The Dark Side of European Integration:
Nationalism and Radical Right Mobilization in Contemporary Europe

By
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Abstract

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Social integration—a goal integral to the European project—has not followed economic integration. The main argument I set forth here is that European economic integration is producing the very opposite of its intended goals, namely, it is leading to cultural disintegration in the form of rising nationalism and radical right mobilization. Using cross-national statistical survey data, an original longitudinal dataset, in-depth interviews, and first hand observations, I examine various aspects of how nationalism manifests in contemporary Europe: as national identity, as support for radical right political parties, and as a process of political mobilization. I focus specifically on the cultural and political consequences of the EU integration process on the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe. One consequence of European integration is Europeans’ increasing tendency to identify more with their nations than with Europe. Analysis of Eurobarometer survey data from before and after the 2007-2009 economic crisis shows that Europeans’ support for the European project is deeply tied to their identities: those who see themselves in primarily nationalist terms are more likely to oppose their country’s continued membership in the EU as well as further European integration. The EU’s response to the economic crisis drove European citizens to pull away from Europe: across all countries, Europeans saw themselves in increasingly nationalist, as opposed to European, terms. In countries that were hardest hit by the economic crisis, individuals turned towards their national governments and national identities in dramatically high numbers. European citizens have grown increasingly disillusioned with the EU, and this disillusionment, anchored by sense of detachment from the European project, has taken shape along nationalist lines.

Over the last two decades, radical right parties that advocate for ethnic vision of national belonging have garnered increasing electoral support in both Western and Eastern Europe. Comparing electoral support for such parties across 27 European countries from 1991 to 2012 shows that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, economic decline does not explain differences in the electoral success of radical right parties in Western and Eastern Europe. Support for radical right parties is lower in the less prosperous Eastern than Western Europe, and differences in immigration rates cannot explain this divergence. Rather, I find that political stability and social trust are more important determinants of support for radical right parties. Whereas higher stability decreases support for radical right parties in all European countries, the effect is much greater in Eastern Europe. In other words, when the governing regime is perceived as unstable in an Eastern European country, a radical right party is more likely to win support than in a Western European country. The greater effect of political instability in Eastern European countries may explain why support for radical right parties begins to decline in those countries after the late 1990s just as the political and economic conditions were stabilizing after the post-socialist transition. As in the West, Eastern Europeans’ have become more likely to see themselves in national, as opposed to European, terms and radical right parties have recently gained support in countries like
Hungary and Ukraine. Yet, in terms of popular support for exclusionary ethnic nationalism, it is the West that appears more backward. The fear for the “new Europe” is no longer about the integration of the East, but rather the disintegration of the West.

Large comparisons, however, can only provide a snapshot of radical right mobilization. To answer why and how individuals join radical right movements, I trace the rise of a radical right movement in Ukraine by conducting over 100 in-depth interviews between 2009 and 2012 with members of Ukraine’s radical right wing party, Freedom (Svoboda). I find that activists were primarily recruited to the movement through friendship networks, reflecting the recruitment practices of progressive social movements. A surprising finding of this case study is that even the most ardent radical right activists were ambivalent about the political aims or ideology of the party before joining. Rather, they developed well formed political beliefs after continued interaction with other activists and participation in political events. Individuals were thus radicalized through the process of mobilization. By showing that radical ideas result from the mobilization process, this finding builds on emerging research of right-wing activists challenging the underlying assumption of social movement theory that activists, and radical right activists in particular, join movements to express preexisting beliefs.

Together, the quantitative analysis and qualitative case study provide a comprehensive analysis of why and how nationalism, in its loose and strict senses, remains a gripping and powerful category for how individuals understand the world and their place in it. As such, this dissertation is an examination of the dark side of Europe’s political and cultural integration since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
For my parents, Naum Brodsky and Irina Polyakova
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Chapter One

Introduction

It remained only to decide the political shape of the new order that must now replace the unrecoverable past.
—Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*

Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create *de facto* solidarity.
—The Schuman Declaration

Ravaged by years of war, mid-twentieth century Europe was a disaster in every meaning of the word. World War II had effectively bankrupted the major European economies. Countless cities in the East and West lay wasted, and the sheer magnitude of human loss—over 60 million killed—left the European continent devastated and its remaining population exhausted. In 1945, an observer standing on the rubble of Berlin, Warsaw, or any other post-war city, would find it difficult to imagine what the future could hold. With the past effectively annihilated, a new Europe was bound to take shape, but a new Europe would have been hard to conceive from atop that rubble. Indeed, the type of economic, political, and social order that will have arisen from those ashes by the end of the twentieth century was simply unimaginable in 1945. A peaceful and prosperous Europe seemed far out of reach in the post-war years.

If our casual observer was transported from 1945 to Berlin or Warsaw in 2013, the economic prosperity of these once ruined cities would have immediately shocked her. And if she spent more time there, she would discover even more surprising and once unimaginable changes: our observer, for example, could board a train from Berlin to Rome without ever being asked to show her passport. Passing through Austria and Switzerland, she would not need to be concerned whether she was holding the appropriate documents, and upon arrival in Rome, she could use the same currency she had elsewhere throughout the continent. Shockingly, if she decided to look for a job in Italy, she could start immediately, without needing to obtain a work permit. If she was a well-educated professional, she would find others like her who considered themselves *Europeans*, just as much or even more so than Germans or Italians. Finally, she would be quite surprised to learn that the Soviet Union, which, in her time, controlled all lands up to the German border, and even half of Berlin, no longer exists, and that most of the once socialist East Bloc republics now constitute a twenty-seven country union, replete with its own supra-national political institutions. The rhetorical device of the World War II observer only goes so far, but it does illustrate the dramatic micro and macro changes that have taken place in Europe in the last seventy years.

Many of these changes, such as the Schengen zone agreement—which allows for the free movement of individuals between countries—and the common currency of the Euro have made contemporary Europe feel more like a single country than a collection of once warring nation-states. The European Union, which began as a coal and mining partnership under the Schuman Plan, now stretches from Lisbon to Romania. The Balkan states and Turkey are candidate countries, and, further east, countries like Ukraine are waiting to sign association agreements. Thus, step-by-step, Europe has become ever more economically and politically interdependent; meanwhile EU member states have prospered tremendously in the
process. Among the EU’s most important achievements has been the maintenance of long-
term peace on the continent. In recognition of this, the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize in 2012 “for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and
reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (Nobel Committee 2012). From our
2013 vantage, another World War on Europe’s soil is practically unthinkable.

But economic and political interdependence was never the sole goal of European
integration to the architects of the EU project. Enshrining the notion of European social
solidarity, representatives from France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Luxembourg gathered to sign the Schuman Declaration in 1950, which laid the groundwork
for what would become the European Union. Likely, economic and political interdependence
would have been enough to prevent future wars, but even in the devastating aftermath of
World War II, the vision of a new Europe emphasized cultural integration. The Schuman
Declaration envisioned an economic and political institutional framework that would
eventually engender a cultural and social solidarity throughout Europe. As Jean Monnet, who
along with Schuman is known as one of the founders of the European Union, famously
declared in 1952, “We are not forming coalitions of states, we are uniting men.” As
Monnet’s vision suggests, New Europe was to be a social union of European citizens
grounded in the common historical and philosophical heritage of Enlightenment ideals. It was
to be the beacon of democracy and tolerance. And Europe’s common currency, the Euro, was
to be more than a medium of exchange: it was to mark a uniquely European identity.¹

In many ways, the European Union has lived up to this ideal of supra-national
solidarity: compared to fifty or even twenty years ago, more Europeans speak foreign
languages, spend significant time outside their country, and identify as Europeans (Fligstein
2008; Risse 2010). These trends do provide some evidence for increasing cultural integration,
but scholars examining European identity agree that no overarching sense of “Europeanness”
has emerged (Fligstein et al. 2012). For every individual that identifies solely as European,
there are ten times as many who see themselves in strictly national terms (see Chapter 2).
Residents of Europe continue to identify primarily as German, Italian, or Romanian. In fact,
many see the EU as an elitist project, imposed from the top on an unwilling population.

This charge of elitism may stem from the fact that the average European rarely
interacts with any of the major EU institutions, such as the European Parliament. Yet, EU
politics have become increasingly influential in national politics (Risse 2010). Rather than
embracing this influence, many individuals—especially those who do not see themselves as
benefitting from the EU project—feel not only disconnected from the EU but resentful of its
interference in what were once national issues. The 2008 economic crisis intensified these
sentiments, as national governments—without control over their national currency—
helplessly failed to abate the crisis (see Chapter 2). Further, the EU’s highly unpopular
austerity policies pushed through in already hard hit countries, such as Spain, Greece, and
Italy, have confirmed the sentiment that EU policies benefit European elites at the expense of
the majority. Unevenness—between countries and individuals—thus characterizes New
Europe more so than cultural unity.

The Dark Side of Europe

As Europe, through the EU, has moved toward greater supra-national integration,
another side of European identity and politics has emerged. If our time traveler from 1945
remained in modern day Europe, she would notice that in some of Western Europe’s most

¹ France’s finance minister, Laurent Fabius, upon the introduction of the Euro was quoted in the London
Financial Times: “Thanks to the Euro, our pockets will soon hold solid evidence of a European identity. We
need to build on this, and make the euro more than a currency and Europe more than a territory…” (Financial
prosperous economies, such as those in Austria, France, Holland, Italy, and Switzerland, voters support radical right parties in shockingly high numbers. Such political parties advocate for everything that the European Union claims it does not: intolerance toward “non-European” immigrants, stricter border controls, exclusionary social redistribution policies, and, most importantly, preservation of national tradition and culture. At the core of the radical right’s ideology is nationalism in its ethnic form (Hainsworth 2008), which “condense[s] the idea of nation into an image of collective homogeneity” (Minkenberg 2002:337). Once considered ephemeral phenomena, radical right parties have become a mainstay in the very countries that are supposed to lead Europe toward the fulfillment of enlightenment ideals. The persistence of these parties and the continued salience of national identities signal that, behind Europe’s many exalted achievements, lies a dark side.

This dissertation is about that dark side of Europe. Specifically, I examine various aspects of how nationalism, in the loose and strict sense, manifests in contemporary Europe: as national identity, as support for radical right political parties, and as a process of political mobilization. There is no single narrative thread woven through the chapters. This project was not conceived as a book. Rather, each of the four chapters focuses on a question of nationalism. The paradox uniting all the chapters is the seeming contradiction between Europe’s EU project of cultural integration and the continued salience and perseverance of nationalism as an ideology, category of belonging, and political project.

The EU project is unique: no other international pact, treaty or alliance in modern history has sought to create a supranational union through voluntary inclusion that nonetheless maintains each member state’s sovereignty and autonomy. Yet, the EU has state-like aspirations: it has established political institutions, such as a parliament, presidency, and judicial court. It issues currency through a central bank and has created symbols indicative of nation states, such as a flag and anthem. Most notably, it has created a new category of belonging: nationals of all member states now carry EU passports. It is likely that, over time, EU institutions and symbols will become increasingly influential. However, cultural unity has not followed political and economic integration. Nationalism, rather than fading away or being subsumed by supranational processes, has instead gained momentum. The emergence and continued electoral success of radical right parties and continued persistence of national identities confirms this. How can social scientists reconcile these contradictory yet interconnected processes of supranational development on the one hand and nationalist persistence and expansion on the other?

The Polanyian Moment

One way to think about this is to consider the relationship between markets and society. In The Great Transformation (1944), Karl Polanyi analyzed the societal responses to the implementation of self-regulating markets in nineteenth century Europe. According to Polanyi, the relationship between markets and society is characterized by what he referred to as a “double movement.”

In the first stage of the movement, there is an attempt from political and economic elites to implement a “pure” liberal, self-regulating market. In contrast to neoclassical economic theory, however, Polanyi argued that unfettered self-regulating markets are an objective impossibility. Markets require the commodification of previously uncommodified resources: primarily, land, labor, and money. Polanyi referred to these three resources as “fictitious commodities” because they are not actual goods produced for the purpose of

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2 I do not suggest that nationalism is either a homogenous category or a morally negative concept. Increasing salience of national identities, and perhaps even “popular nationalism” (DiMaggio and Bonikowski 2008), is, however, an unintended consequence of the EU integration process, the aim of which was to create supranational categories of belonging.
exchange. Labor and land are particularly central to Polanyi’s analysis because, unlike money, the life of man depends on these resources. When these resources are treated as commodities in a market economy, there are potentially disastrous consequences for both society and the environment. For example, labor markets rely on a pool of “free,” or readily available, workers to provide a renewable and replaceable source of labor for industrial expansion. If states cannot or do not intervene in labor markets to institute social safety nets or to regulate employers’ labor practices, the logic of the market dictates that employers will seek to lower the costs of labor by either lowering wages or by moving production to where cheaper labor exists, that it, to developing countries. Workers must bear the consequences of unregulated global and industrial development by living in poverty and dealing with unbearable working conditions. This result of commodifying labor has been verified time and again at the national and global scales. A similarly disastrous consequence of unfettered self-regulating markets occurs when land is treated as a market commodity: without intervention, self-regulating markets use land—the basis for human life—as an input for industrial production irrespective of the environmental consequences. Thus, according to Polanyi, self-regulating markets will eventually destroy the very inputs (labor, land) on which they depend, and with it, the social fabric.

For these reasons, Polanyi argued that a self-regulating market is a theoretical utopia. As markets ravage society and nature, people will eventually resist. This resistance to the disembedding of markets from social relations is what Polanyi referred to as the countermovement, or the attempt to re-embed the market into social relations. For Polanyi, self-regulating markets can never exist in their pure form without dire consequences; markets—by their very nature—are embedded in society, the polity, or culture. Extreme attempts to free markets from social relations will eventually result in a protectionist movement that seeks to ensure the continuation of those social relations: the second phase of the double movement.

One of Polanyi’s greatest insights is that the protective countermovement can take various forms, depending on whether it comes from the right or the left. In Scandinavian countries, for example, social democracy developed to mitigate the effects of market liberalism following World War I. Later, in the United States, FDR’s New Deal attempted to counteract the disastrous social impact of the Great Depression. However, in Germany and Italy, the countermovement came from the right and resulted in inter-war fascism. Both social democracy and fascism were responses to re-embed markets in society. Interestingly, and in contrast to the liberal economic view, Polanyi insisted that the countermovement develops spontaneously, while the imposition of markets is a political project. As he famously put it, “laissez-faire was planned; planning was not” (1944:147).

Polanyi’s insights remain applicable today. Specifically, Polanyi’s theoretical framework provides analytical tools for considering the relationship between the EU project and nationalism as a category of identification and political movement. The EU’s most impressive accomplishment to date has been the establishment a unified market. However, while we may refer colloquially to Europe and the EU interchangeably, as Anderson (2009) points out, these are not the same thing. The EU is an economic, political, and cultural project. Some groups have benefitted from this project while others have been left behind. Like any liberal market, the single EU market has increased inequality both between and within countries. It has freed financial capital from regulation by nation states while allowing for the free movement of labor across borders. Further, the single currency has amputated the economic arms of national governments, hindering their respective ability to manage the social costs of economic crisis. For example, during the 2008 financial crisis, nations were forced to implement EU-driven austerity policies that cut deeply into social benefits, such as pensions and unemployment payments. In the interest of saving the financial system, these
policies have exacerbated the economic effects of the crisis and have pushed already 
struggling groups into further destitution. As unemployment soared across Europe, mass anti-
EU protests erupted in countries like Spain, Greece, Italy, and Portugal. In Italy, the ruling 
government went into crisis, forcing the prime minister to resign, and in Great Britain, where 
the Euro was never adopted, support for further EU integration plummeted.

With EU member states incorporated into a single economy, nation states lost the 
ability to protect their populations from volatile market forces. The EU’s political and 
regulatory institutions, such as the European Central Bank and the EU Commission, remain 
relatively weak in comparison to the economic institutions (for instance, most measures 
aimed at regulation are difficult to pass as they require a unanimous vote from all member 
states). Without national currencies and without control over interest rates, state regulations 
simply cannot create protective social measures, as was the usual strategy prior to the 
 adoption of the Euro. The volatility of the EU market also affects countries that have not 
adopted the Euro, simply due to its sheer size and influence. Thus, the institution of the single 
market and currency means that the protective countermovement cannot come from national 
governments unless those governments drastically shift their position toward the EU. If the 
national government fails to protect its people from the incursion of the market, the 
countermovement must emerge from society.

Nationalism and Radical Right Parties: Symptoms of a Countermovement?

The question, then, is whether nationalism constitutes a countermovement to the 
European economic project. Specifically, is the emergence of populist radical right parties 
and the increasing salience of national identity evidence of an emerging protective movement 
responding to the single European market?

There is some evidence supporting the idea that the emergence of radical parties, 
initially in Western and then in Eastern Europe, constitutes a backlash to the EU project. 
Aside from the Greens, radical right parties represent the only new party family to emerge in 
post-war Western Europe since the 1980s. The first among these parties, the French National 
Front (FN), gained momentum when the party received 9.5 percent of the vote in the 1986 
French parliamentary elections and Le Pen—FN’s leader—received 14.4 percent in the 1988 
presidential election. Since then, other radical right parties in Western Europe, such as the 
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Belgian Vlaams Belang (VB), the Dutch Party for 
Freedom (PVV), and the Italian National Alliance (AN) have succeeded in gaining 
parliamentary representation and increasing popular support. Scholars initially regarded 
radical right parties’ electoral successes as anomalous or as a result of single issues, but by 
2012, radical right parties had become political fixtures in the majority of Western European 
countries (see Chapter 3). The chronology of the radical right’s initial emergence in the 1980s 
and subsequent rise in the 1990s and 2000s coincides with the increasing economic 
integration of the EU: the Maastricht Treaty, which established the membership criteria for 
the EU, was signed in 1993, the Treaty of Lisbon, which consolidated previous agreements, 
was signed in 2007, and the Euro was introduced in 2000. Additionally, the EU more than 
doubled in size during this period, from 12 member states in 1990 to 27 in 2010.

In addition to the EU’s development and the rise of radical right parties, two other 
interrelated and wide reaching socio-economic changes took place at the same time in 
Europe: the end of welfare state expansion in the early 1970s and the abandonment of 
Keynesian economics in favor of neoliberal free market policies. In the West, the thirty year 
period directly following World War II saw a significant increase in public expenditures. 
Before World War II, state support took the form of traditional relief systems rather than 
general social insurance; that is, it aimed exclusively to secure the most destitute strata of the 
population (Quadagno 1987). Between 1945 and 1973, social welfare programs proliferated
across the Western world. Commonly regarded as the “Golden Era” of the welfare state, this period was characterized by the expansion of social welfare programs, spanning from minimum relief projects to a “comprehensive system of universal benefits, guaranteeing workers a basic standard of living” (111). Of course, the social policies instituted varied in their content and timing. For instance, the United States did not develop a national welfare state system and left the responsibility of determining eligibility to states. Sweden, on the other hand, implemented a centralized social provision system with universal access (see Esping-Andersen 1990).

The Golden Era of welfare state expansion came to a close in 1973, the year of the OPEC crisis. This year usually marks the end of a series of political and economic events that led to a dramatic shift in economic policies across Western countries (Stephens et al. 1999). Stagflation following the Vietnam War, the abandonment of the Bretton Woods institutions, including the gold standard in 1971, and increasing unemployment combined to shake the belief that Keynesian public policies could continue to drive economic growth and welfare expansion. In the Golden Era of welfare state expansion, Keynesian economic policies had provided the scientific rationale for using state investment to bolster economic development. But as Keynesian policies failed to stabilize the economic downturn of the recession (Offe 1984), European countries with generous welfare regimes alongside states with more modest ones—like the United States and the United Kingdom—became increasingly concerned with their ability to maintain levels of social spending (Clayton and Pontusson 1998).

One solution to the Keynesian problem came in the form of neoliberal economic policies, which aimed to cut public spending, deregulate financial markets, and reduce government intervention in the economy. By the 1980s, as Thatcher and Reagan led the assault on social spending and labor unions, neoliberalism became the dominant economic creed. At the national level, neoliberal austerity forced welfare state development to shift from expansion to retrenchment. Chronologically, the (re)emergence of neoliberalism as the dominant economic ideology, the increase in welfare state retrenchment, the establishment of the single European market and currency, and the emergence of populist radical right parties all occurred almost simultaneously, following a series of political and economic changes that began in the early 1970s.

Given the confluence of these processes, some social scientists have framed the EU’s push toward deeper cross-national integration as part of a broader neoliberal class project driven by political and economic elites (Anderson 2009; Apelldoor 2002; Carfuny and Ryner 2003; Gill 1998; Grahl and Teague 1989; Hermann 2007). For example, writing about the European Monetary Union, Gill (1998) argues that the Union “can be comprehended as part of a set of policies that has shifted the European Union towards a neoliberal and financial, as opposed to a social market or social democratic, model of capitalism” (9). In a similar vein, Hermann (2007) contends that EU expansion is inherently a neoliberal project that was strategically planned and implemented by financial and political interest groups even prior to World War II. According to Hermann, European integration was used as a vehicle for propagating the neoliberal agenda by transnational economic and political elites: “the European integration process was used to adopt mainstream neoliberal policies and thereby circumvent and erode those state traditions and national compromises that, in the past, gave Europe its distinctiveness” (61). The result of the EU’s neoliberal economic project is dilution and homogenization of European national cultures.

As Polanyi emphasized, capitalist expansion is dependent on state institutions to mitigate the social effects of laissez-faire by providing social protections and ensuring political stability. The dynamic of the double movement is captured in the contradiction between capitalist or market interests and national institutions: at the same time as capital interests seek to free themselves from the constraints imposed by state institutions, they still
remain dependent on these institutions to provide facilitating conditions for the continued functioning of markets. One consequence of this dynamic is that despite some welfare state retrenchment, national governments across Europe continue to provide social protection in conjunction with neo-liberal labor market reforms to maintain social consensus (Apeldoorn 2003). In this sense, neoliberalism remains embedded in social institutions, which are, nonetheless, subordinated to the interests of transnational capital.

This critical perspective treats EU integration as a proxy for neoliberal expansion. Following this logic, a reaction against the EU can thus be interpreted as a response to the destructive consequences of market liberalization and deregulation on the national social fabric. Indeed, Euroskepticism, or disenchantment with EU integration and distrust of EU institutions, has been increasing since the 2007-2009 economic crisis. The most recent survey to assess European attitudes toward the EU—the Pew annual telephone survey, released in May 2013—found sharp drops in support for the European project across all surveyed countries since the crisis (Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Poland, and Czech Republic). In Chapter 2, Neil Fligstein and I show that in countries most affected by the crisis, Europeans identify more with their nations as opposed to Europe. There is also evidence to suggest that continued support for radical right parties in Western Europe goes hand in hand with rising Euroskepticism, which has become a staple feature of radical right parties’ political ideology (Mudde 2007). Some studies have found, for example, that a Euroskeptic attitude is a better predictor for whether an individual is likely to vote for a radical right party than anti-immigrant or xenophobic attitudes (Gomez-Reino and Llamazares 2011). This emerging research implies that disenchantment with the EU, and, by extension, the EU’s free market economic policies, manifesting in terms of support for radical right parties and rising nationalism.

To go back to the question posed at the beginning of this section: are radical right parties and nationalism signs of a protective countermovement against the EU’s neoliberal policies (the Polanyian hypothesis)? Initial evidence does suggest that anti-EU sentiments are driving some of the support for radical right parties and rise of nationalist identities. But Polanyi himself did not provide much guidance on what constitutes a countermovement to market liberalization. In his organicist formulation, the countermovement occurs spontaneously: there are no specified mechanisms for its emergence or signs that can distinguish between non-countermovement and countermovement responses. Such determinations can only be made in hindsight, and the European project is still unfolding.

What is clear, however, is that anti-EU political ideologies are proving to be effective mobilization frames for the radical right, and anti-EU attitudes rise when the European economy stumbles. These trends are signs of resistance to further EU integration. And as the following chapters show, there are underlying conditions and political actors driving this resistance along cultural, as opposed to economic, lines.

Even at the height of the EU economic crisis, a new economic model based on socialist principles was never considered as a possible alternative. At the national level, politics shifted to the left in some of the core European countries, such as France and Germany. In France, for example, Francois Hollande became the first socialist president to be elected in almost twenty years. In Germany, Chancellor Merkel’s center-right party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) saw large losses in regional elections in 2013, placing the CDU and its pro-EU leader in a precarious position for the September 2013 federal elections. Despite these shifts in national politics, however, on the whole the EU moved further toward neoliberal austerity measures as a solution to struggling member states’ sovereign debt crises. Austerity policies have proven to be deeply unpopular. In some of the

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3 On January 1st, 2013, the Fiscal Compact agreement that was signed by every member state except Czech Republic and the United Kingdom came into effect. The agreement stipulates that all member states’ budget
most troubled economies, such as Greece, a critique of austerity measures allowed the radical right party, Golden Dawn, to receive its highest level of electoral support (7 percent in the 2012 parliamentary elections). A version of the party’s slogan—“Greece for the Greeks”—is shared by almost all radical right parties in Europe. Parties such as Golden Dawn are not proposing clear economic solutions (see Mudde 2007), rather, they rely on cultural frames of national loss and ethnic belonging.

As Mudde (2007) has argued, cultural issues have trumped economic ones in radical right party platforms. Two historical characteristics of radical right parties provide evidence for this assertion: first, Western European radical right parties’ shift from neoliberal economic policies in the 1980s to protectionism in the 1990s, and second, the subsequent disappearance of economic policies in favor of cultural issues in the radical right’s political ideologies. When radical right parties initially emerged in the 1980s, their ideological platforms were squarely neoliberal. Writing in 1995, Kitschelt and McGann proposed that the main reason for the radical right’s electoral success was that such parties had found a “winning formula” for gaining popular support: the combination of neoliberal economic policy and anti-immigrant rhetoric. Radical right parties, rather than reacting to market reforms, rode the wave of neoliberal ideology, at least initially. By the 1990s, radical right parties in Western Europe, had shifted their platforms away from neoliberalism and toward a form of protectionism that some scholars have called “welfare chauvinism,” which supports continued welfare expansion but only to the national ethnic majority (Mudde 1999). This ideological shift allowed radical right parties to attract more working class voters leading to a “proletariatization” of the radical right in the 1990s (Mudde 2007). But since then, the importance of economic issues to the parties’ ideological agendas has significantly declined.

Rather than proposing clear economic policies to combat the effects of labor market reforms, radical right parties have shifted their focus to cultural issues, such as loss of language, national heritage, and cultural practices that define their vision of national belonging. The most successful radical right parties, such as the Swiss People’s Party, the National Front, and the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List and Party for Freedom, have begun to style themselves as protectors of the civic liberal tradition, which they have successfully framed along national lines (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). In these party narratives, the EU has become a threat to national sovereignty, and non-European Muslim immigrants have become the scapegoats for the loss of national values and the threat to liberal democratic ideals. Cultural issues, rather than economic demands, have become the key to catapulting the radical right into the political limelight since the 1990s. The radical right’s ability to mobilize around cultural issues may also help explain why economic changes do not adequately predict the electoral fortunes of such parties and why the radical right has been more electorally successful in wealthier Western European countries as opposed to economically troubled Eastern European countries (see Chapter 3).

In sum, Polanyi’s theory of movement and countermovement dynamics provides an elegant framework for understanding some of the changes that have taken place in Europe since 1945. In a prescient moment, Polanyi himself foreshadowed the emergence of a more economically integrated Europe, predicting that European states would move toward economic cooperation to mitigate the effects of the commodification of land, labor, and capital (1944:262). Even Polanyi, however, could not have predicted the extent of European integration brought on by the EU project. But whereas the economic integration project has been successful, the cultural and political consequences are still developing.
Polanyi’s theory helps make sense of the apparent contradiction between European economic integration and the persistence of nationalism, or what I refer to as the dark side of the European project. Rather than contradictory, Polanyi suggests that European integration and nationalism go hand-in-hand. The findings here tend to confirm this Polanyian point. However, the evidence presented in this dissertation is also a challenge to Polanyi’s organicist vision of the countermovement. Social actors enmeshed in a particular socio-political context are actively driving resistance to the EU project: radical right political parties and movements are consciously engaged in framing the economic consequences of EU integration in nationalist terms. The underlying conditions and micro-processes of right-wing political mobilization are analyzable. Spontaneity, while inherently part of all social movements, does not adequately describe what we clearly see in contemporary Europe, namely, the expansion of nationalist identities and radical right political movements across European societies. While perhaps not as planned or coherent as *laissez-faire*, contemporary Europe’s turn towards nationalism follows discernable patterns and involves identifiable social agents.

**Themes and Roadmap**

In its broadest sense, this dissertation is about tracing the discernable facets of nationalist resistance and revealing the macro and micro processes of their development. To that end, I examine nationalism as it manifests in terms of identity, political parties, and mobilization processes. Each of the four chapters addresses a different aspect of this theme, and each is written as a stand alone piece. As such, the dissertation follows a thematic, as opposed to a narrative, structure with three empirical chapters (Chapters 2, 3, and 4) and one theoretical chapter (Chapter 5). Chapter 2 (together with Neil Fligstein) examines nationalism in terms of national belonging, or nationalism in the loose sense. Chapter 3 analyzes electoral support for radical right parties as an indicator for the appeal of ethnic nationalism, or nationalism in the strict sense. Chapter 4 uses a case study of the rise of a radical right movement to trace the micro-processes of nationalist political mobilization. And Chapter 5 is a critical review of the social movement literature in which I formulate an alternative, field theoretical framework, for rethinking the relationship between challenger political parties and social movements. Chapter 5 is not meant as a frame for the empirical chapters, which is why it appears last. Each of the empirical chapters contains its own research question(s), literature review, and methodology. Rather than reproducing those elements here, I briefly outline the various ways in which I use the concept of “nationalism.” This is not meant as an exhaustive review on the topic, which is beyond the scope of this introduction, but rather as a guide to the divergent meanings of nationalism that appear in what follows.

Social scientists have long been concerned with the study of nationalism, but its definition has remained elusive and contested (Breuilly 1985; Brubaker 1996, 2004; Calhoun 1993). One school of thought defines nationalism as a loose cultural concept. This notion stems from Ernst Gellner’s early theoretical formulations on the modern organization of nations according to a common language and culture. Gellner, perhaps one of the first social scientists to devote scholarly attention to the topic, understood nationalism as a sort of cultural pool in which individuals who are part of a national group can, like fish, swim comfortably (Gellner 1981:765). The pool metaphor highlights that, for Gellner, nationalism was a fluid concept rather than a category of exclusion. Language and culture, as opposed to rigid ethnic identity, defined nation-states for Gellner, a point which lead him to emphasize nationalism as “a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983:1). Anderson’s (1983) now famous depiction of the nation as an “imagined community” of belonging based on culturally constructed traditions
echoes Gellner’s original formulation. Whereas Gellner’s emphasis is on the political aspect of nationalism as a strategic (elite) project, Anderson’s conceptualization highlights the cultural element of national belonging. Both scholars agree that nationalism is a process that, to paraphrase Gellner, invents nations where there are none (Gellner 1964). Similarly, what Billig (1995) termed “banal nationalism” refers to a set of loose, mundane, and taken-for-granted cultural ideas, symbols, and practices. Thus, when individuals invoke national categories of belonging, such as “French” or “Romanian,” they are usually referring to this set of deeply embedded schemas, traditions, and practices encompassed in the image of nationhood.

In Chapter 2, Fligstein and I focus on the loose definition of nationalism by examining how the 2007-2009 financial crisis affected Europeans’ sense of national belonging. Because one of the non-economic goals of the European project is to “invent” a supra-national identity that could supersede national belonging, we analyze how the economic shock of the financial crisis—which shook the basic foundations of the single European market—pushed European citizens to identify more with their respective nations than with Europe. Using data from two Eurobarometer surveys, one before and the second after the economic crisis, we are able to treat the crisis as a natural experiment. We find that, in countries hit worst by the economic crisis, individuals have become more nationalist. The EU’s response to the financial crisis has been to push toward greater consolidation of economic policy via the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The evidence suggests that this further economic integration came at the cost of cultural integration. This matters for politics, because if individuals do not see themselves as belonging to the broader European community, national politicians will have trouble mobilizing political support for further EU integration, which will likely hinder the chances for further consolidation in the future.

In Chapter 3, I turn to examining nationalism in its ethnic form. As opposed to the loose cultural definition of nationalism—as a set of taken-for-granted narratives, traditions, and practices—ethnic nationalism “states that to preserve the unique national characters of different peoples, they have to be kept separated. Mixing of different ethnicities only leads to cultural extinction” (Rydgren 2007:244). This version of nationalism is inherently intolerant and exclusionary. In this view, ethnicity and ancestry characterize national belonging, not participation in a common civic culture (Smith 1986). I focus on radical right parties as organizational carriers of this ethnic nationalist ideology. Therefore, in this Chapter, I analyze the economic, political, and social factors that explain variation in electoral support for such parties across European countries.

Chapter 3 asks if economic decline increases nationalist sentiments. But, in this Chapter, I focus on comparing differences in electoral outcomes of radical right parties between Western and Eastern Europe. Despite an ostensibly facilitating set of circumstances, radical right parties have been less electorally successful in Eastern than in Western Europe, a point that contradicts the vision of Eastern Europe as “backward” in terms of economic and cultural development. Analyzing 22 years of parliamentary elections (1990-2012) across 27 European countries, I find that the commonly examined economic and political factors, such as GDP, unemployment, and electoral system types, do not explain variation in electoral support for radical right parties across countries. Economic decline, while often associated with the rise of extremist political parties, does not increase electoral support for such parties in either Western or Eastern Europe. In addition, I show that the determinants of support are different in Western than in Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe, political instability and levels of trust have a significant effect on explaining support for the radical right. And while support for the radical right has remained surprisingly low in Eastern Europe since 1991, support for the EU is decreasing in those countries. This suggests that as Eastern European
countries further integrate into EU politics, they may find themselves moving further to the Right. According to my analysis then, EU integration is not the liberalizing force it was once conceived to be. Rather, it may push otherwise tolerant countries toward a radical right backlash.

In Chapter 4, I use qualitative methods to examine a case study of radical right political mobilization. The case study considers two regions in Ukraine—a country on the outskirts of Europe—where the electoral failure of radical right parties in national elections since 1991 has been particularly anomalous. In 2012, however, the Freedom Party became the first radical right party to gain parliamentary representation on a platform of ethnic nationalism. Using over 100 interviews with party members, nationalist movement activists, and political experts leading up to Freedom’s electoral breakthrough, I document how radical right political mobilization works through social networks. The findings in this Chapter show that recruitment into radical right political parties works similarly to social movement mobilization. Comparing differences in mobilization and recruitment strategies in two regions, I show that Freedom adapted its mobilization strategies to the local context, using a variety of institutional and non-institutional strategies to recruit members, particularly the youth.

In Chapter 5, I review existing theories of social movements to argue that to move forward, sociologists must reimagine the relationship between political parties and social movements. For the most part, sociologists have located processes of mobilization in social movements, reducing political parties to reflections of, or responders to, societal demands—a view that frames political parties as polity members and social movements as challengers. I trace how the movement/party dichotomy evolved out of broader dialogues on the role of the state in society, the challenge to structural functionalism, and the implicit disciplinary division of labor between sociologists and political scientists. As a result, political parties have been absent in political sociology, but an emerging body of literature—the “new” sociology of political parties—has sought to bring political parties back into sociological analysis as social agents who have an active role in shaping grievances and identities. I contribute to this emerging critique. Focusing on challenger political movements, I propose a framework for understanding the conditions under which political parties and social movements develop separately or together. Drawing on the concept of a political field, I propose that political movements’ organizational forms and strategies are as shaped by the state’s openness to challenger groups and the degree of political field structuration. I hypothesize that these factors shape the range of political outcomes for challenger political groups, including radical right parties.

Together, the empirical and theoretical chapters are an analysis of nationalism and right-wing political mobilization in contemporary Europe, both West and East. Each chapter contributes to a different aspect of sociological thinking on the topic, but what unites the project is the question of why and how nationalism, in its loose and strict senses, remains a gripping and powerful category for how individuals understand the world and their place in it. As such, this dissertation is an examination of the political and cultural consequences of European integration and expansion, and it is both a confirmation of Polanyi’s insights and a challenge to the theory’s limitations.
Chapter Two

European Integration, Identity, and Nationalism

Since its inception in 1952, the original European Community of six member states has expanded its institutional scope and geographic reach tremendously. Today, the European Union (hereafter EU) includes 27 member states united by ever expanding supra-national political institutions and economic agreements. No less than 13 centralized EU organizations govern policy, law, and financial decision making, across six levels of economic incorporation ranging from “strong” (Eurozone) to “weak” (free trade association agreements). This institutional complexity has produced an economically integrated Europe. But Europe, and by extension the EU, aims to be more than a supra-national bureaucracy and economic association.

For some, one of the ultimate goals of the EU is to create a cultural community of Europeans united by a shared sense of belonging, a sort of “new nationalism” in Haas’s (1958) terms. We see evidence for this when the EU establishes a “national” anthem (Beethoven’s Ode to Joy), a flag, citizenship and a passport, a “capital” (Brussels), and attempts to establish a constitution—symbols of belonging that are usually associated with nation states, not economic associations. An appeal to a common European cultural heritage is enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, which references the “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe” and a common history (Council of European Union 2008: 18; quoted in Risse 2010:1). In addition to the economic project, the EU is at least partly a political project of identity construction (for a more elaborated argument, see Shore 2000).

But while the economic project has been incredibly successful, the political identity project remains fragile and tenuous. Put more provocatively, the EU-led supranational deepening of political and economic integration in the past 20 years has not resulted in more of a sense of “Europeanness.” In fact, it may be the cause of a decline in “Europeanness” even as the EU has produced the completion of the Single Market, the enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe, and the introduction of the Euro.

