anita because there was a terrific hurricane which toppled over those houses that had been built in Manzanar. Several people were killed and had to be removed.

Same source as #171.

175. The Army told the U.C. students to quit school at Cal.

Grocer, 22, male, Nisei, San Francisco.

176. In Alameda, tenants that had occupied the homes of the evacuees walked off with the furnishings of the home.

Domestic, 31, female, Nisei, Alameda and Berkeley, general discussion on the undesirability of having defense workers as tenants for the duration.

Note: This basic list will probably be supplemented from time to time as the examination of additional notes reveals the existence of rumors not listed here.
APPENDIX C

Undated Rumors Arranged by Areas

These rumors were recorded in interviews in Chicago and were used only as supplementary data to those in the basic list. Studies of psychological distortion have shown that the questioning of an individual about a past event increases the inaccuracy of the reports given. The data to follow, therefore, while a valuable addition, must be used with caution.

1. San Francisco Bay Region

177. Nisei in the U.S. Army are being discharged.

178. Kibei in the Army were put in the guard-houses and their guns were taken away from them.

179. The F.B.I. took away the people without giving them notice or time to make preparations.

180. The F.B.I. took men with the assurance that they would be allowed to return to clear up their affairs, but did not keep their promise.


182. Mr. Shoji is protected from any raids because one of his friends is an informer and gave him the O.K. to the F.B.I.

183. The J.A.C.L. is bargaining with the Army officials to get whatever they could for themselves.

184. The J.A.C.L. knew all about the evacuation weeks before it was announced.

185. Voluntary evacuees were stranded in Nevada because they were not able to purchase gas.

186. Stockton Japanese do not dare go out at night because the Filipinos will kill them if they do.

187. On New Year's Eve the San Francisco Filipinos are going to attack the Japanese in force.

188. Filipinos from Sacramento and Stockton are planning to come to San Francisco on New Year’s Eve to create a disturbance against the Japanese.

189. Japanese cannot go across the Bay Bridge. Everyone who goes across will be searched by the F.B.I.

190. Aliens cannot buy anything in any of the stores.

191. Some people were moving from Los Angeles to Fresno when they were forced out of Terminal Island and since they had nowhere to stay they camped in a field. Some vigilantes came along and burned the whole family to death.

192. Nisei girls, two sisters, were attacked by Filipinos in Gilroy. They were attacked and also shot. One girl was shot in the leg.

193. All domestics and gardeners are losing their jobs.

194. Some Alameda people bought furniture only a year before, and when the prohibited area was moved out they had to sell cheaply to the junkman. The Jews cleaned everyone out.

195. The churches are helping the Japanese by helping them get transportation to the centers.

196. People are dying of a typhoid epidemic in Manzanar.

197. People are all getting diarrhea because of the terrible food in camp.

198. All Nisei in the Army are getting honorable discharges.

199. Nisei in the Army not being discharged are getting demoted.

200. In Washington, the Nisei soldiers were segregated from the others and were placed in a stockade.

201. On the day that the Japanese are all in camps, Japan will invade Alaska.

202. Everybody in Berkeley will be raided by the F.B.I. as soon as they are through with Oakland.

203. In an F.B.I. raid, if anyone was sick, the agents just knocked them out of bed to look around.

204. When the F.B.I. went to raid Baba’s place no one was home so they just slit the screen and got in. They tore up the place and then just waited for them to come home. They smoked and threw all the ashes on the nice rugs.

205. Some men posing as F.B.I. agents are robbing the Japanese in San Francisco.
206. At jail, the internees were treated cruelly. Relatives are not allowed to see the men.

207. Knives longer than 8 inches are contraband.

208. Knives longer than 12 inches are contraband.

209. In Delano and in Santa Maria, some men from the Los Angeles J.A.C.L. came up as spies. They worked with the F.B.I. and all the male heads of families were taken.

210. A Berkeley family went voluntarily to Reno where some friends had a job for them. When they got there they were persecuted. Caucasians gave them jobs just to take advantage of them.

211. A family that evacuated voluntarily was tarred and feathered.

212. A family of voluntary evacuees was run out of the town where they went.

213. Evacuation is coming on April 1. (and various other dates)

214. Berkeley people are going to a race track in Richmond.

215. Automobiles and money will be confiscated when we go to camp.

216. The showers in the camp are bare.

217. There are dead horses still left in the stables of Tanforan. They didn't even clean up.

218. Japanese can't walk around in Stockton because the Filipinos are running wild.

2. Sacramento Area

219. Caucasian people walk into a store and then walk right out without purchasing a thing as soon as they heard that it was being run by Japanese.

