Archivization and Its Alternatives: 
Toward a Critique of Chicana/o Religions and Spiritualities

By

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Abstract

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In this dissertation, I attempt to clarify a problem (i.e., how to think Chicana/o religion and spirituality in light of debates on the archive in South Asian and Latin American subaltern studies?) rather than propose a new approach to the question of the interpretation of Chicana/o religions (e.g., how to understand the relationship between Chicana/o cultural production and religious thought, practice, experience, expression, and so forth?).

In chapter 1, I consider the pros and cons of the history of religions and Chicana feminist thought as critical approaches to Chicana/o religion and spirituality. I conclude with the proposition that subaltern studies – and in particular, Spivak’s notion of reading archivally – might add to the critical works of David Carrasco and Laura E. Pérez. Chapter 2 examines Carrasco’s attempt to link the history of religions to Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. I conclude with the assertion that such an approach may run the risk of reifying the religious/secular divide as hermeneutic foundation. In chapter 3, I turn to Pérez’ distinction between secular religious studies and the politics of Chicana spirituality. I conclude with the suggestion that Chicana/o religion and spirituality might be read as a question of the archive. Chapter 4 argues that a critique of archival memory is central to debates on religion and spirituality in Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. I conclude with an exploration of archival silences within the Bancroft and Ethnic Studies libraries at the University of California, Berkeley.
This dissertation can be situated between two statements. The first is: “The subaltern might serve as a signifier for . . . the ‘unspeakable.’” And the second is: “By the concept of elsewhere, I understand spaces and temporalities that define a world that remains exterior to the spatio-temporal location of any given observer.” If the former suggests subalternity is “outside” conventional modes of expression and representation, the latter suggests “the world” can be defined as irreducible spatio-temporal difference. My task is twofold: to affirm meaningful representations of the “unspeakable” and at the same time to deny the possibility for representing spaces and temporalities as anything other than an “untotizable totality.”

In this dissertation, I focus on the relationship between archivization and representations of Chicana/o religion and spirituality. In Chicanas Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities (2007), Laura E. Pérez has demonstrated that “the politics of the spiritual” should be a site of critical reflection for Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. Pérez argues that “spiritual beliefs and practices – however varied these may be – generate social and political effects that matter.” In this regard, I explore the import of Pérez’ observation that “the politics of the spiritual for many Chicana/os is linked to a politics of memory.” In the first place, how to

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3 Saldivar, Trans-Americanity: Subaltern Modernities, Global Coloniality, and the Cultures of Greater Mexico, xviii-xx; and Rabasa, Tell Me the Story of How I Conquered You: Elsewheres and Ethnosuicide in the Colonial Mesoamerican World, 1.
4 Saldivar, Trans-Americanity: Subaltern Modernities, Global Coloniality, and the Cultures of Greater Mexico, xviii-xx, xvii; and Rabasa, Tell Me the Story of How I Conquered You: Elsewheres and Ethnosuicide in the Colonial Mesoamerican World, 1.
5 Note: Pérez’ observation re: the nexus between “the politics of the spiritual” and “a politics of memory” forms part of her argument in “Spirit, Glyphs” – the first chapter of Chicanas Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities. In “Spirit, Glyphs,” Pérez rightly observes: “The linkages within imperialist and racist thinking between the spiritual, the female, and peoples of color are what make the conditions for talking about women, particularly women of color, and the spiritual, especially difficult.” On the other hand, Pérez observes likewise: “Conjuring and reimagining traditions of spiritual belief, traditions whose cultural differences have been used by discourses of civilization and modernization to justify subjugation and devaluation, are conscious acts of healing the cultural susto: that is, the ‘frightening’ of spirit from one’s body-mind in the colonial and neocolonial ordeals, the result of which is the ‘in-between’ state of nepantla, the postconquest condition of cultural fragmentation and social indeterminacy.” For Pérez, the “curandera (healer) work” of many contemporary Chicana writers and artists is ultimately “inseparable from questions of social justice, with respect to class, gender, sexuality, culture, and ‘race’.” “Membering the spirit” acts to “interrupt the reproduction of gendered, raced, and
theorize colonial and postcolonial memory production? In the second place, how might theorizing colonial and postcolonial memory production contribute to a redefinition of Chicana/o religion and spirituality? Scholars such as Gastón Espinosa and Mario T. García have assumed that representations of Chicana/o religion and spirituality are unique, but in fact they can be linked to the question of the relationship between the South Asian and Latin American subaltern studies groups and Chicana/o literary and cultural studies.

I argue for a critique of archival memory by analogy with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s thesis in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988). (Note: I argue “by analogy” in the spirit of “intellectual bridge building in decolonial thought.”) As opposed to “the additive model” of

sexed politics of spirituality and art.” For example, Pérez examines “the invocation and reworking of pre-Columbian Mesoamerican notions of art and art making represented in glyphs, codices, and the Mexica (‘Aztec’) figures of the tlacuilo (glyph-maker) and the tlamatini (sage, decoder of the glyphs).” Thus, as I understand it, “the politics of the spiritual” (e.g., “citing or constructing culturally hybrid spiritualities”) can be linked for some Chicana/os to “a politics of memory” (e.g., “their mapping of pathways [back] beyond the alienation and disempowerment of the nepantlism of today’s cultural and geographical deterritorializations”). See Laura E. Pérez, Chicana Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 297, 18-49 passim.

6 E.g., Espinosa and García focus on “unique religious expressions that have been shaped by the Mexican American experience.” See Gastón Espinosa and Mario T. García, eds., Mexican American Religions: Spirituality, Activism, and Culture (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 4.

7 Saldívar, Trans-Americanity: Subaltern Modernities, Global Coloniality, and the Cultures of Greater Mexico. Also, see Marcial González, Chicano Novels and the Politics of Form: Race, Class, and Reification (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), 40-76.


9 In this dissertation, I explore Derridean “deconstruction” as a form of “postcolonialism” and/or what Walter Mignolo calls “desobediencia epistémica.” E.g., re: the former see Robert J. C. Young, “Subjectivity and History: Derrida in Algeria,” in Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001). Re: the latter see Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida, trans. Geoffrey Bennington, Desobediencia epistémica: Retórica de la modernidad, lógica de la colonialidad y gramática de la descolonialidad (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del Signo, 2010). On the other hand, it is arguable that such a project runs the risk of a “dis-encounter” — specifically, a further ghettoizing of US women of color feminist and queer decolonial thought. As Laura E. Pérez observes, “Ghettoized as minority women’s or queer reading, U.S. women of color feminist and queer decolonial thought remains largely ‘unknown,’ uncited, or unengaged in the work of Latina/o and Latin American male thinkers and dominant cultural Euro-American feminists, with the notable exception of queer male scholars, like Luis León, Pedro Di Pietro, and Randy P. Conner. This itself is symptomatic of the patriarchal, heteronormative lens still dominating liberatory thought and practice in geopolitically and nationally marginalized thought as among dominant cultural feminisms and other progressive
I focus attention on the prospect of “measuring silences.” In my view, archival memory is riddled with palimpsestic layers and radical alterity, whether culled from one or more archives or circulating outside official memory. Thus envisaged, neither archives nor their alternatives need “end up in single histories.” In one sense, I attempt to clarify a problem (in other words, how to think Chicana/o religion and spirituality in light of debates on the archive in South Asian and Latin American subaltern studies?) rather than propose a new approach to the question of the interpretation of Chicana/o religions (for example, how to understand the relationship between Chicana/o cultural production and religious thought, practice, experience, expression, and so forth?). It is true, as Michael Taussig has noted, “Construction deserves more respect; it cannot be name-called out of (or into) existence, ridiculed and shamed into yielding up its powers.” On the other hand, I value the proposition that deconstruction can be set-to-work in recognition of radical alterity.

thought. Patriarchal and heteronormative privilege has characterized the failures of the Nicaraguan and Cuban socialist revolutions, as it has the U.S. Left and nationalist or ethnic/racial’ civil rights movements of the United States, as the emancipation of ‘mankind’ has literally turned out to be most for the interests of heterosexual men rather than the universal liberation of humanity, as most women have been marginalized from equal power and burdened with double labor (at home and work), while queers have been criminalized as degenerates or closeted.” E.g., as opposed to Spivak, this dissertation could have begun instead with Chela Sandoval’s Methodology of the Oppressed (2000) – a work (Pérez notes) that is “fully centered . . . in the study of U.S. feminist and queer women of color’s literary and political activist writings from the 1960s through the 1980s.” See Laura E. Pérez, “Enrique Dussel’s Etica de la liberación, U.S. Women of Color Decolonizing Practices, and Coalitionary Politics amidst Difference,” Qui Parle 18, no. 2 (spring/summer 2010): 121, 132, 126, 140.

11 Shetty and Bellamy, “Postcolonialism’s Archive Fever,” 25-32.
13 José Rabasa, Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 5.
15 Michael Taussig, “A Report to the Academy,” in Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses (New York: Routledge, 1993), xvi. Note: I would like to thank José Rabasa for bringing to my attention Taussig’s “A Report to the Academy.”
In the first chapter, I consider the pros and cons of the history of religions and Chicana feminist thought as critical approaches to Chicana/o religion and spirituality. I conclude with the proposition that subaltern studies – and in particular, Spivak’s notion of reading archivally – might add to the critical works of scholars David Carrasco and Laura E. Pérez. The second chapter examines Carrasco’s attempt to link the history of religions to Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. I conclude with the assertion that such an approach may run the risk of reifying the religious/secular divide as hermeneutic foundation. In the third chapter, I turn to Pérez’s distinction between secular religious studies and the politics of Chicana spirituality. I conclude with the suggestion that Chicana/o religion and spirituality might be read as a question of the archive. The fourth chapter argues that a critique of archival memory is central to debates on religion and spirituality in Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. I conclude with an exploration of archival silences within the Bancroft and Ethnic Studies libraries at the University of California, Berkeley.

In what follows, I make use of critical terms derived from a number of sources. First, I follow philosopher Jacques Derrida with respect to “the question of the archive.” Derrida defines the archive as commencement and commandment; archivization is a mode of memory that “produces as much as it records the event.” In the course of the dissertation, I test Derrida’s thesis by exploring the “layers” and “frontiers” of colonial and postcolonial archival productions. Second, I try to employ what the Latin American subaltern theorist José Rabasa describes as “an analysis of the mechanisms that produce subalternity.” Thus envisaged, I regard subaltern studies as an endeavor not so much hermeneutical as anarchical (e.g., relativistic in a radical sense, etc.). Third, I use the term “Chicana/o” to denote Mexicans in the US. More specifically, I limit the scope of my study to the field of Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. Lastly, I follow Talal Asad and Laura Pérez’s use of the terms “religion” and “spirituality.” Asad suggests that neither the religious nor the secular are “essentially fixed” terms. I presume that “the secular . . . is neither continuous with the religious that supposedly preceded it (that is, it is not the latest phase of a sacred origin) nor a simple break from it (that is, it is not the opposite, an essence that excludes the sacred).” Likewise, I follow Pérez’s distinction between religion and spirituality. The latter ties “that having to do with the s/Spirit(s)” to “a field of differences and contention, resonances, and crossings.”

18 See above, n. 11.
19 Rabasa, Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History, 42. Also, see Rabasa, “Elsewheres: Radical Relativism and the Frontiers of Empire.”
20 E.g., see Rodolfo Acuña, Occupied America: The Chicano’s Struggle Toward Liberation (San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1972); and Vicki L. Ruiz, From Out of the Shadows: Mexican Women in Twentieth-Century America, 10th anniversary ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
21 Note: I owe my understanding of the field as both literary and cultural studies to José David Saldivar. Personal communication from José David Saldivar to the author, spring 2011.
This dissertation would not have been possible without the extraordinary commitment of my mentors and my loved ones. I owe the theoretical foundation of this study to my mentors at the University of California, Berkeley. José David Saldivar first suggested that I link the analysis of Chicana/o religions to subaltern studies; and José Rabasa helped me to further the project in the stacks at Widener Library. Laura Pérez helped me to think about the topic in ways I could have never imagined. Marcial González provided close readings that helped me to become a better writer. Also, Alfred Arteaga was instrumental in guiding me through the Graduate Group. At the University of Chicago, Mark Krupnick introduced me to the possibilities of Jacques Derrida. Also, Bruce Lincoln and W. Clark Gilpin shared their knowledge of the history of religions and history of Christianity. Rick Rosengarten was instrumental in making graduate work possible. I also had the fortune of working with Rudy Busto at Stanford University. This project began at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Richard Hecht, Alberto Pulido, and Víctor Fuentes gave me the opportunity of a lifetime.

Finally, my loved ones are the true reason I have finished this study. Without the support and encouragement of my wife, I could not have finished. My parents too have been patient. I am thankful also to my siblings – who kept everything in perspective for me. My daughter has been an inspiration. I am indebted also to Reggie and Sidney for their company always.

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CHAPTER 1

A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF RELIGION AND SPIRITUALITY IN CHICANA/O LITERARY AND CULTURAL STUDIES, 1982-2007

The promise of subaltern studies resides in the possibility of interrupting narratives that end up in single histories.


This chapter follows Joseph Sommers’ “Critical Approaches to Chicano Literature” (1979) and Angie Chabram’s “Conceptualizing Chicano Critical Discourse” (1991), but it also builds on the shift toward cultural studies in Angie Chabram-Dernersesian’s *The Chicana/o Cultural Studies Reader* (2006) and *The Chicana/o Cultural Studies Forum: Critical and Ethnographic Practices* (2007). I view the field as Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. Moreover, I agree with José David Saldívar that the field should be brought into conversation with post-nationalist areas of inquiry – in particular, postcolonial and subaltern studies. This chapter forms a prelude to the subsequent chapters wherein I attempt to show how subaltern

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1 This chapter would not have been possible without Laura E. Pérez – whose incisive questions with regard to “religion” and “spirituality” pushed me in unexpected directions.


4 In this regard, I follow José David Saldivar. Personal communication from José David Saldivar to the author, spring 2011.

studies of religion and spirituality can be brought to bear on Chicana/o literary and cultural studies.\textsuperscript{6}

Although Sommers, Chabram, and Chabram-Dernersesian examine key moments in the development of Chicana/o literary and cultural studies, there seems to be a lacuna in the field with respect to theories of religion and spirituality.\textsuperscript{7} Are there methodological trends? Are there conceptual problems that remain unresolved?\textsuperscript{8} For example, is religion the same or different from spirituality?\textsuperscript{9} In what follows, I begin to map critical approaches to religion and spirituality in Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. For the most part, I limit myself to David Carrasco’s “A Perspective for a Study of Religious Dimensions in Chicano Experience: \textit{Bless Me, Ultima} as a Religious Text” (1982) and Laura E. Pérez’ “Spirit, Glyphs” (2007). In Carrasco and Pérez, we can track two significant theoretical moments. On the one hand, Carrasco explores the limits of Christian hermeneutics and, as an alternative, proposes a secular orientation – the history of religions.\textsuperscript{10} On the other hand, Pérez seems to make a critical distinction between religion and spirituality and, as a result, raises questions about the reach of secular religious studies.\textsuperscript{11} Rather than propose a new theoretical orientation, this chapter sets out to examine the history of religions and Chicana feminist thought as critical approaches to Chicana/o religion and spirituality. How has each approach contributed to the “field-Imaginary” of Chicana/o literary and cultural studies?\textsuperscript{12} By way of conclusion, I begin to think about how subaltern studies might add to the critical works of Carrasco and Pérez.

\textsuperscript{6} In this regard, I am especially indebted to the path-breaking work of Rosaura Sánchez. See Rosaura Sánchez, \textit{Telling Identities: The Californio testimonios} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).


\textsuperscript{8} It should be acknowledged that the chief models for this critical appraisal are Sommers, “Critical Approaches to Chicano Literature”; Chabram, “Conceptualizing Chicano Critical Discourse”; and to a degree, id., “Chicano Literary Criticism: Directions and Development of an Emerging Critical Discourse.”

\textsuperscript{9} I owe this question to Laura E. Pérez. Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2011.


\textsuperscript{12} Here, I follow Donald E. Pease: “By the term field-Imaginary I mean to designate a location for the disciplinary unconscious . . . . Here abides the field’s fundamental syntax – its tacit assumptions, convictions, primal words, and the charged relations binding them together. A field specialist depends upon this field-Imaginary for the construction of her primal identity within the field. Once constructed out of this syntax, the primal identity can neither reflect upon its terms nor subject them to critical scrutiny. The syntactic elements of the field-Imaginary subsist instead as self-evident principles.” See Donald E. Pease, “New Americanists: Revisionist
This chapter sets the stage for my own critical approach to Chicana/o literature. Below, I attempt to link the field with debates on religion in South Asian and Latin American subaltern studies (chapter 2). Such an approach seems to suggest that theorizing the archive (chapter 3) is a prerequisite for the critical study of religion and spirituality in Chicana/o literature (chapter 4). But first, I examine Carrasco’s concept of religion. What are the limits of decolonizing Eurocentric disciplines – in this case, the history of religions? Is it possible to apply Carrasco’s orientation to Chicana/o novels? What is gained and what is lost by reading the novel as a reflection of “religious dimensions characteristic of and perhaps fundamental to Chicano experience”? After that, I examine Pérez’ concept of spirituality. How might hemispheric studies contribute to the study of Chicana spirituality? As Pérez suggests, Chicana writing and visual art practices – defined as “culturally hybrid spiritualities” – are a critique of archival memory. By way of conclusion, I regard Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988) as a benchmark for theorizing religion and spirituality in Chicana/o literature. Spivak provides an avenue for thinking further about questions raised by Carrasco and Pérez.

The Study of Religion

In “A Perspective for a Study of Religious Dimensions in Chicano Experience: Bless Me, Ultima as a Religious Text” (1982), David Carrasco suggests that the field of Chicana/o studies, for the most part, has been hindered by an unacknowledged Christian-centric bias. In his view, such a prejudice leads to the misinterpretation of Chicana/o spiritual creativity. As an alternative to Christian theology, Carrasco offers the Chicago school of the history of religions, an approach that he describes as “more humane and humanistic.” Just as some critics, who have noted that Rudolfo Anaya’s work departs from “the traditional realism of other Chicano literary texts,” so, too, Carrasco suggests Bless Me, Ultima (1972) can be read allegorically (e.g., as a dramatization of mythic or magical consciousness). On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that such a reading could efface what other critics of Anaya attempt to foreground – specifically, the relation between representation (e.g., Carrasco’s discussion of “the religious meanings and structures of

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Interventions into the Canon,” *boundary 2* 17, no. 1 (1990): 11-12.
Chicano life”) and its conditions of possibility (i.e., what Pierre Bourdieu has called “the field of cultural production”).

Carrasco argues that a Christian theological approach limits, distorts, and inhibits the interpretation of religious experiences and expressions. Because such an approach tends to measure “the tremendous variety of religious phenomena in human experience” against “the beliefs, doctrines, teachings, and values of the Christian religion,” for the most part “judging them as inferior or degraded religious elements,” the application of this approach likewise discourages an understanding of the creativity, genius, imagination, and spirituality implicit in other religious traditions. As an example of Christian-centric hermeneutics, Carrasco invokes Spanish colonial debates about “the Quetzalcoatl tradition.” He writes:

When the Spanish conquistadores arrived in Anahuac [sic], they were impressed by the crosses present in different parts of Indian society, and immediately thought that some Christian contact had preceded them. They were even more impressed by stories they heard in various places about an ancient Indian lord named Quetzalcoatl, the Feathered Serpent, also called Topiltzin Quetzalcoatl, Our Young Prince, the Feathered Serpent, who had been a great religious and political leader centuries earlier. The indigenous tradition told how this man-god preached with great authority, invented new rituals of sacrifice, possessed the power to go into ecstasy and visit heaven, and built the magnificent city of Tollan. In response, a debate broke out among Spanish authorities and mendicants. They played great intellectual and theological games with this tradition and tried to fit it within the Christian view of the world. One group argued that this story was evidence of pre-Hispanic demonic influences in New Spain, and these influences had misled the Indians into their terrible idolatry; this justified the conquest and missionization of the Indians. But another group saw this tradition as evidence of pre-Hispanic redeeming contact from the Christian religion suggesting that God had prepared the way for their great conquest and conversion. Some theologians claimed that Moses, or perhaps Jesus, and certainly Saint Thomas had visited the Indians centuries before, spreading the truths of the Old and New Testament, and that Quetzalcoatl was not really an Indian genius or hero but a foreign missionary. That is, he was like the Spaniards!

In this passage, Carrasco suggests that “the aggressive use of a particular religious world view” may ultimately misconstrue “the nature and value of another religious tradition.” For instance, must the Quetzalcoatl tradition ultimately prefigure the Christian tradition? And taking the same line of inquiry further, must Chicana/o religiosity be Christian? On the subject of Anaya’s Bless Me, Ultima, he omits to mention examples of critical essays that mask a theological approach, but rather claims that the field of Chicana/o studies suffers by and large from a Christian-centric

bias. Without a critical methodology, he insists, Chicana/o studies will continue to misinterpret “the religious realities (Euro-American and Indigenous) of Chicano history and culture.”

As an alternative to Christian theology, Carrasco proposes the history of religions, and to be specific, what he refers to as “the Chicago School of the History of Religions.” In his words, this approach emerged as “an outgrowth of the attempts to establish a Religionswissenschaft or science of religion in a number of European universities in the nineteenth century” and tends to work “from the conviction that religious experiences and the religions which form around them can be understood if they are approached as an (a) area for scientific inquiry and (b) in relation to the endless variety of human expressions which appear to have a religious nature.” Generally speaking, it seems that Carrasco follows the critical works of Mircea Eliade, Charles H. Long and Jonathan Z. Smith. For example, in a related text Quetzalcoatl and the Irony of Empire: Myths and Prophecies in the Aztec Tradition (1982), he claims that the Chicago school can open the door to a “more comprehensive understanding” of the Quetzalcoatl tradition. He writes:

This is a hermeneutical task. It is an attempt to understand the meanings of a variety of texts (painted, sculptured, written) that carried apparent and hidden messages concerning the nature and character of authority in Mesoamerican cities. My approach depends on the use of the discipline and categories of the history of religions, especially the renewed concern for relating the religious texts of a people to the social and historical contexts in which they were read, danced, applied, and reinterpreted. In attempting to comprehend the enigmatic figure of Quetzalcoatl and his importance as a dynastic paradigm, I will draw upon the inspirational and insightful writings of Mircea Eliade, Charles Long, and Jonathan Z. Smith, whose contributions toward a method of deciphering the meaning of myth, symbol, and religion in traditional cultures have set the stage for a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of Mesoamerican religion.

Unlike Christian theology, the application of this approach furthers an understanding of “the unity and continuity of the religious experience of man on the one hand, and the integrity and autonomous character of particular religious traditions, on the other.” In general terms, history of religions (also called “the comparative study of religions”) makes possible “a more humane and humanistic approach” to “the spiritual universes of significant others.” Owing to its methods and categories, the history of religions shows that religious consciousness – whether “Western” or “indigenous” – is “a part of human nature.” In Carrasco’s words: “Human beings appear to be

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20 Ibid., 195, 219 n. 2, 199.


‘wired’ for religion. It is almost as though in the makeup of human life there is a religiogram, a program which insures that human beings will develop religious movements and traditions, texts, and rituals.” Thus envisaged, history of religions is a means to honor what Christian theology seemingly distorts; that is to say, it attempts to foreground the spatiotemporal diversity of homo religiosus.23

Building on the phenomenology of religion, in the spirit of Gerhard van der Leeuw and Mircea Eliade, Carrasco defines religious experience as sui generis phenomena.24 As opposed to a functionalist approach, Carrasco strives for a substantive account of religion that appreciates manifestations, epiphanies, apparitions, and revelations of “Otherness.” Such a position stresses an interpretation of “the inner structures and meanings of religious phenomena.” If Émile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud, and Karl Marx explain religion in terms of its social, psychological, and economic function, Carrasco suggests “the intended and often obscure meaning of religious data” must be interpreted “on their own plane of reference” as “expressions of the sacred” (e.g., manifestations of “the powerful, the valuable, the wonderful, and the terrifying”). Like Eliade, Carrasco presumes “the ‘sacred’ is an element in the structure of consciousness and not a stage in the history of consciousness.” The religious is sui generis. Yet, at the same time, the concept of Chicana/o religion also reflects what he has described elsewhere as “resistance/hybridity.” For Carrasco, it is important to relate categories employed in the history of religions – in particular, sacred space and the sacred human – to the mestizaje of Chicana/o religiosity (e.g., indigenous, folk, Catholic, Protestant, etc.). In a sense, it is arguable that Carrasco’s emphasis on “sacred landscape” and the “sacred human being” is comparable with the concept of “visions” in Vine Deloria, Jr. or the concept of “experience” in Lewis Gordon. What Carrasco has described as “experiencing the sacred’” is an “encuentro” between colonial and decolonial epistemologies. The “sacred” is a means through which Carrasco attempts to retool the study of religion and thus make it relevant to Chicana/o studies.25


In the first place, Carrasco seeks to underscore the concept of “hierophany,” a concept that refers to a particular “manifestation of the sacred.” In accordance with Eliade’s Patterns in Comparative Religion (1949), Carrasco maintains: “All religions are based on hierophanies or dramatic encounters which human beings have with what they consider to be supernatural forces manifesting themselves in natural objects.” “Human beings,” Carrasco adds, “who feel these transformations in their landscape believe that a power from another plane of reality has interrupted their lives.” Such “transformations in their landscape” become an “axis mundi,” what he describes as “a point in the environment that becomes the ‘center’ of the verticle and horizontal cosmos . . . [the] place or object . . . appreciated as the point of communication between the human community and the world of the gods.” In the second place, Carrasco seeks to underscore the notion of “sacred specialists,” a notion that refers to persons who develop “a profound knowledge of the sacred realities which guide their particular communities” and, in addition, acquire “sophisticated and ecstatic techniques . . . to confront, utilize and even evoke spiritual forces.” Following Eliade’s Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy (1951), Carrasco views shamanism and its corresponding “pattern of initiation” as “the most archaic” form of “ecstasy.” Within such an “initiation,” he argues, a “novice” goes through “a period of suffering and growth” before acquiring “sacred knowledge” for the benefit of a given community. More broadly, it seems that Carrasco focuses attention on people and their ideas. The objective is to understand human culture from “the ideas that religious people themselves imagine to be governing their actions.” The standpoint of the “believer” is primary; social, psychological, and economic forces (e.g., as “the real sources of religion”) are secondary. Expressed in a different way, for Carrasco it is a general understanding of “religious patterns” (e.g., sacred space and the sacred human) that makes a humanistic interpretation of “Chicano Experience” possible.26

Carrasco defines Bless Me, Ultima as a “religious text.”27 In his words: “The patterns of sacred space and the sacred human . . . [motivate] the plot and its meanings.”28 To my mind, Carrasco reads Anaya’s novel as an “allegory of faith.” As Mark Krupnick has observed, in a different though related context, such a hermeneutical approach presupposes that “the interpreter’s task” is “to peel off a work’s rhetorical embellishment to disclose the meanings


underneath or inside [of the text].”

For example, Carrasco discovers in Anaya the Eliadean notion of “archaic ontology.” In Carrasco’s reading, Bless Me, Ultima reflects an “archaic pattern of spiritual creativity,” that is to say, a pattern of religious imagination or experience that is characteristic of “archaic consciousness.”

For some scholars such as Karen Mary Davalos, it is arguable that Carrasco’s notion of “spiritual creativity” is a decolonizing concept (so to speak) – considering that he reads Anaya’s vision of “sacred space” and “the sacred human” as a means of empowerment.

To start with, Anaya locates the protagonist Antonio, anticipating his “initiation into sacred knowledge,” within “a magical landscape overflowing with manifestations of religious power.” The protagonist views “sacraty” (1) in his name and (2) in the river near his hometown of Guadalupe, New Mexico. Antonio’s surnames Luna and Márez impart “Chicano respect for powerful earthly and heavenly places” (e.g., efficacious “powers” that shape his experience) and, also, represent a conflict about “his nature and destiny” as a Luna of the valley or Márez of the llano. Likewise, the river is “not just a water source, but a presence, a manifestation of some ‘other’ power,” and ultimately, the setting of a hierophany of “the Golden Carp.” As Carrasco writes: “The impact [e.g., of a hierophany as a manifestation of ‘Otherness’] is deep, reverent and frightening; both attracting and repulsing the young Antonio.”

On the other hand, focusing on Antonio’s “initiation into sacred knowledge,” Carrasco approaches “the shamanic paradigm” (in an Eliadean sense) as “the religious paradigm for the Chicano experience.”

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30 The term “archaic ontology” refers to “conceptions of being and reality that can be read from the behavior of the man of the premodern societies.” In The Myth of the Eternal Return: Cosmos and History (1949), Mircea Eliade suggests that such ontological “conceptions” are predicated on an impulse to abolish profane time, duration, history and, on the other hand, “to restore – if only momentarily – mythical and primordial time, ‘pure’ time, the time of the ‘instant’ of the Creation.” In Eliade, what one might term a cosmogony compulsion (e.g., the “myth of the eternal return” as fortification against the “terror of history”) can be found not only in “primitive humanity” but also in the cultural forms of “peasant masses” and “modern [metropolitan] man.” See Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return: Cosmos and History, trans. Willard R. Trask, with an introduction by Jonathan Z. Smith, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 3, 35, 54, 139-62 passim.


34 In one sense, see above, n. 32. Following Pérez et al, it is arguable that Carrasco’s argument shows signs of being a double bind. Anaya’s novel is simultaneously a decolonizing “allegory of faith” and, at the same time, exemplary data for the comparative study of religions. In the
the guidance of the “religious virtuoso” Ultima and (2) in an “ecstatic,” apocalyptic dream. Antonio becomes a “spiritual conduit” as he assists Ultima with the “curing” of his “bewitched” uncle Lucas and also goes through a “religious pattern of decay, destruction, dismemberment and regeneration” in a nightmare about “the apocalypse of the world.” The “gift of Ultima” is “a form of religious wisdom” – more specifically, “knowledge that the integration of his [Antonio’s] diverse and conflicting elements [e.g., his names] and the cultivation of sacred forces within a human being [e.g., ‘shamanic imagination’] can lead to a life full of blessings.” Lastly, it is arguable that such episodes of “experiencing the sacred” are decolonizing, for they demonstrate how Carrasco re-imagines the classic sui generis claim as Chicana/o spiritual creativity itself – what he designates “the lyrics of Chicano spirituality.”

However, it is important to note that Carrasco’s argument partakes of a specific universe of belief – again, the field of comparative religions. In The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature (1993), Bourdieu considers “not only the material production but also the symbolic production of the work, i.e. the production of the value of the work or, which amounts to the same thing, of belief in the value of the work.” Besides “social conditions” that contribute to the production of works (i.e., race, gender, etc.), Bourdieu takes into account how “social agents” (e.g., museums, publishers, disciplines, et al) help to produce and sustain belief in the value of art, literature, and scholarship. Though Carrasco’s critical essay appears in Aztlán – a scholarly journal committed to Chicana/o studies – it seems that one of his main objectives may be to acquaint “Chicano students and scholars” with “the Chicago School of the History of Religions.” Indeed, it is arguable that Carrasco’s “affiliation” serves as the basis of a budding

following paragraph, I consider the relationship between Carrasco’s reading of Anaya and Bourdieu’s notion of “the field of cultural production.”

circle of critics – the field of Mexican American religious studies.39 Luis León’s “The Poetic Uses of Religion in The Miraculous Day of Amalia Gómez” (1999) is a case in point. What Carrasco calls “the lyrics of Chicano spirituality” is re-imagined in León as “religious poetics.” León writes:

*The Miraculous Day of Amalia Gómez* . . . portrays the conditions under which religious poetics emerge and function . . . . In narrating the character of Amalia Gómez, Rechy sets religion to a poetic meter, delineating the choreography of religious movement replete with details that are virtually unrepresentable in other forms of writing. Each event in the story registers the meter, building to an epiphanic moment of experience that is key to understanding Amalia's story and religious poetics in general. Inasmuch as the novel creates a realistic account of one woman's religious expression, set to the rhythms of everyday life, it provides structured access to the ways some underclass Mexican Americans reimagine and reorder their perceptual worlds through various physical, psychological, and symbolic movements.

Just as Carrasco reads Chicana/o literature as an allegory of faith, so, too, León regards the novel as a “mimetic” vehicle: Rechy’s *The Miraculous Day of Amalia Gómez* “portrays . . . a realistic account” of Mexican American religious praxis.40 Yet, it should be noted that such a reading – i.e., reimagining the Chicana/o novel as a locus of “religious meaning”41 – seems to efface Rechy’s own engagement with Theodor Adorno. As José David Saldívar has observed, Rechy “escapes the textuality of engaged ‘realist’ art through his fable’s own splendid destruction of the ‘real.'”42 Moreover, in light of Russell T. McCutcheon’s critique of “the sui generis claim,” one

his beloved mentor Wach, preserving a place for him in the history of the school and the ‘discipline’ . . . . The distinctive panoply of concepts characteristic of what has been called the hermeneutical or phenomenological approach – religious experience, understanding, antireductionism (in fact, in some respects the very idea of the history of religions itself) – and . . . the curriculum that was the basis for socializing scholars in the field was the legacy of Wach, communicated through his chief disciple, Kitagawa.” See Christian K. Wedemeyer, introduction I to *Hermeneutics, Politics, and the History of Religions: The Contested Legacies of Joachim Wach and Mircea Eliade*, ed. Christian K. Wedemeyer and Wendy Doniger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), xix-xx.


39 Here, I am indebted to Chabram, “Conceptualizing Chicano Critical Discourse,” 130. See also Espinosa, “History and Theory in the Study of Mexican American Religions,” especially 36-37.

40 León writes: “I recuperate Carrasco’s project, arguing that some Mexican American novels can be valuable textual sources for uncovering religious meaning. John Rechy’s work can be seen as such a source.” See Luis León, “The Poetic Uses of Religion in The Miraculous Day of Amalia Gómez,” *Religion and American Culture* 9, no. 2 (summer 1999): 208, 207, 206.

41 Ibid., 206.

42 Saldívar adds: “Amalia’s life struggle and wanderings in Hollywood concretize Rechy’s critical philosophical views about the insurrectionary power thematized through the very form of
might ask why León opts to link Rechy with the study of religion – as opposed to transamerican literary studies. It is arguable that Rechy develops his notion of the “miraculous” in ways similar to Alejo Carpentier’s theory of “lo real maravilloso.” By extension, it is important to consider the blind spots of a “humanist orientation.” For example, on the subject of Anaya’s novel, Carrasco maintains: “Our primary concern is understanding the human being and not believing or disbelieving in his god.” Such an approach, I would argue, seems to overlook the “geopolitics of knowledge.” How to account for “nothing, non-Being, chaos, irrationality” in Africa, Asia, and Latin America? As Enrique Dussel suggests, “human being” is the ideology of ideologies, the foundation of the ideologies of the empires, of the center.” At the very least, Anaya’s novel calls for a discussion of “geopolitical space.” Instead of “the classic ontology of the center” (i.e., “archaic ontology” defined as “human being”), why not set out from “total exteriority” (e.g., the outskirts of a “North Atlantic ontology”)? In the second place, one might

his genre – the novel . . .. Rechy explodes from within the form of the novel itself and negates Hollywood realism.” See José David Saldívar, Border Matters: Remapping American Cultural Studies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 119-20. Note: I would like to thank José David Saldívar for bringing Rechy’s engagement with Adorno to my attention.

43 Note: here I juxtapose León’s with Saldívar’s reading of Rechy. Re: “the sui generis claim” McCutcheon writes: “The widespread and virtually normative scholarly assumption that religion is sui generis, autonomous, strictly personal, essential, unique, prior to, and ultimately distinct from, all other facets of human life and interaction, is a highly useful discursive as well as political strategy. It makes possible an autonomous discourse, complete with the benefits and the authority of its practitioners, and privileges political claims. In other words, the sui generis claim [emphasis mine] effectively brackets not only the datum but the researcher as well from critical scrutiny and provides a suspect basis for the academic study of religion.” See McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia, 26.

44 In reference to the prologue to El reino de este mundo (1949), José David Saldívar notes: “Carpentier’s thesis rests on the claims that New World artists and people experience the marvelous in their daily existence . . ..” See José David Saldívar, The Dialectics of Our America: Genealogy, Cultural Critique, and Literary History (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 94. I would like to thank José David Saldívar for suggesting a parallel between Rechy and Carpentier.

45 Daniel Pals describes Carrasco’s approach to the study of religion as a “humanist orientation.” For example, he writes: “[Carrasco’s] Religions of Mesoamerica: Cosmovision and Ceremonial Centers (1990) demonstrates how the vision of the sacred, embodied in religious ideas, myths, and rituals, guided and shaped almost every aspect of life in ancient Aztec and Mayan civilizations.” See Pals, Eight Theories of Religion, 294.


47 Note: here, I follow Walter Mignolo’s approach to the “geopolitics of knowledge.” On the other hand, it should be acknowledged, as Espinosa claims, that Carrasco’s project “does not necessarily represent an ideological or a theoretical break with the goals and aims of the Chicano Movement or even with liberation theology’s commitment to the poor and marginalized.” Specifically, see Espinosa, “History and Theory in the Study of Mexican American Religions,” 37. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that Dussel differentiates “Being” (e.g., German, Sein)
ask how Anaya’s novel emerged as a representative portrait of Chicana/o experience. As Carrasco notes, in reference to the relationship between the protagonist Antonio and his mentor Ultima: “The shamanic paradigm [in an Eliadean sense] . . . illustrates the religious paradigm for the Chicano experience [emphasis mine].” In particular, to what extent is Octavio I. Romano-V responsible for producing “the shamanic paradigm” as the prototype of Chicana/o religious experience? In fact, Romano’s dissertation involves (in his words) “the anthropological study of a folk-saint [Don Pedrito Jaramillo] in connection with healing and folk-medicine among Mexican-Americans in South Texas . . . .” To what extent did Romano’s own doctoral research shape editorial criteria for Quinto Sol Publications? For instance, the editor’s note to Bless Me, Ultima, written by Romano and Herminio Ríos C., states: “He [i.e., Anaya] shares and respects the collective intellectual reservoir that is manifest in his profound knowledge of a people and their relationships to the cosmos and its forces. It is only with this deep respect for a people that Anaya has been able to create in literary form a person such as the curandera Ultima, la Grande.” Expressed in a different way, I would argue that the project to reimagine the Chicana/o novel as a locus of religious meaning is problematic. Granted, Carrasco’s most recent work acknowledges the limits of “religious meanings and symbols.” But, it seems that it is not simply a question of interpreting textual portraits of Chicana/o religious experience. It is also a question of reflecting on the means whereby such portraits are “socially instituted” as paradigmatic examples.

from “being(s)” (i.e., German, das Seiende). See Enrique Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, trans. Aquilina Martinez and Christine Morkovskiy (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1985), 89-90, 5, 2, 14, 3, 71, 4; and Walter D. Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); in connection with Carrasco, “A Perspective for a Study of Religious Dimensions in Chicano Experience: Bless Me, Ultima as a Religious Text,” 200-19 passim. I would like to thank José David Saldivar for suggesting that I link Carrasco with Dussel’s work.48 Here, it is important to qualify Carrasco’s assertion. In his words: “I am suggesting here, not that Ultima and Antonio are shamans, but that their relationship reflects some characteristics of the initiation scenario typical of shamanic ecstasy.” See Carrasco, “A Perspective for a Study of Religious Dimensions in Chicano Experience: Bless Me, Ultima as a Religious Text,” 207.


