Amazement and the Experience of Transformation in the Romances of Cervantes and Shakespeare

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Abstract

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This dissertation explores the use of amazement as a transformative experience capable of reframing traumatic memory in the romances of Cervantes and Shakespeare. Romance offers a structure to mobilize emotion and fantasy to deal with traumatic events. Focusing on the experience of amazement and its effect on literary content and form allows the critic to see the connections between romance and tragedy, and specifically between Renaissance romance and ancient tragedy, comedy, and romance. The three parts of this project provide a reading of amazement that is historically grounded in the period between 1550 and 1640. Although modern psychoanalytic theory and trauma studies are engaged in a limited way, the methodology of the thesis is to use the explicit, detailed, and ancient traditions available to Cervantes and Shakespeare as interpretive tools. Renaissance literary theory, popular romance models, and early modern psychology all focus on the dynamic between the fantasy and emotions to demonstrate how amazement responds to trauma.

Part I begins by analyzing ancient tragedy and romance to show how genre limits or makes possible the management of painful events, and how amazement is the central experience marking these limits and possibilities. Then it synthesizes Renaissance literary theory of the Aristotelian and the Neoplatonic schools, and the other strains of thinking those schools subsume. This synthesis focuses on the various treatments of the role of amazement in the process of transformation. Neo-Platonism offers the possibility for transformation from a debased state in an imperfect world to an exalted position in a world remade. Apuleius’ The Golden Ass, a bestseller in England and Spain during the Renaissance with clear influences on both Shakespeare and Cervantes, builds on Neo-Platonist, but also tragic, ideas about amazement. These structure his interpolated tale, “Cupid and Psyche, and build a model for romance. Part I concludes by showing how early modern psychoanalysis, which also draws on literary tragedy and romance for its conclusions, presents a model of amazement as breaking down the psyche and causing depression and anxiety through its effects on the fantasy. Conversely, amazement can work on the fantasy to restore it to wholeness. Ancient tragedy and romance, Renaissance literary theory and its classical models, and early modern psychology all help to elaborate a model of amazement as both the cause of trauma and the means to solving the ruptures it creates cognitively and emotionally.
Part II examines Cervantes’ use of different kinds of amazement to turn around the tragic experience of slavery into a story of hope in *El trato de Argel*, *Los baños de Argel*, and “The Captive’s Tale” in *Don Quixote Part I*. Cervantes portrays the impossibility of completely erasing trauma and the limited, but still significant, success of romance in containing it. This section hinges on the idea of the *trato*, a form of torture in Algeria a punishment in which the hands were tied behind the back, the body lifted up into the air, and then allowed to fall to the ground, so that the bones were dislocated from the shoulders. The word also meant double-dealing and referred to any kind of commercial bargaining. Thus, the first play, *El trato*, depicts a typical Renaissance chaos of love in which lovers long for those who spurn them, but the plot of deliverance literally cashes in on the love of a Moorish couple for their Spanish slaves. There are two strands to this play: stories of martyrdom, torture, and butchery balanced by a comical love plot. The perversity of the Moorish masters is trumped by the greed of an Ottoman king who returns the beautiful Christian slaves to their homeland on the condition that they will send back their ransom money. The experience of amazement as terror is kept apart from the transcendent experience of amazement by the dual structure of the play. One part of the play ends on a tragic note, the other on a comic note, and suspended between these are moments of amazed transcendence. From the experience that will not fit in either genre comes an amazement that Cervantes will later capture in a romance version of this story.

Cervantes reworks much of the same material in the story of Zoraida and Ruy Pérez from *Don Quixote Part I*, but instead of the *trato* as an explicit torture of Christians, the story focuses on *trato* in its other meanings as double-dealing, betrayal, and commercial transactions. On an economic level, this makes sense since the first story fashioned from this material is resolved by a Muslim king’s trust in the integrity of two Spanish slaves to pay him back for their freedom. In “The Captive’s Tale” Cervantes places the inner world of emotions into a context of commerce, as if bargaining, purchasing, and stealing were all perfect metaphors for an emotional and psychological process. The story portrays the purchase of happiness, which exchanges terror for wonder. The love story bears the burden of the explicit torture it cuts out by displacing martyr stories and torture onto the love triangle of father-daughter-lover. The figure of the idealized woman, Zoraida, represents the possibility of escape from slavery by redeeming, or literally buying, the freedom of the captive Spaniards. Symbolically, she serves as a psychological escape from trauma into fantasy. After they escape from Algiers, terror restages itself, showing the limitations of the fantasy of the feminine ideal to eradicate terror through the wonder, or *admiración*, which she inspires. In *Los baños*, which was Cervantes’ last attempt to refashion the same material, the author once again unyokes the love plot from violence and betrayal. The structural change to the tale renders the relationship to the feminine less complicated and instead focuses the experience of wonder on a transcendent ideal.

Part III demonstrates how the feminine becomes the focal point for the emotional oscillation between amazement as terror and amazement as wonder. *Pericles*, *Cymbeline*, and *The Winter’s Tale* manipulate three feminine archetypes: the evil queen, the sacrificed maiden, and the redeemer to forge a pathway for redemption. The sacrificed maiden Polyxena from Seneca’s *The Trojan Women*, which the chapter proves was a direct influence on Shakespeare, is the central character in this pattern of redemption. This chapter also demonstrates the classical influences of Apuleius and Heliodorus on Shakespeare’s treatment of the various kinds of
amazement, his employment of legal themes, and his use of feminine archetypes to dramatize how the male protagonists’ amazement as terror can be transformed into amazement as wonder.

In *Pericles*, *Cymbeline*, and *The Winter’s Tale*, the principle male protagonists succumb to their fears of the feminine other. In order to justify the fantasy, to make it credible to the reason, even though it is not rational or equitable, the male interpreters subject the sacrificed women to a trial in which they come out guilty. When the sacrificed daughter returns as a redeemer at the end of *The Æthiopica, Pericles, The Winter’s Tale*, and *Cymbeline*, a form of trial is resurrected as well. Now, the fantasy of the woman as redeemer overcomes the laws that almost sacrifice her again. As an object of “admiration,” the redeemer allows the male spectator to approach the terror and desire that the feminine inspire in him by providing him with an escape into fantasy. The triumph of the redeemer becomes legible in the power of this new idealized archetype to allow the male judge to break his own laws. In the dream-like resurrection that Paulina orchestrates at the end of *The Winter’s Tale*, Shakespeare shatters the Polyxena Pattern altogether. Instead of a polarized archetype of femininity, Hermione appears on the stage as an imperfect woman who belongs to an imperfect world. When the cycle of demonization and idealization is broken, we move out of a closed circuit of emotions that begins with terror as astonishment, changing into aggression and then the fear and erotic fantasy embodied in “admiration.” The wonder that characterizes the end of *The Winter’s Tale* is of a paradigm of binaries torn up and remade through a fantasy of femininity born from a woman.

This dissertation contributes to the body of work on early modern amazement by including the full range of emotions from terror to wonder that constitute amazement. The range of literary texts allows for a concrete connection between romance and tragedy, centered on affect. Because amazement is cognitive and emotional, aesthetic and psychological, so the study of it must necessarily be interdisciplinary. The intent of the project is to study romance as a mode, rather than as a grab bag of motifs and dramatic devices on which we can impose a theological or philosophical pattern. Rather, the affective aim of these stories is directly related to the limitations and possibilities of literary form. What comes across as episodic or meandering is actually the attempt to provide a structure for the rapprochement of the subject and the dreams and nightmares caused by trauma. The argument demonstrates the interplay between literary form and psychological healing.
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Preface

The key to understanding romance’s power to turn around tragedy is to be found in the concept of amazement, not wonder. This important difference is lost on the modern reader because as the word, amazement, has evolved it has shed the disparate meanings that it once held during the early modern period. Then it described experiences ranging from the traumatic to the ecstatic, the deadening to the revivifying, and moving between these two poles. But if we are to understand the “Age of the Marvelous,” as a compendium of essays calls the early modern period, then we must understand why amazement was such an obsession not just of literature or art, but of all disciplines charged with studying the mind, the emotions, and the human spirit. This dissertation seeks to shed light on Cervantes’ and Shakespeare’s use of amazement as a transformative experience capable of altering the lingering symptoms of traumatic experience. Secondly, it argues that amazement allows us to see the connections between romance and tragedy and specifically between Renaissance romance and ancient tragedy, comedy, and romance. Thirdly, it provides a reading of amazement that is historically grounded in the intellectual models available to understand emotion and cognition between 1550 and 1640. Although the project engages modern psychoanalytic theory and trauma studies in a limited way, the methodology is grounded in the focus on fantasy that explicit, detailed, and old traditions share in common. Renaissance literary theory, romance models, and early modern psychology all show how amazement responds to trauma through the interplay of fantasy and emotion.

In romance, death leads to life, and extreme suffering gives way to the joy of deliverance, “Joy beyond the walls of the world, poignant as grief.” Emotional states and literary form are closely related because in order to move from grief to poignant joy certain literary devices are required: improbable coincidences, swift reversals of fortune, and passionate recognitions. This relationship between emotion and structure is the basis for the popular notion of romance as mode embraced by critics as different in their approaches as J.V. Cunningham, Patricia Parker, and Fredric Jameson. The idea that the structure of romance emerges out of the meandering nature of desire, as Parker posits, explains its episodic structure and the deferral of the end.

According to Northrop Frye, romance is driven toward a final recognition scene that returns life to a fallen world and makes it more resemble the heavenly counterpart of the upper world. The decayed world is made right through the recognition of characters of each other, and the return of the lost or abandoned children. In The Secular Scripture, Frye outlines different levels of existence with their associated states, but according to him, the movement of romance is driven by the compulsion for an end. The romance moves vertically from upper world to lower world and then back up, through four stages. While romance incorporates the cyclical process of death and rebirth, its thrust is, as M.H. Abrams observes, linear, driving toward a triumphant end.

Terence Cave reminds us that the younger Freud also sought the kind of sudden, amazing recognition that provokes a radical transformation. The patient would recognize memories from the past, then experience a release from the symptoms of trauma at the core of those memories. Freud’s psychoanalysis of the novel Grădiva represents his attempt to identify a moment of recognition that emancipates the protagonist patient. The mature “Freud’s reflections on psychic and psychoanalytic narrative will in later years dwell increasingly on the theme of repetition, an

emphasis which by its very nature makes the possibility of a definitive ending—a full recognition and consequent cure—more remote and problematic.”

Freud’s ideas about the structure of a cure were colored by his predisposition for Sophoclean tragedy with its elevation of a moment of recognition. When, as Cave points out, Freud settles on the compulsion to repeat as the response to trauma, he also draws on a famous example from Jerusalem Liberated: Tancredi inadvertently stabbing the reincarnated soul of his lover, Clorinda, who is imprisoned in an enchanted tree. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud takes this example from romance as emblematic of the tendency of a traumatic event to repeat itself. Freud’s citation from Tasso describes a moment of amazement as shock and terror. But Freud’s citation deracines a moment of experience from the others to which it is connected in the past and in the future. Romance provides refracting moments of amazement, and the ecstatic form of amazement as wonder refracts a traumatic form of amazement, and is able to contain it, or at least make it manageable. Focusing on one instance does not capture the whole complex of amazement and its possibility for a kind of healing. It leads Freud to the pessimistic model of the compulsion to repeat, which is relieved only by death.

Romance puts the audience on an emotional roller coaster moving between amazement as terror and “joy…poignant as grief,” to use Tolkien’s eloquent phrase again. This dissertation claims that the emotional experience of romance is not an escape from numbing reality through random extremes of feeling. Rather the form of romance offers a structure for emotion and cognition to deal with traumatic events. In Part I, I show the difference between the tragic vision of traumatic events amazing its victims into a state of terrified paralysis or numb rage, and the vision of romance, which imagines these feelings can be managed. This first section analyzes ancient tragedy and romance to show how genre limits or makes possible the management of painful events, and how amazement is the central experience marking these limits and possibilities. In tragedy, “entombment” represents a dramatic motif and an emblem of the structure of experience. Tragic protagonists descend into a tomb where memory envelopes present experience, and the dramatized moment seems to be enveloped by the past. Seneca’s The Trojan Women depicts Astyanax in his father’s tomb and Polixenes’s blood being sucked into the tomb of a victor of war, Achilles. On the other hand, the incipient form of romance pioneered in Alcestis or Iphigenia in Tauris presents female protagonists as redemptive forces, descending into a tomb-like situation, and emerging from the terror of being almost annihilated by an Other. These tragedies demonstrate how the trauma of the past can be addressed, and what role amazement plays as the emotion and cognitive state with which they begin and conclude.

Part I continues by showing how Renaissance literary theory of the Aristotelian, the Horatian, and the Neoplatonic variety, focuses on moments of amazement, both of the negative and the positive kind, as stages of a process of cognition and emotional catharsis. Amazement allows the audience to experience fear and wonder to educate the senses. It also functions as an allopathic or a homeopathic emotional remedy with the goal of witnessing a world larger than oneself and thus setting limits on the experience of suffering. This focus on the perspective of literary theory on the idea of amazement, particularly amazement as wonder, has been the foundation of studies such as Tillyard’s Shakespeare’s Last Plays, Pettet’s Shakespeare and the Romance Tradition, and Platt’s Reason Diminished: Shakespeare and the Marvelous, to name only the most well-known.

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Renaissance psychological theory and an example of the psychological process exemplified by the extremely popular story of Cupid and Psyche from Apuleius’ *The Golden Ass*, show that trauma cannot be transcended, as in left behind completely. It can be approached incrementally in a process that involves indirect glimpses, because the traumatic event is obscured or hidden. Other refractive narratives surrounding an original memory allow us to experience mediations of it, by means of refraction. *The Golden Ass* embeds a story within a story, and in that interpolated story of Cupid and Psyche, are refractions of the story in which it is embedded. The structure of the tale in this case also reflects the emotions that it is representing.

*The Golden Ass* tells of fantasies of bodies sewn inside of other bodies, human sewn inside animal, the Platonic rational inside the appetitive. These images are meant to suggest how humans are imprisoned in a house of flesh, but they also symbolize a process that does not need to be allegorized, the structure of emotions and of memory. The traumatic core of early hurt and betrayal is contained in later memories. Amazement as wonder contains amazement as terror. The desire to know that Aristotle claims to be the beginning of philosophy also launches—not a cognitive process—but an emotional movement. Conversely, wonder as a heightened emotion, leads to an awakening of consciousness, thus cognitive movement. The structure of trauma and amazement are both about relations of embeddedness, an emotion in a memory, a memory in an emotion; a memory contained in another memory, and an emotion locked into a containing emotion.

Early modern psychology, evidenced through physicians and scholars in England and Spain, reflects the understanding that a person can be filled up, as if by physical objects, by the traces of traumatic experience. This feeling can be visualized and dramatized through the idea of the devil insinuating himself into the bowels or of a body replete with snakes, rocks, excrement, and other strange foreign objects. The sense of intrusion is continually reimagined. The early modern psychology sources of Reynoldes, Burton, and Velásquez, among others covered in this dissertation, reference earthquakes, massacres, and the Devil himself as sources of traumatic amazement. This amazement can be countenanced through an imaginative process that expands the sense of self to contain the terrifying memory. The process of amazement first pulls in the boundaries of the self so that the subject seems to be squeezed out of his body. Then the boundaries expand through the kind of amazement that is wonder. Relief from this terror comes through experiences of expansion in which the subject finds himself connected to larger dreams that are so very far outside the self, that we find the self right at their center: the paradoxical metaphor for this is the lame ass in the fourth trial of Psyche’s dream, who is at the center of Apuleius’ dreams, and also at the furthest remove from the person in “reality.” When Psyche walks past him twice, ignoring him, she begins to break a pattern of trauma, starts to puncture an illusion, by, as Burton will suggest, not paying anymore imaginative attention to him.

Part II considers the issues of the relationship between amazement and genre and the connections between amazement as curse and amazement as cure. Cervantes uses different kinds of amazement to turn around the tragic experience of martyrdom and captivity into stories of deliverance and hope. Comparing three literary mediations of his five-year captivity in Algiers, *El trato de Argel*, *Los baños de Argel*, and “The Captive’s Tale” in *Don Quixote Part I*, this section emphasizes how genre can shape experience. Amazement can be espanto, a profound form of fear that Covarrubias relates etymologically spectrum, linked to ghosts and mirroring he says. It can also be admiración or maravilla, which focus not on the source of terror, but on the pleasurable imaginative effects. Thus, we see how early modern definitions and etymologies
capture the way that terror can generate not only more terror, but also ecstatic experiences. The chapter grounds itself in the historical situation of King Philip II’s leadership of the Counter-Reformation, leading a war against heresy, Islam, and paganism at home and abroad. The historical circumstances lead to a polarized form of dualism of good and evil, God and the Devil, Catholic and non-Catholic, which only further charge the inevitable binary of self and other.

The section hinges on the idea of the trato. This Algerian torture suspended the body from the arms and left it hanging mid-air until the bones were dislocated from the shoulders. Trato also meant double-dealing and referred as well to commercial bargaining. Thus, the first play, El trato, depicts a typical Renaissance chaos of love in which lovers love those who do not love them, but it cashes in on the love of a Moorish couple for their Spanish slaves. There are two strands to this play: stories of martyrdom and torture and a comical love plot in which the perversity of the Moorish masters is trumped by the greed of the Ottoman king who returns them to Spain on the condition that they will send back money. The experience of amazement as terror is kept apart from the transcendent experience of amazement by the dual structure of the play. One part of the play ends on a tragic note, the other on a comic note, and suspended between these are moments of amazed transcendence. From the experience that will not fit in either genre comes an amazement that Cervantes will later capture in a romance version of this story.

In the story of Zoraida and Ruy Pérez in Don Quixote Part I Cervantes plays with many of the same dramatic situations and motifs, but instead of the trato as an explicit torture of Christians, the story focuses on trato in its other meanings as double-dealing, betrayal, and commercial transactions. Buying happiness and exchanging terror for wonder, the love story bears the burden of the explicit torture it cuts out by displacing martyr stories and torture onto the love triangle of father-daughter-lover. The figure of the idealized woman, Zoraida, represents the possibility of escape from slavery by redeeming, or literally buying, the freedom of the captive Spaniards. Symbolically, she serves as a psychological escape from trauma into fantasy. At the end of “The Captive’s Tale,” terror restages itself, showing the limitations of the fantasy of the feminine ideal to eradicate terror through the wonder, or admiración, which she inspires. In Cervantes’ last version of the story, Los baños, he once again unyokes the love plot from violence and betrayal, rendering the relationship to the feminine less complicated and focusing the experience of wonder instead on a transcendent ideal.

This world of extreme otherness is a perfect setting to provide instances of “arresting strangeness” (Tolkien 203). While otherness symbolizes an aggressive force outside of the self, as in the torture and enslavement by the infidel, it also provides the possibility of flight: the escape into the extreme otherness of alternative, alien worlds. Cervantes’ captivity stories draw upon the harsh dualities of life in captivity to create instances of terror and escape into transcendent wonder.

Part II begins to illustrate the prominent role of gender in creating a sense of the strangeness of the Other. The following section expands on this, showing how the feminine becomes the focal point over and over for the oscillation between amazement as terror and amazement as wonder. The third part of the dissertation posits three kinds of feminine archetypes drawn from primitive literature, fairy tales: the evil queen, the sacrificed maiden, and the redeemer. In Pericles, Cymbeline, and The Winter’s Tale, the principle male protagonists succumb to their fears of the feminine other. In order to confirm the sense of amazement as overwhelm of the self by a nefarious woman, the evil queen, Pericles, Posthumus, and Leontes all subject the women in their lives to the threat of death or abandonment. This punishment is
visited upon the daughter, who later returns to redeem, or buy back, the male protagonist from
death. They all suffer from a numbing melancholia, the repercussions of the trauma of earlier
amazement. However, only amazement can stun them into waking up again. When the
redeemer returns, she produces admiration in those who see her. This admiration is a kind of
amazement that is experienced not as a force against the self, but as an aggressive onslaught
from above. Thus, amazement as admiration, or wonder, creates boundaries around the
feminine, momentarily protecting her, and at the same time relieving the male protagonist from
the fantasy of her evil and aggression.

Because amazement as wonder contains a kernel of terror, it always has the possibility of
repeating trauma. In this sense, Freud’s notion of the compulsion to repeat seems to be
vindicated. When Perdita, Marina, or Imogen return they are, like Charicleia from Heliodorus’
Greek romance, returning to the threat of death. They represent, and they provoke, the
experience of amazement as wonder, or admiration, which emerges out of the threat of violence
and terror. As such, they are idealized specters, idealized ghosts of great beauty that promise
deliverance from the past. The plots of these three Shakespearean romances depend upon the
movement through three female archetypes and the attendant experiences of traumatic and
rapturous amazement that they produce. In this sense, the form of the plays depends not only
upon gender and the fantasies it elicits, but also on the experience of amazement. Shakespeare’s
version of romance emerges directly out of the manipulation of amazement.

This dissertation contributes to the body of work on early modern amazement by
including the full range of emotions from terror to wonder that constitute amazement. The range
of literary texts allows for a concrete connection between romance and tragedy, centered on
affect. More recently, the work of T.G. Bishop has emphasized both the wounding and the
euphoric aspects of amazement, but he limits his sources to literary theory and philosophy. The
three parts of this project cast the net wider to include early modern psychology, theology,
history, and influential ancient literary texts, as well as classical literary theory and philosophy.
The reason for this wider breadth of sources is not merely to cover more bases. Because
amazement is cognitive and emotional, aesthetic and psychological, so the study of it must
necessarily be interdisciplinary. The intent of the project is to study romance as a mode, rather
than as a grab bag of motifs and dramatic devices on which we can impose a theological or
philosophical pattern. Rather, the affective potential of these stories is directly related to the
limitations and possibilities of literary form. What comes across as episodic or meandering is
actually the attempt to provide a structure for the rapprochement of the subject and the dreams
and nightmares caused by trauma. The argument provided in these pages demonstrates the
interplay between literary form and psychological healing.
Part I: Revealing the Facets of Amazement

Proemium
Mira ex Machina, Wonder out of the Machine

The genre of romance,\(^4\) as practiced by Cervantes and Shakespeare, sustains an elaborate choreography of the different expressions of amazement in the journey from tragic beginnings to miraculous endings. However, in *The Tempest* Prospero apologizes for these very amazement-producing plot-devices.

\[\text{...} \quad \text{Now I want} \]
\[\text{Spirits to enforce, art to enchant,} \]
\[\text{And my ending is despair,} \]
\[\text{Unless I be reliev’d by prayer,} \]
\[\text{Which pierces so, that it assaults} \]
\[\text{Mercy itself and frees all faults.} \]
\[\text{As you from crimes would pardon'd be,} \]
\[\text{Let your indulgence set me free.}^5 \]

I take these lines as not simply drawing attention to, or even apologizing for, the artifice of literature. Although the first folio classifies *The Tempest* as a comedy, the fact that Prospero’s epilogue follows the disenchantment of his antagonists suggests that the wildly improbable devices of romance are the cause of his appeal for pardon. The request for prayer and indulgence follows the return to consciousness out of amazement of his antagonists; and, it precedes the moment of the audience’s awakening from the dream of the play.

Prospero recognizes that the play has the capacity—indeed it already has done this in what precedes his final speech—to create a bond that exceeds entertainment. The audience is asked to pardon the sorcerer after he has released those he entrapped using amazing devices. The magical spell enables the failed ruler to forgive powerful emotions of rancor, resentment, distrust, and envy. In the epilogue, Prospero expands the circle of mercy to the audience, as a compact in which audience and protagonists participate. The process of the alteration of reality

\(^4\) The debate about the term “tragicomedy” versus romance is extensive. For John Shawcross, “‘Romance’ has meant stories remote from everyday life—such as those about knights and chivalric deeds—fictitious narratives that are extravagant and unrealistic, and those with love as the primary factor. The nub of the tragicomedy is not unrealistic; its treatment is. Like tragicomedy, romance implies difficulties in the love story, often with an idealized heroine and a two-dimensional male lover, with reconciliation and a happy ending” (Shawcross 29). This seems overly influenced by the description of romance in Lukacs’ *Theory of the Novel*, which claims that the Greek romance’s protagonists as unchanging, simple, and two-dimensional. While the nomenclature is less important, I think the term “romance” is apt given that the plays considered in this dissertation draw heavily on the Byzantine and Roman novel. Nevertheless, given the similarity between “romance” and “tragicomedy,” the ideas about tragicomedy, particularly those of Guarini in his *Compendio della poesia tragicomica* (1601) are useful. They use “credible miracles” to achieve a happy ending, and the overall goal is to purge melancholy (Mowat 82). Like tragicomedy, romances pivot around “arrested moments” that “heighten both emotion and meaning…an icon of sorrow-in-joy and separation-in-union…The emotional intensities of the reunions are also expressed in paradox” (Dixon 57). See also Foster, “Ford’s Experiments in Tragicomedy: Shakespearean and Fletcherian Dramaturgies” and Yoch, “The Renaissance Dramatization of Temperance: The Italian Revival of Tragicomedy and *The Faithful Shepherdess*.”

and then the return to reality of the protagonists of the magical island provokes various experiences of shock and paralysis, trepidation and disorientation, fear and wonder. Prospero pardons his subjects and competitors only after they have been subjected to an alteration of reality. What is striking about the end of this play is that the characters are not aware enough to feel remorse, but Prospero forgives them nevertheless as if their amazement were enough. Then we are invited to do the same for him, as if he also were guilty.

Prospero acknowledges on the part of the playwright a form of entertainment he admits transgresses through the demands it makes on the audience to suspend disbelief to the point of absurdity. Both Cervantes and Shakespeare had a fraught relationship with the devices of romance, and especially the hyper-charged emotion of amazement that it creates. For Cervantes romance would always be a part of his oeuvre, and counterpoint the more “realistic” work. The interpolated stories of the Cardenio romantic quadrangle and Ruy Pérez are decidedly romances, and they are necessary for structuring Don Quixote I as a contrast with the more picaresque and satirical elements of the novel. In the Exemplary Novels, romances alternate with relatively realistic stories, and the collection holds together through the principle of counterpoint. The experience of extreme shock or stupefaction (to be atónito), suspended moments of wonder (maravillarse), and admiration at discretion or beauty (admiration) open up the consciousness to possibility—Don Quixote’s refrain, “todo podría ser,” anything could be.

In Part II of the Quixote, the knight errant complains to Master Peter the puppeteer that his rendition of an old, Spanish ballad does not render historical reality accurately. Don Quixote objects that Moors do not ring bells, as Peter pretends they do in his staging. Peter responds, “Aren’t a thousand plays [“comedias”] performed almost every day that are full of a thousand errors and pieces of nonsense, and yet are successful productions that are greeted not only with applause but with admiration?” Working the puppets from within, the retablo deconstructs the enchantment behind storytelling, revealing the constructedness of its fictions. While Master Peter’s quip is likely a critique of a certain playwright, Lope de Vega, it also points out audiences’ strong desire in general to be amazed (to respond with admiración) by “improprieties,” or excesses that push what is acceptably verisimilar. The knight errant, however, comes off more foolish than the puppeteer by getting caught up in the historical accuracy, rather than the effects a story produces.

Peter’s response elaborates what he has said earlier regarding the veracity of Don Quixote’s experience in the Montesinos Cave. Sancho believes that the strange experiences Don Quixote recounted could never have really happened, or were “at least nothing but dreams.” He asks Peter to inquire of his prophetic monkey the truth. The puppeteer responds, “The monkey says that some of the things your grace saw, or experienced, in the aforesaid cave are false, and some are true [“verosímiles”], and this is all he knows, nothing more, with regard to this question…” (Cervantes 2003, 627). What is astonishing here is that something like wisdom can come out of the desire to be fooled. The puppeteer does not contrast true and false, but rather the

7 “…que yo para mí tengo, con perdón de vuestra merced, que todo fue embeleco y mentira, o por lo menos, cosas soñadas.” Cap. XXV, 238.
8 “El mono dice que parte de las cosas que vuesa merced vio, o pasó, en la dicha cueva son falsas, y parte verosímiles; y que esto es lo que sabe, y no otra cosa, en cuanto a esta pregunta.” Cap. XXV, 238.
false and the verisimilar. The reality of the story depends not on whether it is true, but whether it renders experience in a way that makes it appear plausible. The satire is of Sancho’s credulity and also Don Quixote’s need to verify the truth while manufacturing and believing wild fantasies. Cervantes conveys his idea that literature needs to be verisimilar in the words of the canon at the end of Don Quixote Part I, which are repeated by a monkey in the second volume. The monkey who speaks truth in a farce about the artifice of amazement nevertheless expresses the same critical judgment as Cervantes: there are only things that are false and things that are verisimilar. But truth, as I take it, emerges for Cervantes even out of the excess of the imagination so long as it can convincingly provide the required experience.  

Shakespeare exposes the artifice behind amazement in the grim atmosphere of the ending of King Lear, a play whose source material from legend could easily have been crafted into a romance, perhaps more readily than into a tragedy. It shares some of the same elements as Pericles, The Winter’s Tale, or Cymbeline: a woman whose loyalty and goodness are mistaken; evil, scheming women; men who go crazy from jealousy or mistrust; and in Cymbeline a great, final battle. Although Lear shares some of the archetypes and the situations, the old king never fully recovers what is lost. In the Folio of 1623 his last lines begin to recreate the spirit of Cordelia, but only as he dies, not as in romance, when he returns to consciousness: “Do you see this? Look on her! Look, her lips, Look there, look there. [He dies].” The germ of romance, this strong longing that dreams what is lost, and begins the process of incarnating it, is interrupted by Lear’s own death.

Before the dream of Cordelia’s return as redeemer and the death of Lear, the devices of romance are hung out in the gray light of the heath when Edgar convinces his blind father, the Earl of Gloucester, that he is at the top of the cliffs of Dover, and only need jump to plunge to his death.

Come on, sir, here’s the place; stand still. How fearful
And dizzy ‘tis, to cast one’s eyes so low!
The crows and choughs that wing the midway air
Show scarce so gross as beetles…
[…]
…The murmuring surge,
That on th’ unnumb’red idle pebble chafes,
Cannot be heard so high. I’ll look no more,
Lest my brain turn, and the deficient sight
Topple down headlong. (King Lear IV.vi.11-24)
The vivid illusions Edgar paints are, like Master Peter’s theatre, held up for inspection. Edgar theatrically—and metatheatrically—deceives and coerces his father. He lets us in on the rhetorical devices and the acting performance that manipulate the needy, suffering audience (here, the blinded earl) into amazement. Edgar makes much use of the Aristotelian concept of energeia, i.e., using language to paint a vivid, visual picture, to convince the blinded Gloucester

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9 Alban Forcione points out that Cervantes uses the Canon as the mouthpiece for his ideas about a verisimilar romance in Cervantes, Aristotle, and the Persiles. 126, 91.
that they are climbing a cliff. First, there is the movement of the birds that “wing the midway air,” cutting and agitating like small winds. Although he cannot see them, Edgar rhetorically describes the small, moving pebbles that are part of the “murmuring surge.” Out of the discernible movement of the birds winging, or the waves surging, the water murmuring, he adds the movement of pebbles, chafing, which is imagined, but not actually seen or heard. The imagery of the chafing pebbles is born directly out of the energeia of the mental images, the eikon or imagi, which he can see. All these verbs suggest movement and change, and contrast with the sense of blocked possibilities that is actually onstage. Furthermore, these categories come into being out of the dynamic, downward movement of Edgar’s gaze, and the assessment of distances and motion: the description of crows as beetles begins a series of analogies actively measuring size as a function of distance and relative to another object. These images cause internal cogitation and movement in the fantasy of the listener—both the earl and the audience—through analogies that compare and measure; in addition, the rapid succession between these analogies creates further cogitation and visual measuring. Thus, we go from a comparison of large birds to beetles, a man to his head, fishermen to mice, a ship to its small boat, and the small boat to a buoy, which is itself “Almost too small for sight” (King Lear IV.vi.20). In addition to the energeia of the birds’ wings and the various motions of the water, there is movement and dynamism in the comparison of sizes, and there is energeia in switching between analogies.

In The Art of Rhetoric, Aristotle observes, “[Homer] makes everything move and live, and energeia is motion.” The examples that he offers are intensely visual:

I call those things ‘before the eyes’ that signify things engaged in an activity. For example, to say that a good man is ‘foursquare’ is a metaphor, for both are complete; but it does not signify activity [energeia]. But the phrase “having his prime of life in full bloom” is energeia, as is “you, like an apheton” and “now and then the Greeks darting forward on their feet.” DARTING is actualization and metaphor; for he means “quickly.” And [energeia is,] as Homer often uses it, making the lifeless living through the metaphor. In all his work he gains his fame by creating activity…12

Aristotle specifies the vivid visual picture depends upon creating—or recreating—a feeling of motion. This motion measures the distance between the two parts of the metaphor, but it also indicates their rapprochement. We see the essential tension between something at a temporal, spatial, or emotional distance—say, the cliffs of Dover and the Channel, which are actually nowhere near—and the representation by Edgar, which is immediate, urgent, in motion. As audience, we are amazed, and Gloucester is amazed enough by this that he takes the leap. By describing the ascent and leading him to a fictional edge, Edgar has used a powerful rhetorical technique to create an illusion. This deceit, however specific to the circumstances of a son trying to dissuade his father from suicide, nevertheless dramatizes the illusions of romance in the bleakest moment of tragedy. Edgar may speak for the dramatist when he turns to the audience and excuses himself, “Why I do trifle thus with his despair/Is done to cure it” (King Lear IV.vi.35-6).

Edgar’s attempt to rescue Gloucester saves him from death and prepares the way for more suffering. The horror of seeing the world turned upside down, of being betrayed by his mutinous son, and learning that he has been deceived by false evidence into turning on Edgar, combine to drive the old man to desperation. Edgar attempts to turn this around by creating a scenario that is grand and of symbolic magnitude, as Longinus would prescribe:

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Our thoughts often travel beyond the boundaries of our surroundings. If anyone wants to know what we were born for, let him look round at life and contemplate the splendour, grandeur, and beauty in which it everywhere abounds. It is a natural inclination that leads us to admire not the little streams, however pellucid and however useful, but the Nile, the Danube, the Rhine, and above all the Ocean. Edgar attends to his father’s despair by taking him temporarily outside himself and putting him in that grand theatre through the power of suggestion. The sheer cliffs of Dover evoke the grandeur of old battles. Beyond the dramatic plunge to the beach, on the edge of the horizon, crystallizes the hope of relief from France. Gloucester drops a few feet and experiences the feeling of plummeting through space to death. Terror and desire consume him in his embrace of death.

Edgar astonishes his father, recounting that he witnessed Gloucester in the company of a demon because, as Longinus explains, “amazement and wonder exert invincible power and force and get the better of every hearer” (Longinus 1.4). The blind father reframes his memory of falling within the context of demonic persuasion; indeed, early modern psychology pointed to two causes of despair, demonic possession or a trauma to the imagination. Edgar’s simulated experience puts pressure on Gloucester’s imagination and generates a mixture of heightened emotions: desire for relief, terror at falling, and shock and dread at being saved from a devil. The rapid succession of emotions amaze Gloucester, and he is sobered into continuing his life to its allotted end. As exposed as the artifice of the machine behind the production of amazement is, it nevertheless functions. The effect is quite real.

Part I of this dissertation argues against T.S. Eliot’s negative assessment of romance in Elizabethan Essays that “the debility of romantic drama does not depend upon extravagant setting, or preposterous events, or inconceivable coincidences…It consists in an internal incoherence of feelings, a concatenation of emotions which signifies nothing.” On the contrary, I propose that this “concatenation of emotions,” however incoherent it appears, actually is therapeutic; it moves the audience or reader from terror to wonder, responding to the greater existential question of how to interrupt the repetitive iterations of human suffering produced by trauma. Amazement, a “concatenation of emotions” that includes terror, astonishment, shock, wonder, and admiration appears in a delimited form in tragedy and comedy, as I will demonstrate. But romance amplifies the range and increases the frequency of this constellation.

The first chapter in this section, “The Maze of a Maze,” illustrates the Renaissance concept of amazement as embodying opposite emotions and cognitive states, and it disentangles what these states are. The second chapter depicts the genesis of ideas about amazement from Greek and Roman tragedy, and elucidates these by referring to Aristotle. Furthermore, it shows the relationship of amazement to producing, escaping, and absorbing trauma. “Amazement Beyond Hope’ in Euripides’ Romance” explains how Alcestis and Iphigenia at Tauris dramatize the possibilities for amazement as both terror and an emotion meant to spirit the spectator out of tragic catastrophe. Chapter 4 then describes the development of Neo-Platonic thought around the issue of amazement. Neo-Platonism offers the possibility for transformation from a debased state in a radically imperfect world to an exalted position in a world remade. “The Structure of Amazement in Early Romance” illustrates how Apuleius builds on Neo-Platonist, but also tragic, ideas about amazement to structure his classical novel and build a model for romance. Finally, “Overthrowing Ourselves: Amazement as Cure” analyzes the early modern psychology of

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amazement, particularly that of Robert Burton, as a model of amazement for the Renaissance. Drawing on earlier literature, philosophy, and theology, Burton shows how amazement fragments the soul through its effects on the fantasy, and how amazement can also work on the fantasy to restore it to wholeness. Burton’s compendium, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, crystallizes the development of thought on the role of amazement in trauma, which is the basis for Shakespearean and Cervantine thought on the subject. This first section, “Revealing the Faces of Amazement” illustrates how it is that amazement will come to hold such an important role in dramatically and emotionally structuring the romances of Shakespeare and Cervantes—in spite of their self-conscious understanding of the artifice behind these experiences.

1. The Maze of Amazement

We can witness the complicated and paradoxical meanings of “amazement” in its synonyms, and in the words it is used to define. Amazement in these definitions describes what seem to be contradictory experiences: pain and pleasure, cessation of thought and transcendent, out of body fantasy. In John Florio’s *A World of Words* (1598) “amazement” is used to translate several Italian words such as “costernatione.” On one end of the spectrum, when it is closest to the traumatic, “amazement” appears in conjunction with “trouble, feare, sorow, anguish” and “astonishment.” However, it also describes what would seem to be the very opposite experience, “Estasi,” which Florio translates as “extasie, an amazement, and astonishment, a trance,” and also, suggesting the often conflicted nature of the experience, as “a quandarie.” In the definitions of “sbigottimento,” “sgomento,” and “uggia,” amazement refers to emotions of surprise and gradations of fear, from fright to terror. On the other hand, “narcotico,” “scalpore,” “spanto,” and “stupefattione” group it with a euphoric sedation, the effects of a narcotic, and a cessation of action as a result of fear. “Stupidità” also situates amazement as part of a movement away from the senses in response to sudden fear: “amazement, dullnes, or priuation of the sences, sodaine priuation or lacke of sence or feeling, benumming, astoniednes, dulnes or a trouble of the minde vpon a sodaine feare, not perceiuing what is done, vnsensiblenes.”

The above definitions suggest that in the early modern imagination amazement works like melancholy to paralyze the soul. It is experienced as crushing paralysis, and an impasse of cognition, Florio’s “quandarie.” On the one hand, the subject may experience the result of fear, a numbing of the senses. On the other hand, it can cause transport, or “trance” whereby the imagination is launched out of fear and into fantasy. These linguistic features of the word suggest how the structure and plot devices of romance are related to its defining experience, amazement. Fear and paralysis create a “quandarie,” which provokes an explosion of fantasy and escape. A defining feature of romance is the oscillation between paralysis and escape, fear and fantasy. The correlative of trance is dream or dreaminess, and indeed, this is a defining feature of all the romances in this study: scenarios that are spawned literally because of a sleeping body; action that follows a powerful dream; plots that unfold through the logic of dream; and the domination of consciousness by dreams and an ensuing competition between destructive nightmares and generous dreams. Randle Cotgrave’s *A Dictionary of the French and English Tongues* (1611) adds a new dimension by opposing “amazement” to coming back to

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oneself in his definition of “revenir.” However, this study will show that while amazement causes a temporary shutdown of the senses and cognitive ability, when they return not only does the subject “come back” to himself, but also people are drawn to each other: they come back, ils reviennent and ça revient.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* explains the etymology of “amaze: “Given the absence of clear word division in older manuscripts, amase and a mase…are sometimes not easy to distinguish and were indeed often identified.” The maze in amazement refers to the cognitive aporia and emotional impasse resulting from the entanglement of strong, contrary emotions. The earliest instance the *OED* provides is from Lydgate’s translation of the *History of Troy*: “To gape and loke as it were in a mase” (“amaze”). Philosophers and literary theorists, beginning with Plato and Aristotle and continuing with Albertus Magnus, Minturno, Robortello, Castelvetro, Guarini, Fracastoro, and Tasso focus on the cognitive aspects of amazement that give rise to questioning and may arrive at knowledge. It may refer to an endpoint, the solution of a mystery, or gazing upon the splendor of a complex process unveiled. However, even these philosophers cannot disentangle amazement from the bodily experience of many emotions simultaneously or in a confusing, consecutive whirl. Romance narratives connect all of these meanings. First there is terror and cognitive impasse, which repeatedly revisit the protagonists. Exercises of the imagination, experienced as dreams or fantasy scenarios, follow this initial phase, attempting to find a world beyond the nightmare that preceded it. Cognitive bewilderment leads to more searching. Finally, there is a return to the senses, an awakening of the consciousness and the conscience that leaves the nightmare of the past behind. Unlike comedy, where the improbable coincidences that lead to a happy ending seem to happen in spite of the protagonists, in romance the characters earn their endings, and the conclusions offer an expansive view of the imaginative and emotional processes of psychological reconciliation.

The vast array of meanings that characterize early modern amazement has led to a critical confusion. It has been common to contaminate the meaning of one facet of amazement with that of another so that amazement means a shocked consternation and also the wonder that comes as a result of discovering a loved one thought to be dead. Just as easily, writers deploy various words for different facets of amazement—astonishment, stupefaction, admiration, and wonder—interchangeably as if they were more or less the same, not using a more precise version of amazement where appropriate.

As we pursue the history of this particular emphasis of Aristotle’s through the Renaissance, it is necessary to link together a group of words that are partially interchangeable: ‘wonder’ or ‘miracle’ (*thauma*), ‘admiration’ (*admiratio*), ‘astonishment,’ ‘marvel’ (*meraviglia*), ‘awe,’ ‘stupor,’ the unusual, the perfect, the sublime. Some of these terms are partly distinguishable because they divide into causes or effects. At its lowest level, the marvellous is merely that which holds our attention or interests us. Pontano in his *Actius* made *admiratio* mean ‘applause.’ At its highest level, it is practically an access to Godhead or direct intimation of divinity.

The difficulty in pointing out what amazement is makes a great deal of sense given that it is the pivotal experience of a genre that still continues to elude critical attempts to understand it.

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In practice amazement can mean different things, and signify varying levels of knowledge, perception, and emotion. Beginning with the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle focuses on amazement (here translated as wonder) as a cognitive process. The *Metaphysics* claims that wonder is the beginning of philosophical inquiry:

> For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and of the stars, and about the genesis of the universe. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of Wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders); therefore since they philosophized order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end.  

Wonder begins with a pragmatic desire to solve difficulties and then advances to theories explaining larger phenomena of less practical use. The more perplexing statement here is the idea that humans “philosophized order to escape from ignorance,” as if order itself were the goal of philosophy and a sufficient motivation to theorize—rather than “justice” or the “good life.” Aristotle relates order to knowledge, and to the pleasure of knowledge from revealing order, as Stephen Halliwell, an interpreter and translator of Aristotle, makes clear.

Wonder leads to a desire for order, in Aristotle, but its opposite, the irrational, also inspires wonder. In his *Poetics*, he makes claims for wonder not as a source of philosophy, but as the effect of the opposite—the irrational, that which twists logic to create an emotional effect. Aristotle admires the use of *paralogism*, or narrative deception, in epic, but not tragedy. Paralogical devices are typical in romance: In the Sophistic *Elenchos*, Aristotle shows seven ways of constructing *paralogisms*. Hermogenes enumerates four ways in which poets customarily lie: “fabeling of early times; changing men into other forms—Cadmus into a dragon, Tiresias into a woman or man…having animals speak; using hyperbole…” (Cunningham 111). Wonder here is about the search for emotional wisdom, which can be at odds with reason’s revelation. Indeed, even in Aristotle, wonder leads to mythological wisdom or to philosophical systematization is equally prized. The unknown forces responsible for complex natural phenomena and events create wonder, but myth has the same effect on the imagination. Aristotle here shows that our discernment of mythological cycles, archetypes, and stories with an

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20 Halliwell, Stephen. *Aristotle’s Poetics*. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1998. Stephen Halliwell’s analysis crosses over with some of what I am proposing here. However, in his understanding of Aristotle, the emotions are always meant to be managed by a cognitive understanding: “Aristotle conceives of the tragic emotions not as overwhelming waves of feeling, but as part of an integrated response to the structured material of poetic drama: the framework for the experience of these emotions is nothing other than the cognitive understanding of the mimetic representation of human actions and character” (Halliwell 173-4). Particularly as relates to wonder, he writes, “wonder becomes a link between the tragic emotions, on one side, and our understanding of the structure of a dramatic action, on the other. Wonder itself does not seem to be simply identifiable either with the particular emotions elicited by tragedy, or with the process of understanding: yet it has both an emotional and a cognitive significance, in that it is felt alongside—as part of the same experience as pity and fear, and offers a challenge to the mind which, ideally, stimulates and leads on to comprehension or knowledge” (Halliwell 75).

21 Cave, Terence. *Recognitions: a Study in Poetics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. 42. “Homer, says Aristotle, is a master of the art of telling lies…the ‘lie’ being a lapse of narrative logic, a deception perpetrated on the reader. Paralogism is the device by means of which the lie is passed off; it is defined as an argument in which the reader is fallaciously induced to infer the truth of the antecedent from the truth of the consequent; or, to put it another way, to suppose that if p implies q, the presence of q implies the presence of p.”
explanatory power (regardless of their scientific “truth”) makes the lover of myth also a lover of wisdom. Literature will transfer this desire for wonder emerging from the irrational (improbable coincidences, divine intervention, etc) into a moment of recognition in which the pattern of experience come to light; but, most importantly, an emotional process comes to an end.

Albertus Magnus’ commentary on Aristotle amplifies the emotional aspect of wonder, and explains how emotion affects the soma, or body. In doing so, he connects wonder to fear and terror. The focus on bodily change, emotional affect, and the pressing need to know contributes to early modern physicians’ theories of trauma later:

Now, wonder is defined as a constriction and suspension of the heart caused by amazement at the sensible appearance of something so portentous, great, and unusual, that the heart suffers a systole. Hence wonder is something like fear in its effect on the heart. This effect of wonder, then, this constriction and systole of the heart, springs from an unfulfilled but felt desire to know the cause of that which appears portentous and unusual: so it was in the beginning when men, up to that time unskilled, began to philosophize—they marvelled at certain difficulties, which were, as a matter of fact, fairly easy to solve.”

While Albert the Great still privileges the intellectual process of solving an enigma, the language he uses is of the body and the emotions. The desire “to know” is invested with mystery and portent, and the effect on the heart is shock. Thus, Albert the Great helps to clarify what Aristotle leaves inchoate: the solution of the “portentous and unusual” is also the resolution of a psychological shock. The fulfillment of the desire to know comes out of a moment or moments of recognition (anagnosiris), which in tragedy produce destructive knowledge. Toward the end of romance, I would propose that the ubiquitous amazing recognitions we see demonstrate how “traumatic and artistic kinds of knowledge conspire to produce their own mode of recognition,” which are not of an intellectual, but an inextricably emotional and cognitive nature. They are the fulfillment of a desire “to know,” and, therefore to be launched into a process of amazement that includes terror and pleasure, falling asleep and coming back to consciousness.

In tragedy amazement is strongly related to the shock of punishment for injustice or blindness. Although there is an element of chance or destiny, characters generally deserve what they get. Seneca’s The Trojan Women, an example of a tragedy that would have been available to Cervantes and Shakespeare, describes the relationship of terror to amazement in tragedy. In comedy, the characters respond with amazement to errors and unlikely coincidences that nevertheless result in the happiness of flawed characters. In romance, the conflict comes from forces that seem to be much larger than character defects—from fantasy and the sleep of

24 In New Comedy, “errors will finally succeed intrigue, as a climactic entrance dissolves misunderstanding, restores identity, and transfigures anagnorisis.” Miola, Robert. Shakespeare and Classical Comedy. The Influence of Plautus and Terence. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 156. Pamphilus, in Terence’s The Girl from Andros sums up how comedy depends on these devices, but also mocks them: “I can hardly control myself! My mind is in such a turmoil of fear, hope, joy, and amazement at this good fortune: it’s so great, so sudden!” The ridicule extends to the kind of coincidences that comedy pioneers and will be commonplace in romance. “And now the pair of them are making up some bogus story that she’s a citizen of Attica: ‘Once there was an old man in the import-export business; he was shipwrecked off the island of Andros; he lost his life’—and then was washed ashore and taken in by Chrysis’ father as an orphan child! Rubbish!” Terence. The Girl from Androse. The Comedies. Trans. Peter Brown. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 939, 219-223.
consciousness that has a life of its own. The strangeness of dream, of fantasies that belong to another realm or stage of life, invades the present. This continual return of the past, and the inevitable return to the past, follows the logic of dream rather than Aristotelian cause and effect.

Wonder, a form of amazement, which characterizes the endings of romance, is a reaction to the unveiling of the radically foreign—the strange—as now familiar, part of the home, and released of most of the dread and terror that the foreign elicits. I take *Alcestis* and *Iphigenia at Tauris* as offering a perspective on the intermixture of the strange and the familiar—the familiar or family becoming strange and distant, and the foreign and threatening appearing in the familiar. The trauma of betrayal by family is so crushing that it ruptures the text: in *Iphigenia*, her magical transport away from the site of violence, in *Alcestis* the descent into hell and the return with a veil. As hybrid tragic romances, these plays demonstrate how the trauma of the past can be addressed, and what role amazement plays as the emotion and cognitive state with which they conclude.

The Greek romance builds upon Euripides’ turn away from tragedy through the sudden flight from the event of betrayal: instead of a crescendo of violence, there are continual encounters with the threat of sexual violation. The object of desire recedes and rematerializes. *Aporia*, a psychological impasse or difficulty passing, coincides with escapist fantasies that are repetitive in nature. *The Golden Ass* describes a process of encounter and escape that produces amazement, amazement as an emotional state and also as an educational process that primes the protagonist for a final encounter. Structurally, Apuleius’ narrative maps this out as a story inside a story—the dreamy, interpolated core of Cupid and Psyche—within an episodic structure. Likewise, *The Golden Ass* provides images and fantasies of bodies sewn inside of other bodies, human sewn inside animal, the Platonic rational inside the appetitive. These images are meant to suggest how humans are imprisoned in a house of flesh, but they also symbolize a process that does not need to be allegorized, the structure of emotions and of memory. The traumatic core of early hurt and betrayal is contained in later memories. Wonder contains terror. The desire to know that Aristotle claims to be the beginning of philosophy also launches—not a cognitive process—but an emotional movement. Conversely, wonder as a heightened emotion, leads to an awakening of consciousness, thus cognitive movement. The structure of trauma and amazement are both about relations of embeddedness, an emotion in a memory, a memory in an emotion; a memory contained in another memory, and an emotion locked into a containing emotion. These relations are so complex and confounding that they seem at times impossible to discern, leading to further mazes and amazement. There may always be an “original” hurt that keeps generating fantasies, and romance shows us that there is no possibility of return to an Edenic innocence that precedes hurt. Past traumas will never be sufficiently redressed by their perpetrators, and tragedy is tragic in part because of the attempt to redress past hurts. These hurts are contained in the core of wonder: early fear and terror are embedded and contained in a dream that is larger and more conscious than the nightmares that it engulfs.

2. Tragic Genesis

In *The Libation Bearers*, a servant utters the oracular words: “The living are killed by the dead!” Clytemnestra responds, “I know what this riddle means./We killed by deceit and by

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deceit we die” (886-7). Clytemnestra misinterprets the import of these words, so focused is she on the process of retribution that she cannot see the existential context of it. Clytemnestra believes that now that her plot has been unveiled, she needs to act quickly or die as a victim to another’s deceit. However, the servant utters words that should be understandable to the play’s audience. The trauma wreaked on the living keeps them under the dead’s spell. They are amazed in the sense of paralyzed, numb, out of their senses. The dead are no longer physically present, but they continue to make their demands on the souls of the living, drawing them in to a cycle of retribution. The servant again exclaims, “Where is Clytemnestra? What is she doing?/ It is her neck on the block and Justice is poised to strike” (883-4). Here, the Greek for “strike,” πεπληγμένος, means, “struck with terror,”26 because in tragedy although justice may be served, the act of retribution nevertheless has the effect of striking with terror. Thus we see the Furies, who will not loosen their grip on Orestes’ imagination.

Although Clytemnestra may not understand the riddle, the audience perhaps does or will. She does not recognize the logic of retribution, but the servant cues the audience for a moment of amazement. Aristotle explains such moments that emerge when a riddle or a metaphor means something completely different from what one initially thought.

Most smart sayings are derived from metaphor, and also from misleading the hearer beforehand. For it becomes more evident to him that he has learnt something, when the conclusion turns out contrary to his expectation, and the mind seems to say, “How true it is! but I missed it.” […] And clever riddles are agreeable for the same reason; for something is learnt, and the expression is also metaphorical. And what Theodorus calls “novel expressions” arise when what follows is paradoxical, and, as he puts it, not in accordance with our previous expectation.... (Rhetoric Book 3, 11, 6, [6] J. H. Freese, 1926).

When the logic of retribution is interrupted, we are awakened out of its nightmare. The characters may be trapped by terror, but the tragedy offers these surprising cognitive moments whereby the audience may recognize the entrapping logic of tragedy. If trauma is a repetitive process that occurs through complete or partial blindness to its reality, then these moments allow the audience to be released from the spell.

