Playfighting:
Encountering Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta in Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasamgraha and Kamalaśīla's Pañjikā

By
James Michael Marks

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Committee in charge:
Professor Alexander von Rospatt, Chair
Professor Robert H. Sharf
Professor Mark Csikszentmihalyi
Professor Robert P. Goldman
Professor Isabelle Ratié

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Abstract

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The present study collects, translates, and analyzes the surviving fragments of two lost Naiyāyika authors, Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, principally as they have been preserved in the works of the eighth-century Buddhist philosophers Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. (The present study argues, without coming to a definite conclusion as yet, that there is strong evidence Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are not two distinct authors but different names for the same man.) The fragments themselves often contain fascinating and idiosyncratic arguments but are also often difficult to interpret. Unpacking them requires close consultation of major Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, primarily the Nyāyasūtra, Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyabhāṣya, which is the direct source material for most of the fragments, Uddyotakara’s Nyāyavrāttika, which often parallels the arguments in the fragments, and Praśastapāda’s Padārthadharmasamgraha, which clarifies much of the technical terminology tersely packed into the most difficult of the fragments. The majority of the fragments are preserved in Kamalaśīla’s Pañjikā, his commentary on his teacher Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasamgraha. Śāntarakṣita invokes, and Kamalaśīla cites, Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta in chapters concerning cosmology (2), the self (7), momentariness (8), the Vaiśeṣika categories of substance (10), quality (11), and universals (13), and the epistemological issues of perception (17), inference (18), and the existence of other means of knowledge (19). The fragments, accordingly, cover an extremely broad range of issues and, so, serve as an occasion to consider a number of questions about the intellectual commitments of the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika community and various disputes between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas. Several of the fragments also derive from Aviddhakarṇa’s Cārvāka commentary, allowing for a discussion of the relation between Brahmānical philosophical traditions and the materialist Cārvāka philosophy. Finally, because the fragments are preserved in the Pañjikā, they make possible a thorough analysis of the structure and style of the Tattvasamgraha as a whole, as well as the way the Buddhists represent the many rival thinkers they cite. The present study mirrors the structure of the Tattvasamgraha, using the fragments as anchor points in a reading of the text’s overall engagement with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in order to argue that Śāntarakṣita organizes his work in a dialogical manner.
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ABBREVIATIONS

BBh  Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (Śaṅkarācārya) in Śāstrī 1938
Bhā  Bhāmāti (Vācaspatimśra) in Śāstrī 1938
Jaisalmer ms. of Tattvasamgraha (Śantaraksita) [Śrī Jinabhadrāsūri Tadapatriya Granthabhaṇḍāra, no. 377] and Tattvasamgrahapāṇijikā (Kamalaśīla) [no. 378]
K tried
NB  Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti) in Malvania 1971
NBh  Nyāyabhāṣya (Vātsyāyana) in Thakur 1997a
ND  Nyāyadarpana (Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra) in Shrigodekar and Gandhi 1929
NK  Nyāyakandali (Śrīdhara) in Dvivedin 1895
NMGBh  Nyāyamaṇjarī-granthibhanga (Cakradhara) in Shah 1972
NS  Nyāyasūtra (Gautama) in Thakur 1997a
NV  Nyāyavārttika (Uddyotakara) in Thakur 1997b
NViV  Nyāyavinīcaya-vivarana (Vādirājasūri) in Jain 2000
NVṬṬ  Nyāyavārttika-tātparyatīkā (Vācaspatimśra) in Thakur 1996a
NVṬṬP  Nyāyavārttika-tātparyatīkā-pārīuddhī (Udayana) in Thakur 1996b
P  Pātan ms. of Tattvasamgraha (Śantaraksita) [Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānامandira, no. 6679] and Tattvasamgrahapāṇijikā (Kamalaśīla) [no. 6680]
PDhS  Padārthadharmasamgraha (Praśastapāda) in Dvivedin 1895
PPS  Nyāyabindu-pūrṇapakṣasamkṣipta (Kamalaśīla) [D 4232, Tshad ma Vol. 16, we, 92a2–99b5]
PVSV  Pṛamāṇavārttikasavavytti (Dhārmakīrti) in Gnoli 1960
PVSVṬ  Pṛamāṇavārttikasavvyrtītīkā (Karṇakagomini) in Śaṃkṛtyāyana 1943
PVin  Pṛamāṇaviniścayā (Dharmakīrti) in Hugon and Tomabechi 2011
Ś  Śāstrī 1968
ŚV  Ślokavārttika (Kumārila) in Śāstrī 1978
SVṬ  Siddhiviniścaya-ṭīkā (Anantavirya) in Jain 1959
T  De kho na nyid bsdu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa (Śantaraksita) in Pedurma [W1PD95844 107:21-370]
     De kho na nyid bsdu pa’i dka’ ‘grel (Kamalaśīla) in Pedurma [W1PD95844 107:371-1883]
TBV  Tattvabodhavidhyāyini (Abhayadevastūri) in Sanghavi and Doṣi 1984
TS  Tattvasamgraha (Śantaraksita) in Śāstrī 1968
TSP  Tattvasamgraha-pāṇijikā (Kamalaśīla) in Śāstrī 1968
TUS  Tattvasopapalavasimha (Jayarāśi) in Sanghavi and Parīkh 1940
VA  Vādanyāyatikā Vīpaṇcitārthā (Śantaraksita) Śāstrī 1972
VK  Vedānta-kalpataru (Amalānanda) in Śāstrī 1938
VN  Vādanyāya (Dhārmakīrti) in Much 1991
VP  Vākupadīya (Bhārtṛhari) in Rau 2002
VS  Vaiṣeṣikāsūtra (Kaṇāda) in Jambuvijayaji 1961
WZKS  Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens
WZKSO  Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens
INTRODUCTION

Iñeyām bhoṇidhimāṇātād adhigatais tatvāṁrtaiy yo jagā jātīyādhiṣiṣṭatīdūḥkhaśāmanāh kāryanāto 'tarpayat |
tasmāi tatvāvidām varāya jagataḥ sātre prānayādārāt
tattvānām iha samgrahe śphutatarā pṛārabhyate pañjikā || 1 ||

Vaktum vastu na mādrīa jadadhiyo 'pūvam kadaipi kṣamah
kṣuṇṇo va bahudhā budhīr abarahaḥ ko 'sau na paṇthāh kvacit |
kiṁ tu svārthapaśasya ma satīr iyaṃ punyodayākāśaṁ

To he who out of compassion gladdened the world with the nectars of truth, which he found
By churning the ocean of the knowable, and which ease the pain of birth, illness, old age, and death;
To that knower of truth, the finest teacher of the world, I now bow with great respect
And compose this more fully blossomed Elaboration of the Collection of Truths.

The dull-minded like me are never able to say anything that is new.
Is there a path anywhere that the wise have not yet trodden time and again?
Still, out of my selfish desire to raise merit, this mind of mine endeavors
To bring about this persistent study of truth, whose fruit is rising virtue.

—Kamalaśīla, Tattvasamgraha-Pañjikā, opening maṅgala

§ SUBJECT AND PURPOSE

The Tattvasamgraha (“Collection of Truths”), composed by the Indian Buddhist thinker
Śāntarakṣita (c. 725–788),1 is a mammoth work of philosophy and scholasticism. The clarity,
comprehensiveness, and systematic organization of the text are staggering. In over 3,600 verses,

Śāntarakṣīta covers the broad spectrum of philosophical theories and topics current in his time, and engages with all of the major philosophical traditions of Indian philosophy. The treatise is rarely mentioned without reference to its extensive commentary, the Pañjikā (“Elaboration”), by Śāntarakṣīta’s direct disciple Kamalāśīla (c. 740–795).² The Pañjikā rivals the root text in clarity and rigor and exceeds it in comprehensiveness. Kamalāśīla fleshes out each argument in the root text, commenting on almost every word of the original, and his language is not only clear, but often eloquent, as his opening maṅgala verses, cited above, attest.

Śāntarakṣīta and Kamalāśīla are renowned for their encyclopedic knowledge of Indian philosophy and their exhaustive engagement with opposing traditions. The Pañjikā preserves a number of fragments of thinkers whose work is otherwise lost—including the Naiyāyika thinkers Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, whose fragments occupy the bulk of the present study. Śāntarakṣīta and Kamalāśīla are also renowned for their synthetic approach to Buddhist thought. They seek to bring together elements of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra strands in Vasubandhu’s work, Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamakā, and the logico-epistemological school of Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. This syncretic project is regarded as one of the last major innovations in Indian Buddhist philosophy and one of the most important foundations of early Tibetan Buddhist thought. The Tattvasamgraha and the Pañjikā are, for these and other reasons, veritable treasure troves for scholars of Buddhist thought and Indian intellectual history, as well as for anyone interested in interreligious intellectual exchange, the history of debate, and scholasticism more generally.

In the introduction to the Pañjikā, Kamalāśīla says that the purpose of any scholarly work is threefold: (i) what the text does (kriyā-rūpa); (ii) the result of that activity (kriyā-phala); and (iii) the subsequent result of that result (kriyā-phalasya phala). In the case of the Tattvasamgraha, (i) the activity of the text is to collect (samgraha) a particular set of truths (tattva), specifically, the various characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of the Buddha’s teaching of dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda) examined over the course of the text. (ii) The result of the activity of collecting together (samgraha) these truths is the reader’s easy comprehension (samgraha) of them. (iii) The ultimate result of this easy comprehension is the reader’s attainment of the highest of spiritual goals. According to Kamalāśīla, it is the second of these that is most significant, because it is the most distinctive aspect of the work’s purpose. (The mere activity is too obvious to be of deeper significance, and the ultimate aim is shared by other texts and practices.)

The present study is intended to proceed in a similar manner, albeit with far less comprehensiveness and ambition than in Śāntarakṣīta’s work. (i) The main activity of the present study is the cataloguing and close reading of the fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta that are preserved by Śāntarakṣīta and Kamalāśīla. I will say much more about these two thinkers in the pages to come, but for now the most important details are the following: Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are Brahmical authors whose works have been lost but for fragments preserved by others. Their earliest fragments are found in works by Śāntarakṣīta and Kamalāśīla, and the vast majority of them are preserved in the Pañjikā. These fragments present a number of difficulties. For one thing, they are often dense, elliptical, and simply difficult to read. They are also embedded in an intricate web of varying ideas, texts, and traditions. Their intrinsic difficulty is further complicated by the fact that they are preserved by Buddhist thinkers, i.e., rivals seeking to refute them. Śāntarakṣīta and

² Frauwallner 1961, 144.
Kamalaśīla lift the fragments from their original contexts—already an act of distortion—and treat them as entries in an imaginary dialogue. In addition, it is quite likely that many of the fragments are paraphrases rather than direct quotations, adding yet another layer of distortion. Nevertheless, despite these and other difficulties, the fragments of Aviddhaśīla and Bhāvaviveka present us with a number of opportunities to learn about discussions within early Nyāya and early Buddhist-Nyāya discourse. Many of their arguments are also idiosyncratic and intrinsically interesting to readers of philosophy.

Significantly, a closer look at Aviddhaśīla and Bhāvaviveka offers us a promising view onto the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. Specifically, while the primary activity of the present work concerns the fragments of these two Brahmanical thinkers, (ii) the result of our examination of them is to enable the reader to consider and pursue a close reading of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* as a coherent and systematic whole ineluctably embedded in broader (discursive, but also social, institutional, and even imaginative) contexts. (iii) Ultimately, the hope is for the reader to see how the text exceeds itself and opens onto these broader contexts, even as our sense of them, too, must remain uncertain.

In other words, while much of the actual work of the present study focuses on the fragments of Aviddhaśīla and Bhāvaviveka—their meaning and force, the light they shed on their social and institutional contexts, the different ways the Buddhist frame, employ, and respond to them—the primary motivation underlying the overall project is to move toward a reading of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. Though there are a lot of things one can say about the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, scholars have struggled to answer a seemingly simple question about it: What exactly is it? As soon as one tries to answer this question, more questions begin to appear. How is the work structured? To what extent is it a polemic, to what extent a work of didacticism, to what extent an apology? Who would have read it in the eighth century? How, and why, would they have read it? Even more urgently, within what social, institutional, and political contexts did this text emerge, and what new worlds

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3 Is it a study of logic, a polemic, a textbook, a doxography, an apology, a meditation on Buddhist soteriological thought? To give a few examples: As we will see shortly, Sara McClintock (2010) and Isabelle Ratié (2014) both give a lot of thought and analysis to this set of questions. Both try to navigate between the clearly didactic quality of the text and its outward-orientation.

Matthew Kapstein focuses less on the didactic-polemic dynamic and more the rational-soteriological one: “In other words, in its deeper meaning Sāntarakṣita’s *Gathering* is perhaps not primarily a work on logic and epistemology, but rather a sustained exploration of a core soteriological theme of Mahāyāna Buddhism in its relation to the full range of the preoccupations of late first-millennium Indian thought. The *Gathering*, then, is not gathered together in the manner of a miscellany; it is a dialectical gathering-in, a passage through Indian systematic thought whose spiraling flight finds its center in the Buddha’s message and in the person of the Buddha himself” (Kapstein 2001, 13). This is a beautiful description, and each of its components rings true, but I cannot quite say how they all fit together.

Christian Coseru, describing the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Pañjikā* almost as if they form a single text, says, “Our main source, the *Compendium* and its *Commentary*, is not only a vast collection of Buddhist doctrines recorded in the second half of the eighth century but also a highly polemical work bearing testimony to the sustained disputes between Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophers during what is perhaps the golden era of Indian philosophy” (Coseru 2009, 14). Although he highlights the polemic nature of the work, he also describes the actual activity of the text as “bearing testimony” to Buddhist-Brahmanical debate. This suggests one of the fundamental aspects of the text is a hybrid between an organizational/exegetical project and a doxographical one—both resonate with the notion of a *saṃgraha* of *tattvas*, a collection of principles. Yet Coseru treats the text primarily as a rational polemic and, so, a repository for philosophical arguments.

The text exhibits rational, polemical, didactic, apologetic, exegetical, soteriological, and doxographical aspects. The challenge is trying to gauge the degree to which it is oriented on each and how that should color our reading of it.
did it seek to bring about?

The last of these questions is perhaps the most enticing and yet also the furthest from reach. Due to their activities in Tibet,\(^4\) we know more about Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla than many of their predecessors and contemporaries. Yet we know very little of their social world, the life of a philosopher at the massive monastic institution Nālandā, where both are said to have lived and worked for a time, the practices of formal interreligious debate, and so on. We cannot say much at all, to use a granular example, about Kamalaśīla’s education, how it was directed, how specialized it was, whether it was subsidized or patronized by anyone, and whether it included many interactions with non-Buddhists.

The *Tattvasaṃgraha* itself does not directly attest to these realities. Nevertheless, the treatise is oriented on the concept of fruitful debate. As Sara McClintock emphasizes, for example, in her description of the “rhetoric of reason” at play in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla always have a particular, or particular set, of audience(s) in mind in formulating an argument.\(^5\) It is a broadly shared norm of classical Indian philosophical debates that one cannot use \(x\) to prove \(y\) in a debate with someone who does not accept that \(x\) exists. If I am not convinced that there is smoke on the mountain (say, because I suspect it to be steam or vapor, or the like \([bāspa-adi-samādgha]\)), you cannot convince me, on its basis, that there is fire there. As McClintock points out, every rational argument is inextricably embedded in a rhetorical context. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s philosophical project is undergirded by a social, dialogic sensibility. Most fundamentally, it is the sensibility of formal interreligious debate.

There are many stories of great debates that feature famous representatives of rival traditions in a high stakes battle of wits.\(^6\) For example, Dharmapāla (mid-6\(^{th}\) c.) is said to have engaged in a very high stakes debate at the insistence of a king who apparently intended to use the debate as a pretense to abolish Buddhism. As José Cabezón writes, “if the Buddhists lost, then their religion would be destroyed throughout the kingdom, while if the [so-called] Śāstra Master lost, he would cut off his tongue.”\(^7\) During the debate, the “Śāstra Master” gave an elaborate account of his own view, essentially reciting a book the king had commissioned. In response, Dharmapāla demonstrated mastery of his opponent’s work by reciting it back to him perfectly. Dharmapāla won. Afterwards, he stopped the Śāstra Master from cutting off his tongue “and told him that the real way to make amends was for him to correct his views. Dharmapāla then preached the Buddhist doctrine to the Śāstra Master, and both the Śāstra Master and his royal benefactor converted to Buddhism.”\(^8\) Kamalaśīla is himself the subject of tales of the purported Samye debate with the Chinese Buddhist monk Moheyan.\(^9\) A formal debate as such is not likely to have taken place. But we know that

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\(^4\) Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla were both instrumental in the early propagation of Buddhism in Tibet. For records of Śāntarakṣita’s role as the first abbot in Tibet, see Roerich 1949, 41–44; Tucci 1980, 1–15; van Schaik 2011, 33–36.

\(^5\) McClintock 2010, especially 49–62.

\(^6\) Tales of Indian Buddhist debate victors are collected mainly in Tibetan histories and the accounts of Chinese pilgrims (Cabezón 2008), but there are many stories valorizing the great debate victories by major Jain and Brahmanical thinkers, as well (Granoff 1985).

\(^7\) Cabezón 2008, 81.

\(^8\) Cabezón 2008, 82.

\(^9\) For perspectives on Kamalaśīla’s purported participation in the debate at Śamye: Demiéville 1952; Wangdu and Diemberger 2000; Seyfort Ruegg 2013.
Kamalaśīla and Moheyan were in Tibet around the same time, and that Kamalaśīla, at least, was vaguely aware of Moheyan’s views. In any case, Tibetan records claim that victory was awarded to Kamalaśīla, and, as a result, Tibetan Buddhist theory and practice was modeled on the Indian system. Shortly thereafter, Kamalaśīla was assassinated. According to the history written by Bu ston (1290–1364), four killers (shan pa mi) sent by Moheyan “squeezed his kidneys” (m-khal ma mnyes). We do not know to what extent there really were formal live debates between representatives of rival groups, how frequently they would have occurred, or what the stakes might have been. In addition to mythic and hagiographical tales of great debates, there are also many texts in which philosophers quibble about the basic rules of debate and the different kinds of contentious discussion. What we do know, then, is that there was a shared ethos of debate across traditions, and that the stakes were imagined in the highest of terms.

The *Tattvasamgraha* embodies this shared ethos and the way the social practice, real and/or mythic, was imagined. Debates about debates are themselves social practices, and the effects a text has on its readers are as real as the building in which it was composed. When we think about the social practice of debate in, for example, eighth-century India, we do not have to be able to say decisively whether Śaṇṭarakṣita ever argued with a Naiyāyika directly, publicly, or formally to be able to say something about the way that Śaṇṭarakṣita conceived of the practice and function, and the effects, of such an exchange.

Of course, it remains the case that most of our questions will have to remain unanswered. Isabelle Ratié, in her study of Śaṇṭarakṣita’s engagement with Kumārila’s theory of the self, laments that “the historian of medieval Indian philosophy seems condemned to collecting uncertainties.” Alas, as this playfully highlights, “collecting uncertainties” suggests considerably less room for ambition than Śaṇṭarakṣita gives himself in his *Tattvasamgraha*, which we might call his “collection of certainties.”

**Religious Reading, Attentive Reading**

In considering the problem of the audience(s) of the *Tattvasamgraha* and *Pañjikā*, McClintock responds to Paul Griffiths’s notion of “religious reading” in Indian Buddhist textual history. Religious reading is a morally urgent and reverential engagement with a literary work, whether oral or textual, whose motivations are shaped and constrained by the religious worldview underpinning both the text itself and the reader’s engagement with it. “Religious reading,” Griffiths explains,

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11 *Chos 'byung*, ed. Gangs ljongs shes rig gi nying bcub, 190, 10–11; trans. Obermiller 1932, 196. Obermiller’s translation of the full sentence is: “Later on, four Chinese butchers, sent by the Hva-shang, killed the teacher Kamalaśīla by squeezing his kidneys” (*du'us phyis hva’zhang gi rgya’i shan pa mi bzhis slob dpon ka ma la sbi la'i m-khal ma mnyes te dkrongs*).

Others have said that Kamalaśīla’s killers were sent by non-Buddhists agitated by the propagation of Buddhism in Tibet. One cannot help but wonder what exactly it was that led to Kamalaśīla’s purportedly grisly demise.

12 This is true whether, like a Naiyāyika, one considers the building a substantial whole and the psychological effect a quality of the self, or, like a Buddhist, one considers the building a useful construct and the psychological effect an impersonal but causally contingent momentary mental event. Of course, the building in which the *Tattvasamgraha* was composed is gone; our inability to locate and measure it does not mean it was never there.

13 “L’historien de la philosophie indienne médiévale semble condamné à collectionner des incertitudes” (Ratié 2014, 195).
14 Griffiths 1999a, 1999b.
“requires and fosters a particular set of attitudes to what is read, as well as reading practices that comport well with those attitudes; and it implies an epistemology, a set of views about what knowledge is and about the relations between reading and the acquisition and retention of knowledge.”\textsuperscript{15} Such reading is, therefore, always rereading; it “ends only with death, and perhaps not then: it is a continuous, ever-repeated act.”\textsuperscript{16} Think of Kamalaśīla’s reference to \textit{tattva-abhyāsa}, the persistent, repetitive study of truth.\textsuperscript{17}

McClintock points out that, even if we think, as Griffiths’s reading suggests, that such texts were chiefly intended for fellow Buddhist monastics, we need not imagine that their reach was constrained by the walls of the monastery. She says “the only plausible scenario” in which the \textit{Tattvasamgraha} and \textit{Pañjikā} were intended exclusively for a Buddhist audience “would require that the texts were intended as pedagogical tools to prepare monks for public debates against non-Buddhist opponents.”\textsuperscript{18} Indeed, the \textit{Tattvasamgraha} sometimes reads like a series of scripted debates to be studied and rehearsed, and the \textit{Pañjikā} often introduces and explains basic concepts in argumentation and reasoning. The consequence, as McClintock points out, is that non-Buddhist thinkers would still be at least indirect audiences, through the medium of formal debate.

To take this one step further, I would like to pull at a thread Ratié dangles at the end of a chapter. Without denying the possibility that Buddhist readers of the \textit{Tattvasamgraha} went on to engage rivals in debate, Ratié suggests it at least as likely that the text reached other traditions by circulating amongst educated readers.\textsuperscript{19} In addition to Griffiths’s remarks, she cites Helmut Krasser’s take on the audience of Dignāga’s work as another example.\textsuperscript{20} Krasser argues that Dignāga was unlikely to win anyone over, despite his own claims to the contrary, and, so, was effectively writing for Buddhists. Yet even Krasser, Ratié notes, concedes that Dignāga et al must have known their texts would wind up in opponents’ hands, even if their opponents were never likely to be convinced. And yet, as Ratié asks, what hope should Dignāga have had that his students would succeed in debate where his texts had failed?\textsuperscript{21} There are good reasons to doubt the \textit{Tattvasamgraha} was written to directly convert non-Buddhists or to train Buddhist monks to do the same through formal debate. Vincent Eltschinger makes a compelling case for something of a middle way between these views. He argues

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Griffiths 1999a, 40.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Griffiths 1999a, 41.
\item \textsuperscript{17} One implication for Buddhist epistemology, McClintock notes, is that in “preaching to the converted,” Buddhist thinkers made arguments that were not suited to convince anyone of anything (McClintock 2010, 52 n 121). She goes on to argue that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla “\textit{did} hold their arguments to have, in Griffiths’ words (1999b, 513) ‘maximal dialectical force,’ but only for members of their ideal audience, judicious persons” (\textit{preksāvat}). (Emphasis original.) I tend to agree with Griffiths that the arguments of thinkers like Śāntarakṣita and Aviddhakāraṇa have more force within a relatively like-minded community. But I share McClintock’s sense that we cannot compartmentalize the various traditions, sects, and schools of classical Indian philosophy. “Indian Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophers of the classical era participated in a shared intellectual milieu that \textit{did} allow the cross-fertilization of ideas,” she writes (52 n 121, emphasis original). But trying to convince non-Buddhists to give up the worldly life is not the only way of seriously engaging with and challenging their ideas, and cross-fertilization does not necessarily entail persuasion per se.
\item \textsuperscript{18} McClintock 2010, 56–57.
\item \textsuperscript{19} E.g., “…des exemplaires du TS ont également dû circuler parmi différents cercles non bouddhiques et faire l’objet d’une lecture attentive de la part des adversaires de Śāntarakṣita et de Kumārila [sic]” (Ratié 2014, 183). The entire discussion leading up to this remark is incisive and thought-provoking.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Krasser 2004, Krasser 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ratié 2014, 176–183.
\end{itemize}
that we should read Buddhist epistemological works as apologetic rather than proselytic.\footnote{Eltschinger 2012. Eltschinger points out that the Buddhist epistemologists never seem to claim that they are going to convert anyone.} Defending the legitimacy of the Buddhist tradition is a different task than persuading others to join it (or training students to do so), but it is no less legitimate. The polemics of Dignāga et al seem far more effective in this light. As for the Tattvasaṃgraha, Eltschinger argues that, “but for meeting (mainly outward) objections, Sāntarakṣita could have spared himself the trouble of composing such a treatise.”\footnote{Eltschinger 2012, 477.}

This offers great insight into the motivations behind the Tattvasaṃgraha. Eltschinger pays careful attention to the doctrinal and institutional pressures haunting some of the Buddhist epistemological works, including scriptural injunctions against contests and debates. Helmut Krasser touches upon a similar topic in a paper on the textual and chronological relationships between Dharmakīrti, Kumārila, and Bhāviveka.\footnote{Krasser 2012.} The Chinese pilgrim and logician Xuanzang was in India for sixteen years, and left Nālandā in 644, yet he does not mention Dharmakīrti. At first, Krasser considers that Xuanzang might not have been aware of Dharmakīrti. But then he raises the possibility that, despite being aware of Dharmakīrti, Xuanzang chose not to mention him. Krasser notes that Dharmakīrti himself suggests\footnote{Specifically, the second maṅgala verse of his Pramāṇavārttikā-swavṛtti, which we will return to below (cf. “Playfighting”).} “that people are not only disinterested in his work, but are even hostile to it.”\footnote{Krasser 2012, 585.} Perhaps this was why Xuanzang remained silent about Dharmakīrti’s work. “What could have been so terrible in Dharmakīrti’s texts,” Krasser then asks, “that people, for instance, the officials at Nālandā, even became hostile towards them?” The answer Krasser proposes is Dharmakīrti’s claim that scriptural testimony, āgama—including the words of the Buddha—is not a means of knowledge (pramāṇa). “How were they to propagate Buddhism if the Buddha is not even a pramāṇa, if there is no certainty whether what he has said about super-sensible matters is true?”\footnote{Krasser 2012, 585–586.} This happens to be a perfect springboard for a consideration of the Tattvasaṃgraha, the main sources of which are the works of Dharmakīrti, and which culminates in a proof of the existence and authority of a being with vision of super sensible matters, i.e., the Buddha. In other words, the Tattvasaṃgraha can be read not only as a polemically-oriented apologetic for the Buddhist faith, but also as an apology on behalf of Dharmakīrti himself.

Still, I cannot help but continue to think about Ratié’s remarks on the circulation of the Tattvasaṃgraha and Pañjikā. She points out that Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s adversaries were likely to have read their texts, and read them, no less, as an “object of attentive reading.”\footnote{“...objet d’une lecture attentive” (Ratié 2014, 183).} Just who is it who read these texts? How did they read them? Alongside what other texts? Did they recite them aloud to their students and coreligionists? Did they read them in quiet solitude?

There is one thing about the circulation of the Tattvasaṃgraha and Pañjikā that we can say with absolute certainty: they have made it into our hands. We, scholars and historians of medieval Indian philosophy, are readers of these texts, and indeed we read them attentively. Could Sāntarakṣita have
imagined that someone like us would someday read and study his work? Should we regard ourselves as ideal or imagined audiences of the *Tattvasamgraha*? It seems unlikely, even if not impossible. McClintock, highlighting a term used throughout the text, and much of Indian philosophical discourse writ large, argues that the thoughtful people (*preksāvat*) Kamalāśīla mentions in his introduction are the ideal audience. Śāntarakṣita may well have anticipated a specific, and relatively restricted, set of likely readers who fit the bill. I think he is most likely to have principally had in mind scholar-monks in and around major institutions of Buddhist learning, though he doubtless was aware of the likelihood that adversaries would read and potentially respond to his work, and he must have considered additional audiences, such as potential patrons and curious intellectuals with less of a doctrinal stake in the disagreements. Still, surely there are some among our circle of scholars who look before they leap (*preksāpūrvakārin*, which coarsely means “one whose action is preceded by consideration”). Why efface our own participation in this work? We are, in fact, part of the actual audience of the text, and this can inform the way we think and talk about it. The audience of the *Tattvasamgraha* is, in fact, readers.

To read is to be moved. (Should anyone be inclined to disagree, they should at least consult Śāntarakṣita’s causal theory first.) We cannot say much about Śāntarakṣita’s social context with certainty, but we can say a lot about the imaginative landscape of his text. Knowing ourselves to be among the text’s readers, we can seek to engage with it as a reader, rather than exclusively through the scholarly microscope.

*The Fruits of Our Labor*

We need not fear the inevitable embellishments, distortions, or constraints of these idealized conversations in which we participate. We must be vigilant to attend to them, but being honest and courageous regarding their inevitability, we can start to ask new questions. Scholars have often chosen to focus on discrete portions of the *Tattvasamgraha* in their studies. This should come as no surprise. It is a long and complex work covering an enormous array of topics, themes, and rival traditions. In addition, most scholars have chosen to give equal weight to the extensive *Pañjikā*, magnifying the amount of material to cover. Selecting a discrete passage of a few dozen verses makes possible a focused and detailed study. But it also forces a somewhat limited set of questions, such as “What does argument x mean?” or “What are the textual sources and the historical legacy of verses xx–yy?” Broader questions about the work as a whole—“What does the *Tattvasamgraha* do? How does it do it?”—need not be partitioned from our historicist and exegetical work, but can undergird and orient it. Further, and even more fundamentally, we can ask questions as readers participating in the text’s reception: “How does the *Tattvasamgraha* move its readers? How does it move us?”

Kamalāśīla gives a strong sense for how the text moved him, and how he imagines it moving his own readers. In his *maṅgala* verses, he refers to himself as dull-minded (*jāḍa-dhi*). (Of course, in contrast with the omniscience of the Buddha, all of our minds are dull.) He says that his selfish desire for

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29 McClintock, emphasizing our distance from Śāntarakṣita a little bit more than I am inclined to, refers to us as part of the “actual, unintended audience” (McClintock 2010, 51).

30 A small example: the Jaisalmer manuscript (J) of *Pañjikā* is covered with marks and remarks that evince “une lecture attentive” by one of its readers, including such simple things as indications of word breaks in lengthy compounds. Funayama 1992, Kellner 1997, and Ratié 2014 are all dedicated to discrete passages of around 40–60 verses; McClintock 2010 covers wider ground but is intended as a focused study on the final chapter of the *Tattvasamgraha*.
merit (punya) led him to tattva-abhyāsa, a disciplined, repeated, persistent study of the truth(s). The result of such effort, he says, is rising virtue (śubha). The implication is that the reader might similarly benefit from tattva-abhyāsa. In fact, by the time he concludes his extensive commentary, with the final words of the Pañjikā, he draws the connection even more emphatically with a pun on his own name:

Thus, after becoming ever the abode for the grace of the unrivaled victor,
I have obtained that which is good, plentiful, and radiant;
By means of it, may all the world become sugata-kamalaśīla,
Which with its blazing splendor pleases the minds of all beings.

The term sugata-kamalaśīla has several valences here. “Kamalaśīla” is, of course, a reference to the author of these very words, but his name bears particular significance, especially in concert with the term sugata. Sugata means “gone well” and is a common epithet for the Buddha, who has “gone well” in the sense of attaining enlightenment. A kamala is a lotus, a ubiquitous symbol in the Buddhist world and a representation of the Buddha himself. Like a perfectly blossomed lotus flower, which sprouts in the mud at the bottom of a pond but blossoms in the pure open air above the water (i.e., is sugata), the Buddha was born in this world but attained the perfection that exceeds it (i.e., is sugata). Just as the surface of a lotus leaf wicks away water, leaving the flower stainless, so the Buddha is unmarred by the impurities of the world. The word śīla refers in general to any distinctive or habitual conduct and specifically to the good conduct of a pious practitioner. The śīla of a kamala is the pure conduct of a lotus, which stands in for the virtue of the Buddha himself. This makes Kamalaśīla “he whose conduct is like that of a lotus” and by extension “the Buddha-like one.” Altogether, the term sugata-kamala-śīla refers not only to the author himself, but to the particular Buddha-like quality contained in his name. Kamalaśīla wishes for all the world to become sugata-kamalaśīla, to attain the pure conduct of a perfectly blossomed lotus flower—and the stainless lotus-conduct of a Sugata—and so to have the kind of “blazing splendor” that pleases the minds of all beings. Taking all of this together with the reference to his own name, we can restate Kamalaśīla’s rousing conclusion like this: “May this teaching help all mankind become Buddha-like—like me.”

Kamalaśīla also says a number of things about how and why he expects the reader to undertake such an effort. He says that the Tattvasamgraha, in all its complexity, amounts to a single, massive

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32 It is worth comparing this with Dharmakīrti’s bitter maṅgala in his Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti, which appears later in this Introduction, cf. n 75. Kamalaśīla crafted his verses in the same poetic meter as Dharmakīrti’s (jātrīlā-vikṛtītā) and similarly refers to the selflessness of the abhyāsa he has undertaken. But Kamalaśīla strikes the kind of humble tone that was a common feature in such verses; implicitly, his humility suggests that his readers can benefit from following his lead, and his concluding verse confirms this. Dharmakīrti’s tone, on the other hand, is only humble in the sense that he seems resigned to being dismissed and ignored. The language and structure of their respective verses are very similar, yet the actual feeling and meaning conveyed are quite different.

33 It is a tricky verse to unpack. The second line has a seeming tautology: may all beings (loka) become that which pleases all beings (jana). But, of course, it can be true that the Buddha pleases the minds of all beings and that one wishes for all beings to become buddhas.

The Tibetan rendering has a few quirks (e.g., seemingly reading “nija” [rang gi] for “jina”), but the latter portion of the verse in the Tibetan conforms to this reading: dpe med rang gi dpal bden bden par nges byas las dge ba shin tu dri med bdag gi gling thob de/-jig rten thams cad skye bo kun gyi yid tshim mdzad pa yil mdangs gal ba can bde gshegs pad ma’i ngang tsul ’gyur bar shog.
compound sentence (mahā-vākyya).\textsuperscript{34} which is “precisely a sentence like any other” (tad-anya-vākyavad vākyam eva śāstram). In other words, though there are twenty-six chapters in the Tattvasamgraha, each of which is composed of several—often several dozen, and sometimes several hundred—verses, all of these seemingly discrete statements cohere into a single overarching statement signifying a particular subject toward a particular end. Even if we regard individual chapters synecdochically, it seems unsatisfying to treat such a carefully structured systematic whole as if its parts can be separately excised. Consider Kamalāśīla’s playful unpacking of the word samgraha in the text’s title—collecting (sam+Vgraha) truths in a single text leads to their easy comprehension (sam+Vgraha).\textsuperscript{35} Part of the work the Tattvasamgraha performs is to make comprehension of Buddhist philosophy simpler, closer at hand. Refusing to read the work specifically as a coherent whole seems to be pushing further away what Śāntarakṣīta has so kindly brought closer.

This is all the clearer in light of the way the parts of the whole fit together. Ratié argues that the text’s most significant contribution—as well as its main claim to originality—is not merely in its exhaustiveness, nor merely in its synthesis of the work of various Buddhist thinkers, but precisely in its systematicity, in the way that it presents the work of these various thinkers as forming a coherent conceptual whole.\textsuperscript{36} She goes on to say that we have to understand the Tattvasamgraha’s engagement with, for example, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa as the engagement with Kumārila’s system as a whole, rather than an isolated series of arguments of his.\textsuperscript{37} This is the hallmark of Śāntarakṣīta’s pedagogy and his interpretation of the epistemological works he inherits: one must not regard an opponent’s arguments in isolation but only within the context of his overall system of thought. In other words, Śāntarakṣīta presents Buddhist philosophy as a coherent system with which one can systematically pick apart the systems of others. For this reason, each individual chapter of the Tattvasamgraha serves, to some extent, as a microcosm of the whole. Arguments sometimes seem repetitive—and Kamalāśīla even points out many cases when roughly the same argument is being retooled yet again—but this is neither out of laziness nor a stubborn or unimaginative misunderstanding of the subtle differences between the arguments of different opponents. Rather, the point, as I see Ratié arguing, is that the overall system can be successfully brought to bear against any opponent, so long as one knows both one’s own and one’s opponent’s systems well.

At the very beginning of the Pañjiki, immediately after the maṅgala, Kamalāśīla says this:

\begin{quote}
Thoughtful people in this world determine the subject and the purpose of a scholarly work (śāstra) before engaging (pravṛtti) with it; and faith in great beings is the principal cause of the attainment of all that is good. With this in mind, in order to generate faith in the Blessed One, and so that the reader (śrōty) will engage with this work attentively, Śāntarakṣīta declares its subject (abhidheya) and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{34} Kamalāśīla intends the greatness (mahat) of the sentence merely in terms of scale rather than eminence, unlike, e.g., the description of individual Upaniśadic sayings as mahā-vākya. The question is whether an entire treatise (sakalam śāstram) can be understood as a single sentence with a single subject. An opponent argues that a treatise is not a sentence but a heap of sentences (vākyam-samāhā); Kamalāśīla explains that a sentence need not only be composed of words, but can be composed of sentences, as well (na hi padair eva vākyam ārabbhyate, api tu vākyair api [TSP 9.22]).

\textsuperscript{35} He uses the words avabodha (“awakening to”) and udgraha (“taking up”) to clarify that the second sense of samgraha is cognitive (TSP 11).

\textsuperscript{36} Ratié 2014, 168–171.

\textsuperscript{37} Ratié 2014, 169; “De même, c’est contre la pensée de Kumārila en tant que système que Śāntarakṣīta et Kamalāśīla présentent leurs arguments” (Likewise, it is against Kumārila’s thought as a system that Śāntarakṣīta and Kamalāśīla present their arguments), etc. (emphasis original).
Indeed, scholars within the Indian philosophical tradition often say that śāstra should begin with a statement about the subject and purpose of the work, as well as some indication of the manner in which the present study fulfills that purpose. As a number of scholars have noted before, what follows Kamalaśīla's introduction is a lengthy essay on the nature of the subject and purpose of the Tattvasamgraha in particular, and the need for, and function of, an opening statement of purpose in scholarly works in general. Without naming anyone, Kamalaśīla raises and refutes several opposing opinions on these questions. Toru Funayama, focusing carefully on the language of these objections, demonstrates that Kamalaśīla is directly engaging with a number of contemporaneous Buddhist commentators. Kamalaśīla's essay, therefore, is an important opportunity to peer into disagreements between contemporaries within roughly the same milieu. Hiroko Matsuoka, following Funayama's lead, delves into the content of the discussion. Specifically, she offers a clear assessment of the differences of opinion between Kamalaśīla and his fellow Buddhist, and fellow Dharmakirti commentator, Arcaṭa (c. 710–770). Unlike Kamalaśīla, Arcaṭa does not think the statement of purpose is instrumental in the reader's engagement, but only serves to ward off the claim that the treatise lacks purpose. One of Arcaṭa's claims in formulating this argument is that thoughtful people only act on the basis of certainty. Kamalaśīla's counterargument is an important foundation for the work ahead:

It is not true that thoughtful people only undertake a course of action (pravṛtti) on the basis of certainty (niścaya), as we can see that, for example, farmers act on the basis of uncertainty (samāyaya), as well. You may say, “The activity of farmers is indeed preceded by certainty, because, though they may have uncertainty about future crops (phala), they have certainty about the means of producing them (sādhana).” This is wrong. The question is whether someone would undertake an action for a particular aim even if there is uncertainty about it. A farmer does not toil for the sake of the means of production. If that were the case, then, because there is, in fact, certainty about the means of production, we could say their work is preceded by certainty. Rather, they act for the sake of the crop, the fruit. Seeing as there may be some hindrance to the crop, they have certainty about future crops (may have uncertainty about future crops). It is not true that thoughtful people only undertake a course of action for a certain purpose (pravṛtti), as we can see that, for example, farmers act on the basis of certainty.

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38 Kamalaśīla says “with the verses that begin with the word prakṛti and end with the word Tattvasamgraha” (prakṛtiyādbhiḥ ślokāḥ tattvasamgraha īty etatparyantair).
39 iha hi śāstre prekṣāvatām abhidheprayojanāvāsāyapūrvikā pravṛttiśāriḥ mahatsu ca prasādāḥ sarvaśreyo 'dhigateḥ kāraṇam prathamam ity ālocaḥ bhagavatī prāsādotpādanārtham, śāstre cāsmīṁ ādareṇa śrotuḥ pravṛttaḥ arthām svāsātṛpūjāvīdhipūrvakam asya śāstrasya prakṛtiyādbhiḥ ślokāḥ tattvasamgraha īty etatparyantair abhidheprayojane praḥa (TSP 2.1, J1v.2).
40 E.g., cf. Funayama 1995; McClintock 2010, especially 58–62 on the “ideal audience” of the text; Matsuoka 2018.
41 Funayama 1995.
42 Matsuoka 2018.
43 yat tāvad uktaṁ niścayenaiva prekṣāvatāṁ pravṛttir iti tad asat, samāyenaśīri pravṛttidarsanāntā, yathā kṛṣṇalādinām. syād etad yady api kṛṣṇalāder bhāvīni phale samāyaṁ tathāpi tathpalasādhananiścayān teṣām vidyata eva, tena niścayapūrvaikāva teṣām pravṛttir iti. tad asayak. yad arthaṁ hi yaśo pravṛttirāḥ sā tattāśaśya non tiṣya bhavatity etāvad iha prakṛtam. na ca kṛṣṇalādāyāḥ sādhanārthāṁ teṣā bijādiśu pravartante yena sādhanāviśayanāniścayasadbhāvān niścayapūrvikā pravṛttir eṣām upavartyate. kim tarhi. phalārthāṁ te tatra pravartante. tatra ca phale pratibandhādīsamabhāvān na niścayo 'stity atāḥ samāyapūrvikaiva teṣām pravṛttih (TSP 3.13).
44 The term bijādiśu is written above the central column of J2v.1 as an insertion between teṣu and pravartante. Further along the same line, there is a long gap between niścaya and sadbhāvāt, and the term bijādiśu has been traced there by
Farmers toil not, or not merely, for the means of producing their crops, but for the crops, the fruits (phala), themselves—and, of course, for the beneficial results of a good yield. Thoughtful readers engage with a treatise not, or not merely, for the “activity” of the text, but for the fruit (phala) that work yields—and for the deeper result that follows from that. Practiced farmers are well aware that they are not in complete control of their future crops. A change in the weather, a scourge of some kind, social or political strife, etc., can frustrate even the most diligent and knowledgeable among them. A thoughtful farmer, in other words, knows that there is always uncertainty about future crops. In this formulation, uncertainty (saṃśaya) is always bounded, localized, precise. The only way we might be able to describe the farmer’s actions in terms of certainty, Kamalaśīla says, is the thought, “this will necessarily be enough to produce the intended crop so long as there are neither hindrances nor deficiencies in the assisting causes.”

In other words, \( x \) will yield \( y \), *conditions permitting*. But this, he explains, is not certainty about the future crop, i.e., the result, “because those with ordinary vision (apara-darśana) cannot ascertain whether there will be hindrances, and so on.” Knowing what you do not know, and even what you cannot know in principle, is not a hindrance to prudent activity, but a component of it.

The opposite of someone with ordinary (apara) vision is someone with supreme (para) vision. Kamalaśīla’s maṅgala praises the Buddha in part by juxtaposing his greatness with Kamalaśīla’s (and our) dull-mindedness. In Śāntarakṣita’s maṅgala, to which we will return shortly, he directly refers to the Buddha as the omniscient one (sarva-jñā, “all-knowing”). This term anticipates the final chapter of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, the “Examination of Persons with Supersensory Vision.” The Buddha knows, with certainty, that when he gives a specific person a specific teaching, he has planted the seeds of awakening. But by contrast with the greatness of the Buddha, all of us are dull-minded. In other words, one would have to be a superhero, an extremely advanced practitioner, or maybe even a buddha, to know with certainty that a particular practice, engagement with a particular text, etc., will necessarily yield the intended result. Thoughtful people—those who think before they act—act precisely with uncertainty, which is to say with a clear sense of what they do not know.

Collecting uncertainties is not a lamentable condition. Knowing we may never transform all of our uncertainties into certainties, we can avoid the pitfalls of simplistic notions of knowledge and progress; knowing enough to be uncertain, we can investigate.

“The dull-minded like me are never able to say anything that is new.” And so, I speak.

§ DEBATES ABOUT DEBATE

One of the many difficulties in reading and interpreting works like the *Tattvasaṃgraha* concerns the chronology and the fragmentariness of Buddhist-Brahmanical “dialogue” or “debate.” Birgit Kellner points out that, in their engagement with Kumārila, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are hosting a debate with a dead man. In addition, we cannot say what scores of salvos and rejoinders have not another, more recent hand. This would make the whole phrase *sādhana-viśaya-niśaya-bijādisu sadbhāvitā*, which would be difficult to make sense of grammatically or semantically. It seems someone was unhappy with the gap and chose to repeat the inserted *bijādisu* from earlier in the line.

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44 pratibandhakasahākārivaikalyayor asambhave saty avaśyam abhimataphalasampādanāyālam etad ity evamrūpāḥ (TSP 4.5, J2v.2).

45 Kellner 1997a, xxviii: “Dieses Element des Sprecherwechsels im argumentativen Text bedingt einen gewissen
withstood the test of time. We know, for example, that Aviddhakarna had a few things to say about Buddhist arguments for momentariness and selflessness, but we do not know whether anyone in his tradition voiced support for his arguments. We know some later Naiyâyikas referred to Bhâvivikta as an ancient Cârvâka thinker, but did they know him to be a commentator on the Nyâyabhâya, as well? Precisely what connects these dots will likely remain out of reach for us.

The debates in the Tattvasamgraha are imaginary. Śântarakṣita collects the arguments of his rivals and the counterarguments and rebuttals of the Buddhist thinkers he favors, and assembles them into a series of pseudo-dialogues. Nevertheless, the form of these dialogues derives in part from the idea that representatives of opposing religious and philosophical traditions can and do sometimes hold formal debates before an audience. It is unsurprising, therefore, that many of Śântarakṣita’s source texts feature not only arguments about particular subjects and theories, but also about the rules of argumentation and debate.

In the Tattvasamgraha, Aviddhakarna and Bhâvivikta are presented primarily as representing the Nyâya tradition. By the time Śântarakṣita composed the Tattvasamgraha, thinkers from the Buddhist and Nyâya traditions had already sparred—at least in textual form—for hundreds of years. Not merely with one another, and not merely across the Buddhist-Brahmanical divide, Buddhists and Naiyâyikas debated amongst themselves, as well as with real or imagined representatives of various other traditions. These textual “debates” cover broad ground. Though a great deal in the soteriological and analytic orientation of Buddhist and Nyâya logicians is shared, Nyâya asserts many things anathema to Buddhist thought: there is a permanent self; the universe has a single intelligent creator; substantial wholes exist over and above their component parts; anything that exists is nameable in principle. Buddhist logicians disagree on every count.

In the translation and study that follows, we will see several instances of these kinds of disagreements as well as the shape the “debate” takes in textual form. For now, we need to consider some of the opposing ideas from Buddhist and Nyâya thinkers on the nature of debate itself to appreciate the importance of the social practice in their engagement with one another.

Setting the Terms

There is a clear distinction between friendly and contentious debates in the Nyâyasûtra (NS), the

‘ahistorischen’ Charakter: Wenn Kamalaśīla etwa meint, daß ‘der Gegner’ in TS; 1672, wo Śântarakṣita aus ŚV abhāva zitiert, ein Argument gegen ein zuvor von Śântarakṣita vorgebrachtes Argument vorbringt, ist das natürlich anachronistisch, weil Kumārila oder ein anderer Mimāṃsaka wohl kaum tatsächlich auf Śântarakṣita bezug genommen haben kann - es sei denn, Kamalaśīla hätte nach Art eines Fernsehreporters blitzschnell einen in der Nachbarschaft ansässigen Mimāṃsaka um seine Meinung gefragt. Summa summarum kann man einen Text dieser Gattung also aus einter bestimmten Perspektive (hier der buddhistischen) verfaßte Debatte zwischen zwei zu Idealtypen ihrer Denkrichtung abstrahierten Disputanten bezeichnen” (This element of the shift in speakers in an argumentative text entails a certain “ahistorical” character. For example, if Kamalaśīla thinks the “adversary” in TS; 1672, which Śântarakṣita quotes from ŚV abhāva, is arguing against an argument previously raised by Śântarakṣita, this would of course be anachronistic, because Kumārila, or another Mimāṃsaka, cannot have actually referred to Śântarakṣita—unless Kamalaśīla, in the manner of a speeding television reporter, had asked a Mimāṃsaka residing in the neighborhood for his opinion. All in all, we can describe a text in this genre as depicting from a specific perspective (here the Buddhist) a debate between two disputants that are abstracted into ideal types of their respective schools of thought).

foundational text of the Nyāya tradition and the primary source material for all of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāśīla’s Naiyāyika rivals. NS identifies three different types of dialogue: debates (vāda), quarrels (jalpa), and attacks (vitaṇḍā). These are defined as follows:

- **Vāda** entails two people: taking opposing positions on an uncertain manner; using means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and reasoning (tarka) to prove their respective positions and find fault with one another’s; not contradicting established doctrine; and formulating their arguments in accord with the five components (avayava) of a valid formal argument.\(^{48}\)

- **Jalpa** has the same characteristics, plus proving and finding fault by means of chala (quibbling, equivocation), jāti (class, consequence?), and nigrahabhāna (grounds for defeat).\(^{49}\) The first of these, “equivocation” (chala), involves intentionally misinterpreting the words of one’s interlocutor. The second, jāti, is a troublesome concept, but eventually came to refer to a class of devious or sophistical objections.\(^{50}\) “Grounds for defeat” (nigrahabhāna) are, as the term would suggest, failures in the proponent’s argumentation or reasoning that warrant their defeat.\(^{51}\)

- **Vitaṇḍā** is when one engages in jalpa without bothering to maintain a counterpoint.\(^{52}\)

In concert with these concepts, the Nyāyasūtra also defines various aspects of reasoning and formulating arguments. For example, the “five components” mentioned above refer to the formal sequence of a Nyāya syllogism. A typical example involves inferring fire on the far side of a mountain upon seeing billows of smoke rising from it. The five components are as follows:

1. **Proposition** (pratijñā): There is fire on the mountain.
2. **Reason** (hetu): Because there is smoke.
3. **Exemplification** (udāharana): Where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen.
4. **Application** (upanaya): There is, in that way, smoke on the mountain.
5. **Conclusion** (nigamana): Therefore, there is fire on the mountain.

According to Nyāya, all five of these components, in this particular sequence, are necessary to successfully prove one’s point. (Buddhist philosophers disagree, finding especially (4) and (5) redundant.) Carrying on discussions, quarrels, and attacks, requires an understanding of established doctrine, the processes of reasoning and argumentation, and the regulations of debate (e.g., the

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\(^{47}\) Vāda derives from the root vad, “to speak.” Jalpa from jalp, also refers to speech, but more typically refers to chitchat, prattle, or murmurs, and, hence, to conversation. The verbal root of vitaṇḍā (taḍ) refers to beating or striking, whether in the sense of beating a drum or striking a person. The prefix vi- gives the sense of opposition or difference, i.e., beating against or striking away.

\(^{48}\) pramāṇatarkāsādhanopālamβhaḥ siddhāntaviruddhah pāñcāvayapapannah paksapratipakṣaparigrahah vādaḥ (NS 39.5).

\(^{49}\) yathoktopapannah chalātātinigrahabhānasādhanopālamβho jalpaḥ (NS 40.12).

\(^{50}\) Cf. Prets 2001. In early Nyāya, jāti may well have referred to a type of justifiable criticism about an undesirable consequence of an argument (jāti often means “class,” but most coarsely also means “production,” and may in this valence suggest something like a consequence).

\(^{51}\) Importantly, some “grounds for defeat” are used in vāda, but for the most part they are only important when the speaker is contending with a genuine rival. As we will see in a moment, Nyāya distinguishes between samśāda, the kind of friendly debates one holds with fellow truth-seekers, and nigṛhya-kathana, the hostile discussions one holds with someone who wishes only to vanquish a rival rather than come to an understanding of tattva.

\(^{52}\) sa pratipakṣasthāpanāhino vitaṇḍā (NS 41.16).
various “grounds for defeat”). Importantly, components (2) and (3), the reason and the exemplification, can both be formulated in terms of similarity or dissimilarity. One consequence of this is that the example can either instantiate the co-presence of the reason and the property to be proven or their co-absence. I.e., in the argument above, a kitchen is “similar” in the sense that it possesses fire, therefore the smokiness of a kitchen demonstrates the principle that “where there is smoke, there is fire.” By contrast, the non-smokiness of a lake, which is “dissimilar” in the sense that it does not possess fire, would demonstrate the inverse principle, that “where there is no fire, there is no smoke.” The former is called positive concomitance (anvaya, “association”), and the latter is called negative concomitance (nyātireka, “separateness”). In many cases, an argument can be formulated through both similarity and dissimilarity.

Toward the end of the Nyāyasūtra, a passage (NS 4.2.38–51) on the cultivation of tattva-jñāna (knowledge of the principles)\(^\text{53}\) culminates in a discussion of friendly and hostile encounters. Tattva-jñāna arises on the basis of internal and external yogic practices, persistent study (abhyaśa) of Nyāya, and saṃvāda, i.e., “friendly debates.” A seeker should engage in saṃvāda “with unenvious students, teachers, peers, and distinguished, well-wishing people.”\(^\text{54}\) By contrast, “jalpa and vitandāi are for the sake of protecting the ascertainment of truth, like a covering of thorny branches to protect the germination of seeds.”\(^\text{55}\)

The following sutra, which concludes the passage, reads simply: “Hostile conversation (vigrhya-kathana) with these.”\(^\text{56}\) Vātsyāyana (c. late 5th century),\(^\text{57}\) in his Nyāyabhāṣya, the earliest extant commentary on the Nyāyasūtra, frames this statement like this:

> For someone being disrespected by another party out of their indifference to knowledge (vidyā-nirveda), or the like, there is

**Hostile conversation with these. (NS 4.2.51)**

> “Hostile,” i.e., with the desire for victory, not with the desire for tattva-jñāna. This itself is for the guarding of knowledge, not for profit, honor, or fame.\(^\text{58}\)

All of this is to say that, according to Nyāya, when one is engaging with a genuine rival, e.g., a Buddhist, it is permissible to use equivocation, sophisms, and facetious grounds for defeat. The clear implication is that a contentious debate takes place before an audience, and that the winner of the debate may win the audience’s allegiance. As we know, in some of the tales of great debates, companions of the losing party are forced to convert on the spot. The Nyāyasūtra, unsurprisingly, considers Nyāya the true bearer of the knowledge required for ultimate spiritual advancement;

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\(^{53}\) According to the first two sutras in the Nyāyasūtra (1.1.1–2), emancipation (apavarga) requires tattva-jñāna, knowledge of the sixteen principles defined throughout the Nyāyasūtra.

\(^{54}\) tāṃ saṣṭhāgurusabrahmacārīvioṣṭaśretyorthiḥbhīṁ anasūyibhiḥ abhyupeyät ||4.2.48|| (NS 281.1).

\(^{55}\) tattvāyaśasaṃprakṣaṇārthaḥ jalpativāde bijaprabhahasanprakṣaṇārthaḥ kanṭakāskhābhāvanavat ||4.2.50|| (NS 281.14).

\(^{56}\) tābhīyam vigrhyakathanaṃ ||4.2.51|| (NS 282.3). If we do not take vigrhya as a qualification of kathana, the result is something like, “Taking up an argument, there is conversation with these.” But I think the point is far clearer if we read vigrhya as a qualification of kathana, resulting in a karmadhāraya compound. Consider Vātsyāyana’s comments below.

\(^{57}\) Franco and Preisendanz 1995.

\(^{58}\) vidyānirvedādhibhī ca parenāvajiyāmanāsaya tābhīyam vigrhyakathanaṃ ||4.2.51|| vigrhyeti viṣiṣṭāya na tattvajñānabubhūtsayo. tad etad vidyāparipālanārthaḥ, na lābhupūjākhyāyartham iti (NBh 282.2).
devious means are permissible in a contentious debate if they are needed to protect and preserve the truth.

On the Buddhist side, we find direct attacks on the central concepts of the Nyāya analysis of reasoning and argumentation in works by, among others, Vasubandhu (c. late 4th century),59 Dignāga (c. 480–540),60 and Dharmakīrti (c. 6th century),61 all of whom are themselves subjects of tales of great conquests in debate.62

Vasubandhu’s texts on logic are no longer extant, but the Vādavidhi (“Method of Debate”), likely his earliest on the subject, survives in Tibetan fragments.63 In this brief text, Vasubandhu discusses the major issues in formulating an inferential argument and determining its validity and soundness. He defines the various components of an argument,64 delineates types of defects in an argument or in a critique,65 and contends with specific kinds of jāti defined in the Nyāyasūtra—all in distinction to way NS defines and describes these concepts. Along the way, he revises both the formal requirements of a valid argument and the underlying epistemological theory. Implicit in his revision is a critique of two key aspects of Nyāya theory. First, he entirely elides the fourth and fifth components of a Nyāya syllogism, most likely because the application is essentially a restatement of the reason, and the conclusion is literally a restatement of the proposition. More fundamentally, he demands that the exemplification demonstrate an “invariable relation” (avinābhāva), rather than mere co-presence or co-absence. Vasubandhu’s implicit critique of Nyāya epistemology in the Vādavidhi is that correlation is not causation.

Dignāga’s corpus is extensive, though many of his works have been lost. At least one of these lost works, the Nyāyaparīkṣā (“Examination of Nyāya”), seems to have been focused entirely on Nyāya theory.66 Śaṅtarakṣita suggests that the Nyāyaparīkṣā, together with Vasubandhu’s (lost) Vādavidhāna (a different text than the Vādavidhi but presumably with a similar topic), paved the way for a proper understanding of formal logic. Yet we can only speculate about the content of such a work.

Dignāga is often credited with a number of innovations in Buddhist logic that can, in fact be traced at least to Vasubandhu. Even so, his formulation and formalization of earlier innovations clearly had a great impact on later Buddhist thinkers and many of their Brahmanical rivals. One of his unique

59 Deleanu 2006 (186–194), with a detailed examination of the complex web of evidence surrounding Vasubandhu’s dates, conjectures ca. 350–430 CE.
60 Frauwallner 1961, Hattori 1968.
61 Frauwallner (1961) proposes 600–600 as Dharmakīrti’s dates, and most scholars have accepted this as a rough estimate, though the issue has received a lot of attention. Helmut Krasser (2012) more recently argues, on the basis of the textual relationships between Bhāvivikta, Kumārila, and Dharmakīrti, that we should place the latter two in the middle of the sixth century.
64 Eliding components (4) and (5) and highlighting the property-to-be-proven within the statement of the proposition.
65 Vasubandhu most significantly redesines argumentative defects by reducing the list of hetvabhaṅgas (fallacious reasons) and nigrāhāśīthānās (grounds for defeat) in the Nyāyasūtra to three varieties of defect: unestablished (asiddha), inconclusive (anaitikāntikā), and contrary (viruddha). He may have used different terms, but the three clearly correspond to what eventually became the standard list.
66 In the Pṛatimānasaṃuccaya, he mentions the Nyāyaparīkṣā in concert with texts called Vaiśeṣikaparīkṣā and Sāṃkhyaiparīkṣā, which shows that the term nyāya in the title Nyāyaparīkṣā refers to the text tradition rather than, e.g., to abstract logic.
contributions is the so-called *hetucakra*, the wheel of reasons. The *hetucakra* is essentially a table of all of the possible relations a reason (*hetu*) can have with the similar and dissimilar cases (*sapakṣa-vipakṣa*). The idea is to show that only two out of the nine possibilities constitute valid reasons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hetucakra⁶⁷</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. +sapakṣa, +vipakṣa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. +sapakṣa, -vipakṣa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. +sapakṣa, ±vipakṣa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. -sapakṣa, +vipakṣa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. -sapakṣa, -vipakṣa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. -sapakṣa, ±vipakṣa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. ±sapakṣa, +vipakṣa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. ±sapakṣa, -vipakṣa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. ±sapakṣa, ±vipakṣa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: + a property of all; - a property of none; ± a property of some.

This table highlights several key features of Buddhist logic according to Vasubandhu and Dignāga. Mere positive or negative concomitance is not sufficient. The reason must bear a specific relation to similar and dissimilar cases in order to prove the point. Specifically, the reason must be a property of at least one similar case (±) and must not be a property of any dissimilar case (-). As the following tree diagram highlights, (2) and (8) alone are valid; the rest are fallacious (ābhāsa, “apparent”):

In addition, the reason must be a property of the subject of the argument (*paksadharmatvā*)—if there is no smoke on the mountain, there is no reason to infer fire there. Altogether, the reason’s relationships to the subject (*pākṣa*), the similar case (*sapakṣa*), and the dissimilar case (*vipakṣa*) constitute what Dignāga calls the three characteristics (*trirūpa*) that a valid reason must fulfill.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Cf. Matilal 1998, 7ff, for analysis of the members of the “circle” and its development after Dignāga.
⁶⁸ As we will see though much of the present study, inferential reasoning was largely inductive prior to Dharmakīrti’s insight that there are two inference-warranting relations: causality (*tadutpatti*) and identity (*tādātmya*). This innovation allows Sāntarakṣīta and Kamalaśīla to insists on the intrinsic authority of valid inferences, rather than merely on inductive consistency.
By contrast, Uddyotakara (c. 6th century), author of the Nyāya-vārttika, the earliest extant subcommentary on Vātsyāyana’s Nyāya-bhāṣya, defends the validity of what later Naiyāyikas refer to as kevala-antarjñayin and kevala-eyaparikṣā in arguments, i.e., those that have only positive or only negative concomitance. In some cases, according to Uddyotakara, there is in principle no dissimilar case, or no similar case, and yet a sound inference can still be drawn. Uddyotakara directly cites Vasubandhu and Dignāga several times each in the Vārttika. His engagement with their work got the attention of several later Buddhist thinkers, including Dharmakīrti and, later, Śāntarakṣita.

As if in defense of Vasubandhu and Dignāga against Uddyotakara’s attack, Dharmakīrti composed the Vādanyāya, which may have been his last work. According to Dharmakīrti, good people had already demonstrated the rules of debate (vāda-nyāya) before his time, but wrongheaded people obscured the light of truth; therefore, he felt the need to compose the Vādanyāya to ward off their attacks. Śāntarakṣita wrote a commentary on the Vādanyāya, the Vipaścitārthā, which contains several fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, discussed at length in Appendix A. Śāntarakṣita clarifies that the “good people” in question are Vasubandhu and Dignāga. It is here that he specifically cites Vasubandhu’s Vādavidhāna and Dignāga’s Nāyaparikṣā as forerunners to the Vādanyāya. The “wrongheaded people” are, of course, the Naiyāyikas, chiefly Uddyotakara, who occupies most of Dharmakīrti’s attention in the Vādanyāya. Vasubandhu concerns himself primarily with jāti in the Vādavidhi, and Dharmakīrti focuses, in turn, on nigrasabhaṇa, “grounds for defeat.” As far as Dharmakīrti is concerned, “grounds for defeat” are only grounds for defeat if they represent a genuine defect in the speaker’s reasoning or argumentation. The fact that Naiyāyikas like Uddyotakara are willing to use devious and disingenuous methods to win debates makes them, in Dharmakīrti’s estimation, cheats (śātha).

Playfighting

John Taber, in his strikingly spirited review of Kellner’s study of these texts, points out that the Tattvāmsāgraha “exhaustively refutes the doctrines of competing systems, Hindu and Buddhist alike (though Madhyamaka is spared),” but then emphasizes that it “devotes particular attention to—one could even say, is obsessed with—Mīmāṃsā as represented by Kumārila.” Taber observes, following Frauwallner, that Śāntarakṣita likely had a copy of Kumārila’s now lost Bṛhatīṭikā. He was clearly affected by what he read. He may not have been convinced by it, but persuasion is only one potential result of a polemic. In fact, as Phyllis Granoff has shown, narratives of the great debate victories of non-Buddhist thinkers often evince great suspicion that winning a debate really entails convincing anyone of anything. Granoff mentions, among several other examples, a story of Kumārila’s victory over a Buddhist thinker. Despite the victory in debate, the king is not entirely satisfied. “His

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69 Uddyotakara must have lived some time in between Dignāga, whom he quotes, and Dharmakīrti, who quotes him. He may have been a junior contemporary of the former or an older contemporary of the latter.

70 loke ‘vidyātimirapatālollekhanas tattvadṛṣṭer vādanyāyāḥ parahitatair eṣa sadbhī pranītaḥ | tattvālokaṃ timirayati tāṃ durvidagdho jano ‘yam tasmād yatnāḥ kṛta iha maya tataṃjyūjānaṃ ||3|| (VN 68.10).

71 A different text than the Vādavidhi, but presumably with fairly similar content. (The titles are synonymous.)

72 Taber 2001, 73. Indeed, even when contending with Cārvāka in the “Examination of Lokāyata,” the verses with which Śāntarakṣita characterizes the Cārvāka view are from Kumārila’s Slokavārttikā. (It is possible that both thinkers are lifting the verses from another text, but I find Franco’s take rather compelling: “I tend to assume that Kumārila put the Cārvāka arguments into verse and that it was simply easier for Śāntarakṣita, who knew that they were Cārvāka arguments, to quote them in an already versified form” [Franco 1997, 101]).
objection,” Granoff writes, “seems natural enough; winning in a debate might be due to nothing more than skill in argument. A good debater should be able to argue successfully even for a wrong doctrine. How then, the king asks, is a bystander to know who was really right?” Kumārila then participates in two additional tests—not of his wits, but of his divine or supernatural capacities. He survives a leap from a high cliff and then correctly guesses the contents of a pot that is obscured from view. As Granoff explains, “the debate is suspect because its results might be due to mere cleverness on the part of a debater who in fact holds the wrong position.”

Even Dharmakīrti, who certainly seems to hold that the truth of the matter can be rationally arrived at and proven, laments his inability to win anyone over in one of the maṅgala verses from his Pramāṇavārttika-svavytti:

> Usually people are addicted to vulgarity and lack the wisdom equal to the task (of understanding learned treatises); they are not only disinterested in what is said well, but, being afflicted with the filth of envy, are even hostile towards it.

> Therefore, although I believe this work to be of no use to others, my heart, its determination increased through repeated study of eloquent works for a long time, has become eager for it. (Hayes and Gillon 2001, 2)

Kellner brings up the chronological gap between Kumārila and Śāntaraksīta in order to point out that, in fact, the dialogue can at best be only an idealized one. McClintock, though agreeing with the basic point, nevertheless warns against excluding even dead opponents from Śāntaraksīta and Kamalaśīla’s intended audience. “While Kumārila, for example, may have been dead at the time of the composition of TS/P,” she says, “his tradition (the Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsā) appears to have been alive and well.” Still, as Ratié mentions, the chronological distance between the texts that comprise the centuries-long “dialogue(s)” or “debate(s)” between Buddhists, Brahmins, and others, means, in part, that interpretations and intentions may well have shifted over time within and between these various traditions. But we should also be suspicious of the notion that these textual dialogues, or even the purported public debates haunting them, were intended or accepted as efforts to win over new

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73 Granoff 1985, 465.
74 Granoff 1985, 466.
75 prāyaḥ prākṛtastakī apratibala-prajñī janaḥ kevalam | nānārthty eva subhāṣitaiḥ parigato vidvēṣty apiśryāmālaḥ | tenāyaṁ na paropakāra iti naś cintāpi ceta ciraṁ | sūktābhyaśāsvardhitavyasanan ity atrāṇubaddhaspham (PVSV 1.4).

Note the resonance—and consonance—between the second line here and the concluding words of Kamalaśīla’s opening maṅgala, which is written in the same poetic meter (jārdīla-vikrīdita).

76 McClintock 2010, 58 n 132.
77 Ratié 2014, 177–178: “Je ne prétends pas être en mesure de démontrer que l’un de ces modèles est plus adéquat que l’autre – la question me semble d’ailleurs d’autant plus difficile à trancher qu’elle comporte également un aspect diachronique: la philosophie indienne a pu, au cours de sa longue histoire, hésiter elle-même entre ces deux modèles, et il est possible que les auteurs bouddhistes eux-mêmes n’aient pas été d’accord quant à la fonction et au public de leur dialectique, sans compter que le dialogue brahmanico-bouddhique qu’on présente souvent comme le moteur ou l’essence de la philosophie indienne est sans doute apparu assez tardivement” (I do not claim to be able to show that one of these models is more fitting than the other – the question seems to me all the more difficult to settle because there is also a diachronic aspect: Indian philosophy, over its long history, may itself have wavered between these two models. It is possible that Buddhist authors themselves did not agree about the function and audience of their dialectic, not to mention that Brahmancio-Buddhist dialogue, which is often presented as the engine or the essence of Indian philosophy, in all likelihood appeared rather late).
converts.\footnote{As Granoff (1985) and Eltschinger (2012) both show.}

We must not collapse the long spans of time that separate extant entries in the supposed exchange. Nor should we naively accept that these texts represent or imply real exchanges on the ground. But there is also no need to do so in order to see the effects of these texts, and the shared ethos undergirding them. As we have seen, Buddhist thinkers at least as far back as Vasubandhu wrote discrete texts dedicated to the views of specific text traditions. We need not overly idealize a simple, coherent, or discrete “Buddhist-Nyāya debate” in order to see the way a thinker like Śāntarakṣita dramatizes such a notion.

Even more centuries separate us from Śāntarakṣita than separated him from his various sources, and yet we, too, are engaged in some kind of ideal dialogue. This does not diminish the exchange. We, too, like Kamalaśīla,\footnote{And also like Vācaspati Miśra, who, centuries later, quotes a verse by Śāntarakṣita, refutes it, and then moves on with a shrug: “whatever” (yat kimcid etad).} are his readers, his students, his critics, his rivals, his others. And, like both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in their engagement with the works of their allies and their rivals, we, when we read their work, have the task of organizing, interpreting, and finding ourselves in relation to material that can only ever be partial, distant, ideal, concealed, and in part imaginary.

At this point we can return to the question of the Tattvasamgraha’s audience and purpose. In her conclusion, Ratié contends with a number of scholars who describe works like the Tattvasamgraha as bad faith exercises. For example, in his study of two works by Ratnakirti, Katsumi Mimaki, as Ratié puts it, presents Buddhist-Mimāṃsā debate as “a sort of dialogue of the deaf,”\footnote{“...une sorte de dialogue de sourds” (Ratié 2014, 227).} as if the authors in question are unwilling or unable to hear one another. Like Ratié, I find such a critique misplaced—not to mention that it can be difficult to imagine what sort of text would qualify as a good faith exercise in this view. Rather than a dialogue of stubborn people, Ratié describes Buddhist-Brahmanical discourse as a “philosophical game,” the first rule of which is “that one cannot combat an adversary by attributing to him a thesis he does not hold.”\footnote{“...car le jeu philosophique comporte ses règles, et la première d’entre elles consiste en ceci qu’on ne peut combattre un adversaire en lui attribuant une thèse qu’il ne revendique pas” (for the philosophical game has rules, and the first of these consists in the fact that one cannot combat an adversary by attributing to him a thesis he does not hold [Ratié 2014, 230, emphasis original]).} She returns to the martial metaphor in her conclusion a couple of pages later when she argues “that despite complete disagreement between the protagonists, some continued to listen [and] that it is precisely in this dialogue that the one and the other were able to hone their conceptual weapons.”\footnote{“...qu’en dépit d’un désaccord « total » entre ses protagonistes, on a continué de s’y « écouter »; que c’est précisément dans ce dialogue que les uns et les autres ont pu affiner leurs armes conceptuelles; et que le texte de Śāntarakṣita traduit ci-dessous en porte témoignage (Ratié 2014, 231–232).} The Tattvasamgraha, she explains, bears witness to this dynamic. This strikes me as a compelling and elegant interpretation as well as...
one that is generous without sacrificing sophistication or feigning certitude.

As readers of the text, we might take one additional step.

It is significant that Ratié refers to the “philosophical game” and adversarial “combat” in the same sentence. The specific image of honing or sharpening one’s weapon bears an interesting resonance with the present study. Toward the end of this study, we will consider an argument I call “Aviddhakarṇa’s sword.” Aviddhakarṇa, in his skeptical guise, argues that he need not accept the validity of abstract inferential argumentation in order to best a Buddhist in formal debate. So long as he plays by the Buddhist’s rules, he can beat his rival at his own game. Kamalaśīla imagines Aviddhakarṇa or someone similar comparing this to striking an enemy with his own sword after wresting it from his hands. But, Kamalaśīla replies, you cannot cut someone with an imaginary sword. Aviddhakarṇa, of course, does not get the chance to respond, but I can speak for him: You can if you are playfighting.

The Buddhist epistemologists may not have accepted the Nyāya division between samvāda (friendly debates) and vigṛhya-kathana (hostile discussions), especially because Nyāya warrants the use of devious tactics in the latter. For Dharmakīrti, vāda (debate) is for ascertaining truth, whether contending with friends or rivals. But from our privileged position we can disregard this particular prejudice and consider Buddhist works in Nyāya terms.

Kamalaśīla’s insistence on the strict distinction between a real sword, which can cut someone whether they believe in it or not, and an imaginary sword, which cannot even cut the person deludedly imagining it, cannot but remind us of the Nyāya distinction. The devious tools and tactics of vigṛhya-kathana are, as we have just seen, “for the sake of protecting the ascertainment of truth (tattva), like a covering of thorny branches to protect the germination of seeds.” Thorns only protect the germination of seeds because it hurts to be pricked by them. But defeat in a formal debate can sting whether the winning argument was metaphysically correct or not. It would be prudent for Śāntarakṣita to fend off Aviddhakarṇa’s critique with any tools at his disposal if he believed it to be a threat to the ascertainment of truth. Indeed, I argue that he and Kamalaśīla parry Aviddhakarṇa’s attack rather than meet it directly.

But even if such a hostile encounter is integral to the form and method of the Tattvasamgraha, the actual point of the text is, according to Kamalaśīla, the reader’s easy comprehension of tattva. One engages in hostile discussions in order to protect the ascertainment of truth. Outward-oriented apologetic work—vigṛhya-kathana—is integral to the reader’s comprehension of truth and also contains its own didactic force. But we need not distinguish so neatly between fending off non-Buddhists and educating Buddhists. There may well have been thinkers at Nālandā who were hostile to the Dharmakīrtian lineage, and there must have been non-Buddhist thinkers, e.g., some among the Jain thinkers who preserved the only extant manuscripts of the Tattvasamgraha, who can be

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83 As I discuss in the next section of the Introduction, Aviddhakarṇa is credited with a Naiyāyika commentary and a Cārvāka commentary. In the latter, he expresses skepticism about the kinds of abstract inferences that Buddhists and Naiyāyikas both accept.

84 No surprise that Dharmakīrti sought to set the rules of the game!

85 Eltschinger calls attacking rival systems “positive apologetics” and neutralizing their objections “negative apologetics” (Eltschinger 2014, 5).
described as “unenvious students, teachers, peers, and distinguished, well-wishing people,” i.e., those with whom the Nyāyasūtra says a seeker should engage in samvāda. In fact, in the context of the Nyāyasūtra, the term sabrahmacārīn (companion) seems most likely to imply fellow Brahmins.\(^\text{86}\)

Regarding the Tattvasamgraha in terms of samvāda extends the range of such friendly debates beyond the constrictions of caste or lineage, or the like. Śāntarakṣita may sharpen his sword to fend off the attacks of thinkers like Aviddhakarṇa, but victorious combat in the philosophical game is most fruitful if it protects—and inspires—sincere truth-seeking.

When Kamalaśīla describes the audience (śrot-rjana) of the Tattvasamgraha as thoughtful people (prekṣāvat), people who look before they leap, he is not making a doctrinal distinction. Śāntarakṣita surely imagined the reception of the Tattvasamgraha within a relatively restricted set of socio-political contexts. And, as Ratié and others have noted, the text has an “obviously didactic character.”\(^\text{87}\) So why have scholars continued to debate its intended audience? For one thing, as Ratié goes on to say, we do not know enough about the function of such texts to claim it was exclusively intended for, or exclusively had influence within, Buddhist circles—or, by implication, to make the contrary claim conclusively.\(^\text{88}\) But the deeper problem is not the lack of historical data. The Tattvasamgraha exceeds whatever we consider its strict historical moment. We inquire into the audience of a text so we can better understand its force. Knowing what we do not know about its intended audience or institutional function, we must then turn to the text itself—as well as to our own encounter with it. Ratié is right to say that Śāntarakṣita must have known it would reach a broader audience, and the Tattvasamgraha does not demand an exclusively Buddhist audience, even if it clearly favors one. But it does demand a certain degree of attentiveness and persistence from its reader. The word for “reader” in medieval Sanskrit texts is śrotṛ, which means “hearer” or “listener.” This, of course, stems from the storied oral traditions of India. Often enough, a text’s audience was comprised chiefly of listeners rather than readers. (We similarly describe auditors and readers both as an “audience.”) But this also has a certain poetic resonance when we consider the audience of the Tattvasamgraha. If the audience (śrot-rjana) of the Tattvasamgraha is readers (śrotṛ)—which is to say those who listen to it, who know how to hear it—then why neatly divide its Buddhist and non-Buddhist targets? The audience of the Tattvasamgraha, the audience I would argue the text demands for itself, is anyone we can describe as a samvādin, someone who participates in samvāda: a conversation partner.

§ AVIDDHAKARṇA AND BHĀVIVIKTA

Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, the primary focal points of the present study, present us with another strange problem. To put the matter rather plainly, we cannot say definitively whether we are dealing

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\(^{86}\) Brahmacārīn is used by Buddhists, as well, to refer to (typically) celibate students and practitioners, but it can also more specifically refer to the first life-stage of a Brahmin, marked by celibacy and Vedic study. The Nyāyasūtra is intended as an orthodox Brahmanical jātaka, and, so, seems likely to have the latter in mind.

\(^{87}\) “...caractère évidemment didactique” (Ratié 2014, 182). The same obviously didactic character explains McClintock’s proposal that non-Buddhists were at least an indirect audience of the Tattvasamgraha by way of their formal debates with the Buddhist scholar-monks trained by the text.

\(^{88}\) Ratié 2014, 182. “Nous savons en effet, pour l’heure en tout cas, bien peu de choses quant à la fonction exacte que les traités philosophiques pouvaient avoir dans l’Inde médiévale, en particulier vis-à-vis de la pratique orale du débat” (For the time being, we know very little about the exact function that philosophical treatises might have had in medieval India, especially concerning the oral practice of debate), and so on.
with four thinkers, three, two, or one. But this does not mean that we must not speak at all. If our only recourse, when dealing with lapses and uncertainties in the record of Indian thinkers and texts, etc., were to make our best guess, lament our scholarly predicament, and wish for the unearthing of clearer evidence, there could never be an end to our lamentations. But even with such a spotty archive, we have such a wealth of material to wade through, and, so, just as much reason to rejoice.

There may be two Aviddhakarṇas or only one, there may be two Bhāviviktas or only one, and Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta may or may not be one and the same man. Were this but a bit of idle prattle, we could at least reject the problem as such. I hope to show that the problem is real enough, but also that this particular problem actually creates opportunities. As is well-known, Erich Frauwallner proposed that there were two Vasubandhus, basing this view partly on apparent discrepancies in the evidence for Vasubandhu’s dates and partly on the commentator Yaśomitra’s apparent reference to two different thinkers by the same name. 89 Stefan Anacker, in his study of seven works by Vasubandhu, disputes Frauwallner on both counts, arguing instead that “all evidence points to one thinker.” 90 The implications are not insignificant. According to Frauwallner, “we can trace differences in the doctrine of the senior and the junior Vasubandhu,” 91 but if Anacker is right, we have to interpret such differences in the context of a single career. How the texts attributed to Vasubandhu bear on one another depends not only upon the authenticity of the attribution, but the identity of the author. The evidence for two Aviddhakarṇas is less robust than Frauwallner’s evidence for two Vasubandhus, but it is not a trivial idea. Considering why such an idea arises, and what it means to collapse the two Aviddhakarṇas back into one, is instructive. It is especially intriguing, and important, to consider the identity of Aviddhakarṇa alongside that of Bhāvivikta, as we will see.

There has yet to be a focused study on the lost Naïyāyikas, but a number of scholars, such as Ernst Steinkellner, Albrecht Wezler, Esther Solomon, Eli Franco, and Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, 92 have commented directly on the identities of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta. Between the various arguments these and other scholars have made over the last several decades, four possible positions emerge.

\[2 + 2 = 4\]

The case for two Aviddhakarṇas and the case for two Bhāviviktas are nearly identical. Śāntarākṣita tells us that an author named Aviddhakarṇa wrote a Bhāyaṭīkā, unmistakably referring to a commentary on the Nyāya-bhāṣya (cf. Appendix A). Kamalaśīla, besides attributing passages that are likely from the same commentary to a thinker named Aviddhakarṇa, also tells us that someone named Aviddhakarṇa wrote a Tattvaṭīkā—apparently a commentary on the Caṅkvākasūtra, the root text of Caṅkāca philosophy—and cites a few passages from it (§14). 93 Later commentators also refer

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89 Frauwallner 1961.
91 Frauwallner 1961, 132.
93 As is common in Sanskrit philosophy, tattva (apparently) refers in Caṅkāca to the basic constituents of reality, which in Caṅkāca means the four material elements. Several sources cite athātās tattvam vyākhyāyamāḥ (Now, then, we will explain tattva) as the first sutra in the Caṅkvākasūtra.
to Aviddhakarṇa in the context of apparently Cārvāka arguments, and one later Jain commentator, Vādirājasūri (11th c.), refers to him explicitly as a Cārvāka.

Similarly, Sāntarakṣita refers to Bhāviviktā's Bhāsyatikā, from which Kamalaśīla also apparently cites, and yet Cakradhara (c. 11th c.), in his commentary on Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s (9th c.) Nyāyamaṇḍāri, describes someone named Bhāviviktā as an ancient Cārvāka teacher (cirantana-cārvākācārya).

So we have references to Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāviviktā as authors of Bhāsyatikās, as well as Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāviviktā as authors of commentaries on the Cārvākasūtra.

Nyāya and Cārvāka are opposed in many respects. Nyāya postulates a duality between mind and matter; an eternal self, and, so, the reality of rebirth; an all-knowing creator god; four distinct means of knowledge, including scriptural authority; and so on. Cārvāka, on the other hand, holds that consciousness is purely material; that the self persists only until death; that perception is the only primary means of knowledge; etc. At first glance—and maybe even second and third glance—it is hard to imagine a thinker being simultaneously allied with both Nyāya and Cārvāka.

The question, then, is whether Aviddhakarṇa wrote both the Bhāsyatikā and the Tattvatiṅkā, or whether two separate thinkers with the same name each wrote one or the other; the same question goes for Bhāviviktā. Some scholars, like Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, argue that we cannot say one way or the other, "since there is no hard fact for either accepting or for denying such a hypothesis."

Kamalaśīla does not say, for example, that the author of the Tattvatiṅkā is the same Aviddhakarṇa as the apparent Naiyāyika he quotes elsewhere in his Pañjikā. In fact, Bhattacharya goes so far as to say that the Cārvāka Aviddhakarṇa is "to be distinguished from his namesake who was a Naiyāyika," erring on the side of two Aviddhakarṇas.

This leaves us with as many as four thinkers, two by each name.

\[1 + 1 = 2\]

Steinkellner makes the case for a single Aviddhakarṇa and argues that if one and the same Aviddhakarṇa wrote both the Bhāsyatikā and the Tattvatiṅkā, he must have undergone a conversion from theism to materialism or vice versa. Notably, the article in which Steinkellner makes this

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94 Anantavīrya (c. late 10th/early 11th c.), in his commentary (ṭīkā) on Akalaṅka’s (c. 720–780) Siddhiviniścaya, attributes Aviddhakarṇa with a Cārvāka-esque statement about cognition. See Appendix B.
95 Shah specifies only the 10th–12th centuries of the Vikrama Samvat.
96 See the introductory section to “Maṅgala” and Appendix B.
97 Bhattacharya 2010, 424.
98 Bhattacharya 2011, 57.
argument predates the publication of Cakradhara’s commentary. That is to say, at the time, Steinkellner was unaware of Bhāvikṣvā’s affiliation with Cārvāka. Wezler’s response appears around fifteen years later, and three years after Nagin Shah’s publication of Cakradhara’s commentary. Wezler is skeptical that a thinker should have to go “from Saul to Paul,” i.e., to have a full conversion, in order to comment on two different systems. The presumption that one would is, Wezler says, unconvincing. Strikingly, Wezler’s chief argument against Aviddhakarnā’s “Saul to Paul” conversion is the fact that Cakradhara identifies Bhāvikṣvā as a Cārvāka. If Aviddhakarnā could only have commented on both traditions if he underwent a full conversion, presumably the same would be true for Bhāvikṣvā. Without the underlying prejudice, Wezler implies, there is no evidence for Aviddhakarnā’s conversion. Instead, the fact that Aviddhakarnā and Bhāvikṣvā both authored Nyāya and Cārvāka commentaries demands a rational explanation.

Steinkellner highlights Kamalaśīla’s reference to the Tatvāṭikā. Kamalaśīla never mentions the title of the Bhāṣyaṭākā, and, in fact, rarely mentions any titles whatsoever, yet he refers to the Tatvāṭikā of Aviddhakarnā relatively shortly after mentioning Aviddhakarnā as the author of a clearly Naiyāyika argument. In Steinkellner’s view, this suggests that Kamalaśīla mentioned the Tatvāṭikā in order to clarify that he was referring to a different text, on a different system, by the same thinker. For example, if he meant to refer to a different thinker who goes by the same name, he could easily have referred not to the title of a text, but to something like lokāyatikā-aviddhakarnā, “Aviddhakarnā the materialist.” Wezler picks up on this argument against two Aviddhakarnās to argue that there is only one Bhāvikṣvā, too. But he also leverages Bhāvikṣvā’s identity against Steinkellner’s argument that

Wenn auch beide Gruppen von Fragmenten demselben Aviddhakarnā gehören, muß dieser Autor einen Wechsel vom System der Cārvāka zum Nyāya vollzogen haben und gleichzeitig damit eine Wandlung vom Materialisten zum Theisten, oder umgekehrt” (Now, Kamalaśīla hardly mentions the name of any work of the writers opposed by his teacher apart from Śābara’s Bhāṣya and some Buddhist works, yet he refers to the only Cārvāka fragment under the name Aviddhakarnā as a fragment of a Tatvāṭikā, which he mentions again elsewhere to refer to broader execution of Cārvāka argumentation. This goes against Kamalaśīla’s practice, who adds no indication of the work of the remaining fragments of Aviddhakarnā. It seems as though he would like to emphasize this passage as the Cārvāka position among the other passages of the same author; if these had been lines from a different Aviddhakarnā, he could have more easily and clearly described the difference with reference to the system of the author’s membership. This distinction was necessary for him because he had cited some of the Nyāya positions of Aviddhakarnā in the immediate vicinity of this fragment […].

So if both groups of fragments belong to the same Aviddhakarnā, he must have made a change from the Cārvāka system to the Nyāya, and at the same time a change from a materialist to a theist, or vice versa. He, then, wrote a Bhāṣyaṭākā, i.e., a commentary on the Nyāyabhāṣya, and is also the author of a Tatvāṭikā, a Cārvāka work that, according to the fragments, should have been logical and epistemological, and, following the title, also polemically oriented).

100 Wezler 1975, 144: “Die neuen Nachrichten über Bhāvikṣvā aber sind dazu angetan, diese These weiter zu erschüttern. Ich sage „weiter“, weil sie mir wegen des ihr zugrunde liegenden Vor-Urteils, daß ein Autor sich nicht zu zwei, weithin gegensätzlichen Systemen wissenschaftlich äußern könne, ohne sich jeweils vollständig mit dem Gegenstand zu identifizieren, ohne vom Saulus zum Paulus zu werden, oder umgekehrt, schon vorher wenig überzeugend erschien. Daß sowohl Aviddhakarnā als auch Bhāvikṣvā, die auch zeitlich nicht weit voneinander entfernt sind, einen solchen Systemwechsel vollzogen haben, will noch weniger einleuchten. Für entschieden plausibler darf wohl die Annahme gelten, daß diese bemerkenswerte Konvergenz sachliche Gründe hat” (The new information on Bhāvikṣvā is likely to further upset this thesis. I say ‘further’ because the underlying prejudice that one author cannot formally comment on two widely different systems without fully identifying himself with the subject, without going from Saul to Paul, had already seemed unconvincing. That both Aviddhakarnā and Bhāvikṣvā, who were also not far apart in time, carried out such a change in system is even less clear. It is decidedly more plausible that this remarkable convergence has a factual rationale).

101 Steinkellner 1961, 155.
Aviddhakarṇa must have been a convert.

From all of this, we get two thinkers, a single Aviddhakarṇa and a single Bhāvivikta, each of whom wrote a Nyāya commentary and a Cārvāka commentary, either of whom may or may not have converted.

2 + 1 = 3

Of course, Steinkellner’s argument, though compelling, is not conclusive (nor does he suggest it is). It is more plausible that there is a single Aviddhakarṇa than two of them, but not certain. In addition, neither Śāntarakṣita nor Kamalaśīla ever refers to a Tattvātikā by Bhāvivikta, and apart from Cakradhara’s remark, there are no clearly Cārvāka fragments attributed to Bhāvivikta. For this reason, Steinkellner’s argument for a single Aviddhakarṇa cannot be carried over to Bhāvivikta. It is even less certain, then, that there was but one Bhāvivikta. Wezler emphasizes that, in Cakradhara’s identification, Bhāvivikta represents the older Cārvākas, whereas Udbhaṭa (c. 8th c.) represents the younger, or more recent, materialists. In other words, we cannot claim, on the basis of Cakradhara’s identification, that there was an earlier Naiyāyika Bhāvivikta and a later Cārvāka Bhāvivikta. Occam’s razor returns, and it remains most plausible that there was but one Bhāvivikta.

Still, because the arguments for each individual hinge on rather fine details—Cakradhara may, after all, simply have been mistaken; Kamalaśīla may have understood the reference to the Tattvātikā to do what we would think a phrase like lokāyatika-aviddhakarṇa would have done better—either of them may, whether or not we ever find more evidence, simply be incorrect.

There is, then, an argument for a single Aviddhakarṇa, and a separate argument for a single Bhāvivikta, and it may well be the case that only one or the other is correct. Should some evidence surface that there really was a second Bhāvivikta, for example, we may find ourselves with three thinkers, two Bhāviviktas and Aviddhakarṇa the (possible) convert; or even the other way around. As far as I know, no scholar has argued for such a view, but it remains a theoretical possibility.

1 = 1

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102 It is quite likely that earlier scholars who posited two Aviddhakarṇas too readily reified the discreteness of identities like “Naiyāyika” and “Cārvāka.” We cannot say whether Aviddhakarṇa’s contemporaries would have found commentaries on both root texts confusing, or whether they would have understood the sorts of motivations behind such work.

The distinctness of the moniker Aviddhakarṇa would also seem to caution us against presuming two of them during the same period.

103 Wezler, 143: "Jayanta unterschied also nicht zwischen suśkṣitāḥ und dhūrtāḥ Cārvāka, wohl aber zwischen ‘alten Cārvākas’ wie Bhāvivikta usw. und einem jüngeren Cārvāka, bzw. jüngeren Materialisten, die sich seiner Ansicht nach durch noch größere Dummheit von ihren Vorläufern ausgezeichneten, indem sie zwar die Existenz eines pramāṇātattva während des Bestehens des individuellen menschlichen Organismus behaupteten, dabei aber übersahen, daß sie auf diese Weise wider Willen einen ewigen ātman anerkannten, dessen Vorhandensein notwendig aus ihrer These folg" (Jayanta did not distinguish between suśkṣitāḥ and dhūrtāḥ Cārvakāḥ, but between “old Cārvāka,” like Bhāvivikta et al, and a younger Cārvāka, or younger materialists, who were, in his view, marked by an even greater stupidity than their predecessors insofar as they maintained the existence of a pramāṇātattva during the persistence of the individual human organism, but overlooked the fact that, in so doing, they acknowledged against their will the eternal ātman whose existence follows necessarily from their thesis).
Nevertheless, I fear that such a proposal is, as the Sanskrit philosophers might say, too weighty. Steinkellner and Wzaler make strong arguments, respectively, for a single Aviddhakarna and a single Bhāvivikta. We can imagine some kind of evidence emerging for two Aviddhakarna or Bhāviviktas, but doing so is unnecessary. Instead, we can proceed, as Franco and others have done, by regarding each as a single thinker, while maintaining an awareness of our limitations. If Aviddhakarna really wrote both a Nyāya and a Cārvaka commentary, it would raise a host of questions about his life, about the relationship between these traditions, and so on. But we do not have to rely on this as a concrete fact in order to explore a variety of possible interpretations of his fragments.

That said, the elegance of these two arguments and the specific ways in which they resemble and support one another suggest yet one final reduction. Perhaps the reason there are two instances around the same time of the same surprising phenomenon—namely, a thinker writing both a subcommentary on the Nyāya-bhāṣya and a separate commentary on the Cārvakaśūtra—is because there is only, in fact, one instance of it. Perhaps Aviddhakarna just is Bhāvivikta, and, for example, the name Aviddhakarna (“Unpierced Ears”) is actually a nickname or an epithet. Ear-piercing (karnavedha) is a relatively common rite (samskāra) performed in the first year of a Brahmin’s life, often in the seventh or eighth month.104 Alternatively, as Esther Solomon has pointed out, some gurus initiate students by “splitting” their ears with a mantra. In this light, Solomon suggests that “Aviddhakarna” refers to a “self-made man,” a man without a guru.105 Perhaps the ears (karna) of Bhāvivikta, for one reason or another, were never pierced (aviddhā)—whether literally or figuratively.

Prominent Naiyāyikas are sometimes known by two different names, a patronymic and a proper name of some sort. Vātsyāyana—a patronymic—is also known by his apparent given name Pākṣilavāmin. Uddyotakara (“light-maker”)—perhaps a name associated with participation in a particular tradition—is also known by his patronymic Bhāradvāja. The name Bhāvivikta (“pure as light”), like Uddyotakara, may perhaps indicate some kind of affiliation. A 12th-century text explicitly ties the prefix Bhā- to the names of Pāṇḍu-patis. We can imagine a man being given the name of the distinction Bhā-vivikta while nevertheless being commonly known as Aviddhakarna, but unlike Pākṣilavāmin Vātsyāyana, or the semi-mythic authors of earlier texts,107 I am unaware of

104 Gonda 1977.
106 Sarma 1934, e.g., points to the striking passage in Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra’s commentary to their own Nāṭyadārpana that explicitly ties the prefix Bhā- to the names of Pāṇḍu-patis (my translation): “Naked mendicants [i.e., Jain], followers of the Sugata Śākya [i.e., Buddhists], these two are ‘o bhadanta.” Others, worshippers of the Pāṇḍu-pata sect, and so on, should be addressed with the name for celebrated persons (prasiddha-nāma) according to their respective conventions (sva-samaya). For example, addressing a Pāṇḍu-pata, begin with bhā-, e.g., ‘Bhāsarvajña.” (munir nirgranthah, śākyah saugataḥ, etau bhadanteti. aprah pāṇḍupatādīvat svasamayaprasiddhanāmahīr vācyah. yathā pāṇḍupatasya bhāpaurvam bhāsarvajñā ityādibhasanam (ND 212.11)).
107 “Gautama” and “Ākṣapāda” may both refer to the “same” man, the “author” of the Nyāyaśūtra. The same goes for “Kāśypa” and “Kaṇāda.” Gautama and Kāśypa are relatively common patronymics, whereas “Ākṣapāda” (Eye-feet) and “Kaṇāda” (Atom-eater) are more distinctive epithets. Where such epithets originated, and whether they were ever intended to be descriptive nicknames, is uncertain. Later commentators have sometimes attempted to instill such names with intellectual-spiritual significance. “Ākṣapāda” may in some sense refer to meditative focus, either in the sense that his eyes were constantly cast toward his feet in walking meditation, or in the sense that he could “see” with his feet as he walked around with downcast or closed eyes in meditative concentration. “Kaṇāda” (or sometimes “Kaṇabhākaṣa,” which has the same meaning), may refer to the fact that, according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy that Kaṇāda is supposed to have originated, the universe is made up of, and in a sense sustained by, the permanent atoms.
names like Aviddhakarṇa that seem descriptive, more like a nickname than a patronymic, proper name, or marker of sectarian affiliation, so I cannot comment with any confidence on the potential overlap of names like Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta in reference to the same author.

The strongest evidence that Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are one and the same is not the mere fact that they share some biographical quirks, but their actual arguments. As we will see below, the most elaborate, elliptical, and idiosyncratic among their respective fragments—and, so, the most likely to be real quotations rather than Śāntarakṣita’s or Kamalāśīla’s paraphrase—often share a number of stylistic and terminological features. This includes a penchant for elaborate qualifiers, elliptical references to Vaiśeṣika categorization (e.g., “the indeterminate, existent, etc.” [sadādy-aviśeṣa]), and a particular way of describing the subject of an argument as “having come to be the topic of dispute.” In light of their shared biographies, the similarities in their argumentative and rhetorical styles are quite striking.

In response to Wezler, then, we might say this: it may be implausible that two thinkers underwent the same otherwise unheard-of conversion, and, as you say, there may therefore be some other, more mundane explanation for their authorship of separate works on Nyāya and Cārvāka; but by similar logic, we might say it is likelier that there was only one thinker, rather than two, going from “Saul to Paul” in this manner. In his conclusion, Wezler refers to the use of the terms lokāyata and ānvikṣiki in Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra to suggest a kind of commonality between Cārvāka and Nyāya. Nyāya treats ānvikṣiki—which Wezler, referring to Paul Hacker’s article on the term, renders, “the method of investigating with reasons”—as its basic method, and the Arthaśāstra regards Cārvāka (or more precisely, Lokāyata) as the auxiliary science of ānvikṣiki. It would have been intellectually, politically, or possibly even economically useful, Wezler suggests, for a Naiyāyika to examine, comment on, and perhaps be able to instruct others in, this near-rival. Wezler’s conclusion is striking, but some caution is warranted. As far as I can tell, we cannot even be confident that the term lokāyata refers, in the Arthaśāstra, to Cārvāka, undercutting a basic premise of Wezler’s conclusion. We need to consider reasons someone may have written both Nyāya and Cārvāka commentaries, but the deeper rationale may be specific to such an individual. Indeed, even if Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta were different people, one may have been influenced by the work of the other, and their motivations might not reflect broader trends.

Ernst Prets discussed the relationship between these two thinkers at the 18th Congress of IABS conference in Toronto (2017), and I believe he argued on that occasion that they are indeed one and the same man. But I am afraid I was not present, and I am not aware of any publication on this question as yet.

To reformulate the argument for a single author, “Aviddhakarṇa” Bhāvivikta, as I understand it: it is more plausible that there was one thinker around the time of Uddyotakara with the distinction of authoring a Nyāya commentary and a Cārvāka commentary than two, and with markedly similar argumentative style, especially considering that there is no other example of such an author apart from these two. Otherwise, we are confronted with a pair of thinkers living around the same time.

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109 Wezler 1975, 145.
110 Dharmakīrti’s dates are far from certain, but Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta both probably predate him. Krasser 2002 shows that Dharmakīrti responds in PV 2.10ff to Aviddhakarṇa’s first theistic argument, and Śāntarakṣita is
with the same peculiarity.

1 ≠ 1

Occam’s razor does not suffice in this case. We need additional evidence to collapse these two thinkers into one with any confidence, or else decisive evidence against doing so. All we have are tantalizing clues.

Kamalaśīla regularly attributes arguments that were voiced by more than one Naiyāyika to a group of thinkers, naming one or two thinkers and including others with the term -ādi, “et al.” He never once mentions Aviddhakarṇa in one of these groupings. In fact, apart from the fragment found (in Tibetan translation) in his commentary on the Nyāyabindu (Av5, cf. Appendix A), he never even attributes an argument to Aviddhakarṇa et al, but only to Aviddhakarṇa alone. On the other hand, on several occasions he refers to Bhāvivikta et al (bhāvivikta-ādayah). If he had mentioned an argument by Bhāvivikta-Aviddhakarṇa-ādi, or the like, we could have laid this problem to rest. But as Śāntarakṣita himself points out, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.111

We need not lament all of our uncertainties, but we should certainly not pretend there are no loose ends, dead ends, and frustrations in this work. The reference to “Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al” is a good example of the peculiar frustrations of this study. One of the arguments Kamalaśīla attributes to this group (Bh8) corresponds almost exactly to an argument that Śāntarakṣita, in his Vipaścitārthā, attributes exclusively to Aviddhakarṇa (Av1). (Cf. §8.) This opens up at least two possibilities. First, all three of these thinkers made roughly the same argument (about the existence of substances), and Śāntarakṣita elected for some reason to mention only Aviddhakarṇa. In that case, with the term et al Kamalaśīla is likely referring at least in part to Aviddhakarṇa. Alternatively, perhaps when Kamalaśīla cites Bhāvivikta in his Pañjikā, the specific passage he has in mind is the one Śāntarakṣita cites in his Vipaścitārthā. In other words, “Bhāvivikta” in the phrase “Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al” may refer to Aviddhakarṇa.112

Within the Pañjikā, the clearest evidence that we are dealing with two different thinkers—apart from the fact that they have different names—comes in chapter eighteen, the “Examination of Inference.” In verses 1437–1438, Śāntarakṣita dismisses the need for the fourth component of an argument, the application. In verses 1439–1440, he dismisses the fifth, the conclusion. Kamalaśīla attributes the arguments rejected in verses 1437–1438 to “Bhāvivikta et al” (Bh12), and the arguments in 1439 and 1440 to Uddyotakara and Aviddhakarṇa (Av15), respectively (cf. §13). The reference to “Bhāvivikta et al” and the ensuing reference to Aviddhakarṇa are separated by a single verse. This is not dispositive, but it is striking that Kamalaśīla refers distinctly to Bhāvivikta and Aviddhakarṇa in unambiguous that Bhāvivikta predates Dharmakīrti, as well (§4.3).

111 Cf. verse 554 in the translation below.
112 This opens up an interesting possibility. It may be, if Bhāvivikta = Aviddhakarṇa, that when Kamalaśīla refers to “Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al,” he is not hinting at texts beyond those authored by Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, but rather to Naiyāyikas who make similar arguments in speech. Of course, he may be referring to less notable texts that do not even survive in the form of fragments, or, hedging his bets, to any other thinkers that may have been inclined to make the same sort of argument. In such cases, we can let ourselves wonder without wandering too far astray.
such close proximity on such similar, interconnected topics.

There is not much circumstantial evidence about Aviddhakarṇa or Bhāviviktā's chronological relationships with one another or with other thinkers like Uddyotakara. They are differently coupled with Uddyotakara by commentators. Kamalāśīla refers to “Uddyotakara and Bhāviviktā, et al,” whereas the Buddhist commentator Karnakagomin (c. 800) and the later Jain commentator Abhayadevasūri (c. 11th c.), citing the same argument, refer to “Adhyayana, Aviddhakarṇa, and Uddyotakara, et al” (cf. Appendix B). If any of these authors had mentioned both “Aviddhakarṇa and Uddyotakara, et al” and “Uddyotakara and Bhāviviktā, et al,” respectively, we could have proposed on that basis that Aviddhakarṇa preceded Uddyotakara and that Bhāviviktā followed him. No such luck. There are a number of issues with extrapolating historical information from these lists. For one thing, the compound “Adhyayana, Aviddhakarṇa, and Uddyotakara, et al” is likely stitched together syllabically, as per Pāṇini 2.2.34113 (Adhyayana is four syllables, whereas the other names are five). Such compounds are often sequenced in terms of eminence, but perhaps Buddhist and Jain authors were not interested in ranking the eminence of Nyāya commentators. We know even less about Adhyayana than about Aviddhakarṇa or Bhāviviktā, and yet, as Steinkellner points out,114 Durveka Miśra (c. 1100) credits him with a text called the “Rucitikā,” which seems to be a subcommentary on Uddyotakara’s Vārttikā. This, of course, would mean that Adhyayana follows Uddyotakara, entirely undermining the chronological interpretation. As it stands, these different lists in different texts by different authors represent yet another set of tantalizing but inconclusive hints.

What we have, then, are two strikingly similar thinkers—similar in chronology, style, quirky doctrinal affiliation, and writings—who cannot be decisively differentiated apart from the fact that there are two different names.

I cannot say with certainty whether these men are one and the same, but for that very reason I believe that I must deal with them both. The most plausible theories are either that there is one Aviddhakarṇa and one Bhāviviktā or that there is one “Aviddhakarṇa” Bhāviviktā. But because I cannot rule out the latter, I cannot justify reading the fragments of only one thinker or the other. My overall project pursues the possibility that Bhāviviktā’s ears were never pierced, but my specific treatment of the individual fragments is divided according to the two names.

Methodology

The study of the fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāviviktā involves a convoluted web of texts. Each fragment of Aviddhakarṇa’s derives (most likely) from one of two texts: (i) his Tattvatiṅkā (an apparent commentary on the Cārvakaśūtra, which is itself only preserved in partial, fragmentary form) or (ii) his Bhāṣyatiṅkā (a subcommentary on Vatsyāyana’s Nyāyabhāṣya (NBh), which is itself a commentary on the Nyāyāsūtra (NS), the root text of the Nyāya tradition).115 Many of the fragments

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113 Cf., e.g., Cardona 1997, 222.
114 Steinkellner 1961, 160. Steinkellner groups together the references to Adhyayana in Durveka Miśra’s Dharmottaratradāpa, Karnakagomin’s PVŚT, and Abhayadevasūri’s TBV, concluding, “Offenbar gehört dieser Autor noch in die ältere Zeit” (Apparently, this author belongs to the earlier age [160]).
115 Either or both of these may be generic descriptions rather than proper titles. Sāntarakṣita’s commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Vādanāyā, for example, is a Vādanāyā-ṭīkā (“Commentary on the Vādanāyā”), but it also has the more distinctive secondary title Viśāścīrīṭhā (“Elaborated meaning”). The name of the text in its entirety is, then, “Commentary on the Vādanāyā in which the Meaning is Elaborated.” Authors—and/or commentators—seem not
from the Bhāṣyaṭikā parallel or resemble passages in Uddyotakara’s Nyāyavārttika (NV), the earliest extant subcommentary on NBh, as well as Prāsastapāda’s Padārthadharmasamgraha (PDhS), a kind of organizational commentary on the Vaiśeṣikasūtra (VS), which itself informs much of Aviddhakarṇa’s language and style of argumentation. Further, most of the fragments are preserved in Buddhist texts that are themselves commentaries on other Buddhist texts: Śāntarakṣita’s commentary on Dharmakīrti (Vipaṇcitārtha); Kamalaśīla’s commentary on Dharmakīrti (Pūrvapakṣasamksipta); Kamalaśīla’s commentary on Śāntarakṣita (Pañjikā); and others. A single fragment can directly involve a complex interplay of half a dozen texts or more, covering at least three or four philosophical traditions and a span of several hundred years.

Nearly the same web of texts ensnares the fragments of Bhāviviktā as those of Aviddhakarṇa. Like Aviddhakarṇa, Bhāviviktā is also credited with writing a Nyāya commentary and a separate Cārvāka commentary; he, too, relies on Vaiśeṣika terminology and categorization (though perhaps to a lesser extent); and he, too, is cited and refuted by both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. In addition, some of the fragments of these two thinkers share an idiosyncratic style.

