


Molders' and Allied Workers Union; Int'l.

Glory and Despair

of
**CHALLENGE
AND
CHANGE**



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THE MOLDERS

by JAMES E. CEBULA, Ph.D.

The
GLORY and DESPAIR
of
CHALLENGE and CHANGE:
A History of the Molders Union.


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University of Cincinnati

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Allied Workers Union



*For my mother
who labored in
the garment shops
and my father
who toiled in the
coal mines*

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The cooperation of all the staff at the International Molders and Allied Workers Union headquarters made the job enjoyable. The desire of Anton Trizna and Carl Studenroth to have an honest historical statement made research and writing much easier and their candidness in numerous interviews was a great help. International Secretary William Cates freely provided membership data, an important report he had prepared, and offered incisive comments about the more recent history of the Union.

The Research and Education Department was intimately involved in the project from start to finish. Director James Wolfe urged me to undertake the task, made astute editorial observations throughout the project, read the entire manuscript in its earliest and final stages, offered thoughtful criticism, and kept me from making some egregious mistakes. John Bruning provided excellent editorial work on the final draft and did the photographic layout. His professionalism made the book a better one. Mrs. Stella Jennings typed most of the manuscript. The help of these three people proved invaluable.

Sally Neely, Doris Sturzenburger, and Harriete Wolffe of the University of Cincinnati libraries all kindly helped track down sources not available in Cincinnati. My wife Maria read the entire manuscript and made helpful stylistic suggestions. My daughters, Anne and Judy, unselfishly did things on their own so that "daddy could write."

Finally, I alone bear the responsibility for any shortcomings of the book although all of the above people made the job easier, more rewarding, and instructive.

James E. Cebula

INTRODUCTION

“Men make history and not the other way 'round. In periods where there is no leadership, society stands still. Progress occurs when courageous, skillful leaders seize the opportunity to change things for the better.”

— President Harry S. Truman

This history of the molders and the Molders Union is a report of the never ending battle of leaders and members to change things for the better. It begins with the struggle of journeymen molders' efforts to maintain job standards commensurate with their skills, and ends with the question, — “Where do we go from here?”

Spanning more than 200 years of American history, it moves from the days when the craftsman molded his “work of art” in sand, to date, as modern foundries take the place of obsolete shops; and intricate, computerized machines take the place of men.

Long before the Revolutionary War, American “iron mongers” had a tough time even though the Colonies ranked 7th in production of iron. The raw or pig iron was welcome as an export to Mother England, but it was against the law for finished products to be manufactured in the Colonies. Although foundries did operate they were illegal, and the owners were iron and steel “bootleggers.”

No doubt this injustice caused seven foundrymen to be signers of the Declaration of Independence. They were:

Charles Carroll, Maryland

George Ross, Pennsylvania

Stephen Hopkins, Rhode Island

James Smith, Pennsylvania

Philip Livingston, New York

George Taylor, Pennsylvania

James Wilson, Pennsylvania

All were prominent businessmen at the time of the signing, but George Taylor was the only journeyman molder. He came to the colonies as an “indentured servant” from Ireland and took over the foundry by marrying the boss' widow following the latter's death.

Technological CHANGE has always been difficult for workers to accept. A journeyman reaches his position only after years of apprenticeship but his job can be made insignificant or obsolete overnight by a machine. But technological change is the key to American industrial progress, and without it our standard of living would be considerably lower.

The history of the Labor Movement throughout the world since the Industrial Revolution has been a struggle to secure for workers a better life as their share from technology. Each new improvement brings disruption in the affected industry

and often, loss of jobs. It is of little consolation to know that job opportunities are growing in areas where displaced workers are not competent.

One of the evils of the American economic system is instability. Workers and their families are never free from the fear of unemployment, for economic recessions and depressions hit with disgusting regularity. Through their Union, molders attempt to bolster their incomes by collective bargaining, and provide for pleasurable leisure and retirement.

In the 19th Century, Molders attempted to maintain their craft with great success because employers were small and highly competitive. Leaders fought for a time against the incursion of machines, but gradually accommodated themselves to CHANGE. Machine molders and coremakers were merged into the organization but not without the bitter opposition of conservative members. Early efforts to bring all foundry workers into the Union were fought off until well into the first third of the 20th Century.

Fortunately, presidents with unusual leadership skills were elected periodically, who were able to convince the membership that the Union should accommodate structurally to industrial CHANGE. It is not an accident that the name of the Union has been CHANGED 8 times in our history.

- 1859 — National Union of Iron Moulders
- 1861 — Iron Moulders Union of America
- 1863 — Iron Moulders International Union
- 1866 — Iron Molders International Cooperative and Protective Union
- 1870 — Iron Molders Union of North America
- 1907 — International Molders Union of North America
- 1934 — International Molders and Foundry Workers Union
- 1961 — International Molders and Allied Workers Union

In 1968, President William Lazzerini, who had recommended vast changes in structure and administration approved by the 1961 Convention, was deeply engrossed in the process of merger. His immediate concern was the encouragement of merger of small locals into larger centralized unions. He directed the preparation of a pamphlet, "CHANGING TIMES — CHANGING TECHNIQUES," which was printed in the December, 1968 edition of the *Journal*.

Following his death, Presidents Draper Doyal and Anton J. Trizna continued the process, combining Conference Boards (reducing the number from 20 to 13), and beginning the development of larger Districts under responsible leaders.

We will elect our 17th President at the 1976 Convention. This alone is unique, for although we are the oldest international union in America, on the average, presidents serve less than seven years. Through democratic trade unionism the Molders have been able to prosper because we never lost sight of the fact that service to the members is the prime goal. This, coupled with the flexibility that recognizes CHANGE in structure must accompany change in industrial technology, has enabled us to survive.


What about future CHANGE? The 1976 Convention and future leaders will make such decisions. We wager the best interests of the membership will be served.

JAMES E. WOLFE
DIRECTOR – RESEARCH AND
EDUCATION

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NOTE: Cover illustration shows Pittsburgh, Pa., Molders leading a trade union sympathy parade for the steel workers on June 17, 1882. *From Harper's Weekly, XXVI, July 1, 1882, p. 409*



Ancient Egyptian molding operation. Molding is one of civilized man's oldest skills. *Courtesy of Foundry Magazine.*

I

FOUNDING A UNION

“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times. . . .” With this contradiction Charles Dickens, the nineteenth century English novelist, began his *A Tale of Two Cities*. He wrote during an era in which workers throughout the industrializing world were beginning to feel the effects of changes in the organization of their work and the distribution of their work product. Skilled craftsmen, whose work approached that of an artist, more and more found themselves pressed to increase production, take cuts in wages, and experience the pangs of unemployment. For the workers, it was increasingly the worst of times.

On the other hand, profits soared as wealth gravitated into the hands of the few. In the iron industry, small foundries gradually gave way to large scale operations. By 1860 places like the Giles Filley Works in St. Louis, the Miles Greenwood Shop in Cincinnati, and the Baldwin Locomotive Company in Philadelphia employed several hundred workers each. Sheer size brought about impersonality. Pressure for returns on large scale investments and consumer demands for products forced changes in the organization of work to boost production. The operation of plants was increasingly turned over to specialist managers. Production rose and profits grew. For the owners, it was increasingly the best of times.

The United States was experiencing the industrial revolution. Factory districts by the 1850's had spread from New England into the Middle Atlantic states, the Midwest, and even into parts of the South. New inventions, plentiful labor, abundant capital, mass production techniques, a large supply of natural resources, and the drive for profits all combined to produce lusty economic growth and development. Throughout, there was a movement towards larger scale production and specialization of activity. The dehumanizing impact that the process had on the workers led to the decisions to organize and establish trade unions.

The decade of the 1820's witnessed a gradual growth in manufacturing in the northeastern part of the country. Beginning in the 1830's, the pace and scope of industrialization accelerated and expanded. In spite of periodic recessions, such as those of 1839-1843 and 1856-1859, manufacturing maintained an upward growth spiral until the Civil War. In addition to growth, industrial development in the United States was more and more characterized by the appearance of standardized methods of production geared to large scale output, regional specialization of function, and trade between the various regions. In the process, the demand for both consumer and producer goods was becoming national in scope.

During the decades prior to the Civil War, the iron industry began to reflect the above picture. Iron foundries in the United States were few and far apart until the 1830's. The foundries were small operations with the molder being his own employer. This changed. By the 1840's pig iron production centered in Pennsylvania, but the numerous products derived from it were scattered. Massachusetts produced most of the iron forgings. New York and Pennsylvania made the bulk of the iron castings. The leading factory-built consumer product in the 1840-1860 era was the stove. While most of the stove production centered in Troy and Albany, New York; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the size and heft of the product still necessitated regional production. The Burton Range Company in Cincinnati and the Filley Stove Works in St. Louis began serving the growing Ohio-Mississippi river basin.¹

In 1860 the iron industry was the sixth most important one in the nation, and the stove the leading consumer item. In spite of the seminal role played by foundries and molders in the national economy, wages were low, hours were long, and the week's earnings were often not determined until the costs of tools and damaged patterns were deducted. Incredibly, payment often came in the form of store goods. In some places, workers were fined for coming in late but received no compensation for overtime. It became common for management to cut wages according to the dictates of the market and the supply of labor. The molders either accepted the wage cuts and conditions, or they gave up their jobs. Thus, workers in a key industry had no rights over the conditions of employment and could not count on a stable wage structure.²

The iron molding industry was in its infancy, and the management techniques being developed failed to take into account the worker. The times required an approach different from the passing era when the individual negotiated directly with the owner. Self defense was required and group organization became the technique.

Late in 1833 the Philadelphia Trades' Union was organized. The iron molders there were among the workers who joined the union of some fifty different groups of crafts. One incident in the brief history of this organization indicates that the molders were a weak group. In April 1836, the central body called for donations from the various trades. The contributions ranged from 300 dollars to the 10 dollars tendered by the molders.

In this same period, the molders and foundry workers established trade associations in Albany, Troy, and Schenectady, New York (1835); and in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (1836). Local in scope, these organizations grew out of the economic hard times that set in with the inflationary spiral of 1834. They represented a false start in trade union organization, and soon disappeared as the depression of 1837 set in and the strike was declared illegal.³

By the mid 1840's, the boom and bust cycle began again. A series of strikes occurred among iron workers in 1843-1844. Events settled down with the Mexican War, but another depression started in 1847. In the fall of that year, the Cincinnati

stove plate molders used the strike to resist a cut in wages. With labor plentiful and the market down, the strike failed.

The Cincinnati molders developed an alternative approach to securing a decent living. They formed a production cooperative, the Journeymen Moulders Union Foundry, and elected a five man board of directors, a foreman, and a business agent. Issuing stock at 25 dollars a share, they raised 2,100 dollars, purchased some land eight miles down river, and acquired patterns, flasks, tools, and a steam engine. With 500 dollars remaining, they had a down payment for a building. In August 1848, they began work. The business agent opened a store for distribution of their product in Cincinnati. The journeymen drew minimal wages, and the profits accumulated as capital for the cooperative. At the end of a year, the investment had more than doubled in value.⁴


The same pattern developed in Pittsburgh in 1849 when the iron masters cut wages. The workers went out on strike. After two months, to break the strike, the employers began importing immigrant workers. With the workers' strike fund exhausted, the work stoppage was soon broken. In the meantime, several groups of molders with the necessary capital opened cooperatives in Wheeling, West Virginia; Steubenville, Ohio; and Sharon, Pennsylvania. The Steubenville facility was partly worker owned and partly owned by people in the small city who wanted a foundry located there as an investment. Most of the remaining Pittsburgh workers, however, returned to work at the reduced wages originally offered.⁵

The cooperatives were another short term alternative to accepting the dictates of management. For numerous reasons, including shortages of capital and mismanagement, these early efforts dwindled into partnerships, individually owned foundries, or failed completely.

Another innovation emerged in New York City when the Friendly Society of Iron Moulders of America was formed in June 1849. Patterned after the English society, they organized to provide sick and death benefits through a mutual insurance fund. Within a year the Society added out-of-work benefits and the use of the strike. They struck against individual employers rather than the industry of the area. Workers on strike were supported by those still on the job.⁶

The economy settled down by 1851, and strikes diminished. Within a few years, however, a boom developed. Responding, early in 1853, molders in Philadelphia organized the Journeymen Iron Molders' Association to increase wages and improve working conditions. The beneficial features of the now defunct Friendly Society were abandoned. The new group used the strike against all the foundries in the locality and negotiated with representatives of a loosely organized employers' association.⁷

Through this process Philadelphia became the best paying locality in the country for molders. Working conditions were good. Wages were in cash on a weekly basis; the employers furnished the tools; apprentices were few; and helpers, or "bucks" as they were termed, were not allowed. Business boomed with Philadelphia stoves being shipped as far away as California.⁸



Signed in 1863 by William Sylvis, this beautiful charter of affiliation still hangs in the office of Local 28, Toronto, one of only two locals which have been in continuous operation since 1859. (The other is Quincy, Illinois, Local 44.) Photo courtesy of Edward C. Withames.

In Cincinnati, also in 1853, the Moulders' Association was formed for "the promotion of fraternity among fellow craftsmen and their protection as mechanics." One founder of the group reminisced that they did not hesitate to use "a strong arm" for higher wages and better working conditions. By 1854 both the Philadelphia and Cincinnati associations disappeared when prosperity briefly returned.⁹

The economy, however, again turned to bust; wholesale wage cuts and layoffs were initiated on May 16, 1855. Joseph A. Barford, "the father of No. 1," recalled that

The burden became unbearable. . . . I threw my rammer into the sand heap and with a terrible oath, swore I would not make another mold at such prices. I was the first man to do this. . . . James Horn was my partner that day, and I asked him if he would stay with me. He said, yes; I then went to every man in the shop and all but two agreed to make common cause.

Barford and his colleagues at the Liebrant and McDowell Foundry contacted workers in the other shops urging them to cooperate in a strike to force an end to wage cutbacks. All but one of the city's seven stove and hollow-ware shops were closed for ten weeks. The owners capitulated.¹⁰

In the midst of the strike, the molders turned the rump organization into a permanent union. On June 16, 1855, 97 charter members signed the constitution and by-laws of the Journeymen Stove and Hollow-Ware Moulders' Union of Philadelphia. The document proposed to secure "the elevation of the position, the maintenance of the interest of the Craft, the regulation of prices (wages) and all other things appertaining to the Foundry business, in which the molders under its jurisdiction may be involved."¹¹

The Philadelphia constitution's emphasis on conditions of work was of utmost importance. A number of management changes in the organization of work were occurring at the time. In the stove industry, instead of having the journeyman mold all the different pieces of the stove, the technique of assigning one piece to different molders was instituted. When journeymen were laid off, those remaining hired helpers, with five per journeyman being common in the industry. This sped up the process of production and increased wages as molders were paid by piece rates. In time the "bucks," although only partially trained, went to work elsewhere as journeymen, thus greatly expanding the supply of labor. In many shops, the molders were required to rent their floor space. Management also introduced a contract requiring journeymen to stay with the employer for one full year. A third of the wages were withheld until the year concluded. Often foundries would be in operation eight or nine months. During the slack time, the molders could not leave; if they did, they forfeited the wages withheld.¹²

The erratic economy, combined with the above working conditions, led to a number of additional molders' unions being established in the mid and late 1850's. Imitating the Philadelphia union, in 1855 an organization was founded in Reading, Pennsylvania. A secret Dayton, Ohio, group openly organized in 1857, and brass molders in Chicago organized in the same year. After meeting

secretly for a year, the Troy, New York, Molders' Union was established in April of 1858. By mid 1859 molders' unions also existed in Cincinnati, Ohio; Louisville, Kentucky; St. Louis, Missouri; Buffalo, Albany, Utica, Peekskill and Port Chester, New York; Providence, Rhode Island; Worcester, Massachusetts; Jersey City, New Jersey; Stamford, Connecticut; Wilmington, Delaware; Baltimore, Maryland and in several Canadian cities.¹³

These organizations grew out of the depression which deepened after the panic of 1857. As wages were cut, molders struck to maintain previous rates. At Albany, in 1859, management grouped together to resist. They sent out a circular to foundries in other cities, urging the creation of a "founders' league" in order to break the spreading strikes by collectively importing molders from Europe. The idea failed, primarily because of the refusal of the Philadelphia foundry owners to go along.¹⁴

The molders also began communicating with each other. The Troy, New York, union voted to accept paid-up active members from the Philadelphia union. Contributions from financially healthy unions were made to striking molders in other cities. The Buffalo union patterned its constitution after the Philadelphia document.

During the spring of 1858, William H. Sylvis succeeded in getting his Philadelphia union to engage in active correspondence with other molders' unions. By December a committee, with Sylvis as secretary, was appointed to draft and circulate a letter urging a general convention. Receiving a number of favorable replies in June, the committee called for a meeting to exchange views in Philadelphia on July 5, 1859.

After three days of deliberation, the convention of 32 delegates from twelve unions set up a loose national federation with little more than advisory functions. In the provisional constitution, the National Union was given original jurisdiction in "matters pertaining to the fellowship of the craft" and was to be the final arbiter of "all matters of general importance to the welfare of the different unions. . . ." The Union could also "determine the customs and usages in regard to all matters pertaining to craft." A small tax was levied to support the new organization. The National Union could also expell local unions for not abiding by the "laws and decisions." The weak character of the proposed Union showed through in the important area of strike support. The executive committee was to "advise the various Local Unions of the fact and recommend to Local Unions what assistance to render." Before adjourning to meet again in six months at Albany, New York, the delegates resolved to raise money to support the molders on strike in that city and pledged to "never cease our efforts until our Albany brethren obtain their just rights."¹⁵

Reflecting on these events, Sylvis noted that "a start was made, and (some) men began to think for the first time in their lives. Reflection developed new ideas, and these ideas began to assume definite form."¹⁶

In committing themselves to win the Albany strike and to meet in the same city six months later, the Philadelphia delegates put their new organization to




WILLIAM H. SYLVIS
1828-1869

the test. The Albany strike gave molders throughout the country a cause. It provided an opportunity to demonstrate solidarity. They were up to the task, and successfully financed the Albany strike. The new technique of raising money nationally for local strikes provided the delegates at Albany with the necessary momentum to formally organize as a National Union.

Sylvis again stood in the forefront, when on the second day of the convention (January 11, 1860), he moved “that this convention does now resolve itself into a National Union. . . .” The motion was approved, and the provisional constitution of 1859 was adopted, with some minor amendments. In order to keep the molders around the country informed, the convention voted to publish a quarterly report.¹⁷

The momentum of the Albany convention continued during 1860. Twenty-six new locals were organized, making a total of 44 at year’s end. Perhaps the success of the Albany strike bred too much optimism. Molders throughout the country believed they had the weapon to end injustices in the workplace, and strikes were called, some over issues that would normally have been tolerated. The funds of the National Union were taxed to the verge of bankruptcy. Receipts for the year were 6,125.06 dollars, of which all but 134.32 dollars were used for strike benefits. Several strikes could not be supported at all because of lack of funds. The infant Union was in a precarious condition when the Cincinnati meeting convened on January 8, 1861.¹⁸



A huge pit mold operation. Workers cast a cylinder for a ship engine at the Etna Works, New York City, February 3, 1866. The cylinder is 18 tons and was used in a 1 million, 300,000 pound ship engine. *Sketch from Harper’s Weekly, X, March 3, 1866 p. 141.*

The main work of this convention was fine tuning of the constitution in light of the past year. Local unions were now given chronological numbers, and the relationship of the National Union to the local was clarified by establishing the constitutional term for the locals as the "subordinate unions." Of vast importance was the realization that the strike weapon would have to be used with discretion. The body adopted a resolution recommending that the locals hold off on striking "until every other remedy has been tried and failed." Also for the first time, delegates from Canadian locals (Quebec, Toronto, Hamilton, and Brantford) were seated.¹⁹

While the Molders demonstrated an international character, the United States was on the verge of civil war. The dogs of war brought havoc to the economy; banks suspended gold payments; and industrial and commercial failures multiplied, with more than 12,000 firms closed. Huge amounts of northern capital invested in the South was lost. During the business panic, unemployment grew, and unilateral wage cuts continued. Jobs for molders were scarcer than they had been in 1860. Foundries which stayed in operation during the panic took advantage of the situation to destroy the molders' unions. In Troy, New York, after a disastrous strike, the employers successfully compelled molders to sign a statement reading,

We desire your service at moulding . . . upon the following only . . . you will authorize us to publish your name, as one of those molders that have permanently and unconditionally withdrawn from the so called Iron Molders Union of this city.