In Seneca’s The Trojan Women, an audience of spectators, Greek and Trojan, victors and captives, witness the final traumatic strokes of the Trojan War. Seneca illustrates the spectacle of violence and the effect of terror or wonder on the audience in the deaths designed for the descendants of Priam. Polyxena and Astyanax are the focal points of a theatrical spectacle that produces further amazement for the audience. The theatrical symbolism of their deaths is enacted in falling from a great height or entombment. In the first instance, Andromache hides her son in his father’s tomb. After Astyanax is discovered by the Greeks, they escort him to the one remaining tower of the otherwise leveled city. They mean to push him off, but he takes the impetus to jump off himself. The wonder in the audience here arises out of the nobility and dignity they witness in Hector’s child. Because it is rare and unexpected, it imparts a sense of grandeur and even triumph, that even in the most terrifying instance of defeat—the hope of Troy crushed—a child overcomes the dehumanization of his victors. Turning back to Aristotle’s

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explanation of the power of cognitive surprise to jolt the imagination, rather than being consumed vicariously by the terror expected of a child being thrown from a tower, the audience is thrown off its natural course of thinking. Furthermore, the overpowering fury and vengefulness embodied by Pyrrhus comes up against the superior poise and nobility of the boy. However *ekplektik*, the fall also allows the audience to find their way out of paralyzing grief and traumatic benumbedness. It can have the effect of preventing them from becoming merciless themselves by elevating the possibilities of the human spirit.

Polyxena’s death is connected to her nephew’s for while he is taken out of the tomb to be killed, she is sacrificed on Achilles’ tomb.

Now horror/ stuns both Greeks and Trojans.

[...]

The whole crowd was dumbfounded...

[...]

...All are affected

By her courage in meeting death. She walks before Pyrrhus.

Everybody quivers with pity and wonder...  

She, too, urges the Greeks to complete their task, and pushes the axe on her head. Achilles’ tomb sucks up her blood, visually demonstrating the manner in which traumatic experience naturally becomes entombed. From its hidden place, it exerts its power on the perpetrators and the victims.

Both sides were weeping, but the Trojans wept fearfully, while the winners made their lament ring loud.

This was the way the sacrifice went. The spilt blood Did not pool over the ground: immediately

The savage funeral mound drank the blood. (Seneca 2010b, 1154-64)

The sacrifice of the young woman mirrors that of Iphigenia—and for the same cause, to agitate the winds again and put the wind back in the Greeks’ sails. The bookending of the Trojan War by the sacrifice of two young daughters, falsely being led to their weddings, demonstrates the mirroring quality of trauma. It is not simply that one trauma reproduces another that is recognizably a mirror of the first. The traumas are perhaps understandable only in relationship to each other.

The tomb represents the attempt to contain the terror of being sacrificed by the parents and the demands of the dead on the living. The tomb as wedding altar and the site of betrayal emerges in the *energeia* of Seneca’s description: the blood does not pool but is directly sucked up. Seneca’s chilling image of the hunger of the dead and the seduction of violence show just how hard it is to interrupt the cycle of trauma. Polyxena’s and Astyax’s actions provide a point of contrast for Andromache and Hecuba. Andromache becomes paralyzed by grief: “I am fainting, I am shaking, I collapse,/ my blood is overcome by ice, it begins to freeze” (Seneca 2010b, 623-4). Hecuba is first stunned and frozen, “[Hecuba], hearing the news, is stunned:/ her mind is overwhelmed by grief, she faints…”(Seneca 2010b, 949-50); later, Hecuba is consumed with fury and loathing. Both of these prospects dehumanize the victims, freezing their souls and making the person unrecognizable.

The mirroring tombs of traumatic experience illustrate the tendency of trauma to manifest in mirroring episodes. However, these episodes only reify terror, and bury us deeper in an

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imaginative quandary. In describing an amazement that allows the spectator to escape numbing and despair, Aristotle describes falling rather than entombment. In his example of the statue of Mitys falling on his murderer in the ninth chapter of *The Poetics*, Aristotle weaves in an instance of trauma into his discussion of the emotional effects of tragedy, pity and fear, and their relationship to wonder. The statue, a palpable symbol of the pressure of art to recognize an event and to attach feeling to it, interrupts the otherwise empty unfolding of life. Aristotle ties the feeling of wonder this show would inspire—a cognitive and emotional response to traumatic contingency interrupted—to fear and pity.

...Tragedy is an imitation not only of a complete action, but of events inspiring fear or pity. Such an effect is best produced when the events come on us by surprise; and the effect is heightened when, at the same time, they follow as cause and effect. The tragic wonder will then be greater than if they happened of themselves or by accident, for even coincidences are most striking when they have an air of design. We may instance the statue of Mitys at Argos, which fell upon his murderer while he was a spectator at a festival and killed him.28

The murderer is not “cured” of the spiritual blindness that leads him to kill, nor is he forgiven and absolved. How the murder happened, what provoked it, why it went unpunished, and even who committed the act, Aristotle leaves unexplained. The mystery of circumstances, however, underscores the enigma of violence; it also underlines the nature of trauma as an event, which is buried in darkness. The audience only knows about the murder because of a shocking event in the present, which points to a past that is only partially recognizable, but otherwise unknowable. Wonder here is a response to the trauma of violence—traumatic because it was unrecognized until the statue fell, and justice appeared to have been blind-sighted. The falling statue interrupts this occlusion of the event, and seems to reveal an “air of design”; the murder becomes recognizable through knowledge that comes as shock, even while forgiveness and renewal are kept out of reach.

The idea of the statue of a victim falling on the murderer of the person whom it depicts is such an unlikely coincidence that dialectical reasoning will reveal it to have been virtually impossible. However, the “probability” of it lies in its corroboration of the emotional and moral needs of the audience. The descent of the statue closes the narrative arc according to the law of psychic needs rather than the greater universal principle of contingency. One need not ascribe the wonder in this scene to a theodicy that becomes unveiled. Tragic wonder recognizes the revelation of injustice that had been occluded and meaningless. The audience’s *anagnorisis*, however, is recognition of violence, as it is revealed. This coming to consciousness is so cognitively and imaginatively powerful that it creates a supercharged emotion: wonder.

Aristotle’s overall emphasis in this seminal example on the dialectical roles of tragic audience, protagonist as character, and protagonist as spectator suggests that what is needed to create the experience of wonder specifically in tragedy is the act of spectatorship in community. Mitys’ murderer occupies a position in which various levels of watching and action overlap. First, he is the protagonist in a drama of retribution; secondly, he is a spectator watching a theatrical event; and, finally, he is the object of the audience’s spectatorship both in his role as a spectator and as an actor in his own drama. This example explains possibly why early tragedy internalized the protagonist/spectator/audience dialectic through the role of the chorus, which achieves varying levels of distance from the tragic spectacle, functioning sometimes as actor, as interlocutor, or as spectator. The choral role emphasizes the necessity of not only aesthetic

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mediation of traumatic action, but also the structure of layers that drama utilizes to witness otherwise unseen, free-floating trauma. Tragic wonder is an expansive communal response unlocked by the participation of various spectators. Through the act of witnessing in tragedy—choral witnessing, audience witnessing, character witnessing—trauma can be unlocked but not directly seen.

According to Stephen Halliwell, “[W]onder becomes a link between the tragic emotions, on one side, and our understanding of the structure of a dramatic action, on the other” (Halliwell 75). Because for Aristotle wonder is a cognitive process primarily whereby the spectator sees a structure of cause and effect unveiled, it connects understanding with strong emotion, and prevents tragedy from becoming simply “overwhelming waves of feeling” (Halliwell 173-4). Halliwell proposes that for Aristotle wonder “does not seem to be simply identifiable either with the particular emotions elicited by tragedy, or with the process of understanding: yet it has both an emotional and a cognitive significance, in that it is felt alongside—as part of the same experience as—pity and fear, and offers a challenge to the mind which, ideally, stimulates and leads on to comprehension or knowledge” (Halliwell 75). Toward the end of romance, I would propose that the ubiquitous wondrous recognitions we see demonstrate how “traumatic and artistic kinds of knowledge conspire to produce their own mode of recognition,” which are not of an intellectual, but an inextricable emotional and cognitive nature. They are the fulfillment of a desire to know and of a need for the suffering producing by initial shock to end. Fear, which structures the emotional experience of tragedy, invokes what is differentiated in the Greek as ekpleksis or katapleksis. Elizabeth Belfiore connects this shock, quite convincingly, to fear and to pity:

In the Poetics, recognition is sometimes said to arouse pity and fear and at other times to arouse ekplexis. Additional reason to believe that ekplexis is not an emotional effect separate from pity and fear is given by the close connection of ekplexis and wonder in the Poetics, the History of Animals, and On the Universe…[T]here is an affinity of sense between the two words. Wonder, moreover, is closely connected with pity and fear in Poetics 9…(1452a1-6). The logical connection…made here between events that are ‘piteable and fearful’ and events that have ‘the wonderful’ implies that tragic pity and fear include an element of wonder. In fact, this passage suggests that ‘the wonderful’ is equivalent to ‘piteable and fearful’ here, just as in Poetics 25 ‘productive of ekplexis’ is closely related to ‘wonderful.’ If this is so, ‘wonder’ is closely related in sense to both ‘pity and fear’ and ekplexis, which are in turn closely related in sense to each other. The evidence, then, favors the view that the term ekplexis does not refer to a separate emotional effect of tragedy, but to pity and fear, which include an element of wonder. (Belfiore 222)

29 Belfiore, Elizabeth. Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992. 218-19. “The term ekplexis is very similar in meaning to katapleksis in Aristotle and in Greek literature generally. Ekplexis, however, has stronger aesthetic and rhetorical associations. This term is used by writers other than Aristotle to refer to strong emotions, especially pity and fear, aroused by poetry and rhetoric. Gorgias (483-385 B.C.E.) was the first, as far as we know, to use ekplexis in connection with poetry. In the Encomium of Helen (DK B11) Gorgias states that poetry arouses ‘fearful shuddering and much-weeping pity,’ and he compares its effects to the ekplexis that causes soldiers to flee in panic. Ekplexis also refers to the emotional effects of drama in Aristophanes’ Frogs, where Euripides uses it to refer to the effects of Aeschylus’s poetry. Ekplexis is also used of intense emotion, especially fear, in the tragedies, and of the effects of poetry by Longinus, Plutarch, Demetrius, and the scholia” (Belfiore 218-9).
Consequently, in tragedy we can speak of the audience’s shock (*ekpleksis*), which is inseparable from the emotional experience of fear and pity. We can also speak of wonder (*thaumaston*), which though sometimes interchangeable with *ekpleksis*, nevertheless can also refer, as it does in the statue of Mitys smashing his murderer, to a meaning that emerges from a world intuited but never seen. This kind of wonder marks the fulfillment of a desire—a desire spurred by pity—to know. Our humanization through pity for the tragic protagonists’ *hamartia* and our fear of the potential for human destructiveness emerges in response to the tragic plot, and it is accompanied by a sense of a world that is opening—opening in the sense of the legibility of meaning. This, too, is a blow that produces a sense of vulnerability in the spectator, and also of compassion.  

While Aristotle uses the Mitys episode as an example of wonder, it also depicts shock—emotional and physical paralysis—that challenges us to specify what we mean by wonder—and whose wonder? Audience, implied spectators, or protagonist(s)? Aristotle uses both *thaumaston* and *ekpleksis* to describe a series of related, but nevertheless distinct emotions. T.G. Bishop explains, “Etymologically *thaumaston* related ‘sight, spectacle’, ‘gaze at, behold’ and a ‘a place for seeing, a theatre.’ On the other hand, *ekpleksis* is related to ‘a blow,’ to ‘strike, beat’… This derivation inscribes into the word itself a perception of struggle and violence, suggesting a deep phenomenological responsiveness to threat” (Bishop 30-1). Terence Cave also goes back to the Greek, and notes the two different terms to denote shock, on the one hand, and a more theatrical, communal variation of wonder. Of *ekpleksis*, he writes:

> The connotations of *ekplêxis* are rich. ‘Surprise’ is a tame and in many ways misleading equivalent, although it is often found in translations. Liddell and Scott give ‘panic fear’, ‘consternation’ (together with ‘astounding’, ‘striking with terror’, for the adjective *ekplêktikos*): these senses suggest a connection with the ‘fear’ of Aristotle’s famous ‘pity and fear’ formula. As the effect produced by *to thaumaston* (which may however in some contexts be a near synonym of *ekplêxis*), it suggests awe and amazement, but also implies the sudden impact of the marvellous event.

While Aristotle does use *thaumaston* in the case of the statue of Mitys, he varies his use between *ekpleksis* and *thaumaston* throughout the *Poetics*. In this particular case, unpacking the scenario reveals the distinction to be also one of distance: the statue is a petrified signifier of an eternally displaced signified, the dead Mitys, who can exist now only in the things that mediate him—language, art, stone. Mitys’ revenge marks the triumph not necessarily of the gods (although that has been the preferred interpretation), but of the potential of the signifier to transport meaning

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30 Hepburn, R.W. “Wonder” and Other Essays. Eight Studies in Aesthetics and Neighbouring Fields. Edinburgh: Edinburgh U. Press, 1984. 146. “A close affinity between wonder and compassion has been acknowledged by various writers. Where a human life is the object of wonder, there can be a poignant realization of both potentiality and fragility. From that view of humanity compassion can readily flow…To respect and compassion, as moral correlates to wonder, we could add gentleness – concern not to blunder into a damaging manipulation of another. The agent realizes the blinding effects of self-absorption, the misperception of others and others’ needs that can stem from it. […] From a wondering recognition of forms of value proper to other beings, and a refusal to see them simply in terms of one’s own utility-purposes, there is only a short step to humility. Humility, like wonder, involves openness to new forms of value: both are opposed to the attitude of ‘We’ve seen it all!’

31 Bishop, Shakespeare and the Theatre of Wonder. Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 1996. 31-2. Bishop’s thesis is that the audience participates in a “dialectical dynamic in which distance becomes a defensive projection which keeps threat away” and the “collapse” of this distance produces “wounding and knowledge at once.” Thus, *thaumaston* is part of a mediated experience which distances terrible knowledge and the emotion of terror in relation to a suddenly-acquired knowledge, while *ekpleksis* results from the “penettrative,” “wounding” effect of that recognition.

and emotion. As such, the scene creates a sense of wonder because it uses art to evoke not only what is absent, but also what is unrecoverable. This elicits an emotion because it is suggestive of worlds beyond our own, which may in fact negate the contingent meaning of quotidian reality. But from the viewpoint of the internal spectator, not only the murderer at the festival, but also Mitys as petrified statue, no longer capable of living in the flesh and blood, the scene is literally one of ekpleksis. The statue symbolizes the petrified state resulting from total shock, and it literally is the product of shock; blows of the hammer and the chisel have sculpted the piece of art. Of course, Mitys’ murderer also dies beaten by a fatal blow during the very act of watching. Thus, the scene literalizes the capacity of the shocking spectacle to stun the spectator not only into paralysis, but also to death. The overall wonder—thaumaston—produced by the event, however, suggests that the same event exists on various spatial levels, which constitute the difference between shock and wonder. Aristotle’s illustration of wonder here intimates the proximity and distance between death, shock, and (at the furthest spatial and temporal remove from the scene) wonder.

Returning to the example of Mitys, we see that the motion of the falling statue literalizes the power of energeia as motion. It has the power of returning life into something dead (stone), and making it an agent of change. The emphasis on movement in Aristotle’s discussion of amazement from the blow that paralyzes to the energeia of the spectacle that prompts pity is an essential part of katharsis. The theatre allows this movement of emotional energy by creating distance.

Like wonder, pity occurs if the subject recognizes the distance between himself and the suffering individual. In Book II, chapter 8, sections 70-77, Aristotle observes that while a certain level of identification—subjective merging with different aspects of the object—is necessary, that complete enmeshment crosses the line between pity and absolute dread. People “pity those like themselves in age, in character, in habits, in rank, in birth,” but not if the person is too close, as in the case of “Amasis, [who] according to reports, did not weep when his son was led off to death” (Rhetoric 155). On the other hand, he does weep for a friend reduced to poverty, “for the latter was pitiable, the former dreadful; for the dreadful is something different from the pitiable and capable of expelling pity and often useful to the opponent; for people no longer pity when something dreadful is near themselves” (Rhetoric 155). Extreme terror indicates not just the proximity of annihilation, but also an overwhelming of the subject through suffering. Pity, then, like wonder, requires a level of attachment through identification, but the relationship cannot be too close.

Distance in the form of historical time has an analogous function. Aristotle acknowledges that suffering which took place thousands of years ago or is predicted to take place thousands of years in the future cannot move the subject because he either does not remember the events or he cannot anticipate them. This distance can be bridged, however, through the gestures, clothes, and signs of the piteous scenario, which makes it feel imminent. The representation gives the feeling of the scene being before the eyes, but it creates the necessary distance to allow the spectator to feel it without being overwhelmed:

necessarily those are more pitiable who contribute to the effect by gestures and cries and display of feelings and generally in their acting [hypokrisis]; for they make the evil seem near by making it appear before our eyes either as something about to happen or as something that has happened, and things are more pitiable when just having happened or going to happen in a short space of time. For this reason signs and actions contribute to pity; for example, the clothes of those who have suffered and any other such things, and
words and any other such things of those in suffering; for example, of those on their deathbed; for all such things, through their appearing near, make pity greater. (*Rhetoric* 155)

Were the described pitiable scenario to become real it would run the danger of inspiring dread or terror rather than pity. Therefore, the subject seems to needs the safe distance of the act being a *fait accompli*, while at the same time undergoing the illusion of immediacy. Likewise, Aristotle emphasizes the mediated nature of the suffering of others through the reference to the “clothes and other such things.” Aristotle refers to the greatest threat to the human subject, annihilation, but again, the reference is to things several times removed, the report of the words of those on their deathbed.

If terror, as in the example of Amasis, can paralyze the emotions and stunt the individual, the theatre allows the possibility of re-imagining the traumatic episode. The fear the audience feels is residual from an initial trauma; the pity is what frees. The theatre reenacts trauma through the representation and the experience of the blow of *ekpleksis*. The distance implied by stepping back and experiencing the theatrical *thaumaston* is accompanied by reexperiencing the initial fear and by pity.

Because of the influence of Aristotle’s *Poetics* during the second half of the sixteenth-century, there was a focus on the connection between wonder and knowledge. Cave summarizes this neatly in the thought of Robortello, Piccolomini, and Riccoboni, for whom an incident that arouses wonder causes the audience to go over all the verisimilar events, and note a sequence of events of probabilities coming to fruition: “The source of wonder is the unexpectedness and apparent implausibility of an incident nevertheless seen to arise from the preceding action” (Cave 58-9). Here we see the Aristotelian emphasis on pleasure arising from learning and the probable improbable.

Respecting Aristotle’s insistence on the necessity of the verisimilar in producing wonder, Francisco Cascales emphasizes the element of divine justice in the event:

Causan admiración las cosas que suceden sin pensar, o porque creemos venir de la mano de Dios, o de su propio movimiento, como fue cuando en Argos, cayendo la estatua de Micio, dio sobre un hombre que avía muerto al mismo Micio. Y aunque el suceso pareció ser a caso, con todo esso imaginó no aver sucedido sin fundamento, sino por permision divina, para castigar al homicida. Assí que gallardean la fábula en grande manera cosas que fuera de la imaginación y esperanza aacaecen maravillosamente.”

When Cascales recapitulates that the marvelous can occur either by “fortuna,” “caso,” or “destino,” he really is only talking about two possibilities, contingency or divine providence. Further, the language he uses reveals a Tomistic tableau where “su propio movimiento” could refer either to the statue’s agency or to God’s issuing a “movimiento” that penetrates the revealed world. The fall of Mitys’ statue here has all the feeling of a religious revelation that exceeds the possibility of human imagination (“fuera de la imaginación”) and even of hope itself (“[fuera de la] esperanza”). Cascales leaves this without further amplification, but his vision of the Mitys incident adds a dimension Aristotle probably never imagined: the way in which God acts in this world to fulfill needs barely acknowledged and beyond all expectation.

Minturno’s *L’arte Poetica* (1564), written by the bishop during one of the councils of Trent, emphasizes that shock can be harnessed as part of a purgation of vices and a turning away from sin: this is both Senecan and Christian in its inspiration with a strong Counter-Reformation influence in the emphasis on the visual. The crescendo of passion, felt as pleasurable in the

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moment, has a purgative effect on the audience. Finally, through the well-chosen word coupled with a solemn weight of feeling, the tragedian drives emotion, bringing the audience into a state of wonder: “…con empito di parole, e con grave peso di sentimento desta nell’animo passione; & inducelo à meraviglia, così spautentanto come à pieta mouendo.” Here the distinction between *thaumaston* and *ekpleksis* would be particularly useful, since for Minturno the tragic actually moves the audience to piety through fright, or so he hopes. While delight facilitates instruction, fear spooks the spectator into moral rectitude. No doubt it is Aristotle’s illustration of *thaumaston* in the falling statue of Mitys that Minturno has in mind. In relation to tragedy, Minturno conceives of *thaumaston* as an experience very much like stupefaction, the bodily reaction to terror. The emotional charge achieved by the audience in watching the tragic theatrical event unfold empties the bodies of these emotions, and the fear generated makes the audience more receptive to a just way of acting.

3. ‘Amazement Beyond Hope’ in Euripides’ Romances

We have discussed the way that trauma manifests itself in tragedy. Closely related to traumatic experience, the specific forms of amazement common to tragedy—*ekpleksis* and *thaumaston*—are responsible for reifying trauma in tragedy. *Thaumaston*, on the other hand, is related to a cognitive shift that allows the spectator to understand tragic action as “more than grim, desolate and crushing. Some positive value is affirmed, even in a rare and intensified form, precisely in and through the human response to the revelation of the dysteleological side of the world. That value should be thus realized in the very shadow of its imminent annihilation—there, of course, lies the ground of wonder.” Thus far, the potential of amazement has been limited to the tragedy where terror can be transmuted into wonder through the distancing of spectatorship. For Renaissance literary theorists, wonder in tragedy recognizes that an element of justice can manifest itself through divine agency. However, *ekpleksis* can be part of an aversion therapy to prevent spectators from destructive behaviors and offer the possibility of change—transformation that is generally not offered to the tragic protagonists themselves.

This next section will turn to Euripides’ tragedies to identify the features that are picked up in romance. *Alcestis* and *Iphigenia at Tauris* turn around the tragedy by amplifying the role of amazement. Of course, the plays accomplish this through plot devices, including the principle of supernatural intercession, miraculous escapes, trial with rewards, wearing disguises consciously or inadvertently, and separation from then reunion of the family. However, these devices can also be found in tragedies: *Heracles* is a good example of a play that incorporates all the plot devices of romance, but the outcome is that he goes mad. The punishment of the hero highlights the importance of observing the way that the story handles amazement. The *ekplektik* shocks that the play introduces—in Heracles, the descent into hell connects it to *Alcestis*—work on the imagination strongly. Tragedy envisions an amplified form of amazement, *thaumaston*, which distances the spectator. Aristotle illustrates the importance of distance in the example of Amasis; the spectator must be able to feel emotion without being drowned in terror. In the experience of amazement, the romance incorporates feelings from different stages of life: an overwhelming shock and feeling of being devoured from an earlier stage. When the adult child meets its family again, the process of distancing that separates amazement as stupefaction from

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amazement as wonder can be negotiated. Alcestis’ descent into hell plunges her into direct contact with these annihilating forces. The reaction of Admetus when she returns demonstrates how this panic fear becomes a more bearable thaumaston.

Aristotle articulates “longing” as bridging the subject from a displaced object of desire. In the tragedies above, the dead kill the living. In the tragic romances that follow the relationship to the absent is replaced with longing. This longing also explains why amazement as terror feels like something else when the absent “piece” is restored. Wonder contains an element of longing, or desire, for that which is absent and is then restored. Longing brings together hatred, terror, and fantasies of revenge from an earlier stage of life, with idealization and unquenchable desire from a later stage of life. Freud describes this collision of contrasting perspectives about the object of desire. From a later stage comes “overvaluation” and from an earlier, demonization of its characters—what I later describes as the collision of two stages of life. In the wake of disappointment and hurt, the child longs for a larger-than-life parent. For Freud, “the motive of revenge and retaliation, which was in the foreground at the earlier stage, is to be found at the later one” (“Family Romances” 299-300). However, this revenge revolves around the fantasy of nobler, more powerful parents, rescuing him from the flawed, hurtful parents. What is key here is the idea of parental villainy, power, and idealization. The existence of these extremes signals different stages of life, and, indeed, the romances that follow seek to reconcile discordant perspectives from different stages of development. The child sees the betrayal by the parent as crushing and terrifying, and replaces this with an idealized vision.

The desire for the idealized version of the parent and also the residual terror from the traumatic memory of early hurt, combine in the reconciliations at the end of these plays. The reconciliation fulfills a longing for the return of the object of desire, but not as the traumatic visitation of the past. The child does not long to be entombed by the dead parent, or the parent’s enemy (which are psychologically the same anyway). When Alcestis returns to Admetus from Hades, she allows Alcestis to overcome the shock of his own betrayal by his parents through the fulfillment of longing for the absent lover. Orestes finds his idealized father in Phoebus and Iphigenia her mother in Artemis. But Orestes and Iphigenia must reencounter their past through each other. The siblings mirror the trauma of their past to each other. When they come together in wonder, they overcome terror and betrayal by their parents, always fearing that this present reality may be unreal and the trauma of the past instead represent reality.

Admetus’ reaction to Alcestis return is, we can assume from Heracles’ gentle injunction to “be brave,” one of ekplektis. He commands Admetus to “Reach out your hand and take the stranger’s.” In this closure, the husband must be chastened to reach out his hand to somebody whom he doesn’t know anymore. His fear, desire, and ignorance separate him from the wife from whom he has been estranged, underscoring the loneliness of the individual not only in facing death, but also in reunion. The other represents mystery, another one of the “forms of what is unknown” (Alcestis 1156) in a world in which we find ourselves stripped of any real knowledge; the chasm seems to be bridged only by compassion. On a stage in which the characters all become unfamiliar, eerie, opening onto the vastness of an infinite universe, infinitely incomprehensible, the only shred of certainty is this love and this return.

The end of the *Alcestis* is unlike the end of the Renaissance romances we will encounter in the Christian tradition because the universe hasn’t been humanized and shrunk to benevolent forces. Rather, human love and human frailty are underscored, and what the audience is left feeling is something like fear and hope, isolation and communion. Admetus exclaims, 

Gods, what shall I think! Amazement beyond hope, as I look on this woman, this wife. Is she really mine, or some sweet mockery for God to stun me with? (*Alcestis* 1123-5)

Admetus experiences a feeling that is “amazement”—surprise, shock, joy—at looking at his wife, as she really is, that is, in the act of returning. He experiences himself beyond his normal comfort, outside of the normal. This sense of amazement seems to reveal the veiled specter first as stranger, then as woman, and, finally, as wife in a process of becoming by returning to him. We experience the protagonist feeling his identity coalesce in this recognition of the other as utterly strange and unknowable to the other as partner, that is, the other side of the self, which is also unknowable. This movement from bewilderment and fragmentation to an emotional recognition and connection occurs during the process of amazement.

In contrast, Admetus refers to the fear that the return of his wife may be “some sweet mockery for God to stun me with.” In this, we see the kernel of terror staging its return as paranoia. Earlier in the play, Admetus’ parents betray him by refusing to sacrifice themselves to death for him. Then, he hands over his wife to Dis in his place. In the midst of the mystery of reunion, we have an experience of isolation, of loss—in short, of the terror of having been betrayed and hurt, which echoes the earlier, overwhelming childhood terror. Faced with the brutality of his unknowable self and the mysterious God, who chastens by stunning (*Alcestis* 1125), Admetus seems to be immobilized by *ekpleksis*. Not in opposition, but one containing the other, *ekstasis*, which is marked by the hope for the return of the other, of the return of the self, and a fulfillment of the desire for a more meaningful universe, also contains a kernel of trauma: memory of shock, marking the ascendance of terror, brute force, and meaninglessness. From the perspective of the audience, Admetus, who has been running away from the horror of the uncertainty of death, symbolizes one side of amazement, that which is closest to being stunned. On the other hand, *Alcestis* creates a sense of amazement as wonder: there is a residual terror in her anonymous emergence from the underworld at the end of the play, but she also humanizes the world through love. Her journey out of hell is a personal journey for a specific family, but also signals a path—an emotional and mythological trajectory—accessible to all. Thus, we move from amazement as terror and being stunned to amazement as a combination of fear, fulfillment of longing, and exultation at the human spirit.

*Alcestis* describes a household overwhelmed by grief, and also amazed by its matrons’ spirit. The maid reveals to outsiders, “You shall be told/Now how she acted in the house, and be amazed/To hear” (*Alcestis* 156-8). In contrast, *Iphigenia in Tauris* begins with a grief that is crushing, a traumatic shock that shuts down the capacity to feel or empathize. Terror, then, rather than facilitating cognition, actually temporarily disables it. Iphigenia admits:

Now, where my heart was, there is only stone.

[...]

Unhappiness, O friends, can harden us
Toward other sorrow harsher than our own.38

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Not just unhappiness, but the memory of trauma revisits Iphigenia: “My father held the sacrificial knife./I live it all again” (*Iphigenia* 360-1). It matters not that in Euripides’ other play about her Iphigenia takes on the role of Astyanax or Alcestis by embracing her doom. Her memory is of a betrayal, and the shock and terror of it cause it to come back to her. Artemis rescues her, and in doing so becomes both the idealized and the wicked mother. She demanded the sacrifice and thus provoked the terror, and Artemis also deluded Agamemnon into thinking he murdered his daughter. At the same time, Artemis plays the role of the savior, providing the escape that in romance follows on the heels of trauma. The goddess of chastity orders the sacrifice of the daughter at what is supposed to be her wedding. The tragedy links the terror of sacrifice with sexual consummation, which is imagined as a sexual violation. In a marvelous act that mimics dream, Artemis bifurcates reality.

The blow would have been struck—I saw
The knife. But Artemis deceived their eyes
With a deer to bleed for me and stole me through
The azure sky. (*Iphigenia* 27-9)

On the one hand, Agamemnon believes that his daughter died and he bears the guilt. On the other hand, Artemis has saved her, but she has been separated from her family and forced into a life of repetitive ritual. One cannot help but think forward to the repetition that becomes a hallmark of Greek romance, Renaissance romance, and the early modern psychological apparatus that recognizes repetition after trauma. Freud will notice this repetition, and it will force him to abandon the idea of a cathartic recognition that resolves the traumatic past. In his chapter on Freud’s analysis of a novelistic character, Gradava, Terence Cave explains that Freud pinpointed a specific moment of traumatic recognition. Once Gradava recognizes the trauma, she can move on. However, “Freud’s reflections on psychic and psychoanalytic narrative will in later years dwell increasingly on the theme of repetition, an emphasis which by its very nature makes the possibility of a definitive ending—a full recognition and consequent cure—more remote and problematic.”

The sacrificed and then abducted Iphigenia, in her new role as vestal virgin to Artemis on a remote island, literally repeats the same rituals until her brother arrives there.

The image of the “bright, radiant” (λαμπρός) sky is the veil that separates realities and signals the *ekstasis* of being “carried away” (ἐκκλέπτω). While there is a ‘final’ recognition in romance, it is, as Prospero acknowledges, a temporary stasis in the repetitive process of coming to consciousness and falling asleep again. On the other side of this poetic “azure,” or “bright, radiant” veil, the deer—the animal form in which Artemis often appears—serves as the sacrificial substitute for Iphigenia. The divine logic of demanding sacrifice and then offering a manifestation of divinity for sacrifice, the deer, prefigures the soteriological interpretation of Jesus’ crucifixion. Frye will claim that the Christian version of this paradigm provides the basis for romance, but it is significant here that it manifests an important move in romance even before Christianity. The tricky logic of a savior that has created the demand for sacrifice and thus manufactured the need to be saved undermines the autonomy of the protagonist. However, Greek tragedy has already constructed a cosmos in which forces outside of oneself have created the circumstances of tragedy, regardless of *hubris* or *hamartia*. In early modern romance, these

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become psychological or historical forces, mediating the divine. In Freud, they are psychic forces, which have a demonic, horrifying force of their own. In the model of the persecutor as savior resides an enigma so perplexing that it requires a continual rehearsal of the past to try to recognize it. Traumatic repetition of the past and escape respond to each other antiphonally, and this pattern repeats itself. Emotionally this translates as the continual wounding of *ekpleksis* and the corresponding numbness and paralysis, or the *ekstasis* of trance.

Artemis’ scheme—to demand sacrifice and then to provide the escape—centers on the normative ritual of marriage. In the image of the cruel, demanding goddess, we see the continuation of a motif in Greek tragedy and in romance later, the powerful, evil queen: Clytemnestra, Phaedra, Medea, Helen, Hecuba—even Jocasta, who is unwittingly evil. The divine lineup includes Hera, Venus, and Artemis. This Greek tragedy conflates the evil, divine queen with the benevolent divine savior in the figure of Artemis. Christianity includes the same splitting of the traumatizing mother, but it is screened by her division into a masculine Devil and a feminine Madonna. The Greek paradigm eliminates the screens and therefore allows us to see the same parental figure is both evil and a savior.

An evil fate suddenly shifts into a salvific reality, and this abrupt change is ascribed to the gods, who make knowledge unattainable until the time is ripe for it to be revealed. Pylades divulges the mystery that the masters cannot understand.

I shall obey your will, though not my own;
Shall build your tomb in Hellas. Your heart knows
That it shall hold you closer in your death
If death it be. Gods, in mysterious ways,
Gods, in mysterious ways,
Never explaining, mask the face of life,
Behind what looks death, disguising life,
And then revealing it. (Iphigenia 715-23)

Pylades’ statement appears to be a formulaic restatement of the ongoing aphorism in tragedy that things turn out differently than expected and that reality often does not correspond to reality. At the end of *Medea*, for example, the chorus comments, “Many things the gods/Achieve beyond our judgment. What we thought/Is not confirmed and what we thought not god/Contrives. And so it happens in this story.”

In *Hippolytus*, Phaedra’s defeat by her desire, her subsequent lies, and Theseus’ credulity, manifest in the sudden emergence of a leviathan that shatters the false reality of dissembling. The Messenger reports,

As we looked toward the shore,
Where the waves were beating, we saw a wave appear,
A miracle wave, lifting its crest to the sky,
So high that Sciron’s coast was blotted out
From my eye’s vision.

That which was hidden now becomes palpable and symbolized in the disturbance of nature. When the wave obscures the coast and reaches the sky, divine agency working through nature strikes the human eye and heart with an *ekplektik* shock. What seemed unimaginable, to use lines from *Medea*, “god contrives.” Pylades’ statement is different from what we find in

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Hippolytus or Medea, however, because he doesn’t simply claim that reality may be different from appearances. He claims that there is life behind what appears to be death, and that deferring judgment (unlike what Theseus does) may provide an escape.

The ending of Iphigenia at Tauris, like the conclusion of the Alcestis, brings the meaning of escape back to a familial context. Divinity demanding blood sacrifice and then rescuing the sacrificed daughter presents a cognitive and emotional quandary—a particular kind of traumatic amazement. The enigma in Iphigenia in Tauris is dramatized as an unexpected turn in the plot. Thus, what is incomprehensible as dialectical discourse (how can the persecutor be the savior?) becomes a pleasurable pivot away from tragedy. By diverting attention from irresoluble double nature of the parental symbol as both evil and salvific, the recognition of Orestes by Iphigenia functions as a screen. Iphigenia recognizes her brother, and thus avoids sacrificing him to the goddess. The scene is emblematic of traumatic repetition because it mimics the scene of her own sacrifice by Agamemnon, except that it puts her in the role of the perpetrator. On closer observation, however, this perpetrator status is an illusion because Artemis has saved her and forced her into this position. She becomes a symbol of the combination of passivity and violence following a traumatic event. Iphigenia exclaims:

I am bewildered. And I cannot think
What I should say, my friends. I cannot think
Of anything but joy—except a fear
That he might vanish as he came. (Iphigenia 841-4)

The reunion with a sibling whom she almost killed through the repetitive ritual to which she has been consigned, elicits both joy and fear. The earlier terror, which was the result of betrayal by the evil mother, remains and binds with the later joy, which is Iphigenia’s own. The fear of imminent loss signals the traumatic memory of the previous sacrifice and escape.

Not just the suffering, but also the escape, frightens. It contextualizes the idea of escape in a pattern of punishment and rescue. However, this time is different because it relies not on a savior, but on the mutual recognition of brother and sister. This recognition moves the brother and sister out of the paradigm of rescue and escape and beyond repetition. When Iphigenia recognizes Orestes, she articulates the experience as a discovery: “I have come upon things that are beyond wonder, far from speech.”44 Wonder, here, is θαυμάτων.45 Referring back to the quandary posed by the savior as both good and evil, their mutual discovery allows the siblings to move out of the shadow of a traumatic idealization. At the end of Iphigenia in Tauris, we reach further still toward an exultant experience of amazement, beyond θαυμάτων. When the chorus, composed of “some women,” blesses the protagonists: “Go forth in bliss, O ye whose lot/God shieldeth, that ye perish not!” (Iphigenia 1490-1). “Others” (the chorus, the mass of onlookers, the inspired audience?) exclaim:

O great in our dull world of clay,
And great in heaven's undying gleam,
Pallas, thy bidding we obey:
And bless thee, for mine ears have heard
The joy and wonder of a world
Beyond my dream, beyond my dream. (Iphigenia 1492-6)

Here, wonder prefigures the blissful, ecstatic state that abounds in early modern romance, a state made possible by divinity, and offering communion with God. In order to transcend the traumatic pattern of this world of clay, the protagonists pass through betrayal and terror, and an emotional and intellectual quandary. Amazement allows them to see a world that is beyond it, indeed beyond the capacities of fantasies, but which require fantasy and intellectual quandary to arrive there.

4. “Sing[ing] themselves from the ground”: Amazement as Wonder

The Alcestis and Iphigenia in Tauris elevate the human spirit to being able to wrestle with god. In Iphigenia in Aulis or The Trojan Women, the most the tragic protagonists can do is to act with dignity in the face of death and not allow suffering to rob their souls. Thus, the model is Polixena not Hecuba, Iphigenia not Clytemnestra, Astyanax not Pyrrhus. In Alcestis and Iphigenia in Tauris, humans aren’t forever thralls of the divine nor are they always at the whipping post. The unexpected is not only a punishment; it can be a complete shift in reality that introduces hope and possibility. Thus, these plays end traumatic mirroring, and shift from terror and into wonder. Wonder marks the moment when life ceases to be a painful mirroring of trauma. Wonder spirits the soul to a different place, beyond understanding. As Iphigenia in Tauris’ final lines suggest, the emphasis is on dream and experiences that take one out of oneself—on trance and trance-port. Longinus and Plato champion this kind of transport. During the Renaissance, the very strong wave of Neo-Platonism in Italy and in England combines the rhetoric of the sublime with a poetics of divine furor to articulate a theory of literature that focuses on amazement as a vehicle for transformation.

In On Sublimity Longinus points out that rhetoric can spirit the soul into the divine. For grandeur produces ecstasy rather than persuasion in the hearer; and the combination of wonder and astonishment always proves superior to the merely persuasive and pleasant. This is because persuasion is on the whole something we can control, whereas amazement and wonder exert invincible power and force and get the better of every hearer. Experience in invention and ability to order and arrange material cannot be detected in single passages; we begin to appreciate them only when we see the whole context. Sublimity, on the other hand, produced at the right moment, tears everything up like a whirlwind, and exhibits the orator’s whole power at a single blow. (Longinus 1.4)

The description of a poetics of “sublimity” relies on the experience of ekpleksis and ekstasis, which “tears everything up.” The sublime has the power to dramatically shift the way of seeing, not through persuasion, but by bombarding the senses with magnificent ideas and grand images. Thus, Longinus prefers the Nile to a stream, a hyperbole to an understatement, and language that suggests otherness rather than the colloquial. Longinus uses ekstasis, ἔκστασιν, as “displacement.” This definition conveys the idea of transport as a displacement in space, time, and paradigm. Thaumaston, θαυμάσιον, is translated above as wonder and ekpleksis, ἐκπλήξει, as astonishment. For Longinus, divinity is not something that displaces reality in order to create tragedy, but it becomes an agent of renewal—displacement into a world that creates a sense of freedom. Literary genius is like the Pythian “divine vapour” (Longinus 13.2), and allows humans to experience themselves beyond the mundane. People have an “irresistible desire for anything which is great and, in relation to ourselves, supernatural” (Longinus 35.2). The desire for “anything which is great” is a hunger for experiences that create imaginative movement.

“beyond the boundaries of our surroundings” through “speculation” and “intellect” (Longinus 35.3). Thus, we see imaginative “displacement,” intellectual exertion, and heightened emotion combine to allow the soul to exceed the “dull world of clay” (*Iphigenia in Tauris* 1492).

Longinus mentions Plato (Longinus 13.2, 35.2), and the rhetorician calls on the philosopher to show how rhetoric can turn us away from the ordinary and the base. The principles of Plato, Longinus, and Aristotle come alive in the motif of the grasshopper that sings itself to heaven. Aristotle’s statement about misleading metaphors that cause one to say, “How true it is! But I missed it”\(^{47}\) continues with an example of an apophthegm from Stesichorus’ “The Grasshoppers.”\(^{48}\) In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle explains, “smart apophthegms arise from not meaning what one says, as in the apophthegm of Stesichorus, that ‘the grasshoppers will sing to themselves from the ground’” (*Rhetoric* III.11.6). In Stesichorus’s poem, the Locrians threaten the grasshoppers, “You villain vermin! [...] Your Trees I’ll fell, and then you may/In humbler quarters sing away!” (Stesichorus 23). The refrain scolds the Locrians:

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Hush, Locrians! Or far and near
Dwellings and Trees may disappear;
Then Grasshoppers, ill omènd sound,
Shall sing to You,—and from the ground. (Stesichorus 23)
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Aristotle means more than that this is a bit of a trick ending for the Locrians who are too philistine to appreciate the music. Aristotle connects the grasshoppers with the capacity of metaphor to abruptly shift patterns of thinking and deliver truth. This example has a Platonic sensibility. In *Phaedrus*, Socrates uses the grasshoppers as an example of the divine rendered material—specifically, of the Muses of inspiration who become cicadas.

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A lover of music like yourself ought surely to have heard the story of the grasshoppers, who are said to have been human beings in an age before the Muses. And when the Muses came and song appeared they were ravished with delight; and singing always, never thought of eating and drinking, until at last in their forgetfulness they died. And now they live again in the grasshoppers; and this is the return which the Muses make to them—they neither hunger, nor thirst, but from the hour of their birth are always singing, and never eating or drinking; and when they die they go and inform the Muses in heaven who honours them on earth.\(^{49}\)
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In this charming example, Socrates epitomizes his thinking about the descent of the divine into this world. In *Phaedrus, The Symposium, The Republic*, and the *Phaedo*, Plato describes the descent of the human soul into the terrestrial as a forgetting. When the soul “remembers” itself, when it awakens to consciousness, it can reclaim its rightful place as an immortal. The Muses here forget themselves in pleasure, but the result is not, as is usually the case in Plato, carnal perdition. “Ravished with delight” in singing, the process bridges the pleasures of the terrestrial with the divine. In *The History of Animals* (IV.6) Aristotle confirms that the grasshoppers have empty guts. Free of intestinal detritus and the necessity of eating, the grasshoppers symbolize the life dedicated to art. For Plato this is art that is free of guile or quotidian vices, which can be expressed in singing and delight that does not damage the soul. When grasshoppers sing to themselves from the ground, they transcend the vileness of the world, for Stesichorus was


rebuking the Locrians for their foul language.\textsuperscript{50} When the grasshoppers die to this world and “inform” the Muses, we see the fruition of the “good life” leading to immortality in the Platonic tradition.

Neo-Platonism seizes upon the contrast in \textit{The Phaedrus} between the pleasures of good poetry and chaotic carnal pleasures. Indeed, Phaedrus himself separates “the pleasures of discourse” from the “slavish,” and “bodily pleasures” \textit{(Phaedrus 62)}. \textit{The Phaedrus} makes an analogy between loving and poetic composition. The structure of the dialogue, which is first a discourse on love, and then a treatise on rhetoric and poetics, corroborates this. When the lover sees his beloved, he is “overcome with shame and wonder, and his whole soul is bathed in perspiration” \textit{(Phaedrus 58)}. The carnal detail of perspiration demonstrates the exertion that is needed to overcome the carnal, the side of oneself that would demean the lover through the demands of the flesh. The analogy between love and poetic discourse illustrates how poetry must also help the soul to overcome all that debases it and distracts from its return to knowledge of itself.

In both \textit{Phaedrus} and \textit{Ion}, Socrates emphasizes that art shows the individual “knows” in spite of limited conscious understanding. He ascribes this to a “divine fury,” and in doing so shows the necessity of vulnerability and passivity to receive the spirit. This is not just a question of the divine rhythm of the “dithyrambs,” \textit{(Phaedrus 44)} which connect it to the Pythian. In \textit{Phaedrus} and \textit{The Symposium}, dialectical reasoning comes to an impasse, and he can relay his notion of the soul’s return only by using metaphor and analogy. In \textit{ekplektik} amazement, we saw how cognition is interrupted and emotions are bottlenecked. Only after the shock, can the subject transcend this terror and arrive at something closer to ecstasy. After Socrates has shown \textit{Ion} that he does not actually \textit{know} Homer, but that he nevertheless can \textit{deliver} Homer, he concludes:

\begin{quote}
Now if you are an artist and….you only promised me a display about Homer to deceive me, you are playing me false; whilst if you are no artist, but speak fully and finely about Homer, as I said you did, without any knowledge but by a divine dispensation which causes you to be possessed by the poet, you play quite fair. Choose therefore which of the two you prefer us to call you, dishonest or divine.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

That Socrates has whittled this down to a choice between dishonest and divine is unexpected in its own right. Dishonesty means dissimulating things that one doesn’t know. In this case, it is a recognition that imitation happens in spite of ignorance—perhaps because of ignorance. On the other hand, accepting that the poet is infused “without any knowledge” but only divine will, recognizes that knowledge emerges out of revelation. The divine awakens the soul through its shocks, and the poet only need recognize and imitate. In these dialogues, Plato opens up the possibility that the soul can transcend the tragedies of the poets whom he has banished. Circumventing the logic of rage, repetition, and all the other emotions that Plato finds destructive, happens both through an exertion of the self—perspiration and toil. On the other hand, it cannot happen unless one allows oneself to come up against \textit{aporia}. Awakening the consciousness comes out of cognitive impasses. The unexpected turns of fantasy that metaphor activates function as a divine furor, or so the \textit{Phaedrus} and \textit{The Symposium} illustrate.

Neo-Platonist literary theories of the sixteenth-century raise poetry to the level of divine revelation. The genre that best demonstrates Neo-Platonic principles is romance, and these literary critics write prolifically about romance. The theories focus on the poetic devices that

\textsuperscript{50} The epigraph attached to “The Grasshoppers” is “To the Locrians on their use of foul language” (Stesichorus 23).
shatter the quotidian and allow the spectator or reader to make his ascent. This next section briefly surveys Neo-Platonic literary theory in order to identify the dramatic priorities and experiential hallmarks of Neo-Platonism: exceptional events, marvelous coincidences, novelty, and the creation of wonder. These theories draw upon Longinus’ emphasis on shock, magnificence of subject with a correspondingly elegant style, and the supernatural. Plato’s idea that poetic versification of rhythm can transport the divine also plays a large role. Finally, these theorists add the Aristotelian emphasis on the verisimilar to Plato’s notion that “reality” does not correspond to the quotidian. The strain of reading and writing exceptional poetry can help release the soul from the base and the familiar. However, that extraordinary reality needs to seem plausible. When Plato resorts at key moments in his dialogues to extraordinary metaphors, he opens the way for a theory of literature that pushes the limits of what is possible in order to shock its readers into new ways of seeing. Sixteenth-century theory always held up the principle of instructing while delighting from Horace and Cicero, but it also insisted on moments that were pleasurable and at the same time quite shocking or frightening. The use of literary devices to create these contrasting, heightened emotions creates an aesthetic of amazement.

The explanation of Neo-Platonism starts, paradoxically with Aristotle. He lays out the basis for what can be plausibly delivered to an audience without creating a fantastic reality that is merely a ridiculous escape. Aristotle differentiates in Poetics XXV between a “plausible impossibility” and an “implausible possibility,” the former being preferable, because it obeys our sense of the real if not reality itself (Poetics 63). The extraordinary must be plausible within a system of belief, as well, even if it is unlikely. For a contemporary audience, the pagan miracles would seem absurd, hence not marvelous. According to Castelvetro, exceptional events that defy reason but that fall within the realm of the believable are desirable:

> Et io dico, che le cose incredibili non possono operare maraviglia. Come, per cagione d’esempio, se io ho per cosa incredibile, che Dedalo volasse, non mi posso marauigliare, che volasse, non credendo io, che volasse. & similmente, se io ho per cosa incredibile, che l’essercito dei Greci, vbirdo i cenni d’Achille, cessasse da sedire Hectore non mi posso maruigliare, o che egli cessase da sedire Hettore, o che Achille solo il cacciasse.\(^{52}\)

Castelvetro’s example from The Iliad of Achilles chasing Hector while the troops stand apart versus the possibility of Daedalus flying suggest two limits to what is believable. The Homeric example is extraordinary, but certainly within the realm of possibility. Castelvetro no doubt chooses it because Aristotle refers to this example in the twenty-fourth chapter of Poetics as an example of the “irrational, on which wonder depends for its chief effects” (Poetics 32). At the other extreme is the mythological tale of a man flying. Castelvetro suggests that what is believable will depend upon the person reading. The proponents of the “irrational” as a means of producing wonder focus their attention on the manifold stylistic and ideological circumstances that make belief possible. For Tasso, the relationship of believability and wonder rest first upon an ideological foundation, true and false religion: “Dee dunque l'argomento del Poema Epico esser tolto dall'Istorie; ma l'Istoria, o è di religione tenuta falsa da noi, o di religione che vera crediamo, quale è oggi la Cristiana, e vera fu già l'Ebreaa.”\(^{53}\) Contemporary poets cannot fashion epics that inspire wonder if they rely on the pagan myths because these are not believable.

For Tasso, as for most Renaissance theorists and poets, novelty is a key component for

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producing wonder, both because it inspires admiration for the author’s ability and because
novelty makes things seem new again:

Ma di ciò si potrebbe nondimeno dubitare, perché se la meraviglia è de le cose nuove,
poteva parer meravigliosa la poesia d’Omero, ma non quelle tragedie le quali dopo tanti
anni trattarono de le medesime cose già divolgate per i Greci, e fatte famigliari a
ciascuno: se forse non le fece parer meravigliose un nuovo moda di trattarle, il quale,
come invecchiato con l’uso, non parve poi meraviglioso ne’ tragici che seguirono. (Tasso
15)

That wonder should arise from novelty is logical, given the connection between novelty and
surprise. The pleasure to be derived from novelty, while not explicit in this passage, was a well-
known tenant from the Classical and New oratorical traditions, beginning with Aristotle’s
Rhetoric. Tasso focuses in particular on the connection between literary ingenuity as the conduit
for novelty. It is not simply newness of situation, although that should be the aim of the poet, but
also novelty of expression, which makes the world new again. This revivification of the world
produces wonder.

In his theory of wonder, Tasso believes that the wonderful always brings delight, because
the delightful is wonderful. This is not just a tautology, but rather emanates from Neo-Platonism
adapted to literary theory. The wonderful reflects a world of ideas that correspond more closely
to a divine reality than the created world. Thus the pleasure corresponds to a movement of the
soul in longing back toward those things. This longing is related to the implacable force of eros
in Plato’s Phaedrus and to a lesser extent, The Symposium. In these dialogues, Socrates
describes the continual motion of return of the soul to a fulfillment, which it only dimly
remembers. Thus one of the greatest forces in humans, eros, can be simplified into a desire for
something which is no longer present; we are always looking for the dazzling original in the
faded copies: “everything is pleasurable for which there is longing…” (Rhetoric 92). This
theory of pleasure shares with Plato’s model a focus on the imagination as being in a state of
return.

Tasso emphasizes poetry as a medium for a return to a world that more closely reflects
the divine order—a place in which the divine infuses reality and produces marvels. The
audience derives pleasure from experiencing this return to the creator by means of the fantasy.
When poetry elicits the feeling of admiratio, it pushes the subject to reevaluate the world. He
writes, “Può esser dunque una medesima azione, e meravigliosa e verisimile: meravigliosa,
riguardandola in se stessa, e circonscritta dentro ai termini naturali, verisimile, considerandola
divisa da questi termini nella sua cagione, la quale è una virtù soprannaturale, potente ed avvezza
ad operar simili meraviglie” (Tasso 13). For Tasso, the marvelous renders legible the invisible
workings of a deity, who works both outside and inside the material world, through the temporal
and also beyond time. In his Pastor Fido, Battista Guarini renders this notion in verse:

But all these works so great, so wonderfull,
Which the blind world to blinder chance ascribes,
Is nothing but ce’estiall counsell talke,
So speake th’eternall powers amongsth themselues,
Whose voices though they touch not deafened eares,
Yet do the sound to hearts that vnderstand.54

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54 Guarini, Battista. Il pastor fido: or The faithfull shepheard. Translated out of Italian into English. London:
Meraviglia produces admiratio by making the world strange, highlighting its irresistible otherness, and then seducing us to ask questions. The marvelous is at the boundary between a world that routine and habit have stripped of the transcendent, and that which is shimmering with unclaimed meaning, the transcendent illuminating the fabric of existence, the invisible made visible…for an instant. The Poet’s images are fantasies, “thus named by the Greeks from light…as the power which is like light in illuminating things and revealing itself.”

Tasso argues that neither Plato nor Aristotle understood that these fantasies are part of the intellectual core of the soul, and thus for Tasso the poet is more akin to the theologian than the Sophist: he does not produce distractions, and he gets us to see the core of life. And the reason he prizes the ability to arouse admiratio as one of the loftiest goals of the poet, is that it is the most efficient vehicle for getting us to see these things with our interior eyes, in the same way as meditation with devotional art.

Tasso’s Neo-Platonism is behind his idea of the poet as shedding light on that which is invisible, and on levels of reality in which the imaginary is more real than that the material world. The marvelous, then, allows us to see the very real structures that bind the spiritual core of ourselves to the world surrounding it. The crux of this philosophy is in the otherwise cryptic statement, “Let [the Poet] try so far as he can to increase the credibility of the marvel without diminishing the light” (51-2), which equates meaning and the Real with Platonic light. The marvelous that corresponds to the reality of God’s world is channeled through light, while that which is spurious will diminish the light.