The main differences are that Kamalaśīla does not mention Bhāviviktā in the Pūrvapakṣasamksipta, and that, at least as far as I know, the title of his Cārvāka commentary is uncertain. There are differences in the later legacies of these two thinkers, as well. The Naiyāyika commentator Cakradhara, commenting on Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s reference to “ancient Cārvākas” (ciraṇāna-cārvāka), specifies that he is referring to a group “beginning with Bhāviviktā” (bhāviviktā-prabhṛtyibhiḥ). I know of no other reference to Bhāviviktā, On the other hand, several later authors cite Aviddhakarṇa, including the Jain thinker Prabhācandra, and Karnakagomin, one of Dharmakīrti’s commentators.

The following table does not include these later commentaries that cite Aviddhakarṇa or additional Buddhist texts that may have been Aviddhakarṇa’s or Bhāviviktā’s targets, e.g., texts by Dignāga and/or possibly Vasubandhu, but only the direct sources of the present study:

### Table: Sources of Fragments from Aviddhakarṇa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bhāviviktā</td>
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118 For example, towards the end of the Vipaṇcitārtha, Śāntarakṣita suggests that Dignāga’s Nyāyaparīkṣā or Vasubandhu’s Vādavidhāna may have been attacked or intentionally obscured by stubborn or mischievous Naiyāyikas—hence the need, despite these authoritative works, for Dharmakīrti’s Vādanāyā. Dharmakīrti’s concluding verse in VN refers to good people who have already demonstrated the rules of debate (vādanāyā), but says he has composed the present treatise because wrongheaded people—Naiyāyikas—have obscured the light of truth (loke
Were we to think of all of this in terms of something like a *dramatis personae*, the main players and the primary supporting cast, together with the texts of theirs that are most directly relevant for the present study, would look something like this:

**Dramatis Personae**

### Primary thinkers

- Śāntarakṣita  
  - [*Tattvasamgraha* (TS), *Vipaṇcitārthā*]
- Kamalaśīla, his student  
  - [*Tattvasamgraha-paṇjikā* (*the Paṇjikā*)]
- *Nyāyabindu-pürvapakṣa-samksipta* (PPS)
- Aviddhakarṇa  
  - *Bhāṣyaṭikā* (lost), *Tattvaṭikā* (lost)
- Bhāvīvikta  
  - *Bhāṣyaṭikā* (lost), unnamed *Cārvākasūtra* commentary (lost)

### Semi-mythical authors

- (Akṣapāda) Gautama  
  - *Nyāya Sutras* (NS)
- Kaṇāda (Kāśyapa)  
  - *Vaiśeṣika Sutras* (VS)

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‘vidyātimirapatatrollekhanas tattvadarṣer vādanyāyah parabhitaranair eṣa sadbhiḥ praṇītaḥ / tattvālokam timirayati tām durvidagdho jano ’yam taṃmad yatnāḥ kṛṣṇa iha maṣṭa tatamujjvalaṇaḥ I/3/1 (VN 68.10). Śāntarakṣita characterizes this verse as an account for the necessity of a new treatise on this topic despite authoritative statements by Vasubandhu and Dīngha: “Wasn’t the way of the rules of debate made, in the *Vādavidbāna*, into a royal path by the teacher Vasubandhu, unfettered (*asīlbandha*) kinsman (*bandha*) of all the world? And then further trodden in the extensive *Nyāyaparīka* by the revered scholar Dīngha, who is skilled in splitting the necks of elephants (*mātaṅga = nāga*) drunk on the doctrines of fools? Why do you insist on chewing already chewed cud?" (*naṃ ca uṣāṃ vādanyāyamārgaḥ sakalalokāniḥbandhanabhāṇḍhunā vādavidbāṇādau acāryavacabandhanā vahānājanapahīkṣayā mantra ca taṃ maḥatyāṃ nyāyaparīkṣayām kumattalamattatamaṅgaśiṣṭāpātanapautubhir acāryadhināṅgopādāṁ tat kim idaṃ punaḥ carvita-caranam asabhītaṃ tvayetī. (VA 135.28)) Here, Śāntarakṣita does a bit of intellectual history, acknowledging Dīngha’s debt to Vasubandhu’s work while also noting the degree to which his work developed and supplanted it. Vasubandhu’s *Vādavidbha* has not survived intact, but only in quotations (in Tibetan translation) by Dīngha and Jīnendrabuddhi (cf. Frauwallner 1957; Anacker 1998, 31–48), but this impartial record suggests that Vasubandhu was responsible for many of the innovations often attributed to Dīngha (Anacker, 34). Much, following Frauwallner, takes Dīngha to be Uddyotakara’s chief Buddhist target (Much 1991, vol. 2, XIII). Uddyotakara clearly cites Vasubandhu, as well. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that the same is true for Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvīvikta.
Though more thinkers and texts than these will occasionally show up in the pages that follow, these should be kept most firmly in mind. (Some listed here authored additional texts; the list only includes works directly and consistently referenced in the present study, and is not meant to suggest prominence or eminence.) The reader should return to this list, or the table that precedes it, if names, titles, or abbreviations become confusing.\textsuperscript{119}

This elaborate intertextuality is rendered even more complicated by the texts themselves, each of which presents its own interpretive challenges. My interpretation of each fragment necessarily involves my interpretations of each of the other texts forming the imperfect web in which it is ensnared. There are few uncontested anchor points. And the fragments themselves only deepen the challenge. Aviddhakarṇa’s style—at least, as far as we can tell from the passages Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla choose to cite—is often dense and terse, loaded with references, presumptions, and implications, but offering few clues for dealing with them. The same is true for Bhāviviktā.

Though this adds to the challenge, it also suggests an interesting opportunity. Among the most intriguing things about these thinkers are their styles—their personalities. Indeed, each of these “thinkers” has his own range of idiosyncrasies, obsessions, feelings, aims. We need not get caught up in the problems of “authorial intent” to recognize a recurrence of sarcasm, impatience, or wit; a tendency toward the pedantic; evidence of haughtiness; the mark of a grouch. The material for our study is comprised of texts, but in those texts we encounter individuals in the midst of an elaborate choreography. When Śāntarakṣita cites Aviddhakarṇa, he is, among other things, creating an imaginary conversation and then participating in it. We can learn from these moments—not only what these thinkers were thinking, but also what they cared about, what bothered them, what excited

\textsuperscript{119} N.B., I alternate between referring to the author, the title of a work, or an abbreviation, depending on the context. This will create some difficulty for readers who are not already familiar with all of this material, but the other option—referring exclusively, e.g., to NBh, rather than to Vātsyāyana or “the Bhāṣya”—would create some strange, forced sentence structures. It is difficult to learn all of the names, titles, and abbreviations, but it can be even harder to make it through an awkward sentence. Besides, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla both refer sometimes to an author’s name, sometimes the title of a work, and even sometimes to a surname (e.g., Śāntarakṣita refers to Uddyotakara, to the “author of the Vārttika,” and to Bhāradvāja—all the same man). I hope the table and the “dramatis personae” will help readers become acquainted with any of these text traditions with which they are not yet familiar.
them, and what modes of reading their work demands.

The fact that Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta may be two names for the same man compels us to study their fragments alongside one another, both in order to compare and contrast them, and in order to get a fuller picture of the potential individual. The fact that they may well be different thinkers forces us to treat them separately rather than over-hastily collapse their separate works into one another’s. The fact that we cannot be sure one way or the other is the most interesting of all, because it pushes us not only to consider the two thinkers alongside one another, but to actively move between their potential identity and difference. If they are the same man, his is a singular biography (specifically regarding his focus on both Nyāya and Cārvāka); if not, their striking biographical and chronological similarities demand our attention. We must inhabit this space of uncertainty with as much flexibility as precision, with as much imagination as attention to detail.

Of course, should we someday discover a manuscript that is dispositive, such as a partial text of one of Bhāvivikta’s works in which he cites Aviddhakarṇa as a different thinker, we will proceed from there. But in the meantime, the historico-biographical reality does not really matter. Rather than seek to progress toward the “real” Bhāvivikta—which, as things stand, is nothing but an abstract idea—we can flesh out the imaginary Bhāviviktas who are really present in our contact with these texts. We cannot describe Bhāvivikta as being identical with or different from Aviddhakarṇa—but we can imagine both.

The present study is structured around translations of excerpts from nine chapters, along with the opening maṅgala, of the Tattvasamgraha:

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<th>TATTVASAMGRAHA</th>
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<td>3. Both</td>
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Included are the entirety of the second chapter on cosmology and the first section of the examination of the self, and excerpts from the defense of momentariness, several chapters concerning Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, and each of the three chapters on epistemology. The rest of the Tattvasamgraha will have to remain on the relative outskirts of our purview for the time being, though I describe and occasionally quote from the material we pass over.
As should be clear, this means that a lot of interesting and important material lies outside of the translation and study below, and yet, it also means that we are covering quite a lot of ground. Our organizing principle is simple: we include every passage in the Tattvasamgraha that elicits a citation of a fragment of Aviddhakarna or Bhavivikta in Kamalasila’s Pañjika. Most directly, this refers to verses in which Sāntarakṣita paraphrases or invokes the argument contained in one of the fragments. But this also includes Sāntarakṣita’s direct responses to these arguments. In some cases, Sāntarakṣita’s response is contained in one or a few short verses, and in other cases it stretches across dozens of verses. When I feel it helps to give the reader a sense of the style of the text, or important context surrounding the engagement with Aviddhakarna or Bhavivikta, I also include additional surrounding material. For example, I include the entirety of chapter two, and the entire section from chapter seven that concerns the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the self, both because Aviddhakarna features heavily in them, and because reading the entire chapters gives the reader a good sense for the flow of the text. After the translation of a particular chapter or section of the root text, we then hone in on specific moments in Kamalasila’s commentary.

Examining the fragments helps us better understand the nearly lost thinkers who authored them, their place in the early Nyāya and Cārvāka traditions, and their potential impact, whether as authors or as figures in the work of their Buddhist rivals, in the bustling interreligious intellectual milieu of classical Indian philosophy. But when we read their fragments, we are never really outside the (mostly) Buddhist texts that preserve them. This is an important thing to keep in mind in historicizing the fragments, but beyond the necessary caution, I urge my own readers to consider the opportunities. Aviddhakarna is a historical figure, but he is also what we might call a literary figure in the polyphonic atmosphere of Sāntarakṣita and Kamalasila’s texts. Learning more about the figure behind the fragments helps us better understand how the Buddhists construct the figure that features in their own works. The fact that his and Bhavivikta’s fragments are found throughout much of the first half of the Tattvasamgraha means that, in order to examine all of their fragments, we have to—we get to—move through all of that material together.

The reader should consult the Appendices as necessary. The fragments from the Vipaṅcitārthā and Pūrvaḥkārasamkṣipta are examined in Appendix A in the same manner as the fragments of the Pañjika. All of the fragments and reports of Aviddhakarna and Bhavivikta, including those outside the purview of the present study, are collected and translated in Appendix B. Appendix C is a detailed outline of the Nyāyasūtra; the various passages examined throughout the present study are emphasized in order to give the reader a sense for their broader context. Finally, Appendix D contains an edition of the selections of verses from the Tattvasamgraha that are translated below. All translations in the present study are original unless otherwise noted.

**Why Uncertainty**

In his triad of texts on the theory and practice of meditation (Bhāvanākrama, “Stages of Cultivation”), Kamalasila argues that the cultivation of wisdom requires an exhaustive, even obsessive, examination of all things (bhūta-pratyavekṣā, “the discernment of reality”). The ultimate

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120 As mentioned, Bhavivikta is not cited outside of Sāntarakṣita’s Vipaṅcitārthā and Kamalasila’s Pañjika, though the Naiyāyika Cakradhara refers to him. Aviddhakarna is cited or mentioned by several other thinkers, but the vast bulk of his fragments are found in the Pañjika. See Appendix B.

121 Cf. Adam 2002, which focuses largely on the various ways Kamalasila employs this term. The Bhāvanākrāmas,
result of such a practice is the direct encounter with the true nature of reality—omniscience. There is an infinite gap between, on the one hand, the grand scope of all of reality and, on the other, the fragments of two lost Naiyāyikas. Thankfully, my ambition does not extend to the same cosmic dimensions as Kamalaśīla’s. Yet I, too, have been, and continue to be, deeply inspired and moved by my own obsessive examination of this little corner of reality.

I want to suggest one more thing about the approach I am taking. Scholars of all stripes who turn their attention to the history of India know how precious evidence can be. We only know, for example, about Bhāvavikta’s Čārvāka affiliation from a single remark in a text that was only published for the first time half a century ago. It is important to endeavor an interpretation or an account when the opportunity presents itself. There is great risk in being too brazen or too fanciful in spinning out our tales; yet we cannot always seek safety in reserve. What I propose is not simply to avoid staking a claim, nor merely to say as much as I can up to the limit of uncertainty, but rather to stake uncertainty as my foundation.

Being uncertain, I get more from resting on the groundless ground of that uncertainty than I would by pretending to find firm footing or by claiming that no footing at all can be found. Take Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvavikta. We cannot say with any confidence whether he/they converted, or whether he/they commented on both Nyāya and Čārvāka for some other set of reasons; if they are the same individual, we still cannot safely regard all of their words as speaking to one and the same worldview. (Even if we were to take their side in the ātman debate!) If we were to accept with confidence that there is but one Aviddhakarṇa, we should still not presume to be able to link together the words of Aviddhakarṇa the Naiyāyika and Aviddhakarṇa the Čārvāka with certitude.

In the Tattvasamgraha, Śaṅkarṣita often puts forward a provisional thesis in order to demonstrate the reasons it cannot be true (i.e., the pūrvapakṣa). Implicitly, there is value in attempting to inhabit a worldview in which such a thesis would be true, and, so, in going through the process of picking it apart from within. Later, in the Madhyamakaloka, Śaṅkarṣita will more pointedly suggest that an idea, or a view, that is only partially correct can nevertheless be useful in bringing us closer to true understanding. I am not under the impression that I will ever really understand, for example, even such a small matter as the motivation behind Aviddhakarṇa’s Tattvāṭīkā. Not unlike Kamalaśīla, I strive while knowing my limitations, that I may come at least to know them with greater clarity.

especially the so-called third Bhūvanākrama, offers the clearest evidence that Kamalaśīla was aware of the views of Moheyan, the Chinese monk Kamalaśīla is supposed to have debated at Samye. At one point, after giving a dismissive description of an opposing view that resembles Moheyan’s, he says that anyone who believes such things goes against Mahāyāna—a stinging insult, if he knew his rival (Moheyan = Mahāyāna) by name. Cf. n 9–11.
Genre conventions, technical terms, and notes on the translations

Śāntarakṣita wrote the *Tattvasamgraha* in meter, but this is not a work of poetry. The so-called śloka meter was a common form for scholarly works; it gives the text a familiar and consistent shape. Rather than attempt to preserve non-poetic meter or ignore the meter but still print the translation with verse breaks, I have chosen a form that is as familiar in English as the śloka is in Sanskrit: paragraphs. The metrical form sometimes creates awkward and forced constructions, and Śāntarakṣita’s technical and at times terse language creates some interpretive challenges. The text is accessible, but not always particularly easy to read, and requires the reader’s active participation. This is, I think, as true of the translation as of the original. That said, when there is ambiguity, I attempt an interpretation and substantiate my decisions with notes and citations from the *Pañjikā*. Footnotes to the translations are intended for all readers but especially non-specialists. Translator’s notes are included now and then to give the reader a sense of some of the material that is not included in the translation.

One of the most consistently challenging aspects of works of philosophy in Sanskrit is simply keeping track of who is talking at any given moment. The most basic structure in such a work is the dialectic between the pūrvapakṣa and uttarapakṣa. Pakṣa means “side” or “position” (or the wing of a bird); pūrva and uttara mean “former” and “latter,” “lower” and “higher,” “first” and “ultimate.” The pūrvapakṣa, then, is the view of one’s opponent, real or imaginary, formulated as a prima facie view to be refuted; the uttarapakṣa is one’s response, which, of course, also happens to be the correct position from the author’s perspective. Within this clear-cut structure, there is room for flexibility. In some cases, Śāntarakṣita fully inhabits the pūrvapakṣa, articulating his opponents’ arguments as if they were his own. In other cases, he simply describes, or even merely implies, them. Sometimes rather than a single pūrva–uttara structure, there is a series of exchanges. And quite often, within what we might consider an uttarapakṣa, Śāntarakṣita will entertain brief objections from his opponents. Headings in the translations (e.g., “Nyāya arguments,” “Refutation”) are meant to clue the reader into who is speaking at any given moment. These headings, along with punctuation and sentence and paragraph breaks, are all my own, and are meant to guide and orient the reader.
The passive voice, though rarified in English, is ubiquitous in Sanskrit. I often render passive constructions into the active voice in English. In the opening maṅgala of the text, the words ayam kriyate tattvasamgrahah, “this Tattvasamgraha is composed,” becomes “I compose this Tattvasamgraha.” More commonly, I use the first person plural, the “royal we,” when Śāntarakṣita is speaking not of his own composition, but on behalf of what he considers the orthodox view. Depending on who is speaking and how, I alternate between first, second, and third person pronouns for the sake of clarity and to clarify my own interpretations. When Śāntarakṣita is describing his opponents’ views, he speaks of them in the third person; when he is attacking or interrogating them, the second; when inhabiting their view, the first. This is often true in the original text, but Śāntarakṣita uses actual first and second person forms less frequently.

Finally, it will be helpful to discuss some of the most common technical terms and concepts that come up throughout the translation and study. The most important and recurrent technical terms all relate to the discourse around pramāṇa, “means of knowledge.” In particular, the reader should be aware of the basic structure of an inferential argument (anumāna), and the characteristics that, according to Śāntarakṣita, distinguish a valid and an invalid argument. We have already considered some of these concepts in the Introduction (cf. “Debates about Debate”), but it is worth emphasizing Śāntarakṣita’s scholastic understanding of debate and argumentation. Readers who are as-yet unfamiliar with these terms will, I hope, find this quick survey helpful, but some may also find it overwhelming. In the latter case, readers should feel free to skim this section and return to it when the need arises.

A common example of a valid argument is as follows:

1. “Where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen.”

2. “And there is smoke on the mountain.”

According to the Buddhist epistemologists, these two statements suffice to prove the point. There is no need for a separate statement of the proposition/conclusion, “There is fire on the mountain.” In fact, if the two statements above do not generate the realization that there is fire on the mountain, simply saying so is not likely to have that effect.

Still—as Śāntarakṣita says in verse 1434—in a scholarly work like this, we can separate out various elements of this argument for the sake of discourse. First, the basic building blocks of the argument are: (i) the locus or subject (pakṣa), or property-possessor (dharmin), of the argument, i.e., the mountain; (ii) the property to be proven (sādhyā), the fire; and (iii) the reason (hetu), or the mark (liṅga) or proving property (sādhana), i.e., the smoke. To use the more common way of formulating the argument above, “There is fire (property to be proven) on the mountain (subject) because there is smoke there (reason).”

But how do we know that the reason proves the property to be proven? This is where the example (drṣṭānta) comes into play. According to Nyāya, an example can either be similar or dissimilar, but, as we know, Vasubandhu and Dignāga argue that every valid reason bears a particular relationship to both similar and dissimilar examples. A similar case (sapakṣa) is a property-possessor that is known to have the property to be proven, e.g., there is fire in a(n in-use) kitchen. A dissimilar case (vipakṣa) is any property-possessor known not to have the property to be proven, e.g., a lake.
There are a variety of technical terms surrounding the relationships between the reason and the subject, similar case, and dissimilar case. The reason is valid if it fulfills three characteristics (trirūpa): First, it must be a property of the subject, i.e., there must really be smoke on the mountain. This is called paksadharmatā, “being a property of the subject.” Statement (2) above is the statement of paksadharmatā. Second, the reason must be a property of at least some similar case; a kitchen is, indeed, smoky. This is called “positive concomitance” (anvaya), as in, “wherever there is smoke, there is fire.” Third, the reason must not be a property of any dissimilar cases; there is never smoke in a lake, nor anywhere else absent of fire. This is called “negative concomitance” (vyatireka), i.e., “where there is no fire, there is no smoke.” Taken together, positive and negative concomitance demonstrate the invariable relation (avinābhāva), or the relationship of pervasion (vyāpti), between the reason and the property to be proven. Smoke, one could say, is pervaded by fire. (Fire need not be pervaded by smoke—an instance of fire without smoke would not undermine pervasion in the argument we are considering, but only an effort to prove that there is smoke on the basis of fire.) Statement (1) above is the statement of pervasion.

According to Dharmakīrti, there are two fundamental kinds of invariable relation: identity (tādātmya) and causality (tadutpatti). This is a pivotal insight, as these two relations render inference a deductive rather than inductive process. Śāntarakṣita returns to this pair again and again. Being-a-tree is intrinsic to being-a-redwood, so if one can prove that a particular plant is a redwood, then one can prove on that basis that it is a tree. If one can establish this sort of innate relation, then it can serve as the basis for establishing pervasion. And as we have seen, it is also possible to establish pervasion on the basis of causality: fire causes smoke, therefore smoke is pervaded by fire, and we can infer the existence of fire from the presence of smoke.

There are many ways, on the other hand, for an argument to fail. There are three main varieties of fallacious reason (hetv-ābhāsa): unestablished (asiddha), which most basically means that it itself has yet to be proven; inconclusive (anaikāntika), or deviating (savyabhicāra), which generally means that it does not have the right relationships with the similar and/or dissimilar cases; or contrary (viruddha), which includes any kind of contradiction with the subject or the property to be proven. There are various species of each (some of which can be described or identified in more ways than one). For example, a particular species of “unestablished” reason: If a theist argues against a non-theist, “God is perfect because he is eternal,” the non-theist could reply, “You haven’t proven that God exists yet!” One could say that the subject of the argument, God, is unestablished. But Śāntarakṣita typically prefers to describe defects in terms of the reason, and in the present case he might say that the reason, i.e., “because of being eternal,” is “unestablished in its substratum” (āśraya-asiddha). This means that God, the subject of the argument and so the purported substratum of eternity, is himself unestablished.

There are many more technical terms than these that pop up here and there, but this, I think, gives the reader a sufficient backdrop to follow the discussions that follow. When new terms, or specific variations on the terms above, show up in the translation, I explain them in footnotes. My hope is that this kind of language will gradually become more familiar as the reader moves through the translations and analyses that follow.

We begin with the opening words of the Tattvasamgraha, which guide the reader’s engagement with the entire work.
Maṅgala

That which is free from the activity of prakṛti, Īśvara, the two together, the self, etc.; is in flux; is the basis for the constancy of the relation between actions and their fruits; is empty of the conditions that are quality, substance, action, universal, inherence, etc.; is the referent of words and cognitions as superimposed images; is ascertained by the two means of knowledge, which are endowed with clear definitions; does not consist of anything that has come to be mixed even in the slightest; does not pass over; is without beginning or end; is like a reflection, and the like; is free from the mass of all proliferations; and is not understood by others—such is dependent origination, which the foremost of teachers taught, without clinging to independent scriptures, and after habituating great compassion over many countless eons out of his desire to benefit the world. Bowing to that omniscient one, I compose this, the Collection of Truths. (1–6)\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{122} Throughout the translations of the root text, these are the verse numbers of the Tattvasaṃgraha. The Sanskrit text of this and every such translation is found in Appendix D.
§0. THE OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE TATTVASAMGRAHA

As many scholars have noted before, Śāntarakṣita provides a basic outline of the Tattvasamgraha in his maṅgala, i.e., the six verses that comprise the opening benediction of the text.123

123 These are probably the most commonly translated verses in the entire text. Ganganatha Jha, Sara McClintock, and Christian Coseru have all chosen, in their renderings, to alter the syntax to make the sentence more comprehensible. Matthew Kapstein follows the original syntax. Śāntarakṣita opens with four verses listing a series of attributes in the accusative case, and then in the fifth verses he reveals that the direct object to which they correspond is dependent origination (also in the accusative), that the subject of the sentence is the Buddha (the “foremost of teachers”), and that the verbal connection between these two is that the Buddha “taught” dependent origination. Then, in the final words of the maṅgala, Śāntarakṣita, after bowing to the Buddha, states that he has composed the Tattvasamgraha. Rather than following this sequence, Jha, McClintock, and Coseru all open with the composition of the text and close with the characteristics of dependent origination. First, Jha, indicating verse numbers in parentheses, offers this rendering:

This Tattvasamgraha, ‘Compendium of True Doctrines,’ is being composed after bowing to that Omniscient Person, the greatest of expounders, who, with a view to bringing about the welfare of the world,—propounded the Doctrine of the ‘Wheel of Intervolved Causation,—independently of any self-sufficient revelation, supreme mercy having entered into His very soul through long innumerable cycles.—(5–6)—This ‘Wheel of Causation’ is free from all notions of the functioning of any such cause as ‘Primordial Matter,’ —‘God,’ —both of these (Primordial Matter and God). —Soul,—and other such entities (postulated by Philosophers); —it is mobile; —it is the basis of all such notions as ‘Karma’ (Actions, good and bad), the fruits of acts, the connection between these two. —(1)—It is devoid of all such concepts as ‘Quality,’ ‘Substance,’ ‘Movement,’ ‘Universal,’ ‘Inherence,’ and so on; —it is amenable to ‘words’ and ‘cognitions’ only in an assumed (superimposed) form.—(2)—It is definitely cognised by means of two clearly defined Means of Cognition; it is not mixed up with the nature of anything else, even in the slightest degree.—(3)—It admits of no translocation; it is without beginning and without end; it is like a reflected image and other such things; it is absolutely free from the whole lot of fantasies; it has not been apprehended by others.—(4). (Jha 1937, 1–2)

Here is McClintock’s version:

I compose this Tattvasamgraha, having bowed to that omniscient one, who is the best of speakers, who does not depend on an autonomous scripture, who through his desire to benefit the world, inculcated a nature of great compassion throughout many innumerable ages, [and] who proclaimed the dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda) that others do not understand and that is free from the operations (sāyāpāra) of primordial nature (prārthi), God, both [primordial nature and God], self (atman) and so on; that is in flux (cāla); that is the basis for the postulation of the relation between actions (karman) and their effects and so on; that is devoid of the attributes (upādhi) of quality (guṇa), substance (dravya), action (kriya), universal (jāti), inherence (saṃsvāya), and so forth; that is the object of words and cognitions with superimposed images; that is ascertained by the two trustworthy awarenesses (pramāṇa) whose definitions are clear and whose nature is not mixed with even the tiniest part of anything else; that is not [temporally] concatenated (asaṃkṛānta); that has neither beginning nor end; that is like a reflection and so forth; [and] that is entirely free from the mass of conceptual elaborations. (McClintock 2010, 98)

And Coseru’s translation is as follows:

This Compendium of True Principles is composed after having bowed to that all-knowing one, who is the best of speakers, who does not rely on an independent scripture, who, in wishing for the welfare of the world, developed great compassion over innumerable eons, [and] proposed the doctrine of dependent arising, which is difficult to understand, in that it bears no relation to causes such as primordial nature, the divine, both [the divine and primordial nature], the self, and other entities; which is transitory; which is the ground on the basis of which actions, their results, and the connection between the two is postulated; which is devoid of superimposed attributes such as quality, substance, action, genus, inherence, and so forth; which is the object of words and cognitions only [insofar as they operate] as superimposed attributes; which is cognized by the two clearly defined sources of knowledge; whose nature is not mixed with anything else in the slightest degree; which is not intercalated; which has no beginning and no end; which is like a reflected image and other similar things; [and] which is free from conceptual elaborations. (Coseru 2012, 126)
In essence, all six verses amount to two simple sentences: “The foremost of teachers taught dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda); bowing to that omniscient one (sarvajña), I compose the Tattvasaṃgraha.” Even reduced to this simple formulation, these two sentences provide a basic statement of the topic and purpose of the overall treatise, and pay homage to the Buddha. But the first of these two sentences includes an intricate series of qualifications of dependent origination, each of which corresponds to one of, or one grouping of, the first twenty-three chapters of the text, in sequence. The first sentence also includes several additional descriptions of the Buddha, such as his great compassion, and the fact that he “did not rely on independent scriptures” (svatantra-śrutinihṣaṅga). The latter quality anticipates chapters 24 and 25, which concern core doctrines of the Mīmāṁśa tradition. The description of the Buddha as “omniscient” at the end of the maṅgala anticipates the final chapter, chapter 26, concerning, naturally enough, the Buddha’s omniscience.

This table shows the manner in which the opening six verses anticipate the twenty-six chapters of the text. In the left column are the individual attributes of dependent origination and the Buddha, and in the right column are the titles of the corresponding chapters of the text:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent origination is:</th>
<th>Chapter number and title [number of verses]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free from the activity of prakṛti, Īśvara, both, the self, etc. (prakṛti-īśa-ubhaya-ātma-ādi-vyāpāra-rabita)</td>
<td>1. Examination of Prakṛti [39]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Examination of Īśvara [48]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. “ ” both (in concert) [16]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. “ ” the theory of a spontaneous world [18]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Brahman the word [24] [25]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Puruṣa (miscellaneous creation theories) [18]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. The self [179]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Permanence [126]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluctuating (cala)</td>
<td>9. The relation between actions and their results [70]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The basis for the constancy of the relation between actions and their fruits (karma-tatphala-sambandha-vyavasthā-samāśraya)</td>
<td>10. Substance [87]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Quality [58]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Action [16]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empty of the conditions that are substance, quality, action, universal, particular, and inherence (guna-dravya-kriya-jāti-samāvaya-ādy-upādhibhibh śānya)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In different ways, all three of these scholars, especially McClintock and Coseru, emphasize the ingenuity and precision that went into the sequence of these six verses. Suffice it to say, though the reader benefits from an explanation of the logic of this sequence, I do not think the sequence has to be destroyed in order to render the verses in a comprehensible manner.

Kapstein’s translation follows the original syntax and in that way comports more closely with my rendering:

Movement devoid of prime matter, a divine creator, their conjunction, self and similar constructions; / Ground for the deed and its fruit, their relationship, ascertainment and such; / Empty with respect to quality, substance, function, genus, inherence and other superimposed categories, / But within the scope of words and concepts relating to posited features; / Ascertained by the two epistemic operations possessing distinct characteristics; / Unmixed with so much as even a mote of extraneous nature; / Without temporal extension, without beginning or end, like unto reflections and so on; / Free from the whole mass of conceptual projections, unrealized by other [teachers]— / This interdependent arising was propounded by the best of proponents, / Who was unattached to self-justifying revelations, and moved to benefit the whole world; / Who throughout no fewer than numberless aeons became the very self of compassion; / Having bowed before him, the Omniscient, I gather here the tatvatas. (Kapstein 2001, 11).

124 Every chapter is titled the “Examination of” (parīkṣā) the particular topic in question.
125 Sāntarakṣita names five categories out of their usual order, alluding to the sixth with the term -ādī, but it is
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• That onto which the scope of words and cognitions about form are imposed (āropita-ākāra-śabda-pratyaya-gocara)</td>
<td>16. The meaning of words [346]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ascertained by the two means of knowledge, which are endowed with clear definitions (spaṣṭa-lakṣaṇa-samyukt-pramā-dvitya-nīcita)</td>
<td>17. The definition of perception [149]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Not consisting of anything that has come to be mixed even in the slightest (anīyāśa ‘pi nāmīcena misribhūta-aparanātma)</td>
<td>18. Inference [125]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Not passing over (asamkrānti)</td>
<td>19. Other means of knowledge [222]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Without beginning or end (anādyanta)</td>
<td>20. Śyādvāda (Jain standpoint theory) [77]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Like a reflection, etc. (pratibimbā-ādi-sambhā)</td>
<td>21. The three times (Sāravastivāda Buddhism) [71]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Buddha (compassionate, foremost of teachers):</strong></td>
<td>22. Lokāyata (Cārvāka materialism) [108]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does not cling to independent scriptures (svatantra-śruti-nibānga)</td>
<td>23. External things (Yogācāra idealism) [120]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is omniscient (sarvajña)</td>
<td>24. Śruti [726]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25. Intrinsic authority [313]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26. Persons with supersensory vision [523]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

There is a certain logic to dividing the text this way, and it conforms to the titles Kamalaśīla gives to each of the twenty-six chapters. But simply listing the twenty-six does not provide a clear enough sense of the structure of the whole.

Several scholars have discussed the way the opening verses map onto the work as a whole, and the light they shed on the text’s philosophical or didactic orientation. For example, McClintock emphasizes the degree to which these verses parallel the opening of Nāgārjuna’s Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā. (A point Kapstein highlights, as well.) This suggests that the work is oriented on the Madhyamaka philosophical lineage typically credited to Nāgārjuna, even though the Tattvasamgraha as a whole offers relatively little Madhyamaka-style analysis. In terms of the structure of the work, McClintock takes the two aspects of the opening sentence, the qualifications of dependent origination and those of the Buddha, to indicate that the text itself is roughly divisible into two.

“Once we have discerned this twofold structure of the work through a study of the opening verses,” she explains, “we can more easily recognize that the two sections of the work serve different purposes. That is, the greater part of the work concerns the nature of reality, and it moves quite clearly from a critique of gross misunderstandings to more subtle ones.”

She also argues that the text moves roughly from ontological matters to epistemological ones, shifting in the sixteenth chapter, which concerns theory of language. The strongest point in this claim is that chapter 23, which, in McClintock’s reading, marks the final chapter in the first part of the work, concerns the idealist Yogācāra position, “the highest explicit level of analysis in the work.” From here, the final three chapters “involve a conscious stepping back from the Yogācāra perspective and a general re-

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unambiguously that he is referring to this standard list of six.

126 McClintock 2010, 97.

127 McClintock 2010, 100.
adoption, for the purposes of persuasion, of the less controversial Sautrāntika system.”128 For this reason, McClintock goes so far as to say that the final three chapters can be read as a kind of appendix to the body of the work as a whole.

Taking Ratié’s point129 about the systematicity of the text as seriously as I think we should, this division is not entirely satisfying. I am not sure, to take a random example, that the miscellaneous “other means of knowledge” that concern the final portion of chapter 19 really represent more subtle misunderstandings than, e.g., the illusion of the self (chapter 7), which Buddhist theory broadly considers the most fundamental of human misunderstandings, and the most difficult to remedy. In addition, we can find arguments oriented on ontology, epistemology, theory of language, and so on, scattered throughout most of the chapters in the text. The authority and omniscience of the Buddha, as McClintock is careful to highlight, comes up as a rhetorical and logical point of emphasis at various points throughout. The precise arguments one employs must shift in accordance with the system of one’s interlocutor, but the orienting factor remains the same: the Buddha’s teaching of dependent origination is supreme; it enables one to disprove all erroneous views; it accounts for the nature of reality and experience better than any other theories; it does so with simultaneously more rigor and more elegance; it inspires and deserves faith and confidence; and it uniquely leads to enlightenment. The fact that the opening statement comprises a single sentence, rather than a sentence about dependent origination and a separate one about the Buddha, is itself instructive. It is not merely dependent origination in a vacuum, but precisely the Buddha’s teaching of dependent origination that serves as both an example and an expedient for those interested in the height of spiritual attainment.

We should bear in mind the division between the roughly half of the text ostensibly devoted to the characteristics of dependent origination and that devoted to the Buddha, but dividing the text in half does not greatly clarify the logic of its internal structure. In addition, if we follow Śāntarakṣita’s opening verses carefully, we find a more nuanced division of the text:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent origination is:</th>
<th>General topic (corresponding chapter numbers):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free from the activity of prakṛti, Isvara, both, the self, etc.;</td>
<td>Critique of various metaphysics of creation and experience (chs. 1–7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluctuating;</td>
<td>Defense of momentariness theory (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The basis for the constancy of the relation between actions and their fruits;</td>
<td>Account of causality (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empty of the conditions that are substance, quality, action, universal, particular, and inherence;</td>
<td>Critique of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology (10–15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>That onto which the scope of words and cognitions about form are imposed;</td>
<td>Theory of Language (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascertained by the two means of knowledge, which are endowed with clear definitions;</td>
<td>Epistemology (17–19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not consisting of anything that has come to be mixed even in the slightest;</td>
<td>Critique of Jain standpoint theory (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not passing over;</td>
<td>Critique of Sarvāstivāda (21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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128 McClintock 2010, 97.
129 Cf. n 36, for example.
Without beginning or end;                  Critique of Lokāyata (Cārvāka) (22)
Like a reflection, or the like.               Defense of Viśṇunāvāda (23)

**Dependent origination is taught by someone who:**

| Does not depend on independent scriptures; | Critique of Mīmāṃsā (24–25) |
| Is omniscient.                            | Defense of the Buddha’s omniscience (26) |

In this reading, rather than mapping discrete chapters onto the attributes of dependent origination, we group together the sections of chapters that correspond to each discrete attribute mentioned in the opening verses. The first attribute, “free from the activity of prakṛti, Īśvara, both, the self, etc.,” does not just anticipate seven discrete chapters, but the section of the text comprised of those chapters. We can take this a step further by further grouping together chapters that correspond in an important sense: chapters 8 and 9 both concern aspects of the Buddhist account that serves in place of the metaphysical theories of chapters 1–7; chapters 20–23 all concern distinctive teachings from specific traditions that do not fall within any of the earlier categories. This leaves us with the following outline of the text as a whole:

I. Opposing metaphysics [total verses: 349]
   a. Cosmological theories
   b. Theories of the self
II. Buddhist metaphysics [196]
   a. Momentariness theory
   b. Causality
III. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology [320]
IV. Theory of language [346]
V. Epistemology [496]
VI. Miscellany [376]
   a. Jainism
   b. Sarvāstivāda
   c. Cārvāka
   d. Viśṇunāvāda
VII. Mīmāṃsā theory [1039]
VIII. The omniscience of the Buddha

This rightly leaves us with the impression that the two most important opposing traditions in the text are Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Each is given its own dedicated set of chapters, especially lengthy in the case of Mīmāṃsā. Traditions like Jainism or Cārvāka each has a distinctive enough theory that it has to be dealt with separately, and is occasionally raised under the umbrella categories of theories of the self, epistemology, and so on; yet they do not receive anywhere near as exhaustive a treatment as Mīmāṃsā, and especially Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, or, secondarily, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

This outline also emphasizes the fluid nature of the text. Rather than a simple movement up a ladder, or a division into discrete kinds of topics or discrete traditions, the text moves according to a different logic. It will take more time to think through all of Śāntarakṣita’s structural decisions, but,

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130 The entire text has a dialogic structure, and Śāntarakṣita presents the final chapter, concerning the omniscience of the Buddha, as a continuation of the dispute with Mīmāṃsā from the lengthy chapters 24 and 25.
following Kamalaśīla’s lead, I would argue that the text moves in a dialogical manner. Put differently, we might say that it moves according to the logic of dependent origination. Topics, voices, and arguments arise in dependence on the material that precedes and informs them, not in a simplistic causal chain, but rather like the intricate causal complex surrounding the sprouting of seeds. Śāntarakṣita shapes the dialogue—but he also participates in it. His own movement throughout the text responds to the cacophony of voices pushing the discussion forward. Note the transitional verses that open chapters 8 and 10, for example. After seven chapters, and almost 350 verses, dedicated to refuting a series of metaphysical theories, Śāntarakṣita says this:

Perhaps we are making this effort toward unworthy subjects, since prakṛti and so on are refuted by a proof of momentariness. Hence, we will establish momentariness clearly in order to refute what we have already mentioned as well as what we will discuss later, universals, etc., without distinction. (350–351)\(^{131}\)

In other words, after entertaining the views of Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Śāmkhya, and several other traditions on cosmology and the nature of the self, Śāntarakṣita defends the doctrine that disproves all of them. If every entity is momentary, which is to say perishes immediately upon arising, then notions of permanent, or even merely enduring, creators or agents of experience are simply untenable. But then, around 200 verses later, after proving momentariness and explaining the corresponding account of causality, Śāntarakṣita says this:

With nothing but scripture, the followers of Aksapāda and Kaṇāda\(^{132}\) say: “We proclaimed earlier that universals, etc., cannot be devoid of essence; the six categories, substance, etc., really exist.”

Therefore, we briefly convey the refutation of substance, and so on. (546–547)\(^{133}\)

Even though, according to Śāntarakṣita, it should be needless to say anything more about notions already disproved by momentariness, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas are dogmatically fixated on their ontological categories. Hence, the conversation must continue. Note the casual insult that opens this remark: “with nothing but scripture.” Scriptural authority is a powerful force, and, for some, is more deeply compelling than mere logical reasoning. The conversation continues from there. While examining the six categories, Śāntarakṣita increasingly refers to our conceptual imposition of shared conventions. This leads naturally into the “Examination of the Meaning of Words,” and a confrontation with the major theories of language opposed to Buddhist “exclusion” (apoha) theory.

We do not have to impose a fixed and simple structure, or one corresponding in some sense to philosophical surveys of Euro-American philosophy, to recognize the way the text as a whole moves. When creating an enumerative compound in Sanskrit (a + b + c), authors are typically expected to start with shorter words and gradually move to longer ones, or to start or end with the most eminent term or the chronologically prior or posterior person in a group; barring such strictures, they can follow whatever other aesthetic rationale they prefer. Dependent origination is arguably the core Buddhist teaching, the most robust analysis of reality and experience, and the most broadly

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131 atha vā ‘sthāna evāyaṃ āyāsah kriyate yataḥ | kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasiddhyaiḥ prakṛtyādī nirākṛtam ||350|| uktasya vākyamānasya jātyādeś cāviśeṣataḥ | niśedhāya tataḥ spāṣṭaṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgah prasādhyate ||351|| (TS 166).

132 This refers to Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, respectively, as Kamalaśīla notes.

133 jātyādeś niśvabhāvantam ayuktaṃ prāk kāśāśiṣtaṃ | dravyādaṃ śadārthāḥ ye vidyante pāramārthikāḥ ||546|| ity āksapādakāṇḍāḥ prāhuḥ āgamāmātrakaḥ | dravyādipratisēdho ’yam saṃśeṣeṇā tad ucyate ||547|| (TS 231, J27v.3).
efficacious in impelling the practitioner towards enlightenment. Strictly speaking, any number of structures oriented on various aspects of dependent origination could have worked. What is most important is that we see that the text functions as a coherent yet fluid whole.
We begin the work proper, as Śāntarakṣita does, with cosmology.

After the maṅgala, the first words of the Tattvasaṃgraha are:

Different effects, such as they are,134 come forth from, and have as their intrinsic form, nothing but (kevala) the primordial (pradhāna) alone (eva), in which every potency is contained. (7)135

This is a slightly jarring transition. The very first words of the maṅgala, and so of the text as a whole, state that dependent origination is “free from the primordial (prakṛti).” Clearly Śāntarakṣita is no longer speaking in his own voice, but inhabiting the view of a proponent of the Śāmkhya philosophy. According to Śāmkhya, the transient constituents of the universe emerge as a series of transformations (pariṇāma) of “the primordial” (prakṛti or pradhāna), and are ultimately reducible to it.

This verse marks the beginning of the first chapter of the Tattvasaṃgraha, the “Examination of Īśvara,” Śāntarakṣita inhabits the Śāmkhya view for nine verses and then closes his first pūrvapakṣa with the words “thus say followers of Kapila” (iti kāpilāḥ), i.e., Śāmkhyas.

The first several chapters of the Tattvasaṃgraha concern cosmological and theological theories. We are most concerned with the second chapter, the “Examination of Īśvara,” on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theism. Readers more versed in Buddhist thought than Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika may find the proceeding unit on the self more familiar than this one. But it is essential to consider the way the Tattvasaṃgraha begins and to look closely at the breadth of its engagement with Nyāya. In addition, Aviddhakarṇa’s theistic arguments, which we will examine below, are pivotal to understanding his work. They are difficult arguments—especially the first, Av6—but they shed a lot of light on

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134 More coarsely, “according to condition” or “due to existence.” Kamalaśīla offers two explanations: though they are ultimately identical with the primordial, nevertheless it is accurate to describe them separately because they each result from a particular transformation or their intrinsic condition, i.e., their particular arrangement of sattva, rajas, and tamas, determines apparent differences between them. In either sense, “due to existence” or “according to condition,” etc., means that they are “different” (bheda) in a sense. Hence, “such as they are.”

135 aśeṣaṃaktipratiḥ pradhānād eva kevalāḥ | kaṟyabhedaḥ pravartante tadrūpā eva bhāvataḥ ||7|| (TS 20)
Aviddhakarṇa’s argumentative and rhetorical style, metaphysical commitments, and conversation partners.

Before turning to Īśvara, a quick summary of the “Examination of Prakṛti” is needed.

To begin with, it is worth noting that, for Sāṃkhya, the primordial is utterly separate from the sentient witnessing agent (puruṣa), i.e., the self. The intellect, buddhi, is not concomitant with puruṣa, but is in fact the first evolute of prakṛti. Self-consciousness (ahāmkāra) and various other aspects of cognition are modifications of buddhi, and so, ultimately, of the primordial rather than the self, which remains an unchanged and unchanging witness. But puruṣa confuses itself with the elaborate unfolding of prakṛti that it witnesses. The diversity of the manifest universe, and of an individual’s experience of it, are the results of this cosmic confusion.

Since all of the constituents of the universe (apart from puruṣa, which stands on its own) are ultimately reducible to prakṛti, effects must already exist in a latent form in their cause. This is commonly called sat-kārāvāda (doctrine of the existent effect) or parināma-vāda (doctrine of transformations, i.e., the view that an effect is but a transformation or modification of the cause, rather than a new creation). The proponent of Sāṃkhya in the Tattvasaṃgraha substantiates this view with five reasons, which, Kamalāśila explains, derive from Sāṃkhya-kārikā 9: “the effect exists because: there is no production of what is non-existent; we grasp material causes; not everything is possible; the potential is produced by the potent; and the cause exists.”

After closing the pūrva-pākṣa in verse 15, Śaṅkarācārya launches his refutation of the Sāṃkhya view with a cheeky remark:

Concerning this, the wise (sudhī) say the same as an objection against the existence [of the effect].
Your (vah) response to that would be the same for the wise, too. (16)

In other words, Buddhist thinkers (“the wise”) can simply restate Sāṃkhya-kārikā 9 as a refutation of the very claim the “followers of Kapila” had intended to prove. The details of the dispute are outside our present purview, but the basic point is that the Sāṃkhya argument is inconclusive at best, and entirely self-destructive at worst.

Unsurprisingly, it is the doctrine that the effect pre-exists in the cause that most occupies Śaṅkarācārya’s attention in this opening chapter. If an effect already exists, there is nothing for its cause to cause; it ceases to be an effect, and its cause ceases to be a cause. If its existence is hidden or concealed and requires some additional factor (atiśaya) to make it manifest, is this additional factor also already latent in prakṛti? If so, the same problem arises; if not, then how does Sāṃkhya account for this additional something beyond prakṛti and puruṣa?

Sāṃkhya eventually comes to hold that there are infinite selves (puruṣa, ātman) in order to account for the division between the bodies, etc., that we each illusorily experience ourselves as being or having. Ultimately, puruṣa is sentient without being an agent of action (akārtri); yet prakṛti, which is, of course, quite active, has no sentence, and moves purely for puruṣa’s benefit. (Cf. Hulin 1978.) It should perhaps be no surprise that puruṣa is also the word for a man (as in, male) and that prakṛti (nature, source) is a feminine noun.

Asadakaranād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavabhāvāt | saktasya sākyakaranat kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam ||9|| (Esnoul, 14).

Tad atra sudhiyāḥ prāhū tulyā satve ‘pi codanā | yat tasyām uttaraṁ vaḥ śyāt tat tulyaṁ sudhiyāṁ api ||16|| (TS 28).
Notably, Śāntarakṣita does not appear to engage with any particular theorists in the “Examination of Prakṛti.” Kamalaśīla mentions only Ṣivaракṛṣṇa, the semi-mythic author of the Śaṁkhya-kārikā. In Śāntarakṣita’s rational reconstruction, Śaṁkhya appears almost as a hypothetical position, a point of reference for the ensuing discussion.

In the second chapter of the Tattvasamgraha, the “Examination of Ṣiva,” Śāntarakṣita turns to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theism. This is a natural transition. Śaṁkhya’s cosmology is strictly non-theistic. In fact, Kamalaśīla says that the double emphasis of the phrase “nothing but the primordial alone” in verse 7 is meant to highlight this dichotomy. That is to say, the very first words of the pūrvapakṣa of chapter one already anticipate the response from the pūrvapakṣa of chapter two. The proponent of Śaṁkhya is not only engaged in a debate with Śāntarakṣita, but with Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, as well.

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika theisms differ fundamentally from Śaṁkhya in two key respects. First, there is the division between the parināma-vāda of Śaṁkhya and the āramba-vāda (doctrine of generation) of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Śaṁkhya claims that the worlds, and the bodies, of the universe are all ultimately identical with prakṛti, of which they are but a series of transformations (parināma), whereas Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika claim that genuinely new substances, distinct from their material causes, are generated (āramba).

Second, in Śaṁkhya the process is impersonal; the only role of sentience in creation is as an unwitting witness. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, credit an omniscient sentient agent with the intentional creation of the universe. Specifically, Nyāya theology holds that the creator god, Ṣiva, manipulates atoms and karmic merit (dharma), which are otherwise inert, into the shape of the universe, its worlds and its inhabitants. He is the efficient cause, the craftsman and overseer, the cosmic potter. Unsurprisingly, some Naiyāyikas, like Aviddhakarṇa, infer his existence on the basis of design.

In the “Examination of Ṣiva,” after very briefly describing Nyāya theism, Śāntarakṣita again begins by inhabiting the view of his opponents, stating a series of arguments as if they were his own. Kamalaśīla tells us that the first two arguments were originally composed by Aviddhakarṇa. Śāntarakṣita devotes most of the remainder of the chapter to refuting the first of these, “Av6,” Aviddhakarṇa’s first theistic argument.

The entirety of the “Examination of Ṣiva” is translated below. It is not easy material. We are most immediately concerned with the first two arguments of the pūrvapakṣa, and the reader should feel free to skim much of the rest of the chapter and/or return to it after reading the analysis that follows.
TRANSLATION

CHAPTER TWO
EXAMINATION OF ĪŚVARA

Introduction
There are some who claim that God is the cause of everything that has an origin.

Nyāya theistic arguments

As is known, what is insentient does not generate its effects on its own. (46)

(i) A substantial whole, which is something with a particular arrangement of parts that are its inhering causes, can only be understood in terms of an intelligent agent. The locus of debate, i.e., such a thing that is graspable by the two sense faculties, sight and touch, or ungraspable, is preceded by an intelligent agent, like a pot, unlike atoms, etc. (47–48)

(ii) The material causes of bodies, etc., are seen to produce their respective effects insofar as they are presided over by a sentient agent, because they possess color, etc., like threads, etc. (49)

(iii) Merit, demerit, and atoms, all generate their respective effects insofar as they are governed by a sentient agent, because they act after having been immobile, like a shuttle and thread. (50)

(iv) Further, at the beginning of creation, the conventional discourse (vyavahāra) of men is generated by the instruction of another, because it is restricted for those who are informed, like the conventional discourse of the young. (51)

(v) It is distinctly the case that the great elements, etc., are governed by an intelligent cause in their becoming the causes of pleasure and pain for all the world, because they are insentient, because

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139 Section headings, throughout the translations, are my own.
140 This is one of the more difficult pairs of verses in the selected translation, which is unsurprising, because with these verses Sāntarakṣita paraphrases one of the most difficult of Aviddhakarṇa’s fragments (Av6, §1). The gist is that the structure of things like trees and bodies entails intelligent creation, not unlike Paley’s famous watchmaker argument.

“Inhering causes” are, in this case, things like threads, clay, or atoms. According to Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika ontology, a substantial whole, such as a cloth or a pot, “inheres in” its component parts. This means the existence of the cloth is inseparable from its relation to the threads. When the “conjunctions” between the different threads ceases, the threads continue to exist; but when the “inherence” of the cloth “in” the threads ceases, the cloth disappears. Aviddhakarṇa is arguing that just as threads do not spontaneously arrange themselves into cloths, nor do atoms, bodies.

“Graspable by the two sense faculties or ungraspable” is an elliptical reference to the nine substances of Vaiṣeṣika ontology. Most importantly, the idea that a single thing can be both seen and touched is pivotal to the Nyāya worldview (e.g., NS 3.1.1) but anathema to Sāntarakṣita’s.

A coarser translation, i.e., one closer to the syntax and diction of the Sanskrit, is, “Whatever has a particular arrangement of parts that generate effects in themselves should be understood in terms of intelligence. Therefore, the locus of debate, i.e., such a thing that is graspable by the two sense faculties or ungraspable, is preceded by intelligence, like a pot, unlike atoms, etc.”

141 This corresponds with fragment Av7 ($1$).
142 The example Kamalaśīla cites is, “Just as a child who is not yet familiar with verbal conventions comes to possess the verbal convention restricted to particular objects, e.g., cows, on the basis of the instruction, e.g., of their mother” (aprasyddhavāvyavahārānāmy kumārāṇāṃ gavādiṣu prayārthaniyato vāgyavahāro yathā mātrādyapadeśapūrvakaḥ).
they are effects, because they perish, etc., like an adze, or the like.\footnote{As an adze cannot cut and shape wood without a carpenter using it, so the material elements cannot form into bodies, etc., without an intelligent agent employing them to do so.} Hence, his existence\footnote{Krishnamacharya and Shastri print \textit{satvam} (everything), but the manuscripts both read \textit{satv\text{ā}ṃ} (existence), which is also preferable.} is clearly apprehended. (52–53)

(vi) Once it has been established that he is the creator of everything, his omniscience is proven effortlessly, because a creator knows the form, etc., of his creation. (54)

(vii) The entities that are the basis for dispute are clearly perceptible to someone, because they are entities, because of their existence, etc., like different instances of pleasure, pain, etc.\footnote{This, like argument (vi), would seem intended to prove Īśvara’s omniscience: even the growth of a blade of grass must be perceptible to someone, and only an omniscient being could perceive such a thing.} (55)

\textit{Refutation}

The reason in the first of these arguments is unestablished.\footnote{Krasser 2002 tracks the development of Aviddhakaraṇa’s argument beginning with Dharmakīrti’s response in the \textit{Pramāṇavārttika}. The details of Śāntarakṣita’s response, as the general orientation of the \textit{Tattvamāgraha} would suggest, trace back to Dharmakīrti’s discussion there.} It has not been proven that “arrangement” is a kind of relation, nor that wholes exist, because you accept both of these to be visible, yet we apprehend neither. For the same reason, the example lacks the proving property.\footnote{Even a pot, Śāntarakṣita is claiming, has not been proven to be a substantial whole, a singular entity with “an arrangement of parts” and so on. The term “proving property” (\textit{sādhana-dharma}) is another word for the “reason” (\textit{hetu}).} (56–57)

Visual and tactile cognition are each produced with distinct images. They do not share a single object. The same is true for olfaction, and so on. A unifying cognition, which is essentially conceptual and arises on the force of those [cognitions], determines the aggregate [of them]. Such things as water and fire, e.g., are not, in fact, perceptible to two sense faculties. [The reason,] therefore, is unestablished in its substratum,\footnote{In other words, if the subject of the argument has not been proven to exist, the reason cannot subsist in it. If there is no mountain, then the reason “because there is smoke on the mountain” cannot prove there is fire there.} because this property is itself unestablished. (58–60)

In the case of something like a temple, the fact of its having a particular arrangement is such that when one sees it, even without perceiving its creator, one arrives at [the fact that there is] an intelligent being [behind its construction]. If the same sort of thing were perceived in the property possessor, namely, things like bodies and trees, then, because it proves [intelligence], it would be tenable to make the intended argument on its basis. For any \textit{x} determined to be the effect of \textit{y} on the basis of positive and negative concomitance,\footnote{“Positive concomitance” (\textit{an\text{ā}ya\text{n}a}): where there is \textit{x}, there is \textit{y}; “negative concomitance” (\textit{vyātireka}): where there is no \textit{y}, there is no \textit{x}. Where there is smoke, there is fire; where there is no fire, there is no smoke.} a determination of \textit{y} follows upon seeing \textit{x}. This is established reasoning. But the particular arrangement found in different bodies, trees, etc., is not of such a sort. Rather, there is only the word itself [to compare these two sorts of “arrangement”]. If such a property [i.e., one that is only nominally similar] is put forth [to prove something], it results in doubtful negative concomitance, as if one were to argue, e.g., that an ant-hill was fashioned by a potter [merely because it is “a modification of clay”].\footnote{This is an important supplementary phrase that Kamalaśīla adds (\textit{m\text{ā}dvikāratau\text{v}am\text{ā}vam iti \textit{iṣaḥ}). “Negative concomitance” here would be, “what has not been fashioned by a potter is not a modification of clay,” which, indeed, is doubtful.} (61–65)
Objection: “This response is a false objection (jāti) because it entails a variation (vikalpa) in a distinct property. The proving property we have put forward, an effect, is only a generality.” (66)

A mere entity, which is excluded from what does not have that form, proves impermanence on the basis of identity. This reasoning is not found in the argument in question. The white that is seen never to deviate from fire is essentially smoke. Knowledge of fire does not also follow from snow, which only shares in being denotable as “white.” (67–68)

The response would be a false objection if, in response to an invariable connection with a generality, we had issued an objection that takes recourse to something particular. Otherwise, should we not hold firm to this reasoning, it would be possible to prove that thunderbolts, and such, have horns merely because the word “cow” (go) can refer to them. But if no invariable connection is found in this argument, no one can have a dispute about proof through this reasoning. Moreover, no permanent, singular basis of a permanent, all-knowing intellect has been established, because, due to the lack of a property to be proven, there is no pervasion. (68–72)

To explain: It is certain that houses, staircases, gates, towers, and so on, are preceded by many impermanent mental events. For this very reason, you must admit that it [i.e., your own argument,] contradicts your desired [conclusion], because it proves the fact of being preceded by many impermanent mental events. For you have said that there is only invariable connection in terms of an intelligent cause, but we have explained it perfectly clearly in terms of an alternative. (73–75)

Insofar as sequence and simultaneity are incompatible, we maintain that permanent things do not produce effects; and insofar as objects are sequential, there is also a sequence in cognitions of them. Īśvara’s cognition would arise in a sequence because of its connection with sequential objects of knowledge, like, e.g., Devadatta’s awareness of a flame. (76–77)

We also hold that a pot, e.g., is but a heap of atoms. The creator of such a thing, the potter, is the creator of atoms only. The property that you want to prove is not excluded from atoms, which you have put forth as the dissimilar example. (78–79)

Moreover, if you claim such things are preceded by intelligence in a general sense, then we do not have any disagreement about that at all, since diversity is produced by karma. If you argue that it is preceded by a permanent, singular intellect, it is devoid of the quality to be proven, and it is also inconclusive, since we can see that houses, etc., are made by many. (80–81)

151 The term for “false objection” here is jāti, a technical category in the Nyāya taxonomy of devious debate tactics. Generally, it is when one falsely claims a particular defect in one’s opponents argument—if the opponent cannot answer the charge, then, even though it is not true, the opponent is still defeated. Cf. “Debates about debate” in the Introduction; Gokhale 1992; Prets 2001.

152 According to Dharmaśīrī, there are two acceptable relations on the basis of which one can draw an inference, identity (being-a-redwood proves being-a-tree) and causality (smoke proves fire). Śāntarakṣita is going over both options to show that neither works in the present case. Existence and impermanence entail one another, according to the Buddhists, so something’s merely being an existent proves its impermanence.

153 Put differently, it is the causal relationship between fire and smoke that allows one to infer the one from the other, not the whiteness of smoke.

154 Indeed, the word go (cow) in Sanskrit can refer to quite a broad range of phenomena, including thunderbolts.

155 This verse is a little unclear to me. Shastri prints siddhe (in or with respect to what is proven), but J reads siddher (of or from proof). Kamalaśīla only says that this verse is in response to the implicit objection that there is an invariable connection.
This same critique should be applied to the remaining reasons as suitable. Besides this, only a few points [against the remaining reasons] are demonstrated [in the following verses]. (82)

**Argument (iii)**

It has not been established that atoms, etc., act after immobility, because of momentariness.\(^{156}\) And [this reason also] deviates due to [Īśvara] himself, because he would also act in a sequence.\(^{157}\) (83)

**Argument (iv)**

We do not accept that the consciousnesses and memories of people are lost at the time of dissolution (pralaya),\(^{158}\) because they are born, e.g., as gods of the radiant class (ābhāsvara), and because they are born into this world from the same. (84)

That a mouthless being is a teacher could only be grasped through faith, and [we know that] he is mouthless because, due to his freedom from merit and demerit, he is bodiless.\(^{159}\) (85)

**Arguments (i)–(v)**

Further, pervasion (nyāpti)\(^{160}\) is contradicted by inference in all of these arguments. A reason cannot pervade a property that contradicts it. Īśvara is not the cause of all beings because he himself is devoid of origination, like a sky-lotus. Otherwise, all things would arise simultaneously.\(^{161}\) (86–87)

Alternatively, things that arise in sequence cannot at all have Īśvara as their cause, e.g., fools' convictions that arise on the basis of these very arguments. If these [convictions] are also produced by Īśvara, then, since he is eternal, it would be pointless to state these arguments. It could not help someone untreatable.\(^{162}\) (88–89)

You have observed [that x is present]\(^{163}\) when certain things exist, and never when they do

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\(^{156}\) The doctrine of momentariness (śanabhaṅga, śanikatva) is elaborated and defended in chapter eight below.

\(^{157}\) I.e., as Kamalaśīla explains, he would have to have been immobile at some point, requiring an infinite regress of immobile beings whose initial activity is governed by some additional sentient agent (anākāṅkitaḥ ca tenaiveśvaraṇaḥ, yata īśvarah kramavatstu kāryeṣu sthitvā pratvartate. atha ca nāsau cetanāvadadhīśhitah, anavasthāprasagāt).\(^{85}\)

\(^{158}\) According to a common cosmological trope in India, the universe undergoes a cycle of creation, maintenance, and dissolution, leading ultimately to the end of each universal epoch and the beginning of the next. According to Vaiśeṣika, after dissolution, permanent things like atoms continue to exist, but without organization or animation. Creation is the reconstruction of a universe out of these raw materials.

\(^{159}\) Nyāya claims, as Uddyotakara makes clear in argument (iii), that merit and demerit (dharma-adharma) are among the causes of material bodies, and also that Īśvara is free from merit and demerit. Here Śāntarakṣita takes this to its literal and logical end: Īśvara must not have a mouth. How, then, should he impart instructions?

\(^{160}\) “Pervasion” refers to the formal logical pervasion of the reason (hetu) by the property to be proven (sādhyā). When proving fire on the mountain, the reason is smoke: it is in virtue of the smoke that we know that the property to be proven, fire, is present. According to the Buddhists, this argument only works because smoke is “pervaded” by fire: wherever there is smoke, there is fire; and where there is no fire, there can be no smoke.

\(^{161}\) Variations of this classic Buddhist argument are found through much of the early chapters of the Tattvasamgraha. A present, functioning cause gives rise to its effect(s) immediately, therefore, the perfect, eternal cause of all things would have to give rise to all of creation at once. The point, in effect, is that theists are trying to square a circle.

\(^{162}\) This is a slightly surprising way to put it, but someone “untreatable” (acikitsa) is essentially beyond the reach of any help. Ordinarily, of course, this means that someone is terminally ill. In the case of Īśvara, the point is that if he is an eternal being, he must be the same for all eternity. If his mere existence does not prove the point, there can be no helping him; trying to do so would be like giving medicine to someone untreatable.

\(^{163}\) Kamalaśīla says to add the relative pronoun yatr here, to which tasya, “of x,” in the next clause would correspond (bhavaddṛṣṭaḥ yad ity upāskārah).
not. If you imagine an additional cause of \( x \), how can you avoid an infinite regress? (90)

**Arguments (vi) and (vii)**

And one should understand that his omniscience is refuted by the denial of his agency, since it is on the force of that that his omniscience is proven. (91)

Even if these arguments are not spoiled by the defects that we have stated, there cannot be a single creator, because we have demonstrated that this deviates. And if a singular agent is not established, then what is the basis of [your proof of] omniscience? If that[, i.e., merely omniscience as such,] is what is established, the argument you have stated is only relevant against followers of Jaimini.\(^{164}\) (92–93)

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\(^{164}\) Mimāṃsakas (followers of Jaimini) do not accept the existence of an omniscient being. The *Tattvasamgraha* itself concludes with a defense, against Mimāṃsā, of the Buddha’s omniscience, so a mere proof of omniscience would not be relevant in a debate against Buddhists, but against Mimāṃsakas.
§ 1. Av6 and Av7: God and Other Potters

Śāntarakṣita devotes just over half of the entire “Examination of Īśvara” to refuting Aviddhakarṇa’s first theistic argument—not because it takes him so long to disprove it, but because of how many different ways he has, following Dharmakīrti,\(^{165}\) to go about doing so. He regards Aviddhakarṇa’s second theistic argument, Av7, as almost an afterthought,\(^{166}\) but the two arguments share an underlying vision, and inform one another’s reasoning, so I consider them closely together.

The concepts of wholes, arrangements of parts, and things that are graspable by both vision and touch are, Śāntarakṣita claims, unproven. In other words, the Buddhists do not accept such concepts. Aviddhakarṇa’s use of any one of them against his Buddhist rivals would render his argument invalid. Further, Aviddhakarṇa has not, according to Śāntarakṣita, established anything more than nominal commonality between the locus and the example: just because we can arbitrarily use the term “arrangement” (samnīveśa) to describe both human artifacts and human bodies does not mean their respective arrangements amount to the same thing. Even if \(y\) and \(p\) are invariably connected, we cannot prove \(p\) on the basis of some \(x\) that shares one of \(y\)’s qualities. Further, Śāntarakṣita continues, the invariable connection is itself unproven in this case. The arrangement of a pot or a temple (devakula),\(^{167}\) for example, entails many mind-moments rather than a single, permanent intellect. It takes many people to build a temple, but because of momentariness and selflessness, even a pot is in reality built by many different mind moments rather than by a single, stable individual. In short, the notion of a permanent creator creates a host of problems, and the Buddhists can refer to karma or causal concomitance\(^ {168}\) to explain the shape of the universe without raising such problems.

It would seem, on the basis of Śāntarakṣita’s response, that Av6 is a thoroughly naïve argument, utterly failing the basic test of interreligious argumentation in this period by stitching together concepts that are unacceptable to its Buddhist opponents. But is this true? Instead, perhaps Aviddhakarṇa was indifferent to the Buddhist appraisal of Av6 and Av7, intending the force of these arguments to land elsewhere. Let us turn to the arguments themselves for clues.

The basic gist of Aviddhakarṇa’s proof of Īśvara is relatively clear and relatively familiar: the arrangement of the world entails its intelligent creation. But the actual force of the arguments, and the dense language, especially of Av6, is difficult to unpack. Kamalaśīla cites it as follows:

\[
\text{aviddhakarnopanyakdam īśvarasādhane pramāṇadivyayāṁ āha [...]. tad uktam dvindriyagrahyāgrahyaṁ vimatyaadhikaraṇābhāvāpannaṁ buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakam svārāmbhākāvayavaśaṁniveśaviśisṭatvār,}
\]

\(^{165}\) Cf. Krasser 2002 begins with an assessment of PV 2.8–16 and tracks the development of Nyāya arguments for Īśvara in the wake of Dharmakīrti’s rebuttal of Uddyotakara and Aviddhakarṇa. In the “Examination of Īśvara,” Śāntarakṣita drawing on this passage in PV.

\(^{166}\) Specifically, they say the same goes for Av7, mutatis mutandis. This is also true for the additional arguments cited later in the pūrvapakṣa, but, apart from Av7, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla still offer a few additional remarks on each of them.

\(^{167}\) This is a particularly striking example, given that temples are often seen as microcosms of the universe—though the typical examples are ordinary pots and threads. A devout man may consider a pot and a temple to be different sorts of things altogether, but the most obvious difference in present circumstances is that it is uncontroversial that it takes many different people to produce a temple than in the case of the many different “moments” of the pot.

\(^{168}\) They may also rely on beginninglessness, which may be implicit in the discussion but is not directly raised.
The reason is a rather elaborate compound: “Because distinguished by an arrangement of parts that generate [effects] in themselves.” This is not easy to unpack. Kamalaśīla argues that Aviddhakarṇa

169 TSP 52.13, J30r.5. Abhayadevasūri cites the same argument verbatim and also attributes it to Aviddhakarṇa (TBV 100; see Appendix B). In fact, Abhayadevasūri lifts whole passages, such as Kamalaśīla’s explanatory gloss of Av6, from the Pañjikā. In addition, Kumārila seems to refer to this argument in Sambandhikaparastāra 74 of the Ślokavārttika: sannivesāviṣṭānām utpattim yo gṛhādīvat | sādhya cetanādāhishhām dehānām tasya cottaram, “The [proceeding verses give the] response to someone who would argue that the origin of bodies, with their particular arrangements, is overseen by something sentient” (ŚV 467.21).

170 “He says” (āha). Kamalaśīla often introduces verses this way. Given that the Pañjikā is a commentary on Śāntarakṣita, there is no need for him to specify just who is speaking. The only time this creates substantial ambiguity is when Śāntarakṣita quotes Kumārila (or occasionally someone else) verbatim. Śāntarakṣita uses the same ślokā meter as Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika (and now-lost Brhattikā, it would seem), and he quotes Kumārila word-for-word in the Tattvasaṃgraha itself. In such cases, it may be right to understand Kamalaśīla’s āha as referring directly to Kumārila—though even then, it is still Śāntarakṣita “speaking” Kumārila’s words.

171 Or watches.
includes the phrase “generate [effects] in themselves” (svārambhaka) because the reason would otherwise be inconclusive. Universals like cowness are “distinguished by an arrangement of parts that generate [effects] in a substance (dratya-ārambhaka)” and yet they are not preceded by an intelligent cause. Aviddhakarṇa, it would seem, has to specify the kinds of parts that are.

“Therefore,” Kamalaśīla abruptly concludes, “the intelligence in question isĪśvara.”  

But what precisely is a part “that generates [effects] in itself” (svārambhaka), and why does its arrangement entail an intelligent cause? Further clarification requires a detour through Vaiśeṣika.

Interlude: Inherence in Vaiśeṣika

It is neither accidental nor surprising that Kamalaśīla invokes the Vaiśeṣikasūtra in his comments on Aviddhakarṇa’s first fragment in the Pañjikā. Aviddhakarṇa makes frequent reference to the terminology of Vaiśeṣika. In some cases, his reasoning cannot be understood without connecting it to the Vaiśeṣika tradition. Unfortunately, most of the texts of early Vaiśeṣika are lost, save for the Vaiśeṣikasūtra (VS), and Praśastapāda’s Padārthadharmaśamgraha (PDhS), which plays a much more central role than VS in later Vaiśeṣika and Navya-Nyāya, essentially eclipsing the original sutras.

Kamalaśīla refers several times to a thinker named Praśastamati, which has been identified as another name for Praśastapāda. The fragments attributed to Praśastamati that are not found in PDhS apparently come from a lost polemical commentary by the author of PDhS. At any rate, for whatever reason, Kamalaśīla often cites VS rather than PDhS when explaining the basics of Vaiśeṣika ontology. Still, though we cannot say much about Aviddhakarṇa’s relationship to Praśastapāda, it is often instructive to compare the ways they respectively handle and employ specific concepts and terms.

Unto itself, the term sva-ārambhaka could mean “self-generating” or “generating [effects] independently,” but Praśastapāda offers an alternative that better suits Vaiśeṣika theory. The term in PDhS that most closely resembles svārambhaka is svātmany ārambhakatva. The chief semantic distinction between these phrases is that the case relation, “in itself,” is explicit in PDhS, but collapsed into a compound in Av6. Śrīdhara (late 10th century), commenting on PDhS, glosses svātmany ārambhakatva as “producing effects inhering in itself” (sva-samavetā-kārya-janakatva). Indeed, the term “generating” (ārambhaka) specifically conveys the sense of generating an effect, as Śrīdhara’s gloss suggests; recall that ārambhā-vāda, the doctrine that causes generate genuinely new effects, is the Vaiśeṣika alternative to Sāṃkhya’s parināma-vāda, the view that effects are but transformations of the stable underlying material, i.e., prakṛti. Śrīdhara’s gloss is essentially a definition of the Vaiśeṣika technical term “inhering cause” (samavāyi-kāraṇa), a cause whose effect

172 gotvādini tu dravyārambhākāvayavasanniveśeṇa viśeṣyante, na tu svārambhākāvayavasanniveśeṇeti. tena yo ‘sau buddhimān sa īśvara iti (TSP 53.13, J30v.4).
173 Cf. Chemparathy 1970, who follows Thakur and Frauwallner in identifying Praśastamati with Praśastapāda. Chemparathy collects fragments of Praśastapāda’s that are attributed to variations on his name, including Praśastamati.
174 Chemparathy (1969; 1970) demonstrates that fragments attributed to Praśastapāda that cannot be traced to PDhS must come from another text of his, a tīkā, that includes more extensive comments on issues like the existence ofĪśvara.
175 NK 21.3. Notably, Manorathanandin uses this same term to gloss “inhering cause” (samavāyi-kāraṇa) in his comments on PV 2.69. Franco points out that Dharmakīrti’s commentators seem in several cases—including this verse—to waffle between reading a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent and a Cārvaka one. It is hard not to wonder whether Aviddhakarṇa/Bhāviviktā’s affiliation with Cārvaka connects in some way to this ambivalence. Cf. Franco 1997, 317ff.
inhers in itself.\textsuperscript{176}

The relation of inherence is distinctive to Vaiśeṣika ontology.

In Vaiśeṣika, there are two basic relations: conjunction (\textit{samyoga}) and inherence (\textit{samavāya}). Two things are conjoined if they are contiguous but still separable. The yogurt (\textit{dadhi}) in a bowl is conjoined to it, but if you scoop out the yogurt, though it is no longer conjoined to the pot, it, like the pot, continues to exist.\textsuperscript{177} Similarly, when \( x \) inheres in \( y \), \( x \) is situated “in” \( y \) (it is \textit{iha}, “here”). But inherence is a fundamental relation. Praśastapāda describes it as a relation of inseparability (\textit{ayutā-siddhi}). He demonstrates the distinction with a series of examples:

The cognition, “the \textit{dadhi} is here in the bowl” is observed when there is a connection [of conjunction]. So, we observe the cognitions, “The cloth is here in the threads,” “the mat is here in the straw,” “the quality and the action are here in the substance,” “being is here in the substance, the quality, and the action,” “substance-hood is here in the substance,” “quality-hood is here in the quality,” “action-hood is here in the action,” and, “the ultimate differentiae (\textit{antya-viśeṣa}) are here in the permanent substances.” From this, we know the relation of these [i.e., inherence].\textsuperscript{178}

A pot may contain a liquid, but not in an inseparable manner. Such is only a case of conjunction. On the other hand, threads—however odd it may seem to say so—contain the cloth fundamentally. The cloth is, according to Vaiśeṣika, a distinct substance from the threads, but only exists insofar as the inherence relation obtains. We can divide Praśastapāda’s examples into four sorts of inherence: (i) a whole inheres in its parts (cloth in thread; mat in straw); (ii) qualities and actions inhere in a substance (a cloth is blue; an axe is swung); (iii) universals inhere in their instantiations (though this can be subdivided because being (\textit{sattā}) is different from all other universals in being purely universal, rather than distinctive); and (iv) differentiae (\textit{viśeṣa}) inhere in the permanent atoms. Inherence case (i) can be exemplified by cloths, pots, mats. Case (ii) can be usefully exemplified by cognitions, which are qualities of the self, and, so, inheres in the self. Although the situation is rather different than a cloth and threads, the fundamentality of the relation remains: a cognition only exists so long as its inherence in the self obtains. Case (iii) can be described in terms of substances (cowness inheres in a cow) or in terms of qualities or actions (blueness inheres in the particular blue shade of a cloth). This, again, is rather different from the first two cases but is, again, a fundamental

\textsuperscript{176} Though Praśastapāda does not comment any further on the phrase \textit{svātmānā śārambhakatvā}, it seems to correspond, in his description of substances, to the phrase “inhiring cause” in VS 1.1.14: “Possessing action, possessing quality, inhering cause—characteristics of substance” (\textit{kriyāvat guṇavat samavāyi kāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam} [VS 5.7]). Specifically, as context makes clear, he is referring both to the permanent substances and to substantial wholes like threads: “The nine, earth etc., belong to the class \textit{substance}, are getters in themselves (\textit{svātmānī}), possess qualities, do not have an incompatibility between cause and effect, possess ultimate differentiae, and, apart from substantial wholes, are independent and permanent” (\textit{prabhīyādīnām navānām api dravyatvavyogah svātmānā śārambhakatvam guṇavattvam kāryakāraṇāvirodhitvam antavīśeṣa vattvam anādāraṇīvāsanīvīśeṣa vācāyādāvīdāravyeśeśhyyāḥ} [PDhS 20.14, 21.11]). The phrase “parts that generate [effects] in themselves” refers, it follows, to inhering causes that are also parts. Inhering causes that are not also parts include, e.g., the self, the inhering cause of \textit{buddhi}, or ether, of sound.

\textsuperscript{177} The actual analysis of the process whereby two substances come to be conjoined and disjoined is fascinatingly intricate. Conjunction is technically a quality that inheres in what is conjoined, ergo it is not itself a process. Vaiśeṣika analyzes the step-by-step process whereby two things come to be conjoined and disjoined on the level of moments.

\textsuperscript{178} yatheha kunde dadhitī pratayah sambhandhe satī drṣṭaḥ, yatheha tantaṃ pataḥ, iha vīraṇaṃ kataḥ, iha dravya guṇakarmanī, iha dravyaguṇakarmasatī, iha dravya dravyatvam, iha guṇe guṇatvam, iha karmāṇi karmatvam, iha nityadravye ’ntyā viśeṣā iti pratayadārāśnād asty eṣāṃ sambandha iti jñāyate (PDhS 325.2).
relation. Yet the direction of necessity seems to be reversed. Cowness inheres in a cow and yet it is the cow, the substrate, that cannot exist—at least, not as such—without the inherence relation. A blue cloth is only blue so long as blueness inheres in its shade, yet, after the ravages of time, though the cloth may no longer be blue, blueness itself will remain. Universals are eternal. Case (iv) is a little trickier, and less relevant for our purposes, but, in short, according to Vaiśeṣika two atoms of the same substance are identical, so, to account for the fact that they cannot be collapsed into one another, each must have a unique differentia (viṣeṣa) that inheres in it and distinguishes it from any other otherwise-identical atom.

At least superficially, some of this sounds similar to the concept of supervenience, which is commonly used, e.g., in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind to analyze the relation between mind and body (though its applications are far broader than just that). If conscious events supervene on physical events, then, though they are distinct, the conscious events cannot change without a corresponding change in the physical events in the brain on which they supervene. This relation is often discussed in terms of higher and lower levels of properties. McLaughlin and Bennett\textsuperscript{179} use the example of the shapes and colors of a painting (higher-level) and the “microphysical” properties of the painting (lower-level). A forgery is visibly distinguishable from its model only insofar as its microphysical properties differ, and yet, the visible properties cannot be reduced to the microphysical properties—after all, we can only see, and be moved by the sight of, the former.

To what extent does such a notion correspond to inherence? It is not a simple matter. Jonardan Ganeri writes, “We might say that the cow’s existence supervenes on that of the universal cowhood. However, it is not so clear that we can say in the same way that the parts (of a car, say) cannot exist unless the whole (car) exists.”\textsuperscript{180} On the other hand, this would seem to flip the way these respective relations work. Cowness inheres in the cow, and the whole car supervenes in its parts; so if the existence of the cow supervenes on cowness, the parallel would be that the existence of one of the parts supervenes on the whole car. But this, too, is less than clear. To invert matters, there may be a way of describing the car, or the cloth, as supervening on its parts, or some arrangement of them, but it is hard to imagine how we might describe cowness, in the Vaiśeṣika sense, as supervening on a particular cow.

The odd asymmetry between these cases is actually instructive. According to Kamalāśīla, in Av6, it is to exclude universals that Aviddhakarṇa specifies an arrangement of parts generating effects in themselves:

\begin{quote}
He mentions ‘generating [effects in] themselves’ because distinction by an arrangement of parts deviates to cowness and the like. Cowness and the like are distinguished by an arrangement of parts that generate [effects in] substances, but not by parts that generate [effects in] themselves.\textsuperscript{181}
\end{quote}

Universals are eternal and, so, uncreated. A reason that qualifies universals cannot prove intelligent creation. A particular cow’s dewlap is one of the parts in which that whole cow inheres: the dewlap, together with the other parts, generates the cow’s inherence in itself. But the cow does not inhere in

\textsuperscript{179} McLaughlin and Bennett 2018.

\textsuperscript{180} Ganeri 2015.

\textsuperscript{181} avayaavasanniveśiṣṭatvaṁ gotvādibhir vyabhicārity atah svārambhakagrahaṇam. gotvādini tu dravyārambhakāvyayasanniveśena viśeṣyante, na tu svārambhakāvyayasanniveśeneti (TSP 53.13).
the components that distinguish the universal cowness.

In addition, Śāntarakṣita’s lengthy refutation of Av6 emphasizes the part-whole relation. Aviddhakarṇa presumes the existence of wholes, but against a Buddhist he would first have to prove that wholes exist in order to use them in an argument. The reason of Av6, in other words, amounts to the claim that being a substantial whole entails being the effect of an intelligent agent.

At this point we should look at Av7, Aviddhakarṇa’s second theistic argument, which is the inversion of Av6. Here, rather than the effects of creation, Aviddhakarṇa zeroes in on its material causes (upādāna):

\[ \text{dvitiyām ca tad uktam pramānām [...] yatoktaṁ tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāṁ cetanāvadadhiśhitāṁ svakāryām arabhanta iti pratijānimahe, rūpādīmatvāt tantvādīvad iti. (v. 49)}^{182} \]

And his second argument [...], as he has said: We know that the material causes of bodies, worlds, and instruments\(^{183}\) generate (ārabhante) their respective effects (svakārya) when overseen (adhiśhita) by a sentient agent (cetanāvat), because of possessing color, etc., like threads, etc.

It is only with the guidance and design of some sentient agent that atoms take shape. In the first argument, Aviddhakarṇa compares the creator to a potter; here he compares the creation to a cloth. The shape and form of a pot entails a potter, and so does that of the universe (Av6); threads do not spontaneously create cloth, and nor do atoms, bodies (Av7).\(^{184}\) Further, threads, through the action of the weaver, generate an effect (ārabhakā, kāryajanakā), i.e., a cloth, that inheres in themselves

\[^{182}\text{TSP 54.1. J30v.6. Abhayadevasūri cites the same two arguments, Av6 and Av7, in his Tattvabodhaavīdhāyini, also referring to them as Aviddhakarṇa’s pair of arguments to prove God. He cites Av7 in a slightly more expansive form: tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāṁ cetanācetanāṁ cetanādhiśhitāṁ svakāryām arabhanta iti pratijānimahe, rūpādīmatvāt, yad yad rūpādīmat tat tat cetanādhiśhitāṁ svakāryam ārabhate, yo ’sau cetanas tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāder adhiśhitā sa bhagavān īśvāra, “We know that the material causes of bodies, worlds, and instruments, both sentient and insentient, generate their respective effects presided over by something sentient, because of possessing color, etc. Whatever possesses color, etc., generates its effects presided over by something sentient, and this sentient thing that presides over such things as the material causes of bodies and worlds is the lord īśvāra” (TBV 101.12). Kamalaśila may have elided the phrase “both sentient and insentient” (cetanācetanāṁ) as well as the statement of exemplification and the conclusion, but it seems equally likely that Abhayadevasūri, who often copies Kamalaśila verbatim, is developing his citation of Av7 better to match the more elaborate comments on Av6 that he lifts from the Paṇḍitkā.}\]

\[^{183}\text{I.e., the sense faculties. The difference between Kamalaśila’s phrase “bodies, sense faculties, and worlds (jarṇendriyabhuvana)” and Aviddhakarṇa’s “bodies, worlds, and instruments (tanubhuvanakarana)” is superficial—sārīra and tanu are synonyms, and Praśastapāda, for example, consistently refers to the sense faculties as karaṇa, “instruments,” or uses the term karaṇa to describe them. Aviddhakarṇa may have intended to include the mind, the “inner instrument,” in addition to the sense faculties, which would give the term a slightly wider scope than indriya. The difference in the syntax of the compounds is similarly superficial—dvandva compounds are typically arranged in terms of things like syllable count (shortest words to longest), and the sonic resonance of nu and bhu make them a more natural sequence than tanu-karaṇa-bhuvana. I.e., a speaker does not have to change their mouth-shape to read tanubhu-, nor vanaka-, so, despite the fact that bodies and sense faculties are conjoined, it is sonically preferable to separate them in this compound. Other kinds of instruments, like a pot or an adze, are, as Kamalaśila points out and as evidenced by the fact that Aviddhakarṇa uses them as examples, already agreed upon, so the term karaṇa works best as a sonically variant synonym for indriya in this compound.}\]

\[^{184}\text{The invocation of design brings to mind William Paley; the consistent comparison to craftspeople recalls Plato’s Timaeus. A closer examination is warranted in both cases. E.g., Paley’s argument has been interpreted as an instance of induction, abduction, or deduction, and we can similarly read Aviddhakarṇa’s argument in each of these three ways.}\]
In light of this, we know Av6 means roughly the following: living bodies and the worlds they inhabit must have Īśvara as their efficient cause because they are specific arrangements of their inhering causes, like pots and cloths, unlike atoms. Av6 supplies the reasoning behind this: the inhering causes (clay, threads) require an overseer to generate the substances (pots, cloths) that inhere in them.

What this still does not quite tell us is how the reasoning is supposed to work. Why would this argument compel Buddhists to accept Nyāya theology? Alternatively, how, or for whom, would this compellingly defend against an explicit or implicit Buddhist attack? For further clues, we turn again to Vaiśeṣika.

Creation in Vaiśeṣika

There is no reference in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra to Īśvara or any other creator god. The unfolding of the universe seems, there, only to be urged by an impersonal “unseen” force (adrṣṭa). When Praśastapāda describes the process of the dissolution and re-creation of the universe in PDhS, on the other hand, he gives Īśvara a prominent role. Johannes Bronkhorst, without taking a definite position on whether Praśastapāda was the first Vaiśeṣika to credit Īśvara with creation, nevertheless argues that it is “likely that among the major authors of Vaiśeṣika he may have been the first to reserve an important place for God.”

The passage in question comes in the middle of the chapter on substance, after the sections on the first four (earth, water, fire, and wind), and before the remaining five (ether, time, space, self, mind). There are nine substances, but only the first four have both a permanent and an impermanent aspect. Although there is a role in Praśastapāda’s creation story for all nine substances, it would seem that he includes the creation story immediately after detailing the first four because it explains the relation between the permanent atoms and the impermanent elements composed of them. Creation involves all of the permanent substances, but it is the impermanent material world that is actually created.

This is the story he tells:

After a hundred years by the measure of Brahmā, Īśvara desires to give the beings of the universe a rest; the constituents of the world, including Brahmā and eventually the individual elements themselves, dissolve down to the atoms. The atoms remain, along with the infinite selves of the universe, divided and disconnected from one another. When Īśvara has the desire to create (sisṛkṣā), it

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185 Bronkhorst 1996a, 286.

186 The first four go without saying. The manifestation of the great wind takes place in ether (nabhas), and the action of its atoms relies on the karmic merit pertaining to the infinite selves (ātman). Time (kāla) and space (dik) are repeatedly invoked in terms of the relationships between each of the substances. The element of earth manifests after the great ocean and in that great ocean. Mind (manas) is not mentioned, but seems bound up with several moments in the narrative. Like earth, wind, water, and fire, mind is material and has atomic dimension. The five external sense faculties correspond to the first five substances, whereas the atomic mind, of which each living body has one, is itself the internal faculty. When the conjunctions between selves, bodies, sense faculties, and atoms are disjoined at the dissolution of the universe, minds must also stand divided and isolated, like the other atomic substances. When Brahmā, at Īśvara’s command, creates beings, this entails conjoining selves, in accordance with their karmic merit, to bodies and sense faculties—including one mind per being.
immediately follows that\(^{187}\) the atoms of the first four substances, in sequence, begin a process of accumulation into the four elements. First arises the element of wind, “the great wind” \((\text{mahāvīyu})\),\(^{188}\) in which trembling air there arises the element of water, the great ocean \((\text{mahān salilanidhi})\); the elements of earth and fire, in turn, form in that great ocean; then, due to the desire of Īśvara, the great egg emerges from atoms of fire supported by atoms of earth; and in that egg Īśvara generates the worlds of the universe and the new Brahmā, to whom Īśvara gives the task of creating the beings of the many worlds.

This interplay between the four elements, their underlying permanent atoms, the rest of the permanent substances, and the formation of the world and its inhabitants appears to be what is at stake in Av6 and Av7. If we accept that the nine permanent substances are inert after dissolution—the self, for example, can act upon the body to which it is conjoined, but only once it has become conjoined to that body—and yet that “bodies, sense faculties, and worlds” emerge out of some combination of these substances in relation to one another, we cannot but raise the question: How does inert matter and merit congeal into the vast material world? According to Śaṁkhya, it emerges as a transformation of the primordial, and can ultimately dissolve back into that undifferentiated state. According to Vaiśeṣika, as we have just seen, atoms are permanent and indissoluble. Creation involves the accumulation of already-existing atoms into new, impermanent substances—ārambha. Herein lies the fundamental divergence between Śaṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika. At this point, accepting the basic Vaiśeṣika ontological account, one may nevertheless be satisfied—as perhaps Kaṇḍā, the purported author of VS, was—with the notion that an unseen force \((\text{adṛṣṭa})\) impels such activity. Praśastapāda tells a different story, and Aviddhakarṇa tries to prove it.

In the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika, Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara sometimes tailor their arguments to Buddhists, but just as often focus on other traditions like Śaṁkhya, or other voices within the Nyāya milieu. In many cases, it is impossible to know for sure whether Aviddhakarṇa (or Bhāvivikta) crafted his arguments, whether in defense of his own view or to attack his rivals, with Buddhists primarily in mind. In his comments on Av6, Kamalaśīla (provisionally taking the pūrvapakṣa’s side) defends Aviddhakarṇa’s specification that the cause is “intelligent” \((\text{buddhimat})\) in part by juxtaposing it with the Śaṁkhya view that intellect \((\text{buddhi})\) is identical to its cause, prakṛti. “Because,” he says, “possession of intellect \((\text{buddhimattva})\) would be impossible against Śaṁkhya, it is not the case that the property to be proven has already been established \((\text{siddhasādhyata})\). Indeed, Śaṁkhya claims that intellect is indistinct from the primordial, and it is not the case that something comes to possess itself by means of itself.”\(^{189}\) Kamalaśīla’s comment here serves partly to connect the “Examination of Īśvara” with the preceding chapter, the “Examination of Prakṛti,” but also suggests that Śaṁkhya is one of the overt or implicit targets of Aviddhakarṇa’s theistic arguments.

Praśastapāda’s creation story appears to be an innovation in the Vaiśeṣika system, but because other

\(^{187}\) mahāvīraśaṁkṣānantaram, “immediately following Maheśvara’s desire to create” (PDhS 48.19). Īśvara’s desire is an essential ingredient but Praśastapāda does not quite say that he desires to create and then does the work. Praśastapāda’s description reads like a spontaneous event instigated in some way by, or simply contiguous to, Īśvara’s desire. It is not until the creation of Brahmā and the worlds \((\text{bhuvana})\) that Īśvara is unambiguously active.

\(^{188}\) It is important that the wind is “great” \((\text{mahā})\) not only to emphasize its being a mahābhūta (often translated “element”), but also because that means it has become a gross substance. “Great” is the contrary dimension to “atomic.”

\(^{189}\) śaṁkhyaṃ prati buddhimattvānuṇupadatter na siddhasādhyatā. avyatiriktaḥ hi buddhīḥ pradhānāt śaṁkhyaḥ irṣyate, na ca tenaiva tad eva tadvad bhavati (TSP 53.10).
early Vaiśeṣika texts have been lost, it is not clear how controversial it was. Noting Prāṇastapāda’s invocation of “mythological conceptions about the origin of the universe [that] were current in the 'anonymous literature' of Hinduism,” George Chemparathy argues that one is inclined to believe that Prāṇastapāda took up the already existing mythological conceptions of the dissolution and the creation of the universe in order to give them a philosophical basis and to systematise them. That he does not make Īśvara the direct creator of all beings, but rather he makes Īśvara share with Brahmā the creative function, is a clear indication of his attempt to reconcile the existing mythological conceptions with philosophic thought.191

Prāṇastapāda, it would seem, sought to organize the interrelations between common conceptions of the cyclical patterns of the universe, the authority of Vedic scriptures (authorship of which Prāṇastapāda may have attributed to Īśvara192), and Vaiśeṣika ontology and systematic analysis. Perhaps Aviddhakarṇa was appealing to those who shared his own preference for the basic Vaiśeṣika schema but had not yet come to an agreement about the role or nature of Īśvara.193 The argument then carries a lot more force. If an interlocutor accepts that bodies are accumulations of the atoms, etc., in which they inhere, and that atoms, etc., are inert unto themselves, an explanation is needed. In essence, this makes the gist of the argument simple and forceful: if you accept Vaiśeṣika ontology, you must also accept that there is a creator god.

More precisely, the argument proves the intelligence behind creation. Despite his reliance on Vaiśeṣika, Aviddhakarṇa’s motivation to prove specifically that creation has an intelligent (buddhimat) cause clarifies the relationship between Av6/Av7 and the Bhāṣya, and also further demonstrates that they work best as arguments within Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika circles.

Creation in Nyāya

Īśvara has a rather small role in the Nyāyasūtra, but it seems to reflect some degree of internal dialogue or debate. At first glance, the one passage that directly addresses the creator god could be read as refuting his existence. The larger passage of NS 4.1.14–43 (cf. Appendix C) raises and refutes a series of eight theories about cosmology and causation. Sutras 19–21 in this passage concern Īśvara, but, according to Vātsyāyana and later commentators, these verses defend rather than refute Īśvara’s role as efficient cause. The error in need of refutation or correction—in keeping with the structure of the overall passage—may be the idea that men’s actions are independent, or that they are irrelevant. In any case, the Bhāṣya and Vārttika both define and defend the existence of Īśvara and his role in creation in their comments on these sutras, and Aviddhakarṇa almost surely did the same.

The sequence of NS 4.1.19–21 has been interpreted variously by later commentators. It reads as follows:

Īśvara is the cause because we observe human action to be fruitless. (4.1.19)

No, because there is no accomplishment of fruit in the absence of human action. (4.1.20)

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190 Cf. Bronkhorst 1996a for a comparison of the PDhS creations tory with similar accounts in earlier texts.
191 Chemparathy 1969, 73.
193 Cf. Bronkhorst 1996a regarding the “relatively late date” of “God’s arrival in Vaiśeṣika” (281).
This is no reason, because it is effected by him. (4.1.21)\textsuperscript{194}

We can interpret these three sutras as a sequence of three voices, or we can read sutra 21 as the disputant in sutra 19 clarifying the position in light of sutra 20’s objection. In the former reading, the first disputant is only partially correct (ekadesiṇi). Sutra 19 implies that humans lack agency and that Īśvara is the only cause of the fruitfulness of fruitful actions.\textsuperscript{195} The objector in 20 is correct that a human must act for his action to have results, but wrong to think that this refutes the intervention of Īśvara. The final disputant, who holds the correct doctrine (śiddhāntini), clarifies that Īśvara undergirds and impels the process by which humans reap the fruits of their labor. Alternatively, the voice in sutra 19 has the correct view and clarifies it, in sutra 21, in light of sutra 20.

In either case, sutra 21 is, shall we say, riper for extended commentary than sutra 19, given that it contains the preceding discussion and almost surely states, or at least relates to, the correct doctrine.

Vātsyāyana’s comments on 19 and 20 are concise and to the point. Sutra 19 argues that fruitful action requires the intervention of Īśvara, sutra 20 objects that fruitfulness is concomitant with human action, and sutra 21 says that 20 fails to correctly understand Īśvara’s role.\textsuperscript{196}

Importantly, Vātsyāyana goes on to define the notion of Īśvara at greater length in his comments on sutra 21, including the following remark: “Apart from his intellect (buddhi), no property can be pointed out as being his distinctive mark (liṅga).”\textsuperscript{197} In other words, we can only infer his existence on the basis of his intellect. In this light, it would seem that Aviddhakarna’s arguments both set out to prove the peculiar case of intelligence (buddhimattva) that is itself the indicative mark of Īśvara’s existence. That is to say, accepting Vātsyāyana’s claim that Īśvara’s buddhi is his liṅga, Aviddhakarna has only to establish the buddhi, and the rest follows.\textsuperscript{198}

Uddyotakara is nearly as concise as Vātsyāyana in his comments on sutras 19 and 20. He treats them as setting up the terms of the conversation. His comments on 21 are much more extensive. He regards sutra 21 as the opportunity to answer all questions regarding Īśvara, his existence, and the manner in which it can be proven. Early on in these comments he says:

But what is the argument that Īśvara is the cause? We state this argument: the primordial (pradhāna), atoms, and karma act when overseen (adhīṣṭita) by an intelligent (buddhimat) cause prior to [their] activity, because they are insentient, like an adze, etc.\textsuperscript{199}

Note the superficial similarity but underlying consonance with Śaṃkhya. According to Śaṃkhya, the

\textsuperscript{194} Īśvaraḥ kāraṇaḥ puruṣakarmāphalavadyaśaṅkāḥ ||4.1.19|| (NS 227.9);
na, puruṣakarmābhāve phalāniṣpatet ||4.1.20|| (227.13);
tatkāratvād ahetu ||4.1.21|| (228.2).

\textsuperscript{195} Perhaps Gautama had in mind fruitful action (karman) in the Vedic sense of successful sacrifice.

\textsuperscript{196} Whether this begs the question depends partly on our identification of sutra 20. Sutra 21 is a poor argument against a Buddhist, but, following Uddyotakara’s suggestion, if sutra 20 is more of a principled objection against the disputant in sutra 19, who would argue that Īśvara is wholly independent of human action, the argument has more integrity.

\textsuperscript{197} na tāvad asya buddhiṁ antareṇa kaścid dharmo lingabhūtāḥ śākya upaṇādayitum. (NBh 228.12)

\textsuperscript{198} This perhaps explains Kamalaśīla’s abrupt conclusion, in provisional defense of Aviddhakarna, that the argument proves that the intelligence in question is Īśvara.

\textsuperscript{199} Kaḥ punar Īśvaraḥ kāraṇātvaḥ nyāyāḥ, ayaḥ nyāyo ‘bhidhiyate. pradhānaparamānekāmbōjanā prāṇ pravṛtṛter buddhimatkāraṇādhiśṭhitinā pravartante, avetanāvat vāsyādivad iti. (NV 433.12)
primordial is insentient, and the cosmic misidentification of the sentient witness leads to the evolution of the universe. Uddyotakara, on the other hand, attributes intellect (buddhi) to the sentient overseer, and describes creation as a conscious, intentional act. As we have seen, Kamalāśīla, commenting on Av6, says, “It is not the case that something comes to possess itself by means of itself.” In other words, Av6, like Uddyotakara’s argument, serves in part to point out, or to resist, the circularity of the Śāṃkhyya story. The same can be said of Av7, which is closely paralleled by Uddyotakara’s argument above. The phrasing is different, and the similar case emphasizes a craftsman’s instrument (an adze) rather than his material (thread), but the idea is very similar: it is only insofar as they are overseen by an intelligent agent that insentient matter, karma, etc., perform their generative actions. (As it happens, Uddyotakara invokes the common weaving analogy several times in his comments on sutra 21.)

Uddyotakara makes several more arguments—or, more precisely, versions of this general argument—in his comments on sutra 21, and goes on to discuss issues like Īśvara’s motivation for creating the world and the permanence of his intellect. Before concluding his remarks with an invocation of scripture, he returns to the argument that insentient matter requires an intelligent overseer. He points out that things like grass (ṛṇādī), insofar as they are effects, can be treated as the locus of essentially the same argument, the reason being that they are objects of both sight and touch. This is not a parallel for Av6. Its locus is more restricted, and although it similarly focuses on the effects of creation, its reasoning is rather different. Nevertheless, here we see Uddyotakara alternating between an argument based on the material and instrumental causes of creation and one based on its effects. Aviddhakarṇa made a similar move, almost surely in commenting on the same passage in the Bhāṣya, in order to establish the mark that proves Īśvara’s existence.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāśīla find an impressive array of defects in Aviddhakarṇa’s arguments, but they do so largely on the presumption that Aviddhakarṇa intended Av6 and Av7 to compel them to accept his theology. If Aviddhakarṇa was trying to convince anyone, it makes far more sense that he was speaking to a generally likeminded group of people who were torn between the apparently impersonal cosmology of VS and a theistic narrative like the one in PDhS, or defending what had come to be the orthodox view in light of lingering traces of the doubts and debates of the past. Or, of course, the arguments could be apologetic, and intended to demonstrate to likeminded thinkers that, despite real or imagined Buddhist critiques, Īśvara could be rationally proven. The Buddhists may have been straw men, or rhetorically irrelevant, rather than direct targets in any sense.

§ § §

This quick survey of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika theology helps to demonstrate the manner in which we have to examine Aviddhakarṇa’s fragments. The Buddhists’ presentation of, and response to, his fragments is not always satisfactory for our needs. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika source material helps to flesh out Aviddhakarṇa’s dense arguments. But simply understanding the words of the argument is not enough. Behind each of the fragments lurks a world of theory, discussion, and debate. It is pivotal that we consider the potential context and target of each argument. As we will see throughout the

200 evaṁ kāryatvā ṛṇādīni paksākṛtya dārsānaparānaviṣayatvād iti vaktyayam (VN 441.8). (I.e., when a tree falls in an empty forest, because it makes a sound we know it was felled by God?)

201 Nor would these arguments work any better against Cārvāka or Mīmāṃsā.
present study, the Buddhists do not always present Aviddhakāraṇa and Bhāvikta in the best light; they may not always present their arguments fairly. If they are unfair, we have to consider whether it is intentional or accidental, or whether they are indifferent to certain kinds of fairness or accuracy in certain cases.
After refuting several additional cosmologies in chapters three through six, Śāntarakṣita shifts from the universal to the individual.

Chapter 3 concerns theistic Sāṃkhya, the view that Īśvara and prakṛti jointly cause the universe; chapter 4, the notion that the universe is spontaneous (svabhāvika) and, so, uncaused; chapter 5, the theory that the word (sabda, i.e., the Veda) is Brahman and the universe emerges from this primordial source; and chapter 6, miscellaneous Upaniṣadic and other creation myths, typified by a creator god called Puruṣa, who crafts the universe out of himself without diminishing himself, like a spider, her web.202

According to Śāntarakṣita, arguments for Puruṣa and other such creator-gods can all be rebuffed by the same arguments brought to bear against Īśvara. In fact, the very brief sixth chapter serves as a kind of hinge in the conversation from cosmology to theories of the self by bringing the conversation back to Nyāya. (His choice to focus ostensibly on “Puruṣa” has this effect, as well, both by reminding the reader of Sāṃkhya, in which puruṣa is the sentient counterpart to prakṛti, and because puruṣa generally refers to a man, a human, or a person, and is sometimes used to refer to the self.) Immediately after reminding the reader of his counterarguments from the “Examination of Īśvara,” Śāntarakṣita raises a question that goes beyond the discussion there:

The same refutation as for Īśvara should also be stated for him (i.e., Puruṣa). In addition, for what

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202 Śāntarakṣita presents Īśvara as the cosmic potter and Puruṣa as the cosmic spider; yet he regards them very similarly. The “Examination of Puruṣa” does not go into much detail, but god qua spider is a striking metaphor. A spider that spins a web can be said to rely on some existing infrastructure to anchor it, but that, of course, is not the point of the metaphor. The actual act of creation entails the spider creating something separate from herself of herself without diminishing herself. This is very different from the work of a potter—even a cosmic potter. Yet some species, like the various species of trapdoor spiders, relate to their surroundings more like Īśvara does. Trapdoor spiders spend most of their lives in burrows. They get their name from the covering of silk, earth, and vegetation they craft to conceal the opening of the burrow, and they emerge in quick bursts to snatch prey and drag it down into the burrow. God qua black widow relates very differently to her web, and the world she spins out of it, than god qua trapdoor spider.
purpose does he do this sort of activity. (155)

Provisionally accepting Puruṣa’s agency for the moment, Śāntarakṣita inquires about his underlying motivation. Why would Puruṣa—and, perhaps more pressingly, why wouldĪśvara—create the universe, its worlds and inhabitants, and so on? Rather than engage with proponents of Puruṣa or other miscellaneous creation myths, several of the arguments that follow derive, Kamalaśīla informs us, from Naiyāyika authors. Towards the end of the chapter, Śāntarakṣita briefly entertains Uddyotakara’s account of Īśvara’s motivation for creation: it is just his nature (prakṛti), the way that fire burns, or the way that a spider spins her thread. Of course, though Śāntarakṣita had not considered this argument in the “Examination of Īśvara,” he gives a similar answer to his counterargument against Īśvara’s existence: if it were Īśvara’s nature to create the universe, and if he were a single, stable being, the entire universe would be created all at once every moment. In fact, even spiders do not have a fixed essential nature:

Even in the case of a spider, we do not accept that it is the cause of thread due to its very nature, since it makes its web out of hunger for devouring living beings. (168)

The nature of the spider is not fixed. The construction of the spider’s web is contingent on the spider’s hunger, which, Kamalaśīla explains, is occasional (kādācīta). If Īśvara, or Puruṣa, were like a spider, he would not be fixed for all time, and, so, could not be the permanent, all-knowing creator Naiyāyikas and others propose.

The conclusion of the “Examination of Puruṣa” puts a decisive end to the conversation about creation:

Those beings like Śauri and Ātmaja (Self-born) who are also imagined as being creators are, as a matter of fact, rejected by this same means, as well. (170)

By pivoting, toward the end of the chapter, back to Naiyāyika arguments about the nature of Īśvara, Śāntarakṣita turns this conclusion into a natural transition into the first section of the

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203  āsāyāpiśārvarat sarvaṃ vacaṇīyāṃ niśedhanam | kimartham ca karoty eṣa vyāpāram iṁam iḍrām ||155|| (TS 97, J8v.2).
204  Lālā-jālam, “web of saliva.”
205  prakṛtyaivāmsūhetutvam uṣṭanābbe ‘pi nesaye | prāṇībhasaṇalāmpatyaś lālājālam karoti yat ||168|| (TS 100, J9r.3).
206  Kamalaśīla says: “Concerning these, Śauri is Viṣṇu and Ātmaja is Brahma. Others suppose that time is an intentional agent; this is conveyed by the phrase, ‘and the like.’ As it is said: ‘Time ripens things, time kills beings, time watches over the sleeping; indeed, time cannot be overcome.’ The meaning of ‘the sleeping’ is the world that is pressed at the time of dissolution. [The phrase ‘and the like’] conveys still others of this sort—also imagined by the foolish (kumāti)—from which this is an abridged list (samgraha) (tatra śaurir viṣṇuḥ, ātmajo brahmaḥ, ādiśabdena yo buddhimāṇ kālaḥ parair iṣyate, tasya grahapam, yathoktam kālaḥ pacati bhūṭāṇi kālaḥ sāṃharate prajāḥ kālaḥ sūpeṣu jāgartī kālo hi durati krama iti. sūpeṣu iti pralayakaḷālineṣu lokeṣu ity arthaḥ. anyasyāpy evambhūttasya kumatiparikalpitaśyāpi grahaṇāt samgraha iti. [TS 101.2, J44r.6]).
207  a J dittography of ktaṃ.
208  b TS omits iti.
209  śauryātmajādayo ye ‘pi dhātāraḥ parikalpitāḥ | etenaśva prakāreṇa nirastās te ‘pi vastutāḥ ||170|| (TS 101, J9r.4).
210  The “Examination of the Self” has six discrete sections, the first of which contends with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments for the self. The remaining five sections of the “Examination of the Self” concern, in turn, Mīmāṁsā, Sāṃkhya, Digambara Jain, Advaita Vedānta, and Vātsyāputriya theories of the self.
“Examination of the Self,” namely, the self (ātman)\(^{209}\) as imagined by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.

