The Biopolitics of Memory in Transnational Circuits:
Lifted Tongues and Cloned Dogs
by
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A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Rhetoric and the Designated Emphasis in Women, Gender and Sexuality in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley

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Spring 2014
Abstract

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The Biopolitics of Memory: Lifted Tongues and Cloned Pets explores an ethics of memory in a time when bodies are modified, reproduced, and disposed of in transnational circuits. This exploration raises two overarching questions. First, how do we carry memories of others when bodies and images intermingle at the intersection of biotechnology and virtual media? Second, what do such memories tell us about the uneven circuits within which these bodies circulate across the differences in sex, race, species, and nation? Critically engaging with the ethics of mourning, this dissertation searches for an ethics of memory that approaches bodies not as a fulcrum of abjection, but as regenerative interfaces in which collective memories are composed through encounters with other bodies.

The dissertation concerns two sets of technologically intervened bodies, which embody “cuts” in cultural and biological memories. The first part examines the question of the diasporic tongue and its bearing on cultural memories. It begins with a scene from the South Korean film Tongue Tie, in which a boy undergoes surgery upon his tongue to improve his English pronunciation. My analysis explores the biopolitical implications of this surgically lifted tongue in the age of globalization – refiguring it in conjunction with the visceral tongue in Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s literature and video works, with American accent training in Indian call centers, and with the theories of Walter Benjamin, and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. I argue that these wounded tongues perform the memories of displacement in their buffering and stuttering speech, carrying the potential to disrupt operation of the major language through their materiality.

The second part of this dissertation asks how genetic reproducibility revises the politics of mourning, exploring commercial dog-cloning services – provided primarily by Korean scientists for grieving dog owners in the US. I challenge the prevailing criticism that clones are biomimetic replacements (to forego the process of mourning) by examining how this imaginary is ironically reversed in the rhetoric both of the pet cloning industry and of customers who cloned their dogs. I then shift focus to the intermingling of the various bodies involved in cloning, and argue that dog cloning produces memorable bodies by making other bodies invisible and even disposable. I especially trace the disappearance of former surrogate-mother dogs – said to be slaughtered for human consumption – by examining how the discourses of “animal welfare”
(raised by Western critiques), Korean nationalism, and the sex/species hierarchy shape the rhetorical and material landscape of the effacement of these bodies.

This new biopolitics of memory focusing on corporeal assemblages urges us to reimagine our relationship with other beings – human, animal, and technology. However, this approach does not necessarily lead to a declaration of the egalitarianism of all beings, but rather asks us to think about the complexity of the value and forms of life in transnational circuits. Furthermore, the biopolitics of memory allows us to envision “kinship in spite of kind” not as a given, but as an ethical choreography of embodied interrelations across sex, race, and species.
To my father, Yoon Dong-Min,
who left me beautiful memories.

And to my mother, Wi Jung-Mee,
who lights candles for him.
Acknowledgements

I’ve been graced with a remarkable dissertation committee. My heartfelt thanks go to my chair, Trinh T. Minh-ha, who has been a wonderful mentor and teacher in every sense. When I asked her to be my advisor back in my first year at Berkeley, she told me that she expects from her students shared spirit more than shared fields of knowledge. Throughout my time as a graduate student, she taught me what that mysterious word “spirit” might mean through her formidable scholarship, poetic wisdom, trusting patience, and kind generosity, combined with keen (but necessary) criticism. If this dissertation can present even a modicum of that spirit, it would be my great honor and pleasure. My deep thanks to Shannon Jackson for her depth and breadth of knowledge, engagement, and guidance. An unforgettable seminar in Performance Theory with her transformed my vision of writing and scholarly practice. I am also deeply grateful to Charis Thompson for her inspiring commentaries, unfailing encouragement, and sparkling presence. Her brilliant scholarship charmed me into the field of feminist STS, and working with her added new dimensions to my transdisciplinary approach.

The faculty, staff, and colleagues in the Department of Rhetoric at UC Berkeley have given me a rigorous intellectual community as well as generous administrative and financial support. I am especially grateful to Marianne Constable, Samera Esmeir, Maxine Fredericksen, Marcus Norman, and Michael Wintroub. I am also immensely indebted to my cohorts and dissertation writing group members: Mark Minch and Keerthi Potluri. Mark has been a superb intellectual interlocutor, co-instructor, and friend – a true source of support (and silly troubles) – since my first day at Berkeley. Keerthi has been a keen, insightful, and supportive reader, whose wonderful company offered a critical mind, beautiful sarcasm, and a shared love for whisky and yoga.

The Designated Emphasis in Women, Gender, and Sexuality at UC Berkeley has been another venue of intellectual, challenging, and supportive encounters. My special thanks go to the members of the spring 2012 Gender and Women’s Studies dissertation writing seminar: Minoo Moallem, Sole Anatrone, Chris Atwood, Marc Boucai, Mark Minch, Amy Shen, and Julie Stein. I would also like to acknowledge all the students I’ve been fortunate to teach in both the Department of Rhetoric and the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies. I somehow had a perfect group of students every single semester, and I learned a lot from them.

Earlier versions of dissertation material were presented at Funny Kinds of Love (a conference sponsored by Center for Science, Technology, Medicine, and Society at Berkeley) and PostNatural (a conference by the Society for Literature, Science, and the Arts) in 2013. The insightful questions and thoughtful comments at these presentations greatly contributed to my dissertation. I’m also grateful to those who edited and proofread varying stages of the manuscripts, especially Matthew Ritchie.

Sooam Biotech Research Foundation has shown warm hospitality to me. Woo Suk Hwang, Tae Young Shin, Yeon Woo Jeong, and other scientists have kindly arranged meetings, shown me around the facility, explained the cloning process, and shared information. I also deeply appreciate “Eric” for sharing the story of cloning his dogs. The Berkeley Art Museum and
Pacific Film Archive generously allowed me to screen Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s video pieces, over and over.

My scholarship at Berkley wouldn’t be the same without the fabulous feminist scholars, comrades, and friends I’ve met at the Interdisciplinary Program in Gender Studies and through numerous feminist networks at Seoul National University. Special thanks to Chin-Sung Chung, Tae-Hwan Kwon, Hyun-Ah Yang, Jung-Sook Han, Eun-Kyung Bae, Jiyeon Chang, Sunhyung Lee, Ga-Chung Boo, Eunkyoung Choi, Myung-Sook Kim-Shin, Yeonbo Jeong, Jung-Mi Park, Hye-Rim Park, Hye-Jin Um, Bo-myung Kim and Hye-eun Jun.

I would especially like to offer words of heartfelt gratitude to my dear friends Jiyeon Kang, Choi Myungwon, Jung-hee Jin, and Seunghyun Yang. They have been incredible sources of support in times of academic and personal challenges, delightful partners in crime to travel with, and companions for wonderful conversation both over the phone and in person.

And, while this might come somewhat out of the blue, I must say thank you to my adult ballet class teachers at the Academy of Ballet: Zory Karah and Joshua Trader. Despite their different pedagogical styles, both offered an infectious passion that allowed me to maintain and rediscover my love for scholarship during the trying years of completing this dissertation.

Last but never least, I’ve been blessed with the most supportive and loving family anyone could ask for. Ever since I realized that my father wouldn’t see me finish this dissertation, I’ve feared that whatever I could say in these acknowledgements would be unbearably insufficient. I have hundreds of images, but could never find the right words. For now, let me just express my deepest gratitude to my father, for everything he’s given me. Thank you dad. I love you. I also offer my profound gratitude for my mother’s unwavering love, devotion, and belief in her daughter. She taught me grace and resilience, without which I could never have made it this far. Thank you to my younger brother Seung-jun Yoon, who supplied so many tasty snacks and drinks while I was writing in Seoul, and to my younger sister Haeyoung Yoon for being such a wonderful “sis.” She makes my life brighter with her loving and radiating energy. And thank you to my brother-in-law, Sun-kyu Park, for his kindness and support.

While this dissertation has my name on it, it is the result of generous collaboration and support from these teachers, colleagues, friends, and family (and many more), and I will always be grateful.
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Memories, Flickering

The thoughts in this dissertation began to take form at a time in my life when I encountered a series of events that brought a sense of loss, of vulnerability, and even (although it perhaps sounds inappropriate) of excitement – at both the individual and collective level. In hindsight, one image in particular has followed me throughout my research: the flickering nightscape of Seoul in 2008. The image found its way to me via YouTube during my prolonged recess from world news after leaving a journalist position in Seoul for graduate school in Berkeley.

That year a huge wave of candlelight vigils swept through South Korea, protesting the resumption of US beef imports that had been suspended after the outbreak of “mad cow” disease (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) in the US in 2003. Hundreds of thousands of people with candles crowded downtown Seoul and other Korean cities every night for months, and the Internet was flooded by innumerable articles, images, and videos – creating a virtual parallel of the vigils in the streets. During these vigils, participants deployed witty tactics against a Korean government bent on suppressing the movement, reminiscent of the actions of Korea’s military government in the 1970s. President Yi Myung Bak was nicknamed the disrespectful “2MB” (a pun on the initial of his name, as “Yi” and “2” are homophones in Korean), ridiculing the incapacity of his anachronistic leadership in the contemporary world. The flickering candles and blinking Internet-space seemed to signal a “politics of night,” a new phase of democracy in South Korea where ordinary people politicized the issues of food, health, and security as matters of “life” against the currents of neoliberal globalization.

However, in the language of “the politics of life” or “the sovereignty of people,” this movement addressed the potentially contaminating cows as an abject to be defended against, rather than as other lives that share with humans the precariousness (to be contaminated), which had been largely produced by the modern meat industry.¹ Fearing human infection from potentially contaminated meat, the protesters often called out “michin so” (slang for “mad cow”) in their slogans, songs, and posters, where the “madness” of the diseased cow was deployed rhetorically in order to accuse both the Korean and American governments of unreasonable decisions, and to reduce the cows to the mere matter of contagious meat – the contemptible Other. In this politics of night, the cows were effaced, not in the absence of representation but in their very madness – their very vulnerability.

However, although this new phase of popular democracy was figured by the limitless memory and mobility of the digital, it has reiterated rather than reimagined the border of the immunitarian community. One might rethink the permeable boundaries between nations as well as between human and animal bodies by remembering the dark instances of flickering lights in

¹ “The abject” literally means those who are cast off, rejected, and wretched. This term has been theorized by Julia Kristeva as what is ejected by “I” (to enter into the symbolic order), but does not cease to challenge the master “I” – by reminding of his connection to the maternal body, and thereby, of his corporeality. Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). In this dissertation, “the abject” refers more broadly to that which is debased and abandoned within biopolitical relations.
which these cows were forgotten. As such, the flickering nightscape of Seoul – its interstices of light and darkness – is the image of this dissertation.

**Biopolitics of Memory: Rethinking Ethics of Mourning**

And the person or thing photographed is the target, the referent, a kind of little simulacrum, any *eidolon* emitted by the object, which I should like to call the *Spectrum* of the Photograph, because this word retains, through its root, a relation to “spectacle” and adds to it that rather terrible thing which is there in every photograph: the return of the dead. ~ Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida*.

This dissertation searches for an ethics of memory in a time when bodies and images are modified, reproduced, and disposed of in transnational circuits. For this purpose it raises two overarching questions, which interweave throughout. The first question seems simple enough: how do we carry memories of others when bodies and images intermingle at the intersection of biotechnology and virtual media? This question concerns how new forms of embodiment (which have accelerated in a time of biotechnology, informatics, and globalization) refigure an ethics of memory that has traditionally been based on the division between body and image. As shown in the passage from *Camera Lucida* – written as Barthes searched through the photographs of his recently deceased mother – the distinction between object and referent of memory affords the space of remembrance. Jacques Derrida, writing upon the death of Barthes himself, attests that “we are prey to the ghostly power of the supplement,” the unlocatable force of ghosts that are “the concept of the other in the same … the completely other, dead, living in me.”

In other words, the work of mourning for Derrida is to be haunted by the memories of the dead – as the images living within me, yet as the completely other who cannot be fully assimilated within me. However, this seemingly ontological question regarding the relation between body and image has political implications, given the significance of “body” and “life” in the operation of power relations in modern society. Biopolitics, as most famously defined by Michel Foucault, addresses a new form of power “to make live and let die” (“biopower”), which through the advance of modernity eventually replaced the old form of sovereign power “to take life or let live.” In particular, biopolitics refers to the regulatory mechanisms and technologies of the power-knowledge complex (*dispositif*) that addresses “man-as-living-being,” and ultimately “man-as-species.” Consequently, a biopolitical approach interrogates the making of life worth living (or not), and how this division is related to the operation of species both within the human species and in relation to other species. While Foucault’s concept of biopolitics has been reinterpreted and challenged throughout the genealogy of biopolitical theories, this dissertation engages with these discourses as they relate to the ambivalent status of “bodies” as living beings that emerge through (and potentially overflow) biopolitical dispositives. In other words, the

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4 Ibid., 242.
dissertation explores the political and ethical possibility of remembrance as a tool for reflecting on and intervening into the power relations surrounding the various forms of bodies within a biopolitical construct.

My research engages with postcolonial, feminist, and biopolitical discourses on an ethics of memory that obligates us to remember others – especially their suffering and loss – as an act of recognition and respect. In this sense, an ethics of memory often emerges as a form of an ethics of mourning (as both Derrida and Barthes suggest). In this kind of discourse, the recollection of traumatic or erased memories – often through media such as autobiography, oral history, art, and psychological therapy – is endowed with ethical and political values as the resistance against and remedy for dominant narratives of war, holocaust, migration, slavery, and sexual violence.5

The spectrum and depth of the discourses around such an ethics make any attempt to map out the terrain in a short introductory space patchy at best, so let me focus on the ethics of memory as it relates to the embodiedness within biopolitical relations. In *Precarious Life*, Judith Butler postulates that (the possibility of) loss of someone through violence is, due to the embodied interdependence among human subjects, a social and political condition that we cannot will away.6 Mourning displays the recognition of such primary ties with others, and therefore is a political act of performing who counts as a grievable life and who does not – and therefore, who belongs to humanity as a political community and who does not. In this sense, ungrieved loss shows a disavowal of our tie with others, and therefore a complicity with violence against them. Drawing upon the Levinasian notion of *face* (the face of other that demands an ethics of nonviolence), Butler finds such disavowed mourning in the praxis of representation that defaces the other through radical eradication or symbolic disidentification. As such, it does not resolve the problem to bring the other into the realm of representation if this does not also render the suffering and absence of the other recognizable and grievable. For representation to convey the suffering of the other, Butler argues, “representation must not only fail, but it must show its failure” – because human suffering and death is at the limit of our representational practice.7 Butler’s discussion offers insight into the political aspect of mourning as an ethical measure of relationships with others, as well as a critical tool for examining the practice of representation in reference to lives that exceeds the capturability of that representation.

But, what about vulnerable bodies that do not have a *human* face? And further, how do we even recognize a human face when doing so is itself part of the problem? Butler’s ethics of mourning presupposes human vulnerability due to the interdependency and the recognition of it.

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7 Ibid., 144.
However, the ontological and psychological conditions do not neatly align with the human and non-human boundary – which is also a social construct, as Butler’s discussion shows. The relationships between human beings are often non-symmetrical, and are susceptible to varying forms and degrees of injury. In addition, significant parts of these interdependent relations include non-human beings as well. This suggests the necessity of revising Butler’s discussion beyond a mechanical expansion of the circle to include non-human beings. However, Butler’s approach to mourning as a measure of whose life counts and whose doesn’t (as a valuable member of humanity) can be transposed as a tool for examining how we value the life of human and non-human beings embedded within different kinds of interdependence. To that end, this dissertation rethinks the ethics of memory alongside a critical examination of the boundary of the human subject and its bearing on the order of embodied lives within and across that boundary. Theories of memory that can account for differently embodied lives have become necessary as uncertainty accelerates regarding the distinctions among human, animal, and machine – as well as between body and image – in a time of biotechnology and virtual media. Critical thinkers in animal studies, disability studies, ethnic racial studies, postcolonial theory, posthumanism, feminist STS, and media theory have made significant contributions to rearticulating the concept of subject and its (im)materiality. Working upon the fertile (if labyrinthine) ground they have provided, here I address a few of these critical thinkers whose refigurations of subjectivity this dissertation is in conversation with.

In response to the call for a new epistemology and ontology in a time when communication technology and biotechnology are recrafting our bodies, Donna Haraway provided the figure of a cyborg – “a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction.” Haraway argues that we are already cyborgs, referring to the shuffling boundaries between human and animal, organism and machine, physical and nonphysical. While the figure of the cyborg suggests a new ethics based on affinities (not identities) and regeneration (not phallogocentric rebirth), Haraway moves further in this direction in her more recent discussions of companion species. Examining human and animal relations, she argues for an ethics of responsibility that emerges from interaction with “significant others” – the others who are radically different from us and non-symmetrically interconnected to us. From this perspective, instrumentality and necessity are not things that one can transcend, but rather the conditions under which one must respond to others in a specific situation. This ethics of “response-ability” demands a critical examination of ethics of memory, pointing to the limits of a humanist convention that relies on the dichotomy between subject and abject (such as bios/zoe, grievable/ungrievable life), and instead calling for a situated ethics of responding to the suffering and death of other beings within non-innocent and asymmetrical entanglement.

Rosi Braidotti directly discusses how such a reconfiguration of subjectivity for technologically and globally mediated beings – who are non-unitary, nomadic, and yet can

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9 Donna J. Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).
account for trajectories – bears upon the ethics of mourning.\textsuperscript{10} Drawing upon a new materialist and bio-centered egalitarian perspective, she aims beyond the tradition of biopolitics focused on control and regulation of bodies by paying attention to the vital force (life in its inhuman face) that escapes biopolitical control. This vital force is not bound to the modern human subject in Western philosophical tradition, but instead concerns the self-organizing flows of intensities between bodies. Furthermore, memory arises from the composition of the flow of these forces with a modicum of creative work of imagination, within which we transform in assemblage with other bodies – like becoming minoritarian, in Deleuze and Guattari’s language.\textsuperscript{11} From this perspective, Braidotti suggests a leap from an ethics of mourning to an ethics of memory that concerns how we carry within us memories of others in their partial and fragmented inhabitation. Braidotti’s affirmative theory offers a forceful tool for reimagining an ethics of memories that can account for the various bodies produced, transformed, and disposed of in the currents of bio- and info-technologies and post-industrial capitalism. However, her new-materialist and egalitarian emphasis on the vital force (which transcends organic, so-called “living” beings) risks flattening the differences between the various forms of bodies across the intricate and hierarchal webs of entanglement, and therefore also risks becoming incapable of informing which lives over others we are ethically obligated to consider and care for, and how.

Braidotti’s affirmative ethics of memories does not supersede the ethics of mourning discussed earlier, but neither does a conversation between these two threads of thought lead to a seamless synthesis. Rather, interventions between the two positions operate as a constant point of differentiation for recomposing the ethics of memory throughout this dissertation. In other words, the movement between the two positions is that of “crossing,” the meaning of which is investigated in the following section.

\textit{Transnational Circuits: Circles, Borders, and Crossings}

To pass over the bridge to something else, you’ll have to give up partial organization of self, erroneous bits of knowledge, outmoded beliefs of who you are, your comfortable identities. ~ Gloria Anzaldúa, “Now Let Us Shift … The Path of Conocimiento …”

The second overarching question of this dissertation adds spatial and temporal complexity to the first: how do movements of bodies and images within transnational circuits bear upon the memories they convey? This analysis explores the circulation, proliferation, alteration, and disposition of bodies within and across borders through a biopolitical frame, and examines how this frame shapes (and is shaped by) the memories of these bodies. Furthermore, the question impacts the methodology of this dissertation itself – engaging with writing as the practice of remembrance of these bodies, and with research as a movement probing geographical, disciplinary, and affective territories and borders. As such, analyzing “transnational circuits” (and its components, “transnational” and “circuits”) demands consideration of the border and the passage at the same time.


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 170-73.
Here, I use “circuits” to mobilize two registers of meaning. First, it concerns the configurations of cultural, economic, scientific, and other institutions mediated through informational technology and biotechnology (in the wide sense of technology concerning living bodies). Similarly, in “A Cyborg Manifesto” Haraway introduces the notion “integrated circuit” to describe “the situation of women in a world so intimately restructured through the social relations of science and technology.” Haraway’s somewhat archaic use of the expression “social relations” better evokes the power relationships among the points of connection, as well as among the bodies circulating within the circuit, than the alternative “the assemblage” does (as the political valences of the latter term are often neutralized if they are not specified). However, I deploy the term in a more expansive way to address various forms of living and non-living bodies (not limited to women), and to emphasize the heterogeneity of institutions brought into these circuits. Second, “circuits” refers to trajectories that are enclosed circles of the similar as well as passages from one side to another. They are pre-designed and well-beaten, but also contain various probable routes and possibilities for leakage, occlusion, and fibrillation. The concept of circuits enables more accurate analysis of the currents and resistance of bodies and images alongside their trajectories – paving the narrow path between neoliberal-capitalist versions of celebratory nomadism and deterministic criticisms of the technological and social subjugation of subjects in the contemporary world.

These preliminary discussions of “circuits” lead us to a better position from which to critically consider what “transnational” circuits actually are. As I use it, the term “transnational” is deeply indebted to the conversations between transnational feminism and postcolonial theories, which include gender, class, race, and colonial history in the analysis of the modern world. Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan use “transnational” to refer to what “signals the attention to uneven and dissimilar circuits of culture and capital,” and “reflect[s] our need to destabilize rather than maintain boundaries of nation, race, and gender”; this is distinct from “international,” which is based on the “existing configurations of nation-states as discrete and sovereign entities.” From this perspective, transnational circuits do not consist of the plain links between nation-states, but of asymmetrical trajectories between heterogeneous spaces invested with a history of power relations – not only between nations, but also among gender, race, and systems of belief within and across national boundaries. This dissertation attempts to offer a necessarily partial cartography of these circuits by tracing the textures and rhythms of their trajectories.

In this sense, writing on (and within) transnational circuits pays attention to geographical and historical specificity. However, time and space here do not intersect like the x and y axes of the Cartesian coordinate system; rather, they concern a different way of considering temporality and spatiality. In Modernity at Large, Arjun Appadurai finds the most distinctive features of modern subjectivity in a new way of inhabiting the imaginary social and cultural spaces created

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by the transnational flow of people and images.\textsuperscript{14} Since the mid-1990s when \textit{Modernity at Large} was published, the rapid growth of informational media and biotechnology has amplified the transnational flow of bodies and images. This further recomposes imaginary time and space, making Appadurai’s proposition more relevant than ever: “We cannot simplify matters by imagining that the global is to space what the modern is to time. For many societies, modernity is an elsewhere, just as the global is a temporal wave that must be encountered in their present.”\textsuperscript{15}

Then, to write about transnational circuits is also to think about the time/space that Trinh T. Minh-ha calls “elsewhere, within here.” While this concept appears in many of Trinh’s works (and therefore its meaning changes each time), in her book \textit{Elsewhere, Within Here} it points to the seemingly paradoxical forms of life at the intersection of dwelling and traveling in the time of homelessness, and to the imaginability of such a paradox.\textsuperscript{16} Reflections on this kind of paradoxical life call for crossing the normative binaries between here and there, between reality and fantasy, in order to re-envision the possibility of living in both worlds. Her discussion of “elsewhere, within here” becomes even more insightful as the widely celebrated dissolution of the borders in a “global village” is accompanied by the reinforcement of borders and proliferation of fences in the name of homeland security. However, such a crossing is a transformative process that might be threatening to the old self, a notion that Trinh evokes by reciting an ancient story told by master musician Hazrat Inayat Khan.\textsuperscript{17} In this story, there is a wall, and whoever climbs it to look at the other side happily jumps over and never returns. One day, a climber was chained down by those who were curious to know what lay on the other side but would not risk losing what they already had on this side. However, to their disappointment, as soon as he looked at the other side the climber became mute. Yet, this muteness is not a lack of language, but instead the gaining of a new language for one who dares to live elsewhere within here.

This dissertation intensifies the transformative potential of “transnational circuits” by engaging with critical theories of difference and crossing boundaries – such as Derrida’s “the other-others,” Haraway’s “significant others,” and Trinh’s “the inappropriate/d other.” These theories offer examinations of the subversive potentiality of crossing and inhabiting borders, not only between the categories of gender, race, species, and nation, but also between different media (including body, language, and image). To rethink subversive potentiality must necessarily involve some analysis of the precarious affects of crossing, which arguably has been at the heart of queer theories and the feminisms of women of color. In particular, recent conversations between theories of transsexuality and animal studies (and posthumanist theories as well) have regenerated the pungent transgressive valence of crossing, as Mel Chen’s

\textsuperscript{14} Arjun Appadurai, \textit{Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 3, italics in the original.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 9.


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 1-2.
discussion of toxicity and Harlan Weaver’s reevaluation of monstrosity illustrate. These kinds of affects arising from encountering across differences pervade the movements within transnational circuits. In conversations with the discourses on crossing, this dissertation invites us to re-envision what is “trans-” about transnational circuits, and in reverse to refigure what the radical difference might mean alongside the transnational movement of bodies and images.

The political and affective valence of “trans-” also pervades this dissertation as a transdisciplinary project. The sites of research spread from film, literature, and news reports to science labs and the dog-meat industry – mostly in and between South Korea and the US, but not limited to them. The research moves around and across these sites by utilizing ideas from various disciplines, including biopolitics, postcolonial theories, transnational feminisms, queer animal studies, literary theories, and cultural studies. These disciplines are themselves transdisciplinary to the extent that a list of them evokes the kind of oddity that Foucault described after reading Borges’s quotes in a “certain Chinese encyclopedia” in which animals were divided into categories: “(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification ….” However, the shattering of categories and collapse of the planes of categorization is often necessary, not the least because this dissertation aims to re-examine the normative order of things (such as human/animal/machine), and also because it questions what kinds of matter are adequate for certain kinds of discipline (for example, what kind of life is eligible for bioethical consideration?), and how such production and circulation of knowledge is embedded within the power relations co-constitutive with the order of things.

To expand the biopolitical implication of this transdisciplinary approach, I borrow the figure of “feral” from Mel Chen, who uses this term to describe her shifting archives that refuse to “answer whether they constitute proper or complete coverage” for the matching discipline. Through the figure of feral, Chen evokes ambivalent identification with “antihomes, since it both rejects the domicile and reinvigorates a notion of public shelter” and with “diaspora and its potential to naturalize nationalisms and capitalist geopolitics.” Chen’s discussion of the ferality of her transdisciplinary research suggests a metonymic (rather than metaphoric) connection between the epistemological order of things and the biopolitical order of bodies. The transdisciplinary approach of this dissertation, then, is a way of finding and reanimating what is “feral” about the bodies within transnational circuits. Here, the figure of the feral intimates a dynamic between the elusive bodies and the capturing power, unsettling the binary between


20 Chen, Animacies, 18. Through the figure of “feral,” Chen develops the term “in indirect conversation with” Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell, who use this figure to express reluctance about the domestication of loci and methods within disciplinary formations in disability, postcolonial, and queer studies (19).

21 Ibid., 19.
wild/domestic and belonging/exclusion. In other words, this dissertation attempts to refigure the subversive potential of inappropriately-displaced and boundary-crossing bodies, but without losing sight of the regulating and disciplining forces.

**Figures as Research Method**

This dissertation consists of two parts, each of which concerns a group of technologically intervened bodies within transnational circuits, particularly across South Korea and the US. The first part explores memories of displacement and crossing borders via figures of diasporic tongues: a Korean boy’s tongue, surgically altered to facilitate fluent English pronunciation in the short film “Tongue Tie” (2003); and the visceral tongue and mouth in Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s text *Dictee* and video “Mouth to Mouth.” The second part asks how genetic reproducibility bears upon the ethics of mourning, through an examination of the transnational pet-cloning industry. Prominent figures in the analysis include the cloned pets themselves (mostly dogs) and other animals involved in cloning (such as surrogate-mother dogs), as well as the scientists and human-egg donors in animal cloning and stem-cell research.

By calling these bodies *figures*, I borrow Haraway’s conceptualization of the term as a feminist methodology. Haraway characterizes figures as “not representations or didactic illustrations, but rather material-semiotic nodes or knots in which diverse bodies and meanings coshape one another.”\(^{22}\) As figures, the surgically-lifted tongue, the animals involved in pet cloning, and other vulnerable bodies cannot be reduced to mere meat as the locus of an exercise of power, because doing so would ignore the potential of these bodies in the creation of reality. Nor can they be reduced to metaphors of such subjugations, because this disregards their embodied entanglement with us. Haraway refers to an eighteenth-century edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary*, which defines *figuration* as “chimerical vision”; figures intimate the envisioning potentiality of being “at the same time creatures of imagined possibility and creatures of fierce and ordinary reality.”\(^{23}\) It is in this sense that figures have been used in feminist and other critical theories as a method for working between descriptive precision and transformative vision – sometimes even without using the term “figure.” Haraway’s cyborgs and her *oncornouse*, Trinh’s inappropriate/d other, and Chen’s toads show figuration as a method of feminist critique, whose diagnostic and revisionary stories are put into conversation with each other through the course of this dissertation.

If the concept of figure is conceived as the material-semiotic nods that envision alternative stories, then the surgically-moderated tongue and the cloned pets are figures *par excellence*. The tongue as a figure of the organ of language and the clones as a figure of a living image both articulate and disarticulate the relationship between body and image (between the semiotic and material), the question of which is at the heart of the ethics of embodied memory. Furthermore, the figures in my research also intimate “cuts” in these embodied memories, as they undergo technological intervention. However, this dissertation does not approach these wounded bodies as a mere fulcrum of biopolitical abjection. Instead, it attends to how biopolitical interventions generate the interspaces where collective memories are composed

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\(^{22}\) Haraway, *When Species Meet*, 4.

\(^{23}\) Ibid.
through encountering with other bodies in specific historical and geographical configurations. In this sense, this dissertation also takes part in the composition of such the memories of these figures – how they inhabit, move around, transform, and are effaced within transnational circuits.
Part One. Lifted Tongue:  
Diasporic Language and Memories of Crossing

The blank moment is shattered by the voice of a boy merrily singing the Alphabet Song. The voice repeats the letter R like a broken record, slowly turning into echoes from afar.

Now the screen is occupied with the close-up image of a tongue on an operating table. Cut by knives and threaded by wires, it strains even to writhe.

The moaning of the boy, mixed with the noise of the suction machine, is punctuated by the speech of the doctor and the mother.

Encountering medical technology and disciplining speech, the tongue is prominently an organ, flesh and blood.

Jinpyo Park’s “Tongue Tie” portrays surgery on a South Korean boy’s tongue to improve his English pronunciation.¹ The film is a response to, or a variation of, a series of news reports regarding affluent Korean parents – mostly mothers – who have surgeons sever the ligament under the tongues of their children to help them master the R sound, which Koreans often collapse into L. Stories about this surgery have been offered in the media in both South Korea and the US. The Los Angeles Times article “Some in S. Korea Opt for a Trim When English Trips the Tongue” was immediately repeated by news media in Korea, including Chosun Ilbo, Hankook Ilbo, Hankyoreh, YTN, and Ohmynews.² A few years later, another series of reports based on an Associated Press article appeared in Korean media, mostly based on “Tongue Tie.”³

However, among such articles there is only one verified story, which was introduced in the LA Times: Dr. Nam, who has a clinic in the Apgujung district (a wealthy neighborhood in Seoul renowned for luxurious boutiques and plastic-surgery clinics), performs such procedures

¹ “Tongue-Tie,” directed by Jin-pyo Park [in Korean] is one of six short films comprising the omnibus If You Were Me, directed by Kyun-dong Yeo et al. (2003; Seoul: Chungeorahm Film, 2003), VHS. If You Were Me was commissioned by the National Human Rights Commission of the Republic of Korea.


for better English pronunciation, generally on children younger than five. Most articles merely note that although there are no statistics, tongue surgery for this purpose is said to be widespread in Seoul’s wealthiest district. Another article addressing specific facts reports that this kind of surgery is also being performed in Jinju (a relatively small city in the south), but provides no evidence other than a local doctor who says, “I am not sure if the surgeries are done to improve English pronunciation, but recently there have been some inquiries on the surgery.”

The paucity of factual evidence in these reports does not necessarily point to the falsity of the reports. Rather, it suggests that these stories form a cultural repertoire, performing the collective meaning of the English craze that has overtaken South Korea over the past couple of decades. The approach to these stories of tongue surgery in contemporary South Korea as a cultural repertoire makes more sense when read in and against figurations of the tongue as a topos of colonial subjection and resistance in history, and in consideration of their geographical variation – there is also a report of Chinese using tongue surgery to improve English pronunciation, and of a British girl (a big fan of Korean pop culture) who had tongue surgery to improve Korean pronunciation.

Alluding to the apparent absurdity of an English craze that has gone so far as finding resolution in surgery, these stories as cultural repertoire have produced an ambiguous space – a space of tragic farce, evoking and interweaving discourses of nationalism, class inequality, and globalization in South Korea. Since 1990s, the prevailing discourse of segyehwa (literally “worldization,” with implications of neoliberalist and national-developmentalist strategy to adapt to and succeed in the globalizing world) has stirred up the necessity of English in the global era. But, at the same time, the growing inequality in educational opportunities – especially the limited access to private English education or the opportunity to study abroad – has become a sensitive social issue in South Korea involving both class mobility and national identity. The circulation of these stories reflects suspicions regarding the intensifying influence of English as cultural and

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4 Demic, “Some in S. Korea Opt for a Trim When English Trips the Tongue.”


7 For critical discussion on the ideological and discursive construction of English in South Korea, see Hyu-Yong Park, “Segyehwasidae-eu yeong-ehakteup yeolgie daehan bipanjeok damron bunseok” [Critical discourse analysis of the “English-learning” boom: in the lens of social symbolization], Saho-eoneohak 14.2 (2006); and Joseph Sung-Yul Park, Globalization, Language, and Social Order: Ideologies of English in South Korea (PhD diss., UC Santa Barbara, 2004). H. Park provides a critical analysis of the English-learning boom in South Korea, showing how the neoliberal and cultural-imperialist discourses around globalization in Korea have symbolized the ideological equations “English ability=social capability=social success,” and “globalization=national competitiveness=English ability → advanced country” (181, 188). J. Park, through examining cultural representations of English in South Korea, argues that the confluence of ideologies – that Koreans need to know English (in a globalizing world) and that Koreans (for whom Korean is essential component of their national identity) are bad speakers of English – has constructed a hegemony of English, as well as potential subversive power of the language among Koreans. Additional historical and socio-political discourses on the English craze in South Korea are discussed in Chapter 2.
social capital – both as a tool for and symbol of class disparity, and as a potential avenue to forsaking Jokuk (祖國, the grandfather country) – despite its assumed necessity and desirability for both individuals and the nation in an age of globalization. In this vein, these stories also betray an anxiety regarding fellow Koreans who have the opportunity to experience the “global stage” then return to positions of power and affluence, or even to remain in more privileged countries – disappointing to a Segyehwa-myth that patriotic global elites will bring glory to Jokuk.\(^8\) The circulation of these stories about tongue surgery, imbued with such an ambivalence, creates a historically and socially necessary space for criticism of the English craze as emblematic of pedagogy under the segyehwa paradigm in South Korea. However, by dismissing this kind of practice as a tragic and ridiculous absurdity, such stories ask us either to find a more reasonable solution that better serves the neoliberal and developmentalist pedagogy for English education, or to critique the rationale of such a pedagogy through a nationalist reclamation of the importance of the mother tongue. In such an affective and discursive structure, this absurdity signals the inhabitable habitat from which one must find escape.

The ironic consequence of such absurdity is the muteness of the tongue on the operating table – despite its hyper-visibility and abundance of words – as an embodiment of the English craze. As a suffering yet non-innocent body this tongue is doubly-marked, first as an object of the oppressive and competitive education system, and second as a subject of the desired (but potentially treasonous) privileged class in a postcolonial society in the global context. In this sense, the tongue on the operating table is also a lifted tongue, literally from the floor of the mouth and metaphorically from its mother tongue and mother country.