It was one of the earliest "yellow dog" contracts. There and elsewhere, the buck and contract systems were restored. Again labor became an easily controllable cost of production.²⁰

In addition to the union busting, hundreds of members enlisted in the army. The combined effect was that most local unions ceased to operate. Some adjourned for six months or a year, others to meet at the call of the president. Generally from mid 1861 through 1862, with the exceptions of Philadelphia, Albany and St. Louis, most local unions in the United States ceased functioning.²¹

The National Union, as a working organization, lay virtually destroyed. By mid 1861 the officers no longer functioned. The annual convention for 1862 was not called. The president fled the country to Canada, the treasurer died in the war, and the secretary entered Louisville, Kentucky politics. William Sylvus later bitterly observed:

*The almost total demoralization and destruction of the organization . . . not so much the result of these events as the utter inability, or something worse, of those intrusted with the management of our affairs for the two years succeeding the Cincinnati Convention.*²²

As the war proceeded, business and the economy boomed with the government's demand for both men and manufactures. Along with profits, prices soared, and the cost of living sky-rocketed. Wages during 1862 remained at a standstill. Molders around the country were rudderless and unable to act to promote their interests.

The impotence of local unions was demonstrated in the spring of 1862 when No. 1 in Philadelphia began communication with the iron founders in that city to get wage adjustments to keep up with inflation. The owners delayed negotiations several times, and in the process, inflation continued to eat away real income. The year ended with wages remaining the same.

Sylvis, who began the communications for No. 1, had organized a militia company of Philadelphia molders which was called to duty that fall. After taking part in a minor campaign the militiamen returned home. Disgruntled by the inaction of the local union, Sylvis stood determined to reactivate the National Union.²³

Sylvis began the reorganization in much the same way he had spearheaded the founding of the National Union – by corresponding with the active local unions. He urged the holding of a national convention. Only fifteen locals expressed a desire to reorganize. The national officers of record were not interested, and the local unions had trouble finding delegates; but twenty-one representatives from fifteen cities convened in Pittsburgh on January 6, 1863. The broken Union had reached a crisis and was beginning to deal with it.

Recognized as the outstanding leader of the tattered organization, Sylvis was unanimously elected president. It was a frayed prize. He received no salary since the Union had few members, no funds, and little authority among the local unions.

At the convention, Sylvis swiftly appointed committees and presided over the rewriting of the constitution. The new document reflected recognition of the chaos the previous structure had helped to produce. The officers of the newly christened Iron Moulders' International Union were given definite and positive powers. Charters to the subordinate unions would come from the International Union. The president or his deputy could "visit subordinate unions . . . and require a compliance with the laws, rules and usages of this union." A relatively sound revenue base was established. It consisted of a charter fee for new locals, a fee for union cards, and annual dues from each member payable by the local union according to a prescribed quota of members. The International Union had the authority to assess the locals for special funds, but these were not to exceed two percent of wages.

The new constitution provided a framework with the potential to revitalize the central Union during this time of chaos. The situation, however, also required a determination to revitalize the local unions and make the organization work. Sylvis, in addition to his organizing ability and visionary ideas, had this determination.

Making the most of a vaguely worded convention resolution which gave the president discretionary authority to go out and organize but did not provide the funds, Sylvis on January 20, 1863 mailed an announcement of his intention to visit the unions. With a 100 dollar gift from No. 1, his Philadelphia local, and promises of funds from several other locals, he began a four month tour through more than a hundred molding centers.

He traveled through central and western Pennsylvania, the Ohio Valley, down to St. Louis, back through Illinois, across to Detroit and northern Ohio, into Ottawa, Canada, and down to Erie, Buffalo, Rochester, and home. Plagued by ill health and poverty, the organizing trip nearly ended numerous times. At one point, he had to nurse himself back to health; often he was barred by hostile employers and scorned by cynical workmen. He gave the appearance of a molder on the tramp as he begged rides from engineers in his molten pocked coat and asked directions to the nearest foundry.²⁴

Speaking to individual workers, union meetings, or mass meetings of unorganized journeymen, he explained simply the principles of trade unionism. Describing the conflicts between capital and labor, he showed how through organization and solidarity the conflicts could be minimized. He urged inter-union fraternalism and the reading of labor newspapers such as *Fincher's Trades Review*, for which he sold subscriptions. He cautioned against unnecessary strikes, which he saw as destructive, but counseled toughness against those employers who would strip labor of its rights. Appealing to his listeners for working class community, he implored them not to let personal, political, religious, or ethnic differences divide them. At the end of each meeting, the pledge cards were circulated, and a local union was on the way to being organized or reorganized. The hat was then usually passed to finance Sylvis' work as he headed to the next town or city.²⁵

Running an advertisement in *Fincher's Trades Review* notifying molders of his willingness to help organize local unions, Sylvis received numerous requests for visits. In 1863 he made two additional trips, one through upstate New York and western Pennsylvania, a second into the Ohio Valley and the Midwest, with Cincinnati as his headquarters, and back through Canada and New England. In early December, he was home in Philadelphia, as his biographer pointed out, "worn out but content, preparing his reports and programs for the impending national convention at Buffalo in early January."²⁶

***Growth of The International Iron Molders' Union
in the Sylvis Era**

Year	Unions	Membership
1859	12	700
1860	18	1,000
1861	44	3,000
1863	15	2,000
1864	61	3,500
1865	122	6,788
1866	111	7,366
1867	149	8,615
1868	113	4,885

*Convention years only

Source: Jonathan P. Grossman, *William Sylvis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp 68-84; Frank T. Stockton, *International Molders' Union of North America* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1921), p 23.

The technique of using the professional organizer to build a union had been spawned. In a year Sylvis, the organizer, had strengthened the fifteen unions represented at Pittsburgh, revitalized eleven unions which existed in name only, reorganized sixteen locals that had disappeared in 1861, and issued charters to eighteen new unions. By the opening of the 1864 Buffalo convention, the International could claim 61 active local unions. Sylvis described the importance of the organizer when he boasted: "From a mere pigmy our union has become a giant."²⁷

Any consideration of the formative years of the International Union requires attention to what Jonathan Grossman termed "The Silent Revolution." As an administrator, Sylvis stretched the constitution to the limits in order to deal with the unanticipated situation. In the process, he pioneered and established numerous precedents in the field of labor union administration.

The revised constitution of 1863, with its specified powers for national officers and control of local union charters, enabled Sylvis to assert national leadership to control the diverse directions and positions of local groups. The new charters he granted clearly subordinated the new unions to the International constitution. He repeatedly set aside local actions which he believed unconstitutional. He appointed deputy presidents although the office was "not known to law," and levied illegal monetary assessments. "He was," as Grossman observed,

*willing to submit to regular elections, but once elected he wanted almost unlimited discretionary powers. If the delegates did not like his views, let them refuse to re-elect him. He would rather be fired than be a figurehead.*²⁸

Upon assuming the presidency, Sylvis persistently emphasized the need for revenue to meet the expenses of the expanding organization. The dues, charter, and card revenue system established at Pittsburgh was only partly adequate when compared to needs. Sylvis invoked the emergency assessments clause again and again. In the face of protests he brought the revenue issue before the 1864 convention and was able to get a five percent pro-rata tax on September and October wages. At the next convention, however, the delegates voted to return to the fixed dues procedure. Revenues fell in 1865, and during the "great lockout of 1866," Sylvis, illegally this time, assessed the wages of April and June at five percent. Confronted by protest, he ordered expulsion of those who refused to pay. In the following year, the convention approved a 50 cent monthly dues structure and gave the president power to levy a five percent pro-rata tax, but did so by a greatly divided vote. The structure was there to raise adequate money, but 1867 was a depression year, and when the levy was invoked few could pay it. At the end of 1867, the treasury was empty and debts mounted. The July, 1868 convention sought to cut costs, and some delegates even wanted to repudiate the debts. The latter, Sylvis fought vehemently, arguing that the honor of the labor movement was at stake. Through special taxes and economies, the debt was being repaid, and by 1870 the Union had clearly survived the financial chaos. An American labor union had proved itself financially responsible.²⁹

The idea of strike relief from the central Union was established at the first convention. Sylvis, by insisting on adequate revenue, made the principle a practice to be counted upon. When in 1866 the treasurer tried to restrict the use of funds, Sylvis created the office of deputy treasurer and empowered him to call directly on local unions for strike support funds. He later defended himself by saying swift action was essential to win the strike. When the effects of the 1866 national lockout and the depression of 1867 were felt by the treasury, strike payments decreased considerably. By February 1868, the Union could not legitimize strikes and it would be years before strike payments would be much more than tokens.

The financial condition of the Union undoubtedly influenced thinking about sanctioning strikes. Another factor, with long term implications, was the belief that although a valuable weapon, the strike was also wasteful. Its real value, Sylvis believed, was the threat and realization by management that the Union would carry it out to a successful conclusion.

Sylvis worked hard to get coordinated effective strike sanctioning machinery. In 1865 the constitution was amended requiring sealed lists of grievances to be forwarded to the president and then forwarded to the local unions for a vote. Support required a two-thirds majority. Only after this cooling off period would the strike be sanctioned and strike payments forwarded. In 1866 the crafty president explained that the measure was working well and proposed that the International officers direct sanctioned strikes to guarantee that, once begun, the strikes were vigorously prosecuted to insure victory.³⁰

When the combined impact of the "Great Lockout of 1866," the strikes, and the unemployment of 1867 were assessed, it appeared that the International Union would never recover. President Sylvis began to move away from trade unionism to social and economic reform. The lockout led him to encourage the creation of cooperative foundries, an idea popular among reformers of that day. He directly helped found two cooperatives in Troy and Albany during a strike. Others followed in the South, the Midwest, as well as the East. Disillusioned with the excessive expense of strikes, Sylvis, who over the years approved of the cooperative movement, was searching for a new weapon to replace the strike. Ultimately, he came to believe the cooperatives would make capitalists out of the workers and workers out of the capitalists. It would establish the principle that "no man has the right to live who does not produce what he consumes."³¹

In practical terms, the cooperative foundries would provide jobs and incomes for unemployed molders. If employers failed to negotiate, the theory went, they would be destroyed by the workers' co-op. Early in 1868, eight local cooperative foundries were in operation, four were ready to open, and twenty were on the drawing boards.

The fledgling success of the local cooperatives led Sylvis to propose a model foundry controlled by the International Union. When a particularly bitter strike developed in Pittsburgh in the summer of 1867, Sylvis used the *Journal* to announce his intention to create the first International Union Cooperative

Foundry. A governing board was established, a site ideally chosen along a railroad line, ground broken, and a state charter secured. In May of 1868, the operation opened. The facility was successful, and the 1868 Toronto convention approved the creation of a fund to help finance the creation of foundries wherever the board of directors deemed it necessary. The phrase, “protective and co-operative” was added to the Union’s name.

Financially the Pittsburgh experiment floundered. Stock sales only covered two-thirds of the 15,000 dollar cost, and working capital was urgently needed. To provide these needs, Sylvis planned to invest the International Union’s money; but creditors closed in, and Sylvis could not raise the money in time. The equipment was sold. Still, Sylvis did not give up on this new weapon. Using the 1868 convention resolution, he invested International funds in the cooperative fund in the form of United States bonds, and induced individuals with strike pay owed them to transfer the money to the fund. The Pittsburgh failure and Sylvis’ death in July, 1869, did however put an end to the experiment. By 1870 the Union had soured on the idea. Symbolically, “co-operative” was deleted from the official title.³²


Another extremely important area where Sylvis had a great impact on the direction of the Molders Union, and the movement in general, was the labor press and labor education. At the 1860 convention, he made a strong case for the creation of a labor journal, and the delegates agreed to publish a quarterly report from the local unions and the national office. Upon assuming the presidency in 1863, among the first things revived was the report. At the next convention, he prevailed upon the delegates to turn the quarterly into a monthly journal devoted to the interest of molders. A year later, Sylvis assumed the editorship in order to make it “a useful and interesting document.”³³

The *Journal* was essential to Sylvis on at least two accounts. He believed the reports from the local unions “one of the most beautiful and beneficial features in our whole system.” These reports told molders around the country about job opportunities, wages, strikes, and strikebreakers on the move. In this same vein, the quarterly reports, and later the *Journal*, served to inform Union members of the activity of the central Union and issues of importance to them. It was a crucial communications link for labor in an industry which by the 1860’s had become national in scope.

Secondly, the *Journal* was important to Sylvis for idealistic reasons. Self-educated and barely literate until he was thirty years old, Sylvis held education in great esteem. He envisioned the *Journal* as a vehicle to introduce workers to the delights and benefits of education. He hoped education would “elevate labor.” Sylvis said it

enables a mechanic to advance more by head-work than hand-work. It gives him a quicker appreciation of his art . . . it furnishes ideas that often culminate in valuable improvements and inventions. . . .

He believed education prepared people to think for themselves and adjust to the changing current of the times.³⁴



Sketch of an early foundry, circa 1896. *Molders' Journal*.

These ideas prompted Sylvis to go before the 1866 convention and ask for the authority to broadly expand the *Journal*. After a heated debate, no decision was made. Returning to Philadelphia he began publishing the “big *Journal*” as it was termed. It contained the usual reports from the local unions, editorial comment, and messages from the president, but it also had poetry, serialized novels, political commentary, information about other unions, household hints, clothing designs, and historical essays. It was a magazine of information and opinion designed to elevate the consciousness of the worker as well as a publication that the trade unionist could rely upon.³⁵

Sylvis by acting without approval opened himself to condemnation. At the Boston convention in 1867, in the midst of financial problems for the Union, he was instructed to cease publication of the enlarged publication and return to the old smaller format. A year later, he tried to get permission to publish a German edition, but the convention called for a referendum on the whole question of whether there should be any *Journal*. In the depressed economic times of 1868, the members voted to abandon it completely. On this score, Sylvis was vindicated when in 1870, after an eighteen month hiatus, the *Journal* appeared again with the sanction of the membership.³⁶

During the Sylvis era, the Molders were the pre-eminent trade union in America. Technology, management’s organizational innovations, the limitations of craft organization, and lesser leadership would change that in time. Sylvis with unusual foresight saw these shortcomings, and near the end of his life, began to devote energy to inter-union cooperation and organizing labor for political action. He was one of the founders of the National Labor Union, and at his death in July 1869, at age forty-one, was its president.

As a leader of the National Labor Union, he championed women’s rights and the rights of blacks. A creature of his times on both of these issues, his perspective was bound by the usual prejudices. But as a practical organizer, he realized both women and blacks were increasingly part of the industrial labor force. He would rather have them for him than against him. In an 1867 debate in which he supported admission of blacks to the National Labor Union he warned: “The negro [sic.] will take possession of the shops if we (the labor movement) do not take possession of the negro [sic.]”³⁷ As one of labor’s earliest lobbyists, he helped obtain an eight hour law for federal government employees, including molders in the navy yards. At the 1867 National Labor Union convention, he introduced a resolution calling for a Department of Labor, an idea which he probably originated. Innovative and prophetic, Sylvis and the Molders Union were designers of much that would come in the American labor movement.

In the brief period from 1855 to 1869, the Molders went through four stages of development. They began with local unionism and evolved out of necessity into a loose federation with little power. Recognizing their limited impact, they consolidated power into a centralized International Union. When the weakness of this structure began to show, the Union began the long journey to strong inter-union consolidation which eventually came in the form of the American Federation of Labor.

II

THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY

In general, the experience of the Molders Union during the late 1860's and the 1870's differed little from that of the other labor unions. The business depression of 1873-1879 stimulated a concerted effort by employers to free themselves of trade union restrictions. The blacklist, lockout, and legal prosecution became standard management tools to destroy the unions. These tactics proved quite effective and as one scholar noted, it became "difficult to find earnest and active members who were willing to serve on committees." Given this situation, secret organizations, such as the Noble Order of the Knights of Labor, the Sovereigns of Industry, and the Molly Maguires were developed. The times also gave rise to numerous socialist groups who sought a complete restructuring of the American economic system. Other workers, following the National Labor Union model, turned to political parties. The largest of these to appear in the period was the Greenback-Labor Party.¹

The Molders managed to survive the crisis intact, but they were greatly weakened. Denied the leadership of Sylvis, as a result of his untimely death, the Union appeared powerless to combat wage reductions and the other tactics of management. To halt the decline in membership, the 1868 convention reduced the annual dues. This was done in the face of an organizational debt of more than 35,000 dollars. The situation nevertheless continued to deteriorate. When the convention of 1870 opened in Philadelphia, the rank and file had dwindled from the high point of 8,500 in 1867 to 3,860 members.

In order to cope with the declining membership, the convention voted to expand the Union's services. As early as 1861, the leadership had discussed the question of creating a benevolent program, but set it aside in lieu of more pressing issues. In 1864, delegates at the annual convention voted down a resolution to establish "a national benefit feature." But in 1870, as a result of complaints by members who had moved from place to place but could not transfer local beneficiary programs, and because of the need to make the Union more attractive, the convention established the Iron Molders' Beneficial Association of North America. A voluntary association, it provided death and disability benefits to molders who joined the association after being a Union member in good standing for at least three months. The fund was run by a special board, with the president of the International serving as chief administrator. Modeled after a similar program established by the Cigar Makers Union in 1867, it was the second national trade union benefit program in the country.²

In order to further lead the faltering union out of its tailspin, the delegates at Philadelphia chose William Saffin of Nashville, Tennessee, as president. Holding the office until 1879, his tenure was marked by a lack of clearcut direction which reflected the difficult times in which he served. He did however chart some new paths for the Union and, in some areas, built firmly upon the established foundation.

Late in 1869, the economy began to experience a revival out of the post-war depression. Sentiment developed among the remnants of the Union for a more aggressive strike policy. The restrictive strike mechanism instituted in 1868 had greatly limited legal strikes and consequently spurred unsanctioned walkouts. Recalling past successes, the Molders at the 1870 convention revised the strike rules. The power to sanction walkouts was changed from requiring a two-thirds vote by the local unions to a combination membership vote plus a veto power for the president and executive committee of the International.

Saffin approved the more aggressive posture. During the next year applications for strike sanctions poured into the new permanent Union headquarters in Cincinnati.* Beginning in the fall of 1871 and running through the summer of 1872, major disputes developed throughout the Midwest. Most of the strikes were for wage increases and generally were successful, including a nine-week walkout of two thousand Ohio Valley stove molders.

The renewed aggressiveness by the Molders contributed to the formation of the National Stove Manufacturers' Association, a trade association whose motives were at first unclear. Vividly aware of the destructive impact on the Union of the Iron Founders Association and their lockout of 1866, the Molders' convention of 1872 resolved that

we are unalterably fixed in our determination to resist by all lawful means any and every effort made to deprive the molder of his right to demand and receive a fair equivalent for his labor, or to abridge his right to fix a price for that labor.

While expressing this commitment to combat "union busting" by the new national association, the convention also extended an olive branch. At the behest of Saffin, the delegates again amended the strike law by mandating efforts to attempt to arbitrate differences on the local level before a walkout could be sanctioned.

At a time when the union was fighting for its life, arbitration represented an innovation designed to create order in the relations between management and labor. Saffin hoped that it would eliminate the expenses of strikes and thus cut the costs of running the organization. If it succeeded, the process would have the impact of keeping dues down and attracting new members. If management went along, it would be a recognition of the legitimacy of the Union. In return for this order and legitimacy, the Molders were relinquishing the important weapon of a well-timed strike, since requesting arbitration was a

**Saffin on assuming the presidency asked the 1870 convention to establish the permanent headquarters in Cincinnati, and they did.*

notification of the intention to strike. Unfortunately, the idea was before its time.

Four years later Saffin regretably reported that the arbitration law had failed. He noted that

Our unions have invariably offered to submit every dispute as to wages to arbitration . . . and almost as invariably they have been insultingly refused.

