Business Cycles:
Race, Gentrification, and the Making of Bicycle Space in the San Francisco Bay Area

by

John G Stehlin

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Committee in charge:
Professor Emeritus Richard A Walker, Chair
Associate Professor Jake G Kosek
Professor Ananya Roy
Professor Michael J Watts

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Abstract

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This dissertation examines the politics of urban transformation in the San Francisco Bay Area, using the bicycle as a lens into the processes by which social movements engage in the production of urban space. It analyzes how, over the past two decades, urban bicycling has gone from a practice of diverse countercultural and subaltern fringes to an accepted and valued mode of mobility in many cities. Cycling remains regionally marginal but locally hegemonic. In San Francisco and Oakland, bicycle advocates now play key roles in the politics of urban development and the planning of changes to urban streets. Through their participation in these endeavors, they have framed livable urban space as a necessary material base for economic growth, amid the acceleration of gentrification and the displacement of working class people of color. Self-identified progressives, with bicycle advocates in the lead, work tirelessly to make the city more livable, just as livability becomes a key source of value in the urban space economy. Because of this, bicycling now symbolizes the white, middle-class retaking of the city.

Through archival research, ethnography, participant observation, and GIS, this dissertation uncovers how this came to be, and its contemporary implications. It examines the politicization of bicycling, from the early 1990s onward, as a specifically urban phenomenon with aspirations to change the city itself. In San Francisco, the political tumult of Critical Mass created an opening for bicycle advocacy organizations to claim a role in the planning process. For strategic reasons, they appealed to the economic interests of business interests and claimed the economic contribution of cyclists. This argument has become normative in the growing networks of bicycle policy. A decade later, it is taken up by advocates pushing for a new wave of infrastructural development in Oakland, amid a new cycle of gentrification. In this context, bicycle infrastructure represents an urban future within which Oakland’s working class African-American population has no obvious place, revealing the social divisions of Oakland’s “renaissance.” The dissertation concludes with an argument for learning from subaltern cycling voices and for broader coalitions with a vision for more equitable urban development.
For the workers who make the “beautiful machine” possible
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Preface

Just off of 24th Street in the beating heart of what remains of the Latino Mission District, a mural neatly captures a new common sense about what bicycles mean in today’s city. *Mission Makeover*, painted by young artist Lucia Ippolito and her father Tirso Araiza, juxtaposes two sides of the “new” Mission District. On the left, the Mission she and her father knew, with Latino youth, low-riders, a Muni bus, and the heavy hand of the police. On the right, white hipster youth on bicycles and hanging out on stoops, their ears and eyes glued to smartphones, moving vans unloading furniture into neatly renovated Victorians, and a policeman sipping a latte with a bourgeois woman and her tiny dog. These two scenes occupy the same geographical space, but they depict different social worlds, separated by race, class, gender, age, and mobility (Figure 1).

On two afternoons in the summer of 2012, I dropped by while the mural was still in progress and volunteered to help Lucia paint—with marginal success—while we chatted about gentrification. She recounted a conversation she had with her father over the question of race in the mural:
When I was actually painting the hipsters on the wall, I made one of them black. And my dad gave me a bunch of shit about it, and he was like, “You need to make the guy white,” and I was like, “Why?” And he said, “Because they are white,” and I was like, “I don’t think that all bike riders are white and all hipsters are white, I think that it doesn’t really necessarily always have to do with race” (Ippolito 2012).

Our offhanded exchange concealed a critical issue. How did the bicycle come to symbolize gentrification? How does the demonstrable diversity of cycling practice become reinterpreted as “white”? How does the emergence of a visibly new group of cyclists into the street speak to the fragmentation of the daily round of the neighborhood as a social space (Logan and Molotch 2007). What “chain of equivalences” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) equates cyclists with the destruction of a certain lived sense of place? These questions raise a broader issue: how did the bicycle come to represent an urban future in which working class people of color have no discernible place to belong?

The following chapters approach an explanation. They trace the politicization of the bicycle and its valorization in urban culture to the efforts of bicycle advocates to have more effective infrastructure installed in areas of cities where cyclists are now congregating. They examine how the bicycle reveals distinct but not separate worlds of urban experience (Berman 1982), characterized by spatial practices shot through with relations of power and difference. One is new to the city, wide-eyed at its potential, and yearning to change it into a more livable place, and staking claims for a distinctly urban ecological politics. Another is cut off from the urban renaissance, on the losing end of infrastructural development and property investment, with no place in the city now emerging. The following chapters also show how the bicycle can act as a bridge between these worlds, allowing people whose daily lives are extraordinarily different to commune over a shared way of moving through space. I celebrate these moments, even as I recognize that they are for the most part fleeting.

Though the urban problems bicycle activists, livability advocates, mayors, planners, and other actors hope to solve by bicycle exceed their grasp, the promise of a two-wheeled city that is a dignified place for everyone remains a seductive vision, often clouding perception of broader dynamics that work against it. Residents of the “new city,” like myself, enjoy exclusive, racially marked, livable space at their peril, because it reveals the limits of our political imagination. Livability, as it is currently envisioned and practiced, betrays the absence of even attempts at a collective, though not unitary, urban “we” that animated theorists like Henri Lefebvre.

Though cycling remains marginal overall in American urban life, it looms large in a certain imaginary of the city, a fetish that in fact casts into relief the failures of an inclusive urbanism. In raising these critiques, I speak from a position in multiple groupings—cyclist, urban analyst, marginal gentrifier, white, male-gendered “millennial”—that rarely cohere into one identity. This dissertation is an attempt to splash my own eyes, and those of my fellow cyclist-advocates, with cold water. In the words of Iain Boal, I hope to play a small part in “set[ting] the bicycle back on the ground” (2000).
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A dissertation is a strange thing. It bears the name of a single author, who has toiled in isolation in order to give form to what is really a collective, reflexive, and social process. The list of people to whom I owe a debt of gratitude is truly vast.

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Vast portions of this were written at that critical “third space,” the café (and bar). I owe special thanks to the workers and proprietors at Arbor Café, Black Spring Coffee, Commonwealth, Pizzaiolo, and Rooz Café for their indulgence and caffination.

Mary Casper accompanied me at the start of this journey, and has remained a friend even after we parted ways. Steven Ellis, another East Coaster who made the trek westward, has been a stalwart friend. His tolerance of my habit of leaving books and chapter drafts strewn about our cramped apartment will not be forgotten.

Though I’m sure my family has often wondered what exactly I’ve been doing studying geography a continent away, they have been a source of constant support. My dad, Bill Stehlin, keeps in mind the various aspects of life—replacing car tires, keeping up on health insurance—that often fall by the wayside during graduate school. My mom, Cathy Caldwell, is more patient than she should be with my frequent harangues about capitalism, racism, and gentrification, and her sharp editorial eye encourages me to be not just a thinker but also a writer. My sister Kate reminds me in her own way that empathy may be a loftier goal than critique, a point easily lost in the academic world.

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Introduction: Vehicle for a New City

In 1989, the Worldwatch Institute published a paper entitled *The Bicycle: Vehicle for a Small Planet*, in which author Marcia Lowe argued that a broad, global shift to bicycle-powered mobility was key to addressing the compounding environmental ills of a world being rapidly taken over by the car (Lowe 1989). Around the same time, bicycles made an appearance in protests against the US invasion of Iraq, symbolically tying war in the Middle East to oil dependence at home. From San Francisco in 1992 came Critical Mass, an anarchic carnival of urban cyclists who used the act of bicycling to critique the world automobility has made, and spread thereafter to cities throughout the world (Carlsson 2002; Urry 2004). These events marked key moments in the beginning of the contemporary wave of North American “bike culture,” suffusing it with a grassroots, environmentalist, and specifically *urban* spirit that has beat a steady path to the mainstream ever since.

The completion of the federal highway system around the same time made unprecedented funding sources available for incorporating bicycle infrastructure into urban form. In 1991, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Equity Act (ISTEA) restructured federal transportation spending, devolving power over spending on non-motorized transportation to the municipal level and kicking off a dramatic though spatially uneven rise in federal bicycle and pedestrian spending (Pucher, Buehler, and Seinen 2011). Since 2000, 70 major U.S. cities have seen an aggregate rise in bicycle ridership of over 70% (League of American Bicyclists 2012). Annual spending obligations, channeled through newly created state bicycle-pedestrian coordinators, have risen from $22.9 million in 1992 ($38M in 2015 dollars) to over $800 million in 2014.¹ Total spending over this span of years exceeds $10 billion for over 31,000 individual projects.² Neither the burgeoning bike culture nor the modest realignment of federal transportation spending priorities can account for this growth, however. Rather, the explanation lies in how this bike culture became *urbanized*. Since the 1990s, bicycle enthusiasts and advocates have framed the city as their natural home, and for the first time have taken on a decisive role in reshaping it. In doing so they are crafting a persuasive vision for the American urban future, articulating an ethical need to transform the city that in the post-2008 era has fueled the proliferation of new models for urban economic growth.

Since the early 2000s, bicycling has gone from the cherished transportation mode of a countercultural fringe to knocking on the door of the mainstream. While funding for ¹ Yearly figures nonetheless constitute less than 1% of total federal disbursements for highways. See the FHWA Highway Statistics Series, available at: http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2010/2010disbchrt.cfm (accessed May 10, 2015).
bicycle and pedestrian projects still encounters fierce conservative opposition in state and federal politics (Schmitt 2011a), a growing number of actors in urban policy circles articulate the benefits that increasing ridership can have for social life, public health, ecological sustainability and, not least, economic growth. Cycling’s profile in cultural life has also risen dramatically, with bicycle clubs, organized rides, and ad-hoc gatherings proliferating, bike shops and bike-oriented businesses multiplying, and the presence of cycling in advertising now pervasive. On Bike to Work Day, one of professional bicycle advocacy’s most cherished rituals, mayors and city councilors can be found in photo-ops astride bicycles; some of them routinely cycle to work throughout the year as well. These developments coincide with a profound shift in the cultural value and economic importance of urban core areas in the “new economy” (Walker 2006) and the acceleration of gentrification as a generalized urban strategy (N. Smith 2002; Checker 2011; Causa Justa/Just Cause 2014).

Unlike the previous “bike boom” of the 1970s, when cycling for recreation was popularized by a nascent environmental movement, the current wave of enthusiasm for the bicycle takes remaking the city itself as its target. Urban boosters like Richard Florida factor cycling as a key characteristic of the “creative class” of value-producers in the knowledge economy, part of a more general trend that promotes creating amenities to attract a high-wage labor market, in turn stimulating economic growth (Florida 2011; Florida 2005). Over the past decade American cities large and small, from Cleveland to Tampa to New York, have installed bicycle infrastructure at a rapid pace. Under pressure to capitalize on the urbanist zeitgeist and attract the new pedal-powered creatives, planners in these cities also genuinely want to make better cities. More importantly, they have been pushed by politically active groups of cyclists in key cities, chief among them San Francisco, to place cycling on the urban agenda. While actual bicycle usage for transportation remains marginal, therefore, the bicycle looms large in the imaginary of the 21st century American city.

Why the bicycle?

This dissertation begins from a simple paradox: bicycling is cheap, but living where one can easily bicycle for daily needs tends to be expensive. This dynamic is not simply given by the technological characteristics of the bicycle or the social characteristics of its users. Rather, the reasons lie at the intersection of urban political economy, the cultural politics of space and place, and the socio-technological systems that facilitate mobility in the city. I examine three main dimensions of the most recent “renaissance” (Pucher, Buehler, and Seinen 2011) of the bicycle in urban space, focusing specifically on the San Francisco Bay Area as a region and the key urban centers of San Francisco and

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3 There is evidence that during the oil crisis of the 1970s, bicycle commuting was briefly but seriously considered as a solution. In Los Angeles, for instance, councilmember Pat Russell recommended cycling in the event of gas rationing, and a proposal was floated for turning the Los Angeles River into a bicycle path (Los Angeles Times 1972; Los Angeles Times 1973). At this time, however, there was no federal funding for the infrastructure required, and metropolitan expansion was still proceeding in the extensive mode, further working against cycle commuting.
Oakland within it. The first is how the bicycle has become an expression of a progressive environmentalist approach to individual mobility. The dominant discourse of the virtues of cycling was forged through its politicization by Critical Mass and ongoing war in the Middle East, and further fueled by rapidly growing horizontal networks of bicycle politics mediated by the Internet. The second is the way that disinvested urban space has become a key stage for alternative localist practices. These practices articulate with racialized dynamics of gentrification to politically empower an urbanist, white-dominated youth culture while marginalizing previous working class residents of color and their descendants. The third is how bicycle coalitions have collaborated with planning departments and certain fractions of the capitalist class to implement bicycle infrastructure in a manner congenial to capital accumulation. This is inscribing the bicycle into urban space in unprecedented ways.

In this sense, the bicycle links three salient features of neoliberal urbanism: 1) the individualization of urban mobility; 2) the rescaling of urban politics to the local level; and 3) the generalization of gentrification as a growth strategy. In other words, with flexible mobility the key to human capital competitiveness, mass forms of transportation appear wasteful. Similarly, cities must focus investment strategically on key sites within the broader urban fabric, drawing political action toward the sub-municipal and even corridor-level scale. Dependence on profit-driven infill development becomes a main form of ensuring competitiveness by attracting “talent”—a race-classed category—with amenities that erode and frequently erase diverse existing modes of urban life. But this “roll-out” neoliberalization (Peck and Tickell 2002) appears less as an imposed strategy than the increasing entanglement of attempts at emancipatory practice with the fragmented scales of mobility, political community, and economic development.

A guiding premise of this research is that the space of the bicycle—the “cyclescape” (Appadurai 1996)—is a social product, invested materially with relations of power (Lefebvre 1992). Moreover, space is not just the container for or reflector of social relations, but decisively shapes the forms they take. To paraphrase Marx, social agents produce and shape space, but rarely under conditions of their own choosing—and, to add to Marx, they do so with varying degrees of expertise, political power, and permanence. In the 1960s Henri Lefebvre declared that the urban was the critical site of the reproduction of capitalist social relations—the “survival of capitalism”—via the production of space. But he also insisted on the decisiveness of popular struggles to reshape space itself. The implications go beyond Lefebvre’s own assertions: I see urban space as the “shop floor” of a new epoch of capitalism, though the “old” epoch is still very much with us (Lefebvre 1976).

I argue that the bicycle acts as one pivot around which these questions turn. The recent history of the bicycle is an example *par excellence* of the struggle for “urban quality” (Castells 1983). The production of the urban space economy now *requires* the initiatives of grassroots politics for its vitality, even its content, both absorbing and rearticulating critiques of capitalist urbanism in the process (Mele 2000). Hence, the bicycle is far more than just an idea whose time has come, but far less of an urban panacea or a revolution in mobility than its mythology holds. Rather, it is a vector along which new practices of
mobility are developed and institutionalized even as they operate along well-worn pathways of social division. As Lefebvre notes, “[The] production of space, appears at the start; it must ‘operate’ or ‘work’ in such a way as to shed light on processes from which it cannot separate itself because it is a product of them” (Lefebvre 1992).

In the following chapters I explore how bicycle advocates, radical activists, “outlaw cyclists” (Carlsson 2008), and ordinary bike users have over the past two decades not only shaped policy toward bicycle infrastructure provision but made certain urban spaces their own. These actors collectively produce the cyclescape, although never under conditions of their own choosing. It would be an error to call this a simple triumph of popular activity “from below” against the automobile behemoth, though it is often read that way. The daily practice of cycling articulates with existing forms of social power, namely race, class, and cultural capital, to allow certain actors to hitch their interests to the official institutions of planning. Bicycle activists have made themselves a crucial part of governing the city (Foucault et al. 1991; Roy 2009a). In the process of enmeshing themselves with strategic sites within the municipal state itself, they have formed a bourgeois-progressive apparatus of the “integral state” (Gramsci 1971). This is not a solid object or a new urban sovereign. Rather, the relationships that ground the capacity to act upon the cyclescape are politically contingent, and are constantly made and remade. They mobilize certain practices of daily life itself as political technologies for reshaping the city.

Politically active cyclists, historically dominated by the white middle class, pursue their interests via increasingly mainstream bicycle advocacy organizations. They are enabled by their various race and class positions to swim with the stream of gentrification, (usually) without being displaced from the neighborhoods they hope to improve, even when they do not intend to profit from the process. Through this, cycling has gained a popular perception as being a white, middle-class urbanite practice, and bicycle infrastructure as simply an amenity for these social groups. At the same time, the bicycle has become a site of struggle over the meaning of race, class, gender, and age in the contemporary city, a key access point for situated critiques of power and subaltern attempts to recapture grasps on place that are eroding. Thus, the cyclescape does not reflect the placid unfolding of progressive environmentalism, enlightened localism, or genteel cosmopolitanism, but is, in fact, riven with contradictions that reflect and reinforce broader social divisions.

**Positionality and Methodology**

This research connects ethnography, participant observation, semi-structured and unstructured interviews, visual analysis, GIS and Census data examination, archival research and discourse analysis. I participated in social bike rides Critical Mass and Bike Party and the Sunday Streets open streets event extensively from 2010-2012. I interviewed key actors, attended planning meetings, and observed the spatial practices of other participants. I analyzed San Francisco and Oakland planning documents, including public comments recorded in appendices, and analyzed coverage and public discussions.
of bicycle planning on dozens of blogs, online social media, newspapers, and magazines from 2008-2014. I conducted over 30 recorded interviews with city planners and officials, bicycle advocates, activists, and non-profit employees, attended public meetings on streetscaping and advocacy plans in Oakland and San Francisco. Beyond formal interviews, dozens and dozens of fleeting encounters with fellow cyclists, motorists, and transit users gave me insights into the quotidian practices of urban mobility. I attended and presented research at the California Bike Summit and the National Association of City Transportation Officials (NACTO), engaging with mainstream planners and advocates in these venues.

I have spent years of my life developing the tacit knowledge that does not rise to the category of serious fieldwork but is indispensible for interpreting its results. I worked as a service mechanic from 2009 to the present at Box Dog Bikes, a worker-owned cooperative in the Mission District kind enough to allow me to work flexible, often sporadic hours. I did so not for inside access but to remain attuned to the subtleties of change in the cycling population and broader neighborhood context over these years. Moreover, I spent hours in the spaces where bike culture takes place: bike shops, cafes, parklets, mass transit and, most importantly, the street itself. I analyzed unspoken rituals of riding, deference to other road and transit users, defiance of other road and transit users, and practices of making space. I noted the styles, ages, quality levels, and repair conditions of bicycles, as well as styles of dress and accessorization. It is not insignificant that, like many participants in bike culture, I made these observations almost compulsively, with a “feel for the game” that predates the formal start of my research (Bourdieu 1984).

As with any line of inquiry, my interrogation of the class and race politics of bike culture is inspired by my own experiences as a legibly white, highly educated, and relatively low-wage bilingual bicycle mechanic and graduate student, residing in gentrifying frontiers in Philadelphia and Oakland. This introduction would therefore be incomplete if I did not also place myself within the *zeitgeist*. I was turned on to tinkering with bikes in 2002 by several friends at the fringes of bicycle messenger culture, anarchism, and the “anti-globalization” movement. They lived in “punk houses” full of itinerant, jobless, or underemployed (but often financially secure) mostly white youth in Richmond, Virginia. They engaged in cycling as a practical extension of an anticapitalist—or at least anti-petrochemical—politics, as well as form of oppositional identity. Like many in my generation of “millennials” now known for their urbanophilia (Newell 2013), after graduating college in 2004 I moved to an older, disinvested but “up-and-coming” neighborhood, in this case the old streetcar suburb of West Philadelphia. There, ramshackle Victorian houses rented cheaply, there was a strong do-it-yourself vitality among a mostly white counterculture, and bicycles were ubiquitous. This was just as Philadelphia was becoming known as the “sixth borough” of hyper-gentrifying New York, and the University City District, one of the largest land developers in the city, was rapidly colonizing the neighborhood. Though I owned a car, I used a bicycle for almost all tasks from commuting to grocery shopping. Almost every person in my group of friends, most of them white and in similar class positions, did the same.
As a young white resident of a largely African-American neighborhood in West Philadelphia that was rapidly changing, I experienced cycling as endowing me with an often-unwelcome visibility. Neither hidden by a windshield, nor anonymously on foot, as a cyclist I felt both exposed and fleeting, both a target of potential harassment and capable of evading trouble. Many of us, myself included, would likely not have lived in the coded “dangerous” area at the edge of the university district where we could afford the rent were it not for our bicycles, even if the “danger” in questions was nothing more than a racialized perception of vulnerability. At the same time, the visibility of the bicycle enabled us to easily identify our peers in an unfamiliar urban space, a mainly white, countercultural camaraderie on the urban “frontier” (N. Smith 1996).

The metonymic effect of my bicycle—in which my visibility as an incomer signified the broader experience of an onslaught of gentrification—ran counter to my experiences working as a mechanic at Via Bicycle, one of the oldest bike shops in downtown Philadelphia, known for selling low-cost used bicycles and performing inexpensive repairs. The owner was an irascible character from upstate New York named Curtis, a local fixture who had moved to Center City Philadelphia as a youth in the early 1980s during an early, limited wave of gentrification. By the early 2000s, the nearby historic Italian Market neighborhood was becoming a hub of Latino culture, absorbing the majority of Mexican and Salvadorian immigration to the city. A previous employee, a New Jersey native of Peruvian parents, was the shop’s first Spanish speaker, and by word of mouth we became the go-to location for non-English-speaking Latino cyclists. As a mostly fluent Spanish speaker, I took over the role of interpreter, and came to be known as the “güero”—“whitey,” mostly affectionately.

Our Latino customers worked primarily in food delivery, day labor, and back-of-the-house employment like dishwashing. Their chief tools of transportation were extremely inexpensive, poorly manufactured bicycles from Wal-Mart and Target that were in need of near-constant repair. This choice of machine was not, as some fellow mechanics or bicycle enthusiasts have imagined, based in ignorance. In fact, many of the Latino customers I came to know well had mechanical skills and had ridden and repaired bicycles in their hometowns—eventually, a few longtime customers opened their own shop, Bici-Mex, not far away. Because of their bicycles’ vulnerability to theft or damage, however, and a lack of available income to invest in better bikes, these cyclists used machines that required frequent repair and replacement. The shop also served longtime low-income residents, many of them older black men who had lived in downtown Philadelphia long before gentrification had made it attractive to white in-migrants. Former participants in Philadelphia’s cycle racing community of the 1980s, which was in fact substantially African-American, frequented the shop because of Curtis’ encyclopedic knowledge of and ability to service rare equipment from past decades. In other words, the shop was in no sense a uniform reflector of “bike culture,” but a hub of multiple cycling cultures and economic realities. We both benefited from steadily increasing business and suffered from steadily increasing rents, in a neighborhood that had just seen a furor over the arrival of a Whole Foods Market.

It was at this time that cities around the US began undergoing the synchronized
effects of a boom in cycling and a new wave of gentrification. This drew attention to the propensity for bicycle use among largely white newcomers to the city, particularly groups of “hipsters” who were flocking to gentrifying, cosmopolitan neighborhoods in urban cores. For these new residents, the bicycle was part and parcel of eschewing suburban fakery, symbolized by the car and the big box store, and the search for the imagined authentic city. The growing visibility of the bicycle’s footprint in gentrifying areas began to support an emerging commonsense notion that bicycling was a “white” activity.

Yet how could this claim be made, unless by ignoring the countless people of color continuing to use bicycles on a daily basis, for a variety of livelihoods that support but are not recognized as part of the new interest in the city? Who are the food deliverers, day laborers, dishwashers, and recycling collectors, disproportionately people of color commuting and working by bicycle, if not cyclists? Who were the veteran bicycle messengers, many of them people of color, whose aesthetics can be directly traced to West Indian cycle couriers in 1970s and 1980s New York, if not cyclists? Who were the many middle class people of color who rode bikes, if not cyclists? Were they in fact thus “white?” Or did “white” here function as a complex articulation of race, class, gender, and age, a set of practices and rituals that signified social power and required a constitutive outside to support them (Laclau and Mouffe 1985)? Who, for that matter, were the working class whites, less visible but nonetheless present, who used bicycles for daily mobility? In other words, how could a practice so manifestly diverse—cycling—become coded in such a limited way?

The rejection—signified by cycling—of automobility and the postwar suburban dream here performs a renunciation of the economic and social power of whiteness that was built by the highway and the suburb. These capacities are re-mobilized, however, to lay claim to racialized urban neighborhoods, whose disinvestment formed the foundations on which the postwar settlement was built. In doing so, they recapture urban space in the name of ecological and social life. This, as I elaborate below, is the crux of the bicycle’s reclassification from abject to virtuous, which operates through norms, practices, affects, symbols, and material places. These issues are only now beginning to be explored by planners, advocates, and academics. They raise a troubling issue for many supporters of cycling. The bicycle, and the infrastructure that supports its use, is not value-neutral, but shot through with power relations that are rooted in the racialization of urban space and investment over the course of the twentieth century.

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4 The use of the term “hipster” here denotes not a coherent identity but an epithet that references a perceived gap in cultural and economic capital between the utterer and the referent. I adopt this term for myself because it is key to how my movements through gentrifying space, especially by bike, are likely to be interpreted by others within the same social space. As Mark Greif argues:

I think the reason the attribution of hipsterness is always pejorative is that ‘hipster’ is actually identifying today a subculture of people who are already dominant. The hipster is that person, overlapping with declassing or disaffiliating groupings—the starving artist, the starving graduate student, the neo-bohemian, the vegan or bicyclist or skate punk, the would-be blue-collar or post-racial individual—who in fact aligns himself both with rebel subculture and with the dominant class, and opens up a poisonous conduit between the two (Greif 2010, 2).
In what follows, I situate myself as researcher within, not outside, the process of racialized gentrification itself, a position true of many gentrification researchers but not often discussed in gentrification research (Schlichtman and Patch 2014). To the extent that the following in part constitutes an ethnography of a “white” social world and an interrogation of whiteness, I take seriously Bonnett’s cautions regarding the line between research and reification (Bonnett 1996). Instead, I argue that the narrative of bicycling’s whiteness is constructed in the face of abundant evidence to the contrary. It emerges through the visibility that white-dominated social formations have achieved by appropriating cycling for ecological, social, and urbanist ends. My understandings of the bicycle’s sociality therefore draw on ethnographic observations made over many years, beginning long before my dissertation research, spent living within the gentrification process, in gentrifying space, as a white hipster very frequently astride a bicycle.

By problematizing the urbane whiteness of cycling, I keep in view the uses of the bicycle by people of color and working class cyclists that have been relentlessly erased by the dominant narrative of environmentalism, cosmopolitanism, and livability, which claims the bicycle as the most “civilized conveyance known to man” (Murdoch 1965). When cyclists of color are acknowledged, they are often thought of as using bicycles for need rather than by choice, and thus less “real” as cyclists. They are consistently framed as subjects of care, concern and outreach, “invisible cyclists” (Schmidt 2011) rather than political actors, though this narrative is beginning to erode thanks largely to the initiatives of cyclists of color themselves (T. Snyder 2013c).

While there have been increases in cycling among people of color (League of American Bicyclists 2013a), they tend to be framed a-spatially, as though mobility occurs on a plane uninscribed by historical-geographical unevenness and difference. Data availability contributes to this. Fine-grained measurements available through the Census count only commuting trips, while the National Household Transportation Survey (NHTS), which counts all trips, measures metropolitan area, regional, and national statistics. Only recently, however, has the spatial unfolding of cycling been taken seriously. Perhaps because of the obvious cost savings of cycling, little attention has been paid to how the cyclescape is formed out of urban space, often in tacit alliance with the forces rendering working class livelihoods more precarious. Gentrification does not only replace some residents with others through the “invisible hand” of the housing market. It also erodes a sedimented sense of place, struggled for and tenuously won in previous decades by primarily working and middle class people of color in places to which they were confined (Lipsitz 2011). Following Blomley, sedimented place constitutes a form of property that goes beyond the limits of the parcel; gentrification endangers it even when existing residents are not physically displaced (1998). The making of the cyclescape sets in motion new contests over property and belonging in these spaces, entangling cycling with the reproduction of whiteness and class position.

Sites and Processes

I draw most directly on research conducted in the San Francisco Bay Area, but
particularly because of the constant circulation of people and ideas that form bike culture itself, my analysis concerns fundamentally unbounded processes that link practices across space (Roy 2009b). The object of research—the site—brings geographically disparate places into relation, just as places are themselves the uniquely bundled relations between multiple spatial processes (Massey 1994).

With this in mind, I argue that the San Francisco Bay Area is a fertile node in these networked processes, with its own internal contradictions and exclusions. San Francisco, with a long radical environmentalist history (Walker 2008), is a birthplace of sorts for the contemporary politicization of cycling via the Critical Mass phenomenon, which began in 1992 as a collective irruption of cyclists into the Friday evening commute under the slogan “We Are Traffic!” (Carlsson 2002). Critical Mass, as a technique, initiated the practices that would characterize the development of contemporary networked bike culture. It derived its productivity from the relation between places set in motion through the medium of the bicycle. Fitting neatly into San Francisco’s countercultural reputation, the social formation spurred by Critical Mass also blended into the city’s equally well-deserved reputation for flexible work and freewheeling entrepreneurship. Critical Mass’ inventive disruption of automobility is not exactly an ancestor of the current discourse of “disruption” now thoroughly enshrined in Bay Area corporate culture (Lepore 2014). However, the notion of cyclists as agile and autonomous, outmaneuvering the weighty bureaucracies that support automobile domination, has had a lasting power, placing cycling on the ideological side of change, fluidity, and futurity.

The horizontal networks, between participants and cities alike, begun by Critical Mass now play a key role in a more formalized world of Internet-based “communities of consciousness” (Turner 2008) and expertise. Contemporary bike culture and planning practices alike could not exist as they do without the well-integrated network of online media connecting localized practices together into a coherent “structure of feeling” (R. Williams 1977) explicitly oriented around ecologically sustainable transportation and, increasingly over the past decade, economic development. A key dimension of this network consists of actors within city planning departments collaboratively learning from their peers in knowledge transfers facilitated by global design firms, consultants, and “rockstar” planners. Beyond simply bicycle mode share (the proportion of work trips conducted by bicycle), symbolic recognition of city leadership in this world relies on innovative infrastructure design and evidence of its contribution to economic growth. Novel methods of measuring progress and standardizing designs are generated in this mobile social space of “web capitalism” in the blogosphere, which connects advocacy

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5 It cannot be overstated that already present in Critical Mass is the articulation of certain forms of cycling practice as “bike culture,” to the exclusion of other ways of doing political cycling. The attachment of certain environmentalist and anti-authoritarian ethical commitments to cycling, as well as a practical dismissal of respectability politics and formal protest procedure, put emerging practices of urban whiteness to work in claiming the subalternity of cyclists.

6 This argument draws heavily on Turner’s comments regarding continuities between the organizational logic of the Whole Earth Catalog and the early tinkering communities of the World Wide Web (Turner 2008).
organizations, design firms, municipal governments, and ordinary cyclists (B. Anderson 2006). The cyclescape forms an emerging arena of interurban competition and a site where knowledge about the state of interurban hierarchy is made and circulated. Critically, the circulation of ideas through these networks does not simply connect technical experts into a smooth plane of policy transfer (Peck J. and Theodore N. 2010; McCann 2011; McCann and Ward 2012a). It also forms a self-conscious political community that gestates within the body of the old regime of automobility, democratizing street planning through distributed forms of expertise. These networks conjure expertise. Their quite radically circumscribed nature, however, forces us to question who constitutes the polis and the demos of this moment, and who is constituted as outside.

While statements about the bicycle’s futurity abound, its current position within the US mobility regime is best characterized by Gramsci’s statement that “the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (1971, 276). Car-dependent suburbs have lost some of their aspirational luster, and after 2008 many plunged in value, but even in the most bike-friendly cities no more than 6% of workers commute by bicycle. Nevertheless, certain political-economic dynamics associated with the changing geography of production create an opening for cycling to seem nearly hegemonic in certain places. San Francisco and Oakland are prime examples. Two booms in the information technology (IT) industry—1996-2001 and 2009-present—have spurred a rapid reorganization of the region’s race and class geography (Walker 2006; Schafran 2013). As San Francisco asserts its dominance in the innovation on which the tech economy feeds, it draws young, mobile, primarily white and Asian high-wage labor-power into concentrated proximity to work, becoming the most expensive housing market in the country in the process. But demand for the city alone cannot transform broad structures of transportation. The compression of the journey to work makes the bicycle a reasonable—but not automatic—mode of travel. Moreover, these transformations have begun to remake Oakland across the Bay, as San Francisco’s first- and second-stage gentrifiers decamp to relatively more affordable environs. Oakland’s absorption of these high-wage workers, skilled professionals, artists and other “creatives,” and front-of-the-store service industry employees already schooled in the virtues of cycling, has synchronized with a bicycle infrastructure boom there as well.

In each wave of investment, bicycle advocates have played a key role in shaping a new commonsense regarding the positive economic value of bicycle infrastructure investment. Advocates’ increasing sophistication in promoting of bicycle infrastructure as a boost to property values and an attractor of high-quality labor-power gives them sway with policymakers in ways that further entangle their efforts with dynamics of gentrification. The building of knowledge about the presumed political-economic causal powers of cyclists, originally a pragmatic approach to petty-bourgeois obstructionism, has taken on the status of a virtual truth. In the interest of economic growth, many city administrations and strategists now themselves mobilize the discourse bicycle advocates once authored from an oppositional standpoint.

These dynamics are neither confined to the Bay Area nor simply instances of general phenomena. Rather, they should be considered as part of a nodal process that
unfolds through the making of knowledge about cycling in particular places and at particular moments. The Bay Area is one place where the reconcentration of capital around non-routine, high-wage labor (Storper and Venables 2003) coupled with high-cost housing articulates with bicycle infrastructure provision as part of an emerging growth paradigm. In the core cities of the region, the stakes of achieving densification without congestion are high. In contrast to New York City, the Bay Area has high rates of car ownership and dramatically accelerated gentrification. With no comprehensive mass transportation system on the order of New York’s subway system, providing alternatives to automobility is essential to the redevelopment of core real estate, much of which predates widespread auto ownership. Though the region is known for its fertile bike culture, it also expresses in heightened form the contradictions of bicycle planning amid ongoing car dependence and explosive growth.

While booming San Francisco and Oakland mark the Bay Area as a cycling hotspot, the cycling is not actually widespread. Moreover, the geographic extent of the spaces actually being reshaped by cycling is quite small. Infrastructural victories in certain corridors become the discursive evidence supporting the bicycle’s benefit for the whole city. They act as proxies for the current urban renaissance as a whole. For instance, the remaking of Valencia Street in San Francisco’s Mission District in 1998, at a time of the corridor’s dramatic gentrification, formed an early pillar of the argument a commonsense within the circuits of advocacy: bikes mean business (Flusche 2012; People For Bikes 2013). Critically, the corridor here is the imagined scale both of political action and social engagement. This is the same scale as the on-the-ground production of space that constitutes gentrification. Locally, the successes of Valencia Street spurred further collaboration between advocates and planners, laying down an infrastructure-centric tendency within the advocacy world. Moving from antagonism to collaboration, bicycle activism now demands spatial transformations that have become valued as capitalist amenities.

At the same time, the economic crisis of 2008 spurred a reconcentration of capital investment in urban cores, as capital flight from the collapsing markets of the exurbs stranded first-time black and Latino homebuyers in underwater mortgages (Schafran 2013; Reid 2010). Meanwhile, foreclosures in urban cores created opportunities for financial institutions and individual capitalists to profit from the flow of highly-paid workers into the region (Steve King 2012). Thus, the operative scale of bicycle infrastructure investment—the urban corridor—has converged with that of re-urbanizing capital, while the expanded scale of the region produced by the subprime lending bubble is being selectively whittled away. In the new celebration of the bicycle and the city, the corridor comes to stand in metonymically for the health of the city itself. In other words, the Bay Area is a key site where the run-down of exurban growth has made the urban core an ever more profitable and elastic frontier, as well as a target of both local and

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7 The 2009-2013 American Community Survey (ACS) estimated that, in San Francisco and Oakland, 3.5% and 2.6% of workers bicycled as their main commute mode, respectively. The 2013 1-year ACS, which is moderately reliable for larger geographies, estimated 3.9% and 3%, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau 2013c; U.S. Census Bureau 2013d).
regional planning.

A broader question this dissertation addresses is: why the bicycle, and why now? In other words, why has the push to “green” American cities seized upon the promise of individualized “active transportation,” seemingly a consolation prize for a lack of improvement in mass transit networks? To what historical conjuncture does the emergence of the bicycle as a possible solution to the problems facing American cities speak? To whom do the collective use-values of the city belong, whose solutions have an opportunity to be heard, and whose collective manifestations have practical effects? I undertake this work on the premise that existing choice-based narratives—growing environmentalist consciousness of “peak oil,” the social anomic of suburbanization, desire for a more human scale of urban life, and the inherent sustainability of the bicycle itself—fail to grasp how the specific ways that cycling has grown attend deep shifts in the material geographies of race-class, capital, and mobility. In other words, no amount of individual or cultural drive to instantiate environmentalist practice in daily life through the bicycle would have resulted in the growth of cycling without the political opening of racialized disinvestment and ensuing gentrification. Nor, however, is bicycling simply an expression of capital’s long march back to the city. It is a practice that both attempts to address and reinscribes the contradictions of contemporary American urbanism. In this sense, much of the growing bike culture is an attempt to practice an emancipatory relationship with technology and place that is also entangled with capitalist efforts to remake the urban space economy. In what follows, these moments will be held in tension conceptually just as they are materially in daily practice.

Reference Points and Relevant Literatures

The following section identifies three relevant literatures among which the dissertation will draw connections: 1) the politics of bike culture, 2) the embodied dimensions of urban space, and 3) neoliberalism, gentrification and the discourse of livability. This sequence mirrors the way I intend to use the bicycle to open outward onto its broader implications. These are the main entry points for this analysis, but not the only bodies of thought on which I will draw. Furthermore, each acts as a “dense transfer point,” in Michel Foucault’s terms (1978), allowing us to trace connections to other theoretical traditions. This review necessarily schematic, and the fuller connections will be fleshed out in the chapters that follow.

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8 San Francisco’s black southeastern neighborhoods, for instance, have been subject to continuous service cuts and fare evasion patrols. Business owners in Berkeley shot down a bus rapid transit (BRT) plan for the city’s axial artery, delaying the project’s extension into Oakland’s impoverished eastern neighborhoods (Allen-Taylor 2011).

9 Indeed, the explosion in cycling in the 1970s in many ways dwarfs today’s current renaissance. For instance, 1973 was the year of highest per-capita unit sales of bicycles in the United States (National Bicycle Dealers Association 2013). As noted above, however, the “bike boom” had little effect on patterns of urban settlement or land use practices.
Politics, Technology and Public Policy: The State of Bicycle Scholarship

Not surprisingly, with the dramatic growth in bike culture has come a spike in intellectual inquiry into the subject, much of it by cyclists. The bulk of this work falls into two main categories: first, the culture of cycling and bicycle activism; and second, studies of bicycle infrastructure and urban ridership. In the chapters that follow, I will attempt to speak across these themes, linking the political use, sociotechnical history, and planning practices relating to the bicycle to broad structural changes in North American cities. To be specific about the proposed linkage: the politicized appropriation of the street by cyclists, most visible in Critical Mass, has identified the machine itself as inherently progressive. This creates a political opening for mainstream bicycle advocates to assume a more formal role in shaping urban space for cycling.

The literature that most directly deals with the politics of cycling tends to reproduce dominant narratives of the bicycle’s inherent progressive politics. Nevertheless, it is an indispensable point of departure for analyzing the relationship between left politics and bicycle culture, and forms a rich archive of on-the-ground cycling practice. Explorations of the politics of cycling are anchored by reflections on Critical Mass and most prominently found in two volumes, both edited by Chris Carlsson, a founding participant (2002; with Elliott and Camarena 2012). Other noteworthy examples include Jeffrey Ferrell’s Tearing Up the Streets: Adventures in Urban Anarchy (2001) and Zachary Furness’ One Less Car: Bicycling and the Politics of Automobility (2010; see also 2005). Both situate the bicycle in the context of a longer history of left politics, from 1930s socialist cycling clubs to 1960s Dutch anarchism, and a broader context of other urban insurrectionary practices like skateboarding and graffiti. They also illustrate the palpable influence of post-1960s anarchism on the politicization of cycling.

Since the late 2000s, an explosion of enthusiastic popular writing on the positive impact of cycling has occurred, as the bicycle storms the gates of the liberal urban mainstream. Jeff Mapes’ Pedaling Revolution (2009) and J. Harry Wray’s Pedal Power: The Quiet Rise of the Bicycle in American Public Life (2008) trace the growth of bike culture and its significance for environmental sustainability, social renewal, and economic vitality through journalistic case studies. Much of the writing in this vein also has strong ties to the world of online publishing, alternative print media, and underground music. Eben Weiss, the widely read blogger behind BikeSnobNYC, turned his incisive and hilarious sociological dissections of bike culture into a successful pair of books. Portland-based bicycle activist Elly Blue published Bikenomics: How Bicycling Can Save the Economy (2013), based on a series of posts on Grist.com on the personal economics of cycling. The book was released on the Microcosm Press imprint, a publisher of punk and subcultural books and zines. Amy Walker, co-founder of the Canadian bike culture lifestyle magazine Momentum, authored On Bicycles: 50 Ways the New Bike Culture Can Change Your Life (2011). Well-known musician David Byrne of the foundational art-rock band Talking Heads released the widely acclaimed Bicycle Diaries (2010). Mia Birk, founder of the consulting and bikeshare system planning firm Alta Planning + Design, wrote Joyride: Pedaling Toward a Healthier Planet (2010). These titles all share a sense of the joy, elegance, ethical rectitude, and emancipatory potential of cycling, as well as the sense that the city is its fundamental
home. These books argue that bicycles might be used for weekend escapes, but they are fundamentally tools of daily life, and only the density of the city makes them practical as such. The transformative potential of the bicycle is thus equated with that of urban society itself.

As noted, while these texts have been indispensable for thinking about the politically progressive role of cyclists in North America, they have often less carefully interrogated its contradictions. For writers like Carlsson, urban cycling is a site for reimagining the possible modes of reproduction outside of the framework of capitalism (de Certeau 1984, 25). This framing places bicycling alongside guerrilla gardening and other acts of “hacking” the dominant code of capitalist modernity, opening up new ways to rethink the politics of class and labor outside of the circuits of commodification (Carlsson 2008).10 Ferrell sounds a similar tone, affirming the inherently transgressive capabilities of the bicycle—the cyclist can choose when to follow the law or break it, and unlike the motorist is less constrained by the technical capacities of the object itself and how it is legally regulated (2001). Furness has also focused on bicycle repair cooperatives, now a common feature of urban bike cultures, as sites of nonhierarchical expertise sharing across social difference (2010). Few of these texts grapple with how outsider practices, which innovate new forms of making place that produce biopolitical value, relate to dominant structures of urban political economies (cf. Hardt and Negri 2011). Still fewer examine how outsider status articulates with racial and class power at the gentrification frontier, where black and Latino neighborhoods form the conditions for innovation but their inhabitants are disproportionately affected by fiscal discipline and police violence. The subcultural basis of gentrification is well-acknowledged (D. Rose 1984; Godfrey 1988; Zukin 1989; N. Smith 1996; Mele 2000). However, the effects of public practices of claiming road space is somewhat new, and it is here that cycling decisively shapes the senses of place that are mobilized in struggles over use-value and exchange-value in urban space. This is a gap in current theorization of subcultural urban innovation that I explicitly aim to fill.

The last field, exploring bicycle planning practice and the bicycle’s increasingly visible role in urban policy, is fast-growing. Key authors in this vein are John Pucher, Ralph Buehler, and Jennifer Dill, who compare the efficacy of bicycle planning practice across various cities in North America. This is the most authoritative work on the relationships between bicycle infrastructure and rates of cycling (Buehler and Pucher 2012; Pucher, Buehler, and Seinen 2011; Pucher and Buehler 2012; Dill and Voros 2007; Dill 2012). National organizations such as the League of American Bicyclists (LAB), Rails to Trails Conservancy (RTC), Alliance for Biking and Walking (ABW), Bikes Belong (a partnership between the LAB and the ABW), local/regional advocacy groups like the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition (SFBC), WalkSF, Livable City, Walk Oakland Bike Oakland (WOBO), and the transportation authorities of various cities produce grey literature that falls into this category as well. More than the others outlined above, debates in this field

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10 There are strong parallels with computer hacker culture, but more materially it’s important to recall the role of computer tinkerers in the region’s countercultural left that became the dominant current within the libertarian, hyper-capitalist tech economy (Turner 2008).
frequently take place on Internet sites such as Streetsblog, Atlantic Cities, Next City, CityLab, BikePortland, Grist, People for Bikes, as the readerships of these sites and the population of transportation, public health, and community development planners substantially overlap.

Pucher and Buehler orient their interventions toward the field of planning expertise, adopting many of the normative assumptions of the field regarding urban policy and economic growth. Despite periodically acknowledging that bicycle infrastructure and ridership concentrates in gentrifying areas, they do not examine the race and class dimensions of urban cycling. A great deal of inquiry in this vein also ranks cities according to growth in cycling, miles of bicycle infrastructure, and rates of investment, among other indicators. This tends to reproduce an urban hierarchy explicitly oriented towards emulating the vaunted cycling scenes of northern European cities like Copenhagen and Amsterdam, the populist mobility regimes of Bogotá, and rising domestic stars like New York, Chicago and Boston (League of American Bicyclists 2013b; Buehler and Pucher 2012). Almost invariably, celebrations of American cities focus on key neighborhoods where cycling is said to have an impact.

More critical work along these lines traces obstacles to implementing goals for increasing bicycle use, gender and race disparities, and political conflicts over infrastructure projects. Even within this subfield, however, most writing on difference has been devoted to gender and cycling, framing women as an “indicator species” whose absence signals a failure of infrastructure design (Mirk 2009; Mirk 2012; Blue 2011b; Schmidt 2011; Schmitt 2011b; Lugo and Mannos 2012). The indicator species discourse trucks in assumptions about feminine fragility that obfuscate the sociospatial contradictions, such as the disproportionate burdens of social reproduction, that drive gendered differences in rates of cycling (Blue 2011b). Until quite recently, race and class have received less attention (League of American Bicyclists 2012b; T. Snyder 2013a; although see de Place 2011), and though attention to them is growing they remained stubbornly under-theorized. Some attempts to deal more seriously with race and class in fact point toward these gaps. For example, Eric de Place, researcher at the Sightline Institute, notes through data analysis that bicycling, though white-dominated, is in fact trending towards racial parity, yet is popularly perceived as part of racialized gentrification (de Place 2011). Yet these national-level statistics hide the regional changes that have thrust white cyclists into the public eye through the notoriety of certain cities and neighborhoods. Thus, what requires exploration is how knowledge is produced about cycling in ways that both depend on and occlude the racialization of space through which the bicycle renaissance has unfolded.

Instead, issues of race and class in bicycling have been forced by events on the ground, not in the academy, especially situations in which bicycling’s “whiteness” has been contested by cyclists of color. A growing cohort of scholars, in which I count myself, has begun to examine urban transformations spurred by cycling both critically and sympathetically, as symptoms of a complex restructuring of place and mobility underway in American cities. As Adonia Lugo has shown in the context of Los Angeles, the embodied infrastructures of skill sharing, collective learning, and solidarity through which
cycling practice is shaped are not evenly concretized in the physical infrastructures of the street. In short, infrastructural investments are undertaken for the benefit of some cyclists, young, typically white in-migrants, and not for others, particularly black, Latino and Asian residents who cycle out of need (Lugo 2013a). As desire-based trips shorten through gentrification, need-based trips may lengthen due to displacement. Melody Hoffman has argued, in a complementary vein, that bicycle infrastructure in Minneapolis was candidly intended to attract “creative” in-migrants rather than to serve the needs of existing lower-income residents. At the same time, cycling forms the basis of complex forms of intentional community in a Milwaukee neighborhood that in many ways subverts the norm of segregation in that city (Hoffman 2013). These scholars and others (Morhayim 2012; Spinney 2014; Horton 2006) have pushed the boundaries of critical work on mobility and the urbanization of cycling practice in productive ways, lending considerable weight to critiques of the livable city. My intervention here connects the transformations that have attended gentrification to the development of the discourse of economic development and racialization that now form an emerging commonsense about the bicycle.

These connections are sorely needed. Practices on the ground, in which many of the above scholars participate, have forced shifts in thinking about the relationships between race, bicycling, and urban space. At the level of national policy, the League of American Bicyclists has recognized a serious need for greater inclusion in the advocacy movement, and in 2013 appointed the Equity Advisory Council, which was composed of high-profile advocates of color.11 This occurred partly in response to pressure from groups like Washington, D.C.’s Black Women Bike, Red Bike and Green in Oakland, Chicago and Atlanta, and Oakland Spokes in Oakland, as well as advocacy work in cities like Los Angeles with Latino “invisible cyclists” (T. Snyder 2013c). But it also responded to the ways that resistance to gentrification in Portland, D.C., and Brooklyn have at certain points been made explicitly about bicycle infrastructure. In 2010, parishioners in black North Portland, the city’s only African-American neighborhood, protested a bike lane project as a “white lane,” successfully altering the project and the process of community participation in planning (Letson 2012). The same year, rhetoric in the DC mayoral primary turned on “dog parks and bike lanes” as a narrative pinning gentrification amid rising black unemployment on sitting mayor Adrian Fenty (Schwartzman and Jenkins 2010). These and other events put the question of race on the table for a historically white-dominated bicycle movement.

The influence of Latin American sustainability urbanism looms large in the current moment as well, but its translation to the US reality is strikingly incomplete. Former Bogotá mayor Enrique Peñalosa, and his brother Gil, for instance, have had a direct and powerful effect on the discourse of bicycle planning at multiple scales. Collaborating with mayors and local advocates as well as national organizations, Gil Peñalosa’s 8-80 Cities non-profit, based in Canada, wields considerable influence on policy surrounding cycling, walking, and bus rapid transit. Under Enrique Peñalosa’s

11 The council itself has an unclear mission, and reflects more of a tokenist approach to inclusion along lines of race and class, despite the hard work of the advocates themselves.
leadership, Bogotá’s pioneering ciclovías, or open streets events, were direct antecedents to similar events in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Minneapolis. However, the brothers’ public discourse, foregrounding issues of equality and rights to space, is often at odds with the uptake of cycling policy as an essential component to current forms of gentrification. For instance, *Streetsblog San Francisco* and *El Tecolote*, a Mission District Latino newspaper, reported a speech by Enrique Peñalosa in October 2014 in rather different ways. The former focused on his arguments about bicycles and buses’ rights to the street; the latter emphasized his conviction that the state should actively intervene in the housing market to slow gentrification (Bialick 2014b; Posada 2014). In many contemporary US cities, there is strong political commitment to the former, and almost none to the latter. Thus, the moment of Colombian influence gains *traction* in North America through its articulation of livability as a public good, but lacking the commitment to economic justice that was a crucial component of its viability in Bogotá itself.

The current platform of American bicycle advocacy, with some minor deviations, holds *both* to aggressive promotion of the economic benefits of bicycle infrastructure investment *and* recognition of the need for greater diversity and outreach. Little attention is paid to the ways in which these come into direct contradiction through the process of gentrification. Furthermore, the focus on streetscape changes as levers of broader social action, while it should not be dismissed, tends to naturalize the unwillingness of city governments to discipline the private space-economy. What emerges is a politics of urban mobility that rearticulates the demands of its radical influences into a liberal space of pluralism.

*Spatial Practices and Marked Bodies*

A key point of departure in this research is that through a complex process of articulation, categories of race, class, and gender are mapped onto practices and spaces. Moreover, the *political* significance of cycling has changed through these shifting articulations. The image of the bicycle has shifted from a vehicle of last resort—and thus signifying racialized urban poverty—to an expression of post-carbon freedom—making visible the reinvigoration of urban space by the return of the largely white middle class. These changes speak to how political meanings get affixed to technological objects in ways that depend critically on how and *where* they are used, as well as *who* uses them.

This highlights the importance of the bicycle as a technological object. Bicycles are a favored case study in the social construction of technology (SCOT) framework, particularly Wiebe Bijker’s foundational texts. These focus on the “normalization” of bicycle design that occurred between the 1880s and the 1890s, as a chain drive enabled the development of the “safety bicycle” with two equally sized wheels, which supplanted the riskier “ordinary” and put cycling within the reach of a broader group of riders (1997; 2012). Bijker and others, including Furness, also focus on the gendered aspects of the new

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12 Bill DeBlasio’s New York is a significant exception, though it is too soon to evaluate his stated goals of disciplining capital accumulation.
design. The 1890s saw an explosion in women’s cycling and a reinterpretation of the social significance of riding astride the machine (rather than “sidesaddle” on a horse), with undeniable implications for women’s social position. For this reason Susan B. Anthony accorded it a causal role in women’s empowerment (Oddy 1996). More critical work has also emerged regarding this period, such as that by Iain Boal, whose social history of the emergence of the bicycle and the car from the “bestiary” of late Victorian technologies rejects a tidy binary between the self-powered motion of the cyclist and the motorcar driver (2000; 2012). Boal exhorts advocates to “set the bicycle back on the ground,” removing it from its virtuous pedestal and returning it—perhaps for the first time—to the realm of real objects embedded in messy social relations (2000).

The socio-technical meaning of cycling is far from decided, despite a consensus that the Victorian era as the time when the bicycle was standardized as an object. Work situated in the present has increasingly focused on the experiential dimension of cycling, whether as commuter or hardened cycle messenger (Kidder 2011; Fincham 2006; Spinney 2009). But little has been done until very recently to examine how the materiality of the machine intersects with the forces of urban political economy, planning expertise, and racial formation. The SCOT framework, applied instead to the street itself as a technology whose reconfiguration enabled the rise of automobility in the 1920s (Norton 2011), offers a useful perspective that I will harness to analyze technologies of mobility together with those of spatial order. Mimi Sheller and John Urry frame automobility as a large-scale, holistic sociotechnical system that encompasses the production, distribution, and consumption of cars and related support networks, as well as its cultural, environmental and political dimensions (Sheller and Urry 2000). This system is characterized by a “coercive flexibility” (Urry 2004, 28) shaped by the past century of extensive urban growth, which has enabled geographically massive labor markets and large distances between home, work, and leisure. As Norton argues, a key support of this coercive flexibility is the technology of the street itself. Unlike in Amsterdam and Copenhagen, the visual models of bicycle hegemony, American planners have almost completely avoided confrontation with this vast complex, turning fitfully instead toward site-specific interventions on streets at key nodes in the urban fabric. Here, the politics of a successor technology—the human-scale street—instead operate through inducing the proper self-conduct of urban subjects (Haraway 1998; Maniates 2002; Braun 2014).

The coercive flexibility of the street, for which the automobile or automobile-like vehicle is most ideally equipped, strongly influenced the “vehicular cycling” movement, expounded most forcefully by Stanford engineer John Forester. Since the 1970s, vehicular cyclists (VCs), the dominant social bloc of the League of American Wheelmen (later League of American Bicyclists), encouraged cyclists to behave as much like motor vehicles as possible, actively fought against separate infrastructure for bicycle use, and politically supported car-centric road-building (Forester 2012). Until the 1990s, vehicular cycling proponents—disproportionately white, professional and male in a cycling world that was already skewed in those directions—were the most visible bicycle advocates, vigorously promoting individual norms of conduct that reflected a deep modernist bias towards efficient movement. The infrastructure-centric turn toward the Dutch model of livability
is a partial reaction to this tradition. But the socio-technical construction of cities through the automobile has left deep grooves of practice that are only beginning to be undone, chief among them the fetish of the technological object as both the source of urban malaise (the car and highway) and its solution (the bike and livable street).

Within cycling discourse, the highway-car sociotechnical system is understood to be the chief violator of an idealized early 20th century convivial urban fabric. But few interpreters of cycling in the current moment, and the piecemeal attempts to roll back automobility’s destruction of urban places, have understood highways as the fundamentally racial projects they were. As Robert Bullard has argued, transportation investment historically enabled white mobility while circumscribing and impoverishing the mobility of people of color, African-Americans in particular (Bullard, Johnson, and Torres 2004; Bullard 2013). In the second half of the 20th century, dense, multi-racial working class neighborhoods like West Oakland and the Bronx became transportation infrastructure dumping grounds (Self 2003; Berman 1982). Highways destroyed livelihoods, housing units, and property values, increased health hazards, and promoted extreme race-class segregation. Easy transportation by automobile facilitated—but did not cause—capital flight from central cities, in the form of residential, office, and industrial growth in the suburbs. Moreover, the combination of the car, the single-family house, and the quiet suburb was part of an aspirational economy which, though founded on exclusionary whiteness, produced a set of normative expectations regarding middle class status (Jackson 1987; Sugrue 2005; Freund 2010). We still live with the consequences of a social construction of whiteness that was invented in and by the suburb (Roediger 2005).

The devastation wrought by highway development was selective at a remarkably fine spatial grain. In the Bay Area, San Francisco’s “freeway revolt” of the late 1950s led by a white populist movement in the western neighborhoods prevented a large-scale plan to cover the city in elevated freeways, though they were still inflicted on the working class southeastern neighborhoods (Issel 1999; Walker 2008). A coalition of environmentalists and property owners prevented freeway access to Marin County in the 1960s, preserving it as a bucolic white enclave with strong growth controls (Dyble 2007). Meanwhile, Oakland’s working class African-American and Latino neighborhoods were ravaged by freeway development from the 1950s to the 1970s (Self 2003), and runaway industrial development in Santa Clara County spurred freeway growth down the east side of the Peninsula (see Stewart, Bacon, and Burke 2014; Saxenian 1984). The creation of the Bay Area Rapid Transit system also unevenly shaped capacities for mobility, destroying housing and businesses in West Oakland and the Mission District while creating development opportunities in Contra Costa and Alameda counties and facilitating the commutes of white office workers. With the explosive growth of the inland Bay Area, highway development continues, connecting new exurbs to older “edge cities” (Garreau 1991) in a massive lattice of urbanization. Crucially, the infrastructure that supports the socio-technical complex of automobility outlined by Urry (2004) is fundamentally racialized.

As private, dispersed transportation by automobile became a national norm from
the 1950s onward, urban mass transportation in turn became “differentially racialized” (Pulido 2006) through its increased usage by working class and poor people of color (Kirouac-Fram 2012; Pucher and Renne 2003). The bus was especially coded in this way by its association with urban poverty and its role as place of subaltern congregation and sociability. As a technology of movement the bus represents race. Moreover, mass transit systems can take on the identities of the places they connect. Some bus and subway lines have different “racial” identities; failing to match the embodied expectations of the space may render the rider as unusually visible as “matter out of place” (Douglas 1966) as a pedestrian traversing a differently racialized neighborhood. Beyond their identification with sluggishness, confinement, and disorder, buses also represent a fundamental lack of freedom. Bus riders are rarely “choice riders,” depending instead on a mode of transportation uniquely susceptible to delays. Bus ridership is inversely correlated with income, while other transportation systems, particularly commuter rail, correlate positively with income (Garrett and Taylor 1999). Bus service is consistently subject to cuts, while investment is on the rise in light rail and other systems intended to attract choice riders. Moving through urban space is thus an important site where race, class, and gender are made.13

This points to the more general ways that different affective experiences of urban space are organized by and implicated in different technological arrangements of mobility. Furthermore, the parsing of commuters along lines of choice indicates a differential valuation of this dimension. As cracks begin to form in automobility, with far-flung suburbs and long commutes losing their, the experience of urban space has been reframed as an object of design and something technology can improve. The return of attention to designing the urban street as a social space is in part a recovery through technological means of what has been lost in the long binge of automobility. But the uneven development of the technological basis of a new urban milieu also identifies the ways that some desires are differently organized to matter in urban space along lines of race and class. The tentative construction of a successor system of mobility has proceeded from the identification of choice with market demand to identify the spatial arrangements most conducive to attracting valued populations.

The contemporary valued urban dweller is essentially an analogue of Walter Benjamin’s figure of the flâneur. For Benjamin, drawing on Baudelaire, the flâneur represented a peculiarly modern orientation towards urban space as a place of visual consumption. The flâneur is a male bourgeois subject who drifts through the consumer spaces of the city, feasting on modernity’s bounty with the eyes. But despite Benjamin’s sensitivity to the role of objects in social life, the flâneur typically appears, particularly in the work of Benjamin’s interlocutors, as a disembodied subject instead of as a form of practice called into being by the rapid reorganization of urban space. The proliferation of

13 Here again, Enrique Peñalosa looms large, having presided over Bogotá’s influential Transmilenio bus rapid transit (BRT) system. As noted above, Peñalosa frames mobility as an issue of economic justice. By contrast, the adoption of BRT in the United States foregrounds the creation of an aspirational brand for systems in development, to indicate a “premium-type service” and distinguish it from the plain old racialized bus (Federal Transit Administration and United States Department of Transportation 2004, sec. 2).
shopping districts, such as Paris’ Arcades, were the material basis for this new form of seeing, and being, in urban space. Moreover, extraordinarily mundane technologies of space like sidewalks play a critical role in supporting these forms of subject formation. The flâneur reappears in the contemporary city as an elusive and potent figure. Much like Michel de Certeau’s pedestrian, the consumer of urban space itself is understood to evade the rigid, hierarchical ordering of space, seeking experience and pleasure. There are strong parallels with contemporary bike culture here (Lugo 2013a). As noted above, the cyclist is popularly framed as undermining the bureaucratic rigidity and the burdensome costs of automobility, while recapturing fundamental freedom of mobility in urban space. Following De Certeau (1984), the popular understanding of cycling is analogous to the perruque, in which the tools of capitalist order—the technological configuration of the street itself—are turned against it with the aid of a simple emancipatory technology. Again, the bicycle appears to have an inherent subversive politics.

These notions are intimately tied to the retaking of urban space currently underway. Jon Caulfield (1989), drawing on Barthes, makes a claim for the role of the “ludic,” the exploration of the senses, in the process of gentrification, in which urban space plays a critical role in the constitution of selves and practices that are other than routine. The work of bohemian, artistic, countercultural, and anti-normative currents in settling and culturally valorizing disinvested urban space are critical in the first wave of gentrification (Godfrey 1988; Mele 2000). Today, this extends to the rejection of normative modes of mobility, with older urban cores the logical places where this is practical. Bike culture is in part the cultural world that supports and gives meaning to this. But it’s important to recall that “culture” is not composed simply of sentiments that exist in the ether, but material practices and relations to objects. The self-craft of bike culture is so intimately tied to the machine itself—its very specific material aspects—that no amount of conceptual effort can separate the self from the object. Cyclists are fundamentally cyborgs whose particular characteristics endow them with capacities for mobility and position them within a web of commodity production, distribution, and consumption, with all of the dimensions of subject formation this entails (Haraway 1998). The accessibility of the bicycle, its simplicity of use and repair, and its minimal regulation by the state have historically made cycling useful to the working poor. These features increasingly serve, however, the mobility patterns of new urban core residents who choose cycling as an expression of individualized environmentalism and a convenient and authentic way to navigate the city. The shifting sociotechnical meanings of cycling thus have very concrete material outcomes in urban space. Furthermore, just as these forms of difference are written upon the body, so they are written upon the machine itself by finely grained distinctions in a bicycle’s quality, repair condition, riding position, aesthetic elements, and even fit. The reorganization of urban space to create the nascent elements of a functioning cyclescape can be seen as a partial attempt to unite the spatial milieu with the embodied qualities of the cyclist-as-flâneur.

Livability, Gentrification and the Urban Aesthetic

These dimensions of cycling’s “renaissance,” particularly the material signification
of a new way of life, intersect powerfully with the new wave of gentrification currently underway in North America. Gentrification is now no longer the sporadic conquest of disinvested neighborhoods but a process enshrined in both economic and environmental policy (N. Smith 2002; Checker 2011; Whitehead 2003). In Ruth Glass’ original definition, gentrification constituted the replacement of working class populations with higher income residents through the upgrading of the built environment (Glass 1964). Dating to almost the same period as the growing reaction against mid-century urban high modernism, gentrification has over the course of the past fifty years become tightly articulated with the livability discourse in a way that renders the two nearly impossible to disentangle. Livability has now become a key spatial component to capitalist urban investment and a branding aesthetic in its own right, in a way that has eroded, but not extinguished, the more egalitarian impulses of many of its practitioners. This does not mean that livability, and the bicycle as a chief dimension of it, is an utterly compromised ideological veneer to capitalist development. Rather, it represents a contradictory site where genuine needs for a more human streetscape and less alienating mobility enter the production of urban space as a resource for capital accumulation. Moreover, it is a site where the politics of the urban future are made through activities that re-signify value in urban space as well as attempt to claim something beyond it. It represents the murky everydayness of growth machine politics, not the imposition from above of the grid of capital.

Some of the foundational statements influencing contemporary livability discourse can be found in Jane Jacobs’ *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. Writing in 1961, Jacobs relentlessly attacked the dominant orthodoxy of city planning, represented by her enemy Robert Moses, who leveled entire neighborhoods of New York, San Francisco, and other cities in the name of rational spatial organization and combating “blight.” With the pithy analogy that planning was to urbanism as bloodletting is to medicine, she pointed to the “intricate sidewalk ballet” of ordinary residents in tight-knit neighborhoods as the foundation of urban vitality (J. Jacobs 1992, 12, 50). The sociospatial features of these neighborhoods—the informal self-policing of “eyes on the street” rather than official control, the role of small commercial establishments and their “public characters,” and old buildings’ essential role of providing sanctuary for new ideas at low costs (ibid. 1992, 68, 188)—for Jacobs render official planning not only irrelevant but dangerous to city life. Marshall Berman would echo her critiques a generation later in *All That is Solid Melts into Air*, while critiquing her idealization of the Capra-esque white ethnic neighborhood. Berman’s Bronx, to which Moses took the proverbial meat ax, did not have the recourse to white social power that Jacobs’ Hudson Street did (Berman 1982).

Fifty years later, however, Jacobs’ ideas offer ideological support for a new wave of gentrification that has recapitalized urban cores once seen as beyond salvation. “Building like Moses, but with Jacobs in mind!” has become official practice in New York City: to deliver through high modernist expertise the small-scale livability of the parochial urban enclave (Larson 2013). To be fair, the idea that old buildings in dense, mixed-use, mixed-income neighborhoods could ever again command high rates of investment and high prices was virtually unfathomable for Jacobs’ time (Klemek 2011). By the late 1970s,
however, a new generation of post-Moses planners like Donald Appleyard, Kevin Lynch, Jan Gehl, and Allan Jacobs, were learning from the urban struggles of the 1960s and the emerging environmentalist movement. This current was especially strong in the Bay Area, where growth control had an early foothold (Walker 2008). These planners reinterpreted the city by claiming not just a sociocultural but an economic value for densely settled, vibrant, and diverse urban centers in which street space was given over to more ad hoc forms of human sociability. Writers like Ivan Illich, Theodore Roczak, and E.F. Schumacher added their appreciation of small-scale technologies to the cultural ferment. In 1981’s *Livable Streets*, Appleyard put ideas traceable to Jacobs into a set of best practices for making streets convivial spaces rather than high-speed car thoroughfares (Appleyard, Gerson, and Lintell 1981; A. Jacobs and Appleyard 1987). Two generations on, Jacobs-inspired planners now dominate the leading edges of the field in theoretical and practical terms, strongly influencing infill development as well as new-build New Urbanist practices.

The ascendance of livability can perhaps be attributed to a convergence between genuine efforts by Jacobs’ followers to renew an urban sense of place and the pervasive “capitalist realism” (Fisher 2009) of the mid-1970s onward, as cities bore the brunt of cuts to federal spending under neoliberal urban policy. Hitching the humanization of the street to profit-seeking capital rather defending the eroding redistributive state was a realpolitik that set livability planning on a decisively neoliberal path. Increasingly disciplined by the needs of profit and the requirements of creditors, cities turned away from redistributive policies and towards the fiscal requirements of encouraging capital accumulation in whatever form possible. Both spectacular place-making strategies and piece-by-piece efforts by “sweat equity” gentrifiers with access to finance could now be the hallmark of urban land policy, with the “growth machine” of the city dominated by property interests in search of footloose capital investment (Lees, Slater, and Wyly 2007; Logan and Molotch 2007). This creates a recursive relationship between the activities of new residents—particularly white and middle-class in-migrants—and the creation of new urban growth policies. The former have the economic capital to make structural upgrades and the cultural/political capital to demand infrastructural improvement. The latter come from capacity of the city, in increasing collaboration with “grassroots” actors, to respond to their demands by creating the conditions of possibility for profitable reinvestment.

Once a marginal activity of “urban pioneers,” gentrification has risen to dominate urban economic strategy in part through its appropriation of a mode of infill capital investment most strenuously advocated by champions of livability. After a long half-century wherein “inner city” was a metonym for blackness, “urban” is beginning to stand in for a cosmopolitan cool cultivated by the subjects of gentrification. Racism in employment, housing and transportation created the fertile grounds of experimentation proximal to downtowns now exploited for their “authenticity.” In other words, where the idyll Jacobs described had been lost to racialized disinvestment, joblessness, predatory landlordism, incarceration, and demolition, attracting new, predominantly white residents became a means to recreate Jacobs’ imaginary. Its cast of characters is often
even less diverse in both race and class. Over the past two decades or so, this has meant a form of gentrification that delivers livability with tangibly positive qualities: better parks, more pleasant, human-scale streets, and bicycle infrastructure. These positive qualities have blunted critical perspectives on gentrification just as they are most needed, as the process devours urban space as rapaciously as ever (Slater 2006). The nominally public goods pushed for by activists are monetized by land markets as amenities, exerting upward pressure on neighborhood-level potential rents and prying the “rent gap” wider for individual parcels (N. Smith 1979; Hammel 1999). The obvious role of environmentalist, aesthetic, and cosmopolitan impulses in creating such amenities has lent some credence to perspectives that focus on the role of consumers of gentrified space: their changing tastes, (non)reproductive decisions, political attitudes, and “post-industrial” employment (Ley 1994).