Suspending the choices demanded by discourses that erase the lifted tongue in its double meaning, this dissertation calls for an/other story: one emerging from the space of absurdity, embracing the complexity of the memories, desires, and wounds that intersect in the lifted tongue. In search of an alternative story, one might begin with what has often been ignored in the prevailing representations – the embodiedness of the tongue. Instead of disregarding tongue surgery as mere absurdity (“The surgery will not help, because the pronunciation is cultural!”), one can instead ask what this surgical “cut” in the tongue reveals about the relationship between body, language, and the biopolitics of tongue in the transnational context. By refiguring this visceral interstice of the lifted tongue, my research seeks a new way of engaging with a diasporic tongue as a tongue of “elsewhere, within here” to borrow Trinh T. Minh-ha’s concept.\(^9\) To listen

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8 Segyehwa (“worldization”) is a term introduced by the Young-sam Kim administration alongside the South Korean government’s national development strategy in the mid-90s. However, this term is often used interchangeably with globalization, showing the reciprocal construction of developmentalist nationalism and neoliberal globalization in South Korea. For more discussion on Segyehwa as nationalist and neoliberalist project of globalization, see Hyun-chin Lim, “Stumbling Democracy in South Korea: The Impacts of Globalization and Restructuring,” in Korea Confronts Globalization, ed. by Yun-Shik Chang et al. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 161; and Gi-Wook Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), Kindle edition. Further discussion of how globalization is appropriated in nationalist discourse comes in the final chapter of this dissertation.

9 As discussed briefly in the preface, Trinh’s “elsewhere within here” points to the third space that opens up through crossing normative boundaries between here and there, between dwelling and traveling, and between reality and fantasy. Crossing does not mean the assimilation of “there” within “here,” but the enactment of “there” within “here.” However, Trinh notes, the payoff for such a crossing
to language that is neither native nor foreign, to hear what resists translation, and to account for the historically and geographically situated story without losing the chimerical vision to re-envision the lineage – these are important elements of such practice. Here, the wound of the lifted tongue directs us to the material force of the tongue, not in its pure and natural corporeality but in its prosthetic assemblage with other bodies, creating space for recomposing embodied memories of displacement. The first part of this dissertation therefore writes the memories of the lifted tongue, whose untamable force embodies and overflows the force of technological and cultural intervention.

might be muteness – which does not necessarily indicate lack of language but rather regeneration of language – with which to speak about both sides of the binaries.
Chapter 1. A Tongue on the Operating Table:
Words, Bodies, and Two Programs for Making Foreign

But, what does it meant to write the memories of the lifted tongue? Whose memories, and of what? Do these memories refer to what the tongue remembers, or to what we (or “I”) remember about the tongue? Or, can we think of memories that do not belong to a subject predating the act and the contents of remembering, and instead envision memories composed through the encounters of others with this lifted tongue? In other words, we might think of memory as something like what Haraway refers to as “the corporeal story,” where figures “collect the people through their invitation to inhabit,” thereby creating unpredictable kinds of “we.”

Here, a story neither belongs to an author nor precedes the audience, but rather emerges with responses to an invitation. Then, writing the memory of a figure is about how one responds to its invitation – the question of how one hears and speaks.

This first chapter enters into writing about the lifted tongue, about its cut, by asking how the embodied vulnerability of the tongue both delimits and engenders what one can hear and write about the memory of its liftedness. In other words, the tongue on the operating table invites us to think of the relationship between body and language. The following is my response to this invitation, transposing two lines of thoughts: first, how language represents the vulnerability of embodied life, through and delimited by the distance between words and body; second, how the force of the body of language overflows the interstice between them. Through the movement between these threads, this chapter also recomposes the space between the body (the corporeal cut) and the image (the memory of displacement from the mother tongue and mother country) of the lifted tongue, and explore this interstice as a third space of diasporic memory.

1. A Bird in Your Hand: Precarity of Life, of Language

Toni Morrison’s Nobel lecture and Judith Butler’s reading of that lecture show how a figure creates an/other reality in which various bodies encounter each other – bodies that reach toward each other, despite the impossibility of capturing one another. Morrison opens her lecture with a fable: “Once upon a time there was an old woman. Blind. Wise.” At the beginning of the fable, the woman is visited by children who seem bent on disproving her clairvoyance. One asks her a cruel question: “Old woman, I hold in my hand a bird. Tell me whether it is living or dead.” The blind woman responds, “I don’t know … whether the bird you are holding is dead or alive, but what I do know is that it is in your hands.” This fable is then followed by Morrison’s own thoughts about it, in which she can “choose to read the bird as language and the woman as a practiced writer.” “Being a writer,” speculates Morrison about the blind woman, “she thinks of language partly as a system, partly as a living thing over which one has control, but mostly as agency – as an act with consequences. So the question the children put to her … is not unreal because she thinks of language susceptible to death, erasure.”


Butler examines how in Morrison’s reading of her own story, language acquires its agency (and therefore the reality of its force) by referring to its own figural frame; it is through Morrison’s “performance of figural substitution” – her choosing to read bird as language – that the language is figured as a bird, a vulnerable living being. 12 Similarly, it is through the figuration wherein “language is thought of mostly as agency” that the agency of language is enacted. 13 In this sense, it is through the modesty of not daring to say “language is agency” or “the bird is language” that this language creates its other reality, its life and agency – which is “not unreal.”

If language is figured as agency, “as an act with consequences,” it owes its force to this figure of a bird held in the hand of a mischievous child standing before a blind woman. In this fable, the agency of language is framed as an ethical problem concerning the vulnerability of a life that is susceptible both to death and to humiliation. Morrison’s formulation carefully articulates language as agency, distinguishing it from both language as a system and as a precarious living thing. The agency of language emerges from this contingent yet never-collapsing space between the life and death of the bird, the child’s hand holding the bird, and the blindness of the woman. In this way, the life and death of language is related to both the physical vulnerability of the object to which they refer and to the person whom they address. Referring to the Gettysburg address, Morrison says,

> Refusing to monumentalize, disdaining the “final word,” the precise “summing up,” acknowledging their “poor power to add or detract,” his words signal deference to the uncapturability of the life it mourns. It is the deference that moves her, that recognition that language can never live up to life once and for all. Nor should it. […] Its force, its felicity is in its reach toward the ineffable.

This deference of language that creates its own force is not only deference to its figural frame in general, but more specifically to the uncapturability of the life in question. In this sense, the life – and hence the vulnerability – of language can essentially, if not necessarily, be measured by its reach (and failure) toward the vulnerability of (other) beings. Through this recognition of the vulnerability of a life for which language cannot substitute, the vulnerable life of language and the vulnerable bodies it represents touch each other across the radical distance. It is through abusing such uncapturability that language injures bodies in the distance as well as those at hand.

Morrison tells us how the old woman reprimanded the children in response: “They are responsible not only for the act of mockery but also for the small bundle of life sacrificed to achieve its aims.” By pointing out the children’s responsibility, the old woman “shifted attention away from assertions of power to the instrument through which that power is exercised.” By giving her own speculation, Morrison herself not only performs “shifting attention to the instrument through which that power is exercised,” but also adds another accusation of abusing this instrument. The children’s threatening language here is both violence to the language and violence through the language. What these children have demonstrated with a bird in hand is the potential agency of dead language that hurts and kills:

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13 Ibid.
For her, a dead language is not only one no longer spoken or written, it is unyielding
language content to admire its own paralysis. … It is not without effect for it actively
thwarts the intellect, stalls conscience, suppresses human potential. … Oppressive
language does more than represent violence; it is violence; does more than represent the
limits of knowledge; it limits knowledge. … It is the language that drinks blood, laps
vulnerabilities, tucks its fascist boots under crinolines of respectability and patriotism as
it moves relentlessly toward the bottom line and the bottomed-out mind.

In this passage, the agency of the dead language evokes imagery of the vampire – lethal rather
than dead, if being dead means the exhaustion of the force of life. However, Morrison’s lecture
not only figures the agency of language in terms of the life, death, and vulnerability it entails, but
also redefines life and death by portraying them as performative rather than referential forces of
language. With its vampiric force, the dead language is neither the cessation of the living
language nor the inert remnants of it; rather, dead language is distinguished from living language
through its forces: living language creates, whereas dead language suffocates and kills.

“Once upon a time” – a story must be told twice. After Morrison offers her speculation
about the fable, the other half of the story begins with the children challenging the entirety of the
old woman’s lesson. They criticize her for not even attempting to reach out to touch the bird in
the hand – suppose there were no bird from the beginning, and the question were a trick? They
fault her for being wise but not generous, for showing art but not commitment. They ask her,
“Don't you remember … when the invisible was what imagination strove to see?” “Make up a
story. Narrative is radical, creating us at the very moment it is being created.”

In asking for stories from the old woman’s blind clairvoyance, the children create the
story they want to hear from her: the story of a wagonload of slaves, and of the boy and a girl
who secretly give bread and cider to them. In this latter part of the story, the life of language is
enacted – not through the insertion of power over the bird, but through children calling for the
blind clairvoyance of the old woman. This, in turn, becomes their blind performance of
narratives. In a performance that touches them without seeing, words go beyond representation
and create another reality.

So, in whose hand is the bird? At the beginning of the story, the old woman pointed out
the source of the power, and therefore the responsibility of the children who hold the bird;
however, by doing so she demonstrates her blindness and inability to control the life of the bird,
and also deactivates the children’s possessive control over the bird and displaces them into their
own blindness. So, the life of the word, figured as a bird in their interlocution, is suspended in a
tactile-yet-invisible space that is vulnerable but not totally controllable; it is “in your hand,” but
in some way also in hers, and so in ours. Therefore, in such a contingent but irrevocably-distant
space between the consequence of the act of speech and the speaking bodies, the ethics of
commitment is figured as trying to touch a bird you cannot even see, let alone control. In the
second part of the story, this space of vulnerability between the blindness of the writer and the
bird in a visitor’s hand – the agency of language, in a figure of life – is performed not through
control or possession, but through the encounter shared among the voices of the blind woman,
the visiting children, and Morrison herself.

The story repeats. First, to suffer from the cut, lament for the vulnerability, and mourn for
the impossible return and loss in displacement. Second, to take a leap from the wound and create
a new possibility. In the first part of Morrison’s fable, the suspected motivation for the children’s
question is to evoke the blindness of the woman, her inability to tell where she is in relation to
the context of summoned violence through the vulnerability of the bird – to recall her state in
suspension of life and death at the mercy of others. It is about the blindness of the writer, being unable to see and tell the act and consequence of language, let alone to control language. This is a recognition that language is in the hands of others. As Butler puts it, “To be injured by speech is to suffer a loss of context, that is, not to know where you are. … Exposed at the moment of such shattering is precisely the volatility of one’s ‘place’ within the community of speakers; one can be ‘put in one’s place’ by such speech, but such a place may be no place.”

In the second part of Morrison’s fable, what are assumed to be vulnerability and loss – the woman’s blindness and the bird’s precarious life – become a space of possibility and life. In the space of such blindness and silence, the agency of language – through the movement of conversation between plural subjects – unsettles these positions and identities (Whose story is this? The old woman’s, or the children’s?), and from there also unsettles different ethics of vision, imagination, and commitment.

Yet, there is an asymmetry of force in Morrison’s lecture. Compared to the vehement criticism of the violent force of dead language in the first part of the lecture, the second part ends with short comments from the old woman following the rather ambiguous end to the story that the children have delivered about the wagonload of slaves: “The next stop will be their last. But not this one. This one is warmed.” This asymmetry is a performative consequence of the lecture, which measures the life of language by its deference to the vulnerability of life. If the ethical measure of the life of language is posited as the negative passion of not daring to capture or not exerting oppressive power over the body to which the language refers, then it is not surprising that the lively force of language is reserved within its own literal frame – the lack of a physical bird in one’s hand to “have truly caught it,” and the fictional suspension of the deaths of the slaves in the wagon.

2. Regeneration: Toward the Force of the Lifted Tongue

If the story of the tongue on the operating table repeats, it is because the wound – like the blindness of the woman and the muteness of the bird in Morrison’s fable – hinges two spaces. First, the tongue on the table tells us the suffering of the body whose English pronunciation is in/corrected by the surgical cut; we hear the story from the tongue’s wound, like we hear the muteness of the bird. This physical half-uprooting of the tongue metaphorically – and through the discourse of absurdity, literally – displaces the tongue from both the speaking body and its speech. Exiled from its mother tongue yet unable to settle into the metropolitan tongue, the lifted tongue embodies the disidentity of the language, the body, and the (national) territory. As a figure of displacement, articulating such a disjuncture involves mourning its loss of (integrated) body, language, and territory, as well as of the sovereign authority based on the assumed identity between these terrains. In other worlds, it is an inauguration of becoming a stranger within the familiar.

The lifted tongue is displaced from its familiar terrains – its body, mother tongue, and motherland – but is unable to settle in and be assimilated by another. The tongue anticipates an/other story that goes beyond the dichotomy of here and elsewhere, which relies on the logic of territorial identity and difference between these terrains. As a stranger in its most familiar terrains, the one with the lifted tongue learns the tactics of a borrowed language – from either its native tongue or its metropolitan tongue. Speaking with and in the languages of others also

14 Ibid., 4.
requires strategic alliances with others, with/in whose voices this tongue speaks. How the lifted tongue speaks is a form of profanation, an in/appropriation (inappropriate appropriation) of divine language, in that this use constitutes a reappropriation of the material of the language without claiming the meaning – the totalizing truth. Such in/appropriation involves experimentation with borders, a plugging of the one’s own body into borrowed bodies. Even the tongue’s own body becomes material for use, and its wound the opening for plugging into the stream of others’ voices.

One version looking backward and the other forward, these two stories of the forked tongue resonate with what Braidotti frames as the opposition between an ethics of vulnerability and an ethics of affirmation – first in the memory of the wound and loss, and second in the affirmation of regenerative force by virtue of this vulnerability. Both ethics share the project of deconstructing the masterful subject “I” in the Western philosophical tradition of Enlightenment, by attending to the corporeal vulnerability at the heart of the embodied subject. However, there is a certain tension – or rather, a rupture – between the ethics of vulnerability and the ethics of affirmation. Showing respect for ethical discourses that engage with deconstructive critiques on the relationship between the self and the other through their embodied vulnerability and mode of mourning (as in Derrida, Butler, and Agamben), Braidotti espouses a different project: “the qualitative leap through pain, across the mournful landscapes of nostalgic yearning,” as “the gesture of active creation of affirmative ways of belonging.” As potential subjects of such leaping she particularly addresses “diasporic subjects of all kinds,” such as migrants, exiles, and refugees who have “first-hand experience of the extent to which the process of disidentification from familiar identities is linked to the pain of loss and uprooting.” However, this negative sense of loss should be translated into affirmation of “multiple forms of belonging and complex allegiances” in order to leap forward.

How do we make “a qualitative leap” from the story of vulnerability to the story of regeneration? This question involves what appear, at least initially, to be the conflicting problematics of looking backward and leaping forward. Or, rather, the question echoes the slippery position between these two problematics. On one hand, there is an affective as well as a conceptual hesitation about making a leap. In Morrison’s story, the ethics of vulnerability – figured as the life of a bird – tells us about an obligation to fail well in our representation of the vulnerability of life. If we heed this advice, making a successful leap risks a violation of the ethics of mourning, the ethics of deference toward the life of the other. On the other hand, there is a pragmatic question regarding the conceptual tools required to actualize the leap forward. Since the figures of the vulnerability of language – such as a silent bird in another’s hand – have led us to this asymmetry between the forces of life and death, we see that such leaping calls for other conceptual tools. However, these conceptual tools are not for creating abstract moral rules to apply to the new ethical project (and so discarding the ethics of mourning). Rather, these are

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15 I employ the term “in/appropriate” to mean both inappropriate and (re)appropriate. By using this term I hope to evoke Trinh T. Minh-ha’s “inappropriate/other,” which refers someone who is “inappropriate” yet also “inappropriatable.” See Trinh T. Minh-ha, “She, the Inappropriate/other,” edited by Trinh T. Minh-ha, special issue, Discourse 8 (1986-7).


17 Ibid.
for making our desires imaginable, in order to actualize the new project. In this sense, such conceptual tools are what Braidotti (re-reading Haraway’s notion of figures through Deleuze’s use of imagination as a concept) calls “figurations,” which provide us with “the literal expression which represents that which the system had declared off limits.”

This notion of figuration not only demarcates the border between the (accepted) reality and the outside of that realm, but also intimates the potential crossing of that border through the imaginary power.

Does the slippery position between the two ethics – mourning for pain and vulnerability, and affirmation for creative forces – indicate that they are necessarily exclusive or procedural (as is suggested in Braidotti’s phrases, “affirmation versus vulnerability” and “qualitative leap”)? In order to address this question, I suggest a deconstructive reading of how Braidotti transposes the task of mourning onto the task of affirmation. This means that I look into the movement rather than into the status of transposition, another concept Braidotti uses to figure such a leap.

Transposition, a term with a double source of inspiration (from both music and genetics), “indicates an intertextual, cross-boundary or transversal transfer, in the sense of a leap from one code, field or axis into another.” Despite Braidotti’s rhetoric of “vulnerability versus affirmation,” I trace how the threshold between body and image, which is at the heart of the division between the two positions, becomes the locus and process of transposition in her ethics of memory.

While Derrida and Butler ask how one mourns the death of others by representing them (or by failing to do so), Braidotti transposes this onto the question of how life in “me” will go on after “death,” both in the material frame and in memories through the reformulated concept of life. She asks,

How will life (zoe) in me go on after my physical extinction? Firstly, in my embodied and material frame, the organism will continue to produce and grow. But also bacteria, fluids of all kinds and third parties, such as worms and other parasites. … Secondly, ‘Life’ in me will go on in the memories of others, in the multiple webs of interrelations and connections one built up in one’s life.

Instead of taking the path of accounting for the loss of the other – upon whose vulnerability the self is delineated – Braidotti suggests a different approach by plunging into the question of “my” own death (which marks the limit of the imaginability, according to Freudian thinking) in order to destabilize the subject “I.” Beginning with this sobering moment of thinking after one’s own death is not, however, a reminder of death as the limit of humanity (as it often is in Heideggerian heritage, according to Braidotti), but rather a replacement of “I” with the generative and flowing force of Life.

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18 Ibid., 170.


20 Braidotti, Transpositions, 5.

21 Ibid., 239.
Such a shift in the subject is powered by Braidotti’s reformulation of the relationship between *bios* and *zoe*, the two elements of what we call “life.” She offers a critical take on Giorgio Agamben, who himself draw upon the Greek terminologies referring to what we mean by the world “life”: *zoe*, which expressed “the simple fact of living common to all living beings,” and *bios*, which indicated “the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group.”\(^{22}\) For Agamben, this distinction between *zoe* and *bios* offers a conceptual basis for discussing how mere life becomes the locus of biopolitical abjection. Departing from more traditional biopolitical theories that attempt to give *bio-*graphy to *zoe* (the animal, non-human part of life) as the poor half of *bios* (the political and discursive part of life), Braidotti declares “the triumph of *zoe*,” which represents “the mindless vitality of Life carrying on independently of and regardless of rational control.”\(^{23}\) Her reformulation of *zoe* addresses the exigency of revising the ethical subject in post-industrial societies, where the convergence of info-media and bio-genetic technology reworks all existing hierarchal power relationships. Prominent in such societies is the transposed circulation and proliferation of the (traditional forms of) Others – particularly of those that have been associated with *zoe*, including women, machines, insects, microbes, and so on. But more importantly, such return of the Others is accompanied by the return of the Other of Life (*zoe*) as the generative force of life and the ceaseless becoming – with all its vulnerability and monstrosity. She suggests that the power of life might be reformulated as the combination of *bios/zoe* in order to create a “non-unitary nomadic subjectivity,” upon which an ethics of affirmative, materialistic, bio-centered egalitarianism might be developed.

Through a recognition of *zoe* that is not constituted or constrained by *bios*, Braidotti recomposes the negative affects and politics of mourning into a more positive program. In the above passage, Braidotti’s discussion of memory resonates with Butler’s ethics of mourning others as a submission to the radical transformation of the self. However, Braidotti also argues that one who has “a flair of minoritarian becoming” is remembered not in the form of loss or as lost in the psychic black box of others, but rather in the form of fragmented and embodied inhibition in others. While Braidotti maintains the provisional division between physical and non-physical (material frame vs. memories), they are separated by porous thresholds permeable to the force of life. The ethics of mourning, however, is undergirded by the absolute division between body and representation. In *The Work of Mourning*, Derrida emphasizes that the division between the two is asymmetrical and abysmal. For Derrida, to mourn involves interiorization of the other – which, nonetheless, cannot be interiorized totally as images.\(^{24}\) But, from the perspective of *zoe*, the memory of the dead is not the remaining images of the object of mourning but rather parts of Life that go on after one’s death embodied in others’ non/physical bodies. In this sense, such an embodied memory is far from being fixed to so-called real, past experience. For Braidotti, memory is a creative work of imagination that requires “composition,


\(^ {23}\) Ibid., 37.

selection and dosage.”25 It is a choreography of forces and affects, which balances endurance and flow.26

The concept of Life as that which is led by zoe provides us with a new figure of the life of language, with which we can imagine the force of the lifted tongue in its dismembered embodiment. The zoe of language allows us to recompose both the threshold between the figure and the body to which this figure refers, and the threshold between the self and the other; its vital force is not limited to the echo of the absent body, but overflows the thresholds between body and image and between self and other. This concept of embodied memory as a choreography of forces anticipates an/other story of the lifted tongue. In other words, attending to zoe of tongue enables us to envision the materiality of the tongue as the locus of transformation-with-other-bodies, rather than that of loss and abjection. Further, to revive the notion of profane use of language as plugging one’s body into others, zoe of the lifted tongue summons up and connects to the other bodies of the tongue – the sexual, the alimentary, and the non-linguistic voice.

3. Two Programs for Making Foreign: Women’s Audio Archive and Cyborgian Shaman

Addressing Virginia Woolf’s “stream of consciousness,” Braidotti writes:
In those moments of floating awareness when rational control releases its hold, ‘Life’ rushes on towards the sensorial/perceptive apparatus with exceptional vigour. This onrush propels the self out of the black hole of its atomized isolation and disperses it into a myriad of bits of pieces of data imprinting or impressions. It also, however, confirms the singularity of that particular entity which both receives and recomposes itself around the onrush of data and affects.27

So far, we have two figures of the life of the lifted tongue – a bird as the life of language in relation with the deference to the other’s bodily vulnerability, and the zoe of the tongue that flows in its ceaseless recomposition with others. The figure of the bird points toward the deference to the irreducible distance between the corporeal body and the representation; correspondingly, the bird marks the asymmetrical force of language in which death foregrounds the life of language. Then, the figure of zoe of the tongue – rendered by Braidotti’s re-visioning of life predominated by the animalistic force – allows us to imagine a leaping from the deadening force toward the generative force through recomposing the borders between the physical and the non-physical body (of language) and between the self and the other. The zoe of the tongue promises the event of becoming, in which the self opens up to the space of writing that synchronizes the flows between the others and the self, and between the past (as memories) and the present (and the possibility of future).

In Braidotti’s passage, writing is a process of cyborgian body-in-becoming that consists of the organic sensorial and perceptive apparatus and the mechanical processors of data and affects. Such a mechanical figuration of the writing process not only envisions a porous border between the self and the other, but also accounts for an/other kind of life – inorganic. Once Braidotti’s reformulation of a Life punctuated by the overflowing force of animalistic force of

25 Ibid., 168.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 145.
life (zoe) has re-appropriated a humanist discourse on life, the zoe of the mechanical and the technological brings about a more radical deconstruction of the concept of life based on the dichotomy of organic/non-organic and of nature/techne. The cyborgian aspects of memory and writing process become crucial parts of the story of the lifted tongue, which is already a prosthetic creature marked by surgical intervention. The writing machine of perception and dispersion, if plugged in with the memory of the others, opens an asymmetric synchronization between the two streams of ethics, of mourning and of affirmation. The output is the transposition of these oppositional ethics into two programs of making foreign: hearing your own voice from afar, and speaking with the voices of others.

This section develops the programs of making foreign through two works that experiment with lifted tongues in terms of the voice and body of others: Marysia Lewandowska’s article on the Women’s Audio Archive “Speaking, the Holding of Breath”28 and Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s Dictee.29 Both, but each from a different position, involve a mourning of the mother tongue (or of the voice that is securely under your control) and an attempt to leap toward the making of a diasporic polyglot. Instead of posing these on either side of the border (Mourning, or leaping?) or measuring the distance from either side (How far have they leapt?), this analysis focuses instead on the stuttering and buffering of the flow in order to map the zoe of the thresholds in this process of transposition.

Program 1: Hearing Your Voice from Afar: Women’s Audio Archive

It is from a distance that you hear sounds, your own voice perhaps, there unuttered, stored in the memory of the recording, revealed in the event of speaking. The voice comes back to you not as your own any more, it comes in the form of a recording, it exercises authority. But through dialogue you can divest the power of authority, of the singular and one-directional voice.30

The agency of speech that is cut from its context here – from the speaking body as well as from the time and the space of the utterance – has often been discussed as a locus of the deconstruction of the sovereign subject “I,” and therefore as the space of subversive possibility. However, if the concerned speaking body dwells in the realm of the invisible and/or hyper-visible and its speech in the inaudible and/or hyper-audible, and if the concerned project is to represent the voice as the trace of such a body, then the voice that comes back to you exercising its own authority upon you might complicate the ethical (as well as practical) positions of utilizing the agency of this voice as a political program.

The ambiguous positions revealed in Lewandowska’s discussion of her Women’s Audio Archive project reflect the complexity of “the impossible task … to untie the knot of a language / voice / power relationship,”31 especially when you put the in/visibility of the speaking and silent


30 Lewandowska, “Speaking, the Holding of Breath,” 56.

31 Ibid., 55.
body into consideration. One the one hand, as in the above passage, Lewandowska points out the authoritative power of your own voice, which can be divested through dialogue. Her project attempts to avoid giving authoritative power to one’s own voice. On the other hand, she addresses the fragility of the voice torn away from the body and displaced into another body, arguing that “what women (and men) often fear is not speech itself, but the manipulation of words/meanings that are taken from their own body and forced uncritically into the cultural body.”

Such fear is more directly related to the technical reproduction that “presents us with a promise of record keeping, of retaining memory, the privilege of truth,” since “ensuring its repetition, it [recording] often makes it more fragile and vulnerable to manipulation. It grants preservation often at the cost of dislocation, tearing it away from its original context.”

While Lewandowska’s major concern is that women’s voices are often seamlessly absorbed into the cultural backdrop, into the transcribed authoritarian voice, she does not argue for the reassertion of the sovereign control over one’s own (recorded) voice. Her careful hesitation regarding the sovereign voice is based on her diagnosis of the current situation: “We often can only survive if we keep on forgetting. But in a world structured by the order of reason, we are not allowed to forget our memory is stored in the machine and called upon out of our control. We are subject to continual re-telling of the story.”

Such a diagnosis requires an approach different from those based on “the right to speak,” which concerns the tongue that is tightly tied to a speaker who has the right of speech as property. According to Lewandowska, if you speak from “the right to speak” – often thought in liberal democracy to be an antidote to totalitarian repression – then your voice can readily be absorbed into cultural noise, and consequently re/turned back to you with authority. As such, she shifts the focus of freedom from legal guarantees of right to speak to “the ability to question itself and change course, inventing its own parameters.”

This kind of reflective freedom could be pursued through another interlocutor. It is through conversation, sometimes hours of moving away from your’s own speech, that you find a true voice – “a side-track of thought” and “the wrong sidedness of speech.” Instead, Lewandowska’s project involves experimentation with techniques of hearing yourself from afar. How do you allow your voice to “get closer to your own body” by moving away from its familiar body? How do you hear and hold words, as well as speak, which involves various bodies – the mouth and ears of both the self and others?

Techniques of hearing yourself from afar are part of the strategy of in/visible bodies – the strategy to elude capture by the economy of the dominant visual culture yet to assert the desire for presence. From this approach, the restoration and reproduction of your voice can present your presence through the disappearance of the body from the sight, by technically dis/embodying the voice via the machinic bodies of others. However, in order to summon the presence in the

32 Ibid., 58.
33 Ibid., 56.
34 Ibid., 58.
35 Ibid., 61.
36 Ibid., 59.
37 Ibid., 58.
imagination of the ear (of the listener), the voice must invoke the trace of the body – or rather, the trace of its cut from the body. In other words, the voice must invoke the seam and the fold between itself and the context of the present. The terror of non-stopping speech lies in its erasure of silence, which marks the fringe of the voice that has been torn from one body and put into another. This is why Lewandowska’s archive project focuses on techniques that are less concerned with the mouth than with the ear, and less with producing more noise than with tracing silence. As noted in Italo Calvino’s *Invisible Cities*, “It is not the voice that commands the story; it is the ear.”

Recorded silence does not simply reveal the erasure and manipulation of speech; if “we are subjected to continual retelling of the story,” silence (as withholding speech) exerts a threatening power to the dominant script and to the commanding ear. Her discussion of “holding” returns to the power of the body. She says, “Speaking belongs to the area of the untraceable, the testimony of the word cannot be forced out of the body. The body is able to sustain torture in the refusal to utter and submit.” In this sense, the opaqueness of silence measures the difference of the other, the impossibility of total absorption of the other into the authoritarian speech. However,

There is also another aspect of a recorded silence when you are a listener in a gallery situation and you expect to hear sound and not to hear yourself, at the moment of silence and gap you are forced to start hearing yourself. That area of shifting from the reality of sound / voice to the reality of bodily presence, which testifies silence interests me, especially in relation to the Archive.

Silence is something that forces you to hear yourself as the other, and puts your voice into conversation with others. It commands a stop not only to the ceaseless speech, but also to the totalitarian ear that listens to the voices of others and does not expect to hear its own voice. In the moment of silence, you hear yourself hearing. In this sense, the audio archive project calls for not only the defamiliarization of your mouth, but also of your ears; the recorded silence articulates the dis/junctures between mouths and ears, and thereby undoes both totalizing monologues and commanding ears.

The techniques of hearing yourself from afar – first by letting the speech find its “wrong way” through an engagement in conversation, and second by listening to the fringes of speech – are dis/embodied through the technology of this project: the archive. The archive, as a body and as a technology, “holds” the exiled language in a double sense: the archive both houses voices for reproduction and withholds them from dissemination. This realization helps us to revisit the title of Lewandowska’s essay, “Speaking, Holding of the Breath.” While the practice of archiving is often figured as an ironic process of mortification that occurs during attempts at preservation, the Women’s Audio Archive seeks to be a living archive by construing itself as a breathing machine that inhales, withholds, and releases speech.


39 Lewandowska, “Speaking, the Holding of Breath,” 60.

40 Ibid., 62.
Program 2: Speaking with the Voice of Others: Diseuse

May I write words more naked than flesh,
stronger than bone, more resilient than sinew, sensitive than nerve.

Sappho

~ Theresa Hak Kyung Cha, Dictee

In this opening epigraph attributed to Sappho, is Theresa Hak Kyung Cha invoking a divine force through Sappho’s invocation? Or, is she merely mimicking Sappho’s words, devoid of such force? Do these questions pose a separation between the ancient Greek poet and the Korean-American contemporary writer so that the force of words of each is un/done safely – one divine, the other profane? Sappho’s words perform the force of summoning corporeality into her words, whereas Cha’s words perform an in/appropriation of such force, nobody returning other than the echo of her borrowed words. But, what if the words attributed to Sappho turn out to be written by Cha? By mimicking a mimicking gesture (recitation) instead of directly performing an authentic invocation, Cha recalls the separation between the felicitous invocation and the infelicitous one, only to playfully profane the division. By putting her words into the mouth of Sappho, Cha reverses the relationship between borrower and borrowed, and interchanges begging and offering. Summoned through this invocation are her own words echoed back, dis/embodied in the writing: the flesh, bone, sinew, and nerve of the writing.

Dictee opens with multiple passages of written fragments, blank pages, and the interstices in between, each creating a path and a passing. One could say that it opens with multiple partitions – sometimes like an Asian sliding door, which functions as both door and wall – with varying opaqueness, density, and vectors of the liminal instance in each passage. After the invocation of Sappho, then a blank page, a catalogue of Greek muses with corresponding classical genres, another blank page, a dictation piece of someone from afar, and yet another blank page, arrives a passage introducing a figure of this book: the diseuse (yet, we are still in the middle of the opening part). As a figure of the voice and at the same time the production of that voice, the diseuse composes its own textual body by experimenting with the borrowed materials and forces of voices, words, and bodies of both the self and the others.

The short piece titled “Diseuse” is a writing of this vocalization – the performance of “an actress who presents dramatic recitals” and of a female shaman who becomes both the medium and messenger of others’ voices through “Recitation. Evocation. Offering. Provocation. The begging.” The performance of the diseuse is profane, drawing its force from an in/appropriation of divine force and intimating the double sense of sacredness – terrestrial with the trace of the divine.43 If the force of the shamanic invocation is already profane because it

41 diseuse (French) [dizøz] n. (Performing Arts/Theatre) (esp. formerly an actress who presents dramatic recitals, usually sung accompanied by music. Male counterpart diseur (French) [dizœr], Collins English Dictionary, s.v. “diseuse” (Harper Collins Publishers. 2003).

42 Cha, Dictee, 4.

43 My use of the terms “profane” and “sacred” owes to Giorgio Agamben’s discussion of “profanation” and “sacred.” Through a peculiar interpretation of the great Roman jurist Trebatius’s proposition that “profane is the term for something that was once sacred or religious and is returned to the use and property of men,” Agamben points out the subversive politics in profanation: “The passages [of this return] come about by means of an entirely inappropriate use (or, rather, reuse) of the sacred,” that
violates the contingent division between the divine and the profane as well as the bond between
the speaking body and the words uttered (and hence a borrowing of the divine force of the words
as well as the voice), the dramatic recitation of an actress doubly profanes because she performs
an even more dubious form of borrowing: mimicking.

“She mimicks the speaking. That might resemble speech. (Anything at all.) Bared noise,
groan, bits torn from words”\textsuperscript{44} profanes “the speaking” as she “hesitates to measure
the accuracy” and “resorts to mimicking gestures with the mouth.”\textsuperscript{45} Her performance estranges the
speech by displacing the accurate speech (its totalizing meaning in its neutral accentless-ness)
with images of the in/appropriated bodies of the speech. She returns “the” speech to its other: the
physical gestures, sound materials, and flows of speech.

These others of speech are generated through the shamanic invocation – the rituals of
embodying the voices of others in the void of the self: “She allows others. … Make full. …
Make swarm. … Tumorous layers, expel all excesses until in all cavities she is flesh.”\textsuperscript{46} Such
invocative ritual recalls the diverse figures to come in her writing – a school girl from a far, her
Mother, Joan of Arc, Yu Guan Soon (A Korean female patriot), for example – whose stories will
be sung through the Greek Muses. These female figures are often related to their suffering,
sacrifice, displacement across time and space – calling for revision of the patriarchal history
represented by Greek epic through the traditional shaman’s role of speaking for condemned or
forgotten women. Yet, in the gesture of mimicking invocation, these others (and the self) are not
identified with their identities; rather, they are a multiplicity (of it, of them, and of her), whose
movement “begins imperceptibly, near perceptible.”\textsuperscript{47} By processing the organic machines of
mouth, shoulder, flesh, and breath with “intensity machines” of air, weight, thickness, and
pressure, the diseuse renders her empty self to the others in multiplicity.

The function of the diseuse is then to make these others flow in and out. To perform such
a receptive function, the diseuse takes “the echo part,” “at the pose.”\textsuperscript{48} In echoing others, she
does not represent the voice of others; rather, she recomposes the flowing in and out of others
into the textual movement. In the space of writing, “she would take on their punctuations,” and
“would become, herself, demarcations.”\textsuperscript{49} Making herself into the punctuations between the
voices and silence, the diseuse traces the thresholds of inside and outside, self and others,
composing the speed and density of the flow.