Spirituality

In “Spirit, Glyphs” (2007), Laura E. Pérez suggests that fear of ridicule has left contemporary critics, by and large, prone to dismiss “the spiritual” as either an antiquated belief or New Age delusion. As a result, such critics fail to notice the link between “spirituality” and “questions of social justice” – especially, in connection with the cultural practices of women. In order to recognize the efficacy of “spirit work,” Pérez argues that Chicana representations of “the spiritual” – defined as “that having to do with the s/Spirit(s)” – can be understood as a decolonizing practice. In works such as Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza (1987), Chicana artists “engage in curandera (healer) work” that is “politically significant, socially transformative, and psychically healing.”51 In a similar way to Norma Alarcón, Pérez links Anzaldúa’s “new mestiza” consciousness with psychoanalytic and deconstructive notions of fragmentation.52 In this regard, I would like to suggest that “the politics of the spiritual” denotes not only “a politics of memory” (as Pérez contends) but also what Jacques Derrida terms “the question of the archive.”53

For Pérez, the works of some Chicana artists – such as Anzaldúa – echo the “hybrid works” of first-generation, post-conquest Nahua tlacuiloque (i.e., glyph makers) and tlamatinime (e.g., glyph decoders).54 Following Serge Gruzinski, Pérez suggests that such Chicana works seem to turn “the conquerors’ culture to the advantage of the conquered.”55 As Pérez observes:

Much of the Chicana art that cites pre-Columbian pictographic conventions hybridizes the different cultural meanings and functions of preconquest “books,” or

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54 Pérez writes: “The writers and artists studied in the pages that follow structure their work like the painter-scribes of Mesoamerica, particularly those of the immediate aftermath of the Spanish invasion . . .” See Pérez, “Spirit, Glyphs,” 30, 22. Aside from Anzaldúa, Pérez also examines the literary artists Cherríe Moraga, Ana Castillo, and Sandra Cisneros; and the visual artists Frances Salomé España, Yreina D. Cervántex, and Ester Hernandez.
amoxtli, postconquest codices, and contemporary books and art work. As in the stylistically hybrid works of the first-generation, postconquest codices . . . in such Chicana artwork we see the complex reworkings of the technologies and belief systems of the imposed dominating culture and the parallel inscription of alternative knowledges and practices.

In Perez’ hands, Gruzinski’s stance on “painting New Spain” speaks to the “multiple positionings” of Chicana spirituality. The “spiritual world-view” of Anzaldúa, for example, points to a diverse array of recoded beliefs and practices – American Indian, African, African diasporic, Christian, Aztec, archetypal psychology, and so forth. To be sure, such art practices can be linked with the aesthetic projects of the Chicana/o movement during the 1960s. Similar to Alurista, Teatro Campesino, and Rudolfo A. Anaya, among others, Anzaldúa raises questions about the archive and archivization. Whereas Walter Mignolo distinguishes between tlacuilo and tlamatini, Pérez argues that those Chicana artists who collapse the distinction point to “the return of what may have been lost in Eurocentric translations” – in fact, a proposition that Elizabeth Hill Boone seems to corroborate. In a sense, such works can be understood as “glyphs or codices of our own times.” Chicana tlamatinime are a testament to the failure of Eurocentrism; native cultures and belief systems seem to persist as memory or re-imagined hybridized traditions in the “spirit glyphs” of contemporary Chicana artists.

Building on a parallel between Nahua scribe/sages and Chicana writers and artists, Pérez argues that Chicana “spirit glyphs” can be understood as an attempt to address the post-conquest condition of “nepantla” – an “‘in-between’” state that is characterized by “cultural fragmentation and social indeterminacy.” She writes:

Conjuring and reimagining traditions of spiritual belief, traditions whose cultural differences have been used by discourses of civilization and modernization to justify subjugation and devaluation, are conscious acts of healing the cultural susto: that is, the “frightening” of spirit from one’s body-mind in the colonial and neocolonial ordeals, the

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59 Boone writes: “The chroniclers tell us that the books were created by tlacuiloque . . . and that the books were owned and interpreted by tlamatinime . . .. Father Sahagún distinguishes between these two occupations, but the differences between them are far from clear. In ancient Mexico there were tlacuiloque who decorated walls, sculptures, and the like . . . and there were those who worked as simple scribes under the direction of priests or governmental officials; such were probably the court reporters mentioned by Sahagún and Motolinía. But there were also tlacuiloque who themselves authored the painted manuscripts; these painter/scribes had to have been sufficiently well versed in the esoteric content of the books to be counted among the tlamatinime.” See Elizabeth Hill Boone, Stories in Red and Black: Pictorial Histories of the Aztecs and Mixtecs (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), 24.
For Pérez, “spirit glyphs” invoke and reconfigure imposed belief systems and alternative knowledges and practices to heal “the cultural and psychic dismemberment” (to borrow Norma Alarcón’s words) that is linked with colonial and neocolonial nepantlisms. More specifically, Pérez suggests that “spirit glyphs” attempt reintegration of the fragmented Chicana/o self. In her reading of Anzaldúa, for example, Pérez contends that *Borderlands/La Frontera* can be understood as “a glyph” that affirms “the sense of being culturally torn [i.e., *nepantla*] . . . as powerful, as emblematic of the nature of being and meaning.” Writing is a transformative “image-making practice” with the capacity to reconfigure the “borderlands” as “a sign of the centrality of the marginalized, the mutable, and the unarticulated in the construction of fuller knowledges and identities.” In Anzaldúa’s hands, “marginalized ways of knowing” – e.g., “knowing through our spirits” – open the door to “other versions of self and reality.” Rather than a form of resistance, Pérez argues that *Borderlands/La Frontera* is a mode of “*curandera* (healer) work.” Anzaldúa’s text demonstrates, counter to Eurocentric concepts of artwork, how “*la cultura cura.*”

Pérez’ reading of Chicana spirituality as “a politics of memory” raises several questions – mainly, what Derrida has called “the question of the archive.” Of course, I am not suggesting that Pérez can be read through Derrida. I agree with Chela Sandoval (and with Pérez) that European post-structuralism is indebted to postcolonial thinkers such as Frantz Fanon. Rather, I am (to borrow Sandoval’s words) “recognizing and reclaiming” one of Derrida’s contributions to decolonial praxis – in this case, the issue of the archive and its relation to “a politics of memory.” More specifically, there is a double bind at the center of Chicana spirituality. In the first place, Pérez ties “the concept of decolonizing, culturally hybrid spiritualities and aesthetics” to “the general intellectual vindication of Indigenous epistemologies that characterized much of the thought and art of the Chicana/o movement” on the one hand and, on the other, “the great intellectual and artistic generations of the 1920s through the 1950s in Mexico.” In a sense, Pérez

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62 Pérez writes: “*La facultad* and other forms of ‘inner knowledge’ affirm the ‘divine within,’ as well as the ‘supernatural’ or ‘the spirit world,’ and represent alternative forms of perception (‘seeing’) and ‘other mode[s]’ of consciousness,’ and thus, other epistemologies and paths of knowledge than the rational as it is understood and privileged in Euroamerican and European dominant cultures.” See Pérez, “Spirit Glyphs,” 21-34 passim.

63 See above, n. 52.

figures Chicana spirituality as heir to a century of decolonizing praxis – from the Mexican revolution and post-revolutionary nationalism to the Chicana/o renaissance and the present era of post-nationalist literary and cultural production. For Pérez, Anzaldúa’s contention “Like the ancients, I worship the rain god and the maize goddess, but unlike my father I have recovered their names” suggests (in Pérez’ words), “some of these traditions have not been altogether interrupted in the memory or practices of Chicana/o culture itself.” On the other hand, Josefina Saldaña-Portillo has argued that such Mexican and Chicana/o nationalist tropes of mestizaje and indigenismo ironically “[place] the Indian under erasure.” Saldaña-Portillo writes:

The continued use of mestizaje as a trope for Chicana/o identity and the presumed access to indigenous subjectivity that this biologized trope offer us . . . is incapable of suturing together the heterogeneous positionality of Mexican, Indian, and Chicana/o that coexist in the United States, or . . . of offering effective political subjectivity to these positionalities.

For Saldaña-Portillo, Anzaldúa’s attempt to recuperate Nahua deities is “an effect” of “the PRI’s state-sponsored mestizaje and indigenismo” – policies that revered “defunct Mexican Indian culture and history” at the expense of “living indigenous cultures.” Thus envisaged, Pérez read vis-à-vis Saldaña-Portillo suggests the politics of memory at the heart of Anzaldúa’s spirit work is an uncritical appropriation of Mexican nationalism. However, Saldaña-Portillo seems to overlook how such spirit work turns “‘the conqueror’s culture to the advantage of the conquered.’” As Anzaldúa notes:

I think it’s important to consider the uses that appropriations serve. The process of marginalizing others has roots in colonialism. I hate that a lot of us Chicanas/os have Eurocentric assumptions about indigenous traditions. We do to Indian cultures what museums do – impose western attitudes, categories, and terms by decontextualizing objects and symbols, by isolating them, disconnecting them from their cultural meanings or intentions, and then reclassifying them within western terms and contexts.

For Anzaldúa, “some things are worth ‘borrowing.’” Yet at the same time, she adds: “We need to scrutinize the purpose and accountability for one’s ‘borrowings.’” It is important to consider also that Subcomandante Marcos cites the struggles of “so-called people of color” in the US and

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thus is not necessarily reliant on scholars such as Saldaña-Portillo to speak for the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN). Likewise, as Rafael Pérez-Torres notes:

I think it equally important to draw a distinction between mestizaje in the context of Mexican and Chicano identity formations. After all, the corporatist use of mestizaje was part and parcel of the PRI’s official nationalist discourse. The role of Chicano (counter)discourse has, within U.S. culture, functioned quite differently. The mestizo and mestiza body in Chicano critical discourse has helped forge an identity that highlights the relational and political dynamics of Chicana/o identity through the recognition of race and race mixture.

That is to say, Saldaña-Portillo presumes “an all too easy conflation between the nationalist cultural context in Mexico and the subnational context of Chicano/a cultural production.” In the second place, Pérez regards “such cross-cultural borrowing and refashioning” as “the effect of a kind of a ‘minority’/third-world, post-nationalist environment” in which “kindred forms” are reconfigured as “the spiritual nature of all being, and thus its unity.” As Pérez notes, reconfiguring beliefs and practices that are likewise “politically oppositional to (neo)colonizing cultural and religious systems” is a means to counter “the reigning transnational practice of extreme exploitation of the planet and of an unskilled labor force that is disproportionately female and ‘of color.’” Rather than rehashing mestizaje, Anzaldúa’s spirit work suggests the possibility of enlarging one’s field of vision vis-à-vis “multiple layers [of perception and meaning] and through the signifying systems of different cultures.” Like other Chicana writers and artists, Anzaldúa points to “the path beyond both nepantlism and Eurocentrism.” Pérez’ reading of Anzaldúa demonstrates how the politics of the spiritual is a politics of the archive. Memory is produced as much as it is recorded. At this point, I would like to suggest that Chicana/o spiritualities point to the tension between different modes of archivization – e.g., a Mexican postcolonial archive juxtaposed with a Chicana post-nationalist archive. It is not simply a question of what is (and is not) in the archive – but rather which archive? Where does memory begin? And who decides? Chicana hybrid spiritualities are understood best as a critique of archivization.


74 For example, Derrida writes: “The technical structure of the archiving archive . . . determines the structure of the archivable content . . . . The archivization produces as much as it records the event.” See Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, 17; in connection with Pérez, “Spirit Glyphs,” 30-32.

75 Note: here, I have benefited from concepts in Sandhya Shetty and Elizabeth Jane Bellamy, “Postcolonialism’s Archive Fever,” review of Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, by Jacques
On the one hand, Carrasco suggests that the novel – in this case, Anaya’s *Bless Me, Ultima* – can be read as a representation of spiritual creativity. What he terms “the lyrics of Chicano spirituality” is based on the concept of sui generis religion – a notion that has had great influence over the academic study of religion. But, as I have argued, such an orientation can be too narrow. It is doubtful that a Chicana/o novel – *Bless Me, Ultima* or otherwise – is reducible to an “allegory of faith.” Even so, Carrasco points to one of the most significant “self-evident principles” of the field-Imaginary of Chicana/o literary and cultural studies: interpretation is to be based on a religious/secular divide. On the other hand, Pérez argues that Chicana writing and visual art practices – in this case, Anzaldúa’s *Borderlands/La Frontera* – can be read as “spirit glyphs,” a concept that brings contemporary Chicana works into conversation with post-conquest Nahua texts. What is more, Pérez suggests that many Chicana works turn “‘the conqueror’s culture to the advantage of the conquered.’” As I have suggested, such an approach links “the politics of the spiritual” with (in Derrida’s words) “the question of a politics of the archive.” In contrast to Saldaña-Portillo, Pérez counters the notion that Chicana/o spiritualities can be reduced to “single histories.” Rather, Pérez opens the door to a non-totalizing concept of “culturally hybrid spirituality” that not only “[signals] cultural specificity traditionally received” but also “[produces] culturally relevant visual ‘thought’ about the increasingly globalized, multiethnic, and economically polarized global cities of the present . . . .” Chicana spiritualities not only critique dominant forms of archivization but also represent an attempt to transform the politics of archivization itself. In this regard (and in the spirit of


76 For example, see Carrasco, “A Perspective for a Study of Religious Dimensions in Chicano Experience: *Bless Me, Ultima* as a Religious Text,” 207. Also, see above, n. 29.

77 Pease, “New Americanists: Revisionist Interventions into the Canon,” 11-12.


80 Pérez notes: “The search for (and creation of) more socially relevant spiritual beliefs and practices has characterized the United States since the mid-sixties and is thus hardly characteristic of U.S. Latina/o artists alone. What is different is the source of spiritualities cited, the politics of such drawing, and the possible effects of such inscriptions, given the historical and ongoing marginalized social, political, economic, and cultural status of Chicana/os as inequitably racialized ethnic minorities.” See Laura E. Pérez, “Hybrid Spiritualities and Chicana Altar-Based Art: The Work of Amalia Mesa-Bains,” in *Mexican American Religions: Spirituality, Activism, and Culture*, ed. Gastón Espinosa and Mario T. García (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 338, 342; in relation to José Rabasa, *Without History: Subaltern Studies, the
“intellectual bridge building in decolonial thought”) I turn to Gayatri Chakavorty Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988). Spivak’s text sheds light on the “layers” of colonial and postcolonial archival memory. For Spivak, textual layers ad infinitum constitute “the archive.” Reading archivally signifies reading subalternity in terms of “institutional textuality at the archaic origin” – beyond a Saidian concept of colonial modernity back to the archival violence of “antiquity.” How might Spivak regard the conviction that religion/secularism is a hermeneutic foundation? Likewise, how might Spivak complement Pérez’ assertion that spirituality can be read back to antiquity? In the subsequent chapters, I turn to these questions, among others, and attempt to link debates about religion in South Asian and Latin American subaltern studies with Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. Building on Pérez’s work, my goal is to focus attention on “the promise of subaltern studies” as a means to theorize Chicana/o religion and spirituality outside of “narratives that end up in single histories.”

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82 Note: my reading of Spivak builds on Shetty and Bellamy, “Postcolonialism’s Archive Fever,” especially 27-42 passim.

83 Rabasa, Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History, 5.
CHAPTER 2

THE RELIGIOUS/SECULAR DIVIDE:
RELIGIONSWISSENSCHAFT AND CHICANA/O LITERARY AND CULTURAL STUDIES

History of Religions is an outgrowth of the attempts to establish a Religionswissenschaft or science of religion in a number of European universities in the nineteenth century.


This chapter builds on Laurie Louise Patton’s brief study of the relation between religious and subaltern studies. Patton argues for three points of intersection: 1) the Marxist/Gramscian concept of religion in early subaltern studies; 2) debates on religion arising from later subalternists’ critical engagement with cultural studies, postmodernism, and postcolonial theory; and 3) the use of subalternity as a category of analysis within the field of religious studies. For Patton, each trend has taught us much about the study of the “religious aspects of peasant consciousness” – for example, the necessity of “acknowledging the role of religion in peasant consciousness and being careful not to reify it” (first trend); the ongoing issue – both in religious and subaltern studies – “of making the community an ‘it’ with firm boundaries and . . . [likewise] expressing a sympathy for the religious as a way of defining that community” (second trend); and lastly, the possibility of retooling religious studies vis-à-vis an improved understanding of the field’s “own Orientalist perspectives, both colonial and postcolonial” and/or a more nuanced portrait of “the cultural identity of the religious groups” under consideration (third trend). These trends have taught us much about the interrelations between religious and subaltern studies, but they have not engaged – at least, as Patton narrates it – the question of the relationship between religion and the archive. How might the concept of the archive help us to rethink the nexus between religion and subalternity? In what follows, I attempt to explore this question through Edward W. Said’s Orientalism (1978), a work that Patton cites as foundational for subalternists engaged with allied fields such as postcolonial theory.¹

Whereas Carrasco builds on the history of religions – what he describes as “an outgrowth of the attempts to establish a Religionswissenschaft or science of religion in a number of European universities in the nineteenth century”² – I look to the field of subaltern studies – and in particular, those debates Patton suggests emerged as subalternists “became more involved

with cultural studies, postmodernism, and the postcolonial project” (i.e., the second trend). If Carrasco links Chicana/o literary and cultural studies with the sui generis argument (e.g., the Chicana/o novel as allegory of faith), I start with Said’s critical engagement with the concept of the archive in *Orientalism*. More specifically, I focus attention on religion and the archive – as opposed to the question of a distinction between secular and Christian hermeneutics. As I will argue below, if we take seriously the concept of the archive, the fundamental question is not how to interpret and/or explain subaltern religions but more importantly, how to understand “the religious/secular divide.” It is my contention that Said’s notion of the archive can help us to reimagine the role of religion/secularism in Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. Rather than ordering “the field” into the religious on the one hand and the secular on the other, what needs to be addressed is the production-institutionalization of the Enlightenment dyad “the times of gods” versus “the time of history.”

It has been assumed that the study of Mexican American religions is best conceived as a conflict between two hermeneutical orientations: Christian theology and Religionswissenschaft. However, it appears that such a distinction – between theological and secular hermeneutics – may be impossible if, as Gil Anidjar has suggested, “Secularism is a name Christianity gave itself when it invented ‘religion.’” I realize that subaltern religions have been understood as “a form of resistant and political agency in [their] own right.” The notion of “the lyrics of Chicano spirituality” is a case in point. Yet, I can’t help but wonder if it’s possible to think otherwise – for example, outside a religion/secularism binary? What is gained and what is lost when the religious/secular divide is reified?

In chapter 1, I began to consider the pros and cons of the history of religions and Chicana feminist thought as critical approaches to Chicana/o religion and spirituality. I concluded with

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10 See above, n. 6.


12 Patton, “Subaltern Studies.”

the proposition that subaltern studies – and specifically, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s notion of reading archivally14 – might add to the critical works David Carrasco and Laura Elisa Pérez.15 This chapter focuses on Carrasco’s attempt to link Religionswissenschaft to Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. In chapter 3, I turn to Pérez’ critical distinction between secular religious studies and the politics of Chicana spirituality; and in chapter 4, I argue that a critique of archival memory is central to debates on religion and spirituality in Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. In what follows, I treat Carrasco’s thesis (i.e., over against Christian theology is history of religions) as a launching point for a statement of a new approach to the question of religion in Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. To begin with, I review Gastón Espinosa’s claim that Carrasco’s work marks a watershed in the history of the study of Mexican American religions.16 Then, I examine Said’s notion of the archive in the context of Orientalism and Indo-European studies. By way of conclusion, I suggest that Said’s concept of the archive can help us to rethink the relationship between religion and subalternity in Chicana/o literary and cultural studies.

The Study of Religion

In his essay “History and Theory in the Study of Mexican American Religions” (2008), Espinosa notes that David Carrasco’s secular turn in the early 1980s represents an “intellectual and methodological” coming of age for Mexican American religious studies. Whereas Carrasco values “liberation theology’s commitment to the poor and marginalized,” his work ultimately re-imagines “the field” as post-theological. With respect to the “movement” to displace Christian theology, Espinosa writes:

This movement away from the orbit of liberation theology and church histories to increasingly [secular] pluralistic religious and Chicano studies analyses no longer privileged a liberationist or institutional methodological approach to religion . . .. Unlike most contemporary scholars [e.g., Andrés G. Guerrero, Yolanda Tarango, et al] who were writing on liberation theology, Carrasco took many of his main theoretical and methodological cues from Mircea Eliade, Charles Long, Paul Wheatley, the Chicago School of the History of Religions, cultural anthropology, and Virgilio Elizondo’s theological anthropology of mestizaje.


For Espinosa, Carrasco’s move towards secularism has been instrumental in “the decentering of the scholarship on Mexican American religions.”\footnote{Ibid., 37, 36, 20-23, 33-34. Note: Espinosa ultimately rules out works prior to 1968 since in his view the authors of such works (e.g., Manuel Gamio) presumably did not (in his words) “see themselves as scholars of Mexican American religions per se and because they did not seek to self-consciously define or construct a field as such.”} In contrast with Enrique Dussel’s turn to Marxian thought,\footnote{By way of illustration, consider Dussel’s turn to Antonio Gramsci and the “unknown Marx.”} Carrasco’s pluralistic approach not only counters God-talk but also makes an effort “to create a language that explains what is otherwise expressed only by the language of religious insiders.”\footnote{Espinosa, “History and Theory in the Study of Mexican American Religions,” 38, quoting William E. Paden, “A New Comparativism: Reply to the Panelists,” \textit{Method & Theory in the Study of Religion} 8-1 (1996): 47.} Notwithstanding, I would like to suggest that Carrasco’s secular turn is important for an altogether different reason. In light of Gil Anidjar’s critique of the religious/secular divide, I maintain that the production-institutionalization of a secular religious studies approach in the field of Chicana/o literary and cultural studies signals not the end of Christian hegemony – but rather its continuity.\footnote{Anidjar, \textit{Semites: Race, Religion, Literature}, 55. Note: in this chapter, I limit myself to the import of Carrasco’s thesis re: over against Christian theology is history of religions. More specifically, I read Carrasco’s purported secular turn vis-à-vis debates re: self-reflexive critique in the Chicago School of the history of religions (e.g., Jonathan Z. Smith, Bruce Lincoln, et al). However, Carrasco’s thesis can be read otherwise. E.g., as Laura E. Pérez has observed: “Chicana/o and other U.S. Latina/o intellectuals, in the fields of religion and visual arts, along with U.S. Latina/o artists, are radically redefining our understanding of religious and cultural syncretism or American pluralism beyond what is still a Eurocentric idea that vestiges of the precolonial survive as largely incoherent fragments within the engulfing colonial culture.” In this regard, Carrasco’s thesis can be read not as reifying Christian hegemony (e.g., a “religious/secular divide”) but rather decolonizing select notions of religion and/or spirituality in Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. By way of illustration, what Carrasco calls “the return of Aztlan” can be understood (to borrow Pérez’ words) as an example of work that “navigates through, rather than to, dominant forms of Christianity.” I.e., a “secular” turn that takes account of “the return of Aztlan” can be understood itself as a critique of hermeneutical foundations at the root of the history of religions. See David Carrasco, \textit{The Aztecs: A Very Short Introduction} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 117-18; in relation to Pérez, \textit{Chicana Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities}, 94-95, 96.} If the study of religion is inseparable from the political program of secularism, then it is feasible that the study of Mexican American religions likewise may be inextricable from Christian imperialism.\footnote{An important contribution to the field of Chicana/o religious studies, Laura E. Pérez has mapped the varieties of Chicana feminist critiques of religion and spirituality. As Pérez notes: “Chicana intellectuals and artists from the 1960s to the present have self-consciously referenced spiritual beliefs and practices as culturally complex and contested social terrains where dominant cultural understandings of gender, ‘race,’ and sexuality are reproduced or rescripted. As feminists, they scrutinize the racialized gender and/or sexuality politics of European and Euroamerican Christianity, Chicano ‘folk’ Catholicism, and Mexica (‘Aztec’) and other indigenous beliefs, \textit{santería}, Buddhism, and so on.” See Pérez, \textit{Chicana Art: The Politics of...}}
Mexican American Religions

As Espinosa has argued, the contemporary academic study of Mexican American religions has its origin in the work of César Chávez, Gustavo Gutiérrez, Enrique Dussel, and Virgilio Elizondo, among others. He writes:

Over the past thirty-five years, scholars have often taken one of five approaches to the study of Mexican American religions: (1) traditional church history . . . (2) interdisciplinary liberation theology church history . . . (3) interdisciplinary popular theology and religion . . . (4) anthropology, psychology, and sociology . . . and (5) interdisciplinary phenomenological religious studies . . . Still other scholars have blended approaches or taken a Chicano studies/ethnic studies approach . . . Some scholars have drawn on Chicano literature and poetry . . . the writings of Reies López Tijerina, the Chicano Student Movement, Chicana feminism, Black studies, secular religious studies, and the emerging scholarship on postcolonialism, transnational studies, critical theory, ethnic studies, and race, class, gender, and sexuality.

Of particular interest is the historical development of “the field”; it seems that scholars have blended theology with a variety of humanistic approaches. (Following Anidjar’s thesis, we might assume where theology was, there is now the interdisciplinary study of religion.) Further, he argues that the study of Mexican American religions is not simply a sub-field of Latina/o religions but “should itself be an academic field of intellectual inquiry.” What distinguishes Mexican American religions from US Latina/o religions is the singularity of Mexican American history and traditions in the US southwest, demographic statistics that point to a growing Mexican American community, and the increasing diversity of Mexican American religiosity. For Espinosa, it is imperative that Mexican American religious studies be understood as an autonomous “field” of methodological-theoretical inquiry.22

Like Luis Leal, who views the historical development of Chicana/o literature as an uninterrupted tradition that reaches back to the Spanish conquest,23 Espinosa maintains that “the field” of Mexican American religions stretches back to the Spanish invasion of the northern frontier. As the earliest works in the field’s development, he cites ecclesiastical records and histories written from the 16th to the early 20th centuries as well as theological studies and pluralistic research produced between the 1920s and the 1950s – though, the landmark year 1968 marks the “birth” of “the field” of Mexican American religious studies. Especially important to Espinosa are the critical works of Chávez, Gutiérrez, Dussel, and Elizondo. For example, he underscores Chávez’ critique of the Catholic Church in “The Mexican-American and the

22 Espinosa, “History and Theory in the Study of Mexican American Religions,” 17-20, 43 passim.
Church” (1968), Gutiérrez’ development of a “theology of liberation” in *Teología de la liberación: Perspectivas* (1971), Dussel’s view of a “praxis-based historical methodology” in *Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina* (1974), and Elizondo’s attempt to articulate a “mestizo paradigm” in texts like *Galilean Journey: The Mexican-American Promise* (1983) and *The Future Is Mestizo: Life Where Cultures Meet* (1988). Taking into consideration the influence of such works, Espinosa notes that “the field” of Mexican American religions (at least, since 1968) is to some extent “a footnote to liberation theology – in one manifestation or another.” In fact, he suggests that even “the rise of Chicana feminism and . . . mujerista theology” have been “directly influenced” by the largely liberationist “praxis-based” methodologies of Gutiérrez and Elizondo.

In addition to liberation theology, Espinosa suggests that secular religious studies and Chicana/o literature have had an impact on “the field” of Mexican American religions. For example, he cites the social scientific analyses of “Part Five: The Role of Churches” in *The Mexican-American People: The Nation’s Second Largest Minority* (1970) along with literary works such as Carlos Castañeda’s *The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge* (1968), Rudolfo A. Anaya’s *Bless Me, Ultima: A Novel* (1972), and Gloria Anzaldúa’s *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (1987). Such texts mark what is described as an “interdisciplinary and canon-busting movement away from institutional theology.” In particular, Espinosa underscores how the work of Castañeda, Anaya, and Anzaldúa takes issue with “Western” and/or “traditional” ways of being and knowing. Regarding the import of such literary works, he writes:

They [i.e., the literary works] focus on noninstitutional forms of religiosity and theology and treat the U.S.-Mexico borderlands as a hybrid shamanic space that challenges traditional Catholic and Protestant hegemony, traditions, and way of life.

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25 Espinosa, “History and Theory in the Study of Mexican American Religions,” 20-33 passim. Note: Chicana feminists were producing critical studies of religion and the Catholic Church anterior to (or at least contemporaneous with) Gutiérrez and Elizondo. For example, see Alma M. García, ed., *Chicana Feminist Thought: The Basic Historical Writings* (New York: Routledge, 1997). I would like to thank Laura Pérez for bringing said critical interventions to my attention.

Such works represent a shift away from Catholic and Protestant institutional hegemonies. Still, in Espinosa’s periodization of the field’s development, the work of David Carrasco is the most significant turning point. As he maintains, Carrasco’s “A Perspective for a Study of Religious Dimensions in Chicano Experience: Bless Me, Ultima as a Religious Text” (1982) signals “the methodological crystallization of a Mexican American religious studies paradigm that expanded the methodological and theoretical boundaries beyond the field and scope of liberation theology.” Also key are Quetzalcoatl and the Irony of Empire: Myths and Prophecies in the Aztec Tradition (1982), Religions of Mesoamerica: Cosmovision and Ceremonial Centers (1990), and most recently, “The Religious Vision of Gloria Anzaldúa: Borderlands/La Frontera as a Shamanic Space” (2008).27 Such texts articulate a shift in focus – from Christian theology to Religionswissenschaft. Ultimately, Carrasco’s work marks a watershed in the field’s development. As Espinosa contends, “It [i.e., Carrasco’s approach to the study of religion] purports to be entirely naturalistic in orientation and does not assume an a priori belief in the existence of God.”28

Drawing on Carrasco’s secular-pluralistic approach, Espinosa attempts to define what he calls “a Mexican American religious studies framework.” He insists that such a “framework” would be best conceived as “largely pluralistic, humanistic, nonsectarian, and nontheological.” Espinosa writes:

I argue that it is precisely the Mexican American blending and combinative reconstruction of Mexican and “American” traditions, customs, practices, symbols, and beliefs in the United States that we call the distinctively Mexican American/Chicano religious expressions or Mexican American/Chicano/a religions.

In Espinosa’s view, Mexican American religions can be separated from other “religious phenomena” by isolating “a Mexican American or ‘Chicano’ inflection.” To be precise, he maintains: “This combinative hybrid spirituality has given birth to the predicament of neapanta, or of being located in the middle, on the border – ‘en La Frontera.’” In view of Carrasco’s distinction between Christian theology and Religionswissenschaft, Espinosa proposes “an ethno-phenomenological approach . . . [as a means] to bridge the chasm that often separates religious studies from theology by maintaining dialogue with theologians and religious studies scholars.” The goal of such an approach, it would seem, is to move “the field” of Mexican American religions out of an either/or situation (i.e., either theology or secular religious studies) toward a more productive synergy that focuses on “the way ordinary people find hope and interpret their very real and imaginary universes.” Even so, I can’t help but wonder why “the field” must be “in the middle” of the religious/secular divide (e.g., Espinosa notes: “I do not use secular and atheistic interchangeably.”) rather than “on the border” of said binary.29 Is it possible to think

29 Ibid., 39-43 passim, 46 n. 8.
about religion/secularism from the vantage point of what José Rabasa has described as “elsewheres”?

Christianity

Might colonial/postcolonial theory transform our understanding of religion, secularism, and the religious/secular divide? For example, how might Said’s *Orientalism* help us to re-imagine what Espinosa designates “the chasm that . . . separates [secular] religious studies from [Christian] theology”? As Gil Anidjar notes in “Secularism” (2008), there has been much debate about the meaning of the secular in Said, yet the question remains: does he engage with religion, and if so, to what extent? In Anidjar’s view, Said’s work has been instrumental in bringing about critical studies of “religion.” He writes:

> It is important to acknowledge that . . . a number of critics have learned from Said or taken their point of departure from his work . . .. In his footsteps they have sought to explore the role and function of religion in the dissemination of colonial knowledge and the founding of institutions . . .. They have also learned from Said when theorizing not only “culture and imperialism” but religion and imperialism . . . and with it what has been described as the globalization of religion.

In view of the proposition that Orientalism inevitably stretches across disciplines as well as discourses, Anidjar questions the argument that Said is indifferent to religion – that Said leaves religion to religious studies scholars and/or theological communities. In addition, Anidjar challenges the notion that Said has in the end orientalized religion – that he “can be accused of ‘doing’ to religion what the Orientalist ‘did’ to the Orient.” Finally, Anidjar counters the notion that Said proceeds as if religion “persists as an illusion [as in Freud], an aberrant fossil [as in E. B. Tylor, or] the opium of the people [as in Marx]” – that he presumes religion has been already explained away.32 Anidjar notes: “Everything is as if nothing more [needs] to be said about religion . . . [either] because religion is not what Said made of it or because the truly important . . . matter is instead secularism . . . [or for that matter] ‘culture.’” On the contrary, Anidjar argues, Said does in fact “think and write about religion, about theological and quasi-theological structures and institutions, religious and quasi-religious issues and practices.” However, Said attempts to examine religion and secularism at one and the same time – this distinct from post-Eliadean scholars of religion who maintain that the idea of religion was created by and for a secular academy (e.g., J. Z. Smith has argued: “If we have understood the archaeological and textual record correctly, man has had his entire history in which to imagine deities and modes of interaction with them. But man, more precisely western man, has had only the last few centuries

31 Espinosa, “History and Theory in the Study of Mexican American Religions,” 43.
in which to imagine religion.”). Much like Talal Asad’s project to counter “the triumphalist history of the secular” with “an anthropology of secularism,” Said views the religious and the secular as two interdependent cultural-social structural constructs.

In Anidjar’s view, Said’s work draws attention to the inscription of difference – as in “we” are secular, “they” are religious. What appear to be “generic” designations are in fact inventions of one particular historical tradition: Christianity. The “singularity” and “specificity” of Christianity is evident in its “peculiar discourse about itself . . . as it [has] understood itself and its history.” Christianity has reinvented itself as “secular criticism” by means of a “critique of religion.” Here, Anidjar seeks to underscore the role of “one particular ‘religion’” in its “division of the real.” He writes:

The “secularized religion” of which Said writes [which is to say, “the privileged agent of Orientalism”] . . . is after all not just any religion. Nor was it just any “theology” or “culture” . . . . It was Christianity, and more specifically, Western Christendom . . . . Much more than an idea, Christianity is a massive institution, the sum total of philosophical and scientific, economic and political achievements, discursive, administrative, and institutional accomplishments, the singularity and specificity of which are not to be doubted . . . . [One] particular “religion” is the one whose self-identification with, whose understanding and enforced institutionalization of, that most Latin of words [has] shaped the current, hegemonic use and dissemination of that very same word and its ensuing division of the real, what Jacques Derrida has called mondialatinisation and Peter van der Veer “the globalization of Christianity.”

Christianity effaced its “singularity and specificity” by means of “mondialatinisation.” On the other hand, after having renamed itself religion (i.e., after vera religio gave way to the generic concept religion), Western Christendom opposed itself, “judged itself no longer Christian, no longer ‘religious’” – this in view of pagan communities and traditions. In a final act of self-effacement, Western Christendom “disenchanted its own world,” dividing itself into a series of binaries including “private and public, politics and economics . . . religious and secular.” Having

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35 Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 39-43 passim.
set the stage for “the globalization of Christianity,” Western Christendom reinvented itself as secular.

Following Said, Anidjar argues that Christianity “secularized” itself by means of armies and science – through “the diligent agency of its soldiers and . . . unique scientific advancements.” Through force (e.g., guns) and discourse (e.g., the science of religion) Western Christendom became “as unique and worldly as ever.” Anidjar writes:

Colonizing the world since 1492, Christianity slowly granted other communities and traditions, those it exploited or converted, massacred and “civilized,” enslaved and exterminated, new structures of authority and domination, new and newly negotiable configurations of power. It granted them the name it had only ever attributed to itself, the very name of “religion.”

The “secularized religion” of Christianity extended itself through agents (i.e., soldiers, missionaries, scholars, politicians, writers, merchants, etc.) who established in one way or another “the terms of discourse” for religion. On the other hand, such agents likewise established a contradictory “rhetoric of freedom as critique.” Anidjar states:

I propose to take for granted that the religious and the secular are terms that, hopelessly codependent, continue to inform each other and have persisted historically, institutionally, in masking . . . the one pertinent religion, the one and diverse Christianity and Western Christendom in their transformations and reincarnations, producing the love (or hate) of religion . . . . Like that unmarked race, which, in the related discourse of racism, became invisible or “white,” Christianity invented the distinction between religious and secular, and thus it made religion. It made religion the problem . . . . And it made it [i.e., religion] into an object of criticism that needed to be no less than transcended.