Damaris Rose charts a path between these production- and consumption-oriented theses, arguing for a more nuanced understanding of the social production of gentrifiers themselves through her framing of “marginal gentrifiers” (D. Rose 1984). These can be seen, following Pierre Bourdieu, as the “dominated fraction of the dominant class”: participants in but not drivers of the process of gentrification (Bourdieu 1984). For the purposes of this analysis, cyclists might in a similar way act as marginal gentrifiers, by trading savings on transportation costs for higher rents, superior accessibility, and more sustainable mobility. Moreover, bicycles are increasingly the chosen tool of the familiar “shock troops” of gentrification: artists, punks, déclassé intellectuals, students, and other bohemians (Godfrey 1988). This highlights the more general way that marginal gentrifiers seek “environmental solutions for what are social problems” (D. Rose 1984, 65–6)—or in David Harvey’s terms, spatial patterns of settlement intended to counter systemic problems of social process (Harvey 2000). The bicycle, as Dave Horton has shown, acts metonymically for a whole set of progressive political positions, ones that are no less deeply held than they are historically white and bourgeois (Horton 2006).

These commitments take spatial and aesthetic form in bicycle infrastructure that is now entering the calculus of urban value production. The deeper implications of this are that rentiers’ capture of non-capitalist value renders many of the practices considered external to urban capitalism actually critical to its reproduction (Hardt and Negri 2011; Carlsson 2010b). Writers like Richard Florida, whose dubious category of the “creative class” acts as a proxy for an elite segment within the division of labor whose work is not easily routinized, counts these forms of value as amenities that “creatives” desire (Peck 2010, 192–230). Moreover, livable neighborhood reinvestment has become fused to city-regional competitive strategies intended to leverage localized improvements in “quality of life” (Gottdiener 1985) to attract outside capital. Urban livability now means cities can offer a high-value labor force for information, biotech and other skills-intensive industries (McCann 2007). Unlike massive infrastructure projects, “livable” improvements can be done with relatively low capital requirements and political liabilities. Thus, while the scale of intervention that livability represents dovetails neatly with that of gentrification, as

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14 For Rose, these are white, middle-class single mothers for whom a central location reduces the burden of social reproduction.
noted above, the politicization of the various non-economic practices that support accumulation points towards a fuller meaning of what livable urban space could become.

Nevertheless, this discussion of the mutual entanglement of livability, gentrification and cycling must be placed in the context of neoliberal “roll-back” and “roll-out” (Peck and Tickell 2002) as a fundamentally urban phenomenon. Through the production of urban space, political-economic restructuring articulates with the production of new kinds of subjects. It should be clear from the above discussions that bike culture both seeks the production of infrastructure via new kinds of state policies and cultivates self-mobilizing, choice-driven urban cyclists as the archetype of bicycle user (N. Rose 1999). Equally, gentrification is as much the selective reconfiguration of municipal state space as it is the production of the kinds of subjects that inhabit the imagined urban renaissance.

In broad strokes, I view livability as an emerging way to manage the contradictions of uneven geographical development at the municipal scale (N. Smith 1984). It does so partially by producing spaces within which favored populations manage themselves through localist commerce, individualized mobility, and creative innovation. This should not imply that the “livable” turn of urban capitalism is strictly functional for capital. Rather, the move away from car-centric planning in some places—incomplete as it may be—represents a contingent attempt to remake cities in conditions where possibilities for change are circumscribed but latitude for experimentation is quite wide. The financial discipline to which cities are put due to state and federal retrenchment increases dependence on private capital (Harvey 1989; Hackworth 2007). For mitigating problems of traffic congestion, addressing ecological concerns, and channeling capital towards areas of growth (North 2010; Checker 2011; Lugo and Mannos 2012), the bicycle fits both as a cost-effective mechanism and as an on-the-ground innovation pioneered by the very subjects cities hope to attract. It’s important to emphasize here that “actually existing” neoliberalism is not a form but a strategic set of “institutional fixes” that prioritize where possible market-led growth and the personalization of responsibility (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey 2007a). This points to a more appropriate framing of neoliberalization as a process that combines often-contradictory elements, both generative and pernicious (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2010).

If neoliberalization tends to reorganize state power to facilitate capital accumulation, one key mechanism for this is the devolution of risk to downward to localities and the upward concentration of power in finance and corporations. Thus, localities have become dependent on attracting increasingly liquid and rapid capital flows, heightening interurban competition and provoking an “entrepreneurial” municipal stance (Harvey 1989). This flexible, enterprising posture is mirrored at the level of the individual by what Foucault and his interlocutors have called the “entrepreneurialism of the self” (Foucault 2010). These two strands—the political-economic and the formation of subjects—converge on the urban (Braun 2014). Here the requirements of capital accumulation meet the exigencies placed on subjects to become self-actuating, choice-directed agents appropriate to a “flexible” world of labor and consumption. This does not mean they meet neatly. Rather, the valorization of cycling’s liberatory rather than
“coercive” flexibility (Urry 2004) emerged when the arc of urbanization was still expansionist. With the ongoing crisis of suburbanization, popular recognition of the trap of the car provides fertile ground to pursue the expansion of cycling as well as infill development.15

Moreover, bicycle policy requires an activist orientation by municipal government, while neoliberal discourse forecloses visions for infrastructure that do not directly facilitate accumulation. Bicycle infrastructure investment in the US depends on federal funding accessed through competitive grants, reinforcing an entrepreneurial orientation toward bicycle and pedestrian spending while largely avoiding confrontation with debt-averse electorates. Becoming the next Amsterdam, the next Portland, or the next New York in terms of bicycle infrastructure has surged upward on the list of competitive urban strategies, in part at the urging of advocates. As advocates work in a discursive field in which economic growth is paramount, economistic arguments that emerged in bicycle advocacy for strategic reasons have become “contingently necessary” (Jessop 2007; cf. Laclau and Mouffe 1985).

Moreover, these advocates have attempted to shape their own constituencies as model urbanists and local consumers. Enthusiasm for the flexibility and freedom of cycling vividly illustrates Foucault’s understanding of the management of populations as “government through freedom,” as do equally important discourses about bicycling’s health benefits and sustainability (Spinney 2014; Adams 2014). This form of subjectivity is celebrated within the corporate culture of the Bay Area where everyone is an entrepreneur, every encounter a networking opportunity, and every job a temporary blip on the road of innovation. This orientation, to which the discourse on the flexibility of the bicycle is perfectly suited, finds valorization in the work of Richard Florida and others, who not surprisingly see bicycle infrastructure as essential to urban economic dynamism. The “flexible personality” thus informs both a mode of work and a style of spatial practice that is particularly urban.

To understand how the “urban” became a site of opportunity rather than abjection, we must zoom out to capture the longer history of disinvestment, underinvestment, and suburbanization that created such fruitful frontiers of accumulation and subject formation. With the formation of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in 1937, official federal residential lending and mortgage underwriting guidelines relocated capital towards single-family, detached houses in greenfield developments (Jackson 1987; Walker 1977). These guidelines wrote race into housing policy in excruciating detail (Freund 2010; Sugrue 2005), with large swaths of disinvestment in urban cores the systematic result. This “spatialization of race and racialization of space” is what gives the reconcentration of capital and high-wage workers into these disinvested landscapes its overt racialized character (Lipsitz 2007). Economic development via the encouragement of affluent in-migration represents a deep retreat from any commitment to maintaining the livelihoods of those residents who remained as municipal government

15 Many commentators now note, for instance, that parking requirements in new developments drive the cost of housing upward.
capacity was gutted. I treat this literature as part of the discussion of neoliberalism because it is important to recall what exactly has been subject to neoliberalization—the Keynesian racial state—and because the increasingly rapid flows of finance capital characteristic of the neoliberal period have acted both as tools for disciplining cities and resources for capitalist reinvestment. With the crisis of 2008 it became clear that the reversal of redlining, which led to a targeting of black and Latino homebuyers, particularly women, had completed what disinvestment had begun, and in cities like Oakland loosened the grip of cash-poor longtime homeowners on their paid-off houses (Wyly et al. 2009; Reid 2010).

Within these processes, the bicycle is in fact quite marginal. But in its marginality to the fundamental contradictions that plague the Bay Area as a region it becomes inordinately visible as a hoped-for solution. Neoliberalization creates a set of conjunctural moments in which personalized, flexible, and low-footprint mobility—like cycling—emerges as a favored policy solution in part because it does not require a capital-intensive reorganization of place, work and movement. Moreover, they evince a desirable ethical orientation on the part of their users. The emergence of the bicycle has worked on a terrain wherein the devolution of responsibility to the municipal level cannot meaningfully engage the racialized uneven development of the region produced by neoliberalization. Nodes of intensive activity, settlement, and accumulation now predominate in a region desperately in need of broader-scale investment and redistribution. In this context, if the bicycle is in many ways a puny machine for producing space, it is nonetheless one through which whole affective orientations towards place and the powerful political claims based on them are made.

**The Map of the Argument**

In the first chapter, I outline the basic contours of the last thirty years of urban restructuring in the San Francisco Bay Area, analyzing county-to-county commute flows, job distribution by sector across the region, and demographic shifts across the past three decades. This chapter argues that the regional reorganization of race and class has produced an increasingly white and affluent population in the areas now seeing the greatest investment in bicycle infrastructure. Since the 1980s, the region encompassing San Francisco, Oakland, Santa Rosa, Fremont, San Jose and Silicon Valley has undergone a transformation into a global hub of high-tech industry and innovation. The regional poles of this industry are San Francisco’s Mission and South of Market districts and the corporate campuses of companies like Google and Facebook in Silicon Valley, though the gentrification of San Francisco has begun pushing even high-wage workers to Oakland. During the same period, especially from the late 1990s onward, successive waves of gentrification provoked a steady outflow of working class residents of San Francisco. Building booms and predatory lending at the exurban fringe during the mid-2000s created far-flung suburban communities now characterized by clusters of poverty, home foreclosures, and disinvestment (Schafran 2013; Reid 2010; Berube and Kneebone 2013).
The “suburbanization of poverty” (Berube and Kneebone 2013) now seen in cities across the United States, the roots of which are linked to the recapitalization of urban cores, has been particularly acute in the Bay Area. The explosive growth of the IT sector affects the class geography of the region in two ways. With the shift out of heavy manufacturing to non-routine knowledge-intensive industries like software publishing and computer systems design, these industries have concentrated in gentrifying areas of San Francisco and office parks in the wealthy enclaves of Santa Clara Valley. This has accompanied a dispersal of the working class from San Francisco and even Oakland into outer neighborhoods and suburbs, and a reconcentration of wealth amid skyrocketing real estate prices in central districts. This realignment of high-wage employment location and residence spurred by urban core reinvestment sets the backdrop for strong raced and classed differences in commuting patterns and mode choice, as well as the all-out erasure of working-class neighborhoods.

The second chapter charts the politicization of the bicycle through the legacy of Critical Mass and its mainstreaming in urban politics via the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition. Since the early 1990s, the “organized coincidence” of Critical Mass has spread throughout the world, contributing to a growing global “bike culture” and a recognizable political bloc in many cities. The terrain on which bicycle politics now work was made through Critical Mass, a form of bicycle-powered sociality that is neither recreation- nor fitness-oriented, and uniquely urban. Its various mutations have cemented a commonsense understanding of the bicycle as having an inherent set of political and social impacts (Carlsson 2008). A highly publicized confrontation between Critical Mass and the Willie Brown mayoral administration in 1997 put the issue of cyclists’ rights to urban space on the table, enabling the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition (SFBC) to take on a stronger institutional role in streetscape planning. With the success of the SFBC’s infrastructure-centric strategy, Critical Mass’ influence waned. But their relation underscored a tension already present within Critical Mass between agitating for better streets and an open-ended political challenge to the logic of efficient allocation of urban space itself. The upshot of the Critical Mass phenomenon’s role in the construction of “bike culture” is twofold. First, even against the intentions of many Critical Mass participants, the bicycle is now commonly understood to be inherently virtuous and progressive, connecting places throughout the world through the circulation of Critical Mass tactics. Second, bike culture and bicycle infrastructure planning have become a main arena of progressive politics. Current notions of urban sociality and the free play of the street would not look how they do without Critical Mass’ influence.

The third chapter examines how the making of bike culture takes place through the utilization of the “urban frontier” (N. Smith 1996) for experimentation in forms of life that are substantially shaped by cycling. Here, my examination of the racialized cyclescape focuses on the sites of practice that are less organized by the municipal state: namely, the edge areas where the bicycle affords déclassé marginal gentrifiers an increased range, and the sites like bike shops where cycling practice is transmitted and transformed. Through dependence on underinvested proximal space, both residential and commercial, the in-migration of marginal gentrifiers and their use of bicycles
articulate with histories of specifically racialized disinvestment. This chapter focuses on North Oakland, where disinvestment throughout the postwar era was acute, as well as San Francisco’s Mission District, where Latino immigration throughout the 1970s and 1980s staved off disinvestment and where the city’s hypertrophic gentrification meets its hypertrophic bike culture. These areas now form some of the densest constituencies of the East Bay Bicycle Coalition (EBBC) and the SFBC, respectively. It goes on to explore the ways in which cyclists of color have contested the racialization of cycling themselves, and how their efforts both challenge and reinscribe extant narratives about race, class, and place.

The fourth and fifth chapters examine the engagement of cyclists with remaking urban space itself, via the medium of bicycle advocacy organizations, as they move from confronting municipal power to collaborating with planners to create bicycle infrastructure. They reveal moments of struggle over what corridors—and by extension the city—will be. The first of these chapters shows how grassroots activists in San Francisco’s Mission District, not yet professionalized by involvement in the urban process, forged the case for the economic value of bicycle infrastructure. These efforts, occurring during the peak of the first dot-com boom between 1996 and 2001, saw the SFBC intervening in the planning process itself for the first time, as it conducted community outreach for a proposed “road diet” on Valencia Street in the Mission District. The pilot project, completed in 1998, added bike lanes, widened sidewalks and reduced parking on a hotly gentrifying commercial strip in what was still a heavily Latino neighborhood. An influential evaluation study published in 2003 made the business case for the value of the modification, which would go on to serve as a widely circulated foundational text for the emerging economistic logic of bicycle infrastructure investment.

The last chapter traces the contemporary influence of this narrative in the transformation of key streets in Oakland. Now mature, sophisticated, and promoted by influential consulting firms and national organizations, the understanding that bicycle infrastructure promotes economic growth lubricates the machinery of official planning, and draws broad support in rapidly gentrifying North Oakland. But the roll-out of this planning paradigm in Oakland reveals some of the political weaknesses of the bike movement as well. On Telegraph Avenue, North Oakland’s main artery, bicycle infrastructure plans generate opposition not from the residents most threatened by gentrification but from business interests with the most to gain from change. Fights over the street become fights over the balance of forces within business districts. Meanwhile, in other areas, bicycle infrastructure is a priori included in large-scale plans to speed up the reinvestment process, bringing advocates into alignment with projects residents regard as a new wave of urban renewal.

Although this work is not directly aimed toward policy intervention, I do offer some normative claims regarding the present and future of bicycle advocacy. These arguments identify the “lines of flight” of the work already being done in the streets, the planning world, and the academy that attempt to counter some of the less salutary aspects of the trends identified above. Here it is important that the framing of cycling that has emerged from the developments discussed above—as an environmentalist choice and a
driver of capitalist livability—limits some of the potential alliances to be made between bicycle advocates and other activists. In particular, while some bicycle coalitions have made common cause with affordable housing advocates, there been a general dearth of critical thinking within the world of bicycle advocacy about the implications of promoting bicycle infrastructure as part of revitalization schemes intended to attract affluent in-migrants. The realpolitik practiced by many advocates and urban theorists alike—to work with gentrification rather than against it—may directly militate against another stated goal, that of making cycling more diverse. Thus, in what follows I do not so much focus on the bicycle as use it as a lens with which to apprehend some key aspects of the titanic shifts at work in today’s North American cities. I also hope to show that we may equally have to zoom back out from the bike lane to the metropolis in order to gain purchase in confronting its contradictions.
Chapter 1: The Bicycle and the Restructuring of the Bay Area

The past thirty years have seen a transformation in the geography of work, residence, and mobility in the Bay Area. Though the effects have not been automatic, these deep changes in the political economy of the region have created fertile conditions for the surge in cycling and its political visibility. Moreover, these changes play a critical role in materially explaining changing assumptions about the kinds of people assumed to be cyclists. This chapter argues the following: the uneven development of the capacity to live and work in close proximity has enabled largely white, highly educated and upwardly mobile populations to appropriate space in previously devalorized urban cores of the San Francisco Bay Area. This displaces working class people of color to more car-dependent areas. The spatial reconcentration of high-wage, non-routine work reflects and reinforces a political discourse that seeks to curate pools of high-productivity, creative labor-power to attract capital investment. Though this was never the goal of the bicycle movement, bicycle infrastructure has become a key element of strategies aiming to attract the factor inputs to large-scale investment. This has brought the progressive politics of non-motorized mobility into uneasy alignment with broader-scale gentrification projects, in the name of a more humane pace and scale of travel, and a more livable streetscape.

This chapter analyzes the spatial changes in occupation, demography and transit across the 13 counties of the greater Bay Area, showing how high-wage labor and high-cost housing are re-concentrating together in older urban cores. Then it examines the political integration of cycling into three moments of the capitalist development process in contemporary San Francisco and Oakland: legislation mandating cyclist access to downtown SF office buildings, the planning of the Better Market Street Project in San Francisco, and the incipient West Oakland Specific Plan. These three moments are indicative of the process by which the discourse of livability has materially built an unsteady but growing hegemony. The task of the chapters to come will be a history of the present, uncovering how cycling has come to play such an important ideological and material role in this restructuring, as well as to identify its key race-classed contradictions.

The spatial contradiction is as follows. A crisis in the logic of extensive exurban development, provoked by the 2008 implosion of the housing bubble, has stranded many working class populations on the fringes of the region while urban cores have seen a resurgence (Newman 2009; Bardhan and Walker 2011; Newman and Schafran 2013). These fringe areas impose high transportation burdens, and are politically difficult to retrofit for walking and cycling due to the dispersal of employment, amenities, and housing. As the past two decades of runaway development in cities like Brentwood, Antioch, Oakley, and Tracy depended on cheap land and minimal services, it actively

1 Based on the Center for Neighborhood Technology’s Housing + Transportation Index, available at http://htaindex.cnt.org/map/.
discouraged building in proximity to solid transit connections (see Figure 2). The practices of livability planning, initiated by bicycle, pedestrian and transit advocates in the interest of social and ecological justice (Jonas, Gibbs, and While 2011), have now become strategically useful to overcome the crisis and initiate a new wave of accumulation.

Figure 2. The San Francisco Bay Area. Map by author.
The historical irony remains that the 2008 recession that dooms many exurbs has led to accelerating interest in the bicycle and urban core life as an antidote to suburban sprawl and a car-centric lifestyle. Meanwhile urban core land prices and rents weathered the storm and began rising again, putting this new ideal even further from the grasp of working class residents of the Bay Area. Influential urbanists like Christopher Leinberger now proclaim the “death of the fringe suburb,” urging cities to prioritize livability on purely economic grounds, and livability advocates nod in approval (Leinberger 2011; T. Snyder 2012). As noted over thirty years ago, victories for working-class and minority place-based struggles in the Bay Area have been overwhelmed by private capital, “as neighborhoods which once gained public programs for low-income residents rapidly become transmuted into chic enclaves through private purchase” (Fainstein, Fainstein, and Armistead 1983, 204). In this respect, the Bay Area (along with New York) prefigures more general late-twentieth century dynamics in which urban quality of life, long an object of popular struggle, is increasingly an amenity monetized through gentrification (Castells 1983; Gottdiener 1985).

The kind of densification envisioned by livability advocates will be impossible without a departure from private cars as the dominant mode of transportation. This reality has only recently been reflected in policy. In 2008, the California legislature passed Senate Bill 375/Assembly Bill 32 (hereafter SB375), which created a system of targets for reducing transportation-based greenhouse gas emissions by incentivizing development close to mass transit system nodes. SB 375 is implemented through Plan Bay Area, a joint project of the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) and the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), released in 2013. Plan Bay Area operates through the establishment of Priority Development Areas (PDAs) and Priority Conservation Areas (PCAs) (see Figure 3). PDAs give municipalities access to $320 million in competitive grants (40% of the MTC’s total transportation spending) through the OneBayArea Grants program:

The OBAG program rewards jurisdictions that focus housing growth in Priority Development Areas (PDAs) through their planning and zoning policies, and actual production of housing units. The OBAG program allows flexibility to invest in a community’s transportation infrastructure by providing funding for Transportation for Livable Communities, bicycle and pedestrian improvements, local streets and roads, preservation, and planning activities, while also providing specific funding opportunities for Safe Routes to Schools projects and Priority Conservation Areas (Association of Bay Area Governments and Metropolitan Transportation Commission 2013, 14).
Plan Bay Area has no coercive capacity either to create PDAs or to ensure that new developments in them remain affordable, because it legally cannot override local land-use decisions. Furthermore, at a narrower scale, local land-use decisions cannot mandate rental price caps without voluntary cooperation from developers. While the plan requires inclusion at all income levels as a condition of participation in the OBAG program, it can only operate through incentives.

Put simply, Plan Bay Area institutionally supports the growing dominance of transit-oriented capitalist development, constraining spatiality rather than accumulation, while encouraging the withdrawal of capital from the areas hit hardest by the Great

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2 Largely white enclaves in western San Francisco and the city of Orinda, for instance, have rebelled against designating PDAs. Tea Party activists based in Orinda declared the plan a tool of the United Nations to force Americans into “stack and pack” housing (Modenessi 2013). Meanwhile, nearly the entire geography of the historically black Bay Area, from Hunters Point to Richmond to West and East Oakland, has been designated as PDAs. I am grateful to Matthew Palm and Naomi Riemer at the University of California, Davis for alerting me to western San Francisco’s rejection of densification.
Recession. Hence, it is likely to entail car dependence for those who cannot afford to live close to redeveloped walkable and bikeable areas. Furthermore, it builds a racialized logic into regional restructuring. Well-apportioned, white-dominated municipalities that were produced through racialized geographies of investment—the “white noose” (Self 2003)—are able to avoid absorbing the housing requirements for continued growth. Black and Latino landscapes are largely targeted for redevelopment; unlike during urban renewal, the plan makes reference to rectifying histories of disinvestment borne by people of color. As noted below, however, political subjects in places constructed as bounded racial spaces rarely reject such redevelopment plans outright. The potential for some benefit is simply too great.3 Through Plan Bay Area, “livability” may ultimately result in exclusionary development and re-segregation (Henderson 2013; Soursourian 2012).

This reflects, at a regional scale, processes of uneven development that are shaped by capitalism’s contradictory dialectic of differentiation and equalization of profit across space (N. Smith 1984). We see within the Bay Area region the “see-saw motion” of capital (ibid., 177) producing new sub-regions of concentrated capital investment in high-wage specialized manufacturing, professional and technical services, and software development, with corresponding high returns to property ownership. This occurs alongside the devaluation of previous key sectors and the growth of more dispersed, middle-wage health, office support, and educational labor. Moreover, the scale of the region produced through the asset-price boom, rooted in extensive housing development on cheap land, is in the process of erosion and reconstruction.

As densification policies begin to actively constrain the geographic extent of investment, black and Latino working class livelihoods on the periphery may grow more precarious and ecologically untenable. Meanwhile, bourgeois livelihoods in resurgent urban cores flourish within a more concentrated, intensive scale of firm clustering (Kemeny and Storper 2012) and housing development that capitalizes on prior bouts of devaluation. New planning practices put to work in the transformation of the Mid-Market area of San Francisco, the general plan for long-disinvested West Oakland, and Plan Bay Area all endeavor to spatially reconfigure their sites to steer different configurations of enterprise, mobility, and social reproduction. The upshot is that non-car home-work linkages receive institutional support, becoming easier and even intuitive for those segments of a racialized division of labor that command high wages and salaries. In the same stroke, such car-based commutes often become difficult or impossible for those on the losing end of labor market segmentation. As an advocate put it to me at a conference of the California Bicycle Coalition, there is a big difference between being “car-free” and being car-less. In other words, the “coercive flexibility” (Urry 2004) of the car is unevenly materialized within the region.

The first part of this chapter highlights the regional production of uneven development and its conflicting scales of social and economic life. Key to this is the

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3 Even during the destructive peak of postwar redevelopment, black Oakland activists with a radical analysis sought to shape (rather than oppose) projects like BART, the Grove Shafter Freeway, and the Model Cities Program, though not under conditions of their own choosing (Sun Reporter 1972; Oakland Post 1972; Sun Reporter 1979; Self 2000).
relentless reorganization of employment and residential location in a geographic division of labor shaped by what Wendy Cheng calls “regional racial formation” (Cheng 2013). The second turns to the localized production of the cyclescape through current yet to be implemented, demonstrating how bicycling has become central to the reimagining of disinvested and racialized central locations in the urban fabric. The plans I examine work in different ways, but both evince the rising importance of cycling as part of the planning of a street space to support renewed accumulation. In San Francisco, the Better Market Street Project works bicycles into the centerpiece of the city and revalorizes a derelict neighborhood, Mid-Market, that is centrally located but a blot on the city’s image. In this, bike lanes play a spectacular role in branding the area’s “rebirth” and the reclamation of a central but disinvested thoroughfare. Oakland’s West Oakland Specific Plan deals with a neighborhood that has undergone both relative and absolute devalorization and is further removed from the CBD. For West Oakland, bike infrastructure is about sedimenting the kind of transportation milieu that characterizes “livable” residential neighborhoods. In each, the bicycle is worked into official development plans in ways inconceivable even a decade ago.

The Rise and Fall of Subprime California

The past two decades of restructuring have dramatically changed the geography of race, class, and the division of labor in the 13-county greater San Francisco Bay Area. The explosion of the tech industry since the mid-1990s and the corresponding flow of capital into the built environment of the urban cores of San Francisco and Oakland has occurred alongside the massive outmigration of working class populations, primarily families of color, from these areas (Figure 4 & Figure 5). These groups have moved to less advantageously located inner-ring cities like Hayward as well as to inexpensive tract housing on cheap land in Contra Costa, Alameda and Stanislaus counties beyond the urban fringe (Walker and Lodha 2013, 61; Walker and Schafran 2015). The foreclosure crisis of 2008 onward, which devastated the savings of black and Latino families, was most acute in farther-flung areas like Pittsburg, Antioch, Oakley, Brentwood and Solano County, where large collapses in home value reigned (Schafran and Wegmann 2012). Home prices held on in San Francisco and Silicon Valley, decreasing only slightly during the crash and by 2014 had in some areas begun to exceed even their 2007 peaks.

4 Here I adopt the US Census definition of the San Jose-San Francisco-Oakland combined metropolitan statistical area (CMSA), which includes Santa Cruz, San Benito and San Joaquin counties along with the traditional 9-county definition of the Bay Area, but add Stanislaus County, per the methodology suggested by Schafran and Wegmann (2012). It could be argued that Merced County absorbed some outmigration from the Bay Area in the 2000s, but few residents work in another—especially inner—Bay Area county. Similarly, only about 10% of residents of Sacramento County work in an adjoining Bay Area county, so it has been excluded for purposes of analysis (U.S. Census Bureau 2013a). See Schafran and Walker for an even larger grouping of fifteen (2015).
A January 2012 study published by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco reported that employment decentralization, rising urban core rents, and exurban growth driven by the housing bubble had combined to propel the “suburbanization of poverty” (Soursourian 2012; Berube and Kneebone 2013), recognized in policy and academic circles as a key feature of the “return to the city” now underway (Brookings Institution 2010). However, this “suburbanization of poverty” is, as Schafran argues, an urban crisis, in which the standard narrative of sprawl as a phenomenon driven by consumer sovereignty is inadequate to the scale of the region’s contradictions. Moreover, these racialized shifts in people and wealth have been underway since the 1990s; the racially targeted subprime mortgage origination industry that swelled in the mid-2000s simply casts these dynamics into sharper relief.

With the return of capital and high-wage work to regional cores, therefore, wealthy in-migrants reap the benefits of the density of services and transit links that in earlier decades offset the economic disadvantages of living in the underinvested core. Smart growth strategies under Plan Bay Area, the Federal Reserve study notes, are likely to exacerbate this problem, as land prices tend to rise with new transit-oriented
development if not paired with strong affordable housing controls (Soursourian 2012). As the region’s planning discourse has shifted away from car-centric growth, investment in public transportation has not kept up, and new “edge city” (Garreau 1991) job centers serve farther-flung residential growth too dispersed to be efficiently served by mass transit (Terplan et al. 2009). Moreover, with the 2008 economic downturn, the costs of capital devaluation were offloaded onto debtors instead of the intricate network of financial institutions that were driving the process.

Homebuyers of color settling in outer cities of the region like Antioch, Brentwood and Oakley were driven by pull factors of the suburban dream and mortgage issuers under pressure to distribute mortgage-backed securities under pressure to distribute mortgage-backed securities. To these were added the push factors of gentrification, high instability and fear for safety in disinvested, racially bound neighborhoods. Among buyers of modest means, black and Latino mortgage-seekers were disproportionately issued subprime loans, while their incomes and lack of stored wealth made them vulnerable to the inevitable rate hikes built into these products (Bardhan and

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Walker 2011, 307; Reid 2010; Wyly et al. 2009). Accelerating income inequality and gentrification in the urban cores of San Francisco and Silicon Valley made it impossible to purchase a house in many proximally located cities, spurring a “drive ‘til you qualify” search for housing in the developments in small cities of the inland Bay Area (McCormick 2008). These exurban cities gradually then more sharply during the housing bubble gained residents of color, particularly African-Americans, while non-Hispanic whites stormed the urban cores of Oakland and San Francisco (Schafran and Wegmann 2012; Schafran 2013).

Those residents not pulling up stakes for the exurbs, particularly cash-poor, elderly female African-American homeowners, were targeted for home equity lines of credit on aggressive terms (Reid 2010; Darden and Wyly 2013). In areas of north and west Oakland highly sought by the incoming bourgeoisie, this put houses owned outright back into a superheated market. Meanwhile, the bursting of the housing bubble briefly suppressed but had no long-term dampening effect on housing costs in cores (Azvedo 2012). As prices throughout the region fell in the crash, parts of San Francisco, Marin County and Silicon Valley briefly rose in price, and never fell far (Said 2008). According to data from Zillow, median home sale prices in San Francisco and Berkeley already well exceeded their 2008 peak by the end of 2013, and the stratospheric rise of prices in Oakland is fast approaching pre-crash levels. Meanwhile, Brentwood and Antioch fell hard and recovered little. In 2012, Stockton, deep in San Joaquin County, briefly became the largest city in the nation to ever declare bankruptcy before Detroit took the dubious prize.

The crisis of the exurbs did not affect only African-Americans and Latinos, but they were hit the worst. In the region as a whole, median household incomes (in 2012 dollars) fell between by 10% between 2000 and 2012. Broken down by race, these figures were 8%, 13%, and an astonishing 19% for white, African-American, and Latino householders, respectively. Within the region as well, differences are dramatic. In Antioch, Oakley, Brentwood, Pittsburg and Bay Point, median household incomes fell a combined 16% over the same time period; whites sustained the smallest decrease at 11%, African-Americans the largest at 17%. Meanwhile, the core cities of San Francisco, Oakland, Berkeley, Emeryville, Alameda and Piedmont, where the recovery has been rapid and increasingly white, median household incomes of whites actually rose slightly in real terms, while Latino and black median household incomes fell by 13% and over 20%, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau 2012a; U.S. Census Bureau 2000). In these urban cores, which encompass some of the richest and poorest households in the entire region, the median household income of non-Hispanic whites is now triple that of black-headed households. Nonetheless, the explosive gentrification of the region’s cores has little benefited the incomes of people of color in aggregate, while the outer cities to which those with more resources relocated, leaving poorer residents behind, saw their incomes fall.

With the spectacular recovery of housing prices in core areas of Oakland and San Francisco, lower-income residents who remain, often longtime residents of color but also artists, teachers, non-profit and service workers of all backgrounds, face intense gentrification pressure (Causa Justa/Just Cause 2014). In San Francisco this has led to a
spike in “no-fault” evictions, known colloquially as “Ellis evictions” after the Ellis Act, which permits landlords to “go out of business” and evict renters protected by rent control in order to sell a house or building to a primary resident (Tenants Together and The Anti-Eviction Mapping Project 2014). In practice this has led to rampant speculative evictions and serial evictors, as San Francisco undergoes a large-scale replacement of its working class population by the highly-paid upper stratum of tech workers. In relatively lower-cost Oakland, rents have risen even more rapidly. Median household incomes for African-Americans in some neighborhoods of Oakland plunged along with their numbers (US Census Bureau, 2000, 2011; extracted using Social Explorer), suggesting that those with more means have relocated.

Those who remain may be somewhat “locked-in” or facing departure from the city altogether. In vast stretches of East Oakland, abundant foreclosures have been converted into investor-owned rentals to capture this market (BondGraham 2014). Because landlords can continue to extract rents even from dilapidated structures due to racial or class barriers in the surrounding market (Harvey and Chatterjee 1976), the financialization of these assets has allowed class-monopoly rents to become less place-based and more liquid, increasing their extractive qualities (Wyly et al. 2009). While the “milking” of apartment buildings by owners creates a perverse toe-hold for low-income tenants, this only intensifies the gap between realized and potential rents in the longer term. By the same token, landlords seeking to “upgrade” their tenant population have attempted to pass on improvement costs with an unamortized hike in rent, what critics call a shadow strategy to circumvent tenant protections; the Oakland City Council passed a law banning the practice in 2014 (Kane 2014). These landlord strategies, whether coordinated or ad-hoc, amount to the “exclusionary displacement” (Marcuse 1985) of low-income people from the urban cores of the Bay Area, freeing valuable land for profitable reuse.

Uneven Development and the Job-Housing Link

The core industry of the San Francisco Bay Area since the 1960s is the high technology sector: related, vertically disintegrated fields of early product stage prototyping and manufacturing of computers and peripherals, system design and management, software programming, research and development, online media and website publishing. This is the root both of the region’s dynamism and its volatility (Walker 2006). Because of regional fragmentation, cities like Mountain View and Palo Alto that experienced

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6 As Slater points out, contra Freeman, this factor of increasingly limited spatial choice is what gives the impression that gentrification does not harm the poor because they are not (yet) physically displaced (2006).

7 In a local and regional political-economic framework in which landlords are empowered, the face-to-face landlord-tenant class relation can be equally oppressive. For example, in January 2014 community-based organization Causa Justa/Just Cause joined tenants of the Booker Emery Apartments in West Oakland in denouncing severe undermaintenance, pervasive mold and vermin infestation, quite long after rents in nearby apartments in better repair had climbed to well beyond double the $700 charged by the landlord (McCamy 2014).
contradictions of sectoral growth in the 1970s—congestion and skyrocketing housing costs in particular—have since aggressively maintained growth controls (Saxenian 1984). The resulting housing scarcity tends to externalize the residential requirements of the employment that local industries create, and promotes housing dispersal across the region. Subsectors within which workers performing non-routine tasks that require face-to-face interaction can command a high wage remain necessarily concentrated and drive high land prices (Kemeny and Storper 2012; Storper and Venables 2003), while support functions are performed by firms scattered beyond the high-cost cities of the Peninsula. These dynamics have sorted the region’s dominant sector into firms with different spatial patterning, and have begun to shape the social division of labor even within this sector into different modes of mobility.

The decade of the 2000s, following the crash of the dot-com boom, continued prior dynamics of core manufacturing decline and dispersal and back-office and retail growth in outer areas (Walker and The Bay Area Study Group 1990). Manufacturing employment shrank in all core counties, as San Francisco and Oakland continued to shed automobile production and small manufacturing jobs, while electronics and semiconductor production behemoth Santa Clara County offshored production and expanded design and software (Saxenian 1984). Santa Clara and Alameda counties still dominate manufacturing, and production jobs within the manufacturing sector, but soaring housing prices in core areas of these counties have fueled the conversion of industrially zoned land to residential or mixed retail uses. While manufacturing employment grew steadily during the 1990s after the restructuring of the 1980s, especially in Santa Clara and Alameda counties, the first dot-com collapse destroyed a great deal of this progress, and the biggest manufacturing counties mounted the largest losses.

Some counties held onto manufacturing, particularly Stanislaus, Napa, Solano and Sonoma, largely through wine production and other farm products processing, while Santa Clara lost more manufacturing jobs alone than rest of the entire 13-county region between 1992 and 2012. Certain manufacturing subsectors, particularly computer and electronic product manufacturing and transportation equipment manufacturing (NAICS codes 334 and 336) in Santa Clara and Alameda, form the core of the remains of industrial production. Both are dominated by male white and Asian workers, and computer manufacturing in particular has far higher wage rates than the rest of the sector (Bardhan, Jaffee, and Kroll 2004). In this subsector, over-represented in Santa Clara County, whites make over 50% above the monthly average of roughly $12,000, Asian workers make just over this figure, and African-Americans and Latinos make 20-25% below the average. Professional, scientific and technical services (which includes systems design), health care and social assistance, and educational services made very large gains over this period, as employment in the first two each eclipsed manufacturing in the region.

8 Work that is “non-routine” or “creative” is notably not the same as simply being labor-intensive; garment piecing is notoriously labor-intensive and routine, and commands below-poverty wages. To be very clear, these firms do require labor-intensive, routine tasks such as janitorial and food service, but these are fulfilled through contracts with external labor providers, and workers in these sectors receive none of the perks bestowed upon the favored segments of the division of labor.
as a whole. White and Asian workers also predominate in professional fields, with average wages competitive with computer and software production, while the bulk of African-Americans work in health and social assistance, for significantly lower average monthly wages. Traditional black public sector employment strongholds not only suffered sharp cuts during the financial crisis of 2008, but also pay significantly less, only just over the 13-county average monthly earnings.

<table>
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<th>Employees</th>
<th>Payroll (millions)</th>
<th>Average monthly wages</th>
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<td>Asian</td>
<td>727,949</td>
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<td>$8,273</td>
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<td>$2,727</td>
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<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian / Pacific Islander</td>
<td>16,916</td>
<td>$244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian / Alaska Native</td>
<td>10,217</td>
<td>$145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3,303,031 $67,669 $4,787

Source: U.S. Census Bureau Quarterly Workforce Indicators (1992-2012)

These shifts thus deepened the racialization of the regional division of labor. Average monthly wages for whites in all sectors were $6,200 in 2012, 60% higher than those of Latinos ($3,800) and 50% higher than African-Americans ($4,200). Only Asian workers made monthly wages approaching those of whites, at $5,100 (Table 1.1). Big gains in employment in professional, scientific and technical services accrued primarily to non-Hispanic white and Asian workers, who in combination made up over 130,000 of the 143,000 employees added between 1992 and 2012 in that sector alone. In 2012, just over 350,000 professional, scientific and technical service workers in the Bay Area took home nearly $12 billion in first quarter wages and salary. The same quarter, just over 400,000 health care and social assistance workers, a sector consistently the highest employer of African-Americans (though they comprise a small overall portion), earned just over half that amount, $6.9 billion.
Table 1.2. Top Employment Sector Job Counts by Race and Ethnicity, 1992-2012 (4 largest groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Change since 1992</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services</td>
<td>200,496</td>
<td>50,521</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>Educational Services</td>
<td>189,643</td>
<td>33,837</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>Health Care and Social Assistance</td>
<td>171,634</td>
<td>12,993</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>145,246</td>
<td>-57,092</td>
<td>-39%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>144,506</td>
<td>-112,471</td>
<td>-78%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>Health Care and Social Assistance</td>
<td>108,369</td>
<td>67,794</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>104,605</td>
<td>12,641</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services</td>
<td>95,699</td>
<td>68,896</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>59,410</td>
<td>20,896</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>Accommodation and Food Services</td>
<td>58,422</td>
<td>21,285</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>81,909</td>
<td>36,325</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>Accommodation and Food Services</td>
<td>77,693</td>
<td>34,687</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>Health Care and Social Assistance</td>
<td>76,984</td>
<td>46,762</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>68,476</td>
<td>-5,429</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>Admin./Support &amp; Waste Mgmt./Remediation</td>
<td>56,843</td>
<td>29,586</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>Health Care and Social Assistance</td>
<td>33,440</td>
<td>11,277</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>Educational Services</td>
<td>18,022</td>
<td>3,584</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>17,768</td>
<td>1,881</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>Other Services (except Public Administration)</td>
<td>16,222</td>
<td>11,251</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>Admin./Support &amp; Waste Mgmt./Remediation</td>
<td>14,562</td>
<td>3,417</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau Quarterly Workforce Indicators (1992-2012)

In what is left of manufacturing, still an industry paying over $10 billion in the first quarter of 2012 to 330,000 workers, whites made up 43% of employees, the bulk of them in Santa Clara County. They made 30% more than the quarterly sectoral average of $32,000, while African-Americans made up just 3% of the workforce in the same quarter and took home 30% less (U.S. Census Bureau 2013a). Black and Latino dependence on lower-wage jobs in dispersal-prone sectors appears to be growing (Table 1.2). This matters because the high land prices in the core counties of San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, and Alameda are driven by high rates of capital investment and growth, forcing lower-wage workers to outer residential areas with fewer transportation options besides the automobile.

These broad transformations have far-reaching implications for the redistribution of mobility in the region. Areas with extensive development of single-family housing and sprawling office parks lack effective public transit infrastructure, because they developed with densities and road networks designed for cars. The “commute sheds” of the new suburban job centers, exemplified by cities like Pleasanton and San Ramon, as well as established but development-averse cities like Mountain View, are extensive and uncoordinated. In the words of one Santa Clara Valley planner with whom I spoke in
2014, the car-based journey to work resembled “spaghetti,” difficult to steer and without clear bundles of commutes that could be replaced with mass transit (Ledbetter 2014). Although extensions to the BART system have long been planned for eastern Contra Costa, southern Alameda, and eastern Santa Clara counties, even the stations yet to come do not adequately serve the new exurbs. Thus, few realistic options exist for the suburban working class other than car dependence. The less than salutary implications of this are that job dispersal will only exacerbate this dependence by discouraging solid public transit links between disparate job and residential centers.

 Meanwhile, “job sprawl” is profoundly uneven across race and the division of labor (Table 1.3). Retail trade, construction and manufacturing employment is most decentralized, finance/insurance, information, educational services and utilities least so (Kneebone 2009). The former tend to employ more low-wage workers, the latter frequently more high-wage professionals or unionized workers. Large office job centers like San Ramon in central Contra Costa County have no high-quality or high-frequency mass transit service other than a bus system subject to budgetary cutbacks (Cuff 2008). The vast regional landscape of dispersed, low-rise retail has equally poor mass transit access. Office parks, and to a lesser extent retailers, base their competitiveness on reduced location and labor-power costs, driving dispersal.

 With less access to secure jobs, and therefore more disparate and uncertain commute routes, many working class residents of the region face a public transportation system unlikely to ever work in their favor. While the peninsula cities on the bay side are well-served by bike-friendly CalTrain, a commuter railroad line, and parts of Alameda and western Contra Costa counties are served by the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system, these are the only realistic mass options for inter-county commuting combining transit with bicycle. Indeed, decreases in car commuting of up to 4% in transit-rich areas nearer to cores (Davis and Baxandall 2013) have not been matched in increasingly African-American cities in eastern Contra Costa County like Antioch, Brentwood and Oakley (U.S. Census Bureau 2010; 2012b). For most residents of cities outside narrow swaths of San Mateo, Santa Clara, Contra Costa, and Alameda counties, any non-car commuting must be done by infrequent bus or by bike on unsafe roads, or a combination of the two. The result is the emergence of (at least) two scales of mobility mapping onto the division of labor, radically delimiting through geography the possibilities for taking advantage of the lower costs of freedom from car dependence.

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9 Fittingly, in a study of Los Angeles, Alameda and San Joaquin counties, Sandoval, et al. find that access to a car was a significant predictor of successful transition from welfare to work (Sandoval, Cervero, and Landis 2011)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Benito</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,380</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,184</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,970</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,722</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napa</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,964</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,982</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,222</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,722</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td></td>
<td>44,983</td>
<td></td>
<td>33,928</td>
<td></td>
<td>27,733</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,983</td>
<td></td>
<td>19,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marin</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,171</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,519</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,033</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,683</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solano</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,928</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,208</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td></td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonoma</td>
<td></td>
<td>78,049</td>
<td></td>
<td>64,658</td>
<td></td>
<td>53,114</td>
<td></td>
<td>44,066</td>
<td></td>
<td>37,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Joaquin</td>
<td></td>
<td>82,357</td>
<td></td>
<td>69,523</td>
<td></td>
<td>58,060</td>
<td></td>
<td>49,560</td>
<td></td>
<td>41,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contra Costa</td>
<td></td>
<td>139,432</td>
<td></td>
<td>118,900</td>
<td></td>
<td>101,999</td>
<td></td>
<td>90,530</td>
<td></td>
<td>76,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Mateo</td>
<td></td>
<td>139,432</td>
<td></td>
<td>118,900</td>
<td></td>
<td>101,999</td>
<td></td>
<td>90,530</td>
<td></td>
<td>76,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td></td>
<td>236,999</td>
<td></td>
<td>202,969</td>
<td></td>
<td>169,534</td>
<td></td>
<td>144,763</td>
<td></td>
<td>119,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alameda</td>
<td></td>
<td>264,976</td>
<td></td>
<td>221,957</td>
<td></td>
<td>188,356</td>
<td></td>
<td>167,786</td>
<td></td>
<td>139,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Clara</td>
<td></td>
<td>34,387</td>
<td></td>
<td>29,171</td>
<td></td>
<td>23,967</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,959</td>
<td></td>
<td>17,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,600,978</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,200,591</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,000,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>800,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>600,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Workforce Indicators (1992–2012)

**Table 1.3:** 2012 County-Level Job Counts & Change from 1992, by Race/Ethnicity (4 Larger Groups)
A comparison of American Community Survey data on employment (ACS), collected by residence, to industry data collected by firm location, shows the unevenness of employment across the Bay Area. Only San Francisco County showed a positive ratio of jobs to employed population (17%), though Alameda, Napa and Santa Clara were above the average. Meanwhile, Contra Costa, San Joaquin, Stanislaus, Sonoma and Solano counties, showed high county-to-county mismatches (Table 1.4). In reality, cross-county commuting is far higher, but these discrepancies indicate the structural mismatch between the working population and the geography of work.

Table 1.4. Employment and Residence Mismatch by County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alameda</td>
<td>594,549</td>
<td>693,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contra Costa</td>
<td>302,624</td>
<td>473,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marin</td>
<td>92,368</td>
<td>122,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napa</td>
<td>56,576</td>
<td>64,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Benito</td>
<td>11,656</td>
<td>23,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>514,279</td>
<td>439,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Joaquin</td>
<td>177,049</td>
<td>260,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Mateo</td>
<td>295,058</td>
<td>358,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Clara</td>
<td>779,462</td>
<td>837,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>79,865</td>
<td>124,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solano</td>
<td>108,404</td>
<td>184,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonoma</td>
<td>151,166</td>
<td>225,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanislaus</td>
<td>145,255</td>
<td>198,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,308,311</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,007,270</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (2008-2012); U.S. Census Bureau Quarterly Workforce Indicators (2008-2012)

These figures are quite uneven across sectors as well. San Francisco shows over a 30% surplus in finance, insurance, real estate (FIRE) and leasing,\(^{11}\) and a 20% surplus in

---

\(^{10}\) Many factors could contribute to this low total ratio: ACS margins of error, commuting to firms outside the region, telecommuting, part-time employment, and informal employment. The basic regional imbalances depicted, however, are well supported in the literature.

\(^{11}\) The ACS aggregates some NAICS categories that remain separate in the Local Employment Dynamics data; given other analyses, my expectation is that FIRE and professional, scientific and technical sectors in San Francisco and Santa Clara Counties would have higher surpluses if not combined with leasing and
professional, scientific, technical, administrative support and waste management. Predictably, San Mateo and Santa Clara counties, the heartlands of Silicon Valley, have 50% more information jobs than residents employed in that sector. In this high-value segment of the labor pool, those employees increasingly residing in San Francisco commute via shuttle bus. Stanislaus, in many ways a bedroom county with overall low in-county job counts, shows parity in the aggregated category of health care and social assistance and educational services. As noted above, these are the sectors with greatest job growth among black and Latino workers. Alameda County’s industrial southeast and the southern Santa Clara Valley are the area’s wholesaling hearths, feeding regional distribution centers and Oakland’s port, with dramatically more wholesaling jobs than resident employees.

Actual commute flows are similarly unbalanced, if not more so. For example, between 2002 and 2011, Contra Costa County added a mere 10,000 jobs, while the number of residents both employed in the county and living there decreased. In 2011 over 30% of county residents commuted greater than 25 miles, up from 26% in 2002, while the percentage of workers commuting fewer than 10 miles dropped by 5 points. These changes hold for all wage classes, but in trade, transportation and utilities sectors, by 2011 over 40% of workers commuted more than 25 miles to work. Concord, Contra Costa County’s largest employer by share of workers, draws only just under 15% of its employees from the municipality itself, down 3% from 2002. Just under 10% of the workforce in San Ramon, an office cluster employing 40,000 in southern Contra Costa, comes from the city. Only 27% of employees there travel fewer than 10 miles to work. In outer counties, super-commutes abound: nearly 25% of residents of San Joaquin County, profoundly gutted during the 2008 recession, travel more than 50 miles to work.

San Francisco, meanwhile, held fairly steady at nearly 70% of workers commuting 10 miles or less, while between 2002 and 2011 the percentage of commutes over 25 miles ticked up slightly to just over 18%. In 2011 San Franciscans earning more than $40,000 per year were very slightly more likely to have a commute of under 10 miles than in 2002, while commutes tended to be longer in 2011 than in 2002 for those making less. Comparably slight changes obtain in Oakland as well. Even Alameda County, with relatively more concentrated job centers, sees just less than 20% of workers engaging in long commutes by 2011. Workers employed in San Francisco tended to have significantly longer commutes than residents across the data collection period, a fact that stands to reason given its role as a regional employment hub; roughly 40% of jobs in San Francisco are filled by San Franciscans (Longitudinal Employer-Household Data, 2002, 2011). San Jose, the region’s largest city, is comparable to San Francisco in terms of the commute lengths of workers employed there, but city residents tend to commute farther. Even for people employed in Santa Clara County more broadly, nearly 50% of commutes are less than 10 miles; residents of the county make similar journeys.

waste management, respectively. As above, however, the point holds; car-dependent outer counties where many working class households now reside have far less local employment than core counties now seeing reinvestment.
On the whole, since 1990 decreases in automobile commuting have come with increases in travel time to work, across the region. Circumspection in determining causality here is important. Mass transit and bicycle trips tend to increase overall travel time to work. Commuters may appreciate time in transit to read or get work done, or they may have less access to a car and be forced into longer trips by mass transit. Some counties also saw increases in the numbers of commuters spending less than 30 minutes getting to work, but they tended not to be well-served by transit. This raises the possibility that more car trips to nearer regional job centers account for the increases in shorter trips, and longer commutes from more distant residential areas for the increases in longer journeys. What is abundantly clear, however, is that the organization of the region tends toward growth in outer counties, with Alameda, San Mateo, Santa Clara and Santa Cruz adding both population and workers at below the regional rate. Meanwhile, Solano, San Benito, Stanislaus, Napa, and Sonoma grew faster, and more long commutes alongside fewer short commutes is the trend across the region (Walker and Lodha 2013, 64). At the same time, the most recent 2006-2010 Census Transportation Planning Package found bike and walk commutes to be on average the shortest, and on the increase (U.S. Census Bureau 2013b). If biking and walking as well as long commutes have increased, this suggests a bifurcation in journeys to work rooted in some of the effects of superheated land markets on both residential settlement and firm location (Cervero and Wu 1997; Cervero and Duncan 2006). Moreover, while transit usage tends to lengthen commute time, average bus commute times (typically the slowest mass transit mode) are lowest in Alameda, San Francisco and Napa counties. In other words, biking, walking, and busing may yield tangible benefits in terms of shortened travel times, especially in those areas undergoing rising costs of living. Moreover, because of employment structure, in-migrating professionals, who are predominantly white and Asian, capture these benefits disproportionately.12

These figures represent only a snapshot of a large process, as the spatial mismatch between housing and jobs, in wage and housing costs, follows the uneven development of industry in the region. Plans for livable urban space, wherein designers, advocates and investors hope that housing, employment, recreation and social reproduction will all take place at the neighborhood or corridor scale, are up against a dramatically uneven regional employment landscape. These are the limits, in the current configuration, on the possibilities of working in one’s area of residence.

What is clear in the context of the Bay Area is that regional changes during the 1990s and 2000s, whose salient features were rampant fringe city growth on shaky, racialized lending foundations and continued employment dispersal to “edge city” job centers, have created longer travel times and distances to work for residents of outer areas. Meanwhile trip distances tend to be shorter in the denser job centers of Oakland, 12 In Oakland, for example, just over 10% of white workers bike and walk to work, nearly twice the rate of African-American workers (U.S. Census Bureau 2012a).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% 16+</th>
<th>10-17%</th>
<th>% 18-24%</th>
<th>% 25-34%</th>
<th>% 35-44%</th>
<th>% 45-54%</th>
<th>% 55-64%</th>
<th>% 65+</th>
<th>15-24%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Clara</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salinas</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Benito</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napa</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marin</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contra Costa</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alameda</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1.5:** Changes in Commute Patterns by County, 1990-2012
San Francisco, and Santa Clara County. These areas are also seeing massive real estate investment and rising housing costs. Placed in the context of such imbalances between residence and employment, the question becomes not why some people choose not to replace car trips by bicycle but whether they even could. In other words, the real gains in bicycle space in select areas of core cities must be seen in the context of a vast, intensely car-dependent region in which the possibility of replacing trips by bicycle is supremely uneven in distribution (Figure 6).

Moreover, Census data analyses yield profoundly limited understandings of how people move through space and why. First, by measuring only the primary transportation mode used, the Census obscures how workers combine multiple modes of accessing work, either within a single trip or across a set of working days. The effect is to foreshorten how bicycles come into view, and to implicitly valorize “pure” cyclists. Infrastructure funding and political power increasingly requires credible claims at a fine geographic grain for the need for bicycle infrastructure in a given location or corridor. Second, it directs our attention toward waged work, rather than unwaged work or the daily labors of making do by bicycle characteristic of many of the poor of urban core and fringe alike. To the extent that the reproduction of labor-power includes the journey to work, it does little for our understanding of the uses of the bicycle for the broader and profoundly gendered field of social reproduction. This includes the labor of caring for dependents, accessing social services and sites of consumption, and “trip-chaining,” or combining multiple destinations within a single instance of travel, all associated with caring for kin or other dependents. Lastly, in capturing only those waged workers in the formal sector, it cannot tell us about the poor expelled from the labor market who employ bicycles to access services, increase the range or ease of daily activities—scrap metal collection, for instance—that reproduce one’s existence. With unemployment figures profoundly racialized, and unrepresentative of the extent of labor market exit, the cycling population we see through these statistics tends to be whiter and more steadily employed.

Nonetheless, measurements of the effectiveness of local and regional cycling policy and infrastructure provision are based on these data. Methods of counting cyclists beyond the census, such as ride surveys, are unevenly implemented and tend to be conducted during office work commute hours at central locations. Meanwhile, while there is evidence that bicycling is becoming more equal in some ways (League of American Bicyclists 2013a), this depends largely on data on non-commute cycling only available at the national level, such as the National Housing and Transportation Survey. Meanwhile in the cities where it is most celebrated, San Francisco and Oakland among them, it accompanies rising inequality.

13 This is above and beyond its recognized limitations around race in general.
While bicycle advocates recognize the need to reach beyond their traditional base of white, highly educated professionals (Sani 2013), the geography of the current cycling boom works against them. Due to the durable ways in which the home-work linkage has been organized in the Bay Area through uneven geographical development and subregional clustering of wealth and poverty over the past half-century, a focus on journey-to-work commuter cycling limits the scope of who is understood as the political and material subject of the bicycle. Moreover, such a focus skews planning efforts toward enabling the home-work linkage for professional and technical workers whose employers value centrality and for whom advantageously located housing can be secured at fire-sale prices due to racialized disinvestment. By enacting transformations to the built environment that enable this linkage and make it more livable—making the street a pleasant milieu to be in and move through—cities facilitate the mobility of valued populations whose activities produce value for the property circuit. Meanwhile, for advocates and municipal governments alike, the political value of showcasing these populations astride bicycles is enormous, given the uncertainty of bicycle and pedestrian funding at the federal level (T. Snyder 2013a). Here, we return to the paradox with which we began: bicycling is cheap, but living where you can bike to work is expensive. “Livability,” when treated as a value-added amenity in a sharply class- and race-divided
region, develops unevenly and unequally. Its happy face, in the current moment, is the bicycle.

**Hi-tech and High Rent**

The most important piece of the region’s economic geography is its technology industry. Zooming in, the internal geography of this industry is critical to understanding changes within San Francisco itself, which is experiencing a second boom arguably more thoroughgoing than the initial public offering (IPO) bonanza of 1995-2000. Rather than spurring an office boom in Santa Clara County, which resulted in massive office oversupplies in the outwash of the previous bubble (Walker 2006), tech has beat a path “back to the city.” This new boom exposes the tech sector’s geographical fragmentation between Silicon Valley and San Francisco, 50 miles to the north. This spatial division corresponds to a growing divide between large, established firms like Cisco, Apple, Google and Facebook, with massive fixed capital investments in Silicon Valley and small, flexible startups located in the South of Market area (SOMA) of San Francisco, startup culture’s hearth since the 1990s. Since 2008, San Francisco has actually grown at a faster rate than the cities of the Peninsula and Silicon Valley.

March 2014 figures indicated that San Francisco’s tech employment had grown 57% between 2010 and 2013, beating out Silicon Valley’s 14% over the same period, though Silicon Valley remains the regional giant. From 2009 to 2013, tech firms in San Francisco (narrowly defined) added more than 23,000 jobs, leasing up to 22% of city office space, 40% more than during the previous boom (Temple 2013), while financial and legal services have shrunk (Dineen 2012). According to city assessor data, in the first half of 2012 alone the number of tech jobs located in San Francisco increased from 31,000 to 44,000 workers at 1,700 firms in total, as fledgling startups grew, more established firms expanded and Silicon Valley-based companies added San Francisco offices (Taylor 2012). San Francisco’s employment growth in all sectors outpaces the national average, and by March 2014, there was evidence that San Francisco’s tech-sector employment growth was outpacing that of the Valley (Sailors 2014), while rates of wage increase in information and manufacturing sectors have exceeded increases in rents (San Francisco Office of Economic Analysis 2013). In March 2014, the city’s unemployment rate dipped below 5%.

Much of the boom in small startups has concentrated—as before—in SOMA, where old warehousing and light industrial spaces provide ample space for conversion to tech offices. Unlike before, it has also taken aim at the “blighted” Tenderloin/Mid-Market district, downtown San Francisco’s last pocket of non-bourgeois space. The redevelopment of Mid-Market has all the elements of a Jane Jacobs vision become hegemonic, with none of the economic elements—especially low rent and equitable investment in particular (2011, 243)—that make the difference between creating a place consumable for some versus habitable for all. Instead, livability is yoked to a narrative of

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14 This hasn’t eroded the dominance of Silicon Valley firms overall, but it has created a second node of tech development and a friendly competition between the city and the valley.
revitalization that centers on the growth of tech employment in the district. Companies like Yammer (a division of Microsoft), Yelp (consumer reviews), Square (smartphone point-of-sale technology), Dolby (sound) and Twitter have moved to these areas and into well-worn but aesthetically revalorized older industrial buildings. This turn in the “aesthetic mode of production” from artists’ lofts to industrial chic for tech workers, “connect[s] trendy new cultural consumption to netherworlds of tradition and transgression” (Zukin 2011, 233). In other words, the staid and ahistorical suburbs of Silicon Valley will no longer do. Moreover, this elite influx has a strongly racialized character: tech workers nationwide are disproportionately white and Asian—with uniformly high educational attainment—but also black, Latino and female representation in the tech workforce stands lower than the national average and has declined since 2000 (Swift 2010). Google, the largest firm to publish its employment statistics, revealed in May 2014 that only 5% of its employees are black or Latino, and over 60% are white (Miller 2014).

The Mid-Market area, once a thriving theater district dubbed San Francisco’s “Great White Way” for its theater marquees, suffered from shifts in investment away from downtown entertainment over the course of the 20th century. Its hotels, which during the early part of the century housed clerks and office workers, were passed on to the lowest-income tenants as suburban growth accelerated (Groth 1994). The construction of the BART regional rail system to carry suburban white-collar workers from Alameda, San Mateo, and Contra Costa counties, allowed the region’s middle classes access to retail and offices, but permitted them to avoid downtown’s southern end (Fainstein, Fainstein, and Armistead 1983, 222; Hartman 2002). The working class gradually took over residential neighborhoods like the Mission District, Potrero Hill, the Fillmore, and the Castro, leaving high vacancies in Mid-Market. With the redevelopment of the Western Addition in the 1950s—what James Baldwin called “Negro Removal”—African-Americans relocated to the Tenderloin and the Bayview District. Meanwhile, the conversion of San Francisco into a financial center spurred a postwar office building boom that added over 50 high-rise office buildings through 1979 alone (Fainstein, Fainstein, and Armistead 1983). Much of the office growth after 1980 concentrated south of Market (Hartman 2002, 155), devouring a working class residential hotel district, once proximal to the port but now socially and economically marginalized. This development dramatically expanded the business and office district but largely bypassed Market Street beyond 5th. The Yerba Buena Center convention megaproject, planned as early as the 1950s and completed in 1981, anchored this extension of downtown that has added a museum district, an entertainment center, several condominium complexes, and a baseball stadium along with its copious office space.

Through the 1970s, Mid-Market and Tenderloin SRO hotels absorbed refugees from these projects, which laid waste to much of the area’s inexpensive housing. Reagan-era cutbacks to federal mental health funding cast residents unlikely to ever be employed into the SRO rental market, marked by race, class, and age as permanent others in the city’s upward trajectory (Godfrey 1997, 303–33; Wolch and Gabriel 1985). Rapid gentrification throughout the city from the 1970s to the 1990s further compressed the
racialized poor into the Tenderloin. The passage of rent control in 1992, after massive struggles by housing and tenants’ rights organizations, created some protections for low-income residents, including quite strong protections for SRO occupants in place for a month or more. In many cases, they are not up to the onslaught of capital, however, and contain loopholes, particularly vacancy decontrol, which prompt all manner of aggressive landlord actions to rid properties of tenants paying depressed rents (Hartman 2002, 346). Since the 1990s, ongoing gentrification and redevelopment as continued to press in on all sides. The Tenderloin/Mid-Market area represents the last zone of low-income tenancy in the central part of the city (alongside pockets of hotel life still remaining in the Mission), and also houses in open air and intermittent shelter many of the city’s homeless. The area hosts over half of all single-room occupancy rooms in the city, 90% (over 5,500 units) of which are Health Department and Social Services subsidized. For city leaders, Mid-Market is the black eye on an otherwise booming city of finance, information, biotech and real estate, and a perennial target for revitalization.

Whereas during the urban renewal period, the area was a frontier zone of the financial district, with the advance of gentrification it is now penned in on all sides, the hard kernel of a rent gap that the city has been trying to help developers close for years (N. Smith 1979). The City’s own data spell this out. In 2011, when the Office of Economic and Workforce Development published the Central Market Economic Strategy, Mid-Market vacancy rates stood at 30% for retail and 50% for office space. Average office rents were the lowest in the area at roughly $25 and $21 per square foot, respectively, as much as 30-50% below that of nearby submarkets. Meanwhile, the area has seen dramatic increases in professional employment since the early 1990s, priming demand for recapitalization (Central Market Partnership 2011). The Central Market Economic Strategy narrates the rent gap as follows:

[S]ome large, vacant office buildings may also require investment in order to become leasable for large employment uses. Given the current average leasing rates… in many cases the investments are not justified by the potential return; in other words, the projects do not “pencil.” Therefore, without various methods of intervention, many of these properties are likely to remain vacant and continue to contribute to neighborhood blight and depress revitalization efforts. (Central Market Partnership 2011, 20)

With rising pressure on commercial and office space in the immediate area, and SOMA’s vacancy rates at rock bottom (Shevory 2014), depressed rents and high vacancies signal a rent valley of massive proportions.15

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15 Research on transaction data by the Federal Reserve Board suggests that underlying land prices for commercially zoned land in the San Francisco MSA have increased since the 1990s (Nichols, Oliner, and Mulhall 2010). To be clear, this does not include the South Bay, which includes Silicon Valley, where prices for commercial land crashed during the first dot-com boom (Walker 2006). At a wider scale, deriving the component of housing costs represented by rents from the consumer price index for the Bay Area as a whole, Barton finds a similarly massive rise in ground rents, divergent from the United States as a whole and matched only by Los Angeles (2011).
The political-economic analysis conducted by the City suggests an interpretation that state midwifery would be required to close the rent gap and create incentives to return the area to “highest and best use”: state-of-the-art office buildings, high-end retail and dining. Free-market mechanisms and consumer preference would not be enough, despite the strong “pull factors” of the area. To steer tech firm growth toward Mid-Market, in April 2011 the Board of Supervisors approved 8-3 a six-year payroll tax exclusion on new hires, specifically for technology firms, who locate in what Mayor Ed Lee’s office re-branded as the Central Market District (see Figure 7). For firms with annual revenues above $1 million to receive the exemption, specifically for technology firms, who locate in what Mayor Ed Lee’s office re-branded as the Central Market District (see Figure 7). For firms with annual revenues above $1 million to receive the exemption, the plan stipulates that each firm enter into a community benefits agreement (CBA) with the city (Chiu 2011). The “anchor tenant” for what the city hopes will be a dynamic tech corridor is Twitter, which moved into a 1937 art deco office building at 10th and Market Streets later that year.

Colloquially, the area is often now referred to as the “Twitterloin.” Supervisors David Campos and John Avalos, who represent the Mission and Excelsior districts, respectively, voted against the measure, calling it a giveaway and the “wrong precedent” to set. Supervisor David Chiu, representing the wealthier northeastern neighborhoods west of Market, and Jane Kim, whose district encompasses the Mid-Market area, championed

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16 I thank Wendy Wolford for this turn of phrase.
the measure (Wohlsen 2011). For his part, former left-wing Supervisor Chris Daly called the legislation a “land grab” (Daly 2011).

As of March 2014, 14 companies received payroll tax exclusions for locating in Mid-Market, but only six (Microsoft, Twitter, Spotify, One Kings Lane, Zendesk and Zoosk) had the revenue to trigger a CBA. The agreements have had murky results, however (Ha 2013), particularly in the realm of hiring, for which some of the greatest hopes were stoked. For example, a 2011 draft CBA between Twitter and the City would have mandated that Twitter contribute funds and technical support for neighborhood branding efforts, offer street space for arts groups, provide funding for free wireless internet service expansion, offer workforce development services to train residents, hire 40% of new employees as San Francisco residents, and contribute to streetscaping efforts (City of San Francisco 2011). Given that the tax break offered to Twitter is integrated with the Great Streets Project and the Central Market Partnership initiatives, it shouldn’t be surprising that arts, streetscaping, workforce development, and entrepreneurship received priority in the draft over many of the needs of the most vulnerable residents of the area, such as rent stabilization, homeless outreach, and mental health and drug treatment.

This draft was rejected. The CBA that was approved nine months later exchanged local hiring for “engagement” with local organizations that train residents for jobs in the tech sector. The delay in implementing a CBA was estimated in 2011 to have potentially cost the area $3.5 million in benefits (Frazier 2011). The 2014 revised CBA continued in the same vein as the prior agreement, with gestures towards workforce development and providing equipment to local schools, partnerships with local organizations on “building social media capacity,” $500,000 commitment to “local purchasing,” and roughly $350,00017 in direct monetary contributions to local initiatives. Notably, the CBA included a nod to the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition and Sunday Streets, in its “Support Physical Neighborhood Improvements” section (City and County of San Francisco City Administrator 2014). Though it was the most controversial, Twitter’s CBA is in fact the most monetarily binding, with some meager hard sums attached to its corporate social responsibility boilerplate. Zendesk’s CBA, however, is the only one to receive praise from the city-appointed Citizens’ Advisory Committee for the area.

From an employer location perspective, the overall deal was a success, with 17 tech companies adding nearly 8,000 jobs in the area between 2011 and 2013. In 2014 the Office of the Controller reported that a total of 27 companies had taken the exclusion; the report affirmed that revenue generated by the area exceeded the foregone taxes from the program (Office of the Controller 2014). Twitter offices now dominate 10th and Market streets, joining One Kings Lane, Yelp, Square, Microsoft, Spotify, Dolby Laboratories, and Yahoo (Figure 8). Firms like Uber and Square have moved to the district despite not participating in the payroll tax break. Though city analysts find the program revenue-positive, by some estimates losses from the six-year payroll tax exclusion deal with Twitter

17 My calculations of dollar amounts in gifts, excluding in-kind service but including pro-bono legal work.
alone will top $20 million (Bowe 2013). Meanwhile, the community benefits agreement signed by Twitter, which affirmed a commitment to hiring locally in exchange for the tax exemption, has delivered negligible results for longtime residents but a windfall for the firm (Ha 2013), whose initial public offering was one of 2013’s most anticipated. As of March 2014, Twitter’s market capitalization neared $30 billion. The New York Times lauded Twitter for the “revitalization” of the area. In its pages, Twitter’s spokeswoman argued:

The mayor and board of supervisors realized the existing tax structure taxed job creation, so to keep start-ups like ours in the city, they created a limited exemption for the Mid-Market zone… The tax exemption was certainly a factor, but so was the chance to stay in the city in a landmark building (Shevory 2014).

In today’s San Francisco, a company with 2,700 employees worldwide and over $300 million in yearly revenue can straightforwardly call itself a “startup.” Such is the discursive interweaving of the localist “small is beautiful” discourse and the city’s corporate culture, a critical dimension of the narrative of neighborhood renewal.