220. Japan will invade California in the near future.

221. Japan is going to time her attack on Alaska so that the attack will begin at the moment the last evacuee steps into the center. This is revenge for the evacuation.

222. Some Nisei who think they are patriotic are turning in names of their friends to the F.B.I.

223. The J.A.C.L. is trying to be patriotic and they are supporting the evacuation program. They do not have the welfare of the Japanese at heart.
224. People who left voluntarily for the East were stranded in Nevada because no one would sell gasoline to them.

225. People in California want the Japanese to harvest their crops before they leave. Evacuation will not come until after the harvest season.

3. Los Angeles Area

226. A Japanese farmer was shot in the Salinas area.

227. A Japanese man and his family were beaten up on their farm in the San Luis Obispo area.

228. A Japanese man was severely beaten in the Imperial Valley near Brawley.

229. A Chinese in Los Angeles was beaten up when he was mistaken for a Japanese.

230. There are several Los Angeles restaurants that will not allow Japanese to enter. They have signs saying that they will not serve Japs.

231. There are some theatres in Los Angeles that will not sell tickets to Japanese.

232. It is better not to ride street cars because one is made to feel uncomfortable by the Caucasians. No one will let a Japanese sit down, and many insulting remarks are made.

233. Many Issei and Nisei are being laid off their jobs. In Roberts Market everyone of Japanese ancestry was fired. Many gardeners have lost their customers.

234. Sales people in several stores refused to serve Japanese.

235. The Nisei in the Army are being yanked out of their positions on the West Coast and are being transferred to Texas.

236. Firearms were taken away from the Nisei in the infantry and artillery and they were transferred to K.P. and other undesirable duties.

237. Nisei soldiers are not trusted by the Caucasians and they are under suspicion regardless of what they do.

238. Nisei soldiers are being kicked out of the Army.

239. The Sons and Daughters of the Golden West are mapping a campaign to take citizenship away from the Nisei.

240. There are several Caucasian groups that are trying to confiscate all personal and real property from the Japanese so that they can benefit from it themselves.
241. All persons who were nationals of Axis nations will be evacuated from the West Coast, but their children who are citizens will not be.

242. The F.B.I. men are very antagonistic and manhandled the old Japanese people. They left the homes in a mess because they took everything they thought could be used against the person, including any trophies that he had won.

243. F.B.I. men came in without search warrants and just made themselves at home.

244. Some F.B.I. men are kind; those were the old-timers and regular F.B.I. men. The new recruits who were sworn in to meet the emergency were the bad ones.

245. The F.B.I. is searching every house where Japanese are living regardless of whether they are under suspicion or not.

246. There was talk that the Japanese were going to poison all the crops, and therefore the Caucasians are demanding that aliens be taken out of the farms and fruit stands.

247. There are many stool pigeons in the Japanese community. Some people are even turning in their relatives for $25. a head.

248. You can't trust anybody any more. Two ladies were talking in the market, and one lady said that it was hard for her and that she wished that her son in the Army would be released so that she could have someone to advise her in the confusion. Just for this remark the woman and her husband were arrested by the F.B.I. Some neighbor's son turned them in.

249. The government put ads in the papers asking for Nisei men, preferably university men, to work in the federal civil service. One engineer from Cal went to apply for a job and he was told that the ad was just a means of getting F.B.I. agents. They told him that he was just supposed to stand around where Nisei congregate and call the F.B.I. whenever he heard something suspicious. He was to be paid $250. a month, but if he is caught by the Japanese, the federal government has no responsibility for his welfare or safety. This Nisei fellow said no.

250. The J.A.C.L. men are being sucked in by the Army. They were so confused that they had no stand when the Tolan Committee hearings came on.

251. A number of Japanese who evacuated from California voluntarily are being shot at in Nevada and Arizona.

252. Some voluntary evacuees were not allowed to stay in the towns where they went. They were given 24 hours to get out.

253. Vigilante committees are being formed throughout the Mid-West to deal with voluntary evacuees.

254. No one in the Middle West will rent houses to the voluntary evacuees and the stores refuse to serve Japanese.
255. Evacuation is coming soon. (within a week, within a month, tomorrow, etc.)