Still, however, committed to the principle, the president successfully urged that a notification be sent to the National Stove Manufacturers' Association asking each member to pledge themselves to arbitration of wage disputes. If they failed to do so, the arbitration law of the Union would "no longer be binding on our unions or our members, leaving the matter entirely optional with each local union." The request was ignored and two years later, in 1878, the arbitration rule was abolished.³

Another innovation of this era, designed to stabilize relations between labor and management, was the written agreement. In 1874 a local union in Cincinnati signed the first known written contract in the foundry industry. Lasting one year, it was viewed with apprehension by employers and employees alike. Foundrymen doubted the wisdom of the process because the market might change at any moment. Molders had reservations about giving up the right to strike at strategic moments. Conceding the risks for both sides, Saffin saw merit in the procedure. It recognized the right of labor to organize and bargain collectively, and it promised harmony for the duration of the contract. But the use of the written agreement developed slowly in the foundry industry, and it was not until 1879 that a second contract was signed.⁴

While Saffin ultimately carried on part of the Sylvis tradition by working to establish the legitimacy of organized labor, he did not pursue the reform program begun in the late 1860's. The cooperative foundry movement was paid lip service by the organization, but was not supported. The eight-hour-day concept was actually opposed as being against the interest of molders who were paid on a piece work scale! Moreover, Saffin was not an effective organizer, for although the 1870's were generally a period of economic growth in the iron industry, membership in the Molders Union, after reaching an estimated 5,000 in 1876, fell to 2,854 by the time Saffin left the presidency in 1879.

Another legacy of the Sylvis years was inter-union cooperation. Saffin also approached this program with a different perspective by rejecting politicalization. Shortly after becoming president, he wrote to William J. Hammond of the International Typographical Union

Many of the discreet and thoughtful men in the trade union movement have canvassed the advisability of forming a[n] . . . industrial congress, and have decided that [it] . . . must be entirely free from political influences and composed of delegates from bona fide trade and labor unions.

Within the next few years, Saffin and the leaders of the Coopers, Typographical, and Machinist and Blacksmith's Internationals pushed for the creation

of a new organization based upon protective principles. The anti-political sentiment prevailed and the 1873 call to organize, after the collapse of the National Labor Union, pledged "to all intents and purposes to remain a purely Industrial Association."

Convening in July, the Industrial Congress and Industrial Brotherhood was short lived. The first convention developed a twelve point program. They held arbitration as a substitute for the strike; denounced contract immigration laws; urged the establishment of producer and consumer cooperatives; and called for the creation of bureaus of labor statistics on the state and federal levels. However, the organization never caught on. Economic hard times came with the panic of 1873 and persisted for some six years. In 1874 the Industrial Congress approved numerous political reforms and urged the election of candidates who endorsed the organization's objectives. Rejecting this political orientation, the Molders refused to send a delegate to the next meeting of the Congress, which went on record calling for the eight hour day. By 1876, without the support of key unions like the Molders, the Industrial Congress and Brotherhood collapsed.⁶

The finances of the International Union were chaotic throughout its early history. Sylvis made near-dictatorial assessments in the immediate post-Civil War days to finance the fight against the Iron Founders' Association, but the revenues never matched the needs. Saffin's administration inherited a whopping debt, yet he pursued an aggressive strike policy between 1870 and 1874 and greatly increased expenditures. The shortage of revenue experienced by the International led to a policy of funding strikes with union script to be paid in real money when the funds became available. As strikes grew in frequency during the early 1870's, local unions used their own funds, a policy that Saffin initially categorized as "beneficial" in 1872. The situation led to a depletion of local coffers and produced an inability to pay the regular 25 cent monthly per capita dues. Large arrears developed in the revenues of the Union. By the convention of 1878, the delegates began voting for the payment of "back claims" to local unions which had not received aid while on strike.⁷

With membership again dwindling and the organization's finances in disarray, the convention of 1878 restructured the executive branch of the Union by creating a powerful executive board. This consisted of four vice presidents, and three trustees. The board, acting in conjunction with the president, was now granted all "executive powers." The power of the office of president was greatly diminished, and the president became accountable to the executive board. The chief executive was required to "lay all matters of interest" to the Union before the new board. The board also had the power to hear charges against elected officers, fill vacancies, and approve and terminate strikes. The vice presidents were to serve as organizers and negotiators in the field, and the trustees were to deal with the finances of the Union.

Almost immediately, the board came into conflict with Saffin, who denied they had the right to supervise his actions. Unable to exercise their newly granted authority, the board pressed charges of embezzlement against the president when they learned he had not invested portions of the regular dues for the disability

fund that had been established in 1874. The board then proceeded to try the case, find Saffin guilty, get a vote from the local unions declaring the office of president vacant, and convene a special convention in Chicago to elect a new president.⁸

Although the executive board concluded that Saffin had used the money for his personal needs, given the financial chaos of the Union at this time, it is not clear if it was outright theft or mismanagement.* Nevertheless, the situation permitted the executive board to exercise its newly granted power. It was no accident that Patrick J. Fitzpatrick, one of the trustees of the new board, was chosen as the new president by the special Chicago convention, early in 1879.

During Saffin's presidency, the Molders Union had muddled its way through a difficult time. In the next twenty years, under the leadership of Fitzpatrick and Martin Fox, the Union developed the techniques which enabled it to survive, grow, and prosper. These leaders put the organization on a sound financial base, played a crucial role in establishing lasting inter-union cooperation, made arbitration and conciliation a reality in the stove foundry industry, began to effectively deal with jurisdictional questions, and restructured the Union to meet adequately the needs of the membership in a highly developed industrial economy.


Soon after assuming the presidency, Fitzpatrick characterized the Union's strike rules as being as "bad as they could be made." He complained that strike assessments went uncollected and that unsanctioned strikes were not penalized. He also doubted the wisdom of having local unions vote on conditions affecting other locals. At the convention of 1882 Fitzpatrick succeeded in getting the delegates to create a "strike reserve fund" supported through an annual one dollar assessment on each member.

The Fitzpatrick strike fund proved a halfway measure. Although it increased revenues, it did not solve the problem of collecting assessments from the local organizations. In 1890, when Martin Fox assumed the presidency, the assessment system was abandoned in favor of an increase in the per capita tax from 25 cents to 40 cents monthly. Of the dues, fifty-eight percent automatically became part of the strike fund. The decision to combine all of the revenues and allocate portions to specific funds was a conceptual breakthrough. It ended selectivity of dues payments by the membership and represented an acceptance by the local unions of their responsibility to finance the entire operation of the International Union.

Five years later, the financial structure was further strengthened when the Union adopted its "high dues policy." Dues were standardized at 25 cents a week with seven cents retained by the local union.

The immediate justification for the increased dues was the creation of a sick benefits program by the 1895 convention. However, a rise in militancy and an added emphasis on organizing had also developed. Beginning in 1888, and

**The minutes of the Executive Board, if any were kept, for these proceedings are no longer in existence.*



Headquarters of the Molders' and Foundry Workers' Union, 1899, *Molders' Journal*.

stretching into the twentieth century, a steady and dramatic rise in strikes and in membership occurred. The increased activity and the acceptance of national collective bargaining in the industry in the 1890's made a larger scale reserve fund necessary.

To guarantee collection of the now uniform local dues, the convention of 1895 under Martin Fox's prodding devised the stamp receipt system. After forwarding an amount of money equal to the dues of its membership, the local union received an equivalent number of stamps from the parent body. The stamps were cancelled and posted in the dues book of the individual member upon payment. The cancelled stamp became the official receipt to determine membership in good standing. This procedure established a control mechanism which forced local officers to collect the dues in order to balance their books. Seven years later, in 1902, each local had to appoint a financial agent with the responsibility for managing the financial affairs of the local and keeping the now standardized union books.⁹

The effective transference of the responsibility for the collection of dues to the local union, and the increased revenue it produced put the Molders Union

on a sound financial footing. As a result, one economist early in the twentieth century noted that the Union stood “well equipped financially . . . and ‘prepared to face the future with courage and confidence’.”¹⁰

When prosperity returned during the 1880’s, it also revived the labor movement. Simultaneously the situation produced renewed efforts to promote inter-union cooperation. In the process, two distinct approaches emerged to foster working class solidarity, and the roots of each can be traced to the early history of the Molders Union.

At least 62 new international unions were organized between 1880 and 1889. Though some failed, by the end of the decade there were still 79 active international unions. The situation led to jurisdictional problems as well as the realization, once again, that some form of inter-union cooperation was desirable. In an effort to create a degree of order out of the confused organizational structure among the crafts, the Federation of Organized Trade and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada was formed in 1881.

Since the failure of the Industrial Congress and Brotherhood, the idea of federation had persisted and the Molders continued to support the concept. Saffin had asked the 1878 convention to send a delegate to a proposed federation organizing conference.¹¹ When the conference was finally held in August, 1881 the Molders Union was represented, and Fitzpatrick was among those who signed the call to establish a federation of trades in Pittsburgh on November 15, 1881.¹²

Organized around a limited program, the Federation of Trade Unions called for legislation permitting incorporation of trade unions, restriction of child labor, the elimination of contract and Chinese labor, and proposed the establishment of a uniform apprentice law. Supporting the protective tariff, the meeting also urged the outlawing of script, the guaranteed payment of wages in lawful money, and a mechanic’s lien law. By definition, the organization excluded unskilled workers and much of its legislative program stood designed to control the supply of unskilled labor. This very practical and limited program was opposed by a large number of delegates who were also members of the Knights of Labor. Generally, the Federation received little financial support and remained an ineffective lobbying group.

While the Molders played a key role in the early federation movement, philosophically the Noble Order of the Knights of Labor was the heir of much of the Sylvis tradition. Formed as a secret society in 1869 by Uriah Stephens, the Knights organized nationally in January, 1878 at Reading, Pennsylvania. Opposed to strikes, the organization sought to build a large defense fund in order to abolish strikes. Disagreeing with craft union exclusiveness, it sought to organize the unskilled, women, and racial minorities into a huge industrial union. The Knights believed in the cooperative movement and in 1881 created a cooperative fund to finance such ventures. In addition, they generally supported wide scale social and political reform.¹³

Very early the Knights became involved in jurisdictional conflicts with the Molders Union. In 1879 the Order began creating local trades assemblies and before long organized a group of stove molders in Detroit. The Molders Union went on record in 1880 as opposed to these activities and refused to recognize cards issued by the Knights.¹⁴ Ironically, the Molders were still in disarray and were unable to be of much assistance to the many local unions which had fallen apart in the depression of the late seventies.

In contrast, the Knights had a vigorous organizing policy and in 1880 went on record as willing to authorize strikes. Numerous molders now turned to the rival organization. In 1882 machinery molders in Pittsburgh formed a Knights Local Assembly. In the following year a group of men in Albany, New York bolted the Molders Union and established a rival Assembly under the Knights. By 1885, the Noble Order had also established Molders Assemblies in Worcester, Massachusetts, and in Indianapolis, Indiana. At the same time, many molders who were expelled or suspended from the International turned to the Knights, and were admitted.¹⁵

Generally, the Knights of Labor was unsympathetic to the claims of unions to control their trade. The Molders were just one of a number of craft unions engaged in these jurisdictional squabbles. Finally in the spring of 1886 the trade unions recognized a common interest in stopping the industrially oriented Knights. Fitzpatrick joined with four other trade union leaders in a confidential call for a conference of national officers "to protect our respective organizations from the malicious work of an element who openly boast 'that trade unions must be destroyed'."

Only twenty international unions sent delegates to the meeting which drew up a six-point treaty proposing a great restriction on the organizing effort of the Knights. Six months later, the Knights held their annual convention and refused to consider the proposal of the trade union leaders. Instead, the convention drove a number of trade unionists, who also belonged to the Knights, out of the Order. Open warfare broke out between the pro-industrial union and the crafts.¹⁶

Again trade union leaders, with Fitzpatrick among them, issued a call to meet. This time the congress was to convene in Columbus, Ohio, and among other things was to consider advancing the trade union movement by the creation of an "American Federation of Labor or alliance of National and International Trades Unions." The conference attracted 30 delegates and was joined by the delegates of the legislative committee of the Federation of Organized Trades, which was chaired by Samuel Gompers of the Cigar Makers.

The Knights sent a committee to discuss the differences between the two groups. Fitzpatrick chaired the parallel committee of the new A. F. of L. and in conference asked if the Order would accept the treaty. The reply was evasive. In a second meeting it became clear that the committee sent by the Knights could not act. Discussions were broken off.¹⁷

After resolving to unite mechanics and laborers, condemning Chinese immigration, and voting a boycott of several newspapers, the convention elected Samuel Gompers, the secretary of the Cigar Makers Union, as president. Fitzpatrick was chosen as first vice president.¹⁸

In the next few years, the fight with the Knights escalated. The Molders Union was part of the struggle. At New Haven, Connecticut, six members of the Knights were discharged in a foundry and the Order tried to close the shop. Molders Union members were instructed to go back to work, and fighting between the two groups broke out. In Albany, New York, the Knights got control of an important stove works. During The Bridge and Beech lockout in 1887, the St. Louis firm sent its stove patterns throughout the Midwest. When the Molders declared a boycott, members of the Knights refused to participate and in the process aided the lockout.¹⁹

Ultimately the Knights of Labor failed. Its demise was not so much the result of direct conflicts with the various trade unions as much as a shortcoming in its design. Not committed to winning strikes or controlling the organization of work, the Knights disappointed the expectations of many of its members. In contrast, the A. F. of L., building upon the lead of established crafts like the Molders, encouraged healthy strike funds to be used when necessary. The structure of the A. F. of L. also preserved the autonomy of the craft in the area of differences between employers and workers. The Federation thus provided a home and support for struggling unions, and, through its political lobbying, advanced the common interests of all crafts.²⁰ The Molders Union played a key role in creating this new structure at a time when the labor movement was in dire need of a sense of direction.

Confronted by the continued drift of management toward an emphasis upon an organization of work which stressed efficient production at the expense of human considerations, trade unions increasingly found their members displaced by machines. Molding, as a craft, was rough, dirty, and required a high degree of technical proficiency. Technological change came slowly to the industry. During the 1880's and 1890's, however, numerous breakthroughs occurred. Power operated sand rammers appeared first, and they were soon followed by mechanical pattern makers and machinery combining both functions.²¹ The Union, until the 1890's, paid little attention to the potential impact of the molding machinery on the organization. They believed their own propaganda and stressed in numerous *Journal* pieces that the machinery would never work.²²

The first real threat to the Union through machinery grew out of the McCormick Reaper strike of 1885 to prevent a fifteen percent wage reduction. Because of their indispensable skill the Molders had successfully led the union struggles at McCormick since the 1860's. This year, however, the company decided to break the strike and, with the help of Pinkerton men, they secreted 25 scab molders into the plant. The Molders now worked to keep the other employees from entering the plant. Violence erupted. Public pressure developed on the side of the Union and the cutback was rescinded. The victory however was

ephemeral. McCormick decided to replace the plant's molders with the newly developed pneumatic molding machinery, and thus break the Molders Union. By the spring of 1886 none of the original 91 striking molders were employed at McCormick.²³ The Molders Union leaders who had been fired now turned their attention to organizing the rest of the plant into the Knights of Labor and the United Metalworkers Union.²⁴

Since the machines could not produce all of the required castings, McCormick hired fifteen molders, ten of whom were union, to perform the non-mechanized work. In response, a joint union committee of Molders, Knights, and Metalworkers called upon management for wage increases for the unskilled workers, priority for old hands such as the molders, and the dismissal of the scab molders. The company agreed to everything but the latter. A strike was declared, and McCormick instituted a lockout. Two weeks later, on March 1, they reopened with strikebreakers, and 400 police to break the picket lines. The strike went on while McCormick continued to recruit scabs.

On May 1, a series of eight-hour day strikes were held in Chicago. McCormick granted the shorter workday to its new labor force in order to stay in operation. On May 3, fighting again broke out between the scabs and strikers. A detail of 200 police put down the brawl after killing two and wounding several. On the following day at Haymarket Square, a poorly attended rally to protest the police brutality was held. A police detail ordered the peaceful crowd to disperse.



Haymarket riot erupts, Chicago, 1886. Drawing by T. DeThulstrup, *Harper's Weekly*, Vol. XXX, May 15, 1886 pp. 312-313.

A bomb was then thrown and seven policemen were killed. In the weeks that followed a wave of anti-union repression swept the country. In Chicago four anarchists were hanged. With organized labor dead at McCormick, in the fall the company felt free to revoke the eight hour day.²⁵

The blindness to the impact of technological change on molding was detrimental to the Molders Union. When the machinery proved partially inadequate, the Union had the opportunity to insist that molding machines be operated by molders; instead they asked that craftsmen not be required to operate them. Had the Union been realistic, as the typographers would be when they insisted on union members to run the linotype, perhaps the events at McCormick would have turned out differently.²⁶

McCormick's decision to end the influence of the Molders Union in the workplace was part of a trend in the foundries. In 1885 the Stove Founders' National Defense Association was organized to resist "unjust demands of their workmen, and such other purposes as may from time to time . . . (be) necessary for the benefit of the members thereof as employers of labor." Collectively, the members of the Association helped members resist strikes by working on the patterns of struck foundries. In March 1887, a strike broke out in St. Louis at The Bridge and Beach Manufacturing Company. When patterns were sent out, the Molders in the area refused to work on them. The patterns were moved to other districts but rather than boycott them, the Molders' executive board initiated a conference with the Defense Association. No agreement was reached, and the Stove Founders initiated a national lockout. In June, Bridge and Beach reopened with strikebreakers furnished by the Defense Association. With the strike broken and the lockout lifted, Union molders around the country went back to work under the old conditions.

The Stove Founders had demonstrated their strength, and in the next four years strikes in the industry were greatly curtailed. Following the strike and lockout, Henry Cribben, president of the SFNDA, proposed the idea of a national collective bargaining contract. Fitzpatrick initially rejected the concept, but at the 1888 convention a committee was proposed to engage in discussions with the Association. The motion was tabled, but in 1890 under Martin Fox, as the incoming president, the issue was brought from the table and approved. Negotiations were begun on March 25, 1891, after Henry Cribben prodded his association to go along with the proposed discussions, with Fox and Cribben heading the respective committees. Among the first items agreed upon was the principle of arbitration, followed by agreement on the desirability of an annual wage package. By summer both organizations had accepted the idea.²⁷

Joseph Galloway of Dayton, Ohio, characterized the revolutionary importance of the new procedure when he wrote the editor of the *Journal* that:

*There could be no fuller indication of the disappearance of the old idea that the workers constituted a class that the employers were under no obligation to respect. . . .*²⁸

Several years later Henry Cribben echoed this sentiment when he described

the philosophy underlying the procedure by observing “It is truthfully said that organized labor and organized capital have equal rights, so long as they respect the rights of each other and their interests.”²⁹

National collective bargaining proved a worthwhile technique in the stove foundry industry.* Several years later, in May 1896, the American Foundrymen’s Association was established. In January 1898, the machinery and jobbing founders created a separate organization, the National Founders’ Association, to deal with labor questions. They organized into districts and offered mutual assistance in dealing with labor disputes. The leadership in the Molders Union feared the Founders Association would be hostile. Martin Fox, while preparing for conflict, opened communication with the new organization of foundrymen and proposed the creation of an arrangement parallel to the one in the stove foundry industry. The foundrymen’s group agreed and, in March 1899, negotiations began in New York City. Again, the principles of arbitration and annual agreements were approved. Machinery to administer the relationship was established, and both organizations ratified the “New York Agreement.”³⁰

The optimism growing out of the easy agreement with the National Founders soon dissipated, however, as the New York Agreement failed to produce harmony. Within three months, disagreements developed when the foundrymen refused to sanction “the principle of the minimum wage.” By June 1900, a conference was held in Detroit at which management insisted on control over wages and a formal declaration of the open shop. Outright hostility was evident. By the fall, the conference boards could not resolve wage issues in Chicago, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Cleveland. A six week strike developed in Cleveland, but after agreement was reached, three foundries refused to accept it. The Founders Association contended they could not compel acceptance, and the New York Agreement was in tatters. Still, the Molders Union worked to keep the Agreement and reaffirmed its faith in the idea at the next general conference with the Association. Resistance from various members of the Founders’ Association continued from time to time. Late in 1904, after the panic of 1903, the situation finally came to a head.³¹ With the economy stymied and the supply of molders plentiful, in November the National Founders’ Association convention voted to abrogate the agreement and establish the open shop. They forbade limitations on output and declared that matters relating to wages, types of employees, apprentices, and use of machines were the sole prerogative of management. Wages were to be determined by local conditions. The abrogation of the agreement led to prolonged and expensive strikes and lockouts. The Molders found themselves in financial jeopardy and survived with a timely 73,000 dollar loan from the Brewery Workers Union. Gradually, the Union regained some of its losses. Some Founders Association members, either as individual shops or through district-wide associations, began to negotiate in good faith. Still, by World War

*Until this writing, 1976, the relationship has been one marked by harmony, and there has not been a sanctioned strike in the shops covered by the agreement.