Like whiteness, Christianity has in fact “unmarked” itself. (Here, one might ask whether like whiteness Christianity also has “a cash value.” Are we not encouraged to “invest” in the religious/secular divide, “to remain true to an identity [as George Lipsitz has observed in a different but related context] that provides . . . resources, power, and opportunity”?) Nevertheless, the production-institutionalization of a religious/secular divide is “a social fact”

38 Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 43-45 passim, 53. Note: in this regard, also relevant is Laura E. Pérez’ study of “decolonizing spiritualities.” E.g., Pérez writes: “If it is well known that a Western, imperialist Christianity helped to impose a colonizing self-loathing in the native and their mixed offspring, then it is known, though less so, that it is decolonizing for us to explore the issue of spirituality and its many different cultural understandings for ourselves and our communities.” See Laura E. Pérez, “Decolonizing Spiritualities: Spiritualities That Are Decolonizing and the Work of Decolonizing Our Understanding of These,” in Latin@ss in the World-System: Decolonization Struggles in the Twenty-First Century U.S. Empire, ed. Ramón Grosfoguel, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and José David Saldívar (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2005), 162.
39 See Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of Myth, Ritual, and Classification, 3-5.
40 Said, Orientalism, quoted in Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 44.
that continues “with all-too-real consequences.” Similar to “the construction and transformation of racial meanings” (as set out by Michael Omi and Howard Winant), the religious/secular divide “continues to shape both identities and institutions in significant ways” – this despite (or perhaps because of) secularism’s self-avowed transcendence of religion (e.g., as is well-known, J. Z. Smith has observed: “While there is a staggering amount of data, of phenomena, of human experiences and expressions that might be characterized in one culture or another, by one criterion or another, as religious – there is no data for religion.”). In a sense, secularism’s attempt to move beyond religion is reminiscent of what Omi and Winant have described as “‘color-blind’ racial politics.” Presumably, any and all religions are to be treated equally under the color-blind regime of secularized Christianity.

Whereas Carrasco and Espinosa divide “the field” into Christian theology on the one hand (e.g., Christian concepts as “a powerful NORM”) and secular religious studies on the other (e.g., religious phenomena understood “on their own plane of reference”), Anidjar has suggested that theology and religious studies are one and the same approach. In essence, what he proposes is an anti-Christian approach to the religious/secular divide; he views the either/or logic of religion/secularism as a “complex of social meanings” that is “constantly being transformed by political struggle.” The religious and the secular are inextricable – two terms that work

41 George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from Identity Politics, rev. and exp. ed. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), vii. Note: here, one might also link W. E. B. Du Bois’ concept of the wages of whiteness with the religious/secular divide. I would like to thank José David Saldívar for bringing Du Bios’ notion to my attention.


44 Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 45-47 passim. Note: it should be acknowledged that Chicana artists have responded to said discourse in a variety of ways – e.g., a voice of dissent to a Eurocentric atheist mandate; a rebuttal to Darwinian-based theories of religion; a resource for social justice praxis; an expression of socio-cultural hybridities; and rethinking the notions of art and artmaking. See Pérez, Chicana Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities, 2-3.


47 Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s, 54-55. Note: in this regard, also relevant are the “transgressive and decolonizing” goals of the Latina/o Critical and Comparative Studies Group at American Academy of Religion. E.g., see “Latina/o
together as “strategic devices and as mechanisms of obfuscation and self-binding.” As Bruce Lincoln has observed, religion (e.g., myth and ritual) can “serve members of subordinate classes . . . in their attempts to demystify, delegitimate, and deconstruct the established norms, institutions, and discourses that play a role in constructing their subordination.” It is not surprising, therefore, that Anidjar considers the religious/secular divide as a discrete concept: for to separate religion from secularism would no doubt undermine the “analytics of the power of the religious/secular divide, an understanding of its strategic and disciplinary operations.” In spite of (and because of) secularism’s self-avowed transcendence of religion, the religious/secular divide “continues [as Omi and Winant note in a different though related context] to play a fundamental role in structuring and representing the social world.” Through “historically situated projects” (e.g., Orientalism), the religious/secular divide is codified as “common sense.”

With this in mind, Anidjar argues that Christianity persists not only in religion and religious criticism but also in secularism and secular criticism. Secularism is “part of a discourse of power and of institutions” that seems to create a desire to know the object of “religion” (e.g., Carrasco notes at the outset of his reading of Anaya’s novel: “As a historian of religion, [I am] fascinated by the way in which human beings experience and express their sense of the sacred powers in their lives . . .”). Contrary to the either/or logic implicit in Carrasco and Espinosa (not to mention their proclivity to separate religion from secularism – to read the religious and the secular as “essentially fixed categories”), Anidjar claims: “Secularism is a name Christianity gave itself when it invented ‘religion,’ [when it] named its other or others as ‘religions.'”

**Said’s Orientalism**

Anidjar’s central thesis is the following: Said demonstrates how Orientalism is secularism; his text *Orientalism* is “a critique of Christianity, secularized or not.” Anidjar writes: Said does clearly point out that as a field of study, “in the Christian West, Orientalism is considered to have commenced its formal existence with the decision of the Church

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49 Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*, 55-56, 60. Note: it should be acknowledged that Omi and Winant build on the Gramscian notion of “common sense.”

Beyond J. Z. Smith’s notion of “imagining religion” (i.e., “Religion is solely the creation of the scholar’s study.”),\footnote{Smith, \textit{Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown}, xi.} Anidjar suggests that Western Christendom manufactured a religious/secular divide. Christianity “invented” (that is, produced and institutionalized) Judaism and Islam as “religions.” On the other hand, Western Christendom reinvented itself as Orientalism – a tactic whereby Christianity became secularism and thus “forgot and forgave itself.” Such an enterprise can be understood in terms of academic polemics (e.g., J. Z. Smith states: “It [i.e., religion] is created for the scholar’s analytic purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison and generalization.”).\footnote{Ibid.} But, it appears that the invention of religion and secularism materialized “across discourses of knowledge and power” as Orientalism (in Said’s words) “accomplished its self-metamorphosis from a scholarly discourse [i.e., Christianity] to an imperial institution [i.e., secularism].”\footnote{Said, \textit{Orientalism}, 95, quoted in Anidjar, \textit{Semites: Race, Religion, Literature}, 49. Note: in this regard, Laura E. Pérez observes: “Notions of the spiritual [i.e., that having to do with the s/Spirit(s)] circulate unevenly, and with differing political significance. Thus, though we might be able to generalize about the nature or meaning of the spiritual, doing so runs the risk of collapsing cultural differences when that conversation is a cultural monologue rather than a dialogue with perspectives rooted in different cultural assumptions.” See Pérez, \textit{Chicana Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities}, 18.}

Christianity became secularism by means of Orientalism.

In a sense, secular knowledge of the religious is imperial power not because it is secular but because it has been invented as such; secularism is an alibi for imperialism. Anidjar writes: “Said repeatedly, \textit{oppositionally}, pointed to the significance of a ruling elite, which employed or made use of an intellectual elite . . . who together massively created, expanded, sustained, and legitimized a vast structure of political, economic, and cultural domination over the Orient and ultimately over most of the world” (e.g., Said notes: “The accommodation between the intellectual class and the new imperialism might very well be accounted one of the special triumphs of Orientalism.”).\footnote{Said, \textit{Orientalism}, 322, quoted in Anidjar, \textit{Semites: Race, Religion, Literature}, 49.} Said is opposed to secularism; as an oppositional critic, he underscores the coloniality (so to speak) of secular politics, economics, culture, etc. What appears to be “a victorious cause” (i.e., secularization of the religious) is in fact a justification for imperial expansion. Secularism is “internal and external colonialism.” The secular is produced and reproduced through culture and social structures; it persists as the notion of “progress.” Secularism purports to modernize the religious – to enlighten the colonized. By the same token, religion is premodern – yet on the other hand, subsequent to the so-called “Age of Discovery.” As J. Z. Smith remarks: “The term ‘religion’ has had a long history, much of it, prior to the sixteenth century, irrelevant to contemporary usage.”\footnote{Smith, \textit{Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion}, 180.} The term religion acquires its contemporary sense in relation to (i.e., as the opposite of) secularism. Again, “secularism is,” Anidjar suggests, “a name Christianity gave itself when it invented ‘religion,’ [when it] named
its other or others as ‘religions.’” Religion impedes “progress” and thus makes possible the “victorious cause” of secularism. Religion is whatever counters or is encountered as unassimilable to the project of secularism (e.g., cultural nationalism, the “religions” of subalterns, liberation theology, etc.). Having religion, it would appear, is similar to the predicament of having race: both terms convey what Aníbal Quijano has described as the “coloniality of power.” (Here, one might suggest that the religious/secular divide is similar to Quijano’s “racial axis.”) The religious/secular divide not only represents “the basic experience of colonial domination” but also organizes “the more important dimensions of global power.”\textsuperscript{59} As bedfellows in a modern/colonial “construction of difference,” race and religion are part and parcel of one and the same enterprise: secularism.\textsuperscript{60}

Secularism thus racializes religion. Anidjar notes: “To uphold secularism (or, for that matter, religion) . . . is to oppose the world and those who inhabit it rather than those who make it unlivable.” Secularism is an attempt to “blame the victim.” Whether or not the religious are able to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps (so to speak) is a matter of “willingness and ability to accept the norms and values” of secularism – and not a matter of “concrete sociopolitical dynamics” within which the religious “operate.”\textsuperscript{62} Again, as J. Z. Smith has argued: “There is no data for religion [or, for that matter, race].”\textsuperscript{63} Religion is “otherworldly” – in spite of the fact that religiosity is ubiquitous in the world. As a foil for secularism, religion denotes racialization (e.g., well known is Rudolf Otto’s description of “religious experience” as “wholly other.”).\textsuperscript{64} Religion signifies difference – not sui generis “wholly” otherness but a geopolitical “construction of difference.”\textsuperscript{65} As Anidjar states: “To uphold secularism . . . is to erase the fact that secularism . . . [serves] inequality.” Secularism serves “one particular religion . . . and one economic game . . . [all the while] indifferent to religion yet producing religion as a (generic) problem.” To uphold secularism is to erase the “civilizing mission” implicit in secular


\textsuperscript{61} Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 48-50 passim.

\textsuperscript{62} Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s, 150, 21-22.

\textsuperscript{63} Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown, xi.


projects such as human rights, sovereignty, and so forth. Secularism produces the very inequality that it opposes (e.g., Orientalism produces the Orient as religion.). Regarding the “geopolitics” of secularism, Anidjar writes:

What does secularism make us hate, then? Racism, nationalism, sexual inequalities, and, all right, religion. But whose religion? And where? And who advocates secularism? Who opposes racism, nationalism, sexual inequalities, and religion, and from where? With what effects? What are the geopolitics of that “struggle for justice,” the struggle against the oppression of women and, yes, against anti-Semitism?

Here, Anidjar calls attention to “the locus of enunciation” from which the “‘struggle for justice’” is articulated. 66 Secularism opposes yet produces inequity: what is opposed is produced for someone from somewhere in relation to coloniality. Secularism creates hate (e.g., racism, sexual inequalities, religion, etc.). With this in mind, Anidjar insists that Said’s “key words” (that is, Orientalism, Imperialism, and Secularism) are connected. He maintains: “Secularism is Orientalism. And Orientalism is Christianity. It is Christian Imperialism.” 67

Christian imperialism

For Anidjar, Said’s Orientalism is a critical study of religion. He states: “Orientalism reveals that religion [in this case, the “Semitic Orient”] is a discursive device that enables the workings of power . . . [through] key distinctions it produces or participates in producing, whether epistemologically, politically, or legally . . . (as in ‘we’ are secular, ‘they’ are religious).” Again, religion is a foil for “the discourse of power [e.g., the nation-state] that legitimates itself and presents itself as secular.” But, Anidjar claims, this is not to say that Said “denies agency to non-Christians, attributing it only to an all-powerful, determining Christianity.” (Well-known is the charge that Said’s emphasis on “representation” [read: mimesis] ultimately “pictures the colonised as mute and passive, and the coloniser as victorious and ubiquitous.”) 68 On the contrary, Said’s work presents a “theory of agency” that centers on “historical occurrences, on the actual deployment of power in its specific modes and strategies [not to mention ‘its effects’]” (e.g., the notion of double agency implicit in Christianity). What is more, it may seem that religion is somewhat of “an afterthought” in Orientalism. Absent from Said’s study are the exploits of priests, theologians, religious scholars, and missionaries. Instead, he stresses the “elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts” of “secular agents” (i.e., “poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial

66 Note: I borrow the concept of a “locus of enunciation” from Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization. For Mignolo, “understanding” is specific to one’s “locus enuntiationis.”
67 Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 50-52 passim.
68 By way of illustration, see Firdous Azim, “Post-Colonial Theory,” in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. 9, Twentieth-Century Historical, Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, ed. Christa Knellwolf and Christopher Norris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 238.
Though, as Anidjar has suggested, the Orient is religion (i.e., “secularism is a name Christianity gave itself when it invented ‘religion,’ named its other or others as ‘religions.’”). Religion is the condition of possibility for Orientalism. In a sense, Anidjar claims, “Islam is the key figure in the making of the Orient (and hence the Occident) . . . . No Orientalism without Christianity, nor without Islam (or Judaism).” Orientalism presupposes the notion of a “Semitic Orient” – and in particular, “a ‘rigorous Christian picture of Islam.’” Islam is construed as an “imitation of a Christian imitation of true religion.” The Orient is thus “accommodated” to a putative history of religion. As Anidjar notes: “Islam is at the center of the Orientalist imagination.” Islam becomes a religion – which is to say, “the privileged site of an endless enterprise of explanation and preoccupation.” (As a general rule, theories of religion are classified as either functional [i.e., “explanatory”] or substantive [i.e., “interpretive”].) On the other hand, at the core of the Orientalist imagination is the notion of disenchantment. Orientalism implies a loss of religion. As Said notes: “Modern Orientalism derives from the secularizing elements in eighteenth-century European culture” – as in the invention of comparative disciplines such as “philology, anatomy, jurisprudence, [and] religion.” (J. Z. Smith identifies “four modes or styles of comparison” that have shaped the study of religion: the ethnographic, the encyclopaedic, the morphological, and the evolutionary.) For Anidjar, “it is at this point – and at this point only – that Christianity can become one among many ‘religions’ rather than the Church confronting Jews, Muslims, and other heretics.” Christianity is in other words reinvented as “the ‘secularized religion’ of Orientalism.” “The completion and achievement of Christianity” is manifested “in and through science, in and through Orientalism” – which is to say, in and through the formation of an Aryan/Semitic binary. In this sense, “Said demonstrates,” insists Anidjar, “that Orientalism is an enterprise that produces rather than reproduces religion.” Religion is not “a priori” (in a Kantian sense) – not innate knowledge. 

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69 Said, Orientalism, 2, quoted in Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 55.
70 Said, Orientalism, 61, quoted in Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 57.
71 Said, Orientalism, 66, quoted in Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 58.
72 Said, Orientalism, 67, quoted in Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 58.
73 Pals, Eight Theories of Religion.
74 Said, Orientalism, 120, quoted in Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 59.
75 Said, Orientalism, 117, quoted in Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 59.
76 Smith, Map Is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions, 244.
77 Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 59, quoting Said. For example, see Said, Orientalism, 113-23.
78 On the other hand, as Laura E. Pérez notes: “Progressive intellectuals and artists and other well-educated Latin Americans and U.S. Latina/os have largely accepted the rejection of both Judeo-Christian, Indigenous, and African diasporic spiritualities, in favor of abstract philosophical definitions of an increasingly atheistic/godless concept of humankind’s spiritual nature, where instead, spirit is replaced by Eurocentric concepts of intellect, artistic sensibility, political sensibility, and in poststructuralist thought by the rigorously vague and detheified concepts of khora, excess, aporia, supplement, and other discursive loopholes. Whatever we may personally think of creation, deity or deities, and the spiritual nature of man, intellectually, Progressives, have ended up with Western man colonizing even the spiritual imaginary through so-called atheism that remains nonetheless in its negation, Eurocentric.” See Pérez,
Rather, as Anidjar contends: “Where Christianity was, there is now religion . . ..” Again, religion is “a discursive device that enables the workings of power.” Where Christianity was, there is now a religious/secular divide. Said’s *Orientalism* demonstrates how “nineteenth-century Orientalists install the foundations of modern knowledge. Before sociology and anthropology, before literature even, there was [the study of] the Orient as religion.” For Anidjar, Said’s *Orientalism* demonstrates how Christian Europe became secular and thus the Semites became nothing but religious.  

In one sense, Said links the formation of a religious/secular divide with Christian imperialism. In the first place, the concept of religion denotes something that (in Said’s words) “could be studied apart from the economics, sociology, and politics of the Islamic peoples . . .. History, politics, and economics do not matter. Islam is Islam, the Orient is the Orient.” Orientalism sets the stage for the study of religion (as in the anthropology and sociology of religion, history of religions, etc.). After Orientalism, “religion” signifies sui generis data: putative “religious dimensions” are detached from politics, economics, and so forth. For instance, Anidjar notes that Arab or Islamic nationalism is viewed not as nationalism (e.g., politics, sociology) but instead as religion (e.g., myth, ritual, etc.). (Or, perhaps, in the case of Chicana/o nationalism, Carrasco suggests that Anaya’s novel depicts “a few religious dimensions [i.e., sui generis data] characteristic of and perhaps fundamental to Chicano experience.”) In the second place, Orientalism designates religion as “the quintessential enemy of secular civilization.” Essentially, as far as Anidjar is concerned, “Islam is to Europe what ‘religious criticism’ is to ‘secular criticism,’ what ‘religion’ is to ‘secularism.’” Religion signifies not only racialized otherness but also peripheral space: Islam. On the other hand, secularism is a sign of whiteness and scientific omniscience: Europe. Religion calls for the militarization of secularity. (Here, one might also explore the relation between Orientalism and Samuel P. Huntington’s notion of “the clash of civilizations.” Though Huntington praises Said’s work and is critical of the “uniform and negative way which Western Orientalism allegedly once portrayed the East,” he nevertheless regards “religion” as “a central defining characteristic of civilizations.” For example, he designates “Islamic civilization” as one of the West’s foremost antagonists. Huntington notes: “In the long run . . . Mohammed wins out. Christianity [i.e., ‘the West’] spreads primarily by conversion, Islam by conversion and reproduction.”) Without question,  


Said considers Orientalism “a political doctrine willed over the Orient.”83 The Orient comes to represent “difference” and “weakness” at one and the same time.84 Yet, Anidjar notes, Said demonstrates likewise that “essential to an understanding of that East/West difference is the transformation of both East and West into ‘religions.’” The formation of “religions” is a condition of possibility for Western Christendom to reinvent itself as secularism – as “new and improved, reformed and secularized.” Such a transformation divides the world into racialized religions on the one hand and a secularized religion on the other. For Anidjar, Orientalism is “covering Islam” – making and masking race as religion. In fact, it seems that disciplinary enterprises such as Religionswissenschaft are “covering religion.”85 The history of religions purports to be neither religious nor secular; instead, the discipline asserts the irreducibility of “the sacred” to sidestep the presumed reductionism of Christianity and the social sciences. In other words, similar to Orientalism, history of religions appears to approach “religion” as nothing but “religion” (e.g., in a well-known passage, Mircea Eliade maintains: “A religious phenomenon will only be recognized as such if it is grasped at its own level, that is to say, if it is studied as something religious. To try to grasp the essence of such a phenomenon by means of psychology, sociology, economics, linguistics, art or any other study is false; it misses the one unique and irreducible element in it – the element of the sacred.”).86 Or again, in Said’s words: “Islam is [nothing but] Islam, the Orient is [nothing but] the Orient” – this despite Wendy Doniger’s attempt to rethink “the sui generis claim”87 in terms of “multivocality.”88 (For Doniger, what she terms “the present climate of anti-Orientalism” has only strengthened the comparative enterprise. She writes: “The gift that the postcolonial critique has given us is a heightened awareness of what we are doing, why, and the dangers involved. But the gift sours when the giver takes it back by arguing that these dangers are so great that we cannot do it [i.e., comparison] at all. We should use the postcolonial consciousness . . . to show how myths [and the comparative study of myths] can be used as ghetto-blasters . . . [that] blast apart the ghettos of ideology.” No doubt, what Doniger describes as the project to “supplement the tunnel vision of identity politics with the wide screen of cross-cultural studies” is a sort of “covering religion” – with or without the “ghetto-blasters.”)89 Following Tomoko Masuzawa, Anidjar suggests that “Europe ['the West'] came to a distinct kind of self-consciousness” through Orientalism and by extension, it would seem, through disciplinary operations that regard religion as “something

83 Said, Orientalism, 204, quoted in Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 61.
84 Ibid.
87 Note: I borrow the phrase “sui generis claim” from McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia, e.g., xi.
89 Ibid., 66, 70-71. Also, see n. 85 above.
irreducibly religious in nature” – as in comparative mythology, Religionswissenschaft, secular religious studies, the study of religion, and so forth. Anidjar notes:

Whereas “for many centuries Europeans had a well-established convention for categorizing the peoples of the world into four parts . . . namely, Christians, Jews, Mohammedans . . . and the rest [e.g., heathens],” what came to pass in the course of the transformation Said so cogently describes [i.e., the invention of secularism] is that “this conventional ordering began to lose its ruling authority . . . [There] suddenly appeared an entirely new system, namely, a [hierarchical] list of roughly ten to a dozen ‘world religions.’”

Clearly, it is imperative to probe “the invention of world religions” – not to mention its role in the production-institutionalization of the supposition that Europe is “a harbinger of universal history . . . a prototype of unity amid plurality.” But, for Anidjar, Said’s study contributes an altogether distinct observation: religion cannot be regarded as a sui generis category. Instead, religion is part of a Christian imperial “apparatus.” Anidjar maintains: “Orientalism is no mere political doctrine (although it is that too); it is also a religious one (and, to be sure, an economic and scientific one).” Said underscores the “persistence of Christianity as a singular deployment of that division in its multiple configurations, at once ‘religious’ and ‘secular.’” Thus envisaged, Said’s Orientalism is a critique of Christianity. Said establishes how “the global division between religious and secular” is produced and institutionalized as a normative binary. In Anidjar’s view, Said’s critical work is opposed not only to religion but also to secularism. Said demonstrates how Christianity is religion and secularism at one and the same time. Thus, Anidjar suggests that Said’s “oppositional” criticism may be understood better as “anti-Christian” criticism.

**Oppositional Criticism**

As Espinosa notes, the emergence of Carrasco’s pluralistic approach to religion is a key moment in the historical development of “the field” of Mexican American religions. In contrast to Chávez and Elizondo, Carrasco controverts God-talk and instead “attempts to ‘create a language that explains what is otherwise expressed only by the language of religious insiders.’”

William E. Paden writes:

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92 Masuzawa, *The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism*, xi.
The summons to go beyond culturally constituted languages is . . . part of the comparativist’s point of view . . . . A single culture does not explain itself, but the comparative study of cultures begins to . . . [Thus, by] forming . . . comparativist categories, students of religion create a language for explaining the otherwise particularistic languages of culture-specific, one-world claims with all their absoluteness, singularity, and self-confining nature.  

Taking into account Eric J. Sharpe’s *Comparative Religion: A History* (1975), Walter H. Capps’ *Religious Studies: The Making of a Discipline* (1995), along with Donald Wiebe’s *The Politics of Religious Studies: The Continuing Conflict with Theology in the Academy* (1998), Espinosa defines secular religious studies (e.g., history of religions, comparative religion, world religions, etc.) as a scientific, skeptical, and comparativist orientation that seeks to interpret or explain in an interdisciplinary manner the meaning and/or function of religious phenomena that “transcend many religious traditions.” In fact, Carrasco’s “naturalistic” approach to the study of religion can be traced, Espinosa argues, “back through Eliade, Rudolf Otto, and Gerardus van der Leeuw to Enlightenment philosophers such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant, John Locke, and nineteenth-century anthropologists such as Max Müller and E. B. Tylor.” Thus, it appears that there is a long-standing critique of Christian hegemony at the core of Carrasco’s secular turn. Espinosa notes:

What generally differentiates a history of religions or religious studies scholar from a theologian or ethicist is the former’s comparative emphasis and attempt to avoid writing normative theological, ethical, and political faith statements about what society should believe or look like. This job they leave primarily to their colleagues in ethics and theology.

By way of illustration: in his critical study of Anaya’s novel *Bless Me, Ultima*, Carrasco maintains that the “reality of God” may be “witnessed” by religious insiders – but the “primary concern is understanding the human being and not believing or disbelieving in his god.” According to Espinosa, when all is said and done the development of such a “nontheological, nonsectarian, nonnormative . . . non-value-laden” approach has “helped to legitimize the study of Mexican American religions in the academy.”

However, despite Espinosa’s claim that the study of Mexican American religions has come of age by means of a secular turn, I would like to suggest that “the field” (as defined by Espinosa in the essay under discussion) has not yet come to terms with what Anidjar calls “the persistence of Christianity as a singular deployment . . . at once ‘religious’ and ‘secular.’” Again, Anidjar states:

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98 Carrasco, “A Perspective for a Study of Religious Dimensions in Chicano Experience: *Bless Me, Ultima* as a Religious Text,” 200. On the other hand, Carrasco’s critique of Christian hegemony can be read as both within and outside “the dominant logic.” Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2012.
Christianity [has] made itself increasingly forgettable by foregrounding “religion” as a generic category and a target of criticism . . . doing so at the same time that it was arguing for the end of religion in its own practice, often pushing its colonial endeavor as a kind of critical secularism, a secular science.

Without a critical understanding of “the persistence of Christianity,” one might overlook the “colonial endeavor” implicit in “secular science” (e.g., secular religious studies). It seems the study of religion (and in this case, the study of Mexican American religions – again – as I understand Espinosa to define “the field” in the essay under discussion) is inseparable from secularism – which is to say, Christian imperialism. Again, as Anidjar notes:

The two terms religious and secular . . . function together as strategic devices and as mechanisms of obfuscation and self-binding . . . [to the extent] that it remains difficult, if not impossible, to extricate them from each other . . . Ultimately, their separation would be detrimental to an analytics of the power of the religious/secular divide, [to] an understanding of its strategic and disciplinary operations.

What interests me is the possibility of re-imagining the study of religion as a question of the relationship between religion and the archive. I argue that the study of Mexican American religions should be re-imagined to include a critique of Christianity – whether secularized or not. In lieu of ordering “the field” into a religious/secular binary, I begin with the notion that “secularism is a name Christianity gave itself when it invented ‘religion,’ named its other or others as ‘religions.’” In other words, what if the study of Mexican American religions were anti-Christian?100

Religion and the Archive

In my view, an anti-Christian approach (so to speak) would seek to explore how “religion” is produced and institutionalized as “cultural material.”101 In this regard, Said’s critical engagement with the concept of the archive is of particular interest. Aside from his use

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100 Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 62, 55, 47, 48. On the other hand, it is arguable that “the field” has already developed a critique of “Christianity as a singular deployment” and, more importantly, that “the field” has done so without a Saidian critique of Orientalism and/or Spivak’s deconstructing South Asian subalternist historiography. E.g., Laura E. Pérez observes: “Chicana artists’ development of culturally hybrid aesthetic and spiritual idioms . . . form a unique part of the rethinking of the meaning of spirituality and of art in our times.” In addition, Pérez notes: “We [Latina/os] are religiously hybrid, and we are so in politically decolonizing ways – reinserting the once-silent and so-called pagan Indian and African presence into what is picked and chosen from historically imposed Christian traditions.” In this regard, see Pérez, Chicana Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities, 7; id., “Decolonizing Spiritualities: Spiritualities That Are Decolonizing and the Work of Decolonizing Our Understanding of These,” 159; and id., “Enrique Dussel’s Etica de la liberación, U.S. Women of Color Decolonizing Practices, and Coalitionary Politics amidst Difference,” Qui Parle 18, no. 2 (spring/summer 2010): 121-146.

101 Said, Orientalism, 274. Note: here (as well as below), I build on Said’s various discussions of “the archive.”
of the term in its primary sense, that is, a place where records and documents are housed (e.g., Said relates: “As a European he [Silvestre de Sacy] ransacked the Oriental archives, [emphasis mine] and he could do so without leaving France.”). Said also uses the term in a Foucauldian sense – to designate “collective mental archives.” Said writes:

[Ernest] Renan is a figure who must be grasped . . . as a type of cultural and intellectual praxis, as a style for making Orientalist statements within what Michel Foucault would call the archive of his time [emphasis mine]. What matters is not only the things that Renan said but also how he said them, what, given his background and training, he chose to use as his subject matter, what to combine with what, and so forth. Renan’s relations with his Oriental subject matter, with his time and audience, even with his own work, can be described, then, without resorting to formulae that depend on an unexamined assumption of ontological stability (e.g., the Zeitgeist, the history of ideas, life-times). Instead we are able to read Renan as a writer doing something describable, in a place defined temporally, spatially, and culturally (hence archivally), for an audience and, no less important, for the furtherance of his own position in the Orientalism of his era. Said suggests that Renan may be understood best as a mode of discursive practice – as “a style for making Orientalist statements” – inside the cultural and/or intellectual archive of his time. In particular, Said draws attention to (in his words) “[those] epistemological resources that make possible what is said at any given period and where – [e.g.] in what particular discursive space – it is said.” Following Michel Foucault’s The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), Said reads Renan not in terms of “an unexamined assumption of ontological stability” (i.e., the Zeitgeist, the history of ideas, the history of religions, etc.) but in relation to an archive – which is to say, “in a place . . . for an audience and . . . [no doubt echoing Friedrich Nietzsche’s notion of ‘the will to power’] for the furtherance of his [Renan’s] own position in the Orientalism of his era.” Much more than a personality, Renan is a “cultural force” whose “knowledge” (as Nietzsche notes in a different though pertinent context) seemingly “increases with every increase of [in this case, imperial] power.”

As is well known, Foucault’s early works History of Madness (1961), The Birth of the Clinic (1963), and The Order of Things (1966) approach “history” as “archaeology.” In this regard, Foucault suggests that “documents” are understood best as “monuments.” In The Archaeology of Knowledge, his explicit exposition of the archaeological method, Foucault notes:

Archaeology tries to define not the thoughts, representations, images, themes, preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses; but those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obeying certain rules. It does not treat discourse as document, as a sign of something else, as an element that ought to be

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102 Said, Orientalism, 127.
transparent, but whose unfortunate opacity must often be pierced if one is to reach at last the depth of the essential in the place in which it is held in reserve; it is concerned with discourse in its own volume, as a monument. It is not an interpretive discipline: it does not seek another, better-hidden discourse. It refuses to be “allegorical.”

Whereas documents may be read in an “allegorical” manner as a “sign of something else” (e.g., “continuous history” or “the sovereignty of [human] consciousness”), monuments (as defined by Foucault) call attention to “discourses themselves.” As such, Foucault’s archaeological method is an attempt to study discourse as discourse, not as a lens through which the essence of “man” – thoughts, representations, images, themes, preoccupations, and so forth – might be uncovered or, at the very least, interpreted. “Discourse is not,” Foucault maintains, “the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined.” On the one hand, the “statement” is “the [most] elementary unit of discourse.” Foucault suggests: “The statement is neither a syntagma, nor a rule of construction, nor a canonic form of succession and permutation; it is that which enables such groups of signs to exist, and enables these rules or forms to become manifest.” On the other hand, the “archive” denotes “the general system of the formation and transformation of statements.”

Foucault writes:

The archive is first the law of what can be said [emphasis mine], the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events. But the archive is also that which determines that all these things said do not accumulate endlessly in an amorphous mass, nor are they inscribed in an unbroken linearity, nor do they disappear at the mercy of chance external accidents; but they are grouped together in distinct figures, composed together in accordance with multiple relations, maintained or blurred in accordance with specific regularities . . .. The archive is not that which, despite its immediate escape, safeguards the event of the statement, and preserves, for future memories, its status as an escape; it is that which [at the very root of the statement-event, and in that which] embodies it, defines at the outset the system of its enunciability. Nor is the archive that which collects the dust of statements that have become inert once more, and which may make possible the miracle of their resurrection; it is that which defines the mode of occurrence of the statement-thing; it is the system of its functioning. Far from being that which unifies everything that has been said in the great confused murmur of a discourse, far from being only that which ensures that we exist in the midst of preserved discourse, it is that which differentiates discourses in their multiple existence and specifies them in their own duration.

Here, the primary sense of “archive” is neither a collection of texts nor an institution that serves as a repository, but rather, a notion that manifests Foucault’s thesis that “man . . . [is] nearing its

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end.” The archive is a jussive concept; it commands, governs, orders, and so forth, the possibilities and impossibilities of “what can [and hence cannot] be said.”¹⁰⁹ Distinct from “episteme” (i.e., “the total set of relations [emphasis mine] that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems”), the archive designates “the series of rules [emphasis mine] which determine in a culture the appearance and disappearance of statements, their retention and their destruction, their paradoxical existence as events and things.”¹¹⁰ (Foucault has characterized the archive variously as “that which, outside ourselves, delimits us,” as “the mass of things spoken in a culture, presented, valorized, re-used, repeated and transformed,” and as “the set of rules which at a given period and for a given society define . . . [the] limits and forms of the sayable . . . of conservation . . . of memory . . . of reactivation . . . of appropriation” – among other notable renditions.)¹¹¹ Thus envisaged, archaeology is “the description of an archive.”¹¹² Rather than focus on systems of signs or the hermeneutic circle (i.e., the question of language), Foucault


¹¹¹ Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 130; id., Foucault Live: (Interviews, 1961-1984), 66; and id., “Politics and the Study of Discourse,” 59-60. Note: as opposed to the so-called “archival turn” (e.g., Foucault, Derrida, et al), it is important to acknowledge that a critical discussion of “the archive” could have begun instead with Chela Sandoval’s Methodology of the Oppressed (2000) – a work that is “fully centered . . . in the study of U.S. feminist and queer women of color’s literary and political activist writings from the 1960s through the 1980s.” As Laura E. Pérez notes: “Sandoval interrogates progressive poststructuralist thought, showing its commonalities with civil rights and post-1960s Third World thought and practice, its indebtedness to them in crucial formulations, and its shortcomings as a result of the tautological effects of its unwitting Eurocentrism.” See Pérez, “Enrique Dussel’s Etica de la liberación, U.S. Women of Color Decolonizing Practices, and Coalitionary Politics amidst Difference,” 140.

underscores “the historical conditions that account for what one says or of what one rejects, or of what one transforms in the mass of spoken things.” 113  In the first place, Foucault is opposed to “commentary” (i.e., the recovery of meanings and/or truths from documents).  Secondly, he counters the structuralist presupposition that discourse can be understood in terms of “laws of construction.”  And thirdly, Foucault attempts to extricate the study of discourse from “thought, mind or subject” (e.g., the “transcendental subject” presupposed by the phenomenological project).  Instead, he proposes (1) to treat discourse as a “monument”; (2) to examine “the conditions of existence” of discourse; and (3) to link discourse to “the practical field in which it (i.e., discourse) is deployed.” 114  Archaeology is “a non-subject-centered history of thought.”  Rather than “the human subject,” archaeological method stresses the “conditions that define the discursive space in which speaking subjects exist” – what might be termed “the ‘historical unconscious’” of a given period.  As Foucault has noted:

Discourse is not life; its time is not your time; in it, you will not be reconciled to death; you may have killed God beneath the weight of all that you have said; but don’t imagine that, with all that you are saying, you will make a man that will live longer than he. 115  In this sense, archaeology presumes not only “the death of the subject” but also the end of “the subject as origin and foundation of Knowledge (savoir), of Freedom, of Language and History.”  Archaeological description eschews “the search for a beginning” (e.g., the study of Euclid or Pythagoras as the “archê” of Western mathematics).  Instead, Foucault examines (in his words) “discourses as practices specified in the element of the archive” (i.e., those discursive practices that ultimately determine what may or may not count as knowledge at a particular moment). 116  Thus, as Said has observed, it would appear that Foucauldian archaeology “stands away from knowledge, spinning out a whole systematic apparatus so as to do to knowledge what knowledge does to its material.” 117

Whereas Said draws on Foucault’s concept of the archive in The Archaeology of Knowledge, he also builds on the genealogical shift announced in Foucault’s “The Order of Discourse” (1971) and Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975).  For example, in Orientalism Said writes:

I have found it useful . . . to employ Michel Foucault’s notion of a discourse, as described by him in The Archaeology of Knowledge and in Discipline and Punish, to identify Orientalism.  My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one

114 Foucault, “Politics and the Study of Discourse,” 60-61; and Dreyfus and Rainbow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, xix-xxiv.
115 Gary Gutting, Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 228-29, 244; Downing, The Cambridge Introduction to Michel Foucault, 9-10; and Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 211.
cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European
culture was able to manage [emphasis mine] – and even produce [emphasis mine] – the
Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and
imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period.118

Like Foucault in his archaeological studies, Said examines “the conditions of possibility” for
Orientalism. On the other hand, he underscores how Orientalism is used to govern the so-called
Orient. For Said, Orientalism is (in an archaeological sense) “the place [or ‘setting’] of
discourse.” Likewise, Orientalism is (in a genealogical sense) “the place” or “setting” of “that
for which struggles are conducted.”119 As such, Orientalism seems to invoke (as Foucault
suggests in a different context) “the form of a war rather than that of a language: relations of
power, not relations of meaning.” Although, unlike Foucault (i.e., the “Foucault” that emerges
from Said’s readings), Said approaches such “relations of power” from the standpoint of “its
actual realization” as well as “opposition to it.”120 It has been suggested that Said ultimately
“pictures the colonised as mute and passive, and the coloniser as victorious and ubiquitous,”
but in fact Said’s Orientalism seems to suggest that power is best understood from at least two
opposing vantage points.121 Said notes:

So authoritative a position did Orientalism have that I believe no one writing, thinking, or
acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and
action imposed by Orientalism. In brief, because of Orientalism the Orient was not (and
is not) a free subject of thought or action. This is not to say that Orientalism unilaterally
determines what can be said about the Orient, but that it is the whole network of interests

118 Said, Orientalism, 3. Note: here, I am building on Edward W. Said, “Foucault and the
Imagination of Power,” in Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2000). See also Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” in Untying the
Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, ed. Robert Young (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981);
ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). Likewise, see Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy,
119 On the notion of a “history of the conditions of possibility,” see for example Foucault, History
of Madness, xxxiv. Note: here, I adapt elements from Dreyfus and Rainbow, Michel Foucault:
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, xxv; Said, “An Ethics of Language,” 30; and id.,
“Foucault and the Imagination of Power,” in Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge:
120 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other
1980), 114; and Said, “Foucault and the Imagination of Power,” 241-42. Note: in Orientalism
Said works toward “a kind of non-coercive knowledge” that is (in his words) “deliberately anti-
Foucault.” For Said, “everything is [not] always assimilated and acculturated.” See Edward W.
(New York: Pantheon Books, 2001), 80. In this respect, of special interest also is James
Clifford, “On Orientalism,” in The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography,
121 For example: regarding the so-called “limitation” of Said’s focus on “representation,” see
Azim, “Post-Colonial Theory,” 238-43
inevitably brought to bear on (and therefore always involved in) any occasion when that peculiar entity “the Orient” is in question. In a sense, Orientalism betrays a relationship between knowledge and power. On the one hand, Orientalism is what might be characterized as a totality of “thought and action” that determines “the Orient.” Conversely, as far as Said is concerned, such a totality does not automatically preclude the possibility of “effective resistance.” Instead, Said attempts to cultivate a position that is both “with” and “against” power.\(^{122}\) What Nietzsche calls “the will to power” and Foucault “the will to knowledge” is reimagined in Said as the will to Western knowledge and power.\(^{123}\) No doubt, Said might agree with Foucault’s thesis that “the order of discourse” is a result of “the exercise of power.” (As Foucault has observed: “In every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.”) Yet, Said likewise draws attention to the “will to knowledge and power” as an “effort . . . to exclude that which [from the standpoint of imperialism] is not suitable as knowledge.” The “archaeological question” (i.e., what are the conditions of possibility for Orientalism?) is as important as the “genealogical question” (i.e., how is Orientalism used?). In fact, Said appears to link both methods – both genealogy and archaeology – to another problem: how to think about the nexus between knowledge, power, and imperialism?\(^{124}\)


**Knowledge-Power-Imperialism**

In *Orientalism*, Said examines the “materiality” of texts. Against the notion that “a text is only a text,” Said attempts to explore “the very life of texts in the world” (e.g., the “capacity” of “texts” to produce “misery” as well as “liberation”).\(^{125}\) He writes:

The focus of interest in Orientalism for me has been the partnership between a discursive and archival textuality and worldly power, one as an index and refraction of the other. As a systematic discourse Orientalism is written knowledge, but because it is in the world and directly about the world, it is *more* than knowledge: it is *power* since, so far as the Oriental is concerned, Orientalism is the operative and effective knowledge by which he was delivered textually to the West, occupied by the West, milked by the West for his resources, humanly quashed by the West.