Śāntarakṣita opens the “Examination of the Self” with six verses defining the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory: the self is a special substance, distinct from the body, sense-faculties, and mind; it is the inhering cause of desire, aversion, effort, pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), cognition (jñāna), karmic merit, and mental impressions (samskāra); it is not, as Sāṃkhya claims, intrinsically sentient, but, rather, is only so in conjunction with consciousness; it is eternal and all-pervading; and it is the agent of good and bad deeds, as well as of the experiencer of their results.\(^{210}\) In anticipation of the objection from the Buddhists that a permanent, unchanging substance could not be an actor at one point and an experiencer at another,\(^{211}\) the pūrvapakṣa continues: such designations are figurative, depending on what impermanent cognitions or feelings of pleasure, etc., inhere in the self at a particular moment. Similarly, death and birth are spoken of only figuratively to designate the self’s disjunction from a particular body or conjunction to a new body, respectively.\(^{212}\) The first six verses of the chapter communicate all of this, and then, ten verses later, to sum up the pūrvapakṣa, Śāntarakṣita makes the dialogic character of the exchange explicit:

In this way, the existence, permanence, and omnipresence\(^{213}\) of the self have been ascertained; that being so, it is proven that all phenomena are not selfless. (187)\(^{214}\)

This signals to the reader that all of the arguments encountered in the “Examination of the Self” are attacks on or defenses against Buddhist claims or criticisms.

According to the Naiyāyikas cited in this section, the self’s existence can be inferred on the basis of the difference between living and lifeless bodies; the fact that desire requires a container; the very word “self” (ātman); and the synchronic and diachronic unities of perception. They also argue that the self is actually an object of direct perception, and so need not be inferred to be proven.

Aviddhakarṇa emphasizes the unity of experience, specifically the mineness of experience. Here again, as in the “Examination of Iśvara,” after Śāntarakṣita’s initial, generic statement of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position, Aviddhakarṇa’s is the first voice we hear. His three arguments for the self (Av8, Av9, and Av10) open and close the pūrvapakṣa of this chapter. As with his theistic arguments, here again we see reasons to doubt that his arguments were directed primarily at Buddhist rivals. We cannot presume that Aviddhakarṇa’s arguments always fit the frames into which Śāntarakṣita and

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\(^{209}\) And note that the epithet Śāntarakṣita chooses for one of the two imaginary creators he mentions in the final verse of the “Examination of Puruṣa” is Ātma, “self-born.”

\(^{210}\) anye punar ihātmānam iichādīnāṁ samāśrayam | svato ‘cidrūpam ichchānti nityaṁ sarva-gataṁ tathā ||171||

\(^{211}\) jānayatnādīsambandhāṁ kartṛtvam taṣya bhāyante | sukha-duḥkhādīsāmuṣṭītavāya tu bhokṛṭta ||173|| (TS 102, J9r.6).

\(^{212}\) nikāyena viśiṣṭābhī aputūrābhī ca saṅgatiḥ | buddhībhīr vedaṇābhī ca janma tasyābhīkhiyate ||174||

\(^{213}\) TS prag’, J9v1 prag’

\(^{214}\) TS ‘sakṛtaḥ, J9v1 ‘sakṛtaḥ

\(^{215}\) As Praśastapāda puts it, the self, like time, space, and ether, has infinite dimension (paramamahattva). That which inheres in or conjoins to the self is spatially and temporally localized, but the self pervades.

\(^{216}\) evaṁ ca sattvānityavābhīkṣunītāṁ vinīścaye | ātmano na nirātmānaṁ sarvādharmā ātmanā ||187|| (TS 106, J10r.2).
Kamalaśīla squeeze them.

Bhāvivikta features only modestly in the opening portion of the Pañjikā. Kamalaśīla cites him twice in the “Examination of the Self.” He presents Bh4, a mere sentence fragment, as a qualification of one of Uddyotakara’s arguments for the self. With Bh5, Kamalaśīla attributes an argument for the perceptibility of the self to “Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al.”

It is worth highlighting that Kamalaśīla attributes several of Bhāvivikta’s fragments in the Pañjikā to “Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al” or to “Bhāvivikta et al” rather than to Bhāvivikta alone. (Kamalaśīla always puts Uddyotakara first in the compound, never referring, e.g., to “Bhāvivikta and Uddyotakara, et al.”) There is only one instance in which Śāntarakṣita or Kamalaśīla frame one of Aviddhakarṇa’s fragments in this way, namely, Kamalaśīla’s reference in (the Tibetan translation of) PPS to “Aviddhakarṇa et al” (cf. Appendix A, section VII).215 In the Pañjikā, Bhāvivikta comes across partly as an idiosyncratic thinker with arguments rivaling the elaborateness of some of Aviddhakarṇa’s most distinctive fragments and partly as a representative of common threads in early Nyāya commentarial circles. Quite likely, he was both. We will see further evidence in the pages to come that Bhāvivikta may have followed and responded to Uddyotakara.

In addition, the two fragments of Bhāvivikta in this section demonstrate the extent to which Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla often isolate arguments from their broader contexts, and, sometimes, freely alter the arguments so that they work in isolation. It is commonly accepted that these two Buddhist thinkers at least aim to treat their opponents fairly, but even if we accept this as their aim, it is not always the result.

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215 Between the Vipaṇcitārthā and the Pañjikā, there are only two-thirds as many fragments of Bhāvivikta as Aviddhakarṇa. He is not cited in PPS.
CHAPTER SEVEN (A)
EXAMINATION OF THE SELF AS IMAGINED BY NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA

Introduction
There are some in this world who hold that the self (ātman) is the basis of desire, aversion, effort, pleasure (sukha), pain (duhkha), and cognition (jñāna);\(^{216}\) that it is not intrinsically conscious; that it is permanent; and that it is all-pervading. (171)

Nyāya conception of the self
It is the agent of good and bad actions, and the one who enjoys their results. It is conscious through a connection with consciousness, rather than intrinsically. We refer to its connection with cognition, effort, etc., as its “agency,” and to the inherence in it of feelings of pleasure, pain, etc., as its “experience.” We call its association, in a particular class, with new and distinct cognitions and feelings, its “birth;” its disjunction from previously assumed ones is its “death;” its “life” is the connection, constructed by merit and demerit, that it has, as an embodied thing, with a mind. We consider its “harm” to result from strikes against the body, the eye, etc. Even though it is permanent, we observe that this sort of procedure (prakriyā) with regard to the self (pumā) is without stain. (172–176)

Nyāya arguments for the self
(i) My cognitions (jñāna) are knowable by a knower distinct from the body, etc., because they are cognitions (pratyaya),\(^{217}\) like others of those.\(^{218}\) (177)
(ii) Desire, etc., are all situated in something because, while being entities, they are effects, like color. We consider the self (pumā) to be that something. Because of the use of the phrase, “while being entities,” this does not deviate in regard to destruction, because, though it has a cause, destruction is not at all an entity. (178–179)
(iii) A single being’s perceptions of color, etc., all have one and many causes because they are unified with the cognition “by me,” like the perceptions of many at the furrowing of the dancer’s brow. Otherwise, without a basis, unification could not arise. (180–181)
(iv) The expression “self” is expressive of something distinct from cognitions, sense faculties, etc., or an aggregation [of them], because it is accepted to be a single term, under the condition that it is different from established synonyms. And what is ascertained in this manner is joined with the

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\(^{216}\) Śaṅtarakṣita’s phrase “desire, etc.” refers to NS 1.1.10, “desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain, and cognition are the marks of the self” (icchā-dveṣa-prayātra-sukha-duhkha-jñāna ātmano liṅgam).

\(^{217}\) There are various words in Sanskrit for cognition, knowledge, etc. In some cases they are differentiated in some sense. For example, jñāna (cognition) is not always identical with vijñāna (consciousness). Nevertheless, Nyāya and Vaiṣeṣika are explicit that words like jñāna, pratyaya, buddhi, and upalabdhi are synonyms (cf. n 258).

\(^{218}\) This corresponds to one of Aviddhakarṇa’s most elaborate fragments (§2); Śaṅtarakṣita’s paraphrase here is impressively streamlined.

The verse says “like others of those” (tad-anya-vat), but in the prose cited by Kamalaśīla, Aviddhakarṇa’s example is “like the cognitions of other people” (putraśaṁtarapratyayavat). As Śaṅtarakṣita’s response in verse 190 below suggests, tad-anya-vat is ambiguous and need not refer to other people’s cognitions in general. Kamalaśīla may be clarifying what he regards as Aviddhakarṇa’s intent rather than citing Aviddhakarṇa original unambiguous phrase.
property as indicated, like the word “pot.” (182–183)

(v) A living body would be divorced from vital breath, etc., because of its selflessness, as in the case of a pot; therefore, it is not at all the case that it is selfless. (184)

(vi) Every subsequent cognition is known by the same knower of the first cognition after birth because they are “my” cognitions, like the first of them. (185)

(vii) Earth, etc., though situated at a remove, are connected with my self because they possess material form, etc., like my body.\(^\text{219}\) (186)

In this way, the existence, permanence, and omnipresence of the self have been ascertained; this being so, it is proven that all phenomena are not selfless. (187)

Refutation

In the first of these arguments, what is to be proven is already established, since we accept that “your cognitions” can be known, e.g., by an omniscient person. (188)

In addition, the cognitions of others arise independently of an illuminator, i.e., they are self-reflexively known, so this example is devoid of the property to be proven.\(^\text{220}\) Even if the example were the [cognition] known by another [cognition] colored by its form, there would be doubt about another [cognition].\(^\text{221}\) (189–190)

Argument (ii)

If you are trying to prove that desire, and so on, are situated in something, in the sense that the basis is but the cause, then this proves what is already accepted.

If you consider the basis to be its container, in that case, your conception of a container of something devoid of movement is futile. A container, such as the basin of a jujube plant, either arises as a result of restricting movement, or the production of a distinction. (191–193)

And it is not tenable that destruction, which is formless, is an effect, hence the qualification the other party has stated with respect to this reason is pointless. (194)

Argument (iii)

The unification “by me” follows from the affliction of ignorance. Insofar as all is momentary, the conceit of the unity of the knower is a mistaken concept. Therefore, it is untenable as a condition of reality. Even though it is divided, it is the basis for a single thing because of having a distinct capacity. (195–196)

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\(^{219}\) Kamalaśīla attributes arguments (vi) and (vii) to Aviddhakarṇa (§3). Argument (vii) is not easy to pin down, but the idea seems to be this: Each of the senses corresponds to one of the elements, e.g., earth is the basis of the sense of smell. The fact that the different senses, composed of different elements and localized separately in the body, are organized into a coherent experience across space and time entails the existence of the self.

\(^{220}\) “The cognitions of others” are, like all cognitions, self-reflexive, according to the Buddhists; ergo the notion that they must be known by some distinct knower has not been established.

\(^{221}\) Kamalaśīla offers the opponent’s interjection: “We assert the example in this case to be that cognition, regarding a particular object, that arises as that by which the form of the object is grasped” (yasmin viśaye vijñānam āgrhitatadākāram upajāyate, tad ibodhāraman iṣṭam). He then reformulates Śāntarakṣita’s response: “In this case, too, there would be uncertainty with respect to the very self-reflexive cognition that arises devoid of the knowledge of another cognition” (evam api yat svasāntādākāram eva jñānam jñānantarasthānaśamudarāhitam upajāyate, tena samāyā bhave). In other words—if I am understanding rightly—in this case the locus of the argument would be too restricted; this would not prove the existence of any knower beyond the cognition of the example in question.
If it were the effect of a single companion, this would contradict the sequence of the cognitions of color, sound, etc., because of the presence of a functioning cause. It is clearly known that six cognitions [corresponding to the five senses plus mind]\textsuperscript{222} arise simultaneously from a single contiguous cognition, so the argument is already accepted. But sequential things cannot share one and the same cause, thus what was just stated. Hence, we clearly observe the invalidation by inference of the pervasion in this case. (197–199)

The furrowing of the dancer’s brow is not singular in reality, because it is a heap of many atoms. Its singleness is imagined. Because of being connected to a single effect, it falls in the scope of a single term. If you accept this sort of thing to be the property to be proven, then you are proving what is already established. (200–201)

**Argument (iv)**

Though they are single terms, the words “cognition,” “mind,” etc., which are synonyms, do not, for us, [each] denote something distinct, hence the reason is inconclusive. (202–203a)

**Objection:** “We added a qualification to this.”

But it has not been established, because it has been established that it is a synonym of sentience (cetas). Insofar as it is the basis for self-consciousness, we conventionally call the mind (citta) “the self,” even though the referent of this does not exist in reality. (203b-204)

We can see that this [reason] also deviates because a single term, like “producer,” can be applied to things like sky-lotuses. Words arise from mere conventions. In what case are they inapplicable? Terms like “self” do not illuminate things by their nature.\textsuperscript{223} (205–206)

**Argument (v)**

If it were established that there is a connection between the self and vital breath, etc., then this unintended consequence would follow [from our position].\textsuperscript{224} Otherwise, it is irrelevant. The absence of vital breath, etc., in the living body does not follow from the absence of the son of a barren woman. The same goes for your *reductio* argument, as well. (207–208)

First, the two members of the argument are not identical, as you accept there to be a difference between them. Nor do they have a causal relationship, because of the unwanted consequence of simultaneity.\textsuperscript{225} Why would the body’s vital airs disappear in the absence of the self

\textsuperscript{222} Kamalaśīla uses the example of the dancer’s brow to explain that a single cognitive event is the immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya) for the six kinds of cognitive event that follow: “For in this way, the very moment he sees the form of the dancer, he hears the sound of the drums, smells the fragrance of the water-lilies, savors the taste of camphor, feels the touch of the fan-breeze, and thinks to give cloths, and such and so forth” (s下达 to 瑜伽Iranam 為行 tadaiva murajādiśandham ca jighrati, karpūritāram āsvādayati, vyajānānilādisāriṃ cānubhavati, vastra ca manasādātum vintayati). “Etc.” (ādi) follows each of the nouns—drums, water-lilies, etc.—in the Sanskrit.

\textsuperscript{223} This passage, as Kamalaśīla notes, is in response to an argument by Uddyotakara, but at the end of his remarks on verse 206, Kamalaśīla briefly brings up an alternative qualification of the argument that he attributes to Bhāvivikta (§4). It is not reflected in the root text.

\textsuperscript{224} As Eltschinger and Ratié (2013, 117–138) note in their assessment of Dharmakīrti’s arguments against the self in PVSV 12.26–13.11, Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla here “give a synthetic account of Dharmakīrti’s criticism” (134).

\textsuperscript{225} Note again Sāntarakṣita’s reference to the two kinds of relation, identity and causality. If neither has been established, no inference can be drawn.
when they do not have any connection with it? (209–210)

Arguments (vi) and (vii)
And so, since none of these arguments prove the existence of the self, the stated examples for its permanence and all-pervasion are devoid of a property to be proven. (211)

Is the self perceptible?
Some imagine that the self is established by perception, because self-consciousness is known reflexively; they think the self is its object.226 (212)

This is untenable, because its form is not manifest in self-consciousness. Indeed, we do not observe the appearance of permanence or all-pervasion there. What we do quite clearly perceive there is the appearance of such things as pallor, but you do not accept that to be the nature of the self, so the self is not the object of [self-consciousness]. (213–214)

If the self (puruṣa) could rightly be grasped perceptually, then what would be the point of this dispute about its existence, and so on? To explain: self-consciousness is essentially determinate, but determinations and cognitions of superimposition are fixed in the relation of invalidation. (215–216)

Conclusion
Therefore, desire, etc., all do not inhere in the self, because they arise in sequence, like such things as seed, sprout, and tendril. (217)

Alternatively, everything internal has a form that is selfless through and through because of being entities, because of existing, and so on, just like external things like pots. Indeed, if there were a self, everything that had it as a cause would be permanent, and yet permanent things are incapable of efficacious action, so their existence, etc., would cease to be possible.227 (218–219)

The other party seeks to deny that the selflessness common to pots, etc., pertains to the living body. We prove that it does pertain to it. And so, given that the self has not been proven, the procedure you perform with regard to it is entirely unsupported, like the son of a barren woman. (220–221)

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226 Kamalaśīla paraphrases arguments by Uddyotakara and Bhāvivika et al to elaborate this verse (§4).
227 Here again, note the argument, as at the end of the chapter on Iśvara, that a permanent thing would have to give rise to all of its effects at once because it cannot be assisted by auxiliaries or affected by its changing causal potency over time, rendering the underlying concept of a “permanent cause” absurd.
§2. AV8: ME, MY SELF, AND MY COGNITIONS

Before turning to Av8, the manuscript evidence from this part of the Pañjikā has to be briefly mentioned. There is a lacuna in one of the manuscripts that ends in the midst of fragment Av8. It does not greatly impede our interpretation of the fragment, but it does further confirm the relationship between the two available sets of complete manuscripts of the Tattvasamgraha and the Pañjikā, one held in Pātān (P) and one held in Jaisalmer (J).228 As Paolo Giunta has explained in detail,229 we know for several reasons that the Pātān manuscripts are each based on the respective Jaisalmer manuscript. With regard to Av8, the Pātān manuscript of the Pañjikā (from which Krishnamacharya produced his 1926 edition) is missing a large portion of text from the end of chapter six and the beginning of chapter seven. This lacuna corresponds precisely to a single folio side of the Jaisalmer manuscript (from which Śastrī primarily produced his 1968 edition).230 This only adds to the clear evidence231 that the Pātān manuscript was copied from the Jaisalmer manuscript. Though there are two distinct manuscripts, functionally speaking, we have a single manuscript along with an aesthetically exemplary but occasionally corrupt transcription of it.232

In the “Examination of the Self,” after commenting on the opening six verses, Kamalaśīla asks, “But how can the existence of the self be known?” Aviddhakarṇa offers the first response:

atrāviddhakarnas tāvat pramāṇayati sadāyaviśeṣaviśayaviśayajñeyaviṣayā madiyā pratyakṣānumānopamānasābdaṃśrīpratayahāṃsuddhaśāntarāṃśāreakviparyayānadhīyavasāyavaspavapnāntiḥ prajñāviśeṣā madiyāśāntiḥyāditvamātikāsamvedakasāṃvedyāḥ svakārānayattajannavattvasāṃmāyaviśeṣavattvahātmakavārtavariṇāśīteṣvasamśkārādhyāyavatpratyayatvabhyāḥ puṇśāntarapratyayavat vaidharmyena ghaṇṭādaya iti. (177)233

228 Both sets of manuscripts are held in Jain temples in northwest India, around 400 km apart.
229 See Giunta 2008–2009, 125–141, for a comprehensive and detailed description of the manuscripts and the editions, as well as the relationships between them.
230 To be precise, on P28v.5, the “Examination of Puruṣa” ends abruptly with the following words: tasya grahaṇam yathoktam. The implied quotation never appears. Instead, after a danda, the proceeding syllables that appear are: na vyavasthavapnasvapnāntiḥ prajñāviṣeṣā. These words are part of Av8, several verses into the “Examination of the Self.” There is, therefore, an apparent lacuna covering the end of chapter six and the beginning of chapter seven. The final words on J44v are the very same: tasya grahaṇam yathoktam. The implied quotation, and several further concluding remarks, are the first words on J45r. This includes the words that explicitly close chapter six. (Curiously, the scribe inadvertently repeats the krama of yathoktam at the beginning of J45r.) Chapter seven then begins, and J45r concludes, in the midst of Av8, with pratyakṣānumānopamānāśābdaṃśrīpratayahāṃsuddhaśāntarāṃśāreakviparyayā. Flipping to 45v, the first words we see are na vyavasthavapnasvapnāntiḥ prajñāviṣeṣā. The lacuna in P, then, corresponds exactly, down to the syllable, with J45r. The scribe simply missed one side of one folio.
231 For another example, some of the marginalia in J read like the notes of someone (modern?) studying the text rather than the scribe’s self-corrections; the ink is sometimes fainter, the writing less legible, the content a little out of place. P consistently includes these comments, verbatim, in neat and legible handwriting in the margins, suggesting the Pātān scribe copied these margins and erred on the side of caution by keeping them in the margins.

Giunta gives a number of reasons we can be confident that the Pātān manuscripts (as well as the fragmentary and unreliable Koba manuscript of the Tattvasamgraha) are based on the Jaisalmer manuscripts (Giunta 2008–2009, 131, 133, 138).
232 As Funayama (1992, 52) and others have noted, the Tibetan is not particularly helpful, either, but we can be thankful that Kamalāśīla was a good writer—J does not leave us with too many serious issues.
233 TSP 103.7, J45r.7.

a Shastri prints “prabhijñānasiddhātidarśanārāśāreakviparyayāḥ and omits “nadhyavasāya”.

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Firstly, Aviddhakarna argues: Particular cognitions of mine (madiya)—whether perception, inference, analogy, testimony, memory, recognition, established teaching, sagely wisdom, doubt (āreka), mistake, indefinite cognition, dream, or end of dream (svapnāntika), whose objects are the knowable things that fall within the scope and those that do not fall within the scope of the indeterminate, existent and so forth (sad-ady-avisēsa)—can only be known by a knower distinct from my (madiya) body and the like, because of possessing an origin relying on its cause, possessing particular universals, consisting in awareness (bodha), perishing quickly, bestowing impressions, and being cognitions (prataya), like the cognitions of other people, unlike pots and such.

To reframe the argument in somewhat simpler terms: there must be a single agent of knowledge for all of my different kinds of cognition, and that agent cannot be reduced to the body, the sense faculties, and so on.

This fragment demonstrates Aviddhakarna’s apparent penchant for extensive qualifiers, compound reasons, and elliptical references to Vaiśeṣika terminology. Unpacking the argument is a difficult task. Kamalaśīla helps but does not resolve all of the questions—or, at least, not all of my questions.

Categorizing the Categories

Notably, Kamalaśīla’s comments refer us back to an argument from the end of the “Examination of Īśvara.” In that context, Śantarakṣita had nearly finished listing the different arguments of the pūrvapakṣa: the definition of Īśvara (verse 54), a series of proofs, beginning with Av6 and Av7, of Īśvara’s existence (47–53), and the argument that the existence of an omnipotent creator entails his omniscience (54). Before beginning the refutation (uttarapakṣa), Śantarakṣita cites one last argument, or rather what Kamalaśīla calls an “argument-cluster” (pramāṇa-kadambaka).234 Kamalaśīla attributes this cluster only to the group “beginning with Praśastamati” (Praśastamati-prabhṛtyayah)235 that he had mentioned in his comments on the previous verse. He quotes two specific arguments—call them X1 and X2—without any further attribution, both of which resonate with the language found in some of the fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikṣa:

vicitrodhayapropandāspadanāspadāṃ vimatyaadhikaranaḥbhavāpannam
dvitiyādīpramāṇapañcaśajyatiriktrapramāṇāntarāvaccheyam, vastuvādibhyo rūpādivat,
vaidharmyaṇa kūrmaromādaya iti. (55)236

What has come to be the topic of disagreement, that which is the seat, and that which is not the seat, of that whose arising is variegated (vicitra-udaya) and of movement (praspaṇḍa), can be delimited by the other means of knowledge apart from the group of five means of knowledge237 beginning with

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234 The metaphor of the kadamba blossom is magnificent. Dense clusters of the flowers encircle beautiful orange bulbs; a single blossom (kadambaka) is also a cluster (kadambaka) of individual flowers. I have, frankly, no idea how more fully to convey this in an English translation. English is highly idiomatic, and metaphor is the foundation of much of human discourse, but this precise kind of metaphor, which is so commonplace in Sanskrit, would seem rarified in English prose. “Cluster” is accurate, and yet, in a word, sterile.

235 More immediately, to “them” (taḥ), but this pronoun clearly refers back to the compound praśastamati-prabhṛtyayah.

236 TSP 56.5, J31v.2. Cf. n 173 regarding Praśastamati’s identification with Praśastapāda.

237 It is generally said that Nyāya accepts four means of knowledge and Vaiśeṣika only two. Who, then, is referring to this group of six? According to Mīmāṃsā, in addition to perception, inference, testimony, and analogy, presumption (arthāpati) and absence (abhāva) are means of knowledge. Nyāya is typically understood as subsuming arthāpati under inference. Kumārila gives the typical example: “Upon hearing that a portly man does not eat during the day, the awareness that he eats at night is called presumption on the basis of what has been heard“ (piṇo divā na bhūṅkte cety
the second, for such reasons as being an entity (vastutva), like color and such, unlike the hair of a tortoise and so on.

[...]

sadādyaviśeṣāṃśkanditānāśkanditaṃ vimatayadhikaraṇabhāvāpannāṃ kasyacit pratyakṣaṃ sattvād rūpāvidvad itī. (55)\textsuperscript{238}

What has come to be the topic of disagreement, that which is assailed (āskandita), and that which is not assailed (anāskandita), by the indeterminate, existent and so forth (sad-ādy-aviśeṣa), is perceptible to someone because of existence (sattva), as with color and the like.

Skimming over some of the dense Vaiśeṣika terminology, these arguments both amount to the following: existence (vastutva or sattva) entails perceptibility,\textsuperscript{239} and perceptibility entails a perceiver; who could perceive, e.g., the elements in their divided atomic state but Iśvara? This is reminiscent of Uddyotakara’s argument that the perceptibility of natural phenomena like grass proves the existence of their intelligent overseer. (If a tree falls in an unpopulated forest, \textit{because} it makes a sound we know God must be present?) Most importantly for our purposes, the second of these arguments shares the same reference to the Vaiśeṣika concept of “the indeterminate, existent and so forth” (sadādy-aviśeṣa) as found in Av8—not to mention the ornate, elliptical style of many of the fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta. In fact, I cannot help but wonder whether the group of thinkers “beginning with Praśastamati” who put forth these kinds of arguments includes Aviddhakarṇa and/or Bhāvivikta. If so, and given that Praśastamati is another name for Praśastapāda,\textsuperscript{240} a host of questions arises about their chronological and doctrinal associations. For example, did Aviddhakarṇa and/or Bhāvivikta respond in some way to Praśastapāda, or perhaps vice versa?\textsuperscript{241} In any case, Kamalaśīla explains this term in his comments on verse 55, and refers us back to this passage when it reappears in Av8.

After citing the two arguments above, Kamalaśīla quotes VS 1.1.7 (curiously, without marking it as a citation): “These are indeterminate (aviśeṣa) for substance, quality, and action: existent (satt); impermanent; substantial; an effect; a cause; possessing particular universals.”\textsuperscript{242} That is to say, these six characteristics do not differentiate the three categories; all six qualify all three. Substance, quality, and action are, accordingly, “that which is assailed” by these attributes, and the other three categories are “that which is not assailed” by them. All in all, the elaborate, elliptical compound sadādy-aviśeṣa-āskandita-anāskandita boils down to: the six categories of Vaiśeṣika. The same can be said for the compound that opens Av8, “whose objects are the knowable things that fall within the scope and

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\textsuperscript{238} TSP 56.12, J31v.3.

\textsuperscript{239} All six categories are \textit{jñeya: saṃnām api padārthānām asitvābhidheyaṁatrajñeyatvāni} (PDhS 16.1).\textsuperscript{240} Cf. n 173.

\textsuperscript{241} It would be no surprise that Praśastapāda is the “first” (prabhit), given that he likely preceded Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta.

\textsuperscript{242} sad anityaṁ dravyavat kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ sāmānyaviśeṣavat iti dravyagunakaranaṁ aviśeṣaḥ \|1.1.8\| (VS, 3.10).
those that do not fall within the scope of the indeterminate, existent and so forth,” which is extremely close to sadādy-aviśeṣa-āskandita-anāskandita. Indeed, this is also true for the even more elaborate compound that opens the first of the “argument-cluster” cited above: “that which is the seat, and that which is not the seat, of that whose arising is variegated (vicitrodaya) and of movement.” Kamalaśīla explains this as follows: “Variegated arising (vicitrodaya) conveys the category quality, in the sense ‘that whose arising is variegated.’ Movement (praspanda) is the category action. Their basis, their inhering cause, is substance, and the non-basis is the five beginning with quality and ending with inference.” The whole compound, this suggests, amounts to a description of the six categories. Yet it does not quite suffice to say only that in these compounds Aviddhakarṇa et al elliptically refer to the categories. These compounds do not only tell us that the six categories are the topic of dispute or the objects of perception. They also inform us of different ways of grouping the categories together, whether in terms of relations among them (“the basis of quality and action,” etc.) or lists of qualities (“existent and so forth,” etc.). Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvīviktā, et al, seem to have insisted on bringing references to Vaiṣeṣika terminology, categorization, and theory into their commentaries on the Nyāyabhāṣya, as if to transform the Bhāṣya into even more of an occasion for instruction on Vaiṣeṣika.

Knowledge and Ignorance

Av8 is primarily comprised of four compounds. The first—“whose objects are the knowable things that fall within the scope and those that do not fall within the scope of the indeterminate, existent and so forth”—refers to the objects of cognition, i.e., the six categories, which are all, according to Vaiṣeṣika, cognizable (jñeyatva). The second compound enumerates the various kinds of cognition, and amply demonstrates Aviddhakarṇa’s penchant for exhaustive enumeration: “Perception, inference, analogy, testimony, memory, recognition, established teaching, sagely wisdom, doubt, mistake, indefinite cognition, dream, or end of dream.” This striking list calls to mind Praśastapāda’s analysis of cognition in PDḥS—even as it diverges from it. (It is also nearly identical to a list found in Bh7 (§6).)

Praśastapāda lists and describes four kinds of ignorance and four kinds of knowledge, along with a number of additional kinds of cognition subsumed within one or another of these eight, as follows:

**Ignorance**

i. Doubt (samāsya)
ii. Error (viparyaya)
iii. Indefinite cognition (anadhyavasāya)
iv. Dream (svapna)
   a. End of dream (svapnāntika)

**Knowledge**

i. Perception (pratyakṣa)
ii. Inference (lāṅgika)244
   a. Testimony (śabda)
   b. Well-known gesture (prasiddhābhinaya)

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243 vicitrodayo gunapadārtha ucyate vicitra udayo ‘syeti kṛtvā. praspaṇḍah karmapadārthah. tayor āspadaṁ samavāyikāraṇaṁ dravyam, anāspadaṁ guṇādayaḥ paśca samavāyaparyantah (TSP 56.8, J31v.3).
244 I.e., knowledge pertaining to an inferential mark (liṅga).
Praśastapāda discusses “end of dream” cognition (svapnāntika) immediately after his analysis of dreams, but he also describes it as a sort of memory, so I am not sure precisely where to place it in this list. He says relatively little about it: “Although end of dream arises for one whose senses (indriya-grāma) are inactive (uparata), it is actually a memory, because it attends to a past series of cognitions.”

What precise state is this?

Śrīdhara glosses it this way: “Sometimes a recollection (pratisamdbhāna) of something seen in a dream, ‘This I saw,’ arises in the dream state (svapna-avasthā), and this arises at the end, at the conclusion, of the previously experienced dream, so it is called ‘end of dream.’” Kamalaśīla’s gloss of the term in Av6 is fairly similar: “Dream (svapnā) is the cognition arising in the first dream state (svapna-avasthā); end of dream is a later cognition, also in dream (svapne ’pi), that has the former as its object.” Both describe “end of dream” cognition as arising in the dream state (svapna-avasthā, svapne ’pi). In his study of Nyāya philosophy of mind, Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti goes so far as to characterize the sentence in PDhS as saying, “Sometimes dreams may also have a snowball effect and generate further dreams (svapnāntika).” Yet Śrīdhara himself goes on to emphasize that Praśastapāda’s point is to deny that “end of dream” is dream cognition (svapna-jñāna) per se.

Śrīdhara and Kamalaśīla’s descriptions both sound somewhat like lucid dreaming, but even if we describe the moment one recognizes a dream as such as the “end” of the ordinary dream state, it is unclear whether Praśastapāda’s description applies to the actual lucid dream that follows. Eli Franco, glossing Prajñākaraṇgaṭa’s invocation of “the transition of the body at the end of dream” (svapnāntika-sārira-saṅcāra), refers to “the last phase of a dream” and, later, to the movement from

c. Analogy (upamāna)
d. Presumption (arthāpatti)
e. Possibility (sambhava)
f. Absence (abhāva)
g. Tradition (aṭṭhīya)

iii. Memory (smṛti)
iv. Sagely wisdom (ārṣa)

a. Established teachings (siddhārṣaṇa)

245 svapnāntikāṃ yady api uparatendriyagrāmasya bhavati tathāpy atītasya jñānaprabandhasya pratayekeśānti smṛtir eveti bhavati (PDhS 184.13). The term grāma refers to a village but can also refer simply to a collection or totality, or to “all” of something, Indriya-grāma, in this more prosaic sense, simply means the senses. Over time, metaphors often harden and all but disappear for native speakers. But scholars should resist the urge to run from metaphors. Workaday language is not the mark of sophistication, and the metaphors lurking underneath seemingly prosaic phrases—sometimes just below the surface—are often revelatory. “The village of the senses is at rest” is an evocative metaphor that speaks to the kind of totality the senses comprise and the relation between the senses and the being whose waking life they animate—whether the metaphor was alive or dead for Praśastapāda. Not to mention the fact that many thinkers and speakers recognize and take joy in the underlying metaphors and idioms of their words even when their neighbors have, so to speak, forgotten them, and their forgetful neighbors’ views and attitudes are often shaped by these sorts of features of language even when they are unaware of them.

246 kadacit svapnadrṣṭasyārthasya svapnāvasthāyām eva pratisamdbhānām bhavaty ayaṃ mayā dṛṣṭa iti tac ca pūrvavānubhūtasya svapnasyante ’vasāne bhavatī svapnāntikāṃ ucyate (NK 185.26).

247 prathamāsvapnāvasthābhāvi pratyayaḥ svapnāḥ, tadviṣayaṃ svapne ’pi yad apарам jñāṇam bhavati sa svapnāntikāḥ (TSP 103.19, J45v.3).

248 Chakrabarti 1999, 42.
the dream state to the waking state; but Franco also points out that he himself is “not sure whether Prajñākaragupta means [e.g.] that if one dreams intensely of jumping and running at the end of a dream, the awaking body jumps and starts running.”

This seems closer, but the division between dream, “end of dream,” and whatever follows, remains blurry—and surely that is part of the point. Praśastapāda describes two preconditions for dream cognition, the repose of the sense faculties (uparata-indriya-grāma), and mental suspension (pralīna-manaska)—i.e., sleep. He only cites the first as a precondition for “end of dream” cognition, suggesting that the mind has become active again, though the senses remain at rest. Perhaps what he has in mind is something like hypnopompia, or certain descriptions of so-called sleep inertia, a liminal cognitive stage between sleep and wakefulness. In such states, one often recognizes that one was just dreaming—or is dreaming still—but has not yet awoken, does not yet perceive the outside world, and cannot yet move one’s limbs. The village (grāma) is still asleep (uparata). No longer dreaming, not yet awake—it is a little surprising not to find examples of Buddhists using this as a metaphor for the sometimes unsettling effects of meditation!

In any case, Aviddhakarṇa’s list covers much of the same ground as Praśastapāda’s with a few notable divergences. The sequence of Aviddhakarṇa’s list is partly different because he starts with forms of knowledge rather than ignorance but also because he attributes different values to each of the entries. He elevates analogy and testimony from species of inference to distinct forms of knowledge (more precisely, probably as distinct means of knowledge (pramāṇa)) prior to memory. He then adds recognition (pratyabhijñāna), which is not in Praśastapāda’s list, and elevates established teaching to its own place in the list, rather than subsumed under sagely wisdom. He does not mention well-known gestures, presumption, possibility, absence, or tradition. The forms of ignorance follow in the exact same sequence, only Aviddhakarṇa uses the term āreka for doubt rather than samśaya, the latter of which has a very important technical role in the Nyāyasūtra. Whatever the actual relation between Aviddhakarṇa and Praśastapāda, it seems clear that here, in an argument for the existence of the self, Aviddhakarṇa is staking a claim to a particular number and sequence of kinds of cognition.

Mineness

The third compound in Av8 is the property to be proven: “knowable by a knower distinct from my body, etc.” The possessive pronoun madiya (my) is important not only for Av8 but also Av9 and Av10, as we will see shortly. Its relevance can perhaps best be brought out with reference to the Bhāṣya on NS 3.1.14.

NS 3.1.4–17 (cf. Appendix C) establishes, in turn, that the self is distinct from the body, the sense faculties, and the mind. Sutras 12–14 close the excerpt on the sense faculties. The self is distinct from the sense faculties,

Because of the modification of another sense faculty. (3.1.12)

[Objection:] No, because the referent of memory is that which is recalled. (3.1.13)

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249 Franco 1997, 176; also, 249.
250 PDhŚ 271.3.
Sutra 12 (following Vātsyāyana’s interpretation), pursues a line of reasoning that traces back to NS 3.1.1: there must be a sentient agent apart from the sense faculties because one sensory experience can trigger the recollection of a different sense, as when one sees the color of a lemon and recalls a lemon’s sour taste. (I see what I have tasted.) In sutra 13, an opponent responds: the object of memory is the remembered object alone; cross-sensory recollection is not possible. Uddyotakara describes this as a denial that recollection can prove the existence of the self, setting up sutra 14 to affirm that it can. And indeed, sutra 14 rejects the reasoning of this denial on the basis of the fact that memory is actually a quality of the self.

In his comments on sutra 14, Vātsyāyana treats memory as but a paradigmatic case of cognition. He concludes that, on the basis of memory, “It is inferred that there is one agent who, in each body (pratideha), has all objects, and joins together (prati+sam+vdhā) the series of cognitions pertaining to itself (stut-) and the series of recollections.” Memory is, therefore, distinctive because I can recall, in the present moment, any sort of cognition of mine from the past. This means that an instance of memory can encapsulate any number of cognitions, whether a perception, a doubt, a dream, or the like. In fact, immediately before making this comment, Vātsyāyana specifically emphasizes the fact that memories and other cognitions are experienced as “mine,” and his reasoning hinges on the difference between my cognitions and those of others. Countering the Buddhist view, he says:

As for the idea that a being is nothing but a series of impressions (sanskāra): Impressions arise one after the other and disappear. There is no single impression that could experience cognition characterized by the three times or memory. And without this experience, [if there were no self], there would arise no joining together of cognition (jñāna) or memory (smṛti) with [the notions] “I” and “mine” (ahaṃ mameti ca), just as this does not arise in the case of other bodies.

Av8 would be a coherent elaboration on, and formalization of, this passage with a strong emphasis on Vaiśeṣika terminology and categorization. Rather than refer generally to “cognition (jñāna)” and “all objects (sarvasvīṣaya),” Avidhakarṇa lists every kind of cognition and, using an elliptical reference to the six categories of Vaiśeṣika, every sort of object. Like Vātsyāyana, he also emphasizes the role of self-identification: the agent of my cognitions is distinct from my body. He refers to the reflexive nature of our experience without using the disputed term “self” in the actual argument, instead focusing on the undisputed sense of mineness. Vātsyāyana first identifies the view that

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251 indriyāntaravikārāt [[3.1.12]] (NS 143.3);
na smṛteḥ smartavayāṣayatvāt [[3.1.13]] (143.8);
tadātmagunasaḍhāvād apratiśedhāḥ [[3.1.14]] (143.12).
252 Prasātāpāda offers something quite similar as one of many reasons we can infer the existence of the self: “Because we observe a transformation in the faculty of taste in the sequence of recalling the taste immediately after observing the object with the eye” (nayaṃvasaṣayatocanantarānam rasmānumṣṭikramena rasaṇavikṛtyādaśarānād (PDHs 70.3)).
253 ato 'numiyate asty ekaḥ sarvasvīṣayo yaḥ pratidehaṃ svajñānaṃ prabandhaṃ smṛṭiprabandhaṃ ca pratisandhata iti. (NBh 144.2)
254 sanskāraṃ antatimātre tu sattve utpadyotpadya sanskāraṃ tirobhavanti. sa nāstā eko 'pi sanskāro yas trīkālaviśiṣtaṃ jñānaṃ smṛtiṃ cānubhaveti. na cānubhavam antareṇa jñānasya smṛteṣ ca pratisandhānam ahaṃ mameti coticpadyate dehāntaravat. (NBh 143.22)
255 Dignāga uses memory to prove that cognition is self-reflexive: we remember both the object and the past cognition of it. Many thinkers take issue with this notion. Kumārila, for example, does not think we remember cognitions. As Birgit Kellner describes his position, “we erroneously think we remember cognitions, but this is merely because our memory of
beings are but series of impressions; he concludes by comparing this to the difference between different people’s bodies. In short, if I cannot remember someone else’s memories, why, if I am not identical with my past self, can I remember my own?256 His argument is a specific challenge to Buddhists, the proponents of no-self. Aviddhakarṇa’s example works the same way. The sense of mineness, whether in terms of our bodies or our cognitions, cannot take hold if there is nothing—no thing—that makes a single body more than a series of fleeting impressions.

Time and Memory

This still leaves us with the last compound of Av8, the crux of the argument, the list of six reasons. How exactly do these six reasons relate to one another? Does each function as a separate argument? Do all six collectively prove the point? Should they be read cumulatively, building upon one another towards the final conclusion? Or are they grouped together somehow, e.g., in twos or threes?

First, a quick run through of each of the six (slightly out of sequence): (1) “Having an origin that relies on its own causes” (svakānāyattajānmanvat). Aviddhakarṇa does not simply say, “because of being an effect” (kāryatva), but specifies that the origin of each cognition relies on its particular causes. This may seem like a relatively banal point, but the subtext may be that the respective causes of each kind of cognition are distinct, just as the objects of the different sense faculties are distinct. This relates to the next reason, too. (2) “Possessing particular universals.” Particular universals (sāmānya-viśeṣa) are all of the universals apart from the highest universal, being (sattā). They are “universal” in the sense that they give rise to the notion of similarity across all of their instantiations, and yet “particular” because they serve to differentiate one class of thing from others. “Substance- hood” is universal to all substances and yet particular to substances alone. “Being,” by contrast, is truly universal. If I understand Aviddhakarṇa, the fact that each of my different kinds of cognitions possesses a particular universal means that they are each differentiated from one another, perception- ness inheres in all perceptions, but only perceptions, not dreams, and so on. (3) “Perishing quickly”

objects would not be explicable without the existence of their previous cognition” (Kellner 2011, 415). Nyāya neither accepts that cognitions are self-reflexive nor that every cognitive event includes the cognition-of-cognition structure. We do not need to have a cognition of our cognition of a pot in order to see the pot—the cognition of the pot suffices. It is possible to then regard that cognition itself as an object of cognition, but because this is not essential for cognitive functioning, there is no infinite regress.

256 The example “as in the case of other bodies” hearkens back to NBh 1.1.10. Sutra 1.1.10 lists the six inferential marks (liṅga) of the self: desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain, and cognition. Vātsyāyana first explains how each of these can be used to infer the existence of the self. Twice he uses the example “as in the case of other bodies.” At the end of his comments on this sutra, Vātsyāyana explains the phrase: “Concerning this, the phrase ‘as in the case of other bodies’ is taken up: Just as, according to proponents of no-self, different cognitions whose objects are restricted to other bodies are not recalled, nor could they be recalled if they were the objects of a single body, because there would be nothing to differentiate these cases. It is the actual practice for a single being to recall what he has seen, not what was seen by another, nor what he has not seen. In the same way, it is the actual practice of many beings that one does not remember what was seen by another. The proponent of no-self cannot account for either of these cases, and so, it obtains that there is a self” (tatra dehāntaravad iti vibhayate. yathā anātmavādinā dehāntarasya nīyatavīsaṃ buddhibhedā na pratisandhiyante. tathākaśāvatvāyā api na pratisandhiyatā, avāsaśāta. so ‘yam ekasātuvasaṃ samacāraḥ suyaṣātvasāṃ svarutāṇam, nānādṛṣṭasya nādṛṣṭasya. evam khalu nānādṛṣṭvānām samacāro ‘nyādiṣṭam anya na smarattī. tad etad ubhayam aśakyaṁ anātmavādīna ’yavasthāpayitum ity evam upapannam aty ātmeti (NBh 16.16)). That is to say, the Buddhist can neither explain why I am able to remember my own memories (given that I am as distinct from my former self as I am from an entirely different being) nor why I am not able to remember anyone else’s (given that I am as identical with my former self as with anyone else).
(āśutaravināśītvā). This is the same term that Śrīdhara uses to gloss Praśastapāda’s use of the term “momentariness” (ksanikatva). According to Praśastapāda, all actions and some qualities are momentary: “Ether and the self both possess qualities that are entirely specific to them, that are momentary, and that reside in only a portion of their substratum.” Individual cognitions do not persist through time, and yet something seems to bind them all together. (4) “Bestowing impressions” (samskarāddhāyatvātva). There are three kinds of impression, and Aviddhakarṇa presumably has the cognitive sort in mind here, i.e., mental impressions formed by repetition, novelty, shock value, or the like. Praśastapāda specifically says that this is the cause of recollection and recognition (smṛti-pratyabhijñāna-betur). Finally, (5 and 6) two of the six reasons, “because of consisting in awareness (bodhātmakatva)” and “because of being cognitions (pratyayatva),” are nearly, or perhaps entirely, synonymous. This would suggest that there may be something to the sequence, or else that Kamalāśīla is paraphrasing a number of distinct arguments, at least two of which rest on roughly the same reason.

There is an interesting resonance between these two near-synonyms and Kumārila’s engagement with Buddhists. In a well-known verse (that Sāntarakṣita quotes in the Mīmāṃśā section of the “Examination of the Self”), Kumārila defends the intrinsic validity of knowledge on the basis of bodhātmakatva; elsewhere he paints the Buddhist point of view as the polar opposite, i.e., that knowledge is intrinsically erroneous because pratyayatva. Kumārila emphasizes the confidence with which we (rightly, in his view) regard our own cognitions, whereas the Buddhists emphasize the unreliability of cognition that can often be revealed upon examination. Significantly, Aviddhakarṇa’s argument concerns neither validity nor unreliability. He includes in his list both established means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and undoubtedly erroneous cognitions, such as “mistake” (viparyaya), i.e., mistaking one thing for something else. Nevertheless, he thinks there is something else to be gleaned from the fact that cognitions are cognitions, or have the nature of awareness, namely, that they entail a specific kind of perceiver distinct from the body, sense faculties, and mind.

This undoubtedly calls to mind the Bhāṣya on NS 3.1.3. Sutras 3.1.1–3 are as follows:

257 akāśātmānām kṣaṇikaikadeśāśvitiśeṣagunavattvam (PDhS 25.4).
258 A student of J (cf. n 231) was apparently concerned about this, writing in the margin, “The difference between consisting in cognition (bodha) and being a cognition (pratyaya) is only made in the succession, though really there is no difference (bodhātmakapratyayatvayoh paryayakṛta eva bhedabh paramārthaḥ as abhedaḥ).” (P, as usual, has the same comment, also in the margin, but with the same precise, elegant hand as the rest of the manuscript.) NS 1.1.15 states, “buddhi, upalabdhi, jñāna: no difference in meaning (anarthāntaram)” (NS 18.13), and PDhS that “buddhi, upalabdhi, jñāna, pratyaya are synonyms (paryayā)” (PDhS 171.16).
259 Sāṃkhyaśīla’sāvādikarana 409 (ŚV 591). “In this regard, cognition is recognized insofar as it consists in consciousness; people regard it as the cognition of a pot, an elephant, etc., on account of the difference of these [objects]” (tatra bodhātmakatvāna pratyabhijñāyate matiḥ ghataḥastabdibuddhītvaṃ tadābhedaṃ lokasammatam).
260 Nirālambanavāda 23 (ŚV 159): “A cognition of, e.g., a post is false because it is a cognition. To explain: what is a cognition is observed to be illusory, like the cognition of a dream, etc” (stambhāḍipratyayā mithyā pratyayatvat tathā hi yah | pratyayat sa mūyā dṛṣṭah svapnāḍipratyayā yathā). As Taber 1994 points out, Kumārila may have had in mind the first verse of Vasubandhu’s Viśīmāsī. Vasubandhu offers a relatively similar example, but does not give an explicit reason (hetu) for the illusoriness of cognition, inviting Brahmatical thinkers to furnish the reason themselves. “Although the Hindus were attacking a straw man,” Taber says, “their charges did draw attention to the shortcomings in Vasubandhu’s attempt to base idealism on the fact that we are sometimes presented in experience with objects that do not exist” (31). One does not always strike down an imaginary opponent in vain (cf. §14 on Aviddhakarṇa’s sword).
[The self exists] because a single thing is grasped by sight and touch. (3.1.1)

[Objection:] No, because of the differential arrangement (vyavsthana) of the objects. (3.1.2)

[Response:] In fact, the real existence of the self follows as a result of the arrangement of those, so the objection is invalid. (3.1.3)\(^{261}\)

In his comments on NS 3.1.1, Vātsyāyana points out that a sense faculty can only recall an object that was grasped by itself, not by another faculty.\(^{262}\) For this reason, there must be a single agent to account for the joining together of different sensory experiences in our recollections. After 3.1.1, sutra 2 cites an objection: “No, because of the differential arrangement of the objects.” The basic gist of the objection, following Vātsyāyana’s interpretation, is that there cannot be a single agent of both sight and touch, etc., because the object of visual cognition is restricted to the operation of the eye, of tactile cognition to the skin, and so on. Most important for our purposes is the response in sutra 3, which turns the argument on its head: it is precisely this differential arrangement of the objects of the senses that proves the existence of the self.

In the Bhāṣya on 3.1.3, Vātsyāyana largely extends the reasoning from 3.1.1, but emphasizes the manifoldness of cognitive objects and kinds of cognition. Some of the language of this passage of the Bhāṣya is notably resonant with Av8:

Now, if there were a single sense faculty that were unrestricted in its objects, all-knowing, grasping all objects, and sentient, then who could infer a sentient thing other than it? Since the sense faculties are, in fact, restricted in their objects, we infer, on that basis, that there is a sentient agent apart from them who is all-knowing, grasps all objects, and exceeds any restriction in object. […] One recalls (pratisamdhāya) and recognizes (vedayate) the cognitions (pratyaya) of perception, inference, testimony (āgama), doubt (saṃśaya), or intuition (pratibhā), with their manifold objects (nānā-viśaya), as all having oneself (svātmā) as their agent (kartya).\(^{263}\)

To slightly rephrase this, we could say the various kinds of cognitions, with their respective objects, that are all experienced as mine must have a single knower, and that knower must be sentient and unrestricted with respect to objects of knowledge. Here we see an abbreviated list of the kinds of cognitions that must all pertain to the same sentient agent. Aviddhakarṇa—at least, as preserved by Kamalaśīla—makes of this an elaborate formal argument.

And this, taken together with all of the Vaiśeṣika background condensed into Av8, suggests something of the potential sequence of Aviddhakarṇa’s reasoning: different kinds of cognitions all have the same nature (bodḥātmakatva), and yet they are distinct from one another

\(^{261}\) dārānasparānaḥbhāyāṃ ekārthagrahaṇāt [3.1.1] (NS 135.13);
na, viśayavyavsthānāt [3.1.2] (136.6);
tasyayavsthānād evatmasadbhāvad apratisedhāḥ [3.1.3] (136.18).

\(^{262}\) indriyāṃ khalu svāṃ svāṃ viśayagrahaṇām ananyakartrkāṃ pratisamdhātum arhati nendriyāntarasya viśayāntara-grahaṇām iti (NBh 135.19).

\(^{263}\) yādi khalva ekam indriyāṃ avyavsthātaviṣayāṃ sarvajñāṃ sarvaviṣayagrāhī cetanāṃ syāt, kas tato ’nyaṃ cetanāṃ anumātum śaknuvat. yasmāt vyavsthātaviṣayānindriyāṃ, tasmat tebhṛyo ’nyaś cetanāḥ sarvajñāḥ sarvaviṣayagrāhī viṣayavyavsthātām atito ’numi. [...] pratyakṣānāmātigamasya-pratibhā-pratyayaṃ ca nānāviṣayān svātmakartṛkān pratisamdhāya vedyate. (NBh 136.1 […] 136.7)
(sāmānyaviśesavattva) because they are restricted in their objects, and, so, restricted in their respective causes (svakāraṇāyattajanmavattva). They do not persist through time (āśutaravinsītvā), but leave some kind of trace (saṃskārdhāyakatva) that can lead, at a later point, to recollection or recognition. This ephemerality and restriction is part of the nature of cognition (pratyayatva), which is a quality, and, so, depends on a substance for its existence. That is all to say, a cognition requires both an object of cognition and an agent of cognition, and, more precisely, all of my cognitions—diverse sorts, regarding diverse objects, both knowing and ignorant—must all be known by a single sentient agent who is not restricted to particular kinds of objects, particular kinds of cognitions, or particular temporal sequences (madiyaśārirādivyatiriktaṃvedakasamvedya).

264 Cognition “has many forms because there are endless objects and because it is restricted to each object” (sā caṇekaprakārārthāntyāt pratyarthantyāt vā ca (PDhS 172.13)).
265 Color, e.g., “is an auxiliary of the eye” (nayanāsahākāri (PDhS 104.2)).
§3. AV9 AND AV10: MINE MEANS MINE

The emphasis on *mineness* only grows in AV9 and AV10.

After AV8, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāśīla cite one argument by Śaṅkaravāmin, another early Naiyāyika whose work has been lost, and three arguments by Uddyotakara, all four of which aim, like AV8, to prove the existence of the self. Śāntarakṣita then closes the *pūrva-pakṣa* with AV9 and AV10, which, according to Kamalāśīla, argue for the permanence and omnipresence of the self, respectively:

\[
\text{atha nityatva-vibhutve katham asya pratipattaye ity atraviddhakarpas tāvat pramāṇayati mātur udaraniskramanottarakalāṃ madiyādyaprajñānasamvedakasamvedavyān atatkālīni madiyāni prajñānānī madiyaprajñānāvatvāt ādyamadiyaprajñānāvat. (185)\]

*How are the permanence and omnipresence of the self to be apprehended? Concerning this, Aviddhakarṇa first argues: After emerging from my mother’s womb, my cognitions (madiya-prajñāna) across time can only be known by the knower of my first cognition (madiya-ādya-prajñāna) because they are my cognitions, like my first cognition (madiya-ādya-prajñāna).*

 [...] 

\[
vibhutvasiddhaye pramāṇayati avanijalānilamanāmsi vipratipatti-viśayabha-vāpannāṃ dūrataravaratāni madiyenātmāna saha sambadhyante mūrtatavegavattvavaparavaratāparatvamithāsanyogavibhāgavattvabhyo, madiyāśārārādīvad iti. (186)\]

*He makes this argument in order to prove omnipresence: What have come to be the subjects of dispute, earth, water, wind, and mind (avani-jala-anila-manāṃsi), which are situated at a remove (dānartara-varttāni), are connected with my self (madiyena ātmanā), because they have a fixed shape (mūrtatva), they possess movement, they have proximity and distance (paratvāparatvā), and they possess conjunction and disjunction to each other (mithāḥ-sanyoga-vibhāga-vattvā), like my body (madiya-śarīra), etc.*

Kamalāśīla’s description of AV9 as proof of the self’s permanence suggests that its source is somewhere within the passage NS 3.1.18–26, which consists in three arguments that the self persists across lifetimes. All three of these arguments hinge on the innate experience of a newborn baby, and AV9 similarly refers to the first cognition after emerging from the womb. But this passage in the *Nyāyasūtra* is concerned with the question of whether the self disappears upon death. The opponent of these arguments is not someone like a Buddhist, who argues against the notion of the self altogether, but someone more like a Cārvāka who argues against the notion of agency, experience, or karmic merit persisting from one life to the next. AV9 argues for the necessity of a single agent across one lifetime, connected with a single body. In other words, despite Kamalāśīla’s framing, AV9 serves more to prove the existence of the self than its permanence. In fact, in AV9 the self’s persistence through time is axiomatic. It is by dint of the fact that the reflexive nature of experience entails an agent persisting through time that we know there must be a self, since that is precisely what a self is.

Further, Aviddhakarṇa’s use of the first-person possessive determiner “my” (*madiya*) seems to beg the question, and in AV10 he even explicitly mentions “the self” (*ātman*). He should know that the

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266 TSP 106.1, Jāgr.2.
267 TSP 106.7, Jāgr.3.
Buddhists would reject any such argument. (In fact, later in the “Examination of the Self,” Śāntarakṣita cursorily dismisses these arguments precisely because he has already refuted the existence of the self, on which they both rest.) If instead we read Av9 and Av10 in terms of NBh 3.1.14—which, as we just saw, proves the existence of the self on the basis of memory—it would suggest Aviddhakarṇa has a proponent of no-self in mind. Yet he may well be arguing against someone else in these fragments, or perhaps arguing only in principle against the denial of the self. Or perhaps by this point in his comments he considers the self’s existence to be established, and now he wants to establish some of its qualities.

In any case, it is clear that mineness plays a pivotal role in both of these fragments, perhaps even more so than NBh 3.1.14 and Av8. Av9 reads almost like a taunt: our cognitions come with a sense of mineness, but proponents of no-self cannot account for the fact that my cognitions across my lifetime are restricted to me and my body. The force of Av9 hinges on the temporality of mineness. Av10, on the other hand, focuses on the spatial reach of the self. My cognitions across time entail a temporally persistent me; my sensory, bodily, and mental experience entails a me that is spatially unbounded—it pervades the entirety of my body, mind, and sense faculties as they move together through space.

As for the content of the arguments, Av9 is fairly clear. Kamalaśīla does not say much about it, but does point out that “pleasure and the like” (sukha-ādi, and, so, any of the other inferential marks of the self) could also be made into the subject of the argument. My desire must be the desire of the same being who, in the past, desired what I desired in the past. Av10, on the other hand, Kamalaśīla quotes without comment. Is this because he considers it easy enough to understand or unworthy of unpacking? (His expectations and our desires are not always in sync.) Av10 necessitates another detour through Vaiśeṣika classification, yet even then I do not find it very easy to understand.

The Number of Sense Faculties

The first puzzle is the absence of fire. The compound “earth, water, wind, and mind” is fairly surprising, both because there is no obvious reason to exclude fire, one of the four elements, and because Praśastapāda characterizes this group, including fire, in almost the same way as Aviddhakarṇa: “Earth, water, fire, wind, and mind possess actions, have a fixed shape, have proximity and distance, and possess momentum.” The Tibetan translation of the Pañjikā does include fire, but, unfortunately, only lends support to the reading in the Sanskrit manuscripts. Rather than include all four elements, the Tibetan reads “earth, water, fire, and mind” (sa dang/ chu dang/ me dang yid), substituting fire for wind. Perhaps the translator, or the translator’s manuscript, read anala (fire) for anila (wind). Despite the divergence, in other words, the Tibetan confirms there are three elements plus mind. It is easy to see how the list of all five (avanijalānilānalamānāmsi) could become either of these groups of four (avanijalānilānalamānāmsi, as in the Sanskrit mss., or avanijalānilānalamānāmsi, corresponding to the Tibetan), but we must also wonder whether Aviddhakarṇa may have had some reason for limiting the list in one of these ways. (Ether, the fifth substance and the element corresponding to the organ of hearing, does not have a fixed shape, and

268 If we were reconstructing a hypothetical—fragmentary—Bhāsyatikā, this would suggest we strongly consider Av9 as a comment on NBh 1.1.10.

269 kṣitijalājotiranilamānāṃ kriyāvattvamūrtatvatvaparatvaparvatvavegavattvāni (PDhS 21.21).
and V. caspati's comments on NS 1.1.12, the sutra that defines the sense faculties: “Smell, taste, sight, touch, and among color and the like” and “because of illuminating color alone.” In either case, he surely has in mind Uddyana—writing around half a millennium after Aviddhakarṇa—explains the stakes very clearly in his introduction to the section on the number of sense faculties:

The previous section has proven that the sense faculties are material (bhautika) and that they operate after direct contact (prāpya-kārin). Now we must undertake the section on the variety (nānattvā) of the sense faculties. After a general introduction (upodghāta), we dive in (avatāra).

To explain: without establishing their manifoldness, we could not establish their materiality; nor, without establishing that, that they operate after direct contact. Indeed, if there were only one faculty, it would not be possible to establish the arguments demonstrating materiality, such as, “Because, with its restriction among color and the like, [sight] illuminates color alone,” and so on [for the remaining senses]. Hence, it would not be possible to establish that they operate after direct contact, because

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270 Subtle differences in phrasing in this formula (vimati vs. vipratipatti, adhikarṇa vs. visaya) do not alter the meaning.
271 Other possibilities include restricting the locus to the atoms that comprise “my” body or the elements qua objects corresponding to their respective sense faculties.
272 kathāṃ śrotreṇa sanyogāh, tātāpi sanyuktasanyogyo ‘ṣṭi, ātmanā hi sāmyukta tadiyā dyāṭbhisamśkritā kārṇaśaṅkuli, tayā ca sānyuktam ākāśātmakaṃ śrotam (TSP 102.14, J45r.5).
273 adhiśṭhāṇa api khalu pañcendriyaṇāṃ sarvāśārādhīśṭhānaṃ sparśānaṃ sparśagrahaṇāliṅgām, kṛṣṇārādhīśṭhānaṃ cakṣurahāṁbhīṃṣṭaṃ rūpagrahaṇāliṅgām, nāśādiśṭhānaṃ ghrānaṃ, jīvādiśṭhānaṃ rasanaṃ, kārṇacchidrādhīśṭhānaṃ śrotam, gandharasārāpasparśābādgrahaṇāliṅgavāt iti (NBh 167.10).
274 The inclusion of the term “with the restriction” (niyāmena) renders this sentence a little tricky to translate. It is possible that Udayana intends this to refer to two different phrasings of the same argument, “because of the restriction among color and the like” and “because of illuminating color alone.” In either case, he surely has in mind Uddyotakara and Vācaspati’s comments on NS 1.1.12, the sutra that defines the sense faculties: “Smell, taste, sight, touch, and
And the purpose (prayojana) of this is: the proof of the self distinct from the sense faculties, by means of the passage beginning with NS 3.1.1, “Because a single thing is grasped by sight and touch,” entails the proof of the variety of the sense faculties. Otherwise, because it would be singular, the sense faculty alone could combine (prati+sam+vedha) [the different perceptual modes].

To put it briefly: proof of the self hinges on the distinctness of the five senses. The proof of the self is presented a little earlier in the Sutras, and in that context, i.e., in sutra 3.1.1 onward, the manifoldness of the sense faculties is taken for granted. Now, in order to undergird the proof of the self, the manifoldness of the sense faculties must be substantiated.

If in Av10 we read anala (fire) for anila (wind), as in the Tibetan, this would exclude the element corresponding to the faculty of touch—because the hypothetical opponent already accepts the function of the skin (tvac). This would make Av10 a rather sophisticated argument, not against a Buddhist no-self theorist, but in defense of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika analysis of the sense faculties, their relationships with the material elements, the mind, and the self, and the way these corroborate one another.

This is all, admittedly, rather speculative. I do not mean to say that this is what Aviddhakarṇa had in mind, but only to show what worlds of meaning potentially hide behind these fragments.

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275 I understand Udayana’s use of the locative absolute phrase indriya-nānātva-siddhau satyam (given the establishment of the variety of the sense faculties) as describing a necessary condition for the proof of self. Though he does not use the emphatic particle eva, the point of the passage is clearly not simply that the proof of self happens to occur when the variety of the sense faculties is proven, but that the latter is a condition of possibility for the former.

276 evaṁ bhautikatvaṁ prāpyakārītvam cendriyānām anena prakaranena prasādhyendriyanātvacaprakaranam ārambhaṇyam. tasya cupopghatād avatāraḥ. nānātvasiddhau hi bhautikatvaḥ na siddhyet. tadasiddhau ca na prāpyakārītvam. ekate hi rūpādiṣu madhye niyamaṃ rūpasyaiva prākāśakātvaḥ ity añiṣaṃ bhautikatvaprasādhyānān samiddhiḥ syād iti. tathā ca prāpyakārītvam na siddhyet. tasya bhūtadharmatvāt iti. prayaṣaṇaṃ cāsāndriyānātvasiddhau satyam darśanasparśanābhāyaṃ ekārthagrahyaṇād ity ādhīḥ indriyavyatiriktaṁ asiddhiḥ. anyathāndriyaṃ evaikatvāt pratisamādhiphiteti (NVṬṬP 453.19).
That leaves the last puzzle, the compound reason. As mentioned, Praśastapāda offers almost the same list as a description of earth, water, fire, wind, and mind. Praśastapāda says these five:

(i) possess actions, (ii) have a fixed shape, (iii) possess momentum, and (iv) have proximity and distance.

Aviddhakarnā’s says that earth, water, wind/fire, and mind:

(a) have a fixed shape, (b) possess momentum, (c) have proximity and distance, and (d) possess conjunction and disjunction to each other.

(a) through (c) in Aviddhakarnā’s list is identical to (ii) through (iv) in Praśastapāda’s; (i) is absent, and (d) is added.

As is true for all of the fragments, Av10 may not be a direct quotation, but an abbreviation or paraphrase of a more complicated passage. Because the Buddhists do not take this argument very seriously, we have very little to go on. As with Av8, it may well be that Aviddhakarnā’s actual argument here entails a specific relationship between all four reasons. The best I can offer at present is an assessment of the meaning and relevance of each of the four reasons, and a hypothesis about the reasoning of the argument as a whole.

Praśastapāda says a number of things about possession of a fixed shape, momentum, proximity/distance, and conjunction/disjunction over the course of PDhS. In his account, having a fixed shape is the basis for both momentum and proximity/distance, as they are only qualities of things with a fixed shape. Momentum, like conjunction and disjunction, is born of action, and requires some kind of impulse, often predicated on effort. Proximity and distance rely on cognition, which is to say, they are relative to an observer rather than absolute, and they can be both spatial and temporal. Conjunction is a generic relation of contact between two things that remain separate (unlike in a relation of inherence); disjunction, of course, is when two things in contact are separated.

The term mithas, which I have rendered “to each other,” is ambiguous. Each of the four members of the locus has a fixed shape, each possesses momentum, and each has proximity and distance, so, at first glance, it would follow that each possesses the fourth reason unto itself. (In this case we may translate mithas as “mutual,” ergo “mutual conjunction and disjunction,” though the meaning of this would not be perfectly clear.) This would seem to imply that each can conjoin and disjoin from other members of the same class, earth to earth, etc. But mind does not work like that, so the term mithas must indicate a different grammatical relation with the locus than the other three reasons.

More likely, this refers to the role of the mind in sensory experience. The mind is an atomic substance with a fixed shape. Though it is very fast, it has to move between the different sense

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277 samyogaviṃhāgaṃ karman (PDhS 99.6).
278 paratvaparavatvadviṣpaktvādyo buddhayekeḥ (PDhS 99.11). Something is nearer or farther relative to my observation of it, just as the duality in the two cups on my table is relative to my encounter with them. This is a tricky subject, and one that eventually led Navya Nyāya thinkers to posit a special kind of relation (cf. §9).
faculties, conjoining and disjoining from each in turn. As a result, we do not experience cognitions or perceptions perfectly simultaneously. This is why Aviddhakarṇa emphasizes that earth, water, wind/fire, and mind, “are situated at a remove.”

In this reading, the four reasons follow a kind of sequence: Insofar as the mind, etc., have a fixed shape, they possess momentum, and have proximity and distance; because of this, the mind can conjoin and disjoin from each of the other instruments in turn—and, by implication, can only conjoin from one after disjoining from another. Finally, because of all of this—together with the shape of our experience, such as our recollection of sourness upon seeing a lemon—they must all be connected with a single self, operating independently but joined together by the stable underlying agent of experience.

This proves the self’s pervasion of the body-mind complex, the existence of several distinct sense faculties, and the relation between the body, the senses, the mind, and the self, undergirding the all-important reasoning of NS 3.1.1—so long as one has bought into several aspects of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. Whether this interpretation matches Aviddhakarṇa’s intention, it underscores that any number of his fragments could have been intended as arguments within his community, rather than charges launched at his Buddhist rivals.
§4. BH4 AND BH5: BHĀVĪVIKTĀ ON THE SELF

As we know, before Av9 and Av10, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla consider three of Uddyotakara’s arguments for the existence of the self. The first is the analogy of the dancer’s brow, Uddyotakara’s fanciful take on NS 3.1.1: The self is a singular agent that unifies diverse sensory modes just as the furrowing of a dancer’s brow, signifying the end of her performance, is a singular gesture that unifies the minds of the different members of the audience. They all recognize the gesture at the same moment and have the same thought, namely, that the show is over and it is time to offer praise and payment. The second argument, which is the one Bh4 qualifies, is Uddyotakara’s terminological argument for the self. The word ātman is a single term with no synonyms: it must refer to something distinct from the referent of terms like “body,” “sense faculty,” etc. (Uddyotakara actually formulates the argument somewhat differently than Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla do, as we will see in a moment. It is instructive in our attempt to understand the way the Buddhists employ their rivals’ ideas and arguments.) Uddyotakara’s third argument in the “Examination of the Self” is metaphysical: if a living body were devoid of self, it would also be devoid of vital breath (prāṇa). In other words, breath, and the regulation of breathing, cannot be explained in the absence of a stable, organizing agent.

It is the second of these, the terminological argument, that frames Bh4.

In his introduction to NS 3.1.1, Uddyotakara explicitly brings up the Buddhist analysis of the five aggregates (skandhā), the five streams of psychophysical phenomena that we confuse (sometimes singly, sometimes in concert) for a singular, stable being. After citing Buddhist scripture, Uddyotakara asks his Buddhist interlocutor to explain the apprehension of an I (ahaṃ-pratyaya), that is, the fact that our experience of the world is accompanied by a sense of self. If this “I” does not correspond to any of the aggregates, nor to a distinct substance comprised of them, then the Buddhist account must not hold. Much of the discussion centers on the grammar of affirmation and denial and the logic of saying “there is no self” or referring abstractly to “selflessness.” (Uddyotakara also argues here that the self is grasped by perception, which we will return to when we discuss Bh5 momentarily.) Eventually, after refuting a number of (potential) Buddhist denials of the self, he counters with this argument for its existence:

The word “self” has a referent that is distinct from the referents of the words expressing the aggregates (skandhā), form (rūpa), etc., because, given that it is distinct from the words “form” and the like, it is a single term (ekapada), like the word “pot.” This explains the apprehension of an I (ahaṃ-pratyaya).

279 Specifically: material form (rūpa), i.e., the body; feelings (vedanā), which can be pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral; conceptions (samjñā), or the cognitions by which we recognize and classify things; volitions (saṃskāra), habitual tendencies, desires, etc.; and consciousness (vijñāna).

280 rūpādiśkandhāvācākāśabhipravāsitāvācākāśatāmaśabdāḥ rūpādiśabdabhedbhayaḥ nyatve sati ekapadatvād, gharaśabdavād iti. etenaḥampratyayo vyākhyaḥ (NV 325.7). Uddyotakara goes on to defend against two objections. First, that the example is unestablished. Second, that the word “darkness” undermines the argument. Against the first objection, Uddyotakara’s response is simply to refer to the argument that “the quality-possessor is distinct from the quality.” Specifically, he says, “What was said to this is, for example, ‘the quality-possessor is distinct from the quality...’” As far as I can tell, he never uses quite that phrasing earlier or later in the Vārttika, though that is the precise phrase with which Kamalaśīla opens Bh8 (§8). The passage to which Bh8 refers does not appear until later in Uddyotakara’s
Though the force of the argument would seem to hinge on the meaning of the reason, “because of being a single term,” the exact sense of ekapada is not perfectly clear to me. We will return to this shortly.

Kamalaśīla’s citation of the terminological argument evinces some editorial intervention, but he is clearly responding to the words of the Tattvasamgraha. Before looking at Kamalaśīla’s prose, then, here is Śāntarakṣita’s versified paraphrase of this argument:

The expression “self” is expressive of something distinct from cognitions (buddhi), sense faculties (indriya), etc., or an aggregation (sāṅghātā) [of them], since it is accepted to be a single term (ekapada), given that it is different from established synonyms. And what is ascertained in this manner is joined with the property as indicated, like the word “pot.”

The phrase “cognitions, sense faculties, etc., or an aggregation” would more naturally be interpreted as a genitive tatpurusa compound in the sense “an aggregation of cognitions, sense faculties, etc.” but I favor the former reading. This reading suggested by Kamalaśīla’s commentary as well as by the overall passage in the Vārttika. Uddyotakara’s argument is preceded by a lengthy interaction with a Buddhist interlocutor, who at one point argues that the Buddha’s denial that any of the aggregates is the self implies that the referent of the self is the aggregation (samudāya) of all of them. Śāntarakṣita’s reference to their aggregation (sāṅghātā) thus incorporates this earlier discussion. In Śāntarakṣita’s verses, the entire clause about “what is ascertained in this manner” is essentially metrical filler, making explicit what is ordinarily left implicit: the fact that the locus possesses the reason (“is ascertained in this manner”) entails that it also possesses the property to be proven (“is joined with the property as indicated”).

Kamalaśīla rightly attributes this argument to Uddyotakara, but his prose formulation also corresponds more with Śāntarakṣita’s verses than Uddyotakara’s actual words:

The term “self” is an expression for something distinct from the body (śarīra), sense faculties (indriya), mind (manas), cognitions (buddhi), sensations (vedanā), or the aggregation (sāṅghātā), because, given that it is distinct from well-known synonyms (prasiddha-pariṣya), it is a single term, like words such as “pot.”

Uddyotakara’s reference to the aggregates is replaced with a different fivefold list: body, sense faculties, mind, cognitions, and sensations. In addition, following Śāntarakṣita’s version, Uddyotakara’s qualifier, “distinction from the words rūpa, etc.,” is replaced with “distinction from well-known synonyms.” Later in the chapter, Śāntarakṣita will point out, first, that words like cognition (buddhi) and mind (citta) have synonyms, which would undermine the reason without the qualification; but then he also points out that the word “self” is actually synonymous with words like

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281 Not as drastically as other instances we will consider; cf. §5.
282 buddhindriyāśaṅghātavyatirīktyābhidhāyakam | ātmeti vacanam yasmād idam ekapadaṃ matam ||182|| siddhaparyābhinnatve yac caiva pariṇiścitam | yathānirdiṣṭadharmane tad yuktam ghaṭaśabdavat ||183|| (TS 105, J9v.5).
283 ātmeti padaṃ sārindriyāmanabuddhivedānasaṅghātavyatirīktavacanam prasiddhaparyābhinnatve saty ekapadātvat, ghaṭaśabdavat (TSP 105.5, J45v.6).
“consciousness” (cetas), which undermines the qualification, too. This does not necessarily work when the qualification is distinction from the words for the five aggregates, though perhaps Śāntarakṣita would equate cetas with the fifth aggregate, vijñāna, as well. Still, Śāntarakṣita’s version sidesteps the discussion of the aggregates. Even if Kamalāśīla read the exact same text of the Vārttika printed in the modern edition, he had to adjust the argument accordingly.

When we consider the full context of this argument in the Nyāya-vārttika, Śāntarakṣita’s revision seems all the more manipulative. Uddyotakara engages in a lengthy exchange with an imaginary Buddhist interlocutor. He argues that the sentence “there is no self” (nāsty ātmaḥ) simply cannot function as the outright denial the Buddhists claim, both because of the way that language functions and because it would contradict certain Buddhist doctrines and scriptural statements. Here is a lengthy excerpt:

One who denies the self should say what the referent of the term “self” is. In fact, we do not see a single term (ekam padam) that is without meaning (nirarthaka). If you were to explain that the word (sabdā) “self” has as its referent the body, etc. (śarīrā-dī), even then, the contradiction remains (anivṛtto vyāghātah). Why? The meaning of the statement “the self does not exist” would, in that case, be “the body, etc., do not exist.”

You may say, “That which you imagine (vīkṛtā) to be the self does not exist.” We do not imagine the self. Imagination (kalpanā) is the cognition of one thing as something it is not through the imposition of a property of that thing on the basis of a commonality (sāmānyā) with something that is like that. And we do not explain the self in such a manner. Saying, “What you imagine to be the self,” you are liable to being asked: in what manner do we imagine the self, with existence (sattvena) or non-existence (asattvena)? If with existence, then what is the commonality a non-existent has with an existent on account of which the self would be the object of imagination (kalpanā-visaya)? And by saying no-self has some commonality with the self (ātmasāmānyam cānātmano), you admit the self. In fact, there is no commonality between a non-existent and an existent. You might say, “You err because you imagine that the conception of the self (ahamkāra), whose referent is actually the body, etc., refers to the self.” In this case, too, the contradiction remains, because you admit the existence of a referent of the conception of the self distinct from the body, etc.

You may think, “It is not necessary for a single term (eka-padam) to have a meaning, e.g., void (śūnya), or darkness (tamas).” This is not right, because the contradiction remains. First, this is the meaning of the word void: a substance for which there is no protection (rakṣitā) is called void (śūnya) because it is fit for dogs (śvabhya hitatvā). The referent of the word darkness is a substance, quality, or action that has come to be characterized by non-apprehension. Where light is absent, substance, etc., is denoted by the word darkness. And if you say that the word darkness is meaningless, you contradict your own doctrine, because darkness is the material cause of the four [elements] (cattāraṃ

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284 For Uddyotakara, the meaning (artha) of a word and the thing (artha) to which it refers are one and the same. To be is to be speakable. One can just as well render words like nirarthaka as “without an object” or even “without a referent,” rather than “meaningless,” throughout this passage. Though Uddyotakara would understand the distinction, he would not accept that it really makes a difference. Indeed, that is part of his point.

285 This is a pun or an interpretive etymology (nirukti) that hinges on the close phonological similarity between the word for a dog (śun) and the first syllable (śu-) of the word empty (śunyā). The gerundive suffix -ya can lend the sense of being ready for or fit for something. (This suffix is generally attached to verbal roots, but Uddyotakara is playing with the phonology of śu+ya.)
Therefore, there is not a single word (ekam padam) that is meaningless.\(^{287}\)

There is a lot of material here, and the passage continues for some time. Most urgently, this passage makes it clear that the full force of Uddyotakara’s terminological argument relies on the dialogical context of the overall passage.

As for the term ekapada. John Taber, in a delightful essay on Śābara and Kumārila’s interjection into the Buddhist-Nyāya debate on the self, characterizes Uddyotakara’s terminological argument as saying that “the word ‘I,’ in so far as it is a unique word different from the words ‘body,’ ‘idea,’ and so forth, requires a unique occasion for its use.”\(^{288}\) But it is not the uniqueness of the term ātman that concerns Uddyotakara here, only its distinctness from any of the terms that a Buddhist, a proponent of an-ātman, “no-self,” could claim as the referent of the term. Note the refrain in the passage above: the contradiction remains (anivṛutto vyāghātaḥ). Uddyotakara is not arguing abstractly that the term “self” proves the existence of the self though he does believe that to be the case—but rather that Buddhists cannot satisfyingly account for the term without contradicting themselves. Isabelle Ratié, after citing Taber’s description, translates the terminological argument and renders ekapada, “a term [designating] a single [entity].”\(^{289}\) This puts a nice spin on Taber’s interpretation, and suggests a clear analysis of the actual term ekapada.\(^{290}\) Yet it remains somewhat ambiguous. What determines whether a term designates a single entity? Would a compound like śāśa-visāna (hare’s-horn) qualify? What about an adjective? There are several instances in the Vārttika where Uddyotakara refers to a

\(^{286}\) I am not sure what specific text or teaching or statement Uddyotakara has in mind here.

\(^{287}\) ātmapratipādhaṁ ca kuruṇaṇaṁśadaryaya visayo vaktavyah. na hy ekaṁ padam nirarthakaṁ paśyāmah. aṭṭhai śārīrādivisāyām ātmāsadbam pratipadyethāḥ, evam apy anivṛutto vyāghātaḥ, katham iti. nāsti ātmyeta asya vākṣyasya tadāniṁ ayam artho bhavati śārīrādayo na saṁtīti.

\(^{288}\) atha yaṁ bhavanta ātmānām kalpayanti sa nāśti. na vayaṁ ātmānām kalpayāmah, kalpanā hi nāmātathābhūtasya tathābhūvībhīṁ sāmāṇyāt taddharmādhvareṇa taṁpratayaḥ. na cātmanām evambhūtātmā pratipadyāmahe. yaṁ bhavanta ātmānām kalpayantītī bruvāṇī bhavān prашṭaya jāyate, katham vayaṁ ātmānām kalpayāma iti, kim sattvaṁ Śāntaṁ svardvānaḥ sattvānaḥ. yadi sattvāna, kāmāsaṣṭā satā sādharmyaṁ yena kalpanāvisāya ātmaṁ, ātmaśāmāyaṁ cāntāno bhuvātāt ātmā ahbhūpayagado bhavati. na hy asataḥ satā sāmāṇyam asi. atha śārīrādivisāyam ahaṁkāram ātmāni kalpayīvā viparītayet. evam ca śārīrādivasyātāḥkāramāvājāvastvābhūpayagamā anivṛutto vyāghātaḥ.

\(^{289}\) atha manyase ekapadasya nāvaśayām arthena bhavātyeyam iti yathā śūnyaṁ tama īti ca. tama na, vyāghatāvibhīr. śūnyaśabdasya tāvad ayam arthāḥ, yasya rakṣītā dravyasya na vidyate, tad dravyāṁ śvahyo hitaśvat śūyam ity ucyaite. tamaḥśabdasyānupalabdhiḥilaśaṇapraṇapatīni dravyagunakarmāṇi visayah, yatra yatraśanvidhitī tejas, tatra tatra dravyādi tamaḥśabdenābhīdhiyate. tamaḥśabdaś cānārthaḥ iti bruvāṇāḥ svāsiddhāntām bhādhathe, caturṇām upādānārūpaṁtvā tamasa īti. tasmāt nānaṁkalam ekam padam īti (NV 320.16).

Brokhorst has an interesting analysis of this passage in Language and Reality. Skimming over the finer points of the passage, he concludes as follows: “Regardless of the exact arguments Uddyotakara uses to defend his position, what matters is his insistence on the fact that every word, including the word ‘soul’ in the sentence ‘the soul does not exist,’ must refer to an object. We thus have an instance of a sentence which, though correctly formed, is considered meaningless, and that by reason of adherence to the correspondence principle” (Brokhorst 2011, 120).

Matthew Kapstein translates much of Uddyotakara’s introduction to NS 3.1.1, including this passage, in an appendix to Reason’s Traces.

\(^{289}\) Taber 1990, 38.

\(^{289}\) “...un terme [désignant] une seule [entité]” (Ratié 2014, 69 n 188).

\(^{290}\) Unlike, e.g., Bronkhorst’s (1984) striking take on Yāska’s use of the term: “unanalyzed word.” This may be right, but it raises the question: How, exactly, does eka give the sense unanalyzed? Or, in other words, would Yāska use ekapada when what he means is “unanalyzed word?”
compound or a derivative as ekapada, and in the present context he even refers to the indeclinable nāsti, “is not,” as a pada. The term ekapada has a broad range of possible valences, and even though Uddyotakara uses it seldom, it has a broad range of applications in the Vārttika.

I am not sure whether Uddyotakara has in mind some precise or technical definition of ekapada in the present case, or whether he uses the term consistently throughout the Vārttika. What becomes clear over the course of the passage in question is that the potential scope of meaninglessness is what is at stake here. Significantly, Uddyotakara imagines his interlocutor invoking the standard examples of non-existent things, hare’s horns and sky-flowers. Uddyotakara cannot disagree that “a hare’s horn does not exist.” Why is this any different than saying, “The self does not exist?” “The referent of the word hare’s-horn,” he says, “is the connection (sambandha), therefore it is the denial of the connection, rather than a denial of the horn.” The implication may well be that śāsa-visāna (hare’s-horn) is not ekapada because it designates not a single entity but a connection between two and thus does not have the same property that renders the term ātman intrinsically meaningful (artha). Yet even if we say that śāsa-visāna is an ekapada as a single compound, the nature of the denial is different from the Buddhists’ absolute denial of the self. Uddyotakara continues:

And someone making the statement, “A hare’s-horn (śāsa-visāna) does not exist,” should be asked: Is this a generic denial, or a specific one?

If it is a generic denial, then it is not tenable, as it is impossible. What follows from the statement, “For a hare (śāsasya), a horn (visāna) does not exist,” is, “Even the horns of cows, etc., do not exist for a hare.” But this is impossible, for it is not the case that they do not exist. [That is to say, there are various valences of the genitive case, and the blanket denial “for a hare, a horn does not exist,” would entail the denial of all horns.]

If it is a specific denial, what is the horn of the hare that is denied? It is just the causal relation that is denied: “Of which a hare is not the effect,” or, “which is not the cause of a hare.” But this is impossible, for it is not the case that they do not exist. [That is to say, there are various valences of the genitive case, and the blanket denial “for a hare, a horn does not exist,” would entail the denial of all horns.]

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This is [also] meant to explain the non-existence of sky-flowers, etc.

The term śāsa-visāna (hare’s-horn) cannot be the subject of a blanket negation. Devadatta may not

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291 Cf. his analysis of the thirty-one possible readings of NS 1.1.4, which depend on whether one interprets its definition of perception as comprising of just one of the terms (ekapada) in the sutra or some combination of all five of them.

292 More precisely, he refers to the two terms (pade) of the statement, “the self is not” (nāsty ātma).

293 E.g., consider the two instances of ekapada in Yāska’s Nirukta, which present some interpretive challenges—especially when coupled with the two instances of aikapadika. Does Yāska use the term the same way both times? If so, it seems telling that he juxtaposes ekapada with samāsas and sādhhitas, but is an ekapada only a simple noun, or something more restricted, such as a term, as Bronkhorst (1984) puts it, that is “unanalyzed”?

294 śāsa-visānaśabdasya sambandhaśayātvaḥ sambandhapratiśedhau na visānapratiśedhah. (NV 322.20)

295 idaṃ ca śāsa-visānāṃ niśtiḥ bruvāṇaḥ prāśṭavyaḥ kim ayaṃ sāmāṇyapratipādiḥ tāhā visēṣapratipādiḥ iti. yadi sāmāṇyapratipādiḥ, tan na yuktam aśākyaḥ iti. śāsa-visānāṃ niśtiḥ gavādiviśānāṃ api śāsa-visānaḥ na santīti prāptam etac cāsāyām. na hi tāni na santīti.

atha visēṣapratipādiḥ, kincid viśānāṃ śāsa-sa pratiṣidhyate, yasya śāśo na kāryam, yac ca śāsa-sa na kāraṇam iti. so 'yaṃ kāryākāraṇasambandha eva pratiṣidhyate. kāryākāraṇasambandhas tv anyatra dṛṣṭa iha pratiṣidhyate iti nāyantāsattvapratipāde dṛṣṭaṃ bhavati.

etena khaṃ paḍyasyatvamāṃ vyākhyātām veditavyam (NV 323.4).
be the cause, or the effect, of his pot, but that does not mean that “Devadatta’s pot” does not exist. Odd though it seems, it is not all that hard to imagine senses in which a real horn, such as a cow’s horn, may be said to be “a hare’s.” Commonly speaking, by “hare’s horn” people mean a horn growing naturally on the head of a hare, and this, surely, does not exist—but this is a specific denial, and it hinges on the fact that the kind of connection being denied in this case can be observed in other cases. A term unto itself (eka-pada) may be incorrectly applied in a specific case, but it—or at least its components—exists in the first place because it refers to something (artha). A statement—“the self does not exist”—may be meaningless, but a term unto itself cannot. “A hare’s horn does not exist” is meaningful only insofar as there is an actual referent being denied, namely, a specific connection between hares and horns, each of which really exists. “The self is not the body” is a sensible statement. But, according to Uddyotakara, the Buddhists have to explain where the word “self” comes from and what it refers to, and they have to do so without contradicting their own doctrines.

Śāntarakṣīṭa does not quite take up this challenge.

This raises a number of questions. Why did Śāntarakṣīṭa change the argument? There is a chance that he had in mind a different argument from a different text, or that he misremembered Uddyotakara’s words, or even that he had a different or defective text. In other words, it may have been an innocent mistake—but most likely not. Uddyotakara’s argument is not an a priori argument for the existence of the self, but a sharp criticism of the Buddhist view. Buddhists claim there is nothing but the aggregates, but how, then, do they account for the sense of self? If the word “self” does not refer to any of the aggregates, then what does it refer to? What is the self such that the Buddha denies that the word refers to rūpa, etc.? Taking the Buddhist terminology seriously, Uddyotakara finds no way to account for our actual experience, nor for the way we describe it. In Śāntarakṣīṭa’s revision, on the other hand, Uddyotakara is simply making an argument for the self. The upside is that the revision can be attacked purely on its own terms. And yet—does this mean that Śāntarakṣīṭa is quixotically parrying windmills?

To conclude the discussion of the terminological argument, Kamalaśīla considers Bh4, a modest interjection by Bhāvivikta (not unlike Bh1, cf. Appendix A):

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\text{athāvīśeāspadapadārhāntarbhūtajaneyaviśayatve satīty aparām vīšeṇam upādiyate yathoktam bhāviviktena. (206)}^{297}
\]

One may wish to use another qualification, “[because it is a single term] under the condition that its referent is a knowable thing (jñeya) included in the categories that are the seat (āspada) of the indeterminate (avīṣeya),” as Bhāvivikta stated.

This qualification is reminiscent of three of the arguments from §2, the two unattributed arguments for Īśvara that we labelled X1 and X2, as well as Av8, Aviddhakarṇa’s first proof of self. X1 uses the obscure concept of “that which is the seat (āspada) of that whose arising is variegated (vicitra-udaya) and of movement (praspanda)” to refer obliquely to the categories of substance, quality, and action.

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296 Again, ekapada can refer, in a technical sense, to an unmodified noun, but Uddyotakara uses it to refer to derivatives and compounds on occasion, so the most general sense of the term must be something like “a term unto itself,” or “a single term” out of a grouping of more than one.

297 TSP 113.14, J48v.2.
X2 and Av8 both referred to the indeterminate (āvīśa) to similarly convey a grouping of the categories. As we saw in §2, VS 1.1.8 describes the six characteristics falling under the label “the indeterminate” as pertaining to substance, quality, and action. The qualification in Bh4 can, therefore, be rephrased, “[because the word self is a single term] under the condition that its referent is a knowable object within the categories substance, quality, or action.”

It is difficult to see why Kamalaśīla would include this reference apart from a sense of thoroughness. Rather than relying on the uniqueness of the term ātman, Bhāvivikta perhaps means to emphasize that its referent must be a real thing. Śāntarakṣita claims that the terminological argument could be made just as easily for nonexistent things like sky flowers. The real problem, then, is the underlying metaphysics of language. (Of course, this would only apply to the discrete formulation of the argument itself, not to the entire passage, considering Uddyotakara’s remarks about hare’s horns.) Bhāvivikta’s qualification would perhaps sidestep this problem; perhaps Bh4 is a subtle clue that Bhāvivikta followed Uddyotakara. But in any case, the fragment gives us little to go on, and Kamalaśīla adds nothing. All he says in response is that this qualification is unestablished like (pseudo-)Uddyotakara’s, rendering the reason itself unestablished, and that the reason is still inconclusive because of the absence of pervasion.

§ § §

After refuting the inferential arguments for the existence, impermanence, and omnipresence of the self (cf. §2–3), Śāntarakṣita considers an additional possibility:

Some imagine that the self is established by perception, because self-consciousness (ahamkāra) is known reflexively (svaṃvedya); they think the self is its object.

Glossing this, Kamalaśīla cites Bh5, in which he collapses Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta’s arguments into one:

\[ uddyotakarabhāviviktāder matam āśāṅkate. te by evam ābhūḥ pratyakṣa evāṁma siddhaḥ, tathā hi liṅgalīṅgisambandhāṃṣaṇapekṣaḥ aham iti ājñānaṃ rūpa-dīpānavataḥ pratyakṣaṃ. aṣya ca na rūpādir viśayas tadviśānavabhinnaratbhāṣatvāt. tasmād anya eva viśaya iti. (212) \]

He considers the view of Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al. They argue as follows: The self is actually established through perception. To explain: Without requiring a recollection of the connection (sambandha) between mark (linga) and marked (lingin), the cognition “I” is a perception, like the cognition of color, etc (rūpa-ādi). But its object is not color, etc., because it has a different appearance than that. Therefore, its object is something else.

Just as color is the object of visual perception, the self is the object of I-cognition. The proof is in the primacy and immediacy of our sense of self—it does not require the cognitive process of inferential reasoning, but attends to the perceptual, prelinguistic cognition itself.

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298 nabhastalāravindādau yad ekaṃ viniveśyate | kārakādipadaṃ tena vyabhicāro ‘pi drśyate ||205|| (TS 113, J10v.5).
299 evam api yathtakaviveśanāsiddhaḥ asiddho hetur vyāptiyabhāvāc cānaikānātikaḥ (TSP 113.15, J48v.2).
300 anyaiḥ pratyakṣaśiddhatvam ātmanah parikalpitam | svasaṃvedyo hy ahamkāras tasyātmā viśayo mataḥ ||212|| (TS 115, J11r.3).
301 TS 115.11, J49r.3.
Uddyotakara makes essentially this argument amidst his comments on NS 3.1.1. Immediately after his remarks on the denial of hare's horns and sky flowers, he responds to the idea that the self is not apprehended:

First, the self is apprehended perceptually. In what manner perceptually? Without requiring a recollection of the connection between mark and marked, conforming to the distinct character (svabhāva) of its object, the cognition “I” is a perception, like the cognition of color, etc (rūpa-ādi). 302

This is quite clearly one of the passages Kamalaśīla has in mind in attributing Bh5 to “Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al.” Bhāvivikta, presumably, made a very similar argument.

There is an important ambiguity in the example in Bh5 and the one Uddyotakara uses: the cognition of rūpa. The term rūpa typically refers, in the fragments we have seen and in much of Nyāya and Buddhist epistemological writing, to the object corresponding to visual cognition—paradigmatically, color. (A Naiyāyika or a Sarvāstivāda Buddhist may also accept that we see things like shape (cf. Bh8/Av1, §8), but color is common ground, as well as the most common example, of rūpa qua object of visual perception.) It would make good sense for rūpa to refer to color in the present case, since the argument is that the sense of self is a perception but with a different object than the five external senses.

But in the Buddha's deconstruction of our sense of self, rūpa represents the first aggregate (skandha), material form, i.e., (what we take to be) the body. Uddyotakara's use of the term rūpa in his argument contains this ambiguity. According to him, Buddhists cannot argue that rūpa, etc., forms the basis of the perception of self, because the Buddha himself says, “I am not this rūpa, O monk, nor are you this rūpa.” 303 The fact that the sense of self is like the cognition of rūpa (color), etc., but cannot—even according to the Buddha himself—have rūpa (body, form), etc., as its object, means there must be some distinct thing as its basis: the self.

After pointing this out, Uddyotakara then imagines his opponent raising a counterexample that contains the two valences of rūpa: the thought, “I am pale.” The opponent’s idea is that when we refer to ourselves as, e.g., pale- or dark-skinned, we are identifying ourselves with our rūpa (body); therefore, rūpa does, in fact, form the basis of our sense of self, even if only illusorily. But, Uddyotakara replies, when we say “I am pale,” we are not conflating ourselves with our rūpas, but simply metonymically eliding the possessive phrase “my body” and replacing it with the first-person pronoun. “I am pale” means “my body is pale,” and this is a perfectly natural figurative use of language, so the example does nothing against the argument that our sense of self is perceptual.

To be clear, Uddyotakara is not conflating the two valences of rūpa nor engaging in sophistry. His argument is that the perception of self is analogous to the perception of rūpa-as-color; rūpa-as-body is relevant to him only because he wants to emphasize his agreement with the Buddha that the body is not the self. Nevertheless, I find it striking that he uses the term rūpa in both the sense of the object of visual cognition and in the sense of the first aggregate in such close proximity.

302 pratyakṣaṇa tavād ātmā upalabhya-te. katham pratyakṣaṇa? liṅgaliṅgisambandhasthānyapakeṣāṃ viśayasvabhāvahedanuvidyāḥ ahām iti vijayānaṁ rūpāvijñānaṁ pratyaksam (NV 323.14).
303 pratisiddho 'hamkāro rūpādīsa—rūpam nāham, evam tad bhikṣo rūpaṁ na tvam asi. tasmād rūpādaya eva tavād ahaṅkārasya viṣayā na bhavanti (NV 323.21).
Also strikingly, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla carefully delineate the two valences of rūpa in their engagement with Uddyotakara’s argument. First, they explain that if the cognition of the self were a perception of the self, it would appear in the image (ākāra) of the self. To explain, Kamalaśīla refers to rūpa only implicitly: “Visual cognition does not have sound as its object.” The restrictions and divisions among the senses are clear and distinct, and if the self were the object of a special sense, its appearance, and its distinctness from other perceptible objects, should be just as clear. But the cognitive image of the self does not conform to the Naiyāyika notion of a permanent, all-pervading sentient agent. This, however, leads into Uddyotakara’s train of thought, and notions like “I am pale.” Here, too, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla avoid the ambiguous term rūpa. Śāntarakṣita refers instead to a pale complexion (gaura-varṇa), and Kamalaśīla refers directly to the body (deha), arguing that “self-consciousness, which arises through the sensation (samsparśa) of states of the body, etc. (deha-ādi), has nothing but the body, etc., as its objective support (ālambana).” According to Uddyotakara, when we say, “I am pale,” we do not mean it literally. The self has no shade. Instead, we are figuratively highlighting the relationship between the self and the body. But, according to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, figurative expressions function in part on the basis of a subtle kind of cognitive dissonance. The rhetorical and figurative force, e.g., of an expression like “the boy is a lion” hinges on the obviousness of the fact that the boy is not actually a lion. The thought, they say, “wavers” (skhaladgata). No such wavering occurs when someone says, “I am pale.” We think it, say it, and understand it directly and distinctly. In other words, when we say, “I am pale,” we mean it. It is not a figurative expression, just a plain old cognitive illusion like our entire conceptually-imposed apprehension of reality.

We can summarize the discussion as follow:

Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al: The sense of self is like the five external senses, but with a distinct object.

The Buddhists: If so, it would correspond to its object the way visual cognition corresponds to color. In fact, the sense of self relies on our sensations of states of the body and the other aggregates.

Uddyotakara: We only figuratively conflate the body with the self; we are actually elliptically referring to “my body.”

The Buddhists: If that were so, the cognition, “I am pale” should waver the same way a figurative expression like “the boy is a lion” wavers, but instead it is clear and distinct.

Finally, the Buddhists conclude, if the self were the object of perception, the entire dispute would be impossible, as we would clearly and distinctly perceive it. Or, put differently, the fact that there is a dispute means that it cannot be an instance of perception. There is no dispute, for example, about whether we perceive color.

We cannot say to what extent Bhāvivikta’s distinctive thinking lurks behind Bh5. Vātsyāyana remarks, at the beginning of his comments on NS 1.1.10, that the self is not perceptible. Some

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304 cakṣurjñānaṁ na śabdavidayam (TSP 115.16, J49r.4).
305 tasmād dehādyavasthāsamsparśnotpadayamāno ‘hamkāro dehādyālambana eveti jānayate (TSP 116.3, J49r.5)
306 “Concerning these, the self, first, is not grasped through perception” (sattrātmā tāvat pratyakṣato na gṛhyate (NBh 16.2)).
commentators apparently interpreted this as a definitive statement, and did not accept that the self is an object of perception. With Bh5, Kamalaśīla implies that many of those who did made similar arguments.

§ § §

In both of these cases, we can see some of the ways that Śāntarakṣita’s project shapes his, and, by consequence, Kamalaśīla’s, employment and engagement of Naiyāyika authors and arguments. Śāntarakṣita rationally reconstructs a generic Naiyāyika position, stitching his versified variations of specific passages into a coherent dialogic sequence. But this entails more than just reformulating arguments to fit into the confines of a śloka verse. At the very least, he has to isolate discrete sentences from their original context—even if Kamalaśīla cites it word-for-word, its full force may be lost in translation. Depending on the argument, he may have to manipulate it more dramatically to make it resemble a discrete formal argument to be picked apart on formal and logical grounds.

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307 Udayana, for example, suggests that the perception of the self is coreferential with perceptions of the body, so that the distinction between the self and the body has to be established (tatra svasamvedanam mūlam, ihāpi mānasam iti na kaicid viṣeṣah, tat katham ātmani prayyakapratyēdhakām bhāyam ity ata abāham iti, yady api savastuko ‘yaṁ tathāpi sarirapratyayasamāndhikaranyāt tadvastukā evyam ity api syat. ato na tadātirikte vartuni pramāṇayitum śākyate tāvad yāvad dehādibhyo bhinne ātma pramāṇāntareṇa na sādhya ityarthah, etc. [NVṬṬP 233.2]).
In the remaining five sections of the “Examination of the Self,” Śāntarakṣita responds first to the Mīmāṃsā (or more precisely, Kumārila Bhāṭṭa’s) theory of the self, then, more briefly, the Śāṅkhya and the Digambara Jain theories, and, finally and very briefly, the views of the inchoate Advaita Vedānta, and the Buddhist Vātsiputriyas (i.e., the so-called pudgalavādins, “proponents of a person”). The particulars differ in each of the six approaches to the self considered in the “Examination of the Self,” and Śāntarakṣita’s mode of engagement differs depending in part, I think, on how urgently he regards each view. (It is very different, for example, to read through the very tidy and tightly organized pūrvapakṣa of the section on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments for the self, and the more sprawling engagement with Kumārila, whose own śloka verses often take temporary possession of the Tattvasamgraha.308)

On several occasions, the non-Buddhists claim that Buddhists cannot account for karmic retribution without recourse to a stable self, charging them with kṛta-nāśa-akṛta-abhyāgama-dosā, “the defect that what one has done disappears, and what one has not done befalls one.” If a permanent self transmigrates to a new body after death, then the results of one’s actions in this life can visit one in the next; if there is no such stable underlying agent, then we reap the rewards of others’ good deeds and suffer the consequences of others’ sins. Śāntarakṣita, without substantiating his point just yet, returns again and again to the same basic response: a permanent thing cannot be a cause, and all existing things are momentary. For example, he regards the Advaita view favorably, but with a caveat: “Their view has a slight transgression (alpa-aparādha),” he says in verse 330, “because they insist on permanence (niyata-uktītaḥ).” It is no surprise, therefore, that when he has finally made his way through each of these theories of the self, he turns to this fundamental issue in chapter eight, the “Examination of Permanence (sthirabhāva).”

In the “Examination of Permanence,” Śāntarakṣita proves the doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇikatvā), or the idea that entities cease to exist the moment they have originated (kṣaṇa-
Katsumi Mimaki traces the analysis and defense of momentariness in Indian Buddhist philosophical works from Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, through Śāntarakṣita, and ultimately to and beyond Ratnakīrti, whose Sbhisiddhīdāsaka he translates and examines. Mimaki, following Steinkellner, highlights the importance of Dharmakīrti's so-called sattvānumāna, i.e., the argument that non-momentary entities cannot function as causes and, therefore, that mere existence proves an entity's momentariness. Śāntarakṣita follows Dharmakīrti closely in the “Examination of Permanence,” as Mimaki himself notes.

Unlike most of the chapters of the Tattvasaṁgraha, here Śāntarakṣita starts not with a prima facie view to be corrected but with a few arguments for his own position. He then proceeds through a series of definitions, arguments, objections, and responses. This includes a discussion of the nature of destruction; definitions of key terms like “causal efficacy” (arthakriya) and “moment” (ksaṇa); reflections on the relationship between these two; and responses to objections. Aviddhakārṇaśī is the first voice Śāntarakṣita raises in objection to momentariness (Av11).

At the end of the chapter, Śāntarakṣita entertains further objections by Bhāvivikta and Uddyotakara. They argue that we could not experience the world as we do—namely, as comprised of stable objects that we interact with over time—if everything were perfectly distinct each and every moment. Bhāvivikta's two fragments here, Bh6 and Bh7, give the strongest stylistic evidence for equating him with Aviddhakārṇaśī. Bh6 and Bh7 share some of the distinctively dense style and phrasing of several of Aviddhakārṇaśī's fragments. But it is especially important to keep the absence of context in mind with these particular fragments. They are, to say the least, difficult to understand (durbodha). I can only ask the reader to bear with me as we trudge through some awfully dense material. We can only imagine how much clearer this might have been, or might someday be, with access to the full passages from which these fragments were lifted. Kamalaśīla does not always seem to have much firmer of a grasp on these fragments than I do. This is a little disconcerting. But even so, at least he gave us something to puzzle over—better to collect uncertainties than nothing at all! Or at least more fun.