This Neo-Platonic vision of the marvelous as enabling a direct flight to the divine reaches its apex in writers such as Patrizi and Fracastoro in Italy, and Sidney, Harington, Puttenham, and Chapman in England. Fracastoro’s Il Navagero takes the form of a literary symposium, a congenial discussion among friends about, among other things, the proper subject matter of poetry, the goal of poetry, and on how poetry affects the poet and the reader. Echoing most other Italian literary theorists, Fracastoro’s character, Bardulone, recalls, “esser compito e fine del poeta dire le cose in modo da suscitare l’ammirazione” Another interlocutor, however adds to this, “Diceva perciò bene il Pontano che fine del poeta è di esprimersi in modo da suscitare l’ammirazione, ma bisognava aggiungere ‘assolutamente è secondo l’idea universale di dir bene’, per poter capire in che cosa il poeta differisca dagli altri che si studiano di parlare in modo conveniente. Questi imitano il particolare, cioè le cosa nuda com’è, mentre il poeta rappresenta non il particolare ma la semplice idea rivestita delle sue bellezze, ciò che Aristotele chiama l’universale” (Fracastoro 62). Unlike the orator, the poet does not simply move the emotions, but he must do so by representing the particular, dressed anew in its universal beauty. The poet must allow the reader to confront the world anew by creating an oeuvre that conveys the impact of universal ideas. The practical means of achieving this abstract aim is through literary structure: the correspondence of elements of versification to the ideas they represent (e.g., meter and rhyme), the arrangement of words, ideas, and dramatic events, the connection between events and ideas, ornamentation, and figures of speech (Fracastoro 73). Underlying the faith in structure is a mathematical correspondence between formal qualities of poetry with the universal principles of ideas. The poet who apprehends these is transported and conveys this ascent to the audience, who may follow his trajectory.

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Il Navagero uplifts poetic furor as the means of escape from the contingent self into the unchangeable world of ideas. This takes the form not of a contemplative act of composition, but of a participation in Dionysian frenzy:

Dopo che ebbe congiunto le bellezze delle cose e delle parole e si fu espresso con queste, il poeta sentì penetrare in sé una meravigliosa e quasi divina armonia a nessun'altra paragonabile; allora si sentì in certo modo tratto fuori di sè, nè potè contenersi, ma delirò come chi partecipa ai misteri di Bacco e di Cibale, dove risuona il flauto frigio e rimbombano i timpani. (Fracastoro 73-4)

Above we saw how T.G. Bishop referred to ekpleksis as a kind of “wounding” through knowledge, an irrevocable penetration of the soul with information that is powerful and other. Here the poet feels in himself a divine harmony that is felt as ecstasy. The use of meravigliosa in this context is significant because it suggests that the experience of transport, divine harmony, and delirium is constitutive of a response to meraviglia, or wonder. Just as there is a somatic response to the astonishing kind of surprise (spavento), so here Il Navagero records a bodily answer to harmonious arrangement; this mimics the reaction to the arrangement of music, which literally reverberates in the soma itself through the eardrums. An inspired formal arrangement of poetry reflects the divine, and has the power to truly touch the material through the body itself. The interaction between the divine and the created is violent, ekplektik, and transfigured by divine furor:

Di qui, amici, quel furoré di cui parla Platone nell’ Ione e che Socrate riteneva ispirato dal cielo. Ma non è alcun dio la causa di questo furore, si bene la stessa musica, piena di un certo grandissimo ed esultante rapimento, che agita l’animo che non sta più in sé, mosso dal ritmo e concitato da un estro violento, e produce ciò che sogliono provare gli estatici, invasi da stupore. (Fracastoro 74)

It is uncertain whether the disavowal of the source of the divine as the source of the furor is merely a conventional repudiation of the pagan pantheon (such as we see in Tasso, Castelvetro, Minturno), or whether art is being given ultimate authority here. We can, however, with certainty extrapolate that poetry is a source of transformation that comes from above (“il cielo”), shocks the psyche through a violent inspiration, and exults the spirits into rapture. This experience captures the many different meanings of “amazement” that we will see below. It invades the spirit with astonishment; shock becomes the occasion for an exultation of the spirit, an enlargement of the psyche. The furor, which strips the psyche and exposes it to the divine universals through the harmony of inspired literary form, allows the poet to participate in the divine: “Per questo furore i poeti si dissero divini e quasi toccati da un dio, e profeti” because they have turned the signifier of language into a reflection of the divine in the process of pointing to a signified, “il senso divino della parola, con cui anche gli dei si sono degnati di parlare agli uomini mediante gli oracoli” (Fracastoro 74). The disavowal of the gods with which this explanation began goes back to the divine, comparing poetry to the mysterious and frightening dialogue between Creator and creation through the oracle. Poetry as oracle is the highest and most accurate description of the position of inspired literature in Neo-Platonic discourse.

5. The Structure of Amazement in Early Romance

The Golden Ass claims a Neo-Platonic ideal, the end point of love within the framework of a cult of chastity. In fact, the text describes a process of awakening and falling asleep that
could continue at length if it were not for the extraordinary closure. This is like the “shock and dreaminess” that Geoffrey Hartman ascribes to literature in general, but that is especially true of romance.57 Hartman goes on to say, “Where there is a dream, there is (was) trauma” (Hartman). Hartman is interpreting Winnicott’s notion of the inevitably traumatizing nature of love in which trust in the idealized parent collides with the trauma of hurt.58 But it also applies quite broadly to romance with its continual returns to a wound and the return of the wounded.

In contrast to Northrop Frye who famously charted the structure of romance in terms that take in the full course of Christ’s life from the canonical and apocryphal Gospels59—a descent from a higher place, a descent to a lower place, an ascent from a lower place, an ascent to a higher place—I see the structure of romance in terms of an emotional process that begins in “shock and dreaminess” and continually returns to that experience: the return to the wounded and the return of the wounded. This process is not vertical, as the Neo-Platonists envision it, but horizontal. The paradigm that Greek romance establishes, and Apuleius embodies in his Latin prose, is of endless movement through a labyrinth. In Apuleius, the protagonist and the audience experience forms of fear and shock in the maze (amazement) of the picaresque parts of the novel. These cause a trance of return of the interpolated story of Cupid and Psyche and at the conclusion, through the ekstasis of intertwined desire and fear that constitute amazement. Hartman asks of the repetitions of wounding experience in this kind of literature, “Are they intensifying and incremental, or are they meant to soothe like rhythms do preventing in this way a renewed traumatization?” (Hartman). Traumatic repetition reifies shock and terror, and therefore should cause the protagonist to withdraw permanently into melancholy. However, traumatic repetition also bridges the kernel of terror with the past: “Something in the present, therefore, may resemble or (reassemble) something forgotten, as if there were channels along which memory returns like a flood that hides its source. This is where uncanny sensation of repetition or correspondence make themselves felt” (Hartman). Romance grows out of tragedy, but it never expunges traumatic terror. Because the wonder with which romances end harkens back to earlier traumas, romance is isotopic,60 always potentially about to devolve back into tragedy.

The story of Cupid and Psyche dramatizes the paralysis of the soul that results from terror. It then introduces the possibility of feeling and emotion, only to then take it away. The

58 “Winnicott’s observation that the ‘mother is always traumatizing’ is fundamental here: he means that within the child’s framework of basic trust, or idealization of a nurturing presence there are infinite chances to be hurt, and the greater the idealization, the greater the vulnerability. Since being integrated in the psychoanalytic sense remains a type of idealization, it cannot totally defend against this daily hurt, which can go very deep, as deep as childhood” (Hartman).
59 Frye maps the paradigm out fully in The Secular Scripture, but it is one he returns to in The Myth of Deliverance, Fables of Identity, and The Great Code.
60 The concept of the isotope was not published until 1913 by Frederick Soddy, and so would have been unavailable to most of the writers considered here. But the application of the idea to the concept of amazement is rich indeed. The OED defines it as “A variety of a chemical element (strictly, of one particular element) which is distinguished from the other varieties of the element by a different mass number but shares the same atomic number and chemical properties (and so occupies the same position in the periodic table); freq. used to denote any individual variety without reference to identity of atomic numbers (see quot. 1947 and cf. nuclide n.).” Etymologically, it is derived from the Greek isos, meaning equal and topos, a place. Even “stable” isotopes are believed to decay and return to the stable version of the chemical compound. Thus, the notion of great bursts of energy, and the compulsion to return to a different form over a period of time while still being “in an equal place” marks the dual natures of amazement: paralysis and flight, terror and ecstasy, progression and regression.
characters oscillate between stupefaction and bliss, and between ignorance and knowledge. But this is a process that continues until there is a climax akin to the end of *Iphigenia in Tauris* or *Alcestis*. The thematic and dramatic thrust of Apuleius’ *The Golden Ass* is toward a Neo-Platonic climax (although it is truly gnostic at its core) in which Lucius renounces curiosity and sexual lust. However, Psyche’s journey is less about ascent then it is about a process of terror and paralysis, on the one hand, and fantasy and escape, on the other. The story revolves around many of the archetypes and scenarios we have come across—evil queens both human and divine, the sacrificed daughter, the parity of marriage and funeral, for example. The story of Cupid and Psyche may serve as a mirror into how trauma polarizes personalities into persecutor and savior; and it dramatizes the attempts for release from the spell of repetition. However, the story must be seen in relation to the more picaresque elements of Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses*, the novel in which it is embedded.

In his *Anatomy of Melancholy*, Robert Burton refers to the story of Cupid and Psyche as if it were an autonomous text, and William Adlington’s 1566 translation advertises it separately in the title: “with an excellent Narration of the Mariage of Cupide and Psiches, set out in the. iii. v. and vi. Bookes.” These references serve to underline the story’s place as something outside of the main text, or above it. Either way of imagining it conveys the sense in which the text has two topographically distanced parts—internal and external. In a story that is about the protagonist’s response to the unreality of reality, Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses* illustrates the imagination’s movement between different loci within the text and within the body. In and out of suffering, back and forth between realities, in and out of the body, from one identity to another, between reason and unreason, the fantasy continually shifts between different imaginative loci. The cognitive and emotional correlative to this continual pivoting of the imagination is amazement.

As *The Golden Ass* unfolds, it becomes increasingly difficult and futile to try and distinguish the supernatural from the natural. The pattern of *The Golden Ass* is to follow a story of disbelief in a magical occurrence by a confirmation of that reality. The narrative, which Adlington calls the “this fable or feigned ieste” (Apuleius *ii*), is either superseded by the moral and symbolic levels, which are about transfiguration, or it functions as a counter reality. Adlington does not press the matter of these relations except to comment on the Lucretian delivery of this kind of truthful “figure” through “sweete and delectable matter” (Apuleius *ii*). Adlington justifies the transgressive material in *The Golden Ass* as the necessary bait to fulfill its higher moral and spiritual objectives; his use of the term “figure” conveys his vision of the allegorical imperative of the translation.

Although it can be argued that the text charts a Platonic ascent from fleshly to spiritual love, it would be a mistake to assume that it repudiates the world of magic and sensuality in favor of reason. Thessaly is a world governed by the patterns of the fantasy (repetition, recognition, escape) and heightened emotions (ecstasy, terror, lust, fury). These coexist with the more limited perceptions and observable moral limitations of conventional reality. Power is distorted, so that some characters find their ability to act in the world completely eroded (the man turned into a beast, for example) while the power of others is magnified through magic (the witches and the gods). At the end of the story Apuleius has escaped the infernal world to which

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he has gained entry by Fotis’ magic and become a member of the orderly, compassionate world of Isis’ cult. But the latter, too, is a world of magic, albeit one of a different kind with a contrasting intention behind it. I think it would be more accurate to say that that the marvelous is, from beginning to end, the necessary text to elicit the kinds of psychic transformation, which Apuleius, interpreted by Adlington, seeks to attain. As such, Psyche’s amazement at Cupid’s palace, standing open and unguarded, allowing free passage to it and away from it, is emblematic of *The Golden Ass* itself:

> amongst such great store of treasure, this was more meruelous, that there was no closure, bolte, or locke to keepe the same. And when with great pleasure she viewed al these things, she harde a voice without any body, that saide: Why doo you maruell madame at so great richesse? (Apuleius 46, P3v)

Psyche is amazed not only by “so great richesse,” but the fact that there is “no closure, bolte, or locke” to separate the interior from the exterior, representing the “richesse” of the fantasy and the bolt or lock of reason. On one level, the story proposes a theory of love that is free and open. The story of Cupid and Psyche stands apart as an interpolated story buried in the heart of *The Golden Ass*, and also commenting upon and influencing Apuleius the character, the entire text, and the imagination of the reader. The story, like Cupid’s palace allows a retreat from reality for the old woman who tells the story, for Apuleius the ass, and for the terrified, kidnapped maiden. At the same time, it ends, and the characters return to a reality that is not transfigured, in which trauma continues, and terrible scenarios are endlessly spawned.

An old hag tells an unnamed maiden the story of Cupid and Psyche because the maiden is overwhelmed by terror after a dream. In this dream, she is “pulled out” of her house, as if by magical force rather than concrete action, and she “romed about in solitary and vnknown places, callinge vpon the name of my vnfortunate husbande” (Apuleius 42, O3v). Unmoored, “pulled out” of her reality by incomprehensible forces, and calling upon a name for an absent person, she conveys a sense of dislocation, disorientation, and emptiness. There is a contrast between the power of the magic that pulls her out, and the inefficacy of the magic of calling a name to restore an absent love. Her lover attempts to find her by following her footprints and also calling out her name, but he is found instead by the thieves who have kidnapped her. In the dream, the bandits kill her lover. She wakes up in terror. Her dream not only conveys powerlessness, but also a sense of lost identity. She is pulled out of her known world, and roams about blindly. Even language fails her.

In this state of flux and terror, the maiden seems to be forever locked into a continual confirmation of the nightmare of her imagination. The old woman intervenes and explains that terrible dreams often portend the opposite in reality:

> be not afearde at feigned and straunge visions or dreames, for as the visions of the day are accompted false and vntrewe, so the visions of the night doo often chaunce contrary. And to dreame of weeping, beatinge and killing, is a token of good lucke and prosperous chaunce, whereas contrary, to dreame of laughinge, carnall dalliance and good cheere, is signe of sadnes, sicknes, losse of substaunc and displeasure. But I will tell thee a plesaunt tale to put away all thy sorowe and to reuieue thy Spirites… (Apuleius 43, O4v)

The stories of *The Golden Ass*, however, have proven time and again, that dreams are often echoed and corroborated in reality. The old woman rejects the authority of both the “visions of the day” and the “straunge visions or dreames” of the night. They often conflict with each other.

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62 Raised letters lowered and contractions silently expanded. Ampersand replaced by “and” and fossil thorn by “th.” Tildes removed.
and neither bears complete authority. Rather, she presents a series of apparent opposites in which the dream harkens an opposite waking reality: killing in a dream and change in waking, pleasure in a dream and illness after awakening, sensuality in a dream and decay when no longer asleep. The Imagination permeates both realities—dreaming and waking—and neither bears complete authority. However, according to her they work in tension. The realities that produce terror—sickness, loss, beating, killing—can never completely consume because they are balanced by an opposite reality. Moreover, in a theory of the mind without “lock” or “bolt,” in which the imagination and reason freely influence each other, there is a continual movement back and forth between life and death, happiness and suffering. The maid recounts a story of dislocation, blindness, and lack of identity. She is invaded by terror and consumed by it. The old woman’s response is not simply an offer of consolation, but an intimation that healing may come from a fluid movement of meaning between different states of consciousness.

Up until this point, however, we have seen that the magical world of Thessaly in which locks and bolts are continually being picked and doors broken open, pulled down, creates a world where amazement as terror presides. Contrary to what the old woman says, night visions often confirm reality: first, there is the story recounted by Socrates about a witch who has the power to tear down houses with her magic, lock everybody in the town in their houses, and then transport a house one hundred miles away. The witch has the power to create the feelings of being imprisoned, turned out, in continual danger of death and having one’s point of references disintegrated. The witch, then, is a sorceress of trauma and her actions create a kind of amazement that resembles terror. After hearing this story, Aristomenus cannot sleep for the “great feare which was in my harte,” but when he finally does, he experiences “sodenly the chamber doores brake open, the lockes, boltes and postes fell downe, that you would verely haue thought, that some theeues had ben presently come to haue spoiled and robbed vs” (Apuleius 7, C3r). The witches pierce Socrates in the neck and remove his blood, and then one of them reaches into him and pulls out his heart. Socrates claims, these are “thinges I sawe with mine owne eies” (Apuleius 8, C4r). At first he believes all this truly happened, but later when Socrates awakens, he convinces himself it was a dream induced by too much wine. However, the reality of the dream is confirmed when, passing by a stream, Socrates’ throat gushes blood and he dies. This confirms that the witches did truly wound him. Likewise, Telepheron observes a weasel come into the room where he is guarding a corpse from having its face despoiled by witches. He falls asleep and awakens terrified that the witch, in the form of the weasel, has eaten parts of the corpse. Later he discovers that his fears were justified, for the witch ate his nose and ears and put wax in their place.

The witches easily destroy locks and also lock people in amazing loci. There is a sense of boundaries being broken down, of the realm of the fantasy invading reality and creating reality in its own image. The world of the imagination is continually confirmed. The supremacy of fantasy manifests itself in the loss of the organs of outward perception—nose and ears—used to sense the realities of daytime. Fantasy emerges out of night visions and has the capacity to subsume the reality of day. What are left only are eyes, eyes that have the capability of witnessing and of making recognitions. Vision also alternates between the clarity of day and the blindness caused by the inevitable night and the machinations of the witches.

*The Golden Ass* depicts the susceptibility of the fantasy to amazement, and the ability of amazement to produce trauma. Following the tale of Cupid and Psyche is the attempted escape of the ass and the maid, their capture by the thieves, and the imminent tortuous death the thieves promise:
[The ass] shall be slaine to morrow, and when all the guts and entrailes of his body is
taken out, let the Maide be sowne into his belly, then let us lay them upon a great stone
against the broiling heate of the Sunne, so they shall both sustaine all the punishments
which you have ordained: for first the Asse shall be slaine as you have determined, and
she shall have her members torne and gnawne with wild beasts, when as she is bitten and
rent with wormes, shee shall endure the paine of the fire, when as the broyling heat of the
Sunne shall scortch and parch the belly of the Asse, shee shall abide the gallows when the
Dogs and Vultures shall have the guts of her body hanging in their ravenous mouthes.
(Apuleius  65-6, S2'-S3')

This punishment is a powerful comment on trauma and the possibility of resolving it, given the
events that have preceded it. We noted above that the many stories of The Golden Ass have
corroborated the reality of the fantasy, and of the fantasy’s influence on conscious life. The
magic of the witches breaks down the boundaries between the fantasy, memory, and reason, but
it is also responsible for a level of confusion, disorientation, and anguished fear. Their continual
manifestations amaze their audience.

Inspired by the story of Cupid and Psyche, the attempted escape of Lucius and the
maiden only further jeopardizes their lives. When they are saved, it is only because the maiden’s
husband delivers them. Lucius does not manage to save the maiden nor himself, and the idea
behind the punishment that the thieves dream up stands for the irresolution of trauma. In this
image, the self is a dead carcass, while another lives inside of him and is slowly dying an
unthinkably painful death inside of him. The structure of The Golden Ass, as so many stories
contained within each other, realities that seem never to be able to be permanently contained,
resembles the image of the donkey with the maid sewn inside of him. Further suffering or death
seems to be the inevitable consequence of this living trauma being sewn up.

The image of the live person trapped inside a rotting carcass recalls the experience of
traumatic amazement—the somatic and spiritual response to terror. The individual is invaded by
ideas that seem to come from outside. The subject experiences this as being pushed out of
himself, and at the same time the senses deaden in relation to the outside world: this is the
carcass, the lost ears and nose. Socrates’ heart wrenched out and blood drained describes the
somatic reaction to terror. Furthermore, this image of punishment follows the story recounted by
the thieves of a trick in which one thief gains access to a home by wearing the hide of a large
bear. In the end, he is killed inside the bearskin. Symbolically, we see again the mirroring
images of the fantasy and waking reality, enacting the response to trauma. The Golden Ass
continually works through these mirroring events and their symbolic representations. This
movement back and forth between two mirroring images finds its emotional correlative in the
transition between amazement as shock, paralysis, the response to the aggression of the other,
and amazement as openness, wonder, delight and pleasure in the other.

The story of Psyche and her journey is a story that is paradoxical at every turn, and in
which there is no sense of lasting psychological change, but only a pattern of change and flux.
Although surrounded by pilgrims to her beauty, she is desolate and alone.

She was wondred at of al she was praised of al, but she perceaued that no King nor
Prince, nor any of the inferiour sorte did repayre to woo her. Evry one merueled at her
diuine beautie, as it were at some Image well painted and sette out. Her other twoo
sisters, which were nothinge so greatly exalted by the people, were royally married to
twoo Kinges, but the virgin Psyches sittinge at home alone lamented her solitare life, and
beinge disquieted both in minde and bodie (although she pleased al the world) yet hated she in her selfe her owne beautie. (Apuleius 44, P1')

There is a strange disjunction between Psyche as an object of wonder, whose incomparable beauty causes people to be “astonied with admiration,” and Psyche as subject, who does not feel herself desired and sought after in any real way. The objectifying effect of this admiration mirrors the dream of the lost maiden, who calls out, but is not found, or the maid sewn into a dead carcass. When the oracle orders her parents to give her away in marriage to a being described in monstrous terms, she accepts her fate. Her marriage ceremony is a dirge-like ritual: “And when the solemnitie was ended, they went to bringe this sorrowfull spouse, not to her marriage, but to her finall ende and burial” (Apuleius 45, P2'). There is a ruefulness and a sadness in Psyche’s reproach to her parents: “When the people did honour me and call me new Venus, then you should haue wept, then you should haue sorrowed, as though I had beeene then dead” (Apuleius 45, P2'). She is forced to leave the “real” world because her objectification has siphoned off worship from the immortal Venus. She is prepared to be married to death, to “him that is appointed to destroy all the worlde,” to be broken or refashioned (Apuleius 45, P2').

This story follows a pattern that is typical of romance in which the protagonist must symbolically die to be refashioned. This is accomplished by facing the terror of death, and then a dream or a dream-like world introduces the possibility of rebirth. The abducted maiden tells a story in which she has completely lost her identity, and the story of Psyche also recounts the loss of a particular identity and the reestablishment of another. This process of forgetting and then remembering is emotional and cognitive. Psyche, who falls asleep trembling and weeping arises the next day “with a more quiet and pacified minde” in a dream-like world (Apuleius 46, P3'). Feeling the “incorporall voices” and the fantasia of beauty and luxury around her, “Then Psyches perceaued the felicitie of divine prouidence” (Apuleius 46, P3'). That this world without “closure,” “locke” or “bolte” has been created in the plenitude of the Imagination would seem to be confirmed by the fact that its labor is performed by “incorporall voices,” loci in the Imagination which work without laboring (Apuleius 46, P3'). The descent marks the beginning of an alternation between despair and consolation, seeing and blindness, death and resurrection. She has already lost her former identity in descending, and she will again come close to dying several times—dying in all its forms: losing love, losing her self, and experiencing that desolation that is constituted of endless desire and hopelessness.

The trials of Psyche map the cognitive process of amazement. Her immediate reaction to a task that is overwhelmingly difficult is terror. Caught up in her desolation and stunned, she submits completely to her sense of powerlessness. During her trials, she is not saved by anything she solves, but by the active work of normally impenetrable presences come to life—inanimate objects and animals. They do the work of the imagination, creatively and unexpectedly finding a way through a maze, and they do this effortlessly. The fantasy, rather than reason, is the problem solver. We see in the activity of Psyche, the structure of the mind’s movement: she responds to terror through death-like paralysis, and then her fantasy responds by freeing her. This process is repeated over and over—four times, which is more than a confirmation of a pattern. Only in the end, when Zeus intervenes at the earnest request of Cupid, a new order is imposed from above, because the movement through the maze of amazement is seemingly endless.

Zeus calls a tribunal of justice, and threatens them with a fine of “ten thousande poundes: which sentence was such a terrour vnto all the Goddes, that the high Theatre was replenished” (Apuleius 62, R3'). This court’s verdict is based on self-interest (the fear of future retaliation)
and politics to generate the happy ending of the story. This intervention only serves to highlight the unnaturalness of the ending in contrast with the endless repetition of terror and escape, of paralysis of the mind and returning to consciousness.

The enigmas that continually present themselves and need to be solved present a world, which is continually in need of revelation. There is always the suggestion of a hidden face, of something or somebody behind the veil of recognizable action. For this reason, the witch is the great symbol of *The Golden Ass* because she holds the power both of erotic compulsion and the ability to make the world unrecognizable, inexplicable, and illogical. But the power of the hidden face also extends to the lover. Apollo’s oracle introduces Cupid as a “Serpent dyre and fierce” and proclaims that Psyche need go to him with her “corps…cladd in mourninge weede” (Apuleius 45, P2). But like so many oracles in history, this one is misunderstood. It is her body, the “carcass” in which she has been imprisoned—in her case a beautifully-crafted one—that is the “mourninge weede” in which she has been clad. Psyche and her family understand the oracle to mean that she will go to her death, and she sees Cupid as he who is appointed to destroy the world. In fact, the oracle describes in dark language a being who has conquered suffering: “The riuers blacke and deadly floodes of paine/And darkenes eke as thrall to him remaine” (Apuleius 45, P2). Because Psyche can never see Cupid, he can always represent the threat of pain, darkness, and death even though the oracle says just the opposite. Merely the presence of those words in the Oracle leads to their misinterpretation. The quest for love leads the lover paradoxically running from death directly toward it: “why shoulde I refuse him that is appointed to destroy all the worlde?” (Apuleius 45, P2)

In Cupid’s palace, Psyche is surrounded by disembodied voices and music, “for she coulde see no person before her, but onely here voices on euery side,” and “she sawe no man: The harmony of the instrumentes did so greatly shrill in her eares, that (though there weare no manner of person) yet seemed she in the middest of a multitude of people” (Apuleius 46, P3). This world of voices without bodies and music without players is a place where effects cannot be ascribed to a cause. This world defines her relationship with Cupid: he warns her that she “cannot see the shape of my person” (Apuleius 48, O1). She cannot see him or know who he is, but she can experience him through a process of translation: “Psyches husbande spake vnto her (for she might feele his eies, his handes & his eares)” (Apuleius 49, O2). This has been emended in the Loeb Library series to read, “Psyche's husband spake unto her (for she might not know him with her eyes, but only with her hands and ears)” (Apuleius 49, O2). Either way, in this world of disembodied voices, Psyche must feel him and listen to him, but she is not allowed to see him. The palace of Cupid and Psyche recalls the maiden’s dream that precedes the story, where the lovers’ are calling to each other in the dark. Behind it is the threat of death—whether at the hands of a witch, the thieves, or of the Serpent to whom Psyche believes she may be married. The form that this death takes is not just physical, but a devouring of one’s identity, which is why Apuleius’ fantasy of men turned to rocks and beasts, of the maid’s futile calls, and Psyche’s disembodied voices, draw attention to the act of speaking, of externalizing an otherwise hidden interior.

Reduced to silence by being turned into an ass, it is not Apuleius’ ability to talk that gives him an identity. Rather, there is something about the process of consciousness—of the

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63 The signatures reverse alphabetically after “P” back to “O” and then begin another “P” sequence beginning on p. 52 recto.

alternation between recognition and blindness, great feeling and numbness—that makes Lucius who he is, and Psyche who she is, even after being deracinated and even after having the physical shape of reality continually changed. When Psyche succumbs to her fears and curiosity and uses an oil lamp to confirm whether Cupid is a monster or her beloved, she unleashes a painful process of experience that will create her love where there was numbness and fear. Having seen the god’s body, she was “amased in minde” (Apuleius 52, P1). Adlington’s use of amazement here most likely refers to a state of paralysis, since she also “greatly feared,” trembled, and had a “pale countenance” (Apuleius 52, P1). Indurate because of what her eyes have revealed, her previous “tossinge minde, like the waues of the sea,” between distrust and love for her husband, is arrested (Apuleius 52, P1). This arrested moment of fear contrasts with the tumult that precedes it and the mental flux and desire that follow: “And when she sawe and behelde the beautie of his deuine visage, she was well recreated in her minde” (Apuleius 52, P1). This rapturous amazement coincides with her recognition of Cupid’s face. It is no coincidence that she is described as “recreated in her minde” because the act of recognition, following her astonishment, produces a heightened experience of desire and of knowledge. This new phase of amazement, is expressed as “marueling,” (Apuleius 53, P2) and is such a heightened experience of rapture that the narrative can only describe it using the sensual symbolism of wounding:

[Psyche,] merueling at the weapons of her husband toke one of the arrowes out of the quiuier, and pricked her selfe withall, wherewith she was so grievously wounded that the bloude followed, and thereby of her owne accorde she added loue vpon loue, then more and more broylinge in the loue of Cupide, she embrased him and kissed him a thousand times. (Apuleius 53, P2)

In her encounter with desire, we see a pattern of sensory experience and emotional movement: mental tumult causes amazement in its form as astonishment, but amazement also arrests further tumult.

Analogous to the counterpoint of light and dark, ascent and descent, tumult and stillness, there is a necessary movement between numbness and feeling. When Lucius experiences amazement and sees the world transformed, he imagines “the stones which I founde, were indurate and turned from men into that figure” (Apuleius 12, E1). To be indurate, turned to stone, however, is an experience felt in the body as numbness and paralysis. It is one facet of amazement, and indeed is a response to the kinds of erotic invasions by sorceresses that threaten Lucius. The stony man, while unable to feel and act in the world, is also protected against further invasion. Psyche’s sisters convince her that (according to their limited understanding of Apollo’s oracle) her husband is a serpent full of deadly poison, and that he has been seen by hunters in the countryside. He is a “rauenous and gapinge threate” who they claim will “deuoure” her, leaving her “in the ende to be swallowed into the gowlfe of his bodie” (Apuleius 51, O4). Psyche’s response to this terror of not only being annihilated, but devoured and lost in his body, is to be “amased in her minde” (Apuleius 51, O4). This form of amazement is a temporary way of keeping the fear of being devoured at bay; it functions like a poison that numbs and paralyzes the body. But here, the shock therapy of amazement also stops the repetitive scenario of Psyche’s sisters descending to stir up her fear of her husband, and fill her with distrust. It prompts action and change, the beginning of a recognition that will mix fear and desire, which will be rapturous and painful, and will be followed by further kinds of repetition.

When Venus avenges herself on Psyche, her reaction to the dream-like, repetitive trials continues the pattern of amazement as a response to trauma. After Venus “toke her violently by
the heare, & dashed her head vpon the ground,” she sets her a task: to separate a large pile with over half a dozen mixed grains.

But Psiches went not about to disseuer the graine (as beinge a thinge impossible to be brought to passe by reason it lay so confusely scattered) but beinge astonied at the cruel commaundement of Venus, satte still and saide nothing ...(Apuleius 59, Q4’)

Her reason is overwhelmed, and she sits immobilized and wordless. However, a mite, moved by pity, calls upon his brethren to address this injustice of the gods. In the second trial, Venus commands her to harvest the golden fleece from a flock of sheep. Again, overwhelmed by the task, “Psyches arose willingly, not to doo her commaundement, but to throwe her selfe hedlong into the water to ende her sorowe” (Apuleius 59, Q4’). This time, a green reed, “inspired by deuine inspiration with a gracious tune and melodie” explains to her what she needs to do (Apuleius 59, Q4’).

The third task set by Venus is to harness water from the deepest recesses of a mountain, protected by dragons, and connected to the underground.

Psiches (seeing the impossibilitie of this affaire) stooed still as though she were transformed into a stone, and although she was present in body, yet was she absent in spirite and sense, by reason of the great perill which she sawe, in so much that she could not confort her selfe with weping, such was the present daunger that she was in. (Apuleius 60, R1’)

Faced this time by the real threat of being devoured by monsters, lost in the dark bowels of the mountain, she freezes, becomes indurate. This is a grief that is too immediate and threatening to elicit tears. It strikes her with terror. This time, however, she is saved by an eagle, who remembers how he helped alleviate Jupiter’s love.

The fourth trial set for Psyche by Venus is to go down to hell and bring back a box of Persephone’s beauty in a box. She goes up to a tower to kill herself, but the tower, divinely inspired, speaks. The tower gives her a series of complicated instructions that emphasize an impervious single-mindedness. Psyche succeeds in her mission, but after returning to the light of the world, she is “rauished with great desire” to open the box: “… she coulde perceaue no beautie nor any thinge els, saue onely an infernall and deadly sleepe, whiche immediatly invaded all her members as sone as the boxe was vncouered, in such sort that she fel downe on the gronnde, and lay there a sleepinge corps” (Apuleius 62, R3’). In the end, her curiosity gets the better of her, and she fails at her task. Even after all these trials, we come away with the feeling that desire—here, in the form of curiosity—always win out. However traumatic her loss of Cupid and the consequent, repetitive trials after that trauma, Psyche has not learned to control her curiosity. Finally, Cupid, healed and able to come to her, saves her again: he puts the divine sleep into a bottle, and awakens her.

The repetition of trauma, both in the story of Psyche, and in the larger frame story of *The Golden Ass*, produces the sense that the repetitive pattern cannot be escaped. The inevitable consequences of Psyche’s choices lead her into paralysis. Faced with the possibility of violence and death, she is repeatedly shocked into non-action. However, it is the dream-like that facilitates transformation: the talking animals, plants, and even a tower, which are divinely inspired in some way. These ‘things’ coming to life are the exact opposite of Lucius’ earlier vision of the inanimate world as artifacts where men’s souls had become “indurate.” There is, in and through the compassionate intervention of the spectator-turned-actor, a continual possibility for renewal. However, the story of Cupid and Psyche also suggests that trauma is not something that is forever contained, but that returns repeatedly.
After overhearing this story, Lucius himself must continue to go through many trials. There is no silver bullet, no closure that can be achieved until he has a mystical conversion experience, recognizes the presence of the goddess Isis, eats the rose, and becomes a member of the cult of the goddess. This conversion as ending forces a kind of closure in which the repetitions of the previous part of the story are interrupted by an act of faith, an experience of illumination, and an ostensibly permanent change. On the other hand, another model of transformation can be found in the more partial, temporary experiences of shock. The many surprises that we see in this interpolated tale are paradigmatic instances of the shock therapy that arrest Psyche and force her to change course. When she first sees Cupid, some of the scales are lifted from her eyes through an experience that is both pleasurable and painful. The process is difficult. In the first part of the tale, Psyche continually falls prey to her sister’s sowing terror in her imagination, and Venus’ terrible trials mirror this. When Psyche succumbs to her curiosity in the end, just as she did in the beginning, we witness the reality again of the chaos produced by desire. On the other hand, Psyche’s various deaths allow her to ascend: first when she is left at the edge of a cliff, and secondly, when she opens the box with Persephone’s sleep.

Thus, we see the mythological enactment of the structure of amazement as terror, which produces a sense of death, and the relief that follows. We also see how, not long after experiencing this kind of negative amazement, there is an ascent. The most magnificent rendition of this is in the fourth trial when the eagle goes into the bowels of the mountain as a surrogate for Psyche, echoing and foreshadowing the upward ascendance of Ganymede to Jupiter. The memory of this ascent serves as the background of her deliverance. It shows how the positive side of amazement is always the other face of terror’s amazement. However, the divine tribunal that closes the story forces an end to the otherwise endless movement between negative and positive amazement, paralysis and action, blindness and recognition. When Psyche makes the same mistake at the end of the story, when she fails instead of triumphs, an outside audience must be brought in to bring justice and closure. But there is also a sense of things not changing, in spite of the emotional seesaw and the crucible of all the trials.

The structure of the marvelous in *The Golden Ass* involves a dream-like sequence that terrorizes the dreamer, who right afterwards finds a temporary relief in the notion that it was simply a dream. But reality proves the terrible dreams to have actually happened. We see this repeatedly: in the sequence of dream and corroboration of the dream of Aristomenus and Telepheron, but also with Lucius. When he is tried in jest for the murder of three thieves, it is a ruse. But later, he finds out that he has been blamed for the murders of the real thieves who have captured him and the maiden. Therefore, we can expect to see the very large dream at the center of *The Golden Ass*, the story of Cupid and Psyche, to be doubled in some form later in the text. The embedded tale promises some kind of resolution to repetitive, traumatic patterns. And, indeed, when Lucius finally eats the rose and is transfigured, we see a kind of formal closure that echoes the story of Cupid and Psyche.

In the wonderful world of *The Golden Ass*, witches unleash violent forces that terrify their victims. This, of course, foreshadows what we will see in early modern psychology’s response to trauma: traumatic external events such as war and earthquakes or products of the Imagination—hobgoblins and Furies—have the same psychic effect on the patient. They unleash the sense of continual repetition, of events doubling, of repeating themselves in seemingly unending sequences. This kind of trauma can never be completely suppressed since, as early modern medical theorists will explain, it comes out of an unending cosmological battle between God and the Devil, whose wars take place in the private, interior battlefields of the
psyche. But, as we will see in Robert Burton, there is a relief to the terror through transcendence—be it the contemplation of the perfection of God, or the sense of consolation that should come from words that astonish, such as Jesus’ words in the Bible. Consolation comes from the interruption of the painful, obsessive products of the fantasy.

Finally, we cannot underestimate the importance of the implicit audience. The story of Psyche and Cupid is not a play, but it is continually invoking the role of the audience as a salvific force. In her last trial, when Psyche is advised to ignore the lame donkey and the lame mule driver, we see a figure of the Lucius himself. He sees himself as the dream within the dream within a dream. Like Russian dolls, many levels of distancing separate the author from this ignored lame donkey, and it is as if the self must be continually projected through the fantasy in order for there to be change. Then there is the farcical jury that judges Lucius for murder, the coerced jury that provides for Psyche’s bliss, Aristomenus watching his friend murdered in dream and then die in reality, Telepheron holding a vigil for the dead man but then being watched by the witches, and Psyche’s animals and inanimate objects who are her audience and then her counselors. Most dramatically, there are the several audiences that “watch” Psyche: those who help her through her trials, Aphrodite, Cupid, the old hag, the maid, and Lucius, Apuleius the author, and the reader.

The process of amazement first pulls in the boundaries of the self so that the subject seems to be squeezed out of his body. Then the boundaries expand through the kind of amazement that is wonder. So, we are continually moving closer and farther away between interior dream and the amazing enactment of dream in “reality,” and then further away into the contingent world of the mundane. This movement is necessary to break out of the repetitive fantasy of trauma, which is never completely contained, but must be continually renegotiated. The sense of terror it generates is repeatedly experienced through amazement. Relief from this terror comes through experiences of expansion in which the subject finds himself connected to larger dreams that are so very far outside the self, that we find the self right at their center: the paradoxical metaphor for this is the lame ass in the fourth trial of Psyche’s dream, who is at the center of Apuleius’ dreams, and also at the furthest remove from the person in “reality.” When Psyche walks past him twice, ignoring him, she begins to break a pattern of trauma, starts to puncture an illusion, by, as Burton will suggest, not paying anymore imaginative attention to him.

The audience, however, serves a further emotional function. If the witch’s fury and anger have turned men into stone, then Apuleius’ fantasy tries to reverse this by turning unfeeling things in nature into sources of pity, compassion, and guidance. Whether this is viewed as divine inspiration, angelic guidance, or simply wish fulfillment, it nevertheless stresses the importance of an audience to the resolution of trauma. The audience is an indispensable force in healing. The spectator who projects himself onto a character, can experience the disintegration of identity that comes from continual shocks and the recognition of painful realities in part because of the sense of watching and being watched by a compassionate audience. Indeed, the terror of dying, as well as the desire for death that seems to underlie Apuleius’ own thirst for transfiguration, is made bearable by the fact that it is never experienced alone. The imagination creates audiences for its pain even when there seem to be none.
6. Overthrowing Ourselves: Amazement as Cure

Tragedy, tragic romance, and the Apuleian experiment with romance suggest that the response to trauma is a certain kind of amazement. In tragedy, the most that can be hoped for is to maintain one’s humanity as continued suffering and heartbreak unfold. Amazement is either terror that stuns and paralyzes and may lead to one’s dehumanization; or it is a kind of admiration for a person’s strength of character, valor, or a remarkable behavior. However, romance amplifies the possibility of amazement as emotional and cognitive experience, although it is neither straightforward nor linear. Rather, it involves astonishment and stupefaction, and then a falling asleep. This process continues, as the play moves back and forth between different kinds of amazement. At the end of romance, the protagonists are forced to recognize each other and thus come to learn who they are. The cognitive aspect of remembering who somebody is, discovering by recalling memories, can only happen after a fierce exercise of the fantasy. Thus, the amazement that continually stuns the fantasy also provides the psychic shock that allows for the possibility of recognition. The final amazement as wonder recognizes the role that each character has played in producing trauma.

In medical theory, Robert Burton offers the possibility of relief from trauma’s effects on the imagination by remembering one’s role in a grand narrative of Christian redemption. Drawing on a long medical tradition, Burton posited that all illness comes from a disordered psyche, accompanying an unbalanced humoral constitution. Reason, on the other hand, can be used to control the appetite of the body, rein in the Imagination, and prevent emotions from tyrannizing us. Both the conception of illness as coming out of a chaotic mind, and the necessity of temperance—the absolute governance of the body by the faculty of reason—are ancient and entrenched ways of thinking about illness in the Western tradition. Burton’s attribution of melancholy to these same causes also is a newer version of the same principles.

…so we, as long as we are ruled by reason, correct our inordinate appetite, and conforme our selves to Gods word, are as so many living Saints: but if wee give reines to Lust, Anger, Ambition, Pride, and follow our owne wayes, wee degenerate into beasts, transforme our selves, overthrowe our constitutions, provoke God to Anger, and heap upon us this of Melancholy, and all kindes of incurable diseases, as a just and deserved punishment of our sinnes.

This passage underscores several of the different strands in Burton’s argument. There is the correlation between the symptoms of disease and the behaviors that cause them; the commensurability of the suffering caused by disease’s symptoms and a deserved punishment from God; and, most importantly, the transformation of the self by the disease, and ultimately, by behavior. While it may seem that Burton is expressing a simple Judeo-Christian understanding of disease (potently recovered by Calvinists at this time), in truth he will present a complex web

66 “Drawing on Pauline theology and the teachings and wisdom in Ecclesiastes, he described melancholic madness as a condition of sinfulness (1.25.35-26.1). [One of his spiritual arguments] was the patristic doctrine that in the soul of postlapsarian man the will had been perverted, dethroning reason from its position of mastery in the soul and making him resemble a beast enslaved by a multitude of passions: ‘all men are carried away with Passion, Discontent, Lust, Pleasures’, confuse ‘vertues’ and ‘vices’, and therefore ‘more then melancholy, quite mad, brut Beasts and void of all reason’ (1.61.27-30; 62.11-18)…Contempt of the world, particularly of its moral evaluations, was established as the spiritual position from which the Democritean message could be delivered.” Angus Gowland. *The World of Renaissance Melancholy. Robert Burton in Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 2006. 15-16.
of physical and spiritual causes which makes it impossible to assume a simple one-to-one correspondence between sin and disease (I sin therefore I am sick; this sickness is a punishment from God, etc.). But what the passage does not show is the extent to which melancholy can be caused by forces quite external to the will, for example, traumatic shocks; and he does not here admit what he will be forced to later, that the individual—because of the psyche’s permeability to physical and spiritual agents—can fall into desperate melancholy in spite of him or herself.

As the unhealthy body points away from the divine, so the healthy body points toward the divine. Burton begins his work by praising the work of God: “Man, the most excellent, and noble creature of the World, the principall and mighty worke of God, wonder of Nature, as Zoroastes calls him; audacis naturae miraculum, the marvaile of marvailes…” (Burton 121) It is, one should note, not a unique beginning. Thomas Newton’s translation of Lemnius’ Touchstone of Complexions begins similarly, and books on human psychology in general, including Juan Huarte’s influential Examen de los ingenios and Edward Reynolde’s A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man commence with a consideration of man’s original perfection, as a manifestation of divine goodness and ability.

If the healthy human body is the marvel of marvels, source of amazement as wonder, then the sick body is something else altogether. Traumatic shock invades the body completely, and the sight of this sick body elicits in the observer amazement as astonishment and horror. The most striking example that Burton cites from one of the “Papist Physitians,” Cornelius Gemma, describes a body like a warehouse of noxious things.

…a young maid, called Katherine Gualter a Coupers daughter, A° 1571. That had such strange passions and convulsions, three men could not sometimes hold her: she purged a live Èele, which hee saw a foot and halfe long, and touched himself: but the Èele afterward vanished, she vomited some 24 pounds of fulsome stuffe of all colours, twice a day for foureteene daies: & after that, she voided great bals of haire, peeces of wood, Pigeons dung, parchment, Goose dung, coles; and after them two pound of pure blood, and then againe coles, and stones, of which some had inscriptions bigger then a all-nut, some of them peeces of glasse, brasse, &c. Besides paroxismes of laughing, weeping, and extasies, &c. Et hoc (inquit) cm horrore vidi, this I saw with horror. They could doe no good on her Physicke, but left her to the Cleargie.67 (Burton I.ii, 194-5)

The witness attests, “Et hoc (inquit) cm horrore vidi,” a formulation that corroborates both the terror implicit in the event and the witness’s oath of veracity, the authority compounded through the use of Latin. But here the experience of terror becomes transfigured in the eyes of the observer into something that begets amazement, both because it is unexpected and novel and ruptures the experience of the “real” with something extraordinary. Thus we have the large eel that vanishes, coals and stones with inscriptions written on them – “incomprehensible” perhaps, like the Devil, but absolutely captivating nonetheless. The observer, who “saw with horror,” nevertheless notes relatively precise measurements, quantities, and periods of time: one and a half feet, two weeks, twenty-four pounds, twice a day, three men. When the supernatural can be measured and quantified, it partakes both of the spiritual, that which produces horror, and the

67 Compare this story to Pedro Mercado’s Diálogos de filosofía natural y moral. “Y de una mujer melancólica, cuenta Alejandro, que imaginaba tener una culebra en el vientre que durmiendo se le había entrado en él. Y diciendo que él se la haría echar vomitando, pusó de secreto una culebra muerta en el lugar donde había de vomitar, [con] la cual vista quedó libre de sus imaginaciones y melancholia.” Bartra, Roger. El siglo de oro de la melancolia: Textos españoles y novohispanos sobre las enfermedades del alma. Universidad Iberoamericana. Departamento de Historia. 1998. 380.
material, the empirically identifiable. We have the impression of a woman who has been become such a repository that there is no ‘room’ left in her for her.58

Katherine Gualter’s body is an enigma, a virtual source of endless shock and speculation. We can continually read into her body, and so in generating enigmas and thought, she becomes a source of amazement. Burton cites her story as an example of possession by spirits from one of the most approved of the Catholic physicians, the Flemish Cornelius Gemma. However, this example, as we will see below is not qualitatively a different kind of invasion from other kinds of sickness or trauma. Rather, it is an extreme version of the process of traumatic shock, which can have material or spiritual causes, or both. The story of Katherine Gualter manifests some of the defining attributes of traumatic shock. First, the body is seen as permeable. Traditional Galenic theory envisioned a body that was affected by the environment via the humors, but was otherwise self-contained. Disease might come about because environmental factors threw the humors out of whack, but in the sixteenth century, we begin to see this system challenged both through physical explanations and the occult. The body increasingly began to be seen as permeable, vulnerable to external invasion.69 Not just in folklore or popular religion, “moderate” academic medicine accepted a combination of spiritual and material causes of disease; indeed, strict materialists became a fringe group by the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.70

Secondly, the example of Gualter’s traumatic invasion metaphorically pictures the “self” as squeezed out by demonic occupation and by foreign materials. Trauma carves out a space and makes itself known through emotional symptoms: “paroxismes of laughing, weeping, and extasies.” There is a definite relationship between the power of the ambush and the consequent extreme emotions. This describes amazement as a response to an event that is sudden,

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58 No doubt because the person suffering from this kind of melancholy was a repository for foreign objects, a partial remedy, according to the Spanish physician Velásquez in his Libro de la Melancolía, is vomiting (Bartra 325).

70 Alonso de Freylas, for example, explains that melancholics, through no fault of their own, “son engañados, y aprovechándose el demonio del humor melancóclico moviéndose en el cuerpo, y representado con él en la imaginación algunas cosas.” Si los melancóllicos pueden saber lo que está por venir, o adivinar el suceso bueno o malo de lo futuro con la fuerza de ingenio, o soñado. Jaén: Fernando Díaz de Montoya, 1606. (3r-4r). “La idea de que los demonios se aprovechan de los humores, y especialmente de la atrabilis, para provocar males y visiones en las personas era muy común entre los médicos del siglo XVI. Dos importantes autoridades médicas, citadas por Andrés Velásquez, eran de esta opinión. Una de ellas, Jason Pratz, creía que los demonios se escondían en las vísceras para provocar sueños terroríficos y malestar. Otra, Francisco Vallés, quien como he dicho encabezó en España la desarabización del galenismo, en su De sacra philosophia dijo que el demonio no nacía en el cuerpo mismo, sino que a éste lo penetraba desde afuera para excitar la melancolia, transportando vapores negros, aumentando los fluidos atrabiliosos al fomentar la adustión o al evitar la evacuación del humor negro natural” (Bartra 52). “Across the Continent, for neo-Platonic philosophers, neo-Galenic physicians and demonologists alike, the imagination interacted not only with the physical world, but also with the preternatural and celestial domains. Thus, according to the demonologist Francesco Maria Guazzo, evil spirits were able to enter the body afflicted with melancholy through the imagination, and thereby corrupt the animal and vital spirits. This was an argument accepted by many otherwise rationalist and generally skeptical physicians, such as Levinus Lemnius and Du Laurens. In large part, this was because such theories of demonically induced or exacerbated melancholy accorded with ancient authorities, and were widely available in the medical and natural-philosophical literature of the era. More specifically, they also dovetailed neatly with the common assumption that devils are analogically attracted to interfere with complexionate melancholics because of the dark and semi-excremental nature of the black bile predominating in their bodies.” Angus Gowland, “The Problem of Early Modern Melancholy.” Past & Present. (191) 2006. 91-92.
aggressive, and altering. Third, we should note Cornelius Gemma makes a pronouncement that Burton will in effect mirror at the end of the *Anatomy*, namely that physic can do little to respond; the symptoms of this broad disease require pastoral consolation and healing. Finally, as my analysis of the extreme otherness invoked by the description should make clear, what kind of amazement we experience depends upon our position in relation to the patient. If we were the patient, then, it is pure shock that we would feel, and the response to being invaded is at times ecstatically pleasurable or excruciating. It marks the retreat from language into emotion and bodily feeling. This appears on the surface very different from the Aristotelian wonder that initiates the quest for knowledge. It would seem that physical and emotional consolation are what the patient require. As spectator, however, removed from the suffering and looking at the spectacle of it, we may experience considerably less emotion and much more intellectual curiosity. As we will repeatedly see, the experience of amazement involves different perspectives and vanishing points.

The body’s permeability—its susceptibility to malignant forces both occult and physical—is a point to which Burton returns over and over. This can occur through the fantasy, but medical theorists had to explain by what means the Imagination could be so affected absent any obvious causes of terror. Demonic spirits, and the Devil himself, can terrorize the body, taking over its functions, and in particular the “Balneum Diaboli, the Divels bath,” or bile, the humor responsible for melancholy (I.ii). Burton quotes Jason Pratensis,

*the Divell being a slender incomprehensible spirit, can easily insinuate and winde himself into humane bodies, and cunningly couched in our bowells, vitiate our healths, terrify our soules with fearefull dreames, and shake our minde with furies. And in another place, These uncleane spirits settled in our bodies, and now mixt without our melancholy humours, doe triumph as it were, and sport themselves as in another heaven.*

(Burton I.ii, 194)

The description of the Devil’s spirit as “slender” suggests that, although spiritual, it occupies a place in the material world. Indeed, the Devil’s slenderness paints an entire cosmology in which the spiritual can enter the physical through the narrowest of entries. The spiritual battle between God and the Devil, which is signaled in the allusion to the infernal will to reconquer heaven, plays itself out in the human’s tortured body: the “uncleane spirits” permeate the body and colonize it, mixing with black bile, “the melancholy humours.” At the heart of this conquest is the psyche of the other, permeating and ruling the conquered body, and it is “incomprehensible.” The effects of terror, materialized in frightening dreams and the degradation of the physical body, are the direct manifestations of an enigma, the Devil.

The attempts to explain the sudden causes and unbridled effects of terror point at a dark other. It is perceived as malignant, experienced as distressing, suggestive always of complete annihilation from the outside into the body’s core and back out again. We see, then, that influence of “Divels” does not just “produce miraculous alterations in the ayre, and most wonderfull effects,” but their influence can “alter humane attempts and projects (Dei permissu) as they see good themselves” (Burton I.ii, 180). A theory of the psyche emerges in which the “incomprehensible,” “slender” insinuations of the supernatural can materially affect our own bodies and the world around us by permission of God, “Dei permissu.” Sixteenth-century science embraces the reality of the “marvelous,” which can be defined as the tangible manifestations of that which is impenetrable to human reason. The Devil “can worke stupend and admirable conclusions; wee see the effects onley, but not the causes of them” (Burton II.i, 1). That is, the Devil’s work, the perfect inverse of God’s, amazes, as in Covarrubias’ rather
typical definition of one kind of amazement, *admiración*: “…es pasmarse y espantarse de algún efecto que ve extraordinario, cuya causa inora.” Because the cause may be physical or spiritual, the physician was in part limited to the amazing spectacle, to the amazed patient, and, as we will see later, to an amazing cure that takes into account the spiritual laws of a body affected by both material and spiritual causes.

Although that slender agent that caused terror may be impossible to pinpoint, early modern medicine was able to formulate a pathway by which the ethereal, as well as the observable, shaped the psyche. In Part I, Burton recapitulates how the “Phantasie,” which is synonymous with the Imagination, is “an inner sense” that keeps the memory of things past and present, delivered to it by the common sense. Located in the “middle sell of the braine,” the “Phantasie” recalls images, reliving them as if they were new. However, during sleep, when sick, or when suffering from melancholy, it may turn these images into “strange, stupend, absurd shapes, many monstrous and prodigious things, especially if it be stirred up by some terrible object, presented to it from common sense, or memory” (Burton 152). Burton notes that in addition to sick, depressed, and dreaming people, visual and literary artists draw on the Fantasy. He gives Apuleius’ tale of Cupid and Psyche as an example. Nevertheless, “In men [the Phantasie] is subject and governed by Reason, or at least should be…” (Burton 152). The Phantasie, however, can easily overcome Reason.