I, the National Founders' Association, with thirteen percent of the nation's foundries as members, claimed that 85 percent of its shops were open.³²

Why did this new approach to labor-management relations work in one part of the industry and not the other? To begin with, the stove foundries were more stable and mature. These operations had basically the same organization of work, the same business methods, and a similar technology. The members of the Defense Association were mainly the largest operations with well defined markets. They sought controlled relations with labor. In the machinery and jobbing foundries, on the other hand, numerous products were produced in a young and growing industry. Approaches to marketing and management varied greatly among the members. The shops were often small, and competition among them for an edge in the market was keen. The dissimilarity of these operations in organization of work made it difficult, if not impossible, to develop a consensus on labor relations. In addition, personality played a part. Henry Cribben had been a Molder during the formative stages of the Union. He spearheaded, with the help of Sylvis, the creation of one of the earliest cooperative foundries in the 1860's. Cribben believed in the bargaining process and the rights of Labor. No such dynamic leadership existed in the National Founders' Association. In fact, the membership of the organization included many who also belonged to groups like the National Association of Manufacturers, one of the leading anti-union groups in the country.³³

The diversity of the jobbing and machinery molding industry also posed some difficult jurisdictional questions for the Union. As early as 1882, a group of delegates to the convention from this branch of the Union protested favorable treatment to stove molders in the area of strike benefits, and the Union's efforts to maintain piece rates when this branch of the industry preferred day wages. Within a year, an International Brotherhood of Machinery Molders was formed. By 1892 they claimed 82 local unions.

Soon after assuming the presidency, Martin Fox developed a policy designed to broaden the base of membership in the Union. He began by calling for "decided action" against the Brotherhood of Machinery Molders. The convention of 1890 refused them dual membership. The Molders Union locals expelled Brotherhood members. Molders began crossing Machinery Molders' picket lines and replaced them on the job. The Brotherhood called for a conference which was held in April 1893, and agreed to disband and join the Molders Union.³⁴

Fox also launched a jurisdictional campaign against the brass molders. Claiming jurisdiction over brass molding back in 1867, the Union had paid little attention to it. In 1890, after the Knights of Labor began to collapse, the brass molders organized an International Brotherhood. They merged a few years later with the Metal Workers, Polishers and Buffers who in turn merged with the Metal Polishers, Buffers and Platers International in 1896. This new group began aggressively organizing all brass workers and claimed the sole jurisdiction over brass foundries. In response, the Molders reasserted its "right over brass Molding"

and notified the A.F. of L. of their position. The Metal Polishers protested this action to the Federation. The A.F. of L. at first recommended that the two unions solve the problem themselves. However, a conference proved fruitless, and the Federation was pressed for a definite decision. The A.F. of L. decided in favor of the Molders but the Metal Polishers ignored the ruling. Several conferences were held between the two groups in which the Molders noted that they were the older organization and had always claimed jurisdiction over brass molding as well as gray iron, malleable, steel, and mixed-metal molding. The dispute persisted until 1909, when the Molders instructed their locals to go all out to organize brass molders. The A.F. of L. reaffirmed its 1903 ruling and threatened to revoke the Metal Polishers' charter, unless they capitulated. Finally, in January 1911, the Metal Polishers voted to transfer 408 brass molders to the Molders Union.³⁵

Molding machines increasingly came into use at the end of the nineteenth century. Fox, and officers of the Union, finally recognized that the machines were displacing skilled molders. In 1899, the leadership recommended that the Union establish jurisdiction over molding machine operators and all those who work in the various subdivisions of molding. They advised molders to take jobs on the machines, and informed foundrymen they would cooperate with the introduction of machinery if Union jurisdiction were established.³⁶

Extending jurisdiction over the machines did not come easily. First, the skilled molder often rebelled against giving up his trade in favor of the machine. In addition, molders soon realized the machine produced more molds at a faster rate and this meant more physical drudgery. Eventually, this resistance broke down, but not without producing discontent in the workplace. A second obstacle was the National Founders' Association. They rejected the new Union policy and insisted on maintaining control over who would run the machines, and resolved that "molding machine operators should not be considered molders in any agreement entered into. . . ."³⁷ Ultimately, this issue would be a key factor in the breakdown of the New York Agreement. During the strikes and lockouts of 1903 and 1904, the foundrymen invested heavily in molding machines to replace the skilled workers.

In these strikes, jurisdiction over the molding machines was a key cause. A general strike, which was only partially successful, was called in 1906, in which machines were an issue. To deal with the question, the 1907 convention revised the membership article of the constitution to include the machine operators who had not gone through a regular apprenticeship. Nevertheless, with the open shop, establishing control over machine operators proved a slow and tedious process. The membership rolls, which increased so dramatically in the late 1890's and first few years of the twentieth century, began to level off as the industry mechanized.³⁸

Another jurisdictional dispute emerged over the coremakers. In the early days the molder made his own cores. But coremaking had evolved as a special



Militancy personified – Mother Jones. *Photo courtesy of William Cahn.*

craft when the foundries moved toward specialization, and at first they were excluded from the International Union. In the mid 1880's coremakers began organizing under the Knights. In 1890, the Molders resolved to assist the coremakers in organizing and a few years later the Core Makers International Union was formed. By this time, Fox's policy of broadening the base of the Union was well formulated and the idea of amalgamation was discussed in leadership circles. During strikes, conflicts between molders and coremakers were common as the Molders had a policy of refusing to enter sympathetic strikes because of the agreement in the stove industry. Often, the molders did the coremakers' work on the basis that the Union had never given up jurisdiction over the craft. Conflicts continued. In 1902, the Core Makers International voted

to amalgamate and, in May 1903, more than 5,600 coremakers were transferred to the Molders Union, after Martin Fox recommended complete control over the craft.³⁹

One other aspect of Fox's presidency, which was designed to broaden the base of the Union, was the issue of admitting minorities. The Sylvis tradition encouraged this, but it had been dismissed by his early successors. In 1896, Fox, recognizing the increased number of black molders in the open shops of the South, pressed a resolution through the executive board which condemned the "racial prejudice of a past generation." In 1900, the International officers began a concerted effort to organize black journeymen and prevailed upon Local 53 in Chattanooga to help. Because of resistance among the members and pressure from management who relied on blacks as strikebreakers, their success was negligible. Rather than give up this potential membership, the Union in 1903 created a separate black local, which paid no International dues and was guaranteed that white members would not be allowed to cross their picket lines. This plan also failed. As the number of black journeymen increased, the resistance among the membership began to break down. In 1911, the Birmingham, Alabama, local went on record to admit black molders and coremakers and vigorously recruited them.⁴⁰

Women were "steadfastly frowned upon . . . in or about the foundry." This view is ironic, in that the most prominent female labor organizer of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Mary "Mother" Jones, had been connected with the Union. Her husband had been a Molder in Memphis, Tennessee, and, after his death, she migrated to Chicago where she was briefly employed by the local Molders union.

Although the Union ignored women, as early as 1884 women were working as coremakers in Detroit. When the Core Makers amalgamated with the Molders, some women were brought into the Union. In 1907 the convention went on record opposing women in the foundry and several strikes were called to eliminate female coremakers. But women coremakers increased in number outside the Union. In 1910 there were at least 1,298 women working in 90 shops. Still, in 1912, the convention beat down a resolution, which originated with the executive board, to admit women.⁴²

In order to operate the Union with its changed fiscal structure, expansionist membership policy, and national collective bargaining system, changes had to be made in the administrative structure. The first major alteration was the restructuring of the executive department in 1878, which made the president accountable to the executive board. Eight years later, in order to keep accurate records of incoming and outgoing funds, a salaried financial secretary was added to the general staff. In 1888, as the labor movement expanded in all directions, Fitzpatrick realized the need to increase the organizing function of the Union. Vice presidents were given salaries, and designated as "assistant organizers."

This change enabled Fox to develop his expansionist membership program. In 1895, to facilitate these efforts, the educational function of the Union was upgraded when the *Journal* was expanded, and the formal position of editor was created. The *Journal* was increasingly used to advocate changes by the leadership and served as a forum for debate among the members. This change restored the Sylvis tradition in the *Journal's* function. In the same year, as membership had begun to dramatically increase, the office of financier was created. This office became responsible for keeping the records of individual members, local union payments, and the sick benefits funds.⁴³

As transportation and communication became more rapid, it became apparent that a regional approach to Union organizing and cooperation would be more efficient. In 1891, Molders in the New York City area created a regional conference board to establish regional objectives among the strong and weak locals. A year later, four locals in Chicago did the same thing and added a full time staff member to function as an employment officer. Two years later, in 1894, three locals in Dayton, Ohio, came together. In 1895, the convention officially recognized these regional boards, and four years later, the International Union began establishing conference board rules. By 1907, all locals were compelled to join the conference board of their district, if one existed, and the executive board could create regional groups, if they deemed it desirable.⁴³

During these years, the Molders Union had adjusted to the new industrial order marked by large scale organization and specialization of activity. Its leaders carried on the pathbreaking tradition of Sylvis and played crucial roles in the creation of the American Federation of Labor, and successfully implemented a national collective bargaining structure. Both achievements were giant steps in the direction of rationalizing the relationship between management, labor, and government. In addition, the Union, although belatedly, began to deal with the impact of technology through its membership policy and collective bargaining. By the early twentieth century, the union had achieved legitimacy.

III

FROM LEGITIMACY TO INDUSTRIAL UNIONISM

During the years 1900 to 1935 the position of organized labor in the United States changed. The shift was from a place of legitimacy, as enunciated by Henry Cribben of the S.F.N.D.A., to one of guaranteed rights after the passage of the Wagner Act. The journey was punctuated by such benchmarks as labor's role in the search for industrial peace through the National Civic Federation program, the passage of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, the war effort of 1917-1918, economic hard times in the early 1920's, and the "Great Depression" of the 1930's. The experience of the Molders Union helps to describe this evolution of labor and provides insight into why labor had to have its rights guaranteed.

In December 1900, the newly formed National Civic Federation convened in Chicago to develop a procedure that would bring labor-management relations under control. The idea was to avoid the hardships and waste that often grew out of strikes. Leaders from both labor and management joined minds and voices to find a solution. Samuel Gompers was chosen first vice president among a group of leaders who included Ralph Easley, the founder of the Federation, United States Senator Mark Hanna of Ohio, and John Mitchell of the United Mine Workers. Among the principal speakers at the conference were President Martin Fox of the Molders Union, Homer W. Hoyt, former president of the Brotherhood of Machinery Molders and then president of the National Founders' Association; and Chauncey Castle, the new president of the Stove Founders' National Defense Association. All three lauded the virtues of arbitration and conciliation, and mapped out the potential of this as a tool for industrial peace throughout the economy. When the conference closed, these three leaders along with Gompers, Mitchell, and the other representatives from business and government drew up a position paper urging the widespread use of conciliation.¹

The National Civic Federation set the tone for the business unionism that emerged full scale in the 1920's. The conciliation model was the middle ground emphasizing cooperation between labor and management. Still, it was condemned by hard core anti-union employers and socialists alike. Anti-union forces glibly referred to the Civic Federation as "the facile instrument of the closed shop combine," while many socialists claimed that the organization blunted criticism of capitalism and turned the labor movement into appeasers of big business. Over the years efforts were made, generally by labor leaders with an industrial

orientation, to force the officers of the A. F. of L. to withdraw from the organization. The open shop forces ultimately emphasized that company unions were the best way to make conciliation work. During the 1920's the Civic Federation changed its focus to fighting communism. Finally in 1935, with the organization bankrupt of ideas and without influence among serious thinkers, the A. F. of L. withdrew its participation.²

It is ironic that the Molders Union and the foundry industry, two of the key architects of the strategy adopted by the Civic Federation, could not make that strategy work in their own relationship. The cooperative efforts between the National Founders' Association and the Molders rapidly deteriorated over wage cutbacks and the introduction of machinery in the jobbing and machinery foundries. Before long the employers' organization launched a full scale open shop offensive to destroy the Union. In May 1906, the secretary of the Founders' Association asserted

The whole question at issue is that of recognizing the union by signing an agreement. There is no question of wages involved, nor anything but the one question of signing an agreement.

The open shop drive was begun.³

Prolonged and expensive strikes and lockouts took place. The National Founders' Association blacklisted union members. They put skilled molders and coremakers under annual contract and assigned them to struck shops, often after mechanization, to train new workers. Publishing the *Open Shop Review*, the Association distributed it among known union molders in an effort to convert them to the open shop. During 1908 the offensive had a noticeable impact. In that single year membership declined from 51,588 to 35,606.

Over the years the National Founders' Association maintained its open shop perspective. As the molders' skill became more expendable as a result of technology, and lacking protection from the blacklist, the Union found itself in an increasingly weak position. To thwart the blacklist, the *International Molders Journal* feebly stopped publishing the names of newly initiated and reinstated molders. Fighting the Association on a shop by shop basis, the International spent more than seven and a half million dollars on strike benefits between 1903 and 1923. In the end, this expenditure proved a futile effort to preserve the Union's jurisdiction over the organization of work in the expanding machinery and jobbing foundries.

The Molders never permanently regained their membership losses. Briefly, during World War I, because of the shortage of labor in the war heated economy and because of the alliance between labor, business, and government, the Union grew from 33,597 in 1915 to a high of 60,480 in 1920. The post war depression, however, brought a swift decline to 45,316 in 1921 and a further drop to 32,376 by 1924. The trend continued to the all time low for the twentieth century of 12,331 in 1932. Based on this membership data, for the International Molders Union the "Great Depression" began not in 1929 but in 1921. And if the short

term gains of the World War I years are discounted, the Union's decline coincides with the heyday of the open shop movement years of 1906-1914.⁴

Throughout this period of erosion in the strength of the Union, internal debate in the organization was marked by two approaches to deal with the problem. One centered around controlling the supply of labor; the other emphasized further expansion of the membership base.

Controlling the supply of labor was a traditional trade union tactic. Since its inception, the A. F. of L. advocated legislation restricting immigration, establishing uniform apprentice rules, and eliminating contract labor in prisons. The Molders routinely supported these measures, and were particularly active in weakening prison labor.⁵

The prison labor question became a concern of the Union as early as 1864 when a New York State firm closed its shop and contracted with Sing Sing Prison to manufacture stoves. By the late 1870's the system had spread to Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. In the following decade, states in the far West and South were permitting prisoner-made foundry products to be marketed. A by-product of this competition was that numerous non-union molders were trained. This flooded the supply of skilled workers and advanced the cause of the non-union shop.

The Molders Union tried to deal with the problem in several ways. At first they adopted a label system for consumer products. This proved unmanageable. They then turned to lobbying and had more success. The position the organization took was that only prison labor for internal prison consumption was acceptable. In 1884 New York prohibited the system. Illinois followed in 1913. Other states such as Tennessee, Oregon, and Indiana greatly limited the activity. It took seventeen years of intense lobbying to eliminate the system in Ohio and success came in 1913 only after a massive reform movement was begun, which revamped the entire state constitution. An intensive lobbying effort was made by the district representatives of the Central Ohio Conference Board.⁶

On the eight hour day, which also helped control the supply of labor, the Molders dragged their heels. President Martin Fox moved to promote the concept only after prodding by Samuel Gompers. Fox began in 1897 by addressing the American Foundrymen's Association and explaining how the eight hour day would help reduce the army of unemployed and simultaneously lead to increased productivity. Shorter hours, the argument went, attracted the most skilled workers, led to better working conditions, and meant less time off because of illness and fatigue. For management this meant a more highly skilled and stable work force. In spite of Fox's lead and an overwhelming referendum vote favoring the universal work day by the membership, the executive board was slow to act. Finally, in the following year, the board decided to go after "nine hours as a stepping stone to eight." By 1912, through the bargaining process, an estimated 95 percent of the foundries covered by Union contract had achieved the nine hour day. In that year the International began its drive for eight hours.⁷

For at least two reasons the supply of apprentices concerned the Union from its earliest days. First they sought to train good mechanics, and secondly they wanted to avoid “flooding the market with incompetent molders.” President Saffin believed the latter condition was an objective of employers in order to destroy the Union.⁸

Apprentice guidelines were originally set up by the Union in 1865. Two years later a policy was established that required a four year training period and which set the ratio at one apprentice for each eight journeymen. Although this ratio would ultimately last until 1907, there was opposition to it. Sylvis had doubted that the figure would provide for an adequate number of skilled molders and advocated a one to five ratio to no avail. The employers persistently ignored the rule, and the buck system provided a way to circumvent it.

In 1892 the apprentice ratio was one of the first substantive issues considered under the new conference agreement with S.F.N.D.A. The conferees recommended a one to six ratio but both the Association and the Molders rejected it. The manufacturers preferred no statement, and the stove molders stuck by one to eight. Again in 1899 the issue was broached. The leadership of the Union launched a campaign through the *Journal* to get acceptance of a higher ratio. They explained that more apprentices were essential to keep the Union shops competitive and noted that the one to eight figure was complied with only when the local had the power to enforce it, and this was seldom. In 1901 the issue



Hard at work in the Emrich Stove Foundry, Columbus, Ohio. *Molders' Journal*, Nov. 1935, p. 653.

was submitted to the membership; again they beat it down. Finally in 1904, after an intensive educational effort through the *Journal*, the membership approved a one to five ratio by a close vote of 11,308 to 9,028. In the following year, for the first time, the S.F.N.D.A. accepted the apprentice ratio principle. They insisted, however, on an exception which permitted them to exceed the number when they could not hire enough journeymen to fill orders. In 1907 the convention approved the new ratio for all shops under contract with the Union.⁹

Similarly the Union sought to restrict the use of the Berkshire system. As early as 1860 the Molders resolved "that we as body do emphatically discountenance the Helper or Bucksheer [sic.] system, and that it shall be abolished as soon as practicable."¹⁰ In 1874 Saffin banned the use of the helpers in the actual molding process, and the convention of that year resolved that employers who insisted on the use of bucks were initiating a lockout. During the next decade some local unions engaged in strikes over the system, and a number of molders were expelled for using helpers in molding work. Gradually the system was destroyed, and in 1899 the Union even ruled that individual molders could no longer pay helpers to skim, cut sand, and shake out. Enforcement, however, was difficult.

With the membership wanting to end the Berkshire system, the Union turned to incorporating elimination of helpers into the agreement with the S.F.N.D.A. The stove founders tied the issue to the apprentice ratio. When the Union approved the one to five ratio, the founders finally accepted an end to the buck system in 1904.¹¹

Management's constant pressure to increase production and labor's policy of controlling the supply of labor combined to foster an increased fragmentation of work. By ending the Berkshire system, Fox had controlled the supply of labor to guarantee work for the skilled molder. But, besides the apprentice issue, there was another trade off. The Union accepted the "remote" unskilled helper system. The 1902 agreement with the stove manufacturers adopted the following short-sighted clause:

The general trend of industrial development is towards employing skilled labor, as far as practicable, at skilled work, and in conformance with this tendency every effort should be made by the members of the S.F.N.D.A. and I.M.U. of N.A. to enable the molder to give seven hours of service per day at molding, and to encourage the use of unskilled help to perform such work as sand cutting and work of like character, when the molder can be given a full day's work.