For Said, the materiality of “Orientalism” is best understood as a “partnership” between “written knowledge” on the one hand and “worldly power” on the other. Said argues that Orientalism betrays how “knowledge of something [e.g., ‘the Oriental’] gets into texts according to historical laws, social and economic forces, worldly circumstances,” and so forth. Conversely, Said attempts to demonstrate how such a “system of discourse” makes real “the imposition of power upon [so-called ‘Oriental’] bodies.”\(^{126}\) For instance, Said describes Orientalism as a sort of determinant “intellectual power.” He notes:

In a sense Orientalism was a library or archive of information commonly and, in some of its aspects, unanimously held. What bound the *archive* [emphasis mine] together was a family of ideas and a unifying set of values proven in various ways to be effective. These ideas explained the behavior of Orientals; they supplied Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, an atmosphere; most important, they allowed Europeans to deal with and even to see Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics. But like any set of durable ideas, Orientalist notions influenced the people who were called Orientals as well as those called Occidental, European, or Western; in short, Orientalism is better grasped as a set of constraints upon and limitations of thought than it is simply as a positive doctrine.

In Said’s view, Orientalism is an “archive” – “cultural material” that explains and shapes both thought and behavior for a given period. Such an archive produces-institutionalizes what might be termed tropological “lenses” (e.g., journey, history, fable, polemic, etc.) through which the Orient and, by extension, the Occident are experienced. Of particular interest to Said is where, how, and with whose support “the archive of official European knowledge” is formed and

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\(^{125}\) Note: I distinguish Said’s notion of “the very life of texts in the world” from the Heideggerian notion of “worlding.” For me, the former denotes the biography of a text; the latter refers to its ontological significance.

enforced. Following Foucault, Said defines the archive as “the text’s social discursive presence in the world.” Again, Said employs the concept of the archive (in a Foucauldian sense) to underscore what he designates “the materiality of texts.” He writes:

Foucault’s [archaeological historical] method is to study the text as part of an archive, which is composed of discourses, which are composed of statements. In short he deals with texts as part of a system of cultural diffusion, rigidly controlled, tightly organized, difficult to penetrate. He argues that everything stated in a field like literary discourse or medical discourse is produced only with the most selective method, with little regard for individual genius. I have argued that similar things take place when “other” cultures and peoples are discussed. Each statement is therefore a material effort to incorporate a particular piece of reality as selectively as possible.

Like Foucault, Said links “the text” to “an archive.” Yet, where Foucault seems to efface “individual genius” in order to show the conditions of possibility for literary or medical discourse, for example, Said focuses on the “material effort” whereby a given “piece of reality” is incorporated (or not) into colonial/postcolonial discourse. Hence, for Said it appears that the critical question is: where, how, and with whose support is the Western cultural archive produced and institutionalized as “the law” of what does (and thus does not) count as “the real”? Alternatively, Said is likewise interested in the possibility of rereading the archive “contrapuntally” – in an effort to find “absences and gaps.” Even though Said insists that there is no “tabula rasa” (i.e., there is nothing but the archive), he also maintains that it is erroneous to presume that “the archive” is finally “‘nothing but’ imperialism.”

Indo-European studies

As Anidjar suggests, Said is concerned with the role of “the Orient” in Western Christendom’s will to knowledge and power. In fact, Said maintains: “The Orient is not only

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adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe’s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other.” However, it is also true that Said is concerned with the role of “the Orient” in Western Christendom’s self-definition. Said insists: “The Orient has helped to define Europe [or the West] as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience . . . . The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture.” Thus, it would seem that it is of vital importance to consider not only the “cultural material” of Orientalism but also “the archive” (in a Saidian sense) of its counterpart: the area of research known as “Indo-European” studies.129

Anidjar hints at the “aryanization” of Christianity through Orientalism, but for the most part, he seems to omit Said’s engagement with Indo-European (or Aryan) studies.130 For example, Said links the emergence of modern Orientalism to the “discovery” passed on and preserved in “the new science of Indo-European philology.” In Orientalism, Said writes:

The difference between representations of the Orient before the last third of the eighteenth century and those after it (that is, those belonging to what I call modern Orientalism) is that the range of representation expanded enormously in the later period. It is true that after William Jones and Anquetil-Duperron, and after Napoleon’s Egyptian expedition, Europe came to know the Orient more scientifically, to live in it with greater authority and discipline than ever before. But what mattered to Europe was the expanded scope and the much greater refinement given its techniques for receiving the Orient. When around the turn of the eighteenth century the Orient definitively revealed the age of its languages – thus outdating Hebrew’s divine pedigree – it was a group of Europeans who made the discovery, passed it on to other scholars, and preserved the discovery in the new science of Indo-European philology. A new powerful science for viewing the linguistic Orient was born, and with it, as Foucault has shown in The Order of Things, a whole web of related scientific interests.

Here, Said suggests that the production-institutionalization of an Indo-European archive expanded the scope and refined the techniques available to Christianity for “receiving the Orient.” As is well known, the “discovery” that various languages (e.g., Latin, classical Greek, Sanskrit, Old English, etc.) originate from an “Indo-European” proto-language is often attributed to William Jones.131 In a famous passage from “The Third Anniversary Discourse” (1786), Jones posits the existence of a “common source” (or proto-language) as a means to explain apparent affinities (e.g., verb roots and grammar) among distinct European languages, Sanskrit, and Persian. As Jones maintains (and Said repeats):

The Sanscrit language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure; more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely refined than

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130 Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 59-60.

either, yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs and in the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been produced by accident; so strong indeed, that no philologer could examine them all three without believing them to have sprung from some common source, [which, perhaps, no longer exists: there is a similar reason, though not quite so forcible, for supposing that both the Gothick and the Celtick, though blended with a very different idiom, had the same origin with the Sanscrit; and the old Persian might be added to the same family, if this were the place for discussing any question concerning the antiquities of Persia].

Of particular interest here is how Jones’ “discovery” becomes manifest as “a whole web of related scientific interests” (e.g., Orientalism, Indo-European studies, the science of religion, etc.). As Said notes, Jones is the undisputed “ur orientalist” – given his ultimate objective was “to rule and to learn, then to compare Orient with Occident.” For instance, Said adds, what stands out most in Jones’ “Third Anniversary Discourse” is “the extent to which modern Orientalism, even in its philosophical [read: philological] beginnings, was a comparative discipline having for its principal goal the grounding of the European [or, to be precise, Indo-European] languages in a distant, and harmless, Oriental source.” On the other hand, Said suggests that Jones’ hypothesis is best understood not as a form of scienticity, but more importantly, as a type of secularized “Christian supernaturalism.”

Said writes:

Essential aspects of modern Orientalist theory and praxis . . . [e.g., what has become known as Jones’ “Indo-European” thesis] can be understood, not as a sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient, but as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and re-formed by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were naturalized, modernized, and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) Christian supernaturalism.

Rather than “objective knowledge about the Orient,” Orientalism produces “the East” by means of secularized (but also racialized) Christian disciplines such as comparative Indo-European philology. In fact, as Bruce Lincoln has suggested, Jones’ principal goal is to assert a “scientific” validation of the Genesis account. Like Genesis 10, Jones attempts (in his words) to “trace to one centre the three great families [i.e., “the Indian, Arabian, and Tartarian branches”], from which those nations appear to have proceeded.” (Note: Gen. 10:32 reads: “These are the families of Noah’s sons [i.e., Shem, Ham, and Japheth], according to their genealogies, in their nations; and from these the nations spread [e.g., by their families, by their languages] abroad on the earth after the flood.”) Likewise, Jones attempts to “hazard a few conjectures on the different courses, which they [i.e., the three great nations descended from Noah] may be supposed to have taken toward the countries, in which we find them settled at the dawn of all genuine history.” To be precise: in “The Ninth Anniversary Discourse” (1792),

133 Said, Orientalism, 22, 78, 122. Note: here, I borrow the term “ur orientalist” from Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, eds., Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 9. Also, it should be acknowledged that Jones’ status as “ur orientalist” has been problematized in Lincoln, Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship, 76-100.
134 Said, Orientalism, 122, quoted in Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 54.
Jones suggests that Persians, Indians, Romans, and Greeks, among others, descend from Ham. Jews and Arabs, among others, descend from Shem. And Tartars, among others, descend from Japheth. Of special interest to Jones is the “Hamian” (or Aryan) branch – which is not only “the most ingenious and enterprising of the three [great families],” but also the “origin” of Indo-European nations. Hence, what Jones seems to contribute to the formation of modern Orientalism is: a secularized but also wholly aryanized history of the “nations” (or “races”) as descended presumably from Noah.

By the same token, the so-called “Indo-European” thesis seems to set the stage for the scientific study of religion (i.e., comparative mythology, history of religions, secular religious studies, etc.). Whereas Said himself admits that Orientalism ultimately centers on British, French, and U.S. Orientalist scholarship, he acknowledges its lacunae, namely German Orientalism. Said writes: “Any work that seeks to provide an understanding of academic Orientalism and pays little attention to scholars like Steinthal, Müller, Becker, Goldziher, Brockelmann, Nödke – to mention only a handful – needs to be reproached, and I freely reproach myself.” In other words, any account of the “set of structures” that constitute Orientalism should examine (in Said’s words) “the great scientific prestige that accrued to German scholarship by the middle of the nineteenth century.”

By way of illustration, in his Comparative Mythology (1856), F. Max Müller draws on Indo-European philology in order to (in his words) “account in a more intelligible manner for the creation of myths.” For Müller, “myths” – and in particular, Aryan myths – emerge through a process whereby “conceptions” (e.g., morning, evening, spring, winter, etc.) come to have “something of an individual, active, sexual, and at last, personal character.” Müller writes:

Where we speak of the sun following the dawn, the ancient [Aryan] poets could only speak and think of the Sun loving and embracing the Dawn. What is with us a sunset, was to them the Sun growing old, decaying, or dying. Our sunrise was to them the Night

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135 Said, Orientalism, 122; and especially Lincoln, Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship, 91 as well as 79-80, 85-87, 90-95. See also Jones, The Works of Sir William Jones, vol. 3, 185-86, 194-95; and Gen. 10:32, 1, 5, 20, 31 NRSV.
giving birth to a brilliant child; and in the Spring they really saw the Sun or the Sky embracing the earth with a warm embrace, and showering treasures into the lap of nature. As such, comparative Indo-European philology is the basis for “comparative mythology” – which is to say, a comparative “Aryan” mythology. In fact, it has been suggested that Müller’s project to reconstruct “the [original] Aryan mind” (no doubt, a form of “textual imperialism”) was intended to combat “evolutionistic interpretations of mythology based on material from ‘primitive’ peoples.” Müller states: “It is only by a gradual and careful accumulation of facts that we can hope, on this linguistic evidence, to establish the reality of a period in the history of mankind previous to the beginning of the most ancient known dialects of the Aryan world; previous to the origin of Sanskrit as well as Greek; previous to the time when the first Greek arrived on the shores of Asia Minor, and looking at the vast expanse of sky and sea and country to the west and north, called it ‘Europa.’”[141] In addition, in his preface to Chips from a German Workshop (1867), Müller announces a new project: the scientific (read: comparative) study of religions. Again, like the science of mythology, Müller proposes to model “the Science of Religion” after “the Science of Language.” He notes:

It was supposed at one time that a comparative analysis of the languages of mankind must transcend the powers of man: and yet by the combined and well directed efforts of many scholars, great results have here been obtained, and the principles that must guide the student of the Science of Language are now firmly established. It will be the same with the Science of Religion [emphasis mine]. By a proper division of labor, the materials that are still wanting will be collected and published and translated, and when that is done, surely man will never rest till he has discovered the purpose that runs through the religions of mankind, and till he has reconstructed the true Civitas Dei on foundations as wide as the ends of the world. The Science of Religion may be the last of the sciences which man is destined to elaborate; but when it is elaborated, it will change the aspect of the world, and give a new life to Christianity itself.[142]

Here, Müller suggests that “the Science of Religion” is destined not only to “change the aspect of the world” (e.g., uncover “the purpose” that informs “the religions of mankind”) but also to “give a new life to Christianity itself” (i.e., piece together “the true Civitas Dei . . . as wide as the ends of the world”). What distinguishes comparative mythology from the science of religions is a movement away from discovering the Aryan ur-mind toward a comparative analysis of so-called Aryan, Semitic, and Turanian “families of religion.” The “Science of Religion” is (it seems) a name Christianity gave itself when it collected, published, and translated “materials” regarding the religions of mankind and “the true Civitas Dei.” As Müller himself contends: “In the history of the world, our religion, like our own language, is but one out of many; and in order to understand fully the position of Christianity in the history of the world, and its true place among

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the religions of mankind, we must compare it, not with Judaism only, but with the religious aspirations of the whole world, with all, in fact, that Christianity came either to destroy or to fulfill.” In a sense, the science of religion corroborates Christianity’s imperial “exceptionalism.” It is true that Müller envisions the science of religions as a sort of pluralistic lens – through which one might “[dispel] some of the prejudices” accorded to “the sacred writings of the Brahmans,” “the mythology of the Greeks and Romans” and “even . . . the wild traditions and degraded customs of Polynesian savages.” Yet, it is also true that Müller’s project is what David Chidester has called a “global science of imperial comparative religion.” As Müller states in his *Introduction to the Science of Religion* (1873), “Let us take the old saying, *Divide et impera*, and translate it somewhat freely by ‘Classify and conquer’ . . . If the ground before us has . . . been properly surveyed and carefully parcelled out, each scholar may . . . cultivate his own glebe, without wasting his energies, and without losing sight of the general purposes to which all special researches must be subservient.” What Müller intends by “the general purposes to which all . . . researches must be subservient” is no doubt “[classification of] the various dialects of faith.” But, it should be clear that such “researches” are likewise dependent on a general objective of imperialism: to divide and conquer.

As such, Müller disseminated “the [German] vogue for Aryan antiquity” to the metropolitan audiences of the Victorian era, and at the same time, not only initiated “the first grand paradigm” for Indo-European religions, but further (according to Joachim Wach, Mircea Eliade, et al) established himself as progenitor of the “modern” science of religion. Thus envisaged, one might ask the following: how to think the relationship between the history of religions and Chicana/o literary and cultural studies?


Religion

Again, Espinosa regards Carrasco’s secular turn as a key moment in the historical development of “the field” of Mexican American religious studies. Carrasco’s work builds on a scientific, skeptical, and comparativist orientation that can be traced (as Espinosa notes) “back through Eliade, Rudolf Otto, and Gerardus van der Leeuw to Enlightenment philosophers such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant, John Locke, and nineteenth-century anthropologists such as Max Müller and E. B. Tylor.” For Espinosa, the hallmarks of Carrasco’s project are (1) secularism and (2) comparativism – what he calls a “movement away from the orbit of liberation theology and church histories to increasingly pluralistic religious and Chicano studies analyses.” However, I would like to suggest that Espinosa must reconcile the field’s methodological history with (1) “the persistence of Christianity as a singular deployment . . . at once ‘religious’ and ‘secular’” and also (2) the “political dimensions” of so-called “disinterested and ‘objective’” scholarship within the area of the history of religions. As Anidjar has argued, “secularism is a name Christianity gave itself when it invented ‘religion,’ named its other or others as ‘religions’” (e.g., the invention of Judaism and Islam as “religions”). In this regard, Anidjar adds, secularism is Orientalism and Orientalism is Christian imperialism. Conversely, Lincoln has underscored the (not so covert) ties that link the comparative study of religions with the area of Indo-European (or Aryan) studies. Regarding his training as a graduate student in history of religions at the University of Chicago – in fact, a stark foil for the genealogy rehearsed by Espinosa – Lincoln writes:

As a student of the history of religions, I was taught that Friedrich Max Müller inaugurated our discipline, but that his work on “comparative mythology” founded on his own incompetence, as did the later attempt of Sir James George Frazer. The field was rescued, so the narrative went, by Dumézil, with the support of some talented colleagues, Wikander, Otto Höfler, Jan de Vries, and Emile Benveniste . . . . Older scholars also entered my awareness, including Hermann Güntert, Herman Lommel, Walter Wüst, Rudolf Much, Franz Altheim, Richard Reitzenstein, and Hans Heinrich Schaeder . . . . [Though] many of these men were deeply involved with the Nazi movement . . . [to] that side of their work . . . I was largely blind. [That is to say, instead] of dangerous ideologues, I saw talented linguists, erudite Orientalists (a word not yet suspect), and trailblazing students of myth. Whatever questions I had – and they were not many – were deftly deflected. The “Aryan thesis” was fundamentally sound, I was told, although Hitler & Co. had badly abused it. But no one spoke of “Aryans” anymore or located their (presumed) Urheimat in Scandinavia, Germany, or the North Pole. Rather, the postwar discourse dealt with Indo-Europeans, elided questions of race, and placed the origin of this sanitized people off to the east, on the Russian steppes . . . . [Still,] things are not so

simple and the problems – moral and intellectual – that attend this discourse and discipline are not so easily resolved.

For Lincoln, the field of secular religious studies is inextricable from the Indo-European (or Aryan) thesis: “questions of race” are unavoidable in the history of religions.\(^1\)\(^{47}\)

It may be true that Carrasco’s work marks “the methodological crystallization of a Mexican American [secular] religious studies paradigm,” but such an approach is not a critique of religion.\(^1\)\(^{48}\) Espinosa notes that the Eliadean tradition has its limitations; he acknowledges that secular religious studies may promote not only a “theological a priori” but perhaps also the “program” of a “neo-colonial and neo-Orientalist enterprise.” Relying on the critical contributions of Richard Hecht and Donald Wiebe, Espinosa writes:

As important as Eliade’s theories are to the study of comparative religions [and in this case, the study of Mexican American religions], they tended to be . . . ahistorical, apolitical, and consensual, and assume what . . . has [been] identified as a [Christian] theological a priori. Furthermore, some might argue that some religious studies scholars engage in a modernist intellectual and ideological program whose findings are described as objective truth but in fact are projections of a neocolonial and neo-Orientalist enterprise.

In Espinosa’s view, such “limitations” might be rectified by grounding religious studies in “historical, social, and political contexts” and by encouraging scholars of religion to develop a “relentlessly self-conscious”\(^1\)\(^{49}\) attentiveness to “their subject and subjectivities.” In fact, Espinosa is hopeful that “useful interpretive frameworks for analyzing religion” will emerge from disciplined inquiry that melds Eliade’s “perspective of the critical but sympathetic outsider” with J. Z. Smith’s oft-cited contention that “religion has no independent existence apart from the academy.”\(^1\)\(^{50}\) (Here, Espinosa’s thesis exemplifies Patton’s third trend – i.e., the possibility of retooling religious studies vis-à-vis an improved understanding of the field’s “own Orientalist perspectives, both colonial and postcolonial” and/or a more nuanced portrait of “the cultural

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\(^{1}\)\(^{48}\) On the other hand, it is arguable that Carrasco’s work is a critique of Christian Eurocentrism and/or Eurocentric notions of religion, secularism, etc. Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2012. E.g., see above, n. 20.

\(^{1}\)\(^{49}\) Espinosa, “History and Theory in the Study of Mexican American Religions,” 39, quoting Smith, *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown*, xi. Note: in one sense, it seems that the study of Eliade (e.g., his political views) has supplanted the study of his theories. Among other texts, see especially Lincoln, *Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship*, 145, 270 n. 13; and Bryan S. Rennie, “Mircea Eliade (Further Considerations),” in *Encyclopedia of Religion*, 2d ed.

\(^{1}\)\(^{50}\) Smith, *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown*, xi. Smith argues that “[the term ‘religion’] plays the same role in establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept such as ‘language’ plays in linguistics or ‘culture’ plays in anthropology.” See Smith, *Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion*, 194.
identity of the religious groups” under consideration.) Thus envisaged, the aim of Mexican American religious studies is to understand “religious experiences and movements” as sui generis data – and not as an essential element of Western Christian imperialism and/or Aryanism. Despite Carrasco’s attempt to refute “critics of Eliade [who] restrict him through labels like ‘apolitical’ and ‘ahistorical,’” as though he [i.e., Eliade] was not aware of the sources of historical change and political power,” it would seem that a neo-Eliadean approach to the study of Mexican American religions ultimately overlooks what Said calls “the materiality of texts.” I contend that the study of Mexican American religions (as defined by Espinosa in the essay under consideration) must examine how “religion” is produced and institutionalized as “cultural material.” In fact, what Said notes about Orientalism is likewise applicable to Religionswissenschaft:

Orientalism [and by extension, the field of Religionswissenschaft] organized itself systematically as the [secular] acquisition of Oriental [and religious] material and its regulated dissemination as a form of specialized [scientific] knowledge. One copied and printed works of grammar [at first, “Aryan”; but later, “other peoples’ myths”], one acquired original texts [no doubt, with the help of imperial armies], one multiplied their number [in order to facilitate comparative study] and diffused them widely, even dispensed [such secular] knowledge [about the Orient and the history of religions] in periodic form [for perusal at academic institutions].

Like Orientalism, Religionswissenschaft has systematically produced, disseminated, and institutionalized its “material” under the guise of “specialized [scientific] knowledge.” In this sense, such “material” is a process – not a thing. A religious text is not only a text, but also, a process that reveals “human effort” – what Said has described as “the very life of texts in the world.” In my view, a “purely textual perspective” is insufficient. Instead, I argue for a critical understanding of “the partnership between a discursive and archival textuality [on the one hand] and worldly power [on the other].” If the science of religion produces, disseminates, and so forth, “written knowledge,” then Religionswissenschaft is ultimately “in the world and directly about the world.” More than knowledge, the science of religion is power – since the religious (that is to say, the religionized) have been “delivered textually to the West, occupied by the West, milked by the West . . . [and hence] humanly quashed by the West.” Despite the sui generis claim, Religionswissenschaft betrays how religion “gets into texts” by means of “worldly circumstances.” The science of religion is unable to “[conceal] the fact of its fabrication.”

151 Patton, “Subaltern Studies.” Note: as opposed to the so-called “archival turn” (e.g., Foucault, Derrida, Spivak, et al), it is important to acknowledge that a critical discussion of “the archive” could have begun instead with Chela Sandoval’s Methodology of the Oppressed (2000). See above, n. 111.


Because religion (read: the inverse of “subaltern theology”) cannot represent itself, it must be represented. Religion is “a career” – the end result of “institutionalizations.”

In conclusion, I am suggesting that the question of religion in Chicana/o literary and cultural studies should be re-imagined to include an analysis of the “secular” production and institutionalization of “religion” as “cultural material.” Instead of ordering “the field” (again, as I understand Espinosa to define “the field” in the essay under consideration) into a religious/secular divide, what should be addressed is where, how, and with whose support “a religious datum” is incorporated into “the real.” In this regard, I argue that the Saidian concept of the archive might reconstitute the rationale (i.e., the study of “religion”) – not to mention, the raison d’être (e.g., “a new humanism”) – of Mexican American religious studies. Said demonstrates how notions such as “sui generis religion” are part and parcel of a secularized Christian imperialism – if not a sort of Aryanism. Of course, this is not to say that the neo-Eliadean school of Mexican American religious studies is imperialist or racist – that Espinosa and Carrasco, among others, are duped or seduced by coloniality or power, for example. To the contrary, I read Carrasco’s “A Perspective for a Study of Religious Dimensions in Chicano Experience: Bless Me, Ultima as a Religious Text” as a significant contribution to the liberationist orientation that grounds the study of Mexican American religions. Like Charles H. Long, Carrasco reads Eliade “contrapuntally” – and thereby attempts to develop a theory of religion – or liberation theory – that “arises out of the history of colonialism and contact” (e.g., the “lyrics of Chicano spirituality”). As Said has suggested, it would be erroneous to presume that “the archive” is “nothing but’ imperialism.” However, where Carrasco interprets “relations of [religious] meaning,” I see “relations of [imperial] power.” Religion is not simply a matter of language; religion is a question of the archive. Moreover, “religion” seems to be a question of exteriority: is there an outside to empire? Is it possible to think in terms of an anti-Christian (read: anti-secularism, anti-pluralism, etc.) criticism? Must the subaltern be either religious or secular? No doubt, the orientation that I am attempting to develop here inevitably brings to mind the notion of “globalatinization” – if not the possibility of returning the gaze. In view of Tertullian’s famous question (i.e., “What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?”), one might ask: what does Jerusalem have to do with the subaltern?


Note: I acknowledge Carrasco’s thesis can be read not as reifying Christian hegemony (e.g., a “religious/secular divide”) but rather decolonizing select notions of religion and/or spirituality in Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. See above, n. 20. Also, I would like to acknowledge the “transgressive and decolonizing” goals of the Latina/o Critical and Comparative Studies Group
CHAPTER 3
A QUESTION OF THE ARCHIVE:
READING CHICANA/O RELIGION AND SPIRITUALITY

The politics of the spiritual for some Chicana/os is linked to a politics of memory . . ..

Two of the most important studies of religion and spirituality in Chicana/o literary and cultural studies are David Carrasco’s “A Perspective for a Study of Religious Dimensions in Chicano Experience: Bless Me, Ultima as a Religious Text” (1982) and Laura Pérez’ “Spirit Glyphs: Reimagining Art and Artist in the Work of Chicana Tlamatinime” (1998). On the one hand, Carrasco attempts to link “the field” with the concept of sui generis religion – a concept

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1 At the outset of this chapter I would like to acknowledge one of its most significant challenges: the question of spirituality. Is spirituality (or, innumerable spiritualities) a kind of cultural survival that predates the 1492 invasion or a postconquest Christian invention that has subsequently become a resource for cultural resistance? One might suggest that in either case spirituality has been an essential feature of decolonization. On the other hand, there seem to be other issues – mainly, the question of the relationship between spirituality and subalternity. If spirituality – whether culled from one or more archives or circulating outside official memory – serves the interests of some, it may paradoxically efface the concerns of others. I regard spirituality as a problem of representation – both Vertretung and Darstellung. That is, there remains the problem of spirituality (or, its innumerable variants) “speaking for” a totalized “representation” of heterogeneity. Thus envisaged, the question of spirituality is a matter of “measuring silences” rather than “recovery” (e.g., filling in gaps, adding voices, etc.). In my view, the problem of representation (both Vertretung and Darstellung) holds – whether before or after the Spanish invasion. In this chapter, I consider the Derridean concept of archivization as a means of “measuring silences.” Here and throughout this chapter, I am especially indebted to the critique of representation in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271-308. Also, I would like to thank José Rabasa – whose suggestions for crafting this chapter have been indispensable.

that asks scholars to study religion “on its [own] plane of reference.” On the other hand, Pérez argues for a decolonizing concept of the spiritual – a concept that links culturally hybrid representations of Chicana/o spirituality to “questions of social justice, with respect to class, gender, sexuality, culture, and ‘race.’” If Carrasco wants to maintain the singular character of religious experience (e.g., to avoid reducing it to “one of its secondary aspects or its contexts”), Pérez suggests “the spiritual” and its political effects are “inseparable.” More specifically, as regards the work of the Chicana artists under consideration in her book, *Chicana Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities* (2007), Pérez notes: “Citations of the spiritual, whether Western, non-Western, or in newer, hybrid forms, are brought into view as social discourse, for their manifest effects in the social and human bodies, and the natural environment.” For Pérez, “spirituality in this work is inseparable from questions of social justice, with respect to class, gender, sexuality, culture, and ‘race.’”

Most recently, David Carrasco and Roberto Lint Sagarena have attempted to revitalize Carrasco’s earlier proposal – that Chicana/o religion seems to be understood best as religion – by bringing the study of religion into conversation with the decolonizing notion of “border thinking.” In “The Religious Vision of Gloria Anzaldúa: *Borderlands/La Frontera* as a

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6 David Carrasco and Roberto Lint Sagarena, “The Religious Vision of Gloria Anzaldúa: *Borderlands/La Frontera* as a Shamanic Space,” in *Mexican American Religions: Spirituality,*
Shamanic Space” (2008), Carrasco and Lint Sagarena contend that Anzaldúa’s classic study of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands is above all a “religious” text. Unlike conventional interpretations of Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza (1987) – readings that highlight the “ethnic, gendered, and political elements of the [borderlands] space” – Carrasco and Lint Sagarena stress its religious aspects. More specifically, they read Borderlands/La Frontera as “a religious vision.” In their words:

We believe that the heart of her portrayal of the borderlands is articulated, and must be understood, as a religious vision. In our readings of la frontera, her borderlands is a shamanic space where a different quality of knowledge is achieved through ecstatic trance states which inspire the birth of the “New Mestiza.” This shamanic space is not incidental or epiphenomenal in her life and writing, but is, in fact, central to her poetic imagery and attempted cultural healing.

Building on Carrasco’s prior research in “A Perspective for a Study of Religious Dimensions in Chicano Experience: Bless Me, Ultima as a Religious Text” – in particular, the notion that Chicana/o religious experience is understood best in terms of a “shamanic paradigm” – Carrasco and Lint Sagarena suggest that Anzaldúa’s “religious vision” is rooted in “a shamanic imagination.”

In the first place, Anzaldúa (author and text) “emerges from a shamanic imagination that is ‘loco-’ or ‘loca-centric.’” Anzaldúa thinks through not only the spiritual dimensions of imperialism, but also, the epistemological (read: “worldmaking”) potential of “obscured histories.” Carrasco and Lint Sagarena maintain that her “shamanic imagination” is

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Note: it should be acknowledged that Carrasco and Lint Sagarena state that Anzaldúa’s work is not “limited” to religious meanings or symbols. Still, they claim: “Though these ecstatic trances have been largely ignored by scholars reading her work, she tells us on the first page and at strategic points throughout the book that a shamanic imagination – with its attention to spiritual journey, songs, and voices of ancestral spirits, psychic injury, and interior healing – informs her entire project.” See Carrasco and Lint Sagarena, “The Religious Vision of Gloria Anzaldúa: Borderlands/La Frontera as a Shamanic Space,” 224. In this regard, also of interest is David Carrasco, “Borderlands and the ‘Biblical Hurricane’: Images and Stories of Latin American Rhythms of Life,” Harvard Theological Review 101, no. 3-4 (2008): 353-76. For a review of critical trends in Anzaldúa studies, see José David Saldivar, “Unsettling Race, Coloniality, and Caste: Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera, Martínez’s Parrot in the Oven, and Roy’s The God of Small Things” Cultural Studies 21, no. 2-3 (March-May 2007): 364-65.


“always center and periphery and the spaces in between, always critical of authority in order to unmask it and to subvert its limits while performing a new style of creativity” – in this case, “to heal and reconstitute herself [Anzaldúa] in the chaos of la frontera.”10 In the second place, Carrasco and Lint Sagarena link their argument to Mignolo’s concept of border thinking. Thus envisaged, religious elements inform Anzaldúa’s concept of “a space-in-between from where to think.”11 A “colonial in-between space” – “always center and periphery and the spaces in between” – becomes “a religious in-between space.”12 Whereas Carrasco and Lint Sagarena can be understood as a shift from the monotopic lens of Religionswissenschaft to the pluritopic hermeneutics of Chicana feminist thought (e.g., a monotopic “shamanic” as opposed to its pluritopic senses), they seem also to raise the issue of “accountability to the cultures and traditions she [Anzaldúa] is appropriating”13 – what Pérez describes as “a politics of memory.”14 In other words, is it possible Anzaldúa’s decolonization of the spiritual is actually a new form of colonizing memory?15 As María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo suggests, counter-archives important to Chicana/o cultural theory – in particular, the PRI’s rarefied notions of mestizaje and indigenismo that arguably effaced contemporary Indians’ lives16 – may paradoxically contribute

10 Ibid., 223-41. Likewise, see David Carrasco, Religions of Mesoamerica: Cosmovision and Ceremonial Centers (Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 1999), 19-23, 124-57. Note: of special interest are parallels between Carrasco and Lint Sagarena and Bruce-Novoa’s thesis – e.g., the notion that Chicana/o poetry can be read as an “axis mundi object.” See Bruce-Novoa, Chicano Poetry: A Response to Chaos (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).
13 Carrasco, “A Perspective for a Study of Religious Dimensions in Chicano Experience: Bless Me, Ultima as a Religious Text,” 211; and Carrasco and Lint Sagarena, “The Religious Vision of Gloria Anzaldúa: Borderlands/La Frontera as a Shamanic Space,” 238; in connection with Walter D. Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 2d ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), especially 1-25. Note: it is arguable that Mignolo’s concept of pluritopic hermeneutics is rooted in his study of Anzaldúa rather than debates on the question of interpretation – e.g., the Gadamer-Derrida debate – that I explore in sections below. On the other hand, it is possible that Mignolo draws on both his study of Anzaldúa and the Gadamer-Derrida debate at one and the same time. Personal communication from José David Saldívar to the author, spring 2012.
14 Pérez, Chicana Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities, 23. Note: I realize that my reading of Pérez’ notion of the link between the politics of the spiritual and memory may be idiosyncratic.
15 Here, I build on a reading of Mignolo: “Decolonization of knowledge (postmodern and cultural studies counterargument has it) is an illusion because every decolonization (the argument goes) ends up being a new form of colonization.” See Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 456.
16 María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo, The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas and the Age of Development (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 278-82. Note: conversely, it should be acknowledged that Saldaña-Portillo seems to overlook how such work turns “the conqueror’s
to the production of subalternity rather than bring it to an end.\(^\text{17}\)

Of course, it is true that postconquest texts can and should be read in terms of resistance—and perhaps, even as “forms of cultural survival.”\(^\text{18}\) As Carrasco and Lint Sagarena suggest, Anzaldúa’s work represents “the religious concerns and imaginations of individuals and culture to the advantage of the conquered.” As Anzaldúa notes: “I think it’s important to consider the uses that appropriations serve. The process of marginalizing others has roots in colonialism. We do to Indian cultures what museums do—impose western attitudes, categories, and terms by decontextualizing objects and symbols, by isolating them, disconnecting them from their cultural meanings or intentions, and then reclassifying them within western terms and contexts.” For Anzaldúa, “some things are worth ‘borrowing’.” Yet at the same time, she adds: “We need to scrutinize the purpose and accountability for one’s ‘borrowings.’” It is important to consider also that Subcomandante Marcos cites the struggles of “so-called people of color” in the US and thus is not necessarily reliant on scholars such as Saldaña-Portillo to speak for the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN). E.g., Subcomandante Marcos writes: “The racism that now floods the palace of Power in Mexico goes to the extreme of carrying out a war of extermination and genocide against millions of indigenous. I am sure that you will find similarities with what Power in the United States does with the so-called people of color (African Americans, Chicano, Puerto Ricans, Asians, North American Indians, and any other peoples who do not have the insipid color of money).” Likewise, as Rafael Pérez-Torres notes: “I think it equally important to draw a distinction between mestizaje in the context of Mexican and Chicano identity formations. After all, the corporatist use of mestizaje was part and parcel of the PRI’s official nationalist discourse. The role of Chicano (counter)discourse has, within U.S. culture, functioned quite differently. The mestizo and mestiza body in Chicano critical discourse has helped forge an identity that highlights the relational and political dynamics of Chicana/o identity through the recognition of race and race mixture.” That is to say, Saldaña-Portillo presumes “an all too easy conflation between the nationalist cultural context in Mexico and the subnational context of Chicano/a cultural production.” See Serge Gruzinski, *Painting the Conquest: The Mexican Indians and the European Renaissance*, trans. Deke Dusinberre (Paris: Flammarion, 1992), 158, quoted in Pérez, *Chicana Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities*, 30; Gloria E. Anzaldúa, *The Gloria Anzaldúa Reader*, ed. AnaLouise Keating (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 288-89; Subcomandante Marcos, “Letter to Mumia Abu-Jamal, April 24, 1999,” in *Our Word Is Our Weapon: Selected Writings*, ed. Juana Ponce de León (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001), 188-89; and Rafael Pérez-Torres, *Mestizaje: Critical Uses of Race in Chicano Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 14-15.