By delivering the flow of the others, the diseuse performs what Braidotti would call a
writing that carries the memory of others – a memory that is composed of both the zoe of others

\textsuperscript{44} Cha, \textit{Dictee}, 3.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 3-4.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 4.
and your creative imagination. However, such transposition is not characterized by a totally affirmative leap. Rather, it carries the traces of thresholds and marks of pain – “pain to say,” and “pain not to say.” 

Hence, the diseuse composes flow that not only leaps and flies, but also pauses, buffers, murmurs, stutters.

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50 Ibid., 3.
Chapter 2. Mouth to Mouth:
Untranslatable Bits and Regurgitating Memories

Following several opening pages comes the first numbered page of *Dictee*, with its two sibling paragraphs – one in French, the other in English. This duplet piece is written as if it were a dictation practice, and as if one paragraph were the translation of the other. Each paragraph begins with passing into the space of writing: “Aller à la ligne” and “Open paragraph.”

The identity of the writer is ambiguous, but this movement into textual space intimates that it might be someone within the story – “she” who had come from afar. This “she” (who first appears as an ambiguous narrator at the end of the two paragraphs) reappears as a protagonist within her own story, and has only one thing to say: “Il y a quelqu’une point loin point”; “There is someone period From a far period.”

Through the cyclical crossing of the thresholds of textual space (like circling on a möbius strip), “she” emerges as a mysterious figure – announcing the *autopoiesis* of the diseuse. But, this *autopoiesis* is not of a self-containing, impenetrable, and homologous system. Instead, she carries “elsewhere within here” – conjuring up memories from a far within the mundane scenes of learning a foreign language and conversing at a family dinner. However, she who “had come,” right here in this story, is yet to arrive – only on the next page.

Through the interposition of translation and dictation practices, this piece poses the questions of the lifted tongue: “How do we move from one language to another?” and “What does it mean to learn a foreign language?” A transition from one language to another is apparent between the two paragraphs – between French and English. They do not stand as the original and the copy, but accompany each other with slight variations, marking differences that resist transparent translation. Both are written in foreign tongues and not in Korean, which could be taken as the “mother tongue” given the origin of the author. As such, instead of resorting to the mother tongue/foreign tongue dichotomy, she asks, “How do we move from one language to another, neither of them mine?”

However, the opacity of the crossing between languages is more violently and explicitly played out through the dictation practice, in which a too-faithful reproduction of the dictating voice results in a rather ironic disaster. In the process of transcribing from the spoken to the written, the punctuation marks have disappeared, instead carefully spelled out into words. These written-out punctuation marks betray the pedagogical task of transparent translation, embodying the thresholds between the spoken and the written (and alphabet letters and punctuation marks) as well as the distance between hearing, seeing, and writing. This pedagogical failure performs the subversive potential of mimicking: a primary regimen for learning a foreign language, and a speech act lacking consciousness-driven authenticity.

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52 Ibid. As shown in the word “a far,” Cha differentiates spacing between and even within words. Through such use of spaces, Cha not only works with the material and textual aspect of writing (as I discuss throughout this chapter), but also brings our attention to the textures, rhythms, and non-semantic meanings of spaces between words, which are often considered simply emptiness within the hierarchal dichotomy of presence/absence.

53 Lisa Lowe analyses this failure of translation as “a topos of faithful reproduction.” I would also add that Cha in fact plays with such failure, not without jouissance, rendering language subversive. See Lisa Lowe, “Unfaithful to the Original: The Subject of Dictee,” *Writing Self, Writing Nation: A*
that concerns the normative use of a language consisting of different marks in hierarchal order, including the subordinate marks and demarcations that function through silence. In doing so, this exaggerated mimicking of dictation destabilizes the assumed consistency within a natural/national language, and instead illuminates the technology of writing by returning with the others – the sub-bodies – within a language.

But, what does such reading of the translation-dictation piece in *Dictee* tell us about the lifted tongue? If the tongue on the operating table embodies the accent – the intractable foreignness – that resists translation, what would its speech act and its subversive possibility be like? Is the tongue on the operating table necessarily even a speaking figure? The boy is mute during most of the surgery scene of “Tongue Tie.” The only word he utters is a timid “yes,” answering a nurse who asks if he likes strawberry flavor (for anesthesia). But, there is still something more, if not linguistic *per se*: his silence and moaning, mixed with the suction machine, and often punctuated by the speech of the doctor and the mother. However, hearing this tongue – its non-language – on the operating table does not necessarily lead us back to a nostalgic return-to-the-origin based on the habitual distinction between linguistics and pre-linguistics. Instead of fixing the tongue of the operating table as the non-linguistic other, its moaning and muteness *summons* the others – the multiplicity – that inhabit the tongue. In other words, the tongue on the operating table becomes a biopolitical site, where technological, pedagogical, and filial interventions plug the physicality of the tongue into the linguistics of the severed member. But, despite (or perhaps *because of*) its failure in the professed purpose of correcting an English accent, the tongue points to the potential to disrupt such a purpose while still carrying the memories of these interventions, through the materiality of its accent as the embodiedness of foreignness.

With such materiality and multiplicity of the lifted tongue in mind, this chapter examines how the lifted tongue carries the embodied memories of displacement in assemblage with other bodies. The following section begins by figuring and refiguring the historical and geopolitical lineaments of lifted tongues as a locus of subjugation and resistance, in particular by critically re-reading their relation to the mother. This is a gesture to interrupt mother as an oversaturated figure, in order to think of an interstice between mother and the lifted tongue as a space to re-invision lineage and kinship. From there, this subversive potential in the lifted tongue (as its in/cor rected accent relates to the inappropriate/d bodies of the tongue) is advanced by a profane reading of Walter Benjamin’s discussion on the transformative force of “the untranslatable,” and by Deleuze and Guattari’s proposition of minor literature as the practice of becoming a stranger within the major language. With these theoretical concepts in mind, I return to another fragment from *Dictee* and a videowork by Theresa Hak Kyung Cha to examine how her displaced tongue reanimate the diasporic memories (of mother, hometown, and hunger) without returning to the origin. As such, this chapter hopefully opens a space to transpose the lifted tongue as a cyborgian and prosthetic shaman that carries memories of the others through its wounded materiality.

1. **Engendering Mother: Stories of Mother Tongue**

Mother, you are a child still. … Still, you speak the tongue the mandatory language like the others. It is not your own. Even if it is not you know you must. You are Bilingual.

You are Tri-lingual. The tongue that is forbidden is your own mother tongue. You speak in the dark. In the secret. The one that is yours. Your own. You speak very softly, you speak in whisper. In the dark, in secret. Mother tongue is your refuge. It is being home. Being who you are. Truly. To speak makes you sad. Yearning. To utter each word is a privilege you risk by death. Not only for you but for all. All of you who are one, who by law tongue tied forbidden of tongue.  

In *Dictee*, Cha opens the chapter titled “Calliope Epic Poetry” by recalling the memories of the mother tongue through memories of Mother, who was born in Manchuria where her family had moved to escape Japanese occupation (which did eventually reach Manchuria). In this remembrance, the mother tongue is the “refuge,” the “being home” – a privilege worth risking death – of the diaspora, because keeping the mother is to remember yourself, your mother, and the country you’ve lost. And, through the recollection of the memories of Mother, Cha also repeats the act of Mother, of speaking the mother tongue – but, in English. Is this a memory of the mother tongue or a memory that is no longer? Or, is she performing Mother’s memory of being polylingual, secretly saving the mother tongue?  

There are many versions of the “secret mother tongue” story, the forbidden tongue that is whispered from mother to daughter among colonized people because a tongue (as an intersection where body and mind dis/articulate) has often been mobilized as a site of colonization and decolonization. Colonialists often tried to control the colonized by taming and stigmatizing their mother tongue, such that remembering and speaking become a potentially rebellious act. Even if the colonized (and their descendants) no longer remember how to speak their mother tongue, the stories of how their tongues were tied, how their mother tongues were forgotten or fragmented, were nonetheless handed down.  

Yet, the dynamics between the colonialist and the colonized is not reducible to the dichotomous terms *oppression* and *resistance*. The colonialist discourse stigmatizes the native tongue and imposes language upon it, but that discourse also fears total assimilation, because tongue is a difference from the native Other that constitutes the colonial self. Therefore, colonialist discourse continues to discern the difference – how the colonized, even when they use the metropolitan language, speak differently from them. One the one hand, the colonial discourse urges the “natives” to speak like metropolitan speakers, but on the other hand, it vigilantly ensures that the differences do not collapse. Homi Bhabha’s criticism of the figure of mimicry in English colonialism recapitulates this ambivalent discourse: “a tongue that is forked, not false.”  

Bhabha analyses colonial mimicry as “the desire for a reformed recognizable Other, as a *subject of a difference* that is almost the *same*, but not *quite*,” which emerges as “one of the most elusive and effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge.” However, in splitting the colonial discourse between mimicry and mockery – in perpetually turning from narcissism to paranoia – Bhabha also finds the potential of mimicry to interrupt the wholeness of the colonialist discourse itself. The figure of colonial mimicry is mirrored by the figure of the dubious subject in the

54 Cha, *Dictee*, 45-46.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid., 131.
native’s discourse. A native who mimics the metropolitan tongue emerges as an ambivalent subject – whose tongue is forked between a desire for the other and a disavowal of the self, as well as between envious suspicion (of betrayal, if one is too close to the colonial self) and mockery (of failure to be the same as the colonial self).

Decolonial and postcolonial critiques have discussed how such a structure of mimicry has affected the colonized subject’s relation to his language as an important locus of colonial differentiation and subjectification. These analyses offer historical and geopolitical contours to account for the tongue on the operating table – why sorting R and L might matter so much for Koreans, to the extent that parents pursue surgery for their children – and the ambivalent representation of it in Korean society. Franz Fanon discusses how colonization has produced the (post)colonial subject with a mimicking tongue. He argues that colonialization involves an internalization of the colonialist logic that the closer one assimilates the civilizing language (i.e., metropolitan culture), “the whiter he gets – i.e., the closer he comes to becoming a true human being.”

58 In response, the colonized speak the metropolitan language; they try hard to erase their accents, as when a black Martinican – reacting against “the myth of the Martinican who swallows his r’s” – goes into a café and calls out with great assurance: “Waiterrrr? Bwing me a dwink of beerrr!”

59 The flip side of such yearning for the metropolitan language is an active forgetting of one’s mother tongue. Fanon, discussing a black man returned from metropole who “answers only in French and often no longer understands Creole,” tells us a folktale:

After having spent several months in France a young farmer returns home. On seeing a plow, he asks his farther, an old don’t-pull-that-kind-of-thing-on-me peasant: “What’s that thing called?” By way of an answer his father drops the plow on his foot, and his amnesia vanishes.

60 “Awesome therapy,” Fanon adds. As corporal punishment is a means for colonialists to repress the mother language of the colonized, corporal shock can undo repression that has been internalized into the psychology of the colonized. This suggests that the performed similarity is a false exteriority (even when it has been interiorized), as opposed to the inner truth of who he really is (a black Martinican) – the metaphor in the title of the book, the white mask and the black skin behind it. In this sense, the mockery (and the prescribed therapy) for mimicry also mirrors and parasitizes the colonial difference (“almost the same but not quite”) between the colonizer and the colonized. However, the effectiveness of corporal punishment also betrays the frailty of the inside/outside distinction. So, how then do we think of the tongue of the colonized subject – not so much the actual locus of a fixed identity, but the space where the self and others (and inside and outside) intermingle to produce a different subjectivity?

The “wild tongue” as a metonym for untamable resistance is both a topos and a mode of writing in Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera. Anzaldúa tells us an episode of her visit to the dentist, who struggles to control her “strong and stubborn” tongue that pushes out the


59 Ibid., 5.

60 Ibid., 7.
cotton wads, drills, and needles: “We’re going to have to control your tongue.” And she thinks, “How do you tame a wild tongue, train it to be quiet, how do you bridle and saddle it? How do you make it lie down?” Through the figure of a “wild tongue,” Anzaldúa invites us to think of the untamable corporeality of tongue as a metonym for inassimilable identities, resisting colonialist discipline. Anzaldúa recounts how the Mexican students at her American school were forbidden from speaking Spanish, where “being caught speaking Spanish at recess – that was good for three licks on the knuckles with a sharp ruler,” and how “all Chicano students were required to take two speech classes” to get rid of the accents. The corporal punishment and accent correction betray that the flesh of the tongue is a channel not only to the students’ wild bodies, but also to their culture and identity. However, Anzaldúa argues that “wild tongues can’t be tamed, they can only be cut out.”

Such repression and punishment does not actually get rid of the accents, but instead leads to a border tongue, “neither espanol ni ingles, but both” – a patois, a forked tongue, a variation of two languages. Now, they are accused of being a “pocho, cultural traitor” who speaks the oppressor’s language by polluting pure Spanish with an English accent among Latinos. Anzaldúa lists several of the variations of language that they speak, the secret languages to identify themselves, and she picks up a few “home” tongues, closest to her heart. These home tongues are deterritorialized, since they neither claim for the singular identity nor re-establish the geographical borderlines, but instead measure the distance from her heart. In this way, Chicanas inhabit border language, which is strategic but also resistant to the ideas of both accentless English and a pure Spanish. The force of the border tongue does not come from authenticity or legitimacy, but from its visceral seductiveness. Anzaldúa writes, “I will have my serpent’s tongue – my woman’s voice, my sexual voice, my poet’s voice.”

But, what is serpentine about the tongue on the operating table? The boy who had his tongue surgically modified for English accents sounds far from Anzaldúa’s serpent voice, but rather closer to Fanon’s Martinican who calls for a “beerrr.” Instead of the story of a mother who secretly hands down the mother tongue to her daughter, or of a father who reminds his son of his home tongue by dropping a plow on his foot, now we have the story of a mother who compels her son to have tongue surgery to facilitate his learning English and a father who acquiesces. And the mother says “it’s all for him” – which has its own truth. What’s the point of trying to find a subversive possibility in this kind of story? However, before returning to that question, let

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61 Gloria Anzaldúa, “How to Tame a Wild Tongue,” Borderlands, La Frontera: The New Mestiza (San Francisco: Aunt Lute, 1987), 75.

62 Ibid. my emphasis.

63 Ibid., 75-76.

64 Ibid., 76.

65 Ibid., 77.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid., 78.

68 Ibid.
me first point to the figures of parents, which (raising the separate question of lineage and cut within the colonized) complicates the subject of the dubious tongue beyond the colonial-colonized framework. It is worth dwelling on stories of the opportunist traitor in relation to that “cut,” from both diachronic and synchronic repertories in South Korea within the transnational context.

Kwangyong Chon’s short novel Kapitan Lee (1962) shows how learning the foreign conquerors’ language is recognized as a means both to survive and to access social and economic mobility, but also as an act of disloyalty (especially among the privileged elites and their children) in modern Korean history. ⁶⁹ In this novel, Doctor Lee, who had worked for Japanese colonialists during the occupation and whose family was honored as “A National language [Japanese]-using family,” survived the camp where he was to be killed by learning Russian and working as a translator when the Soviet military occupied Korea following Japan’s surrender. He gives fatherly advice to his son: “Japanese was the tongue to master under the Japanese occupation, but now it’s Russian. A fish can’t live out of water, so it must learn to live in it. Take up Russian!” ⁷⁰ When the US army later governs South Korea, he works for Americans, and finds that the strategy always works: learn the master’s language. Doctor Lee, himself a graduate of the imperial university, made his son study abroad in Soviet Russia and his daughter in the US, as a way to maintain social mobility. However, such a strategy handed down to his children ironically generates a “cut” in the lineage of his family; his son disappears from contact amidst political turmoil, and his daughter marries an American.

While the push in contemporary Korea for accentless English resonates with this (post)colonial inclination towards learning the colonist language, it is nonetheless only a partial memory of the tongue on the operating table. Not only does the old colonial dynamic improperly portray the relationship between Korea and the US (and the so-called developed world), but it also cannot account for the other cultural, political, and economic folds that shape the English craze in Korea (such as tongue surgery and pre-college study abroad) in the contemporary transnational context. As David Crystal and others have argued, English has become arguably the most influential “global language” in the twenty-first century (and the cultural, linguistic, and geopolitical interpretation of this phenomenon itself is a subject of much critical analysis). ⁷¹ Given the global influence of English, scholars have shown how English has gained its pragmatic and symbolic value – as an index of both collective and individual competitiveness in the globalizing world – in South Korea since the 1990s, a time market by segyehwa and the IMF crisis. ⁷²

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⁷⁰ Ibid., 244.


These kinds of complex meanings and desires imbricated into the English craze in contemporary South Korea are perhaps most evident in a fairly recent type of migration. There has been a rapid growth in the number of Korean students in primary and secondary school studying abroad – called “early study abroad” compared to the more traditional study abroad in university. Often, the main purpose of studying abroad, especially in the pre-college years, is to learn English. This has created a new form of transnational family, the so-called “wild goose family”; often the mother and their children in elementary or middle school stay in the United States, while their father stays in Korea and visits them only a few times each year. Through her ethnography of the goose families in a college town in California, Cho Unh argues that this phenomenon illustrates how neoliberal globalization invades the intimacy of middle and upper class Korean families, where familism results in a global split (especially at the cost of the conjugal relationship) for the sake of upward social mobility. In this sense, the tongue on the operating table and the goose family are not only sibling figures but also metonymic for each other in their embodiment of the English craze in South Korea.

Foucault’s discussion about the return of homo oeconomicus in the post-war United States, despite the indismissible difference from twentieth-century South Korea, provides us with some relevant suggestions. In his lecture series The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault portrays a new type of subjectivity corresponding to American neo-liberalism, which generalizes the form of the market as an internal rationality “throughout the social body and including the whole of the social system not usually conducted through or sanctioned by monetary exchanges.” A consequence of this is a refiguring of the subject of labor as “homo oeconomicus,” who is “an entrepreneur” of himself, his own human capital – which consists of “the innate” and “the acquired” elements – distinct from the old form of homo oeconomicus as the partner of exchange in the 19th century traditional political economy.

Regarding innate elements, however, Foucault suspends his analyses because “we do not have to pay to have the body we have, or we do not have to pay for our genetic make-up”; however, he also anticipates “the birth of the something,” which could be “interesting or disturbing.” He does not translate this anxiety into “the traditional terms of racism,” but rather suggests “the problem of the control, screening, and improvement of the human capital of individuals, as a function of unions and consequent reproduction.” Now that technologies of “genetic make-up” have become closer to reality over the three decades since the lecture, discussion of how genetics and biotechnology affect the human subject, especially as homo

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75 Ibid., 243.

76 Ibid., 227-228.

77 Ibid., 227.

78 Ibid., 228.
oeconomicus (and of how this changes the traditional terms of racism) is necessary, but beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, cybernetic and biotechnological interventions into what has traditionally been considered “innate” are already happening, challenging the division between innate and achieved. In this sense, the tongue on the operating table (somewhat similar to the bodies modified by cosmetic surgery, as a way to add to human capital value) also marks the ambiguity of such division.

That said, Foucault focuses on the acquired elements of human capital, the most significant of which is the educational investment that is “much broader than simple schooling or professional training” but includes the parents’ time and the care and affection given to the child, as well as the parents’ education. Another element discussed is “mobility,” as migration represents a material and psychological investment for the improvement of status and remuneration. According to Foucault’s account, it seems that homo oeconomicus as an enterprise of oneself is both the product and part of a larger unit: a family, or a larger enterprise consisting of parents and their children. Foucault’s discussion of family’s function as the investor (incorporating affection and care) in the enterprise of the self offers a useful tool for considering the goose family. Goose families show how the neoliberal logic of homo oeconomicus has reappropriated traditional familialism in South Korea – it not only explains the class and economic implications of being a goose family, but also accounts for how such a lifestyle is considered desirable while at the same time being blamed for the destruction of the traditional family and conjugal intimacy.

Considering how a child’s English education embodies the yearning and investment of his or her family in South Korea, the tongue on the operating table is a locus of such yearnings and investment of family in the segyehwa discourse. However, it is not that the tongue on the operating table is equal to or symbolizes the children of a goose family. Rather, the tongue is a metonym for what So Jin Park and Nancy Abelmann call “cosmopolitan striving” – the desire to become a “citizen capable of living at home in the world” – and does not necessarily involve actual migration. As Park and Abelmann observe, even though only the middle or upper class can afford the costs of studying abroad (and goose-family migration), the cosmopolitan striving of those who remain local is no less significant.

Further, such a striving for English education is not only classified, but also gendered: mothers are in charge of managing the education of their children, and they often accompany their children abroad. Therefore, Park and Abelmann argue, a mother’s management of English education speaks to her own class mobility (or maintenance) and cosmopolitan goals. While the management of English education as a mothering task has put both mothers and their children at the center of critical discourses on the English craze, Nancy Abelmann and Jiyeon Kang’s analyses of the memoirs/manuals written by mothers of South Korean pre-college students abroad offer interesting observations about how these writings defend the mothers against criticism that they “create excessive instrumental familism, abrogate gender norms and forsake

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79 Ibid., 229.
80 Ibid., 230.
82 Ibid.
their nation to produce over-privileged, insufficiently filial and unpatriotic children.” In this sense, the lifted tongue carries the cosmopolitan strivings of the mother as much as of the boy (and perhaps more so).

Here, we return to the question of Mother, and to the cut from mother (and from mother country and mother tongue) in the refiguration of the lifted tongue. Before moving on to the political implication, it is worth remembering that this figure is both the object and the product of cultural representation. In other words, the question of the mother in the lifted tongue would be enriched by a discussion of whether these striving mothers subvert the traditional or neoliberal role of mother. What does the tongue on the operating table in “Tongue Tie” remember of the mother in the story? The voice of the mother is all over the film, but she never actually appears. This project of remembering the mother poses a dilemma. On one hand, this story of tongue surgery is a kind of parodic twist on the stories in colonial society, where mothers (as in the phrase from Dictee) secretly handed down their mother tongue to their daughters; therefore, it recalls the postcolonial memory of traitors to the mother tongue. In this sense, the post-colonial and feminist project of celebrating and recovering mother-daughter lineage does not easily apply in this context. On the other hand, while criticism of the mother as part of the new forms and functions of family in contemporary South Korea adds historical specificity of the story, critical discourses that position the mother as both symptom and agent of the problem also echo patriarchal discourses that idealize the mothering role and mobilize mothers for the purpose of keeping, saving, or improving the existing social order (and constantly chastise them for their failures).

Then, the invisibility of the mother in “Tongue Tie” offers a space to rethink the figure of mother as interstice – but not in the Oedipal sense of absence or in the sense of pristine origin, but rather in a sense that it allows us to re-articulate the cut, lineage, and kinship in relation to the diasporic tongue. As shown in the epigraph from Dictee, Cha enters into the memory of mother by calling “Mother, you are a child still.” However, this remembrance is not simply a recuperation of maternal lineage, but an engendering of “mother” as a child.

2. The Biopolitics of Accent: Untranslatable Bodies under Translation

What is the task of the translator in the era of the computer, when it is anticipated that machines will soon perform most translation tasks? In her St. Jerome Lecture on Literary Translation titled “The World as India,” Susan Sontag finds the distinctiveness of the human translator in that, unlike translating machines whose function is to find equivalence, he makes choices implying ethical standards. Furthermore, his task calls for an awareness that, regardless of one’s choice, “translation is basically an impossible task, if what is meant is that the translator is able to take up the text of an author written in one language and deliver it, intact, without loss, into another language.” In other words, the ethical stake of translation involves a recognition of having to choose loss for the sake of something else.

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83 Nancy Abelmann and Jiyeon Kang, “Memoir/Manuals of South Korean Pre-College Study Abroad: Defending Mothers and Humanizing Children,” Global Networks 14, no.1 (2014), 15.


85 Ibid., 158.
From this ethics of loss, Sontag reframes the recurrent dilemma in translation between fidelity to either form or meaning, and instead asks, “Is it the first task of the translator to efface the foreignness of a text, and to recast it according to the norms of the new language?” On the one side, Saint Jerome (ca. 331-420), who translated from Hebrew and Greek into Latin, argued for keeping the sense to suit the new language at the cost of “the impoverishment of the original.” On the other side, German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) insisted on staying close to the original text, because naturalizing foreignness would bear “inauthenticity” on “the spirit of the language” that inhabits only one’s mother tongue. From these historical examples of world language, Sontag locates the difference between the two positions in how they interpose “the idea of national identity as the framework around which linguistic separateness coheres”; however, I suggest here that this logic is what makes them two sides of the same coin, which becomes clearer in the course of this section. For Sontag, such an implication for identity makes discourses on translation relevant to the politics of accents, given the growth of English as a new lingua franca in the world.

Sontag’s metonym for such a contemporary world is India – and more specifically, the outsourced call centers in India. For the coveted jobs in these call centers, young people go through arduous training designed “to erase all traces of their Indian accent in English,” and “to acquire a pleasant middle-American accent.” Furthermore, they are assigned American identities including names and little biographies, and failure to perform such identities is grounds for firing. Sontag addresses research in which these call-center operators are asked if they would prefer to be a real Nancy or Bill, and want to come to America. Of course, the answer is yes, although “virtually none of these young people has ever left home.”

Sontag calls it “a perfect Schleiermacherian Scenario.” However, I would rather say it is a Jeromian dream of international communication turned into a Schleiermacherian nightmare – seeing it as a manifestation of “inauthenticity” neutralizes how the subjects are conscripted to use English but also to desire American life, and overshadows this naïve acquiescence on the other side of the world. Sontag reflects on how her pride in the richness of English she’s privileged to use is “at odds with my awareness” of another privilege: “to write in a language that everyone, in principle, is obliged to – desires to – understand.” And half-blindness on the politics of such desire echoes as she phrases the status of English as an international language “a fluke-become-

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86 Ibid., 162.
87 Ibid., 161.
88 Ibid., 169.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., 172.
91 Ibid., 173.
92 Ibid., 171.
93 Ibid., 164.
Such an approach, despite her observation about the uneven effect of globalization on different languages (by analogy to the Tower of Babel, where certain languages occupy desirable upper floors while others are confined to lower levels), binds Sontag to a rather bland resolution to “secure and deepen the awareness that other people … really do exist.”

If the problem of choosing between form and meaning is the question of national-linguistic identity, holding some space for preserving native accents (as a trace of the existence of other people) might be a conceivable resolution against the invasive international language, which is something like an evil necessity in our era. Through this sort of logic Sontag turns to Walter Benjamin, who argues for keeping the foreignness in the translation. However, I would approach Benjamin’s discussion differently, having two questions in mind. Can one think of “foreignness” beyond the frame of mother tongue versus foreign tongue? And, how does consideration of the relation between meaning and form (as otherness within a language) affect the reconfiguration between languages?

In “The Task of the Translator,” Benjamin argues that a translator’s obligation is to maintain the difference – the foreignness of language. His approach to foreignness in translation is well-articulated in his quotation from Rudolf Pannwitz, who writes,

> Our translations … proceed from a wrong premise. They want to turn Hindi, Greek, English into German instead of turning German into Hindi, Greek, English. Our translators have a far greater reverence for the usage of their own language than for the spirit of the foreign works…. The basic error of the translator is that he preserves the state in which his own language happens to be instead of allowing his language to be powerfully affected by the foreign tongue.  

In the above passage, the foreignness does not serve the preservation of – or the rem(a)inder of – identity in a Schleiermachian sense; instead, foreignness is called for by its potential to powerfully affect the state of the language into which it is translated. In this sense, Benjamin’s approach differs from a nationalist claim for identity, and also from multiculturalist humanism (for which foreignness becomes a resolution to the tension between the invasive internal language and the defensive mother tongue). Benjamin’s insistence on word-for-word translation suggests a different ethics based on the transformative force (power to affect) of foreignness, which also involves the question of the status of “human” in terms of ethical stake. Unlike Sontag, who privileges human translators over translating machines, Benjamin’s approach does not assume that human beings are the agency of ethical tasks (of choosing what to lose) or the orientation of it – instead, Benjamin looks into language itself.

Benjamin begins his essay with a long series of provocative propositions of what translation is not about – the task to serve men, the readers. Then, he offers the positive but no less puzzling proposition that “translation is a mode,” the comprehension of which requires a return to the original where lies the governing law of translation: translatability. For Benjamin, necessity.

Similarly, this rhetoric of necessity – which slides between description (“is”) and prescription (“ought to be”) – appears in her explanation of English as the national language of India: “the only language that all Indians might have in common not only is, it has to be, English.” Ibid., 165.

Ibid., 177.


Ibid., 70.
this concept concerns the question, “Does [the original’s] nature lend itself to translation, and therefore, in view of the significance of the mode, call for it?” Thus, this concept “ought to be considered even if men should prove unable to translate” the work.98 Through such conceptualization, the notion of “translatability” departs from the dichotomy between possible and impossible (based on the logic of realization), and instead moves into a paradoxical space of alteration within the original, of its willingness to submit itself to the process of becoming-other. In Benjamin’s -abilities, Samuel Weber articulates this paradoxical tension within the concept of translatability as “the fact that the work can only be itself insofar as it is transported elsewhere, altered, transformed – in short, translated.”99

Benjamin describes such alteration as “vital,” because “a translation issues from the original – not so much from its life as from its afterlife.”100 This means that “no translation would be possible if in its ultimate essence it strove for likeness to the original,” since afterlife cannot be called afterlife “if it were not a transformation and a renewal of something living.”101 In other words, the essence of translation is not creating a resemblance of the original in another language, but a transformation and renewal of the original. The feature of this transformation is further indicated in Benjamin’s figuration of “abundant flowering,” for which Weber and others have provided the literal translation of “comprehensive unfolding.”102 Interestingly, elsewhere Benjamin explains the double meanings of unfolding: “A bud unfolds into a blossom, but the boat which one teaches children to make by folding paper unfolds into a flat sheet of paper.”103 To make use of what Weber calls “slippage in translation,” we can conjecture that the life of the original unfolds in translation in the first sense, which Benjamin attributed to Kafka’s parables. This unfolding is inappropriate, however, because it would not allow “the reader’s pleasure to smooth it out so that he has the meaning on the palm of his hand,” as in the unfolding of the paper.104 This unfolding does not collapse the distance between the text and the meaning, but rather takes away the measure of distance. It is not a movement of going backward for the sense of security by catching the meaning of the original, but rather an asymmetrical and irreversible leap.

However, despite what the term afterlife might connote, a work’s life with afterlife is not transcendental, because translation is a singular event in the history of that life. Such singularity of translation – and hence of the life of work – is reified in Benjamin’s argument that a translated work cannot be translated again. Furthermore, this untranslatability of a translated work is at the

98 Ibid., 70.
100 Ibid., 71.
101 Ibid., 73.
104 Ibid., 122.
heart of the ultimate purpose of translation: “expressing the central reciprocal relationship between languages,” in which pure language arises:

In translation the original rises into a higher and purer linguistic air, as it were. It cannot live there permanently, to be sure, and it certainly does not reach it in its entirety. Yet, in a singularly impressive manner, at least it points the way to this region: the predestined, hitherto inaccessible realm of reconciliation and fulfillment of languages. The transfer can never be total, but what reaches this region is that element in a translation which goes beyond transmittal of subject matter. This nucleus is best defined as the element that does not lend itself to translation.

Attention to rhetoric suggests a way to approach the paradox suggested above: the nucleus that is transmitted to the region of pure language is “the element that does not lend itself to translation” – a more literal translation would be “what is not retranslatable in a translation.” The above passage therefore describes another way of “the unfolding” of the (after)life of the original work: pointing the way to the region of pure language. The original in translation gestures, rather than represents. Different from a representation, the gesture of pointing-to does not say to flatten out the meaning; it does not collapse the distance between the sign and the meaning, but works through the distance. Furthermore, it does not point directly to the region of pure language, but to “the way to” that region. The original in translation gestures to passages and movement, rather than to pure language.

Here, the passage is related to the disjunction between content and language – which is the reason the translation cannot be retranslated. According to Benjamin, “while content and the language form a certain unity in the original, like a fruit and its skin, the language of the translation envelops its content like a royal robe with ample folds,” making the language of the translation “inappropriate, violent and alien” to its content. What the original in translation points to, then, is its own untranslatability; paradoxically, the untranslatability of a language can manifest itself only through being translated. In other words, the life of the original within translation gestures toward the untranslatable – the distance within the language in and through translation. The path flows from a disjuncture to another disjuncture.

These interstices within a language as the core of the problem of translation are also discussed by Barbara Johnson. Alluding to the unfaithfulness of the US academy in affairs with foreign writer Derrida – whose ideas uncannily resembled domestic New Criticism— she asks, isn’t it less a bigamy (of double commitment to two languages) than an incest (of renewing “our love-hate intimacy with our mother tongue” through foreign language, which is at stake in translation). And this love-hate intimacy – blaming the inadequacy of Mother for the frustration of translation on one hand, and wishing not to have left home on the other— already

106 Ibid., 75.
points to the fact that any given language is never one, is already an impossible translation and can exist only in its own foreignness to itself. For this reason, she calls for another faithfulness – to the violent “love-hate relation between letter and spirit, which is already a problem of translation within the original text.”

For Benjamin, such a gesture toward the distance within language is illuminated, in turn, by the foreignness between languages in translation – more specifically, word-by-word translation, which overrides syntax and even destabilizes sense to the point of silence. This is why the purpose of manifesting “the kinship of languages” comes through encountering the foreignness between languages. In order to describe such a relation between languages, Benjamin uses an analogy to a shattered vessel: “fragments of a vessel which are to be glued together must match one another in the smallest details, although they need not be like one another.”

That is, foreign languages relate to each other alongside the fringes of the fragments. Here, foreignness is not the mirroring other, but the difference that is articulated through the fractures. In this sense, translation is a queer reproduction of the original text, not through resemblance (in either meaning or form) but through transformation by way of crossing the differences between and within language(s).

From this perspective on foreignness, we can revisit Weber’s statement that the original is “condemned to live on and away in the foreign language only as a component of its ‘history.’” However, this claim misses the ironic change that the original undergoes in translation; in other words, translation is not an exile of “the original” to the medium of foreign language, but rather a becoming-foreign with and in another foreign language. In this sense, translation already moves away from the logic of identity, and therefore the destiny of an original text – that it has to be part itself to be something else somewhere else – can be thought of as positive, rather than as a condemnation. And the search for this “positive” returns us to the question of the translator’s task:

It is the task of the translator to release in his own language that pure language which is under the spell of another, to liberate the language imprisoned in a work in his re-creation of that work. For the sake of pure language, he breaks through decayed barriers of his own language.

Although the purpose and potential of the translation lies beyond human delimitation, the task of the translator still involves the ethical task of the liberator. Both active and receptive, such a task demands that the translator be the destroyer of his own language by bringing foreignness into it. From the perspective of the transformative force of foreignness, the human

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10 Ibid., 146.
11 Ibid., 147.
13 Ibid., 73, 75.
14 Ibid., 78.
translator performs his emancipative tasks only when he himself becomes part of the medium through which the life in the original moves elsewhere, into another language. To return to the Indian call centers and the tongue on the operating table, Benjamin’s discussion on the transformative force of foreignness affords us space to envision a question of accent beyond the terms of inclusion and national or ethnic identity. Rather, the untranslatable accents point to the interstices within as well as between languages, to the liberating potential of crossing these boundaries.

3. Mouth Machine: Dis(re)membering Mother, Home and Hunger

Benjamin’s redefinition of the translator as the destroyer of his own language for the sake of divine language echoes in Deleuze and Guattari’s question – “How to become a nomad and an immigrant and a gypsy in relation to one’s own language?” – with more profane and pragmatic resonance. Deleuze and Guattari’s approach that “a minor literature doesn’t come from a minor language; it is rather that which a minority constructs within a major language” reflects a political urgency in our contemporary world where people increasingly live in a major language that is not their own. Instead of resorting to the dichotomy of mother tongue and master’s language, Deleuze and Guattari introduce Henri Gobard’s tetralinguistic model based on the functions of languages (vernacular, vehicular, referential, and mythic), which can “account for social factors, relations of force, diverse centers of power,” and also “evaluate the hierarchic and imperative system of language” in multilingualism. Given such interrelated functions of languages, a minor literature cannot take the route of returning to the vernacular (the mother tongue), whose function is territorialization, nor can it invest in symbolic or mythic meanings, which would be a reterritorialization of language. Instead, a minor literature comes from one’s own burrow dug from within the major language in which one lives – from the “Third World zone by which a language can escape.”