§ § §

What happens when something ceases to be? According to Śāntarakṣita, and Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti before him, any conditioned entity ceases to be immediately upon arising and is in that sense “momentary.” We have already seen traces of this idea. Śāntarakṣita argues that a permanent cause, likeĪśvara, could not give rise to effects over time—on this basis, we can infer from an entity's

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309 For a detailed examination of the doctrine of momentariness, see von Rospatt 1995.
311 See, e.g., Mimaki 1976, 62–64, which leads to the remark, “Le premier ouvrage qui a traité consciemment cette discussion en tant que problème logique, c-à-d. pour établir l'inclusion (vyāpti) du sattvānumāna, est le Pramāṇaviniścaya de Dharmakīrti. […] Désormais cette discussion se déroule […] comme nous l'avons vu ci-dessus, dans le Tattvasaṁgraha de Śāntarakṣita, la Tattvasaṁgraha-pāñjikā de Kamalaśīla […]” (The first work to knowingly treat this discussion as a logical problem, i.e., to establish pervasion (vyāpti) in the sattvānumāna, is Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya. […] Subsequently, the discussion unfolds […], as we saw above, in Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṁgraha [and] Kamalaśīla’s Tattvasaṁgraha-pāñjikā)” (64).
312 Cf. Mimaki 1976. See von Rospatt 1995, 94–110, for different definitions of the pivotal terms kṣaṇa (moment) and kṣaṇika (momentary).
mere existence that it must be momentary, i.e., that it perishes immediately upon arising, and, in so doing, gives rise to the next momentary flash in an incessant stream. There appears to be stability because of the speed of the unceasing process, and because each momentary existent gives rise to another moment just like it. Nevertheless, causal relationships do not unfold in a vacuum, hence the appearance of stability is also marked by the appearance of change. Take the common example of a seed and a sprout. A single seed is really a seed-complex, a heap of atoms that bear upon one another in such a manner that we can usefully conceive of them altogether as a single thing. But over time, what we think of as “the seed” is actually a fluctuation of momentary “seeds,” each of which happens to be nearly identical to the preceding momentary “seed” that gave rise to it. At a certain point, changes in the causal complex surrounding and informing the fluctuation of seed-moments leads to “the seed” becoming the sort of seed that sprouts. Because the whole process occurs with such apparent consistency, we think the sprouting seed is the same as the seed we planted. In reality, the seed has never been the same seed. Moment to moment “it” is an entirely new heap caused by the heap that originated and vanished in the preceding moment. The way that Śāntarakṣita defends this account at the beginning of the “Examination of Permanence” is largely to deny that destruction (vināśa), i.e., something’s ceasing to be, has a cause. Rather, immediate destruction just is what it is to be momentary, which just is what it is to be. Hence, in Śāntarakṣita’s phrasing, an entity is “independent” with respect to its own destruction. It requires no outside assistance to cease to be. Its perishing is intrinsic to its existing.
CHAPTER EIGHT
EXAMINATION OF PERMANENCE

Introduction

Perhaps we are making this effort [in the preceding seven chapters] toward unworthy subjects, since primordial matter and so on are refuted by a proof of momentariness (kṣaṇa-bhaṅga). Hence, we will establish momentariness clearly in order to refute what we have already mentioned as well as what we will discuss later, universals, etc., without distinction. (350–351)

There are some who claim that there is a dichotomy between entities that are produced and those that are unproduced; others believe there is one between those that are momentary and those that are non-momentary. (352)

Among these, the entities that are [considered to be] produced (kṛtaka) are momentary (kṣaṇa-bhaṅgin) because, being independent [of any other causes] with respect to [their own] destruction, they are fixed with respect to it. If x is independent of any other cause with respect to the existence of y, x is understood to be invariable (niyata) with respect to y, because it arises in such a manner from its own causes.314 For example, a causal complex free from obstruction is invariable with respect to the arising of its effects. And all produced things are independent with respect to destruction.315 If, though independent, it could arise at another time or place, it would depend on that [time or place], and, as a result, it would not be independent. And in every case, all produced things are independent with regard to [their own] destruction, because [purported] causes of destruction would do absolutely nothing to them. (353–357)

To explain: The destroying cause could not bring about a destruction that is indistinct from the entity, because the entity is produced from its own cause. An entity’s essence (ātman) arises from its cause fully intact, so a destruction that is identical with the entity could not be delivered by any other causes. (358–359)

On the other hand, if there were something called “destruction” that were produced apart from the entity, there would be nothing for its cause to bring about in the entity itself. Therefore, such effects as the perception [of the thing] would follow as before. And, because it would have a fixed condition, it also could not [be said to] be concealed, etc.[, on account of which its functioning would be delayed]. (360–361)

One might say, “An entity is destroyed by a thing called destruction.” This is not so, because the [problematic] alternatives [that were just mentioned], difference, etc., would still remain. (362)

If one were to say that the “destruction” that is brought about is another name for disappearance and consists in the absence (abhāva) of existence, then it is still not tenable for that to be produced. Or, if non-existence (abhāva), whose form is incessantly devoid of origination, were an effect, it would have to be an entity, like a sprout, because it would be produced by the power of its

313 Śāntarakṣita does not add this phrase here but does in the formula that follows.
314 Moments like these speak to the text’s didactic potential.
315 I struggle to see how this does not beg the question. Something that is produced is, in virtue of being produced, independent of any other cause with respect to its own perishing, therefore it must be momentary. But being momentary itself means arising with a form that intrinsically decays and disappears after the moment it arises. That said, the proceeding analysis does go beyond this seeming tautology.
cause. Non-existence brought about in this affirmative sense, on the basis of implicative negation, would, again, be liable to the same alternatives, difference, etc. If one were to say that the negation of an action does not produce an entity, then it would be established that the agent [of destruction] is not a cause, as it would be deficient in the nature of a cause. (363–366)

Nyāya objection

(i) Objection: Destruction is certainly not present when the entity exists, nor prior, nor much later, but only immediately after the entity. Thus, it is tenable that it has a cause because, given that you have denied that something independent can be incidental, it is temporally restricted. And, because it exists immediately after the entity, it is also tenable that it has a cause because it exists after not having existed, just as you accept that there is another momentary entity [immediately after each preceding momentary entity]. (367–369)

(ii) Further, if it has no cause, is it non-existent like the son of a barren woman, or permanent like ether, since there is no other option? If it does not exist, then every entity would have to be permanent, because they would not perish, and the perception that every produced thing perishes would be baseless. If it is permanent, every entity would have to abide together with its destruction, because there would be no hindrance to this state of affairs. And it is not reasonable to refer to the destruction of something that has not been generated. (370–372)

Refutation

To this, we say: What sort of destruction are you asking about? Is it what we declare, the fact that an entity is subject to last only a moment, or is it “annihilation,” i.e., the cessation of a thing’s character (svarūpa)? If you are asking about the former, then there is no quarrel. We accept that an entity that lasts only a moment has a cause, and one can call this “destruction.” But because the latter does not exist, it cannot have a cause. (373–375)

The property of arising immediately after the entity cannot pertain to such a thing, as the fluctuating character of an entity arises along with the entity itself. Therefore, because destruction really exists, produced things are not eternal, and it does not follow that the notion of perishability is baseless. (376–377)

On the other hand, because annihilation is selfless, like a sky-lotus, etc., it cannot arise immediately after the entity, nor does it exist after not having existed. We understand “there is annihilation” to mean “the entity does not exist,” and we do not believe that this is an affirmation of anything. Indeed, it is not the case that simply calling someone an ass entails perceiving every property of a donkey in him. And if this were an affirmation of a separate thing called annihilation, it would not bring anything about for the entity, so why would that [entity] cease? (378–381)

We hold that destruction, the annihilation of an entity, does not exist in that manner, i.e., with a disjunction from the form of an entity; not due to [i.e., not in the sense of] the non-existence

316 The phrase “there is a non-pot on the table” (implicative negation [paryudāsa]) posits something that is not a pot, whereas, “there is no pot on the table” (non-implicative negation [prasajya]) simply denies that there is a pot without positing anything else.

317 Kamalaśīla attributes this set of reasoning to Aviddhakarṇa (§5). According to the Buddhists, the destruction or decay of a momentary existent is intrinsic to it. Given that all things are momentary, a thing’s existence just is its existing for only a moment. There is no separate event called “destruction” nor a separate agent of destruction. According to Nyāya, however, a substance would persist without something causing its destruction.
We do not say that it consists of cessation in an affirmative sense, and we deny that the form of the entity continues after a moment. Hence, we do not affirm that it has any fixed form, so it is baseless to ascribe the notion of permanence to it. (382–384)

[Translator's note: After explaining that produced things are momentary, Śāntarakṣita turns to the question of unproduced things. In this discussion, he further defines the terms “moment” (kṣaṇa), “momentary” (kṣaṇika), “unproduced” (akṛtaka), and “causal efficacy” (arbhakriyā). Nothing can create a new effect while remaining the same; anything that participates in a causal stream must be impermanent, and, so, momentary. Existence entails causal efficacy and therefore momentariness. After this, Śāntarakṣita fends off objections from several different thinkers, culminating in the following exchange to conclude the chapter.]

**Nyāya objection**

(i) Either the point of your thesis is lost, or the all-encompassing pervasion in all of your reasons is annulled by this inference: A later cognition [of the sun, the moon, etc.] must have as its referent the sun, etc., existing at the time of the [earlier] cognition whose referent was the sun, or the moon, etc., as intended, because, under the condition that it does not have something earthly as its referent, it is denotable as being the cognition of that, like the first cognition whose object was the sun, or the like, at that time.319 (461–463)

(ii) The substrata of universals, color-ness, etc. [e.g., the color blue], their substrata [e.g., a blue cloth], and the perceptions that are produced with those [i.e., with the color blue and the cloth] as their objects, all must not be subject to perishing immediately after arising, for such reasons as being knowable and being denotable, unlike sky-lotuses.320 (464–465)

(iii) Our proclamation is that the sequentially-arising perceptions that are the objects of debate all have one and the same object as their referent. This is because, while there is no basis for annulling [their coreferentiality], the same expression is employed [to describe all of them], just like manifold cognitions in a single present moment. (466–467)

**Refutation**

To begin with, in the first argument, the example lacks the property to be proven, because it is a cause.321 Indeed, every referent is non-coextensive with its cognition. Also, words like “sun,”

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318 This verse puzzles me, but the point seems to be to delineate the kind of “destruction” that Śāntarakṣita admits from the kind that he denies. Kamalaśīla says, “In that manner,’ i.e., non-existence [of destruction] is due to its having the form of the disjunction of the intrinsic condition of the entity, rather than due to the cessation of the intrinsic form of that which is the intrinsic condition of the entity, so why should everything be permanent?” (evam iti vastusvabhāvavṛtyogāpattvāt, na tu bhāvaśvabhāvaya sarad svairapārvṛter asattvam, tat katham sarvabhāvānām nityatvam syāt). In other words—I think—we do not deny the mere cessation of a thing, only that there is a separation between the thing and its destruction, or that its destruction involves a separation between the thing and its intrinsic form.

319 Kamalaśīla attributes this and the next argument to Bhāvavikta (§6). Both prove that the objects of cognition must persist at least long enough for us to perceive, think about, and name them. He thinks most things persist longer than that, but that alone would suffice to disprove momentariness.

320 As in English, the term “like” (yathā) in Sanskrit is sometimes ambiguous when following a negation. E.g., “This is not a novel, like the Decameron.” Does this mean the Decameron is similar in not being a novel, or dissimilar in being one? In the present case, I remove the ambiguity by adding un-, but there is some uncertainty about this argument. The example is different in the fragment cited by Kamalaśīla, as will be discussed in §6 below.

321 Kamalaśīla cites Dharmakīrti (PV 3.246) to defend the view that objects cannot be simultaneous with cognitions of the entity.
which only arise on the basis of a speaker’s whim, can be applied to things like lamps; the argument deviates because of such cognitions. (468–469)

Argument (ii)

Because universals, etc., lack intrinsic existence, we do not claim momentariness [in their case]. The argument for the sake of proving its non-existence is presented in vain. (470)

Argument (iii)

Even the perceptions of lamps, etc., are expressible by the same word, so the reason deviates with respect to that. If you think coreferentiality is annulled in these cases, then why don’t you see this transparent annulment in the intended case, as well? (471–472)

The cognitions that have come under dispute do not all have one and the same object as their referent, because they are produced sequentially, like the cognitions of lightning, a lamp, etc. Indeed, it is contradictory for cognitions with one and the same object to be sequential, because it is contradictory for something that cannot be affected by others to rely on them.322 (473–474)

The negative concomitance in all of your reasons is doubtful, because there is nothing to annul their presence in a dissimilar case.323 (475)

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322 Śāntarakṣita lifts the final clause here from Dharmakīrti (PV 2.242). In Dharmakīrti’s auto-commentary, as well as in the overall passage, he makes it clear that the phrase anayir akāryabhedaśya (which I am rendering, “something that cannot be affected by others”) refers to a permanent (sthirā) entity. Coarsely, the phrase means, “something for which a difference cannot be brought about by others.” As withĪśvara, if the moon were permanent, its form would be fixed once and for all, and, so, could not be affected by anything else. If the moon had to rely on auxiliary causes to bring about different cognitions of itself across time, it would, in relying on those auxiliaries, cease to be fixed once and for all. At the end of Kamalaśīla’s commentary on this verse, one can almost hear an audible sigh: “And it cannot be that it relies on another cause, because a permanent thing cannot be assisted by that. Nor is it tenable that it relies on something that does not give assistance, as that is absurd. Or, if there were assistance, the consequence would be the loss of permanence. We’ve repeated this a hundred times.” (nāpi kāramāntarā paścāt nityasya tenānupakāryatvāt na cānupakārīnāpekaḥ yuktā, atipraṇāgatā, upakāre vā nityatvaḥānupraśaṅga iti śatāśāh carcitam etat. [TSP 207.2].)

323 “Where there is smoke, there is fire, unlike in a lake.” The lake is “dissimilar” in that it does not possess the property to be proven, fire. The “negative concomitance” (where there is no fire, there is no smoke) is not doubtful, because there is no doubt that the reason, smoke, can never be present in dissimilar cases like lakes. But there is nothing nullifying the presence of reasons like “being knowable” in dissimilar cases, i.e., momentary phenomena.
§5. AV11: DESTRUCTION

When we say that a fallen pot was destroyed, that milk is gone once it has curdled, or that firewood is spent once it has burned up, what are we referring to? Is a thing’s “destruction” some separate phenomenon apart from the thing destroyed? Are all instances of destruction caused by the same kind of destroyer?

According to momentariness theory, everything that exists does so for only a moment. Moreover, to exist just is to perish upon arising. We may say “the pot was destroyed” after it shatters, but in reality “the pot” was only a convenient fiction to begin with. The constituents of “the pot,” the unique particulars we conceptually identify as a pot, are destroyed and newly generated each and every moment. “The pot” is actually a continually newly arising heap of momentary particulars.

Destruction, as Śāntarakṣita explains, is neither a separate thing, nor the result of some separate thing. Rather, the destruction of every momentary entity is just that entity’s being momentary.

Aviddhaṅkarna, as paraphrased by Śāntarakṣita in verses 367–369, offers the opposing view, namely, that an entity’s destruction is indeed a separate phenomenon, that it exists immediately after the last moment of the entity’s existence, and that it has a cause.324 Kamalaśīla cites fragment AV11 as follows:

\[
tad evam ete trayo hetava uktāḥ sahetuko vināśaḥ kādacītakatvāt vastūtparyanantarabhāvitvena bauddhair abhyupagamyamānatvāt prāg abhūtvatmalābhāc ca kṣaṇāntaravat, vaidharmyena śāsaviśānādaya iti. (369)\]

\[In this way, he has stated three reasons: Destruction has a cause (i) because it is incidental (kādacītakatva), (ii) because it is accepted by Buddhists (bauddha) as coming into its own immediately after the arising of the entity, and (iii) because it comes into its own after not previously existing, like another moment, and unlike hare’s horns, etc.\]

There are three overlapping arguments here. Kamalaśīla describes the first in terms of the chronology of origination, existence, and destruction. An entity’s destruction cannot exist while the entity exists, nor prior to its origination, nor long after it has ceased to be, but rather, “in the second moment, immediately after the entity” (vastvanantaram dūtīye kṣane vināśāt). The fact that destruction is temporally restricted (kādacītakatva) means it is contingent, so it must have a cause. If it were contingent yet independent, nothing would induce it to arise, and so, destruction never arising, nothing would ever be destroyed. Second, given momentariness theory, Buddhists accept that the destruction of an entity follows immediately upon the entity’s arising—they must, then, also accept that this phenomenon has a cause. Third, just like the proceeding momentary entity, which does not exist until the moment it arises, destruction also comes into existence after not existing previously,

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324 In my reading, the fragment itself, AV11, is restricted to the final citation of three reasons, which reads more like a concise summary than an actual quotation. Kamalaśīla uses the verb nir+√diṣ (to point out, indicate) to describe Śāntarakṣita’s paraphrase of Aviddhaṅkarna’s arguments, rather than the causative of √drī (to present, demonstrate), suggesting more of an indirect invocation than in many other cases. And it is only at the end that Kamalaśīla introduces and concludes a statement with quotation markers (uktāḥ… iti). Otherwise the entire passage appears to be a description of Aviddhaṅkarna’s reasoning rather than a citation or even a kind of direct paraphrase.

325 TSP 172.13, J65v.5.
and its appearance, again, must therefore be caused.

These arguments are not purely distinct from one another, but emphasize different aspects of the temporality and causation of destruction. All three speak in terms of moments, the smallest temporal unit, or phenomena whose existence is defined by it. The latter two in particular hinge on the concept of momentariness. Unlike several of the fragments we have seen so far, this triplet of arguments is unquestionably targeted at Buddhists, whether or not the reference to Buddhists (buddha) in Kamalaśīla's paraphrase is an interpretive interpolation.

**Interruptions**

There are several passages in the *Nyāyasūtra* that are germane to these arguments, but Aviddhakarṇa's direct invocation of momentariness to prove that there is a cause of destruction points most strongly to NS 3.2.10–14. This passage is an interlude in the examination of buddhi (cognition, intellect) that introduces momentariness as a Buddhist interjection into Nyāya's engagement with a Sāṃkhya *pūrva-pakṣa*.

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326 Apart from NS 3.2.10–14, the most relevant passages are (i) NS 2.1.39–43, an auxiliary section to the examination of inference, and (ii) 4.1.29–33, one of the eight theories from NS 4.1.14–43.

(i) After the examination of perception (NS 2.1.31–36), NS 2.1.37 features an objection that inference is not a means of knowledge (apramāṇa), and sutra 38 dismisses the *pūrva-pakṣa*’s reasoning outright. What follows is an objection to the purported temporality of inferential reasoning, and specifically to the notion of the present. The objection in sutra 39 is that something descending (patat) can only occur in the temporality of what has fallen (patita) or what is going to fall (patitavya), so that there is no present moment (vartamanabhāva). The following four sutras refute the reasoning of the objection (40–41), assert the necessity of the present for perception and thus knowledge (42), and point out that we use the present to refer both to existence as such, and to refer to processes that implicate or are implicated by the past and future (43). The relation between the three moments of time plays an important role in Av11, so this passage is worth bearing in mind, though it is only tangentially relevant.

(ii) We have already seen the sequence NS 4.1.14–43 in regard to Īśvara (§1). Momentariness itself does not come up in this sequence, but it still bears mention. In Av11, Aviddhakarṇa may be commenting on the fifth of the eight theories rejected in this sequence, NS 4.1.29, “everything is permanent” (sarvam nityam), which follows immediately upon the fourth theory, in 4.1.25, that “everything is impermanent” (sarvam anityam). It is important for Nyāya that both theories are wrong: the atoms, e.g., are permanent, while the elements composed of them are impermanent. The reason the *pūrva-pakṣa* puts forth in sutra 25 is that all things are subject to origination and destruction (upatti-vināśa-dhārmakatva). After a brief discussion, the final position is that permanent entities are determined to exist in accordance with observation, so they cannot be spoken against (nityayāpratāהק yanam yathopālabddhi vyavasthānāt). In other words, there is no denying what we can directly observe and we can directly observe permanent entities. This then leads to the fifth theory: everything is permanent because the five elements are permanent (sarvam nityam pañcabhūtaniyatyavat). The initial response argues that we perceive the causes of origination and destruction, ergo at least some things must be impermanent. The discussion hinges on the relationship between the permanent constituents of matter and the gross substances composed of them. If, being composed of them, gross substances are essentially identical with their elemental constituents, then the permanence of the constituents must also apply to the substances. According to Nyāya, since we actually perceive the causes of the origination and destruction of entities, this view cannot be correct. This passage partially concerns the cause of destruction but is really about whether things are destroyed as in fact they seem to be, rather than the temporal relationship between existence and destruction.

3 Infantry reasoning is, of course, an important part of Nyāya, “Logic,” but the examination of inference itself is very concise, likely because various aspects of reasoning and argumentation are dealt with throughout NS.

b This discussion, notably, introduces the example of the exhaustion of fire, though not regarding the ashes to which a fire is reduced, but rather the fuel that keeps the fire going. Destroying the fuel, the fire is also destroyed. Sutra 27 raises this in response to the preliminary objection in sutra 26 that impermanence is itself permanent. In other words, an entity’s impermanence, just like the fire that burns the fuel, is exhausted once the entity itself is destroyed.
The nature of buddhi is a central point of contention between Nyāya and Sāṃkhya, as we have already seen. Sāṃkhya believes the buddhi is a singular transformation of the primordial. Being ultimately identical with the primordial, it is permanent and all-pervading. Nyāya, on the other hand, considers the term buddhi but a synonym for cognition (jñāna), and considers individual buddhis to be transient properties of the self. Against Sāṃkhya's view, Buddhists and Naiyāyikas are provisional allies, and NS 3.2.10–14 is partly predicated on their shared ground. But, of course, they disagree vehemently when it comes to the finer details. Nyāya's claim that cognitions inhere in the self, for example, or the Buddhist claim that cognitions are transient because everything is momentary.

In the Nyāyasūtra, the examination of buddhi (sutras 3.2.1–55) begins with a discussion hinging on three points from the Sāṃkhya point of view.

- In sutra 3.2.2, the Sāṃkhya interlocutor argues that we know buddhi is permanent and all-pervading because of recognition—how could we know something to be the same as something we have seen in the past without a fixed substrate of intellection?
- In sutra 3.2.9: We only imagine that there are different buddhis (tad-anyatva-abhimāna), just as we imagine that there is a different crystal when it is placed on something of a different color (sphaṭikatanyatva-abhimāna-vat).
- And in sutra 3.2.15: The diversity of our cognitions is just the sequential manifestation of transformations of the primordial, i.e., reality is just the singular primordial, but it appears to be manifold.

Following each of these three sutras is a brief refutation in justification of Nyāya doctrine. We are concerned with sutras 10–14, following the Sāṃkhya interlocutor's argument in 3.2.9 that buddhi is like a crystal that only appears to change when it is moved:

[The Buddhist objects:] This is no reason, because, given that individuals are momentary (kṣañkatva), there is successive origination even in the case of a crystal. (3.2.10)

[Nyāya:] Because there is no basis for [momentariness being] a fixed rule (niyama), it is permitted only in accordance with observation. (3.2.11)

[Further,] it is not so, because of the apprehension of the cause of origination and destruction. (3.2.12)

[Buddhist:] Just as in the case of the destruction of milk, or the origination of curd, there is non-apprehension of the cause, [so in the case of] the origination of this [i.e., the crystal, as well]. (3.2.13)

[Nyāya:] Because we grasp it on the basis of an inferential mark, this is not a case of non-apprehension. (3.2.14)

327 buddhir upalabdhir jñānam ity anarthāntaram ||1.1.15|| (NS 18.13).
328 viṣayapratyabhijñānāt ||3.2.2|| (NS 176.3).
329 sphaṭikānyatvābhīmānavat tadanyatvābhīmānāḥ ||3.1.9|| (NS 179.18).
330 na payasaḥ pariñāmagnāntarapradhāvāt ||3.2.15|| (NS 182.15).
331 sphaṭikē ‘py aparāparopatteḥ kṣañkatvād vyaktināṁ ahetuḥ ||3.2.10|| (NS 180.12);
After the Śāṁkhya pūrvapakṣa raises the example of the crystal in sutra 9, a Buddhist interloper chimes in to say that momentariness disproves the fixity of the crystal. In other words, not only does the crystal really change when it is placed atop a different-colored surface; in fact, there is a different crystal each and every moment. The very example Śāṁkhya raises in order to challenge the transience of the intellect serves only to substantiate that buddhi, like crystals and everything else, is momentary.

Nyāya agrees with the conclusion of this argument: buddhi is transient. But sutra 11, immediately following this Buddhist interjection, discounts its underlying premise. There is nothing to prove the necessity of momentariness, so we can only accept that things are momentary insofar as they are observed to be so. Vātsyāyana notes that we do not actually observe in crystals the kinds of shifts and changes we observe in living bodies; not everything is in constant flux. Therefore, though the Śāṁkhya view is wrong, momentariness cannot be the reason it is wrong. In addition, as sutra 12 continues, the theory of momentariness is also mistaken because we perceive the cause (kāraṇa) of origination (utpatti) and destruction (vināśa). In sutra 13, the imaginary Buddhist interloper points out that we do not perceive the cause of milk’s destruction or curd’s origination—we do not see milk ceasing to be milk or becoming curd. Then, finally, in sutra 14, the response is that we may not see “the cause of milk’s destruction,” but we can infer it.

According to Vātsyāyana, who says surprisingly little on sutra 3.2.14, “the cause of the destruction of the milk has the destruction of the milk as its inferential mark.”332 In other words, we can infer that something causes milk’s ceasing to be milk, and becoming curd, on the basis of the fact that it has, in fact, ceased to be milk.

Uddyotakara, speaking at considerable length, confronts momentariness more directly. This is the argument Śāntarakṣita paraphrases in verses 370–372, immediately following his paraphrase of Av11. “You may think,” Uddyotakara says, “that there is no cause of destruction in this case, and, therefore, that the entity perishes merely as it is arisen; not so, because there is no possible option.”333 He goes through each available option for this view, as we will see in a moment, and demonstrates that each is impossible. He does not positively prove that there is a cause of destruction, but only attacks the view that there is not.

Aviddhakarṇa, on the other hand, uses the Buddhists’ conception of time against them in order to prove directly that there is a such a cause. This is a little different than Uddyotakara’s approach, but, of course, the end result is similarly to bolster the Nyāya position.

In addition to the meaning of the fragment, it is important to consider the manner of Kamalaśīla’s citation of Av11. It comes across as a potential paraphrase, condensing, as it does, three overlapping yet seemingly distinct arguments into a single statement. But even a faithful paraphrase is an

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332 kṣīravāsā śākāraṇāpanupalabdhiḥ avasthākṛtāḥ utpattivṛttiḥ (NS 182.10).
333 atha manayo naḥāvināśasya karaṇam asti, tasmād utpannamātra evāyaṁ bhāvo vinaśyatīti. na, vikalpaṇapapatteḥ (NV 389.11).
intervention. In this light, it is helpful to look at Kamalaśīla’s citation—or, more precisely, revision—of Uddyotakara.

Interlude: Kamalaśīla as Editor

Immediately after saying “there is no possible option” for the Buddhist view, Uddyotakara goes on to assess the options on offer and demonstrate their impossibly. As mentioned, Śāntaraśita invokes this passage in verses 370–372; as usual, Kamalaśīla cites the corresponding passage in prose.

In some cases, as we know, Kamalaśīla quotes Uddyotakara verbatim, and in other cases he paraphrases him. Sometimes Kamalaśīla’s paraphrase will condense a longer, more complicated passage into a simple formal argument, but in some cases, as here in his comments on verses 370–372, he does not abbreviate Uddyotakara’s words so much as revise them, almost like an editor clarifying Uddyotakara’s sometimes knotty prose.

We will have to look at the two passages at length. Uddyotakara says the following:

He who says there is no cause of destruction should be asked: Is it that (a) because destruction does not have a cause, it does not exist, or that (b) because it does not have a cause, it is permanent? In your view, what is causeless is twofold, permanent or non-existent, whereas in ours, it is only permanent.

(b) If destruction were permanent because of its causelessness, the arising of the effect would not obtain, and there would be the destruction of something that has not yet arisen. There is also a defect because an entity’s destruction cannot coexist with it. And so, because entities (bhāvanām) would not be incompatible with non-existence (abhāva), abiding would be perpetual.

(a) If destruction were non-existent, in this case, too, everything would be permanent because there would be no destruction. If destruction were non-existent, no such notion as “it perishes” would obtain with regard to a destruction that does not actually exist; there is no “it moves” if movement is non-existent.

(c) If you think destruction is causeless because it is imperishable (avinaśin), then why [in your view] does destruction (vināśa) not come to an end (vinaśyati)? You might say, “Because what has perished (vinaśa) does not regenerate.” If what you are thinking is that a thing that has perished would regenerate if its destruction were to come to an end, this is not tenable. For it is not the case that the non-existence (abhāva) of destruction is an entity (bhāva) that would arise on the basis of the destruction of destruction (vināśa-vināśa). Rather, an entity (bhāva) has a cause, and when its cause comes to be, then it arises; but destruction has a cause and yet does not come to an end, because it is a non-entity (abhāva). It is a property of entities (bhāva) that what has a cause perishes; as for a non-entity (abhāva), one that is causeless, such as prior non-existence (prāg-abhāva), comes to an end, whereas one that has a cause, such as non-existence after annihilation (pradhvamsa-abhāva), does not.  

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334 vināśasya hetu nāstīti bruvāṇaḥ paryanuyoktavyaḥ kim akāraṇatvād vināśo nāsti, utakāraṇatvān nitya iti. bhavatām pakṣe akāraṇaṁ dvidhā nityam asac ca. asmaṇkaṁ tu nityam eva.

   tad yady akāraṇatvā nityo vināśaḥ, kāraṇyotpādo na prāpnoti. anupannasya ca vināśo. bhāvasya vināśo na sahāvasthānam īti ca doṣaḥ. tataḥ ca bhāvānāṁ abhiavāindhitvād atyantavasthānam īti.

   athāsan vināśaḥ, evam api sarvanityatvaṁ vināśabhāvāt. yadi cāsaṁ vināśaḥ, vinaśyatīty asati vināśe prayayo na
The point in the final paragraph is tricky to parse, but pivotal to Uddyotakara’s argument. Rather than simply refuting the different options for the causelessness of destruction, Uddyotakara declares a position about the nature of destruction: it is not an entity, an existing thing (bhāva), but rather a non-entity, an absence (abhāva). The relationship between causation and destruction is inverted for entities and non-entities. An existing thing that has a cause arises when its cause is capable of generating it, and then eventually ceases to be. An absence, on the other hand, is either uncaused, but eventually ceases to be, or is caused, but never comes to an end. Case in point: before something exists, it has a “prior non-existence,” which, though itself never caused, comes to an end when the entity arises; after the entity has perished, it has “non-existence after annihilation,” which was caused by the entity’s destruction and yet never comes to an end itself.

Kamalaśīla’s revision of this passage is somewhat easier to read overall, and more clearly structured, but it also omits the conclusion:

*The reasoning stated by Uddyotakara […]:*

He who says there is no cause of destruction should be asked: Is it that (a) because destruction does not have a cause, it does not exist, like a sky lotus, etc., or that (b) because it does not have a cause, it is permanent, like the sky, etc.? For in your view, what is causeless is observed to be twofold, permanent or non-existent, since there is no other mode apart from existence (sattva) and nonexistence (asattva).

Concerning these, (a) if destruction were non-existent because of its causelessness, then it would follow that all entities would be permanent, because there would be no destruction. Moreover, the notion that all constructed things (samskāra) are destroyed would become baseless, for there is no “it moves” if movement is non-existent.

(b) If it were permanent, then it would obtain that an entity would abide with its destruction, because its destruction would always be there. This is not tenable, because existence and non-existence are characterized as standing in mutual exclusion. If you do not accept that they coexist, then the arising of the effect could not obtain, because destruction, the very contrary of arising, would always remain. And so, the destruction of what is unproduced does not arise, either, because, as is commonly accepted, unproduced things like hare’s horns do not perish. Therefore, it would not at all conform to reason to say that there is destruction of something unproduced. 335

prāṇa. nāsāyati gatau gacchatī bhavati.

athāvināśītvād akāraṇo vināśa iti manyaśe. vināśo na vinaśāyatīti kuta etat. vinaśānāṃ punar anutpattā iti cet. atha manyaśe yadi vināśo vinaśṇaḥ vinaśṣaḥ punar utpadyate. na yuktam etad. na hi vināśabhāvo bhāvo yato vināśvināśād bhavet, api tu kāraṇāvān bhāvo tasya yadā kāraṇām bhavati tadotpāda iti. api ca vināśām kāraṇavāṃś ca na ca vināśyaty abhāva. bhāvadharma eṣo y at kāraṇavat tad vināśātītya. abhāvas tv akāraṇo ’pi vinaśyati, yathā prāgabhāvah. kāraṇāvān api na vinaśyati, yathā pradhvāṃsbhāvah (NV 389.12).

335 uddyotakaroktāṃ api yuktam […] vināśasya hetur nāstītu bruvāṇaḥ paryantuṣṭaṃ kah akāraṇavād vināśo nāstī vyomataśitāḥ, athākāraṇavān nītyo vyomādivad iti. bhavatāṁ hi pakṣe ’kāraṇam dvidhā śyāṃ nītyam asac ca. na hi sattvaviṣayatiścena prakāraṇātaram asti.

tatra yady akāraṇavād atat vināśas tāda sarvabhāvāṇām nītyatvaprasāṇo vināśābhāvah. kim ca sarvasaṃskāra vināśantitya eṣa pratītyo nirmūrthaḥ prāṇaḥ, na hi asatām gatau gacchatī bhavati.

atha nītyas tāda bhāvyāsah vinaśṇaḥ sahāvasthānam prāṇaḥ, sahāvasthānāt. na caitad yuktam, bhāvabhāvaryoḥ paraspararūpyatāhāśīrṣṭalakṣaṇavāt. atha sahāvasthānaḥ neyate tādā kāśyopotpāda na prāṇaḥ, tatpratyanikihūtasya nāsasya sadāvasthitatvāt. tataś cājātasya vināśo ’pi na saṅgacchate, na hi ajñāḥ saśavāṣādāya vinaśāyatīti loke pratītām,
What do Kamalaśīla’s revisions tell us about his method, his approach, his relationship to his rival sources?

To begin with, Kamalaśīla flips the second and third paragraphs in conformity to the sequence of the initial question, “Is it that destruction does not exist or that it is permanent?” Uddyotakara’s passage follows the chiastic pattern a-b-b-a—“Is it (a) or (b)? If it’s (b), x; if it’s (a), y”—which is perfectly acceptable in Sanskrit philosophical writing, but Kamalaśīla consistently favors the more regimented a-b-a-b—“Is it (a) or (b)? If it’s (a), y; if it’s (b), x.” Kamalaśīla also adds clarifying transitions like “concerning these” (tatra), “moreover” (kim ca), “consequently” (tataś ca), etc. By explicitly mentioning constructed things (samskāra), Kamalaśīla points to a discussion from later in the same Vārttika passage concerning the Buddhist view that all constructed things are momentary. He removes several ambiguities and redundancies and seems intent on clarifying the overall logical sequence of the passage.

Kamalaśīla essentially elides the final paragraph and instead expands on the reasoning of option (b). Uddyotakara makes three points about this option, densely layered atop one another: (1) If destruction were permanent, an effect, i.e., something that has to be brought into being, could never arise. (2) It is absurd for an entity to persist alongside its own destruction. (3) If a thing’s existence and its non-existence are not contrary, nothing would ever cease to be. Kamalaśīla’s Uddyotakara splits this up differently: First, if destruction were permanent, anything that exists would exist alongside its own destruction. Second, if the opponent rejects this coexistence but continues to claim that destruction is permanent, it follows that the entity could never arise, because its destruction would already be there. The only other possibility is that destruction is the destruction of something that has not yet arisen, but this is clearly absurd.

Kamalaśīla’s version is closely modeled on Uddyotakara’s and seems largely intended to make it match the systematic approach of Śāntarakṣita. Does this affect or misrepresent Uddyotakara’s argument at all?

Uddyotakara’s concluding remarks about entities and non-entities is crucial for his appraisal of destruction. But Kamalaśīla probably elides these remarks because they are not material to Śāntarakṣita’s characterization or refutation of Uddyotakara’s argument. Consider instead a seemingly minor revision at the beginning of the passage. Uddyotakara writes:

In your view, what is causeless is twofold, permanent or non-existent, whereas in ours, it is only permanent.336

Kamalaśīla’s version:

For in your view what is causeless is observed to be twofold, permanent or non-existent, since there is no other mode apart from existence (sattva) and nonexistence (asattva).337

Kamalaśīla begins in the same dialogic form (“in your view”), but then removes Uddyotakara’s

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336 bhavatāṁ paśke akāraṇaṁ dvidhā nityam asac ca. asmākam tu nityam eva.
337 bhavatāṁ hi paśke ’karaṇaṁ dvidhā dṛṣṭaṁ nityam asac ca. na hi sattvasattvavyatireṇa prakārāntaram asti.
remark about his own view (“whereas in ours”); instead, Kamalaśīla substitutes a justification of the Buddhist position as if it were a statement of fact (“since there is...”). From the get go, Kamalaśīla’s revision mimics Uddyotakara’s words while subtly reinforcing the Buddhist position.

Kamalaśīla is not merely paraphrasing or condensing here, but editing. One could argue that he is making the passage easier to read or adding somewhat to the logical sequence of the passage, but we nevertheless must refer to the voice in this passage as Kamalaśīla’s Uddyotakara, a character of Kamalaśīla’s invention, modeled on Uddyotakara, but voiced by Kamalaśīla himself. Since he often quotes Uddyotakara word-for-word, this intervention stands out all the more—and yet, this ventriloquizing also implicates the verbatim quotations. Even when he speaks in Uddyotakara’s own words, we are hearing Kamalaśīla’s Uddyotakara.

The same, no doubt, must also be said for Aviddhakarṇa. We will likely never know, as we can with Uddyotakara, when Kamalaśīla cites Aviddhakarṇa, when he paraphrases him, and when he revises him altogether—moments like these remind us to recognize that these uncertainties are often the ground of a study of such thinkers.

As we have already seen, and will see even more dramatically in the next two fragments, the Tattvasamgraha does not always give us enough information to understand the view of its purported rivals. From the perspective of a modern scholar like me, it practically demands to be put under a microscope for evidence of the texts, theories, and thinkers that it synthesizes and simplifies. When we listen for the voices of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, we do not always hear much beyond the faint whispers preserved in the Pañjikā. Yet even this is significant. We know from the Vipañcitārthā (cf. Appendix A) that Śāntarakṣita, like Kamalaśīla after him, was intent on directly citing and attributing the arguments of these two thinkers. Yet, like Kamalaśīla, he sometimes does so without sufficient surrounding or explanatory context. Is this at all instrumental to his rhetorical technique? Is it only an artifact of the education he expected his readers to receive? Though unanswered and likely unanswerable, we can allow these sorts of questions to inform our reading of the Tattvasamgraha, the way we imagine the worlds to which it responded, and the responses it anticipates and shapes.
§6. BH6 AND BH7: MOON-GAZING

To conclude the “Examination of Permanence,” Śāntarakṣita takes on two arguments by Bhāviviktā and another by Uddyotakara. First, in Bh6, Bhāviviktā argues that all cognitions of particular heavenly bodies share the same stable referents—in other words, the moon is the same moon today as yesterday. Then, in Bh7, he similarly argues, on the basis of a complicated collection of reasons, that qualities, the substances in which they inhere, and our cognitions of them, cannot be momentary. Finally, Uddyotakara makes an argument quite like Bh6, but without Bhāviviktā’s flair. The point of all three arguments is to prove that there must be stable objects persisting through time: momentariness theory is wrong.

Kamalaśīla cites Bh6 as follows:

\[ \text{nanv aneneyādinā bhāviviktōktāni pramānāny āśankate}[…]. \text{tad uktam} \]
vimatuṣṭhikaraṇabhāvāpānnāni candrākṛgārahanaṃsaṭrādiṃśānāni
vivākṣitacandrākṛgārahanaṃsaṭrādiṃśādiviṣayām yad devadattādiviṃśānāṃ
tattālavacchinnacandrākṛgārahanaṃsaṭrādiṃśādiviṣayāny eva,
prthvisambandhitvenāupalabhyamānātve sati candrākṛgārahanaṃsaṭrādiṃśānaśabdavācyatvāt,
prathamakālabhāvivedadattādiṃśānaṃvad iti. (461–463)\[338\]

With the following verses [461–465], Śāntarakṣita considers arguments made by Bhāviviktā. […] He has said this: The cognitions of things like the moon (candra), the sun (arka), planets (ग्रह), lunar mansions (नक्षत्र), and so on, that have come to be the topic of disagreement, must have as their objects the moon, sun, planet, lunar mansions, stars (तारक), and so on, restricted (anavacchinna)\[339\] to the time of the cognition of, e.g., Devadatta’s that had as its object the moon, sun, planet, lunar mansion, star, or the like, intended (vivākṣita). This is because, under the condition that they are not perceived with a connection to the earth, they are expressible (vācya) by the words for cognitions of the moon, the sun, planets, lunar mansions, stars, and so on, like, Devadatta’s cognition of stars, etc., that arose in the first instance.

This argument rivals Āviddhakarṇa’s most elaborate fragments. To follow the reasoning, it is important to keep its distinct components in order.

First, the gist of the argument is relatively simple: When I look up and see the moon, I am seeing the same moon that others have seen in the past, because we can describe it in the same terms. We saw a fairly similar style and structure of argument in Av9 (§3). Āviddhakarṇa argues in Av9 that “my cognitions” across time can only be known by the knower of “my first cognition” after birth. The point of the argument is that the agent of cognition persists through time. Here in Bh6, Bhāviviktā

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\[338\] TSP 202.8; J75r.5.

\[339\] This term is tricky to deal with. If Bhāviviktā had instead written this term with a negation (an-), i.e., tat-kāla-anavacchinna, his proposition would be precisely what we would expect, and would correspond precisely to my analysis below: the objects of cognitions of the moon, etc., at t₂ are not temporally discontinuous (kāla-anavacchinna) with the objects of cognitions of the moon, etc., at t₁. See, e.g., Ratié 2011’s analysis of Abhinavagupta’s use of the phrase kāla-anavacchinna in his līvurapratyabhijñitvādityāvibhijnarūpam in the sense “pas limitée par le temps” (234–235). It is possible that the scribe missed the na, but the Tibetan would not support such an emendation: de i’ dus su bcad pa’i zla ba dang.

Perhaps Bhāviviktā is trying to say something like: I concede that we can distinguish between the object of the cognition of the moon at t₂ from that at t₁ insofar as their respective temporalities are distinct (kāla-avacchinna), and yet the objects themselves must be identical.
aims to prove that the object of cognition does, as well. Significantly, he does not rely on a single
agent’s cognitions across time. Rather, anyone’s cognition of the sun subsequent to Devadatta’s first
cognition of the sun must have the same sun as its object—the sun is constant, independent of the
observer.

As for the formal structure of the argument. To streamline matters somewhat:

(1) subject  cognitions of specific heavenly bodies

(2) to be proven  have as their objects the same heavenly bodies as earlier cognitions of them

(3) reason  because they are expressible with words for cognitions of those heavenly bodies

(3b) qualification  given that they are not being perceived as earthly

(4) example  like the cognition of them that arose in the first instance

In more detail, (1) cognitions of heavenly bodies are the subject. This subject is qualified as vimaty-
adhikarana-bhāva-āpanna (what has come to be the topic of disagreement), which is roughly the
same qualification found in Av6, Av10,340 and the two anonymous arguments we referred to as X1
and X2 (§2). When Uddyotakara qualifies an argument in this way, he more simply calls it
“disputed” (vipratipanna), as we will see shortly. (2) The property to be proven is quite elaborate.
The primary phrase in the property to be proven is the compound, “having as their objects the
moon, sun, planets, lunar mansions, stars, or the like, that were singled out at the time of that.” The
particular time in question is clarified by the subordinate clause, “the cognition of, say, Devadatta
that had as its object the moon, sun, planet, lunar mansion, star, or the like, intended.”341 (3) The
reason is “because of being expressible by the words for cognitions of the moon, sun, planet, lunar
mansion, star, or the like,” and (3b) it is qualified by the phrase, “given that they are not being
perceived as having a connection with the earth.” Kamalaśīla points out that the qualification
excludes cognitions of things like paintings of the sun (citra-ādi-gata-āditya-ādi)—we are talking
only of the heavenly bodies themselves, rather than, e.g., representations of them. (4) The example is
“Devadatta’s cognition of stars, etc., that arose in the first instance.”

The apparent constancy of the heavenly bodies is an intuitively compelling focus for an argument
that things persist through time. When, for example, I read medieval poets pondering the beauty of
the moon—in Sanskrit, in translation from Japanese, and so on—I am moved in part because I feel I
can look up on a clear night and tap into something shared across massive spans of space and time.
In fact, though this extends beyond the bounds of Bh6 itself, one might well argue that the fact that
candra translates so well to moon substantiates Bhāvivikā’s intuition that the conventionality of
words extends only as far as their coining. Sanskrit, English, Japanese, etc., all have words for the
celestial object conventionally called candra, moon, tsuki, etc., because that celestial object is really
there. Once we have established whatever linguistic convention we use to describe it, that word then

340 In the synonymous form vipratipattiviayabhāvāpannāni.
341 The point of the term “intended” (vivakṣita, “desired to be said”) seems to be to underline that later cognitions of the
moon correspond to Devadatta’s earlier cognition of the moon—and of the sun, the sun, and so on—rather than that
later cognitions of the moon might correspond in some way to Devadatta’s earlier cognition of the sun.
really refers to that real thing.

Uddyotakara makes a very similar argument, though without reference to any particular objects, at the end of his comments on NS 3.2.14.\(^{342}\) This is the argument Śāntarakṣita paraphrases in the verses following Bh7. Sutra 3.2.14, to remind the reader, is the Nyāya rejoinder to a Buddhist argument in defense of momentariness theory.

As the Buddhists argue: Just as we do not apprehend the causes of destruction or origination in, e.g., the transformation of milk into curd, so we fail to register the destruction and origination, each passing moment, of an apparently stable crystal. In fact, “the” crystal is a brand new momentary crystal each and every moment, but we, in our ignorance, are incapable of recognizing such subtle changes.

Uddyotakara, referring to our cognitions of the crystal across time—i.e., the varying appearance of the crystal as it is moved onto a surface of a different color—says the following:

\[
\text{The diachronic cognitions that are disputed (vipratipanna) have one and the same object, because, given coreferentiality (sāmānādhikaranyā) with indubitable (avyutthāyi) cognitions of that [object], they are expressible (vācya) by the same words, like the cognitions of many people present at one and the same moment.}^{343}
\]

When, for example, I see a crystal resting on a blue surface, recognize it as such, reach out to pick it up, and then find, as I lift it towards my eyes, that it is actually colorless, the moment I first see the apparently-blue crystal and the subsequent moment when I recognize its crystalline transparency are both cognitions of the same stone. If my friend and I are together, we can both look up at one and the same moment at one and the same thing, and we can both be said to be gazing at the moon. In the same way, when I look up at the moon again a few days later, though it is a different moment, and the moon itself is in a different phase, I am nevertheless moon-gazing again. It follows, according to the Naiyāyikas, that it is the same moon up in the sky.

§ § §

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla cite Bh7 immediately after Bh6 and immediately before Uddyotakara's take on diachronic cognitions. Bh7 is not very easy to read nor to understand or interpret. Kamalaśīla cites it as follows:

\[
\text{idam aparam tadiyam eva pramāṇam ye rūpatvādisāmānyāśrayāḥ, ye ca tadāśrayāḥ, tadviṣayāś ca ye pratyaksānumānopamānāsābdasmṛtipratyabhijñānārṣiddhadasārṣisiddhadārṣasiddhayānapravāsaṃvat avapnāntikāḥ prajñānaviśeṣāḥ te sarve svātmalabhānanta-pradhiṣṭhāsino na bhavanti jñeyatvarameyatvābhidheya-vātanāsuitvādhvānsadānāyata-ratvatvāsadasād-vāntvyālakṣājñeyaviṣayayajñānāvaccchedhayatvāgr āhyāviṣayagrahaṇa-grāhyatvānabhidheya-vābhidheya-ābhidhyākānabhidheya-vātanāsamānānajātiyadravyasāṃyogav}
\]

\(^{342}\) Shortly after his argument against destruction's causelessness (§5).

\(^{343}\) vipratipannā ayugapakālāḥ pratyayā ekaviṣayā avyutthāyatatpratyayasāmānādhikaranye sati samānāsābdavācyatvāt vartamānāikakṣaṇānekupurupasaprtyayavat (NV 393.2). I render avyutthāyi (not possessing vyutthāya) “indubitable.” To possess vyutthāya seemingly means something that can be disagreed about; something that does not possess vyutthāya, then, is something indisputable. Uddyotakara is specifically referring, here, to the cognition of a crystal. Cf. §5.
This is another argument by the same man: The substrata of universals like color-ness [e.g., the color blue], their substrata [e.g., a blue cloth], and the particular cognitions—whether perception, inference, analogy, testimony, memory, recognition, sagely wisdom, established teaching, doubt, mistake, indefinite cognition (anadhyatvasāya), dream, or end of dream—that have those [i.e., the color blue and the cloth] as their objects are all not subject to destruction immediately after coming into their own (svātmalābha). This is because they are cognizable (jñeyatva); because knowable (prameyatva); because denotable (abhidheyatva); because either existent or non-existent (sad-asad-aryatanatvatva); because of not being delimitable by a cognition of cognizable objects apart from what is existent or non-existent (sad-asad-vyatirikta-jñeya-visaya-jñāna-ananavacchedyatva); because of not being graspable by the grasping of an ungraspable object (agrāhyya-visaya-grahaṇa-agraḥyatva); because of not being denotable by what denotes the undenotable (anabhidheya-abhidhāyaka-anabhidheyatva); and because of being denotable by a sound that is the effect of a sound produced by the conjunction and disjunction of homogeneous and heterogeneous substances (samāna-asamāna-jātāya-dravyasanyoga-vibhāga-janita-sābda-kārya-sābda-abhidheyatva); like prior non-existence, etc.

Well now. Here in Bh7, Bhāvivikta matches, and to some extent exceeds, the elaborateness of Av8, Aviddhakaṛṇa’s first proof of the self. Where Av8 nests together six reasons, Bh7 includes eight of increasing intricacy, ranging from mere cognizability to the fact of “being nameable by a sound that is the effect of a sound produced by the conjunction and disjunction of substances of similar and dissimilar classes.” Where Av8 features a single, if complex, subject—“my cognitions” marked with a set of qualifications—Bh7 joins three different loci, including the same exhaustive list of species of cognition as Av8, from perception to “end of dream” cognition ($2).

The trickiest aspect of Bh7 is its massive list of reasons. Is this a single complex argument—as Av8 appears to be—or Kamalāśila’s paraphrase of a series of arguments by Bhāvivikta? Kamalāśila refers to it as a pramāṇa, in the singular, but then, after unpacking it, also refers to it as a hetu-kadambaka (reason-cluster), which is also in the singular, but which may refer to several separate reasons toward the same conclusion rather than a single complex set of reasons (as in Kamalāśila’s characterization of X1 and X2 as pramāṇa-kadambaka). In any case, the basic point of the argument would seem to be that we can only know and discuss things that persist through time.

Before sorting through the reasons, it is worth nothing that cognitions are actually transient for Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. The complex subject of Bh7 includes the particular cognitions that have “the substrata of universals and their substrata” as objects, but Bhāvivikta must have in mind here a looser, more naturalistic description of cognitive events than a strict Vaiśeṣika-style analysis of each momentary flash of cognition. And if, as seems to be the case, he specifically has Buddhist momentariness theory in mind in formulating this reason-cluster, he likely also takes for granted that anything that is genuinely denotable must be distinct from what Buddhists consider momentary. Unique particulars, after all, cannot be captured in words. This argument appears to imply that, even if cognitions are momentary in a sense, they are not technically momentary by the Buddhist

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544 TSP 203.1, J75v.2.
*a* TSP reads “ārtha” instead of “ārṣa”, and “ānuvyavāsāya” instead of “ānadhyavasāya”, but J confirms that the list is the same as in Av8.
545 The metaphor would seem to work as well either way; cf. n 234 about kadambaka.
definition.

As for the reasons. There may well be a method to the madness. Here are the eight reasons in sequence:

1. cognizable (jñeya, or “object of cognition”)
2. knowable (prameya, or “object of knowledge”)
3. denotable (abhidheya, or “object of language”)
4. either existent or non-existent (sad-asad-anyataratva)
5. not delimitable by a cognition of cognizable objects apart from what is existent or non-existent (sad-asad-vyatirikta-jñeya-visaya-jñāna-anavaccheyatva)
6. not graspable by the grasping of an ungraspable object (agrāhya-visaya-graha-agrahyatva)
7. not denotable by what denotes the undenotable (anabhidheya-abhidhāyaka-anabhidheyatva)
8. denotable by a sound that is the effect of a sound produced by the conjunction and disjunction of homogenous and heterogeneous substances (samāna-asamāna-jātiya-dravya-samyoga-vibhāga-janitasaśada-kārya-sabda-abhidheyatva)

Reasons (5), (6), and (7) refer to impossibilities: there is nothing that is “delimitable by a cognition of cognizable objects apart from what is existent or non-existent,” as there is no such cognizable thing. To be cognizable entails being “either existent or non-existent.” Similarly, nothing is “graspable by the grasping of an ungraspable object,” as there is no such means of (cognitively) grasping what cannot be grasped; nor of denoting the undenotable. Vātsyāyana says, very early on in the Bhāṣya, that means of knowledge (pramāṇa) illuminate what is sat and what is asat, i.e., positive or negative facts.347 There is nothing else to be made known.

But these seeming tautologies do not stand in isolation. They seem to mirror the first three reasons, respectively, and perhaps to substantiate the relationships between these three and reason (4). That is to say, because “the substrata of universals,” etc., are cognizable (1), they are either existent or non-existent (4), because being cognizable entails that they can be delimited by a cognition of what is either existent or non-existent (5). Similarly, their being objects of knowledge (prameya) entails being existent or non-existent because they could only be grasped by an instrument of cognitive grasping (graha in the sense of pramāṇa) of what is actually graspable, i.e., what is existent or non-existent. The same goes for their being denotable, and for denotability more generally.

It is possible, in other words, that Bhāvivikta is offering a sequence of reasoning rather than a single logical reason or a collection of independent but similar arguments. Take “indefinite cognition”

346 These two terms, jñeya and prameya, are often treated as synonyms, but since Bh6 clearly divides them, I am treating jñeya as any object of cognition, including things that have already been cognized (and so are not new information), as well as objects of erroneous cognitions, and prameya as objects grasped by genuine means of knowledge (pramāṇa).
347 saṁta prakāśākam pramāṇam asad api prakāśāyatiti, “A means of knowledge, which is an illuminator of what is existent, also illuminates what is non-existent” (NBh 2.4)
(anadhyavasāya) for example. In Praṣṭapāda’s description,348 such a cognition concerns a specific object of perception or inference that one does not fully understand upon encountering it. Say one has never seen a particular kind of fruit tree nor the fruit that grows on it. Coming upon such a tree, one sees that it is a tree, that it is a fruit tree, and that it is not, e.g., a mango tree, yet one does not definitively know what it is. Thus one has “cognized” the tree without fully “knowing” it or being able to “denote” it. Eventually, one may learn more about the tree through experience, or by asking someone about it, and, so, may eventually come to know what kind of tree it is, as well as the tree’s name. Taken sequentially, it is not merely the fact that it is cognizable, or merely that it is cognizable and knowable, etc., but specifically the fact that our cognition, knowledge, and language for that tree arise over time and yet all regard the same object.

In this reading, the final reason, reason (8), is the sequence’s overall termination. Kamalāśīla, in his brief explication of Bh6, glosses “homogeneous substances” (samāṇa-jātiya-draya) as things like lips and teeth, which are similar (to the subjects of the argument) in being produced, and “heterogeneous substances” (asamāṇa-jātiya-draya) as things like ether, which is dissimilar in being unproduced; both sets are essential for hearing language, as lips and teeth form words, and ether is the medium of sound. Kamalāśīla then explains that when the conjunction and disjunction (samyoga-vibhāga) of lips and teeth, etc., form the initial sound, a series of sounds traverses the ether, and it is only the sound that reaches the cavity of the ear that is itself perceived.349 He does not explain the bearing this has on the argument’s reasoning, but the implication seems to be this: The color, for example, of a cloth, can be named by a sound that results from the series of sounds beginning with the conjunction of lips, teeth, ether, and so on, but if things like the color of the cloth perish immediately after arising, then the actual sound that reaches the ear, the sound that technically “denotes” (abhidhāyaka) the color of the cloth, would be denoting something that no longer exists. The sequence with the unfamiliar tree need not unfold over a long sequence of time to prove the point. I am walking through the woods with a friend, we come upon a tree, and I ask her what it is. My friend may not recognize it immediately, but looks carefully at its needles, quickly deduces the species, and right then says, “it’s a Colorado blue spruce.” The entire sequence may only take a couple of seconds, and yet that would already be long enough to refute momentariness theory.

348 anadhyavasāyā ‘pi pratyakṣaṇumāṇaviṣaya eva saṃjayate. tatra pratyakṣaviṣaye tāvat prasiddhārthesy aprasiddhārthsu vā vyāsāṅgad arthirvād vā kim ity ālocanamātram anadhyavasāyāḥ, yathā vāhikasya panasādyasy anadhyavasāya bhavati. tatra sattārāvyayatprthiḥvītṛvṛṣṭvaṃvat-pravartvavattvādāśāḥdākhyapekṣo ‘dhyavasāyō bhavati. panasātvam api panasev anuvṛttam āṃrādibhibho vyāvṛttam pratyakṣam eva kevalam tūpadeśābhāvād viṣeṣasamjñāpratipattīr na bhavati. anumāṇaviṣaye ‘pi nārikedvipavāsinaḥ sāṃnātadaraśanāt ko nu khalv ayaṃ prāṇi syād ity anadhyavasāyō bhavati (Anadhyavasāya) also arises with regard to objects of perception or inference. First, regarding objects of perception: The mere consideration, “What is it?” in regard to something well-known or something unfamiliar, whether because of distraction or desire, is is not merely the fact that it is cognizable, or merely that it is cognizable and knowable, etc., but specifically the fact that our cognition, knowledge, and language for that tree arise over time and yet all regard the same object.

349 samāṇajātiyāni dravyāṇy adharaṇadānadvata kṛtakāvādāsamāṇyād asamāṇajātiyāṇy ākāśāṇām teṣāṁ yau mithah samyogavibhāgau tābhāyaṃ janito yaḥ prathamaḥ sādhas tasya paramparayā yaḥ kāryabhamāḥ śrutipatham avatīrṇas tenābhibhyavatvaṃ. tathā hy esam iyaṃ prakṛtya prathamaḥ kila sādhaḥ samyogavibhāgaṇyosam tasmac chadbāntarāṇaī kadamabogalakanyāya prādurbhavanti. tebhyaḥ pratyekam ekaikāśab mandataratamāyaṇyena prādurbhavati. tatra yaḥ karṇāśaṅkulimadhyam ākāśadeśam āpnoti sa upalabhyaṇe netara iti (TSP 203.16, J75v.4).
Otherwise, as with the blue cloth, the word “spruce” that reaches my ears would denote something that no longer exists. This, it would seem, does not accord with Bhāvivikṣa’s understanding of the real referentiality of language.

Of course, it accords quite well with the Buddhist understanding of the illusory conceptual imposition of language—but that raises an obvious question: Would Bhāvivikṣa have considered this a sound argument against Buddhists? Clearly he must have had Buddhist theory in mind in formulating such an argument, but his specific characterization of an individual instance of color as the substratum of the universal color-ness—the first phrase in Bh7—is already in discord with Buddhist theory. It is hard to figure out just what Bhāvivikṣa is up to with this argument.

We know from Uddyotakara’s analysis of destruction (§5) that there is a difference between a non-entity (abhāva) that is nevertheless a fact, such as the non-existence of something before it comes into being (prāg-abhāva), and a non-entity that simply does not exist, such as a sky-lotus. (Kamalaśīla elided that aspect of Uddyotakara’s analysis when reformulating his comments on destruction.) In Śāntarakṣita’s paraphrase of Bh6, he replaces Bhāvivikṣa’s example, “prior non-existence (prāg-abhāva),” with a sky-lotus. A thing’s prior non-existence has no cause, and never comes into being, and so “does not perish immediately after arising.” But unlike a sky-lotus, prior non-existence is a real non-entity, a negative fact that can be gleaned through a means of knowledge. Did Śāntarakṣita interpret prior non-existence as a similar case (sapakṣa) or a dissimilar case (vipakṣa), i.e., as something that possesses the property to be proven or something that does not? It would be absurd to say that a sky-lotus, which never arises, perishes immediately after arising, so it would seemingly have to be a similar case, yet this makes for a strange argument. The “prior non-existence” of, say, a pot is a cognizable negative fact that persists for longer than a moment. A sky lotus does not perish but nor does it persist. If we keep in mind Uddyotakara’s distinction between different kinds of non-entities, prior non-existence is a sensible example for Bhāvivikṣa to use, far more so than a sky-lotus would be. The small shift in Śāntarakṣita’s version of the argument makes a real difference in the argument’s function.

Śāntarakṣita’s response to Bh7 is brief—and very slightly off target:

Because universals, etc. (jāti-āder), lack intrinsic existence (nīḥsvabhāvatva), we do not claim momentariness (kṣaṇa-bhaṅgātā) [in their case]. The argument for the sake of proving its non-existence is presented in vain. (470)\(^{350}\)

Bhāvivikṣa’s argument is clearly not intended to disprove the momentariness of universals, but of particular qualities (the specific blue that is the substratum of the universal blueness), substances (the cloth that is the substratum of that color blue), and—apparently—cognitions of them. (The subject in Śāntarakṣita’s paraphrase of the argument, in verses 464–465, matches Bh7 nearly exactly.) The word “etc.,” in the phrase “universals, etc.” in the verse clearly encapsulates substances, qualities, and the other categories, so Śāntarakṣita’s point more or less holds, but it is still a little odd that he

\(^{350}\) Kamalaśīla says: tasmāt teṣu tasyāḥ kṣaṇa-bhaṅgātāyā abhāvasiddhyartham yad uktam sādhanaṃ tad vṛtthā (TSP 205.6, J76r.5).

\(^{351}\) jātyāder nīḥsvabhāvatvān naivaś ca kṣaṇa-bhaṅgātā | tadabhāvaprasiddhyarthanā nirdiṣṭaṃ sādhanaṃ vṛtthā ||470|| (TS 205, J23v.4).
specifically mentions universals. (Metrically, *dravyāder* (substances, etc.) and *jātyāder* do not differ.)

The way Kamalaśīla puts it, Śāntarakṣita simply does not bother looking at the argument in any finer detail (*sūkṣmekṣikā*). “If one were to do so,” he explains, “one would fall into an even greater web of defects.”\(^{352}\) He specifically objects to reason (4):

The reason “because either (*anyatara*) existent or non-existent” is not established in the subject or in the example, because the word “either” refers to an option, and there can only be an option (*vikalpa*) when more than one thing is possible, rather than just one. It is not the case that both existence and non-existence are possible in the subject, because, given that it has the form of an entity (*vastu*), only existence is possible. Nor are both possible in the case of the example, because, given that it is a non-entity (*avastu*), only non-existence is possible.\(^{353}\)

I cannot help but wonder whether Bhāvivikta had in the back of his mind something quite like the so-called *sadvitīya-prayoga*, a skeptical argument in which the disjunctive term “either” (*anyatara*) is meant precisely to work as a kind of hinge between the subject and the example. This would perhaps suggest some degree of Cārvāka influence, as we will see when we look at the *sadvitīya-prayoga* in more detail in §15. Kamalaśīla claims that something can only have “either-ness” if the option is genuine. The sky, we might say, is “either bright or dark” because this is a genuine option, depending on the time of day. This is clearly not Bhāvivikta’s understanding of the disjunction, and seems more like Kamalaśīla wringing his hands than making a real argument against this usage.

Bh7 remains fairly opaque to me. I cannot help but wonder what form it might have had in the *Bhāsyatīkā*, and whether Kamalaśīla has tinkered with it, or simply what light its original context could shed on its precise reasoning and intent.

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\(^{352}\) atrāpi sūkṣmekṣikā na kṛtā. yadi sā kriyate, tadā bahutaram atra doṣajāalam avatarati (TSP 205.7, J76r.5).

\(^{353}\) yad etat sadasadanyatātavam sādhanaṃ uktaṃ tat sādhyadharminī drṣṭāntadharminīṃ cāsiddham vikalpaviṣayatvād anyataraśabdasya vikalpaś cānekapadārthasambhave sati bhavati naikasmin, na ca sādhyadharminī dvayoḥ sadasattvayoḥ sambhavo ’sti, tasya vāsturūpatvena sattvasyāiva sambhavat. nāpi drṣṭāntadharminī dvayasambhavah, tasya vāstutvena sattvasyāiva sambhavat (TSP 205.8, J76v.1).

* J *dharmaṇī.
After arguing that all of the claims against momentariness are inconclusive at best, Śāntarakṣita returns, at the beginning of chapter nine, the “Examination of the Relation between Actions and Results (karma-phala-sambandha),” to the objection that momentariness renders causality, and so karmic accountability, impossible. (Kumārila is the primary voice of this objection.) Śāntarakṣita’s response is a rousing defense of core Buddhist doctrines about the fundamental delusions of our mundane experience of reality. Not only is there no agent of action, but even the concepts of bondage and liberation are just words for states of mind. Selflessness and momentariness inform purified minds; the rest of us, Kumārila et al, who foolishly impute unity where it does not really exist, struggle to act well.

With chapter ten, the “Examination of Substance (dravya),” Śāntarakṣita begins his analysis of the six categories of Vaiṣeṣika: substance, quality, action, universal, particular, and inherence. At the beginning of the chapter, as we have already seen (§0), Śāntarakṣita explains why it is necessary for him to refute the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika categories despite the fact that momentariness theory undermines them:

With nothing but scripture, the followers of Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda say, “We proclaimed earlier [i.e., in the “Examination of Permanence,”] that universals, etc., cannot be devoid of essence; the six categories, substance, etc., really exist.”

Therefore, we briefly convey the refutation of substance, etc. (546–547)
In other words, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, clinging to their doctrines, refuse to acknowledge that the proof of momentariness renders all six categories invalid. The Buddhists will have to refute the categories one by one.

After lamenting the stubbornness of Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, Śāntarakṣita turns to the nature of substance. He delineates the substances listed in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, focusing especially on the permanent substances, primarily the atoms. Proving momentariness disproves the permanence of atoms, but to do so more directly, Śāntarakṣita revisits an argument found in many of the earlier chapters of the text, the *yugapad* argument: If atoms were permanent, and yet were also the causes of the gross material objects of the world, the diversity of the world would arise *all at once* (*yugapad*) each and every moment. A present, functioning cause produces its effect immediately.

Av12, Aviddhakarṇa’s proof of the permanence of atoms, follows, along with Śāntarakṣita’s swift rebuttal.

After this, Śāntarakṣita makes the claim that there are no wholes distinct from their parts. He then considers a series of four arguments to prove this distinction, beginning with Bh8, an argument that Kamalaśīla attributes to “Udyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al.” The way Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla frame Bh8 within the “Examination of Substance” exemplifies Śāntarakṣita’s systematic approach to rival philosophical theories.

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Kamalaśīla points out that “followers of Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda” are, respectively, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas.

a J mātrikāḥ.
CHAPTER TEN
EXAMINATION OF SUBSTANCE

Introduction

With nothing but scripture, the followers of Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda⁵⁵⁸ say: “We proclaimed earlier that universals, etc., cannot be devoid of essence; the six categories, substance, etc., really exist.”

Therefore, we briefly convey the refutation of substance, and so on. (546–547)

They maintain that substance is nine-fold, divided in terms of earth, [water, fire, air, ether, time, space, self, and mind]. The four beginning with earth are each twofold, insofar as each has a permanent and an impermanent aspect. The atoms, consisting in earth, etc., are held to be permanent, whereas those [elements] that are generated by these are perishable.⁵⁵⁹ (548–549)

Concerning this, we have already demonstrated the non-existence of the permanent form of atoms, because we have proven that momentariness pertains to all entities. In fact, if the atoms were permanent, gross things would be brought about all at once. In addition, they could not rely on conjunction, or the like, because they are without distinction (aviśeṣa).⁵⁶¹ (550–551)

Objection: “We hold that the generator of atoms is not furnished with the property of existing, because it does not fall within the scope of a means of knowledge that apprehends something present.”⁵⁶² (552)

Not so, because this is unestablished. We observe that weavers, etc., are the cause of atoms, because all things, such as cloths, consist of atoms. Non-existence is not proven through the absence of a means of knowledge grasping something existent. Indeed, if there is no functioning of a means of knowledge, there is no certainty about the absence of a thing.⁵⁶³ (553–554)

On the other hand, we do not at all perceive a whole substance constituted by these [permanent atoms], which is supposed to be distinct from qualities and parts. Therefore, having no means of proof, it is not established.⁵⁶⁴ (555)

⁵⁵⁸ This refers to Nāyiyaśikas and Vaiśeṣikas, respectively, as Kamalaśīla notes.
⁵⁵⁹ When we refer to “earth, water, fire, and air,” we may either be referring to earth atoms, water atoms, etc., which are permanent, or to impermanent earth, etc., i.e., the substances composed of those atoms.
⁵⁶⁰ Again, as with Īśvara and the moon, a permanent cause could not change over time, and thus would have to bring about all of its effects at once.
⁵⁶¹ And yet again, Kamalaśīla says: “Atoms cannot be given a distinction by others, because they are permanent” (parair anādhbevaviśeṣā evāṇatah, nityatvāt).
⁵⁶² I.e., there is no proof that atoms have a cause. Kamalaśīla attributes this argument to Aviddhakarṇa (§7).
⁵⁶³ I.e., absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
⁵⁶⁴ “You have not proven x” is not the same as “we have proven not-x.” (See the previous two notes.) But, according to the Buddhists, it is possible to prove that something does not exist through the non-apprehension of it if we can demonstrate that it would be perceived were it really there. Elephants are visible, the lights are on, and our eyes are functioning, so if there were an elephant in the kitchen, we would know it; the fact that we can open the silverware drawer without bumping into the massive animal—i.e., our non-apprehension of an elephant—proves the absence of an elephant there.
Nyāya mereological arguments

[According to Nyāya thinkers:]

(i) We see a rock that is crystalline when it is in contact with a surface even though we do not grasp its color. In the same way, we see a crane, etc. When a man is cloaked in armor, even without knowing his complexion, we have the perception of a man. We have a perception of a cloth when the cloth has been dyed.\(^{365}\) (556–557)

(ii) Color, etc., can be absolutely differentiated from, e.g., a lotus flower, because of the delimitation of the one by the other, as can [Caitras] horse from Caitra. And earth, etc., can be ultimately differentiated from color, scent, etc., because of the difference between the singular and plural numbers, as with the difference between the moon and the lunar mansions.\(^{366}\) (558–559)

(iii) In this manner, cloth and thread are distinct because they have different makers, powers, etc., just as there is a difference between pillars and pots, and so on, because they are furnished with contrasting (viruddha) qualities. (560)

(iv) But if gross things were impossible, there could be no perception of things like trees, because atoms are beyond the senses. Nor could there be the term “atom,” because it is in reference to gross entities that things are thus said to be very minute. If there were no gross, singular entities, in relation to what would it be minute? (561–562)

Refutation

We grasp crystals, etc., with a color, such as red, and yet they cannot have these as their colors, because that would entail the loss of your own position. But we do not perceive the essence of something else apart from the color. And it is untenable that such things could be known by a cognition with the image of something else, because of overextension. Or, if, e.g., the clear (śukla) [crystal] could be known in this manner, then the cognition would be mistaken, like the cognition of a conch being yellow. (563–565)

As for the man cloaked in armor, that cognition is inferential, because we perceive the armor, the arrangement of which is the reason for [our inference of] him. (566)

In the case of the cloth, due to the red dye or saffron, etc., there is another color upon the destruction of the previous color, because the cloth is momentary. From that color, yet another color, white, is produced through reliance on water, etc., similarly to the blackness of iron [after heating and cooling].\(^{367}\) If it were fixed, nothing else would suppress the color, because the unsuppressed

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\(^{365}\) Kamalaśīla attributes this line of argumentation to Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al (§8), but in the Vipaścitārthā, Śāntarakṣita attributes nearly the exact same argument to Avidhākaraṇa.

\(^{366}\) This argument derives from a passage in Uddyotakara’s Nyāya-vārttika. There, Uddyotakara imagines his Buddhist interlocutor saying, “Earth is nothing but color [or, rather, rūpa], etc; color, etc., is nothing but earth. Earth is itself color, etc.; color, etc., are themselves earth” (evam rūpādinatram prthivi, prthivīmatram rūpādaya iti prhity eva rūpādayo rūpādaya eva prthiviti (ND2, 71.20)). In these sentences, “earth” is in the singular and “color, etc.” is in the plural. He uses a striking example, in addition to the moon and the lunar mansions, to demonstrate that this sort of difference in grammatical number really matters: “The term caturāśrayam [the condition of four stages of life] denotes the fact that all four stages of life are commonly conducive to dharma (caturāśrayam iti caturnām āśrāmānām samānām dharmasādhanañvatvam abhīdhiyate (ND2, 72.5)). In other words, there is a difference between referring, in the plural, to “the four stages of life,” which refers to each of the four as separate stages, and “the condition of four stages of life” in the singular, which indicates something about the fact that there are four stages.

\(^{367}\) Kamalaśīla: “As a black color arises again in an iron in which a bright color had been produced through contact with fire.” (yathāgnisamparkāt samupajātahātārādirāpasya lohādeḥ punah āśrāmāṇāmaḥ potpatiḥ).
earlier character would continue. (567–569)

**Argument (ii)**

Things like the genitive case, and differences in number, come only from the speaker’s whim. It is untenable to determine the form of the true state (tattva) of things from that. To explain: the other party does not accept that the existence of the six [categories] is something else, nor that the set of them is some singular thing. (570–571)

*Objection:* “We hold the existence of the six to be the fact (tattva) of being an object of the means of knowledge making it known.”

This entails something beyond your six. (572)

*Objection:* “We call these six property-possessors. We only hold that the properties are distinct from them.”

Then what do you think the relation between them is? Conjunction is untenable, because it is restricted to substances; nor can there be another inherence; nor do you accept any other relation. And if no relation is possible, then how could they have that property? Should you say, “merely through being produced by them,” then there would have to be others of the same sort. (573–575)

There is also a differentiating case relation in such a phrase as “the existence (asti) of that [existence],” and so, given the existence (bhāva) of yet another thing, an infinite regress follows. And, due to the presence in it of another property, its being a property-possessor would obtain, yet you have also claimed that substance, etc., are property possessors on this same basis. (576–577)

**Argument (iii)**

If you are trying to prove the cloth’s difference from the first threads, then you will not be able to keep the argument from being fruitless. The following threads that are produced, having

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368 More coarsely, “the fact with regard to an object of the means of knowledge...” (visaye tattvam). Kamalaśīla says the interlocutor is claiming that the existence of the six is “another property, namely, the fact of being the object of a means of knowledge by which one apprehends something existent” (samjñāyapakaprakāśanavaca bhāvas tattvam sadupalambhakapraṇānabhisayatvam nāma dharmāntaram saṃśām atistvatvam iyata ity arthab).

369 Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accepts two relations: conjunction (samyoga) and inherence (samavāya). The former is a separable relation (when you put down your cup of coffee, the conjunction between your skin and the surface of the cup ceases, yet both relata remain), while the latter is inseparable (the existence of a cloth depends on its inherence in its threads, if the relation comes to an end, the cloth itself can no longer exist). Conjunction falls under the category of quality, but inherence is unto itself the sixth category; according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it is uniform. Therefore, as Kamalaśīla explains, “If the relation [of existence, etc.] with inherence consisted of inherence, you would have to accept a second inherence” (samavāyena ca samavāyatmakem sambandhe sati devītyaḥ samavāya ‘nigkṛtyaḥ syāt).

370 In other words, yet again there would be something beyond the six that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika claim as having special status.

371 At this point in the text, Śāntarakṣita presumes momentariness. The “first” and the “following” threads are all the momentary fluctuations we conveniently refer to as “threads.” They are causally related: the “first” thread perishes the moment it arises, and, in so doing, effects the “second” thread, and so on. So the later threads are not utterly distinct from the first threads and yet they are not identical moment by moment, either.
obtained a distinct state, and capable of distinguished efficacious activity, are not utterly distinct from the first ones. (578–579)

When hearing about them separately, there may be the defects of weightiness, impotence, or fruitlessness.\(^{372}\) Out of a desire to avoid these, and in order to communicate the fact that [all of the threads] pertain to one and the same effect, speakers make a single word for them, keeping in mind that usage is easier with a comprehensive expression. But they do not prove that the cloth, which is temporally coextensive [with its threads], has a distinct maker, capacity, dimension, and other such qualities. (580–582)

**Argument (iv)**

In this way, the atoms that are produced as mutual companions\(^ {373}\) are certainly not supersensible, as they are within the scope of the eyes. Blue, etc., is imagined as being the innate form of atoms, and visual cognition, etc., is recognized as having blue, etc., as its appearance. Even if they are not marked with the distinction of succession, yet it remains that there is nothing annulling their perceptibility, as is also true of potions and so on. (583–585)

Also, in the observation of all things, which are characterized by exclusion from all [else], in that same manner, it is not the case that there is certainty in every respect. Even if the intact unique particular of an object is known by indeterminate perception, we clearly apprehend the cause of the determination of difference. Just like the illusion of a single light from the arising of [a series of] similar flames, so there is one type in the perception of many subtle [atoms] residing contiguously. If you do not accept the perceptibility of these [atoms] because they are not marked by distinction, then how is it that we find [perceptibility] in the case of flames and such? Or do you accept that wholes are like that? (586–589)

You might reply,\(^ {374}\) “Given that we do not ascertain [atoms], how could blue, etc., be the form of atoms?” Even this is baseless, since the cognition does not lack an object, and does not have a single gross object, because there is a contradiction between grossness and singularity. If a gross object had a single intrinsic condition, then, when [a tiny portion of] it is covered by the mere leg of a fly, all of it (sarva) would consequently be covered, because it has no divisions. And if one portion is dyed, all of it (sarva) would be radiant with dye. Or if there are contrary properties, then, by consequence, there is multiplicity. (590–593)

**Objection:** “It has a single intrinsic condition, so why is the word ‘all’ (sarva) used with respect to it? In fact, that [word] refers to more than one thing, and a whole is not multiple.” (594)

You only describe things like cloths, bodies, and mountains, which are established through worldly usage, as wholes. Phrases like “the cloth is all (sarva) dyed,” “the cloth is dyed without gap,” “without remainder,” “completely,” arise on the basis of mere whim, so all of these (sarve) can be used. With the same sort of intention, we, too, say things like, “all of it (sarva) would be dyed.”

\(^{372}\) I.e., it would simply take too many words (weightiness) to refer to all of the different momentary threads pertaining to a single point one wanted to make about “the” cloth; one would probably not be able to refer to all of them, anyway (impotence); and, in the end, the extra effort would be futile (fruitlessness).

\(^{373}\) The sense of “mutual companions” is that they are one another’s auxiliary causes, as in the sort of heap of atoms that Naiyāyikas mistake for real substantial wholes.

\(^{374}\) “What is understood is...” (itti gamyate), but this verb sometimes refers to a criticism, and Kamalāśīla introduces this verse by saying, “With this, he teaches the other party to object’ (etāvad ity ādinā param codayitum śikṣayati).
Indeed, speakers have no limit. (595–597)

If you say it is a figurative (bhākta) expression [rather than an arbitrary one], this would entail a change in grammatical number. In addition, there is no difference in the cognition of the two things you are claiming to be primary and secondary (gauta). (598)

Objection: “It does not follow that all of it is dyed, nor do we observe the entire thing to be covered, because conjunction is not all-pervading.”

But if a substance does not have portions, then how would its intrinsic form stand without being pervaded? Or, if that is its condition, then, for the same reason, difference is established. There is no basis for a single thing to stand in many places, hence it is established that cloths, and the like, are multiform down to the atoms.

And yet, those who have yet to understand the true nature of reality believe there is a single mass, and they speak of “atoms” in regard to this construction. Or the name is applied to such a thing without reference to any particular basis, but only in connection with convention, just as we might even apply the term “Īśvara,” “lord,” to someone destitute. (602–603)

[...]

375 Kamalaśīla imagines this objection: “This is not a defect for us, either, because the term ‘cloth,’ e.g., is applied to threads, i.e., to its parts, in a figurative, metaphorical manner, insofar as they are its cause. Therefore, the word ‘all’ can be used” (syād etad mamāpy adoṣa eva, yasmād bhāktam upacarītam etat tantuwaćyo avayaevyā tavārātatyā pātādyabhādhamam, tena sarvādiśabdastrapayogam bhavītattti).

376 Given Uddyotakara’s insistence on the non-arbitrariness of grammatical number.

377 If we are figuratively describing the threads by speaking of the cloth, there should be some distinction in the clarity and distinctness of the cognition of the dyed threads and “the dyed cloth,” like the difference between calling a lion “a lion” and calling a boy “a lion.” Kamalaśīla gives two readings, the second of which I find preferable: “Alternatively, there is no difference, no manifoldness, in the cognition of the two things accepted as primary and secondary in this case. Indeed, we do not perceive a different form on the part of the threads and the cloth, as we do, e.g., between color and taste. And it is not possible that two things in which different forms are not perceived have the relation of primary and secondary” (atha va buddher bhdo nātātvar, so ‘śmin gauṇamukhyatvenaṭaḥ na vidyate, na hi tantuwaćrṣayor bhinnam rūpam samupalabhayate rūpasādāvat, na cānupalabdhbhinnarāptayor gauṇamukhyabhāvab sambhavati).

378 Kamalaśīla restates the conclusion in accord with an earlier objection: “Therefore, it is established that blue, etc., is the form of atoms” (tena nilādi paramāṇānām ākāra iti siddham). The ablative in the verse, “due to atoms,” or “than atoms,” etc., is a little puzzling, but the point must amount to the same thing that Kamalaśīla says.
§7. Av12: PERMANENCE

Śāntarakṣita presents Av12 as an objection to the impermanence of atoms. Kamalaśīla cites the fragment as follows:

\[ \text{aviddhakārṇas tv aṅūnām nityatvaprasādhanāya pramāṇam āha paramāṇunām utpādakābhimaṭaṁ saddharmopagataṁ na bhavati sattvapratipādakapramāṇāviṣayatvāt kharaviṣṇavad iti. (552)} \]

In order to prove the permanence of atoms, Aviddhakarna states this argument: What is imagined to be the generator (utpādaka) of atoms does not actually exist because it does not fall within the scope of any means of knowledge that can prove existence (sattvam), as in the case of a donkey’s horns.

We neither perceive nor infer a donkey’s horns; nor, Aviddhakarna argues, do we perceive or infer the generator of atoms. (Only perception or inference, at least in the Buddhists’ estimation, qualifies as “a means of knowledge that can prove existence.”)

Śāntarakṣita—unsurprisingly—is not convinced by this claim. First, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. More importantly, if momentariness is established, it follows that atoms are impermanent and are, in fact, generated. Av12, then, becomes the occasion for Śāntarakṣita to highlight and undergird this point—almost conspicuously so.

The passage NS 4.2.4–17 concerns the relation between parts and wholes. The discussion there resolves eventually, in sutras 16 and 17, on the topic of atoms. As the smallest unit of measure, atoms are, by definition, without parts. This generates a discussion of atomic theory, beginning, in sutras 18 and 19, with an objection to the Nyāya view:

[Objection:] Because of the penetration of ether (ākāśa), this is impossible. (4.2.18)

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379 TSP 233.5, 84v.4.
380 Sad-dharma-upagata: More coarsely put, “furnished with the property of the real” or “instantiating an existing phenomenon,” or the like, but, as Kamalaśīla says, the point is simply that it has not obtained existence: sato vidyamānasya dharmah saddharmo ‘stitvam, tenopagatam prāptam astity arthah (TSP 233.7, J84v.4).
381 The implied opponent of this argument may be someone like a Buddhist, who does not accept the permanence of atoms, but it may also be someone like the proponent of the Upaniṣadic creator-god Puruṣa, who is refuted in chapter six of the Tattvasamgraha, the “Examination of Puruṣa.” According to Śāntarakṣita, Puruṣa is said to create the universe out of himself, the way a spider spins a web of herself without dimishing herself. Perhaps the proponent of such a view would claim that, unlike Iṣvara, Puruṣa generates the atoms from which he spins the web of the universe.
382 “In fact, there is no certainty regarding the absence of a thing if there is no functioning of pramāṇa” (pramāṇavivektatvai hi nārthabhāve ‘sti niicayat [554] (TS 233, J28r.2)). As is well-known, Dharmakīrti developed dṛṣya-anupalabdhi (nonapprehension of a perceptible) as a logical reason distinct from reasons based on causality (tadutpatti) and identity (tadātmaya). As Birgit Kellner explicates, “If an object such as a jāra is present in proximity of all other causes which are required for its perception, such as a sense faculty and the like, it is, as Dharmakīrti clarifies at a later point in the same text, not possible for it not to be perceived” (2003, 124). In such a situation, the absence a perception of the jar warrants the inference that the jar does not exist. In light of this, then, we might rephrase Śāntarakṣita’s remark as saying that failure to apprehend something is not the same as the kind of nonapprehension from which we can properly infer something’s non-existence. (For more on dṛṣya-anupalabdhi, cf. Kellner 1999 and Kellner 2001.)
383 Overall, NS 4.2 concerns knowledge of truth (tattva-jñāna), which, as the very first sutra in NS says, leads to the highest spiritual goal (niḥśreyasa). For a discussion of the historical development of this lesson, particularly regarding the final portion of NS 4.2, see Preisendanz 2000.
[Continued:] Or else ether is not all-pervading (sarva-gata). (4.2.19)

[Response:] “Inside” and “outside” (antar bahīṣ ca)—because they are expressions for other causes (kārāṇa-antarā) of a substance that is an effect (kārya), they are absent in what is not an effect. (4.2.20)\(^{384}\)

The discussion continues for several more sutras, but our concern is here in sutra 20, the clearest claim in the Nyāyasūtra that atom s do not have a cause.\(^{385}\)

The interlocutor argues in sutra 18 that, because ether is all-pervading, it must penetrate each atom. This implies that ether pervades the atom inside and out, and therefore that atoms have parts (an “inside” part and an “outside” part). Sutra 19 further explains that if ether does not penetrate atoms in this way, it would absurdly follow that all-pervading ether does not pervade all.

In response, sutra 20 grants that atoms would indeed have parts if we could accurately describe them as having an inside and an outside, but that this would be an error in terms. The term “atom,” as Vātsyāyana notes, refer to “that than which there is nothing smaller.” An atom cannot be constituted by anything else, such as an internal portion and an external portion.\(^{386}\) The interlocutor’s suggestion makes no sense.

Sutra 20 regards the fact that atoms are not effects (a-kārya) as axiomatic. Vātsyāyana does the same. He does not spell it out, but for him the indivisibility and indestructibility of atoms basically go hand in hand, so not having the “causes” (kāraṇa) that are an “inside” and an “outside” also entails not being produced:

“Inside” conveys a cause (kāraṇa) that is enveloped by other causes. “Outside” conveys a cause that is not enveloped, that envelops [others]. This itself is possible on the part of a substance that is an effect, but not for an atom (anu), because it is not an effect. Indeed, in what is not an effect, an atom (paramānu), there is no “inside” and “outside.” Where there is “inside” and “outside,” that is an effect of atoms (anu-kārya), not an atom (paramānu), for an atom is that than which there is nothing smaller.\(^{387}\)

In his comments on these verses, Uddyotakara\(^{388}\) repeatedly takes the fact that atoms are not produced as axiomatic, as well.

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\(^{384}\) ākāśavyatibhedāt tadanupapattih ||4.2.18|| (NS 267.7);

ākāśasarvagatatvam va ||4.2.19|| (267.12);

antar bahīr iti kārāṇadravyasya kārāṇantaravacanād akārye tadabhāvah ||4.2.20|| (267.15).

\(^{385}\) Cf. NS 2.1.36, which we will discuss in §8, and NS 2.2.24 (nānunītyatvā [NS 111.16]), which presupposes the permanence of atoms in refuting an argument for the permanence of sound but does not actually argue for the permanence of atoms.

\(^{386}\) yato hi nālpataram asti sa paramāṇur iti (NBh 268.4).

\(^{387}\) antar iti vyavahitaṁ kārāṇantarairī kārāṇam ucyaite. bahīr iti ca vyavadhāyakam avyavahitaṁ kārāṇam evocyaite. tad etat kārāṇadravyasya sambhavati, nānōr akāryatvāt. akārye hi paramāṇāv antar bahīr ity asyabhāvah. yatra cāsyā bhāvo ‘kukāryam tat, na paramāṇāḥ. yato hi nālpataram asti sa paramāṇur iti (NBh 268.1).

\(^{388}\) In his comments on NBh 3.2.14, Uddyotakara substantiates the criticism of momentariness with reference to several arguments for the permanence of the self—even there, he does not invoke the permanence of atoms to disprove momentariness, perhaps because he regards knowledge of their permanence as axiomatic rather than inferentially derived (like the self’s existence and permanence, or the cause of destruction).
Aviddhakarṇa, in Av12, actually proposes an argument for the causelessness of atoms, even though it boils down to a mere rejection of any argument to the contrary. This is convenient for Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. In order to disprove the Nyāya argument for the permanence of atoms, there must be an actual argument to disprove. Aviddhakarṇa helpfully supplies just such an argument!
§8. BH8 (AND AV1): DIM LIGHT, DIM MINDS

By the time he begins the “Examination of Substance,” Śāntarakṣita has already disproven the concept of a permanent cause in general, as well as a variety of specific permanent entities. He wastes little time focusing on the permanent substances of Vaiṣeṣika and instead dedicates the bulk of the chapter to the impermanent substances, beginning with Bh8.

Before diving into the way that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla frame Bh8, we have to momentarily turn our attention to Śāntarakṣita’s Vipaścitārthā, his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya (cf. Appendix A). Early on in the Vādanyāya, Dharmakīrti contends with Nyāya mereology, i.e., Nyāya’s analysis of the relation between parts and wholes. According to Nyāya, substances are distinct from their qualities, and wholes exist above and beyond their parts. Dharmakīrti—and Śāntarakṣita—holds that this is logically untenable as well as contrary to experience. If, as Nyāya maintains, substances are perceptible and substance and quality are distinct, then why do we never perceive a substance on its own, apart from its qualities? Commenting on this, Śāntarakṣita cites Av1:

avidhakaṇṇaḥ tu āha rūpāṇyagrahaḥ ‘pi dravyagrahaṇam asty eva, yato mandamanda-prakāśe ‘nupalabhyamārūpādikaṃ dravyam upalabhyate niścitārūpam, gauḥ asvo vēti.

nanu ca tatrāpi saṃsthānamātram upalabhyate.

satyam upalabhyate na tu tadbhūyaṭātman. rūpāṇyātmakate va nilapitādiviśesāgraṇaṇaḥprasaṅgāḥ. tathāyakṣaṇācakāntātate purusārūpāṇyagrahaḥ ‘pi puruṣapratyayayo drṣṭaḥ. rātrau ca balākāṇāṃ śuklārūpāṇyagrahe.98 ‘pi paksipratyayayo drṣṭaḥ. tathā nilādyupadhānabhedānuvidhāyinaḥ sphaṭikamaṇeḥ sphaṭikarūpāṇyagrahe ‘pi sphaṭikapratyayayah. tathā kaśyapārūṇaṃ paṭarūpāhībhave paṭarūpāṇyagrahe ‘pi paṭaṇapratyayayo drṣṭaḥ iti. (VA 34.15)

Aviddhakaṇṇa, for his part, says: We do, in fact, grasp a substance even when we do not grasp color, etc. For, in dim light (mandaṇa-prakāśa), a substance, without its color, etc., being perceived, is perceived in an uncertain form, e.g., as a cow or a horse.

But even in this case, isn’t it that the shape alone is perceived?

True,99 it is perceived, yet does not consist in its color, etc. After all, if it consisted of color, etc.,

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98 Dharmakīrti: “So what if a single thing, say, a pot, were entirely different from color and the like? Were that so, given that this thing is perceptible, and has a form apart from color and the like, what would obstruct its appearance, in its own form, to cognition, in distinction to those things?” (yady anya eva rūpādibhyyo ghata iti ekah yāt, kim yāt. astu, pratīkeṣaiva sato ‘rūpādirūpasya tadāvivekaṇa buddhau svarūpena pratibhāsena kim aviṣeṣat (Much, 8.1)). Śāntarakṣita: “Because you accept it can be grasped by the sense faculties of sight and touch… because you accept a difference between quality and substance” (cakṣubhspariṣaṇendriyagrahyatayābhypagataśvāt […] gunadraftyaṇyor bhedaḥbhypagamati (VA 34.9–11)).

99 Steinkellner (16) valākāvyaṃukta rūpāṇyagrahe t valākānāṃ śuklārūpāṇyagrahe ms > balākānāṃ śuklārūpāṇyagrahe em.

I am using the Śāstri 1972 edition, consulting the SARIT 2014 encoding of Śaṅkṛtyāyana 1935–36, and tracking the corrections and emendations in Steinkellner 2014. When applicable, Steinkellner’s notes are cited verbatim together with their page number, as in the preceding note. “r” refers to Śaṅkṛtyāyana’s edition; “re” to his emendations; “ms” refers to readings in the manuscript; “em” refers to Steinkellner’s proposed emendations; “;” means “against ms (no evaluation implied);” and “>” means “to be changed to.” Cf. Steinkellner 2014, xviii.

The position of the tu suggests that we read na as a new clause, yet satyam… tu suggests a direct response to the objection, “true, and yet…” Perhaps we should understand an implicit syntactic connection with the preceding
[then, perceiving it,] we would have to grasp its particular color, blue, yellow, or the like. In this way, we have observed that when a person is cloaked in iron armor, even though we do not grasp his complexion, we perceive a person; or, at night, even though we do not grasp the white color, etc., of cranes, we perceive birds. Similarly, when a jewel that is crystalline conforms to a particular surface, like something blue, even though we do not grasp the crystal color, etc., we perceive the jewel. Likewise, we have observed that when we see the color of a [dyed] cloth as the reddish tint [of its dye], even though we are not seeing the color of the cloth itself, we perceive the cloth.

Śāntarakṣita’s immediate response to Av1 is to denigrate the dimness—māndya, like the dim light (mandamanda-prakāśa) of his argument—of Aviddhakarṇa’s mind. The product, he says, of studying false doctrines. It is a cute pun, and one of several casual insults in the ViPācitārīhā. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla seem genuinely to relish picking apart Aviddhakarṇa’s arguments, occasionally commenting on what they consider his intellectual deficiencies. We only see it in brief flashes, but we see it throughout their engagement with him. These moments have an effect on the reader. They involve the reader in a social context, and reveal the reader to be the audience to a performance. Śāntarakṣita treats Aviddhakarṇa as an individual, rather than a repository or source of arguments and ideas. He also makes an example of him: This is what happens when you devote yourself to the study of Nyāya.

This is not only reminiscent of, but nearly identical to, Bh8, which Kamalaśīla cites in his comments on verses 556–557:

*uddhotakarabhaṇḍāviviktađayo [...] ābur guṇavyatirikto guṇī samupalabhyata eva, tadrūpādiguṇāgraheṇe ’pi āsrīya grahaṇāt. tathā hi sphaṭikopalaḥ sanvhitapadhānāvasthāyāṃ svagataśuklagunānupalambhe ’pi drṣyata eva. balākādiś ca rātrau mandamandaprakāśāyāṃ tadvatasitādirūpādārāṇe ’pi ghṛtya eva. tathāprapadinaṁcukavacchannasaśāre puṃsi tadvasyāmādirūpādyagramaṇe ’pi puṁmā puṁmīn iti pratyayaḥ prasūyata eva. kaśyakuṁkādirakre vāsasi tadrūpasya saṁsparipūrṇabhūtasyānupalambhe ’pi vastradhāvata eva. (Paṇjikā on v. 556–557)*

_Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al [...] say:_ The quality–possessor is actually perceived apart from its qualities, because it is grasped even when its qualities, color and the like, are not grasped. To explain: We see a rock that is crystalline when it is situated on an adjacent surface even if the quality of clearness that pertains to it is not perceived; and a crane, or the like, is grasped even at night, in dim light, when the color pertaining to it, white or the like, is not grasped. Similarly, when a man’s body is covered in armor from head to toe, even though we do not see the color of, e.g., his dark complexion, the cognition, “man,” does in fact arise. When a cloth is dyed reddish yellow, saffron, or the like, even though we do not perceive its color, which has been overcome by the permeating color [of the dye], there is in fact a cognition of a cloth.

The similarity between this fragment and Av1 is evident, but the relationship between them is uncertain. Kamalaśīla attributes Bh8 to “Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al.” In all likelihood, then, this fragment is not a direct quotation but a paraphrase of at least two passages, one from a text by

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393 As we will see in Bh8 and the parallel passage in NV, this most likely refers to a dyed cloth rather than, say, paint on a canvas. Dye also presents a more distinctive example than paint, because the color of the threads is permeated by the color of the dye rather than simply being covered over, which would be somewhat like armor concealing a man’s flesh.

394 tat etat sarvatvam asyālpañkālopaṇaḥkudārañāḥbāhibhāsyopajātabuddhiṁāndyaśājñāṁbhāt eva prakaṭayati vacaḥ (VA 34.23).

395 TSP 234.12, J85r.5. J reads “āpradipana” for “āpradapina” and appears to read “sargni” for “sarpi”.

*smsthānamātram, “True, [mere form] is perceived, yet does not consist of color, etc.”*
Bhāvivikta, another by Uddyotakara. Sure enough, we find a strikingly similar passage in Uddyotakara's NV on sutra 3.1.1:396

[Objection:] Because grasping by sight and touch have, respectively, color and touch as their objects, they do not have pots, etc., as their objects.

[Reply:] Not so, because, when there is non-apprehension of color and touch, we observe the perception characterized by it. When someone perceives something without perceiving its color, there arises for him a perception that is characterized by that thing. For example, the perception of a crystal that has been placed on something blue, or the like, arises in the non-apprehension of [the crystal's intrinsic] color, etc. And at night, regarding cranes, because there is no grasping of the white color, etc., there is the perception of birds. Therefore, the cognition of a pot has a basis apart from color and touch.397

We have three passages with roughly the same content: (1) an excerpt from Uddyotakara’s NV, (2) a fragment Śāntarakṣita attributes to Aviddhakarṇa, and (3) a fragment Kamalaśīla attributes to Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al. Kamalaśīla’s “et al” (ādi) is as tantalizing as it is frustrating. What does this tell us about the relationships between these thinkers? As we have already discussed in the Introduction (cf. “Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta”), the convergence of these three passages may suggest that Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are one and the same man.

As for the content of the argument itself, Bh8 is relatively easy to understand, with clear significance for Nyāya’s commitment to Vaiśeṣika ontology, specifically the distinct existence of whole substances from their various qualities. In short, Av1/Bh8 raises four subtly different instances in which we not only can infer but in fact directly perceive that substances exist separately from their qualities, in particular, color. Whether a thing’s color is shrouded by darkness (a crane at night), obscured by a covering (an armored man), overcome by a color shining through it (a crystal on top of something), or permeated (a dyed cloth), despite not seeing the color of the thing, we nevertheless perceive the thing itself.

There are several sections of the Bhāṣya that particularly stand out as potentially shedding light on Av1 and whatever precise argument of Bhāvivikta’s lurks behind Bh8,398 but two specific sutras strike me as most resonant: 2.1.31 and 3.1.1. It is worth considering both to see how the fragments are affected by interpreting them as comments on different sutras.

NS 2.1.31–36, an interlude on mereology within NS’s examination of perception, reads as follows:

[Objection:] Perception is actually inference, because apprehension follows the grasping of a single

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396 Uddyotakara also makes a number of arguments along these lines in his comments on NS 1.1.14.
397 [Viśesābrahmanabrāhmaṇaśya rūpasparśāvidvijayavat na ghaṭāvidvijayatvam. na, rūpasparśānupalabdhaḥ tadviśeṣapratyayadarśanāt, yadāyam anulabhyanāmānurūpādikām vastūpalabhyaḥ, tadāyāma tadviśeṣāḥ pratyaya upajāyate. yathā niśādypaḥiḥ sphaṭike pratyayo rūpādyanupalabdhaḥ bhavati. rātrau ca balākāyām śuklarūpādhyāgranāt paksipratyayaḥ. tasmāt rūpasparśāvatiśrītīkatamimīto ghaṭapratyayaḥ. (NV 328.17)]
398 Specifically, 2.1.31–36, 4.1.34–36, 4.2.4–17, and, of course, 3.1.1 (the context of Uddyotakara’s argument). The first three all concern mereology and directly raise the relation between substances and qualities. Av1 may have served to substantiate any of these three (though 2.1.32 strikes me as particularly resonant), and they all contextualize the role of mereology in Nyāya and its discourse with Buddhism. The exact parallel in NV 3.1.1 is most suggestive, and it is informative to consider Av1 in light of the problem of the self.
[Response:] No, because to the extent that it is apprehended, it is by perception. (2.1.32)

[Objection:] There is doubt concerning wholes because they have yet to be proved. (2.1.33)

[Response:] Non-grasping of all would follow from the non-establishment of wholes. (2.1.34)

And because holding and pulling are possible. (2.1.35)

If you say, “Grasping is like that of an army or a forest,” no, because atoms are supersensory. (2.1.36)

Sutra 31 raises the objection that we never see the entirety of a thing, so that perception must in fact entail inference. Sutra 32 points out that even in this case perception is admitted by the opponent. The opponent then raises a deeper objection: the notion that when we perceive a portion of something there is a whole thing that is being perceived (even if only in part) is itself a presumption. Sutras 34–36 then argue for the necessity of wholes—in short, neither perception nor a host of practical activities would be possible if there were no true whole substances over and above their parts.

In the Bhāṣya on sutra 32, Vātsyāyana argues that we do not perceive parts or portions on their own, but rather substantial wholes together with whatever parts are currently accessible to the senses. Av1 could certainly serve to add to and substantiate this argument. In the Bhāṣya, it is said that we see a tree, a “whole,” despite never seeing certain of its parts, such as its roots. In Av1/Bh8, it is said that we see a crane, a substantial whole, even when we do not see some of its qualities, such as its color.

In Uddyotakara’s detailed comments on the following objection in sutra 33, he mentions, as a pūrvapakṣa, the argument that no substance is ever seen without color, etc., but he does not go into any greater detail at this point in the Vārttika. Perhaps Aviddhakarṇa and/or Bhāvivikta had a similar impulse and chose to raise and respond to this kind of pūrvapakṣa in this context. It is notable that Uddyotakara does not really respond to this pūrvapakṣa until 3.1.1.

Sutra 36, the last of the three arguments against sutra 33, distinguishes between substantial wholes that are comprised of atoms and collective wholes that are comprised of gross individuals: we do not grasp wholes the way we grasp a forest or an army, because the individual members of a forest or an army are each perceptible, unlike atoms, which are beyond the reach of the senses.

An even more likely home for Av1/Bh8 can be found in NS 3.1.1, which is surely one of the most

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399 pratyakṣam anumānam ekadeśagrahaṇād upalabdheḥ ||2.1.31|| (NS 72.17);
na, pratyakṣena yavat tāvad apy upalambhāt ||2.1.32|| (73.12);
sādhyatvād avayavini sandehah ||2.1.33|| (75.5);
sarvāgraṇānam avayavasiddheḥ ||2.1.34|| (75.10);
dhāranākaraṇopapattes ca ||2.1.35|| (76.2);
śenāvanavad grahaṇām iti cenyāntādiyavād anūnām ||2.1.36|| (75.13).

400 There are two more clear possibilities, though neither seems as compelling as 2.1.32 or 3.1.1.

NS 4.1.14–43 is an important sequence that raises and refutes eight distinct causal theories (within the larger context of the examination of rebirth). We have already seen the three verses dedicated to the existence of Īśvara within this passage. The sixth argument (NS 4.1.34–6) in the sequence of eight is the (roughly) Buddhist argument that “everything
important single sutras for Buddhist-Nyāya debates on the self: *darśanasparśanābhyyām ekārthagranāṭa*, “Because a single thing is grasped by sight and touch.”

Vātsyāyana introduces 3.1.1 by distinguishing two kinds of designation (*vyapadeśa*). A designation, he says, denotes the relationship of an agent with an action and an instrument. The designation “self” (*ātman*), he says, raises a question that thematizes the grammatical orientation of so much of philosophy written in Sanskrit: when we say that someone (agent) sees (action) with the eye (instrument), are we describing a single whole (*samudāya*) using one of its parts (*avyaya*), like a tree standing by means of its roots, or one thing using something else as a tool, like a person chopping wood with an axe? According to Vātsyāyana, the Nyāya view is the latter: a self relates to its sense faculties the way a lumberjack relates to an axe rather than the way a tree relates to its roots. According to this, what the sutra says is that one and the same agent (the self) uses two different instruments (sight and touch) to perform two separate actions (seeing and touching) on one and the same object (a lemon, a friend, or whatever).

In his comments on sutra 36, Vātsyāyana rephrases the counter-argument: Everything is separate because we refer, when we use words for substantial entities, to heaps or aggregations. In response, Vātsyāyana argues that there can be no aggregate without what is aggregated, i.e., that the components of an aggregate must themselves be entities, so the argument is self-contradictory. The upside is that wholes exist, which is, of course, the gist of Av1/Bh8. It would make sense, given the content of NS 4.1.34–36, that if Av1/Bh8 were a comment on sutra 36, later Buddhists would read it as a direct attack and fire back. But I read Av1/Bh8 as a defense of substantial wholes, whereas I read this passage in the *Bhāṣya* as more of an attack on an argument for momentariness, or the selflessness of dharmas, or the like. Meanwhile, Uddyotakara, in NV 4.1.35, points out that he has already proven the distinct existence of parts and wholes—referring most likely to his comments on 3.1.1.

In addition, the passage NS 4.2.4–17 revisits the problem of mereology at length. NS 4.2 revisits the central notion of *tattva-jñāna* (knowledge of truth, which is said in NS 1.1.1 to lead to the attainment of the highest goal [*niḥśreyasa-adhigama*]). Sutra 4.2.3 says that the basis for defects (*doṣa-nimitta*) is regard for wholes (*avyaya-abhimānaḥ*). Naturally, an opponent raises doubt about whether wholes really exist and a discussion ensues. Though there is a clear thematic overlap between this discussion and Av1/Bh8, there is no obvious role for Av1/Bh8 to play in this passage. Sutras 6–10 contain an extended *pūrvapakṣa* against the existence of wholes, and sutras 11–12 dismiss this *pūrvapakṣa*’s reasoning, rather than propose any arguments for wholes. Sutra 13 seems to return to the discussion from 2.1.31–36, raising the claim that we do, in fact, perceive masses of atoms, just as someone with partial blindness (*tainirikā*) sees a mass of hair, i.e., despite not having the faculty to see each strand individually. But rather than the existence of substances over and above their parts, this leads into another discussion of the existence of atoms and their inaccessibility to the senses.

This gives the Buddhists two clear targets. The first is, of course, the self. Yet Kamalaśīla does not cite Bhāṣya in the “Examination of the Self,” but several chapters later, in the “Examination of Substance (dravya).” This points to the second target created by 3.1.1, the concept of substance itself, especially substantial wholes that are impermanent but persist through time (the “single thing” of the sutra, such as a lemon). According to the Buddhists, this notion fails to account for the momentariness of all phenomena, and, in any case, is contrary to experience. Nyāya claims substances are perceptible but we never actually perceive them.

Though Vātsyāyana invokes the part-whole relationship in his comments on 3.1.1, and, of course, seeks to establish the existence of whole substances elsewhere in the Bhāṣya, he does not here defend the underlying concept of substance in its specific connection to the proof of self. That task falls to thinkers like Uddyotakara and Aviddhakarṇa. As we have seen, Uddyotakara does, in fact, make the Bhāṣya argument at the end of his remarks on 3.1.1. This parallel is suggestive unto itself, but NBh 3.1.1 would also be a striking root text for Av1 and whatever passage of Bhāvivikta’s is included within Bhāṣya. While the Bhāṣya on 2.1.32 offers at least a natural home for these fragments, it does not particularly do anything to the argument itself. That is, reading Av1/Bhāṣya as a comment on NBh 2.1.32 only situates them, without augmenting our understanding of them. When we read them along with NBh 3.1.1, the argument takes on a powerful apologetic force. This reading suggests that Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are, like Uddyotakara, highlighting lapses in the Bhāṣya that rivals had sought to exploit, and raising the issue of substances specifically in defense of the self. This highlights the centrality of substance to the issue of the self, and the relation between Buddhist critiques of substance and Nyāya arguments for the self’s existence. Rather than simply prove that substances exist, Av1/Bhāṣya specifically substantiates the central premise of sutra 3.1.1. The grasping of a single thing, ekārthagrahaṇa, is possible; when we see something, we are seeing some thing that is singular, that persists through time, and that is distinct from its various qualities, such that our perception of it proves that we exist, that our selves exist. The way that perception works, and the way perception relates to substantial wholes, as examined in 2.1.32, serves as a backdrop for this broader argument about the nature of reality and its bearing on one of the central issues in the quest for knowledge of reality (tattvajñāna), the existence of the self. As a comment on 3.1.1, Av1 and Bhāṣya develop what was only a kernel in the Bhāṣya.

In the Tattvasamgraha, Śāntarakṣita does not only paraphrase and respond to the argument in Av1/Bhāṣya, but uses it to create a particular reading of Nyāya mereology. Following Kamalaśīla’s framing, this is but the first in a carefully sequenced quartet of arguments. In verses 556–562, Kamalaśīla explains, Śāntarakṣita presents four (sets of) arguments from the Nyāya perspective in this sequence:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verses</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
<th>Means of Knowledge</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>556–557</td>
<td>quality/possessor distinction</td>
<td>perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>558–559</td>
<td>quality/possessor distinction</td>
<td>inference</td>
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<tr>
<td>560</td>
<td>part/whole distinction</td>
<td>inference</td>
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<tr>
<td>561–562</td>
<td>part/whole distinction</td>
<td>perception</td>
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</table>
With Bh8, “he has demonstrated that [from the Nyāya perspective] the difference between quality (guna) and quality-possession (gunin) is established through perception.” After this, “demonstrating that[ according to Nyāya.] it is established through inference, too,” Śántarākṣita states verses 558–559:

Color, etc., can be absolutely differentiated from, e.g., a lotus flower, because of the delimitation of the one by the other, as [Caitra’s] horse from Caitra. And earth, etc., can be ultimately differentiated from color, scent, etc., because of the difference between the singular and plural numbers, as with the difference between the moon and the lunar mansions.  

Expressions like “a blue lotus” or “Caitra’s horse” work, according to Nyāya, precisely because the quality (blue; being Caitra’s) can be distinguished from the possessors of that quality (the lotus; the horse). The fact that we refer to the moon in the singular and the lunar mansions in the plural serves in part to distinguish these as different things; similarly, we refer to earth in the singular as the bearer of such things as color and odor, which we refer to in the plural, marking a difference between them.