In time the jobs of these unskilled foundry workers were specifically spelled out, and the employer assumed the responsibility for paying these workers even in piece work situations.¹²

The new organization of work raised jurisdictional questions, and the answers given by the Molders ultimately contributed to a dramatic transformation of the Union. During the 1890's the metal industry expanded in many directions.

Hoping to avoid jurisdictional disputes, when various groups of metal workers sought affiliation with the A. F. of L., Gompers often contacted Fox to determine if these groups fell under the Molders' jurisdiction. At first, Fox took a narrow view of molding as consisting of working with cast iron and rejected steel and wrought iron workers.¹³ Gradually, in order to broaden the base of the Union, he moved away from this position and defined the craft by the process of molding.¹⁴

But Fox and his successor Joseph Valentine refused to support a definition of the Union that included allied workers in and around the foundries. In fact, in 1904 they sponsored the admission of the International Brotherhood of Foundry Employees into the A. F. of L. The new organization claimed jurisdiction over molders helpers, cupola tenders, casting cleaners, gangway workers, and yard men. In time they added sandcutters, shakerouts, flask sorters, shippers, pattern carriers, crane men, and blackners. In 1924 the Brotherhood's jurisdiction statement also included melters, furnace men, enamel workers and "all others employed in or around foundries and not covered by other legitimate jurisdiction."¹⁵

During the years in which the Molders Union limited its jurisdiction, other craft unions, such as the powerful United Mine Workers, included the allied workers. In 1901 the Scranton Declaration permitted this kind of organization to exist within the A. F. of L. As a result the membership of the United Mine Workers exploded from 61,800 in 1899 to 251,000 by 1904. In this same period the Molders grew from 22,459 to 48,322, not as dramatic but still substantial growth which included only molders. To the leadership it seemed that if the open shop forces could be defeated continued prosperity was guaranteed.

In the next several years, however, the Union began to lose members and fell to 38,714 in 1911. Concerned about the plight of the organization, the delegates at the 1912 convention confronted the leaders with ten resolutions dealing with various aspects of amalgamation or extension of jurisdiction. Two of them emphasized an industrial model and admitting non-molders who worked in and around foundries. The resolution submitted by the Belleville, Illinois local, the milder of the two, proposed that the leadership explore with the A. F. of L. the possibility of extending the Scranton Declaration to the Molders Union. The other proposal was submitted by Thomas J. Mooney, a local organizer from San Francisco. After raging against the "vast and powerful aggregations of capital" and the "introduction of modern machinery" and increased "specialization of labor" in the foundry, it called for a referendum to admit "all the workers engaged in and around foundries." Lacking the support of the leadership, both of these resolutions were overwhelmingly defeated. The same fate befell proposals advocating amalgamation with the Boiler Makers, the Machinists, the Millwrights, the Pattern Makers, and the Stove Mounters.¹⁶

The resolutions of 1912 on industrial unionism signaled a trend which would not abate. The open shop drive begun by the National Founders Association

continued to drag the total membership down. By 1915 it had fallen to 33,597. During that year ten local unions sponsored a referendum calling for the amalgamation of all the metal trades into one union.

Editor John Frey refused to publish several articles by members in support of the amalgamation proposition. He did, however, print a number of less strident statements in support of the issue. One of the essays he refused to print developed the argument that an amalgamation of the metal workers would produce an organization with considerable political power. The author charged censorship by Frey, and the executive board was forced to rule on the issue. In the hearing, the editor defended himself by citing standing resolution No. 10 which prohibited partisan political questions in the columns of the *Journal*. Additionally, he doubted that the membership would support the amalgamation proposal. Frey's critics, led by Jerry B. McMunn of Pittsburgh, replied that honest debate and the referendum should be the test. The board unanimously upheld Frey's decision not to publish. In this way they tried to use the pages of the *Journal* to control debate on an important issue. They also opposed the amalgamation in a circular distributed along with the referendum. Ultimately Frey was right about the views of the membership as the proposal was soundly defeated.^{17*}

In the meantime the National Founders Association, as did business in general, intensified their assault on the Union through the open shop movement. At the same time the 1916 military preparedness campaign began. The economy and the political climate had begun to heat up. Out of this situation came one of the most incredible legal cases in labor history – the case of Thomas J. Mooney.

A molder by trade and a radical San Francisco labor organizer, Mooney had been involved in numerous organizing efforts. In 1913 he established the International Foundry Workers Educational League to arouse International Molders Union members to “the necessity for taking in all of those who work in and around the foundry for existence.” In 1915 he was organizing the streetcar employees in San Francisco. In response, the United Railways Company in that city posted notices that joining the union would automatically lead to discharge. After a July 1915 dynamiting of the Company's offices, Mooney reported later, the chief investigator of the United Railways twice offered a 5,000 dollar bribe to several individuals to implicate Mooney in the bombing.

In San Francisco the preparedness campaign was run by the anti-union employers, and organized labor refused to participate. During a preparedness parade in July 1916, a bomb exploded, killing eight and wounding 40. The Chamber of Commerce organized a vigilante committee and arrested Warren K. Billings of the Boot and Shoe Workers Union and announced a world-wide

*Note – On two other occasions similar charges were levied against Frey. His particular concern about this one might have to do with pride in creation. In 1907 Frey was one of the driving forces in establishing the Metal Trades Association in the A. F. of L. He later served as its secretary and president.

hunt for Thomas J. Mooney. On vacation when he heard of the search, Mooney telephoned the San Francisco police and told them he was coming home. The police arrested him en route. Mooney's wife Rena and two other local labor leaders were arrested and ultimately found innocent. Billings, tried first, was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Even though W. Bourke Cockran, a nationally known lawyer and Mooney's chief defense council, was able to prove through a photograph that Mooney and his wife were a mile and a half away when the bomb exploded, Mooney was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to hang. Mooney characterized his trial as "The San Francisco Frame-Up" in a 1917 *International Molders Journal* article.


For more than two decades the conviction of these originally insignificant local labor activists was a symbol of the determined character and viciousness of the open shop drive. With the help of funds raised by the Tom Mooney Molders' Defense Committee, the story unraveled.

The prosecution's chief witness in the Mooney case was shown to be a perjurer by the *San Francisco Bulletin* when they published several private letters he had written in which he admitted lying. The judge who presided over the case called for a new trial but to no avail. President Woodrow Wilson used his Mediation Commission to investigate the case, and they reported that widespread knowledge of the evidence used "would shake confidence in the justice of the conviction of Mooney and Billings." After Wilson intervened, the Governor of California commuted Mooney's sentence to life in prison.

Throughout the 1920's and 1930's the Molders Union and organized labor maintained persistent political pressure for Mooney's release. In 1927 Mooney wrote A. F. of L. President William Green that he would refuse parole if it meant accepting guilt. Finally in January 1939, he received a full pardon.¹⁸

The kind of pressure against organized labor that the Mooney case symbolized, and the survival instinct of Samuel Gompers and the A. F. of L., led the labor movement into an alliance with government during the first World War. In return for support of the war, the open shop movement was stymied by government policy. The policy was not necessarily designed to help organized labor, but instead was developed to maximize production in order to win the war.

As chairman of the Advisory Committee on Labor of the Council of National Defense, Gompers used his position to protect the gains made by labor prior to the war. He insisted that "neither employers nor employees use the war situation to change existing standards." Protests came from both labor and management but in the end an acceptable compromise policy evolved. Union standards for hours and wages were maintained. Conciliation Boards with representatives from labor, business, and government were established in key industries such as shipbuilding, shipping, and railroads. This trade association conference approach was an adaptation of the Molders-S.F.N.D.A. model. For other industries a single



Tom Mooney. *Photo courtesy of William Cahn.*

broadly representative National War Labor Board was created. The Board's guidelines guaranteed legitimate organizing efforts and prohibited the firing of organizers. The union shop was continued where it existed but no attempts were to be made to displace the open shop. If conciliation and mediation failed to resolve disputes the board was to appoint an arbitrator.

The executive board of the Molders Union unanimously endorsed the implementation of the National War Labor Board and its policies. With these guidelines and the enforcement of them by President Wilson, organized labor increased its membership from 3,014,000 in 1917 to 5,110,000 by 1920. The Molders Union shared in the growth.¹⁹

Protected in their organizing efforts by government policy as well as by the shortage of labor, the leadership felt secure in maintaining their pure craft orientation. In April 1918 a Milwaukee, Wisconsin, local sought permission to bring car wheel molders and their helpers into the Union. Valentine with the unanimous approval of the executive board refused to grant permission.²⁰ When confronted by the organizing efforts of the Industrial Workers of the World and the One Big Union movement, the officers were again unable to think outside the bounds of their craft orientation. They condemned dual unionism and called for expulsion of Molders Union members who joined these industrial union groups.²¹

The leadership in the World War I era also failed to recognize the full impact of technology on the consumer market. The decade of the 1920's witnessed an explosion in the use of automobiles. In great numbers people moved to suburbia and adopted the auto as their prime means of transportation.

Recognizing the mushroom growth of the automobile the Cleveland Conference Board in January 1920 urged the executive board to launch an organizing campaign among the Detroit, Michigan, and Erie, Pennsylvania, molders working in that industry. Confronted at this time with numerous strikes and the possibility of more, the board had to decide how best to allocate revenues. They decided to set aside 5,000 dollars to organize these foundries. Ironically at the same time they transferred more than 36,000 dollars from the unused military fund into the general fund. By August the organizing fund was gone, and the board curtailed this effort when they laid off three organizers nationwide.²² A year and a half later, when the economy seemed to be improving, another request was made for organizing help in Detroit. Refusing, Valentine responded that organizing brings strikes and that strikes could not be financially supported.²³

By January 1921 the executive board conceded that things had gone awry. In one year the membership had fallen by 25 percent. Strike benefits and out of work payments were draining the treasury. Editor Frey counseled the board to begin accepting price cutbacks and to work to minimize the reductions in spite of the firm resolve of just two months ago to resist them. The board rejected this advice but voted to attempt a settlement with the General Electric Company

foundries. General Electric, however, stood determined to drive the Union out. By early spring there was still no settlement, and General Electric was functioning with scabs.

When the executive board convened that April, the financier reported that two and a quarter million dollars had been spent on strikes since 1919 and that the expenses of the Union were exceeding income by 50,000 dollars per week. The board also learned that less than a third of the members were employed and that current strikes could be supported for only two more weeks. Vice President Michael Keough urged a constitutional notice of the discontinuance of strike benefits. After considerable discussion the board agreed. The Union's financial condition had not been as bad since the mid 1880's.²⁴

The Molders' leadership seemed paralyzed as they clung to old ideas. During the spring of 1922, after membership fell by another 25 percent, the board again considered a resolution, this time from Detroit, urging the organization of foundry workers. In rejecting the request the board said it could not

*see its way clear to approve this resolution inasmuch as it would require a change in the fundamental laws and principles of the I.M.U. of N.A. and . . . would involve us in a jurisdictional dispute with another organization chartered by the A. F. of L. . . .*²⁵

In the fall the board opposed a similar plea, this time coming from seventeen local unions, for a constitutional amendment. The problem, the board believed, was not the craft orientation, but industrial conditions and the reality of non-union molders. The solution, they reasoned in the circular sent out with the proposed amendment, was better and more organizing efforts, not industrial unionism.²⁶ The same meeting appointed John Frey to coordinate a special organizing campaign. After a year of work by four special organizers, the membership rolls had increased by 1,700. It was tough going. In December 1923 Frey reported to the board that


*The more I give my attention to the problem of organizing, the more I am impressed with the belief that suspended members constitutes one of the biggest, if not the most important problem which the International Molders' Union has to face at this time.*²⁷

With this advice in mind the board decided to cut expenses by laying off the organizers. In the spring of 1924 they ended the special organizing program. By the end of the year membership had dropped another eleven percent.

Unable to make any conceptual breakthroughs to help revive the Union, the executive board began assessing the leadership of Valentine. Deciding that the 73 year-old president was physically and mentally incompetent, informally they asked him to resign. He refused, taking the position that "he will determine when that shall be necessary." On March 22, 1924 the chairman of the executive board moved that Valentine be declared incompetent and be removed from office. Sentiment was virtually universal with the exception of Frey. Valentine denied the charge and Frey urged a tabling of the motion to give the president time to reconsider resignation. With the opportunity to save face, on March 25 Valentine tendered his resignation.



MARTIN FOX
Eighth President
1890-1903



JOSEPH F. VALENTINE
Ninth President
1903-1924



JOHN P. FREY
Editor
1903-1927

Once again, as in 1879, the executive board wrested power from a chief executive who seemed unable to deal with the problems of the Union. In the discussion of the resolution to remove Valentine, all the officers and trustees expressed their opinion but probably none reflected the feelings of the group as succinctly as Vice President Michael J. Keough. Next in line to assume the presidency, he said that in "the interests of the organization a change should be made."²⁸

However, Keough proved unable to improve the condition of the Union. During his tenure the total membership sank from 33,376 in 1924 to 13,937 at his death in 1933. Rejecting new approaches, and the tool of industrial unionism in particular for more than two decades, the Molders' leadership really did not understand what was happening to the nation's economy, life styles, and the organization of work. The stove industry which had been the backbone of the Union's activity was now stabilized and declining in importance. Centralized heating produced a shift to the manufacture of heaters and furnaces but the Union was slow to organize here, just as they had been in the automobile industry.

Management, on the other hand, had developed new tools for controlling labor as a cost in production. Building upon Frederick W. Taylor's scientific time and motion approach, by the 1920's they had developed a welfare capitalist model. The concept emphasized cooperation with labor without collective bargaining. In operation it appeared to offer fair wages, a reasonable working day, and improved conditions. Stock sharing and pension plans provided an illusion of security. The program seemed to substitute the benefits of union without the responsibilities to a union. General Electric and the Holland Furnace Company successfully used these techniques against the Molders during the 1920's.

Although the Molders Union had no strategy for dealing with welfare capitalism, the A. F. of L. did. The plan called for co-operation between labor and management in order to promote efficiency. At the 1925 A. F. of L. convention, the organization went on record that low management costs through modern equipment and managerial techniques would help the worker through increased and cheaper goods. By inference, labor was to do its part to increase efficiency. The leadership of the organization, however, overlooked the impact of this philosophy on the number of job opportunities.²⁹

This new spirit of co-operation with management was echoed in the decision of the Federation to make a concerted effort to organize the automobile industry. President William Green assumed the job of bringing the various craft unions who would have jurisdiction into a coordinated effort. The Molders Union participated in several conferences in which the strategy was worked out. The several crafts agreed to a "mass organization" approach with a commitment to transfer "those organized in the automobile industry to the jurisdiction of the respective national and international unions. . . ." Each craft provided an organizer who was under the jurisdiction of Paul Smith, an A. F. of L. coordinator.

Fearing an open campaign would lead to strikes and victimization, Smith rejected that approach and sought consent from the employers. Lacking the will to organize, the campaign hardly went beyond the verbal stage.³⁰

By 1926 the Molders' executive board began serious discussions about again broadening the membership base of the Union. The strategy they adopted reflected the same lack of a will to organize and fight the battles that would have to be fought which characterized the failure in the automobile industry. Frey proposed targeting the energy of the organization in the South among the jobbing and stove foundries. He met with opposition from Keough and several other members who argued along traditional lines that a campaign should be launched to protect the gains of existing members. They reasoned further that the situation changed from day to day, and a general organizing effort was more desirable. Board member Jerry McMunn, an old antagonist of Frey, agreed with the targeting strategy but argued for emphasizing the jobbing foundries. These shops, he reasoned, could be kept closed. The large corporations, McMunn pointed out, can afford to give the workers all the benefits to keep them from joining the Union. The majority of the board, perhaps with their heads in a sand heap, rejected the targeting strategy. The southern campaign failed badly.³¹

The only real alternative left to revitalize craft unions like the Molders by the late 1920's was industrial unionism. In 1928, with the active membership rolls down to 25,527, the rank and file delegates at the Montreal convention thrust the industrial approach upon the leadership. During the meeting at least six resolutions calling for the admission of all foundry workers were proposed. The Committee on Organization, chaired by Harry Stevenson, recommended adoption of the most flexible and least offensive one. This proposal, ultimately approved by the convention, directed the incoming officers to work out a strategy to organize "the laborer and machine molder that is now working in the foundries," develop a dues and benefit system, and submit it to the membership for approval.³²

Before submitting a plan to the membership Keough arranged a conference with the International Brotherhood of Foundry Employees to consider the question of amalgamation. In September and December of 1929 a series of meetings were held. The principal differences of opinion centered around guaranteed positions for the I.B.F.E. leadership as officers in the newly proposed International Molders and Foundry Employees Union; the admission of women, who were quite numerous in the enamel industry; and the assignment of organizers among the laborers. Since both committees agreed to the idea of amalgamation, none of the issues were insurmountable. After the Molders Union conference committee submitted its report there was little discussion and no further action taken by the Union.³³

Upon the recommendation of Keough the board appointed a five man committee to draw up a proposal to bring laborers into the Union. When the plan was submitted that fall, the officers also circulated a position paper expressing

their opposition to the idea. In the depths of the depression, with out-of-work benefits continuing even though membership was down to 18,393, only 4,500 Molders bothered to vote. Those who did, overwhelmingly followed the advice of the leadership who had painted a picture of potential strikes, jurisdictional squabbles, and a drying up of the organization's ability to maintain the benefits program if the unskilled laborers were brought into the Union.³⁴

Michael Keough died late in 1932, and Lawrence O'Keefe of Detroit assumed the presidency. His tenure began with the membership of the Union at its lowest point since 1897. The financier reported only 12,331 members.

O'Keefe recognized that the nadir had been reached, and that dramatic changes were necessary if the organization was to survive. Upon becoming president he enunciated his willingness to change directions when he told his fellow executive board members that "we are all growing old and it is harder for us to adapt ourselves to new environments than when we were younger. . . ." He expressed the belief that new directions were required, and hoped that the board would make the adjustment gracefully.³⁵

Coming out of the Detroit labor movement, he had long been exposed to pressures for industrial unionism. When the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act with section 7(a) was passed, O'Keefe was ready to steer the Molders Union to the industrial model. In the December 1933 convention circular the leadership called attention to the new N.R.A. Trade Association codes and their provisions for wage and hour standards for all the workers in the industry. Recognizing the potential impact of the rules on organizing, the officers explained that "Self-preservation may compel us to extend our jurisdiction to the extent of including all of those engaged in the production of castings."³⁶

When the 1934 convention opened in Chicago, O'Keefe recommended that the Molders assume jurisdiction over foundry laborers. The constitution was revised to include "all workers engaged in the production of castings." A separate category of non-journeymen members was set up with a different dues structure, and the name was changed from the International Molders Union of North America to the International Molders and Foundry Workers Union. From the legitimacy arrived at during the era of Martin Fox, the Molders had traveled the rocky road to industrial unionism.³⁷

IV THE MOLDERS UNDER GUARANTEED RIGHTS

As a result of governmental action the relationship between labor and management was institutionalized and stabilized in the 1930's. The open shop movement, the spy tactics of industry unmasked by the La Follette Committee, and the "Great Depression," with its corresponding immobilization of organized labor, all necessitated federal legislation if the labor movement were to survive. The election of a president of the United States and a Congress friendly to labor paved the way for such action. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, because of his experience during World War I, incorporated the trade association bargaining model into the National Industrial Recovery Act. Although the model emphasized cooperation between labor and management, the new law guaranteed labor the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. When the N.I.R.A. was found unconstitutional, the latter principle was reincorporated into the new National Labor Relations Act, or Wagner Act, of 1935. With its rights guaranteed, the membership rolls of organized labor sky rocketed.