By extension, *Borderlands/La Frontera* can be read as an attempt “to maintain in one’s consciousness, to recall, and to (re)integrate a spiritual worldview about the interconnectedness of life, even if it is fragmented, circulating, as its pieces have, through colonial and neocolonial relations” – what Pérez has described as “a politics of the will to remember.” Such readings call to mind the importance of Dipesh Chakrabarty’s distinction between two kinds of pasts: History 1 and History 2s. No doubt, they also show that Anzaldúa presents a kind of History 2. But, I am more interested in developing an awareness of the variety of History 2s. Rather than debates on pluritopic hermeneutics, I focus attention on the problem of the archive – e.g., as a site that produces subalternity. How to reconcile Anzaldúa’s affirmation of Chicana/o cultural continuity with the erasure of contemporary indigenous subjectivities? (I presume that this problem holds whether Anzaldúa is read literally or figuratively.) I contend that hermeneutics – both monotopic and pluritopic – may reify subalternity. Here, my aim is not to minimize the import of interpretation itself. As Mignol

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20 Pérez writes: “For Gloria Anzaldúa, in *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza*, a ‘new mestiza’ spirituality is inclusive and affirming of her multiple positionings as a feminist Chicana lesbian writer. The spiritual worldview, like the aesthetic of her book, ‘seems an assemblage, a montage, a beaded work with several leitmotifs and with a central core, now appearing, now disappearing in a crazy dance’ of diverse American Indian, African, and African diaspora beliefs and practices, recoded patriarchal Christian and Aztec symbols and translations of archetypal psychology (expressed in her formulation of ‘the Coatlicue state’).” See Pérez, *Chicana Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities*, 23, 24.
21 Chakrabarty writes: “To provincialize Europe in historical thought is to struggle to hold in a state of permanent tension a dialogue between two contradictory points of view. On one side is the indispensable and universal narrative of capital – History 1 . . . . This narrative both gives us a critique of capitalist imperialism and affords elusive but necessarily energizing glimpses of the Enlightenment promise of an abstract, universal but never-to-be-realized humanity . . . . On the other side is thought about diverse ways of being human, the infinite incommensurabilities through which we struggle . . . . to ‘world the earth’ in order to live within our different senses of ontic belonging. These are the struggles that become . . . . the History 2s that in practice always modify and interrupt the totalizing thrusts of History 1 [emphases mine].” Dipesh Chakrabarty, * Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, [new ed.] (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 254. Note: I would like to thank José Rabasa for bringing Chakrabarty’s thesis to my attention.
22 See above, n. 17. On the other hand, it is important to acknowledge the significance of alternative archives. E.g., Pérez notes: “Through altar-based art, Chicana artists succeed in reminding us of a different approach to alterity, one that is in fact a perennial and cross-cultural concept, expressed in the Mayan as ‘You are my other self,’ *In’Laketch.*” See Pérez, *Chicana Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities*, 145.
23 Here, I follow Saldaña-Portillo, *The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas and the Age of Development*, 279-82. Also, see above, n. 16.
24 Note: I would like to thank Laura Pérez for reminding me of the decolonizing potential of hermeneutics. Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2011.
demonstrates, a pluritopic understanding of modernity uncovers its “darker” side: coloniality.\textsuperscript{25} What I am seeking is an alternative that underscores the layers and frontiers of modernity/coloniality. I argue for the critical notion of archivization – a concept I derive from reading Jacques Derrida’s *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression* (1996) through Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988). Archivization highlights cultural discontinuity – i.e., the layers and frontiers of memory in the Americas both before and after the 1492 invasion.\textsuperscript{26} Whereas hermeneutics seeks to understand – or, perhaps, understand ourselves understanding ourselves\textsuperscript{27} – I maintain that archivization can be a means to account for the variety of History 2s. Rather than interpret the meaning of a text (e.g., its significance and/or uses), I focus attention on its biography.\textsuperscript{28} How and why has a particular text produced subalternity? Granted, my interest in discerning the layers and frontiers of a text may be understood as another attempt at “describing ourselves describing ourselves” – i.e., the pluritopic senses and/or uses of a text.\textsuperscript{29} Nevertheless, my objective is to move the discussion away from the question of the meaning of Chicana/o religion and spirituality toward an understanding of their conditions of possibility. Chicana/o religion and spirituality can and should be understood in terms of debates on the question of interpretation. However, I aim at a different approach: reading archivally. Thus envisaged, I take as my point of departure the proposition that Chicana/o religion and spirituality\textsuperscript{30} – whether derived from a ruling archive or a counter-archive – can be understood alternatively as “cultural material” (in a Saidian sense).\textsuperscript{31}

In chapter 1, I began to consider the pros and cons of the history of religions and Chicana feminist thought as critical approaches to Chicana/o religion and spirituality. I concluded with the proposition that subaltern studies – and specifically, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s notion of reading archivally – might add to the critical works of Davíd Carrasco and Laura Pérez. Chapter 2 explored Carrasco’s attempt to link Religionswissenschaft to Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. I concluded with the assertion that such an approach may run the risk of reifying the religious/secular divide as hermeneutic foundation. In this chapter, I turn to Pérez’ critical distinction between secular religious studies and the politics of spirituality in post-1965 Chicana

\textsuperscript{25} Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization.*


\textsuperscript{27} Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization,* 1-25.


\textsuperscript{29} See above, n. 27. Also, I would like to thank Marcial González for bringing to my attention the possibility that reading archivally may be another mode of interpretation. Personal communication from Marcial González to the author, spring 2011.

\textsuperscript{30} Note: Pérez has rightly differentiated between “religion” and “spirituality” in the context of Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. See Pérez, *Chicana Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities,* 309-10. Following Pérez, I aim at distinguishing between their conditions of possibility.

\textsuperscript{31} Here, I am referring to Said’s concept of the archive. See Edward W. Said, *Orientalism,* 25\textsuperscript{th} anniversary ed. (New York: Vintage Books, [2003]), e.g., 274.
artwork. More specifically, I attempt to link Pérez’ reading of Chicana spirituality as “a politics of memory” to Jacques Derrida’s notion of “the question of a politics of the archive.” In Chapter 4, I maintain that such a critique of archival memory is central to debates on religion and spirituality in Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. But first, I expand on my proposal that subaltern studies can help us to develop a new approach to the question of Chicana/o religion and spirituality. To begin with, I examine Mignolo’s claim that colonial situations call for a pluritopic mode of interpretation. Again, as an alternative, I propose archivization. If Mignolo attempts to rethink the hermeneutical legacy, I aim at reading archivally – i.e., mapping the layers and frontiers of archival memory. By way of conclusion, I consider the prospect of thinking about Chicana/o religion and spirituality as a question of the politics of archivization – rather than a debate on the question of interpretation.

Archivization

I take as my point of departure Luis Leal’s thesis on the origins of the Mexican short story. Leal writes: “El origen del cuento es, en términos generales, la tradición popular americana y los acontecimientos suscitados por el descubrimiento, conquista, colonización y evangelización del Nuevo Mundo.” For Leal, the “cuento” has its origin in “fictional elements contained within the [colonial] chronicles.” As such, “los cronistas . . . asumen la función de cuentistas, tomando como material . . . los episodios ocurridos en la Nueva España durante la conquista y los años posteriores.” Expressed in a different way, Leal maintains that the “cuento” is not an independent genre; rather, it is embedded literally within “las crónicas y las relaciones.” Of particular interest is Leal’s contention as regards the history/fiction opposition.

32 Note: I am not suggesting that Pérez can be read through Derrida. Rather, I agree with Chela Sandoval (and with Pérez) that European post-structuralism is indebted to postcolonial thinkers such as Frantz Fanon. In a sense, I am (in Sandoval’s words) “both recognizing and reclaiming” one of Derrida’s contributions to decolonial praxis – in this case, the issue of the archive and its relation to “a politics of memory.” E.g., see Pérez, Chicana Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities, 23, 10; and Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, trans. Eric Prenowitz, University of Chicago Press ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 4, in connection with Chela Sandoval, Methodology of the Oppressed (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 82.

33 “The origin of the [Mexican] short story is, generally speaking, the American popular tradition and the events triggered by the discovery, conquest, colonization and evangelization of the New World.” “[The] chroniclers . . . assume the function of storywriters, taking as material . . . the episodes occurring in New Spain during the conquest and the ensuing years.” See Louis [Luis] Leal, “El cuento y la leyenda en las crónicas de la Nueva España” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1950), 318, 317; and Mario T. García, Luis Leal: An Auto/Biography (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), 42. Also of interest are Luis Leal, Breve historia del cuento mexicano (México: Ediciones de Andra, 1956); id., Antología del cuento mexicano (México: Ediciones de Andrea, 1957); id., Bibliografía del cuento mexicano (Emory: Emory University; México: Ediciones de Andrea, 1958); and id., comp., Cuentos mexicanos: De los orígenes a la Revolución (Miami: Stockcero, 2007). Note: in this regard, I have also benefited from Richard
In his words: “Las crónicas son, más que historias, libros de viajes por países maravillosos y relatos de aventuras tan extraños, a veces, como los de cualquier novela.”34 By extension, it seems Leal approaches the “cuento religioso” as a style or mode of emplotment. Leal is less interested in presenting a metaphysically driven reading of the religious and the spiritual than he is in recognizing their invention. For example, he writes: “If the stories are about Aztec deities, then they are reported [i.e., recorded by the chroniclers] as myths.”35 Granted, Leal’s thesis favors the Spanish chroniclers. (When Leal defended his Ph.D. thesis, the committee requested that he address “the Indian influence on the cronistas.”) Further, Leal’s thesis may be read as “postcolonial” Mexican nationalism. (Leal observes: “Algunos cuentos en las crónicas ya denotan las características de lo que más tarde ha de ser lo mexicano.”)36 Nevertheless, I maintain that Leal’s thesis calls attention to the significance of archivization.37 Over against an “exegetical” concept of interpretation (whether “recollection of meaning” or “exercise of suspiccion”), Leal explores the production of “cultural material” – e.g., how “stories” are “reported as myths” [emphasis mine].38 I contend Leal is less interested in what Paul Ricoeur terms “the conflict of interpretations” than he is in exploring the archive as an “untranscendable horizon” of colonial/postcolonial fiction. Reading is grounded in “archivization” – what Derrida calls the “archiving archive” that not only “records” but also “produces” what counts as “archivable content.”39 If one were to follow Leal’s thesis and prioritize archivization, then it

34 “The chronicles [of New Spain] are, more than histories, books about voyages through marvelous regions and accounts of adventures as strange, at times, as those of any novel.” See García, Luis Leal: An Auto/Biography, 42-44; and Leal, Breve historia del cuento mexicano, 20.
37 E.g., see Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, 17.
might be possible to extricate the concepts of Chicana/o religion and spirituality from exegesis. Interpretation (e.g., reading the substantive and/or functional meanings of Chicana/o religion and spirituality) is no doubt a powerful paradigm. In spite of that, I would like to bracket its indispensability.40

The Question of Interpretation

In this regard, relevant are the interpretations of interpretation developed by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacques Derrida, and Walter D. Mignolo. (Of course, I do not aim at an exhaustive discussion; no doubt, a complete enumeration is beyond the scope of the work at hand.) While Gadamer and Derrida regard the problem of interpretation as a question of language (e.g., a question of meaning), Mignolo contends interpretation is a matter of geopolitics (i.e., a matter of power struggle). What Gadamer, Derrida and Mignolo make plain is the priority of “exegesis” – whether oriented toward tradition (Gadamer), writing (Derrida), or coloniality (Mignolo).41 To a degree, it seems the problem of interpretation is rooted in what might be termed “Platonism for ‘the people.’” In my view, the question of interpretation should be how to substitute exegesis with the concept of archivization?42 What if “Christenthum” (in a Nietzschean sense) were to encompass not only religiosity – and by extension, areas of inquiry such as biblical hermeneutics


40 Note: I reject the conventional distinction within the study of religion between “interpretive” and “explanatory” modes of analysis. In my view, both “interpretations” and “explanations” involve exegesis. E.g., see Daniel L. Pals, *Eight Theories of Religion*, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).


but also “secularism” – and by extension, areas of inquiry such as phenomenology of religion, history of religions and so forth? What interests me is the possibility of developing a mode of reading that stresses the limits of interpretation. Is the reading of religion and spirituality solely an issue of meaning or power? (Is substantive or functional exegesis the only means to approach Chicana/o religiosity?) In order to explore this question, I consider the relation between three master hermeneuts: Gadamer, Derrida, and Mignolo.

In Truth and Method (1960), Hans-Georg Gadamer makes an attempt to develop a theory of understanding. In Gadamer, all understanding is interpretation, and likewise, all interpretation takes place in the medium of language. Following Martin Heidegger’s revision of the “hermeneutic circle” in Being and Time (1927), Gadamer maintains: “The linguisticality of understanding is the concretion of historically effected consciousness.” In other words, if

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44 Again, it is arguable that Mignolo’s concept of pluritopic hermeneutics is rooted in his study of Anzaldúa rather than debates on the question of interpretation – e.g., the Gadamer-Derrida debate. As an alternative, one might begin – instead – with a close reading of Sandoval, Methodology of the Oppressed.


47 Ibid, 265-307, 389. On the hermeneutic circle, including reformulations of its scope, see Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift, eds., The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990). It is arguable that Gadamer attempts here to develop a post-Cartesian theory of understanding. In this regard, it might be advantageous to explore the relation between “historically effected consciousness” and Heidegger’s sense of finitude in Being and Time (i.e., “Dasein-dependent interpretation”). E.g., consider Heidegger’s
that which can be understood is language, then understanding occurs as historically situated interpretation.\textsuperscript{48} For example, against historicism’s Enlightenment-based “prejudice against prejudices,” Gadamer asserts: “In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it.”\textsuperscript{49} That said, the interpretive act is not predicated on a reconstruction; rather, it implies mediation – what Gadamer designates “a fusion of [historically situated] horizons.”\textsuperscript{50} Ultimately, Gadamer’s project – a philosophical hermeneutics – attempts to demonstrate how “language is not only an object in our hands, [more precisely,] it is the reservoir of [an ongoing, natural] tradition and the [universal] medium in and through which we exist and perceive our world.”\textsuperscript{51} Though Jürgen Habermas has taken issue with Gadamer’s assertion that language is a medium for conveying tradition, by underscoring how language is also a means of domination,\textsuperscript{52} of particular interest is Gadamer’s critique of positivistic modes of understanding (read: aesthetics, historicism, and philosophy of language).\textsuperscript{53} In Gadamer’s view, what finally guarantees understanding is not method but historicity. In this sense, I stress Gadamer’s reconfiguration of the hermeneutic circle: to interpret is to come to terms with one’s historicity. We cannot disentangle interpretation from our own historically situated point of view; we are part and parcel of an endeavor to understand history. Here, I follow Habermas’ critique up to a point. No doubt, language is anything but a transparent medium. But, it should be noted likewise that an exegesis of historical consciousness is anything but a natural enterprise. One’s “historically effected consciousness” is not simply a matter of meaning (or, even the manipulation of meaning); rather, it is a question of archivization. I argue Gadamer bases exegesis on an archive: to interpret is to understand one’s self vis-à-vis an ongoing archivization of tradition.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{48} Gadamer, \textit{Truth and Method}, 474-75.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 272, 276.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 306-07, 397.
\textsuperscript{53} Gadamer, \textit{Truth and Method}.
\textsuperscript{54} Habermas, “A Review of Gadamer’s \textit{Truth and Method},” passim; plus, Gadamer, \textit{Truth and Method}, passim; and id., \textit{Philosophical Hermeneutics}, 28. Note: I would like to thank José Rabasa for encouraging me to articulate this point. Of course, any mistakes relating to the reading of Gadamer are my own.
While Gadamer grounds the interpretive act in historicity, Jacques Derrida relates interpretation to the concept of writing, and later in his career, to the question of ethics. \(^{55}\) In *Of

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Grammatology (1967), for instance, Derrida charts a “deconstruction” of presence – what he describes as a critique of “the meaning of being as presence and the meaning of language as the full continuity of speech.”

As he notes in his reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “There is nothing outside of the text . . .. There has never been anything but writing . . .. What opens meaning and language is writing as the disappearance of natural presence.”

On the other hand, in his Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International (1993), Derrida maintains that the concept of “spectrality” calls into question the “[presumed] presence of the [triumphant, neo-liberal] present.”

Construing “the messianic” as “an ineffaceable mark” of Marx’s legacy, he demonstrates how “the opening of this possibility” is the ethical-political imperative of deconstruction. Thus envisaged, for Derrida, there is “no future without Marx . . . [given] there is more than one of them, there must be more than one of them.”

Although Derridean deconstruction owes much to Heidegger’s interest in the “Destruktion” of metaphysics, Derrida is opposed to the Heideggerian attempt “to gather up, to


Derrida, Of Grammatology, 70.


Ibid., 28-30, 89.

Ibid., 13.

unite, to bring together as one – whether in the form of an ‘accord’ within Being or as the ‘spirit’ of a nation.

As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has suggested, against the Saidian claim that “Derrida’s criticism moves us into [though not out of] the text,” deconstruction can be set-to-work “outside the formalizing calculus specific to the academic institution” – in what she terms “a constant pushing away – a differing and a deferral – of the capital-ist harnessing of the social productivity of capital.” Thus, aside from a critique of “metaphysics” (e.g., “any science of presence”), Derridean deconstruction likewise encourages an interrogation of ethics and its relationship to the political – or, the “experience of the impossible.” In a sense, what interests me is how Derrida and Gadamer differ over Heidegger’s “linguistic turn.” Whereas Gadamer posits that we are part and parcel of an ongoing archivization of tradition (e.g., a meaningful “dialogue” between historicity and tradition issuing from the unity, authority, authenticity, etc. of the archive), Derrida places emphasis on absence and spectrality. For Derrida, “language” undermines the efficacy of tradition; the archive is “always already” infiltrated by “otherness” (e.g., “the question of différance,” a “call to the wholly other,” and so forth). Expressed in a different way, Derrida disrupts the notion that archives guarantee the “truth” of exegesis, for there is no “authentic” archive.

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62 Lucy, A Derrida Dictionary, 78.
63 Edward W. Said, “Criticism Between Culture and System,” in The World, the Text, and the Critic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 183. I would like to thank José David Saldívar for bringing this citation to my attention, and for discussing its significance with me.
64 Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present, 431, 430. Note: Spivak also acknowledges that deconstruction “cannot found a political program of any kind . . . . [Rather, it] is a corrective and a critical movement . . . . [that] suggests that there is no absolute justification of any position . . . . If one wanted to found a political project on deconstruction, it would be something like wishy-washy pluralism . . . . or a kind of irresponsible hedonism . . . . Yet in its suggestion that masterwords like ‘the worker’, or ‘the woman’ have no literal referents deconstruction is . . . . a political safeguard . . . . [For] there are no ‘true’ examples of the ‘true worker’, . . . . [or] the ‘true woman’, the ‘true proletarian’ who would actually stand for . . . . [such] ideals [of disenfranchisement].” See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Practical Politics of the Open End,” in The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues, ed. Sarah Harasym (Routledge: New York: 1990), 104. See also id., “Responsibility,” boundary 2 21, no. 3 (autumn 1994): 19-64; as well as Stephen Morton, “Setting Deconstruction to Work,” in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (London: Routledge, 2003).
Like Gadamer and Derrida, Walter Mignolo explores the conditions of possibility of interpretation. However, Mignolo calls attention to the production and interpretation of meaning in colonial situations – a field of study he describes as “colonial semiosis.” Extending Peter 295; plus, Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present, 425.

To begin with, Mignolo describes colonial semiosis as “a conflictive domain of semiotic interactions among members of radically different cultures engaged in a struggle of imposition and appropriation, on the one hand, and of resistance, opposition and adaptation on the other. The very nature of colonial semiosis [as ‘a field of study’] . . . requires a comparative analysis and a diatopical understanding.” See Walter D. Mignolo, “Colonial Situations, Geographical Discourses and Territorial Representations: Toward a Diatopical Understanding of Colonial Semiosis,” Dispositio 14, no. 36-38 (1989): 93. But, he also characterizes the term variously as “the conflictive interactions of alternative literacies in colonial situations”; as “[a notion that] indicates, on the one hand, a field of study parallel to other well-established ones such as colonial history or colonial art [but,] on the other hand, [a notion that] intends also to indicate a change in our understanding of the construction of a New World during the sixteenth century, a perspective in which the darker side of the Renaissance is brought into light and a change of voice in which the European Renaissance is looked at from the colonial periphery”; and as “[an attempt] to identify particular moments of tension in the conflict between two local histories and knowledges, one responding to the movement forward of a global design that intended to impose itself and those local histories and knowledges that are forced to accommodate themselves to such new realities.” In this regard, see id., “Signs and Their Transmission: The Question of the Book in the New World,” in Writing without Words: Alternative Literacies in Mesoamerica and the Andes, ed. Elizabeth Hill Boone and Walter D. Mignolo (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 265 n. 23; id., The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 8; and id., Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking, 17. Among other texts, see also id., “Afterword: From Colonial Discourse to Colonial Semiosis,” Dispositio 14, no. 36-38 (1989): 333-37; id., “Semiosis colonial: La dialéctica entre representaciones fracturadas y hermenéuticas plurítópicas,” in Discurso colonial hispanoamericano, ed. Sonia Rose de Fuggle, Foro Hispanico, vol. 4 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1992); id., “When Speaking Was Not Good Enough: Illiterates, Barbarians, Savages, and Cannibals,” in Amerindian Images and the Legacy of Columbus, ed. René Jara and Nicholas Spadaccini, Hispanic Issues, vol. 9 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 334 fig. 2; id., “Colonial and Postcolonial Discourse: Cultural Critique or Academic Colonialism?,” Latin American Research Review 28, no. 3 (1993): 120-34; id., “The Movable Center: Geographical Discourses and Territoriality During the Expansion of the Spanish Empire,” in Coded Encounters: Writing, Gender, and Ethnicity in Colonial Latin America, ed. Francisco Javier Cevallos-Candau et al (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994); and id., “Afterword: Human Understanding and (Latin) American Interests – The Politics and Sensibilities of Geocultural Locations,” Poetics Today 16, no. 1 (spring 1995): 178-83, 196 fig. 3; as well as id., “The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Colonization and the Discontinuity of the Classical Tradition,” Renaissance Quarterly 45, no. 4 (winter 1992): 808-28; Walter D. Mignolo and Colleen Ebacher, “Alfabetización y literatura: Los ‘huehuetlatolli’ como ejemplo de la semiosis colonial,” in Conquista y contraconquista: La escritura del Nuevo Mundo (Actas del XXVIII Congreso del Instituto Internacional de Literatura Iberoamericana), ed. Julio Ortega and José.
Hulme’s paradigm of “colonial discourse,” in order to account for non-alphabetical “text and discourse,” Mignolo proposes a “performative concept of semiotic interactions . . . [that views] colonial encounters as a process of manipulation and control rather than of transmission of meaning or representation.” (Note: it is true that Mignolo seems to stress the concept of “colonial difference” in his most recent essays, but I center on his notion of colonial semiosis as a means to tease out his critical engagement with Gadamer and Derrida. In fact, as Mignolo has noted, “Colonial semiosis . . . brought about a type of pluritopic hermeneutics that manifested itself in ‘border thinking’; and the enactment and practice of border thinking is one ‘method’ for the decolonization of knowledge.”) In The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization (1995), for example, Mignolo suggests that under colonial situations “mapping and naming (i.e., geographical discourse) are to territoriality what grammars are to Amerindian speech and historical narratives to Amerindian memories.” On the other hand, Mignolo presupposes “the existence and persistence of speech over grammars, of memories over histories, of territorial orderings over maps.” Although European mapmakers, such as Juan López de Velasco, seemingly “emptied the space” as a means to put the West Indies on the map

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Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 457; as well as id., Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking, especially 14-17. Among other texts, see also id., “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom,” Theory, Culture and Society 26, no. 7-8 (2009): 159-81. What is more, it would be advantageous to consider the relationship between colonial semiosis and what Mignolo terms “colonial wound” – a notion derived from the writings of Frantz Fanon and Gloria Anzaldúa, that is used, it would appear, to situate subalternized knowledge production. In this regard, see id., The Idea of Latin America (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 74; as well as Walter D. Mignolo and Madina Tlostanova, “The Logic of Coloniality and the Limits of Postcoloniality,” in The Postcolonial and the Global, ed. Revathi Krishnaswamy and John C. Hawley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).
(in a manner of speaking), Amerindians such as Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala “emptied the center” in order to accommodate in one graphic space two separate conceptualizations of territoriality – what Mignolo regards as a “sense of invaded territoriality, coexisting with foreign ones.” Building on the Foucauldian notion of “mode d’énonciation,” Mignolo underscores not only the coexistence of territorial representations but also the emergence of “alternative loci of enunciation” – subalternized positions from which the Renaissance has been observed, contested, represented, and so forth. (Like Spivak, Mignolo argues unorthodox epistemic positions that lack institutional support will “not [be] heard when they speak their present.” Whereas Guaman Poma’s Nueva corónica y buen gobierno [1615] has been locked away in “royal” archives [i.e., “not heard”], López de Velasco’s corpus has been circulated as a “real” description of “the New World” [e.g., a datum acknowledged to speak its “present”].) For Mignolo, “colonial situations invite one to rethink the hermeneutical legacy.” In a sense, colonial semiosis (as a prerequisite for decolonizing knowledge) attempts to rework what might be described as the geopolitics of hermeneutics.

Of particular interest is Mignolo’s take on Gadamer and Derrida. In The Darker Side of the Renaissance, Mignolo seems to match colonial semiosis against philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction. In the first place, Mignolo argues that Gadamer’s work is based on the notion that “the tradition to be understood and the understanding subject are one and the same; a universal tradition is understood by a universal subject who, at the same time, speaks for the rest of humanity.” For Mignolo, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics seeks to guarantee the continuity of an “ongoing, natural [‘Greco-Roman’] tradition.” Such a hermeneutic is designated “monotopic.” As an alternative, Mignolo proposes colonial semiosis – a mode of “understanding” that presupposes “more than one tradition.” Such a hermeneutic is designated “pluritopic,” inasmuch as it seeks to account for “[the] plurality of traditions” that makes up colonial situations. Mignolo notes:

Colonial semiosis brings the following [hermeneutical] dilemma to the fore: what is the locus of enunciation from which the understanding subject comprehends colonial situations . . .? [In] which of the cultural traditions to be understood does the

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72 Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 296, 303-09, 269.
74 Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 5, as well as 309, 312.
76 Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 15.
77 Ibid., 11. Also, see Mignolo, “Colonial Situations, Geographical Discourses and Territorial Representations: Toward a Diatopical Understanding of Colonial Semiosis,” 95-98.
understanding subject place him- or herself by constructing his or her locus of enunciation?

In a sense, colonial semiosis explores the relationship between epistemic standpoints and the production of “understanding” in colonial situations; for Mignolo, “understanding” is specific to one’s “locus enuntiationis.” Such an approach revolves around “the politics of enacting and of constructing loci of enunciation.” Hence, colonial semiosis presupposes a hermeneutic that “brings to the fore more than one perspective of interpretation, not in the loose frame of universal history but in the frame of the modern/colonial world from where universal history has been perceived monotonically.” As opposed to an “ongoing, natural tradition” Mignolo seeks to underscore “the coloniality of power” – or, “differentials of power” that are constitutive of the modern/colonial world. For Mignolo, the objective is to regionalize the “universality” of the Gadamerian “understanding subject.”

On the other hand, Mignolo suggests that Derrida’s project is rooted in a particular (i.e., local) history of “writing” – i.e., “from Plato and Aristotle, at one end of the spectrum, to Rousseau, in the eighteenth century, before reaching Saussure and Lévi-Strauss in the twentieth century.” In Mignolo’s view, Derrida overlooks the Italian and Spanish Renaissance; accordingly, what deconstruction lacks is an understanding of the connection between “literacy and colonization” (e.g., “the role played by the practice and the philosophy of writing in spreading Western literacy and colonizing non-Western languages and memories”). Rather than Rousseau, the Enlightenment, and a “European trajectory moving from Greece to Geneva and Paris,” Mignolo focuses on Elio Antonio de Nebrija, the Renaissance, and “colonial situations in the margins of the Western world . . . as a guiding principle to understand trajectories going from Seville to Mexico or from London to Bombay.” While Derrida approaches the concept of writing as “a surrogate of speech,” Mignolo seeks to underscore its role in “taming the voice.” Deconstruction is a monotopic paradigm; it lacks the pluritopic horizon of a decolonizing lens. In one sense, Mignolo drives a wedge between deconstruction and colonial semiosis. He notes:

My first departure . . . is in the attempt to go beyond the evolutionary model . . . from which Derrida did not completely escape . . . I prefer to emphasize a coevolutionary model and the idea of writing without letters, which acknowledges both nonalphabetic forms of writing and alternatives to Greco-Roman alphabets. My second departure is by selecting Nebrija instead of Rousseau, as a cue of the Western philosophy and ideology of alphabetic writing . . . Nebrija’s concern with alphabetic writing was political (in the narrow sense of the word), rather than philosophical or cognitive. My third departure . . . stems from the fact that the example chosen in his deconstruction of logocentrism remains within the tradition he deconstructs. Looking at conflicting writing systems during the early colonial expansion and the confrontation between people practicing different kinds of writing . . . brings new light to the ideology of the letter in the Western tradition. My fourth departure is that the discontinuity of the classical tradition . . . is of the essence to understanding colonial situations; and that Western logocentrism shows its limits when confronted with forms of knowledge and understanding built upon

alternative philosophies of language, and alternative speaking practices and writing systems. My fifth departure is located in disciplinary configurations and the history of problems proper to each discipline. Derrida’s main concern is the history of Western philosophy and in the ways that metaphysics functioned in the foundation of Western knowledge and the concept of science . . . [rather than] understanding and comparing alternative forms of knowledge and the structure of power that allowed the practice of alphabetic writing and its ideology to create a hierarchy across cultures . . .

Mignolo calls attention to Derrida’s “emphasis on the ideology of alphabetic writing and its dislocation of the very notion of writing in Western modernity.” However, Mignolo is likewise intent on moving beyond what he regards as “a regional and restricted notion of writing as dependent on the sounds of speech.” If deconstruction relates the concept of writing to “the production of différance,” colonial semiosis focuses attention on “the idea of writing without letters,” Nebrija’s concern with “the taming of the voice,” the diversity of (as well as conflict between) “writing systems” in colonial situations, the “local” (i.e., “regional”) applicability of a “Western logocentrism,” interrelations between “alternative forms of knowledge” and a “structure of power” that privileges alphabetic writing, and so on. In a sense, colonial semiosis begins with (in Mignolo’s words) “the question of the philosophy, politics, and materiality of writing.” For Mignolo, writing is not a question of “metaphysical underpinnings.” Such an approach is viewed as a “Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism.” (In fact, Mignolo maintains: “Western metaphysics is not a totality but a global design.”) Rather, Mignolo stresses the socio-political dimensions of writing. In colonial situations (e.g., “the New World”), writing is a question of “imagining not only alternative literacies but also alternative politics of intellectual inquiry and alternative loci of enunciation.” Apart from différance, writing implies “colonial difference,” which is to say, “the historical creation and reproduction of colonial differences.” (As Mignolo notes, “It is the colonial epistemic difference that calls for border thinking.”) Hence, it is not “the deconstruction of Western metaphysics” per se that is important. Rather, the goal is to link modernity/coloniality to the work of epistemic decolonization.

I stress Mignolo’s relation to Gadamer. Like Gadamer, Mignolo takes one’s historicity in a pluritopic sense as his point of departure; we cannot disentangle interpretation from modernity/coloniality. Of course, the fundamental difference is: for Gadamer, exegesis is based on one archive; for Mignolo, exegesis is based on two or more archives. Instead of an “ongoing, natural ‘tradition,’” colonial semiosis and border thinking attempt to archive a “plurality of traditions.” (Consider Mignolo’s contrast between López de Velasco and Guaman Poma; it seems un-archiving the former is a prerequisite for archiving the latter.) In this regard, I follow Mignolo – but only up to a point. I agree modernity/coloniality is comprised of a “plurality” of archives. Yet, I also agree with Saldaña-Portillo that alternative archives – e.g., the apotheosis of Nahua indigenismo at El Museo Nacional de Antropología – are plagued by “otherness.” Why would such alternative

80 Note: it should be acknowledged that Mignolo insists his “departures” are not intended as “a criticism of or radical alternative to Derrida’s proposal.” See Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 317-20, 437 passim, 382 n. 5.

archives be inherently authoritative or authentic? It is true that the PRI’s archivization of the past (i.e., the processes of collecting, displaying, etc.) can be re-read in an open-ended manner (e.g., Mignolo’s suggestion that epistemic decolonization is understood best as “a constant set of processes in which the means is the end.”) Even so, to insist on the unity of an-other archive (so to speak) is tantamount to foreclosing a “call to the wholly other” (in this case, contemporary Nahua subjectivities). Again, I agree it is imperative that “understanding” be regionalized; the “conflict of interpretations” between monotopic and pluritopic hermeneutics suggests that there is no universally applicable locus of enunciation. Still, it seems that such a project aims to guarantee (in Mignolo’s words) “more than one perspective of interpretation . . . in the frame of the modern/colonial world” – at the expense of radical alterity (e.g., standpoints outside both the archive and its pluritopic alternatives). Mignolo’s take on Anzaldúa is a case in point. Well known is his assertion that “Anzaldúa’s great theoretical contribution is to create a space-in-between from where to think . . ..” Is not such a space riddled with absence? Who haunts the archives – Spanish-American, Nahua, and Anglo-American – on which Anzaldúa bases her “borderlands” hermeneutic? Exegesis based on a plurality of archives may be “a hybrid thinking-space.” But, it may be such a project cannot be disentangled from archivization: at the heart of Anzaldúa’s “three traditions” stands “the wholly other.” (Or, are we to believe that Anzaldúa is thinking in-between archives – i.e., in a “loca-centric” manner?) 82

In sum, Gadamer, Derrida, and Mignolo shed light on what is at stake in exegesis. Whereas Gadamer maintains that historicity guarantees interpretation, Derrida questions the very possibility of guarantees. Conversely, Mignolo argues that the modern/colonial world system undermines both a monotopic concept of historicity and the universality of Western metaphysics. Likewise, in one way or another, all three construe the question of interpretation as a matter of language: how to interpret a text and further how to interpret interpretation is a question of understanding the disclosure (Gadamer), deferral (Derrida), or plurality (Mignolo) of meaning. In a sense, they take on the challenge of Heideggerian “Destruktion.” In Gadamer and Derrida,

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82 Note: here, I build on Saldaña-Portillo, The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas and the Age of Development, 279-82; and Donna Haraway, “Teddy Bear Patriarchy: Taxidermy in the Garden of Eden, New York City, 1908-1936,” in Culture/Power/Patriarchy: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory, ed. Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry B. Ortner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Also, see Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 19, 16, 451, xiii, 13, 456; plus, Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 28; Michelfelder and Palmer, introduction to Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter, 1; Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present, 425; and Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, 20-36. Moreover, of special interest is the (putative) corrective to Anzaldúa’s reading of the “Coatlicue State” by Carrasco and Lint Sagarena. They note: “Discussions of Coatlicue without a discussion of Coyolxauhqui [the dismembered daughter of Coatlicue], her fate, her stone image, and its central meaning in Aztec religious symbolism are problematic . . .. While Anzaldúa gives us a model of a ‘space-in-between’ . . . her work and those of us who follow her must show a stronger obligation to knowing the parent cultures she is drawing from, lest her and our appropriations turn out to be less a form of cultural resistance and more an unintended artistic and religious form of colonialism.” See Carrasco and Lint Sagarena, “The Religious Vision of Gloria Anzaldúa: Borderlands/La Frontera as a Shamanic Space,” 237-38.
the problem is: how to de-structure the language of metaphysics? In Mignolo, the issue is: how to regard (or even recover) the diversity of enunciative loci? Thus envisaged, it seems that Heidegger’s focus on “the priority of language” is reconfigured as the priority of exegesis. To interpret is to describe oneself understanding – e.g., an attempt at recovering Being that “speaks everywhere and always, in every language.” Instead, I would like to propose a shift – from interpretation to archivization. Paramount is the problem of “describing ourselves describing ourselves.” It is a “modern substitute for ‘truth’” (as Nancy remarks in a different though related context). But, important also is the concept of the archive – the “archiving archive” that produces what is recorded and records what is produced (e.g., the priority of exegesis). The “archive” records as much as it produces styles of archivization. Accordingly, for me, the critical issue is: how to read archivally? As in Heidegger’s treatment of Anaximander’s fragment, a “presencing of what is present” is not only a question of interpretation but also a project in reading the archive; a history of “Being” commences with the issue of an “oblivion” to the difference between “Being and beings” – the difference between “presence and the present.” As I will argue below – against the proposition that deconstruction is negative theology – exegesis can be an exercise in “nostalgia.” Chicana/o religion and spirituality read as substantive and/or functional meaning (e.g., as sui generis data and/or subversive praxis) at times seems to betray a quest to recover (in Derrida’s words) “a lost native country of thought.” (By this, I mean that the hermeneutical project often times falls prey to onto-theology – e.g., the proposition that Chicana/o texts represent a literal and/or figural recovery of indigenous subjectivity.) Of course, this is not to discount forms of cultural survival or the decolonizing uses of religion and spirituality (e.g., “a hybrid thinking-space”). Chicana religion and spirituality (to borrow Pérez’ words) can be understood as “a field of differences and contention, resonances, and crossings.” Rather, my interest lies elsewhere. In what follows I explore the proposition that Chicana/o religion and spirituality can be read archivally.83

Reading Archivally

In the last section, my objective was to establish a link between interpretation and the concept of the archive. In this section, I focus attention on the archive itself. My aim is to read archivally. Again, I agree with Mignolo; it is imperative that hermeneutics be pluritopic. In his words:

Colonial situations invite one to rethink the hermeneutical legacy. If hermeneutics is defined not only as a reflection on human understanding, but also as human understanding itself, then the tradition in which hermeneutics has been founded and developed has to be recast in terms of the plurality of cultural traditions and across cultural boundaries.

Like Gadamer, Mignolo seeks to underscore the question: “How is understanding possible?” In addition, like Gadamer, Mignolo presumes that understanding is “not just one of the various possible behaviors of the subject but [in a Heideggerian sense] the mode of being of Dasein itself” (i.e., hermeneutics is “human understanding itself”). On the other hand, unlike Gadamer who presupposes an “ongoing, natural” understanding subject, Mignolo calls attention to the ethical dimensions of hermeneutics. He writes:

The pluritopic hermeneutic I am trying to articulate moves toward an interactive concept of knowledge and understanding that reflects on the very process of constructing (e.g., putting in order) that portion of the world to be known. What a pluritopic approach emphasizes is . . . [the] politics of enacting and of constructing loci of enunciation . . .. Pluritopic understanding implies that while the understanding subject has to assume the truth of what is known and understood, he or she also has to assume the existence of alternative politics of location with equal rights to claim the truth. The ethical problem arises when the ideal relativism in which examples like this one have been cast overlook the fact that coexistence of perspective does not always take place without a display of power relations and sometimes violence.