This latter argument clearly draws on a passage from Uddyotakara’s sprawling comments on NS 1.1.14 (§9), where he says, “‘Earth’ is singular; ‘color and the like’ is plural; and where there is conformity (anuvidbāna) to a different number, there is a different object, as with the lunar mansions (naksatra) and the moon (āśīn).” Kamalaśīla formulates this argument like this: “The substances, earth, water, fire, and wind, are individually distinct from color, taste, odor, and touch, because these are, respectively, objects of the singular and plural numbers, as with the moon and the lunar mansions.”

But Kamalaśīla does not attribute this to Uddyotakara. After Bh8, he does not make any direct attributions in his comments on verses 558–562. The important thing about these arguments, for Kamalaśīla, is not so much where they come from as how they fit together.

“After proving, in this way, the difference between quality and quality-possession,” Kamalaśīla says, “in order to prove the difference between part and whole, he states” verse 560. (More precisely, in order to present Nyāya arguments intended to prove this difference.) This verse argues that a cloth and its threads are different “because they have different makers, powers, and so on” (vibhinnā-kartya-śakty-āder). As Kamalaśīla rephrases it: “Things that have different makers, effects, temporalities, and dimensions, like pillars and pots, are different, and the objects under investigation [i.e., parts and wholes] have different makers, effects, temporalities, and dimensions.” Ergo, from the Nyāya

402 ta evaṃ tāvat pratyakṣata eva guṇa-guṇinor bhedah siddha iti pratipāditan. idānām anumānato ‘pi siddha iti pratipādāyann āha rūpādiyādī (TSP 235.4, J85v.1)  
403 rūpādindivāra divinghīka ekāntena vibhīdyate | tena tasya vyavacchedācaitrād iva turaṅgamaḥ [[558]] ksityādi rūpaganḍhāder atyantamān vibhīdyate | ekānēka vibhīdyatāc candranakashtrabheda vata [[559]] (TS 235.128r.4).  
404 prthivi-ti ekavacanaṃ rūpādaya iti bahuvacanam, vacanabheda-anuvidhānaṃ ca yatra tatrārtha bheda-hā, tad yathā naksatrānī śaśi (NV 72.1).  
405 tathāparaḥ pratyagah pratyekam prthivyāptejovāvāya vṛddhāyaṃ rūparasagandhasparśēbhya bhinnāni, ekavacanabhuvacanaviṣaya-vatāḥ, yathā candro naksatranī (TSP 235.8, J85v.2).  
406 evaṃ guṇa-guṇinor bhedaṃ prasadhyāvayavāvayavino bhedaṃ prasadādihaṇāyaḥ vibhinneyādyi (TSP 235.14, J85v.3).  
407 pravogyo ye bhinnakartṛkāryakālyaparimānās te vibhinnāḥ yathā stambhakumbhādayaḥ, vibhinnakartṛkāryakāryakālyaparimānās ca vicārāviṣayāḥ (TSP 235.15, J85v.3).
perspective, they must be different.

Finally, “having first proven the distinction between parts and wholes through inference, he states [verses 561–562] so as to prove it through perception, too.” Reminding us of several now-familiar passages (NBh 2.1.36 and 4.2.20, as well as Uddyotakara and Aviddhakarna’s arguments for number, which we will turn to shortly), Śāntarakṣita says:

But if gross things were impossible, there could be no perception of things like trees, because atoms are beyond the senses. Nor could there be the term ‘atom,’ because it is in reference to gross entities that things are thus said to be very minute. If there were no gross, singular entities, in relation to what would it be minute? (561–562)

Apart from restating the first verse to clarify the syntax, Kamalaśīla has only one word for this: *subodham*, easy to understand.

This quartet affords Śāntarakṣita the opportunity to pick apart a whole series of issues: First, he argues against the idea that we see a crystal apart from its blue appearance, or that we see, rather than infer, a man underneath his armor (563–569); he then argues that the genitive case does not capture a real relation, but is just brought about by whim, by our desire to speak (*vivakṣā*) (570–577); third, he argues, partly on the basis of momentariness, that a cloth is just a concept we need in order to make use of a particular collection of threads (578–582); and, finally, he argues that atoms are not, in fact, beyond the reach of the senses, and, as Kamalaśīla puts it, that this only holds true if one accepts that atoms are permanent (583–588).

Bh8, then, is the first step in Śāntarakṣita’s rational reconstruction of Nyāya mereology, and the entry point for his systematic analysis of it.

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408 evam tāvad anumānato ’vayavāvayavinor bhedaṃ prasādhyā pratyakṣato ’pi sādhayann āha sthūlārtthetyādi. (TSP 236.5, J86r.1).
409 sthūlārthaśambhave tu syān naiva vṛksādidarśanam | atindriyatayāṇūṇāṃ na cānuvacanan bhavet || 561 || sthūlavastuvapeko hi susūkṣmo ’rthas tathoccyate | sthūlaikavastvabhāve tu kim apekṣāṣya sūkṣmatā || 562 || (TSP 236, J28r.5).
410 Otherwise, he argues, Naiyāyikas would have to accept more than six categories.
411 yasya hi nityāḥ paramaṃava iti pākṣaḥ, tāṃ pratyāṇūṇāṃ viśeṣābhāvāś sarvadaivatindriyatvaṃ syāt, nāsmān prati (TSP 243.7, 88r.2).
After dealing with substances, Śāntarakṣīta turns to the second Vaiśeṣika category, quality (guṇa). First, he points out that it should not be necessary to discuss any of the remaining categories, as they all rely on substance, which has now been disproven. And, of course, proving momentariness already undermined the lot of them. Nevertheless, as he has already explained, he proceeds through each individually.

Vaiśeṣikāsūtra 1.1.5 lists seventeen qualities: “Color, taste, odor, touch; number; dimensions; separateness; conjunction, disjunction; proximity, distance; cognitions; pleasure, pain; desire, aversion; and (ca) effort.” Praśastapāda says that the word “and” (ca) incorporates an additional seven: weight, fluidity, viscidity, formations, merit and demerit, and sound. Kamalaśīla quotes VS, and then lists these additional seven with roughly the same explanation but without any direct reference to Praśastapāda.

This list is complicated, and, indeed, the underlying logic of the schema of the six categories is not perfectly clear. Praśastapāda’s definition of quality does not shed much light on the matter: “All qualities, color, etc., are connected with quality-ness, situated in a substance, devoid of qualities, and devoid of action.” Several of the qualities are relevant to Śāntarakṣīta’s engagement with Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, but for present purposes we are chiefly concerned with only two:

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412 रूपरसागंधस्पर्शाः समक्ष्याः परिमानां प्रथक्तां समयोगविभागां परत्वापरस्त्रे बुद्धहयाः सुखादुःक्षे इच्छादेवशाप्रयत्नां गुणां (VS, 2.17). Semicolons in the translation separate compounds: color through touch are grouped together, as are conjunction and disjunction, etc. “Measures” and “cognitions” are both plural.

413 का सदभास्मूचितां का गुरुवांद्रवत्वस्त्रेषा दशक्षां साप्तायते वाणस पत्रिविमित्तां गुणां (PDhS 10.13).

414 रुपाधिनां गुणानां सर्वसामु गुरुवां शास्मितां द्रव्याशिर्ततां निर्गुन्तां निष्क्रियतां (PDhS 94.6).

415 Conjunction and disjunction are important to a number of fragments, especially those that relate to arguments about the impermanence of sound (cf. Appendix A). Conjunction is a quality because only substances can be conjoined. Inherence, on the other hand, can be the relation, for example, between a universal (blueness) and a quality (an instance of blue); though there must be a blue substance for this relation to hold, strictly speaking the universal inheres directly in the color, i.e., the quality, which itself inheres in the substance. In addition, “formations” (samāskāra) are broadly significant to much of Buddhist-Nyāya discourse, but partly because the term has such a variety of applications in such texts; pleasure (sukha), pain ( dukkha), desire, aversion, and effort are germane to the arguments about the self and the nature of human experience; merit and demerit (dharma-adharma) are among the “material causes” (upādāna) in Śīvā's
color and number. For Śāntarakṣita, color is paradigmatic of the Vaiśeṣika analysis of quality. For thinkers like Aviddhakarṇa, number is a problematic concept in need of defense.

The broad idea is not merely that there is such a thing as color, or the like, but that an individual color is a separate existent that inheres in and qualifies a particular substance. If a blue pot stands on the other side of a wall, but a crack in the wall allows us to see its blue hue, we may not recognize the pot as such, but we can still see its color. We do not have to apprehend the substance in order to apprehend its color because, even though the color “inheres in,” and so is inseparable from, the substance, it is nevertheless a distinct existent. Number is somewhat more complicated, so we will delve more deeply into the Vaiśeṣika analysis of number in §9 below.

Śāntarakṣita proceeds through the list of qualities in sequence, beginning with a brief refutation of color. This stands in for a refutation of taste, odor, and touch, as well. He then turns to number, which is the basis (hetu), according to Vaiśeṣika, of the conventions of one, two, plurality, and so on (ekādi-vyavahāra). In Av13, Aviddhakarṇa seeks to prove the reality and distinctness of number on the basis of our perception of things like elephants and chariots—the plurality of which, we know from Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, form the basis of the notion of an army. In Av14, later on in the chapter, Aviddhakarṇa apparently argues against an earlier claim by Dignāga that we cannot define “heaps, streams, and states,” or the relationships between them, in terms of identity or difference.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
EXAMINATION OF QUALITY

Introduction

We maintain that quality, action, and so on, are rejected by the refutation of substances, as they all rely on substances. And once the bearers of the relation have been discarded, what would have an inherence in what? Nevertheless, we relate the refutation of each [of the five remaining categories] individually. 416 (633–634)

Refutation of color

If you claim there is only one blue color, or the like, in a gross substance, [such as a pot,] then when that [pot] is manifested by light coming through a small fissure, why is that [entire single blue color] not manifested and seen? And we do not observe blue, or the like, residing over a spatial expanse, or else what is manifested at that time by that [point of light] would be an atomic portion of it. 418 (635–636)

Refutation of number

Number does not appear in cognition apart from, e.g., the [one] elephant, which is excluded from what is not that. 420 Yet you claim it is visible. Ergo, it does not exist. Rather, just as in the case of [one] cognition, [or two cognitions,] 421 etc., the consciousness of one, [two,] etc., in the case of a pot, or the like, is concomitant with concentration (manaskāra) on conventions fashioned by

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416 This chapter only concerns quality, but Śántarakṣita points out here at the beginning of the chapter that all five remaining categories are untenable once substance has been refuted. His repetition of this point throughout the chapters on the categories has a striking rhetorical effect.

417 As we have seen, the standard list of qualities, following Praśastapāda, is: color, taste, odor, touch; number; measure; separateness; conjunction, disjunction; proximity, distance; cognitions; pleasure, pain; desire, aversion; effort; weight; fluidity; viscosity; formations; merit, demerit; and sound. (Semicolons separate pairs that are compounded together in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra and Padārthadhammasaṃgraha.) Quality inheres in substance. This means that, e.g., a color, number, cognition, or sound only exists insofar as its inseparable connection to a particular substance remains. There can be no blue without something blue; there can be no three without three things; there can be no cognition without a knower; there can be no sound without a medium of sound.

418 The implication, according to Kamalaśīla, is that it would itself possess qualities, which would render the overarching color, blue, a separate substance, rather than a quality, which renders the entire schema absurd (gunavattvād dratyarāpatiśar syāt, na gunatvam, and so on). Note that Śántarakṣita does not even entertain a single argument in defense of the concept of color as a real quality apart from the substance it qualifies.

419 By skipping from color to number, Śántarakṣita implies that his refutation of color holds as well for taste, odor, and touch.

420 “Exclusion” (apoha) theory will not be fully elaborated until chapter sixteen (not treated in the present study). The gist is that when we see an elephant, we are not actually seeing an elephant, but superimposing the conventional notion “elephant” onto the momentary heap of atoms before us, and yet not in a positive sense, but through a process of exclusion. The elephant’s being “an elephant” is its “exclusion from what that is not that.”

421 Kamalaśīla unpacks “etc.” in this way: “Indeed, just as there is a cognition of one, etc., even without number in the case of one cognition, two cognitions, etc.,” and so on (yathā hy ekam jñānam dve jñāna ityādau samkhyāṁ antarenāpy ekādibuddhir bhavati).

422 Cf. n 425 below.
whim. There is no distinctive number in any of these things because they are not substances, and it is untenable that the cognition of it is derivative (bhākta), because it is unwavering. (637–639)

Perhaps you think the cognition of one in the qualities, etc., follows from the oneness that inheres in the substance because they inhere in one and the same object. Let this be so in the case of a cognition of one. But on what basis does the notion of two, or the like, pertain to these, or to the six categories, etc.? The notion of inherence in one and the same object would be secondary (gaṇa), since it is wavering in such a manner, like the notion of fire in regard to a boy.423 (640–642)

[Objection:] “Because it is entirely distinct from the perceptions of elephants, etc., it is proven that the notion “army” arises from something else, as with the cognitions of things like blue and a cloth.”424 (643)

This proves what we already maintain, because such things as concentration on conventions fashioned by whim are [the something else that is] the means [for the notion of number].425 Or else the number would be in the cognition, etc., by the same reason. If you describe number’s emergence in relation to cognition (buddhi-apekṣā),426 then why don’t you accept the cognition of it on the basis of mere concentration on convention? (644–645)

 […]

[TN: After refuting number, Śāntarakṣita turns to measure, separateness, conjunction and disjunction, and proximity and distance. Then, in following brief passage, he raises the possibility that number, etc., are only conventionally distinct from the substances they qualify, but his imagined interlocutor—Aviddhakarṇa—asserts that the distinction is real.]

Summary of number, conjunction, etc.

The other party might believe that number, conjunction, etc., are all not indistinct from

423 Praśastapāda, in his organizational commentary on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, in the Padartha-dhāraṇa-samgraha, goes into quite a lot of detail explaining how the concepts of duality, etc., emerge in our consciousness from an initial recognition of oneness. (When we see a pot resting on a table, we see, among other things, two single things, one pot and one table, and those unities together make two.) But, according to Śāntarakṣita, when we see two pots, we do so clearly and distinctly, without the kind of cognitive stammer that accompanies figurative expressions. If “seeing inherence in the substance” is similar to “seeing fire in the boy,” then the former cannot be the basis for our perception of two pots, because that would be like saying we know the boy to have brown hair because we see that he is like fire in some sense.

424 Kamalaśīla attributes this argument—which, without explicitly stating it, is clearly intended to prove the fact that number is a distinct quality—to Aviddhakarṇa (§9).

425 Miyako Notake (2011) discusses the differences between Śāntarakṣita’s use of the term samketa-ābhoga and Dharmakīrti’s before him. Notake renders the term samketa-ābhoga, “directing one’s mind to a convention,” which makes nice use of the exact grammatical construction of the term. Kamalaśīla says the expression “such things as” (adhī) is meant to contain samketa-smarana (recollection of conventions), and so on (adhisthāyina samketa-smarānapādaparipārabhāgah). He is, therefore, drawing a distinction between the smarana (recollection) of conventions and the manaskāra (awareness, concentration) or ābhoga (experience, effort) of them. (Śāntarakṣita uses the latter two synonymously.) The distinction seems to be, in part, a matter of degree. E.g., in Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākramas, he distinguishes between “calling to mind” (smṛti) the image of the Buddha as an antidote to restlessness or inattention, and “keeping it in mind” (manaskāra) as the object of meditative focus.

426 By using the term buddhi-apekṣā, “in relation to cognition,” Śāntarakṣita appears to be playing with the Vaiśeṣika term apekṣā-buddhi (relational cognition), with which thinkers like Praśastapāda explain the observer-dependence of qualities like number, proximity, and so on. Cf. §9.
substances because they differentiate them, as with a stick [of Devadatta’s].\footnote{Kamalaśīla, as one would expect, adds this term (devadattasya).} So far as this describes them in terms of conventional existence, it proves what we already maintain, because that which exists conventionally cannot be described in terms of identity (tattva) or difference (anyātva). (676–677)

*Objection:* “We deny that a heap, or the like, is inexpressible, since its properties are restricted, as in the case of color, sound, taste, and so on.”\footnote{Kamalaśīla attributes this to Aviddhakarṇa; the language of the fragment, and the way Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla frames their engagement with it, suggests it may have been a direct response to an argument by Dignāga (§10).} (678)

In reality, this [heap, or the like] lacks intrinsic existence, like a sky-lotus, so its restricted qualities are not established; rather, they are imposed by conceptuality. Stated in just this way, it is inconclusive because of sky-lotuses, etc., since identity (abheda) and difference (vyatireka) are only present in an entity. (679–680)

If you are explaining, in this way,\footnote{Kamalaśīla remarks, “In this way,’ i.e., not non-distinct from substance. How, then? Having a distinction. That’s the meaning” (evam iti na dravyāvyatirekinah. kim tarhi. vyatirekina ity arthah).} that number, etc., is different from substance, then the reason is unestablished in its substratum,\footnote{If there is no mountain, one cannot prove that there is fire on the mountain. If there is no such thing as number, there can be no “difference from substance” in it.} because number and so on have not been proven. On the other hand, should you be saying, in this way, that substance itself is different from heaps, etc., then you would prove the contradiction that substance is distinct from its own form. (681–682)

[...]

\footnote{Kamalaśīla remarks, “In this way,’ i.e., not non-distinct from substance. How, then? Having a distinction. That’s the meaning” (evam iti na dravyāvyatirekinah. kim tarhi. vyatirekina ity arthah).}
§9. AV13: ELEPHANTS AND ARMIES

Before considering Śāntarakṣita’s engagement with Av13, it is important to consider the way number is handled in early Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika works.

Number in Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya

For Praśastapāda, number relies in part on the eye of the beholder, as do proximity and distance. Wilhelm Halbfass refers to these as the “relational gunas,” i.e., those qualities that “involve a plurality of substances that are related to each other, or grouped together, in relation to a perceiving subject.” Praśastapāda uses duality as the model case. When one perceives two objects and recognizes each to be its own singular thing, one has a single cognition (buddhi) of two instances of the universal “unity.” Praśastapāda describes this universal as “inherent in the inherent-in-the-conjoined” (samyukta-samaveta-samaveta). This is a complicated term, but it sheds significant light on the entire sequence:

1. The two objects are in direct contact (sannikarṣa) with the eye; this means the two objects are “conjoined” (samyukta) to the eye.
2. Each of the two objects is a singular thing unto itself, and, so, is qualified by the quality “one;” this “one” quality that inheres in them is “inherent in the conjoined” (samyukta-samaveta).
3. The universal “unity” inheres in each instantiation of unity, and, so, inheres in the “one” quality that itself inheres in the two objects in question; the universal, then, is “inherent in the inherent-in-the-conjoined” (samyukta-samaveta-samaveta).

Despite this level of abstraction and indirectness, we actually perceive the universal. When a single substance is in direct contact with our faculty of sight, we have a cognition of the substance, the quality of unity that inheres in it, and the universal unity that itself inheres in that quality. To return to the model case: When there are, say, two pots before our eyes, each of which is its own unity, we then have a single cognition regarding both of them. This is referred to as the “reference cognition” or “relational cognition” (apekṣā-buddhi), i.e., the cognition (buddhi) in relation (apekṣya) to which duality comes to be generated (ārabhyate) in the two pots.

Other than the number one, number qualifies more than one substance—duality exists in two substances, etc. But this creates a problem. As Jonardon Ganeri puts it, the sentence, “the table has wooden legs,” entails that each leg is wooden, but the sentence, “the table has four legs,” does not

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431 Halbfass 1992, 122.
432 Yadā boddhu caṅkṣuṣa samānāsamanājanātiyayaḥ dravyayoh samnikarṣa sati tattvānyuktasamavetāsamavetākatakatvasāmāyayajñānātādānottātāv āyataḥ vṛttvāntāyaḥ cakasminnottātāv āyataḥ tataḥ punar dvitvasāmāyayajñānāmah nyayaḥ bhāgavānād aikeśabdubhir vinaśyatā dvitvasāmāyayatatsambandhajñānānebhyaḥ dvitvagunaboḥ bhāgavānād aikeśabdubhir upaśamānataḥ ekāh kālāḥ. tataḥ idānām aikeśabdubhirvinaśāḥ dvitvagunasya vinaśyatā dvitvagunabuddhāhād sāmāyayabuddhāh vinaśyatā dvitvagunatatajñānātatsambandhebhyaḥ dvāraḥ sati dravyabuddhāḥ upaśamānataḥ ekāh kālāḥ. tadamantaram dvāraḥ iti jñānātpādaḥ dvitvāya vinaśāḥ dvitvagunabuddhāḥ vinaśyatā dvayajñānātāv samākārsayotpādaṃ sāmāyayāmānataḥ ekāh kālāḥ. tadamantaram dravyajñānād dvitvagunabuddhāḥ vinaśāḥ dvitvagunabuddhāḥ api saṃskārād iti. (Dvivedi, 196.1)
entail that each leg is four.\footnote{Ganeri 2015.}

Later “Navya Nyāya” thinkers, several centuries after Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, attempted to resolve this by coining a new relation beyond conjunction and inherence, “completion” (paryāpti), to account for the distributive aspect of number. If number is a genuine quality, then it must reside somewhere in particular, i.e., it must qualify something. But by what metaphysics does a number larger than one come to reside jointly in more than one substance? Inherence and conjunction would seem to lead to the “each leg is four” problem. “Completion,” in Navya Nyāya, is seemingly devised to resolve it.

This issue seems not to have occupied earlier Nyāya thinkers. Uddyotakara, for example, is concerned mainly with the fact that number sheds light on the division between substance and quality. He discusses this in his comments on NS 1.1.14, the definition of the “objects” (artha).

NS 1.1.14 lists the objects\footnote{The twelve objects of knowledge (prameya)—second in the list of sixteen principles (tattva) laid out in NS 1.1.1—receive extensive treatment in NS, occupying all of 3.1, 3.2, and 4.1, but they are first enumerated and defined in NS 1.1.10–22. Sutra 10 lists the inferential marks of the self; sutra 11 defines the body as the substratum (āśraya) of the limbs, the sense faculties, and their objects; sutras 12 and 13 list the five sense faculties (smell, taste, sight, touch, hearing) and the elements from which they arise (earth, water, fire, air, ether, respectively).} of the senses (tad-artha), the latter of which were defined in sutras 12 and 13:

\[
gandharasarūpasparśaśabdāḥ pṛthivyādiguṇās tadarthāḥ \quad ||1.1.14|| \footnote{NS 18.8.}
\]

Odor, taste, color, touch, and sound, the qualities of earth, etc., are the objects of these [sense faculties]. (1.1.14)

This, at least, is how Vātsyāyana reads it. There are three compounds in the sutra: gandha-rasa-rūpasparśa-śabdāḥ (odor, taste, color, touch, sound), pṛthivy-ādi-गुणः (earth-etc.-qualities), and tadarthāḥ (their-objects). It is natural to take the second compound as a predicate of the first: “Odor, taste, color, touch, and sound, which are the qualities of earth, etc., are the objects of these.” Indeed, this is what Vātsyāyana does. He has little else to say about this seemingly simple definition.

Uddyotakara has a different idea. He argues that what follows from this reading is that every object would be restricted to a single sense faculty (sight or hearing, etc). This, he explains, would conflict with the underlying premise of NS 3.1.1 that a single object can be grasped by both sight and touch. Instead, he reads the second compound as an enumerative compound (dvandva) meaning “earth, etc., and the qualities,” and regards the first two compounds separately:

\[
gandharasarūpasparśaśabdāḥ pṛthivyādiguṇās tadarthāḥ.
\]

Odor, taste, color, touch, and sound; earth, etc., and the qualities—the objects of [the senses].

Uddyotakara entertains the objection that this renders the first compound superfluous: given that odor, etc., are qualities, they are contained in the word “quality” (guṇa) in the second compound, and there would be no need for the sutra to mention them separately. His response is that odor, taste,
color, touch, and sound really are each restricted to a single sense faculty. They are stated separately in order to distinguish them from the objects (earth, etc., and the other qualities) that can be perceived by more than one sense. Accordingly, Uddyotakara thinks that “earth, etc., and the qualities” refers elliptically to number, dimension, proximity and distance, etc. As a result, he goes on to consider each of these qualities in turn—including, naturally, a discussion of number.

Uddyotakara then cites a Buddhist-sounding rival, who claims that we never perceive a substance apart from its qualities. If one thing is identical with another, the Buddhist explains, then we can see that we never grasp the one without grasping the other: we only perceive a “row” (pañkṣi) when we perceive the items standing in a row, therefore the row is nothing but its members. After an initial series of counterarguments, Uddyotakara discusses the row and the issue of plurality. Specifically, Uddyotakara considers things like armies and forests. He describes a group of elephants, men, horses, and chariots (gaja-puruṣa-turaṅgama-syandana) standing in close proximity, but without their exact extent necessarily being determined, and says that the number plurality (bahutva) present in them is referred to as an army. In other words, when we perceive a row, what we are perceiving is number, specifically the number plurality, which is, in fact, distinct from the things qualified by that number.

Eventually, Uddyotakara’s opponent explicitly denies that number exists. Uddyotakara replies:

A cognition of one or many (eka-aneka-pratyaya) has a basis (nimitta) that is different from the basis of the cognition of a pot, because it is utterly distinct from the cognition of a pot, like the cognition of blue. Therefore, the basis (nimitta) of the cognition of that is number.

He then explains the difference between the color blue and the substance it qualifies, using a blue cloth as an example: We perceive the quality as qualifying the substance, but we recognize that the basis for the perception of the quality is distinct from that of the substance itself; the blue of a blue cloth is not itself the cloth. Number is a quality, like color.

§ § §

Śāntarakṣita argues that we never perceive the number of elephants, etc. (gaja-ādi), apart from the elephants themselves, even though number is purportedly perceptible and distinct from the substance it qualifies. Cognitions of number are, he explains, associated with our awareness of conventions that are themselves fashioned by whim (icchā-racita-saṃketa-manaskāra-anvayam). Number is not distinct.

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436 na nāsti, tadagrahe tadbuddhyabhāvāt, yad yasmād anarthāntaraṇī bhavati tadagrahe tasyāgraḥo drṣṭaḥ, tad yathā yūṣasya pāṅkteś ca (NV 70.22).
437 Including an abbreviated version of the Vārttika passage paraphrased in Bh8 ($§$).
438 evam aniyatadigdeśaṃbandhiṣu gajapuruṣaturasṛgasaṃsanyandaneṣu parasparapratyayātītupaghrīteṣu avadhārītānaṃavadhārīteṣu varātmanā bahutvasaṃkhyaiva senety ucyate (NV 72.14).
439 This, of course, points toward his discussion in NV 2.1.36, regarding Vātsyāyana’s description of forests and armies in proving the existence of substantial wholes ($§$).
440 tad asatvām iti cet. athāpy evaṃ kalpyeta, saṃkhyaiva tāvan nāsti, kuto ’rthaḥtaraḥbhāva iti (NV 73.6).
441 Kumbhāpatrāyanimittānānyanimittakā ekānekapratyayāh kumbhāpatrāyavilakṣaṇatvāt, nilādipratyayavat. tasmāt yat tātpratrayanimittāṃ sā samkhyaeti (NV 73.9).
442 atadrūpaparāvṛttagajādhyāvatirekiṇi | na saṅkhyaḥ bhāsate jñāne drṣṭaṃ naiva śaṣṭi tat ||637|| (TS 263).
In response, Aviddhakarṇa rises to the defense of the distinctness of number, bringing Śaṅcarakṣita’s example of “elephants, etc.” into focus. Av13 reads as follows:

sa by āha senāpratyayo° gajaturaṅgayandādivyairītikanībandhano gajādipratyayavilakṣaṇatvān nilapāṭapratyayavad iti. (643)

[Aviddhakarṇa] says: The perception of an army has a basis (niṇāṇbana) that is distinct from such things as elephants, horses, and chariots, because it has a different character than the perceptions of those things, as in the case of the perceptions of blue and a cloth (niḷa-pāṇa-pratyaṭya).

Aviddhakarṇa may have been, like Uddyotakara, expounding NS 1.1.14 and pre-empting later discussions, or, just as likely, glossing a later passage like NBē 2.1.36 that directly addresses the issue of number. In either case, Av13 contains the same basic reasoning as Uddyotakara’s remarks in NV 1.1.14 distilled into a simple formal inference. (Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that the simplicity and clarity of the argument owes more to Kamalaśīla than to Aviddhakarṇa.) There is a clear and present difference between perceiving an army and perceiving the members of the army, and this difference suffices, for Aviddhakarṇa, to prove the necessity of the number plurality, and, as a consequence, number as a distinct quality.

In §8 we looked at Aviddhakarṇa, Bhāvivikta, and Uddyotakara’s arguments that substance is distinct from quality. Here we see Aviddhakarṇa arguing from the other side of the equation: number, a quality, is distinct from the substance it qualifies. In both cases, we find a strikingly similar argument in the Vārttika. Did Aviddhakarṇa borrow from and build on Uddyotakara’s work, or perhaps vice versa? Or were both simply drawing from a shared milieu? Aviddhakarṇa has been described as one of the authors of the dark period between Uddyotakara and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, yet, apart from his likely chronological priority to Dharmakīrti, his dates are just as often described as being entirely uncertain.

The convergence between Aviddhakarṇa and Uddyotakara also raises questions about Śaṅcarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s decisions to highlight his work. If we knew how Nyāya circles in the eighth century

443 TSP 265.6, J95v.2. Abhayadevasūri cites this argument, and attributes it to Aviddhakarṇa, in a slightly different form: gajaturagayandādivyairītikanīmittraprabhavāṃ senāpratyaṭyaḥ, gajādipratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt, vastracarmakambaleṣu nilapratyayavat, “The perception of number has as its source a basis distinct from such things as elephants, horses, and chariots, because it has a different character than the perceptions of those things, as in the case of the perception of blue in cloths, hides, and blankets” (TBV 674.17). Kamalaśīla may have streamlined the formulation of the example.

444 “Shastri prints saṅkhyaḥ instead of senāḥ. Although the conclusion is essentially the same in either case, this is not a trivial distinction.


446 Steinkellner 1963, 153.
regarded Aviddhakarṇa, and how well the Buddhists were familiar with these views, we could draw conclusions about Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s underlying motivations. Perhaps they were—or at least considered themselves to be—simply contending with an important, well-regarded rival. Yet it is just as possible that they were knowingly raising Aviddhakarṇa’s profile—whether because his work was didactically useful, in order to force other Naiyāyikas to defend his arguments, or for any number of other reasons.

It is the very uncertainty of the social context of these texts that necessitates looking at them for more than just rational content. We cannot know precisely what Śāntarakṣita or Kamalaśīla are up to, nor how their projects reflect or refract the work of Aviddhakarṇa. This is precisely why we must not take such matters for granted. In interpreting this material, any confidence or certainty we may have should be grounded by skepticism and doubt.
\section*{§10. AV14: HEAPS, STREAMS, AND STATES}

Toward the end of the “Examination of Quality,” well after refuting the distinctness of number, and after discussing dimension (parimāṇa), separateness (prthaktvā), conjunction and disjunction (samyoga-vibhāga), and proximity and distance (paratva-aparatva), Śāntarakṣīta imagines his opponents arguing that all of these “are not indistinct from substance” (na dravya-avyatirekīn) precisely because they qualify substances.\(^{447}\) As Kamalāśīla rephrases the double negative, “What differentiates something cannot be without distinction from it.”\(^{448}\)

This accords quite well with Uddyotakara’s comments and seems to underlie Aviddhakarṇa’s arguments about substance and quality. But as the Buddhists point out here, conventionally speaking, this is perfectly acceptable to them, too. We cannot say any more than conventionally that \(x\) is definitively not-y: “…that which exists conventionally cannot be described in terms of identity (tattvā) or difference (anyatvā).” There are two main ways of reading the phrase “not indistinct from.” The first is as an affirmation (vidhi). This entails reading the two negations (“not” and “in-”) together as an emphatic double negative, in the sense that quality is absolutely distinct from substance (affirmation).\(^{449}\) The second, mere negation (nisedha), entails reading the negative particle na, “not,” independently, and so as merely denying that quality is indistinct rather than positing or affirming anything in particular.\(^{450}\) This is the sense in which it is acceptable to the Buddhists to say that “quality is not indistinct from substance.”

After explaining this, Śāntarakṣīta entertains an objection by Aviddhakarṇa, which Kamalāśīla cites as follows (Av14):

\begin{quote}
\textit{sa by āha samūhasantānāvasthāviśeṣās tattvānyatvābhyaṃ avacāniyā na bhavanti pratiniyatadharmayogitvād rūparasādīvad iti. (678)}\(^{451}\)
\end{quote}

\textit{[Aviddhakarṇa says:} It is not the case that specific (viśeṣa) heaps (samūha), streams (santāna), or states (avasthā) are inexpressible (avacāniyā) in terms of identity or difference (tattvā-anyatvā), because they are endowed with properties restricted in each case, as in the case of color, taste, and so on.

We can, Aviddhakarṇa argues, state conclusively that a “heap” is a pot, and that its “states” are, though they inhere in it, distinct from it. As we know, according to Nyāya, substantial wholes are distinct from the parts in which they inhere; they are perceptible by different sense faculties; they persist through time; they have both particular and universal aspects; and they can be linguistically denoted. Provisionally accepting that the world is populated by heaps and streams, Aviddhakarṇa

\(^{447}\) samkhyaśyogādayaḥ sarva na dravyāvyatirekiṇāḥ | tadvyaavacchedakatvena daṇḍādir iva cen matam ||676|| (TS 279, J34r.2).

\(^{448}\) yo hi yadvyaavacchedako nāsau tadavatirekī (TSP 279.10, J101v.4).

\(^{449}\) Or perhaps one could describe this as implicative negation (paryudāsa-pratīṣṭedha) in the sense “there is non-indistinctness from substance,” i.e., as positing, by way of the negation, that it is distinct. A standard example would be something like, “There is a non-pot on this table,” which clearly posits that there is something on the table and excludes its being a pot.

\(^{450}\) In keeping with the previous note, one could perhaps describe this as a case of non-implicative negation (prasāja-pratīṣṭedha), in the sense “there is not indistinctness from substance,” though this is a little bit of a hermeneutic strain. A standard example of this would be, “There is no pot on this table,” which does not imply that there is anything there, but merely denies that there is a pot.

\(^{451}\) TSP 279.14, J101v.5.
nevertheless insists that we are able to accurately describe such heaps and streams in accordance with their specific identifiable properties—just like the properties themselves.

Though Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla present Av14 as an argument for quality’s distinctness from substance, it is just as much an argument about the way that language interfaces perception and reality: What is it that we perceive? To what do our words point? And do our words correspond to reality? In other words, what is the relationship between a word, the thing it denotes, and our perception of it? Śāntarakṣita’s response to Av14 emphasizes this nexus of issues. “In reality,” he says, a heap or the like, “lacks intrinsic existence, like a sky-lotus, so its restricted qualities are not established; rather, they are imposed by conceptuality (kalpanā).”

The relation between language and perception arises early in the Nyāya-bhāṣya. The first statement on perception (pratyakṣa) in the Nyāyasūtra, NS 1.1.4, bears partly on this question:

Perception is a cognition (jñāna) that is generated by contact between a sense faculty and an object; it is not-to-be-designated (avyapadeśya), non-deviating, and consists in determination (avasaśya-ātmaka).

Each term in this sutra has generated a diversity of controversies and interpretations in the Nyāya tradition—as have the relations between them. Is every instance of perception both avyapadeśya and avasaśya-ātmaka, or does this distinguish two modes of perception? Does the sutra define perceptual cognition or the knowledge (jñāna) that derives from it? Most pertinent for us, however, is the term avyapadeśya. What does it mean for perceptual, or perceptually-derived, knowledge to be not-to-be-designated? According to Dignāga, perceptual content is essentially avyapadeśya, in the sense that perceptions register unique particulars (svalakṣaṇa) and words can never truly capture or signify them. Nyāya disagrees. According to Nyāya, the word “pot” may be a shared convention, but when we say “this is a pot,” we are, in fact, pointing to (vy+apa+Vdiś) a specific substance in which inheres the universal we call pot.

Here is what Vātsyāyana thinks: Words and things are bound up in our encounter with the world, but we can still differentiate between knowledge that is derived from words (or from testimony, etc.) and that which is derived from direct perceptual knowledge of a thing. There is a difference between the moment we cognize a thing (artha-jñāna-kāla) and the moment of some kind of conventional usage (vyavahāra-kāla); in the latter, we employ (vy+ā+Vpr) the name for a thing (samākhyā-sābda), whereas in the former we do not. “The knowledge generated by contact between a sense faculty and an object,” he explains, “does not derive from words (asābda).” When we say “this is a pot,” we are using linguistically-derived knowledge to designate an object, but we are also referring to the content of the perceptual knowledge we have of a particular object in front of us. We can only speak about such content—naturally enough—with words, but strictly speaking the knowledge itself is non-

\[\text{niḥsvabhāvatayā tasya tattvato 'mbarapadmavat | na siddhā niyata dharmāḥ kalpanāropitās tu te ||679||} (TS 280, J34r.3).

\[\text{indriyārthasannikāroṣṭpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ ||1.1.4||} (NS 10.3).

\[\text{Vācaspati Miśra puts forth the latter view, against the grain of earlier commentators. Cf. Mondal 1982.}

\[\text{E.g., Vācaspati, Jayanta, etc., insert "from which" (yatāḥ) into the sutra, so that it describes perception as that from which such-and-such knowledge arises. Cf. Mondal 1982.}

\[\text{īd evam arthajñānakāle san a samākhyāśābdo vyāpriyate, vyavahārākāle tu vyāpriyate. tasmād asābdam arthajñānam indriyārthasannikāroṣṭpannam iti (NV 10.20).}

452 niḥsvabhāvatayā | tasya tattvato ‘mbarapadmavat | na siddhā niyata dharmāḥ kalpanāropitās tu te ||679|| (TS 280, J34r.3).
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verbal. Pradyot Kumar Mondal describes it clearly and concisely: “Although the statement conveying perceptual cognition requires the knowledge of the meaning of words, perceptual cognition as such is in no way dependent on the knowledge of words. Perceptual knowledge is not word-associated at the time of its origin.”457 The actual moment of perception is not derived from words, but that does not mean the content of perception is inexpressible.

Uddyotakara, commenting on NBh 1.1.4, cites Dignāga’s definition of perception as “free from conceptuality” (kalpanā-apodha), i.e., from “what is linked to name, class, etc.” (nāma-jāty-ādi-yojanā). Unlike Vātsyāyana, Dignāga holds firmly that the content of perception is inexpressible, rather than merely not being strictly derived from language. In turn, Uddyotakara finds it ironic that Dignāga tries to define something as inexpressible. If it is inexpressible, then what does its definition define? If the word “perception” denotes perception itself, then perception is not inexpressible.459

Still later, Dharmakīrti defends the practicality of using language that does not strictly correspond to the perceptual content it purports to denote. In his auto-commentary on Pramāṇa-vārttika 1.137–142, using the same phrase in Av14, “specific heaps, streams, or states,” he says (in Dunne’s rendering):

To be specific, they, being all of such-and-such a kind, are expressed by expressions that indicate a certain conglomeration (samūha), continuum (santāna), or state (avasthā). Those particulars that when conglomterated perform a single effect have no distinction from each other with regard to that effect. Therefore, it would be pointless to express any such distinction. For this reason, in order to refer (niyojana) to all of them at once, people apply one expression to them, such as “water-jug.” (Dunne 2004, 356–357)460

Put differently, though our words do not have one-to-one correspondences with the kinds of singular entities they point towards, it is practical to use them as if they did. Attempting to precisely indicate the specific momentary heap of particulars that is presently of concern would serve no useful purpose, and would probably be impossible, anyway. Dharmakīrti may have had Av14 in mind here—more assuredly, he and Aviddhakārṇa were both thinking of Dignāga.

The *Upādāya-prajñāpti-prakarana* (Taishō vol. 31, T1622: 885a20), attributed to Dignāga, which is only extant in its Chinese translation, may be the source against which Aviddhakārṇa crafted Av14. In this text, the author explains that the Buddha classified existing things into these three groupings, “heaps, streams, and particular states” 一者總聚。二者相續。三者分位差別, in order to preach the Dharma.461 (In the Chinese, the word corresponding to viśeṣa (particular, specific), is compounded exclusively with “state,” rather than distributed across all three, so that *samūha-santāna-avasthā-viśeṣa* in Av14—and the excerpt from Dharmakīrti—should perhaps be rendered “heaps,

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458 “Free from” is the standard rendering of *apodha* here, but I think something like “at a remove from” might be more evocative, as well as closer to the spirit of the term.
460 evamjātīyāḥ ca sarve samūhasaṁtānāvasthāviśeṣasābdā ye samastāḥ kīmścīd ekam kāryam kurvanti teṣāṁ tatra viśeṣābhāvād apārthikāḥ viśeṣacodaneti sakr teṣeṣaṁ niyojanārtham ekam ayam lokāḥ sābdam teṣu nīyuṅkte ghaṭa iti (PVSV, 68.6).
461 T1622 885a28–29.
streams, and specific states,” rather than “specific heaps, streams, and states.”) He exemplifies heaps with bodies and forests, streams with the span of a human life, and states with conditions or characteristics of heaps or streams, like arising or perceptibility. Heaps, then, are spatial unities, streams are temporally unities, and states discretely qualify one or the other. These three, the author says, are “inexpressible in terms of identity or difference; nor are they entirely non-existent” 不可説 爲一性異性。及總無性.462 This must be a translation of something very close to tattvānyatvābhyaṃ avacanīya, as is found in Av14, together with a phrase about non-existence (such as na ca niḥsvabhāvatā, or the like). The author’s point requires pivoting to the fact that the existence of “heaps, streams, and states” cannot be denied entirely—though we cannot qualify them definitively, nor can we deny them outright—but he examines these claims separately. The bulk of this short text is devoted to Madhyamaka-style reductio arguments against identity and/or difference. If we presume the overall identity of a single stream, for example, or the difference between a heap and its particular states, various logical absurdities ensue. If this text was Aviddhakarṇa’s target, or one of his targets, in Av14, it seems it is this portion of the text that most interested him.

Av14 plays a very small role in the Tattvasānga, occupying a handful of verses towards the end of a chapter Śāntarakṣita himself describes as almost superfluous, since the proof of momentariness has already destroyed the foundation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika analysis of quality. Yet, for our purposes, this little fragment has a certain poignancy, as it brings into sharp focus the way the Tattvasānga represents Buddhist-Nyāya debate writ large. Essencelessness, conceptuality, and the relation between our conceptual framework for the world and the reality on which it is imposed—this is an expansive discourse in Buddhist thought, and in the confrontation between Buddhist and Nyāya metaphysics and epistemology. The question is not merely whether quality is a distinct ontological category, but what quality’s distinctness from substance would entail for the nature of reality, the way we encounter it, and our ability to know, think about, and talk about it.

462 T1622 885b7–8.


After the examinations of substance and quality, chapters 12–15 continue with the remaining categories: actions, universals, differentiae, and inherence.

Chapter twelve, the “Examination of Action (karman),” is rather brief, sixteen verses in all. Momentariness undermines the notion of a single entity extending spatially and persisting through time, so the notion of the movement of such a thing must similarly be abandoned. As Śāntarakṣita explains, the notion of a single entity persisting long enough to move and yet remaining the same fixed thing is absurd in light of momentariness. Is it a mover or a non-mover? If it is a mover, it must always move. The notion of a thing that is moving entails its being fixed throughout the movement; if it is a non-mover, it could never move without becoming something else, ergo it would not be fixed. Not only does momentariness prove that motion is but a figment of the imagination, but the concept of motion itself proves that momentariness must be true.

In chapter thirteen, the “Examination of Universals,” Śāntarakṣita parries arguments by Uddyotakara, Bhāvivikta, and another lost Naiyāyika named Śaṅkarasvāmin, who features less frequently in the Pañjikā than Aviddhakarṇa or Bhāvivikta. Two fragments are attributed to Bhāvivikta in this chapter: Bh9, which is the first (non-generic) argument in the chapter, and Bh10, which appears as something like the Naiyāyikas’ last ditch effort towards the end of the chapter to save the notion of universals against the Buddhist attack.

Śāntarakṣita begins the chapter by delineating between the ultimate universal, being (sattā), the particular universals (sāmānya-viśeṣa), such as cowness, color-ness, and so on, and ultimate differentiae (antya-viśeṣa), which he discusses in (the very brief) fourteenth chapter, the “Examination of Differentiae (viśeṣa).” Śāntarakṣita says that, according to Nyāya, “Universals, such as existence (sattā) and cowness (gotva), are proven through perception, because the cognition of something existent, etc. (sad-ādi-pratyaya), only arises upon the proper functioning of the senses.”

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463 At least, after his initial statement (v. 707), as elsewhere in the “Examination of the Six Categories,” that universals are already undermined by the refutation of substance, etc.
464 pratyaksataḥ prasiddhā tu sattvagotvādi jātayāḥ | akṣavyāpārasadbhāve sadāipratyayodayāt ||713|| (TS 294, 36r.1).
In other words, each time we perceive a cow, we also perceive its being-a-cow, which means we directly perceive its cowness. More fundamentally, each time we perceive anything, we perceive its existing, which means we perceive the universal existence (sattā) that inheres in it. “We also,” Śāntarakṣita continues, still in the voice of Nyāya, “clearly apprehend their existence on the force of inference, since the perception of difference (viśeṣa-pratyaya) must arise on the basis of a different cause.” An individual cow’s conformity to the class cow causes our perception of its cowness; the fact that we perceive its individual characteristics apart from its class-conformity allows us to infer its cowness, as well. After making these two generic statements, Śāntarakṣita cites several specific arguments by Bhāvivikta and Uddyotakara.

As we have now seen, Śāntarakṣita refers, throughout his examination of the six categories, to linguistic-conceptual conventions (saṃketa, samaya) with increasing consistency and clarity. More specifically, he says that the phenomena Naiyāyikas attempt to explain with reference to the six categories are really just the results of the mental effort (manaskāra, ēbhoga) that we continually make to apply our shared conventions to the world. In part, he is just using the tools at his disposal to disprove the opposing view and establish his own. But he is also stitching together an intricate dialogue. The examination of the six categories ultimately gives way to chapter sixteen, the “Examination of the Meaning of Words.” There Śāntarakṣita defends the apoha (exclusion) theory, i.e., the idea that we superimpose conventionally shared words and concepts onto reality by excluding from our cognition of any given phenomenon every concept that is “not-that.” The pot we are looking at is really just a fluctuation of unique particulars, but we regard it as a pot because we exclude from our conceptual apprehension of it everything that is not-a-pot. Śāntarakṣita does not go into much detail about this idea in any of the chapters on the categories, but here in the “Examination of Universals” the conversation continues to turn in that direction. Bhāvivikta’s first argument in the chapter, Bh9, contends in part with the idea that a cow’s cowness is nothing but the fact that we conventionally share the notion of a cow. The discussion culminates eventually in Śāntarakṣita’s dismissive response to Bh10, which amounts to saying, “Well, then, why not just accept our view about conventionality?”

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465 anumānabalenāpi sattvam āsāṃ pratiyate | viśeṣapratyayo yena nimittāntarabhāvikāḥ ||714|| (TS 294, J36r.2)
TRANSLATION

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

EXAMINATION OF UNIVERSALS

Introduction

When substance, etc., are refuted, the universals are rejected, as well, since they are all imagined as residing in those first three categories. (707)

Nyāya position

The other party claims that universals are twofold: “Existence” (sattā) is the pure universal, due to its correspondence to all things. [All other universals], “substance- hood,” and the like, are universals in the sense that they give rise to a perception of correspondence in their respective substrata, but they are also said to possess particularity because they distinguish their respective substrata from everything belonging to another class. Hence, it is established that only the latter [of the two kinds of universal] cause cognitions of exclusion. (708–710)

On the other hand, they call “ultimate differentiae” those things that are particular only, that are only causes of exclusion, and that are fixed in permanent substances. It is because of these that practitioners (yogin) have perceptions like, “This is entirely different than that,” with regard to atoms, etc., individually. (711–712)

Universals, such as existence (sattā) and cowness (gotva), are proven through perception, because the cognition of something existent, etc., only arises upon the proper functioning of the senses. We also clearly apprehend their existence on the force of inference, since the perception of difference must arise on the basis of a different cause. [So the other party claims.] (713–714)

Arguments

(i) With respect to cows, elephants, etc., the particular words and cognitions “cow,” etc., have causes that are distinct from conventions, forms, bodies, and so on, because, under the condition that cows, etc., are their objects, they are different from the words and cognitions for those [conventions, etc.], just like the terms “with calf” or “goaded” with respect to the same [cows, elephants, etc.]. The qualification [i.e., “under the condition that cows, etc., are their objects”] is due

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466 A cow is a cow insofar as it instantiates cowness. According to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, the universal of cowness is a real singular entity that inheres in multiple individuals. Universals can inhere in substances (cowness, substancehood), qualities (blueness, colorness), or actions (upward-motion-ness).

467 Being (sattā) is the pure universal; everything else, “cowness,” and so on, is a “particular universal.” Being does not distinguish anything from anything else, but is only a point of commonality between all existing things. “Cowness” is a point of commonality between all cows, but also differentiates cows from horses, pots, etc.

468 I.e., an advanced yogic practitioner is able to discern the distinctions between individual atoms, but because all “earth” atoms, etc., are essentially identical, there must be something to account for their ability to be individually differentiated. “Ultimate differentiae” are an explanatory abstraction to account for this phenomenon. Śāntarakṣita deals with this concept in the brief fourteenth chapter (not translated in the present study).

469 Without the senses, we would not perceive something as existing, or as a cow, or whatever; to perceive something “as a cow” entails perceiving its cowness.

470 Note the systematicity in Śāntarakṣita’s presentation—the hallmark, as Isabelle Ratié (2014) points out most clearly, of his work.
to the deviation [that would otherwise occur] with respect to cognitions of hare’s horns, etc. The terms for the intrinsic nature of those [conventions, etc.] is meant to be the dissimilar [example].

(715–717)

(ii) The cognition corresponding to a cow, or the like, arises on the basis of something other than the body, etc., because it has a distinction, like the cognition of blue, etc. (718)

(iii) Cowness is a different thing than the actual cow itself, because it is the object of a different cognition, as in the cases of color and touch, etc., and because we refer to it as “[the cowness] of that [cow],” like a horse of Caitra’s. (719)

Preliminary response

All of this is without substance. It describes but a theory. There is no means of knowledge that can make it known. Cognitions of the existent, etc., are not established as arising immediately after the proper functioning of the senses, but from directing one’s mind (ābhoga) to conventions.

(720–721)

This is just like dhātī, abhayā, and other plants, which, though manifold, are all found to have the capacity to heal various illnesses, whether individually or jointly. There is no universal in them that has the capacity for that, because we perceive the pacification of illnesses with differences in slowness or speed, etc. Indeed, there is no additional feature in a universal resulting from things like differences in soil, because it [is supposed to have] one and the same form permanently; rather, it belongs to the dhātī, and so on. In this way, though ultimately different, some things, and not others, come to be the causes of the recognition of similar things, etc., due to their restricted capacities. (722–725)

In addition, given one’s desire to express mere fitness for action, one creates the convention for the term “existent” in regard to those things, or for another term, according to whim. Speakers create conventions for terms like “cow” with respect to things with the capacity for particular actions, such as carrying, giving milk, and so on. We can observe that these cognitions of “the existent,” [“a cow,”] etc., arise due to concentration (manaskāra) on those conventions, rather than immediately after the functioning of the senses. (726–728)

A non-linguistic cognition arises at first, and only after that the directing of one’s mind to a convention. Therefore, this is recollective, and for the same reason those [cognitions of the existent, etc., are, as well]. For this very reason, someone whose mind is elsewhere has an apprehension of a mere entity without all of its qualifications. (729–730)

Refutation

As for the first reason, it is fruitless. We already accept that these arise on the basis of directing one’s mind to conventions. It is this that is associated and that possesses positive and
negative concomitance. (731)

If that [i.e., directing of one's mind to conventions] is not external to the subject of the argument, the example is devoid of the property to be proven. It is not at all the case that external things, such as a calf or a goad, are directly the causes of those [notions]. Terms and conceptions do not pertain to unique particulars (śvalakṣaṇa), since the form of a unique particular exceeds the scope of language. Rather, they proceed by relying on conventional notions like “goad,” on which externality is imposed, and which are only approached by internal [cognitive processes]. (732–734)

And you describe the absence (abhāva) of activity, quality, or appellation as the basis of the notion (pratyaya) of non-existence (abhāva), so the qualification is useless. In addition, this is untenable. If it is a cause, it must be an entity due to its capacity, and the notion of non-existence would obtain for existence (sattā), and so on, because there would be no distinction. (735–736)

It is also unestablished that cognitions of these are utterly distinct from the cognitions of bodies, forms, etc., so the reason is also unestablished, since the corresponding (anvayin) cognition has the appearance of words and individuals, even though you describe universals as being devoid of the form of color, form, and sound. (737–738)

Moreover, if the universal has the form of blue, or the like, what is the difference between this and the quality? In addition, we do not observe a single corresponding “blue,” or the like. Even if you say it manifests, it is not perceived distinctly, so how can the cognition and the name (dhi-dhvani) occur in the individual on the force of that? And you claim that the cognition of the universal is essentially determinate. It cannot be that we do not perceive it because it is imperceptible. Even if it were established that there is a different basis [for the term and cognition, etc.], you have not proven that there is a single corresponding universal that is free from impermanence, because of the sequential arising [of the cognitions, etc.]. (739–742)

And what is the other cause on the basis of which the word “category” is applied to the six, or on the basis of which the notion “it is” occurs in regard to existence, etc.? If you say it has another property as its basis, then you accept the existence of existence, given that that [too] would have another property as its basis, and being a property-possessor would entail an infinite regress. Thus, we can see that this reason deviates because of these, and its all-encompassing pervasion has not been established. (743–745)

[...]

that cowness, e.g., inheres in (i.e., is associated with) an individual cow that instantiates it. Śāntarāksita seems to be playing with the terminology of Bhāvavikta’s argument, even though he does not actually use this term when in his paraphrase of the argument (verses 715–717).

475 That whose nature is unique to it. The real constituents of the world are in constant flux; there is no actual commonality between one momentary heap and another; and so, our terms cannot apply to them directly or truly.

476 Kamalaśīla says, “Only the internal, i.e., cognition” (antārmātrā buddhibh).

477 According to Kamalaśīla, here Śāntarāksita is pivoting to an argument by Saṅkarasvāmin that did not previously appear in the chapter (śaṅkarasvāmi prāha, etc.), namely, that every negation, non-existence, or absence, is a negation of something, and it is the universal intrinsic to that something that creates the correspondence between different notions of non-existence, rather than an absurd-seeming universal “non-existence-ness,” or the like.

478 As it happens, quality inheres only in substances, whereas universals can inhere in substances, qualities, and actions; in addition, qualities are impermanent and each inheres in only a single substance, whereas universals are eternal and each inheres in manifold individuals.
Śāntarakṣita goes on to refute arguments (ii) and (iii), which leads to a brief exchange with Uddyotakara and Śaṅkarasvāmin (another lost Naiyāyika like Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta) on a variety of issues, such as what happens when the substratum of a universal perishes. According to Nyāya, the generic concept of a cow derives from the fact that all cows share in cowness; but what about the generic concept of negation or absence? Is there a universal of non-existence? Śāntarakṣita says that our notion of a thing’s absence, or destruction, etc., follows from mere convention. In the passage that follows, he considers an account (that Kamalaśīla attributes to Śaṅkarasvāmin) for the relationship between universals and specific notions of absence.

**Objection:** “The notions of the prior non-existence of a pot and of the annihilation of the pot concern instances of non-existence that have the entity itself as a qualifying attribute. In every case, there is only a correspondence in these on the force of the universal pertaining to that qualification.” (766–767c)

Not so, because there is an utter distinction [between them], and because it cannot have that as its basis. It is tenable that the corresponding notion “pot,” or the like, is due to those, but not non-existence. The notion of existence is entirely distinct from it. For you do not accept that the notion “cow” or “horse” comes about on the force of existence, otherwise you would have to consider a single universal accomplishing everything. (767d–769)

**Objection:** “We do not claim that a cognition conforms to its basis in every case, since we claim that number, e.g., is the basis of the notion of an army, etc.” (770)

If that is so, then why not accept that this notion, which concerns many different things, attends to the directing of one’s mind toward different conventions fashioned by whim? (771)

Indeed, there is a desire to establish a convention when there is a cognition of difference. Then it is established; then it is heard; then one directs one’s mind toward it; then one has the notion of it. Such alone is ascertained as a capable cause by positive and negative concomitance, since anything else would entail an infinite regress. (772–773)

[...]

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479 Kamalaśīla analyzes this compound (vailakaṇḍaṇyātadāśrayāḥ) in two different ways, but the gist is the same. The second analysis is, “because of the utter distinction and because of not having that as its basis” (samāhāradvandvo vailakaṇḍaṇyād atadāśrayac ca naiva yuktam ity arthaḥ).

480 This is an argument by Bhāvivikta, according to Kamalaśīla (§11). In the prose passage Kamalaśīla cites, the argument seems similar to Aviddhakarṇa’s argument in defense of number (verse 643, §9).
§11. Bh9 and Bh10: Correspondence and Convention

The most elaborate argument in the pūrvapakṣa of chapter thirteen—and one of the most elaborate of all the fragments we are examining—is Bhāvivikta’s argument about cows, Bh9, which Kamalaśīla cites as follows:

bhāviviktah prāha gavāśvamahisavarāhamātaṅgādiṣu gavādyabhidhānaprajñānaveśēṣāḥ samayākṛti-
pīṇḍādiyairītikasvarūpānurūpāsamsarginimittāntaranibandhanā ity avaghoṣā. gavādiviṣayatve sati pīṇḍādisvarūpābhidhānaprajñānaveśēṣāḥ prajñānayirītikābhidhānaprajñānāntvāt, teṣv eva gavādiṣu savatsā gaur bhārākrānto mahīṣāḥ sāsāyo varāhāḥ sāṅkuśo mātāṅga ityādyabhidhānaprajñānaveśēsavat, vaidharmyaṇa pīṇḍādisvarūpābhidhānaprajñānaveśēṣāḥ. yāni ca tānī nimitāntarāṇi tānī gotvādīnīti siddham. (715–717)⁴⁸¹

Bhāvivikta⁴⁸² has said: With regard to cows, horses, buffaloes, boars, elephants, and so on, particular terms (abhiddhāna) and cognitions (prajñāna), such as “cow,” have as their basis other causes (nimitta-antara) that are distinct from (nyairītika) conventions (sāraya), forms (aṅkṛti), bodies (piṇḍa), etc., and that are associated (samsargin) with what conforms to their character (svarūpa-anurūpa)—that is the proclamation. This is because, under the condition that cows, etc., are their objects, they are terms and cognitions distinct from the terms and cognitions of the nature of bodies, etc. It is like the particular terms and cognitions, “cow with calf,” “overloaded buffalo,” “wounded boar,” “goaded elephant,” and so on, with regard to the same cows, etc., and unlike the particular terms and cognitions of the nature of bodies, etc. And these other causes (nimitta-antara) are cowness—so it is established.

This is not a very easy fragment to follow. For the sake of clarity, here are the individual components, slightly streamlined:

1. **subject**
   the particular term and cognition, “cow,” with regard to a cow

2. **to be proven**
   is based on another cause, apart from convention, form, body, etc., that is associated with what conforms to its character

3. **reason**
   because it is a term and cognition distinct from the term and cognition of the character of the body, etc.

4. **qualification**
   under the condition that it has the cow as its object

5. **similar case**
   like a particular term and cognition, such as, “cow with her calf,” concerning the same cow

6. **dissimilar case**
   unlike the particular term and cognition of the character of the body, etc.

There are a number of challenges in interpreting this fragment, but the most imposing is surely (2), the property to be proven. Kamalaśīla offers two analyses of the dense compound that comprises the property to be proven, neither of which is wholly satisfying. (I ask the reader to bear with me for a moment—this is not particularly straightforward or concrete material.) The basic difference between

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⁴⁸¹ TSP 294.16, J106r.6.
⁴⁸² Kamalaśīla introduces the next several verses by saying that Śāntarakṣita “mentions arguments fashioned by Bhāvivikta et al” (bhāviviktādīrācita-pramāṇopanyāṣena) and then says “Bhāvivikta has said” (bhāviviktah prāha) regarding 715–717 in particular.
his two readings concerns the syntax of the term “character” (svarūpa). In the first reading, it is the character of the “other causes” that is distinct from convention, etc. In the second reading, the other causes are themselves distinct from convention, etc., and also, in some sense, “conform to a character.” I favor the basic structure of the second reading, but I do not entirely understand Kamalaśīla’s analysis. The compound, together with a diplomatic word-for-word transcription in English, is this:

samaya-ākṛti-pinda-ādi-vyatirikta-svarūpa-anurūpa-samsargi-nimitta-antara-nibandhana

convention-form-body-etc.-distinct-character-conforming-associated-cause-other-basis

After first glossing the terms “convention,” “form,” and “body” with common synonyms, Kamalaśīla then couples “character” (svarūpa) with “distinct” (vyatirikta) as an internal bahuvrihi compound meaning “other causes whose character is distinct from convention, form, body, etc.” He then separates “conforming” (anurūpa) and “associated” (samsargi), describing the “other causes” as “conforming to their respective term and cognition” and as “associated because of being an attribute (upādhi).” This yields the sense,

The particular terms and cognitions, such as “cow,” have as their basis other causes whose character is distinct from convention, form, body, etc.; which conform to the terms and cognitions in question; and which are associated insofar as they are attributes.483

This reading, especially the internal compound “whose character is distinct,” is slightly tortured—but perhaps that is fitting for this fragment.

His alternative is to regard “distinct” (vyatirikta) as a separate predicate, and to couple “conforming” (anurūpa) and “associated” (samsargi), as I have done above, but without spelling out the relation between the latter two:

Alternatively, they are distinct from convention, etc., and associated [with? and?] conforming to the character of each (pratti-svarūpa) cognition and term (prataya-abhidhāna) of something existent, etc. (sad-ādi).484

I cannot fully make sense of this alternative analysis. Kamalaśīla simply keeps “conforming” and “associated” in compound, eliding the question of their syntactic relationship. Nevertheless, most fundamentally, Kamalaśīla divides the intricate reason in Bh9 into two halves: distinct from (vyatireka) and associated with (anurūpa). This corresponds to the division in Śantaraksita’s initial generic depiction of the Nyāya position: we can prove the existence of universals on the basis of class conformity (perceiving the existence of something existent, sad-ādi-prataya) and on the basis of difference (perceiving the cow’s being-a-cow distinctly from its individuality, viśeṣa-prataya). I am

483 samayah saṅketaḥ, ākṛtiḥ saṃsthānaṁ, piñḍo dravyam, ādiśabdena rūpādiparigrahaḥ, ebhyo vyatiriktaḥ svarūpaṁ yeśam svabhādharprayāyaṁ pratyantarūpaṁ upādhīvāt saṃsargiṁ nimitāntaraṁ tāṁ nibhandhanam yeśam iti vigrahaḥ (TSP 295.6, K106v.1). I take it that yeśam, pratyantarūpaṁ, and saṃsargiṁ all qualify nimiṣṭāntaraṁ, and that the latter is in the genitive plural to clarify the internal bahuvrihi analyzed by yeśam; yeśam is then correlated by tāṁ. This would not be the most elegant compound analysis, but I am not sure how else to read it.

484 athavā samayādīvyayatiriktaṁ ca tāṁ sa所所prathantarūpābhādhanam pratiṣvarūpānupūpasamsarginī ceti vigrahaḥ kāryaḥ. śeṣaṁ pūrvvavat (TSP 295.9, J106v.2).
inclined to accept the division of the compound into two predicates of “other causes,” and to offer my own reading of the syntactic relationship between “conforming” and “associated.” The “other causes” that are the basis of the terms and cognitions in question are “distinct from convention, etc.,” and “associated with what conforms to their character.”

The next question, of course, is what all of this actually means.

Bh9’s reference to “terms and cognitions” (abhidhāna-prajñāna) prefigures a later remark by Trilocana, the teacher of the important tenth-century Naiyāyika Vācaspati Miśra. Lawrence McCrea and Parimal Patil translate (Jñānaśrīmitra’s quotation of) Trilocana’s statement like this:

> The inherence of the particular universals—horse-ness, cow-ness, and the like—in their own loci (svāśrayeṣu) is the basis (nimitta) for the awareness (pratyaya) and the term (abhidhāna) ‘universal.’ (McCrea and Patil 2010, 82)

We could reformulate this as an argument for, rather than a characterization of, universals, like this:

“The awareness and the term ‘universal’ has as its basis (nimitta) the inherence of the particular universals, such as cowness, in their own loci.” Put differently, it is because universals like cowness inhere in particular cows that we can recognize and refer to things as universals. This is a declaration rather than an argument, but it must not be far from what Bhāvivikta is trying to say. “Inherence in their own loci” (svāśrayeṣu samavāya) may be a close approximation for what Bhāvivikta intends with the phrase “associated with what conforms to their character” (svarūpa-anurūpa-samsargin). Bhāvivikta cannot simply state that the universals are “associated” with their respective loci, because the entire point of the argument is to prove that there is a need for the separate category of universals. Instead, he refers only to “other causes” of terms and cognitions like “cow” that are associated with “what conforms to their character,” which is to say to their respective loci. A specific cow conforms to the character of whatever it is in virtue of which we recognize it to be a cow. This, then, proves what Trilocana takes for granted, that there must be such a thing as real universals.

Before continuing with Bh9, it is helpful to turn briefly to Uddyotakara’s parallel arguments, which Śántarakaśita and Kamalaśīla cite in the immediately proceeding verses (718–719), and which appear in Uddyotakara’s comments on NS 2.2.69, the final sutra of the second book of the Nyāyasūtra.

The final dozen sutras of NS 2.2, which close out a longer discussion of language and sound, focus on the referents of words. Specifically, this passage is meant to resolve an uncertainty about whether a word refers to an individual (vyakti), form (ākṛti), or class (jāti). After each option has been rejected individually, sutra 2.2.66 establishes the Nyāya position as all three. Sutras 67, 68, and 69 then define the three terms in turn:

Individual (vyakti) is a material body (mūrti) that is the substratum of particular qualities. (2.2.67)

Form (ākṛti) denotes the marks of a class (jāti). (2.2.68)

Class (jāti) consists in generating (prasava) generality (samāna). (2.2.69)

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485 aśvatvagotvādvāmām sāmānyaviśeṣānām svāśrayeṣu samavāyāḥ sāmānyam ity abhidhānapratyayor nimittam iti (McCrea and Patil, 119).

486 vyaktir guṇaviśeṣāraya mūrtiḥ [2.2.67] (NS 133.3);
The word “cow” can refer to an individual animal, the features that mark it as belonging to the class of cows, and/or the class itself.

At the end of his comments on sutra 69 (concerning class/universal as a referent of words), Uddyotakara offers these four arguments:

(i) We observe that the cognition of correspondence (anuvrtti-pratyaya) with regard to cows, etc., comes from a cause (nimitta) distinct from bodies (pinda) because of possessing a distinction (viśesavat), like the cognition of blue, etc. (ii) Cowness is something other (artha-anta) than a cow because it is the object of a different cognition (bhinna-pratyaya-visaya), as in the case of the cognitions of color and touch. (iii) Cowness is something other than a cow because it is the object of a designating word (vyapadeśa-sabdha-visaya), like Caitra’s horse. (iv) The cognition of a cow’s correspondence to cowness has a different cause because of possessing a distinction, like the cognition of color, etc.

Uddyotakara does not mention convention, does not rely on weighty compounds, and does not collapse terms and cognitions into the subject of a single argument, but apart from these obvious differences, there are some helpful parallels with Bh9: When we see a cow, our recognition that it belongs to the same class as other cows (its “correspondence to cowness”) must be caused by something other than the body of the animal itself; the cow’s being-a-cow is something other than the individual cow itself, because there is a difference between our perception of the individual and our recognition of its being a cow like any other, and because we separately designate the cow and its cowness, as we can separately refer to Caitra and his horse. The word “cow” does refer to the individual (vyakti), the body (pinda), standing before us, but our denotation of the fact of its belonging to a class, its correspondence or inclusion within the group that we call “cow,” is distinguishable from our denotation of its individuality.

Several features of Bh9 are immediately clearer in light of this passage from the Vārttika. Bhāvivikta specifies and excludes at least three causal factors in our “term and cognition” of the cow as a cow: convention (samaya), form (ākṛti), and body (pinda). The latter two correspond to the terms defined in sutras 68 and 67, respectively, and “convention” refers to the more or less arbitrary aspect of language, the actual coining of the particular terms with which we pick out types and tokens. Bhāvivikta may well be commenting, like Uddyotakara, on sutra 69, and explaining why and how a term like “cow” refers not only, or not always, to an individual (vyakti) or a form (ākṛti), but also to a class (jāti).

Another important feature of Bh9 is Bhāvivikta’s insistence that cows, etc., are the referents. The conditional phrase “with regard to cows, etc.” does not get lost in Uddyotakara’s first argument because each other component is clear and concise. In Bh9, on the other hand, Bhāvivikta has to

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äkṛtir jātiliṅgākhyā ||2.2.68|| (133.8);
samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ ||2.2.69|| (133.15).

487 gavādiṣy anuvṛtti-pratyayo dṛṣṭah pinda-vyayati-rājṛtā nimittā bhavati viśesavatvā nilādi-pratyayavat iti. goto ‘ṛthaṛtaraṁ gotvaṁ bhinnapratyaya-viśayavatvā rūpasparśapratyayavat. goto ‘ṛthaṛtaraṁ gotvaṁ vyapadesāśābda-visayatvā caitrāśavat. got gotvānuvṛtti-pratyayo bhinnanimittā viśesavatvā rūpādi-pratyayavat iti (NV 318.7). In addition to eliding the fourth argument, Kamalaśīla’s citation of this passage lacks the word dṛṣṭah in the first argument; the word pratyaya in the example of the second argument; and the word śabda in the third; and Kamalaśīla unpacks and explains the reasoning of the example in the third argument.
mention this condition three separate times: he begins the argument with the phrase, “with regard to cows, horses, buffalo, boar, elephants, and so on” (as opposed to Uddyotakara’s far simpler, “with regard to cows, etc.”), then qualifies the reason by saying “under the condition that that cows, etc., are their objects,” and again qualifies the similar case as being “with regard to the same cows, etc.”

One last feature highlighted by Uddyotakara’s quartet is correspondence ($anurūpa$, $anuvṛtti$—cf. NBh 2.1.36). When Bhāvivikta refers to conformity to a character ($svārūpa-anurūpa$), he quite possibly has in mind the “correspondence” that Uddyotakara discusses above. It is not just the material body, the class features, or the whims of convention that we refer to when we call a cow a cow, but also its conformity ($anurūpa$) or correspondence ($anuvṛtti$) to the peculiar character ($svārūpa$) of a class ($jāti$).

With all of this in mind, we can see that Bh9 packs two separate arguments into a three word compound (which is itself only part of the longer compound comprising the property to be proven): the phrase “associated with ($śamsargin$) what conforms to ($anurūpa$) their character ($svārūpa$)” refers, first, to the fact that our denotation of a cow as a cow captures its correspondence to a particular class, i.e., “conformity to a character,” and, second, to the fact that the basis of the denotation must itself inhere in, or be “associated” with, the locus of the denotation and the correspondence, i.e., the particular cow. If we imagine Bhāvivikta following and responding to Uddyotakara, Bh9 would represent his attempt to render a longer discussion into a single, very robust formal inference. On the other hand, if Bhāvivikta predated Uddyotakara, perhaps we could read Bh9 as an earlier, messier argument that Uddyotakara attempted to streamline!

All in all, the argument—contra Dignāga’s denial of universals, and his insistence that language functions on the basis of exclusions that are conventional through-and-through—is that the cognition of a cow as a “cow” bears directly on the cow’s being-a-cow. We use the word “cow” to refer to cows, but the actual referential function that makes the convention possible, the reason we recognize the animal as one member of a broader class, does not rely solely on cultural agreement, but instead on a real universal attribute, the cow’s cowness, which is itself intrinsic to the individual cow.

Subodham—right?

$§§$

Towards the end of the chapter, Śāntarakṣita weaves together his responses to a series of arguments and interjections that Kamalaśīlā attributes alternately to Bhāvivikta, Uddyotakara, and Śaṅkarasvāmin. Śāntarakṣita argues that there there cannot be a universal of absence or negation ($abhāva$) behind cognitions of negation. In response, Śaṅkarasvāmin argues that every negation has an entity as a qualifying attribute ($upādhī$), i.e., that every negation or absence is of something, such as the pot referred to in the notion of the destruction of a pot. In every case ($sarvatra$), Śaṅkarasvāmin says, a notion of negation entails correspondence ($anuvṛttatā$) on the force of the universal that is intrinsic to the entity that qualifies it ($upādbi-gata-sāmānya-vāśāt$).488 In other words, the example of

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488 ghaṭasya pragabhāvo ‘yam ghaṭapradhvamsa ity ayam | tadvastupādhihkan eva dhīr abhāvān pratapadyate ||766||
upādhigatasyaṁyavaśād evānuvṛttatā | tasyāḥ sarvatra cen naivaṁ vailakṣanyātadāśrayāt ||767|| (TS 309, J38v.2).

a TS pratipadyate
nagation or absence does not undermine the idea that cognitions of correspondence are caused by universals. In response, Śāntarakṣita explains that the notion of bhāva—being, presence, an entity—is entirely distinct (vilaksana) from abhāva—negation, absence. The all-encompassing universal “being” (sattā) is not, he continues, the basis for the notions “cow,” “horse,” etc.\(^489\) The implication is that Śāṅkarasvāmin’s argument simply makes no sense. The notion of one thing’s correspondence cannot be based on an entirely different universal, otherwise any universal could serve as the basis for any notion.

This then leads to an interjection by Bhāvivikta, Bh10, which Kamalaśīla cites as follows:

\begin{quote}
 bhāviviktas tv āha na hi sarvatra nimitānurūpam pratyaya iṣyate. tathā hi gajatragadhavakhadirādi-
samavāyini bahutvasāṅkhyā senāvanādibuddhīnām nimitam, pānakakāṇjikādibuddhīnām
vijātiyadravyasarūyogo nimitam, anyathā hi bahavahā saṃyuktā iti ca pratyayaḥ syād iti. (770)\(^490\)
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
 But Bhāvivikta says: In fact, we do not hold that a cognition (pratyaya) conforms to (anurūpa) its basis (nimitta) in every case (sarvatra). To explain: The number plurality, which inheres in elephants and horses, and in axewoods and acacias, etc., is the basis of cognitions (buddhi) of an army or a forest, etc.; the conjunction of heterogeneous substances is the basis of cognitions (buddhi) of a potion or a soup, etc. For otherwise the cognition would be “many” or “conjoined.”
\end{quote}

In the previous fragment, Bh9—if I have understood it properly—Bhāvivikta argues that a particular animal conforms to the character of the universal cowness, and then that universal, which inheres in that animal, forms the basis for the cognition of that animal as a cow. Here in Bh10, however, he argues that in some cases there is not such a clean correspondence between the universal, the individual that instantiates it, and the cognition that registers or relies on this correspondence. When we see a densely clustered collection of axewoods, acacias, and so on, we do not think, “many trees,” but rather, “a forest,” but what we are actually referring to when we name the cluster “a forest” is the number itself, the multiplicity of trees, rather than some actual, distinct, singular substance.

As we have seen before, NS 2.1.36 proves the existence of substantial wholes against the (roughly) Buddhist view that notions like unity are conceptually superimposed onto heaps of atoms. Toward the beginning of his comments on this sutra, Vātsyāyana argues that the Buddhist view creates problems it cannot solve.

If the Buddhist view is true, Vātsyāyana explains, then our notion of unity in regard to something like an army or a forest would be a specific kind of error, namely, “a cognition of x with regard to not-x” (atasmimś tad iti pratyaya). The opponent says only, “So what?” (tataḥ kim). Vātsyāyana then continues: “A cognition of x with regard to not-x relies on a paradigm (pradhāna), thus establishing the paradigm.”\(^491\) His example is the standard case of mistaking a post, or a pillar, for a man (sthānaḥ purusa-pratyaya). In other words, Vātsyāyana accepts that we sometimes mistake a post for a man, but this does not prove that there is no such thing as a man—quite the contrary, in fact. Naiyāyikas can account for situations in which we refer to a multiplicity as a case of unity, because they can point to paradigmatic cases of unity, whereas the Buddhists cannot explain where we rightly got the

\(^489\) na hi sattāvaśād buddhir gaur aśva iti cesyate | ekam evānyathā kalpyaṃ sāmānyaṃ sarvasādhanam ||769|| (TS 309, J38v.3).
\(^490\) TSP 309.13, J110v.1.
\(^491\) atasmimś tad iti pratyasya pradhānāpekṣītvā pradhānāsiddhiḥ (NBh 77.12).
idea we are now wrongly applying.

The specific examples that Bhāvivikta raises in Bh10 lead me to think he is commenting on this passage of the Bhāṣya. Vātsyāyana's discussion in 2.1.36 eventually turns to universals—specifically, to the idea that, given the existence of universals, there must be some substance in which a universal like “cow” or “horse” inheres. How would the cognition of correspondence arise if all we perceived were heaps of imperceptible atoms? But Bh10 does not explicitly address universals and seemingly only appears in this chapter of the Tattvasamgraha because it fits neatly within Śāntarakṣita's discussion with Śaṅkarasvāmin about correspondence. It serves better as a comment on Vātsyāyana's discussion in NBh 2.1.36 of our cognitions of number.
After dismissing Bh10, Śāntarakṣita lays out a few additional arguments against the existence of universals. How does a universal, which is singular and unchanging, exist in manifold individuals? To what extent does a universal rely on its respective individuals? Being permanent, as we now know, renders it causally ineffective. Just what sorts of ontological relations are involved in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika story? Śāntarakṣita speaks as if he is searching for some kind of sensible account, but cannot find one. To conclude chapter thirteen, he reminds his reader of his careful systematic approach in the Tattvasamgraha:

In this way, we have refuted the idea that universals are exclusively distinct, whereas we will reject the universals accepted by followers of Jaimini in regard to Śyādvāda. (811)

He will not discuss Śyādvāda, Jain standpoint theory, until chapter twenty. The topic there partly relates to the topic of chapter thirteen, and he alerts the reader to this overlap. But he still has to conclude his examination of the six categories and follow the logic of the conversation that ensues.

§ § §

We are skipping over three chapters at this point.

The “Examination of Differentiae (viśeṣa),” chapter fourteen, is very brief, just ten verses. Ultimate differentiae are explanatory abstractions to account for the fact that the atoms of each element, earth, etc., are identical and yet differentiable. Śāntarakṣita’s basic argument against this idea is simple: Substances having been refuted, differentiae have nothing to differentiate. But he also asks whether differentiae are even useful in theory. Are atoms intrinsically distinct or not? If so, what is the use of ultimate differentiae? If not, then is distinctness intrinsic to differentiae? In response, Śāntarakṣita considers the argument, attributed by Kamalaśīla to Praśastamati,⁴⁹² that differentiation is indeed intrinsic to differentiae, and the atoms obtain their differentiation by contact with them, as one substance is rendered impure by contact with an impure substance like dogmeat (śva-māmsa, an axiomatic case of impurity). Śāntarakṣita draws on familiar arguments to point out two problems

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⁴⁹² Praśastamati is another name for Praśastapāda, cf. n 173.
with Praśastamati’s account: First, impurity is conventional, so the example does nothing for Praśastamati. Second, atoms are permanent, so even if we accept that differentiation is intrinsic to differentiae, given that atoms have no causes, the differentiae could not serve to differentiate them.

Chapter fifteen, the “Examination of Inherence (samavāya)” closes Śāntarakṣita’s rebuttal of the categories. According to Vaiśeṣika ontology, a cloth inheres in its threads. But we do not perceive a cloth, Śāntarakṣita says, like a bilva fruit in a bowl (kuṇḍādau śripalādivat). There is a discussion of the idea that inherence is singular, which suggests, according to Śāntarakṣita, that the inherence of cloths in threads should be present in other substances, as well. In short, inherence does not pick up any real relation, but only reflects its proponents’ fixation on their own doctrines.

As mentioned, after finishing his examination of the categories, Śāntarakṣita turns to theory of language. Chapter sixteen, the “Examination of the Meaning of Words,” is the third longest in the entire Tattvasaṃgraha, spanning almost 350 verses. Śāntarakṣita opens this chapter with an opponent’s last ditch effort to save the categories: Words express real things; how could language function without the ontological ground of the categories (866–867)? Śāntarakṣita gives the expected response: There is no real basis for words; language is conventional; what is real is inexpressible (868–869).

In the next few dozen verses (870–908), Śāntarakṣita considers potential candidates, apart from the categories, for linguistic correspondence: unique particulars (sva-lakṣaṇā); universals (sāmānyā); and a list of seven quoted verbatim from Bhartṛhari. The next section (909–1200) comprises the bulk of the chapter: objections to apoha (exclusion) theory from Bhāmaha, Kumārila, and Uddyotakara, and Śāntarakṣita’s engagement with and refutation of them. This section, ostensibly dedicated to refuting the specific arguments of these three opponents, serves also to clarify, define, and defend Dignāga’s formulation of apoha theory. Linguistic exclusion is not an entity; it does not have any intrinsic form; it does not touch objects. It is, rather, a description of the manner in which our words, rooted in convention, indirectly filter the conceptual schema we impose on our deluded picture of the world. A conceptual complex is always already in place. Dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda) entails that no conditioned thing exists unto itself, in isolation; the same is true for words and concepts. In the closing verses (1201–1211), Śāntarakṣita dismisses a few minor remaining concerns, and then concludes with an elegant invocation of the common example of the eye condition called timira:

Just as someone whose eyes are beset by timira says to someone like himself that there is a double moon, so do we consider all verbal usage. (1210)

In other words, enough is shared in our confused sense of reality that we can communicate despite the fact that our words point only to more or less reliable illusions.

Finally, we will now turn to the chapters on epistemology (17–19), where we find the last of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāviviktā.

495 For a brief but excellent analysis of a few aspects of this passage, see Hattori 1993, “Kamalaśīla’s Interpretation of Some Verses in the Vākyakānda of Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya.” Cf. §14 for Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s engagement with Bhartṛhari’s epistemological views.

494 timiropahatākṣo hi yathā prāha śaśīdvayam | svasamāya tathā sarvā śabdī vyavahṛtir matā ||1210|| (TS 448, J61r.6).
According to Kamalaśīla’s framing device for the Tattvasamgraha as a whole, each chapter serves to establish one of the qualifications (viśeṣaṇa, i.e., facts [tattva]) of dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda). Quite a few of the first sixteen chapters serve to prove a negative qualification: dependent origination is free from (rahita) the operation of any god, self, etc., and devoid of (śūnya) the conditions of substance, quality, etc. The single concept of dependent origination suffices to account for the vast diversity of the world and of experience, but it takes a lot of work to strip away our attachments to additional, needless—and, worse, deluding—explanatory concepts.

Underpinning the entire discussion up until this point are the basic concepts of epistemology. The chapter on the theory of language leads naturally into the chapters on epistemology—according to Dignāga, there are only two objects of cognition, the fluctuating unique particulars that we perceive, and the universals, i.e., the conceptual abstractions, that we infer. *Apoha* theory explains how we superimpose the latter onto the former. The chapters on epistemology then explain how these two cognitive processes, perception and inference, function, and why there are none but these two.

In chapter seventeen, the “Examination of the Definition of Perception,” Śāntarakṣita defends Dignāga’s analysis of perception as non-conceptual (particularly in his *Nyāyamukha*), and Dharmakīrti’s addition of “non-erroneous” to the definition. In fact, the entire chapter can be divided into two major sections corresponding to these two contentious qualifications. First, Śāntarakṣita defines conceptuality and the relationship between language, experience, and reality (certain cognitions are shaped by language whether or not they entail usage of a particular word; the connection between words and things is erroneous; traces of past impressions account for our conceptual capacity, even as ostensibly pre-linguistic infants; etc.). Then, he examines and defends Dignāga’s analysis of the non-conceptuality of perception. He then considers three main objections to this idea. Around 100 verses into the chapter, where we briefly pick up the discussion, he considers the last of these objections to perception’s non-conceptuality. His engagement with Bhāvivikta here is not very substantial, so we will only consider a quick excerpt from this chapter.
The capacity of the non-conceptual

Even non-conceptual cognition has the capacity to generate the conceptual (vikalpa). Hence, by that means, it is an expedient of all conventional activity. (1305)

Objection: “The non-conceptual does not have this capacity with regard to the conceptual, because of having a different referent, like cognitions of color [and sound], etc., and because of being non-conceptual, like eyes, etc.” (1306)

To this, we say: These two [reasons] are not incompatible with the conceptual. And[, in any case,] the referent is not different, because [a conceptual cognition is] the apprehension of the object of that [non-conceptual perception]. In reality, conceptuality arises without an objective support; it does not have any referent at all, so there is nothing to differentiate. Cognitions of color, sound, etc., are, in fact, mutual causes. Therefore, the example that has been raised is not known to have the property to be proven. In addition, we can clearly perceive deviation in this [argument], because there is a causal relation between cognitions of fire and smoke, etc. (1307–1310)

[...]
§12. BH11: PERCEPTION IS DETERMINE

After defining “conceptuality” (kalpanā) and explaining, in accordance with Dignāga’s definition, that perception is “free from conceptuality,” Śāntarakṣita argues that non-conceptual perceptions lead to conceptual cognition. This is extremely important for Buddhist epistemology. If perception is restricted to unique particulars, but words and concepts can never actually reach or capture particulars, it is not immediately clear what practical role perception plays in experience, communication, and worldly activity. If perception is non-conceptual, how can we undertake a course of action, or act on the basis of an inference? Kamalaśila formulates the objection like this:

At the time of an inference, the property-possessor and the property must, by necessity, be grasped in a determinate manner (niścita) by another means of knowledge, but they could not be grasped in a determinate manner by perception, which [in your view] is essentially indeterminate (a-niścaya-ātmaka). Nor could they be grasped by inference, as that would incur an infinite regress. Nor [according to you Buddhists] is there any other means of knowledge; what would obtain, therefore, is the eradication of all conventional activity (vyavahāra).499

The task for the Buddhists is to account for worldly activity. We know that we act in the world in certain ways, but, according to this objection, none of our conventional activities would be possible if perception were ineluctably indeterminate.

The Buddhists’ response is that, though our conceptual picture of the world is not entirely in accordance with reality, it is practically consistent with it because it is grounded in non-conceptual perception. Precisely how—and when—the non-conceptual leads into the conceptual is somewhat unclear, at least to me. Śāntarakṣita says,

Even non-conceptual (avikalpa) cognition has the capacity to generate conceptions (vikalpa). So, by means of that (taddvāreṇa), it is an expedient (anga) of all conventional activity (vyavahāra).500

Kamalaśila explains that perception, though non-conceptual, arises as delimiting an object through the generation of the object’s conceptual image (ākāra). His example is a fire. The fire is excluded from both similar and dissimilar things—it is not just a fire, but this fire; and it is a fire rather than, say, a cluster of orange flowers. He describes these affirmative and negative concepts of the fire as “not inconsistent” (avisamvādaka) with the object,501 and yet not authoritative (prāmāṇya), either, because they do not apprehend something as-yet unapprehended.502 Strictly speaking, the idea that

499 tathā hy anumānakāle ‘vāyaṃ dharmī dharmaḥ vā pramāṇāntarēṇa niścito ghitavyaḥ, sa ca na pratyakṣaṇaśācāyātmakena niścito ghitum śāyate. nāpy anumānaḥ, anavasthādaśat. na cānyatpramāṇāntaram’ astiti sarvavyavahārochedaḥ prāpnoti.(TSP 477.6, J157v.7 [this entire excerpt is part of a longer marginal insertion]).
500 ‘avikalpaṃ api jñāṇaṃ vikalpotpattiṣaktimat | niḥśeṣavavahāraṅgām taddvāreṇa bhavaty atāḥ ||1305|| (TS 477, J66r.1).
501 Also cf. Dharmottara’s comments toward the beginning of his Nyāyabindu-tikā.
502 From the mss. read vikalpaṃ, but in the context demands vikalpaṃ; in addition, Kamalaśila introduces the verse by citing avikalpaṃ as the first word and the Tibetan reads rtog pa med pa’i shes pa yang. -
there is a fire is a conceptual imposition, but because the delimitation of what we conceive as the fire accompanies the arising of the perception of the unique particular(s), the conception is roughly consistent with reality. Practically speaking, we are correct in acting upon the world as if there were a fire where we conceive the fire to be. If we crave warmth, we can move toward the fire, and our action will bear fruit. The conception is ultimately erroneous while practically consistent, accurate without being authoritative, derivative yet determinate.

In Bh11, Bhāviviktā et al object. Kamalaśīla cites a pair of arguments as follows:

\[
\text{atra bhāviviktādayo vikalpotādādavārenāpi vyavahārāṅgatvam vighaṭayanto yat pramāṇayanti […]}
\begin{align*}
&\text{nendriyavijñānaṁ savikalpakanovijñānakāraṇaṁ bhinnaviṣayatvād rūpasparśādiṣṭāṇānavat,} \\
&\text{nirvikalpakatvāc ca caksurādīvad īti. (1306)503}
\end{align*}
\]

In regard to this, Bhāviviktā et al, laying into the idea that, even by means of the generation of conceptions, [non-conceptual perception] is an expedient of conventional activity, argue like this […]: Sensory cognition (indriya-vijñāna) is not the cause of conceptual mental cognition (savikalpaka-mano-vijñāna) because of having a different object, like cognitions of color, touch, etc., and because it is non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka), like the eye, etc.

The fragment contains two arguments: First, sensory cognition cannot be the cause of conceptual cognition because of having a different object, just as the objects cognitions of color and touch, e.g., differ respectively. Second, sensory cognition cannot be the cause of conceptual cognition because it itself is non-conceptual, like the eye, etc.

The example in the first case is not, strictly speaking, a “similar case,” as it does not instantiate the property to be proven as it is stated here. To say that “cognitions of color, touch, etc.,” are “not the cause of conceptual mental cognition” would not prove the point, but only beg the question. This example only make senses as an exemplification of the principle that “what has a different object than something cannot be its cause,” just as the cognition of color, e.g., is not the cause of the cognition of touch. In the same way, non-conceptual sensory cognition has a different object than conceptual mental cognition, ergo it must not be its cause. Kamalaśīla attributes these arguments to “Bhāviviktā et al” and collapses the two of them into a single statement, so it is likely that he is eliding, or simplifying, longer discussions. Such details may well have been more fully spelled out in some of their original formulations.

Śantarāṣṭita’s brief response to Bh11 focuses on the first argument. He says, firstly, that from the conventional perspective, there is no difference in object, as conceptual cognition just renders determinate the indeterminate content of the non-conceptual perception. Ultimately, however, conceptual cognition has no real object; from this perspective, the reason, “because of having a different object,” is even less coherent. Further, the example lacks the property to be proven because “cognitions of color, touch, etc.” are “mutual causes” (anyonya-hetuta), or as Kamalaśīla puts it, they are one another’s immediately preceding conditions (paraspara-samanantara-pratyaya). Finally, the cognition of smoke and the cognition of fire have different objects, yet they have a causal

\[
\text{anadhigatavasturūpadhigamabhāvāt (TSP 477.13, J158r.1).}
\]

\(^a\) TSP “ād vi”, J “ād avi”.

\(^{503}\) TSP 478.12, J58r.5.
relationship, so the reason is inconclusive.\textsuperscript{504}

We cannot say for sure whether Bhāvivikta accepted that sensory cognition is ever non-conceptual,\textsuperscript{505} but it seems likely that he is aiming here to draw absurd conclusions out of the Buddhists’ premises. Perhaps Bhāvivikta understood NS 1.1.4 as implying that perception has a non-conceptual moment or aspect and a conceptual moment or aspect; perhaps the distinction as such was not entirely material for him. In any case, it is clear from Bh11 that Bhāvivikta et al must have held that our (conceptual) picture of the world stems from determinate perceptions rather than indeterminate (non-conceptual) perceptions. In other words, when we see a fire, we directly perceive the substance that we then call a fire, not just the unique particulars onto which we subsequently impose the concept of fire.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{504} tad atra na virodho ‘sti vikalpena sahānayaḥ | na cápi viṣayo bhinnas tadarthādhyavasāyataḥ ||1307|| vastutas’ tu nirālambo vikalpāḥ sampravarttate | tasyāsti viṣayo naiva yo vibhidyeta kaścana ||1308|| rūpasābdādibuddhinām asty evānyonyahetutā | tato ‘prasiddhasādhyo ‘yaṃ dṛśṭaṃ ‘samudiritah ||1309|| agnidhūmadībuddhināṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvataḥ | vyabhicāro ‘pi vispaṣṭam etasmin upalabhya ||1310|| (TS 478, J66r.2).
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{505} Later Naiyāyika commentators differed on these issues; cf. §10 on the definition in NS of perception as atyapadeśya.
\end{flushright}
The “Examination of Inference,” chapter eighteen, has four main sections, each with an independent *pūrva-paśa* followed by its rebuttal. First, Śāntarakṣita refutes the Jain thinker Pārśvāmin’s notion that there is only one characteristic of a valid reason, namely, being “otherwise impossible” (vv. 1363–1428). Then he turns to Nyāya theory of argumentation (1429–1440). Third, Śāntarakṣita responds to Kumārila’s twofold taxonomy of inference (1441–1454). Finally, in the final thirty verses of the chapter (1455–1485), he considers skeptical arguments against inference by Čārvāka thinkers (such as Aviddhakarna), Bhartrhari, and others. In this context, Kamalaśīla twice refers to a *Tattvātikā*, in the second instance citing Aviddhakarna by name.

The portion of the “Examination of Inference” dedicated to disagreements with Nyāya largely concerns the five components (*aṅga, avayava*) of an inferential argument: proposition, reason, exemplification, application, and conclusion. Śāntarakṣita argues that the proposition is useless (*anupayogin*) because it is not an expedient of proof (*a-sādhanā-aṅga*). He then considers the objection that without a proposition, which indicates the subject (*pakṣa*) of the argument, there can be no similar case (*sapakṣa*) or dissimilar case (*vipakṣa*), nor can the reason fulfill the three characteristics (*trirūpa*), given that they deal, respectively, with the subject, the similar case, and the dissimilar case.

Śāntarakṣita’s response is practical. First, we only make these kinds of distinctions in *śāstra*, i.e., in a technical discussion, instruction, or text, rather than when making an argument. Second, in a dispute, the proponent does not formulate an argument out of nowhere (*akāṇḍa eva*). Disputants know what they are disputing.

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506 See the section on Kamalaśīla’s *Pūrva-paśasamkṣipta* in Appendix A for more on the way he and Śāntarakṣita engage with Pārśvāmin’s inferential theory. The Jain thinker Akalaṅka (Śāntarakṣita’s contemporary) and other later Digambara thinkers came to use this and similar formulations, but it appears that from Śāntarakṣita’s perspective the idea was still distinctive to Pārśvāmin.

507 This recalls the *Vādanyāya*, where Dharmakirti defines grounds for the proponent’s defeat in terms of *a-sādhanā-aṅga*, and where he repeatedly criticizes the concept of the proposition as redundant.

508 * na sādhanābhīdhāme ’sti sapakṣādīvīkalpanā | śāstre tu pravibhāyante vyavahārāya te tathā ||1434|| (TS 513, J72v.2).
After this, Śāntarakṣita neatly dispatches an argument by Bhāvivikta in defense of the application (Bh12), then one by Uddyotakara for the conclusion (nigamana), and another for the conclusion by Aviddhakarṇa (Av15).
EXAMINATION OF INFERENCE

Definition of inference

We hold that inference is twofold: "for oneself" (svārtha) and "for others" (parārtha). "For oneself" is the observation of an inferable object on the basis of a mark (liṅga) with three characteristics (trīrūpa). We call the statement of the mark with three characteristics "for others." We hold that an object with some one or two of the characteristics is a fallacious mark. (1361–1362)

[...] (1361–1363)

[TN: After this initial definition, Śāntarakṣita entertains the Jaina thinker Pātrasvāmin's conception of inference, and his case against the three characteristics. Then he turns to the Nyāya view.]

Nyāya theory of argumentation

Some describe the "for others" (parārtha) inference as the statement of the proposition, reason, exemplification, application, and conclusion.

Against the statement of the proposition

The proposition is useless because it is not a component of proof. It is untenable that it proves the matter directly, because there is no connection. It is also untenable that it does so indirectly, because it does not point to something capable (śakta) [of proving it]. If we accept it to be a component of proof, like the example, because it indicates the scope of [the reason, i.e.,] the property that proves what is to be proven, then it would deviate because of statements of authorization, etc. And in this case, too, the indication of the scope would be useless. (1429cd–1432)

Objection: “[In your view, then,] there is no formulation of the subject (pakṣa), so how can there be a differentiation (srayavastha) of the similar case (sapakṣa) and so on? Because of that, there could be no fulfillment of the three characteristics, either, as reliance on that is its basis.” (1433)

509 To reiterate: The “mark” by which one infers something, or the “reason” (hetu) with which one proves it, must fulfill three characteristics: (i) It must be a property of the thing being inferred; (ii) it must be a property of some similar case (i.e., something that is known to possess the property being inferred); and (iii) it must not be a property of any dissimilar case (i.e., something that is known not to possess that property). The latter two correspond to “positive and negative concomitance,” respectively.

The manuscripts read svarūpa (intrinsic form) rather than trīrūpa (three characteristics)

510 Śāntarakṣita writes only “the proposition, etc.,” but this is purely for metrical reasons, and in this case there is absolutely no ambiguity about the remaining members of the list.

511 The term “component of proof” (sādhanāṅga), or more precisely, “non-component of proof” (a-sādhanāṅga) plays an important role in Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya; cf. Appendix A.

512 An epistemically efficacious statement is like pointing to the smoke over the mountain; the act of pointing does not directly reveal the fact that there is fire there, but does give an indication of something that can, namely, the smoke.

513 A successful inferential statement does not generate knowledge directly, but instigates an inferential cognition in the listener. The proposition is epistemically worthless because it cannot even instigate such a cognition.
The contrivance (vikalpanā) of the similar case, etc., is not present in the statement of a proof. Rather, these are divided in this way in a scholarly work (śāstra) for the sake of discourse (vyavahāra). Or, even if it has the matter under discussion as its basis, this does not contradict [our view]. Indeed, the proponent does not state the argument, even for the other party, out of the blue. (1434–1435)

In fact, being a property of the subject (pakṣadharmatā) follows from presence in the subject of inquiry; the similar case (sapakṣa) is from the commonality of that; the dissimilar case (sapakṣa) is from the absence of that.514 (1436)

**Statement of the application**

There can be no statement of the reason if there is no statement of the proposition, so the statement of the application cannot be brought about to prove the real existence [of the reason in the subject of the argument]. And when the mere existence [of the reason in the subject] has already been stated, after demonstrating pervasion, the representation of the proof of the intended matter is fruitless.515 (1437–1438)

**Statement of the conclusion**

Because the argument is proven entirely on the force of the indication of a reason fulfilling the three characteristics, there is no suspicion of the contrary. Hence the conclusion is useless. (1439)

A single matter is explained only with connected statements. So there is no need to state a separate conclusion to establish the connection.516 (1440)

[...]

[TN: After contending with Nyāya, Śāntarakṣita briefly discusses Kumārila’s twofold taxonomy of inference, and then turns, in the final portion of the chapter, to skeptical arguments against inference.]

**Skepticism**

But there are some shortsighted folks who say, “inference is not a means of knowledge,” while conveying their intention with these very words.517 (1455)

**Anonymous skeptics’ arguments**

(i) [What you call] “for-oneself” [inference] cannot be a means of knowledge, because it is preceded by a mark that fulfills the three characteristics, like a false cognition, which, as is known, can be generated by a reason that refutes what is intended (iṣṭaghātakṛty).518 (1456)

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514 In other words, we can delineate the three characteristics in terms of the subject, similar case, and dissimilar case, but really this is just a useful distinction in a work of scholarship. In an actual discussion, so long as the reason fulfills the three characteristics, the functions of the subject, etc., are fulfilled without their having to be mentioned as such.

515 Buried in here somewhere, according to Kamalaśīla, is an invocation of at least two arguments by Bhāvivikta et al in defense of the need for a separate statement of the application (§13).

516 As Kamalaśīla notes, this is essentially the inversion of a brief argument by Aviddhakarṇa (§13).

517 According to Śāntarakṣita, we infer someone’s intention from their words. To say “inference is not a means of knowledge” is like saying “you cannot understand what I am saying” and expecting that the listener understands. (Cf. “Aviddhakarṇa’s sword.”) Kamalaśīla describes “some folks” as “followers of Bṛhaspati, et al” (bṛhaspatayādayāb).

518 The manuscript quite clearly reads “kṛtāḥ, the instrumental of kṛt, but Shastri for some reason emends this to kṛtāḥ”,
(ii) And the mark’s fulfillment of the three characteristics, like its fulfillment of two characteristics, occurs even when there is no inference, so it is not the cause of inference, and hence there is no inference. (1457)

(iii) And also because there is always the possibility of contradictions in the argument through a further inference or the opposite inference.\(^{519}\) (1458)

**Bhartṛhari's skepticism**

(iv) \([Vākyapadīya 1.32–34:]\) Given that capacities differ according to differences in state, place, and time, proof of the nature of things (bhāva) is extremely difficult to obtain via inference. Even if the capacity of something with respect to a certain purposeful action is already known,\(^{520}\) that capacity can be impeded when there is contact with specific substances. Even if folks who are skilled in inferential reasoning carefully infer something, others who are more well versed may explain it entirely otherwise. (1459–1461)

**Anonymous continued**\(^{521}\)

(v) The “for-others” inference, on the other hand, is not a means of knowledge because it is but a restatement with respect to the speaker; he does not learn something by means of it. Even with respect to the listener, what occurs is “for-oneseff.” Indeed, what is the difference between a cognition rooted in hearing [the statement of the inferential mark] or in seeing [it]? With respect to the listener, the statement is not an inference “for-others” because it causes a cognition in his stream of sound perception and [through this] generates knowledge. Just as there is no direct illumination of the inferable thing on the part of the sense faculty, so for the same reason that [statement] is not [an inference “for others”], like the cognition of the invariable relation.\(^{522}\) If you say it is “for-others” with regard to the activity of others, that, too, is untenable, because it follows that even a “for-oneseff” would be “for-others.” (1462–1466)

**Refutation**

the ablative of kṛta. Dignāga and Dharmakirti both refer to a contradictory reason that is isat(vi)ghātakrt, and Kamalaśīla cites the same example they use: “the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another because they are composite (samghātā), like the components of a bed.” The proponent of this argument intends to prove the self, the singular and stable entity for which the eyes, etc., are composed, but according to the Buddhists, the reasoning only goes to show that the being for whom the eyes are composed is itself composite. Thus the reason “refutes what is intended” by the proponent.

\(^{519}\) Kamalaśīla attributes the reasoning behind some of these points to a text called Tattvaśīla, but does not mention the name of the author (§14). He introduces verse 1456 by saying, “Firstly, Cārvākas make the arguments...” (tāvac cārvākāḥ prāmāṇayantī).

\(^{520}\) There are two differences between Bhartṛhari’s and Śāntarakṣita’s versions of this clause. The first pāda of Bhartṛhari’s version are nīrjñātā-ākṣer dravyasya; of Śāntarakṣita’s, vijñātā-ākṣer apy asya. The difference is fairly trivial, but Śāntarakṣita’s version does read slightly more clearly, so it is quite possible that he adjusted it for the benefit of his readers. Without the api (even), the disjunctive aspect of the verse is less explicit, and the form nīr+viṣṇā is less common than vi+viṣṇā.

J reads vijñāna" rather than vijñāta", which makes the compound somewhat difficult to interpret. I am inclined to think it is simply a minor error in transcription. Kamalaśīla, without citing a pratīkha, glosses it niścita, “ascertained.”

\(^{521}\) Kamalaśīla notably attributes this line of argument to “someone else” (anyayāh). It may well be Śāntarakṣita’s imaginary interpolation on behalf of skepticism rather than his paraphrase of the arguments of any particular thinker or group.

\(^{522}\) Seeing smoke over the mountain is not seeing the fire, even if one learns by means of it that there is fire there. Cognizing or recognizing the invariable relation between fire and smoke does not directly illuminate a fire on the other side of a mountain.
Isn’t being preceded by a mark that fulfills the three characteristics indicative of agreement (samvādin) [i.e., being “not inconsistent” (avisamvādaka) with reality], and isn’t the indication of that what it is to be a means of knowledge? What, then, is denied through this [argument]? And we describe the cognition generated by a reason that refutes what is intended as similar to a false cognition in relation to the pūrṣapakṣa, not in reality. For in reality, the cognition is ascertained to be non-inconsistent. For this very reason, it is a means of knowledge of the inverse of what is intended by the disputant. Hence, the reason [in argument (i)] is contrary and unestablished in the example.\(^{523}\) (1467–1470ab)

The very same shows the reason in the second argument to be unestablished. (1470cd)

**Argument (iii)**

Proponents of reason have stated that it is only a connection firmly ascertained through identity or causality that is effective (sādhana) in proof (siddhi). There can be no contradiction through inference in regard to such a reason (sādhana), for [such a reason] is in no case possible without identity (ātma) or causality (hetu). Two mutually contradictory properties do not occur in one and the same thing, hence the opposite inference is not possible. (1471–1473)

**Argument (iv)**

We say that inferences about things whose characteristics are known through repeated experience (abhyasta) proceed when a valid mark is ascertained; other practices are not inferences. Hence, though capacities differ according to differences in state, place, and time, proof of the nature of things (bhāva) is not so difficult to obtain via inference. (1474–1475)

Also, if folks who are skilled in inferential reasoning carefully infer something, others cannot prove otherwise, even if they are more well versed. For there is no intrinsic condition without an intrinsic condition and no effect without a cause—otherwise difference or causlessness would obtain, respectively—and there is no inference without these two. (1476–1477)

**Argument (v)**

When we refer to the fact that a statement of a mark that fulfills the three characteristics is a “for-others” inference, we do so with respect to the listener, because such a statement points to something capable [of instigating the inferential cognition]. In this way, it is figurative and conventional with respect to its inferentiality insofar as it points to something capable. Therefore, [referring to it in this way] does not overextend. If you say inference is not a means of knowledge, your declaration is fruitless, for no one could learn your intention from the statement. (1478–1480)

**Conclusion**

You may say, “We accept a commonplace (laukika) mark, not what is imagined by others.”\(^{524}\)

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\(^{523}\) For a discussion of reasons that are ēṣṭa(vi)ghātakṣa, see Tillemans 2000, 52ff.

\(^{524}\) Shastri emends this verse in accordance with an interlinear insertion in the manuscript of the commentary. Kamalaśīla seems to refer to the words na tv anyat in the root text, and an interlinear comment either adds to this, or else replaces or glosses it, tatvatāb [sic]. This strikes me as inconclusive. The manuscript of the root text matches Krishnamacharya’s reading (laukikam lingan ēṣtam cren na tv anyaiḥ parikalpitān), which is how I render it. The tattvataḥ in the commentary seems to me to refer to the term in verse 1482.
But doesn’t a common man also understand a cause from its effect, and so on? And in truth, proponents of logic say that alone suffices. So if you admit the commonplace, what is it you set aside? And how does the other party learn with this non-means of knowledge (apramāna)? And what sort of cognition would be produced by a non-means of knowledge (apramāna)? (1481–1483)

You may say, “Inference, which consists in a statement, is not a means of knowledge for the speaker. Just as he illuminates something with that, so could this be thus.” (1484)

We accept it to be a non-means of knowledge because it does not illuminate something as yet unknown, not because it does not point to something capable. But isn’t yours like that? (1485)

Śāntarakṣita actually says “causes, etc., from an effect, etc.” (kāryāder hetvādīn) and Kamalaśīla explains that (i) the term “etc.” (-ādi) refers to intrinsic conditions (svabhāva), which is to say to reasons based on identity rather than causality, and (ii) the grammatical number is different because there are many different instances of causes (or intrinsic conditions) that can be inferred from an effect, but each is inferred on the basis of its (singular) effect.