The “Divell” himself is often directly responsible for much mental suffering by affecting the fantasy, according to authorities that Burton cites. For example, Biarmannus, whom he quotes, states that the Devil “begines first with the phantasie, & moves that so strongly, that no reason is able to resist. Now the Phantasie he moves by mediation of humours” (Burton I.ii, 193). This is an important distinction: the Devil works through physical means, “mingling himselfe amongst those humours” (Burton I.ii, 193). When occultist explanations were used to account for mental illness, these were based on a long tradition of medical theory that had no problem connecting the spiritual and the material. Angus Gowland, a historian of early modern medicine, explains, a

…putative locus of supernatural activity was the imagination which since the antiquity had been deemed a fallible power capable of altering the composition of the body. This notion was given detailed attention in medieval psychology, where the powers of common sense …and imagination… were said to bridge material objects and the immaterial soul. Since the common sense (directly) and the imagination (indirectly) were related to the material world and were both sensitive faculties, they were considered vulnerable to external influences and interference, and it proved a short step from this conception of susceptibility to the formulation of occult powers. (Gowland 51-2)

The cause of so many diseases is a spiritual agent—the Devil himself or his minions—working on a debilitated body, but the initial source can be the individual succumbing to vices, which agitate the Phantasie and unbalance the humors.

Even while the causes may have been a continual source of speculation and debate, nevertheless certain structural principles emerge for thinking about trauma and the relationship of amazement to the perpetuation and interruption of trauma. By outlining the defining characteristics of trauma, its lifecycle in the body, and how it was attached to spiritual and material causes, we will see that the experience of amazement is often at the core of the response to trauma. Amazement is at times a physical and emotional reaction to trauma, at other times an

intense reception of “marvels” that are physical in nature, but suggestive of spiritual causes. In either case, there is a close connection between the experience of amazement and trauma, suggesting that amazement is the initial response to trauma.

Burton defines trauma as cyclical, but also as interrupting the normal course of the natural cycle of birth and death. The continual return of traumatic memory partakes of a haunting, internalized cycle in which the Imagination brings to mind the threat of death with such regularity that it becomes a cycle of its own. Describing the “Massacre at Lions 1572 in the raigne of Charles the 9,” he writes that it was so terrible and fearfull, that many ran mad, some died, great-bellied women were brought to bed before their time, generally all affrighted and agast. Many loose their wits by the sudden sight of some spectrum or divell, a thing very common in all ages, saith Lavater part. 1. cap. 9. as Orestes did at the sight of the Furies, which appeared to him in blacke… As children in the darke conceave Hobgoblins, and are sore afraid, they are the worse for it al their lives. Some by sudden fires, earthquakes, inundations, or any such dismal objects…or by the sight of a monster, a carcase, they are disquieted many months following, and cannot endure the roome where a coarpse hath bin, for a world would not be alone with a dead man, or lye in that bed many yeares after, in which a man hath died. (Burton I.ii, 334)

Regardless of the causes of trauma, be they real or imaginary—an actual massacre or “Hobgoblins”—Burton notes the structural similarity in the effects. Sudden, unexpected violent events as well as supernatural agents affect the imagination. In the best scenario, the imagination continues to “disquiet” the wellbeing of the individual, and in the worst it causes them to “loose their wits.” In this passage, we see Burton’s synthetic, interdisciplinary methodology at work drawing equally from literature, from historical anecdote, and experience. The Furies, awakened by the horror of matricide, of violence regardless of the justification, are the inexpugnable force of conscience. But they are also the continual reminder of trauma, experienced as spiritual beings who see all and are not limited by time or space. The Furies embody the retreat of reason, and the pursuit by conscience and Imagination, a repetitive flight and pursuit. This repetition mimics the natural cycles that it interrupts, and therefore Burton mentions in the same breath the pregnant woman giving birth early, and the dead man. Underlying all these examples is the specter of annihilation as imminent and unexpected, and the body as absolutely fragile and vulnerable: from the womb to the “room where a coarpse hath bin” Burton shows with what ease terror transforms enclosures that typically connote safety into threatening spaces; thus, the womb and the room become tombs, and the past continually infects and haunts the present. We have only to look more closely at the invocation of the Furies and their comparison to the more

72 Thomas Walkington explains in his chapter, “Of the Conceits of Melancholy,” a sudden, unexpected trauma can cause “…a losse of wit, wherewith one being affected, either imagins, speakes, or doth any foolish actions, such as are altogether exorbitant from reason, and that with greate timorousness and sorrow. They that bee accloied with it are not onely out of temper for their organons of body, but their minds also are so out of frame and distraught, that they are in bondage to many ridiculous passions, imagining that they see and feele such things, as no man els can either perceue or touch….Ther was one possest with this humour, that tooke a strong conceit, that he was changed into an earthen vessel, who earnestly intreated his friends in any case not to come neare him, lest peraduenture with their jostling of him, he might be shakt or crusht to peeces….There is mention made of one that perswa ded himselfe hee had no head, but that it was cut off, the Physicion Philotinus to cure him, cause a heauly steele cap to bee put on his head, which weighed so heauly and pincht him so greateously, that he cried amaine his head ak’t…” The Optick Glasse of Hymors. London: Martin Clerke, 1607. 69-70, K5*-K6*. See also, Bartra 376-82. The Folger Shakespeare Library, 2014.
familiar, homespun version of the supernatural in the “Hobgoblin,” as well as threat of real death to see that Burton is making a case for a parity for all kinds of traumatic shock: physical, psychological, and spiritual. They all are experienced as real, however fantastic they may seem, and all emerge out of a play between repetition and violent interruption.

The unexpectedness of trauma gives it the ability to overthrow reason—in spite of whatever order may have existed. The earthquake is the paradigmatic example of shock because it marks an overturn of order—both of the body and the body politic. Burton describes, “At Meacum whole streets and goodly palaces were overthrown at the same time, and there was such an hideous noyse withal like thunder, & a filthy smell…” (Burton I.ii, 336). The upheaval crushes the reign of reason and order—epitomized in the “goodly palaces” and the streets—and turns it into a sulfurous inferno. Likewise, the physical body is crushed when terror overcomes it and upsets the humoral balance. Burton notes the physical manifestations: “their haire stared for feare, and their hearts quaked, men and beasts were incredibly terrified” (Burton I.ii, 336).

Terror, as we will see later, directly affects the heart, and leads to a physical change in the body, which makes it susceptible to recurrences of more terror. “In Sacai another city, the same earthquake was so terrible unto them, that many were bereft of their senses; and others by that horrible spectacle so much amazed, that they knew not what they did” (Burton I.ii, 336). Bodies, like the cities torn up by the earthquakes, are evacuated of reason. The senses no longer function, and the spectacle—the image imprinted on the imagination—continues to exert an influence. Burton uses “amaze” to describe the experience of having lost one’s reason and being in an enchanted, unconscious waking state.

The traumatic event is responsible for physical amazement. Significantly, Burton connects a shock to the heart with the experience of “amazement.” Here “amazement” refers to the somatic experience of the limit of terror. It is associated with an overturn of the body’s functions and in particular with the heart quaking. In another instance of the word, Burton refers to the lingering effects of this kind of shock: “Many men are so amazed and astonished with feare, they know not where they are, what they say, what they doe, and which is worst, it tortures them many daies with continual affrights and suspition” (Burton I.ii, 259-60). The response of fear, which is appropriate in a crisis, nevertheless continues to exert its influence, and it does so, Burton implies by way of unreason, “suspition” and recurrent “affrights.” The body overcome is one in which reason no longer has dominion, and like the smoking, ruined city with its smashed palaces and torn up streets, is ruled by something that is both outside the self and deep within. The unprecedented, unanticipated experience has the capacity nonetheless to create a new pattern of repetition. In this case, the repetitive effects of “amazement” ripple through the material and spiritual body.

In his explanation of “Terrors and Affrights” that cause melancholy, Burton explains how it is that “terrors,” which of “all the feares…are most pernitious and violent” through a sudden, unexpected shock can deeply affect the very locus of being, the brain, the soul, the spirits, the blood. No part of the body is unscathed and the body is overtaken by the terror itself, which is caused by a sense of imminent threat, “This terrore is most usually caused, as Plutarch will have, from some imminent danger, when a terrible object is at hand, heard, seene, or conceived, truly appearing, or in a dreame: and many times the more sudden the accident, it is the more violent” (Burton I.ii, 333). It does not matter whether the event occurs “truly” or “truly appearing” or “in a dreame”: there is parity between these events, as we saw above. The earthquake with its uncontained mess, its aftershocks and conflagrations, symbolizes the terrain of a body broken by terror in which reality and fiction are difficult to distinguish. Burton
recognizes the efficacy of amazement as terror to transform the physical and spiritual body by overturning reason and drawing the insides of the psyche out. Terror can alter the whole temperature of the body, move the soule and spirits, strike such a deepe impression, that the parties can never bee recovered, causing more grievous and fiercer Melancholy, as Felix Plater, cap. 3. de mentis alienat. speakes out of his experience, then any inward cause whatsoever: and imprints it selfe so forcibly in the spirits, braine, humors, that if all the masse of bloode were let out of the body, it could hardly be extracted. (Burton I.ii, 333)

As in the illustration of Katherin Gualter, terror “imprints it selfe,” reproduces itself in the body, so that the individual is evacuated of any sense of self; spirits, brain, humors, blood—indeed all that which constitutes our humanity is remade by terror. It cannot be removed, and this image of the irrecoverability of the self haunts the Anatomy. Felix Plater’s statement that it cannot be extracted even if “all the masse of bloode were let out of the body” suggests the crippling permanence of the effects.

Burton concludes this description of terror by quoting Seneca's Hercules Oetaeus, with its “cor attonitum salit,” which he translates as “their heart amazed quakes” (Burton I.ii, 333). Amazement as traumatic terror affects the very core of being, its suddenness and violence affecting the body from the inside out. Repeatedly, we will see the heart as the primary target of terror, and the stronghold from which terror wreaks havoc on the body. The particular passage that he chooses mentions, in addition to other physically disfiguring incurable diseases, (the “botch of Aegypt,” “Emrods,” “Scap,” and “Itch”), illnesses which cause psychological disorientation: “blindnesse,” which Biblically is associated with spiritual disconnection from God, “madnesse,” and “astonishing of heart” (Burton I.i, 124). We move from diseases that affect the periphery of the body to those that threaten the individual’s sense of orientation, of blasting the order of the body and rendering it rudderless. Gowland explains how fear affected the heart and the rest of the system: “the contraction of the heart in fear hindered its production of spiritus and provoked an inward and downward movement of the spirits, damaging the function and therefore the health of all outlying bodily parts” (Gowland 48). Furthermore, fear attracted black bile from the spleen, causing the heart to contract (“astonishment of the heart”); the heart then drew in and imprisoned the blood and spirits from the rest of the parts, depriving them of the vital heat and moisture necessary for healthy functioning, and cooling and drying the whole organism. The blood around the heart, thus cooled and dried, would degenerate into more black bile, which then spread outward through the body with a multitude of damaging consequences…”(Gowland 49).

A particular structure emerges for the experience of amazement: first the danger is perceived either with the senses and mediated by the imagination, or the imagination itself generates it, directly affected by the spiritual world. This information acts upon the center of the body, freezing it, and drawing in the life forces from the rest of the body. Thus, an external shock produces internal disorientation. By drawing the life forces inward the shock moves the center of feeling from externally- to internally-focused. This change in the quality and quantity of the humors tips the body toward melancholy, which is cold and dry. We may observe a self-perpetuating positive feedback loop: the presence of bile around the cold heart degenerates into more black bile, and the cycle of melancholy is endlessly reenforcing. We see, then, physically, how the humoral system accounts for the persistence of melancholy, which is itself induced by an interruption of healthy bodily rhythms and the proper allocation and proportion of humors.
The structure of amazement, then, emerges out of the interruption of bodily cycles by a real or perceived danger, which literally arrests the heart. This paralysis spreads through the need of the heart for the life forces, which causes a migration from the periphery to the center. Without further interruption, the body internalizes this shock, repeating it through the degeneration of black bile into more bile, and through the hyperactive, traumatized imagination, which continues to generate shocks through the Phantasie. These images convey the threat of death, of being occupied or besieged by a hostile force. In this sense, then, when the feeling of terror repeats itself, it is a return of the past. We would expect a “cure” to exhibit an opposite structure: the heart would warm and thaw; paralysis would be replaced by movement; the senses would return to an outward focus; the individual would feel a sense of expansion and connection rather than constriction and isolation; and we might expect the individual to confront the past on her own terms, either through a literal revisiting of a locus of trauma, or through some form of meaningful substitution that permits the psyche to be the *rapprocheur*.

What we will see is that the other kind of “amazement”—admiration/wonder—structurally mirrors amazement as terror, and indeed, allows a return. The structure of romance itself mimics this movement of trauma and constriction, decay and isolation, followed by its opposite: a return to rather than recoiling away, a shock that connects rather than isolates, the healing of the wounds of aggression by the offer of a gift of help, consolation, and unmerited kindness.

Traumatic shock results in the repetition of feelings of terror and/or of depression. Both responses are captured in the term, “melancholy.” The “cure,” such as it is, for this trauma-induced sickness operates at the level of the Imagination as well. As a comparison with Burton, we may refer to Thomas Newton’s 1576 translation of Lemnius’ *Touchstone of Complexions* for the wholly spiritual approach. According to this pneumatology in which the spirit freely permeates the material world, the Holy Spirit also commingles in our bodies. Unlike the Devil, who attacks, the Spirit must be invited, either through a disposition that is already in sync with the Spirit, or by a sick person asking Christ for help.

Againe as a pestilente winde induceth sickenesse and infection: so do euill Spirites exhale & breath out a pestiferous poysen, and to the mindes of men bring mischiefe and destruction. For by them came the first spot, ruine and destruction of mankinde, so that there was no other way to bryng him to his first excellency, dignity and perfection, but onely by that most wonderful restorer, Christ. (Lemnius 24, F³)

The individual experiences the larger cosmological battle synecdochically. If Christ came into the world to vanquish death, restoring “mankinde” from “ruine and destruction,” so the individual can return by means of the “wonderful restorer, Christ.” I don’t think it is a coincidence that Newton describes Christ’s role as restorer of health as “wonderful” because Christ’s redemption makes it possible to become again that marvel of marvels. Mankind is incapable of defending himself against the “subtile ambushes & deuises of this his moste raginge ennemy Sathan’ (Lemnius 24, F³). The wonderful agency of Christ—that which should elicit a sense of wonder from us properly viewed—“ stirreth vp and comforteth our mindes” (Lemnius 24, F³). In contrast with amazement as terror, this inward stirring comforts; the movement of the spirit, “shakinge away all distruste” moves us closer to the universal center of life, God the

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73 Lemnius, Levinus. *The Touchstone of Complexions.* Generallye appliabl e, expedent and profitable for all such, as bedesirous & carefull of their bodlye health. Contayning Most easie rules & ready tokens, whereby every one may perfectly try….first written in Latine, by Leuine Lemnie, and now englished by Thomas Newton. London: Thomas Marth, 1576.
Father (Lemnius 24, F). Christ as mediator, as agent of wonder has the final pivotal effect of generating hope. For if we see melancholy as a state of paralysis in which the psyche cannot even ask for help, so here it is that Christ as mediator disturbs the stasis and generates the movement that leads us to the Father, of whom “we dare to hope and aske all thinges” (Lemnius 24, F). However, the process is not simply one of beseeching. Rather, God acts upon us through

The Spirite which God hath inspyred into our harts…the spyrite of God therefore, confyrming our mindes, doth engraffe in vs fayth, grounded vppon the word of God, which fayth engendreth an assured trust and confidence toward him, wyth an vndoubted hope to obtaine his promises.” (Lemnius 24, F).

The Spirit that enters us engraves itself onto us, mirroring the way that trauma “imprintes it selfe” in the psyche. Perhaps the greatest gift of this penetration by the Holy Spirit is hope, which plants within the individual a confidence and trust to use the Phantasie to wish for good things: peace, love, life, peace, fulfillment.

Burton addresses the issue of the cure with very practical suggestions. The need for prayer, which he has advocated in Part I through the example of Charles of Burgundy, he continues to espouse in Parts II and III. He explains,

As we must pray for health of body and minde, so wee must use our utmost indeavours to preserve, and continue it. Some kind of divels are not cast out, but by fasting and prayer, and both necessarily required, not one without the other. For all the Physicke we can use, art, excellent industry, is to no purpose without calling upon God…It is in vaine to seeke for helpe, runne, ride, except God blesse us. (Burton II.i, 5)

Burton means “divels” both in the theological sense, but also referring to the more mundane humoral imbalance produced by material causes. He calls for behavioral changes, “doing something or other that shall be opposite unto them, thinking of something else, perswading by reason, or howsoever to make a sudden alteration of them…let him now stop upon a sudden, curbe himselfe in… (Burton II.i, 101). Burton exhorts eating and sleeping properly, for the Imagination spawns terrors when the body is deprived.

Burton does recognize that there are persistent kinds of melancholy in which despair has taken over, and the psyche is tortured by terrible, perhaps violent thoughts. None of the suggestions—prayer, intercession of reason, behavioral change, taking care of the physical body—work. He advises the patient take on a change of perspective, a distancing from the visions, murmurings of the Devil.

…[S]uch blasphemous, impious, uncleane thoughts, are not his owne, but the Divells; they proceed not from him, but from a crazed phantasie, distempered humours, black fumes which offend his braine, they are thy crosses, the Divels sinnes, and he shall answere for them, he doth enforce thee to doe that which thou dost abhorre, and didst never give consent to…..they have not proceeded from a confirmed will in thee, but are of that nature which thou dost afterwards reject and abhorre…they are not thy personall sinnes, for which thou shalt incure the wrath of God, or his displeasure, contemne, neglect them, let them goe as they come, strive not too violently, or trouble thy selfe too much…as Satan labours to suggest, so must we strive not to give consent, and it will be sufficient, the more anxious and solicitous thou art, the more perplexed, the more thou shalt otherwise be troubled, and intangled. (Burton III.iv, 433-4)

The patient must use reason and will to remind herself that the terrors are the product of a crazed Phantasie, the bodily sensation of melancholy the result of tangible material factors, and the
thoughts are not her own. Thus, the patient retreats from that which he associates with the experience of subjectivity, the very thoughts coursing through his mind. They proceed from another, and the individual mediates these images. In order to escape the terror generated by the Phantasie’s images, it must be acknowledged that they are radically other, the product of an infernal mind. The self must find a locus of identity outside of the images with which it becomes identified. Rather than be tortured by these images, one must “reject and abhorre” them, just as one abhors the Devil from whom they proceed. The images must be allowed to run their course, the will dismissing them, moving away rather than toward an entangling discussion. Rather than being “amazed,” the suggestion is to achieve distance so that the spectacle becomes a ridiculous conversation generated by the Other’s mind but in one’s body, and he, rather than his victim, will be accountable.

Although never explicitly proposing it as a ‘cure,’ Burton offers a solution akin to Lemnius, but which also takes into account philosophy and natural science. He cautions against amor heroes, which is the product of desire stirring up a bitter love melancholy. However, beauty similarly has the power to stir up and inspire, in much the same way that Newton describes the presence of God.

For as the same Plato defines it, Beauty is a lively shining of glittering brightnesse, resulting from effused good, By Ideas, seeds, reasons, shadowes, stirring up our mindes, that by this good they may be united and made one. (Burton III.i, 10)

It is not simply that lovers may be united through the mediating presence of beauty, but rather that the life of the Phantasie (Ideas, seeds, shadowes) might be united with other parts of the mind, such as the Reason. The disorder of the terrified psyche, its reason overthrown by a tyrannical Imagination, contrasts with the psyche in which Imagination and reason are inseparable. In the Platonic system, beauty returns us to the mind of the “divine Sunne” (Burton III.i, 11); it dazzles, but also points back to the admirable conscience that created it. Burton’s Platonic system accounts for the power of words that, like Beauty, reflect upon the goodness and truth of their Creator, to which they point. The cure for melancholy is, then, structurally the opposite of traumatic amazement, and it moves a step beyond the explicit cure that he has proposed. But like trauma, or the intercession of the divine, it also stirs up the mind.

The freedom that disavowing the feverish Imagination gives the individual, his liberation from the Devil’s stranglehold on his psyche, comes about when he shifts his perspective and accountability from guilty author of sinful fantasies to captive audience of the Devil’s infernal drama. This movement outward and away contrasts with what has happened at a bodily level: the psyche has been subject to repetitive terrors that come from outside and cause the heart to recoil and draw in its resources. Now Burton describes a different source of amazement and a different response.

There is still some peculiar grace as of good discourse, eloquence, wit, honesty, which is the primum mobile, first mover, and a most forcible loadstone to drawe the favours and good wills of mens eyes, cares, and affections unto them. When Jesus spake they were all astonied at his answers, (Luk. 2. 47.) and wondred at his gratious wordes which proceeded from his mouth. An Orator steales away the hearts of men, and as another Orpheus; quo vult, unde vult, he pulles them to him by speech alone: a sweet voice causeth admiration, and hee that can utter himself in good wordes, in our ordinary phrase, is called a proper man, a divine spirit” (Burton III.i, 23)

Good discourse will affect the imagination by pointing, like beauty, back to the “primum mobile.” This “good discourse” will draw others’ affection and good will to the person who
utters it. As such, Burton seems to echo the Quintillian measure of a good man, who is defined by his good discourse, since a good orator must be a good man. The parallel invocation of Orpheus and Jesus who win over with their words is significant. The orator “steales away the hearts of men.” Likewise, we know in Patristic soteriology, Jesus must act as a thief, stealing away men from the clutches of the Devil. Similarly, Orpheus’ talents allow him to steal his wife away from death. If traumatic amazement is a fear of annihilation of one’s identity and the threat of death, the good speaker draws us away from this, by stealing us, transporting us effortlessly. The reactions of those who listen to Jesus are astonishment and wonder. But this shock will cause the speaker to ascend, to make a journey that involves the emotions and the mind, in which Phantasie becomes the conduit a return to a renewed sense of self. The words of Jesus first astonish, and then the power of the words reveals the sense beyond chaos, the hidden architecture of the cosmos. Words spoken in honesty at once reveal the speaker and the world around him.

In Burton, the fantasy is the place where healing occurs. The body is the locus, the physical place where warring forces clash. The experience of amazement describes being stunned paralysis, confusion and disorder; and it also describes wonder, admiration, and a creative “stirring” of the mind and the soul. For Burton, the word, be it through prayer or an honest, enlightened speech, has the power to stir and change. While traumatic amazement can cause the individual to be possessed by aggressive, destructive forces outside of the self, the solution comes from in effect acknowledging the otherness of the world inside the self. Thus, Burton advises acknowledging the Devil’s thoughts playing themselves out in the imagination, but also recognizes the power of an alternative fantasy to provide relief.

Underneath the Christian soteriology is a real terror, but the resurrection of Christ provides the positive wonder that interrupts it. On the surface, at least, there is an ideological distinction of tremendous consequence in the redemptive, positive view of life inherent in the culture of Christianity that underlies Renaissance romance and distinguishes it from Greek romance. Anglican theologian Simon Ulrich writes, “…the Christian claims that the random events which create disaster belong also to the eternal order. If this unification can be validated then Christian faith and tragic tradition are seen to be married in an indissoluble bond of spiritual transcendence.” For an audience of Christians experiencing death, it is at once tragic, and also part of a scheme of redemption. The spectator seems to exist on two levels. He is the one who pities the protagonist. However, the Christian has a confirmed sense of a redemptive eschatology that does not erase the loss, but rather casts tragic death in a different light:

Death as death is nothing; death must seal the fight against selfish and perverted notions of justice and power. Then death becomes tragic in the original sense, for it cleanses the filth off the survivors. Life eternal after resurrection is not more vindication after martyrdom, but the continuing strain of the music of redemption. (Ulrich 139)

There is an inherent difficulty in reconciling Christianity with the world of tragic theatre, and Ulrich acknowledges it. Indeed, thinking of tragic death as “martyrdom” already betrays a sensibility in which the gods are not divided, but turned full-face toward the movement from one world to the next. One has to go back a little further in Ulrich’s argument to understand what “cleansing the filth off the survivors” might mean.

Christ’s death served a purpose which can only be dimly perceived in the great tragedies. He dies to reconcile the world to God, his death makes peace. Thus the element of the recognition of things as they really are is common to the best of tragic drama and its

fulfillment on Golgotha. The witnesses of the death of Christ feel the terror of the scene and a pity in their hearts beyond all grief. They are not purged by or from pity and terror, but they feel both, drawn into the orbit of the death. The descent from the Cross of the dead body and its entombment lead to an awesome conclusion of a rejected life. Mark’s Gospel ends simply with the words ‘and they were afraid’. (Ulrich 45)

Ulrich is referring to the shortest end point for the Gospel, according to ancient authorities, at Mk 16:8. This being the earliest gospel, source material for the other synoptic gospels, it would seem to be a perfect place for experiencing the inherent tragedy of the story of Christ. It allows a glimpse at the first iteration of the Christian story, which announces the resurrection, but does not present it: “[Christ] is going ahead of you to Galilee; there you will see him just as he told you” (Mk 16:7). It is only after this message of hope, of a reconciliation that occurs outside the confines of the narrative, that we see the verse from which Ulrich quotes in part above: “So they went out and fled from the tomb, for terror and amazement had seized them; and they said nothing to any one, for they were afraid” (Mk 16:8). In the Greek, in place of terror, read τρόμος (tromos), trembling. The Greek word for “amazement” in this instance is ἐκστασις (ekstasis), which Strong’s Concordance shows also at Lk 5:26 and Acts 10:10. However, in the latter instance, it refers not simply to amazement or astonishment, but to falling into a trance: ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ἐκστασις. The idea that Ulrich proposes, then, is that at the very heart of the Christian narrative is a tragedy, a tragedy because it is experienced as fear (trembling) and ekstasis, which embodies the trance-like, the shocked, and is tinged with a sense of euphoric ascent.

In the account of Christ anticipating his death in the garden, Lemnius uses Christ’s fear as an example of how the fantasy can astonish the senses so much that it produces numbness: In what perplexity, distresse, agonie, and feare our Saviour Christ was, euen by this to euerye man euidently appeareth, that, he fixing his mind vppon the instant daunger wherein he presently stoode, and as it were before his eyes beholding his death now imminent at and at hand, the sweate trickeled downe his body to the ground lyke dropes of bloude. For the terrour and feare of death, deepely sinking into a mans imagination, is farre more greeuous and terrible then death it selfe: for many haue theyr Senses so astonnyed and benummed, and Death happeneth vnto them without any feeling of paine at all. (Lemnius 91-2, M3'-M4')

Feelings of distress and agony at the fantasy of what will happen, even in the omniscient godhead, who knows what will happen, still has the power to turn sweat into blood. This vision of Christ’s suffering manifests the transformative somatic effects of the imagination. However, out of this pain, as Mark’s Gospel makes clear, the corresponding feeling of ekstasis allows for an imaginative movement out of trauma.

The mira ex machina that I referred to at the beginning of this section uses the very same methods that create trauma in literature to provide an escape from it. Pedro Mercado explains that melancholy is a particular problem among people with good memories,

Porque entre las cosas que nos acordamos, unas nos atemorizan, otras nos atormentan y casi todas nos enristecen. Por lo cual, siendole prometida por un filosofo a Julio César arte de hacer memoria, respondio que antes queria aprender arte de olvido.” (Mercado, cited in Bartra 397)

Mercado’s wonderful anecdote about Julius Caesar reiterates what Burton observes about the role of the memory of trauma and its effects on the fantasy. That which causes fear and sadness, either needs to be forgotten or needs to be supplanted. Amazement is both the cause and the cure.

for trauma because it interrupts that part of the fantasy that remembers terror, using the same methods used to produce it: surprise and shock. According to Edward Reynolds, that which is sudden and unexpected can also overwhelm the body, but instead of plaguing the fantasy, it enlarges and opens the mind.

So strong and violent hath been the immutation which sudden joy hath wrought in the Body, that many (as I have formerly noted) have been quite overwhelmed by it. And for this Reason it is that new things, and such as we admire, and were not before acquainted withal doe usually Delight us, because the surprize us, representing a kinde of strangenesse unto the minde, whereby it is enlarged and enriched. (Reynolds 113, Ee4)

Strangeness is not only the alien, but also the unexpected, and it is associated with the terrifying. Reynolds turns around this definition of the strange. The unexpected surprise causes delight. The experience of the strange here is the recognition of the sudden arrival of joy. Reynolds points to “strange and New things,” which have the “greatest price set upon them,” and are “brought out of strange Countries” (113, Ee4) that cause delight because they surprise. He conflates the foreign and the unexpected because both have the power to produce haunting memories or to supplant them with a new narrative.

The association of the sudden and the foreign, as both representing kinds of strangeness that either astonish with fear or produce wonder, provides a foundation for the dramatic and emotional movement of the texts that follow. These romances represent the strangeness of the foreign as the source of trauma, but travelling into foreign realms is the only way to bring back joy and get beyond the cyclical suffering of trauma. Thus the protagonists in Cervantes’ captivity stories are continually assaulted by the repeated iterations of the strange, but it is also the strange that makes possible their escape. Posthumus becomes unhinged when a foreigner infects his imagination, and Leontes is overwhelmed by strange fantasies. But they are also remade when their partners return, like Alcestis, strangely, with a veil. Pericles is crushed by a strange woman and then resurrected by another.

The *mira ex machina* in Shakespeare and Cervantes recognizes the constructedness of experiences that produce amazement, but also exploits the therapeutic potential of them. The structure of trauma is *returning to* and *visitation by* an event in the past, and so amazement in these stories is about a repetitive encounter with terror and escape. In tragedy, amazement is a response to terrifying events and to the dignity of humans in the face of catastrophe. The early romances of Euripides and Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses* expand the possibilities of amazement to respond to trauma by introducing escape and pleasure out of the seeds of terror. The Greek *ekstasis* captures the sense in which what is terrifying can provide an escape through trance, which creates dream and pleasure. While escape may be temporary, the *mira ex machina* in the plays that follow provide the imaginative possibility for the return to and visitation by unexpected joy, but also terror.
Cervantes wrote three variations on the same captivity story, two comedias that intertwine a love story with the Senecan horrors of captivity, and a novella, which attempts to eliminate tragic terror in favor of a love plot. El trato, the earliest play, and most likely performed by 1574, ends with an emotionally discordant performance of both terror and wonder. Los baños, chronologically the last piece written, subsumes the terror of Christian martyrs by emphasizing a Platonic version of wonder—an aesthetic and spiritual departure from trauma into the ideal. “The Captive’s Tale” from Don Quixote Part I focuses completely on a love plot and eschews martyr stories, the use of grotesque characters, and Senecan gore, and so it is here we see the relationship of terror to wonder. While the romance attempts to contain terror—literally on an island, symbolically a walled off space of the psyche—it resurfaces after the romance closure.

El trato, a play whose name is based on the Moorish practice of pulling the body apart by hanging it from a tree, depicts the dehumanization of both Christian and Moorish society by a confluence of self-interested sex, betrayal, and violence. In the story of Zoraida and Ruy Pérez in Don Quixote Part I Cervantes revives the same story, but instead of the trato as an explicit torture of Christians, the story reimagines trato in its other meanings as double-dealing, betrayal, and commercial transactions. In the attempt to buy happiness and exchange terror for wonder, the love story bears the burden of the explicit torture it cuts out by displacing martyr stories and torture onto the love triangle of father-daughter-lover. The figure of the idealized woman, Zoraida or Zahara, represents the possibility of escape from slavery by redeeming, or literally buying, the freedom of the captive Spaniards. Symbolically, she serves as a psychological escape from trauma into fantasy. In “The Captive’s Tale,” terror restages itself, showing the limitations of the fantasy of the feminine ideal to eradicate terror through the wonder, or admiración, which she inspires. Later, in Los baños, Cervantes once again unyokes the love plot from violence and betrayal, rendering the relationship to the feminine less complicated and focusing the experience of wonder instead on a transcendent ideal.

The main themes of Cervantes’ captivity stories—martyrdom, sexual desire, and slavery—contribute to his unsettling creation of a comedia that does not conceal the trauma at its core. Loss of life, dismemberment of the body and the family, and rape, which are all handmaidens of terror, menace the players of El trato and Los baños be they Moor or Christian. Much of the terror seems to be submerged or sidelined by a “narrative fetish” in the “Captive’s Tale.” Eric Santner, a Germanist who writes about psychoanalysis and the Holocaust, describes the kind of work a romance like “The Captive’s Tale” accomplishes, as “narrative fetishism,” which is “the construction and deployment of narrative consciously or unconsciously designed to expunge the traces of trauma or loss that called that narrative into being in the first place.” In early modern terms this can refer also to the spiritual practice that exercises the imagination by attempting to replace discordant personal memory with another narrative, Christ’s Passion. According to Luis de Granada, the means of achieving true peace, which is wonder at God, is to focus on the life and death of the Redeemer, and “there will be no room for strange, foreign, or imagined ideas, but rather all these destructive thoughts will be driven out just as one nail drives

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out another.” The new narrative with its joyous, culminating transfiguration would ideally fill up the imagination and squeeze out the unpleasantness of the foreign, which here is actually personal memory. In spite of the overt religiosity of the plays, terror persists as dramatically and psychologically central versus the interpolated novella of Zoraida and Ruy Pérez, where the conventions of the genre of romance seem to strip it of terror. The setting of the plays is punctuated by the terror caused by sex and violence, whereas in “The Captive’s Tale” sexual desire veils itself and violence is literally muted and distanced. Cervantes’ overt treatment of violence and sex in the plays and its sublimation in “The Captive’s Tale” accounts for why terror persists or is forged into something closer to an elevated wonder. Nevertheless, as we can see in the impact of Zoraida and Ruy Pérez on the meta-diagetic audiences in Spain, the specter of terror reemerges, wedded or bound, as the case may be, to the experience of wonder.

This chapter begins by examining the definition of terror, *espanto*, in Covarrubia’s dictionary. Terror, which the previous chapter shows had already been linked to traumatic repetition and to the imagination unhinged, reproduces itself “spectrally,” as a mirage or mirroring situation, that points back to an earlier event in reality. This understanding of terror explains the continual mirroring of different plot situations within each captivity story, and also between them. On the other hand, Covarrubias also relates terror (*espanto*) to wonder (*maravilla, admiración*), and the next examples will demonstrate the mirroring or distension of images and plot situations that are terrifying into those that produce a transcendent, pleasurable wonder. This section draws on contemporary historical accounts and theology to contextualize and clarify the violence in the captivity plays, and also the foundation for understanding wonder as a product of terror, and therefore violence. The chapter then summarizes the captivity tales in chronological order of their composition. After pointing out the emotional vortexes of terror and wonder, it shows how these are related to the possibilities of closure and of containing terror. The chapter then turns to Seneca to show the manner in which the Roman tragedian, whose influence is present thematically and structurally in Cervantes’ plays, provides a model for the doubling of experiences of terror. An emblematic instance of Senecan tragedy, *Thyestes*, illustrates the futility of trying to contain terror in Atreus’ garden, a motif, which is repeated in “The Captive’s Tale,” and later in *Los baños*. Finally, the chapter demonstrates how the various escape plots from the captivity stories either present terror alongside wonder or an oscillation between terror and wonder. Cervantes’ captivity stories demonstrate the limitations of the escape offered by the love plot to contain terror either through sexual fantasy or idealization.

Although there is no entry in Covarrubias’ *Tesoro de la lengua castellana* for “terror” or “trauma,” he provides an analysis of *espantar* that conveys the connections between terror and wonder:

> Cause horror, fear, *admiratio*, and it is said of *espantar*, almost to astonish, from *pasmar*, or from the name *spectrum*, which means ghost, to mirror, a corruption of *espantar*. See the [Latin] verb *expavescere*, to fear; almost [Portuguese] *espernear*, to agitate the legs violently; see also [Latin] *Pane a quo terror panicus*, let the panic terrify. […] Italian.

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Spaventre. French Spanter. To become terrified. To become amazed. Terrified, stupefied, fearful, amazed. Based on the definition of “espantar” as “causar horror” and the reference to panic terror (terror Panicus), the word is quite similar to the English “terrify,” to provoke terror. Moreover, Covarrubias need to relate espantar to astonishment (espasmar, de pasmo) as well as amazement (maravillarse) and admiratio, (admiración), demonstrates the contiguity, the quasi mirroring, and the generative dynamic relationship between terror and the words Covarrubias clusters around it. In reaching for synonyms to French and Italian, Covarrubias almost reflexively betrays how entrenched the concept is in the literary traditions of neighboring romance language-speaking countries, but also the necessary searching for an explanation through other emotional expressions across cultural sensibilities. Espanto—call it shock (atonito), fear tinged with cowardice (medroso), astonishment (pasmo), fear (expavescere)—is related to the experience of wonder (maravillado). This Babel of synonyms that operate on sufficiently different emotional registers makes terror and the words used to define it appear, paradoxically, both completely different and the same.

Terror can cause a doubling of experience or images, and Covarrubias captures this by tracing it to spectrum. On the other hand, the experience of wonder, maravilla and admiración, are also a kind of spectral doubling. Covarrubias writes that espantar is “quasi espasmar,” almost to astonish, “de pasmo” from astonishment, or from the word “spectrum,” which means a ghost, to cause a frightening illusion (espectrar), and from this the corruption espantar. For Covarrubias there is a strong relationship between terror and the illusory that is pregnant with foreboding, a false supernatural that has real effects on the psyche. However, it can also refer to the reaction to something real existing outside of the expected (maravillado).

Theology elucidates the relationship of fear to the doubling of the spectral that we see in Covarrubias’ definition. The person who is easily frightened, who confuses spectral illusions with real marvels, is myopic through a theological deficiency. Fear, properly directed toward God, initiates and then revives one’s relationship to the divine. Luis de Granada explains, “people are enchanted and bewitched, so that although they have eyes, they cannot see.” Fear, theologically speaking can redeem a life of sin by making the sinner aware of this distortion of vision, disenchanting and removing a spell. Terror is the point of departure for a change of behavior and preparing for the inevitable. First comes the trauma of shock—the overwhelming of the body and the senses by fear—and then comes revelation. It is grace, operating through terror and shock that produces the opening of St. Paul’s eyes: “as it befell Paul when he went to persecute the Church. He was knocked down to the ground, and even with his eyes open, could see nothing.” On the other hand, the damned are those who fall prey to the illusions of the demonic. In the Ars Moriendi, a popular book on the preparation for the temptations of the devil

80 “De estas ceguedades hallarás tantas en el mundo, que te parecerá están los hombres como encantados y enhechizados; de tal manera, que teniendo ojos no ven…” (de Granada 1, 185).
81 “como en figura acaesció a sant Pablo quando iba a perseguir la Iglesia, el cual después que fue derribado en tierra, abiertos los ojos ninguna cosa veía…” (de Granada 1,185).
before death, it refers to those who give in to the five temptations of the devil.82 Thus, there is a
distinction between the bewitchment of those who are fooled by the Devil’s illusions—in Los
baños de Argel, an illusory Spanish armada off the coast of Algiers—and something like
Ignatius’ perception of spirits. The final triumph of the Christian is to witness marvels, to
experience the amazement that attends them, and to appreciate them as revelation rather than
enchantment.

Where knowledge is driven out by terror, it makes room for recognition, anagnorisis, of a
different kind. A recognition that is expansive, illuminating losses and agony, drawing, as if by a
supernatural force, lost connections and relationships into its orbit, becomes part of the
experience of wonder. This wonder is more like that in Plato’s Ion than Aristotle’s in his
Metaphysics. It is not necessarily the beginning of a search for knowledge of a philosophical,
rational kind, but is the genesis of an emotional journey. Wonder in Plato’s Ion arrests, deviates,
causes us to perceive what we don’t necessarily understand; it is associated with revelation rather
than explication, truth that is arrived at through a world torn up rather than at the end of a
dialectical chain. However, even in the ecstatic wonder of the end, there is always a return of the
original terror, because the trauma, in spite of all the force of revelation and supernatural
intervention, is not expunged, but repositioned in relation to the traumatized subject.

The historical context of the Mediterranean during the time in which the captivity tales
are set was one of internal religious strife and persecution. There were continual pirate raids
of the coastal towns and ongoing religious warfare with the powerful Ottomans. In spite of being
the greatest empire in the world at the time, the Spanish empire was rife with internal upheaval.
The reconquista, which we think of as already complete with the successful siege of Granada in
1492, was still alive even as Spain expanded its territories and influence in the Americas and in
Europe. There were Moorish uprisings in Alpujarras from 1568-71, following Philip’s reforms
banning all forms of Moorish culture in 1567.83 Moorish unrest in Spain was not limited to the
more newly conquered parts of the south, but also in Valencia and La Mancha. In a sign of the
measures that he would take in his role as self-proclaimed defender of orthodox Catholicism,
Philip initiated his reign with a massive auto da fe inside the walls of the city of Valladolid on
October 8, 1559.84 Menéndez Pidal relates the famous confrontation between Philip and a
heretic. Carlos de Seso “confronted the king and said, “How can you let me burn?” King Philip
responded with these memorable words: “I would bring wood to burn my own son if he were as
bad as you are.”85 After the bishop of Zamora’s sermon, he asked Philip whether he would
defend the Catholic faith, and the newly coronated king swore, “Ay, I do swear I will,” and he
was echoed by the crowd of Valladolid.86 The scene crystallizes the sense in which the Church
and the king enlist their subjects to patrol themselves from cultural and religious contamination.

82 Anonymous. Arte de bien morir y breve confesionario : (Zaragoza, Pablo Hurus : c. 1479-1484) : según el
incunable de la Biblioteca del Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial. Ed. Francisco Gago Jover. Palma de
85 “Se encaró con el rey y le dijo que ‘cómo le dexaba quemar.’ Respondió Don Felipe con estas memorables
palabras: ‘Yo traeré leña para quemar a mi hijo si fuere tan malo como vos.’ (Menéndez Pidal 534).
86 “Así lo juro” (Menéndez Pidal 534).
The presence of an imminent threat from within the empire, by crypto-Muslims, Jews, and Protestants, was coupled by the guerrilla forays of Christian and Berber pirates kidnapping Spaniards along the peninsula’s Mediterranean coast. Many of the moriscos, forced out of the country, founded colonies along Africa’s northern coasts. Algiers was the most famous of these colonies with an economy based on pirating and human trafficking. Thus there was a direct link between the domestic policies that strove for purity of faith and the establishment of colonies where Christians were held as captives for ransom or, if their resources back home were insufficient, life-long servitude.

In addition to these internal threats, there was also a sense of continued threat from the outside by the Ottomans. The victory of the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 by an alliance between Venice, the Papal States, and Habsburg Spain proved that the Ottomans were not invincible. The Muslim enemy had advanced throughout Eastern Europe up to the walls of Vienna, and they had taken back a number of the fortified cities that Charles had established along the North African coast. However, as a number of historians have pointed out, the temporary truce between the Ottomans and the major powers of Mediterranean Spain meant that all parties abandoned military patrolling of the Mediterranean and the area was given over to increased pirating. After fighting in the Battle of Lepanto, it was just such an instance of piracy by which Cervantes initiated his five-year captivity in Algiers. Thus, although the balance of power shifted from organized Ottoman armies to rogue pirates, the threat to life and possessions was continuous.

It is easy to draw a connection between these kinds of real internal and external threats, which felt always imminent and never disappeared, and the experience of group trauma from the presence of sustained terror. Kai Erikson, a Yale sociologist who studies the consequences of catastrophic events, observes,

…it only makes sense to insist that trauma can issue from a sustained exposure to battle as well as from a moment of numbing shock, from a continuing pattern of abuse as well as from a single searing assault, from a period of severe attenuation and erosion as well as from a sudden flash of fear. The effects are the same…

Disagreeing with theorists who point out that traumatized communities fall into Utopianism, sustained by post-disaster euphoria, he imagines that group trauma disposes the psyche toward an apocalyptic mindset (Erikson 186). One sudden catastrophe or a series of sustained instances of aggression creates trauma. Maria Antonia Garcés has already written an acclaimed book on the relationship between trauma and Cervantes’ creative oeuvre, not just his captivity plays. Likewise, Eisenberg, Anderson, Graf, Meregalli, Sevilla Arroyo, Fernández, Dominguez, Spitzer, Smith, Combat, and, Astrana Marin consider the specific effects of the confrontation with the Muslim other, both in Spain and in the wide world outside the Iberian peninsula, on Spanish identity. Whether to a greater or lesser extent, these analyses have had to consider the traumatic impact of, on the one hand, the official suppression of minorities within Iberia, and on the other, the aggressive lash-back of Moors or moriscos and predatory pirates.

Kai Erikson describes the wounding effects of this sense of continual threat on the communal and individual imaginations: “…trauma involves a continual reliving of some wounding experience in daydreams and nightmares, flashbacks and hallucination, and in a compulsive seeking out of similar circumstances” (Erikson 184). From a literary perspective,

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we can see the marks of trauma in Cervantes’ captivity plays in the “daydreams and nightmares, flashbacks and hallucinations” that seem to double, spectrally, a traumatic event in the past. The plays reveal a landscape of melancholy and depression, laments and feelings of inevitable doom: “the plays of the captives’ travails always end in tragedy.”89 This general resignation to catastrophe, due to the trauma of captivity, is punctuated by moments of a visceral, intuited threat. Toward the conclusion of the Baños, Costanza reveals to Zahara, “my heart jumps out of my chest.”90

The proximity of physical torture, verbal taunting, or a sexual intensity that threatens to overcome the boundaries of the self, is balanced by visions of impending doom. In the continuation of her declaration above, Costanza adds, “I saw a vision, which if true, and from a sound mind, declares that the end of this day, will also be the conclusion of my life.”91 Corresponding to the continual signs of danger, we observe mass hallucinations, such as the appearance of a massive fleet off the coast of Algiers, and supposedly legitimate marvels, such as the tame lion that leads the Christian fugitive to freedom. Luis de Granada explains, “The passion of fear is powerful, and makes monumental things out of small things, and present things out of those that are absent.”92 Terror, then, provokes sudden starts and fears, a veritable illusion of misery when it is unmerited. While the disordered psyche—that which cannot distinguish between the real and the illusory, good and bad—creates its own terrors, once fear—imagined or perceived—takes root, it impacts the fantasy and creates illusions.

For the characters in Cervantes’ captivity novels, the dismemberment of the community and of their own bodies produces terror. The title of the original play, El trato de Argel93 stresses this Moorish torture by slowly dismembering the parts of the body. Covarrubias defines “trato” as “from rope, a punishment in which the hands are tied behind the back, the body lifted up into the air, and then allowed to fall to the ground, so that the bones are almost dislocated from the shoulders.”94 This torture creates a sense of falling, without ever reaching the ground, so it is lived as a continual experience of vertigo, of bewilderment. In this sense, the physical torture literally embodies, or somaticizes, the vertiginous feeling of fear. This terror has the potential to, as the Ars Moriendi describes of death in general, strip conviction and belief.95 The final effect is to dismember the body, inscribing an emotional experience through bodily pain: the European captives in Algiers have already been torn apart from family, community, and country. It is fitting that a torture, which bewilders and produces pain, and creates a sense of being unmoored from time and space, should frame Cervantes’ first foray into theatre after his return from captivity.

90 “me da el corazón saltos que me rompe el pecho” (Cervantes 1991, I, 383).
91 “haber visto una visión/ que, si no es fingida,/y en buen discurso trazada, el fin de aquesta jornada/ had de ser el/ de mi vida” (Cervantes 1991, I,383).
92 “Poderosa es la passion del temor, la cual de las cosas pequeñas hace grandes, y de las ausentes presentes” (Granada I, 206).
93 Many literary critics refer to it also as Los tratos de Argel.
94 “Trato.” “de cuerda, castigo que se suele dar, atando a uno las manos por detrás, levantandole en el ayre, y dexandole despues caer sin que llegue a tierra, con que casi se le descoyuntan los huessos de los hombros.”
This continual atmosphere of fear can dismember communities and individual souls, in the same way that the trato suggests it dismembers the individual body. The captivity stories, however, in their attempt to construct a kind of order and meaning for suffering, must continually confront the centrifugal force of terror and its tendency to destroy meaning. If terror disorders the soul, then can the visions produced under duress be trusted? Secondly, is there a possibility for wisdom—the wisdom of seeing divine providence and order behind catastrophe—that comes out of these experiences? Terror can either drive out wisdom or produce wisdom. If Montaigne quotes Ennius, “Tum pavor sapientiam omnem mihi ex animo expectorat,” Miguel de Unamuno retorts that this emptying can also be the beginning of wisdom: “Initium sapientiae timor Domini, it was said, meaning perhaps timor mortis, or maybe timor vitae, which is the same. The beginning of wisdom is always fear.” Unamuno makes intuitive equivalences between the fear of God, the fear of death, and the fear of life, and then goes on to conclude that the beginning of wisdom is fear. The logic here betrays the psychological connection between terror, which as we saw above signals the participation or presence of God, and both the will to live and to die. What is perplexing—at least on the surface—is Unamuno’s recognition that life is just as terrifying as death. In a place between life and death—equally afraid of both—the subject distressed by terror is disoriented. Unamuno posits this fear, as opposed to Aristotle’s more philosophical wonder (thaumazein), as the initial first step of the psyche’s journey toward wisdom. This wisdom is an emotional experience, coupled with recognition; it produces wisdom through an emotional shock of heightened proportions. We see its opposite in destructive terror, most powerfully articulated in Orestes’ fear of the Furies (Belfiore 26). Destructive terror produces illusions, blindness, and despair.

The historical and cultural forces that cohere a sense of nation and of self always in relation to an aggressive and dangerous Other manifest themselves powerfully in the first of Cervantes’ captivity plays. El trato de Argel is one of only two of Cervantes’ plays from his earliest literary period, corresponding to his return from his own captivity in Algiers. As such, it possesses the most raw, least elaborated version of violence and its effects on the captives and captors. The play begins with a long lament by Aurelio, a Spanish captive, reaffirming his commitment to Silvia, whom he believes was left behind when he was captured. The love intrigue that binds the otherwise disparate pieces of the play begins immediately after when Zahara confesses her love to her slave, Aurelio, and to her lady-in-waiting, Fatima. After chastening her mistress, Fatima promises Zahara that she will help her seduce Aurelio. Alone, however, Aurelio promises not to give into the easy life that would come to him by betraying his Spanish lover. In the following scene, we learn of a despondent character named Saavedra who wishes he could speak directly to King Philip and ask for mercy for the many captives enslaved in Moorish lands. We hear of a morisco, who although baptized, becomes a renegade and captures more than six hundred Christians. For this, he is burned in Spain, but his parents avenge the assassination by doing the same to an innocent Christian. In a counterpoint between a love plot and stories of martyrdom, the play moves back to a conversation between Aurelio and

Zahara’s husband, Yzuf. He learns that his master, an upwardly mobile renegade, has acquired a beautiful young Spanish girl named Silvia. Aurelio is amazed.

The next scene depicts a Spanish lad at auction, who strikes the fancy of a Moor. He is ripped apart from his parents to become a garzon, or male concubine, while his parents warn him to keep the Christian faith. We then learn of a possible attack by Philip on the way to Portugal. Following, Zahara asks Silvia to open up to her, woman to woman. Zahara confesses her love for a Christian, and Silvia responds that, at least for a woman, that kind of love is prohibited. When Silvia learns that Zahara is in love with her Aurelio, she volunteers to intercede. In a juxtaposed dialogue between Yzuf and Aurelio, the Spaniard promises to help his master. Next, Fatima invokes the demons in a comic incantation, appealing to the Dis himself.

Act III opens with a discussion between slaves who call on John of Austria, Philip’s brother, or the Spanish king himself, to save them, were it not for the pesky Protestants absorbing royal efforts. One slave reveals to the other his attempt to escape to the Spanish colony, Oran. After a reunion of the two lovers, Necessity and Opportunity, two allegorical characters, debate with Aurelio the benefits of giving in to Zahara. When Zahara emerges on the stage, it seems as if Aurelio has justified his spiritual defeat as a means to justify a noble end. However before succumbing altogether, he recognizes that he will be replacing his amorous fantasies (fantasías amorosas) with dishonest, infamous, vain thoughts. Having strengthened his moral fortitude, he confronts one of the lads sold into slavery, Francisco, who explains to him that his son has recanted his religion for the softer life of the Moor. Enter Silvia and they embrace, witnessed by the jealous Zahara and Yzuf.

After Aurelio makes an excuse for why they were embracing, Yzuf notifies them that the king has demanded the presence of the two Spaniards. The next scene presents a captive slave who has sees a lion come to lead him away and knows “without a doubt” that it has manifested itself because of an amazing power. Next, Saavedra explains to a captive that he cannot be true to the Christian faith inwardly, while paying homage to the infidel on the outside. Saavedra counsels Pedro to stay the course, and one day he will obtain liberty. The man repents. The next scene, however, seems to indicate the opposite, as the slave attempting to escape has been found and is being tortured. The king surprises the couple by giving them freedom on the next ship; because they are Spaniards, known for their integrity, he trusts that they will send him their ransom money. Francisco enters and tells them that a religious order has arrived to buy their freedom, and while one slave thanks God, the other confesses he expects nothing good from anybody from his homeland. Young Francisco urges them to pray to the Virgin for help. The play ends with the supplication of the slaves to the Virgin, their fate still uncertain, on one side of the stage. On the other Aurelio, in full knowledge that he will return to Spain, gives thanks to the Virgin for her mercy and reaffirms his faith.