In 2010, the percent of Europeans who only identify with their nation surpassed the percent of those who see themselves as European sometimes for the first time since 1999. Meanwhile, the percentage of EU citizens who see themselves solely as European has remained low, an average of four percent between 1992 and 2010 (see Figure 2.1). These shifts were particularly pronounced between 2005 and 2010 when increases in having only a national identity were recorded in 20 of the 27 EU countries (see Table 2.1). This occurred not in just small countries but in some of Europe’s largest and most important countries.

These trends in identity suggest that Europeans have started to see themselves more as belonging to their respective nations even as the political and economic integration project has deepened. Why should this be the case?

There is a complex but explicable political and social process going on here. The economic integration project has produced both winners and losers across Europe (Fligstein 2008). The forces of globalization, Europeanization, and neoliberalism have been particularly hard on those citizens who have benefitted less from economic integration. The European Union has mostly been an organization that has produced more market and less social protection. It has also taken control over national markets and diminished the sovereignty of governments to intervene into those markets. It follows that citizens who perceive they have

4 Authorship of this chapter is shared with Neil Fligstein.
benefitted less, who are in the majority, have started to see Europe as less of a collective identity that includes them. They have come in the past 20 years to look to their national political parties and governments to protect them ever more. They have come to view themselves more as members of a national community. The natural protector of those with only a national identity is national governments.

One way to see if this argument is true is to examine how the financial crisis has affected Europeans’ sense of belonging. We see the crisis as an opportunity for a natural experiment to examine if in such a crisis, citizens look to the nation or to Europe for their political identity. The financial crisis was an international crisis that began with massive bank failure across Europe, followed by a steep recession in almost all EU member states (for an account of how this has played out across Europe, see Ertürk et al. 2012). This recession was met by collective policy making at the EU level and coordinated by the central banks. The EU and the European Central Bank have pushed austerity measures onto all countries. From the point of view of citizens, the financial crisis originated because of the globalization of finance. But, the policies pursued to fix the crisis all involved international authorities pushing national authorities to scale back their welfare states and social safety nets in order to lower budget deficits and protect their credit ratings.

The European authorities who push for further integration are perceived as elites who are not working in the interests of citizens in any given nation state (Hix 2008). In wealthier countries like Germany, citizens of poorer countries like Greece could be blamed for the crisis and its severity. The citizens of wealthier countries may view citizens in other countries as undeserving of help. In the countries where the crisis has been the worst, citizens understand that no one is coming to their rescue, certainly not the other “Europeans.” It is not surprising that on both sides of the crisis, one way citizens would respond would be to experience a resurgence in national identity.

Why does this resurgence matter for the future of Europe? For better or worse, European identity is at the core of the European political project. As Hooghe and Marks (2008) aptly put it, “identity is decisive for multi-level governance in general, and for regional integration in particular,” because “governance is an expression of community” (2, original emphasis). Without this identification this governance lacks legitimacy. If in moments of crisis, Europeans fall back to their national identities, while EU elites push for further consolidation and integration (as has been the case in this crisis), there is a mismatch between the political actions of governments and the preferences of citizens who view themselves mainly as citizens of a nation state. This mismatch produces political tension within and across member states. Such tensions could lead to a rollback of existing EU institutions and the exit of some of the member states like Britain. If we are right and the supranationally induced political and economic integration is exacerbating this tendency, then the possibility for more dramatic political reaction increases.

In this paper, we look at whether individuals in countries that were hard hit by the crisis are more likely to identify with their nations than with Europe. We proceed by first providing a theoretical backdrop to thinking about how national identities are formed. Then we consider what is known about the spread of European identity. We generate some hypotheses about how the current economic crisis might undermine a sense of “Europeanness”. In particular, we argue that citizens in Europe view their national governments as their main avenue of both political grievance and protection during an economic downturn. This heightens their sense that they belong to a nation, and have a state that works to protect them. It also increases their awareness that a distant European community is not likely to come to their rescue while their community and government might be politically pressured to do so. They also trust their national government less when it fails to respond critically to the EU integration push.
We then provide evidence that shows how a sense of being European dropped significantly in many European countries during the period 2005-2010. Our data analysis shows that this is quite related to the economic downturn in each society. We conclude by considering how the current negotiations about the future of the Euro show clearly the political dilemmas faced by the leaders of the core member state governments. So, for example, the German government has faced criticism that it has not done enough to help its neighbors. But, it is clear that some Germans are feeling less European and do not view their fortunes as tied to those of citizens in other countries. In this way, the democratically elected German government is not behaving in a “heartless” fashion, but instead is responding to the wishes of its citizens. It is this kind of political pressure that economic integration has induced.

Theories of Integration and Identity

Sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists have been interested in the formation of collective identities like national identities since the founding of their disciplines (for a critical review of the concept of identity in the post-war era, see Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Collective identities refer to the idea that a group of people accept a fundamental and consequential similarity that causes them to feel solidarity amongst themselves (Therborn 1995, ch. 12; Brubaker and Cooper 2000). This sense of collective identity is socially constructed, which means it emerges as the intentional or unintentional consequence of social interactions. Collective identity is also by definition about the construction of an ‘other.’ Our idea of who we are is often framed as a response to some ‘other’ group (Barth 1969). People grow up in families and communities, and come to identify with the groups in which they are socially located. Gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality, social class, and age have all been the basis of people’s identities.

Anderson has written one of the seminal works concerning national identity, *Imagined Communities: The Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (1983). He writes: "In an anthropological spirit, then, I propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (1983:5-6). Nations are imagined because members of even the smallest nation never know or meet more than a minuscule fraction of their fellow nationals. When connected to a state (institutions of government exercising authority in a defined territory), nations establish limits and boundaries. The state creates rules that define who are citizens and who are foreigners. Nations are communities because, "regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings" (5).

Deutsch defined nationality as "a people striving to equip itself with power, with some machinery of compulsion strong enough to make the enforcement of its commands probable in order to aid in the spread of habits of voluntary compliance with them" (Deutsch 1953:104). But in order to attain this, there has to be an interconnection between the members of disparate social groups. "Nationality, then, means an alignment of large numbers of individuals from the lower and middle classes linked to regional centers and leading social groups by channels of social communication and economic discourse" (101).

Deutsch's approach helps makes sense of one on the most obvious difficulties with a theory of nationality. In different times and places, the basis of an appeal to a common culture can include language, religion, race, ethnicity, or a common formative experience (for example, in the U.S., immigration). Deutsch helps us understand that any of these common cultures can form the basis for a national identity and that historical factors influence which identity gets used in a particular society. The historical "trick" in building a nation-state is to
find a horizontal kind of solidarity that appeals to a wide group of people of differing social strata and offers a sense of solidarity that justifies producing a state to protect the “nation.” Nationalism can have any cultural root, as long as that culture can be used to forge a cross-class alliance around a nation-building project. A nation-state can come into existence when such a national story exists, and once in existence, the state apparatus will be used to reproduce the nation. But at its foundation, the nation is created through communication and exchange across social strata and groups.

Deutsch’s theory helps us make sense of what has and has not happened in Europe in the past 50 years. If there is going to be a European national identity, it is going to arise from people who associate with each other across national boundaries. As European economic, social, and political fields have developed, they bring about the routine interaction of people from different societies. It is the people who are involved in these routine interactions who are most likely to come to see themselves as Europeans and be involved in a European national project as they begin to identify with people who are like them.

What does it mean to identify as a European? The literature on national identities tends to distinguish two ideal types of nationalism: civic and ethnic (Brubaker 1992; Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995; Kohn 1944; Reesekens and Hooghe 2010). Civic forms of national identity tend to focus on citizenship as a legal status obtainable by anyone willing to accept a particular legal, political, and social system (Reesekens and Hooghe 2010). Ethnic forms of nationalism require that people adhere to national culture by virtue of having been born into it. Ethnic nationalism focuses on how common religion, language, national traditions, ancestry, and membership in a dominant ethnic or racial group are the bases for national membership. While both civic and ethnic conceptions of nationalism imply that a person has one and only one national identity, the civic conception allows that people who were not born and raised in a particular place can assume its national identity by agreeing to become a member of that society.

Most of the empirical literature (Green 2007; Kufer 2009; Risse 2010) shows that the cultural meaning of “European” tends to follow the civic conception. People who identify as European view themselves as in favor of peace, tolerance, democracy, and cultural diversity and are in general agreement with Enlightenment values. They see being a European as an acceptance of those values. Many people in Europe who have both a national and a European identity also view their national identities in such civic terms. Risse argues (2010) that this means that having a European identity does not force people to choose between their nation and Europe.

Evidence for “Who is a European”

Who are the Europeans and how many are there? Evidence suggests that those who identify as Europeans come from the highest socioeconomic groups in society. These include the owners of businesses, managers, professionals, and other white collar workers. They are involved in various aspects of business and government, travel frequently in Europe, and sometimes live in other European countries for a period of time (Favell 2008; Fligstein 2008; Risse 2010). They engage in long term social relationships with their counterparts who either work for their firm, or are their suppliers, customers, or, in the case of people who work for governments, their colleagues in other governments. They speak second, or third, languages for work. Since 1986, they have created Europe-wide businesses and professional associations in which people gather regularly to discuss matters of mutual interest (Fligstein 2008). Young people who travel across borders for schooling, tourism, and jobs (often for a few years after college) are also likely to be more European. The most Europeanized are those who choose to work abroad (Favell 2008). Such individuals belong to the better educated and wealthier social strata.
If these are the people who are most likely to interact in European-wide economic, social, and political arenas, then it follows that their opposites lack either the opportunity or the interest to interact with their counterparts across Europe. Most importantly, blue collar and service workers are less likely than managers, professionals, and other white collar workers to have their work take them to other countries. Older people will be less adventurous than younger people and less likely to know other languages. They are less likely to hold favorable views of their national neighbors and will remember who was on which side in the Second World War. They will be less likely to want to associate with or have curiosity about people from neighboring countries. People who hold conservative political views that value the "nation" as the most important category will be less inclined to travel or to know, and interact with, people who are “not like” them.

How many people identify with Europe? Fligstein (2008), using Eurobarometer data, shows that in 2004 only 3.9 percent of people who live in Europe viewed themselves as Europeans exclusively while another 8.8 percent viewed themselves as Europeans while also having some national identity. This means that only 12.7 percent of the people in Europe tend to view themselves as Europeans. However, this translated into 47 million people—not a small number. Scholars who have looked at this data have generally concluded that the European identity has not spread very far (Citrin and Sides 2004; Deflem and Pampel 1996; Gabel 1998). The bulk of the population in Europe falls into two other categories: citizens with only a national identity (in 2004, 41%) and citizens with a national mostly but also a European identity (in 2004, 48%). It is this latter group that Risse (2010) describes as European “lite” and Fligstein (2008) as “situational” Europeans. These are people who in some circumstances might think of themselves as Europeans. The evidence shows that these citizens tend to be middle class and have white collar occupations.

In the most recent survey asking the same question (June 2010), there was some important changes from the 2004 results. Seven percent of respondents claimed a European identity first plus some national identity, 3 percent claimed a European identity only, and 41 percent expressed a national identity plus sometimes a European one (3 percent gave no answer). Now, 46% of citizens identified only with their nation. The “situational” Europeans declined substantially while those with only a national identity rose.

We will explore these data in some detail in a moment. It is useful to draw a conclusion for how Europeans’ identity might affect their political view towards more integration. The number of people in Europe who mostly think of themselves as European is quite small, about 10-13 percent. The number who hold mostly a national identity but sometimes think of themselves as European is from 41-48 percent while those with only a national identity ranges from 41-46 percent. These numbers imply that if a political issue comes along that brings people to see themselves as Europeans, 51-59 percent percent of people will favor a European solution to a problem. But since 84-87 percent of citizens have mostly a national identity, it is even more likely that issues will come to be seen as national.

Why Does This Matter for Politics?

There is currently very little political will on the part of the citizens of Europe towards more political integration (Eurobarometer 2010). There are simply not enough people with strong European identities to push forward a European wide political integration project. While there is a majority in most countries who sometimes think of themselves as European, this is clearly a shallow and situational identity. As we have just suggested, it is easy to argue that depending on the political issue, citizens can easily be suspicious of other European countries and support their national government as the locus of relevant politics.

The construction of a "European" identity has only happened in a partial way. There has been increased communication and interaction between certain groups in Europe. People
who are educated or who are owners, managers, professionals or white collar workers have had opportunities to meet with and interact with their counterparts in other countries because of the EU’s market and political integration project. For these people, this interaction has produced a European identity and support for the EU project. But, for the vast majority of the population, these interactions are infrequent. For them, the national narrative still dominates. There are a substantial number of people in Europe who sometimes think of themselves as Europeans but, these people obviously do not share as many interaction patterns with other Europeans, and they remain mainly national in their identity.

This has played out in EU politics in significant ways. The democratically elected governments across Europe have pursued European integration projects when their citizens have favored them. But they have steadfastly opposed EU infringement on national labor markets, labor relations, and all policies tied up with welfare states like pensions and health care. Public opinion polls have repeatedly shown that citizens have opposed transferring sovereignty over these issues to the EU for fear of interference with national social models (Eichenberg and Dalton 2003; Hix 2008).

These features of the EU and national politics and the growth of Europeanized middle and upper middle class persons have created several interesting levels of politics. National political parties over time have tried to adopt different political positions over time to try and attract voters. The middle and upper middle class voters who have benefited from the EU have generally voted for parties with a pro-EU stance. This has produced a pro-EU platform in center left and center right political parties in most of Europe. Only extreme right and extreme left parties have tried to take an anti-EU position in order to garner votes. But most politics in Europe remains resolutely national. Fligstein (2008, ch. 7) reviews the literature on the degree to which a European politics exists at the level of nation states. He concludes that most political discussion within European countries remains focused on the national politics and most political activities organized by national groups are focused on national governments. There is lots of evidence that European political stories are part of the national discourse (Koopmans 2004; Trenz 2004). But, the way these stories play out depends very much on the issue in contention and the role of national governments in that issue. There is some transnational organizing occurring with social movement organizations and there is evidence that the frequency of protests against European policies is on the increase (Imig and Tarrow 2001). But, there is also evidence that much of this protest reflects national groups trying to get their national governments to protect them from EU policies that undermine their positions.

Perhaps the most interesting and subtle effect of all of this economic and social interaction is the creation of interest in European affairs in national political discourse. There is strong evidence that European affairs are covered in national papers and that national groups organize to protest to their governments about EU policies they don't like. There is also some evidence that on occasion, these discussions can be trans-European and result in policy coordination. But, these discussions more frequently reflect the complex identities of people who live in Europe. Since the majority of people who live in Europe have predominantly a national identity, it should not be surprising that many European political issues end up being framed to national as opposed to European wide interests. This means that as issues confronting Europeans are discussed within national media, they are more likely to be filtered through national debates and self-images as European ones. So while there is certainly a wide awareness of European issues, the ability to produce European policies is going to always be difficult because of the institutional limits on the EU and the conflicting political demands that citizens place on their governments.

The financial crisis that began in 2007 has affected Europe dramatically in many ways. What began as a banking crisis, quickly morphed into a recession, and turned into a
long running sovereign debt crisis (Ertürk et al. 2012). It started in the main banks in all of
the main European countries and spread quickly from those countries to all of the countries in
Europe (Fligstein and Habinek 2012). The economies of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania
nearly collapsed as western European banks pulled out and made credit nearly impossible to
obtain. National governments responded to the economic downturn across Europe by
slashing government spending, thereby sending their economies into even more of a tailspin.
Governments’ ability to borrow money came under fire and Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece,
Spain, and Great Britain all experienced severe retrenchments.

One of the central features of the crisis was the management of bank reorganization
and the regulation of the Euro. Much of the fiscal austerity was pushed by the German
government, which presides over the biggest economy and is the main support of the Euro. In
order to stay in the Eurozone, governments had to agree to stiff measures that limited their
spending and pushed them to undertake unpopular political measures.

From the theoretical perspective outlined here, these events clearly showed the
citizens of many countries that the European Union and the European Central Bank would
not be showing them much solidarity. Being a European was not going to mean that your
government was going to be given time to resolve the crisis or undertake measures to ensure
that employment and output were going to rise. It is not too great a leap to predict that
citizens across Europe came less and less to see themselves as Europeans involved in a
positive sum “win-win” political and economic project; instead, they became more and more
skeptical that believing in a European community of like-minded self-identified Europeans
was going to be the political answer to their economic problems.

Moreover, it is also the case that one would expect that in countries where the crisis
was more severe, citizens would be the most skeptical of European wide solutions to the
problems. In sum, citizens who might have felt under some conditions to be European, in
countries where the crisis was particularly intense, might in fact decide that their national
governments and national communities were more likely to protect them than Europe. In
sum, we argue that the financial crisis could actually have worked to undermine even those
with a “European lite” identity, particularly in countries that were the hardest hit.

European Identity and Support for the EU During the Financial Crisis

How did Europeans’ sense of belonging change during the economic crisis? Figure
2.1 uses the last two waves of the Eurobarometer survey (2005 and 2010) that asked
respondents the following identity question: “In the near future do you see yourself as
national, national and European, European and national, or European only,” where “national”
refers to the respondent’s nationality. The Figure shows the EU average by each category
from 1992 to 2010. Exclusive nationalists (nationality only) and inclusive nationalists
(nationality and European) consistently make up the two largest response groups, on average
41 and 46 percent, respectively. Exclusive nationalists are individuals who only identify with
their respective country while inclusive nationalists are those who identify with their
respective county and Europe. A decline in the number of individuals who hold national as
well as European identities signifies a lack of connection to the European project and its
institutions.

The most prominent attitudinal division is not between those holding exclusively
national identities and those holding exclusively European identities: the latter has remained
steadily below six percent since 1992. Rather, the main cleavage in public opinion is between
“exclusive” and “inclusive” nationalists (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse 2010).

Indeed, the most interesting changes in identity occur precisely between the exclusive
and inclusive nationalists: the proportion of nationality-only respondents increases throughout the early 1990s, outnumbering those who are European sometimes (inclusive nationalists) by 1996, and then leveling out to below the inclusive nationalists through the early 2000s.

However, between 2005 and 2010, the number of exclusive nationalists surpassed the number of inclusive nationalists for the first time since 1999. Those holding exclusive nationalist identities in the EU increased from 41 percent in 2005 to 46 percent in 2010, while those holding national and European identities decreased from 48 percent in 2005 to 41 in 2010 percent. The other categories remained stable, which suggests that individuals who once had a secondary European identity became more nationalist after the financial crisis unfolded.

But even more important are how the changes were more significant in some countries than others. Since our argument is that most of politics is national, it follows that if a particular country becomes more nationalist, its overall politics are likely to become more anti-Europe. Table 2.1 shows change across response categories between 2005 and 2010 for the 27 EU member states. The Table excludes the “don’t know” or “refusal” response categories. Looking at changes by country confirms the overall EU trend: in most countries, individuals have become more national and less European in the “lite” sense. Thirteen countries witnessed increases in citizens reporting only having a national identity of more than 5 percent. The increase is particularly stark in some of the newer member states, Czechs (+21.2%), Slovenians (+19.8%), and Romanians (+17.2%) became more nationalist in huge numbers.

Yet, some of the most populous core European countries are not far behind: the Italians (+10.3%) and French (+9.9%) experienced a surge in nationalism as well. Germany, Europe’s richest and most populous country, increased its share of nationalists by 3.2 percent. Given Germans’ discomfort with expressions of national pride and generally high support for European integration since the 1950s, the increase in how many Germans identify with their nation is relatively small but not insignificant. In absolute numbers, a 3.2 percent increase means that 2.5 million more Germans identify exclusively with their nation in 2010 as compared to 2005. The British stand out among the Europeans with 72 percent of the British identifying with their nation in 2010, up from 65 percent in 2005. Other studies have also reported on the British tendency to be more nationalist and less supportive of EU integration than continental Europe (Fligstein 2008).

Unfortunately, without panel data that would allow us to say whether an individual who held an inclusive identity moved to an exclusive category, it is only possible to describe general trends. Europeans across all the member states are identifying more with their nations and less with Europe. Interestingly, in half the countries (13 out of 27), we see evidence for polarization: individuals are moving away from inclusive and toward exclusive identities, either as exclusive nationalists or Europeans (in the strict sense). Thus, as the EU has increased financial and political cooperation to provide coordinated policy solutions in the form of bailout funds and EU imposed austerity measures, public opinion has shifted away from Europe and toward a national sense of belonging.

What is the relationship between identity and support for the European project? Previous studies have shown that identity matters tremendously for whether or not individuals support European integration. Hooghe and Marks (2005) show that exclusive identification with the nation state is a more powerful predictor of opposition to European integration than factors of economic cost or benefit. Citrin and Sides (2004) use the 2000 Eurobarometer questions on support for membership in the EU, attachment to the EU, and
trust in EU institutions to argue that identity (national versus European) has huge effects on all indicators of support. For example, only 38 percent of individuals who identify exclusively with their nation say that EU membership is a good thing, compared to 73 percent of those who identify as both national and European, and 76 percent of those who identify as exclusively European (Citrin and Sides 2004:174). Thus, even a secondary European “lite” identity makes huge differences in support for European integration. Inclusive nationalists are significantly more likely to trust EU institutions, hold positive attitudes toward the EU, see EU membership as good thing for their country, and hold more liberal political attitudes toward minorities and immigrants (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Citrin and Sides 2004; Fligstein 2008; Hooghe and Marks 2005, 2008).

Table 2.2 shows the percentage of respondents who tend to trust EU institutions, hold a positive image of the EU, and see EU membership as good thing for their country, broken down by identity category. Similarly to Citrin and Sides, the 2005 and 2010 data show stark contrasts between exclusive nationalists and Europeans across all measures of support for the EU. While trust in EU institutions decreased between 2005 and 2010 across all identity categories, only a third of exclusive nationalists say they trust the EU in comparison to the majority of situational Europeans and exclusive Europeans. Fewer respondents overall say that they have a more positive image of the EU in 2010 than in 2005, but only a quarter of exclusive nationalists have a positive image compared to a majority of all others respondents. We observe the same trend for those who say that EU membership is good for their country: exclusive nationalists differ from situational and exclusive Europeans by huge margins. Because the number of respondents who see themselves as European/national or only as European is low and consistent over time (see Figure 2.1), these data suggest that the main cleavage in support for the European project continues to be between individuals who see themselves as belonging only to their nation (exclusive nationalists) and those who hold a secondary European identity (inclusive nationalists). Table 2.2 also shows the effect of the financial crisis on support for the EU: regardless of identity, fewer Europeans trust the EU, hold a positive image of the EU, or see EU membership as a good thing in 2010 versus 2005.

2010 was the last year when the Eurobarometer asked respondents the identity question. Yet, the most recent Eurobarometer (May 2012) does ask about trust in EU institutions and attitudes toward the EU. Even though we cannot provide an attitudinal breakdown by national versus European identity, a brief examination of the 2012 data reveals that the effect of the financial crisis is still ongoing. Trust in EU institutions continues on a sharp downward decline after 2010 to hit an all time low with only 29 percent of all Europeans saying that they tend to trust EU institutions. By May, 2012, 58 percent of Europeans say they tend to distrust EU institutions—the highest number since 2005. The same sharp decline occurs in Europeans’ attitudes toward the EU: by May, 2012 less than 30 percent say that they have a fairly positive image of the EU. The largest response group is the percent of individuals who are ambivalent about the EU: almost 40 percent report a “neutral” image of the EU. These recent trends in loss of trust and increasing ambivalence toward the EU underscore that the effect of the financial crisis on public opinion is still ongoing. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, Europeans are pulling away from the EU and seeing it as less relevant in their own lives in record numbers.

So far, we have shown that identity and public opinion are closely linked: individuals who see themselves purely in nationalist terms are far less likely to support the European project. We have also shown that the number of such exclusive nationalists has increased between 2005 and 2010. In the analysis that follows, we make the connection between
changes in identity and the effects of the financial crisis. Before proceeding to the next step, it is important to examine the economic effects of the financial crisis on EU member states. We examine three economic indicators at the country level, which are then included in the model: change in GDP per capita, unemployment rate, and debt to GDP ratio.\(^5\)

Figure 2.2 plots the percent change in GDP per capita (2005 constant US dollars) for the 27 EU member states from 2005 to 2011. The thick line indicates the EU average. The Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania were hardest hit by the economic crisis, experiencing drops in GDP per capita of 20.7, 17.3, and 11.3 percent, respectively, between 2007 and 2009 alone. Yet, the Baltics also experienced some of the highest economic growth in the years prior to 2007. For example, while Latvia was hardest hit, the Latvian economy boomed at double digit increases in GDP per capita between 2004 and 2007. The same bubble effect of extremely high growth, likely a result of EU accession in 2004, followed by dramatic decline also occurred in Lithuania and Estonia. Among other “new member” states, the crisis had milder effects on growth. In Poland, the economy contracted to grow only 1.5 percent between 2008 and 2009, which is down from an average 5 percent growth in the previous years but still not in the negative. The Polish case is, however, more the exception than the norm. As Figure 2.2 shows, the EU experienced a general economic decline with GDP dropping by 4.6 percent during the worst point of the crisis (2007-2009). By 2009, the majority of countries began to recover. Greece, the country that has received the most media attention due to its sovereign debt crisis and public protests against austerity measures, is an outlier in the overall trend of recovery: the Greek economy experienced its worst decline between 2010 and 2011 (-7.8 percent). Between 2007 and 2009, the Greek economy contracted by 3.8 percent. France, Germany, and Italy, the European core countries, saw GDP drops of negative 4.3, 3.7, and 7.9, respectively. Table 2.3 lists the percent change in GDP per capita from 2007 to 2009 for EU member states. In sum, Figure 2.2 and Table 2.3 show that the financial crisis produced the largest economic contractions across Europe in the two years between 2007 and 2009 but to varying degrees across countries.

[Figure 2.2 and Table 2.3 here]

Changes in GDP, while perhaps a good measure of a country’s general economic health, may not capture the full extent of the financial crisis. Unemployment is often the most important issue for public opinion, because rising unemployment can have dramatic effects on the economic future of individuals and communities. Figure 2.3 shows annual changes in unemployment rates from 2005 to 2011 for all EU member states with the EU average indicated by the thick black line. We observe similar patterns to changes in GDP: between 2007 and 2009, unemployment increases drastically across all of Europe and then declines by 2010. Table 2.4 shows the change in unemployment rates from 2007 to 2009. The Baltic states again have the highest increases in unemployment during the crisis, which is not surprising given the correspondingly large drops in GDP. Spain and Ireland join the Baltic states with some of the highest increases in unemployment across Europe, 9.1 and 7.3 percentage point increase, respectively. This effect is not well captured in the GDP data but it is also not surprising: both Spain and Ireland have implemented stark austerity measures aimed at cutting government benefits and state employees. Such policies are bound to affect the number of individuals looking for work to supplement loss of benefits or full time work. Interestingly, unemployment in Greece increases only marginally from 2007 to 2009 (1.09 percentage points increase), but then continues to increase starkly in 2010 (12.5 percent

\(^5\) We also examined IMF conditionality as an indicator for the crisis, constructed as a dummy control variable. However, its inclusion neither altered the results of the model nor did it have a statistically significant effect. Therefore, we do no include it here.
unemployment rate) and 2011 (17.3 percent unemployment rate). While practically all the EU countries stabilize by 2010, the Greek economy continues on a downward spiral.

[Figure 2.3 and Table 2.4 here]

Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland suffered the worst economic effects as the banking crisis evolved into a sovereign debt crisis. To capture this, we look at changes in a country’s national debt as a proportion of GDP from 2007 to 2010, as displayed in Table 2.5. Ireland increased its share of debt by 67.2 percent in just three years, followed by Greece (37.1 percent), Latvia (32.1 percent), Great Britain (31.3 percent), Portugal (25.1 percent), Spain (25 percent), and Lithuania (21.2 percent). In 2010, Greek debt was 144.6 percent of the country’s gross GDP, Portugal’s was at 93.3 percent, and Ireland’s 92.2 percent. These countries slipped further into debt by 2011. As the severity of the debt crisis escalated, these countries agreed to lending agreements with the International Monetary Fund, which operated in cooperation with the EU, to impose harsh austerity policies in exchange for financial assistance. The many protests that broke out in Spain, Greece, and Portugal were a direct response to the EU’s involvement in traditionally national social policy issues.

[Table 2.5 here]

To sum up, we hypothesize that individuals in countries most affected by the economic crisis will see the EU as a perpetrator in the economic fallout. As a result, they may turn away from seeing themselves as Europeans. Because support for the EU project and identity are closely linked, we expect that higher economic decline during the crisis years will push individuals to identify more with their nations than with Europe.

Data and Methods

We now turn to a multivariate analysis to examine more closely the role of the economic crisis in explaining differences in identity across countries. We rely primarily on two waves of the Eurobarometer surveys: Eurobarometer 64.2 (October 2005) and Eurobarometer 73.4 (May 2010) that asked respondents in all 27 EU member states to identify with their nationality, nationality and Europe, Europe and nationality, or Europe only. While the Eurobarometer is conducted frequently, these waves are the two most recent surveys that include the identity question. Because the latest data were collected in 2010, we cannot take into account the ongoing effects of the financial crisis in some countries. However, as discussed above, the most striking effects of the crisis occurred between 2007 and 2009 in most countries.

Using the same survey questions directly prior to (2005) and after (2010) the peak of the economic crisis allows us to examine the effects of the crisis as a natural experiment. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer surveys do not collect panel data, meaning that the same sample of individuals is not surveyed in every wave. Even though panel data would have been ideal for our purposes, we have the next best thing: representative surveys of all EU member states, which allow us to examine changes in identity as a result of the financial crisis. As the following sections discuss, we calculate both individual and multi-level logistic regression models.

6 The exact question is: “In the future do you see yourself as a) Nationality (only) b) Nationality and European c) European and Nationality d) European only e) Don’t know. We exclude respondents who answered “Don’t know” as well as missing responses in our analysis. We also exclude Malta, Luxembourg and Cyprus because not all data are available for those countries.
**Dependent variable**

We focus on identity as the dependent variable. It is coded as a binary variable, where 1 = Nationality only and 0 = National/European, European/National, and European. As indicated earlier, we are primarily interested in the difference between exclusive nationalist and individuals who are Europeans even sometimes, or inclusive nationalists. Because the “European only” response category remains relatively small and stable in both 2005 and 2010, including those respondents does not change the results. Logistic regression is the appropriate method with a binary categorical variable.

**Controls**

Seeing oneself as belonging to the imagined community of the nation as opposed to Europe is both individually and contextually determined. Individual factors such as education, age, and occupation, have strong effects on how likely someone is to identify with Europe (Fligstein 2008; Risse 2010). Better educated white-collar professionals who have the opportunity to travel outside their countries are more likely to see themselves as European, while blue-collar workers with less education who perhaps lack the opportunities of better off professionals are more likely to see themselves in national terms (Fligstein 2008). Age is coded in years, and we limit our sample to adults aged 18-80. Gender is a binary variable (1 = female, 0 = male), education is a categorical variable based on when the respondent finished full-time education (3 categories: less than secondary, secondary, and post-secondary), and occupation is a categorical variable recoded by group from the Eurobarometer’s 18 possible answers (6 categories: not in labor force, blue collar and service, managers, professionals, other white collar, owners).

Support for the EU and identity are closely linked (Green 2007; Fligstein 2008). Trust in EU institutions is a major aspect of support for EU integration. We thus use trust in EU institutions as an indicator of support for the EU project. By the same logic, trust in national government institutions is a measure of trust in one’s nation. Both variables—trust in EU and trust in national government—are coded as binary variables and refer to the question in the Eurobarometer surveys that reads, “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it (EU, national government)” (1 = tend to trust, 0 = tend not to trust). We expect that trust in EU institutions will have a negative effect on the dependent variable. Individuals who support the EU are more likely to see themselves as Europeans instead of nationals. We expect that individuals who tend to trust their national governments will see themselves as national as opposed to European. In addition, individuals who hold more Right political views are more likely to identify with their nation only (Risse 2010). For this reason, we include respondents’ self-placement on a left-right political scale in the analysis. For “political placement,” 1 = left, 10 = right. We expect ideologically Right individuals to be more nationalist.

In the multi-level models, we add country level indicators of economic health and EU institutional entrenchment. Better economic conditions should lead individuals to see themselves more as European, either because they have more financial opportunities to travel and interact with fellow Europeans from other countries or because they may attribute economic prosperity to EU policies (see Hobolt 2012). We operationalize economic health as GDP per capita (in constant 2005 USD, PPP adjusted), unemployment rate, and national debt to GDP ratio. GDP numbers come from the World Bank’s Development Indicators, while unemployment rates and debt ratios are from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook database. We operationalize EU entrenchment with two country level indicators: Eurozone membership (1 = yes, 0 = no) and number of years a country has been an EU member state. Because changes in identity develop over long periods of time, we...
expect that if a country has been an EU member state for a longer period of time and joined the common currency Eurozone, then individuals in that country may identify with Europe more than in countries without a strong EU presence.

Finally, we include a political control variable. Namely, we examine if the presence of a radical right party in parliament affects self-identification as national or European. Radical right parties have made electoral gains in countries like France, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Hungary over the past ten years. These parties have been successful partially because they mobilize nationalist sentiment and play off Eurosceptic feelings (Mudde 2007). Once such a party enters parliament, it has the ability to frame policy debates. We thus hypothesize that when a radical right party has enough popular support to gain representation in the national parliament, it means that individuals are more open to nationalist ideology. To construct this variable, we examined electoral results since 2000 for all 27 EU member states using the NSD European Election Database. “RR presence” is coded as 1 if a radical right party was represented in parliament in the five years prior to the survey date, 0 if not.

Crisis Variables

The most important independent variables for our purposes operationalize the effect of the financial crisis. We use three indicators to model the crisis: drop in GDP, change in unemployment, and change in national debt. Change in GDP is coded as percent change in GDP per capita from 2007 to 2009, in percentages. Because most countries’ GDP fell in 2009 as compared to 2007, the percent change was mostly negative, which makes the coefficient more difficult to interpret. For this reason, we use “drop in GDP” to make interpretation easier. We expect that an increase in “drop in GDP” will lead individuals to see themselves as more national. “Change in unemployment” is coded as the change in unemployment rate from 2009 to 2007 in percentage points. We expect that as change in unemployment increases, individuals will see themselves as more national. Finally, “change in national debt” is coded the same as change in unemployment: we take the difference in debt ratios (ratio of national debt to gross GDP) from 2010 to 2007. As discussed earlier, the debt crisis followed the initial financial crisis with the effect still worsening well into 2010. For this reason, we take the difference between 2010 and 2007 as opposed to 2009 and 2007. As with unemployment, we expect that change in debt will have positive effect on the dependent variable.

Results

To compare the factors affecting national identity, we first calculate the same “base” model for 2005 and 2010 using individual level data only (Models 1 and 2 in Table 6). Because we do not have panel data, it is worth looking at the changes in the determinants of identity before proceeding to the next step. Both models control for national variation using 26 dummy variables (not shown in the table). Model 1 (2005) and Model 2 (2010) reproduce results already found in previous studies: women, older people, and blue collar workers are more likely to be nationalist than men, younger people, and white collar professionals. Surprisingly, political placement on a left-right scale does not have a statistically significant effect on one’s identity as exclusively national or European in either 2005 or 2010, which suggests that identities and political ideologies are not causally related. This finding contradicts a common trope in the literature that individuals who hold right-wing political views are more nationalist and those holding more liberal political views are more European (see Risse 2010). This signals that the relationship between identity and political affiliation is

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7 The exact calculation is: Drop in GDP = [(GDP2009-GDP2007)/(GDP2007)]* (-100)
8 The exact calculation is: Change in unemployment = (Unemployment rate 2009 - Unemployment rate 2007)
more complex and requires further inquiry.

[Table 2.6 here]

Trust in EU institutions confirms our hypothesis: individuals who tend to trust EU institutions are less likely to be exclusively nationalist. The effect is the same in both 2005 and 2010. Holding all else constant, the probability of being exclusively nationalist is 23 percent lower for those individuals who indicate that they trust EU institutions as opposed to those who do not trust. Trust in national governments problematizes the hypothesis that individuals who tend to trust national governments are also more likely to see themselves as nationalist. In fact, trusting national government institutions decreases the likelihood of holding an exclusively national identity. The effect is small in 2010: individuals who trust the national government are only 4 percent less likely to see themselves as nationalist. In 2005, the effect is not statistically significant, but the direction of the effect remains the same. This finding suggests that trust in institutions, EU or national, is more of a diffuse concept referring to generalized trust more broadly. Individuals who tend to trust institutions are slightly more likely to see themselves as Europeans as opposed to those who do not trust. When we consider the high levels of cooperation and integration between national governments and the EU, this finding begins to make sense. In sum, after the financial crisis, the individual determinants of national versus European identity remain relatively the same as before.

Models 3 (2005) and Model 4 (2005) are the multi-level “base” models that take into account contextual economic and political factors. We remove the country dummies, because these models control for country level effects. The effect of the GDP variable confirms our hypothesis that individuals in wealthier countries are less likely hold nationalist identities than those in poorer countries, but the size of the effect is relatively small in 2005 and not statistically significant in 2010. The unemployment rate, while theoretically interesting, does not have a significant effect on identity either prior to or after the financial crisis. The national debt variable, while significant in 2005, is no longer significant in 2010. Furthermore, the effect is the opposite of what we may expect: individuals in countries with higher debt are less likely to be nationalist. However, this may be due to the fact that national debt as such does not necessarily have negative connotations for economic health. In fact, high debt may enable a national government to continue social programs that it would otherwise be forced to cut. As we discuss later, it is the sudden increase in debt that signals economic woes.

Just as at the individual level political ideology does not have an effect on identity, neither does the presence of a radical right political party in parliament. Again, this signals that the relationship between political ideologies and party politics, on the one hand, and identity, on the other, is more complex than the relationship between variables in a regression model. Yet, this finding also implies that radical right parties, while electorally successful in some countries, are limited in their ability frame identity debates and remain marginal across Europe.