This change in the relationship between labor and management led to a significant alteration of the labor movement. Industrial or unskilled workers, who had not achieved the same legitimacy as the skilled workers, immediately sought recognition under section 7(a) of the N.I.R.A. The A.F. of L. began organizing the non-craft workers by using the same approach they had devised for the automobile industry campaign in the late 1920's. They readily established numerous Federal Labor Unions directly under the control of the Federation. John Frey, then Secretary of the Metal Trades Department, introduced a resolution at the 1933 A.F. of L. convention to prohibit the Federal Labor Unions from organizing in those areas claimed by International Unions of the Federation. The convention referred the issue to the executive council but it could not be resolved. At the 1934 A.F. of L. convention Frey and John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers ironed out a loose compromise in the Resolutions Committee which simply forestalled confrontation. A year later, at Atlantic City, the question came to the convention floor with Frey leading the majority of the Resolutions Committee, calling for limitations on the federal unions in order to sustain old jurisdictions, and Lewis, directing the minority forces who favored strict industrial organization in the mass production facilities. When the voices subsided, and the smoke cleared, the committee majority had won by nearly a two to one vote.¹



Mass initiation of 300 new members at the Round Oak Stove Co., Dowagiac, Mich., vice president Chester Sample (standing) presiding. *Molders' Journal*, March 1938, p. 137.

Within a month after the 1935 A.F. of L. convention the leaders of eight unions, led by John L. Lewis, formed a new organization known as the Committee for Industrial Organization to promote the unionization of mass production workers on an industrial basis and “to bring them under the banner in affiliation with the American Federation of Labor.” Before long, President William Green of the A.F. of L. openly expressed doubts about the objectives of the new organization. In response Lewis resigned his A.F. of L. vice presidency. After an exchange of charges and counter charges the A.F. of L. executive council allowed John Frey to come before it and demand the suspension of the then ten C.I.O. unions. In the hearings Frey cited the efforts of the rubber workers to recruit workers from various craft unions as the reason. The A.F. of L. leadership sustained the charges and suspended the C.I.O. unions. The action of the Council was endorsed by the November 1936 A.F. of L. convention. Protected by federal law, the C.I.O. now entered the competition for members. By April 1937 Green anxiously noted that “The country seems to be filled with C.I.O. organizers.”

While the N.I.R.A. section 7(a) and its successor the N.L.R.A. sped up industrial unionism, the Molders had been well on the way to that decision in order to survive. The N.I.R.A. and its trade association codes served to break the final resistance in the Union.

By November 1933, nine months before the upcoming Molders convention in which the delegates approved the new directions, and more than three years before the C.I.O. campaign began, the Molders executive board had decided to organize foundry workers. Board member Jerry McMunn, prior to moving that the Union broaden its jurisdiction, urged that talks with the I.B.F.E. be reopened. If they should fail, he concluded, "we should make our own set up and then go out and organize these employees." The executive board agreed and Molders' organizers began raiding I.B.F.E. members and began issuing conditional charters.³

A further indication of the readiness of the Union to move in the new direction was an incident which occurred in the Chicago region. Chester Sample, who in 1912 was the only member of the constitution committee who favored a convention resolution to organize industrially, had become a vice president in 1928. While organizing a stove foundry in Rockford, Illinois in 1934 he found himself in competition with a federal union. Successful in getting the molders and coremakers to sign up with the Molders Union, he was also "approached by a number of laborers" working in the plant who "requested to be allowed to join the I.M.U. of N.A." Sample recruited them under the rules governing apprentices. To break down opposition from management he explained "the firm would only have one organization to deal with and . . . better results could be obtained." The executive board, after discussing Sample's maneuver, approved his decision "pending the action of our convention in extending jurisdiction."⁴

In further anticipation of the change in jurisdiction, the leadership began meeting with the I.B.F.E. President O'Keefe spoke to the foundry employees' convention in May 1934 and the delegates at that meeting approved amalgamation with the Molders. There were, however, sticky problems that had to be resolved. The officers of the Brotherhood had filed a formal complaint with the A.F. of L., charging that members of their Union were being coerced into joining the Molders. Frank Morrison, secretary of the A.F. of L., urged both groups to come together in conference to work out their differences. By April 1935 they had developed a tentative agreement. The I.M.U. of N.A. would take in all Brotherhood members, including women; the next Molders Union executive board vacancy would be filled by a former Brotherhood member, and at least two organizers would be recruited from the I.B.F.E. But when the plan was submitted to the foundry employees something went awry and they overwhelmingly rejected it. The dispute then shifted to the A.F. of L.⁵


In spite of its dwindled ranks, in the A.F. of L. the Molders still had considerable power. At the 1935 Federation convention, overshadowed by the debate on industrial unionism but tied to it and symbolic of the power wielded

by the craft unions, the Molders successfully protested the seating of E. M. Curry, the recently elected president of the I.B.F.E. They charged that Curry had been expelled from the Molders Union and was "one of a group of Communists who endeavored to secure entrance to the convention in 1932." He was not seated. Raiding continued and the situation between the two groups failed to yield an easy solution. By December 1938 President Green and the leaders of several metal trades unions urged amalgamation but to no avail. The I.B.F.E. refused to send a representative to a conference proposed by Green for July 1939. At the October 1939 A.F. of L. convention the delegates unanimously approved an executive council recommendation to revoke the I.B.F.E. charter. In 1940 the Brotherhood jurisdiction was transferred to the Molders and the A.F. of L. approved the change in the name of the union to "The International Molders' and Foundry Workers' Union of North America."⁶

It should be noted that although the Molders adopted an industrial approach in 1934, albeit limited to the foundry as the appropriate unit, they were slow to move in the new direction. Of course, the depressed economic conditions hampered these efforts. From the end of 1933, after the N.I.R.A. was enacted, through 1936 membership only grew from 13,937 to 19,983. This represented a considerable growth percentage wise, but in real numbers was not great. The competition with the C.I.O. and the advent of World War II proved far greater catalysts in stimulating expansion.⁷

For the most part the Molders Union reflected the A.F. of L. position on the relationship with the C.I.O.⁸ In June 1937, after the Supreme Court upheld the N.L.R.A. and the economy seemed to be in an upswing, the Molders executive board developed a strategy to compete with the C.I.O. They expanded greatly the number of organizers in the field, targeted the soil pipe and stove industries in the South, and urged local unions to cooperate with the president to make initiation fee concessions to members transferring from the C.I.O. The board also gave the president the power to use his discretion to set initiation fees based on recommendations by the organizers in the field.⁹

President O'Keefe outlined the intellectual arguments for joining the Molders Union in an official circular. Using the deep and rich history of the Union he noted that, "the Molders had maintained jurisdiction over foundries since 1859. This long experience and the knowledge that accrued, gave us an unquestioned superior position from which to organize the foundry worker." The C.I.O., on the other hand, he painted as inexperienced, and charged them with entering into agreements which "not only adversely affect those covered by them but have the effect of undermining the wage structure of foundry workers generally." Citing several examples of these contracts O'Keefe called attention to wage settlements ranging from 40 to 42½ cents per hour less than prevailing Molders Union rates. He noted also that the inexperienced C.I.O. negotiators were accepting employee classification systems of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd class workers, an approach long ago rejected by the Molders because it undermined decent working conditions and wage standards.¹⁰



Indiana member Robert Lewis pours a mold. *Molders' Journal*, Jan. 1946, p. 75. He had his first vacation pay that year — after 20 years on the job!

The 1937 drive proved quite successful. With twenty organizers in the field the membership ranks swelled from 19,983 at the end of 1936 to 31,069 at the end of the following year. In the process things got rough. In Chattanooga, Tennessee, a strike broke out at the Casey-Hedges Company, a miscellaneous metal shop.¹¹ The Molders negotiated for the foundry and agreed to go back to work but the C.I.O. organizers threatened to circle the facility with "a thousand pickets" to keep the foundry workers out. O'Keefe took charge of the situation, organized a mass meeting at the city hall, and marched to the plant "ready to dust some of the flies off (of them) if that was necessary." Nothing happened and the Molders were ultimately given jurisdiction over the foundry by the N.L.R.B.¹²

In Cleveland, Tennessee, three stove shops went out on strike that summer. The C.I.O. and the Molders actively pursued the workers to designate them as sole negotiating agents. During the strike the Molders paid strike benefits to the Union molders and coremakers and also to the new foundry workers who signed up with them. This economic power broke the C.I.O. effort and when 400 people signed with the Molders, the company agreed to bargain with them alone. The C.I.O. withdrew from the contest.¹³

Also in the South the Molders made considerable gains in the soil pipe industry. These efforts began in the fall of 1933 under the N.I.R.A. codes. When the codes were declared unconstitutional resistance to bargaining developed. In Rome, Georgia, rioting broke out in 1935 between striking Molders and a group of strike breakers, one of whom was killed. In a local trial the Molders were found innocent. The incident temporarily had a cooling effect on organizing in the South.

By November 1935 the executive board decided to develop an organized campaign in the areas of malleable iron casting and the soil pipe industry. In March 1936 they appointed special organizers to work both industries. Shelley Walden of Holt, Alabama, was expert in the soil pipe field and he made great inroads. Within a year he was elected a vice president, bringing his expertise in the industry to the International office. By the end of 1937, spurred by quick success, virtually the entire industry in the South was under agreement with the Molders through individual shop memoranda. In 1940 the first multi-shop contract was signed.¹⁴

Most of the soil pipe industry of the South was located in Tennessee and Alabama, and much of the success in organizing it grew out of the ability to organize blacks. The 1934 convention amended the preamble of the Union to read "we do not discriminate against any individual because of race, creed or color." This was an important commitment if the organization was going to enter the field of organizing the non-journeymen foundry employees. Blacks, especially during and after World War I, moved into urban areas in large numbers and increasingly found jobs in foundries. Continued efforts were made to integrate the Union by the International officers. However, in Alabama resistance from

whites led to the creation of separate locals for blacks and whites during the late 1920's. These locals continued in the 1930's and grew considerably during the organizing of the soil pipe industry.

The acceptance of segregated locals did not mean a tolerance of wage differentials between blacks and whites. The refusal by the Union to agree to wage differentials was a key to the success in the soil pipe industry. In 1938 the Union sanctioned a strike which lasted nine weeks to wipe out the differential in a Chattanooga foundry. The Union won. A few years later in Mobile, Alabama, the Molders successfully overrode before the War Labor Board, a regional Board decision which had permitted wage differentials based on race.¹⁵

The officers of the International were not above using the segregated locals as a tool to fight the C.I.O. organizing raids. In the spring of 1943 the C.I.O. began signing up members in the Holt, Alabama, Central Foundry and the regional N.L.R.B. ordered an election. President Harry Stevenson manipulated a strike by the black local, whose membership had dwindled because of suspension, protesting the decision. The white local also stayed out and the Union appealed the regional N.L.R.B. decision to hold an election. While the question was in litigation, Stevenson contacted the management of the foundry and promised to return the white membership to work in return for a dues checkoff. Management agreed and the white membership went back into the shop. The black workers followed. With the checkoff agreed to, the membership in the black local swelled and the Molders had a union shop.¹⁶

Success in the southern soil pipe industry led to a concerted effort to organize that industry in the North, primarily in eastern Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Baltimore, Maryland. In the fall of 1938 Stevenson, then acting president of the Union, succeeded in getting a commitment from the officers of the United Association of Plumbers and Steam Fitters not to use soil pipe manufactured by workers not affiliated with the Molders Union. The Association sent a circular to all its local unions urging the boycott, along with a letter from Stevenson listing the Molders Union shops and the non-union and C.I.O. shops. The strategy brought quick gains. Within several months successful organizing drives were launched in Somerville, New Jersey; Reading, Pennsylvania; and Brooklyn, New York. By the summer of 1939 multi-company agreements were being negotiated. By 1948 industry wide bargaining was a reality and the Molders had about 90 percent of the industry under contract.¹⁷

Along with soil pipe, the leadership had also targeted the malleable iron industry. Efforts to develop national collective bargaining in this industry, however, were not so successful. Nevertheless, in 1936 and 1937 considerable gains were made in recruiting membership and establishing locals. The bulk of the growth was in the Midwest. Early in 1936 Chester Sample began bringing representatives from malleable locals together to develop support for a trade association agreement. Three regional conferences were held in 1936 and several in 1937 and the sentiment among the local unions was very positive. By the

spring of 1939, however, Sample had very little luck with the malleable foundrymen.¹⁸

Beginning in January 1936, momentum began to build in the stove industry. The Manufacturers Protective & Defense Association (the new name for the SFNDA) agreed to accept the Molders' jurisdiction over all employees in the industry. At first the various locals negotiated for the non-journeymen.

When the C.I.O. entered the picture in the spring of 1937, the leadership of the Union met with the executive board of the M.P.D.A. and agreed to convene when necessary to establish special agreements for non-journeymen to protect the master agreement from C.I.O. encroachment. This reciprocal relationship helped preserve the Molders' jurisdiction over the stove works in Topton, Pennsylvania, during July of 1937. By 1940, the negotiations on the master agreement led to the establishment of minimum wages of 60 cents per hour for non-journeymen.¹⁹

Also during the late 1930's the International managed to bring several large stove companies under contract. They targeted these facilities and developed a strategy. After signing up journeymen and non-journeymen alike, the Union extended strike benefits, placed the shops on an unfair list, developed advertising campaigns against the products of the firms, and had organizers urge merchants not to handle the products of the targeted company. In 1938 the Round Oak Stove Company of Dowagiac, Michigan, was brought under contract. The Dixie Stove Works in Chattanooga, Tennessee, was successfully organized in the following year.²⁰

TABLE II
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NEW LOCAL UNIONS 1934-40

	EAST	SOUTH	MIDWEST	FAR WEST	CANADA	TOTALS
1934	1	1	3	0	1	6
1935	1	4	3	0	0	8
1936	2	6	6	0	0	14
1937	12	14	33	0	2	61
1938	2	2	2	1	2	9
1939	7	5	10	0	0	22
1940						
1st half	1	0	8	1	0	10
TOTALS	26	32	65	2	5	130

The same period also saw eleven mergers of locals, most of them in the East, and 95 locals suspended. This represented a net gain of 23 locals. At the same time, the six years covered witnessed a gain in membership from 15,159 at the end of 1934 to 37,568 at the end of 1940. (Source: Secretarial Report, 1940 Convention.)

TABLE III
MEMBERSHIP AT END OF EACH YEAR
(including those out of work, paying for out of work stamps, and death benefits)

	SECRETARY'S	REPORT	TOTAL	FINANCIER'S TOTALS
	Journeyman	Non-Journeyman		
1935	13,586	4,668	18,254	18,019
1936	15,269	7,624	22,993	19,983
1937	16,653	19,355	36,008	31,069
1938	14,703	15,070	29,773	29,054
1939	15,354	20,402	35,756	31,833
1940	17,396	24,108	41,504	37,568

(Source: Chartener, William H.; "The Molders and Foundry Workers' Union: A Study in Union Development," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1952, pp. 271, 338.)

Throughout the organizing contest with the C.I.O. the Molders were concerned about the administration of the National Labor Relations Act. One point at issue centered around the problems of the appropriate unit for bargaining purposes. Section 9 (b) of the Wagner Act left determination of the appropriate bargaining unit up to the N.L.R.B., and the Board developed several criteria for making its decisions. These criteria included the history of collective bargaining in the industry, the skills of the workers, the organization of work in the facility, and the desires of the workers. By 1938 the policy solidified, making the wants of the workers the ultimate test when the other factors indicated no clear cut direction. The major concern of the Molders was the policy which denied smaller unit representation (the foundry) once an industrial unit had been established.

The position of the N.L.R.B. made it imperative for the Molders to organize the entire foundry and get the non-journeymen to designate them for bargaining purposes. In 1940 Harry Stevenson warned delegates at the Molders convention of this threat to journeymen and urged them to help organize the non-journeymen. In 1944 at the A.F. of L. convention Stevenson complained of encroachments by the Steel Workers and blamed much of the problem on the appropriate unit rule.²¹

In spite of complaints about regional N.L.R.B. decisions and the appropriate unit rules, the Molders Union prospered under the Wagner Act. The competition with the C.I.O. stimulated organizing drives. The law forced a new attitude toward non-journeymen and broke down resistance to bringing these workers into the Union.

With the N.L.R.B. serving as a mediator between the different unions and management, the rules in labor relations were regularized; ultimately ending, to a great degree, wasted energy, resources, and conflict. The appropriate unit rules often worked in the best interest of the Molders as in the case of the Board's decision to approve association-wide bargaining. This position evolved between 1943 and 1945 and protected the Union in the stove and soil pipe industries.²²

The new legislation giving labor guaranteed rights qualitatively changed the labor movement. Increasingly decisions affecting the well-being of the Molders Union were made in Washington. Legal counsel not only became desirable but a necessary part of the labor movement. At first the Molders hired counsel on a case by case basis, but in late 1938 they hired the Washington based firm of Joseph Padway on an annual retainer. Over time the counsel would change but the legal adviser became permanent.²³

Throughout World War II the Molders Union for the most part went along with the "no strike" pledge given by labor.²⁴ Growth in the organization came because the Union maintained a large field of organizers in a booming economy. The organizers specialized in bringing the small jobbing foundries in low wage areas under contract. In these shops the appropriate unit test was no problem and management resistance was virtually nonexistent in the booming economy. Wages were frozen in certain industries directly related to the war effort by "The Little Steel Formula," which fixed wages at 1941 levels plus 15 percent. But the Union, with its legal counsel, was able to get a 30 percent increase. Unable to make large wage settlements, fringe benefits were targeted. The concept of vacation pay and paid holidays was well established by the end of the war.²⁵

At the War's end, the leadership urged patience. "Act sanely. Keep friends with those foundrymen who have been meeting with us in different parts of the country even in dark times," Harry Stevenson cautioned. Still the Union maintained a large road staff and strikes did occur in an effort to keep wages in step with inflation. This was true not only for the Molders but for organized labor in general.²⁶

The postwar strike wave subsided by 1947 but the Republican-party-dominated Eightieth Congress was determined to tighten the labor laws in order to limit the power of organized labor. They passed the Labor-Management Relations Law, or the Taft-Hartley Act, over President Harry Truman's veto. The new law had very little effect upon the Molders Union but the organization joined the chorus of dissent which echoed throughout the labor movement. The Molders' leadership denounced the law in the *Journal* for denying labor's civil rights by insisting on loyalty oaths. Critical of section 14 (b), they saw it as a revival of the open shop movement. They also condemned the section of the law which prohibited unions from disciplining their members. Harry Stevenson believed this would lead to a breakdown in discipline if strikes occurred and feared it would foster a loss of interest in union affairs. The Union, along with most

of labor, called for the defeat of every congressman who voted for the law. In addition, for the first time since 1936, the Molders endorsed a presidential candidate when the editor of the *Journal* wrote that “the Taft-Hartley Law is the main reason why Truman is our man.”²⁷

Truman was re-elected, the Taft-Hartley law was not repealed, and the labor movement was not destroyed. Instead, the postwar era saw the labor movement come to grips with the reality of guaranteed rights and general acceptance of the collective bargaining model throughout most of the industrial community. The new relationship with government and business produced a new generation of socially conscious and well trained labor leaders. Confident the labor movement was here to stay, these new leaders believed that rational communication and negotiations would yield justice in the workplace. In the Molders Union the best of these sentiments were reflected by a newly appointed organizer when he wrote in the *Journal* that collective bargaining works with

... the right kind of thinking and openmindedness on the part of both Labor and Management when they bargain collectively. The power-hungry labor leader, the labor racketeer or the greedy and unscrupulous employer has no place in the picture of true and honest collective bargaining.

He went on:

*Patience and common sense are the two greatest assets needed for arriving at a suitable working agreement between Labor and Management.*²⁸

During the organizing campaigns of the late 1930's and early 1940's, in choosing organizers the Union's leadership began to pay attention to the characteristics of the labor force and the nature of the industry to be organized. They often recruited road staff who showed promise in the industries that were targeted for organization. Some of the young staff members chosen in this manner were Sheldon Walden, Draper Doyal, Anton Trizna, and Carl Studenroth. These men joined the staff in the late 1930's and early 1940's and later became important leaders in the organization. In much the same way as Chester Sample and Harry Stevenson had, in the previous era, made their marks by being associated with the idea of the industrial model; Walden, Doyal, Trizna, and Studenroth established themselves by successfully moving the organization into new directions.