A residential building boom at a massive scale has followed these firms, with more than 5,500 new, primarily market-rate and luxury housing units in 40 developments in Mid-Market alone, slated for or under construction. The San Francisco Business Times reported $5 billion in new construction, organized by several large firms and real estate investment trusts (REITs), bringing a total of 8,000 new units to the city as a whole, with
downtown and Mid-Market at the core (Dineen 2013). Nearly 7,000 housing units were listed as under construction in the third quarter of 2014, up from 4,300 in the fourth quarter of 2012. Over this same period, gross commercial square footage under construction went from 1.3 million to 6.7 million, 3.7 million of which is office space. Glittering renderings of new developments in Mid-Market and its immediate surroundings dominate the production of imagery surrounding San Francisco’s transformation, showcasing planned buildings at Market and Octavia (the far end of Mid-Market), around the planned Transbay Terminal, at Rincon Hill, in an expanded biotech cluster on the waterfront, and SOMA (including the Museum of Modern Art expansion) (Citybuild Academy 2013). Coincident with the building boom and the affordability crisis is the narrative that the city must build higher, faster, and with fewer restrictions in order to effect a supply-side mitigation of the high costs of living—among the highest in the country (Metcalf 2013; Metcalf 2014).

These developments are all closely tied to the high-wage workforce of the information and technology economy, either housed around the downtown tech cluster or traveling via Wi-Fi-equipped luxury tour buses to Silicon Valley. The massive growth in these shuttle bus services from gentrified San Francisco neighborhoods to workplaces in Silicon Valley signals a reversal of the more common commute pattern of suburb to city. San Francisco is now regarded as a “bedroom community” for the tech corridor to the south, a dynamic that began during the first boom and has accelerated in the second (Solnit and Schwartzenberg 2002; Solnit 2013). As Solnit wrote in 2002, “Much has been said about the New Urbanism, whereby suburbs are designed to resemble small towns, but what is happening in San Francisco and cities across the country is a new New Urbanism in which cities function like suburbs” (Solnit and Schwartzenberg 2002, 29).

The next wave of tech urbanization shows a remaking of urban space in the image of the tech campus, itself modeled on the image of “authentic” urban space. As Mayor Lee crowed, “You just don’t feel innovative in suburban areas,” in a March 2014 statement on tech’s “return” to the city, citing urban amenities, grit, and unpredictable sociality, as part of the reason for the city’s attractiveness for this segment of the workforce (Sailors 2014). This neatly adopts Richard Florida’s claim of a shift in the business culture of high-value industries away from suburban “nerdistans” and toward dynamic urban milieux that, “as opposed to sprawling suburbs, provide the ecology required for breakthrough innovation” (Florida 2013).

Walkable and bike-friendly urban space is suitably framed as a key to attracting and retaining tech talent. Furthermore, the discourse of the productivity gains from livability exposes the fissures between the City and the Valley noted above. As Bruce Katz and Julie Wagner of the Brookings Institution put it, “Talented people want to work and live in urban places that are walkable, bike-able, connected by transit, and hyper-

18 Municipally-organized developments at far-flung, spatially disconnected Hunter’s Point Shipyard and Candlestick Point will add roughly 10,000 units to this total, with the goal of transforming these mostly working-class neighborhoods of color into “mixed-income” communities with 30% below-market-rate (BMR) housing but uncertain implications for overall affordability and access to the core.

19 Calculated from quarterly construction pipeline data available at: data.sfgov.org.
caffeinated” (Katz and Wagner 2014). The kinds of streetscape transformations long sought by bicycle and pedestrian advocates, therefore, are now spoken by the discourse of the economic benefits of livability. They serve as components of the innovation hearths cities hope to build in order to harness the value creation of technology-intensive industry. In 2013, San Francisco “starchitect” David Baker publicly supported bicycle infrastructure on 2nd Street in the South of Market (SOMA) area, a tech hothed, on the grounds that the majority of his workers ride bikes to work. His openly “selfish” reasons (as he put it) included increasing property values and attracting a healthy workforce (M. L. Hall 2013). In other words, bicycles help his bottom line.

As Mayor Lee noted in a dedication ceremony for the new Bay Area Bikeshare, linking the financial district and tech corridors of San Francisco to Silicon Valley cities like Mountain View and Palo Alto via the CalTrain commuter rail system, “It’s no surprise that SOMA is the hottest area of [BikeShare] bicycle use in all of San Francisco. It’s concentrated in that area because that’s where a lot of our technology workers and small business workers are working” (City and County of San Francisco Mayor’s Office 2013). The national advocacy group People for Bikes promotes these economic logics with alacrity, citing innovation, rising property values, larger retail sales receipts and, most notably, a healthier and more productive workforce as reasons for cities to invest in bicycle infrastructure (People For Bikes 2013).

The mobilization of livability and bicycle-friendliness to brand the corridor has begun to take hold beyond the worlds of policy and ideology. One early example of marketing real estate by bicycle was NEMA (NEw MArket), a 750-unit, 37-story luxury condominium tower that opened at 10th and Market in July 2013. Its hyper-chic website boasts, “Ultra-contemporary, extraordinarily-amenitized homes in the center of everything there is to do, go to, or see in the great city of San Francisco” (NEMA 2013a). The NEMA blog celebrates the accessibility, “Tech lynchpins [sic] Twitter, Yammer, Dolby, One Kings Lane, and Square have all moved their offices here in a revitalization of this neighborhood which has always been at the geographical heart of everything cool, hip, trendy and edible that makes SF so unique” (NEMA 2013c). A more recent brochure reiterates the pioneering trope:

A pioneer in a city that loves to be a cultural pioneer, NEMA joins many high-profile technology companies making transformative investments along Market Street in Mid-Market, as well as upscale retail stores, hip restaurants, boutique hotels, and arts organizations that are establishing new locations in the neighborhood. Here, NEMA’s residents will find themselves at the heart of the excitement in a trend-setting community that truly is “Made in San Francisco” (NEMA 2013b).

An omnipresent element in NEMA’s imagery of the neighborhood is the bicycle. Huckleberry Bicycles, opened at 7th and Market in 2011 by the treasurer of the Central Market Community Benefits District, figures prominently in an online NEMA ad, which emphasizes the ability to bike or walk to any nearby destination (Figure 9). NEMA offers a free bike-lending program to residents, with stylish bright red urban-style bicycles produced by the local San Francisco brand Public Bikes, which also supplies tech firms
with campus bicycles (Bialick 2013). Other developments have adopted this branding strategy, as well. The website for a 36-unit condo development at 14th and Valencia portrays a row of cyclists on its main page and boasts of locally owned bike shops nearby. Vara, close by at 15th and Mission, features high-design racks and a bicycle repair station behind its imposing gates. Livability, in this case, literally adds value to spatial investments. As Henderson (2013) puts it, “bicycling is not just hip but also sells real estate,” a lesson San Francisco capitalists are rapidly learning (Sheridan 2013).

At one level, this is simply classic marketing, which can read as a cynical attempt to trade on the undeniable cool of bike culture. At another, though, it shows the alignment of cycling culture with the discursive and material branding of changing urban space (Greenberg 2008). As flexible, individualized transportation option characteristic of urban life, cycling references the innovative entrepreneur (Florida 2011; Russell 2012; Bernstein and Ryssdal 2012). As a caller to local NPR affiliate KQED’s program debating the tech boom argued, “[Tech] employees come here to choose this lifestyle. They want to bike to work, they want to go to cafes… they’re inherently progressive… San Francisco is winning the global battle for talent” (J. Campbell 2012). The new face of cycling—a relaxed, savvy urbanite that has supplanted the Lycra-clad racer and the

20 NEMA’s over-the-top branding strategy depicting impossibly lavish lifestyles inhabited by heterosexual white men and their Asian partners, drew online ire even from NEMA residents who saw it as a distortion of the kinds of people actually living there.
suicidal bike messenger—signals the arrival of bicycles as a legitimate commute mode and the valuation of the people they carry. Thus, the use of cycling to brand urban space is never just ideological foam on the deep currents of political economy; the production of bicycle space is its key material moment.

This valuation of cycling was enshrined in the 2012 Bicycle Access Bill, written in quasi-partnership between the SFBC, progressive supervisor (and avid cyclist) John Avalos, and the Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA). The bill mandates bicycle access and secure parking in all downtown office buildings of 75 feet or more, largely white-collar, salaried or high-wage workplaces. Its passage represented the acceptance by a major fraction of San Francisco’s capitalist class that cycling was an acceptable transit mode and that employers hoping to attract talent needed to provide secure parking. At the SFBC’s annual Golden Wheel Awards in 2012, attended by all major players in San Francisco’s power elite, Executive Director Leah Shahum honored BOMA for its participation: “Thank you BOMA for building bridges and partnering with the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition for a stronger economy and a healthier workforce” (San Francisco Bicycle Coalition 2012).

I learned about this when I dropped in on Car-Free Happy Hour, an informal gathering of bike advocates, policy wonks, and radicals that gathers every month at Zeitgeist, a popular beer garden in the Mission District and a former holdout of the area’s rebel motorcycle culture. Since my research dealt with the growing relationship between bicycle advocacy and discourses of business-friendliness and economic benefit, it was hard to be surprised that the SFBC had joined hands with a key business lobby in the city. The cohort I shared beers with had mixed reactions, many seeing it as evidence both of cycling’s arrival and of the bike coalition’s coziness with the business community, a $75-a-plate dinner with a Who’s Who of the city. Despite the rarified site of politics, I had no trouble getting hold of John Bozeman, BOMA’s public affairs manager, to discuss the move.

When we spoke on the phone, Bozeman insisted that the bill was driven by the tenants BOMA represents, who were “follow[ing] the market trend” of younger companies improving access for cyclists as a perk to attract a talented workforce (see Henderson, 2013). “Ten years ago,” Bozeman told me, “BOMA wouldn’t have supported the legislation. It’s a confluence of safer city riding and the need for secure bike parking.” Indeed, BOMA opposed a similar measure in 2002 (Tube Times 2001d; S. Jones 2012), and its shift in position dovetails with the changed social base of downtown employers. Business Week noted this shift in the new tech boom worker: “In the dizzy days of the dot-com bubble, sports cars emblazoned with Starship Academy stickers were the emblems of geek chic. Now… it’s the one-speed bicycle known as a fixie that can cost as much as $2,000” (Russell 2012). Bozeman took no position on the transformation of Market Street, even as I pushed the point, eager to know if BOMA had been looking to the street transformations when drafting the bill. He reiterated that the Association only reflected the stance of the owners it represents, but offered a more general comment that any street design should be guided by the question: “Is it good for the city?”—understood here as downtown firms.
One doubts that the transformation of Market Street into a more effective conveyor belt for downtown-bound cyclists has no effect on BOMA’s impression of the “market trend” they are following. Furthermore, with the SFBC playing a key role in the Better Market Street Project, the drafting of the bicycle access legislation, and the transformation of Valencia Street, we can identify the emergent spatial coordination of bicycle access to specific streets and buildings as part of the reconfiguration of the home-to-work linkage in San Francisco. The bicycle access bill only affects a privileged sector of San Francisco’s labor force: professionals who work in office buildings in the financial district and commute by bicycle from nearby gentrified areas or by CalTrain from wealthy San Mateo and Santa Clara counties (see Figure 10). Moreover, it is unlikely to expand as policy, given that it depends precisely on providing for the flows of overvalued labor-power into the city, not the larger populations in less secure employment and more spatially dispersed workplaces.

The in-migration of high-wage tech workers is thus far still interpreted San Francisco’s perceived parasitic relationship to Silicon Valley, exemplified by the “Google Bus” phenomenon. This narrative, which holds that the luxury shuttles Silicon Valley firms use to bring in workers living in San Francisco privatize public transportation and ferry spoiled tech workers through the city like “alien overlords” (Solnit 2013). The buses crystallize the deep rifts forming in San Francisco due to the boom, and capture both headlines and activist ire. To the high wages paid by tech firms are added the subsidization of transportation and on-campus food, effectively underwriting ever-rising rents. Stamen Designs, a firm that tracked these shuttles in 2011 using bicycle messengers, estimated that this private bus system carries up to 35% of the volume of CalTrain (Stamen Designs 2012). In 2014, a large protest movement emerged to confront the gentrification caused by high demand for housing near shuttle stops, using innovative street theater and social media messaging to drive the issue to the forefront of news and debate (CBS San Francisco 2014; Anti-Eviction Mapping Project 2014). The result was very little change. The narrative detoured into an argument about the buses’ use of public bus stops, resulting in the imposition of a nominal fee for this practice (Kwong 2014). Although by April 2015 protests in San Francisco against the buses had largely died down, they have emerged in Oakland, as even well-paid tech employees find few options in San Francisco’s housing market.

21 The relationship between the shuttle protests and the bicycle is an interesting one. The social formations aligned around resisting the tech shuttles come from anarchist, activist, non-profit, artist, and even “tech” tinkerer social formations, similar sources from the high point of Critical Mass in the 1990s. In media coverage of these moments, protesters can be seen riding and walking bicycles, and even putting them to tactical use (see Chapter 2). Conversely, bicycles are something of an obsession at Google, which provides hundreds of bicycles for workers to ride across the company’s expansive car-free campus. 7% of Google workers cycle to work, and some even ride the 42 miles from San Francisco in small, athletic groups (McMillan 2013). These examples illustrate the fractured nature of the bicycle, gainsaying any narratives either of the uniform gentrification of the bicycle or its fundamental countercultural quality. But they also show the linkages between these social worlds. Bicycles express both countercultural commitments and the valorization of flexible, small-scale, technological solutions. Indeed, Google’s cultural power has come from casting itself as countercultural (Turner 2009).
Figure 10. San Francisco and Silicon Valley. Map by author.
The buses, in fact, expose a condition in which, to again paraphrase Gramsci, the old is eroding and the new has yet to be built. Firms like Google, Apple, and Facebook require agglomeration to realize the value of the untraded interdependencies that flourish in dense areas, particularly face-to-face contact, as well as the large pools of labor-power that accumulate in cities (Storper and Venables 2003). But the legacy of the “growing pains” of the early semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1984), coupled with its elitism, renders its cities hostile to dense housing even while the incredible wealth created by its industries drives up land prices (Cutler 2014b). Disinvested areas of San Francisco offer cheaper office space for startups and more housing options, encouraging the locus of innovation to shift to San Francisco. In order to more fully participate in a spatial milieu that drives innovation, a move to the city is in order. Amid the rancor of the tech shuttle debates, firms appear to be looking for a way to relocate to urban cores in order to be closer to the action. In February 2014, Google leased a 35,000 square foot site at the edge of the Mission District, evidently to house its startup acquisitions (Bradshaw 2014). Rumors abound as to the firms that will occupy the former Sears and Roebuck building—in the process of redevelopment specifically for tech offices—at the northern edge of downtown Oakland in the city’s booming arts and nightlife district (C. Jones 2014). Beyond city rhetoric, the firms themselves, it would appear, have put money behind talk of urban dynamism. Given the overwhelming role of bicycles on Silicon Valley tech campuses and in the discourse about innovation corridors, bicycle infrastructure and advocacy stand to play a key role in this reurbanization of production.

**Remaking The Street: The Public Realm as Support for Gentrification**

A second set of efforts goes beyond the discourse of livability-as-productivity to enact transformations of streets and mobility, intending to produce a spatial milieu of neighborhood effects in which the bicycle’s value is represented in the streetscape itself. This involves building the bicycle into the material street as a way to produce a more desirable and profitable mode of life out of the detritus of disinvestment. These efforts represent the alignment of bicycle advocates, and other progressive urbanists, with the types of activities that prime the pump of gentrification. They also show the ultimately uncertain status of their toeholds in the world of planning the built environment.

The concentration of non-routine labor and command and control functions in urban cores is nothing new in capitalism, since such firms benefit from agglomeration more than from low land prices. Nor is intervention by regional economic elites, such as the Bay Area Council or SPUR, to steer public infrastructure investment in ways that support urban centrality. Witness the BART system, regional rail, and the highway networks focused on San Francisco, for instance. The intervention at the level of everyday life and spaces of encounter to create a new industrial hearth out of livable urban space is somewhat unprecedented. What is remarkable about the current wave of gentrification is that prosaic and inexpensive improvements such as bike lanes and sidewalks, rather than

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22 Very few PDAs have been designated in this part of the region, for instance, despite tremendous job growth (Association of Bay Area Governments and Metropolitan Transportation Commission 2013).
large, costly fixed investments, have emerged as what makes a “good neighborhood,”
proper *mobility*, and suitable public space.

Whereas the development-happy mayoralty of Willie Brown soured progressives
on building for building’s sake, a new wave of revitalization, taking its cues from early
gentrifiers’ penchant for localism, sustainability, and cosmopolitanism, has been
championed by progressive alliances forged during the late 1990s. Paradoxically, what big
capital allied with a growth-oriented administration could not complete—solving the
problem of Mid-Market—is now spearheaded by a cohort of grassroots organizations
allied with city offices and funded by competitive grants. The most recent iteration of this
network is the Better Market Street Project, a collaborative effort of the Department of
Public Works, the Planning Department, the Municipal Transportation Agency, the San
Francisco County Transportation Authority, and the Mayor’s Office of Economic and
Workforce Development. The collaboration has generated plans for a far-reaching
transformation of the corridor, emphasizing walkability, multi-modal transportation,
vibrant social life, arts, and culture. As the project website attests:

A renewed Market Street will anchor neighborhoods, link public open spaces and
connect the City’s Civic Center with cultural, social, convention, tourism, and retail
destinations, as well as with the regional transit hub that will be centered at the planned
Transbay Terminal. The vision is to create Market Street as a place to stop and spend
time, meet friends, watch people while sitting in a café, or just stroll and take in the scene
(City and County of San Francisco).

The plan, set for implementation in 2017, will integrate the thoroughly gentrified Mission
with the financial district, the Powell Street shopping district and the Embarcadero tourist
zone, with Market Street as the backbone. Project planners hope that investment in
streetscaping and entrepreneurial incubation will further drive the recapitalization of
Mid-Market and the “revitalization” of its public space. This is remarkable because Mid-
Market is nothing if not vital; despite being framed as “underutilized,” it is very much a
space of *use* by the racialized urban poor. As the “front yard” of the cramped SROs in the
surrounding area, however, the forms of sociality practiced in this space make it a site of
middle class unease.

The Better Market Street Project builds on the practical links developed during
the Great Streets Project, a streetscaping design and innovation partnership active
between 2005 and 2012, only now its target is not the minor upgrading of a disparate set
of corridors but the very area most anticipated by San Francisco’s development machine.
Activists and advocates have placed themselves at the helm of efforts to make Market
Street live up to its centrality both culturally and economically. In fact, it depends
substantially on an array of non-profit organizations assembled around making San
Francisco’s streets safer, more aesthetically pleasing, and more cosmopolitan. The
involvement of social service non-profits in particular is in no small part due to previous
victories granting the poor some degree of protection from displacement and thus
requiring the presence of service providers at the planning table. This is a decentralized,
networked machine, which derives its power not simply from congruence with capitalist
interests or the fusion of capital and the municipal state but from a subtle building of
hegemony through innovative design and articulation of developmentalist and environmentalist social blocs, whose core constituency consists of educated, self-understood progressives who are critically enmeshed in the gentrification project. At the core of its logic is the construction of the bicycle as a signifier of value in the labor force and thus a vector of revitalization.

Market Street has long been identified as a key artery for bicyclists commuting to downtown office buildings, and was designated by the 1996 Bicycle Plan as a bicycle route. Despite this, it remains plagued by high traffic volumes, intermittent bicycle infrastructure, and a challenging configuration, due to the convergence of two distinct street grids. Furthermore, the reputation of Mid-Market as a zone of social disorder created an opening for efforts to shape the public realm through roadway design, especially the reduction of traffic speeds and volumes and the enhancement of pedestrian life and bike-friendliness. As advocates pursued greater cycling safety, they also worked towards longstanding goals of cleaning up the corridor. After a long period of stasis, some progress on Market Street was made in 2010 with new bike lanes—painted green and buffered by flexible posts—and mandatory right-turn lanes for cars.\textsuperscript{23}

These changes were achieved despite a standing injunction against new bicycle infrastructure, which was won in 2006 by anti-bike activist Rob Anderson. When voting on the 2005 updated bicycle plan, the Board of Supervisors waived the full environmental review process, perceiving the plan as environmentally positive. In the suit, Anderson argued that the bicycle plan required an environmental review, despite the expected reduction of car use, because more cars would potentially spend time idling. The Superior Court ruled in his favor, and this convenient use of CEQA as a cover for ideological opposition stymied four years of infrastructural investment before being overturned in 2010.

The green lanes were permitted on Market despite the injunction because they were part of a pilot project subject to different regulations. More striping occurred in 2011 in conjunction with Bike to Work Day. According to recent counts, Market Street now boasts the heaviest bicycle traffic of any street west of the Mississippi, with bicycles often outnumbering private cars during rush hour (San Francisco Bicycle Coalition 2013a). Between 2006 and 2011, counts showed a near-doubling in cycling during peak hours (San Francisco Bicycle Coalition 2013b). Such counts have shown impressive growth on many streets throughout the neighborhoods nearest San Francisco’s core, notably Valencia Street in the Mission (see Chapter 3). But capturing Market would mean something new for advocates. Not a quaint, gentrified leisure strip like Valencia, Market is a commuter trunk line, plied by armies of taxicabs, with MUNI streetcars and BART beneath. Here, the inclusion of bicycles in the street design symbolizes their arrival as a legitimate commute mode, and the growing strength of advocates as political players.

This is not the place to examine the intricacies of the planning process except to note its length. But the agonizing pace of transformation of the street, while frustrating

\textsuperscript{23} The forcing of turning traffic into lanes to the right of the new bike lanes minimizes the dreaded “right-hook,” in which a turning car cuts off a cyclist who is continuing straight.
advocates, has actually built political conviction and even facilitated the infiltration of the planning process by activists. Dave Snyder has noted that one critical moment for bicycle advocacy in San Francisco was the installation of staunchly pro-bike planner Ed Reiskin as head of the MTA—a far cry from Maher’s “over my dead body” approach. When I spoke to Tom Radulovich, who in addition to running Livable City serves on the Board of Directors of BART, he emphasized this point:

[There is] certainly a group of people with a similar sensibility that all felt like these were your people, that are now in positions of authority here and there, and you're like, "Wow, that's sort of odd, that we're kind of infiltrating the organizations." And we're now, not the establishment, there really is an establishment that's not us and really has very different values, but at least we're in institutions, elective office in my case, and can kind of advocate those points of view from a position of authority.

Over the period in question, the SFBC went from a ragtag organization to a professionalized non-profit with a dress code and a large staff, as its membership exploded to over 12,000. In many ways the glacial speed of the process, coupled with the injunction, created pent-up political demand that then synchronized with the explosive growth currently underway, with a San Francisco leadership amendable to the cycling agenda.

The symbolic economy of the livability agenda for Market Street, however, which bicycle advocates have played a strong role in shaping, reveals the contradictory nature of the political moment. Specifically, it shows how the careful crafting of a certain version of livability encounters and disavows the race-classed others who must make way for it. I attended the second Better Market Street Project workshop in July 2012, where design concepts were presented to a group of about fifty citizens, most of them involved in the planning and non-profit world, and most of them white. Concerns about encouraging a more public street—and about who counts as public—played out in debates about the presence of the poor who have yet to be gentrified out, and whether their behavior would deter the intended middle-class users. If the livable street is where cosmopolitan citizens are encouraged to dally and “hang out,” incorporating these activities into frontline efforts to gentrify Mid-Market brings these new flâneurs in contact with the poor whose hold on the area the city hopes to break (cf. Harvey 2005).

At the workshop, design concepts were sorted into themed stations, which we rotated to in groups to discuss designs with facilitators and each other. The first station I attended, dubbed Placemaking, set the tone. The facilitator emphasized the need for “place-making” designs and symbols to accentuate the corridor’s “one-street” character, rendering Market Street a holistic space with “new opportunities for synergy.” In other words, the forms of making place that the racialized poor currently practice are not legible as social life. To the pervasive question of these extant spatial practices, which clearly many saw as disorderly and dangerous, a facilitator at another station offered that Streetlife Zones would be “places for new experiences” that would celebrate the area’s diversity and “invite activities,” rather than “exclude” anybody. As the facilitator put it,

24 Reiskin went on to play a key role in NACTO.
these zones would “activate” underutilized space, “inviting people to behave in a more open manner.” During a discussion at another station, one attendee argued that if car traffic was reduced the area was “gonna be scary,” with fewer drivers to see and discourage illicit activity. A cyclist responded, “Cars don’t make the street safer,” to which the commenter angrily replied, “Bikes don’t make the street safer.” At the Public Space station, when asked about “criminal elements,” the facilitator replied that the goal was not “to take away invitations to those people but invite more people”—implicitly middle-class, behaved citizens—“and those uses will go away.” The pervasive trope of invitation, rather than exclusion, frames a governmental role for cyclists and pedestrians as Jane Jacobs’ “eyes on the street,” regulating the behavior of fellow street users by example and surveillance rather than force and discipline (J. Jacobs 1992; Foucault et al. 1991).

This discourse vividly rehearses Engels’ observation that only solution the bourgeoisie has ever found for the poor is to move them around (Engels 1942). It adds a twist, however. The ability of the racialized poor to remain in Mid-Market is uniquely well-protected, as are the social services they depend on, thanks to long and bitter struggle by activists. Eroding the social milieu by which they make the street theirs becomes the goal; following Blomley, property in the social space of the street is what they stand to lose. “Activating” Mid-Market is in fact about parsing the acceptable and desired activities from the unacceptable. Moreover, what is striking about the Better Market Street Project is that ordinary progressive organizations, not simply developers and tech’s modern robber barons, are those seeking the transformation of Market Street into a gracious, cosmopolitan, and bourgeois—in the older sense of “city-dweller”—space. Here, the value attached to cycling bodies goes beyond their roles as consumers or flexible workers to signify a new kind of street, where both politics and poverty are excised by the relentless inclusion of proper forms of mobility and sociability.

The many deleterious effects of San Francisco’s dizzying boom are now widely recognized. Commentators decry the deep social gulf between the tech elite and the neglected poor (and even the middle class). Salon founder David Talbot has called the new San Francisco a “Blade Runner kind of society,” arguing that “everything that attracted these young digital workers to the city is in peril” (J. Campbell 2012; Talbot 2012). Lamentations abound that superheated gentrification is causing San Francisco to lose its “cool” edge, as artists and other “creatives,” as well as teachers, public employees and even tech workers themselves relocate to Oakland (S. Jones and Chanoff 2012b; S. Jones and Chanoff 2012a). Oakland’s gentrification is now in full swing as well, buoyed by its proximity to the wealth generated by San Francisco and even domesticating some tech industry within its own borders. Big Tech has been put ideologically on the run by the protests against shuttles, both in San Francisco and Oakland, and recently published workforce statistics by Google and Facebook have revealed the industry’s stunning lack of diversity. Social media outbursts by startup founders about San Francisco’s poor have confirmed widely-held suspicions that neither firm leaders nor their well-paid employees care about the impact their success is having (Montgomery, 2013; Rodriguez, 2013; but see also Cutler, 2014a, 2014b). Meanwhile, many view billionaire angel investor Ron Conway as the puppeteer behind Mayor Ed Lee’s tech-centric vision for the city (M.
Smith 2012).

In this context, pro-growth organizations such as SPUR and the Urban Land Institute argue for a relaxation of land use regulations to encourage development, locating high housing costs as a San Francisco supply problem rather than a reflection of regional wage disparities and landlord power (though SPUR’s Gabriel Metcalf, for his part, does argue for aggressive construction of affordable housing) (Metcalf 2013; Metcalf and Terplan 2013). In the chapters that follow, however, I argue that despite choice words from a few tech industry robber barons, in the contemporary San Francisco Bay Area we do not find the nasty “revanchism” of Giuliani’s New York (N. Smith 1996). Instead, we see a complex politics of the production of space, saturated with class, race, and generational tensions, in which self-identified progressives work tirelessly to make the city more livable, just as livability becomes a prime source of value in the urban space economy.

**Livable Space as Development Territoriality: The West Oakland Specific Plan**

By 2009, the shock waves of San Francisco’s furious boom were reaching Oakland in earnest, carrying with them teachers, public employees, artists, designers, and others in search of less expensive housing for sale or rent. At this time, Oakland also began to supplant San Francisco as the location of first choice for those coming to the Bay Area from elsewhere, as its growing cachet and San Francisco’s affordability crisis became national news. Whereas 1996-2001 brought the first bout of gentrification to Oakland’s mixed-income neighborhoods east of the Grove-Shafter Freeway, housing prices in the predominantly black neighborhoods to the west were unperturbed.25 With Oakland now figured as a pressure release valve for the overvaluation of real estate in San Francisco and its political antagonisms (Metcalf 2013; Torres 2013), it has seen a surge in rents and high pressure on the housing market around key nodes of easy access to BART. This has occurred amid a storm of foreclosures and investor buy-ups in the “flatlands”—historically disinvested neighborhoods of North, West and East Oakland (Steve King 2012). These primarily African American working and middle class areas, once considered locations to avoid, are now seeing some of the fastest housing cost increases in the region, as the westward creep of the comfortably gentrified environs east of the freeway reaches areas shielded from previous booms.

When former California governor Jerry Brown took office as Mayor of Oakland in 1999, he announced an ambitious rezoning plan to draw 10,000 new residents to downtown Oakland through brownfield redevelopments and loft conversions. As Brown put it, in a clearly racialized turn of phrase, “We needed housing and not just for people that are hanging on or people who live on subsidies, but people who have disposable income that can go to the art galleries and restaurants” (Elison 2010). Fifteen years later, downtown Oakland booms with activity, led by a new crop of bars, cafes, and restaurants, as recapitalization creeps slowly north up Telegraph and Broadway into more residential

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25 Based on historical sale data from Zillow.com.
environ where no massive new developments have occurred. Brown’s “10K” plan, however, focused as it was on jumpstarting downtown, where transit connections are already robust, did little to intervene in the organization of mobility and transportation. In contrast, more recent plans have led with streetscape improvements in the name of sustainability and economic vitality. Exemplary among these is the West Oakland Specific Plan (WOSP).

With downtown Oakland, the Temescal district of North Oakland, and downtown San Francisco’s core neighborhoods now working as an interlinked archipelago of growing wealth, West Oakland for the most part remains conspicuously excluded. This historic working class black community, cut off from downtown by racist housing policies and the construction of the Grove Shafter Freeway, lies surrounded by encroaching reinvestment, a cavernous, neighborhood-scale rent gap. Like Mid-Market, West Oakland has long been considered a frightening zone of social disorder. Unlike Mid-Market, it is a residential neighborhood, with several distinct commercial corridors but no office buildings or large-scale retail space. It is a space in rapid flux. Racialized devaluation of the built environment in the form of foreclosures swept the area from 2007 onward, annihilating African-American home equity.

West Oakland is emblematic of the regional flux of African-Americans out of historic working class neighborhoods (Figure 11). In 1980, West Oakland had just over 20,000 residents, 87% of whom were black. Current census data estimate 25,698 residents, only half of whom are African-American (U.S. Census Bureau 1980; U.S. Census Bureau 2013c).\(^{26}\) Over this period, Oakland as a whole lost 50,000 black residents, 33,000 of them in the first decade of the new millennium (Metropolitan Transportation Commission and Association of Bay Area Governments 2011), and West Oakland no longer contains the majority of Oakland’s African-American population. Despite a weakening of black political power, gentrification, white in-migration, and black population loss in this historically strong and politically organized neighborhood are major topics of public discourse (Kuravila 2011).

As West Oakland’s sociospatial position shifts from ignored warehouse for a “surplus” population to an “opportunity” area with mouthwatering proximity to San Francisco, redevelopment plans focus more attention on adding market-rate housing and amenities. Unlike Brown’s “10K” plan, the WOSP involves extensive rezoning and intervention in the public realm. While the plan includes better bus service and even the return of the streetcar, both longer-term needs demanded by neighborhood activists, it also incorporates strategies to make West Oakland’s streets friendlier to cyclists and pedestrians. Two decades in the making, WOSP, like the Better Market Street Project, unites two main currents in contemporary Oakland development politics. The first is a political class bent on capitalizing on Oakland’s opportunity to siphon off the capital sloshing through the region. The second is an ascendant commonsense among progressive planners that bicycling makes up a critical part of livable, economically vital street. These threads converge on West Oakland, which lies in the crosshairs of the “greenwave” (Checker 2011), planning practices that unite economic competitiveness and environmental governance by shaping the built environment in the name of “quality of life.” But, importantly, plans incorporate the desires of longtime residents—which largely predate the direct gaze of capital—into a framework that relegates their time to the past.

The city initiated the WOSP in 2010, along with the Oakland Army Base Redevelopment Project, with funding from a $2 million federal Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) grant award. In February 2012, in the middle of the WOSP planning process, the state legislature dissolved 425 Redevelopment Agencies, casting the future of funding for development projects into question and eliminating cities’ powers of condemnation, eminent domain, and tax increment financing (Stephens and Fulton 2012). Without redevelopment powers, the plan proceeds with greater dependence on competitive grant funding and far less available capital allocated for affordable housing (City of Oakland 2014, chap. 10). It is important to note that at least through the mid-2000s, community organizations saw reinvestment as a positive step towards the repair of urban space, and participated heavily.

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\(^{26}\) Earlier drafts using the 2008-2012 ACS recorded just over 24,000 people, 51.8% of whom were black. As with any sample for small geographies (the 13 census tracts that make up West Oakland), one-year variations are difficult to rely upon as evidence of anything. The change in neighborhood composition, however, is clear.
in the early stages of the planning process (Zimmerman 2009). The West Oakland Project Area Committee (WOPAC), a community advisory group formed in the 1990s to steer Redevelopment Agency plans, was particularly involved in initial aspects of the project.27

The WOSP is primarily a rezoning plan, converting large amounts of aging and vacant industrial land in the project area to mixed-use residential, high-tech, light industrial, and commercial developments. Heavy industrial uses, such as metal recycling, will be encouraged to relocate to the Oakland Army Base redevelopment area. The street network also presents a challenge. With an industrial legacy comes a streetscape that in many areas is ill-suited for residential use, lacking sidewalks and crosswalks in places, and scattered with rail spurs that pose a threat to cyclists. Throughout the area, enclaves of artists have sprung up over the past two decades, inhabiting vacant industrial buildings, many of which have been converted to lofts and studios. Streets like Adeline and Peralta find Victorian houses, both stately and ramshackle, interspersed with public housing projects, modest 8-unit apartment buildings, and aging factories and warehouses.

While much of the older housing is in poor condition, new housing development and renovation has recently accelerated, with 1,500 units constructed between 2000 and 2011 (City of Oakland 2014, chap. 6). The 7th Street near West Oakland BART, the neighborhood’s southwest corner, hosts the Mandela Gateway affordable housing project of 168 units, and has seen sporadic market-driven upgrades of the older Victorian-era housing stock. North on Wood Street are the 163-unit “live-work” Pacific Cannery Lofts and the 130-unit Zephyr Gate development, both market-rate, the first pieces of the larger Wood Street master plan near the old Central Station at the western limit of 16th Street. The neighborhood’s northern edge, near the Emeryville border, has seen numerous loft conversions and small condominium complexes, with a few larger developments along Mandela Parkway, the first of West Oakland’s streets to see bicycle lanes and streetscaping. Occupying the former footprint of the Cypress Freeway, which collapsed in 1989, Mandela Parkway was a triumph of community organizing to resist the rebuilding of the Cypress and heal the deep scar it created.

Seventh Street hosts the only real commercial strip in the area. Once known as the “Harlem of the West,” it was a pivot of African-American culture in California during the heady years of World War II (M. Johnson 1993). During the postwar period, its waning vitality was exacerbated by the closure of the Key System streetcar, the construction of BART, a massive postal facility, and the Cypress and Grove Shafter freeways from the 1950s to the 1970s. BART and the postal facility destroyed all of the businesses on the south side of the street and deprived the rest of a clientele that now passed overhead. Only the venerable jazz club Esther’s Orbit Room survived until the present, closing in 2012. Currently, the Mandela Gateway development has a few modest blocks of retail, including a cooperative grocery store (the only one in West Oakland). Also on 7th are Revolution Café, a gritty punk/anarchist coffee shop and community space, and Bikes 4 Life, a community-oriented non-profit bike shop run by West Oakland...

27 The following several paragraphs are heavily indebted to Zimmerman’s work, but I write them from a perspective now over half a decade after his fieldwork.
native Tony Coleman and adorned with a large mural of Major Taylor, the early 20th
century African-American champion cyclist. The mission and aesthetic of Bikes 4 Life,
until recently West Oakland’s only bike shop, emphasizes black community
empowerment, health, and anti-violence activism in addition to environmental
responsibility, contrasting sharply with the dominant coding of cycling in the rest of the
city. While these businesses anchor a small but growing district, they depend on its
cheap rents and could be displaced by undirected reinvestment.

Aspects of the WOSP have been in the making since long before the area was a
target of gentrification. Improving decrepit streets and creating jobs have been high on
the list of community demands the Center for West Oakland Revitalization (CWOR)
formed in 1994. As the area’s relative affordability, attractive housing stock, and
proximity to downtown San Francisco attracts middle- and high-income workers to its
enhors, these demands have been crowded out by overwhelming pressure on residential
development. Though the WOSP includes provisions to maintain working class jobs in
the area, and proposes no elimination of existing housing units, the intense contradictions
between the buying power of in-migrants and current residents, exacerbated by county-
level affordability guidelines, stand to put even below market-rate (BMR) housing units
out of the reach of many.

Under the WOSP, improvements to the public realm fall under the category of
“Supporting the Plan,” making it clear that the project’s main targets are the acres of
underutilized and derelict industrial land. Serving the goal of recapitalization, however, is
an extensive plan to enhance the pedestrian, cycling, and transit environment, with bike
lanes, improved lighting, crosswalks, pedestrian bulb-outs, added bus service, traffic
circles, “pocket parks,” and even light rail planned for the area. This includes a “road
diet” on several corridors, among them West Grand Avenue, a major thoroughfare in the
northern part of West Oakland, aimed at “catalyzing new development opportunities
and generally improving the industrial/residential edge” (City of Oakland 2014, chap. 7).
Road diets on West Grand and Adeline, 12th, and 14th Streets are intended to integrate
with streetscaping on Martin Luther King Jr. Way, Peralta Street, and 7th Street. Improving mobility in West Oakland as well as connecting it to other nodes of activity
goes hand in hand with “creating a clean, friendly neighborhood impression” (Gates &
Associates 2012, 90).

The WOSP connects these projects, incorporating them into a coherent vision for
remaking the neighborhood. It sets out a general plan for the area, integrating workforce

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28 This spatialization of race through different geographies of cycling practice will be more fully explored in
Chapter 3.

29 These three corridors were planned separately in the early 2000s after being identified as key vital streets
by WOPAC. 7th Street, the former heart of the West Oakland black community’s commercial strip was
partially demolished to make way for BART in the 1960s. Peralta Street is a former industrial corridor at a
diagonal to the street grid that connects the Lower Bottoms neighborhood surrounding West Oakland
BART to Emeryville. Martin Luther King Jr. Way is a mostly residential former streetcar line running
north-south through the Longfellow/Hoover neighborhood, an area distinct from West Oakland proper
but equally cut off from the rest of Oakland by the freeway. These three corridors form three sides of a
rough trapezoid that circumscribes the east half of West Oakland.
housing, employment siting, job creation, environmental upgrading, and transportation improvements (of which bicycle infrastructure plays a relatively minor role). A fundamental feature is the vigorous pursuit of the “knowledge economy.” West Oakland, historically redlined and disinvested by postwar development, is now framed as a creativity hearth ripe with potential:

Arts related businesses in West Oakland are diverse and include traditional ethnic-based cultural groups, youth groups, individual artists, and most notably a large community of industrial artists who often occupy older and physically-challenged or underutilized buildings due to need for lower rent structures and who contribute industry and creativity to the area. These clusters of arts activities are hubs of innovation and creativity, and spur cultural production (City of Oakland, 2014, Chapter 5, p. 50).

This “self-organized” economy by “marginal gentrifiers” (D. Rose 1984) which largely excludes the black working class in its cultural production, is celebrated as part of the historic resources that need to be preserved. The destruction of working class livelihoods through deindustrialization, reflected in the built environment itself, becomes an opportunity. Here, the Jacobs-meets-Hayek30 world of Burning Man, “hacking,” and “making,” are no longer just subcultural handicraft practices associated with largely white first-wave gentrifiers, but the beginnings of a new urban economy:

Logos and banners are not enough to create an environment of innovation and entertainment that will draw creative residents, innovative businesses or visitors seeking a new experience. Within West Oakland, a “maker” brand identity is underway, which will eventually produce branding or logo identification for Oakland. It is imperative to use such positive branding to dispel the current media perception and reality of West Oakland as an unsafe and blighted community (ibid., p. 58).

Innovation spaces thus form a key part of the area plan for reinvestment in the built environment, essential to West Oakland’s “brand identity”:

The West Oakland Transit Village/ BART development should be curated to include artistic invention and innovation, and to layer uses such that market-rate users in tech or R&D-type creative spaces will augment and support the rental rates, demonstrating the types of creative economy that is [sic] present in the rest of the district (ibid., p. 59).

Such anchors of innovation are the former American Steel building, with 70 studios forming what the plan calls an “industrial commons” (ibid., p. 59), and the Crucible, a group metalworking studio hosting a wide range of arts activities, as well as bicycle fabrication and repair. The plan’s goal is to preserve and solidify such spaces such that the value they produce can be harnessed toward tax revenue and property reinvestment alike.

The WOSP does not list cycling as a direct contributor to this “creative economy,” only as a more or less mandatory part of a livable streetscape. But the chain of equivalences that links livability to creativity runs through the whole plan. It is a framing that identifies the succession of artists and creative laborers in urban space as a valuable foundation for economic growth. The lifestyle of residents not directly connected to the

30 I am in debt to Alexander Tarr for this apt turn of phrase.
arts is reconfigured as a resource:

West Oakland also attracts an “arts-adjacent,” lifestyle segment that is attracted to the artists and their surroundings. These artists’ communities are often in interesting places, such as former manufacturing facilities and yards, which are ripe for discovery and which fuel creativity. Some of these arts-adjacent residents are employed in related fields such as alternative energy and urban farming and there is a natural synergy between environmental innovation and arts (ibid., p. 51).

This “natural synergy” has an unspoken link to the bicycle/transit nexus. Chapter 3 will explore further the ways in which the lifestyles celebrated in the WOSP are in many ways founded on utility cycling. While no large-scale bicycle production is in the offing, the cultural cachet of the bicycle enters both the rebranding of urban space and the concern that wealthier in-migrants could increase traffic if car ownership is not minimized. The plan therefore proposes parking maximums and bicycle parking minimums for residential developments as part of transportation demand management (TDM). With below-average household car ownership/access and below-average transportation expenditures, West Oakland provides an opportunity to grow without the automobile congestion that more affluent in-migrants bring.

The plan’s final draft, unveiled in January 2014, incorporates all of the extant planning practices now associated with livability. While it evinces real efforts to close both the “jobs-skills mismatch” and the “jobs-housing mismatch,” these terms hide the way that the political-economic dynamics of land development, industrialization, and firm location tend to reproduce such spatial inequalities. In practice, it is a plan to close not these two inequities, driven by race, class and the spatial division of labor, but the rent gap, making West Oakland’s suite of uses match its potential valuation as the closest East Bay neighborhood to San Francisco. The incorporation of streetscaping, beyond the simple upgrading of existing streets, marks the fruition of (a certain version of) livability as a critical part of the new planning paradigm. In a sense, the livable streetscape performs the function once asked of the neighborhood park, which Jane Jacobs criticized as merely reflecting the social relations of the area—it could not change or improve them, despite the pretensions of planners (J. Jacobs 1992). Jacobs missed, however, the ways that these features build support among constituencies—like open space or bicycle advocates—that at other times have been critics of urban development.

When opposition to the WOSP finally developed, it was too late. Causa Justa/Just Cause (CJ/JC), alongside more inchoate anti-gentrification groups linked to the Justice for Oscar Grant and Occupy movements, mounted a late offensive against the WOSP. Artists drew visually on its acronym to show a rapacious insect devouring the city, while other critics drew rhetorically on the reality that WASPs (white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants) would be the main beneficiaries of West Oakland’s redevelopment (Figure 12). At a July 2014 Oakland city council meeting deciding the issue, many speakers stood at the microphone and decried the plan. One was a white man in his early thirties, who forcefully argued, “This is not a healthy property market, it is a casino, a casino that you helped create… [The plan should] take into account West Oakland’s needs which has literally never happened.” After supportive comments on the responsiveness of the planning
process, a CJ/JC member decried just that, stating that the development process needed to reflect the community. One supporter of WOSP was booed. A man said sternly: “Bubbles may burst, but people who are displaced will be gone for good. We don’t need market rate housing at all,” or to “roll out the red carpet for people who do not live here yet.” Former Black Panther Party official and mayoral candidate Elaine Brown was most scathing:

Oakland’s significance is tied to the Black Panther Party. The Black Panther Party kicked open doors for blacks to be elected. West Oakland is not just blues and barbecue. This plan is a final solution of the rich and racist to get rid of blacks once and for all. I condemn all who vote for it, especially the blacks.

Rousing applause followed. Toward the end of the public comment period, a teacher stood at the microphone and said, “It’s a beautiful plan that I couldn’t afford to live in.”

Nevertheless, it was clear to many that the plan was meant to manage what was already occurring with blistering speed; many who found fault with the plan also identified elements that they wanted to see go forward. Moreover, black residents had
fought for a place at the planning table, no matter how meager. Several speakers supported the plan’s Mandela Transit Village, connecting BART to 7th Street’s commercial district and showcasing the corridor’s cultural history, while remaining wary of other aspects of the plan. One man took the long view: “We had to fight to get into the West Oakland Specific Plan… When developers and unions get in a room they will cut us out. We’re only going to get crumbs, but let’s make sure the crumbs are big crumbs.” Another echoed this sentiment, though on a more positive note: “This isn’t the end of anything, it’s the beginning.” A representative of East Bay Housing Organizations (EBHO) pointed out that the plan has “no blueprint for who will benefit from growth” and argued for a citywide inclusionary zoning policy.31

Near the end of the public comments, Dave Campbell of Bike East Bay came to the microphone and declared support of the streetscaping and pedestrian safety projects. He added, “We’re very supportive of strong policies for anti-displacement and affordable housing, not just because it encourages biking and transit use, but also because it’s the right thing to do.” This was the most public forum in the Bay Area in which I had seen a bicycle advocacy organization representative speak in support of affordable housing and against residential displacement. After many bicycle enthusiasts had spoken in support, it was an important moment.

Councilmembers were relatively brief in their discussion; a few didn’t even speak. Rebecca Kaplan, at-large councilor and mayoral candidate, nodded to the history of demolition and dispossession that confiscated the opportunities of generations, and the need to “respect, honor and include the existing community.” Lynette McElhaney, who represents West Oakland, emphasized the need to strike while the iron is hot both on development and affordability: “Displacement is already happening with wildcat speculation.” She argued that investors were accumulating land and avoiding developing it because there was uncertainty about zoning changes. For her, passing the WOSP was about creating a framework of certainty for investment. She pointed to the growing advanced manufacturing sector—“green” and “clean-tech”—and claimed that Oakland was one of the few cities that hadn’t yet converted industrial land to residential. In other words, the opportunity to regrow a manufacturing base on new foundations had not yet passed. Only Desley Brooks, representing East Oakland, argued for postponing a vote to “get it right.” Oakland’s city council, eager to maintain access to federal funding set to expire and visibly weary of complaints of gentrification, approved the plan almost unanimously, save Brooks’ abstention. The WOSP would now be both the guiding framework for housing and business development and the document shaping the West Oakland cyclescape.

The formation of the WOSP as a framework for remaking West Oakland is part of a genealogy of intervention in West Oakland that has both demobilized community struggles and called into being (Self 2000; Roy, Schrader, and Crane 2014). Indeed, the

31 Previous efforts at inclusionary zoning were defeated by Jerry Brown in a 2006 tie-breaking vote as mayor and again in a veto as governor in 2013 (McDonald 2006; Meily 2013). The 1995 Costa-Hawkins Act severely limited efforts inclusionary zoning as well as vacancy control (The California Affordable Housing Law Project 2010).
history of West Oakland shows how “community” does not predate collective labor for belonging in its name. While on one level the WOSP is part of a cohort of upzoning plans sweeping American cities in the third or even fourth wave of state-sponsored gentrification (N. Smith 2002; Hackworth 2007), at another the discourse surrounding it reflects a deep ambivalence toward development and investment. This ambivalence has a long history in political action—not against development—as white NIMBYs did against the freeways—but for a place in development, through organizations like Oakland Citizen’s Committee for Urban Renewal (OCCUR) and Jobs on BART (JOBART), which shaped West Oakland’s race-class politics after the war (Sun Reporter 1972; Sun Reporter 1979; Self 2003; Avila 2014). Current struggles to manage the contradictions of growth, rather than mitigate the consequences of shrinkage, draw on this legacy, but have an uncertain future.

Conclusion

The gentrification of the streetscape via bicycle infrastructure and the cyclist identity itself are intimately tied to broader regional shifts, as the cyclist has become not an insurgent citizen in the car-dominated urban fabric but a favored subject of the contemporary city. The political gains and institutional linkages pursued by the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition in its ascent from “scrappy” to respectable must be understood in the context of a strong cultural and economic shift back to the city by young professionals and the firms that employ them. As Walker and the Bay Area Study Group put it:

The Bay Area is the capital of Yuppie America. It is here that the arriviste middle class is most disproportionate in size to the general population and has the greatest opportunity to speak in its own voice and to try to establish its own class position—in all its creative ambiguity” (1990, 19).

The importance of place-based qualities for the supply of labor-power sought by high-tech firms has meant that bicycle infrastructure and bike culture play a dialectically related role in producing demand for centrally located urban space. Progressive efforts to produce more livable urban space, with a complicated relationship to the privileged ranks of the skilled workforce (ibid., 1990, p. 21), have synchronized with successive waves of gentrification that imperil the overall livability—in a larger sense—of the city itself.

The incorporation of bicycle infrastructure into large-scale productions of urban space, therefore, has not occurred simply because of a common sense that cycling should be encouraged. Instead, advocates have worked tirelessly over the past twenty years to get cycling taken seriously as a mode of transportation and as a contribution to the public realm. They have done so, however, in a race-classed register that valorizes professional commuters and the reshaping of racialized spaces into functioning economic places. They have done so largely oblivious to the histories of making place by African-American residents, and how their demands for similar things have fallen upon deaf ears.

As the chapters that follow show, they have done so by valuing certain forms of cycling as an economic and cultural contribution to the vitality of the city and the
corridor. As a result, plans for restarting the engines of accumulation in “under-utilized” areas of San Francisco and Oakland, until recently ignored by capital and its forces of creative destruction, now incorporate cycling infrastructure. These plans work in different registers. The enfolding of bicycle infrastructure into the redevelopment of the Mid-Market area of San Francisco shows its role in attempts to reconstruct the city’s image as a place where bikes are in competition with other modes of transportation. This effort is necessarily spectacular. The recapitalization of Mid-Market generates residential demand from job location, particularly for high-wage workers in the tech sector, and to spatially unite work and employment in ways that minimize car usage. On the other hand, the incorporation of bicycle infrastructure in the WOSP demonstrates the more quotidian ways that bikes enter the planning commonsense. In an area attempting to jumpstart a broader recapitalization out of burgeoning ad-hoc gentrification, bicycle infrastructure is part of creating a livable residential milieu. The plan attempts to forestall the wholesale conversion of industrial space for residential uses, in an area proximally located to major high-wage employment centers. In both cases, bicycle infrastructure is key to the streetscaping viewed as necessary for reinvestment.

The upshot, for bicycle advocates and livability advocates more generally, is a finely grained dialectical tension between complicity with and cooptation into gentrification. As Harvey argues, the construction of place, as an important dimension of urban entrepreneurialism, enrolls disparate actors with contradictory interests and attachments to place into the process of capital accumulation (1989, p. 11, 1996, Chapter 11; see also Hardt & Negri, 2011). Recalling Rose (1984), however, these revitalization efforts in part reflect the produced desires for a certain form and appearance of urban space, in this case corresponding to the discourse of livability and environmentalist critiques of sprawl (see Ley 1994). As capital courses through the tech sector and the built environment of San Francisco and Oakland, those well-positioned professionals, predominantly white and Asian, who can afford the hyper-gentrifying city may enjoy a perfectly reasonable commute by bicycle using world-class infrastructure. Through the same processes, black and Latino residents on the wrong end of the wage gap must locate in less well-connected places. Furthermore, the white politics of livability that now valorize urban density reject the sprawling suburb only scant years after suburban spaces came within the grasp of racialized others (Schafran 2010). The straightforward politics of reducing carbon emissions by acting through the “conduct of conduct” of individuals elides the group-differentiated basis of postwar mobility apartheid (Foucault et al. 1991; Bullard, Johnson, and Torres 2004; Dooling 2009; Checker 2011), As this dissertation argues, the bicycle is both a vector and a symbol of this dynamic.

Growing success does not mean smooth sailing for bicycle advocacy, however. The bike movement is increasingly compressed between a right-wing backlash and credible Left claims of its tacit involvement in gentrification. A particularly bitter fight has

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32 In Oakland, as Chapter 5 shows, the spectacular central locations are handled not as part of a large, coordinated plan but project-by-project, with the rebranding of Telegraph Avenue and 14th Street as demonstration corridors.

33 I am grateful to Jason Henderson for calling my attention to this question.
emerged between a group of Polk Street merchants fearing parking loss and newer forces, the SFBC among them, pushing for a “road diet” on the corridor. Opponents of the bike lane vocally cast the MTA as an extension of the SFBC. By mid-2013, meanwhile, it became clear that the Market Street plan could not support a protected cycle-track, the global standard for bicycle facilities, for which the SFBC had fiercely pushed. For advocates, the alternative offered by the MTA of a cycle-track on parallel Mission Street, is unthinkable; it would rob the infrastructure of its spectacular value. Meanwhile, while advocates at a national level now widely recognize the need to improve outreach to marginalized populations (Sani 2013), gentrification is rapidly pushing these populations from the spaces where bicycle advocates have concentrated their efforts. In the chapters that follow, I examine these dimensions in turn: the construction of the identity of *cyclist* through the practices of Critical Mass; the refinement of planning techniques and claims to economic benefits by increasingly professionalized advocates; and the production of race-class through the bicycle itself and contestation over its role in shaping urban space.
Chapter 2: Critical Mass and the Culturalization of Bicycle Politics

The history of cycling is one of political mobilization. The Good Roads Movement of 1896 saw thousands of cyclists assembled in the streets of San Francisco agitating for better road surfacing, the result a Pyrrhic victory that laid the groundwork for the car (Chapot 2002, 175). Similarly, Susan B. Anthony and other feminists credited the bicycle with liberating women from dress codes and limited mobility (Mackintosh and Norcliffe 2012). In the 1930s, socialist groups saw cycling as a way to increase the health and independence of the working class (Furness 2005). By the 1960s and 1970s, trenchant critiques of automobile-based society and suburban growth framed the bicycle as the car's “Other”: a solution to an impending social and ecological crisis automobiles caused (Horton 2006; Carlsson 2008). With the oil crisis of 1973, the “Bike Boom” of the mid-1970s introduced a whole generation to a form of mobility that seemed to speak to the issues of the day (Chapot 2002, 183). While the Zeitgeist of the 1960s and 1970s didn’t result in widespread adoption of the bicycle as a form of transportation, it did build political constituencies and communities of expertise around the nascent world of bicycle planning.

After ebbing in the 1980s, the political use of the bicycle rebounded in the 1990s with the emergence of Critical Mass, which would leave a lasting mark on bicycle politics for decades to come. Critical Mass is an extra-legal monthly convergence in which cyclists articulate claims to a saner, more convivial form of urban life through the practice of seizing the street itself. It began in 1992 as the “Commute Clot,” led by a small group of cyclists that made up the near-dormant San Francisco Bicycle Coalition (SFBC), spreading its call to reclaim city streets via Xeroxed flyers. The ride was renamed after the riding practices Beijing cyclists, who were shown in cycling enthusiast Ted White’s film Return of the Scorcher massing at intersections until their numbers were great enough to break through the dense traffic (D. Snyder 2012b). Since these beginnings, Critical Mass has met at 5:30 on the last Friday of every month in cities across the world. The ride snakes through urban downtowns with chants of “Whose streets? Our Streets!” and “We’re not blocking traffic, we are traffic!” Having never solicited permits, Critical Mass depends on ad-hoc participation and informal expertise to maintain cohesion.2

1 Until recently, the bulk of the literature on social significance of the bicycle as a technology focuses on this period, when the change in design from the “pennyfarthing” with a large front wheel to the “safety bicycle,” with two equally-sized wheels and a chain drive, as well as innovations in the production process, drove cycling out of the realm of the daredevil sportsman to reach a wider swath of consumers. See Bijker and Pinch (2012).

2 The most well-known of its techniques is the practice of “corking,” wherein cyclists block intersections to prevent cars from attempting to cross the Mass. By going against the legal framework that governs the street, corking keeps the group together but generates most of the controversy about the Critical Mass: that it illegally blocks traffic, and that the police tolerate this blatant lawlessness.
The power of Critical Mass is simple: it does not demand a car-free city, but instead *enacts* it (Carlsson 2008; Furness 2005). Better seen as a set of tactics than an organization, the ride performs a collective politics of the urban carnivalesque. It makes material what founding member Chris Carlsson calls “a *prefigurative* demonstration” (2008, 140) of the primary political act: moving through the city by bicycle. For Carlsson, the political locus of cycling remains the *daily ride*, of which Critical Mass is merely a precipitate rather than a representative organization (Figure 13). According to this framing, the bicycle's intrusion into the carscape of the American city is political in itself. But this politics only becomes *visible*, argues Carlsson, when “the creative eruption of Critical Mass proclaims these myriad isolated acts to the world as a shared act” (2002, 78).

The appropriation of street space as a commons, beyond the antinomy of bike and car, is what separates Critical Mass from more conventional forms of bicycle activism in the global North. As Zachary Furness has noted, “Such forms of appropriation... politicize important aspects of everyday life including transportation, consumer ideology, and the urban landscape” (2005, 402). Statements in this vein form the conceptual basis of claims to a right to the city for the bicycle, and shape bike culture even today (Carlsson 2002; on the quasi-Situationist Dutch Provos movement of the 1960s, see also Furness 2005; 2010). Moreover, they form a pole around which a global constellation of actors organizes political claims to urban space through the motif and practice of the bicycle. Unlike in Enrique Peñalosa’s Bogotá, where the official production of space proceeded under the banner of the commons, in the United States the bicycle is a wedge to prize open this question within a political culture where the commons is not discursively
available.

Critical Mass’ claims to space therefore extend far beyond requesting a more equitable allocation of street space. Critical Mass declares that in the daily ride cyclists are already a kind of social infrastructure, circulating knowledge and meaning through collaborative practices. Critical Mass’ role is to render this hidden infrastructure of cycling visible, collective and political: to reveal the “invisible city” (Gandy 2002). By declaring cyclists present and legitimate in car traffic, Critical Mass proves the possibility of cycling in streets that are the accepted terrain of the car. In other words, Critical Mass has played a crucial pedagogical role in the growth of bike culture, by creating a safe space within which new bike riders learn to become urban cyclists.

Already present in claiming the bicycle as insurgent in urban space, however, is a slippage between the collective politics of cycling and the notion that the bicycle itself has an intrinsic politics. The stakes of bicycle politics become clear in this slippage. For 1970s writers like Ivan Illich, the bicycle represented the pace and scale of action to which human societies should aspire, striking against the motor age’s obsession with speed and distance (Horton 2006, 45). Its material properties embodied the ideals of the Appropriate Technology movement and the emerging environmentalist counterculture of the 1970s (Furness 2010; Turner 2008; Illich 1973). In this framing, the technology of the bicycle facilitates place-based relations and elicits a more human form of urban life, fueling a cosmopolitan urbanism destined to replace car culture. This notion of the bicycle’s natural scale is crucial to claims cyclists now make to creating more livable urban cores. “[T]he use by environmental activists of cycling as the main mode of intra-urban mobility,” Horton writes, “is centrally implicated in the very making of the ‘local’, and in the establishment of spatially more restricted boundaries around the meanings of ‘everyday travel’” (Horton 2006, 48). The local becomes the authentic site of politics, for many enthusiasts, and the bicycle its necessary technology.

Critical Mass has played a key role in constructing this common sense regarding the bicycle’s virtue. It also reflects a broader contradiction concerning the role of collective action in contemporary political life. In an age of “crowd-sourcing” as a tool for everything from market research to military strategy, the political valence of the crowd is changing. The crowd no longer signifies only a destructive irrationality at odds with liberal society (M. Arnold 1993; Freud 1975). Instead, the crowd can now be harnessed as a source of “wisdom” (Surowiecki 2005). The hum of the crowd signifies the renewal of public life in the contemporary turn back to the urban, the authentic location of capitalist innovation (Florida 2002). In other words, the politics of Critical Mass are not straightforwardly radical. In this chapter, I argue that, rather than disrupting urban

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3 For example, as Dan Kaufman, a Portland-based filmmaker, put it to me, “bikes have changed the economic paradigm. Cyclists are more likely to shop at locally owned, mom and pop stores… you’re not going to go to big box stores and drive through restaurants, because those are designed for people with cars. Bicyclists are going to go to the coop, the small grocery store, and pump money back into local economy… It’s a small-scale economy, closer to bartering” (Kaufman 2012).

4 This of course is mediated often through a suite of personal technologies, generated capacities, and social networks that limit who becomes legible as the crowd.
order, Critical Mass has shaped the social processes by which bicycle users come to recognize themselves as a political constituency of cyclists.

Moreover, Critical Mass’ disruption of urban traffic prefigured the hegemonic discourse of the tech economy, only barely on the horizon in 1992. In this narrative, entrepreneurs refer to themselves as “disruptors,” shaking up the urban system to create efficiency and create new sources of value. In the revaluation of the city as a site of creativity and the turn towards creating spaces that foster this creativity, both radical activists and growth-oriented urban actors have seized on commons-making activities as sources of value. While the former may articulate its use-value, the other its exchange-value (Logan and Molotch 2007), in practice these blur and interlace. Critical Mass is one site of their interlacing. In other words, the urban space economy in its current form requires autonomous social formations to produce new sources of value (Hardt and Negri 2011). Critical Mass’ links to urban government—in the Foucaultian sense—are therefore far more complicated than radical narratives of disruption allow. The relationship between Critical Mass and advocacy organizations, municipal authorities, and the wider world of cycling reveals the iterative process by which attempts to reimagine social life articulate with the fields of power they hope to disrupt.

“Everywhere, Locally”: Critical Mass as Technique

Critical Mass has traveled widely through the anti-organizational stance of its adherents. It circulates virally a set of practices, rather than scaling up to an umbrella organization, which allows it wide purchase and local relevance. Since its inception, cyclists in hundreds of cities throughout the world from Zurich to Johannesburg and Budapest to Kuala Lumpur have taken up the Critical Mass methods forged in San Francisco (Carlsson 2002, 70–1). Each place makes the tools of Critical Mass its own. As one Chicago participant put it, “It is local but it is a different kind of local. It is everywhere, locally” (quoted in Culley, 2002, p. 13). Interpretations of Critical Mass proliferate through decentralized networks connected with increasing strength via the Internet, allowing “scale-flexibility” (Blickstein and Hanson 2001, 349–50). These techniques are so effective that the Rand Corporation has studied Critical Mass for application in military counterinsurgency and the “dark side” of networked organization (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001).

It should be clear, however, that Critical Mass is not the origin point of the localized politics of the production of space through cycling. Instead, through articulation with these struggles it Critical Mass gives them legible form as a certain kind of politics to them. In other words, it circulates not through passive diffusion but as a technique of protest that creates a platform for other issues, while simultaneously marking the bicycle itself as pertaining to these issues. In late 1990s New York, for instance, Critical Mass combined with the Time’s Up environmentalist group and Lower East Side residents contesting gentrification, police brutality, and the erosion of public space (Shepard and Moore 2002, 196). A 1995 Mass in London doubled as a protest against the resumption of nuclear testing in the South Pacific by the French government (Anonymous 2002, 69).
In Milan, a Critical Mass critiquing ineffectual attempts by industrial northern cities to curb air pollution drew large numbers in 2001 (Pesce 2002, 53). Localized controversies surrounding Critical Mass refract outward to global import. In 2011, Porto Alegre became a global touchstone when a motorist deliberately drove into the Mass, injuring twelve (Yapp 2011); various YouTube videos of the incident collectively saw roughly half a million views.

In the United States, Critical Mass achieved its greatest notoriety during the “anti-globalization” and anti-war movements of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Although by the late 1990s Critical Mass had been growing in several cities, the 1999 mass protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle saw no mass presence by cyclists. Nevertheless, bicycles played a growing tactical role in street demonstrations (Gillham and Marx 2000). By 2003, however, protests against the Iraq war saw large contingents of cyclists organized under the banner of Critical Mass, in partnership with Bikes Not Bombs. The San Francisco Chronicle reported, “Although festive, the ride was politicized by the war, which some cyclists say they believe is driven by a thirst for oil and imperialism. “This war is about oil and empire, and bicyclists prove we don't need either,” [Bikes Not Bombs organizer Jason] Meggs shouted to the throng before the ride began” (Rubenstein and Buchanan 2003). Beyond this symbolic value as the car’s opposite, Critical Mass tactically aided protest organizers in bringing the city to a grinding halt. During the 2004 protests of the Republican National Convention in New York, a Critical Mass ride of over 5,000 encountered a massive police response, resulting in hundreds of arrests and a class-action lawsuit. Antagonism between the NYPD and Critical Mass continues to this day (Lynn, Press, and Ryan 2005; Dwyer 2005). In his account of the summer of 2004, Ben Shepard wrote:

Throughout the spring and summer of 2004, activists across the country recognized that the last Friday of August dovetailed with the RNC protests. Critical Mass rides took place around the world on the last Friday of every month. Anticipating the RNC, riders careened across the FDR freeway during the July 30 ride—the last ride of ‘the fun old days’ of Critical Mass. By the next month, everything would be different (Shepard 2005).

These moments demonstrate two features of Critical Mass specific to the early 2000s. The first is the (re-)emergence of the bicycle as a tool of Left politics not limited to bicycle advocacy or cyclists’ rights to street space. The second is the durable ideological relationship between bicycles and politics, extending beyond the street protest itself.

I argue, however, that the decline of street politics following the failure of the anti-war movement to stop the invasion of Iraq led to the turn toward “bike culture” as a more immediate, everyday form of politics. In short, the bicycle has become a friendly home for the activist in the anti-political chill cast over the second half of the 2000s.5 A

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5 In my experience, myself and fellow protesters of that era became more and more interested in bicycles, particularly after the failure of the mass mobilizations of early 2003 to prevent the invasion of Iraq. Kaufman puts it nicely: “I needed to stop using petroleum so much, because that’s why we were in Iraq” (Kaufman 2012). Those of us in college tended to move to denser urban areas after graduating, where bicycles were practical and inexpensive. Of course, more research would be required to parse questions of
tool for an everyday, embodied politics, the bicycle “carries an environmentalist message without a placard” (Horton 2006), despite often being supplemented by a placard reading “ONE LESS CAR” or “BICYCLING: A QUIET PROTEST AGAINST OIL WARS.” The politics of subtracting one’s mobility from the buildup of carbon emissions, and evading the monotony of automobility, are written directly on the cycling body itself.

**Beyond Disruption: Bike Party and Anti-Politics**

Critical Mass participants emphasize its lack of a political program. For adherents, Critical Mass offers only a toolkit of what has worked in the past, practices that grow by adaptation. These practices have changed depending on how Critical Mass has been appropriated in place. For instance, turned off by what have long been framed as its confrontational methods, San Francisco cyclists tried to start a “Courteous Mass,” while Portland attempted “Critical Manners” (Maus 2007). These short-lived experiments in a “law-abiding” Critical Mass highlight how, it acts as an inescapable referent for bicycle politics, even for those who oppose it. This is most evident in Critical Mass’ longest-running mutation, Bike Party.

The road to a more formalized, less anarchic version of Critical Mass has been a long one. Critical Mass participants have long been cognizant of the critiques leveled against them, but intentionally never created any structures for addressing them. In 2009, however, “best practices” began to emerge when a group of Critical Mass founders started SFCriticalMass.org, hoping to more clearly articulate their goals and counter doubts regarding the ride’s continued relevance. Generating a list of “Dos and Don'ts” regarding interactions with motorists and police during rides, they exhorted:

**DO**
- talk to strangers, bystanders, bus riders, motorists – welcome people to join us next time
- help cars stuck in mass to exit to the right
- stop regularly if you’re in front (no matter how slowly you think you’re going, gaps are opening up behind you)
- stop at red lights when in front to allow the rest of the ride to “mass up” behind.
- keep going in dense packs through red lights to stick together and keep it safe for everyone.
- fill gaps; Critical Mass depends on bicycle density to displace cars.
- remember that pleasure and friendliness are more subversive than anger and blaming.

**DON’T**
- race ahead to block cross traffic before the Mass has arrived
- ride into oncoming traffic on the wrong side of the road
- pick fights with motorists, even (especially) if they’re itching for one
- fail to turn and twist through the city to make the ride more interesting
- forget to smile and wave and talk to strangers!

movement fatigue from bicycle advocacy and politics. But the more general point holds here: through the late 1990s and early 2000s, bicycles became equated with politics itself.
Chris Carlsson, an “old-timer” and frequent contributor to the site, addressed the “young radicals” new to the scene in 2009: “You may not care if you’re winning hearts and minds, but overall, the point of Critical Mass is not a fraudulent ‘class war’ between cars and bikes. We started Critical Mass to be a new kind of public space, and to help promote a different way of being together in city streets” (Carlsson 2009). Carlsson has consistently acted as an organizer and participant in the ride, as well as a stalwart critic of its more aggressive fractions, which he calls the “testosterone brigade.”