256. The government will issue evacuation orders in the morning paper and you will have to move on the following day.

257. A Santa Barbara storekeeper was arrested for sending huge quantities of money to Japan. He never had that much, but his customers used to bring large checks and ask him to send their balances to Japan for them in their names. Since he sent them, his name was connected with them, and he was arrested.

258. Trucks owned by Japanese which are left unsold will be confiscated by the Army.

259. Many mean Filipinos are out for blood. They are being used by some anti-Japanese Caucasian elements to stir up trouble. They are being told that now is the time to strike against the Japanese bosses because we are defenseless.

4. Stockton Area

260. Some Caucasian people are going around disguised as F.B.I. agents and are swindling money and other property from the Japanese.

261. Japanese women are being attacked by Caucasians whenever an opportunity presented itself.

262. Vigilante committees in central California are shooting Japanese.

263. Several prominent Stockton restaurants have refused to serve Japanese.

264. The church council in Stockton is helping the Japanese. They have offered to take care of property for the duration.

265. Large farmers on the islands are willing to hire and pay guards on their farms so that the Japanese can continue to work on the ranches. In this manner they can protect the Japanese from harm and also guarantee the government that the Japanese cannot do any harm either.

266. The Nisei in the Army are either being sent home or are being given jobs as farmers, gardeners, K.P., or latrine detail.

267. There are more fights between the Japanese and Filipino soldiers in the Army than there are between the whites and Japanese.

268. They are going to give Issei American citizenship. The J.A.C.L. is instigating such a program.

269. There are some Japanese soldiers in America already.
270. The government restrictions are to apply to Issei only and not to the Nisei.

271. Any Japanese literature is contraband.

272. Any Japanese phonograph records are contraband.

273. The F.B.I. was going to go through the Japanese names once, but instead they are going through them three or four times.

274. There are Japanese in the pay of the F.B.I. who are going around to suspected individuals and offering to clear their names off the lists for a bribe of $500.

275. Some Koreans are working for the F.B.I.

276. One man in the country had a broken down radio set, but was arrested and accused of having a short-wave set.

277. Since the J.A.C.L. cabinet is going to Salt Lake City or Denver at the time of evacuation, they don't care about the other Japanese being evacuated. That's the reason why they are supporting evacuation.

278. The J.A.C.L. is supporting the idea of cooperating with the government and evacuating voluntarily because then they can go in and buy up all the goods in Japanese stores at robbery prices and make a substantial profit.

279. The J.A.C.L. big shots have their fingers in the graft. They are getting something out of the evacuation.

280. People who left California on their own were stranded in Nevada because they were refused gasoline.

281. There will be no evacuation in Stockton. At the last moment the deadline will be extended.

282. Farmers are getting a raw deal because they have to sell their crops at 25 or 40 per cent of the original prices. People are putting the squeeze play on them.

283. There are some Caucasian automobile dealers who bought cars from Japanese at low prices and then turned right around and sold them for a 200 per cent profit.

284. If you bring a car to the camp, the Army will confiscate it.

285. The Army will confiscate anything that is left unsold.

286. In camp, you have to work to earn enough money to pay for your own food and lodging.

287. Everybody who walks by Filipino town will get a neck-trim.

288. The Filipino steal things from the Japanese and then claim that they are being patriotic.
289. Filipinos are attacking Nisei girls.

290. Filipinos keep their hands in their pockets and when a Japanese passes by, they pull out knives and attack them.

291. The Japanese government announced over the radio the names of the stool-pigeons in each of the areas.

292. The Japanese have taken Pearl Harbor.

293. On McDonald Island, some Caucasians came and threatened and shot give Japanese. 22 were huddled up when the police came and saved them.

294. One U.C. girl had both parents killed by Filipinos.

295. In Gilroy, the father and mother were killed and a girl raped by Filipinos.

296. All Japanese store windows on MX El Dorado Street are broken.

297. One Japanese baseball player was knifed by a Filipino.

298. The Nisei are forming a goon squad in Stockton to beat up the Filipinos.

299. Some Filipinos are O.K., but the others are threatening them/if they don't boycott Japanese places.

300. The town Filipinos are encouraging the outbreaks in order to get business for themselves.

301. All Filipinos are out to get the Japanese. Don't go to the streets because they are just waiting for Japanese.

302. All Filipinos are organized for the purpose of beating up Japanese.

303. A group of Filipinos knocked on the door late at night. Mr. Ito looked out through a crack and then didn't open the door.