Measures of EU’s institutional entrenchment as the number of years a country has been in the EU and Eurozone membership do not have a significant effect on identity. This means that individuals in core European countries, such as France, Germany, and Italy, are just as likely to see themselves in nationalist terms as individuals from new joiners, such as Romania and Bulgaria. A country’s membership in the Eurozone is significant in 2010 (not in 2005) but small: holding everything else constant, individuals living in Eurozone member countries are only 5 percent less likely to identify as nationalist. In sum, we observe changes across multiple economic country level variables between 2005 and 2010, when we would have expected the effects to remain more or less the same. This provides additional justification for examining the effects of the financial crisis as a sort of natural experiment.
Model 6 is the “Crisis Model.” Using the 2010 data, the model includes our indicators of the financial crisis: drop in GDP, change in national debt, and change in unemployment. While change in unemployment is insignificant, this outcome is not surprising given that the unemployment rate failed to have a significant effect in Model 4. Most importantly, the other two crisis variables are highly statistically significant and have the predicted effect. More specifically, for every 1 percent decrease in GDP between 2007 and 2009 (or 1 percent increase in “drop in GDP”), the probability of identifying as exclusively national increases by .8 percent. For example, a 10 percent decrease in GDP, as was the case in hard hit countries, increases the probability of an individual being exclusively nationalist by 8 percent. The effect of the debt ratio is smaller: for every 1 percentage point increase in debt the probability of being national increases by .08. But if we take into account that in countries like Ireland the debt ratio increased by 67 percent and in Greece by 37 percent, then the magnitude of the comes into starker focus. It is worth noting that once the crisis variables are taken into account, the coefficients of the country level controls move closer toward their 2005 values, suggesting that the crisis variables help explain some of the difference we observe between 2005 and 2010.

Summarizing the results, the findings show that individual level characteristics have the most explanatory power on whether an individual holds an exclusive nationalist or European identity. Better educated individuals belonging to the professional or managerial occupations who trust EU institutions are most likely to have at least a secondary European identity. However, in the pre and post crisis models that include country level factors, there are observable differences in how a country’s economic health, national debt rate, and Eurozone membership, affect identity. Controlling for indicators of the crisis produces results similar to pre-crisis levels. The effect of the economic crisis on identity is significant: individuals in countries that were worst hit by the crisis are more likely to hold exclusive nationalist identities.

Conclusion

The core argument of the paper has been that increased European political and economic integration in the past 20 years has pushed citizens in many of the member states to embrace a more national identity. We suggest that this happened because of the seemingly impersonal economic forces that have been released. Globalization, Europeanization, and neoliberalism are viewed by many citizens as threats to their collective well being. The EU has been an agent of these processes by creating more open markets and trying to prevent national governments from putting up various forms of trade barriers and social protection. Naturally, many people have seen the nation as the main bulwark against such changes and embraced political parties to help push government towards preserving various forms of social protection. Citizens in many countries do not see their fellow Europeans as being in the same boat as them; in fact, they do not see other Europeans as like themselves at all.

We set out to test this mechanism to see how the financial crisis of 2007-2009 affected Europeans’ sense of belonging. We argued that the crisis embodied many elements we have just discussed. It was caused by global finance. It spread across Europe and has caused widespread recession and unemployment. The supranational authorities in the EU and the European Central Bank have all pushed member state governments towards policies of austerity and away from social protection. We hypothesized that in countries where the recession was the worse, citizens would turn to trying to protect themselves and not see Europe as the solution to their problems. This would cause them to increase their identification with the nation and decrease their identification with other people in Europe.

The findings showed that the crisis has had a significant effect on whether individuals hold nationalist or European identities, and the effects are stronger in countries that were
worst hit economically. Across Europe, individuals are becoming more nationalist in response to the financial crisis. The numbers of exclusive nationalists have increased, while the numbers of those who see themselves as Europeans, even as “lite” or “situational” Europeans, have decreased.

What does this mean for the future of Europe and the EU? Public opinion is moving the opposite way of policy coordination by political elites. While politicians push for coordinated measures to solve the sovereign debt crisis by following the scripts of the EU and the European Central Bank, their constituents are becoming increasingly more alienated from Europe and its politics. The recent decisions to increase banking supervision and the agreement to coordinate fiscal policy are all directed at decreasing the ability of national governments to respond to their citizens’ preferences in future economic crises. If we are right, then the larger the increase in political coordination at the EU level, the more likely citizens will be to turn to political parties that will offer them a nationally focused alternative based on their national identities.

The current crisis illustrates this process. Economically, the only solution for preventing countries like Greece and Spain from spiraling further down the economic black hole, and potentially taking everyone with them, is a coordinated effort of loans and enforced austerity measures. But, in both the lending and receiving countries, such policies are widely unpopular. In both countries, national identities have increased in the wake of the crisis. Yet, catering to public opinion could result in each country making unilateral decisions, which is not clearly possible given the high degree of coordination between national and EU institutions.

This suggests that future crises are likely to increase the political conflict both within but also across the EU. In Great Britain, where now 72% of citizens only have a national identity, there is serious talk of holding a referendum on the withdrawing from the EU all together in the next couple of years. Public opinion polls show overwhelming support for that withdrawal.

The 2007 financial crisis has been a key test of Europe’s economic and political project. Economically, the EU was able to prevent complete default and hold the Eurozone together, but politically, it has taken losses. In 2012, the crisis is far from over across many beleaguered countries. If the main response of citizens is to turn more nationalist and to support political parties with resistance to the EU project, we can expect more conflict in national politics and the potential exit of countries from the EU. What remains to be seen is whether decision makers will be able to reach a compromise that will facilitate economic stabilization while also making European institutions positively relevant to the majority of Europeans. Without a positive agenda that appears to directly help all of the citizens of Europe, the EU is in danger of finding its entire structure delegitimized.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality only (%)</th>
<th>Nationality/European (%)</th>
<th>European/Nationality (%)</th>
<th>European (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>43</td>
<td>9.9</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>41</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>54</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
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<td>50</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>36</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to trust EU institutions (%)</td>
<td>Have a positive image of the EU (%)</td>
<td>See EU membership as a good thing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National/European</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European/national</td>
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<td>64.5</td>
<td>65.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>61.9</td>
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Table 2.3 Change in GDP per capita During the Crisis

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Change in GDP per capita 2007-2009 (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>6.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>-0.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-2.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-3.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>-3.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>-3.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>-3.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-3.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-4.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-4.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-5.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>-5.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>-5.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>-6.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-7.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>-7.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-7.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>-8.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>-8.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>-11.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>-17.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>-20.70%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Bold* countries are below the mean
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Change in unemployment rate (2007-2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>10.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>9.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>9.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>9.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>7.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.13</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>1.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.45</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>-1.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
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</table>

**Bold** countries are above the mean
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Change in Gross Debt as Percent of GDP (2007-2010)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>67.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>37.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>32.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britan</td>
<td>31.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>25.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>25.02</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
<td>18.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>18.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>17.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>17.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>15.52</td>
</tr>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>15.51</td>
</tr>
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<td>Hungary</td>
<td>14.36</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>13.49</td>
</tr>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>12.38</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>11.45</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Czech</td>
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<td>Cyprus</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>-3.62</td>
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**Bold** countries are above the mean
### Table 2.6 Logistic Regressions on National Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
<th>M3</th>
<th>M4</th>
<th>M6</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female==1)</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.033)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
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<td>0.0063***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education (Ref. below secondary)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edu: secondary completed</td>
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<td>-0.47***</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Occu: Blue collar and service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occu: Managers</td>
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<td>-0.29***</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Trust in EU-institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.037)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in National Government</td>
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<td>-0.19***</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>-0.19***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.011</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.0076)</td>
<td>(0.0080)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (1000 USD)</td>
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<td>(0.0098)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross debt (% of GDP)</td>
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<td>-0.0011</td>
<td>-0.0054</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Radical right party in government</td>
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<td>(0.15)</td>
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<td>-0.32**</td>
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<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
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<td>Drop in GDP 2007-2009 (%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dummies for 27 countries (Ref: Austria)</td>
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<td>not shown</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.82***</td>
<td>1.46***</td>
<td>1.41***</td>
<td>1.43***</td>
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<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
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<tr>
<td>log country level variance</td>
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<td>-2.09***</td>
<td>-2.91***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
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<td>Intraclass correlation (ICC)</td>
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<td>0.11</td>
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</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Figure 2.1 National and European Identity in the EU, 1992-2010
Figure 2.2 Percent Change in GDP per capita in EU Member States, 2004-2011
Figure 2.3 Change in Unemployment Rate in EU Member States, 2004-2011
Chapter Three

Electoral Support for Radical Right Parties in Western and Eastern Europe

In the last three decades, Western Europe has undergone a “Right turn” in politics. The emergence of popularly supported radical right parties is evidence of a shift to the Right in political attitudes (Betz 2003; Hainsworth 2000, 2008; Lubbers et al. 2002; Mudde 2007; Norris 2005). Aside from the Greens, the radical right “party family” is the only new addition to the European political space since World War II. Scholars initially paid little attention to radical right parties or dismissed them as “single issue parties” that would quickly fade away (Hainsworth 2000; Mudde 1999). Far from fading away, however, the presence of a radical right party in national parliaments has now become the norm rather than the exception across Western Europe (Bale 2003). This took social scientists seemingly by surprise, prompting a slew of studies to examine one core question: why do xenophobic nationalist parties continue to garner support, particularly in Western Europe—the birthplace of Enlightenment, universal welfare states, and liberal democracy? Scholarly preoccupation with this central question has resulted in research that either has focused on case studies of countries with particularly successful radical right parties, such as France or Austria, or on comparative studies seeking to explain variation in support for radical right parties across Western Europe (Art 2006, 2011; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2005; Carter 2005; Gibson 2002; Givens 2005; Norris 2005; Schain et al. 2002).

Yet, by framing the question of the emergence of radical right parties in terms of “why the West?” researchers have overlooked an equally puzzling paradox: namely, “why not the East?” Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, prominent scholars warned of the dangers of radicalization in the “backward East.” They feared that the transformation of an entire region from a supranational state to a collection of nation states, from state socialist to liberal market economies, and from authoritarianism to democracy created the perfect “breeding ground” for radicalization (Mudde 2007). However, when compared to Western Europe, radical right parties in Eastern Europe have not been nearly as successful at amassing popular support (see Figure 3.1). This has been the case despite economic and political factors that would seemingly have facilitated a turn right: periods of high unemployment, economic stagnation, and proportional electoral systems that are more favorable to marginal challenger parties.

Studies examining variation in support for radical right parties in Western Europe have meticulously analyzed contextual factors that could explain electoral outcomes and voter behavior. But time after time, these empirical studies have produced inconsistent results. For example, some find that high numbers of immigrants or asylum seekers correspond to high support for the radical right (Van der Brug et al. 2005; Gibson 2002; Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002; Swank and Betz 2003) while others find the opposite or no relationship (Givens 2005; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Norris 2005). The same inconsistencies exist for the effects of unemployment (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Arzheimer 2009; Jackman and Volpert 1996), economic growth (Art 2006), and electoral systems (Jackman and Volpert 1996; Swank and Betz 2003). By focusing on a limited set of factors—economic downturns, electoral systems, and immigration, or what can be called the “usual suspect” variables—studies have neglected to acknowledge the role of other factors.

9 Calculation of changes in party positions between 1999 and 2010 of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2012) shows a movement of European parties towards the right.
that could explain differences in support. In addition, scholars have given surprisingly little attention to examining factors that might support radical right parties in the post-socialist Eastern European context (but see Bustikova 2009; Minkenberg 2002; Rose and Munro 2003).

In this Chapter, I examine the effect of economic, political, and societal factors on electoral support for radical right parties in 27 European countries over 22 years of national parliamentary elections, from 1990 to 2012. I set out to answer two questions. First, do changes in the standard contextual factors—the “usual suspects”—economic decline, high unemployment, high immigration, and majoritarian electoral systems—increase support for radical right parties in both Western and Eastern Europe? Second, are the determinants of support for the radical right different in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe? This study contributes to the current literature by including all of Europe in the analysis of radical right parties and by focusing explicitly on explaining the differences between West and East. I add three previously unexamined explanatory factors: political stability, civic participation, and social trust. Political stability and social trust, in particular, explain the differences between Eastern and Western Europe.

In the following sections, I first discuss the relationship between radical right parties and nationalism. Support for radical right parties is an indicator of the appeal of nationalism, understood in its extreme exclusionary form of “ethnic nationalism.” This is a departure from most studies of radical right parties that do not make a connection between electoral outcomes and theories of nationalism. However, I suggest that increasing support for radical right parties is not just outcome of aligning economic and political factors. Rather, it is indicative of a broader societal resurgence of ethnic nationalism.

Second, I discuss the paradox of the “backward East” to underscore why scholars have predicted that radical right parties would be particularly successful in Eastern as opposed to Western Europe. Third, I present theoretical explanations for differences in support for the radical right in Europe. To the existing economic and political explanations, I add “social” explanations derived from theories of democracy. In the fourth section, I describe the data and statistical model I use to test the hypotheses from section three. The model is based on a new dataset of 167 parliamentary elections in Western and Eastern Europe. I then present results of the analysis in section five. Finally, I discuss the results’ theoretical implications for explaining differences in radical right support between Western and Eastern Europe.

**Defining the Radical Right**

What defines radical right parties? What is the relationship between radical right parties and nationalism in contemporary Europe? As Mudde (2007:139) points out, the most striking commonality in the rallying cries of radical right parties is the various take on the slogan, “France for the French!” or “Bulgaria for the Bulgarians!” This ubiquitous motto speaks directly to the distinguishing feature of radical right parties: ethnic nationalism, or the idea that the state exists to promote the interests of the titular ethnicity. In the broadest sense, radical right parties across Western and Eastern Europe share a strong nationalist and anti-establishment ideology with grievances aimed at immigrant or minority populations (Betz 2003; Hainsworth 2000, 2008; Lubbers et al. 2002; Mudde 2000; Norris 2005). Radical right parties’ ideological platforms emphasize the imagery of cultural loss—be it language, tradition, or religion—which allows them to fashion themselves as the legitimate heirs to national culture, traditions, values, and history. As ideology, right-wing radicalism’s “core
element is a myth of a homogenous nation, a romantic and populist ultranationalism directed against the...principles of individualism and universalism” (Minkenberg 2002:337).

Visions of ethnic nationhood, which determine who belongs and who does not to the national community, have come to define radical right parties’ ideologies; as such, these parties have become the organizational carriers of ethnic nationalist ideas. Electoral support for radical right parties is thus an indicator for measuring the appeal of nationalism in its ethnic form. When the relationship between radical right parties and nationalism is understood in terms of indicator and concept, respectively, then radical right parties’ electoral outcomes takes on a different meaning. Increasing electoral support for radical right parties signifies, at least in part, the sway of nationalist ideas. Because an ethnic vision of nationhood is at the core of the radical right’s ideology, this cultural core shapes radical right parties’ economic and political agendas.

Classifying radical right parties on the economic dimension no longer makes sense, because neoliberal economic policies, once the cornerstone of early radical right parties in the 1980s (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), have since disappeared from radical right parties’ platforms (Gibson 2002; Rydgren 2005). Beginning in the 1990s, Western radical right parties generally dropped neoliberalism from their economic agendas to instead emphasize economic protectionism and redistributive policies, but this new agenda contained one key caveat. In line with the view that ethnic and national belonging are one in the same, radical right parties’ platforms advocate extensive social redistribution to the national ethnic majority alone while limiting redistributive efforts to ‘unpopular’ ethnic groups. The ideological shift from neoliberalism to social protection worked to attract new constituencies for radical right parties in Western Europe. Beginning in the late 1980s, workers and middle classes turned out to support the radical right agenda, leading to a process of “proletarization” of the radical right electorate in the 1990s (Betz 1994). Workers, the traditional constituency of the Left, continue to be overrepresented among radical right party supporters (Rydgren 2007; Werts et al. 2012).

Much like neoliberal economic platforms, discursive and symbolic connections to the “Old Right” of inter-war fascism progressively disappear as radical right parties attempt to gain a permanent foothold in national politics. Radical right parties in both Western and Eastern Europe have sought to distance themselves from the inter-war legacies of fascism, even while relying on similar symbolism and minority scapegoating rhetoric. For example, in its early years the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) instituted black uniforms for party members, which it has since abandoned. The Hungarian Jobbik party and the Romanian Greater Romania Party also relied on implicit fascist symbolism (uniforms, red and black colors, slightly altered symbolism) but removed overt references from their “front stage” public personas. Softening of extremist rhetoric is also evident in successful radical right parties’ gesturing toward and cooptation of democratic values, which has proven particularly successful when paired with a critique of established political parties. Most radical right parties (with the exception of Switzerland) have the advantage of never having been in power, which provides a standpoint for criticizing established parties and policies (Mudde 1996).

It is, however, important not to overstate the softening of extreme stances toward immigrants and minorities. In Western Europe, radical right parties target immigrants as unjust recipients of social benefits and offenders—or, at least, not upholders—of cultural

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10 An individual may, of course, have other reasons for voting for a radical right party aside from the party’s nationalist ideology. For example, one may vote for a radical right party out of protest or disillusionment with the alternatives. However, an individual who has no propensity toward nationalist ideas is not likely to vote radical right. Thus, while imperfect, measuring nationalist appeal in terms of electoral outcomes captures a general tendency.
traditions. For example, the well-publicized debate in France on Muslim women’s use of headscarves was framed as at odds with French laïcité (or secularism) in popular and political debates on the issue. This was quickly picked up by the National Front, who accused Muslim immigrants of imposing their values on French society and, who thus, used it as justification for opposing further immigration from non-European countries. While the National Front has softened its stance on immigration from repatriation of all immigrants to deportation of illegal immigrants only, the FN’s position that non-white and non-Christian immigrants present a threat to French society has, in fact, hardened. Indeed, in all of Western Europe the imagery of the “Muslim threat” is fodder for radical right parties. In Eastern Europe, where foreign immigration is not as high as in Western Europe, radical right parties use the rhetoric of pure nationhood to target indigenous ethnic minorities, or the “enemies from within” such as the Roma and Jews. Mudde (2007) has referred to Muslims, Roma, and Jews as the “special enemies,” because these groups are consistently used as scapegoats for a wide range of social problems.

Eastern Europe differs from Western Europe on another key aspect, which underscores the importance of understanding radical right parties in terms of cultural ideologies. The legacy of state socialism has made the traditional Left-Right political spectrum murky in Eastern Europe, where successor communist parties are still active and receive a consistent, though minor, share of the vote (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Kuzio 2008). Whereas in Western Europe, communist or far left parties are progressive and culturally liberal, in Eastern Europe, they are reactionary and culturally conservative. Thus, on the far left, communist parties draw on the legacy of the Soviet era to advocate for a return to law and order, stricter moral guidelines, and extensive social spending. On the far right, parties advocate for the exact same policies but, importantly, they add an ethnic vision of national belonging (Minkenberg 2002). Because of the similarity in economic and social platforms, radical right parties and communist successor parties often cooperate and become strange bedfellows (Ishiyama 1998)—an outcome that is almost unimaginable in the West.

To summarize, radical right parties’ economic and social policy platforms have changed drastically over time, but a vision of ethnic nationalism continues to drive their political ideologies in both Western and Eastern Europe. For this reason, radical right parties can be treated as the organizational carriers of ethnic nationalism and support for radical right parties can be interpreted as evidence for the ideology’s increasing appeal.

The Paradox of the “Backward” East

As Figure 3.1 shows, radical right parties have been more successful in Western than in Eastern European countries. Why is this surprising? In this section, I discuss how several influential studies in history, political science, and sociology predicted the opposite outcome. The stark difference in electoral support for the radical right between West and East complicates long standing assumptions regarding the so-called backwardness of Eastern Europe and the potential for radicalization in the region.

In 1962, Gerschenkron’s essays on economic development defined Russia, and by extension, the socialist Eastern European countries, in terms of economic backwardness (Gerschenkron 1962). Even though Gerschenkron was using Germany and Russia as an example to make broader theoretical points about the process of industrialization in nineteenth century Europe, his formulations inaugurated the dichotomy, perpetuated by scholars following him, between the “civilized” West and the “backward” East. For example, the dichotomy of western/eastern nationalism, which roughly corresponds to the idea of civic/ethnic nationalism, reflects the often unspoken notion that the West is more developed, not just economically but also culturally. Even as former socialist countries joined the European Union, the notion that individuals from these countries, were not quite the same as
their Western neighbors remained in the popular imagination. The name-games during the accession process of Eastern European states illustrate this notion of second-class belonging. Risse (2010) opens his book on European identity with a quote from the Hungarian writer Peter Esterhazy, which aptly captures the sentiment of second-class EU citizenship awarded to the new EU member states:

Once I was an Eastern European; then I was promoted to the rank of Central European...then a few months ago, I became a New European. But before I had the chance to get used to this status – even before I could have refused it – I have now become a non-core European (Risse 2010:1).

As Risse points out, Esterhazy’s quote highlights the importance of regional and national identity in “New Europe” (Risse 2010). Yet, it also emphasizes the underlying assumption that Eastern Europe’s history and lack of democratic development offsets it from the rest of the European “core” by implying that it remains prone to anti-democratic, radical right political movements.

Since Gerschenkron’s early work, other prominent scholars have pointed to the problems of economic backwardness, the tendency to toward authoritarianism, democratic underdevelopment, and ethnic tensions plaguing Eastern Europe. Writing shortly after Soviet disintegration, Janos (1993) vividly described the deeply entrenched but misguided vision of Eastern Europe as a sleeping beauty: upon waking, she would be rescued by her Western prince to return to her rightful place. In 1989, when the cracks of the Soviet system became painfully visible, Eastern Europe was far from a pure, sleeping beauty who could return to her previously romantic life. Rather, “the most striking of the historical continuities is the fact that…Eastern Europe has been and remains economically underdeveloped, [a] marginalized part of the European continent” (Janos 1993:3). Janos goes on to explain how “over the past centuries and decades the degree of this marginalization has tended to increase rather than decrease” (3) due to economic decline, increasing inequality, and ethnic fragmentation.

Ethnic tensions within Eastern European states were particularly dangerous, because “the ‘higher purpose’ of ethnic survival may be used to subvert political systems based on pluralistic principles” (7). In other words, after the fall of state socialism, Eastern Europe was just, if not more, backward than it was before it “went to sleep” under the influence of the Soviet Union in the mid-twentieth century.

Howard’s (2003) study on the development of civil society in Eastern Europe meticulously examined how post-Communist societies lagged behind on every measure of civic engagement and participation in the 1990s. Howard starts with the assumption that a well-developed public sphere between the state and the family is generally necessary for a well functioning democracy. Yet, he goes on to show how post-Communist European democracies have remarkably low and declining levels of membership in voluntary organizations. According to Howard, weak civil societies in the post-Communist world are a result of the lingering distrust of communist organizations, the prominence of friendship networks that serve as disincentive for joining formal organizations, and the widespread disillusionment with the rate of political and economic progress after Soviet collapse. These factors have pulled citizens away from participation in the public sphere. While Howard insists that a civic culture could be developed with the right political institutions, the overall prospect for civic and, by extension, democratic, development seems grim.

Howard’s study feeds into broader theories of the relationship between civic participation and democratic development. In her classic work on totalitarianism, Arendt (1951) suggests that widespread societal anomie, in which individuals are isolated, atomized, and disconnected, predisposes populations to totalitarian movements, as was the case in
Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany. Expanding on this point, Kornhauser (1959) described “mass societies” as particularly at risk for radicalization. According to Kornhauser, mass societies are characterized by a collection of atomized individuals who are disconnected from political life and who do not participate in a variety of associations that cut across socio-economic lines. The lack of a “multiplicity of associations and affiliations,” as Kornhauser (99) called it, opens individuals to manipulation by elites who are able to aggregate the atomized masses and direct their frustrations toward a radical political goal. The post-Communist states’ weak civil societies—characterized by low civic participation and declining membership in voluntary associations—places these states at risk for mass radicalization. Taking Howard’s empirical evidence together with Arendt’s and Kornhauser’s theories of totalitarianism and mass society, suggests that the development of liberal democracy was never a given outcome for post-socialist Eastern Europe. Rather, the combination of a weak civil society with political and economic insecurity implies that right-wing radicalization was a more likely outcome.

Writing about the mobilization potential for radical right parties in Eastern versus Western Europe, Minkenberg (2002) makes a similarly gloomy prediction: “The resulting strains of economic and political insecurity, especially the uncompleted process of democratization and consolidation of the new regime, provide opportunities for the radical right which present western democracies do not” (336). Minkenberg goes on to qualify this statement by expressing doubt as to whether such movements could be effectively transformed into political parties, ending with a more toned down prediction that “the mobilization potential for the radical right in Eastern Europe seems rather large but not significantly larger than in western democracies” (Minkenberg 2002:344). Even assuming this more modest prediction, the electoral data in Figure 3.1 show that the supposedly large mobilization potential for radical right parties has not been realized in Eastern Europe.

The “paradox” of the backward East is that its economic, political, and societal “backwardness” did not lead to a surge in radical right political movements. On the contrary, support for ultranationalist radical right parties, which has perennially been lower than that in Western Europe, has continued to decline in the East while increasing in the West. Whereas scholars have been predicting disaster for the East, in reality, it is Western Europe that is becoming increasingly radicalized. The task facing researchers is to examine the determinants of electoral support in Europe in general and Eastern Europe in particular.

**Explanations and Hypotheses**

In this section, I discuss and draw hypotheses from three perspectives: structural strain, institutional politics, and theories of democracy. Previous studies have suggested that economic conditions and immigration levels determine the success and failure of radical right parties. The choice of these “usual suspect” variables is based on the idea that together, they can create the perfect “breeding ground” for radical right parties. The rationale for examining these specific factors stems from structural strain theory, which suggests rather straightforwardly that broad socio-economic changes contribute to frustration and thus increase the chances for political radicalization.

Focusing on political institutions, political scientists have emphasized how the structure of electoral systems can facilitate or deter support for radical right parties. The usual comparison is between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems, because proportional electoral allow for small parties to gain representation if they surpass a certain electoral threshold. Consequently, studies have also examined the electoral threshold level for parliamentary representation as an explanatory variable, but because my aim is to examine differences in electoral support and not whether a radical right party actually succeeds in entering a parliament, I do not include electoral thresholds in the analysis. In addition, there
is very little variation in the electoral threshold for parliamentary representation: the range is three to five percent across almost all Western and Eastern European countries. In Eastern Europe, with the exception of Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Ukraine, which have a four, four and three percent threshold for parliamentary representation, respectively, all other CEE countries have adopted a five percent threshold (Rose and Munro 2003). In place of this threshold variable, I propose that a measure of political stability be added as an explanatory variable, because unstable political periods could present more political opportunities for challenger parties.

Political and structural explanations, nevertheless, fail to address how societal factors, such as a civically engaged citizenry and generalized trust, could affect support for radical right political parties. Theories of democracy, however, have long been concerned with understanding how civic participation facilitates trust and the development of a liberal democracy (Putnam 1993, 2000). The classical Tocquevillian tradition suggests that an active civic sphere, characterized by high levels of civic participation and trust between individuals, is an indicator of a healthy democracy (Tocqueville 1988). The implication of this civic explanation is that in such a society, radical movements and political parties are unlikely to succeed electorally. In the rest of this section, I elaborate these theories and derive the hypotheses that I then test in the statistical analysis.

The Usual Suspects: Economics and Immigration

Economic decline and rising immigration are the most common contextual factors for explaining support for radical right parties. The influence of these factors on electoral outcomes is hotly debated in the case of Western Europe but remains largely unexamined for Eastern Europe.

**Hypothesis 1:** Unemployment and economic decline increase support for radical right parties in both Western and Eastern Europe.

Hypothesis 1 is based on structural strain theory (Smelser 1962) which posits that economic decline strains social relations leading individuals to become frustrated and disconnected from society. As more individuals lose employment, are unable to participate in the labor market because they lack the needed specialized skills, or feel increasing competition, they may seek to express their frustrations wrought by decreases in opportunities (real or perceived) by turning to radical political parties. To capture this state of frustration resulting from socioeconomic change, scholars have also referred to the strain explanation as the “losers of post-industrialism” hypothesis (Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007). The terminology underscores that radical right parties have a greater opportunity for garnering support when larger parts of the population are losing out from structural changes beyond their control, because it is at this point that individual grievances could be compelled to find political expression.

At the individual level, studies have found support for the “losers of post-industrialism” argument: manual workers, the unemployed, and people with lower educational attainment are more likely to vote for a radical right party (Lubbers et al. 2002; Arzheimer and Carter 2006). Wert et al. (2012) find that “income level does not significantly affect radical right-wing voting after controlling for other individual characteristics” (11). At the aggregate level, however, the evidence is less clear. For example, the Austrian radical right party, Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ) enjoyed its highest levels of support during a period of low unemployment and tapering immigration (Art 2006). Looking specifically at

When the threshold variable was included in the models, it had no statistically significant effect on electoral support.
unemployment, some studies of Western Europe find a positive correlation between
unemployment levels and support for radical right parties (Jackman and Volpert 1996) and
others a negative one (Lubbers et al. 2002; Knigge 1998; Arzheimer and Carter 2006). A few
studies examining economic change and electoral outcomes for the radical right find no clear
relationship (Bréchon and Mitra 1992; Westle and Niedermayer 1992). In the case of Eastern
Europe, the question has not been systematically examined.

In addition to economic decline, immigration is another type of “strain” factor that
places pressure on the native population. In an extension of structural strain theory, ethnic
competition theory proposes that ethnic groups with common economic interests see
themselves as competing for economic resources (Coser 1956; Levine and Campbell 1972).
The entrance of new ethnic groups into the labor market presents a perceived threat to the
native population, particularly if the new comers are so-called “visible” minorities, which is
often the case in Western Europe, where Turkish and North African Muslims make up some
of the largest immigrant groups. Because immigrants often compete for manual or lower
income service jobs, they become the natural scapegoats for the lack of economic
opportunities among already precarious situacted sectors of the population. The “immigrant
threat” is equally powerful whether it is real or perceived.

Radical right parties across Western and Eastern Europe have picked up on the
rhetoric of the immigrant threat by consistently linking immigrants to job shortages and high
unemployment (Jackman and Volpert 1996). The National Front set the precedent for making
the link between unemployment and immigration in the 1980s, when Le Pen, then the leader
of France’s National Front, coined such slogans as: “Two million immigrants are the cause of
two million French people out of work” (Mitra 1988). Le Pen’s strategy of directly blaming
immigrants for unemployment has since been copied by virtually every radical right party
across Europe (Mudde 2007). Even in Eastern Europe, where immigration rates are on
average lower than in the West, radical right parties’ anti-immigrant discourse directly
blames immigrants and indigenous minorities for shortages of economic opportunity and
cultural loss. And while empirical evidence does not support the claim that higher
immigration causes higher unemployment or that it negatively effects wages (Borjas 1995;
Golder 2003b), the radical right has utilized this simple—albeit false—logic to effectively to
construct a powerful frame that speaks to potential supporters. Indeed, previous studies have
shown that immigration was one of the main reasons why voters said they supported a radical
right party (Golder 2003; Lubbers and Scheepers 2002; Mitra 1988).

Hypothesis 2: High numbers of immigrants increase support for radical right parties, but the
effect of immigration is lower in Eastern Europe alone.

One implication of ethnic competition theory is that in countries where there are large
numbers of immigrants, voters are more likely to support radical right parties. Yet, evidence
on the relationship between immigration and support for radical right parties is inconsistent.
Some studies of Western Europe have found a positive correlation between high immigration
rates and radical right support (Knigge 1998; Gibson 2002; Lubbers et al. 2002), while others
have found no relationship (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Norris 2005). With a small number
of cases, there are too many outliers to make a compelling argument: Germany, Sweden and
the Netherlands have been high immigration countries with low long-term support for radical
right parties. On the other hand, Austria and Finland are low immigration countries with
highly successful radical right parties (Art 2011). Even studies examining subnational
immigration effects by electoral districts have been inconclusive (Mudde 1999). For example,
comparing districts in Austria, France, and Germany, Givens (2002) found that radical right
parties received higher support in districts with a high percentage of foreigners in Austria and
France but not in Germany. The methodological problem with district level comparisons is that detailed data on district voting and immigration rates are not available in all Western European countries and in almost none of the Eastern European countries.

For the case of Eastern Europe, the relationship between immigration and support for radical right parties has not been systemically examined even at the national level. Lack of comparable immigration data, especially at the local level, is one reason for this, but the main reason for the absence is the general assumption that immigration is a non-issue in Eastern Europe. Rather, the proportion of ethnic minorities is thought to be more important in Eastern European countries (Mudde 2007). However, as I discuss in the following section, due to the nature of ethnic heterogeneity measures, which are assumed to be slow moving variables that do not change over a twenty year period, including these measures in an analysis with a longitudinal dependent variable is problematic. In one of the most comprehensive recent studies to examine countries in both Western and Eastern Europe, Werts et al. (2012) found that immigration has a positive effect on an individual’s propensity to vote for a radical right party across all countries but the percentage of ethnic minorities does not. While the study only included five Eastern European countries and examined effects on an individual’s propensity to vote for the radical right as opposed to actual electoral outcomes, the results suggest that immigration may indeed be an important explanatory variable across all of Europe, but the effect of immigration may be lower in Eastern Europe.

Political Institutions: Electoral Systems and Stability

Proportional electoral systems are thought to privilege small parties by allowing any political party that reaches an electoral threshold in popular support to have representation in parliament: between three and five percent in most countries. On the other hand, a majoritarian electoral system disadvantages small parties by allocating votes based on a winner-take-all system. Whereas proportional representation systems facilitate multi-partism, majoritarian single-member district systems facilitate a two party system (Duverger 1954).

Hypothesis 3: Proportional electoral systems favor radical right parties across all countries.

Most Eastern European countries, except Hungary that has a mixed system, and Ukraine that had a majoritarian system only in the early 1990s, have instituted proportional representation systems at the national level with some variation at the district level. Yet, in Hungary, the radical right party, Jobbik, received 16.9 percent of the vote in 2010, making it one of the most successful European radical right parties in a country with a mixed electoral system. Studies have found mixed results when testing this hypothesis in Western Europe as well: some find a positive connection between share of votes for radical right parties and proportional representation systems (Swank and Betz 2003; Jackman and Volpert 1996), while others show no connection (Van der Brug et al. 2005; Carter 2005). The inconsistency of these findings in Western Europe and the lack of analysis of Eastern Europe warrants an examination of whether or not electoral systems have any effect on the success of failure of the radical right.

Hypothesis 4: Political instability increases support for radical right parties across all countries but has a greater effect in Eastern than in Western Europe.

A second political factor potentially important for the success or failure of radical right parties is political instability, as evidenced by outbreaks of political violence and frequent changes in governance (Hypothesis 4). Radical right parties are marginal in most European democracies, meaning that they have never governed as a majority. Except in
Switzerland, where the *Schweizerische Volkspartei* (SVP) is the largest political party, in all other European countries, radical right parties style themselves as anti-establishment challengers to the mainstream. During highly unstable political times—when the ruling government fails to address political violence or when the political establishment falls apart under economic or social pressure—radical right parties have the greatest opportunity to seize the moment and mobilize support. This is exactly what happened in Greece in the 2010 parliamentary elections when the radical right Golden Dawn party received almost seven percent of the popular vote at the national level. In the aftermath of the debt crisis, the Greek government crumbled under the economic and social pressures of imposed austerity measures and an out of control economic crisis. As high ranking officials, including the Prime Minister, began to resign, the Greek citizens grew frustrated with their governments’ inability to deal with the crisis. The Golden Dawn swooped in with its anti-immigrant and anti-mainstream message to win the largest share of support for a radical right party in Greece’s democratic history. It remains to be tested whether Greece’s situation was anomalous or if political instability facilitates increasing support for the radical right. Political stability could be particularly important for Eastern European countries, where party systems were highly volatile in the post-socialist period of the 1990s.

**Theories of Democracy: Civic Participation and Social Trust**

Structural strain and political institutional theories could provide a partial answer to why radical right parties are more successful in some countries than others. However, current studies do not address how differences in societal factors could affect support for the radical right. Theories of democracy have long highlighted the importance of civic participation for democratic development and diffusion of liberal values, but there are competing views as to whether civic engagement and social trust facilitate or deter radical challenges. Civil society is the associational space between the state and private sphere, consisting of formal voluntary organizations, professional associations, recreational clubs, religious groups, veterans’ organizations, and local or community organizations (Howard 2003).

The classical Tocquevillian tradition asserts that a robust civil society is necessary for the success of liberal democracy. According to proponents of this perspective, most notably Putnam (1993, 2000) a well-functioning civil society forms the basis of social trust. Trust grows out of civic participation because civic groups can bring individuals together into continual participation around a common purpose. When civic associations cut across different social groups, citizens develop trust relationships with others who are not like them (Kornhauser 1959). It follows that in a society with high civic participation and, subsequently, high levels of social trust, individuals would be less likely to support extremist exclusionary movements. In addition, civic associations potentially discourage radical challenges “from below” by acting as a first line of defense for grievance resolution, thus shielding state elites from extremist demands. On the flipside, in societies without a well-developed associational sphere, individuals are disconnected from each other and from political elites. In such societies, individuals do not have an avenue for pursuing collective goals and engaging in politics. As a result, citizens are vulnerable to totalitarian and authoritarian mass movements from above, and political elites are vulnerable to extremist movements from below. For example, Putnam (2000) argues that declining civic participation and social trust threatens the core of participatory democracy as individuals become more disconnected from their government and each other.