Following Appadurai (2001), we could see such appeals as “governmentality from below,” wherein activists appropriate techniques of government towards insurgent ends (cf. Foucault et al. 1991). This offers a tempting frame for thinking about Critical Mass’ self-conscious horizontalism, with its shifting membership, unbounded strategies, and informal norms. Although the largely middle-class ridership of Critical Mass has little in common with the members of SPARC, the Mumbai squatters’ rights organization in Appadurai’s account, they share features that speak to contemporary horizontal politics. Like SPARC, Critical Mass persists on the basis of unstable rapprochements with local authorities, intervenes theatrically against the givenness of daily life in what Furness calls “performative critique” (2010, 83–4), and practices an implacable “politics of patience” (Appadurai 2001). Despite an outwardly spontaneous appearance, Critical Mass participants celebrate doing “a much better job at self-policing than any group depending on outside forces to keep them in line” (Kessel 2002, 106, 111). In 1997, San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown attempted to both crack down on and co-opt the ride, appearing at the start of the June ride and “thanking” the crowd for coming, after which motorcycle police attempted to steer the ride and responded with violence when they couldn’t. The many illegal arrests that followed embarrassed the mayor and the police department (Lynn, Press, and Ryan 2005). Critical Mass’ response the following month was a “ride to rule,” following every traffic law to the letter and vastly increasing traffic congestion (Carlsson 2009; D. Snyder 2012a). Meanwhile, outrage at Brown’s heavy-handed response swelled the volume of participants as well as the membership numbers of the SFBC (Krasny 2012). It would seem that Critical Mass won the moral high ground by policing itself, securing cover for its radical agenda.

Nevertheless, following Ananya Roy’s critique of Appadurai, simply celebrating the “deep democracy” of Critical Mass misses its participation in making governmental norms regarding proper bicycle use and participation in public space (Roy 2009a). Moreover, the extra-legality of Critical Mass enables mainstream advocacy groups like the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition (SFBC) to position themselves against it. This reinforces their claims to represent law-abiding cyclists, even though their memberships also participate in Critical Mass (Kessel 2002, 110; D. Snyder 2002a, 115). As Carlsson
notes, “Mainstream bicycle advocates maintain that cyclists as a group must be extremely law-abiding, in order to reinforce the self-congratulatory fantasy that bikes are angels in the transit universe, compared to the (automobile) devil” (Carlsson 2008, 116).

By superficially dismissing Critical Mass, mainstream bicycle advocates in the long run encourage the state to see cyclists as a potential political constituency. “We are getting more attention from transit and transportation agencies due to Critical Mass,” the chair of one Bay Area advocacy group said in 1997, “...agencies think 'you are well behaved and reasonable, we'll deal with you'” (Blickstein and Hanson 2001, 360). Dave Snyder, former director of the SFBC, argues, “Critical Mass forced the politicians to ask us ‘what is it you folks want?’” (2002a, 115), demonstrating the “radical flank effect” (Furness 2010, 100). This was especially true after the crackdown in 1997, which came at the same time as nascent efforts by SFBC volunteers to plan a “road diet” of Valencia Street, a popular thoroughfare in the Mission District experiencing slowly growing gentrification (see Chapter 4).

As the SFBC head at the time, Snyder initially responded to the barrage of media asking what Critical Mass “wanted” by distancing the SFBC from them. At a friend’s urging, he shifted strategies, arguing that Critical Mass reflected San Francisco cyclists’ anger that the city’s first bicycle plan, approved in 1996, was “sitting on the shelf” gathering dust.” He consistently redirected questions about Critical Mass with “Implement the bike plan!” (D. Snyder 2012b). The cyclist presence at a Board of Supervisors meeting in early 1998 in which changes to Valencia Street were approved fed on Critical Mass’ anarchic energy; for all intents and purposes, Critical Mass packed the room. The productive tension with mainstream bicycle advocacy provoked Critical Mass to act representatively, not prefiguratively. Cyclists took their first steps as participants in the production of urban space, transforming an omnidirectional political desire into support for infrastructure embedded in the built environment. Furthermore, in the twenty years since Critical Mass began, many cyclists who received their political education amongst its ranks have entered city agencies as planning practitioners, “infiltrating” the bureaucratic power structure (Radulovich 2012).6

Not surprisingly, in the years since Critical Mass began, membership in the SFBC went from a few dozen to over 12,000 dues-paying members. The leap in SFBC membership following the 1997 crackdown notwithstanding, the most rapid growth has been seen in the second half of the 2000s. This has coincided with greater acceptance of cycling by city leadership, and a combination of demonization and dismissal toward Critical Mass. Moreover, as Snyder told me, it was at this point that Critical Mass and the SFBC ceased to substantially overlap (D. Snyder 2012a). As the SFBC pursues a strategy of becoming a major political player, this distance has only increased. In 2012, the SFBC failed to include the twentieth anniversary of Critical Mass, attended by as many as 10,000 riders, in the list of events on its website. An open letter denouncing the “bureaucratic, top-down” organization of the SFBC under director Leah Shahum was

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6 These shifts will be explored more fully in subsequent chapters, but are discussed here in order to make the linkage between Critical Mass and the provision of infrastructure clearer.
published on the *SFCriticalMass.org* site, prompting recriminations on both sides, though the success of the ride made the dispute more or less moot (Carlsson 2012; SF Critical Mass 2012).

The acceptance of the SFBC into the fold of power in San Francisco indicates a broader readiness of a city to mainstream the bicycle (Blickstein and Hanson 2001, 361). This acceptance seems to be the contingent on distance from Critical Mass. Bicycle advocates look to the nation’s most successful cycling city, Portland, Oregon, and see Critical Mass completely absent. When asked about Critical Mass, Portlanders simply reply that it is unnecessary because “every day is one.” Missing from this claim is the fierce police repression Critical Mass experienced in Portland in the early 2000s, particularly 2005, when a counterintelligence unit of the Portland Police Department was devoted to infiltrating participants and rides frequently encountered mass arrests (Furness 2010, 98). As Elly Blue put it to me, “People found other things to do, they just moved on” (Blue 2011a). Similar claims about Critical Mass’ irrelevance are routinely made about Amsterdam and Copenhagen, despite the fact that the mode share of bicycles in these cities vastly exceeds those of any US city. Even Portland’s has stalled at just 6%. The imagined inverse relationship between Critical Mass and mainstream success frames confrontational politics over what urban space should be as just a phase on the road to the bike movement’s maturity.

Critical Mass’ usefulness for the goal of making cycling *normal*, therefore, is to become “irrelevant.” It nonetheless plays a part in making a self-governing cycling public itself, generating “governable spaces and governable subjects” despite largely avoiding questions of power (Roy 2009a, 163). It does so by identifying its participants as a constituency in the making, through the act of disruption itself. This disruption temporarily produces a space—the mass ride—within which bicyclists *literally govern*, police themselves, and collectively mark the limits of legitimate participation in the political community. The growing civic embrace of these spaces of bike culture, especially Critical Mass’ less unruly offshoots, represents the articulation of this population into public life—as a political constituency—and the urban economic activity—as a niche market.7

These post-political mutations of Critical Mass are evident in Detroit. In the narratives of Detroit’s “two-wheeled renaissance,” the rapid growth of Critical Mass from dozens in 2009 to hundreds by 2011 indicates the city’s arrival as a hotspot for bike culture.8 Celebrators claim that the very spatiality of the city, with its vast, wide boulevards built for massive automobile traffic volumes, now perfectly accommodates the

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7 The explicitly economic lens turned upon bike culture will be taken up in subsequent chapters. I will explore the uneven distribution of discipline and government (in the Foucaultian sense) of cyclists later as well.

8 Enthusiasm about the current wave of Detroit bike culture represented by Critical Mass also received a boost from the 2010 World Social Forum, which saw an associated ride of over 300 participants, after which it began to steadily grow (Carlsson 2010a). This again demonstrates the traffic between broader left politics and the politics of cycling, and how each marks each other as its familial relation.
bicycle. Rather than having to constantly defend a sliver of road space, cyclists can now leisurely claim an entire lane virtually unnoticed. "Our abandoned landscape," Toby Barlow writes, "suggests an opportunity that alternative-transportation proponents should consider: instead of raging against their cities’ internal combustion machines, they might consider a tactical retreat to the city that cars have pretty much abandoned" (2009). Thus, in contrast to denser—and richer—cities like San Francisco, Critical Mass in Detroit is framed as largely unproblematic. Positive articles in the press celebrate its energy, without mention of the controversy that accompanies it elsewhere. The subtext of this framing naturalizes the opposition bicycle advocates face in other places as the inevitable effect of a crowded roadway, suggesting that cyclists must evade automobility by colonizing new spaces rather than confront it politically.

When I visited Detroit in 2011 and participated in Critical Mass, a few hundred of us rode in high spirits in the rain and poor visibility of late September. I experienced none of the contentious encounters with cars seen in San Francisco; instead, passersby cheered and shouted encouragement. Detroit’s Critical Mass, however, is in itself an unusual mutation. It meets later than the commute time, at 6:30, to allow participants from surrounding suburban areas time to arrive after work, leading to the amusing sight of riders arriving by car for an ostensibly “anti-car” gathering. Moreover, it meets in a somewhat gentrified residential area near Wayne State University, rather than in downtown with the goal of clogging the evening commute. As Jack Van Dyke, founding member of Detroit’s Back Alley Bikes collective, put it to me, most participants “prefer to ride in the city, but not to live here yet” (Van Dyke 2011). In Detroit, Critical Mass operates as a form of interaction, temporarily bridging the racialized urban-suburban divide that plagues the city, by pulling together groups of cyclists who may rarely come in contact on a daily basis.

For the above reasons, Detroit Critical Mass doesn’t register as protest, and is instead seen “more as a party, with lots of audience participation,” as Van Dyke noted to me. In this way it benefits from the perception of harmless fun, and attracts many riders with no political axes to grind. It draws strength, however, less familiar currents within Critical Mass’ history. Most importantly, the East Side Riders and Grown Men on Bikes (G-MOB), black bike clubs oriented around community-specific health concerns, gang resistance, and anti-violence education, substantially shape Detroit Critical Mass, providing musical accompaniment from sound systems mounted on their heavily decorated bikes and trikes. Much of the mechanical work done to decorate these machines occurs at Back Alley Bikes, a long-running non-profit community bike shop. Both East Side Riders and G-MOB have recently received media attention underscored how Detroit’s bicycle renaissance is not the “typical” story of young white in-migrants (Detroitblogger John 2010; Sands 2012; T. Scott 2011). Commentaries that stress this atypicality, however, reinforce the notion that Detroit is an exception, and occasionally treat the activities of black cyclists as a spectacle for consumption. Nevertheless, while

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9 The explosive growth of Slow Roll Detroit, an unsanctioned group ride not unlike the Bay Area’s Bike Parties, is also widely used as evidence of Detroit’s new role as a hotspot of bike culture; co-founder Jason Hall was recently featured in an Apple iPad commercial.
demographically Detroit’s Critical Mass remains white-dominated, it is better understood as a complex articulation of different race-classed geographies of cycling practice. What it may do, however, is signal the presence of a valuable constituency of cyclists who someday be coaxed into the city to stay.

**Bike Party and the Post-Political**

In many cities, an understanding was reached between Critical Mass and local police departments by the early 2000s, despite the outbursts of repression noted above. By the mid- to late-2000s, rides continued in most cities, but with the implementation of better bicycle infrastructure it began to be seen as anachronistic. Splinter rides emerged, such as Portland’s Courteous Mass and Midnight Mystery Ride, operating on the terrain cleared by Critical Mass but disavowing its more openly confrontational aspects. The most established of these offshoots is Bike Party, which began in 2007 in San Jose and spread to the East Bay and San Francisco. San Jose remains the largest Bike Party, with over 1,000 riders common, while its San Francisco and East Bay iterations regularly see attendance of over 500. Bike Party has become a successful pioneer in crafting a new form of Critical Mass for a post-protest era in bike culture.

From the start, Bike Party framed itself against Critical Mass, and adopted an entirely different form of organization while creating a similar social space and aesthetic. Where Critical Mass gathers during the evening commute, intentionally snarling the evening commute, Bike Party assembles on a different Friday each month, long after commute hours have passed, at a public place where it can amass without blocking traffic. Where Critical Mass has no leadership structure, Bike Party is conducted by a committee that sets the month’s theme, plans the route, produces media, and enlists volunteers to direct the ride. Where Critical Mass has no set course (though many rides take similar routes), Bike Party follows a planned and tested route, with designated off-street party stops. Lastly, where Critical Mass has a tense relationship with drivers and police, Bike Party enlists police cooperation, despite eschewing a permit, and its organizers demand that participants follow the rules of the road as a courtesy to other road users. This structure, which would be quite inimical to the spirit of Critical Mass, allows the construction of a space within which its forms are enacted.

Bike Party also explicitly claims another lineage in Midnight Ridazzzz, a group that began in 2004 in Los Angeles, again without association with Critical Mass aside from the concept of a group celebration by bicycle. Practicing evasion and fun rather than confrontation and serious politics, as Critical Mass is often seen, Midnight Ridazzz pioneered the convivial, off-hours themed group ride for a post-Critical Mass era. As the group’s blog puts it:

*What Midnight Ridazzz is:*
  - Fun
  - Friendships
  - Non Confrontational
  - Family

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• Compassionate
• Open – Minded
• Multi-cultural

What Midnight Ridazz is NOT:
• Mean Spirited
• Political
• Commercialized
• Non-inclusive
• Abrasive
• Protest

While Critical Mass is not explicitly named, and actually includes most of the first column in practice, this positioning implicitly places it into the second category, echoing popular understandings of it. Again, Critical Mass serves as the inescapable referent. Making cycling subjects who avoid political engagement is itself a political process, no matter the apolitical stance of the post-Critical Mass group rides. At the same time, the carnivalesque feel is preserved with the counterposition of fun to politics, rather than just order to unlawfulness.

Bike Party begins with a trickle of riders at the designated meeting point around 7:30, with participants milling around, organizers coordinating amongst each other, and volunteers distributing cue sheets, maps and spoke cards. Heavily decorated bicycles and tricycles arrive with high-powered sound systems and bright flashing lights. Some participants dress up according to the chosen theme, such as “Under the Sea” or “Lebowski Ride,” while most just wear street clothes. Bikes range in caliber and style, with everything between the fashionably disheveled “beater” and the hardcore utility machine represented. Most participants are white, but depending on the location and route there are many more people of color than seen at most bike culture events. As eight o’clock approaches, the mingling begins to acquire a direction, and organizers use a megaphone to announce the rules of the ride:

1. Stay in the right lane
2. Leave nothing and no one behind
3. Stop at red lights
4. Ride straight, ride predictably
5. Roll past conflict
6. Ride sober
7. Make some NOISE!!! (see Figure 14 for an alternate version)

A crescendo of bells, horns, shouts, and clattering gears grows as the ride rolls out, following the sound-equipped vehicle leading the way. Volunteers stop at key turns to direct traffic, sometimes enlisting the help of police at busy intersections.

As the ride moves along, the act of riding itself provokes lively conversations and the sharing of intoxicants. Barks of “Bike Party!” prompt residents we pass to come to their doors and observe the sight. At the designated stops, the revelry continues, with flashing lights and multiple different dance parties, rolling taco stands and bike-mounted barbecue grills. Riders mostly observe the exhortation to stop at lights, although stop signs are usually disregarded. When riders do run a light, other participants scold the transgressors. Riders alert other participants to the presence of a motorist with a “Car up!” or “Car back!” Some riders nearly race, while most ride at a leisurely 10 to 12 miles per hour, as clumps of a few dozen riders each, having been punctuated by traffic signals, roll along. Where the ride encounters hills, an “accordion” effect can space out the ride, and riders continuously trickle into the party stop for half an hour or more. While traffic is not completely blocked, when they are in numbers bicycles control the streets and the ride mainly follows less well-traveled routes to avoid undue conflict. Even to me, the critical researcher, Bike Party is undeniable fun.

Figure 14. East Bay Bike Party flyer, scanned by author.

Self-Policing as Respect

I do not intend to criticize Bike Party for “selling out” the political promise of Critical Mass. Instead, I want to examine how it formalizes a set of non-transgressive norms for a post-political bicycle counterculture, in the process becoming a virtually
mainstream part of the monthly entertainment calendar. This introduces possibilities not open to Critical Mass, such as increased participation by families and riders who have no interest in potential melees with irate drivers, let alone police. It remains more open to the non-initiated, and despite a lack of political engagement with the production of urban space it introduces these riders to the issues affecting cyclists. In the words of one participant I spoke to while we paused in a park in the Visitation Valley neighborhood of San Francisco, “Some people prefer a space that’s more ordered, even though anarchists would probably see it as conformist.” Bike Party’s rhetoric, largely conveyed on blogs and Facebook pages, positions it against Critical Mass, which is said to have run its course.

This framing has been quite persuasive to the media. The East Bay Bike Party received a “Best of the Bay” mention from the East Bay Express in the “Revolution” category in 2012, while San Francisco’s edition won “Best Group Ride” from the San Francisco Bay Guardian in 2013. While members of staff of the lefty Guardian and Express might approve of Critical Mass, “Best of the Bay” focuses mainly on culture and commerce over politics. An article in the Guardian described their relation as follows: “While the venerable Critical Mass ride—which marks its 20th anniversary next year—seizes space on the roads, ignores red lights, and often sparks confrontations with motorists, Bike Party is a celebration that seeks to share space, avoid conflict, and just have fun” (S. Jones and Donohue 2011). This avoidance of conflict is achieved spatiotemporally (by avoiding large commute corridors and times) as well as normatively (by mandating stopping at red lights and outlawing corking). As the San Francisco Bike Party blog argues:

The number one complaint from the community against group rides is that we often run red lights. Don’t give the city, angry residents, or anyone a reason to hate such a joyous celebration. […] It Models Bicycle Community! As bicycle riders, we need drivers to respect our rights to share the road. However, in order to get respect, we must also give respect. As such a large visible group, we need to show drivers and fellow riders how to share the road by stopping at red lights (San Francisco Bike Party website). Bike Party’s avoidance of corking demonstrates to other road users that, firstly, Bike Party is not Critical Mass, and secondly, cyclists deserve inclusion into road space because they can behave themselves. There is no penalty for not following this practice, nor do all participants follow the rules of the road, but the ethical tone of the ride places responsibility for its continued success on the law-abiding rider. In my experience, even when participants deemed the practice a little excessive, they went along with it.

One irony of the stoplight rule is that it punctuates the ride, breaking it up into smaller groups often with too many cyclists for cars to pass safely but not enough of them to fully take the lane. At least once in the bustling nightlife of the Fillmore District in San Francisco I was in a small group whose interactions with cars became dangerous because a red light had separated us from the larger group. Another time, in the southeastern outskirts of San Francisco, stopping for red lights so fragmented the ride that many sub-groups became lost in unfamiliar neighborhoods, repeatedly circling blocks, scrutinizing their cue sheets, and phoning friends to guide them to the next party stop. These are minor issues when compared to the confrontations that can occur when Critical Mass
corks at intersections. The framing of lawfulness, however, renders the massive differentials in vulnerability between cars and bikes into a question of “respect,” and has practical consequences for the safety and cohesion of the ride.

Another salient feature of Bike Party in contrast to Critical Mass is the route sheet, which removes the spontaneity of the ride and allows Bike Party to design tours of neighborhoods less often visited by either ride. This dynamic has its own paradoxes. For instance, a recent Bike Party route snaked through the Bayview, Excelsior, and Visitación Valley neighborhoods in southeastern San Francisco, some of the few remaining areas that working-class people of color retain a foothold in the face of skyrocketing rents and home prices. While SF Bike Party participants are not uniformly white and middle class, few had been to these outer neighborhoods, and even with the detailed cue sheet we became lost at several points along the ride. On a “feeder ride” leaving from the Mission District’s famed hipster hangout of Dolores Park, one older man commented, “If you’re unfamiliar with the area you should stay with the group,” implying a potential for either danger or confusion. At another point in the ride, a woman asked rhetorically, “Are we still in San Francisco?” We were, but her question underscored the uncharted character of the space. On an East Bay Bike Party ride in Richmond, an economically depressed, largely African American city north of Berkeley, a participant commented on the city’s major problems, saying, “Richmond needs Bike Party.”

In this framing, the venturing into territory unfamiliar to the majority of participants is both a kind of outreach, taking bicycling to the masses, and an education to the riders themselves about less well-known neighborhoods. Riders tend to go out of their way to sow good cheer when they suddenly inundate a neighborhood that rarely sees large groups of cyclists with a rolling party and loud techno music. This doesn’t mean that Bike Party is unwelcome. Although complaints do occur, due to noise rather than traffic blockage, most onlookers respond with curiosity. To the question, “What is this about?” participants respond not with “Whose streets? Our streets!” as in Critical Mass, but “Bike Party!” as both description and justification. As more than a few riders noted on our way to the Bayview, Bike Party is “a way to see parts of the city you wouldn’t see otherwise,” implicitly coding participants as not of those neighborhoods.

Cyclists do reside in these neighborhoods, but they are not the constituency of the SFBC or frequent participants in Bike Party. Their marginality demonstrates the incompleteness of the city’s bicycle revolution. On a feeder ride to the Bayview Bike Party, requiring help from cue sheets and volunteers, we executed the complex maneuvers required to negotiate the “Hairball,” a treacherous cluster of on- and off-ramps where Cesar Chavez Street meets Highway 101. Doing this, we were tracing for fun the movements that bike users from the southeastern neighborhoods must perform to access the better bicycle infrastructure of San Francisco’s gentrifying core. Moreover, despite wide demographic variation in Bike Party’s participants, the notion of venturing out of well-traveled areas reinforces the norm of bike culture as pertaining to the hip neighborhoods of San Francisco’s core. The gaze of bike culture constitutes these outer neighborhoods as locations where there is none.

The inward gaze of respectability polices difference as well. In November 2014,
incidents of graffiti and physical conflicts prompted a racialized debate within EBBP over who should be included and how certain behaviors should be enforced. On November 23, the group’s Facebook page announced the cancellation of the December ride:

Despite concerted thought and effort over many months to more effectively communicate our values and reign [sic] in behavior counter to those values, we’ve experienced a general decline in civility at our bike parties, manifested by:

- Riding into oncoming traffic, attacks on motorists
- Property destruction / tagging
- Threats directed at volunteers
- Theft of bicycles and personal gear
- Disregard for music volume limits in residential areas after hours
- Offensive and exclusionary misogynistic music
- Littering

Debates on the Facebook page about the causes of the “breakdown in civility” largely traded in coded racialized language, some moving beyond code to overt racism. One commenter wrote: “Once the ‘hood’ gets ahold of something it pretty much turns ghetto from there… sorry to say. I’ve noticed a drastic change in Bike party in the last few months I’ve attended. Routes particularly in the Oakland area tend to attract the wrong crowd…” Reactions were not uniform, however. One commenter wrote, with irony, “don’t worry everyone, bike party will return as soon as oakland is safely gentrified and the undesirables have been relocated to the less bike-friendly environs where they belong.” Another post from a black Bike Party participant, worth quoting at length, read:

Phixed Bikes Party - All music bikes welcome, all "Ghetto Trash" welcome, all Oakland Residents welcome, all Women and Female Identifying bike riders welcome, all LGBTQ Identifying People welcome, all Disenfranchised Souls welcome, all targets of police brutality welcome, all ***TRUE*** Allies welcome, all people disgusted by coded language welcome, all people who actually want to connect with new people welcome, all people who work for justice and equality welcome, all people who ride bikes by choice welcome, all people who ride bikes as a last resort welcome, all people who love getting sweaty welcome, all People of the First Nations welcome… (https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10152464500370756)

Here I am emphatically not arguing that Bike Party is external to “real” Oakland. Instead, these exchanges reveal Bike Party both as a site where race-classed norms of “bike culture” are made and contested, and a social formation implicated more broadly in the agonistic politics of what I call in the following chapter “gentrifying space.”

Critical Mass, Bike Party, and Spaces of Order

It is important not to overstate Bike Party’s quiescence. The filling of city streets with bicycles, for any reason, is an important irruption into the car-dominated functionalism of the street. To this extent it is necessarily political (Masucci 2012). The rolling celebration provokes all manner of exuberance and positivity, sentiments often lacking in the public discourse that frames cyclists as reckless hipster elitists (Doig 2011).
While extra-legal and unpermitted, however, Bike Party is more coordinated with local police than Critical Mass in the United States has ever been, even at its most non-confrontational. While San Jose Bike Party began with little police connection, at a certain point in its growth it became necessary to formally partner with law enforcement and community institutions. Facilitating this are the Birds, SJBP’s official, badged volunteers.

Other Bike Parties have adopted this stance as well. At key points during the April 2012 ride through Richmond, police provided traffic control at intersections, and while they did not escort us, they were also present at each of the party spots in an observational capacity. Many riders greeted and cheered police, thanking them for their help or chatting with them as riders assembled before the start. The police involved are often also on bicycles, and far less on-edge than the motorcycle cops that escort Critical Mass. At a Bike Party leaving from El Cerrito in the East Bay, one policeman said to another, “These things are pretty low-key.” At the start of the April 2012 “Hella Big” Bike Party (Figure 15) that brought together the three Bay Area Bike Parties with a contingent from Midnight Ridazzz, an organizer happily shared the turn-by-turn cue sheet with Oakland police, adding, “Thank you very much for keeping us safe tonight,” to which the officer cheerily responded, “We’ll keep an eye on you.” The fact that the Bike Party organizer perceived no ominous content in this exchange speaks to the extent to which Bike Party sees itself, much like any subject of surveillance accepting its “hailing” as having “nothing to hide” (Althusser 1972).

Considering Critical Mass’ fraught relationship with the police, this would seem
like a positive step. But as Carlsson has argued, “When the organizers start negotiating with the police it won’t be long before the police are dictating what is acceptable in terms of routes, stops, and pace. How will Bike Party’s fun evolve when the ‘birds’ are more obviously enforcers of police preferences?” (Carlsson 2011). This points to how the formalization of the relationship between extra-legal rides and state power has blunted the directly political content of the ride itself, especially its autonomous decision-making. Following Foucault, this renders the inclusion of bicycles into traffic a technical matter of ensuring that valued populations are endowed with the conditions of life (Foucault 2010; N. Rose 1999), rather than an issue of transforming dominant understandings of the street itself. Moreover, it makes Bike Party visible as a political constituency. The 2012 campaign of outside San Francisco mayoral candidate John Avalos had a strong presence at the rides leading up to the November election, and Avalos featured prominent bicycle-related iconography in its campaign literature. The symbolic adoption of the bicycle in Avalos’ challenge from the left not only demonstrates the maturation of San Francisco’s bike culture as a political resource, but also shows a shift from Critical Mass’ “radical flank effect” to Bike Party’s convening of a public ready for the right political candidate.

While this analysis has presented Bike Party as a unitary phenomenon, it varies a great deal between its San Jose parentage and San Francisco and East Bay offshoots. Most importantly, by importing the form Bike Party format from San Jose to new places, its offshoots change the character of its engagement with urban space. As one participant in San Francisco told me, San Jose Bike Party is a far more diverse group, reflecting San Jose’s demographic composition. Our exchange went as follows:

J: [on SF Bike Party] This one is, well there are some older people, but its, well you know…”
Me: Young white hipsters?
J: Yeah, or people who are really into bikes. At the San Jose one I met a fifty-year-old guy who was just using a bike to get around…

It is important to note the concepts of intentionality at play. Part of how SJBP reaches new riders is by creating a space within which cycling in the city street can be convivial and safe, where those “just using a bike” can participate alongside more “intentional” cyclists. San Francisco’s iteration, by contrast, seems to empower mainly those who already ride for a fuller social calendar of bike-related activities. EBBP seems to be somewhere between these, attracting more African American and Latino participants as well as white “hipsters” and students migrating to the East Bay. The boundary between “intentional” and “necessary” cycling itself reflects and reinscribes a race-classed relationship between different groups of bicycle users.

Exceptional Public Spaces: Sunday Streets, Parklets & Occupations

At the April 2012 meeting of the California Studies Association, Dave Snyder, a veteran of Critical Mass, longtime SFBC organizer and head of the newly formed California Bicycle Coalition, gave a presentation on Critical Mass as a form of making
urban space public by “de-privatizing” the car-oriented street. In it, he traced a direct lineage from Critical Mass to two celebrated forms of appropriating urban space. The first is the open street event, represented by San Francisco’s monthly Sunday Streets and CicLAvia in Los Angeles in which certain streets are closed to car traffic for several hours on a weekend day. Pace Snyder, however, these events have longer roots in Bogotá’s pioneering “ciclovías.” They articulate with currents in many cities that fueled Critical Mass, however; some, like Snyder, even affirm them as a closer approximation to what Critical Mass was “supposed” to be. The second is the “parklet” phenomenon, a semi-permanent reclamation of parking space for public seating and socializing, which began with the Rebar art collective’s yearly PARK(ing) Days, now celebrated in 162 cities across the world. Each of these is a form of making space public that acts as the exception to car domination rather than its disruption. These exceptional spaces may as easily act as resources for accumulation and political safety valves, displacing questions of justice onto the technical issue of properly allocating functional space.

Taking inspiration from the long-running Ciclovías of Bogota, which gained momentum under star mayor Enrique Peñalosa to worldwide recognition, Sunday Streets closes a small network of streets in the chosen neighborhood to car traffic from 10 AM to 3 PM one Sunday a month. The monthly focus on a specific neighborhood encourages local businesses and non-profits to showcase the area’s attributes, in hopes of attracting visitors back at other times. As the “Frequently Asked Questions” (FAQ) section of the Sunday Streets website argues,

Sunday Streets offers free and fun physical activity space to all San Franciscans and provides open space in neighborhoods that lack such space currently. Local businesses will also benefit from increased pedestrian and bicycle traffic along commercial corridors. The events provide a model of how cities can provide healthy, environmental friendly outdoor activities for their residents (San Francisco Sunday Streets website).

Sunday Streets expanded from two popular pilots in 2008 to six in 2009 and ten in 2012, in the process gaining support among merchants and municipal officials. Another part of the effort involved bringing Peñalosa as a consultant on the Great Streets Project to remake Market Street. In its third year, Sunday Streets stepped out of the shadow of Bogotá to a certain degree. According to organizer Susan King, “Sunday Streets is turning the corner. We’ve gone from being a pilot project that turned out to be more successful than any of us really had an idea that it would evolved into a moving event. We’re trying to get a pattern” (Bialick 2012a). The institutionalization of Sunday Streets raises interesting questions about the purpose of temporarily closing streets to car traffic.

One of the main questions surrounding Sunday Streets is its effect on local business. The Sunday Streets website features a FAQ specifically for merchants about what to expect during the event, and encourages them to participate to attract customers and expand their clientele (San Francisco Sunday Streets). In an effort to curry favor with local merchants and avoid opposition to parking loss, the rhetoric of Sunday Streets casts

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11 Though there is nothing inherently more social, with the exception of the absence of a windshield, about the private car and the individual bicycle.
the ideal user of the public space created as one enjoying themselves and/or spending money at local establishments. I don’t intend to condemn Sunday Streets as simply catering to business, but rather to highlight the powerful constraints on any vision of what a street closure could be. As Streetsblog reported in 2010, “In addition to the tens of thousands of people coming out to enjoy the sun and open streets while pedaling and strolling, the events have had a very positive impact on the bottom line” (Roth 2010). Tellingly, in a response to a commenter on Roth’s piece, who credited Sunday Streets for their visit to a local business they didn’t know about beforehand, Streetsblog editor Aaron Bialick wrote, “Great! Perhaps local business associations could pool together money to hold more of them” (Roth 2010). Because Sunday Streets is good for business, it would be conceivable for businesses to tax themselves (voluntarily) to promote it.12 As Jason Henderson puts it, Sunday Streets also has the feel of a real estate tour by bicycle. In other words, the public Sunday Streets frames is not that of contentious democratic politics, but rather the consumer public whose desires cities must harness to remain competitive. While this is not the motivation driving Sunday Streets’ organizers, it comprises the attractiveness of the event for the city and its commercial constituency. Here again, the purpose is not devastating criticism but committed critique.13 Sunday Streets creates a real, convivial space free of cars (Figure 16). Cyclists, pedestrians, skaters, and rollerbladers of all ages mingle, children play games, and local residents barbecue in the street, set out furniture, and do art projects. Bands play in the street or from houses along the route, street vendors sell their products, impromptu stoop sales go up, local businesses hold specials and non-profits promote their work. When I go to Sunday Streets as a researcher, especially the well-attended Mission District edition, I run into friends and colleagues as well as interview subjects. In addition to the pleasing absence of cars, Sunday Streets means the suspension, however brief, of the dominant logic of the street, which spatially allocates functions with lane markings, signals, and grade differences to streamline high volumes of traffic flow.

Sunday Streets accomplishes what bicycle infrastructure may never in its current form: an undoing of the functional logic of road design, albeit for only a day per month, and only in one neighborhood at a time. Rather than promoting orderly movement, Sunday Streets encourages low-level chaos, on-the-go determinations of right-of-way, and a slow pace of movement. It conjures the pre-1920s American street, which had yet to be reconfigured by the interests of “motordom” as a technology of rapid traffic circulation, and acted instead as a social space in its own right (Norton 2011). Sunday Streets makes space public. This publicness can facilitate the kinds of use that lay the groundwork for more engaged politics. As Snyder has argued, “Thousands of people experienced car-free streets space for the first time; who knows what they will do with that knowledge, but it will probably be good!” (D. Snyder 2009).

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12 This is not to say that what Bialick proposed is in the offing, but it is symptomatic of a contemporary logic that reconceptualizes taxation as something more like shareholdership, and public space is a product of strategies to increase private profit, or at least cannot substantially conflict with them.

13 Thanks are due to Ananya Roy for insisting upon this important distinction.
Sunday Streets does, however, materialize some of the contradictions currently present in what the “public” means for contemporary urban life. For instance, the August 2011 event closed streets along the Panhandle and Alamo Square, two white, middle-class neighborhoods, and extended northeast to Fillmore Street in the Western Addition, a historically black neighborhood devastated by urban renewal in the 1970s. Along the streets of the former, vendors peddled wares at a farmer’s market, brunch spots offered specials, and young people set up furniture in the street. Tents representing non-profits like the SFBC, Iraq Veterans Against the War, and college radio station KUSF, as well as the “green” firms Clif Bar and outdoor retailer REI, dotted the streetscape. The political uses of space, such as that of IVAW, were informational rather than agitational—in effect, the politics became part of the consumption landscape. As one crossed a daunting hill at Alamo Square and descended into the Western Addition, the offerings shifted to poverty-related non-profit organizations and black-owned businesses. Music shifted from alt-country or “conscious” hip-hop near Golden Gate Park to live jazz and more commercial hip-hop/R&B offered by the KMEL booth. The route was ostensibly designed to connect these spaces, but in many ways they remained as separated socially as topographically. Few revelers I saw made the crossing between the two regions of the route, save a group of 8- to 12-year-old youth of color gleefully and hazardously racing down the hill into the Fillmore. Sunday Streets has no explicit mandate, or capacity, to
heal social divisions along race and class, but the spaces it assembles have something to reveal about the state of these divisions in contemporary San Francisco.

Furthermore, the difficulty with Sunday Streets is both spatial and temporal. In each respect, it acts as an exception to car-dominated space that in some ways proves the rule. At the July 1 Sunday Streets in the Mission, I took the opportunity to stick around at 4 PM, when the rode closure was scheduled to end, to see what would happen. As vendors packed up carts and tables, non-profits put away their tents, and a dwindling but still substantial crowd ambled and biked along in the middle of Valencia Street, groups of Sunday Streets volunteers in bright green shirts rode past, announcing on megaphones, “Sunday Streets is over! Please return to the sidewalk!” Of course, in order for the event to remain viable, Sunday Streets coordinators need to honor their agreement with the city by clearing revelers from the street promptly. But this may be a symptom of the

Figure 17. Performance piece on 22nd Street at Valencia, just before clearance by SFPD. Photo by author.
limitations inherent in Sunday Streets. Just after Valencia was reopened, a queer performance piece was held in the street in front of the 22nd St. Co-Op, a venerable leftist collective from before the area’s superheated gentrification (Figure 17). The crowd composed of queer activists, allies, and curious onlookers amassed to witness the performance, spilling off the narrow sidewalk and into the streets. The police quickly arrived, ushered people back onto the sidewalk, and remained until the crowd dispersed, many to attend a related event at a nearby bookshop. It was 4:30. The street had been briefly enlivened—outside of the parameters of the event but close enough to cast the contrast into high relief.

The phenomenon of “parklets” bears some similarities. Its origins lie in an event in San Francisco in 2005 held by Rebar Art & Design Studio, which paid for two hours of metered car parking, laid down Astroturf and lawn chairs, and made a “park” in the street. This action has since been commemorated by PARK(ing) Day, a yearly event practiced throughout the world. Parklets, which occupy several parking spaces relatively permanently, are a mutation of this concept. The parklet sponsor (typically a business) pays a yearly fee to the city and commits to maintaining the space. In return, the parklet creates an attractive public space in front of the sponsor’s property. Since the first formal parklet was installed in San Francisco in 2010, parklets have proliferated as somewhat permanent installations made of steel and wood, with planters, benches, and bike racks. No longer an ad-hoc appropriation, these sidewalk extensions are a celebrated part of livability initiatives. For instance, former San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom’s Pavement to Parks Initiative identifies the 25% of public space taken up by the street network as an obstacle to livability.

The first parklet, installed in front of bicycle-themed Mojo Café on Divisadero Street, set a pattern followed by all but one of the over 40 now in existence: it serves as de facto extra seating for a café or other hospitality business. All feature signs that label the space as “public,” but in practice they tend to be occupied by patrons of the sponsoring business or its neighbors. Whatever the legal status of the parklet as a space, sponsorship by successful, often overflowing establishments, serving a specific demographic of the “creative class,” encodes them as quasi-private space. This falls into line with how community and “the public” are considered in contemporary urbanism. During the dedication ceremony for San Francisco’s first parklet, then-mayor Newsom proclaimed, “This is all about taking the narrative of the 25 percent of our land mass that [is] streets, and begin to take a little bit of that back and open that up for the community and create a framework where there is a stronger community connection, a stronger sense of place and a better community environment as well” (Roth 2009). We might see this as a contemporary analogue to the idealized Parisian boulevard café created through Haussmannization, with outdoor seating serving a flâneur clientele that appears as a public, but whose presence is undergirded by a massive reorganization of urban space (Harvey 2005). In contemporary American urban life, membership in the “public” frequently requires the ability to purchase rights to occupy nominally public space. Thus, while parklets are legally public, their clear doubling as seating or bike parking for sponsoring businesses creates a conceptual limitation on the kind of public that might
entertain rights to spaces freed from automobile domination.

With this in mind, it bears noting that only one parklet is residentially sponsored. More importantly, when it was installed it was such a departure from the pattern that it warranted specific mention on Streetsblog. Valencia Street resident, software engineer, Bicycle Coalition board member, and Bike Party stalwart Amandeep “Deep” Jawa commissioned a parklet for the street space directly in front of his house, stating, “I wanted the front of my house to reflect the fact that people come and hang out there. In general, that’s a great thing, and that’s what Valencia’s all about. The parklet is a natural extension for that.” The article outlines the process by which other residents can follow Deep’s example, and quotes a representative of the Planning Department who speaks approvingly of residential uses of the program. At the same time, it implicitly critiques the uses of parklets, despite celebrating their installation:

Most of the parklets that continue to pop up around the city have so far been largely motivated by the benefits they bring to businesses, although some come from non-profits. Restaurants and cafes usually take on construction and maintenance duties but benefit by attracting more customers to their storefront (Bialick 2011a).

This betrays the instrumental logic behind creating livable public space: as an amenity to facilitate economic growth (Lavine 2012).

In January 2012 the Great Streets Project released the first impact study on parklets, which found a market increase in pedestrian traffic, a significant increase in bicycle parking, and no detrimental impacts on businesses due to the loss of street parking. It noted, “Although the benefit to businesses is most clearly felt by the sponsoring business, no negative impacts on nearby businesses were identified” (L. Pratt 2011). However, the quantifiable benefits of the parklet, represented by increases in pedestrian and bike traffic, were negligible in two of the three sites surveyed. Part of the motivation for the thin survey seems to have been to allay fears that parklets could hurt commerce by facilitating “anti-social behavior” (listed as “panhandling, illicit drug use, and aggressive or belligerent behavior”) and removing parking. Public space, if it does not directly benefit business, cannot be permitted to negatively affect it, even if a full conception of the public must include behaviors determined by the bourgeoisie to be “anti-social” (Mitchell 2003).

This logic, which privileges securing accumulation, isn’t limited to the permanent parklet. It applies even to the act of taking streets space temporarily on PARK(ing) Day:

Last year, a number of parklets were created for PARK(ing) Day to demonstrate how converting space for autos can enliven a street and business, providing a comfortable place to sit and enjoy the city, especially in neighborhoods cursed with narrow sidewalks (Goebel 2010).

Even where these activities create genuine conviviality not reducible to profit, this vitality is framed as an economic resource (Florida 2005). This narrows who counts as the desired public—and the kinds of activities considered valuable—in the urban landscape (Morhayim 2012).

Could parklets go beyond the instrumentalization of public space to become
commons? Hardt and Negri argue that biopolitical labor, or the production of a commons, has become the primary relation of production in the North Atlantic. The fruits of these autonomous activities are carved off as rent through the mechanism of private property (Hardt and Negri 2011). This insight points us towards two paradoxical conclusions. The first is that the “commons” of the parklet is no commons at all, but a “shop floor” of social labor harnessed to produce a valorizable milieu. The second is that it acts as a space of potential nonetheless, where the privatized purpose of public space may be subverted. For Marx, after all, by bringing together large masses of workers in factories, capitalists created the political and spatial conditions for class consciousness. It may be that the neoliberal manipulation of publicness as value-addition might convene a new class of gravediggers, or at least a new political space. Harvey hopes this, though largely against hope (1989). As a factor in gentrification, however, parklets more often convene already valued activities, and extend the commercial landscape into nominally public space, than ground transgressive politics.

**Occupying Bicycle Politics**

The above implies that the techniques of Critical Mass—leaderless organization, spontaneous improvisation, and convivial celebration—are on the wane as cyclists gain formal political power. They should instead be seen as an archive of practices and know-how that can be called upon for purposes beyond those of bicycle advocacy. This became evident with the role of cyclists in the various Occupy Wall Street struggles, many of which were not named with the spirit of Critical Mass but drew on embedded knowledge that would not exist without it. In the dozen years since the “Battle in Seattle,” bicycles have gone from a personal expression of the environmentalist politics of some participants to playing a central role in mass mobilizations. Although during the dormancy of the Left in the second half of the 2000s, everyday technologies like the bicycle largely took the place of street politics, their users developed creative capacities that could be reimported to acts of protest.

Occupy Oakland, for instance, was saturated by bicycles. Many participants arrived by bicycle, locking to every conceivable location at Oscar Grant Plaza, and bicycles were used at the camp for generating electricity, to collect supplies, and for reconnaissance of police positions during raids. During both successful Oakland port shutdowns, hundreds of participants rode bicycles, which were tactically useful to confirm the location and strength of various pickets. A Critical Mass was called for on December 12th to quickly reach the port during the longshore workers’ shift change, when most demonstrators would still be downtown at the mass rally. Even more noteworthy were the other aspects of bike culture not typically considered part of street politics. For instance, the East Bay Bicycle Coalition set up a bicycle valet parking area at Oscar Grant Plaza for the Oakland general strike. Many of the cyclists participating in the marches did not conform to stereotypes of the typical Critical Mass participant. I witnessed many demonstrators astride store-bought commuter bikes rather than heavily tinkered rigs. If bicycles have been embedded with an implicit *lifestyle* politics over the past two decades, they have also begun to leave the subcultural sphere and act as a general condition of
progressive politics.\textsuperscript{14}

In Portland, a novel mutation of Critical Mass emerged, known as “Bike Swarm.” Bike Swarm began on the night of November 12\textsuperscript{th}, 2011, following an “Occupy Your Bike” ride the day before, in solidarity with Occupy Portland as eviction loomed (Bailey 2011). At midnight, when the eviction order went into effect, roughly a hundred cyclists began circling the encampment continuously until morning, effectively preventing a confrontation and enabling occupiers to safely pack up the camp (Maus 2011). In the bicycle blogosphere, even this action was largely glossed in a liberal tone. As BikePortland.org editor Jonathan Maus wrote, “Note: If you weren’t there, please understand that the bike swarm/brigade did not interfere with the police. This is because the police were passive and peaceful almost the entire night. When the police did move forward aggressively for a brief moment, the bike swarm was nowhere around” (Maus 2011). This framing notwithstanding, Bike Swarm drew its efficacy from the sedimented practices of Critical Mass, even if Critical Mass no longer exists there, as well as an infrastructure of social media and email lists.

This does not make Bike Swarm simply Critical Mass in a new guise. The concept of a “swarm” (beyond its entomological reference) was drawn from a similar bike action during the Copenhagen climate talks earlier that year. Furthermore, it did not simply emerge, but was planned in committees following the “Occupy Your Bike” ride, drawing on the spokescouncil practices of Occupy. As Dan Kaufman, an early participant, put it to me, the presence of bikes was “a tool, like a cavalry,” supporting the encampment rather than forwarding a politics of the bicycle. For Kaufman, however, the intimate linkage between corporate power and automobility meant that politicized cyclists were Occupy’s “natural” allies. As he put it to me, “As long as the government is so heavily influenced by corporations, by Wall Street, by moneyminded interests, we’re not going to see any significant changes to our transportation system” (Kaufman 2012). With the success of Bike Swarm, it became a working group within Occupy Portland, and it actually gained momentum following its “spontaneous” beginning. Even after a quiet winter for the movement as a whole, Bike Swarm remained, holding semi-regular meetings and taking part in a February action against local filling stations and the May Day celebrations that spring. For a city in which no Critical Mass occurs because “every day is one,” Portland produced a bicycle protest formation that articulated with Occupy in powerfully radical ways.

These instances are important to recall, because they work against a teleological of the progression from radicalism to cooptation, spontaneity to institutionalization, or subculture to the mainstream. My purpose in tracing the mutations of Critical Mass is to claim its role in stabilizing bicycle-related politics, not its disruption of order. In other words, Critical Mass is not a pure origin of authentic politics that has been corrupted, but as a site where cycling subjects, with all their contradictions, have been forged through

\textsuperscript{14} Bicycles were again prevalent within the Black Lives Matter demonstrations in Oakland in late 2014, ridden by militant black youth in leadership roles. In other conditions, the bodily hexis of these youth would have slotted them as “hipster,” but here they were street tacticians in immediate, high-stakes situations—a far cry from the ecological lifestyle politics the bicycle often signifies.
politics. As bicycles continue to play a role both in the resurgence of Left politics and the commodification of urban space, these contradictory elements will produce new formations of “bike culture,” though, to follow Marx, never under conditions of their own choosing.

**Conclusion: Making Space Public**

The above analysis should not be seen as a narrative of decline, whereby Critical Mass degraded into Bike Party, Sunday Streets, and parklets. Instead, it should be clear that the tension between disruption and inclusion is present within Critical Mass itself, expressed in its two best-known slogans: “Whose streets? Our streets!” and “We’re not blocking traffic, we ARE traffic.” On one hand, Critical Mass interrupts the normal functioning of the street, albeit in a temporally and spatially circumscribed way. On the other, Critical Mass’ most lasting achievement is to force bicycle infrastructure planning onto the agenda for San Francisco, converting anarchic energy into a desire for the bureaucratic allocation of space.

This does not diminish the fact that bike lanes contribute to cycling becoming safer, although whether the infrastructure itself or the increased numbers of cyclists deserve credit is the subject of endless debate. It does, however, render at a finer grain the dialectic of spatial form and social process outlined by Harvey (2000). While Critical Mass has typically been analyzed as an ephemeral practice in the sense valorized by De Certeau (1984), we must understand the kind of space it brings into being: a social space in search of some permanent form. It acts as a mediator between processual and formal tendencies present in the world of bicycle activism, rather than as one pole of Harvey’s dialectic. To paraphrase De Certeau, while what Critical Mass wins it does not keep, it produces the desires to win and keep. These are strategic rather than tactical desires, in De Certeau’s parlance.

There is no easy binary relationship between Critical Mass and Bike Party. Each creates a social space where the bicycle holds an effective monopoly over the street, but by different means. Critical Mass does so by ad-hoc organization and regularized rhythms of the ride itself, Bike Party by more structured planning and facilitation. Their commonality is that they act as exceptions to car-dominated space, rather than a break with it. Therefore, the more productive question asks what kind of exception each is. Critical Mass, in its processual aspects, acts as a prefigurative exception, anticipating a “new kind of public space,” in Carlsson’s words, and enacting it in the present. Bike Party, on the other hand (along with Sunday Streets and parklets), creates a functional exception, a carnival in the specific sense. The status quo is briefly and predictably overturned so that it can go on being the status quo. Bike Party, more and different bike parties, and similar gatherings, have few ambitions beyond an enjoyable respite from the car. A community-building agenda of non-disruption for cyclists in fact shores up the hegemony of the car. By the same token, it creates a shared sense of what bike culture is, in ways that can be exclusionary but nevertheless create a more durable political formation of cyclists “for themselves.”
This points to a larger tension in the politics of the bicycle, between seeing cycling as an individual mode of transportation and experiencing it as a collectivity of practices. This tension might be called “liberal” versus “radical” (Carlsson, Elliott, and Camarena 2012). This chapter has argued that Critical Mass has always embodied this tension, and engaging with the politics of Critical Mass involves dealing with the dialectical interplay between these two dimensions. If Critical Mass in San Francisco now feels like “the hole in the middle of the donut,” as Carlsson put it on the eve of its 20th anniversary, this seeming irrelevance is the political result of how infrastructure and advocacy have shifted. It is also partially because something Critical Mass was claiming all along—without explicitly doing so—has been fulfilled.

Critical Mass simultaneously worked two fronts over its turbulent history: one about radical disruption and the other making normative claims for inclusion. As a slogan, “We Are Traffic!” exemplifies this tension. On one hand, an ungovernable horde of cyclists claiming to be traffic forces a redefinition of what traffic is. Is it just a mass of vehicles passively following bureaucratically organized spatial cues, or a space of social encounter? Traffic isn’t an abstract problem, traffic is ultimately composed of us. Many of us spend a large portion of our days in traffic but experience it as an alien force. Critical Mass shows that traffic could be a social experience, were society organized differently as a commons. On the other hand, the slogan articulates an invisible collective of cyclists claiming to be part of traffic, which performs a critical role in the reproduction of capitalist relations of production by transporting the commodity of labor-power to the site of its use. To say that “we are traffic”—that the labor-power this we take to market has value and must not be damaged, deploys a subjectivity already endowed with social power. It also reinscribes the nominal role of publicness, as the necessary supplement to capitalist accumulation and deliberative democracy, organized and regulated to perform this role (Mitchell 2003).

None of the transformations now allowing the mainstreaming of the bicycle in urban space would be thinkable were bicycles still considered a transportation mode of last resort as in the past, or if subjects claiming visibility as bike culture were negatively marked. This could be called cooptation, but the investment in physical infrastructure for the bicycle has also satisfied the participants who simply want inclusion into traffic—normal urban life—rather than its remaking. Critical Mass didn’t transform the city into a post-capitalist paradise, but it did assist the cultural formation of a class of city dwellers who claim a right to be part of traffic. The chapters that follow elaborate how these claims intersect with the racialization and reorganization of urban space that attend this inclusion.
The bicycle has been in wide use for well over a century, forming a key part of the material culture of industrial modernity. “Bike culture,” however, which loosely groups together the diverse social forms of contemporary urban cycling, has been part of common parlance for scarcely a decade. In the early 2000s, “bike culture” was referred to by name only in fringe publications like Bike Culture Quarterly and On the Wheel, or online email lists of activists and advocates. Just over a decade later, it is everywhere. Countless blogs detail its intricacies, covering policy advocacy, urban planning, product design, style and aesthetics, social division, and beyond. The popular online news site Huffington Post has a section on it, as does the New York Times. As the phenomenon of urban cycling has exploded, despite a notoriously car-centric American culture, its manifestations in different cities are mediated by growing networks. These mediations play a crucial role in bringing bike culture into being as an object in ways it could never have been considered before.

While the particular subcultures of road cyclists, mountain bikers, and BMX (bicycle moto-cross) riders are well established within the world of cycling, bike culture denotes a specifically urban phenomenon. This does not mean that all urban uses of the bicycle are prima facie part of what is known as bike culture. Instead, bike culture depends on the appropriations of urban space pioneered by Critical Mass and its mutations, even where Critical Mass’ politics have fallen from favor. Bike culture’s constituents are city dwellers who use bicycles in daily life and who consider cycling a primary component of identity; its struggles are urban struggles. Where for decades groups of cyclists have used their machines to escape to the countryside, bike culture encourages cycling as a way to more fully experience the city. The micro-level actions of moving through urban space by bicycle are framed in bike culture as transformative of life and the city itself.

The coding of urban cycling has changed dramatically since the emergence of Critical Mass and its politicization within the culture of individualized environmentalism (Maniates 2002). Once a physical representation of poverty and lack of automobile access, seen as used only by radical environmentalists, the homeless, alcoholics with revoked licenses and lunatic bike messengers, since the 1990s the bicycle has left the fringes and entered the mainstream. While this mainstreaming of the bicycle is celebrated in the growing online discourse on urban sustainability and now touted as an economic benefit to cities that produce bicycle infrastructure (Simons 2012), the constitution of the normal cycling subject is a process that has operated in and through race to remake urban space.

The spaces that urban bike culture hopes to more fully experience and reshape, however, are in the throes of far-reaching transformations of which the bicycle is only a small part. Bike culture has flowered precisely in the areas of cities that are undergoing...
racialized gentrification. The “gales of creative destruction” (Schumpeter 1942) sweeping through many older working class districts across the country have not yet remade the streets with cyclists in mind. The new, more bourgeois stratum of cyclists now springing up does not just reflect the maturation of bicycle advocates from earlier, more rebellious social formations. These new cyclists, greater numbers of them young professionals, are empowered by the reconcentration of wealth in cities but remain disadvantaged by the road system. Their political engagement, unlike that of Critical Mass, seeks to transform urban mobility in order to better match the transformations of the neighborhoods they occupy.

To understand this process, however, we first must understand how the bicycle became an ideal tool for reinhabiting the disinvested city. The goal of this chapter is to explore how bike culture is reproduced through spatial practices that depend on a longer history of the racialization, gendering, and classing of urban space (Lipsitz 2007). It will trace the expansion of the social infrastructure of bike culture: the spaces linked together in practice through the bicycle but not made material through official planning. The urbanization of bike culture creates what I am calling an “ethical cyclescape” (Appadurai 1996; Hirschkind 2006). The ethical cyclescape is a “deeply perspectival construct[,] inflected by the historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sorts of actors” (Appadurai 1996, 33). It is a dimension of mobility that draws its strength from the affective experience of what the just city should feel like. For this perspective, the bicycle is an ethical tool. It knits together localized social relations in the “daily round” (Logan and Molotch 2007). It brings neighbors into more frequent contact, the “sidewalk ballet” pushed further to humanize the street itself (J. Jacobs 1992). Most importantly, it articulates a claim that the car is irrelevant for urbane life.

The close-range materiality of the bicycle is represented ideologically by an aestheticized localism that bicycles express. Advertisements in cycling magazines have begun shifting from the lycra-clad racing cyclist or suburban Sunday rider to the stylish urban aesthete who zips to the café on a bike to sip an espresso, read, and create. Bicycles now appear in the imagery of downtown real estate, conveying an urbane lifestyle available for purchase. The delivery of locally made goods by bicycle enables businesses to align themselves with a neighborhood ethos that is both genuine and adds value to products. The network of the bicycle’s cultural spaces—bike shops, bicycle-themed cafes, community bike workshops, businesses providing bike parking, and other features—

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1 In this chapter I will be privileging race-class as an analytic, though it is my belief that the production of new urban gendered practices through the bicycle is important and will come through in the analysis. There are a few reasons for this. First, the gendering of cycling in the US (and Anglophone countries more generally) is well studied and debated, though arguably its spatial entailments are not. Second, practices of visually counting cyclists have thus far adequately captured (binary) rider gender but not race/ethnicity, though the claim that the former is easier to see quickly than another would rightly be seen as erasing gender diversity. Third, I am not convinced that the shaping of contemporary urban modes of gendering through cycling practice is as determinate for the geography of gentrification as race-class. It is, however, a powerful medium for the ideology of gentrification.

2 The San Francisco Public Press and Oakland’s Bicycle Coffee and Linden Street Brewery, for instance, distribute their wholesale products to cafes and bars exclusively by bicycle.
describes a localized cyclescape that depends on the processes of urban capital accumulation.

What is now known as bike culture, moreover, grew up connected across multiple spatial scales. While the material travels of cyclists remain important, bike culture is mediated through “web capitalism” (following Anderson 2006). Understandings of what it means to be a cyclist in the contemporary United States—in all its diverse forms—circulate through Internet-based “communities of consciousness” (Turner 2008) at an ever more rapid pace. Early modes of circulating information were email lists and online forums like rec.bicycles.tech and San Francisco’s Car-Free Cities list. More recently, blogs like Cyclelicious, Streetsblog, BikeSnobNYC, and Copenhagenize cover topics of concern for the phalanxes of new urban cyclists. Physical magazines oriented toward urban cycling culture, like Momentum and Urban Velo, are available online as well (Figure 18). Bicycle coalitions have also shifted to an increasing online presence; broadsheets like the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition’s Tube Times are still available at local bike shops, but the online world is its future. Coalitions gain access to their memberships via online means, and they put ever more effort into savvy branding and social media outreach. These mediating networks have far-reaching implications for the ways that cyclists have constituted themselves as a cultural and political formation that “hangs together.”

They are instrumental for how bike culture visually reproduces race-classed spatial divisions. At the same time, they act as a medium through which subaltern cyclists—the constitutive outsides to bike culture—challenge their exclusion from the dominant narratives of cycling’s urban renaissance (Butler 1997).

Since the late 2000s, a discourse relating cycling to a growing white, bourgeois, cosmopolitan urbanism has begun to circulate through these networks. Advocates have begun to recognize the need to reach out to “underrepresented” groups, particularly African Americans and immigrants, in order to conduct bicycle planning in these communities. They have also begun to understand that cyclists’ needs are not uniform, and that cyclists of color face challenges that better infrastructure cannot fix (League of American Bicyclists 2013a; Lugo and Mannos 2012; Applebaum et al. 2011). Outside of bike culture there is a growing narrative of cycling’s “elitism,” rooted in right-wing national politics as well as more local debates over bicycle infrastructure (Doig 2011; Bialick 2011b). Resistance from small businesses has been just as fierce, if not more so. Business groups, seeing themselves as besieged by the threat of street parking removal, have mounted assaults on infrastructure plans in San Francisco, Oakland, Portland, and

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[3] I owe this expression, which for me captures the complexity of contingently necessary relations, to Michael Watts.

[4] Here I will use “white” unqualified by quotation marks, though I recognize that the youth culture surrounding urban cycling is not composed entirely of the non-Hispanic white Census category. This youth culture is indeed mostly white, but more importantly the practices of cycling themselves are coded in a way durably linked to white urban youth culture. An analogy might be made between the 1980s and 1990s category “buppie” (black yuppie) and the current though infrequently used term “blipster” (black hipster); each indexes the unacknowledged racial coding of the unqualified terms. “Bike culture” isn’t only white, but formations of black, Latino and/or Asian youth around the bicycle tend to require the ethnoracial qualifier to mark their distinction.
elsewhere. In many cities, bicycle advocates have been cast as the “all-powerful bike lobby”: coddled yuppies promoting gentrification and exercising dictatorial control of city government (Milloy 2014; Rabinowitz 2013). In national politics, bicycles are now the target, along with mass transit, of right-wing attacks against any transportation spending not focused on the car (Schmitt 2011a). While the ascendancy of livability as a planning orthodoxy in major cities has undoubtedly contributed to the political power of bicycle advocacy groups, these nagging claims have hampered efforts to implement more thoroughgoing infrastructure plans.

This chapter seeks to explain the spatial processes through which the bicycle, once considered a lowly form of transportation reserved for the poor, becomes encoded as white and bourgeois for some and the marker of urban reinvigoration for others. It examines the ideological transformation of the bicycle into a machine that signifies a complex articulation of race, class, and generational conflicts at work in contemporary cities. It also explores how bike culture shapes new material geographies of racialized urban space. In other words, I read the formation of bike culture as inseparable from its race-classed dimensions. San Francisco and Oakland figure here as moments of a skein of interlinked relations where questions of race, class, and mobility are materially worked out, not as a site where the generalized process of racialization “takes place” (see Massey, 1994).

The debates about the bicycle outlined above are rarely connected to the spatial
process of racialization, especially housing markets and the division of labor. This chapter examines how bike subcultures have produced new spaces of practice in Oakland, and the thorny politics of race and class that these spaces force to the surface. Oakland’s complex articulation of factors casts the process of racialization into sharp relief. These factors are the racialized unevenness of capital investment, reinforced by transportation infrastructure, and the production of a gentrification habitus (Bourdieu 1984), a set of practices that depend on disinvested spaces for their conditions of possibility. Key to the politics of race-class and the bicycle in Oakland, however, is how cyclists of color have intervened in the process, contesting the racialization of cycling and the narratives told about urban “revitalization” through the bicycle. We must keep in view at all times the fact that the bicycle becomes thinkable through the category of race only through the spatial processes of racialized urban change in the first place.

The argument of this chapter is two-fold. First, the urban culture surrounding the bicycle has been shaped by practices of “marginal gentrification” (D. Rose 1984) that produce new forms of space—both fleeting and durable—within racialized landscapes of suppressed investment. Cyclists who flock to proximally located areas with depressed housing costs do so by bicycle in a way that both affects the geography of in-migration and its visibility. At the same time, contesting of the white, middle-class coding of cycling by activists of color both reinscribes and challenges the coherence of bike culture itself. It simultaneously highlights the broader spatial inequalities in mobility that the flowering of bike culture depends upon. I hope to show that bike culture is a contested space because the cities where it prospers are in upheaval.

Social Infrastructure, “Economic Diversity” and the Production of Place

Social infrastructure, for the purposes of this analysis, refers to the spaces brought into relation through material practices. What I want to capture with the term are the ways that spaces are appropriated by networks of actors in ways that link them together beyond their original purposes. These links are constantly maintained through social relations, instead of becoming embedded in technological systems. This perspective, drawing on urban anthropologists like AbdouMaliq Simone, emphasizes the contingency of these relationships, which are made through iteration rather than by design (Simone 2004). It differs from Simone, who focuses on economic collaboration in Johannesburg, by emphasizing how actors create ethical forms of life that link urban spaces together into an alternate experience of the city. Another urban anthropologist, Adonia Lugo, uses “human infrastructure” to refer to the embodied bicycling knowledge shared between people that has been overlooked in bicycle advocacy’s growing obsession with physical infrastructure (Lugo 2013a; Lugo 2013b). My usage of social infrastructure is similar but distinct; it stresses the practices of repurposing physical spaces to create new relationships between them.

In Marxian terms, the creation of social infrastructure occurs through the often-intangible connections among activities of social reproduction and the reproduction of labor-power (Harvey 2005; Harvey 2007b). It captures, however, the way that these tasks
produce entire realms of life that are not simply given by the relations of production. The fabric of the neighborhood social world is made in the interplay between the built environment and the social relations between residents—the production of space (Lefebvre 1992). Social life is created by linked activities that work upon the material of the city, forming place-based use-values out of existing material (Logan and Molotch 2007, 18–23). Place, in other words, is both the product and setting of a labor process. The use-values this process depends upon can be destroyed by redevelopment in the name of “higher and better use”, or by demographic flux leading to rapid changes in social relations (ibid., pp. 111–24).

These use-values are not an unchanging world to be defended against the dynamism of exchange-value-driven urban development intruding from outside. Following Doreen Massey, places are the “meeting place” of multiple scales of social practice from the global—what Latour would call “long” networks (Latour 1993)—to the regional and local. Places, like identities, are fundamentally iterative and unstable, rather than bounded (147, 153). Each place is unique only as a complex articulation of different processes that extend beyond its conceptual boundaries. As Gregory argues, “community describes not a static, place-based social collective but a power-laden field of social relations whose meanings, structures, and frontiers are continually produced, contested, and reworked in relation to a complex range of sociopolitical attachments and antagonisms” (1998, 11). Searching for “authentic” place-based use-values to defend, a quest that characterizes much writing on gentrification, pursues the wrong object. A more useful question asks how certain changes in place-based use-values may set into motion their conversion into exchange-values.

This conversion is neither automatic nor complete. For Rose, seeing any creative appropriations of disinvested urban space as the leading edge of masks the diversity of economic processes at work (1984; Gibson-Graham 2006). This is undoubtedly the case. Solidarity economies persist, and may even be enhanced, through the practices of marginal gentrifiers. Labor barter, skill-sharing, gleaning, squatting, land banking, gift economies, and solidarity networks all occur in the interstices of urban capitalism, often practiced by people coded as gentrifiers.5 Mutuality networks proliferate. But they can create entry points for capital to articulate with non-capitalist processes. In other words, following Graeber, they produce values not reducible to capital, but which always risk objectification as exchange-values. Focusing on the diversity of economic practices in gentrification in this way risks masking the differential access to resources that some members of subcultures like bike culture bring to bear on remaking urban space.6 For our

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5 I want to stress here that the desires of gentrifiers matter (D. Rose 1984; Ley 1994; Danyluk and Ley 2007). At the same time, however, the racialized devalorization of the built environment is critical to the cultural politics of gentrification, not just its political economy (N. Smith 1996). As Rose argues, marginal gentrifiers are motivated by the desire to address politically insurmountable social problems by spatial means. Persistent sociospatial segregation and car dependence are two social problems that the spatial strategies of these gentrifiers address in contradictory ways.

6 The capitalist totality rightly critiqued by Gibson-Graham has in fact rarely existed as an ontology lived by everyone in a social formation, only as a set of processes that connect to produce surplus value at an adequate level. Place-based processes that emerge as limitations on the ability to produce surplus value
purposes, therefore, gentrification does not rapidly and completely replace existing use-values with “highest and best” uses. Rather, it is a process that creates gentrifying space: a social field in which creative destruction coexists with and even depend on existing use-values even as it undermines them.

**Race and the Daily Round in the Cyclescape**

For Logan and Molotch, among the most important neighborhood use-values is the “daily round”—the routine movements through space around which urban social life coheres. Regular travels describe the limits of familiar zones; unexpected encounters occur as often between destinations as at them. Traditional urban sociology and time-geography alike pursue the ways that these movements shape perceptions of space. Here, I focus more narrowly on the daily round as practiced by the bicycle, which differs from the spatiality of walking, driving, riding a bus, or taking a train. Nodes in the daily round (bikes shops, certain cafes and bars, and other places where cyclists congregate) are meaningful for cyclists in different ways. Pathways connecting these nodes (quieter streets, shortcuts, and direct routes) assume different forms than for other users of space. These practices are sedimented in bike culture as a shared sense of the cyclescape (see Appadurai, 1996).

Here it must be stressed that mobility intervenes on two sides of the same gentrification process. Large-scale investment in freeways and other transportation infrastructure drove the uneven development of urban space in the United States, creating the ground-rent valleys now subject to gentrification. But mobility shapes the “demand” side of gentrification as well. Too often, studies of the aesthetic component of gentrification focus on the structures and spaces preferred by gentrifiers, like Victorian houses, sidewalk cafes, and neighborhood parks (Ley 2003; Zukin 2008). Practices of mobility, however, stitch these locales together into a daily round. The forms of mobility gentrifiers practice shape the geography of gentrification itself. In the case of cycling, the qualities of the bicycle itself enable new geographies of gentrification; locational priorities emerge that are not simply given by the patterns of disinvestment alone. In this way, the bicycle gives the production of gentrifying space a distinct texture.

The spatial concentration of cycling rounds and the interactions between cyclists in gentrifying space produces a simultaneously material and sensorial social infrastructure. Key spaces act as toeholds for participants in bike culture; as like-minded fellow initiatives cluster there, the area takes on a cycling identity or “feel.” These activities often take over vacant, undermaintained, or decrepit buildings in marginally disinvested areas. At a certain point, however, the identification of a particular corridor with bike culture cannot occur without the reconfiguration of some existing neighborhood use values. Even a grassroots bike culture not yet concretized in infrastructural changes can enter the circuits of value production by showing an area to

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may be revolutionized, often through technological and political means, or investment shifts away from this site entirely. The reality of capital is the production of surplus value, not the conversion of all social relations into ones that look capitalist.
be “vibrant.” Some local use-values act as fulcrums around which to leverage increases in exchange value, through their articulation with the desires and values of favored populations.

Importantly, therefore, the cyclescape is not unitary. The putative “community” of bicycle users is riven with contradictions; even bike culture itself is not coherent. Yet there is a commonsense assumption that what is good for bicycles will be good for all cyclists. This is in part due to the fixation on the machine itself as expressing a politics with an inherent set of “interests” on its own—a position inherited equally from the appropriate technology (AT) movement as from Critical Mass (Winner 1989; Carlsson 2008; Furness 2005; Furness 2010). The new residents of gentrifying areas who bicycle in ever-increasing numbers do not engage urban space—either as cyclists or from other subject positions—in the same ways as Latino day laborers, African-American youth, or metal recyclers. Political commitments based on these experiences are necessarily partial, despite the commonality of the machine. The coherence they endow to bike culture is therefore produced through exclusions.

This is relevant not just for the issue of who remains excluded from normative bike culture. It also matters for how new forms of mobility produce race itself. How people move through space, the attachments they form to particular modes of transport, how different positions in the sociospatial fabric engender different mobilities—these articulate to produce and reproduce difference. The daily round of place thus necessarily implicates practices of movement in racial formation and the dialectic of race and space (Omi and Winant 1994; Lipsitz 2007). The social infrastructure of bike culture is therefore a key part of the practice of urban whiteness in the “regional racial formation” of the Bay Area (Cheng 2013). Through race, attachments to ways of movement are naturalized in space. The power of race is to produce the belief that where race, class, gender, and division of labor articulate, “we see race alone” (Brahinsky 2014, sec. 1261). This means that questions of urban belonging, set in motion in conflicts over mobility, are debated through the motif of race. “Increasing diversity” in bike culture comes to mean the patronizing question: “Why don’t people of color like bikes?” It forces us to ask about the moments in which race is marshaled as an explanation for differences in practices of mobility, as well as those in which the relevance of race’s history is disavowed.