Deleuze and Guattari suggest that this kind of deterritorialization of a major language is what constitutes Kafka’s work as minor literature. According to Deleuze and Guattari, “each language always implies a deterritorialization of mouth” from its primitive territoriality in food, by occupying it with the articulation of sounds; and, ordinarily, “language compensates for its deterritorialization by reterritorialization in sense.” But Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari note, utilizes “the very poverty” of Yiddish – a withered vocabulary and incorrect syntax – for a new possibility of invention. He would “retain only the skeleton of sense” and let the noise (an accenting of the word) be deterritorialized irrevocably, so that only the intensity of the noise

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118 Ibid., 59.

119 Ibid., 65.

120 Ibid., 69.

121 Ibid., 62.
remains, the fluctuation of which becomes a circuit of collective assemblage and mutual becoming of man, animal, and insect.\textsuperscript{122} That is, instead of using Yiddish (the Jewish language grafted onto Middle High German) as a linguistic territoriality for the Jews, Kafka takes it as a “nomadic movement of deterritorialization” – “a frightening language” that “so reworks the German language from within that one cannot translate it into German without destroying it.”\textsuperscript{123}

Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of minor literature offers another tool for politicizing the force of the tongue on the operating table as a lifted tongue. Their postulation of the exigency of minor literature within major literature as “something impossible” – “the impossibility of not writing, the impossibility of writing in [the major language], the impossibility of writing otherwise” – is suggestive of the condition of the lifted tongue.\textsuperscript{124} Their emphasis on deterritorializing the functions of language within the relations of forces allows us to think of the subversive appropriation of English as a major language, beyond the dichotomy of colonized/colonizing language (the mother tongue/metropolitan tongue). In that sense, tongue surgery on a little boy is less about a cutting-off from the mother tongue to which it should return, and instead marks the impossibility of such a return, and of speaking without in/corrected accents. Further, Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of accent based on its materiality renders the biopolitical potential of the tongue on the operating table more tactile.\textsuperscript{125} If Benjamin sees the foreignness of language as gesturing the way toward pure language, Deleuze and Guattari see the accents of words themselves as having the force to generate lines of escape. In this sense, accents are materials for transposition, a springboard for affirmative leaping-forward. And this leaping is not without risk, which makes it even erotic, as shown in their reading of Kafka’s Letters to Milena: “Milena, with an accent on the i … evokes ‘a woman whom one carries in one’s arm out of the world, out of the fire,’ the accent marking here an always possible fall or, on the contrary, ‘the lucky leap which you yourself made with your burden.’”\textsuperscript{126}

Then, how would a lifted tongue make this joyous yet dangerous leap with its accent? And, to put this into conversation with previous discussion, what memories does this leap carry – what are the rhythms and textures of this leap? In indirect response to these questions, let us look at some of Cha’s writing and videoworks, which engage with the materiality and viscerality of languages, alongside other visual and aural materials. In Dictee, written mostly in English and partially in French (alongside some images of calligraphy in Chinese characters), Hangul

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 64.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 66-67.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 59.

\textsuperscript{125} Here I use “biopolitics” in the broad sense of what Foucault defines as the political technologies of governing bodies who constitute the political sphere, in Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol.1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990). However, while Foucault focuses on how individual bodies become representative of the species in a biopolitical regime, the political applications of the concept have been developed far beyond the issue governing population, race, and species; Foucault himself later addresses the arrival of a different kind of biopolitics in the making of the laboring subject (homo oeconomicus) in The Birth of Biopolitics, as discussed earlier in this chapter and in the preface. Here I attend to the subversive and evasive possibility of bodies as they emerge through the relations of bio-power in the making of neoliberal subject.

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 63.
(Korean orthography) appears only once. The frontispiece of the book is an image of a reduplicated photocopy of writing in Hangul carved on a hard surface. Presented without translation, it appears that the very untranslatability alongside the untranslatable affects is what this image of rough white strokes on a black background remembers.

The affects that overflow the semantic meanings of phrases like
Miss you Mother
(I am) hungry
To my hometown (I) want to go
embody the diasporic memories of elsewhere within here in the materiality of manual inscription and mechanical reduplication of the image of the words. These words were said to have been carved by a Korean laborer on the wall of his sleeping quarters at a Japanese mining camp during the Asian Pacific War, when many Koreans were conscripted for forced labor under Japanese occupation. At the limit of translatability, the coarse texture of the manual inscription on the wall, and the jaded texture of this photocopied image – as a result of repeated reproduction – performs the embodied memories. The memories, which are fading but at the same time induce anachronic illusion, emerge from the black-and-white surface with scattered white spots and several layers of marginal frames tracing the repeated reproduction. As an image, rather than as language, such texture alludes to the affects of not only temporal and spatial displacement and distance, but also of the perpetuating liminal-ity between light and darkness – between remembering and forgetting, original and copy, and awake-ness and dream.

Again, what is untranslatable is at the heart of diasporic memories in Dictee, but not without putting the concept of the (un)translatable into question. The mere fact that the inscription was not translated into English or French would not make it untranslatable – in that case, it is simply untranslated. The affect of the untranslatable emerges as it goes through a near-translation, a transmission to another medium – a photocopy. The concept of this untranslatability is not exclusive to the concept of translatability, since the former – the distance between and within languages – becomes legible only through transition to another medium. However, the shift from translation to photocopy does not mean that what is untranslatable in language can be transmissible through the reproduction of the image – the nostalgic celebration of the primal, the non-linguistic. Rather, the rough resolution and the dark frames at the margin of the image show the alterations between the copies throughout the process of repeated photocopying. In this sense, the shift suggests that language is paradigmatic of media, illuminating the material aspect of words and therefore their untranslatability as a paradigm of the untransferability of media.

By undergoing transmission to other bodies, the foreignness as an untranslatable of the original performs the transformative practice of memories in this image. In this sense, Dictee shows how translation and technological reproduction are the “technologies of making foreign” discussed in the first chapter – hearing your voice from afar and speaking with the voice of others. This is why the affect of the inscription is disturbed and complicated, but not lessened, by

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127 My translation of the frontispiece of Cha’s Dictee.

128 Michael Stone-Richards provides an analysis emphasizing the media of this image, suggesting that the photocopy aspect of the image creates a liminal and transformative space, which he relates to cinematic effects. Michael Stone-Richards, “A Commentary on Theresa Hak Kyung Cha's Dictee,” Glassator 1 (2009), 178.
the exposition that these words were actually carved for a scene in a film. By being transferred to another medium, the untranslatable creates distance from and within the original, and performs through the prosthetic bodies into which it has transferred. Through such technological reproduction, memories that are corporeal and phantom at the same time are reanimated in *Dictee*.

I use “reanimation” to invoke the movement – within the stillness – of some sort of anima (the *zoe*) in this technological reproduction. This force of life that flows with the sensual and affective aspect of the image is both organic and technological. Through technological reproduction, the visceral memories of hunger, longing for mother, and homesickness are summoned; but, in the process of repetition the origin has already been displaced, and the affects of such memories overflow the original body and location. This image from a mine in Japan works not only through its yearning toward Korea as the origin, but also through the sense of dislocation from Korea to Japan, and no less from Japan to the United States where the book is published; the image gestures elsewhere within here, but neither here nor elsewhere is stable any longer. Through such displacements, the corporeal affects no longer belong to the assumed original body, but flow with others in cyborgian assemblages.

Such reanimation, not recollection, is a becoming feral of affective and embodied memories. Here, memories overflow the original bodies, rejecting the domicile and crossing the borders – contesting the spatial and temporal order of “here vs. there.” These feral memories are not so much free (like wild animals) as elusive, with uncontrollable reproductive power. But, how does the yearning for the (imagined) origin – for mother, homeland, and food – in the frontispiece image of *Dictee* generate the feralized and feralizing affects? I might begin with examining “배가 고파요,” which can be translated as “(I am) hungry.” Carved upon the wall, what does this image hunger for? In other words, what kind of body do these letters evoke? This hunger then leads us to think of the mouth as a place where different kinds of bodies and

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129 There is no explanation of this image in *Dictee*. However, it is fairly well known among Koreans that these letters are written on the wall of sleeping quarters in a coal-mining camp on the southern Japanese island Kyushu. Images of this inscription have often been used to remind Koreans of the severity of the forced labor conscription during Japanese occupation, as both historical oblivion and compensation have been the subjects of contentious debates among Koreans (and between Korea and Japan). However, Young-ho Choi questions the use of this photograph for the purpose of exposing the suffering of Korea during Japanese occupation without sufficient examination upon its factuality. He quotes from Gwang-ryeul Kim, a local historian of Chikuko, that the scribbles on the wall were produced as mise-en-scène for the film *The Traitors of 1905*, made by the Federation of Joseon (Korean) Writers and Artists, affiliated with *Chong-ryun* (the association of Joseon residents in Japan sympathetic to North Korea). This movie was produced as a part of the movement against the establishment of diplomatic ties between Korea and Japan in the 1960s, and the scribbles were carved by a crew filming the trace of forced labor during the Japanese occupation in the Chikuho coal mines. See Young-ho Choi, “Gang-je jing-yong joseonin nodongja nakseoneun yeonchuldeon geot” [The scribbles by a Joseon forced laborer are a Mise-en-scène], *Hanil Sipyeong*, November 22, 2005, http://home.freechal.com/choiygho (Accessed October 26, 2012).

130 As discussed in the preface, my use of “the feral” as a biopolitical figure is inspired by Mel Chen’s use of the term to describe her transdisciplinary research method and to consider the political ambiguity of diaspora. Mel Y. Chen, *Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 18-19.
meanings intermingle, effecting territorialization, reterritorialization, and deterritorialization. Here, I would like to think alongside Elspeth Probyn’s discussion of the mouth machine as she examines the bodies that eat – and also the body that writes about the body that eats – in Carnal Appetites. Probyn engages with Deleuze and Guattari’s approach to bodies as assemblages, whose “opening and closings … constantly rearrange our dealings with others.” From this approach, we can think of the mouth machine that takes in as well as spits out “material, semiotic and social flows,” constantly rearranging the interminglings of our bodies with others. Probyn does not necessarily relate the sensual functions of the mouth – alimentary and sexual – to the primary territory, to the point of nostalgic returning. Rather, she finds the possibility of rhizomatic connection as it operates through different registers of flows. Hence, eating is less about confirming your identity than about losing yourself in what you eat; fasting can be connected to anti-homophobic politics by joining “the mouth with sex with mouth that regurgitates homophobic statements.” As such, the lifted tongue could be figured as a mouth-machine, through which affective and prosthetic memories and desires are transformed and feralized, in the interminglings of various bodies – the organic, linguistic, and technological.

In Cha’s video work “Mouth to Mouth” (1975), the cyborgian physicality of the act of speaking evokes memories of the diasporic mother tongue. In close-up, a mouth opens and closes, repeating eight Korean vowels. However, these vowel sounds are inaudible. Instead, there are sounds of birds, bubbling water, and running water fused with electric noise. And, intermittent silences. The image of the mouth fades in and out, as video static hazes thicker and thinner over the mouth. As the video static thickens, it becomes snowflakes, and then even rippling water. Through the mufflings of the pronounced sound, fade-outs, silences, and other visual and aural noises, the movements of the mouth evoke the memories of forgetfulness, the loss of primal language. As the title “Mouth to Mouth” anticipates, this piece performs a resuscitation of lost language. However, the mouth’s repetitive physical movement does not recover the mother tongue (Korean) through recombining meaning and sound, nor translate it into English. Rather, what the mouth resurrects is the bodily memories of forgetting and summoning-up the language, and these bodily memories are cyborgian – the mixture of and transmission between organic and electronic bodies. Through such prosthesis, the mouth creates pure shapes and movements of light surface and dark holes – the space of memories and forgetfulness. If the meat of your tongue were altered in order to change the interiority of the tongue (language), you would dis(re)member this cut by writing/speaking the very embodiedness of language. Through such dis(re)memberment, Cha’s works perform how a lifted tongue leaps – not returning to the origin, yet carrying the memories of it.

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132 Ibid., 19.

133 Ibid.

134 Theresa Hak Kyung Cha, "Mouth to Mouth," 1975 (Video).
Part Two. Cloned Dogs (and Their Surrogate Mothers):
Entangled Bodies and Affective Ethics

In 2009, BioArts International announced that it had “completed delivery of healthy cloned dogs to all five of its clients” from its commercial dog-cloning project Best Friends Again, but would “discontinue cloning service as a result of several problems.”

A northern California biotech company testing the waters of the pet-cloning industry, BioArts had offered dog-cloning services in partnership with the Sooam Biotech Research Foundation, based in South Korea and led by Dr. Woo Suk Hwang. Hwang was once feted as a Korean national hero for making a breakthrough in human stem-cell cloning research, until being disgraced for fabricating data and for violating bioethics laws. He also led a team of scientists at Seoul National University that delivered the first dog clone in the world, just before his involvement in the scandal and dismissal from the university. In the announcement from BioArts, CEO Lou Hawthorne attributed the cessation of their service primarily to “unethical, black-market competition” from RNL Bio, another South Korean company that had joined the commercial pet-cloning industry in cooperation with SNU scientists. Hawthorne blamed RNL for not respecting international patent law (under which BioArts claimed the exclusive right to clone dogs and cats) and for promising an unrealistic price drop. In order to lower the price, Hawthorne warned, RNL would reduce care costs by sending dogs that had served as surrogates to dog farms – where they would be slaughtered for human consumption.

Hawthorne further remarked that the reason South Korean scientists were first to clone dogs had “far less to do with scientific acumen, and far more to do with the availability of dogs as ova donors and embryo recipients,” supplied by dog farms.

Since BioArts stepped out of the pet-cloning industry, South Korea – a “wannabe” international powerhouse in biotechnology – has become the center of commercial companion-animal cloning services, largely for bereaved pet owners in the US. However, RNL Bio (which was ambitious enough to acquire the international patent license for cloning dogs, and had announced plans to open the world’s largest dog-cloning research center in 2010) quietly ceased its dog cloning because of “negative public opinion,” among other reasons. As a result, Sooam is currently the only laboratory consistently producing dog clones. Running its own dog-cloning service independent from BioArts, Sooam had produced about four-hundred dog clones as of 2013, including special services dogs, medical research model dogs, and dozens of pet dogs.

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136 Ibid.

137 Ibid.

(mostly for Americans). Sooam is gearing up to enter the European market as well. It recently ran a promotional competition in the UK whose winner, a young cook from west London, was awarded free cloning for the dachshund that helped her to overcome an eating disorder.\(^\text{139}\)

The second part of this dissertation examines what the emergence of transnational pet cloning tells us about the ethics of mourning in an age of genetic reproduction. How do we make sense of this new way to keep the memories of beloved pets alive, when these memories are mediated through intermingling with and intervention into other bodies – the clones themselves, and but also less visible bodies such as the egg-donor dogs and surrogate-mother dogs involved in the process? And how does this mesh with the biopolitical relations of human and nonhuman bodies within transnational circuits across South Korea and the US in its historical and geopolitical specificity?

I am not, however, interested in reiterating the apocalyptic vision prevailing in both popular-cultural representations and philosophical discourses, in which clones are technological supplements for natural creatures. As technically-exteriorized memories, clones have been seen as symptomatic of our inability to properly deal with loss and mourn. Instead, this dissertation asks what such an apocalyptic vision does. In other words, how does it perform clones as copies of the originals? In response, the following chapters examine the biopolitical consequences of this vision on the epistemological and ontological reality of what are seen as “living copies,” as such vision interlocks the dichotomy of original versus copy and differences in sex, sexuality, race, and species. Approaching this vision as performative rather than descriptive allows us to see how it creates its blind spots: the cultural semiosis of “cloning” relative to the historical and geopolitical context in which cloning is promoted and practiced, and the other bodies involved in the process outside the frame of cloning as bio-mimesis. A different lens is necessary if we are to account for, for example, how dog-eating culture in Korea has become a “bioethical” issue for commercial pet cloning in the Western market. In its search for an alternative vision of cloning, my dissertation shifts from the frame of clones as repositories of mimetic memories of the original to the frame of cloning as prosthetic interfaces, where collective memories are composed through assemblages of various bodies – humans, animals, and technologies – in specific cultural and technological configurations of the transnational pet-cloning industry.

Approaching cloning as a prosthesis of memories, I draw upon Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive reading of the concept of “supplement” in conversation with Rosi Braidotti’s new materialist perspective on “minority memory.” In his analyses of the technologies of writing as the supplement, Derrida evokes how thinkers from Aristotle to Freud to Heidegger discuss the double edges of technological intervention into the human body and mind: while such interventions extend the body and mind, they ironically disable the human by building dependence on technologies.\(^\text{140}\) However tightly tethered they are, there is always the possibility

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\(^\text{139}\) The result of the competition was announced through a Channel 4’s documentary program: The £60,000 Puppy: Cloning Man’s best Friend, Channel 4, April 9, 2014. At first, Sooam announced that the prize was a 70% discounted price for its dog-cloning service (Sooam BRF, “Dog Cloning Competition for the UK,” March 22, 2013, http://en.sooam.com/html/?code=B01&div=30, accessed September 3, 2013). However, a few months after the initial application date Sooam announced that it would instead offer cloning for free to the winner (October 11, 2013, https://twitter.com/DogCloningUK).

\(^\text{140}\) Jacques Derrida’s discussion of the supplement appears in many of his works, including Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” in Disseminations, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago:
that such technologies can escape our control and return to us as the other. In this sense, technologies are basically prosthetics. For Derrida, however, this problem is not something we can will away by remaining with the “natural” body; rather it marks every experience, in which we encounter the other who cannot be totally assimilated within us. Alongside his epistemological and ontological consideration of the others through reinterpreting the concept of the technological supplement, Derrida calls for an ethics that is unconditionally welcoming of these others, and ultimately for an ethics of living with the specters of the others.  

141 Approaching cloning in terms of prosthesis of memory is therefore an ethical project, examining how we remember others through technological extension at the same time as through conjuration of the absent bodies. But, how do we live with specters that return to us in the form of living bodies, or as a part of living bodies in the case of cloning?

Within this space of intermingled body and image, Rosi Braidotti’s new materialist feminist perspective on “minority” memory as becoming (in which one is remembered not in the form of loss but in the form of fragmented and embodied inhibition in others) offers a powerful tool for recomposing the concept of specters.  

142 From this approach, the technology of cloning – which displaces memories to outside the unitary subject “I” by diffusing them into other bodies – helps us to refigure the porous boundaries between memory and body, nature and technology, self and others, and thereby allows us to see the act of remembrance as a prosthetic process involving embodied others. I am not suggesting a synthesis of the two positions, but instead a utilization of Braidotti’s criticism to transpose Derrida’s notion of prosthesis such that it becomes accountable for the various bodies involved in the process of cloning, as well as for the transformative force in that process.

In order to explore a new ethics of memory through pet cloning as a prosthetic and affective process, the second part of this dissertation mobilizes a double movement of the concept of “prosthesis” through its two chapters: the extension of memory through substitution of artificial body parts for missing parts, and at the same time the conjuring of what is absent, the specters. The first chapter examines how the trope of clones as mimetic supplements of the original both operates within and is challenged by the practice of remembrance in the site of pet cloning. On one hand, I discuss how the trope of clones as mere copies is complicit with the production of clones as biopolitical abjects, drawing from critical theories on mimetic subjects and criticisms of the original/copy dichotomy. On the other hand, I explore how the notion of irreplaceability (often associated with the original) has been reappropriated by both the pet-cloning industry and pet owners, suggesting the necessity of a different frame for analysis.

In that sense, the second chapter is a prequel to the first, tracing the forgotten others that haunt the scene of pet cloning. What does pet cloning suggest about the ethics of memory, when...

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it reproduces memorable bodies by rendering other bodies invisible and even disposable? The question highlights the intrinsic relations between the value of memorable bodies (whose exchange value amounts to $70,000 to $150,000 per clone) and the (non)value of surplus bodies – such as former surrogate-mother dogs, sibling clones stillborn or born with defects, and unwanted extra clones. This chapter explores the nodes of such entanglement by tracing the surrogate-mother dogs reportedly sent to the dog farm for meat (without leaving many traces to follow) in South Korea. What I present is not a comprehensive exposure of what happened to these dogs, but rather fragmentary gestures tracing the representational, ontological, and affective matrix within which these animals have disappeared. I approach the discourses that simplistically reduce ethical concerns surrounding the treatment of surrogate dogs to either the dog-eating culture or the lack of bioethics in South Korea, not as (insufficient) explanations for the problem but as a part of it. From this approach, I examine how the postcolonial discursive structure surrounding dog-eating and the developmentalist regime of the biotech industry intersect, rendering these female dogs invisible and disposable.

Through these two sets of inquiries, the latter half of this dissertation calls for a biopolitics of memory that accounts for the ontologically and epistemologically entangled bodies at the intersection of differences in sex, species, (dis)ability, and nation in transnational circuits.
Chapter 3. Best Friends Again: Reproducing the Irreplaceable

Writing at the dawn of the pet-cloning industry – just before the first companion-dog cloning project succeeded after ten years of effort, and after a handful of pet cats had been cloned commercially – Donna Haraway made an apt observation about how pet cloning was making its way into the technoculture of companion species through anticipatory marketing. For example, Animal Cloning Sciences, Inc., one of the biotech companies making a business out of gene preservation in advance of concrete pet-cloning technology, made a promissory claim: “You no longer have to look forward to heartrending grief at the death of your pet. If you preserve your pet’s DNA now, you will have the option to clone your pet and continue your pet’s life in a new body.” Even though there is no evidence that Animal Cloning Sciences ever actually cloned pet-animals (which is not unusual for biotechnology companies involved in pet cloning), its statement captures the prevailing imaginary of pet-cloning services in that it shows the anticipatory structure of commercial pet cloning. First, as Haraway notes, it was anticipatory of the cloning technology itself, which had not yet been developed for pet animals. Second, it was anticipatory of the death of pets, and of grief at the loss. Now that pet...
cloning has been performed for several years, the popular imaginary of pet cloning still portrays
the technology as a preemptive resolution to the loss of beloved pets.\footnote{I borrowed this articulation of cloning as a “preemptive act” of anticipatory loss from a conversation with Charis Thompson. I agree that animal cloning (especially in the cases of pet cloning and endangered species) is often based on a fantasy of the preemption of loss and grief. However, as I discuss in the rest of this dissertation, pet cloning – in the intermingling of various kinds of bodies – raises more ambivalent and multifaceted implications regarding loss and mourning.}

As a technology of anticipatory mourning, commercial pet cloning has attracted a mixed
response. While it provides hope and relief to some, it also raises suspicion in many that cloning
is a circumvention of the difficult but necessary process of mourning – instead, replacing what is
irreplaceable with mere copies. While the figure of clones as replacements is a prevailing frame
for pet cloning, one might ask if this figuration is not only descriptive of but also operative of
encounters among the technologies, bodies, and other tropes surrounding genetic reproducibility.
In response, this chapter examines how the figure of the clone as an artificial supplement
interacts with other figures of the similar (and related tropes such as image, copy, replica,
simulacra, and masquerade) and with the figures of technological bodies (such as cyborgs) –
reiterating the meanings and values of subjects that are often associated with inauthentic mimicry, such as clones, women, and the colonial subject.

However, in making sense of pet cloning the figure of cloning as mere replacement does
not come into play without convergence and friction with other systems of meaning. Sociological
and anthropological studies on reproductive technology and regenerative medicine have
suggested that cloning technology, and specifically somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), takes
specific meaning as it creates assemblages with various other elements – such as biology,
institutions, culture, and individuals – in particular settings of the practice.\footnote{See Charis Thomson, \textit{Making Parents} (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2007); Sarah Franklin, \textit{Dolly Mixtures} (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). Also, see Carrie Friese, \textit{Cloning Wild Life} (New York: NYU Press, 2013) and “Models of Cloning, Models for the Zoo: Rethinking the Sociological Significance of Cloned Animals,” \textit{Biosocieties} 4 (2009).} Challenging the deterministic view of cloning as copying, Carrie Friese discusses how interspecies cloning of endangered animals, through being reframed as a means of generating “genetic value,” has become a meaningful model for zoological parks, where the current practice of species preservation focused on biodiversity had been at odds with the popular imaginary of cloning as the reproduction of identical copies.\footnote{Friese, “Models of Cloning, Models for the Zoo.”} In addition, while the social semiotics of pet cloning has been affected by the prevailing trope of copy (as an image of the original), the meaning of copy itself can vary by the cultural, political, and economic circumstances in which it is reproduced and circulated. In her studies on intellectual property and generic drugs in Latin America, Cori Hayden claims that while the value of \textit{mere} copy as epistemologically and morally inferior has modern capitalist implications, the heterogeneity of the same (“same but better,” “same but cheaper,” and so on) has become a source of value in postindustrial capitalism in the global south.\footnote{For the political implications of the division between proper and illicit copy (e.g., innovative copy/mere copy in intellectual property, and generic/piracy in pharmaceutical markets), see Cori Hayden, “A Generic Solution?: Pharmaceuticals and the Politics of the Similar in Mexico,” \textit{Current Anthropology}}
Bearing in mind this social semiosis of the clone, this chapter examines the political and cultural implications of the prevalent tropes of cloning, and how such tropes have been affected and transformed in making sense of pet clones in the context of the commercial pet-cloning industry. The chapter begins with a critical examination of the prevailing vision of cloning, utilizing postcolonial, queer, and critical media theories. These theories afford us space to discuss how the rhetoric of clones as dubious copies is performative – rather than merely descriptive – of the reproduction of clones as biopolitical abjects, by evoking and reiterating the mimetic attributes of the other such as women, queers, the colonized, and even terrorists in disguise. Then it explores how the notion of the irreplaceable singularity (which often marks the absolute significance of “the original”) has been reappropriated by the pet-cloning industry to produce the commodity value of “life worth cloning” – which I compare to Judith Butler’s concept of “life worth mourning” – and by pet owners themselves in a paradoxical effort to reproduce the irreproducible memories of deceased pets. However, such a reappropriation and reproduction of the singularity (especially by a capitalist rhetoric) does not point to the necessity of recuperating the authentic form of singularity, but rather to the need to rethink the notion of “singularity” as a critical tool. For that purpose, this chapter examines what resists and transforms during the reappropriation of “the irreplaceable” in pet cloning, through what Haraway calls “the encounter value.”

In this way, the chapter rejects the technologically deterministic view that cloning technology preempts the memory of the original, and instead examines cloning as a site where the value of life is generated, calculated, and contested, interlocking various tropes and practices.

1. Disaster of the Clone: How Has It Lost Its Face, Soul, and Aura?

Is it possible to speak of the soul or the conscience, or even of the unconscious from the point of view of the automatons, the chimeras, and the clones that will supersede the human race? ~Jean Baudrillard, “The Final Solution”

Every morning, I begin my work with a greeting to a pussycat – gently prick her little belly with my index finger, and say a few secret words of endearment. This is a real cat, truly, believe me, a little cat. But, un/like Derrida’s cat, she is a figure of a cat, who has appeared in several newspapers and magazines. She is my laptop’s wallpaper picture, captured from an online image of the first cloned cat – named CC, an abbreviation for “carbon copy” or “copy


152 Here I parrot Derrida’s famous encounter with his cat gazing at him naked. See Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” in The Animal That Therefore I Am, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 6. Despite Derrida’s claim that his cat is not a “figure,” she has become one in his writing – creating exactly the kind of paradox that Derrida is often concerned with.
cat.” CC is the product of a project called “Operation Copycat,” a branch of the Missyplicity Project – devoted to cloning a mixed-breed pet dog (“Missy”) in cooperation with scientists at Texas A&M University and funded by Genetic Savings and Clones (GSC). GSC, itself a spin-off of Missyplicity, had expanded its efforts to develop and refine technologies to clone pet and livestock animals for commercial applications.153 In the February 21, 2002 issue of Nature, Texas A&M scientists reported that a cloned cat had been produced through nuclear transplantation of cumulus cells from a donor mother into an enucleated cat ovum.154

However, somewhat ironically given her name, the kitten did not look like her genetic donor, Rainbow. Rainbow was an orange, black, and white calico female, but CC was born grey and white. This is because the coat pattern of multicolored animals is the result “not only of genetic factors but also of developmental factors that are not controlled by genotype.”155 In an interview with New Scientist, GSC’s CEO Lou Hawthorne commented on this: “That was a disaster! We had the dubious distinction of having produced the world’s first clone that did not resemble its genetic donor. It created an enduring argument that clones will often not resemble their donors even physically – which is false.”156

Despite her cute appearance, CC has become the figure of a clone with the affect of disaster. Firstly, CC embodies the disaster of non-resemblance, of not matching the expectation for a clone. In her debut to the world, this non-resemblance caught the attention of media no less than the first successful creation of her kind via SCNT. A technology journalist reported that this non-resemblance turned “a scientific victory … into a public relations disaster,” that it catalyzed the difference between the science-oriented Texas A&M team – who would emphasize that cloning is “reproduction, not resurrection” – and the business-oriented GSC, which was selling the resemblance between donor and copy.157 In other words, CC brought disaster with her by failing to create enough “resemblance” to implicate “resurrection.”

Secondly, by embodying this disaster of non-resemblance, CC mirrors – summons up only to destroy, and vice versa – another disaster associated with clones: the disaster of resemblance. As a figure of the disaster of resemblance, clones have often evoked in both pop-culture films and philosophical writings an apocalyptic vision of the mass-production of indistinguishable copies susceptible to control, erasure, and replacement. However, CC’s non-resemblance is disastrous to the disaster of resemblance (as envisioned in the apocalyptic scenarios), not because it neutralizes the disaster of resemblance but because it hyperbolically

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155 Ibid.


implodes the ironic structure of the resemblance – the irony of producing an “other” that is “almost the same but not quite,” to borrow Homi Bhabha’s famous phrase in his critique on the postcolonial discourses of mimicry (discussed in Chapters 1 and 2). In other words, the “surprise” at the non-resemblance of CC belies the anxiety regarding collapse of the difference between the original and its copy. The scientists’ watchword – “It’s reproduction, not resurrection” – is not a resolution to the disaster of resemblance, because this is not a problem of scientific reason versus mythic fantasy. Rather, the uncomfortable sense of relief shown in this phrase betrays deep-rooted anxiety regarding disastrous resemblance, even though it is also desired. As such, CC is another figure of the “inappropriate/d other,” which both evokes and disturbs the dominant trope of clone by showing the ironic structure of such a trope (shuttling between desire to reproduce the same and paranoia over the indistinction between original and copy) and the heterogeneity within the similar showing the contingency of the meaning and value of similarity.

In the apocalyptic visions, clones are deprived of individual singularity – or its variations, such as soul, face, and even “aura” in the Benjaminian sense. Indeed, Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” is one of the most frequent references in philosophical and literary critiques of cloning, as the essay concerns the loss of aura in its aesthetic form and the uptake of a new political form in serially reproduced works of art, such as photography and cinema. Clones, when figured as mass-reproduced genetic copies that could possibly devour the original by appropriating its aura, pose a threat to an ethics of mourning that emphasizes the irreducible gap between the original and the image. Here, the lost aura marks the difference between what ought to be mourned (the original) and what averts mourning. Like the discourse of colonial mimicry, the figure of copy as mass-reproduced resemblance constantly generates differences through mere proximity to the origin, thereby producing hierarchal relations between the two. It is in this context that I raise the question: how have clones become faceless, soulless, aura-less? Following Katherine Hayles’s style of inquiry (as shown in the title of her book, How We Became Posthuman, itself referencing Bruno Latour’s We Have Never Been Human), the question does not so much reinscribe the attributes of clones as it attends to their performative force by pointing to how this kind of figuration reproduces clones as the other(s). This question allows us to examine the biopolitical consequences of the figuration of the clone in reproducing the other, whose radical difference is actually amplified as it comes closer to the original.

The disastrous affect of clones reverberates in Jean Baudrillard’s two essays, “Clone Story” and “The Final Solution.” My approach to Baudrillard’s writings is contiguous with Jackie Stacey’s feminist and psychoanalytic reading, which positions Baudrillard’s work as “a symptomatic indicator of genetic imaginaries” both in Western philosophy and in pop-culture representation. If, as Stacey points out, Baudrillard’s writing shows an instance of how

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“philosophy becomes an eloquent science fiction” of the imaginaries, then it is worth attending
to how his stories not only illustrate but also perform the biopolitical disaster of clones.

In “Clone Story” Baudrillard evokes Benjamin’s discussion on the loss of aura in art as a
consequence of its mechanical reproducibility. Baudrillard claims that such is what happens to
us when cloning is “no longer at the level of messages, but at the level of individuals,” when the
body is conceived merely “as a stockpile of information and of messages, as fodder for data
processing” for its limitless repetition. In this scheme of cloning, “each cell of the body
becomes an embryonic prosthesis for this body” – an internalized (esotechnical) prosthesis, as
opposed to the external (exotechnical) prostheses of the industrial era in which Benjamin
wrote. Based on his conceptualization of clones as internal prosthesis, Baudrillard claims that
“the individual is no longer anything but a cancerous metastasis of its base [genetic] formula.”
Baudrillard laments that such uninhibited proliferation of a single matrix would eliminate “all the
differential vicissitudes that once constituted the aleatory charm of individuals.” In this story,
the disaster of resemblance takes the form of “the hell of the same” where all individuals lose
their unpredictable differences and become “neither the one nor the other [but] the Same.”

Almost twenty years after “Clone Story,” Baudrillard wrote another essay on cloning –
“The Final Solution” – with more political urgency, as by this point people had been
cryopreserved for future cloning, and Dolly the sheep had been cloned. In his later essay,
Baudrillard portrays clones as biopolitical abjects, proclaiming that while cloning fulfills the
human fantasy of immortality, ironically it is a trap that takes the species on an evolutionary U-
turn toward extinction (back to immortal and undifferentiated beings) by making sex and death
obsolete.

“The Final Solution” begins with two images of this involution: the cryopreserved human
heads in Arizona, from whose brain cells researchers hope to reconstitute whole bodies; and their
counterpart, the headless clones of frogs and mice in private laboratories on the other side of the
Atlantic Ocean, “in preparation for the cloning of headless human bodies that will serve as
reservoirs for organ donation.” In the juxtaposition of these images, a new form of aura-less

iBooks edition, preface.


162 Ibid.

163 Ibid., 98, 100.

164 Ibid., 100.

165 Ibid., 101.

166 The phrase “the hell of the same” is the title of another version of this essay with an extended


168 Ibid., 3-4.
human is envisioned via headless frogs and mice, foreboding headless human bodies for organ donations.

These premonitory murine and batrachian clones embody two features – acephalic and non-human – which delineate the figure of clones as biopolitical abjects. “Why bodies without heads?” Baudrillard poses. “As the head is considered the site of consciousness, it is thought that bodies with heads would pose ethical and psychological problems. Better simply to manufacture acephalic creatures whose organs could be freely harvested, because such creatures would not compete with – or invoke too closely – the original human beings.” The possibility of reproducing organs without a head is not merely the condition for biopolitical abjection; it also figures clones as primarily headless beings. What was somewhat mysteriously figured as aura-less in “Clone Story” now materializes as head-less, which is conceived primarily as consciousness-less. Through such circular figuration, headless-ness becomes a feature of clones, which now marks their difference from the original human beings. In this sense, the absent head is the locus of producing clones as “almost the same but not quite”; the headless figure justifies the differentiated allocation of life value between the original human beings and the headless (provisionally animal, but potentially human) clones, despite their similarity. If, as Stacey and others have argued, the indiscernibility of clones disturbs the liberal humanist fantasy of a human subject based on unique identity, headless figures can be read as a reaction to anxiety over the threat to blur the boundary of such a human subject. And, if consciousness is at the heart of the identity of a human subject, what would better mark the clones as non-human than denying their heads? Inasmuch as consciousness is conceived as the legitimate criterion for differential allocation on the value of (human) life, the figure of acephalic clones is not only illustrative but also performative of this biopolitical abjection. However, this abjection is not complete. If these animals concern us despite their headless-ness, does this not also suggest that we can think of the Levinasian face without a head (brain)?