In The Captive’s Tale, there are far fewer overt displays of religiosity on the part of the captives, and it is stripped altogether of martyrs and violence. Ruy Pérez recounts his family history; his father split three brothers’ inheritance while he was still alive, but it was not enough for them to live on. Each had to find his fortune. He enlisted in the royal navy, and the night after the Battle of Lepanto had been won, he found himself the prisoner of pirates. After a period in Constantinople, he is moved to Algiers and is owned by a ruthless renegade. Housed in the

99 “¿Tan presto has ofrecido y dado al viento/las justas, amorosas fantasias/y ocupas la memoria de otras vanas-inhonestas, infames y livianas?” (El trato 156).
100 “Sin duda es divina cosa/y asegúrame este intent/que en mis espíritus siento/con fuerza maravillosa...” (El trato 160).
baños, the enclosure of the slave barracks, he finds himself adjacent to the home of one of the richest Moors, Agi Morato. One day, they notice a reed with a white cloth on the end hanging from the window. A white hand, by which they imagine the person to be a Christian damsel or European renegade, shows itself along with a cross. Several men approach the reed and it is pulled up and shakes as if to say no. Finally, the captive shows himself, and the reed falls to the ground at his feet. He finds it filled with Moorish gold coins.

Later, she sends her first letter, written in Arabic, but which she asks him not to entrust a Moor to translate. However, he asks a renegade whom he has befriended, and who has been collecting signatures to return to Christendom. In her letters, she proclaims her devotion to the Virgin Mary, whom she has learned about through a Christian slave she once had. She promises to marry him should he help her escape to Christian lands, and explains that she is rich. The captive responds that he can be trusted to follow through on his promises, as Christians always do, and that a Christian captive has been translating for him. In reality, he had gone against her wishes and entrusted his mission to a renegade. With each letter Zoraida sends money to Ruy Pérez to organize the escape.

Having already entrusted the renegade, the captive is afraid to contradict him, even when he decides against following Zoraida’s instructions. The rich maiden asked the captive to get the boat himself from Mallorca, but the renegade claims that all those who leave forget their obligations and do not return. The captive swears to Zoraida, however, that he is following her requests. Leading up to the departure, the renegade docks several times along the garden of her father Agi Morato’s estate. By continually exposing them to noise and commotion, he means to make the day of their escape seem like just another small disturbance. Later, Pérez visits the garden on pretense of picking salad for his master. There, he encounters father and daughter, and communicates indirectly to Zoraida that they will soon be leaving. The renegade arrives with his crew of Christians, and they surprise the Moors in the garden. They tie the frightened Moors up, and Zoraida come laden with treasure and dressed opulently. Her father does hear noise, sees the band of Christians, and screams out for help. The renegade says that they will now need to take Agi Morato in order to avoid having a search squadron after them.

They tie Zoraida’s father up, assuring her that he will not be harmed, and will be set free the soonest opportunity they have. When the rich Moor wakes up in the boat, Zoraida hides her eyes from him. He weeps that his daughter has been kidnapped and proclaims that they can have all his treasure, but she is his prize jewel. She comforts him and they both cry. Afterward, he notices what she is wearing and asks him why she is dressed in her finest. The renegade intervenes to tell him that Zoraida has given up a life of darkness for the light of true religion, and when asked by her anguish father if this is true, Zoraida confirms that it is. The despondent Agi Morato dives overboard, and they must fish him out of the sea and revive him. Zoraida mourns him as if he were dead and her father warns the captive that she has no reason to convert and that becoming Christian is merely a pretense for going to a more sexually permissive country.

They decide to leave the Moor off in the first place they can, which is the Cava Rumía, which translates as the cove of the bad Christian woman. There they abandon him and the other Moors, and he wails for his daughter. When they are on the open sea, Corsican pirates board their ship. Although the captive fears that they will steal not just their wealth but also his betrothed’s greatest jewel, her virginity, the Corsicans are more interested in money than sex. Since the Corsicans want to return to La Chapelle not Spain, they take leave of the Spaniards and even give forty escudo coins back to Zoraida. The number is worth noting since it is the number
of days that Antiochus will give Pericles to solve the riddle, and which corresponds both to Noah’s journey on ship during the Great Flood, the Jewish Exodus, and Jesus’ temptation in the desert.

After they arrive in Spain, Zoraida and the captive terrify a shepherd who believes that a Moorish invasion is underway. They quickly change clothes and when they encounter one of the captive’s uncles. Shortly thereafter, they encounter the people from the other interpolated novella, the Cardenio group, and the main characters from the main plot line. The captive’s brother and niece show up at the inn, and the captive is reunited with his family and off to meet his father.

*Los baños* begins with the Moors landing in a Spanish coastal town in the middle of the night, mirroring the terror of the sudden intrusion by the Christians in Agi Morato’s garden in “The Captive’s Tale” and projecting forward to their magical rescue at the end of this play. The Moors capture a number of people from a coastal town, including a maiden, Costanza, a sacristan, and two young boys and their father. After discovering that his lover was abducted by Moors, Don Fernando jumps into the sea to follow her into captivity. The next scene takes place in Algiers where Don Lope and Vivanco converse with a renegade, Hazén, who is gathering signatures for a secret return to Christendom. Hazén shows the letter to them where he proclaims never having mistreated Christians as the Turks do. This letter mirrors another that the captives will receive, dangling from a reed. Although they ask the renegade who lives in the adjacent house, unlike in “The Captive’s Tale,” they do not entrust the renegade with secrets. From him they learn that the young Moorish woman next door was raised by a Christian servant, now dead, who was the pillar of the captives’ community. In the next vignette a Christian confesses to a Moor that he is going to escape by land, and we learn from the exasperated Moor that he has already failed three times, much like Cervantes himself. When Vivanco and Don Lope return, Zahara chooses the latter to receive her letter, which reads almost exactly like that of her counterpart, Zoraida, in *Don Quixote*. Zahara, too, asks Don Lope not to entrust a Moor or renegade with her secrets.

Like *El trato*, this version of the captivity play interweaves stories of martyrs with sexual intrigue and a love plot. However, in the relationship of Zahara and Don Lope, the play presents a model of love through Christ and Mary as opposed to the mundane romance of Don Fernando and Costanza. It also complicates the idea of amazement by contrasting “prodigies” created by mass hysteria with the amazement caused by Don Lope’s rescue mission or young Francisco’s martyrdom. Following the initial encounter with Zahara, Hazén finds himself tested by another renegade. Having just sacked his hometown in Spain, Yzuf presents his nephews and uncle to the Cadi. The Cadi is struck by the lads’ beauty, and Yzuf assures him that either would make a good garzón, or male concubine. At the end of the first Act, Hazén confronts Yzuf, admitting to being a Christian, and kills him for selling his family and particularly for being a sodomite. As he dies, Yzuf denounces Hazén as a Christian and the Cadi condemns him to death by impalement.

At the beginning of the next act, Don Fernando finds Costanza in the presence of Zahara and Halima. Halima reveals her desire for Don Fernando, and a similar plot line to *El trato* unravels in which both Halima and her husband fall in love with the Christian lovers. Zahara tries to persuade Halima that her lust is unseemly. From the Moors’ lust the play moves on to the tasteless humor of the sacristan humiliating a Jew through words and trying to bully him into breaking the Sabbath. The “gracioso” character, the irreverent jester, is meant to garner a few laughs from an audience that dislikes Jews, but Cervantes nevertheless paints the Jew as a
sympathetic character. In spite of his errant beliefs, the Jew’s demeanor resembles the repentant Moor or the stalwart Don Lope who saves the Christians at the end of the play. The next scene depicts the sacristan and other minor characters preparing for an Easter play, which features the cameo appearance of Mrs. Catalina reciting a song of longing for the homeland.

The captain promises to reward Don Fernando with money if he conquers Costanza for him. The dialogues of love between the Christian couple, Fernando and Costanza, and Don Lope and Zahara take place in one scene in which the actors presumably speak to each other, make asides, and address the entire group. From the love plots, the play goes back to the sacristan jousting with the Jew briefly. When they exit the stage, Don Fernando confesses to Costanza how much she means to him and the willing sacrifice he made to follow her to Barbery. Halima and the Captain discover the lovers embracing and become infuriated, but the Christians make the same excuse as Aureliano and Silvia in *El Trato*. Blinded by lust, they each believe that the lovers were expressing their master’s sentiments. The second act ends with the young brothers encouraging each other in their faith and confronting the Cadí, who sentences them to death.

The third act opens with the Moorish guards charging the Christians to attend their own Easter mass and *comedia*. We see this play within a play and then learn from the principal warden about the illusory Spanish armada that the Moors believed they saw off the coast. Rather than being John of Austria’s fleet, it turns out to be a mirage. However, the reaction of terror that this illusion breeds in the Moorish hearts leads them to slay Christian captives to avoid an insurrection from within as well. A Christian then announces that Francisco is suffering a tortured strung up on a pole, and his father laments. Halima and Zahara enter, and the former announces to her friend that her father has sent for Zahara to announce her imminent wedding to King Muley. Zahara laments and proclaims she would be happier with much less, and is waiting for God to unite her to another. When Halima departs disbelieving, Zahara confesses to Costanza that she is a Christian and therefore will not marry a Moor.

Another captive is caught, and the Moors discuss how tenacious the Spaniards are. When Francisquito expires, his father takes his spirit into his mouth. In the next scene, Don Lope and Vivanco talk to Zahara, and then two Moors recount that they have seen her in the wedding procession. Vivanco exclaims, how great are God’s mysteries because she is in two places at once! This wonder bodes well for their journey, Don Lope observes, and he tells Vivanco that he will be leaving shortly for Mallorca, and will come back to rescue them. They must be vigilant for six days, waiting in the garden for his return. When the Sacristan comes on stage, he explains that he was ransomed by Jews so that he would leave their food and their children alone. We then learn from several Christians that a friar has come to buy Christians out of slavery. Following this, Halima discovers Zahara has a cross, but Costanza explains that it is actually hers. When Don Fernando enters, Halima exclaims that she can no longer hold back her feelings. In this scene, it becomes apparent that Halima takes on the role of both Zoraida as the “bad woman” and Agi Morato, as the Moor who must be sacrificed during the escape. Don Fernando begs for three more days before he gives himself to her. Don Lope comes back for the Christians and for Zahara, and they escape onto his ship.

“[‘The Man Who Was Wrecklessly Curious’ and ‘The Captive’s Tale’ would have seemed separated from the main narrative [of *Don Quixote*] to the Spanish focalizers of the seventeenth century,” R.M. Flores observes, “Because the narrator confronted them with ways of living
totally different from those which they had experienced.”

While most critics have struggled to reconcile the difference in genre of a tale like “The Captive’s Tale” with the rest of *Don Quijote*, Flores’ observation is almost so obvious that it is easy to dismiss; and yet it is quite profound. The “Captive’s Tale” presents “ways of living” that are radical even though the tale is delivered by a man who appears to be the exemplar of the Old Christian—a man of León, who as Garcés notes in “Zoraida’s Veil,” is associated with the originating point of the *Reconquista.*

The interpolated novella—compared with the captivity plays—has the least amount of violence and terror, but its romance closure is the most complicated with echoes of the tragic and a lingering aura of melancholy. Part of this comes from the strain of presenting ways of living that are, as Flores claims, using Mieke Bal’s notion of the external focalizer, different from—more complicated and traumatic—than the lives of the focalizers (the Spaniards at the inn). But there is also a “strangeness,” which Paul Hammond, an early modernist, ascribes to the genre of tragedy, which is always alluded to and then which the narrative attempts to circumscribe. It is at once the “strangeness” of the foreign (the Moor, the Muslim), which cannot also help but be familiar to all but the most insulated Spaniards. It is also the “strangeness” of the tragic overtones of terror: an *espanto* that opens up onto worlds of suffering and magic, which the novella’s melancholic narrator confesses and also flees.

The magical echoes are to be found in the earlier iteration of the captive story, the *Trato,* and in the later story, the *Baños.* Hammond writes of tragedy, “One of the elements which makes the staged spaces of tragedy so unstable is that they seem to abut onto, or to open out into, other spaces which we cannot quite grasp: these are not contiguous places, but other kinds of space, other ways of inhabiting or perceiving.” Hammond’s comment aligns with Flores’ remark. The question is, how does “The Captive’s Tale” open up into spaces of terror and then attempt to put them literally out of sight? The unlocked space can be “a locus of fear and longing,” and can refer temporally to an imagined past or future that can overwrite the present (Hammond 23). “These self-generated, mythical scenarios are often more cogent and persuasive…than what is taking place…on the visible stage.” In the case of the garden scene—the locus of deliverance from captivity—there are echoes of reference to other enclosures: the claustrophobic all-male *baños* in which the prisoners are housed, the cursed cove on which Zoraida’s father is abandoned, the well where Zoraida would have been buried alive as punishment for apostasy had


102 Garcés 1989, p. 72: “It is precisely from this area of Spain that the march of the Reconquista began in the Middle Ages.”


104 “Este baño no tiene nada que ver con nuestro baño, dicho del latín balneum. Dijose del árabe baniya, edificio, y significa ‘especie decorral grande o patio conaposentillos o chozas alrededor, en el cual los moros tenían encerrados a los cautivos,’” explains Francisco Rodríguez Marin. *Cervantes,* Miguel de. *El ingenioso hidalgo don Quijote de la Mancha.* Ed. Francisco Rodríguez Marin. Vol. 3. Madrid, Ediciones Atlas, 1947-49. 188, n. 16. “This bath has nothing to do with our own bath, which comes from the Latin balneum. It was said of the Arabic baniya, which is a building, and means ‘a kind of large enclosure or courtyard with little rooms or huts around it, in which the Moors locked up their captives.’” In a later note goes on to explain, citing Haedo, that the King’s baño where the Captive was kept, would have included a church where Christian mass was said, and an actual cistern-like bath (Rodríguez Marin *DQ* III, 189, n. 4).
she been caught. The baños are a place of torture and longing, the cove a place of suffering that can never quite disappear, however far it is left behind. The Moorish patriarch is left to die on the cove, a shimmering reflection of the death by burial that Zoraida only barely missed. The garden is full of promise, but also of duplicity: of speaking words that suggest something other than what they say, and that constitute Zoraida’s betrayal of her father. The enclosure—this verdant tomb—is the site of trauma, radiating back and forth toward other spaces that are closed off across these texts: courtyard jail, the cove sealed off by a promontory, and the hole in the ground. It marks the “severely split (dissociated) psyche,” of both Zoraida and Ruy Pérez, of “repetitions…temporal stutter,” where “shock and dreaminess collude” (Hartman).

The trusting father jokes with the Christian captive who is on the verge of absconding with his daughter to Spain; the Christian pretends that he has another love in Spain who resembles Zoraida, while his words convey to Zoraida that their escape is imminent. On the surface, the scene fits into other such lush gardens in the Hispanic Judeo-Arabic tradition, places of courtship and seduction. The difference is in the mirroring effect of all these discrete spaces. One cannot help but associate them because they are all enclosed, but partially open spaces of intense longing and pain. The baño and the cove are sites of torture and suffering, and it is the garden, because of the act of betrayal that goes on through a confusion of signs, serves as an in-between space, taking on the subsumed terror from El trato, which Cervantes eliminates altogether from the lovers’ plot in Los baños. There are echoes of another more disturbing enchanted garden, famous in the theatrical tradition of the sixteenth-century: the enchanted, enclosed space where Atreus betrays butchers his brother’s sons in Seneca’s Thyestes.

My claim that Thyestes is a mythical locus informing the experience of terror and wonder in the captivity stories may seem far-fetched. There is a very good case for Senecan influence in general, and even without direct influence, Atreus’ garden is a powerful literary counterpoint to Cervantes’ garden because it also embodies terror and wonder and a spectral doubleness, which Cervantes also carefully manipulates in “The Captive’s Tale.” As a general claim, Américo Castro declares that Cervantes “is incorporated into…that characteristically Spanish tradition of Senecanism, which Petrarch and Erasmus revive during the Spanish Renaissance.” As for the specific influence of Seneca on his work, Florencio Sevilla Arroyo and Antonio Rey Hazas in their introduction to El trato disavow Neosenecanism, pointing out first that the number of characters in the play, which total thirty-eight, far outnumbers the usual fifteen or twenty in a Senecan play. In addition, they observe that unlike in Seneca’s plays, the characters are divided according to their social status, race, and familial relationship rather than dramatic function (Sevilla Arroyo & Rey Hazas viii). Finally, according to Sevilla Arroyo and Hazas, the play is less episodic than a Senecan play and revolves around thematic antipodes (Sevilla Arroyo & Rey Hazas xii). That the play is less episodic than Seneca’s plays is unconvincing; indeed, aside from the Byzantine-inspired romance at the center, the other captive scenes are at best

105 “…do not trust any Moor, because they are all false. I am very worried about that: I wish you would not show it to anybody, because if my father finds out, he will throw me in a well and cover me over with stones.” Cervantes, Miguel de. Don Quixote. Trans. Edith Grossman. New York: Harper Collins, 2003. 347. “…no te fíes de ningún moro, porque son todos marfuces. Desto tengo mucha pena: que quisiera que no te descubrieras a nadie; porque si mi padre lo sabe, me echará luego en un pozo, y me cubrirá de piedras” (DQ I 490).


thematically connected; certainly there is nothing necessary in the relationship of dramatic scenes; they are wholly episodic. Rather than Senecan influence, Stainslav Zimic refers convincingly to the influence of Dante’s Inferno on El trato through the creation of a vertical abyss, the use of tercetos, which resemble terza rima, and the depiction of love as burning.\footnote{Zimic, Stanislav. \textit{El teatro de Cervantes}. Madrid: Castalia, 1992. 41-42}

Jean Canavaggio, on the other hand, believes that there is a mitigated Senecan influence on Cervantes’ comedias, although he admits that Cervantes uses a great deal less violence than, for example, Cueva, Virués, and Argensola. Compared to these, Cervantes depicts less brutality and prefers to avoid horrible spectacles of bloodshed in favor of aggression that provokes emotion rather than horror.\footnote{Canavaggio, Jean. \textit{Cervantès Dramaturge: un théâtre à naître}. Paris: Press Universitaires de France, 1977. 350.} Hermanegildo argues for the popularity of a morally inflected tragedy with violent action, situations that lack verisimilitude, spectacular gestures (rhetorical or dramatic) with the aim of moving the spirit of the audience.\footnote{Hermenegildo, Alfredo. “La presencia de la dinámica trágica en el teatro del siglo XVI.” \textit{Hacia la Tragedia Aurea}. Eds. Frederick de Armas, Luciano García and Enrique García. Madrid: Editorial Iberoamericana, 2008. 25. “Por eso se instala en el modo de dramatización la necesidad de conmover el ánimo de los espectadores, de situaciones que dejan de lado toda verosimilitud con tal de llegar a conmover el ánimo de los espectadores por medio de acciones brutales y sangrientas, de muertes en escena, de gestos espectaculares, de situaciones que dejan de lado toda verosimilitud con tal de llegar a conmover y corregir las prácticas vitales del espectador, del ciudadano, del gobernante.”}

Certainly, El trato and Los baños with their highly improbable coincidences, the spectacle of child martyrdom, the illusory prodigy of a fleet from Spain, and the miracle of the tame lion leading the Christian slave out of captivity, all indicate the moral and religious imperative trump verisimilitude, and that violence sprinkled throughout is meant to cause emotion and a change of heart in the audience. If this is Senecan in inspiration, which it is in a general way, then certainly Hermanegildo is right in his theory.

But we would want a more specific influence on the structure and content to make a serious claim about the influence of Seneca on the way I am claiming Cervantes turns to Seneca’s Thyestes. Given the popularity of Seneca in Spain, it is more than likely that a voracious reader like Cervantes encountered a translation of Seneca or was exposed to the principles of Senecan dramaturgy during his time there. In addition, there was already in the fifteenth century a translation into Castilian (González Vázquez 79). Moreover, as González Vázquez and Luque Moreno both concord, the school of Spanish tragedians beginning in 1570 was principally influenced by Seneca’s style (González Vázquez 79). González Vázquez notes in addition the division of El trato into the classic Aristotelian prologue, protasis, epistasis, and catastrophe corresponding to the four acts; the system of alternating plot and subplot; the expositive prologue; and the theme of psychologically enslaved freemen and free-acting slaves (González Vázquez 80-83). Familiarity with Seneca can also be drawn from a play written in the same time period, Cervantes’ La Numancia. Christina Karageorgou-Bastea acknowledges the dispersal of a classical chorus among different characters and allegorical figures, attenuating terror, and distancing the audience from the luck of the protagonist.\footnote{Karageorgou-Bastea, Christina. “Del coro al héroe en \textit{La Numancia} cervantina.” \textit{Theatralia: El teatro de Miguel de Cervantes}. Vilagarcía de Arousa, Spain: Mirabel Editorial, 2003. 53-60.} While the chorus of Greek plays functioned in just this way, it is a commonplace that the Greek material was known primarily through Seneca or through plot summaries and excerpts in commentaries. Cervantes adds to the legend of La Numancia, the Senecan detail of the last standing Numantian boy jumping off a tower, which exactly mimics Astyanax in Seneca’s Troades.
Given that Cervantes wrote *El trato, La Numancia*, and “The Captive’s Tale” at a time when the Senecan-inspired theatre of horror was at its most popular, it is not surprising that they privilege the moment of *espanto* as the dramatic and emotional locus. The wonder that the audience is meant to feel is not a euphoric wonder, but something more tortured, full of fear and pity. Georges Guntert writes of the suicide of Bariato in *La Numancia*, “*In admiratio* over the spilled blood of the child, what is thematized is the act of spectatorship as a moment of contemplation.”

Guntert defines *admiratio*, then, as a form of contemplation—that is, a partially detached, distanced act of spectatorship that at the same time marks a profound descent into the self. The death of Bariato in the play is a bloody spectacle to be shown on stage *à la* Seneca, but unlike Greek tragedy, which generally leaves such spectacles offstage. Cervantes creates these moments of *admiratio* in the Senecan tradition.

The experience of terror is of a psychological nature, more than a spectacle of blood and mangled flesh, but terror certainly figures prominently in these plays. As in Senecan theatre, terror has a central role in generating the dramatic tension that leads to the change of heart in the *auto sacramental*. In the Algerian plays, the martyrs are explicitly Christians, or lapsed Christians, and the *admiratio* that their deaths produce accompanies pity and fear. Thus martyr stories with their emphasis on the gruesome have a Senecan effect in the theatre. In the case of Francisquito, the child martyr, this effect is still further heightened because of his age and his exceptional conviction and courage. As Enrique Fernández demonstrates, Cervantes drew specifically on the lives of martyrs that died in Barbary. In Senecan fashion, “the face of violence and excess causes fear and immediately elicits a cringe; however, this immediate repulsion nonetheless has as a corollary a fascination, which at the price of exceeding horror, renews the emotion in the sense having refined the passions.”

It is clear that producing *espanto* is in part a method for sustaining attention, quickening the heart, and opening the eyes and the heart of the audience.

It has been said of *La Numancia*, that it has an apocalyptic feel to it, and indeed the claim is true of the Algerian plays. A scene such as the conversion of wild animals into tame

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113 Andrés de Olave wrote in Latin about Andrés de Espoleto, an Italian Franciscan friar who was martyred in Fez in 1532. It was published in Castilian in 1543. Enrique Fernández notes of the martyr stories: “*Contienen episodios como el encierro de Espoleto en un pozo con un león que no le ataca, o el de su martirio en el fuego, que recuerdan a episodios de Los tratos de Argel... esta inclusión de hechos milagrosos realiza el carácter de testimonio verídico de la obra, pues es característico de la literatura testimonial aumentar su veracidad adoptando formas y contenidos de géneros de reconocido prestigio en la época...*” Fernández, Enrique. “*Los tratos de Argel: obra testimonial, denuncia política y literatura terapéutica.*” *Cervantes* 20.1 (2000). 13. Such instances of martyrdom also occur in Diego de Haedo’s famous *Topographia e historia general de Argel* (1612) and Jeronimo Gracián’s *Tractado de la redempción de captivos* (1603).

114 “le visage de la violence et de la démesure, il provoque l’effroi et suscite aussitôt un mouvement de recul; toutefois, cette répulsion immédiate n’en a pas moins pour corollaire une fascination qui, au prix d’un dépassement de l’horreur, renouvelle l’émotion dans le sens d’une passion épurée” (Canavaggio 349).

115 In “The Coming of the New Jerusalem,” Brian Stiegler uses Klaus Koch’s eight motifs of apocalyptic thought to present “the apocalyptic vision in *La Numancia* that Cervantes uses to identify the end of an age of division, sin, and suffering in Spain, and the arrival of a new golden age under the reign of the almighty Felipe II.” Stiegler, Brian. “The Coming of the New Jerusalem: Apocalyptic Vision in Cervantes’ *La Numancia.*” *Neophilologus* 80 (1996). 569-70. Stiegler concludes that “Cervantes was quite imperialistic… he places his own time, that of the great Spanish Empire, in the spot in an apocalyptic vision, where the new Jerusalem or the reign of God would normally be found” (Stiegler 579). I disagree with his conclusion and support Cory Reed’s notion that Cervantes forces a collective *anagnorisis* on the part of the audience. They react as a group to what has been represented for them on
creatures is straight out of *Revelations*, as is the torture and death of children and the innocent, and the manifestation of prodigies (both demonic and from God). Both martyr stories and apocalyptic literature emphasize the audience as active spectator, who in becoming aware of the evils that cause suffering, experiences fear, pity, and *admiratio* that potentially lead to praxis.  

Aurelio’s laments against Philip’s abandonment of his subjects to a life of servitude in Barbary, Izuf the renegade’s sale of his own Christian family into slavery, the torture and immolation in Algiers of a Valentinian priest in retaliation for the execution of a renegade in Spain, are dramatic representations or narrative retellings within the plays that put moral and political pressure on the Spanish spectators. While Cervantes often offers panegyrics to the Spanish spirit, he is critical of the imperial political policy that focused on the Protestants in the North and the annexation of Portugal and allowed the trafficking of Christians to flourish. Cervantes manipulates moments of intense emotion, of *espanto* and *admiratio* in reaction to terror such as we saw above: the betrayal of family for money (Izuf), the sacrifice of children (Francisquito), and the capture, transfer, and torture of innocent Christians because of imperial policies that not only allowed but profited from human trafficking.

The cannibalistic tendency of hatred and desire alike, in gods and humans, that is Seneca’s trademark, permeates the *comedias* and the “Captive’s Tale.” The emotional and literary end of all these stories is to create an *admiratio* that cannot be extricated from *espanto*, *maravilla* that is full of *pavor*. When escape does come, it is only to a few, or at the expense of others, and so euphoria is always haunted by trauma.

When Thyestes and his son Tantalus are approaching Argos, it is his son who notices the hesitation, “Pigro (quid hoc est?) genitor incessu stupet uultumque uersat seque in incerto tenet” (Seneca 1921a, 421-2). Approaching Argos, struggling with the lure of power, but yearning more for a reconciliation that has forced him into exile, he wears, as Tantalus proclaims, a look of astonishment on his face (*stupet*), and his movements are slow, tentative. Even Thyestes does not know why fear continues to grip him: “Causam timoris ipse quam ignoro exigis./ nihil timendum uideo, sed timeo tamen” (Seneca 1921a, 434-5). This is already over a third of the way into the play at the beginning of the third act, the first two acts having been dedicated to building up the audience’s emotional appreciation of Atreus’ uncontrollable fury. The audience’s terror at the consequences of Atreus’ plan and pity for Thyestes are already at a high pitch at the moment when Thyestes experiences his *anagnorisis* in *ekpleksis*. That is, the greatest recognition that he will make is acknowledgement of fear. In his admission of fear is a terrible wisdom that there are hatreds that cannot be quelled, and rage that is not put out by

the stage of the protagonists’ lives and then imagine what their role will be in the powerful new empire anchored in Spain (Reed 72). “He requires his oyentes to experience a moment of *anagnorisis*, as if they collectively were the tragic heroes, in which they recognize their own role in the potential tragedy and discover that the redemption of Numancia’s historic sacrifice lies ultimately in the present” (Reed 74).

Apocalypses dramatize “the present time as some form of crisis (most frequently, the growth of evil and the persecution of the just); they look forward to the judgment in which the wicked are punished and the just approved…” (Patrides and Wittreick 10, cited in Stiegler 578).

Spain also held Muslim captives for ransom; the money went to fill Philip’s coffers. On the other hand, the money used to ransom Spaniards in the Maghreb came primarily from Orders who raised their own money and went to North Africa to buy captives—not from imperial funds.


“Even I do not know quite why I am frightened./I see nothing to fear, but I am still afraid” (Seneca 2010a, 193).
reconciliation. Indeed, reconciliation is sometimes only a ritual that masks further violence. When they meet, Atreus feigns forgiveness and Thyestes kneels and admits his sorrow, hoping that all rage be wiped from their hearts: “ponatur omnis ira et ex animo tumor/erasus abeat” (Seneca 1921a, 519-20).120

When Atreus butchers Thyestes’ two children, it is the place itself, the garden, which witnesses the betrayal. There are no human witnesses, just the victims themselves, and they die before speaking to anybody. We have the messenger’s narrative, pushed forward in response to the chorus’ questions. But who saw the act of horror originally? Is the witness displaced by terror itself, stunned and forced to reckon with the scene belatedly? This belated arrival of knowledge accompanies an intensely somatic experience of shock. Paul Hammond writes that Seneca describes frenzy, shock, and astonishment as physical: “a word such as ‘psyche’ would draw us from the bodily experience which Seneca is mapping” (Hammond 109). The butchery in the magical garden, then, is the belated rendering of a terrified witness, a spectator who through the act of terror cannot recognize himself. The sense of self is displaced onto a sense of place. Hammond comments that when the messenger arrives to narrate the butchery of Thyestes’ sons, he begins with questions of place: “Quaenam ista regio”121 (Hammond 120). I’d like to take Hammond’s two comments about the somatic experience of the psyche in Seneca and the emphasis on place after a trauma. Hammond uses this as an example of an “underworld” erupting into the “innerworld of Atreus and the outerspace of his victims” (Hammond 120).

The cause of Thyestes’ terror is something that is never seen; rather it is “scene.” The scene echoes the originary familial sin: Tantalus, the father of Atreus and Thyestes, killed Pelops and attempted to serve the child up as food to the gods. The first iteration had witnesses. The scene in the garden, like the enchanted forest Freud recalls where Tancred reencounters Clorinda, is a dream-like repetition of an experience that is outside the time frame of the play. We are reminded of it only spectrally by Tantalus at the beginning of the play and by the chorus later. The sacrifice of children to the continuing wrath of the parents, announced by a ghost from the past, is something lodged in the memory of the messenger and the audience; but it is a trauma so big that nobody is there to witness it. Only the natural world and the agency of divinity respond. The only human response to the dream-like trauma is of a ploughman’s astonishment at a change whose cause he does not know: stupet ad subitae tempora ceneae/nondum fessis bubus arator (Seneca 1921a, 800-1).122 The use of “stupet,” echoes the earlier astonishment of Thyestes as something experienced emotionally, but whose original cause is unknown. Astonishment represents the somatic acknowledgment of something that is not understood. Behind it lies a terror that can only be referred to obliquely, but cannot be represented. We know it, in effect, from the repetition, or the rippling effect, on the world around.123 Thyestes knows reconciliation isn’t possible, but whole story of hatred and fear is compelled to repeat itself to produce a doubly traumatic final anagnorisis. Perhaps this is in the very nature of the “knowledge” of trauma, that it can only be known through repetition.

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120 “Let all our anger be set aside; all rage/be wiped clean from our hearts” (Seneca 2010a, 195).
121 “What place is this?” (Seneca 2010a, 201).
122 “the oxen were not weary yet—the ploughman/stopped astonished at the sudden dinner-time” (Seneca 2010a, 203).
123 In her essay on Moses and Monotheism, Cathy Caruth notes Freud’s admitted compulsion to repeat himself, as if he were reenacting the same trauma about which he is writing. This tendency to repeat has, at least since Freud’s essay on the “Uncanny” and Beyond the Pleasure Principle, as an annunciation of trauma.
Terror’s capacity to cause traumatic displacements helps to link it, as we will see, to the experience of thaumaston as defined by place. The messenger reveals a vision that stuns him with fear:

Si steterit animus, si metu corpus rigens
remittet artus. Haeret in uultu trucis
imago facti. Ferte me insanae procul,
illo, procellae, ferte quo fertur dies
hinc raptus. (Seneca 1921a, 634-8) 124

This vision corresponds to a drifting from place that attempts to erase the repetitions of time. If the messenger announced his disorientation in the beginning, the nature of the vision (imago) as something that will not leave, produces in him a desire for further movement. However, his limbs are stiff, and he is paralyzed. He needs to be taken out of terror through, as he imagines it, by a furor, or storm-winds. This figuration establishes an important connection between paralysis as the seat of terror and the need for equally violent means of escape.

The hidden, enclosed space, lies at the furthest reach, “arcana in imo regio secessu iacet…” (Seneca 1921a, 650). 125 I quote at length:

fons stat sub umbra tristis et nigra piger
haeret palude; talis est dirae Stygis
deformis unda quae facit caelo fidem.
hinc nocte caeca gemere feralis deos
fama est, catenis lucus excussis sonat
ululantque manes. Quidquid audire est metus
illic uidetur: errat antiquis uetus
emissa bustis turba et insultant loco
maiora notis monstra; quin tota solet
micare silua flamma, et excelsae trabes
ardent sine igne. Saepe latratu nemus
trino remugit, saepe simulacris domus
attonita magnis. Nec dies sedat metum;
nox propria luco est, et superstitionem
in luce media regnat. Hinc orantibus
responsa dantur certa, cum ingenti sono
laxantur adyto fata et immugit specus
uocem deo soluente. Quo postquam furens
intrauit Atreus liberos fratris trahens,
ornantur are. (Seneca 1921a, 665-84) 126

124 “If my heart stops fluttering, if my body, stiff with fear, can let my limbs be free. The vision of that crime will not go from my eyes. Storm-winds, carry me to where the day is taken far away.” (Seneca 2010a, 199)

125 “a hidden space lies in the farthest part” (Seneca 2010a, 199).

126 “Under the shadows is set a dismal fountain, stuck in a black and stagnant pool; most like the ugly water of terrible Styx, by which the gods swear faith. They say the spirits groan here in the dead of night, The grove resounds with the clattering of chains, And the ghosts howl. All things that make one shudder
Before the act of butchery, the symbolic and the allusive are combined in this description with the experience of invisible terror made visible. In this enclosure that is a tomb for the children, the terrors from the past are rendered with *energeia* through the described action of the dead wandering (*errat*). The sense of dreaminess comes forth from the way the garden emerges as a collusion of opposites. The action of wandering contrasts with the static, for example, in the tensions between fountain (*fons*) whose gushing is deadened in the sluggish dark pool (*nigra piger*); and between the sealed tombs and the released throng of dead. The actuality of “thronging dead” defies reason; the tomb is the image of terror *par excellence*. Wilson has translated, “superstitio inferum/in luce media regnat” as “Even in full daylight, the place is ruled by awe,” but this *superstitio inferum* is the terror of the underworld. The existence of the terror from nightmare, of the repressed, during the day creates a sense of a boundariless world. The wood is aflame without fire, and in this unreal place—a place, which we imagine as both sluggish and wandering, static and moving, black and brilliant, quiet and also full of commotion, the oracle booms. The oracle is borne out by a string of paradoxes that blast apart reality because it makes contact as through a “cleft” with a force that comes from a space that cannot be seen, that has no witness, but the wandering figures of the imagination.127