Struggles over mobility have furthermore formed a critical part of racial politics over the course of the 20th century. For livability advocates, the development of highways and suburbs, both regional processes nurtured by federal transportation and housing policy, represent the failures from which the 21st century metropolis must recover. These

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7 Brahinsky proposes “race-class” as a central analytic with which to understand processes of urban capital accumulation in the United States, but I have added the division of labor to the potent articulation that race-class crystallizes, following Sayer and Walker (1992).

8 This goes back even further. The landmark Plessy v. Ferguson case, in which the US Supreme Court established the “separate but equal” doctrine that sealed the fate of Reconstruction, was precipitated by the arrest of a black shoemaker for taking a seat in a white railroad car. Eighty years later, the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955 was likewise a critical offensive in the struggle against segregation.
failures were made through race.\textsuperscript{9} Highway construction was a way for cities to clear “blighted” areas, almost always represented through race, while suburban development, only open to Euro-Americans, became the crucible within which whiteness was formed (Roediger 2006). Highways and mobility via private car enabled the definition of metropolitan space through race, and symbolically and physically insulated white drivers from the troubled spaces through which they traveled (Avila 2014; Bullard, Johnson, and Torres 2004). Meanwhile, with highway construction across the country displacing 30,000 primarily working class people of color annually by the early 1960s, infrastructure became a central point of black urban politics (Mohl 2002). In 1967, black activists in Washington, D.C. called for “No more white roads through black bedrooms” (Ayres 1967). In the 1970s Oakland activists fought both against devastation through infrastructure provision \textit{and} for a role in shaping its allocation (Perry 1971; \textit{Oakland Post} 1972; \textit{Sun Reporter} 1972). These efforts for a more just mobility were formative of black political power in the city. They worked against the suturing of race, place, and mobility that postwar federal policy encouraged. The broader arc of highway development, however, is the story of how race constrained who could limit deleterious growth and who had to accept it.

This history forces us to pay close attention to the claims to mattering in urban space that are made in the name of cycling. It directs our view toward how bicycling is assigned ethical and economic value by articulating with race and undergirding new processes of racializing space. It pushes us toward the partiality of bike culture, which seeks, implicitly and explicitly, to undo the damage that racialized highway building and suburbanization wrought upon the city \textit{without undoing race}. Bike culture’s rejection of car-based life in its current form requires the built environment of older, denser, cheaper urban places, unfolding on a terrain of disinvestment and acting as a signal of rebirth. Moreover, its valorization of urban grit and vigor mobilizes difference to constitute a white urban subject position through gentrification. The marginality of cycling as a practice is not a liability here, but grounds a political claim to authenticity even among people otherwise empowered by the transformations currently underway.

\textit{Shock Troops and Frontier Machines: Practices at Gentrification’s Margins}

In popular media, the “whiteness” of bicycling is often taken as given. Blogs like \textit{BikeSnobNYC} and \textit{Stuff White People Like} exploit the trope for humor. In discourse on gentrification, moreover, bicycles are one of the clearest shorthands for neighborhood change available.\textsuperscript{10} The trope of the bicycle-riding (white) hipster who sips single-pour

\textsuperscript{9} In one of the more famous (and debated) episodes of infrastructural racism, New York City Parks Commissioner Robert Moses is said to have built the underpasses on Ocean Parkway to all-white Jones Beach too low for buses to pass under, effectively blocking non-whites from the site (Winner 1989; but see Joerges 1999). Moses also took a “meat axe” to the racially mixed South Bronx to build the Cross Bronx Expressway, while political action by whites in lower Manhattan, Jane Jacobs among them, saved neighborhoods like Greenwich Village from a similar fate (Berman 1982; Avila 2014).

\textsuperscript{10} In fact, the popular currency of the term “fixie” has over the past decade grown in step with the extent to which fixed-gear culture is now substantially populated by youth of color; white hipsters have largely
coffee in a chic café symbolizes of the current wave of gentrification. It also symbolizes the hopes of many cities for economic growth. Most importantly, the race-bicycling linkage is so embedded in common sense that it rarely requires elaboration. The connection is so intuitive that writers in the world of advocacy tend to begin from the proposition (Walljasper 2013; Courtney 2014; Stebbins 2013; Andersen 2013). These narratives are largely based on high-profile controversies in Portland, Washington, D.C., and New York, which gained notoriety as they circulated through the world of advocacy blogs.

These narratives circulate in reference to Oakland in a much less explicit way. In April 2013, the popular news blog Oakland Local hosted a series of articles debating gentrification in Oakland. The home page for the series featured an image of a person astride an old ten-speed bicycle, pictured from the waist down with one pale-skinned hand visible (Figure 19). Notably, none of the articles in the series actually discussed bicycling. The bicycle functions intuitively to represent gentrification nonetheless. A 2014 article in the Guardian UK more pointedly named the bicycle as part of the process: “Gentrification hums through northern and western Oakland: U-Haul vans spilling furniture on to lawns, ADT security signs sprouting alongside bike lanes, hubs of yoga studios, music venues, boutique hotels, miniature parks. All brushing up against slums and grime” (Carroll 2014). Here the bicycle functions as a sign of change to come, an “indicator species,” to use a popular ecological metaphor. It emerges as a symbolic anchor of gentrification in part because it is recognizably new—the long history of bicycle use in Oakland’s neighborhoods notwithstanding. Planners also see the bicycle as new in these spaces. As Jason Patton of the Oakland’s Bicycle and Pedestrian Facilities Program told me,

It feels like there are more people in Oakland, more like twenty-something age… the kind of folks who have discretion in choosing where they want to live, they’re working in SF or they’re going to Cal, folks that are choosing to live in Oakland that never would have chosen to live in Oakland before. Which is tied to all the other cultural stuff that’s going on too. And then the byproduct is we get more bicyclists (Patton 2013).

The novelty of cycling is in this sense inseparable from the novelty of certain bicycle users appearing in race-classed space.

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moved on from the “passé” fixed gear to other specialized bicycles that convey different signals about cultural capital.

11 This shorthand is used throughout bicycle advocacy, typically to refer to the bicycle as representing the level of community health and cohesion; Brian Drayton of Oakland Spokes is a vocal exponent.
The bicycle has long served as a means for new arrivals to cities to avoid depending on cars in dense urban space. They do not just get around by bicycle, they also congregate socially through it. Susan King, the Sunday Streets coordinator for Livable City, grew up cycling in Long Beach, which had many bike-friendly streets but “if you rode your bike you were a geek.” Like many cyclists, she was converted by practicality, rather than politics: “When I moved to San Francisco in 1989, I moved to the Upper Haight, and I very quickly started racking up parking tickets that I couldn’t pay… So I think it was 1994, I lost 2,000 pounds in one day. I sold my car and I never looked back.” The bicycle was part of the shared lifestyle of new residents of run-down working-class neighborhoods, who moved there for the excitement of the city, packed into old single-family houses to save money on rent, and left behind their cars in the process.


The experience of marginality in urban space strongly shaped King’s political outlook: “As a cyclist, you really were pushed to the edges. Nobody gave you any respect, nobody knew the rules, but they just assumed you were breaking them… You were a vagabond because there were no laws to protect you.” Cyclists used their machines flexibly and defensively: “The law didn’t work for us, so there was no reason for us to
work with it. We were small enough, there were so few of us, that it wasn’t really a
movement.” As she put it, Critical Mass was not just politics but “a social thing”; it was
“the day that we could take the streets back.” At the same time, however, cycling also
simply made sense (2012). LisaRuth Elliot, a longtime bike activist and member of the
planning committee for the Critical Mass 20th anniversary ride, echoed this sentiment:
bicycling was “just my life,” a cheap and easy way to get around (Elliott 2012). These
narratives reverberate throughout the world of bike culture. The bicycle signifies the
renunciation of something: the car, and the privileges that go along with it.

This marginality imbues the bicycle with a subterranean quality. Cycling becomes
a “tactic” that invisibly eludes the totalizing logic of the car-dominated city (de Certeau
1984, xix; see also Ferrell 2001). The bicycle allows ephemeral “spaces of play” within the
urban order, endowing cyclists with an urban *metis*: a know-how built through practice (de
Certeau 1984, 18). These spaces of play are part of how cycling becomes visible, even if it
remains an “alternative” practice. The bicycle grants control over one’s movement, and
freedom from mass transit schedules and fossil fuel dependency alike. As Mark Nichola of
Oakland art collective Rock Paper Scissors put it: “Riding a bike is kind of an alternative
infrastructure. If you want to figure out your own way to get from point A to point B or to
haul something without buying a car, getting insurance, buying gas, it’s an alternative
way to do it” (McCamy 2010b).

Bicycles are not just evidence of individual tactical interactions with urban space.
Where they cluster, they show material social networks in the making. Where things are
happening, bikes appear. When looking for an event in an unfamiliar area, one just
follows the bikes. The precise address is simply the place where the most bikes are parked.
Avant-garde cultural events, from punk shows to art openings to panels of radical
thinkers, at warehouse spaces, communal houses, and dive bar, create clusters of bicycles
parked outside. Stop signs, fences, and racks fill with bicycles. They are stacked and
locked to each other, hung on fences, brought inside or to the back and awkwardly piled
among each other. These clusters of bicycles are not just the result of a shortage of bicycle
parking. They are signs of a new presence in the neighborhood, evidence of activity and
excitement.

Coming from Philadelphia, this dimension of Oakland was immediately familiar.
The places I connected by bike and the people I interacted with on bicycles were new,
but the how of being a new resident and moving through space by bicycle was well known.
I was not alone in this. Very few of the many punk, outsider, artist, student, and/or non-
profit worker bike users I met had grown up in the city of Oakland. For incomers from
nearby suburban cities like San Ramon, Santa Rosa, Walnut Creek, San Rafael, El
Sobrante, and Orinda, as well as Houston, Philadelphia, Boston, or New York, bicycles
were how one learned to be urban. It was the unquestioned tool of our urban
environment, fitting the lifestyle cultivated at gentrification’s frontiers as well as a broader
ideological position in opposition to the car.12

12 Here I want to distinguish between the urbanization of cycling through subcultures, for whom
infrastructure is not an object of activism, and that of bicycle advocates, frequently young, upwardly
At these frontiers of bike culture, “the bicycle” exceeds the simple act of cycling, encompassing home repair, building and welding, and bicycle-related artistic projects. At a house or warehouse, bicycles pile up inside or in the backyard. They can be dilapidated and self-assembled or high-quality machines in good repair, but new, store-bought bicycles are uncommon. Tangles of bicycles, frames, parts, and wheels may fill corners of communal houses. Outbuildings, in-law apartments, basements, and garages host makeshift repair areas and even welding shops (Figure 20). Those with more repair experience open their garages as impromptu bike shops. In these fertile spaces of cultural experimentation, the alignment between cycling and urban cool is consistently being made and remade. While these “nowtopian” practices are reproduced on the margins, they now ground a discourse framing urban cyclists within a world of unseen but valuable innovators (Carlsson 2008). Spaces of tinkering become spaces of industrial renewal (see Chapter 1).

The bicycle is neither new in urban space or a symbol of wealth on its own, but new in-migrants to gentrifying spaces become uniquely visible as cyclists. Movement through space by bicycle is a critical part of how the alternative geography of bike culture is enacted at these frontiers. Bicycles are not just a “taste,” they ground a practice with a spatial entailment—cycling produces space, and acts as a lens into it. Distances are

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13 I am grateful to Jason Henderson for reminding me of this point.
measured in bicycle time, routes are selected for their ease of cycling, and areas identified as unsafe for parking. This has important implications for the spatiality of first-wave or even “pre-gentrification,” because the bicycle enables a different geography of mobility than other modes of transportation.

On a bicycle, I often make eye contact, nod or occasionally wave at other cyclists as well as pedestrians and people on the street. I ride through neighborhoods and see houses under renovation, houses for sale, condos under construction, new cafés opening, old establishments closing, cyclists I see frequently, cyclists I’ve never seen before, cyclists clearly new to the city, new bike lanes being striped, new bike racks installed, and new bike shops opening. On a bicycle, one sees oneself being seen, often becoming a body out of place, both conspicuous and fleeting, gliding through on display. Less common than both walking and driving, the bicycle is noticed because it heralds certain kinds of changes by how it intersects with the class- and race-marked body. In gentriflying space, one is always a kind of cyclist. With a circumscribed spatial range, one appears to be passing through for a reason, from nearby.

For example, one day when I stopped while bicycling through the Longfellow neighborhood of Oakland to photograph a bungalow for sale, a middle aged African American woman, getting out a car with her elderly mother, assuming I was interested in the house, commented, “You should move to this block, it’s a nice block.” It was a quiet street with little through traffic and modest, well-kept houses, many of which had been recently renovated. In fact, I had several white friends who lived quite close by and reported rapid turnover of houses nearby to new, mainly white buyers. I explained to her that as a graduate student I probably couldn’t afford it. The woman then commented, “The neighborhood sure is changing. We’ve been here forty years.” I didn’t press her on what she meant because she was busy taking groceries into her house across the street, but agreed that it was. When I later looked up the listing, the house had already sold for nearly $500,000. I note this fleeting interaction not because it represents the perceptions of Oakland’s African-American residents of the process of rapid white in-migration and housing turnover, but present within the genuinely pleasant exchange were layers of race, class, and memory left unsaid but grounded in that space. Moreover, the bicycle did not determine our interaction, but had I been in a car it simply may not have happened.

Most notable in the spatiality of cycling is a fleeting relationship to the spaces that are racially coded as dangerous. “Discovering” neighborhoods is best done by bike (McCamy 2010b), presumed to be a more authentic form of engagement with space that simultaneously modulates the rider’s feelings of unfamiliarity and danger in urban space. Here the material characteristics of the bicycle intersect with race, class, and gender in complex ways. The bicycle enables a more rapid pace and lessened exposure to danger (both perceived and real) than walking. By the same token, on a bicycle one moves slowly and visibly enough, without the metal and glass casing of a car, that social interaction is still possible. In dozens of informal conversations, friends, acquaintances, and interview subjects have expressed that the neighborhood where they live is “sketchy,” but they can pass through quickly without problems when on a bicycle.

This racialized understanding of spatial danger articulates with gendered
perceptions of safety as well. Only when riding with female friends have I gotten a sense of the near-constant harassment female-gendered cyclists receive from men on the street. Women I have talked to describe bicycling as lessening their feelings of neighborhood risk, and affirm that they bike places they wouldn’t walk. One young white woman I knew rode her bike one block to the local liquor store, rather than walk and increase her exposure to men on the street. In situations that become dangerous (again, whether real or perceived) people describe being able to escape more easily. Spoke Cyclery co-owner Adam Shapiro put it to me particularly poignantly, regarding perceptions of “sketchiness”: “The marker of West Oakland is maybe a moving target, as people change mental maps where we draw red lines.” We all have red lines in our heads. The bike changes these red lines” (A. Shapiro 2013).

Statements about place within these worlds show a “taste for the necessary” and a vague competition for what we might call “subcultural capital”—a vague competition for status transferred into a more esoteric subfield of cultural taste (or anti-taste) (Bourdieu 1984). Protestations of authenticity can take the simple form of discussing where one lives, wherein residing in a “sketchy” neighborhood, defined by the presence of raced-classed others, signifies authenticity. The friendly euphemism “families” signifies appreciation of living among people of color without speaking the language of race. Living at gentrification’s frontier is often cast against the “yuppie” fakery of more expensive central locations, where home prices and rents have soared, condo construction has accelerated, and the commercial environment serves well-to-do professionals.

This performative negotiation of belonging in gentrifying space, where no claims to authenticity among in-migrants can stretch very far into the past, is not the only form of sociality. In conditions of spatial insecurity and the sense that newcomers are spoiling things, however, location and duration signify one’s place in the process. As prevalent as negotiations of authenticity are conversations about complicity in neighborhood change. As a researcher and a resident of gentrifying space, I have participated in countless exchanges in which members of the “shock troops” of punks and artists (Godfrey 1988) discuss neighborhood change with ambivalence, clearly aware of their complicity with the processes at work. Nevertheless, the livelihoods of these so-called gentrifiers, including many of my personal friends, exist at risk of displacement in the process. They are often renters who depend on landlord absenteeism, substandard housing, overcrowding, and property “milking” for what little affordable housing stock remains, and could never afford to buy houses in the spaces where realtors use their presence to market housing to

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14 Referencing, as a trained urban planner, the Residential Security maps produced by the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) in 1937 to provide lending guidelines based on race as a proxy for investment risk.

15 I have experienced this first-hand. As a graduate student living on a small stipend or inadequate teaching wages, I spent years seeking out the cheapest rent practical, always in spaces marginal to gentrification that were rapidly becoming whiter. My spatial itinerary as a student renter in a sense tracked the gentrification frontier. I described where I lived to knowing nods of approval. When I moved in with a partner who happened to live in a rent-controlled apartment in the booming Temescal district (paying roughly half the market rate), these nods became raised eyebrows. My current address, on a neighborhood bikeway mere steps from $4-a-cup coffee and $3 artisanal donuts, conveys an entirely different social trajectory.
newcomers. Even if they have access to wealth, and poverty is a stage in the life course rather than a structural condition, their vulnerability is real, driven by the dynamics of property markets that hound them across space just as resolutely as tenure-insecure racialized longtime residents. Moving by bicycle extends their range, increases their flexibility of location, and mitigates the effects of relocation to new areas.

Not all who have affirmed to me feeling safer cycling in “dangerous” space are white, but this does not mean that the construction of spatial danger is not a race-classed process. Rather, danger involves the mapping of race onto space through a history the hegemonic “white spatial imaginary” that categorizes black spaces as dangerous and unruly, to the point that this racial schema becomes social common sense (Lipsitz 2011; Gramsci 1971). Here, danger is also not “merely” ideological; racialized spaces relentlessly produce bodily insecurity for their residents (Gilmore 2007).

The ways in which risk is experienced geographically also works to deter cycling by black residents of these neighborhoods, even as the bicycle is an essential tool for new white in-migrants. I discussed this question with Jenna Burton of Red, Bike, and Green. She relayed common statements to me from her membership about fear of cycling through dangerous spaces, and again these fears were often quite gendered. She described black men and women from East Oakland driving their bicycles to Lake Merritt by car rather than cycling through the neighborhoods near where they lived. They did so explicitly for safety reasons, not just fear of cars but concern about the neighborhoods themselves. As Burton put it to me:

For me my bike is my only security blanket, getting from the BART station home, or from A to B, I’m like, “If I’m on my bike, chances are no one can catch me.” And I had a friend who got robbed on her bike last week, and I had heard stories, it happens, but I think, “Well that’s not going to happen to me!” And the more I was hearing about it I was like, “Well, maybe it will happen to me!” [laughter] And so I think that’s one of the factors that has a lot of people intimidated right now.

I had a complicated reaction to this statement. I recall being surprised that as a black woman she felt fear riding through certain Oakland neighborhoods. Socialized as a white gentrifier, my initial feeling was that fearing spaces coded as black was something only white people did because of subconscious racism. Burton may be African-American, but she also spoke as a college-educated in-migrant from the other side of the country, as new to Oakland as I was. The bicycle illustrates here the specificity of the articulation of race, place, and history that renders cyclist in-migrants as strange. At the edges of gentrifying space, bike culture responds to impermanence with a form of social infrastructure and spatial practice that creates new daily rounds of belonging.

These social infrastructures lend the subterranean practices credited with the return of vitality to disinvested spaces an association with the bicycle as a motif of renewal. The motif does not come from intentional branding, but from the diverse economies of actually-existing bicycle cultures; this lends it authenticity. For example, Art Murmur, Oakland’s premier monthly event, started as a group of artists taking over an industrial side street of Telegraph north of downtown, where fledgling art galleries held monthly openings. For years, on the first Friday of every month, a disparate but growing
community gathered there to hawk wares, barter, build art objects, hold impromptu musical performances and film screenings, make and sell food, and everything in between. Since 2011, Art Murmur has swelled to thousands, an official event with vendors, performers, programming, and so on that closes 10 blocks of Telegraph. From its humble beginnings to its role as a cultural ambassador for Oakland’s revitalization, Art Murmur shows one rigorous constant—one can never find a place to park a bike. This extends beyond monthly events to characterize most of Oakland’s public space. On a sunny weekend day, Mosswood Park, North Oakland’s most popular and centrally located open space, is dotted with groups of twenty-somethings amid their bicycles, most of them white, gathered to unsurreptitiously drink beer and socialize. Lake Merritt, the centerpiece of downtown Oakland’s renaissance, is positively clogged on summer weekends, with clumps of a dozen bicycles or more, often flipped upside down in repose as their riders relax. Locked to city-provided racks outside the restaurants, cafes, and bars that signify Oakland’s resurgence, one finds a more bourgeois version of the clusters of bikes outside punk shows.

I do not belabor these points for ethnographic texture alone. They are critical to explaining why the bicycle feels novel in urban space, even if it is not. What is new is a form of cycling as flânerie, inseparable from the race-class position of the bicycle’s rider. In the divided city, this signifies change. When supported by new bike racks and bike lanes emanating unbidden from the city, often after years of infrastructural neglect, it signifies the injury of selective connection. The bicycle becomes invested with what Sherry Ortner calls “surplus antagonism” (2006), crystallizing racialized histories of exclusion into the motif of the gentrifying white cyclist. As Chapters 4 and 5 show, this extends to the picture of a powerful political fraction allied with municipal government to transform space. Nevertheless, the material practices that form the base of support for these transformations must be sought in the emergent social space of bike culture at the frontier. These practices are logically prior to streetscape transformation, but in reality form part of a recursive process: cyclists agitate for infrastructure, creating more bike-friendly urban spaces, which encourage more cycling.

The New Bike Shop Wave: Marginal Gentrification or Diverse Economies?

No space is as critical to bike culture as the bike shop. This is not a new observation—bike shops have always served as social spaces in which cycling practice is constituted (Furness 2010, 179). With distribution in the bicycle industry traditionally organized along the dealership model (even with online sales a growing sector), final assembly of even low-end bicycles (excluding “mass-market” models from Wal-Mart or Target) is performed by skilled mechanics at physical shops. While a great deal of maintenance can be performed at home, the specialization of repair tools means that a physical shop retains its importance. Although the physical locations of high-volume online retailers like Performance now crowd out many locally-owned stores, the local bike shop remains a part of the conceptual infrastructure of being a “real” cyclist. Long-running shops like Hill Cycle in Philadelphia, Cupertino Bike Shop in Cupertino, CA, American Cyclery in San Francisco and Velo Sport in Berkeley were hubs of European-
inspired racing culture in the 1950s and 1960s, before lightweight bicycles were popular or even widely available in the United States (Heine 2006).

At that time, the American “heavyweight” bicycle exemplified by the Schwinn “Black Phantom”—the Cadillac of bicycles, with gleaming chrome components, glass lights, balloon tires, a coaster brake, and an inefficient riding position—typified the notion that bicycles were for suburban children who pined for a car rather than serious machines for urban transportation. Schwinn’s sport road models were equally heavy, intended as indestructible transportation for young adults on college campuses (Crown and Coleman 1993). Bicycle sales hit their all-time high of 15.2 million units in 1973 during the legendary “bike boom,” when postwar demographic growth coincided with oil shocks and a growing environmental consciousness (Siedenbaum 1971; Rosenblatt 1971; National Bicycle Dealers Association 2013). During these years, the strong dollar allowed lighter European and Japanese imports to flood the US market, introducing Americans to sleeker models that were easier to ride for long distances. Thriving bike shops at this time tended to be located where their customers were: in suburbs and small cities.

With the bicycle again on the rise, the bike shop is returning in a new way. With the new urban bike boom has come a new kind of bike shop. The new bike shops and community bike spaces now proliferating are not just businesses like any other. They are linked to the politicization of the bicycle, the valorization of localism as ethical action, and the reshaping of urban cores. Do-it-yourself (DIY) spaces and socially minded bike shops are exemplary in this regard, framing their work as part of the reappropriation of control over personal mobility and of expertise regarding its repair. Furness (2010) and Carlsson (2008) have thoroughly analyzed these phenomena, but neither has foregrounded the relationship between the geography of community-oriented bike spaces and patterns of investment in the built environment more broadly. In this section I will examine the new role of the bike shop as an anchor of a specifically urban cyclescape, saturated with a political commonsense inherited from a subcultural sense of \textit{urbanity} surrounding the bicycle.

As Furness (2010) makes clear, the community bike shop is an emerging fixture of the contemporary urban bicycle scene, and a site where many young mechanics first learn their skills. Moreover, they form the materiality of the notion of bike culture itself. As he puts it:

[R]enovated warehouses, old storefronts, and rickety garages… as well as the community bicycle organizations they house, have become integral parts of the cycling infrastructure in an increasing number of cities, and perhaps more important, they give real substance to the notion of community that cyclists sometimes abstractly associate with, or attribute to, bike culture (2010, 170).

These spaces often operate with an explicit social justice mission, emphasizing the ways that access to knowledge and tools can help to break down the raced, classed, and gendered divides in mobility. Many have programs through which youth can earn a bike by learning to build one up from a bare frame, lead adult classes in bike repair, and offer access to bins of cast-off parts for repairs. Places like the Bike Kitchen in San Francisco, Colectivelo, Cycles of Change, and Oakland Spokes in Oakland, BiciCocina in Los
Angeles, Back Alley Bikes in Detroit, the Community Cycling Center in Portland, and Neighborhood Bike Works in Philadelphia, are focal points for local bicycle communities and spaces where cycling practice is more horizontally transmitted.

Many community bike shops have origins in bike cooperatives on college campuses. Moreover, volunteers often learn skills that they use when starting their own for-profit—or not non-profit—bike shops, making evident a tighter link between the other-than-capitalist community space and the small, entrepreneurial but still “socially-minded” bike shop. Most celebrations of these spaces discuss the pressures of rising costs only in passing, even in the “up-and-coming” neighborhoods where they find access to space. The discipline of rent can force shops to relocate, raise labor rates, widen sales margins, carry higher value items and fewer inexpensive parts, and maximize space by reducing stocks of used parts. These three dimensions—the physical location of non- or low-profit bike shops, the incubation of “social entrepreneurs” in non-profit shops, and rising rents in areas where these social infrastructures are put into place—form a key dimension of the urbanization of bike culture.

Founded in the Mission District in 2002 by Oberlin graduates, the Bike Kitchen was an anchor of the early 2000s neighborhood bike culture and a space from which many other shop founders emerged. “It’s all about teaching people to do things themselves and fostering a do-it-yourself mentality… It’s very powerful when someone comes in and realizes they don’t need to be intimidated about fixing their own bike,” noted co-founder Catherine Hartzell to Oberlin’s alumni magazine (Meredith 2005). She echoed a theme repeated, often nearly verbatim, throughout the world of bike kitchens and similar cooperatives: empowerment through skill-building and individual mobility. The Bike Kitchen began under the wing of CELLspace, an avant-garde artist collective and performance center located in a warehouse in the Mission’s industrial district to the east of Van Ness Avenue. Volunteers began simply by hosting bike repair efforts once a week in the parking lot. Since then it has grown to become a large, formally structured 501(c)3 organization with a permanent space and a staff of 17 volunteers.

Like many kindred projects, San Francisco’s Bike Kitchen was originally located in a neighborhood where depressed rents in a formerly industrial area. This allowed the shop to meet certain space-intensive needs, chiefly the storage of massive amounts of used parts and frames, while keeping costs low. In 2006 the organization obtained non-profit status and moved to the Civic Center area entirely by bicycle, in an event they called “Critical Move,” enlisting the help of volunteers and fellow advocates. There, at 9th and Mission, where they stayed for two years, similarly cheap rents obtained, but in poor conditions. Geoffrey Colburn, a volunteer from those times, described that location as “sketchy” and reported having to deal with more difficult characters and a cramped work space (Colburn 2013). When pondering another move, volunteer and bookkeeper Angel Lowrey recalled, they worried about finding places that were cheap enough, but also wanted to “get a place in the Mission with our community” (Lowrey 2013). After pondering a move to the Women’s Building, a feminist activist space in the Mission, the Bike Kitchen struck up a deal with Citizen’s Housing Corporation. The non-profit developer had just built the Mosaica Apartments, a mixed-income, mixed-use
development at 19th and Florida just a block from the CELLspace. Retail space was built around the Bike Kitchen’s needs, and the organization relocated there in 2009, where it has thrived. As evidence of its prosperity, it granted CELLspace an interest-free loan in 2011 to help it tide over financial difficulties.

This was not the story I expected when I began my research into the Bike Kitchen. I imagined an organization hounded by rising rents, frequently having to choose between a social justice mission and political-economic realities. Instead, as Angel put it to me, “they [the landlord] want us here… we have a good-vibe landlord”; securing refuge in the retail space of a non-profit developer is no guarantee of avoiding displacement, but it moderates the risk. The maturation of the Bike Kitchen was accompanied by shifts in its organization and clientele:

Now we have fewer homeless people and people scraping bottom. We used to be more compassionate… we used to bend over backwards for people. We used to have more principled things like a kids program, but that fell through. Jordan [a former volunteer] left because we weren’t grassroots enough anymore. Other mechanics didn’t have patience for the kids’ program… and the Spanish language program never worked out… We were really cheap back then, it took us a while to get the balls to say no [to doing things for free] (Lowrey 2013).

Nonetheless, the Bike Kitchen happened to benefit from the upzoning of the neighborhood under the 2011 Eastern Neighborhoods Plan, which permits higher densities and commercial/retail development (San Francisco Planning Department 2008). The plan will accelerate the conversion of industrial facilities to residential and commercial uses. The Bike Kitchen, in other words, occupies a frontier zone in the Mission, not as much between old industrial uses and gentrification as between “sweat-equity” gentrification and its accelerated variant. Clustered in the area are new restaurants, a climbing gym, a brewpub, an upscale tile retailer, and the headquarters of yearly desert arts festival Burning Man, as well as new condos consistently going up and warehouses converted to housing. Three blocks north, Google recently acquired the location of a printing company to house local startups it acquires (Bradshaw 2014).

Had it not been for a fortuitous deal struck with a non-profit developer, it is unclear whether the Bike Kitchen could have remained in the part of the Mission District where it was born, especially as constant rent increases have pushed out many other non-profit institutions. CELLspace was not as fortunate; in 2013, just months after hosting the 20th anniversary celebration of Critical Mass, it folded. The building was sold to a developer, who in June 2014 filed for a $50 million construction permit to build a 276-unit apartment building with retail on the ground floor. This does not imply causality—that community bike shops somehow cause rents to rise—but calls our attention to contradictions inherent in their geographic and political-economic position.

The diaspora of campus cooperatives extends beyond the Bike Kitchen itself to for-profit shops, speaking to the way that involvement in the bicycle world is now considered a social mission in itself. An exemplary institution of this diaspora is Box Dog Bikes, a worker-owned cooperative and member of the Network of Bay Area Workers
Cooperatives (NoBAWC) where I have worked part-time as a mechanic since 2009.\textsuperscript{16} Box Dog Bikes was started by graduates of Oberlin College, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, and the University of California-Santa Cruz, all of whom had been volunteers in campus bike cooperatives. All had also volunteered at the Bike Kitchen upon moving to San Francisco.

As my coworker Andy Reed at Box Dog described the Oberlin College Bike Cooperative:

\begin{quotation}
It was a core group of ten to fifteen people interested in anarchism, associating as individuals and creating non-hierarchical institutions. The bike coop was about living the idea, although it was a private institution and subsidized. The point was to create space for teaching and learning to fix bicycles, to take ownership over your transportation (A. Reed 2012).\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quotation}

A fellow co-founder Dan Thomases, who got into the cooperative movement through the U-Mass Center for Student Business, sounded a similar note: “It was an internal kind of thing for people who work at coops, learning about taking responsibility for your labor” (Thomases 2012).\textsuperscript{18} As both Andy and Dan noted, however, their respective institutions contributed subsidies to offset rent, or permitted the free use of campus space, rendering effectively moot one of the most pernicious difficulties facing fledgling bike shops. Leaving the campus involves a search for cheap space in a relatively accessible neighborhood. In other words, finding a rent gap. These bike shops, like marginal gentrifiers in the first section, need to find what we might call “use gaps,” where depressed rents permit less capital-intensive use-values to proliferate where they can be accessed. This leads cooperatives on a search that overlaps geographically with capitalists’ needs to exploit these same gaps for profit.

The Bike Kitchen found such a space in the Mission, the local cultural hearth of the bike scene, and so did volunteers who left the Bike Kitchen to start other shops. Box Dog Bikes founders Dan, Angel, Gabe Peterson, and Gabe Ehlert had been volunteers there, and had also worked as bike messengers and mechanics at Ye Olde Bike Shop. Ye Olde Bike Shop, located on 14\textsuperscript{th} Street in the Inner Mission, was a ramshackle space that was part used bike shop, part flophouse, and part drug den. When we talked, Dan described working at Ye Olde as it steadily slid downhill in vivid detail. In 2004 Seth, the owner, eventually ceased paying rent, and Evangeline and Dan took the opportunity to pay off back rent and take over the space for a worker-owned bike shop on the model of

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item It should be noted that no observations regarding the shop were obtained due to special access other than the familiarity that enabled me to conduct formal interviews. It should also be noted that while a core collective of between 5 and 9 worker-owners engages in decision-making processes, Box Dog Bikes does hire part-time employees.
\item Another shop owner I interviewed, Adam Shapiro of The Spoke Cyclery in Oakland, was an East Bay native who attended Hampshire College and became involved in the campus bike scene. Each recounted similar stories.
\item Notably, Dan listed as a major influence the late economic geographer Julie Graham, half of the duo J.K. Gibson-Graham, whose work on alternative economies has shaped the field of feminist economic geography.
\end{itemize}

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their campus experiences.

The area surrounding the shop had largely escaped the first wave of dot-com related gentrification in the late 1990s. Next door to a methadone clinic and around the corner from transitional housing for psychiatric care, it was a decaying facility in a structure owned by an elderly absentee landlord. The minimal improvements done by Ye Olde workers barely supported any kind of sustained commercial activity, and when Box Dog took it over they had to close to conduct repairs. Within a year, however, with the hard work of its founders, Box Dog was profitable and co-owners were able to pay themselves and afford health insurance coverage. In these days, many of the commercial practices that characterized Ye Olde Bike Shop—and any community bike coop—continued under the new regime. Bins full of used parts were mined for working components, down to disposable items like brake cables, and the shop mainly sold refurbished bicycles purchased at swap meets and flea markets. Andy attributed this partly to the economics of the bike industry; Box Dog lacked the resources to invest in a line of new bicycles at a volume that would give them affordable unit costs (A. Reed 2012).

Owners lived nearby in the Mission District, and continued to take part in the Bike Kitchen, Critical Mass, and other dimensions of local bike culture. The customer base in the early years of the shop was primarily young people just out of college. Andy said he knew a lot of the customers as people he would see around, particularly restaurant, bar, and art gallery workers in the neighborhood. The clientele of Ye Olde
continued to visit Box Dog to take advantage of low-priced repairs, inexpensive used parts, and a do-it-yourself repair bench, aspects the upgrading had not affected. The rhythms of working in this kind of shop were very familiar based on my experience working in Philadelphia.

When I began working at Box Dog in the summer of 2009, however, the broader gentrification of the area was in full swing, with new condos, boutiques, salons, art galleries, and cafes dotting the stretch of Valencia Street between 14th and the 16th Street BART station, as well as on 14th near the shop (Figure 21). Beyond there the street was saturated with them. Box Dog still paid below-average rent, and retained the used parts bins and price-flexibility with longtime customers, but no longer sold used bikes except for better models on a consignment basis. The DIY bench remained until summer of 2011, when the shop hosted a release party for a bike-specific line of Levi’s jeans and the bench was displaced by an apparel display, after which it did not return. The true reason behind the change was that the shop’s insurance policy did not permit customers to use tools inside the shop, but the perception I gathered from comments made by customers was that fancy clothes had replaced the free community bench. Moreover, some collective members did feel that the twenty square feet occupied by the DIY bench could be better used in other ways. We still lent tools, but they had to be used outside, without the benefit of a repair stand. Around this time, the bins of old components were also removed, and any usable parts were donated directly to the Bike Kitchen, to which the shop remained connected. Customers I had previously seen coming in to find salvageable items to install on their bikes, cheaply if not effectively for free, returned less and less often, and we directed people interested in used bicycles and parts to the Bike Kitchen or other shops that still dealt in them.

Box Dog was now on an upward trajectory, with the clientele of the shop, like most of the Mission District, grew rapidly and visibly more affluent even in the time I worked there. The shop raised labor rates and pursued higher quality machines and components in part because of our appreciation for them as machines, while still stocking relatively inexpensive utilitarian bicycles. We rolled out a cherished project of Gabe Ehlert’s, a custom-designed high-end frameset, made for us in small batches by an Oregon framebuilder and selling for ten times what many people would consider spending on a complete bike. Production runs often sold out before delivery. While we had no stated restrictions on the kinds of bikes we worked on, repairs of mass-market bikes grew fewer and farther between, while we routinely performed repairs on top-end custom bicycles with esoteric components. By 2012 the shop had stopped selling consignment bikes altogether, concentrating on new bike sales and broader product lines, following changes in the baseline price customers were able to pay and the needs of economic sustainability. As Andy put it:

> The need to pay rent became more and more real as we got older. From a payroll perspective it adds up, and the cost of living goes up… Until recently, everyone lived in the Mission or the Tenderloin, but there was a change in our needs as we grew older. Friends in affordable places live in bigger group houses, and money and rent is not as big a part of life, but as we get older that changes (A. Reed 2012).
As the Mission solidified its role at the epicenter of hip consumerism, becoming in effect a bedroom community of Silicon Valley, I noticed more and more customers who had recently moved from other parts of the country, and often Europe. They frequently wore the T-shirt of their tech firm. Moreover, as the Mission District and San Francisco in general underwent a dramatic boom, fewer of our employees remained in the city, opting for living in Oakland and commuting by BART instead. By July 2014, two worker-owners (one of them a San Francisco native) continued to live in the Mission District. By February 2015, they had both moved out of the Mission to the cheaper Sunset District to the west.

Between 2004 and 2014, Box Dog had gone from a “corroding facility,” as Dan put it, to a thriving business and an anchor shop of the Mission District bicycle scene. In the process, the shop became more refined, with a wealthier, whiter clientele of bicycle commuters who also rode recreationally and devoted increasing resources to each pursuit. In the intervening years, the Bike Farm on 24th and Heavy Metal Bikes on 29th were also started by members of the Bike Kitchen diaspora, retaining its salvage and refurbishing-oriented culture. Meanwhile the bigger and older Valencia Cyclery and Pedal Revolution (a non-profit originally located in the Lower Haight district that opened a Valencia Street location in 2003) acted as incubators of repair skill. Most experienced bicycle mechanics working in the area worked at Valencia or Pedal Revolution at some point. Mission Bicycle Company, a boutique selling custom-built bicycles rather than a full-service shop, opened on Valencia at 23rd in 2009, begun by a trio of graphic designers who also ran a design and consulting enterprise. Custom framebuilder Raphael Cycles and handmade cargo rack maker Pass and Stow also located in the Mission’s warehouse spaces, still somewhat plentiful despite the new gentrification onslaught underway, with other framebuilders moving instead to the still-existing industrial spaces of the Bayview. The Mission, more than any other area of the city, is known as a bicycle mecca, thanks largely to the work of numerous DIY-oriented enterprises and individuals, but working on the terrain enabled by the early activism of the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition (SFBC) in creating the bicycle infrastructure that draws new residents to the neighborhood.19 Since 1999, when the SFBC succeeded having a car travel lane on Valencia Street, the core gentrified strip of the neighborhood, removed to make room for bike lanes, 11 bike shops have located within five blocks.

Such stories of small, gritty shops with minimal startup costs recall the “sweat equity” narrative typically applied to residential structure upgrading within the literature on gentrification. This literature has dealt less commonly with commercial property, but commercial gentrification has been reframed in recent celebratory narratives as “revitalization”: small businesses that breathe life into a stagnant or “dead” neighborhood. This is not exactly new. But within this framework, bike shops have taken on special significance as local businesses that also enable a form of transportation that keeps the neighborhood locally oriented (O’Keane 2013; Flusche 2012). Moreover, bike shops create a definable link between the world of commerce and advocacy. Most bike

19 This history will be discussed more fully in Chapter 4.
shops in San Francisco offer a discount to SFBC members, sell member registration packets, and act as points of outreach for advocates (Bialick 2011c). Rather than just another business, the local bike shop is a key hub of an imagined harmonious neighborhood ecology, the bicycle a powerful element of the symbology of the local, and the presence of cyclists a key indicator of neighborhood health. This symbolic value now no longer requires an explicit mission of social justice or workplace autonomy for its power. Even the ordinary for-profit bike shop appears to be something more than just a capitalist business.

North Oakland is seeing a similar surge in new bike shops that San Francisco did several years ago. As in San Francisco, these shops are concentrated in—and at the edges of—areas where gentrification is also occurring. They function as pivots of bike culture in ways familiar from San Francisco’s history, and they in many cases express extant understandings of what the bicycle means. Manifesto Bicycles, located in North Oakland amid the burgeoning commercial strip of 40th Street just off of Telegraph Avenue in North Oakland, is exemplary of Oakland’s boom. Here, light industrial spaces and building suppliers have given way to an aching hip café, a vintage store, a hair salon, two macaroni-and-cheese restaurants, and a punk record store, along with Manifesto. The shop’s website puts their mission in bold terms with its “manifesto”:

Manifesto is located in the beautiful city of Oakland. Our shop promotes customization, recycling and the spread of urban bike culture. Manifesto likes art, music, and skateboarding. Manifesto likes DIY. Manifesto likes small business and local products… Manifesto believes in bicycles. As an extension of the rider, bicycles are a form of self-expression. There is a simple joy that comes with riding a bike and experiencing a city at street level. We believe bicycles are more important than ever because they are practical, low-cost, and non-polluting. And that the camaraderie shared by groups of cyclists in cities can be a powerful force for change… Join the movement. We are Manifesto (Manifesto Bicycles 2014).

Here lies the central premise of urban cycling ideology, a thread connecting Critical Mass through the bike cooperative to a contemporary localist ecology of small-scale capitalism shorn of any direct articulation a social justice politics. Instead, on its own, the bicycle acts as a tool for producing a virtuous city.

“Mass Transit for One”: Public Bikes, Civic Branding and the Privatization of Public Space

This notion of the bicycle’s virtue creates a powerful ideological pivot between bike culture’s transformative ambitions to reduce certain kinds of consumption and a political economy that requires place-based consumerism. With the turn toward the bicycle as a tool for the city and the celebration of the local bike shop as its cultural hearth has come the growing recognition of urban cyclists as a valuable market. Somebody must sell the machines that produce the virtuous neighborhood. With urban cyclists a fast-growing segment of the bicycle retail landscape, makers and distributors have identified gaps in existing product lines and rushed to them (Bicycle Retailer and Industry News 2008; Bicycle Retailer and Industry News 2011). These shifts mirror the growth in everyday urban cycling rather than suburban or rural recreational riding, as well as bicycle
advocacy’s interest in the bicycle utopias of northern Europe. Nearly every major brand now sells several “urban” models in the Dutch mold that offer an upright riding position, fenders, a rack, and often a dynamo-powered light system, all of which were previously aftermarket items that dedicated commuters would buy to equip their bicycles for urban use. Off the rack urban machines are now a normal sight in most bike shops and American cities.

Transportation-specific bicycle sales survived and actually thrived during the 2008-2011 recession. While Interbike, the annual bicycle trade show, typically focuses on the most advanced new products in recreational and competition cycling lines, its 2011 edition featured an urban-specific display organized by the San Francisco messenger bag company Chrome. As Interbike managing director Pat Hus put it, “Urban cycling culture is here to stay and it's providing our industry with an incredibly dynamic landscape of products and lifestyle identities” (Bicycle Retailer and Industry News 2011). In the contemporary urban cycling scene, “a bike is just another article of clothing, a lifestyle brand” (as one Critical Mass participant put it to me). Here, cycling becomes a site of subject formation through consumption. Instead of counterposing the “genuine” politics of Critical Mass to mere consumerism, we should recall here Critical Mass’ influence on seeing the bicycle itself as the locus of politics. The slippage between the politicization of cycling and the fetishization of the bicycle, identified by Winner (1989) in his analysis of the “appropriate technology” movement of the 1970s, generates an individualized market for both the proper machines and the proper spaces through which to operate them.

One new company adeptly filling this lifestyle niche with transportation-specific bicycles is Public Bikes. Founded in 2008 by Rob Forbes, a scion of the Forbes family, Public Bikes sells relatively inexpensive, well-appointed commuter bicycles in crisp, bright colors. They feature a relaxed riding position, simple gearing, integrated fenders, a chainguard, and a rear rack; higher end models offer an integrated lighting system. In 2013, they added a sport road model with a vintage appearance. Public Bikes exude a minimalist, cosmopolitan aesthetic, easily contrasted to garish, over-decorated performance bicycle markets, and maligned lycra-clad cyclists that purchase them. At a cost between $550 and $1200, they far exceed the low-quality bikes sold at department stores, but fall at the lower end of the price range of true bicycle shops. In the years since Public began, their visibility has grown dramatically. In the commuter rush on Valencia Street in San Francisco or Telegraph in Oakland, they are ubiquitous. Public also provides fleets to companies like AOL, Mozilla, Square, Clif Bar, and the Gap for employee use on errands. Their advertising showcases all the trappings of gracious urban living, featuring stylish men and women at farmer’s markets, cafes, industrial lofts, and sleek offices. Public even leads bicycle tours of the Mission District on the company’s fleet of rentals.

20 As noted in chapter 1, bicycles are becoming a key part of corporate culture. Rackspace, a firm for which Public provides bicycles, offers the following testimonial: “Offering bike share as an amenity helps Rackspace reinforce its progressive, innovative culture to attract top tier talent, especially with younger software engineers who appreciate the urban lifestyle” (http://publicbikes.com/c/RACKSPACE, accessed April 29, 2015).
At Public’s airy “pop-up” boutique in an upscale furniture store at 17th and Valencia Streets, hip, young employees fit customers for different models, but do not perform repairs or stock replacement parts. Public also sells wholesale to shops in San Francisco and the East Bay, and ships direct throughout the country. In June 2012, Public opened a 10,000 square foot warehouse store in Oakland’s booming Jack London Square district. Company headquarters are located in “Multimedia Gulch,” the South Park neighborhood of San Francisco that was ground zero of the first tech boom in the late 1990s. Like Forbes’ previous venture, Design Within Reach, which adopted the mission of selling high-design Scandinavian housewares at lower (but still extraordinarily high) prices, Public Bikes taps the market for intelligently designed products.

![Public Bikes “Mass Transit for One” business card.](image)

Beyond commodity fetishism, however, Public reveals important aspects of how bicycles are considered as consumer products. Within the pithy slogan found on its business cards—“Mass Transit for One”—lies an entire orientation towards individual mobility that is endemic to the contemporary politics of the bicycle (Figure 22). Here, the idea of publicness becomes more than just a marketing mechanism; it references a real desire for a social form of everyday transit. This desire, however, articulates with an entrepreneurial capitalism in which social change is imagined primarily through harnessing the power of the market to enable individual subjects to express their politics (Maniates 2002). Public’s product, an object fetishistically imbued with the power to make a public, contributes to the “civilization” of cities, as the website reads. It articulates the following mission:

Our vision is that more of our urban streets and sidewalks get reclaimed for walking and biking, and that our public spaces are developed for better human interaction and conversation. We’d like to see a closer personal connection between residences with shops, parks, cafés and libraries. We’d like to see streets safe enough for kids and old folks to get around on foot or on a bike. The quality and usage of our public spaces is the measure of the success of our democracy. This is why we call ourselves PUBLIC. We want to help in our own way (Public Bikes 2013).
This is firmly in keeping with the contemporary valorization of socially-minded, small-scale, entrepreneurial pursuits. The fact that Public is not public is not just ironic. Over the last 40 years, the shifts away from taxpayer-funded public goods means that even “publicness” must be produced, packaged, and delivered privately, as an amenity. Public Bikes should be seen as part of the effacement of the public realm itself.

The “Mass Transit for One” slogan also reflects the individualization of the concept of transit. Here the individual cyclist-consumer becomes invested with a transformative capacity. I am not arguing that cycling advocates—or Rob Forbes himself—believe that bicycles will solve all transit problems. Forbes and many cycling entrepreneurs like him, however, identify automobility as primarily a design problem and an issue of consumer choice, rather than a political-economic complex that has been central to American capitalism over the past 80 years. As Forbes put it in a fluffy interview with Dwell:

> The US is simply way behind the rest of the modern world with respect to urban transportation design. In building or manufacturing design we have many examples of excellence in the US. Name one excellent example of modern transportation design here” (Rich 2010).

This perspective, which sees good design as the basis of urban sociability, is pervasive on websites like Streetsblog, Next City, and The Atlantic Cities. The result is an orientation toward changing building codes, design standards, and funding allocation to enable a car-free mobility that is compatible with neoliberal capitalism. Better transportation choices, rather than different forms of social life, become the call-to-arms of individualized mobility.

A New Public: Racialization and Uneven Development

At stake in questions of the public realm and the individualization of mobility are powerful issues of race and class that undermine the claim that cycling is open to all regardless of background. This perspective forms a key part of the allure of the bicycle. It abstracts, however, from the historical circumstances of bicycling’s rise and the allies bicycle advocates have made along the way. The racialized withdrawal of investment from urban cores, assisted by postwar federal housing policy, means that racialized gentrification forms the condition for the flourishing of a mostly white bike culture. This is a reality only beginning to be acknowledged by advocates. It means that the new wave of bike shops, particularly those begun by in-migrants to disinvested cores, become microcosms of the gentrification process, bringing people into contact across lines of race, class, gender, and age. While many exceptions exist, bike shops tend to be white, male spaces, in which expertise is expressed through the bodily *hexis* (Bourdieu 1984) of the bike mechanic. They mark a distinct node in processes of racialization even when acting as important sites of solidaristic practice.

Because of the anointment of urban cycling with an ethical rectitude, the racialized foundations of in-migration are typically silent in narratives of how cyclists
relate to urban space. Before its overhaul in March 2014,\textsuperscript{21} the “Who We Are” section of Manifesto’s website affirmed the bike shop as the basis for a new neighborhood ecology in ways thoroughly underwritten by race:

\begin{quote}
We are: a couple of Oaklanders who decided to open a different kind of bike shop. We are: part of a growing bike shop cartel - operating under the assumption that more bike shops in a city is a good thing. We are: looking forward to a time when every neighborhood has a local bike shop instead of three nail salons (Manifesto Bicycles 2014).
\end{quote}

As someone who is friendly with the shop owners, I was shocked when I first encountered this statement.\textsuperscript{22} Statements like this do not issue from a conscious racism against the kinds of businesses operated and frequented by people of color, however, but from a stance against the mainstream. This position is narrated through a process of neighborhood ecological succession that would create the “right” kinds of daily rounds: sustainable, local, and economically productive. Just as the bicycle acts as a signifier of a subculture that emerges amid the grit of the underinvested city with a mission to redeem it, so here the nail salon frames the “needless” duplication of functionless businesses as part of what needs changing. “Highest and best use” (bikes, not nail salons) has an ethical component not reducible to maximizing rents. Nevertheless, arguments about what the future city should look like and how to get there inevitably employ a lens saturated with race and class. This is reinforced through the media, particularly urbanist blogs, who frame the local bike shop as tangible evidence of neighborhood revitalization (McCamy 2010b).

The bike shop itself, however, is not simply the expression of an internally homogeneous in-migration of new residents. Instead, it is a site where the meaning of cycling is negotiated, largely through a “hidden transcript” that hinges on the politics of difference (J. Scott 1990). Because the bicycle reflects and reinforces subjectivity of the rider, inevitable judgments about the need for repairs and quality of the machine resolve into judgments about the rider, mediated by the machine. Slang terms for components, unconventional riding positions, modified components, or deferred maintenance can all mark the rider as other, intersecting with race-classed social divisions to amplify their significance. Department store-bought bicycles, for instance, identify the rider as inexpert and naïve, because even the moderate price of a new bike sold through a bike shop ($400 or more) is out of the price range of working class riders.\textsuperscript{23} Because the amount of labor needed to repair department store bicycles to a minimum standard far exceeds their initial cost, mechanics’ frustration with these bicycles becomes frustration with working-

\textsuperscript{21} Derived from snapshots saved to the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, available at archive.org/web.

\textsuperscript{22} I am grateful to Erin Collins for noticing this statement and pointing it out to me.

\textsuperscript{23} Working as a bike mechanic for many years in both Philadelphia and San Francisco, I noted that these bicycles tended to be purchased by black and Latino riders, for the reasons noted above. Almost any time I worked on one of the many substandard bicycles sold through Wal-Mart, Target or K-Mart, I wound up performing more work than requested or paid for, because my priority was ensuring a safe machine to ride. These are among the manifold ways in which wage suppression in the United States articulates with the offshoring of bicycle production and the upstream pressure from large distributors to cut corners on bicycles used in the road amid large, lethal cars.
class cyclists themselves. These processes result in working class people of color riding unreliable machines in city streets (Figure 23).

![Figure 23. Working class bicycles parked every day at Jack-in-the-Box, Oakland. Note front wheels removed to prevent theft. Photo by author.](image)

Because of high theft rates and little tracking of stolen bicycles by law enforcement, the bike shop is also a site where security concerns translate into race-classed assumptions about people whose bicycles seem not to “fit”: whether their bodily comportment matches the aesthetic codes of the bicycle in question. The symbolic economy of cycling, which is the basis of both bike culture and its commercialization, here is inverted. The discordance of the signs emitted by the rider and the bicycle arouse suspicion. Normative understandings of the appropriate body and knowledge base of the cyclist are thus marshaled to make ad hoc judgments about the legitimacy of ownership. In my experience, white customers are rarely treated with suspicion unless they profess to have purchased the bike for a low price in a particular area. For instance, “Civic Center,” the area of Mid-Market San Francisco adjacent to the Tenderloin (see Chapter 1), means “stolen.” It is also one of the few remaining sites of subaltern appropriation of public space left in the city.

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24 Somewhere around 2007, a bike shop owner in University City, Philadelphia, began referring to department store bicycles as “bike-shaped objects” (“BSOs,” in his shorthand), and instituted a policy of not repairing them. By the same token, Box Dog Bikes is located next to a public housing project where many youth of color live. We typically repair their chronically damaged bikes at cost or for free. Such practices are an ad-hoc decision based on a sense of shared place, not on an explicit rule to undercharge subaltern cyclists in the interest of justice.
None of this is meant to deny the reality of bike theft, though the most recent arrest made in a large-scale bike theft ring in San Francisco was of a white man (Holmes 2013). Nor do I intend to reinscribe a racialized commonsense around who is likely to be riding a bicycle that was once stolen. Rather, I introduce these examples to underscore that in my ten years of bike shop experience on two coasts, I have found the bike shop—and the bike world more generally—to be devoid of “official” practices surrounding race-class but overflowing with a “feel for the game” (Bourdieu 1984) about which bodies may belong on which bikes in which spaces. I have noticed myself pre-cognitively making such determinations, to my consternation. My question in exploring this ethnographically is whether the bicycle is actually thinkable in its current form without race-class. My understanding is that it is not. Difference thus operates through the bicycle in these situations. The sites where they play out—the bike shop—are valorized spaces in the discourse of livability but sites of stress for race-classed others.

This question got Brian Drayton going when we discussed it. He tied the issue to a broader absence of bike shop ownership by people of color and women. In fact, as bicycling has grown in Oakland, the number of shops owned and operated by women and people of color has decreased. Here I quote him at length:

BD: I personally don’t understand why the women’s bike shop that was on San Pablo Avenue that sold olive oil had to close down. There were only three women-owned bike shops, they all closed down. There was one in Rockridge, San Pablo Avenue, and then another over on the east side of the lake—gone! What the fuck’s up with that? And how does the EBBC throw their 40th anniversary party and not have somebody say, “Hey you know, we’ve lost a bunch of bike businesses. We’ve gained a bunch but we’ve lost a bunch. What did we lose and why?” There’s no reason to lose women-owned bike businesses, there’s no reason for me and Tony Coleman to be the only males of color that own bike shops. There’s no reason for Major Taylor to be the only black bicycling team and for Tony to be the only black owner.

JS: Because Recycle-a-Bicycle [in West Berkeley] closed down and Ty [another black bike shop owner] sold the Bent Spoke. And Tony runs Bikes 4 Life, correct?

BD: Yeah. And when he first opened up, because it was in West Oakland—you’ve seen the redevelopment stuff, you know what’s happening in West Oakland—he got a bunch of play because basically he was the anchor right there along with the café and you get these anchor businesses and he’s actually serving probably more hipsters than people of color right now at this point.

JS: Because of how the neighborhood’s changing?

BD: The economy, he has to pay his rent. He has to pay his rent. He’s still doing stuff for free, I know, because he operates like I do, I do sliding scale. If somebody from the neighborhood comes in and they’re like, “Dude, I got a flat,” I totally take care of it, you know? If somebody from the hills comes in and says, “Dude I got a flat,” I say, “Well that’s $6.99 for the tube and ten dollars labor.” You know? Then I also say why. I say, “It’s a pay it forward situation, we don’t turn anyone away.” I would love—I personally, with resources and privilege, would love to not have the experience of going into Bay Area Bikes with my daughter’s banana seat bike and have them not be able to find a 14mm nut for her front wheel and allow us to leave with an unsafe bike. I would love to
be able to walk in and say, “Hey can I borrow a tool?” and not have someone hand me some kind of weird little torn up pieces of shit. I would love to have people not say the things that have been said to me, as what they see as a minority cyclist—and I’m not—and be treated like an unwanted customer. And so we go through this stuff; you see people like Tony having to pay his rent and literally saying, “Can we sit down and brainstorm? Dude, I’m dying over here.”

Bike shops become sites of entrepreneurial opportunity and culturally valorized employment for white in-migrants, while people of color hold a small fraction of the non-residential wealth that could support owning a struggling bike shop (T. Shapiro, Meschede, and Osoro 2013). Predominantly low-income neighborhoods of color in Oakland, in fact, have no bike shops at all. Instead of an amenity, Brian frames the bike shop as a race-class project of wealth-building for black communities. This is why, when he shared the following story with me, he was both so exultant and so incredulous:

Did I tell you about the guy that came in and said, “When I saw the bike shop I knew everything would be ok”? That fits right in there. It’s like, a white dude [gestures toward me] comes in and asks me for a job. I’m like [incredulous]. I’m like, “So you live there with your family?” I was hoping he had a sob story— he had no sob story! He was a single white dude who bought a house in Richmond. And he was like, “When I saw the bike shop I knew everything would be all right.” And I was like “Well cool, thank you, thank you very much, come in and buy some tubes, homeowner!”

Brian’s candor reveals a very familiar but less-discussed dynamic. The bike shop is a social nexus, a site where ties, to bike culture and the neighborhood, are often defined through exclusion. With “bike culture” now framed as a critical element of the renewal of urban space, these definitional sites take on new significance. Through gentrification, the “health” of a neighborhood moves in an inverse relationship to the population and political power of working class residents of color.

During Oakland’s ascent to notability as a hub of bike culture, the North Oakland/South Berkeley area lost two African-American-owned bike shops. Recycle-a-Bicycle, a financially troubled black-owned bike shop located in a depressed zone of South Berkeley, closed down after several attempts at resuscitation. At around the same time, the Bent Spoke, a better-established black-owned shop in a sparse commercial area of North Oakland north of Temescal, changed hands. The Spoke is sandwiched between the white wealth of Lower Rockridge and the Bushrod neighborhood, which until recently was majority African-American (U.S. Census Bureau 1990; U.S. Census Bureau 2012a). The owner, Ty, was a familiar face on the bicycle swap meet circuit—gregarious and full of laughter, and a shrewd bargainer as well. His main employee was a gruff white punk named Timm. The Spoke sold used bikes and used parts, a pursuit most bike shops shy away from because of their low profitability, high space needs, and tendency to attract people with little to spend, but it was a resource for parts scavengers of North Oakland.

During the hard post-crash times, Ty decided to retire. He sold the business to Timm and another former employee Adam, who had gotten involved with the bike world at Hampshire College. The two had been mulling over the idea of upgrading the shop.
before the crash, and reopened it in 2011 as The Spoke Cyclery, with a stylized old-timey logo replacing the well-worn red and yellow graffiti lettering of the previous sign. Inventory was upgraded as well, though the new shop continues to trade in used bikes and parts. This should not be taken straightforwardly as the takeover of a stronghold of black cycling culture by an uncritical gentrifier. In fact, when I spoke Adam, a planner by training, after a long workday, I found him a keen thinker of the gentrification process. As he put it, “This neighborhood is definitely feeling like a frontier of gentrification. If we were looking for commercial space, we would look here where it’s not all fancied up. Bike shops do that—bike shops and galleries form the frontier.” Our discussion ranged from the failures of the bicycle planning process in North Portland to the transportation improvements at Lake Merritt, which he saw as an attempt to “open” East Oakland to gentrification, to the difficulties of running a shop that sells used items [A. Shapiro 2013].

The foregoing raises important issues regarding the geography of bicycle shops in “up-and-coming” areas of Oakland. The new wave of shops rooted in urban bike culture, where primarily white cyclists flock and become visible as newcomers, is a key element of the uneven social infrastructure of cycling. These shops raise fundamental questions of race and class in gentrifying space, not just because of where they locate but also because of their internal social dynamics. The bike shop affirms the daily round of some cyclists while acting as a site of uncertainty for others.

Fragmented Social Infrastructures: Narrating Race in Bicycle Culture

If the bicycle is stereotypically understood as a practice of the gentrifier, it also has become a means of contesting how cycling and race have been linked in urban space. It must be recalled that the bicycle per se is not on its own an indication of gentrification—poor and working class people in neighborhoods of color have used bicycles for decades. The recoding of the bicycle from a marker of urban poverty to a symbol of value has not eroded its racialization but instead worked through it, both rendering invisible and overexposing the mobilities of the subaltern residents of rapidly changing cities. Subaltern cycling issues a challenge to bicycle advocacy: to accept as political practices that do not fit the pattern set by dominant bike culture. The forms of outreach pursued by bicycle coalitions form an obstacle to inclusion. They depend on proving the economic contributions of cyclists and using infrastructure to convince car users to shift modes.

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25 I regret not prodding him to discuss race in the context of his shop. I didn’t have the gall to bring up the topic of how it felt to “whiten” the shop where he had apprenticed. The topic never came up, even as we talked about gentrification and mental “red lines.”

26 Thus, Lugo and Mannos refer to “invisible cyclists” to highlight the ways in which the needs of cyclists of color in Los Angeles are effaced in the dominant narrative, constructed through the process of gentrification, of the growth of cycling in cities as based primarily on choice (Lugo and Mannos 2012). The determination of “choice” versus “need” involves a complex coding of subaltern bodies as “pre-political” (Hobsbawm 1971), while bike use by those who have the resources to do otherwise, typically race-classed as white and bourgeois, is taken as evidence of political agency in the wake of the bike movements of the 1990s and early 2000s.
Showcasing the value of cyclists and combating old stereotypes of poverty effaces cyclists who are not seen as having chosen to give up their cars. Despite this, counter-narratives have emerged from Oakland that articulate a different narrative of bicycling and race than either the triumphalist account of gentrification or pessimistic concerns about the bicycle’s whiteness. The Scraper Bike Team and Red, Bike and Green, in very different ways, place a value on cycling from a specifically African-American perspective. They are not simply claims to inclusion, however. Instead, they expose the limits of bicycle advocacy’s simultaneous pursuit of diversity and tacit celebration of gentrification.

The “scraper bike” phenomenon is one of the most well known formations of African-American bike culture, and until recently one with the fewest formal links to the mainstream bike world. Originating among black youth of East Oakland, scraper bikes are brightly decorated and highly customized bikes. BMX (bicycle moto-cross) frames designed for small 20” wheels are fitted with larger 26” or 27” wheels scavenged from discarded bikes. Wheels are taped with duct tape or aluminum foil and then painted. To fit the larger wheels, the frames must be customized with a hacksaw—hence the “scraper” effect that mimics the East Oakland car style of placing oversized rims on 1980s-1990s American sedans. Candy wrappers and potato chip bags (in an ironic twist on the health and junk food discourse) are woven into the spokes and affixed to the frame in a
particular color scheme unique to each bike (Figure 24). Scraper tricycles are also common, carrying a stereo connected to a car battery for musical accompaniment.

Scraper bikes began to rise in prominence in Oakland in 2007 with their widely shared hip-hop video “Scraper Bike” (Trunk Boiz 2007). Tyrone “Baybe Champ” Stevenson, one of the rappers in the video, founded the Scraper Bike Team as a formal organization the next year. A 7-minute documentary about the phenomenon entitled “Scrapertown” increased the team’s visibility in 2010, with over 100,000 views in May alone (Cooper and Canepari 2010). Scraper bikes have become Oakland’s most recognizable contributions to bike culture as their imagery circulates throughout networks of advocates (Szczepanski 2012; Hoffman 2013). Their activism vividly demonstrates affective attachments to space by cyclists rarely included in normative visions of bike culture, least of all its hegemonic environmentalist and cosmopolitan framing. It also testifies to the ubiquity of bicycles among black youth in East Oakland, and to the practical ingenuity required of cyclists who live in areas with almost no access to bike shops.

In the course of reusing material leftovers to create new bicycle forms, the scraper bike movement also philosophically recombines contemporary themes in bike culture with discourses on race. As the Scraper Bike Team blog puts it:

The Scraper Bike Movement seeks to capture the creativity of youth living within dangerous communities. It gives them a positive outlet that is fun, educational, and promotes healthy lifestyles. The Scraper Bike Movement offers youth a sustainable group of peers that is positive and motivating. We want to expand and enlighten young peoples perspective on life through fixing and painting bicycles. Our goal is to support youth entrepreneurship and cultural innovation (Stevenson 2014).

Here I will refrain from offering an exhaustive account, either celebratory or critical, of the scraper bike movement. Instead, I will analyze two moments in the articulation of scraper bikes with more formal institutions of bicycle advocacy. In doing so I hope to show both the limits of and hopes for a more inclusionary bike culture.

The first of these articulations concerns the relationship between the scraper bike phenomenon and a white-dominated bike culture seeking a narrative of cycling’s diversity. I began learning about scraper bike cultures via social media networks of which I was a part. From 2008 onward, shortly after I moved to Oakland, the “Scraper Bike” video began circulating through friend networks of bike culture enthusiasts. While youth of color riding scraper bikes are not geographically confined to East Oakland, they are not a common sight in the gentrifying areas of Oakland’s core (such as the neighborhoods

27 As of March 2015, two versions of the video had over 5 million views combined.

28 My recollection of the 2010 video was that it circulated largely among friends who believed in the transformative power of bike culture. This contrasts sharply with how the original YouTube video circulated, which was often as humor, evinced by the thousands of racist comments uploaded by viewers.

29 By the same token, one could analyze the discourses and practices of the movement itself, which combines masculine narratives of violence prevention, personal responsibility and leadership cultivation to produce viable black male futures in the context of East Oakland’s ongoing crisis and triage. Each of these “cuts” could be a dissertation on its own.
I have lived in). The video predates most interactions between scraper subculture and more mainstream bike culture growing amid gentrification. Scraper bikes therefore became known through their mediation via networks of knowledge.

Over the course of graduate work, I frequently discussed my developing dissertation project, which involved discussing the racialization of cycling, with friends, colleagues and acquaintances. A common response was, “Oh, have you seen [or are you studying] scraper bikes?” My friend would then describe how cool the bikes were, or mention a time they saw them on the street, or expound on their inspiring organization. While this is a partial interpretation, to me the relentless circulation of images of scraper bike subculture contrasts sharply with their marked absence in day-to-day of bicycle advocacy, activism, and culture. The scraper bike acts aspirationally within a bike culture that does not want to see itself as racially marked. The image of scraper bike youth marks “underrepresented” others as different but includable, while creating hopes for solidarity across lines of difference.

This occurs in more embodied ways as well. The 2011 San Francisco Bike Expo, a bike culture industry show held at the Cow Palace Convention Center in Daly City, featured a visit from the Scraper Bike Team. Amid the contemporary material culture of the bicycle—urban themed lifestyle bicycles, casual clothing, technical garments, mugs and shirts adorned with bikes, a swap meet, and an urban bike style fashion show with a “runway”—the scraper bikes rode in to their own musical accompaniment and took their place at a booth that had been provided at a discount. There, they accepted donations, answered questions, offered versions of the group’s philosophy to attendees, and posed for photos. The most consistent theme they articulated was the mission of “keeping kids out of trouble.” Expo attendees, most of whom were white, enthusiastically gathered and snapped photos of the youth as well as their customized bikes. While the booth was fairly well attended, visitors tended not to stay and engage—for a whole set of possible reasons not reducible to race and cultural divisions but also likely never far from them.

In this space I experienced a sense of the uncomfortable politics of representation. Clearly, the scraper bike team was invited to the expo through organizers’ efforts to be inclusive, as well as to showcase the diversity of bike culture. In practice, I felt discomfort watching mostly white and middle class attendees surround the booth to take photos. I also recognized the strategic performance of otherness in service of their goals of publicity, raised awareness, and donations that would be critical to their transition to a 501c(3) organization. These were not naïve youth trotted out as evidence of bike culture’s diversity, but keen political agents using the bicycle to articulate with broader, politically salient issues around geographically concentrated violence, disinvestment, and poverty. Nonetheless, the experience demonstrated that the scraper bike team was enthusiastically included in bike culture as cyclists with an asterisk. Their otherness attached to their machines themselves.