As such, Mignolo uses the term “hermeneutics” to denote the “process of understanding” as it takes place “in the context of power and domination.” What the pluritopic approach emphasizes is “the ethical dimension” (re: coloniality) of “human understanding itself.” (Well known are his examples apropos colonization of languages, memory, and space.)

Carrasco and Lint suggest that Mignolo’s work is fundamental to an ethical reading of religion and spirituality in colonial situations. Mignolo asks us to “recast [religion] in terms of the plurality of cultural traditions and across cultural boundaries.”

Thus envisaged, a critique of Chicana/o religiosities must take modernity/coloniality into consideration. Even so, it seems that pluritopic hermeneutics can be

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84 Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 15; and Gadamer, Truth and Method, xxx; as well as id., Philosophical Hermeneutics, 28.

85 Note: here, I continue to explore Carrasco and Lint Sagarena – who argue that Mignolo can help us to understand better Anzaldúa’s “religious vision.” But, it is possible that the inverse would be more appropriate. That is to say, it is arguable that Mignolo’s work itself draws on Anzaldúa’s treatment of spirituality. I owe this observation to Laura Pérez. Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2011.
read as part of History 1 (i.e., “the indispensable and universal narrative of capital”). The study of religion and spirituality (in a pluritopic sense) often times draws on modern/colonial archives. Neither orthodox nor alternative archives allow for the wholly other. As Derrida notes: “There is no archive without . . . a certain exteriority. No archive without outside.” Archivization is predicated on otherness. Thus, my interest lies in History 2s (i.e., “struggles . . . that in practice always modify and interrupt the totalizing thrusts of History 1”). There remains the problem of exteriority. How to think outside the archive? How to think religion and spirituality apart from secular styles of archivization? (If the archive records cultural material it produces, then why not center on the archive itself?) Colonial situations (to borrow Mignolo’s words) invite one to rethink the archive. If hermeneutics is to be based on a plurality of archives (e.g., both orthodox and alternative), then the archive itself calls for a critical appraisal. As an alternative to exegesis (i.e., interpretation based on archives), I attempt to read archives from the outside. To read archivally is to stress archival “layers” on the one hand and “the frontiers of empire” on the other.

86 A point of clarification: I argue for a critique of both orthodox and alternative archives. It is true that alternative archives may resist, subvert, reconfigure, etc. dominant forms of archival production. E.g., consider Mignolo’s study of the Peruvian quipu as an alternative to Western alphabetic reading and writing. However, it seems that the question remains re: archons of alternative archives – who likewise order the sequential and jussive orders of memory. On the other hand, it is possible that alternative archives may not intend to record said orders. Note: I would like to thank Laura Pérez for reminding me of 1) the decolonizing potential of alternative archives and 2) the potential limitations on a Derridean concept of the archive. Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2011.

87 Again, here I am referring to both orthodox and alternative archives with the caveat already mentioned. See above, n. 86. I would like to thank Laura Pérez for encouraging me to clarify this point. Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2011.

88 Note, here, I follow Gil Anidjar’s critique of secularism. Anidjar writes: “Secularism is Orientalism. And Orientalism is Christianity. It is Christian Imperialism.” See Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 52. I would like to thank Laura Pérez for suggesting that I clarify my usage of the term. Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2011.

89 Here, I have benefited from Rabasa, Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History, 3; and Wendy Brown, introduction to Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech, by Talal Asad et al, The Townsend Papers in the Humanities, no. 2 (University of California, Berkeley: Townsend Center for the Humanities, 2009), 7-19; plus, Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles / Éperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche, passim; id., Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, 11, 17; and Said, Orientalism, 274. Also, see Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 15; and n. 21, above.

90 Again, here I am referring to both orthodox and alternative archives with the caveat already mentioned. See above, n. 86. I would like to thank Laura Pérez for encouraging me to clarify this point. Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2011.
other. In this regard, I depart from what might termed a colonial “school of suspicion” (to borrow Paul Ricoeur’s phrase). I regard reading as a “wager.” Betting on archival authority one stands to gain an ethical sense of historicity (e.g., its “darker side”). Conversely, betting against the archives one stands to gain a sense of exteriority – a sense of dwelling “without history.” In a sense, at issue is the notion (no doubt, Rankeian) that History 1 – based on modern/colonial archives – can show “what actually happened.” Likewise, I maintain even the proposition to show “that which is said to have happened” (e.g., Diana Taylor’s “repertoire”) should be called into question. Both seem to exhibit (in a manner of speaking) a possessive investment in the archive. In what follows, I attempt to move outside an ethical reading of religion. I aim at a...

91 Here, I have adapted concepts from Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 281; Shetty and Bellamy, “Postcolonialism’s Archive Fever,” 28; and Rabasa, “Elsewheres: Radical Relativism and the Frontiers of Empire.”

92 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, 32; and Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer, rev. ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 121-27. In addition, see Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 15, vii; Gadamer, Truth and Method, 265-307 passim; and Rabasa, Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History, 3. Note: here, I allude to Pascal’s “wager” (i.e., “Either God is or he is not.”) – except that I take the side of his interlocutor (e.g., “I am being forced to wager [on infinity/nothing] . . .”). I presume that religion/secularism has “limits.” Further, it should be noted that my presentation of the “wager” is derived – in fact, borrows whole phrases – from Leszek Kolakowski, “Blaise Pascal,” in Encyclopedia of Religion, 2d ed.

93 Again, I argue for a critique of both orthodox and alternative archives (e.g., Taylor’s innovative notion of “repertoire”). It is true that alternative forms of memory can resist, subvert, reconfigure, and so forth dominant forms of archival production. However, it seems that the question remains re: the archons of alternative archives who likewise order the sequential and jussive orders of memory. On the other hand, it is possible that alternative archives may not intend to record said orders. Note: I would like to thank Laura Pérez for reminding me of 1) the decolonizing potential of alternative archives (in this case, Taylor’s notion of the “repertoire” as “embodied practice/knowledge [i.e., spoken language, dance, sports, ritual]”) and 2) the potential limitations on a Derridean concept of the archive. Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2011. See n. 86, above; and Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 19; plus, Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences, Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 14-16; and Leopold von Ranke, The Secret of World History: Selected Writings on the Art and Science of History, ed. and trans. Roger Wines (New York: Fordham University Press, 1981), 58. Note: as is well known, Ranke presents his notion of history as “wie es eigentlich gewesen” in History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations, 1494-1535 (1824): “History has had assigned to it the office of judging the past and of instructing the present for the benefit of the future ages. To such high offices the present work does not presume: it seeks only to show what actually happened [emphasis mine] . . . .” Furthermore, see n. 21, above; Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 2; and George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness:
“dis-enclosure” of Christian imperialism. But first, I discuss what has been termed the archival turn. This discussion will set the stage for theorizing the archive.

**The Archival Turn**

In recent years, the “problem of the archive” (as defined by post-structuralism, postcolonialism, et al) has come of age as a key paradigm shift; the “archive” is no longer regarded as “a place of study” but “the object of study.” To be sure, as Francis X. Blouin, Jr. has noted, such a shift focuses attention on how “the archive in its selection, organization, and presentation may implicitly reinforce certain cultural and political constructs, which, in shaping the content of the record, also shape how we come to know the past.” Still, it is not only a

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question of what is (and is not) in the archive or what the consequences are for postcolonial histories dependent on colonial archives. Rather, it is a question of recognizing that the concept of the archive itself is a cultural and political construct: the archive (i.e., a corpus of documents, an institution that stores them, etc.) is also the “archive” – a “metaphor” for totality (in a Foucauldian sense) or alternatively the origin of authority (in a Derridean sense). Here, I stress how Foucault and Derrida differ over the archive; most significant is the outcome of each concept for the study of Chicana/o religion and spirituality. The Foucauldian archive seems to foreclose any possibility of exteriority. In contrast, the Derridean suggests otherwise is unavoidable.

In this regard, several works are of particular interest. First, in Myth and Archive: A Theory of Latin American Narrative (1990) Roberto González Echevarría suggests that Latin American narrative has assumed the form of three hegemonic genres: the legal, the scientific, and the anthropological. He writes: “It is my hypothesis that the novel, having no fixed form of its own, often assumes that of a given kind of document endowed with truth-bearing power by society at specific moments in time.” In the manner of Michel Foucault, González Echevarría focuses attention on “the Archive” – “the law of what can be said.” For example, González Echevarría argues that the novel – like the Archive – hoards knowledge. He notes:

Like the Archive’s, that knowledge [i.e., the novel’s] is of the origin, meaning that it is about the link of its own writing with the power that makes it possible, hence with the

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98 Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense, 45. Also, see Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), especially 126-31; and Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, especially 1-5. Note: I understand that the concept of the archive – as defined by Foucault and Derrida respectively – may not apply to non-Western forms of memory. However, part of my objective here is to test their applicability. More specifically, I hold to the thesis that archons of both orthodox and alternative forms of memory can and should be subject to criticism re: any foreclosure of exteriority. I would like to thank Laura Pérez for reminding me of 1) the decolonizing potential of such alternative archives and 2) the potential limitations on poststructuralist concepts of the archive. Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2011.


possibility of knowledge. In the beginning that power was the law, but later, other origins replaced it [e.g., the scientific and then the anthropological], though preserving the seal of that initial pact between power and writing. The modern novel retains those origins and the structure that made them possible . . . . Archives keep the secrets of the state; novels keep the secrets of culture, and the secret of those secrets.

In one sense, the “figure of the Archive” constitutes the core of Latin American narrative: the novel mirrors not “a given reality” but “a given discourse that has already ‘mirrored’ reality.” In González Echevarría, Inca Garcilaso de la Vega’s *Comentarios reales de los Incas* (1609) assumes the form of “notarial rhetoric” (i.e., it is “a simulacrum of the order of the Empire, an order that is itself a simulacrum of the authority invested in the figure of the King”); Domingo Faustino Sarmiento’s *Facundo* (1845) and Euclides da Cunha’s *Os Sertões* (1902) both bear the stamp of 18th and 19th century scientific travelogues (e.g., like Alexander von Humboldt’s *Voyage aux régions équinoxiales du Nouveau Continent* [1805-1834], Sarmiento and Euclides employ scientific models to relate “Latin American historical uniqueness”); and lastly, works such as Jorge Luis Borges’ “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” (1940) and Miguel Barnet’s *Biografía de un cimarrón* (1966) both develop self-reflexive narratives that mimic the “literariness” of anthropological discourse. As regards the latter genre, what he characterizes as “archival fictions” constitute the “current mode” of narrative. In González Echevarría, Alejo Carpentier’s *Los pasos perdidos* (1953) and Gabriel García Márquez’ *Cien años de soledad* (1967) assume the figure of the Archive; thus, what remains after Carpentier and García Márquez is “opening up . . . the Archive or perhaps only the story about the opening of the Archive . . . .” “Latin America, like the novel,” he contends, “was created in the Archive.” As “a myth of myths,” the Archive contains all the “phantoms” of original authority; the Archive is a repository of “master-stories” – “something between a ruin and a relic.” That is to say: in González Echevarría, “the structure of mediation” is “the constitutive structure of Latin American narrative.” The Archive (in a Foucauldian sense) constitutes “the story” of Latin America’s narrative potentialities; the Archive is “the law of what can [and it would seem, by extension, what cannot] be said.”

Of course, as I will argue below, one might counter that such a thesis seems to reinforce the notion that there is nothing outside empire – or, nothing outside “the archive.” If one were to follow González Echevarría’s thesis and prioritize the “figure of the Archive,” religion and spirituality would become concepts able to be read only in terms of legal, scientific or anthropological discourse. Of course, I agree that the archive – as a repository of “master-stories” – is open to re-inscription. (As Antonio Gramsci notes, the subaltern can reconfigure discourse as a means to

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102 E.g., José Rabasa has observed: “According to this view [i.e., law as rhetorical formula], individuals writing relaciones faced the task of literally writing their ‘selves’ into the dominant discourse.” See José Rabasa, *Writing Violence on the Northern Frontier: The Historiography of Sixteenth-Century New Mexico and Florida and the Legacy of Conquest* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 86. What’s more, Foucault might counter González Echevarría; for Foucault, “it is not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within these rules that we speak . . . .” It thus follows, from a Foucauldian point of view, that perhaps the Archive is no longer the “current mode” of narrative. See Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, 130.
de-legitimate authority.) However, the end result of González Echevarría’s theory is “enclosure.” There is no possibility of exteriority for Latin American narrative. For instance, is González Echevarría suggesting that “reported as myths” is tantamount to narrative potentiality? González Echevarría’s archive resists “opening up.”

Second, in The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire (1993) Thomas Richards suggests that a central motif of late 19th and early 20th century British narrative is “the fantasy of the imperial archive.” He writes: “The imperial archive was a fantasy of knowledge collected and united in the service of state and Empire.” In a sense, for Richards Foucault’s so-called archaeological and genealogical methods are linked: the “archive” is a matter of power/knowledge. As Richards notes:

In the [British] fantasy of the imperial archive, the state actually succeeds in superintending all knowledge, particularly the great reams of knowledge coming in from all parts of the Empire. The myth of imperial archive brought together in fantasy what was breaking apart in fact, and it did so by conjoining two different conceptions of knowledge [i.e., ‘positive’ and ‘comprehensive’ knowledge] . . . . The peculiarly Victorian confidence that knowledge could be controlled and controlling, that knowledge could be exploding and yet be harnessed as the ultimate form of power, issued from this felt merger of the Victorian project of positive knowledge with the Romantic project of comprehensive knowledge. The merger of these two projects made possible the fantasy of an imperial archive in which the control of Empire hinges on a British monopoly over knowledge.

In other words, for Richards “archive” signifies a consolidation of the power/knowledge dyad: the “control of Empire” depends entirely on a “monopoly over knowledge.” For example: in Richards, works by Rudyard Kipling, Bram Stoker, H. G. Wells, and Erskine Childers equate “British mastery of the means of knowledge” with “overpowering threats to empire.” (Richards goes so far as to claim: “In these novels knowledge defeats power every time.”) Kipling’s Kim (1901) seems to tie the protagonist’s “search for individual knowledge” to the state’s search for “a utopian space of comprehensive knowledge” (e.g., a Bildungsroman in the service of empire); Stoker’s Dracula (1897) suggests that threats of “mutant disorder” are manageable (i.e., the colonial is knowable by means of biology); Wells’ Tono-Bungay (1909) relates scientific inquiry to “the consolidation of the modern state” (e.g., the concept of entropy as an essential tool of “state control over knowledge”); and Childers’ The Riddle of the Sands (1903) considers the notion of “an enemy archive” (i.e., the work of Prussian scientific institutes as an impetus for...

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104 Thomas Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire (London: Verso, 1993), 9, 6, 6-7. Note: here, I have benefited from Joseph Rouse, “Power/Knowledge,” in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed. Gary Gutting, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Also, it should be stressed here that said “monopoly” is “fantasy.” I would like to thank Laura Pérez for suggesting that I reiterate this point. Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2011.
Like González Echevarría, Richards builds on Foucault’s concept of the archive. (In fact, in a passage reminiscent of Foucault, Richards notes: “The archive [is] not a building, nor even a collection of texts, but the collectively imagined junction of all that [is] known or knowable, a fantastic representation of an epistemological master pattern, a virtual focal point for the heterogeneous local knowledge of metropolis and empire.”) What seems to differentiate Richards from González Echevarría is (again) the former’s emphasis on a power/knowledge nexus: in Richards, “archive” signifies not only “the law of what can be said” (as in González Echevarría) but also “the fictive thought of imperial control.” (Note: it goes without saying that British “imperial control” has had real consequences – “fictive thought” or not.) In any case, the problem addressed by Richards and González Echevarría is: how to account for the “archive” – in a Foucauldian sense? As I suggested above, González Echevarría forecloses any possibility of exteriority; the archive contains “the law” of Latin America’s narrative potentiality. Conversely, taking Richards’ thesis into account, one would have to consider religion and spirituality in connection with “the fantasy of the imperial archive.” In a sense, Richards’ thesis is contradictory. On the one hand, reading religion and spirituality in terms of an “imperial archive” would embed the concepts in a panopticon. As Richards seems to suggest in his reading of late 19th and early 20th century British narrative, total knowledge (e.g., a “universal” history of religions) is tantamount to imperial control. There is no outside. On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that Richards argues that totalization is “fantasy.” The concept of an “imperial archive” is a motif – a portrayal of plentitude in the face of dissolution. While narratives represented a consolidation of power/knowledge (e.g., a “universal” history of religions in the service of “state and Empire”), in actuality he suggests British dominion was “breaking apart.” In other words, it would seem that Richards’ thesis opens the door to radical alterity; the total archive is fantasy – not “reality.”

Alternatively, of particular interest are several works that consider the “archive” – in a Derridean sense. As is well known, in Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression (1996) Jacques Derrida reads “archive” in terms of the Greek “arkhē,” a term that designates two principles of order: “the commencement and the commandment.” Derrida writes:

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105 Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire, 5-125 passim.
106 Ibid., 11. Also, e.g., compare Foucault: “By this term [i.e., archive] I do not mean the sum of all the texts that a culture has kept upon its person as documents attesting to its own past, or as evidence of a continuing identity; nor do I mean the institutions, which, in a given society, make it possible to record and preserve those discourses that one wishes to remember and keep in circulation. On the contrary . . . [the] archive is first the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events. But the archive is also that which determines that all these things said do not accumulate endlessly in an amorphous mass . . . .” See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 129.
107 Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire, 2. Also, see above, n. 106. To a degree, Richards’ claim that the imperial Archive is “fictive” seems to derive from Foucault’s contention that “the archive cannot be described in its totality.” See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 130, quoted in Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire, 11.
108 Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire, 6.
109 Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, 1. Note: my reading of Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression has benefited from Tlatli, “Algeria as an Archive,” 178-81; and Mikics,
This name [i.e., the Greek arkhē] apparently coordinates two principles in one: the principle according to nature or history, there where things commence – physical, historical, or ontological principle – but also the principle according to the law, there where men and gods command, there where authority, social order are exercised, in this place from which order is given – nomological principle.

In the first place, the concept of the archive – in its physical, historical, ontological sense – denotes sequential order (e.g., “the originary, the first, the principial, the primitive”). In the second place, in its nomological sense, “archive” denotes jussive order – “a house, a domicile, an address, the residence of the superior magistrates, the archons, those who commanded.” If the principle of order begins by inscribing itself in the archive, then the archons ensure its authority. In safeguarding the archive, archons assume both the power of interpretation and the power of consignation – the “hermeneutic right and competence” to gather together signs into a coherent, unified corpus. Through “the force of law,” the archive institutes limits, borders, and distinctions “declared to be insurmountable.”110 (As Derrida has observed: “There is no political power without control of the archive, if not of memory.”) On the other hand, Derrida also insists that such “order [i.e., the archive] is no longer assured” – for “the archive always works . . . against itself.” From his reading of Freudian psychoanalysis, Derrida suggests that the “archive” is indissociable from the “death drive.”111 He writes:

If there is no archive without consignation in an external place which assures the possibility of memorization, of repetition, of reproduction, or of reimpression, then we must also remember that repetition itself, the logic of repetition, indeed the repetition compulsion, remains, according to Freud, indissociable from the death drive. And thus from destruction [emphasis mine]. Consequence: right on that which permits and conditions archivization, we will never find anything other than that which exposes to destruction, and in truth menaces with destruction, introducing, a priori, forgetfulness . . . into the heart of the monument . . .. The archive always works, and a priori, against itself.112

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111 Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, 4-12 passim.
112 Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, 11-12, quoted in Tlatli, “Algeria as an Archive,” 179. Note: again, I acknowledge that the Derridean concept of the archive may not apply to non-Western forms of memory. Yet, part of my objective here is to test its applicability. More specifically, I hold to the thesis that archons of both orthodox and alternative forms of memory can and should be subject to criticism re: any foreclosure of exteriority. See above, n. 98. I would like to thank Laura Pérez for reminding me of 1) the decolonizing potential of
The archive presupposes “destruction” – and thus, “forgetfulness.” In one sense, at issue is not the past (e.g., the possibility of memory figured as a “mystic pad”) but “the future.” (How might “new archival machines” affect the representation of memory not to mention the archivization of psychoanalysis itself?) For Derrida, the archive is “not only the place for stocking and for conserving an archivable content of the past . . ..” Quite the contrary, “the technical structure of the archiving archive [e.g., psychoanalysis] . . . determines the structure of the archivable content . . .. The archivization produces as much as it records the event.” (“In the past,” Derrida contends, “psychoanalysis would not have been what it was . . . if E-mail, for example, had existed. And in the future it will no longer be what Freud . . . anticipated, from the moment E-mail, for example, became possible.”) Derrida regards the archive (i.e., “that other archive”) as a question of the future: how will it have been otherwise? The archive produces more archive; it opens toward “times to come.” (In fact, it appears “what will have been and ought to or should be in the future” suspends “[in the conditional] the very possibility of knowledge.”) For Derrida, “messianicity” is at odds with “archive fever” – an interminable “searching for the archive right where it slips away.” (Of course, the figure in question for Derrida is “Freud,” who in spite of having “deconstructed” the concept of the archive still persists “[in burning] with a passion . . . [and running] after the archive . . . right where something in it anarchives itself.”)

Whereas the Foucauldian concept of the archive stresses “the law of what can be said,” it appears the Derridean underscores “the question of a politics of the archive.” Two examples alternative archives and 2) the potential limitations on a poststructuralist concept of the archive. Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2011.

Note: for Derrida, “the theory of psychoanalysis . . . becomes a theory of the archive and not only a theory of memory.” See Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, 11-17, 19; plus, id., Geneses, Genealogies, Genres, and Genius: The Secrets of the Archive, 87.

Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, 36-91 passim. Note: for Derrida, “a spectral messianicity is at odds with “archive fever” – an interminable “searching for the archive right where it slips away.” (Of course, the figure in question for Derrida is “Freud,” who in spite of having “deconstructed” the concept of the archive still persists “[in burning] with a passion . . . [and running] after the archive . . . right where something in it anarchives itself.”)

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will suffice. First, in his essay “Archival Action: The Archive as ROM and Its Political Instrumentalization under National Socialism” (1999) Wolfgang Ernst’s focus of attention is archivization – in a Derridean sense. In Ernst, the technical structure of “the archive” also determines the structure of “what is to be archived.”

He notes:

From 1806 to 1918 the network of Prussian state archives functioned as a non-discursive juridical “Programmable Read Only Memory” [i.e., ROM] . . . solely for internal use by the bureaucratic system. With the formation of the Weimar Republic a degree of democratic transparency was sought, a form of archival “information politics”; this did not, however, strike deep roots in the system, and only a minority of state institutions adhered to this new politics. It was the National Socialist regime that mobilized the existing magazine of Akten, in its most extreme manifestation becoming an active instrument in the project to annihilate European Jewry.

In a sense, at issue for Ernst is the interplay between a “new state order” and “its archival system.” Prussian archives served a “juridical” purpose as a form of “memory resident in [the] hardware” (i.e., ROM); the Weimar Republic sought to detach “memory agencies” from the state and thus democratize the archive (e.g., archives that in theory reflect “the people”); and National

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Socialists “mobilized” the archive to establish racial genealogies – to distinguish “Jews” from “Aryans.”

(As the head of Bavarian archival administration noted in 1936: “There is no practice of racial politics without the mobilisation of source documents, which indicate the origin and development of a race and people . . . . There is no racial politics without archives, without archivists.”)

In this regard, the “archive” is a site of “politicization” – not only ideologization (i.e., “political use or misuse”) but also “archival micro-politics” (e.g., issues of “narrative order” in Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Will to Power or “unreadability” as regards obsolete databanks of the former GDR State Security). For Ernst, “wars” restructure archival systems that in turn restructure archival memory; archivization is a form of techno-determinism.

Second, in her piece “Archive Fever and the Panopticon of History,” the epilogue to Dwelling in the Archive: Women Writing House, Home, and History in Late Colonial India (2003), Antoinette Burton’s focus of attention is the concept of the archive itself. In Burton, recent debates about the writing of history (e.g., its relation to truth, fiction, theory, etc.) lead to archival polemics. She notes:

It still remains for us to ask why it has proven so difficult to imagine the official archive [i.e., state repositories] as something other than a panoptical institution. Is it because such archives were themselves born out of a determination to survey, an outgrowth of states convinced of their all-seeing and all-knowing capabilities? Or is it because so much academic thinking remains tethered, unwittingly or not, to earlier claims about disciplinary omniscience and its relationship to truth?

At issue for Burton is (in her words) “who counts as a historical subject and what counts as an archive.”

Like Derrida, Burton stresses the connection between “political power” and “control


119 Ibid., 26, referring to Torsten Musial, “Archive im Dritten Reich: Zur Geschichte des staatlichen Archivwesens in Deutschland 1933-1945” (Ph.D. diss., Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 1994), 49.


121 Antoinette Burton, Dwelling in the Archive: Women Writing House, Home, and History in Late Colonial India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 138, 140-41. Note: my reading of
of the archive.” As a locus of memory, the archive betrays either “effective democratization” or “breaches of democracy.” (In fact, it should be acknowledged that Burton’s characterization of the empiricist argument seems to echo Derrida’s etymology of the Greek arkhē: “The traditional archive is being rehabilitated as the originary site of ‘real’ history [i.e., a ‘commencement’] and the last bastion of ‘real’ historical knowledge and authority [i.e., a ‘commandment’].”)

By way of illustration, Burton examines the writings of Janaki Majumdar, Cornelia Sorabji, and Attia Hosain. Such works reimagine what counts as “legitimate archives,” and at the same time, call into question “the truth-fantasy of the total archive” that infuses British imperial and Indian nationalist histories. Majumdar connects “the houses of her family’s past” to the history of 19th century Indian nationalism; Sorabji regards “the interiors of the Indian home” (i.e., “the orthodox zenana and its purdahnashin”) as an archival source for antinationalist history; and Hosain links “the impossibility of dwelling comfortably at home” with historical polemics regarding the 1947 partition of India. For Burton, “archiving the domestic” bears witness to the “fragmentation and ghostliness” that characterizes “all archives” – whether “official” or not.

Here, I underscore two Derridean propositions. In the first place, Ernst builds on Derrida’s thesis that “interpretation” can be subsumed under “archivation.” If the term archive were to denote primarily the machinations of jussive order (e.g., a shifting ground of “state order”), “religion” and “spirituality” could be read in terms of an ever-evolving “archival system” – rather than substantive or functional hermeneutic theories. Again, as I maintain above in chapter 2, “religion” is an invention that has shaped both culture and social structures; thus, one must allow for religiosity. But, as I argue in the present chapter, it does not follow that “religion” must be interpreted. In view of Ernst, archivization of religion (and perhaps, spirituality) would precede


122 Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, 4, 1; in connection with Burton, Dwelling in the Archive: Women Writing House, Home, and History in Late Colonial India, 139, 138. Note: also of interest is what seems to be Burton’s application of other Derridean concepts, such as “domiciliation,” “the archons,” and so forth. Burton observes: “At issue in the project of interrogating archival evidence – what counts, what doesn’t, where it is housed, who possesses it, and who lays claim to it as a political resource – is not theory, but the very power of historical explanation itself.” See Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, 2-3; in connection with Burton, Dwelling in the Archive: Women Writing House, Home, and History in Late Colonial India, 138.

123 Burton, Dwelling in the Archive: Women Writing House, Home, and History in Late Colonial India, 138-44 passim, 32, 67, 106.
exegesis. In the second place, Burton takes up Derrida’s thesis that an archive “always works . . . against itself” – in fact, “anarchives itself.” If the archive were to reflect a lack of sequential order (i.e., an incessant “fragmentation and ghostliness” at its core), religion and spirituality might be read outside the trajectory of History 1. As an alternative to “legitimate archives” or their supplements (e.g., “archiving the domestic”), one might explore how religion and spirituality have evolved as part and parcel of “the archiving archive.” Again, if archivization precedes exegesis, why insist religion and spirituality retain a substantive or functional meaning? On the contrary, in view of Burton it seems the concepts of religion and spirituality are archived “right where [they slip] away.”

Theorizing the Archive

In a sense, the archival turn seeks to underscore the significance of the archive as a cultural and political construct. The archive is the locus of a problem: how to theorize coloniality – here and now? As Said observes in *Culture and Imperialism* (1993):

Appeals to the past [i.e., appeals to the archive] are among the commonest of strategies in interpretations of the present. What animates such appeals is not only disagreement about what happened in the past and what the past was, but uncertainty about whether the past really is past, over and concluded, or whether it continues, albeit in different forms . . . . This problem [e.g., how to theorize coloniality] animates all sorts of discussions – about influence, about blame and judgement, about present actualities and future priorities.

In this regard, it seems “the archive” refers to “the present” – not simply “what happened in the past” or “what the past was.” That is, “the archive” unsettles the proposition “the past really is past, over and concluded.” The “archive” (understood as a locale and a concept) can be “among the commonest of strategies in interpretations” of coloniality.

I propose to read “the archive” in terms of “layers” and “frontiers.” Such a thesis builds on what might be termed Left Derrideanism. Such an approach makes possible a

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125 Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, 12, 91, 17; and Burton, *Dwelling in the Archive: Women Writing House, Home, and History in Late Colonial India*, 144, 143. Also, see above, n. 21.

126 Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 3. Note: it should be acknowledged that “forms of cultural survival” might also pervade the present – thus, raising the issue of the possibility of “different presents.” I owe the latter observation to Laura Pérez. Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2011. Also, see above, n. 18.

127 See above, n. 55. Note: here, I do not intend to pigeonhole certain texts as Derridean – but simply to acknowledge the relevance of Derrida beyond a more or less text-centric paradigm.
deconstructive reading of religion (and perhaps, spirituality) – from the outside. First of all, it has been suggested that in her essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988) Spivak approaches “the archive” as a “palimpsestic narrative of imperialism.” In Spivak, the question of “widow sacrifice” betrays “the British codification of Hindu Law.” At issue here is “a history with a double origin” (in a Freudian sense). Spivak writes:

“The Hindu widow ascends the pyre of the dead husband and immolates herself upon it. This is widow sacrifice . . .. The abolition of this rite by the British has been generally understood as a case of “White men saving brown women from brown men” . . .. Against this is the Indian nativist argument, a parody of the nostalgia for lost origins: “The women actually wanted to die.”

As Spivak observes: the arguments legitimize each other (i.e., “One never encounters the testimony of the women’s voice-consciousness.”). That is, the Hindu patriarchal archive (read: “the classical and Vedic past of Hindu India, the Rg-Veda and the Dharmasastra”) serves as a substrate for the British imperial archive; the silence implicit in “the women actually wanted to die” is reconfigured as “imperialist benevolence” (e.g., “white men are saving brown women from brown men.”).

For Spivak, “archival” work is not a matter of “recovery” (filling in gaps, (e.g., neo-New Critical reading strategies). For instance, Spivak writes: “This paper [i.e., ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’] is committed to the notion that, whether in defense of Derrida or not [emphasis mine], a nostalgia for lost origins can be detrimental to the exploration of social realities within the critique of imperialism.” See Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 291.


Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 271, 281, 297; as well as Mark Sanders, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: Live Theory (London: Continuum, 2006), 33. Note: in this regard, Shetty and Bellamy state: “As a means of describing the ‘postcolonial archive’ of ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?,’ we could rest content within the discursive practices of Foucault’s archive and its statements ‘specifie[d] in their own duration’ were it not for a second statement or ‘sentence’ that Spivak insists is crucial to an understanding of the legal underpinnings of sati, and that we argue necessitates another conceptualization of the archive. This sentence reads: ‘She [the self-immolating widow] wanted to die.’ As the Foucaultian ‘law of what can be said,’ this sentence emanates not from within the ‘duration’ of colonial Indian modernity in the nineteenth century, but rather from the laws of Hindu antiquity dating as far back as the sixth century BCE. The statement ‘She wanted to die’ is at semantic as well as legal odds with the statement ‘White men are saving brown women from brown men,’ and is a key reason why Spivak is prompted to summarize British law’s abolition of sati textually as ‘the palimpsestic narrative of imperialism.’” See Shetty and Bellamy, “Postcolonialism’s Archive Fever,” 27.
adding voices, etc.) but “a task of ‘measuring silences.’” In this regard, it seems Spivak focuses attention on what Derrida has called “the violence of the archive itself, as archive, as archival violence.” In question is how “the archive takes place at the place of originary and structural breakdown of the said memory” – as in “there where things commence . . .” For Spivak, textual layers ad infinitum constitute “the archive.” Reading archivally signifies reading subalternity in terms of “institutional textuality at the archaic origin” – beyond a Saidian concept of colonial modernity back to the archival

130 Here, it is important to reiterate that both archives are patriarchal – and thus, act together to efface gendered subalterns. That is to say, it is likely that neither archive will contribute to a recovery project and/or affirmation of cultural continuities with respect to spirituality. On the other hand, I hold to Spivak’s proposal that archival work might be envisioned as “a task of ‘measuring silences’” rather than a matter of “recovery.” I would like to thank Laura Pérez for suggesting that I stress this point. Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2011. Also, see Anjali Arondekar, “Without a Trace: Sexuality and the Colonial Archive,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 14, no. 1-2 (January-April 2005): 13-14; and id., *For the Record: On Sexuality and the Colonial Archive in India* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); as well as Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 286, quoted in Shetty and Bellamy, “Postcolonialism’s Archive Fever,” 25. Note: well known is Spivak’s thesis that “once a woman performs an act of resistance without an infrastructure that would make us recognize resistance, her resistance is in vain . . ..” See Swapan Chakravorty, Suzana Milevska, and Tani E. Barlow, *Conversations with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak* (London: Seagull Books, 2006), 62. Furthermore, see Morton, *Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak*, 25-69; and id., *Gayatri Spivak: Ethics, Subalternity and the Critique of Postcolonial Reason*, 42-69, 95-123.


134 See above, n. 128. Moreover, see especially Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 303, quoted in Shetty and Bellamy, “Postcolonialism’s Archive Fever,” 32. Well known is Spivak’s reworking of the concept of subalternity. E.g., Morton notes: “Spivak oscillates between the use of the term subalternity to denote a non-relational concept that is not unlike Derrida’s *différance* on the one hand; and its use as a concrete category to denote the social composition of subordinate groups in South Asia on the other.” See Spivak, introduction to *Selected Subaltern Studies*, passim; and Morton, *Gayatri Spivak: Ethics, Subalternity and the Critique of Postcolonial Reason*, 65, as well as 95-105. Rather than recover the subaltern (in a positivistic sense), Spivak insists (it would seem) that subalternity cannot be represented outside dominant discourse. By way of illustration, Spivak argues: “The Rani [of Sirmur] emerges [in the archival record] only when she is needed in the space of imperial production [that is to say, ‘the commercial/territorial interests of the East India Company’].” Subalternity is gendered – irrespective of class. See Spivak, “The Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading the Archives,” 270, 263; and Morton, *Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak*, 7-61 passim.
violence of “antiquity.”¹³⁵ (Needless to say, whether or not Spivak’s palimpsestic reading leads us to a “postcolonial archive” is another question altogether. Are there “true” examples of such an archive?¹³⁶ On the contrary, significant here is the proposition that reading archivally opens the door to the concept of reading beyond antiquity back to an even more remote layer of archons who likewise perpetrate archival violence.) In one sense, the task is to trace how archival violence ensures coherence and closure¹³⁷ – that is to say, how metaphorical totalization becomes a normative truth (e.g., in Nietzsche’s terms: “fixed, canonical, and binding”).¹³⁸

As is well known, Spivak demonstrates how Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze conflate two distinct concepts of representation; that is, Vertretung runs into Darstellung. It seems Foucault and Deleuze are ultimately “speaking for” a totalized “re-presentation” of heterogeneity. (“The much-publicized critique of the sovereign subject,” Spivak notes, “actually inaugurates a Subject.”) In like manner, British imperial and Hindu patriarchal archives seem to identify vertreten with darstellen; archons are “speaking for” a totalized “re-presentation” of subalternized women. (Again, to be precise: on the one hand “White men are saving brown women from brown men” and on the other “The women wanted to die.”) In general, Spivak suggests discursive violence rules out the possibility of hearing or reading alterity. “Subaltern as

¹³⁵ Shetty and Bellamy, “Postcolonialism’s Archive Fever,” 27-30; plus, see above, n. 131. As Shetty and Bellamy have observed: “Spivak is intent on rediscovering what modernity has ‘repressed,’ that is, the origins of the practice of sati in the Hindu texts of antiquity.”

¹³⁶ Again, I argue for a critique of both orthodox and alternative archives. See above, n. 86. E.g., as Shetty and Bellamy observe: “Claims for hermeneutic authority on both sides of the colonial divide (‘Britain’ and ‘Hinduism’) rest on slippages, mistranslations, and corrupt phrasings of the sacred texts.” And thereafter by way of a conclusion: “The postcolonial archive, this impossible space where a deconstructive critique of imperialism meets Orientalist scholarship, reveals antiquity belatedly as that which must be both distanced and summoned in the aftermath of colonialism.” See Shetty and Bellamy, “Postcolonialism’s Archive Fever,” 43, 44. Also, see Spivak, “Practical Politics of the Open End,” 104; plus, Morton, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 33-35.

¹³⁷ Here, my observation (re: coherence and closure) is adapted from a brief discussion of Derrida in Morton. See Morton, Gayatri Spivak: Ethics, Subalternity and the Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 49; as well as id., Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 39.

¹³⁸ Note: here (re: metaphor and normative truth), I build on Morton as regards some of the theoretical ties between Spivak, Derrida, Nietzsche, Paul de Man, et al. See Morton, Gayatri Spivak: Ethics, Subalternity and the Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 44-45, 51-52. Also, see Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870s, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale (Amherst: Humanity Books, 1999), 84. Of course, in question is “totalization” with respect to the archives of antiquity and British imperialism as well as Indian nationalism, or (in a general sense), “the fabrication of representations of historical reality.” For example, Spivak asks in another though related context: “As the historical record is made up, who is dropped out, when, and why?” In this regard, see Spivak, “The Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading the Archives,” 271, 270. And with respect to the text under discussion Spivak states: “This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one.” See Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 281.
female” is a case in point: “If, in the context of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow.” At issue is representational ethics; assuming “there is no space from which the sexed subaltern subject can speak,” must she be represented? For Spivak, the subaltern woman cannot speak (in a positivistic sense). Rather, the task is to measure her “silences” – that is, to read the layers of archons “speaking for” a “re-presentation” of subalternity.