304. In Imperial Valley, one whole family was wiped out by Filipinos.

305. The Filipinos didn't want Japanese in the canneries where the Japanese have separate unions.

306. There is a man posing as an F.B.I. agent and collecting protection money.

307. The F.B.I. raided a sporting goods store and got 50,000 rounds of ammunition. There was a big play-up in the papers. The man was released the next day.

308. In Monterey, the F.B.I. arrested a family for having a telescope but released them the next day. It was played up big in the papers. It was just a broken down thing in the yard with no lenses.
309. The F.B.I. is taking all kendo officials and leaders according to the book. (Yearbook of the Hakubei Butoku Kai)

310. The F.B.I. is arresting all Buddhist priests.

311. When the F.B.I. raided San Pedro, they went in the middle of the night. They allowed the men to pack one bag and then didn't tell the family where they were going. The families were evacuated 24 hours later and the men could not correspond for months.

312. The F.B.I. looks everywhere at everything—even in the rubbish. They leave the place in a mess.

313. One man was arrested for having radio parts in his house. This was in Sacramento.

314. A Nisei had a short-wave radio set, and the F.B.I. raided the place.

315. Any picture other than portraits are contraband. If any scenery or landscape is showing in the background it is contraband.

316. Golden Gate Exposition pictures are contraband.

317. Pictures of airplanes are contraband.

318. Any knife over 6 inches is contraband.

319. All field glasses are contraband.

320. If one has any kendo equipment, he is sure to be arrested.

321. All documents in Japanese are contraband.

322. All maps are contraband.

323. All insurance policies held by Japanese have been automatically cancelled.

324. One man was arrested by the F.B.I. for staying out after curfew.

325. The F.B.I. placed Buddhist reverends in San Francisco in confinement to their quarters.

326. The Japanese-American News (Nichi Bei) was closed by the F.B.I.

327. No sermons can be delivered in Japanese in the Buddhist church.

328. One cannot travel on buses and trains, except on the Santa Fe where the officials have been kind enough to allow Japanese.

329. Nisei students cannot sell books without a birth certificate.

330. The F.B.I. is stopping all cars on highways. One must always have his birth certificate when travelling.

331. Aliens cannot travel over the San Francisco Bay Bridge unless they are with Nisei.
332. Nisei have to sign in at the sentry box before they can cross the San Francisco Bay Bridge.

333. All insurance men are stool pigeons.

334. Yamaguchi admitted that he was a stool pigeon and said that it was for the good of the community. Besides he gets $100. for everyone he turns in.

335. The Filipinos have a camp outside of Stockton. Since they boycotted the Japanese there is no hotel in Stockton that will take them. They have a hobo camp because there are no other cheap rooms.

336. A Filipino in French Camp who was working for a Japanese for 10 years was threatened by a group of Filipinos. He was told to quit, but he is in hiding.

337. Greyhound buses will not take any Nisei passengers even with a birth certificate.

338. Rocks are thrown against the windows as Japanese ride by on cars.

339. In Stockton Junior College, some of the teachers have changed their attitudes toward the Japanese. Some, like Miss Jones, have suddenly become unfriendly.

340. One man in Monterey was taken by the F.B.I. and then released. It was a false arrest but he lost all his Caucasian friends. They knew him for 12 years, but they said that they couldn't trust a Jap.

341. The Italian landowners come over to the Miyoshi's on rent day with his wife and kid. He is much nicer since the war began.

342. The American Friends Service Committee is helping the Japanese by preparing bundles. They are sending books to camps and are working on student relocation.

343. The U.S.E.S. will aid all Japanese on any matter. They will help. They have been given the responsibility.

344. All Nisei civil service workers in San Francisco were fired.

345. Some prostitutes will no longer take Japanese.

346. Some barber shops will not take Japanese.

347. All Communist literature is contraband.

348. General MacArthur is dead.

349. The war will be over in six months to a year and Japan will win.

350. The entire U.S. fleet has been annihilated.

351. Four or five families have short wave radios and are listening to Japanese broadcasts every night.
352. Japanese troops have landed in northern Australia.