Walden was recruited as an organizer in 1936 at the same time the International targeted the southern soil pipe industry. With the help of the Wagner Act, he managed to organize numerous soil pipe shops by successfully signing up the non-journeymen workers. When he was elected a vice president one year later the *Journal* noted that Walden “is most knowledgeable in (the soil pipe) industry.”²⁹

Draper Doyal also made his mark in the southern pipe industry. When the organizing drive began in Chattanooga he was among the activists as president of Local Union No. 8. Appointed an International organizer in 1941, he built upon Walden's success in the soil pipe industry. As president of the Southern

Soil Pipe Council, Doyal was a key organizer of the Chattanooga and Vicinity Conference Board and served as its president for three years. Success as an organizer combined with expertise in the soil pipe industry catapulted him into a vice presidency in 1946.³⁰

Anton Trizna developed a reputation organizing non-journeymen in the stove shops of northern Illinois. A non-journeyman himself, Trizna knew the Molders Union well since his father had been a Union molder in Joliet, Illinois, since 1916. Undoubtedly this background combined with his Czechoslovakian ancestry, attracted him to Chester Sample and Harry Stevenson when they were looking for an organizer for the Chicago district late in 1940. Trizna's labor activities, however, were stymied in April 1941, when he entered the service just prior to World War II. Returning to organizing in 1946, Anton spent three successful years developing the Union in Illinois and eastern Iowa. His Slavic background, he later recalled, was an asset in organizing the foundries of northern Illinois. When the office of ninth vice president became vacant in 1948, Trizna was chosen to fill the position by the executive board in June 1949. He was the first non-journeyman elected to the office.³¹

Carl Studenroth developed his reputation in the malleable and soil pipe facilities of eastern Pennsylvania – two of the industries targeted for organization in the late 1930's. In 1943-1944 he organized the Malleable Iron Company in Columbia, Pennsylvania, and was the first president of the new local union there. During the World War, because of numerous difficulties with Malleable's management, Studenroth came into considerable contact with International



Cook shack and shelter of striking members of Seattle, Washington, Local 158. *Molders' Journal*, Jan. 1937, p. 44.


officers while the disputes were being ironed out before the War Labor Board. Early in 1945 he was appointed an International representative (the new term for International organizer) and in September 1946, was elected district representative of the Eastern Pennsylvania Conference Board. While serving as an International organizer and later as district representative, Studenroth frequently contributed essays on collective bargaining and labor management relations to the *Journal*. As district representative he involved himself intimately in the workings of the soil pipe industry. Beginning in 1946 he became a regular participant in these negotiations. In 1955 Studenroth was selected to fill a vice presidency, replacing Sheldon Walden, the Union's first specialist in the soil pipe industry, who died that year.³²

These "young turks," and the others who emerged with them in the late 1930's and early 1940's, wrestled with the rigid governmental controls of World War II and simultaneously were part of the greatest expansion of the Union's history. At the end of 1939, when the war economy began to heat up, membership stood at 31,833. By the end of 1947, when the economy began to cool off, the Molders had 90,132 members. A growth of nearly 200 percent in eight years time!³³

V THE NEW DEPARTURE

The postwar years witnessed some tying up of loose ends from the previous era. In Canada the Molders successfully negotiated their first multi-firm contract in the New Brunswick Province stove industry. The agreement covered three firms employing 600 people. Also in Canada the Union managed to help secure the eight hour day in numerous shops. This improvement, particularly in the Quebec Province, helped to defuse Canadian critics who charged that their dues were going to a foreign organization that had no interest in the well-being of Canadian workers.¹

In Cincinnati the Union solved a problem that had plagued it for decades when it built and moved into its new International headquarters building. After Congress passed the N.I.R.A. the leadership of the Molders recognized that an increased role of government in labor-management relations would mean a centralization of decision making in the nation's capital. They laid plans to move the headquarters to Washington in order to be near the center of activity and



Headquarters building.

the 1934 convention approved a resolution to make the move. When the *Journal* reported the decision, opposition from local unions throughout the Midwest raged. A referendum to prevent the action was narrowly defeated. The officers aggressively opposed the challenge to the convention decision but the closeness of the vote plus a Supreme Court decision negating the N.I.R.A. caused the executive board to reconsider. In 1946, upon the recommendation of President Harry Stevenson, the convention approved a resolution to build a permanent headquarters facility in Cincinnati. Opened in the spring of 1950, the building was located on the cool green hilltop rim of the city, ten minutes from the central business district. The two story Indiana limestone building, wrapped by ribbons of windows, was designed with the future in mind. The foundation was laid to carry six more floors, should the space be needed. In dedicating the structure, President Sample believed it would last "at least 100 years."²

The establishment of a permanent home can be looked upon as a symbol of the new direction taken by the Union during the decades of the 1950's and the 1960's. These years saw the "young turks" of the 1940's move into positions of leadership. They brought with them a philosophy geared to the reality of change. Anchored in a permanent residence which provided institutional continuity, the need to clutch to old ideas was no longer necessary to provide for continuity. The change in directions can be seen in the decisions to apply scientific approaches to collective bargaining, to develop the education and research function of the Union, to broaden contractual benefits and the corresponding elimination of the old welfare program. Similarly the new direction can be noted in the efforts to streamline the organizational structure, in the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Union, and in the movement back into the mainstream of organized labor after sinking into semi-isolation during the 1920's and 1930's.

Following World War II collective bargaining contracts began to emphasize welfare benefits. The Molders participated in the trend. The number of paid holidays was expanded and the concept of the paid vacation was universally extended. In August 1949 Draper Doyal and Carl Studenroth negotiated the first industry-wide welfare package for the Union soil pipe manufacturers' agreement. It was soon duplicated in the stove manufacturers' agreement of 1951. By the summer of that year Chester Sample could report to the convention that most agreements contained welfare clauses of some sort and that the agenda for the future was to improve them. The soil pipe welfare agreement typified the kind of benefit program negotiated. It provided a company paid insurance policy which had a 1,000 dollar death benefit, a 26-week disability payment, and fixed amounts to pay medical and hospital bills.³


By 1956 the majority of the members were covered by the above type of welfare clause and pensions were being added to many of the agreements. Consequently the delegates at the Toronto convention that year, on the advice of the officers, approved a resolution which discontinued the sick benefits feature of the dues structure. They transferred the revenue to the strike fund. Opposition




Delegates to the first Molders' Institute, July 1962, University of Wisconsin School for Workers.

developed to the elimination of the program from members working in small shops who often lacked contracts with sick benefits. At the fall meeting of the executive board, Chester Sample reported that it was possible to establish regional group shop benefits that could be transferred from shop to shop. Finally a breakthrough in this technique was made when the California Metal Trade Association negotiated a regional benefits plan, including pensions, which was transferable.⁴

Since most, if not all the members, were covered or could be covered by a benefits program via their contracts, the Union in 1961 took steps to further transform the dues structure in order to improve the organization's finances. At the two previous conventions the delegates, with the approval of the officers,



A stainless steel ship propeller, made by Union members at Avondale Shipyards, Inc., New Orleans. *Molders' Journal*, Oct. 1960, p. 22.



Toronto member displays a gear ring after complete machining. *Molders' Journal*, Feb. 1961, p. 19.

noted the growth of revenue in the funeral benefits fund and voted to increase the benefit. They did not vote increased assessments to cover the cost. The increased longevity among the members created the illusion of a healthy benefit fund. However, when a sound actuarial analysis of the fund was done in 1960, the officers discovered that the Union had a potential liability of 22.9 million dollars but had only 3.5 million of it funded. The situation had potentially disastrous implications.

Upon the advice of the officers, the delegates at the 1961 convention voted to freeze the benefits for the existing membership and to abolish the benefit for future members. In conjunction with this change they also voted to eliminate the separate dues classification between journeymen and non-journeymen. To strengthen the strike fund the monthly dues were raised from four dollars and three dollars a month to a uniform five dollars a month for all members.

It should be noted that the success in getting the membership to go along with this financial restructuring was not accidental. The members were informed

and they acted responsibly. The president, vice presidents, staff officers and organizers all went out on the road explaining the program to every local union and every conference board.⁵

Another new departure which helped bring the Union in step with the postwar world of organized labor was the development of scientific approaches to collective bargaining. During the late 1940's Carl Studenroth, then a district representative, began compiling statistical sheets. He broke down every contract negotiated in the district into categories such as the size of the facility, wages, benefits, and working conditions, and distributed the data to shop stewards and local union officers throughout the Eastern Pennsylvania Conference Board. The comparative data was then used by the various local unions during the next round of negotiations. Before long, Orian Williams of the Central Ohio Conference Board and Jim Davis in Iowa were using a similar technique.

At the 1951 convention Chester Sample called upon the delegates to approve the creation of a uniform statistical sheet to be filled out by the local unions and forwarded to the International headquarters whenever a contract was negotiated. Although the delegates approved the procedure and the forms were sent out to the local unions, there was no mechanism to get the unions to comply and it would be more than a decade before the statistical data sheets were being used at near their full potential as a bargaining tool.⁶



A delegate to a seminar tests his lung capacity on a "spirometer." After passage of the federal Occupation Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Union Research & Education Department has been conducting a series of OSHA training programs. *Molders' Journal*, March 1974, p. 7.

Prior to the 1951 convention, during one of the sessions setting up the agenda, Anton Trizna suggested the need to develop a training program for the officers and organizers in the fields of time study and job evaluation. He pointed out that industry increasingly relied on using incentive programs and that knowledge in this area was essential to adequately serve the membership. His proposal met with a terse rebuff by one of the senior staff officers who snorted "you can't teach those guys nothing." But the young turks would not be beaten. Four years later, at the 1956 convention, a resolution was approved instructing the president to provide training for the officers and men in both of the above fields. They began attending an A.F.L.-C.I.O. sponsored program at the University of Wisconsin.⁷

By this time the new direction for the Union was set. Prodded by Trizna, Strudenroth, and Assistant Secretary Reginald Bigsby, in 1961 the new president, William Lazzarini, of San Francisco, agreed to support a resolution to expand the educational program. The convention that year created a permanent Education and Research Committee "to implement the necessary educational and research programs for the Union." Reginald Bigsby, and vice presidents Trizna and Studenroth were appointed to the committee by Lazzarini.⁸

The 1961 convention also established the Molders Institute. Since 1962, in conjunction with the University of Wisconsin School for Workers, the International Union has annually provided 50 summer grants to individuals who wanted to advance their understanding of collective bargaining and keep abreast of the issues in labor-management relations. The local unions or the individuals have assumed the costs of travel and incidental expenses. In 1970, a second program was begun at the University of West Virginia. The 50 original annual scholarships are divided between the two schools and additional students are admitted to the institutes if they or their locals assume all of the costs.⁹

Upon the recommendation of the standing committee on education in 1966 an "in house" Research and Education Department was established. The new department began organizing institutes for various conference boards and local unions on such subjects as steward training, grievance procedure, collective bargaining, arbitration, local union administration, time study, occupational safety and health, and communication techniques. Somewhat of a catch-all department directly responsible to the president, Research and Education was assigned the task of helping to put out the *Journal*. In addition the head of the department assists the president and researches for the staff.

The Research and Education Department had a broad and demanding mission from the start. Ray MacDonald, who had been an intern in the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Research Department, was hired in 1966. He returned to the A.F.L.-C.I.O. in 1968. President Lazzarini learned that Jim Wolfe, Research and Education Director for the Brewery Workers Union for 12 years, was interested in changing jobs. Looking for someone with experience and stability, Wolfe met Lazzarini's criteria. In addition to his Brewery Workers experience, Wolfe had a national

reputation in the field of labor education. He had been instrumental in setting up the first statewide A.F. of L. research and education program in Kentucky, and he was a member of advisory boards on labor education at the Indiana University, Ohio State University, and Roosevelt University. He also served as a member of the Clergy Economic Education Foundation and as President of the A.F.T. workers' education Local No. 189. After meeting with the education committee Wolfe was hired.¹⁰

The new Research and Education Director's experience quickly proved an asset. He began improving the files of contracts and brought the statistical data sets into order. In 1969 he initiated a column in the *Journal*. The number of local institutes was greatly increased and the subjects were broadened and put in step with the constantly changing issues in the field of labor education. In 1971 the department established a bargaining goal program for the semi-annual meetings of the Mid-West Conference. The concept was soon adopted by the Mid-Atlantic Conference Board.¹¹

In 1969, at the request of President Lazzerini, the department was asked to develop a strategy for improving the efficiency of the Union's structure. The concept developed was described in a *Journal* essay entitled "Changing Times, Changing Techniques." The essay recommended the consolidation of local unions and the amalgamation of conference boards wherever possible. The proposed structure demonstrated how costs could be cut, services improved, and bargaining clout enhanced. Since 1969 numerous locals have amalgamated and conference boards have merged.¹²

During the 1950's technology began to displace foundry workers in large numbers. The membership declined to 79,903 in 1950, rose briefly in 1956 to 86,321, but declined again the next few years to 68,079 by 1961. The fluctuation upward in 1956 resulted primarily from gains made when the A.F.L.-C.I.O. merger occurred and a number of federal unions were turned over to the Molders. This was a short term gain as technological displacement continued.

To deal with the general decline several strategies were employed. Chester Sample placed continued emphasis on organizers. He created the position of Director of Organizers in 1956 in order to improve the efficiency of the field staff. He expanded the number of international representatives to 24 and appointed First Vice President Lazzerini to the position of Director of Organizers. In addition the Sample-Lazzerini strategy stressed organizing in fields that were displacing foundry products. These were primarily in the plastics, fiberglass, and nonferrous metals industries. According to the theory, regular meetings with the organizers, with pep talks, and intensive field work would yield success.¹⁴

Paralleling the emphasis on organizing was the idea of amalgamation. The successful consolidation of the AFL-CIO meant that the federal unions would be turned over to the crafts. This did bring some growth to the Molders but generally these unions were spread throughout the labor movement, with the United Auto Workers and the Steel Workers getting most of the unions the Molders could have claimed.¹⁵



Molders Union officers join with other unions in the promotion of union-made products at the annual Union-Industries Show, sponsored by the AFL-CIO Union Label & Service Trades Dept. *Molders' Journal*, July 1973, p. 1.

Also in 1956 the leadership began exploring the possibility of merger with the former United Auto Workers-AFL who had just recently reorganized and reformed as the Allied Industrial Workers Union. They had just gone through a scandal linking them to organized crime but nothing grew out of the meetings.¹⁶

When Lazzarini became president in 1960, almost immediately he cut back on the number of organizers and decided to build the strike fund. During the first few years of his tenure the number of organizers was cut to seventeen, the lowest number since the late 1930's. His financial program greatly increased the strike fund. In the field of organizing he continued to stress moving into those industries which were replacing foundry products, but also advocated a broader industrial orientation. The financial structure remained healthy and services were expanded as security was provided by negotiations. Throughout the 1960's, according to International Secretary William Cates, the membership stabilized at around 65,000 members.¹⁷

Stability was achieved, in spite of technological losses, by organizing in new areas and providing improved services. Gains made in the plastic and nonferrous industries, although usually in small shops, added to the total membership. Because of the newness of these industries and the ease with which they could move from one place to another, organizing them has been tough going. Although in the relatively new heavy industries, such as the airplane industry, where materials made by molders have been used the Union has made important gains.¹⁸

Reflecting the new organizing directions, the Union changed its name to the International Molders and Allied Workers Union in 1961. By the middle of the decade the Union was organizing in fields like radio components, television antennas, hot water heaters, mesh wire facilities, and various others.¹⁹

As the Molders adjusted to limited growth, efforts were made to revise the organization's administrative structure. The shift began to take place in the late 1950's. At that time the Union began to hire specialists when it placed a financial consultant on retainer. This was followed by the hiring of a pension consultant. The effort to establish a Director of Organizers reflected this same tendency. In the mid 1960's the creation of the Research and Education Department was a part of this same trend to bring the best professional advisers into the service of the Union.

Another aspect of this adjustment was the 1966 convention decision to have the International Union pay the salary of the district representatives, although this was done to relieve the local unions of the burden. Nevertheless, in return for assuming this expense, the International gained the right to appoint the district representatives from a list supplied by the various conference boards. This provided the International with some control over the individuals who held these key coordinating positions.²⁰



International officers and other labor leaders join striking Molders Union members in a mass march for justice in Charlotte, North Carolina. *Molders' Journal*, Aug. 1975, pp. 1-2.

There has also been a trend to streamline the headquarters staff. In the late 1950's more efficient record keeping systems were established. The 1961 convention went on record to combine the offices of Secretary and Treasurer in order to eliminate duplication of effort. To date this has not been done. In 1966 the cumbersome dues-stamp system was finally eliminated in the name of efficient record keeping.²¹

As the Union modernized its services, streamlined its administration, and altered its jurisdiction it became more a part of the mainstream of the labor movement. In the early 1970's the International urged active participation by the local unions in their respective city and state AFL-CIO bodies, a tradition of inter-union cooperation rooted in the earliest history of the Molders Union. Similarly the International reaffiliated with the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO after resigning from it in the 1960's. In 1973 Doyal appointed John Bruning to staff to assist Editor Ed Wulf and Research and Education Director Wolfe.



International officers participated in the Bicentennial Year Working Americans' Exhibition, at the Folk Life Festival of the Smithsonian Institution, in June 1976, Washington, D.C. *Molders' Journal*, July 1976, p. 1.

During the brief presidency of Draper Doyal the Union, for the first time since the Sylvis era, once again involved itself in political activism. Rather than remain neutral in the presidential election of 1972, the Molders broke ranks with the AFL-CIO leadership and supported, along with numerous other international unions, the hapless candidacy of George McGovern. "Our decision was a matter of principle," Doyal later recalled. International Secretary William Cates, conscious of Richard Nixon's long anti-labor posture, observed after the Watergate scandals that, "the Molders made the right decision." Anton Trizna further advanced the revival of the Sylvis tradition of inter-union cooperation on a broad scale when on July 1, 1976 he announced the affiliation of the Molders with the World Metal Workers Federation. Trizna has also continued the revival of the Sylvis heritage of political activism.²²

Thus as the International Molders and Allied Workers Union entered the mid 1970's it was moving in a direction which sought to offer the best service with the lowest possible cost to its members, in a world made smaller by virtual instant communication. The leaders who emerged in the late 1930's and early 1940's placed the organization on a sound financial footing and dramatically changed the nature of the International Union from a staid craft union into a truly industrial organization. The Molders Union continues to provide security and protection for its members, but does so in a way that William Sylvis would hardly recognize.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER 1

1. Douglas C. North, *The Economic Growth of the United States: 1790-1860* (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1966), pp. 156-176.
2. Philip Taft, *Organized Labor in American History* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1964), pp. 37-38; Frank T. Stockton, *The International Molders' Union of North America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 1921), pp. 11-20 and *passim*.
3. Commonwealth v. Hunt, in 1842, established the principle that unions and the strike were legal.
4. Henry E. Hoagland, "The Rise of The Iron Molders International Union," *Iron Molders' Journal*, XLIX (June, 1913), 296-298.
5. *Ibid.*, 298.
6. Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 13-14; Hoagland, "Rise of the Iron Molders' Union," 299.
7. *Ibid.*, 300.
8. "Reminiscences," *Iron Molders' Journal*, XXIV (February, 1881), 4-5.
9. "The Old Banner's Story," *Iron Molders' Journal*, XXXIII (November, 1897), 503-504.
10. Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 14-15; Joseph Barford, "Reminiscences of the Early Days of Plate Molding and the Union," *Iron Molders' Journal*, XXXVIII (March, 1902), p. 129.
11. Stockton, *The International Molders*, p. 15.
12. Hoagland, "*The Rise of the Molders' Union*," 302-303.
13. Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 15-16.
14. James C. Sylvis, ed, *The Life, Speeches, Labors, and Essays of William H. Sylvis* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, Publishers, 1968), p. 29; "Sketches of Our Organization," *Iron Molders' Journal*, XXVII (November, 1888), 2.
15. *Iron Molders' Journal*, XXIII (January, 1874), 226. William C. Rea of St. Louis was elected the first president.
16. William Sylvis, "Our True Policy," *The International Journal*, I (July, 1866), 111; Henry E. Hoagland, "The National Union of Iron Molders," *International Molders' Journal*, XLVII (December, 1911), 918.
17. Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 19-20.
18. Hoagland, "The Rise of the Molders," 308-309.
19. Iron Molders' Union of America. *Proceedings of the 2nd Annual Convention* (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1861), p. 39.
20. Jonathan Philip Grossman, *William Sylvis, Pioneer of American Labor: A Study of the Labor Movement During The Era of the Civil War* (New York: Octagon Books, 1973), pp. 43-44.
21. *Ibid.*, 55; Hoagland, "The Rise of the Molders," 309.
22. "Sketches of Our Organization," *Iron Molders Journal*, XXVII (December, 1888), 2; Grossman, *William Sylvis*, pp. 55-56. *Proceedings of the 5th Annual Convention* (Buffalo, N.Y., 1864) p. 10.
23. Sylvis, ed., *The Life of William H. Sylvis*, p. 51, "Sketches of Our Organization," *Iron Molders Journal*, XXVIII (January 1889), 6.
24. Sylvis, ed., *The Life of William H. Sylvis*, p. 15; *Proceedings of the 5th Annual Convention*, pp. 13-15.
25. Jonathan P. Grossman, "A Day With Organizer Sylvis," *International Molders' Journal*, LXXIX (July, 1943), 400-401.
26. Grossman, *William Sylvis*, pp. 60-62.
27. *Proceedings of the 5th Annual Convention*, pp. 14-15; Hoagland, "The Rise of The Molders," 312-313.
28. Grossman, *William Sylvis*, pp. 89-91.
29. *Ibid.*, 91-96.
30. *Ibid.*, 100-104.
31. *Proceedings of the 8th Annual Convention* (Boston, Massachusetts, 1867), pp. 119-121; Jonathan Grossman, "Co-operative Foundries," *New York History*, XXIV (April, 1943), 196-197; *Iron Molders Journal*, VIII (July, 1867), 104.
32. Grossman, *William Sylvis*, pp. 200-210.
33. Jonathan Grossman, William Sylvis and The Labor Press," *International Molders and Foundry Workers' Journal*, LXXIX (April, 1943), 204-208.