The Scraper Bike Team meets at El Colectivelo, a community-run bike repair

30 This occurred before I came to know some members of the Scraper Bike Team more personally in the course of my fieldwork.
space in the basement of a Catholic Worker house at 50th and International Boulevard in East Oakland, at the border between majority-Latino Fruitvale area and the majority-African-American neighborhoods to the east. Every Saturday afternoon, team members, mostly school-aged youth, congregate to put together and decorate bikes. After bikes are assembled and adorned, Champ and R.B. hold a meeting before setting out on a winding ride through East Oakland’s neighborhoods. During the meeting, Champ is a kind but stern taskmaster. No bikes without “rims”—wheels covered in foil or colored tape—are permitted. Helmets are required, though R.B. admits it’s a difficult rule to enforce. “Your ticket to get in next week,” Champ called out at the end of one meeting, “is a helmet and tape.” “I don’t want to see a regular bike, put it where I can’t see it,” he told another youth who brought an ordinary mountain bike to fix in addition to his scraper. Swearing means you lose a quarter to the “swear jar.” Maintaining a 3.0 grade point average at school is a requirement. Lining up to set off on a ride, Stevenson puts the team in order so that particularly colorful bikes are evenly distributed and stand out. “Have to teach them to line up right,” he says to me. “I don’t want to see any recording [with cell phones],” he barks before the group takes off in formation. “If I see a phone, you’re going home!” Champ commands his charges with a familial seriousness and an ethic of care that clashes with both the anarchic play of Critical Mass and formal structure of bicycle coalition safety classes. This is because the political stakes are much different.

As scraper bikes, along with urban bike culture more generally, are mediated through a widening online milieu that blurs the line between advertisement and documentation, the gaze of branding draws closer. I happened upon a particularly key moment in this quite by accident. I arrived one Saturday afternoon to volunteer at the Colectivelo and put my mechanic skills to some use there. When I pulled up on my bicycle I saw a young man outside who looked suspiciously like me, unusual for the neighborhood we were in: young, white, with slim jeans and sunglasses. Inside the Colectivelo I found a film crew of more young white men and one white woman shooting a commercial for the Levi’s Commuter Jean, a bike culture-specific “lifestyle” design. Inside, the Colectivelo functioned basically as before, with a low level of organizational chaos and a shortage of needed parts. By the door, however, was a printed consent flyer indicating that those on the premises would be filmed (Figure 25).

I talked with one of the members of the film crew while trying to remain out of the fray and the filming, and described my work documenting the unevenness of bicycle infrastructure. “Well yeah,” he said, “the projects go where there is the most economic return I guess.” He told me that they were part of a subset of the company with significant artistic freedom, and they had approached the Scraper Bike Team because they had been following their online presence. They found it to be an inspiring story and wanted to document it. After the team meeting, as the scrapers departed for their ride with the film crew following, the man I had been chatting with took my card and said he’d send a pair of jeans.

31 Ironically, this was the same model that had sponsored the release party at Box Dog that lead to the displacement of the community bench.
Several weeks later the video came out on YouTube. By September 2014 it had received 37,000 hits, and by April 2015 over 70,000, modest numbers compared to the originals’ over 5 million (over 7 years). In the video, Champ narrates a story about youth empowerment and keeping kids on the right path, over artfully shot views of Colectivelo’s workshop. In slow-motion, the team swerves back and forth across a street as they ride in formation, waving to people they pass, with a gorgeous soul dirge for the soundtrack (Levi’s Commuter 2014). It is a beautiful video. What the video does not show, however, is that the Scraper Bike Team is performing labor, producing value for the Levi’s brand. Perhaps, given the meager number of hits, the value has turned out to be minimal. Nevertheless, it demonstrates an imagined demand for images and knowledge about this unique East Oakland bike culture, seen as all the more authentic for being helmed by young people of color facing difficult circumstances. It places the Levi’s brand on the side of innovation, empowerment, and inclusion, rather than rehearsing the same tired footage of white hipsters on bikes that is now ubiquitous in pop culture. The play of value, image, and affect that articulates these different segments of bike culture an important site of encounter, but it also reveals the shortcomings of a marketing-based appropriation of the scraper bike as a cultural form. By contrast, “We Dem Rakas (Hola)” a hip-hop video in which black, Latino, and Afro-Latino youth cruise East Oakland on scraper bikes and fixed-gears, garnered 12,000 hits just days after its release in mid-September; by April 2015, it had ten times that amount (Navarrette and Cheek 2014). The Los Rakas video is equally an appropriation, but a solidaristic one.
The second articulation I want to identify is the involvement of scraper bike team members in planning efforts led by the East Bay Bicycle Coalition around bicycle infrastructure in East Oakland. This marks an important shift from activism focused on the transformation of individual subjects—what Lugo (2013b) calls a “human infrastructure” of cycling—to engaging in changes to the street. In 2013, Reggie Burnett (R.B.), a Scraper Bike Team elder, began working for Bike East Bay (formerly the East Bay Bicycle Coalition) on outreach for bicycle infrastructure projects in East Oakland. With extremely low membership numbers in working class districts east of Lake Merritt, Bike East Bay has not been able to rely on traditional member-driven outreach approaches or the tacit support of gentrification. Connecting with local cyclists embedded in their communities is a critical part of smoothing the planning process in certain areas of East Oakland with very low rates of cycling, high poverty, high cycling injury rates, and a desperate need for safer streets (Parks 2013).

In 2013, Bike East Bay and the city of Oakland experienced political setbacks in East Oakland, particularly on Havenscourt Avenue, a historic African-American middle class neighborhood and an arterial that could connect the bike lane on Bancroft Avenue to Mills College at MacArthur Boulevard. Viewing bicycle infrastructure as a low priority for the street, Councilmember Desley Brooks of East Oakland’s sixth district issued an ultimatum to Dave Campbell of Bike East Bay: demonstrate the need for bike lanes by getting East Oaklanders on bikes and making residents see their value (personal communication). Brooks put it more bluntly to Oakland’s Bicycle Facilities Coordinator Jason Patton: “There will never be bike lanes on Havenscourt” (Patton 2014). As Dave put it to me, Brooks’ indifference toward bicycle infrastructure reflected the prevailing understanding that, in East Oakland, “only drug dealers and criminals bike.”

Consequently, Bike East Bay has begun to increase advocacy efforts through the Scraper Bike Team. In September 2013, the EBBC hosted a “Scrapertown” barbecue in a park, conveniently located at the junction of Camden Street and the controversial Havenscourt:

Join the Scraper Bike Team and the East Bay Bicycle Coalition for an afternoon bike tour of potential new bikeways in East Oakland, including bike lanes on Camden/Havenscourt, neighborhood bikeways, and better east-west bike routes between International Blvd and MacArthur Blvd. It’s time for East Oakland to catch up with the rest of the ‘Town for better bikeways. Let’s stripe some bike lanes!

R.B. now works as an Outreach Intern with Bike East Bay conducting door-to-door outreach on Havenscourt, collecting signatures in support of bike lanes to deliver to Brooks. He pursues the project with vigor and visible pride, and his involvement with Bike East Bay has continued to grow. At Bike East Bay’s strategic planning meeting in January 2015, he was one of the few African-Americans in the room, and the only one from East Oakland.

During these outreach efforts, however, as a black youth on a bike R.B. faces unwelcome contact with the police even as a well-known face in the Havenscourt area. May 8, 2014 was Bike to Work Day, the biggest day in the calendar of every bicycle advocacy organization. Begun in 1956, Bike to Work Day is one of the oldest rites of
bicycle advocacy, a day of high ridership and publicity opportunities, and the only day of the year when mayors and councilmembers ride together to City Hall. Oakland’s Bike to Work Day begins with a morning pancake breakfast in front of City Hall, with speeches from the mayor and other notables, advocacy and planning outreach, and a generally festive scene with free valet parking coordinated by local bike shops. A key feature of Bike East Bay’s outreach efforts are Energizer Stations, where volunteers flag down cyclists headed to work, handing them bags of snacks, stickers, and outreach literature.

Instead of riding downtown on Bike to Work Day to see the festivities as I had in the past, this year I rode 70 blocks east, away from downtown, to the corner of Bancroft Avenue and Havenscourt Boulevard. There, R.B. and a friend were standing on the sidewalk in front of a vacant building manning an Energizer Station, the first of its kind in that area of East Oakland. A handful of commuters and kids riding their bikes to school stopped by and partook of the free snacks, but by and large there were precious few cyclists when compared to the hundreds passing by more centrally located stations. Many passers-by on foot asked what we were doing, and remained quizzical when R.B. explained. As he noted wryly, it was odd to be talking about biking to work in a neighborhood where many people don’t even have jobs.

The difference between the central nodes of bike culture and the Havenscourt area was not just one of geography and central location. Cycling practices in East Oakland also elicit different relationships to space and law enforcement. After I had been there for a while, R.B. mentioned that he had seen the same police car roll through the intersection several times. He then turned to me and said, “If you weren’t here they would have harassed us by now, but they’re probably like, ‘Oh, there’s a white guy with them, it’s cool.’” He and his friend laughed. I asked him if the police frequently harassed him. He shrugged and said he was. “They think we’re up to something,” he said. Just a few minutes later some kids who had stopped by the Energizer Station on their way to school rode back by and said a shopkeeper had drawn a handgun on them while they were in his store. R.B. expressed indignation at the owner’s actions, but after the youth rode on he and his friend chuckled, shaking their heads, “Those are some bad little kids.”

This sequence of events highlighted, in compressed form, the unevenness of how cycling practices provoke contact with police power based on race, class, and gender. With low-income African-American male youth cast as idle and dangerous, the bicycle becomes evidence not of ecological rectitude but a threat to order. Though little data exists on frequency of stops of cyclists by race, pretextual stops of cyclists by color by police have become commonly reported phenomenon (H. Smith 2015). A 2005 report from the Washington, DC Office of Police Complaints noted that mandatory bicycle registration laws (which exist in Oakland but are seldom enforced) create confusion about the law and increase the likelihood of abuse by police (Fernández et al. 2005). A Tampa Bay Times investigation found that African-Americans made up 26% of the city’s population but 80% of tickets issued for bicycle infractions (Zayas and Stanley 2015).

The articulation between Bike East Bay and the Scraper Bike Team in East Oakland reveals cleavages in bicycle advocacy that go beyond race and class. The mode of activism practiced by Champ and the Scraper Bike Team looks profoundly different
from how bicycle advocacy has become over the past twenty years with growing collaboration with city planning departments. The logic of the Scraper Bike Team intervenes in personal conduct rather than durable infrastructures. The social infrastructure incarnated through the Scraper Bike Team produces subjects whose self-conscious goal is the spread of positive community. Where marginal gentrifiers pursue new forms of life, here the bicycle serves a more urgent goal: the evasion of what Gilmore calls the “group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” that shapes collective futures in East Oakland (2007, 28).

This kind of person-to-person outreach also characterizes Red, Bike and Green (RBG), an Afrocentric bicycle organization founded in Oakland by Jenna Burton, with chapters in Chicago, Atlanta, and New York. RBG’s explicit motivation is to instigate a cultural shift within black communities towards healthier forms of living, chief among them cycling. Describing her move to Oakland from Washington, DC after graduating from Howard College, Burton told me:

I saw that there was this really hip culture around bike riding in the Bay Area and I didn’t see a whole lot of black people being included in that culture, and maybe it’s because I’m African-American I was like, “We like things that are hip!” [laughs] … But there was already this established stigma against bike riding, and I think it’s tied into this kind of mentality that if you have a bike then that means you can’t afford a car. And I think we have these images, that we see a bike rider, and they’re white, or they’re homeless, or they’re just about anything but just your average African-American person (Burton 2013a).

RBG in this way speaks to a desire to repair deep divides between the urban cool of bike culture and the ways that African-Americans understand themselves within the changing culture of the city.

More importantly, the primary terrain on which RBG works is not the sacrifice zone of East Oakland but the areas of heated battle over Oakland’s future. Gentrification clearly looms large in this representational struggle. Burton has told me how concerns about gentrification have risen to the fore even since she founded the organization in 2008. She described shooting a promotional video in West Oakland, her primary area of focus, and the extent to which middle class white residents she saw out and about claimed the space as their own. As she put it at a conference in Davis, “It’s clear the bike lanes weren’t put there for you, because if they had been they would have been there a long time ago, but they’re yours now, and you should use them” (Burton 2013b). At the same time, the mode of engagement, like the Scraper Bike Team, is one of interpersonal interaction combined with the feeling of safety that comes with group riding. For Burton, recalling Lugo, the human infrastructure of RBG was critical to their mode of engagement:

[The] great thing … about RBG being a community is that we have relationships with each other. And so sometimes you’ll say, “Well how about you and I just go on a bike ride, I’ll come and meet you at your spot and we can go take a bike ride somewhere and get something to eat, it’ll be just the two of us, it’ll be a little different, and we’ll see how comfortable you feel.
Human infrastructure here entails, again, an ethic of care, reflected as well in Burton’s interest in health and a specifically embodied response to the structurally produced reality of the prevalence of type 2 diabetes, obesity and heart disease among African-Americans (Guthman and DuPuis 2006). For Burton, these person-to-person moments are the core of her advocacy; political connections and infrastructure provision are secondary concerns when considered at all. The bicycle is a means to create community among black Oaklanders.

Talking to Burton recalled one of the questions that animated my research from the beginning: what distinguishes a bicycle user from a “cyclist,” and what are the limits to the figure of “cyclist”? For Brian Drayton, the limits are quite clear: countless people who use bicycles intermittently or regularly don’t consider themselves cyclists. “Cyclists” wear Lycra or bike-specific clothes, race, ride fancy bikes, and so on. Looking for “cyclists” among bike users radically reduces the framing of progressive bicycle politics. In the political struggle between the forces of “motordom” (Norton 2011) and those of bicycle advocacy, the urge to appear rational and disciplined encourages advocates to narrow their definition of who they represent. This manifests concretely in attempts to exact compliance with safety rules—helmet use, the use of lights, classes on safe riding—from the populations receiving outreach. In its more disciplinary form, it mandates reflective clothing for New York City delivery riders—almost to a person men of color—under penalty of a fine (Lee 2015).

More subtle forms, however, discourage advocates from seeing as cyclists people whose riding practices differ from the norms advocacy has. Emily Drennen, a former MTA staffer and author of a foundational report on Valencia Street (see Chapter 4), recalled a bike count volunteer discounting certain cyclists who passed as not “real” (Drennen 2014). Whatever the truth of the anecdote, she related it to me in the context of how bicycle culture and advocacy have developed unequally:

There are two classes of cyclists the bikes that have always been there and the induced biking. The induced bikers are now more attractive [from a policy perspective]. These two worlds don’t even come together. People haven’t even counted them [the former]” (ibid. 2014).

Drennen neatly synthesized Drayton’s comments and the “invisible cyclist” narrative from Los Angeles. These two “classes” of cyclists do in fact come together, however, under conditions of equal relations of power and expertise, when advocates attempt to address questions of difference. How they do so, however, often leaves the white, bourgeois foundations of cycling advocacy unshaken.

At issue in East Oakland is that bicyclists there largely do not represent a social bloc rising in influence, as they do in gentrifying areas of Oakland’s core. In middle and working class areas of black East Oakland, cycling is perceived as for the poor, for drug dealers, or for white gentrifiers. The articulation between Scraper Bike leadership and bicycle advocacy places local advocates in the service of a mandate that seems to come
from elsewhere, not generated from within East Oakland itself. It is still too soon to
determine what the political result of this dynamic will be. Advocates like Bike East Bay
Board President Morgan Kanninen and officials like Jason Patton with the City of
Oakland are acutely aware of the inequality of how bicycle infrastructure investment has
proceeded thus far, but have contradictory understandings of why. For Kanninen,
speaking while we repaired bikes at Colectivelo, the practice of doing the “low-hanging
fruit” merely reinforces spatial inequality. In a different conversation, Patton recognized
this but valued projects that actually stood a chance of getting completed. In this sense,
the “low-hanging fruit” of striping bicycle lanes in areas with already rising ridership was
potentially exclusionary, but the alternative could be far fewer projects. In terms of how
cyclists are valued and their access to resources like repairs and supplies, the political and
social bases of bicycle advocacy are sharply uneven between central Oakland and East
Oakland.

Conclusion: Racialized Social Infrastructures

This chapter has argued that bike culture is characterized by practices through
which cyclists produce space, not an abstract fetishization of the bicycle as a machine,
though this certainly exists (Lefebvre 1992). I have referred to these practices as a social
infrastructure, since the circulation of knowledge, rumor, habit, and “feel for the game”
(Bourdieu 1984) takes place through situated networks connecting nodes in space. These
collectivities in motion are organized loosely around a uniquely user-modifiable, form of
mobility. The geography of these collectivities matters for their race-classed
characteristics, and vice versa. Moreover, this geography shapes how certain practices
become intelligible as cycling. Social infrastructure is not strictly prior to the provision of
formal bicycle infrastructure by the state but exists in an iterative relation to it. In the
following chapter, I examine the mechanisms through which favored collectivities within
bike culture, in particular the largely white mainstream of bike culture, have articulated
their rights in ways that drive the geography of infrastructure provision.

The larger stakes of recognizing cyclists as a constituency within urban politics,
enabled by patterns of gentrification and new efforts at ecological governance, concern
who counts as part of the city itself. Through the optic of bike culture’s social
infrastructure, cities become intelligible as cyclescapes of a certain kind: dangerous/safe,
quiet/vibrant, etc. In the world of bicycle advocacy, as in gentrification, bike-friendly
neighborhoods metonymically stand in for the city as a whole. They are zones of “sheer
life” where the conditions for human thriving are concentrated without being generalized
in space or across difference (Ong 2006). Bike culture is about the rescaling of what
spaces count as the city worthy of focus.

32 Part of this antagonism owes to the nature of the bicycle plan mandate in accordance with ISTEA. Local
governments are required to generate plans with coverage for the entire city, while the social blocs driving
increases in cycling cluster in specific areas.

33 A small example: the Art Murmur event, which once illegally but licitly occupied a small alley off of
Telegraph Avenue, has ballooned into a massive carnival that closes 10 blocks of the street in the heart of
This occurs in a new way in comparison to much of the gentrification literature. Instead of city-led schemes that transparently raid public coffers to spur capital accumulation in a specific zone—the publicly financed sports complex, for instance—there is a complex articulation between earnest initiatives pursued by valued in-migrants and a city desperate to attract them. The paradox identified by Rose, that attempts to address social processes of oppression, dispossession, and exploitation take the disinvested urban core as their site of experimentation. This happens both because low housing costs ease the discipline of the market and because the disinvested urban core is the object of redemption. The bicycle becomes a mechanism by which the flaneuristic rediscovery of urban grit pioneers urban space for less intrepid bourgeois in-migrants to follow.

This troubles the choice-based explanations of gentrification as well as cycling. As Chris Carlsson put it to me, “Bikes don’t cause gentrification, but gentrifiers like bikes.” This may be partially true, but the conditions under which gentrifiers prefer bicycles are, following Marx, not of their own choosing. Neither are the neoliberal conditions in which cities are trapped in a never-ending search for revitalization, a proxy for bourgeois colonization. Urban in-migrants bicycle more and more due to a complex set of factors, but the ones I have identified here are spatial and ethical: cycling makes the desired city occur in the present.

 Crucially, bicycle cultures are not simply made on a terrain cleared by racialized disinvestment. They are actively produced through race. The codes by which bicycle users come to matter as cyclists are saturated with racial meaning. More importantly the resignification of the bicycle as bearing value occurs by effacing its racialization. In other words, marginal gentrifiers practice downward mobility through cycling in a way that is unavailable to negatively marked people; the irony lies in the fact that their race-class position reframes the bicycle as valuable. Moreover, the ideological image of the bicycle is not simply transformed tout court through gentrification. Instead, the articulation of body and machine in space—which mobilizes intimate details to mark difference—underpins the uneven valuation of bicycle users. As Chapters 4 and 5 will argue, a certain figure of urban cycling, hewn by the disparate practices of bike culture, becomes the pole around which political claims to infrastructure are organized specifically through signifying value. Those practices marked by difference that employ bicycles but are blocked from such claims, meanwhile, face an uncertain future in gentrifying space.

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Uptown. Recently, Councilors Brooks and Larry Reid of East Oakland argued that far too many resources were spent by the city on police to patrol the event, at no cost to the organizers, and many of them reassigned from specific safety initiatives in the East Oakland neighborhoods hardest hit by violence (Cain 2013). While this narrative elides the complex and fraught relationship between Oakland’s African-American communities and a police force placed under a federal monitor, it speaks to the rescaling of resources underway.
Chapter 4: “The Valencia Epiphany” and the Production of the Cyclescape

Just two short decades have passed since the irruption of Critical Mass, whose Bakhtinian carnival politicized the bicycle as a machine whose material nature levies a critique of automobility. Cycling now signifies a very different politics. The bicycle’s complex itinerary has led it from the counterculture to a signifier of urban revitalization—from the tool of gentrification’s critics to a tool of gentrification itself. A now commonplace assumption holds that local investment in bicycle and pedestrian infrastructure increases the livability of a given urban area, which has positive economic spillover effects in higher property values and commercial vitality. This narrative also represents the individualization of ecologically responsible mobility, in the absence of large-scale state-led investment in transportation infrastructure, with the bicycle a necessity for ethical urban life. Green livability, in this respect, is the aesthetic logic of contemporary gentrification, and the bicycle plays a crucial role as both vector and signifier.

Gentrifying areas have seen most of the recent increases in ridership and investment in bicycle infrastructure (Pucher and Buehler 2011). When infrastructure arrives in working class neighborhoods, it is often in response to demand shown by more affluent in-migrants. This has made bicycle infrastructure politically fraught in ways not reducible to the antinomies of car versus bike. In North Portland, where black community activists made the link between bike lanes and gentrification explicit, cyclists took the brunt of the blame for rapid demographic change in the area (Letson 2012). Meanwhile, in Washington, DC, a successful 2010 bid to unseat young mayor Adrian Fenty, a noted supporter of bicycle network expansion, employed a coded language of “dog parks and bike lanes” to brand Fenty as a promoter of gentrification (Schwartzman and Jenkins 2010). Unlike these cases, the Bay Area has not seen a sustained political attack on bicycle infrastructure from an anti-gentrification perspective. The frontiers of bicycle network expansion in 1990s San Francisco and contemporary Oakland, however, remain spaces shot through with race-classed inequalities, while bicycle advocates have made great strides claiming the economic contributions of their efforts.

Where did the economic assumptions regarding bicycle infrastructure come from? This chapter argues that, in parallel to the growth of the social infrastructure of bike culture, the involvement of local bicycle coalitions in the process of planning infrastructure has generated a tangled relationship between cycling and gentrification. It traces the involvement of the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition (SFBC) in the construction of bicycle lanes on Valencia Street in San Francisco’s Mission District between 1998 and 2001, a contentious process that involved the removal of a car travel lane. The result was a lower-speed, more pedestrian- and bicycle-friendly commercial corridor at a moment of massive investment, white, bourgeois in-migration, and property turnover spilling over from the dot-com boom.
This chapter concerns that ways that bicycle infrastructure has emerged as a convenient strategy to leverage investment in the public streetscape for private accumulation, articulating the desires of the “new [urban] middle class” (Ley 1994) with the capitalist production of space. Bicycle infrastructure provision mobilizes state actors, planning methods, and measurement techniques to generate knowledge about the effects of changes to the street. At the same time, non-state actors like bicycle advocacy organizations have come to play a critical role in developing infrastructural capacity folding them into state practices and driving their “progressive-neoliberal hybridization” (Henderson 2013).

At a finer grain of analysis, the argument of this chapter is twofold. First, I argue that the bike culture of San Francisco went from the margins to the mainstream in large part by intervening in the planning process of Valencia Street in the late 1990s. These interventions were justified ex post facto by the available language of economic revitalization and draw credibility from broader dynamics of gentrification. Second, I argue that over the last decade this association has passed from a contingent to a necessary relationship, as the interests of bicycle advocates have directly benefited from the gentrification process while their language frames infrastructural investment in economic terms. The lessons from these moments have circulated through the networks of bicycle advocacy, rendering Valencia Street a “patient zero” in the viral travel of the economistic claims that are now the norm. These dynamics point to serious contradictions between social justice and economic justification in the world of bicycle advocacy, and they cast into sharp relief the exclusions that attend the proliferation of bicycle infrastructure.

Marginal Gentrifiers and the Aesthetics of Neighborhood Change

Neil Smith’s account of the “rent gap” anchors the Marxist theory of gentrification and redevelopment. In the context of capitalist housing markets, the devalorization process creates areas where rent received by the owner (capitalized ground rent) falls to the point where the potential rent under a “higher and better use” exceeds costs of revalorization, yielding profits in the process. These rent gaps emerge due to the devaluation of structures through undermaintenance, neglect, and eventual destruction, which drags capitalized rent to below potential rents based on location. Gaps can also emerge through a rapid increase in surrounding potential rents through asset price inflation, rather than devalorization.1 The entire process is driven by a set of given interests, particularly developers and urban governments, in the production of housing. Most importantly, it is in the economic interest of landholders to allow devaluation to occur, rather than continue upkeep with diminishing returns (N. Smith 1979; Harvey and Chatterjee 1976).

Dan Hammel, in a friendly critique of Smith, argues that Smith’s focus on the parcel, where individual landlords act to maximize ground rent, ignores the intermediate

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1 In this case, it is the house value that remains relatively constant, while the rent climbs, and once again their combination is expressed in price.
scale of the neighborhood, which plays a crucial role in shaping capitalized rents (Hammel 1999). The neighborhood is the scale at which both constraints on and supports of ground rent play out:

Urban land rent is determined by matters of location, but also by infrastructural characteristics that are now ‘inherent’ to the land. Both of these factors are created by human action and use of land. They both enable and constrain the use of the land and determine its rent” (ibid., p. 1290, emphasis added).

Because of the relational nature of space and place, massive fixed transportation systems with controlled access points (freeways and rail transit) augment the accessibility of certain sites within the metropolitan fabric, and are capitalized as what Walker calls “redistributive rent” (1972). Also determinate, however, are social perceptions of risk and the desirability of different neighborhood-level factors. These factors are shaped by the process of gentrification itself, which creates cumulative effects that can ratchet up current and potential rents.

The neighborhood is where gentrification actors attempt to shape use-values—or “quality of life”—in ways that support increases in exchange-value (Gottdiener 1985, 153; Logan and Molotch 2007). This dynamic is most often understood in aesthetic terms (Zukin 1989; Ley 1996; Ley 2003). But in the current moment, movement through space by bicycle has become similarly aestheticized, both as a desired dimension of the good life and an economic amenity. The idealized scale of cycling reinforces the processes of localization that produce the neighborhood as a coherent object, however fictive. The social infrastructures discussed in the previous chapter, where activists pursue durable changes in the urban fabric for reasons beyond exchange-value, harmonize with this localized sense of place (Massey 1994). For livability advocates, interventions in the socio-material structure of neighborhood—the milieu (Foucault 2010)—support more ethical forms of social reproduction and “smarter” resource usage. This constitutes an important use-value. Infrastructural improvements at this scale are easier for fiscally strained municipalities to undertake and easier for neighborhood-level actors to organize around. The articulation of interests around such infrastructure projects produces an unstable alliance between exchange-value-driven promoters of growth and use-value-driven advocates hopeful for more livable urban space. We find a “growth coalition” of an unusual sort, in which property interests are somewhat dependent on grassroots actors’ pursuit of use-values in urban space. Bicycle infrastructure is a key point of convergence between these interests, with powerful implications for the reorganization of capital investment across the metropolis.

**Streets as Technologies**

The target of livability advocates in the current moment is not access to housing, or segregation, or wages, but the physical structure of the street as both expressive and generative of urban problems. The current dominant configuration of the roadway—an

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2 At stake is the problem that bicycle lanes may contribute to redistributive rents, but only for the segment of the population who is willing and able to cycle regularly.
arrangement of concrete, asphalt, paint, metal signage, and planted greenery—is a technology for enabling certain forms of movement and restricting others. For livability advocates, it is unethical life objectified, laid down in the twenty years between 1910 and 1930 amid pitched battles over what streets meant. This period saw the invention of the crime of “jaywalking,” the standardization of curbs and traffic signals, and the broad conversion of the street from a social space into a system of hydraulic channels and valves for circulating traffic (Norton 2011). These more hydraulic streetscapes reduce the turnover time of capital, allowing goods and people to course through the city’s arteries more quickly (Harvey 2005). But they also instantiate the social order, materializing rules of conduct surrounding mobility which go beyond their functionality to capital accumulation. The unimpeded freeway became the ideal against which surface streets are measured and consistently fall short (Sheller and Urry 2000). The objective of advocates is to break the fantasy of speed through more efficient allocation of road space, rather than a challenge to the hydraulic logic of the street itself.

Streets are governed as technologies by the evaluation criteria of level of service (LOS). LOS standards evaluate street modifications by attempting to measure the delay to car circulation the design may incur, excluding non-motorized users from this measurement. In recent years, pedestrian and bicycle advocates have sought to overhaul LOS, proposing an alternative multi-modal level of service (MLOS) that would enable the construction of safer and more habitable pedestrian and cyclist environments (Henderson 2013). Jason Patton identifies the conflict between LOS-based traffic engineering and bicycle-pedestrian planning as one of circulation versus place (2007, 929). As planners inspired by Jacobs and others now play a larger role in shaping the urban realm, and see their work as in harmony with accumulation, this conflict between flow and place refracts a deeper contradiction: between reducing turnover time and enhancing exchange-value through site-specific amenities. For the most part, efforts to change the street have concentrated on efficiently moving all users by expanding the category of use. The rigorous segmentation of uses to make the street safe for cyclists marks a more complete extension of the logic of roadway efficiency, not its erosion.

Debates over the technology of the street have provoked strong shifts in the politics of bicycle advocacy, from an old guard promoting “vehicular cycling” which taught cyclists to behave as cars, to infrastructure-driven advocates who see separated facilities as providing superior access. Vehicular cycling advocates, led by Stanford avionics engineer John Forester, have long held that any facility separating cyclists from the rest of traffic is dangerous to cyclists and a slippery slope to their exclusion from the roadway (Forester 2012). As the leading bicycle advocates for decades, vehicular cyclists

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3 This is the same Jason Patton who is an interview subject by virtue of his role as director of Oakland’s Bicycle and Pedestrian Program.

4 One knotty point of contradiction between these dual functions of the street is parking. Parking entails the use of part of the roadway as a storage facility for automobiles while they are not in use. As Henderson argues, parking is the “third rail” of the politics of livability, a key site where what the street does is contested (2013). As advocates and activists attempt to shift ways of knowing the street through protest, innovation, and “code activism” (Radulovich 2012), parking in many ways constitutes the political limit, imposing an artificial scarcity on the space of the roadway.
opposed street changes, focusing instead on teaching correct cycling technique and
protecting rights to road space. Their ranks were dominated by white, middle-class men
and, until the 1990s, bicycle coalitions reflected these this composition (Tube Times 1999;
Bodzin 2001). The turn towards infrastructure does not just represent the changing of the
guard in bicycle advocacy, however. It reflects a sense, however shaped by the racialized
fluxes of people and capital “back” to the city, that the struggle for bicycle space is an
urban struggle.

Advocates now accord a primary role to bicycle infrastructure as a way to shape
new cyclists, not just to make roads safer for existing ones. This means that the production
of infrastructure has a profoundly ethical dimension that is not simply about meeting
demand. Bicycle infrastructure, for advocates, is about creating a new kind of city, via
making new kinds of streets. If the anchor of the social infrastructure of bike culture is the
bicycle—its mechanical properties, the freedom it grants, the ethical life it enables—the
focus of advocacy’s infrastructural turn is the street itself. The street is made into ethical
space through technical innovation.

To summarize, the production of space through gentrification connects the
abstractions of the property market to concrete determinations like transportation
infrastructures and other use-values through dynamics of spatial differentiation and the
geographic division of labor (N. Smith 1984; Lefebvre 1992). Gentrification goes beyond
simply the revalorization of specific parcels to incorporate the creation lifeworlds, laying
claim to space by transforming it (Blomley 1998). The opportunity to do this depends on
the prior devaluation of space, historically dependent on race-classed exploitation and
lack of access to capital. By contrast, the contemporary production of gentrifying space
requires changing the street into a technology that facilitates the lifestyles desired by in-
migrants.5 Advocates have made progress by appealing to valued populations’ preferences
for bicycle infrastructure.

The following argues that the discourse of bicycle infrastructure’s economic
benefits originate with pragmatic arguments made by advocates attempting to ease
business concerns about street changes. Efforts to materialize a daily round that is more
placeful, more convivial, and less alienated by the automobile (Larson 2013; J. Jacobs
1992) intervened at the decisive point for the rent gap: the neighborhood milieu (Hammel
1999).6 Bicycle advocates have pursued “environmental solutions to social problems” by

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5 Some of the forms of life enabled by gentrification may not simply be capitalist consumerism but
prefigurative attempts at different arrangements of life and work; the bike cooperatives discussed in the
previous chapter, for instance, that are ripe with solidaristic possibilities across the gentrifier/victim binary.
The problem, as Rose argues, is that while the patterning of gentrification never simply reflects
unrestrained preference, the process of neighborhood “upgrading” results from the search for environmental
solutions (spatial form) to the social effects of automobility (social process) (D. Rose 1984; Harvey 2000).
Moreover, the spatial practices of these groups discussed above, such as artists, punks and déclassé
intellectuals, as well as the spaces they produce, encode the “gentrification aesthetic” that characterizes
subsequent, more bourgeois, iterations (Danyuk and Ley 2007; Ley 2003).

6 Moreover, operating a bicycle on streets designed solely for car traffic is, for white, middle-class in-
migrants, particularly men, the first experience of the structural oppression that is a daily feature of the
racialized, gendered, and classed city (Susan King 2012). Efforts to address this injustice articulate with the
intervening to transform the built environment to make cycling easier (D. Rose 1984). They have succeeded in claiming their value as economic subjects. The strategic decisions of bicycle advocates to ally with business interests, once fragmented from a broader left politics of the city, developed into a mature narrative of cycling as a necessary component of entrepreneurial competitiveness. The production of a more durable cyclescape, and the business-friendly ideology that goes with it, requires gentrification. Moreover, these efforts have become essential elements of capitalist visions of proper urban life in the 21st century.

San Francisco’s Mission District and the Making of a Bay Area Gentrification Aesthetic

It is perhaps fitting, following Castells, that a movement like Critical Mass and the broader bicycle and livability movement would emerge from San Francisco (Castells 1983). From the freeway revolt of the 1950s to the Mission Coalition Organization (MCO) and struggles against urban renewal, urban movements in San Francisco have, in complicated ways, foregrounded qualities of place in protective actions against untrammeled development. As in Jane Jacobs’ New York, however, winning concessions against the federal bulldozer meant preserving the attractiveness of existing housing stock for “sweat-equity” gentrifiers and speculators alike (P. Hall 1996, 231–5; Fainstein, Fainstein, and Armistead 1983, 222). Nevertheless, movements against “destruction by the forces of progress” in San Francisco preserved vital elements of the city’s left political culture (Walker 1998, 1). It was on this terrain that bicycle advocates operated from a grassroots position, storming the gates of official street planning represented by the Department of Parking and Traffic and allying with insurgents against the political machine of development-friendly mayor Willie Brown.

The years 1997-2003 were a critical period for bicycle advocacy in San Francisco. They spanned: Mayor Brown’s controversial crackdown on Critical Mass in 1997, the ensuing spike in membership in the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition (SFBC), the evaluation of the 1999 “road diet” of Valencia Street spearheaded by the SFBC, and the formation of broad and deep institutional connections between the SFBC and other organizations. These years composed a broader political conjuncture as well. They saw left and progressive forces, which had conquered district elections in 2000, coalesce around Green Party mayoral candidate Matt Gonzalez in 2003. The SFBC played a key role in these efforts, and through the strength of the growing bike movement made itself a formidable political force. In the wake of the embourgeoisment of San Francisco during the 1997-2001 boom, at stake in the electoral contests as well as the streets were competing visions of urban belonging.

These pivotal years witnessed one of the largest property booms in the city’s history, as the super-profits of the dot-com bubble drove rents up 225% between 1996
and 2000 and median home prices to three times the national average by 2002. Despite the spectacular crash that followed, these years permanently aligned the region with the “New Economy” of high-tech and Internet (Walker 2006, 130). The formerly working class South of Market (SOMA) area, now the epicenter of startup culture, pressed southwestward into traditional skid row. The predominantly Latino Mission District experienced a surge of investment in real estate, spurring evictions of non-profits, community organizations, artist groups, and other broadly left entities, as well as thousands of residents (Hartman 2002, 331–6; Anti-Eviction Mapping Project 2014). The Mission was also home to marginal gentrifiers aligned with the bike movement. They worked in a grassroots capacity but without little organizational connection to the neighborhood’s active community groups which were formed in the wake of the MCOs breakup (Castells 1983, 121). The threats the bicycle grassroots faced from development pushed it toward alliances with the broader left, and into strong positions on race and political economy in the gentrifying city (D. Snyder 2001a; Fall 2001; Tube Times 1999; Tube Times 2002b). The successes of SFBC activists in securing changes to Valencia Street, however, which without question improved the quality of life of those with access, pushed them in the opposite direction: towards partnerships with a growing “enlightened” capitalist class. These years also paved the way for the highly paid workers and consumers of the new economic paradigm to congregate in the Mission and “consume [its] authenticity” (Zukin 2008). The Mission is now both the epicenter of struggles over gentrification and the epicenter of San Francisco’s bicycle culture.

This chapter explores the convergence of factors through which the SFBC first intervened in San Francisco’s infrastructure planning, spearheading changes to Valencia Street, a central axis of the Mission. The volunteer-led organization with fewer than 500 members conducted outreach to businesses and community groups on the corridor in the effort to set a “road diet” into motion. A study of the completed project, based on interviews with businesses on Valencia by a San Francisco State master’s student, has become a foundational document of bicycle advocacy. Meanwhile, the SFBC’s partnerships with groups like San Francisco Planning and Urban Research (SPUR), Transportation for Livable Communities, City Car Share, the Sierra Club, and the Green Party, were formed in this period and were decisive for its entry into San Francisco’s institutional politics. I argue that these years represent a key moment in the alignment of bicycle advocacy with processes of gentrification that operate through the transformation of streets into engines of growth. These processes have remade corridors throughout the Bay Area, but have also played a key role in national and global planning. The growth-oriented narrative it spawned has circulated through the advocacy world as a generalized truism put to use in other places. The “Valencia epiphany” is central to the growing infrastructural focus of bicycle advocacy and the professionalization of the SFBC, and has had lasting effects for how the purpose of bicycle infrastructure is interpreted.

In 1995, the San Francisco Department of Parking and Traffic (DPT) released a

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8 A grant from the San Francisco Foundation in 2001 prevented the SFBC from being forced to leave its offices on Market Street (Tube Times 2001b).
draft of the city’s first bicycle plan developed by a group of progressive planning firms.\(^9\) The plan identified key bicycle routes through the city, problem areas, and “attractors and generators” like educational institutions, major employers, and retail corridors (San Francisco Department of Parking and Traffic 1995). It designed a route map, a numbering system, and a prioritization schedule for improvements to these routes. The final plan was released in 1997, and became the base document to which the current plan of 2009 still refers. Politically mobilized cyclists saw the draft plan as incomplete.\(^10\) As advocates made clear during public meetings, the preliminary plan omitted some routes that the burgeoning community of cyclists in San Francisco had already claimed in practice. Valencia Street had become a favored connector for cyclists traveling downtown from the Mission District, which was quickly becoming the hub of the city’s bike scene. Valencia was not identified in the plan for improvements beyond the removal of a median, however. As far as the 1997 plan was concerned, Valencia would remain a busy four-lane street dominated by automobile traffic, but a suggested north-south route for cyclists.

I asked Dave Snyder, who was the director of the SFBC at the time, why Valencia became such a priority when it hadn’t been included in the plan. As he put it, “[Valencia Street] always was a priority, it just wasn’t necessarily reflected in the bike plan because the bike plan at the time was a crock of shit.” He added that few of the bureaucrats in the city’s planning institutions had any experience with bicycle planning as anything beyond an afterthought (D. Snyder 2012a). In light of the plan’s inadequacy, cyclists associated with the SFBC had already begun laying the groundwork for the road diet that would turn Valencia Street into a more livable street. In doing so, they went up against the entrenched practices of the DPT and the Planning Department, which like many such entities throughout the US had prioritized efficient automobile flow through the postwar era. As Jason Henderson has argued, the rigidity of members of the bureaucracy at this point was less based on ideological fealty to the car than to resistance to complicating their work (Henderson 2011, 1142).\(^11\)

Valencia Street’s road diet, which would become the standard-bearer for San Francisco’s bicycle infrastructure, did not appear in the final plan adopted by the city. Notes from outreach meetings published in the draft plan evinced this shortcoming: “Removing median [this had already occurred prior to 1996] on Valencia is not enough. Remove a parking lane,” “Remove one or two motor vehicle lanes on Valencia” and

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\(^9\) Among the other firms operating in association were Stevens and Associates, a smart-growth planning organization, Nelson/Nygaard Consulting Associates, a multi-modal transportation planning firm started by two former San Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI) managers, and HPV (Human-Powered Vehicle) Transportation Consulting, which would again collaborate with WSA on the City of Berkeley bicycle boulevard network. Nelson/Nygaard plays a critical role in streetscape planning today.

\(^10\) Some advocates also criticized the plan’s ignorance of the needs of Latino cyclists, as well as the total omission of the African-American Bayview neighborhood in the plan.

\(^11\) Tom Radulovich, an interview subject of both Henderson and myself, affirmed this interpretation (Radulovich 2012).
“Why not mark a bike lane on Valencia?” According to Mary Brown, a young SFBC staff member at the time, bike lanes had been considered for Valencia Street at the time, but were withdrawn from the city’s general plan to reduce potential obstacles to getting it approved. It was understood that if cyclists wanted bike lanes, the SFBC and affiliated volunteers would conduct the necessary outreach. The bureaucratic strategy of following the path of least resistance in the creation of bicycle infrastructure did not square with the hard political work many bicycle advocates wanted. With municipal actors loath to court political turmoil, the initiative fell to the SFBC.

In this spirit, a parallel planning process began within the nascent bike culture centered in the Mission District, spearheaded by Brown and other volunteers, who began organizing in the winter of 1996 (Brown 2013). As volunteers under the auspices of the SFBC, they put flyers on bikes they saw parked throughout the area to solicit other volunteers, and distributed information at Critical Mass, the only major gathering of cyclists in the city at the time. At this point, Critical Mass was still on the rise, and Brown and nearly all the cyclists she knew participated regularly. In those days, chances were good that she would know nearly any cyclist she encountered on the street, because there were so few riders and it was a very close-knit community. In 1997, Brown was hired by the SFBC as membership coordinator, and was fully committed to the road diet plan, though there was no real model or precedent available to follow. She and volunteers hadn’t done measurements or consulted traffic engineering models; they simply saw that a lane of car traffic had to be removed to make room for bicycles.

It should be recalled that many involved in cycling at the time were artists, punks, bohemians, independent intellectuals, free-lance software engineers, and non-profit workers—marginal gentrifiers, or the “shock troops” of gentrification (D. Rose 1984; Godfrey 1988). The bike culture that Mary Brown recalled was a “young person scene,” outsider, alternative, and white. While it was rich in cultural capital, no credible observer would have claimed that cycling was being encouraged by the city as a proxy for gentrification. She described her fellow cyclists as “environmentally-tinged” people. Few of her friends and housemates worked full-time, and some didn’t work at all because their rent was so cheap. Many worked for local non-profits, which were beginning to be squeezed out of their offices by the dot-com boom. Cycling at this time was “scrappy” and non-professional—Brown recounted with humor needing to borrow a suit for a meeting with a Supervisor—a far cry from the current population of downtown professional-class bike commuters (Brown 2013). At the time, the cultivated cool of

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12 Specific comments were only noted in the report the first time they were made. Moreover, at least one comment about the process discussed the actually-existing diversity of cycling: “There are numerous bicyclists in the Mission District who may have comments but are unaware of the proposal. They are non-English speaking and you should keep this community in mind because they may have special needs.”

13 As noted below, the DPT had limited capacity for bicycle planning; its bicycle program had a staff of three at the time.

14 By the same token, feelings of membership in such a community rely on race-classed notions of identity. It is unlikely that literally all bicycle users in the space of the Mission at the time knew one another or recognized each other as part of the same social world.
Valencia Street’s subculture, a social milieu shaped by creative engagements with space, was only beginning to attract attention from real estate interests.

Brown and her volunteers began conducting outreach and collecting signatures. Their efforts included churches and neighborhood associations, but focused specifically on merchants, who Brown and Snyder worried would be the most recalcitrant parties if not contacted early. Outreach was conducted entirely with SFBC resources and volunteer labor (Drennen 2003). Brown and Snyder reported being surprised at the extent of support from the Mission Merchants’ Association, given that many individual merchants were opposed to changes that could decrease car traffic past their businesses. Some unexpected early signatories were car-oriented businesses, of which there were many at that time on Valencia. She also described a herd effect, in which some businesses did not want to sour relations with their neighbors and fellow merchants by being the first to sign on to an unpopular measure. This drove apparent natural allies like Valencia Cyclery to wait until others had joined in (Brown 2013).

With these efforts in motion, the critical conjuncture came unexpectedly in July 1997. Mayor Willie Brown, calling Critical Mass the “height of arrogance,” moved to discipline the ride, ordering the SFPD to come ready with “hats and bats” (Bodzin 1999). The situation quickly devolved into a police riot. The most memorable image of the melee showed a police officer’s knee holding a middle-aged white woman’s head, complete with bicycle helmet, to the ground. The SFPD arrested 105 participants and impounded dozens of bicycles, though all charges were eventually dropped. This massive show of police force only strengthened the ride and galvanized San Francisco’s bicycle community (see Chapter 2). It also created a political opening that the SFBC, with only about a thousand members at the time, could step into and make claims on behalf of San Francisco cyclists as a whole. Up to that point, the SFBC, which had only two full-time employees, had avoided involvement with Critical Mass, although there was substantial overlap between the two groups. As Snyder put it in retrospect:

This forced the mayor to take bicycling a little more seriously than they [sic] had. We at the Bicycle Coalition didn’t want to have anything to do with Critical Mass, and I thought that we were succeeding in that job because in all of the newspapers, in top-of-the-fold San Francisco Chronicle 3 or 4 days in a row they had an article about Critical Mass and the bike coalition wasn’t mentioned… and a friend of mine says, “Dude, bicycles are getting slammed and you’re not there, you’re getting slammed”…. And so we had an emergency meeting and decided that we would take advantage of all of the attention to spin the message that people are upset because the city actually has a bike plan but they’re not implementing it well, it’s just sitting on the shelf, they’re not taking it seriously. Implement the bike plan”—that was our message. I’d get calls from the media, and they would say, “What do you think about Critical Mass?” and I would say, “People are upset about the bike plan not being implemented, it’s just sitting on the shelf collecting dust, we need to implement the bike plan” (D. Snyder 2012b).15

15 Adam Gubser, head of the DPT’s Bicycle Program, publicly shared this explanation for the anger over cycling issues that Critical Mass represented. Other bicycle advocates were less charitable: in the same Los Angeles Times article, former executive director of the SFBC Darryl Skrabak called Critical Mass “mob rule” (Curtius 1997).
The importance of this turn cannot be overstated. In a 1997 interview with the *San Francisco Chronicle*, Snyder said:

> If it weren't for Critical Mass, I don’t think the politicians would understand the urgency of the issues we've been advocating for years. And if it weren't for us, Critical Mass would just be an amorphous ride causing a lot of trouble with no clear demands (Martin 1997; see Chapter 2).

After this point, however, Critical Mass and the SFBC would slowly but decisively diverge. The former continued its disruptive prefiguration of a people-dominated urban realm, the latter pursued institutionalizing livability planning, framing better physical infrastructure as a way to increase rates of cycling and quality of life.

The way Snyder and the SFBC used the political moment to demand specific infrastructural changes had a direct effect on the fate of Valencia Street. As Brown made clear to me, the push for the road diet wouldn’t come from the DPT, which was somewhat hostile to bicycle infrastructure. At a public meeting in 1997, Bill Maher, head of the DPT, had vowed that there would be bike lanes on Valencia “over my dead body” (Henderson 2013, 121). Instead of the design coming from transportation planners in the DPT, political pressure from the Board of Supervisors was required to shift the DPT’s position. The DPT was not necessarily a monolithic bloc, however. As noted above, there was inertia from the old guard, but there was also limited planning capacity within the DPT for bicycle infrastructure. At the time, the DPT’s Bicycle Program had three staff members (up from one a few years prior) who were young recent graduates of Berkeley and San Francisco State, along with two summer interns (Gubser, Velasco, and Summerell 1998). The program was a recent addition to the Traffic Services department of the DPT, and marginal within the organization. As will become clear later, these years would be critical for strengthening these poles of livability planning within the municipal state by creating connections to experts in other cities and outside the official bureaucracy.

Progressive supervisor Tom Ammiano, president of the Board and allied with supervisors Susan Leal and Jose Medina, championed a resolution to implement the road diet on Valencia Street, based on the SFBC’s outreach. The resolution authorized the construction of bike lanes on Valencia Street on a trial basis, subject to a one-year evaluation (Figure 26). When we talked, Brown wasn’t sure there was any precedent for the flow of planning moving in this direction, in which the city council went against the recommendations of traffic engineers in the DPT. By the same token, there was also little precedent for a bicycle advocacy organization to take up the role of planners, although the Bicycle Advisory Committee in existence since 1993 was a significant repository of knowledge. At a hearing before the Board in 1998, over 100 cyclists, energized and politically organized after the SFPD crackdown, packed the room in support of the road diet. Brown described it as Critical Mass in City Hall (Brown 2013). The resolution was

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16 A member of the BART board of directors reportedly claimed the same thing to East Bay Bicycle Coalition (EBBC) representatives when the system opened in 1972. Bicycle access on BART in 1975 was the EBBC’s first victory.
unanimously adopted in October 1998 (San Francisco Board of Supervisors 1998).

![Diagram of Valencia Street road diet](image)

Figure 26. The Valencia Street “road diet.” Source: Sallaberry 2000.

The resolution affirmed the Board’s support for environmentally sustainable forms of transportation and public safety, both of which the road modification would enhance. It ordered the DPT to submit an evaluation of the trial based on its effect on vehicular traffic, bicycle counts, and pedestrian safety; no land use or public life criteria were included in that mandate (San Francisco Board of Supervisors 1998). In 1999, the new head of the DPT, Stuart Sunshine, declared, “We are extremely pleased by the impact of the Valencia Street bike lanes,” a striking shift for the organization (Shahum 1999b). Radulovich called it the “Valencia Epiphany”:

Peter Strauss, who worked for MUNI for many, many years, described what he called the “Valencia Epiphany,” which occurred within the DPT when they did the first road diet on Valencia Street. And so the prediction was this was going to be terrible for businesses, right? Even though no parking was lost, they were going to lose roadway capacity putting in bike lanes, somehow it was going to be bad for the street, and it was going to be these horrible traffic nightmares, like this is going to be wrenching change, and… nothing happened! It slowly became a better street to bike on, you know, all the businesses were doing fine if not better, and everything just chugged along. So that created this understanding within the MTA that road diet works, and again road diet’s a really cheap thing to do… I think doing it once, and having it work, and having the horrible predictions of disaster not transpire at all, and everyone actually kind of liking it in the end—“You know, actually Valencia’s moving a little slower, oh it's easier for my
customers to get into the parking spots”—of those things. And so when we went to widen the sidewalks on Valencia, we were coming back to a street where that argument had transpired and everyone realized, “Oh yeah, this works” (Radulovich 2012).

The one-year evaluation found that cycling rates increased dramatically on Valencia Street, and all accidents, including those involving cyclists, decreased (Sallaberry 2000). Cycling was measured only on Valencia, not parallel Guerrero, Dolores, Mission, and Van Ness where higher traffic volumes and speeds are present. Resident concerns about increased traffic volumes on Guerrero Street, one block uphill from Valencia, prompted the inclusion of a lower speed limit (to 25 mph) in the final resolution. On the other side of Valencia, Mission Street, with a high concentration of Latino owned businesses and low-income housing, saw an 8% increase in car traffic. The net ongoing result of the Valencia road diet was for Guerrero and Mission to become “sacrifice streets” for cars and transit, respectively (D. Snyder 2012a). At the hearing to confirm the changes to the street, Supervisor Mark Leno declared, “We need to build the whole network” (D. Snyder 2001b).

The reinterpretation of the increase in bicycle traffic on Valencia through the lens of economic benefit thus did not begin with the Sallaberry report for the DPT. Sallaberry’s study did hint at the need for broader evaluation criteria, however; responding to criticism of the Valencia commercial corridor as the bicycle route:

Some people question the choice of routing cyclists along a commercial street with transit and have inquired about the suitability of parallel streets for bike lanes. Valencia Street, even prior to any bicycle facility improvements, is the route chosen by cyclists through the western half of the Mission District. It is the first flat north-south street east of Twin Peaks and provides a direct and easily rideable connection between San Jose Avenue and Market Street. While Valencia Street serves as a major corridor for cyclists, it is also a destination for people wishing to shop, dine, or visit one of the many commercial establishments (Sallaberry 2000, 3).

The study framed Valencia Street as the best choice from a topographical perspective, but emphasized the potential harmony between its roles a cycling corridor and a commercial strip. It also presented bike lanes on Valencia Street as essentially a ratification of the “desire lines” of cyclists who already used the street (Throgmorton and Eckstein 2000). Here the social infrastructure of cycling in the Mission made Valencia the intuitive choice for travel.

Advocates had taken notice of the strong support for the road diet coming from the Mission Merchants Association, however. Celebrating the victory in December 1998, Leah Shahum wrote in the Tube Times: “Bicyclists can’t work alone. We need the support of neighborhood groups, merchants and everyone who has a stake in improving the area” (Shahum 1998). The Bicycle Advisory Committee Annual Report noted the following:

17 The study noted ironically that comparing a single year to the previous five years of data often did not render statistically significant results.

18 It should be noted, however, that as the gentrification of the Mission increases in the contemporary moment, there are efforts underway to “fix” the streetscape of Mission Street as well to make it more pedestrian and bicycle friendly.
Since adding the lanes, bicycle ridership has increased by nearly 2.5 times on this important corridor. Bike lanes often improve the attractiveness and safety of walking in a neighborhood. Local merchants, restaurants, and other commercial establishments often benefit from increased business that bike lanes bring to their neighborhood. The Valencia Street bike lanes, for example, enjoy broad support from many local businesses, including the Mission Merchants Association (San Francisco Bicycle Advisory Committee 2001).

The SFBC honored the Mission Merchants Association at its annual Golden Wheel Awards (then less of a gala and more of an offbeat fundraiser) in 1999, framing livable streets as critical to a corridor’s economic health:

The Mission Merchants Association, an early, strong, and unwavering supporter of the Valencia Street bike lanes, receives our other Golden Wheel honor this year. The Mission Merchants Association serves as a model for other merchant groups in their insistence for safe streets for pedestrians and bicyclists as an important prerequisite for a healthy urban business climate (D. Snyder 1999a).

Moreover, the success of Valencia allowed the SFBC to re-narrate the rationale for conducting a road diet on Polk Street as well, another commercial corridor that advocates had suggested as a bicycle route, which went before the Board of Supervisors in May 1999. Celebrating the implementation of bike lanes on Polk in 2000, then-Program Coordinator wrote in the Tube Times:

While the Polk St. striping is a significant success, it will still take work from supporters to make sure it lives beyond this six-month trial period. If Polk St. follows the success of Valencia St., we should see an increase in bike use, a decrease in injury accidents among all types of road users, and improvements to the overall neighborhood and shopping environment (Shahum 2000a).

The piece quoted cyclist supportive of the changes to the commercial environment: “I would never think about stopping and shopping on Polk St. if I weren't on a bike. I can actually look because I'm on a bike and I go slow enough. I can see a blouse in the window and stop and buy it” (ibid.). With Polk’s lanes more under fire than Valencia’s, the SFBC exhorted cyclists to shop on the corridor and declare their identities as supporters of the changes.

The next logical step was to more straightforwardly claim a positive causal relationship between the improvements and the business climate of the corridor. Another report, conducted by Emily Drennen shortly after the DPT study and released as her MA thesis in Public Policy in 2003, picked up where Sallaberry left off. Drennen treated Valencia Street as a test case for emerging theories of the economic benefits of livable streetscaping, in particular traffic-calming measures. The report cited planners Ian Lockwood and Timothy Stilling of the city of West Palm Beach, FL, who implemented New Urbanist principles to “revive” the city’s “dead” downtown, and claimed a causal role for traffic calming (Drennen 2003). Valencia was the only street in her paper (which included examples from West Palm Beach, FL and Lodi, CA) where traffic calming was done with bike lanes, and where planning had been done by a bicycle advocacy organization.
The language of the study, which resonates with neoliberal commonsense about what makes vital urban space, laid the foundations for future claims. Under the heading of “Economic Revitalization and Property Values,” Drennen argued, “Traffic calming can increase residential and commercial property values, which attracts wealthier residents to the area (gentrification) and can increase retail sales and bring economic revitalization to a commercial corridor” (2003, 7). This sounds a familiar tone for today’s use of livability to stimulate capital accumulation, but at the time congestion concerns dominated discussions of urban traffic and neighborhood vitality. Moreover, bicycling had not been considered a positive contribution to urban space rather than a disruptive menace or simply marginal road users to be ignored. The study suggests that the economic benefits of bicycle infrastructure be considered alongside those of transit-oriented development (TOD) and walkability as part of a complete urban livability strategy. In this paradigm, change agents in urban space are identified not just by traditional markers of social status but by mode choice as well.

The study framed bicycling as an inexpensive transit option that encourages locally based economic activity. In the third point of the study, Drennen noted:

Traffic calming encourages local residents to buy in their own neighborhoods, and also attracts customers from a wider area due to reduced travel time, hassle, and cost. Traffic calming can also help people live less car-dependent lifestyles, which will increase the amount of discretionary income they can spend on things other than transportation” (2003, 7).

Again, this frames the bicycle user as an economic agent whose chosen mobility frees up funds to be spent locally, tying the legitimacy of bicycle infrastructure to the revenue-generating capacity of bicycle-friendly spaces. This argument conflicts with the notion that the bicycle encourages savings on transportation and more frugal living. In practice, part of the income freed from expenditure on automobility is likely to be spent on housing as property values and rents increase. In other words, local businesses may see some increases in sales, but the real beneficiaries are likely to be property owners and developers.

The main goal of the study was to stress the need to allay the concerns of small business owners, making the explicit case that further economic impact studies could assist in community outreach (2003, 4). As Drennen put it to me when we spoke on the phone, “I had seen too many good projects get stopped by merchant groups at the last minute… you need to acknowledge people’s valid concerns from the beginning” (Drennen 2014). She saw her work as a tool to meet merchant concerns head on, instead of ignoring or minimizing them. But the positive outcomes that merchants identified in the study also reflected groundwork done by the SFBC after the road diet was underway. The SFBC had done what Mary Brown called a “post-sell,” a month of outreach after the road diet during which members were encouraged to patronize businesses on Valencia. Advocates sold “bike bucks” to spend at local businesses and urged cyclists to enter shops with a helmet on to demonstrate to proprietors the value of cyclists. This work helped

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19 This is essentially given in neoclassical models of the bid-rent curve.
shape the post-hoc interpretations that merchants held towards the change. Although it is impossible to gauge the extent of their influence, Drennen found that 30% of survey respondents had heard about the road diet from the SFBC, while 56% had heard about it from customers and neighbors. On the whole, 65% of those interviewed reported a positive impact on businesses and would support further road diets; the remainder reported no effect or didn’t know, with less than 5% claiming a negative impact (Drennen 2003, 43–4).

The study had no effect on the city’s official evaluation of the project, but it had a broad impact in the world of bicycle advocacy. Despite a somewhat thin methodology, the Drennen paper would become a convenient anchor. The SFBC’s success on Valencia Street created momentum for further projects like Fell Street in the Haight District and Polk Street adjacent to the Tenderloin (noted above). The impact of the study was slow to build. Mary Brown didn’t recall using the Drennen study for further outreach, but said it was “handy to have.” By this time, she said, the Internet was yielding study after study with similar findings, bolstering the success the SFBC felt. “At the time we didn’t realize how important it would be, but it was held up as a model for road diets. A lot of people from different jurisdictions would come and see it.” The success of Valencia Street, however, was evaluated in the context of a neighborhood that was rapidly gentrifying. Though bicycles retained outsider status, bike culture was an intrinsic element of the culture of early gentrification in the Mission, and would prove important for future understandings of Valencia’s significance.

Making Common Sense

The demonstrative power of the street’s transformation has been surpassed only by the power of the narrative Drennen’s study made possible. The Valencia Street road diet has entered the official discourse of bicycle advocacy, from city bicycle coalitions to national organizations. Valencia produced the discursive terrain on which bicycle advocates increasingly made their claims to mattering for the production of urban space. It did not prove an iron law relating bicycle infrastructure with neighborhood reinvestment and economic vitality, but it shifted discussions of bicycle projects from the ethical to the economic realm. From this perspective, the tenuous evidence and cautious statements of causality of the Drennen study have little importance; their mobility now gives them power (Peck J. and Theodore N. 2010; McCann 2011). The circulation of the study has cemented its credibility, with the gentrification of urban cores in the US a condition that reinforces its claims. The study now appears in literature prepared at the

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20 In one of many similar pieces in *Tube Times* urging support for the Valencia road diet, Leah Shahum wrote, “Help ensure that the new bike lanes (which are a one-year trial) keep working. Let Valencia merchants know that you’re a bicyclist and a customer and that you support the lanes” (Shahum 1999a).

21 As Ward and McCann argue, these kinds of expert circulations are increasingly prevalent in the context of entrepreneurial urbanism (Ward 2011; McCann and Ward 2012b). The prodigious travels of urban planners going back through the 19th century, including the traffic between colony and metropole in planning practice, however, should not be forgotten amid declarations of novelty (Rabinow 1995; P. Hall 1996).
highest levels of bicycle advocacy, by the national group People for Bikes (umbrella organization of the League of American Bicyclists and the Alliance for Biking and Walking), ubiquitous in articles published on Streetsblog and Atlantic Cities, and used throughout the National Bike Summit, the pre-eminent annual political strategy conference of bicycle advocacy.

The Drennen study is now marshaled as evidence throughout the world of advocacy. Its subsequent circulation, however, has eroded the careful wording of Drennen’s conclusions. People for Bikes published the widely circulated handbook Protected Bike Lanes Mean Business in 2013, in which a sidebar claimed that 66% of merchants saw increased sales, despite the fact that Drennen’s study selected a small sample and asked whether merchant perceived changes in business (see Figure 27). On the Smart Growth movement website, under the “Economic Development” category, the Valencia road diet is described as follows: “When a bike lane was added along Valencia Street in San Francisco’s Mission district, nearby businesses saw sales increase by 60 percent, which merchants attributed to increased pedestrian and bicycle activity” (Smart Growth America). The 2013 Bike Summit in Washington, DC, which convenes advocates across the world of bike culture, from policy to planning to community activism, was organized under the theme “Bicycling Means Business.” At the summit, a consultant contracted by the League of American Bicyclists explained to attendees that, “If you’re not speaking traffic safety and economic competitiveness, then forget it” (T. Snyder 2013a). In previous references to the Drennen study, Streetsblog writers had provided a hyperlink to the study itself (Schmitt 2011c), but coverage of the Bike Summit conference simply stated, “On San Francisco’s Valencia Street, two-thirds of the merchants said bike lanes had been good for business” (T. Snyder 2013b). The umbrella group People for Bikes, a joint advocacy venture formed in 2012 between the LAB and the Alliance for Biking and Walking, has pushed the “bikes and business” angle forcefully, consistently returning to the Valencia Street road diet as a coda.

Figure 27. The Drennen study, as cited in the Protected Bike Lanes Mean Business report. Source: People For Bikes 2013, available at: http://www.sfbike.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/Protected_Bike_Lanes_Mean_Business.pdf. Planning materials for Telegraph Avenue used an identical image (see Chapter 5).
While John Patton, Oakland’s Bicycle and Pedestrian Program manager, said he did not use the Drennen study in his own outreach work in Oakland, he concurred that the economic role of bicycle infrastructure was now common sense among planners:

[It] was one of the early [studies of the economic benefits of bicycle facilities], and so it circulated a lot, and then Valencia went through this massive transformation, and how much of that is the cause or the effect of the road diet, who knows? Because things were simply changing. And I think that if you already believe the argument you don’t really care that maybe San Francisco is or isn’t different from everywhere else (Patton 2014).

When I spoke to Drennen on the phone, she was unaware of the power of the report. I told her it was ubiquitous in the bicycle advocacy world and she affirmed that ubiquity had been her goal: to create a document that would circulate and make future planning efforts easier. Her intent had not been to sell bicycle infrastructure as a gentrification strategy, however, and she shared concerns about the state of the bike movement on this score.

Clearly, the study played a strategic role in the politics of bicycle advocacy at a time when it was hard to believe that decreasing car traffic could benefit a commercial district economically. The SFBC’s original goal in the road diet, moreover, was not to promote local businesses or prove the economic value of cyclists. When I talked to Snyder he didn’t recall claiming that bicycles could increase traffic to local businesses at the time, although Brown confirmed making that argument on occasion. However, Snyder expressed to me what was in 1997 an emerging understanding of the potential role bicycles could play in economic revitalization:

You know, you don’t gain anything by people driving by really fast, you have a much more likely chance that someone’s going to stop and shop if traffic goes more slowly. And, not to mention the bicycle riders that might be customers. That was a harder argument to make back then, but… So I guess we did make that argument but we didn’t talk about how it was going to transform the economy. I think the bigger impact was the sidewalk widening, frankly (D. Snyder 2012a).22

At the time that the SFBC conducted the outreach for the road diet, they were motivated by a commitment to pushing for better and more appropriate bicycle infrastructure. Within this context, economic claims were largely a pragmatic strategy.23 In the broader world of livability advocacy, most notably led by SPUR, the creation of a new economic paradigm was key. In 2001, Frankie Lee of SPUR declared the Valencia road diet proof

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22 This conversation took place at a parklet on Valencia Street in front of the wildly successful boutique café Four Barrel, next to a bike lane full of cyclists streaming by, even in the cold wind. Most importantly, Snyder and I were speaking in the present, after nearly ten years of consistent discourse about the economic benefit of bicycle infrastructure, and he was responding to my question as to whether during outreach fifteen years prior they had made the economic argument so common now.

23 As Rich Newlands, current head of bicycle planning at the Portland Bureau of Transportation (PBOT), pointed out to me with reference to North Williams Street in Portland, dense commercial corridors are commonly too politically difficult to retrofit with bicycle infrastructure—in Portland, only North Williams has been, and it has provoked political strife (Newlands 2012). The fact that in each city the only bike lanes installed on commercial strips are located in rapidly-gentrifying—with an accompanying massive influx of whites—areas undergoing rapid business turnover may be a phenomenon other than coincidence.
that, “If you build them, we will come” (D. Snyder 2001b).

According to Snyder, however, few people involved in bicycle advocacy in 1997 anticipated the extent of the gentrification the next few years would see. Still less was it conceivable that gentrification could be related to bicycle infrastructure. Brown recalled considering the possibility that the changes to the street could spur gentrification, but she didn’t think bicycles could drive the process. When she arrived in San Francisco in 1994, Valencia Street had already been changing. Fears of gentrification were growing, but to her it wasn’t a big topic. “The changes snowballed in the late ‘90s. It felt like a train” (Brown 2013). One of the most visible manifestations of gentrification, in fact, was the luxury car. A flyer produced by Kevin Keating, the sole “member” of the Mission Yuppie Eradication Project (MYEP) and a self-described “déclassé white” who moved to the Mission in the 1980s, reflected the situation. The flyer encouraged vandalism of the luxury cars parked outside the new restaurants and clubs that were springing up on Mission and Valencia streets. It proclaimed, “MAKE THE MISSION A SPORT-UTILITY VEHICLE FREE ZONE. NOT ONE YUPPIE VEHICLE SHOULD BE SAFE ON THE STREETS OF THE MISSION!” (Keating 1999).

This was not the statement of a broad-based political movement against gentrification, but it was symptomatic of how gentrifiers became visible within the space of the Mission: by luxury car, not bicycle. The dot-com nouveaux riches displayed their ownership over space by taking over the median on Valencia near 16th Street as car parking (Centner 2008). They were not yet moving to the Mission, as they would a
decade later—they were driving there, and they hadn’t yet seized on the bicycle as cool. Within this context, a push for bicycle infrastructure, while it may have caused concerns about parking, congestion, and traffic spillover onto adjacent streets, was not seen as serving gentrifiers.

The boom set the stage for a continued round of reinvestment on Valencia Street through the 2000s, transforming it from a working-class corridor with a Latino character and a strong lesbian subculture to one of the most rapidly gentrifying areas in San Francisco, festooned with chic cafes, restaurants and bars. In the six census tracts that comprise the Valencia corridor, the estimated population of residents with a bachelor’s degree or higher more than doubled to 56% between 1990 and 2013. Despite the boom, median incomes in these tracts have stagnated for all but white households, who are now the plurality at 46%. Meanwhile, the estimated percentage of households earning over $200,000 (in 2013 inflation-adjusted dollars) more than doubled to nearly 15% since 2000 (see Figure 28 & Table 4.1).

Table 4.1. Demographic and occupational change along Valencia Street, 1990-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>32,762</td>
<td>34,977</td>
<td>32,757</td>
<td>33,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>41,051</td>
<td>43,691</td>
<td>40,333</td>
<td>41,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Housing Units</td>
<td>13,093</td>
<td>14,421</td>
<td>16,334</td>
<td>15,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancy Rate</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter-Occupied Units</td>
<td>87.9%</td>
<td>86.2%</td>
<td>81.2%</td>
<td>79.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons per Unit</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/finance/management/professional occupations</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degree or higher</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
<td>56.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households over $200,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median household income</td>
<td>$46,470</td>
<td>$62,976</td>
<td>$69,452</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median white household income</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$74,021</td>
<td>$103,366</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commute</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycle</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walk</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census (1990,2000), American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (2009-2013); tracts 201, 202, 207, 208, 209, 2010 (see Fig. 28).