353. We may as well go to the centers because then we can collect indemnities of $10,000 each.

354. All Japanese will be released in six months because of the crop shortage. They cannot get along without Japanese.

355. An Allied convoy en route to Australia was completely destroyed.

356. The Japanese could have taken Pearl Harbor, but they did not because they did not wish to lengthen their lines of communication.

357. 27 Nisei soldiers in a Midwest camp were confined for two weeks for their own protection.

358. All Nisei soldiers were moved out to Midwest camps.

359. Some Nisei were given dishonorable discharges.

360. All Nisei troops had their rifles taken away from them.

361. It is now harder for Nisei to get promotions. They are transferred to different units and their ranks are broken.

362. The Japanese Army will land in Mexico and come up.

363. One Kibei soldier denounced the United States. He didn’t want to stay in the Army. He was beaten up.

364. The American J.A.C.L. is charging people money to give them information.

365. The J.A.C.L. favor Christians over Buddhists, Nisei over Issei, in order to prevent the entire group from being evacuated.

366. The J.A.C.L. is in favor of evacuation.

367. The J.A.C.L. leaders are inu.

368. The J.A.C.L. is not doing anything. They are being pushed around by the government.

369. Mike Masaoka butched up everything at the Sunday (February 22) Tolan Committee Hearings.

370. The J.A.C.L. is charging aliens for information that they could have gotten anywhere for nothing.

371. The J.A.C.L. is planning the evacuation with the officials. They are mixing with the high government leaders.

372. The J.A.C.L. is insisting upon the evacuation.

373. Italians are asking for the evacuation of all Japanese. So are the Germans. They are trying to save themselves.
374. Those who went to Denver were told that they could not stay. Everywhere that they went they were told to move on.

375. Families that went to the "White Zone" are living five or six families to a house.

376. Some people started going through Nevada when their car was stopped and searched. They were thought to be spies.

377. There will be no evacuation until the end of May. The place is not ready.

378. The cooks and the members of the advanced crews are going to be paid $150 a month.

379. One suitcase, one bedroll, and anything else that you can carry is all that you are allowed to take.

380. One has to bring his own plates and eating utensils. Everyone has to buy winter and summer clothes and boots.

381. The evacuation is being rushed because of a fear of a Japanese invasion.

382. All camp mail will be censored.

383. Food is terrible in the centers.

384. Portable chairs and tables must be taken.

385. Everyone must live in rooms with 36 people.

386. Dust is bad in all the camps.

387. People are all getting sick in camp.

388. Sanitation facilities are bad in Santa Anita.

389. Farmers near Stockton are not working in the fields because they do not know whether they are evacuating or not.

390. Gardeners were fired by their bosses.

391. Saburo Kido turned down an offer of $2,000,000 put up by the Friends Service Committee to help the Japanese.

392. Only one carload of rice is allowed in certain given periods; therefore, no more rice is being shipped from Arkansas.

393. If the Japanese farmers do not plant their crops, they will be arrested by the F.B.I.

394. Two Nisei in the Army who are skilled at jiu-jitsu were attacked by some soldiers. They fought back to back and fought off a dozen soldiers.
395. All people with sons in the Army will not be evacuated.

396. No Japanese can travel on a bus or train.

397. Nisei soldiers in the guardhouse were allowed by guards to go to the canteen to buy things. Some were given rifles for rifle practice.
APPENDIX D

Statistics on Voluntary Migration

To record the amount and type of movement, a "change of residence" reporting system was instituted by the Army in Public Proclamation No. 1. From March 2 to March 29, everyone was encouraged to leave voluntarily from the Coastal areas, and all that was necessary was the mailing of a "Change of Residence Notice" to the Provost Marshall of the Fourth Army. Although no specific procedures were set up to cope with infractions of this regulation, there is reason to believe that virtually all Japanese moving during this period complied with the regulation. The statistics below were compiled from the applications to move and the cards indicating arrival at destination.

Between March 2 and 25, 4,070 "Change of Residence" cards were received by the Army, but of these only 1,235 stated that they intended to move outside of Military Area 1. They were simply moving within the area to be evacuated. With the issuance of Public Proclamation 4 on March 27, forbidding migration after March 29, there was a sudden rush to leave. Between March 26 and April 1, the number of applicants to change residence jumped from 1,555 to 7,774—a total of 6,219 in one week and by far the largest increase throughout the period.