Figuring clones as inhuman abject is even literalized in the second feature of the headless clones: their being non-human animal. However, Baudrillard does not ask, “Why frogs and animals?” (while he did ask, “Why bodies without head?”). Instead, the headless animals are presented as a reference point for the abjection of the human species. Furthermore, the use of nonhuman animals as this reference point is not by chance – a nonhuman animal is not only the previous step toward human cloning, but more significantly is also the next step, where cloning technology is leading the human species. Baudrillard claims that by cloning, the human species is willingly becoming “its own guinea pig under the same terms as the rest of the world.” He asks, “Have we come, via an unexpected detour, to the same point at which animal species, when

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169 Ibid., 4 (emphasis in original).

170 Stacey, The Cinematic Life of the Gene. Also, Katherine Hayles, in How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), criticizes how cultural representations of cybernetics often present a disembodied consciousness as the locus of human subjectivity, reiterating the Cartesian mind/body split. From this kind of disembodied rationalism, cybernetics (based on the fluidity of information moving from one body to another) paradoxically threatens its own fantasy of the unitary subject. Although clones do not neatly fit into Hayles’s discussion on cybernetics and cyborgs, the prevailing geneticism that sees a body as the conveyer of genetic data can be thought of as another variation on this disembodied rationalism.

they reach a critical saturation point, automatically switch over to a kind of collective suicide."\(^{172}\) Under Baudrillard’s narrative, the problem of cloning shifts from individuals to the (human) species. In other words, the loss of aura among undifferentiated individuals becomes a problem of the indistinction of humans from other species. Here, humanism is followed by neither the human nor the inhuman, but by “the genetic simulation of life,” which Baudrillard equates with the extinction of the human species.\(^{173}\) In this, Baudrillard sees the disappearance of traditional liberal humanism, since cloning forgets that life as “form” cannot be measured in terms of (exchange) “value,” and that “the human is that which cannot be traded as currency for any given artificial species, such as clones, even if the clones … are a ‘better value.’”\(^{174}\) Baudrillard’s figuration of clones as biopolitical abjects reflects the anxiety over any affinity between human and non-human creatures that might be raised by the technology of genetic reproduction (and he warns us, “We share 98 percent of our genes with apes and fully 90 percent with mice!”\(^{175}\)). While this fact of shared genes might for some inspire a new ethics based on the shared ontology between species,\(^{176}\) Baudrillard’s concern is strictly anthropocentric in that cloning matters for its implications on the human species, and more particularly on the human species becoming animal. Particularly, his concern relates to defending the subject of liberalist humanism (which he also calls “the traditional humanism … of the Enlightenment”), as he asks with agony, “What right do these genes have to exist?”\(^{177}\) This urgency to recover the blurring boundary between the human species and others – in contrast to which the human subject is defined – is at the heart of his doubt regarding “the soul” of automatons, chimeras, and clones, and of his assumption regarding the aura-less-ness of clones.

While Baudrillard’s nostalgia over the disappearance of distinctive human-ness echoes that of Benjamin’s over the loss of the aura, Benjamin also suggests that the destruction of aura opens up the revolutionary possibility of the work of art in its political form. To take up where Baudrillard left off then, what would be the new form of “human”? And, what would be the political possibility of such change? For this inquiry I put into conversation W. J. T. Mitchell and Jackie Stacey, two contemporary authors who also use Benjamin’s notion of technological reproducibility and the loss aura to examine the biopolitical significance of cloning. Both offer insights into how the trope of clones, as the figure of disastrous resemblance, has created the constitutional other of the human species outside but also within the human species. In the process, both also engage with a critical examination of the trope of “image” (which has become a prevailing language for discussing clones) in Western philosophical tradition, and how the contemporary manner of producing images has affected the notion of image and its relation to the original (and particularly the digitalization of image production). Of course, this affects the

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\(^{172}\) Ibid., 19.

\(^{173}\) Ibid., 23.

\(^{174}\) Ibid., 28-29.

\(^{175}\) Ibid., 22.

\(^{176}\) In the beginning of When Species Meet, Haraway celebrates that “90 percent of the cells are filled with the genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists” as a way to refigure the notion of a human being.

\(^{177}\) Baudrillard, “The Final Solution,” 21-22.
meaning and value of clones, too. Through such navigation, Mitchell and Stacey go beyond analogy with Benjamin; on one hand they delineate the figure of clones as images, and on the other they point to the boundary where clones exceed the features of an image.

Mitchell further examines the reproduction of clones as biopolitical abjects and their affect of disaster. However, his discussion offers a critical take on this figuration of clones by politicizing (rather than taking it for granted, as in Baudrillard) such figuration in the context of the long history of iconophobia in Western civilization, and in relation to other constitutive figures of abjection in our contemporary world – terrorists.

Mitchell argues that clones have become “the hypericon” – the figure for copy, imitation, and simulation – of our time, as cloning signifies a new way of reproducing living image in late capitalism. According to Mitchell, “the mechanical reproduction” of the time of Benjamin has been succeeded by the “biocybernetic reproduction” (a synthesis of biotechnology and computer science) of our time, when “the assembly line begins to produce, not machines, but living organisms and biologically engineered materials,” and “image production moves from the chemical-mechanical technology of traditional photography and cinema to the electronic images of video and camera.”

These changes in biotechnology and electronic media introduce “a turn toward the biodigital picture,” the images rendered animate by means of the techno-sciences of biology and information. Mitchell’s primary example of the biodigital picture is a scene from Stephen Spielberg’s film Jurassic Park, a still image showing a dinosaur with the letters of the DNA code projected onto it, condensing the digital/literal reanimation of the fictional/biotechnological reanimation of an extinct creature. In this example from Jurassic Park, Mitchell’s concept of image still revolves around the traditional realm of images – visual representation. However, his concept of biocybernetic reproduction offers a useful tool for challenging the traditional notion of what “image” is (alongside other concepts such as work, art, technology, and media). This implication becomes more forceful when we think beyond how clones are represented and proliferated in digital media, and instead question what kind of image “the living organisms and biologically engineered materials in the assembly line” (or in the laboratories) are – if they are to be thought of as images – and how these bio-technical bodies bring a tension to the trope of clones as image.

Mitchell examines how clones signify the possibility of realizing the ancient dream to create a “living image,” and thereby recalls the paralleling anxieties regarding such a realization, which underlie the ancient iconophobia – the fear of the icon, copy, imitation, resemblance, and similitude because of their power of realization. While Mitchell finds this kind of iconophobia at the root of contemporary aversion to clones, he renders historical and political specificity to what

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180 Ibid., chap 6.

181 Ibid.
he calls “clonophobia” by examining how the images of clones in the “Clone Wars” (referring both to the film Star Wars: The Clone Wars and to faith-based policies against cloning and stem-cell research during the Bush Administration in the US) are interlaced with images of terrorists in the post-9/11 “War on Terror.”

Mitchell makes an argument that clones and terrorists are “the mutually constitutive figures of the pictorial turn in our time.”

Juxtaposing the image of the cloned stormtroopers of the Star Wars saga with the hooded prisoners of Abu Ghraib, Mitchell notes the uncanny similarity between these faceless, soulless, and anonymous figures. As shown in the rumor that Osama bin Laden was cloning Hitler to reproduce five hundred elite Aryan SS troopers – with blond hair and blue eyes coupled with perfect American accents – to become agents for al Qaeda, “cloning and terrorism converge as forms of extremism and are merged as forms of radical evil.” Through such configuration, the image of clones has become synonymous with images of proliferating mutants, replicants, cyborgs, and soulless masses of identical warriors, ready to sacrifice themselves in suicide missions.

Mitchell traces such images of nightmarish repopulating of the same back to anxiety about the enemy within us, the other within the self. Turning to Dolly the sheep, Mitchell asks why the idea of “a sheep in sheep’s clothing is more disturbing” than that of “a wolf in sheep’s clothing.” He explains that “the fear of difference … is what might be called a ‘rational’ fear, or at the very least, a fear that has a determinate object or image. … But the true terror arises when the different arrives masquerading as the same, threatening all differentiation and identification.” As with Aryan terrorists threatening the racial distinctions between friends and foes, and the imagined propensity of clones towards transvestism and transsexuality, clones’ overtone of indistinction slides into the passing of others within the same. Although Mitchell hints at the queering and subversive potentials of the figure of clones, his discussion is focused more on the abjection of these othered figures.

Through this slippage between the indistinguishable and the uncanny other, the unidentifiable faces are given a kind of facelessness, and therefore, soullessness. Then, it is not surprising that this facelessness becomes the pivot of the bipolar images of clones as suicidal killers and helpless organ donors at the same time. Drawing upon the surprising resemblance between images of clones as organ donors (the literal “body without organs”) and of hooded

182 Ibid.
183 Ibid., preface.
184 Ibid., chap 2.
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid., chap 3.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid. Also, Stacey discusses the mutual figurations of clones and queers throughout The Cinematic Life of the Gene.
Iraqi torture victims at Abu Ghraib, Mitchell argues that both figures are exemplary of Agamben’s bare life.189

By illuminating the mutual constitution between clones and terrorists, Mitchell enables us to see how indistinct bodies have become faceless, and therefore murderous as well as killable. In other words, the assemblages of these figures perform an affective poesis of abjection. In this sense, the association between clones and the inability to mourn is not a given fact but a biopolitical assertion reiterating the unstable borders between subjects bound by self-sameness and those constitutive of the others. Can we then consider such threatened boundaries as a potentially positive force for thinking about different kinds of ethics of mourning based on different kinds of kinship and community?

At this point, Stacey’s analyses on the cultural representations of cloning from the perspective of “the genetic imaginary” offer a much-needed discussion on the subversive potential of the figure of clones, especially when it is considered with the vocabularies of imitative resemblance. In the first chapter of The Cinematic Life of the Gene, she offers queering analyses of clonophobia in the work of Baudrillard. To briefly return to Baudrillard, his claim of cloning as involution is based on his assessment that, while the human has involved from immortals into mortal living beings through sexual differentiation, sexual liberation – of which cloning belongs to the second phase – ironically returns us to the primitive stage of repetition of the same, by making sex and death obsolete (or “leisurely activities” at most).190 Stacey criticizes how such narrative privileges heterosexuality as a necessary and normative form of reproduction. In this vein, she argues that the haunting imageries of the proliferation of artificial life are connected to “fears of broader changes in the practices of sexuality and reproduction” implicated in the technical and genetic interference.191

While Stacey shares Mitchell’s critical perspective that the dystopian visions of cloning are a reflection of anxiety about the threatened status of normative subjectivity, she takes the different path of subverting the figure of clones utilizing feminist and queer criticism around the trope of imitation. Drawing on Butler’s intervention into the notion of the original and copy by showing how heterosexuality is already a failed copy of itself, Stacey suggests that “the clone confounds the distinction between original and Copy upon which notions of imitation have depended,” because “geneticizing the human body through cloning means turning it into a reproducible code that reveals the vanity at the heart of the subject’s self-imaging.”192 Stacey queers the figure of the clone by creating affinities with the others alongside the axes of gender, sexuality, and race (and, let me add, species), which are often associated with duplicity and pejoratively labeled to mimic, parrot, and masquerade. In this direction, Stacey suggests that “perhaps bio-aura is actually the by-product of its own demise,” as the retroactive projection of its “nostalgic longing for an organically reproductive body” is invoked by the possibility of new modes of reassemblage and reproduction of subjects.193

189 Ibid., chaps 3 and 6.
192 Ibid., chap 4.
193 Ibid., chap 7.
Critical examination of the disastrous affect of clones as replacements for humans, who are no longer mourned properly, shows how such a trope is performative rather than merely descriptive. It reiterates cultural anxiety toward the slippery boundaries between the desirable and the undesirable forms of subject and forms of reproduction. However, this does not mean that such a trope is merely crafted falsity (which can be dismissed once you realize its figurative aspect), since it is operative as the most popular figure of clones of our time, and is interwoven with various figures of others. That said, looking at both the descriptive and performative force of such figuration offers not only insight into the work of biopolitical abjection and the subversive possibility around the figure of clones, but also some degree of analytical distance from the underlying paradigm of cloning as (bio)mimicry.


Great companion animals are like works of art…. Once we’ve identified these masterpieces, then arguably it’s not just reasonable but imperative that we capture their unique genetic endowments before they’re gone – just as we would rescue great works of art from a burning museum. (Lou Hawthorne)\(^\text{194}\)

The analogy between clones and works of art (as mass-reproduced copies) has frequently appeared in arguments against pet cloning, but this time the analogy that “pet cloning is like rescuing great art” is promotional. It was presented by Hawthorne, who at that time was a project coordinator at Missyplicity, a research project devoted to cloning the mixed-breed dog Missy, and CEO of Genetic Savings and Clone (GSC), a spin-off company for developing technologies to clone pets and livestock animals for commercial applications.\(^\text{195}\) Hawthorne’s claim can be read as a response to criticisms that commercial pet cloning – the purpose of which is to provide genetic replicas of deceased pets – has no social or scientific value to justify the great expense of resources and the six-digit price tag for cloning.\(^\text{196}\) In a sense, the controversies around commercial pet cloning have been a social process of reckoning whether clones have value exceeding that of mere copies, and if so what kinds of value they have.

In this context, deflecting the popular figure of clones as technically reproduced copies of art through the figuration of clones as masterpieces, Hawthorne’s statement is an attempt to evoke the cultural, aesthetic, and ethical value of a “unique genetic endowment” beyond simple exchange value. He would later compare the value of a clone to that of a Ferrari, more explicitly appealing to capitalist logic than to artistic value. Hawthorne’s speech, even if it sounds like hype, is illustrative of the industry’s intervention into the meaning-making of commercial pet cloning during its pilot period, through framing cloning as rescuing unique genetic endowments,

\(^{194}\) Quoted from Haraway, When Species Meet, 156, my italics. I borrow this passage from Haraway’s analyses of a presentation given by Hawthorne at the public panel “The Ethics of Cloning Companion Animals,” sponsored by Stanford University in 2000.


\(^{196}\) The standard price was around $100,000–$150,000 for a dog (and lower for a cat) when the service first became available; it has now dropped to $70,000 for a dog (as of 2013). Some clients are said to have received a promotional discount for participating in media events.
rather than as replacement by copies with no aura. Along these lines, this section explores the biopolitical implications of this new frame of pet cloning in companion-dog cloning projects based on two questions. First, how does this frame of “unique genetic endowments” generate a value for cloning beyond that of mimetic replacement through interlacing the tropes of endangered species, eugenics, art, and impending disaster? And second, what kinds of value for life does this frame suggest, and how do they reconfigure the affects—forces of encounter between bodies beyond individual emotion—of mourning in the trans-species community generated in the process of cloning?

Hawthorne’s metaphor of rescuing masterpieces from a burning museum oddly mimics the rhetoric of extinction of natural species, generating value by appealing to imminent endangerment. In this kind of imaginary, pet clones are kin to what Akira Lippit calls an “electric animal.” According to him, modernity sustains “a constant state” of disappearance of animals. They move toward extinction as the result of human habitation, but at the same time keep returning to humanity as specters—a logical consequence of Western philosophy, which dictates that animals cannot die and therefore cannot be properly mourned. Lippit locates the place of animals’ spectral reappearance in the artificial unconscious, such as in cinema, and suggests that “modern technology can be seen as a massive mourning apparatus summoned to incorporate a disappearing animal presence.” In this vein, the metaphor of saving art from a burning museum is embedded within a broader landscape in which technological intervention into disappearing animals in “nature” is at stake. However, Hawthorne’s analogy does not merely mimic but also reshapes the landscape—it shifts the stage from nature to museum, and more importantly it presents cloning not as a symptom of the disaster but as its resolution.

As Hawthorne’s rhetoric draws heavily from the trope of endangered species, Haraway points out that it is also reminiscent of the colonial discourse on “vanishing indigenes,” where white settlers easily claim their task of “rescue.” However, although there is shared epistemological and political history between the museumization of art and of “the indigenes,” the conflation between these two associations foregoes the more ambiguous nature of Hawthorne’s statement in relation to imperialism. The metaphor of the work of art to some degree overwrites the racist connotation of “a unique genetic endowment”—either of colonial discourse or of eugenics—by making it into a matter of aesthetics, which itself is not without political implication (as Pierre Bourdieu has convincingly shown in his discussion of taste as cultural capital). In this way, Hawthorne endows pet clones with cultural capital and reinstalls their authenticity. Furthermore, by claiming that this is not only a reasonable but also an imperative kind of “rescue” from a burning museum, the rhetoric of preservation gives pet cloning an almost noble and collective ethical value, making it pertinent to the political sphere of

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198 Ibid., 1.

199 Ibid., 188.

200 Haraway, When Species Meet, 156–57.

community. In this sense, determining what kind of pets are identified as clone-worthy not only involves the crafting of ethical, aesthetic, biological, and economic value, but also draws boundaries for who or what constitutes a valuable member of the community.

If cloning is like saving masterpieces from a museum, it requires an eye for discernment to identify dogs with “unique genetic endowments,” which would distinguish it from cloning as replacement, as the following statement from GSC’s website suggests:

Before gene banking your pet, we urge you to answer one question as honestly as possible: do I want to bank my pet’s DNA because I’m distraught and want the SAME pet back, or because my pet had a special genetic endowment that ought to be preserved? Keep in mind that you can love someone or something whose genetic trait is unremarkable, simply by virtue of shared experiences. If your honest answer is that you are grieving your pet’s loss and seeking an identical replacement, then we respectfully discourage you from using our services.202

In this statement, the value of cloning is generated along two axes: first, pets with unremarkable genetic traits versus those with a special genetic endowment; and second, cloning for the purpose of replacement because of grief versus cloning to preserve what “ought to be preserved.” By conflating two measurements of value – one measuring the quality of genetic traits, and another the purpose of cloning – the statement privileges one type of cloning over another. In this sense, the statement on some level acknowledges the criticism that pet cloning could be used as a way of doing away with the mourning process through replacement. After this categorization, the statement offers advice to those grieving the loss of their genetically unremarkable pets: “Nothing can replace your pet, not even a clone, and the healthiest thing you can do is grieve fully, without illusions.”203

Despite its recognition of the necessity for a “healthy” process of mourning, the statement also delicately sets aside the emotional and personal affect of mourning in order to position the company’s pet-cloning services in the realm of an objective and even public project. Underlying such a distinction is the assumption that the grief resulting from the loss of a beloved object is diagnosed as a vulnerable state of mind – if totally understandable and even psychologically healthy – that can bring about an unreasonable decision resulting from confusion between the subjective value of a pet for the owner and its objective genetic value. GSC even offered a “Grief-Time Guarantee” for its separate gene-banking program for deceased pets or those about to be euthanized (PetBank Ensure Plus), which allowed a full refund upon request within three months, saying, “We understand that grief also sometimes leads people to make impulsive decisions.”204 The company’s effort to recognize the psychological and ethical significance of

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203 GSC, “Is Cloning Right for You?”

grieving and its accompanying vulnerability deserves appreciation. However, the underlying assumption that the affective force of grief is something to be set aside resonates with what James Stanescu criticizes as the frequent feminization of mourning and regulation into the private sphere (which paradoxically affirms the radical potential of grieving).205 Both GSC’s statement and Hawthorne’s panel speech try to detach their pet-cloning service from the affective force of grief by positing “unique genetic endowment” as a factual property and neutral object of social and technological intervention.

Such a framing of cloning as the preservation of unique genetic endowments suggests a particular measure of the value of life that might be called life worth cloning – as distinct from life worth mourning, the measure raised by Judith Butler in Precarious Life.206 Butler’s concept of a “grievable life” – whose suffering and death are recognized in the form of loss as part and parcel of ourselves – sheds lights on who counts as a livable life and who does not in the community called “humanity.” The concept of “life worth cloning,” however, implies a desirable life to populate our world, by virtue of the viability of genetic life that can be transferred and reactivated in other bodies with proper technological intervention. Although both “life worth mourning” and “life worth cloning” refer to the differential allocation of the value of life, the latter significantly diverges from the former in being based on the regenerativity rather than the mortality of the life form, and on its susceptibility to objectification by the technological process rather than the dignity to be served by or protected from such intervention.

In examining how these two kinds of biopolitical value are related to each other in the specific case of pet cloning, Catherine Waldby’s discussion of two conflicting ideas regarding the life of an embryo in stem-cell research offers a useful tool.207 Whereas the opponents of stem-cell research believe that “the life of the embryo is biographical,” for advocates “the life of the embryo is a form of raw biological vitality” and therefore “the embryo is not killed, [but] its vitality is technically diverted and reorganized” in stem-cell research.208 Based on such a distinction, Waldby introduces the concept of “biovalue” to describe the yield of vitality as a source of use value and exchange value through the biotechnological reformulation of living processes.209 Moreover, the relationship between “life worth mourning” and “life worth cloning” and that between biographical value and biovalue are parallel. Yet, I introduce Waldby’s concepts to challenge the notion of “life worth cloning” as a matter of objective genetic property, by showing how clone-worthiness is produced by investing biovalue with biographical value.

In this context, I turn to how certain dogs were represented as “genetically special” and therefore “clone-worthy” in the two pilot projects of commercial pet cloning: the Missyplicity Project and the Golden Clone Give Away. Missyplicity, often credited as the world’s first pet-cloning research project, demonstrated the invention of a “clone-worthy” pet. Hawthorne

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208 Ibid., 313.

209 Ibid., 310.
recalled that the idea to clone his mother’s dog Missy stemmed from a breakfast-table conversation with his mother Joan Hawthorne (henceforth Joan, to distinguish her from her son) and family friend and entrepreneur John Sperling, inspired by the news in 1997 that Dolly the sheep had just been cloned.210 With Sperling’s funding and Lou Hawthorne’s coordination, in 1998 the Missyplicity Project—a $3.7 million scientific research project devoted to cloning Missy, a border collie and husky mix—took off with the partnership of a team of scientists at Texas A&M.211

From the beginning, Missyplicity presented Missy as a companion dog with “an exceptional genetic endowment,” and explained that “because she was a spayed mutt of unknown parentage, it was otherwise impossible to continue her ‘breed.’”212 GSC’s website introduces Missy as the company’s “inspiration,” and posts anecdotes written by “Missy’s human ‘mom’ Joan” that show “some of the features that made Missy such a special dog”—material that was originally posted on the Missyplicity website.213 In the first anecdote, Joan describes how she met Missy at a pound and found her to be not only beautiful, but also—and unlike her other pet, an old coydog (a coyote-dog mix) named Liebe—responsive and compatible.214 In the second anecdote, Joan describes how she was certain that Missy “understood the frailty” of the old Liebe, and how Joan “fell into deep permanent love with Missy” on a rainy night when Missy helped her rescue Liebe, who was lost in the bush.215 The final anecdote, entitled “A Breed Apart,” addresses Missy’s mysteriously ambiguous breed, which makes her “the dog equivalent of a Rorschach Test,” in whom “people saw the breed or blend they wanted to see.”216 The question is, then, how do such heart-warming (and often


213 Ibid.

214 Ibid., section “How Missy Found a Home.”

215 Ibid., section “Missy Rescues the Old Dog.”

216 Ibid., section “A Breed Apart.”
sentimental) stories describe Missy’s “special genetic endowment,” and what does that suggest about her clone-worthiness? Susan McHugh’s article “Bitches from Brazil” (named after Ira Levin’s 1976 novel The Boys from Brazil, subsequently made into a movie by Franklin Schaffener) offers interesting insights for our inquiries into how Missy was invented into a clone-worthy dog, drawing on the Marxist notion of reification. In her analysis of the stories and images of Missy on the project’s official website (missyplicity.com), McHugh discusses how these portrayals of Missy as a special dog not only justify human intervention in canine breeding (as opposed to canine self-selective reproduction), but also turn Missyplicity into a paradoxical project: although it draws on the scientific value of cloning Missy from her unique and inscrutable genetic status as a mongrel (different from other cloning projects of exclusively bred animals), the project turns her genetic uniqueness into something reproducible (i.e., breed-able) and thereby establishes this mongrel as the clone mother of a new breed, “a breed apart.”

McHugh argues that such reappropriation of the dog’s specialness into the human breeder’s language conforms to the abjection of animals, citing Hawthorne’s comment on the website:

Most people aren’t bothered so much – or at all – by cloning dogs, compared with cloning humans…. The simplest explanation I can come up with is that our concept of people – especially ourselves – is closely linked to the concept of uniqueness, while our concept of a good canine companion does not depend on uniqueness – at least not to the same degree. In McHugh’s opinion, Hawthorne’s comment illuminates that “canine non-identity, not the supposedly singular identity of the celebrated mongrel, lies at the heart of Missyplicity.” Furthermore, through the transition from an individual to the avatar of a breed, Missy “becomes a figure of reification in Fredric Jameson’s dual sense, both of the transformation of dog love into clones and, more abstractly, of the effacement of the traces of the cloning process from the cloned products.” To follow the logic of McHugh’s critique, pet cloning as a practice to preserve “a unique genetic endowment” is based not only on its reproducibility (as much as cloning for the purpose of replacement), but also on turning it into a “distinct kind of similarity” from which exchange value derives (as Hayden notes about postindustrial capitalism).

Prior to my departure from McHugh, it is worth noting that Missy’s death preceded by years the eventual accomplishment of the Missyplicity Project. And there were some important changes in the team of scientists; a few months after Missy’s death in 2002, GSC terminated their partnership with Texas A&M, who, although it succeeded in reproducing CC the kitten, had

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218 Ibid., 186.

219 Ibid., 187.

220 Ibid., 189.

221 Hayden, “New Same Things.”
been unsuccessful in cloning the dog. \textsuperscript{222} GSC went on with their own team of scientists, cloning seven cats (four for paying customers) before shutting down at the end of 2006; with the technologies available at that point, they were “losing money with every order.”\textsuperscript{223} But the next year, Hawthorne picked up the Missyplicity project in partnership with Korean scientists at the Sooam Biotech Research Foundation, led by disgraced scientist Dr. Woo Suk Hwang – who had cloned Snuppy, the first dog reproduced by SCNT in the world.\textsuperscript{224} Finally, they successfully created clones of Missy: Mira in December 2007, and Chin-gu and Sarang in February 2008.\textsuperscript{225}

McHugh’s critical analysis of the representation of Missy offers a valuable insight into the affective and political economy of value (clone-worthiness) in pet cloning as a way of supplementing human-centric dog love. However, her argument that “canine non-identity is at the heart of pet cloning” sees cloning as a mere form of abjection (of not recognizing a unique “identity”), resonating with the figure of clones as aura-less copies of the original. To rephrase her argument in Waldby’s terms, clone-worthiness derives use and exchange value for human purpose through exploitation of the viability of genes (bio-value) and simultaneous erasure of the biographical life of the individual dog.

Instead, I take a different route and examine how biographical life and genetic life intersect in the making of clone-worthy pets, challenging the notion of the singular identity of the subject – which itself is problematic, not because it is under human monopoly as McHugh argues, but because this notion by definition privileges the liberalist conception of human subject (as Stacey criticizes). Also, now that the success of Missyplicity has been followed by commercial pet-cloning services, this perception of pet cloning as mass reproduction of identity-less pets has not been able to account for the difference between pet cloning and other areas of animal cloning. Animals cloned for agricultural or research purposes, as well as for service dogs and specialty dogs, are often produced in larger numbers. However, in the case of pet-dog cloning, clients typically want only a small number of clones (usually only one), and additional clones are therefore considered extra or superfluous. Hawthorne, later assessing the pet-cloning service provided by BioArts International – a reorganized descendant of GSC – conceded that, because of the difficulty in predicting cloning efficiencies, “multiple births of cloned dogs are both common and unwelcome, given that most clients only want one or two clones at most.”\textsuperscript{226}


\textsuperscript{223} Hawthorne, “Interview.”

\textsuperscript{224} Dr. Hwang was involved in a scandal for violating ethics laws and fabricating data in his human stem-cell cloning research, and was dismissed from Seoul National University. However, there are still controversies, which I discuss in the next chapter.


\textsuperscript{226} Hawthorne, “Six Reasons.”
He asks, “What are we supposed to do with the rest?” It turns out that in many cases the clones of “a breed apart” were not so special for people other than the owner of the donor dog. Such frictions suggest an ambiguous position for dogs in commercial pet-cloning services: caught within a dichotomy of the singular identity pertinent to a human subject versus the undifferentiated non-identity given to animal(s), as discussed by Derrida. In other words, pet dogs are disposed to cloning, not because they are deprived of an identity, but because they are neither a subject of identity nor a subject of dis-identity. However, the implication of such a position goes beyond the question of whether or why dogs should be endowed with “singular identity,” and the question of how much of what has been reduced to genetic traits should be properly credited to biographical characteristics (pertinent to a subject with an “identity”).

In the anecdotes of Missy, what characterizes her “special genetic endowment” is her compatibility with humans (especially her human mother, Joan) and her “humanist” nature of caring for other dogs, as her human mother remembers. For example, Missy responded to Joan by barking back, having a “soft mouth,” and being obedient, in contrast to Joan’s old coydog Liebe, who had bitten humans and was not obedient. Also, in these stories the traces of Missy’s animal traits are presented as both amusingly adorable and tamed to the level of no functional use. Missy seemed to have herding heritage, for example, and she corralled cows, only to upset the overseer of the farm. Missy had a “special connection with coyotes” and loved hunting, but unlike Liebe was never a good hunter; for Missy, hunting was “pure dog imagination.”

In these stories, what makes Missy a clone-worthy dog is not only irreducible to the regime of genetic reproducibility, but also overflows the boundary of the subject marked by its “singular identity.” It is, rather, closer to what Haraway calls “encounter value,” which derives from both individual and species history. As in Missy’s story and others told by those who want to clone their pets, the “special genetic endowment” of these animals often arises from shared experiences between humans and their companion animals. However, such individual encounters cannot be separated from the history of co-evolution between the species.

Pet cloning is in some way a technology to reproduce domesticity (distinct from the cloning of endangered species aiming to bring back nature) and in this sense it would be fair to say that the encounter value is affected by the dominance-oriented human–canine relationship, as McHugh notes. Such technological intervention, however, does not leave the zone of humanness intact. For example, McHugh analyzes the website’s picture of Missy mounting her human mother’s leg with a caption interpreting it as Missy’s sweet love for a human, and argues that this picture points to the erasure of canine sexuality and sociality. But, in the attempt to reorient animals’ affection for domestication, humans themselves are affected too, as they become part of the trans-species sphere of intimacy. In this sense, the production of “clone-worthiness” is not a simple exploitation of biovalue in reifying the value of biographical life of dogs, but also affects and is affected by the trans-species biographies.

The “Golden Clone Give Away,” an essay contest for a free cloning of “the most clone-worthy dog,” offers another chance to examine what makes a dog “clone-worthy” and its biopolitical implications. The give-away was a part of the Best Friends Again project, an online

227 Ibid.

228 GSC, “Missy: Our Inspiration.”
auction to clone five dogs, with bidding to start at $100,000, sponsored by BioArts in 2008. A descendant of GSC, BioArts was launched in response to the success of Missyplicity in partnership with Sooam, and moved on to Best Friends Again as the beginning of commercial pet-cloning services. A few weeks after initiating the project, BioArts announced that, in response to “the large volume of e-mails we’ve received from passionate dog owners who wish they could participate in this auction, but can’t afford it,” the company decided “to give one additional dog cloning slot to the person with the most ‘cloneworthy’ dog.” This title went to a German Shepherd named Trakr, the “canine hero of 9/11 … now disabled.” According to the company, the former K9 dog Trakr and his handler James Symington – a police officer in Halifax, Nova Scotia during 9/11 – were among the first search-and-rescue teams to arrive at Ground Zero following the airplane impacts. (Symington was fired for his unauthorized trip to New York for 9/11 rescue work while officially on sick leave, and was working in the entertainment industry in Los Angeles when he applied for the contest.) They worked together searching for the living and the dead, and Trakr ultimately located the final human survivor (Genelle Guzman McMillan) under the debris. The story caught more media attention – including some exaggerated accounts – when five clones of Trakr were born two months after his death. Although there are conflicting accounts of Trakr’s contribution at the site of the disaster, such controversies do not dismiss, and potentially even affirm, the social crafting of Trakr’s clone-worthiness.

In a CBS report on Symington’s first meeting with the five clone-puppies in 2009, Hawthorne says, “We expected the winner would be an exceptional pet. Maybe he would have rescued Timmy from a well. But we didn’t think it would be anything of the historical


232 Ibid.

233 For example, WCBS-TV reported that “the dog actually pulled the last remaining survivor from the rubble itself.” Quoted from John Woestendiek, Dog, INC. (New York: Avery, 2012), 269. The original article is no longer available on the CBS website, but is posted on http://www.bioethics.net/search/trakr.

234 Although Time Magazine named Trakr one of history’s most heroic animals (“Top 10 Heroic Animals: 6. Trakr the Dog,” http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2059858_2059863_2060232,00.html, accessed August 17, 2013), Woestendiek raises suspicions that the heroic stories of rescue dogs after 9/11 are exaggerated in Dog, Inc.
significance that Trakr played. That blew us away.”

According to his explanation, Trakr’s clone-worthiness lies in its historical significance, which in the above context implies something that would mark an exceptional time beyond the everyday life of (human) society. As such, what distinguishes Trakr from other dogs is that he contributed not merely to human society – as many dogs do, without being acknowledged – but to a political community in peril, showing the civil values expected from a member of the community. Trakr was involved in this political community through his heroic rescue work as well as his shared suffering with humans following the disastrous attack. CBS News emphasized that Trakr later suffered from neurological problems, with symptoms similar to those suffered by “human 9/11 rescue workers.”

Such a figuration of Trakr is politically significant as it performs the making of such a community. In response to BioArts nominating Trakr as the golden clone, Marcy Darnovsky accused the company of “emotional manipulation,” and criticized it for “trying to appropriate the 9/11 disaster for a practice that abuses pets and misleads pet lovers.” Although Darnovsky was correct in that the representation of cloning Trakr as an act of patriotism operates through erasure of the involved materiality of the process, the deployment of patriotism also performs more than an ideological covering-up of a hidden ugly truth. The title of Darnovsky’s article, “Cloning Canine Patriotism?,” might be sarcastic, but it nonetheless describes what the figure of Trakr does: “cloning” (reproducing) the sense of a community under terrorist attack, and reproducing the Other of a community at war by drawing boundaries between friend and foe. However, whether this is mockingly suggested in the phrase “canine patriotism,” or more positively displayed through the “matching red-white-and-blue stars-and-stripes collars and leashes” on the clone puppies of a Canadian police dog, when the in/appropriate (canine) figure enters the picture the assumed coherency of the nation as a political community is negotiated, as well as the boundaries of that community.

The political (as opposed to personal) value of Trakr is not a neutral fact, but rather overlaps with and performs through the hierarchical dichotomy between polis (political sphere) and oikos (household), in tandem with the ambiguous and slippery categorization of animals – especially what might loosely be called “companion animals.” The historical significance of Trakr’s role was generated through proximity to human 9/11 rescue workers on the one hand, and by comparison with the (hypothetical) dog who might have rescued Timmy from a well on the other. If the distinction between the two aligns not only with the distinction between search-and-rescue dog and pet dog, but also with the division and differential allocation of value between polis and oikos, then the “clone-worthiness” of Trakr is also affected by and reiterates such a dichotomy and its associated value system. In this context, cloning Trakr becomes a preservation of objective political value and a commemoration, beyond the matter of private mourning.

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236 Ibid.