In the description of the hidden garden, Seneca draws a picture of a place that exceeds the boundaries of place. The place is a dis-place-ment of a witness to a trauma, which tries to undo time by standing in for a repetition in time. The terrible becomes embodied and embodies itself, as Atreus embodies Tantalus and Thyestes embodies his children inside of him, children that mirror in name their terrible grandfather. The garden is the final destination of desire—of a kind of desire that is driven by hatred. Womb, tomb, and garden are virtually indistinguishable. In the opening to *Thyestes*, Tantalus’ experience with his own desire is described in terms of place:

```latex
qua cum percaluit sanguis et ignes
exarsit facibus, stat miser obuios
fluctus ore petens, quos profugus latex
auertit sterili deficiens uado
conantemque sequi deserit; hic bibit
altum de rapido gurgite puluerem. (Seneca 1921a, 169-175)
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Even to hear, are there made visible. Old tombs break open,
Releasing hordes of wandering dead. Everywhere spring
Unprecedented wonders. Indeed, throughout the wood,
Flames sparkle, and the tallest trunks shine, without fire.
Fear is not soothe by dawn: night-time belongs to that grove;
Even in full daylight, the place is ruled by awe.
True oracles are given here to those who ask,
When from the inmost place, with a great crash,
Fates are set free, the whole wood gives a roar
When god unfurls his voice. This was the place
Where angry Atreus dragged his brother’s children.” (Seneca 2010a, 199-200)

127 “Many are possessed by a spirit not their own. It is like what we are told of the Pythia at Delphia: she is in contact with the tripod near the cleft in the ground which (so they say) exhales a divine vapour, and she is thereupon made pregnant by the supernatural power and prophesies as one inspired” (Longinus 14.2, p. 19).

128 “his blood grows hot, the fire sets him alight;
poor man, he stands there hoping for water,
which seems to flow towards his mouth; but it twists away,
leaving a barren, empty channel. The stream
abandons him; he tries in vain to follow.
He drinks the thick dust left from the rushing river. (Seneca 2010a, 185)
We can better understand the nature of the trees in the hidden garden, lit by a flame that is not pyrrhic. The blood is ignited, his thirst aflame; the images of fury and desire for relief coincide. And this image of perpetual desire ends with the “pulverum” of the expiation of desire and of death itself. When, in the later garden scene, we see the same eerie, lit trees, we know we are indeed in the realm of desire, and of the illusory. This is a world of terror that can never be witnessed, as I already pointed out, but can be felt. This scene repeats the earlier Tantalus dream again and points out that we are in the night without end world of trauma.

The garden in *Thyestes* is the site for perhaps the most taboo, violent representation in the corpus of classical theatre. The absence of a witness means that the enclosed space becomes the representation of what is unseen. Furthermore, the doubleness of this scene with an earlier scene and the mirroring of characters—the two scenes of cannibalism, the two Tantaluses, for example—dramatize the psyche in distress, the “severely split (dissociated) psyche” (Hartman I). Hartman goes on to explain that traumatic knowledge is “as close to nescience as to knowledge,” and indeed that is what we get in this garden of ghostly reflections. The knowledge of what happened comes less as knowledge than as a denial of what is credible, of verisimilitude itself—something is happening that history will not absorb into its annals. Trauma exists as a magical space without an eyewitness—a site that encloses terror, just as Thyestes in turn digests his torn-apart children. Thyestes’ children’s proper burial must come about through his own immolation. This would be the event that transports the audience violently in terror to produce a sense of tragic wonder: literally, a digestion of terror, an expiation in fame, that tears the world apart. It is violent and oracular, and cannot erase the traces of the trauma that produced the final images.

The final scene of *Los baños* takes place in a garden, a verdant lawn which we can imagine abuts upon the ocean. It is a cove perhaps, deep enough for a boat to quietly dock; maybe there is a beach with gentle waves. It is likely that *Los baños* was written after “The Captive’s Tale,” and it includes more—more terror and more remorse—than the novelistic version. In this section, however, the later work will be considered before the earlier work because in *Los baños* the presence of *espanto* and *admiración* is more visibly linked to terror, and it persists through to the end of the play.

Before the quiet denouement of *Los baños*, Vivanco exclaims upon the sudden appearance of Zahara, whom he and Don Lope, her Christian lover, believed to be in a procession before her marriage to King Muley Maluco: “There is no lack of mystery/In Zahara being both here and there.” Vivanco later gives a pragmatic, although false, explanation, that the great joy caused by the festivities distorted their perception—making it seem as if she were in two places at once. However, Don Lope’s response stands out because of the self-conscious gesture of signaling this moment as an instance of *admiratio*:

He has earned his faith.
My wonder [*admiración*] waxes,
For she is here, and alone,
Where there are so many servants,
We have found a quiet space apart.
Such good fortune—a miracle, indeed.\(^{130}\)

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\(^{129}\) “De misterio no carece/estar Zahara aquí y allí”

\(^{130}\) “Este bien su fe merece,
Y el estar tan sola aquí
La admiración en mí crece;”
Unlike the demonic illusion preceding this, which the Moors believe they have seen (Cervantes 1991, I, 372), the spectral “prodigy” in which a Christian armada materializes out of the foam of the ocean to inspire terror in the Moors, Don Lope signals the appearance of Zahara in two places at once as a confirmation of faith. Where there should have been a multitude of servants, there is quiet and solitude. This is an unexpected turn of events, a stroke of good luck—even a miracle. Don Lope responds to the dramatic turn of events—the reversal of expectations—with a growing sense of admiración. Zahara refuses in this instance to give an explanation. Later, the audience finds out that her appearance is due to a plausible, but seemingly contrived and artificial, last minute decision on the part of King Maluco to claim his rightful inheritance, the kingdom of Morocco. She had been at the procession, but then was asked to return home and wait while he went to Morocco. He would reclaim her upon his return. Vivanco’s response to the explanation is to reaffirm the mystery of God, “O! God is great!”

The play sets up an antithesis between a real marvel and a demonic illusion. The apparition of the armada precedes the real marvel of a captive Christian who is found on an “strange and hitherto not seen boat.” The martyrdom of Francisquito is followed by the appearance of Halima, who the stage directions indicate, has “her face covered with a veil, in place of Zahara.” But from the audience’s perspective, the switch may or may not have been recognizable, depending on how the director staged it and made use of costumes. Certainly, from the perspective of the protagonists, this is an illusion because the disguise fools them. Subsequent to this scene Zoraida actually appears and reveals herself. Thus, the structure of the play, alternating between reality and illusion, truth and dissimulation, gives the audience a subtle cue as to what is real and what is not.

The reality of martyrdom, which differentiates the play from the novelistic version, heightens the prevailing air of terror that dominates the play. At the same time, it highlights the difficulty of discerning reality. Luis de Granada claims that the heart encumbered by groundless fears cannot differentiate between reality and illusion. On the other hand, divine Providence makes itself known to the pious, and allows them to follow their path to salvation: “In its perfection, divine Providence reveals and instructs.” In this case, the divine providence makes itself known in the plot. The abrupt peripeteia, which characterizes the play as a whole, creates difficulties in perceiving reality. The play complicates this further by alternating between real wonders and false illusions.

The idea that true faith knows how to discern a real wonder versus a false illusion is continually tested. When they are in the garden, Costanza, Don Fernando’s Christian lover, announces her terror to Zahara and her lover:

Costanza: My heart is jumping
Out of my chest.
Zahara: It’s because of waking up so early
Costanza: And having a vision,

Adonde hay tanto criado
Tal soledad se ha hallado;
Todo es milagro y ventura.” (Cervantes 1991, I, 377)

131 According to Covarrubias, criado used in this sense can mean “Muchos criados, mucha familia” (“criado”).
133 “extraña y nunca vista barca” (Cervantes 1991, I, 373).
134 “con un velo delante del rostro, en lugar de Zahara” (Cervantes 1991, I, 375).
135 “… a la perfección de la divina Providencia pertenece revelar y enseñar a los hombres el camino de su felicidad y salvación” (Granada II, 588).
Which if it isn’t an illusion
And has come from a sound mind,
When today finishes
So my life will end.
Don Fernando: These are all vain illusions.
Costanza, there is nothing to fear.136

Zahara responds by allaying her fears, ascribing them to the strain of staying up all night. Don Fernando explains that they are idle fantasies. But the shadow of terror is there in the garden, its presence gripping Costanza’s body. It would be easy to simply say this is part of the built-in suspense, or that it reflects Costanza’s shaky faith. However, in the novelistic version of this scene, this kind of terror is not neatly enclosed in the breast of a half-hearted Christian. Rather, Zahara’s experience of fear swirls around within the walls of the garden, it operates as the binding emotion of the plot. The dissembling between Christian and Moor in front of her father sets off a kind of alarm in the plot, a foothold for fear to later turn into terror when Agi Morato awakens to find his daughter absconding on the very day that the Captive had announced he would be leaving to Spain.

Costanza is not Zahara’s dark shadow, for they are characters from different genres. The character of Costanza is drawn from Silvia of *El trato*, the woman who attracts the desire of her master Izuf even as her betrothed has made Zahara, his mistress, aflame with desire. In that play, the differences are delineated: the lustful, adulterous Moors and the chaste, committed Christians. These characters are clearly drawn from the Byzantine novel.137 On the other hand, the character who Zahara from *El trato* becomes in *Los baños* is altered altogether. The character by the same name in the earlier play is very human: she befriends Costanza, but she lusts for Aurelio and schemes to have him. On the other hand, Zahara in the later play is pious, not just beyond sexual intrigue, but who identifies with the Virgin Mary. She is a secret Christian who in response to Don Lope’s beautiful proclamation of romantic devotion reminds him that she is his only in Christ: “Many proofs I have given you/That I am completely yours/Not for your sake, but for Christ’s.”138 Whereas Costanza loves Don Fernando for himself, Zahara loves Don Lope in a perfect Christian fashion. As René Girard maps out triangular desire in *Desire, Deceit and the Novel*, Christ mediates the love between a Christian and his lover. The lover models himself on Christ and loves through Christ. This is a perfect iteration of desire in the Christian tradition, and Cervantes contrasts this second version of Zahara with Costanza. Costanza loves mutable flesh, so however chaste and lofty her commitment to Don Fernando may be, nevertheless it is marked by fear. This fear signals Costanza’s relegation to a material,

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136 Costanza: …me da el corazón saltos que me rompe el pecho.
Zahara: El madrugar lo habrá hecho.
Costanza: Y haber visto una vision
Que, si no es cosa fingida,
Y en buen discurso trazada,
El fin de aquesta jornada
Ha de ser el de mi vida.
Don Fernando: Todas son fantasmas y vanas;
Costanza, no hay que temer. (Cervantes 1991, I, 383)

137 Canavaggio persuasively demonstrates the similarities in general with the Byzantine novel and sees the lovers’ plot in the *Trato* as an exact replica of that in Achilles Tatius’ *Leucippe and Clitophon* (Canavaggio 67).

138 “Por mil señales has visto/ cómo yo toda soy tuya,/no por ti, sino por Cristo…” (Cervantes 1991, I, 377).
rather than a spiritual realm. Her vulnerability to her projections of spectral fears marks her limited spiritual development.

In Los baños, a pervasive fear persists until the very end in the garden. The anonymous father appears with his son’s bones in the garden, full of trepidation, but oriented by the “holy relics,”\textsuperscript{139} which give him the strength and provide the compass to navigate him—“they will guide my feet”\textsuperscript{140}—to the fated garden of Agimorato. As in the end of the tragic Thyestes, the father walks to his conclusion with the body of his son, whom he has earlier consumed, symbolically: “Put your soul in my mouth!”\textsuperscript{141} As the group of Christians and Zahara wait for Don Lope to return with the boat that will take them to Spain, Vivanco exclaims that in the midst of all this pain and terror, the whole world has been transfigured in a light that mirrors the majesty above. Awaiting Don Lope’s boat, the moment of terror is transfigured into wonder:

Vivanco: They are at sea, surely.
This broken plate shows
That they reached land.
Now they respond to our signals:
Wound the flint, my friend,
So that you may harvest the light
That guides and illuminates,
Bringing the good out of our bad.
Don Fernando: Don’t you see how their lights
Call back to ours?
Vivanco: Call these happy refrains
Not sparks, but stars.
Be still and listen to the whispering song
Of those holy oars.\textsuperscript{142}

Throughout the play, the distinction between reality and illusion has depended upon the discernment of the individual. If oriented to the divine and to true religion, those visions have been real. As in the case of Costanza, if only nominally Christian, terror takes the place of true vision. Here in the dialogue between Vivanco and Don Fernando, this interpretation of reality takes place at the moment of highest suspense and the climax of concrete dramatic interest: will Don Lope save the captives or not? Vivanco sees the interruption of the flat expanse of calm

\textsuperscript{139} “reliquias santas” (Cervantes 1991, I, 383).
\textsuperscript{140} “encaminarán mis plantas” (Cervantes 1991, I, 383).
\textsuperscript{141} “¡Echa tu alma en mi boca…” (Cervantes 1991, I, 375).
\textsuperscript{142} Vivanco: En la mar está, sin duda
que haber a tierra llegado
muestra este plato quebrado.
A nuestra señal se acuda:
Hiere, amigo, el pedernal,
Porque saques de[l]a la lumbre
Que traiga, guíe y alumbre
Todo el bien de nuestro mal.
Don Fernando: ¿No ves cómo otras centellas
Corresponden a las nuestras?
Vivanco: Llama a tan alegres muestras,
No centellas, sino estrellas.
Sosiega y escucha el son
Manso de los santos remos. (Cervantes 1991, I, 383-4)
water by Don Lope’s ship as a broken dish—“este plato quebrado.” He reads the signs of deliverance with a poetic detachment, only by way of analogy suggesting the brokenness and violence that has led them here. Rather than the more direct command to strike the flint and give a signal to the ship, Vivanco tells Don Fernando to “wound” the flint in order to redeem all the good out of their bad fortune. The literal translation is, “take out the light from it [the flint] so that it brings, guides, and illuminates the good from our bad.” In the garden of darkness and suspense, time is stilled, the sense of foreboding, of catastrophic doom that chased the characters throughout has not been altogether eradicated; it persists as a sense of woundedness. The light itself, the vision, and the deliverance come out of that wound.

When Don Fernando notes that their signals have been acknowledged through corresponding flashes, Vivanco elevates these signals, and calls them stars not sparks. If the stars themselves are the Platonic antecedent of the flame, Vivanco suggests that the world has been restored to an original purity in this moment. Through a process of aestheticization that distances the contingent, which in this case is also the terrifying, the speaker substitutes the ideal for the real. He then interprets the transfiguration in his fantasy of the real as proof of God’s action at work expiating the transgressions of man. The peaceful feeling of this deliverance is responsible as well for the interpretation of the terrifying suspense of waiting for the ship’s arrival as the mild music of saintly oars. The vision that Vivanco articulates is one of piece, compared with that of Costanza, which is marked by terror. However, we can see the relation of terror to the aestheticized description of deliverance. The vision inspired by wonder still bears the wound of terror—the striking of flint that Vivanco compares to wounding, the jarring image of the broken plate—but it elevates the terrestrial to a Platonic ideal in which God expiates the sins of His creatures’ transgressions.

Here in the garden, the father carries the son’s bones to receive proper burial in Christendom. He has lost his other son to apostasy and we have no mention of his wife, just of other Christians who were able to leave: “other CHRISTIANS who could leave.” The apparitions of the past—Zahara appearing in two places at once, the illusory armada that nevertheless provokes the slaughter of Christian captives—are replaced by a Platonic dualism that projects to the heavens rather than leading listening to terror’s call: Zahara calls Don Lope her “divine north star,” the star which her heart follows toward safety, and Don Lope calls Zahara her “beautiful star.” It is toward the very end of the play that Zahara undergoes her name change and becomes Maria, completing a trajectory from Moor to enchantress to star to Christian. The completeness of this religious transformation would seem to attend an analogous completion of an emotional trajectory out of fear and into wonder. This total conversion is underscored by the difference between Costanza’s and Zahara’s responses, one marked by the illusions of terror, the other by a transfigured vision that sees divine Providence guiding terrestrial events.

However different the plots of El trato and Los baños, the ending of both present a dualism; in the earlier play, it is between martyrdom and deliverance, and between supplication and thanksgiving. The fate of Aurelio and Silvia marks the completion of an otherwise comic love plot. Although the lucky ending might be traced to Aurelio’s victory against temptation, generically it belongs to the serendipitous endings of comedy, not of the auto sacramental. On the other hand, the prayer to Our Lady by those left behind belongs to the genre of the auto sacramental. Nothing in the comic closure absorbs the uncertainty and dread of the juxtaposed

143 “otros CRISTIANOS que pudieren salir” (Cervantes 1991, I, 384).
144 “norte divino” and “estrella hermosa” (Cervantes 1991, I, 385).
somber pleading. There is a sharp distinction between the comic ending with its unheroic—
certainly not idealized—heroine, and the ending of the martyr stories, as if they were two
completely different plays, juxtaposed next to each other. Whatever dread or fear the audience
of El trato feels for the penitents, it feels separately, set apart from the tonal register of the
comedy. In Los baños, the dualism is in the women themselves: Costanza and Zahara. Zahara
absorbs all the Marian idealism, and she becomes an object of admiration. Costanza belongs to
the comic genre. She is lifted out of her circumstances by a stroke of luck, but not because of
any inherently good quality. On the other hand, the father returning with the bones of his son
signals the tragic, and also the possibility that, no matter the aestheticizing and idealizing
tendencies of don Lope, Vivanco, and Zahara, the possibility of terror returning is there. These
plotlines and the discordant feelings that they inspire coexist because they have been separated,
walled in, like the garden.

When we turn back to the interpolated novel, we see a different strategy for dealing with
terror emerges. Rather than being Platonized, the romance closure is made complete by the
entombment of terror through Agi Morato. As Leo Spitzer observes in his “Perspectivismo
linguístico en el Quijote,” Zoraida’s abandonment of her father, who has been good to her and to
the Christians, is the most tragic scene in the Quixote. The acceptance of his fate as a
necessary evil in divine providence projects a brutal God along the lines of the Jesuit conception
of divinity. Louis Combet accepts Spitzer’s characterization, suggesting that indeed this is the
God whom Cervantes signals and accepts through Zoraida’s heartrending renunciation: “The
divinity that Cervantes refers to here is the same punishing God that the Jesuits believed in at the
time. He seems to accept all these God’s decisions, but also the inherent complications that
result from them.” Indeed, the painful ending complicates the romance at the end of the
interpolated novella, but it does so in a way that is quite different from the plays. “The Captive’s
Tale” lacks the gory torture, the nightmares and the hallucinations, and, it appears to end in a
way most fitting with the romance. Nobody actually dies; the father is abandoned, but his own
death is, if not forgotten, pushed aside. On the other hand, the captivity plays end with the
specter of death, and the garden is always on the verge of becoming a tomb.

The presence of the father with his son’s martyred body or the slaves that are left behind
in the plays points to the possibility of a repetition of terror. Because the plays oscillate between
fortune and misfortune, terror and aestheticized wonder, the pattern indicates that after the
curtain is drawn, the good fortune of some will be followed by the tragedy of others. Seneca’s
garden depicts the recognition of terror as something that is located in a strange place, and that
becomes known not because it is represented, but because it is felt through antitheses: stiffness
and movement, death and life, stupefaction and recognition, pain and numbness. The same can
be said about the endings of the plays with their antitheses of feelings, plot devices, images, and
even genres. The focus on feelings and bodily sensations coupled with the experience of the
spectral or the visionary emerges, it would seem, out of espanto. Both Seneca’s depiction of
terror and its recognition, as well as Covarrubia’s definition of espanto, suggest that terror
repeats itself, and can be recognized through its somatic symptoms. While the direct

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est la divinité tortueuse et jésuite en laquelle on croyait en ces temps-la, dont il accepte toutes les décisions mais
avec toutes les complications inhérentes.”
representation of the terrifying event may not be possible, we know it is there through repetition, somatic symptoms, spectral visions, and, most importantly, because there seems to be an effort to enclose it, to set it off in a separate space. If the “baño” is an enclosure of torture, the garden is the spectral repetition. We can think back to the *Thyestes* with all its spectral repetition: the ghost Tantalus reemerging and ushering the catastrophe in the garden; the dark enclosure of the garden that is reproduced in Thyestes’ gut where the undigestible trauma is walled in his body.

In “The Captive’s Tale,” on the other hand, the distinct fate of those left behind from those who leave, or of one group from another, is not neatly separated. Because there is no Costanza to set off Zahara, no slaves left behind to contrast with Aurelio or Silvia, both the idealization and the terror become part of the romance plot. This difference surfaces as early as the first letter that Z. (Zoraida/Zahara) sends down to the captives. Zoraida’s letter warns Ruy Pérez not to trust any Moor with her letter, “…because they are all false. I am very worried about that: I wish you would not show it to anybody, because if my father finds out, he will throw me in a well and cover me over with stones” (Cervantes 2003, 347). Although Zahara warns don Lope not to trust a Moor or renegade, the one and only letter in *Los baños* never mentions this death by entombment, and this is odd, considering the ubiquity of violence and terror in that play. Secondly, in *Los baños* Cervantes removes the complicating factor of the need for translation. Right away, Zahara proclaims her knowledge of “all Christian ways” and how to “read and write, for this is my own writing.”

By allowing that Zahara commands some intelligible European language, Cervantes removes a problem that leads to the captive’s duplicity. In response to Zoraida’s request not to trust any Moor, Pérez enlists the help of a renegade. In Los baños the renegade never finds out about Zahara, and in any event he confirms his faith by becoming a martyr. However, Ruy Pérez does not admit that he has trusted a renegade in his letter to Zoraida, but blasphemes and lies by saying, “Almighty Allah has given us a Christian captive who can speak and write your language, as you will see by this letter” (Cervantes 2003, 348). Zoraida has sent Pérez enough money for him to go back to Spain and return to pick her up in “my father’s country estate, which is near the Babazon Gate, close to the ocean, where I must spend the summer with my father and my servants” (Cervantes 2003, 350).

The renegade, however, persuades Ruy Pérez to allow him to go to fetch the boat because if he or the others were to go, they might be tempted never to return. Renegades, according to Garcés, were the crueler than Islamic-born people to Christians. (Garcés 135). This renegade presents papers with Christian signatures, and puts on an emotional show of regret for renouncing his religion and his home. While he claims to want to return to Spain, it is also true that it was common for renegades to use these papers to try and escape punishment by Christians if they were caught pirating. Unlike in the plays with their open displays of torture and

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147 “porque si mi padre lo sabe, me echará luego en un pozo, y me cubrirá de piedras” (Cervantes 2010, I, 490).
148 “todo el cristianesco. Sé….leer y escribir, que esta es mi letra” (Cervantes 1991, I, 334).
149 “el grande Alá nos ha dado un cristiano cautivo que sabe hablar y escribir tan bien como lo verás por este papel” (Cervantes 2010, I, 491).
150 “el jardín de mi padre, que está a la puerta de Babazón, junto a la marina, donde tengo de estar todo este verano con mi padre y con mis criados” (Cervantes 2010, I, 492).
151 Paul Julian Smith remarks, “The renegade collects signatures which will guarantee his good faith on his return to Spain; and we are told at the end of the tale that he returns…through the offices of the Inquisition (I.41). But his very existence suggests duplicity or deviance, the possibility of treacherous translation. Far from guaranteeing good faith, the signatures collected by renegades may be counterfeit: as Derrida suggests, the very fact that a signature can be repeated means that it is subject to unauthorized reproduction.” Smith, Paul Julian. “‘The Captive’s Tale’: Race, Text, Gender.”
martyrdom, in “The Captive’s Tale” there is a much more subterranean current of threat. It comes out of subtle perversions of truth in a world of polarized enemies, where even a slight betrayal might provoke a massacre. The consequences would be, on the one hand, death by immolation or dismemberment for the Christian captives, on the other, entombment for the Muslim apostate.

The captive lies a second time to Zoraida by deciding to trust the renegade. Zoraida has made her good faith manifest, and her story has been confirmed by the renegade as true: “he told us that the same Moor lived in the house, whom she told us about,” along with other details that confirmed the truth of her letter. Instead of following Zoraida’s instructions (after all, she has provided them with money and put her own life in jeopardy), the captive trusts a renegade instead and then lies to Zoraida in the letter: “we replied to Zoraida, telling her we would do everything she advised because her advice was as good as if Lela Marién had told her what to say, and it was entirely up to her whether the plan should be delayed or put into effect immediately” (Cervantes 2003, 351). This is a remarkable moment in the novella, and not one which has received any critical attention that I know of, because it marks a double betrayal, both of the Virgin to whom she has entrusted herself and who is responsible for her conversion to Christendom, and it is a betrayal of Zoraida’s trust. Pérez goes along with the renegade’s plan of a fear that the renegade might betray them all: “Although my comrades and I thought it would be better to buy the boat in Mallorca, as the Moorish lady had said, we did not dare contradict him, fearing that if we did not do as he wished, he would betray us and endanger our lives by revealing our dealings with Zoraida, and to protect her life we could certainly have given our own” (Cervantes 2003, 351). In the interpolated novella, the renegade becomes the center of dramatic tension; trust in this most untrustworthy of characters is perhaps naïve credulity, but also in the end, comes to stand for the captive’s powerful faith. The knot in the plot of the two lies constitutes a dual betrayal: of faith and of friend.

“The Captive’s Tale” adds this element of complexity to its plot to make up for the lack of sexual intrigue and violence compared to the plays. It is fascinating that this bit of interest comes about after the renegade tells a tale to confirm his belief that none of the captives should return to Christendom because upon returning they would forget their obligations: “the freedom they obtained and the fear of losing it again erased from their memories every obligation they had in the world” (Cervantes 2003, 350). Then, “As confirmation of the truth he was telling us, he recounted briefly an incident that had occurred very recently to some Christian gentlemen,

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Quixotic Desire: Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Cervantes, Ed. Ruth El Saffar and Diana de Armas Wilson. Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1993. 230. In Los banos, we certainly have an example of the extreme treachery of a renegade in the character of Yzuf, whom as Casalduero notes, sells his own blood like Judas (Casalduero 85). On the other hand, during Cervantes’ personal captivity, he was pardoned three times for his escape attempts by the Venetian renegade, Es Hasan Basa, who was king of Algiers.  

152 This literal translation is my own, as Edith Grossman’s is more interpretive than needed to make this point. “…y nos dijo que había sabido que en aquella casa vivía el mismo moro que a nosotros nos había dicho…todo lo cual concertaba con lo que venía en el papel” (Cervantes 2010, I, 491).

153 “en aquel punto se le respondió a Zoraida, diciéndole que haríamos todo cuanto nos aconsejaba, porque lo había advertido tan bien como si Lela Marién se lo hubiera dicho, y que en ella sola estaba dilatar aquel negocio, o ponello luego por obra” (Cervantes 2010, I, 493).

154 “nos había parecido mejor enviar por la barca a Mallorca, como la mora decía, no osamos contradecirle, temerosos que, si no hacíamos lo que él decía nos había de descubrir y poner a peligro de perder las vidas, si descubriese el trato de Zoraida, por cuya vida diéramos todos las nuestras” (Cervantes 2010, I, 493).

155 “la libertad alcanzada y el temor de volver a perderla les borraba de la memoria todas las obligaciones del mundo” (Cervantes 2010, I, 493).
the strangest that had happened in that place where astounding and remarkable things happen every day” (Cervantes 2003, 350). Following this story, the content of which is not revealed, the renegade lays out his plan, which is to enlist a Moor to buy the boat and then fetch the Christians and Zoraida. It is revealing that the story of “espanto” and “admiración” is used as a method of persuasion, heightening the level of fear of “The Captive’s Tale” by referring to the very means—terror and wonder—that are meant to make this story entertaining, instructive, and in some way transformative. But the intrigue that is injected has the effect of introducing deceit and religious impurity into a story that could otherwise be seen as an ideal religious romance. The captive is not telling the truth to Zoraida; the “mora” is endangered but kept in the dark; and the exodus, which is dangerous in Los baños, reintroduces a dependence on the cunning and good will of the enemy, as in El trato. “Espanto” and “admiración” emerge less from what is said—the public professions of faith in the plays—than from what is briefly mentioned and then ignored.

When Ruy Pérez goes to Agi Morato’s garden to let Zoraida know of his plans, again, we have a return to doublespeak, in which the truth is veiled, and what is explicitly revealed either alludes to it or outright contradicts it. It is not surprising, then, that the word “trato” begins to appear in the captive’s narrative. The captive referred to Zoraida’s letter as her “trato.” When the renegade goes to Agi Morato’s garden in order to make his presence familiar, and not surprise anybody when he returns to free them, the captive mentions that he was unable to speak to her “because Moorish women do not allow any Moor or Turk to see them unless instructed to do so by their husbands or father. They allow Christian captives to spend time with them and talk to them, even more than is reasonable” (Cervantes 2003, 352-3). Moreover, the captive continues, it would have alarmed her to know that the business was in the hands of a renegade. When Pérez finally meets Zoraida in person in that garden, she speaks to him in the same mixture of languages in which he has spoken to her father: “the language used between captives and Moors throughout Barbary, and even in Constantinople; it is not Moorish or Castilian, not the language of any nation, but a mixture of all tongues, and with it we can understand on another” (Cervantes 2003, 352-3). She asks him if he has been ransomed, and the fascinating exchange follows:

I replied that I had been ransomed, and for a price that would indicate how much my master valued me, for I had paid fifteen hundred zoltanís for myself. To which she responded:

‘In truth, if you belonged to my father, I would make certain that he did not ransom you for twice that amount, because you Christians always lie and pretend to be poor in order to deceive the Moors.’

‘That may be so, Señora,’ I replied, ‘but the truth is that I have been honest with my master, as I am and will be with everyone in the world.’ (Cervantes 2003, 344-5)

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156 “donde a cada paso suceden cosas de grande espanto y de admiración” (Cervantes 2010, I, 493).
157 In El trato, the Turkish king allows Aurelio and Silvia to repatriate, effectively blocking the schemes of Yzuf and Zahara to capture them as lovers.
158 “porque las moras no se dejan ver de ningún moro ni turco, si no es que su marido o su padre se las manden. De cristianos cautivos se dejan tratar y comunicar, aun más de aquella que sería razonable” [emphasis added] (Cervantes 2010, I, 495).
159 “en lengua que en toda la Berbería y aun en Constantinopla, se halla entre cautivos y moros…una mezcla de todas las lenguas, con la cual todos nos entendemos” (Cervantes 2010, I, 496).
160 Yo le respondí que ya estaba rescatado, y que en el precio podía echar de ver en lo que mi amo me estimaba, pues había dado por mí mil y quinientos zoltamís. A lo cual ella respondió:
The sudden extravagant appearance of *tratar* in this part of the captive’s story is notable, but even more so because the word is so closely connected to deceit, sexual licentiousness, double-dealing, and commerce. Covarrubias defines *tratar*:

Commerce of buying and selling merchandise, from which comes “trataste” and “trato” [the preterit and the past participle], the transaction. To conduct business well, or badly, to negotiate truthfully, or with deceit. Double dealing, veiled deceit. “Tratar” with somebody is to get to know them and to have a conversation. A woman of bad “trato,” one who is not chaste or modestly retired from the world.\(^{161}\)

The definition of *trato* in Covarrubias has quite a different meaning, as we saw above, but is also applicable here, particularly since his first attempt to write about captivity is entitled *El trato de Argel*. It is worth reproducing it to compare with the definition of *tratar*.

From rope, a punishment in which the hands are tied behind the back, the body lifted up into the air, and then allowed to fall to the ground, so that the bones are almost dislocated from the shoulders.\(^{162}\)

Zoraida’s letters, then, for all their expressions of faith and their chaste romantic promises, are reduced to a commercial exchange, a matter of business.\(^{163}\) On the other hand, given that the phrase of *mal trato*, one which is fairly common in the literature of the time period, refers to an unchaste woman, it is suggestive that first the captive calls her “la mora” when he uses the term, and, secondly, that he uses it when he is talking to her after having said that the Moors allow their women to speak even more openly than is “reasonable.” This veiled conversation, then, which is in full view of her father has, because of the repetitive mention of *tratar* this sense of transgression. Furthermore, when he uses the word three times to refer to his dealings with his former master, he is making a conspicuous allusion to the double dealings—the *doble trato*—which he is about to do with Agi Morato. Indeed, the overtures of protest are an oblique, but resounding affirmation of guilt, a confirmation of the deceitful Christian that Zoraida jokingly calls him. One wonders what he antecedent of “la” is in his statements, “yo la he *tratado* con mi amo, y la *trato* y la *trataré* con cuantas personas hay en el mundo”? It cannot be “precio” or “rescate,” the terms to which the direct object would most likely correspond. Is he referring to Zoraida, and if that is the case, is he not admitting to his well-intentioned deceits, which nevertheless have the possibility of turning the tale into a tragedy?

This brings us to the second definition of *trato*, as a very particular kind of torture notoriously used in Algiers. Indeed, this is most likely how Francisquito expired in *Los baños* and it is after all the title of his earliest work on captivity. While the captive’s audience at the inn would not have heard anything in the captive’s story about *tratos*, the fact that torture is introjected surreptitiously—made both highly visible and beyond a linguistic smoke screen—

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\(^{161}\) “Tratar.” “Negociar comprando y vendiendo mercaderías, de donde se dixo trataste, y trato, la negociación. Tener buen trato, o mal trato, negociar con verdad, o con engaño. Trato doble, engaño disfrazado. Tratar a uno, es tener conocimiento con el y conversación. Muger de mal trato, la que no es casta, y recogida.”

\(^{162}\) “Trato.” “De cuerda, castigo que se suele dar, atando a uno las manos por detrás, leuantandole en el ayre, y dexandole después caer sin que llegue a tierra, con que casi se le descoyuntan los huesos de los hombros.”

\(^{163}\) This follows on the heals of the captive’s appraisal of her wealth and her beauty through the value of the jewels she is wearing: “she who was mistress of my heart was mistress of all this”; “…at the moment she appeared so richly attired and so exceedingly beautiful she seemed the loveliest woman I had ever seen…” (Cervantes 2003, 354).
corresponds to the double-dealing of both Zoraida and the captive. The camouflaged presence of torture also intimates the ubiquity and imminence of terror, even though it is not visible in this garden. The emphasis on tratar and trato confirms something else that I have affirmed about the relationship of terror to wonder: we expect terror to be digested and transmuted into wonder, but instead it lurks next to it—as in Los baños and El trato—or behind it, partially transfigured, but always likely to return. We see this as well in the very nature of the discussion that goes on in the garden, and in the hidden treachery. Finally, in the sweet exchanges between Zoraida, Agi Morato, and Ruy Pérez we will also observe the relationship between that which inspires wonder and what lies behind it. Cervantes provides a kind of structural latticework that allows the relationship of terror to wonder to come forth in this garden—a garden that captures the simultaneous promise of freedom and death, trust and betrayal, and, ultimately, the dismemberment of the family.

‘And when do you leave?’ Zoraida asks the captive, and her father does not know that she is actually asking him, when are they going (Cervantes 2003, 355).

‘Tomorrow, I believe,’ I said, ‘because a ship from France is scheduled to sail tomorrow, and I intent to leave on it.’

‘Do you think it would be better,’ Zoraida replied, ‘to wait for a vessel from Spain and sail on that rather than on a ship from France? For the French are not your friends.’

‘No,’ I responded, ‘though if it is true, as I have heard, that a ship is arriving from Spain, I might wait for it, but it is more likely that I shall leave tomorrow, because the desire I have to be in my own country and with the people I love is so great that I cannot endure waiting for another opportunity, even if it is a better one.’ (Cervantes 2003, 355)

It is quite easy to get swept in the charming aspects of this doble trato and become entangled in the paralogic that Aristotle connects with the wonderful (Poetics XXIV). We are, if we are able to resist the sweetness of the encounter in the garden, in the realm not of double-speak, but triple-speak, as in the number of times that the captives says that he will “tratar” with his master. Pérez tells Zoraida that he will go home on a ship from France, which is not true. Rather, he means to communicate to her simply that they will be leaving, but the talk of Spanish versus French ships deflects from the fact that it is a Moorish ship that will be taking both of them. Seen from Agi Morato’s perspective, this is triply untrue. Then, of course, there is the question of who is waiting for him in Spain. We know from the description of his family history, that he is estranged from his family because of his pride, his unwillingness to ask his father or brothers for ransom money, and it is only later by a wildly improbable turn of fate, that he runs into his brother the audiente at the inn. One even wonders about his desire to return to Spain and his intimate attachments. Finally, and this is perhaps the most glaring instance of paralogic, is the manner in which Ruy Pérez is talking to Zoraida and the consequences of this discussion for the intrigue in the plot. In Los baños, Cervantes edits the complication of the language barrier: don Lope is able immediately to read Zoraida’s letter. Here, however, we have a very weak link in the logical thread. The captive seems to understand when, “[a]s soon as she approached us, her father told her in their language that I was a slave of his friend Aranúte Mami and had come to

164 “Y ¿cuándo te vas?”

—“Mañana, creo yo”, dije, “porque está aquí un bajel de Francia que se hace mañana a la vela, y pienso irme en él.”

—“¿No es mejor”, replicó Zoraida, “esperar a que vengan bajeles de España, y irte con ellos, que no con los de Francia, que no son vuestros amigos?” —“No, respondí yo; “aunque si como hay nuevas que viene ya un bajel de España es verdad, todavía yo le aguardaré, puesto que es más cierto el partirme mañana porque el deseo que tengo de verme en mi tierra y con las personas que bien quiero es tanto, que no me dejará esperar otra comodidad, si se tarda, por mejor que sea”. (Cervantes 2010, I, 498)
pick a salad. She began to speak, and in that mixture of languages I have already26665(816,456),(906,516)(816,456),(906,516) mentioned she asked me if I was a gentleman…” [emphasis added] (Cervantes 2003, 354). How is it that he understands Agi Morato in “su lengua,” and why did they not use the mixture of languages the captive describes now to communicate earlier in the letters? Indeed, what is the need for the use of the renegade in this plot, and why is the plot stripped of this glaring paralogic in Los baños?

The discussion continues, and broadens to include the father who is the most seriously deceived.

‘No doubt you are married in your own country,’ said Zoraida, ‘and wish to return to your wife.’
‘I am not married,’ I responded, ‘but I have given my word to marry as soon as I return there.’
‘And is the lady to whom you gave your word beautiful?’ said Zoraida.
‘She is so beautiful,’ I responded, ‘that truthfully, she looks a great deal like you.’
At this her father laughed heartily and said:
‘By Allah, Christian, she must be very beautiful if she resembles my daughter, who is the most beautiful woman in this kingdom. If you doubt it, look at her carefully, and you will see that I am telling you the truth.’

Zoraida’s father, who was a Ladino, acted as our interpreter for most of this exchange, for although she spoke the debased language that, as I have said, is used there, she tended to declare her meanings more by gestures than by words. (Cervantes 2003, 355)

It is at the moment that Agi Morato asks him to look at his daughter that the captive refines the explanation for how the language barrier is breached. Although Zoraida has indeed been speaking to him, he explains, “…she tended to declare her meanings more by gestures than by words.” On both sides, the intention has been communicated more through a doble trato of insinuation and suggestion than through any imaginable gestures. But we have been led to believe until this break that Zoraida and he have spoken in some direct manner without an interpreter using a hybrid language. Now, the inclusion of the explanation of the father’s intervention is brought in at the same time as the invitation to directly look at his daughter. What we are seeing here is the impossibility of a direct gaze, and of levels of betrayal and complicity—at the level of language and of the emotions—that attend the beginning of the great crescendo of the romance ending. Here, in Agi Morato’s garden, even the reader is involved in the confusion, where the narrator himself seems to be lying, or covering his tracks.

Can we possibly extrapolate about this event in the garden, what is at one level a beautiful moment built on slips in logic, the underlying sense of terror, and at the intersection of these a confusion of signs, both intentional and unintended, that make direct sight impossible? Is this great build-up of deliverance—this overt Christianization of the theme of exodus and

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165 “le dijo su padre en su lengua como yo era cautivo de su amigo Arnaute Mamí y que venía a buscar ensalada. Ella tomó la mano, y en aquella mezcla de lenguas que tengo dicho me preguntó si era caballero…” (Cervantes 2010, I, 497).

166 “Debes de ser, sin duda, casado en tu tierra”, dijo Zoraida, “y por eso deseas ir a verte con tu mujer”. –“No soy”, respondí yo, “casado; mas tengo dada la palabra casarme en llegando allá”. –“Y ¿es hermosa la dama a quien se la diste?”, dijo Zoraida. –“Tan hermosa es”, respondí yo, que para encarecella y decirte la verdad, se parece a ti mucho”. Desto se rió muy de veras su padre, y dijo: —“Gualá, cristiano, que debe de ser muy hermosa si se parece a mi hija, que es la más hermosa de todo este reino. Si no, mirala bien, y verás cómo te digo verdad.” Servíanos de intérprete a las más destas palabras y razones el padre de Zoraida, como más ladino; que aunque ella hablaba la bastardada lengua que, como he dicho allí se usa, más declaraba su intención por señas que por palabras. (Cervantes 2010, I, 498)
return—merely a shabby, transparent smoke screen for a betrayal? Zoraida will abandon her father in a cove that is named for a treacherous woman, and it is so cursed that no Moor will approach it. Perhaps most telling is the detail of Agi Morato as a \textit{ladino}, which according to Covarrubias, is the name given to the “morisco y al extranjero que aprendió nuestra lengua” (Covarrubias 747.a.47, cited in Cervantes 2010, I, 498, n. 13). The exchanges here are rife with the double-dealing that is due to the enemy. The conversion of Zoraida, ironically, is as much about making her into “muger de mal trato” as it is about her mirroring Mary.

Terror, \textit{espanto}, emerges out of its hiding place in between words and double meanings when the clean departure begins to unravel. After the Christians surprise the Moorish sailors and threaten them, the captive explains that the Moors “were frightened….without a word they allowed the Christians to tie their hands, which they did very quickly, threatening the Moors that if they raised any kind of alarm or called out in any way, they would all be put to the sword” (Cervantes 2003, 358). When the Christians arrive at Zoraida’s house, they threaten that the entire plan will be ruined if Agi Morato is not taken captive on board. She resists, but in the end gives in. Later, “When his daughter saw him she covered her eyes so that she would not see him, and her father was horrified” (Cervantes 2003, 359). Here, then, we have a direct inversion of the earlier scene in the garden. The betrayal finally revealed, the battle between Christian and Moor unleashed and made legible, there is no retreat possible into the obscurities of language, but the raw emotion behind the \textit{doble trato} and the \textit{trato} as punishment comes forth here. It has somehow all been ordained—divinely ordained, according to Leo Spitzer and Riley’s reading. I take a much less providential view of this. Rather it is ordained by the structure of terror itself, which has been lying in wait in a linguistic screen. Now the \textit{espanto}—the terror and shock—is revealed in the face of Agi Morato.

To his credit, the captive unfolds the entire painful abandonment of the father. Zoraida attempts to hide her own face from her father in the captive’s hands. When Agi Morato begins to realize that his daughter is involved in the plot that has humiliated him, he demands that she respond why she came dressed in her finery: “Answer me, for this is even more disturbing and surprising to me than the calamity in which I find myself now” (Cervantes 2003, 36). He uses the sense of “admiración” not as a detached contemplation of a terrible spectacle, but as a bewildered confrontation with a moment of terror. It is the renegade who responds with a cliché of Christian discernment that almost word for word reproduces Luis de Granada. The renegade explains that Zoraida is like the person “who comes out of the darkness into light, out of death into life, out of suffering into glory” (Cervantes 2003, 361). This is a cruel statement, a kind of religious conviction that is shocking coming from somebody who has introduced fog, \textit{tinieblas}, into the story through the manner in which the escape is carried out. Ultimately, however, if we

\begin{itemize}
\item 167 “quedáronse espantados….se dejaron, sin hablar alguna palabra, maniatar de los cristianos, los cuales con mucha presteza lo hicieron, amenazando a los moros que si alzaban por alguna vía o manera la voz, que luego al punto los pasarían a cuchillo” (Cervantes 2010, I, 501).
\item 168 “cuando su hija le vio se cubrió los ojos por no verle, y su padre quedó espantado” (Cervantes 2010, I, 502).
\item 169 “Respóndeme a esto, que me tiene más suspenso y admirado que la misma desgracia en que me hallo” (Cervantes 2010, I, 505).
\item 170 “que sale de las tinieblas a la luz, de la muerte a la vida y de la pena a la gloria” (Cervantes 2010, I, 505).
\end{itemize}

Compare with Luis de Granada’s characterization of the fog, \textit{tinieblas}, of this world in \textit{Guía de pecadores}: “When he lowers his eyes from up on hight to see the dark valley of this world, he sees above him the brightness of that eternal light. He knows then what he loved in this world was a dark and foggy night.” “…cuando abaja los ojos de lo alto a mirar el valle tenebroso de este mundo, y ve sobre si la claridad de aquella luz eternal, conosce claramente que era noche y tinieblas todo lo que en este mundo amaba” (de Granada, I, 210).
scrutinize this far enough—armed with a shield to resist the paralogic of the romance—it is the captive, the storyteller, and even Cervantes himself, who have introduced this eruption of terror. Perhaps this is a sadistic return of violence, avenging the *tratos* of the captivity plays.

Either way, in the ending of the romance, terror marks its return. If the *audientes* at the *inn* are transported by, as Don Fernando explains, speaking for the group, “accidentes que maravillan y suspenden a quien los oye” (Cervantes 2010, I, 514), the wondrous accidents—the fact that a Moorish woman became Christian through what seems to be a primitive indoctrination that overrode cultural and familial allegiance, the miraculous reconciliation of the captive with his brother at the inn—are the wonders which are meant to supersede the father’s terror that precedes. When Zoraida admits that she was part of the plan of escape and has become an apostate to Christianity, her father dives into the ocean to kill himself. They fish him out and revive him. The captive explains,

> it was our good fortune to reach a cove beside a small promontory or cape that the Moors call the *Cava Rumía*, which in our language means the ‘Wicked Christain Woman’; it is a tradition among the Moors that this is the place where the *Cava* who caused the loss of Spain lies buried, because *cava* in their language means ‘wicked woman,’ and *rumía* means ‘Christian’; they still take it as an evil omen when a ship is forced to anchor there, because otherwise they would never do so, but for us it was not the shelter of a wicked woman but a safe haven and refuge, for the sea had become very rough. (Cervantes 2003, 362)

Thus he is finally abandoned on this cove set aside by a promontory, whose name derives from the legend of the bad Christian who betrayed Hispania to the Muslim invaders. It is, according to the captive, a place with such a curse that no Muslim will moor there. Thus, by surrendering the wailing patriarch to the island, Zoraida allows him to die in this enclosure, a kind of deadly womb, or a garden-like enclosure safe-guarded by a curse and a phallus, the promontory. It is not surprising, then, when the captive and Zoraida return to Spain they inspire so much terror. At first, it is the clothing that they are wearing that they attribute to it. Then of course there is the tenacious move to keep their Moorish clothes on. It is almost as if in “The Captive’s Tale,” Cervantes most strikingly reveals the manner in which lattice work of wonder and suspense, comes with a necessary terror that cannot be buried. The narrative devotes a great deal of time to the unfolding of the complications of a trauma produced by terror, but then also attempts to enclose it in a garden, in a cove, and indeed beyond a veil of language. But in the end, terror restages its own return during the experience of *admiración* and *maravilla*, which is, after all, a spectral doubling of *espanto*.

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171 “quiso nuestra buena suerte que llegamos a una cala que se hace al lado de un pequeño promontorio o cambo que de los moros es llamado el de la *Cava Rumía*, que en nuestra lengua quiere decir *la mala mujer cristiana*; y es tradición entre los moros que en aquel lugar está enterrada la Cava, por quien se perdió España, porque *cava* en su lengua quiere decir *mujer mala*, y *rumía*, cristiana…” (Cervantes 2010, I, 506)
Part III: The Polyxena Pattern in Shakespeare’s Late Romances

Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses* and Heliodorus’ *Æthiopica* provide the themes and archetypes of a revitalized romance during the Renaissance that emphasizes the trials of women, as both court trials and ordeals or quests, at the hands of their fathers and lovers. The renewed tradition, as interpreted by Shakespeare, relies on the complex relationship between men whose fantasies are overwhelmed by their fears of the feminine, but paradoxically, can only be saved through the escape offered by the feminine as redeemer. Confronted by the enigma of the feminine, Leontes, Pericles, or Posthumus are “astonished,” but not for the first time. Rather, the polarized feminine archetypes that emerge are a sign that a traumatic event has taken place, and its ripples are felt as an “astonishment” of the mind. The spectral return of perceived threat triggers the imagination to create “strange, stupend, absurd shapes” in dream and in conscious life. Drawing on a fantasy as old as tragedy itself, a thread runs through ancient tragedy, the Hellenistic novel, and Shakespeare’s romances of feminine threat and betrayal, sacrifice, and redemption—the Polyxena Pattern.

In order to justify the fantasy, to make it credible to the reason, even though it is not rational or equitable, the male interpreter subjects the sacrificed woman to a trial in which she comes out guilty. When the sacrificed daughter returns as a redeemer at the end of *The Æthiopica*, *Pericles*, *The Winter’s Tale*, and *Cymbeline*, a form of trial is resurrected as well. Now, the fantasy of the woman as redeemer overcomes the “laws” that almost sacrifice her again. As an object of “admiration,” the redeemer allows the male spectator to approach the terror and desire that the feminine inspire in him by providing him with an escape into fantasy. The triumph of the redeemer becomes legible in the power of this new idealized archetype to allow the male judge to break his own laws. In the dream-like resurrection that Paulina orchestrates at the end of *The Winter’s Tale*, Shakespeare shatters the Polyxena Pattern altogether. Instead of a polarized archetype of femininity, Hermione appears on the stage as an imperfect woman who belongs to an imperfect world. For the first time in Shakespeare’s romances, perhaps for the first time ever in romance as a corpus, the imperfect woman is born from the fantasy of another woman, and in her imperfection, she redeems her whole family. When the cycle of demonization and idealization is broken, we move out of a closed circuit of emotions that begins with terror as astonishment, changing into aggression, then the fear and erotic fantasy embodied in “admiration.” The wonder that characterizes the end of *The Winter’s Tale* is of a paradigm of binaries torn up and remade through a fantasy of femininity born from a woman.

In Shakespeare’s romances, the men succumb to their fantasies of feminine threat and allure. There are two types of women: the evil, deceitful, and licentious queen and the beautiful, innocent, and chaste maiden. The contrary feelings of hatred and longing that this splitting arouses spawn images of maidens repeatedly abandoned, sexually violated, or threatened by predators. A male hero sacrifices the innocent daughter to punish the evil queen of his fantasy.

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172 Burton, Robert. *The Anatomy of Melancholy*. Vol 1. Eds. Thomas Faulkner, Nicolas Kiessling, Rhonda Blair. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Located in the “middle sell of the braine,” the “Phantasie” recalls images, reliving them as if they were new. However, during sleep, when sick, or when suffering from melancholy, it may turn these images into “strange, stupend, absurd shapes, many monstrous and prodigious things, especially if it be stirred up by some terrible object, presented to it from common sense, or memory” (Burton I.ii 152).
However, this sacrificed maiden later becomes the object of desire and his redeemer. The feminine as redeemer allows the male protagonist’s fear and lethal aggression to change into something manageable—“admiration,” which is a kind of amazement that aestheticizes its object and is bound up with erotic desire. However, as we will see in Pericles, Prince of Tyre, this fantasy of the feminine redeemer, because it is tied up with the complex of the feminine persecutor and sacrificed maiden, is unstable, and always in danger of leading him back to his original nightmare. Thus, at the end of the Renaissance model of romance, par excellence, The Aethiopica, and also in Shakespeare’s Pericles, Cymbeline, and The Winter’s Tale, the redeemer comes perilously close to being sacrificed again through death or incest. The experience of “admiration,” a species of fear that also combines aestheticization and erotic desire, is a spectral, i.e., ghost-like and mirroring, doubling of his experience of terror and aggression with the earlier archetypes of femininity, the evil queen and the daughter whom he sacrifices.

The figure of Polyxena in Seneca’s Troades focuses male aggression and raw erotic desire, the instinct to violate, and the longing to be redeemed by the woman whom he sacrifices for his fantasies. Like Iphigenia, Polyxena is sacrificed because of a male fantasy that requires retribution—the unlikely, and “stupend” idea that Artemis would require the death of a virgin or that the ghost of Achilles craves a young woman’s blood. The admiration that Polyxena inspires in Greeks and Trojans alike helps them manage the continual trauma that they inflict on women (the dehumanization of Hecuba, Andromache, Cassandra, and even Helen’s daughter Hermione). The figure of Polyxena, building upon Iphigenia whom she mirrors, is the link between tragedy and romance, focusing terror and turning it into wonder. The focus here is on Polyxena, rather than Iphigenia, because she mirrors the earlier episode, and therefore becomes a repetition of the traumatic event of female sacrifice. Secondly, the assassination of Polyxena is overtly associated with sexual desire and mourning, Pyrrhus’ fantasy that his father’s ghost craves the maiden’s blood. Thirdly, the sacrifice itself, as it is described in Seneca,173 transmutes terror into admiration in a way that the story of Iphigenia does not. Finally, there is a correspondence not just of themes, but also of nomenclature of the cast of characters in Troades, and those in the romances, and particularly The Winter’s Tale.

The threat of the evil queen needs to be expunged so that the castaway maiden can return as redeemer. At first what is visible is the dyad of the evil queen and the sacrificed daughter: Hermione and Perdita, Cymbeline’s queen and Imogen, Antiochus’ queen and Marina, Dionyza and Marina, Venus and Psyche. Tragedy remembers that the evil queens—Clytemnestr and Hecuba—are created out of their grief and anger at the sacrifice of their daughters, but in romance, the fantasy of the evil queen precedes the sacrifice, rearranging the causality. After the hero throws out, abandons, or attempts to kill his daughter, she returns. Indeed, she must return; she is compelled to return, according to the laws of the “fantasy,” the early modern term that signals the imaginative part of the psyche. The redeemer who comes back home, or to whom her male violator is drawn back like a magnet, returns as a spectral mirror of her former self. She revisits him precisely because she is the ghost of his traumatic violation of her.

The redeemer is the third submerged part of what is actually a feminine triptych. The evil queen triggers fear, astonishing the imagination and throwing off reason altogether, and in an effort to expunge her, the hero sacrifices her daughter. Defying the structure of tragedy, the daughters return, but they do not haunt their persecutors. When Marina, Perdita, and Imogen revisit, they elicit “admiration,” a form of amazement that centers on longing and desire.

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173 It is much more likely that Shakespeare encountered Polyxena in Seneca than in any Greek version of her story.
Because the redeemer is the product of fear, the sensation that she elicits, admiration, combines fear with longing. The fantasy of feminine sexual transgression expresses itself in the man’s feeling of being, or having been, sexually violated by a duplicitous woman, whom he later prosecutes and punishes. The two antithetical female forces, evil queen and chaste maiden, cannot be separated in the male imagination, continually sliding into each other, because where there is an evil queen there is always an innocent maiden, and the man cannot see his role in creating these. The constellation seems to happen to him, like a dream, rather than to have any causal relationship to his actions. The split fantasy of women is, however, unstable, and it needs to be continually reassessed and reimagined; the tribunal becomes central as the place where men try to reclaim their reason, but instead fall again into fantasy. Fantasy creates the need for the tribunal and represents the sleep of reason, for example, Leontes’ indictment of Hermione and Posthumus’ of Imogen, for example. Consequently, the trial often comes out of a dream, is featured in a dream, or gives rise to a dream.

The figure of Polyxena plays a central role in Shakespeare’s romances by embodying the redeeming maiden, the object of admiration, as an expression of traumatic repetition. The astonishment of the fantasy gives rise to trial and the consequences of trial. In romance, the traumatic repetition creates a powerful male fantasy of redemption that combines the feelings of his initial terror of betrayal by the sexual object with the fear and longing of being revisited by the spectral spawn. Polyxena is the mythological and literary response to the earlier Iphigenia. By transmuting terror into admiration, the figure of Polyxena stands for the possibilities of romance to turn tragedy around emotionally. The specific correspondence of Polyxena with characters and themes in Shakespeare’s late romances, however, can be deduced not just from literary echoes, but even more convincingly, from nomenclature. Most of the important male protagonists’ names begin with a P: Prospero, Pericles, Posthumus, Polixenes, and the heroine who most resembles Polyxena, Perdita. Paulina, the feminine protagonist, who at different points has the most toxic fantasy of the female, the witch, projected onto her, later asserts a male role at the moment when she creates an alternative female archetype out of her own fantasy. Leontes believes Polyxena’s closest namesake, Polixenes, to be the lover of Hermione, and indeed, Polixenes is the catalyst that triggers the fantasy of evil queen, cast out maiden, and through his later persecution of Perdita, of sending her home to become the redeemer. Shakespeare’s version of Greene’s Pandosto, changes most of Greene’s names, and significantly he replaces them with names that conjure up Polyxena. He adds Hermione and Polixenes to The Winter’s Tale, the former being straight out of Troades, and the latter a modification of Polyxena. In choosing the name of Odysseus’ grandfather, Autolycus, for the rogue in The Winter’s Tale’s last two acts, he gestures to the legendary Autolycus’ shape-shifting, cunning grandson, Odysseus, who is central to bringing about the sacrifice of both Iphigenia and Polyxena. That the grandfather, Autolycus, should make up for the sins of the children, Odysseus and Pyrrhus (Achilles’ cruel, young son), is a dream-like inversion of the pattern of ancient tragedy, where the children pay for the sins of the fathers.

This chapter begins by describing the tragic roots of the Polyxena Pattern, finding its genesis in Iphigenia. Jane Lumley’s translation of Iphigenia in Aulis made the story available directly by the middle of the sixteenth-century; indeed, it was the first Greek tragedy translated into English, and also has the distinction of being the first theatrical piece written by a woman in
the English language. However, I turn to Lucretius’ Latin version of the story because it points out the connection between male fantasy and the sacrifice of the daughter. Lucretius asserts that Iphigenia’s death was a cold-blooded murder caused by nothing more than a fantasy of Artemis’ demands. Once the pretense of necessity is exposed as fantasy, the idea of Clytemnestra as evil queen who doesn’t understand Agamemnon’s regal obligations, proves to be yet another fantasy. Seneca’s Polyxena, which would have been readily available to Shakespeare, especially given the Senecanism of Elizabethan theatre, confirms a pattern of sacrifice. Her fate mirrors Iphigenia’s. Clytemnestra’s daughter is assassinated at the beginning of the Trojan War, while Polyxena is slaughtered at the end. But Seneca’s rendition of Polyxena’s fate, unlike Euripides’ preceding him, makes it into a moment of transfiguration. Iphigenia at Tauris is undoubtedly the pioneer of romance by depicting Artemis as the one who sacrifices her victim and then saves her. However, Euripides’ play does not provide a model for how masculine aggression, and terror at its consequences, can be managed. Seneca’s description of the death of Polyxena provides a potent model.

The chapter then turns to The Winter’s Tale to witness the fantasy triggered in the mind of Leontes. The first three acts show the dynamics behind the astonishing of Leontes’ judgment, which constructs the evil queen before our eyes. Leontes’ trial of Hermione confirms his fantasy rather than resurrecting his reason, and it leads him to sacrifice his daughter. Cymbeline starts off already in the realm of the dream-like with an evil queen fully formed, who seems to have cast a spell on the men. Cymbeline and Posthumus both share a sense of paralysis of action and an overriding guilt for their impotence. This guilt is transferred from Cymbeline to Posthumus and, finally, to Imogen, again creating the cast-out, sacrificed daughter.

We then turn back to the Apuleian representations of the male fantasy of feminine duplicity and guilt. In The Golden Ass, the man feels besieged and betrayed, and it is only through trial that women’s guilt is revealed and punished. Apuleius makes the connection between dream, i.e., male fantasy, and the trial. This deceit is so buried that it requires the dead to come back to life, to reveal murder or mutilation to the jury of men. The second model of the relationship between dream and the instinct to trial comes from another ancient romance, Heliodorus’ *Æthiopica*. Heliodorus connects the Andromeda story of feminine sacrifice to the moment of male penetration and conception. This fantasy, here the woman’s fantasy, becomes literally embodied in the Ethiopian queen’s child. She must cast the child away and therefore hide the connection between the fantasy of violence, sex, and female duplicity. In Cymbeline, the combination of Iachimo and Posthumus creates a complex of jealousy and aggression, hatred of the feminine coupled with sexual desire for that very same thing. The complex of the two men comes together as one force, the accuser, which works single-mindedly to later justify the desire to murder Imogen. In a moment of terror, Iachimo emotionally, if not cognitively, recognizes how his erotic desire is tied up with his appetite to inflict harm. In this scene, Shakespeare unveils the complex relationship that Heliodorus establishes between the male fantasy of the evil queen and the sacrificed maid. The act of imaginative conception (the action of the fantasy), emotional recognition (astonishment as terror), and sexual desire are all linked. Iachimo’s astonishment temporarily awakens his conscience; it interrupts what otherwise seems to be the general tendency of heros in these plays to figuratively sleepwalk with a knife.