In this regard, the issue of exteriority arises. Is there an outside to empire? Might the archive have limits? Is not the archive a metaphor for imperialism, patriarchy, and so forth? (As Spivak asserts: “I am suggesting . . . that to buy a self-contained version of the West is to ignore its production by the imperialist project.”) Is not what might be termed an “archival prejudice” (perhaps, a subset of Derrida’s “theological prejudice”) at work in the consolidation of imperialism, patriarchy, and so forth? As Derrida notes: “There is no archive without a place of consignation, without a technique of repetition, and without a certain exteriority. No archive without outside.” In a manner of speaking, the archive consolidates “the ethnocentric Subject.” The premise “on the outside memory as internal archivization” is consistent with the thesis “secularism is a name Christianity gave itself when it invented ‘religion,’ named its other or others as ‘religions.’” The archive betrays the limits of metaphorical totalization; its metaphysical assumptions turn ethnocentric.

Here, in the second place, of critical interest is José Rabasa’s concept of frontiers.

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139 E.g., Spivak observes re: the complicity of Vertreten and Darstellen: “a proxy and a portrait . . . are related, but running them together, especially in order to say that beyond both is where oppressed subjects speak, act, and know for themselves, leads to an essentialist, utopian politics . . . . My view is that radical practice should attend to this double session of representations rather than reintroduce the individual subject through totalizing concepts of power and desire . . . . The archival, historiographic, disciplinary-critical, and, inevitably, interventionist work involved here is indeed a task of ‘measuring silences.’” See Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 271-308 passim. Also, see Morton, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 56-69; and id., Gayatri Spivak: Ethics, Subalternity and the Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 105-23.

140 Note: here, I build on personal communication from José Rabasa to the author, spring 2011; as well as Rabasa, Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History.

In “Elsewheres: Radical Relativism and the Frontiers of Empire” (2006), Rabasa argues for a “space” that resists totalization – what he describes as “elsewheres.” Rather than “endangered cultures” (e.g., an “uncontacted tribe” in Brazil), such a notion refers to “political, aesthetic, logical, and loving articulations of independent worlds.” Rabasa suggests that “radical alterity between languages” (e.g., “aporias of translation” between standard European and Mesoamerican languages) betrays the “frontiers of empire” (i.e., the “limits” of totalizing “forms of life” such as the “Greco-Abrahamic”). In his words: “traffic between cultures is a two-way street . . .” By way of illustration, he notes:

The tlacuilo who painted . . . [folio 46r] of the Codex Telleriano-Remensis (ca. 1563) was responding to the demand, “Tell me the story of how I conquered you.” The missionaries asked her not only to produce a book in iconic script describing the feasts, ancient calendar, and pre-Columbian Mexican history, but also to devise a pictorial vocabulary depicting the colonial order and her subjection to it. The friars supervising the production of this book were surprised, perhaps, when they realized that they had requested a return of the gaze, a particularly brilliant instance of the observer observed. This possibly explains why the project was abandoned only a few pages later when the Dominican Fray Pedro de los Rios took over the production of the book; the aesthetically pleasing and informative use of color and iconic script were supplanted by boxes enclosing the names of the years written in a shoddy calligraphy. This effort, too, was soon abandoned when the Dominicans realized that rather than the inclusion of data, the objective had been to register native forms of writing that would not only inscribe knowledge about the pre-Columbian and colonial worlds, but also offer a window into the mind of the tlacuilo. This mind apparently proved too powerful, as the project of translating back the translation of the colonial world in her depiction faced an aporia of infinite inter-lingual regress; the missionaries faced a process in which the tlacuilo would respond to their translation, which in turn would have to be translated back to Spanish, and so on endlessly.

Of course, such an argument is intended to counter “relativism” in a conventional sense. For Rabasa, “traditional accounts of relativism” presume that “all possible worlds” can be absorbed into “a single all-encompassing world.” Instead, “radical relativism” focuses on “the universality of truth-statements” in relation to “singular worlds” (e.g., “comparisons of universalities”). Folio 46r of the Codex Telleriano-Remensis is a case in point. Again, what emerges from such an “aporia of infinite inter-lingual regress” (i.e., translating back translations ad infinitum) is an instance of “plural-world dwelling.” Incommensurability between languages betrays “the frontiers of empire” – a “return of the gaze” in which the observer’s universality is observed. In this sense, Rabasa restricts the Greco-Abrahamic. He writes:

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1978); Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present, 423-31; and among other works, Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority.’” In this regard (re Levinas, Derrida, and Spivak), see also Morton, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 37, 42.

Are philosophy, history, literature, art, and law not universal discourses? Shouldn’t we be suspicious of any attempt to validate indigenous practices by insisting that we would find these disciplines and fields if we looked close enough? What is to be gained by defining philosophy as a universal practice, rather than as a set of disciplines particular to Greco-Abrahamic worlds? Clearly, these disciplines may function as universal frameworks for actual discourses that seek to inscribe themselves within their definitions, problems, and categories. We may speak of Aztec philosophy, or for that matter of Hindu philosophy, by teasing philosopemes out of statements not intended to fulfill the definition of philosophy in the first place, but what do these traditions gain by doing so? Why would all cultures want to identify themselves as cultivating history, literature, philosophy, or art?

Here, of particular interest is the “denial of coevalness” in a radical sense: to resist Greco-Abrahamic universals (e.g., philosophy, history, literature, etc.) is to assert the efficacy of “elsewheres.” (In fact, it would appear that Rabasa’s thesis brings out the literal sense of Nietzsche’s famous declaration: “I am afraid that we have not got rid of God because we still have faith in grammar . . .”)

In a sense, Rabasa defies the dictum: “Always historicize!” Rather, the focus is on “writing elsewheres.” To trace the limits of empire is to affirm “a plurality of worlds” (e.g., the possibility that the subaltern chooses to dwell “outside history”). The injunction to “always historicize” forecloses a “return of the gaze” from “elsewhere to the modern.” (Note: even the

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145 Note: said “moral” is well known. See Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act, ix.
path-breaking notion “the underside of modernity” seems to foreclose “an outside.” Is not alternative history still a history of the modern?) Rabasa notes:

The promise of subaltern studies resides in the possibility of interrupting narratives that end up in single histories. The denial of the existence of an outside history, capital, and the state [i.e., ‘elsewheres to modernity’] would constitute one such instance of single history regardless of the claims of nonteleology or the proposal of multiple understandings history or, for that matter, the insistence on temporal heterogeneity . . . .

For Rabasa, it seems, the question is: “Why always historicize?” To insist on modernities (conventional, alternative, and so forth) is to foreclose exteriority – to insist on a narrative of “single history.” Of course, it is imperative to develop (in his words) “an inventory of the colonial legacy of modernity.” The task is to conceptualize “plural-world dwelling” – the capacity to participate in “forms of life” (e.g., Greco-Abrahamic) without abdicating others. What Rabasa regards as exteriority is perhaps “a logical consequence” of empire. (In a related essay, Rabasa explores the notion that “thinking the incorporation of Europe into Mesoamerican culture” is “a logical consequence” of Edmundo O’Gorman’s concept of “the incorporation of America into European culture.”) In other words, it would seem modernity and its alternatives necessarily coexist with “elsewheres.” (What’s more, it would appear that Rabasa’s thesis

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147 Rabasa, “Elsewheres: Radical Relativism and the Frontiers of Empire,” 72-88 passim; plus, id., Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History, 5-318 passim; as well as id., “Ecografías de la voz en la historiografía nahua,” 106. Note: such a proposition (i.e., incommensurability) is of particular interest with respect to comparativism in subaltern studies, religious studies, literary studies, etc. If “multiple autonomous worlds . . . cannot be compared without assuming a single world that engulfs them,” then is not the call for comparative studies (e.g., hemispheric literary studies, “cross-cultural inquiry,” “transnational” theory of colonial/postcolonial history, etc.) an injunction to always historicize – to insist on the singular history of modernity and its alternatives? See Rabasa, “Decolonizing Medieval Mexico,” 47; plus, by way of illustration, Bruce Lincoln, review of Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam, by Talal Asad, History of Religions 35, no. 1 (august 1995): 83-86; and Tony Ballantyne, “Rereading the Archive and Opening up the Nation-State: Colonial Knowledge in South Asia (and Beyond),” in After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation, ed. Antoinette Burton (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). In this regard: among other texts, see also Rabasa, Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History, especially re: “background.”
gives a new sense to Walter Benjamin’s interest in “the trash of history.” One might argue modernity’s “detritus” necessarily betrays “a plurality of worlds.”

Again, I have proposed to read the archive in terms of layers on the one hand and frontiers on the other. The concept of layers makes possible a critical reprisal to archival violence. Metaphorical totalization gives way to layers ad infinitum of archons invoking coherence and closure. Vertretung is not Darstellung. However, it seems the question of exteriority remains. The subaltern cannot speak (Spivak notes) “without an infrastructure that would make us recognize [her] resistance.” In this regard, I turn to the concept of frontiers. As Rabasa observes, Spivak’s assertion “loses its pertinence” if the subaltern “[chooses] to remain outside the state and history . . ..” The concept of frontiers makes possible a critique of (what I am calling) archival prejudice (i.e., the preconception that there is no outside to empire). Metaphysical ethnocentrism gives way to subalterns who observe the observer from elsewhere outside modernity and its alternatives. The archive coexists with a plurality of worlds. Of course, this is not to deny the efficacy of empire. Writing elsewhere entails (Rabasa argues) “drawing the limits of . . . Greco-Abrahamic forms of life.” At issue is the (putative) capacity of the subaltern to partake in archivization without abdicating other forms of memory. As Rabasa


149 See above, n. 130.

150 Rabasa, Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History, 4. Also of interest, Rabasa contends: “Spivak’s question ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ builds on a binary that sets an absolute distance between Europe and its Others . . .. Spivak’s question and negative answer reproduce the terms of this absolute binary in a circular argument: dominant discourses define the colonized as incapable of reasoning, hence subalterns are incapable of reasoning and need the mediation and representation of what Spivak calls First World intellectuals . . .. The ‘subaltern cannot speak’ construct . . . betrays a metalepsis, the substitution of effect for cause . . ..” And re: Spivak’s Death of a Discipline (2003), he adds: “Spivak’s brilliant call for a new comparative literature remains within the one-way street of translating the ‘other’ for metropolitan readers. Her call for learning the languages of the ‘other’ . . . could not be more timely, but I would push the proposal to include a reflection on the ways the ‘other’ translates the projects and concepts ‘we’ bring into the field.” Plus: “The notion that ‘the subaltern can’t speak’ carries as its ultimate irony the corollary that if a subaltern speaks [e.g., ‘the languages of the West’] she . . . would no longer be a subaltern.” Ibid., 105, 296.
notes, “the work of memory is a two-way street.” In this sense, Spivak and Rabasa unsettle the presumption that the past is past. Likewise, both disrupt the notion that the archive provides coherence and closure for the present. A theory of the archive is indispensable to a critique of coloniality. As I argued above, the prospect of reading archivally (i.e., reading archival layers and frontiers) opens the door to a hermeneutical wager: either one invests in an ethics of historicity or one is skeptical (e.g., holds out against a totalizing tradition). This is not to insist on an either/or choice. (Of course, the notion of plural-world dwelling comes to mind). Rather, it is my contention that the so-called archival turn is stuck on the former. In González Echevarría and Richards, the archive is a totalizing concept: it contains all the master-stories of Latin American narrative; and as a central motif of late 19th and early 20th century British texts, it signifies a consolidation of the power/knowledge dyad. (Note: Richards maintains that in view of the demise of British empire such consolidation is fantastical; nevertheless, he gives no sense of exteriority – only threats to empire). Likewise, in Ernst and Burton the archive retains its connection with history and the state: it betrays transformations in state order; and it can be reimagined to serve as a basis for alternative histories. (Note: neither Ernst nor Burton take to Derrida’s assertion that there is “no archive without outside.” Burton acknowledges the impossibility of a total archive; however, she seems unable to dispense with the archive altogether.) Instead, I focus on archivization as an alternative to exegesis; rather than recollect meaning (e.g., from archival formations) I explore the production of recoverable meaning.

Such an approach is proposed as a first step in deconstructing “Christianity.” Here, I build on Anidjar’s thesis: “Secularism is a name Christianity gave itself when it invented ‘religion,’ named its other or others as ‘religions.’” My contention is this: “globalatinization” is “the archiving archive.” At issue is globalatinarchivization (so to speak). To read religion (and perhaps, spirituality) is to read archival formations. In fact, archivization sets the stage for interpretation; exegesis is based on archivization. (Consider for example how the Septuagint has shaped Christian hermeneutics! Consider how history of religions has shaped Chicana/o literary studies!!)

Is Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera “a religious vision” or a meditation on the

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151 Rabasa, “Elsewhere: Radical Relativism and the Frontiers of Empire,” 73; and id., Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History, 228. In this regard, also of interest is Rabasa re: “policing” of the past: “The link between history and the state (in reinforcing or in redefining the status quo) produces subalternity (the subaltern cannot speak — that is, his or her discourse lacks legitimacy) but also the ‘without history’ (the possibility of choosing to remain outside history, a fortiori, to foreclose the constitution of a new state).” Ibid., 15.

152 Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, 11.

153 Ibid., 17.

154 A point of clarification: here, I understand that Chicana/o literary and cultural studies – as a whole – cannot (and should not) be described as exclusively Christian, hermeneutical (e.g., derived from the discipline of the history of religions), etc. In fact, such a characterization would run the risk of defining the field as Eurocentric. Rather, I am interested in some of the limitations on religion and spirituality as analytical categories – a point (it is arguable) that Carrasco broaches when he states: “The Christian-centric orientation of most Chicano studies is a serious problem.” See Carrasco, “A Perspective for a Study of Religious Dimensions in Chicano Experience: Bless Me, Ultima as a Religious Text,” 197. Alternatively, there are (it is arguable) many critical works that are at odds with Carrasco’s position. E.g., among others, see
archival formations (both orthodox and alternative)? Carrasco and Lint Sagarena seem to take archivization for granted. In their words: “The heart of her [i.e., Anzaldúa’s] portrayal of the borderlands is articulated, and must be understood, as a religious vision.” Yet, the archive itself is “a live and important question.” “Where Christianity was,” writes Anidjar, “there is now religion . . .”

Deconstructing “Christianity”

In “Second Thoughts on The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Afterword to the Second Edition” (2003), Mignolo sets out his concept of “epistemic decolonization.” He writes:

Epistemic decolonization . . . is, in the first place, a constant set of processes in which the means is the end; and second, the steady set of processes understood as epistemic decolonization is not oriented toward “the deconstruction of Western metaphysics” but, rather, both to uncovering the illusions of modernity, progress, and development by revealing its darker side, coloniality, and to imagining and working toward possible futures that the very logic of modernity/coloniality made and contributed to obscuring.

For Mignolo, “decolonizing knowledge” is, in the first place, a nonteleological endeavor (i.e., “the means is the end”), and second, a hermeneutic of suspicion (e.g., “uncovering the illusions of modernity . . . by revealing its darker side”) with constructive goals (e.g., “working toward possible futures . . . [obscured by the] logic of modernity/coloniality”). In particular, Mignolo insists, “decolonization of knowledge” is “not oriented toward ‘the deconstruction of Western metaphysics.’” Epistemic decolonization is not Destruktion; which is to say, Destruktion is not oriented toward decolonizing knowledge. In line with his position in the epilogue to the first edition, “On Modernity, Colonization, and the Rise of Occidentalism” (1995), Mignolo reads “the deconstruction of Western metaphysics” as part and parcel of Hegel’s “‘heart of Europe.’” Rather than coloniality, deconstruction is concerned with modernity (e.g., “the history of


Note: it is possible that I miss aspects of the decolonizing potential of the concepts of “the religious” and the “shamanic” in Carrasco and Lint Sagarena (e.g., appropriation and/or recovery and/or affirmation of continuities re: forms of cultural survival that conceivably relate to “the spiritual”). On the other hand, I hold to Spivak’s notion that archival work might be envisioned as “a task of ‘measuring silences’” – as opposed to a matter of “recovery.” I would like to thank Laura Pérez for reminding me of 1) the decolonizing potential of “religion” and “spirituality.” Personal communication from Laura E. Pérez to the author, spring 2011. See above, n. 18 and n. 130. In addition, see above, n. 94. Also, see Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, Literature, 60, 8; and Carrasco and Lint Sagarena, “The Religious Vision of Gloria Anzaldúa: Borderlands/La Frontera as a Shamanic Space,” 224, 238.
Western philosophy” and “the ways that metaphysics [has] functioned in the foundation of Western knowledge and the concept of science”).

For Mignolo, it seems Derridean Destruktion is incompatible with decolonization of knowledge. But in fact, it is arguable, deconstruction plays a vital role in decolonizing “ways of knowing,” “uses of knowledge,” and so forth. On one hand, Homi Bhabha has suggested that the arch of colonial authority is itself always already deferred. On the other, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has suggested that deconstruction can be set-to-work in recognition of radical alterity. In one sense, Bhabha and Spivak speak to a well-known shift in deconstruction – from the question of difference to the call of the wholly other. Of course, Spivak has argued such a “double program” is already at work in the so-called “first phase” of Derridean deconstruction. In this regard, of special interest is Mignolo’s take on the concept of “globalatinization.” In his essay “Globalization and the Borders of Latinity” (2002), Mignolo calls into question Jacques Derrida’s concept of a global Christian Latin substratum. Such a notion it would seem effaces struggles (e.g., of imposition and of resistance) at “the borders” of Latinidad. In the first place, Mignolo suggests the term designates “the Christianity in which western Europe was founded, and divided between Catholics and Protestants” – as opposed to “the Christianity that led . . . colonization in the sixteenth and the seventeenth century.” In the second place, the term seems to occlude “countermovements and emerging forms of identifications no longer reducible to the master plans of Christian and Catholic Latinidad or Christian Protestant Anglicidad.” Mignolo suggests, for example:

In the Americas . . . the Theology and the Philosophy of Liberation came forward both in the South and in the North (as Black Theology of Liberation and in philosophy mainly through the work of Cornel West) and, as such, cast doubts on the Latinidad of

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Christianity and the Christian side of Latinidad. Vudoon, Santería, Candomblé, and Rastafarianism brought to the foreground memories that are no longer Christian, even if Christian elements can be found in them, and collectivities that until recently have been made invisible by Mondialatinisation [i.e., globalatinization] and other forms of global designs.

“Christianity” in the Americas (e.g., as conceived by James H. Cone, Cornel West, et al.) has moved beyond “its foundation in Latin.”161 Cone writes, for instance: “In a society where persons are oppressed because they are black, Christian theology must become black theology, a theology that is unreservedly identified with the goals of the oppressed and seeks to interpret the divine character of their struggle for liberation.”

Moreover, “religions” (e.g., Santería, Rastafarianism, etc.) attest to a reinscription of memory (i.e., Christian elements “no longer Christian”) and the continuity of oppositional collectivities (e.g., despite “Mondialatinisation”). By extension: lastly, the term betrays a monotopic orientation (e.g., “the etymology of religio, from Latin to modern vernaculars”); Mignolo reads globalatinization as a locus of enunciation that effaces pluritopic understanding. In his words:

I do not think . . . “we” all speak Latin through Christianity . . .

Speaking a language does not mean “being [in] that language”. . .

Globalatinization – yes, but to a certain extent the borders of globalization are becoming increasingly vociferous.

Instead of globalatinization, at issue for Mignolo is “the colonial difference” – “the space where coloniality of power is enacted . . . where the restitution of subaltern knowledge is taking place . . . where border thinking is emerging . . .”166 In the final analysis, Mignolo posits a hermeneutical impasse: deconstruction as against decolonization. (In a sense, it seems that

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163 E.g., Mignolo observes: “If Christianity is indeed the ideological matrix of the modern world, then modernity is linked to Christianity, not through its Roman genealogy but, rather, through coloniality . . . Religion [i.e., religio] becomes, on the one hand, a hegemonic word that has Christianity as the parameter of religion, and on the other hand, it is a word that implies and names the colonial difference . . . Perhaps he [i.e., Derrida] has in mind the northern part of the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic when he sees Latin as the Archi language beneath. His globalatinization may be indeed valid for a good sector of the North Atlantic, and the North Atlantic only, but not all of it. Indigenous and African components have been always tangential and edge-lined in the Latin world.” See Mignolo, “Globalization and the Borders of Latinity,” 90-91.
164 E.g., he writes: “The limit of Latinidad appears when we think that if it is true that the prevalence of Roman Catholicism reinforced parallels between the Catholic saints and the multiple gods of, especially, the Yoruba, then it is not altogether clear that contact meant Christianization. Briefly, Latinidad is being tested within the borders; these borders are between Christianity and Afro-Caribbean religions, Andean religions and languages, and so forth . . .” Ibid., 92.
165 E.g., Mignolo cites Vine Deloria Jr. who “is not concerned with the etymology of the word religio, but rather with Christian ideology seen from the receiving end.” Ibid., 92-93.
166 Ibid., 91. Re: “colonial difference,” see Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking, ix.
“colonial situations invite one to rethink the hermeneutical legacy” – but only to the extent “I am where I think.”) Mignolo writes, by way of illustration:

The hegemonic meaning of a word jumps at you immediately (like religio), and it appears as the word is naming the world. The hidden meaning, its darker side, cannot be deconstructed. You can deconstruct religio within the same family of languages and cosmologies, but you have to decolonize it to show that the word is not an empty signifier within the Western tradition but a connector that speaks for and from all those meanings and belief systems that have been cast away by the imposition of a name . . . religio. Decolonization requires double translation, translation in two directions, from the silenced meaning to the hegemonic empty signifier and vice versa.

Deconstruction is a one-way street; globalatinization cannot account for the “darker side” of “religio.” Rather, at issue for Mignolo is decolonization: “double translation” points to “another religio.” Expressed in a different way, decolonizing knowledge amounts to a critique of universal Christian Latinidad by means of a recovery project – a recuperation of “silenced meaning” through “a connector that speaks for and from all those . . . belief systems that have been cast away by the imposition of . . . religio.” In my view, such a project – what might be termed postcolonial hermeneutics (read: modernity/coloniality as hermeneutic circle) – runs the risk of totalizing coloniality – an outcome, I would argue, Bhabha and Spivak, among others, have sought to avoid vis-à-vis deconstruction.

167 Well known are Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 15; and id., Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking, 334. Whereas the former recasts “the tradition in which hermeneutics has been founded and developed” in terms of a recovery project – a recuperation of “silenced meaning” through “a connector that speaks for and from all those . . . belief systems that have been cast away by the imposition of . . . religio.”

168 Mignolo, “Globalization and the Borders of Latinity,” 100, 92. In this regard, see also Chela Sandoval, Methodology of the Oppressed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); and Pérez, Chicana Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities.

169 E.g., one rendition of the paradox (per Friedrich Schleiermacher) might read: “We cannot truly understand the . . . parts [i.e., modernity and coloniality] except in the light of the whole [i.e., modernity/coloniality], and yet we can only know the whole as it is expressed in its parts.” See Tilottama Rajan, “Hermeneutics: Nineteenth Century,” in The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory and Criticism, ed. Michael Groden, Martin Kreiswirth, and Imre Szeman, 2d ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 487. Likewise, consider the relation between “tradition” and “the problem of prejudices” in Gadamer, Truth and Method. In this regard, of particular interest is Mignolo’s take on exteriority in relation to hermeneutics on the one hand and border thinking on the other. To begin with, Mignolo defines “exteriority . . . in geohistorical terms, as the outside made, or constructed, by the inside.” See Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 428, 459; plus, id., Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking, chapter 1. Secondly, re: hermeneutics and border thinking, Linda Martin Alcoff notes: “At one point Mignolo was adopting the phrase ‘pluritopic hermeneutics’ . . . to signify the way in which a hermeneutic approach might be cured of its Eurocentrism and provide a real alternative to monological and imperial unified standards of reference . . . However, Mignolo has recently backed off from using the concept of pluritopic hermeneutics as a positive alternative. His
As Nancy suggests in *Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity* (2008), the cost of expansion is enclosure: “Space is not conquered without space conquering its conquerors as well.” (Here, Nancy refers to European expansion into “the ‘New World’” as well as present-day expansion into “the universe.”) On the other hand, Nancy suggests at the heart of “enclosure [sic]” is dis-enclosure – a “dismantling and disassembling of enclosed bowers, enclosures, fences.” (Hence, “a given world” or “a given creator” yields to “wide-openness.”)

“Christianity” is for example both a closing and an opening: “The ground of a dis-enclosure is inscribed at the heart of the Christian tradition.” By way of illustration, one might juxtapose Augustine’s *On Christian Teaching* (396; 426/427) with Charles Baudelaire’s “Correspondences” (1857). Whereas Augustine argues, “every sign is also a thing . . . but not every thing is also a sign,” Baudelaire inverts the thesis: “Nature is a temple, where the living / Columns sometimes breathe confusing speech: / Man walks within these groves of symbols, each / Of which regards him as a kindred thing . . . .” Baudelaire seems to resist the “dis-enclosure” at the heart of Christian semiotics: every “thing” corresponds to a “sign.” For Nancy, it seems deconstruction leads to Christianity. “One could wonder,” he notes, “whether the ‘jewgreek’ Derrida speak of at the end of ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ (that ‘jewgreek’ he says is our history) is not the Christian.” Deconstruction itself is “the deconstruction of Christianity.” But, Derrida cautions: “There is deconstruction and deconstruction.” Destruktion harbors *destructio* – the Lutheran project (in Derrida’s words) “to reactivate the originary sense of the Gospels by deconstructing theological sediments.” Nancy’s “deconstruction of Christianity” opens the door to messianic fulfillment – “a Christian victory.” For Derrida, at issue is how to disentangle a “deconstruction of Christianity” from “Luther’s phantom.” To that end, I link Nancy with Anidjar; read together, a “dis-enclosure” of “Christian imperialism” stresses the “limits” and “frontiers” of globalatinization. Mignolo demonstrates that deconstruction (conceived as a Destruktion of Western metaphysics) effaces pluritopic understanding (e.g., “the borders of adoption of pluritopic hermeneutics was aligned with the project of colonial semiosis, which aimed to effect a rerepresentation of the colonized other to free it from the hegemonic terms of Eurocentric conceptual imagery. That is, colonial semiosis is a way of revealing the multiple realities covered over by colonial systems of meaning. The point is not simply to reveal multiplicity, but to reveal the lines of tension and conflict, or the points of contradiction, between colonizing and colonized spaces . . . . But now, Mignolo claims that both epistemology and hermeneutics, whether monotopic or pluritopic, need to be transcended since they have both presupposed a subject-object distinction, with epistemology focused on the de-subjectified object and hermeneutics focused on the non-objective subject . . . . Although the interpretive reflexivity of hermeneutics might allow one to represent ‘both sides’ (that is, colonizer and colonized) by bringing in the spatial location of meaning, this is not a sufficient corrective, or even the best way to articulate the goal, because it leaves unanalyzed the formation of the representational divide itself. We need to take a further step back to reach the level of exteriority where representations are made possible in the first place [emphasis mine]. It is not enough to acknowledge the interpretive frame if that frame itself is not theorized in relation to coloniality and its construction of the colonial difference . . . . Hermeneutics is still implicated in the ontological bifurcation of subject and object presupposed by epistemology. This unmediated approach blocks our ability to critique the mediations by which objects are constructed, and then known . . . .” See Linda Martin Alcoff, “Mignolo’s Epistemology of Coloniality,” *CR: The New Centennial Review* 7, no. 3 (winter 2007): 89-90.
globalization”). Still, Mignolo seems to limit Derrida to his so-called “first phase” (i.e., the issue of différance). Rather, globalatinization can be set-to-work in recognition of the call of the wholly other. Put succinctly, in this chapter my aim has been to argue that “reopening space” – outside the archive of religion/secularism – is a decolonizing deconstruction.  

It is my contention that reading Chicana/o religion and spirituality is a question of the archive. As opposed to the meaning and/or uses of such concepts, I focus on their role in the production of subalternity. I propose reading archivally – i.e., discerning the layers and frontiers of empire – as a means to think about Chicana/o religion and spirituality as “cultural material” (in a Saidian sense). Granted, Carrasco and Lint Sagarena demonstrate that Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera can be read as 1) a “religious vision” that 2) redefines Mignolo’s concept of “border thinking” as “a religious in-between space.” On the other hand, they also broach the issue of Anzaldúa’s accountability – as regards the politics of archivization. Anzaldúa’s work is a decolonizing “religious vision,” but at the same time it contributes to the subalternity of contemporary indigenous subjectivities. More significantly, though, Carrasco and Lint Sagarena open the door to another issue altogether: is the subaltern religious? The problems of secularism (as a form of Christian imperialism) and essentialism (as in reifying the subaltern) aside, the question arises as to whether atheism likewise might be a form of cultural survival. (Or, is “atheism” neo-colonizing?) In other words, if “religion” and “spirituality” signify decolonial thought, then why not also consider atheism as a subversive act to appropriate, recover, and/or affirm as continuity? What remains to be seen is whether Chicana/o “religion” and “spirituality” can be read as something other than referents.

CHAPTER 4

A CRITIQUE OF ARCHIVAL MEMORY:
MEASURING SILENCES IN THE BANCROFT AND ETHNIC STUDIES LIBRARIES

The archival, historiographic, disciplinary-critical, and, inevitably, interventionist work involved here is indeed a task of “measuring silences.”


In Recovering Hispanic Religious Thought and Practice of the United States (2007), Nicolás Kanellos suggests that the recovery of US Hispanic literary heritage makes possible a restoration of US Hispanic religious heritage. He writes:

Now, thanks to a research project designed to locate, preserve and make accessible the documentary heritage of Hispanics in the United States, “Recovering the U.S. Hispanic Literary Heritage,” the written culture created by Hispanics from the colonial period up until 1960 is being made available . . .. The project has also located a large body of religious thought written by U.S. Hispanics during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In that treasure trove of manuscripts and printed material are hundreds of religious periodicals . . . that circulated in Hispanic communities during this time span . . ..

Equally unknown, and now unearthed for the first time, are the hundreds of Spanish-language books published by and for Hispanic faithful from such religious centers as El Paso, San Antonio, Kansas City and Chicago . . .. In addition, Recovery has brought into its archives thousands of manuscript sermons, correspondence, book manuscripts, photographs, reports, studies, etc. . . ..

There is now a corpus of Hispanic religious thought from across the ages . . ..

For Kanellos, recovering the heritage of “Hispanic religious thought” is an archival project: religious texts are to be located, preserved, and systematically examined in relation to the past, present, and future of “Hispanic life in the United States.” In fact, he argues that such a project is “laying the groundwork on which an entire sub-discipline of Hispanic history, literature and theology will be constructed.”

In the first place, it is arguable such a project echoes Luis Leal’s proposal in “Mexican American Literature: A Historical Perspective” (1973/1979) that “Chicano

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literature had its origin when the Southwest was settled by the inhabitants of Mexico during Colonial times and continues uninterrupted to the present.” Like Leal, Kanellos claims “a long uninterrupted . . . tradition” rooted in “descendants living or having lived in what is now the United States.” In the second place, Kanellos reads Leal’s attempt to trace “the historical development of Mexican American literature” as a restoration project. For Kanellos, a critique of the archive is tantamount to filling in gaps, adding voices, and so forth. However, Leal’s emphasis on “historical development” can be read alternatively as a call to focus on archivization. I connect Leal’s conclusion in “Mexican American Literature: A Historical Perspective” with his earlier work on the origins of the Mexican short story. In both cases, it would appear that Leal is less interested in recovering and/or restoring the religious and the spiritual than he is in recognizing their invention – e.g., as styles or modes of emplotment. In “Mexican American Literature: A Historical Perspective” Leal concludes:

It is only when we look at Mexican American literature from a historical perspective that we understand its true nature. From Mexican literature it has derived its forms, both erudite and popular, as well as its spirit of rebellion. And although the more recent phase of it may emphasize social protest or a search for Chicano identity, its roots reach far back to poets like [Vicente] Bernal who write simply about mystic experience, or other universal themes.

Leal suggests that the “true nature” of “Mexican American literature” emerges from “a historical perspective” that considers not only an interpretation of its “spirit” and/or “themes” but also its debt to Mexican discursive “forms.” In similar fashion, in Breve historia del cuento mexicano (1956) Leal observes:

Las crónicas son, más que historias, libros de viajes por países maravillosos y relatos de aventuras tan extraños, a veces, como los de cualquier novela.

For Leal, the Mexican “cuento” is not an independent genre; rather it is embedded literally within “las crónicas y las relaciones.” In other words, over against an “exegetical” concept of interpretation (whether “recollection of meaning” or “exercise of suspicion”), Leal explores the production of “cultural material.” Leal is less interested in what Paul Ricoeur terms “the conflict of interpretations” than he is in exploring the archive as an “untranscendable horizon.” Thus envisaged, reading is grounded in “archivization” – what Jacques Derrida calls the “archiving archive” that not only “records” but also “produces” what counts as “archivable content.” Of

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3 E.g., Kanellos suggests: “The contemporary literary movement . . . has helped define Hispanic identity in the United States . . . by exploring Hispanic spirituality and religious practices . . . .” See Kanellos, introduction to Recovering Hispanic Religious Thought and Practice of the United States, 3.


course, filling in gaps, adding voices, and so forth can be fundamental to any attempt at thinking through the specificities of US archival memory.\textsuperscript{6} But I would like to focus on the possibilities of “measuring silences” – a notion that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak seems to contrast with the project of filling in gaps, adding voices, etc.\textsuperscript{7}

I regard Chicana/o “religion” and “spirituality” as a question of the archive.\textsuperscript{8} As Laura Pérez has observed: “The politics of the spiritual for many Chicana/os is linked to a politics of memory.”\textsuperscript{9} Chicana/o spirituality has been an essential feature of decolonization. The “spirit glyphs” of Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza (1987) is a case in point.\textsuperscript{10} But at the same time Chicana/o spirituality may be an aporia of subalternization; while

\textsuperscript{6} José David Saldívar, Trans-Americani-ty: Subaltern Modernities, Global Coloniality, and the Cultures of Greater Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 58, re: “the South Asian Subaltern Studies Group’s imperative to itself to ‘think through the specificities of Indian history.’”


\textsuperscript{8} Note: here, I limit my comments re: Chicana/o “religion” and “spirituality” to “the archive” as defined by Kanellos in the essay under consideration. Also, it should be noted there are a few studies that consider Recovering the US Hispanic Literary Heritage in relation to Derrida’s concept of the archive (e.g., as a debate on the import of recovery projects with respect to canon formation, anthological endeavors, etc.) But, it still remains to explore how recovering and/or restoring “religious heritage” relates to Derrida’s concept of “the archiving archive.” E.g., see Thomas J. Kinney, “Remapping the Archive: Recovered Literature and the Deterrioralization of the Canon,” in Recovering the U.S. Hispanic Literary Heritage, vol. 4, ed. José F. Aranda, Jr. and Silvio Torres-Saillant (Houston: Arte Público Press, 2002), 59-77; and Agnes Lugo-Ortiz, “La antología y el archivo: Reflexiones en torno a Herencia, En otra voz y los límites de un saber,” in Recovering the U.S. Hispanic Literary Heritage, vol. 5, ed. Kenya Dworkin y Méndez and Agnes Lugo-Ortiz (Houston: Arte Público Press, 2006), 139-68.