According to Kamalaśīla, the phrase “in truth” (tattvataḥ) construes with “recognizes causes...,” but this is a fairly awkward reading of the Sanskrit with no clear upside. I have opted to read the root text as it scans naturally.

Kamalaśīla not only attributes this to Aviddhakarṇa, but states explicitly that it is from his Tattvāṭīkā, meaning his Čārvāka commentary (§14).

The J manuscript does not include the negation of illumination (aprakāśa), but both editions print it, as Kamalaśīla’s gloss, and, by consequence, the verse, makes more sense if the negation is there. “We do not claim,” Kamalaśīla says, “that a statement is a non-means of knowledge on account of not pointing to something with respect to the speaker. Why, then? Because it does not illuminate something as yet unknown. It [i.e., a valid inferential statement] actually does point to something capable [of instigating an inferential cognition]. Your inferential argument, on the other hand, does not [even] point to something capable, so it is not comparable. Indeed, otherwise it would be established for both parties. It is proper that this means of knowledge, which does not deviate from logic, is tenable for all, like perception” (na hi vacanasya vaktvapecāyastvāsamsūcandā' aprāmāṇyam iṣṭam. kim tarhi, ājñātārthāprakāśanāt. saktasāksāvattātāv asāyasty eva bhavet. tvaḍāyam et anumānam na ādāsamsūcākam ity asāmānam etat. anyathā by ubhayasiddham eva bhavet. tasmān nyāyād anapetam pramāṇam sarvesāṃ yuktaṃ pratyaksavat iti nyāyāṃ).

*TSP prints a space, eliding the negation here.

*T does not always distinguish between s and š in the commentary, but the ms. of the verses is fairly clear, and here a/sakta makes more sense than a/sakta.
§13. BH12 AND AV15: GLOSSES OF NBH 1.1.38–39

As we have seen, there are, according to Nyāya, five components of a valid argument. The five components (avayava) are discussed in NS 1.1.32–39. In sutra 39, Vātsyāyana gives this example of a standard inferential argument:

1. Proposition  Sound is impermanent
2. Reason  because it is subject to origination;
3. Exemplification  a substance that is subject to origination, like a dish, is impermanent;
4. Application  and, in this way (tathā), sound is subject to origination.
5. Conclusion  Therefore, because it is subject to origination, sound is impermanent.\(^{529}\)

Bhāvivikṣa’s final fragment in the Pañjikā, Bh12, concerns the fourth component, the application (upanaya).

Nyāyasūtra 1.1.38 gives this definition:

The application is the drawing together (upasamḥāra) of the subject of the argument (sādhyā) ‘in this way’ (tathā) or ‘not in this way’ (na tathā) in relation to the exemplification.\(^{530}\)

The syntax is a little wonky but the point is fairly clear. While the exemplification demonstrates that the reason proves the property to be proven, the application indicates that the reason is a property of the subject—and this leads to the conclusion. Vātsyāyana clarifies that the word sādhyā, “to be established,” which often refers to the property that is being proven, here refers to sound, the locus of the argument. (We could say that impermanence is “to be established,” but also that sound is “to be established” as being impermanent.) He also explains that the term “in this way” (tathā) concerns arguments made on the basis of similarity (sādharmyena), such as the example above, whereas the phrase “not in this way” concerns arguments made from dissimilarity (vaidharmyena), such as the argument that sound, unlike the self, is subject to origination (“sound is not in this way not subject to origination”).\(^{531}\)

Kamalāśila first frames Śāntarakṣita’s discussion of the application with an inference he credits to Dignāga: “The statement of the application is not effective because it illuminates the meaning of the reason that has been stated, like a second statement of the reason.”\(^{532}\) In other words, the application

\(^{529}\) anityāḥ śābda iti pratījñā. utpattidharmakatvād iti hetuḥ. utpattidharmakam śāhādyāmī dravyam anityam ity udāharaṇam. tathā cotpattidharmakah śābda ity upanayāḥ. tasmād utpattidharmakatvād anityaḥ śābda iti nigamanam (NBh 34.13).

\(^{530}\) udāharaṇāpekṣās tathety upasamḥāro na tatheti vā sādhyasayanapanavāḥ ||1.1.38|| (NS 33.16)

\(^{531}\) ātmādīrayaṃ anutpattidharmakam nityam draṣṭaṃ, na ca tathānupattidharmakah śābda iti (NBh 34.4).

In his comments on the following sutra, 1.1.39, Vātsyāyana lists a series of rhetorical questions and contrapositives demonstrating the need for each of the five components. Just before his defense of the conclusion, he says the following about the application, he says: “Without the application, the proving property (sādhaka dharmam) [i.e., the reason], not having been drawn together (anupasamhrta) to the subject (sādhyā), could not prove the point (arthā)” (upanayam cāntarena sādhīye ‘anupasamhrtaḥ sādhaḥko dharmo nārthaṃ sādhyayet [NBh 35.9]).

\(^{532}\) tatropatridharmavacanaṃ na sādhanam, uktahetvarthaprakāṣakatvāt, dvitiyahetuvacanavad ity acāryadignāgapādaiḥ pramāṇite… (TSP 514.2, J166v.7). (Bh12 follows immediately upon this sati saptami.) There are several ways of
is not epistemically meaningful; it does not actually serve to produce knowledge.

Then, Kamalaśīla cites Bh12 as the Nyāya response:

\[
\text{bhāviviktādayo hetvāsiddhyartham āhūḥ na khalu pākṣadhartvam pratiśnānantarabhāvinā hetuvacanena prakāśyate kāraṇamābhāyādhihānāt. anityaḥ śabdo bhavati kṛtakatvāt, tat punaḥ kṛtakatvāṁ kiṁ śabde 'sti nāstīti ceti, tasyāstītvaṁ upanayāt pratiyate.}
\]

athūtā pratibimbanārtham upanayanam, pūrvaḥ hi hetuvacanena nirviśeṣaṁ kṛtakatvam śabde nirdiṣṭaṁ, tena dṛṣṭānte pradarśitāsādhyāvānābhāvivaṃyā kṛtakavyasopanayenā pratibimbanam ānudāna[(?)]| ādarśyate tathā ca kṛtakaḥ śabde iti. tasmād viśeṣadyotanāṁ na punaruktateti. (1437–1438)\textsuperscript{533}

\textit{Bhāvivikta et al, in order [to demonstrate] that the reason [of Dignāga's argument] is unestablished, say: Actually, [the reason's] being a property of the locus (pākṣadharmatva) is not illuminated by the statement of the reason (hetu), which appears right after the proposition, because it denotes the reason (kāraṇa) alone. Sound is impermanent because of producedness, but does this producedness pertain to sound or not? One learns that it does from the application.}

Alternatively, the purpose of the application is mirroring (pratibimbaṇa). Indeed, the statement of the reason first indicates, without distinction (nirviśeṣa), that producedness pertains to sound; then

\textsuperscript{533} TSP 514.3, 166r.8.

a TSP upanayā. J (167r.1) and P (125r.2) both read cuṃṣanamadārṣyate, or something along those lines.

Krishnamacharya (1928, 420) prints uṣanatā, eliding e and m, and proposes upanayāt in brackets; Shastri more or less follows suit, listing "nam cuṣanamād" in a footnote.

The Tibetan is inconclusive. The key excerpt is dpe la bstan pa'i byas pa de bgru ba med na mi 'byung ba nyid ni nye bar sbyor bas bzḷas pa yin nol de bzhin du ugra la yang byas pa nyid yin no zhes bya has 'dra bar bstan pa yin nol de lta bas na khyad par bsal bar bya ba'i phyir zlos pa ma yin no zhes zer ro. Does bzḷas pa (recited, repeated) correspond in some way to the corrupted term in the Sanskrit? In the final sentence, zlos pa renders punaruktatā, so bzḷas pa presumably means something similar. This would work fairly well if bzḷas pa was meant to render pratibimbanam together with the mystery word, in the sense “the mirroring [read: reflection, i.e., reiteration] is stated/brought about by the application.”

If the syllables in the manuscripts had actually been uṣanamadārṣyate, rather than cuṃṣanamadārṣyate, I would find Krishnamacharya’s emendation more compelling. In addition, adding upanayāt would require reading pratibimbanam as the end of a clause (perhaps supplying nirdiṣṭam from the previous line), and upanayādārṣyate as the beginning of a new one. But then Sanskrit would have a slightly odd redundancy. Eliding this strange collection of syllables altogether, we can then read pratibimbanam as the patient of darṣyate or adarṣyate, and upanayena as the agent. I think this makes the construction beginning with tena more satisfyingly ornate, and I have tentatively taken this approach in my translation. Alas, this does not at all solve the problem of cuṃṣanam. Derivations of verbs like samu (recite, repeat) and kuṃś (speak) could fit quite close syllabically and semantically, but would be rare, and especially surprising in such a prosaic context.
producedness is shown in the example to have an invariable relation (avīnābhāva) with the property to be proven; the application presents the mirroring of producedness: “And, in this way, sound is produced.” Therefore, because it illuminates a distinction (tvīṣa), it is not redundant.

Bhāvivikta et al present two possible defenses of the function of the application.

The first is to clarify the relation between the reason and the locus of the argument. The reason, “producedness,” or “being subject to origination,” may or may not be a property of the locus of the argument, so this relationship bears being stated.Śāntarakṣita refutes the first alternative in Bh12 on the basis of his earlier rejection of the proposition. Bh12 specifically says that the statement of the reason immediately follows the proposition, but, because this is so, once the proposition has been rejected, the entire sequence is lost along with it. “There can be no statement of the reason (kārana) if there is no statement of the proposition,” Śāntarakṣita says, “so the statement of the application cannot be brought about to prove the real existence” of the reason in the locus.

“How,” Kamalaśīla adds, “is the reason [in Dignāga’s argument] unestablished?” That is to say, Dignāga argued that the application was redundant, and the first option in Bh12 does nothing to disprove this.

The second alternative in Bh12 points more directly to the main point of NS 1.1.38, namely, the significance of the manner—tathā—in which the reason pertains to the locus. It may already be accepted that producedness pertains to sound, but the bearing this has on whether sound is permanent or impermanent has to be illustrated. The statement of the reason may say that sound is produced, but it does so “without distinction.” The “distinction” in question is, I think, the relation between producedness and impermanence. The exemplification demonstrates the relation between producedness and impermanence, but the application illustrates the fact that sound’s producedness is distinguished “in this manner.” For Bhāvivikta et al, implication is insufficient. The direct statement of the application is what makes the conclusion available.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s response raises the question of the relation between trairūpya and vyāpti in pre-Dharmakīrti thinkers, which we will discuss further in §14 and §15. As Kamalaśīla puts it:

Mirroring (pratibimbana) is entirely pointless, too. The statement of the reason has already conveyed the mere fact of its being a property of the locus (paksadharmamātra), and its pervasion with the property to be proven has already been related; this being so, stating [such mirroring] for the establishment of the intended point quite clearly incurs redundancy.

534 This, it should be noted, is strikingly different than Aviddhakarṇa’s skeptical argument in Av4, which Śāntarakṣita cites in the Vipācitārthā (cf. Appendix A). In Av4, Aviddhakarṇa argues that merely stating that sound is produced “does not bring about [such knowledge] for someone who has yet to learn about producedness.” Aviddhakarṇa, at least in his Čārvāka posture, would seem to reject the first defense of the application in Bh12.

535 pratijñānabhidhāne ca kārāṇābhidhānataḥ [kartavyopanayasya]kha na sadbhāvaprasiddhyay || 1437 || (TS 514, J72v.4). Kamalaśīla adds: sadbhāvaprasiddhaya iti hetor dharminīti ṣeṣaḥ (514.11, J167r.1).

536 kuto ‘siddhatā hetoḥ (TSP 514.19, J167r.4).
In this case, too, how is the reason unestablished?\footnote{pratibimbanam api vyartham eva, yatatas tasmin pakṣadharmamātre hetuvacanena prāgukte sati sādhyadharmēṇa ca tasayā vyāptau kathitayāṃ vivakṣātātrāsāṃsiddher ucyāmnēṃ spuṭataram eva punaruktatām eva eva phalavitahāti kuto ‘trāpy asiddhatā hetoḥ (TSP 515.1, J167r.4)\footnote{TSP wrongly prints purukta”}.

Clearly the Buddhists understand it to be the proponent’s burden to establish pervasion, and they take it that the exemplification—the statement of concomitance—serves this purpose. It may be anachronistic on their part to presume that Bhāviviktā et al understood a valid reason in these terms (cf. §15), but in either case, the underlying point is compelling. Practically, there may be value in separating out each element of the argument and clarifying their relationships the way Naiyāyikas do—especially in the case of arguments that are more elaborate or technical than “sound is impermanent because produced.” But Naiyāyikas argue that the five components are necessary rather than merely practical.

If the standard is epistemic necessity, theirs is an uphill battle.

§ § §

After NS 1.1.38, sutra 39 defines the conclusion as “the restatement (punar-vacana) of the proposition after the indication of the reason.”\footnote{hetvapadeśat pratiñjāyāḥ punarvacanāṃ nīgamānāṃ 111.39|| (NS 34.9).} The charge of redundancy is not very surprising. But Vātsyāyana asserts the need for each of the five components. First, he explains the sequence they follow, including that the conclusion “demonstrates the capacity of all of these to communicate a single matter (eka-artha).”\footnote{sarveśāṃ ekārthapratiptattau sāmarthya-pradarśanāṃ nīgamānāṃ iti (NBh 35.4).} He then explains that there is not just a logical and rhetorical sequence to the five components, but an overarching relationship of mutuality (itaretarābhisaṃbandho) between them. Without the proposition, for example, from what would the exemplification bear on the proposition? And so on. “If there were no conclusion,” he asks, “then what would explain (pratipādana) that, ‘in this way’ (tathā), the proposition and the like, whose connection (sambandha) is not yet manifest, advance with a single aim (ekārtha)?”\footnote{nīgamānābhāvā cānābhivyaktasaṃbandhānāṃ pratiñjādinām ekārthena pravartanaṃ tatheti pratipādanaṃ kasyet (NBh 35.10).}

In Av15, Aviddhakarṇa restates the need for a separate conclusion—seemingly against the Buddhist attack. As we know, Dharmakīrti and Sāntarakṣita argue not only that the proposition and the conclusion are redundant, but that neither statement serves any epistemological function. The statement of pervasion and the statement of pakṣadharmatā suffice to bring about the knowledge that sound is impermanent, so even the statement of only one or the other, proposition or conclusion, would be epistemically worthless—let alone both. Aviddhakarṇa, we can presume, has already defended the statement of the proposition earlier in the Bhāṣyaṭīka, and is now implicitly arguing that both are necessary. (And of course, if he and Bhāviviktā are identical, Bh12 is his defense of the application.) Av15 reads as follows:

\textit{ aviddhakarṇaḥ tv āha viprakīrṇaś ca vacanair nekārthāḥ pratipādyate. tena sambandhasiddhyarthan}
vācyam nigamanāṃ prthak iti. (1440)\textsuperscript{541}

Aviddbhakarna, for his part, says: A single aim (ekārtha) cannot be explained (pratipādyate) with scattered statements. Therefore, a separate conclusion must be stated in order to establish the connection (sambandha).

Av15, it is quite clear, reformulates, in almost the same terms, Vātsyāyana’s closing rhetorical question—“If there were no conclusion…”—as a declaration. Vātsyāyana says the connection between the components is manifest before the statement of the conclusion, and asks how, without the conclusion, one would demonstrate the manner in which all of the components share a single aim. Aviddhakarṇa flatly states that this is not possible, and asserts the need to state the conclusion separately.

In the Pañjikā, in moments such as this, Kamalaśīla concludes with a punchy remark we have seen before: “The rest (śeṣa) is easy to understand (subodham).” In other words, nothing more need be said. I cannot always agree that “the rest,” i.e., whatever Kamalaśīla chooses not to gloss or explain, is, in fact, easy to understand. The challenge, in these cases, is to figure out what I am missing—or whether, in rare instances, Kamalaśīla might be dodging a tricky issue. But, at any rate, in the present case I can happily agree.

\textit{Subodham.}

\textsuperscript{541} TSP 516.1, J167v.1. As Shastri indicates in his edition, this fragment is in śloka meter and may, therefore, preserve a verse composed by Aviddbhakarṇa.
§14. AV16: AVIDDHAKARNA’S SWORD

The bulk of the “Examination of Inference” concerns the definition and scope of inference. First, Śāntarakṣita fends off Pātrasyāmin’s notion that a valid argument must only fulfill a single characteristic, “being otherwise-impossible,” rather than the three characteristics (trirūpā) of Buddhist logic. This notion, according to Śāntarakṣita, is only valid insofar as it is a shorthand for the three characteristics. Then, as we just saw in §13, he dismisses the five components of Nyāya theory. Nyāya fails, in his view, to isolate the statements that have the real epistemic function of teaching the other party about something. After this, he briefly considers Kumārila’s description of two varieties of inference, those based on what is “observed in specificity” (viṣesatodṛṣṭa) and what is “observed through generality” (sāmānyatodṛṣṭa). The Buddhists have several problems with this dichotomy, but they focus especially on the fact that momentariness renders inferences based on particularity impossible. Kumārila conflates perceptible things, i.e., momentary unique particulars, with inferable things, conceptual universals.

After refuting Kumārila, Śāntarakṣita turns to his discussion with anti-inference skeptics, in which he posits a provisional alliance between Cārvāka and the grammarian-theorist Bhartṛhari (5th c.). The first words of this passage put everything that precedes them in a new light:

But there are some shortsighted folks (kudṛṣṭi) who say, “inference is not a means of knowledge,” while conveying their intention with these very words. (1455)

Pātrasyāmin, Kumārila, and the Naiyāyikas may wrongly define inference because of their mistaken views about the nature of existence, perception, and language, but at least they can see well enough to recognize the necessity and authority of inference itself. Some folks—Cārvākas and Bhartṛhari—have such bad vision (kudṛṣṭi) they cannot see the contradiction in saying “inference is not a means of knowledge.”

According to Śāntarakṣita, communication entails inferential reasoning. When I say something, I have a particular intention (vivakṣā, “desire to speak”) that I am trying to convey. You hear my words and infer my intention on their basis. Śāntarakṣita substantiates this idea in the following chapter, the “Examination of Other Means of Knowledge.” When an opponent points out that people’s words do not always match their intentions, Śāntarakṣita explains that

The utter distinction between words used by someone befuddled and those used by someone lucid is very clear. Clever people can discern it on the basis of the topic of conversation and such things. (1516)

Simply saying—and meaning—that inference is not a means of knowledge entails relying on inference as a means of knowledge. One’s interlocutor can only understand the claim, and the intention one wishes to convey with it, because they are capable of drawing that fundamental

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542 Cf. “Setting the Terms” in the Introduction.
543 na pramāṇam iti prāhur anumānāṁ tu kecana | vivakṣāṁ arpayanto ’pi vāgbhir ābhiḥ kudṛṣṭayah ||1455|| (TS 520, J73v.3).
544 bhṛntābhṛntaprayuktānāṁ vailakṣaṇaṁ pariṣphuṭam | vidagdhāḥ prakṛtādibhyo niścinvanti girām alam |||1516|| (TS 540, J76v.5).
After verse 1455, the next eleven verses comprise the skeptical pūrva-pakṣa, which has three distinct voices: (i) anonymous arguments against “for-one’self” inferences and the three characteristics (trīrūpa); (ii) Bhartṛhari’s skeptical verses; and (iii) anonymous arguments against “for-others” inferences:

\textit{Pūrva-pakṣa:} Shortsighted folks claim inference is not a means of knowledge [1455]

I. Anonymous Cārvāka(s) [1456–1458]
   a. A valid reason can generate a false cognition
   b. An inferential mark can fulfill the three characteristics even if there is no inference, ergo it is not the cause of inference
   c. Inferences can be invalidated by further inferences and by the opposite inference

II. Bhartṛhari [1459–1461]
   a. Time, place, and context can alter or impede a thing’s capacity; inference is unreliable
   b. More skillful disputants can always come up with an alternate explanation

III. Anonymous [1462–1466]
   a. The speaker does not learn from a “for-others” inference
   b. What occurs for the listener is “for-one’self”

The first set of arguments is not entirely anonymous. For one thing, Kamalaśīla explicitly attributes these arguments to Cārvākas. But more specifically, Kamalaśīla links one claim—that inferences can always be invalidated by the opposite inference (\textit{viruddha-avyabhicārīn}), i.e., by an equally valid reason that nevertheless “does not deviate from (\textit{avyabhicārīn}) what is contrary (\textit{viruddha})” to the point of the opponent’s argument—with the \textit{Tattva-śāstra}, referring most likely to Aviddhakarṇa’s Cārvāka commentary:

\begin{quote}
sarvatra ca viruddhāvyabhicārī āsambhavati. tad yathā, anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛta-kṣamābhāvata iti kṛte kaścid viruddhāvyabhicārīnām āha nityaḥ śabdaḥ śravaṇa-mātvaḥ chabdatvavad iti. evamādis tattva-śāstraḥ udāharanapravāpačdo draṣṭavyaḥ. (1456–1458)\footnote{TSP 521.4, J168v.5.}
\end{quote}

And in every case, the opposite inference (\textit{viruddha-avyabhicārīna}) is possible. So, for example, if what has been put forth is, “Sound is impermanent because it is produced, like a pot,” someone may state the opposite inference, “Sound is permanent because it is audible, like [the universal] soundness (\textit{śabdavatva}).” A proliferation (\textit{prapañca}) of examples such as this can be seen in the \textit{Tattva-śāstra}.

There are two important uncertainties to note about this brief passage. First, it is not clear whether, strictly speaking, this is a fragment from the \textit{Tattva-śāstra} or merely Kamalaśīla’s report about it. The example is relatively generic,\footnote{Cf. the \textit{Nyāya-pravāsa}, a primer on logic attributed to a Buddhist thinker named Śaṅkaravāmin, who seems most likely to have lived between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (Tachikawa 1970). This same pair of arguments is raised in the \textit{Nyāya-pravāsa}. Tachikawa describes their relation very clearly: “The Vaiśeṣikas admit the existence of permanent universal which resides in each individual. For example, they hold that the universal ‘sound-ness’ resides in every individual sound. According to them, if a thing is cognized through a sense-organ, the universal of that thing can also be cognized through that same sense-organ. Sound is cognized through the ear. Therefore, soundness or sound-universal can also be perceived through the ear. […] The combination of these two marks, however, furnishes occasion for a fault. That is to say, it leads to a set of contradictory results – Sound is permanent and impermanent. Dharmakīrti does not consider this to be a
Second, it is not clear whether he is referring to the same *Tattvāṭīkā* that he attributes to Aviddhakarṇa later in the “Examination of Inference,” though that is surely the likeliest possibility.

In the theoretical debate in this passage, the first disputant argues that sound is impermanent “because it is produced, like a pot.” To counter this, the opponent simply states an argument for the opposite claim: “Sound is permanent because it is audible, like soundness.” Now, for Vaiśeṣika, the universal soundness is (i) permanent, (ii) distinct from individual sounds, (iii) inherent in individual sounds, and (iv) perceptible. As with the blueness of a blue cloth, when we hear a sound, we also hear the universal soundness that inheres in it. But Buddhists do not accept that soundness is a real thing, let alone that it is distinct from individual sounds. The similar case (soundness) must be distinct from the subject of the argument (sound) in order to demonstrate the invariable relation between the reason (audibility) and the property to be proven (permanence). The mountain cannot be the example used to demonstrate the principle that smoke over the mountain proves there is fire there. Audibility, Buddhists would argue, is unique to sound, ergo it cannot be employed as a reason for sound’s permanence or impermanence, because nothing else can serve as the similar case. For the Buddhists, then, this dispute demonstrates the need for each proponent to respect their opponent’s views in formulating arguments. Each element in an argument must be accepted by both parties (*ubhaya-siddha*). The author of the *Tattvāṭīkā*, on the other hand, seems to be arguing that such arbitrary rules for debate cannot rescue the authority of abstract inferential reasoning.

The passage Kamalaśīla is describing most likely stems from the portion of the *Tattvāṭīkā* on the epistemological aphorisms of the *Cārvākasūtra*: “perception alone is a means of knowledge” (*pratyakṣam eva pramāṇam*), and, even likelier, “because a means of knowledge is not secondary, it is difficult to obtain certainty about something on the basis of inference” (*pramāṇasyāgaṇatvād anumānānād arthaniścayo durlabhah*). These aphorisms have been interpreted, both in medieval India and by modern scholars,547 as an unqualified denial of inference and every other means of knowledge apart from perception; but, as Ramkrishna Bhattacharya argues at length, taking the extant evidence seriously, the point seems to be to emphasize the unique intrinsic authority of perception rather than to deny inferential reasoning entirely.548 The authority of an inference is, according to these aphorisms, derivative of perceptual knowledge; it is not possible to learn anything from an abstract inference about things that cannot be perceived. That does not mean that we do not know there is fire on a smoky mountain. If being a means of knowledge strictly entails intrinsic authority, then perception is the only means of knowledge. But inferential reasoning that ultimately rests on basic perceptual knowledge may still be authoritative in a derivative sense.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s response to the claim that every inference can be invalidated by its inverse highlights Dharmakīrti’s distinction between inferences based on an intrinsic relationship (*svabhāva-hetu*) and inferences based on a causal relationship (*kārya-hetu*). This distinction is meant to resolve the problem of induction, i.e., that inferences based solely on prior observation (e.g., never seeing a black swan and inferring there are no black swans) may be falsified by a later observation to the contrary (later seeing a black swan). The intrinsic relationship between being-a-redwood and

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547 See, for example, Franco 1991 and Franco and Preisendanz 1998. Namai (1976b) does not accept the latter as a genuine *Cārvākasūtra* aphorism, but I am afraid I am not yet able to read the original Japanese of his full analysis.

548 Bhattacharya 2011.
being-a-tree, for example, cannot be invalidated by a later observation, nor can it be contradicted by some kind of contrary inference, because of the principle of non-contradiction. Significantly, in this context Śantaraksūṭa invokes an important standard of epistemic authority:

Isn’t being preceded by a mark that fulfills the three characteristics indicative of agreement (samvāda) [i.e., being “not inconsistent” (avisamvādaka) with reality], and isn’t the indication of that what it is to be a means of knowledge? What, then, is denied through this [argument]? (1467)

We saw in the Introduction that the Nyāyasūtra uses the term samvāda to refer to friendly debates between like-minded truth-seekers. Dharmakīrti uses the same term together with a double negation, a-vi-samvāda, to describe the relationship between a means of knowledge and reality, it is not (a-) in dis- (vi-) agreement (samvāda). Thus, even though inferences concern universals, which are fundamentally conceptual and, so, at a remove from unique particulars, they can still grant genuine knowledge insofar as they are avisamvādaka.

In effect, Śantaraksūṭa’s response to the claim that the opposite inference is always possible is that this is only salient if an argument is not grounded in a necessary relationship; intrinsic and causal inferences, along with the triple-characterization of the reason, serve precisely to isolate such necessary relationships (avībhāva, vyāpti). A valid inference is “not inconsistent” with reality and so has genuine epistemic authority.

Apart from this, all of the arguments surrounding the verses from Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadiya are without attribution. Kamalaśīla refers to “Cārvākas” and to “someone else” (anyā), but, apart from Bhartṛhari and the Tattvatikā, does not mention any other thinker or text in the pūrvapakṣa. While these arguments may originate in texts like the Tattvatikā, it seems at least as likely to me that Śantaraksūṭa is essentially making them up on the basis of earlier discussions in works like Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, like the discussion of reasons that “refute what is intended” (iṣṭaghāṭakṛtya).

The most concrete claim in all of the anonymous skeptical arguments is the first critique of “for-oneself” inferences:

[What you call] ‘for-oneself’ [inference] cannot be a means of knowledge, because it is preceded by a mark that fulfills the three characteristics, like a false cognition, which, as is known, can be generated by a reason that refutes what is intended (iṣṭaghāṭakṛtya).559 (1456)

“A reason that refutes what is intended” is a technical term that Dignāga describes as a species of contrary reason. Kamalaśīla offers the same example that Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti discuss in this context, namely, a Śamkhya thinker proposing that “the eyes, etc., are for the sake of another because they are composite, like the components of a bed.”550 As Tom Tillemans demonstrates, in a discussion of Dharmakīrti’s remarks on Dignāga’s use of the term iṣṭa (intended),551 the Śamkhya’s point cannot merely be that composite things do not exist for their own

559 trirūpānāgānupalīputvat svarthaṃ mānaṃ na yujyate | iṣṭaghāṭakṛtyaṃ jānyaṃ mithyājñānaṃ yathā kila ||1456|| (TS 520, J73v.4).
50 śkṛtāj
550 parārthābhāvaṃ caṣṭurādāyaḥ saṃghāṭavatvāc chayaṇānaṃdvyāṅgavat (TSP 520.11).
551 Tillemans 2000, 50–57.
sake, as the Buddhists already accept that to be the case. The implication of the argument is that the “other” for whom the eyes exist is the self and that the self is non-composite. “The reason, ‘being a composite’ (saṃghātavat),” Tillemans explains, then becomes contradictory in that it does not prove the parārtthavat [for-other-ness] qualified in this way: instead, it proves the opposite, viz., that the eyes and other faculties are for the benefit of another who is composed.”552 Not only does the reason fail to prove what the proponent intends, but it in fact proves the opposite.

Śāntarakṣita’s skeptical pūrvapakṣa seems to imply that with this example the Buddhists are claiming that the reason, “because of being composite,” fulfills the three characteristics and is valid and yet, because it “refutes what is intended,” also generates a “false cognition.” A mark that fulfills the three characteristics can thus generate a false cognition, and so it does not warrant knowledge. It is not a particularly strong argument, but it does offer Śāntarakṣita the opportunity to explain that there is a difference between the way that one’s argument bears on one’s own view and the way the argument relates to reality. The reliability, or non-inconsistency, of the cognition is absolute; it is “false” in the sense that it cuts against the proponent’s desired view, but that is a mark against the proponent’s view, not against the argument itself or inferences as such. Śāntarakṣita is clearly responding in this discussion to a topic found in the major sources of the Tattvasaṃgraha.

There is little evidence of any real specificity in the remaining anonymous arguments. The arguments against “for-others” inferences essentially boil down to the idea that a “for-others” inference cannot really be for others and an inference. If the statement generates an inferential cognition, it is really a “for-oneself” inference in the listener: hearing it is no different than seeing smoke over the mountain. But this is already the Buddhist position. In response, Śāntarakṣita only has to clarify that a “for-others” inference, the formal statement of an inferential argument, is just called an inference conventionally. The statement itself does not warrant or generate knowledge, but it does instigate an inferential cognition in the listener, and, so, is figuratively called an inference. As the opponent suggested, the statement is an inference “for-others” in the sense that it impels the other party to experience the “for-oneself” inference that it communicates.

At the end of the uttarapakṣa, Śāntarakṣita reiterates his opening claim against skepticism:

If you say inference is not a means of knowledge, your declaration (vyāhṛti) is fruitless (viphalā), for no one could learn your intention from the statement.553 (1480)

The claim is essentially that Cārvāka and Bhartṛhari declare inference not to be a means of knowledge—with no further context or qualification. For the Buddhists, inference either is or is not a means of knowledge, and if you do not accept its authority, you contradict yourself when you try to convey such an attitude.

After this, at the very end of the chapter, we finally hear from specific Cārvāka commentators, Purandara and Aviddhakarṇa, who appear to be trying to rescue the validity of the declaration (vyāhṛti). In order to think most fruitfully about Aviddhakarṇa’s fragment from this brief passage, we

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552 Tillemans 2000, 53.
553 nānumāṇaṃ pramāṇaṃ ced viphalā vyāhatis tava | na kaścid api vāco hi vivakṣāṃ pratipadyate ||1480|| (TS 527, J75r.1).
KŚ vádo, T tshig gang gis kyang
should first consider what a few others have said about the authority of inferential reasoning, specifically (i) Vātsyāyana, (ii) the Cārvākasūtra, (iii) Bhārtṛhari, and (iv) Aviddhakarṇa himself.

I. Vātsyāyana on Inference

To begin with, Vātsyāyana makes an important comment at the beginning of the Bhāṣya about the relative value of perception, testimony, and inference. NS 1.1.1 names all sixteen of the principles (tattva) defined and examined in the Nyāyasūtra. Early on in his comments on that sutra, Vātsyāyana entertains the objection that the last fourteen principles need not be mentioned separately because they can all be subsumed within the first two, the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and the objects of knowledge (prameya). Vātsyāyana concedes the basic point but argues that the last fourteen principles have to be mentioned separately because they are the special subjects under the purview of Nyāya. After commenting on the third principle, doubt (samsaya), he turns to the principle called “purpose” (prayojana), and says this:

Purpose is that by which someone who engages in a course of action has been urged, i.e., the object that one desires to obtain or to abandon in undertaking an action. Therefore, all beings, all actions, and all sciences (vidyā) are accompanied by it, and nyāya proceeds with it as its basis.

But what is this nyāya?

Examining (pariksana) things with the means of knowledge, and inference relying on perception and testimony—that is analysis (anviksā). Analyzing (anviksana) an object observed (iṣita) through perception and testimony is analysis, and what proceeds by means of that is analytics (anvikṣikā), i.e., the science of nyāya, the nyāya-sāstra. Whereas an inference contradicted by perception or testimony is pseudo-nyāya.555

In this passage, as quite a few scholars have noted, Vātsyāyana identifies Nyāya with the science of anvikṣikā, positioning it as one of the four royal sciences identified in the Arthasastra. The emphasis on testimony further solidifies Nyāya as an authoritative Brahmanical science. The word for testimony, āgama, means “arrival” and commonly refers to tradition. In the context of the Nyāyasūtra, it refers to the testimony of a reliable person, received knowledge, and scripture—knowledge that “has come down to us.” In this specific passage, Vātsyāyana seems to have the latter two most firmly in mind. Perceptual experience is more fundamentally authoritative than inferential reasoning: if the two conflict, the inference cannot stand. But the same is true for tradition, the knowledge derived from scripture and received wisdom. The scope of inferential reasoning is quite extensive for Vātsyāyana, as we have seen throughout the present study. But the distinction between

554 “Concerning these, the separate mention of doubt, etc., is senseless; seeing as doubt, etc., are included within the means of knowledge and objects of knowledge, as suitable, they are not separate” (tatra samāyādānaṃ prthivyacanam anarthakam, samāyādayo hi yathāsambhavam pramāneyu prameyeyu cāntarābhatu na vyatiricyantu iti [NBh 2.17]).
555 yena prayuktaḥ pravartate tat prayojanam. yam artham abhipsan jihāsan và karmārabhate. tenānena sarve prāṁinaḥ sarvāni karmāni sarvāca ca vidyā vyāptāḥ. tadaśrayaś ca nyāyaḥ pravartate. kāḥ punar ayaṃ nyāyaḥ. pramāṇair arthaparikṣāno. pratyakṣāgamāśritam cānumānam. sāvikā. pratyakṣāgamābhyām iṣitāsārthāsānyvikṣāno anvikṣā. taya pravartata ity ānikṣikā nyāyavidyā nyāyasāstram. yat punar anumānam pratyakṣāgamaviruddham nyāyabhāsah sa iti. (NBh 3.9)
556 Preisendanz 2000, for example, includes not only Preisendanz’s own insights on this passage, but also a concise and excellent run-down of work on this passage by Hermann Jacobi, Surendranath Dasgupta, Paul Hacker, and Wilhelm Halbfass. Vātsyāyana’s passage has been remarked upon many more times.
genuine nyāya, which proceeds from and relies on perception and āgama, and pseudo-nyāya, which conflicts with either or both of them, is key.

II. Cārvāka on Inference

The Cārvākasūtra says something not entirely dissimilar, albeit without any deference to scriptural authority and with sharply divergent implications for the science of reasoning. The two best attested epistemological aphorisms557 of the Cārvākasūtra are:

i. Perception is the only means of knowledge.

ii. Because a means of knowledge is not secondary, it is difficult to obtain (durlabha) certainty (niścaya) about something on the basis of inference.558

There are several ways of interpreting this pair of statements. The first, of course, is that they deny the authority of inference altogether. The second aphorism defines a means of knowledge (pramāṇa) as non-derivative, implying that perception is its own foundation but inference is derivative. If authority (pramāṇya) is by definition intrinsic, and inferences require perceptual knowledge, then inference is not a pramāṇa. This seems simple enough.

But this is only an outright denial of the validity and value of all inferences if we think we only learn from what are strictly pramāṇas. I see no reason to presume that Cārvāka thinkers were pramāṇa-vādins (proponents of pramāṇa) rather than what we might call vyavahāra-vādins (proponents of common practice). Inferences that proceed from scripturally-derived knowledge are quite clearly out the window. And even inferences derivative of perception are unlikely to warrant certainty. But does this mean we should stop inferring things? The worldly orientation of Cārvāka suggests a different interpretation: we should stop debating abstract principles and imperceptible things altogether—i.e., ideas received through āgama—and be wary of overconfidence in our more earthly deductions, but continue to make use of common and commonly accepted practices like “inferring” fire on the mountain. If perception alone is intrinsically authoritative, the question is not whether all inferences should be avoided, but what sorts of inferences are legitimately derivative of perception and what sorts of inferences are warranted.

This is how Purandara and Aviddhakarṇa appear to have interpreted these aphorisms. Franco and Preisendanz have regarded Purandara as an innovator,559 but as far as I know, there is no concrete evidence, apart from a smattering of hostile comments from rivals, that there was anything for him

557 Different collectors of Cārvāka fragments have given the aphorisms different schemes of lettering and numbering, so I am simply referring to these as (i) and (ii). The numbers do not indicate anything about their “original” placement in the Cārvākasūtra.

558 pratyakṣam eva pramāṇam; pramāṇasya gāṇṭatvād anumāṇād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ (Bhattacharya 2011, 80). Namai 1976b (39) gives instead pratyakṣam evākāṃ pramāṇam; anumāṇām apramāṇam.

559 Franco and Preisendanz 1998. They describe Cārvāka thinkers after around the 5th century as “embarrassed over the justification of their single means of valid cognition.” Purandara, according to them, gave one of four distinct responses to this problem: “A philosopher called Purandara claimed that the Cārvākas also admit inferences, but only those that are well-known in everyday practice, such as the one from smoke to fire. Inferences meant to establish nonperceptible entities like God or a soul are rejected. To justify only limited use of inference, Purandara emphasized that inference is not an independent means, but depends on perception and therefore cannot transgress the scope of perception.” If the Cārvākasūtra aphorisms are authentic, this sounds little more than a characterization of them.
to innovate. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla seem to suggest that some Cārvākas were entirely against inferential reasoning, but this comes across more as a theoretical or hypothetical position than anything else. As Ramkrishna Bhattacharya highlights, when thinkers like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla invoke strict anti-inference claims, the only actual thinker they cite is Bhartṛhari, who is not a Cārvāka at all, and whose actual position on inferential reasoning is more complex than Śāntarakṣita suggests.

III. Bhartṛhari on Inference

In a verse that Śāntarakṣita lifts from the Vākyapadīya, Bhartṛhari says,

Given that capacities differ according to differences in state, place, and time, proof (prasiddhi) of the nature of things is extremely difficult to obtain (atidurlabha) via inference.560 (TSP 1459; VP 1.32)

The resonance with the second Cārvākasūtra aphorism is clear enough. Śāntarakṣita also cites the proceeding two verses from the Vākyapadīya, which substantiate Bhartṛhari’s skeptical stance:

Even if the capacity of something with respect to a certain purposeful action is already known, that capacity can be impeded when there is contact with specific substances. Even if folks who are skilled in inferential reasoning carefully infer something, others who are more well versed may explain it entirely otherwise.561 (TSP 1460–1461; VP 1.33–34.)

This is reminiscent of some of the stories highlighted by Phillis Granoff562 that present rational debate with great suspicion. The view Granoff describes is that “a good debater should be able to argue successfully even for a wrong doctrine. How then […] is a bystander to know who was really right?”563 As Kamalaśīla points out in his introductory comments in the Pañjikā, we cannot know whether some obstacle or impediment will get in the way of a particular course of action.564 For Bhartṛhari, this means that we cannot always derive certainty through inferential reasoning. Accordingly, the Buddhists use his words to articulate the skeptical position they otherwise attribute to Cārvāka.

But Bhartṛhari’s epistemological views are not quite so simple. For one thing, Bhartṛhari is not an epistemologist. He is not interested in systematic analyses of the means of knowledge. He does not define perception, inference, or āgama. As we have seen, he regards inference with suspicion, and he regards perception with some skepticism, as well:

The sky looks like a surface, the firefly like a fire; but there is no surface in the sky, no fire in the firefly.565

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560 avasthādesakālanāṃ bhedād bhinnāsu śaṅkṣu | bhāvānem anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā ||1459|| (TS, 521, J73v.5).
561 vijñātaśakteṣaḥ apya asyaḥ tāṃ tāṃ arthakriyāṃ prati | viśiṣṭadravyasambandhe sā śaktiḥ pratibadhyate ||1460||
566 talavād drṣyate vyoma khadyoto havyavāḍ iva | naiva ca talaṃ vyomini na khadyote hutaśanah ||2.140|| (VP 72).
Things are not always as they appear. Nevertheless, as Ashok Aklujkar has shown, Bhartṛhari does not entirely dismiss the authority of either perception or inference. In fact, his skepticism about perception and inference seems predicated on his accepting their relative authority. Bhartṛhari “nowhere declares pratyakṣa and anumāṇa to be unacceptable or always unreliable,” Aklujkar rightly notes. Even more importantly, Bhartṛhari clearly regards āgama as a means of knowledge. In fact, he clearly treats it as the highest means of knowledge, at least when it comes to knowledge about dharma, which is his chief concern. Alberto Todeschini puts a fine point on the significance of Bhartṛhari’s skepticism to his overarching project: “āgama is a sine qua non for determining Dharma, that is, pratyakṣa and anumāṇa are not sufficient with regard to Dharma.” Expressing skepticism about the foundations of inferential reasoning seems, for the Buddhists, to be as good as saying that all inferences are invalid. But the words the Buddhists use to present Bhartṛhari as a crusader against inference are, in fact, only words of caution.

Bhartṛhari’s emphasis on āgama is the single most important element in his provisional alliance with Čārvāka. Without making systematic claims, Bhartṛhari nevertheless clearly elevates āgama. The alliance can only extend so far.

In response to Bhartṛhari, Śāntarakṣita revises two of the verses he quoted from the Vākyapadīya:

Though capacities differ according to differences in state, place, and time, proof of the nature of things is not so difficult to obtain via inference. Also, if folks who are skilled in inferential reasoning carefully infer something, others cannot prove otherwise, even if they are more well versed.

He substantiates these revisions in two ways. First, he differentiates between proper and improper inferences:

We say that inferences about things whose characteristics are known through repeated experience (abhyasta) proceed when an accurate (samyak) mark is ascertained; other practices are not inferences.

Drawing an inference requires thorough practical knowledge and the ascertainment of a legitimate inferential mark. Otherwise, it is not a proper inference. But what distinguishes a legitimate mark? The answer by now should be familiar:

For there is no intrinsic condition (svabhāva) without an intrinsic condition and no effect without a cause—otherwise difference or causlessness would obtain, respectively—and there is no inference without these two.
In other words, relations of identity and causality warrant inferences and guard against the concerns of Bhartṛhari and his ilk. A farmer may not know for sure that planting a seed will lead to a sprout, but when he walks past a neighboring farm and sees a field of sprouts, he knows that seeds were planted (causality). If he recognizes the sprouts as those of rice plants, he also knows it to be a field of grain (identity). This has little to do with the whims of state, place, and time, and nothing to do with the skill of a disputant.

IV. Aviddhakarṇa on Inference

One last thinker whose thoughts on the authority of inference we should consider before turning to the concluding verses of the “Examination of Inference” is Aviddhakarṇa himself. The Buddhist commentator Karṇakagomin (c. 800), in his commentary (ṭīkā) on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttikasvārīṭti, includes several citations of Aviddhakarṇa (cf. Appendices A and B). Two of these, Av19 and Av20, are of particular importance for this discussion. In Av20, Aviddhakarṇa seems to make the clear, categorical statement that Śāntarakṣita attributes to Cārvāka:

\[
\text{Av19: A means of knowledge (pramāṇa) delimits a matter that has not yet been understood, ergo inference is not a means of knowledge, because it does not have the condition of delimiting an object.}
\]

Inference, Aviddhakarṇa claims, does not qualify for this fairly common definition of pramāṇa. Therefore: “Inference is not a means of knowledge.” This is the precise declaration Śāntarakṣita criticizes. Kamalaśīla perhaps could have used this same citation to instantiate Śāntarakṣita’s initial charge against the skeptics. And yet, earlier in Karṇakagomin’s Ṭīkā, Av19 appears:

\[
\text{Av19: True, we actually accept that inference is a means of knowledge, but only insofar as it is commonly accepted in the world (loka-pratīti); the definition of the mark (liṅga-lakṣaṇa) is untenable.}
\]

As we will see, this is nearly identical to Purandara’s description of Cārvāka epistemology. But how can this statement stand alongside the straightforward negation found in Av20? In all likelihood, the word “inference” in Av20 stands for something more specific, something like “[a technical] definition of the mark,” “the Buddhist concept of inferential reasoning,” or even “the verbal formulation of an argument.” If, in the Tattvaṭīkā, Av20 followed shortly after Av19, the

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572 The full sentence begins tena yad ucyate... and ends iti tad apāstam, “What Aviddhakarṇa says [...] is refuted by this (tena) [passage].” In the passage in question, Dharmakīrti explains that causal and identity relations generate knowledge, and concludes, “thus [reasons based on causal and identity relations are] means of knowledge like perception” (iti pramāṇam pratīkṣavat). This, according to Karnakagomin, serves in part to disprove Av20.

573 The formulation is the same as in the previous note. In this case it is Dharmakīrti’s analysis of the three characteristics that, according to Karnakagomin, disproves Av19. Karnakagomin says the three characteristics are commonly accepted.
implication would be, “Inference as you define it is not a means of knowledge.”

Karnakagomin argues that Dharmakirti’s definition of the three characteristics disproves Av19, “because fulfillment of the three characteristics (trairūpya), i.e., the definition of the mark (lingalaksana), is also commonly accepted in the world (loka-pratīta), as in the case of smoke, etc.”

According to Karnakagomin, Av20 is disproven by Dharmakirti’s analysis of the two kinds of inference-warranting relation, causality and identity:

Though these two cognitions of inferable objects do not have the appearance of that [inferable thing] because they do not arise directly from it, they nevertheless do not deviate from it because they arise from it [indirectly], thus [they are both] means of knowledge, like perception.

A thoughtful person, as Karnakagomin explains, acts on the basis of their certainty (niścaya) that invariable relations they have already come to understand (pūrva-pratipanna) will hold good in the future, even though the future efficacy of their activities (anāgatam pravṛttī-śādhyā-arthakriyā-sāmarthyam) is not perceptible. Curiously, with this explanation, Karnakagomin seems to describe an inductive process, whereas Śantaraksita and Kamalaśīla focus more on the deductive necessity of causal and identity relations. In any case, both Av19 and Av20 are, for Karnakagomin, refuted by Dharmakirti’s analysis of reasons that are valid and genuinely inference-warranting—whether Aviddhakarna is denying the authority of inferential reasoning as such or only a certain class of technical, abstract inferences.

Straying from the Common Course

This brings us, finally, back to the conclusion of the chapter. In verse 1480, at the very end of the uttaratpakā, Śantaraksita reiterates his initial charge that the declaration (vyāhṛti), “Inference is not a means of knowledge, is fruitless—communication requires that the listener infers the speaker’s intention on the basis of their words, so the declaration undoes itself.

In response, two voices chime in to try and save the Čārvāka declaration. Here are the final five verses of the chapter (in bold) together with Kamalaśīla’s commentary:

CONCLUSION OF “EXAMINATION OF INFERENCES”

SANSKRIT TEXT

purandaras tv āha lokaprasiddham anumānaṁ cārvākaiś apiṣyata eva, yat tu kaiśicī laukikam āśiḥ ca apīṣyata eva, āha laukikam ityādi. laukikam āśiḥ cen na tv anyaḥ parikalpitam |
nanu loko ‘pi kāryāder hetvādīn avagacchati || 1481||

574 traipūpyasyāpi lingalaksanasya lokapratītā caḥ dhūmādāv itva (PVSVT 19.4).
575 tāu dvāva anumeyapratyayau sākṣād anupattar atatpṛthibhāṣīte ’pi tadātputrē tadavayabhiśīvat ēva iti pramānaṁ pratyaksavat (PVSV 3.5).
576 yataḥ sarvā eva pṛkṣavān pravṛttikāmaḥ pramānaṁ anveṣate pravṛttiviparītārthoparāsakāreṇa pravṛttiviparītā pravṛttikāyā caś ca Rātikriyāsamartha eva. na cāṇāgatā pravṛttisādhyārthakriyāsāmarthyām vāstūnaḥ pratyakṣaṁ paricchinātya uktam atah katham asyārthaśca pratyakṣaṁ tāmat vāsavyāvādipratyakṣaṁ vyayā pratyanānāyān mayā pūraipratipannaṁ prabandhenārthakriyākāri tud avam eva iti niścayaṁ kuro pan pravartakavat pramānaṁ tathānānumānam api (PVSVT 25.6).
577 Two small excerpts are left out of the translation, but included in footnotes. They are not insignificant, but relatively pedantic. The reader is encouraged to read them, but I have chosen to streamline the passage for ease and clarity.
tattvatas tu tad evoktaṃ nyāyavādibhir apy alam |
tal laukikābhyanujātē kīṃ tayaktaṃ bhavati tvāyā ||1482||
tattvata iti579 hṛtvaṁ avacchātīti sambandhaḥ. kāryādē ityādiśabdtā svabhāvagṛhaṇanm.
evaṁ hṛtvaṁ579 atrāpi svabhāvagṛhaṇanam eva. bahuvacanam tu vyaktibhedat. yata580 eva śingat581
tādātmyaṭadurtappratipadabdhāḥ loko ’ṛtham582 pratipadate, tad evoktaṃ liṅgam asamāḥhi.
tadabhyānujātāṁ kīṃ tayaktaṃ syād, yasyānumāntvaniśedho bhavet.
atāpi syān naivāmakaṁ kīṃcid anumāṇam iṣṭam, kīṃ tu paṇeṇa tatr pramāṇam iṣṭam,
tadābhupagamāṃ mama vīphalā vyāhṛtār na bhavatītī. atrāhāpramāṇenetyādi.
apramāṇena caityena paraḥ kīṃ pratipadyate |
kutaś cāyaṁ niścayo jātaḥ paṇeṇa tat pramāṇam abhyupagatam iti, na hi parābhupagamaḥ
pratyaśaḥ, na cāyats tava pramāṇam asti, yena niścayo syāt. bhavatu nāma niścayoḥ, tathāpi585
tenāpramāṇena parābhupagatena kīṃti paraḥ pratipadyate,584 na vai vyasanam etat.
atāpi syād yathā ripuhastraṭācchidyā khaḍgām tenaiva sa eva ripur niśpātyate, evaṁ paṇeṇa
yat pramāṇatvenaḥbhupagatam, tatr eva ghrītvā paro nirākriyata ity āsānkyāhāpramāṇaṅkarṭa iti.
apramāṇakṛtaḥ cāsau pratyayā pradiṣṭo bhavet ||1483||
etad uktāṁ bhavati yadi mohat paṛṇāpramāṇam eva pramāṇam iti kṛtvā samgrhitam,
kathaṁ tenāpramāṇena parasya samyagjñāṇotpādaṇam śakyate kartum, samyagjñāṇaphalāvat
pramāṇasya. na hi mohat khaḍga iti kṛtvā ghrītayena yena kenaic cchedakena paraś chettum śakyata iti
na samāno drśṭāṇāḥ.
aviddhakarṇas tattaṅkātyām aha nanu cāpṛamāṇena585 kīṃti paraḥ pratipadyate,
ubhayasiddham hi pratipadatī bhavatītī. tad tad ayuktam. yasmād vacanātmakam anumāṇam na
cā vaktuḥ pramāṇam atha ca vaktā tena paraḥ pratipadayati parapratipadārthathvāt prayāsasya.
nāvāsyam ubha[171]ḥyasiddhaṃ prayaṇanam iti. tad āsāṅkate ’numānam ityādīnā: anumāṇam cet vakturna vacanātmakam |
prakāṣayati tenāyāṃ yathā tadvad idam bhavet ||1484||
ayam iti vaktā. teneti vacanātmakena.
ājanātetyādīnā dūṣanam āha.
ājanāṭārthāprakāṣatvād apramāṇam tad iṣyate |
nāśaktasūcakatvena tāvākānāṃ tathā nanu ||1485||
na hi vacanasya vaktrepanāśasamsūcanaṇād aprāmāṇyam iṣṭam, kimārthi.
ājanāṭārthāprakāṣānāt. sūcakasūcakatvam586 asyasty eva, tvadīyaṁ [P128v] tv anumāṇam na
saktasamsūcakam587 ity asamānam etat. anyathā hy ubhayasiddham eva bhavet. tasmān nyāyād
anapetam tat588 pramāṇam sarveṣaṁ yuktam pratyakṣavad iti nyāyam.589

578 K nanu loko ‘pīti, J na tv anyata iti (J marginalia indicates alternate reading ["pā"] tattvataḥ: P identical [except
“pāthā” for “pā”]), T gzhan ma yin zhes bya ba; cf. n 591.
579 KŚ hṛtvaṁ ity
580 K yad
581 J ligat
582 KŚ lokārthaṁ
583 J “yāḥ sta”
584 KŚ pratipad
585 KŚ nanu vā, T ‘on te
586 KŚ sakaṭa” (J prints s for š here, as is often the case; P šakta”)
587 KŚ sakaṭa”
588 KŚ om., JP marginalia indicates tat as an alternate reading
589 J nāyyāṃ
TRANSLATION

But Purandara says, “Even Cārvākas accept inference as it is generally accepted in the world, but deny what those straying from the common (laukika) course call inference.” Śantarakṣṣita raises this objection (āsāṅkya), then censures it:

You may say, “We accept a commonplace (laukika) mark, not what is imagined by others.”

But doesn’t a common man also understand a cause from its effect, and so on? And in truth,⁵⁹⁰ proponents of logic say that alone suffices. So if you admit the commonplace, what is it you set aside? (1481–1482)

[...]⁵⁹¹ The common man learns something on the basis of a mark that is invariably connected to it through identity or causality. That alone is what we call an inferential mark. If you admit this, then what is it you set aside, whose inferentiality you would deny?

Yet you may say, “In fact, we do not admit inference at all. Rather, the other party claims it to be a means of knowledge, and, because they accept it to be so, our declaration (vyāhṛti) is not in vain.” To this, he says:

And how does the other party learn with this non-means-of-knowledge?

How is your certainty that the other party accepts it to be a means of knowledge brought about? Another person’s acceptance is not perceptible, and you have no other means of knowledge with which to ascertain it. Still, let there be such certainty. Even so, how would the one be instructed with the non-means-of-knowledge accepted by the other? Surely it’s not just bad luck (vyāsana).

Yet you may say, “Just as one might strike down an enemy with his own sword after wrestling it from his hands, so we refute the other party after seizing what they have taken to be a means of knowledge.” With this objection in mind (āsāṅkya), he says:

And what sort of cognition would be produced by a non-means-of-knowledge? (1483)

This conveys the following: If out of delusion someone mistakes what is in fact not a means of knowledge for a means of knowledge, how can they generate a correct cognition for someone else using that non-means-of-knowledge? After all, it is [only] a means of knowledge that has a correct cognition as its result. Indeed, it is not possible to cut someone with whatever weapon was mistaken out of delusion for a sword, so the example is not commensurate.

Aviddhakarna, in the Tattvāṭikā, says:

Objection: “How can the other party be taught by a non-means-of-knowledge? Actually, only what is established for both is instructive.”

⁵⁹⁰ For the phrasing of this verse, cf. n 524–526.

⁵⁹¹ Skipped passage: “The phrase ‘in truth’ [is in verse 1482, but it] construes with ‘recognizes causes, etc.’ [in verse 1481]. The term ‘etc.’ in the phrase ‘an effect, etc.’ imparts ‘intrinsic condition’ (svabhāva) [on the basis of which one can infer a more general intrinsic condition, as when inferring being-a-tree on the basis of being-a-redwood]. In the same way, in the phrase ‘causes, etc.,’ it just imparts ‘intrinsic condition,’ as well, but the plural number is used because there are different instances.”

I.e., in general, one can deduce causes or intrinsic conditions, but each from its effect or from an intrinsic condition, hence, “causes, etc., from an effect, etc.” One can infer tree-ness from something’s being-an-oak, both of which can be said to be the “intrinsic condition” (svabhāva) of the thing. For the debate about Dharmakīrti’s use of the terms bhāva and svabhāva in different texts, see, e.g., Hayes 1987 and Steinkellner 1996.

The manuscripts read na tv anyata iti (“but not from others”) but insert tattvataḥ (in truth) as an alternate reading (pāṭhaḥ). (The Tibetan reads gzhan ma yin zhes bya ba.) It is hard to make sense of na tv anyata. A similar phrase, na tv anyāyaḥ, appears in the second pāda of verse 1481, but there is little reason to think that Kamalaśīla would want this to construe syntactically (iti sambandha) with “recognizes causes, etc.” Śāṅkṛī appears to take this marginalia to mean that tattvataḥ is an alternate reading for na tv anyāyaḥ in the verse itself, but this makes little sense in the verse. I provisionally read tattvataḥ, and take it as a reference to the first pāda of verse 1482, though I am not as inclined as Kamalaśīla to syntactically connect this term with “recognizes causes” in the preceding verse.
Response: This is untenable. An inference consists in a statement and is not a means of knowledge for the speaker, and the speaker teaches the other party with that [statement], since the point of the effort is teaching the other party. Hence, there is no need for what is established for both.

With the next verse, Śāntarakṣita raises [Aviddhakarṇa’s] objection (āśāṅkate):

You may say, “Inference, which consists in a statement, is not a means of knowledge for the speaker. Just as he reveals something with that, so [our declaration] could be the same.” (1484)

[...] With the following, he censures this:

We accept it to be a non-means-of-knowledge because it does not illuminate something as yet unknown, not because it does not point to something capable. But isn’t yours like that? (1485)

Indeed, we do not claim that a statement is a non-means-of-knowledge on account of not pointing to something with respect to the speaker. Why, then? Because it does not illuminate something as yet unknown. It [i.e., a valid inferential statement] actually does point to something capable [of instigating an inferential cognition]. Your inferential argument, on the other hand, does not point to something capable, so it not comparable. Indeed, otherwise [i.e., if it did point to something capable] it would be established for both parties.

It is proper that this means of knowledge, which does not deviate from logic, is tenable for all, like perception.

The passage begins with Purandara’s clarification, quite like Aviddhakarṇa’s in Av20, about Cārvāka epistemology: Cārvākas accept inferences that are laukika—common, mundane, worldly. In response, the Buddhists say relations of identity and causality are well within the scope of common sense. “If you admit this,” Kamalaśīla says, “then what is it you set aside, whose inferentiality you would deny?”

The implication is that Purandara has no response, but his use of the term laukika is significant.

The Cārvākāsūtra includes at least a few aphorisms denying the existence of “the other world (paraloka),” i.e., heaven and hell realms and/or the transmigration of the self to another body in the next life. One of the relatively well-attested aphorisms of the Cārvākāsūtra says, “Because there is no otherworldly being (paralokin), there is no other world (paraloka).” It is easy to see why this follows: if the only fundamental means of knowledge is perception, but none of us lives in “the other world,” there is no one whose perceptions can warrant knowledge about it. There is no way to prove that the other world exists, ergo there is no reason to believe it does.

Purandara and Aviddhakarṇa refer to inferences that are loka-pratīta or loka-prasiddha, commonly accepted or well established in the world (loka). That is, they are referring not only to common sense and common practice, but more precisely to knowledge that pertains to this world (loka) rather than the other world (paraloka). Definitions of inference that “stray from the common (laukika) course” are also definitions concerning supramundane (alaukika) phenomena. The fact that relations of identity and causality are generally known to common sense says nothing about a philosopher using

592 Skipped passage: “‘He’ is the speaker. ‘With that’ means with that which consists in a statement.”
593 The J manuscript does not include the negation of illumination (aprakāśa), but both editions print it, as Kamalaśīla’s gloss, and, by consequence, the verse, makes more sense if the negation is there. Cf. n 528.
594 paralokino’bhāvāt paralokābhāvāḥ (Namai 1976b, 39; Bhattacharya 2011, 80).
specific claims about identity and causality to prove otherworldly phenomena. Śāntarakṣita is concerned with definitions, whereas Purandara is concerned with applications. And yet, Purandara and Aviddhaṁkaṇḍa both comment on the way that other thinkers describe (ucyate) or define (laksāna) inferences, setting themselves up for Śāntarakṣita’s counterpoint. If the problem for the Cārvākas is a definition of inference that goes beyond the scope of the everyday world, then Buddhist epistemology has nothing to answer for.

After dealing with Purandara, Kamalaśīla imagines an interlocutor chiming in with the stronger view that scholars have attributed to pre-Purandara Cārvāka: “In fact, we do not admit inference at all. Rather, the other party claims it to be a means of knowledge, and, because they accept it to be so, our declaration is not in vain.” This, Kamalaśīla says, is what Śāntarakṣita is responding to when he asks, “And how does the other party learn with this non-means-of-knowledge?”

Kamalaśīla’s characterization of this exchange is striking:

How is your certainty that the other party accepts it to be a means of knowledge brought about? Another person’s acceptance is not perceptible, and you have no other means of knowledge with which to ascertain it. Still, let there be such certainty. Even so, how would the one be instructed with the non-means-of-knowledge accepted by the other? Surely it’s not just bad luck (vyasana).

The statement that “inference is not a means of knowledge” only conveys the Cārvākas’ intention, Śāntarakṣita argues, if the other party is able to infer their intention on its basis. Kamalaśīla inverts the direction of the inference to point out another chink in the Cārvākas’ defense: without inferring it, how can the Cārvākas discover the Buddhists’ belief in the authority of inference? “Another person’s acceptance is not perceptible,” he explains, but Cārvākas claim that perception alone has epistemic authority. This would be a major hurdle for a strict anti-inference Cārvāka. Nevertheless, following Śāntarakṣita’s impulses toward comprehensiveness and systematicity, Kamalaśīla grants this first point: “Let there be such certainty.” Though the strict anti-inference Cārvāka has no way of discovering his rivals’ commitment to the authority of inference, there is a deeper problem. Kamalaśīla’s imaginary interlocutor says that the declaration, “inference is not a means of knowledge,” is not made in vain because others accept the authority of inference. But if the Cārvākas intend to convince their rivals that inference is not a means of knowledge, they have to explain how an argument can actually instruct anyone of anything. With a bit of rhetorical flair, Kamalaśīla insists that there must be some epistemic mechanism at play here: “Surely,” he says, “it’s not just bad luck” (na vai vyasanaṇaṃ etat).

Tenable for All

To try to solve this riddle, Kamalaśīla’s imaginary interlocutor raises the analogy of the sword:

Just as one might strike down an enemy with his own sword after wresting it from his hands, so we refute the other party after seizing what they have taken to be a means of knowledge.

Kamalaśīla says that Śāntarakṣita has this objection in mind (ity āśāntyāya) when he asks his next rhetorical question: “And what sort of cognition would be produced by a non-means-of-knowledge?” If a delusional enemy were to swing a sunflower as if it were a sword, one could wrest it from his hands and even strike him with it without being able to pierce his skin. If inferential reasoning is
nothing but idle prattle that Buddhists deludedly take to be a means of knowledge, Cārvākas can babble in a similar fashion, but they are not likely to generate knowledge in the Buddhist by such a means.

There is no glint of an imaginary sword in the root text, but Kamalaśīla is very good at conjuring the words of others that seem to be anticipated in Śāntarakṣita’s responses. In Kamalaśīla’s reading, even when Śāntarakṣita does not directly invoke the words of his rivals, as he does when he paraphrases Purandara in verse 1481 or Aviddhakarṇa in 1484, his words are always already immersed in dialogue.

This inexorably dialogic character extends to the words of others, as well. We do not encounter Purandara’s or Aviddhakarṇa’s words in a vacuum or as an absolute statement, but always as a response. In fact, Śāntarakṣita not only speaks in response to an anticipated objection, but also speaks in order to generate such an anticipation. “How does the other party learn with this non-means-of-knowledge,” he asks in verse 1483. In verse 1484 he paraphrases Av16, which, as we know from the Paṇḍitā, begins with an opponent asking, “How can the other party be taught by a non-means-of-knowledge?” In order to refute Aviddhakarṇa, Śāntarakṣita first plays the part of Aviddhakarṇa’s interlocutor, using nearly the exact words to which Aviddhakarṇa’s argument responds.

But here again the response leaves a little bit to be desired. In Śāntarakṣita’s paraphrase, Aviddhakarṇa hardly seems to respond to the initial question. Even if the statement is not a means of knowledge for the speaker, it still remains to be said how it manages to impart knowledge to the listener. Śāntarakṣita, like Aviddhakarṇa’s imaginary interlocutor, asks how the other party can be taught by a non-means-of-knowledge, but in Śāntarakṣita’s paraphrase, Aviddhakarṇa’s response amounts to: “The statement is not a means of knowledge, anyway.” His actual point, in Av16, is different. Aviddhakarṇa’s interlocutor not only asks how someone can be taught by a non-means of knowledge, but also asserts: “Actually, only what is established for both is instructive.” The concern, then, is Dignāga’s requirement that all of the components of an argument be “established for both parties” (ubhaya-siddha). In other words, a real debate requires a certain amount of shared ground. If Cārvākas do not even accept that inferences are authoritative—to use Franco’s words—what right do they have to participate in the philosophical scene?

Aviddhakarṇa’s response, Av16, requires careful attention:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{aviddhakarṇa tattvaḥkāyām āha nanu cāpramāṇena kimiti parah pratipādyate, ubhayasiddhaṁ hi pratipādakaṁ bhavatī. tad etad ayuktam. yasmād vacanātmakam anumānaṁ na ca vaktuḥ pramāṇaṁ atha ca vaktā tena paraṁ pratipādayati parapratipādanārthatvāt prayāsasya. nāvāyaṁ ubhayasiddhena prayojanam iti. (1484–1485)\]
\[\text{TSP 529.6, J170v.6.}\]

Shastri and Krishnamacharya both print nanu vā pṛamāṇena. I am not familiar with the phrase nanu vā, whereas nanu ca is ubiquitous. More importantly, vāpṛamāṇena can be broken up in two ways, with a negation of pṛamāṇa or without it, i.e., vā + pṛamāṇena or vā pṛamāṇena. Jha, for example, translates the latter. The characters for v and c are sometimes hard to distinguish in J, but v always tends towards roundness, whereas c often has a telltale indentation similar to the horizontal line that marks it in Devanāgari. This indentation is present here, obviating the need to interpret the phrase nanu vā, and, more significantly, making the negation in apramāṇena certain. (Tib. ’on te tsad ma ma yin pas ci ’i phyir
Aviddhakarṇa, in the Tattvaṭīka, says:

*Objection:* “How can the other party be taught by a non-means of knowledge (apramāṇa)? Actually, only what is established for both (ubhaya-siddha) is instructive.”

*Response:* This is untenable. An inference consists in a statement and is not a means of knowledge for the speaker, and the speaker teaches the other party with that [statement], since the point of the effort is teaching the other party. Hence, there is no need for what is established for both.

Why does the fact that an inferential statement is not a means of knowledge for the speaker bear on the requirement that the argument itself be established for both? Ordinarily, when we think about this requirement, we think about the speaker’s opponent. A Naiyāyika cannot rely on concepts like the self or god to draw an inference against a Buddhist. The Buddhist could simply say, “You have yet to prove that the self exists.” But Aviddhakarṇa flips this requirement on its head. To convince someone, you may have to rely on terms and concepts that they already accept, but why should that mean you have to accept them yourself?

The implied practice should be familiar to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla and any other followers of Nāgārjuna: manipulating interlocutors’ beliefs and statements to force unwanted consequences on them. For Aviddhakarṇa, this not only means that he can make successful arguments in bad faith by using his opponents’ beliefs and statements against them, but, more fundamentally, that he can use inferential reasoning, and even abstract inferential reasoning, in a debate with Buddhist rivals even though he does not accept the authority of such reasoning. They have made the rules—he seems to imply—and they are committed to playing by them.

But as is so often the case, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are more inclined to interpret such arguments in categorical and definitive terms. Rather than reply to the implicit critique—and taunt—in Aviddhakarṇa’s claim, Śāntarakṣita instead takes it as an opportunity to reiterate his stance on the epistemic function of inferential statements, and to mock, one last time, the Cārvākas’ declaration that “inference is not a means of knowledge.”

We accept [an inferential statement] to be a non-means-of-knowledge because it does not illuminate something as yet unknown, not because it does not point to something capable [of instigating an inferential cognition]. But isn’t yours like that?

“For-others” inferences are not, strictly speaking, means of knowledge. But this is only because they do not “illuminate (prakāśayati) something as yet unknown.” As Śāntarakṣita says in verse 1479, a “for-others” inference “is figurative and conventional with respect to its inferentiality insofar as it points to something capable.” A valid inferential argument “points to (sūcaka) something capable (śakta),” just as the finger pointing toward the smoke billowing up over the mountain does not itself illuminate or reveal the existence of the fire on the mountain, but points someone else towards what is “capable” of instigating such an inferential cognition, i.e., to the smoke itself. There is a difference

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596 The Sanskrit reads nāvaiyaṃ … prayojana. I understand Aviddhakarṇa to be using prayojana with the instrumental (ubhaya-siddhena) in the sense of “need for” or “use of.” In total, then, the sentence means something like “There is no necessity for the use of what is established for both.” The rhetorical effect is to emphasize the needlessness of ubhaya-siddha, but this is conveyed more clearly in English by collapsing the senses of avaiya and prayojana. (Tib. gdon mis za bar gnyis la grub par dogs pa med do.)
between the smoke and the statement, “There is smoke over the mountain,” but there is also a
difference between the statement, “There is smoke over the mountain,” and the statement,
“Inference is not a means of knowledge.” The former points to something that is capable of
instigating an inferential cognition, whereas the latter fails even on that count.

Kamalaśīla brings the discussion back to the terms of Aviddhakarṇa’s actual comment. “Your
inferential argument,” he explains, “does not point to something capable, so it not comparable.
Indeed, otherwise it would be established for both parties.” Aviddhakarṇa denies the need for an
argument to be established for both, but even so, if his argument were valid, Kamalaśīla suggests, it
would be anyway.

Is that so? If Aviddhakarṇa were to craft his argument in such a manner that the Buddhists were
obliged to accept, would it be “established for both” even if he intended only to throw a wrench in
the Buddhists’ system rather than to establish something about the nature of reality? Kamalaśīla’s
conclusion is that it would have to be:

It is proper that this means of knowledge, which does not deviate from logic (nyāya), is tenable for all,
like perception.

This is a far cry from the Cārvākasūtra’s epistemological aphorisms, but it also seems somewhat
removed even from Vātsyāyana’s description of inference’s reliance on perception and testimony.
Though Kamalaśīla would grant that many inferences involve perceptual knowledge, here in his final
remark in the “Examination of Inference,” he posits nyāya as its own foundation. If Cārvākas or
anyone thinks that they can deny the authority of inference, they are, Kamalaśīla’s conclusion
suggests, kidding themselves.

But the question remains whether Aviddhakarṇa intended Av16 to prove a specific conclusion or to
make something like a rhetorical point.

The manner in which Kamalaśīla frames his earlier reference to the Tattvāṭikā is significant in this
regard: “A proliferation of this and other examples can be seen in the Tattvāṭikā.” Most of
Aviddhakarṇa’s Cārvaka fragments597 concern the authority of inference, so it would not be
surprising to hear that his comments on the epistemological aphorisms contain “a proliferation of
examples” for doubting inference’s intrinsic authority. In several cases, the Buddhists regard
Aviddhakarṇa’s skeptical arguments as sincere arguments, and therefore (i) self-contradictory (in the
sense that Aviddhakarṇa is making an inferential argument against the possibility of inferential
arguments), and (ii) inimical to his commitment, as a Naiyāyika, to the validity of inference. (Cf.
§15 below.) This may be true, but there are a few other possibilities. First of all, Aviddhakarṇa may
have “converted” from Nyāya to materialism (or vice versa), eliminating the contradiction between
denying inference and upholding Nyāya. This, however, still raises the question of self-contradiction.
Whether he converted or not, we should not presume that he intended his skeptical arguments
sincerely. Instead, he may have raised these arguments against inference in order to mock or
undermine—and so to expose weaknesses of—Buddhist epistemology. In fact, he may have done so
not after a conversation to Cārvāka, but as a committed Naiyāyika weaponizing the Cārvāka view

597 Appendix A, sections V and VII. Appendix B includes several additional fragments from Karṇakagomin’s
Pramāṇavārttikasūtraṇāṭṭikā that derive most likely from the Tattvāṭikā.
against Buddhists.\footnote{Consider Av5, which Kamalaśīla cites in PPS; cf. Appendix A.}

One of Aviddhakarṇa’s arguments from the Vipaṅcitārthā, Av4 (Appendix A, section V), concerns the statement of concomitance: where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen. In Av4, he argues that the statement of concomitance “only generates a memory” (smṛti-mātrakā) because it only functions if the person hearing the statement is already aware of the relationship between smoke and fire; the mere statement does not generate genuinely new information. If we link Av16 with Av4, we can see a faint glimpse of the arguments surrounding the “proliferation of examples” Kamalaśīla mentions. Aviddhakarṇa emphasizes the Buddhist demand that the terms and ideas underlying one’s argument must be acceptable to both parties; but if both parties already accept the elements of the argument, then the argument is needless, or, if the other party does not yet accept them, the argument is fruitless (Āv4); and since the idea is to convince the other party of something, it does not actually matter whether the speaker believes it or not (Av16); it is possible to make something up on the basis of the other party’s beliefs.

In response to skeptical arguments against inference, the Buddhists argue that their inferences stand on the firm ground of intrinsic and causal relationships. If Av16 is meant more as something like an intentional sophism than a sincere argument for the nature of inferential reasoning, the underlying point becomes a poignant counterpunch: the ground of argumentation is not certain at all; it is arbitrary, because it is possible to convince someone of something by manipulating their own beliefs without believing them oneself. It is not hard to imagine our Buddhist authors making a similar point about the Buddha’s ability (upāya-kauśalya) to leverage someone’s afflictions and attachments to guide them towards the way. In fact, considering the notion of a “sliding scale of analysis” that scholars\footnote{E.g., in Dunne 2004, Blumenthal 2004, McClintock 2010.} often use to characterize the Buddhist epistemological school, we can easily imagine Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla putting a slightly different spin on the same basic idea: One must adjust the “level” of analysis in accordance with the needs and limitations of one’s interlocutor. All swords, ultimately speaking, are imaginary; practically speaking, however, some imaginary swords can cut.\footnote{Cf. n 260 on Kumārila’s attack on the purportedly Buddhist “dream argument” for idealism.}

Aviddhakarṇa’s larger point is not that inferences never work, nor that knowledge is impossible, but simply that argumentation is a game. At some point, we have to rely on things like testimony and scripture—and dogma—to get the game going.
In chapter nineteen, the “Examination of Other Means of Knowledge (pramāṇa-antara),” Śāntarakṣita argues against the epistemological authority or independence of testimony, analogy, and several other cognitive processes believed by others to be pramāṇas.601

Śāntarakṣita begins by refuting Śabara and Kumārila’s analyses of verbal testimony as a distinct means of knowledge. The Mīmāṃsakas argue that testimony (śabda, “word”) consists in the statements of the Veda as well as those of a trustworthy person. Śāntarakṣita does not, of course, accept the intrinsic validity of the Vedas, nor that a person is reliable merely on account of their word having been good on some occasions.602 In any case, he says, words do not inform us about the nature of things, but only about the speaker’s intention (vivakṣa), which we infer from their statements.

An unnamed opponent interjects to point out that befuddled people sometimes say one thing when they mean to say another; we cannot infer the one on the basis of the other. We have already seen (cf. §14) Śāntarakṣita’s retort:

The utter distinction between words used by a befuddled person and those used by a lucid person is very clear. Clever people can discern it on the basis of the topic of conversation and such things. (1516)603

When a person’s words accord with their intentions, clever people can tell. (One can only hope to be up to the task.)

Śāntarakṣita does not consider any other arguments for testimony apart from those of Mīmāṃsā. After this, he considers analogy (upamāṇa), beginning with the Mīmāṃsā view, then turning to

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601 Namely, implication (arthāpatti), absence (abhāva), and, very briefly, logic (yukti), non-apprehension (anupalabdhi), probability (sambhava), tradition (aitihya), and intuition (pratibhā).

602 A (selective) objection, perhaps, to what we would call inductive rather than deductive reasoning.

603 bhrāntābhāntaprayuktānāṁ vailaṅkṣaṇyaṁ parisphuṭaṁ | vidagdhaḥ prakṛtādvibhyo niścinvanti girām alam ||1516|| (TS 540, J76v.5).
Nyāya.

The Nyāya theory of analogy is distinctive. As we will see in more detail below, Nyāya holds a statement of similarity to be a genuine means of knowledge when it teaches the person who hears it the connection between the name of a thing and the thing itself (or, at least, a member of that particular class of things). Av17 appears as an objection to Śāntarakṣita’s first line of argument against analogy. At the end of the chapter, Av18, a rather odd-seeming argument, appears as a last-ditch effort by the Naiyāyikas to rescue analogy, though I am not at all sure that is what it originally was.
TRANSLATION

CHAPTER NINETEEN
EXAMINATION OF OTHER MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

[...]

Analogy, according to Nyāya

Some hold that analogy is the understanding of the connection with a designation that arises when someone who has heard an analogue statement perceives the similar object.604 (1562)

Preliminary response

If a lucid and clear apprehension of the connection with a name has already been generated when one hears the analogue statement, then, because of grasping something already grasped, it is not a means of knowledge. This is because, like memory, analogy would not have the purpose of bringing something about.605 (1563–1564)

If it has not yet been generated, then how does one learn that “this is that whose name I heard”? Indeed, in this way, someone who has not yet heard the name cannot, upon apprehending [e.g.] a gayal,606 know that they have heard its name. (1565–1566)

Nyāya argument for analogy

Objection: “One who applies an analogy understands the connection to have a specific referent when grasping the similar object. For, one knows the connection to a general extent through received knowledge, but understands the specific referent on the basis of analogy.”607 (1567–1568)

Refutation

It is not tenable that one understands the connection to a name with respect to one thing after coming to understand it in relation to another, as this would strain logic. When someone has grasped a particular name with respect to a man with a beautiful armlet, he does not, at another time, understand the same word with respect to a man with a lovely diadem. Therefore, when someone already knows a name with respect to a conceptual image, i.e., with what we call “a universal,”608 through a cognition of external things, then, even when apprehending a gayal, it is that

604 Uddyotakara puts it this way in his Nyāyatārttika: “The meaning of the [Nyāya] sutra [defining analogy] is that one learns the connection between designation and designated after learning the gayal’s resemblance to a cow” (gavā gavayaśārpyapratipattes tu samjñāsamjñīsambandham pratipadyata iti sūrārthah (ND2, 54.12)). In other words, with analogy, one is taught that a gayal (gavaya) is similar to a cow (gauḥ), and then, upon seeing a gayal, learns that this is the thing called “gayal.”

605 Kamalaśīla says, “The purpose (arthā) of bringing something about (karana) means being most effective insofar as engaging (pravṛtti) in an action (karman) that has not yet been done (aniṣṭpādita)” (karaṇārthāḥ sādhakatamatvam aniṣṭpādite karmāṇi pravṛttyā). A gayal is a bovine native to South and Southeast Asia; it is similar to but distinct from the gauḥ (which I render “cow” throughout the present study).

606 According to Dignāga’s division, the object of perception is a unique particular (svalakṣaṇa), the object of inference is a universal (sāmānyā), and all conceptions and linguistic conventions refer to the latter. “Gayal” is a useful conventional
[“universal”] with respect to which he learns [the name]. He who does not understand the division between the perceptible and the conceptual believes it to be “external.”

Furthermore, it must be understood that we have already refuted, at length, words and concepts referring to unique particulars. (1573)

Yet, even if they had those as their referents, it would only be an inference that would arise. We clearly apprehend that this is produced by a mark fulfilling the three characteristics, as follows: “This thing that is similar to a cow is the referent of the expression ‘ox,’ just like the ox that was present in mind on the occasion of grasping the convention.” (1574–1575)

If it was not even present in mind on that occasion, then with respect to what was the convention “this is similar to a cow” made? We have already proven that there is no connection apart from the things connected. Earlier, at the time of the convention, one heard the sound with an auditory perception; then one sees with the eyes the animal standing before one. It is not tenable that combining these two things that have already been cognized separately is a means of knowledge, because it only joins together what has already been grasped, as in the case of the fragrant and the sweet, and so on. A cognition of the connection with a name does not go beyond the status of memory. (1576–1579)

In addition, there are limitless means for producing cognitions of the connection with a name. They are even produced without respect to similarity, as in the case of kings and such. Suppose someone has been told, “Among those people, the king is he for whom the rays of the sun are concealed by a white umbrella.” Later, when he sees that man, on account of that particular teaching, he has the thought, “That is the name of this one.” For you, it must obtain that this is a distinct means of knowledge, because it does not rely on similarity, etc. (1580–1582)

**Conclusion**

Others seek to prove the existence of another means of knowledge on the force of inference: “Perception is connected with another means of knowledge apart from inference because it is a means of knowledge, like inference; and the same with inference, too.”

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609 Kamalaśīla explains that “even when apprehending a gayal, one learns that name with respect to that itself, rather than with an external unique particular called ‘gayal.’ And that itself, the conceptual image, which we conventionally denote ‘universal,’ is only imagined by the other party, as we have already refuted it” (gavayopalambe ‘pi tatraiva tannāma pratipadyate, na tu bāhye svalakṣaṇe gavayākhyate. tad eva ca vikalpapratibhānaṁ sāmānāyaṁ iti vyavahṛityate, tat paraprākāśītaṁ, tasya nirākṛtaṁvāt).

610 “In,” as Kamalaśīla explains, “the examination of the meaning of words,” i.e., chapter 16 (śabdārthaparāśītyam).

611 The grammar of this term puzzles me, but Kamalaśīla glosses it with the very clear “at the time of grasping the convention” (samketa-grahaṇakāle), which is what one would expect this to amount to, especially considering the following verse.

612 “In the examination of the category of quality,” says Kamalaśīla (guṇapārṇaparāśītyāṁ), i.e., in chapter 11.

613 Kamalaśīla glosses samaye (convention, in the locative case) with the more explicit “at the time of the convention (samayakāle), and I follow his lead.

614 Taking a bite out of a ripe mango and thinking about how sweet it may link together the notion of sweetness, which one learned about earlier in life, and the present sensation of the mango on one’s tongue, but this is not a means of knowledge—it does not warrant any new information.

615 This is the last fragment of Aviddhakarṇa that Kamalaśīla cites; it is not clear whether this attack on Buddhist epistemological theory is really leveled from a Nyāya perspective or if it comes from Aviddhakarṇa’s skeptical Cārvāka writings (§15).
This reason is not invariably related to those, because nothing demonstrates the annulment [of the reason in the dissimilar case].\textsuperscript{616} (1583–1584)

Also, in this very manner, you would obstruct your own view that there are four means of knowledge. Your objection to that will work against this.\textsuperscript{617} (1585)

\textsuperscript{616} Kamalaśīla: “Because nothing illuminates the annulment of the reason in the dissimilar case, it is demonstrated that there cannot be an invariable relation between the proving property and the property to be proven” (\textit{sādhyāvipakṣe hetor bādbakasyāprakāśānān na sādhyāsadhanyoḥ pratibandha upadarśitah}).

\textsuperscript{617} If Aviddhakarna makes this argument in order to prove that there are four, rather than two, means of knowledge, someone else could wield the same argument against him to prove that there are five or more, rather than four; Śāntarakṣita suggests he apply whatever counterargument he would use in that case against his own argument, as well.
§15. AV17 AND AV18: ANALOGY

Av17, like Av15, is a concise and fairly straightforward gloss on a basic term of Nyāya epistemology, in this case analogy (upamāṇa).

NS 1.1.6 defines analogy as “proving what is to be proven through homogeneity (sādharmyāt) with something well-known.” In his comments, Vātsyāyana, without explicitly mentioning testimony, describes a process of learning that appears to hinge on a combination of testimony and perception. The entirety of his comments are as follows:

Analogy is the making known of something to be made known on the basis of similarity (sāmānyāt) with something that is already known (pratipattī), e.g., “a gayal (gavaya) is like a cow (gauh).” But what does analogy bring about in this case? When one learns (pratipadyate) that something has a similar quality (samānā-dharmā) to a cow, one then learns about the thing itself through perception. The purpose of the analogy is learning (pratipattī) the connection with a name (samākhyā). For example, when the analogy “a gayal is like a cow” has been uttered, then, while perceiving an object that has a common quality with a cow through contact between the object and the sense faculties, one learns the connection between the designation and the designated (samjnā-samjnī-sambandha):

“The word ‘gayal’ is the designation of this.” When the analogy that has been uttered is, “the mudgaparni is like the mudga,” or, “the māsaparni is like the māsa,” one who learns the connection between designation and designated through the analogy then fetches the one herb or the other for medicine. The same goes for other objects of analogy in the world that one may want to know about.

Commenting on this, Uddyotakara entertains an objection he attributes to Buddhists (bhadanta): What makes analogy a distinct means of knowledge from perception and testimony? One learns, presumably from a trustworthy source, that there is such a thing as a gayal and that it is similar to a cow. This only describes a case of testimony. Similarly, when one sees a gayal and recognizes its similarity to a cow, this is nothing but an act of perception. In response, deriding what he considers his Buddhist opponent’s simplistic view of cognition, Uddyotakara reiterates Vātsyāyana’s main point about the connection between designation and designated:

“He learns either the gayal’s resemblance to the cow or the gayal’s existence.”

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618 prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhananām upamāṇam ||1.1.6|| (NS 13.10).
619 These are, it would seem, different but similar plants, rather than different parts of the same plant (such as the bean of the māṣa plant vs. the leaves (parṇi) of the same plant).
620 prajñātana sāmānyāt prajñāpanīyasya prajñāpanam upamāṇam iti. yathā gaur evaṃ gavaya iti. kim punar atropāmāṇena kriyate? yadā khalv ayaṃ gavā samānādharmāṃ pratipadyate, tadā pratyakṣaṭas tam arthaṃ pratipadyata iti. samākhyāsambandhapratipattī upamānārthaṃ ity āha. yathā gaur evaṃ gavaya ity upamāṇe prayukte gavā samānādharmāṃ artham indriyārthasaṃkaraḥ upalabhamāno ’syā gavayaśabḍhaḥ samjñeti samjñāsaṁjñīsambandhaṃ pratipadyata iti. yathā mudgas tathā mudgaparni, yathā māṣas tathā māsapaṇīty upamāṇe prayukte upamānāt samjñāsaṁjñīsambandhaṃ pratipadyamānas tāṁ tāṁ oṣḍhiṃ bhāṣajyāya āharati. evam anyo ’py upamāṇasya loke viśayo bubhutsitavya iti (NBh 13.11).
621 pratyakṣṣagamābhyaṃ nopamāṇaṃ bhidyate. katham iti. yadā āva ubhau gogavaya pratyaṣeṇa padaṭyati, tadāyam anena sarūpa iti pratyakṣaṭaḥ pratipadyate. yadāpi śrṇoti yathā gaur evaṃ gavaya iti tadāya śrṇvata eva buddhir upaṭyāyate. kecid godharmā gavaye ’nvyāna upalabhyaṇe, kecid vyatirekena iti. anyathā hi yathā tathety etan na sāt. bhūyas tu sarūpyaṃ gavā gavayaśa ity evaṃ pratipadyate. tasmāt nopamānaṃ pratyakṣṣagamābhyaṃ bhidyata iti (NV 54.6).
Behold, the Buddhist’s faculty for pramāṇa.

Actually, the meaning of the sutra is that one learns the connection between designation and designated (saṃjñā-saṃjñī-saṃbandha) after learning the gayal’s resemblance to a cow. Therefore, he has just said something without having understood the sutra’s meaning.\(^{622}\)

In the Tattvasamgraha, Śāntarakṣita emphasizes the “connection with a designation” in verse 1562, which characterizes the Nyāya position:

Some hold that analogy is the understanding (viṣṇāa) of the connection with a designation (saṃjñā-saṃbandha) that arises when someone who has heard an analogical statement (atidēśa-vākyā) perceives the similar object (saṃāna-artha).\(^{523}\)

The discussion that follows centers on the relation between the statement comparing gayals to cows, the perception of a gayal, and the understanding that a gayal is what is called “a gayal.” Has one learned, once and for all, the connection with the designation when one hears the statement? If so, the cognition that follows later on, when one sees a gayal, is not a means of knowledge (na pramāṇatā), but something more like a memory. If, at the later moment, when one sees the gayal, one has not yet learned the connection with the designation, then how, at that point, would one come to see that this is the thing called a gayal?

In the next two verses (1567–1568), Śāntarakṣita paraphrases the argument in Av17, which Kamalaśila cites as follows:

\[ \text{aviddhakarnas tv āha āgamāt sāmānyena pratipadyate višeṣapratipattis tūpamānād iti} \ (1567–1568).\]

\[ \text{Aviddhakarna, for his part, says: One learns [the connection] in a general way (sāmānya) through received knowledge (āgama), whereas learning of the particular (viṣṇa-pratipatti) follows from analogy.} \]

Unto itself, the fragment does not announce its bearing on the connection between designation and designated, but Śāntarakṣita’s version—in verse, as always—does:

\[ \text{Objection: One who applies (upayukta) an analogy understands the connection (sambandha) to have a specific referent (viṣīṣṭa-visaya) when grasping the similar object. For one knows the connection to a} \]

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\(^{622}\) gāvā gavayāsārūpyam pratipadyate gavayassattām vety aho pramāṇābhiṣīna bhadantasya. gāvā gavayāsārūpyapratipattes tu saṃjñāsaṃjñīsaṃbandham pratipadyata iti sūtrārthah. tasmād aparijñāya sūtrārtham yat kīciḍ ucyate (NV 54.12).

\(^{523}\) śrutatīdeśavākyasya samānārthopalambhane | saṃjñāsambandhavijñānam upamā kāśicīd iṣyate ||1562|| (TS 551, J78v.6).

\(^{624}\) TSP 553.1, J176v.1.

\(^{625}\) There is a minor ambiguity in the juxtaposition between saṃānya and viṣṇa in Av17. These terms are often juxtaposed in the adverbial senses “in general” and “in particular,” respectively, especially in the ablative or instrumental cases (saṃānyena) or at the beginning of a compound (viṣṇa-pratipatti). So it would seem in Av17. But Vātsyāyana uses the same term, saṃānya, in the ablative, to gloss the term “homogeneity” (sābdarṇya, “having the same property”) in the sutra. In the Bhāṣya, saṃānya, construed with the instrumental prasiddhena, “with something known,” means “on the basis of similarity” rather than the adverbial “in general.” Is Aviddhakarna commenting on this passage in the Bhāṣya while using a term from the Bhāṣya in a semantically distinct manner? It seems so. Otherwise, the fragment would mean that one learns by means of similarity through testimony. This ambiguity is a little odd, but Av17’s use of saṃānya and viṣṇa is common, their juxtaposition in the fragment is clear, and Śāntarakṣita’s paraphrase (cf. next note) is unambiguous, so we are on safe ground.
general extent (sāmānya-gocara) through received knowledge (āgama), but understands (vijānāti) the specific referent (viśiṣṭa-viśaya) on the basis of analogy. (1567–1568)626

Although Av17 itself does not mention the connection between designation and designated, the overall discussion in which Śāntarakṣita places it, his paraphrase of the argument in verse, and, even more importantly, the content of the passage in the Bhāṣya that Aviddhakarṇa was most likely commenting on, makes the argument in Av17 fairly clear: The actual analogical cognition is neither the statement, “a gayal is like a cow,” nor the ensuing perception of the ox itself, but rather the application of the designation learned in the statement to the object seen in the perception, and thus constitutes a unique means of knowledge.

Śāntarakṣita spends the next fifteen verses refuting this. He argues that the entire notion is built on a misunderstanding about the relationship between words and things, between concepts and perceptions—and in this light he points back to the “Examination of the Meaning of Words.” If one genuinely learns anything about the concept of a gayal through the kind of process the Naiyāyikas describe, it is simply as an inference. Aviddhakarṇa’s argument implies that words can have both a general aspect and a particular aspect—“gayal” refers generally to an animal that is similar to a cow, but also truly refers, when one is standing before a gayal, to that particular animal. As Śāntarakṣita has already explained at length in his discussion of apoha, this cannot be so. The general (universals, sāmānya) is essentially disconnected from the particular (viśeṣa, svalakṣaṇa). For Śāntarakṣita, as for Dignāga and Dharmakīrti before him, we learn about the former through inference, the latter through perception—and never the twain shall meet.

§ § §

Finally, to conclude the section on analogy in the “Examination of Other Means of Knowledge,” Śāntarakṣita considers one last argument of Aviddhakarṇa’s, Av18, which Kamalaśīla cites as follows:

aviddhakarnas tu dve eva pramāṇe svalakṣaṇasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyyām cānyatprameyam nāstity
etadvighātaṁartham pramāṇyaṁty pratyakṣam anumāṇyavitiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyam pramāṇatvāt
anumānāvat. anumānām va pratyakṣavyavitiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyam pramāṇatvāt, pratyakṣavat.
tathā svalakṣaṇāṁ sāmānyalakṣaṇavyavitiriktaprameyārthāntarasadvitīyam prameyatvāt, sāmānyalakṣaṇāvavat. sāmānyalakṣaṇām va svalakṣaṇavyavitiriktaprameyāntarasadvitīyam prameyatvāt, svalakṣaṇavad iti. (1583–1584)627

But Aviddhakarna makes this argument in order to demolish the idea that there are only two means of knowledge, and that there is no object of knowledge apart from unique particulars and universals: Perception is accompanied (sadvitīya) by another means of knowledge (pramāṇa), apart from inference, because it is a means of knowledge, like inference; or inference is accompanied (sadvitīya) by another means of knowledge, apart from perception, because it is a means of knowledge; like perception. In the same way, unique particulars are accompanied (sadvitīya) by another [class of] object of knowledge (prameya), apart from universals, because they are objects of knowledge, like universals; or universals are accompanied (sadvitīya) by another [class of] object of knowledge, apart from unique particulars, because they are objects of knowledge, like unique particulars.

626 upayuktopamāṇaḥ cet tulyārthagrahane sati | viśiṣṭaviśayatvena sambandham avagacchati ||1567|| āgamad dhi sa
sambandham vetti sāmānyagocaram | viśiṣṭaviśayam taṁ tu vijnānasy upamāśrayat ||1568|| (TS 553, J79r.4).
627 TSP 556.14, J177r.5.
Dignāga is the clear target of this argument—specifically, Dignāga’s claim that there are precisely two means of knowledge, perception and inference, which are restricted, respectively, to the precisely two kinds of object of knowledge, unique particulars and universals. On its face, the overall argument, or quartet of arguments, entails that there are more than two of each. Yet, as we should now expect with Aviddhakārṇa, there may be more here than meets the eye.

Śāntarakṣita, for his part, also performs the way we have come to expect: he reads the argument entirely sincerely. He makes two points: First, the reason does not have a necessary connection (apratibandha), because Aviddhakārṇa has not demonstrated what blocks the reason from applying in a dissimilar case. Second, this argument conflicts with the Nyāya commitment to four means of knowledge. If the argument holds, then it holds just as well to prove that there are more than just four means of knowledge as that there are more than two. Śāntarakṣita concludes wryly: “Your objection to that will work against this.” In other words, Aviddhakārṇa has put himself in a bind. Whatever he may say to try to salvage the Nyāya doctrine that there are exactly four means of knowledge will, Śāntarakṣita insists, undermine the reasoning in Av18.

Śāntarakṣita’s response only makes sense if Av18 is a simple and sincere argument from the Nyāya perspective meant to prove that there are more than two means of knowledge and more than two kinds of object of knowledge. Yet here again we have to wonder whether this argument might have come originally from the Tattvaṭīkā. Is Av18 meant, in other words, to positively establish something inferentially or to cast doubt on inferential argumentation as such?

The most striking term in the argument is “accompanied,” or, more coarsely, “with a second” (sadvitiya). It is hard to look at Av18 without thinking of the so-called sadvitiya-prayoga (i.e., the argument based on “accompanied”), especially considering Aviddhakārṇa’s occasional Čārvāka sympathies.

The sadvitiya-prayoga is a fascinating argument countered by Dharmakīrti. In Eli Franco’s rendering:

\[
\text{abhivyaktaicitayanīśaralakṣaṇapuruṣaghaṭānyatarasadvitiyo ghaṭaḥ, anutpalatvāt, kuḍyavat.}
\]

The pot is accompanied (sadvitiya) either (anyatara) by a man who is characterized as a body where consciousness is manifested, or by a pot, because it is not a lotus, just like a wall.

As Franco says, this “reads like nonsense.” What could possibly be the point of this hodgepodge of random nouns? Franco makes a compelling case for three important features of the argument: historical, logical, and rhetorical. First, Franco suggests that Tillemans and Iwata, in their earlier accounts of the sadvitiya-prayoga, both regard the argument through post-Dharmakīrtian lenses. Both scholars attempt to characterize the argument in terms of pervasion (vyāpti), but Franco points out that there is no reason to presume that Čārvāka thinkers prior to Dharmakīrti would have

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628 teṣāṁ apratibandho ‘yam hetur bādhāprakāśanāt ||1584|| (TS 557, J80r.4).
629 yas tatra parihāras te sa evātra bhaviṣyatī ||1585|| (TS 557, J80r.4).
630 Franco 2012, 219–220.
understood an equivalence between fulfillment of the three characteristics and pervasion. As we have already seen, for Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, the triple characterization (trairūpya) of the reason is inextricably bound up with pervasion (vyāpti) or an invariable connection (pratibandha)—but, of course, they follow Dharmakīrti, too.

It is important to note that Dharmakīrti did not come up with the requirement that pervasion entails fulfillment of the three characteristics and vice versa. Nor did Dignāga. We find this concept at least implied as early as Vasubandhu’s Vādavidhi. And we know Naiyāyikas were familiar with Vasubandhu’s work on logic, as Uddyotakara cites him in his definition of vāda. But in Uddyotakara we see a defense of arguments that are kevalānvayin and kevalavyatirekin, i.e., those based either entirely on positive concomitance, or entirely on negative concomitance. It is not so much that Dharmakīrti established the equivalence between trairūpya and pervasion as that its equivalence may only have become widely accepted in his wake.

Considering the idea that a pre-Dharmakīrti Čārvāka may not have understood triple characterization in terms of pervasion, Franco turns to the logical function of the sadvitiya-prayoga. In short, though this argument fails to establish pervasion, it does fulfill the three characteristics: the reason is a property of the subject (because a pot is not a lotus), it is a property of a similar case (because neither is a wall), and it is not a property of a dissimilar case (because, imagining the dissimilar case to be non-existent things, what is not existent cannot be qualified as being a non-lotus). (Franco notes that the Čārvāka may have intended this as a kevalānvayin inference, which suggests looking at this from a slightly different vantage point than Franco does. Rather than establishing trairūpya without establishing pervasion, the Čārvāka can claim to fulfill Vasubandhu’s requirement, i.e., an invariable relation (avinābhāna), through positive concomitance with a kevalānvayin inference.) The term sadvitiya implies difference; a pot cannot be “accompanied by” itself (or, we might say, pots cannot have pots as their second). Proving that “the pot is accompanied either by a man who is characterized as a body where consciousness is manifested or by a pot,” serves actually to prove the former, which is what Čārvāka theory entails.

Importantly, Franco does not leave it here. This argument, he explains, was probably not intended to conclusively prove the Čārvāka position,

for his inference can easily be countered with the opposite inference (cf. viruddhānyahathicāri-hetu), but [its purpose was, rather, probably] to show a serious deficiency in the structure of inference that allows any odd thesis to be established, and consequently that inference should not be considered a reliable means of knowledge, especially not for establishing metaphysical entities such as God and Soul.633

Though the rhetorical force of the argument hinges on its validity, the point is not really to positively prove something, but rather to undermine others’ epistemological theories. Franco briefly considers another argument countered by Dharmakīrti that similarly (a) uses a disjunction (anyatara) to cleverly fulfill the three characteristics, (b) does not attempt to establish pervasion, and (c) seems likely to have been intended to demonstrate the unreliability of inferences. But in this case, rather

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632 Specifically, “I would rather argue that it is anachronistic to consider the establishment of trairūpya at the time prior to Dharmakīrti as equivalent to establishment of vyāpti and pakṣadharmatā” (221).

633 Franco 2012, 223.
than a Cārvāka, Franco thinks the author of the argument may have been a Mīmāṃsaka. “One can well imagine,” Franco concludes, “a Mīmāṃsaka and a Cārvāka joining forces in such an endeavor, each for his own purpose.” We can imagine such a provisional alliance between a Cārvāka and a Naiyāyika, as well.

To return to Av18, the most obvious difference between Aviddhakarṇa’s argument and the sadvitiya-prayoga is that Av18 does not have a disjunction. The key feature of the sadvitiya-prayoga is the “either x or y” structure in the property to be proven—that is the mechanism by which the point about consciousness is proven, but also the trick that reveals the trouble with inferences in general. Lacking that, Av18 cannot exactly be described as a version of the sadvitiya-prayoga. But it is not just the word sadvitiya that resonates. Here, too, we can point to roughly the same historical, logical, and rhetorical features of the argument.

First, consider Śāntarakṣita’s response: there is no invariable connection (apratibandha). In other words, Aviddhakarṇa has failed to establish pervasion. But, to use Franco’s formulation, it may be anachronistic to think Aviddhakarṇa, presuming he precedes Dharmakīrti, considered the three characteristics equivalent to pervasion. Just as some post-Dharmakīrti scholars, both traditional and modern, criticize the sadvitiya-prayoga’s failure to establish pervasion without recognizing that its author was not attempting to do so, Śāntarakṣita may be looking for pervasion where none was intended.

Instead, then, we should look for mere fulfillment of the three characteristics (or to the features of a kevalānvayin inference).

Perception is accompanied (sadvitiya) by another means of knowledge (pramāṇa), apart from inference, because it is a means of knowledge, like inference.

(i) The reason, being a means of knowledge, is, in fact, a property of the subject, perception. (ii) It is also a property of the similar case, inference. (iii) The dissimilar case is whatever is not accompanied by another means of knowledge apart from inference. Here, again, we can imagine the dissimilar case being whatever is non-existent, and the third characteristic is fulfilled. (And here, too, we might instead think of this as a kevalānvayin inference and leave off (iii) entirely.)

Finally, we must consider the rhetorical force of the argument. Perhaps Aviddhakarṇa was not attempting to establish pervasion. Nevertheless, Śāntarakṣita’s other point would seem to hold. If we accept Aviddhakarṇa’s argument as fulfilling the three characteristics, the same argument could be extended beyond the four means of knowledge accepted by Nyāya. The success of Av18 would undermine Aviddhakarṇa’s own doctrine. Did he simply make a poor argument? Or, as with the sadvitiya-prayoga, was the real point to criticize a certain epistemology rather than to establish a particular claim? The sadvitiya-prayoga, as Franco argues, is most forceful as a sophism intended to undermine triple characterization in particular and abstract inferences in general. The same, I would argue, holds for Av18.

Perhaps Aviddhakarṇa intentionally re-tailored a Cārvāka argument to prove that there are four means of knowledge; perhaps the resonance with the sadvitiya-prayoga is adventitious. In any case, if

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634 Franco 2012, 223.
Aviddhakarṇa intended Av18 as an earnest argument from the Nyāya perspective, then he would seem to have devised a fairly poor argument, even without the requirement of pervasion. The argument surely works better as a sophism meant to unsteady the foundations of Dignāga epistemology. The point, in this case, would not be that there are four means of knowledge, nor merely that inference does not have epistemic authority, but rather that the rigidity of Dignāga’s epistemology undoes itself—the two means of knowledge prove that there are more than two means of knowledge; triple characterization proves that triple characterization is invalid. Buddhist epistemology yields ultimately to skepticism, rather than yielding certainty.

If Śāntarakṣita were primarily an intellectual historian rather than a scholastic philosopher, he might instead have replied to Aviddhakarṇa by saying that argument might have worked against Dignāga, but that Dharmakīrti solved this particular problem. Instead, he treats pervasion resting on the relations of causality and identity as a timeless fact of epistemological authority and of the superiority of Buddhist epistemology.

One question that remains is whether this skeptical argument comes from Aviddhakarṇa’s Naiyāyika or Cārvāka work, and what that tells us about these two phases of his career. Surely if he intended Av18 to prove four means of knowledge, that would imply that he was, or was still, a Naiyāyika when he composed it. It is possible to imagine this argument appearing somewhere in his defense of analogy, as its location in the Pañjikā implies. But given that it works best as a skeptical argument, and as a sophism meant to reveal the inadequacy of Dignāga epistemology, I find it easier to imagine Av18 stemming from the Tattvaṭīkā. If Av18 is one of Aviddhakarṇa’s “proliferation of examples” against inference, then Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla would seem to have misunderstood and/or misrepresented it.

Up until this point, I have regarded Aviddhakarṇa’s possible conversion with modest skepticism. “Conversion” from Nyāya to Cārvāka (or vice versa) should not be considered a prerequisite for writing both Nyāya and Cārvāka commentaries. (It is not even clear that such a concept even makes much sense.) Still, whenever we consider one of Aviddhakarṇa’s fragments as a potential remnant of the Tattvaṭīkā, we must bear in mind the possibility that he did, in fact, undergo a real change of mind. Reading Av18 as the argument of a fully converted Cārvāka presents us with the most ironic of possibilities: Śāntarakṣita is interpreting Aviddhakarṇa’s Cārvāka materials as arguments for Nyāya positions. This would mean the proponent of no-self mistaking the author of a Cārvāka treatise for an earlier author of a Nyāya treatise simply because, conventionally speaking, he is the same man.
EPILOGUE: EARS PIERCED

His entire material unfolds before him as a series of human orientations. His path leads not from idea to idea, but from orientation to orientation. To think, for him, means to question and to listen, to try out orientations, to combine some and expose others. For it must be emphasized that in Dostoevsky’s world even agreement maintains its dialogic character, that is, it never leads to a merging of voices and truths in a single impersonal truth, as occurs in the monologic world.

—Mikhail Bakhtin, “Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics”

Speaking, vāda, does not necessarily imply listening, srāva. We can speak out, speak for, speak to, speak about—and we can do all of these things in the form of a monologue. We can also speak with: samvāda. Having a conversation would seem to imply listening well. And yet, good conversation is not necessarily good communication. It’s like good writing. It excites, it invites, it unsettles, it moves. And it works sometimes despite—sometimes even because of—our failures to listen.

In the present study, I have attempted to amplify the voices of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāviviktā and, in so doing, to shed light on the way Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla employ their arguments. I have done my best to guide my own reader through an enormous swath of the Tattvasaṃgraha. I hope to have made a compelling case that the style and structure of the treatise, especially concerning its incessant movement between many different voices, are as important for reading and interpreting it as the reasoning behind its arguments. I wish I could say I have a reading of the Tattvasamgraha to offer. I am afraid such a goal is still somewhat far off. I am still learning how best to listen to it and speak with it. For now, I hope to have shown that such a goal is worthwhile.