Of the 10,312 persons who applied for "Change of Residence" cards between March 12 and June 30, 4,310 stated that they wished to go to the California portion of Military Area 2 and were subsequently evacuated. The following are some of the prospective destinations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>No. Reporting Prospective Move</th>
<th>No. Actually Reporting Arrival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>2,292</td>
<td>1,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>2,138</td>
<td>1,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other states</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>1,017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following are the net totals of people who actually moved and

2. Ibid., p. 107.
3. Only the California portion of Military Area 2 was evacuated.
4. Ibid., p. 107.
5. Ibid., p. 111.
did not return subsequently to evacuate with their families:

### Number of Japanese Migrating Voluntarily from Selected Counties by Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Total Departing</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alameda</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>1,969</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Joaquin</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four state total (Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington)</td>
<td>4,889</td>
<td>2,602</td>
<td>2,287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Japanese Migrants from Evacuated Areas by State of Origin and by Sex and Nativity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nativity and Sex</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Arizona</th>
<th>California</th>
<th>Oregon</th>
<th>Washington</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Migrants</td>
<td>4,889</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4,203</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2,602</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2,269</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2,287</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Born</td>
<td>3,377</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2,888</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1,763</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1,531</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,357</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-Born</td>
<td>1,512</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

6. Ibid., p. 110.
7. Ibid., p. 112.
A. General Theory


B. Theories and Studies of Rumor


C. Case Materials and Popular Literature on Rumor


5. Britt, George, "Rumors (made in Germany)." New York: Council for Democracy, 1942.


1. Next page
1. The number of references containing case materials on rumor is countless, and an exhaustive list would contain hundreds of historical sources. This bibliography lists the limited number of sources that were consulted, although relatively few of these references have provided data used directly in this report.


22½. LeBon, Gustav, *Psych. of Evolution*.


29. Pringel, Henry F., "Don't Believe a Word of It!", *Colliers*, CIX (January 17, 1942), pp. 19, 53-54.


2. The literature on the Japanese in the United States is at once vast and inadequate. Virtually all of the references are polemic, and sober studies, especially from a sociological point of view, are rare. There are literally hundreds of articles in the periodical literature, particularly during the period between 1900 and 1925 and the period following the outbreak of the current war. A small number of these references have been included. An attempt has been made to select those references that will give a well-rounded background for the topics discussed above.
Readers," Christianity and Crisis, May 18, 1942.


20. Fuller, Varden, "The Supply of Agricultural Labor as a Factor in the
Evolution of Farm Organization in California," in U.S. Senate,
Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee of Education

21. Fante, J., "Helen, Thy Beauty Is to Me," Saturday Evening Post, C.C.XIII,
(March 1, 1941), pp. 14 ff.

Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938. Chapter IX.

Sons, 1914.

Revell Company, 1917.

of Sociology, XLIII (May, 1938), pp. 908-16.

26. High, S., "Japanese Saboteurs in our Midst," Readers Digest, XL (Jan-
uary, 1942), pp. 11-15.

(December, 1941), pp. 689-97.

LVIII (December 31, 1941), pp. 164-65.

Stanford University Press, 1932.

30. Iglehart, C., "Citizens Behind Barbed Wires," Nation, CLIV (June 6,

31. An Intelligence Officer, "The Japanese in America: The Problem and the

32. Kawai, George, "An Evacuee Defends Evacuation," Christian Century,
LIX (September 2, 1942), pp. 5.

33. Kimura, Yukiko, "A Sociological Analysis of Some Effects of the War
Situation upon the Alien Japanese in Hawaii," Unpublished manuscript, 1943.
Honolulu.

34. Lasker, Bruno, Filipino Immigration to the Continental United States


37. "Letters"(from camps)," Nation, CLIV (June 6, 1942), p. 666.


42. , "White Peril," Collier's, XCVI (October 19, 1935), pp. 9 ff.


44. , "The Structure of the Japanese Family in Hawaii," American Journal of Sociology, XLVI (September, 1940), pp. 168-76.


49. Murase, Kenny, "Nemesis?", Current Life, II (October, 1941), pp. 3-4.


58. Oakland Tribune, published daily in Oakland, California, December 7, 1941 to May 1, 1942.


64. Rutherford, D.M., "Do We Need the Japanese Farmers?", Pacific Rural Press, February 21, 1942.


70. Stockton Record, published daily in Stockton, California. 1939-1942.


73. Time-Life-Fortune News Bureau, War Comes to the U.S.—December 7, 1941: The First 30 Hours. Chicago, 1943.