_Hypothesis 5_: Low civic participation and lack of trust leads to higher success for the radical right.
More recent research has challenged the classical perspective to argue that a robust associational sphere with high participation can lead to authoritarian regimes, such as state fascism, as opposed to democracy (Berman 1997; Riley 2005, 2010). Examining the historical cases of fascism in Germany (Berman 1997), Italy, and Spain (Riley 2005), these studies find that the roots of fascism first formed in regions where civil society was most developed. Rather than acting as schools of democracy and pluralism, civic associations became the social basis for organizing support for fascist parties. These studies suggest that civic engagement can facilitate the spread of a radical, anti-democratic agenda. In other words, there is no guarantee that high civic participation inevitably leads to the positive outcome of liberal democracy. The implication for contemporary radical right parties is that such parties need a preexisting civic foundation to be electorally successful. This argument is in direct contradiction to classical theories of democracy. Here, I refer to the “classical hypothesis” (Hypothesis 5 above) as the base test of theories of democracy.

Data and Model Design

I created a dataset to examine voting trends for radical right parties in national parliamentary elections in 27 countries: 16 are in Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) and 11 are in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine). These countries represent all democracies in Europe except Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and Malta, which were excluded because they are outliers in terms of size and income. The list includes both EU and non-EU countries. To classify parties as “radical right,” I compared party classifications in secondary literature (Bakker et al. 2012; Bustikova 2009; Lubbers et al. 2002; Mudde 2007; Ramet 2010; Rose and Munro 2003) and in two databases: the Manifesto Project Database (MPD) that classifies European parties into party families based on parties’ platforms from 1945 to 2012 (Volkens et al. 2012) and Benoit and Laver’s (2006) expert panel survey that classifies parties based on expert opinions. Table 3.1 lists the parties examined in each country and the number of national parliamentary elections per country from 1990 to 2012.

Included in the analysis are countries without an active radical right party (Ireland and Spain) and election years when no radical right party was represented. Whereas most studies exclude countries and election without an active radical right party, doing so biases the analysis and overestimates the effect of the explanatory variables. Excluding cases with a zero on the dependent variable introduces selection bias, because countries where conditions may deter the radical right are systematically missing. However, including the zero observations can also be problematic because it assumes that the explanatory variables have no effect on support for the radical right (Jackman and Volpert 1996). A solution to the selection bias and zero coding problem is to use maximum likelihood estimators (Golder 2003). I deal with these issues in more detail in the following sections where I describe the statistical model.

[Table 3.1 here]

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12 Including Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and Malta did not change the results of the analysis, but because none of the countries have ever had an active radical right party, including the data created more zero values on the dependent variable. Belarus was also excluded because it is not a democracy. Moldova was excluded because of a lack of available data.

13 Available at https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu
Dependent Variable

The dependent variable (\(Pvote\)) is the percent of the popular vote received by all radical right parties in a parliamentary election. Electoral results are from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) European Election Database.\(^{14}\) The NSD collects national electoral data for all European countries starting in 1990. In years when more than one radical right party participated in the parliamentary election, the vote is pooled. I cross checked NSD’s electoral data with those collected by national governments. The total number of parliamentary elections across 27 counties and 22 years is 167 (n=167).

Independent Variables

To test the five hypotheses identified in the previous section, I collected data on economic, political, and social indicators for each country and year. Strain theory suggests that economic decline strengthens support for radical right parties (Hypothesis 1). Economic decline is captured by two measures: GDP per capita and unemployment. Data on GDP per capita is from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) dataset and is adjusted for inflation using the purchasing power parity (PPP) method and collected on an annual basis. Unemployment data are also reported annually by the World Bank and measure as percent unemployed of the total labor force.\(^{15}\)

Ethnic competition theory suggests that high numbers of immigrants in a country can lead individuals to votes for radical right parties, because immigrants are perceived as a threat to economic opportunities (Hypothesis 2). Immigration is measured as the stock of migrants as a percent of the total population. The World Bank reports these figures every five years (1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010). Because the frequency of data collection is consistent and comparable across all countries, it is possible to extrapolate values for the missing years in between collected data points using linear (OLS) techniques. Arguably, immigration can be measured in different ways. Previous studies have used the number of asylum seekers in a country, percentage of foreign born, number of refugees, annual immigration rates, and the number of ethnic minorities (see Wert et al. 2012 for discussion). However, due to the large number of countries and the long time span, other measures of immigration are not available for all countries and all years. While it would be possible to obtain additional measures from more than one source, these data would likely not be comparable across all cases. The World Bank data, while not ideal, since they do not capture all aspects of immigration, allow for comparability across counties and capture an element of ethnic diversity as well as migration.

It is important to note why other ethnicity variables cannot be included in this analysis and specifically, why measures of ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic vs. civic conceptions of citizenship, which could be particularly relevant in an East/West comparison, are not included. To start with the conception of citizenship, the European Values Survey (EVS) and the World Values Survey (WVS) and also the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) ask this question: "Some people say the following things are important for being truly [respondent’s nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?" Possible answers to the question are: “to have been born in [country], to have [country] citizenship, to have lived in the [country] for most of one’s life ancestry, to be able to speak [country’s] language, to be [religion], to respect [country’s] political institutions and laws, to feel [country nationality], to have [country nationality] ancestry.” In an analysis of the 2003 ISSP wave on nationality, Reeskens and Hooghe (2010) find that ethnic conceptions are most associated with ancestry and civic conceptions with obeying laws. However, the authors find that the measures are not comparable across countries, because “civic and ethnic typology are not being measured cross-nationally.

\(^{14}\) Available at http://www.nsd.uib.no/

\(^{15}\) Available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators
equivalent across nations,” which means that “countries should not be ranked based on their ‘scores’ on these two dimensions, contrary to what has become practice in current comparative research” (Reeskens and Hooghe 2010:593).

For the purposes of my analysis, the bigger problem is that both the EVS/WVS and the ISSP only asked the above question at one point in time, 2008 and 2003, respectively. Moreover, the ISSP does not include all the countries in my sample. The EVS/WVS 2008 data are the only options. However, using the EVS/WVS 2008 cross-sectional data would mean that there is no variation on the independent variable within each country. Each country would be assigned the same 2008 value for all the years in the analysis (1990-2012) or mass missing values would be produced because additional data points are not available. In a fixed effects model with controls for differences between countries (country dummies), assigning the same value to each country has essentially the same effect as the country dummies of controlling for country heterogeneity: one must either exclude country controls or include the additional independent variable. The same problem arises with measures of ethnic heterogeneity. Measures of ethnic heterogeneity for the time period I examine are also cross-sectional (the assumption is that ethnic make-up does not change much over a 20 year period). The most comprehensive dataset was compiled by Alesina et al. (2003), which is based on all the existing measures (CIA, World Directory of Minorities, plus others) and provides a value of "ethnic fractionalization" per country that is standardized and comparable. But again, because there is one value per country, country controls must be dropped if the variable is included. Since my intention is to examine differences between regions, while controlling for country heterogeneity, I cannot include cross-sectional measures of ethnic heterogeneity or conceptions of citizenship in a fixed effects model.

Political institutional theory suggests that the type of electoral system and the stability of political institutions effects support for radical right parties (Hypotheses 3 and 4). Political system is coded as a categorical variable where 1=Majoritarian, 2=Proportional, and 3=Mixed. The data are from Bromann and Golder’s (2013) Democratic Electoral Systems Dataset, which collects extensive information on electoral systems in 200 countries from 1946 to 2011. Political stability is an index measure of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism as defined by the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators. The estimator “captures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism” (http://databank.worldbank.org/). The index ranges from -2.5 (highly unstable) to 2.5 (highly stable). These data are collected from 1996 to 2011, which is problematic because the early 1990s are not represented, which results in dropped observations on the dependent variable when political stability is included in the model. It is not possible to extrapolate values for the early years because at least two data points are needed (start and end point). Thus, while not ideal, the World Bank stability index is the best available comparable measure given the years and number of countries.

Theories of democracy suggest that low civic engagement and lack of social trust are facilitating conditions for the radical right. Data on civic participation and social trust are from the three waves of the World Values (WVS) and European Values (EVS) Surveys (compiled into an integrated data set by GESIS) conducted in 1990/1991, 1999/2000, and 2008. Data points for the missing years are imputed linearly. Civic participation is the percent of respondents in each country who say they participate in at least one voluntary organization.16 The standard WVS and the EVS ask respondents the following question in each survey wave: “Do you belong to any of the following organizations?” followed by a list

16 The WVS and EVS are the most comprehensive and comparable surveys on civic participation, but they are not perfect. In 1990/1991, the question was not included in Greece. For Switzerland, data are missing in the first two waves, because the surveys were not conducted.
of voluntary organizations such as environmental groups, youth group, labor unions, animal rights groups, etc. Respondents are asked to mark all organizations to which they belong but also have the option of selecting “none.” I use this “none” category to capture overall participation by subtracting the percentage of respondents who claim to not belong to any voluntary organization from 100. This makes interpretation simpler while at the same time shows a general tendency of civic engagement as opposed to choosing an arbitrary cut-off (e.g. percentage of respondents belonging to more than one versus more that two organizations). Trust measures the percentage of respondents in the WVS/EVS data who select “yes” to the question “Do you think most people can be trusted?” As with civic participation, gap years are linearly imputed.

In addition to the above variables, I include a dummy variable for Eastern Europe in the full models (Eastern Europe = 1) and country dummies for all 27 countries. Table 3.2 shows summary statistics and data sources for all the variables in the analysis. Table 3.3 displays the correlation matrix for all the variables in the analysis. Some independent variables appear highly correlated. In particular, trust and civic participation (r=.74) and trust and GDP (r=.70). As discussed in the previous section, it is not surprising, and rather expected, that civic participation and generalized trust would be positively correlated. Previous studies have also found that trust and wealth are positively related (Howard 2003). To ensure that these correlations do not introduce multicollinearity into the analysis, I examined the variance inflation factor (VIF) of each variable, which indicates the percentage of variation in the independent variable that is explained by the other independent variables. Fox (2008) suggests that VIF values around 10 indicate high multicollinearity. All the variables in my analysis showed a VIF of three or under, which means collinearity does not bias the estimates.

[Tables 3.2 and 3.3 here]

Model Description

Most studies examining electoral support for radical right parties exclude countries and elections where such parties garnered no electoral support (Anderson 1996; Givens 2002; Knigge 1998). The problem with this approach is that it focuses only on success cases, and thus introduces bias into the model by over- or underestimating the effect of the independent variables. In other words, the independent variables could be systematically related to the success of radical right parties. Jackman and Volpert (1996) and Golder (2003a, 2003b) recognized that because, in many instances, radical right parties garner no electoral support or are not represented, the dependent variable is left-censored at zero. “Because the dependent variable is left-censored in this way, employing ordinary least squares (OLS) carries the risk of generating biased and inconsistent estimates, the magnitude of the bias hinging on the ratio of censored to uncensored observations” (Jackman and Volpert 1996:513). To adjust for this error, previous studies have used maximum-likelihood estimation that takes into account the probability of being observed (Golder 2003a, 2003b; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Knigge 1998).

Following these studies, I use a tobit model, which employs maximum likelihood estimation for left-censored variables. The estimators from the model can be interpreted as in a linear OLS regression (King 1994), where the “estimated coefficients represent the marginal effect of the independent variables on the underlying support for extreme right parties” (Golder 2003a:449). In a review of the literature on sample selection bias and techniques for adjustment, Winship and Mare (1992) point out that additional adjustment

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17 For a detailed discussion of Tobit models, see King 1994; Greene 2000; and Sigelman and Zeng 1999.
techniques may be too restrictive for smaller samples. The Heckman estimator (Heckman 1979) is commonly used as an estimator in tobit models. The Heckman is a more restrictive version of the generalized tobit model: the estimator assumes that the expected errors of the censored observations are normally distributed. When the normality assumption does not hold, “the maximum likelihood estimates may be worse than simply using the observed sample mean” (Winship and Mare 1992:342). Furthermore, even if the normality assumption holds, the Heckman estimator may not improve the mean square error of OLS estimates of slope coefficients in small samples” (Stolzenberg and Relles 1990:342). Because the number of observations is relatively small (N=106 in Models 3-4 in Table 3.4), I do not use the Heckman estimator (or a two step tobit) here.

The second specification is that I use a pooled cross-sectional time-series design. The dependent variable (support for radical right parties 1990-2012) is longitudinal but the number of observations is too small for panel techniques with a large number of observations per panel and per cluster. In my dataset, there are five to eight elections (observations) per country, which is too small for longitudinal panel analysis. To control for country heterogeneity, I include country dummy variables to run a fixed effects model.

[Table 3.4 here]

Results

Table 3.4 shows the results of four Tobit regressions on the voteshare \( (pvote) \) received by radical right parties in Europe from 1990 to 2012. The 27 country dummies are included (not shown), and standard errors are in parentheses. Model 1 includes all 27 countries (Austria is the reference category for Models 1-4) and tests the effect of the “usual suspect” variables: economic factors, measured as GDP per capita and unemployment, and immigration, measured as the proportion of migrants as a percent of the total population in each country, as well as a dummy variable for Eastern Europe.\(^{18}\) The only two variables that have a significant effect on support for radical right parties are immigration and the Eastern Europe dummy. This means that economic factors do not have an effect that is significantly different from zero on the voteshare received by radical right parties in Europe. Whereas the coefficient on unemployment is positive, as predicted in Hypothesis 1, the coefficient on GDP per capita is also positive, which is the opposite of strain theory’s expectation. Economic variables remain insignificant in the three models that include data on all European countries. Hypothesis 1 can thus be rejected: economic decline does not contribute to increasing support for radical right parties.\(^{19}\)

The significant negative coefficient on the Eastern Europe dummy indicates what is already clear in the descriptive data: Eastern European countries have less successful radical right parties than Western European countries. If a country is located in Eastern Europe, then popular support for radical right parties is 14.4 percentage points lower than if that country is in Western Europe. Because there is a significant difference between Western and Eastern Europe, there is reason to examine interaction effects between the Eastern Europe dummy and other independent variables (discussed in Model 4). Immigration has a significant positive effect on support for radical right parties: in Model 1, the coefficient on the immigration variable (1.06) indicates that for every percent increase in the proportion of migrants in a country, support for radical right parties increases by a similar amount. This

\(^{18}\) For easier interpretation, GDP per capita in the models is scaled down = (GDP per capita/1000). This keeps the values essentially the same but scales the variable for more straight forward comparison with the other independent variables.

\(^{19}\) I also looked at the effect of changes in GDP and unemployment (coded as a change variable) on the dependent variable, but the results were similarly insignificant.
effect decreases slightly but remains significant once political (Model 2) and societal (Model 3) factors are taken into account. The evidence provides support for Hypothesis 2 that a higher immigration helps increase support for radical right parties in both Western and Eastern Europe.

Model 2 adds the political variables: electoral system type and stability. It is important to note that the number of observations drops from 165 to 129, because data for the stability variable is only available from 1996 to 2011, which results in dropped values on the dependent variable. Both political variables are highly significant, but this result should be interpreted with caution. The reference category for the electoral system variable is majoritarian electoral systems. Hypothesis 3 proposed that majoritarian electoral systems lower electoral support for small challenger parties, including radical right parties. The negative coefficient on both proportional and mixed categories indicates the opposite: majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to facilitate successful radical right parties than proportional or mixed systems. The problem with this result is that there is little variation on the proportional system variable: only 10 percent of all elections in the data took place under a majoritarian rule system, while 72.5 and 17.5 percent of elections took place under a proportional or mixed system, respectively. Moreover, out of the four countries that currently have a majoritarian electoral system (UK, Austria, France) or had one in the past (Ukraine 1990-1994), half (Austria and France) have the most electorally successful radical right parties in all of Europe. As a result, the political system variable essentially becomes a dummy control variable for Austria and France. Because of the nature of the data, Hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected or accepted: the effect of electoral system types is unclear, but the fact that countries with majoritarian electoral systems also have the most successful radical right parties suggests that difference in electoral systems cannot explain difference in electoral outcomes for the radical right, at least not at the country level.

A country’s political stability has a significant effect on the success of radical right parties: lower stability increases electoral support for the radical right, and the coefficient is large (-5.54). However, this result should also be interpreted with some caution. Stability is an index variable ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, but as Table 3.2 shows, the minimum value for the countries in this analysis is -0.51 and the maximum is 1.67. This means that a two point increase in stability is huge: it is the difference between the most unstable (Ukraine 1994) and the most stable country in Europe (Finland in 2002). In terms of support for radical right parties, this is equal to a difference of approximately 11 percentage points in support for radical right parties between a very unstable nation (higher support) and a very stable one (lower support). Also reflective of stability is, to some extent, a country’s economic wealth. As Table 3.3 shows, stability is somewhat positively correlated with GDP (r=.51), but whereas GDP cannot explain the variation in the dependent variable, political stability does, which suggests that the stability variable is capturing something more than just differences in wealth. As Hypothesis 4 proposed, unstable political situations provide opportunities for radical right parties to gain at the polls.

The model in column three includes all the independent variables and countries\(^{20}\). The effect of immigration, the Eastern Europe dummy, stability, and political system remain significant in Model 3 with small changes in the coefficients. The added societal variables—civic participation and trust—are not significant. A negative value of the coefficients is found in the expected direction (Hypothesis 5): lower civic participation and trust increase support for the radical right, but the lack of a significant result does not support the hypothesis that social factors can explain changes in support for radical right parties in Western and Eastern Europe. However, because there are significant differences between Western and Eastern

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\(^{20}\) As in the two previous models, the reduction in the number of observations (N) in Model 3 is due to missing data on independent variables, in this case trust and civic participation.
Europe, as evidenced by a significant coefficient on the dummy variable for Eastern Europe, there is reason to expect that the explanatory variables may have different effects in Eastern Europe.

To account for differences between Western and Eastern Europe, Model 4 introduces interaction effects between the dummy variable for Eastern Europe and stability plus the dummy variable and trust. These two interactions are shown because they are the only statistically significant interaction effects. The negative coefficient on the EE dummy*stability variable is highly significant and large (-10.2). This means that a one point increase in stability (a large change given the scale), decreases support for radical right parties in Eastern Europe by 10.2 percentage points as compared to Western Europe. Political stability has a much greater effect of reducing support for radical right parties in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. Calculating the difference between the most stable (stability = 1.2) and unstable (stability = -0.5) Eastern European countries in terms of support for the radical right yields a difference of approximately 18 percentage points. This means that an unstable political situation is much more likely to help radical right parties in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. The result confirms the prediction made in Hypothesis 4: political instability increases support for radical right parties in Eastern Europe more than in Western Europe.

Perhaps the most interesting result in Model 4 is the effect of the social variables on support for radical right parties. The coefficient on the EE dummy*trust is negative and statistically significant (-1.07). While the coefficient is small in comparison to the stability interaction variable, the scale of the trust variable is smaller as well. For example, a 10 percent increase in trust, decreases electoral support for radical right parties by 10.7 percent in Eastern Europe versus Western Europe. Considering that support for radical right parties in Eastern Europe is already lower than in the West, this is a sizeable effect. Levels of trust are correlated with wealth (see Table 3.3), but whereas GDP per capita does not explain any of the variation in the dependent variable, trust does. The finding partially supports Hypothesis 5 and theories of democracy: lower levels of trust contribute to support for radical right parties more in Eastern Europe than in the West. Once the regional interaction terms are included in Model 4, the effect of immigration is no longer statistically significant. In addition, when an interaction term between immigration and the Eastern Europe dummy was included, it showed no statistically significant effects. This suggests that immigration levels do not explain differences in support for radical right parties between West and East. Rather, political stability and social trust explain the contrast in radical right voting in Figure 3.1.

Lastly, it is worth noting the differences in effect between the two social variables, trust and civic participation. Trust and civic participation are positively correlated (see Table 3.3), but civic participation does not have a significant effect on support for radical right parties in any of the models. This result could be due to the peculiarity of the civic engagement question in the WVS/EVS surveys, which asks respondents to select the voluntary organizations they belong to. Belonging does not necessarily equal active participation: individuals may formally join a group but then rarely attend meetings, or they could participate informally in social groups but not consider these groups formal voluntary organizations. Even though the theoretical assumption is that civic participation leads to higher social trust, correlation between the variables does not equal causation.

**Discussion**

Structural strain theories and popular discourse tend to blame declining economic conditions for the electoral success of radical right parties. The evidence, however, does not

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21 Stability was not significant in a model that restricted the sample to Western Europe only.
substantiate this assumption for European radical right parties over the last two decades. The common indicators of economic health – GDP and unemployment – do not effect the electoral outcomes of radical right parties. These findings make a strong case for rejecting the hypothesis that economic conditions can either deter or facilitate support for radical right parties in national parliamentary elections (Hypothesis 1). The results suggest that individuals do not turn toward radical political parties when economic conditions decline. However, it would be an ecological fallacy to make conclusions regarding individual behavior based on aggregate level data. Therefore, without individual level data on voters’ actual behavior, this conclusion remains speculative.22

Electoral system types have the opposite effect than expected: proportional systems seem to deter support for radical right parties rather than facilitating high electoral outcomes (Hypothesis 3). But with so little variation in electoral system types, this finding is also not surprising. This finding casts doubt on the importance of national electoral rules in determining electoral outcomes for radical right parties in particular and challenger parties in general.

Unlike economic factors and electoral system types, immigration has a positive effect on support for radical right parties in Europe: increases in the proportion of migrants in a country, increases support for radical right parties (Hypothesis 2). At first glance, the results in Models 1-3 seem to confirm previous studies’ findings that there is a positive relationship between immigration and electoral support for radical right parties (Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002; Swank and Betz 2003; Van der Brug et al. 2005). Without further analysis, this finding would also seem to explain differences in support for radical right parties between Western and Eastern Europe.

Further examining the differences between East and West reveals that once interaction effects are introduced into the model, immigration is no longer a significant determinant of electoral support. Rather, political stability and trust explain the differences between Western and Eastern Europe. Unstable countries in Eastern Europe are more likely to have an electorally successful radical right party than unstable countries in Western Europe. Whereas Eastern European countries are on average less stable (mean = .56) than Western European countries (mean = .98), political stability has greater explanatory power in Eastern Europe.23 This means that increasing political stability in Eastern Europe could decrease support for radial right parties even more but would not have the same deterring effect in Western Europe. For Eastern European radical right parties, a politically unstable environment presents an electoral opportunity.

East Europeans trust less than their Western counterparts: on average, only 23.3 percent of East Europeans say that most people can be trusted, compared to 43.2 percent of West Europeans, but support for radical right parties is lower in Eastern Europe than in the West. How can this be reconciled? The evidence in Model 4 suggests that just as with political stability, generalized trust matters much more in the East than in the West: small changes in trust affect the electoral fate of radical right parties in Eastern but not in Western Europe. The implication is that if Eastern Europeans trusted more, then they would support radical right parties less. In Western Europe, however, higher trust does not decrease support for radical right parties. Western Europeans support radical right parties irrespective of how

22 Norris (2005) and Werts et al. (2012) examine individual and aggregate level data in a multi-level analysis. Using the European Social Survey (ESS) data, Werts et al. (2012) show that unemployment at the aggregate level does not effect whether an individual voted for a radical right party in the previous election or not. Looking at an individual’s propensity to vote for a radical right party in a future election, Norris (2005) does not find a significant relationship either.

23 When comparing two restricted models, one for Western Europe and another for Eastern Europe, the coefficient on stability is -10.5*** (2.19) in Eastern Europe and 3.8 (2.9) for Western Europe (coefficient is not significant). The means are for the entire time period, 1990-2012.
much they trust each other.

The first question posed at the beginning of the chapter asked if the “usual suspect” factors – economic decline, high unemployment, majoritarian electoral systems, and high immigration – increase support for radical right parties in Western and Eastern Europe. The answer to the economic and electoral system hypotheses is a clear “no.” Economic changes do not correspond to changes in electoral support for radical right parties. Majoritarian electoral systems do not decrease popular support for the radical right. The answer to the immigration hypothesis is more complex. Higher immigration increases support for radical right parties in Europe (Models 1-3) but only in so far as there are no additional controls for differences between West and East. Once stability and trust are added as interaction terms to account for the different effects of these factors in Eastern Europe, immigration loses explanatory power (Model 4). This suggests that higher immigration may be a necessary but not sufficient precondition for successful radical right parties (Art 2011; Rydgren 2007).

Immigration (measured as a stock of migrants) has on average been slightly higher in Western Europe (mean=9%) than in Eastern Europe (mean=7.1%) between 1990 and 2012. The results of the analysis suggest that, while immigration may contribute to higher support for radical right parties in general, it cannot explain differences in support between West and East.

To address the second question posed at the beginning of the Chapter—are the determinants of support for radical right parties different in Eastern Europe?—the answer is “yes.” First, political stability has a greater effect on support for radical right parties in Eastern Europe. Whereas higher stability decreases support for radical right parties in all European countries, the effect is much greater in Eastern Europe. When the governing regime is perceived as unstable in an Eastern European country, a radical right party is more likely to win support than in a Western European country. Second, the social factors examined here (civic participation and trust) have no influence on radical right support across Europe (Model 3). However, in Eastern Europe, lower trust does increase support for the radical right. The implication of these new findings is that the determinants of radical right support are significantly different in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe.

Conclusion

In this Chapter, I set out to examine the contextual factors that influence support for radical right parties in Europe. Previous studies focused only on Western Europe, success cases, or a limited set of explanatory variables, which I termed “the usual suspects.” In contrast, I included Eastern European countries, failure cases, and a set of new political and social explanatory variables. Economic decline, while often associated with the rise of extremist political parties, does not increase electoral support for such parties in Europe. This implies that individuals support or reject radical right parties irrespective of the economic conditions in their countries. The findings here show that high immigration and political instability matter more than economic factors for increasing support for radical right parties, but immigration cannot explain differences between East and West.

The second goal of this Chapter was to examine the determinants of radical right support in Eastern Europe. Radical right parties receive less electoral support in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe, which contradicts the vision of Eastern Europe as “backward” in terms of democratic development and tolerance. The evidence presented here confirms that support for radical right parties in Eastern Europe hinges on a different set of factors than in the West. The significance of political stability and trust suggests that individuals turn to radical right parties when they grow suspicious of others including, perhaps, political representatives. One way to interpret the greater effect of political instability in Eastern Europe is to think about perceptions of stability in terms of trust: when
individuals are no longer convinced that their governments are capable of protecting them during unstable times, they may turn to more extremist, hardline political parties. Thus, if political stability is a measure of how much individuals trust their governments, and higher instability contributes to higher support for the radical right, then trust is inherently tied to the fate of radical right parties in Eastern Europe much more so than in the West.

A broader, through slightly speculative, implication of the findings is that radical right parties’ “immigrant threat” frame may be particularly powerful in countries where the national government’s stability comes under question. A political or economic crisis that undermines the political establishment could present an opportunity for an extremist party. The combination of high immigration and sudden external shock may explain some of the spikes in support for radical right parties in parliamentary elections during and after the 2007-2008 economic crisis in countries like Holland, Greece, France, and Austria. Voters may not be driven to support radical right parties due to economic decline per se, but rather due to how they perceive the ability of their governments to effectively manage the effects of economic crises.

What do the findings tell us about the future of European politics and society? The evidence shows that immigration, while important, is not sufficient for explaining differences in the appeal of ethnic nationalism between East and West. However, the radical right’s cooptation of the immigration issue combined with mainstream political parties’ slow response to the immigration debate, has provided radical right parties an entry into mainstream politics. The result is that center-right political parties have found themselves in coalitions with the radical right on more than one occasion or have catered to the radical right’s demands (Art 2011). Consequentially, European politics have shifted to the Right over the past two decades (Bakker et al. 2012), which could have dramatic consequences for the future of the European Union. The influential radical right parties in Western Europe (e.g. FPÖ, FN), while retaining their anti-immigration stance, have also been deeply critical of the EU, calling for secession on more than one occasion. Anti-EU sentiments are reflected in voters’ attitudes: overall, Europeans are becoming less convinced that the EU is good for their countries (see Chapter 2). Since the economic crisis of 2008, Euroskeptic attitudes have proliferated among mainstream political parties as well. These trends could threaten European unity in the years to come.

In Eastern Europe, support for the radical right has remained low, but support for the EU is waning in these countries as well. As these countries become further integrated into EU policies and politics, they may find themselves moving further to the Right and away from the once coveted position of an EU member state. There is evidence, for example, that immigration and Euroskepticism increase support for radical right parties in some Eastern European countries (Werts et al. 2012). As in the West, Eastern Europeans’ have become more likely to see themselves in national, as opposed to European, terms (Chapter 2), and radical right parties have recently gained support in countries like Hungary and Ukraine. Still, Eastern Europe today is not the backward hinterland that some scholars feared it would become. In terms of popular support for exclusionary ethnic nationalism, it is the West that appears more backward. The fear for the “new Europe” is no longer about the integration of the East, but rather the disintegration of the West.
Figure 3.1 Voteshare Received by Radical Right Parties in Western and Eastern Europe, 1990-2012
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Radical Right Parties</th>
<th>Number of Parliamentary Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WESTERN EUROPE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>FPÖ - Freedom Party of Austria</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>VB - Flemish Interest</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FN - National Front</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DF - Danish People's Party</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FP - Progress Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Perus - True Finns</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>FN - National Front</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DivED - Diverse Extreme Right Parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>REP - The Republicans</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NPD - National Democratic Party of Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DVU - German People's Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>LA.O.S - Popular Orthodox Rally</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chrysi Aygi - Golden Dawn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>LEGA Nord - Northern League</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AN - National Alliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>CD - Conservative Democrats</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LPF - List Pim Fortuyn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PVV - Party for Freedom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>FRP - Progress Party</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>PNR - National Renovator Party</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>New Democracy</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD - Sweden Democrats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>SVP - Swiss People's Party</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>BNP - British National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EASTERN EUROPE</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>BChP - Bulgarian Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BZNS - Popular Union of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNRP - Bulgarian National Radical Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ataka - National Union Attack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RZS - Order, Law and Justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZASHTITA - Union Of The Patriotic Forces &quot;Defense&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Total Number of Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>SPR-RSC - Pro Republic Party, DSSS - Workers' Party of Social Justice</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>MIEP - Justice and Life Party, Jobbik - The Movement for a Better Hungary</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>TB - Fatherland and Freedom, NA - National Alliance, TKL-ZP - Popular Movement for Latvia-Siergerist Party</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>LTS - Lithuanian Nationalist Union</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>LPR - League of the Polish Motherland, KPN - Confederation of Independent Poland, Party X, ROP - Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>PUNR - Party of Romanian National Unity, PRM - Greater Romania Party, PREP - Republican Party</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>SNS - Slovak National Party</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>SNS - Slovenian National Party, SND - Slovenian National Right Party, SSN - Party of Slovenian People</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda/Social-National Party of Ukraine, Fewer Words bloc, KUN - Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, OUN-UNA - Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists-Ukrainian National Assembly</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Number of Elections</strong></td>
<td><strong>167</strong></td>
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics for All Variables

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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
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<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>22,593.81</td>
<td>10,188.62</td>
<td>3,429.97</td>
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<td>4.24</td>
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<td>Immigration</td>
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<td>Civic participation</td>
<td>50.36</td>
<td>23.04</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>98.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>34.93</td>
<td>16.99</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>76</td>
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Table 3.3 Correlations between the Dependent and Independent Variables

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<th>GDP per capita</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
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<th>Electoral system</th>
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<th>Trust</th>
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<td>Pvote</td>
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<td>Model 1 Usual suspects</td>
<td>Model 2 Political</td>
<td>Model 3 Social</td>
<td>Model 4 Interactions</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Chapter Four

How Right-Wing Mobilization Works on the Ground

How does movement mobilization work? Why do individuals join political movements? These questions have been a central concern to social movement theory since the revival of mobilization studies in the 1960s. Scholars have traced how social movement organizations and activists recruit members, construct convincing cultural frames, and exploit political opportunities to mobilize support. However, the many answers to this central question have been decidedly skewed: overwhelmingly, sociologists have based their theories of movement mobilization on studies of progressive or leftist social movements. Few studies have sought to examine the processes of right-wing political mobilization (but see Munson 2008; Skocpol and Williamson 2012), a fact that has biased findings. Given the immense influence of progressive movements on American politics in the 1960s, this oversight is perhaps understandable, but it is no longer acceptable.

Right-wing political movements have entered institutional politics to become part and parcel of contemporary American and European political realities. In the United States, the Tea Party infiltrated the Republican Party to back several successful candidates in the 2010 congressional elections (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Across Europe, radical right political parties have become the norm in the national parliaments of countries such as France, Austria, and Hungary. Whereas political scientists have analyzed the structural determinants and social bases of electoral support for radical right parties, sociologists have been slow to apply the insights of social movement theories to examine how such political movements organize support, recruit members, and mobilize for elections. As a result, sociology has remained silent on some of the most important political changes taking place in Europe since World War II, namely, the resurgence and increasing influence of radical right political movements on contemporary European politics.

To understand the complexity of the radical right phenomena in Europe, it is not enough to explain the electoral outcomes of radical right parties or the characteristics of voters, as political scientists have done. As all social movements, radical right movements depend on individuals who are willing to commit their time and resources to attend demonstrations, hand out leaflets, and recruit new members. These individuals are more than just voters; they are activists who often take great risks, such as imprisonment, fines, or social ostracism, to participate in the movement. Sociologists have examined the trajectories and individual attributes of social movements activists on the Left (McAdam 1986, 1988; Jasper and Poulsen 1995) but we know very little about why and how individuals become radical right activists. In other words, we know very little about the micro-processes and mechanisms of radicalization, and right-wing recruitment and mobilization. Further, we cannot answer the most fundamental question of social movement theories for the case of radical right movements: how and why do individuals join? This is the missing piece of the radical right phenomenon that I examine in this Chapter.

Recruitment into a radical right political movement involves individual (activists)

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24 I use the term “challenger political movement” (or simply political movement hereafter) to refer to institutional and non-institutional challenger groups. Whereas in the United States, the two party winner take all electoral system deters third party challenges, in multi-party electoral systems, which now characterize all European countries, challenges to mainstream political institutions can arise from groups internal and external to conventional politics. In particularly open polities, social movements can turn into challenger political parties while still maintaining a social movement character (see Chapter 5 for a longer discussion on this point). Such an outcome is particularly common for radical right political parties that often continue to use non-conventional political strategies after entering institutional politics. In this case, the boundary between movement and party
and collective actors (organizations). To study the on-the-ground processes of political mobilization, I examine the individual activists and the organizations—that is, the political parties and movement groups—to which they belong. To that end, I use a case study of a radical right political party, Ukraine’s Freedom (Svoboda) Party. Using over 100 interviews with Freedom party leaders, members, and activists in nationalist movement groups, I analyze what lead individuals to join the political movement and the party’s organizational strategy for recruiting new members.

My data support the conclusions of previous studies which found that activists’ friendship networks were key for convincing them to join. Recruitment to right-wing political movements works through the same social network mechanisms as recruitment to leftist or progressive social movements. Unlike previous studies, however, I find that beliefs or ideologies did not always play a strong role in activists’ initial reasons for participation. The underlying assumption in social movement theory is that beliefs, convictions, or worldviews precede political participation (see Meyer 2007 for a review). The conventional assumption is that individuals who hold, in this case, radical or nationalist, beliefs will seek out ways to express those beliefs through participation in a movement organization that reflects these ideas. My research demonstrates that the opposite is often true: individuals develop and adopt radical right ideologies through participation in events. In brief, as individuals’ social lives and relationships become embedded in the political movement, the social costs of leaving the movement increase. Participation in a political or social event is often the key turning point leading to more formal membership and interest in the party’s political ideology. Over time, the political movement becomes one’s community, and it is this sense of belonging that prompts individual to continue participating, recruit friends, and propagate the movement’s political ideology. Thus, while social networks pull an individual from the balcony to the barricade, it is the sense of belonging that the movement creates that drives continued participation.

The Chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly outline sociological studies on social movement recruitment. Whereas in Chapter 5, I provide an extensive review of social movement theories since the 1950s, in this Chapter, I focus specifically on studies that examine how and why individuals become political activists in challenger political movements. Second, I situate Ukraine’s experience with radical right political movements within the broader regional and historical political context. Because my case study is of a currently active radical right political party, it is useful to situate the party’s ideology and electoral history in the broader context. Third, I discuss the case selection and cross-regional comparative methods that I employed to draw out differences in recruitment practices. Lastly, I conclude the chapter with a discussion of how this case study can inform future research on radical right movements.

Explaining Movement Participation: Social Networks and Activists’ Motivations

Previous research on social movement mobilization has shown that individuals’ social connections are decisive for determining who becomes a movement activist and for how movement organizations recruit participants (McAdam 1986, 1988; McAdam and Paulsen 1993). However, despite the breadth and depth of social movement research, scholars have based the majority of their theoretical conclusions on analyses of progressive social movements, such as the civil rights (Andrews 1997; McAdam 1982, 1986, 1988; Santoro 2002), women’s (Banaszak 1996; Costain 1992; McCammon et al. 2001), and anti-nuclear movements (Joppke 1993; Kitschelt 1986; Meyer 1990, 1993). With the exception of...
historical studies of fascism in interwar Europe (Berman 1997; Brustein 1996; Riley 2005, 2010), few sociologists have undertaken a study of contemporary right-wing movements (but see Luker 1984; Munson 2008; Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

As a result, social scientists know very little about the recruitment strategies of right-wing movements and the motivations of right-wing activists. Research examining right-wing movements can solidify current theories by exhibiting whether theoretical assumptions based on progressive movements are applicable irrespective of the movement’s political orientation. Here, I first summarize how scholars have theorized both the role of social networks in recruitment and activists’ motivations for joining movements. I then focus on the few existing studies of right-wing activists in particular; these studies complicate current understandings of what drives individuals to join such movements.