§ § §

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla do not riff on Aviddhakarṇa’s name, “Unpierced-ears.”635 They may not

635 Kamalaśīla may riff on his Chinese rival Moheyān’s (=Mahāyāna) name in the third Bhāvanākrama, when he
have found it unusual or surprising, or at any rate they may have understood it more concretely than we do. As we saw in the Introduction (cf. “Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta”), Esther Solomon suggests Aviddhakarṇa was a “self-made man” in the sense that his ears were never “pierced” by a guru’s mantra. However striking, such an idea is at best uncertain, and I am unaware of any other interpretation. It may simply be that, for whatever reason, Aviddhakarṇa missed the kārṇa-vedha (ear-piercing) ritual\textsuperscript{636} when he was a child; if his family or caste did not participate in that particular samskāra, it may have been distinctive for a thinker in his milieu. On the other hand, thinking both metaphorically and concretely, his ears would never have been “pierced” by a guru’s words or anyone else’s if he were deaf. We also saw in the Introduction that Isabelle Ratié uses the term “dialogue of the deaf” to describe Katsumi Mimaki’s characterization of bad faith Indian philosophy. There is, of course, nothing oxymoronic about deaf people having a dialogue unless we presume that dialogue entails audibility.\textsuperscript{637} But if we move further along the metaphorical path, we find perhaps the least likely yet also perhaps the most potent—and the most fun—valence of Aviddhakarṇa’s name. If his faculty of hearing functioned well enough yet the words of gurus and others never quite “pierced” his ears, we might simply call Aviddhakarṇa “the stubborn one.” He could hear—but could he listen?

In the course of the present study, we have trained our ears on Aviddhakarṇa’s and Bhāvivikta’s voices, listening for the faint traces preserved in the Pāñjikā. We have done so in part to learn about these two nearly-forgotten thinkers, their commitments and concerns, their sources, reasoning, and style, as well as the potential light they shed on early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. But we have also done so in order to learn to listen well to the Tattvasamgrahā itself.

When I first conceived of this project, at the very outset of my doctoral program, I thought it would be a close study of the first section of the “Examination of the Self,” the section on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. I always intended to read the entire treatise and to try to understand the way the chapter on the self fits within the whole, but I imagined that as a peripheral concern, a pet project to keep in the back of my mind. The focus would be the “Examination of the Self.” As soon as I encountered Aviddhakarṇa’s proof of the self (Av8), I stumbled. I simply could not make heads or tails of it. I kept reading in the hopes that the rest of the chapter would help clear things up. Instead, as I reached the end of the chapter’s pūrvatapaksa, I came upon two more of Aviddhakarṇa’s argument (Av9 and Av10), and my confusion—and curiosity—only grew. I read and reread Śantaraksita and Kamalaśīla’s responses to these arguments, and I was left disappointed. They hardly said a word about Av9 and Av10, and somehow their take on Av8 failed to clarify the original argument for me. Śantaraksita and Kamalaśīla are clear, often eloquent, writers. Aviddhakarṇa’s obscurity felt like an intrusion, a dissonant sound I could not get out of my head—as if the Buddhists’ voices were momentarily drowned out.

\textsuperscript{636} Gonda 1977 discusses some of the ritual sutras that deal with kārṇa-vedha, particularly grhyasūtras.

\textsuperscript{637} The idiom “dialogue of the deaf” is typically used to refer to a discussion whose participants are talking past one another or failing to hear or listen to one another. In effect, it means “dialogue of the stubborn.” But I prefer to interpret the phrase more literally in order to highlight its ableist undercurrents—and, hopefully, to counteract them.
I looked for help in scholarship and in other primary texts, but I found very few references to Aviddhakarṇa in either. But there were many more references in the Pañjikā. I turned back to the second chapter of the Tattvasamgraha, the “Examination of Īśvara,” to see if Aviddhakarṇa’s arguments there could shed any light on Av8. As it turned out, his first theistic argument, Av6, was even more obscure than his proof of the self!

All I originally wanted was to understand Aviddhakarṇa well enough to be able to translate and characterize his arguments for the self with precision—that, I thought, would put me in a better position to understand the “Examination of the Self” on its own terms. Aviddhakarṇa’s theistic arguments had two effects on my vision for the project. First, I was now thoroughly frustrated by my failed efforts to understand even one of Aviddhakarṇa’s arguments with any real clarity. I was determined to become better acquainted with his work. Second, after studying the chapters on Īśvara and the self, my interest in the structure of the Tattvasamgraha as a whole grew. Simple questions arose: Why is Īśvara the second topic examined in the Tattvasamgraha? Why was the first section of the “Examination of the Self” concerned with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory? I already knew, from prior scholarship, that Śaṅtarakṣita’s methodical māṅgala verses lay out the entire sequence of the treatise, but I did not know whether there was any particular logic to the sequence. I did not know how the Tattvasamgraha moves, let alone how it moves the reader. Now I wanted to know.

Eventually I encountered several of Bhāviviktā’s fragments, and I noticed the striking similarity between some of his and Aviddhakarṇa’s idiosyncrasies. After I found out that Śaṅtarakṣita cites both thinkers in the Vipañcitārthā, his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya (cf. Appendix A), I discovered a nearly-identical argument attributed to both Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāviviktā (Av1 and Bh8—cf. §8), and began to wonder about the relationship between these two thinkers. My curiosity spiked again when I found out both thinkers are credited with Cārvāka commentaries. Their voices began to inform my engagement with the Tattvasamgraha.

When I finally began writing the present study, I had become thoroughly preoccupied with the fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāviviktā. I could not understand either of them without an exhaustive, almost obsessive examination of their fragments and their potential sources, conversation partners, and targets—my own version of abhyāsa or bhūta-pratyaveksā (cf. “Why Uncertainty” in the Introduction). Proceeding through the Tattvasamgraha in search of fragments put me in direct contact with a host of other voices. The “Examination of Īśvara” came more fully into focus after a close reading of the “Examination of Prakṛti,” which precedes it. The “Examination of the Self” took on a new character when I considered it partly as a prelude to the “Examination of Permanence,” which follows it. The better acquainted I became with Vātsyāyana’s and Uddyotakara’s voices, the more clearly I could hear Aviddhakarṇa’s and Bhāviviktā’s. And the same was true for the voices of Kumārila, Pātravāmin, Bhartṛhari, and so many of the other real and imaginary interlocutors of the Tattvasamgraha and Pañjikā.

This then altered the way I thought about the Tattvasamgraha. Rather than a collection of discrete examinations with an unknown structure, I began to see the Tattvasamgraha as a coherent whole. I began outlining its discrete chapters, looking and listening for poignant transitions, recurring arguments, rhyming action, and any other signs of the work’s overall movement. And then, trying to amplify Aviddhakarṇa’s voice meant listening ever more closely for the other voices that intrude into the Tattvasamgraha, the other orientations Śaṅtarakṣita tries on, the other speakers he mimics or
mocks, the sources he combines, and those that he exposes, in his collection of truths.

From Idea To Idea

Even after the years I have spent with Aviddhakarṇa, I do not feel I can say whether he is a good listener. His fragments tell us a lot about his concerns, his sources, his reasoning, and his style, but not nearly enough about Aviddhakarṇa the conversation partner (saṃvādin), Aviddhakarṇa the listener (śroti), Aviddhakarṇa the reader (śrotṛ). But what about the Buddhists whose words preserve for us the faint traces of Aviddhakarṇa’s voice? Can we describe Śāntarakṣita or Kamalaśīla as a good listener?

Kamalaśīla favors the well-known division of three kinds of wisdom: that derived from listening to (śruta), from reflecting on (cintā), and from meditating on or cultivating (bhāvanā) the Buddha’s teaching. In the introduction of the Pañjikā, he says that “the understanding that people and phenomena are selfless, which is the cause of the highest good (niḥśreyasa), arises through the stages (krama) of listening (śruta), reflecting (cintā), and cultivating (bhāvanā).”638 He relies on the same set in his three Bhāvanākramas (Stages of Cultivation), the very title of which hearkens to the progressive movement through all three practices.

We might describe the whole process as dialogic. Many tales of the Buddha’s prowess as a teacher involve his ability to formulate the teaching in whatever words his student can—must—hear. If the Buddha himself were not a profoundly accomplished listener, could his teaching have been heard with such resounding force? In a similar vein, the Tattvasamgraha, the Bhāvanākramas, and so many other similar texts, exemplify a kind of writing qua reading qua dialogue. In the Tattvasamgraha, Śāntarakṣita compiles and orchestrates a vast array of overlapping discussions with other texts, thinkers, and traditions. In the Bhāvanākramas, Kamalaśīla weaves together practical meditation instruction, scriptural citations, and philosophical analysis. In both cases, the text itself is a dialogue—and evinces dialogues within Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla themselves, as well as between them and their teachers and sources—but also initiates a dialogue with its reader. The Pañjikā is Kamalaśīla’s discussion with his own teacher, Śāntarakṣita, and also as the teacher of his students and readers.

At least, we can describe these texts and practices in such a way. But we can just as well describe the Tattvasamgraha and the Bhāvanākramas, the stages of wisdom, and even the Buddha’s teaching as a series of monologues. The point of much of Buddhist philosophy, in that sense, would not be to teach one how to listen to one’s interlocutors and conversation partners, but to help one discover—or confirm—that the Buddha is the one to whom one should listen, that dependent origination is the instruction on which one should reflect, that selflessness is the insight one should cultivate, and so on. To ask whether Kamalaśīla is a good listener accords with his vision for the task of a practitioner, but to ask whether he is any good at listening to Aviddhakarṇa may be a misunderstanding of his philosophical-spiritual project.

Throughout the present study we have repeatedly had to consider the possibility that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s ears have failed to be pierced by Aviddhakarṇa’s words. If they misunderstand or misconstrue his actual intent, the context of an argument, or the force of his reasoning, we can say

638 pudgaladharmanirātmāvyāvabodhaś ca niḥśreyasahetuḥ śrutacintābhāvanākramenotpadyate (TSP 13.5).
they are listening poorly whether or not they considered it important to listen well. Such would not be evidence of “a dialogue of the deaf,” but, much more precisely, a dialogue of the stubborn—a “dialogue” between monologuists.

To reframe the question, then, we can ask: Is the Tattvasamgraha, with its proliferation of voices and discussions and debates, ultimately a dialogue or a monologue? In other words, does Śāntarakṣita, and/or his readers, hear all of the voices that constitute the text and allow them to speak on their own, or are they purely instrumental in the formulation of his singular statement? Does Aviddhakarna speak in the Tattvasamgraha or is he merely ventriloquized?

To Question And To Listen

At the outset of the present study, we considered the possible audience of the Tattvasamgraha. Throughout the study, we have considered the possible audience of Aviddhakarna’s and Bhāviviktā’s arguments, as well. When we ask after a work’s intended audience, we often concern ourselves with the motivations behind it. Did Śāntarakṣita write the Tattvasamgraha to combat his non-Buddhist rivals? Was he trying to educate scholar-monks in the art of debate? If the latter, does that make the former an implicit or indirect aim?

Vincent Eltschinger has recently shown that we can understand a complex set of motivations behind works like these if we consider them in terms of apologetics. Attacking rivals is positive apologetics; neutralizing their critiques is negative apologetics. When we think about such a work as an apologetic, it pushes us to consider broader social, political, and institutional contexts. Rather than examining Śāntarakṣita’s and other Buddhist epistemological works as either analytic (and, so, only incidentally “religious”) or proselytic (and, so, perhaps less rigorously “philosophical”), regarding them in terms of apologetics collapses such distinctions. Analysis is an integral component of Śāntarakṣita’s project, and we also know that spreading the faith was important to him (cf. his time in Tibet). Bolstering the faith and its institutions is a coherent aim for the Tattvasamgraha, perhaps more so than inspiring conversion. Such an aim is as soteriologically oriented as proselytism, and yet does not cut against the pursuit of well-reasoned arguments for Buddhist ideas.

But if we consider the audience of the Tattvasamgraha to be readers and conversation partners, we are left with additional questions.

It is, of course, important to inquire into the motivations behind the text’s composition. Without worrying about Śāntarakṣita’s intentions, we can still discuss things like the work’s socio-political

639 Eltschinger 2014.
641 Eltschinger notes that the collapse of the Gupta empire, in the middle of the sixth century, coincides with the rise of the Buddhist epistemological school, which he interprets as “a Buddhist answer to the sociopolitical, institutional, religious and philosophical challenges of that much troubled period” (Eltschinger 2014, 94). By the end of the eighth century, the rise of the Pāla empire brought with it increased patronage for Buddhist institutions like Nālandā. The Tattvasamgraha may well have been part of Śāntarakṣita’s efforts to bolster such support for his monastic institution.

As we briefly considered in the Introduction, the Tattvasamgraha works well as an apologetic on Dharmakīrti’s behalf. Dharmakīrti clearly commanded interest and respect from many eighth-century Buddhist commentators. But the sorts of attitudes that inspired Dharmakīrti’s bitter lament at the beginning of the Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (cf. n 75) may have lingered into Śāntarakṣita’s time.

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context, textual history, and so on. But once written, what was the *Tattvasamgraha*’s reception? What was it like to read it? Without knowing exactly what Śāntarakṣita hoped it would do, we can still inquire into what it actually did.

Here, too, we lack evidence. The *Tattvasamgraha* features rarely in later texts. It was entirely eclipsed in Tibet by Śāntarakṣita’s much more concise and focused *Madhyamakāloka*, which he may well have written while he was living there. Manuscripts of the *Tattvasamgraha* and *Pañjikā* have been preserved until today in Jain temples, and Vācaspati Miśra (c. 10th c.), at least, responds directly to one of Śāntarakṣita’s arguments, so we know the root text must have had some cachet. In addition, the *Pañjikā* clearly provided source material for the Jain thinker Abhayadevasūri (c. 11th c.), who, for example, not only cites Aviddhakarṇa’s first theistic argument (Av6), but copies much of Kamalaśīla’s explanatory gloss of it, as well. Otherwise, if we are concerned chiefly with concrete historical facts, it is not surprising that scholars have typically only given the *Tattvasamgraha* passing attention. But readers are usually not writers; they rarely leave evidence of their encounters with texts. Apart from Kamalaśīla, the only readers of the *Tattvasamgraha* we can really engage with in any remote depth are ourselves. The question then might not be what the text *did* in a historicist sense, but what the text actually *does.*

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla seem at times to claim they are engaged in a purely rational enterprise. They examine the nature of things—including, pivotally, the concept of knowledge and the very means by which we secure it—and arrive at a truer understanding of it based on nondoctrinal, nonpartisan rational inquiry. They do not deny that some truths cannot be arrived at through logic nor that logic can be misused or misunderstood. But a clever, well-trained mind constrained by sound principles of rationality and the attentive focus of fair-minded interlocutors can arrive at genuine knowledge and even generate—or at least instigate—such knowledge in others. That is the basic underlying premise of the Buddhist epistemological lineage to which the *Tattvasamgraha* is largely indebted.

Yet as Eltschinger’s insight about apologetics reminds us, thinkers like Śāntarakṣita begin with the truth—Buddhist thought, as they understand it—and go about defending it by rational and rhetorical means. When Kamalaśīla describes the exhaustive examination of all things (*bhūta-prayavekṣā*) that the meditative practitioner must undertake (cf. “Why Uncertainty” in the Introduction), he is not describing a process of starting from scratch and building back up from there. Rather, the practitioner begins right where she is, fully and infinitely immersed in the beginningless streams of consciousness, conventional construction, and karmic complexity; from there, the practitioner carefully, comprehensively examines the constituents of reality in order to

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642 This certainly does not mean Śāntarakṣita et al are not engaged in philosophy. I do not see much need to try and prove that Śāntarakṣita is a philosopher. It should be obvious to anyone who encounters his work. But, as Eltschinger (2014) lays out at the beginning of his book on apologetics, scholars have often seemed at pains over the last several decades to demonstrate that Buddhist philosophy is philosophy. Perhaps this is not because of anything unfamiliar or unphilosophical about the Buddhist material, but simply because we often think about philosophy strangely. What would it mean to start a philosophical project from scratch? We all know that Descartes claimed to have done exactly that; but we also know he was wrong to think he succeeded. (Do we not?) Philosophy is a bit more like Īśvara’s creation of the world—using all the material available to him—than Puruṣa constructing the web of the universe by himself, of himself. But it is even more like the Buddhist alternative to theories of creation, which also happens to be the focal point of the *Tattvasamgraha*: dependent origination.
cultivate an intimate encounter with the basic state of things. It is not enough merely to hear the Buddha’s teaching (śrūta), nor even merely to reflect on it (cintā); one must inculcate it (bhāvanā).

In order to know what one is inculcating, why and how one must do so, it can be useful to mimic the Buddha’s journey, inquiring into the highest teachings of other traditions and discovering their unsatisfactoriness. Even if one has accepted the doctrine of dependent origination, with careful observation one is likely to find oneself quietly committed to artificial and delusive constructs. We are not singular, fixed beings. Listening to ourselves well is itself a dialogic encounter. Śāntarakṣita treats some of the rival voices that populate the Tattvasaṃgraha with sensitivity and respect; others, he mocks. Perhaps he is modeling the way his readers should engage with the various thoughts and beliefs they may encounter in themselves as they proceed in their persistent study of truth.

When we reach the end of the Tattvasaṃgraha, an exhaustive and at times exhausting work filled with a multitude of voices, ideas, and arguments, there is no grand conclusion, no epitomizing statement, no instruction for what comes next. The final pūrvapakṣa is answered with the final uttarapakṣa, and we are left with the resounding echoes of Śāntarakṣita’s many discussions.

We are left with ourselves—only, somehow, different from before.
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APPENDIX A
“BEYOND STUPID AND TOO CUTE:”
AVIDDHAKARNA AND BHĀVIVIKTA IN VA AND PPS

VIPAÑCITĀRTHĀ

The Vipañcitārthā Tikā (Commentary in which the Meaning is Elaborated) is Śantaraksita’s commentary on the Vāda-nyāya (VN) by Dharmakīrti. As its multivalent title suggests, VN is both a polemic against the Nyāya tradition and an analysis of the rules (nyāya) of debate (vāda). Dharmakīrti introduces the treatise by complaining that cheaters—i.e., Naiyāyikas—are winning debates by implementing corrupt rules. Adding insult to injury, he refers to fair-minded practitioners of debate—i.e., Buddhists—as “proponents of nyāya,” which is to say, proponents of logic, rather than proponents of (capital-n) Nyāya. Naiyāyikas are, in other words, undermining nyāya to steal victory on behalf of Nyāya.

In VN’s first chapter (of two), Dharmakīrti presents his own streamlined rules for determining the victor and the vanquished in debate, and discusses several related epistemological issues. In the first verse, he distinguishes between two broad categories of “grounds for defeat” (nigraha-sthāna), those committed by the proponent and those committed by the opponent. Unsurprisingly, should one party commit such “grounds for defeat,” and should the other party recognize this and point it out, the guilty party is defeated. In two short but dense compounds, a-sādhanāṅga-vacana and a-dosa-udbhāvana, Dharmakīrti describes every genuine ground for defeat, analyzing each compound in a variety of ways to draw out eleven distinct cases. The compounds could be understood simply as “non-proof-stating” (a-sādhanāṅga-vacana) and “non-error-demonstrating” (a-dosa-udbhāvana), i.e., failure on the part of the proponent or the opponent, respectively, to accomplish their designated task in the debate. But both compounds can be broken apart in several ways. In both cases, the negation can be read with different members of the compound. The negation in “non-error-demonstrating” may refer to the demonstration or to the error: the opponent may fail to demonstrate an error in the proponent’s argument (“non-demonstrating of error”), or they may fail to point out a genuine error on the proponent’s part (“demonstrating of non-error”). Similarly, “non-proof-stating” indicates the failure to state a proof or a statement of what is not actually a proof. This compound is particularly multivalent, because each member of the compound can be understood in slightly different ways. There are various ways in which the content of one’s statement can be a-sādhanāṅga, depending on the particular kind of argument or the particular component of

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643 The word nyāya refers to the text tradition rooted in the Nyāyārūpa, to logic or logical arguments in general, as well as to any technical rule, maxim, or standard.
644 nyāyavādīnām āpi vādeṣu asādyavasthapyāyāsaiḥ śaṭhā nigriṃṇanti, tannidhārtham idam āraḥbhyaite (VN 1.2).
reasoning in question. Dharmakīrti fits all of the grounds for defeat into these two terms by boiling reasoning and debate down to its essential features.

In the second chapter, he then turns his attention to the Nyāya analysis of grounds for defeat, based on Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara’s comments on the final chapter of the Nyāyasiśtra (book five, lesson two). NS 5.2 lists and defines twenty-two varieties of ground for defeat, each with its own distinctive technical term. Dharmakīrti refutes each of these in turn, often quoting verbatim and directly responding to both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. Generally speaking, he finds their analysis of grounds for defeat (as he often finds Nyāya analysis of all sorts of things) overwrought, redundant, and self-contradictory. In some cases he finds the term in question completely needless, and discards it outright, whereas in other cases he partly accepts the idea, but reduces it to one of the three basic categories of fallacious reason laid out by Vasubandhu and Dignāga. If Naiyāyikas are cheaters, the task of VN is to level the playing field.

Most of the Vipaścitārtha’s fragments come from this chapter. (The structure of the second chapter of VN tracks NS 5.2, cf. Appendix C.) The fragments here are enmeshed in a dense discussion of grounds for defeat. More commonly in interreligious polemics, if a Buddhist quotes an argument by a Naiyāyika, the dispute is about the validity or soundness of the argument itself. In this case, the Naiyāyikas are intentionally crafting defective arguments in order to demonstrate the need for their preferred taxonomy of fallacies. Dharmakīrti’s critique does not concern the validity of these arguments, but whether they demonstrate the legitimacy of a certain category of ground for defeat. It is essential to keep this in mind when reading and thinking about this material.

The Vipaścitārtha is reminiscent of the exhaustiveness and scholarly acumen of Kamalaśīla’s Pañjikā. In the Vipaścitārtha, Śāntarakṣita gives us important information about Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta beyond the fragments themselves, e.g., crediting both with writing a Bhāsyatikā, indicating that Bhāvivikta was a direct target of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya (confirming that Bhāvivikta predates Dharmakīrti), and citing a fragment from Aviddhakarṇa’s apparent Carvāka guise. Several of the fragments of both Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are clear comments on specific portions of the Bhāṣya, both because of the focus of the second chapter of VN and because of terminological marks in the fragments themselves.

Av1, the first fragment in the Vipaścitārtha, is nearly identical to Bh8, one of the fragments of Bhāvivikta from the Pañjikā. We have already examined this fragment in §8, so we will skip straight to Av2 and the second chapter of VN.

I. Av2: Gloss of NBh 5.2.3

After Av1 in the first chapter, we do not find another fragment—of Aviddhakarṇa or Bhāvivikta—in...
the *Vipañcitārbā* until we reach the second chapter. As noted earlier, in the second chapter of VN, Dharmakīrti goes through each of the grounds for defeat (*nigraha-sthāna*) listed and defined in NS 5.2, often discussing both the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārttika* on each sutra. Typically, Dharmakīrti first presents the sutra itself, then cites the corresponding gloss from NBh and/or NV, and then proceeds to pick apart their analysis.

NS 5.2.1 lists all twenty-two varieties of ground for defeat; sutra 5.2.2 defines the first of these, “harm to the proposition” (*pratijñāhāni*); sutra 3 defines the next, “another proposition” (*pratijñāntara*), and so on for the remainder of NS 5.2.649

Śāntarakṣita cites Av2, the second fragment of Aviddhakarṇa, in his comments on Dharmakīrti’s response to Vātsyāyana on the topic of NS 5.2.3, “another proposition” (*pratijñāntara*). As its name suggests, an instance of this ground for defeat is when the proponent, realizing his proposition has been refuted, introduces a new proposition in order to bolster it. Vātsyāyana’s example is this: the proponent realizes that his proposition, “sound is impermanent because it is sensuous,” has been refuted; he then argues that sound is not omnipresent (*asarvagata*), and that, just as a pot is both sensuous and non-omnipresent, so, too, does this prove sound’s impermanence. This is grounds for defeat because one cannot prove a proposition with another proposition, but only with a reason and an example.650

Dharmakīrti discounts Vātsyāyana’s example altogether, arguing that, in this case, rather than introducing another proposition, the proponent is actually qualifying the reason: sound is impermanent because it is sensuous *while not being omnipresent*. It is permissible to add a qualification (*viṣeṣaṇa*) to a reason to specify its scope. Dharmakīrti also says that “it is already established that sound is non-omnipresent, and a proposition is defined by indicating something to be proven.”651 In other words, Vātsyāyana’s specific example does not qualify as genuinely involving an additional proposition. But Dharmakīrti finds the underlying concept unacceptable, anyway. A proposition, he argues, that is stated in order to establish another proposition would not actually be a proposition at all, but rather a reason, or one of the other members of a syllogism.652

Śāntarakṣita introduces Av2 as if as a direct response to this criticism:

*aaviddhakarṇas tu bāhṣyaṭiśāyāṃ idam āśākṣaṃ uparijihṣati* nanu cāsarvagatave satīti hetuviṣeṣaṇam uktam, saviṣeṣaṇaḥ ca hetu vipakse nāstīti na pratijñāntaram nigrasthānāṃ. naitad653 evam asarvagataḥ śābda iti pratijñāntaropādānā. hetuviṣeṣaṇopādāne hervantaraṃ nigrasthānāṃ iti. (VA 76.1)

*But Aviddhakarṇa, in his Bhāṣyaṭṭikā, considers this and then tries to avoid it:*

[Objection:] But “while not being omnipresent” (*asarvagatave satīti*) conveys a qualification of the reason (*hetuviṣeṣaṇa*), and the reason with this qualification is not present in the dissimilar case.

649 NS 5.2.15 clarifies the definition, in sutra 14, of “redundancy” (*punarukta*). Otherwise each sutra in 5.2.2–24 defines a separate *nigrasthāna*.

650 na pratijñāyāḥ sādhanam pratijñāntaram. kiṃ tāti. hetudṛṣṭāntau sādhanam pratijñāyāḥ. (NBh 310.14)

651 na punah pratijñāntaram āha, asarvagatavasya śābde siddhatvā pratiṣñāyāś ca sādhyanīrdeśālaṃkāntvāt. (VN 27.14)

652 na hi pratijñā pratijñāśādhanāyocamānā pratijñāntaram bhavati, kiṃ tāri hetvāder anyatamaḥ. (VN 27.18)

653 Steinkellner (34) na hi tad r : naitad ms.
therefore this is not the ground for defeat “another proposition.”

No, because “sound is not omnipresent” is the employment of another proposition. When employing a qualification of the reason, the ground for defeat is “another reason.”

This is the first reference to Aviddhakarṇa’s Bhāṣyāṭīkā. Even without such a remark, this is quite clearly a comment on “another proposition,” the technical term defined in NS 5.2.3 and discussed nowhere else in the Bhāṣya but here. Unlike Av1, Av2’s source material could not be much clearer. The source of Av2 also helps to contextualize its content somewhat. The reference to the phrase “insofar as it is not omnipresent” is a particular reference to Vātsyāyana’s example of “another proposition,” rather than Aviddhakarṇa’s own example.

Immediately responding to Av2, Śāntarakṣita again denigrates Aviddhakarṇa’s intelligence, referring to the entire passage as atisthūla, “excessively coarse” (or, better, beyond stupid) and the particular comment about “another thesis” as almost the polar opposite, atipelava, “excessively soft” (or, rather, too cute).

Nevertheless, this atisthūla fragment suits Śāntarakṣita’s purposes rather perfectly. Dharmakīrti argues that “while not being omnipresent” is a qualification of the reason; on cue, Aviddhakarṇa refutes precisely that point. Was Aviddhakarṇa responding directly to VN? Dharmakīrti seems quite clearly to respond to Aviddhakarṇa’s first theistic argument in PV 2.10ff (cf. Krasser 2002), making it rather unlikely that Aviddhakarṇa responded to him. In VN, Dharmakīrti explicitly invokes and quotes Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, often referring to them as, respectively, the “author of the Bhāṣya” (bhāṣya-kāra) and the “author of the Vārttika” (vārttika-kāra); perhaps he does not refer to the tīkā-kāra because he was not particularly concerned in VN with any of his arguments. (As we will see in section VI below, Śāntarakṣita states quite clearly in the Vipañcitārthā that Bhāvīvikta predates Dharmakīrti.)

The fragment itself somewhat supports dating Aviddhakarṇa before Dharmakīrti. Av2 may suit Śāntarakṣita’s needs well, but it does not add anything to the discussion. Aviddhakarṇa simply states that the purported “qualification” is in fact another proposition. He does not seem to contend with Dharmakīrti’s claim that this, by definition, cannot be a new proposition because its content is already established. Nor does he comment—at least, not in the excerpt Śāntarakṣita provides—on whether a proposition stated to prove another proposition can actually be a proposition at all. Despite the fact that Śāntarakṣita describes Aviddhakarṇa as considering and responding to “this” (idam aśāṅkyā), i.e., Dharmakīrti’s argument, the fragment itself does not suggest direct engagement with Dharmakīrti himself.

II. BH1: GLOSS OF NBH 5.2.4

After NS 5.2.3, sutra 4 discusses the ground for defeat called “proposition contradiction” (pratijñāvirodha). The sutra defines the term as “contradiction of the proposition and the reason” (pratijñāhetvor virodhaḥ)—seemingly meaning between the two. Vātsyāyana, following the sutra

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654 The fragment mentions “another reason” (hetvantara), a ground for defeat defined in 5.2.6, but clearly in order to refer forward to that concept, rather than to define or defend it here.
closely, gives only one interpretation and example of “proposition contradiction,” namely, “Substance is distinct from quality, because of the nonapprehension of anything other than color, etc.” This example, roughly speaking, affixes a Buddhist reason to a Nyāya proposition. If qualities like color are all that we perceive, then substance is not distinct from quality, hence the reason contradicts the proposition.\(^{655}\)

Uddyotakara adds significantly more nuance to the term by analyzing the compound \textit{pratijñā-virodha} in several ways, thereby incorporating cases when the proposition contradicts itself (\textit{svavacanena virudhyate}), when the proposition contradicts the example (\textit{pratijñāyā drṣṭāntavirodha}), and so on.\(^{656}\) He calls Vātsyāyana’s example an instance of “the reason contradicting the proposition” (\textit{pratijñā hetunā virudhyate}). Śāntarakṣita’s first mention of Bhāvavikta, Bh1, appears in this context. Bh1 is only a single word, but it suggests similarity between Bhāvivikta’s comments and Uddyotakara’s.

Before considering the fragment, we must turn back to an important backdrop of Bh1, Vātsyāyana’s comments on NS 4.1.36. The passage from NS 4.1.34–36 concerns the (roughly) Buddhist claim that “everything is separate,” which is to say that there are no singular, substantial entities. This is the sixth in the sequence of eight causal theories raised and refuted in NS 4.1.14–43.\(^{657}\) The three sutras are as follows:

- **[Claim:]** All is separate, because of the separateness of the mark (\textit{lakṣana}) of an entity. (4.1.34)
- **[Response:]** No, because a single entity has its completion by means of more than one mark (\textit{lakṣana}). (4.1.35)
- **[Continued:]** There is no refutation [of unities] because of the differential establishment (\textit{vyavasthāna}) of the mark (\textit{lakṣana}). (4.1.36)\(^{658}\)

The pseudo-Buddhist argues, depending on one’s interpretation, either that the definition (\textit{lakṣana}), or the characteristics (\textit{lakṣana}), of purported entities are separate: a pot is comprised of different portions, colors, scents, materials, functions, etc., and it is only the conceptual construction of the identity of “the pot” that makes it seem that as if these are all unified. In response, Nyāya argues first that entities do, in fact, have many characteristics. As Vātsyāyana says, “A single entity [such as a pot] comes forth connected with qualities, such as scent, and parts, such as a base.”\(^{659}\) It is only insofar as there is a pot that there can be a base of the pot. The base is a real part of a real whole. Then, in sutra 36, the Naiyāyika continues by arguing that unities cannot be denied because the names (\textit{lakṣana}) for things are restricted. “It is not a heap of atoms,” Vātsyāyana says, “that is grasped [when we say], ‘I am touching the jar that I saw,’ or, ‘I am seeing the jar that I touched,’”\(^{660}\) it is an

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\(^{655}\) This recalls the polemical context of Av1, and highlights the centrality of mereology to the division between Buddhism and Nyāya.

\(^{656}\) NV 522.2.

\(^{657}\) Cf. n 326 (§5) and n 400 (§8).

\(^{658}\) sarvāṃ prthāg bhāvalakṣaṇapṛthātvā ||4.1.34|| (NS 234.12);

nīnakakṣaṇair ekahāvanispatteḥ ||4.1.35|| (234.18);

lakṣaṇavyavasthānād evaśāsvedhā ||4.1.36|| (235.6).

\(^{659}\) gandhādhībiḥ ca guṇair bhūmnādībiḥ cāvayavaibhiḥ sambaddha eko bhāvo nispadyate (NBh 235.1).

\(^{660}\) yaṃ kumbham adrākṣaṃ taṃ sprāmi yaṃ cāsprākṣaṃ taṃ pāśyāmi nāṇusamūho gṛhyata iti (NBh 235.8).
actual jar.

Vātsyāyana’s interlocutor disagrees. Everything is indeed separate, he says, “because of the application of the word entity to heaps” (samūhe bhāvaśabdapurāyogāt). In other words, it is precisely a heap of atoms that we call “a pot,” rather than a real, substantial whole. In response, Vātsyāyana says that a heap, e.g., a heap of atoms, is comprised of the individuals heaped together, i.e., the atoms, each of which is its own singular thing. The reason actually proves that there must be unities, and this contradicts the proposition, “everything is separate,” which is meant to deny exactly that. The interlocutor’s argument here in NBh 4.1.36, therefore, qualifies as a “proposition contradiction.”

Nevertheless, Vātsyāyana does not use this as his example of “proposition contradiction” in his comments on NS 5.2.4. Instead, he creates an absurd hybrid argument by affixing a Buddhist reason to a Nyāya proposition. But Uddyotakara does. He interprets the phrase “proposition contradiction” variously, and presents the interlocutor’s argument from NBh 4.1.36 as one example of this kind of ground for defeat.

Dharmakīrti comments at length on “proposition contradiction,” primarily in response to Uddyotakara’s layered unpacking of the term. He does not accept that “because of the application of the word entity to heaps” is a genuine case of “proposition contradiction.” Instead, he explains, its defect is non-coreferentiality (vyadhikaranatvā) between the topic and the reason. The reason, “because of the application of the word…,” is not a property of the topic, “everything.”

Sāntarakṣita clarifies the point with an example: in the fallacious argument “molasses is sweet because of the blackness of crows,” the blackness of crows does not apply to molasses and, so, cannot prove anything about it. The application of the word entity is a property of the word, not of “everything.” This change in subject renders the reason unestablished (asiddha). And, as Dharmakīrti points out elsewhere, if the reason is unestablished, the proponent has already lost and need not be defeated again.

At this point, Sāntarakṣita cites Bh1:

syād buddhiḥ samūhavācakasābdavācayatvād ity evaṁ bhāvyaviktena bhāṣyaṭkāyāṁ prayogād vyadhikaranatvāṁ nāsti. (VA 85.3)

One might think that in Bhāvivikta’s formulation in the Bhāṣyaṭkā, i.e., “Because of being expressible by a word expressive of a heap,” non-coreferentiality does not occur…

The entirety of the fragment is, strictly speaking, a single compound, the reason, samūha-vācaka-śabda-vācayatvat, “because of being expressible by a word expressive of a heap.” The distinction between this and the reason in Uddyotakara’s example is that “being expressible” directly characterizes “everything,” and so does not entail any grammatical inconsistency. The implication is that Bhāvivikta’s formulation of the (defective) argument presents a (genuine) case of “proposition contradiction,” undercutting Dharmakīrti’s counterargument.

We can see that Bhāvivikta gives a similar example of “proposition contradiction” as the

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661 api cāyam viruddho ‘viruddho vā sati hetuprayoge vyadhikaraṇatvād asiddha ity asiddhatā hetor nigrasthānam (VN 33.12).
662 guḍo madhuraḥ, kākasya kāśṇyād iti yathā (VA 65.1).
Some scholars have proposed that the context of Śāntarakṣita’s philosophical treatises and formal debate. If we will see when we turn to Bh1 (section VI), we know that Śāntarakṣita most likely predated Dharmakīrti, so he must not have been responding to Dharmakīrti’s critique in the Vāda-nyāya. Nevertheless, it is possible that he formulated his example of “proposition contradiction” in order to avoid the problem of non-coreferentiality. In that case, Bh1 would support dating Śāntarakṣita after Uddyotakara, though this is far from conclusive. In any case, we do not know how exactly Śāntarakṣita used this argument to establish or define “proposition contradiction,” or anything else about his comments on NBh 5.2.4, including its potential audience or target.

Śāntarakṣita’s response is, essentially, that it does not matter whether Śāntarakṣita’s example skirts the shift in subject. Dharmakīrti only mentions this flaw as a kind of thought experiment. Even accepting that a contradiction between the proposition and the reason constitutes a distinct ground for defeat, Uddyotakara’s example fails to instantiate it. But Dharmakīrti had only provisionally accepted this to be so. In fact, following Śāntarakṣita’s reading of the passage, purported cases of “proposition contradiction” fall under the fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa), and so are contained by the final sutra in NS, 5.2.24, which lists the fallacious reasons as grounds for defeat.663

III. AV3: GLOSS OF NBH 5.2.4

Av3 appears shortly after Bh1, also in the context of Dharmakīrti’s rejection of “proposition contradiction.” Concerning the interpretation that “proposition contradiction” involves a “contradiction of the reason by the proposition,”664 Dharmakīrti imagines an interlocutor raising this objection: perhaps a fallacious reason (hetvābhāsa) and a proposition contradiction both mar the same argument at once. This, Dharmakīrti argues, should be especially unacceptable for a Naiyāyika, who is committed to a strict sequence in argumentation and debate. Once the first possible defect has been pointed out, it is irrelevant whether there be some other defect. Defeat is defeat.665 The reason, in such a case, may be contrary (viruddha) or uncommon (asādhārana, a species of inconclusive (anaikāntika) reason), but in any case, as Śāntarakṣita puts it, a contradiction with the

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663 pratijñāhetvar virodhasya ca nigrahasthānāntaratvam aṅgikṛtya mayedam abhyadhāyi, na tv asya tad yuktam, hetvābhāsā ca nigrahasthānānity anenaiva sanghītavād ity etad bhāṇiṣur āhapi cetyādi (“I stated [the defect of shift in grammatical subject] after [ provisionally] accepting that a contradiction between proposition and reason is a distinct ground for defeat, but this is not [ actually] tenable for that, because it is contained in [NS 5.2.24], ‘And fallacious reasons are grounds for defeat.’” Desiring to say this, he says: “Moreover...” [VA 85.8] Śāntarakṣita seems to misquote NS 5.2.24, which actually reads, “and fallacious reasons as stated” (hetvābhāsaḥ ca yathoktaḥ).

664 Uddyotakara refers to situations “in which the proposition is contradicted by the reason, and the reason by the proposition” (yatra pratijñāḥ hetvāna viruddhyate hetas ca pratijñayaḥ [NV 522.2]), as well as several other valences of the term “proposition contradiction.”

665 This is one of many significant comments in VN regarding the relationship between śāstra and vāda, i.e., between philosophical treatises and formal debate. If Śāntarakṣita accepts the idea that a single point of defeat suffices in the context of vāda (debate) surely he does not feel at all constrained in pointing out myriad defects when composing śāstra. Some scholars have proposed that the Tattvasaṃgraha may have been written to train students in vāda. Comments like these must be kept in mind when we consider such matters.
At this point, Śāntarakṣāta raises Av3. This fragment, like Bh1, is only a sentence fragment, a short phrase of Aviddhakarṇa’s commentary on—apparently—NS 5.2.4:

*yat punar udāhrtam aviddhakarmena bhāṣyaṭikāyām vyaktam ekaprakṛtikam, parimitatvā, śaravādavād iti, tatrāpi viruddho hetuḥ.* (VA 89.10)

*But what Aviddhakarṇa gave as an example in the Bhāṣyaṭikā, “The manifest has a single thing as its source because it is limited, like a clay dish (ṣārāvata), etc.,” is also an example of a contrary (viruddha) reason.*

Here, as an example of “proposition contradiction,” Aviddhakarṇa raises a Śāṁkha-style argument for identifying the manifest world with *prakṛti*. Śāntarakṣāta cites this in terms of cases of “contradiction of the example by the proposition,” and that seems to be what Aviddhakarṇa considers the defect in this argument. In any case, according to Śāntarakṣāta, Dharmakīrti’s response to Uddyotakara works just as well against Aviddhakarṇa: this is not a genuine case of “proposition contradiction,” but just a contrary reason. The reason, he explains, “is present in the dissimilar case, i.e., that which does not has many things as its source, because clay is divided into separate moments and components.”667 Perhaps this fragment reflects something about the community or communities of early Nyāya subcommentators, but, as far as I can see, Av3 reveals fairly little.668

The more interesting detail is that Śāntarakṣāta again refers to Aviddhakarṇa’s *Bhāṣyaṭikā*, very shortly after mentioning Bhāvivikta’s. This marginally supports the idea that Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are different thinkers, however similar their biographies and bibliographies. Now, the fact that both authored a *Bhāṣyaṭikā*, unto itself, tells us little. The term *bhāṣya-tikā* simply describes a subcommentary on the *(Nyāya-)Bhāṣya*, and may not have been a proper title. Any number of authors may have written *bhāṣya-tikās*. Nor is the fact that Śāntarakṣāta refers to both names dispositive. Śāntarakṣāta refers to Uddyotakara by that name, but also by the name Bhāradvāja (a patronymic or surname?), with which Uddyotakara refers to himself in the closing verse of the *Vārttika*. Is “Aviddhakarṇa” some kind of epithet for Bhāvivikta (or Bhāvivikta something like a consecration name for a thinker commonly called Aviddhakarṇa)? Perhaps. Yet the proximity of Av3 and Bh1 is striking. Av3 and Bh1 both fall within the section on “proposition contradiction,” and are only separated by about four pages in the editions and around five folio sides in the manuscript (each of which is a mere 29.3 x 6.4 cm.) There may be a specific point in Śāntarakṣāta’s mentioning Aviddhakarṇa’s name and his authorship of a *Bhāṣyaṭikā* so shortly after citing Bhāvivikta’s *Bhāṣyaṭikā*, namely, to clarify that these are distinct thinkers. Steinkellner points out that, when Kamalaśīla says “Aviddhakarṇa, in the *Tattvaṭikā*...” it serves to clarify that we are dealing with a different work by the same author. In a similar vein, Śāntarakṣāta may here be clarifying that we are

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666 *na tu drśṭāntavirodho hetvābhāṣārūpāsāmsparśāyati* asti (VA 89.7).

667 *parimitatvasya hetoh sapakṣe bhāve vāvṛtteḥ, vipakṣe cānekapṛakṛṭike śaravādu vṛtтеḥ, mṛḍaḥ pratikṣaṇaṁ pratvavayavaṃ ca bhidyomānattvāt.* (VA 89.11)

668 It is noteworthy that Śāntarakṣāta mentions the *Bhāṣyaṭikā* again here. He does not attribute Av4, Aviddhakarṇa’s last fragment in the *Vipaṇicītārtha*, to any particular text, but, as we will now see, it is quite likely from the *Tattvaṭikā*, Aviddhakarṇa’s Cārvāka commentary. Though the two-Aviddhakarṇa theory was perhaps never very compelling, the movement from Av3 to Av4 helps to strengthen Steinkellner’s argument against it.
dealing with a different text by a different author on the same material.669

IV. BH2: GLOSS OF NBH 5.2.5

NS 5.2.5 defines the ground for defeat called “rescinding the proposition” (pratijñāsannyāsah), which is, naturally, when the proponent rescinds his proposition in light of its refutation. Vātsyāyana explains:

When [the proponent] has said, “Sound is impermanent because it is sensuous, like a pot,” the other party might say, “Universals are sensuous and yet not impermanent, so sound, too, is sensuous and yet not impermanent.” If, when the proposition is thus refuted, [the proponent] were to say, “But who says sound is impermanent?” this would be a case of concealment of the matter proposed, i.e., “rescinding the proposition.”670

Dharmakirti considers this entirely superfluous. If the argument has already been refuted, what does it matter whether the proponent tries to take it back? He has already been defeated. Further, if we admit this as a distinct ground for defeat, we will have to include every conceivable situation when someone is unable to defend their claims, such as remaining silent or running away in the face of counter-argument.671 Dharmakirti calls this absurd (asambaddha).

Śāntarakṣita, adding things like fainting and sweating to the list, says that Dharmakirti’s intention is to say that this is absurd “because such a manner is coarse (sthūla) in an assembly of learned men.”672 The implication seems to be that a learned practitioner of debate would not behave so foolishly, and/or that a learned audience would recognize when an argument has successfully been refuted. Vātsyāyana’s example leaves something to be desired. There is no need for the superfluous technicality that rescinding an already-refuted proposition is yet further grounds for defeat.

At this point, Śāntarakṣita introduces Bh2, demonstrating why he chose the term sthūla:

\[ \text{tad atra bhāvivikta śvayam āśāṅkya kila pratividhate sthūlatvān āśāṅkya kila pratividhate} \]

prāśāṅkayaśvayam dātāḥ prāśāṅkayaśvayam dātāḥ karoti. asambaddha ucyate tattvabhiprāyāparyajñānāt. na brūmaṃ dhvaṃśa śābda iti, kiṃ tu sañyogavibhāgaṃbhāyaṃ na vyajyata iti ayaṃ pratiṣṭhānaḥ ity aha śāmānyasya ca vaśārayavyāgyatvā vyahīcārabhāvaḥ iti. nigrāhasthānām

669 Of course, it may serve the opposite purpose—to demonstrate that Bhāvivikta and Aviddhakarṇa are both *the* author of *the* Bhāratīkā. That would certainly have been helpful for our purposes, but how would it have benefited, for example, Śāntarakṣita’s students? If he felt the need to make this point, he surely could have been clearer about it. If Bhāvivikta is Aviddhakarṇa, it seems more likely that, as in the case of Bhāravāja Uddyotakara, he would have treated it as a known fact.

670 anityaḥ śābda āndriyakatvād ghaṭavat ity ukte paro brūyāt śāmānyam āndriyakaṃ na cāntitya iti. evaṃ śābdō 'py āndriyako na cāntitya iti. evaṃ pratiṣṭhānō pakṣe yadi brūyāt—kāḥ punar āha anityaḥ śābda iti. so 'yaṃ pratiṣṭhānōtvādhaṃ pratiṣṭhaṃ śāmānyasya iti. (NBh 311.10)

671 paścātpratiṣṭhānō dhāvataḥ tāṣṭaḥvibhāvaḥ nāma nigrāhasthānam prāplaśāṃ ṣāṃ ṣāṃ nāma nigrāhasthānam ity evamādy api vācyaṃ sāyaḥ. (VN, 38.17)

672 mūrccāvapathutasasvedavānāṃ adīśabdanāvordhaṃ. tasmād etad apy asambaddham, vidvatsadasya evaṃprakāraḥ sthūlatvād ity ahābhāpyaḥ (VA 93.5).

a Steinkellner (41) “trasattvādī” r : “trasasvedādī” ms.

b VA aty°

c Steinkellner corrects the edition’s ahābhāpyaḥ.
tu pūrvam apratijñātārthatvāt,4 anaikāntikadoṣena pratiśedhe hetau pratijñātārthāpahnavam karotī tī. (VA 93.7)\textsuperscript{673}

With regard to this, Bhāvivikta, as he says, states the objection himself and then responds:

You may say, “This is not grounds for defeat because of its coarseness (sthūlatvāt). It is in the presence of the examiner, the opponent, and so on, that he performs the concealment of the matter proposed.”

We say this is absurd (asambaddha), because in such a case there is no discernment of the intention.

“We do not say, ‘Sound is perishable.’ Rather, we say the matter proposed is ‘not manifested by conjunction or disjunction,’ and there is no deviation because universals are manifested in their respective substrata.”

But this is already grounds for defeat, because this is not the matter proposed. When the reason is refuted by the defect of inconclusiveness, he denies the matter proposed, and, so, is defeated.

Dharmakīrti takes NBh 5.2.5 at face value. The argument is refuted, so the proponent is defeated.

Bhāvivikta insists there is more to the story. In Vātsyāyana’s characterization, the proponent simply denies saying what he had just proposed—an unsatisfying and improbable example, especially in a learned assembly. In Bh2, on the other hand, the proponent tries to dodge the attack by claiming that, with the word “impermanent,” what he really meant was not “perishable,” but “not manifested by conjunction or disjunction.” This undercuts the refutation, but still includes a denial of the original proposition, rather than a legitimate clarification of intent. In fact, this is an especially egregious case from the Nyāya perspective because the proponent would have won the argument if he had played his cards right.

To explain requires another detour through an earlier portion of the Bhāṣya.

Vātsyāyana’s example of “rescinding the proposition,” on which Bhāvivikta is expounding, actually calls back to an earlier discussion of the impermanence of sound, NS 2.2.13–17, where this argument is made successfully. The passage begins with a group of three reasons that sound is impermanent, followed by an objection to each reason in turn:

Because it has a beginning, because it is sensuous, because we refer to it (upacāra) as something produced. (2.2.13)

[Objection:] No, because of the permanence of the absence of a pot [after it perishes] and the permanence of universals, and because we also refer to (upacāra) permanent things as impermanent. (2.2.14)

[Response:] There is no deviation because there is a division according to the difference between the true state (tattva) and the secondary usage (bhākta) [of notions like “permanent”]. (2.2.15)

\textsuperscript{673} Steinkellner (41) provides several corrections based on the manuscript:

\begin{itemize}
\item a sthūlatvenaṁ r: sthūlatvā nedaṁ ms > sthūlatvā(ṇ) nedaṁ em.
\item b na vyakta r : na vyajyata ms.
\item c vivādābhāva r : vicārābhāva ms > v(yabh)icārābhāva em.
\item d ārthatvāt re : ārthātvāt ms [this, presumably, was an error in the ms]
\end{itemize}
Because this is a qualification of the inference of the series. (2.2.16)

Because the term portion (pradeśa) denotes a causal substance. (2.2.17)

Sutra 13 argues that sound is impermanent (i) because it possesses a beginning, (ii) because it is sensuous, and (iii) because it is referred to as a product. The opponent in sutra 14 denies each in turn: (i) after a pot perishes, its absence, though caused, is eternal; (ii) universals are permanent, yet they are also sensuous; and (iii) we refer—following Vātsyāyana’s gloss, and anticipating sutra 17—to things like “portions” (pradeśa) of ether (ākāśa). Sutras 15, 16, and 17 are the orthodox responses from the Nyāya perspective.

It is, of course, the second of these three reasons, “because it is sensuous,” that is important for our present purpose. In his comments on NS 5.2.5, Vātsyāyana imagines someone arguing that sound is impermanent “because it is sensuous,” and being presented with precisely the same counterargument as in sutra 2.2.14, “no, because of the permanence of universals.” In Vātsyāyana’s example in NBh 5.2.5, the proponent immediately backs down, and Vātsyāyana says nothing else about the situation. The example could stand perfectly well on its own as an example of a proponent rescinding his proposition at the first sign of trouble. But Bhāviviktā’s mention of “manifestation by conjunction and disjunction” highlights a deeper point in Vātsyāyana’s call-back to this earlier discussion of sound’s impermanence.

In his comments on the first reason in sutra 13, “because it has a beginning,” Vātsyāyana asserts that sound is produced by conjunction and/or disjunction; ergo it has a cause; ergo it is impermanent. The second reason, “because it is sensuous,” is brought in, Vātsyāyana says, to confirm that the conjunction or disjunction causes the origination of an individual sound, rather than its manifestation. This is a pivotal distinction. Causing some thing to appear does not mean bringing it into existence, but only creating the conditions for its apprehension. If conjunction and disjunction manifest sound, the apparent origin of any particular sound may be but a momentary appearance of a permanent substance. “Because it is sensuous,” Vātsyāyana says, resolves this debate:

When someone is cutting wood, after the conjunction between the wood and the axe has ceased, the sound is grasped by someone who stands at a distance. But there is no grasping of something manifested in the absence of that which manifests it. Conjunction, therefore, does not manifest

674 ādīmattvād ainḍriyakatvāt kṛtakavad upacārāc ca ||2.2.13|| (NS 105.4);
na ghaṭābhāvasāmānityatvān nityeṣv api anityavad upacārāc ca ||2.2.14|| (106.18);
tattvabhāktaṭyor nānaṃvāsyā vibhāgaḥ avabhācāraḥ ||2.2.15.|| (107.8);
saṃtānānumāṇaviśeṣanāt ||2.2.16|| (107.16);
kāranaṇdravyasya pradeśāsābdenābhīdhiḥ ṃnāt ||2.2.17|| (108.5).

675 An atom is permanent in the true sense (tattva) that it has no beginning and no end, and exists for all time; the absence of a thing after it perishes is permanent only in the figurative sense (bhākta) that it never ceases to be. The former is a real thing (vastu, bhāva) that is really permanent; the latter is a non-entity (avastu, abhāva) that is only permanent in a manner of speaking.

676 See the ensuing discussion.

677 The permanent substances are either atomic (atoms, mind) or all-pervading (self, time, space, ether); but being divisible into “a portion” would seem to cut against the permanence of the latter. Vaiśeṣika describes hearing as sound reaching the “portion” of ether within the ear canal. This does not actually refer to a “portion of ether” in the literal sense, but rather, since the cavity of the ear does not extend over the entirety of ether, it is as if the space of the cavity is a “portion” of ether.
sound.

On the other hand, if the conjunction produces it, it is tenable that a sound can be grasped when the conjunction has ceased: a series of sounds follows from the sound produced by the conjunction, and in light of this, the sound proximate to the ear [of the person at a distance] is grasped.⁶⁷⁸

That sound is sensuous means, Vātsyāyana explains, that it can only be grasped in proximity to the sense faculty. It is not the mere fact that sound relates to the senses that proves its impermanence. Rather, the manner, and the condition, in which it is sensibly perceived demands that we infer a series of sounds emanating from the first sound caused by, e.g., the conjunction of an axe and a piece of wood.⁶⁷⁹ The second reason, “because it is sensuous,” functions almost like a qualification (viśeṣaṇā) of the first, “because it has a beginning.”

In NBh 5.2.5, the proponent is caught off guard by the objection. Rather than explain the sequence of reasoning, he bashfully abandons his argument, leading to his defeat. In Bh2, on the other hand, the proponent tries to subvert the objection, implying, when he says that he really meant to say sound is “not manifested,” that it is, instead, produced. But instead of clarifying his position, he winds up denying his actual proposition, i.e., that sound is impermanent. After all, the upshot of the fact that sound is produced rather than manifested is that it is impermanent. We know this, and, by extension, that the proponent of Bh2 has a winning hand, from the earlier section of the Bhāya—but he misplays it. “Rescinding the proposition” must be accepted as a distinct ground for defeat in just such a situation.

Śāntarakṣīta, it should go without saying, does not accept Bhāvīvikā’s argument. But his gloss of “absurd” as “coarse” is artful. Dharmakīrti says “rescinding the proposition” is absurd; Bhāvīvikā offers Bh2 in response to the argument that it is “coarse.” In turn, Bhāvīvikā calls this objection itself “absurd” (asambaddha). It almost seems, reading Śāntarakṣīta’s framing of Bh2, that when Dharmakīrti calls “rescinding the proposition” absurd, he has in mind Bhāvīvikā’s use of the same term. Unto itself, Dharmakīrti’s attack on “rescinding the proposition” does not seem to address Bhāvīvikā’s point, but Śāntarakṣīta constructs a kind of back-and-forth between the two passages.

He offers two readings of the situation raised by Bhāvīvikā:

To this, it should be said: (i) If the proponent’s argument is incomplete,⁶⁸⁰ and, in the meantime, he is criticized for the defect of inconclusiveness by someone wrongheaded, but he reveals his intention by clarifying the matter proposed, then there is no further defect. Why rescind the proposition? (ii) If his argument is complete and, criticized at last, he qualifies the proposition, this, too, will be defeated for the defect of inconclusiveness, so then, [as Dharmakīrtī says,] “What’s the point in looking for the

⁶⁷⁸ dāruvraścane dāruparāsusamyoṣaṇaviṃśtu dūrasthena śabdo gṛhyate. na ca vyañja-kabhāve vyañgyasya grahaṇam bhavati. tasmā ca vyañjakaḥ samyogaḥ, utpādake tu samyogena saṃyogajāc chabdāc chabdasantāne sati śrotrapratyaśannasya grahaṇam iti yuktam saṃyogaviṃśtu śabdasya grahaṇam iti. (NBh 105.13)

⁶⁷⁹ In PDhŚ, Prāṣastapāda says sound is “produced by conjunction, disjunction, or sound” (saṃyoga-vibhāga-saṃbda-ja). This contains Vātsyāyana’s first point, that some conjunction or disjunction of two things must serve as the origin for a particular sound, as well as his second point, that that initial sound itself impels a series of sounds that persist beyond the conjunction that gave rise to it.

⁶⁸⁰ In the first case, the proponent is sīkāṅka. Rather than desire, Śāntarakṣīta must here be referring to ākāṅka in its grammatical valence, i.e., the proponent, or his argument, still requires an additional word or phrase to complete its meaning. In the second case, the proponent is nirākāṅka, without this need; his argument has been conveyed.
later rescinding of the proposition?” Nothing is repelled. Moreover, this is clearly contained in regard to [Dharmakīrti’s criticism of] “another proposition.” Nothing need be stated separately.\(^{681}\)

Śantarakṣita uncovers—or, rather, plants—a direct rejection of Bhāvivkta’s reasoning in two places: Dharmakīrti’s rhetorical question attacking “rescinding the proposition” and his earlier critique of “another proposition,” which was the topic of NS 5.2.3 (section I). A clever piece of commentary.

V. AV\(^4\): THE STATEMENT OF CONCOMITANCE ONLY GENERATES A MEMORY

AV\(^4\), the last of Aviddhaṇa’s fragments in the \textit{Vipaścitarthā}, appears some time later, in the context of Dharmakīrti’s discussion of NS 5.2.12. This sutra defines the ground for defeat called “defective” (\textit{nyūna}), in which one of the five components of the argument is lacking.

According to Nyāya, a proper argument requires the statement of (i) the proposition (\textit{pratijñā}), (ii) the reason (\textit{hetu}), (iii) the exemplification (\textit{udāharana}), (iv) the application (\textit{upanaya}), and (v) the conclusion (\textit{nigamanu}). For example: sound is impermanent (\textit{proposition}) because it is produced (\textit{reason}); whatever is produced is impermanent, like a pot (\textit{exemplification}), and sound is produced in this way (\textit{application}); therefore, sound is impermanent (\textit{conclusion}).

Dharmakīrti uses the “defective” ground for defeat as an opportunity to revisit his case against the proposition, application, and conclusion. He argues that they are inessential to communicating an argument, as well as redundant. “Someone who employs a pointless statement whose meaning is already present in our awareness,” he explains, “would be deserving of defeat.”\(^{682}\)

By way of example, Śantarakṣita points out that two steps are sufficient to communicate the impermanence of sound: “(i) What is produced is impermanent; (ii) and sound is produced.” Here again Śantarakṣita introduces the fragment as a direct response from Aviddhaṇa:

\[
\text{tad atrāviddhaṇaḥ pratibandhaṇaṁyena pratya\-vasti\-thaṁ yady evam kṛta-kaś ca sābda ity etad api na vaktyaṁ, kim kāraṇaṁ?}^{683}\text{ anityatvaṁ ity etenaiva sābde ‘pi kṛtakatvaṁ anityatvaṁ cobbhyāṁ pratipadyate. yasmāt pūrvaṁ api sābde kṛtakatvaṁ pareṇa pratipannam eva, karaṇāc chabdo ‘pi buddhau vyavasṭhiṭāḥ. ato ‘nvayavākyena śūmtimeśtrakam utpādyate. apratipannakṛtakatvasya pūnaḥ kṛtakaś ca sābda ity etasmād api naiva bhavati.}
\]

\[yadva kṛtakaṁ sābda ity etāvad vaktyaṁ. kṛtakatvasya tv anityatvenāvino bhāvitaṁ parasya\]

\(^{681}\) tatra vācyam—yadi vādi sākāmśa evāntarāle kenacid durvidagdhenānaikāntikadoṣena’ cōditaḥ san pratijñātārthapalakarānena svābhīpayaṁ āvīkaroṭi, tadānyo ‘pi na kaścid doṣaḥ, kim aṅga pūnaḥ pratijñāsāṃsyāsaḥ. atha nirākāmśaṁ saṇ paśaḥ cōditaḥ pratijñāṁ viśiṇaṣaḥ, tad’ apya aṅkāntikadoṣenaiva niḥgyata iti kim uttaraprajñāsāṃsyāśeśayet na kīṁcit pariḥṭam. kim ca sphaṭaṁ idaṁ pratijñāntare ’ntarbhavatīti na prthag vācyam iti (VA 93.13).

\(^{682}\) ms. durvīgḍhena” (Steinkellner 2014, 41).

\(^{683}\) VA reads \textit{tadā”}.

\(^{684}\) yah pratijñamānārtham anarthakaṁ sābdaṁ prayūṅkte, sa nigrham arhet (VN 49.11).

\(^{685}\) Steinkellner (46) kiṁkāraṇaṁ re : kiṁkāraṇa ms / (nimitta)m re : nīṁ ms. In other words, the ms reads \textit{kiṁkāraṇanim}, and Sāṅkhyāyana proposed emending to “nimittaṁ, but kāraṇa-nimitta would be an odd construction. (Nimitta-kāraṇa, meaning instrumental cause, is far commoner.) Kiṁ kāraṇam (what’s the reason?) is a perfectly sensible phrase here.
Aviddhakarṇa resists this by means of an impediment (pratibandhaka): If that is so, nor should one say, “And sound is produced.” The word “impermanence” alone makes it known that both producedness and impermanence pertain to sound. Sound is also fixed in the other party’s mind on the basis of the action (karaṇa) through which (yasmāt) he was earlier instructed that producedness pertains to sound. As a result, the statement of concomitance only generates a memory (smṛti-mātraka). But the phrase, “And sound is produced,” surely does not bring this about for someone who has yet to learn about producedness.

Or else, one should say so much as, “Sound is produced.” But the invariable relation between impermanence and producedness is well-known to the other party, so this communicates that impermanence pertains to sound, too.

Aviddhakarṇa appears to be using the Buddhist epistemological tendency toward reduction against the Buddhists. Once you have reduced the five components to two, what is to stop us from using the same reasoning to reduce your two to one? If the other party does not already agree that sound is produced, a separate argument will have to prove it first; merely stating it will not do. Presuming the other party does agree, “what is produced is impermanent” communicates every essential bit of information. “And sound is produced,” by Dharmakīrti’s own criteria, is pointless.

Śāntarakṣita’s response? “What he has done is actually agreeable” (tenānukūlam evācaritam). He cites a stanza from Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika explaining that mere statement of the reason is sufficient for the wise (viduṣāṃ vācyo hetur eva hi kevalah), but that one must state the example for the ignorant (dṛṣṭānte tadavedināḥ khyāpyete). In other words, Dharmakīrti’s theory of debate is essentially practical, not axiomatic. Whatever it takes to make the other party draw the correct conclusion is what is needed. By endorsing the gist of Aviddhakarṇa’s objection, Śāntarakṣita takes the teeth out of it.

Śāntarakṣita refers to Aviddhakarṇa’s argument as a pratibandhaka (impediment), suggesting not the logical invalidation of a bādhaka (invalidation), but rather an appeal to the psychology of doctrinal commitments. Yet he does not comment any further on the tone of Aviddhakarṇa’s argument. Taken seriously, Aviddhakarṇa is not merely arguing that the Buddhists’ two components are liable to further reduction. Rather, he is mocking the kind of reasoning Buddhists use to, among other things, attack Nyāya inferential theory. Among the two statements, (i) “what is produced is impermanent” and (ii) “and sound is produced,” if you accept the need for the first, the second becomes pointless; if you take off the word “and,” you can state the second and render the first pointless. Why? Because, if the argument works at all, in both cases the second statement would serve only to remind the other party of something they already know and accept. But this reasoning has an obvious next step: whether you state both components or only one, the argument really only works if the other party already knows and accepts both things to be true. If I do not already accept that “what is produced is impermanent,” you will not convince me by merely saying it; nor will you convince me that “sound is produced” if I am committed to the opposite view. It follows that both statements are equally “pointless” insofar as they only work if they generate “simply a memory”

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684 It is not clear to me whether Śāntarakṣita considers a pratibandhaka as intrinsically less forceful an objection than a bādhaka, more of a sophism than a serious argument, as the dichotomy somewhat suggests in Dharmakīrti’s work. Cf. Tillemans 2000, 133–135, 138–142.
rather than a genuine insight. This suggests that Aviddhakarna’s argument works best when it is read sarcastically. The end result is not a definite position (“therefore, only one component is essential”), but scorn: “Have it your way, arguments are useless.”

Though it is possible, of course, that Aviddhakarna included this critique of Buddhist argumentation somewhere in his commentary on the Bhāṣya, the language and the tone of Av4 recall the arguments that are attributed to, or at least more likely to derive from, his Tattvātikā. In his apparent Cārvaka guise, Aviddhakarna likes to throw wrenches into the very concept of inferential argumentation. Rather than explicate something about the “defective” (nyāna) ground for defeat, or defend the necessity of the proposition (pratijña) or application (upanaya), as we might expect the author of the Bhāṣyaṭikā to do, in Av4 Aviddhakarna simply takes aim at the Buddhist analysis of argumentation and what, it appears, he sees as its pretension to authority.

The question, then, is why? What, for Aviddhakarna, is the upside to putting a crack in the foundation of inference? It is less surprising if we interpret this as a fragment from his Tattvātikā. Cārvakas seem to have accepted some inferences to some extent, but questioned its primary authority as a means of knowledge. But if so, it is quite striking that Śāntarakṣita cites it here in his commentary on a text exclusively concerned with Nyāya. This suggests that Aviddhakarna’s Cārvaka commentary is relevant to Buddhist-Nyāya polemics. We will return to this question shortly. For now, suffice it to say that Aviddhakarna seems to have wielded Cārvaka or Cārvaka-style arguments against Buddhist ideas.

VI. BH3: "THIS SAME CLATTER OF HOOVES"

The final sutra of the Nyāyasūtra, 5.2.24, is an interesting case: “And fallacious reasons as stated” (hetvābhāsā ca yathoktāh).

The treatment of the fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa) is one of the many quirks of the Nyāyasūtra (and also, more generally, of interreligious pramāṇa theory). According to the very first sutra, NS 1.1.1,

685 Cf. section VII below, and §14.
686 Following something like the sort of reasoning Steinkellner applies to Kamalaśīla’s mention of the Tattvātikā, we can say that Av4 may be the reason Śāntarakṣita mentioned the Bhāṣyaṭikā by name in Av2 and Av3. Cf. “Surveying the Fragments” in the Introduction.
687 Cf. §14 and §15 for a continuation of this discussion. The two surviving sutras from the Cārvakaśūtra that concern pramāṇa theory are as follows: Perception alone is a means of knowledge (pratyakṣam eva pramāṇam). Because a means of knowledge is not secondary, certainty about things is difficult to obtain through inference (pramāṇasya guṇa tvād anumāṇād arthaniṣcayo durlabhah). Bhattacharya makes a compelling case that Cārvaka (or at least some Cārvaka) did not entirely dismiss inference, but rather emphasized its secondariness. They accept basis worldly inferences—the fire on the mountain—but rather than concluding that inference is authoritative, they point out that valid inferences are entirely derivative of perception, and do not generate knowledge on their own (Bhattacharya 2011, 80). Cf. Namai 1976b.
688 It is very unlikely that there were two Aviddhakaranas. Such an idea seems to stem more from an overreliance on rigid categories of “Nyāya” and “Cārvaka” than any textual evidence. In any case, the fact that Śāntarakṣita may here be citing Aviddhakarna’s Cārvaka commentary supports presuming a single Aviddhakarna. Steinkellner’s argument that when Kamalaśīla refers to the Tattvātikā, he could have instead, with a simple characterization, clarified that he was talking about a thinker with the same name but a different affiliation, rather than a different text by the same author. See “Aviddhakarna and Bhāvivikta” in the Introduction.
reaching the highest spiritual aim requires knowledge of sixteen principles (tattva). The last of these—and hence the last topic discussed in the Sutras—are the grounds for defeat. As 5.2.24 makes clear, fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa) are species of grounds for defeat; but they seem to have special status, as they are also listed as the thirteenth of the sixteen principles (tattva). Accordingly, they receive their own treatment earlier in the Sutras. NS 1.2.4–9 lists and defines the five kinds of fallacious reason: inconclusive (avyabhīcāra or anaikāntika), contrary (viruddha), neutral to the dialectic (prakaranasama), similar to what is to be proven (sādhyasama), and past time (kālatīta). In sutra 5.2.24, the phrase “as stated” refers back to this earlier passage.

Dharmakīrti expresses reservations about the phrase “as stated.” “It is still to be examined,” he says, “whether the fallacious reasons are, in fact, like the varieties defined earlier, or otherwise. But this would take us too far if we examined it here, so it is not extended.”

Though Dharmakīrti indeed leaves the discussion here, Śāntarakṣita follows his suggestion and examines the varieties of fallacious reason “as stated” earlier in NS. Śāntarakṣita, like Dharmakīrti before him, admits “inconclusive” and “contrary” as categories of fallacious reason, adding also unestablished (asiddha)—which is rather close to “similar to what is to be proven”—and various species of each of these three. The Buddhists
do not accept that the other three—“neutral to the dialectic,” “similar to what is to be proven,” and “past time”—characterize distinct fallacies. Śāntarakṣita attacks all three at some length and in an intricate sequence.

First, Śāntarakṣita pairs Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, treating the latter as essentially finishing the former’s sentences, regarding reasons that are “past time” and “neutral to the dialectic.” Then he turns to an anonymous “other” (anyā) Naiyāyika’s interpretations of the same two fallacies.

In his comment on “neutral to the dialectic,” the “other” sidesteps the Bhāya and comments directly on the sutra. After refuting these groups of arguments in turn, Śāntarakṣita introduces Bh3 as yet another defense of fallacious reasons that are “neutral to the dialectic.”

The overall passage in the Vipaścitārtha looks like this:

- Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara’s comments on “past time” [VA 130.20]
- Śāntarakṣita’s refutation [131.5]

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689 tat tu cintyamānam ihātiprasajyata iti na pratanyate (VN 68.7).
690 He adds one additional comment: “And fallacious reasons are only accepted to be grounds for defeat to an extent that accords with reason.” hetvābhāsaḥ ca yathānyāyam nigrahasthānam ity etāvanmātram iṣṭam iti (VN 68.8).
691 According to them, a reason is “past time” if there is a temporal lapse within the concept of the reason itself, e.g., “sound is permanent because it is manifested by conjunction.” This is an odd idea, and the Buddhists fairly convincingly show that in most cases such a reason could be described as unestablished (asiddha). It is not particularly surprising that different commentators came to their own conclusions about the sutra rather than substantiating Vātsyāyana’s interpretation.
692 The “other” first argues that a reason is “past time” if it is valid but contradicted by perception or scripture. In an early section of the Bhāya, Vātsyāyana suggests that one should only resort to inference after consulting perception and scripture. A valid argument that does not accord with perception or scripture evinces an improper sequence of reasoning. This is called “past time.” Then the “other” offers two readings of “neutral to the dialectic.” First, that an argument that entails an infinite regress may be valid, but fails to resolve the underlying question. Second, on the basis of nirukti, prakaranasama means a reason that is neutral (sama) because of establishing (karana) the property to be proven in only a portion (pra-deśa) of the locus.
693 Line/page numbers follow my interpretation of the passage, which seems to differ at times from Shastri’s.
Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara on prakarana-sama [131.22]
- Śantaraśṭa’s refutation [132.4]
- Anonymous “other” on “past time” [132.20]
- Refutation [132.32]
- Anonymous “other” on prakarana-sama [133.6]
- Refutation [133.21]
- Bhāvivikta on prakarana-sama [134.1]
- Refutation [134.8]

According to sutra 1.2.7, a reason that is “neutral to the dialectic” is intended to bring about a resolution, but only serves to perpetuate uncertainty about the matter at hand. Later commentators noticed that this is fairly similar to the idea of an “inconclusive” reason (or a reason that “deviates” (savyabhicāra)) and either subsumed it within that category, or else rationalized its distinctness. Bhāvivikta belongs to the latter group.\(^6\)

Vātsyāyana defines prakarana as a dichotomy of positions raised in order to resolve a particular case of uncertainty (samśaya), hence, “dialectic.” A reason that is “neutral to the dialectic” fails to distinguish the two positions. Without resolving the dialectic, the motivating uncertainty remains. This is different from a reason that is inconclusive, according to Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, because the latter concerns the internal reasoning of a single argument rather than the relationship between the pair of arguments comprising the dialectic.

Bhāvivikta’s interpretation is slightly different. Like the “other,” he first glosses the sutra itself, apparently circumventing the Bhāṣya’s reading and seemingly offering a different take on the term prakarana. (Though he also presents prakarana-sama as straddling a pair of arguments, Bhāvivikta appears to equate prakarana with sādhyā.) Then he offers an example in order to prove that such a reason is distinct from one that is inconclusive. First, the sutra itself, with the word prakarana untranslated:

\[\text{yasmāt prakaranaṃcintā sa nirṇayārtham apadiṣṭaḥ prakaranaṃsamaḥ.} \]

From which there is anxiety about the prakarana, that, adduced for the sake of ascertainment, is prakarana-sama.

And Bh3, with terms lifted directly from the sutra in bold:

\[\text{bhāvivikto ‘py atraiva khurarave patitah prakaranaṃsamo anyathā samarthayati yasmād dhetoḥ} \]
\[\text{prakaranaṃcintā vipakṣasyāpi vicāraḥ paścād bhavati, sa evaṃlaksanaḥ hetuḥ nirṇayāya yo} \]
\[\text{‘padiśyamānah prakaranaṃsamo bhavati, prakaraṇe sādhye samo tulyaḥ sattve ‘sattve vā. yathā sat} \]

\(^6\) Gokhale (1992, 22) describes savyabhicāra as “related irregularly or with uncertainty.”
\(^6\) Caraka also mentions prakarana-sama. Gokhale renders the sutra, “Prakarana-sama is one from which the investigation of the problem begins and still which is applied as a hetu for reaching the conclusion,” and says the meaning has not changed from Caraka’s use (Gokhale, 25). He also favors Randle’s definition of prakarana-sama as begging the question, over Matilal’s objection.

In addition, there is a jāti called prakarana-sama in NS. Gokhale defines this jāti as “a wrong claim that the disputant has committed the fallacy of infinite regress.” In other words, an improper reductio ad absurdum by asserting that the proving property has to be proven on the basis of yet another property, and so on.

\(^6\) NS 44.4.
sarvajñatvam,4 itaradviparitavinirmuktatvād,4 rūpādivat iti. yasmād ayaṁ ubhaya tra samānāh, yo ’py asattvaṃ sādhyati tasyāpi samānāh. katham? asat sarvajñatvam, itaradviparitavinirmuktatvāt, kharaviṣāṇavat iti. na cāyaṁ kilobhayadharmanavate ’py anaikāntikaḥ, vipākṣavrāttvaiṅkalyāt. (VA 134.1)698

Bhāvivikta, too, reduced (patita) to this same clatter of hooves (khurarava), construes “neutral to the dialectic” in another manner.

Say there is a reason from which there arises anxiety about the prakarāṇa, i.e., hesitation (vicāra) even after [statement of] the dissimilar case;699 that, a reason characterized in that way, being adduced for ascertainment, would be prakarāṇasama, neutral (sama) to the prakarāṇa, i.e., comparable (tulya) to what is to be proven (sādhyata), existence or non-existence.

For example, “Omniscience does not exist because it is free from what is contrary to that, as is color, etc.” Since this reason is the same in both cases, it is the same as that which proves non-existence, too. How so? “Omniscience does not exist because it is free from what is contrary to that, as is a donkey’s horn.” And this indeed is not inconclusive, even if it is a property of both (ubhaya-dharma), because it lacks presence in the dissimilar case (vipākṣa-vṛtti-vaiṅkalya).

There is a considerable amount to unpack here, even before turning to the content of the fragment itself.

To begin with, Śāntarakṣita refers to a “clatter of hooves” (khurarava). Steinkellner points out, in a footnote, that this term does not appear as a name in Demoto’s register of auxiliary hell regions (Nebenhölle).700 Presumably, Śāntarakṣita’s reference to Bhāvivikta “falling” (patita) to khurarava led him rightly to consider whether it refers to a particular region or state that serves as a metaphor for Bhāvivikta’s intellectual or mental fall from grace. From what I can tell, rather, it appears to be a rhetorical expression for some kind of overhasty argumentative or interpretive move.

A comparable example can be found in a small moment in Vācaspati’s commentary (Bhāmati) on Śaṅkara’s Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya (3.3.18), in which Vācaspati uses roughly the same term. Better still, in the subcommentary (Vedānta-kalpataru), Amalānanda offers an explanation of the expression.

698 Steinkellner (60) provides two corrections:

a khararave r : khurarave ms.

b heṭo(h) ā : heṭo ms.

c My emendation. The editions read betu, and Steinkellner does not comment, but sah must construe with betub. Otherwise the sentence would read, “That [...] which is being adduced for the ascertainment of the reason...” but it is the reason that is being adduced for ascertainment the fact of the matter.

d My emendation. The editions read sarvajñam; no comment from Steinkellner. The phrasing in the second example is more precise, and the passage makes little sense if the two arguments do not have the same subject.

e My emendation. Ed. itaravadhiparitavinirmuktatvād, no comment from Steinkellner. As in the previous note, the passage hardly works without parallelism. “na” introduces a redundant pronoun, and vi+nir

4 The dissimilar case is often the last thing mentioned in an argument (e.g., the mountain is fiery because it is smoky, like a kitchen, unlike a lake), so “after the dissimilar case” may well mean after the statement of the dissimilar case, i.e., after the argument has been fully formulated. Alternatively, perhaps paścāt is meant only to clarify the force of the ablative yasmāt in the sutra, in which case vipākṣasyāpi vicārah would be Bhāvivikta’s gloss of prakarāṇacintā, meaning, “anxiety about the prakarāṇa, i.e., hesitation even about the dissimilar case.”

700 “Auch in der reichen Nebenhöllenliste von Demoto 2009 sind diese Namen nicht zu finden” (Steinkeller 2014, 60).
First, Śaṅkara poses a question about the purport of the sutra. The sutra refers to two different practices; but what does it enjoins? He asks, in this sequence, whether the sutra (i) entails both practices, (ii) entails only the first of the two, or (iii) entails only the second. Śaṅkara entertains the first two possibilities before settling on the third. Vācaspati describes the sequence as follows:

Suddenly (āpātata), by the mere clatter of hooves (khura-rava-mātrena), after the position that both are enjoined has been taken up, the pūrvapakṣin seizes on the middle position.

Amalānanda then explains this idiom:

For, just as it is said that a horse, without being led (anirṇīya), runs by the mere sound of hooves (khura-sabda-mātrena), so this, too. That’s the meaning.

A horse follows the sound of another horses’ hoofbeats without having to be led. Śaṅkara poses the question, and the pūrvapakṣin follows after it in the same sequence, down the same path. The implication seems to be that such a practice is reflexive, almost unthinking—instinctual.

In the Vipaścitārthā, the “clatter of hooves” may refer to the sutra itself. Again, it is only after first considering Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara’s comments on NS 1.2.7, and then those of the anonymous “other,” that Śāntarakṣita cites Bh3. Like the “other,” Bhāvivikṣa seems to circumvent rather than gloss the Bhāṣya, focusing instead on the sutra itself. Perhaps, in saying that Bhāvivikṣa has “fallen” or “been reduced” to the same clatter of hooves, Śāntarakṣita is saying that he is failing to think for himself, instead just following after the hoofbeats of the sutra.

Śāntarakṣita’s initial response to Bh3 is noteworthy, as well. Here he shows that Bhāvivikṣa predates, and was a direct target of, Dharmakīrti:

The teacher refuted this himself in his Pramāṇaviniścaya, beginning with, “But to which dissimilar case, which lacks the property to be proven, do you resort here? How, now, is the reason absent in the dissimilar case and [at the same time] a property of both (ubhaya-dharma)?”

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701 tat kim ubhayam api vidhiyata utācāmanāṃ evotānagnatācintanam eveti vicāryate (BBh 775.1).
702 Bhāvivikṣa has “fallen” (pattitā) to, or at, the clatter of hooves, whereas, in Vācaspati’s reading of Śaṅkara, the position is taken up “suddenly” (āpātatā). It may be significant that both of these terms derive from the same verbal root, √पत, to fall or to fly, but I am not sure how.
703 khuraravamātrenāpātata ubhavaidhānaṃ pakṣam gṛhitvā madhyamaṃ pakṣam ālambate pūrvapaksy athavācāmanāṃ eveti (Bhā 775.1).
704 khuraravamātreneti yathā hy anirṇīyaiva khuraśabdamātrenāśvo dhāvatity ucyate evam idam apiṭy arthaḥ, siddhāntabijām āśāṅkya pariḥarati yady apiṭi (VK 775.1).
705 I am not very familiar with the traditions of horsemanship in India, though horses obviously have a long and storied history in South Asia. Nor have I come across similar idioms or ideas in English. But my friend Hannah Beresford, who has considerable experience training and riding horses, has explained the situation to me like this: Horses’ eyes are set on the sides of their head, giving them a considerable blind spot directly in front of them, but their ears can rotate so as to give them a 360 degree range of hearing; trail horses are specifically trained to keep track, by sound, of the horses in front and behind them, and wild horses moving in single file on mountainous terrain would likely do the same. Whether these biological features are part of the reasoning behind the idiom of doing something “by the mere clatter of hooves,” I cannot say.
706 tat idam acāryena svayam pramāṇaviniścaye pratisiddham—kām punar atra bhavān vipakṣam prayetī sādhyābhāvam. katham idāniḥ hetuś ca vipaksavṛttiḥ ubhaya-dharmaś cetyādinaḥ (VA 134.8).
707 VA hetum, PVin (78.2) hetum.
Dharmakīrti focuses on the final sentence of the fragment. The phrase “a property of both” (ubhaya-dharma) suggests, in Dharmakīrti’s interpretation, that the reason is a property of both the similar case and the dissimilar case. For example, in the classic example, “There is fire on the mountain because it is smoky,” being smoky is a property of similar cases like kitchens, but never of dissimilar cases like lakes. “There is fire on the mountain because it is visible,” on the other hand, is inconclusive because “being visible” is both a property of similar cases, and of dissimilar cases. “Being a property of both” precisely entails presence in the dissimilar case. In Dharmakīrti’s reading, Bhāvivikta’s claim that the argument is “a property of both” and yet “lacks presence in the dissimilar case” is incoherent.

Śāntarakṣita goes on to examine the Nyāya standard for establishing negative concomitance. According to him, Nyāya accepts mere non-observation (adarśanamātra) as a sufficient basis for negative concomitance. Without establishing some kind of necessary connection, however, mere non-observation would lead to arguments that may be valid, but stand on doubtful ground, e.g., “Perception is conceptual because it is a means of knowledge like inference.”⁷⁰⁷ For this reason, Śāntarakṣita calls Naiyāyikas “those for whom doubt is remote” (apagata-śāṅka), i.e., the insufficiently skeptical. (This is an especially striking comment, considering Aviddhakarṇa’s Cārvāka fragments.)

As for the content of the fragment itself. Rather than describe prakaraṇa as the pair of arguments raised to resolve a particular doubt, here Bhāvivikta equates prakaraṇa with sādhya, the property to be proven (i.e., the fire on the mountain that we cannot see but must infer). This is a somewhat surprising gloss, given that prakaraṇa-sama would then resemble sādhya-sama, a distinct fallacy in NS. But the distinction is clear. A reason that is sādhya-sama is similar (sama) to the property to be proven (sādhya) in the sense that it, too, has yet to be established. A reason is prakaraṇa-sama, on the other hand, if it is the same (sama) whether the sādhya is the existence or non-existence of the topic. This is not entirely dissimilar to Vātsyāyana’s interpretation, but it is even more restricted. Here again the fallacy only appears in the navigation between two positions, rather than the internal functioning of a single argument. Yet Bhāvivikta takes the syntax of the sutra very seriously. In his interpretation, the fact that the reason leads to further anxiety about the prakaraṇa is logically prior to the formulation of the argument; it is the use of such a reason in an argument that constitutes the fallacy.

The example Bhāvivikta uses demonstrates just how restrictive his interpretation is. The phrase “because of being free from what is contrary to that” is ambiguous. When “being free from the contrary of that (itara)”⁷⁰⁸ is used to prove the existence of omniscience, the pronoun “that” refers to existence, and the reason precisely excludes everything that is contrary to existence alone. But when the argument proves that omniscience does not exist, “that” refers to non-existence, and the reason precisely excludes what is contrary to non-existence.

It seems that Dharmakīrti’s response actually misrepresents Bhāvivikta’s position. Rather than both

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⁷⁰⁷ savikalpaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇatvād anumānavad (VA 134.15).
⁷⁰⁸ The pronoun “that” (itara) implies a pair. If “that” refers to existence, here it implies that while existence is “the one” (itara), non-existence is “the other” (itara).
the similar and dissimilar cases, the reason in Bhāvivikta’s example is a property of both arguments. As in Vātsyāyana’s reading, the need for a distinct technical term, prakarana-sama, stems from situations where the reason may work well in one argument, but equally well in that argument’s inverse. (Here again we cannot help but think of the claim in the Tattvātikā that in every case an argument can be rebutted with the opposite inference, cf. §14.) It is precisely the deictic, or indexical, openness of the term “that” (itarad) in the reason, and the specificity of the sādhyā, that leads to this situation.

One can imagine different scenarios where a similar issue could arise. When Richard Hayes, following Richard Robinson, points out the equivocation in Nāgārjuna’s use of the term svabhāva, he demonstrates an instance of something fairly similar to prakarana-sama, only in this case the neutrality is intentionally employed to create an irresolvable dialectic. Of course, the Buddhists would still be unlikely to accept the term. They may well consider it needless, and, so, harmful conceptual proliferation (prapañca), and, in any case, the logical standard for negative concomitance remains an important locus of debate. But it is important to note here again, as with several of Aviddhakarṇa’s fragments, that the Buddhists sometimes interpret an argument in their own terms, rather than seeking to understand the terms of the intellectual community of their Naiyāyika opponents, and in so doing misjudge—or at least appear to misjudge—the actual point.

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709 Hayes 1994. I am indebted to Nir Feinberg for this striking observation.
710 I am grateful to Max Brandstadt for emphasizing the Buddhist concern for prapañca when we discussed this passage.
Pūrvapakṣasamkṣipta

Kamalaśīla’s Pūrvapakṣasamkṣipta (Prima facie views in brief, PPS), which is only extant in Tibetan (D 4232, Tshad ma Vol. 16, we, 92a2–99b5, as rigs pa’i thigs pa’i phyogs snga ma mdo bsdus pa’i), is a studious and creative take on Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu. The title describes the contents quite well: Kamalaśīla abbreviates (sam-vṛkṣip) opposing viewpoints from various traditions of Indian philosophy and stitches them in between the stanzas of the root text as prima facie views to be refuted (pūrvapakṣa). Before Dharmakīrti’s definition of a particular kind of perception, for example, Kamalaśīla inserts the adverse opinion of Avidhakarṇa—without any comment but the words of the Nyāyabindu that follow and set the record straight.

Like Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla turns his source material into a conversation, albeit in a very different manner. Quite unlike Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla does nothing but collect and organize the opposing views. To what end, exactly? Was PPS an assignment given to a close disciple, a young teacher’s lecture notes, the work of an overeager student, or perhaps even preliminary research toward the Paññikā? How we read this interesting little book determines a lot about its affect.

For the most part, Kamalaśīla only cites general groups as pūrvapakṣas. He mentions Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, for example, throughout the text, and he mentions Lokāyatikas once. He names Vasubandhu a couple of times, but otherwise only mentions three thinkers by name: Caraka, Pātrasvāmin, and Avidhakarṇa. This raises a clear question: Is there something distinctive about any or all of these three thinkers that distinguishes them from the authors who Kamalaśīla otherwise collapses into generic philosophical affiliations?

In PPS, he mentions Caraka in the context of the number of means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Buddhist epistemologists accept only two, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāṇa), on the basis of the sharp distinction Dignāga draws between the two kinds of object of knowledge (prameya), unique particulars (sva-laksana), which are perceivable, and universals (sāmānya), which are inferable. Kamalaśīla lists four traditions with different views: “Followers of Brhaspati” (Cārvākas) accept only perception (cf. §14); Śaṃkhyā accepts three, adding verbal testimony (śabda) to the list; Naiyāyikas add analogy (upamāṇa) to make it four; and Mīmāṃsakas (“followers of Jaimini”) accept six, including presumption (arthāpatti) and absence (abhāva). Finally, as a catch-all for any additional means of knowledge people may admit, he mentions “Caraka et al,” who accept reasoning (yukti), non-apprehension (anupalabdhi), and/or probability (sambhava). Caraka, who accepts yukti, stands in for any other such thinkers who accept means of knowledge beyond the six of Mīmāṃsā.

Pātrasvāmin also shows up later in the Paññikā, and the passage Kamalaśīla attributes to him in PPS is roughly the same as the passage in the Paññikā. In the first two verses of the “Examination of Inference” (1361–1362), Śāntarakṣita defines the two kinds of inference, for-oneself (svārtha) and for-others (parīrtha), specifying the necessity, in both cases, of a reason with three characteristics (trirūpālīnīga, trairūpīya, etc.), i.e., a reason that is a property of the locus of the argument (anumēye sattvam eva), that exists in a similar case (sapaṃśa eva sattva), and that does not exist in any dissimilar case (asapaṃśe ca asattvam eva). An inference “for-oneself” is a cognition, e.g., inferring that there is

711 The three features are here cited as found in Nyāyabindu, though they are phrased slightly differently in different
fire on a mountain after seeing smoke rising from it; whereas an inference “for-others” is a statement, e.g., instructing someone that there is fire there. (The latter is, in effect, an effort to instigate the former in one’s opponent.) In both cases the smoke is the reason (hetu), or the mark (linga), and in both cases it fulfills the three characteristics: it is a property of the locus of the argument, the mountain; it is a property of a “similar case” (sapakṣa), i.e., something that is the locus of the property-to-be-proven (sādhyā), fire, such as a kitchen that is in use; and it is not a property of any “dissimilar case” (asapakṣa, vipakṣa), i.e., something that is never the locus of the property-to-be-proven, such as a lake.

Śāntarakṣīta devotes the next several verses (1363–1378) to the opposing view that the reason only requires a single characteristic, namely, “being otherwise impossible” (anyathunupapannatva). In short, if the reason (smoke) cannot arise in the locus (the mountain) without the property to be proven (fire), the reason fulfills the condition of “being otherwise impossible.” (Śāntarakṣīta has a number of things to say to this idea, but his main point is that it is only valid insofar as it entails fulfillment of the three characteristics, making it nothing but an abbreviation of trairūpya.) In the Pāṭiyikā, Kamalaśīla, unpacking these verses in his usual fashion, attributes the view to Pātrasaṃvāmin and cites (or paraphrases) his argument.

It is unsurprising to find Kamalaśīla citing roughly the same passage, again directly credited to Pātrasaṃvāmin (sno d kyi rje), at the beginning of the second chapter of PPS, in response to Dharmakīrti’s definition of inference for oneself, which is the first reference in the Nyāyabindu to the three characteristics of the reason. The Nyāyabindu is clearly Śāntarakṣīta’s most immediate source for his definition of the two kinds of inference,712 and it is surely no coincidence that he and Kamalaśīla both immediately think of Pātrasaṃvāmin when the issue arises.713 Though Kamalaśīla attributes several arguments to Digambaras in general, Pātrasaṃvāmin’s theory appears to have been novel in Śāntarakṣīta and Kamalaśīla’s time, or at least in their view.

Otherwise, apart from Vasubandhu, the only thinker Kamalaśīla names in PPS is Aviddhaṅkarṇa, who he cites once. According to the Tibetan, he refers to “Aviddhaṅkarṇa et al” (rna ma phug la’sogs pa), suggesting that, like Caraka, Aviddhaṅkarṇa is not quite alone in this argument, and yet that he could not be reduced to a more widespread affiliation. Aviddhaṅkarṇa, too, must have occupied a distinctive position in Kamalaśīla’s pantheon of rivals. He is only cited once in PPS, and yet, because he is cited by name, he comes across as occupying a singular place in Kamalaśīla’s view. Perhaps—judging by Av5—it is because of his curious connection with Cārvāka.

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712 Specifically: svārtham parārtham ca [2.2] (NB 88); tatra svārtham trirūpāl liṅgād yad anumey jñānaṃ tad anumānam [2.3] (89); trirūpālīṇīgaḥkyānāṃ parārtham anumānam [3.1.1] (150); evam eṣaṃ trayāṇāṃ rūpāṇām ekaṅkasya dvayor dvayor va rūpayor asiddhau sandhe va yathāyogam asiddhaviruddhānākāntikās trayo hetvābhāsāḥ [3.1.09] (224).

713 Perhaps this suggests a common feature in Buddhist philosophical education during their time, or specifically suggests something about Kamalaśīla’s education under Śāntarakṣīta.
VII. AV5: MENTAL PERCEPTION IS NOT A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

Towards the beginning of the Nyāyabindu, Dharmakīrti lists four kinds of perception, the second being mental cognition (mano-vijñāna), which he defines in a fairly intricate but purposeful manner: “Mental cognition is that [perception] which is produced by the sensory cognition, its immediately preceding condition (samanantarā-pratyaya), that is concurrent with the object immediately preceding the object of [the mental cognition] itself.”714 This is very precisely put together, and solves two particular problems with Dignāga’s earlier formulation, as Masaaki Hattori points out. First, in order to qualify as a genuine means of knowledge (pramāṇa), mental cognition must perceive an object that has not yet been grasped (anadhiṣṭata-arthagantṛ). Second, if there is no difference in the object between the sensory cognition that comes first and the proceeding mental cognition, nothing should stop a deaf or a blind person from mentally perceiving sound or color. As Hattori puts it, Dharmakīrti’s definition resolves both matters: “(1) What is perceived by means of mental perception is the object in the moment that immediately follows the moment of sense-perception. Therefore mental perception is held to be anadhiṣṭata-arthagantṛ. (2) Mental perception is conditioned by the immediately preceding sense-perception as its samanantarā-pratyaya. Accordingly, blind and deaf persons who have no sense-perception are unable to have mental perception.”715

Kamalaśīla offers Av5 as the pūrvapakṣa to Dharmakīrti’s definition of mental cognition. It reads as follows:

\[
\text{de bzhin du rna ma phug la sogs pa ni yid kyi zhes bya ba'i mngon sum tsad mar rigs pa ma yin te. sngar mngon sum gyis gzung ba las yul gshan ma yin na de bzung zin pa 'dzin pa'i phyir tsad ma ma yin pa kho na'o. yul don gshan nyid yin na ni. 'di rang dbang du 'jug pa'i phyir dang. don thams cad yul yin pa'i phyir. 'ga' yang long ba la sogs pa'i dngos por mi 'gyur ro zhes zer ro. (PPS 92b2)}
\]

In this way, Aviddhakārṇa et al say: It is not tenable that so-called716 mental perception is a means of knowledge. If its object is nothing but what was grasped by perception, then it is not a means of knowledge, because it grasps what has already been grasped. If its object is something else, then [it is not a means of knowledge] because it would function independently [of perception] and because it would have every object in its scope; but nothing comes to be an entity for the blind, etc.717

Aviddhakārṇa argues that mental perception cannot be a means of knowledge because it either grasps what has already been grasped by sense perception, and so does not give us anything new, or because, if it is independent of perception, it would render the world visible to the blind. Clearly this is the

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714 svaviṣayāntaraviṣayāsahakāriṇendriyaśīvānam samanantarapratyayena jānitaṃ taṃ maṇovijñānam (NB 57).
715 Hattori 1968, 93 n 1.46.
716 yid kyi zhes bya ba = māṇasa iti—?
717 This final sentence is tricky to interpret. If there is no implicit repetition of “tshad ma ma yin pa kho na,” the negation in the final clause (mi ’gyur) renders the whole argument rather incoherent. If we do not read an implicit repetition of the conclusion (i.e., it is apramāṇa), we would have to read, “If its object is something else, then it functions independently, so it has every object in its scope, and so nothing comes to be an entity for the blind, etc.” If instead we interpret the repetition as implicit (taking the topic marker ni as emphasizing the fact that the if-clause expects a conclusion), the two phyir (-tvāt) clauses explain that implicit conclusion (it is apramāṇa), and the final negative (mi ’gyur) clause underscores the absurdity of the notion. Even without anticipating Dharmakīrti’s response, the text as is does not make much sense without either reading it this way or removing the negation from the final clause.
very two-fold problem Dharmakirti’s definition seems designed to resolve.

Like Av4, there is a chance that this appears somewhere in Aviddhakarṇa’s Bhāṣyāṭīkā, most likely in his comments on NS 1.1.4, the definition of perception:

Perception is a cognition that is generated by contact between a sense faculty and an object; it is non-linguistic (aryapadeśya), non-deviating, and consists in determination.

Uddyotakara, for example, at one point entertains the objection that the sutra should mention contact between a sense faculty and the mind, since that is a peculiarity of every perception. His first response is that there is simply no need, as the sutra is not intended to exhaust every single aspect of perception. But then he says, “Or the term contact between a sense faculty and an object is used because it is distinctive.” Perceptual cognition, he explains, is always designated (vi+apa+Vdis) with a sense faculty or an object: “color cognition” or “visual cognition.” “For it is not the case,” he says, “that there is ‘mental cognition’ (mano-vijñāna) when there is a cognition with color as its objective support.” But Uddyotakara simply states as a fact that we do not speak of “mental cognition” in such cases, rather than arguing against such a notion. Uddyotakara’s interlocutor in this passage is a fellow Naiyāyika, rather than a rival Buddhist. In fact, in the very next line, Uddyotakara brings up perceptions of the self: “But when mental perceptions (mānasa-buddhi) arise on the basis of the conjunction of the self and the mind, then these are designated by the self or the mind.” This may be the interlocutor’s voice rather than Uddyotakara’s own (only the disjunctive particle tu, “but,” serves to indicate this), but if so, he does not disagree. He just goes on to explain that things are named after their most distinctive cause, as a plant is named for the seed from which it sprouts, rather than the myriad other causal factors of its sprouting. It is not hard to imagine Uddyotakara disagreeing with the Buddhist notion of “mental perception,” but he does not engage that particular issue.

Av5 may, then, have been part of Aviddhakarṇa’s commentary on NS 1.1.4. Uddyotakara considers at length whether the sutra should mention the mind. Perhaps in doing the same, Aviddhakarṇa saw fit to raise the Buddhist notion of mental perception. But Av5 is also rather similar to one of Aviddhakarṇa’s fragments in Kārṇakagomin’s commentary (ṭikā) on Dharmakirti’s Pramāṇa-vārttika-svavṛtti. The fragment that Kārṇakagomin cites probably derives form Aviddhakarṇa’s Čārvāka commentary, the Tattva-ṭīkā: “A means of knowledge delimits a matter that has not yet been understood, ergo inference is not a means of knowledge, because it does not have the condition of delimiting an object.” The underlying reasoning—purported means of knowledge are disqualified

718 Cf. §10 for a discussion of the term aryapadeśya.
719 indriyārthasannikarotpannam jñānam aryapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasayātmakam pratyakṣam ||1.1.4|| (NS 10.3).
720 indriyārthasannikaraṇaṃ dvipājyate viṣeṣānām tasyānātard vīśeṣaṃ bhavati. indriyam artho vaidvīśeṣaṃ, tena vyapadeśat, yasmād viṣeṣām indriyena vijñānam ati vyapadiṣyate arthena vā, rūpaviṣeṣaṃ iti vā caksuvijñānam iti vā. na punar indriyamanāḥ samyogena vyapadiṣyate. na hi bhavati rūpālambane viṣeṣāṃ manoviṣeṣānam iti (NV 30.9).
721 yad tv ātmamanāḥ samyogāni mānasā bhuddhāḥ sampravartante tadātmāṇāṃ vyapadiṣyante manasaḥ vā (NV 30.14).
722 Kārṇakagomin cites Aviddhakarṇa three times. See Appendix B.
723 yad ucyate ‘viddhaṅkhaṇenānādhigātīramathaparicchiṭṭhitī pramāṇam ato nānurūpābhavānām arthaparicchedakatvābhāvānām (PVSVT 25.5). Specifically, this would be a comment on the second epistemological aphorism in the Čārvakasūtra, pramāṇasamayatvād anumānād arthaniṣcayo durlabhah (Certainty about an object is difficult to obtain through inference, because its authority is derivative). Cf. §14. This is “Av20,” the second fragment of
if their objects are already known—is quite similar to what we found in Av5, as well as in Av4. Any or all of these three fragments may derive from the Tattvaṭīkā. What might this tell us about Aviddhakarṇa-the-Cārvāka?

The PPS, like the Vipaṅcitārthā, deserves closer scrutiny than I can give it here. What I have been trying to emphasize is Kamalaśīla’s focus on Aviddhakarṇa as a singular voice. Perhaps it is incidental that Kamalaśīla only mentions Caraka, Pātravāmin and Aviddhakarṇa by name. His consistency and diligence throughout the rest of the PPS, however, puts this into question. In addition, whatever his intention, the effect of the rarity of these citations is to draw our attention to them, so we might as well give them our attention.

Kamalaśīla mentions Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas repeatedly, but could not rightly attribute an argument from the Tattvaṭīkā to them. He also mentions “Followers of Brhaspati” and “Lokāyatikas” once each (both terms can be used to describe the Cārvakasūtra and/or its proponents), but does not attribute this view to either of them, only to “Aviddhakarṇa et al.” Perhaps he could not rightly attribute to Lokāyatikas an argument by a prominent Naiyāyika, or vice versa?

We are left with the Naiyāyika-Cārvāka conundrum. If Aviddhakarṇa was a Naiyāyika and a Cārvāka, we must at least ask about the transition between these two phases of his career. Av5 suggests, however faintly, that this may have been a slight conundrum, or at least a point of distinction, for Kamalaśīla, as well. He could not reduce Aviddhakarṇa to one affiliation or the other.

Albrecht Wezler argues that thinkers like Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta—though these are his only concrete examples—may have had economic or political motivations for exploring various traditions. But we need not venture outside the arguments themselves, and the responses they generated, to imagine another reason a Naiyāyika might entertain Cārvāka theory. Specifically, Av4 and Av5 raise a clear possibility: to spar with Buddhists. Eli Franco notes that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Mimāṃsakas sometimes “criticized the Buddhists with arguments that bear a baffling resemblance to those of the Carvaka.” With some amazement, he concludes that “it seems that the most orthodox and the most heterodox schools have joined forces to criticize the Buddhists.” Perhaps Aviddhakarṇa embodies the occasional borrowing between these traditions. Whether before, during, or after his stint as a Naiyāyika, Aviddhakarṇa may well have written a Cārvāka commentary as a way of weaponizing the incisive and playful reasoning of Brhaspati against Buddhist epistemology. At the very least, it is clear that a number of later Buddhists jumped—on cue.

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Aviddhakarṇa in PVSVṬ (cf. Appendix B).
724 Cārvakas are typically understood
725 See previous note.
726 Wezler 1975, esp. 144–145; see also “Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta” in the introduction of the present study.
727 And indeed, if Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are separate people, perhaps “et al” refers to the latter!
729 Franco 1997, 100.
APPENDIX B

THE FRAGMENTS OF AVIDDHAKARNA AND BHÄVIVIKTA

AVIDDHAKARNA

Av1 rūpādyagrahe ‘pi dravyagrahaṇamasty eva, yato mandamandapräkāśe ‘nupalabhyamānārūpādikāṁ dravyam upalabhyaTE niścitārupam, gauśā vo eti. nanu ca tatrāpi saṃsthānāmāttram upalabhyaTE satyam upalabhyaTE na tu tadrūpādyātmakam. rūpādyātmakte vīvilapātiprīvīṣagrahanaprāṣaṅgah. tathāyāsakaṇcukāntargate puruṣe puruṣārūpādyagraha ‘pi puruṣapratyayo drṛṣṭaḥ. rātrau ca balākānāṁ śuklārūpādyagrahe730 ‘pi pakṣāpratyayo drṛṣṭaḥ. tathā nilādyupadhānabhedānuvidhāyinaḥ śphaṇikamaṇeḥ śphaṇikarūpādyagrahe ‘pi śphaṇikapratyayāyaḥ. tathā kaṣāyaraṇeṇa paṭarūpābhīhavapeṭarūpādyagrahe ‘pi paṭapatrtyayo drṛṣṭaḥ. (VA 34.15; Av)731

We do in fact grasp a substance even when we do not grasp color, etc. For, in dim light, a substance, without its color, etc., being perceived, is perceived in an uncertain form, e.g., as a cow or a horse.

But even in this case, isn’t it that the shape alone is perceived?

True, it is perceived, yet does not consist in its color, etc. After all, if it consisted of color, etc., [then, perceiving it,] we would have to grasp its particular color, blue, yellow, or the like. In this way, we have observed that when a person is cloaked in iron armor, even though we do not grasp his complexion, we perceive a person; or, at night, even though we do not grasp the color covering a crane, we perceive a bird. Similarly, when a jewel that is crystalline conforms to a distinct support, like something blue, even though we do not grasp the crystal color, etc., we perceive the jewel. Likewise, we have observed that when we see the color of a [dyed] cloth as the reddish tint [of its dye], even though we are not seeing the color of the cloth itself, we perceive the cloth.

Av2 nanu cāsarvagatavate satīti hetuviśeṣaṇam uktam, saviśeṣaṇaś ca hetur vipakṣe nāṣṭiti na pratiṣṭāntaraṇaṁ nigrahasthānam. naitād732 evam asarvagaṭaḥ śabdā iti pratiṣṭāntaropāḍaṇār. hetuviśeṣaṇopāḍāne hetvantaraṇaṁ nigrahasthānam. (VA 76.1; Av; BhṬ)

But “while not being omnipresent” conveys a qualification of the reason, and the reason with this qualification is not present in the dissimilar case, therefore this is not the ground for defeat “another proposition.”

No, because “sound is not omnipresent” is the employment of another proposition. When employing a qualification of the reason, the ground for defeat is “another reason.”

730 Steinkellner (16) valākāvyāmukta rūpādyagraha ṛ : valākāmāṁ śuklārūpādyagrahe Ms > balākānanāṁ śuklārūpādyagrahe em. (Cf. n 391 regarding Steinkellner 2014.)
731 Three pieces of information are indicated, when applicable, after the Sanskrit text of each fragment: (i) the source in which the fragment is preserved; (ii) the author(s) to whom the fragment is attributed; (iii) the text from which the fragment is cited. Abbreviations: Av = Aviddhakarṇa; Adh = Adhyayana; Bh = Bhāvivikta; U = Uddyotakara; & = et al; BhṬ = Bhāyatiṣṭaka; TT = Tattvaṭiṣṭaka. If (ii) and/or (iii) are not included, the source text lacks any such attribution.
7 Adhyayana is the name of another lost Naiyāyika. There are only a handful of known references to this thinker.
732 Steinkellner (34) na hi tad ṛ: naitād Ms.
Av3 vyaktam ekapraṇṭikam, parimitavrta, śaravādīvad (VA 89.10; Av; BhṬ)

The manifest has a single thing as its source because it is limited, like a plate.

Av4 yady evaṃ kṛtaṃ ca śabda ity etad api na vaktavyam, kim kāraṇam? anityatvam ity etenaiva śabde pi kṛtakṛtaṃ anityatvam cobhayam pratipadyate. yasmāt pūrvam api śabde kṛtakṛtaṃ pāreṇa pratipannam eva, karaṇac chabdo ‘pi buddhau vyavasthitāḥ, ato ‘nvyavākyena smṛtimaṭarakam utpādyate. apratipannakṛtakṛtaspaunā kṛtaṃ ca śabda ity etasmād api naiva bhavati.

yadvā kṛtaḥ śabda ity etavād vaktavyam. kṛtakṛtaspaunā anityatvam ity ete naivaśabde ‘pi kṛtaṃ kramatvam anityatvamṃcobhayaṃ pratipadyate. yasmāt pūrvam api śabde kṛtaṃ ca śabde ity etasmād api naiva bhavati.