Apuleius’ *Golden Ass* provides a model for understanding why the male protagonists feel persecuted by feminine sexual power and feel their fantasies overwhelmed. Lucius depicts

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The fantasy of having his body violated, and always being falsely accused by his female persecutors. Pericles follows in Lucius’ footsteps, guided to a dangerous, nameless queen by his desire for sexual fantasy. Comparing Pericles’ encounter with Antiochus’ queen, his initial meeting of Thaisa his wife, and his reunion with his daughter Marina, we see the astonishment of being overwhelmed by female sexuality, and then his passive, seemingly inevitable abandonment of both wife and daughter. Like Cymbeline and Posthumus, the prince feels impotent, as if under a spell caused by feminine transgression, the fearful memory of Antiochus’ daughter.

The last part of the chapter shows how the woman as redeemer provides a striking moment of “admiration.” This experience of admiration responds to the desire for sexual escape, but is reined in by fear, which prevents desire from devolving back into persecution. Admiration evokes from the past the terror of being overwhelmed and the memory of male aggression, which is either condensed or reenacted. The past almost repeats itself as a confirmation of an earlier trauma, but is then arrested in an extended ritual of wonder. This chapter concludes by revisiting the final trial scene in Heliodorus’ *Æthiopica*. It then returns to *Cymbeline* and *Pericles* to show how Shakespeare adapts or transforms the earlier model of trial, dispensing with it altogether in *The Winter’s Tale*.

The complex combination of feelings that coalesces around the tripartite fantasy of the feminine is captured in the cluster of stories and emotions around a literary open wound—*Iphigenia*. For Lucretius, the sacrifice of Iphianassa represents the catastrophic consequences of misinterpretation of the feminine by a jury of leading men. He recreates the story of her death as an example of crimes committed in the name of religion. Although his verses are about a religious rite, the crime is less about religion and more about the blind spots in men’s interpretation of the feminine, which leads to catastrophe:

As once at Aulis, the elected chiefs,
Foremost of heroes, Danaan counsellors,
Defiled Diana’s altar, virgin queen,
With Agamemnon’s daughter, foully slain.  

In the Latin, the sacrificial altar of the virgin is a meeting of the cross roads, “Trivia virginis aram,” as if it were an ineluctable destination, where all the roads of fantasy or thinking drift. Diana is not mentioned, but the altar of her virginity is synecdochic for the goddess; thus, in Lucretius, Diana, as the agent of evil she is in earlier traditions, is at least temporarily occluded, and she becomes overshadowed by the seductive idea of virginity. On the other hand, when the “ductores Danaum” choose, “delecti,” Luceretius’ verse preserves the sense of their agency. Lucretius vividly describes the daughter walking to the altar where the priest holds a concealed knife, “ferrum celare ministros” (I.90) and contrasts Iphianassa’s chastity or purity with the men’s impiety or impure character, literally juxtaposing the words, “sed casta inceste” (I.98).

There is an audience of spectators, who also function as witnesses, to the crime. However, they are in various stages of astonishment or weeping. The extremity of the emotional condition of the spectators, her helplessness, and the moral blindness of those who decide her death converge

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upon the crossroads, “Trivia,” of the altar of virginity. The whole scene is supercharged with emotion, but nobody, neither the jury nor the witnesses, can be trusted to explain the cause of the sacrifice or what actually happened. There is only the emotional imprint of the scene, the astonishment of Iphianassa—“muta metu terram” (Lucretius 2014, I.92)—and the tears of the people, “lacrimas” of the “civis” (Lucretius 2014, I.92).

On the other side of the Trojan War, we have Polyxena’s sacrifice to Achilles. She is the literary double of Iphigenia, a confirmation of the trauma of the event through its repetition, but also a modification. In Euripides’ Hecuba, the death of Polyxena begins the process of turning the Queen of Troy into the evil queen who kills Polymestor’s children. Hecuba confesses to Polyxena, “I died of sorrow while I was still alive,” which expresses in one verse her sense of being astonished senseless, of feeling beyond sorrow and therefore like the living dead.176 Euripides’ The Trojan Women does not elaborate the death of Polyxena; but Seneca’s version, and this would have been the version of The Trojan Women that would have been most readily available to Shakespeare, vividly presents her death as a mirror of Iphigenia’s. Seneca seizes the sacrifice as an energetic Stoic moment in which the people are terrified “mutus,” while Polyxena faces her death courageously:

…The girl looked down
modestly, but her cheeks were bright, and at the last
she was more beautiful than ever before,
just as the light of the sun is often sweeter
as it sets and the stars are taking up their places
and doubtful day is pressed by the neighbouring night.
The whole crowd was dumbfounded: indeed, people
have more respect for things about to die. Some notice her beauty,
others her youth, while some are moved to think
of Fortune’s mutability. All are affected
by her courage in meeting death. She walks before Pyrrhus.
Everybody quivers with pity and wonder… (Seneca 2010b, 1136-48)

Seneca displaces the center of gravity of the moment from grief to aestheticization. He renders the reaction of the crowd in powerful language, but there is no picture of the crowd; they are faceless symbols of emotions—“terror attonitos tenet/utrosque populos.”177 He depicts Polyxena using a beautiful metaphorical analogy that describes an ephemeral sliver of time, a liminal temporal and visual place in that line between day and night when night impresses itself on the day, and the day filters through night like a palimpsest. Seneca’s distancing of the moment by pointing to this break in a natural cycle alludes to the philosophical purpose to which he puts the scene; it is an analogy of the way in which stoicism breaks the cycle of terror with calm, and even beauty. Polyxena’s face is revelatory to the crowd, and it allows terror and pity to turn into wonder: “omnia mentes tremunt,/mirantur ac miserantur” (Seneca 1921b, 1147-8). Seneca’s depiction demonstrates the central role the young woman plays in turning terror into something like wonder, but how underlying this is a profound emotional sacrifice.

Polyxena, as she is viewed by the populos, turns fear into admiratio, as Edward Reynolds describes it in 1640. In his summary of Chapter XXI of A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man, he explains that “the opposite passion to this of Hope is

Feare,” and one of these fears is the “intellectual Fear of Admiration, when the excellency of the Object dazleth our Eye.”  

Seneca’s description turns the raw fear into something “intellectual,” that is, of the intellect, rather than just the fantasy, but only gets there through the aestheticization of an otherwise unbearable scene. Reynoldes details in the chapter how admiration is a subspecies of fear:

Admiration is a kind of fear: it being the property of man, not only to fear that which is against, but that also which is above our nature, either in regard of natural and civil dignity, which worketh a fear or reverence…of moral excellency and excesses above the strength of the faculty, which worketh a fear or admiration. (Reynoldes 285, PP1r)

He goes on to describe admiration as a “broken knowledge, and commonly the first step, which we make in each particular science,” relating how the experience of something that dazzles the eye through something of a Longinian magnitude, something “above our nature,” creates fear (Reynoldes 285, PP1r). When the terror that accompanies pity moves from the fantasy into the intellect, it allows the scene of fear to be internalized and remembered without taking the spectator back into the natural cycle of repetition. Seneca’s analogy above conveys a psychic process in which repetition is interrupted when the “broken knowledge” of the traumatic event becomes part of an intellectual puzzle that seeks to understand and contain it.

Polyxena, rather than Iphigenia, represents one end of the fantasy of men, the maiden who through sacrifice allows the male gaze to be turned away from pity and fear to the object that “dazleth the eye.” But Polyxena does not eclipse Iphigenia. The sacrifice of Iphigenia in Lucretius’ description is a fantasy that constructs Agamemnon’s paternity, his role as man, leader, and the one who sacrifices her. After describing Iphigenia’s terror, Lucretius exclaims “’Twas she who gave the king a father’s name.” (Lucretius 1916, I.95) which Ronald Melville translates, “Nor could it help, poor girl, at such a time/That she first gave the king the name of father.”

Thus, in Lucretius’ version not only does he erase the exigent, demanding goddess, but he also ties fatherhood to female sacrifice; he reminds the reader of her primogeniture just after describing her pathos. Lucretius connects the inevitable crossroads of sacrifice with virginity, marriage, and paternity. If Polyxena is part of a pattern, it is not because she blocks out the fact of male culpability in this fantasy of marriage turned into murder. She sufficiently resembles the earlier scene that her twin in suffering represents, but the “broken knowledge” of Iphigenia cannot be resolved as anything but the furthering of a tragic cycle, while Seneca’s Polyxena allows “broken knowledge” to exceed the traumatic events. While both maidens produce evil queens who wreak their revenge, Clytemnestra and Hecuba, Seneca’s Polyxena provides a counter savior to combat the darker version of femininity.

In Seneca’s Troades, while the Trojans still believe that Polyxena is going to the wedding altar, they exclaim “tali nubat Hermione modo,” (Seneca 1921b, 1134), “so may Hermione be veiled,” connecting Helen’s daughter by Menelaus. Hermione, “maestum caput/demissa,” (Seneca 1921b, 33-4) with sad and lowered head, precedes Polyxena, and the Trojans pray that her fate might be the same as Polyxena. In Euripides’ Andromache, Hermione appears again as Andromache’s nemesis. First, she is petulant, then histrionic; in neither case does she inspire empathy or awe. Regardless, it is doubtful Shakespeare came across even a summary of this

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180 The literal translation is my own.
more obscure and less successful of Euripides’ plays. The source of Polyxena and Hermione is most likely Seneca.

There is also a strong case for the influence of Apuleius’ *Golden Ass* and Heliodorus’ *Æthiopica* on Shakespeare’s vision of romance. Given the widespread interest during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the Greek romance as a model for a renewed romance, a general influence on Shakespeare’s plays is more than likely. More concrete influence of motifs, plot devices, and specific patterns of emotion are visible in his work as well. Scholars such as Miola clearly privilege the classical influences on Shakespeare.\(^{181}\) Hunter, Cooper, Grantley, Marshall, and Marsalek claim that the medieval play was the greatest influence on the bard.\(^{182}\) However, the majority of Shakespearean criticism favors a combination of these.\(^{183}\) In his late romances, I will argue that Apuleius and Heliodorus, given their popularity and prestige, provided a model for the juxtaposition of the dream-like and the irrational with the trial scene. Moreover, in both novels, there are illustrations of the need to assert reason and law after the male protagonist finds himself overwhelmed by fantasy. Finally, there exists in all of these a complex relationship between the three different archetypes of evil queen, sacrificed maid, and the redeemer.

In his thorough study of details that strongly favor Shakespeare’s familiarity with the *Golden Ass*, one of the structural similarities D.T. Starnes points out is the combination of an amazing scenario with very realistic emotions both in the interpolated story of Cupid and Psyche from the *Golden Ass* and *The Tempest*:

> The similarity of atmosphere in the enchanted isle and the palatial home of Psyche—the strangely alluring music coming from no visible persons or instruments—is worthy of note. And giving point, by contrast, in each piece is that in the midst of the idealized surroundings is introduced the realistic and disturbing motif of the treachery and exposure of kinsmen.\(^{184}\)

The combination of the dreamlike—music without musicians, palatial service without servants—and the paradox of disembodied sensuality, combined with an awareness of treachery, emerge from the juxtaposed trial and dream: the dream in the trial and the trial in the dream. Starnes’ addition of “exposure of kinsmen” marks the vulnerability to violation by family that initiates the story of Cupid and Psyche, of Persina and Hidaspes, and that colors the *Golden Ass* and the romances of Shakespeare.

Apuleius “contributes to a narrative tradition of the marvellous in Renaissance Europe, adding new contexts to the Ovidian ‘vocabulary of surprise’ while it feeds the rebirth of the picaresque, the interest in magic and witchcraft…and the symbolic function of the transformation plot.”\(^{185}\) These elements of form and content—magic, surprise, and

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\(^{183}\) See, for example, Jensen’s chapter on “Singing psalms to hornpipes: Festivity, iconoclasm and Catholicism in *The Winter’s Tale.*” *Religion and Revelry in Shakespeare’s Festive World*. Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 2008.

\(^{184}\) Starnes, D.T. “Shakespeare and Apuleius.” *PMLA*. 60 (4) 1945. 1047.

transformation, in particular—are picked up in Shakespeare’s plays. By shedding the picaresque, and focusing on the magical, the structure of Shakespeare’s romances is cast more along the lines of the Heliodoran, although the motif of mirroring trials, illusory reality, the feeling of being overwhelmed by a threatening feminine presence, and the return of the dead is Apuleian. The popularity of the *Golden Ass* before the time of Shakespeare, the number of editions imprinted during his life, and, as Starnes concludes, “Familiar passages in the plays and the poems which have seemed hitherto to have a sole, demonstrable source may, in fact, represent an imaginative synthesis of two or more related sources,” including *The Golden Ass* (Starnes 1050). This evidence suggests Shakespeare’s familiarity with Apuleius. Adlington’s English translation of *The Metamorphoses*, known more commonly as *The Golden Ass*, appeared first in 1566 and reprinted in 1571, 1582, 1596, 1600, and 1639 (Starnes 1021). Starnes makes a convincing argument that Shakespeare read it at the beginning and the end of his career, pointing to instances where when choosing between Ovid and Apuleius or Plautus and Apuleius, the details in the latter more closely resemble Shakespeare’s appropriations. For example in *The Comedy of Errors*, “Two aspects….suggest that the dramatist was unconsciously perhaps exhibiting familiarity with Apuleius’s novel: “The atmosphere of Ephesus as it seemed to Antipholus of Syracuse and his servant Dromio; (2) recurrent statements of Dromio that he is transformed into an ass…” (Starnes 1022). He adds to this the fear, of which there is no hint in the other source text, Plautus’ *Menaechmi*, of “dark-working sorcerers” [I.i.99] and soul-killing witches that deform the body” [I.i.101]; and witchcraft and sorcery that Antipholus and his servant emphasize throughout” (Starnes 1022). In *Pericles*, Cerimon’s revival of Thaisa begins with him recounting “I heard of an Egyptian/That had nine hours lain dead, who was/By good appliance recovered” (III.ii.83-5), which as Gossett notes, echoes the eleventh chapter of *The Golden Ass* in which Zachlas, the Egyptian, revives a dead man in order to become a witness in a murder trial.

Julia Gaisser traces the *Golden Ass* motif from “late antiquity through the sixteenth century. The major links of the chain were forged by Fulgentius, Boccaccio, and Beroaldo, but it also has more obscure links, as well as offshoots leading into vernacular translations and the realm of art.” From the fourteenth century twenty-three manuscripts of the novel are extant, including a copy owned by Petrarch (Gaiser 28). Boccaccio’s rendition of the story of Cupid and Psyche appears in his *Genealogy of the Pagan Gods*, which he wrote concurrently with the *Decameron* (Gaiser 29). It is also possible that Shakespeare may have read the book in its original. A more detailed study, *Shakespeare’s Favorite Novel* traces parallels in language, phrasing, and structure between Apuleius’ novel and Shakespeare’s plays, including the great tragedies. Gillespie’s dictionary lists the “possible links to *The Golden Ass* in *Venus and Adonis*…and in a number of later Shakespeare plays…*Cymbeline* (for the Cupid and Psyche story as a paradigm for the Platonic theme of ‘gazing on beauty bare’ in the Imogen plot…”

In support of the influence of the Greek romance on the Elizabethan imagination, Gillespie concludes, “…the very considerable importance of the romances in the Elizabethan

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188 See Baldwin’s *Shakespeare’s Small Latine and Lesse Greeke*, I, 190; II, 26; 185; 247.
ocean of stories...is little recognised." Heliodorus, rather than Chariton and Xenophon ("Shakespeare and Greek Romance" 231), would have been available to Shakespeare. Rather than plot devices or stock characters, Gillespie seizes on particular concepts that come out of the Greek romance: “‘distanciation of the narrative events, the way that human life becomes mere spectacle’; a chorus; and a “spiritual climate of transcendence, a dying from this world into another” ("Shakespeare and Greek Romance” 232). One other detail to be noted is that in Pericles, Shakespeare altered the detail from Apollonius and Twine of the prince striking his daughter so that her blood gushed or she swooned. Rather, as Muir notes, “In Shakespeare’s gentler version Pericles pushes Marina roughly back.” In Cymbeline, I support the idea that Shakespeare draws directly from the Greek convention. The fact that he chose not to in Pericles, in spite of the literary precedents, but opted to use the blow in the later play, signals a knowledge of the Greek romance convention. I agree with Gesner that blow is derived directly from Heliodorus:

Theagenes’s blow was a Greek romance motif, typical of the genre and expected by the reader. Posthumus’s blow seems to be a rather self-conscious duplication of it, for in both instances the blow occurs at a trial-like public occasion after long separation of the lovers....In neither case does the blow advance the plot.

Gesner also rightly points out the trial-like denouement of both the Æthiopica and Cymbeline (Gesner 108). The Winter’s Tale substitutes the trial with a meeting between accused-as-art and the accuser-as-penitent. The dependence of the scene on transformation, as both magical and aesthetically transcendent, draws upon the Greek romances. J.A.K Thomson more cautiously speculates, “It looks as if he had read the Æthiopica of Heliodorus in Underdowne’s translation,” but does not offer further explanation.” Geoffreý Bullough makes no reference to the Greek romances, and proposes more immediately available sources for Cymbeline, such as Philaster, the Chronicles of Holinshed, Geoffreý of Monouth, Boccaccio, and even Snow White. Sources for The Winter’s Tale include Pandosto, Ovid’s Metamorphoses, and Amadis de Gaula (Bullough 118 ff, 131-5, 133).

Taking into account the arguments in favor, neutral, and against any direct knowledge of the ancient romance, I am inclined to believe that Heliodorus and Apuleius influenced Shakespeare’s late plays, either indirectly through other writers (Spenser at home, Cervantes abroad), or directly, given their popularity at the beginning of the seventeenth century, which is amply evident from the number of editions of both novels. More specifically, the continual intrusion of the “strange” through dream or through foreigners, the centrality of the feeling of being overwhelmed by the opposite sex, the resurrection of the dead, the limits placed on reason, the discrepancy between inner feeling and outer appearance, the pervasiveness of sexual violence in intimacy, the figure of the evil queen, and the return of the victimized, abandoned child as redeemer, link the later plays to the classical romance. These all function at the level of idea and structure not simply motifs and topoi. Certainly the importance of shipwrecks, magic potions, and enchanted settings also show a strong connection. I take the most important proof to be in

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the relationship of the trial scene to the dream because for Shakespeare all the ideas and motifs of classical romance coalesce around the trial and dream scenes.

3

We see the construction of the evil queen archetype as a dynamic process between Hermione and her male interlocutors in *The Winter’s Tale*. Only when Hermione has taken on the assumed guilt of women for getting in between the princely love, and teases Polixenes not to come to the conclusion that his wife and she are “devils,” does she “win” Bohemia (*The Winter’s Tale* I.ii.82). She speaks of sex as “offences we have made” to which she will “answer” (*The Winter’s Tale* I.ii.83). We know that fantasy has been unleashed not only in Leontes’ head, but also in the structure of doubling in the text, which marks the advent of dream. When Hermione gives her hand to Polixenes she has already taken on the role of accused. Having just spoken of when she gave her hand to Leontes and brought him into sin, this gesture has the eerie sense of doubling. Shortly after, Leontes has moment of “tremor cordis,” the attack by strange fantasy—a fantasy so strong that he will direct all his powers to confirming it through a trial.

We know that we are in the realm of repetition, and therefore of traumatic repetition, because the images and actions seem to confirm something that has already happened. His monologue is full of images of doubling: the “paddling palms” (*The Winter’s Tale* I.ii.115) echoes the initial (traumatic) acceptance of marriage. The “looking-glass” is another image of reflection and distortion, which is generative of the questions over Mamillius’ paternity, based on whether the child reflects the father’s image. The confusion of doubling reflects the paradox of the feminine that is embodied in Mamillius. Only Hermione’s fidelity allows Leontes to see himself, as in a mirror, through Mamillius. But if she is not faithful, she introduces a basic problem of identity: he has lost his bearings because he cannot see himself. Thus, we have in the imagery of mirroring, a critical problem manifesting itself in the imaginative part of the “common sense” being able to reflect reality. Without Hermione, Leontes’ fantasy becomes unmoored from its referent in reality. Leontes tries to manage the collapse of reason by gathering the “evidence” to accuse his wife, thereby shoring up the fantasy of his wife as a devil, literally, an evil queen:

Affection?—Thy intention stabs the centre,
Thou dost make possible things not so held,
Communicat’st with dreams—how can this be?—
With what’s unreal thou coactive art,
And fellow’st nothing. (*The Winter’s Tale* I.ii.138-42)

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195 “Phantasie, or Imagination, which some call AEstimative, or Cogitative…is an inner sense, which doth more fully examine the Species perceived by common sense, of things present or absent, and keepes them longer, recalling them to mind againe, or making new of his owne. In time of sleepe this faculty is free & many times conceaves strange, stupend, absurd shapes, as in sicke men we commonly observe. His Organ is the middle sell of the braine; his Objects all the Species communicated to him by the Common sense, by comparison of which hee faines infinite other unto himself. In Melancholy men this faculty is most Powerfull and strong, and often hurts, producing many monstrous and prodigious things, especially if it be stirred up by some terrible object, presented to it from common sense, or memory. In Poets and Painters Imagination forcibly workes, as it appears by their severall fictions, Antickes, Images: As Ovids house of sleepe, Psyches palace in Apuleius, &c. In men it is subject and governed by Reason, or at least should be…” (Burton I.ii. 152).
Leontes speaks of the passions as fellowing, a now obsolete transitive verb meaning, “To conjoin, associate (a person or thing) in partnership or companionship with, to (another)” (“fellow”). From sexual jealousy, his mind seeks to draw comparisons between different mirror-like images, ending with the “nothing” at the “centre”—the “nothing” at the center of the enigma of the feminine that intrudes, but which he is unwilling to admit as material evidence of his own distempered judgment. Rather, the strange “centre,” the fantasy, becomes the evidence of Hermione’s adultery.

The changes that Shakespeare makes to the source material, Pandosto, demonstrate that there is meant to be no doubt about Hermione’s innocence, and that the fantasy is guilty of creating the “strange, stupend shapes” that Leontes sees. The interactions the play dramatizes between Polixenes and Hermione offer little if any incriminating evidence. The playwright clearly tries to frame the situation as a problem of interpretation for Leontes, an occlusion of his reason by fantasy, rather than a viable possibility. In contrast, an excerpt from Pandosto (1588) provides much more circumstantial evidence to indict Hermione. Greene’s earlier telling of the story recounts a fervent, if platonic relationship, developing between Bellaria and Egistus:

Bellaria who in her time was the flower of curtesie, willing to shew how vnfaynedly shee looued her husband by his friends intertainement, vsed him likewise so familiarly, that her countenance bewrayed how her minde was affected towards him: oftentimes comming her selfe into his bed chamber, to see that nothing should be amis to mislike him. This honest familiarity increased dayly more and more betwixt them: for Bellaria noting in Egistus a princely and bountifull minde, adorned with sundrie and excellent qualities, and Egistus finding in her a vertuous and curteous disposition, there grew such a secret vniting of their affections, that the one could not well be without the company of the other: in so much that when Pandosto was busied with such vrgent affaires, that hee could not bee present with his friend Egistus, Bellaria would walke with him into the Garden, where they two in priuat and pleasant deuises would passe away the time to both their contents.196

Although the narrator characterizes their interactions as “honest familiarity” and, as Hermione protests in The Winter’s Tale, a reflection of her affection for her husband to love his friend, nevertheless there are the unchaperoned visits to his bed chamber, the queen’s assessment of Sicilia’s “princely and bountifull minde,” as well as the more damning “secret vniting of their affections,” so that they cannot be without each other’s company. The narrator presents very real emotional evidence of wavering desire, as well as providing the most notorious spaces for adultery: the bedchamber and the private garden. Greene’s version adds to this a piece of circumstantial evidence that, on top of what he already describes, would excite suspicion and jealousy in a more balanced witness: Bellarius becomes pregnant during the time that Egistus visits.

Not only does Shakespeare allow for less evidence to give doubt, but he also gives Hermione advocates. In The Winter’s Tale there is nobody in Leontes’ court willing to testify against Hermione, and Leontes does not invent “accusers” to bolster his case. On the other hand,

196 Greene, Robert. Pandosto the triumph of time. Wherein is discovered by a pleasant historie, that although by the meanes of sinister fortune truth may be concealed, yet by time in spight of fortune it is most manifestlie reuealed. Pleasant for age to auoyde drowsie thoughtes, profi table for youth to eschue other wanton pastimes, and bringing to both a desired content. Temporis filia veritas. By Robert Greene Maister of Artes in Cambridge. London, 1588. Early English Books Online. A4^v-B1^v. Raised letters lowered and contractions silently expanded.
Greene refers to the “false accusers” that Pandosto has conjured in Bohemia and which Bellaria believes exist:

Bellaria, who standing like a prisoner at the bar, feeling in herselfe a cleare conscience to withstand her false accusers: seeing that no lesse than death could pacifie her husbands wrath, waxed bold, and desired that she might haue Lawe and Iustice, for mercy she neither craued nor hoped, and that those periured wretches, which had falsly accused her to the king, might be brought before her face, to guie in evidence. (Greene C1)

Bellaria, like Shakespeare’s Hermione, appeals to “Lawe and Iustice” as capable of vindicating her “cleare conscience,” despite Pandosto’s claim that witnesses have come to him. The processes of law—witnesses, evidence, and the jury whom she later calls upon and Pandosto denies—are not the problem; she believes that these false witnesses’ perjury will be brought to justice, and this, in spite of the fact that she has nobody to back her up and much more damning circumstantial evidence. Bellaria believes in the judicial system to save her.

In contrast, at a certain point, Hermione reads through Leontes’ ranting, and recognizes that he no longer sees her. She has become a figure in a perturbed fantasy. She gives up in spite of the fact that in The Winter’s Tale, Leontes does not invent false witnesses. Instead of false accusers, Shakespeare furnishes Hermione with two advocates: most significantly, Paulina, and, later, Antigonus. There is much less in Shakespeare’s version to provoke jealousy in the prosecuting king, and much more to convince him that he is misinterpreting events. And if we compare Bellaria and Hermione, the latter should have much more faith in the processes of law, given that there is less to indict her. But that is not the case. Why?

Leontes has no hard evidence and only circumstantial evidence to make the right decision, but he is enveloped by the reality of his dream, and Hermione recognizes this. In The Winter’s Tale Hermione recognizes that nightmare has hijacked the procedures and methods of the tribunal and derailed its ability to reveal truth.

You speak a language that I understand not.
My life stands in the level of your dreams
Which I’ll lay down. (The Winter’s Tale III.ii.78-80)

Hermione realizes that she cannot use reason to convince Leontes of her innocence. Her submission evokes the vertigo of the situation, for at this moment she relinquishes herself to the reality of his fantasy, however destructive it is. John Pitcher glosses the last sentence as, “My life is the target of your deluded fantasies and I’ll surrender it” (The Winter’s Tale III.ii.79-80n.). According to Pitcher, “level” here, as in II.iii.5-6, is “the action of taking aim or the mark aimed at” in a target. In The Art of Rhetoric, Thomas Wilson uses the expression, “we must level our reasons,” when discussing the “Oration Judicial,” and Shakespeare undoubtedly read this book; he may have even turned to it when writing his trial scenes, as Hermione’s rhetorical prowess illustrates every one of the techniques that Wilson outlines. When Wilson uses the term, “to level our reasons,” he explains further that reason must “direct our invention” so that “the whole drift of our doings may seem to agree with our first-devised purpose” (Wilson 121, 30). The sense of this sentence is that through reason we steer the imagination. All that we

have already said, and everything that we say after, will be leveled at one unified goal only after reason sets the course for imaginative movement. Having failed to persuade Leontes using reason, exhausting the rhetoric through which she can advocate her innocence, Hermione now inverts the idea of leveling reason by putting “dream” in reason’s course. The destructive power of Sicilia’s fantasy represents the unbridled imagination steering the course of meaning. Dream displaces reason as the navigator, and in this case, that undisclosed dream will seek to wipe out Hermione, Mamillius, and the as-yet-unnamed daughter.

By saying that her life stands in the “level of your dreams” to Leontes, Hermione admits that there is no place for her to advocate her position using reason; instead, reality will be measured by the vertiginous standard of fantasy. Dream serves as the “level.” The substantive form of the word that she uses here also denotes the builder’s instrument used to measure whether a surface was straight or crooked, just as it is today. The first definition of the noun, “level,” according to the OED is, “An instrument which indicates a line parallel to the plane of the horizon, used in determining the position as to horizontality of a surface to which it is applied.” In 1573 J. Baret uses it in Aluearie according to this definition: “A Leauell, lyne, or carpenters rule” (“level”). This meaning suggests that Leontes’ fantasies now become the measure of what is straight, and by extension, reasonable, regardless of other evidence. The fantasy itself is the evidence. All the outward show of evidence, witness, jury, and judge reflect Leontes’ attempt to use the devices of the tribunal, which are meant to reveal truth, to give life to his fantasy of a deceitful, threatening wife. Out of this fantasy, however, is launched another, also of the feminine. The castaway Perdita, like her predecessors in classical tragedy and romance, becomes the source of salvation.

The death of Mamillius, as Stephen Orgel observes, is the terrible event that interrupts Leontes’ madness, not the oracle nor the fear of divine wrath. In Shakespeare’s version, rather than the circumstantial evidence, Mamillius is the silent, but powerful, sign associated with Leontes’ madness. As long as Leontes allows his fantasy to continue to plague him with doubts about Hermione’s fidelity, Mamillius can no longer be the mirror in which his identity coheres. When Leontes voices his suspicion, when his jealousy suddenly materializes, it is Mamillius whom he fixates upon. Leontes’ release from madness coincides with the ekplektik shock of his son’s death because the death. T.G. Bishop explains “ekpleksis is related to ‘a blow,’ to ‘strike, beat’… This derivation inscribes into the word itself a perception of struggle and violence, suggesting a deep phenomenological responsiveness to threat.” Terence Cave adds: “Liddell and Scott give ‘panic fear’, ‘consternation’ (together with ‘astounding’, ‘striking with terror’, for the adjective ekplêktikos): these senses suggest a connection with the ‘fear’ of Aristotle’s famous ‘pity and fear’ formula” (Bishop 30-31). My hypothesis is that this panic fear coincides with the ascent of the evil queen archetype. When she seems to be reigning, the male protagonist feels a sense of astonishment as terror. Paradoxically, when he becomes aware of the fantasy of this fear, he also is struck by the same terror.

The Oracle in Pandosto, provides the ekpleksis that awakens the king of Bohemia:

[T]he King whose conscience was a witnesse against him of his witlesse furie, and false suspected Jealousie, was so ashamed of his rashe folly, that he intreated his nobles to perswade Bellaria to forgie, and forget these iniuries…(Greene C3)

The king has consciously manipulated the evidence—Egistus’ sudden departure, for example—and lied about witnesses against his wife. Nevertheless, the narrative depicts Pandosto’s

awareness of the truth-telling power of parts of the tribunal in the idea of his conscience as a
“witnesses against him.” The Oracle is the ultimate witness to testify against him, and he accepts
its verdict. In contrast with Greene’s Pandosto, only the extremity of Leontes’ son’s death
delivers the ekplektik blow that interrupts the king’s fantasy. Once Mamillius is dead, Leontes
loses the focal point for his fantasies about Hermione. Hermione falls away from the nexus of
action of the play and leaves an absence in the feminine triptych of sacrificed-savior-persecutor.
The romance half of The Winter’s Tale fills the motherless vacuum with a dyad of maiden as
savior, Perdita the lost, and the redeemer Perdita. The fantasy of the feminine as savior
coalesces in a dream that will revisit Leontes at the end of the play.

Having shown the extent to which The Winter’s Tale differs from the source text in
framing Leontes’ suspicion as unsubstantiated, we can begin to speculate about what it is that
seizes his imagination. After scolding Hermione for suggesting that his accusations are based
only in fantasy, Leontes refers to his suspicion of her adultery as a fact: “Those of your fact are
so—so past all truth” (The Winter’s Tale III.ii.85). Factum means both crime and fact in the
legal parlance of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (The Winter’s Tale I.ii.n85). The
association of “fact,” as both the reality of something done in the material world, and “crime”—
crime, as a grave enough offense to associate it with the punishment of the court, merits
consideration. The word “fact” appears fourteen times in Shakespeare’s corpus. Cleon uses
it in Pericles to describe Dionyza’s murder of Pericles’ daughter. In Henry VI “fact” mainly
signifies treason and in Henry VI Part II specifically to the treason of witches and conjurers
under the protection of a noble woman “raising up wicked spirits from under ground/Demanding
of King Henry’s life and death” (Henry VI Part II II.i.169, 170-1). It also refers to patricide and
rape (Macbeth III.vi; Rape of Lucrece 290, 395). However, these facts are generally crimes well
hidden by oaths or through secrecy, or, as in Macbeth, in the realm of the supernatural. The
“fact” here, according to Leontes, is “past all truth,” that is both so obvious as to be true, and also
beyond truth, or false. At the same time, it has the connotations of treason of a hidden kind,
something which he cannot easily—or, for that matter—ever occur. This is the treason of
women, of witches, and of men who go behind their lord’s backs.

Leontes is correct that these crimes are “past all truth,” not in the sense he intends, as
being beyond thinking, but as existing in a realm beyond reality, in his fantasy of the queen’s
actions. The “rhetoric of jealousy is fantasy: language has become separated from substance,
from the actuality of the chaste and faithful wife” (Cooper 289). When in The Winter’s Tale
Hermione confronts Leontes, “My life stands in the level of your dreams,” she is already
predicting the failure of Leontes’ trial to reveal her innocence. Hermione confesses that she
believes there is no room for reason to inform his judgment any longer. On the other hand, he
feels that his trust has been violated and that his wife has been “infected” by another, which is
perfectly expressed in his retort, “Your actions are my dreams.” (The Winter’s Tale I.ii.306,
III.i.82). Like demonology, early modern psychology models this sudden onset of delusions as
a violation of the body and then of the fantasy by a foreign spirit, which is depicted symbolically
as a sexual penetration, invoked here by “infection.”

Immediately after once again affirming his suspicion that Polixenes has violated him by
making love to her, his mind immediately goes to the retribution he has made by sacrificing her
daughter: like the “brat [that] hath been cast out…so thou/Shalt feel our justice; in whose easiest
passage/Look for no less than death” (The Winter’s Tale III.ii.87-91). The drift of his thoughts
goes from his dreams to her actions to his feelings of being violated to the sacrifice of the

daughter and to Hermione’s death. His fantasies of violation lead ineluctably to her death and the sacrifice of his daughter. Thus we see how inextricably connected the dream of being violated is with the need to expunge the figure of the evil queen; and the in his mind, exorcising Hermione from his fantasy means also sacrificing his daughter.

The “tremor cordis” that Leontes feels early on reveals the onset of this feminine fantasy (The Winter’s Tale I.ii.110). The dangerous syncope follows shortly after his reminiscence of an ideal moment in an idealized past:

what we chang’d
Was innocence for innocence; we knew not
The doctrine of ill-doing, nor dream’d
That any did. Had we pursu’d that life,
And our weak spirits ne’er been higher rear’d
With stronger blood, we should have answer’d heaven
Boldly ‘not guilty’, the imposition clear’d
Hereditary ours. (The Winter’s Tale I.ii.67-74)

Leontes reimagines his childhood friendship as a guiltless time, but the fact that this dream has ended arouses in Leontes the need to charge an interloper with the crime of interrupting it. By the end of his description he is already foreshadowing his trial of Hermione. In the court of heaven he would have been found blameless had he not been tempted by Hermione. The queen of Sicilia plays along with Leontes’ fantasy, not realizing the minefield of his dreams. She supplies the words he has not mentioned, speaking of herself and Polixenes’ queen as “devils,” their “offences” being to tempt the young princes to have “first sinn’d” with them (The Winter’s Tale I.ii.82, 83, 84). In Leontes’ fantasy the language of innocence, guilt, and temptation, cast into the cosmic terms of the Garden of Eden, reveals a dormant fantasy that has reawakened.

After Hermione completes her persuasion of Polixenes to stay by saying that she is putting her hand in that of another man for the second time, the fantasy that she awakens is not merely of adultery.

“Tremor cordis” marks the onset of a deep-seated fear, which in the early modern imagination is associated with an intrusion in the fantasy of a malignant outside force. It is as if Leontes were falling asleep now, being pushed deep into his fantasies. This visitation by an outside force, causing a shocking fear, has all the feeling of an acute violation. Nothing really happens in this scene; it is all dream and reminiscence. And yet this scene possesses the shock value of a classic peripetia scene, as if something had happened unexpectedly and suddenly. Since Shakespeare has truly stripped the play of damning circumstantial evidence, let alone any possibility of real transgression, we must charge Fantasy, almost like a character from a morality play, as having pushed open the door. Edward Reynoldes writes on the suddenness of something, which produces fear: all “Vnacquaintance then and Ignorance of an approaching Evill, must needs worke Amazement and Terrour; as contrarily a foresight there of worketh Patience to undergoe, and Boldnesse to encounter it” (Reynoldes 278 Oo1). The unexpected evil causes a paralyzing terror that renders the individual impotent, as opposed to the person who is prepared and therefore equipped with both Christian patience and courage to confront and perhaps overcome the fright. Reynoldes’ definition of “amazement” incorporates a vulnerability to the possibility of annihilation by “an approaching Evill.” It is the approach of something inchoate that Leontes feels, and the audience witnesses.

The unexpected evil, however, is not in the present; it exists in the past and casts its shadow on the present through Leontes’ fantasy. Of this fear Burton writes, “Many lamentable
effects this Feare causeth in men, as to be red, pale, tremble, sweat, it makes sudden cold and heat to come over all the body, palpitation of the heart, Syncope, &c.” (Burton I.iii, 249). We know of the palpitation of the heart, and syncope, because Leontes admits it. But the relationship of these symptoms of fear to his fantasy is unknown to him. Angus Gowland, a modern historian of science and medicine, summarizes what syncope does to the body in the humoral scheme current at the time Shakespeare wrote this play. The contraction of the heart damages the health of outlying body parts by hindering the production of spirits and causing them to go inward and downward. More importantly, fear provokes the release of black bile, which also works on the heart to contract it further, drawing in blood and spirits from the rest of the body. This process would decrease the heat and moisture of the body, cooling and drying the it. Finally, the cool, dry blood around the heart transforms into black bile (Gowland 48-9). Fear, then, results in the production of more black bile, which both surgeons and demonologists imagined to be the balneum diaboli, the devil’s bath.

The imaginative pathway that early modern psychology offers to explain the damage wreaked on the body by fear does not simply offer a contemporary explanation for what happens to Leontes. The expression of symptoms allows us an entry into the opaque workings of fantasy as a bodily violation. The Edenic image that feeds into the fantasy represents the ideal—the young, ideal body, the romantacized past, and the image of the self and the other as uncorrupted. Eve’s action in the garden causes the first couple to be thrown out of bliss, but more importantly it introduces two elements: time and sex. Life in Eden, just like what Leontes’ describes, goes on forever just the same. But when time is introduced, so is the reality of bodily degradation, the corruption of ideals, and the idea that relationships change. Hermione as devil, like Eve, introduces the reality of sex as a departure from an unchanging ideal. With sex comes intimacy, and with intimacy the fear of betrayal. Sex exacerbates the effects of time because it leads to offspring, and it is in the passing of the generations that we see time not as an abstraction but as a reality. But sex also introduces the possibility of sexual violence. The Winter’s Tale, as all the other romances, depicts the danger of sexual seduction, and ties it to the danger of death.203

Are we to imagine, then, that suddenly Leontes becomes invaded by a terror of his mortality, which is wrapped up in his fear of betrayal? In his fantasy does Hermione crush his ideal state and hasten his journey to the grave thereby triggering his need to erase her and his offspring? If that were the case, he would not be so shattered by the death of Mamillius, which Shakespeare’s version of the tale places front and center as the ekplektik shock that interrupts his sadistic course of action. Rather, it is the idea of the feminine that is on trial here, since in his mind, as I have shown above, Hermione and the child are linked to betrayal in his dreams. However, the sudden escalation of his fears and the ferocity of his fantasy at this particular moment need to be explained.

Leontes asks Hermione to plea for Polixenes to stay, and the metaphors that both Bohemia and Sicilia use are martial, signifying that under the teasing banter there is an aggressive jockying for power centering around gender. Polixenes explains that although he would be moved by his dear friend’s request “were there necessity in [it],” that nevertheless his “affairs/Do even drag me homeward: which to hinder/Were (in your love) a whip to me” (I.ii.22,23-25). Hermione customarily develops the metaphors that her male interlocutors have

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203 “Normally, the energy of Eros travels in the direction of Thanatos or death, and the greater the erotic energy, the sooner it gets there.” Frye, The myth of deliverance: Reflections on Shakespeare’s Problem Comedies. Toronto: U of Toronto Press, 1983. 39.
started, and here is not different: “You shall not go,” she says, and acts as if her power were
equivalent to a man’s through her rhetorical prowess:

Verily,/
You shall not go: a lady’s Verily’s
As potent as a lord’s. Will you go yet?
Force me to keep you as a prisoner,
Not like a guest… (The Winter’s Tale I.ii.49-52)

She argues for him to stay through an extended metaphor of him as a prisoner, which is meant to
be joking banter. But then she insists, perhaps just as tongue in cheek, on her own “Verily” as
powerful. If this is meant to be a joke, then what place does truth or the pretense of truth have?
There is a confusion of terms, one that doesn’t show up when these lines are acted on the stage,
but which nevertheless in a fantasy like Leontes sows seeds of other thoughts. For Leontes it
becomes increasingly difficult to discern joking, the play-acting of desire, and true feeling.
Unfortunately for her, neither Polixenes nor Hermione know this.

Leontes uses Hermione as a pawn, even as sexual bait, not just to lure Polixenes back, but
to keep him from his regal duties. The longer Bohemia stays, the more he is “question’d by my
fears, of what may chance/Or breed upon our absence” (The Winter’s Tale I.ii.11-12). The
scenario juxtaposes the queenless Bohemia with his real fears and Sicilia with his queen and the
only fears being those of his fantasy. The fulfillment of Leontes’ desires poses a real risk for
Polixenes’ kingdom. Because Leontes uses his queen as a go-between, he transfers the role of
the aggressor onto her. In acting as the faithful, dutiful wife, Hermione has to take on the part
that Leontes’ fantasies dictate. Even before the powerful moment when Hermione realizes that
she stands in the “level of your dreams,” we, all of us, are already in Leontes’ dream.

Leontes mixes desire and aggression, manipulating both his wife and his friend, and does
not stop at putting Bohemia in danger. This behavior would seem to be at odds with the intensity
of his idolization of Polixenes and the dream of the past in which he places him. However, it is
precisely because of the force of this adoration that Leontes resorts to manipulation. When
Leontes finally turns on Hermione, he does so with all the acrimony of somebody whose
fantasies have been threatened, and places the guilt for his desires onto her. Early modern
psychology presents a model for the ideal form of the imagination, and a corresponding
explanation of the violation of the ideal. The violation is a bodily, sexualized penetration of the
boundaries of the body. This can occur through the fantasy, but medical theorists had to explain
by what means the Imagination could be so affected absent any obvious causes of terror.
Demonic spirits, and the Devil himself, can terrorize the body, taking over its functions, and in
particular the “Balneum Diaboli, the Divels bath,” or bile, the humor responsible for melancholy
(I.ii). Burton quotes Jason Pratensis,

the Divell being a slender incomprehensible spirit, can easily insinuate and winde
himself into humane bodies, and cunningly couched in our bowels, vitiate our healths,
terrify our soules with fearefull dreames, and shake our minde with furies. And in
another place, These uncleane spirits settled in our bodies, and now mixt without our
melancholy humours, doe triumph as it were, and sport themselves as in another heaven.
(Burton I.ii, 194)

The devil conquers the fantasy through the body, and the overthrow of reason is pictured as a
violation. At the heart of this conquest is the will of the other, permeating and ruling the
conquered body, and it is “incomprehensible.” The effects of terror, materialized in frightening
dreams and the degradation of the physical body, are the direct manifestations of an enigma. The observer sees the effects, but not the cause, and the name that is given here is the Devil.

The Devil is a placeholder name here for the entity responsible for the invasion of the fantasy and the concomitant feeling of bodily penetration (expressed as syncope and the consequent disorder of the body). This paradigm entered the discourse of medicine because of the work of demonologists, as Stephen Greenblatt argues, in “Shakespeare Betwitched.”

Greenblatt provides a telling story from the *Malleus malificarum*:

A certain man tells that, when he had lost his member, he approached a known witch to ask her to restore it to him. She told the afflicted man to climb a certain tree, and that he might take that which he liked out of a nest in which there were several members. And when he tried to take a big one…

The explanation they give is already familiar: the devils have created a confusion of vision by projecting images directly into the fantasy. The “case history” provided, however, is emblematic of the whole discourse. Having one’s imagination possessed by the Devil is tied up inextricably with the feelings of being sexually violated. Here, the man has lost his penis. Elsewhere, at night his wife leaves her body and consorts with other witches in a sexual orgy with the Devil (Greenblatt 109).

Reading back to Act I, scene ii of *The Winter’s Tale*, the scene structurally acts out male impotence, the feeling of being overwhelmed, and the feminine as the evil instrument. Although the scene is meant to be one of teasing banter, the metaphors and symbols developed leave no doubt as to the submerged feelings underneath. Leontes feels that his idyllic fantasy was disturbed by the necessity to get married. In this scene, Polixenes is presented without a wife, and in that vacuum there is a foothold for Leontes’ longing. This is not to say that Leontes has homosexual desire, but something much deeper than the gender of the sexual object. Leontes desires a return to wifelessness, and he has the opportunity to be alone with his boyhood friend and to hold him under his power. The longing for the past surfaces because sex and marriage bring with them the fear of betrayal, the reality of time going by, and a fear of becoming the sexual aggressor, or, worse, being sexually overcome. Here, that is particularly obvious because Leontes needs Hermione to seduce Polixenes, and therefore he feels his powerlessness. By identifying with Polixenes, as the fantasy of the past requires, he also shares with Bohemia the fears of his adult title, the cares of the regent. The fears that belong to a head of state color the relationship with his spouse: both seem to be full of the threat of mutiny. Polixenes’ idea of plots “breeding” suggests the association of treason with fertility, which on stage we can see as the cloaked, but still obvious bulge of Hermione. In effect both kings feel stripped of their youthful power and virility precisely because they are bound by the responsibility of being the head of state and the head of the household. The fear of having a witch steal one’s member, or of already being emasculated, emerges paradoxically from the very sources of power that they must use: the woman as go-between, as the object that mediates desire between men. As dutiful wife, Hermione develops the metaphors and symbols—the Devil, the prisoner, the commander—that the men have put in front of her; and in doing so, she assumes the role they have given her. Although they have given Hermione her power, it *feels* as if they have been emasculated. The paradox of her faithfulness to Leontes’ fantasy and her role as perpetrator

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205 This is a form of the triangulation of desire that René Girard theorizes in * Desire, Deceit, and the Novel*. 
creates an enigma—an impasse of understanding and emotion. This enigma creates an archetype
of the feminine here as the “evil queen.”

The complex that unfolds here would straightforwardly lay all guilt for this emotional
warfare on Hermione, but of course it is more complicated than that. Leontes also feels this
guilt, and it is in the air even before the drama reaches a critical point. Even before Leontes
enters, Archidamus and Camillo have framed the adult relationship between Sicilia and Bohemia
as one of difference, obligation, and therefore debt and necessity. Archidamus refers to the
“great difference” between Bohemia and Sicilia (The Winter’s Tale I.i.4). Camillo in turn refers
to the “visitation which [Leontes] justly owes [Polixenes]” (The Winter’s Tale I.i.6).
Archimadus then jokes about needing to drug them should they visit so that the visitors cannot
“accuse us” (The Winter’s Tale I.i.16). They then recount that lost childhood relationship the
young princes had, which now that they are heads of state consists in “interchange of gifts,”
hands shaking “over a vast” (The Winter’s Tale I.i.28-30). But even the gifts are “attorneyed”
(The Winter’s Tale I.i.24). If not real guilt, certainly, a feeling of guilt presides in the legal
language. When Camillo refers to the “affection which cannot choose but branch now” the
metaphorical meaning may be of bearing “shoots and branches” (note 24, 147), but it also
reflects the inevitable division, branching out, of the formerly intertwined men. Latent in their
language is an underlying, unconscious guilt that has been negotiated by gifts. The situation
needs to be “attorneyd,” prosecuted in order for each not to assume the guilt of the “accused.”

The atmosphere of male guilt that begins The Winter’s Tale is quickly transferred onto
Hermione. The circle of guilt expands to include the daughter, who is punished as a
confirmation of the queen’s treason, as if one punishment unhinged from reality can corroborate
a second. First there is the dyad of the evil queen and sacrificed daughter, and only after the evil
queen is removed can the sacrificed daughter become the redeemer. The uncanny sensation that
something is reappearing, intruding from an earlier fantasy, reveals itself through the sign of the
“strange.” This notion of the “strange” makes use of all of the early modern definitions of the
word provided by the OED: foreign, outside the family, sudden, unexpected, and a “strange
woman,” or harlot (“strange”). I argue that when “strange” comes up it is because a powerful
psychological force is exerting its power on events.

The “veil,” which in Latin is interchangeable with “marriage,” shrouds Polyxena, as she
walks to her death. It shrouds male erotic desire and aggression, distrust and fear, of the
feminine beyond a veil of guilt—her guilt. The term “strange” is a “veil” of the complex of
feelings that underlies marriage (the woman is a seductive devil) and exists in the fantasy.
However, when the word “strange” appears, it also signifies the experience that “something” is
happening: the Polyxena Pattern of feminine evil leading to sacrifice and then requiring
redemption is shaping the course of events by structuring the dynamics between the genders. For
this reason, variations of “strange” appear sixty-nine times in Heliodorus. “Strange” marks the
continual intrusion of the foreign, which we see not just in Heliodorus, but in Shakespeare’s
romances. It manifests itself in the intrusion of the spirits or passions of suspicion and jealousy,
the unwelcome appearance of the foreigner, the intervention of dream, and the return of the
disguised daughter and/or sons. When the pattern manifests itself, the protagonists experience a
sense of falling asleep or of awakening—stupefaction, sleepiness, shock, terror, admiration,
wonder. The passage from one state of consciousness to another, rather than the state itself, is
what matters. For this reason, the title of the play mirrors the story that Mamillius whispers into
his mother’s ear about a man who lives by a graveyard, for it is about the sudden emergence of
things that terrify, “Of sprites and goblins,” coming out of dormancy and into the consciousness (The Winter’s Tale II.i.26).

The onset of the strange in this frosty story also parallels the breakdown of communication between Leontes and Polixenes, and the captive king’s confusion: “This is strange: methinks/My favour here begins to warp. Not speak?” (The Winter’s Tale I.ii.364-5). Only when the presumably dead, castaway women, later speak, as they will at the end of The Winter’s Tale, does the graveyard give up its burdens, telling the truth and redeeming victims. The language of a person coming back to consciousness from death-like sleep carries with it the potential for change. As it is, the first part of The Winter’s Tale ends with silence—of Polixenes and of Leontes’ female victims.

In terms of popular culture, “strange but true…unlikely events, unusual or ‘marvelous’ phenomena, strange customs, or ‘remarkable’ adventures would not necessarily be viewed with the skepticism that they are today” Shapiro describes the late sixteenth century broadside news sheets, which tended to report the “unusual, the ‘monstrous,’ and the sensational. Strange animals, unusual weather, ‘monstrous’ human or animal births, criminal behavior, or accounts of witchcraft were among the most common items of broadside ‘news’” (Shapiro 88). As a way of confirming these were real marvels, not mercenary inventions, Shapiro observes that news “was beginning to be characterized by the conventions for establishing ‘fact’ or ‘matters of fact’…There was an emphasis on identifying the witnesses” (Shapiro 88). The broadsheets map marvels using witnesses and positioning the reader as judge. The reader is the one who must be swayed to accept the veracity of the improbable, and must accordingly suffer whatever alterations that produces in his or her perspective of the surrounding world.

At the end of the third act, a destructive fantasy possesses Leontes, demonizing his wife and daughter. This fantasy manifests itself physically in the form of a bear, representing real primal aggression, as well as the intrusion of terror and the irrational. At the same time, the romance elements of the play begin with the stage directions, “Exit, pursued by a bear” (The Winter’s Tale III.iii.57). The OED defines a “bear” at the time as an object of imaginary terror, like a hobgoblin (The Winter’s Tale III.iii, n.57). The tragic, ekplektik terror of the first half of the play crescendos with the appearance of the bear. The bear abstractly represents the kernel of violence that Leontes senses in the masculine, which can suddenly transform into force, but which reveals the ekplektik terror of his fantasy of the feminine. The “strange” bear—exotic, and yet familiar on the Stuart stage—marks the turn in the plot. A dream that has been launched by Leontes’ imagination commences with the stage directions, “pursued by a bear” (The Winter’s Tale III.iii.64 SD).

The violent King terrorizing his court finds an emblematic representation in the raging animal killing his courtier... Shakespeare’s bear is the stuff winter’s tales are made of...A narrative element steps out of the story. In the same way that the sprites and goblins in the dreams of Prince Mamillius materialize in the nightmare engendered by King Leontes, the bear becomes a threatening reality...

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208 Ravelhofer, Barbara. ‘Beasts of Recreacion’: Henslowe’s White Bears.” English Literary Renaissance 32 (2) 2002. 307. See also, Geoffrey Bullough’s dismissal of the possibility of a real bear in Narrative and Dramatic Sources 126-128.
“Pursued by bear” marks the intervention of dream and the effects of an unjust trial and the perverse victimization of those we love. It also augurs the genesis of the feminine redeemer created in the second part of the play. The bare artifice behind this shock-inducing theatrical device draws attention to the scaffolding of forces constructed in the imagination, which bear little connection with reality. Nevertheless, these forces construct a reality that reveals the Polyxena Pattern. Ekpleksis forms the kernel of what later becomes admiration through the return of the expelled woman. This fantasy serves as an escape from the unbearable dynamics created by the other feminine dyad of evil queen and sacrificed daughter. Perdita, sacrificed to confirm Leontes’ nightmare and redeemed by Antigonus’ dream, returns later, but not as a hobgoblin. She comes back, as the daughters do in three of the romances, to be the object of a sublimated form of sexual desire, which arouses admiration rather than astonishment. In doing so, she provides a route of escape through the maiden as redeemer. However, she still brings back with her all the dangers of female sexuality, which can keep the pattern endlessly repeating itself in time.

If we turn to the beginning of Cymbeline, we can better understand what this “strange” force is that exerts its power in The Winter’s Tale and vice versa. The pall of strangeness that ushers in Cymbeline and Pericles veils the complex psychological dynamics of the feminine as a dangerous threat, which demands the sacrifice of the maid. This kernel of strangeness is particularly pronounced in Cymbeline, overwhelming and destroying the family altogether. The First Gentleman admits that “Hows’er ’tis strange […] Yet is it true…” that the king made no more effort to find his kidnapped boys (Cymbeline I.i.65,67). A paralyzing melancholy, or a curse by the evil nameless queen, arrests the king’s power to recover his sons. The action descends into a nightmarish underworld, presided over by a wicked queen and her ding-dong son. The Winter’s Tale depicts a monarch invaded by potent passions that lead him to reject his best friend and entire family; Cymbeline traces similar losses, which emerge out of a melancholic paralysis. The British king is continually losing: first his sons, then his daughter, and, ultimately he risks relinquishing his kingdom. The Roman Empire poses an external threat, and all that is foreign assumes the vague, but frightening aura of the “strange.” This nightmare takes shape both at home, through the plotting of the nameless Queen and through the intervention of the foreigner, Iachimo. The Italian’s “strange,” that is, foreign, designs and the “strange” poison are directed at the life of Imogen, the sacrificed maid, who is, implicitly, left open to attack through the king’s negligence.

The figure of the evil queen that exists only in Leontes’ fantasy becomes unveiled here as an actual, if unnamed, character. She has a fable-like feel to her, a caricature like the evil stepmother in “Snow White.” Imogen points out her dissembling immediately after she is introduced, “O/Dissembling courtesy! How fine this tyrant/Can tickle where she wounds” (Cymbeline I.i.83-85). The evil queen is a terrible “mother hourly coining plots,” which the king cannot see for himself (Cymbeline I.vi.58-9). When Cymbeline commands Posthumus to leave, for “Thou’rt a poison to my blood,” he foreshadows the queen’s secret plan to poison Imogen (Cymbeline I.i.128). In doing so, the king reveals the sense that he is being poisoned, cursed, but he does not consciously know what the force is. Cymbeline is possessed, as Leontes

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209 For S.L. Bethell, Shakespeare was using an antiquated technique by introducing the bear. “By the use of exaggerated conventions and by continual reminders that the play is a play…Shakespeare forbids absorption in the action so that we can ‘observe the subtle interplay of a whole world of interrelated ideas’…” The description of the bear’s dinner, interspersed with ludicrous references to the shipwreck, marks the point in the play where tragedy is metamorphosed into comedy: it is the hinge dividing the two panels of a diptych” (cited in Muir 271).
imagines he is, by the queen’s designs, and he is manipulated, like her own son, Cloten. Cymbeline seems to live under a curse, cast into the role of the stupid son. This parallel role of king and stepson emerges as well from the mirroring scenes used to describe them: the anonymous gentlemen that capture the king’s impotence, and the nameless lords that comment upon Cloten’s powerlessness with contempt at the end of the second scene. Against this tableau of reginal paralysis and feminine deceit and manipulation, Imogen is set as prisoner to this dynamic.

As in The Winter’s Tale, the king seems to live under a spell of feminine deceit, although what exists wholly in the fantasy of Leontes is dramatized here. Without any causal relation, the evil queen and the cast-out daughter emerge in the same context. Here, however, it comes much closer to reflecting an unadulterated fantasy of the feminine. The king’s impotence finds its corollary in the scheming queen, his guilt for not finding his sons in the curse that the evil queen seems to be casting on all of them. Posthumus, the son that Cymbeline adopts to replace his stolen boys, is also implicated in the guilt of allowing his family to disappear—at least according to the logic of emotions if not of reason. Parallel to Cymbeline’s losses, the men in Posthumus’ family have disappeared, and although Posthumus cannot be blamed, yet the reality of the missing family registers the same way emotionally. The men are gone and the women are simply not mentioned. The first gentleman in the opening scene explains to his interlocutor that Posthumus’ father died even before he was born out of grief for his two sons’ death in war. Likewise, his mother dies giving birth to him. In this context, Posthumus bears all the grief, but also the guilt, of the disintegration of his family.

The queen triggers dormant feelings of guilt in both Cymbeline and Posthumus that lead eventually to Imogen’s guilt. The exchange between the Queen and Posthumus makes explicit the young man’s guilt, and catapults the drama into the space of the trial. She refers to the “offended king” (Cymbeline I.i.6) and promises to be his “advocate” (Cymbeline I.ii.7), and she refers to the king having “charg’d” that they not speak together (Cymbeline I.ii.14). What the final result of this kind of trial will be is already foreshadowed in Posthumus’ reference to the bracelet he puts on her as a “manacle of love” making her a “prisoner” (Cymbeline I.ii.53-4). Posthumus’ assumed guilt for the disintegration of two families morphs seamlessly into the guilt of Imogen.

This causal chain manifests the fantasy of the feminine in which masculine guilt is displaced onto women. Because the chain begins with a fantasy, it takes us into another dream where the male protagonist seeks to prosecute the woman and confirm his fantasy’s reality. In Italy, Iachimo begins to work on Posthumus’ security immediately by using a powerful metaphor expressing the duplicitous nature of women: “You may wear her in title yours: but you know/ strange fowl light upon neighbouring ponds” (Cymbeline I.v.91-2). When Philario tries to avert disaster, Posthumus interrupts by protesting that Iachimo “makes no stranger of me; we are/familiar at first” (Cymbeline I.v.105-6). It is not simply that Iachimo is overly familiar and Posthumus is pointing that out. Rather, Posthumus gets absorbed into the “strange” dreamworld of Iachimo’s imagination. Still attempting to steer away from conflict, Philario notes that this challenge has come about too suddenly” (Cymbeline I.v.124). We have noted that the dream world is characterized by its strangeness, that in The Winter’s Tale, Leontes dream overrides everybody else’s perceived reality. So, here, we can see something of the sudden and strange, therefore ekplektik, nature of Iachimo’s dream; “the hugeness of [Iachimo’s] unworthy thinking,” has already swept up Posthumus in its whirlwind (Cymbeline I.v.150). In both plays, a foreign, strange dream encompasses all and leads directly to an unjust trial.