McAdam’s (1988) classic study of the civil rights movement in the United States showed that recruitment to the movement worked through individuals’ personal networks. To demonstrate this, McAdam compared personal characteristics of activists who remained in the movement and those who withdrew. He found that out of the participants of the 1964 Freedom Summer civil rights campaign, those who remained active after the campaign had more previous experience in civil rights organizing and more extensive social connections than those who withdrew from the movement. By showing that movement activists were more politically active and socially engaged than non-activists, McAdam’s work helped debunk the long-standing assumption of so-called “breakdown” theories, which posited that individuals who felt disconnected from society were driven to engage in collective action as an outlet for expressing anger and frustration (see Chapter 5 for a review). By emphasizing the importance of social connections in leading individuals to participate, this research exposed the underlying social processes of what was previously treated as an individual choice.

Since McAdam’s study, social networks have been generally understood as the micro-mechanisms through which movements grow and mobilization occurs (Walder 2009). Subsequent studies of movement activists have followed McAdam’s method of comparing activists to non-activists in order to explain why some individuals participate in movements while others do not. This approach has led scholars to emphasize how activists’ personal attributes distinguish them from the rest of the population or from non-activists. Summarizing this research, Meyer (2007) noted that movement participants in general tend to be more politically engaged, social connected, better educated, and wealthier in comparison to the rest of the population as a whole. It is important to note, however, that this conclusion is based on studies of participants in the progressive movements of the 1960s and the “new” environmental, LGBT, and anti-globalization movements.

The few existing studies of right-wing movement activists have produced contradictory findings regarding activists’ personal attributes. For example, in her study of the abortion debate, Luker (1984) interviewed both pro-life and pro-choice activists to show that pro-life activists tended to be less educated and less wealthy than their pro-choice counterparts. Luker’s research signaled that participants of conservative or right-wing movements exhibit different socio-demographic characteristics than participants of progressive movements. However, in their timely study of Tea Party activists in the United States, Skocpol and Williamson (2012) found that Tea Partiers were wealthier and better educated in comparison to the rest of the population, which makes them more similar to activists in progressive movements. Art (2011), a political scientist, similarly found that the most electorally successful radical right parties in Western Europe had leaders and members who possessed previous organizational experience and were better educated than leaders and members of less successful parties.

In another study of the pro-life movement in the United States, Munson (2008)
compared pro-life activists to those who hold pro-life beliefs but do not participate in the movement. Munson’s research confirmed that, as is the case for progressive movements, organizational associations and social networks bring individuals into the pro-life movement by facilitating initial contact which makes the subsequent process of mobilization possible. Munson’s study, however, made two key interventions in the literature regarding the motivations of movement activists.

First, Munson challenged the view that personal attributes are decisive for understanding who participates in the movement, because, as he says, “any explanation based on differences in attributes [cannot] account for the vast majority of people who share the same attributes as pro-life activists and yet are not part of the movement” (Munson 2008:4). Moreover, not all activists will share the exact set of characteristics, and “many nonactivists will have [the] same attributes [as activists]” (4). To illustrate this point, Munson interviewed individuals with similar economic, educational, and religious backgrounds who held similar views on abortion; they differed in that only some were active movement participants. To explain why personal attributes cannot account for who becomes a pro-life activist and who does not, Munson develops a process model of mobilization that emphasizes the importance of timing in an individual’s experience with movement participation. In other words, the circumstances surrounding an individual’s initial contact with the movement has broad consequences for that individual’s continued involvement.

The second, more surprising, argument in Munson’s study is that strong anti-abortion views were not the motivating factor for an activist’s initial involvement in the movement. Rather, Munson showed that individuals participated in the pro-life movement before they developed strong views about abortion: “movement action commonly precedes the formation of strong pro-life sentiments among activists” (15). As Munson argues, the broader theoretical implication of this finding is a direct challenge to the “conventional wisdom” underlying all theories of mobilization: namely, that individuals’ views on an issue prompt them to join movements that express the same views. Or put simply, that ideas precede participation. For example, framing theories of mobilization posit that to mobilize supporters—that is, to recruit activists—a movement’s task lies in constructing an ideological frame that aligns with the views of potential supporters in such a way as to prompt these individuals to take action (Benford 1993; Snow et al. 1986). Thus, frame analysis has focused on analyzing how movements construct convincing frames that pull sympathetic supporters into action. In the case of pro-life activists, however, Munson shows that individuals held a wide range of views about abortion before participating in the movement, which were not necessarily sympathetic to the pro-life message: some activists were pro-choice and other ambivalent in their views before joining. Rather than preceding or prompting involvement, individuals developed pro-life views through the process of participation.

Whereas other studies have shown that movement participation affects participants’ life trajectories in transformative ways (Calhoun 1994; McAdam 1988; Yang 2000), Munson goes further to elaborate how participation inculcates particular worldviews. In the case of right-wing movements, this suggests that extremist or radical beliefs play a secondary role in activists’ motivations for joining such a movement. In other words, radical right activists are not born but made in the process of mobilization. This is not to imply that individuals are empty slates until they join a movement, at which point they simply adopt the movement’s ideological stance. Undoubtedly, individuals hold a set of beliefs, concerns, ideas, or worldviews before participating in a political movement. However, those beliefs are not as well formed as theories of mobilization tend to assume (see Lichbach 1994; Mason 1984; Muller and Opp 1986).

Research on ethnic mobilization and violence has examined the relationship between participation and beliefs in terms of ethnic identity formation. The central concern of these
studies has been to specify the conditions under which ethnicity becomes the salient identity marker, as opposed to other categories of belonging, such as gender or class (see Bélanger and Pinard 1991; Olzak 1992). Recent studies focusing on ethnic violence in particular (Petersen 2002) have reached a similar conclusion to Munson (2008): individuals who express extremely hateful sentiments toward certain ethnic groups do not hold such extremist beliefs prior to (continued) participation in a movement that mobilizes ethnic resentment. Ethnic identities gain salience through a process of increasing movement participation and mobilization. As Brubaker (2002) forcibly argues, sociologists should aim to rethink ethnicity, as well as race, nationalism, and other categories of collective belonging, as processes rather than bounded categories. Doing so “means thinking of ethnicization, racialization, and nationalization” as opposed to ethnicity, race, and nation. These identity markers are to be understood “as political, social, cultural and psycho-logical processes” (Brubaker 2002:167, original emphasis).

While social movement scholars have long thought about movement mobilization as a political process (see McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994), they have been slow to apply the same logic to understanding how individuals are not only recruited to movements but how they form beliefs regarding the movement’s goals. Yet, as Brubaker’s (2002) theoretical intervention suggests and Munson’s (2008) work shows, understanding how individuals become activists is fundamental to the process of mobilization, since, without activists, there is no movement. Social movement research would benefit from incorporating the insight of ethnic mobilization and violence studies—that ethnic identities form in the process of participation—for explaining how individuals not only join movements but the micro-processes through which they become believers.

Thus, for movement activists, participation includes both a social and individual or cognitive component. First, social movement studies have shown that individuals’ social networks—friends, colleagues, classmates, or even teammates—are a strong influence once an individual takes the initial step to participate in a movement event. Second, studies such as Munson’s (2008) find that activists’ belief in movement goals develop as a consequence, rather than a cause, of participation. Connecting these two insights suggests that social networks are not only responsible for bringing individuals into a movement, but that they are also decisive for shaping individuals’ ideas and worldviews. Applying this logic to the case of right-wing movements means that social networks function as the mechanisms underlying the process of radicalization: social connections incite initial participation but they also work to transmit and diffuse ideologies.

The role of social networks in the development of individuals’ beliefs is crucial. As interviews with activists will show, individuals only acquire concrete ideas about national belonging and politics after continued interactions with fellow activists and successive participation in movement events. Once an individual has taken the initial step of participation, he/she usually makes connections with other activists who may already hold well-formed ideas about the movement. As new recruits attend more movement events, they gain exposure to movement ideologies, but perhaps more importantly, they develop social ties with fellow activists. In some instances of long-term sustained participation, one’s entire social circle could be embedded in the movement. By forming personal connections with other activists, individuals become progressively deeper entrenched and attached to the movement. In other words, the movement becomes a community of like-minded individuals in which radical ideas become naturalized as a taken-for-granted part of everyday life. As my interview data show, it is this sense of community and belonging that activists are drawn to; the ideology, no matter how extreme or inconsistent with one’s view prior to joining the movement, begins to seem less radical as the movement engulfs participants’ social worlds. Thus, I propose that social networks are crucial at the initial stage of recruitment (as previous
studies have shown), but they become increasingly important in facilitating sustained activism and in the development of right-wing beliefs by managing the diffusion of a coherent set of ideas.

The Case: Ukraine’s Radical Right Movement

From the albeit narrow point-of-view of scholarly expectation, post-socialist Eastern Europe has had a surprising history with radical right movements. An examination of radical right parties (as opposed to all movements, which are more difficult to locate and quantify) to gauge the appeal of radical nationalist ideology reveals that such parties have been more electorally successful in Western than in Eastern Europe (see Chapter 3). Since 1991, however, every former socialist country with the exception of Lithuania has had a radical right that surpassed the electoral threshold for parliamentary representation—a common measure of electoral success. Yet, whereas research attempting to explain the electoral outcomes of radical right parties is abundant (see Rydgren 2007 for a review), only a few studies have examined voting patterns in Eastern Europe (but see Minkenberg 2002; Mudde 2007; Ramet 1999). In addition, to the best of my knowledge, not a single study to date has attempted to examine the grassroots recruitment strategies of radical right movements in Eastern Europe. This study is thus the first to use interviews with radical right activists to explore how and why individuals join radical right movements and the first to systematically examine the recruitment strategies of radical right groups.

Why Ukraine? Prior to 2012, Ukraine’s history with radical right parties and nationalist movements was characterized by failure: despite a politically favorable environment (Shekhovtsov 2011)—potential for ethnic and cultural conflict, a legacy of ultranationalist movements (Rudling 2006), and political instability in the years after independence—not one of Ukraine’s radical right parties managed to mobilize support at the national level. For example, in the early 1990s, the nationalist independence movement, the People’s Movement of Ukraine (Rukh), became a political party and served as an influential opposition force against the communist successor party. But shortly after independence in 1992, the movement and party splintered and the original leaders joined more centrist political parties, such as former president Yushchenko’s party, Our Ukraine. Following Rukh, ultranationalist movement-turned-parties, such as the Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian Self-Defense (UNA-UNSO) and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN), led by the widow of a World War II nationalist movement leader, were able to garner local support in the western Galician regions but never won more than three percent of the vote in national elections. Due to historical and cultural reasons, which I discuss in the following sections, Galicia has been the hotbed of Ukrainian nationalist movements. Thus, it was not surprising that many radical right parties and movements enjoyed higher support there than in the rest of the country. What was surprising is that despite electoral aspirations, radical right movements prior to 2012 consistently failed to mobilize nationally.

In many ways, Ukraine’s latest radical right incarnation, Freedom, seemed bound to go the way of its predecessors as a strong, but ephemeral, Galician political movement with unfulfilled national electoral aspirations. When I began my research in 2009, Freedom was a regional party with an emerging stronghold in Galicia. The party ran candidates in the 2007 parliamentary elections as part of an electoral bloc, but at that time, Freedom received only

25 Eastern Europe refers to the post-socialist democracies of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

26 Due to space limitations, I cannot adequately discuss the numerous political, historical, economic, and social factors that should have predisposed Ukraine to a radical right movement prior to 2012. It suffices to say that all the “usual suspect” variables—poor economic development, political instability, ethnic conflict, pre-existing nationalist ideology, and an electoral system that favors small challenger parties—were all present there.
.76 percent of the popular vote. By the 2012 parliamentary elections, however, Freedom’s electoral fortune changed dramatically when the party received 10.44 percent of the popular vote, which gave it 37 parliamentary seats (out of 450). Freedom became the first radical right party to break through the electoral threshold for parliamentary representation (3 percent 2006-2012, 4 percent prior). The party’s surprisingly high showing in 2012 prompted the main opposition parties (Fatherland and UDAR) to enter into a coalition agreement with Freedom. As a result, in a short five years, Freedom transformed itself from a small regional party to a national political player with influence of over 40 percent of the parliamentary seats. Explaining how Freedom broke the pattern of similar preceding political movements requires an examination of its recruitment practices and activists’ motivations. It is also a unique opportunity, rarely afforded to researchers of right-wing political movements to trace the movement’s growth from the provinces to the parliament.

Freedom (Svoboda): Origins and Radical Right Ideology

Key to understanding the movement, it is important to briefly outline Freedom’s political platform and history (see Rudling 2012 and Shekhovtsov 2011 for a detailed discussion). The party was officially registered under its current name in 2004, but prior to that time, it was known as the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU). SNPU was founded in L’viv (Galicia) as a collection of several fledgling nationalist organizations and officially registered as a political party in 1995. SNPU’s official emblem was a slight modification of the Wolfsangel—a symbol used by the Nazi SS—and its colors were red and black to symbolize “blood and soil.” According to Freedom’s party website, this “new” symbol (still used by Freedom) represents the “idea of the nation.”27 SNPU’s idea of the nation was defined as “a community of blood and spirit” (Shekhovstov 2011:213), a clear example of what scholars refer to as ethnic nationalism. In the mid 1990s, SNPU’s wrath was aimed primarily at Russia and ethnic Russians residing in Ukraine—who make up approximately 20 percent of the Ukrainian population (All-Ukrainian Census 2001)—whom the party blamed for Ukraine’s economic problems.28 Electorally, SNPU was not successful: the party received only .16 percent of the popular vote in the 1998 parliamentary elections as part of the electoral bloc Fewer Words (Menshe sliv). SNPU made an effort to build international ties with radical right parties in Western Europe, most notably with the French National Front whose then leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, attended SNPU’s 2000 party convention (Shekhovstov 2011). Yet, after SNPU’s failure at the polls and the rise of Victor Yushchenko’s party, Our Ukraine (Nasha Ukraina), in the early 2000s in western Ukraine, it became clear to a faction of leaders, most notably Oleh Tyahnybok, that the party would not make a comeback.

At SNPU’s party convention in 2004, the party leadership was split on how to proceed with planning the organization’s future. In one camp were those who did not want to abandon the party’s organizational origins as an alliance of social movement organizations (Personal interview with former SNPU member, 10/20/11). This group distrusted electoral politics, which are notoriously corrupt in Ukraine, and wanted to see SNPU “keep its hands clean.” In the other camp, however, were those who wanted SNPU to focus on institutional goals of winning power through electoral means, which meant softening the party’s image (Personal interview, 5/12/11).29 Based on what happened next, the latter camp won: Oleh Tyahnybok became the head of a new party, All-Ukrainian Union Freedom (a name likely

27 See http://www.svoboda.org.ua
28 See http://www.vatra.org.ua for SNPU’s original party program
borrowed from Austria’s Freedom Party), complete with new “friendlier” symbols. The modified Wolfsangel or “idea of the nation” was abandoned in favor of a yellow hand holding up three fingers against a light blue background—resembling the peace sign but also representing Ukraine’s national symbol, the trident, and the colors of the Ukrainian flag, yellow and light blue. The party program remained completely intact from its SNPU days.

The 2004 “rebranding,” as described by party members and leaders in interviews, was mainly cosmetic. Tyahnybok’s speech following the 2004 convention clearly reaffirmed Freedom’s commitment to its original racist, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic platform when he claimed that Ukraine was ruled by a Russian-Jewish mafia (moskal’s ’ko-zhydivs’ ka), using pejorative terms for Jews and Russians alike. Scholars studying Freedom’s trajectory have pointed out the prevalence of neo-fascist rhetoric in the public speeches of party leaders. 30 In 2012, a Freedom party deputy and parliament member was accused of anti-Semitism when he, again, used the derogatory term for “Jew” to describe the Ukrainian born American actress Mila Kunis. 31 In 2013, the World Jewish Congress listed Freedom as a neo-Nazi party. 32

Freedom’s political program continues to emphasize nationalist economic and cultural policies, such as the nationalization of natural resources controlled by an ethnically Ukrainian governing body, the reintroduction of ethnic passports (as was the case in the Soviet period), the removal of ethnic minorities/immigrants, and the restriction of land ownership to Ukrainian citizens. These ideological characteristics define Freedom as a nationalist radical right party.

Method and Data

This study uses in-depth interviews and participant observation to examine Freedom’s mobilization strategies. Between 2009 and 2012, I spent 10 months in Ukraine over three multi-month fieldwork trips, during which I conducted interviews with party activists, leaders, and members of nationalist organizations. In addition to party activists and members of nationalist groups, I interviewed academics, researchers at policy think tanks, journalists and NGO leaders who provided invaluable information on the structure of the development of the radical right in Ukraine. I refer to this group of respondents as expert interviewees. I also participated in numerous demonstrations, rallies, and cultural events organized by Freedom or its subsidiary organizations, such as “Student Freedom” and conducted many informal interviews at these events.

Interviews and fieldwork took place in four cities representing three regions in Ukraine: L’viv in Galicia, Luts’k and Rivne in Volyn, and Kyiv (the capital). I chose these geographic regions strategically: Galicia is Freedom’s stronghold where Freedom has evolved into the majority party at the local level and received its highest support in national elections. Volyn is a neighboring western region where Freedom has been focused on increasing its support base since 2009. Kyiv is the capital city and the site of Freedom’s headquarters. Galicia and Volyn are extremely similar in terms of the ethnic and linguistic characteristics of the population: according the 2001 Ukrainian population census, 96.7 and 96.4 percent of the population in Galicia and Volyn, respectively, identified as ethnically Ukrainian, and 97 percent in both regions cite Ukrainian as their native language. Galicia and

Volyn are more ethnically homogenous than Ukraine as a whole, where 77.8 percent of the population identified as ethnically Ukrainian in 2001. The second largest ethnic group is Russians, who comprise 17.1 percent of the entire population. Kyiv is more representative of the country as a whole with 82.2 percent Ukrainian and 13.1 percent Russian.

I chose Galicia, Volyn, and Kyiv as research sites because these three regions represent three different political environments and levels of popularity for radical right movements in general and Freedom in particular. The demographic similarities of Galicia’s and Volyn’s populations allowed me to control for ethno-linguistic differences, which are deeply important for defining the pool of potential supporters for a Ukrainian nationalist movement. For example, in some eastern Ukrainian regions only 56.9 percent identify as ethnically Ukrainian (Donets’k). There are additional differences between western and eastern Ukraine, which are too vast to discuss in detail here, but which make comparison between west and east regions illogical for the case of Ukrainian nationalist movements (for extensive discussion on regional differences see Kuzio 1998; Wilson 2000; Yekelchyk 2007). After all, in any country it would be difficult to imagine an individual joining or supporting a political movement that uses one’s non-native language and advocates for universal implementation of that language in all public institutions, which is part of Freedom’s platform.33 One could compare Ukraine’s ethnic and linguistic divisions to a country like Spain, where the Basque Nationalist Party could never hope to garner electoral support, much less recruit activists, in Spain’s northern regions.

In Galicia and Volyn, however, one can rule out that differences in language and ethnic background explain why an individual becomes an activist. Nonetheless, Galicia and Volyn represent different political environments for a radical right movement: Freedom, like many nationalist movements before it, was founded in L’viv (see previous section). Freedom was thus able to tap into pre-existing social networks and organizational infrastructure established by its predecessor, SNPU, to recruit activists. The presence of fractions of previous radical right movements primed potential activists to Freedom’s political message. As the data show, these factors made Freedom’s organizational tasks easier. In Volyn, however, previous radical right movements, and Freedom itself, were never as active (or electorally successful) as in Galicia. Finally, as the capital, Kyiv is the center of all political activity and mobilization, especially prior to national elections. Most of the interviews with party leaders, for example, took place there.

To gauge the radical right movement’s appeal in Galicia, Volyn, and Kyiv, it is useful to compare Freedom’s electoral results in the three most recent elections: the 2007 parliamentary elections, the 2010 local district council (oblast’) elections, and the 2012 parliamentary elections.34 Table 4.1 displays electoral support for Freedom from 2007 to 2012. The numbers are an average for the three Galician districts (L’viv, Ternopil’, and Ivano-Frankivs’k), the two Volyn district (Volyn and Rivne), and the single Kyiv district. Electoral results for the Kyiv metropolitan area are in parentheses. While my intent here is not to explain differences in Freedom’s electoral outcomes, electoral results are an indicator for the political party’s, and by extension, the radical right movement’s, growth. As Table 4.1 shows, since 2007, Freedom’s electoral popularity has surged across all three regions. The party increased its share of the vote by 31 percentage points in Galicia, 16 in Volyn, and 10.2 in the Kyiv district (16.1 in the Kyiv metro area) between the 2007 and 2012 parliamentary elections.

34 I exclude the 2010 presidential elections here to focus on elections to representative bodies only. The 2010 district elections were crucial for Freedom, because it received the highest support of any radical right party in Ukraine (Shekhovstov 2011).
elections. Freedom’s surge was reflected at the national level: Freedom received .76 percent of the popular vote in 2007 and then increased its share to 10.44 in 2012. Together, the three regions represent three levels of popular support for Freedom: high (Galicia), medium (Volyn), and average (Kyiv). Examining recruitment processes in these regions reveals how Freedom adapted recruitment strategies across different contexts.

[Table 4.1 here]

In total, I conducted 111 formal and informal interviews. These interviews and my ethnographic observations provide the main data for this study. Table 4.2 displays all the interviews by region and type. The majority of formal interviews are with Freedom party activists and experts. These interviews typically took place at the party offices, cafes, parks, restaurants or at the respondent’s place of employment (in the case of expert interviews). Men are overrepresented in my sample of party activists and nationalist group members, with only 16 interviews with women. This disproportion likely represents the overall membership of these groups. Respondents range in age from 16 to 56, with an approximate average age of 27.

[Table 4.2 here]

Formal interviews are those that were scheduled in advance, primarily with party leaders and experts, and at which I was able to take notes non-stop and follow a more structured interview schedule. Informal interviews typically occurred at demonstrations, protests, or cultural events, and were not always pre-scheduled. I could not always take extensive notes directly at the event but would document the interviews usually within an hour after they took place. I conducted interviews in Russian, Ukrainian, and occasionally English. I asked party activists to describe how they were recruited to the party. I asked about their rates of participation, the types of events they attend, and who attended these events with them. I also asked them to describe what happens at social and political events, and why they keep going. I did not focus on questions of ideology, because respondents mainly regurgitated the official party program. Formal interviews lasted anywhere from 30 minutes to three hours and were semi-structured. Informal interviews lasted from 15 minutes to an hour and were also semi-structured.

Given the secretive and suspicious culture of the radical right movement, I could not record interviews but was able to take extensive notes. Therefore, the interview quotes from party activists and nationalist group members are paraphrased from the original but still capture the meaning and sentiment. The names of all respondents have been changed. Whereas radical right parties in Western Europe have developed a public image in light of their parliamentary successes and are thus more open to requests for information, emerging radical right parties in post-Soviet countries are less open to foreign researchers requesting information. In the case of Freedom, the location of the headquarters was not publicly available on my first trip in the summer of 2009. For fears of repression, Freedom does not release the list of its members. Therefore, random sampling is not possible. Rather, I had to rely on connections and respondents’ willingness to introduce me to additional interviewees. The snowball sampling method has been used in other studies of hard to reach populations (Heckathorn 1997).

35 While I do not discuss it here, Freedom’s surprisingly high electoral support in the Kyiv metropolitan area in the 2012 parliamentary elections is in itself worthy of inquiry.

36 Men participate more in street protests, but women are involved in activism through social work activities. It was difficult to get access to women, however, because they are less visible in politics in general.

37 Some respondents would not reveal their age. In those cases, I estimated.
Members of nationalist groups were particularly difficult to gain access to and conduct formal interviews with. The individuals I categorize as nationalist group members belong to nationalist subcultural organizations that use vandalism, harassment, and occasional protests against perceived enemies to the Ukrainian nation. As opposed to Freedom, these individuals do not partake in party politics but they espouse a nationalist ideology in line with ethnic nationalism. The groups draw ideological inspiration from the same historical time period and organizations (i.e. OUN-UPA) as Freedom. However, as I discuss in the following sections, members of these groups did not always see Freedom’s political strategy as representative of their interests. Because nationalist groups engage in illegal and violent activities, their members are particularly wary of outsiders, use pseudonyms instead of their real names, and are notoriously difficult to identify. Thus, most of these interviews were informal, because I was often asked to not take notes.

In the following sections, I first discuss the organizational side of recruitment from the point of view of Freedom party leaders who aggressively targeted the youth and members of other nationalist groups. Interviews with party leaders demonstrate the party’s role in creating spaces of political and social participation, where potential and current activists could make connections. I then turn to the individual motivations of party members for joining and actively participating in the movement.

Recruitment Strategies in the Nationalist Heartland: Galicia

Before Freedom became a national party in 2012, it was a regional political movement centered in the quaint Galician city of L’viv, and it is where Freedom first developed its recruitment strategy. Yet, to an outside observer, L’viv does not appear as the epicenter of a radical right movement. With a population of approximately 735,000, L’viv is one of the major cities in western Ukraine (All-Ukrainian Census 2001). Even though many of my interviewees exalted modern day L’viv as the crucible of Ukrainian culture and tradition, its history tells a different story.

L’viv has undergone various incarnations over the centuries as the Galician lands were passed around between warring empires. Until 1918, L’viv, known as Lemberg at the time, was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and was populated primarily by Poles and Jews. Under the Habsburgs, Lemberg became a bustling multicultural city and acquired its distinctly Austrian architecture, which continues to distinguish L’viv from other Ukrainian cities. With the collapse of Habsburg rule following World War I and the bloody Polish-Ukrainian war, Lemberg became the Polish city of Lwów. The city prospered under Polish rule until 1939 when it was annexed by the Soviet Union as part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Hitler and Stalin. Under

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38 Five groups belong to this classification: 1. Autonomous Nationalists: a widespread and informal organization that operates across Ukraine. Members self identify as “radical right nationalists” but are not allied with any political party. Members tend to be young men, many of whom were once active in neo-fascist organizations. 2. Tryzub: a paramilitary group that has been active in Ukraine since the early 1990s. Members self identify as “radical right nationalists” but do not ally to any political party. Members are organized in a paramilitary structure, with one leader and sub-commanders by region. 3. UNA-UNSO: a former political party that has now retreated into the background of politics. 4. Patriots of Ukraine: formerly a wing of the Socialist Nationalist Party of Ukraine (SNPU and now Svoboda) but now officially divorced from any political affiliation. This group is currently most active in eastern Ukraine, where it has orchestrated attacks on foreigners and international students. Members of this group are most clearly connected to neo-fascist ideology and symbolism. 5. Bratstvo (brotherhood): small group most active in southern Ukraine. It is aligned with the radical right movement and is an outgrowth of UNA-UNSO. Interviews are with members of the first three groups, which self identify as radical right Ukrainian nationalists.

39 L’viv has a tumultuous and complex history. There are many excellent historical studies of Galicia’s Jewish history (see Bartov 2007; Snyder 2010) and L’viv’s numerous transitions (Amar 2011). It is not the purpose of this study to delve into this complex story. I refer to it only as far as this history serves as background to contemporary politics.
Soviet rule, the city once again changed names from the Polish Lwów to the Russian L’vov. Quickly after the Soviet annexation, the German armies invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, capturing and occupying L’vov until 1945. During these years, the once large and prosperous Jewish population of L’viv and neighboring towns was almost completely wiped out (Bartov 2007). Approximately 200,000 Jews resided in L’vov in 1941, many of them refugees from Poland and other Eastern European countries, but by the end of the War only a few remained (Bartov 2007). Once the Soviet Union regained permanent control of Galicia in 1945 as part of the Yalta Treaty, the Polish population was forced to emigrate. Thus, it was only in the 1950s and 1960s that L’viv (then Soviet L’vov) and Galicia became primarily ethnic Ukrainian regions. As of 2001, 88 percent of the population identified as ethnically Ukrainian in the city proper and 94.8 percent in the district as a whole (All-Ukrainian Census 2001).

Walking around L’viv in 2013, one would be hard-pressed to find signs of the city’s tumultuous and bloody history. Today’s L’viv is a relatively prosperous and active city. Known colloquially as “Ukraine’s Little Paris,” the city has been attracting increasing numbers of tourists. Since 2010, L’viv experienced a 40 percent increase in its tourist industry, which is the highest increase for any European city (BBC 2011). In the summers, tourists and locals crowd the central square’s many cafés and cozy restaurants as street musicians serenade the passersby. L’viv is also home to three major universities, dozens of research institutes, and many smaller schools of higher education, making it an educational center of western Ukraine.

However, some of the very features that make L’viv a lively tourist attraction have also facilitated the development of a radical right movement: universities are a hotbed for movement recruitment, and the quaint town squares and cafés serve as the site for the many events that Freedom organizes to attract potential members. As outlined by party leaders in interviews, Freedom’s recruitment strategy includes two focus areas: (1) organization and recruitment of young people, and (2) making connections with pre-existing nationalist groups. The party pursued these organizational goals by aggressively using street protests, demonstrations, and rallies, in addition to cultural or social events to attract media attention and potential new members. Providing a space and place for where the political and social overlapped allowed the party to reach a wider pool of potential supporters.

1. Organizing the Youth

Starting in 2008, Freedom focused on attracting and organizing young people. As one party leader explained, “we [the party] went through a shift in strategy in 2008 to focus on youth organization as a key component of mobilization” (Personal interview, 10/19/11). According to party leaders, this strategic shift included increased presence of the party in cultural events, such as film clubs and music festivals, and the creation of explicitly and implicitly affiliated youth groups, “so that everyone could participate, without necessarily being an official member of the party” (Personal interview, 10/19/11). Freedom organized a variety of social and political events aimed at attracting young people through its youth groups, Student Freedom (Student Group, hereafter), aimed at university students and teenagers (ages 17-22), and Sokel (School Group, hereafter), a physical training organization primarily for teenage boys 14 and up. The first has a clear political orientation: Student Group members are also card carrying party members (one must be 18 to join the party) who see themselves as future party leaders. The second, however, focuses on physical training, discipline, and nationalist consciousness raising. The School Group consists largely of summer camps and other excursions to sites of historical relevance (e.g. UPA battle sites.

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41 Freedom has third group for children in primary school, called Plast’, but I do not discuss it here.
from World War II), during which participants (mostly young men) engage in physical training exercises, team building, and engagement with nationalist writing.

Each of the two young adult organizations (Student Group and School Group) has a leader, who is also a party member, responsible for coordinating events for the entire district. They communicate primarily via mobile phones as opposed to social media. These two individuals then coordinate with the party member responsible for youth activity in the district, usually a young party deputy. In L’viv, the Student Group also had point persons at the major universities, whom potentially interested students could approach about joining the group or participating in events. The Student Group members then acted as mentors in the School Group, in which many of the students themselves participated as school children. Through this organizational structure, the party leadership is able to reach young people quickly.

The party, in conjunction with the Student Group, organized a variety of events year round aimed at increasing visibility and recruitment. As one party leader described it, Freedom along with its Student Group engages in organizing “serious political demonstrations, flash mobs, cultural events, sporting events, and educational events” (Personal interview, 10/21/11) on a weekly basis and more frequently during the summer months. On average, party activists reported attending political or cultural events sponsored explicitly by the party at least once a week, especially during the warmer months. “Serious political demonstrations” took place on key dates such as religious holidays, the birthdays of UPA “heroes,” like Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych, and other days important for the history of the nationalist movement. The largest of such events that takes place across the county annually is “UPA Day” on October 14 41, which celebrates the supposed founding date of the UPA and attracts all nationalist groups. While the demonstrations for this event take place primarily in Kyiv, Freedom and its Student Group sends members to participate in the demonstrations from districts across Ukraine. One party member estimated that approximately 150 Student Group members and 500 party members traveled to Kyiv to participate in the UPA Day rally in 2011 and double the number in 2012. These estimates are likely an exaggeration, but they provide an idea of the size of the most active party and Student Group members in L’viv.

The Kyiv UPA Day rally is the largest event organized primarily by Freedom in the country, with approximately 10,000 individuals participating in 2011 and in 2012. 42 L’viv and other cities hold their own smaller demonstrations during which participants dress in war time UPA uniforms, carry red and black flags alongside the Freedom party flag and the national Ukrainian flag. I attended the UPA rally in 2011 in L’viv. The rally began with a band procession playing a typical military march with UPA war veterans in their seventies and eighties following in full military uniforms. The rest of the approximately 200 participants were mostly very young (15-30) and all were wearing what appeared to be old World War II uniforms paired with rusty rifles and other imitation war gear, such as old hand grenades. When I asked some of the participants about the uniforms, they unanimously said that they were wearing them in honor of “the fallen UPA fighters of Ukraine.” A majority of the younger participants who I approached to ask why they had decided to participate

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42 When I asked about the use of social media to organize activities (e.g. vkontakte or Facebook), party leaders said that social media sites, while maybe useful for recruitment, are not secure enough for organizing protests. In addition, not enough members have consistent internet access to make spontaneous mobilization possible.

43 “Some 10,000 Ukrainians mark 70th anniversary of formation of Ukrainian Insurgent Army.” 2012. Kyiv Post, 15 October, available at http://www.kyivpost.com/multimedia/photo/ukrainian-ultra-nationalists-mark-the-70th-anniversary-of-the-formation-of-the-ups-314383.html, accessed on October 19, 2012 (Kyiv Post 2012). Freedom’s dominance at the UPA day rally is a relatively recent occurrence: the event has been organized since 2005 by various nationalist groups and parties. Based simply on looking at the flags carried by activists in 2011 and 2012, Freedom was clearly in the majority.
claimed that they were Freedom or Student Group members.

2. Making Connections, Creating Community

Freedom party leaders attributed the movement’s electoral successes to the party’s strategy of youth recruitment and ability to connect with pre-existing nationalist groups. According to a L’viv city council member, Andrii, in 2008, the party began to focus on reaching out to existing nationalist groups and subcultures in addition to the creation of party affiliated youth organizations. In L’viv, several pre-existing nationalist movement organizations were active in organizing protests, rallies, and demonstrations around nationalist themes (anti-LGBT, immigrants, minority groups, anti-Russian language). Convincing these groups to support Freedom’s agenda was important, as Andrii explained:

When we [the party] started organizing, the nationalist movement was fractured and disorganized. There were leftover groups from previous parties that failed and other groups that weren’t interested in politics but clearly shared our political views. We knew that to lead the movement, we had to unite these groups under our flag.

(Personal interview 10/25/11)

Andrii was referring to previous radical right parties, such as the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) and Ukrainian Nationalist Assembly-Ukrainian National Self-Defense (UNA-UNSO) both of which failed at parliamentary representation in the 1990s and early 2000s but still had supporters, particularly in western Ukraine. In addition, other nationalist groups were still active, such as the Autonomous Nationalists (AN), a street gang, Opir (resistance), once a fledgling social movement in the west, and Trident (Tryzub), a paramilitary group. These groups were potential competitors to Freedom’s electoral future because they attracted “radically minded” activists (especially young people). Freedom, when it was still known as SNPU prior to 2004, had attempted to found its own more extremist and violent organization called the Patriots of Ukraine. In the party’s 2004 rebranding, Freedom distanced itself from the Patriots (the group is thought to be responsible for several violent attacks on foreigners in eastern Ukraine).

Higher up leaders of Freedom and nationalist groups in Kyiv claim independence from each other. Yet, rank-and-file members of nationalist groups in L’viv expressed only positive assessments of Freedom and readily acknowledged cooperation between the party and their members. Sentiments such as “Freedom members are great guys” and vice versa, were overwhelmingly common among party activists and members of nationalist groups. Multiple group memberships were common among Freedom party activists, which points to the close cooperation between nationalist subculture groups and the party on the ground. In L’viv, the AN and Opir act more as the youth arms of Freedom than the independent organizations they claim to be. The supposedly autonomous Patriots co-organize rallies with Freedom as well. Freedom’s continued involvement in on the ground demonstrations and protests proved to nationalist groups that the party was not going to abandon radical action to accommodate the political process. Thus, in 2011, Andrii referred to the existing nationalist groups as the “youth wing of Freedom” (Personal interview 10/19/11). According to Andrii, Freedom then established and purposely supported semi-autonomous nationalist movement groups in L’viv in order to:

…garner the support of radically minded youth who do not want to participate in the formal party…to give them a way to participate independently. The point is to create groups that everyone can join without being an official member (Personal interview 10/24/11).

Thus, Freedom relied on a pre-existing network of nationalist groups to recruit activists, while simultaneously creating new opportunities for political participation. According to party leaders in L’viv, this strategy doubled Freedom’s formal membership between 2008
and 2012. Again, this estimate is likely an exaggeration, but the party’s increased grassroots presence between 2009 and 2012, when I was conducting research, and its ability to mobilize over ten thousand participants for the annual UPA rallies, indicate that the movement increased its numbers dramatically in a relatively short period of time.

**Galician Exceptionalism?**

Why was Freedom’s recruitment strategy particularly effective in Galicia? One reason for the seeming ease with which the party was able to recruit new members, and young people in particular, has to do with the specificity of Galician political culture. Previous studies have noted differences in civic and political culture between Galicia and the rest of Ukraine (Birch 1995; Drummond and Lubecki 2010; Magocsi 2002; O’Loughlin and Bell 1999; Wilson 2000). Focusing on Galicia, Drummond and Lubecki (2010) argue that:

Galicians, whether they live in Ukraine or Poland, are far more civic than their compatriots, they share higher levels of political efficacy when compared to the rest of Ukraine and Poland, they are more likely to vote, and when they do, they are far more likely to support the candidacy of parties that stand in opposition to the successor left (2010:1312)

The authors argue that a distinctly Galician civic culture is a result of the Habsburg legacy that encouraged associationism and active volunteerism. According to Drummond and Lubecki (2010), the historical roots of civic engagement were not eradicated by 70 years of Soviet rule. Rather, Galicia remained the site of workers’ protests during the Soviet era, despite its largely agricultural economy (Birch 1995). In the post-Soviet period, Galician districts continued to stand out in terms of higher political participation than in the rest of the country. Before Freedom came to dominate the radical right movement, earlier radical right parties and movements found most support in the Galician districts. Motyl and Krawchenko (1997) showed that even during the Soviet years, the nationalist, pro-independence, and pro-democracy movement People’s Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) received the most support in the L’viv district in particular. Freedom’s predecessors benefited from Galicia’s active political culture, but unlike Freedom, they were not able to break out of the Galician nationalist heartland or make any headway at the national level.