Valencia Street now sits proudly at the center of the transformation of the Mission into the “hottest neighborhood for residential real estate” (Marie 2013), a race-class reconfiguration still underway (Figure 29). Formerly low Mission rents have risen nearly to
the astonishing citywide median of $3200 per month (Kuchar 2014). By 2013, talk of San Francisco’s “affordability crisis” dominated the press as gentrification has now strongly hit the middle class, putting housing costs far out of the reach of teachers, firefighters, and other decently paid segments of the workforce (Keats and Fowler 2012; Metcalf 2013; Metcalf 2014). According to the real estate site Trulia, the median home sale price between mid-April and mid-July 2014 in the Mission was well over $900,000. While the Mission is by no means the most expensive neighborhood in the city, its meteoric rise as a center of cool and a real estate hotspot attracts well deserved attention.


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In addition to its role as a metonym for San Francisco’s gentrification, Valencia Street is now at the center of the city’s bicycle culture (Figure 30). The number of cyclists passing 17th and Valencia at peak time nearly doubled from 2006 to 2011, compared to an estimated 71% in the city as a whole over the same period (San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency 2012). Over 120 new bike parking racks have been installed on Valencia since 2000, including ten in-street corrals since 2010, and eleven new bike shops have located on Valencia or within 5 blocks since 1999.25 A “green wave” of traffic signals timed to 13 miles per hour, installed in 2011, slows traffic flow to bicycle speeds. At peak commute times the bike lanes are routinely full. The SFBC now boasts over 12,000 dues-paying members and holds a permanent seat at the planning table. Its membership is concentrated in politically progressive and rapidly gentrifying areas of the city, with low membership numbers in the poorer outer neighborhoods to which working class people of color are mostly relegated. If San Francisco, with the Mission District as its centerpiece, has earned a consistent place near the top of the hierarchy of bicycle-friendly

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American cities, a nearly recession-proof property market has cemented its reputation as one of the most expensive.

It is important to recall that the successes of Valencia Street in many ways superseded the planning of other corridors nearby that were not prioritized by politically active cyclists. César Chavez Street, at the southern end of the Mission and perpendicular to Valencia, travels east from the Mission before passing beneath a harrowing tangle of freeway interchanges, aptly named the “Hairball,” to join the Bayshore Freeway (US-101). East of there, between the Bayshore and the John F. Foran Freeway (I-280, serving Silicon Valley), the street enters an industrial area before re-emerging east of I-280 into the Dogpatch, a gentrifying cluster of converted warehouses at the formerly industrial waterfront. The 1996 Bicycle Plan identified César Chavez Street as a priority corridor and the Hairball an especially dangerous site, and bicycle advocates were well aware of its harrowing nature. Valencia, however, which was not slated for improvement in the 1996 plan, received attention because of the politically engaged cyclists living in the Mission and already using it.

Improvements to César Chavez, which divides the gentrifying neighborhoods of the Mission, Mission Bay, and Dogpatch from the politically isolated African-American neighborhood of the Bayview, did not warrant the same efforts. As Snyder put it to me, “I bet you could find a lot of people of color trying to navigate their way through that. You could get a lot more people who live and work between those neighborhoods to ride bikes if you made that safe.” Until relatively recently, though, bicycle advocates did not prioritize the Bayview District, though there were periodic outreach efforts throughout the 2000s. The changes to César Chavez envisioned by the 1996 plan were finally implemented in 2013, nearly twenty years later, with local community organizations putting strong pressure on the city to make the street safer (Bialick 2014a). In 2012, the SFBC began partnerships with People Organized to Win Employment Rights (POWER) and People Organizing to Demand Environmental and Economic Justice (PODER) to conduct bike builds and giveaways in the Bayview, led by new hire Chema Hernandez Gil, community organizer and national notable in bicycle equity planning. When he and I spoke, there was hope that these efforts would contribute build a cooperative bike shop. The district continues to be politically marginalized and cut off by freeways, however, hanging on the precipice of gentrification and hemorrhaging its black population.

My argument is not that cynical bicycle advocates have intentionally ignored under-served areas in favor of projects that serve gentrifying neighborhoods and put bicycling in the public eye. More complicated processes are at work. The development of bicycle infrastructure was pushed by the grassroots efforts of people for whom safe cycling is of paramount importance. In car-dependent, low-income neighborhoods of color like the Bayview, where activists are more concerned about police brutality, unemployment, discrimination, and disinvestment, this tone often falls on deaf ears unless incorporated into a broader, place-based program of justice and empowerment (Herrera 2014). “Trickle-out” bicycle infrastructure provision, focused on normative notions of the commuter cyclist, tends to mirror “trickle-down” processes of gentrification, producing a nodal geography of investment (Maskovsky 2006; Lees 2008).
Through these dynamics, gentrification has become a normalized aspect of San Francisco’s social geography. Gentrification, framed as the natural working of the market, is granted a libertarian cast that elides the role of the state, especially the Ellis Act’s circumvention of tenants’ rights and the increased policing of the Mission since the late 1990s (Mirabal 2009). Furthermore, it is celebrated outright as a reflection of grassroots initiative. C.W. Nevius, conservative columnist with the *San Francisco Chronicle*, compared the current real estate market to the “Manhattanization” wave of the 1970s: “The difference this time is that the push is coming from the bottom up. Rather than fat-cat developers promoting ugly skyscrapers, the demand is coming from young techies who work here or in the Silicon Valley and want to preserve the feel of unique neighborhoods” (Nevius 2013). This aesthetic parsing of “good” and “bad” gentrification confuses spatial form and social process. Nevertheless, it betrays how the aesthetics adopted by marginal gentrifiers, much like Jacobs’ critiques of modernist planning, are now gentrification’s mainstream spatial forms.

The notion that gentrification and displacement are inevitable and that the most any actors can do is plan for it, following Mark Fisher, is a form of “gentrification realism” (Fisher 2009; see also Marcuse 1985). This ideological move reaches contradictory heights when economic dynamism of the kind San Francisco is currently experiencing fails to translate into redistributive or even trickle-down benefits to the poor and working class. There is an element of truth to celebrations of gentrification’s molecular processes, however. They are now necessary elements in a time when large-scale urban renewal has become so thoroughly delegitimized. This extends to practices of mobility as well; turning the tide of automobility comes to appear as a project of a grassroots to make the city better. In 2011, Nevius abandoned his typical animosity towards cyclists, shocking readers by arguing, “Bikes are the future. We need to do a better job of dealing with it” (Nevius 2011). His justification rested on portraying cycling as a mainstream activity of the urban middle class, and an essential part of the cosmopolitan city of the future, while sparing no venom for Critical Mass. It is, indeed, a major ideological victory for bicycle advocates to have conquered the reactionary editorial pages of the *Chronicle*. The mainstream, however, is so thoroughly imbued with gentrification realism that, for cyclists, winning its acceptance may be a step backward on issues of justice.

It should not come as a surprise that the mainstreaming of cycling is tied to spatial transformations that enable the mobility of valued populations in key neighborhoods of the city. With the suburban ideal rejected by the new bourgeoisie, a new urban vision has displaced it. A sanitized version of the city, constructed from a pastiche of European references and saturated with a localist romanticism inherited from Jacobs, with a dash of Lower East Side grit, relies on the juxtaposition of remaining ethnic businesses with new boutiques, restaurants, art galleries and cafes, revealing the “fantasy city” of the contemporary urbanite (Hannigan 1998; Mele 2000). This potent combination is purchased at an ever-rising cost. Writers like *Salon.com* founder David Talbot who lament the homogenization of San Francisco are often themselves of the gentrifying class, affiliated with the IT and social media industry, and politically disconnected from on-the-
ground struggles against gentrification. Furthermore, it can be convincingly argued that much of the social base from which resistance to gentrification might come has been pushed out of the area.

Rather than seeing the ubiquitous claims about the economic benefits of bicycle infrastructure as tendential, overstating the far more modest arguments of Drennen and other advocates, we might instead understand them as cementing a discourse that no longer requires a referent. Bicycle infrastructure provision and gentrification have become so intertwined that parsing causality is no longer necessary. The two are entangled in a reflexive process through which localized improvements to the public realm spur rising housing prices, attracting new residents who push for more improvements. Arguments for the economic benefits of bicycle infrastructure connect claims made by bicycle advocates toward policymakers (who are most concerned with the economic impact of any initiative) with urban boosters like Richard Florida, who frames bicycle infrastructure as necessary to attract a high-value labor force (Florida 2011). These are not exactly circulations of “fast policy” of the kind detailed by Peck and Theodore (2010), though the insistent refrain that bicycle infrastructure benefits business has clear policy entailments. They instead constitute what we might call “fast ideology”: a ready-made, mayor-friendly set of claims to progressive legitimacy perfectly suited to allaying the concerns of business districts about roadway changes. They have become the bread and butter of bicycle advocacy’s entry into the mainstream of urban growth politics.

The “Valencia Epiphany” and the Building of an Orthodoxy

Closer to home, the success of Valencia Street consolidated the SFBC’s role as a representative of cyclists’ interests and led the organization to collaborate with others in a new wave of infrastructural innovation in San Francisco. The circumstances that allowed bicycle advocates to take such a central role in the production of space were not historically given but politically contingent. They depended on an articulation of interests between bicycle advocates pursuing infrastructural improvements, other organizations working toward livability planning goals, a group of progressive politicians, and elements of city leadership hoping to stimulate reinvestment. Most importantly, success in a few corridors gave the SFBC the opportunity to build alliances, but it did not eliminate political obstacles overnight.

The most immediate alliances the SFBC made were with progressive supervisors like Leslie Katz, Mark Leno, Sophie Maxwell and José Medina, who were broadly aligned against the Democratic political machine helmed by Willie Brown. Leno in particular, representing the 5th District including the Castro, Noe Valley, and the wealthier western edge of the Mission, was an early ally. In 1999, the SFBC became a 501(c)(4) organization, which permitted lobbying and official political endorsements, and waded into electoral politics, working hard to re-elect Leno in the recently reinstated
district election system (D. Snyder 1999b; Shahum 2000c; Tube Times 2000b). The new cohort of progressive supervisors led to alliances with Chris Daly, Matt Gonzalez, Aaron Peskin, and Gerardo Sandoval. Bike to Work Day in May 2001 even saw Mayor Brown astride a bike on his way to City Hall (Tube Times 2001c). In 2003, the SFBC was part of a broad, motley, cultural-left coalition supporting Gonzalez’s mayoral bid against Brown’s handpicked successor Gavin Newsom. Gonzalez came within a hair’s breadth of winning, though outspent 5 to 1, in a contest that shook the centrist regime to its core (Wildermuth 2003). In these years, as Dave Snyder put it, the question of the bicycle in San Francisco shifted “from ‘What if?’ to ‘How soon?’” (D. Snyder 2001c). In the interregnum of left disarray following Gonzalez’s narrow defeat, alliances formed around livability would continue growing in strength, though increasingly unmoored from a broader social justice alliance.

Elections in 1999 also brought changes to the structure of planning in San Francisco. Proposition E, a charter amendment to consolidate the DPT and Muni into one organization, the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA), passed by a 22-point margin, with strong support from Rescue Muni and the SFBC (City and County of San Francisco 2015b). The creation of the SFMTA brought the city’s transportation planning under one roof, though the two wings remained organizationally isolated (Radulovich 2004). The newly constituted SFMTA became a powerful seat of progressive planning expertise in the following years, producing figures like Ed Reiskin who would go on to become key figures in national and global livability planning networks. In these years, the SFBC also actively began making extra-local connections in the bicycle advocacy world, sending staff to Amsterdam and global cycling conference Velo Mondial in Montreal in 2000 (Tube Times 2000a; Shahum 2000b; D. Snyder 2000). 2001 marked the first National Bike Summit in Washington D.C., which convened 200 local advocates from throughout the US, along with congressional bicycle advocates like Oregon’s Earl Blumenauer and Jim Oberstar of Minnesota, to share strategy and expertise (Tube Times 2001b). The traffic between the SFMTA and these national and global networks of expertise, brokered in part by the SFBC, would continue to grow over the first decade of the 20th century.

These years also cemented the SFBC’s position within a growing network of progressive planning non-profit organizations and the foundations who funded this work. The link between the SFBC and SPUR, the region’s pre- eminent progressive-capitalist planning think-tank for over fifty years, and originally the creation of the Blyth-Zellerbach Committee (Hartman 2002, 10–11), was the first and tightest. In 2001, the SFBC formed a sister organization, Transportation for a Livable City (TLC, later shortened to Livable City), to work on broader land use issues. In 2002 Gabriel Metcalf of SPUR wrote TLC’s mission statement and Dave Snyder became its executive director.

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26 Evincing their growing alliance, in 2001 Leno invited an SFBC representative to the San Francisco Small Business Summit to provide a counterpoint to merchant narratives of the need for parking (Tube Times 2001a).

27 This would be repeated with Leah Shahum’s 7-month sabbatical in Amsterdam in 2010, after which she wrote, “It’s not often that you get to take your idea of utopia out for a test ride” (Shahum 2011).
followed by BART board member Tom Radulovich in 2004. The SFBC, SPUR, Walk SF, City Car Share (of which the SFBC was a fiscal sponsor), Congress for New Urbanism, the Housing Action Coalition, and Bridge Housing, among others, were all brought into alignment around TLC. TLC received funding from the Evelyn and Walter Haas, Jr. Fund, the Hellman Foundation, the Lane Family Charitable Trust, the Rose Foundation, and the San Francisco Foundation. This network became a main pole of attraction for progressive planning in San Francisco.

The most serious challenge faced by advocates came, ironically, from local implementation of state environmental law. Under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), any local projects deemed to have potentially “significant impact” trigger an environmental impact review (EIR), a monumental undertaking that significantly increased planning costs. Under planning conventions not written into law, level of service (LOS) downgrading was sufficient to trigger an EIR, even if the modifications facilitated an increase in persons passing a given point in the roadway via other modes and could lead to fewer net auto trips (San Francisco Bicycle Advisory Committee 2001). By 2003, it was already clear that for San Francisco to implement its “transit first” policy goals (on the books but unenforced since 1973) LOS would have to change (San Francisco County Transportation Authority 2003). In 2005, an already delayed update of the 1995 Bicycle Plan was rushed before the Board of Supervisors and quickly approved. In the updated plan were a number of recommendations, including on-street parking removal, lane reductions, and more shared-lane markings (“sharrows”). The revised plan also asserted that San Francisco’s use of unmodified level of service (LOS) guidelines directly contradicted transit-first guidelines (see Henderson, 2013 for a thorough analysis of this period).

The populist, if not exactly popular, reaction was led in the name of a return to car-centric planning as representing the will of the majority. Local political gadfly Rob Anderson, filing under the name Coalition for Adequate Review (or CAR), appealed the City’s decision, arguing that the Board of Supervisors had illegally exempted the bicycle plan from a complete environmental impact review (EIR) mandated under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Anderson held that an EIR was necessary to determine whether expanding bicycle facilities in the public right of way would delay cars, creating congestion that would lead to higher emissions. He argued that the “general rule exemption” called for by the revised plan violated state law, because it did not examine LOS impacts to corridors receiving bicycle treatments. California Superior Court Judge James Warren concurred, signing an injunction in 2006 against any new infrastructure in the public right of way, with the exception of “easily reversible” projects, pending a full EIR of the bike plan (Gordon and Tucker 2010). This stalled implementation of an additional 34 miles of bikeways until 2010, when the injunction was lifted following an exhaustive 1,300 page EIR, at the cost of $1 million and lasting over two years (Roth 2008).

28 To this support was added an additional grant of $226,000 from the California Department of Transportation for the SFBC to conduct outreach for the additional components of the bike plan that remained to be implemented (Tube Times 2002a; D. Snyder 2002b).
While the use of legislation governing EIRs to block changes to the transportation status quo was not new, Anderson’s prolific writing on the topic makes it clear that his anger about what bicycling represents—an effort to shift the priorities of roadway configuration away from car dominance—had motivated the suit:

In San Francisco riding bikes has become something of a sacrosanct, Politically Correct issue, even though few of us actually ride bikes. The reality is that the bike zealots aren’t accustomed to having any political opposition. Hence, they’ve become arrogant, and, in their arrogance, they have badly overreached here. You shouldn’t let them get away with it. It’s bad policy, bad government, and, in the long run, it’s bad politics, since future political opponents in your districts will rightly use this issue against you if you vote to give this small, arrogant, politically aggressive minority a blank check on city policy by enshrining their dangerous hobby in the city’s General Plan (R. Anderson 2005).

Clearly, concern over personal delays for auto drivers, not air quality per se, combined with a strong dose of antipathy towards cyclists, spurred the legal effort. More importantly, the way that cycling emerged as representative of politicized cyclists with specific spatial requirements put cycling on the city’s agenda, setting in motion efforts to reconfigure the technology of the street as a more hospitable space for non-drivers (Henderson 2013).

The significance of this period is not limited to the “bike-lash” that stalled much-needed infrastructure (Applebaum et al. 2011). Also important was the equation of bicycle advocacy with infrastructure, which was solidified during the injunction. At the same time, the importance of reversibility in projects pursued during the injunction should not be underestimated. Given the city’s inability to even stripe new bike lanes, let alone shift curbs or install more permanent infrastructure, bicycle advocates focused on innovation and collaboration, building even broader support for livability planning within city government, the private sector, and non-profit affiliates.

In 2002, the SFBC had formed the Market Street Committee with a $275,000 grant from the San Francisco County Transportation Authority (SFCTA) (chaired by Supervisor Daly) to develop designs for remaking Market Street as a less car-dependent corridor (Switzky and Shahum 2002). Key members of the committee were the SFBC, SPUR, the Market Street Association, the Green Party, Walk SF, and TLC. The result was the Market Street Study Action Plan, which elaborated a transit-, pedestrian-, and bicycle-oriented future for the corridor, with technical support from Fehr and Peers and rising bicycle planners Alta Planning + Design (San Francisco County Transportation Authority 2004). These efforts formed the basis for continued collaborations during the injunction.

One such collaboration was the Great Streets Project, which joined the SFBC, TLC, the Project for Public Spaces, and SPUR alongside the Department of Public Works in pursuing the “return of our city’s streets to their rightful place as the center of civic life in this wonderful city by working with government, business, and neighborhood leaders to test, analyze and institutionalize placemaking” (San Francisco Department of Public Works 2007). Project participants invited two heavyweights in the world of contemporary urbanism: Gil Peñalosa and Janette Sadik-Khan. Peñalosa, brother of
superstar Bogotá mayor Enrique Peñalosa, administered the massive expansion of Bogotá’s bike network during his tenure as Commissioner of Parks. Sadik-Khan, New York City Department of Transportation commissioner under Mayor Bloomberg, presided over the previously unthinkable explosion of bicycle infrastructure in New York over the past decade. These two revered practitioners brought expertise on how to accomplish these feats and shaped the missions of organizations working within San Francisco.29

Bringing in outside expertise was about more than just star power. The Great Streets Project brought in staff from other municipalities to discuss design practices with San Francisco elected officials and planners. Tom Radulovich, executive director of Livable City (which runs Sunday Streets) and current president of the BART Board of Directors, was a key participant. I visited their office at 5th and Market, a homey 14th-floor space with bikes parked inside and an entire shelf of The Death and Life of Great American Cities in the meeting room. As we talked about the project and the making of livable streets in San Francisco more generally, Radulovich reflected on the principle of the project:

The idea was to bring people who’ve done this to talk to department heads and say, “You can do this,” and, “I live in your world, I don’t live in the world of the advocates”—they all think that we’re pretty much totally unrealistic and we just don’t get how the city works—“We’re your people, and we’ll tell you how to do it” (Radulovich 2012).

Realism in planning practice, in this framing, comes neither from hierarchical mandates nor political ferment from below, but horizontally, from planners of other cities squeezed between stubborn car-oriented design standards and vocal livability advocates. Realism, however, implies working within the epistemic boundaries of the neoliberal city, emphasizing flexible, low-cost, business-friendly solutions to create a more attractive urban milieu.

From 2005 to 2009, the GSP developed streetscape plans for major corridors in San Francisco’s core: Market Street, Valencia Street, Divisadero Street, Balboa Street, Polk Street, Van Ness Avenue, and San Bruno Avenue, among others. Working within the constraints of the injunction, planners focused on pedestrian improvements and beautification rather than altering the public right of way, soliciting input through surveys and public meetings. On rapidly gentrifying Divisadero Street in the historically working class Western Addition (also known as NoPa, or North of the Panhandle, in real estate slang), tree planting, median greening, streetlight upgrades, public art, and bus stop bulbouts were high on the list of priorities (San Francisco Department of Public Works 2007). No bicycle infrastructure was mentioned on the distributed survey, because it had already been planned through the 2004 update of the 1997 bicycle plan and was awaiting an EIR. The 2005 to 2009 period focused on redesigning the components of the street, mainly beautification and reducing bus congestion by consolidating stops, not changing their relationship.

29 The SFBC’s “Connecting the City” campaign adopted the “8 to 80” age-based measure of infrastructural effectiveness, the namesake of the 8-80 Cities organization, of which Peñalosa is the executive director.
In 2009, Kit Hodge, who would later be deputy director of the SFBC, was named the head of the Great Streets Project, and design implementation began. The implementation phase, which lasted from 2009 to 2011, streetscaped several corridors with federal grants allocated under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). Its most notable project was the creation of a pilot plaza at 17th and Castro streets, in the heart of the gay Castro District. Market Street received trial bicycle treatments, and the Sunday Streets and parklet programs expanded. Improvements also included another lane reduction on Valencia, which widened the sidewalks between 15th and 19th Streets, installed custom lighting, bike racks, unique sidewalk designs, and street furniture (San Francisco Department of Public Works 2010). The return to Valencia Street was fitting, given the role it played in shifting institutional discourse regarding street design. The groundwork for the GSP, which converted key streets into laboratories of new planning practice, was thus laid by the SFBC, and solidified by a narrative of its success that blended enhanced safety with economic improvement.

The GSP wound up its operations in 2012, after completing changes to roughly a dozen corridors and, more importantly, institutionalizing organizational connections that would be critical to further changes to the city’s streets. The project website announced its conclusion with the following:

When the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition began the Great Streets Project back in 2009, San Francisco was a frustrating place for those of us wanting to make our streets safer and more enjoyable. Three years later we are celebrating dramatic improvements to bicycling, walking and transit on Market Street through permanent car restrictions at Sixth and 10th streets, a handful of wonderful new street plazas, dozens of well-loved parklets (and many more planned), and the prospect of a much-expanded Sunday Streets program. Perhaps less obviously, we’re also celebrating a City administration that feels inspired and empowered, more than ever, to find innovative ways to create great streets, and many new, unlikely allies in our quest to realize the potential of our streets as great places. Today, businesses and business groups are some of the loudest advocates for investing in creative improvements to our public realm. This is truly a new era! (San Francisco Great Streets Project 2012).

The organizational changes initiated by the Great Streets Project formed an emergent commonsense regarding what the technology of the street is for. The alignment of the SFBC with SPUR, what Henderson calls its “progressive-neoliberal hybridization” (2013) was key to these efforts to pioneer market-oriented urban design. This should be seen as another form of the production of space: creating new institutional spaces that shift the boundaries of planning practice in San Francisco. As Radulovich put it:

Somewhere between 2006 and 2008 it just tipped... It's kind of funny, at some point you realize, 'Oh wow, we won.' You won in the sense that you won the argument. It doesn't necessarily mean you won meaning the world's changed, because those codes and all that institutional stuff changes really slowly, it's super conservative. And that's why you need to

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30 SAFETEA-LU was the successor to the 1991 ISTEA, and set aside $244 billion for bicycle, pedestrian, and transit projects.
be a code activist, you need to get into those codes, get into that body of practice, and say, “Let's change that, and let's deinstitutionalize all this understanding,” because otherwise you have a worldview that's here but then what's encoded is the prior worldview (Radulovich 2012).

The GSP was thus a forum for rendering concrete the circulation of this “new worldview”—it was a mode of winning an argument with an entrenched science of car-centric planning.

It also aided what Radulovich called the “infiltration” of the city’s planning bureaucracy by livability advocates. For Dave Snyder, the 2011 naming of pro-bike Ed Reiskin as head of the MTA was a major turning point in moving the agency away from its earlier hostility to—and dismissal of—bicycle improvements. Cheryl Brinkman, former director of Livable City and involved in the SFBC, was appointed to the MTA board in 2010 and elected Vice-Chairman in 2012. The SFBC continued to contribute staff to the MTA thereafter. Through the efforts of the SFBC, Livable City and other advocacy organizations, San Francisco’s planning apparatus had been drawn into a global network of innovation in urban form, loosening the grip of core practices still in place from the era of high modernism and auto-centricity. This loosening enabled previously marginalized planning practices to proliferate in the interstices of the orthodoxy, until it “tipped” in their favor.

As a temporary collaboration between municipal offices and non-profit organizations, moreover, the GSP also revealed a great deal about the limits of the institutionalization of “tactical urbanism” (Lydon et al. 2011, 2012). As Radulovich put it:

It fed perfectly into the Newsom approach to public policy, which is everything should be short-term, a pilot, and send out the press release, the glossy photos… the Newsom administration was never really interested in institutional change either” (Radulovich 2012).

This hostility toward irreversible changes that initiate the institutional machinery (especially environmental review) required to actually remake streets speaks to the contradictions of contemporary urban theory and practice. “Tactical urbanism” absorbs the neoliberal logic of flexibility and reframes it as a virtue. While its methods can be traced to the radical “space-hacking” politics of Parking Day and Critical Mass, its incorporation into official planning practice merely forestalls the real thoroughgoing changes that a just city would require. Moreover, it represents the gentrification of insurgent urbanism: the extra-legal interventions in urban space that achieve traction as public policy are practiced not by subaltern populations but the “dominated fraction of the dominant class” (Bourdieu 1984).

Conclusion

31 As Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore and Eugene McCann have argued, these kinds of horizontal networks of knowledge transmission are increasingly common in the world of urban policy, especially with competitively allocated federal funds, and cities have been forced to learn by doing in order to determine what kinds of endeavors will bring in resources (Peck J. and Theodore N. 2010; McCann 2011).

32 This is true even apart from the concrete conditions of the injunction, which required reversibility.
Valencia Street was a touchstone for a new phase of bicycle advocacy, produced by the overdetermined intersection of the political rupture created by Critical Mass, its agile reinterpretation by the SFBC, and the political context of a progressive takeover of the city council that shook San Francisco’s power structure. By the end of the first decade of the 2000s, a growing institutional network placed the SFBC in a position to participate in sweeping changes to San Francisco’s central thoroughfare: Market Street. Market Street brought the ambitions of livability advocates into line with the most prized target of the city’s development machine (Hartman 2002). Shifts within the SFBC and its relationships to other organizations, particularly SPUR, enabled it to pursue these converging interests with vigor in what Henderson calls its “progressive-neoliberal hybridization” (2013). Pent-up by the injunction and the glacial speed of the planning process, the burst of cycling energy has synchronized with a new wave of urban growth helmed by a city leadership that recognizes the value of livability for leveraging accumulation. The Better Market Street project, discussed in Chapter 1, is the latest iteration of a long sequence of attempts to reconfigure the technology of the street. “Livability” acts as a point of connection between advocates’ interests in more expansive use-values and city leaders’ interests in increasing exchange-values. It also blurs advocacy between these two faces of urban space.

A comparison to an earlier moment of planning intervention in the Mission is illustrative of the shifts this period set in motion. The federal Model Cities Program, instituted in the 1960s in the wake of the devastation wrought by urban renewal, was designed to elicit greater citizen participation than preceding waves of planning. In 1966, due to grassroots mobilizations by the Mission Council on Redevelopment (MCOR) and a narrow victory before the Board of Supervisors, an urban renewal proposal for the Mission District was defeated. In 1968, Mayor Joseph Alioto responded with a proposal for Model Cities Program to redevelop the Mission with citizen participation. The Mission Coalition Organization (MCO) was formed to organize citizen input; as in other cities, it articulated with other fractions of the popular defensive struggle against urban renewal, including outgrowths of the MCOR, to become much more than what was intended. According to Castells, though the MCO dissolved after a brief period of action, it successfully defended the district from destructive investment, and laid down a political culture that resisted development pressures from outside while promoting household renovations and Latino small businesses (the Calle 24 Merchants Association was formed in this period). There was some measure of room within this space for small-scale “sweat equity” gentrification by Anglos as well (Castells 1983, 109–37). Based on Latino popular struggles in the Mission and middle-class gay politics in the Castro, Castells makes a more general claim about the preservation of “neighborhood quality” as a driving force in San Francisco’s neighborhood anti-development politics.

What do we make of the Valencia epiphany in light of this history? On one hand, it is significant that Valencia was not the Mission’s “main street”; it was neither old main drag of Mission Street nor the Latino cultural hearth of 24th. Valencia was a mixed-use corridor one block off of Mission, with auto service stations, furniture stores, small shops, and many vacant storefronts. It was also what the Los Angeles Times called “America’s only
lesbian neighborhood” (Roderick 1991). As Castells argues, because of the political formation of the Mission District against large-scale development, “the settlement of young middle class couples or even of lesbian households did not meet with open hostility, as long as they fitted into the neighbourhood, collaborated on its upgrading and got along well with the predominant Latino culture” (1983, 133).

The efforts of bicycle advocates, from a consciously grassroots position, to transform Valencia Street did not overtly extend to changing its character, despite representing an emerging Anglo-dominated social bloc settling within the Mission. It was recognizably based within a community—though not neither working class nor Latino—articulating a vision of quality of life that did not include large-scale development or displacement. In Jane Jacobs’ terms, the residents these efforts mobilized and constituted as a political entity did not represent “cataclysmic money” (J. Jacobs 1992). Because many Latino residents of the area used bicycles on a regular basis, it was also possible to frame bike lanes as in the general interest of the neighborhood as a whole, framed as a community.

On the other hand, as Miranda Joseph argues, the naming of community as apart from the workings of capital obscures the way that they are connected (2002). While she contends (in a Derridean frame) that community is the necessary supplement to capital that also exceeds it, the foregoing analysis stresses instead how the spatial practices by which social formations are constituted articulate with capital in complicated and unstable ways. The forms of community-making the SFBC pursued around livability after initial successes on Valencia Street did not simply place it in the camp of capital. Instead, it formed alliances with other elements—capitalists included—searching for a “transition urbanism” (Mason and Whitehead 2012) that worked to mobilize support for reasonable infill development within the existing urban fabric. These alliances with capital did not “destroy community,” they articulated together fragments of the social formation surrounding cycling and livability more broadly to embark on new practices of city-building.

The success of bicycle advocates in framing bicycle infrastructure as the general interest has not been universal. In 2013, a nasty struggle broke out between a group of Polk Street merchants and the SFBC regarding the street’s configuration. Polk’s anti-bike merchants, aligned under the name Save Polk Street, represented mainly older businesses who had weathered grinding commercial decline in the 1980s and 1990s, and who reacted in terror at the idea of any loss of parking on the corridor. They allied with

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33 There is no extant evidence that the Mission Anti-Displacement Coalition, for instance, formed in the late 1990s to counter the dot-com onslaught, regarded bicycle advocates with any suspicion. To the contrary, there are trace accounts of anti-displacement activists, including Latinos, used bicycles themselves (Selig 2005; Gin 2007).

34 As noted above, comments on early drafts of the 1997 Bicycle Plan indicated that while many working class Latinos used bicycles, their interests as cyclists were potentially unknown because they were not represented on the advisory committee or in the planning process.

35 As noted above, between Valencia and Polk, the latter was always the more tenuous of the two, and more vulnerable to merchant counteroffensives.
local senior citizens, for whom cycling held little interest and who had accepted a framing of cyclists as dangerous scofflaws. At a public meeting in May 2013, I watched opponents of a road diet openly accuse MTA staff of acting as an extension of the SFBC, showing their views of the SFBC as the official orthodoxy and their localist distrust of citywide agencies. Meanwhile, the SFBC and allied businesses on the corridor formed Folks for Polk, which put forward arguments similar to those made regarding Valencia Street. Save Polk Street, and parking advocates more generally, have successfully framed themselves as populists defending local values against the city juggernaut, now ironically represented by the bicycle coalition.

The fate of Polk is still to be decided. Battles that appeared “won” at the discursive level are still very much alive. If anything, the success of bicycle advocates at partially changing some streets has intensified the bicycle’s role as a “dense transfer point” where wider ideological positions converge to contest its meaning (Foucault 1978, 100). In this sense, the contradictions of the “Valencia epiphany” are not simply given by gentrification. Neither has gentrification simply been “bike-washed.” Instead, a condensation of conflicts over place, economy, and meaning, shot through with race-class and intergenerational tensions, is refracted through decisions about the purpose of the street itself.
Chapter 5: The Generalization of the “Epiphany” and Blocked Transformations in North Oakland

If the rhythms of economic growth and bicycle advocacy first synchronized for contingent reasons in the planning of Valencia Street, the past decade saw its lessons solidify into a powerful new orthodoxy. A new, more extensive boom in the region has surged far beyond San Francisco’s borders, permeating Oakland across the bay and reaching areas untouched in the previous cycle. With the gentrification of the Mission and surrounding neighborhoods now mature, Oakland’s comparative affordability and accessibility attracts large numbers of artists, young professionals, and tech workers. This fuels speculation that Oakland is poised to steal San Francisco’s creative thunder (S. Jones and Chanoff 2012a), and even Oakland’s tech startup scene attracts attention as the leading edge of an industry vulnerable to its own successes (Grady 2014; Said 2012). Planned transit-oriented developments at the MacArthur and Lake Merritt BART stations, each with significant bicycle infrastructure components, anchor development throughout Oakland’s downtown and wealthier northern neighborhoods. From this base of strength, growth has extended into historically troubled neighborhoods of West Oakland and Fruitvale and San Antonio in East Oakland (see Chapter 1).

Oakland has seen an explosion in bicycle use, with bicycle commuting increasing 150% since 2000 and a reported 73% 2010-2011, a rate placing it among the fastest-growing US cities (League of American Bicyclists 2012). In December 2007, the Oakland City Council adopted a renewed and updated bicycle master plan, and the city has added 54 miles of bicycle facilities (34 of them bike lanes) between 2004 and 2014. Bike East Bay (formerly the East Bay Bicycle Coalition, or EBBC) has seen a spike in membership, exceeding 4,000 in November 2012 from well under 2,000 just a few years prior. Armed with increasing numbers and the now commonsense association of bike culture with urban revitalization, advocacy groups like Bike East Bay and Walk Oakland Bike Oakland (WOBO) have made significant political gains. Like the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition (SFBC) in 1998, these organizations have intervened in the planning process and built allies in city government, steering infrastructure toward core membership areas and critical commute routes.

This chapter focuses on the struggle to transform Telegraph Avenue, North Oakland’s central corridor, into a more livable street, amid rapid gentrification in some areas and an ongoing social crisis in others. The uneven production of the cyclescape in Oakland reveals deep race-classed cleavages stretching back to the wreckage wrought by redlining and urban renewal (Jackson 1987; Self 2003; Freund 2010). The resurgence of

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1 These figures are derived from the American Community Survey 1-year estimates, and at small geographies are necessarily less reliable than the full decadal Census, which no longer asks about commuting patterns.
Oakland’s livable core, primarily north and west of Lake Merritt, proceeds apace with the deep and ongoing crisis of East Oakland, where little of the infrastructural support for gentrification has been implemented. The contradictory aims of livability are, to put it bluntly, visited upon historically black spaces. Oakland is in this way a place with a unique confluence of factors. At the periphery of the most superheated property market in the United States, home to a once-prosperous homeowning black middle class and a leading edge of postwar black radicalism, it is now a rising star in the bicycle world. Its transformation raises important questions about how progressive efforts to transform cities into more livable places become entangled with histories of racialized dispossession. Infrastructural change is a key dimension of this history of dispossession.

Telegraph Avenue, passing through a North Oakland riven by a sharp color line that was reinforced by the CA-24 freeway, is both an arterial and a commercial strip, with nodes of intense reinvestment and swaths of relative disinvestment alike. West of the freeway, fitful gentrification overtakes historically middle-class black neighborhoods shielded from previous booms by race-class and geographic obstacles. In the neighborhoods to the east, a well-established, mainly white and Asian professional population has solidified the gains made during the previous dot-com boom. Along Telegraph, Oakland’s troubled past and putative future are interwoven, and a key thread of this fabric is mobility. How Oakland has been sliced up by infrastructure, along lines of race and class, matters for understanding the social history of spaces within which bike culture is now flowering. It also demonstrates how infrastructural investment articulates with processes of social transformation. Urban space is not a container for race and class, but a dynamic milieu that shapes how race and class are lived.

Racialized Infrastructural Spaces

The production of Oakland’s cyclescape must be situated within a broader dialectic of economic growth and infrastructural change. Unlike San Francisco, Oakland was not spared during the midcentury freeway-building boom. North and West Oakland became a virtual infrastructural dumping ground. Like many cities of the North and West, a surge of employment in shipbuilding, warehousing, and manufacturing spurred by World War II drew large numbers of black workers from the American south to the East Bay. The “flatlands” of West Oakland, received the most in-migrants. There, the Southern Pacific and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters had helped to create a homeowning black proletariat and professional class in the early 20th century. Their descendants formed the political and social anchor of the neighborhood, whose belle époque came and went with World War II. Yet, by the 1970s Oakland was gutted by industrial relocation, racist governance, suburbanization, and destructive freeway construction.

Between the 1950s and the 1970s, black West Oakland’s advantageous position,

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2 This cleavage registers both statistically and socially, as bicycle users deep in East Oakland effectively do not share space with cycling’s dominant formations rooted in Oakland’s core and its advocacy community.

3 Neither, for that matter, was San Francisco’s largest working class black neighborhood, the Bayview, next to the Hunter’s Point Shipyard in the city’s southeast corner.
at a critical transport juncture between the East Bay and San Francisco, was converted into infrastructural suffering (Self 2003, 150). The construction of the Nimitz, Cypress, and Grove Shafter freeways carved up the neighborhood, destroyed thousands of homes, and separated West Oakland from the rest of the city. Freeway construction neatly mapped onto the racialized lending boundary created by the 1937 Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) map of Oakland (T-RACES website), and reinforced the color line with dead zones of concrete where houses once stood. The BART system, built to solidify downtown San Francisco’s financial district by facilitating commutes from the suburbs of the East Bay, blasted through 7th Street, West Oakland’s commercial heart. The decline and segregation of West Oakland increased. Struggles for inclusion were fought in large part through the politics of infrastructure, which formed a key part of West Oakland’s black radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s (Perry 1971; Sun Reporter 1979; Self 2003; J. a. Rodriguez 1999). As in the Mission District and many other cities across the country, extra-state organizations like the West Oakland Planning Council politicized the “community participation” requirements of the Model Cities program in West Oakland, rendering community an active political formation produced through attempts to shape development, instead of a governmental category (Rhomberg 2004; Roy, Schrader, and Crane 2014).

The political vitality of this period could not long stall the depredations of deindustrialization, disinvestment, and suburbanization, however. Abandonment had extended beyond redlining boundaries as legal discrimination ended in 1963 with the passage of the Rumford Act. The urban renewal period, however, set the stage for the transformations now underway, however. Transportation corridors created lasting patterns of racialized disinvestment based largely on the political vulnerability and economic marginalization of African-American residents. These disinvested zones are now a major source of the rent gap critical to gentrification, as well as the ideological justification for its necessity (N. Smith 1996). By the same token, freeway construction cut off moderately underinvested neighborhoods, Temescal chief among them, from the crisis of the rest of the flats. Temescal would become one of the first neighborhoods in Oakland to experience “organic” reinvestment—without a large community mobilization (as in Fruitvale) or city-led development (as in Uptown and Jack London Square). In this respect, Temescal is a key example of the observable tendency for gentrification to first hit moderately disinvested areas, leaving the deepest portions of the rent gap to persist long into the process of gentrification (Hammel 1999; Lees, Slater, and Wyly 2007).

The 1977 election of Lionel Wilson, Oakland’s first black mayor, did little to stem the difficulties the city faced. In response to ongoing outmigration, city development efforts led by Wilson and successive black political regimes focused on revitalizing the

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4 Similarly, southeast San Francisco’s Bayview neighborhood, a black stronghold from the days of wartime shipbuilding at Hunter’s Point Shipyard, was cut off in the 1960s by the Bayshore and Interstate 280 freeways, while the western half of the city was spared by the conservative freeway revolt. In Portland, Oregon, black residents of North Portland still cite the construction of Interstate 5, during the period of “urban renewal” that ravaged a once relatively prosperous neighborhood, as a defining moment in the infrastructural politics of racism (Letson 2012).
central business district, which had lost both its large commercial tenants like Kahn’s and its white civic elites like the Knowland and Kaiser families (Rhomberg 2004, 183–6). From the mayoralty of Elihu Harris through that of Jerry Brown from 1999-2006, City Hall focused on the needs of downtown business and real estate interests, channeling funds through the Oakland Redevelopment Agency (ORA). While the Harris regime focused on new office construction and midday commercial districts for downtown workers, Brown’s “10K” plan sought to attract new residents to downtown through new-build developments and loft conversions. “Jerryfication” meant the pursuit of a New Urbanist “elegantly dense Ecopolis” constructed mainly on the basis of downtown’s accessibility to BART. This placed explicit economic value on the mass transit-riding professional, and barely concealed the whiteness of the desired subjects of urban revitalization, eliciting strong opposition from community groups like Causa Justa/Just Cause, which was formed at this time (Salazar 2006). As noted in Chapter 1, however, reconfiguring mobility was not meaningfully on the urban growth agenda.5

Postwar spatial divisions persist today, and are given new significance by black outmigration and gentrification. In 1980, Oakland’s black population peaked at 47%, and has been in decline ever since. The 1990s economic boom spurred middle-class people of color to move to the suburbs in increasing numbers. By 2010, whites, African Americans, Asians, and Latinos each comprised roughly a quarter of the city’s population, with the number of whites rising rapidly. While white, middle class bastions in the foothills persisted throughout the 20th century, in-migration to the flatlands has create solid white majorities in South Berkeley and North Oakland east of the Grove Shafter Freeway. Since the 1990s, white renters and homebuyers have even made inroads into areas of historically high black homeownership west of the freeway, especially near BART stations with access to San Francisco. This accelerated after the 2008 crisis, as foreclosures ravaged the area. The Lake Merritt apartment district was never fully disinvested and is currently undergoing piecemeal gentrification, while its eastern portion, settled by Southeast Asian outmigrants from Chinatown, is an important horizon of reinvestment. To the east, Fruitvale is a thriving Latino neighborhood with an uncertain future. Recent investment in affordable housing and commercial development surrounding its BART station has made it more attractive to early gentrifiers, as housing prices rise and job growth in downtown Oakland makes it a more viable location to commute from. Deep East Oakland, however, with miles of modest working class bungalows abandoned by the white proletariat in the 1950s and 1960s, remains solidly majority-black, increasingly cut off from the rest of Oakland, and plagued by continued deindustrialization, job loss, and crime (Figure 31).

5 BRT was proposed as early as 2001, but the planning process did not ramp up until the late 2000s.
The changes Oakland is currently experiencing are thoroughgoing. Strongholds of black social life like West Oakland and the Longfellow neighborhood were destroyed by the 2008 financial crisis, which dispossessed African American homeowners of prime real estate. As of October 2011, large investors owned 42% of Oakland’s over 10,000 completed foreclosures, concentrated almost exclusively in majority-black neighborhoods (Steve King 2012). The housing boom has seized and remade these former African American strongholds that the freeways and BART devalued. With median home prices in San Francisco over $1 million, and monthly rents shooting past $3,000 (Levy and Levy 2014; Pender 2014), North Oakland offers a relatively affordable alternative, especially for young professionals seeking homes for purchase, and more marginal areas attract artists, punks, and déclassé intellectuals. The flow of capital and middle class whites back into the area has not reversed racialized patterns of devaluation in the built environment as much as taken advantage of them.

Not without significance did these latter populations, where cultural ferment articulates with radical politics, participate vigorously in the explosive social struggle of Occupy Oakland, which made unsteady though productive alliances with longstanding traditions of Bay Area radicalism stretching back through the Black Panther Party to the interwar radicalism deeply rooted in West Oakland’s proletarian character.
Telegraph Avenue is the spine of Oakland’s celebrated “rebirth.” It runs just to the east of the Grove-Shafter Freeway through a bungalow district that was never quite disinvested after WWII. New condo development, spurred by Brown’s “10K” plan, lines Telegraph and Broadway in the Uptown area just north of downtown’s nightlife revival, with two BART stations at close range. Uptown anchors a thriving arts scene, which began with the illegal but licit Art Murmur gathering that now attracts thousands of visitors every month. The Koreatown-Northgate (KONO) business improvement district champions a slower-to-gentrify zone just to the north, sandwiched between an automobile district on Broadway, a hospital cluster stretching northward from MacArthur Boulevard to the east of Telegraph, and the Grove-Shafter Freeway. North of MacArthur, Telegraph enters the former Italian neighborhood of Temescal, with its booming commercial center of eateries, cafes, boutiques, and a few remaining businesses from earlier years. Temescal’s single-family bungalows now command median prices of $900,000, having already rebounded far beyond their pre-crash peak in 2007. Between the redevelopment of MacArthur BART and two new buildings soon to be built in Temescal, the area stands to add over 800 new housing units in the near future.

Telegraph remains a significant divider of social space, even beyond where the freeway veers eastward to pass under the Oakland hills. Census tracts along the east side of Telegraph from Uptown to the Berkeley border have been consistently majority-white, professionally-employed strongholds throughout the postwar era. Since 1990, real median household incomes in these neighborhoods have increased by 20%, and the percentage of residents with a college education or higher by 40% (Table 5.1 & Figure 32). While Temescal was seriously affected by the construction of the Grove Shafter Freeway, which demolished the corridor’s northernmost strip and disrupted business for several years, it never experienced the levels of disinvestment or segregation that other areas did. The two census tracts that form the core of the neighborhood never dipped below 40% white even in 1980, while median household income has more than doubled in real terms since then to nearly $60,000.

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7 Data retrieved from http://www.trulia.com/real_estate/Temescal-Oakland/7971/ (accessed May 7, 2015). This is more than double the inflation-adjusted median price in 2000, and at an average of $700 per square foot nearly triple that year’s figure. Note however that this figure is for only six sales. Inflation calculated using the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Calculator (http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm).

8 The MacArthur Transit Village plan for MacArthur BART does include roughly 20% below market rate housing, but is coinciding with and intensifying a property boom in the surrounding neighborhoods, and affordability thresholds are calibrated to countywide median income— at $65,000, roughly double that of the surrounding census tracts, whose residents stand to be displaced by increasing housing costs. Data from www.hud.gov.

9 Despite relatively greater social power, the Italian-American residents of Temescal west of Grove Street were unsuccessful in their struggle to prevent the freeway. However, because it followed a decommissioned railroad grade for a large part of its path, the freeway destroyed fewer houses in its pass east through the district (Norman 2006).

10 Census tracts 4011 and 4012. The 1960 Census, with very different tract outlines, showed the median family income in the core tract of the neighborhood (OK000900) to be roughly $50,000 in 2013 dollars, with the median falling somewhere between $47,000 and $53,000. Professionals, managers, clerical
workers, craftsmen, and foremen made up roughly half of the working population (U.S. Census Bureau 1960). There is no simple way to relate these figures to current tracts, but they give a general sense of neighborhood composition.
Table 2.1: Demographic and occupational change along Telegraph Avenue & Martin Luther King Jr. Way, 1990-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Walk</th>
<th>Bike</th>
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<tr>
<td>Median Household Income</td>
<td>$55,437</td>
<td>$47,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Household Income</td>
<td>$33,216</td>
<td>$35,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households over $200,000</td>
<td>V/N</td>
<td>V/N</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degree or higher</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/finance management &amp; professional</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons per unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Renter-occupied units</td>
<td>69.8%</td>
<td>83.1%</td>
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<td>Owner-occupied units</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant units</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied housing units</td>
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<th>MLK Telegraph</th>
<th>MLK Telegraph</th>
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More striking have been the changes to the historically black, middle-class
Longfellow and Hoover-Foster neighborhoods just to the west, across the freeway. While
the first dot-com boom of the late 1990s spurred a rise in Temescal housing prices, no
such price movement was seen west of the freeway. After 2008, however, these
neighborhoods saw steadily climbing home values, with median prices approaching half a
million dollars. Since 1990, the percentage of white residents in the census tracts west of
the freeway has nearly doubled to 28% while the black population has dipped below 50%
for the first time since World War II. The number of college-educated residents has more
than doubled from 18% to 42%, and the gap in median household income between non-
Hispanic whites and others has grown since 2000. At over $66,000 per year in 2013
dollars, white median household income in the area west of the Grove-Shafter is now
more than double that of neighboring African-American households, which have
dropped in real terms since 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau 2013c).

Within a North Oakland characterized by racialized socioeconomic flux, the
bicycle has taken hold. With easy access to BART, downtown Oakland, and the
University of California, North Oakland more generally sees substantially higher rates of
bicycle commuting than other parts of Oakland. The 2008-2013 5-year ACS showed
roughly 1,700 employed residents representing 7.9% of the working population of North
Oakland (and the southernmost edge of Berkeley) commuting to work by bicycle, up 62%
from the 2000 Census (though gains were relatively flat between 1990 and 2000). These
eños and their surroundings represent the bulk of the gains that have propelled
Oakland to 6th in the US in bicycle commute mode share (League of American Bicyclists
2012). Bicycle counts on Telegraph, the area’s busiest cycling arterial, recorded 1,200
riders daily in 2011, while in 2008 a survey conducted by BART found 7500 weekday
users of the North and West Oakland stations, and the ZIP code through which the
corridor passes has the highest Bike East Bay membership density in the region
(Community Design + Architecture and Fehr & Peers 2014; BART Marketing and
Research Department 2008; East Bay Bicycle Coalition 2013a). This part of Oakland is
just dense enough that different neighborhoods are easily connected by bicycle, but not so
dense that bicycles are difficult to store or mass transit is more practical. This spatial form
undoubtedly shapes possibilities for bicycle use, but does not determine them.

Here, diverse populations use bicycles, but they are unevenly represented in

11 During the collapse of the housing market in 2008, gales of foreclosure swept through these areas. Here,
where many long-term residents owned their homes outright, homeowners of color were targeted for
home equity lines of credit; others still with mortgages often refinanced (Reid 2010). While the foreclosure
rates in these areas pale in comparison to the ravaging of deep East Oakland, the Longfellow and Hoover-
Foster neighborhoods stick out among their surroundings.
12 Census tracts 4005, 4006, 4007, 4010, and 4014.
13 Census tracts 4002, 4003, 4004, 4005, 4006, 4007, 4010, 4011, 4012, 4239.01, 4239.02, and 4240.01.
14 Moreover, the freeway network, combined with the branching lattice pattern of Oakland’s historical
development as a streetcar city, creates no simple solution for installing relatively direct bikeways parallel
to busy arterials. Bicycle infrastructure planners have been forced to take on some of the busiest, most
well-traveled streets, chief among them Telegraph Avenue.
advocacy. While non-Hispanic whites make up just over 30% of the residents of areas along Telegraph Avenue, only 13% of 323 respondents to a Bike East Bay survey about bicycling conditions on Telegraph identified themselves as people of color. Just over a third were members of Bike East Bay. Just 24 (7.4%) both identified as people of color and reported living within a few blocks of Telegraph (East Bay Bicycle Coalition 2013b). While Oakland does not stand out in this regard, Bike East Bay has served as a key point of contact between cyclists and the planning process on the corridor. In other words, bicycle users recognized as political subjects of the planning process reflect neither the diversity of the corridor nor the diversity of actual cyclists in the area.

*The Oakland Bikeways Campaign*

As in San Francisco, bicycle and pedestrian advocates in Oakland have played key roles in building the institutional infrastructure of livability planning. The timing and substance of the conjunctural moments of the process have differed significantly however. In San Francisco, the city’s first bicycle plan became an object of political struggle, quite by accident, due to the complicated interaction between the Mayor’s Office, the Department of Parking and Traffic, the SFBC, and Critical Mass. Advocates took the opportunity to construct knowledge about the relationship between bicycle infrastructure and urban political economy. In Oakland, a consensus formed much later, and was located in the relationship between the Department of Public Works and advocacy organizations like the EBBC and WOBO. This does not mean that there was no popular base, however circumscribed by race-class, from which the EBBC and WOBO drew. Nor does it mean that advocacy organizations were smoothly integrated into the planning apparatus; Jason Patton, head of Oakland’s Bicycle Facilities Program, recalled strong tensions between the city and the EBBC in the early 2000s (Patton 2013).

Instead, shifts in priority appear to have come from the formation of organizations that explicitly linked investments in livability with an economic development agenda for the city. The interplay between WOBO, begun more explicitly in the interest of livability and urban revitalization, and the EBBC, which at the time of WOBO’s founding remained a more traditional bicycle advocacy organization in what Patton referred to as the “watchdog” rather than “social movement” model,15 WOBO emerged from efforts of a group of neighbors in the Harrison Street area just northeast of downtown Oakland to shape a planned Whole Foods into a more walkable development (McCamy 2010a). From its start, WOBO was more engaged with the intersections of mobility and land use, and drew expertise from the broader non-profit world as well as from marketing and real estate. When we spoke, WOBO board member Jonathan Bair called himself “the last capitalist in Oakland” (Bair 2014). While the SFBC began as part of the broader left, and was in part pushed into economic claims for pragmatic reasons, the EBBC-WOBO

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15 Adam Shapiro of the Spoke Cyclery cited the “modernization” of the East Bay Bicycle Coalition—hiring Renee Rivera as Executive Director, shedding its “old white guy” advocacy culture, and allying with newer, more urban-focused WOBO—as key to its renewed relevance (A. Shapiro 2013). Fittingly, in early 2014 the EBBC “rebranded,” becoming Bike East Bay.
alliance began on well-established terrain that ideologically linked economic growth and non-motorized mobility. The adventures of the WOBO-Bike East Bay alliance in Temescal, however, reveals the limitations of the economic discourse on its own when countering long-established class interests who perceive their power as dependent on automobility.

Within the context of a changing Oakland, these advocates work the front lines of the planning process. The role played by Bike East Bay bears resemblances to that of Mary Brown and the nascent SFBC: tapping mobilized members and the wider bike culture in the interest of better street designs and more proactive outreach to businesses, often in advance of the city’s implementation of the infrastructure itself. They engage community organizations and merchant groups with a sophisticated discourse of the benefits of bicycle infrastructure, now produced by a wide array of non-profit organizations and consulting firms operating on a national scale. As in planning efforts on Valencia Street, cyclists’ participation in planning mobilizes affective ties to the neighborhoods they live in, even if they are quite recent in-migrants.

Bike East Bay is a membership-driven organization like the SFBC, but it represents cyclists in 33 municipalities rather than just one city. Its actual geographic footprint is similarly uneven within the East Bay though. Until the 2000s, the center of gravity of membership was Berkeley, with its base of progressive professionals and students. As membership density migrates southward to Oakland, Bike East Bay has followed, relocating in 2013 to an office in the Jack London Square district of downtown. Though Oakland’s bicycle mode share remains lower than Berkeley’s, its share has grown faster and in raw numbers it has drawn even.16 With this shift, Oakland has become a key area of focus for advocacy, and, much like the SFBC, Bike East Bay has engaged in the planning process beyond traditional lobbying and advisory roles. Without allying with an entity like SPUR, however, Bike East Bay and WOBO have successfully forwarded a discourse of livability framed as economic growth, and benefit from the strength of the broader economistic discourse spearheaded by bicycle advocates nationally.

In 2013, Bike East Bay and WOBO launched a new phase of the Oakland Bikeways Campaign, prioritizing three particularly difficult corridors: Telegraph Avenue between Highway 24 and downtown Oakland; 14th Street, which cuts through the heart of downtown between West Oakland and Lake Merritt; and Park Boulevard, which joins the wealthy Oakland Hills with the gentrifying eastern end of the lake. All three corridors were included in the 2007 bike plan as possible candidates for road diets. The goal, according to Bike East Bay’s Outreach Coordinator Dave Campbell, was to work ahead of implementation and present the Oakland Bicycle Facilities Department with comprehensive street plans generated through mobilized member input. In the kickoff meeting for the bikeways campaign, which also circulated an online survey via social media and the Bike East Bay website, Campbell affirmed that the further out in front of the process cyclists could get and the more comprehensive the plans submitted, the better

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16 The 2000 Census showed 3,071 bicycle commuters (5.6%) in Berkeley and 2,085 (1.2%) in Oakland, while the 2013 5-Year ACS estimated 4,680 (8.6%) and 4,679 (2.6%), respectively.
the result would be. These efforts proceeded in collaboration with Fehr & Peers and Community Design & Architecture, who produced the official streetscape proposal for the city, but preceded their existing conditions studies as well.

During the SFBC’s studies in preparation for the Valencia Street road diet, volunteers simply decided a travel lane should be removed without performing measurements or traffic assessments. Mary Brown recalled just doing sketches on paper. 15 years later, Bike East Bay brought greater technical expertise to bear in its efforts, with volunteers contributing GIS and computer-aided design (CAD) skills. Bike East Bay also turned the solicitation of member input into a social ride in which volunteers mapped street conditions, identified hazards, shared experiences, and debated designs for various street segments. In a sense, these practices mobilized cyclists in a citizen mapping project that created plans for cycling using bicycles, making the bicycle a tool of planning. Of course, this raises questions of what kinds of cyclists have access to the planning process in this way, what corridors receive this kind of focused attention, and why.

I participated in planning rides on all three corridors with a group of a dozen or so other volunteers and several Bike East Bay staff. On each ride, we surveyed the street, noting existing conditions, choke points, danger zones, opportunities to change traffic flow, and existing uses—especially businesses—that could pose obstacles. Armed with large-scale site maps from the city’s planning department and collective experience riding the street, we embarked on two-hour journeys on each corridor. Each ride ended at an eatery where, over a beer, we drew up the designs we envisioned during the ride on the maps.

The first ride surveyed Park Boulevard, a high-speed, hilly thoroughfare through the streetcar suburbs just east of Lake Merritt. Park Boulevard connects the low-income, predominantly Asian but rapidly gentrifying East Lake neighborhood to the bourgeois enclave of Montclair in the Oakland Hills, and is bisected by a freeway that neatly cleaves the project area by race and class. The following week’s ride surveyed 14th Street through downtown Oakland, an important cross-town connector from Lake Merritt through the newly thriving downtown to the edge of West Oakland. To bicycle advocates, a road diet on 14th, which passes directly by City Hall, would also make a statement about Oakland as a bicycle city. The final ride took us on Telegraph Avenue through the Temescal district and ending in Uptown.

In each case, the goal was to stitch together three different corridors into one coordinated project, and to work out best practices for problem intersections based on member input. In this respect, we were planning a coordinated bikeway network after a coordinated bikeway network had technically already been planned. While Bike East Bay staff made it clear that twenty people on a given ride weren’t going to dictate the redesign of the street, we did play some role in shaping how Bike East Bay pursued bicycle projects on these streets, based on our experiences as cyclists coming from specific race-classed subject positions.

17 Including UC Berkeley geography department undergraduates.
The subject of race and gentrification did not come up during the rides themselves, which focused on the technical characteristics of the street. When we settled in for lunch after the Park Boulevard ride, however, and members of the group asked me about my research, all manner of comments emerged. I explained contemporary debates surrounding gentrification and bicycle infrastructure, and awaited hostile reactions. Instead, these advocates, almost all of them white, wanted to talk about race, class, and bicycle infrastructure. A Bike East Bay member said that as a longtime Oakland cyclist he felt he saw all social groups represented out on the streets, but then noted that only one of us present was not white and middle-class. One woman recalled that while we stood at the busy intersection of Park and East 18th, an African-American man in a truck shouted, “You bicyclists are going to have to find another place to ride.” She reflected on this specifically in light of my discussion of the controversies in Portland and the question of who feels ownership over a space.

One volunteer said he agreed there was a link between bicycle infrastructure and gentrification, and expressed discomfort at the position that bicycle coalitions have been forced to take, putting themselves on the side of neighborhood associations organized around reinvestment. Coming out on the side of gentrification made him wonder if he should also be doing work towards affordable housing to offset it. On the Park Boulevard ride, we agreed that the city-led streetscaping project on the southwest side of the lake and the Lake Merritt BART station transit-oriented development plan would improve access to downtown from the neighborhoods east of the lake beginning to gentrify, but we did not reflect on our role in this process. On the 14th Street ride, I again assumed I would offend advocates with my research interests, but instead found others with similar misgivings about aligning bicycle infrastructure with racialized urban change. Again, however, I found myself around a table with mostly white advocates, a fact hardly lost on anybody there. The most immediate issue at stake on the 14th Street ride, however, was the adamant opposition of Chinatown merchants to striping lanes through the formal boundaries of the district, which was a streetscaping feature sought in the Lake Merritt BART station renovation design. Ironically, as Dave Campbell put it, their concerns were not about gentrification, but were instead based on the perception that cyclists were poor and undesirable.

On the 14th Street ride the social difference between cyclist-planners and bicycle users became clear. As we rode, I noted many cyclists on utilitarian machines and unadorned with the recognizable gear of the dedicated commuter. Many of them were people of color. Many used the sidewalk, and few wore helmets. One, a white man in his fifties on a non-descript mountain bike, riding helmetless while gesturing with a beer, exclaimed, “What’s with the helmets? If you drink enough beer you can’t get hurt!” Later in the ride, along busy Franklin St., an elderly Asian woman crossing 14th in the

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18 I include this comment not for the sake of mockery but to point out that this was once a stereotype of the urban bike rider, but has been superseded by the bourgeois commuter and the hipster on a fixie. These are all cyclists, despite varying levels of intentionality and socialization into road norms, but they are now rendered invisible and are often only made visible when they are well-behaved and enter the field of bicycle advocacy as subjects of pedagogy (Hoffmann and Lugo 2014).
crosswalk pedaled agonizingly slowly while two utility trucks waited to turn. It was clear that she wasn’t oblivious, but she appeared unperturbed by the large vehicles whose drivers were becoming impatient. As a practice, she was adopting the crosswalk as a pedestrian would, as many cyclists do, but counter to the normative practices of formal advocacy. These are the kinds of practices that advocates hope proper infrastructure will render unnecessary, but they are practical responses to the condition of urban streets.

*The Struggle for Telegraph*

Out of the Oakland Bikeways Campaign, Telegraph Avenue emerged as the highest priority as well as the greatest challenge. As Jamie Parks, planner with Oakland’s Public Works Department and head of the Telegraph Project, put it, “We’ve made the street really bad for cyclists, and they still use it.” He also speculated that Telegraph has the highest ridership of any comparable corridor lacking bicycle infrastructure (Parks 2014). The street is a destination in its own right, with new businesses opening daily and the tide of bicycle commuters steadily increasing. Cycling on the street, however, poses serious difficulties, the greatest being the volume of traffic and the ever-present potential of being “doored” by passengers exiting parked cars. By city estimates, dooring caused 25% of bicycle accidents on the corridor (Community Design + Architecture and Fehr & Peers 2014). The effort to transform this arterial from a technology of throughput to one of a convivial daily round would mobilize all of the discourses set into motion by the “Valencia epiphany.” They were now aided by the popular understanding of cycling as a central feature of the urban renaissance.

This perception is not just an ideological effect of the business-friendly discourse of bicycle advocacy that gained traction in the early 2000s. Nor is it simply because of dramatic increases in bicycling on given streets, though that plays a part. It also emerges through patterns of where and how cyclists congregate, and the locations of demonstrable commercial growth shaped by and dependent on new residents motivated by issues of livability and car-free mobility. The bicycle-friendly business, such as the new cafes all along Telegraph and on the east-west Grand Avenue and 40th Street corridors, suture bike culture to the spatial imaginary of gentrification. In this respect, Telegraph is both the spine of Oakland’s gentrification and the corridor in Oakland with the highest rates of cycling, a relationship that advocates sought to exploit. In other words, in order to be seen as a valued transit constituency, bicycle advocates seek to represent cyclists as a valuable customer base.

Not surprisingly, the many new businesses opening on the street are cycling’s most ardent champions. One of them is Arbor Cafe, at 42nd and Telegraph. Arbor is not just a coffee shop; it is a bicycle-flavored café where single-pour coffee costs $3, mostly white twenty- and thirty-somethings tap away all day at laptops, and the bike racks inside and out are always full. Bicycle Coffee brand coffee beans are delivered daily by cargo bike from the roaster twenty blocks away. I met up with Brian Drayton at Arbor shortly after

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19 Myself included—portions of this chapter were written there, among many other undergraduates, graduate students, bloggers, coders, non-profit workers, activists, independent scholars, and so on.
he was appointed to the League of American Bicyclists’ Equity Council. As we discussed my research, I commented that on Martin Luther King Way (where I lived at the time) I would see a diverse crowd ride by on bikes, but on parallel Telegraph I saw mainly white commuters, and he interrupted me with an apparent non-sequitur:

This used to be my video store [points to the ceiling]! I raised my family in this neighborhood. I moved here when I was 18 with a hundred bucks and a backpack. And UC Berkeley used to say “don’t rent down below Alcatraz avenue because it’s a bad part of town”… Literally this was Midnight Video when my daughter was born, the donut shop is still there, there was a dry cleaners there [pointing down the block], none of these businesses were here, and over at 41st and Telegraph the church really held down the whole neighborhood to keep it from going down. A few blocks further down [below MacArthur Boulevard] that’s where everybody had their long white t-shirts and they were getting shot—every night someone was getting shot (Drayton 2013).

Here, Drayton narrated the transformation in Telegraph Avenue through the changing fate of one commercial parcel that had anchored a sense of place that was in a state of advanced erosion. But the “old” Telegraph is not simply extinguished by a café and an influx of stylish cyclists. Across the street from Arbor at Golden Gate Donuts elderly black men sit outside starting early in the morning drinking un-anointed coffee and chatting. These spaces overlap, nudge up against one another, but they do not dissolve into the same shared reality—and hot real estate buzzword—known as “Temescal.”

Businesses like Arbor proudly show their commitment to their bicycling clientele, and engage politically in building support for bicycle infrastructure. Arbor hosted a few Oakland Bikeways Project planning meetings; the strip’s newest café, Barkada, a block north, hosted a February meeting. According to Dave Campbell, the owner of upscale Italian restaurant Pizzaiolo, a minor restaurant impresario in the area, underwent a “conversion experience” upon visiting Copenhagen in 2013 and approached Bike East Bay about being their partisan on the corridor. In these small but important ways, the corridor is marked by the practices of cyclists, who are construed as valued customers and indicators of neighborhood health.

The most contentious choke point of the Telegraph corridor is the Temescal District, where gentrification is most advanced and a high-traffic access point to the Grove Shafter Freeway joins the neighborhood. Commercial activity in this district is partially coordinated through the actions of the Temescal-Telegraph business improvement district (BID). BIDs, formed by groups of businesses to pool their economic fortunes and steer investment, are imbued with the moral rectitude associated with localism that is endemic to livability discourse. Conquering the hearts and minds of the BID is key to bicycle advocates securing a positive image for cycling and building support for streetscape changes.

With bicycles ubiquitous in Temescal, the BID has taken tentative steps toward integrating the bicycle into the gentrifying corridor’s brand identity. In fact, some of the “grassroots” feel of Temescal’s culture occurs through the actions of the BID; this extends

20 Barkada has since closed, replaced by a mid-scale pizzeria.
to bicycles as well, even though the struggle over bike lanes on the street has only begun. Hard infrastructure such as racks for bike parking, for instance, are provided by the city upon business request, with each rack featuring instructions about bike parking and a “Shop Oakland” logo. In-street bicycle corrals, similarly, require business initiative. Meeting minutes show an interest in accommodating bicycles growing from October 2011 onward, after a city of Oakland traffic study showed that fewer than half of customers surveyed arrived by car.

By April 2012, the BID was moving forward on an in-street bicycle parking facility with distinctive branding. The result was Telegraph’s first bike corral, installed in front of the wildly popular restaurant Burma Superstar at 48th Street by the request of the BID. Meeting minutes show an obsessive concern with its distinctiveness. The word “iconic” is used in every mention of the proposed branding symbol, an “I [bicycle symbol] OAKLAND” marker signifying the district’s character as a “green BID” (Temescal Telegraph Business Improvement District 2012a; Temescal Telegraph Business Improvement District 2012b) (Figure 33). Since this time, several other in-street
bike corrals have been installed. After the success of the Burma Superstar bike corral, Pizzaiolo was designated for a second corral, and has pursued installing a parklet there, as well.

This form of the production of space, wherein small business owners and local activists collaborate to shape a neighborhood’s character, has been relentlessly romanticized in the narratives of revitalization in Oakland. These efforts are uncontroversial because they do not intervene in the public right of way beyond the repurposing of a few parking spaces. The feel of the district, in fact, has been carefully tended by property interests represented by the BID. Real estate entrepreneur Sarita Waite, who owns large amounts of property on the east side of Telegraph Avenue in Temescal’s most active and congested zone, is active in defending these interests. Waite, along with her husband and partner UC Berkeley professor Raymond Lifchez, is known for resisting chain stores and curating a local character for the district.

Though this position would appear to support completing the corridor’s transformation into Oakland’s Valencia Street, Waite has opposed prior changes to the street. In 1998, due to EBBC efforts, bike lanes had been striped north from Aileen Street (north of Temescal) to the border of Berkeley. Lanes planned to pass through Temescal, which would have removed a travel lane, were blocked by a lawsuit Waite filed with a vehicular cycling advocate named Robert Pratt under the Coalition to Save Telegraph Avenue. This lawsuit, rather than the more well-known injunction in San Francisco, was the first use of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to block bicycle infrastructure on the basis of the lack of an EIR. It was also part of the reason for Bike East Bay’s concerns about winning the favor of business. 21 From very early on, at the first meeting of its Telegraph Bikeways outreach planning meeting, WOBO and Bike East Bay placed placating merchants at a high priority, and targeted mostly new businesses as potential allies. By this time, however, the economic discourse was not just a convenient palliative. Advocates had clearly absorbed the economic rationale for bicycle infrastructure as a primary ethical goal. The potential contribution to the “rebirth” of the city—though seen by many as naked gentrification—was a powerful source of motivation.