238 Woestendiek, Dog, INC., 263.
Hawthorne’s claim of historical significance for Trakr posits the animal’s contribution not only as political, but also as something that exceeds (and ought to exceed) its own time in the past. It is not surprising, then, that the news report framed cloned puppies of Trakr as “carrying on an extraordinary tradition.” It also emphasized Symington’s view that cloning is “not about holding onto the past,” but “about continuing a legacy.” In this figuration, cloning Trakr becomes an act of memorializing the heroic dog’s historical value, rather than of replacing the dog. Even the clones’ names were given “to reflect different qualities of Trakr: Trustt (also capturing Trakr’s unusual spelling), Solace, Valor, Prodigy, and Déjà vu,” which makes an interesting comparison with the names given other “pet-dog” clones, often involving variations of the names of the original pets (for example, Sir Lancelot and Lancelot Encore, Nicky and Little Nicky).  

Symington, in pursuit of continuing the legacy, founded the Team Trakr Foundation—an international humanitarian organization committed to training and deploying elite K9 search-and-rescue teams. Reporting on Team Trakr’s training, the Malibu Times introduced Symington’s vision that “Team Trakr will operate similarly to Doctors Without Borders. Whenever a disaster, such as last year’s earthquake in Haiti, occurs, a Team Trakr dog will be sent to the area to assist in search and rescue operations.” The newspaper also reported that “one significant benefit of cloning in this particular case is that each of the dogs possesses Trakr’s unique characteristics—an incredible drive, air-scenting ability and adaptability to diverse terrains—that are difficult to find in one dog. By having Trakr cloned, BioArts International effectively short-circuited nature to produce five world-class search and rescue dogs.” By re-enacting Trakr’s genetic viability, Team Trakr is expected to carry on the political virtues surrounding the memory of 9/11, which flow beyond not only Trakr’s biographical life but also the biographical lives of the individual clone puppies. 

The cases of Missyplicity and Trakr show how the frame of pet cloning as preservation of special genetic inheritance operates through its distinction from the frame of pet cloning as replacement to soothe grief, and also where such a distinction falters or collapses. Although the industry is attempting to generate the social value of pet cloning through identifying dogs with unique special genetic endowments, these examples show that “clone-worthiness” cannot be fully captured by inherent objective genetic value, but instead is created through the interweaving of biological and biographical values within trans-species encounters. As such, these clones come to carry the extended memories, not as genetic repertoires, but ones that overflow the bodies of clones and recompose the private, public, and trans-species memories of encounter.

3. Remembering with Clones: Performing the Irreplaceable

During dinner at a Korean barbeque restaurant in Southern California, “Eric” brought up a scene from a film: a scientist creates a clone of his wife, after a car accident leaves her in an

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241 Ibid.
irreversible coma. He is tormented when facing and requesting sexual intimacy with the clone (who, as is customary in sci-fi films, has all the memories of the original, and is the same age as the original was at the moment of cloning) and finds he cannot bring himself to have sex with her.  Eric thought he might be the only real person to experience these kinds of conflicted feelings – although his case is different, at least because the wife in the movie was still alive, whereas Eric’s dog Fluppy had already died. After Fluppy’s death, Eric had her cloned by Sooam BRF in South Korea, and was living with two of the clones when I met him on a spring day in 2013. By then, he was also waiting for a clone of Fiona (Fluppy’s sister), who was born recently and still with Sooam BRF (he was excited to hear that I had actually met the puppy on my visit to Sooam a few weeks before).

Eric’s empathy for the scientist in the film returns us to the question of replacement, alongside the senses of loss, grief, and intimacy. And such an affective bond illuminates better what is irreplaceable about the lives we value than does “a unique genetic endowment,” which often leads to conflation of unique genetic traits with singularity and irreplaceability. It is interesting that although the Missyplicity Project was based in theory on Missy’s special genetic endowment as discussed in the previous section, what “forms the core of GSC’s business model” was the paradox it discovered from the overwhelming responses from pet owners after the Missyplicity Project was introduced on the BBC: “Millions of people believe they have a one-in-a-million pet.” If this paradox lies at the heart of commercial pet cloning, we need to explore how the paradox of replacing the irreplaceable (or repetition of the singularity) shapes ontological as well as ethical stakes in the process of pet cloning. This requires at least a temporary suspension of the prevalent approach to the idea of replacement, in which the paradox is resolved into (self) deception – the irreplaceable is replaced, but since it is not replaceable, it is falsely replaced. Instead, I ask how cloning one’s pet as a paradoxical act refigures the practice of carrying memories of beloved beings, by taking into account the trans species affective sphere, in which encounter value between the involved bodies emerges.

Christopher Grau’s philosophical examination of what constitutes the “unique value” of beloved ones, which makes them irreplaceable when lost, offers us interesting insights to work with. It is interesting if not surprising that Grau begins his essay on irreplaceability and the unique value of beloved ones with the Missyplicity Project. Grau conjectures that if Missy had known about the project, she might bark out in objection:

Why, then, are you so eager to transfer your love for me to a duplicate dog who happens to have (if your project is successful) the same properties I now possess? Can you blame me for feeling that this will somehow do a disservice to me and my memory? I may not

242 All the conversation with Eric (psedonym) cited in this section happened during my meeting with him on April 2013, unless otherwise noted.

243 Eric’s Facebook page shows that he had another clone of Fiona, making four clone puppies all together, as of August 2013. Although his Facebook page is accessible to anyone, I am not including the web address because he preferred to remain anonymous in my dissertation.

244 For Christopher Grau’s inquiries into what it means to love someone as a unique individual, in terms of irreplaceability, identity, and history, see his “Irreplaceability and Unique Value.” Philosophical Topics 32, no. 1–2 (2006); “Love and History,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 48, no. 3 (2010); and “Love, Loss, and Identity in Solaris,” in Understanding Love: Philosophy, Film and Fiction, ed. Grau and Susan Wolfe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
deserve all the consideration due to a human being, but I also don’t deserve to be treated like a toaster oven: i.e., something that can simply be replaced with a functional equivalent when it ceases to operate. After Grau discusses the possible objection that what Missy is demanding might not be appropriate for “an animal that lacks the capacity to reason or … use language” and that such animals are “in fact closer to toaster ovens than they are to human beings,” he concedes that, inasmuch as the objection grants that Missy’s claim makes sense when applied to a human person, it suffices for his purpose. I return to the ramifications of his dismissal of animals later, but for now let me just note that an analysis of “irreplaceable value” is embedded within the order of things, which is never free of biopolitical implications.

Grau’s primary proposition is that “the unique value we attribute to the beloved cannot be captured by a reductive analysis of the value of the properties that make up that person.” This proposition, which at first glance sounds obvious, has philosophical and ethical significance, as it contends with the Platonic idea that love is and ought to be attached to the good that the beloved person manifests. Furthermore, if as per Platonic tradition one’s love is directed to the properties of the beloved person, the conclusion necessarily follows that the beloved person is replaceable by another with the same or superior properties. Then, Grau claims, “unique value” is not, as is often assumed, a kind of intrinsic value, but that of final value (as opposed to instrumental value) deriving from “certain extrinsic or relational properties of the object.” Instead, Grau argues that what individuates this unique value as irreplaceable is “the shared history” between lovers, and that this kind of historicity is of greater significance for the “responsible agency” it involves. For Grau, attention to such historicity tells why a beloved one is irreplaceable, even by an exact duplicate with identical quasi-memories. Grau further examines this idea through analyzing Steven Soderbergh’s movie Solaris (2002), in which a therapist named Kelvin is visited by replicas of his wife Rheya, who had killed herself. Although he manages to expel the replica that appears first, as another one arrives, he not only becomes sexually intimate with her, but also tries to undo the past by reactivating the past. Grau’s interpretation is that Kelvin has violated the ethics of commitment to his beloved as irreplaceable, ignoring the difference between the original and the copy – which turns out to be a replica only of Kelvin’s own memory of Rheya.

I respect Grau’s ethics about irreplaceability as a measure of love. Also, his reformulation of the irreplaceability helps us to understand better the paradox of the unique value of not-so-

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245 Grau, “Irreplaceability and Unique Value,” 112.
246 Ibid., 112-13.
247 Ibid., 113.
248 Ibid., 120.
249 Ibid., 126.
250 Ibid., 127.
special objects of love, by paying attention to shared history instead of the intrinsic properties of the objects. However, the underlying idea that shared historicity is bounded by the identity of the individual subject requires more examination. Not surprisingly, he suggests that the concept of identity of his concern might fit best with an approach that takes “the continuance of a functioning brain as necessary for identity.” Grau’s recursion to the liberalist notion of subjects – who are characterized primarily by the capability of speech and reason, as well as by mutual responsibility and agency – undermines his insights into the importance of relational historicity, as it is not applicable to love between different types of subjects (such as love between mother and her baby), and turns shared history into a kind of property pertinent to the function of the brain.

In this context, the rest of this section tries to transpose the concept of shared historicity, by returning to a point that Grau raised but did not explore in his main focus: in pet cloning the distinction between final value and instrumental value (alongside use value and exchange value) is not only blurry but also problematic, and the involved “subjects” do not quite fit the model of reciprocal and responsible agency, nor into a model of identity defined primarily by the continuance of a functioning brain.

Earlier the day I visited him, Eric had shared stories about cloning his pets, which in many ways were also stories about his life. As he described his grief after Fluppy’s death, he said he went to shelters and met a few dogs that very much resembled her, but he felt it was wrong: “I would rather be alone than substitute her.” Eric’s account suggests that what constitutes the violation of the irreplaceability is not a neutral fact pertinent to a certain technological practice – which means, it is not the question of whether pet cloning or adoption is replacement – but that the meaning of practice is framed through what Thompson calls “ontological choreographies” and in relation to other practices of mourning and memorialization. Although the idea that adopting is still a form of substitution is not totally untrue, as is also the case for other forms of memorialization – such as choosing the same name for another pet, getting a similar pet, or even taxidermy and freeze-drying – the social acceptance of these technologies of substitution varies. The “Adopt a Clone” section of nopetcloning.org, a website run by AAVS (the American Anti-Vivisection Society), shows that “finding similar looking pets” is considered more than acceptable. Encouraging adopting a similar looking pet as an alternative to cloning, this webpage shows exemplary pairs of a companion animal and a similar-looking adoptable animal, linked to information about adopting the “clone.” The underlying idea of “adopting a clone” is that the essence of cloning is having another pet that looks similar to a pet one already has (or had), and further that this kind of replacement is on some level understandable. In this context, Eric’s reluctance to adopt a dog as a substitute, and the sense of guilt he shared with the science-fictional scientist facing his wife’s clone, suggests that a clone might both be and not be a replacement, and embodies the paradox of reproducing what is unique.

Although “Is the clone going to be the same?” – one of the questions asked most frequently about pet cloning – is more often than not a rhetorical gesture to disillusion the notion of having the same pet back, it pushes us to question what it means to be “the same,” and how “the similar” is related to it. Most of those who have cloned their pets (at least those who appear in the media) assure us that they know the pet is not the same, but often nonetheless tell stories about the sameness between the original dogs and their clones. According to Eric, there are multiple levels of relationship between Fluppy and her clones. First, at the scientific level, they

are genetically identical: not only are the clones similar in appearance, behavior, and personality, but parts of them are literally from the original dog. Second, at the spiritual level, it is impossible to say whether reincarnation exists or not, and, if it does, whether the soul of the deceased dog might “transfer” into the body of a clone. And finally, at the emotional level, Eric wished that it were true that the clone were Fluppy: “We love someone so much that … when you have a clone in front of you, every part of you wishes that it is the truth.” And when asked if he believed it, he described how the only thing he believed is that we do not know the answer. In Eric’s stories, retaining the memory of a deceased companion dog through clones is a constant process of interweaving these different levels of relationships, investing the genetic identity and associated similarity with the meanings of sameness and continuity of biographical life. In this sense, cloning becomes a paradoxical task of reproducing what is irreproducible through interpreting similarity as heterogeneity and multiplicity of “the same,” rather than as mimesis of the same.

In the process of such interactive interpretations, what becomes as important as having your pet cloned is living with the clones. When I visited Eric’s place to meet his cloned puppies, he explained that he moved back to the place where Fluppy was born, in order to give the clones as similar an environment as they could get. This simulation of both “nurture and nature” was one of the frequent themes of his life with the clones. As I accompanied him walking his puppies (of course, the same route as he used to take with Fluppy), I asked what similarities and differences he had found between Fluppy and the clones, as well as between the clones themselves. His idea was that each clone is half the original dog and half its own, and when combined the two clones are Fluppy – one puppy has exactly same body size and barks a lot, just like Fluppy, and the other is very affectionate and kisses a lot, again just like Fluppy.

In this process of searching for traces of the original dog in interacting with the clones, the clones become an interspace of streamlining two lives – the original’s and their own. In other words, the bodies of clones are haunted by the specter of the original dogs. In some cases, differences are thought of as signs of the dual embodiment of the clones, rather than as a sign of discontinuity between the original and the clone. For example, Fluppy’s clones are on the grey side, while the original was black most of her life and turned greyer only at ten years old. Eric guessed that this might be because the clones are from cells that were already more than ten years old, and he suggested that this means the clones are both one year old and eighteen. And this is why each clone also has two birthdays: the original dog’s and the clone’s.

However, these different lives within the clones do not always streamline smoothly. Eric brought up the conflicted feelings he had when he was going to put Fluppy’s clothes on her clones. On the one hand he felt guilty about giving the original dog’s clothes to other dogs (“No, they’re not Fluppy! They can’t wear Fluppy’s clothes!”), but on the other hand he felt that it was acceptable, since they are clones of her (“It’s okay. They’re her clones, and parts of them are actually her!”). Telling me this story seems to be what reminded him about the film scene of the scientist with his wife’s clone, but it does not necessarily means that the clones have replaced the original pet. Rather, this instance of ethical conflict can be interpreted as a series of frictions and interruptions, which the multiplicity that inhabits the bodies of clones generates as they take part in the composition and recomposition of the memories of Fluppy.

If these memories are composed through interacting with the clones, they become prosthetic parts of memories of the person who remembers. As much as a simulating environment is shaping the clones, Eric himself is re-living his memories of Fluppy. Because of this, carrying on the memories of the deceased pet through its clones can be seen as a prosthetic and performative practice of remembering, involving the blurring and reshaping of the
boundaries between and within the “individuals.” This kind of practice of memory pushes us to imagine different kind of subjects involved in shared history than those posited in Grau’s discussion. Approaching from the prosthetic and performative aspect of memory, our examination of the shared historicity that generates the irreplaceable value of the beloved strikes up a conversation with the ongoing efforts to refigure subjectivity in terms of relationality, especially in critical feminist and queer animal studies. Haraway offers a more accountable, if less noble, perspective on approaching the values of beloved others. According to her, we are “becoming with” companion species, with whom “the partners do not precede their relating.” Further, the ethics between these partners does not presume the self-same autonomous subjects, but asks for “response-ability” in the asymmetrical matrix of inter- and intra-actions – in which “instrumental relations” does not necessarily mean abjection, but “intrinsic to bodily webbed mortal earthly being and becoming.” Haraway’s concept of trans-species “encounter value” – her revisionary addition to Marxist concepts of use value and exchange value of commodities – therefore offers a way to better understand the relationship among non-human-exceptional *enfleshed capitals*, in which “commerce and consciousness, evolution and bioengineering, and ethics and utilities are all in play.” Introducing such non-reciprocal and performative relationality not only extends the boundaries of the subjects of irreplaceable value, but also enables us to understand shared history not as something that is accumulated as property in the brain of each individual but as something truly relational, within which we have become-with.

Thinking of pet cloning in terms of encounter value, a human person (the pet owner in particular) is no longer an autonomous subject as much as the cloned pets are not mere objects anymore, even when the relationship is marked by human dominance. The human–animal intimacy involved in pet cloning has been often categorized as something of less impact, often by contrasting it with erotic intimacy between human subjects – as in the different valences between the episode of *Missyplicity* and *Solaris* in Grau’s discussion (or more obliquely, in the ambiguous valances between the movie scene about a scientist with his wife’s clone, and the anecdote about putting Fluppy’s clothes on her clones in Eric’s story). By the same token, the pet owners who have their pet cloned (or those who are considering cloning) are often represented as who are “obsessed” with their pets to the point where they cannot do well in normative (heterosexual) human intimacy. For example, “I Cloned My Pet,” a reality-show-style TV series on those who are determined to clone their pets, portrays how these pet owners bond with their pets as conflicting with their relationships with humans (in one case, a pet owner decided not to clone her pet, and instead find a true relationship with a nice man). A more extreme case would be that of the first successful commercial dog cloning in the world, even before Missy and Trakr were cloned. In July 2008, RNL Bio succeeded in creating five clones of Booger, a diseased pit bull who had saved the life of the owner – an American woman who identified herself as “Joyce McKinney” – during an attack by another dog, and then worked as a service

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255 Ibid., 71.

256 Ibid., 46.

257 *I Cloned My Pet*, episode 1, broadcast Jan 11, 2012 and episode 2, broadcast May 21, 2012 by TLC.
dog for her after her severe injuries in the attack. However, what was supposed to be a heart-warming story of the bond between a disabled old lady and a rescued pit-bull took a bizarre turn, as Joyce McKinney was identified as the former beauty queen Bernann McKinney, who decades ago had been accused of kidnapping a Mormon Missionary in England and making him her sex slave. As the story spread through tabloids, it became an embarrassment to the pet-cloning industry, as it intensifies the suspicion that pet cloning somehow is at odds with the normative order of intimacy.

The point is not that all the species included in relationships should be treated equally, nor to deny that pet culture – upon which pet cloning relies – sometimes becomes complicit in anthropomorphism and consumerism. But don’t such cultural representations take part in the normativization of sphere of intimacy, in which subject/object, intensity, and expression of intimacy are policed by the biopolitical order of things? Harlan Weaver’s discussion of “trans species” helps us to rethink how the difference between the species co-constitutes each other’s identities and modes of living. Weaver offers a fascinating account of how his pit-bull-type dog Haley secured his safety in public when he “felt vulnerable as a visibly transgender person,” while his “whiteness, queer identity, and middle-class status” made Haley coded as less dangerous by other humans. In this relationship, Weaver’s gender as well as Haley’s species and breed are shaped by their presence to each other as well as by the space between each other. Weaver illuminates how this kind of relationship is connected to trans species transformation, as it “productively disrupt[s] heterosexual gender norms and kinship formations.”

Haraway and Weaver’s discussions of the transformative force of trans species relationship push us to think of the subject and object of pet cloning as a technology of memory, alongside the affective force of trans species relations and their making and unmaking of kinship across difference.

Approaching pet cloning in terms of trans species “becoming with” does not mean to euphemize instrumental use of the animals or human-dominant relationship between the species involved in the practice. But, we can understand better what these animals have become only when we ask what we (humans) have become with them. In other words, the value of companion animals cannot be accurately assessed when we pretend that we as human subjects remain intact while the involved animals are objectified and replaced both in their physical embodiment and their memories within us. As a prosthetic and performative act of carrying the memories of others, pet cloning transposes the human-centric notions of political/private sphere as well as sphere of intimacy. And when we see pet cloning as a space in which these kinds of trans species memories are made through the intermingling of bodies, we can also recall the shadowy parts of the prosthetic memories – the story of haunting bodies in pet-cloning services, who are the primary figures to come in the next chapter.

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Let me return to where I began my discussion of pet cloning with – the simultaneous announcement from BioArts International’s Lou Hawthorne about the successful delivery of clone-puppies in the company’s first commercial companion-dog cloning project as well as the cessation of cloning services. As Hawthorne announced the end of what seemed to have just begun after ten years of efforts in dog cloning, the suspicion he raised – that a rival Korean cloning company would return retired surrogate mother dogs to the farms to be slaughtered for meat – complicates the ethical questions already raised by remembering deceased pets through their clones. Hawthorne’s statement on the treatment of surrogate-mother dogs reminds us that these clones as memorable bodies are reproduced by rendering other bodies forgettable, or even disposable – such as surrogate-mother dogs, egg-donor dogs, clones with defects, those that are stillborn, and any “extra” clones. It also suggests that the form of such rendering – especially the suspicion that these dogs are eaten – and its affective valence of shock, disgust, shame, or indifference is socially contingent, pointing to the cultural geopolitics (primarily along lines of the West versus the East) involved in articulating the (bio)ethics of pet cloning.

If we are to consider an ethics of memory that accounts for the various bodies involved in the practice of cloning, we need to shift our focus from the relationship between the original and the copy (and from the question, “Can one remember the original through its copy?”) to the partial and fragmented assemblages within specific scientific, social, and historical contexts. This shift calls for the second sense of prosthetic memory discussed in my introduction to Part Two: the invocation of the specters of others within us. In this vein, what I present are evocative gestures tracing some of the forgotten bodies, especially those of the surrogate-mother dogs, which haunt the site of the transnational pet cloning industry.

I call Hawthorne’s accusation a “suspicion” because I haven’t yet found concrete evidence that the dogs used for pet cloning have actually been slaughtered for human consumption. Hawthorne was the first to raise this claim against RNL (a Korean biotech company offering pet cloning services in partnership with scientists at SNU), listing it under the heading of “unscaleable bioethics” as one of the reasons for BioArts’s withdrawal from the pet-cloning business. Interestingly, Hawthorne raised the accusation as a future possibility, rather than as what had already happened: “For every dog cloned by RNL in the future, it is likely that a dozen or more will be slaughtered for food as a direct result.” Other than the fact that there is an industry that raises dogs for food (which results in a large number of dogs available for use in cloning), Hawthorne’s argument was based solely on the analysis that RNL’s plan to drop the price for cloning to as low as $30,000 would be impossible without compromising the most expensive aspect of cloning – animal welfare. His conjecture is certainly plausible (and there might be evidence that he didn’t publicly expose), but nonetheless remains unproven.

I asked RNL for an interview, but received no response. The company cloned the first commercial pet dog, and there have been media releases describing its success with dogs for special purposes, plans to build a new dog-cloning center, and ongoing litigation regarding

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263 Ibid.
patent licenses; however, it remains unclear to what extent RNL has actually engaged in cloning pet dogs. As of early 2013, the company was no longer (at least publicly) cloning dogs at all, and later that year it was reorganized as K-StemCell, a company specialized in stem-cell therapy developments (for humans) – leaving in the dark the fate of former surrogate-mother dogs.

Although the initial accusation by Hawthorne targeted RNL, such criticisms have raised suspicions about Korean dog-cloning practice in general, which puts BioArts’s former partner Sooam (currently the only consistent provider for this kind of service) on the table as well. When I asked about this during my first visit to Sooam’s facility, CTO Woo Suk Hwang told me that the dogs are borrowed from “special breeders,” and returned after they recover from the cloning process.264 Another scientist carefully suggested that these breeders might be those who run dog farms for meat, but added that he “would like to believe that the surrogate-mother dogs are treated separately and would not end up as meat.”265 In a more recent e-mail communication, Sooam’s vice president Dr. Taeyoung Shin explained to me that (1) clients might choose to also adopt the surrogate-mother dogs with the clones (which had never yet actually happened when I visited the facility), (2) when surrogates are purchased by Sooam, they are raised in a separate facility run by Sooam, and (3) when surrogates are borrowed, the dogs are returned to the breeder under the agreement that they be used only for breeding purposes.266

A former customer of Sooam who runs a website called My Friend Again – which provides information about (and promotes) Sooam’s dog-cloning services, and about other companies that offer cell-banking – responded to these allegations267:

Sooam allowed me complete access to their entire process. … I can assure you that all animals under their care are treated humanely. The surrogates are never used more than twice for cloning purposes. They are tended to 24 hours a day around the clock. Once they have finished with the cloning process the surrogates are then sent to live the remainder of their lives at another location. … Of course Sooam knows that there will be questions about what happens to surrogates after cloning. As Sooam begins to offer dog cloning services to the world they intend to keep their doors wide open.268

Such testimony appeases the concerns to some degree, as it suggests Sooam’s investment in the welfare of the surrogate dogs. However, it offers no details about “another location.”

John Woestendiek, who includes a thorough investigation on the emergence of the dog-cloning industry in his book Dog, INC., reported that at least in the past “some of the surrogate

264 Personal communication, March 19, 2013.

265 Personal communication.

266 Personal communication, September 15, 2013.

267 My Friend Again, http://myfriendagain.com (accessed September 28, 2013). The website used to offer a promotional discount code for cell-banking company Viagen, and as of September 2013 showed an ad for another similar company, perPETuate. The profits from these advertisement are donated to animal charities, according to the Facebook page linked to the website.

268 “Dog Cloning Story,” My Friend Again, http://myfriendagain.com/dog_cloning_story.html (accessed September 28, 2013). This page does not show the exact date of update. However, the author of this website was also concerned, but was not certain about Sooam’s treatment of surrogates, when we spoke about it in April 2013. So, this page seems to have been updated after our conversation.
dogs used in Korea have gone to ‘farms’ – meaning they were then raised for their meat.” However, in an e-mail conversation with me, Woestendiek wrote, “As the industry has progressed, there has been a better realization of the whole public relations side and the concerns of dog lovers and animal welfare types,” and so “it’s quite possible that … the dogs no longer come from meat farms.” However, he also added, “Sooam doesn't specify what those places are, but insists they are not meat farms. Short of following some egg donor/surrogate dogs who are leaving the facility, and seeing where they end up, I'm not sure how to get the answer.”

With this fragmentary and sometimes-conflicting information, I fumble around the site of my research. Even though there is plenty of intimation, the actual details remain opaque. Considering that Sooam alone has cloned more than 400 puppies (as of September 2013), that a surrogate-mother dog is reportedly used only twice for that purpose, and that the pregnancy rate is 10-50% (and if we assume that a pregnant dog delivers two clones on average), then there should be 200 to 1000 former surrogate-mother dogs from this one company alone. Besides Sooam, there have been other dog-cloning projects in South Korea – sometimes on a massive scale, as I discuss later – which adds up to much larger numbers of former surrogate-mother dogs.

Where did all they go? I find Woestendiek’s analysis of the situation persuasive, and it conforms to my own findings. However, instead of taking this opaqueness as something to clarify – possibly by “following” these dogs as hinted by Woestendiek, or by pushing Sooam and other institutions to reveal the locations – I see this uncertainty as a part of the problem to be examined. In a sense, this uncertainty is a passage to bringing in another set of questions, in order to imagine more situated language (other than a condemnation of dog-eating habits and lack of bioethics in South Korea) with which to trace the disappearance of the dogs. I therefore follow another way of tracing, which accounts for the ontological, representational, and affective landscape within which these dogs disappeared, as well as for the opaqueness of the landscape. This tracing attends to what Mel Chen calls “the style of disappearance” as she pays homage to the toads that used to hop around the back yard of her childhood home. However, Chen’s remembrance of the disappearing toads comes only retrospectively; the animals are now vanishing after contamination by a lethal fungus grown in labs where amphibians were studied. That said, her retrospective remembrance of the disappearing toads is different from what Renato Rosaldo calls

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270 John Woestendiek, personal communication, August 31, 2013.

271 Ibid.

272 The pregnancy rate (numbers of dogs pregnant over numbers of surrogate-mother dogs) differs depending on factors such as the freshness of the somatic cell of the donor dogs. On my second visit to Sooam on March 30, 2013, Yeon-woo Jeong (research manager) told me that the rate is between 10-50%, which was used for my calculation. However, the Sooam website describes that when Snuppy was born in 2005 the pregnancy rate was below 2%, but in the five years since the average pregnancy rate had risen to 30% (http://en.sooam.com/dogcn/sub03.html). Considering the much lower pregnancy rate at the beginning, the number of surrogate mothers used so far might be even larger.

the “imperialist nostalgia” that erases its own involvement in the destruction of what is vanishing. Chen’s recalling of the toads creates affinities with toads not by erasing but by evoking our complicated connections to these disappearing creatures in the web of intoxication. The affinities between Chen and the toads are not based only on the shared experience of suffering from toxic environments, and are complicated by the double-sidedness of their precarity: their intoxicated bodies can themselves be threatening to others. Similarly, tracing the disappearing dogs is also an act of remembering our entanglement with these precarious animals, accounting for both our empathetic affinities with them and our non-innocent involvement in their effacement.

This chapter, then, is a gesture of remembering the surrogate-mother dogs by contouring the oblique paths along which they have disappeared. In its first section, I discuss how dialectic exchanges between colonialist stigmatization of dog-eating and nationalist defense of traditional food culture in modern Korea have ironically pushed the dog-meat industry into an “invisible zone.” However, I also pay attention to the affective impressions – such as shame and disgust – that the dogs have left on the bodies of those who speak/write about them, as the animals disappear into the discursive structure of dog-eating; indeed, such affective remainders mark the postcolonial condition of my own writing. The second section examines the nationalist-developmentalist paradigm of biotechnology in South Korea, in which the pet-cloning industry relies upon its economic viability in the global market rather than upon any appeal to the value of animals, leaving a narrow space for reflection on the ethical implication of biotechnology. The word *bitches* in the chapter is used to mark the sex of these dogs under effacement, and the final section discusses how it affects both metaphorical and material invisibility of the female dogs used for cloning. This chapter addresses the problem surrounding the female dogs alongside the feminist critiques on sexed, gendered, and racialized practice of biotechnology, specifically in relation to the massive mobilization of women’s bodies (especially for eggs) in stem-cell research and the silence on the accompanying ethical concerns in the course of Hwang Woo-Suk scandal in South Korea. Through these three paths, the rest of this chapter delineates the rhetorical, material, and affective landscape over which the bitches used for cloning have vanished at the intersection of sex, gender, species, and nation in the transnational circuits of biotechnology.

1. “White Men Saving Yellow Dogs from Yellow People”: Postcolonial Affects and Bioethics

Although investigations into pet cloning in Korea haven’t proven that these dogs are consumed, the critics have persuasively noted that South Korea’s competence in dog cloning owes much to the farms that raise dogs for meat. These farms were an essential element in the development of dog-cloning technology because they supplied a large number of female dogs to be used as egg-donors and embryo-recipients. This observation punctuates not only that dog cloning as a way of reproducing memorable pets is ontologically and structurally imbricated with the institutional reproduction and killing of animals for human consumption, but also that such imbrication – like that between scientific labs and the dog farm industry in Korea – is contingent on specific social contexts.

The discussion of social contexts by Western critics, however, has often been reduced to the unethical use of dogs by a “shocking” dog-meat industry in South Korea. Such a reduction

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appears in Hawthorne’s statement, and in virtually all news reports on pet-dog cloning by Korean companies that cite a line or two on the dog-meat industry from John Woestendieck’s book-length examination of the pet-cloning industry. This, then, marks the discursive structure in which surrogate-mother dogs have become a bioethical concern, the political implications of which need to be addressed. Hawthorne has developed codes of bioethics for the Missypticity as well as GSC’s animal cloning projects, which are noteworthy in terms of the animal rights discourse. Also, he does offer gestures of cultural relativism in his accusation against RNL – for example, after saying “obviously the idea of eating dogs is quite shocking to Westerners,” he added, “just as U.S. consumption of 34 million cows per year is shocking to most East Indians.” However, the possibility of surrogate-mother dogs being returned to dog farms nonetheless becomes a signifier for Korea’s lack of bioethics and its larger illegitimacy in the global market. This kind of discourse reiterates postcolonial inscription, imposing the Western notion of animal welfare as a norm for bioethics and making the Western subjects of the discourse transparent in historical and geopolitical contexts.

Further, when dog-eating becomes an immediate deal-breaker, the language of bioethics invokes the affect of disgust in the Other – which certainly plays an important role in the production of “the abject” as discussed in postcolonial, feminist, and queer critiques. Julia Kristeva, for example, attends to one’s encounter with “the abject” through affects such as spasm, retching, repugnance and shame. She conceptualizes the abject as what is ejected by “I” in order to enter into the symbolic order as an independent subject. However, the abject does not cease to challenge “I,” and draws him “towards the place where meaning collapses.” This force of the abject hits one when he is reminded of his connection to the maternal body, his bodily matter that is rotting away – when he encounters a corpse, a wound with blood and pus, or dung. Although I do not follow a strictly psychoanalytical sense of the term “abject,” Kristeva’s analysis affords a space for discussing the affects of shame and disgust as they relate to the production of the other within our culture, beyond the realm of representation. In that vein, this dissertation examines how the postcolonial (re)inscription, at the limit of its own logic, operates through affective forces of shock, disgust, and shame – conditioning the affective-scape of my research as well.

I have no interest in raising cultural relativism to defend the treatment of these dogs in Korea, nor am I arguing that white people shouldn’t criticize non-Western culture. However, some criticism, which not only equates Korea’s dog-eating culture with a lower standard of ethics but also makes this association by evoking the affect of shock and shame, echoes something familiar. What Gayatri Spivak formulated as “white men saving brown women from brown men” now oddly repeats in another form: white people saving yellow dogs from yellow


276 Hawthorne, “Six Reasons.”

277 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 2. The affects of shame and disgust have been important subjects for both queer and postcolonial literature, as I discuss later in this chapter.

278 Ibid.
Spivak’s phrase recapitulates how the voice of Indian women was doubly shadowed in the debates around Britain’s abolition of widow sacrifice (sati), first by the masculine-imperialist discourse of saving (in which the women are reduced to objects of protection from their own kind), and then by the patriarchal Indian nativist discourse that “the women wanted to die” (ironically locating the woman’s agency in burning herself on her husband’s pyre in the cycle of birth, based on dubious interpretations of Rg-Veda and Dharmasastra). Criticizing how these “dialectically interlocking” sentences legitimize each other as they assimilate the women’s voice, Spivak turns to Derrida’s deconstruction as a useful tool for postcolonial critique— which, instead of professing “letting the other(s) speak for himself” — whose voice will then be assimilated into that of the intellectuals who represent the other(s) – rather invokes “the voice of the other in us” without collapsing the voice of the speaker and that of the represented.

My reformulation of Spivak’s sentence points to both the symmetry and the asymmetry between the original and the revised formula, transposing the trajectory of the critique. On the one hand, the revised sentence draws upon Spivak’s insight that colonialist discourse reappropriates the interest of Indian women by opposing it against Indian men in order to consolidate its own status. My reformulation “white people saving yellow dogs from yellow people” points not only to how the Western discourse of animal welfare speaks for the interest of yellow dogs by opposing it against yellow people, but also to how the original formula repeats in variations, re-enacting the postcolonial memory.

On the other hand, as a parody, my phrase plays on the folly of such reformulation, intimating the critical difference between the subaltern as women in colonial India and dogs in contemporary South Korea. Spivak’s formula evokes the question of the Indian woman as speaking subject and legal subject, as it relates to the title of the essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” However, with the dog – as a species of animal that is already defined partly by its inability to speak, and hence by its non-subjectivity, especially within the prevalent Western philosophical tradition – this parodic sentence does not refer to the communicative ability or legal subjectivity of the animal, even though there is certain political value in rethinking the concepts of language and subject through the question of the animal, as hinted in titles like “Can the Subaltern Bark?” or “Can Animals Sue?” Rather, this asymmetry points to something about animal bodies that resists total inclusion into the original formula (which revolves around an ethics based on certain kinds of subjectivity that can “speak” for oneself and about oneself), and even contaminates the sentence with its doggy-ness. Here, the dog is not merely a muted subject or object, but is instead what brings both the critiques from Westerners and Koreans into affective circuits of disgust and shame. In other words, this circuit of affects opens another passage to recall that the dog (and especially its meat) has left trace within and between us.


280 Ibid., 297.

281 Ibid., 294, 297.

From this perspective, any discourse that represents the treatment of surrogate-mother dogs and the opaqueness surrounding the situation as a transparent index of the lack of bioethics (or of animal welfare) in South Korea is suspicious, if benevolent in its intent. Rather, the circumstances point to a discursive matrix in which the “concern” regarding these dogs – if “concern” means something totally different here than in animal ethics or welfare discourses – takes the form of either silence or hyperbolic disavowal in a (post)colonial sensibility in South Korea, echoing back to the patronizing and humiliating inscription of “bioethics.”

I begin tracing the disappearing surrogate-mother dogs at the locus of debates regarding dog-eating in Korea, but not because dog-eating is the most important bioethical issue in the dog-cloning industry. I do this because examining the history of how dog-eating became the animal issue of South Korea in reaction to the Western stigmatization and pressure against dog-meat allows us to see how this obsession on dog-eating is a factor that has shaped the current condition of the dog-eating culture, as well as to measure the geopolitical climate in which the bioethics of dog cloning (and other biotechnologies) is being discussed and practiced.