If that is so, nor should “and sound is produced” be stated. What’s the reason? The word “impermanence” alone makes known that both being-produced and impermanence pertain to sound. If the other party has already learned that being-produced pertains to sound, on that basis sound is also established in cognition, so that what the statement of concomitance generates is simply a memory. But for one who has yet to learn about being-produced, it certainly does not come about even on the basis of the phrase, “And sound is produced.”

Or else, to the same extent, what should be said is, “Sound is produced,” because the invariable connection between impermanence and being-produced is well-known to the other party, so it is already communicated that impermanence pertains to sound, too.

Av5 yid kyi zhes bya ba’i mngon sum tsad mar rigs pa ma yin te. sngar mngon sum gyis gzung ba las yul gzhan ma yin na de bzung zin pa ‘dzin pa’i phyir tsad ma ma yin pa kho na’o. yul don gzhan nyid yin na ni. ‘di rang dbang du ‘jug pa’i phyir dang, don thams cad yul yin pa’i phyir. ‘ga’ yang long ba la sogs pa’i dngos por mi ’gyur ro. (PPS 92b2; Av& (rna ma phug la sogs pa))

It is not tenable that so-called mental perception is a means of knowledge. If its object is nothing but what was grasped by perception, then it is not a means of knowledge, because it grasps what has already been grasped. If its object is something else, then [it is not a means of knowledge] because it would function independently [of perception] and because it would have every object in its scope; but nothing comes to be an entity for the blind, etc.

Av6 dvindriyagṛhārghṛṣṭam vimatyaḍhikaraṇabābhāvapannāṃ buddhimatkaranaṇsāpvāvakaṃ svārambhakāvavyavasaṃśaviśiṣṭatvāt, ghaṭādivat, vaidhmyena paramāṇava iti. (TSP 52.13; Av)

What is perceptible and what is imperceptible to the two sense faculties that has come to be the topic of disagreement is preceded by an intelligent cause because of being distinguished by an arrangement of parts that generate [effects] in themselves, like a pot, atoms dissimilarly.

Av7 tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāni cetanāvadadhīṣṭhitāni svakāryam ārabhanta iti pratijñāmahe, rūpādiṣṭatvāt tanvādīvad. (TSP 54.1; Av)

733 Steinkellner (46) kimkāraṇam Re : kimkāraṇa Ms / (nimitta)m Re : nim Ms.
734 Abhayadevasūri cites this verbatim, and Kumārila seems to refer to it. See Av6, and Av6b below.
735 Abhayadevasūri cites this in a slightly more expansive form. See Av7a below.
We know that the material causes of bodies, worlds, and instruments generate their respective effects presided over by something sentient, because of possessing color, etc., like threads, etc.

Av8 sadāyaviśeṣayāviṣayajñeyaviṣayā madāyā pratyakṣaṇumānapamāsābdasmārtipratyabhijñānasiddhadarśanārṣārekāviparyāyānadhāvyāvalāysvapnasvapnāntikāḥ. prajñānaviśeṣā madiyaśārīradivyāyāntikāḥ svakāraṇāyartajānamavatvasādāmyaviśeṣavattvabodhātmakavatvāsutaravināśitvasamśarādāhyakavatprayatnavyāhyāḥ puruṣāntaraprayayavat vaidharmyaṇa ghaṭādaya. (TSP 103.7; Av)

Particular cognitions of mine—whether perception, inference, analogy, testimony, memory, recognition, established teaching, sagely wisdom, doubt, error, indefinite cognition, dream, or end of dream, whose objects are the knowable things that fall within the scope and those that do not fall within the scope of the indeterminate, existent and so forth—can only be known by a knower distinct from my body and the like, because of possessing an origin relying on its cause, possessing particular universals, consisting in awareness, perishing quickly, bestowing impressions, and being cognitions, like the cognitions of other people, unlike pots and such.

Av9 mātur udaranīkramaṇottarakālasa madiyaṭaprajañānasamvedakasamvedyānya atatkālīni madiyānī prajñānāni madiyaṭaprajanāntvādyamadiyaprajñānavata. (TSP 106.1; Av)

After emerging from my mother’s womb, my cognitions across time can only be known by the knower of my first cognition because they are my cognitions, like my first cognition.

Av10 avanijālānilanamāṃsi vipratipattivisayabhāvāpānāni dūrataravarttāni madiyenātmanā saha sambadhyante mūrttavavegavattvaparatvāparatvamithaḥṣaṃyogavibhāgavattvhyo, madiyaśārīradivad. (TSP 106.7; Av)

What have come to be the objects of disagreement, earth, water, wind, and mind, which occur far apart, are connected with my self, because they have a fixed shape, they possess momentum, they have proximity and posteriority, and they possess conjunction and disjunction to each other, like my body, etc.

Av11 sahetuko vināśaḥ kāḍācitkatvatvā vastūtpattanantarabāhāvātvena bauddhābhiyupagamānyamānantvāt prāg abhūtvātmalābhāc ca kṣaṇāntaravat, vaidharmyaṇa śāśaviśāṇādaya. (TSP 172.13; Av)

Destruction has a cause because it is incidental, because it is accepted by Buddhists as coming into its own immediately after the arising of the entity, and because it comes into its own after not previously existing, like another moment, and unlike hare’s horns, etc.

Av12 paramāṇūnāṃ utpādakābhīmatāṃ saddharmopagatāṃ na bhavatī satṛvapratipādakapramāṇāvīṣayatvat kharaviśāṇavat. (TSP 233.5; Av)

What is imagined to be the generator of atoms does not actually exist because it does not fall within

736 Shastri prints “prabhijñānasiddhātārṣārekāviparyāyāḥ and omits “nadhyavasāya”.
737 Jayarāśi Bhāṭṭa refers to an argument that is fairly similar to Av9, but without the distinctive phrasing of the fragment in the Pañjikā. See Av9, below.
the scope of any means of knowledge that can prove existence, as in the case of donkey’s horns.

Av13 senāpratayo⁷³⁸ gajaturaṅgasyanādivatāriktanibandhano gajādiprayayavilakṣaṇatvān nilapāṭaprayayavat.⁷³⁹ (TSP 265.6; Av)

The perception of number has a basis distinct from such things as elephants, horses, and chariots, because it has a different character than the perceptions of those things, as in the case of the perception of blue and a cloth.

Av14 samūhasantānāvastrāviśeṣās tatvānyatvābhyyām avacaniyā na bhavanti pratiniyatadharmayogitvād rūparasādivad. (TSP 279.14; Av)

It is not the case that specific heaps, streams, or states are inexpressible in terms of identity or difference, because they are endowed with properties restricted in each case, as in the case of color, taste, and so on.

Av15 viprakīrṇaiś ca vacanair nekṛthaḥ pratipadyate. tena sambandhasiddhyāṃ cyaṃ nīlapāṭapratipadyatvāḥ. (TSP 516.1; Av)

A single aim cannot be explained with scattered statements. Therefore, a separate conclusion must be stated in order to establish the connection.

Av16 nanu cāpramāṇena⁷⁴⁰ kimiti paraḥ pratipādyate, ubhayasiddham hi pratipādakam bhavatīti. tad etad ayuktam. yasmād vacanātām prameyānām na ca vaktuḥ pramāṇamatha ca vaktā tena paraḥ pratipādayati parapratipādanārthavat pravāsaya. nāvāsyam ubhayasiddhena pravojanam. (TSP 529.6; Av; TṬ)

Objection: “How can the other party be taught by a non-means of knowledge? Actually, only what is established for both is instructive.”

This is untenable. An inference consists in a statement, and is not a means of knowledge for the speaker. The speaker teaches the other party with that, since the point of the effort is teaching the other party. Hence, there is no need for what is established for both.

Av17 āgamāt sāmānyena pratipadyate viśeṣapratipattis tūpamānād. (TSP 553.1; Av)

One learns in a general way through received knowledge, whereas learning of the particular follows from analogy.

Av18 pratyakṣam anumānavatāriktraprmāṇāntarasadvitīyam pramāṇātvāt anumānavat. anumāṇam vā pratyakṣavyatāriktraprmāṇāntarasadvitīyam pramāṇātvāt, pratyakṣavat. tathā svalakṣaṇaḥ sāmānyalakṣaṇavyatāriktraprmeyārthāntarasadvitīyam prameyatvāt, sāmānyalakṣaṇavat. sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ vā svalakṣaṇavyatāriktraprmeyāntarasadvitīyam prameyatvāt, svalakṣaṇavat. (TSP

⁷³⁸ Shastri prints saṅkhēyā instead of senā”.
⁷³⁹ Abhayadevasūri cites this argument in a slightly different form; see Av13, below.
⁷⁴⁰ Shastri and Krishnamacharya both print *nanu vāpṛamāṇena*. Tib. ’on te tsad ma ma yin pas ci’i phyir gehan rtags par byed de.
Perception is accompanied by another means of knowledge, apart from inference, because it is a means of knowledge, like inference; or inference is accompanied by another means of knowledge, apart from perception, because it is a means of knowledge; like perception. In the same way, unique particulars are accompanied by another object of knowledge, apart from universals, because they are objects of knowledge, like universals; or universals are accompanied by another object of knowledge, apart from unique particulars, because they are objects of knowledge, like unique particulars.

Av19  satyam anumānam iṣyata evāsmaṁbhiḥ pramāṇaṁ lokapratītātvāt kevalaṁ liṅgalakṣaṇam ayuktam.  
(PVSVṬ 19.3; Av)
True, we actually accept that inference is a means of knowledge, but only insofar as it is commonly accepted in the world; the definition of the mark is untenable.

Av20  anadhigatārthaparicchittīḥ pramāṇam ato nānumānam pramāṇam arthaparicchedatvābhāvād.  
(PVSVṬ 25.5; Av)
A means of knowledge delimits a matter that has not yet been understood, ergo inference is not a means of knowledge, because it does not have the condition of delimiting an object.

Av21  yadi tulāntayor nāmonnāmavat kāryotpattikāla eva kāraṇavināśaḥ, tarhi kāryakāraṇabhāvo na syād yataḥ kāraṇasya vināśaḥ kāraṇotpādaḥ. evaṁ bhāva eva nāsā iti vacanāt evaṁ ca kāraṇa saha kāryam uppannam iti prāptam. yadi ca bhāva eva nāśaḥ prathame ṗi kṣane bhāvasya na sattā syāt vināśād. bhāvanvyṛtiḥ ca vināśo lokapratitito na bhāva eva. sarvakālaṁ ca nāsādabhāvād bhāvasya sattvam syāt. atha kāraṇotpādaḥ kāraṇavināśo bhinnas tadā kṛtakasvabhāvatvam anityatvasya na syāt. vyatirikte ca nāse jāte tasya kṣaṇasya na nīvṛttir iti katam kṣaṇikatvam. (PVSVṬ 90.26; AdhAvU&c)
If the destruction of the cause occurs at the very moment of the origination of the effect, like the rising and falling of the two sides of a scale, this would not be a causal relation, since the destruction of the cause is the origination of the cause, which follows from the statement, “Existence itself is destruction.” And in the same way it would obtain that the effect arises together with the cause.

Further, if existence itself is destruction, then existence would have no being even at the first moment, because there would be destruction. And destruction is commonly understood as the cessation of existence, not existence itself. Also, because destruction would really exist for all time, existence would exist for all time.

If the destruction of the cause were distinct from the origination of the cause, then impermanence would not be the intrinsic condition of objects that are produced. But if destruction were produced as something distinct, there would be no cessation of this moment; how would it have momentariness?

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741 The manuscript reads *yadi*, but Śāmkṛtyāyana proposes *tadā*, which fits the context better; I am modifying his emendation to *tarhi*, in line with the repetition of *yadi... tarhi* in the surrounding context of the *Tikā*.

742 Śāmkṛtyāyana adds the *visarga*. If the absence of the *visarga* is not accidental, *kāraṇotpāda evaṁ* suggests the locative form *kāraṇotpade* before sandhi, giving the sense, “the destruction of the cause occurs at the origination of the cause.”
Av22  avinābhāvitvaṁ ekam drṣṭvā dvitiyādīdarśane sati siddhyati. na ca kṣaṇikavādino draṣṭur
avasthānam\(^\text{743}\) asti. na cāṇyaṇānubhute ‘rthe ‘nyasyāvinābhāvitvasmaraṇaṁ asty atipraṣaṅgāt.
(PVSVT 98.10; Av)

The fact of an invariable relation is proven when, after seeing it once, one sees it for a second time,
and so on. Yet, for the proponent of momentariness, the seer does not endure, and one person does
not recall the invariable relation upon another person perceiving something, as that strains logic.

**VARIANTS**

**Av6.**  sanniveśaviśiṣṭānāṁ upattim yo gṛhādivat | sādhyec cetanādhiśṭhāṁ dehānāṁ tasya cottaṁ. (ŚV
(Sambhandhākṣepaparibhāja 74) 467.21)

The [proceeding verses give the] response to someone who would argue that the origination of
bodies, with their particular arrangements, is overseen by something sentient.

**Av6.**  dvindriyagrāhīgrāhīyaṃ vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāvapannām buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakām
svārambhakāvavyaśasaṃnivesāviśiṣṭatvāt, ghaṭādivat, vaidharyena paramāṇaṇa īti. (TBV\(^\text{744}\) 100.34; Av)

What is perceptible and what is imperceptible to the two sense faculties that has come to be the topic
of disagreement is preceded by an intelligent cause because of being distinguished by an arrangement
of parts that generate [effects] in themselves, like a pot, atoms dissimilarly.

**Av7.**  tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāṁ cetanācetanāṁ cetanādhiśṭhitāṁ svakāryam arabhanta iti
pratijāntimahē, rūpādīmattvāt, yād yad rūpādīmat tat tat cetanādhiśhitam svākāryam ārabhate, yathā
tantvādi, rūpādīmac ca tanubhuvanakaraṇādikāraṇāṁ, tasmāc cetanādhiśhitam svākāryam ārabhate.
yo ‘sau cetanas tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāder adhiśītātā sa bhagavān īśvara. (TBV 101.12; Av)

We know that the material causes of bodies, worlds, and instruments, both sentient and insentient,
generate their respective effects presided over by something sentient, because of possessing color, etc..
Whatever possesses color, etc., generates its effects presided over by something sentient, like threads,
etc., and the cause of bodies, worlds, and instruments possesses color, etc., therefore it generates its
effects presided over by something sentient. This sentient thing that presides over such things as the
material causes of bodies and worlds is the lord Īśvara.

**Av9.**  mātur udaraniṣkramanānantaraṁ yaṁ ādyaṁ jñānaṁ taj jñānāntarapūrvakaṁ jñānatvād
dvitiyajñānavat.\(^\text{745}\) (TUS 57.3)

\(^743\)  The edition reads *draṣṭur arat(?)*vasthānam.

\(^744\)  The *Pañjikā* is one of the direct sources, if not the direct source, for the citations of Aviddhakarṇa (and others) in the
*Tattvabodhisūdānti*. For example, Abhayadevāsūri copies Kamalaśīla’s explanatory comments on Av6 verbatim and only
slightly reworks his refutation of Av13.

\(^745\)  Esther Solomon (1971, 22) describes this as “almost the same words” as Av9, but the wording, and reasoning, is
actually rather different. This argument more directly fits with NS 3.1.18–26, which seeks to prove the permanence and
rebirth of the self on the basis of an infant’s innate knowledge. In addition, Solomon also says that Jayarāśī cites this
The first cognition immediately after emerging from the womb is preceded by another cognition, because it is a cognition, like the second cognition.

Av13. gajaturagasyandanādivyatiriktanimittrapbhavaḥ senāpratyayaḥ, gajādipratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt, vastracarmakambalesu nilapratyayavad. (TBV 674.17; Av)

The perception of number has as its source a basis distinct from such things as elephants, horses, and chariots, because it has a different character than the perceptions of those things, as in the case of the perception of blue in cloths, hides, and blankets.

Av21. yadi tulāntayor nāmonnāmavat kāryotpattikāla eva kāraṇavināśas tadā kāryakāraṇabhave na bhavet yataḥ [?? kāraṇasya vināśah kāraṇotpāda eva nāśah??]"46 iti vacanāt evaṃ ca kāraṇena saha kāryam utpannam iti prāptam. yadi ca sa eva nāśah prathamaṃ 'pi kṣane na sattā bhāvasya syāt vināśat tadaiva loke ca bhāvanīvṛttir vināśāḥ pratiṣaḥ na bhāva eva, sarvakālāṃ ca vināśasambhavāt sarvadā bhāvasya satvam syāt. vyatirikte ca nāše samutpanne na bhāvasya nivṛttir iti kathāṃ kṣaṇikatvam. (TBV 332.15; AdhAvU&)

If the destruction of the cause occurs at the very moment of the origination of the effect, like the rising and falling of the two sides of a scale, this would not be a causal relation, since [it is the destruction of the cause], which follows from the statement, “[The arising of the cause is itself destruction.]” And in the same way it would obtain that the effect arises together with the cause.

Further, if it itself is destruction, then existence would have no being even at the first moment, because there would be destruction. And in the world, destruction is understood as the cessation of existence, not existence itself. Also, because destruction would be possible exist for all time, existence would exist for all time. But if destruction were produced as something distinct, there would be no cessation of existence; how would there be momentariness?

REPORTS

1. itarasyācetanasya vā bhūmyādeḥ mūrtasya, anenāviddhakaṇṇasya samayo daśītaḥ. (SVṬ 306.22)
   Of the other or of the insentient, earth and the like, that which has a fixed shape—this presents the tenet of Aviddhakaṇṇa.

2. sarvatra ca viruddhāvabhicāri śambhavati. tad yathā, anityah śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad iti kṛte kaścid viruddhāvabhicāriṇam āha nityah śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāc chabdattavād iti. evamādis tatvataḥkāyām udāharaṇaprapaṇcām draṣṭavāyaḥ. (TSP 521.4; TT)
   And in every case, the opposite inference is possible. So, for example, when the argument “Sound is impermanent because it is produced, like a pot,” has been made, someone may state the opposite the opposite inference, “Sound is permanent because it is audible, like soundness.” A proliferation of examples such as this can be seen in the Tattvāṭikā.

"with a specific reference to Aviddhakaṇṇa," but he only characterizes this argument as anyaduktam, "stated by another."

46 As printed in the edition.
3. tathā ca kāryakāraṇayor buddhikāyayoḥ madhye tasya kāraṇasya nivṛttito vinipātāt nāsti saṁsāraḥ kāyaṁtaraśaṅcāraḥ. kuto nāsti? buddher avasthānāt tasyā eva tadupagamād iti cet. na, kāryasya buddheḥ abhāvagateḥ abhāvapraپter abhāvaniṁśayād vā. na hi kāraṇaniṁśtau kāryaṁvaśtānam atatākāryatvāpattēḥ. ity evam kaścana cārvākaviśeṣo 'viddhakarṇaḥ. (NVīV [v.2] 101.23; Av)

“And in this way, concerning the body and the intellect, which are cause and effect, because of the cessation, the death, of the cause, there is no samsara, no transition to another both. Why not? You may say, ‘Because of the stability of the intellect, because it itself is what reaches there.’ Not so, because the effect, the intellect, goes to non-existence, i.e., because it comes not to exist or because its non-existence is ascertained. For it is not the case that the effect remains in the cessation of the cause, because this would incur that it is not the effect of that.” Thus said747 someone, i.e., a particular Cārvāka, Aviddhakarṇa.

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747 This may appear to be a fragment, but Vādirājasūri is clearly just glossing the terms in Akalankaṅdeva’s root text: kāryakāraṇayor buddhikāyayoḥ tannivṛttitāḥ || 70 || kāryābhāvagater nāsi saṁsāra iti kaścana (NVīV 101.2).
Bhāvivikta

Bh1 samūhavācakaśabḍavācayatvād. (VA 85.3; Bh; BhT)

Because of being expressible by a word expressible of a heap

Bh2 sthūlātvān nedām748 nigrāhasthānam iti cet. prāśnikaprativādisannidhau pratiṣṭhātārthāpahnavāṃ karoṭīti. asambaddham ucyate tātrābhīprāyāparetiṣṭhānāt. na brūmo dhvamsi sābda iti, kiṃ tu samyogavībhāgabhyām na vyājyata749 iti ayaṃ pratiṣṭhātārtha ity aha śāmānyasya ca svāśrayavyāhavyatvāt vyabhicārābhāva750 iti. nigrāhasthānam tu pūrvaṃ apratiṣṭhātārthatvāt,751 anaikāntikadoṣena pratiṣedhe hetau pratiṣṭhātārthāpahnavāṃ karoṭīti nigṛhyate. (VA 93.7; Bh)

You may say, “This is not grounds for defeat because of its coarseness. It is in the presence of the examiner, the opponent, and so on, that he performs the concealment of the matter proposed.”

We say this is absurd, because in such a case there is no discernment of the intention.

“We do not say, ‘Sound is permissible.’ Rather, we say the matter proposed is ‘not manifested by conjunction or disjunction,’ and there is no deviation because universals are manifested in their respective substrata.”

But this is already grounds for defeat, because this is not the matter proposed. When the reason is refuted by the defect of inconclusiveness, he denies the matter proposed, and, so, is defeated.

Bh3 yasmād dhetoḥ752 prakaranaṁ cintā vipakṣasyāpya vicāraḥ paścād bhavati, sa evaṃlakṣaṇo hetur753 nirṇāyāya yo ‘padiśyamāṇaḥ prakaraṇasaṃ bhavati, prakaraṇaśādhye samo tulyāḥ sattve ‘sattve vā. yathā sat sarva jitvatvām,754 itaradvipaśītārthamuktaṁ,755 rūpādīvat iti. yasmād ayaṃ hetu ubhayatra samānah, yo ‘py asattraṃ śādhyati tasyāpya samānah. katham? asat sarva jitvatvām, itaradvipaśītārthamuktaṁ, kharaviṣaṇavat iti. na ca yaṃ kilobhayadharmatvā ‘py anaikāntikāḥ, vipakṣavṛtti vaikalyāt. (VA 134.1; Bh)

Say there is a reason from which there arises anxiety about the prakarana, i.e., hesitation even after the dissimilar case; that, a reason characterized in that way, being adduced for ascertainment, would be prakaranaṁ ca, neutral to the prakarana, i.e., comparable to what is to be proven, existence or non-existence.

For example, “Omniscience exists because it is free from what is contrary to that, as is color, etc.” Since this reason is the same in both cases, it is the same as that which proves non-existence, too. How so? “Omniscience does not exist because it is free from what is contrary to that, as is a donkey’s horn.” And this indeed is not inconclusive, even if it is a property of both, because it lacks presence in the dissimilar case.

748 Steinkellner (41) sthūlatvān nedām R: sthūlatvā nedām Ms > sthūlatvā(n) nedām em.
749 Steinkellner (41) na vyakta R : na vyajyata Ms.
750 Steinkellner (41) vivādābhāva R : vicārābhāva Ms > v(yabh)icārābhāva em.
751 Steinkellner (41) ‘ārthātvāt R : ‘ārthātvāt Ms. [This, presumably, was an error in the ms.]
752 Steinkellner (60) heto(h) Re : heto Ms.
753 My emendation. The editions read hetu”, and Steinkellner does not comment, but saḥ must construe with betub.
754 My emendation. Ed. read sarva jitnaṃ; no comment from Steinkellner.
755 My emendation. Ed. itaratadvipaśītārthamuktaṁ, no comment from Steinkellner.
Under the condition that its referent is a knowable thing included in the categories that are the seat of the indeterminate.

The self is actually established through perception. To explain: Without requiring a recollection of the connection between mark and marked, the cognition "I" is a perception, e.g., of Devadatta’s that had as its object the moon, the sun, planet, asterism, star, or the like, in question. This is because, given that they are not being perceived as having a connection with the earth, they are expressible by the words for cognition of things like the moon, the sun, planets, asterisms, and so on, like, Devadatta’s cognition of the moon, the sun, planets, asterisms, stars, and so on, like, Devadatta’s cognition of stars, etc., that arose in the first instance.

The substrata of universals like color-ness, their substrata, and the particular cognitions—whether perception, inference, analogy, testimony, memory, recognition, sagely wisdom, established teaching, doubt, error, indefinite cognition, dream, or end of dream—that have those as their objects are all not subject to destruction immediately after coming into their own. This is because they are cognizable; because knowable; because denotable; because either existent or non-existent; because of not being delimitable by a cognition of cognizable objects apart from what is existent or non-existent; because of not being graspable by the grasping of an ungraspable object; because of not being denotable by what denotes the undenotable; and because of being denotable by a sound that is the effect of a sound produced by the conjunction and disjunction of homogeneous and heterogeneous samāna substances; like prior non-existence, etc.
Sensory cognition is not the cause of conceptual mental cognition because of having a different

757 J reads "āpradipana" for "aprāpadina" and appears to read "sargṇi" for "sarpī".

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Alas, this does not at all solve the problem of construction beginning with... then read... then the Sanskrit would have a slightly odd redundancy. Eliding this strange collection of syllables alto... perhaps with... more compelling. In addition, adding... word, in the sense “the mirroring... something similar. This would work fairly well if... the corrupted term in the Sanskrit? In the fi... 758. Adàrśyate tathā ca kṛtakāḥ śābda iti. Tasmād viśeṣadyotanān na punaruktatā. (TSP 514.3; Bh&)

Actually, being a property of the locus is not illuminated by the statement of the reason, which appears right after the proposition, because it denotes the reason alone. Sound is impermanent because of producedness, but does this producedness pertain to sound or not? One learns that it does after the application.

Alternatively, the purpose of the application is representation. Indeed, the statement of the reason first indicates, without distinction, that producedness pertains to sound; then producedness is shown in the example to have an invariable relation with the property to be proven; the representation of producedness is indicated by the application. Through the application, it is shown: “And, in this way, sound is produced.” Therefore, because it illuminates a distinction, it is not redundant.

REPORTS

1. cirantanaçārvākair hi bhāvīviktraprabhṛṭibhir bhūtebhyā ca ātanyam iti śūrtaṃ bhūtebhya iti pañcamyantapadayojañayā vyākhyātaṃ bhūtebhya uṭpadyate ātanyam iti. (NMGBh 197.4)

Indeed, the ancient Ĉārvākas, beginning with Bhāvīvikta, glossed the sutra bhūtebhyā ca ātanyam in terms of the ablative construction, i.e., “consciousness (caitanya) is produced (uṭpadyate) from the elements (bhūtebhyā).

758 TSP upanayād. J (167r.1) and P (125r.2) both read cūmaṇamādaśārṇyate, or something along those lines. Krishnamacharya (1928, 420) prints uṣāṇaś, eliding e and m, and proposes upanayāt in brackets; Shastri more or less follows suit, listing ”nām cūmaṇamādaśārṇyate” in a footnote.

The Tibetan is inconclusive. The key excerpt is dpe lta bstan pa’i byas pa de bgrub bya med na mi ‘byung ba nyid ni nye bar sbyor bas bzlas pa yin nol de bzhin du sgra la yang byas pa nyid yin no zhes bya bas ’dra bar bstan pa yin nol de la bsad na khyad par bsal bar bya ba’i phyir zlos pa ma yin no zhes zer ro. Does bzlas pa (recited, repeated) correspond in some way to the corrupted term in the Sanskrit? In the final sentence, zlos pa renders punaruktatā, so bzlas pa presumably means something similar. This would work fairly well if bzlas pa was meant to render pratibimbanam together with the mystery word, in the sense “the mirroring [read: reflection, i.e., reiteration] is stated/brought about by the application.”

If the syllables had actually been uṣāṇamādāśārṇyate, rather than cūmaṇamādaśārṇyate, I would find Krishnamacharya’s emendation more compelling. In addition, adding upanayāt would require reading pratibimbanam as the end of a clause (perhaps with nirdīṣṭam carried over from the previous line), and upanayādāśārṇyate as the beginning of a new one. But then the Sanskrit would have a slightly odd redundancy. Eliding this strange collection of syllables altogether, we can then read pratibimbanam as the patient of ātaryate or ādārṇyate, and upanayena as the agent. I think this makes the construction beginning with tena more satisfyingly ornate, and I have tentatively taken this approach in my translation. Alas, this does not at all solve the problem of cūmaṇam. Derivations of verbs like sāmi (recite, repeat) and kuni (speak) could fit quite close syllabically and semantically but would be rare and especially surprising in such a prosaic context.
APPENDIX C  
Nyāyasūtra

OUTLINE

N.B. This is not intended as a robust or definitive statement on the structure of the Nyāyasūtra, but rather as a condensed (sanskṛipta) point of entry for the reader—my intention is to provide a sense of the context of the various passages in the present study that are lifted from this intricate text. The Nyāyasūtra is divided into five books (adhyāyā) with two daily lessons (āhnika) each; a lesson contains anywhere from twenty to over seventy sutras. I indicate the demarcations between the books and lessons; but topics are not necessarily confined to a single book or lesson, so the levels of the outline do not conform to these, but rather follow the sequence of topics. Sutras or groups of sutras are numbered according to Thakur 1996a. “[1.1.1]” means “book one, lesson one, sutra one.” “[5]” means “sutra five (within the book and lesson under discussion).” Sutras directly discussed in the present study are indicated in **bold**.

BOOK ONE, LESSON ONE

- Introduction
  - [1.1.1] The highest good (nihāreyasa) is acquired through knowledge of the sixteen principles (tattva-jñāna): (i) means of knowledge; (ii) objects of knowledge; (iii) doubt; (iv) purpose; (v) examples; (vi) doctrines; (vii) components; (viii) reasoning; (ix) ascertainmet; (x) debates; (xi) quarrels; (xii) attacks; (xiii) fallacious reasons; (xiv) equivocation; (xv) futile rejoinders; (xvi) grounds for defeat
  - [1.1.2] Emancipation (apavarga) follows upon the successive destruction of pain, birth, activity, defects, and false knowledge

- Definition of the sixteen principles
  - [1.1.3] Means of knowledge (pramāṇa), four
    - [1.1.4] Perception (pratyakṣa): a cognition generated by contact between a sense faculty and an object that is non-linguistic, non-deviating, and determinate
    - [5] Inference (anumāṇa)
  - [1.1.6] Analogy (upamāṇa): proving something through similarity with something familiar
    - [7–8] Testimony (śabda)
  - [1.1.9] Objects of knowledge (prameya), twelve
    - [1.1.10] Self (ātman): indicated by desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain, and cognition
    - [11–13] Body (śarīra); sense faculties (indriya)
  - [1.1.14] Objects: odor, taste, color, touch, sound; qualities of/and earth, etc.
    - [1.1.15] Cognition (buddhi): synonymous with jñāna and upalabdhi
    - [16–22] Mind (manā); activity (pravṛtti); defects (doṣa); rebirth (pratyabhāva); results (phala); pain (duḥkha); emancipation (apavarga)
  - [23–25] Doubt (samśaya); purpose (prayaṇa); examples (drṣṭānta)
  - [26–31] Doctrines (siddhānta), five
  - [1.1.32] Components (auvatara), five
    - [33] Proposition (pratiṣñā): indicating what is to be proven
    - [34] Reason (hetu): proving what is to be proven
      - through similarity
      - [35] or through dissimilarity

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Exemplification (udāharaṇa)
- similar
- [37] or dissimilar

Application (upanaya): relating the subject to the example

Conclusion (nigamana): restating the proposition after indicating the reason

- [40] Reasoning (tarka)
- [41] Ascertainment (niścaya)

**BOOK ONE, LESSON TWO**

- Definition of the sixteen principles, continued
  - [1.2.1–3] Debate (vāda); quarrel (jalpa); attack (viṭañḍā)
  - [1.2.4] Fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa), five
    - [5] Inconclusive (savyabhicāra)
    - [6] Contrary (viruddha)
    - [1.2.7] Neutral to the dialectic (prakaraṇa-sama): putting forth as the reason a fact that only perpetuates the question at hand.
    - [8] Similar to what is to be proven (sādhyā-sama)
    - [9] Past time (kalāṭīta)
  - [10–17] Equivocation (chala)
  - [18–20] Futile rejoinders (jāti); grounds for defeat (nigrabasthāna)

**BOOK TWO, LESSON ONE**

- Examination of (iii) doubt (saṃśaya)
  - [2.1.1–5] Objection to the definition in 1.1.23
  - [6–7] Clarification of the definition of doubt

- Examination of (i) the means of knowledge (pramāṇa)
  - Introduction
    - [2.1.8–11] Objection: There are no means of knowledge
      - [12–15] Response: Then by what means do you prove that there is no means of knowledge?
    - [16–] A means of knowledge is also an object of knowledge, depending on the circumstances
      - [17–18] Objection: This implies that there are additional means of knowledge by which the means of knowledge are themselves known
      - [19–20] Response: Not so, it is like the light of a lamp
  - Perception
    - Defense
      - [21–23] Objection to the definition in 1.1.4
      - [24–30] Defense of the definition of perception
    - [2.1.31–36] Auxiliary: Mereology
      - [2.1.31] Opponent: Perception is actually inference, because we apprehend something after grasping only one part
      - [2.1.32] Response: No; to the extent we apprehend it, it is through perception
      - [2.1.33] Objection: You have yet to prove that wholes exist
      - [2.1.34–5] Response: If there were no wholes, we would not grasp anything, and holding and pulling would be impossible
      - [2.1.36] It is not like grasping an army or a forest because atoms, the components of a whole, are beyond the senses
  - Inference
o Defense
  ▪ [2.1.37] Opponent: Inference is a non-means of knowledge (apramāṇa) because examples of each species of inference can be shown to deviate
  ▪ [2.1.38] Response: The examples offered are fallacious arguments, undergirding the authority of a valid inference

o Auxiliary: Time
  ▪ [2.1.39] Objection: What is falling can only occur in the temporality of what has fallen or is going to fall; there is no present moment
  ▪ [2.1.40] Response: Past and future rely on the present; neither can exist without it
  ▪ [2.1.41] It has not been proven that past and future are mutually dependent
  ▪ [2.1.42] Without the present, perception is impossible; we would not grasp anything
  ▪ [2.1.43] Our notions of past and future entail the existence of the present

• Analogy
  ▪ [2.1.44–45] Defense of the tenability of analogical cognition
  ▪ [46–48] Distinction from inference

• Testimony
  ▪ [49–56] The statement of a trustworthy source
  ▪ [57–68] Veda

BOOK TWO, LESSON TWO

• [2.2.1–12] The number of means of knowledge
  ▪ [1–2] Other means of knowledge can be reduced to the four
    ▪ [3–6] Presumption (arthāpatti)
    ▪ [7–12] Absence (abhāva)

• [2.2.13–69] Theory of language
  ▪  The impermanence of sound
    ▪ [2.2.13–17] Proof of the impermanence of sound
      ▪ [2.2.13] Three reasons: it has a beginning; it is sensuous; we refer to it as something produced
      ▪ [2.2.14] Objection: No, for three reasons: the permanence of the absence of a pot after it perishes; the permanence of universals; we refer to permanent things as impermanent
      ▪ [2.2.15] Response: There is a distinction between primary and secondary uses of notions like “permanent”
      ▪ [2.2.16] “Because it is sensuous” is not its own reason, but a qualification of the inference of the series, i.e., sound is produced because someone hears a sound from afar after the conjunction that creates it has ceased, like the sound of chopping wood
      ▪ [2.2.17] When describing the movement of sound through ether, we refer to a “portion” of ether, but only in the sense that ether is a causal substance
    ▪ [18–39] Refutation of the permanence of sound
  ▪ Syllables
    ▪ [40–57] Contra Sāmkhya, the diversity in letters and syllables cannot be the result of the transformation of permanent sound
  ▪ Words
    ▪ [58–65] Do words refer to an individual, a form, or a class?
    ▪ [2.2.66] A word can refer to all three
    ▪ [2.2.67] An individual (vyakti) is a material body with particular qualities
    ▪ [2.2.68] “Form” (ākṛti) is the name for the marks of a class (jāti)
    ▪ [2.2.69] Class (jāti) is what generates generality
BOOK THREE, LESSON ONE

- Examination of (ii) the objects of knowledge (prameya)
  - [3.1.1–26] Self
    - Existence
      - [3.1.1] Because a single thing can be both seen and touched
      - [3.1.2] Objection: This is not so, because objects are restricted to particular sense faculties
      - [3.1.3] Response: In fact, the differentiation of the senses entails that there must be a single agent binding together the different sense modalities
    - Difference from body
      - [4] Killing would not accrue demerit if there is no self apart from the body
      - [5] Objection: If the self is eternal, there is nothing to kill
      - [6] Response: “Killing” is the destruction of the body and sense faculties that belong to the self
    - Difference from sense faculties
      - [7–11] The fact that there are two eyes
      - [3.1.12] An object perceived by one sense can spark the recollection of another
      - [3.1.13] Objection: This cannot be so, as we only recall what is recallable
      - [3.1.14] Response: In fact, memory is a property of the self.
    - Difference from mind
      - [15–17] The mind is an instrument of the self like the sense faculties
  - Eternality
    - [3.1.18] A newborn experiences fear, joy, and sorrow based on recollection of past experience
      - [3.1.19] Objection: These are just modifications of a transient soul
      - [3.1.20] Response: What causes such a modification?
    - [3.1.21] After death, upon rebirth, there is desire for milk
      - [3.1.22] Objection: This is like iron moving towards a magnet
      - [3.1.23] Response: Neither example is fortuitous; both have specific causes
    - [3.1.24] We never observe a newborn free from desire
      - [3.1.25] Objection: Birth is like the birth of a new substance with its qualities
      - [3.1.26] Response: Not so, because desire, etc., are caused by volition
  - [3.1.27–31] Body
    - Composed of earth, or some combination of elements?
  - [3.1.32–61] Sense faculties
    - Evolved of prakṛti?
      - [32–36] Discussion with Sāṅkhya
      - [37–50] Perceptual theory
    - [3.1.51] How many are there?
      - [3.1.52] Opponent: There is only touch
        - [3.1.53–54] Response: No, because we do not perceive objects simultaneously (yugapad); it would be contradictory for there to be touch alone
      - [3.1.55] There are five sense faculties because there are five objects
        - [3.1.56] Objection: No, there are many of them
        - [3.1.57] Response: They are rightly grouped into five
        - [3.1.58] Objection: Then all five can be grouped into one
        - [3.1.59] Response: No, the five have significant distinctions
      - [60] The sense faculties and their objects correspond to their respective elements
  - [3.1.61–72] Objects
    - Composed of the elements
• [3.2.1–55] Cognition (buddhi)
  o [3.2.1] Is buddhi transient and limited or eternal and all-pervading?
      o [3–8] Response
    ▪ [3.2.9] Sāṃkhya: We only imagine there are different buddhis, just as we imagine there to be
      a different crystal when it is placed on something of a different color
      o [3.2.10] Buddhist: Momentariness proves that even the crystal is different
      o [3.2.11] Nyāya: There is no basis for accepting momentariness as a fixed rule
      o [3.2.12] We would apprehend the causes of the origination and destruction of the
        successive crystals if this were true
      o [3.2.13] Buddhist: We do not apprehend the cause of the destruction of milk or the
        origination of curd, and the same is true in the case of the crystal
      o [3.2.14] Nyāya: Actually, we infer the cause of the destruction of milk, etc.
  ▪ [15] Sāṃkhya: The diversity of our cognitions is but the sequential manifestation of
    transformations of prakṛti
    o [16–17] Response
  o [18–41] A property of the self, sense faculties, or objects?
    o [42–45] Comes to an end quickly
    o [46–55] Not a property of the body
• [3.2.56–72] Mind
  o [56–58] Singular
  o [59] Atomic
  o [60–72] Karmically produced

BOOK FOUR, LESSON ONE
• [4.1.1] Activity
• [2–9] Defects
  o [3–5] Three kinds: desire, aversion, delusion
    ▪ [6–9] Delusion is the worst
• [4.1.10–43] Rebirth
  o [11–13] Possible because of the permanence of the self
    ▪ [14–18] Absence is the cause of things
    ▪ [4.1.19–21] God is the cause of things
      o [4.1.19] Claim: Īśvara is the cause because we observe human action to be fruitless
      o [4.1.20] Objection: Not so, human action is essential for obtaining desired results
      o [4.1.21] Response: Yet this is effected by Īśvara
    ▪ [22–24] Things arise without cause
    ▪ [25–28] All is impermanent
    ▪ [29–33] All is permanent
    ▪ [34–36] All is separate
      o [4.1.34] Opponent: All is separate because the marks of a purportedly single entity are
        themselves separate; a unity, like a “jar,” is but a conceptual imposition
      o [4.1.35] Response: Entities have more than one mark; it is only insofar as there is a pot
        that there can be such a thing as the base or lid of the jar
      o [4.1.36] When we refer to “the jar,” we are not referring to mere heaps of atoms
[37–40] All is non-existent
[41–43] Indexing

- [44–54] Results
  - Immediate or delayed?

- [55–58] Pain
  - Not a denial of pleasure, but a clarification

- [59–68] Emancipation
  - Is possible

**BOOK FOUR, LESSON TWO**

- Interlude on knowledge of the principles (*tattva-jñāna*)
  - [4.2.1–3] Knowledge and defects
  - Mereology revisited
    - [4.2.4–17] The existence of wholes
      - [4–5] Wholes have already been proven
        - [6–10] *Objection:* There is no tenable relation between a whole and its parts
        - [11–12] *Response:* None of the objections are logically sound
      - [13] *Objection:* We see masses of atoms just as someone with partial blindness can still make out a mass of hair
      - [14–17] *Response:* The atoms are beyond the senses; they are permanent and without parts
    - [4.2.18–25] Auxiliary: Atomic theory
      - [4.2.18] *Opponent:* Atoms must have parts because ether penetrates them
      - [4.2.19] *Continued:* Otherwise ether would not be all-pervading
      - [4.2.20] *Response:* Atoms are not effects, ergo they cannot have an “inside” or “outside,” which denote causes
      - [21–22] The qualities of ether
      - [23–24] *Objection:* Atoms have parts because they have shape, and form conjunctions
      - [25] *Response:* This would lead to an infinite regress
  - [4.2.26–37] The external world
    - [26] *Objection:* On close inspection, we do not apprehend the external world
    - [27–30] *Response:* This is self-contradictory; means of knowledge prove the existence of the external world, otherwise you could not prove your own point
    - [31–32] *Objection:* It is like the objects in a dream, mirages, etc.
    - [33–35] *Response:* There is no evidence for this claim; the objects of dreams are like those of memories and desires; *tattva-jñāna* like waking from a dream
    - [36–37] The erroneous cognition itself cannot be denied; it is duplicitous because of the difference between the real object (e.g., the pillar) and the paradigm for the error (e.g., the man)
  - [4.2.38–51] Cultivating knowledge of the principles
    - [38] *Tattva-jñāna* arises on the basis of the repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) of a particular form of meditative concentration (*samādhi*)
      - [39–40] *Objection:* Forceful objects like thunder and states like hunger make this impossible
      - [41–42] *Response:* Such concentration arises as a result of previous actions; it should be practiced in forests, caves, and river-banks
      - [43] *Objection:* The intrusion of forceful objects, etc., follows even upon emancipation
      - [44–45] *Response:* Not so, as the requisites for such cognition are absent upon emancipation
    - [46–47] For the sake of *tattva-jñāna*, one should engage in internal and external yogic practices, persistent study of Nyāya, and friendly debates (*samvāda*)
- [48–49] The latter should be carried out, without counterargument, with well-wishing peers and teachers
- [50–51] Quarrels, attacks, and hostile conversations are for protecting the truth against unfriendly interlocutors

**BOOK FIVE, LESSON ONE**

- Examination of (xv) the futile rejoinders (jāti)
  - [5.1.1] There are 24 varieties
    - [2–38] Definitions of the 24 varieties, together with the proper responses to each
  - [39–43] The six-sided (sat-paksin) argument: the proponent cannot bring the discussion to a resolution by answering a jāti with another jāti

**BOOK FIVE, LESSON TWO**

- Examination of (xvi) the grounds for defeat (nigraha-sthāna)
  - [5.2.1–24] There are 22 varieties
    - [2–3] Harm to the proposition (pratijñā-ḥāni); another proposition (pratijña-antarā)
    - [5.2.4] Proposition contradiction (pratijñā-virodha): a contradiction with or by the proposition
    - [5.2.5] Rescinding the proposition (pratijñā-sannyāsa): concealing or denying the proposition when it has been refuted
    - [6–11] Another reason (hetv-antarā); another matter (arthantarā); senseless (nirarthaka); unintelligible (avijñātārtha); useless (apārthaka); not accomplished in time (aprāpta-kāla)
    - [5.2.12] Defective (nyūnā): deficient in one of the components
    - [13–23] superfluous (adhika); redundant (punarukta; distinguished from anuvāda); non-reformulating (anubhāṣana); non-understanding (ajñāna); timidity (apratiḥā); distraction (vikṣepa); accepting what is believed (mata-anujñā); overlooking what should be urged (paryamyọjya-upaśaṇa); employing what should not be urged (niramyọjya-anuṣoṣa); opposed to doctrine (apasiddhānta)
    - [5.2.24] Fallacious reasons (hetv-ābhāsa) are also grounds for defeat
APPENDIX D
SANSKRIT TEXT

MAṆGALA

prakṛtisobhayātmaṇḍivyāpāraraḥitaṃ calaṃ  
karmanatphalasambhandhavyavasthādisamāśrayaṃ || 1 ||
gunadravyakriyājātisamavāyādyupādhibhiḥ  
śūnyam āropitākāraśabdaprayagaṃcaram || 2 ||

spaṣṭalakṣaṇasamasyasyayuktrapramādvitayaniścitam  
aṇiṣasāpi nāṃśena misriḥūtāparātmakaṃ || 3 ||
asaṃkrāntim anādyantaṃ pratibimbādisannibham  
sarvaprapaṇcasandohanirmuktam agataṃ paraḥ || 4 ||
svatantrarūtiniṃśagdo jagaddhitavidhitsayā  

anālpatryaṃ ankhyeyasātmibhūtamahādayaḥ || 5 ||
yāḥ pratityasamutpādam jagada gadaṃ varaḥ  

tam sarvajñāṃ praṇamyāyaṃ kriyate tattvasaṃgrahaḥ || 6 ||
CHAPTER TWO
ĪŚVARAPARĪKŚA

sarvotpattimatām iśam anye hetum pracakṣate |
nācetanām svākāryāṇi kīla prārabhate svayam || 46 ||
yat svārāmbhakāvayavasamnivesāviśeṣavat |
buddhimaddhetugamyam tat tad yathā kalaśādikām || 47 ||
dvindiyāgrāhyam760 agrāhyan vivādapadam idṛśam |
buddhimatpūrvakām tena vaidharmenāṇavō matāḥ || 48 ||
tanvādīnām761 upādānāṃ cetanāvadadhiṣṭhitam |
rūpādimittvāt tanvādī yathā dṛṣṭam svākāryakṛt || 49 ||
dharmadharmanāvasaṃ satyam cetanāvadadhiṣṭhitāḥ |

5 svākāryārambhakāḥ sthitvā pravṛtties turitantuvat || 50 ||
sargādau vyavahāraś ca puṇṇām anyopadeśajāḥ |
niyatavat prabuddhānām762 kumārayavahāraṇaḥ || 51 ||
maḥbuddhūrādiṃkāṃ vyaktam buddhimaddhervadadiṣṭhitam |
yati sarvasya lokasya sukhaduḥkhaṃimittatāṃ || 52 ||

10 acetanatvākāryatavānāśīrśtvādihetutāḥ |
vāsyādīvad atas pāśāṃ tasya sattvāṃ763 pratiyate || 53 ||
sarvakartrtvasiddhau ca sarvaṃjñatvaṃ atyatkātāḥ |
siddham aṣṭaṃ kārtā kāryarūpādvedakāḥ || 54 ||
vimater aṣpadam vastu prayaṃkṣam kasyacit sputatam |
vastusatvādihetubhyāḥ sukhadūḥkhaṃdibhedavat || 55 ||
tadarśādhatāhetoh prathame sādhanē yatāḥ |
saṃniveso na yogākhīyaḥ siddho nāvayavi tathā || 56 ||
dṛṣyate bhīḥṣhpyupetasya dvavyasyaṃupalambhanāt |
sādhanānivitaṃ cedam udāharanēṃ aṃ paraḥ || 57 ||

15 cakṣuhṛṃparśānavijñānam bhinnabhām upajāyate |
ekalambanāt nāstī tayor gandhādhiśvityat || 58 ||
tatsāmartheṣaṃudbhūtaṃkalpanānugaratāramakām |
pratisandhaṃnvijñānaṃ samudayaṃ vyavasyati || 59 ||
jalalādāḥ naivedaṃ dvindiyāgrāhyoḥ asty aṭhāḥ || 60 ||

20 āśrayādhiṣhhatāsiddhe764 yathābhīhitadharmanīṇaḥ || 60 ||
saṃnivesāviśeṣatvaṃ yādṛc devakulādiṣu |
kartary anupalābdhe 'pi yaddṛṣṭau buddhimadgatīḥ || 61 ||
tāḍṛg eva yādikṣetānaṃvādhiṣu dharmiṣu |
yuktam tattādhanād asmād yathābhīṣṭasya sādhanam || 62 ||

25 anavyavatītakābhīyaṃ yat kāryaṃ yasya niścitaṃ |
niścayaṃ tasya taddṛṣṭe iti nāyāko vyavasthitāḥ || 63 ||
saṃnivesāviśeṣas tu naivāmīṣu tathāvidhāḥ |
tanutāvādhibhedōḥ śādā eva tu kevalāḥ || 64 ||
tāḍṛṣpāḥ pṛcycamanās tu sandīḍhavyatīrekatāṃ |

30 āśādayati valmike kumbhakārakṛtāv iva765 || 65 ||

760 P buddhi°
761 K tatt°
762 PK pravṛddh°
763 KŚ sarvam, JP satvam
764 P *āsiddhe*
765 KŚ *kṛtādīṣu, T rdza mkhan gyis ni byas pa bzhin
nanu766 jātyuttaram idaṃ dharmabhedavikalpanāt |
sāmānyam eva kārāṣā śādhanāṃ pratipādītaṃ || 66 ||
atadṛṣṭāpravṛttāṃ vastumātraṃ anityatāṃ |
tādātmāṃ dhavalo dṛṣṭāḥ pāvakāvyabhācitāraṇān ||
sitābhidyatamātraṇān hi maṃd api tādgaṭih || 68 ||
sāmānyapratibandhe tu viśeṣāśrayaṇī yaddā |
codāna kriyaṃ tatra jātyuttaram udāhṛtam || 69 ||
gośābudvācyatamātraṇān vajraśānām767 viśānītā |
samsiddhyed anātyāḥ hy eṣa nyāyo naśriyaṇe yaddā || 70 ||
yadi tu pratibandhaḥ 'smin pramāṇe no papapadyate |
tad atra yuktītaḥ siddhe na768 vivādo 'sti kasyacit || 71 ||
kim tu nityaikasavajñanītya-buddhasamāśrayaḥ |
sādhyavaikalyo 'vyāpter on siddhim upagacchati || 72 ||
tathā hi saundhasopānagopūrṇaṇākādaṇāḥ |
anekānityavijñānapūrvavatvena niścaṇāḥ || 73 ||
ata evāyaṃ iṣṭasya vighaṭakaṛt api ṣaṭyate769 |
anekānityavijñānapūrvavatvaprasādhanāt || 74 ||
buddhimaddhetumātre hi pratibandhas tvayoditaḥ |
dvitiye punar asmābhīr visaṃpātaṃ abhīdyaye || 75 ||
kramākramavirodhena nityā no ‘kāryaṅkāriṇāḥ |
viṣayaṇāṃ kramitvena tajñānaṇēv api ca kramāḥ || 76 ||
kramahāviṣvarajñānam krami-vijñeyasāṅgateḥ |
devadātā-vijñānāṃ yathā jvālādimgocaram || 77 ||
anūsaṃḥatimātraṃ ca ghaṭādy asmābhīr iṣyate |
tatkārakaḥ kulālādir aṇāmany eva kārakaḥ || 78 ||
nvāyvṛttaṃ tato dharmāḥ sādhyatvenābhivāṇchitaḥ770 |
aṇūdaḥhaṇād asmad vaidhaṃryeṇa prakāśitāt || 79 ||
buddhipravakatvam ca sāmānyena yadiṣyate |
tatra naiva vivādo no vaiśvarūpyaṃ hi karmajam || 80 ||
nityaikabuddhipūrvatvasādhanā771 sādhyasāṇyatyatā |
vyāhīcāraṣ ca saudhāde bahubhiḥ karaṇaṇaṇāṃ || 81 ||
etad eva yathāyogam772 avaśiṣṭeṣu hetuṣu |
yojyam dūṣaṇāṃ anyac ca kiṃścim mātraṃ prakāśyate || 82 ||
sthītvā pravṛttrī anyāder on siddhā kṣaṇabhāṅgataḥ |
vyaḥīcāraṣ ca tamaṇaḥ tasyāpi kramavṛttaḥ773 || 83 ||
pralaye luṃvijñāṇaṃsaṃmṛtaḥ puruṣā on naḥ |
ābhāṣavāraṇārāmānāṃṣeṣu tatā evaṃ saṃbhavat || 84 ||
vimukhāṣyopadeśeṣeṃ saṃdhāgaṃyāṃ param yadi |
vaimukhyaman vitanuvatena dharmāḥdharvarṣeṣeṣevitaḥ || 85 ||
anuṁaṇāvirodhāḥ ca vyāpṛṇeḥ sarvatra sādhane |
nvārundaḥ dharmenaḥ vyāpṛṇeḥ tetroḥ prakalpeṇe |
neśvāro janmīṁ nhetur utpattivikalartvataḥ |
gaganāṃbhovat sarvam anyathā yugapad bhavet || 87 ||

766 P tu
767 K digādi
768 J "r na. T grub 'di la
769 K ṣaṭyate, P ṣaṭyate.
770 P sāṃdhya
771 P nityeka
772 K yogyam
773 K vṛttītā
85 ye vā kramaṇa jāyante te naiveśvarahetukāḥ
dhātrāḥ jadānāṁ pratyaya iva || 88 ||

89 teśāṁ api tadudbhūtau vīphalā sādhanaḥbhidhānāṁ
ciśātva acukitsyasa naiva sā sahakāriṇī || 89 ||

90 yeṣuṣ 775 satsu bhavaddṛṣṭam asatsu na kācana

90 tasyānyahetutāklptāv anavasthā kathaṁ na te || 90 ||
kartṛtvapratīṣedhāc ca sarvajñatvaṁ nirākrītām

91 boddhavyaṁ tadbalenaiva sarvajñatvopapādanāṁ

92 yathoktadoṣṭāni mā bhūvan sādhanaṁ vā

93 tathāpī kartur naikatvam vyābhaśca ṛpaṃsarṣanāṃ
ekakartur asiddhau ca sarvajñatvaṁ kim āśrayam

tatsiddhau sādhanāṃ proktaṁ jaimitiyeṣu rājate || 93 ||

774 Ś naśvāra

775 K ye tu (P has yeṣuṣ, but tu is cancelled)
anye punar ihātmānam icchādiṇāṃ samāśrayaṃ 776
svaṭo ’cidrūpam icchanti nityaṃ sarvagatam tathā || 171 ||
śubhāsubhānāṃ kartārakaṃ karmanāṃ tapthāsaya ca |
bhoṭkārakam cetanāyogac cetanaṃ na svarūpataḥ || 172 ||
jñānayatnādiśambandhaḥ kartṛtvam tasya bhanyate |
sukhaduḥkhaṇḍisamvritsamavāyas tu bhokṛṭā || 173 ||
nikāyena viśistābhir aprūvābhiṣ ca samgatiḥ |
buddhībhir vedanābhiṣ ca janma tasyābhidhiyate || 174 ||
prāgattābhir 777 viyogas tu maraṇaṃ jīvanāṃ punah |
sadeḥasya manoṣyogadharmādharmābhīṣaṃśkrtaḥ 778 || 175 ||
śaṅracaśurādināṃ vadhād dhīṃsasya kalpyate |
ittahm nitye ’pi puṃṣyas eṣa prakṛtīya vimaleksyate || 176 ||
jñānāṇi ca madiyāni tanvādivyattarekinaḥ |
saṃvedakena vedyāṇi pratyayatv tataṇyavat || 177 ||
ichādayaḥ ca sarve ’pi kvaḍic ete samāṣritāḥ |
vasturva sati kāryavād rūpavat sa ca nāḥ 779 puṃmāṇ || 178 ||
vastuvagrahāṇād eṣa na nāśe vyabhicāravān |
hetumattve ’pi nāśasya yasmān naivāṣti vastūtā || 179 ||
rūpādiprītayāḥ sarve ’py ekānekanimittakāḥ || 180 ||
mayeti pratyayenaśaḥ pratisandhānabhāvataḥ || 181 ||
nartakibhrulatābhhange bahūnāṃ pratyayā iva |
anyathā pratisandhānāṃ na jāyetāṇibhandhanam || 182 ||
buddhīnirādiśamghātavyātiriktaḥbhīdhyakām |
ātmety vacanaṃ yasmād idam ekapadāṃ maṇaṃ || 183 ||
siddhaparyābhinnatvte yac caivaṃ prānīṣcitam |
yathānirūḍadṛṣṭdharmena tad yuktam ghaṭasābdvāt 780 || 184 ||
prāṇādibhir viyuktas ca jivaṛdeho bhāved ayaṃ |
nairātmyāda ghaṭavat tasmān naivāṣtasya asya nirātmatā || 185 ||
sadyojaṭāyādīṣāṇāvṛtvedanenaiva vedyate |
śarvam uttaravijñānāṃ majjānāvat tadādyavat 781 || 186 ||
maṇḍenāṭmanā yuktam dūrādeśavirtt’ṣaṃ api |
saṃdiyāsārīravat 782 || 187 ||
evaṃ ca sattvaniyatavibhuvāṇāṃ viṇīṣcaye |
ātmana na nirātmanāḥ sarvādharmā iti sthitam || 188 ||
tadatra prathame tāvat sādhane siddhādhyatā |
sarvajñādīpracyayatvam tvajjānānasyayate yataḥ || 189 ||
prākāśakānapekṣaṃ ca svacidṛūpam praṣṭāyaṣe |
yanyajñāṇāṃ apy evaṃ sādhyaṣūṇaṃ niḍārāṇam || 190 ||
tasyodāharaṇatvate ’pi bhaved anyena samāṣayaḥ || 191 ||
Śreads JP kuā’pi

K tathā ‘pi
JP kuḍādi
Ś reads ‘sannidhiḥ in J, but the line distinguishing dhi from dh seems to be erased; P preserves ‘sannidhiḥ; T nye phyr
svaṣaṃvedyo hy ahamkāras tasyātmā viṣayo mataḥ || 212 ||
tad ayuktam ahamkāre tadrūpāṇavabhāsanāt |
na hi nityavibhūtvādinkinirbhāsas tatra laksyate || 213 ||
gauravārṇādinkinirbhāso vyaktaṁ tatra tu vedyate790 |
tatsvabhāvo na cātmeṣto nāyaṁ tadviṣayas tataḥ || 214 ||
yadi prayaksagamyas ca satyataḥ puruṣo bhavet |
tat kimarthaṁ vivādo 'yaṁ tatsattvādu pravartate || 215 ||
tathā hi niścayātmāyam ahamkārah pravartate |
niścayāropabuddhyoś ca bādhyabādhhakatā sthitā || 216 ||
tasmād ichhādayah sarve791 niāvātmasamavāyinaḥ |
kreṣṇotpadyamānātvād bijāṅkuralatādivāt || 217 ||
atha vādhyātmikāḥ sarve niārāṃyākrāntamūrtayaḥ |
vastusattvādiḥetubhyo yathā bāhyā ghaṭādayah || 218 ||
sātmakate hi nityatvam taddhetūnāṁ prasajyate |
nityāś cārthakriyāsaktā nātāḥ sattvādisambhavaḥ || 219 ||
ghatādiṣu samānaṁ ca yan niārāṃyām792 niśidhyate |
parair jīvacchāre 'smiṁs tad asmābhih prasādhyahe || 220 ||
itiham793 ātmāprasiddhau ca prakriyā tatra yā kṛtā |
nirāspadaiva sā sarvā vandhyāputra iva sthitā || 221 ||

790 PKŚ vidyate, T rig 'gyur
791 Ś sarvai
792 P yavairātmā
793 JP icchāṁ°, T de ltar
CHAPTER EIGHT
STHIRABHĀVAPARĪKṢĀ

EXCERPTS

atha vā 'sthāna evāyam āyāsah kriyate yataḥ |
kṣaṇabhāṅga-prasiddhyāvai prakṛtyādi nirākṛtaṃ || 350 ||
uktasya vaksya-manasya ṇaṭyādes cāviśeṣataḥ |
niśedhāya tataḥ spaṭaṁ kṣaṇabhāṅgaḥ prasādhyate || 351 ||
kṛtakārkatavena dvairāśyaṁ kāścid isyate |
kṣaṇikākṣaṇikatvena bhāvānām aparair matam || 352 ||
tatra ye kṛtakā bhāvās te sarve kṣaṇabhāṅgināḥ |
vināśaṁ prati sarvesaṁ anapekṣatayā sthīteḥ || 353 ||
yadbhāvam prati yan794 naiva hetvam araṁ apekṣate |
tat tatra niyatam795 ātyāyaṁ svahetubhyas tathodayāt796 || 354 ||
nirvibandhayā797 hi sāmagri svakāryotpādana yathā |
vināśaṁ prati sarve 'pi nirapekṣaś ca janminah || 355 ||
anapekṣo 'pi yady eṣa desākālāntare bhavet |
tadapekṣatayā naiśa nirapekṣaḥ prasajyate || 356 ||
sarvatraivānapekṣaś ca vināśe janmino 'khillāḥ |
sarvatāḥ nāsaheṭunāṁ tatrākṣicitaratvataḥ || 357 ||
tathā hi nāśako hetur na bhāvāvṛtirēkinaḥ |
nāśaya kāraka yuktaḥ svahetor bhāvacarmanataḥ || 358 ||
na cānāme samudbhūte bhāvāṁtaṁ798 ātmahetuṭāḥ |
tadātmajiva vināśo 'nyair ādhātuṁ pāryate punaḥ || 359 ||
padārthavyatirikte tu nāsaṁāmi kṛte sati |
ḥāve hetvantarais tasya na kिमिद upajāyate || 360 ||
tenopalambhakāryādi prāgyad evānuṣajyate |
tādavasthyāc ca naivāyasya yuktam āvarāṇādy api799 || 361 ||
nāsaṁānāmā paṅgārtha bhāvo nāṣyata ity asat |
anyatvābhūcikaṁpanāṁ tatrāpy aviniśśitaḥ800 || 362 ||
bhāvāvāvṛtākālo naśāḥ pradhvamṣāpārasamjñākāḥ |
kriyate cēna na tasyāpi karaṇaṁ yuktisaṁgaṭaṁ || 363 ||
abhāvasya ca kāryatve vastutvāvāṅkarūḍavidatvā |
praksatājanyārūpaṁsya hetusākṛtyā samudbhavāt || 364 ||
vidhinivaṁ abhāvaś ca paryudāsāśrayat kṛtaḥ |
yas tatra vyatirekābhūcikalpo vartate punaḥ || 365 ||
atha kriyāniṣedho 'yaṁ bhāvam naiva karoti hi |
tathāpy ahetuṭā Siddhā kartur hetuvahānitaḥ || 366 ||
nanu naiva vināśo 'yaṁ satākāle 'stī vastunāḥ |
na pūrvam na cirāt paścād vastuno 'nantaraṁ tv asau || 367 ||
evaṁ ca hetumāṁ eṣa yuktō nityatakālataḥ |
kādācāltatvavayoṁ hi nirapekṣe nirākṛtaḥ || 368 ||
vastvanantarabhāvāc ca hetumān eva\(^{801}\) yuyjate |
abhūtvā bhāvataś cāpi yathaivānāh kṣaṇo mataḥ || 369 ||
ahetukavāt kim cāyam asan vandhyāsūtādīvat |
atha vākāśvān nitya na prakārāntaraṃ yataḥ || 370 ||
asattve sarvabhāvānāṁ nityavatṣyād anāsataḥ |
sarvasamskārāntāśīptatratyayāś cānīmīttakaḥ || 371 ||
nityatve ’pi saha sthānaṃ vināśenāvirodhaḥ\(^{802}\) |
ajātasya ca nāsoktir naiva yuktyanupātini || 372 ||
tadatra katamaṃ nāsam pare paryanuyuñjate |
kim kṣaṇasthitidharmānāḥ bhāvam eva tathoditam || 373 ||
atha bhāvasvarūpasya nivrṛttaṁ dhvamsasamjñitām |
pūrvaparyanuyoge hi naiva kīṁcīd virudhyate || 374 ||
yo hi bhāvāḥ kṣaṇasthāyī vināśa ity giyate |
tam hetum antam iccāmaḥ parābhāvāt tv ahetukam || 375 ||
vastvanantarabhāvītvam na tatra tv asti tādṛśi |
calabhāvasvarūpasya bhāvenaiva sahodayāt || 376 ||
atoviṇāśadbhāvān na nityāḥ sarvasamskṛtāḥ |
na viṇāśītī buddhiś ca nīrṇīmītā prasajyate || 377 ||
pradhvamsasya tu nairāmyān nāsty anantarabhāvītā |
nābhūtvā bhāvayogasā ca\(^{803}\) gaganendivārdīvat || 378 ||
pradhvamsāḥ bhavatīty eva na bhāvo bhavatīty ayam |
arthaḥ pratyāyāyyate tv atra na viḍhīḥ kasyacin mataḥ || 379 ||
na hi bāleya ity evam nāmāmatre krte kvacit |
sarlo rāsabhadharmo ’śmin prasaktiṁ labhate nare || 380 ||
dhvamsanāmnaḥ padārthasya viḍhāne punar asya na |
vastuno jāyate kīṁcid ity etat kīṁ nivartate || 381 ||
 bhāvadhvamsātmanāś caivaṁ nāsasyāsātvam iyate |
vasturūpāvīyogena na bhāvabhāvarūpataḥ || 382 ||
nivrṛtirūpātāpy asmin viḍhinā nābhēdhiyate |
vasturūpānurvṛttiś ca kṣaṇād ūrdbhāṃ niṣidhyate || 383 ||
atovo yavasṣhatam rūpam vihiṣṭaṁ nāsyā kīṁcana |
iti nityavikalpo ’śmin kriyamāṇo nirāspadaḥ || 384 ||

[...]

navn anenaṃnamena bādhyate sarvahetuṣu |
vyāptiḥ sarvopasamhāra pratiśārthasya va kṣaṭiḥ || 461 ||
vivakṣitārkacandradīviṣayaṁ yat pravartate |
jānānāṃ tattkalasambaddhasūryādīviṣayaṁ param || 462 ||
pārthīviṣiṣayatve āti tajjānavābhidhānataḥ\(^{804}\) | 

dayathā prathamaṃ jānānaṃ svakālārkādīgocarām \(^{805}\) 463 ||
rūpavādyāśrayāḥ sarve ye ca teṣām samāśrayāḥ |
ye ca tadviṣayāḥ keci jāyante pratyayāś tathā || 464 ||
upādānantaradhvamsabhbājo\(^{806}\) naiva bhavanti te |

\(^{801}\) P eṣa

\(^{802}\) P vināśai

\(^{803}\) KS “yogasya: Kamalaśila’s pratikṣa is “yogaś ca, and he specifically comments on “the particle ’and’” (caṅkāra) 

\(^{804}\) P dittography tattā

\(^{805}\) KS tatkālā

\(^{806}\) KS “ntaraṃ dhva"
prameyatvābhidhīhayatvahetutaḥ kāravindavat \( ||465|| \)
vivādaviṣayā ye ca pratyayāḥ kramabhāvināḥ |
85 ekārthaviṣayās te 'pi sarva ity avaghoṣanā \( ||466|| \)
abādhāikāśrayatve hi samānoktiniveśanāt |
vartamāṇe yathaikasmin kṣane \( ^{807} \) naikavidhā \( ^{808} \) dhiyāḥ \( ||467|| \)
sādhyaṇa vikalaṃ tāvad ādye hetau nidarśanam |
herutvād viṣayāḥ sarvo na hi svajñānakālikāḥ \( ||468|| \)
yadā śuryādiśabdāś ca vivakṣāmātrabhāvināḥ |
dipādau vinivesyante tajjīnānair \( ^{809} \) vyabhicāritā \( ||469|| \)
jātyāder niḥsvabhāvatvān naivaśa kṣaṇabhaṅgītā |
tadābhāvaprāsiddhyartham nirdiṣṭam sādhanam vr̥thā \( ||470|| \)
90 samānāsabdvācyatvam dipādiratayasya api |
vartate vyabhicāry eṣā hetus tena bhavaty atāḥ \( ||471|| \)
sāmānādhikaranyam ced bādhitaṃ teṣu kalpyate |
vivakṣite 'pi vispaśṭā bādhaisā kiṃ na viṣyaṭe \( ||472|| \)
vivādapadam ārūḍhā naikārthaviṣayā dhiyāḥ |
kramoṃṭapadyamāṇatvād viḍyuddipādibuddhivat \( ||473|| \)
kramabhāva virodho hi jñānasya ekārthabhāviṣu |
100 anyair ākāryabhedasya tadapeśvirodhatāḥ \( ||474|| \)
sandīghavyatirektaṃ sarvesv eteṣu hetusu |
vipakṣe vartamānānāṃ \( ^{810} \) bādhakānupadarśanāt \( ||475|| \)

\( ^{807} \) J kṣene
\( ^{808} \) J neka°
\( ^{809} \) J tajñā°
\( ^{810} \) P om. anusvāra
CHAPTER TEN

DRAVYAPARIKṢĀ

EXCERPT

jātyāder niḥsvabhāvataḥ ayuktaṁ prākāśītam |
dravyādayaḥ sādarthaḥ ye vidyante pāramārthikāḥ || 546 ||
ity akṣapaḍakāṇāḍāḥ prāhur āgamamātrakāḥ 811 |
dravyādiapratiśedho 'yaṁ samkṣepena tad ucyate || 547 ||
kṣitiṇābhedaḥ bhinnam navadhā dravyam iṣyate |
catuḥṣankhyam prthivyādi nityānityatayā dvidhā || 548 ||
prthivyādātmatkās tāvad ya īṣṭāḥ paramāṇavah |
tev 'nityā 812 ye tadādyais tu prārabdhās te vināśīnaḥ || 549 ||
tatra nityānurūpāṇāṁ asatram upapāditam |
niḥśeṣavastuvaiśayakṣaṇabhāṅgaprāsādhanāḥ || 550 ||
nityarve sakalāḥ sthūlā jāyeraṁ sakṛd eva hi |
samyogādi na cāpeksyaṁ teṣāṁ asty aviśeṣataḥ || 551 ||
saddharmopagataṁ no ced anūtpadākam iṣyate |
vidyamāṇopalambhāṅtrapramāṇāvaiśayavatāḥ || 552 ||
nāsīddher 813 drāyate yena kuvindādyanukāraṇam |
paramāṇvātmaṇā eva yena sarve paṭādayāḥ || 553 ||
sadgrāhakapramāṇabhāvān na cāsattā 814 prasiddhyati |
pramāṇavinivṛttau hi nārthābhāve 'sti niścayāḥ || 554 ||
tadārabdhās tu avayavi gunāvayavabhedaṁvān |
nairopalabhāyate tena na Siddhyaty apramāṇakah || 555 ||
nanūpadhānamsamparke drāyate sphaṭiṃkopaḥ |
tadrubāgraḥane 'py evaṁ balākādiś ca drāyate || 556 ||
kaṇcukāntargate 815 puṃsī tadrūpādyagatav api |
puruṣapratyayo drṣṭo rakte vāsasi vastraḥdhīḥ || 557 ||
rūpādiṃvarādiḥbhya ekāntena vibbidyate |
tena tasya vyavacchacedaḥ caitrād eva 816 turāngamaḥ || 558 ||
kṣitiṇādirūpagraṇḍhāder atyaṃtaṁ vā vibhidyate |
ekaṇekavacchēdāc candraṇaksatrabheda� || 559 ||
vibhinnakartrasakāyder bhinnau tantupatūtathā || 560 ||

viruddhadharmayogena stambhakumbhāḍibheda� || 561 ||
sthūlārthaśambhāve tu syān naiva vrksādidasānanam |
atindriyayājñunāṁ na cāṇuvacanaṁ bhavet || 561 ||
sthūlavastuvyaapeko hi susūkṣmo 'ṛthas tathocyaṭe |
sthūlakāvastubhāve tu kim āpekṣāsya sūkṣmatā || 562 ||
nanu raktādirūpeṇa grhante sphaṭikādayaḥ |
na ca tadṛṣpaṭaṁ teṣām svapaksakaśayasāṅgateḥ || 563 ||
tadṛṣpavyatiritkaś ca nāparātmopalabhāyate |
na cāṇyākāraḍhivedyā yuktās te 'tiprāsāṅgataḥ || 564 ||
śukładayas tathā vedyā ity evaṁ çāpi sambhavet |

811 KŚ mātrakāḥ
812 K om. te
813 P 'ddhīr
814 KŚ vā'
815 SK 'ntarite
816 K caitrādeś ca
40 tasmād bhrāntam idaṃ jñānaṃ kambupitādībuddhivat || 565 ||
kācuccāntargate puṃsi taj jñānaṃ817 tv añumānikam |
taddhetusanniveśaya kācuccasyopalambhanāt || 566 ||
kaśāyakunindādibhoyo vāstre rūpāntarodayah || 567 ||
pūrvarūpināśe hi vāsasah kṣanikatvataḥ || 568 ||
50 tato na yuktā vastūnāṃ tattvarūpavivasthitīḥ820 || 570 ||
tathā hi bhinnamā naivanyaiḥ saṃñām asitvam īşyate |
teṣām vargaḥ ca naivaikāha kaścid artho 'bhuyeyate || 571 ||
saṃjñāpapakramānamāśa visaya tattvam īşyate |
saṃñām asitvam iti cet īṣadbhayo 'nyas te prasajyate || 572 ||

P12r

55 śaḍ ete dharminiḥ proktā dharmās tebhayo 'tirekinaḥ |
istā cet kai 'yaṃ sambandhas tasya tair mataḥ || 573 ||
dravyēṣu niyāmād yuktā na samyogā na caipakārah |
samavāyō 'sti nāyāś ca sambandho 'ṅgikṛtāh821 pariḥ || 574 ||
sambandhanupapatrau ca teṣām dharmo bhaver kathām |

dadurpaṇānamātrāc ced anye 'pi syus tathāvidhāḥ || 575 ||
tasāpy īṣitvam ity evāṃ vartate vyaṭirekiṇī |
vibhaktis tasya cānyasya bhāve 'nīṣṭāḥ prasajyate || 576 ||
anyadharmanamāveśe prāptā tatra ca dharmīta |
dravyāder āpi dharmitvam asmād eva ca saṃmatam || 577 ||
prathamebhyaḥ ca tantubhyāḥ822 paṭaṃya yadi śādyate |
bhedaḥ sādhanāvaphaldam durnivāraṃ825 tadā bhavet || 578 ||
prāpāvasthāviśeṣā hi ye jātās tantavo824 'pare |
viṣistārthakriyāsaktāh prathamebhyo 'vilakṣaṇāḥ || 579 ||
ekaṇāyopagītvajnāpānāya prathak śrutau |
gauravāsaktivaṇapalhadoṣatyakābhivāṃchayaḥ || 580 ||
sākṣayābhīdhānena vyavahārasya lāghavam |
manyamānaiḥ krātā yesu vāg ekā vyavahartrbhīḥ || 581 ||
tebhyaḥ saṃmahākālas tu paśo naiva prasiddhyati |
vibhinnakarsāṁarthapariprakrāνdharmanvān || 582 ||
70 anyonyābhisaṃs caivaṃ ye jātāḥ paramānaṃvah |
naivātindriyātā teṣām aksānāṃ825 gocharatvataḥ || 583 ||
nilādiḥ paramānūnām ākārah kalpitā nilaiḥ |
nilādipratibhāsa ca vedyate caksurādihih || 584 ||
paurvāparsvadvivekena yady apy esām alaśaṇām |
tathāpy ādhyākaṣatābādhā pānakādāv iva sētīhā || 585 ||
sarvēṃ eva vastūnāṃ826 sarvavyāvrīṣṭirūpāñām |
dṛṣṭāv āpi tathāviteti na sarvākāraniścayaḥ || 586 ||

817 JP tajñānaṃ, K na jñānaṃ, T shes pa de rjes dpag pa
818 KŚ 'ādi
819 KŚ "bhavi
820 K tat svarūp"
821 P "ndho 'gū"
akalpanākṣagamyे ātī niścaye "śūtasya lakṣaṇe" 827 |
yaddhedaśvyavasaye "stī kāraṇaṃ sa pratiyate" 587 ||
samānajñvalasambhūter yathā dipaikavibhramah 828 |
nairantarysthitānekasūkṣmavittau 829 tathāikadhā 830 || 588 ||
vivekālaṣaṇāt teṣaṃ no cett pratyakṣatesyate |
dipādau śa katham drśta kim veṣto ‘vayaśi tathā’ 589 ||
etvāt tu bhaved atra katham eśām aniścaye 831 |

nilādiparamāṇunām ākāra iti gāmyate || 590 ||
tad āpy akāraṇaṃ yasmān naita 832 jñānam agocaram |
na caikasthūlaviṣayam sthāulyaikatvavirodhatah 833 || 591 ||
sthūlasyaikasvabhāvatve maśikāpadamātrataḥ |
pidhāne pihitaṃ sarvam āsajyetaśvibhāgataḥ || 592 ||
rakte ca bhāga ekasmin sarvam rajyeta raktavat |
viruddhadharmabhāve vā nānātvam anuṣajyate || 593 ||
nanu caikasvabhāvatvāt sarvasābdo ‘ātra kim kṛtah |
sa hy anekārthaviṣayo nānātmāvayavī na ca || 594 ||
nanu ye lokataḥ siddhā vāsodehanāgādāyah |
ta evāvayavitvēna bhavadbhir upavarnitāḥ || 595 ||
raktaṃ vāsa ‘khiḷaṃ sarvam niḥśeṣam nikhilaṃ tathā |
tatrecchāmaṃstrabhābhubat ātī sarve prayaṇjate || 596 ||
tathāvidhavākṣayāṃ asmābhir api varṇyate |
sarvam syād raktam ity ādi nirvībandhā 834 hi vācakāḥ || 597 ||
bhāktaṃ tad abhidhānaṃ ced vacobhedhā prasaṇyate |
na ca buddher vibheda ‘stī gaunamukhyatayeṣṭayaḥ || 598 ||
nanu cāvyāpyavṛttiṃvāt saṃyogasya na raktataḥ |
sarvasāṣajyate nāpi sarvam avṛtāṃ ikṣyate || 599 ||
nanu cānāmsaṅke dravye kim avyāptaṃ vyavasthitaṃ |
svarūpaṃ tadavasthāne bhedaḥ 835 siddho ‘ta eva vā || 600 ||
bahudesāsthitis tena naivaiṣakṣmin kṛtāpadā |
tataḥ siddhā paṭādīnām anuśo 836 ‘nekarūpataḥ || 601 ||
avijñātarthāhatattvās tu piṇḍam ekaṃ ca manyate |
lokus tatkālpitāpekaṣṭā paramāṇur ihocaye || 602 ||
nimittanirapekṣā vā samjñeyam tādrśi sthitā |
samkṛtenvayiṃ yadvan nirvite ‘piśvaraśrutih || 603 ||

827 K "rthasya lakṣaṇe" 828 K dipena vi 829 P "cittau" 830 P "dhāḥ" 831 K na niścaye, P eśān aniścaye 832 Con. JP naita", KŚ naiva, T shes pa de ni 833 P sthāulyekaśa vi 834 KŚ nirṇi 835 P bhidaḥ 836 KŚ ānubhyo
CHAPTER ELEVEN
GUṆAPARIKŚA

EXCERPTS

dravyāṇāṁ pratiṣedhena sarva eva tadāśīrītah ||
gunakarmādayo 'pāstā bhavany eva tathā matāh || 633 ||
kvā kasya samavāyaś ca sambandhīyān āpahastițe ||
viśeṣapratīṣedho 'yām tathāpi punar ucyate || 634 ||

5
dravye mahatil nilādīr eka eva yadiyate |
randhralokena tadvyaktu vyakti drṣṭiś ca nāsyā kim || 635 ||
na ca deśavitānena837 sthito nilādīrinī838 ikṣyate839 ||
vāyajyate vā840 tadā tena tasya bheda 'nūsas tataḥ || 636 ||
atadṛṣṭuparāvṛttagāḍhāvyatirekinī |

10
na sāṅkhya bhāṣate jñāne drṣṭeyṣā naiva sāsti tat || 637 ||
icchāracerasāṅketaṁ samaskārāṇvayaṁ tv idam |
ghatādyekādiyāñām841 jñānādv īva vartate || 638 ||
adṛavyatvān na sāṅkhya 'sti teṣu kācid vibhedin842 |
tajjñānāṁ naiva yuktaṁ ca843 bhāktam askhalitatvataḥ || 639 ||
taddṛavyasamavetac ced ekatvāt parikalpyate |
guṇādvīṣv ekaviyāñāṁ ekārthasamavāyataḥ || 640 ||
asto nāmaivaṁ ekatra jñāne dvyaśimayāni844 tu kam |
eteyv apekṣate hetum śaṭpadārthādikeśu vā || 641 ||
ekārthasamavāyāder guṇo 'yam pratyayo bhaveta845 |
tathā ca skhalito yasmān māgave 'nalabuddhivat || 642 ||
gajādipratyayaebhayaṁ ca vailakṣanyaṁ prasādhyate |
seṇābuddhi846 tadanytydha nilavāstrāṇidbuddhivat || 643 ||
icchāracerasāṅketaṁ samaskārāṇvayaṁtvatvataḥ |
tatrestasiddhir buddhyādau sāṅkhyayenaiva bhavet || 644 ||
buddhyāpekṣā ca sāṅkhyayā nisparśīr yadi varṇyate |
sāṅketābhogamātreṇa tadbuddhiṁ kīṁ na saṁmatā || 645 ||

[...]

30
sāṅkhyāyogādayaṁ sarve na dravyāvyatirekīnāṁ847 |
tadvyavacchedakataṁva daṇḍādīr īva cen matam || 676 ||
tēśāṁ saṁvṛtisattvamāna śaṁvṛtisatvamānaṁ ītaśādhanam |
tattvānyatvamāna nirvācyamāna saṁvṛtisad yataṁ || 677 ||
athāniḥsarvaniyaṁtaṁ sāṁhāder niśidhyate |
yasmān niyatadharmaṇatvaṁ rūpāḥśadārṣaṇādīvata || 678 ||
nīḥsāvahāvyataye tasya tattvato 'mbarapadmavat |
na siddhā niyātā dharmāḥ kalpanāropitāṁ tu te || 679 ||

837 KŚ deśāvibhāga, T yangs pa’i phyogs
838 P niṭā’
839 K iṣyate, T mthong ba
840 K yas
841 K ghaṭesye, T bum soṅs gcig soṅs
842 P vebhedinī
843 K tu
844 K vyāpti(dvyaṭi’), P vyāḍhi’, T gnyis soṅs blon
845 K bhavan
846 K sāṅkhyā’
847 P dravyā’vyati’
tathaivoktāvan ekānto viyatpadmadibhir yataḥ |
abheda vyatirekaś ca vastuny eva vyavasthitah || 680 ||

saṅkhyaider dravyato 'nyatvam evaṁ cet pratipādyate |
āśrayasiddhata hetoḥ saṅkhyaiddinām asiddhitaḥ || 681 ||
samuccayādibhinnaṁ tu dravyam eva tathacyate |
svarūpād eva bhedaḥ ca vyāhataḥ sādhito bhavet || 682 ||
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
SĀMĀNYAPARĪKṢĀ

EXCERPTS

dravyādiṣu niśiddheṣu jātayo ‘pi nirākṛtāh |
 padārthatrayavṛttā hi sarvāḥ848 tāḥ parikalpitāh || 707 ||
 tatreyaṁ dvividhā jātiḥ parair abhyupagamyate |
 sāmānyam eva sattākhyam samasteśv anuvṛttītāh || 708 ||

5  dravyatvādi tu sāmānyaṁ sadviṣeṣo ‘bhidhiyate |
 svāśrayeṣv anuvṛttasya cetaso hetubhāvataḥ || 709 ||
 vijātibhyāś ca sarvebhyaḥ svāśrayasya viśeṣaṇāt |

vyārvṛtibuddhihetutvāṁ teṣāṁ eva tataḥ śthitam || 710 ||
 viśeṣa eva kecit tu vyāvṛtter eva hetavāḥ |

10 nityadravyasthītā ye ‘ntyā viśeṣā iti varṇītāh || 711 ||
yadbalat paramāṁvādau jāyante yogināṁ dhīyaḥ |
 vilakṣaṇo ‘yam etasmād iti pratyekam āśrītāh || 712 ||
 pratyaksataḥ prasiddhās tu sattvavādijātayah |
 aksavyāparasadbhāve sadādipratyayodayāt || 713 ||
 anumānabalenāpi sattvām āśāṁ pratīyate |

viśeṣapratyayo yena nimirntantarabhāvikaḥ || 714 ||
 gavādiṣabdaprājnānavidviṣeṣā gogajādiṣu |
 samayāktripeṇādīvyatiriktaṁtārathetavah || 715 ||
 gavādiṣayatve hi satī tachabdabuddhiḥ |

20 anyatvāt tad yathāisy eva savatsānkuśadādhiḥvanā || 716 ||
 śāśāṅgadviṣiṇānair vyahicārād viśeṣaṇam |
 tat svarūpābhidhānaṁ ca vaidharmyeṇa niḍarśanām || 717 ||
 gavādiṣv anuvṛttam ca viṣṇānām piṃḍato ‘nyataḥ |
 viśeṣakarvān-nilādviṣiṇānam iva jāyate || 718 ||

gotattvārthāntaram849 gotvaṁ bhinnadhibhāṣayatvataḥ |
 rūpasparśādīvat tasyety ukteś caitraturaṅgavat850 || 719 ||
 aśaram tad idam sarvaṁ851 prakriyāmātravaraṇānām |
 na tu tajjñāpakaṁ kiṃcit pramāṇam iva vidyate || 720 ||
 aksavyāparasadbhāvanā hy anantarabhāvānāh |

30 sadādipratyayāḥ siddhāḥ saṅketaḥbhogatas tu te || 721 ||
 yathā dhāturyābhāyādinām nānāroganivartane |
 pratyekām saha va śaktiṁ nānārve ‘py upalabhya-te || 722 ||
 na teṣu vidyate kiṃcit sāmānyam tatra śāktimāt |

cirakṣiprādibhedena rogaśāntyupalambhātaḥ || 723 ||
 sāmānye ‘tiśayah kaścin na hi kṣetradibhedataḥ |
 ekārupatayāḥ niyamāḥ dhātryādes tu sa vidyate || 724 ||
 evam aryantabhede ‘pi kecin niyaraśaktitāḥ |
 tulyapratyavamarśāder hetutvam yānti nāpare || 725 ||
 kāryamātropayogitavivakṣāyām ca sacchruteḥ |

848 P sarvas
849 J gotaśvā, P gotaśva", T ba lang las don gzhan
850 K caiva°
851 KŚ kāryaṃ
samayah kriyate teṣu\(^{852}\) yad vānasyā yathāruci\(^{853}\) || 726 || vāhadhādirūpeṇa kāryabhedorpayogini |

gavādīśrutisāṅketaḥ kriyate vyavahartrbhiḥ || 727 ||
tat saṅketamanaśkarat sadādiṃpratayā ime |

jāyamāṇās tu\(^{854}\) lakṣyante nākṣavāpṛtyantanantaram\(^{855}\) || 728 ||
alpākārama evādau vijñānam tu prajayate |

tatas tu samayābhogas tasmāt śmaṛtaṁ tato 'pi te || 729 ||
anyatra gatacīrtasya vastumātrapalambhanam |
sarvopādhivyekena tata eva pravartate || 730 ||
hetāv ādye 'pi vaiphyāyāṃ samayābhogabhāvītā |

tesāṃ īṣṭaiva saṃsargī so 'navaavyātyirekāvān || 731 ||
tasya pakṣabahirbhāve sādhyaśunyam nidarśanam |
naiva\(^{856}\) taddhetavaḥ sāksād bāhyavatānākṣādayat || 732 ||
nābhidhānavikalpānāṃ vṛttir āsti svalakṣane |
sarvāṃ vāggocāraśātmārūta\(^{857}\) yena svalakṣanam || 733 ||
antarmātrāsamārūḍhāṃ sāṃvṛtā tv acaalambya te |

bahirūpādhyavasitam pravartante 'nākuśādikam || 734 ||
kriyāgūnāvyapadeśābhāvo hetaḥ ca varṇyate |

abhāvaprātyayasyeti viśeṇaṃ anarthaṃ || 735 ||
tad apy ayuktam heturetvasturā śaktiro 'pi ca |

abhāvaprātyayah prāprāth sattādīśy aviseṣaṭāḥ || 736 ||
vālakṣaṇyam asiddham ca pīṇākṛtyādibuddhitāḥ |
tajīnānānāṃ asidho 'pi hetur eṣa bhavaty atāḥ || 737 ||
anvayī pratyayo yasmāc chadbavyaktyavyabhāsvān |

varṇākṛtyakārākāraśunyā jātis tu varṇyate || 738 ||
sāmānyasyāpi nilādirūpaṇte guṇato 'syā kāḥ |
bheda nāṅgataḥ caiko nilādir upalakṣaye || 739 ||
bhāsāmāno 'pi ced eṣa na vivekena lakṣyate |
tat kathāṁ dhiṅdvanaḥ vyaktau vartete tadbalena tau || 740 ||
nīcayātma evāyaḥ sāmānyapraṇayaḥ prayāḥ |

iṣṭaḥ cāgrahanaṃ prāpṛte\(^{858}\) yuktam nāṅgupalaṅkṣaṇam\(^{859}\) || 741 ||
siddhe 'py anyanimittatve na sāmānyam prasiddhyanti |
anugāmy ekam adhrawyavaviktaṃ ca kramaṃdāyāt || 742 ||
padārthāṣabdaḥ kaṁ hetum aparāṃ śāsāṃ apekṣate |
astiti pratyayo yaḥ ca sattādiṣv anuvartate || 743 ||
anyadharmanimittāt ca tatprāpya asty asitāmatīḥ |

tadanyadharmaḥheturte 'niṣṭhāṣaṅkṭā ca\(^{860}\) dharmītā || 744 ||
vyabhicārī ātāḥ hetum amibhir ayam āksyate\(^{861}\) |
na ca sarvopasaṃhārād vyāṃprīṣy aṣya praśādhitā || 745 ||

[...]

\(^{852}\) P yeṣu
\(^{853}\) P ruciḥ
\(^{854}\) P 'naś ca
\(^{855}\) S nāksād vyā, T dbang po'i bya ba'i rjes thogs min
\(^{856}\) K naivāṃ
\(^{857}\) J sarvavāg°..."mūrtti, P sarvam rvāg°..."mūrtti
\(^{858}\) K 'ṇe prāpte, P 'ṇapṛpte
\(^{859}\) P nanupa°
\(^{860}\) KŚ 'saktā a°
\(^{861}\) K āksyate
ghaṭasya prāgabhāvo 'yaṃ ghaṭasya dhvamsa ity ayam tadvastūpādhikān eva dhīr abhāvān prapadyate || 766 || upādhiyacāmityaśād evānuvṛttatā ||

tasyāḥ sarvatra cet naïvaṃ vailakṣanyātadāśrayat || 767 || ghaṭa ity ādikā buddhis teḥhyo yuktānunāmīnām nābhāvo bhāva ity eṣā tānmatis tu vilakṣanā || 768 || na hi satrāvasād buddhir gaur aśva iti cēsyate ||

ekaṃ evānityāḥ kalpyāṃ sāmānyāṃ sarvasādhanam || 769 || na nimitrānurūpā cet sarvasmin buddhir iṣyate ||

yatas senādībuddhīnām saṅkhyaḍīśṭam nibandhanam || 770 || yady evam iyaṃ eṣv eva bhedēsv iṣṭa na kiṃ maṭih ||
icchāracitasaṅketaḥbhodābhogānumāriṇī || 771 || bhedajñānāṃ saticchā hi saṅketakaraṇe tataḥ ||

tatkṛtis tacchrutiḥ cābhogā tānmatis tataḥ || 772 || anvavayatirekābhhyām iyad eva viṇīcitaṃ ||
samarthamāṃ kāraṇaṃ tasyāṃ anyeṣāṃ anuvasthitih || 773 ||

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862 KŚ ghatapra°, P corrupt
863 P "anaiva"
864 P "va niyam"
865 PK idam
866 Ś yasyām
867 JP anyeṣṭāv
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
PRATYAKŠALAKŠANAPARĪKŚĀ

EXCERPT

avikalpam\textsuperscript{868} api jñānaṃ vikalpotpattiḥaktimat |

\textsuperscript{868} JP vikalpakam, T rtog pa med pa’i shes pa yang.

niḥśesavavyahāraṁ\textsuperscript{869} taddvāreṇa bhavaty atah || 1305 ||

\textsuperscript{869} Ś “vyahāra”

nāvikalpam vikalpe cec chaktam\textsuperscript{870} visayabhedataḥ |

\textsuperscript{870} \textit{K proposes ca iktam}

akalpatvāc ca rūpādījñānavaśa caksurādīvat\textsuperscript{871} || 1306 ||

\textsuperscript{871} Ś “vaj jakṣur”

tad atra na virodho ‘sti vikalpena sahānayoḥ |

na cāpi viśayo bhinnas tadarthādhyavasāyataḥ || 1307 ||

\textsuperscript{872} Ś vastus

vastutas\textsuperscript{872} tu nirālambo vikalpaḥ sampravarttate |

\textsuperscript{872} Ś vastus

tasyāsti viśayo naiva yo vibhidyeta kaścana || 1308 ||

rūpaśabdādibuddhīnām asty evānyonyahetutā |

tato ’prasiddhasādhyo ‘yam dṛṣṭāntah samudiritah || 1309 ||

agnidhūmādibuddhīnām kāryakāraṇabhavataḥ |

vyabhicāro ’pi vispaṣṭam etasminn upalabhyate || 1310 ||
svaparārthavibhāgena tv anumānaṃ dvidhēṣyate | svārtham tirūpato875 liṅgād anumeśārthadarśanām || 1361 ||
trirūpaliṅgavacanāṃ874 parārtham punar ucyate | ekaikadvidvirūpo ‘ṛtho liṅgābhāsas tato mataḥ || 1362 ||

[...]

asambandhān na sāksād dhi sā yuktārthopapādi kā | aśaktasūcānāṃ875 nāpi pāramparyena yuṣyate || 1430 ||
sādhyasādhanadharṣasya viṣayasyo padarśanāt |
dṛṣṭāntapadavattvesa sādhanāṅgam yadīṣyate || 1431 ||
abhyanuṣṭādīvākyena nany attra vyabhicāritā |
niṣphalāṃ ca tad apya atra876 viṣayasyo padarśanām || 1432 ||
sapākṣādīvavasthā cet kathāṃ pakṣāprayogatāh |

nātas traṅguṇam apy asti tada-peṣānibhandhanam877 || 1433 ||
na sādhanābhidhāne ‘sti sapākṣādīvikalpanā |
śāstre tu pravidbhajyante vyavahārāya te tathā || 1434 ||
prakṛta-rthāśrayā sa ‘pī yadi vā na virudhyate ||
na vādyakāṇḍa evāha parasyāpi hi sādhanāṃ || 1435 ||

jiñnāsitaviśeṣe hi vartanāt pakṣādharmatā |
sapākṣaṃ tattva-māntvād vipakṣas tadabāvataḥ || 1436 ||
prati-jñānabhidhāne ca kāraṇānabhidhānataḥ |
kartavyopanayoktir na sādhabāvapratisiddhye || 1437 ||
prāgukte bhāvamātre ca paścād vyāpēte prakāsānāt |
vivakṣitārthasamsiddhā viphālaṃ pratibimbakāṃ || 1438 ||
trirūpahetunirdesāsāmarthāyād eva siddhitāḥ |
na vīparyāya-sāṅkāsti vyarthaṃ niṣgaṇaṃ tataḥ878 || 1439 ||
sambaddhair eva vacanair eko ‘ṛthāḥ pratipādya |
nātāḥ sambandhasiddhyarthaṃ vācyāṃ niṣgaṇaṃ prthak || 1440 ||

[...]

na pramāṇam iti prāhur anumānaṃ tu kecana |
vivakṣāṃ arpaṇant879 ‘pi vāgbhir ābhīh kudṛṣṭayaḥ || 1455 ||
trirūpaliṅgāpūrvarvatvāt svārthāṃ māṇaṃ na yuṣyate |
iṣṭaghātaksiṭa880 janyāṃ mithyājñāṇaṃ yathā kāla || 1456 ||
bhāvād anumnäme ‘pi na cānumiti-kāraṇāṃ |
dvairūpyam iṣva liṅgasya traṅguṇam nāṣṭyato ‘numā || 1457 ||
anumāna-pāroddhasya viruddhāhāṃ ca sādhanā ||

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875 JP sva`, T tshul gsum pa’i
876 Ś vadanāṃ
877 KŚ sakta`
878 K tadā yatra
879 P tadāpeṣā
880 dittography tatatab
879 Ś artha`
880 Ś kṛta
sarvatra sambhavāt kiṃ ca viruddhāvyabhicārīṇāḥ || 1458 ||

avasthādeśakālaṇām bhedād bhinnāsu śāktisu [J74r]
bhāvānam anumāṇena prasiddhir atidurlabhā || 1459 [Vākyapadīya 1.32] ||
vijñātaśaktə 881 apy asya 882 tāṃ tāṃ arthakriyām prati |
viśiṣṭadārvyasambandhe sā śaktīḥ pratibhadyate || 1460 [Vākyapadīya 1.33] ||
yatnānūmīta ’py arthaḥ kuśalāīr anumāṭrhīḥ |
abhīyuktatarair anyair anyathāivopapādyate || 1461 [Vākyapadīya 1.34] ||
parārtham anumāṇaṃ tu na mānaṃ vakt度假ṣya |
anuvadān na tenāsu svayam arthaṃ prapadyate || 1462 ||
śrotvyapėkṣaya ’py etat svārtham evopapadyate |
śrottraddānāmūlāyāḥ ko viśeśo hi saṃvīdāḥ || 1463 ||
na parārthānāmāntvatvām vacasah śrotvapēkṣaya |
śrottraddānānīvyādhetvajnāpakaṭvataḥ || 1464 ||
yathendriyasya sākṣaṇ ca nānumeyapraśaṇaṃ |
tasmād asāvināhāvāsambhandhaṣaṇānvan na tat || 1465 ||
avasthādeśakālaṇām bhedād bhinnāsu śāktisu [J74v]
thocyate parārthatvam paravyāprtyapekṣaya 883 |
tad apy ayuktaṃ svārthe ’pi parārthavaprasāṅgatah || 1466 ||
trirūpapālaṇaḥ pārvaṭvāṃ nu sāmvedilakṣaṇāṃ |
tallakaṇaṃ ca māṇaṭvaṃ tat kiṃ tasmān nisidhyate || 1467 ||
mitheṣaṇaṃ samāṇaṃ ca pūrvapākṣaya |
īṣṭānākṛta 884 ānya jānaṃ utktaṃ na vartutah || 1468 ||
vastuthityā h taj jānaṃ aṣaṃvādī niścitam |
vādiṣṭaviparītasya prāmāṇaṃ ata eva tat || 1469 ||
atu viruddhātā 885 hetor drṣṭante cāpy asiddhātā 886 |
etenaiva prakāreṇa dvitiye hetvasiddhātā || 1470 ||
yat tādārmyadadutpaṭṭaya sambhandhaṃ pariniṣcitam |
tad eva sādhanāṃ prāhuḥ siddhaye nyāvādinaḥ || 1471 ||
anumāṇavirodhādhir idṛṣy aṣṭā 887 na sādhanē |
naiya tad dhyātmahetubhyāṃ vinā sambhavati kvačit || 1472 ||
parasparavirodhau ca dharmau naikatra vastuni |
yuṣyete sambhavo nātu viruddhāvyabhicārīṇaḥ || 1473 ||
abhyastalakṣaṇānāṁ ca samyaglīnaṇīścaye |
anumāvrtrī 888 anyā tu nānumety abhidhiyare || 1474 ||
avasthādeśakālaṇāṃ bhedād bhīnhāsu śaktisu |
bhāvānām anumāṇena nātaḥ siddhīḥ sudurlabhā || 1475 ||
yatnānūmīta ’py arthaḥ kuṣalaīr anumāṭrhīḥ |
nāyathā sādhyate so ’nyair abhīyuktatarair api || 1476 ||
na hi saṃvāhāḥ kāryaṃ vā saṃvāhāt kāraṇād rte |
bhedānīṁittatāprāptes te viṇāsti na cāṇumā || 1477 ||
trirūpapālaṇaḥ pārvaṭvāṃ śaktasāṁsūcakātvaḥ 889 |
yat parārthānāmāntvam uktam tač chrottrapekṣaya || 1478 ||
gauṇaṃ sānketikaṃ caivaṃ anumāṇāntvam āsṛtam ||

881 Š nirjñātā*, JP vijnāna*, Vākyapadīya nirjñātā*  
882 Vākyapadīya dravyasa  
883 K “vyāvṛty”  
884 Ś “kṛtā”  
885 P viruddhā  
886 KŚ asādhyatā  
887 P idṛṣṭi, KŚ idṛṣe ‘ṣti  
888 J anumāṇavṛttir  
889 KŚ sakta*
śaktasamsūcakatvena⁸⁹⁰ tena⁸⁹¹ nātiprasajyate || 1479 ||
nānumānāṃ pramāṇāṃ ced viphalā vyāhatis tava |
na kaścid api vāco⁸⁹² hi vivaksāṃ pratipadyate || 1480 ||
laukikaṃ lingam iṣṭāṃ cēn na tv anayaḥ⁸⁹³ parikalpitam⁸⁹⁴ |
nanu loko ‘pi kāryāder hetvādīn avagacchati || 1481 ||
tattvatas⁸⁹⁵ tu tad evoktaṃ nyāyavādibhir apy alam |
tallaukikābhyanujñāte kim tyaktāṃ bhavatī tvayā⁸⁹⁶ || 1482 ||
apramāṇena caṣṭena paraḥ kim pratipadyate |
apramāṇakṛtaś cāsaṇa pratrayaḥ kidrśo bhavet || 1483 ||
anumāṇaṃ pramāṇaṃ ced vaktur⁸⁹⁷ na vacanātmakam |
prakāśayati tenāyaṃ yathā tadvad idaṃ bhavet || 1484 ||
ajnātārthāprakāśatvād⁸⁹⁸ apramāṇaṃ tād iṣyate |
nāsaktasūcakatvena tāvakīṇaṃ tathā nanu || 1485 ||

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⁸⁹⁰ KŚ sakta°
⁸⁹¹ P tana
⁸⁹² KŚ vādo, T tshig gang gis kyang
⁸⁹³ Ś cet tattvataḥ
⁸⁹⁴ P parikalpitaḥ (in J the bottom dot of the visarga is cancelled, leaving an anusvāra; P retains the visarga), T
gzhan ni brtug nus min zhe na
⁸⁹⁵ P dittography tatattvatas
⁸⁹⁶ K svayam, T khyed la
⁸⁹⁷ K cakrū, T sgra ba po yi
⁸⁹⁸ J “rthaprakāś”
CHAPTER NINETEEN
PRAMĀṆĀNTARAPARĪKṢĀ

EXCERPT

śrutātideśavākyasya samānārthopalambhe
samjñāsambandhaviśnānam upamā kāśicḍ iṣyate || 1562 ||
tatrāpi samjñāsambandhapratipāttrī999 anākula ||
tasyātideśavākyasya jātaiva990 śravaṇe yadi || 1563 ||
tathā parigṛhitārthagrahaṇān na pramāṇāt ||
smṛter īvopāmānasya karaṇārthāvyogataḥ || 1564 ||
atha sā naiva samjñā tathāpi pratipadyate ||
so 'yaṃ yasya mayā samjñā samśruteti kathaṃ tadā || 1565 ||
tathā hy aśrutatatsamjñā āgavāsyanalambhe ||
tan nāma śrutam āsīteti na jñātum kaścana prabhuh || 1566 ||
upāyuktopalānasṛḥ cet tulyārthagrahaṇa9901 sati ||
viśiṣṭasānyatvena sambandham avagacchati || 1567 ||
āgāmadhi sa sambandham vetti sāmānyagocaraṃ ||
viśiṣṭāsānyataṃ tu vijnātāt upamāsrayāt || 1568 ||
nanv anyatra na samjñāyāḥ sambandhāyāvabodhane ||
tasyā arthāntare9902 bodho yuyāte9903 'tiprasāṅgataḥ || 1569 ||
na hi citrāṅgade kaścit tannāmagrahaṇa sati ||
kālantarena tam śabdām vetti cārūkārītīni || 1570 ||
tasmāt prāg yatra tenedaṃ vikalpapratipātiṃbake ||
20
jñātum nāma bahīrpuṇyāḥ sāmānyam iti samjñīte || 1571 ||
gavāsyanalambhe 'pi tatraiva pratipadyate ||
dṛśyakalpāvibhāganāḥ bāhya ity abhimaneye || 1572 ||
evāṃ ca pratipattavyam yat svalaṃsānagocaraḥ ||
vikalpā dhvanayaś cāpi vistaraṇa nirūkṣeta || 1573 ||
teśām tadvācaraṅtate 'pi bhāvatey evānumāva ṣa9904 vā ||
trīrūpāṇa-jānyatvam asyā evāṃ9905 pratiyate || 1574 ||
yo gavā sadṛśo 'saṃhavaiyāsṛtiṣṭocaraḥ ||
saṅketagrahaṇāvastho buddhisto gavayo yathā || 1575 ||
buddhisto 'pi na cet tasyām avasthāyāṃ bhaved asau ||
30
kriyate samayāḥ kaśmin ayaṃ ca sadṛśo gavā || 1576 ||
nā sambandhaṭaṅkitaṣa ca sambandho 'stītī sādhitam ||
prāg eva samaye śabdā gṛhitaḥ śrotacetasā || 1577 ||
caṅkuṣaḥ dṛṣyate cāśāv agrato 'vasthitāḥ9906 paśuḥ ||
prthāvijñātayor esā yuktā na bhagataṃ pramā || 1578 ||
grhītāpratisandhānāt sugandhimadhurādibhav9907 ||
tannāmāyogasamvīrtiḥ smārtatāṃ nātvartate || 1579 ||
anantopājajanyāś ca samākhya-yogasamvīdeḥ ||

899 P "pratirūpaḥ" ||
900 K tadaiva, P dātaiva, T skyes pa nyid ||
901 K tulyatvā, T mtshungs don 'dzin pa ||
902 Ś tasyā hy arth" ||
903 Ś yuyjete ||
904 J esā", P corrupt ||
905 K asya caivaṃ ||
906 Ś avagrato 'sthi° ||
907 K "madhurtva" ||
sādharmyam anapeṣyāpi jāyante naṃpiṣu || 1580 ||
sitātapatrapihitabrhadnapādo908 narādhīpāḥ ||
teṣām909 madhya iti prokta upadeśaviśeṣataḥ || 1581 ||
kālāntarena taddṛṣṭau tan nāmasyeti yā matih ||
sā tavānyā910 pramā prāpta sādharmyādyanapeṣaṇāt || 1582 ||
anye911 pramāntarāśītvaṃ sādhyanty anumābalat ||
pratyaksiṃ anumābhinnapramāṇāntarasaṅgatam || 1583 ||
anumāvāta912 pramāṇatvād anumāpy evam eva ca ||
teṣām913 apratibhandho 'yaṃ hetur bādhaṃprakāśanāt || 1584 ||
catuṣṭvaṃ914 ca pramāṇānāṃ vyāhanyetaivamaṇeva915 te ||
yat tatra parīhāras te sa evātra bhaviṣyatī || 1585 ||

908 KŚ "patrāpi"
909 J om. anusvāra
910 KŚ tadā, T khīyed la
911 K anyāḥ
912 J P anumānavat
913 K (naiva)m
914 P unclear but additional aksara in catusṭvaṃ
915 P eṣa