The view that Ukraine’s radical right movements were bound to remain a localized Galician phenomenon was common in my interview with political analysts and local academics (but see Shekhovstov 2011). In the fall of 2011, when asked about Freedom’s electoral prospects, a common reply from academics, journalists, and political analysts was that Freedom’s support in Galicia was expected given the region’s historical and cultural specificity.44 Its ideological stance being too radical for most Ukrainians, Freedom, like its predecessors, would remain a Galician party without much prospect for expansion to the national level.45

Of course, the 2012 parliamentary elections, when Freedom became the first radical

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44 As late as spring of 2012, Taras Kuzio—a political scientist and prominent expert on Ukrainian politics—downplayed Freedom’s electoral chances in an online debate with Ivan Katchanovski—also a professor of political science and researcher of Ukrainian politics—who claimed that Freedom’s rising popularity should be “ringing alarm bells.” The full debate is available here: [http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/taras-kuzio/problem-in-ukraine-isn’t-svoboda-it’s-yanukovych-reply-to-ivan-katchanovksi](http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/taras-kuzio/problem-in-ukraine-isn’t-svoboda-it’s-yanukovych-reply-to-ivan-katchanovksi) (Kuzio 2012)

45 This is a general summary of expert opinion based on 10 interviews in the fall of 2011, September 5-18. Earlier, in 2010, Freedom was so low on researchers’ radars in Kyiv that my questions were met with surprise. There were, of course, some dissenting opinions, particularly those of Andreas Umland (Professor of Political Science at Kyiv Mohyla University) and Vecheslav Likhachev (Director of the Eurasian-Jewish Center and expert on radical right movements in Russia and Ukraine). In an interview on September 18, 2011, Likhachev told me that Freedom’s growing popularity and increasing street presence outside of Galicia was cause for concern.
right party to gain a national presence, signaled that the movement had expanded beyond the Galician heartland into neighboring western regions and even towards the capital. While there are other potential explanatory factors for Freedom’s increased electoral support in 2012, such as the structure of the political opportunity at the time (see Shekhovstov 2011), the elections indicated that, unlike previous radical right movements and parties, Freedom was able to mobilize and exploit a political opening. Political mobilization does not occur over night or in the weeks prior to the elections, rather, it is a long-term process that requires resources, leadership, and above all, willing and active participants.46

Recruitment Strategies Outside the Heartland: Volyn

To understand why Freedom has been more successful as a political movement, we must step out of the Galician context to the neighboring Volyn region, which does not share the same political culture as Galicia. When arriving in Luts’k or Rivne from L’viv, the difference between the cities is palpable.47 As opposed to L’viv, where people gather in the central squares to listen to music, participate in demonstrations, or attend festivals, Rivne’s and Luts’k’s squares are often empty. As in L’viv and Kyiv, all the major political parties have tents in the main city square, but aside from the volunteers distributing the political literature, I rarely saw anyone approach. Overall, political and civic life is not directly visible to an outsider. Whereas in Kyiv and L’viv, I often found myself in the middle of protest or rally without even seeking it out, in Volyn’s cities, I saw only one demonstration in the fall of 2011, lead by Freedom, against the Party of Regions’ minister of education (Dmytro Tabachnyk) whom Freedom accused of planning to russify and Sovietize history textbooks.48 Otherwise, Luts’k and Rivne were quiet provincial towns.49

In Volyn, Freedom had to adapt its recruitment strategies. The organizational strategy that the party developed in L’viv was based primarily on making connections with pre-existing citizens’ groups, bringing in nationalist movement organizations, and, in parallel, establishing new groups to expand its organizational reach. In addition, Freedom sponsored or organized a wide range of cultural and social events through its subsidiary groups in order to attract potential supporters. In Volyn, the playing field was profoundly different: there were fewer pre-existing nationalist organizations, they were less political active, and there existed a smaller student population in the major cities (Luts’k and Rivne).50 These factors made it difficult for Freedom to “plug-into” a pre-existing organizational infrastructure, and the party had to invest more resources into identifying potential local leaders and activists.

According to local party leaders in Volyn, political events organized by Freedom take place a maximum of six times a year. For example, the UPA day rally that attracted hundreds in L’viv and thousands in Kyiv had an attendance of 10-20 in Luts’k in 2010 (Personal interview 10/3/11). If in L’viv respondents reported participating in party related events at

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46 The process I describe here is similar to Gramsci’s notion of the “war of position” (Gramsci 1971).
47 At the regional level, Volyn and Galicia are similar in terms of size and population, but Volyn’s major cities, Luts’k (population of 203,000) and Rivne (population of 247,000), are smaller than L’viv (population of 1.5 million) but about the same as Ternopil (population of 218,000) in Galicia.
49 In April of 2011, Freedom held demonstrations in Luts’k to support city council members’ proposal to ban Soviet symbolism. The measure and demonstrations were successful with the ban passing on April 20, 2011.
50 There are two major schools of higher education in L’viv: the Ivan Franko National University (about 11,000 students) and L’viv Polytechnic (about 30,000 students). In Luts’k, the two major institutions are the Lutsk National Technical University (about 7,500 students) and the Lesya Ukrainka Volyn University (about 12,000 students). In Rivne, the two major institutions are the Rivne State Humanities University (about 13,500 students) and the Rivne State Technical University (about 8,000 students). However, L’viv is also host to at least ten additional smaller universities and vocational schools.
least once a week, in Volyn, once a month was a more common response. In comparison to Galicia, individuals in Volyn tended to participate in collective activities less and the opportunities for participation were fewer as well.

Nationalist groups, while present in Volyn, were also fewer in numbers than in Galicia. This made respondents incredibly difficult to find. The five interviews I was able to conduct with members of nationalist movements (the Autonomous Nationalists in this case) in Luts’k and Rivne were brief. The information I was able to gather from respondents signaled that relations between these groups and Freedom were more strained than in Galicia. For example, referring to members of nationalist subgroups as the “youth wing” of Freedom—a phrase commonly used in L’viv—was received as an insult in Luts’k. As one member of a nationalist group, Ivan, (who asked that his affiliation not be revealed) told me, “we don’t cooperate with them [Freedom party members] because they are a bunch of fascists, and we’re nationalists…the true heirs of the UPA and Bandera legacy” (Personal interview, 10/3/11). Ivan went on to explain that his group saw itself as clearly ideologically autonomous from Freedom and did not approve of their “liberal democratic tactics.” According to Ivan, power “must be fought for” through militaristic means rather than political ones, because politics and democracy are a dead-end for nationalist movements in Ukraine.

The other nationalist group members I spoke with did not express as strong of an opinion as Ivan; he thought that Freedom activists were “good guys” trying to do “what’s best for Ukraine in their own way” (Personal interview, 10/3/11). While it is difficult to make conclusions based on a few interviews, the absence of nationalist subgroups and the hostile opinions toward Freedom expressed by some respondents suggest that the radical right movement is more fractionalized and less active in Volyn than in Galicia.

Interviews with party leaders confirmed that nationalist groups were not particularly active in Volyn. A local Freedom council member outside of Rivne, a young woman named Yulia, said that she rarely came in contact with nationalists (natsionalisty)—the term commonly used by interviewees to refer to members of nationalist groups as opposed to the party: “I don’t know anyone in those groups, so no, I can’t say that I’ve ever known us [the party] to reach out to them” (Personal interview, 10/4/11). Vasil, a city council member in Luts’k, who was once a member of one of the nationalist group (though he would not specify which one), before running for the city council seat, told me that all his contacts and friends from “those times” were no longer actively participating in political events, or like himself, had joined Freedom (Personal interview 10/11/11). Whereas in L’viv, connections with pre-existing groups helped Freedom recruit “radically minded” activists, in Volyn, such groups were not active or did not have a strong public presence.

In Volyn, party activists complained that they lacked opportunities to engage in any collective activities and had encountered problems when attempting to organize friends. As Aleksandr, a young party member (17) in Rivne lamented, “most young people are not politically minded or involved in politics. They don’t want to become party members because that implies a certain amount of responsibility: the party is work” (Personal interview, 10/10/11). Aleksandr was speaking directly to the difference in civic engagement between Galicia and Volyn. When I asked him to think of a single student club or organization that he had heard of, after a few minutes, Aleksandr came up with a name: “Euro Club,” a student group set up in anticipation of the upcoming soccer championship that was to take place in the summer of 2012. He conceded, however, that he personally had never attended an event organized by the club and could not recall the types of events that the club had organized in the past. “But!” he said, perking up, “Student Freedom is coming to Rivne soon! We are trying to organize it right now, actually.” Aleksandr excitedly told me that plans were underway to set up the same organizations that enjoy wide support among young people in
L’viv (Freedom’s student and school groups) in Rivne and Luts’k as well. When I asked why it was only now that these groups were being formed, Aleksandr said that he had been interested in getting involved in organizing for some time, but it was only within the last few months that a Freedom city council member had approached him to start recruiting. Aleksandr’s phrase that the new groups were “coming to Rivne” from Galicia and the council member’s involvement, highlighted that the party was beginning to transplant organizational structure from Galicia. As Aleksandr said, “it’s just a matter of time until we can find people” to join.

Freedom was not able to directly implement the same strategy in Volyn that it developed in Galicia, because the region’s political culture was profoundly different: fewer pre-existing organizations and lower political engagement created a more politically apathetic population and fractionalized radical right movement. The party’s Galician strategy of building a support base through co-optation of pre-existing groups and mobilization of frequent mass protests could not take root in a place like Luts’k or Rivne. This created an initial obstacle for mobilization and recruitment, but in 2011, there was already evidence of the party’s increased activity and investment in developing an organizational structure. What I observed in Luts’k in Rivne in 2011 was the beginning of Freedom’s organizational mobilization: interviewees excitedly told me about future plans to organize groups and clubs for young people. As a city council member in Rivne put it, “we [the party] are very interested in developing our young people. We [the party leadership in Volyn] have been in constant contact with our western neighbors, and we are confident that what they have been able to achieve there [in Galicia], we can also achieve here” (Personal interview 10/9/11). In Rivne, for example, “Ukrainian disco” (which I discuss in the next section) were already being organized with some success. Plans for additional social events were underway.

In Galicia, Freedom built a community for young people. The party did this by setting up an organizational structure that allowed it to reach a larger youth population. Freedom organized rallies, demonstrations, and a variety of cultural events to mobilize and recruit young people. These youths’ social worlds became deeply intertwined with the party. While cultural events and club parties seem apolitical, they are aimed at what many interviewees referred to as “nationalist consciousness raising” that occurs through participation in social, cultural, and sporting events. These social events were aimed at increasing participation, as “gateways” to political involvement. Social connections, reinforced through collective participation in informal settings, increased the likelihood of continued participation. To these young people, Freedom and its affiliated youth groups represented more than politics or ideology; they represented a sense of belonging and social cohesion. In Volyn in 2011, the party was starting to develop the same kinds of organizational bases.

When I returned to Ukraine in the fall of 2012, shortly before the parliamentary elections, Freedom’s mobilization capacity and recruitment abilities had clearly grown since my last visit a year prior in the fall of 2011. The party was organizing rallies, protests, and demonstrations almost on a daily basis in Kyiv on a wide range of topics: anti-Communism, pension reform, language reform, corruption, and even rezoning. In follow up phone interviews with party members in Luts’k and Rivne, I learned that Freedom had increased its activity in Volyn substantially over the past year: the Student Group was now operating with an increasing membership in both cities, and students from universities had started to attend regularly. Freedom had become more active in street protests, which drew more interest from young people. The summer of 2012 was particularly active, with political and social activities taking place on a weekly basis—a substantial increase from just once a month a year prior. In Luts’k, the UPA Day rally on October 14th even attracted a few hundred people. Freedom’s investment in developing and building an organizational basis of support in Volyn likely helped the party at the polls in the 2012 parliamentary elections.
How and Why They Join: Radical Right Activists

Party leaders’ views of recruitment strategies tell only one side of the story. Interviews with party activists reveal that for the most part, they were recruited to the movement by friends, but that at the time of initial contact with the movement, activists’ political views were ambivalent rather than clearly nationalist or radical. Activists’ recruitment stories were surprisingly casual. As Mykola, a 21-year-old student member of Freedom in L’viv said, “I had a beer one night and went to the Freedom party tent on the main square. Talked to the people in the tents about the party, then went to an anti-communist rally, got beat up, and [as a result] became more interested in party events after that” (Personal interview, 10/20/11). As with other political parties in Ukraine, Freedom maintains a tent in the city square, where a volunteer representative distributes information. But as Mykola points out, the motivation for joining the party officially was the result of his active participation in an anti-communist rally and experience with police repression. Mykola’s trajectory from casual participant to rather ardent party member was typical among the most engaged activists.

After joining the Student Group in 2010, Mykola brought other friends, who “were not interested in politics beforehand” to party events and became an active organizer. He even met his girlfriend, Kalyna, through the Student Group. While talking to Mykola for about an hour in a smoky basement of a student café in L’viv, Kalyna joined us for a coffee. At 19, she looked older than her age. Unlike Mykola, who tended to speak loudly as if practicing his next rally speech, she was soft spoken and shy. She tended to let Mykola do all the talking, but I asked Kalyna to tell me about her experiences in the Student Group and how she was recruited. Kalyna’s story was similar to Mykola’s in some ways: she too had joined the Student Group after participating in several non-political events and then joining at a friend’s behest. Yet, Kalyna’s experience was different because of the types of events she participated in:

Well, I am studying to be a nurse, because I’m really concerned about the children in our country—so many are in orphanages and don’t have anyone to care for them. These children don’t know where they came from, who they are…they have very little joy in life. On [religious] holidays, they don’t have a family to go to. So a few years ago, I volunteered to go to orphanages around L’viv to bring the children presents and to read them stories. There were other girls who volunteered with me. We became friends, and about two years ago [2009], some friends, Freedom activists [svobodovtsi], started coming along. They helped us raise money for the kids, and now almost everyone that comes to the orphanage is part of the Student Group.

Kalyna’s story demonstrates how the party engaged with volunteer groups and was not just involved in organizing political events, as discussed in the previous section. But Kalyna’s story is also interesting because it shows the broad range of activities—social, cultural, and political—that the party (or its student wing) organizes to recruit young people. Kalyna went on to tell me that the children’s books they read at the orphanages emphasized national Ukrainian traditions and that she saw it as her job to “educate these children about who they are and where they come from,” meaning, to give them a sense of belonging in the Ukrainian nation.

Kalyna and the other young women in her volunteer group also visited the elderly in nursing homes, where they often heard complaints about living conditions. Student Svoboda helped her raise money to buy some basic goods, like favorite foods or new slippers, which were donated to the homes. Of course, these goods and the children’s toys came with Freedom party paraphernalia: t-shirts with the party logo, the party newspaper, party pens, calendars, and many other promotional items. Kalyna’s experience also highlights the
gendered role of participation: women in the Student Group tended to participate less in street protests, which have a tendency to turn violent as Mykola’s experience shows, and instead took part in educational or cultural events such as educating orphaned children about their Ukrainian heritage. The result is that women tend to be less visible and less accessible, but they are still involved in radical right movements in roles that mirror women’s traditional family roles: working with children and the elderly.

As Kalyna’s example demonstrates, cultural and educational events were key recruitment sites, because unlike political rallies, they were not always explicitly affiliated with the party. As Mykola pointed out, many young people came to the events to just have a good time, socialize with friends, and meet new people. The majority were not “politically minded.” For example, in addition to political protests or demonstrations, I attended a wide range of cultural events in L’viv, all either implicitly or explicitly, organized by Freedom party activists and leaders. At one such event, a talk by a Ukrainian academic on the etymology of Ukrainian names was held at the one of the major universities in L’viv. Because the lecture took place in the evening and was not part of a course, I was surprised to see a full lecture hall of students in attendance. However, I was more surprised to see a local Freedom party deputy deliver the introduction and a trio of musicians dressed in traditional Ukrainian national clothing play prior to the academic talk. The content of the lecture focused on showing the historical origins of Ukrainian, as opposed to Russian names, and encouraged young people to use their Ukrainian as opposed to russified first names—an issue that had been widely discussed and criticized in the Ukrainian media. The academic setting obscured the ideological element of the event—nationalist ideas appeared under the guise of scholarly objectivity.

In the lecture hall, I recognized a few Student Group members. One of them, an engineering student named Serhiy, waved me over to join his group of five friends. After the lecture ended, I joined the group for a tea and a snack in a café across the street from the university. As Serhiy praised the lecture and the party deputy who gave the opening remarks, I asked him and the others (two young women and three young men) why they had decided to spend their evening at the lecture hall. Serhiy, an active party member, revealed that he had helped organize the event. The others in the group shrugged their shoulders, and then Eryna, an 18-year-old literature student, spoke up, “I thought it sounded like a fun thing to do on a Tuesday.” Nods from the rest of group followed this statement, and then Kolya (a student in a nearby technical school) added, “I came along with the rest,” he said as he motioned to the group, “and, besides, it was free. You know, we students don’t have much money to go the movies or rock concerts,” he smiled. As the conversation went on, it became apparent that none of Serhiy’s friends were party members. Out of the five, none considered themselves “politically minded”—a phrase I heard used often to describe one’s non-affiliation with a political ideology. They had come along because Serhiy called Kolya, who called Eryna, who called the others. Eryna agreed, “I just came along to see my friends. I’m not a nationalist or part of the party.” Upon hearing this, Serhiy interjected with a smirk, “not yet!”

Serhiy’s comment underscored the subtle process of conversion from casual participant to activist described by other respondents. Munson (2008) likened this process to that of religious conversion. Not all party activists I interviewed, however, were ambivalent about the movement’s political ideology. Some, like Volodymir, a 17-year-old student in a technical vocational school, sought out a political organization that reflected his strong ideas about the meaning of Ukrainian nationhood and the political future of his country.

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I met Volodymir through Mykola. We chatted over a hotdog in a starkly lit small fast food restaurant. Volodymir said that he became interested in nationalist ideas while he was still in school, because “topics of nationalism and Ukrainian repression were discussed at the kitchen table, especially around 2004 during the Orange Revolution” (Personal interview 10/23/11). Yet, he too, only officially joined the party’s Student Group after casually attending several demonstrations in L’viv—“just to have some fun.” Eventually, he met Mykola at one of the rallies.

On first impression, Volodymir looked like a stereotypical radical right activist: he had a shaved head, and when we met he was wearing black pants and boots with a simple white t-shirt and a dark green army style jacket. When I asked him to tell me about how he joined the Student Group, he went into a monologue about the dangers of liberal democracy, which sounded as if he had memorized it especially for the occasion. He claimed that his grandfather was an UPA fighter and that members of his family had died in the Great Famine (Holodomor) that took place under Stalin in the early 1930s. Other young male respondents made similar claims about their family ties to UPA and family suffering during the famine. These familial legacies, actual or not, seemed to be a right of passage for young men in particular. But as I began asking Volodymir about the events he attended and why, a different image of him emerged. Volodymir said that now he was more interested in organizing film viewings, musical festivals, sporting events, and nightclub parties than political rallies:

I’ve been doing this [organizing social events for the Student Group] since about 2010. At first, I just wanted to, you know, get in fights, go to protests and see what happens. I still do that, sure, but I think it’s more important to show everyday citizens that we’re not a bunch of radicals as the media says we are. Because anybody who attends any of these [social and cultural] events will see that we are responsible people who just want the best for our country (Personal interview 10/23/11)

This discourse of “normalization” was very common among party activists, who tended to blame the media or the current administration for the negative image that the party receives. Phrases such as “we are just normal Ukrainians” or sentiments expressing initial surprise at how non-radical the party members are “once you get to know them” were typical among respondents. As one, rather articulate and reflective 19-year-old female Student Group member said, “Freedom members are largely well-educated, decent people. Comparing us to Nazis or fascists in not logical” (Personal interview 10/21/11).

Overwhelmingly, the recruitment experience of respondents was through friends who invited them to an event. Indeed, once I became aware of the scope of implicitly and explicitly Freedom sponsored events in L’viv, the party seemed as if it was everywhere: I would recognize that many of the young people gathering in the evenings to listen to a street musician play a traditional Ukrainian instrument were Student Group members. The flyers and posters for “Ukrainian discos”—basically club parties that encourage attendees to dress in traditional Ukrainian clothes—I was told, were Freedom sponsored events as well. Through these forms of social organizing, the party became a taken-for-granted part of the everyday, no longer seen as radical or extreme.

When I struck up conversations with participants at protests to ask why they had come, the answers were typically not focused on ideology or even the issue of the protest.

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52 Holodomor is a contested and dark event in Ukrainian history. It refers to the Stalin lead terror-famine during two winters in 1932 and 1933 when Ukrainian peasants were forced to relinquish their crops to the Soviet army and millions (scholarly estimates are of 2.4 million but nationalist groups claim upwards of 10 million) starved or froze to death in Ukraine (Snyder 2010). This remains a contested topic in Ukrainian politics, with some claiming that Holodomor was intentional genocide of Ukrainians and should be recognized as such, while scholars tend to view this period a part of a broader pattern of mass civilian death and repression under Stalin’s Great Terror (Snyder 2010).
The typical answer was, “I’m here because my friends came,” or “my friend called me up and said I should come, so I did.” The majority of party activists in all three research sites said that they had joined the party after attending several social events to which he/she was invited by a friend. Social events then turned to invitations to political rallies and, eventually, formal party membership.

In Volyn, however, activists like Aleksandr, discussed earlier, complained about the lack of political engagement and social activities for young people. These sentiments were repeated by other young party activists like Olena, a 22-year-old student studying at Rivne’s Technical University. When we met at a local café in Rivne, I asked if her friends were also activists. Her response reflected her frustration with her peers’ attitudes: “there isn’t much for young people to do. Most of my friends aren’t interested in politics and just hang out in parks drinking or watching TV at home” (Personal interview, 10/7/11). Unlike most of the party activists in L’viv, whose social circles revolved around politically oriented events and who had joined the party through friends and acquaintances, the activists in Luts’k and Rivne first got interested in the party through online social networks, by joining a nationalist online group on vkontakte (a Russian language version of Facebook). Party members like Olena reported that after she had joined the online group and posted a few comments, one of the local party leaders (also interviewed) contacted her. After meeting him and a few others from the party, Olena realized that “this was a good group of normal Ukrainians who just want the best for their country.”

In contrast, online social networks did not play a significant recruitment role among my interviewees in L’viv. Olena had clearer political ideas about the importance of national culture and traditions than many of the activists in L’viv, at least when they first began to attend events. She sought out a community of like-minded individuals, first by joining online social media groups, and then meeting other activists face to face. For their part, party leaders used online networks to reach out to potential converts. Ivan, the city council deputy who recruited Olena, told me that he maintained an active presence on vkontakte and regularly searched the site for potential recruits. He identified individuals based on their group memberships in Freedom’s online forums, online social connections, and stated interests. Ivan talked about the “Galician model” of recruitment, which he wished (or was under pressure) to create in Volyn. Much of his time, he said, was spent identifying “future leaders” for the groups he envisioned forming in Rivne. “Young women like Olena,” he said, “were essential for the future of the Ukrainian nation” (Personal interview, 10/6/11).

Olena told me that she could only think of at most ten friends who she knew to be active in politics as well. Frustrated with the lack of opportunities for participation, Olena and another young woman, Yulia, had recently started a volunteer group whose members, mostly young women, visited orphanages and elderly people during holidays, much like the group described by Kalyna in L’viv. When I asked Olena if the volunteer group was organized by the party (as was the case in L’viv), she insisted that it was not, but the volunteer activities she described were almost identical to those described by Kalyna: reading Ukrainian folklore to orphan children, volunteering to teach children Ukrainian history, and collecting donations for care of the infirmed, with the help of other Freedom activists.

Activists in Volyn and Galicia had similar “conversion” stories, from a casual, not “politically minded” observer to activist. Friendship ties were crucial for prompting initial participation and continual activism. In Galicia, where political activism was part of the local political culture, activists joined the movement through friends. In Volyn, however, in the absence of an active culture of political engagement, party leaders used social media connections to reach out to potential recruits. The result was that many activists in Volyn were less ambivalent about political ideology than those I met in Galicia. For example, Yulia, Olena’s friend who started the volunteer group, told me that she became interested in
“nationalist ideas” after reading about one of Freedom’s protest action in Kyiv, in which the party was protesting the use of Russian language textbooks in Ukrainian schools. This issue had struck a chord with Yulia, who had attended a Russian language school in Volyn, even though Ukrainian was her mother tongue:

I always thought it was strange that in school, I had to speak and read Russian, even though at home we spoke Ukrainian. As I got older, I started to really think about what my experience meant, not just for me, but for Ukraine as a nation: how can we live in a country whose people don’t even share the same language? (Personal interview, 10/5/11)

When Yulia read about Freedom’s anti-Russian rallies, she wanted to learn more about the party. Thus, Yulia was more similar to Volodymir, who considered himself a nationalist prior to joining the party, because she joined the political movement that reflected her concerns on the issue of language reform. Unlike most activists who were recruited to the party by friends, Yulia simply stopped by the Freedom’s tent stand in the city square in the summer of 2009 and filled out the membership form. Before long, she was volunteering at the party offices, which was when she met Olena. Like Olena, Yulia became more enmeshed in political ideology as a result of continued participation and involvement in organizing local events. As she put it, “the language issue was what brought me to the party, but now that I’ve met other [activists] and really thought about the issues facing our country, I believe that Freedom is fighting for the right things.” When I asked Yulia what those “right things” were, she repeated some of the key points that appeared in Freedom’s party program, such as the re-establishment of the ethnic passport system, quotas on minorities holding public office, ban on foreign ownership of land, and the removal of Russian as an official language. Whereas before becoming an active member, Yulia did not think of herself as a nationalist, now she said, “you know, it took me a long time to learn that nationalist is not a dirty word. That’s what I am.”

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I used a case study of Ukraine’s radical right movement to show how right-wing political mobilization occurs through social network mechanisms. Interviews with political activists revealed that ideology played a secondary role in individuals’ motivations for participating in political events. Most activists were ambivalent about nationalism or the party’s political demands when they initially joined. Right-wing nationalist beliefs developed over time, as a result of continued participation and stronger social connections between participants. As individuals developed stronger social ties with others in the movement, the movement became more than an avenue for expressing concerns regarding a specific issue; it came to embody activists’ social worlds. The sense of belonging and community that the political movement provided superseded ideological beliefs. The individuals in this study became radical right activists in the process of mobilization. This conversion process followed a surprisingly similar narrative for both ardent and more casual activists.

While the aim of this research was to examine why individuals join radical right movements and how such movements mobilize in a case study context, the conclusions reached here could have been bolstered through comparison with a radical right movement in a different national context. However, radical right activists are a difficult population to reach: they are not listed in registries or phonebooks, and many are secretive of their affiliation. During my fieldwork experience, I was often met with suspicion and was only able to set up initial interviews after months of personal networking. It is largely for this reason that there are so few studies of this population. Nonetheless, as this study demonstrates, with a bit of determination, qualitative research on right-wing mobilization is possible. Future studies could, for example, examine if activists of Greece’s recently elected
Golden Dawn party were similarly “apolitical” before joining that movement. Additionally, future research could attempt to replicate McAdam’s comparative methodology of activist and non-activists for the case of European radical right movements.

Why study radical right political parties? The goal of this study was not to explain electoral outcomes, but there is undoubtedly a connection between elections and movement mobilization. As McAdam and Tarrow (2010) point out, “elections and social movements are the two major forms of political conflict in democratic systems, our inattention to the connection between the two fields [is]…a serious lacuna in the entire broad field of contentious politics” (532). As the case of Freedom showed, the boundaries between electoral politics, campaigning, recruitment, and mobilization are not clearly delineated. Moreover, the lines between parties and movements are often blurred: movements evolve into parties, and parties retain movement connections after entering institutional politics. Boundary blurring is particularly likely in the case of right-wing social movements. Thus, only by exploring the on the ground processes of political mobilization can scholars hope to understand what motivates individuals to join such movements, and ultimately, why radical right parties succeed at the polls.
Table 4.1 Percent of the Popular Vote Received by Freedom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Galicia</th>
<th>Volyn</th>
<th>Kyiv (city)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.67 (1.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>25.76</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>1.56 (1.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local district elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>34.34</td>
<td>17.31</td>
<td>10.84 (17.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2 Interviews (2009-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Party members</th>
<th>Nationalist group members</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formal Informal</td>
<td>Formal Informal</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>11 16</td>
<td>0 7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volyn</td>
<td>10 7</td>
<td>0 5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>14 12</td>
<td>3 8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35 35</td>
<td>3 20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Five

Reimagining Political Parties and Social Movements

Social movement theories in sociology have shifted focus several times since the 1950s. Driven by Parsonian structural-functionalism, early perspectives on social movement development focused on explaining the structural conditions for collective action. These early theories include Smelser’s (1962) theory of structural strain and Davies’s (1962) and Gurr’s (1970) relative deprivation perspectives. Because structural explanations could not stand up to empirical testing (Tilly 1964), by the early 1970s, the field shifted toward studying the political processes of resource mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1978), political opportunities (McAdam 1982; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996), and framing (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and Benford 1988). Together, these studies sought to explain the mobilization of groups—their organizational abilities, recruitment, and ultimate success or failure at influencing institutional politics.

Since the mid-1990s, the main concern in the field regards how groups mobilize and why movements emerge (Walder 2009). But as de Leon, Desai, and Tugal (2009) argue, sociologists, in focusing on mobilization, have paid little attention to the role of political parties, implicitly reducing them to mere reflections of social movements. That said, there has been a renewed interest in the sociology of political parties with scholars calling for an end to the artificial distinction between institutionalized and non-institutionalized politics (Goldstone 2003, 2004). These researchers seek to reimagine how social movements shape parties. More elusive and less examined, however, is the question of how political parties influence and generate social movements. Drawing on emerging studies of what can broadly be called the ‘‘new’’ sociology of political parties,” I propose that in order to understand the linkages between the social and the political, research must re-embed political parties into theories of social movements and, more generally, into the field of political sociology. One must therefore understand political parties as agents of social change. Our task, then, should be to examine the conditions under which parties and movements develop as independent or mutually constitutive social agents. In other words, I suggest that previous studies (Goldstone 2003; McAdam et al. 2001; Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Tarrow 1994) have not gone far enough in challenging the distinction between institutional/non-institutional or conventional/contentious politics. To move theory forward, in Chapter, I begin to outline a field theoretical approach to the study of movements and parties that takes the institutional/non-institutional dichotomy as a subject of inquiry rather than as an assumed given.

This Chapter proceeds as follows: I first review the various strands of social movement literature, from early structural-functionalist approaches to framing processes. This overview is necessary to frame current debates. I then present a critique stemming from two basic errors in the literature: (1) the binary view that situates social movements as challengers and political parties as members, and (2) the pervasive logic of reflection that unidirectionally posits movements as the cause of parties. Third, I highlight perspectives in the emerging sociology of political parties that seek to move beyond the movement/party dichotomy and unidirectional causality. Fourth, I propose a field framework for reimagining the relationships between parties and movements.

1950s-1960s: From Marxism to Structuralism

It was Marx’s analysis of revolutionary workers’ movements that spawned social movement theories of the mid-twentieth-century. Working in this tradition, scholars like Lipset (1950) were particularly interested in exceptions to Marx’s basic position, which held
that radical political consciousness can only emerge among the working class. Applying the logic of class analysis, Lipset examined the emergence of socialist movements among agrarian populations, which, far from being revolutionary, Marx relegated to the “idiocy of rural life” (Marx 1972[1848]:477). Centrally, this research aimed to know why certain groups (or classes) adopted radical ideologies while others did not. At its core, however, class analysis theorized that political parties expressed class struggle (Lipset 1960).

Methodologically, these studies generally combined a historical analysis with a case study approach that sought to trace the social bases of political radicalism (Calhoun 1982).

The original Marxist formulations, however, were criticized for their inability to predict the emergence of revolutionary movements. Further, these formulations were undermined by the simple fact that revolutionary movements did not occur when and where Marx had originally specified (i.e., among the working class in the most advanced capitalist economies). Faced with this disjuncture between the theoretical and empirical, Marxist sociologists began studying the obstacles to working class radicalization and social movement: namely, the repressive function of the capitalist state (Miliband 1969) and the ideological subjugation of the working class (Anderson 1964)53. This focus on the state—which saw political parties functioning as tools of either capitalist or worker interest—shaped political sociology for decades to come.

Drawing on the Durkheimian and Parsonian theoretical tradition, structural strain approaches developed in response to Marxist class analysis. Underlying structural strain theory is the notion that societies become increasingly complex and specialized as they modernize. As opposed to pre-modern societies, in which a set of moral norms unites individuals, modern societies are held together precariously and, thus, are constantly at risk of collapsing into pathological, anomic states. To establish equilibrium and manage potential conflict, society needs laws and norms. Rapid modernization presents a danger to the balance between social structure and moral norms. When modernization proceeds too quickly, as happens in the transition from pre-modern to modern societies, changes in the moral order (e.g. in laws or collective consciousness) cannot keep up. Some groups are inevitably marginalized by this process. The social groups most negatively impacted by structural changes, so the theory goes, are more likely to become reactionary, particularly by participating in radical social movements (see Figure 5.1).

**Figure 5.1 Model of Structural-Functionalist Theories**

| Social change (structural strain) | → | anomie, psychological frustration, norm disruption | → | social movement (collective behavior) |

Smelser’s (1959) study of workers radicalism in England exemplifies the structural strain approach. In that study, Smelser attributed political radicalization not to class struggle but to the strains that rapid industrialization places on the traditional family structure. In his theoretical work on collective action (1962), Smelser accounted for ideological variation among social movements by the degree to which a society’s order is disrupted.54

In another version of structural strain theory, relative deprivation approaches posit

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53 Also see Poulantzas (1976) for a response to Miliband.

54 Even though the structural strain perspective failed to address what are now commonly regarded as key aspects of social movements—namely, grievance formation and social movement organization—the theory’s paradigm, which holds that development can prevent reactionary movements by proceeding in evolutionary stages, has powerfully influenced modernization theory (Parsons 1964). In comparative politics, for example, modernization theory has been used to explain revolutions in developing countries (Huntington 1968).
that collective action—and protests in particular—occur when there is a disconnect between expectations and reality (Gurr 1970; Davies 1962). Absolute hardship does not drive groups to rebel; rather, collective mobilization is likely to occur when one group’s social mobility falters more than others or when improving conditions only benefit some groups while leaving others behind. As Walder (2009) suggests, this tradition, while adopting a structural perspective, was “ultimately rooted in conceptions derived from [Merton’s] role theory, which viewed social structures as constellations of overlapping, socially constructed roles with assigned statuses, normative expectations, and varying degrees of socially structured role strain” (395). This means that psychological frustration is framed as the driving force behind collective action. In this view, individuals are anomic social actors driven by immediate, unfulfilled grievances into outbursts of protest or rebellion. Grievances enter the analysis primarily as short-term economic interests. From this perspective, the process and mechanism of interest politicization are, at best, of secondary concern.

Tilly’s (1964) study of the Vendée counterrevolution in eighteenth-century France dealt structural theories of collective action a first blow. Tilly tried to determine which groups participated in the counterrevolution. Marxist theory predicted that reactionary pre-capitalist social classes (nobility and peasants) would drive the counterrevolution, while modernization theory predicted that the revolution would originate in the region most strained by capitalist transformation. Using detailed historical evidence, Tilly showed that neither theory adequately predicted the social or regional origins of the counterrevolution. Instead, social groups split “vertically,” with members of each group on either side of the conflict; further, there was no clear regional pattern for insurgency. In each region, every social group—even the urban bourgeoisie, who should have been most supportive of the Revolution—fractured, with members allying with both sides of the conflict. In fact, it was the Catholic clergy that drove the split. Some clerics refused to repudiate papal authority and take a loyalty oath to the revolutionary government. The local parishes followed their clergy’s lead to either side of the conflict.

Tilly’s empirical challenge to class analysis and modernization theory started to shift theoretical debates away from aggregate structural explanations and toward a focus on mobilization processes. In later work, Tilly and his collaborators went on to discredit the basic assumptions of relative deprivation and modernization theories: measures of social strain or deprivation could not explain the occurrence of protests, revolutions, and other forms of mass collective action across a variety of contexts (Lodhi and Tilly 1973; Snyder and Tilly 1972; Tilly 1973). Most important, however, was that structural approaches failed to explain the emergence of progressive social movements in the 1960s and 1970s (see Walder 2009 for a review). Structural explanations could not account for the organizational capacity and mass mobilization of the Civil Rights, Anti-war, and Feminist movements. The events of the 1960s, the empirical failure of structural explanations, and a broader shift within sociological theories led scholars to focus their attention on the processes and mechanisms of mobilization.

1970s-1980s: Mobilization Theories

Between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, a paradigm shift occurred in the study of collective action: the field of “collective behavior” as conceived by structural theories disappeared and was replaced by “social movement” studies. This shift reflected the social changes of the 1960s, but it also reflected a transformation within sociology that began to question the dominance of functional and structural theories. As neo-Marxist, feminist, and cultural theories challenged the Parsonian tradition, they also brought the structural strain explanation for collective behavior—namely, that all types of collective behavior occur because of norm breakdown, anomie, and psychological frustration—under theoretical
Resource Mobilization

Resource mobilization theory, as first outlined by McCarthy and Zald (1977), refuted the claim that collective action was the result of psychological frustration. Rather, collective action—including collective violence—is “not anomic tension release, but purposive and political” (Oberschall 1993:52). People neither coalesce into mass movements spontaneously nor do social movements arise out of anomic social states (see Tilly 1986). On the contrary, a great deal of organizing must take place prior to any collective action. As such, resource mobilization theory analyzes how groups aggregate and organize resources toward collective goals (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Outside influence from political elites matters to the extent they are willing to supply social movements with political support or financial resources. Groups with political supporters or funders are more likely to succeed at influencing institutional politics by, say, influencing policy or setting agendas. Other exogenous factors primarily enter the equation in the form economic changes that shift resources among social groups (see Figure 5.2).