This “dog meat” issue has been at the center of animal advocacy discourse in South Korea, to the point that “most of the currently active animal advocacy organizations in Korea began with the fight against dog-meat.” However, the primacy of the dog-meat issue – among many other problems that are shared (or not) with Western culture – is entwined with its historical context as reaction to the Western perspective. BoudewijnWalraven, a scholar in Korean studies citing An Chon (a rather heterodoxical historian of Korea), traces the history of the dog-eating debate in Korea. The first strike against eating dog meat in South Korea was led by the Austrian-born first lady, Francesca Donner Lee, in the late 1940s. The effort was not popular and brought only superficial changes, such as switching the popular name for dog stew.

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283 This opacity might be an indication of the non-transparency (which also has a connotation of corruption and danger) of Korean scientific research in general. This point is related to the approach I offer here because this non-transparency is less a cause than a consequence of the scientific culture shaped by South Korea’s postcolonial and neoliberal modernity.


Walraven refers to An Chon’s “gegogi eumsik-kwa gukje jungchi munhwa” [Dog meat food and international political culture] in Yosong Chongchi Munhwaron [On women’s political culture], Seoul: Garasani, 1991. An, a professor of Sociology at Seoul National University of Education, studies the Korean Empire (the state of Korea, which succeeded the Joseon Dynasty in 1897 and was forcefully annexed to Japan in 1919) and argues for the restoration of the Korean Imperial Family – which is certainly heterodoxical even among the nationalists in South Korea. However, I cite Walraven’s reference to An specifically because I was introduced to An’s article by Walraven’s, and also because how the history surrounding dog meat (ignored by almost all scholars in South Korea) is introduced into academic discourse by a Korean studies scholar is itself suggestive about the discursive production of dog-eating in Korea.
gaejang-guk (dog soybean-paste soup) to the less descriptive boshintang (invigorating stew). While governmental disapproval of dog meat receded during the Korean War, the second major international criticism of Korea’s dog consumption began in the 1980s – a South Korean government established by coup d’etat was anxious to offer a good image to the world through the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. In response to international animal welfare advocates’ boycott of Korean commodities and the Seoul Olympics, in 1983 and 1984 the government took to regulating “repugnant foods” (which, according to the Ministry of Health and Welfare, includes dog-stew, dog-tonic, snake-stew, lizard-stew, and worm-stew), banning the sale of dog meat at market, and prohibiting restaurants from serving boshintang in large cities (where foreigners are more likely to visit). However, these bans were not strictly enforced, and vendors avoided regulations by again changing the name of dog stew, this time from boshintang to youngyangtang (nourishing soup) or gyejoltang (seasonal soup). Under international pressure, the South Korean government also established the Animal Protection Law in 1991; the law included articles that could be applied to the practice of slaughtering dogs for food, but it was not effectively enforced.

Both international and national criticism of dog-eating resurfaced before the 2002 World Cup (which Korea co-hosted with Japan), pressing the Korean government to ban the consumption of dogs. French actress Brigitte Bardot wrote to Korean president Young-sam Kim that Korea’s dog-eating was nothing but savage practice; she also made notoriously racist and arguably unreasonable claims in a phone interview with a Korean radio talk show (which she ended by abruptly hanging up). Bardot has become the symbol of the movement opposing dog-meat in Korea, aggravating already-existing perceptions that “dog meat = traditional culture,” “anti-dog meat = imperialism” resulting from the top-down policy on dog meat imposed by the military government in the 1980s.

Between international pressure and the Korean government’s superficial responses, dog eating and the dog-meat industry have remained in a grey area – dogs are included in the livestock category, and dog meat constitutes a livestock product under the Livestock Industry Act (Korean), but dogs are excluded from livestock by the Livestock Product Sanitary Control Act (Korean).

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286 Ibid., 109.
289 Sonsekhui-ui siseonjipjung [Son Seok-Hui’s Focus], MBC Radio, November 28 and December 3, 2001. A few who read an earlier version of this section suggested that I explain more clearly what Bardot actually said, and I saw their point. However, every time I went back to the transcript, my heart beat too quickly for me to think or write properly. As many critics have discussed, repeating violent words for criticism has the paradoxical consequence of reiterating that violence. Regarding Bardot’s case, I choose not to repeat (or rephrase) her words, at the cost of perhaps providing insufficient “evidence” for my argument.
As such, raising, slaughtering, processing, and distributing dog meat is not subject to legal regulation, if not illegal. Accordingly, as problems concerning the hygiene, environment, and treatment of dogs continue to resurface, attempts have been made to formally legalize dog meat and put the industry back under regulation. In 1999, Hong-shin Kim and twenty other lawmakers submitted a Livestock Product Processing Act reform bill, enlisting dogs as livestock and legalizing (and therefore regulating) the dog-meat industry. Kim argued that the poor hygiene surrounding dog-meat practices was the foremost problem, and that protection of citizens was more important than “the eyes of the other countries and the dog being cute.” The amendment did not pass, as the assembly recognized it would result in both international and domestic resistance. In 2005, the Office for Government Policy Coordination commissioned a study on the hygiene control of edible dogs, and a few years later the Seoul city government announced a similar attempted amendment. However, both efforts were criticized by animal advocates as attempts to “legalize” dog-meat and dismissed.

These efforts to legitimize dog consumption have often (if not always) gone hand-in-hand with a nationalist response against Western pressure and the government’s compliance toward it. Hong-shin Kim wrote in his letter to Bardot that the Livestock Product Processing Act should be revised to include dogs because “our people’s health has priority over foreigners’ eyes.” Also, a group of progressive celebrities and organizations announced a “declaration of non-intervention,” demanding that foreign countries respect Korea’s traditional food culture, in response to the increasing international pressure around the 2002 World Cup.

Livestock Industry Act (Chuksanbup), Statutes of Republic of Korea, http://www.law.go.kr/
Livestock Product Sanitary Control Act (Chuksanmul uisaeng-gwanribup), Statutes of Republic of Korea, http://www.law.go.kr/lsSc.do?menuId=0&p1=&subMenu=1&nwYn=1&query=축산물위생관리법&x=0&y=0#liBgcolor0.

KARA, Report, 139 (in Korean).


The amendment was resubmitted in 2001 (when the World Cup was just around the corner), and again did not pass. J. Jo, “A Study on the Animal Rights,” 125 (in Korean).


While assertive nationalism regarding dog meat is a minority perspective among Koreans, the prevailing approach has altered this nationalist perspective into a more neutral sense of cultural relativism. Such a conjunction of nationalism and cultural relativism explains how a majority of Koreans are against banning dog consumption even though most Koreans do not actually eat dog meat.\textsuperscript{299} One survey found that 72% of responders (all women, in this particular case) answered that “I do not eat boshintang, but think it is a matter of individual choice,” and another survey showed that 69% of those who do not eat dog meat “do not agree with some foreign animal advocacy organizations’ accusations that boshintang culture is savage.”\textsuperscript{300} A more recent poll shows that 89.5% of respondents agreed with dog-eating because “it is our own food culture,” and only 9.9% disagreed because “it does not accord with the time of globalization.”\textsuperscript{301} As this research and even the very rhetoric of the questionnaires show, a cultural relativist approach to dog meat entails a nationalist perspective and sentimentality corresponding to postcolonial power relations.

In these nationalist and cultural relativist discourses, eating dog becomes an issue of “traditional food culture” (or “local food culture”), a contested terrain of cultural habits that proponents argue should continue and be protected from foreign intervention. Yong-geun An, a professor of food and nutrition and the only scholar specializing in dog meat (also known as “Dr. Dog Meat”), has excavated historical records ranging from a fourth-century tomb painting to French missionaries’ writings in the nineteenth century in an effort to prove that eating dog is Korea’s traditional food culture and has a long history.\textsuperscript{302} Therefore, he argues, to reject dog-eating because of the criticisms of foreign powers is “toadyism and neglect of sovereignty.” Koreans, he claims, should be proud of and actively develop and spread dog-meat cuisine throughout the world.\textsuperscript{303}

This widespread cultural relativism on the dog-eating issue has created rough terrain for Korean animal advocacy. For example, KARA (Korean Animal Rights Advocates) has

\textsuperscript{299} The actual number of Koreans who eat dogs is difficult to measure. According to a poll by SBS Radio (one of the major broadcast companies in Korea) in 2007, 25.5% of Koreans eats dogs (quoted in Hee-kyung Cho’s presentation, “Gaesigyong haphubhwaui hamjeonggwga gaesigyong banndaegamseonungui gachi” [The Pitfall of Legalizing Dog-Eating and the Value of the Anti-Dogmeat Sensibility], Presentation at Korean Animal Liberation Association’s Chobok Concert, 2013). However, Yong-geun An’s research shows that 83% of Koreans have eaten dog meat, although the poll was taken in a region where dog-eating is more popular than elsewhere (quoted in I. Jo, Research, 23 [in Korean]. The actual proportion of people who regularly eat dog meat might be smaller, considering that these polls included only adults (and dog meat is mostly popular among older generations), and that among those who have ever eaten dog meat most do so only once every few years or no longer at all (poll taken by Chosun Ilbo in 1999, quoted in Cho, “The Pitfall” [in Korean]).

\textsuperscript{300} I. Jo, Research, 23 (in Korean). The first poll was done in 1997, and the second in 2000.

\textsuperscript{301} Ibid., 24-25.

\textsuperscript{302} Yong-geun An, Hangookingwa gaegogi [Koreans and dog meat] (Seoul: Hyoil, 2000).

\textsuperscript{303} Ibid., 3-4. In this book, Y. An not only introduces recipes for various dog-meat dishes, but also urges readers to develop recipes to fit foreigners’ tastes and habits – to globalize Korean dog-meat cuisine (269). His position is rather eccentric even among Koreans who support dog-eating, but he nonetheless crystallizes thoughts and sensibilities underlying the popular discourses in Korea.
attempted to challenge the cultural relativist defense on dog-eating in two registers. On one hand, KARA argues that dog-eating is not a Korean tradition, but rather was influenced by China during the Chosun Dynasty when Sinocentrism prevailed. KARA also points out that the modern “farming” of dogs is itself in conflict with Korean tradition, which has never treated animals as mere commodities. On the other hand, KARA argues that cultural relativism is a method only for understanding different cultures, and that ethical universalism should be applied to make a normative judgment, especially concerning the suffering of “the weak, such as life [sic] and women” – offering the example of female genital mutilation in Africa and Middle East (of course, with pictures of women in veils).

KARA makes a valid point when it notes the limit of cultural relativism for engaging with ethical and political problems. However, in assuming that cultural relativism is a purely epistemological project for understanding local culture (allowing space for ethical and political judgment based on universal ethics), KARA’s proposition paradoxically depoliticizes both the cultural construction of traditional culture and “universal ethics.” Through such separation, the proposition erases the political aspects of how dog-eating has become a culture in the postcolonial context. In other words, it forgets that dog-eating as traditional culture – in historical and anthropological discourses as well as in pop-cultural representations – has always been constructed in a political context (and specifically in the postcolonial encounter between Korean and Western cultures) as discussed. As such, KARA’s claim about a universal ethics is not merely depoliticizing, but has the political consequence of effacing the complicity of “universal” ethics in the construction of the problem.

Cultural relativism has limits – not because it offers only epistemological tools distinct from ethical criteria (as KARA suggests), but because it assumes that cultures are segmented into separate areas, diluting the political context in which a “culture” is constructed through encounters with others. Lila Abu-Lughod’s critique on the discourse of “Muslim women” offers valuable insights into the complex relationship between colonial discourse and cultural relativism. Abu-Lughod calls attention to the obsession with the cultural iconicity of veiled Muslim women (or veiled brown women, or veiled women – is it about their religion, or their veils and/or race?) in the post-9/11 United States and criticizes how the rhetoric of “saving Muslim women” is used to overwrite and legitimate the messy historical and political background of the “War on Terror.” She notes its resonance with British colonialist discourses, where colonial interventions into sati, child marriage, and other practices concerning women in South Asia were used to justify colonial rule. She also asks if Western feminists are so readily mobilized to save Muslim women because they feel sorry for them – “to whom they can feel smugly superior,” projecting their own pursuit of liberation onto these women – without considering the actual meaning of veiling to the women. However, Abu-Lughod does not


305 Ibid., 113, 117-18.


307 Ibid., 784.

308 Ibid., 787.
relapse into the cultural relativism that reproduces “the imaginative geography of West versus East, us versus Muslims, cultures in which First Ladies give speeches versus others where women shuffle around silently in burqas.” Instead, she points out that we already live within global interconnections in which “Islamic movements themselves have arisen in a world shaped by the intense engagements of Western powers in Middle Eastern lives.” Based on such global entanglement, Abu-Lughod calls for a more egalitarian alliance rather than a project of salvage or cultural relativism.

Resonating the transnational connectedness noted by Abu-Lughod, Walraven analyses dog-eating as a cultural product of “the confrontation of local preferences with global pressure” from the intensification of East-West contact in the contemporary world. Examining the national identity attached to certain foods such as rice, kimchi, and dog meat, Walraven considers the difference between the character of kimchi (which has earned an official symbolic status of Korean-ness) and of dog meat (which is still controversial, and is not important in the typical Korean diet), attending to how each food has acquired its symbolic association with Korean custom in the context of multicultural controversy. In this sense, Anthony Podberscek’s recapitulation of Walraven as saying “dog eating is considered a major part of South Korean culture, just as kimchi (fermented vegetables) is, and that many South Koreans will defend their identity most strenuously, regardless of whether or not they themselves eat dog meat” has a point, but misses some nuances of Walraven’s argument. This is not because, as both authors have noticed, the majority of people do not eat (or support eating) dog, but rather because this argument neutralizes the disidentity within the identity. In other words, such argument obscures the complexity of logical and affective dynamics within the act of defending and (trans)forming the identity of being Korean.

Cultural studies of food often approach certain foods as a confirmation of identity, binding the eater to where he belongs. In such an approach the focus is on how one affirms identity (sometimes even despite stigmatization), which underpins a politics of identity that calls for shedding shame and being proud of one’s own culture, as rather hyperbolically shown in Yong-geun An’s push to globalize dog-meat cuisines. However, here I would like to explore a different line of thought in conversation with Elspeth Probyn, who explores eating as an event where “we lose ourselves in a wild morphing of the animate and the inanimate” (as food goes in, is broken down, and comes out of a body) and therefore as a locus from which to consider the ethics of visceral engagement with the world. Reflecting on her own experience of anorexia, Probyn explores disgust and shame as the hidden face of body pride, as well as other identity politics based on body and sexuality – including projects of affirming the body, be it gay, black,

309 Ibid., 784.
310 Ibid., 789.
disabled, fat, or old. In other words, the conscious claim for a “pride” does not necessarily nullify the affects of shame and disgust: one’s face could blush, eyes close, or stomach might upset, even though she tries to resist. Drawing upon affect theorist Silvan Tompkin’s argument that disgust has “evolved to protect the human being from coming too close” while shame is in part “generated by the recognition of having been too close,” Probyn suggests considering shame and disgust as measures of the body’s own reflective capacities to reach out, spill over, hide, and run away.314

Following Probyn’s experiment of utilizing affects “as an analytic optic,” I would like to regurgitate the phrase “white people saving yellow dogs from yellow people.” To play with Allen Weiss’s note on a strange food combination that “the shock of categorical incongruity was an overture to all future discourse,” we can think of how the dog – in the categorically incongruent form of meat – choreographs the affective dynamics between those who eat dog meat (and those who do not eat dog meat, but belong to the people who do) and those who are disgusted by it.315 What if we consider the affect of shame – of provoking disgust in others – not as something that ought to be thrown away to recover the self-same subject (either by being proud of the Korean custom of eating dogs, or by stopping the shameful act) but as an instance of sensing the work of “the other” within the self, arising in the encounter with other bodies? That is, what if we consider this an instance of the destabilization of the self and its permeability to others in the subject of the dog-eating controversy in South Korea? Through transposing postcolonial critique with affects as an analytic tool, one is not speaking about or for the (mute/d) dogs, but rather speaking of and through the bodies that are affected by dog-meat – those who are shamed and those who are disgusted.

On the one end of this affective circuit, there are those shamed for being disgusting, or ashamed of being shamed for one’s own culture. Probyn offers further stinky food for thought in her discussion of a short story in which a protagonist discovers the joys of Swedish tinned herrings that smell of shit (and keep fermenting inside the stomach, leading to uncontrollable burping): “Well, this was like someone else farting through your mouth.”316 In the controversy around dog-eating, a postcolonial ventriloquism might be like “someone else farting through your mouth” – the canine body ferments inside, and the animal does not speak (or bark), but the fart-burps are a reminder of already having been contaminated.

On the other end of this affective circuit, there are bodies that are disgusted by dog meat – either expressively so, or embarrassed at being disgusted, or even adventurous with something disgusting (like those trying “exotic foods”). Criticizing these bodies for being disgusted would not chase the disgust away (even though there is a certain political urgency in such projects), but we can reflect on the disgusted bodies as a touchstone for the normative order of distance and intimacy. Such reflection offers us a chance to examine how the rhetoric of saving (or other related claims of morality) is intermingled with the moralizing force of bodily affect, and especially of disgust, caused by the “shock of categorical incongruity” – echoing in variations of

314 Ibid., 133-34.
315 Ibid., 135.
316 Ibid., 137. Italics in original.
the phrase “to pet and eat.” In this vein, Harold Herzog and Lauren Golden’s argument that people with higher visceral disgust sensitivity (associated with “elevated levels of ethnocentrism, prejudice, and right-wing authoritarianism”) are “more likely to be upset by animal suffering, and thus are more apt to become involved in the animal protection movement” is dangerously moralistic but nonetheless offers a useful insight (although at odds with the authors’ arguments). The affect of disgust will not explain away the attack on dog-eating by animal advocates. However, the fetishization of dog meat as the animal question in Korea and the moralization of this categorization point to how ethical and political arguments intermingle with the moralizing force of carnal affects.

The affective circuits afford us an account for the disappearance of the dogs beyond the dichotomy of Western ethics and Asian (lack of) ethics. In this affective circuit, the two discourses interlock with each other to put these dogs into an invisible (or better yet, inaudible) zone. However, the muted animals leave their own traces on the bodies who speak about them (in the form of corporeal affectivity), pointing to the webs of power relations within which they disappeared. It is also important to remember that these circuits of affect do not neatly align with the division between East and West, Korean and foreigner, but instead are complicated by differences within Korean culture – dog-meat is associated with oriental maleness (as an aphrodisiac), blue-collar ethics, and rural culture. This points not only to the heterogeneity among Koreans, but also to the sexual and class relations within the circuits. In this sense, engaging with the discourse on the ethics of dog cloning (even in the form of silence), one immediately enters into the circuits of affects, where moralizing the forces of affects choreographs the political entanglement of bodies intersecting at the differences of sex, race, and species in this transnational context.

2. Dogs for Tigers: Biotechnology, Nationalism, and Globalization

When I contacted some of the major animal-rights organizations and activists in Korea to inquire about the pet-cloning industry, most were not aware of the pet-cloning services provided by Sooam and RNL. Even for those that were, the treatment of animals involved in cloning hadn’t yet caught their attention. This absence of any discourse on pet cloning in Korea, let alone ethical debates around the animals involved in the practice, is not too surprising, considering that these services are geared toward the Western market, not Koreans. The English version of Sooam’s website introduces its dog-cloning service on the main page, while the Korean site addresses it in a single paragraph on a sub-page. Such a subdued existence of the pet-cloning industry, contrasting with other high-profile projects (such as Korean cow cloning, mammoth restoration, and human stem-cell research – all of them led by Dr. Hwang, currently CTO of

317 Podberscek’s article “Good to Pet and Eat” is only one among many that examine Korea’s dog-eating culture primarily through what is most shocking about it (at least to Westerners) – the idea of “eating” what we “pet,” the violation of categorization. He explains such a distinction of animals (even among the same species) through Michael Fox’s concept of compartmentalization (628).


319 The website introduces Sooam’s three main areas of research: transgenic technology, embryonic stem cells, and animal cloning. http://sooam.com/
Sooam), points to the ambiguous status of the industry within the field of biotechnology, which has been thickly invested with the symbolic and pragmatic value of serving *segyehwa* ("worldlization," with implications of neoliberal and nationalist projects of globalization) in South Korea.\(^{320}\) While science and technology has been sought as a tool for modernization in the colonial and postcolonial history of Korea, biotechnology (alongside IT) has emerged as a strategic site for achieving Korea’s competitiveness in a globalizing world since 1990s.\(^{321}\) Such phenomenon is not unique to Korea, but rather resonates with Aiwha Ong’s observation that biotechnologies – often as state-led enterprises – are “allied to nationalist efforts to restore national identity and political ambition” in the postcolonial Asian context.\(^{322}\) This section explores how the social meaning of pet cloning has been framed in relation to the nationalist globalization paradigm of biotechnology, how such relation bears upon the bioethical discourses in South Korea.

In exploring that idea, this section first examines the so-called Hwang Woo-Suk scandal, which epitomizes the nation’s ideological, sentimental, and material investment in biotechnology after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.\(^{323}\) The discussion of Hwang’s scandal illustrates an ideological climate in which bioethical debates are silenced in the name of the national interest that biotechnology promises, which has often been exaggerated or mystified among Koreans. However, it is also important to note that not all cloning projects have been seamlessly incorporated into this nationalist discourse. Commercial dog-cloning projects targeting the pets of Americans – sometimes mockingly represented as a metonym for Hwang’s downfall from a time of Siberian Tiger cloning and human stem-cell cloning – have a more complicated relationship with the nationalist paradigm of biotechnology. This section examines the pet-cloning industry’s ambiguous position within the nationalist-globalization paradigm, and its ramifications for the invisibilization of ethical issues concerning animals used in cloning-related technology in South Korea.

Hwang, then a professor in veterinary medicine at SNU, gained credit as a world-class cloning expert among Koreans for his success in cloning a dairy cow (named *Youngrongyi*) and a Korean cow (*Jinyi*, named after a patriotic Korean geisha during Japanese Colonialism) in 1999. Since then, his projects have engaged with nationalist sentiments that attract media coverage, as

\(^{320}\) “Segyehwa,” a Korean word for “worldlization,” implies a specifically-Korean manner of globalization, promoted by the Korean government since the 1990s. The notion of segyehwa is discussed more in Part 1 of this dissertation.


\(^{323}\) There has been abundant work on Hwang’s scandal, and particularly many cultural and political analyses of nationalist and state-led biotechnology (and science and technology in general) in South Korea. For more discussion, Chia-Ling Wu ed., *East Asian Science, Technology, and Society: An International Journal*, 2, no.1 (2008) includes a special feature of articles on the topic. *Analyzing Hwang Scandal to the Root*, Special issue, *Yeoks Bipyeong* 74 (2006), presents articles written by Korean STS scholars.
in his attempts to clone a Siberian Tiger – a symbol of the spirit and culture of Korea, but now on the verge of extinction. Hwang’s fame picked up as his team published two groundbreaking articles in Science: first on the derivation of a stem-cell line from a cloned human embryo in 2004, and then on the establishment of patient-specific stem cell lines in 2005. Acclaimed as a national hero who elevated the status of Korea in the world, Hwang was titled the first “Supreme Scientist” by the Korean government and appointed as the first director of the World Stem Cell Hub – an international consortium for therapeutic stem-cell research based in Seoul, which would have satellite labs in the US and UK.

However, Hwang’s glory quickly became tainted. After PD Sucheop (a popular investigative TV show in Korea) raised suspicion about ethical breaches in acquiring human eggs for Hwang’s stem-cell research (followed by the appearance of evidence suggesting the fabrication of research data), Hwang was involved in a spectacular scandal. SNU launched an investigation into Hwang’s research and found that there was neither a human embryonic stem-cell line nor a patient-specific line (nor any evidence that either had ever existed). Instead, data had been fabricated, many more human eggs had been used than reported, and female members of the research team had been encouraged to donate their own eggs to the project. Hwang was fired from SNU, and later convicted with a two-year suspended prison sentence of embezzlement of research funds and breach of bioethics law.

What made the scandal more dramatic and attracted both domestic and international critics’ attention was the rather puzzling reaction of a considerable portion, if not majority, of Koreans: an ardent support for Hwang as a heroic patriot who brought glory to the nation and promised to cure intractable diseases, a support that persisted even after his fabrications were revealed. Herbert Gottweis and Byoungsoo Kim attribute the phenomenon to bionationalism, which had temporarily undermined the democratic process of deliberation on the social values and ethical issues of biotechnology. However, their contrast between irrational Korean (or

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Woo Suk Hwang et al., “Patient-Specific Embryonic Stem Cells Derived From Human SCNT Blastocysts,” Science 308, no. 5729 (2005). This article has since been retracted.


326 “Hwang Woo Suk sinhwai nanja eihok” [The Myth of Hwang Woo-Suk and Suspicions over Eggs], PD Sucheop, MBC TV (Seoul: Munhwa Broadcasting Company, November 22, 2005).


329 Herbert Gottweis and Byoungsoo Kim, “Explaining Hwang-Gate: South Korean Identity Politics between Bionationalism and Globalization,” Science, Technology & Human Values 35, no. 4 (2010). However, their analyses of Hwang’s case as symptomatic of the emergence of bionationalism –
Asian) nationalism and the rational science and liberal democracy of the international standard (as Gottweis and Kim suggest) is a simplistic tool for understanding the dedicated support for Hwang. In efforts to move beyond such a dichotomy (with an implication of the West/East) and to grapple with the specificity within Asian countries, Charis Thompson points out that Hwang’s embodiment of “charismatic nationalism” – with a strong emotional (rather than rational) appeal, undergirded by the old state-led developmentalism – explains at least in part the mythic exaggeration. There have been more various explanations for the Korean public’s reaction to the Hwang scandal, from han (a sentimentality of ressentiment and sorrow, which encourages people to identify with Hwang’s humble origin) to a kind of “fandom” or “pseudo-fascism.”

However, this apparently irrational phenomenon makes more sense if we examine how “the local” stands in competition to “the global” in the discourse of segyehwa, which seeks to establish Korean superiority and a global recognition in scientific research. 330 When the team at SNU that included Woo Suk Hwang and Byeong Chun Lee – who later led rival biotech companies providing dog-cloning services – announced it had produced the first dog clone (named “Snuppy,” a portmanteau of SNU and puppy) at the height of Hwang’s fame in 2005, the media reported the achievement as confirmation of the superiority of South Korea’s biotechnology and the nation’s symbolic and competitive status in the world. 333 Actual defined by stem-cells or oocytes rather than traditional nationalism marked by blood – needs further evidence to be convincing. Although there have been symptoms of bionalism in Korea (such as the nationwide resistance against US beef import over fears of mad cow disease), the nationalist rhetoric surrounding stem-cell research does not show concern for the biological enhancement and wellbeing of Koreans in particular.


discussion of ethical issues concerning animal cloning was hard to hear, overshadowed by debates over whether such discussion would serve the national interest. A major newspaper published an article calling for a consideration of bioethics, because “our country has become the leader in the field of cloning technology,” and “the world is watching us.”

Another newspaper took a more defensive posture, arguing, “It is worrisome that there is a sign that the birth of Snuppy would serve as a momentum to replay the bioethical debates.”

This editorial argued that bioethical discussion would diminish the achievement of Korea’s biotechnology “based only on imaginary possibility,” considering that the cloning of humans was prohibited by Korea’s recent Bioethics and Safety Act, and that Hwang had clarified his goal as curing human diseases, by, for example, developing human disease model dogs. In fact, Hwang was cited to have said, “In no case will the result of the research be used for pet cloning,” implicating that this did not accord with his noble purposes – patriotic and humanist values. In other words, the nationalist paradigm for biotechnology not only delimits bioethical debates about the technology, but also situates pet cloning at the margin of (or even outside of) the frame.

Almost simultaneous to the Snuppy project, substantial efforts in dog cloning were underway by a project funded by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) called Development of Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer Technology in Special Usefulness Animals (the official English title; the literal translation of the Korean name would be The Project to Clone Animals of Special Use) that operated from March 2005 to February 2011. How the meaning of “special use” was constructed in conjunction with humanitarian and nationalist language in the discourse around this project tells us about the discursive context in which the value of pet-dog cloning was articulated. While the Project to Clone Animals of Special Use researched the cloning of cats, dogs, and monkeys, its purpose – and especially whether it included applications for cloning pets – was ambiguous. A news article reporting the launch of the project described its goal as the development of “mass cloning technology for pet animals (dogs and cats).” The project was immediately met by protest from animal-advocacy groups arguing that the mass...
reproduction of animals is founded on the debasement of life to machines and that the project would involve the death and sacrifice of animals; they condemned the mass cloning of pet animals in particular as neither necessary nor ethical. In response, MOST explained that the project was not intended for commercial purposes, but was instead an infrastructural project to resolve the genetic and disease anomalies that frequently occur in the cloning of disease model animals and animals that produce medicines for humans. According to the midterm and final project reports, the formal goal of the project was to develop infrastructural somatic-cell nuclear transfer cloning technologies to produce special-usefulness animals and to mass-produce transgenic animals, which would ultimately benefit mankind. However, these reports (written in a fragmented and repetitious style suggestive that they are assembled from discrete pieces) also address the broader applicability of developing human-disease model animals, producing medically-useful proteins, conservation and restoration of endangered species, and commercial pet cloning, and assert a social and cultural meaning to these purposes that interweaves the rhetoric of humanitarianism and nationalism. In these reports, the humanitarian rhetoric – mostly used to describe cloning for medical research, but sometimes extended to cloning of endangered species and companion animals – appeals to rather abstract values such as “improving the quality life of mankind.” Conversely, the nationalist rhetoric seems somewhat bifurcated. Sometimes it refers to sentimental values, but more often than not, it appeals to more pragmatic values, such as “national profit,” “the nation’s brand value,” and “national competitiveness,” relating to South Korea’s symbolic and economic status in the globalizing world. For example, the development of technology for cloning monkeys is promising because it would enable South Korea to acquire the original technology and the international patent (in the unprecedented field of primate cloning) to prepare for the potential international medical and pharmaceutical market. However, the urgency to conserve and restore endangered species is critical because “the tiger, a symbol of this society, will not be seen any longer, but remain in the aching heart of Koreans.”

KAAP (Korea Association for Animal Protection) et.al, “Gae goyang-yi bokje saeop bandae seongmyeongseo” [Statement against the dog and cat cloning project], January 21, 2005, http://www.kaap.or.kr/notice.html?mode=read&idx=13184&db_name=notice&kw=%ED%8A%B9%EC%88%98%EC%9C%A0%EC%9A%A9%EB%8F%99%EB%AC%BC&page=1&page_list=1&PHPSESSID=770b042904d291512632d026bf8a3577.


Il-Geun Gong, Teuksuyuyongdongmulbokjesaeop [Development of somatic cell nuclear transfer technology in special usefulness animals] (Ministry of Science and Technology, South Korea, 2006), 16; Teuksuyuyongdongmulbokjesaeop [Development of somatic cell nuclear transfer technology in special usefulness animals] (Ministry of Education and Science Technology, South Korea, 2011), 10. Henceforth, Special Usefulness Animals (2006) and Special Usefulness Animals (2011).

Gong, Special Usefulness Animals (2006), 16-22; Special Usefulness Animals (2011), 10-17

Gong, Special Usefulness Animals (2011), 3.

Ibid, 11, 14.

Ibid, 15.
As for commercial pet-cloning in particular, the reports predict that it would contribute to the country’s economy considering the size of the global market, and that companion-dog cloning especially would help with “wiping out the global antipathy against Korean dog culture.” Of course, the mere mention of pet cloning in the reports does not necessarily confirm that it was pursued as an applicable arena from the beginning of the project. It is possible that the project was indeed conceived primarily for medical-research purposes as MOST claimed (and that initial media reports misleadingly interpreted dog and cat cloning projects as pet-cloning projects), but that the potential benefits of pet cloning were acknowledged after the dog-cloning research team at SNU joined the project in 2006. However, what is of more interest for our inquiry is how the social value of pet cloning – considered less valuable, as suggested in Hwang’s emphatic statement that his research was not for this purpose – is articulated. Whereas other uses of cloning technology appeal to national pride (even when they are represented in pragmatic terms), the benefits of pet cloning are described in terms of both its marketability in the West and rather defensive image-making under the Western gaze. In other words, the “special use” of pet cloning within the prevailing paradigm is somewhat fragile, defined narrowly by its profitability in the Western pet industry rather than by any strong symbolic value of companion animals.

Meanwhile, there have been further active efforts in the application of dog cloning for the nation-state. In April of 2012, JTBC (a South Korean television network) reported that the Korean government had launched a secret project to clone 800 special service dogs of “genetic excellence.” According to the report, the project aimed to clone all “professional” dogs – such as drug-sniffing, explosive-detection, and search-and-rescue dogs – working in government departments. A few months later, the birth of two clones of Baekdu, a retired 119 (Korean 911) search-and-rescue dog was reported. However, the social values of these clones were represented differently from those of Trakr the 911 hero dog. While both the Trakr and Baekdu projects appealed to patriotism, the patriotic value of cloning government work dogs was


348 The same year the SNU canine-cloning team joined the project, RNL Bio also announced their plans to push forward with commercializing Snuppy technology in the fields of pet cloning and cloning dogs for clinical experiments – suggesting an increased expectation regarding the profitability of the pet-cloning industry. See Gil-won Kim, “Seuncopi bokje gisul sangeopha duina” [Will Snuppy cloning technology be commercialized?]. Hankook Ilbo, May 22, 2006, http://news.hankooki.com/lpage/economy/200605/h2006052212051821500.htm.


addressed primarily in economic terms: to reduce the cost to produce and purchase the animals and also to benefit Korea by creating a new export item. In this sense, although cloning dogs for special purposes might appear to have categorically different social values from pet cloning, it is addressed similarly within South Korea’s developmentalist and nationalist globalization paradigm. That is, inasmuch as both dog-cloning projects bring foreign dollars to the country, they both benefit South Korea. Furthermore, such projects are in a symbiotic relationship with pet cloning, as the demand and growth of cloning dogs for special purposes contributes directly to creating a viable environment for commercial pet-cloning by widening markets for the dog-cloning industry.

Likewise, while the drive for nationalist globalization was pervasive in the area of biotechnology in South Korea, the pet-dog cloning industry has been somewhat derivative to other dog-cloning projects with more patriotic and humanistic values, and it is therefore taking pains to establish its own social value – for example, by claiming its economic contribution to the nation. While the biotechnology within the nationalist segyehwa paradigm has left little room for ethical debate, the pet industry’s marginal and derivative position within the paradigm has delimited its social meaning within that economic value, shielding it from the articulation of values that would otherwise be associated with pets and other animals in a different context. The repercussion of such delimitation seems to be most eloquently heard in the paucity of ethical debates around the animals involved in biotechnology, including cloning projects.

Before examining how this kind of neoliberal-nationalist approach to biotechnology mobilizes and invisibilizes human and animal bodies, let me discuss the only news article that raised ethical questions concerning the animals used for the advancement of biotechnology in South Korea. Reading it in conjunction with the memorial rituals for lab animals in South Korea, the final part of this section asks what it means to mourn the loss of animals through the language of sacrifice for the community (in both nationalist and imperialist senses). On Korea’s Independence Day in 2005 (ten days after the announcement of Snuppy’s birth), progressive newspaper The Hankyoreh published a column comparing the treatment of model animals for human-disease research to the torture and medical experiments committed on Koreans by the Japanese during the second Sino-Japanese War and World War II. Conceding that scientific experiments on animals for humanitarian purposes cannot truly be compared with experiments on humans to develop efficient methods of killing, columnist Byung-chan Gwak argued that Koreans were nonetheless accountable for not having shown due respect to the sacrificed animals. He called for legislation to minimize the suffering of the animals in experiments and the establishment of a memorial day to commemorate animals sacrificed for the community. Gwak

351 Ibid. This cloning project had been carried out since 2011 by the National Institute of Animal Science and Byeong Chun Lee’s team at SNU. Later, this projected was presented as an exemplary case of administrative collaboration between government departments. Ministry of Public Administration and Security, Yunghapchaengjung-ususaryejip [The case book of converging public administration], 2012.