The recalcitrance of Temescal property owners in 1999 was mainly a protective response in defense of their class interests, not an anti-bicycle crusade like Anderson’s in San Francisco. As Jason Patton put it:

The Temescal merchants had become very well organized, they were just starting to get together [in 1999]… and they said, ‘Hey, we’re trying to turn this district around that Highway 24 killed, we’re not going to let you kill it with this poorly thought-out roadway

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21 In fact, efforts by bicycle advocates to counter the lawsuit at the time mobilized the economic value of livability as well. In 1999, Kathryn Hughes, who was then Bicycle and Pedestrian Facilities Coordinator, argued, “The bottom line is that Telegraph Avenue is ‘way too wide’ to be a viable street commercially… The entire strip from Berkeley to Oakland simply needs to slow down. And the slowing of traffic will ultimately be good for business. The area needs to experience what I called a road diet… Curbing the flow of traffic will allow commuters to smell the variety of foods in the area and actually see what’s available in the wonderful shops along the street” (C. L. Williams 1999).
reconfiguration.’ [Oakland’s response could have been] “Great, we respect your concerns, let’s give you the commercial district as it is and we’ll just work on either side of it.” That would have been 35 blocks of facility that for 14 years now hasn’t existed (Patton 2014).

By the same token, Patton insisted that the merchants aren’t “NIMBYs” either, but have very real fears about congestion on the street:

Their leadership will say things like, “We want everybody to ride their bike, walk and take the bus to our commercial district. But if we can’t make that happen, we’re still going to need vehicular access.” They’re very pragmatic and reasonable in that respect. And I’m confident that when we have the chance to work with them again on this, that we’ll get to some resolution. Because they want the bike access as much as anybody else. They just don’t want Temescal to be known as this snarl of traffic that you should avoid. Which is a reasonable concern.22

A defensive localism, tempered by a healthy mistrust of planning efforts emanating from City Hall, forms the ground on which resistance to changing Telegraph relies. In many ways, this reflects the fragmentary nature of neighborhood development politics, not limited to Oakland, in the post-Keynesian city. While the corridor’s commercial vitality was indeed severely damaged by the construction of the freeway, a Jacobs-esque position of “fight city hall” now opposes not the federal bulldozer but the municipal paint-stripper.

Making a realistic assessment of the political situation, advocates for bike lanes on Telegraph (a group in which I count myself) have little choice but to appeal to the lessons of Valencia Street. Bike culture has contributed to marking the neighborhood as “cool” in a way that other branding efforts have not, and business owners only stand to benefit from the increased bicycle traffic that a safer streetscape will bring. Moreover, with many businesses owners supportive of any improvements to pedestrian safety, advocates promote bicycle infrastructure as a way to calm car traffic and create positive effects for those on foot. This valuation of bicycle infrastructure couldn’t be articulated were it not for a whole new set of businesses that have opened on the strip in the current boom, oriented toward the “new Oakland” economy. To these actors, such as Arbor Café (which was awarded a Bicycle-Friendly Business distinction by Bike East Bay and now hosts a bike corral), Lanesplitter Pizza (which sponsors a cycling team), and Burma Superstar (at the site of Telegraph’s first bike corral), the claims are obvious. These and a host of others already benefit from cyclist traffic. As Patton affirmed to me, because of business turnover the question of bike lanes will be “a very different conversation” from before.

Although WOBO and Bike East Bay anticipated serious opposition to any plan that touched parking or slowed through-put to install a full-fledged bike lane, Bike East Bay took a “maximalist” position, advocated Copenhagen-style separated cycletracks for the entire length of Telegraph, including Temescal. For Bike to Work Day in May 2014, Dave Campbell set up a demonstration “pop-up” cycletrack on Telegraph at 26th Street

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22 It should be noted that, now 14 years on, the area is frequently snarled with traffic without the aid of any bicycle infrastructure whatsoever.
for participants—and several councilmembers—to try out in an effort to build support for separated facilities along the entire corridor. It was a clever piece of unpermitted political theater, making headlines on *Streetsblog* and allowing cyclists to try out the future of Telegraph (Figure 34).

As the campaign’s coordinator, Campbell compiled a list of friendly and “on the fence” businesses on the corridor, posted it on the Bike East Bay website, and encouraged members to shop conspicuously on the corridor and wear helmets to show their support for bicycle infrastructure. The list of friendly businesses reads as a Who’s Who of the “New Oakland”; at least 80% opened within the past decade and serve a clientele brought to their doors by gentrification. Campbell also won the favor of the Koreatown-Northgate (KONO) and Uptown business districts, both of which hope to encourage activity on the less congested sections of the street they represent. Campbell held several “Bike Talks” at various businesses on the strip in spring of 2014, encouraging members to drop by, spend money, and get excited about the bikeways campaign. At one of them, he updated me on the state of the outreach: “People are amped, businesses not so much. Some are cool and do get it, but there’s one of those for every 10 neighborhood groups.” He framed the political outcome he hoped for as a version of the “post-sell”: “Ideally Telegraph gets bike lanes, then Broadway says, ‘What about us?’ and then San Pablo says, ‘What about us?’” In other words, an ideal result would be for local business owners to steer future infrastructure development their way after witnessing its success, creating a tacit business-advocacy coalition to pressure the city.

Figure 34. "Pop-up" cycletrack on Telegraph Avenue at 27th Street, Bike To Work Day 2014. Photo by author.
On the model of Long Beach, California, Bike East Bay has also pursued a formal “Bicycle-Friendly Business District” designation with the KONO district, which Campbell plans to extend to Temescal pending merchant support. In a December 2014 blog post for Bike East Bay, he wrote:

The importance of bicycling is much higher on Telegraph Avenue when you consider the street as a local neighborhood commercial corridor, rather than an arterial cut through street, as it has been looked at for many decades. People bicycling are competitive shoppers to other modes already on Telegraph Avenue, and this with no current bicycle facilities. The installation of bike lanes on Telegraph is only going to increase the success of local businesses, as will making the street safer and more inviting for pedestrians and a better street for transit (D. Campbell 2014).

While planners with the City of Oakland continue to make arguments that rest on the bodily risk to cyclists on the corridor as sufficient evidence for the need for bike lanes, bicycle advocates here frame the issue in language merchants understand: profit, and the negative effect bodily risk has on the spending patterns of cyclists.

Aiding in this is the generalization of the “Valencia epiphany.” When we spoke in 2013, Patton was tentative about making an economic argument, though he did hint at that direction:

[B]icycling supports local business. People are not bicycling to Walnut Creek to shop… Beyond that, I think the lifestyle angle has a lot of potential, and you have companies choosing to locate in a particular place because they want a lifestyle that they can attract high-quality employees” (Patton 2013).

At that time, he saw Valencia Street as a unique situation that couldn’t easily transfer to Oakland. However, by 2014 slick, well-produced materials from Bikes Belong were distributed to tables at planning meetings, expounding cycling’s economic benefits stretching back to the Valencia Street road diet and Emily Drennen’s paper. Max Hunter, Bike East Bay’s Membership and Volunteer Director, echoed this convergence of economic and political interests, recalling that a local politician had surprised him by thanking him for his efforts in promoting economic growth (Hunter 2013). Before the 2000s, when the relationship between bike culture, style, and gentrification solidified, such a statement would hardly be thinkable. Now, it is a commonsense written into the normative practices of being a bicycle advocate.

A key moment that pushed the Oakland Bikeways campaign to a new level occurred when the National Association of City Transportation Officials (NACTO) brought its Cities for Cycling Roadshow to Oakland in April 2014. This event, much like the Great Streets Project, brought the experience of champions in the field like New York’s Ryan Russo (who worked alongside Janette Sadik-Khan) and San Francisco’s Ed Reiskin to bear on Oakland’s decision-makers. The purpose of the Roadshow was to share the best practices enshrined in the NACTO Urban Bikeway Design Guide, which was published in 2011 as a competitor to the more conservative American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) design standards. At a dinner hosted by the event (which was otherwise limited to city staff), local advocates rubbed elbows with emerging heavyweights in the field, and guest speakers shared mostly
hagiographic stories of their experiences in bikeway planning. Attendees included interested advocates, academic researchers, representatives from other planning departments, and planners at the several consulting firms who contributed to the design guide.

Oakland Mayor Jean Quan spoke first, extolling the city’s green virtues, its history of political radicalism, the 100 miles of bicycle facilities installed between 2011 and 2014, and the imminent extension of Bay Area Bikeshare into the East Bay. She affirmed bicycle infrastructure and housing along transit corridors as “critical to economic development,” and went on to place bicycle advocacy within a teleology of Oakland’s progressive history, citing the Pullman Porters, the Black Panther Party, and the anti-apartheid student strikes as its precursors. Speakers from WOBO and EBBC followed, after which Ed Reiskin affirmed that Oakland could be “ground zero for the next wave of biking.” Throughout the event, the term “world class city” was inescapable, as speaker after speaker affirmed bicycle infrastructure as fundamental to the category. To achieve the successes of its peers like San Francisco, Chicago, and New York, Oakland needed comprehensive bikeways.

The timing of the NACTO Roadshow was not arbitrary. Though the dinner was packed with believers, organizers hoped to convert the city traffic engineers whose support would be needed to relax the LOS standards that constrain bike planning on Telegraph. As the program made clear:

The Telegraph Avenue Complete Streets Project is currently developing alternative design concepts to incorporate bicycle facilities on Telegraph Avenue. The Road Show will provide a unique opportunity for a peer review of alternative concepts by national experts in bikeway design to ensure that the project incorporates emerging best practices (National Association of City Transportation Officials 2014).

Beyond its role as a clearinghouse of information and a depository of best practices, NACTO is in this way a pedagogical tool for embattled planners within their own departments. NACTO hopes to depose the more car-oriented AASHTO standards, arguing that cities should be planned differently and using metrics beyond efficiency—namely economic growth—to make the case for alternative street designs. It proceeds from the assumption that travel behaviors are not given but can be shaped (Ridgway 2014). The role of transportation planning is not to accommodate demand but influence practices of mobility through infrastructure. At the scale of the municipality, however, this translates into reshaping certain corridors to become more conducive to gentrification. For the city of Oakland to pursue its strategy of denser development, the main travel behavior requiring change is reliance on the private automobile. To convince planners schooled in the old ways, Oakland called on the authority of longer networks of practitioners (Latour 1993).

The NACTO dinner revealed as much about the limitations of this new network of experts as about its growing strength, especially with regards to race and class. Not surprisingly, white faces dominated the crowd, which drew from the ranks of professional planning and consulting. It was a primarily cheerleading crowd as well, celebrating accomplishments and leaving some dimensions of bicycle planning conspicuously
unexamined. When NYCDOT’s Ryan Russo was questioned about the “bikelash” of wealthy Park Slope residents resisting bike lanes, he dismissed it as “a moment that every city has to go through,” a product of “the political chatter class.” He did not take the opportunity to discuss New York’s transformation, particularly under Bloomberg, into a “luxury city” (Brash 2011). Similarly, Boston’s Nicole Freedman celebrated the bike sharing network’s subsidy to low-income riders, but when asked how Boston justified the investments she said, virtually quoting Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel, “There is no way to be for a tech economy and not be for bikes, but more importantly ‘Oh my god, every other city is doing this, we need to do it too!’” What could have led to a productive conversation about balancing chasing the wealth of the new economy with equity goals became instead a chance to tout the “creative class” case for bicycle infrastructure. Most important were those forms of expertise that never entered the room. The event, which was hosted at the Henry J. Kaiser building in downtown Oakland, featured free valet bicycle parking offered by Bike East Bay. Amid the excitement and knowledge-sharing regarding Oakland’s pedal-powered renaissance, it was RB of the Scraper Bike Team, one of the few African-Americans in attendance, who was downstairs parking the bikes of the attendees, not among the experts meeting with city officials and drumming up excitement for Oakland’s bicycle-powered renaissance.

Narrating the Contradictions of Growth

The unveiling of possible plans for Telegraph Avenue crystallized and brought to the surface tensions within the current practices of bicycle facility planning. By extension, the moment also refracted larger contradictions surrounding intervention into the built environment as a way to leverage quality of life into capital accumulation. It revealed how debates about the cyclescape had been shifted onto a discursive terrain dominated by economic concerns. This had contradictory effects. The project mobilized the narrative of cyclists as valuable consumers, but opponents saw the existing configuration of the street, especially the supply of parking, as critical to commercial viability.

In other words, while all involved agreed on the need for change, proposed changes provoke material conflicts between different fractions of small capitalists and rentiers. On one hand, support for robust bicycle infrastructure brings together a rising bloc of young in-migrants, a subgroup of planners won over to livability, “quality-of-life” grassroots organizations, key political figures, and, most importantly, small business owners whose establishments are key nodes in this social world. On the other hand, resistance to changes in parking or traffic came from older, more car-dependent residents who feared overflow from restricted parking supply, business owners with car-dependent customers (a foreign car dealership and a firm selling safes, for instance). Some were simply ideologically opposed to changes in the lived experience of place and the function of streets. All views were either tacitly or explicitly articulated over the course of the meetings I attended.

By late April 2014, the Telegraph study was complete, and street design options were ready to be unveiled during open houses held on or near the route. The first open
house was held at Beebe Memorial Christian Methodist Episcopal Temple, a historic black church at 39th and Telegraph (though few if any parishioners were in attendance). Inside the temple’s community center, posterboards with designs produced by Fehr & Peers and Community Design + Architecture (CD+A) lined the room, displaying analyses and recommendations for various segments of Telegraph. In the center of the room were long tables with butcher paper, markers, and letter-sized versions of the posters. Also on every table was a glossy report from the New York Department of Transportation (NYDOT), entitled “Economic Benefits of Sustainable Streets,” which made the economic case for bicycle improvements stretching all the way back to Valencia Street (Figure 35).

While the posters covered several different elements of the street (loading conditions, improved pedestrian crossings, and transit improvements), the bicycle element was the undeniable centerpiece of the project and its greatest political liability. As one poster read, “complete streets can help Telegraph Avenue’s ongoing transformation from a place people just want to get through to a place they want to get to,” alongside a section entitled “Grow Business Without Growing Congestion.” Another read, “New businesses are creating a more walkable, enjoyable environment for pedestrians on Telegraph Avenue, with new restaurants, cafés, bars, yoga and fitness studios, clothing shops, galleries, etc.,” followed by a projection that bicycle volumes also stand to increase with business development. The presentation also touted the role of bike lanes for making pedestrian crossings safer and contributing in this way to the vitality of the commercial corridor. One poster featured a “word cloud” showing the most common responses to the question, “What streets in Oakland, the Bay Area, or anywhere in the world do you wish...
Telegraph Avenue more closely resembled?” (Figure 36). Valencia Street was proudly in the center as the most common response, mentioned 85 times in the survey responses (Community Design + Architecture and Fehr & Peers 2014).

The crowd was almost completely homogeneous ideologically and socioeconomically. Only two voices interrupted the consensus. One was a middle-aged vehicular cyclist, who assailed an advocate for turning the street into a “laboratory.” NACTO planners were untrained physicians, he claimed, and “cyclists are the patient.” His argument was that cyclists would bear the brunt of poorly designed infrastructure, and that the “innovative” NACTO designs had not been proven scientifically. Instead of claiming, with some justification, that the NACTO designs were more about their spectacular qualities than rider safety, his position hewed firmly to a science-based line: NACTO simply had no evidence of their superiority. The only other voice to break the waters was an African-American woman visibly not a part of the cyclist crowd. In a far more amicable conversation with city staff, she raised the issue that pedestrian improvements have been needed for “two, three, four decades,” but are only being provided now. She did not raise the issue of gentrification frontally, but the subtext was that with white people now flocking to the area, road safety has been placed on the agenda.

The second meeting, held at a church on 49th Street in the heart of Temescal, just blocks from the commercial strip’s busiest block, was considerably less placid. In a grim underscore to the stakes of the street’s transformation, a pedestrian was struck and killed in the corridor’s busiest intersection just before the meeting began. Almost as soon as the open house began, several people raised their voices in criticism, forcing reluctant CD+A
meeting facilitators to field questions rather than just allowing the crowd to mill around and view the posters. While most of the attendees were supportive of bicycle facilities, these vocal critics pressed the issue of parking specifically. One woman said, “You’re talking about a solution where there’s not enough parking… We keep adding businesses without adding one space.” She added, “We’ve never won once.” Another woman exclaimed, “People live here!” to which another attendee responded, “That’s city living!” “You want less people driving,” said another wryly, “but you want businesses to grow!” These internally contradictory statements nonetheless cohered around a sense that the city was imposing a plan from outside. This framing cast the city as forcing existing residents to deal with the congestion resulting from gentrification, while shrinking the street and potentially starving businesses of their economic base.

Meeting facilitators attempted to exert a little more control over the conversation. They articulated the goals of the project: traffic calming, enhancing the “vibrancy” (meaning commercial health) of the corridor, and “balancing the needs of all users.” “Streets are important public places. Safe and comfortable can equal economically vibrant streets,” Phil Erickson of CD+A argued, again turning to how bicycle infrastructure makes for a safer pedestrian realm. “Every time there’s a new business there are more pedestrians,” he said, reframing the material basis of retail success from parking to walking and cycling.

Among a core of older, white residents, suspicions persisted. One woman, a property owner, asked if street repaving was delayed because of the project. Another, a 25-year resident, said she had “heard about a lot of projects” that didn’t happen over the years, including the letdown of bus rapid transit (BRT, though other critics in the room had fought it), and questioned how real the plan was. An older man asked, “What’s next, our houses get torn down for new condos?” Mistrust of city efforts and outside consultants was clear. The vocal critics, few in number but loud, performed the roles of aggrieved locals “fighting City Hall” in Jacobs’ phrasing, despite being homeowners and property owners in one of the hottest real estate markets in the city. The most outspoken was a man who called out, “There’s going to be a lot of neighborhood opposition. Have you looked at alternatives? Have you looked at how this will affect traffic flow and air pollution?” He was Robert Pratt, a veteran cyclist who had led the fight against bike lanes in 1998. Lane reductions, he argued, would cause congestion and reduce efficiency. Moreover, “segregated” facilities would eventually lead to the exclusion of cyclists from roadways without bike lanes. “There’s an agenda being pushed here,” he said.

At the third open house, held at the Oakland Humanist Hall on 27th Street, considerably south of the conflicted area, Pratt was again in attendance but somewhat more isolated. There, the economic discourse was addressed more directly. One attendee raised the 1998 lawsuit, hoping that the business community had changed its position since then. Erickson replied: “A lot has changed with how bike/ped improvements affect businesses. Pratt responded, “The merchants are opposed to this!” A comment came from the crowd: “Streets that are better for biking and walking are better for business,” to which Jamie Parks responded by citing the NYDOT “Economic Benefits of Sustainable Streets” study that had been again distributed to every table. Another question brought
up Latham Square, a pilot project that briefly turned the intersection of Telegraph and Broadway in downtown Oakland into a pedestrian plaza, but was abruptly cut short by the city’s new planning director. In the debate over Latham Square, both sides had cited merchant support for their positions (McCamy 2013a; McCamy 2013b). “Any chance the city will axe this project as well?” he asked. Meeting organizers responded that their goal is “to find something we all are comfortable with.”

As the open house wound down, Oakland city staff absorbed more questions from Pratt at the side of the room, while the dominant mood was excitement. Oliver Luby of District 1 Councilman and mayoral candidate Dan Kalb, who represents the Temescal neighborhood, affirmed Kalb’s commitment to the project and the opportunity it provides: “Some areas hit rock bottom and I want to be a part of building something new.” A Fehr & Peers planner discussed the expansion of such opportunities and planning strategies to meet them, particularly the usefulness of the new NACTO standards, citing the “change in attitudes of cities” as a major factor. “It’s an interesting time,” he told me. The consensus held that the bicycle would play an active role in supporting the ongoing revitalization of the corridor, stitching together with two wheels neighborhoods once separated by four.

Between the second and third meetings, I met with Robert Pratt, hoping to learn more about the suit to stop bike lanes on Telegraph in 1998. We met to chat at a café in Oakland’s affluent Rockridge neighborhood that was a popular hangout for an older school of cyclists. He was suspicious of my intentions, clearly concerned that I was a devotee of the new wave of bicycle advocacy. He saw this new wave as detrimental to the status of cyclists as road users and apparently felt that I might use my work to further vilify detractors like him, who were now marginalized in bicycle advocacy. To him, the ascendant commonsense regarding bicycle infrastructure was a fusion of Critical Mass, which he detested, Bike East Bay, whose politics he saw as “vindictive,” and the city, which claimed was imposing pre-ordained changes to the roadway via the charade of a nominally public meeting. Regarding the CEQA suit, he said vehemently, “We used environmental law, like they do, to stop their dirty, arrogant scheme that causes congestion and in some cases reduces cyclist safety” (R. Pratt 2014). Like the later suit filed by Anderson, who lauded the efforts of the Coalition to Save Telegraph Avenue (R. Anderson 2006), CEQA here operated as a convenient political lever to fend off changes to the technological arrangement of the street. While the irony of this use of CEQA should not be missed, the vehicularists’ critique of infrastructure projects shows how far cycling has drifted down the path of urban development. In their purest form, vehicularists argue for the fundamental identity between the bicycle and car. The bicycle, in their view, should not be seen as special at all, because “special” technologies have the habit of acquiring “special” laws. While Pratt’s views sound out of step with contemporary bicycle advocacy, his long involvement in cycling issues shows the seismic shifts inaugurated by the post-Valencia wave.

I do not intend to lampoon vehicular cyclists like Pratt, or caricature their opposition as simply a retrograde reaction. Rather, I want to identify their populist interpretation of the current moment in bicycle advocacy, and how it relates to other
resistance to change. Bicycle advocates are framed in Pratt’s narrative as liberal Berkeley (and now Oakland) anti-car zealots imposing their wishes on Telegraph Avenue, openly allied with the anarchists of Critical Mass and a hostile city to oppress small business owners in the name of the unproven benefits of “livability.” Here, the contradictions both of the economic narrative of livability and the technological function of the street emerge in sharp relief. The city’s interest in encouraging an urban vitality that contributes to sustained capital accumulation is clear; the role of the bicycle in this is contingent, rather than necessary. By identifying traffic-calming efforts on Telegraph as an outside imposition, Pratt and other vocal opponents ally “indigenous” homeowners and capitalists in the area, who have played a major role in crafting the area’s image and nurturing its property market and fear the change that, ironically, their success has sown (Urevich 2014; Swan 2012). The contest is about whose class interests will win out, refracted through the technology of the street as a facilitator of movement and a place of belonging.

As we sat at the café, Pratt’s friend, a proprietor of several bars and music venues in San Francisco, joined us. After catching the drift of the conversation, he disagreed with Pratt’s identification of the bicycle coalition for special ire: “[SFBC director] Leah Shahum is just a bike advocate. She’s not against you and me.” He then went on to rail against the gentrification of the Mission, arguing that Valencia had been “given over to developers” and homogenized. He counterposed this homogenization with the ostensible desires of in-migrants for city living: “If you don’t have people of color, if you don’t have diversity, you don’t have a city.” “I don’t want Oakland turned into Davis,” he added. A relatively homogeneous small college town and a national leader in bicycle infrastructure, Davis represents here the suburbanization of the city, its conversion into a playground for the comfortable classes.

The contradictions between the dual roles of the street play out in the spatial tug-of-war between bicycle infrastructure, parking space, and traffic flow. When we spoke, Pratt likened Telegraph to “the Mississippi”—a great thoroughfare whose fluidity would be compromised by any reduction in travel lanes. By this logic, on-street parking would be unjustifiable, except that the tenants of Telegraph’s busy commercial district object to any reduction in a customer’s ability to park directly in front of their establishments. Within this situation of politically enforced scarcity, bicycle advocacy engages on the only front available by claiming the economic value of cyclists as both elements of a more livable flow of traffic and a valuable customer base that has gone ignored. Moreover, it does so within an emerging municipal mandate to both densify and reduce vehicle trips. While the vehicularists hold that competent cyclists of all ages should be able to navigate Telegraph in relative safety as it is, and any configuration that reduces the available space for a cyclist to maneuver is both a threat to safety threat and a political attack. Telegraph’s build-out depends on new arrivals leaving their cars behind, however. For new cyclists to hit the ground pedaling, so to speak, road space must be made. Hence the contradiction: making new cyclists involves a rigid segmentation of the roadway, while most advocates affirm the need for a more convivial, less regimented street space.

The alternative envisioned by opponents to bicycle infrastructure on Telegraph is
the Webster-Shafter bikeway, which roughly parallels Telegraph, passing through the bungalow district to the east. The bikeway was one of the Oakland flatlands’ first signed bicycle routes, a quiet street with local traffic, but impeded by four-way stop signs, periodic speed humps, and the obstruction of the Highway 24 freeway. “I did the survey work when we opposed the bike lane last time,” Pratt said at the second open house, “It’s a 30 second difference riding to Berkeley on Webster. I rode it and timed it. I don’t think enough people know about Webster.” In fact, plenty of cyclists know about Webster; it carries nearly half the estimated bicycle traffic of Telegraph, according to city counts. It is pleasant, but with few destinations; each four-way stop invites confusion with a motorist or a potential stop sign violation. Nevertheless, Temescal BID archives show their belief that it could serve as a reasonable alternative. As late as December 2013, they claimed to be “blindsided” by Jamie Parks’ statement about “how best to accommodate bikes on Telegraph Avenue in Temescal, recognizing that Telegraph will remain a major bike route in the future.” (Temescal Telegraph Business Improvement District 2013). Clinging to the Webster-Shafter option, the BID put forward that counter-proposal in a hasty meeting just before the first open house. Dave Campbell called it a “non-starter,” a position held by a few powerful property owners but out of step with businesses.

At the third open house, Karen Hester, a Temescal resident, supporter of bike lanes, and promoter of the annual Temescal Street Fair, had a hearty laugh at the BID’s proposal and lampooned it on her blog as the “Temescal By-Pass.”

Wouldn’t it be wonderful to have Temescal slide back to the way it was in 2004, before the BID started, when there weren’t so many darn people (especially those latte-sipping, Oaklandish style hipsters/bicyclists) that now are almost everywhere you look, but especially in Arbor Cafe and causing such “congestion?”, especially with their bike racks littering the sidewalk? How I long for the Temescal of the good ole days (Hester 2014).

When we talked about my research, however, Hester brought up her days living on Valencia Street before its gentrification and how intolerable she found its current state, wondering if that would happen to Telegraph. The contradictory nature of how urban vitality is imagined is revealed in such statements. The only imaginable form that the good life might take is a city of small, Capra-esque Main streets: a virtuous ecology of small proprietors, good consumers, and localist sentiment.

The circulation of the discourse inherited from Valencia Street did not simply part the waters for bicycle infrastructure to unfold over urban space unimpeded. Nor have the NACTO planning guidelines now tentatively endorsed by Caltrans (California Department of Transportation 2014) simply altered how the technology of the street is produced. Instead, claims about the economic benefits of cycling widen the field of battle, opening up terrain that runs up against entrenched power, exposing competing fractions within the process of gentrification. In July 2014, Jamie Parks confirmed what many

23 In an argument with another resident who disagreed with the bike project, Hester brought up the case of nearby Shattuck Avenue, where bike lanes had been recently installed. The woman gushed about how nice the street had gotten, then visibly realized her self-contradiction when Hester asked why she didn’t want the same for Telegraph.
suspected: there would be no lane reduction north of 48th Street. For the plan to include bike lanes in the heart of Temescal, would require “a political decision to accept congestion” and discard the LOS guidelines, or a decision to remove parking and anger vocal business interests. Despite the outcry at the second open house, however, out of 240 comment cards distributed only 13 responses were negative. “It was like a Soviet election,” Parks joked. He went on, regarding the consensus: “The hard core vehicular cyclists were significant before, they’re totally marginalized now. The things they were saying didn’t resonate… And Sarita Waite isn’t interested in leading the opposition again” (Parks 2014).

When the final draft plans were unveiled at two public meetings in September 2014, it was bicycle advocates’ turn to be angry. The plan divided Telegraph into three segments with different characteristics. The middle segment, between 52nd and 46th street, was the “most constrained.” Here, in the heart of Temescal, the draft plan called for shared lane markings—“sharrows”—in the right lane. According to this design, bicycles, 60-foot articulated buses, and parking cars would compete for space, suddenly forced to coexist after remaining separated by bike lanes for thirty blocks in either direction. From the perspective of vocal cyclists at these two meetings, this solution was unacceptable. Several even hissed and jeered when Phil Erickson of CD+A announced the design. Even beyond the controversial sharrows, the “maximal” proposal of protected cycletracks was rejected in favor of buffered bike lanes. With that design, a 2-foot buffer of painted hash marks separates a 7-foot bike lane from passing traffic, but forces cyclists to contend with parking maneuvers and delivery loading. To one angry cyclist, this design was “radical for the 1990s” and “a missed opportunity for cycletracks.” “The city needs them, Telegraph needs them,” he said. Dave Campbell voiced Bike East Bay's position: “Do you envision a future for Oakland where twenty to thirty percent of all trips are done by bicycle? Do you want people who are ‘interested but concerned’? Then you need cycletracks.”

This hope for a future of high cycling rates produced by the technology of the street itself intersected with concerns about whether Telegraph could support another technology: Bay Area Bikeshare. One Bike East Bay staff member explained that the street needed continuous cycletracks for it to be utilized by inexperienced Bikeshare users. To bicycle advocates, the proposed street configuration would discourage new cyclists from using the street. In other words, while established cyclists voiced their concerns based on their own experiences, the draft did not depict a street that could make new cyclists, the main goal of current advocates.

Moreover, it was a configuration that highlighted the contradictions of Telegraph’s multiple functions in the broader Oakland street fabric. Because of the obsessive concerns of certain merchants and property owners, it pitted bicycles and public transit against each other for scraps of street space. In the draft put forward by the city, the Temescal district would see all 72 feet of street space dedicated to cars, including 20 feet of in-street car storage (parking). In breakout discussions at the meetings, bicycle and transit advocates discussed various concessions they could make, all predicated on the

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somewhat arbitrary constraints dictated by on-street parking, and the vigorous political defense of it that businesses have mounted. As Erickson put it, “We know that this isn’t ideal. But from past experience and from outreach to businesses, we’ve heard concerns about the loss of parking.” From a street performance standpoint, therefore, the only reasonable compromise—parking removal—was the only option outside of consideration. Paraphrasing Gramsci, if the old main street with a parking space for every consumer is dying, its death throes, clinging to parking as a proxy for commercial health, strangle the street. The requirement of the street’s transformation creates fractional tensions between groups brought into conflict by gentrification.

In all of the debates about Telegraph Avenue, while safety was a pervasive concern, that street’s ability to sustain livability through infill development without congestion was at stake. Economic concerns lay not far below the surface and were frequently voiced in tandem with safety issues. The arguments made by the city and CD+A consultants that the plan was needed to “revitalize” the corridor took as given the positive economic contribution of cycling. Telegraph represents the maturation of the Valencia Epiphany: from a pragmatic bargaining chip used with dubious merchants to a sense that the bicycle is part of a larger, systemically integrated shift underway. This shift encompasses streetscape transformation and new housing construction as the foundations of the city’s renewed economic competitiveness. While the frontal assault on parking, which some in Bike East Bay and WOBO hope for, is unlikely to happen, the political alignment of bicycle-oriented infrastructural change with a more comprehensive economic development strategy for the corridor is more or less secure.

A Tale of Two Cities

The development of bicycle infrastructure in Oakland’s core reinforces the spatial congregation of valued bodies and valued property, exposing the stark divisions between those zones of the city receiving heightened investment and those that appear to be discarded. While Oakland’s bicycle master plan mandates network coverage throughout the city, most infrastructural investment has concentrated in areas of high ridership, especially north-south corridors connecting Berkeley and downtown Oakland. The vast majority of bicycle parking is located in the neighborhoods east of the freeway stretching down Telegraph to downtown, and along other smaller commercial streets like College, Piedmont, and Grand avenues. The dramatic concentration of bicycle infrastructure in these areas contrasts sharply with the vast neglect of car- and bus-dependent East Oakland, where people on bicycles, primarily of color, face freeway-like conditions on surface streets and often ride on sidewalks (Figure 37 & Figure 38).

25 Data retrieved from https://data.acgov.org/.
Figure 37. Uneven development of bicycle infrastructure in Oakland. Map by author. Source: Oakland Bicycle and Pedestrian Facilities Program 2014; Metropolitan Transportation Commission 2014.
East Oakland’s flatlands developed during a different period of urbanization as an extensive working class bungalow district close to the waterfront’s manufacturing and warehousing area. Both its urban form and race-class characteristics work against cycling as a primary mode of transportation. According to the Census, less than 1% of workers in East Oakland proper commute to work solely by bicycle (U.S. Census Bureau 2012a). Along with fewer BART stations than Oakland’s core, East Oakland has well below half of the number of weekday BART users who access stations by bicycle: just below 3,000 daily in 2008 (BART Marketing and Research Department 2008).

Bicycle counts, conducted jointly by the City, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, and the Alameda County Transportation Commission, show uniformly low numbers of cyclists east of Lake Merritt.26 While, since 2011, the number of bicycle facilities in East Oakland has increased, so apparently has political ambivalence about their value. In neighborhoods where many people bicycle out of necessity, cyclists are stereotyped as “others”: the poor, alcoholics, drug dealers, or outsider “hipsters,” not ordinary working people (see Chapter 3). The race-class articulation between cycling and disposable income that now holds sway in bicycle advocacy has less traction where many people bicycle out of need.

This is not entirely new. In 2001, Councilmembers Ignacio de la Fuente and

26 Data retrieved from the City of Oakland Bicycle and Pedestrian Facilities Program website, www2.oaklandnet.com/Government/o/PWA/o/EC/s/BicycleandPedestrianProgram/OAK024559.
Larry Reid of East Oakland opposed a bike lane on Bancroft Avenue connecting the Lake Merritt area to San Leandro. An unusual convergence ensued between the bicycle coalition’s interests in traffic calming and police interests in reducing stunt driving by local youth. As the August 2001 issue of *RideOn*, the newsletter of the EBBC, reported:

> De la Fuente has reportedly requested that a recently repaved section of Foot- hill Blvd be restriped as-is – without adding bike lanes – and Reid has accepted a “compromise” on Bancroft that would only offer 13-foot wide curb lanes... The Police Department also favors the addition of the bike lanes and reduction of the travel lanes to help counter the cruising activity referred to as the “sideshow.” Nevertheless, when the police called on bicycle activists to speak at a “Town Hall” meeting on the “sideshow” at the Eastmont Mall on June 25, Larry Reid intervened to deny them the opportunity to speak in the presence of City Manager Robert Bobb. (*RideOn: The Newsletter of the East Bay Bicycle Coalition* 2001, 3).

Since advocacy for bicycle infrastructure has depended on grassroots networks of cyclists that increase in strength with gentrification, in East Oakland, where there are only hints of in-migration, bicycle projects appear to come in from outside.

Bicycle projects also, as with the WOSP, come attached to larger projects with greater potentials for dislocation. One example is the East Bay Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) project. BRT, first proposed in 2001, was planned to connect San Leandro to downtown Berkeley, running along International Boulevard through East Oakland and Telegraph Avenue through Oakland to Berkeley. BRT mimics fixed-guideway transit, creating boarding stations in the center median to reduce boarding time. As the project approached the final design stages, it met a backlash from street-front merchants along Telegraph. Randy Reed, owner of Reed Brothers Security, had been involved in support for the suit against bike lanes in 1998 and was again in the lead on resisting BRT, claiming the disruption to parking involved in the project would kill businesses (Bialick 2012b). One major sticking point on Telegraph Avenue, for Reed and others, was the inclusion of bike lanes in the project, which would have further reduced parking (N. Johnson 2010). Reed claimed in an *Oakland Tribune* op-ed to be an ardent supporter of BRT, but that the planning process had proceeded without taking stock of merchant concerns (R. Reed 2012). In the end, AC Transit dropped the portion stretching from downtown Oakland to Berkeley because merchants in Berkeley were similarly resistant, and adopted a truncated plan for BRT through East Oakland alone, which was approved by the Oakland City Council in 2012 (Allen-Taylor 2011; Bialick 2012c).

As in 1998, merchant opposition had altered the process of reconfiguring street technology, stalling a wave of spatial reorganization intending to adapt Oakland’s infrastructure to a less automobile-intensive mode of growth. Robert Prinz of Bike East Bay put it in almost exactly these terms on *Streetsblog*: “What is really going to happen is the reduced scope [sic] San Leandro-Oakland BRT is going to be built, it will be a huge

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27 According to Dave Campbell, Reed’s stance showed signs of softening when he saw a demonstration cycletrack during the annual Temescal Street Fair in summer 2014, but by fall he was still in opposition to the removal of parking or through traffic lanes in Temescal.
boon for the communities along that corridor, and then the Telegraph merchants with a collective case of selective memory loss will start lining up to ask for an expensive extension into their business districts.” Later, in sharply-worded comment on his story, Prinz added:

I'm certainly not rich, but by not driving a car I have a lot more discretionary income burning a hole in my pocket than I would otherwise. Also, as a non driver I am a lot more likely to shop at the local store down the street as opposed to someone who will more likely hop in a car and drive further to a big box store with an enormous parking lot out front. Local business owners who appreciate this dynamic and learn to adapt are the ones who are going to stay afloat despite a changing economy and transportation network (Bialick 2012b).

Prinz’s rebuke to Reed thus affirms the commonsense regarding both BRT and bicycle infrastructure: that improvements to the livability of the public realm have spillover effects that naturally benefit small capitalist enterprises.

Merchants on International Boulevard, overwhelmingly small proprietors of color, have been less successful in modifying or resisting the project. Construction of BRT in East Oakland is slated to begin in 2015. The project will thoroughly transform the busy arterial, with some of the city’s highest numbers of pedestrian and cyclist injuries and fatalities, reducing travel lanes and parking in some areas and adding bike lanes through most of the corridor. BRT has been celebrated as a much-needed investment and an improvement to the mobility of the over 100,000 residents adjacent to the route. However, representatives from AC Transit endured a frosty reception at a June 2013 public meeting called for by the Oakland Sustainable Neighborhoods Initiative (OSNI), an organization formed to engage with and shape the transit-oriented development aspects of the plan. OSNI emerged from an alliance between East Bay Housing Organizations (EBHO), East Bay Asian Local Development Corporation (EBALDC), transportation justice organization TransForm, and other community-based organizations like Causa Justa/Just Cause. In this way, the effort mirrors previous moments, notably OCCUR and WOPC, in which political communities have formed around mitigating the negative effects of infrastructural change among populations who do not have the luxury of rejecting investment.

When I arrived at the OSNI meeting, Dave Campbell told me that “the G-word” had already been mentioned. In the room of 75, however, most of them African American and Latino residents of the neighborhood, the loudest concerns were about the project’s Business Impact Mitigation Plan, which provides funds for businesses disrupted by construction. As on Telegraph, the voices in the room were concerned about the outreach process, and felt they had been taken by surprise. One resident said, “I’m concerned that this beautiful process has left the community out… Where is the community input?” Another asked, “Where does the feedback go? What is the communication process?” Beyond business concerns, the distance seniors would need to walk between stops and a proposed privately contracted security force were points of contention. While the AC Transit representative worked to allay their concerns, calling the mitigation plan “a living document” and a major opportunity (“Here’s your transit,
now orient your development on this transit”), many there regarded BRT with suspicion at best. While the project will spend over $20 million on business impact mitigation, including relocation costs in a few cases, the dislocation associated with construction will be real. As on Mission Street in San Francisco and 7th Street in West Oakland during BART construction in the 1960s, BRT has the potential to permanently displace existing businesses, and could spur a dip in rents that would allow gentrification to obtain a foothold.

This is how bike lanes are likely to come to East Oakland’s central thoroughfare. While eyes are on BRT, bike lanes have a complicated relationship to the project and could be its most politically vulnerable element should streetscape changes impinge on parking. At a broader level, the more organized, largely white Temescal merchants were able to resist BRT not just because of their social power but because their gamble was likely to pay off: even without the T (transit) in TOD, the area’s property boom is secure. The less organized, less politically connected residents of East Oakland face a much different scenario. They must choose whether to accept unfavorable elements of BRT in exchange for badly needed investment and improved transit service, even if it jumpstarts gentrification as East Oakland becomes the last affordable frontier. Bicycle infrastructure here is less freighted with associations with gentrification per se than a convenient add-on to a larger, more disruptive infrastructure project. As the history of infrastructural investment in Oakland shows, politically marginalized residents do not easily or quietly weather the “creative destruction” that comes with transportation projects.

Advocates of bicycle-led revitalization ignore or minimize histories of segregation and dispossession at their peril. Gentrification in Oakland is directly tied to the coproduction of race and space, within which people of color, particularly African-Americans and Latinos, have consistently been on the losing end of infrastructural change. There is no reason for residents of East Oakland to see bike lanes, promoted by a movement with white leadership and supported by processes of gentrification, as any different. As Angie Schmitt put the issue in Streetsblog, “[I]nfrastucture decisions are inherently political, and those with greater resources have always held an advantage in seeing their wishes enshrined in concrete and pavement…” (Schmitt 2011b). Advocates’ hope for quality bicycle infrastructure is not simply a “special interest” that commandeers the planning process and shapes the public realm in their image (as various conservative commentators would have it). The persistent need of advocates to placate the concerns of small businesses, however, puts them into alliances with social currents that are displacing longstanding institutions and residents. The bicycle, though in principle open to all, emerges into the streetscape as an element of the mechanics of gentrification.

When talking to her membership, Jenna Burton of Red, Bike, and Green describes bike lanes in the following way: “Taking up this space is a reminder that new bike lanes obviously weren’t built for you, because if they had been they would have been there a long time ago. But they’re yours now and you aren’t going anywhere” (Burton 2013b). This contestation of the racialization of infrastructure speaks to how investment in the cyclescape has been led by and served primarily white in-migrants to “up-and-coming” neighborhoods. The alignment of bicycle infrastructure with gentrification, in
many ways one of the few routes available for urban economic development, has created a fraught political landscape for further bicycle network expansion. The perception that bike lanes serve processes of neighborhood change, or serve the interests of “outsiders,” has become commonplace. Amid residential segregation along race-class lines, the “low-hanging fruit” of implementation becomes a political liability. Moreover, bicycle infrastructure becomes a physical reminder of the unevenness of municipal investment, and an ideological motif that demonstrates the city’s aggressive promotion of some neighborhoods and neglect of others.

**Conclusion**

As in Chapter 4, it is important here to recall earlier moments in which neighborhood activists engaged with the planning process to steer growth. As in San Francisco, mobilizations surrounding the Model Cities program in the 1960s generated political communities around federally-mandated offices intended to manage discontent spurred by the dislocations of modernizing the urban fabric. These offices were turned into powerful sites of politics, even as their promise faded, by their articulation with radical currents they were intended to demobilize (Castells 1983; Rhomberg 2004).

Movements against the extension of the Grove Shafter Freeway in the 1970s and 1980s similarly galvanized political fragments in opposition to infrastructural racism (*Oakland Post* 1972; *Sun Reporter* 1979). In the 1990s, the Latino Unity Council in the Fruitvale neighborhood successfully transformed a plan for expanding parking for BART into Fruitvale Village, creating a model for community-driven transit-oriented development (Agyeman and Evans 2003).

Against this backdrop, mobilization around bicycle infrastructure planning in Oakland’s neighborhoods looks quite different. The subtle passage of bicycle advocacy from a radical promotion of human-scale mobility to the vanguard of development discourse must be considered in terms of the historical commitments of the city. Up through the Brown administration, Oakland’s focus was trained upon the rejuvenation of downtown, either through office development featuring ample parking or later transit-oriented housing and entertainment development in the New Urbanist mold. Claiming the value of cyclists for localized patterns of neighborhood growth, on Valencia Street, Telegraph Avenue, or International Boulevard, appears to be a great departure from this tradition. However, presenting *certain* cyclists as key economic actors may make the neighborhoods their daily rounds shape legible as investment spaces while also increasing the range of middle class consumers of residential space. The foregoing argument has been that these two dynamics are impossible to disentangle.

By the same token, it is worth comparing the relationship of local actors involved in producing bicycle infrastructure (bicycle advocates, citizen-planners, city officials, cyclists, residents) to the sinewy path of federal investment that enables it. In an unusual way, the political community organized around bicycle infrastructure shares the barest resemblance to groups like the Mission Coalition Organization or the West Oakland Planning Council. Federal programs to increase active transportation are filtered through
the priorities of states, master planning organizations like the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, and localities such as Oakland or San Francisco. These funds do not automatically conjure a politics that conjoins bicycle planning to economic development, any more than Model Cities conjured black radicalism in Oakland. Rather, they become a point of struggle for control over how urban space is produced, and over what the role of the state and the polity as defined will be in that process. In the case of bicycle advocacy, cyclist claims to belonging in the street, and demands for infrastructure that reflects this belonging, articulates with social powers that previous waves of political mobilization around federal investment did not. What appears self-evident now to both advocates and city officials—that bicyclists signal economic vitality—was in fact made through a discursive and material process to which racialized gentrification was critical.

The entanglement of bicycle advocacy with gentrification did not simply happen because middle-class and professional whites moved to disinvested urban cores and began bicycling. The relationship is mutually constitutive: gentrifiers who settle in accessible but disinvested locations become involved in efforts to improve the infrastructure of their neighborhoods, which in turn increases the attractiveness of the place. In places where they have met with success, such as Valencia Street, their position within the broader process of gentrification has cemented the association between cycling and economic growth. In places where they have yet to succeed, like Temescal, the discourse of the value of bicycle infrastructure has strengthened in the contest between two visions of capitalist growth. In places like East Oakland, where bicycle advocates have yet to produce coherent infrastructure plans, significant resident skepticism can be explained in part by the race-class dynamics of how cycling has achieved prominence, along with a general distrust of plans emanating from the city.

As gentrification has accelerated, due mainly to forces beyond the bicycle, the framing of bicycle infrastructure as an economic development strategy has become increasingly persuasive, and cities now act upon this narrative in ways that do contribute to gentrification. What was originally a pragmatic approach to the power of property interests to halt the planning process is now a commonsense understanding within bicycle advocacy. An entire epistemic infrastructure connects national, regional, and local advocacy, design firms, and consultants via online “communities of consciousness.” Mayors draw on evidence from other successful cities, municipal bicycle-pedestrian planners bring in planners from elsewhere to convince skeptical colleagues, and advocacy organizations import outreach techniques and materials from throughout the advocacy world. Local efforts draw on the authority of these long networks, while broader organizations depend on localized successes for evidence that cycling helps a city’s bottom line. The sites where these claim achieve traction, however, are racialized landscapes undergoing rapid flux, places where the question of who belongs to the new city is answered with infrastructure. In this way, a new regime of livable streets is incompletely worked into the broader reorganization of urban space that Oakland is now pursuing. This happens in ways that substitute a livable order—a capitalist space of “quality of life” (Gottdiener 1985; Lefebvre 1992)—in place of the livelihoods of residents not riding gentrification’s rising tide.
The stakes of livable streetscaping become clear when considering what kinds of subjects already use bicycles in the areas of Oakland experiencing gentrification, and who the bike lanes anticipate. Just west of Telegraph Avenue, beneath the “MacArthur Maze,” made up of the various overpasses that connect the MacArthur and Grove Shafter Freeways, is an infrastructural netherworld within a stone’s throw of some of Oakland’s most rapid gentrification. Here, dozens of homeless people live in lean-tos, in tents, or out under blankets. Among them, bicycles are ubiquitous, enabling relatively rapid movement for people who cannot afford bus fare. Bicycles help these residents tow valuable recyclable material on their daily rounds throughout the neighborhood. Even with dilapidated bicycles with multiple shopping carts in tow increase their mobility. The destination of these recyclers lies several blocks west, at the corner of 34th and Peralta Streets, in the Dogtown neighborhood at the northern end of West Oakland. There, a hulking metal recycling center named Alliance Metals, occupies the entire northeast block, a classic example of a noxious use now being overtaken by the conversion of industrial land to residential infill. On the way to Alliance Metals, these cyclists traverse a dangerous uncontrolled intersection on San Pablo Avenue, which cuts through the grid at a diagonal. Living at 34th and Martin Luther King Way, just at the rear edge of gentrification’s first wave, I frequently watched recyclers negotiate complex traffic, speed bumps, road debris, and hostile drivers as they towed their cargo.

These unwanted cyclists themselves constitute a “noxious use” to members of the Dogtown Neighborhood Association, which was formed by in-migrants to the several condo complexes and post-industrial lofts built in the neighborhood during the 1990s. Recyclers congregate in the park directly opposite Alliance Metals, which is perceived as a site of drug use, violence, and other social disorders. A frequent topic of neighborhood meetings and online invectives alike, the facility they depend on represents the waning industrial West Oakland, not the zone of opportunity now undergoing reinvestment. No infrastructure has been installed to make these cyclists’ daily rounds safer. No advocates seek these cyclists’ opinions on where infrastructure should be located. Nobody courts the support of small business owners by touting the value of their discretionary income. In the context of contemporary bike culture, they are not “cyclists” but bike users, whose dilapidated machines are as likely to be stolen as trash-picked and cobbled together. These “invisible cyclists” do not appear as subjects of infrastructure (Schmidt 2011; Newton 2011).

Aggregated public comment on the WOSP affirmed residents’ interests both in better bicycle facilities and the relocation of recycling facilities (City of Oakland 2014). With Peralta Avenue scheduled for streetscaping as part of the West Oakland Specific Plan (WOSP), which will also zone out noxious industry, bicycle infrastructure will arrive just as Alliance Metals and other recycling facilities are relocated away to the Oakland Army Base redevelopment site. With no fewer than ten recycling centers occupying the WOSP’s “opportunity areas,” the creative destruction of the livelihoods they support, however parasitically, will open up valuable space for housing investment. Some of those who already use bicycles for their daily rounds will be driven from the area by this change.
This sorting of cyclists into valued populations is a process without a single author. It is produced in a crucible of dramatic neighborhood change, the need to transform streets in order to enable denser residential development, the politicization of the environmentalist dimensions of bicycle usage, and a history of racialized dispossession. It occurs within a city where two successive mayors have publicly argued that growth must not simply proceed through gentrification; recently elected Libby Schaaf has declared that Oakland’s future would be for Oaklanders. In recent decades, bicycle advocates have made strong claims to mattering in urban space—to meriting the allocation of resources and arrangement of space into durable configurations that reduce the likelihood of their avoidable deaths. These claims have taken on an economic vocabulary that depends on an articulation of race, class, age, and geography that marks the ascendancy of certain cyclists as the city’s future. The political labor that it will require for advocates to make good on their claims to social justice, however, has barely begun.
Conclusion: Toward a Politics of the Impossible

At the end of a piece in Salon entitled, “It’s Time to Love the Bus,” Will Doig writes, “The bus suffers from an image problem. But not long ago, so did bicycles. Now bikes are the cool kid’s transport, and all it took was a little investment and some reputation rehab” (2012). Part of this “reputation rehab” came with the efforts discussed in this dissertation, as bicycle advocates in cities throughout the US to prove the economic benefits of bicycle infrastructure investment, just at a moment when the reversal of “white flight” accelerated the racialized transformation of urban space.

Bicycle infrastructure is now seen as an inexpensive way to redeem disinvested spaces, abjected bodies, and car-dependent cities. It is part of the suite of investments in livability that proves a city’s capacity to attract labor “talent” (Florida 2011; Katz and Wagner 2014)—a racialized category dominated by highly paid, middle-class white and Asian college graduates. This “talent” tends to outcompete existing working class residents for housing near the central business district. Bicycle infrastructure also allows cities to take visible action on climate change—though results are difficult to measure—without large capital expenditures on new transportation systems. Bicycles have come to represent, as Doig indicates above, a very different set of users of urban space. The political communities that have formed around bicycling have been integral to changing the valence of the word “urban” itself, from signifying crime and decay to excitement and possibility. This shift in tacit meaning has involved a shift in the populations who are targets of urban development policy, from the racialized poor to the equally racialized (white) “new middle class.” The former now come under the gaze of the carceral state, as gang injunction zones now neatly overlap with prime real estate areas and gentrified areas hire private security patrols (E. K. Arnold 2011; Lo 2014).

What of those who appear as vestiges of the old, pre-renaissance city? When I began this research project in 2009, the relationship between bicycle infrastructure investment and gentrification was rarely discussed. The notion that bicycling, which was not only cheap but also ecologically positive, could contribute negatively to urban space, seemed counterintuitive. I recall an argument at a friend’s dinner party that ended with, “Well, would you rather there be liquor stores on every corner?” As with so many debates on gentrification, my attempts to understand the bicycle’s role in the process frequently met with a zero-sum implication: make urban spaces more livable and risk their gentrification, or keep them run-down to keep them affordable. This perfectly illustrates the aporia of the neoliberal city, its perverse bargain: when any aspect of urban space is potentially capitalized, it seems that only abjection can save a place for economic diversity.

These antagonisms are symptomatic of the fundamentally contradictory process within which bicycle infrastructure planning unfolds. Bicycle facilities planners have a
broad mandate to create an equitable distribution of infrastructure across the city, and plans are voted on and adopted by city governments. Overt and organized support for bicycle infrastructure is often more easily found in gentrifying neighborhoods however, where the need for access to the central business district evinces identifiable demand for specific bicycle routes. This is compounded by the efforts of bicycle advocates, who have made remarkable gains on the strength of a growing body of research showing the spending patterns of cyclists. While bicycle advocates may have the attention of mayors and some councilmembers, bicycle planners often remain marginalized within the bureaucracy, and contend with entrenched codes that were designed to facilitate automobility above all else. Fine-grained data exist only for work commutes by bicycle, meaning that planners do not have a good idea of how many cyclists their jurisdiction contains. Ride surveys, an effort to overcome these limitations, tend to measure well-traveled routes to the central business district at standard commute times, reinforcing this bias. Pushing through a piece of bicycle infrastructure can be politically costly if it is not well-utilized by cyclists, and elected officials are loath to be on record overturning established level of service guidelines in for a “special interest.” Within these constraints, is it at all surprising that bicycle infrastructure tracks gentrification, and often reinforces it?

This is the terrain of the possible on which bicycle planning currently operates. In what follows, I will sketch three dynamics currently underway that stand to further reconfigure what is possible. Though efforts at race-class inclusion, larger-scale bicycle sharing systems, and more holistic regional planning signal opportunities for a more just cyclescape, they also set in train new sets of contradictions.

Inclusion vs. Transformation: The Equity Advisory Council

Humor broached the topic of cycling and gentrification largely before advocates did. The website Stuff White People Like listed bikes at #61, between the Toyota Prius and “Knowing what’s best for poor people,” while BikeSnobNYC poked fun at the “Great Hipster Silk Route” of Kent Avenue in Brooklyn.¹ When the issue began to receive more coverage in the advocacy press, it was often minimized by reference to the affordability and accessibility of cycling. Nevertheless, in cities like Washington, D.C. and Portland the alignment of bicycle infrastructure investment with racialized gentrification begun to create ideological obstacles to advocacy work. More subtly, the perception that bike lanes are for people other than the existing residents of working class neighborhoods, particularly people of color, dogs advocates in ways that do not make it to the “official transcript.”

Since the early 2010s, through their deepening involvement in infrastructural development, bicycle advocates have become entangled in the urban process with all of its contradictions and exclusions. Some of the exclusions already present in bicycle

advocacy, historically dominated by white men, have become more visible in the process. Around 2012, bicycle advocates began discussing racial equity in the bike movement at a national level, and in 2013 the League of American Bicyclists (LAB) created the Equity Advisory Council with a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, which convened advocates of color from across the United States. Many of its members already knew each other from having formed alternative networks of solidarity, such as United Cycling Voices, within a field where they are marked as other. Under the aegis of the Equity Council, the LAB released two reports on the issue of equity, *The New Majority: Pedaling Towards Equity* (2013) and *The New Movement: Bike Equity Today* (2014), coauthored by Adonia Lugo, Elizabeth Murphy, and Carolyn Szczepanski. Each report profiled the rapid growth of cycling among people of color, especially African-Americans and Latinos, and the steps bicycle activists of color were taking to change narratives around race and bicycling. They revealed a world of bicycle advocacy rarely glimpsed in the mainstream of the movement.

The LAB’s actions were set in motion by the on-the-ground efforts of local activists to politicize the exclusionary images and practices of the bike movement. Yet the reports themselves are remarkably anodyne. Gentrification is mentioned twice in *The New Movement*, by Jenna Burton and Chema Hernandez Gil, bilingual community organizer with the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition. “Police” as well appears only once, referenced by Allison Mannos of Multicultural Communities for Mobility in Los Angeles, one of the earliest popularizers (with Adonia Lugo) of the concept of “invisible cyclists.” The word “racism” appears in neither report. “Affordable” appears eleven times in *The New Movement* in reference to bicycling, but only three times in as “affordable housing.” One mention of affordable housing (and the only of displacement) by Mannos illustrates the stakes that, on the whole, remain hidden in the LAB narrative:

> It’s been an amazing trajectory to see our city politicians and mayor get behind transit and bike expansion in the city, but now we have to be very vigilant that these bicycle and transit expansion opportunities are equitable and don’t just displace people. We’re working with coalition partners to make sure, for instance, that transit-oriented development has affordable housing opportunities, because the last thing that our group wants to do is advocate for bike lanes in these areas and then not have a way for people to thrive and stay in their communities and not benefit from the facilities we worked so hard to win (League of American Bicyclists 2014, 12).

Rarely discussed in these narratives, is the way that the framing of inclusion relies on positing mainstream bicycle advocacy as the norm, in which advocates of color are being invited to enter. It remains whole with or without them. Yet, the Equity Advisory Council nonetheless functioned as a site at which race-class inequality and bicycle advocacy could be politicized and discursively brought together, even if within the organization of the LAB itself, that site was ultimately vacant. Ultimately, the reports reveal that vacancy itself. They show how on-the-ground actions not initiated by national-level organizations are making explicit the need to broaden the bicycling movement. Many local advocacy organizations, Bike East Bay among them, have internalized this need, and have taken steps to foreground racial justice in their activities. What the future holds for these efforts remains to be seen.
The discourse of inclusion in bicycle advocacy, which argues that the health, social, and economic benefits of bicycling should be extended to all, also remains largely a-spatial. It does not grapple with the powerful forces that are currently reshaping American cities, remaking geographies of race and class in ways that overspill the containers of issue-based politics and political boundaries alike. When working class communities of color are simply vanishing from the spaces where bicycle advocacy has worked hardest to engage in the production of space, “cultural competency” in outreach cannot be enough. When affordable housing is a primary concern, advocates armed with a narrative of benefits to business bring the wrong tools. When work is intermittent, dispersed, or difficult to access, Bike To Work Day rings hollow. While organizations like the SFBC and Bike East Bay are now foregrounding race-class equity, pursuit of race-class justice would necessarily push beyond the bicycle itself and against some alliances they have already made.

Bike Share: New Frontiers and Old Divisions

Bicycle sharing systems raise both the contradictions and stakes of the development of bicycle infrastructure to new heights. Modeled after Paris’ Velib and Barcelona’s Bixi, these systems have swept the US in the past half decade, as city leaders build the infrastructure that allows them to capitalize on the urban renaissance. Because they are capital-intensive, they prioritize efficient station performance, and thus tend to be sited in places near the central business district where cycling is already common and high ridership is expected. Since a nodal system of bicycles is only as good as the pathways between these nodes and destinations, bikeshare systems encourage infrastructure changes to support them, but these are likely to cluster in gentrified areas. Furthermore, systems are neither public utilities nor obligated to act as such—they contract with cities to gain access to the public right-of-way, but are capitalist firms. In 2014, prolific bike-share provider Alta Bicycle Share was purchased by REQX, the venture capital arm of luxury real estate firm Related Companies, revealing a perceived connection between station location and property values (Moses 2014).

The result is very high ridership by high-income white users (and in the case of Capitol Bikeshare in D.C., overwhelmingly men), and little coverage beyond core areas. As Joe Grengs has noted, this model betrays a shift away from equitable distribution of access to mobility (2005). As a black resident of Brooklyn’s Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood put it in a humorous segment on The Daily Show, “Where’s Citi-Bike where we really need it? Ain’t no Citi-Bike in the hood!” (2013). Similarly, systems in Miami and Denver are accessible only in the central business district and tourist areas. It also deepens distrust of the systems themselves. As one advocate told me in an email on her experiences with bike-share planning: “We are trying to be trusted by people who don't trust the city and simultaneously to have a seat at the city's decision-making table… and some days I want to just kick everyone in the balls because of that.” There are some efforts to reverse this course. In Philadelphia, focus groups for the roll-out of the Indego bike-share system have specifically reached out to African-Americans, particularly women, whose input for the system’s marketing was “Enough with the yuppies!” (Corbin
Boston and Minneapolis have also taken steps to build racial and economic equity concerns into system design. Despite these efforts, comprehensive coverage would bankrupt systems that are expected to be revenue-neutral. These constraints reveal the deeply reduced field of possibility for mobility justice in the neoliberal city.

The form of infrastructural roll-out presents problems as well. All bikeshare systems began with a pilot located in areas expected to perform well. In the San Francisco Bay Area, for instance, Phase 1 has tightly cleaved to the commutes of professional workers, allowing access from the high-cost commuter rail CalTrain system to the Financial District and South of Market in San Francisco and the Peninsula cities of Redwood City, Palo Alto, Mountain View, and San Jose. Essentially, the system has created a Silicon Valley transit district, linked by commuter rail, stretching across several jurisdictions. A system expansion is planned for the Mission District and Oakland and Berkeley in the East Bay, and planning documents include statements in support of greater equity in station distribution, especially for “underserved” communities. I have spoken with Oakland city staffers who are committed to these efforts. Yet with Oakland becoming a new horizon of investment in the tech economy, if the category of “underserved” is only determined spatially, it begins to look suspiciously like the rent gap, if not paired with strategies to ensure that people have equal access to these spaces. Of course, any infrastructure must be created in stages. In sharply race-class divided societies, however, these stages reveal assumptions, embedded in non-political metrics like efficiency and safety, about expected users and their priorities. Until recently, these systems have been approached as an amenity, not with the gravity that should accompany the design of an entirely new system of public mobility.

Think Regionally, Act Locally: Plan Bay Area and the Localization of Politics

The implementation of Senate Bill 375 through Plan Bay Area has institutionalized a new era of regional planning (see Chapter 1). Regional planning now has three main objectives: 1) to set targets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions; 2) to create incentives for projects consistent with regional targets; and 3) to promote regional coordination of housing and transportation “while maintaining local authority over land use decisions” (Institute for Local Government 2015). As noted above, the $320 million OneBayArea Grant program (OBAG) funds infrastructural improvements designed to support infill real estate development:

The CMA-managed program, a new incentive based funding approach, is known as the OneBayArea Grant (OBAG), which better integrates the region’s federal transportation program with land-use and housing policies by providing incentives for the production of housing with supportive transportation investments (Association of Bay Area Governments and Metropolitan Transportation Commission 2013, 14).

OBAG represents a large new funding source for complete streets projects in the Bay Area, according to a logic that internalizes a representation of bicycle infrastructure as supportive of economic growth. Through the OBAG program, complete streets projects are specifically intended to spur corridor-based investment, particularly residential
development. Bicycle and pedestrian infrastructure that “complete” a street, however, are here funded not coherently as regional transportation networks, but on a case-by-case basis as an inducement to real estate development.

Moreover, the designation of PDAs is ultimately the decision of the region’s 101 municipalities; as a creation of a regional planning body, Plan Bay Area has no powers of compulsion, leading to regional unevenness in implementation at multiple scales. First, adequately resourced municipal governments whose constituents value limited growth, like Orinda, can choose to forgo the inducements OBAG offers (Modenessi 2013). Second, within municipalities, the designation of PDAs responds to local priorities for steering growth. In practice, these are strongly shaped by histories of disinvestment, which lead cities like Oakland to identify almost all of its historically working class strongholds for reinvestment. In theory, these places are also where land can be had for the lowest cost, meaning that developers will be more eager to capitalize on this “rent gap” if the city can offer a favorable investment environment (N. Smith 1979). Moreover, areas that have not undergone disinvestment may not be asked to absorb the requirements of growth, and ABAG lacks the power to enforce housing affordability (Association of Bay Area Governments and Metropolitan Transportation Commission 2013, 45). Political fragmentation in the implementation of the regional plan thus reinforces spatial segregation.

The unevenness of funding under Plan Bay Area also augments the already fragmented character of the region’s transportation investment landscape. For instance, by means of a ballot measure, for instance, Alameda County voters in November 2014 approved, Measure BB, the extension of a half-percent sales tax increase (previously voted in by Measure B in 2000) to fund mass transit, pedestrian, and bicycle improvements. Measure BB’s passage nearly doubled Oakland’s bicycle and pedestrian facilities program overnight, and will allow the city to capitalize on demand for walkable, bicycle-friendly, transit-accessible districts proximal to downtown San Francisco and Oakland job centers. One hopes that, despite being a regressive tax, it will also allow the planners committed to a more just mobility to do the work of stitching together a fragmented cyclescape.

The shape of metropolitan planning in the Bay Area reflects the absence of a territorial agency able to impose a “structured coherence” on the region (Harvey 2003). In other words, the widespread recognition that accumulation on the extensive suburbanization model, whereby new municipalities able to control land use decisions protected property values and promised lower taxes, has stalled has not automatically led to an organizational form that can adequately express the need for regionally coordinated planning. There exists no body with the capacity to institute “creative destruction” (Schumpeter 1942; Harvey 2007b) on the scale required to reorganize this hypertrophic and polycentric region where economic and social polarization has reached new heights (Walker and Schafran 2015). Instead, in true neoliberal fashion, the telescopic governance instituted by Plan Bay Area operates through inducements to entrepreneurial behavior on the part of municipalities, and by offering “better choices” in mobility in order to reshape individual behavior. In practice, these inducements feed the creation of place-based accumulation districts around existing automobile corridors, through a model that
rewards market-rate development on devalued urban land but avoids disturbing existing pockets of low-density residential wealth. “One Bay Area” rhetoric notwithstanding, there in fact exist many Bay Areas, driven apart by the torsional effects of the current boom.

**Conclusion**

This dissertation has argued that the involvement of bicycle advocacy in the race-class remaking of urban space is a fundamentally geographical problem. In making this claim, I have connected two scales of analysis, charting the relationship between regional restructuring and the corridor-level conjunctures through which bicycling has passed into the mainstream. I have also emphasized that neither scale pre-exists the dynamics that constitute it. The local corridor would not function as it does in today’s urban political economy without the ways that bicycle advocates have made it a key site for claiming the economic value of a built environment that supports livable mobility practices. The region would not look the way it does without the violent centrifugal forces of core land markets and the racialized displacement they have provoked, as well as the search by people of color for less expensive, higher quality housing they have encouraged. In other words, the valorization of locality to which bicycling currently speaks is intimately linked to the cultural resurgence of urban cores and the denigration of exurban sprawl, with very material consequences. In its rejection of the suburb and embrace of the city, the contemporary politics of livability is racialized at both ends.

Across these scales, I have argued that the formation of bicycle advocacy into a movement to remake the physical spaces of urban mobility has led to institutional restructuring in the municipal state. This has broadened the scope of planning the streets, as well as the scope of who counts as a planner, articulating new social formations into the networks of expertise that physically make the city. Bicycle advocates have worked hard to lengthen these networks and leverage their own relative marginality, leading to the formation of large, well-funded organizations like the National Association of City Transportation Officials (NACTO), which functions as an alternative repository of power-knowledge. These moves are critical to remaking the terrain of the possible in urbanization. By building bicycle infrastructure into a narrative of urban livability and competitiveness, they make the reshaping of mobility a key part of processes of gentrification where it was not before. These dynamics ask us to move beyond the residential parcel and the commercial establishment to understand gentrification as the remaking of the material realm of the city. This involves examining who is empowered to fight for improvements to this material realm, what these improvements signify, and who ultimately will have access to the livable city. The bicycle is a unique window into these processes in motion.

Returning to the political conjunctures I have outlined above, how might we salvage the critical power of thinking through the lens of the bicycle by centering it? What would something like an alliance between Bike East Bay and Causa Justa/Just Cause look like? What kinds of claims would this permit bicycle advocates to make regarding gentrification, displacement, affordable housing, and access to jobs? How might
anti-gentrification narratives be reframed by a focus on how the loss of working class access to urban cores robs them of opportunities for active transportation? How might bicycle infrastructure be rethought not as an amenity and an improvement to quality of life but as a survival strategy and a necessity for a just metropolis? There are glimpses of these moments, such as in the coalition to stop gang injunctions in Fruitvale, which included Causa Justa/Just Cause and prison abolition organization Critical Resistance as well as Bikes 4 Life (discussed in Chapter 3) and the Bikery, a non-profit bike cooperative of people of color in East Oakland run by Cycles of Change.² The mainstream of the bicycle movement has been largely absent in these popular struggles, but this need not be the case. Greater housing affordability, for instance, could translate directly into greater rates of bicycle use if it means that working class residents of color aren’t chasing jobs and higher-quality housing into the suburbs as they have thus far. In the end, it is up to the bike movement to go beyond the bicycle. They have gone halfway, engaging questions of how urban space is produced; the second half of the journey involves the question of for whom it is produced.

In the end, the bicycle is dwarfed by the scale of the processes with which it is entangled. Yet cycling plays an intimate role in how the urban future is imagined, fought for, and enacted in the present. In the foregoing, I have explored what the burst in interest in cycling has to tell us about the changing dynamics of the production of urban space. I have tried to show the entanglement of attempts to make cities more livable places with efforts to reshape them into more effective generators of private profit. The multiple and varied social formations brought together through cycling necessarily exceed their usefulness to capital, however. They generate new potentialities even in constrained times. Nonetheless, I am convinced that the courses of action required of the situation currently facing mobility justice, in the Bay Area and elsewhere, are not yet considered politically possible. My hope in writing this is that, through conscious political struggle, they become so.

² A list of organizations opposing the injunctions can be found here: https://stoptheinjunction.wordpress.com/endorsements/ (accessed May 10, 2015).
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