Tilly et al. (1975) contributed to the resource mobilization perspective in their study of conflict events in Europe (1830-1930). Providing more evidence contrary to early structural theories, the authors showed that during periods of sudden social change, instances of social conflict actually decreased. The authors theorized that this was due to the weakening of traditional group solidarities in the short run, which reduced the mobilization potential of existing groups. Additionally, new groups and solidarities required time to coalesce, so that in the immediate period after an episode of social change, new groups that could have mobilization potential were still unorganized. In the long run, however, resources shifted to these new groups, which could then mobilize into action. Social change was thus important only insofar as it affected new groups’ access to resources and shifted resources away from existing groups. At the individual and organizational level, it is not irrational outburst that prompts individuals to participate in collective behavior but rather rational cost-benefit considerations (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973).

Figure 5.2 Model of Resource Mobilization Theories

Social change → resource redistribution to challengers → social movement

In sum, the resource mobilization perspective shifted the focus of explanation from psychological/structural to political/organizational factors. The new perspective challenged structural strain theories in three ways. First, resource mobilization rejected the assumption that collective action was driven by individual, psychological factors. This assumption framed all collective behavior as somehow psychologically deviant as opposed to organized and political. As McAdam (1982) points out, structural strain theories’ denial of the political aspect of collective behavior implies that political demands are just “a convenient justification for what is at root a psychological phenomenon” (17). Newer perspectives placed social movements squarely in the terrain of political struggles and argued that social movement participants were “at least as rational as those who study them” (Schwartz 1976:135). Second, the critique accentuated how structural theories’ individualistic emphasis neglected contextual political factors. Specifying the political conditions for mobilization became a central component of social movement research. Third, social movements—now seen as organized, rational, and political—were separated from other “less rational” forms of collective behavior, such as riots, violent events, or even revolutions. The result was the birth
of social movements as a distinct subfield in sociology and the abandonment of the collective behavior label.

**Political Opportunities**

In early formulations, resource mobilization scholars did not try to specify the exogenous conditions affecting mobilization. This task was taken up by scholars of what came to be known as “political opportunity structures” and the “political process model.” The first explicit mention of the political opportunity structure referred to the institutional openness of local governments toward challengers. Eisigner (1973) applied this measure to explain why race riots occurred in some American cities but not others. City governments that were open to hearing claims provided a space for participation and were thus able to prevent riots. Governments closed to traditional participation could only prevent mass riots through repression. Thus, riots were most likely to occur in cities that exhibited a combination of open and closed opportunities. Subsequent studies applied similar logic to nation states to understand how states structure incentives to facilitate or repress mobilization (Kitschelt 1986; Tilly 1978). Tilly (1978) further elaborated the concept of political opportunity by adding opportunity/threat and facilitation/repression to the set of conditions for mobilization. In that book, Tilly also introduced the notion of “repertoires of contention”—the limited set of learned scripts available to social movement actors and leaders (see Tarrow 2008 for a review on this topic). These culturally structured repertoires are resources that social movement entrepreneurs can use to challenge the state. Importantly, Tilly’s addition to the model related the study of collective action to the political.

McAdam’s (1982) study of the US civil-rights movement drew on the political opportunity structure model to develop the political process model (see Figure 5.3). Unlike Eisigner’s or Tilly’s formulations, which specified particular structural factors of political opportunity, McAdam conceived that the political opportunity structure encompassed the broader political environment. According to McAdam, “any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in political opportunities” (1982:41). McAdam thus examined demographic, historic, and institutional changes in order to understand the conditions under which African-Americans could mobilize and influence politics. He argued that socioeconomic changes expand political opportunities for challenger groups. In addition to expanding political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength (e.g. leadership, members, and networks) provides the “structural potential” for collective political action (48). Together, external (political opportunity expansion) and internal (indigenous strength) contribute to “cognitive liberation”—a shift in the meanings that individuals attribute to their social conditions—to produce social movement mobilization (51). McAdam’s staunch critique of both the classical structural perspectives and the resource mobilization model helped to popularize the political process approach and quickly inaugurate it as the benchmark for case studies of mobilization. Goodwin and Jasper (1999) even claimed that the political process model had become “the hegemonic paradigm among social movement analysts” (28).

Since McAdam’s influential statement, the political opportunity and political process models have been criticized on at least three fronts. First, scholars have added more and more conditions to the black box of “political opportunity structure.” As Gamson and Meyer (1996) warn, the “the concept of political opportunity structure is…in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment” (Gamson and Meyer 1996, qtd. in Meyer and Minkoff 2004:1458). In later work, McAdam (1996) lamented the imprecision with which sociologists used the term “political opportunity” in social movement

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55 Kitschelt (1986) for example, argues that political opportunity structures are “filters between the mobilization of the movement and its choice of strategies and its capacity to change the social environment” (59).
research (24). For example, Tarrow’s (1994:85) definition of political opportunities frequently appears in the literature; he sees political opportunities as “consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure.” Yet, while the formulation seems succinct, “consistent” factors of the “political environment” could encompass everything from electoral systems to political economy. The expansion of the political opportunity concept to include all factors external to social movements is perhaps the most prominent critique of the political opportunities approach. The breadth of the concept simply makes measurement impossible.

A second critique concerns the conceptualization of grievances in both resource mobilization and political opportunity perspectives. In both formulations, grievances are a pre-existing given: “[t]here is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grassroots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group” (Turner and Killian 1972, qtd. in McCarthy and Zald 1977). While McCarthy and Zald acknowledged that grievances “may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and associations” (251), they did not try to explain the mechanisms underlying grievance creation and manipulation. In their focus on resource organization, resource mobilization theories neglected to specify how collective resources actually motivate individuals from being observers to participants. For their part, in their determination to frame social movements as political struggles, political opportunity approaches overemphasized the exogenous factors affecting mobilization and underemphasized grievances.

Third, at its core, the political opportunities approach implied that social movements arise ipso facto given the right constellation of political, economic, and historical factors. It generally did not specify how political opportunities translate into collective behavior or why similar conditions of opportunity might give rise to ideologically different movements (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Social movement scholars working in the political opportunity tradition took the progressive movements of the 1960s as their case study and proceeded to detail the conditions that led to the formation of those movements post hoc. This approach identified the positive factors (demographic, economic, and political changes) that led to an already known outcome (Civil Rights, Women’s, Student movements), which gave the impression that these types of movements were inevitable, being propelled forward by a historical alignment of facilitating conditions. As Buechler (2004) suggests, “opportunity’ has become a substitute for ‘breakdown’” painted in a more positive light (61).

**Figure 5.3 Model of Political Opportunity Theories**

| Social change → resource redistribution, expanding political opportunity → social movement |

**1990s-2000s: Collective Action Frames and Contentious Politics**

By the 1990s, studies in social movements had moved away from the early structural explanations to focus on processes of mobilization. Yet, in the attempt to develop more dynamic models of collective action, comparative studies often fell back to listing structural political conditions for mobilization (Kriesi 1996) while case studies were stuck on the social movements of the 1960s. Furthermore, the focus on exogenous factors beyond the control of social movement activists or organizations overlooked the agency of actors, which, importantly, translates to their ability to construct meanings that mobilize individuals.

Led by David Snow and Robert Benford (Benford and Snow 2000; Benford 1993; Snow and Benford 1988; Snow et al. 1986), a parallel literature that focused on the processes
of meaning construction by social movement actors was developed alongside the political process model to fill this gap.

**Framing**

Out of all the various strands of social movements literature, studies of “collective action frames” most explicitly address the meaning making process of grievance construction. Speaking directly to the political process model, Benford and Snow (2000:613) point out that in frame theory “social movements are not viewed merely as carriers of extant ideas and meanings that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or existing ideologies.” On the contrary, movement actors shape and generalize grievances by drawing on collective identities to produce movement solidarity around a set of ideas. Successful movement entrepreneurs (Tarrow 1994) are those individuals who are particularly adept at recognizing political opportunities and tapping into popular frames. Thus, even if the political opportunity is there, collective mobilization may not occur without individuals or organizations capable of convincingly aggrandizing popular grievances.

Social movement scholars who examine cognitive frames are concerned with the micro-processes of “meaning work,” or how social movement organizations construct and shape group grievances into broader political claims (Snow and Benford 1988; Benford and Snow 2000). According to Benford and Snow (2000) “collective action frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (614). Social movement frames define “us” and “them,” articulate injustices, attribute blame, organize consensus, and motivate action (Gamson 1975).

Snow and Benford (1988) identify three types of “framing tasks” that every social movement must address: first, diagnostic framing refers to problem identification and blame attribution. Second, prognostic framing refers to the strategy or plan of action that should be employed to deal with the problem. Third, motivational frames involve the construction of a rationale for collective action, including movement specific rhetoric or vocabulary.

Social movement leaders in particular have a great deal of agency in the construction of framing tasks. The key to mobilization is that social movement frames have to resonate with popular cognitive frames (de Leon et al. 2009). Resonance depends on how credible the frame is and on the extent of its relevance to the target population. Credibility can be undermined if, for example, movement discourse does not match movement activity. Relevance or frame salience is increased when the social movement can appeal to a core belief, reflect everyday experience, or tap into a cultural myth. It is important to note that framing processes—diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational—take place at every stage of movement development, from initial grievance appeals, to mobilization and state challenge (see Figure 5.4).

**Figure 5.4: Model of Framing Processes**

| Social change | resource redistribution, expanding political opportunities | social movement (framing processes ongoing) |

Much like movement organizers, state actors engage in the struggle to make meaning in an effort to garner support for political agendas. The link between institutional and non-institutional politics occurs when social movement and state policy frames align. Frame alignment can produce long-term dynamic relationships between social movements and political parties, as was the case with the U.S. Democratic Party and the progressive social movements of the 1960s (Goldstone 2003). In such an instance, social movements can have a
long lasting influence on politics; indeed, they even become institutionalized as part of conventional politics. Often, however, social movements and states compete over framing and meaning-making in the public arena (Melucci 1996). In this case, the state has a distinct advantage in terms of available resources and tools for meaning making, not least of which is its influence over media outlets (Tarrow 1994). In social movement studies, the outcome of struggles between the movement and the State is usually seen as binary: movements lose to the state on the terrain of meaning making and peter out, or movements influence the state through an ongoing alliance or institutionalization, at which point the movement loses autonomy. The latter outcome, when a social movement’s demands are institutionalized into conventional politics, is the tradition view of a successful social movement (Gamson 1975; Goldstone 2003). Yet, absorption into the state, through co-optation of movement demands by a political party or changes in policy and rhetoric, is the movement’s dénouement. To illustrate this point, Meyer (1990, 1993), in his work on the anti-nuclear movement in the US, shows that once the movement won political inclusion, mobilization faded.

In contrast to political opportunity or political process approaches, framing emphasizes the dynamic micro-processes of meaning making that occur at the individual and group level. By focusing on the agency of individuals and organizations in constructing contention, framing adds a new component to McAdam’s political process model. Yet, framing studies in the 1990s and 2000s shied away from pushing the boundary between social movements and politics, preferring to focus on how framing processes engage popular discourse as opposed to political actors (see Benford and Snow 2000). In the struggles between social movements and political actors to construct grievances and groups, the object of the struggle is usually a disadvantaged or aggrieved group, which has the potential to be mobilized. Thus, framing processes provide a link from political opportunity structure to action. But studies of framing processes tend to address the relationship between the movement and the polity in terms of competition over legitimate representation of group grievances. Less acknowledged is the process through which social movements constitute political actors and vice versa.

**Contentious Politics**

By the early 2000s, the study of social movements had been wrestled away from the classical structural strain tradition to become a full-fledged subfield of sociology. Yet, the literature on what Smelser called “collective behavior” splintered into self-referential subfields. Lacking the theoretical cohesion once offered by the classical tradition, scholars studying revolutions, protests, labor movements, and ethnic violence developed their own sets of theoretical questions that were rarely in conversation with each other. Social movements research was dominated by specifications of political opportunity structures, and while framing approaches offered an interesting social constructivist alternative, the literature did not cohere into a unified theoretical approach. While the so-called “new social movements” studies shifted the subject of analysis to ideologically different issues—such the environment, health, and peace—the theoretical models remained essentially structuralist.

It was in this context that McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow (2001) made their intervention. *Dynamics of Contention* (2001) aimed to be nothing less than a synthesis of collective action perspectives. McAdam et al. criticize the structuralist social movement bias in mobilization studies. They call on researchers to broaden their view beyond social movements to include other forms of collective organizing such as revolutions, civil wars, ethnic violence, and democratization, which they classify under the umbrella term “contentious politics.” McAdam et al. define contentious politics as “episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at
least one of the claimants” (2001:5). Contentious politics can take two forms: contained and transgressive. These correspond to the traditional distinction between “conventional politics,” and “social movements” respectively. Contained contention roughly refers to the institutionalized politics taking place in the realm of elections and political parties where “all parties are previously established actors employing well established means of claim making” (2001:7).

The focus of the book, however, is on transgressive contention or contentious episodes during which “at least some parties employ innovative collective action” that “incorporates claims, selects objects of claims, includes collective self-representations, and/or adopts means that are either unprecedented or forbidden within the regime in question” (2001:8). The emphasis on political struggles outside of “conventional politics” once again frames social movements (and other forms of “transgressive” contention) as non-institutional politics. This parceling is clear in the authors’ model of mobilization. *Dynamics of Contention* proposes a dynamic framework for mobilization (2001:45) as a counter to the static mobilization model of classical social movement approaches (17). The model rightfully challenges the social movement agenda on its “check box” tendency to explain mobilization in terms of independent variables that are not placed in relation to each other.

McAdam et al.’s work emphasizes the mechanisms and processes underlying social mobilization across episodes of contention. They define mechanisms as “delimited sorts of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” that link together into processes that produce transformations (24). Three kinds of mechanisms—environmental, cognitive, and relational—subsume the various parts of the classical social movements approach. For example, external factors, such as resource availability (resource mobilization theory) and political opportunities (political process theory) become environmental mechanisms in the dynamic model. Collective action frames and cultural repertoires that connect individuals to social movements function as cognitive or relational mechanisms. And social networks (or mobilizing structures in social movement terms) between individuals and groups work as relational mechanisms. Tracing the various kinds of mechanisms at work in the process of mobilization produces a dynamic picture of collective action. The result is a meta-model of contentious politics from emergence to maturity.

The call for greater collaboration between researchers of various forms of collective behavior and the emphasis on the mechanisms and processes of mobilization was a much needed intervention in the social movements literature.

**Where Are We Now?**

After decades of research, what is the state of social movement studies? Since the 1950s, theoretical reformulations driven by broader societal changes have reshaped the study of collective action from structural explanations to progressively more nuanced theorizations on the role of resources, opportunities, and collective action frames in the process of mobilization. In abandoning the classical tradition, analysts became overwhelmingly concerned with questions of mobilization and organization. The initial explosion of studies of various forms of collective action, including social movements, created a somewhat schizophrenic collection of subfields. McAdam et al.’s synthesis, while most influential, was one of many attempts to bring together the strands of social movement theories under a common frame (Aminzade and McAdam 2001; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Goldstone 2003; Goodwin et al. 2001; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). These syntheses have provided progressively more complex models of mobilization, but as Walder (2009:399) boldly asserts, “all of this breadth and vitality…has remained within the narrowed boundaries of the defining question – how groups mobilize, or why social movements emerge.” The result is
that we know a great deal about the internal dynamics of social movement organization, from how social movements use social networks and organizations in recruitment (i.e. mobilizing structures) to how they make appeals to aggrieved groups (i.e. framing processes). We also know a great deal about how changes in policy or socioeconomic conditions can open political opportunities for social movement emergence. And lastly, we know, and can show empirically, how successful social movements have influenced policy outcomes and transformed popular and political discourses on a wide range of issues.

Despite the focus on the politics of social movements, scholars have rarely addressed the relationship between social movements and political parties. In a reflection upon their work, McAdam and Tarrow (2010, 2011) later admit their oversight of electoral politics in particular: “elections and social movements are the two major forms of political conflict in democratic systems, our inattention to the connection between the two fields was a serious lacuna in [Dynamics of Contention], as it is in the entire broad field of contentious politics” (2010:532). To go even further, political parties have been excluded from sociology in general in what de Leon et al. (2009) refer to as an “unspoken division of labor” between sociologists and political scientists (194). Put bluntly, sociologists study social movements, or non-institutionalized politics, and political scientists study party politics, or institutionalized politics. Yet, this theoretical and disciplinary division does not represent reality: social movements and political parties are deeply intertwined and mutually constitutive.

Sociologists, and social movement analysts in particular, tend to overlook political parties for two reasons. First, social movements are seen as “challengers” existing outside the normal political process, which is driven by polity “members.” This sets up a false binary of outsiders and insiders. Second, “reflection” logic frames political parties as reflections of social cleavages and/or reflections of the state. As a result of the “reflection” logic, the relationship between social movements and political parties is framed as unidirectional, with political parties emerging out of social movements but not vice versa. I discuss these critiques in detail in this section.57

1. Challengers versus Members

Social movement perspectives have tended to view movements as inherently extra-institutional. As the reasoning goes, it is this “outsider” aspect that allows social movements to be agents of social change, while political parties must remain handmaidens of the state (see Piven and Cloward 1977). The dichotomization of collective political struggles into institutional and non-institutional politics is rooted in the classical structuralist tradition that classified all forms of collective behavior as pathological in the Durkheimian sense. Because collective action was seen as a result of alienation, psychological frustration, or norm disruption, it was squarely outside of conventional politics, which occur through elections, political parties, and policy making. Even though this vision of collective action was subsequently abandoned, the separation between social movements and institutional politics persisted in theories of mobilization.

One need look no further for evidence of the separation than Tilly’s (1978) polity model that placed social movement actors as challengers. Political elites and parties were characterized as polity members due to their access to political power. The polity model was reproduced as the base model in McAdam et al.’s (2001) famous treatise (11). In Dynamics of Contention, “challengers” and “members” are once again separated (visually and analytically), with challengers driving “transgressive contention” and members driving

56 See Schattschneider (1960) for classical formulation of this perspective.
57 See de Leon et al. (2009) for a similarly structured critique. I use De Leon et al.’s organizational structure to further elaborate these points. I discuss De Leon et al.’s work in detail later in this Chapter.
“contained contention.” After distinguishing the two at the onset, McAdam et al. move on to structure the entire book around the former. Thus, the explicit focus on the polity/state as the subject of claim-making relegated “contained contention” to a secondary role. Transgressive, or non-institutionalized, politics are front and center, while political elites only appear as the subjects of claims, resources for challenger groups, or aspects of broader environmental mechanisms. Political parties are theorized only insofar as they facilitate or block challenges from social interests or produce divisions among the political elite, which alters the political environment. The irony of the book is that with all of its emphasis on mechanisms and dynamism, the “polity” appears static and remains outside of the dynamic process of mobilization.

The binary—social movements or political parties—is embedded in the very definition of social movements itself. Snow, Soule, and Kriesi (2004) define social movements as: “collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part” (12, added emphasis). Gamson (1975) described social movements as outsider groups. Katzenstein (1998:195) is even more blunt when she claims that “social movements…are necessarily extrastitutional” (qtd. in Goldstone 2003:1). Tarrow (1994:9) slightly softens the line between movements and conventional politics when he defines social movements as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.” But Tarrow then goes on to say that “[m]ovements characteristically mount contentious challenges through disruptive direct action against elites, authorities, other groups, or cultural codes,” which once again reinforces the notion of social movements as challengers and political parties as members (added emphasis). The conceptualization of social movements as outsiders, challengers, unconventional, or transgressive, as opposed to part of the institutionalized political process is the structuralist vision repeated in different terms.

Recent studies have acknowledged that social movements and institutionalized politics often overlap, with social movements influencing political parties’ discourses and political parties relying on social movements for support. Again, the relationship between the progressive social movements of the 1960s and the Democratic Party in the United States is a prime example. Goldstone (2003) and collaborators challenged the non-institutionalized vs. institutionalized divide. They call on researchers to stop treating politics and social movements as separate:

We can no longer treat institutionalized politics in the realm of elections and parties as somehow primary and the noninstitutionalized actions of social movements acting from outside the polity as merely an effort to influence the former’s decisions. The very existence, actions, and structure of institutionalized political actors are permeated by social movement activity on an ongoing basis. Understanding how social movements give rise to parties, shape political alignments, and interact with normal political institutions has become essential to comprehending political dynamics (12).

Goldstone’s challenge is a move in the right direction. However, the volume stops short of challenging the assumption that social movements, as opposed to political parties, are necessarily the agents of social change. Furthermore, the language of “overlap” or “permeation” still implies that movements and parties develop in separate spheres, only merging occasionally when social movements need political elites for resources (financial and cultural) or when political elites need the support of social movements to push through a political agenda (I return to these points in the following sections).
2. Reflection Logic

It would be wrong to say that political parties were never discussed in sociology. An important text for both sociology and political science, Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* does extensively discuss them. This work is a departure from Lipset’s earlier class analysis approach (Lipset 1960). Whereas in *Political Man*, Lipset saw parties and party systems as a “democratic translation of the class struggle” (Lipset 1960:220), in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, Lipset and Rokkan expand beyond class analysis to include non-class based cleavages. The authors draw on pluralist theories to assert that there is an elective affinity between societal cleavages, or collective group interests, and political parties. The primary social cleavages are territorial—urban/rural and center/periphery—and functional—church/state and capital/labor. Voting blocs, and thus political parties, are organized on the basis of these primary cleavages. The formation of social cleavages is not problematized, as they are assumed to be an inherent natural feature of modern societies. From this perspective, it follows that the relationship between political parties and social cleavages is not problematic, because, to be elected, political parties must align with these primary cleavages. Once formed, social divisions tend to ossify for long periods of time, such that “the party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structure of the 1920s” (1967:50; original emphasis).

Lipset’s (1960) and Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) work came to represent the “sociological approach” to the study of political parties (Chen and Mudge, forthcoming). However, two original insights of the studies were subsequently forgotten: first, that political parties do not just spring up from social cleavages or movements, and second, that political parties serve an “expressive function” of translating social demands into political demands. Instead, the simplified version, in which political parties appear as passive actors reflecting societal demands, grew to dominate mainstream sociological thinking. In this reductionist sociological approach, political parties do not have a role in shaping social interests, cleavages, or identities. Thus, political parties may absorb pressures “from below” but are not themselves the agents of social change.

Social movement studies pertaining to grievances also exhibit the “reflection hypothesis.” In mobilization theories, grievances are assumed to be natural and pre-existing, lying dormant until the right set of socioeconomic conditions creates an opportunity for a social movement to mobilize them. Frame theories have articulated the relationship between grievance construction and social movements, but because grievances and cleavages are presumed to exist prior to political organization, the question of how and why people become aggrieved in the first place and the role that political parties—not just social movements—play in that process has not received proper attention. Among other shortcomings, the tendency to regard political parties as reflective of social cleavages and social movements as reflective of grievances leaves little theoretical space for analyzing the role of political parties and social movements in interest and identity articulation (de Leon et al. 2009:199).

In turn, the reflection assumption has led to unidirectional causal thinking: parties are regarded as the outcome of social movements rather than the agents of those movements (see Figure 5). For example, in his critique, Goldstone (2003) insists that social movement scholars end the analytical separation between institutionalized and non-institutionalized politics. He puts forward the claim that “social movements constitute an essential part of

58 Sartori’s (1976) book *Parties and Party Systems* and Duverger’s (1954) text on *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* are foundational texts in the study of political parties. However, because they both deal primarily with the relationship between electoral systems and party systems, as opposed to the relationship between social interests and political parties, I do not focus on them here.

59 I borrow the phrase “reflection hypothesis” from de Leon et al. (forthcoming).
normal politics” (2003:2) so that “[m]ovements shape parties, sometimes produce parties, often cooperate with parties, and sometimes suggest potential avenues for party action” (24). While, Goldstone’s critique is a move in the right direction, there remains the underlying assumption, driven by reflection logic, that political parties are influenced by or are the outcomes of social movements and not vice versa. To demonstrate this point, the additional articles in Goldstone’s edited volume include titles such as: “Parties out of Movements” (Glenn 2003) and “From Movement to Party to Government” (Desai 2003).60 Thus, even in the explicit attempt to challenge the longstanding social movement/political party binary, the lingering image of political parties and social movements as developing in separate and rarely overlapping spheres, remains.

To summarize, political parties have played a secondary role in sociological analysis due to: (1) the intellectual development of social movement and political sociology theories that explicitly and implicitly separated society from the state and social movement from political parties, and (2) the prevalence of reflection logic that stems from structural-functionalist conceptions of the relationship between social interests and political parties. As a result of the latter, when the causal connection between political parties and social movements is made, it is unidirectional from social movement to political party. Political sociologists see political parties as part of the state: they carry out state tasks, struggle over state resources, and when pushed by social pressure from below, they respond to social movement demands by absorbing social change. This view of political parties as merged with the state is deeply influenced by the Weberian, and particularly Michelsian (1962[1915]), conception that modern bureaucratic states have oligarchic party tendencies. If a movement morphs into a political party to become part of the state, its original value driven goals will be muted in the face of bureaucratic organization. Inevitably, the party will become disconnected from society in pursuit of bureaucratic power.

Thus what we are still missing is a reformulation of the relationship between the social and political in which political parties are analyzed as social agents capable of shaping grievances, constructing identities, and even (re)organizing social movements. In examining the relationship between social movements and political parties, it is not enough to leave the former for sociologists and the latter for political scientists or to assume that political parties are Michelsian agents of the state. Doing so overlooks the processes through which political parties shape social reality, produce social cleavages, and connect social groups to the state (de Leon et al. 2009).

Figure 5.5: Reflection Logic Chains

Cleavage → grievance → social movement → political party (→ state)

Where We Are Going: Political Articulation and Field Theories

More than forty year ago, Giovanni Sartori (1969) implored sociologists to not take for granted the relationship between party systems and social cleavages:

As long as we take for granted that cleavages are reflected in, not produced by, the political system itself, we necessarily neglect to ask to what extent conflicts and

60 Desai’s (2003) essay complicates the relationship between political parties and societal interests by showing how the same political party implemented different social policies in India’s Kerala and West Bengal regions, which lends support to the notion that political parties can be relatively autonomous actors (also see (Desai 2006; Przeworski 1985). But Desai’s analysis emphasizes how political parties can become path-dependent given certain conditions, which are beyond the party’s control. In later work, Desai (2006) argues that political parties must continue to maintain a movement character to implement change.
cleavages may either be channeled, deflected and repressed or, vice versa, activated and reinforced, precisely by the operations and operators of the political system (209). Yet, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, sociological studies remained silent on the topic of how political parties, as the so-called “operators” of the political system, produce cleavages and influence social movements. To borrow Sartori’s language, sociologists turned away from examining the “producers” (political parties) to focusing the “sellers” (voters). Since Lipset (1960) and Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) work, the sociological approach to studying politics addressed social movements and the state, forgetting that it is political parties that have the task of connecting the social to the political. Defining political parties as “socially constitutive” organizations that do the work of bringing together various groups under a collective will (Tugal et al., forthcoming), means that political parties not only influence social movements (and vice versa), but also that parties play an active role in organizing and articulating interests and identities. Rather than focusing exclusively on how social movements affect parties, sociologists should turn the logic of inquiry in the opposite direction. Namely, to address this lacunae, sociologists must examine a) the conditions under which political parties become the agents of mobilization, that is, when political parties form in conjunction with social movements, b) how political parties facilitate social movement development, and c) the mechanisms through which parties articulate identities.

Some scholars have taken up the task of redefining and retheorizing the social role of political parties. In a review of sociological theories of political parties, Chen and Mudge (forthcoming, 2013) note that sociological attention to parties has been “hourglass” shaped: moving from a vibrant literature in the 1960s, to near eclipse in the 1970s and 1980s, and a recent revival starting in the 1990s. Chen and Mudge trace the renewed interest in political parties in sociology as occurring in conjunction with a “sociological turn” among students of American politics in the mid 1990s. Political scientists picked up on the insights of the classical sociological approach that asserted the importance of organized societal interests in structuring parties’ ideological concerns. Led by a group of political scientists at UCLA, these studies reexamine the relationship between social cleavages and political alignments and question the rational choice view of parties as working purely out of self-interest for reelection (Chen and Mudge, forthcoming:15). While political scientists began to draw on sociology to rethink the class basis of American political parties, sociologists have only recently reasserted explicit interest in the relationship between political parties and social movements.

Only in the last five years, has the “hourglass” begun to widen. Moving closer toward specifying the relationship between movements and parties that reaches beyond the challenger vs. member or noninstitutionalized vs. institutionalized dichotomies, studies have shown how social movements achieve changes in public policy by introducing issues to the political agenda (Halfmann 2011). Emphasizing the role of social networks in merging movements and parties, scholars have also studied how movement activists become political actors (Diani and McAdam 2003; McAdam 1982; Schwartz 2006). Others have analyzed the political practices social movements use to achieve political goals. Jansen (2011), for example, proposes that through examining populist mobilization, scholars can better understand “the role of political parties in representing and (re)producing social and political cleavages” (76). And whereas some social movement scholars acknowledged the autonomous role of parties in influencing movements (Costain and McFarland 1998; Goldstone 2003, 2004), the analytical focus remained on the social movement, positioning parties as mediating actors.

Gramscian Stance: Political Articulation

One path of inquiry that has widened the theoretical hourglass is the “articulation
perspective” first put forth by de Leon, Tugal, and Desai (2009) and developed in the authors’ later work (forthcoming) reverses unidirectional movement-party logic to argue that, under certain conditions, parties can articulate social groups and individual identities. Drawing on Gramsci, Laclau, and Althusser, the authors emphasize the “socially creative role of parties” to focus “on the ways on which parties integrate collective identities, coalitions, and institutions into taken-for-granted social orders” (de Leon et al. forthcoming: 2-3).

Political articulation is defined as “the process through which party practices naturalize class, ethnic, and racial formations as a basis of social division by integrating disparate interests and identities into coherent sociopolitical blocs.” (de Leon et al. 2009:194-195, original emphasis). This means that political parties do the work of structuring social interests, cleavages, and identities into political aggregates. According to this argument, it is not the case that specific social divisions or cleavages have an affinity to a particular political ideology. In other words, political parties actively manipulate social divisions and identities through the process of articulation rather than reflecting those social divisions (see Chen and Mudge, forthcoming for a summary).

The articulation approach intervenes and expands upon the existing literature in three analytical moves. The first analytical move is to give primacy to the political in investigating the relationship between social interests and parties, which means problematizing “the primacy and autonomy of the social” in producing political parties (de Leon, Desai, and Tuğal, forthcoming:1). This assertion resonates with literature in the state-centered school that emphasized state autonomy (Evans et al. 1985). As already mentioned, however, these earlier approaches reduced political parties to state, which allowed researchers to overlook political parties as objects of analysis. The articulation approach partially autonomizes political parties as organizational actors, reducing them neither to state nor society. Once the assumption of political autonomy is in place, the second move is to counter the unidirectional movement-party logic. Following other scholars who challenged the movement-party binary (Goldstone 2003; Manza and Brooks 1999; Sartori 1969), de Leon et al. (2009) view political parties not as reflections but as producers of social cleavages, such that parties articulate grievances and interpellate individuals in various ways: particularly in terms of class, ethnic, or gender identities. As de Leon et al. (forthcoming) assert, “a key assumption of our approach…is that ethnoreligious, economic, demographic and gender differences among others have no natural political valence of their own, and thus do not, on their own steam, predispose mass electorates to do anything” (2). From this follows the third analytical step that moves beyond asserting an autonomous role for the political and reversing unidirectional causality: as social agents, articulation theory states, “political parties, leaders and organization, through their rhetorical, institutional, and organizational practices, partially create society” (forthcoming: 1, original emphasis). This assertion goes further than Goldstone’s (2003) intervention. Whereas Goldstone acknowledged that political parties often shape, influence, and align with social movements, the articulation perspective gives more agency to political parties in engineering the social basis of mobilization by “suturing” elements of the social together.

It is important to note that the articulation argument refers to specific types of political parties: “integral” and “traditional”:

[O]ur focus is not merely on ‘traditional’ parties whose sole purpose is to win elections, though obviously such parties are ubiquitous and may even be the most pervasive kind. Rather, our focus here is more broadly on what we call ‘ethical’ or ‘integral’ parties, whose overarching objective is to inaugurate a new social order. (forthcoming: 3)

This is a key distinction, because it allows for the analytical division that separates mass parties that work as electoral machines but are perhaps ideologically empty from challenger
parties that arguably must work harder to organize the bases of social support around an ideology. For example, in post-Soviet countries the party system is particularly vulnerable to domination by ideologically empty political parties, which are organized for the sole purpose of winning elections and retaining power. Such parties are able to mobilize massive financial and administrative resources during electoral campaigns, but do not have a clear ideological core. In other words, they do very little of the “suturing” work to connect social groups to the political.

To summarize, the political articulation view provides an innovative theoretical approach for investigating the role of political parties as creative social organizers. In addition, it moves beyond the idea that parties inevitably rely on institutionalized strategies to garner support. Rather, political parties must sometimes maintain a social movement character (Desai 2006) to bring together various social interests and to mobilize those interests toward political ends. It is in this sense that political parties can be reimagined as social agents tasked with the organizational work of mobilizing social groups. The articulation perspective’s challenge to the social movement and political sociology literatures is clear: sociologists must reincorporate political parties into the study of social movements, not as mediators, resources, or dependent variables, but as active creative agents in the processes of social mobilization.

The articulation perspective’s challenge opens the door for new questions in the sociology of political parties and social movements. However, aside from the authors’ own work (Desai 2003, 2006; de Leon 2008, 2011; Tuğal 2009), empirical application of the framework to other historical and contemporary cases is still lacking. While the authors begin to specify how processes of articulation develop (or fail to develop) across different contexts, the framework is contingent on a small set of case studies in Turkey, India, and the nineteenth century US. And because the authors focus on a specific type of party—the integral party—the relationship between such parties and traditional parties or even between integral parties and established social movements remains unclear. What seems to be missing in the articulation approach is a theorization of the specific contextual conditions that shape the various forms of political organizing. In other words, what is missing is a framework that could account for why political movements take on particular organizational forms and develop along an institutional or non-institutional path, or a combination of both. Because, as I will argue, the separation (or overlap) of institutional and non-institutional politics is not a given, but rather the outcome of specific conditions, namely, the structure of the political field and the state.

Field Theory of Social Movements and Political Parties

The “new” sociology of political parties, including the articulation perspective, is moving research in the right direction: sociologists are beginning to analyze and theorize how political parties can influence social movements, not just vice versa. While these studies are invaluable for progressing the sociological knowledge of the relationship between parties and movements, a set of questions remain unanswered. First, previous studies have shown that political parties sometimes act like social movements, meaning that they use non-institutional strategies to mobilize support. Integral political parties, a la de Leon et al. (forthcoming), as well as challenger parties both fit this category. But, what remains unclear is why some political parties at certain times look more like social movements and use movement like organizational strategies, which may actually harm the party’s political legitimacy. Second, the traditional view of movements as outsider challengers and parties as insider members should be viewed not as an underlying assumption, but rather as an outcome to be explained. Movements and parties may indeed develop separately from each other, and movements may also primarily influence parties and not vice versa, but I propose that this is true only in a
particular political context. Thus, as opposed to taking the movement/party dichotomy for granted, scholars’ work should be to examine the conditions under which movements and parties develop in particular ways.

There is evidence of an emerging consensus among social movement scholars that parties and movements are complementary forms of political organization, most likely to coalesce in democratic (or open) societies. Goldstone (2004), for example, argued that social movements will become increasingly ubiquitous with the diffusion of democratic institutions: “[a]s democracy spreads, social movements – even more violent movements – seem more, not less, likely to emerge and engage in contentious politics” (2004:336, original emphasis). Goldstone goes on to posit that in democratic societies, “it may be the ability of groups to combine both protest and conventional tactics for influencing government actors that best conduces to movement success” (340). The solution to rethinking the old challenger-member conceptualization, according to Goldstone, is to replace the diluted idea of “political opportunity structure” with the notion of an external relational field. Using Goldstone’s intervention as a starting point, I draw on recent work that has sought to further develop a field approach to the study of social movements to specify the conditions under which movements and parties are likely to develop as either mutually dependent or alternative forms of mobilization.

I propose that two key components structure the form and strategies of political movements: state openness to challengers and field structuration. After defining these components, which I see as continuous axes, I formulate theoretical propositions regarding the type of political movements likely to emerge in each set of circumstances. I then use the case of radical right wing parties to demonstrate how this framework can be useful for understanding the emergence and development of challenger parties and movements in Europe and the US.

**Fields Defined**

In a general sense, a field is a meso-level social order in which actors, collective and individual, orient their actions vis-à-vis one another (Fligstein 2001). The use of the field concept in sociology is relatively new (see Martin 2003 for a review), but elements of field thinking have appeared in the literature since the early 1980s. For example, public policy domains (Laumann and Knoke 1987), societal sectors (Scott and Meyer 1983), and organizational fields (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) all refer to an organizational environment that structures interactions between actors. Explicit formulation of the field concept in sociological theory is most closely associated with Bourdieu, who defined it as “a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:97).