352 Sooam has been also producing more police dogs and search-and-rescue dogs, which usually involves a larger scale (because they aim to produce large numbers) and potentially a higher price compared to pet cloning, providing a larger pool for this niche market.

envisioned memorial events on both the national and private levels and artists promoting “reconciliation” between humans and animals through gut (a Korean traditional shamanist ritual), songs, and plays. “Therefore,” he writes, “life and life become one. How beautiful is this?”

But, is it? Such a call for the due consideration of bioethics and of the animals involved in biotechnology is in many ways appropriate and long overdue. It also points to the possibility that nationalism can be extended to recognize non-human others based on shared suffering and death (and I was thrilled to finally find an article in a major newspaper that discussed the suffering of animals involved in cloning). It is noteworthy that Gwak reflected on society’s ethical obligation to the animal lives used for scientific research, predating the legislation of the Laboratory Animal Act by three years, amidst the triumphant atmosphere of South Korea’s biotechnological advancement. Nonetheless, Gwak’s argument based on “sacrifice for the community” somewhat mirrors the nationalistic logic justifying the cloning agenda. While the suffering and deaths of animals is framed as a sacrifice for the community, the argument implies that the basic form of community is the nation – and it isn’t clear whether animals belong. This rubric of sacrifice also assumes the utilitarian necessity of the use of animals in research, which itself is a contentious issue. However, what concerns me more in Gwak’s argument is his claim that the sacrificed animals and benefitting humans become “one” through our gestures of appeasement, appreciation, and commemoration. This claim seems to forget the enormous asymmetry between the “sacrifice” of the animals and the human gesture of commemoration. Such gestures of commemoration could indeed be beautiful; however, the gesture of commemoration undermines itself as soon as it declares a kind of closure and erases the distance between those who are sacrificed and those who commemorate (and benefit from the sacrifice). Such an ironic forgetting of suffering and death is obscured (and even called “beautiful”) by the nostalgic evocation of Korean traditional rituals.

In fact, this kind of memorial ritual (and national service) for laboratory animals has been performed for decades in a majority of medical and science research institutions in South Korea – from the Food & Drug Administration (KFDA) and Seoul National University and Hospital to the Korea Institution of Oriental Medicine. Silhoom dongmul wireongje, which can be literally translated as “ritual to appease the spirits of lab animals,” has a format similar to Korea’s traditional Confucian ceremony for human ancestors, with shamanist and Buddhist elements. Interestingly, cultural anthropologist Elmer Veldkamp argues that the ritual is of Japanese origin, transplanted during the colonial era and later resurfacing, reflecting Korean society’s increasing concerns for animals. The specific ceremonial address read during the ritual at KFDA is said to be from this period as well:

Beastly and birdly living beings,  
although we differ in nature our lives are the same.  
Your pitiful lives did not evade a virtuous death.


355 Elmer Veldkamp, “Commemoration of Dead Animals in Contemporary Korea: Emergence and Development of Domgnul Wiryeongje as Modern Folklore,” The Review of Korean Studies, 11, no 3 (2008). He points out that two of the oldest monuments for lab-animal spirits — at KFDA and the Museum of Medical History — are dated 1929 and 1922 respectively, from the colonial period (155-56).
Please do not bear a grudge against Heaven,
and do not bear a grudge against us people,
for the sake of human welfare and the health of your fellow birds and beasts.
We pray in silence for your sad soul and wish for a happy afterlife,
so that you can come into the brighter world again and live eternally.\textsuperscript{356}

What interests me in Veldkamp’s argument more than the ritual’s Japanese origin is the
historical change in the meaning of such rituals within the Japanese tradition. He conjectures that
during the early twentieth century “these rituals were molded to fit the imperial ideology by
replacing the belief of vengeful spirits of the dead in traditional customs with the modern and
nationalistic goal of commemoration for honorable souls of war casualties.”\textsuperscript{357} In other words,
Veldkamp’s discussion demonstrates how a “traditional” commemorative service could be a
process of legitimizing the mobilization and sacrifice of animals for nationalist (and imperialist)
purposes. Of course, it would be simplistic (and mistaken) to argue that the commemorative
services performed in Korea directly revive this kind of (imperialist) nationalist ritual. These
rituals in Korea have also changed, and are now used both to commemorate the lab animals and
to affirm a commitment to improving their treatment. However, the genealogical contiguity
between the imperialist and decolonial rituals might be more than happenstance. When a
commemoration for the dead is used to legitimate (and to mourn “away”) their sacrifice for the
community, even the decolonial nationalist discourse risks ironically mirroring an imperialist
biopolitics in which certain lives earn their social value only through death.

That said, although the segyehwa discourse has hailed biotechnology as a means for
improving the nation’s economic and symbolic status within the globalizing world, it has also
prioritized contribution to the nation over bioethical concerns. In this context, pet-cloning
projects have attempted to claim a social value primarily through their economic contributions
to the country, leaving ethical concerns regarding the involved animals invisible. Furthermore, even
when the animals used for the advancement of biotechnology are brought into the light, their
death and suffering has been effaced by a language of “sacrifice” for the greater good. The
discussion of bioethics concerning pet cloning goes beyond the question of whether the dogs
used for cloning can be sent to dog farms, and requires an examination of whose bodies are
sacrificed for what and whom.

3. Eggs, Wombs, and Meat: Female Bodies in Transnational Circuits

Following the affirmation that Snuppy was a real clone – the only real achievement
among Hwang’s major accolades – a story about the “proving” process in a Korean newspaper
described how Professor Byeong Chun Lee (credited as first author in the Nature article

\textsuperscript{356} Ibid., 155. This translation is by Veldkamp except for the second line (Veldkamp’s translation
was “although our looks differ we both enjoy life”), the sixth (“because it was for the sake of human
welfare and the health of your fellow beasts and birds”), and the last (“so that you can come into this
word”). The changes are my own translation, in reference to the original Korean version from Ji-nam
Kang, “In-gan wihae mombachineun silhum dongmuldeul: yamkul jungdok, pibu goesa, jang-gi

\textsuperscript{357} Veldkamp, 161.
reporting the cloning of Snuppy, although Hwang was known to have led the team) combed the dog market where they had purchased the egg-donor dog in order to take a sample for the DNA test. He was “dismayed to find that that the dog was already dead,” but managed to acquire a sample of its lung tissue from a place for necropsying dogs. Focusing on the rather eccentric journey of Lee to find the evidence – and with a sense of relief at him having found it, in a time when “everything solid was melting into the air” – the story does not specify where the “place for necropsying dogs” is, nor does it ask why and how the dog ended up there.

The title of this chapter, “Disappearing Bitches,” is intended to evoke the sex of these animals under erasure, and this section attempts to delineate the landscape of their disappearance in relation to the sexualized repercussions of reproductive technology and regenerative medicine. In both scientific and commercial discourses on pet cloning, the most visible bodies are undoubtedly the DNA-donor dogs and the successfully delivered clones. On the other side, the surrogate-mother and egg-donor dogs, any “defective” or stillborn clones, and the “extra” clones are often left invisible. A Google image search for “pet cloning” offers endless pictures of similar-looking puppies and their DNA donors (the “originals”), while only a very few pictures of the clones and their surrogates appear – and only then to emphasize how different they are. This kind of representation portrays pet-cloning technology as an asexual science, effacing maternal bodies by reducing them to fragmented functions distinct from the kinship that cloning (re)produces. However, with current cloning technology by Somatic-Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT), and particularly where dog cloning is concerned, the most “wet” and “messy” parts of the process involve female reproductive organs and body parts. In the case of Sooam, for example, five surrogate-mother dogs per order are used, and each is implanted with about ten embryos. The egg-donor dogs, meanwhile, are monitored constantly for progesterone levels to predict ovulation, and when the timing is right the eggs are collected through a surgical procedure called “flushing.” This in vivo process (“within the living” – using an intact, living organism) of egg acquisition was the key to success for Hwang’s team because the conventional way of collecting eggs in vitro (“in glass,” outside of a living body in an artificial environment) does not accommodate the reproductive physiology of dogs. This means that current dog-cloning technology – unlike the cloning of other animals – requires living egg-donor dogs, and cannot simply use the leftover eggs from slaughterhouses or spaying clinics. Hence, where these female dogs come from, as well as where they go after used, has become a significant logistics of the cloning practice – and it is in this context that the connection between the scientific labs and dog farms (mainly raising dogs for food) have become a contentious subject.

359 Ibid.
360 Interview with a researcher at Sooam in March 30, 2013.
361 Ibid.
362 Ibid.
This invisibility of female bodies in pet cloning recalls feminist critiques of how the dominant representations of reproductive technology intervene and invisibilize female bodies, and of how these technologies have reshaped sexual and familiar (familial?) relations.\textsuperscript{363} For the closely-related area of human embryonic stem-cell research (which involves techniques similar to SCNT in earlier stages of the process), Charis Thompson analyzes the Proposition 71 amendment to California’s state constitution and notes that its language does not in any way address the necessary extensive re-articulation of conventional “women’s issues” such as abortion or egg-donation:

A constitutional right was established to conduct human embryonic stem cell research in the state of California, and three billion dollars of taxpayer money was pledged to support the research and its real estate requirements, without mentioning women, embryos, eggs, research donors, totipotency, or research cloning.\textsuperscript{364}

Such shared affinities between human and canine female bodies under the lens of reproductive and regenerative technologies suggest that feminist interventions within related areas might offer a useful platform for discussing how pet-dog cloning operates through the sexed bodies of animals and makes (and unmakes) kinship – affording us a space to envision a trans-species alliance between women and bitches. However, such an approach does not necessarily involve the essentialization of biological sex, collapsing the difference between humans and other animals. Rather, I draw upon feminist theories that discuss how biotechnologies have affected women differently at the intersection of race, class, and nation. In this regard, accounting for the female dogs in pet cloning requires less a critique of the encompassing sexism in biotechnology and more an examination of the configurations among sex, gender, and species throughout the specific cultural and historical contexts in which these technologies are practiced. More specifically, this section examines how the mobilization of women (for egg donation) that contributed to the Woo Suk Hwang scandal is interlaced with the mobilization of female animal bodies in the biotechnological practices of South Korea. This perspective offers a way to rethink the circuits connecting dog markets and research facilities, through which the dogs (or their female reproductive organs) used for the pet cloning have moved. The circulation of dogs within the circuits connecting dog-farms – dog market – research facilities is imbricated in other social and scientific circuits in which human and animal bodies circulate in a transnational context, rather than as evidence of a lack of bioethics in Korean (or Asian) scientific practice.

Hwang’s scandal triggered ethical debates on the use of women’s eggs in human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research.\textsuperscript{365} According to Hwang’s Science article in 2004, 242

\textsuperscript{363} There is abundant feminist and queer research into the area of reproductive technology and regenerative medicine. To name only some that has directly affected my approach, Charis Thompson, \textit{Making Parents: the Ontological Choreography of Reproductive Technologies} (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2007); Donna Haraway, \textit{When Species Meet} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Catherine Waldby and Melinda Cooper, “From Reproductive Work to Regenerative Labour: The Female Body and the Stem Cell Industries,” \textit{Feminist Theory} 11, no. 1 (2010).


\textsuperscript{365} For the formation and development of ethical debates surrounding the collection of eggs for research during and after Hwang’s scandal, see Eun-kyung Choi, Ock-joo Kim, “Hwang Woo Suk sata-
fresh oocytes were donated by 16 healthy women, who “voluntarily donated for therapeutic cloning research and its applications only,” without financial payment. After the publication, feminist and bioethics organizations raised ethical concerns, asking for proof that the recruitment of women volunteers followed the appropriate guidelines – as the side-effects of egg donation can be serious, even life-threatening. Nature also reported that one PhD student in the team had initially told them that the donors included herself and another woman in the lab, but she “subsequently called back and said that she had not donated eggs, blaming her poor English for a misunderstanding.” Suspicion increased after a 2005 Science article reported that eighteen women had donated another 185 oocytes for the research. Soon Dr. Gerald Schatten (a biologist at the University of Pittsburg, and a co-author of the 2005 article) ended his collaboration with Hwang, claiming that Hwang committed ethical breaches in egg collection and lied about it.

These concerns surrounding the acquisition of eggs were confirmed in subsequent investigations by SNU, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and the National Bioethics Committee. Even though investigators were unable to determine the exact number of the eggs actually used in the research due to a lack of documentation and ambiguity regarding the exact beginning of the research, nonetheless more than 2200 eggs were procured for Hwang’s research team during the three-year period relevant to the two articles. The investigations also found


Hwang et al., “Patient-Specific Embryonic Stem Cells,” 1779. This article also claims that all donors “were fully aware of the scope of this study, and each signed an informed consent form,” and that “although expenses for public transportation and injections administered by medical personnel could have been provided, none of the donors requested this, and therefore no financial reimbursement in any form was paid” (1778).


that a majority of the eggs were purchased or traded, and that two junior female researchers on
the team had donated their own eggs – which Hwang was aware of, and might have actively
encouraged.\textsuperscript{373}

Nonetheless, as Yeonbo Jeong points out, ethical issues regarding the procurement of
eggs were treated as a relatively trivial problem that could hold back the nation’s progress in
biotechnology, a more important concern in Korea at the onset of the scandal.\textsuperscript{374} The discourse
on the ethics of eggs was even reappropriated by an egg-donation movement supporting
Hwang’s research (in the name of patriotism and the cure for intractable diseases), which
continued even after the disclosure of Hwang’s research fabrications.\textsuperscript{375} Jeong’s research points
to the limits of the discourses that reduce the ethical issues concerning egg donation to a
liberalist sense of “informed consent,” and suggests a need to examine the issue within the larger
and more complicated context of such subject/object formations.

In this vein, Korean feminist scholars have offered historical and political analyses of the
seemingly-ironic phenomenon whereby the invasive access to and use of women’s bodies has
become a source of women’s political agency. As Joo-Hyun Cho suggests, the use of eggs in
human embryonic stem-cell research (hESC) extends the utilization of the maternal body at the
intersection of patriarchal family-ism, developmentalist nationalism, and reproductive/medical
technology in the modernization of Korea.\textsuperscript{376} In this context, reproductive facilities (and the egg
markets for them) have proliferated, providing “fertile grounds” for regenerative medicine by
producing and circulating surplus eggs that have been objectified as materials for use, separate
from the bodies they came from.\textsuperscript{377} This objectification of eggs and maternal bodies has become
the site of paradoxical female subjectivity as women become patriotic, maternal, and care-giving
subjects by mobilizing their own bodies.\textsuperscript{378}

\textsuperscript{373} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{374} Yeonbo Jeong, “Bae-ajulgisepo yeonguwa jendeo: Nanja jegong-gwa yeoseong nodong mit
chamyoreul jungsimeuro” [Human embryonic stem cell research and gender: Egg donation, and
women’s labor and participation], \textit{Peminiseum Yeongu} 7, no. 1, (2007), 182-83.

\textsuperscript{375} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{376} Joo-hyun Cho, “Nanja: Sengmyeong-gisului siseongwa yeoseong mom cheheomui
jeongchiseong” [Egg: Politics structured around the vision of biotechnology and the touch of women’s
embodied experience], \textit{Hangook Yuseo nghak} 22, no. 2 (2006), in Korean.


\textsuperscript{378} For more discussion on biotechnological intervention as a site of the complex and paradoxical
formation of women’s subjectivity in South Korea, see Jeong’s “Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research
and Gender” and “‘Leftover’ Embryos and Ova for Research” (in Korean). See also, So Yeon Leem and
Jin Hee Park, “Rethinking Women and their Bodies in the Age of Biotechnology: Feminist Commentaries
The picture looks even more disconcerting with the realization that this might not be an accidental happening in Korea, but rather the harbinger of a global trend. Catherine Waldby examines the transnational oocyte markets in which impoverished women sell their eggs (risking serious side-effects) to wealthier women, mostly in more advanced countries.\textsuperscript{379} Waldby argues that the transnational mobilization of eggs from the poor women will be exacerbated by the increasing demand for human eggs for stem-cell cloning research and by the growth of regenerative medicine, which no longer seeks specific phenotypes (as in the reproductive market, where the eggs of pretty, intellectual, healthy women of particular races are preferred).\textsuperscript{380}

Waldby’s argument is limited in that she approaches certain groups of women as primarily victims, without addressing the complicated and dynamic formations of female subjectivity in the oocyte market within specific historical and social configurations (as discussed here for South Korea). However, Waldby does offer a useful sketch of the uneven circuits of transnational biotechnology within which the value-added eggs (fresh from healthy young women, in particular) circulate separately from the women they are extracted from.

While feminist critiques have offered historical and geopolitically-situated approaches to the ethical issues of eggs and women’s bodies in the reproductive and regenerative sciences since Hwang’s scandal, I suggest examining a different genealogy of the use of female reproductive body parts. The rest of this chapter traces the filament linking the use of animal eggs in the field of veterinary medicine (Hwang’s background) and the mobilization of human eggs in Hwang’s hESC research. I hope this would help us to move from analyses of the analogical relation between female animals and women in biotechnology to examination of the complicated texture of the entanglement between these bodies.

In his account of Hwang’s scandal and the research team’s evolution of cloning technology from animal embryo to human stem cell, Keun-bae Kim pays attention to the large number of eggs needed for SCNT research in general (due to the low efficiency rate when SCNT is developed for a new subject of application), and notes the supply of animal and human eggs as a factor that affected the path of Hwang’s research team.\textsuperscript{381} Hwang was initially involved in embryo cloning (a method of splitting one already fertilized embryo into two or more; also called “artificial twinning”), which better fit his goal of the mass reproduction of high-quality stock animals. This remained true even after Dolly the sheep was born via an SCNT method developed by Ian Wilmut at the Roslin Institute, whose purpose was biomedical applications.\textsuperscript{382} However, eventually Hwang became more interested in SCNT, shifting his focus from the mass reproduction of stock animals to transgenic xeno-organs and stem-cell therapy.


\textsuperscript{380} Ibid., 29.

\textsuperscript{381} Keun-bae Kim, “Dongmulbokje-eso ingan bokjero: Hwang Woo Suk yeonguteamui bokje gisul jinhwa” [The conversion of animal clone to human embryo clone: Evolution of clone technology in Woo Suk Hwang’s research group], \textit{Yeoksapipyeong} 74 (2006).

\textsuperscript{382} Ibid, 25.
Hwang’s team launched human stem cell research, and the same year they successfully cloned two cows via SCNT as well.\(^{383}\) In the beginning Hwang’s stem-cell cloning research used cow eggs to produce a human embryo, as his team was more familiar with animal eggs and thought it would cause fewer ethical problems by avoiding sacrificing human egg cells – although this later spurred resistance to his research because of the popular perception that the result would effectively be a minotaur (*banin bansu*, literally half-human, half-beast).\(^{384}\) Hwang also expressed doubts about human cloning due to the large amount of eggs required; he reportedly said, “It would require thousands of eggs to successfully create an embryo and transplant it into a uterus. To extract that many eggs, we would need about 500 women and a considerable size of research facility.”\(^{385}\) Nonetheless, Hwang switched to human eggs (which later become difficult to acquire, leading to his illicit procurement activities), a move Kim attributes to a few factors: the news that a research team in the US was making progress using human eggs, the complete prohibition of inter-species SCNT (and the restriction of human SCNT) in the draft proposal of the Bioethics Laws, and Hwang’s own drive for reputation (especially his aspirations for a Nobel Prize).\(^{386}\)

Examining the “evolution” of Hwang’s research, Kim argues that Hwang’s scandal was not only symptomatic of larger problems in South Korea’s scientific community (characterized by “aggressive and condensed development” to catch up with the science of more advanced countries), but also demonstrated the limits of this style of developmentalist scientific research, epitomized by reliance upon the intensive labor and “the science of scale” in Hwang’s research.\(^{387}\) What is worth dwelling upon in Kim’s analysis is his example of the “science of scale”: the large number of the eggs (and the corresponding scale of the facility and human resources) employed in Hwang’s research. According to Kim, the research lab used more than 2000 animal eggs per day, and the stem-cell research team used far more human eggs than any other research team in the world did, or could. Even though Kim does not analyze the ethical and gender implications of this use of eggs, his discussion of Hwang’s shift from animal to human eggs hints at the intricate relations between women and other female animals.

In other words, if South Korea’s development in cloning technology is based on what Cyranoski pejoratively called a “cloning factory,” then this kind of industrial model of (re)production seems to be based on the massive use of female reproductive cells (eggs).\(^{388}\) In Korea’s cloning research, animal cloning and human stem-cell research provided each other with a model for the massive mobilization of both eggs and the application of SCNT. However, they are not merely in an analogous relationship with one another; to argue that both women and

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383 Ibid, 31-33. However, Hwang’s plan to apply this technology for mass reproduction of cows was ultimately not successful, and the Ministry of Agricultural and Forestry’s “Plan to Supply of Premium Cows by Cloning Technology” ended with unsatisfactory results.

384 Ibid., 35.

385 Ibid., 38.

386 Ibid., 38-39.

387 Ibid., 46.

female animals are objectified by biotechnologies in a similar way is, if not completely wrong, at least significantly incomplete in not showing the specific nodes of such entwinement. While easy access to a large number of cow eggs allowed the replacement of human oocytes (sometimes coded as an ethical act of saving human eggs and other times as an abominable act creating a mixture of human and animal), it also modeled a massive mobilization of eggs in SCNT to be adopted in hESC research. This objectification of women’s eggs as a resource for economic and social status (for the nation, for family, and for individual women), and the invisibilization of the women’s labor (and suffering, and risk) involved in the extraction of eggs reiterate the patriarchal vision of science and technology in which the female animals involved in cloning are effaced.

Here, the “replacement” (of animal bodies for human bodies) emerges as a node for examining the relation between human and animal females in the mobilization of eggs in biotechnology. Although the surrogate-mother dogs and egg-donor dogs used in pet cloning are not exactly a replacement for human subjects (as are the animals used for their eggs or other parts to substitute for humans), the logic of the replacement is relevant for our discussion not only because these same animals are often used to develop and clone medical model animals, but also because animals substituting for humans in scientific and medical experimentation is intricately related to why we are allowed to clone pets (when the reproductive cloning of humans is prohibited) – or why cloning some species is more acceptable than others.

That said, I would like to advance our discussion of this question of replacement in conversation with two feminist science-studies scholars’ discussions of disease model animals. Donna Haraway renders the powerful figure of OncoMouse™ to re-envision kinship in a time when “natural” kinds are constantly crossed, in a world of “promising monsters, vampires, surrogates, living tools, and aliens.”

OncoMouse™ is my sibling, and more properly, male or female, s/he is my sister. Her essence is to be mammal, a bearer by definition of mammary glands, and a site for the operation of a transplanted, human, tumor-producing gene – an oncogene – that reliably produces breast cancer. Although her promise is decidedly secular, she is a figure in the sense developed within Christian realism: S/he is our scapegoat; s/he bears our sufferings; s/he signifies and enacts our mortality in a powerful, historically specific way that promises a culturally privileged kind of salvation – “a cure for cancer.”

Here, Haraway creates a sisterly-kinship with this murine-commodity, who suffers for – or, in the stead of – women. This sisterhood is not based on an extension of biological essentialism (the identity among human and non-human females), but rather is forged in the embodiment of natural-cultural-technological femaleness in a specific and consequential context – hence, even a male mouse can be a sister. Thinking through this human-murine relation, Haraway tries to keep herself from “resting easily with the idiom of sacrifice,” since the ethics of responsibility requires remembering that “no balance sheet of benefit and cost will suffice.”

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390 Ibid., 79.

391 Haraway, When Species Meet, 76.
However, she also does not leap into the general injunction of not-killing, but instead undertakes a more modest ethics in recognition of the fact that humans are not outside killing, the ecology of mortal beings.\(^{392}\) For Haraway, the inequality (which makes it okay to experiment on a mouse, and to make it a commodity) is “in *the precise and changeable labor practices of the lab*, not in some transcendent excellence of the Human over Animal, which can then be killed without the charge of murder being brought.”\(^{393}\)

Charis Thompson discusses the ethics of animal models from a slightly different angle, by analyzing what she calls the “substitute research subject” that is deeply engrained in current biomedical research (including human stem-cell research) and bioethics within the specific history of scientific practice and socio-political agenda.\(^{394}\) Thompson points to the historical context in which “non-human animals became a mandatory bioethical substitute for unethical experimentation on human subjects of research” during the post-WWII period when experimentation on human subjects was a social concern.\(^{395}\) The Nuremberg Code – a result of the Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial, an American military court trying 23 German physicians and administrators for war crimes and crimes against humanity – had become the foundation of modern bioethics, and advanced the use of animals as research subjects:

> The experiment should be so designed and based on the result of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment.\(^{396}\)

In her analysis of this code, Thompson points out not only that experimenting on animals is set as an *ethical* substitution for experimentation on humans, but also that there is an *epistemological* element in the experimentation (based on the logic that animals are “both biologically alike and ethically unlike” humans) – which makes experimentation on animals a routine part of ethical research, but also the limit of it.\(^{397}\)

In this sense, Thompson argues that the trope “treat someone like an animal” is at the heart of modern biopolitics, while the ethical and epistemological legitimation of model animals was “the means whereby the abjection of those experimented upon as if they were animals [in Nazi science] was diverted onto the bodies of literal animals.”\(^{398}\) Recalling the history of animalization as a means of and justification for the biopolitical abjection of women, slaves, and the disabled, Thompson criticizes a version of animal rights that adds the animal as a new subject of enfranchisement, following the long list of human minority groups, and calls instead for a move away from substitutational research logic itself.\(^{399}\) She also argues that such a move is not

\(^{392}\) Ibid., 79.

\(^{393}\) Ibid., 77. My italics.

\(^{394}\) Thompson, *Good Science*, 189.

\(^{395}\) Ibid., 191.


\(^{397}\) Ibid., 192-93.

\(^{398}\) Ibid., 214. Original italics.

\(^{399}\) Ibid., 216.
only possible, but would help research to advance beyond the scientific limits of model animals (and other forms of substitute research); if, as an alternative, the efforts invested in making animal models more like humans were redirected toward developing *in vitro* systems, it would result in a scientifically-viable as well as ethical research paradigm.\(^{400}\) Thompson does not discuss what then makes animal tropes paradigmatic of the modern biopolitics, but instead offers an operative feature of this paradigm – substitution – for considering not only the relations between human and animals, but also the epistemological and ethical status of the human research subject in relation to other human beings and to society.\(^{401}\)

Both Haraway and Thompson, albeit different in their perspectives on the subject of substitutional relations, offer useful tools for examining the kinship between female dogs and women in biotechnological circuits. Biopolitical abjection does not occur in the great divide between the human/the animal, male/female, or bios/zoe (as in traditional biopolitical theories), but rather emerges within specific practices operating through the semiotic commerce between “treating like animals,” “substituting,” and “sacrifice.” While both canine and human females are mobilized into the circuits of transnational biotechnology by virtue of their female reproductive bodies, the surrogates and egg-donor dogs used in pet cloning are not only used in place of other dogs, but also share lineage with other animals that are used to substitute women (such as egg donors), who themselves are also interpolated into reproductive and regenerative technology – often in place of other humans – at the intersection of sex, class, and nation. These nodes of replacements compound the prevailing figures of clones as replacement in the question of whether a clone, as a technological replacement (simulacra, image) of the original, does not forget the singularity of the original (to go back to the ethical and political implication of such a frame as discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation). Instead, the nodes of replacement discussed in this chapter brings to the fore how certain bodies are mobilized and invisibilized *for* others, recomposing the differences and similarities across the various hierarchical order within a specific social and scientific context.

If pet cloning reproduces memorable bodies by rendering other bodies substitutable – and hence invisible and disposable – it demands another politics of memory, concerning less of the mass reproduction of copies, but more of the mass-reproduced surplus bodies and the byproduct of the pet-cloning industry. In this vein, this chapter tries to remember the female dogs used in pet cloning (and are said to be slaughtered for meat), by tracing the layers of complicated material and rhetorical construct through which they disappear. If the disappearance of the surrogate-mother dogs and egg donor dogs is disturbing, it is not because of the shockingly savage practice of dog-eating in Korea. Even though the dog-meat industry facilitates the massive use (and disposal) of animals for reproductive and regenerative technology in South Korea, such reactions naturalize the normative compartmentalization of animals between species (one can eat certain species, but not others) and between categories (pets/stock animals/lab animals/service animals), and reinscribes postcolonial power relations and the West/East divide

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\(^{400}\) Ibid., 220-22.

\(^{401}\) Some contemporary encounters between biopolitics and animal studies have inquired into the abjection of the animal as the paradigm of modern biopolitics, without falling into claiming the human-like rights to the animal (which Thompson criticizes). For more discussion, see Cary Wolfe, *Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013).
as discussed in the beginning of this chapter. Rather, the circuit between the dog market and the pet cloning industry in Korea intimates its relation to the massive mobilization and substitution of (especially female) human and other animal bodies in the scientific and technological practices of transnational circuits. Feminist STS, animal studies, and postcolonial theories have much to offer to each other in analyzing these connections, affording us a space to recompose a political kinship across differences within non-symmetrical and non-innocent entanglements – as suggested by the tentative alliance with the disappearing female dogs used for pet cloning and human egg-donors articulated at the intersection of sex, species, class, and nation.
Epilogue

This dissertation has searched for a biopolitics of memory of our time – a time when bodies are displaced, duplicated, and disposed of in transnational circuits. To do so, it began with a couple of related questions. How do we think of embodied memory, when these dubious bodies proliferate in assemblage with biotechnology and virtual media? And, what does the embodied memory of these bodies tell us about how we value what (or whom) we’ve lost, as it relates to the “order of things” intersecting differences in sex, race, species, disability, and nation? Tongues and genes are often associated with embodied memories, and this dissertation tried to answer these questions by engaging with the figures of lifted tongues and of cloned dogs (and the forgotten “surplus” animals, such as surrogate-mother dogs) that embody “cuts” in cultural and biological lineage. In writing with these figures, I’ve tried to approach their “cuts” as affective and prosthetic interspaces, where collective memories are recomposed through the encounters of different bodies – of humans, animals, and technology – within specific historical and geopolitical configurations.

From this approach, the project has been a double commitment to the ethics of mourning and of affirmative becoming – a commitment destined for infidelities. On the one hand, it has been driven by attempts to move from the loss of mourning toward the affirmative becoming, as my emphasis on bodily assemblages suggests. The transition from Part One on diasporic language to Part Two on human and other animal bodies in biotechnology suggests such a movement, also reflecting the shift of intellectual currents – from linguistic turn to new materialist, affective, and animal turns – that have influenced this research. However, on the other hand such movement has been far from a linear process, but instead a transposition of the ethics of mourning via memories as affirmative becoming.

For one thing, these turns haven’t taken me away from the question of representation – and of language and image of memory – but rather returned me to it, although the question itself has changed in the meanwhile. In Part One, I explored how lifted tongues perform the memories of displacement in their buffering and stuttering speech, carrying a potential to disrupt operation of the major language through their materiality. However, these tongues do this only by showing the otherness within the system of the major language in a world of globalization. In this sense, such a potential is at odds with the undifferentiated celebration of diasporic tongue, its unassimilable accents. Rather, it points to how lifted tongues resist smooth translation into the major language, which operates through taming the “bodies” of minor language in tandem with cultural, political, and economic institutions within the transnational circuits. Then, a lifted tongue is not necessarily language that safely belongs to those who have moved from their original homeland, but instead language that transforms as it passes boundaries – even when the actual speaker doesn’t cross a national border, as in the case of the tongue surgery and the Indian call center.

And, if my dissertation itself also speaks in a lifted tongue, this is not because it is written in English with a Korean accent. Nor does it claim identity with the surgically lifted tongue in South Korea, the tailored tongue in the Indian Call center, or the evocative tongue of Theresa Hak Kyung Cha, regardless of the differences in their specific historical and social contexts. Rather, if my research speaks in a lifted tongue, it does so because this dissertation utilizes the “differences” of these lifted tongues in order to generate “elsewhere within here” – within academic institutions thickly invested in the history of (post)colonial and capitalist knowledge production.
I made more explicit interventions into the production of knowledge in Part Two, examining the interconnection between the politics of representation and the biopolitical order of things across gender, species, and nation. I argued for a shift of focus away from the mass reproduction of clones as “images” to the corporeal assemblages of human and animal bodies in transnational pet cloning. However, such attention to the assemblages and affectivities of bodies nonetheless does not lead to the replacement of language (and image) for those bodies – whose differences are flattened in simplified versions of new materialism. Instead, I revisited Gayatri Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak” to show how the circulation of animal bodies (dog meat) has brought the “speaking subjects” into the affective circuits of shame and disgust, reiterating postcoloniality within the discourse of (bio)ethics in the contemporary societies. Likewise, the animal and affective turns do not annihilate the significance of language, but instead drag the politics of representation beyond the exclusively human realm of linguistics. This is not to include the animal into the realm of language (or giving a “voice” to the animal), but to examine how linguistic structure is contigous with the biopolitical order of things in historical and social contexts – in this case, the postcolonial relations between the West and Asian cultures. That said, my writing as a gesture of remembering the surrogate-mother dogs (reportedly slaughtered for human consumption) is a writing on and within exactly these postcolonial affective circuits, and so also a criticism of Western-centric bioethics, animal welfare discourses and critical animal studies.

A biopolitics of memory that approaches bodies not as a fulcrum of biopolitical effacement but through assemblages of human, animal, and technology affords us a space to rethink the value of life and to reimagine our relationship with other lively (and deathly) bodies. By attending to the force of life, this dissertation has critically revised the traditional biopolitical dichotomy of bios/zoe. As illustrated in the discussions of the forces of language and of dog-meat, this approach both brings non-human matters into biopolitical consideration and encourages us to consider the value of life beyond the human face, and beyond the dichotomy of organic/inorganic (and of life/death). However, this approach does not necessarily lead to a declaration of the egalitarianism of all beings, but rather asks us to think about the complexity of the value of life in transnational circuits. As shown in the “clone worthy dogs,” the value of life worth remembering is not only predisposed to, but also generated through, technological intervention. Further, these “memorable” animals are reproduced by rendering others disposable– such as surrogate-mother dogs, sibling clones with defects, and “extra” clones – intersecting the differences among sex, species, and nation. As such, this measure of “life worth mourning” (and life that isn’t) demands a critical revision that examines how the value of human and animal life is made and unmade in articulation of the biopolitical order of things and the technology of life.

Finally, this dissertation turned out to be a project of reimagining our relationship with inappropriate/d mothers – or the space between Mother and mother. Recuperation of motherhood has been an important focus in both postcolonial and feminist theories. However, my research has dealt with the figures of mothers that do not conform to the patriarchal imperialist/nationalist image of Mother but nonetheless are thickly embedded within power relations. In “Tongue-Tie,” the mother is no longer someone who hands down the “mother tongue” – as she often is in the decolonizing literature. Instead, she is a part of the neoliberal-family machine, through which she interposes her own transnational aspiration of “elsewhere within here” upon her son’s tongue. I also retraced the female reproductive bodies in the making and unmaking of kinship through
biotechnology, by following the representational and ontological disappearance of the surrogate-mother dogs and egg donor dogs used in pet cloning.

This emphasis on the corporeal entanglement of bodies offers a better understanding of the complexity of biotechnological subjectification of female bodies in the transnational circuits. For example, I discuss how the massive use (and disposal) of female dogs in animal cloning is connected to the massive mobilization of human women for egg donation to stem cell research in South Korea under the neo-liberal regime of globalization. Here the link between the bitches and these women is not based on their biological identity (“sex”), but generated through a concrete practice of technology contingent upon the historical and geopolitical context. That said, I nonetheless argue for the biopolitics of memory as a feminist method of re-envisioning kinship—not as a given, but as what arises through the remembrance of embodied interrelations across the difference of sex, nation, and species.
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