34. "Presidential Address," *Proceedings of the 8th Annual Convention*, p. 88. This speech was not published until a year later.
35. *Proceedings of the 7th Annual Convention*, (New York, 1866), pp. 16-17. See the nine issues of the *Journal* from March, 1866 through January, 1867.
36. Grossman, *William Sylvis*, pp. 118-119.
37. Charlotte Todes, *William H. Sylvis and the National Labor Union* (New York: International Publishers, 1942), pp. 73-79.

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1. John R. Commons and Associates, *History of Labor in the United States*, Vol 1, (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, Publishers, 1966), pp. 195-196.
2. Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 85-86.
3. See the Proceedings of the Iron Molders Union Conventions of 1872, 1876, and 1878; F. W. Hilbert, "Trade Union Agreements in the Iron Molders Union," in *Studies in American Trade Unionism*, ed. by Jacob Hollander and George E. Barnett (New York: Holt, 1906), pp. 224-226.
4. *Ibid.*, 225.
5. William Saffin to William J. Hammond excerpted from Taft, *Organized Labor in American History*, p. 65.
6. Taft, *Organized Labor*, pp. 66-67.
7. A. M. Sakolski, "The Finances of the Iron Molders Union," in Hollander and Barnett, Eds., *Studies in American Trade Unionism*, pp. 84-89.
8. Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 28-29.
9. Sakolski, "The Finances of the Molders," 101-105; Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 70-75.
10. Sakolski, "The Finances of the Molders," 107.
11. *Proceedings of the 14th Convention*, (Louisville, Kentucky, 1878), p. 35.
12. Commons, *History of Labor*, II, pp. 319-320.
13. Taft, *Organized Labor*, pp. 87-89; Commons, *History of Labor*, II, pp. 353-355. The timing of the decision to establish a national organization of Knights is important as it was in response to this action that the federation movement gained a new impetus.
14. *Ibid.*, 344.
15. Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 45-46.
16. Taft, *Organized Labor*, pp. 107-113.
17. *Ibid.*, 113-115.
18. Commons, *History of Labor*, II, p. 412.
19. Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 47-48.
20. Taft *Organized Labor*, pp. 119-122.
21. Margaret L. Stecker, "The Founders, the Molders, and the Molding Machine," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XXXII (February, 1918), 279-283.
22. Reading through the *Journal* beginning with the Sylvis years on up until the 20th Century numerous statements appear about the impossibility of developing a mechanized molding process.
23. Robert Ozanne, *A Century of Labor-Management Relations at McCormick and International Harvester* (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp. 14-20.
24. *Ibid.*, 21-22.
25. *Ibid.*, 23-25.
26. *Ibid.*, 28.
27. John R. Commons and John P. Frey, "Conciliation in the Stove Industry," *Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor* (January, 1906), 161-196. Although arbitration was the term used, the procedure adopted was conciliation between the leadership of both organizations.
28. Joseph Galloway to the Editor, April 12, 1891, *Iron Molders Journal*, XXVIII (May, 1891), 1.
29. Henry Cribben, "Cooperation," *Iron Molders Journal*, XXX (September, 1895), 2. Until this writing in 1976, the relationship has been one marked by harmony without a single sanctioned strike in the shops covered by the agreement.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER II – CONTINUED

30. Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 127-128
31. *Ibid.*, 129-135.
32. *Ibid.*, 135-136; International Molders Union of North America, *Minutes of the Executive Board*, Nov. 22, 1909.
33. Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 129-131; Stecker, "The Founders, the Molders, and the Molding Machine," 295-308.
34. Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 49-50; Martin Fox to Samuel Gompers, May 4, 1892, Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin, American Federation of Labor Papers.
35. Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 50-52.
36. "The Machine and the Molders," *International Molders Journal*, XXXV (August, 1899), 395-397.
37. Stecker, "The Founders, the Molders, and the Molding Machine," 209-291.
38. Stecker, "The Founders, the Molders and the Molding Machine," 279-308.
39. Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 52-56.
40. "Sparks From the Board Meeting," *International Molders Journal*, XXXI (July, 1896), 277-279.
41. Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 61-63.
42. Sakolski, "Finances of the Molders," 97-102.
43. Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 36-38.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER III

1. Martin Fox, "Arbitration and Conciliation in Labor Disputes," *Iron Molders' Journal*, XXXVII (January, 1901), 1-5; Chauncey H. Castle, "Industrial Arbitration," XXXVII (July, 1901), 397-401; Taft, *Organized Labor*, pp. 227-229.
2. *Ibid.*, 228-229.
3. William H. Chartener, "The Molders' and Foundry Workers Union: A Study of Union Development," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1952), pp. 104-110; Taft, *Organized Labor*, pp. 212-218.
4. Chartener, "The Molders' and The Foundry Wrokers," pp. 110-111, 338.
5. Martin Fox to Samuel Gompers, January 23, 1900, A. F. of L. Papers.
6. Jonathan Grossman, "The Molders' Struggle Against Contract Prisoner Labor," *New York History*, XXIII (October, 1942), 449-457; Frank T. Stockton, "The Molders' Union and Prison Labor" *International Molders' Journal*, LII (June, 1916), 491-498.
7. Martin Fox to Samuel Gompers, June 12, 1897, A. F. of L. Papers; Stockton, *The International Molders*, pp. 165-167.
8. *Proceedings of the 2nd Annual Convention*, p. 4; Presidential Address, *Proceedings of the 11th Convention* (Troy, N. Y., 1872), pp. 20-21.
9. Chartener, "The Molders and Foundry Workers," pp. 167-171. In 1934, during he depths of the depression the ratio was restored to 1 to 8.
10. *Proceedings of the 2nd Annual Convention*, p. 5.
11. Chartener, "The Molders and Foundry Workers," pp. 177-185; Commons and Frey "Conciliation," 176; Frank T. Stockton, "The Molders' Union and the Helper," *International Molders Journal*, LIII (October, 1917), 721-729.
12. Chartener, "The Molders and Foundry Workers," pp. 186-187; Presidential Address, *Proceedings of the 26th Convention*, (Cleveland, Ohio, 1923), p. 9.
13. Martin Fox to Samuel Gompers, September 22, 1893, A. F. of L. Papers.
14. Martin Fox to Samuel Gompers, May 8, 1901, A. F. of L. Papers. Note also the negotiations with the Metalworkers over the brass molders cited in Chapter 2.
15. Chartener, "The Molders and Foundry Workers," pp. 239-240.
16. *Ibid.*, 244-245; *Proceedings of the 24th Convention*. (Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1912), pp. 173-174, 259-260, and *passim*.
17. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, June 7-18, 1915, pp. 440-455; *International Molders' Journal* LI, (July, 1915), 527-528. Frey in 1907 was one of the driving forces behind the creation of the Metal Trades Association in the A. F. of L. He later served as its secretary and president. On two other occasions Frey was challenged by similar charges while editor of the *Journal*.

18. Selig Perlman and Philip Taft, *Labor Movements*, Vol. IV of *History of Labor in The United States*, ed. by John R. Commons. (4 vols.; New York: Augustus M. Kelley, Publishers, 1966), pp. 413-418; Taft, *Organized Labor*, pp. 327-334; Minutes of the Executive Board, April 3-19, 1913, pp. 83-84. *International Molders' Journal*, XLIII (April, 1917), 253-257.
19. Taft, *Organized Labor*, pp. 316-318; *Minutes of the Executive Board*, April 5-20, 1918, p. 61.
20. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, September 20-October 3, 1919, pp. 19-20.
21. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, January 26-31, 1920, pp. 46-48; August 9-21, 1920, p. 9; September 30-October 6, 1920, p. 29; May 29-June 8, 1922, pp. 77-78.
22. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, January 26-31, 1921, pp. 6-15; April 8-24, 1921, pp. 10-21.
23. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, May 29, 1922, p. 68.
24. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, November 13-25, 1922, pp. 49-50. *International Molders' Journal*, LIX (January, 1923), 37.
25. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, December 3-21, 1923, pp. 12-14.
26. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, *Ibid.*, p. 30; March 17-29, 1924, p. 81.
27. *Ibid.*, 41-52.
28. Perlman and Taft, *Labor Movements*, pp. 580-587.
29. Taft, *Organized Labor*, pp. 484-485; *Minutes of the Executive Board*, May 9-17, 1927, pp. 76-78.
30. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, September 13-21, 1926, pp. 30-36.
31. *Proceedings of the 27th Convention* (Montreal, Quebec, 1928), p. 213; Chartener, "The Molders and Foundry Workers," pp. 247-248.
32. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, March 17-31, 1930, pp. 107-135.
33. *International Molders' Journal*, LXVI (September, 1930), 540-542; Chartener, "The Molders and the Foundry Workers," pp. 249-250.
34. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, November 14-22, 1932, pp. 2-3.
35. Chartener, "The Molders and the Foundry Workers," pp. 251-252. *International Molders Journal*, LXIX (December, 1933), 744.
36. *Proceedings of the 28th Convention* (Chicago, Illinois, 1934), *passim*.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER IV

1. Taft, *Organized Labor*, pp. 468-471.
2. Green made the observation before the A.F. of L. Executive Council, *Ibid.*, 480.
3. International Molders Union of North America, *Proceedings of the 28th Convention* (Chicago, 1934), p. 11; *Minutes of the Executive Board*, November 13-24, 1933, pp. 65-67.
4. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, April 16-May 4, 1934, pp. 39-42.
5. *International Molders Journal*, LXX (July, 1934), 402-405; (September, 1934), 543-545; (May, 1935), 286-287.
6. Chartener, "The Molders and the Foundry Workers," pp. 258-259; *International Molders Journal*, LXXV (June, 1939), 352.
7. Membership figures compiled by Chartener, "The Molders and the Foundry Workers," p. 338.
8. See Harry Stevenson, "C.I.O. Versus A.F. of L." *International Molders Journal*, LXXV (May, 1939), 1-3.
9. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, June 14-23, 1937, pp. 28-30.
10. Lawrence O'Keefe to Officers and Members of Subordinate Unions, June 26, 1937 in *International Molders Journal*, LXXIII (July, 1937), 422-423.
11. This company also ran a separate soil pipe facility in which the Molders successfully negotiated a union shop.
12. Lawrence O'Keefe to the members of the Executive Board, July 14, 1937 in *Petitions and Miscellaneous Documents*, 1935-1938; *International Molders Journal*, LXXIV (March, 1938), 143.
13. Lawrence O'Keefe, to the members of the Executive Board, *ibid.*
14. Lawrence O'Keefe to the Members of the Executive Board, September 22, 1937. *ibid.*; *International Molders Journal*, LXXII (January, 1936), 43; LXXIII, (March, 1937), 161; LXXXX [sic.], (August, 1959), 20; Chartener, "The Molders and Foundry Workers," p. 270.
15. Presidential Address, *Proceedings of the 30th Convention* (Birmingham, Alabama, 1946), p. 2; Chartener, "The Molders and the Foundry Wrokers," pp. 294-295.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER IV – CONTINUED

16. Harry Stevenson to the Members of the Executive Board, April 23, 1943 in *Petitions and Miscellaneous Letters, 1943*.
17. *International Molders Journal*, LXXIV (December, 1938), 739-740; LXXV, (February, 1939), 93-94; (November, 1939), 675; Chartener, "The Molders and Foundry Workers," 271-273. This Agreement broke down in the mid 1960's. According to Carl Studenroth the two key reasons were technology and competition between the soil pipe manufacturers. As of now there are only about 3,000 workers covered by about four separate contracts which account for about 60 percent of the industry.
18. *International Molders Journal*, LXXII (September, 1936), 532; Harry Stevenson to the Members of the Executive Board, November 8, 1938 in *Miscellaneous Petitions and Documents, 1935-1938*. Harry Stevenson, "Greetings," *International Molders' Journal*, LXXV (March, 1939), 131-132.
19. *International Molders Journal*, LXXII (January, 1936), 22; LXXIII, (August, 1937), 412, 483; Chartener, "The Molders and Foundry Workers," p. 273.
20. *International Molders Journal*, LXXIV (March, 1938), 137-138.
21. Chartener, "The Molders and Foundry Workers," pp. 264-268.
22. *Ibid.*, 269.
23. Lawrence O'Keefe to the Members of the Executive Board in *Miscellaneous Petitions and Documents, 1935-1938*; *Minutes of the Executive Board*, November 20, 1938.
24. Harry Stevenson, "Review of 1945," *International Molders Journal*, LXXXII (January, 1946), 3. The Molders generally did not cross C.I.O. picket lines and they paid lockout benefits to their members.
25. *International Molders Journal*, LXXXI (February, 1945), 81; (March, 1945), 132; LXXXII (January, 1946), 3-6.
26. Harry Stevenson, "1919 and 1946", *International Molders Journal*, LXXXII (February, 1946), 70-71.
27. *International Molders Journal*, LXXXV (January, 1948), 3-5, 15; (October, 1948), 501
28. Carl Studenroth, "Collective Bargaining," LXXXI (February, 1945), 138.
29. *International Molders Journal*, LXXIII (March, 1937), 161.
30. *International Molders Journal*, LXXXII (December, 1946), 718; CVII (August, 1971), 7-8.
31. *International Molders Journal*, LXXXV (August, 1949), Interviews with Anton Trizna, June 25, 27, 1976.
32. *International Molders Journal*, LXXXXI [sic.], (December, 1955), 13-14; LXXXII (May, 1946), 266-267; LXXXI (March, 1945), 138.
33. Membership compiled by Chartener, "The Molders and the Foundry Workers," p. 338.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER V

1. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, October 15-20, 1945, pp. 15-18; Robert Menary, "History in the Making," *International Molders Journal*, LXXXII (May, 1946), 269.
2. *International Molders Journal*, LXXI (January, 1935), 45; (February, 1935), 105-107; LXXXVI (May, 1950), 1-8. The area to the east of the building has recently been designated as a national historic preservation district. To the south the office is bordered by Edgecliff College and the largest park in Cincinnati. The headquarters is only five minutes away from Xavier University, the University of Cincinnati, and the newly established National Environmental Protection Agency Research Center.
3. *International Molders Journal*, LXXXV (August, 1949), 507; Presidential Report, *Proceedings of the 31st Convention* (Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1951), p. 6; M.I.R.A. – I.M.U. of N.A. Contract Agreement, 1951, Research and Education Department, International Molders and Allied Workers Union.
4. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, November 12-17, 1956, p. 18; *International Molders Journal*, LXXXXVIII [sic.] (August, 1961), 9.

5. William Cates, "Procedure Followed in Dissolving The Death Benefit Fund" n.d., n.p. As of July, 1976 The Molders Union still had approximately a 7 million dollar liability under the death benefits fund.
6. Presidential Report, *Proceedings of the 31st Convention*, p. 5; Interview with Carl Studenroth, June 27, 1976.
7. Interview with Anton Trizna, June 27, 1976; *Proceedings of the 32nd Convention* (Toronto, Ontario 1956), p. 180.
8. *Proceedings of the 33rd Convention* (Cincinnati, Ohio 1961), pp. 147-148; Interview with Anton Trizna and Carl Studenroth, June 27, 1976.
9. Presidential Report, *Proceedings of the 35th Convention* (Cincinnati, Ohio 1971), p. 6; Interview with James E. Wolfe, July 2, 1976
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. James E. Wolfe, "Changing Times-Changing Techniques," *International Molders Journal*, CIV (December, 1968), 21-29.
13. William Cates, "Membership Memorandum," July 6, 1976.
14. Interviews with Carl Studenroth, June 27, 1976; William Cates, July 2, 1976; *Proceedings of the 32 Convention*, p. 126.
15. *International Molders Journal*, LXXXXVI [sic.] (December, 1960), 12-13., *Minutes of the Executive Board*, November 12-17, 1956, p. 16; Interviews with William Cates and Carl Studenroth.
16. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, May 14-24, 1956, pp. 17-18; Interviews with William Cates and Carl Studenroth.
17. *Minutes of the Executive Board*, October 12-19, 1960, pp. 1-2; Interview with William Cates.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Interview with James E. Wolfe, but see the *Journal* for the decade of the 1960's.
20. *Proceedings of the 34th Convention* (San Francisco, California, 1966), p. 97; Interview with Carl Studenroth.
21. Cates, "Procedure Followed in Dissolving the Death Benefit," 2. *Proceedings of the 33rd Convention*, p. 147; *Proceedings of the 34th Convention*, p. 82.
22. Presidential Reports of Draper Doyal and Anton Trizna; Manuscripts, Research and Education office, International Molders Union.

APPENDIX

International Molders and Allied Workers Union

Founded July 5, 1859

1225 East McMillan Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45206

International Officers


<i>President</i>	Anton J. Trizna
<i>First Vice-President</i>	Carl Studenroth
<i>Second Vice-President</i>	Bernard Butsavage
<i>Third Vice-President</i>	Ernest Fish
<i>Fourth Vice-President</i>	Michael J. Kogut
<i>Fifth Vice-President</i>	Orian Williams
<i>Sixth Vice-President</i>	Charles A. Boyd
<i>Seventh Vice-President</i>	George Roper
<i>Eighth Vice-President</i>	Paul D. Parker
<i>Ninth Vice-President</i>	Jarrell F. Legg
<i>Secretary</i>	William F. Cates
<i>Assistant Secretary</i>	Andrew Swafford
<i>Financier-Auditor</i>	Stan J. Mierzejewski
<i>Treasurer</i>	Roland O. Belanger
<i>Editor</i>	Edward F. Wulf

Executive Board

Harry C. Augusti	Alex Grant
Jarrell F. Legg	Stan J. Mierzejewski
Ernest Fish	William F. Cates
	Carl Studenroth

Research and Education Department

<i>Director</i>	James E. Wolfe
<i>Assistant</i>	John A. Bruning



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

James E. Cebula was born in Dupont, Pennsylvania, July 28, 1942. He grew up there because it was a mining town and his father was a coal miner and a member of the United Mine Workers Union.

His mother supplemented the family income (Jim is the 5th of six children) by working in a garment shop, where she was a member of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union.

Jim taught high school in Pennsylvania and at East Stroudsburg State College before coming to Cincinnati. Currently, he is an associate professor of history at the University of Cincinnati.

He received his Ph.D. in history in 1972 from the University of Cincinnati. Jim is the author of a biography of James M. Cox, an Ohio journalist and politician, as well as numerous articles on American history.

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