For Bourdieu, a field is analogous to a game in which actors compete for the particular stakes in that field along a set of rules that are defined through actors’ continuous

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61 Goldstone lists the following characteristics of external relational fields: “external fields include (at a minimum): (1) other movements and counter-movements that may compete for attention and resources, or provide reinforcement and alliances, or engage in direct competition or conflict with the movement; (2) political and economic institutions (and their history) that provide the framework in which movements recruit, act, and seek responses; (3) various levels of state authorities and political actors (including political parties and civil and military officials) whose responses to the movement and its actions affect its development and outcomes; (4) various elites – economic, political, religious, media – whose interests, capacities, and actions affect movement development and its outcomes; (5) various publics whose interests, capacities, and actions affect movement development and its outcomes; (6) symbolic and value orientations available in society that condition the reception and response to movement claims and actions; and (7) critical events – such as wars, economic crises, or incidents of violence or outcomes of specific episodes of confrontation. It is the relations among these elements of the external field – both relations among them and of them to movement claims and actions – that appear to shape movement dynamics” (Goldstone 2004:357).
interaction. Here, rules refer to largely implicit understanding about what types of actions are possible, available, and legitimate. The range of available actions to a particular actor (collective or individual) varies based on that actor’s position in the field: fields have the effect of producing differentiation among actors into dominant and dominated groups. Dominant groups, or incumbents, aim to maintain the rules of interaction that benefit them, while dominated groups, or challengers, struggle to improve their field position by changing the rules. Actors in the field are thus aware of their own position and the position of others. In other words, “they know who their friends, their enemies, and their competitors are because they know who occupies those roles in the field” (Fligstein and McAdam 2011:4). The stakes of each field are also relationally determined through actors’ continued interaction: they can be economic, political, or cultural resources. In sum, for Bourdieu, a field is characterized by relational action, struggle to define the stakes and rules of the game, and power differentiation between actors (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Bourdieu’s key insight was that relational forces resulting from interaction between actors shape how these actors act, and in the case of collective actors or organizations, how they are structured.

In the most cohesive attempt to formulate a field theory of collective action, Fligstein and McAdam (2011, 2012) argue that the fundamental units of analysis for both schools of thought are neither “organizations” nor “social movements,” which are often reified categories, but “strategic action fields” (SAFs). An SAF is “a meso-level social order where actors (who can be individual or collective) interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the field, the relationships in the field (including who has power and why), and the field’s rules” (Fligstein and McAdam 2011:3). The authors conceive of all SAFs as structured by other overlapping and encompassing SAFs, much like stacked Russian dolls that open to reveal additional dolls inside (2011). In other words, all field are nested (Fligstein and McAdam 2012:60).

Fligstein and McAdam’s formulation differs from Bourdieu’s field notion in three ways. First, unlike Bourdieu’s formulation, which downplays actors’ ability to manipulate field structure or rules, Fligstein and McAdam emphasize how collective or individual actors can create identities, frames, and rules to shape the field in their favor. Particularly skilled social actors that are able to convince others to follow their agenda can create political coalitions and alter power dynamics. This ability is particularly valuable during unstable moments, such as field emergence or transformation. Second, whereas Bourdieu mainly described the effects of existing or stable fields, Fligstein and McAdam theorize how fields emerge (2011:11-13; 2012:86): “unorganized spaces becomes organized through a crescive social process akin to a social movement” (2011:11). This stage is particularly important for

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62 Fligstein (2001) emphasizes that field rules are also relational: “rules of each field are unique and embedded in the power relations between groups; they function as ‘local knowledge’” (109).

63 One problem with Bourdieu’s formulation is the issue of field measurement. Bourdieu states that a field can only be measured by its effects and that the limits of the field are defined by where its effects cease to exist (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Because the notion of a field conjures up the idea of a magnetic field with clear effects but no clearly visible boundaries, there is a danger of attributing otherwise unexplainable effects to a field, which may not exist in the social world (Martin 2003). To further complicate the problem of field measurement, Bourdieu does not equate networks between actors in the field as constituting the field itself. For him, a field cannot be measured directly, which means that networks are manifestations of the field, or a product of the field effect but not the field itself (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:114). The measurement issue leads to a set of questions about how to determine when a field has emerged, stabilized, or dissolved. Fligstein and McAdam (2011, 2012) address the issue of field evolution, but I do not focus on it here.

64 “[S]ocial skill can be defined as how individuals or collective actors possess a highly developed cognitive capacity for reading people and environments, framing lines of action, and mobilizing people in the service of these action ‘frames’” (Fligstein and McAdam 2011:7).
understanding how challenger political movements mobilize, construct collective identities, and exploit (or fail to exploit) political opportunities. The processes that take place during field emergence—the struggles between various actors to define the legitimate action, stakes, and rules of the field—subsequently determine the structure of the field, possibilities for coalitions and alliances, and the strategies that actors will use to pursue their goals.

Lastly, Fligstein and McAdam contend that groups (formal and informal organizations), in addition to individuals, are primary actors in fields. This contradicts and complicates Bourdieu’s vision of fields as consisting solely of individual actors, because unlike individual actors groups, face both external and internal struggles. They compete with other groups and at the same time must work to maintain their own organizational cohesion (2011:19-20). The emphasis on agency, field emergence, and collective actors, make Fligstein and McAdam’s formulation well suited for understanding how organizational actors (political parties and movements) develop their strategies and organizational forms in relation to one another, and the conditions under which parties and movements develop simultaneously as mutually constitutive social actors. I use the term field interchangeably with SAF.

Fields have the following characteristics:
1. Fields are nested in other fields
2. Fields contain collective and individual actors
3. Fields are relational: interactions between actors define the rules of the field, including the range of possible action

In particular, I focus on field emergence because it is in this phase that alliances and coalitions are made between political actors which then determine the development and form of the political movement: during field emergence, the structure of the field and actors’ positions (incumbents or challengers) are defined as actors compete to set the rules and stakes of the field

Movements and Parties in the Political Field

How does field thinking help overcome the party/movement dichotomy? Parties and movements are political organizations (or collective actors) that seek to influence the state. More generally, one could refer to challenger parties and social movements as political movements. Depending on which field actors win the struggle for legitimate representation and the structure of the political field itself, a political movement can take either an institutional (political party) or non-institutional form (social movement), or both can develop as mutually constitutive political actors.

A brief example is useful to illustrate this point. Following the financial crisis of 2007, two movements emerged in the United States: the Tea Party and the Occupy Movement. Both formed outside of institutional politics: the Tea Party was right-wing movement organized by citizens’ groups in response to Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential election (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Occupy, or Occupy Wall Street, was a left-wing social movement that evolved as a response to the Obama’s administration’s bailout of the failing financial industry. But whereas the Tea Party essentially became a radical wing of the Republican Party after successfully running candidates for office, Occupy remained outside of institutional politics. In other words, one evolved into an institutional actor while the other

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Amenta et al. (2010:288) define political social movements “as actors and organizations seeking to alter power deficits and to effect social transformations through the state by mobilizing regular citizens for sustained political action.” In this definition, they include challenger SMOs that rely on both non-institutional (protests, civil disobedience) and institutional (lobbying, law suits, press conferences) forms of collective action. This definition is close to my use of “political movements” but with one distinction: I use the terms to refer to nascent political actors, which may take the form of either a party or social movement.
pursued non-institutional strategies. The reverse could have easily occurred: Occupy could have become a left wing of the Democratic Party by following a similar path as the Tea Party. Field logic suggests that the Tea Party followed one path and Occupy another because different frames, propagated by specific actors, won over enough support to direct each movement toward institutional or non-institutional goals. To understand why Occupy remained a non-institutional actor and the Tea Party did not, one would have to analyze the power dynamics between the social actors involved at the onset of the movement: their connections to other groups/individuals (social networks), the resources they had at their disposal, and the cultural frames they used to garner support for their vision of the movement.

The Tea Party and Occupy example demonstrates that a new political movement is not locked into a path of an institutional or non-institutional action. The outcome is dependent on the power struggles between field actors to define the movement’s goals, strategies, and structure.

The form an emerging political movement takes depends on the structure of the political field in which the movement develops. In a political field, actors compete to claim the legitimate rights of representation of social groups. In this struggle, actors face competition from other groups/individuals in the field: political parties, social movement organizations, and other organized groups (formal and informal). The receptiveness or openness of the state toward challenger groups shapes the range of available strategies, coalitions, and alliances in a political field and the range of institutional or non-institutional politics available to them (protests, civil disobedience, lobbying). In addition, highly structured and unstructured fields produce a different set of possibilities for challengers. I propose that these two elements—field structuration and state openness—shape the forms and strategies of emerging political movements. Figure 5.6 displays this framework.

**Figure 5.6 Political Fields, the State, and Challenger Movements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State openness to challengers</th>
<th>Low (closed)</th>
<th>High (open)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td>Autarky</td>
<td>Firm line between institutional and non-institutional politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Challenges are difficult or unlikely</td>
<td>Institutional influence (alliances, coalitions, mergers) is possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td>Non-institutional challenges are possible but short lived</td>
<td>Soft line between institutional and non-institutional politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional influence is unlikely</td>
<td>Bricolage of organizational forms and strategies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*State openness* refers to the democratization of state institutions, polity structure, and electoral rules and procedures (Amenta et al. 2010). This includes electoral systems (majoritarian/proportional), electoral volatility (Pederson 1979), and regime type

In Bourdieu’s terms, actors seek to monopolize the means of symbolic violence.

Such groups can include citizens’ groups that organize protests against neighborhood development projects, non-governmental organizations, and advocacy groups.
(democracy/autarky). An open state is characterized by a multi-party proportional representation system, direct access to state institutions through institutionalized means (direct petitioning, freedom of speech and assembly), and in democratizing countries with unstable democracies, high electoral volatility. All the elements of state openness are continuous rather than disparate concepts. The degree of state openness influences the range of possible actions, forms, and strategies, or “repertoires,” available to political movements. To take the Tea Party example, if a political movement similar to the Tea Party had emerged in a country with a multi-party system, as opposed to the United States’ winner-take-all system, it would have likely become an independent party as opposed to a wing of an existing political party.

Social movement scholars have discussed state openness as part of the political opportunity structure, particularly when analyzing the outcomes of social movements (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995). For example, Kriesi et al. (1995) argued that in more open polities with strong state capacities, challenger movements are more likely to achieve proactive, as opposed to reactive, results. While the meaning of what constitutes political opportunities became diluted over the past decades, there is no doubt that state institutions do, in fact, influence the range of possible strategies and forms of political movements. As Amenta and Caren (2004) point out, research frameworks using the strong/weak and open/closed dichotomies, while useful for comparative studies, have not been able to account for the development of different types of political movements in the same state. But, there is general scholarly agreement that “longstanding characteristics of states and political institutions influence the prospects of challenges generally and encourage certain forms and strategies, but do not completely determine them” (471).

Field structuration refers to the degree of field stability. In a stable field, actors’ positions are well known to the other actors in the field: actors know which groups/individuals are more influential or powerful, who their friends and enemies are, and the range of possible actions. In other words, actors’ positions in the field are well defined, as are the rules of interaction. This type of field is highly structured. Actors’ worldviews, visions, and understanding of the rules and stakes in the field are deeply cognitively embedded as common sense understandings. Interactions between field actors are ongoing, as in a repeated game. In highly structured fields, change is incremental rather than revolutionary or transformative: it is difficult for challengers to enact changes to the established field structure or worldviews, because incumbents (the dominant actors) will work to reinforce the status quo (Fliqstein and McAdam 2011, 2012). In the United States, for example, the political field in national politics is characterized by high structuration: the two major political parties dominate the political debate and the winner-take-all electoral system prevents new challengers from instigating transformative changes; rather, challengers are either pushed out in the electoral process or are absorbed into the Democratic or Republican party (as was the case with the Tea Party).

In contrast, an unorganized or unstructured political field is murkier: actors may not know who is allied with whom, which groups/individuals are more powerful than others, or the rules of the game. Emergent fields are characterized by lower structuration. Fliqstein and McAdam (2011) define emergent fields “as a social space where rules do not yet exist, but where actors, by virtue of emerging, dependent interests, are being forced increasingly to take one another into account in their actions” (11). At the extreme, of course, an unstructured

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68 This is similar to Bourdieu’s notion of doxa, where processes of field reproduction dominate interaction between actors (Bourdieu 1977).

69 Unlike Fliqstein and McAdam (2011, 2012), I do not aim to account for field emergence. Rather, the framework here uses the field concept to sketch out the conditions under which challenger political movements may take institutional or non-institutional routes or both.
field ceases to be a field and becomes unorganized social space. The difference between an unstructured or emergent field and unorganized social space is that in a field, actors orient their actions toward one another, even if actors’ roles are not yet clearly defined. In unstructured fields, particularly adept actors have the greatest opportunity to influence the power structure of the field. For example, political fields in Eastern Europe countries were in flux after the collapse of socialism: as the incumbent political elites were delegitimized, many new political parties and movements emerged to fill the political void. At first, it was unclear which political actors would replace the old elite. Over time, some parties dissipated and others gained support. The lines between the dominated and dominant actors thickened. In other words, the political field became more structured and stable as the positions of field actors became better defined.

Together, state openness and field structuration, shape the range of possible organizational forms and strategies available to political challengers.

Proposition 1: New political movements are unlikely to emerge in a highly structured political field within a closed polity.

The upper left quadrant of Figure 6 represents this outcome. At the extreme left of the openness continuum, a completely closed state would be an autarky. North Korea is perhaps one of the few examples of a contemporary autocratic regime. In the twentieth century, the Soviet Union was the prime example of an autarky. Some contemporary states, while not pure autarkies, have autocratic tendencies: the Russian Federation, while economically more open than its predecessor, has moved towards more restrictive political policies by limiting party competition, restricting press freedoms, and moving appointing officials that were once elected. In closed polities, the political field is likely to be highly structured as well. In Russia, for example, it is clear that Putin’s United Russia Party is the most powerful political actor that also has access to the means of state violence. The challenger political parties must cater to the rules set out by United Russia and Putin or face potential repression. Non-institutional challenges are also met with repression or they peter out without any state response. Thus, it is unlikely that any political movement, political party, or social movement, will be able to gather enough momentum, because it would be very limited by state institutions, powerful incumbents, and lack of existing repertoires of action to draw on.

Proposition 2: New political movements in a less structured political field within a closed polity will be short lived. Challengers are more likely to be non-institutional actors.

A less structured or unstable political field coupled with a closed polity presents limited opportunities for challenger movements. As previously mentioned, in closed polities, challengers are likely to be turned down or prevented from entering institutional politics completely by powerful incumbents. Challengers may also face violent repression. Yet, if the political field is less structured or in flux, savvy social actors can maneuver to convince other challenger groups to mobilize but only up to a limit. If the state is highly autarkic, even the most skilled actors are unlikely to gain entry into institutional politics. For this reason,

70 Fligstein and McAdam (2011) draw the difference between unorganized social space and emergent fields: “SAFs are stable when they have role structures that are based on either hierarchical incumbent/challenger structures or political coalitions. Unorganized social space, on the contrary, is characterized by the frequent entry and exit of organizations, no stable social relationships, and no agreement on means and ends. This kind of drift or conflict can go on for long periods of time” (12; original emphasis).
challenges are more likely to arise from social, as opposed to political, actors. They may coalesce around specific issues of injustice but without response from state actors, these coalitions will likely dissipate quickly.

**Proposition 3:** New political movements in a highly structured political field within an open polity are likely to be non-institutional actors, but with a high likelihood of alliance, influence, and even merger with institutional actors. Non-institutional movements have a high chance of influencing political incumbents but lower chances of entering institutional politics.

This is the traditional view of movements and parties as separate political actors with access to different repertoires of action. I propose that this interpretation of movements and parties is context specific. Political challenges are most likely to come from non-institutional actors in an open polity with a highly structured (or stable) political field. The United States is a good example of such an outcome. The United States’ political field is highly structured: the incumbents are well defined and institutional politics are difficult to penetrate by outside actors. But the state is open to societal challenges: individuals have the right of assembly, the press is relatively free, electoral rules and procedures (while more restrictive than in other Western democracies) allow for relatively free and fair democratic elections, and the state’s ability to use repressive force is limited by democratic due process.

Challengers will find it difficult to break through via the electoral route, and if they do (as some Tea Party candidates have done), their ability to alter power dynamics will be highly restricted. For this reason, challengers will see better outcomes if they seek to influence institutional politics rather than entering them directly. Because social movement theories developed during the era of progressive social movements in the United States, the conclusions they reached took for granted the separation of non-institutional and institutional politics. But in fact, I argue that this separation is due to the specific structure of the U.S. political field and state institutions. For example, if the political system in the United States was more open to new political parties, the Civil Rights Movement may have evolved into a separate political party rather than remaining outside of institutional politics as an ally of the Democratic Party. But this outcome was not within the range of possibilities: U.S. political institutions and the highly structured political field encourage challenges from outside institutional politics.

**Proposition 4:** New political movements in a less structured political field within an open polity are most likely to be mutually constitutive with a high likelihood of overlap. The boundaries between institutional and non-institutional actors are blurry: challengers are likely to use both institutional and non-institutional strategies and to exhibit both party and movement characteristics.

In an open state with a less organized political field, new political actors have the greatest freedom to maneuver. Such a situation can arise when the political field is unstable or emerging. Because in less structured fields, actors’ positions are still in flux, social actors

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71 The Civil Rights Movement is the most significant example of social movement influence on institutional politics. Other movements have been far less successful in changing policies and political discourse. The more recent Occupy Movement was not able to achieve any significant results in policy or political agenda. It did, however, bring the issue of inequality into the political dialogue.

72 There are important differences between emergent and unstable fields (see Fligstein and McAdam 2011). I do not draw out those differences here, because my main point of comparison is between structured (stable) and unstructured (unstable, emergent) fields.
have a wide range of possible actions as they compete to claim the dominant positions in the field. In the context of an unstructured political field paired with a state open to challenges, new political movements have a good chance at not only influencing institutional politics, as is the case in highly structured political fields, but of entering as well.

In unstructured political fields within open states, organizational forms and strategies are fluid. Whereas in a structured field, alliances or coalitions are already set, in an unstructured field, they are still in the process of being formed. The same is true for the range of action available to each field actor, which is determined by that actor’s position (challenger or incumbent) in the field. In a structured field, the available repertoire of action is limited by the actor’s position in the hierarchy. For example, it is difficult to imagine the Republican Party in the United States organizing a sit-in to protest the election of Barack Obama or passage of healthcare reform. Political parties would risk delegitimization if they were to act like social movements. The same is true for social movement organizations or individual activists who “abandon” their movement roots to pursue entry into politics. This means that to retain one’s position in a stable field, actors must act in line with their position or risk supporters’ defection.

In an unstructured field, social actors are freer to pick and choose forms of organizing that suit the political context. This results in an organizational “bricolage” wherein the line between institutional and non-institutional actors is blurred. Socially skilled actors are especially valuable in this context. Every political field contains a variety of organizational actors (political parties, social movement organizations, civil society groups) and repertoires of action (protests, demonstrations, lobbying, electoral politics). But because in an unstructured field, actors’ positions are in flux, an organizational actor could potentially use a mix of institutional and non-institutional strategies to pursue a political agenda.

The most effective political movements are likely to be those that are able to strategically combine institutional and non-institutional strategies to organize existing groups and take advantage of political openings. Thus, under these conditions, challenger parties may emerge prior to, or simultaneously with, social movements, or political movement organizations may be most effective when they retain elements of both. For example, Schwartz’s (2006) concept of party movements is just one possible form of political organizing that can occur in unstructured political fields. If the political field stabilizes and actors’ positions become more clearly defined, it is likely that institutional and non-institutional actors would distance themselves from each other. In Figure 6, this would be represented by a movement from the lower right to the upper right quadrant.

**Conclusion**

What does the field framework add to the study of challenger political movements and how can it help scholars rethink the relations between parties and movements? First, field thinking moves beyond the party/movement dichotomy by taking a broader view of parties and movements as organizational actors engaged in the same political struggle. The perspective presented here suggests that the organizational forms political actors take and the strategies they use are not predetermined but shaped by the structure of the political field and state in which political movements are embedded. Consequently, the separation between institutional and non-institutional actors becomes a puzzle to be examined rather than a taken-for-granted assumption.

A concrete example of how political field and state characteristics shape political

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73 Schwartz (2006) defines party movements as “organizations…that, no matter how radical their goals or how willing to use noninstitutional means, are still prepared to work within the system like any political party, because they see government office as the most direct way of achieving their objectives” (11). Party movements are just one type of political organization that could emerge in an unstructured political field.
movements is the case of radical right parties in contemporary Europe. Radical right parties first entered electoral politics in France in the 1980s. Since then, similar parties have gained electoral representation in many Western European and Eastern European countries. Studies examining the radical right phenomena have largely focused on trying to explain why such parties have succeeded at the polls in some places but not others (see Chapter 3). After decades of research, however, scholars continue to disagree on the answer to this central question (for a review see Rydgren 2007). The field framework proposed here suggests a new direction for research: rather than focusing on explaining electoral outcomes of challenger parties, scholars should take a broader view of political movements to examine the interplay between these parties and other organizational actors in the political field. For example, research could take a step back to ask why radical right movements pursue electoral politics in some places but not others, how these parties make linkages with other organizations, or how crises (such as the economic crisis of 2007-2009) affect the relations between parties, movements, and other groups.
Chapter Six

Conclusion

More serious [for the West] are the practical repercussions of forgetting that the world is not made of individuals but of communities—national, religious, or tribal—which govern the individual’s loyalties and behavior.
—Régis Debray, “Decline of the West?”

The central argument of this dissertation is that contemporary European societies are moving away from the European vision set forth in the second half of the twentieth century. Social integration—a goal integral to the European project—has not followed economic integration. In fact, one of the more provocative implications of the present research is that European economic integration is producing the very opposite of its intended goals, namely, it is leading to cultural disintegration in the form of rising nationalism and radical right mobilization. Each of the four chapters asks a specific research question aimed at examining an aspect of this broader argument. Chapters Two and Three focus respectively on loose and strict forms of nationalism, whereas Chapters Four and Five take up questions of political mobilization. In this concluding chapter, I first summarize the main findings, arguments, and contributions of each chapter. I then take a step back to elaborate the broader implications of this study for the future of European integration.

Summary of Key Findings

In Chapter Two, Neil Fligstein and I ask if European integration is pushing Europeans to become more nationalist. Our analysis of Eurobarometer survey data from before and after the 2007-2009 economic crisis shows that Europeans’ support for the European project is deeply tied to their identities: those who see themselves in primarily nationalist terms are more likely to oppose their country’s continued membership in the EU as well as further European integration. European countries’ response to the first major economic crisis since the establishment of the single market was coordinated through European—not national or local—institutions, producing widespread grievances among citizens of wealthier European countries who resented bailing out their economically troubled neighbors. For their part, citizens in countries most affected by the crisis resented the coordinated efforts by the EU and wealthier national governments to impose harsh austerity measures. Our analysis shows that in all European countries, the EU’s response to the economic crisis drove European citizens to pull away from Europe: across all countries, Europeans saw themselves in increasingly nationalist, as opposed to European, terms. In countries that were hardest hit by the economic crisis, individuals turned towards their national governments and national identities in dramatically high numbers. European citizens have grown increasingly disillusioned with the EU, and this disillusionment, anchored by sense of detachment from the European project, has taken shape along nationalist lines.

The results in Chapter Two have important implications for the future of European economic, political, and cultural integration. In its first moment of crisis, the European Union has failed to provide a convincing narrative in support of its continued political integration. The crisis has also exposed how fragile the cultural and social foundations of European solidarity are. One question that emerges from our findings is whether European economic and political integration will stall without “Europeans” to support EU-driven policies. Given the depth and breadth of integration, it seems unlikely that any EU member states will actually abandon the union, but it is probable that national governments—even of the most
pro-EU countries such as Germany—will have to respond to their constituents’ growing anti-EU sentiments. Already evident is the gap between political elites, who have been at the head of the European project, and the rest of Europe. Unless national political leaders change their approach to the EU, as Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron has done, they risk further widening the gap between public opinion and national politics.

Whereas Chapter Two examines the relationship between national identity and European integration at the individual level and over a short period of time, Chapter Three takes a longer view to examine how economic, political, and social factors affect electoral support for radical right parties—the organizational carriers of nationalist ideology in Europe. Analyzing electoral outcomes of radical right parties in parliamentary elections across 27 European countries from 1990 to 2012, I asked if the “usual suspect” variables that scholars typically attribute to the electoral success of radical right parties—economic decline, proportional electoral systems, and increasing immigration—can explain differences in the radical right’s electoral results across countries.

My findings show that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, economic decline and national electoral systems do not explain differences in the electoral success of radical right parties. A particularly surprising finding is that differences in levels of immigration did not explain why radical right parties have been more successful in Western than in Eastern Europe. This finding challenges another common assumption in public discourse: namely, that radical right parties’ increasing support in western European countries reflects an actual reality of increasing immigration to those countries. The fact that immigration rates have no effect on such parties’ electoral outcomes in Western Europe challenges commonly held assumptions about the relationship between immigration and radical right parties. This finding also contradicts some previous studies that found a positive relationship (see Chapter 3 for a review). The persistence of the assumption that rising immigration increases support for radical right parties is a reflection of the radical right’s successful framing of immigration as a threat to economic chances and national culture.

Chapter Three also focuses on analyzing differences between Western and Eastern Europe. An unanswered puzzle in the literature on European radical right parties is why such parties have been less successful in the so-called “backward East” than in the West. I find that the determinants of support for the radical right are, indeed, different in the East than in West, the most important factor being political stability and, to a lesser, degree, levels of generalized trust. Political stability has a greater effect on support for radical right parties in Eastern Europe. Whereas higher stability decreases support for radical right parties in all European countries, the effect is much greater in Eastern Europe. In other words, when the governing regime is perceived as unstable in an Eastern European country, a radical right party is more likely to win support than in a Western European country. The greater effect of political instability in Eastern European countries may explain why support for radical right parties begins to decline in those countries after the late 1990s just as the political and economic conditions were stabilizing after the post-socialist transition (Figure 2.1).

Additional research examining radical right movements in Eastern Europe is badly needed to balance the current scholarly overemphasis of electoral success cases in Western Europe. The findings in Chapter Three provide a direction that future studies could follow to theorize and identify the conditions under which radical right parties garner electoral support outside the Western European context. Such research could assess current theories’ analytical reach and generalizability.

Chapter Four shifts focus from a large cross-national comparison to an in-depth case study of radical right mobilization. The aim of this Chapter was to examine the micro-processes of right-wing movement recruitment and the motivations of radical right activists. I pose one of the most fundamental questions of social movement studies: how and why do
individuals join political movements? As I argued in Chapter Three, scholars have paid scant attention to how radical right parties mobilize outside Western European, but social scientists know even less about the ground level mobilization strategies of radical right movements or about the beliefs of the participants in such movements. This gap in the current literature is the result of sociologists’ tendency to study exclusively progressive or leftist social movements. To answer the mobilization question for the case of radical right movements, I traced the rise of a radical right movement in Ukraine by conducting over 100 in-depth interviews between 2009 and 2012. Examining the mobilization practices of Ukraine’s radical right political party, Freedom, as it grew from a regional movement to a national party, I find that activists were primarily recruited to the movement through friendship networks. Recruitment to radical right movements occurs along the same social network mechanisms as recruitment to progressive social movements. This finding thus extends previous findings on movement recruitment and mobilization to the case of radical right movements.

Another key, and more surprising, finding from the case study in Chapter Four concerns the relationship between activists’ beliefs and motivations for participation. The few qualitative studies of right-wing activists to date have begun to document the varied and often ambivalent beliefs held by activists prior to participating in the movement. Munson (2008), in his study of pro-life activists in the United States, referred to the vague, unformed, and incomplete beliefs on a key movement issue as “thin.” Given the general tenet in social movement theory that movements reflect pre-existing grievances, it is particularly surprising to find that activists’ beliefs regarding issues as integral to the radical right movement as national identity and nationalism were similarly “thin” prior to joining the movement.

The central assumption—that beliefs precede mobilization—is particularly strong for activists involved in radical or extremist political movements because these movements’ political ideologies are so far outside the “mainstream” that, the logic goes, the individuals who wish to join them must already hold similarly strong or extremist views. My interviews show, however, that even the most ardent activists in the movement were ambivalent about the political aims or ideology before joining. Rather, they came in contact with the movement through friends and only developed well formed political beliefs after continued interaction with other activists and participation in political events. Individuals were radicalized through the process of mobilization. By showing that radical ideas result from the mobilization process, this finding builds on emerging research of right-wing activists challenging the underlying assumption of social movement theory that activists, and radical right activists in particular, join movements to express preexisting beliefs.

Chapter Five expands the theoretical ideas that emerge in the case study to elaborate a critical review of the social movement literature. Specifically, I focus on how sociologists have conceived the relationship between movements and parties. In their focus on non-institutional processes of mobilization, sociologists have paid little attention to the role of political parties, implicitly reducing them to mere reflections of social movements and generally relegating their study to political scientists. In this Chapter, I argue that political sociologists must reconceive political parties as drivers of social change and mobilization. To do so, we must reimagine the bounded and reified categories that social science applies to political organizations. Drawing on recent insight from an emerging field of “new” sociology of political parities and field theory, I propose a field theoretical framework for rethinking the organizational forms and strategies of challenger political movements that focuses on how state openness and the structure of the political field shape the range of possible repertoires of political action and organizational alliances. Field thinking moves beyond the party/movement dichotomy to take a broader view of parties and movements as organizational actors engaged in the same political struggle. As a result, the forms of
organization political actors take and the strategies they use are not predetermined; instead, they are shaped by the political and institutional environments in which they are embedded. Parties and movements tend to be mutually constitutive social actors in an unstructured or emerging field within a state open to challenges (Figure 6, Chapter 5). The separation between institutional and non-institutional actors, which continues to dominate sociological theories, is thus a puzzle to be examined rather than a taken-for-granted assumption.

What Would Polanyi Say?

To go back to the Polanyian question set out in the introduction: are the trends of increasing nationalism and the rise of radical right movements signs of a countermovement? The answer remains largely open-ended. It is simply too early to tell to what extent these trends in nationalism and radical right mobilization cohere or are causally related to each other. For example, while the findings in Chapter Two show that Europeans have become more nationalist in the aftermath of the economic crisis, it is still too early to know how such identity shifts will affect politics. There are some signs that national governments in the major European economies—France, England, and Germany—are distancing themselves from the EU project for fear of electoral repercussions. But it remains unclear how far this distancing will go or the shape that it will take. Will radical right parties benefit from increasing public resentment toward the EU, as the conclusions of Chapter Three suggest, or will such parties fail to take advantage of this political opportunity?

This question points to a broader theoretical issue regarding the relationship between individuals’ attitudes and political mobilization. And as the case study of radical right mobilization in Chapter Four shows, the nature of this relationship is more complex and nuanced than social scientists tended to assume: neither the political mobilization practices of right-wing movements nor the motivations of radical-right activists are unique to these movements alone. This implies that radical right movements draw supporters from the same pool of individuals as other social movements. Moreover, individuals’ existing attitudes may not determine their willingness or desire to engage in political action, which may help explain why differences in xenophobic or nationalist attitudes do not correspond to the electoral outcomes of radical right parties (Art 2011). Thus, while personal attributes and political context are undoubtedly important for mobilization potential, it is ultimately individuals’ social connections that pull them from the balconies to the barricades.

The purpose of this study, however, was not to resolve the Polanyian dilemma—Polanyi himself never provided a satisfying answer to the question of what constitutes a countermovement. Rather than providing an answer, I have sought to illuminate some of the less savory elements of European integration. Whether these various elements—national identity, support for radical right parties, and right-wing political mobilization—cohere into a Polanyian countermovement is not yet clear. What is clear is that they represent cracks in the European project. How deep these cracks run will shape the destiny of Europe in the future. For now, it is becoming apparent that the vision of a politically and socially united Europe, as conceived of in the Schuman Declaration in 1950, at the very beginning of the European project, has not been realized.

Unintended Consequences of Economic Integration

The central thesis of this study is that European economic integration has been coupled with cultural disintegration. This argument brings into question a fundamental, yet often implicit, assumption of the European project: that community can be integrated through the economy (Swedberg 2013). This principle is enshrined in every step of the European
project, and is indeed fundamental to the Kantian Enlightenment project itself. To take as an example the foundational text for the establishment of the EU: the Treaty of Rome of 1957. The determination “to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe” is the first tenet of the Treaty of Rome, and the means for ensuring the formation of this union have been decidedly economic. As a result, economic decisions have taken on symbolic meanings, whereby economic institutions and policies are framed in cultural and political terms. By this logic, the common European market is more than a medium for exchange; indeed, it represents a mechanism for political cooperation. And the Euro is more than a currency that makes exchange possible; rather, it is “a symbol of European identity…one of the strongest tangible symbols of European integration and the shared values of Europe, the European nations and Europeans themselves” (European Commission 2010).

One only has to skim the Treaty of Rome, Jean Monnet’s memoir (1978) or virtually any publication by the EU commission to find countless examples of the logic in which cultural values are attributed to economic policies. This logic is so embedded in every aspect of the EU project that it now appears as common sense, which of course, it is not. Mimicking Clausewitz’s famous formula about war, Swedberg, for example, has referred to the idea that community follows economic integration as “economics as politics by other means” (Swedberg 2013). As Swedberg’s formulation suggests, the problem with this logic is that it conflates the ultimate goals of integration—which are political and cultural—with the economic, producing a situation in which political trends do not follow the economic ones. Or to paraphrase Polanyi, liberal economies do not necessarily make for liberal politics. In other words, such a course of action is bound to have unintended consequences, which are likely to be exacerbated when the economic institutions begin to fail, as has been the case in the European economic and sovereign debt crisis (2007-2010). Thus, one way to think about the changes in European identity and politics analyzed in this study is not in terms of a Polanyian countermovement, but as the unintended consequences of a deeply embedded logic that assumes a mutual dependency between economic and cultural integration. By explicating the “dark” elements of the European integration process, I show that this logic is not only deeply problematic, but that, in fact, it has exposed the conflict between the economic and social in contemporary Europe.

An Ever-Closer Union?

In many ways, the economic crisis that began in 2007 exposed the cracks in the European project. Yet, despite dramatic drops in public support for the EU since the outbreak of the crisis, economic integration has only accelerated. We can see evidence for this in how the EU managed the sovereign debt crisis that emerged in the Eurozone in 2009. In May of 2010, the EU commission and European Central Bank (ECB) established the European Economic Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) to provide billions of bailout funds to Ireland and Portugal. Another safety net program, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), followed. The establishment of these new crisis institutions pushed member states into deeper economic integration, and it also indicated that member states’ response to the crisis would continue to proceed through EU institutional mechanisms. Mass social resistance to the EU’s handling of the crisis, and austerity measures in particular, culminated in protests across the hardest hit countries, such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal. If the thesis of this study is correct, increased economic integration that proceeds along neoliberal lines is bound to have more long-term cultural and political consequences.

74 I am referring to Kant’s 1795 essay, “Perpetual Peace,” in which he outlines the integrative role of markets.
76 Keynote address delivered at the Swiss Sociological Congress, in Bern, Switzerland, June 28, 2013.
One potential consequence is increasing bifurcation of European societies between those who are benefiting from the European project and those who are not, and the numbers of those who are losing out are likely to increase during economic crises. A common counterargument for why cultural integration has not followed economic integration is that not enough time has passed since all the pieces of EU project were implemented. Once a new generation of “true” Europeans comes of age in the new Europe, the logic goes, old categories of identification tied to the nation will no longer be relevant. These new, young Europeans will be the ones to truly reap the benefits of European integration.

However, looking at the situation of young Europeans in 2013, it is difficult to see a bright new European future: at the end of 2012 (the latest available data), the youth unemployment rate for Europeans aged 16-24 was 23.2 percent in the 27 EU member states. This number, while already alarmingly high, is still low in comparison to the youth unemployment rate in the countries hardest hit by the crisis. In Portugal, the figure is 38.4, in Spain 55.2, and in Greece a shocking 57.9 percent of youth are unemployed (Eurostat 2012). These numbers do not paint a picture of a new generation of Europeans who will be able to take advantage of what the EU has to offer. Unfortunately, these figures suggest that these young people may become another of Europe’s lost generations. And if young people are joining the ranks of those who lose from the European project, then unless these trends are reversed, Europe in the future will be more socially and economically divided than it is today.

A second potential consequence, connected to the first, is that identity issues are likely to become increasingly more important in European politics. By allowing the free movement of labor, services, goods, and capital, the common European market is uprooting traditional categories of national or regional belonging. As I discussed in Chapter Three, radical right parties have been particularly adept at styling themselves as the protectors of national tradition and culture, which EU integration threatens to homogenize. As integration proceeds, who belongs and who does not in the national and the European community will become increasingly salient for individuals and political leaders.

Two scenarios are possible here. The first is the continued reassertion of national or even regional categories of belonging. As the findings in Chapters Two and Three show, signs of this are already visible. If the trends continue toward increasing national belonging and turning to right-wing cultural issues, the final outcome may be the dominance of culture over the economy. In other words, a cultural backlash against the consequences of deeper economic integration could force (through politics) a reversal of the economic integration process. In this scenario, member states may begin to abandon the European Union in the interest of national protection. Britain has already expressed its intent to pull away from deepening ties with the European continent. Of course, England was never part of the European Monetary Union (EMU), which affords it a higher degree of independence, but it is plausible that as resentment continues to build and more radical right parties critical of the EU gain seats in national parliaments, other member states will move to exit despite economic consequences.

The second scenario is that once economic growth is restored, more Europeans will once again begin to embrace their Europeanness. National belonging will cease to be as important, and a new European identity will unite a truly integrated Europe. This, of course, is the outcome that EU integration was supposed to lead to, but so far has not. The issue that brings this bright vision into question is that the content of European identity, or what it means to be a European in the new Europe, remains unclear. What new Europe and new Europeans will look like is still an open question that will be one of the most important challenges facing Europe in the twenty-first century. Thus, while all that is solid melts into air, what will now take shape remains unknown.
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