That Imogen is put on trial is clear from the language used: Posthumus asks for “covenants” to be written and “articles betwixt us” (Cymbeline I.v.148, 161-2); Iachimo refers to the “testimony” or evidence of his conquest and also to the “covenant” that is to be “set down by lawful counsel” (Cymbeline I.v.154, 171-2). When Iachimo gathers false evidence, observing Imogen’s body in order to destroy her reputation and sunder her relationship with Posthumus, he is deceptive and the process is a conspicuous parody of evidence-gathering. The scene undermines the very idea of trial because Iachimo manipulates the forensic procedure to violate her. When Iachimo emerges from the trunk and begins his inventoring of the room, he seeks “some natural notes about her body” that will provide stronger evidence than “ten thousand meaner moveables” (Cymbeline II.ii.28-9). The kind of evidence that he is searching, a mole or such, is the source of recognition, par excellence in romances. When he discovers the “mole cinque-spotted” on her left breast he acquires the most damning “voucher” of having bed her (Cymbeline II.ii.38, 39).

…Here’s a voucher,
Stronger than ever law could make; this secret
Will force him think I have pick’d the lock, and ta’en
The treasure of her honour. No more: to what end?
(Cymbeline II.ii.39-42)
The statement, “Here’s a voucher, stronger than ever law could make,” is perplexing. Shakespeare’s Legal Dictionary sheds some light. Historically, the voucher, a legal document, was part of a complicated scheme involving substitutions and defaulting whereby an heir could acquire a piece of land. By the sixteenth century, “the vouchee was a landless humble court official paid a sum of money” who stopped this process. In Shakespeare’s time, vouching would have meant to proclaim or affirm, but with a strong connotation of the chicanery of the legal process from which the word derived. In this context, then, it makes sense that the “voucher” is a document used to corroborate Iachimo’s false witnessing, and the “law” to which he refers, is something like natural justice. Manipulated evidence can lead to false conviction. But there is a sense of a higher law, which may be occluded but can never disappear. Indeed, this law is what is appealed to at the end of these plays with their deus ex machina (Cymbeline and Pericles) or a magical, spiritual ceremony that draws on the trial’s procedures of looking and judging, but also that of divine illumination from above (The Winter’s Tale).

After finding the most misleading evidence, Iachimo concludes “No more: to what end?” but he then continues to scrutinize her bedtime reading (Cymbeline II.ii.42). Earlier, he had interrupted his poetic description of her body with the short, staccato phrases of his legal mind, “But my design./ To note the chamber: I will write all down,” (Cymbeline II.ii.23-4). Here, “the tale of Tereus” (Cymbeline II.ii.45), the book Imogen reads before falling asleep, is turned to the page where “Philomel gave up” (Cymbeline II.ii.46). This observation interrupts a strange back and forth between the staccato rhythm of legal notetaking and poetic language that reflects his desire to use false evidence to lock Imogen into his fantasy of women. However, the story of the raped woman whose tongue is cut out by her rapist delivers an ekplektik shock to Iachimo.

I have enough;/
To th’ trunk again, and shut the spring of it.
Swift, swift, you dragons of the night, that dawning
May bare the raven’s eye! I lodge in fear;

Though this a heavenly angel, hell is here. (Cymbeline II.ii.46-50)

The reason for this moment of astonishment is ambiguous. Iachimo’s words do not specify whether it is dawn’s light or the content of the tale that causes him to “lodge in fear; / Though this is a heavenly angel, hell is here.” He has until this point alternated between erotic desire for the sleeping woman and careful observation. Behind the eroticism is a desire to find evidence to accuse her, an instinct that Iachimo follows seemingly without any conscience. The intrusion of the panic fear corresponds to his vision of hell being there. The contrast between his vision of her as an “angel” and the hellish quality of the location indicates that we have arrived in some traumatic site, since trauma, as the second part of this dissertation sought to demonstrate, is associated with a place and the corresponding emotions provoked by that place. Iachimo makes clear the association between the sleeping woman and the male sense of being overcome by terror. The association of sleeping and the “dragons of the night” manifests the male terror of being overcome by some diabolic force in and through the figure of the sleeping woman.

What Iachimo does not unpack is the relationship between the story of Philomele and his own fantasy. Imogen sleeps as he gathers all the false evidence, because, like Hermione, she exists in the level of Iachimo’s and Posthumus’s dreams. In their dreams, Imogen is also silenced, violently muted, like Philomel with her tongue cut out of her mouth. Symbolically, the story enacts the idea of the sacrificed daughter, who is raped and whose tongue is cut out of her mouth. Imogen’s beauty and the admiration that she elicits as this “heavenly angel,” who must nevertheless be sacrificed to her perpetrator’s lust, recall the story in Ovid. The dark need to punish the Polyxena figure is intertwined with the production of terror and of admiration—admiration at her beauty and terror at the sense that his fantasy is causing her to do violence to the “angel.” The terror comes forth, as in Seneca’s description of Polyxena’s sacrifice, during a liminal space in which night turns into dawn that will “bare the raven’s eye.” The raven is not Imogen, of course, because the story with which she is connected here casts her in the role of the nightingale. The “raven’s eye,” the eye of the black scavenger bird, is the eye of Iachimo’s conscience, which opens up. In the book that Imogen is holding in her arms, the raven represents the “disobedient suiet that agaist his prince is bent,” that is, the same treason we see associated with women above. Astonishment, as I explained earlier, refers less to a state than to a change in consciousness from sleep to waking or waking to sleep, and indeed Iachimo feels this change in him as well. He momentarily awakens out of his sleep walking in the presence of the dormant woman, and he sees himself for what he is, a traitor to the truth, a victim of his fears, and a violent man.

The sense of being overcome by terror is no doubt also the feeling, if not the knowledge, that Imogen’s guilt is a product of his lust. In his epistle to The Metamorphoses, Arthur Golding’s carefully positions the story of Philomele in contrast to Medea—the sacrificed daughter against the evil queen—and uses it as an example of “the man in whom the fyre of furious lust dooth reigne,” who “Dooth run too mischeefe like a horse that geteth loose the rene” (Ovid A3). This pivotal insight into the male fantasy that creates the Polyxena Pattern unconsciously mirrors Seneca’s description in which the sadistic male gaze gets turned on by feminine vulnerability. He is astonished not by the machinations of the evil queen archetype, but by terror unveiled for what it is, the product of his sexual fantasies.

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Iachimo observes and takes notes, as if he were objectively looking for incriminating evidence, but in reality he is caught in the strong crosscurrents of fantasy: Ovid’s, his and Posthumus’s, and the sleeping Imogen. Iachimo uses the trial as a way of confirming his fantasy, a show that reason, rather than the imagination, is accusing the maiden archetype. In order to understand the reason for the sadism of this moment, however, we must see how an alternate experience exists here. The man feels that he is being overcome and raped, as in the Malleus’ vision what witches do to man in the middle of the night, or Burton’s explanation of the Devil’s frolicking inside a man’s body. If we turn to Apuleius, we can see this dynamic in the relationship between a dead man brought to life because of his wife’s treachery, and Telepheron, the man who is meant to watch over the corpse, and is violated as well. The witches eat his nose and his ears, both of which stand in for phalli, and which are a physical manifestation of astonishment. In astonishment, the senses are stormed and closed down. It is “dullness, or priuation of the sences, sodaine priuation or lacke of sence or feeling, benumming, astoniednes, dulnes or a trouble of the minde vpon a sodaine feare, not perceiuing what is done, vnsensiblenes” (“stupidità). Here, this unraveling is born of a sensation of feminine threat in the dark of the night.

The story of Telepheron points forward to the Winter’s Tale and Cymbeline’s emphasis on the manipulation of evidence in trial, except in this case it is the women who manipulate the evidence. The “true” fantasy that is dramatized here manifests the fear that underlies Leontes’, Posthumus’, and even Iachimo’s loathing of women: the notion that behind the outward displays of affection, they actually conquer and possess the man’s soul. They hold him under a spell that paralyzes him and renders him impotent—literally, in this story, cutting off the organs of sense, but figuratively cutting of his penis. The story begins with a mourning wife searching for a man to watch over her husband’s corpse to make sure that it is not defiled. After engaging Telepheron for the night vigil,

[…] she called seuen witnesses, before whome she showed the dead bodie, and every parte and parcelle thereof, and (with weeping eies) desired them all to testifie the matter, whiche done she saide these woordes of course as followe: Beholde his nose is whole, his eies salue, his eares without scarre, his lippes vntoucht, & his chinne sounde: All whiche was written and noted in tables, & subscribed with the handes of the witnesses to confirme the same. (Apuleius C2v)

The story is bookended by legal language. The wife presents the corpse and makes a thorough examination of it with no less than seven witnesses. They scrupulously inspect “every parte and parcelle thereof” in a manner not unlike Iachimo’s inventory of Imogen. The focus on ocular proof, the presence of witnesses, and writing suggest trial and jury, not simply an inventory, and thus implies future guilt or innocence. The strangeness underlying the story resides in the discrepancy, as we will discover, between the apparent and the hidden, which corresponds to the contrast between this quantifiable and carefully observed reality and the power of the strange—in the form of the dream or the supernatural—to overturn reality. The idea behind the gathering of evidence and confirmation by witnesses is that the wife is trying to “prove” her innocence.

The anticipated witch enters the room in the shape of a “Weasell” and fills Telepheron with a “very great feare” which causes him as well to “maruel greatly” at the little animal’s audacity (Apuleius C2r). He orders the animal to go away, but as soon as the apparition has left, he falls into a deep sleep. That sleep changes him in ways he cannot anticipate. In the morning, “immediatly came in the Matron weeping with her witnesses, & ranne vnto the corpse and eftsones kissinge him, turned his body and found no parte diminished” (Apuleius C2*-C2r).
Later, an old man accuses the widow of poisoning her husband to get her inheritance and “maintaine her whoredome,” and while the crowd is ready to throw stones at her, the authorities summon “Zachlas an Egipitian…who was hired…to reuieue his bodie for the triall hereof” (Apuleius C3r). The resurrected corpse produces tangible evidence to unify the divided jury of spectators, some who believe and others who do not trust him: “Beholde I will giue you some euident token, which neuer yet any other man knew, wherby you shall perceaeue that I declare the truth …” (Apuleius C3v-C4r). The dead man points to Telepheron, who was dreaming all night and therefore an unconscious witness.

Telepheron, although vigilant, succumbs to the spell of the powerful, but evil woman. She puts him under a temporary death through deep sleep. But but he responds to the call of his name, which is identical to that of the corpse, and the witches steal his nose and ears and put prosthetic ones in their place, so the corpse recounts. “Whiche when [the corpse] had saide, I was greatly astonied, and (mindinge to proue whether his woordes were true or no) put my hande to my nose, & my nose fell of, and put my hande to mine eares, and mine eares fel of. Whereat al the people wondred greatly, and laughed me to skorne but I (beinge stroken in a colde sweate) crept betweene their legges for shame, & escaped away” (Apuleius C4r). Telepheron’s story traces the movement from trial and misjudgment to astonishment and wonder. In a dream-like fashion it deals first with a strange duality: the widow’s fear of her husband’s body being desecrated, while at the same time she has taken his life; and with Telepheron’s fear of dissolution of the self by losing parts of his body. The movement from trial to dream and back to trial hinges on a fear of losing a coherent self and of being victimized by two women—the witch in the fantasy and the wife of the dead man.

The man’s fantasy of being overcome by women in his dream, and then the need to call a trial to prove that she is false, requires the resurrection of the dead. The deceit of women is so thorough and so perfectly executed that it requires a reversal of the order of life, the return of the dead to articulate how lethal she is. The inverse to this trial is that of Psyche at the hands of Venus, who is subjected to the cruel, evil queen. However, even this scenario is triggered by Psyche’s betrayal of Cupid, burning him in his sleep. Apuleius dramatizes this terror of women being able to break down boundaries and the integrity of the male body to violate him. In the magical world of Thessaly, locks and bolts are continually being picked and doors broken open; this creates a world where amazement as terror presides.

Contrary to what the old woman says to the terrified maiden before she narrates the story of Cupid and Psyche, night visions often confirm reality: first, there is the story recounted by Socrates about a witch who has the power to tear down houses with her magic, lock everybody in the town in their houses, and then transport a house one hundred miles away. The witch can induce the feeling of being imprisoned, turned out, in continual danger of death and having one’s point of references disintegrated. The witch is a sorceress of trauma and her actions create a kind of amazement that resembles terror. After hearing this story, Aristomenus cannot sleep for the “great feare which was in my harte,” but when he finally does, he experiences “sodenly the chamber dooeres brake open, the lockes, boltes and postes fell downe, that you would verely haue thought, that some theeues had ben presently come to haue spoiled and robbed vs” (Apuleius C3r). The witches pierce Socrates in the neck and remove his blood, and then one of them reaches into him and pulls out his heart. This, Socrates claims, are “thinges I sawe with mine owne eies” (Apuleius C4r). At first he believes all this truly happened, but later Socrates awakens, convinces himself it was a dream, induced by too much wine. However, the reality of the dream is confirmed when, passing by a stream, as a confirmation of his wounding by the
witches, Socrates’ throat gushes blood and he dies. The witches easily destroy locks and also lock people in places of terror. There is a sense of boundaries being broken down, of the realm of the fantasy invading reality and creating it in its own image.

The fantasy of feminine malevolence and danger reaches its most extreme form in Pericles. However, it is also in Pericles that a consciousness emerges of the fantasy of the feminine in which terror and pleasure come together—terror at being violated by the evil queen, pleasure at violating the maiden, and pleasure and fear at the return of the redeemer. The strangeness that we noted above is a sign that these powerful fantasies are dictating the course of action of these encounters. Pericles finds himself exiled, traversing the sea continually from one foothold of land to another. The movement of the play, mimicking the Byzantine novel and New Comedy, from which it takes inspiration, is centrifugal. There are moments of stasis and temporary unions, but Pericles seems driven by forces outside of himself.

In my notes, for this section, I wrote that meaning is not integrated until the end. I misread my own handwriting, in which I had written “meaning,” and I read that word full of minims as “uncanny.” This seems to be less a random coincidence than a profound explanation of the way that the encounter with feminine threat and allure unfurls as a process. The play begins with a transparent, but very opaque, riddle, and it is always returning to it. There is, in the persistence of “strangeness,” in the driving force of the peculiar that propels the play, a reliance on the “uncanny,” a concept that denotes the sudden return of knowledge or memory. This can be a consciousness, for example, of the eruption of a dangerous fantasy that relies on doubling and mirroring the past in a spectral, dark fashion, as we see it in The Winter’s Tale. Equally, it can refer to the sensation created in the audience when Pericles meets his daughter. The hidden knowledge of their relationship, of their familiarity in spite of being unconnected, as they think they are, is meant to create a sense of danger and terror in the most familiar relationships. The past seems to be about to repeat itself and end catastrophically because this scene mirrors earlier encounters with women whom he desires, but who terrify him.

The definition of Unheimlich, literally the unhomely, points to its meaning as an aesthetic category, relating it to literary emplotting and to the experience of emotion as it is mediated not through life, but through art. Freud notes that, according to Schelling, “everything is Unheimlich that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light” (“On the Uncanny” 225). Quoting from Grimm’s dictionary, its opposite, Heimlich is “a place free from ghostly influences…familiar, friendly, intimate” (“On the Uncanny” 225). Freud explains that paradoxically Heimlich comes to mean Unheimlich, because they both imply something hidden: the home hides experience from the outside, and so the meaning of homey slips into the uncanny: “the notion of something hidden and dangerous” (“On the Uncanny” 226). “Thus heimlich,” he writes, “is a word the meaning of which develops in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlich. Unheimlich is in some way or other a sub-species of heimlich” (“On the Uncanny” 226). At the end of the first section of his essay, Freud asks the reader to “bear this discovery in mind” although “we cannot yet rightly understand it” (“On the Uncanny” 226). At the heart of family relationships is a strong pull, which consists of both attraction and repulsion, where the notion of home becomes both the enclosure that protects and the place where secrets are kept away from the public. Terror and pleasure are closely linked in Freud’s notion of the Unheimlich.

For Freud, it is the repetition of something familiar with something frightening, the doubleness of contrasting iterations that constitutes “the quality of uncanniness.” “When all is said and done, the quality of uncanniness can only come from the fact of the ‘double’ being a
creation dating back to a very early mental stage, long since surmounted—a stage at which it wore a more friendly aspect. The “double” has become a thing of terror…” The idea of a double, which describes the familiar becoming frightening, makes more sense only in Freud’s fascinating self-revelation a page later. He describes a hot day in an Italian town, when he kept returning to the same neighborhood of ill repute:

Nothing but painted women were to be seen at the windows of the small houses, and I hastened to leave the narrow street at the next turning. But after having wandered about for a time without enquiring my way, I suddenly found myself back in the same street, where my presence was now beginning to excite attention. I hurried away only to arrive once more by another detour at the same place yet a third time. Now, however, a feeling overcame me which I can only describe as uncanny, and I was glad enough to find myself back at the piazza I had left a short while before…. (“On the Uncanny” 237)

Freud underlines the feeling of helplessness in thinking back on the experience. The detour, which would seem to be a random move away, brings him back to exactly the same place. It is here that we can begin to see the way that my note, “meaning is not integrated until the end” was read by me (and I use the passive voice emphatically in this instance because I was led), as “uncanny is not integrated until the end.” Freud’s use of the sexual allure of the “painted women” as an example of helplessness, doubling, and repetition in a foreign context (the anonymous Italian provincial town) demonstrates how sexual desire may not be responsible for detours, but it is inextricably bound to it.

Freud describes the double as the familiar rendered foreign, and it is precisely here that we see the Viennese mother turned into the Italian painted woman. The innocuous stroll to aid digestion takes him on an adventure. He is “working” something out on the walk by returning repeatedly to the same place. Something familiar lies behind the “painted women,” which are analogous here to the gods turned into demons: the all-providing, god-like mother turned into the pernicious, startling whore.

Shakespeare’s Pericles opens with a similar struggle between sexual desire and horror as he faces head on the full force of the archetype of the evil queen. Like the other princes, who fall to their demise, Pericles is pulled to see the anonymous daughter of Antiochus. It is Gower, the narrator, who signals the morbid and at the same time all-too-human nature of Pericles’ journey. Incarnated out of the past, speaking a language that is his own, but no longer that of the audience, Gower announces he has appeared, “Assuming man’s infirmities” (Pericles I.0.3). While this could be glossed as, in “mortal form,” as Gossett explains (Pericles I.0, n.3), I would take it at face value. The incarnation of Gower announces the infirmity of Pericles’ love-melancholy. The juxtaposition of Gower’s archaic language with the contemporary verse of the play, also corroborates a doubleness that is always relating, as Freud suggests, a familiar past with a present terror. Likewise, when he points to the severed heads “displayed above,” as the stage directions note, he is touching upon something that Freud associates with the unheimlich: “Dismembered limbs, a severed head…all prove something particularly uncanny about them” (“On the Uncanny” 244). They also point directly to the fantasy of being overcome by a malignant feminine force, as in the stories of the witches violating the protagonists in Apuleius. The severed head suggests an identity that has been shattered and bodily penetration, as well as the more obvious emasculation.

There is something disconnected, a sense of the unheimlich in yoking desire with the severed heads. The risk of love, the specter of death, the agitation of Pericles, express themselves in the Gower’s references to infirmity and the severed heads. Also, it contrasts with
the justification that Pericles gives for putting his kingdom at risk. The ruler’s dismembered head cannot be reconciled with the desire to prolong his dynasty. The princess’ mask of beauty combined with her nameless state in a chain of genealogy only underlines this difficulty:

I sought the purchase of a glorious beauty
From whence an issue I might propagate,
Are arms to princes and bring joys to subjects.
Her face was to mine beyond all wonder,
The rest--hark in thine ear--as black as incest
Which by my knowledge I found... (Pericles I.ii.70-5)

We are left then with two things: first, Pericles’ insistence of her beauty as a source of wonder and secondly her role as a vessel of royal propagation. Juxtaposed against this, like the uncanny image of dismembered heads is the secret, hidden incest, which, nevertheless the riddle makes absurdly transparent. When I say, then, that the “meaning” or the “uncanny” (depending on how I decipher the minims), does not come to fruition until the end, we are also following the same course by which amazement as astonishment leads to destructive fantasy and then becomes mirrored and transfigured as admiration.

In the structure of Pericles, the “painted” (to use Freud’s term) beauty of the anonymous princess is productive of the later uncanny when he meets his daughter Marina in an erotically-charged context. When Freud speaks of dread and terror, the early modern equivalent is “amazement”—an experience that will stun and keep him in his state of confusion. The riddle that makes sense and at the same time no sense leads to a reaction on the part of Antiochus that confounds reason. The repression of reason and the triumph of fantasy here confounds the audience, creates a sense of dread. The combination of fantasy, desire, and the repression of reason is uncanny precisely because the meaning cannot be understood. There seems to be a deferral of reason and thus of meaning, and reason is repressed altogether. Thus when relating this love that can contribute to the destruction of the human soul, of communities, and even of the world itself, Robert Burton, significantly, notes that he is “amazed,” “afraid to relate” this connection of sexual desire with the destruction of the soul and of the world:

I am almost afraid to relate, amazed, and ashamed, it hath wrought such stupend and prodigious effects, such foul offences. Love indeed (I may not deny) first unied Provinces, built citties, and by a perpetuall generation, makes and preserues man kind, propagates the Church; but if it rage it is no more Loue, but burning Lust, a disease, Phrensie, Madnesse, Hell…t’s no vertuous habit this, but a vehement perturbation of the minde, a monster of nature, witte and art...It subverts kingdomes, ouerthrowes citties, townes, families, marres, corrupts, and makes a massacare of men; thunder and lightning, warres, fires, plagues, haue not done that mischiefe to mankin, as this burning lust, this brutish passion. (Burton Fff4r)

The destructiveness of love that Burton describes is connected with the suppression of reason in the suitors and with the stunning effect of the riddle. As with previous suitors, the language of the riddle stuns Pericles. It prevents him from pronouncing a judgment. Gower relates that to make it impossible for suitors to attain her as a “bed-fellow,” Antiochus,

… made a law,
To keep her still, and men in awe,
That whoso ask’d her for his wife,
His riddle told not, lost his life:
So for her many a wight did die,
As yon grim looks do testify.
What now ensues, to the judgment of your eye
I give, my cause who best can justify.  (Pericles  I.0.37-44)

Antiochus’ law poisons those around him into a paralysis: it “keep[s] her still” and it freezes the “men in awe.” Moreover, the deadly ritual of awing and “stilling” is cyclical, seemingly unending. So, while it seems paradoxical that Antiochus would willingly bring suitors into the circle of the tribunal to judge his case, the power of the rhetorical trap he has set ensures the endless deferral of judgment, a kind of psychological impasse. Like a hall of mirrors, the confusion of roles (who is judge? witness? prosecutor?) and the horror of the riddle itself, serve, as Gower describes, to “keep men in awe.” Thus, the continually reinscribed law, which he has rhyme with “awe,” is connected not to revelation, but to stupefaction.

In Shakespeare’s dramatization, we see clearly the collusion between the law-weilding father and the trapped daughter, whom he makes into an evil queen. The law, which we have continually seen as a method of confirming fantasy, is explicitly set up here to perpetuate the evil queen-sacrificed daughter dyad. However, the idea that the father creates this through his power and his lust, is transparent here. Polyxena’s fate as the sacrificed daughter, who pays the price of the hero’s fantasy and creates the archetype of the evil queen, manifests itself in one person. Antiochus’ law does not release men of their fantasy, but it perpetuates it, keeping them terrified until the moment when they should die. Significantly, the strangeness of the fantasy is unveiled as a product of male law, rather than the law being a way of freeing men from a malignant feminine force.

The evil queen’s face inspires desire, and it generates a terror that lulls him into dying. The suitors who are drawn by the allure of the combination of eros and thanatos ultimately submit to the power of death itself. This power of a destructive feminine fantasy to bring about death is epitomized in the context of the riddle, and also in the very power of image and description, the handmaidens of fantasy, to seduce and confound. Antiochus explains, “Her face, like heaven, enticeth thee to view/ Her countless glory…” (Pericles  I.i.33-4). In this case, what is her glory? Her physical face or the glory of the deaths of “countless” princes who have been stricken with “awe”? Antiochus describes the princes as so many “speechless tongues” reduced to silence by the trial of the riddle. All that survives is a ghostly counterpart to his own daughter’s glorious face: the images of the ghosts’ faces, the “semblance pale” and “dead cheeks” that should “advise thee to desist” (Pericles  I.i.39,42). The specter of death presents itself on the other side of skillful rhetorical praise, seducing young men and killing them. Nevertheless, Pericles’ posture of ambivalence toward the danger of the trial and the power of rhetoric to seduce or destroy is captured in his resonant description of the princess’ face as “the book of praises, where is read/ Nothing but curious pleasures” in which curious signifies both inquisitive and perverse (Pericles  I.i.18-19).

In spite of a recognition of the danger of submitting to this fantasy of the feminine, Pericles cannot help but put himself in danger because of the erotic allure and danger. The tragic end, as the law of the riddle makes clear, is an anagnorisis so horrifying, it kills (as one meaning of “the breath is gone”) the one in possession of the revelation: “sore eyes see clear.” These sore eyes may very well be those of the pale ghosts or simply of disembodied wisdom. “Sore eyes see clear” invokes tragic recognition, but the end of Pericles is not tragic. Rather, seemingly without any logical reason, Antiochus allows Pericles a reprieve of forty days before answering the riddle. This deferral of the law, which Antiochus reminds Pericles, requires the contestant to answer immediately, permits meaning to continue to unfold.
While astonishment engenders a feeling of being overpowered by the feminine, it also interrupts the *denouement* of a fatal end. The interruption occurs here because the law of fantasy itself becomes visible through the actions of Antiochus. When fatality is deferred, it allows response of horror to this feminine archetype to be reassimilated into another fantasy of the woman as redeemer. But we are still in a circle of fantasy animated by an image of beauty and a feeling that one has been dismembered, taken apart, by some malignant influence. By releasing Pericles from the fantasy of his own creation, Antiochus can still salvage the law of his fantasy, for it now comes under the sign of equity.

The experience of paralyzing shock, “astonishment of heart,” gives way later to shock that is wondrous. Antiochus, who has been the agent of terror, in the very process of terrorizing, provides an escape from the repetition of his law. By continually inviting suitors to see that which is otherwise hidden and then stunning them into submission, Antiochus has been able to harness the *energeic* power of rhetoric to ensure the silent subjection that enables him to perpetuate the fantasy of women. The fact, however, that Antiochus suspends judgment—both on his part and on Pericles’—indicates to us that we have reached the limits of one kind of thinking. We saw the capacity of fantasy conveyed through rhetoric and image to produce the bewilderment of the eyes or the soul. Now it is Marina as redeemer who must complete the circle of feminine fantasy. Through a combination of discourse and as an object of sexual fantasy herself, she harnesses the persuasive capacity of rhetoric for movement—to turn her clients away from their former selves and into another mode of being. We see this in her ability to transform the desire of her suitors from a sexual desire based on conquest and blindness to an openhearted and clear-eyed admiration.

In his narration of Marina’s abilities, Gower characterizes her discourse as vibrant and moving. She literally sings and dances, and uses her art to “dumb,” but not as we have seen to paralyze, but rather to produce joy and change.

She sings like one immortal, and she daces
As goddess-like to her admired lays;
Deep clerks she dumbs; and with her needle composes
Nature’s own shape, of bud, bird, branch, or berry,
That even her art sisters the natural roses;
Her inkle, silk, twin with the rubied cherry:
That pupils lacks she none of noble race,
Who pour their bounty on her; and her gain
She gives the cursed bawd. (*Pericles* V.0.4-12)

As in the first step of rhetorical composition, Marina begins with *inventio*: she produces a song out of her mind, and her voice and her body convey the feeling to her spectators. Her art is linked to *imitatio* in which art imitates nature: “her needle composes/ Nature’s own shape”; the likeness of the imitation, as Aristotle explains in his *Poetics*, is what produces pleasure because the mind is provoked to compare and cogitate, deliberate and judge. The implicit *energeia* in all of her efforts of articulation emerges out of the dynamic movement of voice, of the body’s resonance through time and space, and the art of her needle. Rather than “dumbing” through astonishment, her lays provoke admiration, a kind of shock that uplifts. Thus, we see a reversal from the astonishing power of Antiochus’ riddle, which renders the living lifeless; and we see a complete shift from the logic of retribution that characterizes the court of law. A principle of redemption is at work here, which appears to be countering the fantasy of the evil queen and the sacrificed daughter. In *Cymbeline*, *The Winter’s Tale*, and now *Pericles*, the law serves to
confirm and maintain the father’s fantasy. Although the men feel captive, amazed by the law, it
nevertheless creates a sense of a powerful, compelling enigma of sexuality.

The strangeness that Polixenes notes in his crazed friend’s behavior, the strangeness of Cymbeline’s court where an impotent king and a dark queen preside, and the strangeness of the itinerant Prince Pericles’ tortured and passive behavior manifest the awakening to consciousness of the fantasy of women. In Pericles, the strangeness of the fantasy that overwhelms Pericles’ coherence of identity as head of state and man of reason is particularly legible because new encounters with women mirror previous ones and project future liaisons. Pericles connects image and language through the figure of the evil queen to create an emotion of terror early on in the play. The romance, then, permits us to see again how image and language also make it possible to experience “admiration,” the emotion that enables Pericles to connect his earlier experience of Antiochus’ wife and Thaisa with his later one of Marina. Like Freud’s Unheimlich, the early modern “strange,” suddenly presents the cognitively and emotionally incomprehensible fantasy to the consciousness.

The terror of an unexpected evil is inextricably connected to the species of fear, admiration, which attends the return of the redeemer, Marina. The atmosphere of strangeness that characterizes the beginnings of these plays with their terrifying queens describes the feelings Pericles, Posthumus, Cymbeline, and Leontes of being overwhelmed by something “which is Against” their nature (Reynoldes 285, PP1). In the return of the redeeming daughter, he experiences admiration because she is “above our Nature.” The “strangeness” of the event of the daughter’s return, marks it as related to the earlier encounter, as indeed they are. Edward Reynoldes writes:

Admiration is a kind of feare: it being the property of man, not only to feare that which is Against, but that also which is above our Nature, either in regard of natural and civilldignity…which worketh a Fear or Admiration. […] Againe, though such evils may happily be in themselves but sleight, yet the very strangenesse of them will worke an opinion of their greatnesse… (Reynoldes 285, PP1)

When Imogen returns, Cymbeline observes that they are meeting “so strangely” again (Cymbeline V.v.281). The message that a young woman and Polixenes’ son Florizel have returned is greeted with the word “strange.” In Pericles, the entire meeting between father and daughter partakes of the strange because unlike in The Winter’s Tale or Cymbeline where the moment of return is also marked by the demise of the evil queen (Cymbeline) or the commemoration of the loss of the queen (The Winter’s Tale), in Pericles the prince must work out his relationship to his fantasy of the toxic feminine; in his case, it is literally a matter of life and death that this strange fantasy turn into something manageable. “Admiration” allows him to recover.

The return of Marina, however, also marks the need for trial, and this is precisely how we know we are not overthrowing fantasy, but confirming a new iteration of it—the revelation of the redeemer and the death of the evil queen and sacrificed daughter. Turning back to Heliodorus, we can see, however, how the return of the redeemer is connected with the fantasy behind the fantasy, the powerful memory of Andromeda. In feeling overwhelmed by a monster, Persina becomes caught herself in the web of fantasy of the deceitful wife, for the fear of overwhelm by the monster at the moment she loses her virginity is responsible for creating the white child. Heliodorus makes it clear that fantasy itself produces the deceitful wife. Rather than being thrown off, the trial only further confirms the fantasy, because while the return of Caricia redeems king and queen from silence and dissimulation it comes with the price of the revelation
of their dark fears. The trial produces this knowledge, or rather, the consciousness of the fantasy. The continual revelations are experienced as admiration, a form of amazement that stuns, but it does so because a truth that “is above,” rather than “against,” is unveiled.

In the Ἄθιοπικα’s final scene, after their many separations and reunions, Theagenes and Cariclia both arrive as prisoners of war to the court of the Ethiopian king Hidaspes and Queen Persina. Equity, transcending the letter of the law to dispense forgiveness and mercy, emerges, as Heliodorus illustrates in the Ἄθιοπικα, to defer an unjust sacrifice. Thomas Underdoune’s 1567 translation features repeated pleas for the king to defer judgment in the name of “equitie.” Although Hidaspes, the king of Ethiopia, struggles with anger and impatience at the piecemeal and contradictory disclosure of facts during the revelation of his daughter’s identity, Sisimithres, his councilor, and his wife Persina urge him to be magnanimous and patient in his judgment. In the final scene, the characters undergo ekplektic shocks, but Cariclia orchestrates a deliberate, slow recognition, in the same way that Paulina will in The Winter’s Tale.

Unrecognized, the daughter and her betrothed are chosen for ritual sacrifice, confirming the reality that the redeemer is always in danger of becoming sacrificed. The returns of Perdita, Marina, and Imogen are marked by similar dangerous situations in which they are almost sentenced, cast off, or raped. The redeemer must explain herself, and it is both the image of her beauty and her ability to talk her way out of sacrifice that produce “admiration.” Like Pericles before Antiochus’ law, she is about to be sacrificed to the law of another’s fantasy. She must provide evidence and witnesses, but she must also work against forgetfulness. The desire for sleepiness and forgetting, symbolically associated with dreaming or dying, lie behind the need for fantasy. The scene of admiration, then, must wake everybody up out of their fantasies.

In order to save herself, Cariclia must gradually convince her parents of her identity, and afterwards she must prove that she is wed to Theagenes. Cariclia challenges her father, reminding him, “the Lawe suffereth you to kill Straungers, but neither this Lawe, nor the Lawe of nature will, that you kill your owne Children” (MM1r). True to her purpose to expose the evidence with “circumspection,” Cariclia asks for the “witness” and “Iudge,” her mother. When Persina sees the letter written in her own hand, she is amazed into silence (MM1r). Showing them the jewels and tokens, the parents recognize them, but Hidaspes challenges that she could have acquired these by theft.

The acceptance of the fantasy of women as valid interrupts the inequitable implementation of the law. As we saw above in Shakespeare’s plays, the implementation of the law is a confirmation of the male fantasy. Male fantasy seeks its confirmation through law, and that fantasy is of the treacherous feminine and the daughter who must be sacrificed. In order to move beyond the dreamy drift toward sacrifice, both Hidaspes and Persina must be awakened. Indeed, both of them need to come to a different state of consciousness, not just the king, because they both participate in a dynamic that produces the fantasy. The interactions between Hermione, Leontes, and Polixenes allow us to see how fantasy comes out of collusion of the men and the woman. Therefore, the redeemer must allow them to see and, more importantly, to feel themselves transported out of themselves through a kind of fear. This fear is not of annihilation, as in the myth of Andromeda, that is, of things against oneself. Rather, it is like the descent of higher law, divine law versus natural law, which is “above” oneself. It is embodied in the return of the redeemer, and it replaces a law of compulsion, violence, and sacrifice. The kind of

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amazement that is “admiration” possesses the necessary fear to push out the former fantasy, as one nail pushes out another (to bring back Luis de Granada).

When Cariclia’s Ethiopian parents fail to recognize her because she is white, the move from improbable to highly unlikely is accompanied by a shift in the law to which Sisimithres appeals. Whereas before Cariclia asked him to appeal to natural law, Sisimithres, as Cariclia’s “Advocate” and judge (Heliodorus MM’2’), councils Hidaspes to use equity: “For wee liue not to please other menne, but seeke to contente our owne consciences, with onely honesty, and mere equitie” (Heliodorus MM’2’). In his section on “Contrary Laws,” Thomas Wilson explains that (1) “the inferior law must give place to the superior;” (2) “the law general must yield to the special;” (3) “Man’s law, to God’s law;” (4) “An old law, to a new law” (Wilson 129, 20-30). Equity is one of the ways, like God’s law, covenants and deeds authentic, which when “the state of right or wrong” comes into question, God’s law of equity prevails. Sisimithres offers an explanation for how Cariclia was born white in which equitable judgment must supersede natural law.

…Persina conceiued such a Figure by looking vpon Andromeda, when you had to doo with her: if you desire to be fully satisfied herein, and be made to beleue without denial, the Picture is at hande, looke vpon Andromeda, who is as wel expressed in the Mayde, as in the Picture without any difference. (Heliodorus MM’2’)

Persina responds earlier to the letter by being “straight so amased that she could saie neuer a woorde” (Helidorus MM1’); the sight of the tokens makes her “more astonied then shee was before” (Heliodorus MM1’). Now, “Persina coulde rule her selfe no longer, but suddainely wente out of her Throne, imbraced her and wepte, and for the exceedingnesse of her ioye, which shee could not conceale, shee made a certaine muttering, and shee wanted but little, to haue fallen with Cariclia” (Heliodorus MM2’). Hidaspes, who formerly “marveiled” at Cariclia’s declaration, but considered it a lie, now succumbs: “So that Hidaspes…coulde not distruste any longer, but stood a great while, what for ioye and woonderinge, still and sturred not” (Heliodorus MM2’). The audience, citizens for whom the king must interpret and explain, oscillates between knowledge and ignorance, at times stunned, but also marveling with pleasure.

In romance, the process of return to the moment of trauma, results in an intensification of the initial trauma because it is recognized as such: the painting of Andromeda, which infects Persina through her eyes, and enters precisely at the moment of conception, is of a young woman who is also sacrificed. Terror enters through the eyes, affects the dreams, and transforms the body. At the moment of coitus, there is a kind of split, represented in the difference between black and white, between Persina and her child; but it is induced by the combination of penetration, of the ecstatic feeling of dissolution in the other through sex, which unites, and at the same time creates a problem. The child’s color bares/bears a secret: Persina’s betrayal of Hidaspes by looking at another during sex, and it bares the secret of her identification with the sacrificed.

In the fantasy of the queen, she identifies with the sacrificed. It is not the queen’s actions that force the father to sacrifice her daughter, but she materializes the fantasy by dreaming the dream for Hidaspes. Already, Persina has given birth to a dream that symbolizes the internal violence of being both prosecutor and accused, spectator and witnessed, judge and judged. When Persina’s daughter returns, the external story is of the return of the white child who must prosecute her existence or go to death along with her betrothed. Cariclia and her Advocate, Sisimithres, must externalize occult knowledge in the form of oracular, interpretable dream and bodily memory to interrupt the execution of further violence out of a dream of violence and
...betrayal. Although comedies may end in trials, the absolutely improbable, which comes through an ecstatic disorder, puts the process of shock—amazement or wonder—at the forefront of discovery. These moments interrupt bad judgment, as Sisimithres counsels the king, “…the wisest men are often blinded” (Heliodorus MM4).

Like Hidaspes, Pericles must be awakened out of his destructive fantasy by his daughter. He meets her privately, as she has encountered so many men in private. In the past, every time she meets a man, she must use her wits and her ability to reveal a higher order beyond sexual aggression and possession. Only this saves her from her job, which is to submit to men and provide them with erotic pleasure. The encounter with Pericles in which they are both blinded to each other’s identities is the most high stakes of these encounters, for it he does succumb to his lust, he risks later finding out he is exactly like Antiochus, the man whom he fled. This final scene takes on the danger that Shakespeare excises from Greene’s version of the reunion of Pandosto and his daughter. In that story, the Bohemian king kills himself when he realizes he hadusted for his own daughter. Clearly, that danger, and the possibility that this romance will turn into tragedy, is present as a background text.

Marina, however, is responsible for awakening Pericles to a new state of consciousness. She accomplishes this through a process of transformation and invention that produces admiration. The fear of things “against” that is always in the background of this encounter contrasts with the power of things “above,” the divine current that allows transformation. Gower’s narration transitions swiftly from a depiction of Marina to her father, thereby rhetorically linking her own act of *inventio* and *transformatio* to the fate of Pericles.

…Here we her place;
And to her father turn our thoughts again,
Where we left him, on the sea. We there him lost;
[…]
In your supposing once more put your sight
Of heavy Pericles; think this his bark:
Where what is done in action, more, if might,
Shall be discover’d; please you, sit and hark. (V.0.12-25)

In the first part of the narration, Gower illustrates Marina’s ability to transform. Here, the arrival of her father seems to be a direct result of the power of her discourse; the movement of scene imitates the movement of thought itself: “And to her father our thoughts turn again.” That is, the plot itself begins to yield to the power of rhetorical persuasion, manifest in the redeemer. Marina as person, and marina as symbol of the ocean, impels the arrival of her father. We move from the world of thought to “what is done in action.”

As Thomas Wright counsels in his *Passions of the Mind*, “thorow the windowes of the face” we should be able to “behold the secrets of the heart,” and indeed Pericles’ blushing spurs Marina to further questioning just as Marina’s aspect inspires trust in Pericles. The continual revelation of names and memories of events leads to the mutual recognition of father and daughter. This is, of course, the classic pattern of recognition in both the court of law and in tragedy, as Aristotle outlines in his *Poetics*. The scene is peppered with references to the court of law: “Motion!”; “troubler of your peace”; Marina fears that her story “would seem/ Like lies disdain’d in the *reporting*”; “falseness”; “Justice.” [Emphasis added] (V.i.182, 178, 136, 138, 139). However, Marina’s revelations add the necessary admiration; they transform the nightmare of Pericles’ reality into “the rarest dream” (V.i.192). The male fantasy of feminine threat and danger that Antiochus’ court of law promulgated must be overturned here by a
different fantasy. For this reason, there are traces of the process of the court of law here. The imaginative motion that Marina has emancipated is the driving force behind the articulation and manifestation of divine force, the later intervention of Diana who, coincidentally, is the goddess associated with the need to sacrifice Iphigenia and also the goddess with whom witches consort in their orgies. Diana’s divine intervention marks the inversion of these other myths that require the maiden’s death (either because the evil queen demands it or to punish the evil queen), putting the fantasy of the redeeming woman in the place of the sacrificed daughter. Diana’s oracle, unleashed by Marina, exceeds the limits of the terrestrial court of law, which we have already seen as perverted, blind, and prone to corruption.

Pericles’ ecstatic recognition produces a sense of admiration. He admits to being “wild in my beholding” (Pericles V.i.257). At the moment of recognition, after being guided by his daughter’s discourse, he experiences the overwhelming joy of witnessing her being.

…But, hark, what music?
Tell Helicanus, my Marina, tell him
O’er, point by point, for yet he seems to doubt,
How sure you are my daughter. But, what music? (Pericles V.i.258-61)

Pericles acknowledges the difficulty of the confirmation of truth—how recognition is always tinged with doubt—but he projects this uncertainty outside of himself, and becomes consumed instead by the music. In the past, he projected his desire onto Antiochus’ daughter. Now he burns with the wonder of beholding a world that seems to be opening out of this one; Marina’s language, her “music,” embodies the power of metaphorical signification, transcendence, an overabundance of meaning that is beyond the letter of the law implicit in the recognition. Pericles hears “rarest sounds,” “heavenly music” which finally allows him to rest (Pericles V.i.266, 268). Indeed, he has now finally provided the third term in Antiochus’ riddle, that which exceeds the duality, “the two” of the riddle. In the fullness of time, Antiochus has actually permitted us to see how daughter can be “mother” and father “son.” This third term is the excess of meaning produced by the dynamic movement between the two terms of the metaphor.

If Pericles suffers in Antiochus’ trial, it is because he is the victim, like those who preceded him, of his fantasy. However, in Pericles Shakespeare links stupefaction to a perverse law, an unfair judge, and the confusion of roles in the court of law. From awe and amazement, we move in the final scene to wonder, which comes to fruition in expression as music. Pericles succumbs to the transformative music of Marina, and in the end, he seems to have been so moved that it is the music he hears and not just the speaker. The trial of the riddle reveals the power of fantasy to replace live beings with specters, meaningful discourse with hollow praise. It also demonstrates the capacity of fantasy to “awe” and stun into subjection. All subjects are turned into objects; one empty signifier points to another in an endless process of deferral of meaning. In the final scene, Shakespeare depicts a world that mirrors both the court of law, the locus of judgment and retribution, and the brothel chamber, where the man asserts his fantasy of desire and aggression.

The resolutions of Cymbeline and The Winter’s Tale also mirror previous scenes, reflecting the judgment of fantasy in the first parts. The statue scene where estranged husband and wife meet each other is a response both to Leontes’ earlier fantasies of Hermione and an alteration of the court scene. In Cymbeline, Iachimo’s intrusion into Imogen’s bedchamber is later mirrored by the discovery of, once again, the sleeping Imogen by her brothers. Whereas the earlier scenes are created by a lust-driven violence that manufactures the archetype of the evil queen and her sacrificed daughter, in the later scenes the men are redeemed. This redemption
begins a process of remembering, as if a spell had been broken, and for this reason in Pericles and Cymbeline, the female malefactors, Dionyzia and Cymbeline’s queen die, of their own accord—a fantasy driven to the peripheries of the play and evaporating because it no longer serves a psychological or dramatic function. In this sense, the play forgets the queen. Forgetting feels like a curse breaking. Forgetting makes room for remembering lost family. The scenes of reencounter must mirror the earlier scenes of terror in order for admiration, as a subspecies of fear, to allow a rapprochement and modification of the earlier trauma.

The scene of encounter of the brothers with the sister-disguised-as-a-man Imogen contrasts markedly with Iachimo’s visual rape earlier. Imogen begins by defending herself for eating their meat. Having just escaped being sacrificed, this scene presents a conspicuous contrast for the theatrical spectator. The rustic, young men, whose benevolent and princely nature cannot “bow” in the cave where they are hidden, manifest a totally different kind of man than we have seen in Cymbeline, Cloten, Posthumus, or Iachimo: “Nature prompts them/In simple and low things to prince it…” (Cymbeline III.iii.83, 84-5). As in Pericles, there is very little to stop incest, and it is only the continual reiteration of the princes’ “good minds” (Cymbeline III.vi.37) and noblesse oblige, as well as Imogen’s costume, that prevents Guiderius from “woo[ing] hard” (Cymbeline III.vii.43). The relationship between disguised sister and unrecognized brothers establishes a longing, but also a respectful distance. Imogen’s sudden appearance, seemingly manifested out of nowhere, is a shocking coincidence to the princes. It frames the object of vision and of longing not as something to be conquered, but rather as an object that opens compassion and vulnerability. The new dynamic eases Imogen out of the role of accused. She longs for a complete transformation—her dream to beget another dream of mutuality and compassion: “I’d change my sex to be companion with them…” (Cymbeline III.vii.60).

Arviragus articulates precisely what will reconfigure the dynamic of this broken family and restore to Cymbeline his children: “Love’s reason without reason” (Cymbeline IV.ii.22). This idea does not convey the assertion of reason that the male protagonists in their terror try to assert through the forensic process. Rather, it will push out the old dyad of evil queen and sacrificed daughter, and substitute the vision of the redeemer. Imogen continues to suffer the loss of her lover precisely because of the unjust trial. When she takes the queen’s potion, she takes in her poison and all the poison of the fantasy. The philter imbibed symbolically enacts the phallus reaching its destination, and the female’s fantasy of the man’s violence and lust—Persina’s vision of Andromeda during sex. On the other hand, Imogen takes in the poison of this fantasy, by drinking the potion that will induce the death-like sleep, which does not result in the return of reason per se but in the establishment of a new fantasy.

After Imogen’s trial, she finds comfort in the love of people whom she does not know but with whom she feels the bond of an unreasonable love—a guileless, “natural” love. A similar unreasonable love allows Perdita to bring about the redemption of Bohemia and Sicilia. But first, Perdita must confront the aggression of Polixenes and Camillo. Having been discovered by the king and his Sicilian advisor, Perdita offers to give up “This dream of mine/Being now awake…” (The Winter’s Tale IV.iv.453-4). Camillo and Polixenes prosecute the shepherd and Perdita. Finally, they threaten Florizel’s right to succession. Florizel espouses a love that goes beyond the bounds of reason:

I am [advised], and by my fancy; if my reason
Will thereto be obedient, I have reason.
If not, my senses, better pleased with madness,
Do bid it welcome. (The Winter’s Tale IV.iv.487-50)

Pitcher explains that, “At this date, ‘fancy’, associated with ‘fantasy’, meant the experience of love as well as the capacity to create mental images. Reason was a higher power than fancy, so Florizel is threatening to overturn the hierarchy of human understanding. His fancy parallels the destructive affection Leontes felt” (The Winter’s Tale IV.iv.487-90n.). Florizel’s articulation of love, this unreasonable love that nevertheless topples the unreason of reason, perfectly parallels the love of Imogen and her brothers. Madness here represents the intervention of a new fantasy where the feminine brings a sword. In this manner, we will see all the women turn into men, or boys, at least, at the end. Imogen, Perdita, Paulina all take on masculine clothes or a man’s agency, to work to bring about the providence of the oracle. The children who have been cast-out through the violence of fantasy can come back to the parents who have forgotten them.

When Perdita returns it is only after Leontes affirms that he cannot forget Hermione. Paulina ushers in the return of the queen and her daughter by reminding him that in taking another wife, he forfeits her memory. Significantly, Paulina imagines herself as an agent of terror, a ghost, shocking his fantasy—an echo of what we have already seen:

Were I the ghost that walk’d, I’d bid you mark
Her eye, and tell me for what dull part in’t
You chose her; then I’d shriek, that even your ears
Should rift to hear me, and the words that follow’d
Should be “Remember mine.” (The Winter’s Tale V.i.63-7)

We must recall that at this moment nobody knows that Perdita, Florizel, and Camillo are on their way, all of them driven by longing. Camillo’s desire to “re-view Sicilia, for whose sight/I have a woman’s longing” addresses the homosocial love that earlier has complicated the plot by triggering Leontes’ fantasy of feminine malignancy (The Winter’s Tale IV.iv.666-7). Now, this same longing works in tandem with remembering to reestablish an alternate fantasy. The memory of Leontes’ “blemishes,” rather than keeping him mired in a destructive cycle of recrimination (The Winter’s Tale V.i.8), actually functions as Paulina’s image of the ghost does, to frighten him into remembering the capacity of his fantasy for bad. On the other hand, the creation of a new reality requires a new fantasy, driven by longing, and irrespective of sexual boundaries. Thus, we see at the turn of the fifth act, action fueled by longing from many different directions.

The trial positions Hermione, as it did Imogen, in the middle of a crossfire of fantasies. Now it is not the redeemer, Perdita, who will be the focal point, as Imogen was in Cymbeline or Marina who upstages the return of her mother in Pericles. Somebody else outside of the triptych of archetypes: a real woman born of the imagination of another woman. For this reason, unlike in the earlier romances, the focal point is possibly for the first time in romance, not the redeemer who opens up a space for admiration, but the flawed, visibly aged queen. Because Florizel longs to be married to Perdita, she leads them all back to Sicilia. The play sets apart the series of reunions that Perdita brings in her wake, anecdotally, rather than dramatizing them. I don’t believe this is because the wondrous is ultimately incapable of being dramatized by actors on a stage without, as Aristotle says of Achilles chasing Hector in Book XXIV of the Poetics, appearing absurd. Indeed, the return of Perdita on the surface is much less improbable than Hermione’s Pygmalion moment. Rather, Shakespeare pushes the fantasy of the redeemer to the side; we know of it as a tale, a luminous counterpoint to Mamillius’ winter’s tale. As such, it is about the return of a ghost, as Paulina augurs, only the ghost returns in spectral fashion not as an agent of terror but of admiration.
The return of Perdita still keeps us in the circle of male fantasy. Her return serves as a focal point, much as that of Imogen, for men to love each other. A trio of gentlemen of Sicilia recounts the “amazedness” (The Winter’s Tale V.ii.5) of men being reunited:

I make a broken delivery of the business; but the changes I perceiv’d in the King and Camillo were very notes of admiration. They seemed almost with staring on one another, to tear the cases of their eyes. There was speech in their dumbness, language in their very gesture; they look’d as they had heard of a world ransom’d, or one destroy’d. A notable passion of wonder appear’d in them; but the wisest beholder, that knew no more but seeing, could not say if th’importance were joy or sorrow; but in the extremity of the one, it must needs be. (The Winter’s Tale V.ii.9-19)

The “extremity” of emotion marks the awakening of consciousness through the ekplektik force of pivoting between one powerful surge of feeling and another contrasting one. Amazement as admiration signals the sudden arrival of something from above; of course it is the redeemer who makes it possible, but the admiration is directed not at her, but at him. Like the fantasy of the evil queen, the fantasy of the redeemer makes it possible for men to look upon one another with love and longing. This scene invokes the intensity of homosocial desire in the beginning of the play, which leads catastrophically to the expulsion of the queen and her daughter. This meeting is a prelude to the liebestod-like reunion of Polixenes and Leontes:

There might you have beheld one joy crown another, so and in such manner that it seem’d sorrow wept to take leave of them, for their joy waded in tears. There was casting up of eyes, holding up of hands, with countenance of such distraction that they were to be known by garment, not by favor. (The Winter’s Tale V.ii.43-9)

While this all comes about because of the “found daughter” (The Winter’s Tale V.ii.50), the reunion of Leontes with his spiritual brother and his father figure combusts all emotions like a fire. The image of the two men so merged that their features cannot be distinguished, “garment, not…favor,” marks an emotional return to the Edenic past before women that Leontes longed for so vehemently that he was willing to set fire to his reality. Amazement as admiration operates here because there is a clear reference to verticality, to “up above”: “casting up of eyes, holding up hands.” At this point, we are closest to Heliodorus and to Apuleius, indeed to most ancient romance, because the reunion (here of old men, rather than heterosexual lovers) points upward toward the heavens. As in the earlier models, eroticism is written under, like a palimpsest, gesturing toward the celestial.

In Part II of this dissertation, Zoraida is the redeemer who literally buys back the Christian lover from his captivity. The denouement depicts the redeemer as the bright, but emptied, center of reconciliations between men. She casts away her father, and is emptied emotionally and financially. In becoming a luminous specter of terror (her father’s terror allows her to be the object of admiration and redemption to the Spaniards), she also empties herself as her continual mourning suggests. But this depletion of the woman in favor of the spectral feminine allows the other men to meet uncle, long lost brother, and father. There is, at the end of “The Captive’s Tale,” a return of terror in addition to admiration. The end of romance, because it is based on fantasy, has the potential of being cyclical and leading back to tragedy; thus in Greene’s Pandosto, the reunion of father and daughter is followed by his suicide.

In the ending of The Winter’s Tale, we see the Polyxena Pattern shattered. Paulina, named with a P like Polyxena herself, and like almost all the heroes of Shakespeare’s romances, assumes the role of both a man and a woman. She is, like the ghost she earlier cast herself as, a kind of sorceress. As such, she takes on the role of the female alluded to above, of witches who
overcome the fantasy at night and rape the man’s body. It appears that Paulina has created this fantasy, as a sorceress would. Rather than prosecuting Paulina, Leontes refers to an equitable law that makes the fantasy of the woman not a source of terror, but lawful. Leontes assures Paulina, “Proceed;/No foot shall stir,” which ushers in a new dynamic in the play (*The Winter’s Tale* V.ii.97-8). Leontes pledges that nobody will indict her, inverting the trial in Act III when she advocated for Hermione, and thus seemed to him guilty of treason as well. Now free from his nightmarish fantasies, he uses his regal power to rein in the potential of the law for ill: the legal, “Proceed,” explicitly marks his sovereignty to act as king and judge, but now to curb the potential for a paranoid misapplication of the law. This contrasting use of the law does not confirm his fantasy, but allows a new reality to materialize in front of our eyes.

We have already seen Leontes, like Posthumus and Pericles, overwhelmed by his fantasies of women. His imagination has driven him to demonize his wife and judge her guilty, provoking the unjust punishment of her daughter. The confirmation of Leontes’ fantasy in the trial put the Polyxena Pattern into motion. When the redeemer returned, she helped him countenance the trauma of his own behavior, containing the fear with admiration. But just as the trial marked the confirmation of his fantasy and unleashed the Pattern, so here “Proceed” signals a legal foothold for an alternative reality that will arrest it. The return from dead stone of the reality of Hermione is marked by a corresponding depletion of the fantasy of the redeemer. Whereas the redeeming maiden was needed as an object of desire to mediate past traumas, now Perdita can be a subject, who stares at the image of her mother. This statue “From thy admiring daughter took the spirits,/Standing like stone with thee” (*The Winter’s Tale* V.ii.41-2). These lines indicate a special moment in romance, for it is rare that the woman gets to admire. Rather, it is usually the man gazing at the feminine redeemer that creates a spectacle of admiration.

In Paulina’s studio, a feminine fantasy is created in which we see how these male-produced archetypes are petrified, daughter becoming like mother, and replaced by new ones: Hermione “wrinkled” as if sixteen years had really passed. The terror of the passing of time, which we linked to Leontes’ fixation on the Edenic past, was connected with a terror of the feminine and results in her demonization. Here, Paulina links her age with Leontes’ redemption, his suffering, and ultimately his humanization. Before his fantasy hardened his soul. He acted in ways that were monstrous under the curse of his fantasy of the evil queen. The representation of the “triumph of time” has the effect of “piercing” his “soul” and conjuring his evils; Camillo and Polixenes seem to want to retreat into fantasy and away from the reality of sorrow when Camillo tries to protect his king from the powerful feelings of “sorrow…too sore laid on” by the sudden appearance of the statue (*The Winter’s Tale* V.ii.49). Likewise, Polixenes protests that the artist, who produced “so much grief,” should now take it back (*The Winter’s Tale* V.ii.55). But it is the memory of one’s evils, rather than hiding them in fantasy, which will allow the king to forgive himself enough to welcome his wife back into his life, as a woman, not an archetype. Only after the experience of amazement as admiration allows him to reconcile grief and guilt with longing and remembering does Leontes recognize the therapeutic effect of this feminine production: “Do, Paulina; For this affliction has a taste as sweet/As any cordial comfort” (*The Winter’s Tale* V.ii.75-7). His statement is not yet another rehearsal of the pleasure in pain notion that permeates medieval courtly literature and chivalric novels. A combination of extreme opposite emotions provides an *ekplektik* shock, and it also pierces the fantasy in which the hero moves from terror and sadism to escapism.

Bullough points out that the statue scene and the trial scene both put Hermione at the center. In contrast with the earlier scene, this reconciliation is not an excuse for Leontes to assert
the reality of his fantasy, but rather for Paulina to reposition reality around amazement at reality rather than amazement caused by fantasy: “the total effect is not of a circle but of a spiral, since the statue scene leaves us in a very different mood from the trial scene. Thanks to Paulina, Leontes’s repentance, and the natural goodness of the young people, we have broken out of the dismal round which seemed about to be repeated” (Bullough 152). The “dismal round” about to repeated, as Bullough appraises the situation, intuits the relationship between the redeemer and the more nefarious and tragic archetypes of femininity. The redeemer who just barely escapes a “dismal round” in Pericles or in Cymbeline is no longer an object of admiration that allows for men to bond through a shared fantasy of longing to save the woman whom he sacrificed.

In Paulina’s studio, everything begins moving again energetically, because hearts are brimming with feeling. This is not the spectral, emptied image of femininity. This scene centers around three real women: Paulina, Hermione, and Perdita. Paulina cautions that reality will begin to fall away through a vertiginous process: “…resolve you/For more amazement. If you can behold it,/ I’ll make the statue move indeed, descend,/And take you by the hand” (The Winter’s Tale V.ii.86-9). When she comes alive, it is really the male spectators who are confronting their fear of age, of mourning, of feminine agency. The experience of amazement and marvel (Paulina’s command to “look upon” the coming to life “with marvel” [The Winter’s Tale V.ii.100]) centers around the reunion of mother and daughter: “Turn, good lady,/ Our Perdita is found” (The Winter’s Tale 120-1). However much he comes to life through this, Leontes is on the sidelines in contrast with his position in the trial scene where Hermione lived only in his dream, his fantasy. In Hermione coming to life, she breaks the Polyxena Pattern because male fantasy no longer provokes a chain of emotions and dictates a pattern of actions. Paulina overthrows reason here, but her magic is lawful, bringing our amazement to dwell on the magic of reality, rather than fantasy. Amazement at the end of The Winter’s Tale does not confirm a lethal law, but a pattern of redemption that accepts the passing of time and the change in relationships with joy.
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