\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 30-32. E.g., it is arguable Pérez aims at “reopening space” (so to speak) outside the archive of religion/secularism. Similar to José Rabasa and Walter Mignolo (though distinct – as their work is geared toward debates in Latin American subaltern studies), Pérez enacts a decolonizing “deconstruction” of heretofore Eurocentric concepts such as “art,” “religion,” “spirituality,” etc. E.g., Pérez reads Anzaldúa as “reopening space” (again, so to speak) re: the Greek connotation of “soul” (i.e., psuchē) as a “psychological” attribute. Pérez writes: “Anzaldúa understands the image-making process not only through the sacred and shamanic aspects of the tlamatinime/tlacuilo’s path of writing and wisdom . . . but also through James Hillman’s archetypal psychology in Re-Visioning Psychology, from which she selectively draws
Chicana/o spirituality serves the interests of some, it may paradoxically efface the concerns of others. An aporia of subalternization suggests that restoring one memory (e.g., Kanellos’ notion of US Hispanic religious heritage) may efface another. María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo has suggested that Anzaldúa’s work may reflect the PRI’s rarefied notions of mestizaje and indigenismo – and thus arguably effaces the lives of some contemporary Indians. Rather than recover and/or restore a long, uninterrupted tradition of “religious thought,” I focus attention on


11 María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo, The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas and the Age of Development (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 280-82. On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that Subcomandante Marcos makes reference to the struggles of “so-called people of color” in the US and thus is not necessarily reliant on scholars such as Saldaña-Portillo to speak for the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN). E.g., he writes: “The racism that now floods the palace of Power in Mexico goes to the extreme of carrying out a war of extermination and genocide against millions of indigenous. I am sure that you will find similarities with what Power in the United States does with the so-called people of color (African Americans, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Asians, North American Indians, and any other peoples who do not have the insipid color of money).” See Subcomandante Marcos, “Letter to Mumia Abu-Jamal, April 24, 1999,” in Our Word Is Our Weapon: Selected Writings, ed. Juana Ponce de León (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001), 188-89. Note: I define “aporia” (in a Derridean sense) as an “impassible situation, one which cannot be resolved through rational analysis or dialectical thought.” See Simon Morgan Wortham, The Derrida Dictionary (London: Continuum, 2010), 15. Also, I acknowledge Walter Mignolo’s contention that “decolonization of knowledge (postmodern and cultural studies counterargument has it) is an illusion because every decolonization (that argument goes) ends up being a new form of colonization. This counterargument is indeed predicated on the very logic of modern epistemology in that it assumes that decolonization is a means toward an end. Epistemic decolonization as I understand it is, in the first place, a constant set of processes in which the means is the end; and second, the steady set of processes understood as epistemic decolonization is not oriented toward ‘the deconstruction of Western metaphysics’ but, rather, both to uncovering the illusions of modernity, progress, and development by revealing its darker side, coloniality, and to imagining and working toward possible futures that the very logic of modernity/coloniality made and contributed to obscuring. There is a totalitarian bent of modernity that presents the other side, coloniality, as something to be overcome when, indeed, coloniality cannot be overcome by modernity, since it is not only its darker side but its very raison d’être.” See Walter D. Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization. 2d ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 456.
the prospect of reading Chicana/o religion and spirituality archivally as a means to avert the production of subalternity. 12

My argument is based on José Rabasa’s contention that “the promise of subaltern studies resides in the possibility of interrupting narratives that end up in single histories.” 13 It is my contention that Kanellos’ notion of a US Hispanic religious heritage calls for “measuring silences,” as opposed to recovering and/or restoring “a long uninterrupted . . . tradition.” 14 Archival memory is riddled with palimpsestic layers and radical alterity, whether culled from one or more archives or circulating outside official memory. 15 Put succinctly, neither archives nor their alternatives need “end up in single histories.” 16 By way of illustration, I focus attention on measuring silences in the Bancroft and Ethnic Studies libraries. In the first place, I explore the limits of Hubert Howe Bancroft’s historiographic method – a method that seems to reproduce Gilded Age monopoly capitalism. 17 In the second place, I explore the possibilities of Lucha Corpi’s detective fiction; I argue that Corpi’s novels not only raise the question of “what official history represses” 18 but also (again, in Rabasa’s words) “the possibility of interrupting narratives that end up in single histories.” 19 In both cases, I regard a critique of archival memory as an affirmation of “the existence of an outside history, capital, and the state.” 20 Of course, it is possible to recover notions of Chicana/o religion and spirituality from both official archives and their alternatives. Likewise, such notions can be read as critiques of history, capital, and the

13 Rabasa adds: “The denial of the existence of an outside history, capital, and the state would constitute one such instance of single history regardless of the claims of nonteleology or the proposal of multiple understandings history or, for that matter, the insistence on temporal heterogeneity . . ..” See José Rabasa, Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 5.
14 See above, n. 7; and n. 2.
16 Rabasa, Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History, 5.
19 Rabasa, Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History, 5.
20 Ibid.
But, I am less interested in restoring such critical notions than I am in disrupting their paradoxical capacity to produce subalternity. In chapter 1, I began to consider the pros and cons of the history of religions and Chicana feminist thought as critical approaches to Chicana/o religion and spirituality. I concluded with the proposition that subaltern studies—specifically, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s notion of reading archivally—might add to the critical works of David Carrasco and Laura Pérez. Chapter 2 explored Carrasco’s attempt to link Religionswissenschaft to Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. I concluded with the assertion that such an approach may run the risk of reifying the religious/secular divide as hermeneutic foundation. In chapter 3, I turned to Pérez’s critical distinction between secular religious studies and the politics of Chicana spirituality. I concluded with the suggestion that Chicana/o religion and spirituality can be read as a question of the archive. This chapter will argue that a critique of archival memory is central to debates on religion and spirituality in Chicana/o literary and cultural studies. More specifically, I focus on the possibilities of “measuring silences”—as opposed to restoring “a long uninterrupted ... tradition.” To begin with, I consider the paradox of using Californio “testimonios” to recover histories of Christianity in Alta California. Then, I explore the historiographic method at the base of Lucha Corpi’s mystery novels—a method that resists “single histories.” By way of conclusion, I reflect on the prospect of measuring archival silences in the Bancroft and Ethnic Studies libraries at the University of California, Berkeley.

The Field of Production

Both the Bancroft Library and the Ethnic Studies Library are located in the center of the University of California, Berkeley campus. In a sense, each plays a vital role in what Pierre Bourdieu calls “the field of cultural production.” In The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature (1993), Bourdieu considers “not only the material production but also the symbolic production of the work, i.e. the production of the value of the work or, which amounts to the same thing, of belief in the value of the work.” Besides “social conditions” that contribute to the production of works (i.e., race, gender, etc.), Bourdieu takes into account how “social agents” (e.g., museums, publishers, disciplines, et al.) help to produce and sustain belief in the

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22 See above, n. 14.
23 Rosaura Sánchez, Telling Identities: The Californio testimonios (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
24 E.g., see Lucha Corpi, Black Widow’s Wardrobe (Houston: Arte Público Press, 1999), in the context of Rabasa, Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History, 5.
25 See above, n. 7; and n. 13.
value of art, literature, and scholarship. How do the Bancroft and Ethnic Studies libraries act as “social agents,” and what can each contribute to a critique of “belief in the value” of Chicana/o religion and spirituality?

The History Company

In Hubert Howe Bancroft: Historian of the West (1946), John Walton Caughey argues that Hubert Howe Bancroft’s venture in history has left its mark on the “field-Imaginary” of US historiography. Caughey writes:

In the historiography of western America no name is writ larger than Hubert Howe Bancroft’s. He was the first determined collector of the materials on this half continent and the first to undertake to chronicle its history comprehensively and exhaustively. The library that he established is the chief depository of such materials and for a generation has been the area’s fountainhead of historical research. Similarly the thirty-nine massive volumes of his Works stand today, a full half century after their publication, as the fundamental reference on this vast subject matter and the best reference on a good fraction of the topics which comprise it. Basic to these achievements he had a long career as a businessman reasonably representative of the West in the Gold Rush and post-Gold Rush generations. In this passage, Caughey contends that any assessment of “Bancroft’s achievement” must be three-dimensional – embracing his work as collector, as historian, and as entrepreneur. As a collector, Bancroft sought to document the rise of “Pacific Civilization” from the Rocky Mountains west to Hawaii and from Alaska south to the Isthmus of Panama, the materials that today constitute the core of the Bancroft Library, the primary special collections library at UC,
As a historian, Bancroft employed some 600 persons during 20 years to assist in the production of 39 volumes—nearly 30,000 pages of social and historical study. As an entrepreneur, he approached collecting and historiography as business ventures, and turned both into a series of very profitable enterprises: H. H. Bancroft and Company, A. L. Bancroft and Company, and the History Company. Though his success in collecting and publication were notable, it seems that Hubert Howe Bancroft was first and foremost an entrepreneur. Bancroft embodied the “incorporation” of US culture, in that “history-making” was his business.

In Bancroft’s career as frontier bookman, we can see how an “imperialist nostalgia” and the demands of the literary marketplace shape the production, publication, and sale of late 19th century US history. As Caughey notes:

Bancroft’s business success . . . conformed to the West’s economic pattern, his collecting expressed its cultural aspirations, and his publications illustrated its intellectual maturation.

In 1851, Bancroft was sent west by his brother-in-law, a book dealer in Buffalo, to open a bookstore in northern California, though by 1856, he had established his own San Francisco book house, called H. H. Bancroft and Company—an enterprise that would preoccupy him, in one way or another, for the next 38 years until 1894. As a frontier book dealer, Bancroft sold and published everything from law books to labels for the Pacific Coast salmon canneries. Around 1859, confident that he could sell an encyclopedia of the newly minted Pacific states, Bancroft decided to produce, publish, and sell what has been described as “the most detailed account of the area as a whole that has ever been written . . .” Ultimately, Bancroft’s Works, published in 39 volumes between 1874 and 1890, yielded a profit of $500,000—despite protracted controversy over authorship (Bancroft considered himself the sole author, omitting the role of his staff) and an unfavorable reception of its 7-volume sequel, Chronicles of the Builders (vanity biographies as “Kings of the Commonwealth” were available for a fee, ranging from $500 to $10,000).

As several scholars have observed, in an attempt to rethink Bancroft’s historiographic project, the Works can be read in reverse—by revisiting sources used to construct the histories, by recovering voices that contradict the project’s rationale, and by reconstituting

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30 Caughey, “Hubert Howe Bancroft, Historian of Western America,” 463-65.
33 Caughey, “Hubert Howe Bancroft, Historian of Western America,” 469.
34 Clark, A Venture in History: The Production, Publication, and Sale of the Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft, 1, 8-9, ix.
35 Caughey, “Hubert Howe Bancroft, Historian of Western America,” 464-66.
modes of late 19th century counter-memory. Likewise, my purpose here is to explore the critical possibilities of the analytical shift that moves from archive-as-source to archive-as-subject.

In Bancroft, there is a link between market forces, the constitution of archives, and the writing of histories. In *The Writing of History* (1988), Michel de Certeau notes that “history-making” is an “operation” constituted by the interrelations between a place, analytical procedures, and the construction of texts. By connecting Bancroft’s collecting and publication activities to his business ventures, we can explore how the Pacific histories capitalized on the sentiment of “imperialist nostalgia” – to produce, publish, and sell what Henry Nash Smith has called the American West as symbol and myth of “virgin land” (i.e., the utopian promise of a new beginning).

Here, I want to underscore the following questions. What were Bancroft and his staff collecting? And second, to what extent did the demands of an imperial marketplace shape Bancroft’s venture in history? To begin with, the task of “collecting” – of “setting aside” materials – to establish an archive of sources is the condition of possibility for a new beginning from which a historical narrative can be written. In *Literary Industries* (1890), Bancroft writes:

An investigator should have before him all that has been said upon his subject; he will then make such use of it as his judgment dictates. Nearly every work in existence, or which was referred to by the various authorities, I found on my shelves. And this was the result of my method of collecting, which was to buy everything I could obtain, with the view of winnowing the information at my leisure.

By 1870, Bancroft had put together a reference collection of some 16,000 volumes; a number that would exceed 50,000 by the time the University of California acquired the collection in 1905. Moreover, Bancroft collected maps, newspapers, manuscripts, abstracts of colonial

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38 De Certeau, *The Writing of History*, 57.


archives, and oral histories. In “Report of Labors in Archives and Procuring Material for History of California, 1876-9” (1879), Thomas Savage, Bancroft’s staff specialist on “Spanish-American affairs,” describes how documentary sources were produced for the 7-volume account of California’s past:

He [i.e., Savage] was not only to get abstracts from government and church records, but also dictations on California events from old natives and others willing or able to contribute the same, and such old documents as he might find in private hands. According to Savage, he was employed to collect “every thing of historical value, not already possessed by the Bancroft Library . . .”\(^{43}\) In a sense, it seems that the criteria for such “historical value” was shaped by a kind of “imperialist nostalgia” – wherein agents of oppression lament the passing of that which they themselves have transformed.\(^{44}\) As Savage remarks about his encounter with José María Amador – a son of Pedro Amador, one of the Spanish soldiers who founded San Diego and Monterey – the “old natives” were figures of the past. Savage writes:

The aged Amador [was] . . . probably the only living man whose father was one of its [California’s] first founders. The old man was in great poverty on a ranch 4½ miles from the town [i.e., Watsonville], under the care of his youngest daughter who is married and has many children. On being requested to narrate the events which occurred in the country during the Spanish and Mexican occupation etc. – he promptly acceded without demanding any remuneration or gratuity. During five or six days he related all events in which he participated, and much other important matter, forming a volume of 229 pages – every word of which was written down by Savage, who for that purpose rode out to the ranch in the morning and returned in the evening to town. Of course, nice things in the way of edibles were daily taken to the old gentleman and the children, and occasionally a bottle of Old Bourbon to warm his heart.\(^{45}\)

In this passage, the collecting of putative “historical facts” about a “colonized culture as it was ‘traditionally’ (that is, when they first encountered it)” is equally a means of staging a present in which Amador’s impoverished condition is left entirely unquestioned.\(^{46}\) In other words, the establishment of sources is a redistribution of the past that produces a new present – a point from which a nascent system of historical explanation can progress.\(^{47}\) Thus envisaged, imperialist nostalgia contains within it the promise of a new beginning.

While Bancroft and his staff were collecting artifacts to displace their own complicity in US imperialism, the Bancroft historiographic operation turned research on pastoral pasts into a commodity.\(^{48}\) By taking advantage of a revolution in print culture that exploded after the Civil

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\(^{44}\) Rosaldo, “Imperialist Nostalgia,” 108.


\(^{46}\) Rosaldo, “Imperialist Nostalgia,” 107.

\(^{47}\) De Certeau, The Writing of History, 72-86.

War,\textsuperscript{49} Bancroft devised a plan to turn his field of collecting into a marketable product – a program his critics would label the “history factory.”\textsuperscript{50} After cataloguing the collection, staff made abstracts, wrote and revised manuscripts, printed and sold volumes by subscription, and even engineered the publication of favorable reviews.\textsuperscript{51} Criticism of competition was another aspect of the marketing campaign: Bancroft made an attempt to distinguish his \textit{Works} from historical novels such as Helen Hunt Jackson’s \textit{Ramona} (1884) by emphasizing the straightforward, fact-based content of his project.\textsuperscript{52} At the outset of the first volume of \textit{The Native Races} (1886), he writes:

Facts are the raw material of science. They are to philosophy and history what cotton and iron are to cloth and steam-engines. Like the raw material of the manufacturer, they form the bases of innumerable fabrics, are woven into many theories finely spun or coarsely spun, which wear out with time, become unfashionable, or else prove to be indeed true and fit, and as such remain. This raw material of the scholar, like that of the manufacturer, is always a staple article; its substance never changes; its value never diminishes; whatever may be the condition of society, or howsoever advanced the mind, it is indispensable. Theories may be only for the day, but facts are for all time and for all science.\textsuperscript{53}

Yet, as a member of the Spanish fantasy heritage movement, Bancroft also pandered to a reading public hungry for ethno-racial adventure and pastoral.\textsuperscript{54} While the \textit{Works} detail the rise of “Pacific civilization” from savagery to US ingenuity, the narrative also “increases in exhaustiveness with progression northwestward and culminates in the five volumes devoted to California as a province under Spain and Mexico.”\textsuperscript{55} Anticipating Fredrick Jackson Turner’s notion that “the frontier promoted the formation of a composite nationality for the American people,” Bancroft’s argument is simple: “history” is US manifest destiny.\textsuperscript{56} As a form of “retrospective science fiction,” Bancroft’s \textit{Works} forecast US expansion by writing histories of territories such as British Colombia, Mexico, and Central America. The promise of an expanding future is articulated in terms of the past. As Bancroft conducts research in Spanish-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{49} Gregory M. Pfitzer, \textit{Popular History and the Literary Marketplace, 1840-1920} (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008), 6-7.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Caughey, \textit{Hubert Howe Bancroft: Historian of the West}, 253.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Caughey, “Hubert Howe Bancroft, Historian of Western America,” 463-65. Also, see the training manual “Information for Agents to Assist in Selling \textit{The Works of Hubert H. Bancroft}” (San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft and Company, Publishers, n.d.).
\item \textsuperscript{52} E.g., see Venegas, “The Erotics of Racialization: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of California.”
\item \textsuperscript{53} Hubert Howe Bancroft, \textit{The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft}, vol. 1, \textit{The Native Races}, vol. 1 \textit{Wild Tribes} (San Francisco: The History Company, Publishers, 1886), 1.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Venegas, “The Erotics of Racialization: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of California,” 69; and Saldívar, \textit{Border Matters: Remapping American Cultural Studies}, 175.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Caughey, “Hubert Howe Bancroft, Historian of Western America,” 465.
\end{itemize}
Mexican archives, his own “archiving archive” determines the archivable content of the future.57 A trope used repeatedly to establish the zero-point for an American West is conquest as a means of liberation from the simplicity of “pastoral times.” In his discussion of “Woman and Her Sphere” between 1769 and 1848, a period he calls “pastoral times,” Bancroft describes how women in California were waiting to be rescued by the immanent future of US expansion. For example, the following appeal to a “universal female heart” is staged strategically on the eve of a US declaration of war on Mexico:

Mr. Bryant, while on a journey from Los Angeles to San Francisco in 1846, stopped for the night at a small adobe country house, where he was comfortably provided for. The good woman of the house was delighted above measure by an incidental remark of the questioned traveler, to the effect that clothing and finery of all sorts would become immensely reduced in price under the new régime. Wittingly or unwittingly, he had struck a chord tender in the universal female heart, and her Vivan los Americanos! was so genuine that in the morning she could hardly be persuaded to accept remuneration for her trouble; and only, at last, on the condition of her guest taking with him a good supply of her cookery for future use.

In drawing on the promise of his archive, Bancroft authorizes himself to proclaim: “It was a happy day for the Californian bride whose husband was American . . . .”58 What Derrida describes as the “archiving archive” makes manifest the multiple “layers” of imperialism in which a gendered coloniality is codified again and again as innocent and pure.59 In other words, the emplotment of imperialist nostalgia and its underside “the possessive investment in [male] whiteness” seems to be a strategy for success in a competitive Gilded Age marketplace. As George Lipsitz reminds us: California has a history in which “whiteness has a cash value.”60

If Bancroft linked “history-making” to monopoly capitalism, he also contributed to the notion of US exceptionalism by monopolizing the archivization of the American West. In one sense, the US’s “unique place in world history” depends on the notion that archives are already formed and/or finished entities.61 In “Evolution of a Library” (1908?), a brochure published by

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61 E.g., Donald Pease contends: “The discourse of exceptionalism may be best characterized by its account of the United States’s unique place in world history – the ‘redeemer nation,’ ‘conqueror of the world’s markets,” and, more recently, the ‘global security state.’” See Donald E. Pease, “Exceptionalism,” in *Keywords for American Cultural Studies*, ed. Bruce Burgett and Glenn Hendler (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 109.
the Bancroft Company of New York, the Bancroft Library and Bancroft’s 39-volume “history” of the American West are portrayed as the end result of a monopoly on historical sources:

Whoever possesses the Bancroft collection, whether an individual, institution, state, or society, adding to it eastern books and new publications, which can always readily be bought, will forever have not only the largest and most complete library of American history in the world, but the largest and most complete collection that can ever be made. The rationale for such a grandiose statement: “Obviously there is little left elsewhere for another to purchase.”

However, as Derrida notes in his various meditations on the conditionality of archives and archiving: who will continue to wonder, as they study the archive, how it might have been otherwise? What are the limits of Kanellos’ “archive” of US Hispanic religious heritage? This question will shape the remainder of this chapter as I begin to think about the possibilities of a transnational theory of Chicana/o religions and spiritualities. How might unraveling such US exceptionalist state fantasies and their field-Imaginaries contribute to a trans-American concept of religion and/or spirituality? And how might such a critique of state-centric archival memory and cultures of scholarship help us to rethink the possibilities of dominant archives such as the Bancroft Library and their various alternatives such as the Ethnic Studies Library?

Reading Bancroft Archivally

In *Telling Identities: The Californio* testimonios (1995), Rosaura Sánchez reads Bancroft’s historiographic operation against the grain; she argues that oral histories collected by agents of Bancroft, such as Thomas Savage, can be understood as sites of struggle – both representational (e.g., a struggle for representation) and ideological (e.g., a struggle to construct a collective identity). Sánchez writes:

These elicited dictations, or testimonials . . . represent an effort on the part of this subaltern population to counter hegemonic historiography, to construct a collective identity, and to reposition and recenter themselves textually at a time when the physical and social spaces from which they could operate had become increasingly circumscribed. For Sánchez, the Californio testimonials are “subaltern texts . . . concerned with politics of identity construction.” But also, Sánchez suggests that it is important “to recover” the Californio testimonials in that they speak to both the representational and ideological struggles of “present-day Chicanos.” Sánchez recovers and/or restores “a long uninterrupted . . . tradition” of

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64 E.g., see Saldívar, *Trans-Americanity: Subaltern Modernities, Global Coloniality, and the Cultures of Greater Mexico*, 75-89; as well as id., *Border Matters: Remapping American Cultural Studies*, 185-97.
66 Ibid., 57-74.
resistance to US hegemony – from the 1870s to the present. Yet, what is gained and what is lost in pitting one nation against another? It is true that Californio testimonios disrupt “the supposed homogeneity and presumed boundedness of the U.S. public sphere.” But, seizing on the opportunity to “tell me the story of how I conquered you” need not be construed as “a [nationalist] struggle of dominance and subordination” over the history of the US West. Rather, it is important also to consider (to borrow José David Saldivar’s words) “the limits of a Chicana/o cultural studies that adheres for its categories of analysis too narrowly to the imagined Chicano and Chicana nation.”

By way of illustration, Sánchez’ reading of Eulalia Pérez’ testimonial (1877) is paradoxical – even perhaps an aporia (in a Derridean sense). In Sánchez, Pérez is a “subaltern” who produces subalternity. That is, Pérez occupies “a subaltern role in a patriarchal society” – at the same time Pérez is “the right-hand (wo)man of the San Gabriel missionaries . . . .” As Sánchez observes:

From her [i.e., Pérez’] perspective as the head housekeeper of the wealthiest mission in Alta California [i.e., San Gabriel], she is able to provide an insider’s view of the organization of life at the mission, including the daily schedule of the Indian laborers, their supervision, assignment of tasks, punishment and housing, as well as offer details on the clothing and feeding of the Indian workers, treated in good measure more like slaves than like serfs.

For Sánchez, Pérez contributes to a “reconstruction” of “the mission as the dominant social space of Alta California during the Spanish colonial period” (i.e., both “as a religious and economic institution”). However, a “reconstruction” of histories of Christianity in Alta California that is based on an “imagined Chicano and Chicana nation” (in this case, Kanellos’ notion of “a long uninterrupted . . . tradition”) fails as resistance to US hegemony; recovering Hispanic religious heritage (so to speak) produces subalternity at the same time that it purports to end it. In other words, in pitting the “archiving archive” of one nation (e.g., the US) against another (i.e., the

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67 Sánchez, _Telling Identities: The Californio testimonios_, ix-xi. Also, see above, n. 2.
68 Note: here I follow Saldivar, _Trans-Americanity: Subaltern Modernities, Global Coloniality, and the Cultures of Greater Mexico_, xxiii.
70 Saldivar, _Trans-Americanity: Subaltern Modernities, Global Coloniality, and the Cultures of Greater Mexico_, xxiii.
71 See Eulalia Pérez, “Una vieja y sus recuerdos,” in _Nineteenth Century Californio Testimonials_, ed. Rosaura Sánchez, Beatrice Pita, and Bárbara Reyes (La Jolla: UCSD Ethnic Studies/Third World Studies, 1994), 31-44; and Sánchez, _Telling Identities: The Californio testimonios_, e.g., chapter 2. Also, see above, n. 11.
Chicana/o nation), Sánchez seems to efface the transnational context of Christian imperialism, in this case, as it pertains to the subjectivities of “mission Indians.” As opposed to a recovery project, I propose: “measuring silences.” I argue for a mode of analysis that focuses on palimpsestic layers and radical alterity in the Bancroft Western Americana collection.

Lucha Corpi and the Ethnic Studies Library

In *Black Widow’s Wardrobe* (1999), Lucha Corpi touches on “the field of cultural production” at UC Berkeley. In a sense, Corpi juxtaposes “belief in the value” of archival memory in the Bancroft and Ethnic Studies libraries. I understand that Corpi raises epistemological issues (e.g., what is the real history of Chicana/os?) by seizing and subverting the detective genre. As Tey Diana Rebolledo suggests, Chicana writers have responded to attempts to silence and erase Chicanas from history by assuming the personae of witness, historian, ethnographer, and so forth. Yet, it seems that Corpi not only raises the question of “what official history represses” but also (in Rabasa’s words) “the possibility of interrupting narratives that end up in single histories.” As Ralph E. Rodriguez has suggested, Corpi “arrives at what Norma Alarcón has identified as ‘the realization that there is no fixed identity.’”

In *Black Widow’s Wardrobe*, the protagonist Gloria Damasco links the past to the present to solve a murder-mystery – specifically, the reason Licia Lecuona the Black Widow kills her husband. As Damasco discovers, Licia and her husband are reincarnations of Malintzin Tenepal and Hernán Cortés. Licia kills her husband in retribution for his (i.e., Cortés’) past testimonios, x, xii. Moreover, see above, n. 70; n. 2; and n. 5.

72 Pérez, “Una vieja y sus recuerdos,” 32; and Sánchez, *Telling Identities: The Californio*

73 See above, n. 7; and n. 15.

74 See above, n. 26.

75 Pérez, *Chicana Art: The Politics of Spiritual and Aesthetic Altarities*, 241-44.


78 Rabasa, *Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History*, 5.


80 Note: the novel seems to involve more than one type of murder-mystery – e.g., Gloria Damasco is hired to find out who and/or why someone tries to kill Licia Lecuona. I focus on the murder-mystery re: Licia Lecuona and her husband.
abusive treatment. In the course of the investigation, Damasco draws a distinction between dominant archival memory and its alternatives. On the one hand, when Damasco (here, undercover as Miss Vélez) meets Juan Gabriel Legorreta, a relative of the victim and UC Berkeley professor of Anthropology tied to Mesoamerican artifact smuggling; Legorreta attempts to disparage her knowledge of Latin Americana (so to speak). Legorreta begins:

“No do you know anything about pre-Columbian art, Miss Vélez?” he asked . . .

“Not much,” I answered. “In college, I took a course in cultural anthropology. We briefly studied some pre-Columbian cultures. Unfortunately—”

“Cultural anthropology . . . You mean folklore,” he interjected. “Hardly anthropology, is it?”

I was putting together a polite response when he added, “You Mexicans—Chicanos—you are so ignorant. You don’t value what you have.”

“I suppose that’s why you feel that any Juan has the right to walk away with Mexico’s national treasure,” I snapped back.

On the other hand, when Damasco requires details about the death of Malintzin Tenepal, she enlists her mother and friend to conduct research at the University of California, Berkeley Chicano Studies Collection. Damasco’s mother reports:

“Nina and I went to the Chicano Studies Library at UC Berkeley. I didn’t know so many Chicana writers and poets were interested in Malinche. Anyway, the librarian there gave us copies of some essays by Professors Cypes and Del Castillo. The librarian also told us to talk to Professor Norma Alarcón, who told us that Malinche died more or less at the age of twenty-four, perhaps during a smallpox epidemic that swept through Mexico in 1527. But no one knows for sure how and when Malinche died . . .”

In a sense, Damasco focuses attention on “intellectual apartheid” at UC, Berkeley; “the field of cultural production” betrays what Chela Sandoval terms “the apartheid of theoretical domains dividing academic endeavors by race, sex, class, gender, and identity.”

The Chicano Studies Collection

The Ethnic Studies Library was established in 1997; what had been three separate libraries (i.e., the Asian American Studies Library, the Chicano Studies Library, and the Native American Studies Library) were merged due to a restructuring of the Ethnic Studies Department. The Chicano Studies, Asian American Studies, and Native American Studies

81 Corpi, Black Widow’s Wardrobe, 79-80, 95.
82 Chela Sandoval, Methodology of the Oppressed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 78, 4. Also, see above, n. 26.
libraries each emerged from “student interest in collecting and preserving a perspective that was lacking in other campus libraries.” As regards the origins of the Chicano Studies Collection, Richard Chabrán notes:

Guillermo Hernandez places its beginning in 1969. According to Hernandez, students established a small collection of books and newspaper clippings under the direction of Richard Rodriguez in order to address student needs. By 1971 Herminio Rios was coordinator of the La Raza library as it was then called. Under his direction the collection was organized under the Dewey Decimal system . . . . In 1972 the Chicano Studies Library reached a turning point under the Coordinatorship of Jose Antonio Arce. Arce had a vision of the library as an information system. Whether that system resembled a library which followed traditional library practices was secondary to him. It had become apparent that the Dewey Decimal System was not working so he consulted several librarians about devising an alternative information system. Chief and most influential among these librarians was Margaret D. Uridge. While directing Arce to the Library of Congress Classification system she noted its arbitrary nature and made note that it should be revised according to his needs. With this information in hand he proceeded to develop the Chicano Classification System. All of the material in the library was recataloged into this new scheme . . .

The Department of Ethnic Studies at UC, Berkeley was established in fall 1969 as result of the Third World Liberation Front strike. The “Proposal for a Third World College” (ca. 1969) notes that “among the facilities of this college there will be a college library and specialized departmental library on Third World Studies.” Still, in 1973 the issue of “providing library


Chabrán also relates: “Although the Chicano Studies Library is one of the major Chicano libraries in the U.S. very little information exist on its development.” See Richard F. Chabrán, “Notes on the History and Future of Major Academic Chicano Libraries,” in Biblio-Política: Chicano Perspectives on Library Service in the United States, ed. Francisco García-Ayvens and Richard F. Chabrán (Berkeley: Chicano Studies Library Publications Unit, 1984), 94.


services for the Chicano Studies program” persisted. Reflecting on a meeting with University Librarian Richard Dougherty, Raymond V. Padilla observes, “The issue is quite simple: you either train Gabachos to know Chicano materials or you train Chicanos to know library techniques.” Likewise, Padilla suggests the rationale behind “the Chicano Classification system.” In an interview with Robert H. Becker, Chief Librarian at the Bancroft Library, Padilla asks: “What specific library services or materials does the Bancroft Library provide for the Chicano Studies Program?” Becker states: “We have been collecting what is now called ‘ethnic materials’ before that term was in vogue. This is nothing new to us. We’ve always been doing it . . . .” And Padilla continues: “How useful is the LC [i.e., Library of Congress] subject heading list for cataloguing Chicano materials?” Becker responds (and Padilla ruminates further):

As good as any I suppose. It isn’t that good in general anyway. The only real good way to find out what is in a collection [e.g., the Western American collection] is to examine it. (There was a discussion on whether the LC system differentiates between Chicano materials to a sufficient degree. For example, can it differentiate between Chicano literature and Chicano history. It seems that the LC system would lump all materials together, according to Becker.)

As Chabrán contends, rethinking the Library of Congress Classification (LCC) system was one of “the most radical aspects” of the Chicano Studies Library. The creation of a subclass (i.e., PX) for Chicana/o literature is a case in point. He writes:

In the Library of Congress Classification scheme Chicano literature which is written in English is placed under PS (American Literature), while Chicano literature in Spanish is placed under PQ (Latin American Literature). In the Chicano scheme Chicano literature regardless of language is placed under PX (Chicano Literature) a new sub class.

Since its inception, the Chicano Studies Library has not only collected materials but also challenged how such materials are to be classified – e.g., The Chicano Database presupposes subject headings revision in The Chicano Thesaurus for Indexing Chicano Materials. As noted


89 Chabrán, “Notes on the History and Future of Major Academic Chicano Libraries,” 94-95. It should be noted that Robert H. Becker also claims that the Bancroft Library has “modified the hell out of it [i.e., the LCC system].” See Raymond V. Padilla, “Providing Library Services for the Chicano Studies Program at the University of California, Berkeley: Policy Issues and Recommendations,” September, 1973.

90 E.g., see Lillian Castillo-Speed re: “The Chicano Database and the CD-ROM Experience” in Mary Kay Dugan, ed., CD-ROM in the Library: Today and Tomorrow: A Conference Presented by UC Berkeley Extension and the School of Library and Information Studies, UC Berkeley (Boston: G.K. Hall and Company, 1990), 73-78. Likewise, Castillo-Speed suggests: “The guiding principle of the creators of The Chicano Thesaurus was ‘usefulness.’ It certainly proved useful to indexers who would no longer have to stretch inappropriate terms to cover Chicano concepts . . . .” See Lillian Castillo-Speed, “The Usefulness of the Chicano Thesaurus for
by Lillian Castillo-Speed, Head Librarian at the Ethnic Studies Library and Chicano Studies Librarian: “Libraries are not neutral. What is collected, what subject headings are used, what is preserved, and even how it is shelved are all political questions.”

As an undergraduate at UC, Berkeley, Lucha Corpi held “work-study” positions at the Chicano Studies Library; she worked as a “researcher/bibliographer/indexer.” In her essay “The Indian, Spanish and Mestizo Heritage” (1970? 1971?), a research paper written as “background material for the first Chicana course at U.C., Berkeley,” Corpi seems to set the stage for a post-nationalist theory of historiography; Corpi regards Malintzin Tenepal not as “a historical figure” – but “a person.” Malintzin Tenepal embodies “layers” of patriarchal “heritage” – including indigenous, Spanish, and postcolonial Mexican. Likewise, in her poem “Marina” (1975) Corpi seems to suggest that the “history” of Malintzin Tenepal is still happening, in that “her name” is open to reinterpretation. The “vindication” of Malintzin Tenepal is not simply a matter of recovery (e.g., filling in gaps, adding voices, etc.) but rather a question of the “frontiers” of so-called universal discourses such as justice. As regards Black Widow’s Wardrobe, Corpi suggests that all of the old certainties concerning “murder” are in question:

Licia, “Black Widow,” is the victim of her abusive husband. She kills him. Extenuating circumstances or not, her own sense of justice demands that she be punished. The legal
system agrees with her, but it stacks the deck against her . . . . Licia is legally tried but by an all-male jury. Convicted, she is sentenced to eighteen years in prison. And with respect to one of the key goals of Gloria Damasco’s “investigation,” Corpi adds:

During the investigation, Gloria [Damasco] begins to explore the nature of justice. How absolute a notion is it in the face of discrimination, abuse, or the socio-political reality encountered by people – particularly women – of color in the system? How do law and justice interact with or prey upon each other? Is true justice really attainable by ally?

In Black Widow’s Wardrobe, Corpi resists “single histories” of Malintzin Tenepal. As a “researcher/bibliographer/indexer,” Corpi establishes a critique of archival memory that affirms “the existence of an outside history, capital, and the state.”

Rereading Eulalia Pérez

By way of conclusion, I attempt to reread Eulalia Pérez’ “Una vieja y sus recuerdos” in light of a critique of archival memory. As opposed to a recovery project (e.g., recovering and/or restoring US Hispanic religious thought, practice, etc.), I argue for a mode of analysis that stresses palimpsestic layers and radical alterity. I define a critique of archival memory as “measuring silences.” As Bancroft and Corpi have shown, neither conventional archives nor their alternatives need “end up in single histories.” Thus envisaged, “measuring silences” focuses on the production of subalternity rather than a recovery of subaltern voices in a substantive and/or functional sense. My primary aim is to regard Chicana/o religion and spirituality “outside history, capital, and the state” – whether Bancroft’s US nationalist monopoly capitalist archival endeavor or Third World Liberation Front proposals for “specialized departmental libraries” predicated on an imagined subaltern (e.g., Native American, Chicano, etc.). The question is: how to think Chicana/o religion and spirituality as a trans-American category of analysis?

Of course, filling in gaps, adding voices, etc. can be fundamental to any attempt at thinking through the specificities of US nationalist and Chicano cultural nationalist archival productions. However, Kanellos’ project to recover and/or restore “a long uninterrupted . . . tradition” of Chicana/o religious thought and practice can be an aporia of subalternization: whereas such a tradition serves the interests of some, it may paradoxically efface the concerns of others. As an alternative, I propose a hermeneutic that stresses multiple positionalities.

For example, as Thomas Savage dehumanizes Eulalia Pérez, Eulalia Pérez dehumanizes “the

96 See above, n. 92; in the context of Rabasa, Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History, 5.
97 See above, n. 7; and n. 16; as well as n. 87; and n. 70.
98 See above, n. 68; and n. 70.
99 See above, n. 2; and n. 11. Note: it should be acknowledged that my allusion to this concept is rooted in both post-structuralism and Chicana feminist thought.
Indians.” In the first instance, Savage observes that Pérez “had been for many years the llavera or Stewardess of the San Gabriel mission, and was questioned only upon mission life, characteristics of Padres, manner, and customs of the Californians in her early days, and other topics like these . . .” At the same time, Savage characterizes Pérez as animalistic; Pérez sits “on the floor,” raises herself “first on four feet,” steps out “to sun herself,” etc. Savage writes:

She [i.e., Pérez] sat by me upon a chair a while yesterday, but her usual seat is on the floor, and when flies or mosquitoes annoy her, she slaps and kills them with her slipper on the floor. When wishing to rise she places both palms of her hands on the ground before her, and lifts herself first on four feet (so to speak) and then with a jerk puts herself on her two feet – for this she needs no assistance. After that she goes about the house without difficulty. She did it in my presence yesterday, and saying that she felt chilled walked out and sat on the stoop to sun herself a while, then came back and resumed her former seat.

In the second instance, Pérez recounts how “the Indians” within and without San Gabriel mission were “treated well.” She notes:

El Padre [José María de] Zalvidea quería mucho a sus hijos de misión, como llamaba él a los indios que él mismo había convertido al cristianismo yendo en persona unas veces a caballo y otras a pie y atravesando las sierras hasta llegar a las rancherías de los gentiles para atraerlos a nuestra religión.

El Padre Zalvidea introdujo muchas mejoras en la misión de San Gabriel, y la hizo adelantar muchísimo en todo – no conforme con sustentar a los neófitos con abundancia, sembraba árboles en los montes y lejos de la misión para que tuviesen que comer los indios broncos cuando pasasen por esos lugares.100

At the same time, Pérez describes a scene that – at its extreme – echoes what Hannah Arendt calls “the banality of evil.” In a sense, what for Pérez was a job, with its daily routine, was for “the Indians” quite literally the end of the world: girls were locked away in “the nunnery” from an early age (e.g., between seven and nine years of age), provisions were given to “the Indians working in the fields” so that “the Indians would not get sick” and continue to labor till “sunset,” “the Indians” were “taught to pray” yet subject to “punishments” such as “the stocks and confinement,” and so forth. As Pérez maintains:

Los padres . . . siempre fueron muy considerados con los indios. Yo no me meto a decir lo que hicieron otros porque no vivía en la misión.101

100 For an English translation, see Eulalia Pérez, “An Old Woman and Her Recollections,” in Three Memoirs of Mexican California, trans. Vivian C. Fisher et al. (University of California, Berkeley: Friends of the Bancroft Library, 1988), 76:

“Father Zalvidea was very much attached to his children at the mission, as he called the Indians that he himself had converted to Christianity. He traveled personally, sometimes on horseback and at other times on foot, and crossed mountains until he came to remote Indian settlements, in order to bring them to our religion.

Father Zalvidea introduced many improvements in the Mission of San Gabriel and made it progress a very great deal in every way. Not content with providing abundantly for the neophytes, he planted [fruit] trees in the mountains, far away from the mission, in order that the untamed Indians might have food when they passed by those spots.”

101 For an English translation, see Pérez, “An Old Woman and Her Recollections,” 82:
Granted, Pérez and Savage can be used to recover an uninterrupted tradition of “Hispanic religious thought and practice” – e.g., histories of Christianity that destabilize US nationalist and/or Chicano cultural nationalist historiography. But there are other issues here. Such a critique is predicated on an aporia of subalternization: restoring one memory effaces another.\footnote{“[The] Fathers . . . were always very considerate with the Indians. I would not want to say what others did because they did not live in the mission.”}

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